samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We, Europeans and Japanese, shoulder-to-shoulder with Canada and others elsewhere, must resolutely defend international economic relations based on commonly respected rules and multilateral institutions: their deterioration would dampen world trade and economic activity. In a recent speech, the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda, stressed “the importance of multilateral cooperation”. He said: “Economies must overcome their narrowly-defined self-interest so as to cooperate and coordinate from a broader perspective […]. It requires a well-functioning institutional framework such as the IMF, multilateral development banks (MDBs), and the G20.” i These words are particularly relevant in the current context. II. Regional responses: the case of Europe  Let me now turn to my second point: regional responses, taking Europe as the example. The European Union is a unique case of very advanced cooperation between countries at a regional level. The cooperation is obviously multifaceted, but today I would like to focus on three shared economic and social assets of Europe: its single currency, its single market, and its unique social model. Page 3 sur 6 Three European assets: its single currency, its single market, and its unique social model. First, with the euro, we share a solid currency which is recognised worldwide. Let me say it straight away: the Monetary Union can be considered as one of Europe’s greatest successes. As you know, the single currency was officially launched with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and introduced in 1999.

I will not elaborate on Asia, but on Europe, and the European Monetary and Economic Union. **  I. The need for active multilateralism to face our global challenges. Let me start with my first point: the need for active multilateralism to face our global challenges. We have to strive to maintain the collective rules of the game, at international level and with all our partners. In the current context, international cooperation between countries is more important than ever: it is essential to preserving the improvement in the global economic environment. The global recovery has indeed been gathering pace since 2016: according to the latest IMF forecast, global growth should stand at 3.6% in 2017, after 3.2% in 2016, while in Japan real GDP growth should pick up to 1.5% in 2017 after 1.0% in 2016. Moreover, growth in the euro area should reach at least 2.2% this year, reflecting a strong economic recovery. However, there are two major risks threatening growth: financial instability and protectionism. Regarding financial instability, the continued rise in global public and private debt since the start of the 2000s – from 190% of global GDP in 2001 to 230% in 2016 [slide] – has become a subject of concern. The 2008 crisis stemmed from this, but this trend has unfortunately not slowed down since; the private debt in emerging countries (namely corporate debt) has risen particularly rapidly.
A first characteristic of contagion is that the spread of instability would usually not happen without an initial trigger event – which often appears to be a relatively contained event. A second characteristic is that the transmission of instability is in some way abnormal, for example, in terms of its speed, strength or scope. Though spillovers are to be expected in an interconnected financial system, contagion is distinct in that it often reflects a market failure and a dangerously amplified transmission of instability. The underlying market failure consists of the fact that contagion often involves externalities.3 As a result, the private costs of the initial financial market failure, that is the costs to the actor triggering contagion, are lower than the social costs. In the specific case of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the trigger could, for example, be that a country in a precarious fiscal situation does not seriously implement the necessary fiscal consolidation measures. This could lead interest rates on this particular country’s government debt to rise and could in turn also constrain economic growth in that country. This is what I call the “private costs” of such behaviour. Although in this case the lack of fiscal discipline is something which is strictly related to one country, this circumstance may still lead volatile financial markets to also lower their expectations about fiscal consolidation efforts in other countries. As a result, those other countries also begin to face costs in terms of significantly increased interest rates on their government debt.