samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In order to put such belief into a concrete form, the Bank of Thailand has announced guidelines supporting the practice of good corporate governance of banks’ Board and management. 5. Conclusion  The discussion thus far has covered various aspects of the question posed to me - what do regulators really want? - By now you will have already known my answers to this question. In essence, it is our hope that industry participants will make their best effort to do their job as well as we do ours to meet the challenges set out in the Financial Sector Master Plan: •  Providing financial services for all potential users indiscriminately to those in urban and rural areas, whereby viable users with simple needs and those with more sophisticated needs have access to financial products and services commensurate to their depth of financial literacy and risk appetite at reasonable price. •  Developing a competitive, efficient, stable, and balanced financial system  •  Fostering fairness and protection for customers whereby financial institutions follow good corporate governance principles and consumers receive adequate information and advice from various financial institutions to make informed investment decisions. Thank you. 6  BIS Review 22/2004

In the UK we have experienced a sharp and broad-based slowdown in activity that gathered momentum in the autumn (Chart 4). In part that reflected the concerted credit squeeze that started in summer 2007. But we also saw a sharp drop in confidence among consumers and companies after the crisis in the banking system which followed the decision to allow Lehman Brothers to fail in September last year. A similar drop in confidence has been observed across the world – in China and India as much as in the West – and we are now in the throes of a severe and coordinated contraction worldwide (Chart 5). Even those countries which sat out the excesses of the credit boom  2  BIS Review 5/2009  have been affected by the slowdown. Around the globe, sectors like manufacturing which are heavily dependent on world trade have been particularly badly hit by the ebb tide of global demand. In the United States, the ISM survey of manufacturing activity posted a near thirty year low in December. And in Japan, the November fall in industrial production was the largest percentage contraction on record. The recent industrial production figures from Germany, France and Italy tell a similar story. The outlook for the remainder of 2009 The immediate prospects in the UK, as elsewhere, remain difficult.
Exchange rate developments after the introduction of the euro  6  BIS Review 90/2001  Before the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, it was assumed that the establishment of a large currency area in Europe could result in more substantial exchange rate fluctuations than earlier. Foreign trade for EMU as a whole accounts for a smaller portion of the economy than for Germany, for example. The focus on exchange rate changes could thus be expected to fade. The Norwegian krone would also be affected by such increased fluctuations. For Norway and other countries on the rim of the euro area, exchange rate fluctuations have not increased since the introduction of the euro. To the contrary, the effective exchange rates for pound sterling, the Swiss franc, the Swedish krona and the Norwegian krone have varied somewhat less than in the period 1996-1999. These currencies have also fluctuated somewhat less against the euro than they did against the German mark the last few years before 1999. Market participants also seem to assess the risk of future short-term fluctuations in the krone exchange rate against the euro as fairly moderate. This uncertainty, which is indicated by the costs of hedging against future exchange rate fluctuations in the short term, is now relatively limited for the Norwegian krone compared with other currencies on the rim of the euro area. BIS Review 90/2001  7  Changes in the terms of trade are an important source of exchange rate fluctuations.

This experience of slow recovery and persistently low inflation is a symptom of a deeper problem afflicting advanced economies—the root cause of which is a combination of low neutral interest 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  rates and the lower bound on interest rates, a topic to which I now turn. What’s Past Is Prologue Underlying these events has been a sea change in the supply side of economies, owing to fundamental shifts in demographics and productivity growth. Two demographic trends are evident: People are generally living longer and population growth is slowing. Overall life expectancy in member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has increased from about 65 years in the 1950s to nearly 80 years today, and is projected to exceed 90 years by the end of this century (Figure 6). 1 Despite this increase in longevity, dwindling birth rates are bringing population growth to a standstill. In OECD countries, population growth averaged over 1 percent back in the 1950s and 1960s, but is now running at half a percent per year, and is expected to gradually fall before dipping into negative figures by 2070 (Figure 6).2 When it comes to productivity, the changes are no less dramatic. In OECD economies, growth in labor productivity—the amount produced per worker hour—has averaged a little over 1 percent per year since 1995, about half the pace seen over the prior decade (Figure 7).
In addition, there are about 130 Islamic unit trusts issued in Malaysia. Thirdly, there are two Shariah-compliant real estate investment trust (REIT) listed on the stock exchange – a hospital REIT and an oil palm  2  BIS Review 57/2008  plantation REIT. Finally, Asia's first Islamic exchange traded fund (ETF) was issued in January 2008 valued at the equivalent of USD262.5 million. A second foreign currency tranche is expected to be launched later in the year which is open for participation of international investors. In relation to this, Malaysia maintains a liberal foreign exchange administration regime where investors are freely able to obtain ringgit and foreign currencies to fund their investments. There continues to be free mobility of inward and outward movement of funds relating to both foreign direct investment and portfolio investments. Having developed a comprehensive Islamic financial system that is supported by the legal, Shariah and regulatory infrastructure, the Islamic financial landscape has been liberalised with the entry of new international players. In addition, the foreign equity ceiling in Islamic financial institutions has also been raised to a maximum of 49 percent as part of the effort to promote strategic alliances. New licences are also being offered for International Islamic Banks and International Takaful Operators to conduct the full range of Islamic banking business or takaful and retakaful business in international currencies. These institutions may be established as a branch or subsidiary and are accorded a tax holiday until 2016.

Economic and business environment in Malaysia Malaysia has entered this period of global uncertainty from a position of strength. In 2007, the Malaysian economy expanded by 6.3 percent, the fastest pace in the past three years. This has been largely due to strong domestic demand from the private and public sectors. This is also the result of the increasingly more diversified structure of the Malaysian economy. This growth has also been achieved with relative price stability, high level of savings at 38 percent of the GDP, and a strong external balance with international reserves that is now exceeding USD120 billion. The Malaysian economy is expected to sustain a growth of 5 to 6 percent in 2008. Malaysia has an open economy with a strong commitment to promote international trade and investment. Malaysia with a population of over 26 million is ranked among the top 20 trading nations in the world that offers a wide range of world class products. The volume of trade activities in Malaysia is now about two times the size of our economy with the ratio of trade to GNP being among the highest in the world. Not too long ago, Malaysia's total trade has breached the RM1 trillion mark or USD320 billion, reflecting the robustness of the economy. Malaysia has also been an important destination for foreign direct investment for more than a hundred years. In 2007, Malaysia was ranked the 16th most attractive destination for such investment.
I will then discuss the risks and challenges facing the Thai economy, especially those relating to volatile international capital movements and their impact on the Thai baht in the short term and in building resiliency and enhancing productivity for the longterm. Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me start with the global picture. For a number of years now, we have witnessed strong global growth driven mainly by growth in the US economy and in emerging markets, particularly non-Japan Asia. During this same period, we have also seen growing global imbalances with the rest of the world financing the US’s growing current account deficits. There is yet no consensus on how this global financial imbalance will unwind, but everyone expects that a large dollar correction will be part of the unwinding process, which will impact on financial markets and exchange rates worldwide. My view is that we are likely to see more market jitters along the unwinding process of this global imbalance. Indeed, for the last couple years, we have already experienced large magnitude of capital fluctuations and exchange rate volatilities. This year alone, we have observed two episodes, in February and again in August, of the shift toward greater risk aversions, with sharp falls in the stock markets across the world, from New York to Shanghai, and Bangkok included. At this juncture, there seems to be an increasing disconnect between global growth and financial stability.

pdf Haldane (2014), “Central Bank Psychology”, Speech given at the ‘Leadership: stress and hubris conference’, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech776.pdf Heckman, J (2006), “Investing in Disadvantaged Young Children is an Economically Efficient Policy” available here: http://jenni.uchicago.edu/Australia/invest-disadv_2005-1222_247pm_awb.pdf Iaryczower, M, Lewis, G and Shum, M (2013) “To elect or to appoint? bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians”. Journal of Public Economics 97, 230–244. Ingalhalikar, M, Smith, A, Parker, D, Satterthwaite, T, Elliott, M, Ruparel, K, Hakonarson, H, Gur, R, Gur, R and Verma R (2014), “Sex differences in the structural connectome of the human brain”, Proceedings of the National Academiy of Sciences of the United States of America Vol 111 No. 2 Joel D, Berman Z, Tavor I, Wexler N, Gaber O, Stein Y, Shefi N, Pool J, Urchs S, Margulies D, Liem F, Hänggi J, Jäncke L, Assaf Y (2015), “Sex beyond genitalia: the human brain mosaic”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Vol 112 No 50 Kahneman, D (2012), ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’, ISBN: 978-0141033570 Karlan, D and List, J (2007), “Does price matter in charitable giving? Evidence from a largescale natural field experiment”, American Economic Review 97:5 pages 1774–93. Lagarde, C (2014), “The Economic Power of Women’s Empowerment”, Keynote speech, Tokyo, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2014/091214.htm Land, G and Jarman, B (1993), “Breaking Point and Beyond”, San Francisco: HarperBusiness. Land, G (2011), “The failure of success”, TEDxTucson available on youtube.
The first step was usually to see whether a healthy bank was able and willing – or at least able and persuadable – to buy the distressed bank’s business. Examples here range from acquisitions of smaller institutions by much larger ones, such as Santander’s acquisition of Alliance and Leicester; to mergers between two large lenders, such as Lloyds TSB’s with Halifax Bank of Scotland and, in the United States, Bank of America’s merger with Merrill Lynch. There were some hasty shotgun weddings. The great attractions of finding a buyer for a failing institution are of course that it both ensures continuity of service provision and avoids triggering deposit guarantees or use of public funds. Depositors find themselves banking with a different bank but access to services  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  is maintained. And there is continuity in the provision of lines of credit, including through overdraft arrangements to households and corporates. There are, however, two big risks. First, mergers can concentrate supply and so damage competition particularly if both the distressed bank and the rescuer are relatively large. In the UK, the largest six banks and building societies now account for 80% of the outstanding household and corporate lending, up from 65% at the start of 2008. And second, the rescue mission can go badly wrong if rather than pull the failing operation up it pulls the purchaser down.

In the end, disorderly liquidation looks to have left unsecured creditors in the holding company with a recovery of around 20 cents on the dollar. The last resort, if no white knight can be persuaded to come forward and if the contagion caused by administration was simply too dangerous, was to use public funds to attempt to recapitalise and resurrect a failing bank. Although it was the last resort, it was also probably the most common. For the UK, this proved to be the only option available for what had, before the crisis, been three of largest five UK lenders. Given these banks accounted for some 40% of lending to the UK economy – and scarred by the chaos in the aftermath of Lehman – the government  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  was left with little option but to make a huge £ injection of funds to shore their capital position. The intervention was successful in stabilising the situation but UK taxpayers are still counting the cost. Today, the government’s stake in RBS, equivalent to economic ownership of a little over 80% of the group, is worth around £ a loss of over 25% on the funds injected. The UK was not alone. The US injected over $ of preferred stock into financial institutions, including a number of the largest firms. On the continent, the three Benelux countries injected € in a part-Nationalisation of Fortis; France, Belgium and Luxembourg injected € of capital into Dexia.
The City of London has been making a positive and constructive contribution to their development by doing what it does best: providing a lead through innovation; and setting the standard for excellence. As a result, all the available evidence continues to indicate that, since the launch of the euro, London has fully maintained its market share. Let me give you a few figures. •  There are 482 foreign banking institutions in London, around double the number in Frankfurt, and more than double the number in Paris. •  The wholesale euro payment system in London, CHAPS euro, has recently accounted for 19% by value of cross-border payment flows in TARGET, the pan-European payment system. This figure has grown from 15% since the launch of the euro, and the UK now accounts for more crossborder payment flows in euro than any other country, except for Germany, even though the UK is not participating in EMU. •  London is estimated to have a 32% share of global foreign exchange turnover, compared with 5% for Germany and 4% for France. •  London's global market share of over-the-counter derivatives is around 35%, compared with 5% for Germany and 6% for France. •  Over 98% of the euro short-term interest rate contracts on the three major European derivatives exchanges (in London, Frankfurt and Paris) are traded on LIFFE.

