samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Secondly, Estonia has avoided volatile short-term capital flows due to strong fiscal stance. While these "soft" policy principles support crisis prevention by providing relatively stable and transparent environment, the resilience of the system depends ultimately on the actions of market participants themselves. The task of the authorities is to provide an adequate regulatory framework and to undertake maximum effort for the supervision of the implementation of these regulations. There is another interesting, albeit still debated issue – to what extent should the supervisors rely on banks' internal risk control models and ratings. Estonian banking supervisors have taken relatively forward-looking approach in that respect by increasingly relying on risk-based approach of supervision. At the same time, and having in mind rapidly developing economy and currency board arrangement, we believe that our banking system should have also robust liquidity buffers as well as sufficient capital to withstand the fluctuation of asset prices. Therefore, we have set relatively high reserve requirement half of what the banks can meet by the holdings of high-rated foreign assets. We will further adjust the system of reserve requirements in the future as monetary policy framework will converge towards the eurosystem principles. Finally, I would like to stress that as an essential element of the safety net, the Deposit Insurance Fund is functioning well and has proved its usefulness already two years ago. The immediate task for Estonian authorities is to introduce the investor protection scheme for the other parts of the financial system.

This is especially valid with respect to the area of macro-prudential tools and instruments, in view of the significant differences across countries in their initial conditions or stages of development and convergence. Starting with the obvious focus of interest for every central bank – namely monetary policy – I would like to remind you that the BNB is among the few central banks in the world with such recent know-how in two remarkably contrasting monetary policy regimes. Since the start of transition from the centrally planned economy 25 years ago and the restoration of the traditional two-tier banking system in Bulgaria, we initially practiced discretionary monetary policy, and then after our crisis, we introduced the currency board arrangements in 1997. In addition to conducting monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability, the BNB was traditionally entrusted with the regulation and supervision of the Bulgarian banking system. The banking regulations in Bulgaria and the supervisory powers of the BNB were strengthened after our crisis in the mid-1990s. The BNB has ever since persisted in implementing highly conservative supervisory standards. As a result, today the banking system of Bulgaria remains one of those in the EU where no single bank needed to be rescued or supported with taxpayers’ or central bank money. Furthermore, our banking system is already in full compliance with the new Capital Requirements Directive and the Capital Requirements Regulation.
Given its source – the third in a triplet of crises, this time afflicting the emerging market economies – I do not expect that rise in uncertainty to be temporary. I expect its impact to be greater in today’s world of post-crisis traumatic stress and could more than offset the cost of capital accelerator, as we have already seen repeatedly since the crisis. Against that backdrop, my view is that the case for raising interest rates is still some way from being made. Whatever the reason, the economic aircraft appears to be losing speed on the runway. That is an awkward, indeed risky, time to be contemplating take-off. Meanwhile, inflationary trends do not at present given me sufficient confidence that inflation will be back at target, even two years hence. Growth has slowed towards trend in the UK, US and globally. And speed limits matter. Any further loss of momentum would risk taking growth below trend, widening the output gap and adding to downward pressures on already-weak prices. My personal view is that, in the current environment, a rate rise would increase unnecessarily the chances of the economy falling below critical velocity, thereby extending the period inflation remains below target. For those reasons, I have continued to vote to leave rates unchanged, with a neutral stance on the future direction of monetary policy. Now more than ever in the UK, policy needs to be poised to move off either foot depending on which way the data break. General Secretary.

