samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Observing the data, one can notice very strong growth of domestic demand before the crisis, on average of around 6%, while as of 2009 until 2013 domestic demand was contracting. In the last couple of years it was brought on a solid grounds, but yet the average growth is more modest at around 3.5%. 10  Chart 7 Domestic demand and fiscal balance  14.0  12.9  10.0 8.0  4.8  0.0  7.3  7.2  6.1  3.5  3.3  4.0 2.0  0.0  10.9  12.0  6.0  Current account and fiscal balance, as % of GDP (average for the selected countries)  Real GDP and its components growth rates, in % (average for the selected countries)  -1.9  -2.4  4.2  -5.0  -4.4  -2.0  -5.0  0.2  -2.0 GDP  -10.0  Domestic Demand 2000- 2008  -8.0  -0.6  -1.8  -4.0  2009- 2013  Exports  2000- 2008  Imports  2014- 2018  Fiscal balance  Source: Eurostat and NBRNM calculations. 2009- 2013  2014- 2018  Current account balance  Source: IMF and NBRNM calculations. Financial flows to and from advanced economies have been much weaker since the global financial crisis. In particular, portfolio debt flows have weakened, reflecting a combination of factors: large government debt asset purchases by central banks, increased fragmentation in euro area debt markets, and much-reduced accumulation of reserves by emerging market and developing economies.

News conference  15 December 2022, 10.00 am  Introductory remarks by Andréa M. Maechler In my remarks, I will talk in more detail about the implementation of today’s monetary policy decision, which Thomas Jordan has already touched on. I will start, however, by giving you an overview of how we have steered interest rates since the switch to a positive SNB policy rate in September. The switch from a negative to a positive SNB policy rate required us to make an adjustment to the implementation of our monetary policy in the money market. The new approach comprises two elements: reserve tiering – that is, tiered remuneration of the sight deposits that banks and other financial market participants hold at the SNB – and reserve absorption. This approach has proved successful. Following our monetary policy decision on 22 September, secured short-term Swiss franc money market rates moved quickly towards the new SNB policy rate (cf. chart 1). We are also continuing to see solid activity among participants in the money market, which ensures a robust basis for the calculation of SARON. From the outset, the market responded favourably to the deployment of our monetary policy instruments to absorb liquidity. On the very day of the monetary policy assessment in September, we started conducting repo transactions on a daily basis and issuing SNB bills on a weekly basis (cf. chart 2). In this way, we were able to reduce the liquidity supply in the money market sufficiently to allow us to steer interest rates effectively.
I should like to highlight this latter aspect of price-setting policy at the level of products or services since, traditionally, services that are not explicitly charged and whose cost has been covered by the net interest margin have been provided to customers. I believe it is important to introduce transparency and rigour into price-setting. Without it, the reality of the business is distorted as is, consequently, the attendant analysis, and informed decision-  1  “SSM thematic review on profitability and business models. Report on the outcome of the assessment.”, September 2018. 3/8  making is hampered. Not in vain, in the aforementioned thematic review price-setting is included among the areas where the SSM recommends making improvements. I would further stress that, in this comprehensive analysis of the bank’s accounts, there should be some thought on the weight of operating expenses. Unquestionably, Spanish banks have made a great effort in terms of capacity adjustment in recent years. Numbers of staff and offices have fallen approximately by 32% and 40%, respectively, from their 2008 peaks. It is necessary to continue paying attention to these expenses, so as to ensure they are in step with developments in lending activity and in revenue. Against this background, progress in new technologies, and the alternatives these offer to the traditional means of providing bank services, may prove an opportunity to cut costs and come into line with the change under way in the customer-bank relationship.

How these decisions materialise, which in the literature is known as “risk culture”, is particular to each bank and the responsibility of each one. Supervisors observe and assess but, ultimately, this is one of the idiosyncratic aspects of banks’ DNA. In short, governance structures should be capable of measuring, heading off and analysing current risks and those that are arising. While there are no strong signs of any easing, for activity as a whole, in lending conditions and of aggressive pricing that might suggest that risk is not sufficiently reflected, banks must be careful to retain a suitable profitability/risk trade-off that is sustainable over the cycle in all business segments. An individualised reflection, adapted to the characteristics of each institution. I shall conclude with a brief but nevertheless important reference. In addition to being comprehensive and strategic, reflection on the business model should also be individualised, i.e. adapted to the idiosyncratic characteristics of each institution. Indeed, the findings of the SSM thematic review of profitability and business models show that there is no one single approach and that, even among those banks with better profitability results, there are differences in strategies. Some pursue strategies geared to obtaining high income, which counter relatively high costs. Others place an emphasis on low costs that are compatible with relatively low income. And others strike a balance between a medium income-generating capacity and medium or low-level costs.
