samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The assessment I am sharing was made by the Monetary Policy Committee in its meeting in October and is now available in our latest Inflation Report that has just been published. The key point is that, with the ongoing recovery, the Thai economy is set to return to positive growth next year, supported by improvements in the global economy and continued policy stimulus to support private sector demand. A key part of the policy stimulus is the expansionary fiscal policy of which a fiscal deficit equivalent to 3.9 percent of GDP is set for the 2010/2011 fiscal year. Stronger momentum in exports, continued policy stimulus, and a recovery in private sector demand are expected to lift real GDP growth to a range of 3.3 to 5.3 percent in 2010. As the economy returns to growth, a return of domestic inflation is also expected next year on the back of a rebound in economic activities and the rise in oil prices. Inflation next year,  while rising, is forecasted to be within our policy target of 0.5-3.0 percent for core inflation. Again, developments on the inflation front is not without uncertainty. With growth, pressure on prices could return quickly, not to mention the added pressure to inflation that could be coming from the oil price and from the spillovers of the possible rises in asset price linked to persistent capital inflows. Hence, the challenge for monetary policy next year will be to help foster a sustained economic recovery while maintaining price and financial stability.

Greater consumer activism and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  demands for more consumer-focused corporate information reflects the increased demand by consumers for institutions to account for their behaviour and values. In terms of the demand for ethical and responsible finance, greater awareness among consumers and investors on the availability and viability of such positive finance is also needed, including among governments, corporates and the retail market. Education, engagement, incentives and the alignment of legal and regulatory frameworks on the utilisation of such finance will be important to achieve this. Finally, is the need to foster strong leadership at the global level that can have an advocacy and facilitative role in resolving barriers and bringing together different stakeholders to work together in a coordinated and cohesive manner. The Responsible Finance Institute, initiated as a think tank based in the United Kingdom, that brings together responsible finance experts from around the world and has a unique role for this endeavour. The focus on collaboration and convergence between the diverse fields of ethical and responsible finance has great potential to harness the best practices of positive finance in its various forms to collectively wield a powerful force in shaping future finance. Moving forward, stable and sustainable development can be best served by re-connecting the current gulf between finance and value creation that is reinforced by bringing benefit to society.
This sounds quite straightforward but actually it would be quite a step because, of course, all of us are answerable to our national parliaments. But nor do I think it is realistic for countries to engage in or embark on what one might think of as unilateral disarmament, where a country that acts as host to financial institutions says to the home countries “I will let you lead in the resolution of all banks in all circumstances, notwithstanding whether you take account of the interests of my country”. So countries probably need to reserve some powers for themselves but should eliminate from their regimes any automatic triggers that can cut across sensible resolution led by a firm’s home country. The other step that we could sensibly take, I suspect, is for there to be much closer planning on a bilateral basis between host and home countries in respect of particular banks. I mean at the level of entering into more or less binding agreements on who would do what in the event of distress. That, again, sounds easy, but actually it would be embarking on quite a change from where we are right now.

