samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
You don’t want board members so involved that they need to approve every policy and procedure. You do want them to be involved enough that they understand the organization,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  they are providing the right level of oversight and guidance, and they share a sense of responsibility for the actions of the firm. 2. Resources: In terms of talent, we see firms struggling to recruit and retain sufficient expertise in some areas, with firms competing for the talent needed to implement new standards and to address identified resource gaps. We also understand the challenges firms are having with filling many difficult leadership roles, such as risk management and compliance positions, where demand is higher than the supply of talented candidates. With regard to general population of eligible candidates, hiring managers must be willing to look closer at the 25 to 40-year-old cohort that makes up much of the workforce in the industry. There needs to be a better understanding of: 1) what incents and motivates them; and 2) why they fail to make long-term commitments to firms. The high turnover rates in financial services can be attributed in part to the competitive nature of the industry, the financial incentives to move, and the lack of repercussions for bad behavior. But, more importantly, the demographics of the workforce may also playing an important role.

The emerging interest in Islamic finance includes countries such as Australia, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and China, with initiatives in introducing Islamic finance in their financial systems. Such developments would create a dynamic and competitive environment for the global Islamic finance industry. The development of the Islamic financial system is guided by Shariah principles that form the very foundation which contributes to its overall stability and resilience. Shariah embodies Islamic law with rules and regulations derived from the Quran and Sunnah, or practices of Prophet Muhammad. The intrinsic value propositions embedded in Islamic finance are universal and subscribe to the values of ethical finance and socially responsible investment. In essence, it is a requirement for Islamic financial transactions to be supported by an underlying economic activity, with business and trade activities that generate legitimate profits. This precondition ensures that the funds are channelled into productive economic activity, thus strengthening the link between financial and productive flows. This serves to protect the Islamic financial system against the excesses, in terms of leveraging, imprudent risk taking and speculative activities that were root causes of the recent global financial crisis. Profit and risk sharing are also fundamental elements in Islamic finance which strengthens incentives for appropriate due diligence to be undertaken to ensure the economic viability of business activity and profits that are commensurate with the risks involved. This in turn increases for greater transparency and disclosure in Islamic financial transactions.
Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Money laundering and terrorism financing Speech by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the AsiaPacific Group on Money Laundering Typologies Workshop 2008, Colombo, 27 October 2008. *  *  *  His Lordship, the Chief Justice, Hon Sarath N Silva, the Attorney General, other distinguished guests from Sri Lanka as well as from abroad; my dear friends. At the outset, I wish to extend to all of you a very warm welcome to this Asia Pacific Group Seminar on Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. It is indeed a pleasure to see all of you here, from 34 different countries, and we hope that you will have a wonderful stay and take back happy memories of your period here; not only as far as the Conference is concerned, but also by experiencing our country. Sri Lanka has been in the forefront of the worldwide efforts on the containment of money laundering and terrorism financing. We have been associated with this effort in a special way, not only to help the international effort, but also to fulfil our own local needs. That is why we are very pleased to see such a large gathering of experts on this subject who are getting together to develop ways and means by which this vexed problem could be dealt with.

Without finance, terrorism cannot progress. So, steps taken by countries to ensure that the funding lines to terrorism and money laundering are cut off, that terror financing transactions are interrupted or stopped, and that there is worldwide co-operation to track down persons who are suspected of being involved in terror financing in whatever way, is of vital importance. Just take a small example. If at the end of the month, you do not receive your salary, you will find it difficult to comfortably progress with your next month’s activities. In the same way, if we can stop the funds going to terrorist activities, that will put a dampener on their activities. It is very simple to understand. Therefore, not only should we deal with terrorists on a military basis, but we should disrupt their progress by cutting off and interrupting their funding lines. By doing so, we complicate their agenda. In order to do so, and to continue to do so, we have to equip ourselves. The judiciary, the law enforcement agencies, the regulators, the media, the bankers, the prosecutors, all of these groups, have to equip themselves with whatever it takes, to meet with this challenge. We have to learn from each other. We have already learnt many lessons during our own activities in this field. But, it is important that we share such knowledge and experience with others as well.
We need to look at the fundamental determinants of money demand. Ideally, we should have a full and comprehensive model of portfolio allocation and choices which, as an aside, would produce a determination of the demand for money. We might be a long way from building such a model. But we can have some intuitions. We could start from the fact that money is both substitutable and complementary to financial assets. Because it is substitutable, money demand depends on changes in relative returns - i.e. the actual and expected moves in interest rates. But money is also a complement to financial assets, and as such reacts to permanent changes in the supply, availability and characteristics of those assets. Our economies are becoming more and more "financial" in the sense that the ratio of financial wealth to GDP is constantly increasing. Since economic agents - especially financial intermediaries and corporates - need to keep part of their total financial assets in liquid holdings, there may be a structural increase in the demand for money (everything equal). The euro and the integration of European capital markets may have accelerated this evolution. 2  BIS Review 108/2006  This could help explain the apparent break in the trend of the income velocity of money that took place in the euro area in 2000/2001. In effect, since 2001, income velocity has been declining by 3.5% a year, much faster than the rate embedded in the reference value.