Helping to develop deep and liquid euro markets is arguably the main contribution that we in the UK can make to the success of the euro from the 'outside'. And in this sense, the UK has been making a positive and constructive contribution. Deep and liquid euro markets have become well established in London. They have replaced the previous, more segmented, markets in the old national currencies (like the Deutsche mark and the French franc). As a result, the European Union has begun to achieve one of its objectives in introducing a single currency in place of the old national currencies. The City is pioneering the changes in the euro markets The volatility in the euro exchange rate has diverted attention from the structural changes taking place in the euro markets. Yet these changes are of fundamental importance. They will affect all businesses using the euro - Japanese businesses as much as UK and euro area businesses. I would like briefly to mention five of these structural changes. It is of course important to recognise, as I do so, that while the euro has been the catalyst for these changes it is not the only cause. But in each case, the City of London has been playing a leading role as a centre of innovation and excellence. The first change is the growth of euro issuance - particularly in the private sector, as the financing needs of euro-area governments are limited by fiscal discipline and special influences, such as the proceeds of mobile phone auctions.
The results of inflation targeting My retrospective begins in autumn 1992, when the krona moved from a fixed exchange rate to a floating rate. It was then important to find a new anchor for monetary policy as rapidly as possible. The alternative chosen was inflation targeting. In January 1993 the Riksbank stated in a press release that the change in CPI inflation would in future be limited to 2 per cent a year with a tolerance interval of ± 1 percentage point. The floating exchange rate and the inflation target constituted a drastic changeover of monetary policy. There were also a number of problems in the initial stages. The decision to introduce inflation targeting was controversial and much criticised in the public debate. Naturally, the Riksbank had no experience of this type of monetary policy regime and even in countries where it was already established it was a relatively new phenomenon. Moreover, the experiences of Swedish stabilisation policy in both the monetary policy and fiscal policy fields during the 1970s and 1980s were less than positive. This meant that there was considerable opposition at first and many believed the new regime would be short-lived. The Riksbank had to balance the need to create confidence in the new, price stability-based regime against the need to conduct less restrictive monetary policy to soften the effects of the economic crisis. It was a difficult starting point for many reasons, including the fact that public finances were in very poor shape. There were also problems with inflation.

I recall that some economists wanted to interpret the high level of unemployment following the crisis years as an indication that the changeover of monetary policy regime had raised the economy's equilibrium unemployment level and caused a permanent deterioration in employment. However, once the crisis had been overcome and the new policy was established, the labour market situation soon improved. Unemployment is currently around 4-5 per cent, which can be compared with figures of above 8 per cent in the mid-1990s. However, we still have some way to go to return to what was considered full employment prior to the crisis years 1991-93. 2  BIS Review 9/2004  2. GDP growth in Sweden 1970-2002 7  7 Annual growth Average 1970-1989 Average 1995-2001  6 5  6 5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  -3  -3  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the  All of this has been achieved parallel with a low inflation rate and during the period as a whole inflation has been in line with the Riksbank's target. From 1993 to the present day, the increase in CPI inflation has averaged 1.9 per cent, while the measure of underlying inflation on which we usually choose to base our monetary policy decisions - UND1X - has risen by an average of 2.1 per cent.
Faced with this situation, the digital euro could be a vehicle for retaining the option whereby citizens have access to the central bank’s safe money and avoiding the risks that would arise from total dependence on private means of payment. However, before launching a digital euro we must resolve many questions. Only thus will we be in a position to respond to the challenges and react swiftly where necessary. For one thing, we have to acquire practical experience regarding the possibilities technology offers for the operational design of this digital euro. Within the Eurosystem we must consider, among other matters, what the most appropriate technology would be, how we should shape it to ensure maximum resilience and how we would have to involve the private sector in the provision of the digital euro. Purely technical issues aside, we must further analyse the macroeconomic and financial consequences of a digital euro in the different scenarios identified, as there are basic aspects regarding the potential impact of the digital euro on the economy that would have to be clarified before taking a decision on issuing it. By way of example, I would highlight the need to minimise the adverse impact that potential banking disintermediation would have on financial stability, or the possible effects of the digital euro on situations of financial instability. These aspects probably require an additional analytical push to ensure that these unwanted secondary effects can be avoided.

In any event, I believe the Eurosystem’s current position does not differ substantially from that of those central banks that are immersed in a similar line of thought. Where we may diverge somewhat more is the pace at which we are moving, largely as a result of the different state we are in relative to the scenarios indicated. For instance, in the Nordic countries the diminished use of cash is already a fact. Likewise, means of payment in China  10  https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SPA/sispago/ficheros/es/estadisticas.pdf. 13  appear to be tending towards concentration in ecosystems managed by a small group of local technological giants outside the traditional banking system. What this discussion shows is the need we central banks have to understand the changes the economy is facing as a result of the digital transformation and, most particularly, to appreciate the scale of their impact on the financial sector. The importance of the functions assigned to us both in monetary policy and in payment systems means our action must always have the broadest consensus and be preceded by rigorous and in-depth analysis. Squaring the rigour of our decisions in areas of undeniable importance for society at large with the flexibility and swiftness of response that a rapidly transforming economy demands poses a challenge. To resolve this challenge we must call on our capacity to anticipate these situations so as to be able to analyse them in good time and in all their depth.