samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But even for that it has been decided not to give details of the voting. Q: To avoid the vote being interpreted in terms of the country of origin of each Council member? A: Personally, I would be in favour of publishing all the details, since governors are independent and should vote in the interest of the euro area, but I realise that there are also very good reasons for not doing so. Q. Might there be resignations from the Council like in 2010 and 2011 when the programmes to purchase public debt were approved? A: At that time the euro area was under great pressure due to the severity of the crisis. There was a risk of a euro break-up and the ECB was facing very difficult decisions in this respect. We are not in a comparable situation today. We have a low growth, low inflation and little credit. They represent major challenges, but are part of the normal monetary policy debate. I see no big differences among governors when it comes to analysing the situation. The discussion on Thursday was focused more on whether it was advisable to wait for more data before reacting. But I don’t see any substantive differences at this point in time. Q: Draghi has called on governments to go for fiscal expansion and reforms – it sounded almost like a desperate plea. A: Mario Draghi’s speech at Jackson Hole in August and the conclusions of the Governing Council last Thursday reflect the seriousness of the situation.

So, the only way to ensure debt sustainability is to raise productivity, invest and increase the employment rate, and this implies structural reforms. Q: None of these factors are present. There is hardly any growth, investment or jobs. A: I am aware that the situation is still very difficult in Spain and that the Spanish people have suffered a lot in the process of reducing imbalances and implementing reforms. However, they can rest assured that Spain has turned the corner, and that the outlook is once again improving. This will encourage firms to invest and to start recruiting again, not only Spanish firms but also foreign ones. In a way, Spain can stand as an example not only for other countries that have been hit by the crisis, but for other large countries at Europe’s core, that have not been so active in reforming their economies. Spain is an example of how, through reforms, it is possible to redress imbalances and get out of the doldrums. Q: Which reforms are urgent? A: It depends on the country. The European Commission has already issued so-called “country specific recommendations”. The worrying thing, as the Commission acknowledges, is that these recommendations are too rarely followed. It would be preferable if countries took them seriously and felt collectively committed. In the case of Spain, my personal view is that much remains to be done to support the young people and help find jobs. They are the future.
Another example is the Netherlands which, like Sweden, is normally characterised as a small, open economy. Even there, worrying signals similar to those in the Swedish and American economies can be perceived. The improved economic activity has led to falling unemployment and rising asset prices. During the last two years, total lending has risen at an annual rate of around 15%. In the Netherlands too, a large part of this rise in lending can be explained by rising prices, especially house prices. Dutch house prices rose on average 15.8% during 1999. As a comparison, it can be mentioned that Swedish house prices rose by approximately 8% during the same period (prices for tenant-owned apartments rose to a considerably higher extent, however). In the Netherlands, household indebtedness in relation to GDP has traditionally been low, but has risen dramatically in recent years and today amounts to almost 45% of GDP. If we compare the developments in Sweden, the USA and the Netherlands, we see Dutch property prices have risen considerably faster than Swedish and American prices both in real and nominal terms. In this context, the development in Sweden appears to be less sensational. What can the Riksbank do if the build-up of risk increases? An increasing level of indebtedness in the economy, combined with rising asset prices, involves greater vulnerability to changes in the macroeconomic environment, i.e. growing risks. The obvious question then, is what the authorities can do to prevent such a build-up of risk.

An increase in the repo rate would in this case contribute both to counteracting incipient inflation tendencies and to reducing the risk of financial imbalances, through a dampening effect on demand for credit and on asset prices. 5  BIS Review 50/2000
It is clear that richer economies and stable societies tend to have stronger and more stable institutions. It is, therefore, my belief that our region should not subscribe to an ‘organic model’ of institutional growth. By ‘organic’, I mean a growth model where institutions catch up to economic development, and tend more to ensure a certain level of prosperity rather than instigate it. To the contrary, I believe institutions and policies should lead the growth and development processes. In this context, our task as policy makers is to define goals, to identify impediments, and to undertake the required countermeasures. This, in essence, is the role of leadership. Let me illustrate my point with just a few examples of the challenges facing us as a region: First, problems with the business environment, including corruption and informality, rank high on the list of growth impediments, both in Albania and in the region. Second, our economic and financial stability should be further enhanced, in order to increase our resilience to shocks and to decrease our financing costs. Third, it is becoming increasingly clear that our financial systems have become over-reliant on banks. Looking ahead, we should rely more on capital markets in order to finance 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  domestic growth. Fourth, a common complaint frequently heard from potential foreign investors is the limited attractiveness of small and fragmented markets. While partly incorrect, we should do more to increase our trade and infrastructure integration.

