samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The analysis focuses on the effect of push and pull shocks on capital flows in the  contemporaneous quarter and the subsequent two quarters. In a second specification the role of a set of additional factors (X) in affecting the sensitivity of capital flowsat-risk to global push shocks is considered. This is done by adding an interactive effect to equation (1): 37 KF@R = α + β 𝑃𝑢𝑠ℎ + γ 𝑃𝑢𝑙𝑙 + δ X + θ (𝑃𝑢𝑠ℎ ∗ X) + 𝑢  (2)  A series of factors is considered: in one specification the focus is on the share of foreign currencydenominated debt and a measure of reserve adequacy, while in another specification the role of macroprudential policy is analysed. 34  The FCI is the first principal component of the following series: long term government bond yields, term spreads, sovereign spreads, interbank spreads, corporate spreads, equity returns, equity volatility and financials market capitalisation (normalised by the broader market). These indices are based on those presented by the IMF in their April 2017 GFSR. 35 The main difference between this specification and the one proposed by the IMF in their October 2018 GFSR is that they consider capital flows in aggregate across EMs and, consequently, can only look at the effect of push factors. The choice to do this in a panel setting with country-specific series means pull factors can be incorporated into the analysis. The current analysis also broadens the scope from portfolio flows to different types of capital flows.

Chart 15: Major structural changes are increasing the sensitivity of Capital Flows-at-Risk to push shocks  2006  2018  2030 excluding growth in 2030 including growth in EME external balance EME external balance sheets sheets  -1  -2  Impact of the increasing role of investment funds  -3  Impact of the shift to market-based finance Impact of higher share of FX-denominated debt in EMs Pre-crisis Total  -4 Capital Flows-at-Risk as a % of GDP  Sources: IMF, EPFR, IIF, Bank calculations. Notes: This chart shows estimates and projections for the sensitivity of Capital Flows-at-Risk to negative push shocks at different points in time. The chart is based on separate panel quantile regressions for FDI, banking, market-based finance and investment fund flows. We use the global FCI (push), country-specific FCIs (pull), and the share of NFC debt denominated in foreign currency as regressors. The third bar combines regression results with projections for the composition of flows and the role of FX-denominated debt in 2030, as described below and in footnote 21. The fourth bar also takes into account projected growth in EM’s external balance sheets as described below and in footnote 21. In particular, we estimate that the growing shares of FX-denominated debt, market-based intermediation and, within that, the increasing role of investment funds, have increased the sensitivity of Capital Flows-at-Risk to push factors by 50% since the crisis (second bar, Chart 15) – largely using up the self-insurance purchased by EMEs. Left unattended, these vulnerabilities are likely to grow.
Page 2/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  The external value of the Swiss franc has remained stable since the monetary policy assessment in September. There has also been scarcely any change in the trade-weighted exchange rate over 2019 as a whole, although it initially declined before appreciating again in the summer. The Swiss franc thus remains highly valued, and the situation on the foreign exchange market is still fragile. Short-term interest rates are close to the SNB policy rate. The long-term Swiss franc rates reached new lows in the summer, and have recovered only slightly since. This pattern reflects global interest rate movements. The yield on 10-year Swiss Confederation bonds currently stands at –0.5%, compared with –0.2% at the beginning of the year. The long-term interest rates in the euro area and the US have declined even more strongly. All in all, the low interest rate environment around the world has become more entrenched over the course of 2019. Finally, inflation expectations have declined slightly in Switzerland by comparison with the start of the year. However, they remain within the range of 0% to 2% that the SNB equates with price stability. Five years of negative interest  Ladies and gentlemen, the SNB introduced the negative interest rate five years ago. Hardly anyone thought then that it would still be in place at the end of 2019. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to set out for you why we are convinced that negative interest remains necessary today.

