samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Do you think prices in general will be higher, about the same, or lower, 5 to 10 years from now?” Those who respond “stay the same” are then asked whether they mean that prices will go up at the same rate as now, or that prices in general will not go up during the next 5 to 10 years. Those who indicate that they mean prices will go up at the same rate are then given the same follow-up questions as those who answer that they believe prices will be higher 5 to 10 years from now. Respondents who answer that they expect prices to be higher [lower] 5 to 10 years from now receive the question “By about what percent per year do you expect prices to go up [down] on the average, during the next 5 to 10 years?” Only respondents who give a response over 5 percent are then asked the clarifying follow-up question “Would that be [x] percent per year, or is that the total for prices over the next 5 to 10 years?” Respondents who answer “total” are then asked for a “per year” amount. 18  Further, the clarifying question used in the Michigan survey that asks whether respondents meant their response to reflect price changes per year or over the entire time period induced significant revisions. The follow-up question is administered only to respondents who give expectations over 5 percent, thus failing to correct misinterpretations among those who gave lower responses.

GDP fell about 5 per cent and unemployment rocketed from levels around 2–3 per cent to two-digit figures. After a series of heavy attacks, the Swedish krona was left to float in 1992. The fixed exchange rate regime was replaced by a return to price stability as the policy objective, now in the form of a 2 per cent inflation target. Since 1999, price stability is enshrined in law and the Riksbank is more independent in the pursuit of this goal. While low inflation is admittedly not an ultimate goal for economic policy in general, it is an important prerequisite for generating growth that is stable and high. History clearly demonstrates that a high and fluctuating rate of inflation is incompatible with a permanent improvement in standards of living. A commitment to price stability is therefore one of the foundation stones of any economic policy that aims for rising prosperity and high employment. BIS Review 81/2001  3  The years since the policy realignment have been successful. But this is not only because stabilisation policy is now being conducted differently, with a clear focus on price stability and a balanced budget. It is also a result of all the measures that were introduced around the turn of the 1980s to improve the workings of the economy. These included the deregulation of capital markets, “the tax reform of the century”, a realignment of housing policy and so on.
Crises can and should be curbed, using measures to strengthen the economy’s immune system as well as measures that reduce the impact once the crisis has erupted. This means that government intervention using public funds may be the right approach in a situation of decline and deflation, low interest rates, high unemployment and pessimism. But crisis-related measures must also be focused on the deeper causes of the crisis in order to strengthen economic sustainability over time. Countercyclical policy must not become counterstructural policy. Crises are not necessarily just an evil. A crisis can lead to reforms and measures that foster progress, as it did in Norway in the 1990s. The regulation of the banking sector in the wake of the global financial crisis is another example. Experiences such as these may give us some comfort in the bleakest of times. The world will go on, even after a deep crisis. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Of course, last year the fall in the oil prices was also beneficial for the trade balance. On the financing side, the financial flows were large enough to cover the current account deficit and to provide additional reserve accumulation. It is important to note that FDI inflows continued to flow in the economy, with their ratio to GDP being kept stable at 3.3% of GDP. Yet, the largest part of the financing flows came through the government borrowing at the international market, at rather favorable terms, pinpointing the perception of the investors for sound fundamentals and rather prudent policies in the Macedonian economy. Observing the inflation path, it more or less resembled the inflation pattern elsewhere, with the falling food and energy prices pushing prices down. The average headline rate for 2014 was mildly negative (–0.3%), while the core inflation albeit slowing down, on average remained positive. The inflation adjustment is perceived as temporary, driven by supply-side factors, and without any risks to become entrenched in the inflation expectations and to jeopardize the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  economic recovery. The fact that the negative output gap has been narrowing and the fall of the prices has been significantly slowing down in the first months of this year, just support the former notion. Domestic financing through the banking sector significantly increased in 2014, with credit market recovering much faster compared to the previous years.
