samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This brings me to the FX Global Code and its global implementation, which I will share more about today. Launch of the FX Global Code The FX Global Code was launched in May 2017 by the Bank for International Settlements (or BIS). It was developed over 2 years by the BIS Foreign Exchange Working Group (or FXWG), which comprised central banks from the key FX jurisdictions. The effort was also supported by a public-private partnership between the central banks and active engagement from key FX market participants. The private sector participants included the sell-side, buy-side, trading platforms and other market infrastructure. What we have now is a single, global code of conduct for the wholesale FX market. Benefits of the Code How will the Code benefit the FX market? Let’s take a step back and look at the nature of the wholesale FX market. It is inherently complex: Activity takes place across multiple venues; there is no single trading venue and no single price. Trading happens 24 hours a day, spanning multiple centres, with the day’s trading starting in 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  New Zealand, Australia, and moving to Singapore and London as the day progresses, before ending in New York. Participation is diverse – with banks, asset managers, corporates, and central banks, each transacting FX to meet different objectives. Participants act as principals or agents, and the responsibilities pertaining to each may not be well understood. Hence, there could be market failures, asymmetry in information and potential conflicts of interests.

There are thus a number of good reasons that explain why we use cash and why we will continue to do so for some time to come. For this reason alone there is a lower limit below which cash usage cannot fall. Where exactly this limit lies and how quickly we may reach it will largely depend on what other payment services are developed. For payments from private individuals to companies there are a number of competing services such as card payments, mobile payments, Internet transfers and so on. However, for payments between private individuals there are far fewer alternatives. Despite the rapid rate of technological development, no satisfactory replacement for cheques has emerged in this context. What is required to make new payment services successful? There are a number of fundamental characteristics of the payment system that affect the chances of successfully launching new substitutes for cash and other existing payment services. Some of these characteristics raise barriers to innovation and may thus help to protect the already established payment services. If we assume that, in one way or another, new payment services will be based on payment by electronic means between accounts in one or several custodial institutions, then there at least three problems that a payment service must overcome in order to succeed. First, launching a new payment system is in itself costly.
But this cut did not exhaust our monetary policy tools. In July we took additional measures to make monetary policy still more expansionary. Beyond adopting the commitment that we still keep, of holding the MPR at its minimum level for a prolonged period of time, we made it explicit by creating a time liquidity facility, the “FLAP.” This was meant to ascertain to the market that they would be able to obtain resources at a rate equivalent to the MPR for three- and six-month terms, and thus generate an interest rate structure that would allow a faster and stronger transmission of the monetary stance to market interest rates. The success of these measures is tangible proof of the diversity of monetary policy tools at the Bank’s disposal as well as of its commitment with meeting the inflation target. The global crisis and the weakening of economic activity The effects of the global crisis in Chile, on both the financial and the trade sectors, do not reflect its full impact on the domestic economy. The increase in risk premiums and the tensions in the world financial markets last year tightened local financial conditions, with a direct effect on the demand. Although at some point every country feared a generalized shutdown of international financial markets, Chile maintained its normal access and the direct financial impact was milder (figure 7).

Table 1 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent) 2013  2014 (f) Jun.14 Report  Sep.14 Report  2.5-3.5 1.75-2.25  Dec.14 Report  2015 (f) Sep.14 Report  Dec.14 Report  GDP  4.1  1.7  3.0-4.0  2.5-3.5  Domestic demand  3.4  1.7  0.1  -0.7  3.4  3.0  Domestic demand (w/o inventory change)  4.2  2.4  1.0  0.4  3.2  2.6  Gross fixed capital formation  0.4  -0.7  -4.1  -6.2  1.8  1.9  Total consumption  5.4  3.4  2.6  2.4  3.6  2.8  Goods and services exports  4.3  3.2  2.4  1.4  3.8  4.0  Goods and services imports  2.2  -1.1  -3.9  -5.9  4.0  3.7  Current account (% of GDP)  -3.4  -2.5  -1.8  -1.6  -2.2  -1.1  Gross national savings (% of GDP)  20.5  19.9  19.8  19.7  19.7  20.8  December CPI  3.0  4.0  4.1  4.8  2.8  2.8  December CPIEFE  2.1  3.7  3.4  4.3  2.5  2.8  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
Lars Nyberg: Are the risks growing in the banking system? Speech given by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at an analyst meeting at Enskilda Securities, held in Stockholm, on 14 June 2000. *  *  *  I would like to thank you for inviting me to today’s analyst meeting and giving me the opportunity to discuss financial stability issues with such a qualified audience. I would like to start by briefly explaining the Riksbank’s analysis of financial stability. In addition to the inflation target, the Riksbank has another primary task, namely that of being responsible for financial stability. These two important functions are closely linked. A stable financial system is important for price stability since financial imbalances can threaten the inflation target. Likewise, an inflation target policy contributes to stability in the financial system, as it has a levelling effect on cyclical fluctuations. The Riksbank’s analysis of financial stability can be interesting for analysts of bank and property shares, since we closely monitor the banking sector and property market within the scope of this analysis. Our perspective is somewhat different, however, since we are mainly interested in risks which can threaten the stability of the financial system and which often appear to be relatively improbable, while stock analysts attempt to assess the most likely developments in the market. However, the information about the markets is largely the same and analysts also need to consider the risks in the companies which they are covering.