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Figure 13 Retail sales and new car sales (1) (2) (index, 2003=100)  250  Employment and unemployment (1) (index, centered on mean of period 19902011)  225  300  200  250  175  200  150  150  125  100  100  50  20.00  20  0.00  0  -20.00  -20  -40.00  -40  06 07 08 09 10 11 Durables Non-durables  40  350 40.00  New cars  90 93 96 99 02 05 08 11 Employment  Unemployment  (1) Seasonally-adjusted series. (2) Sold during moving quarter. Sources: National Automobile Association of Chile, Central Bank of Chile, National Chamber of Commerce, and Ricaurte, M. 2011, “Indicadores de Mercado Laboral para la Comparación de las Crisis Asiática y Financiera Internacional”. Preliminary document, Central Bank of Chile, June. Table 3 Economic growth and current account (annual change, percent) 2009  2010  GDP National income  -1.7 -1.9  5.2 6.25-6.75 4.25-5.25 15.7 6.6 4.2  Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports  -5.9 -2.9 -15.9 1.9 -6.4 -14.6  16.4 11.5 18.8 9.3 1.9 29.5  9.1 9.7 14.4 8.2 6.5 12.0  4.5 5.4 7.1 4.9 5.0 4.6  1.6  1.9  -1.0  -2.1  Current account (% of GDP)  2011 (f)  2012 (f)  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Ahead of the crisis, there was a robust debate on whether monetary policy should seek to moderate credit/asset-price booms as well as maintain low inflation. On the one hand, the Bank for International Settlements and others (e.g. Bill White, 2006; Stephen Cecchetti et al., 2002) argued that policy should be set tighter than justified by the inflation outlook so as to “lean against the wind”. On the other hand, Chairman Greenspan and others at the Federal Reserve (Alan Greenspan, 2002; Bernanke et al., 1999) advocated only responding to such events in so far as they affected the immediate macroeconomic outlook, but acting aggressively to stabilise markets in the event of a correction, sometimes referred to as “cleaning”. The Fed broadly followed such a policy during the dot-com boom-bust. Before the crisis, I stood some way between these two positions (Bean, 2003). On the one hand, a policy of leaning against the wind is perfectly consistent with the practice of flexible inflation targeting once it is recognised that financial instability usually results in a sharp contraction in demand and potential disinflationary pressure. Undershooting the inflation target in the near term could then enhance the chances of success further out. On the other hand, there are practical obstacles to the implementation of a “leaning” policy. In particular, such a policy involves accepting lower output in the short term in return for uncertain future gains and also runs the risk of precipitating the very collapse one is seeking to avoid.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: ASEAN financial integration – outlook and implications Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the ASEAN Risk Conference: “ASEAN financial integration – outlook and implications”, Kuala Lumpur, 14 May 2015. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on the subject of ASEAN financial integration and its implications for the region. The theme is contemporary and relevant as ASEAN approaches an important milestone this year – the realisation of the vision to establish the ASEAN Economic Community. The path to economic integration is inherently challenging given that political and economic imperatives do not always converge. But at the same time there are enormous opportunities that can be realised for the good of member countries. For a region as diverse as ASEAN, where political systems, cultural backgrounds, stages of economic development and domestic priorities vary widely, the challenges are substantially greater, but not insurmountable. It is worth noting that ASEAN leaders had adopted the ASEAN Economic Blueprint in November 2007 when the global financial crisis was upon us. It was a bold and visionary decision. The unfolding of the crisis, including the issues faced by the European financial and economic integration process, provided important lessons for the region in advancing its own integration journey. Taking the primary lessons learnt, ASEAN has decided on an integration process that is flexible and pragmatic.
If the supply shock involves food or energy, this dynamic causes measures of total inflation to rise, but does not have a large impact on what economists call core inflation – which excludes the volatile food and energy sectors. But in the longer-run, the impact of the supply shock on the prices of other goods will depend importantly on how inflation expectations respond to the shock. If people expect that food and energy prices will stabilize – in other words, that the price shock will be temporary – and do not believe that the central bank will allow any long-run effect on inflation, then the disruption to total inflation will likely be temporary and the total inflation rate will eventually converge with the lower core inflation rate. Since 1986, this has largely been what happened when we experienced these types of supply shocks – as I’ll illustrate in a moment with some charts. Alternatively, if expectations of inflation do rise in response to the supply shock, then (nominal) wages and salaries across the economy will be pressured to increase over time to keep pace. If that happens, the supply shock could affect prices throughout the economy – not just those that that were part of the initial supply shock. In this case, the core rate of inflation rises to converge with the higher measure of total inflation. This was the U.S. experience in the 1970s, for reasons I’ll discuss in a moment.

