samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is tempting, therefore, to think of these clauses as being the enduring legacy of Magna Carta, while at the same time allowing ourselves to patronise the juxtaposition of these apparently fundamental principles alongside so much  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  antiquated gibberish about fish-weirs, the obligation to construct bridges, and the theft of wood for building castles. This would, I think, be a mistake. The specificity of the clauses animates the general principles. It is because they are detailed and targeted at the concerns of the time that they are a genuine attempt to place a boundary on the authority of the King, rather than relying on vague platitudes. 19 Magna Carta was nowhere near the first attempt to encapsulate ideas of justice and good government, nor was it the last. Indeed, it was a spectacularly unsuccessful attempt – and it was anyway concerned only with the interests of a very small segment of society. But, largely because King John’s heirs were forced into a tight corner and therefore obliged to reissue the charter again and again after 1215 (in 1216, 1217, 1225, 1234, 1253, 1265, 1297 and 1300, to cite only the more famous reissues), it is Magna Carta that has become the icon of the principle that the exercise of authority requires permission from those subject to that authority – and that, once granted, this permission can just as easily be withdrawn.

In the decade prior to the crisis, labour costs grew by around 2½ per cent each year on average, with wages and salaries growing at around 4¾ per cent and productivity at 2¼ per cent. Inflation averaged 2 per cent, 27 however, in part because import prices rose only by around ¼ per cent each year at the same time. The possibility that history might repeat itself points to a third important consideration: the need to monitor developments in firms’ costs other than labour. The sum of these is evident in so-called “core” inflation, which are measures of prices that strip out the most volatile determinants of inflation, like energy prices, revealing more persistent trends. In an open economy like the United Kingdom’s, those factors include import prices, which are affected by movements in the value of sterling, and which, on past experience, can take a considerable time to pass through to core inflation. 28  24  In our May projections, the MPC expected PPP-weighted worth growth of 3 ¼ per cent in 2015 and 3 ¾ per cent in 2016 and 2017, just shy of the pre-crisis average of around 4 per cent. 25  I discussed labour supply developments in the UK in detail last autumn. See Carney, M (2014), Speech to the Trades Union Congress Annual Conference, 9th September 2014. 26  Unlike regular pay, bonuses are closer in spirit to dividend payments, being state-contingent disbursements of profits.
The Swiss franc remains significantly overvalued. The financial sector has also suffered from the effects of the recent crisis on Switzerland and its currency. For instance, the current account shows that exports of banking commissions have diminished markedly since the financial crisis. Indeed, the entire Swiss economy has had to adapt to new international monetary conditions. At the SNB we have geared monetary policy towards this new and difficult situation. 6  Swiss Bankers Association, Banking Barometer, September 2015. 7  BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey 2013. 8  Full-time equivalents. 9  Cf. Final report of the group of experts for the further development of the financial market strategy, dated 1.12.2014; Annex to the Review of the Swiss TBTF regime by international standards – Basis for an evaluation in accordance with Article 52 of the Banking Act, p. 55. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Monetary policy during the financial and European debt crises The Swiss economy is currently being hit by external shocks. In such a context, the SNB aims to dampen short-term costs without jeopardising the long-term goals of monetary policy. The challenge for monetary policy in recent years has been to react to sudden developments in international markets and geopolitical risks that have endangered Switzerland’s real economy and price stability in the medium term. The goal has been to steer policy responses in a way that reduces short-term costs while preserving the stability achieved over the past four decades of independent monetary policy.

