samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thriving and surviving in this world has demanded a new generation of leadership – forward looking leaders that are able to succeed and bring teams, organisations and countries, to new successes, to new frontiers and having the ability to sustain such performance in this new and more challenging environment. A further phenomenon that has intensified the demand for a new generation of leadership is the trend towards the relentless pursuit of instant results and the attainment of short-term goals. Additionally, the complexities of the world has also had the unintended effect of blurring our lens to focus on immediate challenges and problems. The scourge of shorttermism has defined a world where success is measured by short term results because the criteria for success and the incentive structures have promoted such behaviours. Such successes can however be only fleeting. The world needs leaders who offer a compelling vision with ambitious goals, where the outcomes will genuinely add value and make a difference, and with results that are sustainable. In this new environment of increased interconnectivity and increased inter-linkages, the role of leaders is also about galvanising and bringing together highly diverse entities and providing solutions to problems that have multi-facetted dimensions. It is also about managing diverse relationships that are often conflicting. While this is not new, what has changed is the intensity and the scale of the interconnectedness of businesses and of the goals that need to be achieved.

It was against this background that we announced the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). Like all our monetary policy measures, it has served to ensure compliance with our price stability mandate as provided for in the Treaty. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  And it builds on an established monetary policy doctrine that has gained prominence not least because it has been successfully pursued by the Bundesbank for several decades. Namely that the central bank should be endowed with a clear price stability mandate and, within this mandate, should be allowed – in fact obliged – to use its instruments in full independence to deliver price stability. Combining a clear mandate with strong independence in pursuing that mandate is particularly important when conducting a single monetary policy in EMU, which consists of 18 countries with heterogeneous economic structures and institutional landscapes. On the one hand, it allows us to flexibly tailor our policy measures to the specific monetary policy challenges that may arise in this multi-country context – most notably to tackle the financial fragmentation that has hampered monetary policy transmission during the crisis. On the other hand, it establishes a stable anchor for inflation expectations through our price stability objective. This approach of “constrained discretion” is what made the track record of the Bundesbank and then the ECB so successful. And this approach is further validated by the strong progress towards restoring the singleness of the euro area’s monetary policy observed since the announcement of the OMTs.
All this, aside from shaping a very frail growth scenario in the zone, opens the door to new stress episodes in external financial markets. Although so far the international scenario has not been as negative as was expected, taking for granted that the slower global growth and tensions in external financial markets will not affect our economy is not wise thinking. Thus, while the inflation trajectory in Chile, the stronger growth in demand and output and changes in certain prices such as oil and fresh fruits & vegetables, have risen the risks for short-term inflation, the risks in the external scenario are still significant. Let me now describe the macroeconomic scenario assumed in our Monetary Policy Report. Macroeconomic scenario Relative to December, world growth shows no major change on aggregate, although its composition has changed and, certainly, so have the associated risks. In the United States, improved figures of job creation, manufacturing output and expectations reflect on upward revisions to forecasts for this year, partly offsetting the gloomier outlook for the Eurozone. A somewhat deeper recession is expected in the zone for this year, which, due to its commercial and financial links, reflects, albeit marginally, in revised growth projections elsewhere, especially in emerging Europe and Asia. With respect to December forecasts, trading partners’ growth is unchanged for 2012 and 2013. The baseline scenario also assumes that the oil price will remain high for longer than projected in December.

