samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It ties up resources without providing the extra capacity in stress that regulators wanted them to provide, and had assumed they would when determining how to prepare the system to absorb shocks. If a regulatory buffer is instead perceived as similar to a minimum requirement and firms take actions to avoid dipping into it, these actions might be harmful to the real economy and, as last year’s Bank analysis showed, to the banking system. Thus it is essential to have a well-designed regulatory buffer framework which can make fresh resources available when they are most needed. The early Covid stress gives us an opportunity to investigate how the current framework behaves and how practically usable regulatory buffers may be. Given the effectiveness of the fire-fighting I mentioned at the outset, bank capital ratios did not approach their Capital Conservation Buffers, so we cannot probe directly how banks would have behaved had capital ratios fallen inside that regulatory buffer. However, there are at least three approaches we can look at. Approaches to analysing capital buffer usage Approach 1 – What do banks and investors say about buffers? The first approach involves asking banks what constraints they face in practice in dipping into buffers and how they manage their capital positions. In broad terms, they told us that expectations of capital instrument and debt investors and concerns about the actions of credit ratings agencies are a major constraint.

This enabled them to support mortgage and corporate lending growth to a slightly greater extent, as can be seen in the last two columns of Table 1, though these differences in lending outcomes are not statistically significant. Taken together, these international and UK results are striking. 13 Table 6, Basel report on “Early lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic on the Basel reforms”. 14 Record of the Financial Policy Committee - 13 December 2019 (bankofengland.co.uk) (pg. 4) 15 The UK CCyB rate is set with respect to banks’ UK credit exposures and therefore has a greater quantitative impact  when raised and reduced for banks with a high proportion of UK credit risk-weighted assets relative to total riskweighted assets. 16 The analysis was carried out by a team including Aakriti Mathur, Matthew Naylor, Aniruddha Rajan, Katie Low, and Damien Lynch. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  The fact that the release of the CCyB has such a positive effect globally, and to a degree in the UK, seems like good news. But recall that the CCyB is itself an extension of the Capital Conservation Buffer. So when we take a step back it suggests something less positive about the non-releasable Capital Conservation Buffer: it indicates that, to be treated as practically useable, regulatory capital buffers may first need to be released into management buffers; and suggests that, despite their purpose, non-releasable regulatory buffers such as the Capital Conservation Buffer may well be unusable in practice.
Total assets have amounted to ALL 353,6 billion, whilst liabilities have amounted to ALL 321 billion. Realized profit totalled about ALL 10 (9,993) billion, the highest in the last three years. This result has increased the Bank of Albania’s capital. Pursuant to the obligations of Law No. 8269, dated 23 December 1997, Article 9, 25 percent, about ALL 2,5 (2,479) billion, of the net profit was capitalized, causing the general reserve to amount to ALL 10 (9.994) billion. Similarly, the Bank of Albania has observed the obligation of transferring the net profit to the State Budget pursuant to Article 10 of the same Law, and paid to the State Budget about ALL 6,74 billion for the year 2009. Pursuant to Article 10, in March 2010 the balance of 2009 net profit amounting to ALL 2,4 (2,436) billion was paid to the State Budget. BIS Review 78/2010  9  Honourable Ms. Chairwoman, Dear deputies, Thanking you for your attention, on behalf of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, I want to guarantee the Parliament of the Republic of Albania that the central bank will remain a responsible decision-making institution in 2010. Our decision-making will:   remain transparent both for the financial market and the public at large;    consider all possible information in and out of Albania;    rely on qualified human resources, and    improve its policy and operational framework, considering the best contemporary and international practices.

