samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Banks’ capital reserves, transparency, funding, risk management, corporate governance and both micro and, especially, macro supervision and regulation need to be adjusted. Let me start with the fragile liabilities. We have experienced since August 2007 a funding liquidity dry-up. As I said before, in the run-up to the crisis, Spanish banks were highly dependent on foreign wholesale funding. As a result, the sector as a whole ended up suffering and some of the more dependent banks have been hit very badly. But bank liquidity also depends crucially on bank capital and, hence, banks with stronger balance sheets suffer much less from a lack of liquidity.8 The liquidity provided by the Eurosystem has been vital to minimise the liquidity shortages, but bank capital needs to be stronger so that all banks have access to private funding liquidity. Fragile assets were an important factor too, as very high volumes of credit (and risk) were granted during the good years. Some banks took more risk than others in the real estate bubble, and some banks recorded substantially lower profits and higher (realized and potential) loan losses during the current crisis. Hence, bank capital significantly decreased, especially for some groups of cajas; they, moreover, cannot easily raise capital because of their specific structure. The availability of bank capital is essential for two additional reasons: First, a bank capital crunch may lead to a credit crunch. Thus, in order to help the real economy recover, some weak banks need to be recapitalised.

  in improving the education system at all levels – it is critical to raising productivity over the medium term and, therefore, to improving welfare. I truly hope that when another book like this one is written in, say 50 or 100 years’ time, the authors will conclude that the steps taken in response to the crisis in the banking and in other key sectors of the Spanish economy were the right ones and, in particular, that they played a part in overcoming the crisis and increasing in a sustainable way the well-being of the citizens of this country. References Acharya and Richardson (eds.) (2009) Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed System, John Wiley & Sons. Adrian, T. and H.S. Shin (2009), Money, liquidity and monetary policy, American Economic Review. Allen, F. and D. Gale (2000), Financial Contagion, Journal of Political Economy. Allen, F. and K. Rogoff (2011), Asset Prices, Financial Stability and Monetary Policy, Wharton Financial Institutions Centre WP #11–39. Altunbas, Y., Marqués, G. and L. Gambacorta (2010), Securitisation and the bank lending channel, European Economic Review. Brunnermeier, M. and L.H. Petersen (2009), Market liquidity and funding liquidity, Review of Financial Studies. Cuñat, V. and L. Garicano (2010), Did Good Cajas Extend Bad Loans? Governance, Human Capital and Loan Portfolios, LSE mimeo. Freixas, X. and J.C. Rochet (1997), Microeconomics of Banking, MIT Press. Hellmann, T., Murdock, K. and J. Stiglitz (2000), Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?, American Economic Review.
Both commercial property prices and housing prices have risen substantially for many years and although we have been able to see that the rates of increase have slowed down slightly in recent months, they are still high. I believe that property prices may well continue rising at a fairly high rate over the coming period. But in the slightly longer term such a rapid increase is not sustainable. Why is the Riksbank interested in the property market? The fact that the Riksbank is interested in what is happening in the property market is based on the tasks we have been given by the Swedish Parliament. One is that we shall ensure that inflation is kept at a reasonable level, more precisely at two per cent a year. The other is that we shall safeguard the stability of the financial system. The way the property market develops can have significance for both of these tasks. Property often functions as collateral for the loans the banks grant to households and companies. If the properties are not reasonably valued; if prices have been pushed up through exaggerated optimism or speculation, there is a risk of a heavy price fall. During the crisis of the 1990s it was falling property prices, particularly office premises, that were the cause of major losses for the Swedish banks. Developments in the property market can also affect activity in the real economy. For instance, rising house prices reduce households’ loans in relation to the value of their assets.

