samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In  3/7  addition, the number of bank branches has declined by 43%, while the number of Spanish banks1 has fallen from 122 at the start of the crisis to 61 in 2018. Also, all the former savings banks, apart from two, have been transformed into commercial banks, and most of the mergers and takeovers that have taken place have given rise to healthier institutions and have resulted in significant cost savings. The FROB, for its part, has played a prominent role in promoting some of these consolidation processes. These efforts to correct the excessive size of the sector were also accompanied by a significant balance sheet clean-up. As we all know, the financial crisis caused the quality of Spanish bank assets to deteriorate significantly. Indeed, in just five years the nonperforming loan ratio reached unprecedented levels (of around 14% at the end of 2013) and foreclosures rose to over € billion in 2014. The decline in the return on assets and the increase in net provisions for bad debts caused the banking industry as a whole to post a loss in 2012. This weakened bank solvency and, moreover, led to significant capital requirements for some banks, to the extent that public support was necessary to cover the capital shortfalls identified and to guarantee financial stability and, ultimately, the deposits of the general public. The FROB was once again fundamental in this area since, along with the deposit guarantee scheme, it injected around € billion of capital into the system.

In Europe, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is responsible for preparing the resolution of significant European institutions. This preparation has already included drawing up resolution plans for all significant institutions, analysing their resolvability on an individual basis and establishing a minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) that make it possible to comply with the paradigm shift I have just referred to. The SRB has also put in place effective mechanisms for cooperation with the national resolution authorities that (like the FROB and the Banco de España) participate in the drawing up of resolution plans and in determining the MREL, and in implementing decisions taken by the SRB, as well as developing their own responsibilities for less significant institutions. I should like to underline the importance in these European resolution arrangements of the requirement that European credit institutions (including Spanish ones, naturally) have sufficient levels of MREL. The paradigm shift from a bail-out to a bail-in system, and the other tools permitted by European legislation, require that banks have a sufficient level of MREL so that, if the case arises and there is a public interest involved, the institution can be resolved, while minimising the burden on the taxpayer and ensuring the continuity of critical functions and a minimum impact on the rest of the financial system. For some institutions, this requirement represents a considerable challenge for the coming years.
The consequence is that like any health check the list of what we need to review is long. And so the key is how we prioritise our work and what prescriptions we write on the back of it. That’s a daunting task. But helpfully while for some issues only the macro-prudential policymaker can do the job, for other issues just like a GP we can call on the help of specialists. I’m not proposing to write any prescriptions in this speech today. But the Bank and FPC are working hard on their diagnoses and will aim to communicate further on issues that they wish to prioritise later this year, through the Bank’s Financial Stability Strategy and the FPC’s mediumterm priorities. And I hope that today has given you a flavour of the importance of building a macro-prudential framework that’s as fit for the risks and opportunities of the future as it is for those we have faced in the past. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Financial Policy Committee. I am grateful to Nicola Anderson, Kristina Bluwstein, Giovanni Covi, Tom Daniels, Emma Moriarty, Nicholas Vause, Danny Walker and Gabija Zemaityte for their assistance in drafting these remarks. I would like to thank Jon Cunliffe, Alina Barnett, Geoff Coppins, Lee Foulger, Grellan McGrath, Jon Relleen and Matt Waldron for their helpful comments. 1 Numbers based on the Office of National Statistics publication “The 2008 recession 10 years on”.

In addition, the new technology has the potential to reshape activity currently taking place in the traditional financial sector, either through the migration of that activity or the widespread adoption of the technology. Crypto technology has the potential to bring significant benefits, for example by reducing the cost and increasing the speed of cross-border transactions, and encouraging competition in the financial system. But those benefits can only be realised and innovation be sustainable if it is undertaken safely and accompanied by effective public policy frameworks that mitigate risks and maintain broader trust and integrity in the financial system. In this way, the growth of cryptoassets and DeFi has highlighted another of the key challenges for policymakers: the need for regulatory frameworks to adapt. 3.The transition to net zero: structural change requires coordinated action from all sectors And finally, we face the continued need to support the orderly transition to a net zero economy. Climate change creates risks to financial stability through two channels: physical risks and transition risks. And the financial system will play a key role in financing the significant structural economic changes needed to deliver the transition to a net zero economy. The unique challenge here is that the orderly transition to net zero will require coordinated action across private and public sector institutions, and across all sectors of finance and the real economy. The Bank’s role is focussed on tackling the consequences (not the causes) of climate change.
It would be against their longer-term national economic interest; and countries behaving in this way should not be at all surprised if other European Union countries sought to protect themselves against disruptive behaviour. With or without monetary union, within it or outside, it is of overriding importance that we all continue to pursue stability-orientated macro-economic policies. On that BIS Review 14/1997  -3-  basis I can see no reason, and certainly no right under the Treaty of Rome, for distinctions to be made among the member states of the European Union whatever the outcome on monetary union. Indeed we would all suffer if they were, because it would reduce the potential benefits of the single market to Europe as a whole. Whatever the surrounding noise, we must surely be smart enough to avoid cutting off our nose to spite our face in that way. Our national and collective economic interests are too closely aligned for that to be allowed to happen. So I am not particularly impressed either by the fears sometimes expressed about the economic penalties that will be visited on countries outside monetary union, or by the occasional rattling of the cage to try to bully them into it.

The simple fact is that there are real risks as well as real potential benefits in monetary union; and it would be foolhardy just to assume that the enterprise, if it is embarked upon, will inevitably bring about the political harmony and economic prosperity across Europe that anyone in their right mind wants to see. It is hugely important to all of us that Europe’s political leaders stand back and weigh the risks as well as the potential benefits, dispassionately, before any irrevocable step is taken. If the debate in this country encourages open debate elsewhere then we will be doing a service to Europe as a whole. It is something of a fashion these days to describe economic conditions in terms of fairy stories. I have heard the steady expansion in the United States, and more recently in this country, described as the “Goldilocks” condition - with the economic temperature not too hot, not too cold, but just right. In the same vein I might describe European monetary union as Beauty and the Beast. The Beauty of it lies in intra-European exchange rate certainty. And if you don’t find that instantly seductive I suggest you speak, as I have, to some of Britain’s exporters. They have seen, over the past six months or so, an erratically sharp appreciation of sterling, against the core European currencies in particular, which can’t be adequately explained in terms of economic fundamentals.
It is important to note, however, that the main focus of an investment policy evaluation rests in the model of the Central Bank's actions. Having been responsible for the areas of Capital Markets, Currency, Operations Desks, and Corporate and Sovereign Credits, I am confident in concluding that there is a consensus in the world today that the Central Banks that have been assigned a multiplicity of functions and targets are doomed to fail. Successful Central Banks are those that have price stability as their only mandate. In this regard, I would like to emphasize that competence, seriousness and patriotism are a legacy of Arminio Fraga's administration at the Central Bank. There is no doubt that the implementation of a floating exchange rate regime and of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil at a critical moment for the Brazilian economy in 1999 are a hallmark in the history of Central Banks in emerging economies. The substantial improvement in transparency and credibility that has taken place over the past three years has been incorporated into the working structure of the Brazilian Central Bank. Arminio, thank you for the loyalty and professionalism you showed in the transition process. Although there are many instruments a government can use to implement its economic policy, the task assigned to the Central Bank is to keep the rate of inflation at a low level, mostly because the Central Bank has only one instrument, which is monetary policy.

To sum up, supervision is something that must work based on a regime of verification, analysis and conclusion. It is important to highlight the intensity and deepness of government-owned banks supervision, which brought us the knowledge of their existing problems and the costs involved in their recovery. Significant restructuring has been carried out in federal banks, after deep and comprehensive general consolidated inspections done by the CB. The adjustments that were made aimed at making the government-owned financial institutions sounder, more efficient and more competitive, rendering them apt to meet the same requirements faced by the private financial system. The maintenance of this behavior will reveal the true costs of governmental programs and will avoid recursive expenditures, which could become skeletons (hidden liabilities) in the public accounts. The continuation of reforms is important in other areas of the CB. In the external area, the CB must aim at intensifying transparency and communication with the markets and investors, while seeking to increase flexibility and to simplify the regulations on foreign currency operations, within a process intended to increase the country’s participation in world trade and international financial markets. In the banking area, the restructuring of the Brazilian Payment System improved risk reallocation, and favored a higher efficiency of the system. This is due to the fact that the Central Bank no longer has any role in financing the institutions that did not have the necessary funds for their operations, reducing moral hazard.
More foreign investors are likely to participate in our markets when Singapore Government Securities are included in the World Government Bond Index next January. Our market surveillance must broaden as the mix of market participants becomes more diverse. As the volume of trade in Singapore dollar securities increases, our management of the Singapore dollar will become more challenging. We must constantly review and improve our intervention strategies and our communication with the market. We must also continue to strengthen our regulatory and supervisory framework, in line with changes in the industry and evolving risk issues. As our local players go regional and expand their activities, we must take our approach to consolidated and integrated supervision to the next level. We will enhance our framework for supervising local banks’ securities and asset management operations overseas, as well as fine-tune the framework for the integrated supervision of banks engaging in capital markets and insurance activities. In addition, we have to co-operate more closely with other regulators in order to adequately supervise the institutions operating in our markets. As more financial institutions turn to outsourcing, we will review the need to supervise companies providing significant outsourcing services to our institutions. With the convergence in product offerings by different types of financial institutions, we need to harmonise our regulatory requirements and supervisory practices to prevent arbitrage. We are currently developing a common risk assessment framework for banks, insurance companies and capital markets intermediaries.

Once these exercises are complete, we will analyse the feedback we have received and use it to inform our final decision, which will be announced in December. If a final decision is made to move to polymer, we will also use the opportunity to introduce notes which are somewhat smaller than the current series. These will be easier for both the public and the cash industry to handle and will generate further financial benefits in terms of lower production and storage costs. In moving to smaller notes, we will retain the present tiering of denominations by size, which is of particular benefit to the visually impaired. I would now like to invite any questions that you may have. I’ll be joined in addressing these by the Bank’s Chief Cashier and Executive Director for Banking Services Chris Salmon, and the Head of our Notes Division Victoria Cleland. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In conclusion, I would like to congratulate the organisers in successfully providing a platform at this conference for all the sukuk stakeholders ranging from the issuers to investors. I wish all of you a highly productive and successful conference. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 74/2007

Starting from the fact that the role of central banking in the development of the economy is best seen in the development of the institution itself, please allow me to draw your attention to some of the more significant moments of that development. At the very beginning, the Bank was conducting only a few central banking operations: distribution od cash, payment operations, control, i.e. in today's language, supervision of banks. Its first manager was Dr. Todor Mirovski, at that time manager of Makedonska Stopanska Banka, while from the beginning of 1947 until June 1950, Aleksandar Bogoev. From a functional viewpoint, the central banking in the past 60 years may be conditionally divided into three periods. We could call the first period pre-institutional (1946-1970), the second was a period of formal institutionalization (1971-1991), and the third was a period of monetary independence (1992-2006). We denote the first period as pre-institutional since there was an institution established only on a federal level - central bank. And, as you are well aware, the main feature of post-war life in all spheres, including banking as a whole, was centralization. Consequently, all communal banks immediately  BIS Review 100/2006  1  became branches of the National Bank of, at that time, Federal Yugoslavia - Head Office of NRM, engaged in attracting funds, extending credits in the amount of the funds attracted, performing limited activities in the international payment operations, performing vault activities for executing the budgets of the local units, etc. The Head Office, i.e.
With the scorecard, remuneration of intermediaries will be more closely aligned to the suitability of products for prospective customers and the overall quality of service. I believe that such a shift in incentive structures will encourage advisers to build more enduring relationships with customers. More can be done beyond the realm of regulation. In other countries – such as Australia, United Kingdom and India – financial advisers are voluntarily adopting a fee-based model. The combined effect of increased customer awareness and bargaining power are also pushing financial advisers to reduce their commission-based income. In India for example, several firms have successfully shifted to largely fee-based models. This is, however, not a painless transition. In doing so, some have parted ways with customers who were unwilling to pay these fees. I believe that the move towards a fee-based model is an important signal that the advisers’ incentives are aligned with those of their customers. To ensure a successful transition to a feebased model, financial advisers will need to enhance their value proposition to ensure that customers receive the standard and breadth of advisory services that would be worth paying for. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  This is no easy undertaking, but I am confident that it is one that our financial advisory firms will be able to achieve. Adaptability to change At the beginning of my remarks, I had highlighted three key trends affecting the industry. How well financial advisers respond to these developments will determine the industry’s relevance in the years to come.

To many, financial planning can be a fairly complicated task. Identifying personal financial needs requires consideration of an impossibly wide array of factors, finding the right solutions for them even more so. For years, financial advisers have played the crucial role of condensing the vast technical complexities of finance into practical, reliable advice on a personal level. It is a role whose prominence I am certain can only grow with time, but only if it successfully adapts to a rapidly transforming financial and social landscape. In this connection and before elaborating further on the concept of a trust, I would like to draw your attention to three major trends that are shaping the industry as we speak. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  First, demographic shifts. Malaysia is a relatively young nation. 40–50% of our workforce are aged between 21 to 35, also known as Gen Y. This remains a largely untapped market for financial advisory services, and for a reason – many individuals within this age group are skeptical of, or distrust financial advisers. According to a survey by the Asian Institute of Finance in 2015, only 37% of these individuals had sought advice from a financial adviser. Of this, only 26% trusted the advice they received. This is complicated by the fact that these are highly connected, tech-savvy individuals with broad access to online platforms that act as a primary source of information and advice.
At the Trades Union Congress in Blackpool last September I had emphasised that our inflation objective was symmetrical, and promised that if overall demand threatened to fall significantly below the supply capacity of the economy, with the risk that we would fall short of the inflation target, then we would be just as vigorous in reducing interest rates to stimulate demand as we had been in raising them when the risks to inflation were on the upside. So, in the new situation, the Monetary Policy Committee promptly reversed engines to pump up demand, cutting rates by 2¼% over the next few months to as low as they have been since 1971. (This relatively aggressive response was not incidentally – as is sometimes suggested – a sudden conversion to a more activist philosophy, simply a reflection of the rapid decline in the economic prospect which required a strong response.) Since last autumn the world financial and economic situation has certainly stabilised under the impact of the continuing strength of domestic demand in the US economy and of the beginnings of export-led recovery in a number of emerging markets, particularly in Asia. And world commodity prices, notably the price of oil, have shown signs of strengthening. But global imbalance seems likely to persist for some time, with domestic demand growth still relatively sluggish in Japan, and in the Eurozone taken as a whole. This imbalance, in turn, is a significant influence on the international pattern of interest and exchange rates.

Bond Price Bulletin One of the factors affecting secondary market activities in the bond market is the lack of information on bond prices. To help overcome this problem, the HKMA launched the Bond Price Bulletin at the beginning of 2006. The bulletin provides investors with convenient on-line access to information on bond products and bond prices provided by eight major banks in Hong Kong. Indicative bid/offer prices of over 200 bonds of different currencies issued by both public and private sector entities are provided by the eight contributing banks. Outlook Let me now turn to talk about the outlook of our debt market. Notwithstanding the achievements we have made so far in developing our debt market, we fully appreciate that there is nothing to be complacent and there are still many challenges facing us. The HKMA has therefore embarked on a review of our debt market development with a view to identifying measures which can be adopted to help market development. On the demand side, everybody knows that the Mainland of China is enjoying a rapid economic growth and business opportunities are mushrooming. The recent announcement by the Mainland authorities of measures to liberalise portfolio investment outflows has marked the emergence of such kind of opportunity for Hong Kong. Under these new rules, each Chinese citizen is allowed, among other things, to invest in fixed income securities overseas within certain limits.