samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This module needs to allow for a substantial sectoral breakdown so as to be able to reflect both the risks assumed by banks and the opportunities opening up in this process. In this context, I would like to mention a problem facing us all: the lack of reliable information. The fact that this aspect is brought up repeatedly is a reflection of its transcendence. It is not a coincidence that there are various references in the conference agenda to initiatives related to transparency and information on sustainability in general. The topics discussed today and yesterday have covered, for example, the Directive on non-financing reporting, the register of sustainable funds, the climate benchmarks and the European taxonomy. In this regard, we are assessing the reporting and data requirements needed to perform the analyses I just mentioned. We are also conducting a pilot programme for collecting data in collaboration with major credit institutions and we have the benefit of our Central Credit Register. We can attempt to exploit to the full the data already available to us, but we need to be aware that, without information, it is impossible to make further headway. We are also taking action in our role as portfolio manager. Central banks are important investors in the debt markets, both in respect of monetary policy and reserve management. In this area, we have included environmental responsibility and sustainability criteria in the reserves investment policy and we are progressively increasing our own holdings of green bonds.

On average, total wage costs are expected to rise by just under 4 per cent per year during 2004-2005. Inflation in line with target Inflation has fallen back slightly in recent months, although less than expected. This is because energy prices have not fallen as forecast. However, when adjusted for energy prices, inflation has been lower than expected. This may be due to the fact that productivity has grown unusually strongly so far this year, while preliminary wage bargaining outcomes indicate slightly lower wage increases than expected. Over the coming months, energy prices are expected to remain at a relatively high level. Electricity prices are not anticipated to return to more normal levels until spring 2004. This means that they cannot be expected to subdue inflation over the coming year as much as was estimated during the summer. Instead, some of the restraining effect will be postponed. However, at the same time the forecast for underlying inflationary pressure is being revised upwards for 2004 and 2005, as a result of  2  BIS Review 44/2003  the slightly higher resource utilisation. As before, the future path of inflation will be greatly affected by fluctuations in energy prices. The krona exchange rate has been slightly weaker on average over the summer than the Riksbank had forecast in June. However, following the referendum the krona rate has strengthened relatively rapidly and is now in line with the earlier forecast.
Our latest bank lending survey reported a tightening of overall credit standards, which was stronger than banks had expected in the previous round and suggests that lending may weaken further. Weak lending has meant that money growth has also continued to decline. Conclusion Summing up, the inflation outlook continues to be too high for too long. In light of the ongoing high inflation pressures, the Governing Council today decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Overall, the incoming information broadly supports the assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook that we formed at our previous meeting. Headline inflation has declined over recent months, but underlying price pressures remain strong. At the same time, our past rate increases are being transmitted forcefully to euro area financing and monetary conditions, while the lags and strength of transmission to the real economy remain uncertain. Our future decisions will ensure that the policy rates will be brought to levels sufficiently restrictive to achieve a timely return of inflation to our two per cent medium-term target and will be kept at those levels for as long as necessary. We will continue to follow a data-dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. In particular, our policy rate decisions will continue to be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Most significantly, this process induces banks to improve their capital planning processes in light of potential stress scenarios. It also creates an enforcement mechanism so that dividends and share repurchases can be suspended more quickly when economic circumstances deteriorate. On the liquidity side, there has also been progress. U.S. banks have bolstered their liquidity buffers and the Basel Committee has proposed a liquidity coverage ratio requirement that effectively would require large, systemically important banks to hold sufficient liquid assets so that they could reasonably conduct their operations for 30 days without having to raise any new funds. In addition, the industry is reengineering how the triparty repo system operates in order to significantly reduce the large intraday exposures of the two clearing banks in the system. This is important because, as we saw during the financial crisis, very large intraday exposures can prove destabilizing. However, I would argue that progress on the liquidity front has not progressed as far as desired.1 First, many banks remain dependent on short-term funding to finance longer-term assets from counterparties that tend to flee at the first signs of distress. In particular, money market mutual funds remain vulnerable to runs. Such runs can occur even when the underlying risks remain negligible, making money market mutual funds a source of instability. Just a question from an investor about the fund manager’s exposures can cause the fund manager to withdraw funding from a counterparty.
This can be better achieved by the formation of a regional CTC to centralise the management of treasury activities which is essential for advancing operational efficiency, risk management and cost reduction. The business case is obvious and compelling. Regional cash pooling reduces idle cash and transaction costs by standardising payment systems and centralizing foreign exchange management. Cost of capital can be reduced by optimising external and internal funding. It can also optimize the corporate tax structure and compliance with international regulatory requirements to support global business expansion. 14. Hong Kong is keen to be considered by MNCs as a location for setting up CTCs as we see huge benefits in becoming a CTC hub in the region. The cash pooling function of CTCs will enlarge Hong Kong’s liquidity pool and strengthen Hong Kong’s role as an international financial centre as CTCs are major users of financial services, capital markets and professional services. It is our goal to capture in particular the high value-added segments of the CTC value chain, including cash and liquidity management, corporate finance activities and financial risk management. By attracting more CTCs and corporate activities here, we will not only bolster our financial sector but also advance the development of headquarters economy in Hong Kong. 15. So the interests of MNCs and Hong Kong are very much aligned. That said, we are fully aware that the competition to become the Asian CTC hub is very keen within the region.