Finally, I am pleased to see many old friends of the HKMC supporting this new issue. I would like to thank the HSBC and Bank of China (Hong Kong) for underwriting a portion of the bond issue as well as placing the notes. Taking this opportunity, I would also like to thank the other placing banks, namely, Bank of America (Asia), Bank of Communications, Bank of East Asia, Chiyu Bank, CITIC Ka Wah Bank, Dah Sing Bank, DBS Bank, Hang Seng Bank, Fubon Bank (Hong Kong), Liu Chong Hing Bank, Nanyang Commercial Bank, Shanghai Commercial Bank, Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong), Wing Hang Bank and Wing Lung Bank, for their participation in this bond issue. With their extensive branch networks, and sophisticated telephone banking and the Internet banking facility, I look forward to another successful retail bond issue by the HKMC. Thank you. BIS Review 55/2005  1
It could grow and have a very clear purpose – countercyclical stabilisation. Now it’s more like a sort of competiveness instrument. We have to share more risk, for sure, if we want to improve the performance of the euro area and reduce the burden of monetary policy because, as I said, monetary policy is not almighty. And there is one element that is going to be key to achieving these steps: trust. You have to trust other countries to behave. But when a country misbehaves, as seems to be the case with Italy now, are you concerned that this may hamper trust? In the case of Italy, if you look at the fundamentals there are pros and cons. Italy is not a very vulnerable economy on financial grounds, if you take into account the net investment position and other factors. If you want an example of a vulnerable economy, look at Spain in 2010. It had an external deficit of 10% of GDP and a net investment position of 90% of GDP in the red. That’s not the situation Italy is in now. My point is that trust sometimes depends on the political intentions of the government. You mean the Italian government must provide some clearly stated objectives that are acceptable to the rest of the club. Yes, on both sides. This is a bilateral game, so it’s from both sides. And I think it’s very difficult to make progress if we can’t build trust.

There is nothing unfair in comparing Italy to Spain in June and July 2012. The situation was very similar. We were very close, we were on the edge…  The situation was the same and the two countries took two different paths. Spain decided to take an EU programme for the banks, whereas Italy committed itself to making it on its own. Do you think that decision explains the divergence between the two countries since then? Again, I don’t want to make a direct comparison. The situation in Spain in 2012 was different – the government had an absolute majority in Parliament, we were lucky in that. And the clean-up of banks in Spain was far-reaching. It was not easy; it was bloody, I can assure you. But we did it and, after that, we were able to deal with an issue like Banco Popular. That was not easy, either. Then, Spain gained a lot of competiveness because of labour market reforms. Those are the two factors. But I don’t want to make a comparison with Italy. I am only focusing on Spain now. By 2013 Spain had started to grow again, and it has outperformed its peers for the last five or six years. So do you think frontloading that effort paid off? Yes, I think so. In Spain there was a government with an absolute majority, but even then we had a difficult time, politically speaking, after that.
A third step succeeds later, and thus onward till a genius pieces the bits together and makes the decisive contribution.”16 Today, I have had the privilege of addressing such people – geniuses who have pieced the bits together and made decisive contributions. 1 Ricardo, D. (1817), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, London: John Murray. 2 Sargent, T. & Wallace, N. (1976), “Rational Expectations and the Theory of Economic Policy", Journal of Monetary  Economics, 2(2): 169–83; Lucas, R., (1976), “Econometric policy evaluation: A critique”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1: 19–46; Kydland, F. and Prescott, E. (1977), “Rules rather than discretion: the time inconsistency of optimal plans”, Journal of Political Economy, 85(3): 473–491. These models also provided the ground for structural econometrics, which allowed for policy analysis and the study of counterfactuals. See Hansen, L. P. (2013), “Uncertainty outside and inside models”, Lecture on receipt of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 8 December; and Sims, C. (1980), “Macroeconomics and Reality“, Econometrica, 48(1): 1–48. 3 Clarida, R., Gali, J. and Gertler, M. (1999), “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective”,  Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4): 1661–1707. 4 6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  4 Notably Kiyotaki, N. and Moore, J. (1997), “Credit Cycles”, Journal of Political Economy, 105(2):211–248 and  Bernanke, B., Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S. (1999), “The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework”, Chapter 21, Handbook of Macroeconomics.

