samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to the Commission, less than 2 per cent of EU nationals are resident in another EU member state. The mobility, on an annual basis, of EU nationals within the EU is less than 0.4 per cent of the resident population (about 1.5 million persons). In 1998, migration between states in the USA was approximately 2.4 per cent of the population. The low levels of mobility reflect various institutional differences (such as, for example, professional recognition of qualifications) as well as cultural and linguistic differences between the EU 8 member states. A common perception in Sweden is that the mobility of the labour force will not play any major role - at least within the near future - in stabilising fluctuations in production and employment that arise from country-specific shocks within the EMU area. Let me finally conclude by stating that wage formation is central to the development of the Swedish economy. The Riksbank’s primary task is to uphold the inflation target. The Riksbank shall also, pursuant to the background to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, safeguard growth and employment if this can be attained without neglecting the price stability objective. The challenge of maintaining price stability and a good development in employment will remain if and when Sweden takes part in the Third Stage of EMU. It is therefore important that, for instance, regulatory systems, traditions and labour market policy should lay the foundation for sustainable growth, a high level of employment and a low inflation rate.

Inflation is still being restrained by the fall in prices for imported consumer goods, increased competition in a number of markets and the current period of lower nominal pay increases. The trend in prices for consumer goods over the past two or three years is a result of favourable developments in the Norwegian and global economies. Low inflation is being accompanied by real income growth and a rise in production. It cannot be ruled out that small open economies are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Deviations from the inflation target in Norway are broadly in line with Sweden and New Zealand, but are larger than for example in the UK and Canada. Developments in recent years have also been influenced by the fairly large favourable disturbances to which the Norwegian economy has been exposed. Developments in Norway’s terms of trade provide an illustration of this here. As consumers, we enjoy the benefits of falling prices for many imported goods. As a nation, we benefit from a fall in prices for the goods we import in relation to prices for the goods we export. Norway’s terms of trade are improving. The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices is particularly strong – and the domestic economy is shielded to a certain extent through the oil fund mechanism – but there have also been terms-of-trade gains in the mainland economy. The situation in Norway differs from that of our Nordic neighbours.
Thereupon these countries have been increasingly affected by the crisis. According to IMF, the emerging countries of Eastern Europe are estimated to incur a contraction of about 5 percent during this year. The Albanian economy, in the face of this unfavourable environment, has recorded a comparatively positive performance. There are few data on the real economy. The Bank of  BIS Review 94/2009  1  Albania estimates that a positive economic growth has characterised the first half of year. On the others hand, low growth of credit and money supply, deteriorated business and consumer confidence indicators, slow-down of budget revenues and specific indicators of certain economy sectors, suggest that the economic growth rate has decelerated. It is still early to draw conclusions on the economic performance over the course of 2009 and onward. The Bank of Albania deems that the premises to keep positive economic growth rates in the country are present, among which the macroeconomic and financial stability of the country is of primary importance. Economic activity at home is carried out under the presence of favourable consumer price stability. It is sustained by a soothing tendency of monetary conditions and by an expansionist fiscal policy over this period. The Bank of Albania cut the base interest rate in January and undertook liquidity-injecting operations, raising its quantity in the market.

For example, the unexpectedly strong productivity growth, combined with moderate wage increases, has contributed to inflation being below target in recent years. Wage formation will remain a focal point in the monetary policy analyses, particularly next year when the majority of the collective wage agreements are due to be renegotiated. The level of capacity utilisation and the impact it has on wage formation are also important and topical issues. The OECD calculates what is known as the GDP gap. Their interpretation is that capacity utilisation in the Swedish economy is already higher this year than is compatible with a low and stable inflation rate. However, calculating the GDP gap and similar measures is a very uncertain process. Nor are the measures stable; they change over time. The National Institute of Economic Research (NIER) calculates the labour market gap and equilibrium unemployment. The calculation in the most recent wage formation report shows the labour market gap as being close to zero in 2007 and then becoming slightly positive in 2008 and 2009. Equilibrium unemployment is calculated at 4.5 per cent; it is predicted that this level will be reached next year and that open unemployment will thereafter be slightly below equilibrium level. However, according to the NIER, the social partners have the possibility in the central wage negotiations next year to choose different alternative actions that could either reduce or increase equilibrium unemployment.
Going forward, the strategic location of Thailand and regional trend towards more economic integration provides an opportunity for Thailand in terms of market reach. We are located in the centre of ASEAN, with a combined population of more than 600 million, a large proportion who are of middle income and have potential to spend on goods and services. We are also to enter the ASEAN economic community, a regional agreement to liberalize and integrate trade in 2015 which would further develop trade prospects. Economic integration with CLMV countries will open up the opportunity to tap into a rapidly-growing consumer market as well as the regional workforce. Thailand is well known as a high performance production base in the region, especially for automobiles, food and petrochemicals. Meanwhile, the CLMV countries have a young and abundant labor force. Thus Thailand can benefit from a production supply chain that makes use of the CLMV resources for more efficient production to support businesses at home. Seeing these chances, the government has given priority to infrastructure by endorsing investment plans, especially in railways and roads, to reduce transportation costs, and setting up Special Economic Zones at five locations along our border to reap the benefit from our strategic location as a gateway to other ASEAN countries. On the side of the Bank of Thailand, we facilitate the ease of doing business through the Capital Account Liberalization Master Plan so that businesses can benefit from this opportunity.

