samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Savings instruments that attract customers are even being provided, at least in Sweden, by food chains and petrol companies. In the case of loans, a growing proportion of credits is being arranged in the securities markets. Then there is more uncertainty about the social security system’s future ability to generate adequate pensions. The demographic trends are also entailing changes in saving behaviour; a growing proportion of people in the industrialised world are approaching retirement and are more prone to save than to borrow. BIS Review 81/1998  -2Cross-border investment is rising. People in Sweden, for example, are placing their longterm savings to a growing extent in assets issued abroad. At the same time, non-residents are increasing their holdings of Swedish financial assets. Furthermore, technological advances are making it possible to supply traditional banking services without the aid of a large branch network. This in turn makes new banking establishments less costly than before and a bank with just a few branches or a business concept based on telephony or the Internet can gain a competitive advantage in certain segments of the market. Products are also becoming more sophisticated and their construction and production are increasingly dependent on specialist knowhow that may become available outside the banks. The speed of these processes varies from country to country. The structure of bank earnings is already changing, with a growing share from a range of commissions compared with the traditional income from net interest.

In some countries the State has been able to obtain foreign loans and thereby contribute liquidity to banks with problems. Meanwhile, these countries have made their own efforts to implement confidence-enhancing measures that would stabilise the situation. Other countries have been obliged to turn to the international community, headed by the International Monetary Fund, for assistance with foreign liquidity. Private banks have also been engaged, as one might expect considering that they are the banks which have exposures in these countries. In return, the countries have been required to take measures so that confidence can be restored. In other words, the underlying problems must be tackled. By itself, liquidity support does not suffice. The required measures include the orderly winding up of insolvent banks, a clearer account of the problems, a reduction of current-account deficits, a consolidation of government finances so that expenditures for restoring the financial sector can be covered, and a construction of monetary policy that guards against the risk of the country been suddenly hit by massive currency outflows. In such a situation one cannot expected the necessary adjustment to be painless or free from difficult decisions. Attempts by a country to isolate itself from the international exchange of financial services would probably lead in time to effects on growth and prosperity that are just as disastrous as protectionist measures in other fields. A country that chooses to impose controls for a time would find it hard to re-enter the international credit market once the crisis had subsided.
6  See Financial Stability Board (2013), “Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending “Too-Big-To-Fail””. 7  For example, at the FDIC Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee Meeting on 10th December 2012. The webcast for the meeting is available online at: http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/2012_12_10_agenda.html  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  (5)  The resolution agenda is not just about banks and dealers. It is about central counterparties too, for example  Banks became TBTF by accident. The G20 Leaders having mandated that standardised OTC derivatives must be centrally cleared, there is a risk that central counterparties (CCPs) will come to be seen as too important to fail as a matter of policy. That makes it incredibly important that CCPs are robust, effectively managed, effectively supervised, and have first rate recovery plans. And, beyond that, they absolutely must be subject to a credible resolution regime. I worry that CCPs are “for profit”, or are typically part of “for profit” groups. If a CCP fails and it turns out that its risk management was slack, this point is bound to come up in the public response. Policymakers should think about that now in the context of the governance structure they want for CCPs embedded in vertically integrated groups. Meanwhile, work is underway in CPSS/ IOSCO8 on loss-allocation rules. Unlike banks, CCPs are essentially rule-based machines for netting and allocating risks. Those rules need to be enriched so that it is clear what happens when, due to a member’s default , both the initial margin and default fund are exhausted.