To overcome this problem, the Riksbank has begun a review of the regulations, together with the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. Conclusion In the current situation there are great expectations that the future will bring economic growth and good times. “The new economy” with a low inflation rate and high levels of employment and growth has gradually crossed the Atlantic to reach us. In such times of strong confidence in the future, consumption and indebtedness increase, while saving declines. We have seen this happen many times before. If the expectations are fulfilled, there is no problem. However, if the expectations race ahead of economic developments, asset prices and indebtedness can develop in a way that causes imbalances. If there is an economic downturn, households may find difficulty in meeting their payment obligations, which will lead to a rapid increase in saving, falling asset prices and a decline in demand. This is also something we have seen in other contexts. While this development could give cause for concern, it is important not to paint an excessively negative picture. As the Riksbank has pointed out earlier, a decline in the macroeconomic situation would probably lead to problems for individual households, but would hardly cause sufficient loan losses to threaten the banks’ stability. However, there is every reason to be vigilant with regard to continued developments, particularly from a price stability perspective. Continued rising asset prices and credit expansion could risk leading to overheating and thus rising inflation.
Villy Bergström: Monetary policy in an uncertain world Speech by Mr Villy Bergström, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Sparbanksstiftelsen Nya, held at the Gävle concert hall, 14 May 2001. *  *  *  Following several years of very strong GDP growth, we are now seeing a slowing down in the Swedish economy. It is necessary for the growth rate to slow down over the next few years to avoid a long-term threat to price stability. While there was a plentiful supply of free resources, GDP could grow more quickly than the long-term productivity growth and labour force supply allowed. Now, however, the resources are running out and production needs to be adapted to a slower rate that is more sustainable in the long term. When the Riksbank raised its repo rate by 25 points to 4 per cent in December last year, the decision was based on assessments that demand would continue to increase to such an extent that the shortage of resources would lead to the inflation target being exceeded. The interest rate was raised despite the fact that the inflation rate was then only 1.4 per cent. This shows the pedagogical and practical problems the Riksbank faces when making such decisions. Monetary policy decisions are based on assessments of the inflation rate a couple of years ahead and are aimed at achieving the inflation target in this time horizon.

Macro-prudential policy protects the financial system from itself and the wider economy from its consequences. The FPC’s actions to date have been completely consistent with those objectives. For example, it has called for UK banks to increase their capital levels to safeguard their future resiliance. It has also relaxed liquid assets requirements for UK banks to support future growth. Through these actions, the FPC has sought to protect the financial system from itself and the wider economy from its consequences. In future, the FPC will have at its disposal a Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCB) and Sectoral Capital Requirements (SCR). These are designed explicitly to lean against financial cycles. Like monetary policy, they operate symmetrically to constrain credit booms and cushion busts. They help safeguard today’s younger generation from the impatient grasp of their parents and grandparents, to avoid the ultimate deceit. The FPC can also invest in financial public goods – for example, new financial infrastructure to support resilience. In the past, central banks helped build market infrastructures such as payment, clearing and settlement systems to support resilience. Like lampposts and  4  8  The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) is the third point of the regulatory triangle of the UK. It has responsibility, among other things, for consumer protection. BIS central bankers’ speeches  language, these are classic public goods. In future, the FPC may wish to help build other types of market infrastructure – for example, securitisation markets – to help create a more diverse financial system.
xii  x, xi  This is particularly  important in a rapidly changing world, where information is super abundant and certainty is absent. Indeed, almost all decisions in finance are taken under uncertainty. This makes it especially important that decision makers are exposed to a range of views, with open debate that includes perspectives that challenge the prevailing wisdom. For those central banks with regulatory responsibilities, biases in supervision can be countered by considering a variety of perspectives and debating within diverse supervisory teams. xiii  Diversity must be supported by the right structures for its benefits to be realised. For example, research on central bank committee design shows how diverse decision making benefits from:   Having a clearly defined policy objective;    Having relatively small policy committees, with external members;    Publishing policy decisions, and allowing for external scrutiny of decision-making processes. xiv  These features are integral to the MPC, FPC, PRA Board and Court of the Bank of England. In recent years, we have reinforced them by implementing the recommendations of the Warsh review, including publishing transcripts and putting all policy committees on an equal footing with clear remits. More effective communication  Being diverse can help us to craft communications that people can actually understand. The past few decades have seen enormous strides in central bank transparency – minutes are published, interviews given, speeches rendered, blogs posted. Now it is high time that greater emphasis is placed on how central banks communicate.

