samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If the individual members sent out different signals it was probably also difficult to distinguish a clear message from this "cacophony of voices", to quote Professor Blinder again. This type of problem seems rather unnecessary. A central bank should be able to be so clear with regard to its view of the future that there should be no need for loosely-grounded speculations and interpretations – it should not be necessary to be a Kremlinologist to interpret the Riksbank. We hope that we have solved this problem with our new way of working. A further weakness of the earlier signalling process concerned the responsibility the Riksbank has in its role as independent authority. It is a question of democracy. This responsibility includes, for instance, the fact that the general public must have good insight into the decision-making process – the decisions at the monetary policy meetings must be made in a correct manner. This is why minutes are taken at the monetary policy meetings and then published, and the chairman and deputy chairman of the General Council of the Riksbank have the right to attend the Executive Board meeting. There must be no doubt that the interest rate decisions are actually made at the monetary policy meetings and not at some other point in time – in some informal way that prevents insight. If the signalling prior to the meetings leads people to believe that the interest rate decisions have been made in advance of the meetings, then doubts may arise.

I believe that there is a broad understanding among households, companies and market agents that we need to adapt monetary policy and reconsider how we should set  BIS Review 106/2007  3  the repo rate in future when new information changes the economic picture. We have been clear about the fact that a forecast is by definition uncertain and that it becomes more so the further ahead it stretches. And the interest rate path presented in the Monetary Policy Report is indeed a forecast. It is not a promise! The fact that we do not have perfect knowledge of the future is no reason to refrain from being as open and clear as possible with regard to what we believe will happen. We must form an opinion of how the policy rate should develop in the future regardless of whether we publish it or not. If it turns out that we have made an incorrect assessment in our forecast, it would not have been less incorrect just because we had refrained from telling anyone about it. It is hardly reasonable that we should try to gain greater credibility by hiding things or sending unclear signals about one of the most important variables in our analysis. I believe it is better that we are open about what our decisions are based on, now that the inflation target is so well-established that we are able to be open.
I would thus like to share with you now some thoughts on the nature of these challenges and the contribution that central banks can make to address them effectively. 1.The digitisation of the economy and its challenges for sovereignty A- The digitisation of the economy has led to a profound change in financial ecosystems. The development of an Internet-based network economy has provided businesses with more direct access to consumers, while reducing the fixed costs of launching and operating services This change has gone hand in hand with changing lifestyles and increased expectations in terms of simplicity, availability, immediacy and even personalisation of services. This is commonly referred to as the “customer experience". The emergence of digital banks, where interaction with the customer is mainly carried out via a mobile application, is an example of a response to this new standard in terms of practices. Changing patterns in practices have also prompted some companies to position themselves between customers and traditional service providers in very specific segments in order to offer value-added services. This “re-intermediation” has given rise in Europe to a continuous adaptation of regulations in order to regulate and secure data sharing, which is the driving force behind open banking. This trend benefits both relatively small players (FinTechs) and technology giants whose business model is based on the monetisation of data (Gafams and BATX, whose entry into the European market is more recent). These changes are the natural result of a process of creative iteration, and promise to simplify practices by diversifying them.

One thing is clear in our work, it is time to take stock on this issue. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
And the reforms do pay off: the remarkable labour productivity growth performance in some network industries in Europe over the last ten years provides a perfect example of the positive impact on labour productivity growth of easing regulations and fostering competition. For example, in the telecommunication sector which was largely liberated in the course of the 1990s, hourly labour productivity grew on average by 8.5% in the euro area over the period 1996-2003 compared to 6.9% in the US. The euro area HICP index for telecommunications fell by 35% relative to the overall euro area HICP index in the period 1998-2005. The third prerequisite for higher growth in the euro area is the unlocking of business potential by creating an entrepreneurial-friendly economic environment. This includes lowering costs imposed by public sector administrations for existing firms and business start-ups. Let me illustrate this with some figures. According to the World Bank, in 2004, the average cost of starting a business with up to 50 employees in the euro area (excluding Luxembourg) is estimated to have been around ten times larger than in the US 12 . The policy implication of lowering business regulation is that EU countries can help to raise economic growth by avoiding an excessively restrictive regulatory environment for firms. The immense importance of this issue is increasingly appreciated by European governments and several initiatives at national or EU level have started to implement actions for a “better regulation”.

