samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As confirmed by G20 Finance Ministers and Governors at their meeting in Shanghai, the aim is now to focus on making Basel III effective without further increasing regulatory capital requirements. In addition, in 2015 the Basel Committee initiated a review of the prudential treatment of banks’ exposures to sovereign risk. This review – which is being conducted in a “careful, holistic and gradual manner” – is meant to take into account several broad issues relating to the role of sovereign debt markets and the impact that any changes may have on this role and on certain market segments. In particular, in reviewing the existing regulatory treatment of sovereign risk, due consideration should be given to the liquidity function of sovereign bonds and to its potential implications for monetary policy implementation and transmission. Given the widespread reach and impact of any policy action in this area, consistency at the global level is key to ensuring a truly international level playing field as it is stated in the Five Presidents Report. Conclusions Let me conclude. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Europe is facing a number of challenges simultaneously, in the economic sphere and beyond. Addressing these challenges requires a joint response. The ECB is doing, and will continue to do, its part by taking the necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.

These efforts have also included working closely with WAIFEM and its technical partners to streamlining the back office functions of the MoF; and enhancing institutional capacity building efforts. Government will continue to keep these measures under constant review, because the process of achieving effective debt management is not like a sprint race, but rather, could be likened to a marathon involving medium to long-term policy thrusts and interventions. Ladies and Gentlemen, Over the past couple of minutes, I have attempted to sensitize you on some of the issues that would be dealt with in detail during this course. Even so, I make no pretensions to any exhaustive analysis. I am aware that the expert faculty assembled by the organizers will do just that. All that is left for me to do is to invite you to take maximum advantage of the opportunity presented by this course to strengthen your competencies in debt data compilation in line with best practices. 4.0  Conclusion  Ladies and Gentlemen, I would be remiss in my duty if I ended this address without expressing the profound appreciation of the Board of Governors of WAIFEM to COMSEC, IMF, and World Bank for their support to WAIFEM in strengthening capacity of countries of its member central banks in the area of debt management capacity building. Before I take leave of you to commence the technical sessions, let me enjoin you to take some time off your crowded schedule to visit some of the tourist attractions in Freetown, and its environs.
With the savings rate still high at about 35% of GNP and the rising incomes, Malaysia has the potential to promote a higher level of consumption without undermining the potential for financing of private investment from domestic sources. The higher consumption has also not created risks of increased household indebtedness which has remained within prudential levels at less than 60% of GDP. Ladies and gentlemen, Capital spending continues to gain momentum both in domestic and export oriented activities. Domestic companies are also forging strategic alliances as part of the strategy to expand to new export markets and leverage on new technologies. The on-going capacity expansion and more competitive business environment will keep inflation low thereby allowing domestic interest rates to continue to remain low for sometime to come. Malaysia's trade and investment links with Asia, particularly with the large economies in the region, is also expected to strengthen further. There also continues to be steady inflows of foreign direct investment. In addition to sustained inflows into the manufacturing and oil and gas sectors, these flows have become more broad based with higher shares of new flows shifting towards higher value-added activity in the services sector. This structural change in FDI flows reflect the changing opportunities Malaysia accords with the services sector now gaining significance as an engine of growth. The new inflows have also tended to be low import content and higher value added. The FDI in services sector has also been increasingly broad based.