The arguments for establishing a committee for monetary policy and financial stability are weaker, in Norges Bank’s view, if the GPFG is separated from Norges Bank. Without responsibility for the GPFG, the Board’s range of responsibilities will be substantially reduced. In addition, dividing responsibility for central banking matters between the two bodies will pose challenges, particularly with regard to the division of work and reporting. The central bank’s core functions are closely intertwined and must be viewed as a whole, as experienced during the financial crisis. A solution where responsibility must be transferred from the board to the committee in critical situations, as proposed by the Commission, could give rise to a lack of clarity and conflicts of competence. An important point in this context is that in the implementation of the committee’s tasks, the Governor will not be responsible to the board, but will report directly to the Ministry of Finance on central banking matters. If the management of the GPFG is removed from the aegis of Norges Bank, the Bank’s function will be to exercise authority with regard to monetary policy, financial stability and the payment system. A board with broadly the same composition as at present would then function well. Combining responsibility for central banking matters and administrative matters in this board will place responsibility with the same body in both normal and crisis times. The consideration of central bank independence also points towards this solution.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: ASEAN financial integration – outlook and implications Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the ASEAN Risk Conference: “ASEAN financial integration – outlook and implications”, Kuala Lumpur, 14 May 2015. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak on the subject of ASEAN financial integration and its implications for the region. The theme is contemporary and relevant as ASEAN approaches an important milestone this year – the realisation of the vision to establish the ASEAN Economic Community. The path to economic integration is inherently challenging given that political and economic imperatives do not always converge. But at the same time there are enormous opportunities that can be realised for the good of member countries. For a region as diverse as ASEAN, where political systems, cultural backgrounds, stages of economic development and domestic priorities vary widely, the challenges are substantially greater, but not insurmountable. It is worth noting that ASEAN leaders had adopted the ASEAN Economic Blueprint in November 2007 when the global financial crisis was upon us. It was a bold and visionary decision. The unfolding of the crisis, including the issues faced by the European financial and economic integration process, provided important lessons for the region in advancing its own integration journey. Taking the primary lessons learnt, ASEAN has decided on an integration process that is flexible and pragmatic.

But while net financial income has fallen for the wealthiest households, the same is not true for wealth. Wealthier households tend to have a greater amount of housing wealth and house prices have risen since the introduction of negative interest rates. Extrapolating the HFCS forward using changes in equity, bond and house price data shows increases in the net wealth for every wealth quintile. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The ECB’s policy measures have been unambiguously positive for euro-area governments. Germany alone saved approximately 28 billion euro in 2015 in lower than expected interest payments. Such payments would ultimately have been financed from lower spending or higher taxes. Broadly speaking, the lower income the household sector has received from income payments from government bonds, either directly or intermediated through the banking sector needs to be offset against lower tax liabilities now or in the future. Indeed, research by Deutsche Bank4 shows that the impact of low and negative interest rates on the returns of German household financial assets has been limited so far. This was in part due to revaluation gains on the back of the ECB’s asset purchase programme as well as interest income from investment funds and insurance and pension products. It is still possible for savers to gain positive real returns by holding a diversified portfolio of assets.
Tarisa Watanagase: Bank of Thailand’s perspective on the retail banking industry Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Excellence in Retail Financial Services Convention 2008, Bangkok, 15-16 May 2008. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to be invited to give the keynote address for this prestigious convention organized by the Asian Banker. It gives me the opportunity to share with you the Bank of Thailand’s perspective on the retail banking industry, which I hope would help both service providers and consumers alike to better understand our regulatory objectives and priorities. Retail banking business in Thailand has enjoyed rapid growth since after the Asian financial crisis, as banks – having learned the lesson of risk concentration – began to shift their strategies to diversify their portfolios and revenues by making inroads into the retail market segments. Over the past five years, bank consumer loans have grown at an average annual rate of 20 percent, outpacing the corporate loans which have increased three percent annually. As a result, consumer loans now constitute almost a quarter of total loan portfolio of the banking system in Thailand, compared with 16 percent in 2003. Housing loans continue to account for the largest share, followed by personal loans and credit card loans. Competition in the retail banking business has been intense, with more variety of product offerings and new delivery channels introduced to satisfy customer needs.

I think we need both in a well organised financial system because as banks have a predominance of deposit liabilities with the characteristics I described earlier they are not on their own natural equity providers. This brings me to the last part of the story, namely the growth of non-bank asset management in its broadest sense as the size of bank balance sheets has tended to reduce post-crisis. It is striking that if you were familiar only with a chart of the evolution of global assets under management over the last twenty years, you should be excused for failing to spot that a global financial crisis had occurred. It follows from what I have said that this shift from banks to non-banks makes sense as we seek to achieve a clearer demarcation of the types of liability or funding contracts and the assets best suited to go with them. But it only makes sense if a few conditions are met, two in particular. First, that there is no lack of clarity about the nature of the assets held under management. Thus the label on the can is an accurate description. Take as an example the recent failure in the US of the Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund (focused on what a comedian might say). The purpose of the Fund was to invest in high yield debt. The label seems to have made that clear, and it wasn’t therefore in the form of a AAA label which obscured the reality.
Prominent reasons for the disruption in inflation dynamics in May 2006 were the significant depreciation of the Turkish lira due to the deterioration of risk perceptions in an environment where domestic demand was strong and the impact of the exchange rate pass-through on prices as well as increases in non-processed food prices were high. The Central Bank’s response was a rapid and strong monetary tightening aimed to overcome the deterioration in inflation expectations in that period – so that economic units would continue to take the inflation target as a reference in their decisions. Today, the primary cause of the lasting deterioration in inflation outlook is the presence of significant supply side shocks .As I have mentioned previously, the Central Bank’s projections suggest that it will not be possible to bring inflation back to 4 percent in the shortterm even with a sustained maintenance of the tight monetary policy stance. In this case, a strong reaction by monetary policy, as was the case in 2006, would not ensure the convergence of inflation to 4-percent target in the short-term, but would create undesired fluctuations in economic activity and relative prices. It should be kept in mind, however, that the inflation expectations will deteriorate further in the absence of a reaction by the Central Bank. The current path of core inflation indicators demonstrates that the sharp increases in food and energy prices have started to adversely effect pricing behavior. The core inflation indicator that excludes food and energy prices rose to 6.3 percent as of May.