Peter Pang: Asia Treasury Trailblazer Summit 2015 Speech by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asia Treasury Trailblazer Summit 2015, Hong Kong, 30 April 2015. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. I am delighted to join you this morning to take part in The Asset’s inaugural Asia Treasury Trailblazer Summit. I like the buzz word “Trailblazer” in the banner and the chosen theme of this event: “Taking Treasury to the Next Level’. 2. “Trailblazer” quite rightly describes the role and requisite mentality of corporate treasurers now operating in Asia. The region is in unchartered waters awash with groundbreaking opportunities and, at the same time, unprecedented challenges. If we can rise up to the challenges and capitalise on the opportunities, multinational companies (MNCs), leveraging on strategic application of their treasury capabilities, can certainly raise their business to the next level. 3. Let’s take a closer look at these opportunities and challenges and give some thoughts on how the public and private sectors can work together to engineer a win-win solution. 4. After three decades of high speed growth, propelled by China’s rise to become the second largest economy and the largest trading nation, all global MNCs are expanding their presence in Asia, and the share of global revenues generated in Asia continue to rise at a staggering speed. According to the Asia Business Outlook Survey by the Economist, “In 2011, Western firms said that Asia contributed 19% of their global revenues.
The pertinent question to ask, therefore, is whether or not prudential regulation amplifies this natural behaviour by financial market participants. Before analysing the elements of procyclicality that Basel II and international accounting standards may contain, it should be stressed that this set of rules includes numerous positive  4  BIS Review 62/2008  elements. Basel II will entail, and is in fact entailing, notable progress in the management of the risks credit institutions face. Had Basel II been in force some years back, many of the dysfunctions currently lying behind the turbulence would not have taken place. Moreover, international accounting standards, and in particular the financial reporting standards adopted in 2005 by the European Union, contribute to the common goal of a single financial market, since it appears reasonable that companies operating in a single area should be subject to the same accounting rules. Returning to procyclicality, I must remind you that this was a very significant debate during the period Basel II was being prepared. Insofar as capital requirements are more sensitive to risk, it is reasonable to believe that procyclicality is greater, requiring less capital when things go well and more capital when they go badly. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was mindful of this and that is why the new regulatory framework for capital includes elements that mitigate it, both under Pillar 1 and under Pillar 2.

In particular, regional arrangements, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative, if correctly designed and disciplined, can be an important supplement to the existing IMF facilities. 2  BIS Review 24/2006  For those of you not familiar with East Asia, the Chiang Mai Initiative, or CMI, was set up in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in the year 2000 as a regional arrangement of the ten ASEAN member countries plus Japan, China and Korea. The Initiative comprises a process of economic and financial surveillance at governmental level and a voluntary financing arrangement in terms of a network of bilateral swaps, which now amounts to US $ 55.5 billion. Twenty percent of the agreed bilateral swaps can be drawn to meet emergency liquidity needs unrelated to an IMF program. The CMI is now under review, with a view of making it more useful and more relevant to the needs of the region in the longer-term. I see regional arrangements, such as CMI, as an important regional financial architecture that complements and supports the Fund’s works on crisis prevention and resolution. First, in addition to IMF surveillance, the surveillance undertaken under CMI provides a new dimension of peer review that draws on regional knowledge and expertise in the surveillance process. Second, the drawdown of the bilateral swaps under the first tranche provides an important liquidity support facility.
Understanding is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trust-building. And trust tends to be earned slowly from repeated experience. Nonetheless, these studies point to an important role for simpler, personalised communications in lowering the twin deficits. There probably further for this agenda to run. For example, there is no reason in principle why the same methods could not be applied to other central bank publications, covering the financial system and banknotes. The Bank has already made some strides in this direction through its Financial Stability Report and Knowledge Bank, aimed at improving public understanding of the economy and finance. Looking ahead, in my view greater personalisation of central bank communications holds promise. Central banks often affect people’s lives in ways which are lagged and indirect and hence difficult for them to observe. Earlier this year, I constructed “personalised” scorecards, which set out the impact of the Bank’s monetary policy easing actions after the global financial crisis on the income, wealth and well-being of citizens across the UK. 49  This recognised that the impact of monetary policy on people’s lives is often quite different depending on their personal circumstances – old versus young, borrower versus saver, home-owner versus renter, North  48 49  Haldane and McMahon (2018) and Bholat et al (2018). Haldane (2018a). 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  versus South. Casting the impact of monetary policy in terms of averages or aggregates tends not to resonate with people’s personal experience.