Competitiveness may have to return to a level we have not experienced since petroleum production began. Rough estimates indicate that the real exchange rate that safeguards the balance of trade when Norway’s oil wealth no longer has the same weight in the economy will be more in line with the real exchange rate we had in the 1960s. Thank you for your attention. 7/7
The main concern is the problems in the banking system, and the need for capital injections from the public sector has been highlighted. This type of support measure is complicated by the need to address the budget deficit. The outcome of the election in Greece and the uncertainty over whether a government can be formed, and if it would then be able to present the savings needed for the next payment of the support loan from the EU and the IMF, have also sent shockwaves through the financial markets. This means that the unease on the financial markets has increased once again. With regard to the statistics reflecting real economic developments in the euro area, the confidence indicator showed weaker confidence for the euro area as a whole. The purchasing managers’ index for Germany has also weakened, but at the same time other German statistics have been stronger than expected. This applies, for instance, to the IFO indicator, as well as to production in industry. It is natural for us to focus on the parts of the world that are facing major problems regarding growth. But it is also important to remember that the situation is not as gloomy in all of the euro area countries, as illustrated by Germany. It is also important to note that the US economy has continued to strengthen, albeit at a slow rate. The situation on the labour market is improving slowly but surely and this has contributed to increased confidence among US households.

I would like to point out that our cautious forecasts for growth in the euro area are because we are assuming there will be tangible effects from the tightening that is necessary to bring down the public debt ratio. However, there is a risk that the deleveraging will take longer than we have assumed. A prolonged debt consolidation with savings imposed simultaneously in several euro area countries would have a negative effect on the surrounding world through lower trade and demand. This would have effects on the Swedish export industry, which is dependent on trade with the euro area. Good competitiveness – lower public debt At the same time, deleveraging at present involves a difficult balancing act, as extensive savings measures risk strangling consumption and leading to a downward trend, with a fall in growth. It is a major challenge to find an appropriate balance between reducing expenditure and raising taxes to alleviate the effects on growth. Structural reforms of the product and labour markets are also necessary to improve competitiveness and ultimately growth potential. This is easier said than done, however, as such measures may be painful in the short term and politically difficult to implement. But countries that can create the right conditions for better competitiveness can hopefully also reduce the pressure on public  2  “Debt and deleveraging: Uneven progress on the path to growth”, McKinsey Global Institute (January 2012). 3  IMF Fiscal Monitor, Debt Database Fall 2011.
By 2020, although the increase in level is notorious compared to the previous projection, its rate of annual variation compared to 2019 is not so different, as it remains a little over 3% (Figure 5). Regarding consumption, it has lost some dynamism most recently, but is forecast to resume growth at a pace aligned with GDP. This is based on the growth shown by the wage bill, when considering the National Statistics Institute’s (INE) revised salary information, the evolution of the hours habitually worked and the employment growth obtained by inputting the effects of the immigration flow of recent years. Plus, imports of consumer goods are still high. In the fiscal area, we use as a working assumption that in 2019 the economy will receive a boost consistent with the approved budget. From then onwards, we assume that the structural deficit will follow the path of gradual descent defined by the authority (Table 1). External scenario On the external front, the baseline scenario expects a reduction in the next two years of the momentum that the Chilean economy will receive from abroad, although it will remain positive. On the one hand, after reaching the peak of this growth cycle in 2017 and 2018, in 2019-2020 the expansion rate of our trading partners’ activity will be reduced. On the other hand, in the last few quarters the relevant financial conditions for the emerging economies began to normalize, a process that will continue in the next two years.