BIS Review 44/2006  1  considerably improved our understanding of what has happened in the mid nineties with the end of what has been called the Solow paradox… On this side of the Atlantic one can understand why we did not observe the same jump in labour productivity: on the one hand the share of I.T production in the GDP is significantly lower and, on the other hand, the absence of sufficient flexibility in the economy in general does not permit to benefit from the rapid diffusion of innovation in general and of I.T in particular in the other sectors of the economy. To sum it up Europe would still be in the Solow paradox. But there is a second paradox in the case of Europe or perhaps more than a paradox: a conundrum. Why is it that not only we did not improve our productivity when the US did it – around the mid eighties – but that we observed on the contrary a very significant diminishing of our productivity? This phenomenon seems to me only half understood through traditional explanations: the impact of specific policies aiming at drawing back to work a significant number of previously unemployed unskilled workers – with a low level of productivity – that have been launched in several European economies; and a degree of under-investment hampering the stock of capital allocated to each employee. But it explains only around half of the diminishing of the labour productivity growth.
All economic players benefit from lower interest rates: households, when they purchase a property, companies when they invest, but also governments and hence taxpayers. In addition, the euro has helped consolidate the European single market, by eliminating currency fluctuations for corporates, simplifying day-to-day life for citizens and promoting capital market integration. Lastly, the economic size of the euro area and the stability of its currency have enabled the euro to play an important international role. Today, the euro accounts for 20% of international reserves, second only to the US dollar. An internationally recognised currency generates economic gains: financial markets are more attractive to domestic and foreign investors, more liquid, and thus more efficient. But it also carries a political weight: when Mario Draghi speaks at the G7 or G20, the whole world listens to Europe attentively, just as when Janet Yellen speaks for the United States. Page 4 sur 6 Overall, this list of benefits is impressive, particularly when you think that the euro is only 19 years old. More importantly, we have come this far despite the global financial crisis, which triggered the deepest recession in three generations and despite the euro area sovereign debt crisis a few years later. The robust economic recovery in the euro-area now enables us to pursue a path of gradual normalisation of our monetary policy.

Indeed, the current turmoil has underscored the importance of robust liquidity management by banks, as well as the need for supervisory approaches which keep pace with structural market developments. Many initiatives with a view to addressing issues and risks arising from the recent financial market turbulence that go into the right direction have already been launched, both at the international level, namely by the Financial Stability Forum, and at the EU level, with the ECOFIN agreeing to a roadmap for action by 2008, and also by the private sector. They must be pursued now with even stronger impetus. In this respect, co-ordination at the global level should be ensured. In closely interlinked financial markets, any policy measure should be agreed to and consistently applied at the international level. Fifth, in the same vein, there is a need to reflect carefully on the “originate-anddistribute” business model. The period ahead is likely to provide a first material test of changing banking business models and the increased reliance on secured funding. Although currently profitable and well capitalised, many banks will experience income and credit losses, which may trigger a re assessment by some of them of the suitability of the so-called originate-and-distribute business model. The current episode has also shown that the transfer of credit risk outside the banking sector may ultimately not be effective. This is related with reputational and other concerns, which induce banks to take credit risk back onto their balance sheets.
Although the depreciation of the krone since September 2008 will redress the balance somewhat, we must nevertheless expect job losses in manufacturing. Indeed, recent years’ growth in this industry was an unexpected break in the long-term trend. Norwegian households have built up debt over many years. In the mid-1990s, debt was one fifth higher than income. In 2008, debt was twice as high as income. We have no clear basis for determining what constitutes sustainable debt. People today spend less of their income on basic necessities and have more to spend on their homes and mortgages. Changes in credit markets have provided greater opportunities to spread consumption over a lifetime. The public safety net is also gradually being expanded, which may lead to lower saving. BIS Review 16/2009  11  The experience of recent years nevertheless indicates that the level of debt is on the high side. Growth in private consumption slowed sharply when interest rates rose to more normal levels through 2007. Household debt is largely secured on residential property. When residential property falls in value – and we are probably not at the end of this road yet – consumers have less leeway. A larger number will want to reduce their debt, and banks will curtail lending. All in all, it must be expected that households will deleverage and be more cautious in their consumption and investment in the years ahead. It is easy to bury one’s head in the sand when the economic situation deteriorates.