However, experience has shown that when a country requests such assistance, the national authorities tend to blame European institutions, including the ECB, for having pushed them to do so. “Europe” thus becomes a scapegoat and this may fuel strong – although unjustified – anti-European sentiment in the countries concerned. So governments have a natural inclination not to request financial assistance at an early stage. The second thing that has gone wrong has been the implementation of the Greek programme of reforms. Reform fatigue set in at an early stage and it probably went unnoticed for a while. Member States adopting IMF/EU programmes have to remain firmly committed to very specific measures, which need to be acted upon from the outset. Monitoring has to be strengthened. I will not elaborate on these two first issues but – being here in Berlin today – I would like to focus on the third issue which has not gone well, in my opinion, namely the whole discussion about private sector involvement. The point I would like to make is that having the private sector actively involved in preventing and resolving sovereign crises is a good idea. However, the practical implementation of this idea is fraught with complications and, if done unwisely, may actually be very damaging, and turn out to be more costly for taxpayers. The events of recent months seem to confirm my views.
What could be the long-term impact? The long-term impact is about how the world is run. It’s about having an open, free market economy globally, with the rule of law and with instruments for nations to talk together. That’s how we’ve worked since World War II and we’ve been very well served by the system. We want it to continue. It has to be improved; it has to become fairer, it has to deliver fairer outcomes for workers and for households, but it has to remain open. It has to remain built on trust between nations. We’ve got this trade war going. We’ve got uncertainties around Brexit. We’ve got geopolitical risks, with new sanctions on Iran. What is the biggest risk you see throughout this summer? To start with, we see risk as coming mainly from outside the Eurozone. Primarily that’s about trade tensions, as we’ve just discussed. That’s about escalation of trade tensions denting business confidence globally, and that’s the main risk. Could the ECB have to rethink its path between supporting growth and fighting inflation because of these risks? These risks were discussed when the Governing Council met in Riga last month. We discussed risks thoroughly and we designed a path of sustained monetary accommodation, anticipating that net asset purchases end in December 2018, but with a continued degree of monetary accommodation being delivered by rate guidance – enhanced guidance on rates – and by reinvestment policy. That is the balance we struck in Riga and it already took account of the risks.

That’s part of the political discussion; that’s not for us to decide. Very finally, the Eurozone budget – which is an idea wanted by the French President, Emmanuel Macron – seems to face a lot of opposition. Do you think it’s a good idea? Is it necessary and what could overcome this opposition? It is not an easy discussion. It’s a fundamentally political discussion that’s about sharing money, that’s about sharing sovereignty. It’s good the discussion has started. It’s good that ministers and leaders are discussing ways to make the Eurozone more resilient and to make the Eurozone stronger. Given the amount of uncertainty that we see around us in the world, all of us in Europe, in the Eurozone, have a duty to make our system stronger. It’s good that that the discussion has started, finally. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Even if it’s being delayed, even if it might not happen in this mandate of Emmanuel Macron? No one expects that discussion to be easy, so there is lower-hanging fruit such as completing the banking union. We would certainly hope that the capital markets union would feature more prominently on the agenda and also that the rules, the fiscal rules and the macroeconomic rules we’ve been working with, can be improved, can be made more credible. Fiscal union is not lowhanging fruit; it is difficult, it will take time, but it’s good that that discussion has started. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches