samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The one-cent euro coin is in fact equivalent to less than the Maltese five mils coin, a unit of such a low value that it is no longer in circulation. Property price inflation has finally started to slow down but the pace of construction activity has not – and there are no indications that it will this year. What are your forecasts? The Bank’s residential property price index indeed shows a marked deceleration from a peak of almost 20% in 2004 to 3% in the first quarter of this year. A major contributing factor is surely the marked increase in the supply of residential units, both in the shape of large up-market developments and of smaller apartment complexes. Given this situation of over supply, we expect property price inflation to remain low in 2007. At the same time, one should not overlook the fact that in a country where land is scarce and substitute locations do not represent a competitive alternative, property remains a popular component of investment portfolios because of the widespread anticipation of large capital gains. Developers, therefore, are willing, and indeed seem able, to hold on to vacant property in the expectation of a rebound in prices. This prevents prices from finding their true level. Reference is made in your Statement in the Bank’s Annual Report to the independence of the institution. Will this change with the entry into the euro area?

Alexey Zabotkin: Plan of analytical work and events for the Bank of Russia’s Monetary Policy Review Speech by Mr Alexey Zabotkin, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, on releasing a plan of analytical work and events for the Bank of Russia’s Monetary Policy Review, Moscow, 6 October 2021. * * * Good afternoon, As Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina announced making a speech at the International Financial Congress at the end of June, the Bank of Russia plans to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy, its objectives and instruments — the Monetary Policy Review — over the period of inflation targeting in Russia. Today, we have launched a special web page covering the plan of analytical work and key events within this Review. I will provide a brief summary of this announcement and then answer additional questions. Why is this important and why are we doing this right now? First. The Bank of Russia switched to the inflation targeting regime in 2015. Annual inflation decreased to 4% in 2017. It has been seven years since we started to implement this policy and nearly five years since inflation reached the target. This is a sufficient period for us to be able to make conclusions about our achievements. The Review is intended to assess the effectiveness of the monetary policy implemented and take a look at past events.
24 In this context, the combination of our interest rate and credit easing policy, together with the recently completed Comprehensive Assessment of bank balance sheets, can be seen as creating the ideal conditions for reforms to succeed. By bringing real interest rates well below the medium-term growth rate, this policy package is creating strong price incentives to invest. And by improving the transmission of those low real rates into actual borrowing conditions, it ensures that the financial sector can quickly reallocate finance to firms that capitalise on those incentives. In this way, accommodative monetary policy supports structural reform by ensuring that the investment and employment benefits materialise faster. And structural reform, by reducing  23  Draghi, M. “The ECB’s recent monetary policy measures: Effectiveness and challenges.” Camdessus Lecture at the International Monetary Fund, 14 May 2015. 24  Bouis, R., O. Causa, L. Demmou, R. Duval, and A. Zdzienicka (2012), “The Short-Term Effects of Structural Reforms: An Empirical Analysis.” OECD Working Papers, no. 949. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  uncertainty about the future macro- and microeconomic outlook, supports monetary policy by releasing the pent-up investment demand that accommodative policy creates. It should therefore be clear that the argument that accommodative monetary policy constitutes an excuse for governments and parliaments to postpone their reform efforts is incorrect. In fact, I would submit it actually makes reforms less socially and politically costly, as it reduces the time it takes for reforms to produce positive effects.