Gent Sejko: Future Balkans - towards a global inclusion Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Tirana Economic Forum "Future Balkans: Towards a global inclusion" Leadership, Institutions and Policies Convergence 2017-2020, Tirana, 24 January 2018. * * *  Your Excellency Mr President, Your Excellency Deputy Prime Minister of Albania, Your Excellency Deputy Prime Minister of Kosovo, Honourable Minister of Finance and Economy, My fellow Colleagues and Honourable Participants, It is a pleasure for me to participate at this Conference, convened to discuss on the importance of regional integration, which should be promoted by a forward-looking leadership and supported by the policies convergence. I believe that the dialogue that focuses on sharing our vision for the future, the convergence of perspectives about the challenges ahead of us, and identifying the objectives and drafting agendas for joint action, will be a fruitful dialogue to all of us. Policy convergence, both within and between countries, promotes efficiency and minimizes negative spill-overs. The role of institutions in the growth and development Institutions are the backbone of any modern society, in as much as they generate and implement laws, regulations and policies of development, thus laying out the rules of the game in a market economy. From a broader perspective, these rules should provide for a stable and transparent environment, thus enabling a predictable and long-term decision-making process. They should promote fair competition and equality of opportunities, and they should engender fairness and social cohesion.
Some may not adequately address recent changes in the global economy—such as the rise of digital trade—and may need to be refreshed. And, important trade barriers still remain that should be addressed. In particular, from a U.S. perspective, the access of U.S. firms to some foreign markets and the protection of intellectual property rights are issues that deserve close attention. But, in addressing these issues, we should take care to preserve the vital benefits of trade to higher standards of living in both advanced and emerging market economies. Our focus should be on further strengthening an open trade regime, and, as appropriate, amending and improving these agreements. 1/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  The Pace of Globalization To begin, let me briefly describe the pace of globalization as a reminder of what is at stake. Global economic integration has increased dramatically in recent decades. Trade in goods and services, for example, has grown from nearly 40 percent of global GDP in 1990 to 54 percent in 2016. Over the same period, the stock of foreign direct investment has increased from roughly 10 percent of global GDP to 36 percent. Put simply, national economies and financial systems have become more integrated and interdependent.2 This rapid growth in trade reflects falling trade barriers, declining transport costs, and improved information and communication technology. These trends have enabled the development of complex global supply chains that allow companies to manage their production more efficiently.

But, at a broader level, the momentum behind global trade reform has clearly waned in recent years. This has occurred even though there are a number of areas that would benefit from further reform, such as agriculture and services. That momentum needs to be rekindled and reaffirmed. Although advanced economies historically have tended to lead the way, it is important that large emerging market countries now play a greater role. This is appropriate given their growing prominence in the global economy. There are many approaches to dealing with the costs of globalization, but protectionism is a dead end. Trade restrictions address the symptoms and not the underlying problems, and they introduce other costs and distortions. While such measures might generate a temporary boost to growth from greater domestic production and consumption, these would likely be offset by a range of other costs. Over time, such measures would retard productivity growth and thereby shrink the economic pie. As an illustration, import substitution models that were pursued by many emerging market economies following the Second World War eventually led to poorer economic outcomes. Such was the experience in Brazil, which helped trigger the reforms of the early 1990s. 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  In assessing the benefits and costs of trade, it is important to understand that a nation’s trade balance reflects much more than its trade policy. Just as important are the country’s saving and investment spending proclivities, which are affected by many factors, including tax and fiscal policies.
9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  The results show that the highly indebted tail has become a little smaller over since 2015. At the same time, the average debt level of the mass of the distribution has increased (Chart 3). If we draw on the literature on the links between debt and consumption cuts I mentioned earlier, and apply those coefficients to these stock distributions, we find that the two effects broadly offset each other. We can therefore I think conclude that the vulnerability from indebtedness has not changed markedly since 2014 – the increase in vulnerability that the FPC sought to prevent happening has not happened. Chart 3. Estimated LTI distribution of the outstanding owner-occupier mortgages  (a)  Chart 4. Estimated LTI distribution of the outstanding owner-occupier mortgages – with and without FPC policy(a)  Sources: FCA Product Sales Database, British Household Panel Survey (1991-2008)/ Understanding Society (2009-13) and Bank calculations. (a) The 2015 H1 distribution of stock LTI ratios is based on loan-level data containing outstanding loan values and borrower income at origination. Incomes are updated to 2015 H1 using panel data quantile regressions. The 2018 H2 distribution combines the 2015 H1 data on the stock of mortgages with loan-level data on the subsequent flow of new lending, also updated to 2018 H2. See Levina et al (2019) for methodology  Sources: FCA Product Sales Database, British Household Panel Survey (1991-2008)/ Understanding Society (2009-13) and Bank calculations.

