samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And this takes considerably more time than addressing or doing away immediately with problems by injecting public funds. Yet this requirement to promote private solutions does not fully explain the enormous workload that has fallen on the supervisor over recent years. Insofar as it was decided at first to retain without major changes the singular legal arrangements for savings banks, and particularly their governance, this made it necessary to pursue most complex negotiations with the parties involved, namely trade unions, managers, regional governments, etc., each with very different interests from those that prevail in any mercantile company, where market discipline leads owners to worry about minimising losses and increasing shareholder value, and not about maintaining power, or the total amount devoted to early retirements, or about where headquarters should be established. In merger operations, processes such as determining shares of interest are reasonably easy to agree upon, since it suffices to make a proper valuation and to assign to each party what corresponds to it. But those who have followed the news in recent years will have witnessed the long drawn-out discussions, on a flimsy economic basis, that have been necessary to determine the power apportioned to each player in savings bank integrations. Before their transformation into banks, observance of the legal structure of savings banks meant that their restructuring could only move forward very gradually, step by step and with great prudence.

Zdeněk Tůma: Education as investment in human capital Speech by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, for the graduation ceremony, The New Anglo-American College, Prague, 20 June 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, It is my pleasure to be here today and to share with you some thoughts that concern the role of education as an investment in human capital in the long-term development of our economy and society in general. Today it’s commonplace for politicians to swear by concepts like investment in education, knowledge-based economy or the effect of education on long-term economic growth. They are also quick to add something about the necessity to pay for university education, at least those on the right wing of the political spectrum. Don’t worry, we haven’t met today to assess individual political ideas, and we all know that sometimes it’s a long road from what politicians say to what they do. However, the fact that you are sitting here today indicates that viewing education as an investment has its place in today’s society regardless of political preferences. I would like to use this opportunity to point out that although the concept of investment in education may be somewhat misused and can have unfortunate overtones for somebody, it has a rigorous theoretical foundation and is of high empirical relevance.
The insufficient volume of external safety nets as well as the underdeveloped nature of financial markets in EMEs made financial crises unavoidable. In addition, inability to implement countercyclical policies made EMEs suffer from larger damaging effects of financial crises on their real economies than otherwise. It is noteworthy that despite the lack of capacities in avoiding financial crises, EMEs mostly managed to recover swiftly from their acute past financial crises succeeding severe economic recessions. Likewise, most EMEs survived the – a once in a century event – GFC of 2008 in spite of its profound impacts on the financial systems of AEs with the subsequent “balance sheet recessions”. EMEs again largely escaped the great recession though some of them had brief economic recessions. With lessons learned from previous episodes and improvements over the years EMEs are, on average, better positioned to withstand financial turbulences, both now and in the near future, than in the past. First of all, they embarked on extensive structural reforms aimed at overhauling financial regulatory and supervisory systems, strengthening public finances and fiscal discipline, granting central banks independence, and adopting flexible exchange rate systems. These reforms enabled them to implement more prudent and countercyclical policies as well. EMEs solidified their post crisis reforms by accumulating adequate foreign exchange reserves as an alternative to the IMF provided financing, which carries strong conditionality, as well as further deepening and broadening their domestic financial markets.

Broad impact on the economy All in all, the Swiss economy got off relatively lightly compared with other countries in the difficult years following the global financial crisis – and this despite the fact that, as a small open economy with a large financial sector, we were hit hard by the shocks. This can be mainly attributed to two factors. First of these was the remarkable flexibility of Swiss companies and workers, which made it possible to increase efficiency, develop new products, and tap into new markets. Coupled with this, the SNB’s unconventional monetary policy substantially cushioned the blow of external shocks. The real trade-weighted exchange rate of  Page 4/8  the Swiss franc has thus remained fairly stable since September 2011. Were it not for the negative interest rate and the extensive interventions by the SNB, Switzerland would today be facing a different economic reality. The franc would have become much stronger, inflation would have fallen well below zero, growth would have slowed abruptly and unemployment would have risen markedly. For us there is thus no question that the negative interest rate was significant in helping Switzerland emerge from a difficult period in good shape. And it is still making an essential contribution to ensuring that our economy continues to fare well today, despite the array of uncertainties worldwide. But how exactly does negative interest work? Negative interest rates take effect on an economy in a very similar way to a monetary policy with positive rates.
Across Upstate New York, broadly speaking, the cycle of recession and recovery has been much less pronounced than in the nation, and even the state as a whole. This pattern has been true in Syracuse, as well. Employment fell by a little over 4 percent during the downturn – a steep drop, to be sure – but only about two-thirds of the decline that occurred nationally. This is quite a change from the region’s past recessions, which have tended to be longer and deeper than the nation’s. One reason why Upstate New York weathered the economic storm a bit better than the nation is the resiliency of its housing markets. Like much of Upstate New York, Syracuse’s housing market has been relatively stable and did not experience a boom-bust cycle like much of the rest of the nation. In fact, since the peak of the national housing market in early 2006, home prices in Syracuse have increased by close to 10 percent, compared with a decline of more than 30 percent nationally. 1  As measured by the 12-month change in the core PCE deflator. 2  See for instance, the behavior of the three- and six-month changes in the core PCE deflator. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As a result, the drop off in economic activity that is connected, directly and indirectly, to the performance of the housing sector has not been as severe here as it was in many other places.