•  There will be a greater rebalancing between the role of the public and private sectors in the economy, with the public sector activity focussed on providing the enabling environment to strengthen the role of the private sector in the economy. •  While large domestic corporations and multinational corporations will continue to be important in the economy, the role of the small and medium-scale enterprises will gain significance. •  Greater focus will be given to secure competitiveness on a more comprehensive basis in terms of other dimensions such as productivity and efficiency, labour quality, logistics, research and development, the delivery system and the supply chain. BIS Review 44/2004  1  Malaysia will also continue to leverage on our low country risks in terms of the political stability, industrial maturity and the supply of a skilled workforce. To promote endogenous sources of growth, greater focus has been directed at promoting greater private investment, including by the small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The financial infrastructure and incentive structure will continue to be enhanced to promote investment in new sub-sectors in particular, the services, agriculture and manufacturing sectors. On the external front, while there has been a synchronisation of growth among the major economies, there has also been some rebalancing of the relative strength of the growth among the economies. The increase in the expansion of world trade and the strengthening of labour market conditions in most of these economies suggest continued and self-sustaining growth.
I and my colleagues on the Executive Board have, for example, discussed what would happen if the market’s policy rate expectations were rapidly brought into line with the Riksbank’s repo-rate path. If we assume an immediate alignment, then the upward effect on long-term rates would depend on what measure one sees as being representative of the monetary policy expectations. In the Prospera surveys in November, expectations were higher than those reflected in the forward rates but lower than the Riksbank’s repo-rate path. If we assume that it is the Prospera surveys that best reflect expectations, rather than the forward rate curve, the upward adjustment will thus be smaller, as will the effect on the long-term rates. Market expectations are thus clearly an item on the list of those factors that are difficult to assess and that monetary policy decision-makers must take a stance on. The assessment of market expectations was especially critical earlier in the autumn when the variation in different measures of market expectations was particularly great, with forward rates at a much lower level than other measures. When various indicators of monetary policy  1  The somewhat simplified term risk premium is used throughout instead of the more correct term maturity premium. 2  The price gain made on a long-term bond if the short-term interest rate is lower than expected is, on the other hand, somewhat higher than the price loss that will be made if the short-term interest rate is to a corresponding extent higher than expected.

It is not the case that I personally believe that the risks associated with household borrowing constitute an immediate threat to the economy, or that housing prices are dramatically overvalued and that a rapid downward adjustment is on the cards. But I do believe that there are risks further ahead if household borrowing continues to increase at a much higher rate than incomes for an additional extended period. And if monetary policy continues to be too expansionary for too long, these risks will increase even further. I also believe that this is roughly the view of the majority of the members of the Executive Board. It is not possible to exactly determine at what level household borrowing will reach the “critical point”. As long as economic activity is favourable, the labour market is improving, incomes and wealth are increasing and the households have confidence in the future everything is hunky-dory. But in a different economic situation with increasing uncertainty on the labour market the behaviour of the households may change; they may begin to consolidate their balance sheets. This would reduce their consumption and reinforce the downward tendencies in the economy. The higher the debt burden the greater the risk of significant consequences. If housing prices fall in such a situation, households’ assets will be undermined while their debts will still remain. Households would therefore want to amortise rather than borrow, which would dampen demand.
chart 6). The latest World Economic Outlook by the IMF reports that “Global growth is in low gear (…) and downside risks persist.” The IMF now anticipates global growth of 2.9% for 2013 and 3.6% for 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  A change in growth momentum is becoming evident at a global level. Chart 7 shows the purchasing managers indices (PMIs) for various countries. On the vertical axis we see the current level of PMIs and on the horizontal axis, movements over the past six months. Momentum in the emerging economies has declined recently (red ring). By contrast, the advanced economies are picking up, in particular in the euro area (green ring). Moreover, PMIs for most of these economies are above the growth threshold of 50 points. Growth in the US, especially, is very robust and, on this side of the Atlantic, the UK has exceeded expectations (blue ring). Particularly important for Switzerland were the surprisingly favourable economic indicators in Europe this summer. In the second quarter of 2013, the euro area reported positive growth for the first time in six quarters. There are encouraging signs from the peripheral economies, especially. Since mid-year, for instance, these countries have again been recording surpluses on their current accounts. Nevertheless, these signs must be put into perspective. The improvement in the peripheral economies is beginning from a very low base level and the unemployment figures are oppressive. The banking system is very fragmented and unhealthy bank balance sheets give rise to declining levels of lending.