In this context, future efforts at policy coordination should start by setting out a clear and concrete medium-term goal, then followed by a few but concrete and specific issues to be addressed or projects to be executed. A case in point is the development of a shared regional financial infrastructure such as linking the clearing and payment systems, harmonizing minimum regulations on cross-border investment flows, and developing a shared facility to promote greater flows of investment information. This type of specific efforts and projects would be easier to win region-wide political commitment and support. 2  BIS Review 66/2006  Another suggestion is that, for the market-based approach to work efficiently, we may need to engage more formally the cooperation of the private sector. On this, I think East Asia can learn a lot from the experience of the EU in engaging the private sector in planning and reviewing major financial initiatives. Specifically here, I am thinking of the Giovannini Group of private experts, established in 1996, which has done at least four useful reports for the EU Commission. Their inputs have helped the EU in introducing the necessary directives. My last point is on the role of IFI’s such as the World Bank. In recent years, in a good way, we have seen active involvement of all major IFI’s in the region’s financial market development. They contribute to research, ideas, technical assistance, policy advice, and funding. Some are even involved as market participants.
For Estonia as a small European economy highly dependent on trade, euro area membership was a natural goal stemming from close economic ties and similar cyclical behavior. A common currency with many of our main trading partners would reduce the costs of trading and more importantly deepen the economic integration that can drive all of the productivity improvements that will ultimately lie behind higher living standards. Our main trading partners are in Europe, so it is not an international issue for us but domestically important if we want to grow. In any case, our strategic choice two decades ago to tie our currency first to the DM, then to the euro, and a clear determination to never change this peg, meant that our macroeconomic environment was already very similar to that of a euro area member, and that the extra step towards full euro area membership would only be logical and natural. Let me now turn to the process. When discussing such currency reforms, we often speak in terms of the date on which this takes place, which can leave the impression of a single event which suddenly brings great changes. In fact, the process element is crucial. We have been on a given path for 20 years, and we will be on this path for another few decades. Therefore,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  it is many small steps that contribute and the actual date of conversion is somewhat less of an event.

And while the actual tasks performed by the Bank’s branches have changed since the network began expanding in the 1830s, the end goal remains unchanged: to support and serve local economies in order to back local initiatives and provide assistance in coping with economic and financial risks. From the time of its creation until the First World War, operating in an economy with relatively few banks and in which few people had bank accounts, the branch network of the Banque de France aimed at facilitating payments and supporting the regions during economic shocks by offering discount refinancing solutions. France’s economy has changed enormously since the 19th century. GDP per capita has grown by a factor of more than 20 since 1800 and by more than seven since 1914.9 Our banking and financial system has also been greatly modernised and now offers payment and credit solutions that are much faster and less costly than in the past. Reflecting these dual economic and financial transformations, the way in which the Bank performs its task of serving the regional economies has evolved. Our service to support local economies have expanded and now extend to households, especially the most vulnerable people, and companies, particularly the smallest  8  Leclercq, Yves, 1999, La formation d'une banque centrale: la Banque de France (années 1830 - années 1850), Revue économique Vol. 50, pp. 151-174 9 Source: Our world in data, Maddison Project Database 2020, see Jutta Bolt and Jan Luitten van Zanden, Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Innovative financial inclusion Opening remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Global Symposium on Innovative Financial Inclusion, Kuala Lumpur, 21 September 2016. *  *  *  While the global economy is still recovering from the Global Financial Crisis, the focus on boosting global growth has never eclipsed the financial inclusion agenda. In fact, policymakers continue to recognise the importance of financial inclusion and have accorded it as a global priority to address the widening income inequality gap, to promote the economic empowerment and protection of low income households and SMEs and to unlock the growth potential of the fast-expanding middle class population. Expanded opportunities to save securely, to invest in productive activities and to protect against unforeseen shocks, would meet the needs of the underserved. This would drive domestic demand, a key engine of growth for many economies. Between 2011 and 2014, the World Bank estimates that 500 million people have gained access to formal financial services for the first time. If our efforts continue, we are on our way to assisting the remaining 2 billion adults that remain financially excluded. A succession of technology breakthroughs combined with the ubiquity of mobile devices present significant opportunities to scale up financial inclusion to an unprecedented level.

