samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Chart 1: Unemployment and wage growth since 1971 35 Per cent  Chart 2: Stylised decomposition of four quarter wage growth Other  Unemployment  Percentage points  Productivity  30  Wage growth  5  Wage growth (per cent)  4.5  25  4  20  3.5 3  15  2.5 2  10  1.5  5  1 0.5  -5  1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016  0  0  2001-07  2010-12  2013-17Q2  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Notes: Whole economy average weekly earnings (AWE), total pay. Unemployment rate for 16+ population. Average whole-economy AWE growth. Productivity per worker is based on the backcast for the final estimate of GDP. The decomposition assumes a one-for-one relationship between productivity growth and wage growth over these periods.

19 20 21  For example, Nagel, S and Malmendier, U (2011) Stiglitz (1997) has described a similar process for the price Phillips curve based on asymmetric price adjustment. See Borio and Filardo (2007). 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Mark Carney has pointed out how global influences will shift the Phillips curve both lower (due to the positive supply shock from increased product and labour market integration) and flatter (due to integration of global value chains, increased competition and contestability of product and labour markets). The downward shifts, which will persist as long as integration continues, are disinflationary, pointing to running the domestic economy at tighter spare capacity to meet the inflation target. 22  For the policymaker a flattening of the Phillips curve poses a more difficult challenge than under-measurement of labour utilisation or a lowering of the natural rate or of inflation or real pay expectations (Chart 9). The latter pose the challenge of judging the timing of policy action right; excess (deficient) demand for labour will drive pay up (down) as before as unemployment falls (rises). But the point – i.e. the level of unemployment and the rate of growth of pay – at which that will happen is lower. Getting the timing of monetary policy right is a formidable challenge for the monetary policy maker. But it is a familiar one.
More generally, we know that the global economy operates under an important constraint – the sum of trade balances around the world, properly measured, must add up to zero. When one country follows policies that are designed to increase exports, there must be an offsetting adjustment elsewhere – either higher imports or fewer exports by another country. Similarly, there is the same adding up constraint in terms of the financial flows that accompany trade and investment on the capital account – current account balances around the world – again properly measured – must add up to zero. What this means in practical terms is that the outcomes for economic activity and capital flows for any individual country depend not only on the public policy and private decisions made within that country, but also on policies and mix of activities pursued in other countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  For example, for Germany to have a large trade surplus with the rest of Europe, other European countries must run trade deficits. And if Germany runs such surpluses it must accumulate large financial claims on the other countries. Or, if the U.S. has an unsustainably high level of consumption, the adjustment to a lower, more sustainable level must be offset by greater investment and exports if the U.S. economy is to be able to operate close to full employment. The fact that it takes (at least) two to tango to make these types of adjustments is just another way of saying that our economies are interconnected.

Arthur Yuen: Welcome remarks - HKMA Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Technology Forum Welcome remarks by Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Regulatory Technology (RegTech) Forum (Excerpt), Hong Kong, 22 November 2019. * * * 1. First of all let me welcome you all to this AML/CFT Regtech Forum, which we intend to be the first in a series. 2. In particular let me thank everyone for the very positive response and participation of key stakeholders including the FinTech Association of Hong Kong, experts, academia, other regulators as well as our partners in government bureaux, Companies Registry, Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and Hong Kong Association of Banks. 3. Let me start with a question that speaks to why we are all here today: how effective are we, really, in our important role in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing? We all recognise the efforts of the banking sector over many years – and continuing today – in helping to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This has recently been praised by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which gave us a very good score card in its Mutual Evaluation Report on Hong Kong. 4. But, despite the mutual evaluation result, no system is perfect and most of the challenges we face – money laundering from fraud, tax crimes and corruption to name but a few – are global in nature.
The domestic legislative and regulatory requirements are largely in place, and firms have provided their plans to implement them in time for the government’s 2019 deadline. Firms are working to implement the plans. There are many challenges ahead. We will work closely with firms as they change their structures and transfer business activity, assets and liabilities between entities. They must manage the impacts on customers, employees and other stakeholders. The implementation process coincides with a period of heightened uncertainty before the UK – and therefore the banking system – adjusts to a new relationship with the European Union. I won’t pretend this is a perfectly happy coincidence: in an ideal world we would not restructure our banking system and extricate ourselves from the EU at the same time. But the execution risks of managing these changes simultaneously are outweighed by the benefits of increasing firms’ resolvability and removing the public subsidy from banks. So it is full steam ahead. Alongside ring-fencing, the other major reform which is progressing through implementation, and is key to making big banks resolvable without recourse to the taxpayer, is bail-in. Here in the UK work on this is being led by my colleague Sir Jon Cunliffe, and we will shortly publish our final policy. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  At these two frontiers, and across the whole reform programme, we must secure the progress that has been made as memories of the last crisis fade.