The second tool that many of us believe really should be considered, and which the Financial Stability Board is likely to urge countries in the G20 to consider seriously, is to be able to write down, or haircut, claims of unsecured, uninsured creditors and impose a partial conversion from debt to equity in conditions of distress while leaving the non-toxic parts of the bank or dealer as an otherwise viable concern. This is a technique sometimes called Bail-in, although that term is also used for a purely contractual route for recapitalising banks which is rather different in some crucial respects (both operationally and in terms of policy). Reduced to its bare essentials, it involves the following. You take the distressed bank or dealer, and examine whether it is rotten all the way through, or whether – as can easily be the case for highly-levered firms – its financial problems are concentrated in specific parts of the business. In other words, is there a viable underlying franchise once the toxic parts are written off? That will sometimes be the case, although by no means always. When it is, you also make an estimate of the firm’s loss. Sometimes that may not be possible due to chaos in the firm or the breadth of its problems. But if you think about the SIFI failures during this financial crisis, there are some instances where supervisors could, perhaps, have made estimates of the losses before the final curtain came down because they were on notice of accumulating stress.
Paul Tucker: The debate on financial system resilience – macroprudential instruments Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at Barclays Annual Lecture, London, 22 October 2009. *  *  *  What stage have we reached in the current financial and economic crisis? The stage where the most hideous macroeconomic nightmare – a second Great Depression revisited – is now probably remote but where the outlook remains highly uncertain by any normal standard. Where the banking system is recovering, but where some big UK (and overseas) banks have a lot left to fix. And where there has been real progress with many policy initiatives to make the international financial system more resilient in future, but where perhaps some of the biggest issues remain unresolved, even incompletely articulated. After some scene setting, I will address one of those issues this evening: whether there might be macroprudential instruments that could lean against and preserve banking system resilience in the face of credit boom and bust. I will also provide an update on international plans for banks to produce recovery and resolution plans, known here as Living Wills. The macrobackdrop and the credit system At the beginning of this year, 1 I thought it would take until the autumn at least to tell whether the economy was going to lurch downwards into a spiral of falling prices, rising real debt burdens, generally enfeebled banks and falling output.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: New economy - same old problems  Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE, Governor of the Bank of England, at the CBI National Conference, held in Birmingham, on 7 November 2000. *  *  *  Thank you, Mr President. I’m honoured to have been invited back to address your annual conference. I remember very vividly my earlier visit to your conference in 1996. I remember reporting to you that the British economy was then into its fifth consecutive year - its nineteenth consecutive quarter - of relatively steady growth at an annual average rate of 2.6%; that unemployment had fallen, pretty well month by month for most of that time, to below 7½%; and that inflation had averaged 2¾% over the previous four years - compared with over 10% on average in the preceding two decades. The question then was could we keep up - or even improve upon - that performance. And my answer was a cautious yes - provided we met three conditions: a continuing firm grip on inflation; continuing prudent and sustainable fiscal policy; and continuing structural, supply-side flexibility. Well, that cautious optimism was amply justified.
Given these critical roles and the risks posed by periods of sharp volatility, understanding the manner in which the evolving market structure is affecting market liquidity, efficiency, and price dynamics is of the utmost importance, and something we plan to study further. Best practices in the treasury market The Treasury Market Practices Group (TMPG) recently released a consultative white paper that addresses the effects of ongoing changes in automated trading on the structure of the Treasury market. This study was well under way before October 15, but it includes some preliminary observations from the TMPG on that event as well. The TMPG is a group of market professionals, sponsored by the New York Fed, committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the Treasury, agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities markets. The group has released a wide range of best practices for these markets, including a fails charge that resulted in a dramatic decline in delivery fails in Treasury securities and agency MBS, and the recommendation to margin forward agency MBS trades, a practice that now covers most bi-lateral forward trades in that asset class. The TMPG white paper on automated trading in the Treasury market includes an updated set of best practice recommendations that provide additional guidance for firms and trading venues involved with electronic and automated trading. Some of the changes to the best  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  practices have to do with improving governance and back-office processes to keep pace with technological advancements.

Thomas Jordan: Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy decision and assessment of the economic situation Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the media news conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 16 June 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I will begin by explaining our monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation. I will then hand over to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will present this year’s Financial Stability Report. After that, Andréa Maechler will review the situation on the financial markets and outline some innovations affecting financial market infrastructure. Finally, we will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions. Monetary policy decision Let me begin with our monetary policy decision and the inflation forecast. As you will have gathered from our press release a few minutes ago, we are maintaining our expansionary monetary policy. Interest on sight deposits at the SNB is to remain at –0.75% and the target range for the three-month Libor is unchanged at between –1.25% and –0.25%. At the same time, we will remain active in the foreign exchange market, as necessary. Our monetary policy thus continues to be based on two key elements: the negative interest rate and our willingness to take an active role in the foreign exchange market.
The Petroleum Fund 1996-2000, estimates 2001-2005. In billions of NOK 1200  1200  800  800  400  400  0  0 96  97 98  99  00 01  02  03  04  05  In the years ahead, the capital in the Petroleum Fund will increase as the surplus on the central government budget is transferred to the Fund. The chart shows the estimates for growth in the Petroleum Fund. The projections, as they should be, are based on prudent assumptions concerning oil and gas prices, the return on the Fund and the domestic use of oil revenues. The state’s direct financial interest in petroleum activities (SDFI) may be regarded as part of the tax system. The government would have had little possibility of ensuring that a sizeable share of the  8  BIS Review14?/2001  economic rent benefit society without such a field-specific instrument. It is doubtful whether the government can fully realise the value of the SDFI through its disposal. Buyers may have more knowledge about the holdings than the seller. Companies that buy SDFI stakes will also face some uncertainty as to the future tax system, which will have a negative effect on their willingness to pay. It is therefore understandable that only a smaller share of the SDFI is offered for sale. At the same time, the sale of the SDFI increases the need to remedy the substantial loopholes that have been found in the petroleum tax system.