Although developments in bank credit continue to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets, the monetary policy measures in place since June 2014 are increasingly filtering through to support borrowing conditions for firms and households and thereby credit flows across the euro area. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need to preserve the very substantial amount of monetary support that is necessary in order to secure a return of inflation rates towards levels that are below, but close to, 2% without undue delay. Monetary policy is focused on maintaining price stability over the medium term and its accommodative stance supports economic activity. As emphasised repeatedly by the Governing Council, and as strongly echoed in both European and international policy discussions, in order to reap the full benefits from our monetary policy measures, other policy areas must contribute much more decisively, both at the national and at the European level. The implementation of structural reforms needs to be substantially stepped up to reduce structural unemployment and boost potential output growth in the euro area. Structural reforms are necessary in all euro area countries. The focus should be on actions to raise productivity and improve the business environment, including the provision of an adequate public infrastructure, which are vital to increase investment and boost job creation.
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Charles Handy who conceived the concept of the “S-curve”, has this to say, “It is one of the paradoxes of success that the things and the ways which got you where you are, are seldom those that keep you there”. A reminder that is worth heeding. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In addition, the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services stabilised, and towards the end of 2004 there was a tendency towards a more rapid rise in prices for these goods and services. Prices for imported consumer goods fell more than expected at the beginning of 2005, while the tendency towards a more rapid rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services has persisted. So far in 2005, inflation measured by the CPI-ATE has hovered at ¾ per cent. The projections in Inflation Report 1/05, published on 16 March, are based on a gradual increase in the interest rate. This is in line with expectations among financial and foreign exchange market participants. It is assumed that the exchange rate will shadow movements in the forward exchange rate. This implies that in the years ahead the krone will remain fairly stable at approximately the current level. With a path for the interest rate and the krone exchange rate in line with the baseline scenario in Inflation Report 1/05, inflation may increase gradually from less than 1 per cent today to close to 2 per cent in mid-2006. Under these assumptions, inflation may stabilise at around 2½ per cent at the three-year horizon. Developments in line with these projections imply that the output gap will widen to about 1¼ per cent in 2006 and then gradually narrow. Developments since the March Inflation Report was published do not provide grounds for changing the perception of the main features of developments in the real economy.

Household wealth  Household gross financial assets have increased more than debt in recent years (measured in NOK). This financial buffer reduces some of the concern related to debt growth. Debt as a percentage of gross financial assets is lower today than at the end of the 1980s. Insurance claims account for a substantial share of household wealth. Insurance claims are illiquid, however, and cannot be utilised if payment problems arise. However, debt as a percentage of liquid financial assets, i.e. financial assets minus insurance claims, is also lower now than it was at the end of the 1980s. The strong increase in wealth indicates that the debt growth in recent years has not led to a reduction in saving. This contrasts sharply to the situation in the 1980s. At that time, debt growth was also high, but it financed consumption and not investment, and overall saving fell sharply. BIS Review 39/2005  3  In addition to financial assets, households also have housing wealth. There is considerable uncertainty attached to the estimates for housing wealth. A cautious estimate indicates that household housing wealth is 11 per cent higher than financial assets and more than 40 per cent higher than debt. Total debt is unevenly distributed One worrying aspect of these developments is that debt and wealth are unequally distributed across different household groups. Compared with the 1980s, the debt burden has increased in low- and middle-income households (deciles 1-6). Households with higher income (deciles 7-9) have the highest debt burden.
Paris FinTech Forum – 25 January 2017 Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution  France: a European powerhouse for financial service innovation  Good morning to all of you. I am delighted to be here today. Who could have imagined just a few years ago that a central banker would be making an appearance at a forum on innovation? I remember when we first met up, about a year ago, with the developers from the start-up Labo Blockchain to work on a Proof of Concept, everyone from the Banque de France had made an effort: they’d dressed casually for the occasion… except that all the developers had decided to turn up in a suit and tie. It was a complete role reversal! But things change very rapidly. Today, our dealings with innovators go far beyond any of the assumptions we might have had about each other: the Banque de France is testing blockchain technology and is opening a LAB to work with start-ups; the ACPR (the supervisory body which I chair) has welcomed more than 100 key innovators since the creation of its FinTech Innovation Unit, and has set up a FinTech Forum with the AMF to increase our interaction with innovators.