My sense is that presently, we could do this: (a)  While still maintaining the attractiveness of investing in Treasury and agency securities relative to other highly liquid sovereign markets and not sparking significant increases in rates;  (b)  Simultaneously providing some alleviation of the collateral shortage we have helped create, and;  (c)  Reducing the need for the New York desk to perform the complicated jujitsu we at the FOMC have tasked it with in creating alternative strategies that stretch its traditional mandate and which may give further rise to congressional criticism of the Federal Reserve and a New York Fed that some influential lawmakers already consider to be either too big for its britches or not being able to fill out its suit. This would make crystal clear to Congress and the public our stated desire to make the ON RRP facility a temporary one that will be eliminated when it is no longer necessary. Mind you, the above proposition does not imply any rush to raise the fed funds rate or its equivalents, such as the rate on excess reserves. That will depend on progress made toward meeting our dual objectives of maintaining price stability around the FOMC’s 2 percent target while facilitating full employment. Nor should it be interpreted as a criticism of the very able people we have on the trading desk: I hold them in highest regard; they perform their duty admirably.
The fiscal response was swift and substantial. Within the span of a hundred days, the government announced four Budgets amounting to $ billion – by far, the largest fiscal outlay in Singapore’s history. Abstracting from the capital set aside for loan guarantees, $ billion will be injected into the economy. The key focus is to provide businesses and households with cash support to weather the COVID-19 storm: Wage subsidies to help firms keep their workers employed; Property and income tax rebates to help ease cash flows for businesses; and Cash transfers to households, especially the lower-income. The second aspect of government support is providing SMEs access to affordable credit. The government is sharing the risk on loans to SMEs by banks and finance companies by absorbing 90 cents for every dollar of loan loss. MAS has launched a facility to lend to banks and finance companies at 0.1% for a tenure of two years, for them to on-lend to SMEs. The formula is simple, with each party doing what it is best at: the government underwrites most of the risk of lending; the central bank provides low-cost funding; and the banks decide who to lend to based on their credit assessment. 4 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  The third initiative is to provide temporary legislative protection for businesses and individuals who are unable to fulfil certain contractual obligations due to COVID-19. This includes temporary reliefs on loans to SMEs secured against property or businessrelated fixed assets as well as hire purchase agreements.

The priority in structural reform must be the rapid dissemination of these technological advances throughout society. And yes, because people expect too much from the ECB, if other actors rein in their efforts whenever we take action. We are seeing less of an effort on the public finance side. The ECB made it possible to avoid an outright depression in 2012 and 2013, and even the break-up of the euro. It will pursue an accommodative monetary policy for as long as is necessary. Without giving a date, this timescale is fairly long. It’s a long lasting endeavour. Additional risks have arisen from the slowdown in the emerging countries, risks that are pretty significant for the euro area. There are also downward pressures on prices in the manufacturing sector as a result of surplus output and the very high unemployment level. But monetary policy alone will not solve all the problems. Is the situation in Greece under control now? Discussions are ongoing and are still intensive at the political and technical levels, but the will to succeed is there and the atmosphere of the discussions has improved considerably. It is distinctly more positive than it was at the beginning of the year. A great deal of progress has already been made through these negotiations. Significant reforms have been voted in. The banks will be able to be recapitalised. Nevertheless, the situation remains very fragile in this country. After the debt crisis, isn’t the migration crisis the next threat to European cohesion?
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Vision of Asia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) – “Vision of Asia Award Acceptance Speech”, London, 30 June 2010. *  *  *  It is my great honour to be here today to receive this Vision of Asia Award from the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF). I would like to thank Lord Desai, for his generous introduction and the advisory board of OMFIF for this recognition. As a policy maker from an emerging economy in Asia – for almost three decades – it has been both exhilarating and most rewarding. While being challenged to the limit, in particular, during the Asian financial crisis, the Asian economies have now emerged stronger and more resilient. This decade has seen a dramatic change in the nature of the globalisation process. As this process intensifies, Asian economies have demonstrated their flexibility to adjust and respond to the opportunities and challenges that have emerged. The initial wave of globalisation was in the form of trade. This was followed by the globalisation of corporations and more recently by the globalisation of financial flows. The recent global financial and economic crisis has called for the globalisation of policy given the limits for policy at the national level and the need to address cross border developments that have implications on the domestic financial system and hence the domestic economy.