In practice, the evidence suggests progress towards improving the public’s understanding of the economy, finance and central banks has been slow and patchy, despite these initiatives. To start with the positives, there is concrete evidence of the improved central bank communications having improved the functioning of financial markets, the forecasting performance of economists and even the reporting of the media on the economy. 13  The transparency revolution improved understanding among those  whose day job it was to understand the economy and the role of central banks within it – the experts. The revolution appears to have had far less impact on understanding among the public – the non-experts. In 1999, the Bank of England began surveying the public to gauge their understanding of the economy and the 14  Bank. Back then, only around 7% identified the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) as responsible  for setting interest rates. 19 years and one transparency revolution later, the same survey earlier this year suggested around 6% of the general public had heard of the MPC. 15  The failure to boost understanding of the economy and central banks among the general public helps explain why trust in central banks proved more fragile than expected after the crisis. It is for these reasons I have spoken about central banks facing a “twin deficits” problem – a deficit of public understanding and a deficit of public trust. 16  These twin deficits are clearly complementary and mutually-reinforcing.
Second, individual countries need to press on with unfinished financial reforms and take judicious steps to liberalise the financial sector. Greater regional cooperation On regional cooperation, countries have clearly recognised the benefits of greater trade integration, driven by the forces of globalisation. To facilitate the integration process, ASEAN has accelerated the timetable for the formation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area. Last October, the leaders decided to commit to creating an ASEAN Economic Community, giving for the first time a supranational cast to ASEAN’s aspirations. The ASEAN+3 process that links ASEAN with China, Japan and South Korea, ought eventually to evolve into an East Asian Economic Community that may include Australia and New Zealand. ASEAN is also negotiating free trade agreements with key trading partners. In addition to a Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Japan, ASEAN has targeted FTAs with China and India by the end of this decade. Meanwhile, individual ASEAN countries are already concluding FTAs with China, India and Japan. More recently, regional countries have also embarked on various initiatives to deepen capital market cooperation and integration in the region. For example, the EMEAP Group, comprising 11 central banks and monetary authorities in the East Asia and Pacific region, has launched the Asian Bond Fund I. The group is now working towards launching the local currency-denominated Asian Bond Fund 2. The ASEAN+3 member countries have also made significant progress to develop regional bond markets under the Asian Bond Market Initiative and to establish a regional financing arrangement through the Chiang Mai Initiative.

