samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Last year, the Ministry decided that the Fund should prepare the ground for investing in real estate at 5 per cent of the strategic benchmark portfolio. In time, this may reduce the fixed income share to 35 per cent. Under the Fund’s investment strategy, more equities are purchased when equity prices fall and fewer when prices rise. Thus, the Fund purchased a large volume of equities in the  BIS Review 58/2009  3  period 2001-2003 and is buying a considerable volume now. Of the equities now held, 40 per cent were acquired in 2008 when prices were falling. The Fund currently owns a little more than 1¼ per cent of listed European equities, and the Fund’s average ownership share in international equity markets was ¾ per cent at the turn of the year, with allocations to equities accounting for close to 50 per cent at that time. The Government Pension Fund – Global is invested in almost 7900 equities and bonds from 2200 different issuers. Although the Fund is well diversified, its size means that it will have large individual positions in capital markets. The largest equity holdings include multinational companies like Royal Dutch Shell, Nestlé, BP, Exxon Mobil Corporation and Novartis, to name a few. Since summer 2008, the Ministry of Finance has allowed the Fund to hold up to 10 per cent of a company’s shares.

34, No. 1-2, pp. 219-251. Haldane, A and McMahon, M (forthcoming), ‘Central Bank Communications and the General Public’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. Kynaston, D (2017), Till Time’s Last Sand: A History of the Bank of England 1694-2013, Bloomsbury Publishing. Tetlock, P and Gardner, D (2016), Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction, Broadway Books. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11
Page 19 of 27  Figure 11 International cost of maritime freight (1)  Commodity prices  (dollars per a 20-foot container)  (index 2002-2021 average=100)  4,200  Foods (2)  600  3,500  Iron (3)  Lumber (4)  500  2,800  400  2,100  300  1,400  200  700  100  0  0 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  18  20  (1) Weekly data from Shanghai Containerized Freight Index that weights the prices of 15 routs from Shanghai, for a 20-foot container. (2) Bloomberg Commodity Spot Index. (3) S&P GSCI Agricultural & LiveStock Index Spot CME. (4) Import spot prices of iron ore on Qingdao Port, China. (5) Prices of lumber futures contracts, in dollars per thousand board feet. Source: Bloomberg. Figure 12 Headline and core inflation (*) (annual variation, percent) CPI  Core CPI  6 5 4 3 2 1 0 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  (*) Core CPI represents 65.1% of the total CPI basket. For details, see Box IV.1 in December 2019 MP Report, and Carlomagno and Sansone (2019). Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

Monetary policy orientation  The recent improvement in the economy’s performance, the significant boost to domestic demand, the imbalances in the dynamics of spending and production, together with cost pressures, will influence the behavior of prices. How much will correspond to temporary effects and how much to more persistent ones will be key to determine the correct degree of expansion of the monetary policy stance, in order to ensure that the recovery of the economy is sustainable and continues to unfold in an environment of stable prices. In the immediate future, the Board estimates that the economy is still suffering from the impact of the pandemic and the lag of the labor market in the recovery. However, the high dynamism that consumption already exhibits and the additional boost to private spending represent major changes in the macroeconomic scenario of the coming months, making it necessary to recalibrate the expansionary nature of monetary policy going forward. In particular, the expected higher growth in spending and activity will make it less necessary for the monetary impulse to support the economy’s recovery with the current intensity, and it should begin to gradually moderate sooner than we anticipated in the last Report. This will help to avoid the buildup of inflationary pressures at a particularly sensitive time of the recovery. It is important to bear in mind that inflation is particularly detrimental to middle- and low-income households, which do not have the purchasing power and asset protection mechanisms available to the better-off.
BIS Review 33/1997  - 12 -  Figure 1  i nt e re s t r at e s 3  2  b ra nc h n e t wor k  1  b an k i n g s u p e rv i s i on  0  p a y me n t s y s t em  g o v e r n me n t d eb t  Figure 2  i n t er es t ra t es  b r an ch n et w or k  ba nk i n g su p e r v i s i o n  UK US  p a y m en t sy st e m  govve rn men t go de bt  Fr a nce G e r m an y Ja p a n  BIS Review 33/1997  - 13 -  Figure 3  i n t er es t ra t es  ba nk i n g su p e r v i s i o n  b r an ch n et w or k  H u n g ar y Po la n d  p a y m en t sy st e m  Slo v e nia  govve rn men t go de bt  C zec ech h r e pu blilic c Slo v a k ia  Figure 4  1/3, 000  1/10 10,,000  1 00 ,000 Russia India  1/30 30,,000  USA Germany France Italy Poland Japan UK  1 0, 000  Belgium  Czech R  Portugal  Norway  1 , 0 00  Finland Ireland  Hungary Bulgaria  Austria  Spain Canada  Australia Netherlands  Romania  Sweden Switzerland Denmark  NZ  1 00 1  10  1 00  1 , 0 00  Po pula tion milli illio ons (log sc ale )  BIS Review 33/1997  - 14 -  Figure 5 R uss ssiia Fr an ce Ge r m a ny I ta l y P o l a nd US A N e th e r l a nd s A u s tr a l i a Sp a in C a na d a UK R o m a ni a Ja p a n I n di a  0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  St aff p er mililll io n po p ula ti o n  Figure 6  0 .

We have given advice principally on core functions such as monetary policy and operations, the development of money markets and payment systems, the management of government debt, and banking supervision; but our help has also been sought in some less obvious matters such as the physical security of central bank buildings and their contents. The assistance is provided through our experts visiting other central banks and by their staff coming on study visits to London, as well as through seminars and workshops here and abroad. In the earlier years most of these events were essentially training courses. But increasingly the participants from many countries are able to contribute more themselves to the discussion so that they are now learning not only from our own experience as central bankers, BIS Review 33/1997  -2-  but also from each other. And in some instances, their experience may well hold lessons for us. Since 1990 over 4,000 staff of other central banks - two thirds of them from the transition economies - have participated in these various events. The work of the Centre for Central Banking Studies, and the other inter-bank links we maintain (notably between supervisors) give us, I believe, a privileged perspective on the development of central banking across Europe. The analysis below - particularly the Eastern European sections - is very largely the work of Lionel Price, the Centre’s Director, and his staff.
The IMF has an experience of at least 5 decades in analysing the economies of its members, 185 countries at present, and such a capacity is rather difficult to build. 7. Expansionary measures should be accompanied by exit strategies from the very beginning. History has shown that expansionary measures taken in order to exit an economic crisis do have side effects in terms of inflation. The lesson learned from the '70s is that protracted expansionary policies resulted in high levels of inflation and public debt, the reduction of which called for tight monetary policies, which resulted in relatively low average economic growth. This lesson, along with that learned from other episodes which were addressed similarly, shows that the measures to weather the crisis should be based on the objective of ensuring medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability and price stability. In practice, this means that anti-crisis measures should be accompanied by credible exit strategies from the measures that are now necessary to support the financial sector and provide renewed impetus to global demand. From this perspective, the recent meeting of the G20 leaders is encouraging. On the one hand, there were discussions regarding expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, including the use of unconventional monetary instruments, and, on the other hand, the objectives of ensuring medium- and long-term fiscal sustainability and price stability, with a special emphasis on drawing up credible exit strategies from the measures that are now necessary to underpin the financial sector and give a new impetus to global demand. 8.

Following practice in the USA, we encourage banks to pre-position collateral with us. It is only prudent to do so. Banks’ boards, as well as their supervisors, should take an interest in this as part of ensuring banks have sensible contingency funding plans. The Bank also holds a monthly auction of funds against a reasonably wide range of collateral. The size of those auctions could be increased to cope with stressed markets, and we are ready to do so where desirable. Access to our liquidity-insurance facilities remains confined to banks, as monetary institutions. But as I noted earlier, non-banks – including money funds and finance companies – turned to central banks for liquidity during the 2007–08 crisis. The prevalence of non-bank banks as they used to be called, or shadow banks as they are now known, was a deep faultline in the international financial system. Things cannot be left where they are. The status quo was deeply unsatisfactory, and if we do nothing it will be made worse by the re-regulation of the banking system, which creates powerful incentives to reinvent the economic substance of banking beyond the perimeter of prudential regulation and supervision. The authorities internationally, led by the FSB and with the active involvement of Adair Turner and myself, are debating how to tackle the phenomenon of “shadow banking”. A preliminary, but I hope substantive report will go to G20 Ministers and Governors in October.
One possibility could be to discuss the consequences of part of the infrastructure being temporarily out of order, and how the negative effects of this could be limited. The focus on consequences means that it would be possible for the business continuity and crisis recovery planning to manage a large percentage of possible crisis scenarios. Summary A payment system with effective resilience to shocks is of critical importance to the economy and to society. However, the resilience of the payment system depends on investments from individual agents, which each have their own objectives rather than those of the economy as a whole. This makes it important for the Riksbank to participate and work to ensure that the resilience of the payment system as a whole remains on a reasonable level with regard to the social economy. There is some gain for the commercial organisations to have a good resilience to shocks as recurring disruptions at one agent will lead to customers changing to a different agent. This also means that it is rational to invest in cooperation with those on whom the agent is dependent to supply its service. One can reason in a similar manner with regard to the resilience of the system as a whole. The advantages of an improvement in the resilience of the payment system will benefit everyone, but to achieve a sufficiently strong resilience it is necessary to cooperate. Here the Riksbank and other authorities have an important task in explaining and acting as catalysts for cooperation.

•  Banks in the region could face higher non-performing loans. They could also face reduced US Dollar funding if there are large capital outflows from ASEAN. •  But their liquidity and capital positions are generally sound and they should be able to weather this. ASEAN growth story still good Over the medium to long term, ASEAN is expected to remain among the fastest growing regions in the world. Last year, the combined GDP of ASEAN was close to $ trillion – larger than India. •  The ASEAN-4 – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines – are projected to grow by at least 4% per annum on average over the next five years. •  It could be as high as 6% if ASEAN becomes more integrated and these countries successfully implement structural reforms to raise productivity and competitiveness. For banks in ASEAN, it is not just the size and growth of the economies that matter. It is the composition of that growth and demand. Rising incomes and the agglomeration effects of urbanisation will significantly expand the ranks of the middle class in ASEAN. •  In 2010, ASEAN had a population of 600 million, with around a quarter making up the middle class. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  In 2030, ASEAN will have a population of 700 million, with about two-thirds attaining middle class status. •  In other words, the size of the middle class will swell by as much as three times over two decades.
On the external balance, the more diversified exports and markets has allowed the balance of payments position to remain sound. Thus, despite the fall in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  commodity prices, the trade and current account is expected to remain positive, sustained by manufactured exports while the financial account is expected to adjust in an orderly manner. During this same period, the financial sector restructuring, rationalisation and reforms, the institutional development, the strengthening of the regulatory, supervisory and legal framework and the development of the domestic financial markets have also diversified the financial sector and has enhanced its ability to disperse external shocks throughout the system. In particular, the financial reforms also involved the transition to greater market orientation and more liberalised financial system which has allowed for greater flexibility to adjust to the effects of shifts in global liquidity. The now deep and robust financial system is also underpinned by high levels of capitalisation and sufficient levels of liquidity. This has ensured that financial intermediation continues to be effective in providing support to economic activity. It is therefore not the recent policies nor the new measures that have placed Malaysia on a stronger position to manage the external challenges. Rather it is the economic restructuring and financial reforms and development undertaken during the recent two decades and the building of several layers of buffers that has allowed us to weather the current challenging operating environment.

Regulatory and supervisory authorities should strengthen prudential and other financial market regulations in order to deepen financial markets and improve investment climate, whereas central banks should focus more on greater currency flexibility and price stability. In conclusion, as a central banker, I would like to highlight three key messages from the thoughts I have shared with you. First, to achieve price stability, central banks need to ensure efficiency of financial infrastructure and maintain smooth operation of financial services. An efficient and effective payment and settlement system is at the core of financial infrastructure. Second, removing market imperfections is essential for the smooth operation of financial systems. Establishment of credit bureaus to improve exchange of information on credit history of economic agents and reducing fiscal dominance are important steps to ensure sound-lending activities. In this context, the role of micro finance in promoting the access of the low-income segment of the society to credit should be supported and encouraged. Third, the overall level of external financing and its composition is important for domestic access to finance. The benefits of capital inflows to economic growth would be higher with a developed financial sector. Central banks could best support this process through their contribution to macroeconomic stability. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 21/2008
All these developments will help soften the impact of the crisis on employment, reallocate surplus labour towards more productive sectors and raise our economy’s potential growth rate. And there are more reforms recommended by analysts: the re-directing of support policies to the unemployed, so greater importance is given to active policies such as training, improvements to the intermediation capacity of public employment services, etc. In addition to the reform of labour institutions, there are other areas where action should not be delayed, even though the effects will be over a longer term. This is the case primarily of education, which is pivotal for ensuring a continuous increase in human capital and for reinforcing one of the main sources of improving productivity. And, of course, there is a long list of reforms outstanding to increase competition in many industries, such as services, energy, rail freight transport, etc., to which I have repeatedly referred. Lastly, the soundness of the financial system is essential for ensuring the financial flows needed to restore economic dynamism. The Spanish financial system has weathered very well the direct and indirect effects of the international financial crisis thanks to a series of widely known factors that I shall not repeat here.

The strong adjustment in spending is also manifest in a rapid reduction in the external deficit, which may have halved by 2009 from its level of close to 10% of GDP in 2007. Ideally, however, the spillover effect of the weakness of national demand on imports should be reinforced by a strengthening of the export base through the improved competitiveness of our companies. But we should not lose sight of the fact that the correction of these imbalances is coming about through a severe contraction in output that is exerting a most adverse effect on employment, as a result of the problems present in the functioning of the labour market, and on public finances. Job destruction, which was concentrated in the second half of 2008 in construction, subsequently spread both to industry and to market services, affecting temporary contracts most especially. After the sharp drop in employment in the closing months of 2008 and early 2009, the pace of job destruction has slackened, largely due to the effects of the launch of the Local Investment Plan. And since the dynamism of the labour force has held up well into 2009, the unemployment rate has skyrocketed from 8% in 2007 to almost 18% in the second quarter of the current year. The sharp employment adjustment has prompted a rise in apparent labour productivity from a rate below 1% in 2007 and the previous years to more than 3% in the second quarter of 2009.
Figure 1: Inflation in Africa (in %) 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 South Africa  Northern Africa (median)  Sub-Saharan w/o SA (median)  The figures displayed suggest that businesses and households in most African countries now enjoy an environment of increasingly stable prices. Undoubtedly, the recent inflation record has contributed to the increasingly robust growth environment. Figure 2 shows that per capita growth has picked up in recent years in parts of Africa. This is particularly true where disinflation was strongest. 2  BIS Review 110/2007  Figure 2: GDP per capita in Africa (in constant 2000 USD) 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 South Africa  Northern Africa (median)  Sub-Saharan w/o SA (median)  Governments no longer seem to rely on money printing as a revenue source. This is a sound policy development which encourages private sector activity. Going forward, the challenge for African central banks will be to maintain this recently acquired track record. 3. Payment systems  Next let’s look at the payment system. The development of the payment system determines how easy it is for firms and consumers to access and transfer money. Can businesses pay their suppliers by writing a cheque or making an electronic transfer? Or do they have to undergo the cumbersome and insecure process of sending cash physically?

BIS Review 110/2007  3  Figure 3: Share of Non-Cash Money in Africa (in%) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 South Africa  Northern Africa (median)  Sub-Saharan w/o SA (median)  How can central banks foster the further development of safe and efficient payment instruments in Africa? First and foremost, central banks must take a leading role in the development, operation and oversight of necessary infrastructure, such as interbank and retail payment systems. In doing so, it would seem natural to take advantage of international knowledge and expertise. As financial sector regulators, central banks can further create a market environment which encourages the entry of new service providers, as well as the development of innovative payment instruments, such as SMS-banking and mobile-banking. As an oversight authority, it is then the task of the central bank to ensure that new payment services adhere to the security requirement desired by businesses, households and financial institutions. 4. Financial sector development  Third, let’s take a brief look at financial sector development. An efficient and deep financial sector provides enterprises with debt and equity to finance their growth, thus spurring economic activity. At the same time a deep financial sector can provide households with savings and credit products to smooth their consumption patterns, again increasing their return from economic activity, and reducing poverty. To what extent have financial sectors grown and become more efficient in Africa in recent years?