But the pooling of savings within Life insurance companies and the willingness of policyholders to commit their savings for the long term also allows those savings to be channelled into new types of investment – ones that would be difficult or impossible for individuals to access directly, but which will play an essential part in the recovery and in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. And our data show that insurers are investing in ever more diverse and novel asset types, which often represent very long-term commitments. A willingness to innovate is to be welcomed. There is nevertheless a flipside to this novelty – the lack of a long history to guide the selection and risk-management of these assets, or to show how they may perform under various possible stress scenarios. So there are new sources of uncertainty to contend with, alongside those that insurers have been managing as their bread and butter for hundreds of years. Insurers, and we as their prudential regulator, have a responsibility to understand and respond to new uncertainties, some of which may play out over a very long horizon, to ensure that policyholders’ trust is repaid. Ensuring adequate policyholder protection is clearly a good in its own right – policyholders are consumers of a financial product, which may be very significant to them and their families, and they deserve to be protected. But it goes further. Securing policyholder protection upholds policyholders’ confidence and trust in the face of uncertainty.

In Norway, Norges Bank will inform the authorities that measures other than those available to the Bank are required if a situation arises where we are unable to return the exchange rate to its initial range without causing inflation or a deflationary recession. This implies a greater focus in the conduct of fiscal policy on factors that influence the exposed sector of the economy. This is consistent with our concern that the economy may run into a Dutch disease. 10. Economic developments  From looking at the principles of Norwegian economic policy, let us turn to Norges Bank’s view of the current situation. The high and steady rate of growth from 1992 and onwards has been moderated this year. The overall picture indicates that the exchange rate is stable, while the economy is showing signs of cooling off. BIS Review 121/1999  12  Each quarter Norges Bank presents an inflation report with an assessment of the outlook for the Norwegian economy and for price inflation for the next two years. The projections in the Inflation Report provide a basis for the Bank’s conduct of monetary policy. The Inflation Report published in September indicates that price and cost inflation in Norway will gradually slow to the level aimed at in the euro area. Among other things, this is based on the assumption that growth in public expenditure will be approximately in line with the trend rate of growth in the mainland economy. For 1999 Norges Bank expects a growth rate of ½%.
A monetary stimulus in the US will have a different effect on the euro area if, say, Asian countries have flexible exchange rates rather than fixed rates against the dollar. So the choice of exchange rate regime by any one bloc both depends on and affects the choices of the others. How did we end up in this position? Under the gold standard of the late 19th and early 20th century, exchange rates were fixed and capital flowed freely internationally. Domestic monetary policy was subordinated to the demands of the gold standard, except in time of extreme crisis when the need for flexibility overcame the desire to adhere to the standard. From the end of the Second World War until 1971, the member countries of the Bretton Woods system had a formal commitment to fixed but adjustable exchange rates, and capital accounts were largely closed to give members the flexibility to operate independent monetary policies. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangements, countries have been free to make quite different choices of exchange rate regime, and have not hesitated to do so. As international financial markets have developed, there has been a general movement to flexible exchange rates supported by credible domestic monetary policies. That is a sensible use of the price mechanism to respond to complex and unpredictable shocks.

Mervyn King: The international monetary system Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the “Advancing Enterprise 2005” conference, London, 4 February 2005. *  *  *  Later today the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors meet in London. Markets are speculating on what the communiqué will or will not say about exchange rates. On such matters a private exchange of views might serve us rather better than a public statement. What is a matter for public discussion, however, is the mix of exchange rate regimes we see in the world today, and the consequences for international monetary stability. The current international monetary system comprises three large currency blocs: the dollar, the euro, and an Asian bloc of currencies that are to varying degrees fixed against the dollar. These blocs, of broadly comparable size, produce more than twothirds of world output in total. Given their size, the choice of exchange rate regime of one bloc has a significant effect on the options available to the others. Countries have always faced constraints in choosing their exchange rate regime. Any country can have only two out of the following three – an independent monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate and an open capital account. At various times countries have tried – and failed – to have all three. But in a world of large currency blocs decisions about exchange rate policies are interdependent.
