samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In my view, this is not an area for regulatory prescription - there is not a unique organizational model that would be most effective for every bank. Rather, we look to see whether a compliance function achieves certain goals in addressing a firm’s specific compliance risk challenges. •  First, is it structured so that compliance staff can carry out their responsibilities with appropriate independence? Compliance staff may be embedded within business lines or have reporting lines to branch management or to country heads. But whatever the reporting line, they must have the capacity and incentives - monetary and otherwise - to critically evaluate operations, and they must have resources and support when problem areas are identified. •  A second, and related, question is: do local compliance staff have strong linkages to, and the backing of, head office compliance…and through head office compliance to global senior management and the board of directors? •  Third, does the structure support the development and implementation of sound monitoring and testing programs? Testing of course is a “point-in-time” event, but monitoring is very much an ongoing process. We have generally found that monitoring and testing tends to be one of the weaker components of many firms’ compliance risk management programs. •  A fourth question is whether the volume and quality of compliance resources is appropriate. This is obviously more than just a body count, but an assessment as well of whether the firm has staff with the appropriate technical skills to carry out the necessary sophisticated analysis.

Even in the absence of a clear definition and a consensus on a numerical benchmark, it became clear that a high-enough level of real convergence is a prerequisite for minimising the costs associated with losing monetary policy independence after euro adoption. Recent years have shown that the euro area is not a cosy place for economies with lagging competitiveness or rigid markets. We should not forget that euro adoption involves a permanent commitment, as Otmar Issing, the first ECB chief economist, pointed out. Romania made significant progress in terms of real convergence, with growth resuming and gaining momentum after the global economic crisis. This led to a rise in GDP per capita as a percentage of euro area average (based on PPS) from 31.7 percent in 2005 to 58.6 percent in 2017. The advance was the fastest within the group of peer countries which recorded similar trends. Clear prospects for EU entry favoured Romania’s real convergence before 2007. Afterwards, actual membership in the EU “convergence club” has fuelled the catching-up process. The obvious next stage is joining the euro area. A successful adoption of the single currency, however, requires optimal timing. This, as I pointed out before, is mainly conditional upon achieving a high-enough level of real convergence, alongside compliance with the nominal convergence criteria. Unlike the EU, the euro area is not a “convergence club”, as its current members did not necessarily increase their convergence level after adopting the euro.
What would happen, for instance, if several credit events were to occur simultaneously? Perhaps there would suddenly be only sellers and no buyers in the market. Then prices will plummet. This was the case during the Russian debt crisis in 1998, for instance, when the LTCM hedge fund suffered problems. A crisis of  4  BIS Review 24/2007  this nature risks spreading rapidly to other financial markets and possibly threatening the lending banks. Such situations do not last particularly long, as buyers always appear when prices fall. This was also the case after the LTCM crisis. Remember also that the credit derivatives market and the market for the underlying bonds are tightly interwoven. If the premiums on credit derivatives increase substantially, this will mean that at the same time the return on the underlying bonds increases. Unless something important has happened that affects the credit rating of the company that has issued the bonds, it will sooner or later become profitable to buy them – or to buy the credit derivatives. Several large-scale credit events in recent years, such as the downgrading of Ford’s and GM’s credit ratings last spring, have also shown that more or less serious problems could be solved without liquidity in the market being affected to any great extent. 4. Risk of mispricing  Finally, I would like to bring up the risk of mispricing, a risk that in many respects is closely related to the liquidity risk.

