samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This ceremony is therefore more than timely as the Government is working tirelessly towards empowering its citizens economically and at the same time increasingly diversifying the economy and promoting export led growth. It is for this reason, Mr President that the Government established the Citizen’s Economic Empowerment Fund under the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act of 2006 in order to promote empowerment of citizens in various economic activities. This signing ceremony is yet another indication of the growing investor confidence in Zambia’s economy. You will be glad to note that the country’s total investment pledges rose more than ten times over to US $ billion in 2007 from US $ million recorded in the year 2001. This is an indication of the vast investment potential and improving investor confidence due to the macroeconomic stability particularly lower inflation and the sound fiscal polices that the Government has put in place. Institutional capacity has also been enhanced with effective supervision of the financial system to promote efficient operations of the banking sector. Mr President, the mining sector continues to be the major economic activity in the country. Following the liberalisation of the sector and subsequent privatisation of the mines, Government has continued to facilitate mineral exploration by the private sector and created an attractive investment environment through the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. This has sustained renewed interest in mining, reflected in a complete rebound in the mining sector on the Copperbelt and North Western province start up of new mines.

Caleb M Fundanga: Growing investor confidence in Zambia’s economy Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Afreximbank/PTA Bank Financing Agreements Signing Ceremony, Lusaka, 10 June 2008. *  *  *  • The President of AFREXIM Bank • The President of PTA Bank • Chief Executives and representatives of Financial Institutions Present • Distinguished ladies and gentlemen I am greatly honoured to be given an opportunity to make these brief remarks at this signing ceremony of two important financing agreements. I wish to extend a warm welcome to all of you gathered here today, particularly those who have travelled from outside the country. I hope that you will not only have a pleasant ceremony today but also have fruitful deliberations at the Euromoney Conferences starting tomorrow at this same venue. I also hope you will find time to explore the beautiful scenery and experience the warm hospitality that Zambia has to offer. Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen, over the recent past, the Zambian economy has performed relatively well. This is reflected in the overall macroeconomic stability which has been underpinned by positive growth rates in real Gross Domestic Product, low inflation, relative stability in the exchange rate of the Kwacha against major currencies, stable financial sector and improved banking services. However, although incomes have generally increased, the challenge that still remains is that of meeting the basic needs of the majority of Zambians in order to uplift their living standards.
As a consequence, the ECB independently defines its monetary policy strategy and quantifies the price stability objective. Instrument independence refers to the central bank’s ability to determine its policy tools in pursuit of price stability without interference. It means that the central bank has discretion to use and clarify its monetary policy instruments foreseen in primary law such as outright purchases, the collateral framework and its counterparties. Personal independence safeguards the capacity of the members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies to take decisions without external influence. This translates into requirements for appointment and protection from dismissal, as well as the length of mandates that should be longer than the electoral cycle. The members of the Executive Board have the requirements spelled out in the Treaty; their tenure is 8 years and their dismissal on grounds of either inability or serious misconduct is pronounced by the CJEU. The national laws for appointing governors, who in their personal capacity are members of the Governing Council, are to be compatible with the Statute of the ESCB. The reasons for dismissal are the same as for the members of the Executive Board and subject to the CJEU’s scrutiny as soon as there is knowledge of material evidence of such a procedure. Their terms of office must be 5 years at a minimum.