It will take a team effort to get there – from health authorities, from fiscal authorities and from all of you here. But I can assure you that the ECB will continue to play its part, as we have done since the first days of the crisis.  2. “An attitude and a conviction”. See Erhard, L. (1956), 1. European Commission (2019),  SME Performance Review. “Mittelstandspolitik”, in Rüstow, A. (ed. ), Der mittelständische Unternehmer in der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft: Wortlaut der Vorträge auf der vierten Arbeitstagung der Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft e.V am 17. November 1955 in Bad Godesberg, Ludwigsburg, pp. 51-61. 3. Simon, H. (2012), Hidden Champions – Aufbruch nach Globalia: Die Erfolgsstrategien unbekannter Weltmarktführer, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York. 4.   McKinsey (2020), “  How COVID-19 has pushed companies over the  technology tipping point—and transformed business forever”, 5 October. 5.  ”, NBER Working Papers, No 27137, National  Barrero, J.M., Bloom, N. and Davis, S.J. (2020), “  COVID-19 Is Also  a Reallocation Shock  Bureau of Economic Research, May. , 15 July.  7. SME United (2020),  , 30 June. 8. IMF (2021), “ ”, 19 January.  9. 2009-2018 average. This definition of external finance includes bank 6. OECD (2020),  Coronavirus (COVID-19): SME policy responses  The economic impact of COVID-19 on SMEs in  Europe  Germany: 2020 Article IV Staff Report  loans, debt securities, trade credit and other liabilities and excludes intercompany loans and equity. 10. Aggregate figure for all maturities. 6/8  11.
Across all these areas, these judgments have to be translated into appropriate limits, an appropriate capital cushion above the regulatory minimum and a robust liquidity management strategy. These thresholds need to be calibrated to withstand more adverse conditions than we’ve seen in the recent past. The major institutions seem in general to be managed so that they are in a stronger position to withstand the shocks of the nature and magnitude of the last few decades of experience. The apparent increase in the strength and resilience of the U.S. financial system has contributed significantly to the improvement in the overall performance of the U.S. economy of the past 20 years. As the challenges of risk management become more demanding, it is important that supervisors and those charged with managing the major financial institutions make the investments necessary to stay abreast of the changing frontier of risk management challenges and a potentially more uncertain future. Thank you. 3/3