Accordingly, the evolution of macroeconomic conditions makes it necessary to reduce the monetary stimulus, a process that will continue to be implemented gradually and cautiously, in a context where there is still high uncertainty coming from the external scenario. Recent economic developments As had been anticipated in a number of Monetary Policy Reports, in the third quarter GDP slowed down its annual growth rate with respect to the first half of the year. This is consistent with a scenario The Imacec (Índice Mensual de Actividad Económica) literally corresponds to the “Economic Activity Monthly Indicator”. 1  1  in which economic growth is closer to potential—estimated to lie in the 3% to 3.5% range—given the progress made in the process of closing capacity gaps, the end of specific factors that had favored growth in the first half and a more challenging comparison base in the second (Figure 1). In any case, the deceleration of the last quarter was sharper than expected, highlighting the worsened performance of mining and manufacturing. In the former, there were operational difficulties in some mines; in the latter a significant and greater than expected effect from a string of holidays in September. All of us who devote ourselves to analyzing the economy and its evolution should bear in mind how difficult it is to draw medium-term conclusions from the observation of high frequency data.
4  BIS Review 21/2004  In Phase I, Bank Negara Malaysia may also allow banking institutions to remain on the current accord if they intend to adopt the Foundation Internal Rating Based (FIRB) approach, instead of the standardized approach. However, Bank Negara Malaysia would require a submission of business case justification as well as a blueprint for implementation that has been approved by the Board of Directors of the banking institutions concerned. These banking institutions would be expected to have undertaken a comprehensive gap and business impact studies to justify their roll-out plans. In this regard, a broad guideline on the required processes and expectations will be issued to facilitate the process. Banking institutions intending to adopt the FIRB approach are expected to do so by January 2010. This is when the second phase of implementation will commence. These institutions will be required to submit to Bank Negara Malaysia parallel calculation of capital adequacy on a monthly basis for one year prior to implementation. However, during the second phase, banks on the standardized approach will not be mandated to migrate to the FIRB approach. For purposes of regulatory validation and approval, Bank Negara Malaysia would expect that all parameters and assumptions used for the FIRB approach will be based on local data inputs. Conclusion - capital is key, but not the sole factor to ensure soundness Ladies and Gentlemen, Despite the increased sophistication of the regulatory capital framework and internal economic capital model in banks, capital remains the last line of defence.

Over the time remaining until January 2000, we hope to use the Joint Year 2000 Council as a means of gathering a better picture of the state of global preparations, and to help direct resources and attention to those regions that appear to be faltering in their efforts. We will use the information provided for our web site and the discussions with members of our External Consultative Committee as our primary resources in seeking to identify “hot spots” where more urgent efforts are needed. If we identify regions where more needs to be done, our first step will be to work through the relevant national financial supervisors and regulators to increase the urgency of efforts in their jurisdiction. We may also involve multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, to help increase national attention on the issue. I do not believe that calling public attention to problems in specific countries would be a constructive step for us to take at this stage as we are still trying to build cooperation and our current information is incomplete. In this context, I would also point out that the market itself will begin to bring strong pressures to bear on specific firms and markets that exhibit signs of being ill-prepared during the course of 1999. In conjunction with preparations for Y2K, the recent discussion of the Joint Year 2000 Council with the External Consultative Committee raised several important issues.
Barbro Wickman-Parak: The financial crisis from a central bank perspective Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish Bankers' Association annual meeting, Stockholm, 12 November 2008. *  *  *  Introduction In normal times, reporting about the Riksbank is dominated by what we do, or do not do, with interest rates. The focus is usually on one of the Riksbank's two main tasks: maintaining price stability. Less attention is paid to the other main task, safeguarding financial stability; health is silent, as the Swedes say. For obvious reasons, financial stability has been given more prominence recently. We have now lived with turmoil in the international financial markets for rather more than a year and over the past two months have seen it lead to a large-scale global crisis of confidence. The origin of the current crisis, as well as of our Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s, can be found in reckless lending practices related to property. As we now know, it began when American financial institutions lent money to borrowers with weak credit histories. Whereas the Swedish banking crisis remained altogether Swedish, the American crisis has spread like wildfire and reminded us of just how globally connected the financial markets are. The high-risk sub-prime loans were sold on to a large extent by bundling them together with low-risk loans in what are known as structured credit products. The use of these complex products grew rapidly and had a wide geographical distribution.

