samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The General Court in Luxembourg held in its judgment in 20154 that it would be for the ECB to request the EU legislature to amend Article 22, should the ECB consider that having the power to regulate CCPs is necessary for the proper performance of its tasks under the Treaties. In particular, revising Article 22 is a necessary step for us to carry out the tasks foreseen under EMIR II. Considering the risks the ECB faces with regard to the implementation and transmission of its monetary policy, it is imperative that it be equipped with the necessary tools vis-à-vis CCPs, particularly in a crisis situation. I want to make clear that such measures would aim to address risks in a limited number of areas which are crucial for the implementation of the single monetary policy and the smooth operation of payment systems, which ultimately affect our primary objective of maintaining price stability as mandated by the Treaties. Areas of particular relevance from this perspective are liquidity arrangements, settlement processes, collateral, margins and interoperability arrangements. Let me add that such measures would only be triggered in the event of a clear threat to the conduct of our monetary policy, and would in no way encroach upon the prerogatives of CCP supervisors or the frameworks established by EU legislators. The ECB will act only within its competence, which is to formulate and implement the monetary policy of the euro area.

While these links are not new, they now warrant closer attention for two reasons. First, the financial system has come to rely more on central counterparties. The introduction of mandatory central clearing requirements in response to the crisis has made financial markets safer and more transparent. This is in large part thanks to the European Parliament’s push for stronger financial regulation, such as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR). While this strengthening is of course welcome, it also means that CCPs have become more systemic. Second, the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU means that, under the current legislative regime, several CCPs clearing significant volumes of euro-denominated business will be operating outside the framework of EU regulation and the safeguards this provides. In this context, the Commission’s EMIR II proposal, currently being discussed by this committee, is a welcome and necessary initiative. The existing regime was never intended to cope with large-scale euro-denominated clearing activities being carried out in a country outside the EU. The EMIR II proposal would enable EU authorities to directly supervise systemically important third-country CCPs on the basis of EU regulatory requirements using EU supervisory instruments. The proposal provides for an enhanced role for the central bank of issue in this context, reflecting the strong links between clearing and monetary policy. The indispensable corollary to the EMIR II proposal is the recommendation to amend Article 22 of our Statute, which was unanimously adopted by the ECB’s Governing Council last June.
Better, sometimes, to try to address a bubble at its source. This could be unpopular, but such is the job of taking away the punchbowl. We will explain our decisions. I cannot emphasise enough that the FPC will not indulge in attempts to micromanage the banking system or the allocation of credit. Nor will we be excessively activist, trying to fine-tune credit policy. This is about stability, which is an absolute precondition for steady improvements in economic activity and employment. The goal is to make the financial system resilient, to contain destructive “busts”, and to do so without impairing the contribution that the financial sector makes to the economy’s medium-term growth. Can the FPC help right now? The benefits of the new regime for stability will take time to come through. That might leave you asking what the FPC could do to help right now. Indeed, with credit conditions so tight, it has been asked whether the FPC should be easing regulatory constraints on banks. The aim would be to encourage them to loosen lending conditions, helping recovery. And, it is suggested, that would be consistent with the FPC’s remit because it could reduce threats to stability from the risk of borrowers defaulting. At its September 2011 meeting, the FPC concluded that such a step would in fact be counterproductive – endangering stability and jeopardising recovery. Given the precarious starting position of UK banks when the crisis broke, their capital adequacy is still being rebuilt. And banks are still operating in an extraordinarily risky international environment.