Article 130 prohibits the ECB and the members of its decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties. In addition, under Article 130, Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle, and not to seek to influence the members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. [11] This is a very strong concept of independence from the perspective of its content (double prohibition), its legislative source (Treaty level, meaning that it is very difficult to modify), and the judicial protection granted in the event of violation (individual governors have locus standi against their Member States). The concept of central bank independence has four features institutional, instrument, personal and financial independence. [12] In view of the broadened scope of the tasks performed by http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  central banks, they have to be viewed through a functional lens in order to be in line with the rationale of the Treaty provisions on independence. Institutional independence refers to the prohibition of the influence of third parties on the structure, functioning, decision-making, and exercise of powers of the central bank. Institutional independence implies that the central bank has a “broad discretion”[13] when making policy decisions.
Policy Panel: Investment and growth in advanced economies Remarks given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  2017 ECB Forum on Central Banking, Sintra 28 June 2017  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  The experience of business investment in the UK since the onset of the financial crisis broadly matches that elsewhere in the advanced world – a sharp fall followed by a feeble recovery (Chart 1). Peak to trough, the level of UK business investment fell by 20%, and it was six years before it surpassed its pre-crisis level, putting the recent experience at the bottom of the swathe of past UK cycles (Chart 2). In my brief remarks today, I will offer some possible explanations for this performance before concluding with comments on the outlooks for UK investment and monetary policy. I. Investment since the crisis In part, weak investment reflects a weak economy, with the recovery following the crash being the slowest since the Great Depression. Weakness in demand is not, however, the whole explanation. Business investment has underperformed relative to output since the crisis, with the ratio of the two falling in the UK by around 2 percentage points in the immediate aftermath (Chart 3), similar to the experience in other advanced economies. 1  Falls in investment tend to be more persistent for recessions associated with financial crises (Chart 4). This partly reflects restrictions in credit supply constraining investment, as well as productivity, wages and economic performance more generally.

in 2010–2012, and those foreign currency purchases were made at a considerably lower exchange rate than the recent sales. Furthermore, on 19 February the Bank concluded a forward currency swap agreement with Landsbankinn in the amount of 6 b.kr., which means that Landsbankinn will not need to accumulate foreign currency to comply with the Bank’s foreign exchange balance requirements. The Monetary Policy Committee is of the opinion that intervention of this type is justifiable in order to mitigate temporary exchange rate volatility that is addressed more effectively with  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  instruments other than interest rates. In recent weeks, the foreign exchange market has been characterised by an unusual combination of features: weakening terms of trade, foreign exchange accumulation in anticipation of heavy foreign debt service, foreign exchange mismatches in the banks’ balance sheets and, in part, self-fulfilling expectations of a currency depreciation. Because these conditions are in part temporary and increased foreign exchange inflows are expected as the spring advances, limited one-off foreign currency sales by the Central Bank were considered appropriate to prevent excessive currency depreciation and stem the tide of these self-fulfilling expectations of market participants. This is consistent with the strategy outlined in the Bank’s report Monetary Policy After Capital Controls, published in late 2010. Capital controls were imposed early in the winter of 2008 as part of the Government’s IMF programme.
According to various estimates, about 5% people at working age have already left Poland. For Estonia, this figure stands at as much as 10%. In the global economy of the 21st century, technological progress and lower transportation costs have allowed for the business processes or their parts to be easily moved between countries (a phenomenon frequently described as business process offshoring). The relative role of crucial factors behind long-term development prospects is thus changing. In the 21st century, the key factor conducive to economic growth will be knowledge – broadly understood as a country’s intellectual capital – and this country’s ability to drive innovation. If businesses in a given country fail to change their product and service profiles to achieve greater value added, they will find themselves pushed out of the market by companies from countries with low manufacturing costs. This applies to a number of markets, products and services only recently considered as subject to the international competition, one glaring example being the off-shoring of services offered by radiologists from the US to India 6 . China has already become the world’s leading exporter of computers and their components or telecommunications equipment 7 . I believe that it is just a matter of less than twenty years for China to achieve a similar position in the automotive industry, mainly because Chinese companies have mastered network-based cooperation.

Secondly, ICT development leads to innovation growth in public services worldwide, which means that changes in public administration’s activities increasingly rarer show features of reproduction, and the public administration becomes ever more often a leader in the field of innovative services. In consequence, methods of a country’s actions and fulfilment of its functions are irrevocably directed at using such technologies, and adopt the form of e-strategy, e-policy, eregulations and e-services. With just a few exceptions, public administration in Poland has not contributed to increasing innovativeness and effectiveness of the private sector, but has been rather ball and chain. Communication between citizens, entrepreneurs and an authority takes place mainly on paper, and it is necessary to come in person, bring a form, sign a document, while in other countries, e-government bodies are available via a mobile phone. For example, would it not be easier and more cost-efficient for an entrepreneur, if such sufficed, to participate in a tender by submitting only a factual offer, and other documents would be automatically collected through communication between various public and private registers (such as the National Court Register, Social Insurance Institution, Central Statistical Office, the revenue or credit database etc.). There are countless examples where public administration’s activities might sizably increase the economy’s efficiency.
Irma Rosenberg: Monetary policy, house prices and household indebtedness Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Sparbanken Finn’s customer meeting, Lund, 20 September 2004. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to come here and speak at Sparbanken Finn’s customer meeting. Tonight I intend to talk about something that has been much debated in the media recently; namely the increase in house prices and household indebtedness and its significance for monetary policy. House price trends, combined with increased indebtedness, could for instance cause significant problems in the future if households have not taken into account in their calculations the fact that interest rates will rise from their present low levels. Is this something we should take into account when making monetary policy decisions? To answer this question, I shall begin with a few words on how we conduct our monetary policy and the aims of our policy. I shall then go on to describe developments in household borrowing and house prices and the most important driving forces behind them. I shall also mention how household wealth is included in our forecasts and whether there is reason to pay particular attention to developments in debts and house prices in the monetary policy stance. In conclusion, I shall also briefly comment on the present economic situation and the inflation outlook. The aims of monetary policy The Riksbank has been assigned two tasks by the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament).