The euro area suffers from a lack of competitiveness and productivity, which of course take different forms in individual Member States. Structural problems and current weak demand lead to unsatisfactory economic growth and unacceptably high unemployment in many countries. Tackling these challenges in the long term is not the job of monetary policy. Crisis management must tackle the root causes for the long term and we, the ECB, will therefore not tire of reminding governments that we can only provide them time for the urgently needed reforms. Against this backdrop we could ask whether it was appropriate that the ECB took action. I think it was – precisely because of the path of inflation, even if there is room for discussion about the some of the measures and their design. The list of our crisis management measures is long. In June and September this year we lowered key interest rates further. The main refinancing rate is now just 5 basis points. The interest rate channel has thus been exhausted. For the first time in our history we have resorted to a negative deposit rate in an effort to achieve the desired monetary policy accommodation within the tried and tested corridor system. This justified monetary policy step – which favours investment – was not an easy decision for us, not least because of its possible side effects for the financial sector and for savers.
Furthermore, Russia is one of the first states which started to tighten its monetary policy. Our economy is now close to its potential. If we had continued accommodative monetary policy, it would not have promoted growth any longer, but would have only provoked bubbles in the market. As inflation has risen both globally, and inside the country due to internal and sufficiently steady factors, we need to take committed efforts to bring inflation back to the target. Secondly, monetary policy significantly promoted the fast rebound of the Russian economy. I mean not only and not so much the reduction in the key rate in spring 2020. The main thing is the result of inflation targeting over recent years. We were able to shift towards countercyclical monetary policy and aid the economy during the crisis, rather than combat the soaring risks of inflation, as we used to before, exactly because we had been maintaining inflation close to the target for a rather long period of time. This reassures us that we have made the right choice and that our monetary policy instruments enable us to achieve our goals in very diverse circumstances. Thirdly, shifts in the economy and peoples’ and businesses’ expectations and behaviour might require central banks to adjust all their policies, including monetary policies. To this end, most central banks, first of all those pursuing inflation targeting policies, carry out regular in-depth analysis of their goals and instruments, that is, a review of their monetary policies.

Financing of euro area companies’ via debt securities and non-bank loans has increased from 24% to 36% in the last ten years.3 In fact, in this period, issuance by companies grew from 8% to 10% of GDP. 4 Turning to equity financing, listed equity issued by non-financial companies increased from 36% of GDP in 2014 to 41% in 2018. The total market capitalisation of listed companies in the EU is now above pre-crisis levels. Another positive is that European investment funds are playing an increasingly important role in 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  cross-border integration. This helps investors spread their holdings across countries and achieve better diversification than they would through direct holdings of assets. The sector is also contributing to integration in the euro area corporate bond markets: almost 80% of investment funds’ holdings of euro area-issued bonds are non-domestic, i.e., issued outside their own domicile.5 But the picture for the overall financial system is mixed. We see positive developments in the convergence of asset prices across the euro area – what we call price-based integration. However, the post-crisis reintegration of cross-border asset holdings, which we call quantitybased integration, has stalled.6 Consequently, while most initiatives under the CMU action plan are on the path to completion, a “CMU effect” on the cross-border integration of capital markets is yet to be seen. One reason is that despite general support for the CMU project, progress in addressing core barriers to further integration has been too slow.
The exchange rate has been relatively stable after the adjustment that took place in the first half of last year, and the króna is currently somewhat stronger than historical measures would warrant, although it should be admitted that determinism is probably not the most suitable approach for assessing currency developments. One reason for uncertainty about the exchange rate is the large current account deficit, as well as the fact that it can easily be driven by factors over which we have no control, given how closely Iceland’s financial sector is now integrated with global financial markets. A central bank with a legislative and regulatory remit to target inflation is of course pleased with such inflation developments, but would prefer them to be built on a more solid foundation. Domestic demand growth has declined, but rather more slowly than the Bank had hoped. The current account deficit is large and will also contract more slowly than the Bank would have desired. Demand remains buoyant in the housing market and there are indications that the rate of credit growth may be on the increase again. For these and other reasons, the Bank will remain on the alert and not ease its monetary stance until even clearer signs emerge that a lasting change has been established. Equity prices have soared in Iceland in recent years.

Thus caution, steadfastness and self-control are called for in all areas of the economy – in other words, the maxim that “the doors of pleasure should not be thrown wide open” still applies. As far as the Central Bank is concerned, ensuring low inflation is its most important function today and in the future. And that picture is growing brighter, although care still needs to be exercised. 4  BIS Review 42/2007