Caleb M Fundanga: Zambia’s economic overview and its accountancy profession Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the 2010 Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Ball, Lusaka, 24 April 2010. *  *  *  The President – Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA), Mr. Chintu Mulendema The President – Eastern, Central and Southern African Federation of Accountants, Mr. Koos Du Toit The President International Federation of Accountants, Mr. Robert Bunting The Secretary & Chief Executive – Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants, Mr. Hapenga Kabeta The Chief Executive Officer – Eastern, Central and Southern African Federation of Accountants, Mr. Vickson Ncube Distinguished Members of ZICA Members of the Press Ladies and Gentlemen I am greatly honoured to have the opportunity to join you this evening and to say a few words on the important role that the accountancy profession plays in our economy. The importance of the accountancy profession has indeed been highlighted following the recent global financial crisis in which a lack of appropriate governance arrangements and clarity about the inherent risks taken by financial institutions contributed to the near collapse of financial markets in the developed economies. Clearly the accountancy profession has an important role to play in ensuring that the regulatory response to the crisis leads to more robust and transparent financial institutions that serve the needs of households and firms and avoids the build-up of systemic risks.
The performance of total and core CPI inflation in the run-up to the referendum was consistent  13  The MPC judged that these factors could explain around three-quarters to four-fifths of the deviation of inflation from target, with the remainder reflecting the impact of past spare capacity weighing on domestic cost growth. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  11  with this judgment – one that helped ensure that the UK economy continued to expand jobs and growth at some of the strongest paces in the advanced world. In my view, this period demonstrated the strength of the Bank’s expanded powers. Aware that the combination of strong growth and historically low interest rates could lead to excessive risk taking, this was a period of macroprudential activism by the Bank. In the five years to 2016, the major UK banks’ CET1 capital ratios in aggregate nearly doubled, rising from 7.2% to 13.4%. The FPC introduced a new leverage ratio and counter-cyclical capital buffer. With the PRC, it regularly stressed tested the major banks against a wide range of extreme economic and financial shocks. In a major innovation, the FPC brought in two measures to help ensure that mortgage underwriting standards did not deteriorate as they had in previous cycles and to limit the rise of heavily indebted households. The active management by the PRC and FPC of potential risks to financial stability ensured that monetary policy could concentrate on its core responsibilities.

An assessment of which tools that might be useful will partly depend on the specific features of the Norwegian credit and financial markets and partly on the shocks that hit our economy. The tools we resort to in a crisis may be less suitable in a normal situation. Gains must be weighed against costs. This brings us to some key interrelated questions: what should the level of ambition for monetary policy be, and how far should the limits of monetary policy be stretched before other components of economic policy must take over? Conventional monetary policy – how much room for manoeuvre is there? Chart: The policy rate in Norway First, a few words on our most important monetary policy instrument – the policy rate. Since the trough at 0.5 percent, the policy rate has been gradually raised to 1.5 percent, reflecting favourable developments in the Norwegian economy. In our September interest rate forecast, the policy rate remains close to today’s level of 1.5 percent for the next couple of years. On the one hand, growth in the Norwegian economy is still solid, inflation is close to the target and capacity utilisation is somewhat above a normal level. On the other hand, there is considerable uncertainty about the global growth outlook. The policy rate path reflects a trade-off between these conditions. Chart: Low policy rates abroad A rate of 1.5 percent is considerably lower than the average level for the policy rate since inflation targeting was introduced in 2001.
New regulations may simply do more harm in the present situation. But the players in international financial markets do need to review their systems for evaluating risks. Risk assessments based on historically determined correlations between different assets may be inadequate when earlier patterns are broken and the supply of liquidity changes. In the short run the problems in the global economy must be solved at their origins. Via the International Monetary Fund, in certain situations the international community can contribute liquidity if the countries in question are prepared to take measures. It is, indeed, an enigma that the world’s second biggest economy, Japan, has not managed, year after year, to tackle the problems in its banking system. Economic development in Japan is highly important, not least for other countries in the region. All observers are agreed that the problems in the banking sector must be rectified. Fiscal measures are also called for. Nor would I rule out the introduction, as part of a stability programme, of a numerical inflation target that might help to modify the negative expectations. It is my hope that the current signals about future measures will be fulfilled. The US Federal Reserve is also strongly focused on the problems in the global economy. In Europe the action of central banks will be determined by the extent to which Europe is affected by what is now happening. To date, however, it looks as though Europe is moving in the right direction.

