samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And it’s a sign of what needs to come – because, according to the UN, emissions need to fall by a similar amount every single year for the next decade if we are to avoid the disastrous consequences of global warming.9  Chart 1: Global CO2 emissions  Chart 2: Orderly vs disorderly transition  Source: Global Carbon Project https://www.globalcarbonproject.org/index.htm Source: IIASA NGFS Climate Scenarios Database, using marker models. ‘GHGs’ = greenhouse gases. That won’t happen easily – or on its own. It turns out that the only previous material reductions in global emissions have been by-products of disasters like Covid, the financial crisis of 2008-9, World War 2, or the Great Depression (Chart 1). But relying on future disasters to force adjustment is not a plan. Orderly transition requires concerted efforts across every sector and country in the global economy. Start late, and the best case is severe economic disruption, at least as bad as in 2008-9 (Chart 2 – yellow line). Leave it completely and temperatures will soar, causing untold physical, human and economic damage (Chart 2 – grey line). Responsibility for making the hard political choices to bring about orderly transition lies with governments. In the UK, greenhouse emissions have already halved in the past thirty years (Chart 3), one of the best performances in the G7. To get to net zero, we need the same again – and that’s why the Government has committed to reduce emissions to 78% of 1990 levels by 2035, and net zero by 2050.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conditional inflation forecast of March 2011 and of June 2011 Percentage change in national consumer price index from previous year Inflation Forecast March 2011 (with Libor at 0.25%) Forecast June 2011 (with Libor at 0.25%) % 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 –0.5 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  Observed inflation June 2011 2008  I nf l at i on  2009  2010 Q2  Q3  Q4  2011  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2.5  2.7  3.0  1.6  0.0 - 0.7 - 1.0 - 0.2 1.1  1.0  0.3  0.3  0.6  Q2  Q3  2008  2009  2010  2.4  - 0.5  0.7  Q4  Conditional inflation forecast of March 2011 with Libor at 0.25% and of June 2011 with Libor at 0.25% 2011  For ecast Mar ch 2011, Li bor at 0.25% For ecast June 2011, Li bor at 0.25%  4  2012  2013  2014  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  0.4  0.5  1.2  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.3  1.5  1.8  2.1  2.5  0.5  1.4  1.3  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8  2.2  Q1  2.6  Q2  Q3  2011  2012  2013  0.8  1.1  2.0  0.9  1.0  1.7  Q4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
The monetary policy easing that we enacted in the last two months – on a scale that is unprecedented in such a short period of time – was motivated by a sharp easing of inflation pressures looking into the future. The fact that markets could predict our moves with a fair degree of precision – despite the exceptional cloud of uncertainty that surrounds economic projections in present conditions – is a proof that our main mode of  1  See, for example, Alesina, A. and L. Summers (1993), 'Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: some comparative evidence', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 2, May. 2  Benati, L. (2008), “Investigating inflation persistence across monetary regimes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123:3, August 2008, 1005-1060. For instance, estimates of the inflation persistence in the euro area fell by around two-thirds from the period before (until the Bretton Woods arrangement) and after the launch of EMU. 2  BIS Review 160/2008  communication, via disclosure of the economic outlook as we perceive it, is effective and robust to extreme occurrences. The second component of the strategy which helps in times when expectations become disoriented is what we have called the “separation principle”. In view of safeguarding its credibility and firmly anchoring long-term inflation expectations, it is crucial that the Governing Council sets the appropriate monetary policy stance on the basis of no other considerations than the delivery of price stability in the medium term.