The flow of liquidity has improved slightly, and interbank rates have fallen. In the US and Europe, these rates were more than 2 percentage points above the key rate in October last year, but now the gap has been halved. As a result, the low rates set by central banks are having a greater effect. In the US, mortgages and corporate loans have become cheaper after the Federal Reserve began to purchase bonds and commercial paper issued by mortgage banks and firms. In Germany, Sweden and Denmark, mortgage rates have decreased markedly. And in Norway, borrowing rates have fallen and credit to homebuyers is flowing again. Equity and commodity prices are still fluctuating widely, but the decline is no longer steep. BIS Review 16/2009  9  Lower key rates, higher public expenditure and reduced taxes will push up demand for goods and services, gradually stabilising output and employment and preventing inflation from becoming too low. There are also strong self-regulating mechanisms in market economies that can easily be underestimated when times are at their bleakest. Corporate profitability is being squeezed, but the rise in unemployment will result in lower wage growth, which will curb the impact on earnings. Investment is falling sharply, but there will in time be a need for new houses and commercial buildings and to replace obsolete machinery. Households all over the world are now increasing their saving and reducing debt. When debt eventually reaches a sustainable level, consumption will pick up.
Marzunisham Omar: Risk and opportunity – managing risk for development Welcoming remarks by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the WB-BNM Seminar on the World Development Report 2014 “Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development”, Kuala Lumpur, 29 April 2014. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to welcome you to Sasana Kijang this morning to the seminar on the World Development Report 2014, with the theme “Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development”. Reading through the Report, I’m struck by two observations: •  first, in the past 50 years, middle-income countries have been in recession 14 to 16 per cent of the time and low income countries, a staggering 27 per cent of the time. •  second, from 1970 to 2011, there were 147 banking crises in 116 countries. So, while the world has, in the last 50 years, made significant progress in terms of economic development, poverty eradication and overall standard of living, the above observation begs the question of whether the global economy is also more prone to crises, highlighting the fragility of the economic system that is currently in place. This reinforces the need to have a proper framework to identify and manage risks, towards achieving a common shared goal of sustaining long-term development. Almost six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the world economy is still coping with the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, notably the worst financial crisis in the last 70 years.

Today, four out 5 2/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  of the top 10 global exchanges are in Asia 5 and Asia contributes nearly half of the total number of IPOs globally6. During the same period, Asia’s bond market has grown at an annualized growth rate of 24% to reach USD 4.7 trillion in 2015, accounting for 9% of global corporate bond market outstanding volumes7. Some analysts8 estimate that the size of the financial system in Asia could reach USD 200 trillion by 2030. This is four times its current size and more than double the projected size of the U.S. financial system. Developments in global markets will be increasingly driven by Asia’s growing economic and financing needs. This is well-evidenced in the wealth management9 space. In 2015, as global high networth individual (HNWI) wealth grew at a modest 4% globally and just 2% in North America, Asia-Pacific wealth expanded by 10%. 2015 also became the year that AsiaPacific overtook North America for the first time to become the region with the most HNWI wealth and population globally10. HNWI growth in Asia-Pacific has doubled over the decade and if the trend persists, Asia-Pacific will represent two-fifths of the world’s HNWI wealth by 2025. In infrastructure financing, Asian financial institutions will be well placed to meet the significant financing needs of around USD 8 trillion of infrastructure projects in Asia, as estimated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In commodity markets, Asia’s influence has also grown stronger.
In this regard, I would like to point out that the inclusion of information technology developments in financial services is increasingly drawing the attention of central banks, regulatory and supervisory authorities worldwide. Both international and domestic practices show that a comprehensive approach through collaboration considerably supports the achievement of 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  effective and optimal results. A concrete example of aligned efforts in this regard is exactly the one in the field of payments. In this field, the measures undertaken by the Government of Albania for the digitalisation of government services and recently for the draft-law “on billing and monitoring system of circulation”, which aims at increasing and strengthening the fiscalisation of the Albanian economy, appear to fully harmonise with the initiatives undertaken by the Bank of Albania, through the National Payment System Committee, for modernising the payment market and increasing financial inclusion. The Bank of Albania has worked on drafting a new legal and regulatory framework, which aims at promoting digitalisation in the area of payment services. The compilation of the draft-law “On payment services” is considered as the first and crucial step in the framework of reforming and digitalising the small-value payments. In concrete terms, this draft-law is seen to considerably encourage the competition in the market, by providing a crucial contribution to the establishment of low cost services and easily accessible by the large public.

