samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Building back better together through a sustainable and future-ready workforce Keynote address by Ms Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 24th World Conference of Banking Institutes, Kuala Lumpur, 28 June 2023. ***  Introduction It is my delight and great pleasure to be a part of the 24th World Conference of Banking Institutes hosted in Malaysia this year. Let me start by congratulating the joint organisers, the Asian Institute of Chartered Bankers (AICB) and the Global Banking Education Standards Board (GBEStB) for putting together what promises to be great event, the first physical instalment since before the pandemic in 2019. Of the many challenges and equally, opportunities, that are facing the financial sector today, none in my view come close to the importance of understanding the implications of the profound change we are seeing in world of finance for its workforce. The latest Future of Jobs Report released by The World Economic Forum last month revealed that over 80% of organisations surveyed identify higher adoption of frontier technologies, broadening digital access and the application of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) standards as key trends most likely to drive workforce transformation. It might surprise some of you to know that early thinkers predicted similar trends on the future of work as far back as the 20th century.

We have an important role and responsibility to help employees adapt to and thrive in roles that are constantly being re-defined. And how we do this needs to evolve from a narrow focus on providing just-in-time training to get jobs done, to one which helps individuals acquire new knowledge, skills and capabilities on a continuous basis to meet business and professional goals. 2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Work to develop a Future Skills Framework (FSF) for the financial sector, which serves as a single point of reference on future skills and career development pathways for those working or aspiring to work in financial services, is a major step in this direction. In the longer run, the FSF should serve to foster a culture of lifelong learning and skills development within the financial sector workforce. I wish to commend AICB for leading the framework together with the Malaysian Insurance Institute (MII) and the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM). Financial institutions here today will have a key role to play in realising the vision for the FSF by helping shape the framework into something that will be beneficial and relevant to institutions and individuals in the financial sector. By supporting the reskilling and upskilling of individuals whose roles may be at risk of displacement, the Future Skills Framework also serves as a risk management strategy for financial institutions that are already facing growing legal and reputational challenges associated with redundancies.
[21] Despite these interventions, a BCBS report detailing the early lessons from Covid-19 shows evidence of banks taking or planning to take management action to bolster liquidity across a number of Basel Committee jurisdictions. [22] In the UK, examples of defensive actions planned or taken by banks in the Covid-19 stress included declining to roll funding and cutting some lending, a reluctance or refusal to buy-back commercial paper, wholesale issuance and actions to raise deposits. While the limited duration of liquidity pressures due to authorities’ interventions meant these actions did not likely have a significantly negative wider impact, this tendency for banks to collectively hoard liquidity in fear of being the first to use their liquid assets substantially can be collectively damaging. Certain actions aimed at preserving liquidity could lessen market intermediation and credit provision through a reduction in certain types of lending and asset holding,[23] as well as leading to restrictions in expansionary trading desk activities and slowing the on-boarding of new clients. [24] Moreover, the reluctance of banks to absorb part of the stress through the use of liquid assets implies that central banks have to intervene in greater size and more quickly than in the counterfactual. I feel that here, we might not have got the balance quite right: maybe the system is relying a bit more than is appropriate on central banks to jump in super quickly and in size. Interventions of central banks to address market dysfunction are not costless.

Given the exceptional nature of the circumstances that would justify a CCoB release we would seek to limit the duration and scope of the distribution restrictions to the minimum required to address the risks faced. This would be dependent on the severity of the shock and the level of  Page 6  uncertainty that the banking system might have to face. [15] Enough said on capital buffers. I expect the debate on this to continue at the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Let me now turn to liquidity buffers. Liquidity framework and liquid assets usability The global financial crisis exposed the lack of sufficient liquidity in banks’ balance sheets and led to regulatory reform, including the introduction of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), which enhances the resilience of banks to short-term liquidity runs. [16] Alongside the LCR, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) was also introduced to ensure that banks maintain a stable funding profile over a longer horizon in relation to the composition of their assets and off-balance sheet activities. Following these reforms, we find ourselves in a much better place than before the global financial crisis. Liquidity regulation has helped banks to build strong liquidity buffers that can be used to absorb shocks. A decade after the onset of the financial crisis, liquid assets accounted for 17.2% of major UK banks’ total assets – more than double the level in 2007. Similarly, banks’ reliance on short-term funding reduced substantially – falling by more than three quarters over the same period.
At bottom, of course, is the historical experience of the effects on the real economy of financial market 3  Remarks of Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, at the Cyberpayments Conference ’96 (June 18, 1996). BIS Review 17/1997  -3-  disruptions and bank failures, especially when the disruptions and failures spread beyond the initial impetus.”4 A bank supervisor should have concerns other than cost, and these comprise the bad news -- the “risk” aspect of banking on the Internet. In the simplest terms, while we strive to ensure that banks remain efficient and cost-effective, we also have to ensure that banks know what they are getting into, and that they are capable of handling the risks that accompany banking on the Internet. The tension between the two is very constant and real, particularly because the technology today seems to be moving so much faster than bankers or bank supervisors can fully absorb. At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, we are being proactive in this area. We currently conduct on-site, information systems examinations of State member banks in our district -- in addition to commercial, trust, trading, and compliance examinations -- in which we try to review and constructively criticize the examined bank’s entire MIS infrastructure. There is no separate, independent electronic or Internet bank exam as such.

