samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As well as being a year that saw a considerable strengthening of fiscal and macroeconomic discipline in Europe, 2012 also saw significant progress towards a banking union. Why has a banking union suddenly become such an indispensable and urgent project? Simply because we are now certain that many of the problems we have experienced, could have been avoided with a banking union. A banking union is necessary for the smooth functioning of a monetary union for the following three reasons: •  It breaks the link between banks and sovereigns by bringing banking supervision and crisis management to the federal level. With the banking union, banks will be considered as euro area institutions over and above their nationality; it will ensure that credit conditions in the euro area will not depend on where you are but on who you are, which is what should be expected of an efficient financial market. •  It allows re-integration of the European banking system. A supra-national supervisor is in fact better placed to assess the risks of cross-border activities and therefore to protect and encourage such activities; it is not subject to national biases that can lead to the temptation of economic introversion. It is therefore more credible and strengthens stability and confidence in the area;  •  Moreover, it restores the full efficacy of monetary policy.

We must now pursue the efforts already initiated and do our utmost to ensure that these improvements feed through to the real economy so that economic growth can return and unemployment can reverse its rising trend. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
This has helped keep macroeconomic imbalances under control, yet the flipside of the coin is that the pace of real convergence was slowed by these powerful constraints, at least in the aforementioned case of Bulgaria. Consequently, it can be said that both approaches have benefits and drawbacks and that the story of these economies on their catching-up journey is still far from over. I would point out that there are resources for all these economies to continue to grow relatively fast. While convergence will go on, it is unsure at what pace, how linear and how sustainable it will be, and the surprises that the future has in store for us are difficult to foresee, just like the recent past differed from what we could have forecasted two decades earlier, for instance. The third lesson concerns the manner in which the global economic and financial crisis was weathered. With only one exception (Poland, which has not seen a single year of recession precisely because it managed to adequately combine exchange rate flexibility and fiscal discipline), all CEE economies witnessed periods of economic decline – more or less severe, shorter or longer – owing to the crisis, irrespective of their exchange rate or monetary policy regimes. The steepest decline was in Romania, which had to undergo the most painful fiscal adjustment.

One reason lies in the model that western governments in the 1990s prescribed for the east’s transition to free-market democracy. As it shed its communist past, the east was told to embrace not just liberal democracy but globalisation, open borders and the lightly regulated financial capitalism that the west viewed as the touchstone of its own economic success. This model’s flaws were exposed in the 2008 financial crisis and the European refugee and migrant emergency of 2015–16. […] EU membership, too, has brought more pluses than minuses. Access to the single market, regional aid and, from ordinary people’s viewpoint, Europe-wide freedom of movement are cherished gains. […] This resentment has much to do with the western model grafted on to the east. In 1989, as during Europe’s 1848 revolutions, the people wanted civic freedoms and, in many cases, liberation from foreign overlords and their first independent states of modern times. But after 1989 the adoption of the western model — complete with EU membership, global capitalism and a liberal political philosophy — created tensions between liberalism allied to internationalism and the assertion of a newly acquired national sovereignty. […] Now central and eastern Europe is experiencing its own contest between populist nationalism and liberal democracy. It would be brave to forecast a winner when some western societies are caught up in much the same struggle.” This being said, let me thank you for your attention and wish you insightful discussions.
At the present time, the SNB’s most important task remains the requirement to ensure that our money remains sound, thereby safeguarding its value. In this context, retention of value refers to prices for the goods and services paid by an average consumer in our country. I am firmly convinced that price stability is, first, a fundamental basis for the growth of an economy, thereby contributing to prosperity. Second, it has an important social component and is part of the glue that holds our modern society together. Price stability protects the purchasing power of pensions and enables citizens with lower incomes to accumulate and maintain assets. Retention of value cannot be taken for granted. Over the course of history, our neighbour countries have often experienced the pain of a collapsed currency. Money that retains its value, backed by sound institutions, therefore makes an important contribution to social harmony and material prosperity in our country, particularly in today’s world, with its major insecurities and imponderabilities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  However, sound institutions alone are not enough. Additional prerequisites for sound money are widespread fundamental trust by the general public in both our monetary order and the SNB, as well as understanding and support of our stability policy. It is only because these conditions were and are met in Switzerland – for which I am very grateful – that the SNB has been able, and is able, to fulfil its mandate.