Dear ladies and gentlemen, The promotion of the above objectives is not only important for the functions of the Bank of Albania as the monetary authority, but it also provides an essential contribution to the economic development and welfare of the general public. All these developments would provide the expected effects only if they are based on measures in the framework of financial education of the public. Being aware that financial literacy constitutes a significant instrument for promoting the development of the market, for more than a decade, the central bank has been engaged in designing and developing educational programmes to address the needs of groups of interest. It is not a coincidence that the focus of central bank, in both, advanced and developing countries, is on enhancing financial literacy. Numerous studies have shown that financial education has multiple benefits. Being familiar with the basic financial and economic concepts, appropriately knowing and using banking products and financial instruments as well as the ability to manage personal and household finances, are crucial to achieve individual, and societal welfare. On the other hand, a well-informed financial decision of households helps central banks to accomplish their mandate in achieving price stability and safeguarding financial stability. A better understanding of monetary policy accelerates its effective transmission to the real economy. Meanwhile, the quality of decisions for financing or investment has a direct impact on the stability of the whole financial system.
It also started to become clear for old Taraldsen; but immediately afterwards, he became very confused again; because he understood the entire scope of this; he had the entire town's bills of exchange in his head; and of course he had seen a lot of this kind of thing during his long life but all of those were trifles compared to what would happen now. His voice shook as he almost ceremoniously asked: "Will Carsten Løvdahl's papers be protested?" "Yes," replied Marcussen without looking up. Old Taraldsen trotted out of the offices; but on the steps he met the messenger from Aktiebanken: "Is it true? – Taraldsen!" "Now the entire town is going to collapse," answered the old man, throwing up his arms in despair. Kielland’s description of a financial crisis and its consequences was realistic. There was speculation then and there is speculation today, but in other kinds of financial instruments than at that time. We might find employees at Lehman Brothers today who have expressed themselves in the same way as old Taraldsen. It seems to be an inherent property in financial markets that financial bubbles and crises occur from time to time. A monetary policy that is oriented towards stabilising inflation and inflation expectations will reduce the impact. We have seen that when the interest rate is raised to restrain the rise in prices for goods and services, it also has the effect of stabilising house and property prices. In some areas, however, regulations and frameworks – cf.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy from a historical perspective Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference to mark the 100th anniversary of the Association of Norwegian Economists, Oslo, 16 September 2008. The text may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by offering my congratulations to the Association of Norwegian Economists on its 100th anniversary. One hundred is a respectable age. In Norway, the introduction of a university degree in economics was certainly an important stimulus in the first part of the last century. In the period since the Second World War, major changes in society have increased the demand for expertise in the field of economics. And economists are constantly gaining new insights. This also applies to the field of central banking, even though one of the fundamental central bank responsibilities – to safeguard the value of money – was as important 100 years ago as it is today. Monetary policy in Norway has changed considerably over the past 100 years. The government, with the support of the Storting, has now defined an objective for monetary policy of low and stable inflation. Norges Bank sets its interest rate with a view to achieving price stability. This has not always been the case. Monetary policy in Norway  Norges Bank was established in 1816 and was placed directly under the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The government had no control or influence.