Credible macroeconomic policies  A key strength of the Thai economy is sound macroeconomic policy management, which has allowed the country to weather through various shocks relatively well. In fact, it often tops the list of positive factors cited by credit rating agencies in their sovereign credit assessment reports. More specifically, the country is often credited for having a robust macroeconomic policy framework and close coordination among public agencies. –  Monetary Policy:  Under a flexible inflation targeting framework, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) cautiously weighs overall stability against downside risks to growth. In the absence of a fullyfunctioning fiscal authority prior to changes in the political situation, the MPC stepped up and reduced the policy rate to support the economy. –  Fiscal Policy:  Fiscal policy formulation and public debt management are guided by explicit fiscal rules, which provide checks and balance against potential challenges to fiscal discipline from offbudget expenditure and financing. In this connection, public debt-to-GDP stood at 46.85% in July 2014, indicating favorable fiscal discipline. Recently, the government has announced concrete roadmaps which help bolster public confidence. Going forward, the government will continue to play proactive roles in supporting an economic rebound. 2. Strategic location  Thailand is located in the center of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). Rich human and natural resources in the GMS will make it a new frontier for economic growth in ASEAN, providing clear opportunities for the region.
And a disorderly transition, where more severe policies are introduced later in the horizon to compensate, could result in both lower growth and higher inflation from rising energy and materials costs in the economy. In either case, the economic impacts from such transition scenarios over the medium term will likely be much lower than the growing challenges from physical risks. Under current climate policies, which are insufficient to reach net-zero emissions, analysis from the NGFS scenarios suggest that up to 13% of global GDP would be at risk by 2050, even before accounting for the potential consequences of severe weather events. Monetary policy These risks to the economic outlook make climate change and the transition to a net-zero economy also relevant factors for the conduct of monetary policy. The typical policy horizon for monetary policy is two to three years, and so many of the effects of climate change (particularly tipping points) will manifest beyond that timeframe. But the effects of climate change matter for monetary policy because structural shifts in the supply side of the economy can affect not only future point-in-time macroeconomic variables, but also the expected natural rate of interest (r*) and the natural rate of unemployment (u*). The physical and transition risks from climate change are relevant to these issues, although the economic modelling and research to estimate the relative size of these effects has only started to emerge in recent years.

Michael C Bonello: Facing the challenge of today’s economic realities Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Institute of Financial Services Annual Dinner, St Julians, 14 November 2003. *  *  *  This being my first public statement since my reappointment, I should like to express my appreciation to the Government for the trust that has been placed in me. I am conscious of the magnitude of the task that lies ahead, but I am also comforted by the thought that I shall continue to be supported by a team of competent and dedicated professionals. I am, therefore, able to look forward with confidence to leading an independent Central Bank of Malta into membership of the European System of Central Banks next May, and to cooperating closely with the Government in creating a policy environment which would allow us to guide the Maltese lira smoothly into the euro area. I stress this point because it is only when the economy becomes anchored in the relative safety of the common currency area that the benefits of participation in the European single market can be enjoyed to the full. Early adoption of the euro is, therefore, in the national interest and must become our common objective. Pursuing that goal successfully, however, will require a courageous effort to overcome the obstacles that stand in our way. This much was clear from the beginning.
Along those lines, the Committee recently agreed that banks adopting the "internal ratings based" approach to credit risk will be required to conduct appropriate credit risk stress testing, which should help to contain procyclical behavior. •  Another concern raised about Basel II is its complexity. If the New Accord is to be more risksensitive, however, it must involve an irreducible degree of complexity, which parallels the changes in bank practices and market instruments. Indeed, some of this complexity stems from the various options the New Accord provides to address the wide range of risk profiles, strategies, and systems that banks maintain. •  The treatment of operational risk has been a more specific area of concern. While operational risk cannot be quantified with the same degree of precision as credit or market risk, the Committee believes that introducing a separate charge for operational risk will bolster efforts to find better ways to address it. In this vein, we have seen encouraging progress in operational risk measurement, although we recognize that the industry has not settled on particular methodologies or principles. Accordingly, the New Accord will permit an unprecedented amount of flexibility to accommodate a spectrum of approaches to operational risk. Toward that end, under the "advanced measurement approach," the most sophisticated institutions will be free to experiment with a great variety of methodologies.

