samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another example is the recent agreement between the National Statistics Institute, the Tax Revenue Service, the Social Security and the Banco de España, as holders of a significant amount of administrative information and of granular data collected for statistical purposes, for the joint design of a collaborative data system to which researchers will have access, provided that the information to be used is for scientific purposes in the public interest. The purpose of this agreement is also to promote the future inclusion of other institutions that hold administrative records or other granular databases of research interest. It is our obligation as the participating authorities to put this agreement swiftly into practice, and to establish what might be an unprecedented landmark in information availability for economic research and evaluation purposes in Spain. The need to improve the economic and financial education of the population Quality data, technical ability, and analytical rigour and independence would thus seem to be the necessary ingredients for setting in place an assessment culture leading to the evidence-based formulation of public policies. In my view, this recipe will be like one for bread without yeast. A third key ingredient is needed: an appropriate economic and financial education for the public at large. With citizens able to critically internalise in their individual economic and financial decisions both the fundamental results of these independent evaluations and the various benefits and costs associated with different courses of action, it would be easier to set an assessment culture in place.

Caleb M Fundanga: Repatriation of bank notes between Zambia and Mozambique Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the Agreement on Repatriation of Bank Notes between the Bank of Mozambique and the Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 4 February 2009. *  *  *  • Your Excellency, the High Commissioner; • Governor Ernesto Gouveia Gove, Governor of the Bank of Mozambique; • Members of the Mozambican delegation; • Bank of Zambia staff present; • Distinguished Invited Guests; • Ladies and gentlemen: May I begin by extending a warm welcome to Governor Gove and members of the Mozambique delegation to Zambia in general and to this signing ceremony of the Agreement on the Repatriation of Bank Notes between the Bank of Mozambique and the Bank of Zambia, in particular. Governor, the existence of an extensive border between Mozambique and Zambia has resulted in significant cross-border trade as evidenced by the movement of people, goods and currencies across the border thereby strengthening our shared identity and background as Africans. I must however, hasten to mention that, the cross border trade has hitherto been hindered by the need for traders from both sides of the border to convert funds into United States Dollars and then convert funds back into the other currency when purchasing goods or services. By so doing, cross-border traders incur foreign exchange losses as well as other conversion costs in the process.
As we know, trade finance is an integral part of the global trading system and the paper-based system is very inefficient and prone to human errors and fraud. But then it has proved to be very difficult for the trade finance processes to be automated or digitalised mainly because multiple parties and banks in different jurisdictions are involved in a single trade transaction. Unless there is a common global standard for the digitisation of trade-related documents and a trusted central repository, it is pointless for any party or jurisdiction to change the paper-based system on its own. However, with the breakthrough of the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), we firmly believe that the time has come for trade finance to move into 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  the digital era. Together with a consortium of five banks in Hong Kong, the HKMA conducted in the second half of 2016 a proof-of-concept project on the use of DLT to build a trade finance platform in Hong Kong. I am pleased to announce that the proof-of-concept project has been successful in that it can digitise trade documents, automate the processes, allow sharing of required documentation among authorised participants, and reduce human errors and risks of fraud. We are therefore moving into the next phase of the project by developing a full production system. The consortium, now joined by two more banks, is in the process of conducting tender for the system development.