Recent forecasts put German growth at more than 2%, Italy in positive territory, and the outlook for France has improved markedly. Growth of business activity in the euro area in April was the highest in the past three years. But the crisis has left an important legacy:   Money and financial markets remain excessively segmented. The monetary transmission mechanism is severely impaired and credit conditions are still very different across countries and sectors.   Deleveraging in the banking sector still acts as an impediment to recovery and growth. Bank credit remains flat in the euro area as a whole, and SMEs’ financing is a major concern, especially in stressed countries, where the percentage of financially constrained but viable borrowers is estimated at 25% vs 1% in “core” countries. We are very aware that balance sheet repair is a prerequisite for credit to resume and for monetary policy to be efficient. So, we are addressing the problem as a priority. 1. We are building a safer and more robust system of financial intermediation. A major step has been the creation of a banking union that, as you all know, will delink bank and sovereign risks and ensure a harmonised and tough financial supervision. It is easy to underestimate this achievement. The idea was adopted less than two years ago. The Single Supervisory Mechanism is now up and running. There is no example in contemporary European history when so much has been achieved in so little time. 2.
The capacity of policymakers to restore stability was constrained by the depth of the balance sheet problems. In some cases, where the scale of external borrowing was less acute, policymakers had more room to act. But in most cases, policy options were very limited. Initially, governments were reluctant to let exchange rates move too far, because of fears that this would force banks and companies that had borrowed in dollars or yen into default on a scale that could further damage growth. At the same time, the authorities were reluctant to tighten monetary policy as a way to help stabilize the exchange rate because of concern it would hurt growth and perhaps exacerbate the flight from domestic assets. This dilemma made the initial policy response in the crisis countries look halting and tentative. And, uncertainty about the strength and continuity of political leadership further hampered government efforts to recover credibility. In the countries hit hardest by the crisis, looming issues of succession and elections compounded the problem of confidence. The crises prompted a searching reassessment of the conventional economic wisdom and a new appreciation of the challenges that come with financial integration. The classic measures of macroeconomic stability and policy prudence, in fiscal positions and measured inflation rates, could mask substantial structural weaknesses, and these same structural weaknesses could ultimately undermine the achievements of otherwise reasonably conservative macroeconomic policy management. Partial capital account liberalization, which encouraged the accumulation of short-term debt obligations, brought substantial risk, magnifying weaknesses in domestic financial systems.

This is partly because the listings function is the more visible part of the SRO to investors and listed companies. But in fact, the SRO function is much broader. Besides functioning as a listing authority, the SGX’s SRO role also encompasses a market surveillance function to uphold the integrity of the market, and a member supervision function to ensure participants’ adherence to trading and clearing rules. 14. So removing the SRO function from the SGX – as some have suggested – could mean that the exchange will not need to undertake market surveillance; nor to regulate members for compliance with rules of the exchange. Others have suggested removing only the listing authority function from SGX. But the flip side is that this risks losing the synergy of its regulatory function with its other roles pertaining to the development of a viable and credible marketplace; and creates ambiguity as to who oversees proper conduct of listed companies – the separate listing authority or the exchange. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15. It is worth noting that SGX’s SRO function is neither a new invention nor “uniquely Singapore”. Exchange self-regulation has a long history in financial markets and in many established markets. Most, if not all exchanges globally, perform a varying range of SRO functions.
The Riksbank therefore began its repo rate increases, but was force to back down when it became clear that the global economy was weaker than anticipated. Moreover, long-term inflation expectations fell. In 2015, the interest rate was cut to –0.5 per cent. The Riksbank also bought a large amount of government bonds to further stimulate economic development. The Riksbank has also reinforced the foreign currency reserves to have a better preparedness to give Swedish banks access to foreign currency in a crisis situation. Both of these measures led to the Riksbank's balance sheet becoming much larger than it was before (see Figure 1). The Riksbank's response to the coronavirus At the beginning of 2020, the world once again suffered a global economic crisis, this time in the form of the repercussions of the coronavirus outbreak. The measures taken to reduce the spread of the virus have had very large economic consequences and created a need for support measures from various authorities. The Riksbank’s role in the initial stage of the crisis has been to ensure that there is no lack of liquidity so that lending can continue and we can conduct an expansionary monetary policy to support the economy. We have therefore taken a large number of measures to reduce the economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. When it becomes clearer how lasting the crisis is likely to be, it may be appropriate to further adjust the expansiveness of our monetary policy.