We are not at this stage yet; however we are working hard in this direction. I should now like to say a few words about our immediate priority tasks. First, we are making sure the measures resulting from the asset quality review are strictly applied with a focus on the capital buffer replenishment plans as prescribed for some of the banks. Second, we are finalising the plan to further enhance the work of the banking supervision. That is a continuation of the plan we have been implementing for the last almost two years now and whose fulfilment has produced good results. The new accents are: internal regulations, 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  information systems, and increase of resources, including appointment of the additional number of people as provided for in the original plan, which, unfortunately, takes more time than we expected. Third, we adopted a combination of measures to make the already developed system for recovery and resolution of banks fully functioning. In this area we have prioritised two sets of measures: the approval of resolution plans for the systemically important domestic banks (something that we have already done for the subsidiaries of EU banks); and the joint work with the Ministry of Finance of possibilities for the BNB to provide liquidity support.
Spencer Dale: 2009 – a review of the economic year Remarks by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the Chairman’s Annual Breakfast, Essex Institute of Directors, Billericay, 2 December 2009. *  *  *  I would like to thank Rohan Churm, Julia Giese and Chris Young for their considerable help in preparing these remarks. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. Introduction Thank you for the invitation to speak to you this morning. On the occasion of the Chairman’s Annual breakfast, I thought it would be fitting to look back over the events of the past year. A year which started with our country – together with much of the rest of the world – in economic freefall. A year in which many firms and families suffered significant hardship, as output fell markedly and unemployment rose. But a year which is ending with signs that the economy is stabilising and has turned a corner on the road to recovery. Financial crisis and collapse in confidence The financial crisis obviously predates the beginning of this year. The first signs of the instability can be traced back to at least the summer of 2007, when the emerging sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States and the resulting pressure on banks’ balance sheets around the world led to a sharp tightening in the availability of credit.

This is now commensurate with the scale and nature of the risks that the UK’s high degree of financial openness can pose. And it provides the foundations for the UK to remain the world’s leading international financial centre, one which can safely be home to the largest global, systemically important banks and insurers. The effectiveness of our reformed domestic framework for financial stability depends in part on the quality of financial regulation set at the EU level as well as the flexibility we have to apply that regulation to meet the UK’s specific financial stability challenges. In the main this combination has been achieved thus far. However, there have been some limits on flexibility in certain areas, including:   a bonus cap restricting the proportion of pay that can be clawed back in the event of excessive risk taking or poor conduct, thereby weakening discipline from remuneration;    trigger thresholds for contingent convertible capital instruments that some may judge too low; and    a reduced role for national discretion in insurance supervision. While common international standards and effective EU rules should continue to support the operation of the single market, it is imperative that UK authorities, including the Bank of England, continue to retain the flexibility to impose the high standards necessary to manage the world’s leading global financial centre. This flexibility may be challenged by how EU financial regulation evolves.
But I will conclude by quoting a Frenchman, Clément Beaune, the new Minister for European Affairs, who I believe sums up the situation eloquently: "Celebration is necessary, but it is never enough and does not dispense with what has for six decades been the unique strength of the Franco-German relationship: a working relationship, organised at all levels of our political and administrative life, whose power stems from the fact that our two countries have indeed often divergent positions but know, at key moments, how to overcome them by involving others”. Involving others is what we did in July 2019 with the appointments to the Commission and the ECB, and even more so this year in the face of the crisis. Together we have served Europe and Europeans well. We can be sure of one thing: they will still need our common commitment, on many ambitions and for a long time to come. i Clément Beaune (2020), “L'Europe, par-delà le COVID-19”, Politique étrangère, autumn. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

As an industry, banking institutions should continue to share infrastructure cost and compete on providing quality products and services. Basic payment infrastructure should not be a tool for competitive edge but rather as a means to reduce cost and adopting common standards. Migration to E-Payments to achieve cost savings Accelerating the migration to e-payments is one of the key strategies in the Financial Sector Blueprint. On numerous occasions we had highlighted that a successful migration has the potential to drive further efficiency gains and cost savings. It will improve the country’s competitive position. Research has suggested that successful migration to e-payments can save the country in terms of costs (of about 1% of GDP annually). Today, cheques and cash remain prevalent in Malaysia. Based on the last 3 years data, an average of 205 million cheques totalling to about RM2 trillion were issued on an annual basis. Our preliminary estimates showed that at RM2.70 cost per unit, the banking industry spends at least RM544 million annually on extending cheques issuing services. This is an expensive way of doing business. In terms of cash, over the last 3 years, an average of 547 million cash withdrawals at ATMs were made amounting to RM276 billion per annum. This represents 93% of the total financial transactions conducted at the ATMs, while only 7% of the ATM transactions were for noncash withdrawal.
The guideline for fiscal policy implies the use of petroleum revenues equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund, ie an estimated increase in the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget of about 0.4 per cent of mainland GDP each year up to 2010. A clear majority in the Storting supported the Government's long-term strategy for using petroleum revenues. BIS Review 47/2001  1  At the same time, the guidelines stipulate that the Government shall use the budget to stabilise economic developments. The annual budget resolutions will provide an indication of the emphasis placed on this consideration. The Norwegian economy and state finances are marked by a high and varying level of petroleum revenues. The basis for determining central government expenditure from one year to the next may thus easily be impaired. If budget outlays are allowed to swing in pace with oil prices, the result may be abrupt shifts and instability in the Norwegian economy. Changes in oil prices will then rapidly influence wage and price expectations, the exchange rate and long-term interest rates. In that case, it would be very demanding to ensure price stability. This would prompt rapid and pronounced changes in short-term interest rates and be accompanied by a higher risk premium on Norwegian kroner, which would lead to a generally higher interest rate level over time.

