samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have thus been faced with a broad litany of serious problems affecting many of the institutional requirements and elements that are so vital for maintaining confidence, for the efficient allocation of resources, for the orderly working of any financial system and for the effective supervision thereof. I shall return to these matters later. But let me first say that, faced with the above-mentioned multifarious shocks, the international financial system showed a capacity for resilience that should be viewed as highly satisfactory. It is not easy to assess which factors have contributed to increasing, and to what extent, such resilience. Among them, however, mention should be made of the following: the priority given to stability by many monetary and fiscal authorities during the preceding long expansionary phase; the improved workings of more integrated and better informed international financial markets with increasingly flexible trading systems; the high levels of solvency, via own funds and provisions, attained by banks during the previous upturn, which has made it easier to soak up the losses now arising; and, finally, the advances made by many banks in risk management, providing for better risk identification and monitoring, risk diversification and the reallocation of risk towards final investors, on increasingly efficient derivatives markets. Despite the resilience of the international financial system, both the independent developments within the system and the aforementioned events which perturbed the markets have repercussions for banking supervision. These are worthy of mention.

2014 is very different from the time of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 when Emerging Asia only accounted for 18% of global trade and 17% the World’s GDP. Today, Emerging Asia makes up of 25% of global trade and 28% of the world’s GDP. Moreover, the world has become so much more interconnected through the trade, FDI and financial market channels. It is all too easy to give too much credence to the “decoupling” theory than it deserves, as many people did when they over-rated the prospects of the EMEs when the advanced economies were having very difficult times after the eruption of the Global Financial Crisis. So the advanced economies also need to understand and watch out for the developments of the EMEs and their spillover effects. 5. Finally, I wish the Conference every success and all the participants a very pleasant stay in Hong Kong. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Hence, on behalf of the Bank of Albania, I would like to thank all the experts that have helped and have been actively engaged for their successful realisation. In addition to the precious work of the Bank of Albania's staff, I would like to highlight the rather 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  precious contribution of many renowned academics, historians, Albanologists, numismatists and experts from the most experienced companies in the field of banknote production. Meanwhile, the Bank of Albania is working on the completion of the new series with two other banknotes, 500 lek and 2000 lek, which are in production process. Concluding, I like to call on the users to handle each banknote with due care, in order to preserve their durability, quality and integrity in circulation. Banknotes are more than a valuable paper. They boost and sustain the economic activity of Albania and similarly tie with visible threads our national identity. I wish the public will welcome both new banknotes we are presenting today, like the previous ones. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Better information about the credit risk profiles of the largest, internationally active banks, including the composition of their portfolio by internal ratings, would also be useful. A commitment to the use of advanced analytical tools, stress testing, and improved disclosure comes under the widely discussed rubric of seeking out and adopting industry-wide best practices. It is, perhaps, most important to note that the development of best practices is a dynamic, not a static, process that can only be enhanced by consistent risk management efforts over a long time horizon. In sum, I am led to conclude that diligent market discipline using techniques such as those I suggest here is in the long run the essential element needed to achieve both public and private goals. All market participants bear the difficult responsibility of determining and exacting adequate compensation for risk. While the public sector has a responsibility to increase the effectiveness of its overall regulatory and supervisory framework, it is the private sector’s continuous reassessment of risk and advancement of risk management techniques that ultimately will serve to preserve a safe and sound financial system while simultaneously rewarding individual institutions with long-term profitability. In the public sector, we can help markets work more effectively by ensuring that regulated financial institutions support the trading process by making sound credit decisions. We can also work to improve bank supervision by our ongoing examinations of bank risk measurement and management processes, a major focus of the examination process.
But in order to achieve this, three cross-cutting levers will be needed: revitalising the single market; providing equal access to training and skills in the southern countries, including France; and pooling our funding. Europe has on the one hand the resources, i.e. a savings surplus of EUR 300 billion per year, and on the other hand huge digital and ecological investment needs: to build the bridge between the two, it is urgent to speed up the Capital Markets Union. The remaining two-thirds of this targeted additional growth could be achieved by addressing two issues specific to France: primarily, inadequate labour supply. To increase potential growth, we do not lack public spending or capital overall, we lack labour. In France, more than 50% of companies are experiencing recruitment difficulties whereas there are still 2.4 million unemployed, including 600,000 young people: this paradox is socially unacceptable. France has almost 3 million fewer people in employment than Germany, and the majority of these are young and elderly people. In this respect, the levers of reform are: for young people, the strengthening of basic education and apprenticeships; for older people, a fair pension reform. And for all working people, professional training more focused on the key issue of skill enhancement; a reform of the unemployment insurance system that provides good incentives for long-term employment and work; and negotiated wage increases for jobs that suffer from a lack of attractiveness.

