samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
16  40  60 80 Unchanged  100  Figure 9  Labor income and social benefits (1) (2) (variación anual, porcentaje)  20  20  10  10  0  0  -3  -10  -10  -20  -20 -27  -30 -40  Second quarter Labor income  -30 Third quarter Social benefits  -40 Net  (1) The labor income is calculated using the wage bill, where (a) the employment projection is that implicit in the baseline scenario of the September 2020 MP Report, (b) those employed covered by the Employment Protection Law are excluded from the calculation, and (c) the labor income of self-employed workers would fall by 55% in Q2 and 35% in Q3. (2) The calculation of benefits considers: Employment Protection Law, Emergency Family Income (IFE), Severance Insurance, Covid-19 Emergency Bonus, and Middle-Class Bonus. Official information regarding payments already made is updated to 27/Aug/2020 and interpolated for the remaining months. For the IFE, four payments are considered. It does not consider the reforms to these benefits that had not been approved at the statistical closing. Source: Central Bank of Chile using INE, Ministry of Finance and Superintendence of Pensions data. Figure 10  Sales by electronic billing (*)  (moving two-week average, billion pesos)  7  Supermarkets  6  30/Jul,: Law for 10% pension fund withdrawal published in Official Gazette  5  +33% 6 +15%  4  2  20 01  4  2  26/Mar.

The New York City economy continues to rebound strongly from the 2008–09 downturn – more strongly than the nation as a whole. The New York Fed’s index of economic activity for the city has grown solidly and steadily for the past three years, signaling a robust rebound in the local economy. This strength is reflected in strong job creation: while the U.S. economy has thus far recovered only about two-thirds of the jobs lost during the recession, New York City has recovered all its lost jobs and then some. In fact, total employment in the Big Apple recently surpassed not only its pre-crisis peak of 2008 but also its all-time peak of 1969. Here on Staten Island job creation has not been quite as robust over the past couple years. It should be recognized, however, that Staten Island’s economy was actually more resilient than Manhattan’s during the recession, experiencing only minimal job losses. Staten Island’s key industries – local-market sectors like health, education and retail trade – tend to be less susceptible to sharp economic downturns than more cyclical sectors, like manufacturing, construction and finance. Even so, not all indicators of the local economy are improving. Unemployment remains stubbornly high, at just over 8 percent. And home prices, though recovering gradually, are still down about 15 percent from where they were back in 2007. This compares to nationally where they are down about 25 percent on average.
Eva Srejber: The transmission mechanism Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Umeå University, Umeå, 15 May 2001. *  *  *  The Riksbank has a statutory duty to maintain price stability. However, it has the power to decide how to operationalise monetary policy and the monetary policy strategy that is to guide the monetary policy decisions. In the annual assessments of the performance of the Riksbank made by the Riksdag Finance Committee, both the objective and the strategy adopted have won acceptance. Monetary policy is governed by an inflation target expressed as the annual rate measured by CPI is to be limited to 2 per cent with a tolerance interval of ± 1 percentage point. However, the decision to define price stability as a reduction in the value of the krona by two per cent per year in relation to the basket of goods and services consumed by Swedish households is by no means self-evident. In principle, another rate of price increases, other weighted combinations of goods and services, financial assets or currencies could serve as the anchor in relation to which the value of the krona is to be kept stable. When the inflation target was adopted in 1993, conditions did not favour a return to any form of fixed exchange rate.

The required return on investment is reduced at a lower interest rate at the same time as saving is less profitable. ii. Interest rate changes also have an income effect through interest income and interest expenditure on existing assets and liabilities. iii. Interest rate changes also affect share prices and real estate prices – lower interest rates increase demand for shares and properties and prices increase. An interest rate reduction also affects household wealth through higher share and property prices which in turn affect consumption decisions. The interest rate channel therefore affects demand for goods and services and thus the output gap with some time lag through many complicated mechanisms. Changes in the use of resources or the output gap then affect inflation in turn, with some time lag. The impact of changes in the instrumental rate on demand and inflation may also be affected by the lending rate set by the banks. The channel that is mediated by the behaviour of the banks can be generally referred to as the credit channel. Higher interest rates may, for instance, reduce the willingness of the general public to keep funds deposited in current accounts, which have a very low return. Deposits have a very low financing cost for the banks and if they have to finance an increased proportion of their lending in another way, the banks may compensate for this by a higher lending rate. 2 However, it is uncertain how the behaviour of the banks affects the impact of monetary policy.
There is a tendency to try to re-invent the wheel and overlook past experience, but by taking a step back and learning from one another, we can have a much greater positive impact in our communities. Roadshow Workforce Experience Sustainable economic growth and thus broad-based prosperity is dependent on a healthy job market, one in which employers can find the skills they need and workers find jobs that allow them to grow and move up the economic ladder. The challenge is developing a system that encompasses both and is accessible to all those seeking a job. Our workforce development initiative aims to promote dialogue and a greater understanding of promising policies and programs that allow workers, especially those in low and moderate-income communities, to develop in-demand skills and connect them with employers. We can achieve this by connecting with workforce stakeholders through policy forums, roundtable discussion sessions, and examining areas through our research and outreach. One of the best aspects of my job is the opportunity to visit communities across our Second District. The skills gap and the uneven economic recovery among different communities are consistent themes I hear, not just in the Second District but also in my previous job on the West Coast. I also have heard about a variety of policies and programs that seem to be making an impact and could have broader potential that are worth sharing.

Mr Yam looks towards a stronger financial system in Hong Kong  Speech given by Mr Joseph Yam JP, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Annual Dinner 1999 of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants on 29 October 1999. *  *  *  Introduction I feel greatly honoured to have been invited to speak at this year’s Annual Dinner of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants. I must confess that I became a little worried when I checked up on the list of speakers at your Annual Dinners in the past 10 years. I realise that, in accepting this speaking engagement, I have taken on the almost impossible task of performing to a standard that may well be beyond me. I shall nevertheless try my best not to make you feel that you have gone down market. You are of course well aware of the close working relationship between the accounting profession and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Your involvement in all our many advisory committees and in regulatory compliance of the financial institutions we supervise is crucial to our work, and I take this opportunity to thank you all for your help and forbearance in our ever-increasing supervisory demands. As a gesture of gratitude I shall this evening steer well clear of the irksome domestic supervisory issues. Instead I shall focus on the broader subjects of economy and finance as we recover from the financial turmoil of the last two years.
Banks were granted access to essentially unlimited liquidity at our policy interest rate in our regular open market operations. This support enabled them to maintain their crucial role in financing the real economy. 1  See the speech “The ECB’s enhanced credit support” (Munich, 13 July 2009). BIS Review 103/2009  3  As a second measure, we expanded the collateral eligible in our liquidity providing operations. This offered an opportunity for banks to refinance assets that had become less liquid in the wake of the market turmoil. While the quantitative impact of this measure was not large in aggregate terms, it was important as it gave reassurance to banks that a larger share of their balance sheet could be refinanced at any time in case of need. A third motivation was to give banks a more medium-term perspective in their liquidity planning, making them less vulnerable to short-term shocks and attenuating the maturity mismatch on their balance sheet. By giving banks a longer planning horizon we could further support their credit provision to the economy. A fourth issue we needed to address was the currency mismatch in banks’ balance sheets and the malfunctioning of the international swap market. This was particularly relevant for US dollars, given the need of European banks to fund their dollar assets. We therefore began to supply liquidity to European banks in US dollars, backed by a swap facility established with the Fed. Finally, the Eurosystem acted in financial markets directly.

During property market and economic downturns, the chance of default for this group of borrowers can be significantly higher than those with only one property under mortgage. In view of this, the HKMA considers it necessary to require banks to further tighten the underwriting criteria for mortgage loans to borrowers with multiple property mortgages to reduce the risk of banks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  6. Besides, the HKMA notices a recent trend of lengthening average tenor of new mortgage loans. The average tenor for new mortgage loans now is 25 years, which is three years longer than that of 22 years in 2009. Some banks have extended the maximum tenor to even 40 years. Prolonged loan tenors will not only increase credit risk of banks, but may also weaken the ability of borrowers to withstand interest rate risk. In particular, when mortgage rates return to more normal levels, borrowers with a loan that already stretches to 30 or even 40 years simply cannot seek to reduce their monthly instalment payment burden by extending the tenor, and may therefore face financial difficulty. Therefore the HKMA has now required banks to set the ceiling for the maximum loan tenor for all new mortgage loans to not more than 30 years. 7. The above measures take effect immediately. However, loan applications in respect of property transactions with provisional sale and purchase agreements signed today or earlier will not be affected. 8. Mr Arthur Yuen, our Deputy Chief Executive, will explain the details of these measures later.
Figure 28: Total Aggregate Domestic Demand (Seasonally Adjusted, at 1998 Prices, Billion TL) 28 26 24 22 20 18 16 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3* 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  *Forecast. Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Data pertaining to the third quarter indicate that external demand remained weak and the negative contribution of net exports to quarterly growth persisted. The course of external demand will be determined by the outlook of the speed and timing of global recovery. The medium-term outlook for global growth indicates that the GDPs of developed countries would not reach the pre-crisis level for an extended period of time. Within this framework, external demand is expected to continue to suppress aggregate demand for quite some time (Figure 29). 12  BIS Review 143/2009  Figure 29: Actual and Forecast GDP Growth in Developed Countries (Seasonally Adjusted, 2008Q2=100) 104 102 100 98 96 94 92 90  USA  Eurozone  Japan  England  88 86 2  3  4  1  2  2008  3  4  1  2  2009  3  4  1  2010  2  2011  Source: Consensus Forecasts, September. In the June-August period, non-farm employment increased for the first time since the second quarter of 2008, in seasonally adjusted terms.