That counterparty bids more aggressively for funds – something that is immediately observable from the pattern of bids (Table 2 and Chart 6). These examples highlight how the new ILTRs can provide an “early warning indicator” of stresses in the market, at both an individual and aggregate level. That information can be used to determine the size of and frequency of subsequent ILTRs (hence solving one important problem with the old LTRs). The ILTR supply curve The Bank’s supply curve is pinned down by its preferences – namely to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system at a price that doesn’t undermine the incentive to prudently manage liquidity. The Bank summarises its preferences using a Relative Supply Schedule (RSS). The RSS dictates how the proportion of each auction allocated to the wider collateral set responds to changes in the bids submitted, and specifically the difference between the clearing spreads on the narrow and the wider collateral set (known as the stop out spread). Chart 7 below shows some illustrative examples of an RSS. A larger stop out spread increases the proportion of the auction allocated to the wider collateral set, so the Bank’s “supply schedule” is upward sloping. Consider two simple examples. With a perfectly inelastic RSS, the Bank essentially pins down the quantity of funds it would provide against wider collateral, regardless of the bids submitted. With a perfectly elastic supply curve, the bank would, once a certain price threshold is exceeded, be prepared to allocate against all the wider collateral bids.
By 2006 planning for Basel II will in fact have taken 8 years! Finally, an issue with which you are I expect all familiar - the EU Financial Services Action Plan. I would like to echo the views expressed recently by Callum McCarthy, in his speech to the European Policy Forum. The FSAP is an important initiative aimed to create a single market, and it promises many benefits. But the implementation of such changes over a short period of time raises some concerns; and while considerable progress has been made in addressing the 42 Directives under the FSAP umbrella there is still much to be done. Over the next few years we need to implement fourteen significant EU legislative measures, including for example the International Accounting Standards Regulation - the importance of which I highlighted earlier, as well as the new capital adequacy regime. We need to achieve so much so quickly, that there is a danger that people will take their eye off the ball. This is relevant not just to the authorities but also the firms and institutions who need to introduce new systems and new procedures. All this needs to take place in parallel in the course of the normal business day. And in doing so we need to ensure that the changes which are being introduced to enhance the EU financial sector do not themselves threaten the stability of that system. I have this morning traversed a broad territory. Firstly, what is financial stability?

Others are more of a surprise, such as LTCM. What is certain is that financial crises can be very costly. For sovereign debt crises they can run to a loss of 15-25% of GDP. For Chile in the early 1980’s they were closer to 40%. So the art of minimising the emergence of crises, and mitigating their effects when they do nevertheless occur, are matters of public importance. For us in London the challenge is particularly real. Our focus must clearly be on the stability of the UK financial system. But markets have globalised; and they have also become more complex. With London a pre-eminent international financial centre, contagion from just about any significant financial crisis anywhere in the world has the potential to threaten financial stability here. In a broad sense, I like to think of financial stability in terms of maintaining confidence in the financial system. Threats to that stability can come from shocks of one sort or another. These can spread through contagion, so that liquidity or the honouring of contracts become questioned. And symptoms of financial instability can include volatile and unpredictable changes in prices. Preventing this from happening is the real challenge. So how do we fulfil our responsibility for the “overall stability of the financial system as a whole”? The Bank’s role is set out in the MoU. How do we approach the tasks of reducing the threat of crises and of coping with them if they actually occur?
This is a very favorable development for the economy and monetary policy, which can safely “look through” transitory shocks. Anchoring Inflation Expectations at the Target This brings me to my second point of the importance of anchoring inflation expectations at the target level. As HMS correctly stress, policymakers cannot take for granted that inflation expectations will remain well anchored. They highlight the risk that very tight labor markets could eventually lead to a resurgence of inflation and unmoor expectations, as in the 1960s. I concur that we must remain vigilant regarding a sustained takeoff in inflation. We must be equally vigilant that inflation expectations do not get anchored at too low a level. So far during this expansion, core and overall PCE inflation has averaged about 1.5 percent, well below the Fed’s 2 percent target. Taking a longer perspective, over the past 25 years, core and overall inflation have both averaged 1.8 percent. This persistent undershoot of the Fed’s target risks undermining the 2 percent inflation anchor. In this regard, research by Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel is sobering.6 They find that inflation expectations are heavily influenced by the inflation experience in one’s own lifetime, which implies that decades of too low inflation can become embedded in expectations. Indeed, we have seen some worrying signs of a deterioration of measures of longer-run inflation expectations in recent years, as seen in Table 2.