Both exchange rates and interest rates then determine monetary conditions in Switzerland, and thus eventually output and inflation. Although short-term interest rates are the main monetary policy instrument, the SNB has, in recent years, been using exchange rate interventions as an additional tool. Due to the safehaven status of the Swiss franc, the SNB has been active on the foreign exchange market. We are also willing to intervene, as required, as part of our current monetary policy. Once again, banks have been at the heart of monetary policy transmission. They have acted as intermediaries of the SNB’s foreign exchange interventions. 4 With depressed international demand and a strong Swiss franc weighing on GDP, credit availability has been crucial for the domestic economy. Low interest rates and ample liquidity provision by the SNB have facilitated banks’ intermediation activities. In short, the SNB’s  4  2  For further details, cf. Lukas Altermatt and Romain Baeriswyl, The effect of the monetary base expansion on the balance sheet of domestic banks, SNB Quarterly Bulletin, 1/2015, and Raphael Auer, A safe haven: international demand for Swiss francs during the euro area debt crisis, SNB Quarterly Bulletin, 2/2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  policy has supported the banks’ provision of credit to the real economy. The banking sector, which is traditionally procyclical, has in turn benefited from improved economic conditions. In order to fulfil our mandate we need a stable banking system. Financial stability is key, both for the SNB and the whole economy.
Up to now payments for over 14 thousand businesses and over 93 thousand households, totalling more than BGN 9 billion, have been suspended , which really and considerably eases the financial conditions during the hardest time of the crisis. The crisis has moved the external financing conditions issue to the top of the agenda. You know that the crisis triggered the accumulation of deficits which must be financed and the required financial buffers must be maintained. Therefore, we had to give an additional signal to markets and investors that Bulgaria stays stable in the crisis in terms of its financial position and its 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  monetary regime. This signal was given with the EUR 2 billion swap line set up between the European Central Bank and the Bulgarian National Bank, and it has been read unequivocally as a positive one by markets, rating agencies, and investors alike. I want to point out one very important thing – the conclusion about Bulgaria’s strong financial position remains valid now, despite the developments in the last months. A drastic change of this direction would be a mistake with serious repercussions. All measures so far pursued in relation to the banking sector, which I believe were successful and timely, do not, in any way, diminish our concern of what is happening and is going to happen in the coming months.

The introduction of the euro has profoundly changed the environment in which the Swiss economy operates. Since 1999, the Swiss franc has coexisted quite harmoniously with the euro. In fact, the franc has been more stable against the euro than it was against the D mark. This is good news for Swiss companies exporting to the European market. On the other hand, such companies have to contend with a greater concentration of foreign-exchange risks. They are responding to this challenge with hedging policies that are more active than those pursued in the past. Pegging the franc to the euro in order to eliminate exchange-rate risks would entail more problems than advantages, as it would inevitably push up the level of interest rates in Switzerland. Against this backdrop, the National Bank is continuing to pursue an independent monetary policy that takes account not only of economic trends and inflation forecasts but also of the situation on the foreign exchange markets. BIS Review 10/2004  1
This also calls for ensuring a consistent regulatory treatment of similar risks, irrespective of the framework or combination of frameworks under which stablecoins schemes might be operated. - Secondly, coordinating the adjustment of regulatory and supervisory frameworks at the international level Whatever the final choice made for the European Union in terms of regulation strategy, such an adjustment of the regulatory framework should be part of broader adjustment at the global level, given the possible development of global stable coins. Indeed, there is a need for overall consistency to prevent regulatory arbitrage under the “same activities, same risks, same rules” principle. This is also necessary to address risks that fall outside existing frameworks, including risks to fair competition and monetary policy transmission. Indeed, in July 2019, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors agreed that possible stablecoins initiatives must meet the highest regulatory standards, be subject to prudent supervision and oversight and that possible regulatory gaps should, as a matter of priority, be assessed and addressed. Accordingly, the Financial Stability Board is working on a global regulatory and supervisory approach towards stablecoins. Developing shared public policy, regulatory and supervisory goals and principles should help capture activities that fall outside traditional regulatory boundaries. It should also help prevent any discrepancies at domestic levels that may give rise to fragmentation and regulatory arbitrage which would be counterproductive for the development of these new instruments themselves.