Caleb M Fundanga: International financial reporting standards for banks and other financial institutions Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of a workshop on “International financial reporting standards for banks and other financial institutions”, organised by the Bank of Zambia in conjunction with the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants, Lusaka, 17 February 2005. * •  The Chief Executive, ZICA  •  Distinguished Resource Persons  •  Distinguished Participants  •  Ladies and Gentlemen,  *  *  I wish to welcome you all to this important workshop on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and International Auditing Standards, (ISAs) organised for finance officers and auditors from commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions and the Bank of Zambia. This workshop is organised by the Bank of Zambia in conjunction with the Zambia Institute for Chartered Accountants (ZICAs) out of the recognition that the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and International Auditing Standards (ISAs) are critical not only to the integrity of our financial system, but also to the Bank of Zambia’s efforts of ensuring effective supervision and regulation of banks and non-bank financial institutions. As you may be aware, three important factors have heightened the relevance of accounting and auditing standards to bank supervisors. These, include: •  First, IFRS and ISAs are a set of high-quality, transparent and globally renowned accounting and auditing standards that the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has included in its 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems.
At that time, the par value of money had been restored over a period of 20 years, but now the authorities achieved the same in a quarter of the time at considerable real economic costs. 16 We usually refer to this as “parity policy”. The ambition to keep their promise was admirable, but the follow-through lacked flexibility. 17 We might say that in the 1920s, the central bank adhered rigidly to “the letter of the law”. 18 After the Second World War, unemployment in the 1920s and 1930s was often associated with the rigidity of “parity policy”, which led to considerable changes in views on economic policy. 19 The objective of a fixed exchange rate and a gold standard nevertheless remained intact and was achieved. Norway and a number of other countries pegged their currencies to the dollar under the Bretton Woods Agreement. In reality, they also linked the value of their money to gold, since the dollar was linked to gold. 20  13  In Norway, the silver standard was replaced by the gold standard on 1 January 1874. See annex by Ragna Alstadheim in Qvigstad, J.F. and A. Skjæveland (1994) “Valutakursregimer – historiske erfaringer og fremtidige utfordringer (Exchange rate regimes – historical experience and future challenges)”, in Berg, S. A., J. F. Qvigstad and K. Storvik (Eds.) Stabilitet og langsiktighet: Festskrift til Hermod Skånland (Stability and a long-term perspective: Festschrift for Hermod Skånland), 1994, Aschehoug.

The government recognised that the repeated devaluations were ineffectual. Confidence had been lost. In Norway, inflation had also soared without a fall in unemployment. Even if it was costly to restore credibility, in reality we had no choice. 29 The alternative was to bring the country even closer to the brink of financial chaos and runaway inflation. The devaluation in 1986 would become the last in the series. Internationally, the 1980s ushered in three innovations that would become decisive for the design of modern monetary policy as we know it today. -  First, market deregulation led to freer cross-border capital flows. Promises could no longer be relegated to the future. Failing credibility was promptly reflected in higher interest rates and weaker exchange rates. Nixon’s disinflation plan to bring down inflation at some point in the future would have had immediate consequences. On the other hand, it also became clear that a credible and transparent monetary policy could be more effective precisely thanks to financial markets’ swift reactions. 30  -  Second, the notion of central bank autonomy regained favour. The political authorities, who wanted to show the world that they were committed to delivering their promise of price stability, did as Ulysses and tied themselves to the mast. The mechanism was central bank independence and Norway was no exception. The new Norges Bank Act of 1985 gave Norges Bank the authority to set the interest rate.