We do not burden the banking system any more than is necessary for us to be able to steer short-term money market rates. Ladies and gentlemen, we monitor the impact of negative interest precisely, and we take the side-effects seriously. However, we remain convinced that the benefits it brings Switzerland as a whole clearly outweigh the costs. The negative interest rate and the willingness to intervene are currently the best instruments for ensuring appropriate monetary conditions and thus securing price stability and supporting the economy. Page 4/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Monetary policy outlook  Allow me to summarise the key messages with regard to our monetary policy. We anticipate that our economy has expanded by around 1% this year. We are expecting growth of between 1.5% and 2% next year. Inflation expectations are within the range consistent with price stability. The conditional inflation forecast for the coming quarters is slightly lower than in September, but it is essentially unchanged in the longer term. The Swiss franc remains highly valued, and the situation on the foreign exchange market is still fragile. Against this backdrop, our expansionary monetary policy remains appropriate. Monetary policy and climate change  This brings me now to the significance of climate change for the SNB. When it comes to this key issue, we are focused first and foremost on being able to properly assess the possible consequences for the functioning of economies and financial systems, both in Switzerland and worldwide.
For purposes of this discussion, I will split our economy in two--the real economy and the financial economy. Let me begin my explanation of the present structure of the economy with real variables. - The Turkish economy is a continuously growing, dynamic economy. Its longterm average annual growth rate is over 4 percent and its average annual productivity increase is around 2 percent. In each of the last two years, GNP has increased by around 7 percent, well above most OECD countries. Along with this rapid growth, the composition of the gross domestic product (GDP) has shifted during the last two decades, toward the industrial and services sectors, while the GDP share of agriculture has greatly declined. The share of the public sector in industrial output has also decreased. - Spending on investments has been increasing since the first quarter of 1995. Normally, periods of investment aimed at increasing production capacity last for about 20 months, but the increase in investment activity spending remained focused on increasing production capacity throughout 1995 and 1996. The Economic Trend Analysis of the Central Bank of Turkey shows that no earlier period of expectation of rising investments has ever lasted longer. - Official records show that Turkey’s unemployment rate has been holding fairly constant at around 7 or 8 percent, which is very low compared to the other OECD countries. In April 1996, total employment rose by 2.6 percent and unemployment fell to 6.3 percent. The urban and rural unemployment rates were estimated at 9.3 percent and 3.8 percent respectively.

Even though during the early years of the Exchange Market’s operation in the 1860’s, the amount of foreign direct investment in Turkey was negligible, foreign capital was being encouraged to form joint stock companies. Up until the beginning of the 20th century, the Market helped the government find funds to finance its obligations. In 1906, the Istanbul Exchange Market was re-organised and once more became a source of new capital for young private ventures. BIS Review 42/1997  -2-  Without giving the whole history of the Istanbul Exchange Market, I want to emphasise that Turkey’s experience with free markets did not begin in 1980 but goes back more than a century before. What the reforms of 1980 did accomplish was to institutionalise the markets and put them on a solid legal footing. Besides liberalisation, the structural reforms begun in 1980 included measures providing investment and tax incentives. I would like to review these issues briefly. The aims of these incentives were to encourage activities that would earn foreign exchange on the one hand, and to help foreign sources of capital finance investments in Turkey on the other. It can be said that by liberalising its capital account and introducing structural tax changes to improve investment returns, Turkey issued an invitation to foreign capital.
Vahur Kraft: A successful Estonia - in a successful Europe Speech by Mr Vahur Kraft, Governor of Eesti Pank (Bank of Estonia), at the Euro Conference of Eesti Pank, Tallinn, 3 May 2004. *  *  *  This year spring is going to be different, chirp-chirp! Different, this year different… These are the words by Henrik Visnapuu, an Estonian poet, in his third letter to his beloved Ing in May 1919. May has been a month of important events in the history of Eesti Pank. 85 years ago, on 3 May 1919, the first entry regarding the fixed capital of Eesti Pank was made into the general ledger, and the first payment was accepted into the current account. Thus, 3 May 1919 was the actual day the doors of the Bank opened. (By the way, the historical entry into the general ledger can now be viewed at the Museum of Eesti Pank.) Today, on 3 May 2004, Eesti Pank made its first share capital transfer to the European Central Bank. Eesti Pank has become a member of the European System of Central Banks, one of the owners of the European Central Bank. Today, 3 May 2004 is already the third day of being a fully-fledged member state of the European Union. Two out of three Estonian citizens voted for accession to the European Union in the referendum held last September. What is going to happen now? This is largely up to us.