Among lower income groups, a more granular level of analysis on income patterns is needed to structure solutions that address the irregularity in loan repayments. Financial inclusion for the ageing population is another critical area that requires more understanding. It is important that new products, delivery channels and technologies also work well for our senior citizens that are financially excluded. Many financial products and services offered today have age limits that create barriers to access financial services. This ought to be changed to ensure inclusive financial systems for the ageing population segment. Technologies that enable better data collection and analytics can support deeper research to fill this gap while mitigating the risks to providers of financial solutions. Beyond data applications, opportunities exist in other areas. For example, distributed ledger technology eliminates the need for centralised transaction validation and shortens the settlement chain, effectively lowering costs of real-time remittances. By incorporating adequate Know-Your-Customer (KYC) requirements, distributed ledger has the potential to address de-risking. Robo-advisers could potentially be adapted to increase financial literacy and support customers in less accessible locations. The adoption of open Application Interfaces (API) facilitates a sharing environment whereby improvements build on existing innovations could shorten the time to market for more offerings. These are just a hint of many more examples that can be examined. What is needed is a rethinking of today’s most promising financial innovations for applications and new gains in financial inclusion.
In the case of LIBOR, the official sector has taken a multi-pronged approach: strengthening the LIBOR regime, developing reference rate principles, using its convening authority to marshal private sector participation, supplying robust alternative reference rates, and using the bully pulpit to educate and spur action. International coordination has featured strongly in these efforts, and should continue to do so. This approach has achieved a great deal to date, but, in light of the risks and potential implications, will it be sufficient? The transition away from LIBOR represents a significant risk event for firms of all sizes, and they should actively manage this transition through their existing frameworks for identification, management, and mitigation of risk. Supervisors should continue to support this objective by ensuring that all firms are aware of the transition and that LIBOR-related issues are being addressed in a way that is commensurate with a firm’s exposures and risks. More broadly, the official sector will continue to push market participants to take all necessary steps to mitigate the risks to financial stability from a disorderly transition. In closing, the LIBOR scandal certainly was one low point among many during the financial crisis and its aftermath. It highlighted the need for reform of a critical area of the global financial system. We have made considerable progress since then, but reform still has a long way to go. The remaining work, by necessity, will involve purposeful collective action and engagement across the financial industry to address market-wide issues.

It also underscores the power of incentives to drive individuals and firms to do things that are imprudent and/or unethical.4 And, the governance and control framework that the banks and the LIBOR administrator had in place proved woefully insufficient to prevent misconduct that stemmed from poor incentives. In this context, one could say it was a situation ripe for exploitation. The openness and brazenness of misconduct as captured in the recorded transcripts also point to serious deficiencies in bank culture. My New York Fed colleagues and I have commented frequently on the need for sound culture and incentives as a complement to effective regulation and supervision. While there has been some progress on this issue in recent years, the LIBOR and other rate-rigging scandals—not to mention more recent breakdowns at individual banks— point to the need for further strengthening of bank culture.5 I look forward to the discussion with Minouche and Andrew on improving culture in the fixed income, currency, and commodity markets in the following panel. One of the key lessons from the financial crisis was that critical pieces of financial system infrastructure must be both strong and resilient, and the LIBOR scandal underscored this need.6 The essential problem with LIBOR is the inherent fragility of its “inverted pyramid,” where the pricing of hundreds of trillions of dollars of financial instruments rests on the expert judgment of relatively few individuals, informed by a very small base of unsecured interbank transactions.
In fact, our own Consumer Credit Panel, a representative sample of the liability side of the U.S. consumer balance sheet derived from consumer credit reports, indicates that total household liabilities increased last quarter on a year-over-year basis, the first rise since mid-2008. In addition to the firming in consumer spending, growth of exports was quite strong over the second half of last year. Following a few years of lackluster performance, growth among our major trading partners improved, providing a boost to employment and output in our manufacturing sector. Moreover, the important advances made in oil drilling technology have boosted U.S. energy production, cutting oil imports and boosting petroleum product exports and this is also leading to steady improvement in our trade balance. The economy also received an important boost from quite strong inventory accumulation, which added nearly a full percentage point to the annualized second half growth rate. This inventory investment was broad-based across sectors and types of goods. In fact, all four quarters of 2013 saw a positive growth contribution from inventory accumulation, something that typically only occurs as the economy first emerges from recession. I interpret this as a sign of increased confidence about the economic outlook within the business community. Finally, federal fiscal restraint lessened over the second half of 2013.