As commodities become the flavour of the day, market participants should ensure that they understand the risks as they participate more actively in the markets. In their eagerness to  2  BIS Review 90/2008  ride the commodities wave, banks and other intermediaries should put in place appropriate risk management systems and processes, ensure they have adequate resources including qualified staff, and uphold proper market conduct. Investors too, should carefully evaluate complex structures as they seek attractive returns. Singapore as a commodities hub Singapore has historically played an important role to connect importers and exporters. Besides being strategically located, Singapore offers a high level of connectivity with its efficient infrastructure and business friendly environment. Today, Singapore is a key aviation and shipping hub, and an international financial centre. In the area of commodities, over 230 global trading companies have their offshore trading, marketing and procurement operations in Singapore. We enjoy the reputation as the top energy trading hub in Asia, and is increasingly a location of choice for other sectors including agri-commodities, metals and minerals. Singapore continues to be the hub for over the counter ("OTC") commodities derivatives trading in the region, capturing more than 10% of global OTC commodities. In May 2006, the SGX launched a central counterparty clearing facility or SGX AsiaClear, for OTC commodities trading to mitigate counterparty risks and create efficiencies for the market place. Today, SGX AsiaClear has seen growth in energy, freight and petrochemical derivatives and potentially agriculture commodities.
1 Second, there could be situations where the no bail-out clause might not be entirely credible, given that serious budgetary deviations in one country could generate economic and financial instability across the EMU as a whole, which would end up compelling the latter to bail-out countries in difficulties. Such constraints required implementing additional common rules. Thus, the Treaty stipulated that Member States should avoid excessive deficits and that the European Commission should monitor public finances to identify significant deviations (or, in the language of the Treaty, “gross errors”) that could endanger the macroeconomic and financial stability of the monetary union. 1  Aizenman, J., M. Hutchison, and Y. Jinjarak. (2013). “What is the risk of European sovereign debt defaults? Fiscal space, CDS spreads and market pricing of risk”. Journal of International Money and Finance, 34, 37-59. 2  In practice, the SGP implemented these principles through two well-known reference values: 60% for the ratio of government debt to GDP and 3% for the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio. Non-compliant countries entered the corrective arm, which ensured that excessive deficits were corrected in a given period of time. Compliant countries functioned under the preventive arm, which required convergence to medium-term budgetary objectives. Shortcomings of the current fiscal governance framework Thus, the institutional approach to fiscal policies in the EMU rested on the assumption that supranational constraints would yield national budgetary policies consistent with the smooth functioning of the monetary union.

The literature emphasises that it is the design of fiscal rules –and not just their mere existence – that determines their effectiveness. That is why aspects such as their definition, enforcement mechanisms and correction procedures are so important. 3 Fourth, the initial design focused on fiscal imbalances, overlooking the fact that other imbalances, such as financial or current account imbalances, are also important for the correct functioning of the EMU. As a result, it did not prevent the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances at the national level, which could potentially destabilise the euro area as a whole. This was addressed during the euro area sovereign debt crisis with the introduction of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), but with only limited success. Here I would like to point out that structural reforms, such as those proposed in the European Semester and the Commission's recommendations, are also important for the proper functioning of the EMU and for fiscal sustainability. Finally, the Treaty did not foresee the scale of the mechanisms needed for joint crisis management, including a common fiscal action to smooth the cycle and coordinate with common monetary policy. In fact, there was no crisis management mechanism in place until the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in the wake of the euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2012.
The experience accrued during periods of crisis and the changes that have taken place in the financial industry have conditioned the authorities’ preferences over time. For instance, until the end of the last century, the prevalent worldwide model was one of allocation of supervisory responsibilities by sector (banking, insurance and securities  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  markets). This model typically included a supervisor – normally the central bank – which was charged with ensuring that credit institutions complied with the sectoral regulations on solvency and conduct; a second supervisor, with similar competencies for insurance companies; and a third supervisor, which oversaw the behaviour of securities market participants. This model responded well to an industry structure in which the various types of institutions primarily pursued their activity in a single sector – whether banking, insurance or securities markets – and to the absence of widespread concern over the existence of possible conflicts between the surveillance of institutions’ solvency soundness and the monitoring of their behaviour with customers and investors. In the mid-1990s, this sectoral model began to be replaced in many countries by a single supervisory authority model (following the paradigm of the reform implemented in the United Kingdom in 1997) in which the oversight of banks, markets and insurance companies, in terms of both solvency and conduct, was assigned to a single supervisory agency separate from the central bank.