Paul Tucker: The debate on financial system resilience – macroprudential instruments Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at Barclays Annual Lecture, London, 22 October 2009. *  *  *  What stage have we reached in the current financial and economic crisis? The stage where the most hideous macroeconomic nightmare – a second Great Depression revisited – is now probably remote but where the outlook remains highly uncertain by any normal standard. Where the banking system is recovering, but where some big UK (and overseas) banks have a lot left to fix. And where there has been real progress with many policy initiatives to make the international financial system more resilient in future, but where perhaps some of the biggest issues remain unresolved, even incompletely articulated. After some scene setting, I will address one of those issues this evening: whether there might be macroprudential instruments that could lean against and preserve banking system resilience in the face of credit boom and bust. I will also provide an update on international plans for banks to produce recovery and resolution plans, known here as Living Wills. The macrobackdrop and the credit system At the beginning of this year, 1 I thought it would take until the autumn at least to tell whether the economy was going to lurch downwards into a spiral of falling prices, rising real debt burdens, generally enfeebled banks and falling output.
Because the normalization process is expected to proceed gradually, it can be anticipated that monetary policy will remain expansionary still for some time, probably making it the longest period of continued monetary expansion since the adoption of the current monetary policy regime. The CBC will be prepared to act countercyclically if downside risks materialize in the external sector. 1  Let me now turn to the details of our baseline scenario and the related risks we see. In the second quarter, economic activity grew 5.3% annually, giving an important upward surprise with respect to June expectations (Figure 1). By sectors, the greatest differences were observed in non-mining activity, particularly trade, business services and manufacturing. Domestic demand also grew above expectations, reflecting a greater expansion of private consumption, an increase in inventory build-up and more dynamic investment in machinery and equipment. This dynamism was largely maintained in July’s monthly index of economic activity (Imacec). The non-mining component of this indicator posted an annual increase of around 4%, while its mining counterpart dropped by nearly 2% annually, due to some one-off adjustments in some operations. About the labor market, for several quarters its recovery seemed to lag behind activity, mainly because private salaried employment—which typically has a closer link with the business cycle—was stagnant. This phenomenon was not entirely unexpected given that the lags with which activity affects employment are variable, but anyway advised some caution regarding the strength and durability of the economic recovery. In recent months we have been reviewing this diagnosis.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  sustained basis, that would pose a risk to inflation and, thus, would have important implications for monetary policy. With respect to the inflation outlook, I think there are four important questions that deserve attention. 1. How much slack is there in the economy? In other words, how fast can the economy grow for how long until the economy is close to full employment? 2. Are there speed-limit effects on inflation? In other words, could inflation rise because the rate of economic growth was unusually high, even though plenty of slack remained in the economy? 3. Given the emergence of such economies as China and India, can commodity price pressures be safely ignored as temporary “noise” in terms of the long-term inflation outlook or are these pressures likely to prove persistent? If commodity price pressures persisted, this could undercut one rationale for focusing on core measures of inflation – the argument that core measures are better predictors of future headline inflation than today’s headline rate. 4. What can the Federal Reserve do to ensure that inflation expectations stay wellanchored? With respect to the first question, the economy retains a very large amount of slack by virtually all measures. For example, last month the industrial capacity utilization rate was 76.1 percent. This compares with a long-term average of 80.9 percent (Chart 21).
So these four accelerators are needed, but this does not mean they all have to be implemented at the same time. The latter two accelerators, fiscal and institutional, would indeed require Treaty changes, unless they were to be very limited. However, this must not stop us from taking steps straight away on the first two accelerators, macro and micro, on which I will insist today. I would like to share with you some personal reflections – useful for the proposals that the European Commission will make in December and for our debate today. To be more specific, I will focus on one part of each of these two accelerators, where progress can be made quickly: I will first dwell on the creation of a Stabilisation Lending Instrument (SLI) as part of the macro accelerator, and I will then elaborate on the completion of the Banking Union as part of the micro accelerator. **  I. A macro accelerator, including a Stabilisation Lending Instrument (SLI) and perhaps a European Monetary Fund The macro accelerator is premised on one simple fact: economic growth and employment would be stronger in the euro area if we combined more reforms in countries where they are needed, like France or Italy, and more stimulus in countries with leeway for it, like Germany or the Netherlands. To achieve this collective economic strategy, euro area Member States have to seal a deal, which could be prepared and adopted as early as 2018.

For takaful operators, staying competitive in a digital world will require far more than just direct sales channel or automated processes. It requires a rethinking of the fundamentals and principles of takaful, for which digital technology can be a catalyst. Takaful operators must rethink their sources of revenue, operational efficiency and talent strategy to reap the opportunities of digital disruptions. It is also important to rethink the business model and the role that takaful operators can play in a digital ecosystem that has transcended geographical boundaries. Digital disruptors such as virtual or peer-to-peer takaful provider that is tech-enabled might be able to overcome many pain points experienced by the industry in more efficient ways. The buzz right now in the financial industry is around digital banks. Nonetheless, this can swiftly turn to digital insurers or takaful operators. Such development could be the next phase that could further enhance the 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  quality and pricing of services delivered, while also penetrating new areas for the industry to achieve our protection goals. This development could provide the impetus for exponential growth in insurance and takaful penetration in the country. Thirdly, the industry must take greater responsibility to educate consumers and inculcate understanding about the importance of financial protection. Almost half of respondents in the 2018 Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey cited lack of product understanding to be the key reason for not purchasing life insurance and family takaful.
This can be seen in chart 5, which shows the example of interest rate differentials between Germany and Switzerland for three-month, two-year, five-year and ten-year maturities. While interest rates on the money and capital markets declined as a result of negative interest, mortgage rates did not decrease to the same extent. Indeed, for mortgages with longer terms, rates are slightly higher than they were at the beginning of the year. The main reason for this divergence is that a major part of bank refinancing costs consists of interest paid on savings deposits, which has not fallen below zero as did interest rates on the money market. Because interest on savings deposits is significantly higher than the money market interest rate, bank interest margins came under pressure after they had hedged the interest rate risk associated with their mortgage business, and some mortgage rates were increased. Fears that negative interest might contribute to a significant decline in mortgage rates and, in turn, to stronger growth in mortgage lending have so far proved unfounded. For investors, by contrast, the current low interest rate environment means that the challenges have increased. It is even more difficult for them to find yield-bearing investments. I should emphasise, however, that this investment predicament is an international phenomenon and not limited to the Swiss franc alone. Conclusion I will now come to my concluding remarks. Initial experience has shown that the interest rate instrument is also effective in negative territory.

As some of you may recall, during my presentation in Arusha, I did indicate that our economy had shown some resilience in the midst of the global economic crisis. I am delighted to inform you that following the presentation, we have seen further improvements in macroeconomic indicators with GDP growth for 2009 estimated at 6.3% while inflation edged downwards to 9.9% in December 2009 and 9.6% at end January 2010. The exchange rate of  BIS Review 18/2010  1  the Kwacha against major international currencies has also shown some stability in the recent months. This is no mean achievement and credit must go the Government for providing a stable macroeconomic environment. However, the recent crisis has exposed clear gaps that need to be addressed in order to create wealth and reduce the high levels of poverty in our country. There is need to have innovative solutions to the problems that our economy faces today. These innovative solutions are expected to come from various stakeholders including associations such as yours. For us to make a significant dent on poverty, the economy should record growth rates of 8% and above. This can only be achieved by innovation and competitiveness on the world market. Ladies and Gentlemen, despite the stable macroeconomic environment, we have not reaped full benefits from the international trade arena.
In the face of the global pandemic governments have taken significant fiscal actions to maintain incomes and preserve economic capacity. At the same time, central banks have aggressively eased monetary policy. Because these things have occurred alongside each other some commentators have suggested that central banks are engaged in “monetary finance” of government deficits. However, one of the points I want to make today is that the coincidence in time of easier monetary policy and a higher government deficit doesn’t really tell you anything about this question. That’s because both are naturally cyclical, especially when the central bank is targeting inflation. Economic slowdowns push up the government’s deficit. Because they’d otherwise depress inflation they also tend to result in easier monetary policy. Depending on how persistent the downturn is expected to be – and, because capital markets are global, on how widespread it is – you might even expect to see lower longer-term bond yields as well, even as the government is obliged to sell more debt and even without any extension of QE. There is nothing intrinsic in the nature of these transactions, or in the co-movement of these various economic series, that constitutes “monetary finance”. What really lies behind that term is instead an institutional question: who is doing what and why? Is monetary policy controlled by an independent authority, using its tools solely in pursuit of a fixed nominal objective?

Whether inflation is actually an efficient tax – whether the economic harm it causes is worth the fiscal benefit – is far from clear. Certainly an extra bout of inflation that’s fully anticipated, and that therefore raises nominal interest rates and bond yields in advance, does very little to improve the government’s financial position, and even less now than in the past. That’s because the public sector has almost nothing in the way of zero-interest liabilities. If higher inflation and nominal growth pushed up the demand for physical cash the government might make a little more from that source. (The economic value of cash is higher than the cost of producing it. The difference, known as “seigniorage”, is a source of revenue for the public sector3). But the sums involved are 2 On their own, the instruments of policy are not a reliable way to discern whether there’s “monetary finance” of the government. But they may be more informative alongside other information. For example, if the central bank is easing policy in the face of clear inflationary pressure that might suggest it’s putting weight on some other objective: the joint behaviour of instrument and target can be informative. It might also tell you something if the central bank eased policy and, at the same time, the authorities introduced restrictions to limit or prevent people from selling the government’s debt. That way, the central bank might be able to reduce borrowing costs for the government alone – i.e.
The objective of MyStats is to provide a platform for our statisticians, analysts, economists, policy makers, academicians and media to share, discuss and highlight insights and issues in statistical analysis and policy formulation as well as challenges in the compilation and communication of statistics. MyStats will not only discuss economic and financial data, but will also encompass other socio-economic statistics such as poverty measurement and indicators, labour and employment statistics, just to name a few. I hope that this collaborative effort will one day turn into an annual THE statistics event in Malaysia and MyStats will evolve into a regional conference, similar to the well-established statistical conferences organised by the International Statistics Institute (ISI), European Central Bank (ECB) and IFC. I must acknowledge that this conference was inspired by the efforts of the ECB and IFC, which the Bank and I, as the Chairman of IFC, have been actively engaging with on statistical initiatives, in particular over the last one year. For those who are new to the IFC, allow me to mention a few words on the Committee. The IFC is a forum of central bank economists and statisticians as well as others who wish to participate in discussing statistical issues of interest to central banks. It is established and governed by the international central banking community and operates under the auspices of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Currently, the IFC has about 80 central bank members and is actively organising statistical initiatives, particularly conferences, seminars and workshops.

Tarisa Watanagase: Securing Thailand’s future with capital market development and the role of the Bank of Thailand Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thailand Focus 2008, Bangkok, 17 September 2008. *  *  *  Excellencies, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, Good morning, I would like to begin by thanking the Stock Exchange of Thailand for inviting me to deliver a keynote address at this year’s Thailand Focus. This annual forum, traditionally opened by the Prime Minister of Thailand, has firmly established itself as the event of the year where domestic and foreign investors meet and interact with Thailand’s top policymakers and leading listed companies. It is thus not only my great pleasure but also my great honor to be here. Ladies and Gentlemen, Given the turbulent time we are in at the moment, I am very pleased at the number and the composition of this year’s turnout. Glancing through the list of prospective attendees, I saw participants from Asia, Australia, Europe and North America, representing a large spectrum of investors. This is despite the fact that a number of invited fund managers were forced to cancel their trips due to the declared state of emergency that was lifted on Sunday. Moreover, I see that many of you have been long-time investors in the Thai stock market. All of these are quite reassuring, for they reflect your continued faith in the Thai economy.