Given the current crisis in public services, their necessary modernisation and mobilisation are not incompatible with performance and management; and spending on the future - from education to investment - has a better multiplier effect on long-term growth. Page 2 sur 15 Ladies and gentlemen, dear teachers and students, I am very happy to be with you again today, in this very important place of teaching and knowledge. I had the honour of speaking here in January 2020, on the then much disputed question of low interest rates. Two months later, the Covid crisis erupted, which not only rebuilt the consensus on these low rates, but also called into question all our forecasts and many of our common points of reference. Since then, we have been living under the continuous pressure of an emergency situation, in a permanent present that masks our structural challenges. I understand and share the suffering. But one day, we will overcome for once and for all this Covid ordeal: this is both an obvious wish for this new year, and a necessity. It is time for us to talk at last about the fundamental choices for Europe and for our country, and to do so, we must take a longer-term view. ** I. A perspective that must go beyond the short term  As regards the short-term economic situation, I will therefore just make three remarks: a) The French economy is currently proving resilient to Omicron and to the fifth Covid wave.
Historically, central banks have relied on the assumption that, even if liquidity shortages emerge in the non-banking sector, banks are likely to remain an effective conduit for LOLR. The efficacy of that channel may be less reliable in the future, however. For that reason, the Bank of England has extended access to its published facilities to broker dealers and CCPs overseen by its supervisory arm the Prudential Regulation Authority, and has ensured it faces no technical obstacles to providing ELA if required. The Bank has also set out principles under which it might operate as market maker of last resort – consistent with the role it played in sterling corporate bond and commercial paper markets during the crisis. Conclusions Ensuring central banks lend neither “too little” nor “too much” in pursuit of financial stability is vital if countries are to retain LOLR toolkits that can both protect their economies against genuine liquidity risks whilst maintaining broad-based public support and legitimacy. In recent years, reforms to the Bank of England have focused on minimising the risk that it might lend “too little”, significantly increasing the Bank’s ability to provide structured LOLR assistance, to a wider range of counterparties, against a wider set of collateral, at longer maturities and somewhat lower prices. But at the same time, safeguards have also been strengthened against the Bank lending “too much”: better supervisory and resolution frameworks; transparent terms for access, pricing and collateral; and stronger accountability and governance. The UK’s arrangements are no panacea.

The decision to lend or not to lend will always be a difficult one, conducted with imperfect information and in the midst of a crisis. Ex post judgments on whether the central bank lent too much or too little must recognise this constraint. But the UK’s experience can I hope show one way to address the risks of lending “too much” through enhanced accountability whilst also still allowing central banks the “constrained discretion” to exercise expert judgment in the pursuit of financial stability. I look forward to our discussion of these issues today. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
It is manifested in exchange rate regimes that still permit relatively limited variability against the dollar. It is manifested in the extent of reserve accumulation, in part the consequence of resistance to exchange rate appreciation. And it is manifested in the remaining controls on capital movements and the occasional experimentation with the introduction of new controls. The search for durable insurance against future volatility is an understandable response to the searing experience of the crises of a decade ago. But there is risk in this as well. And the incomplete embrace of integration could contain the seeds of future vulnerability. In this sense, the policy agenda needs to move from a focus on creating stronger defenses against crisis to building a greater ability to adapt to change. This requires strong institutions for the management of macroeconomic policy so that the monetary and fiscal policies are able to respond to shocks in a credible manner. It requires strong financial institutions with a substantial capacity to absorb losses and cope with volatility. It requires regulatory policies that encourage competition and innovation, with strong protections for property rights, low barriers to entry and effective financial supervision. And it requires investments in a nation’s human capital, in education, healthcare and pension provision. This complement of policies improves the prospects for producing the mix of flexibility and resilience necessary for sustained growth in a more integrated world economy.

Capital inflows, largely through the banking system, helped finance a boom in investment and real estate. Distortions in the financial system led to a misallocation of resources so that high rates of private investment did not generate substantial improvements in productivity. Exchange rate regimes where the domestic currency was fixed to the dollar generated false expectations of stability, and the resulting increase in unhedged borrowing generated large exposures to changes in the exchange rate or interest rates. By 1997, the short-term external debt of the private sector had risen substantially, relative to GDP and to reserves, and this created conditions similar to a classic bank run, when the crises hit. The initial spark for the loss of confidence is still not fully clear, as is often the case in financial crises. And although the particular dynamics differed across the countries in the region, the basic pattern was common, with a rapid and sustained effort by domestic and foreign investors to reduce their exposure to further losses. The initial effects of this behavior made the exchange rate commitments untenable, and when those commitments were broken and currencies fell, the panic became self-reinforcing. Uncertainty and lack of information fed the run. Market participants were unable to judge whether deteriorating developments reflected temporary liquidity problems or deeper solvency issues. They  BIS Review 65/2007  1  reacted by assuming the worst. These shifts in market sentiment risked becoming self-validating, with liquidity problems transformed into solvency problems with broader risk of default.
This policy, now a cornerstone of our prudential arrangements, pre-dates even the foundation of the HKMA and evolved out of a productive dialogue between HKAB and the supervisor. It has survived strong political pressure for relaxation and market pressure for innovative credit risk transfer through securitisation. The policy – now nearly two decades old – fits in well with the macroprudential approach which, particularly in the light of the recent crisis, supervisors in other jurisdictions now consider to be essential to banking stability. The fact that no such policy existed in the advanced financial systems is remarkable enough. But what is more remarkable is the level of initiative of the Hong Kong banking sector itself in seeing the importance of systemic stability and giving it precedence over the profitability of individual institutions. We might therefore observe, in the light of this and of our experience over the past year, that Hong Kong has got it broadly right in the relationship between the supervisor and the banking system. However, this should not lead us to the complacent conclusion that there is nothing much that needs changing. And indeed, no such conclusion is in our minds. Both the  BIS Review 116/2009  1  Carse Report and the recent reports to the Financial Secretary on the Sale of Lehmanrelated products see room for development and improvement in the way we carry out our work.

The Swiss franc temporarily appreciated immediately following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The trade-weighted Swiss franc exchange rate, however, was recently below its level at the beginning of the year (cf. chart 4). Adjustment of the threshold factor I would now like to discuss the lowering of the threshold factor from 30 to 28 as mentioned earlier by Thomas Jordan. With this technical adjustment, which will take effect from 1 July 2022, we will ensure that sufficient amounts of sight deposits are subject to negative interest, and that the latter is being passed on to the money market as intended. From March 2022, upward pressure built up on the short-term rates on the secured money market. This stemmed from the fact that the exemption thresholds had risen over time due to the dynamic calculation model, which meant that there were no longer sufficient amounts of sight deposits subject to negative interest. To keep the secured short-term money market rates close to the SNB policy rate, the SNB provided additional liquidity to the money market via repo transactions as a temporary measure. However, given that the increase in exemption thresholds is structural in nature, it is appropriate that we lower the threshold factor. This will result in the secured short-term money market rates being close to the SNB policy rate again without the SNB having to regularly provide larger amounts of liquidity. The SNB will continue to regularly review the basis for calculating the exemption threshold and adjust it as necessary.
To restore confidence, we  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  need less complexity and more transparency. Not every portfolio or risk can be modelled. For these portfolios, we must use simple, standardised approaches. We must reduce the complexity of the model-based approaches to a level which allows both the banks’ supervisory bodies and the supervisory authorities to understand and review them within a reasonable period of time. Standard approaches should also be used here as a control variable and indicator for capital savings. •  Given the great number of regulatory measures, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger picture. We will therefore carry out a comprehensive analysis of the overall effect of regulatory measures. This project is already being planned and prepared by the Basel Committee. Such an exercise will do us good and will also be beneficial to the general debate on regulation, helping objectify it. I hope that this work will not only result a list of overlaps, duplication and other inefficiencies which we would subsequently clear up. I also expect that we will address unintended consequences of the new rules. In supervision, too, much needs to be changed. The crises of recent years did not come about solely because there were weaknesses in the regulatory framework. The supervision of banks did not function optimally, either.