Monetary policy was successful in bringing inflation — and thereafter, inflation expectations — back to the target after 2012, without sacrifice costs in terms of employment Furthermore, the use of new policy instruments helped ensure that the exchange rate of the króna was countercyclical rather than procyclical, as it had been to some degree before the crisis. Inflation remained close to the target for about five years. When the banks failed in autumn 2008, new banks were established virtually overnight. These banks received deposits in Iceland and matching assets, and became a new channel for domestic payment intermediation. There was hardly a hiccup in domestic payment intermediation, which has to be considered quite a feat. As I mentioned earlier, the task of recapitalising the banks and finalising the new-bank-old-bank split remained. It was decided that the old banks should take an equity stake in two of the new ones. To begin with, there were sizeable imbalances in the banks’ balance sheets, including foreign exchange imbalances, and non-performing loan ratios were very high. As a result of various measures and the economic recovery, the imbalances subsided and non-performing loan ratios fell rapidly from 2011 onwards. Since 2015, they have been relatively low in historical context. The banks’ capital adequacy ratios increased, both for these same reasons and because the Financial Supervisory Authority prohibited dividend payments without explicit approval during the banks’ first years of 4  operation and the capital controls made dividend payments to foreign creditors less feasible.
I view these two strands as complements rather than substitutes, with more work necessary on both. Turning first to the issue of reducing the consequences of failure, there are numerous elements of this effort underway. Some are focused on making the financial market infrastructure more robust so that when a failure occurs the shock is dampened, not amplified and propagated throughout the financial system. For example, considerable effort has been made to create incentives for firms to standardize over-the-counter derivative trades and to clear those trades through central counterparties. Similarly, extensive work has been undertaken by the Federal Reserve and the major clearing banks to make the tri-party repo system more stable. Money market mutual fund reform is also part of this ongoing effort. Other initiatives are focused on reducing the financial stability consequences from the failure of a systemically important financial firm. The major initiative here is the single point of entry framework for resolution proposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Under this framework, if a financial firm is to be resolved under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIC will place the top tier bank holding company into receivership and its assets will be transferred to a bridge holding company. The equity holders will be wiped out and sufficient long-term unsecured debt will be converted into equity in the new bridge company to cover any remaining losses and to ensure that the new entity is well capitalized and deemed creditworthy.

Growth in the first quarter has been subdued as domestic spending, both private consumption and investment is weaker-than-expected. Part of this pullback may have been a natural reversion to a more normal pace of growth after an unusually strong expansion last  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  year. At the same time, on the external side, a drag on the overall Thailand’s trading partners’ growth continues to weigh on Thai exports. Going forward, however, many of the supporting factors remain in place. High level of employment and strong private sector confidence should provide an enabling environment for growth. Fiscal stimulus related to large-scale infrastructure investment should also begin to phase in from the latter part of this year. This would potentially generate a positive crowding-in effects on private spending. For this, I would expect the economy to return to its normal path in the third and fourth quarter of this year. Apart from slower growth, a potential threat to financial stability has increased, stemming from development in household indebtedness. Currently, household debt is rising to over 70 percent of GDP. International evidence suggests that a prolonged period of rapid credit growth could lead to a build-up of financial imbalances, worsen households’ debt servicing ability and loan quality, as well as sow a seed for asset price bubbles. The need for long-term focus Ladies and gentlemen, Having said all of the above, I may seem to paint the picture that the Thai economy is slowing down recently, largely as a result of weaker global growth.
32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  32  Chart 8: Trade openness and productivity  GDP per hour worked  100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30  R² = 0.4434  20 10 0  100  80  60  40  20  0  Average of Goods and Services MGI Connectedness Ranking Sources: McKinsey Global Institute, OECD and Bank calculations. Notes: Data for 2014. GDP per hour worked in $ at constant prices, in 2010 PPPs. UK marked in red. Chart 9: Finance openness and productivity GDP per hour worked 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 R² = 0.3431  30 20 10 0  100  90  80  70  60  50  40  30  20  10  0  Financial MGI Connectedness Ranking Sources: McKinsey Global Institute, OECD and Bank calculations. Notes: Data for 2014. GDP per hour worked in $ at constant prices, in 2010 PPPs. UK marked in red. 33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  Chart 10: People openness and productivity GDP per hour worked 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 R² = 0.199 30 20 10 0 120  100  80  60  40  20  0  People MGI Connectedness Ranking Sources: McKinsey Global Institute, OECD and Bank calculations. Notes: Data for 2014. GDP per hour worked in $ at constant prices, in 2010 PPPs. UK marked in red.

Andrew Sentance: Prospects for global economic recovery Speech by Mr Andrew Sentance, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, at the British Chambers of Commerce Annual Convention, London, 18 March 2010. *  *  *  I would like to thank Michael Hume and Abi Hughes for research assistance and I am also grateful for helpful comments from other colleagues. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. Over the three-and-a-half years I have spent so far on the Monetary Policy Committee, one of the things that has struck me most forcefully is the way in which the UK economy is so heavily influenced by international developments. The global financial crisis and the recession which resulted from it have highlighted that very clearly. But even before we felt the full force of the crisis in late 2008 and early 2009, UK inflation was pushed up to over 5% by a surge in global energy and commodity prices. And looking back over the whole history of the MPC since 1997, most of the shocks to UK growth and inflation that the Committee has had to worry about have had a significant international or global dimension. 1 These global influences on the UK economy partly reflect our economic history.