Europe depends on it; its independence from the other big global regions depends on it; and so too does the strength of its economy. 4  My message is clear: we, as regulators, regard innovation as key. Within Europe, France has many strengths that can make it a leader in the digital transition. You are the driving force in this, with your audacity and your successes; it is up to us – the Banque de France and the ACPR – to ensure that we are capable partners - vigilant when necessary and always openminded. Rest assured we are fully mobilised towards this goal. Thank you for your attention. 5
They inevitably reduce real national income  Chart 16: Monetary policy cannot offset the fall in real incomes caused by a terms of trade shock  Page 27 Sources: ONS, Bank of England, Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. Nominal wages in the chart are private sector regular pay. It’s interesting too to ask what the world might now look like had this very steep path for interest rates been taken – but without any subsequent rise in import prices. The outcome of this experiment is the ‘alternative variant’ line in Chart 17. The predicted result – this despite the prior growth in household deposits – is a steep fall in inflation, well into negative territory. All this makes it a challenge, I think, to argue that the rise in broad money in 2020 is the main (or even an important) contributor to the inflation that’s followed. Chart 17: In the absence of big rises in import prices tighter policy would have pushed inflation into negative territory  Sources: ONS, Bank of England, Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. The ‘alternative variant’ reflects the same monetary tightening imparted in the ‘scenario’ but no increase in the contribution of import prices (energy and other goods) to CPI inflation relative to its pre-Covid average.

In such a context, what should we do to return to normality? Economic theory provides a set of conditions to be fulfilled for a market to function efficiently: full information, enforceable property rights and contracts, absence of externalities just to mention the most important ones. In times of stress, these conditions are not fulfilled. But they are hardly met in normal times either. Moving from one situation, to the other, does not necessarily involve a huge economic shock. Small changes in economic sentiment or “animal spirit” may bring financial markets to a point of near collapse. The past ten years are a striking case in point. The development of securitisation was initially perceived as improving welfare through better risk management and allocation. Overall, it was seen as a move towards more complete and efficient markets. The crisis has shown that this was not necessarily the case: the process was plagued by information asymmetries and moral hazard, and created high risk concentration on a limited number of counterparties, It also lead to the build-up of financial imbalances which proved unsustainable. In those conditions, a minor change may suffice to trigger a financial market collapse. It is difficult to rationalise such an outcome unless it is the result of some kind of coordination between economic agents on a bad equilibrium. Some contributions presented here mentioned strategic complementarities, an explanation which cannot be completely ruled out. Indeed, it seems that the driving force behind the massive securitisation era was, for most participants, regulatory arbitrage.
But a general increase in risk weights is of a more structural nature.8 On the other hand, if the risk weights are allowed to vary over time, they can be used as a specific macroprudential instrument with the aim of counteracting risks in the mortgage market: the banks must hold more capital during the good times for their mortgage lending, but not for all forms of lending; rather like a countercyclical capital buffer, but just for mortgage lending. A further example of more specific macroprudential instruments are the different limits as to how much households may borrow. This can be done by setting a limit for how large a mortgage can be in relation to the collateral, also known as a mortgage cap or LTV (loan-tovalue) requirement. This was introduced in Sweden as a general recommendation from Finansinspektionen in the autumn of 2010. In simple terms, it imposes a maximum loan-to-  6  Of course, there are also macroprudential tools with other purposes than to reduce the risks linked to household debt and the housing market, for instance, limiting the risks arising from the links between the banks, what are known as structural risks. See, for instance, C. Nordh-Berntsson and J. Molin (2012), “Creating a Swedish toolbox for macroprudential policy,” Riksbank study, Sveriges Riksbank, and my colleague Karolina Ekholm’s speech “How can financial crises be avoided in Sweden?”, published on 27 September 2012.