Cecilia Skingsley: Are non-banks reshaping the retail payments market? Speech by Ms Cecilia Skingsley, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the conference “Non-banks in Payment Market: Challenges and Opportunities”, organised by the Bank of Lithuania and the Sveriges Riksbank, Vilnius, 8 October 2015. *  *  *  The retail payments market is undergoing a structural change, potentially unparalleled with anything we have seen in a long time. This gives rise to a number of important questions as regards competition and cooperation, regulation and where this development may take us in the long run. An interesting and important market The retail payments market is an interesting and important market. Important because it underpins the modern economy. If we were unable to pay in a safe and efficient way, the economy would soon grind to a halt when markets for goods and services stopped functioning. Interesting because of its rapid development. It is here the action is. On a global level, the payments market has grown by some 8 per cent a year for a decade. Growth has been higher not only in the developing world, reflecting overall higher economic growth rates, but also in Europe and North America, where it has been some four per cent annually. Given the financial crisis and the relatively low economic growth, this is a healthy growth rate. On a global level, estimates indicates that the retail payments market is worth several hundred US billions in revenue from transactions.
Speech  Embargo 30 April 2021, 10.00 am  SNB distributions – not a matter of course even when profits are high 113th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Zurich, 30 April 2021 © Swiss National Bank (speech given in German)  Page 1/7  Madam President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests A warm welcome to you all to our Annual General Meeting. The pandemic has brought great suffering for many people. At the same time, coronavirus has posed unexpected challenges for the economy and politics in Switzerland. It has also placed a heavy burden on the finances of many households and companies, and on the public sector as well. Our sympathy goes to all those who have been affected by the disease or have lost people dear to them. From a professional perspective, our efforts are focused on the contribution that the Swiss National Bank can make within its mandate towards reducing the economic impact of the pandemic on our country. In the past months, we have used every means at our disposal to perform our mandate as well as we possibly can, even in adverse circumstances. Our policy is aimed at helping the people in Switzerland to get through these difficult times.

As a crucial counterpart, policy-makers are in the process of establishing the Single Resolution Mechanism, which should enable quick and efficient resolution of ailing banks without permanent recourse to taxpayer funds. Together, these new institutions will fundamentally strengthen transparency, stability and incentive-compatibility in the financial sector. In a primarily bank-based financial system like the euro area’s, these features are crucial, not only for the functioning of the financial system per se, but also for the conduct of monetary policy. This is because, with an impaired bank lending channel, monetary policy may lose its handle on the real economy and ultimately inflation. At the same time, given the persistent downside risks to price stability, monetary accommodation was a necessary ingredient in the crisis response. How has monetary policy contributed? Accordingly, since I last spoke at this venue, the ECB’s Governing Council has taken further decisive steps to engineer a monetary policy stance that is commensurate with the subdued medium-term inflation outlook. These steps included a sequence of further rate cuts, accompanied since July 2013 by explicit communication that we expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at current or lower levels for an extended period of time. But standard monetary policy in the form of rate cuts and the accompanying communication were not enough to ensure an appropriate monetary policy stance. In fact, given unwarranted fears of a euro area break-up, monetary policy transmission became severely impaired – to the extent that the financial market dislocations jeopardised our ability to deliver on our price stability mandate.
Christine Lagarde: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Speech by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, at the Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 20 March 2023. ***  Accompanying charts of the speech I am happy to be back in this Parliament to discuss the ECB's monetary policy shortly after last week's Governing Council meeting. More than one year has now passed since that February morning when we all woke up to the horrifying news of war in Europe. The Russian invasion of Ukraine – which you have selected as a topic for this hearing – is first and foremost a human tragedy for the people of Ukraine. And in the face of this senseless atrocity, they have shown remarkable resilience and determination. In the words of the former President of this Parliament, José María GilRobles, who sadly passed away last month, "The future belongs to those who are prepared to make the effort to hear the voice of hope".1 As Europeans, we need to continue hearing the voice of hope coming out of Ukraine and support the Ukrainian people in their struggle for freedom, democracy, and peace – the fundamental values of our Union. It is clear that solidarity, especially during this crisis, makes us stronger and more resilient.

And the threat posed by climate change means we need to give serious consideration to the resilience of our physical and digital infrastructure. The New York Fed has the appearance of an historic institution, but behind the stone façade 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  we’re grappling with these issues in the same way that you are. In our economic research, our supervision of financial institutions, the payments systems we operate, in short – in all that we do. Talent, technology, and innovation challenge us every day. They create incredible opportunity, but they also test us by exposing new vulnerabilities. I know that over the next couple of days there will be lots of valuable insights shared by experts about how to handle the challenges posed by big data, cryptocurrency, and climate change. But first, to kick off the conference, it’s my pleasure to introduce John Dugan, Chair of Citigroup. Citigroup has operations in over 150 countries, with about 200 million customer accounts worldwide.2 As head of a global employer with complex, international operations, John is no stranger to the changing nature of risk. John became Chair of Citigroup at the start of this year. Prior to that he was chair of the Financial Institutions Group at the law firm Covington & Burling LLP, where he spent much of his career. He has also held a number of public sector roles, including Comptroller of the Currency during a critical time for our financial system and economy, from 2005–2010.
These are changes that we could make relatively quickly and with a high-degree of confidence, rather than a wholesale reinvention. Any longer term changes or ‘rationalisation’ of the reporting package will need proper consideration in close conjunction with industry. The Bank’s central Data Team will also consider data collection mechanisms – the ‘how’, as well as the ‘what’ when it comes to collecting data. The changes that we implemented in March to allow delays to various aspects of Solvency II and PRAowned reporting were designed to reduce some of the operational pressure on firms due to Covid-19. Firms have told us that these flexibilities have been helpful. Any further reduction in reporting requirements will need to balance efficiency for firms, whilst still enabling us to collect the data we need to effectively supervise the industry. These areas for reform have been raised by industry on numerous occasions. It should not come as a surprise however that there are fundamental principles of the regime that we would seek to maintain. As I’ve said before, the principles of Solvency II – a whole balance sheet, market consistent approach to regulatory solvency, focus on good governance and risk management – remain valid. Looking forward: emerging supervisory priorities  Beyond Solvency II, the Insurance Supervision Directorate has a number of supervisory priorities that we are pursuing through firm supervisory programmes and cross-firm reviews.