Yiu-kwan Choi: Basel II implementation in Asia Introductory remarks by Mr Yiu-kwan Choi, Deputy Chief Executive (Banking) of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the BCBS/FSI/EMEAP: Basel II Implementation in Asia, Hong Kong, 17 October 2007. *  *  *  Dear colleagues, Good morning. On behalf of the HKMA, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to you all here today to take part in this outreach event organized jointly by the Basel Committee, the FSI and EMEAP, focusing on the IRB validation aspect of the Basel II framework. The event coincides with one of the regular meetings of the Validation Subgroup of the Basel Committee’s Accord Implementation Group, which was held here over the last two days. The Validation Subgroup, or the AIGV as it is commonly called, is one of three subgroups under the AIG that share information and discuss specific issues related to Basel II implementation. The AIGV specifically explores issues related to the validation of systems used to generate the ratings and parameters that serve as inputs into the internal ratingsbased approach to credit risk. The AIGV has done some excellent work, using the regular AIGV meetings as an information dissemination platform for members of this Subgroup to explore various IRB validationrelated issues. The AIGV has also published several high quality supervisory guidance papers covering topics on validation of low-default portfolios, use of vendor products, use test and control expectations for validation under the Basel II IRB framework.
However, an important point that should not be forgotten is that the financial sector encompasses a wider scope than just banks. In fact, policymakers in ASEAN have been successful in enlarging the borders of our financial markets by developing more diverse sources of funding for the economy. This is best reflected in the building of deeper and more liquid bond markets arising from the experience of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. We are also seeing a shift in the financial landscape through the usage of technology, something that I will elaborate more on later. Thus, the term bankers without borders, should perhaps, be expanded to be finance without borders. Yet, despite the positive outcomes from these and the continued strong need for openness, the conviction for globalisation and international banking seems to be waning. For one, post the global financial crisis, we have seen the rationalisation of operations by many international banks. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  We read regularly on the prospects of trade protectionism, how globalisation has created widening inequality and how globalisation is like a train running out of control. No doubt, a key driver of the 2007/2008 financial crisis was indeed financial liberalisation going too far. Interestingly, some, including economists at the Bank of England have also begin to consider the theory of “peak finance” – that global finance has peaked and financial de-globalisation has begun, while others at the BIS have argued otherwise.

It requires firms which are strong in technology and know-how, with systematic managements and meritocratic practices, firms which can hold their own against foreign competition, and with the potential to grow into significant industry players. Even then, such firms will complement, not replace, foreign investments by MNCs. Following this philosophy, Singapore’s economic policies will therefore remain externally oriented. We will continue to push for free trade, welcome investments, and integrate into the global economy, even as we promote entrepreneurship and seek to build Singapore firms into regional players. The pressures of globalisation can be uncomfortable, and the changes they force upon us can be painful. But globalisation has helped us to build a stronger, more resilient economy, one better prepared to hold our own against formidable competitors, and deliver a high and rising standard of living for our population. On capital account liberalisation, countries are now acutely aware that sound macroeconomic management is a key prerequisite, without which no regime of exchange controls can deliver stability. They also realise that they must sequence liberalization judiciously, and strengthen financial supervision and prudential safeguards as they liberalize. In the aftermath of the crisis, no Asian country imposed capital controls, apart from Malaysia. But several tightened safeguards to reduce the risks of destabilising capital flows, and to shield domestic foreign exchange and money markets from speculative pressures emanating from abroad. They improved monitoring, and discouraged trading in currencies that was not related to the real economy.
This could be done by stating that we would hold the federal funds rate at extraordinarily low levels until particular markers were reached with regard to the unemployment rate and inflation. I will talk about this in more detail in a minute. Alternatively, I have previously discussed how state-contingent, price-level targeting would work in this regard.7 Another possibility might be to target the level of nominal GDP, with the goal of bringing it back to the growth trend that existed before the recession. I think these kinds of policies are worth seriously contemplating as ways to enhance economic growth and employment while maintaining a disciplined inflation performance. Policy problem Such conditional-trigger and level-targeting policies could result in inflation running at rates that would make us uncomfortable during normal times. I understand this discomfort. The difficulties in reestablishing credibility following the inflation of the 1970s weigh on all central bankers’ minds. And many of us are conditioned by the work of Ken Rogoff8 and others, who note that in normal times, we may want conservative central bankers as institutional offsets to what would otherwise be inflationary biases in the monetary policy process. Given this strong anti-inflationary orientation of central bankers, appropriate policy actions may face a credibility challenge of a different nature than we are used to talking about – can conservative central bankers be counted on to commit to keeping interest rates low in the event inflation rises above their long-run target?

What are the implications of these challenges or qualifications to what is, overall, a favorable picture of the strength of the U.S. financial system? One of the more persistent features of financial history is that discipline tends to ebb and flow to some degree with changes in financial and economic conditions. Even though we have seen a broad-based, secular improvement in risk management practices over the past decade, competitive pressure and the search for return in a low interest rate environment can lead to a relaxation of internal disciplines even as potential risk in the balance sheet increases. There are a number of factors that suggest these forces have not led to the build up of major imbalances that would present a major source of strain as these incentives diminish in a changing financial environment. Net borrowing by the non-financial corporate sector has been quite moderate, especially as compared with the late 1990s. The financial position of this sector is very strong, with declining leverage, particularly for smaller firms, which tend to be more highly levered. Credit to the household sector has of course risen quite considerably, but debt service burdens still look relatively manageable. Net credit growth to emerging market sovereigns has been quite moderate relative to past periods. While growth in commercial bank assets has picked up in recent quarters, it also remains below the pace of the late 1990s.
4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

When that finally materializes, I’ll view it as consistent with the result we are trying to achieve, and not a reason to pull back our policies prematurely. If you’re trying to get a car moving that is stuck in the mud, you don’t stop pushing the moment the wheels start turning – you keep pushing until the car is rolling and is clearly free. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
However it is without doubt also a result of activities like this, which introduce or staff to the relevant work that is done in academia and other central banks. Whether you are from Academia or central banks, we are grateful for your continued interest and thankful for your participation. We hope that you and your colleagues will continue to join our workshop in the future, hopefully, in a COVID free world. Hence, we can go back to our traditional ways of the past, and give you the opportunity to present your works at Bank of Albania, engage with our research and introduce yourself to our beautiful Tirana, Albanian culture and the delicious taste of Albanian cuisine. Wish you the best and the most productive event! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

The proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty has fallen from just under 40% to 10%. This rapid improvement in prosperity was made possible by the better use of the three factors needed for growth: labour, capital and technology. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  After 1990 we saw an increasingly international division of labour. Countries specialised in areas where they were particularly proficient compared with their trading partners. The manufacture of labour-intensive products was outsourced to countries with relatively low wage levels. This increasing division of labour resulted on the one hand in rising incomes, above all in the new production countries, and on the other hand in a decline in goods prices worldwide. This effect was strengthened further by international competition. With increasing economic integration, capital, the second factor influencing growth, could be invested globally. Foreign direct investment and loans helped in the construction of production facilities and infrastructures in the newly opened regions of the world. The high levels of savings in the advanced economies were thus put to productive use in the catch-up growth of these regions. That leaves the third factor: technology. The integration of the global economy led to a massive transfer of knowledge between countries, which greatly accelerated the economic development of the poorer nations. Furthermore, the growth in the number of people participating in the global economy meant that there were a lot more ideas and innovations.
Indicators Relating to Risk Premium JP Morgan EMBI+ Turkey Index  5 Ye a r C DS R a te s 1450  1100  1250 1050 850 650  900 700 500  450  300  27-Dec-05  27-Aug-05  27-Apr-05  27-Dec-04  27-Aug-04  27-Apr-04  27-Dec-03  27-Aug-03  27-Apr-03  100 27-Aug-02  50  27-Dec-02  250  Source: Bloomberg. Interest rates remained unchanged in the first quarter of 2006. However, a reduction by 25 basis points was made in April. The consistency of data relating to inflation and economic activity, which were released in the first four months of the year, with Central Bank forecasts specified in the first  12  BIS Review 67/2006  Inflation Report allowed us to act in compliance with the policy perspective that was shared with the public. The benchmark interest rate in the ISE, which has been realized under the overnight borrowing rate since October 2005, displayed a slight increase in March due to the stagnation in interest rate reductions, global liquidity conditions and domestic uncertainties (Graph 19). Graph 19.

