samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, the combination of the liquidity provided by the Bank, the State guarantees, various regulatory adjustments and the adequacy of the banking system, has contributed to commercial loans showing expansion rates above 10% by mid-year (Figure 12). This behavior of credit is very different from what was seen in past recessions. In fact, both in 1998 and in 2008, a few months after the period of negative activity variation started, commercial credit began to decline (Figure 13). Thus, to date, about 230 thousand loans have been granted to small and medium enterprises linked to these instruments. Also, almost 1.5 million restructurings have been made, 15% of which correspond to commercial credits. As reported in one of the boxes of this MP Report, the analysis at the individual firm level shows that a large number of these loans have reached the firms whose sales have been most affected by the pandemic. Evidence suggests that this access to credit has supported the operational continuity of these businesses and helped mitigate the drop in investment. For its part, the asset purchase program announced by the Central Bank in June has helped to improve financing conditions in the banking and corporate bond market. In this context, the outlook for investment has also improved with respect since the last MP Report, based on the recent evolution of imports of machinery and equipment, large-scale energy-related projects and the recently announced public investments and reactivation measures for the period 2021-22.

Among the services that will be available are advisory services on banking, insurance & takaful and SMEs financing related matters; retrieval of personal credit status through the Central Credit Reference Information System (CCRIS); and advisory on any other financial related matters under the purview of the Bank. The introduction of MobileLINK complements the series of consumer financial advisory initiatives that have been introduced by the Bank since 2005 with the establishment of BNMLINK at the Bank’s six offices; the Bank’s call center, BNMTELELINK; as well as BNMLINK mobile counter services in semi-urban areas to provide access of financial information and consumer redress mechanisms. The introduction of MobileLINK also provides a platform for enhancing financial literacy and financial capability of consumers to make well informed and responsible financial decisions and thus participate meaningfully and effectively in the financial system. Akhir kata, saya ingin merakamkan penghargaan kepada semua hadirin sekalian yang memberi sokongan kepada inisiatif “MobileLINK” ini. Kami berharap inisiatif ini akan dapat merealisasikan usaha Bank dalam mencapai rangkuman kewangan yang menyeluruh. Bagi mencapai objektif ini, kerjasama pihak yang hadir pada hari ini dengan Bank Negara Malaysia adalah dialu-alukan bagi memastikan usaha yang lebih bersepadu dan berkesan dapat digembleng bersama. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Swiss economic outlook The slower pace of global economic growth was also felt in Switzerland, with the first official GDP estimate indicating stagnation in the third quarter. Economic performance thus came in below expectations. This was mainly due to a slump in value added in trade and the financial sector. Growth in manufacturing was positive, but varied greatly from one sector to another. Aside from the strong Swiss franc, sluggish global manufacturing activity was also undoubtedly a factor. Demand for Swiss intermediate goods and equipment was particularly lacklustre. On closer examination, however, the economic situation appears somewhat more favourable. There are three reasons for this. First, growth was materially inhibited by an unusually sharp dip in energy output over the summer months, which had nothing to do with the economic cycle. The second reason concerns final demand, namely, that both private and public consumption as well as exports were up on the half of the year. And third, a range of other indicators leads to a somewhat more positive assessment of the economy. Nevertheless, capacity utilisation remains unsatisfactory, and demand for labour muted, with the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate having edged up from 3.3% to 3.4% since the last monetary policy assessment. As many companies have had to reduce prices considerably, margins remain a major source of concern. Recent months have seen numerous measures aimed at cutting production costs and increasing efficiency. According to the latest survey conducted by the SNB delegates for regional economic relations, these measures are now beginning to take effect.