But Denmark, too, has experienced problems in its housing market (see Figure 4). In Sweden, house prices have risen substantially since the middle of the 1990s, even compared with the countries where prices have since plummeted (see Figure 4). As house purchases are to a great extent funded by borrowed money, it is hardly surprising that this has also entailed a large increase in household debt (see Figure 5). I think that it is important in this context to try to clarify the actual risks for Sweden here. It is not very likely that a fall in house prices would lead to extensive loan losses from mortgages for banks and mortgage institutions. Both the experiences from the 1990s and the analyses  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  we have made ourselves point to this not being the case.1 However, a fall in house prices can give rise to other effects, direct and indirect, on both the macro economy and financial stability. The most direct effects for the macro economy concern household consumption. Experiences show that the countries hit by severe falls in house prices usually experience long periods of very weak consumption. This is because households then tend to increase their savings to restore their wealth. Figure 6 shows developments in household consumption and real house prices in different countries. We can see that Sweden has had a much stronger growth in consumption than the countries affected by severe falls in house prices.
In any event, based on the experience of Spain and other countries, I consider that in all key aspects of the resolution process, the direct involvement of the supervisor is crucial to avoid information gaps, prevent duplications and ensure efficient use of the resources employed to monitor financial institutions. 5  Conclusions  To conclude, I believe that as resolution authorities we have a very exciting policy agenda in front of us. Indeed, it is hard to think of other policy tasks which are so closely related to such a large number of first-order public objectives such as financial stability, the orderly functioning of the capital markets and the integrity of the public finances. Yet it is clear that, since resolution policy is arguably in its childhood as a recognised policy area, we still lack something like a comprehensive manual to guide our actions in the field. Therefore our decisions must often be taken as if we were exploring an uncharted territory full of legal and economic risks. That is why I think that events like this, which allow competent authorities to exchange experiences and thoughts, are no doubt extremely useful in counteracting our uncertainty until a sufficiently large store of knowledge, if not doctrine, becomes available. I wish to thank Antonio Carrascosa, Mario Delgado and the rest of the FROB team involved in the organisation of this conference, and all of you for your participation. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Here I would like to remind you that the Banco de España has opened a public consultation process on the amendment of Circular 2/2016 on supervision and solvency this very week. The aim is to develop certain aspects of the macroprudential toolkit that legislation has made 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  available to the Banco de España. Pursuant to this legislation, the Banco de España may set limits and conditions on lending standards and other financial institution transactions, along with sectoral concentration limits. The new Circular defines the procedures for activating, deactivating and changing these measures, including the variables and parameters that the Banco de España may take into consideration to adopt a decision, the sectors that may be affected and the contractual terms or ratios that the measures may apply to. I would like to conclude by thanking the General Council of Economists for this initiative geared to young people, a group that the Banco de España considers a strategic priority in the context of the Financial Education Plan. It is a further example of how the Financial Education Plan partners, in this case the General Council of Economists, play an essential role in meeting the Plan’s objectives. We have continued to move resolutely in this direction: through partnership agreements such as those recently signed with the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs; and by pressing ahead with the work avenues opened with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation.
An important movement in the last decade has been a much more explicit emphasis being given to the macro prudential aspects of banking supervision by central banks as well as academics and other market observers. What do we mean by macro prudential aspects? I think it has the following four features: •  First, its aims to limit the distress to entire financial systems rather than distress to individual institutions. •  Second, its chief aim is to avoid large and burdensome costs to the economy – such as expensive bank bailouts – rather than aiming to protect more narrowly the depositors of an individual bank. •  Third, it is based largely on the assumption that at least some of the risks faced by the banking system collectively differ from those faced by individual banks. In other words, the risk to the system is not simply the sum of risks to individual banks. •  And, fourth, it aims to examine risks that arise from the interaction of banks as part of a financial system rather than on a bank-by-bank basis. While having sound and sturdy building blocks of the system is essential, it is also essential to understand how they all fit together in a framework and this is where the macro prudential perspective becomes critical. In short, the difference between the two pillars of micro and macro prudential surveillance is between a system-wide health check and ensuring that individual banks are inoculated  BIS Review 106/2006  1  properly from disease.

I also believe that the question of the general nature of the ECB’s monetary and exchange rate policies in pursuit of price stability, sustainable growth and low unemployment is of concern not just for those 11 countries. Since the ECB’s policies will have global effects, they are of global concern. As you all know, the general outlines of the monetary policies to be pursued by the 11 countries whose currencies are tied to the euro have already been determined. This has also created some new problems. But before discussing them, I would like to point out the four main characteristics of the ECB. First, it is independent. This independence means that it can decide on what monetary policy strategies to follow and what monetary instruments, especially short-term interest rates, to use in pursuit of its primary objective of maintaining price stability. BIS Review 1/1999  –2–  The ECB’s Governing Council, consisting of the governors of the national central banks of the euro area and the ECB’s Executive Board, will determine the basic outlines of the ECB’s monetary policy. The chosen strategy will be carried out by the ECB’s Executive Board, consisting of a governor, vice governor and four members appointed by the president or prime minister of countries in the European Monetary System. From the independence of the central bank governors on the Governing Council, one can infer a high degree of independence for the system.