Earnings are obviously following the same trend as in 2007 and reflect the persistent effects of the risks associated with the subprime crisis, with valuation losses on assets and higher risk-related costs. A compound indicator, such as ROE shows a decline in profitability, but it still stands at an average of 14 per cent, compared to 18.9 per cent for the three largest banking groups in the first quarter of 2007. On this point, I would like to put this decline into context. It follows several years of exceptional profits, which raised questions about their sustainability. Despite declining income, the French banking system is still financially sound: the Tier 1 solvency ratio based on original own funds stood at an average of 7.1 per cent for the three largest banking groups at the end of 2007, much higher than the minimum ratio of 4 per cent set under Pillar 1 of the Basel II Accord. Banks increased their solvency ratios in the first quarter of 2008 and the Commission Bancaire attaches a great deal of importance to this effort. The benefits of business diversification, the effectiveness of the measures taken to limit risk exposures and the satisfactory capital levels have also enabled the major banking groups to remain highly rated by the leading international agencies. 2  BIS Review 82/2008  2. The current economic situation calls for vigilance nonetheless, since banks must be ready to cope with new risks that may occur at any time.
There are of course a number of conditions that have to hold before we can be confident that increased disclosure will deliver real benefits for financial stability and efficiency. As far as market discipline is concerned, increased disclosure by itself is not enough to achieve this: the market has to have an incentive to monitor the disclosed information, the ability to monitor it, and the means to influence the banks once it is disclosed. There is no point, for example, in introducing extra disclosures if the burden of producing and absorbing it proves too high. This will not achieve our aim of improving stability and will probably negatively affect efficiency through the imposition of pointless costs. I think that the proposals in the new Basel Accord do incorporate these considerations, even though there has been some concern from the industry about the proposed volume of disclosure. First, the disclosure requirements are intended to use information that is already produced for other purposes, whether regulatory or internal. This helps to keep producer costs down. And secondly, there are recommendations for standard formats and templates for disclosures, which will help keep the user costs of absorbing the information low. Equally there is no point in enhancing disclosures if the market has no incentive to apply the information because creditors believe that banks will not be allowed to fail. So our goal of improving and harnessing market discipline has to go hand in hand with continued rolling back of state guarantees, whether formal or implicit.

To achieve this, risk sensitive capital requirements need to be both sufficiently backward looking and sufficiently forward looking: backward-looking in the sense that they should be based on long runs of data that incorporate experience of both peaks and troughs; and forward-looking in the sense that risk measures hold good through the business cycle, taking account of possible future downturns even as banks are extending credit in benign conditions. (b)  Overall capital  The issue of how the new Basel framework will affect the overall amount of capital in the international banking system is also a hot potato at the moment. Again, this is a question which is crucial to the right balance between financial stability and financial efficiency. Erring on the low side in the minimum capital standard could result in unacceptable risk, while erring on the high side with too much capital is likely to result once again in wasteful and costly regulatory arbitrage. The importance of the question is, however, mirrored by its difficulty. Deciding the relative riskiness of different types of banking business is technically challenging enough, but the issue of where absolutely our tolerance of banking fragility lies is not only a problematic technical question but is also of course a normative one. And like all normative questions, different people will have different answers.
She and her staff see some 500 business contacts a year, and report the information gathered directly to the Monetary Policy Committee. In addition, members of the MPC themselves make regular visits to different parts of the country to listen and learn. And I shall be doing that during my visit to Scotland. So whatever the critics may think, we are not short of information. Of course, whenever interest rates rise it is always said that the rise might be appropriate for certain parts of the country, but is wrong for some sectors of the economy, some regions or even some companies. The UK economy, we are reminded, is not homogeneous. Of course it isn’t, and a good job too. But policy can never be set with the interests of one sector, or one region, let alone one company in mind. And it isn’t. I can assure you that policy is not set with the South East of England in mind. But equally, it is not set either in the sole interest of the North East of England or Scotland. It is set for the United Kingdom as a whole. Some have argued that if monetary policy has but a single instrument, namely the national interest rate, then would it not be sensible to use other policies to reduce imbalances in the economy? In particular, it has been suggested that fiscal policy should complement monetary policy in bringing demand into line with supply. 3  BIS Review 111/1999  3.

Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability in the euro area Remarks by Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the 15. Handelsblatt Jahrestagung "Zukunftstrategien für Sparkassen und Landesbanken", Berlin, 2 February 2017. * * *  Introduction The euro area recovery is progressing at a moderate, but firming pace.1 The economy has now posted positive real GDP growth for 14 consecutive quarters. The unemployment rate is back to a single-digit figure. Economic sentiment is at the highest level recorded in almost 6 years. The monetary policy measures the ECB has taken over the past few years have contributed decisively to these positive developments. After having hovered at levels well below 1% for three years, euro area HICP inflation has edged up towards the end of last year and, according to preliminary data, reached 1.8%, in January. The recent upward movement of inflation mainly reflects temporary factors, most notably the increases in energy and food prices. By contrast, underlying inflationary pressures have remained subdued and inflation excluding food and energy has mostly remained below 1% since late 2013. The current environment still falls short of a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation to levels closer to 2% over the medium term. It will take time for inflation to stabilise around levels consistent with our price stability objective. Recent developments show the role monetary policy plays in driving the economic recovery and, further down the road, in ensuring a durable return of inflation to levels close to 2%.
Before I explore issues like inflation in any greater depth, I should give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. The U.S. Economy If monetary policy represents a set of scales, on one side we have a strong U.S. economy with unemployment near a 50-year low, and on the other, a more challenging and uncertain landscape. GDP looks to grow around 2 percent this year, and unemployment has stayed at or near historically low levels, boosted by solid job growth. At the same time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has moved to cut rates three times. What’s going on? There are three trends I’ll explore today, which all demonstrate the commonalities and the interconnectedness of the global economy. The first is the low neutral rate of interest, or r-star, the second is slowing global growth, and the third is rising geopolitical tensions. All are critically important to the long-term prospects of the U.S. economy, and each tells an important story about the conditions we’re experiencing today. Low R-star Those of you who know me won’t be surprised that I’m starting with low r-star! The neutral rate of interest—the rate that prevails when monetary policy is neither restrictive nor accommodative— has been an area of study, and a personal passion, for the past two decades.