The background here is that the policy is currently associated so strongly with a single person, Alan Greenspan, and there is concern about what will happen after him. To me, proposals of this kind about a more pragmatic policy seem rather naive. Policy principles that are less clear-cut, combined with a less transparent basis for decisions, by no means guarantee a BIS Review 98/2000  6  successful policy in the longer run. Just the reverse, I would say in the light of many years of decision-making in economic policy. One of the most important things to do in work of this type is try to build up distinct processes whereby a foundation for decisions based on sound economic analysis is produced systematically and then subjected to as broad a scrutiny as possible. One will then at least have provided conditions for consistent and wise decisions. That in turn is fundamental for all credibility in monetary policy, too. I believe, moreover, that decisions should be made in ways that contribute to insight and afford good opportunities of evaluating them and exacting accountability. These are requirements I consider people in Sweden should be entitled to make of an institution which has been given such a strong and independent status as the Riksbank. The current monetary policy situation Let me conclude by briefly presenting my view of current economic developments and their implications for monetary policy. For a couple of years now the Riksbank has had reason to count on rising economic activity.
BIS Review 21/2009  5  Giving these responsibilities to the Bank is the right choice because they build on the role the Bank already has as LOLR in crisis handling (which nearly always involves a crisis of liquidity). More generally it provides a statutory basis for the Bank’s second core purpose – financial stability – which was not mentioned in the 1998 Act and appeared something of an orphan in the Bank when supervision moved to the FSA. Over the last 18 months of course that has changed and the Bank is now closely involved with the FSA in monitoring and intervening in banks and markets facing stress, as well as reviewing the risks to financial stability more widely and playing a role in forming international policy through bodies like the G20 and the FSF. In effect the Bank has become a second pair of eyes alongside the FSA watching the health of the financial system. The FSA, as the regulator, is informed by “bottom up” knowledge of the position of individual institutions; the Bank is informed by a top down view drawing on its own engagement in many markets and on its analysis of the wider economy. We come together to monitor institutions when they become vulnerable. Some argue that we should go further and move prudential supervision – at least of the main banks - back into the Bank.

BIS Review 21/2009  13  Bank of England  Stabilisation  MoU  Equity & Efficiency  Regulation  FSA  HM Treasury  Chart 2 : The Great Stability Variance of inflation  ( )A  ld  De jure gold standard (1855-1913)  Floating of the pound to inflation targeting (1972-1992)  Bretton Woods (1948-1972) Inter-war period (1922-1939) Inflation targeting (1992-2004)  0  1  2  3  Chart 3: Consumption Growth  14  4  Variance of6output 5  7  Chart 4: Indicators of labour market tightness  BIS Review 21/2009  Percentage changes on a year earlier 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2  1973 Q3 1980 Q1 1990 Q3 2008Q3 -16  -12  -4 -6 -8  -4  0  4  8  12  16  Chart 5 : Change in leverage ratios of the major UK banks(a),(b),(c) Maximum-minimum range Interquartile range  Change in ratio 40  Median  35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  S o urc e : P ublis he d a c c o unts a nd B a nk c a lc ula tio ns .
By purchasing commercial paper, it offers to provide short-term loans – loans that will need to be paid back – to companies of investment grade standing before the virus disruption. It provides an alternative – backstop – source of finance for larger companies in the event that markets are disrupted. The Scheme has lent £ to 68 companies. More importantly, it has also authorised borrowing limits amounting to £ to 199 companies accounting for nearly 2.3 million jobs. The knowledge that this backstop to funding markets is there removes the need for larger companies to run to the banks to insure themselves against market disruption. By standing ready to lend to larger companies, we have protected the space banks have to lend to the wider population of companies. Financial Response II: Support for bank lending  The package of measures to support bank lending has gone much further than just protecting their capacity to lend. [See slide 4 of accompanying deck]  Banks have been given the funding for new lending. The Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs (TFSME), provides 4 year funding for banks, at rates very close to Bank Rate, to match any increase in lending. The scheme provides additional incentives for lending to small and medium sized businesses, with £ of cheap funding for every £ increase in such lending. Crucially, the Government has provided banks with guarantees on new lending. The Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Schemes guarantee 80% of new lending by banks.

Further to this, in the Q&A on the use of liquidity and capital buffers, the PRA set out its general expectation that any required rebuild of capital buffers would be gradual, and that banks would not be expected to restore their capital buffers in full until a significant time after the end of the current stress. 8 See May 2020 interim Financial Stability Report 7  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  The financial system is well on the way to filing the financing needs of businesses. [See slide 4 of  accompanying deck]  By no means all the additional finance to preserve productive capacity has yet been delivered, particularly given the limited appetite many businesses may have to run down their cash buffers in the face of uncertainty. Fuel must continue to be injected. And the fuel may need something extra to be added. That additive is equity. The case for equity  There are at least three reasons for adding more equity finance to the mix. First, half of the cash-flow deficit we have identified is accounted for by companies with net debt already more than four times their regular earnings. Although the UK’s corporate sector did not, as a whole, go into this crisis with a stretched balance sheet, a material subset of companies had levered up.