It will also expand the options for investors and borrowers and thus, contribute to more efficient allocation of financial resources across borders. In addition, the development of the capital markets in the Asia region will have the important role in channelling part of the sizable savings of Asia back into productive investments in the region. With greater liberalisation of the financial sector and the capital account, and the increased linkages of the national payments systems in Asia, and the greater presence of regional institutions in the individual domestic financial systems, the trend for increased financial flow within the region will continue. Given Asia’s favourable economic prospects and more developed financial market, Asia is already attracting volatile capital flows. The route that Asia is taking to forge greater financial integration will however be different from that of Europe. Unlike in the European Union, Asia has not ventured to have centralised institutions to coordinate financial integration. Rather, it has leveraged on existing regional groupings and existing networks to forge greater collaboration in areas of common interest. Secondly, a common currency is not on Asia’s medium term agenda. To minimise exchange rate risks and facilitate intra-regional trade and investment, countries have ventured into arrangements to use domestic currencies for trade settlements. Let me touch on policy and strategies adopted in Asia. Asia has tended to not adhere to rigid ideologies but rather focus on institutional building and financial market development, strengthening of the payment systems and the regulatory and supervisory framework.
Although we have seen marked improvements in the critical areas of capital, liquidity, and resolution, we have not yet fully addressed the root causes of many of the problems that have plagued the financial sector. I am thinking of not only the excessive risk-taking and leverage in the run-up to the crisis, but also the repeated scandals related to LIBOR, FX, money laundering, sales practices; unfortunately, the list goes on and on. Underlying these scandals is often an inadequate corporate culture, where accountability and ethical conduct have fallen by the 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  wayside. The good times we’re in can exacerbate these problems in three ways. First, there’s a risk of complacency setting in—an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality. Second, in a strong economy, the hard numbers that we tend to focus on when examining profits, losses, capital, and liquidity can look like everything’s coming up roses, even when an uncomfortable reality lies beneath. And, finally, culture is a long-run investment that takes many years to develop and requires constant reinforcement to preserve. If you let it erode, you can’t go to the market and obtain a new “culture” overnight. As I mentioned, establishing a more robust regulatory framework was absolutely necessary for a healthier, more resilient financial system. But, it is far from sufficient. The danger we face today is that people may conclude that the hardened defenses are enough, and other supervisory activities around culture, conduct, and governance are superfluous.

13  Ryan, R., O’Toole, C. and McCann, F. (2014), “Does bank market power affect SME financing constraints?”, Journal of Banking and Finance. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  other words, it creates the conditions for diversity and competition within the sector so that an optimal market structure can evolve. Conclusion Let me conclude. Repairing bank lending channel after a major financial crisis is inevitably a long and difficult process. Monetary policy has an important role to play, but the agenda is also broader: it involves supply and demand factors, and multiple aspects of national and European policy. The steps we have taken so far to strengthen the banking sector are necessary conditions for a stronger recovery in credit, and I am confident that we will see increasingly positive effects. But as banks transition to a new business environment, ensuring that they continue to have microeconomic incentives that coincide with our desired macroeconomic objectives is essential, as is developing a banking landscape that is sufficiently efficient and diversified to sustain credit supply. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Private consumption has been enhanced by wage growth and a low unemployment rate. However, it must be noted that while consumption of non-durables and services has remained relatively stable, durable goods consumption has recovered, partly due to the appreciation of the peso during the last year, and the necessary replenishment of inventories following several years of weak growth and even contraction. Something similar is observed with gross fixed capital formation in machinery and equipment. Excluding the purchase of non-regular transport machinery, this component of investment has improved in recent months. 8. In our baseline scenario, gross fixed capital formation will experience a slightly positive growth in 2017, after three consecutive years of contraction. A key factor in the negative figures we have seen the last few years is the end of the mining investment cycle, which reached its peak in 2012. More recently the deterioration of housing construction has added, as the boom triggered by tax incentives finished and a modification of loan-to-value norms reduced home sales. Going forward, our forecasts rely on an increase in non-mining and non-residential investment (mainly machinery and equipment). While mining investment will eventually return to positive territory during 2018, the gradual adjustment in residential investment is expected to continue during the following quarters (figure 5).