Like Kashmir, it is difficult to see a definitive solution to the North Korean problem. But this too can be managed. The six party talks have reduced the risk of accidental war. The key actors are rational and, despite their differences, share a common interest in a peaceful resolution of the issue. Kim Jong Il is a master of brinkmanship. But he too is rational and must know that war will lead to the outcome that he fears most, the disappearance of North Korea as a sovereign state. Therefore, while he may go to the very edge, unlike Saddam Hussein, Kim will not deliberately step over it. The North Korean issue is a strong incentive for the US and China to cooperate for their common interest. The risks of miscalculation are perhaps highest over Taiwan. The issue is extremely delicate because it engages the domestic politics of China, US and Taiwan. There is growing tension between economic forces that are integrating Taiwan with the Mainland and Taiwan’s desire for a separate identity. No PRC leadership can ever tolerate a bid for independence by Taiwan. If Taiwan pushes too far, the Chinese must react or be exposed as a ‘paper tiger’. The US stand, and perceptions of the US stand in China and Taiwan, are key to the problem. President Bush has said publicly that he does not support Taiwan’s independence. But the US may still be drawn into a Cross Straits conflict. If this happens, there will be serious consequences for the entire region.
The Eurosystem has decided to take firm action when it considers that these interest rates do not reflect a genuine credit risk differential, but rather unfounded fears about the reversibility of the euro. Because at that point, the effectiveness of the single monetary policy is clearly jeopardised: the key interest rates that we set no longer feed through to the real economy in the same way in all countries via the bank lending channel – which is a crucial channel in the euro area given the predominance of intermediated financing. In order to fulfil our mandate of maintaining price stability, our monetary policy impulses need to be transmitted homogeneously across the whole area. This is why we decided to create a new instrument: Outright Monetary Transactions. The idea is to have a credible backstop to counter unjustified increases in sovereign yields. This backstop must naturally be accompanied by strict conditionality to guarantee that the country concerned makes effective progress towards a more robust economic situation. By means of this new tool, as with all of the other tools that we have deployed since the start of the crisis – in particular the measures to support bank liquidity – the Eurosystem is endeavouring to relieve the pressure from the markets which may undermine the ability of countries to implement the reforms embarked on, and which may eventually jeopardise price stability.

Today there are a number of positive signs: bond market activity is reasonably buoyant, yields of peripheral countries have declined slightly and stock markets have picked up. However, two major weaknesses persist: –  Financial markets are highly fragmented within the euro area and sovereign yield spreads remain substantial;  –  Growth is weak and, here too, there are major disparities within the euro area. In the second quarter, growth stood at -0.2% for the area, after stagnating in the first quarter. Germany posted the highest growth, at 0.3%, and Portugal the weakest, at –1.2%. We are still expecting growth to recover very gradually next year. Before discussing how to address these problems, we have to correctly analyse the causes. In my opinion, three mutually reinforcing causes gave rise to the euro area crisis. 1. The main origin of the crisis lies in the lack of fiscal discipline on the part of most Member States. While these countries had had to make considerable consolidation efforts to fulfil the convergence criteria and to be allowed to join the euro, almost all of them became more lax as soon as they entered. In the first ten years of EMU, they ran up deficits and debts, including during times of growth. As a result in 2008, when the crisis started, these countries had no more fiscal room and their public finances deteriorated substantially.
Some conclusions Now back to Lars Göran's question: Does globalisation have anything to do with the closing of the ATM? Yes and no. In a dynamic economy with rapid growth, the production of goods and services is constantly changing. There is cost cutting, restructuring, closures, innovations and new production starting up all the time. When an ATM gives rise to more costs than it brings in income, it is closed down and bank services have to be handled in a different way, sometimes at higher costs to the customers, but always at lower costs to the bank. These are the conditions in a market economy. Globalisation speeds up the process by increasing competitive pressure. The closing down of the ATM may occur sooner than it would have otherwise. But the tougher competitive pressure provides us with other services, e.g. we can sit at our desks at home and pay our bills via the Internet as well as making transfers between wages accounts and bank loans. And we can pay by card. The ATM becomes less important. Globalisation speeds up the process in the changes in production and consumption patterns in a competitive market economy. This probably cannot be avoided and if we are careful, it can be turned to our advantage, as has been demonstrated in recent years. And we Swedes have shown that we can quickly adopt technological innovations, such as computers, mobile phones and IT. Let me finish with a few reflections.

Many necessary data are still simply missing  To foster data availability within the financial sector, in summer 2020, the NGFS launched an ambitious workstream to identify and map lacking data (financial and non-financial) relevant to climate risk analysis. We actively look forward to the publication of the preliminary results in the course of 2021 (that is: a detailed list of data items that are currently lacking, but which are needed). 2.2. Current disclosures are often hardly comparable However, the available data should also be comparable enough to be processed easily on a large scale, with reliable results. To solve this issue, regulations should be more specific and prescriptive towards climate-related reporting from financial firms as well as corporate firms, including SMEs (with proportionality). This is why we need harmonised and relatively granular reporting standards. France and the EU are at the leading edge and have already implemented targeted disclosure requirements (art. 173 in France / upcoming “Disclosure regulation”– SFDR –, to be implemented next March in Europe). However, this is still not enough, as the data disclosed currently lack homogeneity and comparability: this is a major loophole of the implementation of article 173 in France, for instance. We are not yet able to assess and compare the results of financial institutions in our public reports. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  I strongly believe that the EU should keep its first-mover advantage in climate data standardisation.