Cavallo, Alberto (2018) ‘More Amazon effects: online competition and pricing behaviors’, Harvard Business School & NBER, 7 September. 5 Swiss Federal Statistical Office data, for example, show that the share of goods and services subject to price adjustments rose from some 20% per month in 2011 to just over 25% in 2017. Page 3/9  As its responses both during and after the crisis have shown, the SNB has a monetary policy strategy that has proved its worth in highly volatile circumstances. Robust and appropriate, this framework offers the required room for manoeuvre, allowing the SNB to tolerate inflation temporarily moving outside the range it equates with price stability, provided inflation expectations remain well anchored. Innovations on the foreign exchange market As I have explained, the SNB must adapt its analysis continuously in order to understand and anticipate changes in the goods and services market. However, the latter is not the only market to have undergone profound changes. The foreign exchange market, too – a key market for the SNB – has also evolved considerably since the crisis. It is here that we conduct interventions, as required, and it is here that we actively manage our foreign exchange reserves. The SNB has had to adapt to ongoing changes taking place on this market as well to ensure that it is able to implement its monetary policy effectively at all times.

Speech  Embargo 8 November 2018, 6.30 pm  Ten years after the crisis: evolving markets and the challenges for the SNB Money Market Event  Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser Member of the Governing Board / Alternate Member of the Governing Board ∗ Swiss National Bank Geneva, 8 November 2018 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2018 (speech given in French)  ∗ The speakers would like to thank Dirk Faltin, Fabio Panzera and Nicolas Stoffels for their support in drafting this speech. They also thank Bernd Aumann and Alain Kouo as well as SNB Language Services. Page 1/9  Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish you a warm welcome to the Swiss National Bank’s Money Market Event in Geneva. Ten years ago, back in the autumn of 2008, none of us knew when or how the crisis would end. At the time, central banks adopted a raft of measures to tackle multiple challenges in quick succession. Having exhausted the conventional monetary policy toolkit, they turned to more innovative approaches, cutting their short-term interest rates to unprecedented levels and substantially expanding their balance sheets. Today, a decade later, the worst fears have evaporated, economic growth has returned to a robust level in many parts of the world, and some central banks have started to gradually tighten their monetary policy. For the SNB, though, it is still too early to contemplate taking such action. At our last monetary policy assessment in September, we decided to maintain our expansionary monetary policy stance.
Page 10 of 18  15  16  6 3  Figure 3 Inflation indicators (*) (annual change, percent)  6  6  5  5  Services CPI  4  4  services EFE  3  3 CPI  2  2  1  CPIEFE  Goods CPI  1  0  0  -1  -1  goods EFE  14  15  16  17  18  19  (*) As from January 2019, the new 2018=100 annual base indexes are used, so they are not strictly comparable with earlier figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). Figure 4 Non-mining GDP (real annual change, percent)  6  6  5  5  Trend  4  4  Potential  3  3  2  2 Actual (moving annual average)  1  1  0  0 13  14  15  16  17  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Figure 11 Real exports and world GDP (1) (contributions, percentage points; annual change, percent)  6  World GDP 4.0 (2) (right axis)  4.5  4.5  Emerging Latin America  4  3.6  3.0  3.0 Other  2  3.2  1.5  1.5  0  2.8  0.0  0.0  Developed  Emerging  Europe Asia  -2  2.4 -1.5 14  15  16  17  18  19  -1.5 14  15  (1) Moving three-month average. (2) IMF's quarterly data. Sources: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis and IMF. Page 16 of 18  16  17  18  19  Figure 12 CPI inflation forecast (1) (2) (annual change, percent)  CPIEFE inflation forecast (1) (2) (annual change, percent)  4  4 4  4  3  3 3  3  Jun. '19 Report 2  Jun. '19 Report 2 2  2 Mar. '19 Report  Mar. '19 Report 1  1 1  0  1  0 0 18  19  20  21  0 18  19  20  21  (1) As from January2019 the new 2018=100 annual base indexes are used, so they are not strictly comparable with earlier figures. (2) Gray area, as from the second quarter of 2019, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE)).