Plantin, G, Sapra, H and H S Shin (2008), “Fair Value Accounting and Financial Stability”, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business Research Paper 08–15. Simonson, D G and G H Hempel (1993), “Banking Lessons from the Past: The 1938 Regulatory Agreement Interpreted”, Journal of Financial Services Research, pages 249–267. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Inflation has varied slightly more in the past few years. In a period of increasing cross-border labour flows, substantial technological advances, changes in competitive conditions and new trading patterns, we may, with our very open economy, have to accept a somewhat greater variation in inflation and deviations from the target, as we have witnessed over the past two to three years. An overall assessment implies that the interest rate in the baseline scenario gradually increases to a more normal level. The projections are based on the assumption that interest rates in Norway and abroad will rise somewhat faster than may be implied by today’s forward rates. Since the previous Inflation Report, the upward movement in Norwegian and international long-term interest rates has become more pronounced. Exchange rate movements are difficult to project. In Inflation Report 1/06, the path for the interest rate in Norway and abroad was assessed to be consistent with an approximately unchanged krone exchange rate. The high rate of economic growth implies that price and cost inflation will edge up after a period. Inflation measured by the CPI-ATE is projected to increase from today’s level of around 1¼ per cent, up to almost 2 per cent at the end of 2007. There are prospects that inflation will increase further and be close to the target of 2.5 per cent three years ahead. With a gradual reduction in unemployment, Norges Bank expects wage growth to edge up.

Getting our core job right, and so maintaining financial stability, is far and away the most important thing we can do to support the fight against climate change. Achieving net zero will not be possible unless our societies make considerable investments in developing and disseminating new technologies, and will require major changes across the economy. A stable financial system can support households and businesses through these changes, and channel investment where it needs to go to support the transition. Transitioning to net zero will be a major challenge for our institutions and societies even in a benign economic environment – doing so without confidence in the basic functioning of the financial system would be near impossible. It is therefore vital that firms can withstand risks to their safety and soundness, including those that arise as a consequence of climate change – both ‘physical’ risks like flooding and extreme weather events, and ‘transition’ risks that arise as the economy moves away from carbon-intensive activities. Firms therefore need to understand, at a granular level, how their balance sheets and business models are exposed to both present and future climate risks, so that they can take the right risk management actions today. This includes investing in their data and modelling capabilities, and  Page 3  carefully scrutinising the data they get from third parties. It means ensuring Boards and senior executives see climate risk as a strategic priority. [3] And ultimately, it means ensuring firms hold sufficient financial resources to absorb losses arising from climate change.
We do not pursue a zero failure regime and we don’t have aspirations to further strengthen this protection as part of the Solvency II review. To the extent that there might be some wider benefits to reduced levels of protection, we would need to weigh these carefully against the costs to policyholders and the wider economy – especially when considered over the long terms for which many insurance promises persist. In coming to this view, we are particularly mindful of just how important the UK insurance market is, and how large the sector is relative to our economy3. The London Market is competitive, in 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  part, precisely because policyholders are confident their claims will be met. And as discussed, the life sector is responsible for paying retirement income to millions. This retirement income underpins a significant amount of spending, and much of it is provided in a way – via annuities – in which the investment and longevity risks are borne by insurers – so the security of that source of income and spending depends on the soundness of the life insurance sector. There is a growing degree of consensus around the world, exemplified by the work of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), over the financial standards to which insurance should be held.