There is agreement, however, that these payments have increased compared with last year's survey and that this trend is likely to continue in future. Wage and salary payments in euros are still not an issue. Employees would not accept wage and salary payments in euros. Furthermore, such a practice would result in substantial administrative complications (social security deductions and taxes in Swiss francs). The selective use of euros in place of the Swiss franc does not create any difficulty with regard to monetary policy. On the one hand, the bulk of payments in Switzerland will probably continue to be effected in Swiss francs also in future. On the other hand, under the current monetary policy strategy, a possible euro-induced decline in the demand for money will not lead to any problems either. Contrary to the previous policy of targeting the money supply, the steering of the interest rate the National Bank pursues today is not dependent on a stable demand for money. The National Bank realises, however, that, as invoicing in euros becomes more widespread, our export industry must bear higher exchange rate risks. BIS Review 73/2002  3
However, for financial systems to be stable, monetary policy must be consistent with the other aspects of economic policy, that is, fiscal policy and structural programmes. The policy mix must be well-balanced at the international as well as the domestic level. Placing too heavy a burden on monetary policy in terms of achieving the main economic and financial balances is detrimental to its effectiveness. In particular, it diminishes its ability to maintain and consolidate financial market stability. This concern underlies the implementation of the Growth and Stability Pact in Economic and Monetary Union. By obliging fiscal policies to commit to stability, the pact allows the fiscal buffers to fulfil their role as stabilisers. 5  BIS Review 85/2000  Lastly, one must also take into account the fact that, by their information and expectations, investors can penalise imbalances affecting the main world economies or diverging developments in different countries. To reduce this constraint, economic and monetary policies must be harmonised at the international level in order to achieve more balanced international financial relations. Second, prudential policies should try to reconcile efficiency and stability in financial markets I would like to insist on three objectives I feel are fundamental to promoting efficient and balanced financial systems. Supervisors’ first objective should be to monitor the soundness of financial institutions To do so, they must work at two levels. At the micro-prudential level, they must ensure that the restructuring of financial systems is well-balanced and that the merged institutions are healthy.

The recent BIS report on macroprudential instruments – presented in our last meeting in Mexico – is an good step in that direction. However, the report and the discussion surrounding it also highlights the difficulties of setting up a proper macroprudential framework, at the local, regional and global level. Another lesson I would like to mention refers to the importance of a close cooperation between home and hosts supervisors, which has materialized in Supervisory Colleges, playing an important role in this context. Indeed, the setting up of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, a process which will have its starting point next year, will entail new challenges for euro-zone supervisors, who will also need to develop new procedures in their relations with supervisors of other regions. Before concluding, I would like to thank Banco Central de Chile and President Vergara for the hospitality and the perfect organization of this event, the European Central Bank for the collaboration and support and all the participants for their interest. I wish all of you a very good continuation of the Seminar tomorrow and a very pleasant stay in Santiago de Chile. Muchas gracias a todos. Muito obrigado. Thank you very much for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
But I think there are good reasons for believing that demand may be presently somewhat less responsive to real interest rates than usual. Uncertainty rose sharply after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and rose again during the worst of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis. Banks and highly indebted households and businesses have focussed on deleveraging and improving the resilience of their balance sheets. Under these circumstances, it would be hardly surprising if changes in the cost of borrowing have less  10  The path for the policy rate in this scenario may seem surprisingly close to that under the previous scenario, but it needs to be remembered that the real interest rate – which is what matters for demand – is nevertheless lower here because inflation is higher. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  traction on demand than is usually the case. Chart 5 shows the implications of assuming the interest elasticity is just a third of the size assumed in the earlier experiments. The key point is that the policy rate under a nominal income target is now kept at the zero lower bound for more than six years, even though the output gap is closed after four. That long period of low interest rates is necessary to generate enough of a fall in expected future real interest rates to boost demand today. But a world where policy is kept loose for so long after the economy is back to normal is somewhat troubling.