Consequently, trading tends to occur infrequently and largely on a bilateral basis. Through the prism of these two asset classes, I hope to provide some preliminary answers to five key questions. First, what do we mean by liquidity and how can we measure it? Second, what does the available evidence show in terms of how liquidity has changed in recent years in the U.S. Treasury and corporate bond markets? Third, what factors could influence liquidity provision? Regulation might be one factor, but there also could be others. Fourth, what are the costs associated with shifts in liquidity and how do these costs compare to the benefits of a more resilient and robust financial system? Fifth, what future work is needed to better assess whether increased regulation has damaged liquidity provision and whether the resulting costs exceed the benefits of higher capital and liquidity standards in terms of financial stability? As always, what I have to say today represents my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. 1 What do we mean by liquidity and how can we measure it? I would define liquidity as the cost – both in expense and in time – of buying or selling an asset for cash.

William C Dudley: Regulation and liquidity provision Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the SIFMA Liquidity Forum, New York City, 30 September 2015. *  *  *  The charts can be found at the website (Federal Reserve Bank of New York). The financial crisis and the ensuing recession exacted a high cost on the country. Real gross domestic product (GDP) declined by over a half of a trillion dollars. Total nonfarm payroll employment declined by 8.7 million jobs, and 5.8 million households lost their homes to foreclosure. Extraordinary fiscal and monetary policy efforts were required to prevent a collapse of the financial system and the onset of a world-wide economic depression. In the aftermath, new regulations, such as Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act, were implemented to strengthen the financial system and to limit the risk of a future financial crisis. Some opponents of tougher bank regulation claim that the increased regulatory requirements, such as the higher capital requirements and new liquidity standards, that have been imposed on large financial institutions in the aftermath of the financial crisis have reduced these firms’ market-making capacity. As a result, so the argument goes, this is leading to less liquidity for trading securities, and to more illiquidity events in which the prices of financial assets move sharply and become temporarily unmoored from their fundamental valuations.
If a household, firm, bank or government has become too heavily indebted, all experience to date indicates that, sooner or later, the debt will have to be restructured. Hayek would probably have reiterated the view he expressed in 1932: “ ..... the existence of public debt [on a large scale] imposes frictions and obstacles to readjustment very much greater than [the frictions and obstacles imposed by] the existence of private debt.” Perhaps Hayek, originally from Austria, had in mind Germany’s enormous reparations debt from the First World War, which probably contributed to the fall of the Weimar Republic. We should not exaggerate: after all, Europe is still a region of peace, prosperity and cooperation. This is perhaps the greatest difference between the current situation and the 1930s. Nonetheless, the 1930s taught us that deep economic crises can also have substantial social and political consequences. The European Central Bank – the ECB – is the only institution in Europe that can have a material influence on developments across the continent in the short term. The ECB is keeping government debt yields low by means of record-low policy rates and large government bond purchases. This is keeping the wheels in motion. It is also supporting 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  government finances in a number of European countries.

For the Spanish banking industry, the year 2013 marked the culmination of a major reform in the framework of the financial assistance programme agreed with the European authorities. This programme began in 2012 and, as you know, concluded last January. The reform has seen the clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring of the sector. In a complex macroeconomic and financial environment, which required the adjustment of the imbalances that have built up in the previous expansionary phase, the Spanish banking sector has demonstrated notable adaptability. I will briefly review some of the basic parameters marking developments at our banks, in particular the changes in the structure of their balance sheets, non-performing loans and results. I will then underscore the importance of the capital conservation measures in the current setting. Changes in the structure of bank balance sheets Last year, the banking sector significantly reduced the size of its balance sheet, as well as changing its structure. On the asset side, the reduction in lending to the private sector persisted. This reduction was, however, compatible with an increase in the weight of assets relative to the total balance sheet, whereas other asset items – such as deposits at central banks and credit institutions, and derivatives operations – contracted at very high rates. In turn, on the liabilities side, there was a shift towards private-sector deposits, thereby furthering the reduction in funds borrowed from the Eurosystem. In addition, the sector also increased its own funds, the relative weight of which on the balance sheet has gained in significance.
I will aim to cover three topics: first, the progress of the economic recovery to date; second, the prospects for UK economic growth looking ahead over the next couple of years; and third, and most crucially, the role of monetary policy in supporting sustainable economic growth in the UK economy over the economic cycle. The current recovery – progress to date Economic recoveries are normally uneven – particularly in their early stages – and we should not be surprised to see significant fluctuations in the GDP growth rate from quarter to quarter. We have seen this in previous recoveries, with the quarterly rises in GDP fluctuating from zero to 1.5% in the first three years of the 1980s recovery and from –0.2% to 1.4% in the equivalent period when the UK economy was recovering in the early 1990s.2 In this context, the performance of the UK economy over the recovery so far does not look unusual. Before the snow arrived at the end of the year, we had four quarters of economic growth in which the rise in GDP fluctuated from 0.3% to 1.0%. In fact, until the snow-affected fourth quarter, the growth of the UK economy over the first year of this recovery was stronger than in the equivalent period of the early 1980s and early 1990s recoveries.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  In a speech last month, I set out the reasons why this might be the case.6 First, the relationship between spare capacity and inflationary pressures may be much more complex than the simple model suggests – particularly in the services sector which now dominates the UK economy. Second, the very accommodative policies we pursued in the depths of the recession allowed companies to pass through cost increases and may have encouraged companies to believe they have more pricing power than in the past. We have seen further evidence of this today in the very strong price expectations which are continuing to be registered by manufacturers in the CBI survey. And, third, the UK is a very open international economy. Global price pressures and the value of the pound appear to be having a greater impact on our inflation rate than the domestic margin of spare capacity. There are other criticisms which can be made of the “output gap” view of the world. Measures of the “output gap” are frequently revised, partly because of GDP data revisions and partly because of changes in our view of where the trend or capacity level of output truly lies. For both these reasons, the “output gap” is notoriously difficult to measure in real time.7 Indeed, there have been quite significant revisions to the GDP profile of the early 1990s recession from the initial estimates.
The share employed in the public sector is also somewhat higher than in Norway as a whole. Unemployment has also been markedly lower in the inland region than in most other regions in recent years. 2  BIS Review 79/2005  According to the most recent reports, the economic situation in the region is favourable. Participating companies report rising employment and solid growth in all industries. In retail trade and in the construction sector, activity is brisk and increasing, with a somewhat wait-and-see approach to future developments. Growth in manufacturing has slowed slightly, but is likely to stabilise. Investment is rising in all sectors. Enterprises in the region envisage a slight rise in prices in the period ahead. Inflation has edged up since the beginning of 2004. In October, the year-on-year rise in consumer prices adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) was 1.2 per cent. Adjusted for the estimated direct effect of the interest rate fall on house rents, the rise in prices is estimated at 1.3 per cent in October. Total consumer prices (CPI) rose by 1.8 per cent in the same period. Prices for domestically produced goods and services rose by 2.0 per cent in the twelve months to October this year. The rise in prices for domestically produced consumer goods exposed to international competition has been very low this year. In October, prices for these goods were 0.2 per cent higher than in the same month one year earlier.

During my visits to the Middle East, I sensed their interest in investing in Asia. Many are keen to engage China and India but their businessmen told me that they were not so familiar with doing  2  BIS Review 83/2005  business in China. Singapore can serve as a bridge, given our knowledge and connections. Furthermore, Indian, Chinese and Singaporean financial institutions could tap into Islamic funds from the Middle East for infrastructural and other major projects in India and China. 21. As an international financial centre, Singapore is well placed to intermediate and facilitate investment flows between Asia and the Middle East. Already, funds managed in Singapore from the Middle East have increased by over 70% to $ billion in 2004. But this is still a small figure, given the trillions of dollars of wealth in the Middle East. We should work with credible partners to offer a wider suite of Islamic financial services and products. The role of MAS 22. MAS will continue to support and partner the financial industry to seize the opportunities. Last year, I highlighted three strategic priorities for MAS and our financial sector. They are first, strengthen our position as a leading financial centre in Asia; second, maintain excellence in a riskier environment; and third, leverage and build on our reputation. We have made good progress on all three fronts. Strengthening our position as a leading financial centre in Asia 23. As MAS Chairman, I regularly meet CEOs of global banks and big companies.