In order to generate innovation, innovative people have to be raised in Estonia, brought to Estonia - and kept in Estonia, hence the aim should be to create more high-productivity jobs. •  I maintain that being a part of Europe, we should become quality leaders since we have already lost the price leader position to Asia. This is undoubtedly easier to say than to do. Here we face the threat of outpacing the so-called natural development, which calls for step-by-step industrial development towards manufacturing products with increased added value - such a development is in fact currently under way in Estonia. On the other hand, the payback period of such investments is very long and the experience of several countries (including Finland and Ireland) has shown that success often arrives only decades later. Consequently - if it is our goal to become a quality leader, development activities in this direction should be launched as soon as possible. •  Here we come to the question, WHERE to start? The answer requires a good prediction or even a vision: which areas have enough potential in Estonia that are worth to be given systematic development priority. It is possible that due to its small size Estonia lacks any potential for developing high-technology industry since this would require the emergence of clusters. Even if we manage to develop our own high-technology industry, sufficiently high-level know-how will most likely emerge only in few fields. However, this does not mean that we should develop just a few areas.
Conclusion The people of the UK have chosen price stability as the primary objective for monetary policy, having reason to value inflation control. 30  Their preferences have been encoded in the MPC’s inflation remit. Although those preferences are set in a statute, there remains an element of discretion in how the MPC delivers its inflation objective. That is because the people of the UK also have reason to value stable growth, jobs and incomes. And in exceptional circumstances, trade-offs between real stability and inflation can arise that monetary policy is required to balance. This is now the case given the decision of the people of the United Kingdom to leave the EU. In the coming years, the UK will redefine its openness to the movement of goods, services, people and capital. The flexibility and dynamism of this economy will help it adjust as its relationship with the EU becomes clearer and new opportunities with the rest of the world open up. Over the next few years, the magnitude of the effects of this adjustment on the economy’s supply potential, domestic demand, and the value of sterling will be somewhat uncertain; and this process will have a significant bearing on inflation. Whatever transpires, the MPC will manage monetary policy to achieve the inflation target in a sustainable manner consistent with the preferences and instructions of the people of the United Kingdom. 30  Sen’s capability approach emphasises “capabilities of [people] to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value”.

Because monetary policy can also influence demand it can lean against such shocks. If successful, it can stabilise inflation. In this case, no output-inflation trade-off arises. This is the so-called “divine coincidence”. 10  In Figure 2, negative demand shocks would create a tendency for inflation and the output gap to move into the south-west quadrant. Similarly, for positive demand shocks, inflation and output gap would move to the north-east. Because in these cases, there is no trade-off between stabilising inflation and the output gap, it is relatively straightforward for monetary policy to keep inflation and the output gap close to the origin. Chart 1: For much of the great moderation period, data were consistent with predominance of demand shocks… Great moderation  3.5  In practice, data in these quadrants reflect lags in the transmission of monetary policy and other uncertainties: it takes time for monetary policy to  Inflation (%)  affect output, and for output in turn to affect inflation. But if monetary policy has been effective, these  3  deviations would not be expected to be either large or 2.5 Output gap (%)  persistent. This state of affairs characterised much of the “Great Moderation” in the United Kingdom, from  2  -1  0  1  1993 to 2007 (Chart 1), which was effectively a 11  1.5  1  period of demand management. Things are different when shocks drive inflation up or down independently of demand.
Page 2/4  Berne, 13 December 2018 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Swiss economic outlook  I shall now turn to the economic outlook for Switzerland. According to initial estimates, Swiss GDP fell by an annualised rate of 0.9% in the third quarter. Despite this decline, GDP was still 2.4% higher year-on-year thanks to the strong expansion in the previous quarters. How are we to assess this development? First, a slowdown in momentum was to be expected after several very strong quarters. Second, the decline in GDP is also attributable to a number of temporary factors. These include the absence of the contribution made by major international sporting events and the weather-related production losses at hydroelectric power plants. An analysis of all the available economic indicators points to momentum weakening slightly but remaining positive. The favourable development on the labour market also continued. Employment increased strongly in the third quarter. The unemployment rate declined again through to November and now stands at 2.4%. The companies surveyed by our delegates in October and November expect staff numbers to rise in the coming months. They also report increasing difficulties in finding specialist employees. We are now anticipating slightly lower GDP growth of around 2.5% for 2018 as a whole. As in other countries, economic momentum in Switzerland is likely to weaken somewhat in 2019. We are expecting a rise of around 1.5% in GDP for the coming year. Overall, capacity utilisation in the Swiss economy should remain high.