This is why I have spoken of the danger of fragmentation in payments akin to the Middle Age, with so-called “cryptocurrencies” having limited constituencies and acceptance. 3. But do we agree about the solutions? In principle yes: in order to avoid repeating past mistakes, we would need a collective momentum towards a stable and market oriented multipolar International Financial System. A more multipolar IFS would help deal with the modern version of the Triffin dilemma: the supply of USD global safe assets is limited by the fiscal capacity of the US, while demand for them is bound to  Page 4 sur 7 increase. It could also offer more monetary policy independence to Emerging Markets, by reducing the influence of US financial and real cycles spillovers. That said, the political conditions for such a major shift are not very favourable, to say the least: imagining the US, China and other major emerging economies converging today on a new IFS, while they didn’t for decades, could appear as utopian. Let me be more positive: we need to keep this concept of a more balanced multipolar system on the horizon, at least as a “creative frontier”. And we Europeans need to be active and committed on what depends on us. To move towards a more resilient global system, the euro should play a more important international role. It is a currency in a jurisdiction with solid democratic and stable institutions, including independent central banks and the rule of law.
Cross-border capital flows can “run”– just as deposits can “run” for banks. And the majority of a sovereign’s assets – claims on future taxpayers, are both hard to value and inherently illiquid – so, like banks, they are susceptible to runs by international investors, which even if not based on fundamentals, could threaten their solvency by raising borrowing costs. Sovereigns are particularly exposed to run risk or a sudden “stop” if they have borrowed in foreign currency – the so called “original sin” – as large depreciations raise the domestic burden of repaying the debt, particularly if there is a shortage of foreign exchange reserves. In the Euro-area, countries have become painfully aware of the risks of borrowing in a domestic currency that individual sovereign states have no right to issue. But of course, sovereigns are also very different from banks. By definition, their finances are not regulated by any authority, and there is no legal framework for dealing with bankruptcy or resolution, giving them more discretion to default. Instead, we have IMF surveillance (which is weaker than bank supervision) and a complex and often messy process whereby markets and the official sector deal with sovereign debt restructurings. While there are important differences between sovereigns and banks, I think there are enough parallels to draw some insights. 4.

As with an independent central bank that houses supervision and liquidity provision under one roof, there are advantages to combining country surveillance and lending in one global institution, with an impartial and experienced staff. And risks are most efficiently pooled at a global level. This is the raison d’etre for the IMF. 8  4  Bank of England staff estimates based on the spread between returns on reserve assets and those paid on domestic bonds. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Unfortunately, signs of fragmentation of the global financial safety net are obviously in part a reaction to the failure to implement the 2010 quota and governance reforms to bolster the IMF’s resources and the representation of emerging market economies. The priority must be to implement those. But we also need to consider whether and how the temporary resources collected by the IMF in the form of bilateral loans when it passed the hat around in 2012 could be put on a more permanent footing. One possibility is to extend these bilateral loans further. Another possibility is for the IMF to borrow directly from capital markets 9 during a systemic crisis which would create safe assets when demand for them is high, allowing funds to be recycled to those parts of the world with temporary liquidity needs. A more reliable and flexible resource base would allow the IMF to more credibly perform a crisis prevention role of providing committed lines of credit to sound sovereigns through its Flexible and Precautionary Liquidity lines.
Structural factors can push inflation down in a way that can be difficult to counteract for a relatively long time, even if not permanently. It is therefore quite an important discussion that the Borio camp has initiated. 18 How should a central bank act in a situation in which, despite conducting the most expansionary policy it deems possible, it does not expect to be able to reach the target in a foreseeable time frame? As I see it, the reasonable decision in such a situation is to hold fast to the inflation target and continue with the expansionary policy. 19 If the central bank instead were to change its policy in a less expansionary direction, the inflation target would become even more distant and even more  17 Friedman (1963). It should be mentioned that, according to the so-called ‘fiscal theory of the price level’, fiscal policy has crucial influence over inflation, see for example Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). To achieve low and stable inflation, a well-balanced monetary policy is therefore insufficient. It also requires fiscal policy to be conducted in a way that is compatible with the inflation target. However, this theory is controversial and does not actually question the value of central banks having inflation targets. 18 It should be emphasised that the BIS, where Borio is chief economist, has often been early to bring up issues of fundamental importance for central banks.

And, in Sweden, the Riksbank has indeed important functions in this context, both in preventing financial crises and tackling them should they occur. In addition, the ongoing parliamentary inquiry into the Riksbank will examine this matter and others in more detail, and I look forward to its conclusions with interest. My discussion today has centred on my view that monetary policy and the policy rate are better suited to focus on an inflation target – and that good conditions exist for them to continue to do so. Of course, monetary policy systems and frameworks do not last forever. But, so far, I consider that there are good reasons to keep the one we have. 14 [20]  References Andersson, Björn, Vesna Corbo and Mårten Löf (2015), ”Why has inflation been so low?”, Economic Review 2015:3, pp. 5–46. Blanchard, Olivier (2016), ”The US Phillips curve: Back to the 60s?”, Policy Brief No. PB16-1, Peterson Institute of International Economics, January. Borio, Claudio (2017), “Through the looking glass”, OMFIF City Lecture, London, 22 September. Borio, Claudio, Piti Disyatat, Mikael Juselius and Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul (2017), “Monetary policy in the grip of a pincer movement”, paper presented at 21st Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile “Monetary policy and financial stability: Transmission mechanisms and policy implications”, Santiago, Chile, 16-17 November. Borio, Claudio and Philips Lowe (2002), “Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus”, BIS Working Papers, no 114, July.
News conference  Embargo 23 March 2023, 10.00 am  Introductory remarks by the Governing Board  Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler Chairman of the Governing Board / Vice Chairman of the Governing Board / Member of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Zurich, 23 March 2023 © Swiss National Bank  Page 1/6  Zurich, 23 March 2023 Thomas Jordan, Martin Schlegel and Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Ladies and gentlemen It is my pleasure to welcome you to the news conference of the Swiss National Bank. After our introductory remarks, we will take questions from journalists as usual. Contribution to financial stability  Ensuring price stability is and will remain the core objective of the SNB. Our monetary policy assessment has taken place in an exceptional situation. Last week, there was a loss of confidence in Credit Suisse. In order to avert damage to Switzerland, on Sunday the authorities decided on extensive measures to safeguard financial stability. The SNB contributed to this solution within the framework of its mandate. I would like to describe our contribution in more detail and explain why it was necessary. The global crisis of confidence rapidly intensified last week due to the turmoil in the US banking industry. From Wednesday onwards, this had a direct impact on Credit Suisse’s liquidity situation as a result of strong outflows of customer deposits and cuts in counterparty limits. The SNB then lent Credit Suisse large amounts of liquidity in Swiss francs and foreign currencies.

Philipp Hildebrand: Global economic prospects and key challenges for monetary policy Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event, Zurich, 23 March 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Summary Current economic developments are basically in line with the SNB’s expectations. Global economic activity is robust and the outlook is bright. The SNB expects broad-based growth of over 2% for 2006 and a moderate rate of inflation of approximately 1%. In addition to the usual economic risks, monetary policy today is faced with three key challenges. First, the effects of globalisation on inflation must be anticipated. Second, the way in which the interaction between globalisation and an ample supply of liquidity affects the price development of several assets needs to be analysed. The SNB's monetary policy concept enables it to take a long-term view and to recognise possible distortions early on. Third, identifying the neutral interest rate has become more difficult in today's environment. Many factors tend to support a lower neutral interest rate, while others would support a higher neutral rate. Against this background, the SNB will continue the gradual normalisation of its monetary policy. The scale and timing of this normalisation process will depend on further economic developments. Owing to a favourable inflation trend and well-anchored inflation expectations, we are in a position to cautiously approach a neutral interest rate level.
OECD (2019), PISA 2018 Results (Volume I): What Students Know and Can Do, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris xii Borne, E., Rencontres des cadres dirigeants de l'État, speech , 17 May 2023. xiii Villeroy de Galhau, F., « Comment la France et l’Europe vont vaincre l’inflation », Letter to the President of the French Republic, April 2023. xiv Cour des comptes, La DGFiP, dix ans après la fusion, 20 June 2018. xv Baromètre - Institut-Paul-Delouvrier 2022 xvi Banque de France, Annual Report 2022, 22 March 2023. xvii Le sursaut, Vers une nouvelle croissance pour la France, working group chaired by Michel Camdessus, 2004. xviii Rapport de la Commission pour la libération de la croissance française, 23 January 2008. xix Conseil d’Etat, Simplification et qualité du droit, annual review, 25 September 2016. xx DITP, Baromètre BVA de la complexité administrative et de la confiance en l’administration par évènement de vie, 24 May 2023. xxi Commitment No. 3 of the 7th Interministerial Committee for the transformation of public services of 9 May 2023. xxii Cour des comptes, La décentralisation 40 ans après, Public Annual Report 2023. i  ii