In short, monetary policy with a flexible exchange rate is much more successful now than it had been before 2012, when the Bank published its report entitled Iceland’s currency and exchange rate policy options.3 Chart 5  1  Special Publication no. 4, Monetary Policy in Iceland after capital controls. Report from the Central Bank of Iceland to the Minister of Economic Affairs, December 2010: https://www.sedlabanki.is/library/Skraarsafn/Serrit/Peningastefnan_eftir_hoft.pdf 2 Special Publication no. 11. Monetary policy based on inflation targeting: experience since 2001 and post-crisis changes, September 2017: https://www.sedlabanki.is/library/Skraarsafn/Serrit/Serrit_nr_%2011.pdf 3 Special Publication no. 7. Iceland’s currency and exchange rate policy options, September 2012: https://www.sedlabanki.is/library/Skraarsafn/EMUskýrsla/Valkostir%20Íslands%20í%20gjaldmiðils-%20og%20gengismálum.pdf  6  Capital flow management tool There have been proposals in the media recently to the effect that the special reserve requirement on foreign capital inflows for investment in the bond market and in high-yielding deposits be immediately reduced or even eliminated. In a Box in the newly published Monetary Bulletin, the Bank discusses this special reserve requirement. It does not agree with these proposals. The special reserve requirement has functioned as intended, and monetary policy transmission along the interest rate channel has improved, as can be seen at the right in Chart 6. Without it, monetary policy transmission would have been shifted in greater measure to the exchange rate channel, leading to a stronger appreciation and increased exchange rate volatility, which would not have been terribly popular under current conditions. Although the goal is to lift the special reserve requirement, conditions do not warrant it as yet.
One of our greatest underlying economic strengths is our relationship with the Mainland of China, a relationship which helped fuel rapid growth in both economies over the last two decades. Our two economies maintain extensive and highly productive economic links yet at the same time operate entirely separate economic systems under the one country, two systems formula. Not much more than a year ago, just before the Asian financial crisis erupted and on the eve of the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong, pessimists were depicting this relationship as a weakness rather than a strength: they were predicting extensive meddling by the Central Government, and consequently a loss of autonomy and dynamism in Hong Kong. They have been very wrong on this. The track record so far has been impressive, and all the more so given the succession of crises over the last year. As far as Hong Kong’s monetary system is concerned, the transfer of sovereignty has meant more, not less, autonomy for Hong Kong. Whereas before the handover monetary policy often required close consultations with the Secretary of State in London, the Central Government in BIS Review 98/1998  -6-  Beijing has left such matters entirely in the hands of the HKSAR Government. Furthermore, it has strongly and clearly reiterated its support for what we are doing, its confidence in our ability to manage things on our own and its preparedness to help in the unlikely event that help is needed.

The fact that you exist makes our lives safer, both for those of us who are at sea and for those who wait on land for our return. Bad weather and dark conditions can sometimes make it challenging to navigate at sea, even with good equipment. From my part of Hvaler, I have a good view of several lighthouses.Even though navigation systems are becoming increasingly automated, many of the lighthouses in Norway serve an important function, both as a landmark and as a symbol of a coastal culture that a great many Norwegians hold dear. Norges Bank has chosen one of these lighthouses as the primary motif on the 50-krone banknote. Utvær lighthouse is located west of the mouth of Sognefjord, at what is considered to be Norway’s westernmost point. It was built in 1900, towers 45 metres high, and the beacon, whose light you can perhaps make out on the reverse side of the 50-krone note, has a range of 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  19 nautical miles. Utvær lighthouse is considered to be one of the main lighthouses in western Norway and was manned until as recently as 2004. It is now fully automated, but the lighthouse and its keeper’s quarters have become a popular destination to visit. The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) has primary responsibility for maritime infrastructure in Norway, ranging from lighthouses, seamarks and fairways, to pilot services and fishing ports.
The role of unemployment in our forward guidance It is important to be clear what role unemployment is – and is not – playing in the setting of monetary policy. If you remember just one thing from this talk, I would ask that you remember this: targeting a particular level of the unemployment rate is not a job for monetary policy. Monetary policy can’t control the level of unemployment in the long run: we can’t generate sustainably higher output or employment simply by printing more money. That way lies the horrors of the high and variable inflation rates of the 1970s and 80s. We forget those lessons at our peril. Monetary policy continues to have only one target: the 2% inflation target. Nor is unemployment a sufficient measure of slack in the economy on which to base our policy. The 1970s and 80s also taught us the foolishness of trying to control inflation by responding to movements in a single intermediate target. When we reach the 7% unemployment threshold, the Committee will reassess the state of the economy based on all available information and, on that basis, decide whether it should start to withdraw the current extraordinary levels of stimulus.2  2  Some (eg Taylor 2013) have suggested that the use of an unemployment threshold, together with an inflation target, might mark the beginnings of a transition to the setting of monetary policy according to some form of quasi-Taylor rule. But that misunderstands the role being played by the unemployment threshold.

Opinions may differ about what were the most important “triggers” of the acute crises we are discussing today. Again, I see both differences and similarities between Sweden and the Asian countries. In our case, a policy shift to the low-inflation regime in the rest of Europe, combined with structural changes and a more hostile international environment (with higher interest rates and lower growth, as I mentioned before), made the existing situation unsustainable and triggered the crisis. In the early 1990s the government refrained from accommodating the high costs and inflationary pressures that had been building up in the 1980s. Under similar circumstances earlier in the 1970s and 1980s we had devalued several times. Now there was broad agreement that we should stick to the fixed exchange rate in order to bring inflation down; in this respect, the policy was indeed successful: inflation fell from 8-10 per cent to 2-3 per cent in less than two years. One effect of this, however, was that real interest rates shot up. Structural reforms were also implemented, particularly in the tax system but also in housing and other areas. One aim of these reforms was to create more market-related incentives for savings and to reduce subsidies. While these changes were long overdue, they now came at the worst possible time from a macroeconomic point of view. In this context, it is relevant to mention the importance of the sequencing of policy changes.
Then, Secretary Paulson revealed the initial plan of 700 billion $ for purchasing assets in order to support the banking sector. However, this did not eliminate the doubts. The pressures grew in Europe, too. In September, Dexia, Fortis and Hypo Real Estate had to receive an urgent capital injection, mainly from the governments. In England, the authorities facilitated the quick consolidation in the mortgage sector by having Abbey Santander buying Alliance and Leicester, they supported some mergers in the construction sector and suggested a merger of LTSB and HBOS. Finally, at the end of September, the transparent authorities in England intervened in order to solve the rising difficulties in Bradford and Bingley, by transferring the deposits and the branch network to Abbey Santander and by undertaking the remaining assets and liabilities in public ownership, and subsequently closing them in an organized manner. All analysts perceived the events on the financial markets as something unseen ever since the great financial crisis in the period 1929-1933 of the previous century. As early as in the second half of September the companies and non-banking financial institutions accelerated their withdrawal even from the short-term financing of the banks, and the banks were increasingly losing the confidence for extending loans to each other. The costs of financing grew tremendously. Many institutions could make only overnight borrowing. The credits to the real sector almost stopped.

The securitized mortgages, polling of mortgages sold through securities, including the infamous US-sub-prime mortgages, were traded on the market during the upward trend in the prices of apartments and houses, and when the interest rates were low, it disguised the risks of the core loans. With securitization of mortgages in such a volume, the banks have transformed the liquidity in their loan portfolios. They financed that by wholesale borrowing. But when the defaults multiplied, and the prices of the apartments dropped, firstly in the USA, and then wider, the investors had to reassess the risks inherent to these securities. Observed as more risky, they lost their value. The demand for these securities plunged. For the same reasons, the value of the mortgage portfolio went down. The value of their assets reduced, whereas the value of the liabilities which remained unchanged. The negative effect increased with the very high level of borrowing compared to the capital (or the so-called leverage), with which many banks worked, and with the fact that the banks have purchased a large quantity of securitized and more complex financial instruments from one another. Not only the real evaluation was difficult, but the distribution of the losses through the financial system was vague. The price of the banks' shares dropped. The capital became restricted. The market has sent a clear signal: the banks' capital was insufficient. The message? Recapitalize them immediately. What does the latest news from the market say? Since the recapitalization packages and other measures have been announced, signs of improvement occurred.