Chart: Projections for the key policy rate in various Monetary Policy Reports In the period to the monetary policy meeting in March 2015, the Norwegian economy had moved broadly in line with the path projected in December 2014. Inflation remained close to 2.5 percent. Unemployment had remained stable and was slightly lower than expected. At the same time, the outlook ahead was weaker than envisaged in December. Oil prices had continued to slide and activity in the petroleum industry appeared to be falling more than previously anticipated both this year and next. Wage growth in 2014 turned out to be lower than assumed and there were prospects of somewhat lower wage growth ahead than projected earlier. At the monetary policy meeting in March, Norges Bank gave weight to that fact that the key policy rate had been reduced in December to counter the risk of a pronounced downturn in the Norwegian economy as a result of lower oil prices. So far, the effects on the real economy had been relatively small. At the same time, house prices had continued to rise at a rapid pace. The rapid rise in property prices may lead to higher debt growth. That may increase household vulnerability and trigger or amplify a downturn in the economy further ahead. Based on an overall assessment, Norges Bank chose to leave the key policy rate unchanged.
The objective of price stability, therefore, must be symmetric. The reaction function of central banks should equally be perceived as symmetric. They should be equally vigilant about any deviation from this objective, in either direction, up or down. A central bank that remained passive with persistently low inflation would in effect encourage a downward drift in expectations. The case for symmetry is even stronger today as we are confronted with several sources of uncertainty, regarding: the economic situation; the transmission mechanism of monetary policy; and the underlying causes for low inflation. We should avoid adding a further uncertainty concerning the true priorities of central banks. For the same reason, it would be unwise to entertain the idea that the inflation objective should be revised, – upward or downward. The analytical argument for a higher target sounds attractive. For a given equilibrium real rate, a higher inflation objective would reduce the probability of hitting the zero lower bound in the future. This may be a case, however, where analytics do not provide a proper guide for policy. The truth is we do not know how inflation expectations would react to a change in objective. We are in a period where expectation dynamics are highly uncertain. Empirical evidence collected over the last 15 years shows that, in the euro-area at least, a rate of inflation significantly over 2% triggers very negative reactions from the general public. Finally, the credibility of central banks in sticking to their objective could be jeopardized by the change of definition of price stability.

We remain flexible and ready to make adjustments to our operations as needed to ensure that monetary policy is effectively implemented and transmitted to financial markets and the broader economy. Conclusion I’ll conclude with this: The coronavirus poses evolving risks to the U.S. economy. Our policy action this week positions us well to support the economic expansion. We are carefully monitoring the effects of the coronavirus on the U.S. economic outlook and will respond as appropriate. Our focus remains trained on serving the American people by pursuing our dual goals of maximum employment and price stability. Once again, thank you for this evening’s award. 1 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, March 3, 2020. 2 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement Regarding Monetary Policy Implementation,  October 11, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Statement Regarding Treasury Bill Purchases and Repurchase Operations, October 11, 2019. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Inflation rates have been falling in most countries and they have registered appreciable expansion in economic activities with GDP growth rates averaging at about 5% in 2007. In addition, most countries have become more democratic in political circles, giving more say to the public on the running of governments and their institutions. Distinguished Participants, allow me now to turn to the subject we are gathered here for, that is, “Central Bank Governance”. Good corporate governance is generally acknowledged as  BIS Review 26/2008  1  important in economic management. In this regard, Central bank governance is arguably defined by a number of key-concepts or pillars, which together should form the basis of an effective legal framework governing a central bank and on which central bank governance should rest, that is, operational independence, democratic accountability and transparency. Despite its common usage, it is not always very clear what central bank transparency amounts to. Generally, two definitions of transparency can be distinguished in the policyoriented literature. Firstly, central bank transparency is referred to as the activities of the central bank in providing information. Thus, in this case, transparency has been defined as the degree to which information on policy actions is available. However, a somewhat broader approach to transparency includes the public’s understanding of the decisions taken by the monetary authorities and the reasoning behind it.