On this issue, the draft of the new Bank of Thailand Act has stipulated this condition. Even though there is a need to review the draft in order to make it more effective, the Bank of Thailand strongly endorses the importance of this Act because it will provide for an up to date framework for the development of the Thai monetary system in the future. In data dissemination, the Bank of Thailand has improved the process of data collection and dissemination to ensure that they are complete, correct, and expeditiously published, such as the improvement of the M3 data, the report on buying-selling of foreign currency especially the forms F.T. 3 and F.T. 4, as well as random checks on the correctness of the report. At this point, we would like to note that the purpose of this random check is not to emphasise the use of penalties but to create awareness amongst the financial institutions the importance of data reporting to the Bank of Thailand, so that the Bank of Thailand can have an up to date database for policy decision-making. On the external data, for the first time there has been a survey and announcement of the International Investment Position (IIP), in order to correctly monitor foreign currency exposure of the Thai economic system. Also, Thailand is the 21st country ranking in the world, in compliance with the International Monetary Fund's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).
Ignoring quality changes, the price rose by a factor of 3.5 (that is, £ But ignoring the vast quality improvements would surely overstate this increase - a quality change bias. So how do we quantify the increase in the quality of today’s record player relative to the one in 1910? Statistically, there are a number of ways of dealing with this issue: one is to determine the price as a function of characteristics that do not change over time. The prime example of such hedonic pricing techniques in use today is for pricing computers, where the quality characteristics - performance in terms of speed and memory - can be fairly accurately measured. But hedonic pricing is not the only way to deal with this measurement issue, and recent research suggests that these techniques may overstate the extent to which quality has improved. Is a record player still the relevant product, since record players today are only used by a small group of enthusiasts of - now outdated - vinyl records? Perhaps a computer or CD (or DVD or MP3) player is the relevant product today. From about £ you can buy a CD player on the Internet today. This is a much more sophisticated piece of equipment than even today’s record player, and its features are impossible to compare to those of a 1910 record player. If we ignore the invention and marketing of new products, we introduce a new product bias.

As we are lagging behind advanced Europe in terms of income and productivity, sustaining banks' financing can contribute in narrowing those gaps. At the same time, climate change and technological innovation continue to accelerate, pressing on our societies to transform towards greener and digital future. Banks can have a crucial role in financing the twin transition. To sum up, as policy makers we do face a difficult conundrum. After long time of economic moderation, all of the sudden we have to deal with major global shocks that impose tectonic shifts in the economic order, modify conventional macroeconomic paradigms, and accentuate the tradeoffs in policymaking. In this current context, it is crucial to preserve stability- stability of prices, as our primary objective and contribute to stability of the financial system. We all recall how profound consequences and scars instability causes, which is why we have to remain determined, focused and clear. It is the only way to preserve public trust, and as Brunnermeier said "the public is the ultimate source of central banks power and independence". Thank you and looking forward to the insightful debate! 1 Cited from "Monetary Policy in a High Inflation environment: Commitment and Clarity  ", Lecture by Christine Lagarde, November 2022. 2 Geopolitical risk dashboard, Black Rock, December 6, 2022 3 "Front-loading" monetary tightening: pros and cons", BIS Bulletin 63, December 2022. 4 Three have increased the rate (Slovakia, Bulgaria and Czech Republic) while other  four introduced the buffer for the first time (Croatia, Romania, Hungary and North Macedonia).
To this extent, our recent reorientation of monetary policy stance will serve towards ensuring the needed safeguard of economic stability, whilst not detracting from the underlying growth potential. And because in an economic cycle upturn, risk of imbalances building up in some sectors of the economy may emerge. Even though there is no current sign of imbalances or bubbles, the Bank of Thailand will need to be alert and be vigilant in looking out for signs of imbalances to prevent economic instability at an early stage. At the same time, we have made significant progress in strengthening our financial institutions. This progress has now allowed us to move forward to the phase of upgrading the efficiency and continued adoption of evolving international standards, which in turn, will serve to enhance financial system competitiveness, stability, und credibility in the period ahead. Thank you. BIS Review 58/2004  3

... “that the bubble has reached such a size partly due to the fact that the dot-com bubble burst with very little footprint on global GDP”...that as late as April, 2007 the IMF noted that “global economic risks have declined, the overall U.S. economy is holding up well”; that “many quantitative firms whose number crunching sought to expose profitable market trading principles were successful so long as risk aversion moved incrementally (which it did much of the time)”; that “the risk management paradigm nonetheless, harbored a fatal flaw” i.e. that “in the growing state of high euphoria, risk managers, the Federal Reserve, and other regulators failed to fully comprehend the underlying size, length, and impact of the negative tail of the distribution of risk outcomes that was about to be revealed as the post-Lehman” that “for decades, with little, to no data, most analysts, in my experience, had conjectured a far more limited tail risk” and that “this is arguably the major source of the critical risk management system failures”. “In despair, says Greenspan, an inordinately large part of investment management subcontracted to the ‘safe harbor’ risk designations of the credit rating agencies.” But the  2  BIS Review 90/2010  analysts of the credit rating agencies proved no more adept and no more proficient at anticipating the onset of crisis than the investment community at large.