I call on all parties to continue the discussions but more importantly to move from talking to doing. In order to help this situation as well as the economy, at the CBC we also initiated a project to digitise the banking sector's client onboarding process as well as the exchange of customer information between banks. Let me be clear: this is not the responsibility or remit of the central bank. However, I decided for this to happen in order to push this technological change in the banking sector. We set this project as a priority and obtained the commitment of Cyprus banks to embrace and participate in the project. We are now at an advanced stage of formulating the technical and legal requirements for the project. The project, as envisioned by the CBC, will be a flexible and scalable solution to be implemented in phases. Phase one, will be the remote digital onboarding of new customers through a seamless digitalised process and an optimised customer on-boarding experience, thereafter expediting the remote updating of customer data and information. Digitalisation of the onboarding process will initially focus on Cyprus citizens, allowing for expansion to include EU and non-EU citizens as well as legal entities and, to the extent possible, similar structures. In other words it will learn to walk before it will run. Phase two will roll out an interoperability solution with utility service providers and governmental services, allowing for possible incorporation of electronic IDs as provided for in the European Regulation.
Annual loan growth to the private sector has remained subdued, with the rate (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) moderating in February to 1.1% year on year, from 1.5% in January. The annual growth rates of loans to non-financial corporations and loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) stood at 0.6% and 1.8% respectively in February. The volume of MFI loans to non-financial corporations and households remained practically unchanged compared with the previous month. Money and credit data up to February confirm a broad stabilisation of financial conditions and thereby the avoidance of an abrupt and disorderly adjustment in the balance sheets of credit institutions, as intended by our measures. Funding conditions for banks have generally improved, and there has been increased issuance activity and a re-opening of some segments of funding markets. The demand for credit remains weak in the light of still subdued economic activity and the ongoing process of balance sheet adjustment in nonfinancial sectors. The full supportive impact of the Eurosystem’s non-standard measures will need time to unfold and to have a positive effect on the growth of loans when demand recovers. In this context, it should be noted that the second three-year longer-term refinancing operation was only settled on 1 March 2012. Following the stabilisation in the financial environment, it is essential for banks to strengthen their resilience further, including by retaining earnings.

This combination of measures has contributed to a stabilisation in the financial environment and an improvement in the transmission of our monetary policy. We need to carefully monitor further developments. It is also important to keep in mind that all our non-standard monetary policy measures are temporary in nature and that all the necessary tools are available to address upside risks to medium-term price stability in a firm and timely manner. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Real GDP contracted by 0.3% in the euro area in the fourth quarter of 2011. Survey data confirm a stabilisation in economic activity at a low level in early 2012. We continue to expect the euro area economy to recover gradually in the course of the year. The outlook for economic activity should be supported by foreign demand, the very low short-term interest rates in the euro area, and all the measures taken to foster the proper functioning of the euro area economy. However, the remaining tensions in euro area sovereign debt markets and their impact on credit conditions, as well as the process of balance sheet adjustment in the financial and non-financial sectors and high unemployment in parts of the euro area, are expected to continue to dampen the underlying growth momentum. Downside risks to the economic outlook prevail. They relate in particular to a renewed intensification of tensions in euro area debt markets and their potential spillover to the euro area real economy.
The significance of climate risks to financial stability may change over time. The SNB therefore considers it a priority to continuously monitor developments and review its assessment. Completion of the ninth banknote series To finish, let me turn to a very different topic – the issuance of the ninth banknote series. The development of the new banknotes was a complex, long-term project with exacting design and production requirements. The 100-franc note, which entered circulation on 12 September 2019, was the sixth and final denomination of the SNB’s new banknote series. Since the issuance of the first of the new banknotes, the 50-franc note in April 2016, feedback on the new banknotes has been very positive. The new series has been well received by the public. The new substrate Durasafe® has also proven a success. Preliminary evaluations suggest that this substrate should ensure a longer lifespan for the banknotes. The issuance of modern and forgery-proof banknotes is a central task of the SNB. It is important to us that we are able to meet the expectations of the Swiss population. The new banknotes use state-of-the-art technology, and are robust and easy to handle. The entire logistical processes, including the modification of ATMs to accommodate the new notes, also proceeded without significant problems. The eighth banknote series will continue to be legal tender until further notice. The SNB plans to announce the recall date for the eighth-series notes in the course of 2020.

The SNB will closely monitor the effectiveness of the revised self-regulation. In  1  Federal Council (2019): Bericht des Bundesrates zu den systemrelevanten Banken. www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2019/5385.pdf  Page 2/4  Berne, 12 December 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  parallel, it will continue to regularly reassess the need for an adjustment of the countercyclical capital buffer. Climate change and financial stability  Let me now turn to climate change, a subject already addressed by my colleague Thomas Jordan. Climate change can pose longer-term risks to financial stability. There are primarily two ways in which climate risks can affect the financial system. One is through the increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters with all their consequences, and the other is through changes to climate policy and to the corresponding regulations. It is the responsibility of individual financial system participants to fully understand climate risks relevant to them and to correctly assess the potential consequences from a business perspective – just as with other risks. For its part, the SNB is focusing on how climate risks could impact on the stability of the Swiss banking system as a whole, as well as on systemically important financial market infrastructures. Currently, the SNB considers the likelihood of risks linked to climate change threatening the stability of the banking system as a whole to be low. In the case of financial market infrastructures, climate risks are minimised, for example, by stipulating that technical facilities be distributed over different locations.
We must not forget that inflation forecasts are made under great uncertainty and that inflation is affected by unpredictable factors. Nevertheless, during the 10 years we have employed inflation targeting, the average inflation rate has remained very close to the target level. To summarise, we can observe that the growth rate for 2003 was weaker than we had expected in 2002. The inflation rate, however, was more or less as expected. It is possible that we became slightly too pessimistic with regard to economic activity in 2003. When we made our monetary policy decision in December the international upturn appeared to have been confirmed, and there were also signs that the Swedish economy was strengthening. Inflation had developed roughly as we had calculated in earlier forecasts. Although energy prices did not fall as far as we had calculated, domestic inflationary pressure excluding energy prices proved to be lower than expected, probably because of the weak labour market development and good productivity growth. The falling import prices had an even more significant effect on inflation. We assumed in our inflation forecast for the coming years that import prices would cease falling and instead begin to rise gently as international economic activity improved. The forecast for domestic cost pressure was adjusted slightly downwards as this was expected to show only a slight increase during the forecast period.