European financial markets calmer thanks to monetary policy If you take a look at chart 1, you can follow the movements in both the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate and the average risk premium for the government bonds of five peripheral euro area countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland). The risk premium is drawn on an inverted scale, in other words, a movement downwards signifies a higher risk. This chart serves as an illustrative example for two developments. On the one hand, it shows that uncertainty in the euro area has decreased greatly over the past twelve months. At the time of the last Money Market Event in Geneva, the risk premium was almost 1,200 basis points; it is now below 400. On the other hand, the chart illustrates the fact that the upward pressure on the Swiss franc has abated. Following a long period last year when the exchange rate stuck closely to the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20, it moved away in January and, since May, has fluctuated within a relatively narrow range of CHF 1.22–1.26 per euro. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Here, the situation has calmed in two respects. In order to reduce the risk of the euro area collapsing, the European Central Bank (ECB) resorted to an unconventional measure in late summer 2012, the outright monetary transactions programme. Market participants were persuaded, and since then the risk premium for peripheral economies in Europe has declined steadily. What is remarkable is how persistent this trend has been.
All in all, the evidence points to discretionary fiscal policy having a moderately positive impact on economic growth in advanced economies. Yet the effectiveness of such measures depends on the way in which they are taken and their timing, in particular with regard to delays in the recognition, decision and implementation process. Precisely because of such difficulties, a budget policy which is 16 aimed ex ante in an anti-cyclical direction tends to produce pro-cyclical effects ex post. The effectiveness of discretionary measures also depends on the temporary nature and on the possibility of withdrawing them in a timely manner once the shock has passed so as to guarantee fiscal sustainability. 3.2  Comparing the importance of automatic stabilisers and discretionary policies in the euro area and in the United States  If we compare budget policy on the two sides of the Atlantic, we see that the automatic 17 stabilisers play a more important role in the euro area. First of all, the greater the percentage of government spending over GDP, the greater the budget position’s response to fluctuations in economic activity. Automatic stabilisers are smaller in the United States, where government is smaller in relative terms (government 18 spending is worth 37% of GDP, whereas it tops the 45% mark in the euro area countries).

Durmuş Yilmaz: Press conference for the presentation of the Inflation Report Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the press conference presenting the third issue of the Inflation Report, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 28 July 2008. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests and Members of the Press, Welcome to the press conference for the presentation of the third issue of the 2008 Inflation Report, one of the most important communication tools of the full-fledged inflation-targeting regime that we have been implementing. In this conference, I would like to give you a short summary of our evaluations and the Central Bank’s inflation forecasts in the Inflation Report which will be posted on our website later today. 1. Inflation developments  Esteemed Members of the Press, I would like to start with a general assessment of inflation developments in the previous period and share with you the factors impeding the disinflation process in the first half of the year. Distinguished Guests, In April, both the Open Letter and the Inflation Report issued by the Central Bank of Turkey presented a detailed explanation for the factors impeding the disinflation process. The source of inflation has not changed in the past quarter. In the second quarter of 2008, prolonged increases in food, energy and other commodity prices continued to exert significant upward pressures on headline inflation.
I am positive that, like in the banking sector, the society will benefit from this. It will result in more efficient production, lower prices, better service quality and curb the power of the monopolistic producers. To date, as in the early 1990s, we again face the question of what is the right fiscal policy. Of course, today this problem is raised in a slightly different way. But, in essence, it is the same question - what fiscal policy shall ensure the stable development of the Estonian economy within the fixed exchange rate regime and as part of the euro area. I shall return to this question towards the end of my presentation. Thus the economic policy key issues we are facing in the beginning of the 21st century resemble in many aspects the problems we tried to resolve in the beginning of 1990s. We have achieved progress in finding solutions to some of the problems, others have remained unresolved. One thing is clear - undue postponement of tough issues is no good to anybody. If we want to be treated as equal partners in the European Union, if we want to sustain the rapid growth rate and  2  BIS Review 51/2002  growing income level, we must tackle these problems with similar resolution and energy we did 10 years ago. B. Challenges facing Estonian economy on its way to the European Union - internal policy  So - what are today’s and tomorrow’s challenges facing Estonian economy?

Limited spare capacity in the Norwegian economy and persistent external inflationary pressures may lead to inflation accelerating further. On the other hand, the rise in interest rates and high inflation may cool down the housing market and curb household consumption faster than currently envisaged. There is also a risk of a sharper slowdown in global growth. The future path of the policy rate will depend on how the economy evolves. We cannot make any promises about the policy rate. The promise we can make is that we will continue our efforts to fulfil the mandate of keeping inflation low and stable and to promote economic stability. 1 A new set of forecasts was not prepared for the monetary policy meeting on 17 August. Updated forecasts will  be presented when Monetary Policy Report 3/22 is published on 22 September. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Equity does a much better job than debt of sharing risk between borrowers and lenders as repayment terms adjust automatically with servicing capacity. Equity is also better able to support the financing of long-term investment projects because it is perpetual. So a world without equity is likely to be one with poorer risk-sharing and weaker long-term investment. To illustrate these costs, consider the portfolio behaviour of pension funds around the financial crisis. At this time, global equity prices fell sharply and risk appetites evaporated. These are precisely the circumstances in which pension funds, as long-term investors, could play a stabilising, counter-cyclical role. In particular, those pension funds with stronger balance sheets might be expected to bear greater risk when its price is cheap – for example, by buying equities. In fact, the evidence suggests quite the opposite happened. We have looked at the portfolio behaviour of over 2000 corporate pension funds between 2006 and 2012, splitting them into those with “strongest” and “weakest” balance sheets. Strongest is defined here by the net funding position (ratio of assets to liabilities) of the pension fund. Chart 8 shows the changes in equity portfolio allocations of the strongest and weakest pension funds, together with the FTSE All-Share index, over that period. 9 Both the strongest and the weakest pension funds began the period with a similar equity allocation. As equity prices started to fall in 2008, however, the allocations of strongest and weakest funds diverged sharply.