Gent Sejko: Increasing the formalization of the Albanian economy Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the joint press conference with the Minister of Finance and Economy, Tirana, 7 December 2017. * * *  Dear Minister Ahmetaj, Dear media representatives, It is with great pleasure that I present this concrete initiative of the Bank of Albania (BoA) in the framework of our efforts to promote the formalization of the economy. It is encouraging to see that a series of initiatives by other Albanian authorities are taken for the same purpose, to enhance the law enforcement and the use of financial channels. Experience has shown that complementary efforts of regulatory institutions lower the policies’ implementation costs and increase their likelihood for success. Informal activity imposes open and hidden costs for the Albanian economy and the society. It damages the country’s public finances, increases the tax burden and distorts its effect on the economic agents, hampers competition and increases the costs of fair business activity, reduces business financing resources and curbs their normal development, and creates social problems that arise from lack or insufficient coverage of social and health insurance. From the BoA’s point of view, as the monetary authority and as the supervisor and regulator of the banking sector, informal activity reduces the effectiveness of our stabilization policies and creates the premises for instability of one or more segments of the financial system.
News conference  Berne, 14 December 2017 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan Ladies and gentlemen It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I will begin by explaining our monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation. I will then hand over to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will speak about current developments in the area of financial stability. After that, Andréa Maechler will review the situation on the financial markets and the progress in reference interest rate reform. Finally, we will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions. Monetary policy decision  Let me begin with our monetary policy decision and the inflation forecast. We are maintaining our expansionary monetary policy in order to stabilise price developments and support economic activity. Interest on sight deposits at the SNB is to remain at –0.75% and the target range for the three-month Libor is unchanged at between –1.25% and –0.25%. We will remain active in the foreign exchange market as necessary, while taking the overall currency situation into consideration. The Swiss franc has depreciated in recent months. The overvaluation has thereby decreased, yet overall the franc remains highly valued. The depreciation of the franc reflects the fact that safe havens are currently less sought after. However, this development is still fragile. Therefore, despite the easing of the situation, the negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary remain essential.

Our challenge concerns more the nature of this financing: developing equity financing more than debt financing. Flat tax is a welcome step towards a greater tax neutrality between the different forms of investment. I have already stated this, insurers must create new tailored products, in the area of life insurance, which are less liquid but allow savers to benefit from the higher returns offered by equities in the long term, with a form of capital protection. The PACTE law on growing and transforming companies, presented by the Minister of the Economy, could provide an opportunity. Banks are also considering offering a new long-term savings product: I understand this point of view, provided that the aim isn't to create a new tax loophole; we have had enough of this great French speciality. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  My last wish concerns the Banque de France, and it is a commitment to our transformation, which we want to be exemplary for the public service. In 2018, we will be over half way with our strategic "Ambitions for 2020" plan, which aims to improve our services to the French and European economies, while achieving significant savings: as of this year, our net spending will be almost EUR 100 million lower, in current euro, than it was in 2015: this is what we are "giving back" to the national community. In 2018, let us also be exemplary in our commitment to the social and territorial cohesion of the country, in order notably to help our most underprivileged citizens.
Monetary policy has become progressively more restrictive over the past year, appropriate for the prevailing elevated inflation. MAS started tightening relatively early and implemented it in a gradual manner through a series of steps. Our calibrated actions corresponded with more frequent reviews of evolving economic conditions and the outlook. In October, we will assess the accumulated effects of previous policy shifts against the likely baseline conditions into the turn of the new year. Monetary policy will stay focused on price stability in the medium-term, amid an uncertain near-term environment. [1] Boissay, F., De Fiore, F. and Kharroubi, E. (2022¬), “Hard or Soft Landing?”, BIS Bulletin, No 59. [2] Ang, K.J., Ang, Y.S., Liu, S. (2022), “Feature Article: Analysis of External Final Demand Drivers of  Singapore’s GDP”, Economic Survey of Singapore Second Quarter 2022, Singapore, Ministry of Trade  and Industry. ***

On our part and, as I mentioned earlier, we have initiated an intensive process to project our work and the best way to fulfill our objectives and functions within a changing economic, political, and social scenario. This process is aimed at developing our Strategic Plan for the period 2023-2027 that, building on the great progress achieved in the Plan still in effect for the years 2018-2022, will allow us to focus on the challenges of today and the future. Going forward, the focus of the new strategic plan will be to continue building trust in the technical area in order to contribute to the well-being of society in terms of financial stability, market evolution, technological development and innovation, changes in payment systems and business development, so as to explore adjustments to the regulatory framework. We also believe in the importance of preserving stability beyond the current advances in new technologies, integrating the systemic risk of each activity into the regulation and supervising the activities that pose the most risk to the system. Of course, all this involves a major challenge for our institution and those of us who work in it. At the center must continue to be our staff and our credibility. This can only be nurtured by excellence, service vocation, ethical and transparent action, respect for our autonomy, and the technical response at the service of our country's welfare. Honorable Senators, we are facing an enormous challenge.