0  100  200  300  10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10  400  Household debt to income in 2007, per cent Sources: Flodén, M (2014) and OECD National Accounts. (a) Change in consumption is adjusted for the pre-crisis change in total debt, the level of total debt and the current account balance. See Flodén, M (2014), ‘Did household debt matter in the Great Recession?’ available at www.martinfloden.net/files/hhdebt_supplement_2014.pdf. Our aim was to guard against an upside risk. In 2014 the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee’s central forecast was that in the medium term house price inflation would fall back and rise broadly in line with  9  The 2014 stress test was based on a scenario, in which house prices fell by 35% and unemployment increased to 12%. Cumulative losses on mortgages over 2009 to 2013 were very small, at around 0.3% of outstanding balances – compared to around 25% for consumer credit. They were somewhat higher in the early 1990s, when unemployment rose higher than in the crisis. 11 Bunn and Rostom (2014). 10  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  nominal incomes. If that were to happen, we expected the impact of the FPC’s borrower-based policies to be small. But while this was the central case, the FPC judged that there was a material upside risk of mortgage borrowing growing more rapidly and house prices increasing faster relative to earnings.
The list goes on. Yet, based on a recent survey report by GlobeScan, only one third of the private sector 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  respondents reflected on SDGs in setting long-term sustainability strategies for their organisations. This should concern us. In 2015, 15 years after the Millennium Development Goals were adopted, the United Nations itself conceded that the Millennium Development Goals, despite propelling significant progress, fell short for many people. So a different approach was taken for the SDGs. One that was more encompassing and inclusive. Five million people from 88 countries shared their deepest, most pressing concerns and aspirations to create the SDGs. These aspirations would ring hollow without the dedication and commitment of those with the influence and position to make a difference. For the financial sector, this needs to go beyond the cursory initiatives that have generally been associated with “corporate social responsibilities”. Greater progress by financial institutions to more fully embrace sustainable principles in their business strategies will play an important catalytic role in delivering the SDGs. Among other things, it would provide a stronger focus on needs-based selling, increase financial resources that are directed at economic activities that promote sustainable goals, and encourage support for businesses to adopt sustainable practices. Looking beyond remittances Turning more specifically to remittances which is the focus of this Forum, more can and should be done to amplify the developmental impact of remittances.

This Forum seeks to address not just the question of facilitating transfers more efficiently, but how to make such transfers go further and do more to meet today’s most pressing global challenges – from access to healthcare and education, equal economic opportunity for all, to protection of the environment. Without addressing these challenges, economic freedom would remain an elusive dream for 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  many. This Forum will cover a broad range of issues – not all of which will have clear solutions. But we will most certainly learn more, understand better and hopefully, be able to determine what our next steps must be. With that in view, let me take this opportunity to offer some brief reflections on what those steps might be. Reinvigorating financial services to drive the SDGs First, we need to do more to reinvigorate financial services to drive the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Many countries in this region, including Malaysia, have made important progress in the adoption of the SDGs under the national development agenda. Certainly, Malaysia has had a long-standing commitment to the pursuit of sustainable and inclusive growth. Malaysia’s national economic development policies adopted since more than four decades ago reflect many of the SDGs. Like many central banks in this region, financial inclusion is an important priority of Bank Negara Malaysia – one that is in fact legislated as a mandate of the central bank, which is actually not all that common in many countries.
In fact, if the – basically fiscal – measures implemented by governments are sufficiently successful the role of regulators and supervisors should largely be to ensure that financial institutions properly incorporate the impact of such measures into their risk analysis. That said, many of the models used by institutions to evaluate risks are based on historical data, which, by their very nature, will take a long time to incorporate the changes that occur. Stress tests may be very helpful here and supervisors could develop action guidelines as a reference for institutions. The role of central banks and monetary policy  14  For example, the evidence we have clearly shows that the worsening of the financial position of a solvent borrower may lead to insolvency, while its improvement, by definition, simply means that the borrower remains solvent. Thus, the solvency of the system as a whole may deteriorate even though the aggregate economic situation does not change, if the financial situation of some borrowers worsens and this is offset by an improvement in that of others. 6  The general public currently have rather high expectations regarding the role that central banks can play. An example of this is the press conference held following the meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank in March. In her answers to journalists questions, President Lagarde mentioned “climate change” up to ten times.