Philipp Hildebrand: The virtues of flexible financial markets - a central banking perspective Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the CFA Institute Annual Conference, Zurich, 22 May 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Summary Rapid technological change and market liberalization have been the driving forces behind the remarkable evolution of global financial markets over the past three decades. The consequences of this development include a geographic rearrangement of global capital markets, a fast pace of product innovation and changes in the nature and composition of financial market participants. The benefits associated with today’s flexible financial markets are manifold. Financial markets have become much more efficient in allocating capital. New products enable a better distribution of risks and the liquefaction of previously illiquid assets. They have also increased market transparency. As a result, modern financial markets facilitated innovation and likely enhanced economic growth. Moreover, they have contributed to make economies more resilient to shocks. These extensive benefits notwithstanding, modern financial market also entails new risks. These risks tend to elicit calls for increasingly far-reaching regulation. While some regulation may indeed be required to guarantee the integrity of financial markets, the threshold for such regulation should be set high.
We will need to notify relevant Parliamentary committees when we publish a consultation and to respond in writing to select committees’ formal responses to consultation. It will also establish a new panel providing independent oversight of the cost benefit analysis we  Page 7  carry out when developing proposals. Furthermore, we will publish our approach to cost-benefit analysis so that everyone can understand how we carry out this important stage in the policymaking process. It is also essential that we explain our proposals to all our stakeholders and take into account their views. We will engage with them more, including by publishing more discussion papers to explain our early stage thinking. This will go hand-in-hand with clear communications to help firms understand our plans for future changes to policy. To that end, the Regulatory Initiatives Grid now provides firms with a comprehensive overview of initiatives planned by eight financial regulators, including the PRA. [17] Being more accessible also means making it easier for firms to understand the requirements they must meet. Firms today face requirements scattered across primary legislation, statutory instruments, retained EU law, UK Technical Standards, PRA Supervisory Statements, PRA Statements of Policies, and Guidelines, Recommendations, and Q&As originally drafted by European Supervisory Agencies. We need to change that. Under the reforms implemented by the Financial Services and Markets Bill, we intend to create a single, easily useable Rulebook written in plain English, although this will be a multi-year project.

In the meantime, we don’t think firms should have to wait before we provide more accessible rules. That’s why have already launched a new Policy Index. [18] It is an online resource that divides policies into sectors and topic areas. For each topic area, a dedicated webpage lists relevant policy material and provides quick access links, allowing firms to find applicable policies more easily. Conclusion I’m going to conclude by reminding you that while these are our ideas about how the PRA should make policy, we really want to hear your views. That is why we have published our discussion paper on our approach to policy making. I encourage you to submit responses. If Parliament approves the changes that make up the FRF, we will consult on proposals for how we make policy. Responses to this discussion paper will help us shape those proposals. I would like to thank Austen Saunders for helping me write this speech. I would also like to thank Andrew Bailey, Charlotte Gerken, Hannah Schraer, Gareth Truran and Sam Woods for their helpful comments. Any errors are my own. 1. PRA Discussion Paper 4/22 ‘The Prudential Regulation Authority’s future approach to policy’, September 2022 2. ‘Our responses to coronavirus (Covid): regulatory measures for PRA firms’  Page 8 3. PRA Dear CEO Letter ‘Existing or planned exposure to cryptoassets’, March 2020 4. PRA Discussion Paper 3/22 ‘Operational resilience: Critical third parties to the UK financial sector’, July 2022 5.
19 In this example, I am referring to capital requirements intended to remain constant over time and applied to the entire banking sector. It is thus not possible to apply the example to the countercyclical capital buffer. See also Gersbach (2011). 20 This is in line with Goodfriend and King (2016), who write that it is important that decisions on macroprudential responses be separated from day-to-day political pressures. 18 [23]  Riksdag Committee on Finance, could also be adjusted for the follow-up and control of macroprudential policy decisions. There are thus strong grounds for arguing that macroprudential policy should be conducted by an independent authority. In addition, there are other reasons for why macroprudential policy should also be coordinated with monetary policy. One that I have just mentioned is that financial stability and monetary policy are closely interlinked with each other. This means that the coordination of the monetary policy decisions and decisions on macroprudential policy measures would probably be of increased benefit to society. 21 Giving the Riksbank an extended mandate to prevent financial crises and, at the same time, allocating the Riksbank some macroprudential policy tools would solve both the time inconsistency problem and the lack of coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies. An independent and effective macroprudential policy is important for the prevention of financial crises. But if a financial crisis should nonetheless occur, an important task for the Riksbank is to provide liquidity support to Swedish banks, not only in Swedish currency but also in foreign currency.

At the same time, unemployment continued on a downward path and economic sentiment improved across the board. Some recent signals point to a slowdown, yet they seem to have more to do with temporary influences, growth prospects continuing to look strong. The past year recorded, on average, positive developments in EU candidate and potential candidate countries as well, in spite of GDP dynamics delivering a more mixed picture (from over 7 percent in Turkey to around 2 percent in Serbia and even stagnation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Nevertheless, the outlook is positive, with recent forecasts pointing to relatively robust growth in the coming years. However, against this relatively rosy background, I should highlight that our economies, even those that belong to the Eurozone, have still much to do in order to become robust and offer good living standards to most of their citizens. Some members of this Club, Romania included, had to go through very painful adjustments during the past decade, as the global crisis found them trapped in a pro-cyclical policy stance and it remains to be seen to what extent they will manage to break free from this pattern in the current good times; some need to fight high inflation, pressures on their currencies or to correct their external imbalances. Nevertheless, the common denominator of all our economies is having to deal with institutional weaknesses and the need to undertake reforms that should make them stronger.