The centralised income settlements in Norway have been an arena of coordination, where macroeconomic considerations have at times received considerable emphasis. This has contributed to low unemployment levels in our country. But we have also seen that the income settlements may be a source of economic disturbances. The income settlements in 1974/75 and 1986 have had the strongest negative impact. The settlements in 1998 and 2000 also fuelled higher cost inflation. In 1998, high wage growth, combined with the fall in the krone exchange rate, contributed to a 4 ½ percentage point rise in interest rates during the spring and summer months. The retail and service industry almost acted as a spearhead in this wage negotiation. During and after the wage settlement in 2000, short-term interest rates rose by 1½ percentage points. We have also seen that income formation is affected by labour market conditions and profit trends in the business sector. This is also true of wage and income developments among managers, salaried employees and the liberal professions. The structural changes that now seem to have occurred in the income formation for these groups has probably also been important for the outcome of the ordinary wage settlements. Distributive trades  BIS Review 47/2001  9  Growth in wages and labour costs in distributive trades has also been high the last five years, with an average wage growth per normal person-year of 5 per cent, the same as for mainland Norway. National accounts figures for service industries are more uncertain than figures for manufacturing industry.
This idea had also come to hold sway in this country. Chart 1 shows the transmission process on which the SNB’s traditional monetary policy framework was based. Until the beginning of 2009, the three-month Swiss franc Libor was the only price that was directly steered by the SNB through its monetary policy operations. Via this short-term rate, monetary policy stimulus was transmitted to the economy through various channels – including interest rates, credit, exchange rates and asset prices. Page 2/8  Expansion of the monetary policy toolkit post-crisis As the financial crisis unfolded, this all changed. Starting in autumn 2008, central banks – including the SNB – rapidly cut short-term interest rates to historically low levels of or close to zero. Conventional monetary policy had reached its limits, at least according to the prevailing view at the time. But the options for monetary policy were not yet exhausted. Instead, all the major central banks expanded their monetary policy toolkits with new measures, called ‘unconventional’ measures because they deviate from the traditional monetary policy framework and are designed to deal with unusual situations. These unconventional measures fall into two categories: interest rate policy and balance sheet measures – measures by which a central bank exploits its opportunities to create money and thereby expand the balance sheet. Unconventional interest rate policy measures include forward guidance 1 and negative interest rates. Balance sheet measures include, in particular, quantitative easing, or QE for short, but also foreign currency purchases.