The transition to a more global financial system has certainly not been free from problems. It should not be forgotten that extensive capital regulations entail a mispricing of risks. Deregulation then leads to desirable price adjustments. But it is often during these transitional corrections that financial problems are liable to occur. Changes have often occurred too quickly for the system, including the institutional infrastructure, to be able to keep up. In most cases, neither the banks nor the public authorities had the necessary prerequisites for adapting to the new conditions that were created by a freer capital market. The expansion of lending had too free a rein in many countries and the authorities did not properly monitor what was happening at either micro or macro level. Economic overheating often followed the deregulation and opening up of the domestic financial system due to a rapid expansion of credit rapidly. Asset prices rose sharply and imbalances developed. Furthermore, in countries with a fixed exchange rate system, extensive short-term borrowing abroad was stimulated. A large proportion of these funds was often channelled through the domestic banking system and rendered this rather vulnerable. When capital flows subsequently reversed, the adjustment was often violent. Production fell, unemployment rose and both the currency and the banking system faced an acute crisis. Apart from the actual process of financial market deregulation, there may have been other factors at work. The openings for capital investment in so-called emerging markets created opportunities for international investors for achieving high returns.
Each country is also to allow continuous monitoring of its government finances by the other EU countries. A government budget deficit is normally not to exceed 3 per cent of GDP, though there is room for certain exemptions. If a country in the euro area does have a budget deficit above 3 per cent and this cannot be explained by factors that are exceptional and temporary, sanctions are to be imposed. EU countries outside the euro area are not liable to sanctions, however; they are only included in the monitoring provisions of the Pact. The task of establishing price stability in the euro area will be facilitated if low inflation in the area is also promoted by fiscal policies. The importance of fiscal policy lies both in creating sustainable government finances, which contribute to the general credibility of economic policy, and in countering tendencies to excessive price pressure in the economy. In that the single monetary policy is to be constructed in relation to the overall situation in the euro area, more will be required of fiscal policy in the context of national stabilisation policy - fiscal instruments will still be available for stabilising national economic trends. But this in turn does presuppose that there is room for manoeuvre in the national budgets. Partly on this account, the Stability and Growth Pact’s medium-term objective of a government budget balance or surplus is reasonable and it is highly important that the countries meet this undertaking.