For example the Bank recently announced that it would be consulting on the appropriate level of access for new payments providers.20  Dealing with uncertainty: post-QE frameworks  We can, and will, continue to strengthen our analysis of the demand for reserves, through more structured and frequent dialogue. But if there’s one big message I take from our Discussion Paper exercise, it’s that, no matter how deep we dig, we will still face persistent and material uncertainty about the future demand for reserves. We must ensure our post-QT framework can deal with that uncertainty robustly if we are to be confident that we can continue to use our balance sheet to deliver monetary and financial stability. One response would be to stick with the simple floor, but stop contracting reserves well before we hit the PMRR, leaving an ample buffer to ensure market interest rates are stable (Chart 9).

While overall labor market indicators for the second half of 2013 were not particularly strong, the overall trend in unemployment showed some improvement with the unemployment rate falling sharply over that period, from 7.5 percent in June to 6.7 percent in December. However, as has been the case since October of 2009 when the unemployment rate peaked at 10 percent, this decline in the unemployment rate was driven in large part by a decline in the labor force participation rate. Much has been written about the forces that are causing this decline of the labor force participation rate. Researchers have shown that the aging of the population is playing a role, as are changes in behavior. But our own analysis suggests that the cyclical weakness of demand for labor is an important contributing factor. As a result, I conclude that the decline of the unemployment rate significantly overstates the degree of improvement in the labor market. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Looking forward, I believe that the underlying fundamentals of the U.S. economy have improved to the point where we can expect sustained growth above the roughly 2 1/4 percent annual pace that prevailed from mid-2009 through mid-2013. Also, the amount of fiscal drag continues to diminish. Another good piece of news is that Congress has raised the debt ceiling until March 2015. This lessens the risk that political brinkmanship in Washington could harm consumer and business confidence.
This positive trajectory reflects a number of key fundamental strengths in the Thai economy. First, our human capital remains intact and strong. Thailand’s flexible and skilled workforce will continue to provide a solid foundation for businesses to flourish and expand. Second, the corporate sector boasts healthy balance sheets from accumulated savings and profits, enabling them to rebuild and invest. Third, the banking sector is strong and well-placed to provide the financing necessary to sustain the investment cycle. Finally, Thailand is well positioned geographically to serve as a supply-chain hub for many industries and to reap the benefits of an expanding as well as more integrated Asian economic block. As alluded to earlier, the process of regional integration will provide Thailand with enormous opportunities to expand our role in the region through increased trade in goods and services. Realizing these opportunities will not be easy, nor will they be automatic. The key impetus falls on structural reforms that lift Thailand’s international competitiveness. Considerable adjustment and transformation of our economy will be required. Factors of production will have to be reallocated to activities that offer the most promising way forward. Government policies and laws will have to be updated and changed to best facilitate such structural adjustments, all the while making sure that the burden of adjustment on those who stand to lose is bearable. The pursuit of economic growth should not be absolute, but inclusive. As should be apparent, such challenges cannot possibly be completely met in the short-term, let alone in 2012.

Against the backdrop of fear and uncertainty, banks have tightened their lending and consumers have become more cautious in their spending. This will act as a drag on the euroarea economy going forward. A key constraint for both the US and euro-area, as well as many other advanced economies, is the limited policy space available to authorities. In these countries, monetary policy and fiscal stimulus have been pushed to their limits. Limited capacity to respond to new shocks thus represents a real risk for these economies, and for the global economy, that we must be weary of. In this setting, and given the deep-seated nature of the problems being faced, meaningful remedies rest just as much on political factors as on economic ones. How governments respond and how their electorates receive these responses will be an important source of uncertainty. In contrast, the rising economies in Asia offer a more positive outlook. Despite the slowdown in exports of many Asian countries, reflecting the softer global economic backdrop, domestic demand remains robust. More fundamentally, the continued rise of China and the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will generate enormous economic opportunities for the region. As will be discussed later, the key challenge for Thailand will be how to optimally position ourselves to reap the full benefits of this trend. This brings me to the internal challenges.