Moreover, our current account surplus essentially means that we are exporting capital on a large scale; in somewhat more extreme terms, you could say that the jobs being created by our growth are largely ending up outside Sweden's borders. So the low employment growth does not appear primarily to be a result of weak demand. Instead, the explanation must be sought among longer-term structural factors. This is reflected in particular by the fact that the employment rate, in spite of historically high economic growth, has not completely recovered since its sharp fall in connection with the crisis in the early 1990s. Moreover, the fact that open unemployment did not drop more during the economic upswing in the 1990s suggests that the labour market is not functioning satisfactorily. One example of rigidities in the labour market is that unemployment has remained around 8 per cent in the construction sector,  6  BIS Review 84/2005  even though it is one of the few sectors where activity has risen and labour shortages have begun to appear. Another sign that the unemployment problems are structural in nature is the large differences across regions and occupational categories. In spite of a single monetary policy for the whole of the Swedish economy, unemployment figures in some regions are twice as high as in others, while the proportion of people receiving benefit from their unemployment fund is twice as high in some occupational categories as in others.
2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Chart 1: Global Price Phillips Curve? Notes: Average world output gap and global core CPI inflation (PPP-weighted). Sources: CEIC, IMF, ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. Chart 2: Price and Wage Phillips curves have flattened throughout globalisation  Source: BIS 87th Annual Report. With correlations of headline CPI inflation rates as elevated today as during the first oil shock (Chart 3a), some contend that global forces have become dominant – a conviction reinforced by the ‘missing disinflations’ in the wake of the global financial crisis  2,3  and by the current series of wage puzzles in  2  See, for example, Chapter 3 of the IMF’s WEO April 2013, ‘The dog that didn’t bark: has inflation been muzzled or was it just sleeping?’. 3 One explanation put forward for this, unrelated to globalisation, is that companies facing liquidity constraints maintained prices at higher levels than they would otherwise have done in order to preserve cash flows and remain in operation. See Gilchrist, S, Schoenle, R, Sim, J and Zakrajšek, E (2017), ‘Inflation dynamics during the financial crisis’, American Economic Review, Vol. 107, No. 3, pages 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  4  advanced economies. There are even suggestions that monetary policy frameworks should be overhauled – potentially lowering the inflation target – in response globalisation’s growing impact.

Last but not least, our Project will be implemented by 7 authorities – three of them from EU member states and four from the beneficiary country. The strong commitment and cooperation between the partners is a prerequisite for our success. I would like to thank our twinning partners for the cooperation we have already established, owing to which this project came to its successful start and will further develop to its ultimate success. I would also like to thank in particular the Central Bank of Montenegro, for providing the facilities and hosting our resident twinning advisor for the next 18 months. I wish success to all of you and to our joint project. 2  BIS Review 168/2009
The Norwegian authorities have been successful in ensuring that the bulk of the petroleum wealth benefits society as a whole. Both the state’s ownership interests through the State’s Direct Financial Interest in petroleum activities (SDFI) and the tax system have contributed. The companies that extract oil earn a reasonable return on their investments and have incentives to invest, but the economic rent has essentially accrued to the general public. The authorities have so far also been successful in smoothing the use of petroleum revenues over time. This is important for several reasons. First, it is misleading to look upon the cash flow from petroleum activities as income. The appropriate economic perspective is to see the transfer of cash flow to investments abroad as a way of transferring capital from one account to another – from petroleum to foreign securities. By doing so, we diversify risk. Second, the size of the cash flow from petroleum activities varies. If petroleum revenues were to be used as they accrue, this would lead to wide fluctuations in demand in the Norwegian economy. Third, the use of petroleum revenues has an impact on competitiveness in Norwegian business and industry. A high level and substantial variations in the use of petroleum revenues would have a negative impact on internationally exposed industries. The establishment of the Government Pension Fund and the spending guidelines for petroleum revenues are intended to meet these challenges.

Bagi Malaysia dan Indonesia, kewangan Islam menyediakan peluang strategik untuk meningkatkan perkongsian bagi memperkembangkan lagi kewangan Islam dan seterusnya merangsang potensi pertumbuhan kita bersama. Berdasarkan hubungan yang kukuh antara Malaysia dan Indonesia, kerjasama dalam kewangan Islam juga mempunyai potensi untuk memacu integrasi ekonomi dan kewangan masing-masing dengan negara-negara membangun yang lain. Kewangan Islam akan menggalakkan jalinan padu untuk mengukuhkan lagi kepentingan bersama bagi mencapai kemajuan, kesejahteraan dan kemakmuran yang diingini. Let us take this opportunity to share the many possibilities that are before us. Sekian, terima kasih. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Initially, this strategy worked well and medium term inflation expectations were anchored despite the surge in headline inflation. Later, however, the uptrend in commodity prices turned out to be more persistent than anticipated, leading inflation to exceed the targets for two consecutive years by a significant margin, primarily due to the sharp increases in commodity prices. In response, we decided to set the inflation targets by mid-2008 for the following three years on a declining path. In this context, the inflation targets were set as 7.5, 6.5, and 5.5 percent, for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively. Later on, the inflation target for year 2012 was set at 5% in year 2009 and was kept at 5% for the following year 2013. These targets allowed us to accommodate relative price changes driven by global developments, which itself is the optimal response from a welfare perspective. Second, we wanted to anchor inflation expectations by setting a feasible and credible path for the medium term rather than leaving this job to central bankers’ own inflation forecasts in the interim period. The plan worked reasonably well. The deterioration in inflation expectations stopped right after announcing these targets and the targets were undershot in 2009 and 2010. During this period, many other central banks opted for changing their forecasts significantly above their target for a prolonged period of time.