For a small country like Singapore with limited human capital, the single agency model allows MAS to more effectively utilise available expertise and exploit synergies to achieve our objectives for the financial sector and wider economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  And like the blending of British and tropical themes in the bungalows, bringing together central banking, integrated supervision, and developmental functions serves important practical purposes. First, being an integrated supervisor gives us better insights into the full range of activities that a financial institution engages in and hence facilitates more holistic financial supervision. Integrated supervision is consistent with the broad range of services that financial institutions provide as well as the blurring of distinctions across financial products that we see today. •  Banks offer their clients a suite of financial services, including investment and insurance products. •  Insurance companies offer financial planning solutions that incorporate elements of savings deposits and investments, in addition to protection. There are synergies across prudential regulation and market conduct regulation. Market conduct issues provide useful perspectives on the prudential safety and soundness of individual firms. How financial institutions treat their customers speaks a great deal about their corporate values, ethical standards, and quality of risk management and internal controls. Second, being a central bank and a financial regulator allows us to harness synergies between macroeconomic analysis and financial stability oversight.
11  Moreover, recent revisions, lowered the level of output by around 0.3% in the third quarter of 2015 compared to the previous data vintage. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Chart 5: Headline growth rate has moderated 3.5 3.0  2.0 1.5  Per cent  2.5  1.0 0.5  GDP growth (oya) Average within each calendar year Sep 15  Jun 15  Mar 15  Dec 14  Sep 14  Jun 14  Mar 14  Dec 13  Sep 13  Jun 13  Mar 13  Dec 12  Sep 12  Jun 12  Mar 12  Dec 11  Sep 11  Jun 11  Mar 11  Dec 10  Sep 10  Jun 10  Mar 10  0.0  Source: ONS and Bank calculations. Chart 6: Household consumption has accelerated despite slowing headline growth 3.5  GDP growth (oya)  3.0  Household consumption growth (oya)  2.5 2.0 1.0 0.5  Per cent  1.5  0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5 Sep 15  Jun 15  Mar 15  Dec 14  Sep 14  Jun 14  Mar 14  Dec 13  Sep 13  Jun 13  Mar 13  Dec 12  Sep 12  Jun 12  Mar 12  Dec 11  Sep 11  Jun 11  Mar 11  Dec 10  Sep 10  Jun 10  Mar 10  -2.0  Source: ONS and Bank calculations.

The MPC’s current policy horizon of around two years reflects our judgment of how best to balance these persistent forces while implying a slightly tighter stance of monetary policy, all else equal. Since monetary policy operates with a lag, it must be forward looking.8 As a result, monetary policy will continue to depend on economic prospects not the calendar. The UK’s prospects must be assessed in the light of an unusually uncertain supply side of the economy.9 The financial crisis upended the certainties of the pre-crisis years when productivity progressed predictably and labour supply expanded at a steady pace. Productivity growth fell markedly after the crash and, though recently picking up, now seems  7  Indeed, Lord King’s letter to the Chancellor noted that this would also have entailed risking an undershoot of inflation in the medium term once temporary factors had abated. 8  Estimates of the effects of monetary policy rely on plausible ways of identifying monetary policy shocks. There is a large literature on this, which seeks to quantify the “long and variable lags” suggested by Friedman. Examples include Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Uhlig (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2007). Estimates for the UK include those in Burgess et al (2013) and Cloyne and Hurtgen (2014). Such estimates typically refer to unanticipated changes in interest rates.