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Because weather effects are by their nature temporary, the widely held expectation coming into the second quarter was that there would be a sharp rebound in growth similar to what took place last year. But current data suggests that the rebound has been relatively muted. I think this is because some of the non-weather factors evident in the first quarter – such as the drag from the sharp drop in oil and gas investment – have persisted into the second quarter. Also, real disposable income growth has slowed over the past three months as aggregate hours worked have grown more slowly and crude oil and gasoline prices have partially recovered. This means that the fundamentals for consumer spending are not as strong as they were at the beginning of the year. Nonetheless, my view is that growth will likely pick up further during the remainder of this year. This judgment reflects several factors. First, some of the forces that have been restraining growth are likely to fade later this year. For example, consider oil and gas investment. The U.S. oil and gas rig count dropped precipitously during the first quarter, but the rate of decline has slowed during the current quarter. Combined with the partial recovery in crude oil prices, this implies that oil and gas investment is likely to stabilize during the second half of the year. Second, business fixed investment outside of oil and gas seems likely to advance, reflecting strong fundamentals.

It is expensive to use, however, and in one way or another we all as bank customers pay for the use of it. For reasons of security and efficiency in retail payments, a more widespread use of cards would be desirable. Forces driving the development of the card payment market The forces of supply and demand shape the evolution of the card payment market in much the same manner as they influence the evolution of any other market. Demand is influenced by factors such as acceptance, convenience and relative prices. It has sometimes been argued that demand for payment instruments is not price elastic - that relative prices 1 do not greatly influence users' preferences for different payment instruments. The Nordic experience does not support this view. The rapid expansion of card payments and other electronically initiated instruments in Norway clearly point in a different direction. Norwegian consumers' shift of preferences followed immediately after banks' change of pricing strategy, where (among other changes) a price was put on the use of cash (as a small fee on ATM withdrawals). In Sweden, as previously noted, the use of checks fell sharply when banks started to charge for their use, although the charge was fairly small. Of course, good substitutes must be readily available. But if alternative ways of payment are present, fees seem to matter and matter a lot.
Since then, we have made significant progress in moving the unemployment rate back to a more normal number. Yet, at 6.1 percent, it remains too high. And, as we have heard all morning, other measures of labor market activity remain suppressed. We have underperformed on the inflation front as well. Since 2008, year-over-year total inflation as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index (PCE) has averaged just 1.4 percent, well below its 2 percent target. Today, PCE inflation stands at 1–1/2 percent and is expected to move up only slowly toward the FOMC’s target. Nonetheless, we have come a long way in healing the injuries the financial crisis inflicted. Certainly monetary policy has been doing some heavy lifting. The Federal Reserve responded quickly to the unfolding recession by cutting the fed funds rate to near zero by December 2008. At the zero lower bound (ZLB), we then turned to unconventional measures, such as large-scale asset purchases and forward guidance about the federal funds rate to provide further accommodation. In the fall of 2012, with the unemployment rate hovering stubbornly at around 8 percent and core inflation steadily drifting lower than our 2 percent target, the Fed introduced open-ended asset purchases and, later, forward guidance that related federal funds rate actions to thresholds explicitly expressed in terms of our policy goals. Together, these efforts have helped the economy make impressive progress toward our employment mandate and appear to be moving us closer to our 2 percent inflation target as well.

To give you the punch line, this research and work done by others in the field lead me to conclude that, although we have made great strides, a good deal of slack remains in the labor market. Labor force participation and employment As everyone in this room is aware, the labor force participation rate has fallen throughout the recession and recovery and is now at a 35-year low. 1 As Julie Hotchkiss described earlier this morning, it is well understood that much of the decline is due to trends that far predate the Great Recession. The movement of baby boomers into retirement age and the longrunning declines in teenager and prime-age male participation would have significantly reduced labor force participation rates independently of the economic downturn. Chicago Fed economists first did work on the prospects for a declining labor force participation trend back in 2001 – near the time the rate peaked at just over 67 percent. 2 Even after revisiting this topic numerous times and with multiple generations of research assistants running the programs, their views about the trends that are consistent with the composition of the population and a labor market near equilibrium have not changed much  1  The labor force participation rate is defined as the share of the population aged 16 and older who are either employed or unemployed. To be unemployed, a person has to not have a job but be actively looking for work in the prior four weeks and to be currently available to work.