In this regard, I wish to make special mention of the Stock Exchange Technical Committee (SETC) First Initiative, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management, the Team of local Lawyers headed by Mr Eke Halloway, as well as market practitioners in neighbouring countries who have been unrelenting in sharing their experiences and expertise with us. Naming people in these situations can be invidious, but let me crave your indulgence to mention Mr Maroof Matin, the Resident Consultant provided by First Initiative, Mr Jacob Kanu of First Discount House, Mr Melvin Tucker, former Deputy Governor and other members of the Stock Exchange Technical Committee. To all of these, I say thank you very much and please let us continue to work together for a more prosperous Sierra Leone. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 107/2007
We also need citizens who are willing and able to concern themselves at all times with developments in the community and to help shape these developments. If progress is to be made towards achieving balanced - and therefore stable growth, it is especially important that individuals should be able to identify with the community as a whole. Clear interdependencies with the economy emerge here as a key aspect of social coexistence. Only if the individual members of society are assimilated into a balanced and flourishing economic environment will they identify with society to the extent that they work actively towards its goals - which in turn is essential to the successful shaping of the appropriate economic framework. The resulting social equilibrium, i.e. political stability, creates the necessary confidence in a stable and sustainable development that is so essential to a financial centre. Today, there is a tendency for people to retreat into the role of the pure economic subject. I see this as a worrying development, and indeed as posing a threat to both the economy and society. Based on what I said earlier, the economy and society can only flourish in a balanced environment. But this balance can only be achieved if the citizens are aware of their dual responsibility and act accordingly. BIS Review 26/1998  -3We have talked about economic stability, political stability and the human factor. These are the elements which define the substance of a financial centre, and the necessary symbiosis between them hinges on the actions of the individual.

They make use of technology at many different levels: from traditional cross-harbour ferry and metallic coins to advanced transcontinental passenger planes and real-time electronic clearing. And usually both transport systems and financial infrastructure receive attention only when something goes wrong. Financial infrastructure suffers the further handicap that it is largely invisible – a matter of wires and electronic pulses – with none of the glamour or nostalgia that physical transport can sometimes evoke. So, quite understandably, the general public take it for granted – indeed may not even be aware – that Hong Kong has for some time had some of the most advanced, efficient and secure payment, clearing and settlement systems of any financial centre in the world. One of the responsibilities of the HKMA is to promote the development of these systems in collaboration with dedicated service-providers and the financial industry generally. In addition to its responsibility for Hong Kong's domestic systems, the HKMA also has a specific responsibility for promoting the development of systems in Hong Kong that facilitate the safe and efficient conduct of international and cross-border financial activities. We have been paying special attention to this aspect of our work in recent years in a way that has a very direct bearing on the development of financial markets in the region.
There are a number of impediments: 1) Financial institutions – many of which still face balance sheet problems of their own – have tightened underwriting standards and, 2) a decline in property prices has cut collateral values and made the refinancing of many residential and commercial mortgages difficult. On the banking side, there is considerable differentiation across the industry in terms of health. The largest banks in the United States are generally in much improved health following the Supervisory Capital Assessment Process (SCAP) in 2008, which led to substantial additional equity raising. For smaller banks, the situation is more mixed. According to the FDIC, as of June 30, 2010, 829 of the nation’s 7,830 commercial banks and savings institutions remain on the FDIC’s problem institution list. But overall, the situation is one in which credit availability is slowly improving. According to the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officers Survey, the percentage of banks reporting that they were tightening credit standards across a wide range of lending categories peaked in  BIS Review 127/2010  3  late 2008. The most recent data indicate that virtually no banks are tightening standards, and a number of banks have begun to relax credit terms (Chart 12). In addition to households, the small-business sector is another area that has seen a contraction in credit.

Although so-called “soft-patches” are quite common during the early stages of an economic expansion, this soft patch is a bit different. First, it looks like it will last somewhat longer because the deleveraging process is not yet complete. Second, the current weakness is somewhat more concerning because it is occurring at a time that the central bank has already cut interest rates to near zero. In fact, this failure of the recovery to “catch fire” has occurred despite aggressive monetary and fiscal policy steps to stimulate the economy. On the monetary policy side, short-term interest rates have been nearly zero for a year and a half; the Fed purchased $ trillion of long-term assets, and the proceeds from maturing securities are being reinvested to keep the balance sheet from shrinking unduly. On the fiscal side, a series of measures has provided support to a broad range of activities. The sluggish nature of the recovery in the face of very substantial stimulus reflects the dynamics at work during the expansion that preceded it. Beginning around 2003,  BIS Review 127/2010  1  underwriting standards for residential mortgages were significantly relaxed, leading to a sharp rise in household borrowing and in home prices. The two trends were inextricably linked. The rise in home prices helped to support additional demand for credit as households used the collateral represented by their homes to borrow large sums of money via home equity lines of credit and second mortgages.