We know the current over-reliance on monetary policy to solve the problems arising from the global financial crisis has had downsides for long term finance, particularly pension funds and insurance funds. The costs and benefits of low or negligible interest rates are being debated, but there is no doubt about the increasing burden they pose for pension and insurance funds. 6. But the problem is not merely to do with current monetary policies, and not fundamentally of a cyclical nature. Low real interest rates are very likely here to stay, and for reasons that are essentially structural. 7. There are two main forces behind this. 8. The first is ageing itself, and its implications for savings behaviour, particularly in today’s advanced countries. A baby boom generation is reaching retirement, and they also expect to live significantly longer than their parents did. They will have to save more, for some time to come, in order to sustain themselves through retirement. Higher savings will in turn mean that a continuing surplus of savings over investment globally, a stubborn gap, and it also means that interest rates over the medium to long term, even after the normalisation of monetary policy, will remain low. 9. This is accentuated by shifts in asset allocation, as the baby boom generation is also likely to allocate more funds to bonds and other fixed income instruments, and gradually reduce holdings of equity.

But in a situation where we are going to have much longer lives, it is critical that we have the ability to earn a living and to save money over more years, so as to provide security and assurance through our retirement years. 22. It’s true everywhere in the world. Some countries have already recognised it through legislation. Denmark is a good example, of having linked their retirement age and pension age to life expectancy. Sweden intends to follow. Several other countries are considering the same thing. 23. But it is not just about pushing back the retirement age or pension age. It is critical that we make it attractive for older citizens to work. That means not just providing jobs but rearranging the work place so that it becomes part of the culture to have older persons, experienced persons, in the team, in the work place. The culture of the work place has to change and the culture of the consumers has to change in a whole range of industries so as to accept and celebrate the presence of older persons at work. 24. So that’s one important reform over the next 10 to 15 years – enabling older persons to work for longer, it may be full time or part time, but make it attractive to work. 25. The second important reform concerns the financial industry. We have to reduce the costs that ordinary savers face in saving for the retirement. 26.
This has the advantage that there is no contradiction between long market rates abroad and the forecast for policy rates abroad, which makes it easier to determine the effects on the exchange rate. If there are special reasons for assuming forecasts for policy rates abroad that deviate from market expectations, this should be explained and justified. In these cases one should construct forecasts for inflation and resource utilisation using unanticipated deviations, where market participants are surprised by the actual policy rates abroad deviating from what was expected. The exchange rate determination will then be correctly based on long market rates abroad, even when the Riksbank’s forecast for policy rates abroad deviates from that implied by these market rates. 12  BIS Review 158/2010  BIS Review 158/2010  13  14  BIS Review 158/2010  BIS Review 158/2010  15  16  BIS Review 158/2010  References Assenmascher-Wesche, Katrin and Stefan Gerlach (2010), “Credit and Bubbles”, Economic Policy July 2010, 437–482. Bank of England (2010a), Inflation Report, August 2010, www.bankofengland.co.uk. Bank of England (2010b), Inflation Report, November 2010, www.bankofengland.co.uk. Bank of England (2010c), Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting 6 and 7 October 2010, www.bankofengland.co.uk. Bank of England (2010d), Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting 3 and 4 November 2010, www.bankofengland.co.uk. Bean, Charles, Matthias Paustian, Adrian Penalver and Tim Taylor (2010), “Monetary Policy after the Fall,” in Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, www.kansascityfed.org.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Sustaining Malaysia as a platform for international Islamic finance Address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launching of HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad: "Sustaining Malaysia as a Platform for International Islamic Finance", Kuala Lumpur, 25 November 2008. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to be here today at this official launch of "HSBC Amanah Malaysia Berhad" (HSBC Amanah). This launch is significant in a number of respects. It reflects the continued expansion of Islamic finance in Malaysia , taking place at a time of great uncertainty in the glo bal financial system. The launch of HSBC Amanah, as an Islamic subsidiary of an international financial group, is also significant as it will contribute towards enhancing further the international dimension of Islamic finance in Malaysia, thus strengthening our international financial and economic linkages with other parts of the world. The Islamic subsidiary represents the transformation of the Islamic banking window operations into a dedicated entity that allows for greater strategic direction and drive of performance for the Islamic banking business. The advancement of the Islamic subsidiary institutions structure has the potential to further complement the goals of the group by providing an alternative model to spur the expansion of the banking business. It will pave the way for providing strong support in terms of capital, resources and operational infrastructure to elevate performance.