Of course, this does not prevent differing opinions being held, both within the Riksbank and by external analysts, as to how the repo rate should be managed in order to maintain price stability. Monetary policy is based on how the inflation rate is expected to develop in the near future, primarily 1-2 years ahead. There are two reasons for this. The first is that monetary policy measures make their full impact on inflation during this time horizon. Thus, the Riksbank has little possibility to counteract shocks that affect inflation in the short term, but it can conduct a well-balanced monetary policy to ensure that inflation is maintained around an average rate of 2 per cent a couple of years ahead. The second argument in favour of forward-looking monetary policy is that this provides scope for taking into account developments in the real economy. If the repo rate were to be changed continually to try to bring inflation back to the target level as quickly as possible every time a shock occurred, it could lead to considerable, and undesirable, fluctuations in interest rates, production and employment. During the years that monetary policy has employed an inflation targeting strategy, we have developed a clear analytical framework for our work. The Riksbank has developed a simple rule to make monetary policy more easily comprehensible and to create stability when making monetary policy decisions.
Whoever lived there and worked there felt himself free of all confinement and prejudice.”ix I admire this Viennese spirit, which combines audacity and liberty, and which was the cradle of the greatest minds of our contemporary era. Today, as Europe’s time may be here again, I hope that this spirit will continue to inspire us. Thank you for your attention. i  I would like to thank P. Andrade, P. Antipa, G. Cette, M. Dujardin, O. Garnier, A. Lojschova, B. Mojon and B. Rudelle for their help in preparing this speech. ii Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2017. iii See e.g. Blanchard (O. ), Cerutti (E.), and Summers (L.) (2015) “Inflation and Activity - Two Explorations and their Monetary Policy Implications,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 21726, November. iv Guilloux-Nefussi (S.) (2016) "Globalization, Market Structure and Inflation Dynamics," Banque de France Working Papers 610. v See e.g. Andrade, Philippe, Johannes Breckenfelder, Fiorella De Fiore, Peter Karadi, and Oreste Tristani (2016) “The ECB's asset purchase programme - an early assessment” ECB Working Paper No. 1956 and Arrata, William and Benoît Nguyen (2017) “Price Impact of Bond Supply Shocks: Evidence from the Eurosystem's asset purchase program” Banque de France Working Paper No. 623. Page 9 sur 8 vi  See e.g. D’Amico Stefania and Thomas B.