Thus, EMU is to be seen primarily as one aspect of a larger, political project. Most analyses, however, have tended to concentrate on the union’s pros and cons in an economic context. The advantages that have been cited for the participating countries include lower transaction costs for trading in a common currency, increased transparency and competition in the single market, and low, stable inflation. The lack of an exchange rate as an instrument for stabilisation policy is mentioned as one of the drawbacks. Sweden’s Parliament decided in December 1997 that Sweden would not be joining the monetary union from the start, mainly on account of the lack of public support. The BIS Review 68/1998  -2-  decision was made after a committee of experts had reported on participation’s advantages and drawbacks for Sweden. The commission was basically in favour of Sweden being a member of EMU but was of the opinion that, given the disadvantages considered, Sweden should not participate from the start. The costs in terms of stabilisation policy were assumed to exceed the benefits from economic efficiency. The report’s assessment of political aspects favoured Swedish membership of EMU. The report gave the Riksbank an occasion to present its appraisal of the monetary union. This differed and amounted to a recommendation that Sweden should participate from the start. We considered that the commission had overestimated the costs for stabilisation policy, while the economic and political benefits were likely to be even greater than envisaged in the report.
This will provide more clarity on the respective roles of the various agencies – as well as MAS’ own approach to investigating misconduct. Where laws are broken, the MAS will rigorously investigate a case including with the Commercial Affairs Department (“CAD”), and will not hesitate to charge the perpetrators involved. We also supervise regulated financial institutions on a regular basis and will take enforcement actions against an institution that has fallen short of our regulatory requirements. But enforcement actions cannot operate in isolation. No amount of rules can stop someone who is intent on gaming the system or breaking the law. Our capital market works best in a regime where all stakeholders share some responsibility in holding the line against any mismanagement or misconduct, analogous to community policing. The statutory and market regulators can work closely with the industry, investors, industry associations and other groups to co-create a fair and orderly capital market. This will engender confidence and trust, and allow market discipline to thrive. This brings me to the important role of market discipline. As our capital markets develop, we can and should expect market discipline to increasingly feature. It is the process by which market participants themselves exercise oversight over companies and call out what may be possible transgressions or dubious practices. The fact that we have indeed seen more of such commentaries and reports in recent years need not be interpreted as a sign of weakness but of strength arising from a more mature capital marketplace.

Joseph Yam: Basel II - back to the future Opening remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Seventh Distinguished Lecture: “Basel II: Back to the Future”, Hong Kong, 4 February 2005. *  *  *  Let me first extend a warm welcome to all of you to this seventh HKMA Distinguished Lecture. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce our speaker, Governor Jaime Caruana, and our discussant, Mr David Eldon. Basel II, or the New Capital Accord, or whatever we might call it, has been on the minds of bankers and regulators for around five years now. This new framework of capital adequacy standards for banks, issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, is an important step forward in the field of regulation. By making capital requirements more risk-sensitive, Basel II will bring banking regulation more into line with the way that banks themselves manage risk. It will also give banks the incentive to improve their own risk management. Basel II will help make banks stronger, and it will improve the safety, stability and efficiency of financial systems. The title of Governor Caruana's lecture today, "Back to the Future", might for a moment give the impression that Basel II is the stuff of science fantasy. There is no doubt that it is a highly complex matter, and that it has – literally – required the recruitment of physicists and rocket scientists by the regulators and banks tasked with its implementation.
Hence, the offered exchange rate is generally unattractive, and visitors will almost always be better off converting their money at a bank or using their credit cards. Historically, parallel currencies have only prevailed in those countries that no longer had a sound currency of their own. As long as the SNB continues to pursue a policy that aims at maintaining price stability, the Swiss franc will remain a widely accepted and trustworthy currency. There is no reason to expect it to disappear. By contrast, the declining significance of the Swiss franc as a denomination of foreign bonds in recent years is not primarily due to the creation of the single currency. This trend had already been observable long before 1999. It can be seen as a return to a situation in which the importance of the Swiss franc is more in check with Switzerland's economic size, as compared with its former extremely over-proportional weighting as an investment currency. Certainly, the launch of the euro has not enhanced the attractiveness of Swiss franc bonds, mainly because the market liquidity of euro bonds has grown significantly since 1999. On the other hand, the Swiss franc has gained in stature simply because it is a member of the dwindling family of international currencies. For this reason, we expect it to maintain a role as an instrument of portfolio diversification. 3.2.

As long as the SNB can conduct an autonomous monetary policy, the Swiss franc will remain a crisis-resistant investment currency, and the interest rate bonus will be maintained. 4  BIS Review 60/2002  4. The euro's implications for the SNB's monetary policy  4.1. The monetary policy concept  With the euro now existing in its physical form, some cash transactions will tend to be effected in euros rather than in Swiss francs. This development will, in turn, have a negative impact on the demand for Swiss francs. But as I have set out before, there is no doubt that the large majority of domestic payments will continue to be transacted in Swiss francs. On the whole, the decline in seigniorage, i.e. the profit that central banks achieve with the circulation of money, is likely to be very limited. However, the main point I want to make here is that even if the creation of the European Monetary Union did have a significant impact on the demand for Swiss francs, this would not call the viability of the SNB's monetary policy concept into question. A possible change in the demand for money hampers monetary policy decisions especially if a central bank pursues money supply targets. The steering of the money supply as a monetary policy concept has by now been abandoned by many countries.