Thank you very much for your attention. 8
Particular attention should be paid to abrupt repricing moves in risky asset prices, in the wake of rising interest rates. This situation could put some non-bank financial actors in difficulty, especially the ones using leverage, as illustrated by the Archegos’ default at the end of March 2021. Likewise, given the role played by Russia and Ukraine in the supply of energy and more widely some commodities, rising prices and volatility in commodities markets have led to a major increase in the magnitude of margin calls for derivatives, in particular for energy and agricultural products. Such margin calls have generated liquidity strains for commodity market participants, which require strong vigilance notably to ensure that any possible default should remain idiosyncratic and does not develop into a systemic chain. The banking sector has proved resilient so far and has contributed to soften and not amplify shocks. Given the uncertainties about the macroeconomic and macrofinancial outlook, it is important that banks’ capacity to absorb shocks is maintained going forward and possibly strengthened. Hence the relevance of a timely, fair and definitive implementation of the Basel 3 accord. With the Basel III agreements in 2017, we indeed reached thebest possible agreement to promote financial stability at the international level. With the publication last October of the Commission’s proposal for a new banking package to implement it, the European Union made a decisive and very balanced step.

By way of conclusion, let me say that there is currently no shortage of challenges. However, the reforms introduced in the regulation and the efforts made by banks to enhance their resilience over the last decade have borne fruits and the European banking system has demonstrated with the Covid crisis not only its ability to withstand enormous shocks but also its ability to support public authorities efforts to overcome difficulties to the benefit of the European people. This is a major positive development. While this is not the time for complacency, this development should collectively encourage us to maintain our attention and efforts and to address the current and forthcoming challenges with both confidence and determination. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
The ECB is purchasing bonds in the market to stimulate activity and boost inflation, but has now begun to reduce the pace of its purchases. The policy rate in Sweden is also negative, with the latest reduction made in February 2016. The Swedish 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Riksbank’s forecast indicates that the first policy rate increase will occur next year. Chart: Oil prices Oil prices gradually rose through 2016 and have in recent months hovered around USD 50 per barrel. Futures prices indicate that oil prices will remain close to today’s level in the years ahead. Oil prices have almost doubled since reaching their lowest level in early 2016, but are nonetheless less than half the level recorded before the steep fall in oil prices in summer 2014. Petroleum investment has declined markedly compared with the 2013 level. Lower oil industry demand has affected the wider economy. Last year, growth in mainland GDP was at its lowest since the financial crisis. Chart: Unemployment Unemployment increased through 2015 and to some extent in 2016, particularly in southern and western Norway. So far this year, the labour market has improved and unemployment has fallen. Monetary policy supports the necessary restructuring of the Norwegian economy. The key policy rate is low and the krone depreciated in pace with the fall in oil prices. Combined with moderate wage settlements, the krone depreciation has contributed to a marked decline in relative labour costs, strengthening the position of Norwegian firms exposed to international competition.

Øystein Olsen: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 15 May 2017. * * * Accompanying slides Thank you for the opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy. My introduction here today is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2016 and our monetary policy assessments up to the monetary policy meeting earlier this month. Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards keeping inflation low and stable. The operational target is consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 percent over time. Monetary policy is at the same time flexible in that our interest rate setting also takes developments in output and employment into consideration. The key policy rate was lowered to 0.5 percent in March 2016 and has since been kept unchanged. The key policy rate is low because interest rates abroad are low, while capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy is below a normal level and the forces driving inflation are moderate. Low growth and the risk of deflation in the global economy have brought down interest rates among Norway’s trading partners to a very low level. Chart: Global and trading partner GDP Growth in the global economy has gradually slowed in recent years and was in 2016 at its lowest since the financial crisis. The slowdown reflects more moderate growth in China and stagnation in some other important emerging economies.