In particular, the collapse in demand after the demise of Lehman Brothers was so sudden and deep that there was no way that monetary policy could in practice have been relaxed early enough, and by a large enough amount, to prevent it. It is, though, a moot point whether policy would have been set even more stimulatory during the latter part of 2009 if we had been operating under a nominal income growth target, given that we were implicitly expecting a rather slow recovery in nominal income growth. Given how stimulatory policy already was, I suspect that we might well have taken the view that it was simply not feasible to get nominal income growth back much faster. The unexpected weakness of nominal income growth in the past year or so does, however, serve to highlight a more significant difference between an inflation target and a nominal income growth target. A remarkable feature of the current cycle has been the juxtaposition of a weak recovery in output with robust growth in employment. One possible explanation is that the financial crisis has led to a fall, possibly temporarily, in the underlying rate of growth of supply. If that is so, then a fixed nominal income growth target would obviously go hand-in-hand with a higher inflation rate, whereas a fixed inflation target would be associated with lower nominal income growth. But this hardly provides an argument in favour of a nominal income growth target.
The (lagged) effects of this rise in consumer prices are unlikely to have fully materialised as yet. In the context of the aforementioned prospects for strong economic growth in the euro area, the protracted rise in import price inflation in the past few months clearly gave rise to a greater danger of a spillover to domestic sources of inflation, such as, for instance, firms aiming at raising or restoring profit margins. These risks had to be counteracted. With our monetary policy we are contributing to the conditions for high, sustained, non-inflationary growth. Since November of last year, the Governing Council of the ECB has decided to raise interest rates by a total of 175 basis points. Admittedly, this is not negligible. Given the strong economic data, the continuously high level of confidence and the continued strong growth of money and credit, the increase in interest rates does not mean that the ECB has put the brakes on growth. Economic expansion in the euro area is now strong enough not to be hurt by a gradual adjustment of the monetary policy stance. The interest rate moves are providing a clear signal to market participants, social partners and policymakers that the ECB is determined to counter inflationary dangers in a timely fashion, and that the prospects for price stability in the euro area remain good. This is also of great importance for the longer-term potential of the euro.

As you know, the Governing Council of the ECB raised the rate of its main refinancing operation, and that of the deposit facility and the marginal lending facility by 0.5 percentage points to 4.25%, 3.25% and 5.25% respectively on 8 June. This decision was based on the conclusion that both pillars of the monetary policy strategy pointed to upward risks to price stability in the euro area in the medium term. Let me elaborate on this. With regard to monetary developments, M3 growth has deviated from its reference value since the beginning of 1999. This deviation has increased further since the beginning of 2000. Thus, the three-month average of the annual growth rates of M3, covering the period from February to April 2000, increased from 5.9% in the preceding three-month period, to 6.3%. As a consequence, the deviation of M3 growth from the reference value of 4½% rose to almost 2 percentage points. The assessment of there being ample liquidity in the euro area was further supported by the continuing rapid expansion of lending to the private sector. The annual growth rate of lending to the private sector stood at a very high level throughout 1999 and in the first few months of 2000. Important determinants underlying this development are strong economic activity in the euro area and very favourable industrial and consumer confidence.