In summary, over the course of the past decade or so, the asset management industry has fundamentally changed shape. It is now large and is set to get larger still. The assets it manages are increasingly being allocated into illiquid assets or indexed strategies. And the risks on these asset allocations are increasingly being borne by (perhaps trigger-happy) endinvestors. Too-big-to-fail Given this evolving structure, what risks to financial stability might the asset management industry pose? The financial crisis alerted us to the perils of banks that are “too-big-to-fail”. During the crisis, the collateral damage from big bank failure necessitated state bail-outs. These nourished the beast that had already eaten the farm. A variety of regulatory reforms are being put in place in an attempt to house-train this beast (Haldane (2012a)). 4  Some of this is a mirror-image of trends in the pensions industry, but the pattern is also evident for nonpension savings products. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  One natural question, then, is whether the asset management industry has spawned similar such behemoths. Two relevant factors here are, first, the relative degree of concentration in the industry and, second, the scale of its largest players. Table 1 shows the world’s top 10 largest asset managers and banks by asset size. The degree of concentration across the two industries is broadly similar. The top 10 asset managers account for just less than 30% of the sector, the top 10 banks a little more than 20%. Their balance sheets are also similarly-sized.
We always cooperate with the market in financial technologies and innovations. Thereby, in 2015, we held the first forum on innovative financial technologies; it was in demand with businesses and we are going to hold it again in autumn. We have established an institution of bond programmes. The development of debt instruments is extremely important for our financial market, because it is the best instrument for large companies, while banks should be more focused on lending to small and medium-sized businesses. In 2015, we laid foundations for the development of a national rating industry, and the new legislation allows us to expect that a really respectable and professional rating industry will be built in our country. Now about the national payment system. In 2015, operations and clearing centre of the NPCS was launched. It processes all operations made in Russia through cards of international payment systems. The transfer of payments into Russia was implemented in a very short period due to external risks but its implementation was of high technological quality in line with international standards. In the end of the last year a pilot issue of national payment system cards Mir was implemented. The cards are already issued by banks of the Crimea (and accepted throughout the Crimea) and some other banks. The mass issue of the cards is to start in the second half of the year. Besides, we have improved the system of Bank of Russia financial messaging system, a SWIFT counterpart.

We applied them because the external conditions throughout 2015 were persistently challenging, even extraordinary, and really required the Bank of Russia to take special substandard measures. The Bank of Russia used special-purpose refinancing instruments which somewhat backed up the real sector in the fields where the market failed: project financing, non-commodity exports, and small business. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Now, the upcoming transition to structural liquidity surplus is putting the expansion of specialpurpose instruments on hold. The efficiency of these instruments varies, that is why we will focus on fine-tuning them. Thereby, we have revised the criteria for driving non-commodity exports in order to focus on technological and manufacturing projects. As for project financing, we will refinance liabilities only for the projects already selected by the Interdepartmental Commission. The use of allocated limits only slightly exceeds 70% or 97 billion rubles. To solve the issue of external debt repayments, FX refinancing instruments were used. As a result, the external debt shrank by $ billion, i.e. by 16%, in 2015. The total debt reduction for the two years was 30%. It means that the debt burden for our economy has decreased considerably. Banks’ demand for foreign currency, provided by the Bank of Russia, was sinking noticeably over the past year and we are gradually abandoning these instruments. We expect banks to redeem the FX debt by the end of next year. We offered banks temporary regulatory easing to support the financial system.