In closing, I wish to say this: If we succeed in restoring confidence in the Icelandic economy, which is the cornerstone of the IMF programme – and this includes lifting the capital controls and regaining access to foreign credit markets – we will be able to rise up from the depths. How quickly we can travel once we’ve reached the surface is another matter. It could be that we will have to content ourselves with less than before, but that is not a given. If we play our cards right, our small country – with its location and natural resources – can enjoy a wealth of possibilities. What we may never do again, however, is force our economy to grow faster than it is able to do – which has dire consequences for stability. 6  BIS Review 130/2010
As for the other 11 measures, some were implemented by CBK and the banks, while others were proposals presented to the Council of Ministers to take the appropriate action. The Households Sector: Where this sector is concerned, the committee specified the goal as guaranteeing basic needs, providing financial support, and maintaining job security for nationals. Accordingly, it introduced a set of measures to protect and safeguard the stability of this important sector. Among the measures were guarantees to protect nationals employed in economic sectors impacted by the Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -4-  crisis, whether in the government or private sector, as well as maintaining the stability of prices of food items and medical goods, in addition to depositing of six months’ retirement pay (pension) for those eligible. As well as support for salaries covered under Chapter Five 1 of the budget as stated in Council of Ministers Resolution (455), the committee added an item to double the support extended to nationals registered under Chapter Three2 for six months. This was in addition to guaranteeing a minimum income level that is sufficient to meet livelihood needs for affected workers and the provision of basic humanitarian needs for all those living on Kuwaiti soil. Banks meanwhile took the initiative and implemented a moratorium on personal loans and waived point of sale and ATM fees.

This reflects the growing relevance of Islamic banking and is testimony to its acceptance as the embodiment of ethical banking and finance. Other threats to the financial system Financial institutions also face increasing challenges from other non-financial risks associated with the extensive use of technology and the potential outbreak of epidemics. Therefore it is vital then that the state of preparedness of BCP/BCM contingency measures is constantly ready to address any possibilities and not be blind sided by financial risks alone. Closing It is neither by accident nor coincidence that the Malaysian financial system is currently at a position of considerable strength, depth and resilience. Rather it is through the combined efforts of both industry players and the regulator as well as the support of all our  2  BIS Review 58/2009  stakeholders. I believe that this spirit of cooperation and mutual respect is entrenched and will serve us once again as we look forward to safely ride out the impact of the current global financial crisis. BIS Review 58/2009  3
The other side of the story has shown us that during the last couple of years, the euro area underwent extensive governance reforms, designed to address the flaws revealed by the crisis. However, their actual effectiveness is still to be tested in practice. We are still in unchartered waters. There have been recent statements referring to the fact that Europe might have not exited the crisis yet. As Jean Monnet used to say: “Europe would be built through crises” and would be “the sum of their solutions”. Consequently, non-member States from Eastern and South-eastern Europe seem closer than ever to complying with the Maastricht criteria, but readiness for successful Euro Area membership needs further work. Labour, product market and other structural reforms are still required in order to observe convergence not only in letter, but also in spirit. Non-member States, on the road towards euro adoption, have to both comply with the Maastricht criteria and to choose the right moment for it. Each and every Member State should put their houses in order as a prerequisite for a successful Euro Area enlargement. Only this way new candidates will be able to obtain the opportunities of a single currency, while being in turn a valuable contributor to the monetary union. Romania has recently reached political consensus, at the highest level, namely the President and the Prime Minister, that the target date for euro adoption will be January 1st, 2019.

It is unlikely that in future decades the West will account for such a large share of the world’s unequivocally systemic firms. In both Asia and Latin America, a number of jurisdictions have made progress with putting the KA regime on to a statutory footing. But it is probably fair to say that not a few emerging-market countries are watching progress in the EU. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the EU’s Directive is the keystone to breaking the back of the TBTF problem. How? The toolkit for Resolution Authorities established by the KAs obviously includes the workhorse techniques for resolving standard commercial banks. Either: liquidation with prompt payout to insured depositors by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS), commonly known as Liquidation and Payout (L&P). Or: what the US call Purchase & Assumption (P&A) – selling to a third party the distressed bank’s deposit book together with some cash injected by the DGS and perhaps some other good assets. At its simplest, P&A involves splitting the distressed bank into ‘good’ and, let’s say, ‘not so good’ bits. The deposit book and cash might for a while be held in a Bridge Bank controlled by the Resolution Authority (RA), pending sale to a purchaser. But whether or not a Bridge Bank is employed as a holding position, the services to insured depositors are sustained. Meanwhile, the rump goes into administration, with the administrators selling what they can and winding down the rest.