Zdeněk Tůma: Challenges of free capital movement and the role of international standards (focusing on money laundering prevention) Introductory remarks by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the IFex Training Course: Fraud, Terrorist Financing And Money Laundering Prevention, Prague, 15 September 2003. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, It is my great pleasure and honour to give an opening address to this high-level training course. For my introductory remarks today I have chosen a topic related to the questions you are going to discuss during your seminar. I would like to focus on the issues stemming from free international mobility of capital and on the international standards that have been broadened and deepened in recent years to address underlying challenges. I will also come to the anti-money-laundering standards that form an important part of the new financial architecture. The last few decades have seen substantial growth in global capital flows. In the emerging market economies alone, the net inflows of foreign capital have now reached about USD 150 billion a year, despite a contraction following the wave of emerging market crises in 1997-1998. The financial flows between the advanced market economies are of an even higher order, of course. Moreover, the turnover in the international markets is substantially higher than the net flows, exceeding global real economic activity many times over.
It has been plausibly argued that globalisation has played an important role in determining the low level of world real interest rates, for example as a result of emerging market savings having been mainly invested in developed economies due to a lack of investment opportunities in the respective home markets. 20 This has induced a decline in the equilibrium global real interest rates, which monetary policies have accommodated with low nominal interest rates. 21 Obviously there remain risks associated with a potential abrupt unwinding of global imbalances and investment strategies strongly influenced by a low interest rate environment. But monetary  20  See Caballero (2006). 21  See Bernanke (2005). 10  BIS Review 9/2008  policies have not played a role in the emergence of global imbalances and associated financial stability risks. Alternatively, it has been argued that the benign effects of global competition and low-cost imports on consumer prices might have led to an underestimation of the stimulating effects of a monetary policy, which is consistent with the preservation of price stability over the medium term, but which can be characterised as accommodative over the long term, as evidenced by buoyant credit and money growth over a prolonged period of time. 22 A strong and persistent expansion of monetary liquidity could fuel or even trigger an asset price boom.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Payments in the digital era - inside out Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the 13th Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures, jointly organised by the National Bank of North Macedonia and the Netherlands Bank, Ohrid (digitally), 9 December 2021. * * * Dear Governor Knot, Minister Besimi, Dear speakers and participants It is my great pleasure to welcome you to our traditional conference on Payments in the Digital Era: Inside Out, hosted by our central bank together with the Dutch Central Bank, for which I express my deep gratitude to governor Knot and his colleagues. Our lives are becoming increasingly digital as a result of the proliferation of new technologies that transform public and private services making them more convenient and accessible to consumers. As our lives have gone digital, so have our payments. The digitalisation of consumer payment behaviour, which has been going on for years, has been accelerated by the pandemics that shifted it in a higher gear. Globally, last year cash payments declined by 16%, while the number of non-cash transactions increased by 6%. The pandemics has particularly accelerated the shift towards real time/instant payments that grew by 40%. In the euro area, according to the ECB survey on payment attitudes (2020)1, 40% of the respondents stated that since the onset of the pandemic they have used less cash and more cards (contactless in particular).