Developments in house prices and household indebtedness are regularly analysed in the Riksbank's Financial Stability Reports. Of course, any assessments of the valuation of the house market are connected with a large measure of uncertainty. However, the calculations we have made so far do not indicate that the pricing of houses in Sweden as a whole is significantly out of balance. Price trends can be explained fairly well by the increase in household incomes, the decline in interest rates and a low construction rate, despite strong demand. However, one should be aware that the rate of price increase varies substantially between different regions. House prices have increased at a much faster rate in metropolitan areas than in the rest of the country. The possibility that price increases may have been exaggerated in certain individual regions or markets cannot be ruled out, although developments in Sweden as a whole appear to be balanced. Indebtedness, house prices and inflation forecasts What significance do house prices and household indebtedness have for the Riksbank's inflation forecasts? The inflation forecasts are based on an analysis of the various driving forces behind domestic inflation and the international rate of price increase, imported inflation. Domestic inflation is largely governed by cost trends and by how total demand develops in relation to production capacity, that is to say, resource utilisation. Household consumption comprises a significant part of total demand and this is where indebtedness and house price trends mainly come into the forecast work.
Note for example, the obsession of the financial markets with when the Fed is going to increase its interest rate by a quarter percentage point! Frankly, I do not think any one of the QE central banks is thinking of putting down its fiddle just yet. But the anticipation is certainly creating instability and over-reaction in the global financial markets, with EM currencies experiencing a high level of volatility. It is also not inconceivable that having run out of profitable opportunities in other parts of the markets, portfolio funds are now making currencies the next game in town. Implications for Malaysian economy and financial system These global developments obviously have implications for Malaysia. First, the volatility in the global financial markets will continue to wash on to our shores and create a challenging environment for both policymakers and participants in our financial markets. Such volatility does have an economic cost. Second, the fact that for the first time all the major economies are showing positive growth will provide support to growth of the Malaysian economy. However, until global growth can become self-reinforcing, the weak nature of external demand will remain a challenge. The significant contribution of domestic demand to growth in the face of the adverse external environment over the past several years is a tribute to the resilience of our economy and financial system. It is an outcome of not only the policies that were implemented during these years but also in the years before.

We have launched and will build upon our responsible lending guidelines and practices. The important next steps for us on the banking side in terms of the green initiatives would be to improve disclosure, which, under any scenario and initiatives, remains a critical and essential building block to make all the others work. Aside from that, another critical initiative is the development on a green taxonomy that is consistent across the financial sector so that we do not end up working at cross purposes and can leverage upon each other’s efforts. I am happy to say that the Bank of Thailand has been working very closely with our colleagues at the Securities Exchange Commission, the Office of the Insurance Commission, the Stock Exchange of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance to try to develop a consistent taxonomy in green that extends across the financial sector in Thailand. Also, we hope that this will eventually be a taxonomy that is consistent across the region as well as within the ASEAN region. This is particularly important because the climate challenge will be, in many ways, won or lost here in Asia. While everybody has a lot to do, we have seen clear initiatives being taken in Europe, and obviously, more needs to be done both in Europe and the United States. Given where we are in our cycle of development, a lot of climate challenges is going to take place in Asia, not particularly within ASEAN itself, but also within broader Asia.
That is why around the world countries are introducing resolution regimes that enable them to put losses on to bondholders without all the costs of liquidation. Bail-in – a power for the Resolution Authority to write down and convert debt into equity – is one way of doing this. 5 It is included in the Financial Stability Board’s global standard on resolution, and it is an important feature of the EU Commission’s draft directive on recovery and resolution – and so it is set to become part of UK law over the next few years. Bail-in is only one resolution tool, and no one is claiming that it could be used on its own in every circumstance. For example, group-level recapitalisation via bail-in will not work when the financial condition of every part of the business is so rotten through and through that the  3  See Haldane (2012), “Tails of the unexpected”. 4  For a fuller account of the international agenda, see Tucker (2012), “Banking in a market economy – the international agenda”, a chapter in Investing in Change: A book of essays on financial reform in Europe. 5  See Tucker (2012), “Resolution: a progress report”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  group’s losses cannot remotely be quantified upfront. In those circumstances, the authorities do have to focus on preserving continuity in the most critical (even elemental) services – payments and deposit taking.