Furthermore, rallying demand is likely to help ease pressure on margins in the coming months. We continue to expect a slow improvement of the economy. Our forecast for real growth in 2015 is unchanged at just under 1%. The global economy is likely to gather pace gradually over the course of 2016, and this should strengthen foreign demand for Swiss goods and services. Domestic demand is also likely to remain robust. For 2016 as a whole, we expect growth of approximately 1.5%. Interest rates, exchange rates and inflation expectations I will now review changes in monetary conditions and inflation expectations since the beginning of the year. When we discontinued the minimum exchange rate in January, the monetary policies of the major currency areas were set to diverge, and we were aware that this would have significant consequences for international monetary relations. This is exactly what came to pass, and is  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  clearly reflected in the exchange rate path of the Swiss franc against various currencies. While the Swiss franc/US dollar exchange rate is now virtually the same as it was at the end of 2014, the Swiss franc has appreciated 10% against the euro since the beginning of the year. The export-weighted Swiss franc exchange rate is about 8% higher than it was in January, having gained approximately 20% at times in the interim. In January, concurrently with the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate, we lowered the interest rate on sight deposits to –0.75%.
How could an individual understand the nature of the real world? There are two approaches suggested for this purpose, namely, classicism or romanticism. Classicism shows the world by means of its underlying form. It proceeds by reason or by laws governing Nature. If a motor car engine is presented to a classicist, he would be interested in finding out its underlying mechanism as determined by mechanical laws governing the working of the engine. A romantic, on the other hand, would simply be interested only on the outer surface of the world. He would look at the world from the point of its immediate appearance. Hence, a romantic would find a motor car engine with wires and cables strewn everywhere in a disorderly manner as a dull appearance. A person with a scientific mind would get himself embroiled in classicism and not in romanticism. This is because romanticism is concerned about emotions – feelings like biases, fears or prejudices which a scientist should avoid when undertaking a scientific inquiry. What is scientific method? Robert M Pirsig, the philosopher-novelist, in his novel titled Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, raises a very pertinent question regarding scientists and scientific inquiry. Is a sideway motorcycle mechanic a scientist? The answer depends on how the motorcycle mechanic would apply himself to the problem at hand. According to Pirsig, if a motorcycle mechanic does a lousy job, then he does not qualify himself to be called a scientist. There are many mechanics of this type.

Third, the boom was fueled by new financial products, such as collateralized debt obligations that were backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages. Investors misunderstood how risky these products were and this resulted in lower mortgage rates for non-conforming residential mortgages and lower funding costs for commercial real estate borrowing. In the housing sector, these factors interacted to create a strong reinforcing dynamic. The relaxation of underwriting standards that made it easier to become a homeowner and the low mortgage rates – supported in part by the new financial products – made it easier to speculate in real estate. Moreover, as home prices rose, household net worth increased, making households more willing to consume a greater share of their current income. Not surprisingly, this bout of speculative fever ended badly. Eventually, the supply of houses caught up with and then vastly overshot demand. Easing underwriting standards to support demand could only go on for so long. Prices turned down. At the national level, home prices peaked in late 2005 to early 2006 with commercial real estate prices peaking about one year later (Chart 8). From those peaks, home prices have fallen by about 30 percent on average, with much larger declines in some areas, while commercial real estate prices have fallen by about 40 percent on average. As price declines intensified, the number of serious mortgage delinquencies surged and, in fact, continue to rise (Chart 9).
But it brings very material benefits through increased competition as a result of greater transparency of prices and lower transactions costs, through broader and more liquid financial markets, and through the associated improvement in economic resource allocation. And there is no doubt that intra-European exchange rate certainty in particular will enhance the benefits to be derived from the European single market. Whether or not it is essential, therefore, most people would, I think, agree that, other things equal, the nominal exchange rate certainty that comes with the move to the single European currency is very desirable in this context. What then are the economic arguments against it? Essentially they can be summarised as the risk that the single monetary policy - the single, one-size-fits-all, short-term BIS Review 88/1998  -2-  interest rate within the euro area, which is a necessary corollary of the single currency - will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic needs of each of the euro-member countries. There is no doubt that such risk exists. It may result from cyclical divergence within the euro area, with some participating countries needing to stimulate domestic demand while others are already operating close to capacity. It may arise from differences in fiscal positions even though these are to be constrained through the Stability and Growth Pact. Or it may result from economic shocks of some sort that have a bigger impact on some countries than on others.