Among the cyclical factors, I would like to mention two in particular: first, persistent slack in the labour market – the unemployment rate has fallen sharply in the euro area, to stand at 9.1% in August 2017, but it is still too high; second, backward-looking wage bargaining, which means that low past inflation is feeding through to wages today. The influence of these two causes should nevertheless diminish with the recovery in economic growth and inflation. Structurally, many studies iii suggest that the Phillips curve, that is the relationship between inflation and fluctuations in economic activity or unemployment, appears to have flattened since the 1980s [slide]. Inflation seems less responsive to changes in economic activity in advanced countries, notably because of globalisation,iv which appears to exert downward pressure on inflation via the decline in imported goods prices and competition from lowwage countries. But a flatter Phillips curve does not call into question this relationship: we are in no doubt about the way we are heading: the recovery and job creations will lead to higher wages and, ultimately, more inflation. But we remain, nevertheless, less certain as to the speed of this adjustment. We are both confident about the effectiveness of our monetary policy and willing to be patient regarding the time it will take. II. The prospects: an adequate reduction of asset purchases, within an overall substantially accommodative monetary policy Let me now turn to the implications of this for our monetary policy.
Although each plan is different in their rationales and implementation, their intended outcomes can be summarized along three key dimensions – (1) to reduce cost of financial services for households and businesses (2) to deepen financial inclusion and (3) to facilitate financial connectivity in the region. Allow me to delve into some details. Starting with reducing costs of financial services. As the Thai economy can no longer compete on supply of cheap labors, cost competitiveness in other areas are critical. In light of this objective, the Financial Sector Master Plan and the Payment System Roadmap envisage  that cost savings in the financial sector due to more efficient operation of financial institutions and the payment system would be passed on to the real sector and the households. Here, I would like to note that the term financial institutions go beyond banks and finance companies to include non-bank players like e-Payment service providers and FinTech (Financial Technology) firms as well. 3/5  BIS Central Banker's Speeches  The Bank of Thailand believes that the very foundation for improved financial services’ efficiency is through the adoption of digital technology and shared infrastructure. The former comprises digitization of operations, product offerings and service channels. An example of the shared services initiatives is the PromptPay system, the Minister of Finance mentioned in the speech. PromptPay is an integrated retail fund transfer system that will allow  individuals, businesses, and government to transfer funds across service providers at low costs with ease, flexibility and resilience.

Veerathai Santiprabhob: The Bank of Thailand’s financial and monetary policies – the way forward Speech by Dr Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thailand Focus 2016 “A new growth strategy”, Bangkok, 31 August 2016. * * *  Chairman of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Secretary General of the Securities and Exchange Commission, President of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Chairman of Phatra Securities, and President of Asia Pacific Bank of America Merrill Lynch Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen, A very very good morning to you all. It gives me great pleasure to be back at this prestigious forum. Let me begin by thanking the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Phatra Securities, and Bank of America Merrill Lynch for inviting me to be part of the 10th anniversary of Thailand Focus. I believe many of you, if not all, have learnt about Thailand’s reform initiatives and kept eyes on the outcomes of these developments. Today, this forum will bring you insights from the nation’s key policymakers and give you a chance to learn about exciting opportunities which Thailand has to offer. As for my part, I would like to share with you my perspectives on ‘The Bank of Thailand’s Financial and Monetary Policies’. Indeed, as the Thai economy is undergoing transformation in order to lift our growth potential, I would like to highlight the roles of monetary and financial policies in facilitating this critical transition.
It is available on our website along with data and information useful to policymakers, business people and the public. We use our website to share what we learn about our diverse District, and you will find extensive detailed information about the region at the site. I invite you to visit newyorkfed.org to explore our highly localized maps and information on small business, credit and housing conditions, and even the latest job openings at the New York Fed. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Finally, and crucially, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, we are working with our colleagues in Washington, D.C., and at other agencies to help put the nation’s financial system on a firmer footing. Our supervisors are working hard to ensure that our District’s banks are operating safely and soundly. Although much has been done, we are not finished and are determined to keep at it. I recognize fully that there can be no return to pre-crisis business as usual – whether on the part of the financial sector or on the part of regulators like ourselves. All in all, there is a lot to keep myself and my colleagues busy. National economic conditions Now I’d like to turn to the national and regional economy. The incoming data on the U.S. economy generally has been a bit more upbeat over the past few months, suggesting that the recovery may be finally establishing a somewhat firmer footing.

To put the recent pace of growth into perspective, we believe that the economy’s long-run sustainable growth rate – what economists call the potential growth rate – is around a 2 ¼ percent annual rate. We need sustained growth above that rate to absorb the still  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  substantial amount of unused productive capacity. Thus, our recent growth rates are barely keeping up with our potential. Even though the unemployment rate has declined sharply from 9 percent last September to 8.2 percent in March, it is still unacceptably high. In addition, many other measures of the labor market remain weak. The labor force participation rate, the percentage of people employed, and the total number of hours worked in the economy all dropped sharply during the recession and remain well below their pre-recession levels, even taking into account the impact of demographic shifts. Also, it appears that productivity growth has slumped recently. Although that means that a given amount of growth translates into bigger employment gains, it certainly is not an unmitigated positive development. Also, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the economy still faces significant headwinds and that there are some meaningful downside risks. In the headwinds department, I would include the run-up in gasoline prices mentioned earlier because that will sap purchasing power, the continued impediments to a strong recovery from ongoing weakness in the housing sector, and fiscal drag at the federal and state and local levels.