The recent redesign of monetary instruments and the yesterday’s cut of reference CB bills interest rate from 4% to 3.75% are aimed towards conducting of policy at optimal level of reference interest rate. Allow me to elaborate. We were preparing the monetary instruments redesign for a longer time period, and made the actual redesign when we considered that the time was right. The economic activity decelerates because the euro area demand is lower and the credit growth rate is below expectations. Moreover, data on the foreign exchange market and foreign reserves and on the trade deficit in the first quarter indicate balance of payments deficit lower than projected. The inflation rate reduced to around 2%, as expected for this year’s average. The banks, instead of investing the household savings, that increase faster than expected, in lending, purchased CB bills, the amount of which increased by Denar 10 billion, i.e. one third in only three months, even though the capital adequacy and liquidity are at exceptionally high levels. The net external borrowing of the country decreased by Euro 220 million only in the last quarter of the last year, and by Euro 280 million, or by one fourth, over the entire last year. Finally, immediately prior to our decision to redesign the monetary instruments, the Ministry of Finance announced cut of budget expenses by 5%.
31  Second, translating estimates of financial gain into welfare terms can help when deciding how best to aggregate across different channels to gauge their general equilibrium impact. For example, how do we appropriately aggregate changes to income and wealth in their impact on well-being? And should we focus on percentage or money changes when judging the impact on people’s welfare? 29  Carney (2016) notes that just 2% of households have deposit holdings in excess of £ few other financial assets, and do not own a home. Therefore, “the vast majority of savers who might have lost some interest income from lower policy rates have stood to gain from increases in asset prices, particularly the recovery in house prices.” 30 As discussed in Ball and Chernova (2008) and Clark, Frijters and Shields (2007), for example. 31 Taking the sum of individuals’ utility is consistent with a Benthamite utilitarian concept of social welfare, but other specifications are possible. A Rawlsian specification, for example, would define social welfare as the wellbeing of the worst off member of society. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  In principle, a welfare-based analysis allows us to answer those questions. Doing so is not, however, simple. In algebraic terms, consider a utility function of the general form: 𝑈 = ∅(𝛼(𝑦), 𝛽(𝑤), 𝛾(𝑋)) Let’s call this Equation (1). 𝑈 is utility, 𝑦 is income and 𝑤 is wealth. To turn our quantitative estimates into welfare-equivalent measures, three empirical uncertainties loom large.

In welfare terms, the biggest gainers from the MPC’s monetary loosening have been the young, though every age cohort benefits overall. The same is true looking along the income distribution, where every cohort gains in welfare terms, even though the same was not true of purely financial gains. Policy Implications  Where does this leave us? Let me summarise the key empirical conclusions before turning to policy lessons. I take the key empirical conclusions to be:   The material loosening of UK monetary policy after 2007 has had a significantly positive effect on employment, income and wealth, without which average living standards in the UK would be materially lower.   These gains have been shared right across the distribution of income and wealth, age and region, though the precise scale and nature of these benefits does differ across cohorts. Very few households across the UK are likely to have been net losers in financial terms from the MPC’s monetary loosening, once all of its effects are take into account.   This conclusion is reinforced if we consider the impact of monetary loosening on people’s well-being. In addition to the financial gains from higher income and wealth, many people have benefitted significantly from greater job security and reduced financial anxiety. In welfare terms, these benefits may have been as large as the financial gains. The number of households who have lost out in welfare terms from looser monetary policy is only 12%.
I am particularly pleased that the first Managing Director of Access Bank Zambia Limited is a Zambian who is vastly experienced in our financial sector. Finally, as we witness the commissioning of the bank, I wish to warmly welcome Access Bank (Zambia) Ltd to the Zambian banking sector and wish them the best in their operations. Thank you! 2  BIS Review 117/2008

From the building of the foundation of legal, regulatory and shariah framework, the Islamic Banking Act (1983) to the formation of the first Islamic bank and Takaful Company to instituting Islamic windows concept for banking institutions and encouraging competition amongst the Islamic financial institutions in the nineties (1990s), to establishing key infrastructures and institutional arrangements such as the Shariah Advisory Council and the Islamic Money Market, we are on a mission to be the center for Islamic finance. Today we have a comprehensive system for Islamic finance but as you would expect, because of competition and the fast changing pace of the banking industry, we must continue to strive to maintain the lead in this industry. There are a few pre requisite to maintain this competitive edge. It is the ability of the industry to meet the evolving and discerning needs of the users of Islamic finance and the ability to meet those needs in a timely and comprehensive manner. The solutions to customer needs must be as innovative and competitive as any other alternatives offered by the financial market. The shariah aspect of the products must be recognized and accepted by the majority of players practicing Islamic finance. The supply and ability to attract and retain talent, not only in shariah area and Islamic finance, but also those who are conversant in IT, legal, accounting, risk management and communication. The next level of development will probably entail the enhancement of linkages between various centers, be it in the financial markets, credits or investment of funds.
For example, given economies of scale, it is much cheaper for foreign banks to cover their China operations through their Hong Kong offices, rather than incurring the additional costs of setting up a new office in, say, Shanghai. Also, contrary to the established wisdom, the cost advantages are not always on Shanghai’s side: corporate tax, for example, is twice what it is in Hong Kong. Other positive inducements include the efficiency and sophistication of Hong Kong’s financial markets, and the critical mass that goes with being the world’s fourth largest banking centre and seventh largest foreign exchange centre. We have in Hong Kong a pool of professional expertise trained in all facets of international business: a skilled local workforce, which is well educated, computer-literate, productive, disciplined and highly trainable; in addition to a foreign expertise attracted by rich business opportunities and an international, cosmopolitan orientation, with English as the business language. Without wishing to labour the elements that make up a free economy - which the Cato Institute has set out so well - I think it is worth highlighting the point that Hong Kong scores extremely high on all of them. It enjoys the rule of law and the free movement of information, capital and human resources. It has efficient and clean government, a market-oriented economic policy, a non-intrusive but effective regulatory system, and a low and simple tax regime. It treats domestic and overseas companies on equal terms and has a liberal policy on employing foreigners with expertise.