BIS Review 88/1998  -3-  And the potential for external shocks, with asymmetrical effects on different Euroland countries, of course remains. A particular worry is that macro-economic stability - vitally necessary though it is will not, on its own, be sufficient to prevent the persistence of unacceptably high levels of unemployment in a number of the major Continental European economies. Unemployment has been for some considerable time, and remains, much the most urgent and important economic issue confronting us in Europe. I do not suggest for a moment that the right answer would be to abandon macro-economic discipline and revert to old-fashioned demand management policies. In anything other than the very short term that would be likely to make matters worse. I share the broad consensus view that Europe’s unemployment problems originate essentially in rigidities on the supply-side of the economy. The point is that unless we are all more successful in bringing down this structural unemployment, through micro-economic policies designed to improve structural, supplyside flexibility, then some countries could find it difficult to continue to live with a common macroeconomic discipline without significant tensions. The nagging doubt is whether the necessary commitment to fiscal discipline, alongside monetary stability, will prove - in the terms of the Maastricht Treaty - to be sustainable.
Domestic demands have been helped not only by direct government spending, but also by other government schemes that injected funds directly to the grass roots. We had the Bht 74 billion village fund (approx $ 1.7 billion) whereby each village had been allocated Bht one million to on lend to village members, often under group mutual guarantees. We also had the micro loan scheme organised by the Government Savings Bank, the government owned bank, which lend directly to the poor. Ladies and gentlemen, The good news went on. Despite the strong recovery, we have been able to keep inflation under check. Headline inflation for 2002 was 0.7% and core inflation 0.4%. The adverse affect from high oil prices has not translated into much inflation. BIS Review 8/2003  1  Our currency was also quite stable. For the whole of 2002, the bath appreciated against the US dollar by less than 2%, which was quite modest compared to other Asian currencies. The international reserves level was also ample at $ 38.9 billion, allowing us to aim to pay back all the loans under the IMF program by the end of July this year. Moreover, three major credit rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings, all assigned better outlook to the Thai economy. Japan Credit Rating Agency did in fact upgrade Thailand’s sovereign rating from BBB to BBB+ last November. Such widespread improvement in confidence among consumers, entrepreneurs, and investors helped support both consumption and investment throughout the year.

Any partner of a bank had the duty and right to warn against and take steps to constrain another partner from taking excessive risks, if such risks could bring down not just the culprit but all the partners who were jointly responsible for the well-being of the firm. In contrast, in modern times, banks operate predominantly in the form of limited companies, often listed on stock exchanges, with very diverse public ownership. Senior managers who run the bank do not have most of their personal worth tied up in the firm and the prospects for life-long employment have become few and far between. Nowadays (in particular during the period preceding the GFC), senior bank managers are generally rewarded by a combination of very high salaries coupled with very substantial annual bonuses tied to performance in the preceding year. Even where share options are included in their remuneration packages, the lock up or vesting period is relatively short – just a couple of years at most. The effect of this change is that the previously strong alignment of long term interest between bankers and customers has been materially weakened, leading to the classic situation of an agency problem, with the bank management using depositor funds to leverage up the scale of business while the downside risk that they face in doing so is limited.
A financial meltdown was avoided and the effects on the real economy seem to have been negligible. In the 1990s, the global monetary policy picture has in many countries been very different compared to the 1980s. Low inflation seems to have become the norm rather than the exception. If monetary policy is successful in providing price stability, does that mean that the risk of financial instability will be smaller? In order for a financial crisis to have severe effects on the real economy, substantial financial imbalances must have been allowed to build up during the preceding period. In other words, monetary policy makers must have seen no reason or been unable to prevent these imbalances from building up. Thus, an important question is whether a monetary policy for price stability will indirectly prevent excessive debt accumulation in the economy? In other words, how likely is it that large imbalances will have time to build up before the central bank judges that its inflation target is threatened and therefore raises interest rates? Can large imbalances materialise without inflationary pressure building up? BIS Review 50/2000  2  A related question is whether the choice of monetary policy strategy has a bearing on the risk of financial imbalances and financial crises? For example, will a monetary policy based on a simple policy rule lead to a lower or higher risk of financial imbalances building up compared to a more discretionary policy?