Second, the Fed, as the financial system’s lender of last resort, should play an important role in the consolidated supervision of those institutions that have access to central bank liquidity and play a critical role in market functioning. Our ability to directly oversee the risk profile of these institutions is essential to our capacity to make the judgments necessary for using our lender of last resort tools, including critical judgments about liquidity and solvency for individual institutions and for the system as a whole. Those judgments require the knowledge that can only come from a direct, established role in supervision. And replacing our ongoing role as consolidated supervisor with stand-by, contingent authority to intervene would risk exacerbating moral hazard and adding to uncertainty about the rules of the game. Third, the Federal Reserve should be granted explicit responsibility and clear authority over systemically important payment and settlement systems, and the ability to continue to encourage broader improvements in the over-the-counter derivatives markets. Fourth, the Federal Reserve Board should have an important consultative role in judgments about official intervention where there is potential for systemic risk, as is currently the case for bank resolutions under FDICIA. And, finally, the responsibilities for market and financial stability that are accorded the Fed in current and any future legislation will require that the Fed adopt a more comprehensive  4  BIS Review 95/2008  approach to financial supervision and market oversight.
But it presumably helped that the Riksbank has endeavoured to open up discussions, present the grounds for its policy and do so in accordance with clear principles. In my opinion, the most important link in our communication is monetary policy’s analytical framework. This includes the distinct 2 per cent target and the specification of the deviations from this that may be acceptable in connection with transitory effects. It also includes the rule of action and the fact that to a large extent we have adhered to it. Finally, it has to do with the forecasts and assessments on which the policy is based being published and used to argue for the policy. The changeover to the new Executive Board with six members gave transparency a new dimension. Previously, external communication had been in the hands of the governor and the deputy governor responsible for preparing monetary policy. It involved mutual consultations and aimed to voice a single opinion. With the new Board, each of the six members is individually accountable for the monetary policy decisions. So ought not each one be allowed to make their voice heard? How could their individual contributions be properly assessed without knowing their positions on monetary policy issues? But how were all the speeches and other statements to be coordinated efficiently in practice to ensure that they conveyed a single, clear picture? With the procedure we have chosen, you know that each of us normally speaks independently of the others.

Normal competitive pressures can push valuation methods away from the conservative extreme and generate larger exposures to risk. As a result, individual firms and the overall market are more exposed to risk in a stress scenario than would be desirable. Another set of challenges comes with the broader damage to markets that can accompany the failure of a major financial institution. Firms have strong incentives to avoid large financial losses and to reduce the risk of failure, of course, but they do not have the incentive to internalize the potential external consequences of their distress on the financial system, and it is unrealistic for market participants to incorporate these risks into market prices. This “public good” dimension of financial stability means that while the whole economy benefits from a more stable financial system, each individual institution would prefer that others incur the costs associated with its provision. As a result, firms may collectively underinsure against the risk of failure and underinvest in the infrastructure and policies that promote financial stability. And finally, policies designed to reduce the risk of failure in financial markets create moral hazard, dulling the incentive individual firms face to self-insure against potential loss. We apply a set of capital requirements and supervisory constraints to offset the distortion created by the safety net, but these may not fully compensate for the impact on behavior of the broader range of financial intermediaries of the perception that the authorities will act to protect the financial system from systemic risk.