Joseph Yam: The WTO - China’s future and Hong Kong’s opportunity  Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, JP, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at a conference co-sponsored by the Cato Institute and the Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research on “Globalisation, the WTO, and Capital Flows - Hong Kong’s legacy, China’s future”, held in Hong Kong, on 4 September 2000. *  *  *  I feel honoured to be invited to deliver the keynote address at today’s conference on the implications of China’s prospective entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This is a timely conference for, although the arrangements for China’s entry into the WTO are not yet signed and sealed, it looks very likely that they will be agreed soon. The Cato Institute takes a special interest in the relationship between economic change and government policy throughout the world, and it is appropriate that it should be following this historic event closely. The Hong Kong Centre for Economic Research - now, I note, more than 20 years old - has established a solid reputation for independent research into public policy and economic affairs: it is therefore well positioned to provide the Hong Kong and regional perspective. It also seems right to me - despite the heavy rainfall we’ve been having this summer - that Hong Kong should be the venue for this conference. The reasons, I hope, will become clear in this address.
William J McDonough: Issues in corporate governance Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the William Taylor Memorial Lecture, Washington, D.C., 29 September 2002. *  *  *  I am honored this evening to be invited to deliver the William Taylor Memorial Lecture. Bill Taylor was a very special person. He was deeply committed to public service and to the well-being of this nation's financial markets in his many years as head of Bank Supervision at the Federal Reserve Board and as chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. For many of us, he embodied the ideals of a central banker and a bank supervisor: measured, professional, impartial, and unstinting in his willingness to go the extra distance in his search for the right answers to the problems he needed to address. His years in the bank supervisory community were cut all too short. We have sadly missed the benefits of his wisdom. This evening I would like to honor Bill's memory by talking about some issues I know would have been of profound interest to him. Specifically, I would like to focus my remarks on the elements that make for a sound banking and financial system and the issues that have been raised over this past year which have led many to question the quality and integrity of the information available to our markets.

Such an apparatus is also needed to promote the firm's operational efficiency and to ensure compliance with managerial policies, laws, regulations, and sound fiduciary principles. Effective risk management is based on a foundation of good corporate governance and rigorous internal controls. Taking calculated risks is part of any business enterprise. That is well understood. At the same time, each firm needs to have in place the technical systems and management processes necessary not only to identify the risks associated with its activities but also to effectively measure, monitor, and control them. An effective risk management and control structure is not sufficient, however, if it is not accompanied by an institutional culture that ensures that written policies and procedures are actually translated into practice. Ultimately, a firm's culture is determined by the board of directors and the senior management it installs. In particular, the actions of senior management and the consistency of their decisions and behavior with the values and principles they articulate are critical to shaping firm culture. It is vital that managers make certain that their commitment to an environment that includes effective risk management and rigorous controls filters fully down the line to all employees in their organization. Official regulation and supervision provide a second line of defense against financial instability. Governments have long recognized that banking and other financial institutions, because of the nature of the functions they perform, must be subject to at least some form of regulation and official oversight. Governments have a broad mandate here.