Will an inflation targeting regime lead to a larger or smaller risk of imbalances building up compared to a monetary targeting regime? These highly relevant questions are being asked by a number of central banks in emerging markets that have recently been forced to abandon a fixed exchange rate policy that was no longer sustainable. The papers to be presented at this conference will hopefully throw some light on a number of the questions I have raised here this morning. I look forward to learning what our distinguished guests have to say on these matters. 3  BIS Review 51/2000
It initially relied on outside investment advisors to support its first purchase program, before eventually bringing trading operations in house, and then later developing capabilities to conduct auctions on its proprietary auction platform.44  Conclusion The Federal Reserve and other central banks initially proceeded with asset purchases in a cautious way given that the tool was new. However, I believe we have learned that the benefits are notable and the costs likely less than feared. Moreover, U.S. fixed income markets were able to withstand more sizable purchase operations than we initially anticipated, and we now know that we can successfully maintain interest rate control with a large balance sheet as we raise rates. This experience could give policymakers greater confidence in using this tool to provide additional monetary policy accommodation in future zero lower bound episodes, and give market participants greater confidence in the effectiveness of the tool in mitigating the zero lower bound. With evidence suggesting the neutral fed funds rate has fallen notably, we should continue to absorb lessons from our and other central banks’ experiences. In particular, we will need to consider the importance of communications, how to organize an operating regime that transitions smoothly, and how to maintain operational readiness. As we normalize the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, we continue to proceed cautiously given our lack of experience with this process.

Adjustments and increased volatility recently observed in international financial markets are other factors to consider in this conjuncture, and their implications will depend critically on how they will ultimately affect the future inflation trajectory. We have the luxury of having a well-established macro/financial framework that permits us to be well prepared to face turbulences as they occur. BIS Review 97/2007  9
But it is important to be aware that the results in this literature depend, of course, on the assumptions, which are often relatively simple and stylised. Therefore, the relevance of the theoretical results to the practical conduct of monetary policy is also uncertain! We look at theory with considerable interest, albeit with a certain degree of Brainardian caution. Summary The government has defined a mandate for monetary policy that involves flexible inflation targeting. In addition to ensuring that inflation is close to 2.5 per cent over time, monetary policy shall also contribute to stabilising developments in output and employment. Monetary policy cannot influence the potential output level, but can dampen fluctuations around this level. In this way, monetary policy can contribute to stabilising developments in output and employment. Inflation cannot be controlled exactly, but it is relatively simple to measure how far it is from the target. It is more demanding to measure the gap between actual output and potential output. In our operational conduct of monetary policy, we normally set the interest rate with a view to maintaining inflation at 2.5 per cent two years ahead. Due to uncertainty, we usually proceed gradually. In our opinion, this response pattern will normally result in a reasonable trade-off between stabilising inflation around the target and stabilising output and employment. 15  Brainard, W. (1967) “Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy,” American Economic Review, 57 (2), May 1967, pp 411425. 16  See Söderström, U. (2000): “Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters”, ECB Working Paper No. 13, February 2000.

The borrowing terms that a country’s Treasury enjoys from foreign creditors generally serve as a floor for the interest rate offered to the private sector. This makes it crucial to restore the Treasury’s good credit rating. Not only will this pave the way for domestic enterprises to external financing, it will also significantly reduce the likelihood of a fire sale of domestic assets once the capital controls are lifted. The principal task of the economic recovery programme drafted in co-operation with the IMF is to restore confidence in the Treasury’s ability to meet its foreign currency obligations. How can this be done? First, by practicing sufficient fiscal restraint to convince financial markets that, despite a temporary spike in indebtedness in the wake of the banks’ collapse, the Treasury will be fully capable of meeting its international obligations; i.e., that its debt position is sustainable for the long term. Second, the Treasury has to demonstrate that it has access to sufficient foreign currency reserves to repay, if it comes to the crunch, loans maturing over the next two years. We still are just short of reaching this position, as efforts to achieve it have been delayed for reasons known to all of us. Here it is important to bear in mind the  2  BIS Review 64/2010  common saying that banks, domestic as well as international, are ready to offer you an umbrella on a sunny day, only to demand it back promptly once the rain starts to fall.