Lars Nyberg: Credit derivatives – risks and opportunities Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a meeting at StartegiTorget Bank, Finans & Försäkring, Stockholm, 13 March 2007. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and speak about the risks and opportunities offered by credit derivatives. Credit derivatives may appear complicated, but the principles as to how they work are essentially simple. They are a type of insurance, nothing else. A person who owns a house runs the risk that the house may burn down. A person lending money runs the risk that the borrower will not pay back the loan. The house-owner usually wants to sign a home insurance policy covering the risk of fire and is happy to pay a premium for this. The bank lending money may correspondingly – although banks are actually specialised in managing credit risk – wish to sign a credit insurance to dispose of the credit risk, wholly or partly. The bank then also has to pay an insurance premium. A credit derivative is quite simply a modern form of credit insurance, adapted for trade in the financial markets. Trade in credit derivatives has expanded enormously in recent years, which of course implies that credit derivatives offer advantages to their users. At the same time, a debate on the potential risks for the financial system has arisen and interest from the supervisory authorities and central banks has increased.
That said, the Bank has been greatly encouraged by the progress of on-going efforts in the industry to ensure that all companies are fully competent through mandatory AML/CFT training programmes conducted by the Association. Steps being taken to require all compliance officers in the industry to be accredited or certified by recognised professional accreditation and certification bodies will mark another important milestone for the industry. Conclusion Innovation is ultimately a collaborative process whether it is between individuals within an organization coming together to develop new ideas to give the firm a competitive advantage; or between companies to share common utilities between policymakers to create conditions that encourage innovation or between industry, governments and multilateral institutions to deepen knowledge and advance policies that increase the impact of innovation on growth and development. The best ideas, and more importantly the ability to put them into practice, will come from our ability to overcome natural instincts to erect protective barriers, and to open up individual companies, institutions and economies to new possibilities that can make us more successful, more competitive and more inclusive over the longer term. This conference is a valuable opportunity for the industry to exchange ideas and reflect on how innovation – not just technological but all facets of innovation – can create a game-changing impact in the industry. On that note, I wish you highly productive and fruitful discussions over the next two days. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 1  © Globe Cartoon  Chart 2 Switzerland’s foreign trade, 2000−2015  Source: Swiss Customs Administration  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3 Interest and exchange rates, 2008−2011  Chart 4 Monetary base from 2008 to the present day  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Chart 5 Interest and exchange rates from 2012 to the present day  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches
At its core, attracting and nurturing the right talent is crucial for any organisation of the future. Thus, it is critical to begin thinking beyond policies for short-term recovery and start the task of building a future of work that is safer, fairer and greener. "Building back better" calls for increased policy coherence, particularly between economic employment and social policies, and a whole-of-society approach. My remarks today seek to explore three strategies on how we may futureproof our talent workforce: 1) equipping the workforce with the right skills; 2) employing a "good jobs strategy"; and 3) strengthening collaboration among ecosystem partners. Equipping the workforce with new skillsets that are relevant and practical for future needs With greater adoption of technology, in-demand skills across jobs in Malaysia will shift over the next few years. The skills gaps will continue to widen. By 2025, half of all employees will need reskilling. Even for workers who remain in existing roles, 40% of core skills will need to change to remain relevant. A sizeable number of jobs will be replaced or become obsolete. This means individuals need to continuously learn new skills to be indispensable and grasp new opportunities. This means access to comprehensive upskilling and learning infrastructures are essential, whether at an individual, organisation or industry-wide level. And this means, lifelong learning is a must for everyone in the workforce. In the financial sector, we too face this challenge.

This includes expansion of gig workers, increased remote or flexible working arrangements, and a dynamic workforce with more frequent career switches. We have already witnessed, for example, a rise in digital nomads who travel freely and work remotely. Third, an ageing population and the need for diverse participation. Malaysia is swiftly ageing, requiring changes in the labour market policies to cater to an older working segment as well as encouraging higher workforce participation among women and other minority groups. At the same time, we need to resolve the issue of relatively higher unemployment rates among youths. And fourth, the growing generational gap in the workforce. Up to four different generations now coexist in many workplaces. Each have varying perspectives on leadership, learning and workplace culture. We can thus expect a host of opportunities, but also the need the navigate deep-seated differences. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The digital revolution is expected to increase our labour productivity by 30% and create up to 500,000 jobs by 2025. However, the reconfiguration also poses challenges. The need for specialised skills can lead to a widening talent gap, if left unaddressed. Already, 51% of firms surveyed by BNM faced difficulty in hiring workers, largely due to mismatches of skills for the mid and high-skilled segments1. What does this mean for us? Looking ahead, the local and global outlook means organisations need to embrace the 'new normal' by adopting new business models to address overall productivity and challenges at work.
Mr. Heikensten discusses recent economic and monetary policy developments in Sweden Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikensten, at the Local Authorities Economics Seminar in Malmö on 19/8/98. Thank you for the invitation to attend this Seminar and talk about the Swedish economy and monetary policy. I shall begin with a brief account of how the Riksbank operates with its inflation target. In that context I shall also be saying something about economic policy’s results in recent years. Then I shall consider the Riksbank’s appraisal of the Swedish economy, as presented in our latest inflation report last June, together with subsequent economic tendencies. Finally I shall be returning to the somewhat longer perspective of my opening section. This will tie in with the theme of the seminar and highlight some factors that are of crucial importance for our success in creating a potential for future economic expansion. 1. Inflation target policy—how does it work? The objective of monetary policy is to keep the value of money stable. This has been defined more specifically as keeping the annual rate of inflation (measured as the change in the Consumer Price Index) at 2 per cent. Around this target there is a tolerance interval of ±1 percentage point which serves to accommodate normal deviations that arise, for instance, from transitory impulses. But the possibility of larger deviations than this cannot be ruled out.

This contagion may not be fully in any individual firm's interests - or powers - to resolve, and it is this 'gap in the market' which creates the need for public involvement via central banks. Fortunately, banking crises do not occur every day of the week. But they do happen: an IMF study counted 54 across the world between 1975 and 1997, of which 12 were in developed countries. Such crises can have enormously harmful effects: recent Bank of England analysis suggested that, over the past quarter century, total output losses during banking crises have averaged around 15-20% of GDP in the countries in which they occurred. Whilst the Bank has responsibility for maintaining systemic stability, the day-to-day supervision of individual banks and other financial firms in the UK has been the responsibility of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) since 1997. Co-ordinating our system-wide perspective with the FSA's supervision of individual institutions and the Treasury's legislative responsibilities is essential to the smooth functioning of the new arrangements. A Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Bank, the FSA and the Treasury in October 1997, sets out our respective responsibilities, both in 'normal' times, and in a crisis. And we work hard to foster these relationships, helped by the fact that I am a member of the FSA Board and Howard Davies is a non-executive director of the Bank. The three institutions also get together each month in the so-called 'tripartite Standing Committee' to exchange information and discuss current threats to financial stability.
Conduits and SIVs have no capital of their own, and they depend heavily on the liquidity support and credit enhancement from their sponsor banks, whose terms, and conditions, as I said, may  1  2  Market Liquidity and Short Term credit : The Financial Crisis of August 2007 ; 3 September 2007. BIS Review 128/2007  be variable and uncertain. And yet, they undertook maturity transformation on a significant scale. So those risks which materialized directly translated into liquidity shortage. Conversely, the reason why most hedge funds weathered the shock – at least until now – may be that they managed to strengthen their capital base by imposing strict redemption rules to their investors. Strong capital will not guarantee liquidity in all circumstances. There can be panics and sudden increases in the demand for liquidity. That's the job of Central Banks to help in those circumstances. But a strong capital base in the system – and in all its components – is likely to limit future liquidity shocks. In the period to come, Central Banks, regulators and market participants will debate on the ways and means to restore the securitized model on a robust and sound basis. The implementation of Basel II will bring significant improvements in the measure and management of risks. Had it been into place some years ago, we may have avoided some of the problems we currently face. Other evolutions in the regulatory environment and business practices may prove necessary.

With respect to stock prices, the S&P 500 index has recovered by more than 50 percent from the trough reached in March. But this should be put in context. The S&P 500 index is still about one-third below its recent peak in October 2007. Moreover, compared with its level ten years ago, the S&P 500 index is down by about 20 percent. The shock to household net worth seems likely to have several important implications for household behavior. The shock creates a risk that the household saving rate could increase further. For example, during the period from 1990 to 1992, the household saving rate averaged about 7 percent of disposable personal income, considerably higher than the 4.3 percent average rate during the first half of this year. If the household saving rate were to rise, then consumption would rise more slowly than income, making it more difficult for the economy to develop strong forward momentum. In addition, it seems likely that some workers will respond to the wealth shock by postponing their retirement. This suggests that the labor force participation rate may rise once labor market conditions improve. This would tend to push up the unemployment rate, all else being equal. The second force that could restrain the recovery is the fiscal outlook. The fiscal stimulus that is currently providing support to economic activity is temporary rather than permanent. This has to be the case if we are to ensure that fiscal policy is on a sustainable path over the longrun.
To offset this expense and obtain an equilibrium or surplus that allows debt to be contained and reduced, significant primary surpluses must be run; but this may affect activity and employment if, for example, fiscal policy involves taxation levels or specific taxes that adversely affect growth, or lower levels of productive spending. Moreover, a high level of public debt reduces the ability of fiscal policy to play a countercyclical role, which is a particularly valuable lever to have in a monetary union, where exchange rate adjustments vis-à-vis other members of the union cannot be made. It is vital to see through fiscal consolidation in order to preserve the gains in credibility already achieved, ensuring the fulfilment of fiscal targets by all tiers of government and the application of the mechanisms of the Budgetary Stability Law. From a medium and longterm perspective, budgetary and fiscal consolidation requires taking into account other factors, including the composition of the adjustment, in an attempt to pave the way for a greater contribution of public finances to growth, making headway in the rationalisation and efficiency of spending and, also, of the tax basket. We must also take into account the impact of population ageing on public finances, in particular through spending on pensions.

The reforms since 2011 to the public pension system (the progressive raising of the retirement age; the definition of a sustainability factor linking the initial pension to changes in life expectancy; the introduction of a new pension indexation system; and the segregation from the system of specific non- contributory pensions that should be financed through general taxes and not through social security contributions) have been in the right direction as far as the sustainability of the system is concerned. Apart from these reforms, there are insurance and saving mechanisms that can help supplement the unfunded pension system. But, as I said earlier, a key factor for the public pension system is the buoyancy of employment. It is in this nexus between employment, pensions and public finances where, I believe, the “hard core” of the difficulties facing our economy in the years ahead is concentrated. 3. The reduction in private debt and in the net external debit position  The third challenge facing the Spanish economy is high private debt and the heavy dependency on external financing. The Spanish economy’s net external debit position stood at around 93% of GDP at end2015, far above the level in other euro area or developed countries in a debit position, not to mention core Monetary Union economies such as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, which run an external credit position.
Luis M Linde: A review of the Spanish economic situation; Spain’s Budget for 2014 Testimony by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Senate in connection with the draft State Budget for 2014, Madrid, 25 November 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, When I appeared before this Senate last year, the Spanish economy was undergoing a phase of great difficulty and uncertainty. Developments since then show it has notably improved and, at present, it may be beginning to emerge from the second recession of this prolonged crisis. In any event, prudence advises avoiding any complacency since the risks have not disappeared and the momentum for a sustained recovery is still weak. The euro area and Spanish economies Several reasons explain the change in the Spanish economic situation in recent months. Firstly, the international economic setting has improved, despite the uncertainty over the behaviour of the emerging economies. This improvement has, above all, affected the United States, Japan and, most importantly from the standpoint of the Spanish economy, the euro area. In the third quarter of this year euro area GDP posted limited growth, of 0.1 pp in quarter-onquarter terms, following its dynamic performance in the second quarter, with 0.3 pp of growth, which surprised most analysts and ended six consecutive quarters of contraction.

That reflects the strong dynamism of exports, driven in recent months by the improvement in Spanish competitiveness and the buoyancy of the euro area markets; but it is also indicative of the weakness of domestic expenditure, giving rise to the contractionary behaviour of imports. As a consequence of these developments, Spain will show a net lending position against the rest of the world of around 2% of GDP, an unprecedented and record figure in recent decades. Over the past months, inflation, proxied by the CPI, has been declining notably, essentially as a result of the tapering off of the effects of the VAT increase over more than a year back. Thus, in October, the CPI fell by 0.1%. Foreseeably, however, positive though moderate rates of change will resume in the coming months, therefore proving compatible with the necessary continuation of the ongoing improvement in competitiveness our economy requires. For 2014, a central scenario has been outlined in which the factors that have been affecting domestic demand progressively slacken. It is projected that the processes of adjustment in the economy, and most particularly the redressing of private-sector debt and the ongoing fiscal consolidation, will continue to influence the pace of recovery of demand and activity; but, at the same time, the reduction in uncertainty and the culmination of the restructuring of credit institutions, along with their improved results, will lay the foundations for improving financial conditions for the resident sectors.