In this section I show how consumer prices for various groups of goods and services have developed since 1995. This is the type of basic data needed when calculating underlying inflation with the aid of exclusion. Table 1 below shows the fifteen components (or price groups) in the CPIF that have varied the most since 1995, measured according to the standard deviation for the series. 19 The results show that prices of coffee, tea and cocoa have had the most volatile rates of price increase during the period. Table 2 shows the fifteen components that have varied the least. This shows that rents have had the least volatile rate of price increase during the period. Table 1.
10 But why do banks want to do business in a country where they are not completely familiar with the laws, local customs or business practices and where they typically would have to compete with well-established local banks? A bank that decides to enter a foreign market must believe that it can offer something new or better than what is already being provided by local banks. 11 The driving forces behind the geographical expansion of banks are likely to be in many ways similar to those of other types of business. A bank with a better business model or stronger brand name than the local banks can gain market shares if it gets access to customers, and in retail banking local presence is often necessary. In this sense, the reasons behind banks’ decisions to expand their business to foreign markets are not much different from those of goods-producing firms that establish foreign subsidiaries in order to gain better access to their foreign customers. 12 This type of driving force may have been particularly relevant for  9  Based on data on foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks, immediate borrower basis, at the end of September 2009 from the Bank for International Settlements. 10  Before the single market was introduced, European banks wanting to establish themselves in another member country had to obtain authorization from the supervisory body of each host country.

of rooms  2.5  2.0  1.5  1.0  0.5  0.0 BE IE LU UK MT DK ES FR CY FI DE SE NL AT EE PT CZ LT SI IT BG EL LV HU SK HR PL RO  Source: Eurostat  6  Figure 6. Population living in poor conditions percent 30  25  Total population having neither a bath, nor a shower, nor indoor flushing toilet in their household - 2015  20  15  10  5  0 RO LV BG LT EE HU PL HR PT CY SK DK EL UK FR AT SI FI BE CZ ES IE IT LU MT NL  Source: Eurostat  Figure 7. People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, % total population percent  Bulgaria  70  Czech Republic Hungary  60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  Source: Eurostat  7  Figure 8.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Autonomy on the edge of a large monetary zone - the Swiss experience Address by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 28 May 2006. This paper was prepared with the support of Ms Petra Gerlach-Kristen, Economic Research Section, Swiss National Bank, Zurich. *  *  *  This is my second visit to Israel and I am delighted to be back. I am especially happy to speak at this institute which, according to the will of its founder, Leonard Davis, should promote a better understanding of Israel external policy. The first time I was in Jerusalem was in November 2004 when the Bank of Israel celebrated its 50th anniversary. The Swiss National Bank is itself approaching an important anniversary. Next year, it will have been 100 years since we opened our doors for business. Since 1907, our institution has seen large changes in the monetary environment. When the SNB began operating, the Swiss franc's parity was defined in terms of gold and silver. In the early 1920s, Switzerland adopted a gold standard and fixed exchange rates remained the dominating feature of its monetary regime until the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Since then, we have learned how to conduct our monetary policy independently and how to live with flexible exchange rates.

But unfortunately, market players failed to act in a responsible manner in this situation. They made offers to individuals to invest funds in complex, or opaque products, and people could thus lose not only income, but also a part of their investment. Of course, this was the last thing people needed during the pandemic. We are grateful to you for empowering the Bank of Russia to limit the sales of hazardous products to individuals. Furthermore, we will establish requirements for product selling procedures so that financial institutions cannot mislead retail investors. To this end, we are introducing key information documents on all products which will provide a clear and brief description of a product’s main parameters and inherent risks. We also need an open-ended cooling-off period for people, even if they have faced hard selling when some products were offered or promoted, will have the opportunity to reject any services. At the moment, such a period is applied solely to voluntary insurance. I would like to stress that we will continue our efforts to tighten the screws in this area, so to say, until we see that the market behaves more maturely, understanding that it is more beneficial for it to establish long-term relations with customers, rather than swindle money from them right there and then.