Jean-Paul Redouin: Monetary and financial stability – a dual role for a central bank: recent lessons Speech by Mr Jean-Paul Redouin, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Money and Banking Conference 2010, Central Bank of Argentina, Buenos Aires, 3 September 2010. *  *  *  Introduction 1. It is an honor to be speaking at such a distinguished conference on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 2. Anniversaries of central banks are special. It is so because time is inherent to central banking. Indeed, time is at the root of a Central Bank credibility and is essential to its tool kit. Time plays a great role in many aspects of a Central Bank action. Let me just take three concrete examples:   the first and obvious one is inflation : time is necessary to firmly anchor expectations;    foreign exchange interventions played a great role in the European construction: time is necessary for a Central Bank to play against the market;    time will also be necessary to monitor systemic watch responsibilities; this new approach of the risks will require the Central Banks to develop their capacity to take “the long view”. 3. Being the first speaker in this session, I will focus my remarks on the dual role of central banks in terms of monetary and financial stability. I will address three main points closely interlinked in the light of our recent experience.
In fact, since June 1997 the MPC has changed interest rates 23 times and the FOMC 20 times. Changes in rates reflect economic developments, not the frequency of meetings. In any event, the Bank of England Act 1998 states that we must meet at least once a month, and that we shall continue to do. Second, there has been a suggestion that a more formal voting procedure be adopted for MPC meetings. The current voting procedure of the MPC is straightforward: discussion continues until each person’s views are clear. The Governor then puts a proposition to the Committee which will command majority support. Some have questioned whether this procedure is robust and might bias the outcome. For example, the issue has been raised by the House of Lords Select Committee. But I think this is a misunderstanding of the way we work. It is important that our views are known to each other before we cast our votes because that is part of the process of making up our mind. The only complication with the current procedure would be if the Committee was split equally between three different courses of action. In theory, this could lead to a “voting paradox”. The Governor would then need to decide which course was eliminated, leaving two policy choices for the Committee to choose between. That would normally be straight forward provided that, in the economist’s jargon, preferences between interest rates were “single-peaked”. When this is the case the voting paradox does not apply.

Third, the votes on the MPC are transparent, and hence members can be held accountable. The merit of individual accountability is that each individual in the group has a genuine incentive to reach a good decision. This aspect leads us directly into my second question. 2. Second, does it matter that there are differences of view among Committee members? From the outset, commentators have been unable to resist labelling members of the Committee as either ‘hawks’ or ‘doves’. I have argued before that it makes no sense to use these descriptions because each member of the Committee has the same objective. Members of the MPC cannot entertain closet views about their desired inflation rate because they will be held personally accountable for their judgments about the level of interest rates necessary to meet the mandated inflation target. As circumstances change, it is easy to imagine that ‘hawks’ shall be ‘doves’ and ‘doves’ shall be ‘hawks’. But that is not to say that differences of opinion do not, and should not, exist amongst committee members. If part of the reason for the improvement of groups over individuals is their pooling of knowledge, then differences of opinion during the discussion that takes place at each MPC meeting should be central to the Committee’s performance. As The Economist put it back in 1998 (when there 4 were only eight serving members): 4  Economist, 18 April 1998, p. 28.