samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The east European trade is particularly important to the Swedish economy, which is already one of the most open and trade-dependent economies in Europe, at the same time as we have strong historical ties to several eastern European countries, particularly the three Baltic states and Poland. Already, central and eastern Europe as a whole is a larger market for Swedish foreign trade than, for instance, Japan or East Asia. When the Riksbank makes its inflation forecasts, central and eastern Europe will move gradually from being a brief footnote to becoming an important area in the international forecasts. The importance of membership The recipe for success behind the trade integration between the EU and eastern Europe is a littleknown international trade agreement. While the WTO and NAFTA steal the headlines, few people are aware of the agreement that created the boost in east-west trade in Europe, the “Europe agreement” between the EU and the eastern European countries. There are major shortcomings in this agreement, but it includes free trade for almost all industrial goods and thereby enabled the rapid changeover to become reality. However, a decisive factor for the success of the Europe agreement is that all of those involved knew that actual membership of the EU would come in the near future. Membership is that major and important step, when the rules of the game are confirmed and investors know that the institutional conditions are stable and up to EU standards.

The benefit is not limited only to enhancing credit evaluation, but also provides the foundation for more effective portfolio analysis and management on an ongoing basis that are the hallmarks of any effective risk management system. For example, the overall quality of the SME portfolio can be monitored based on information available from the Bureau to  BIS Review 67/2008  3  support analyses on the distribution of financing by rating, migration analysis and stress tests. The findings from portfolio analysis supported by the bureau information would assist SME financiers to better price their SME financing and facilitate more effective allocations of capital. Moving forward, one of the roles that the SME Credit Bureau can effectively play is to provide market research and reports on the SME industry. This will expand its user base beyond SME financiers and creditors to include policy makers, economic and investment analysts, and even academic scholars. The credit information infrastructure in Malaysia is advance, relative to other countries in a similar stage of economic development. Our main credit information database currently is the CCRIS that captures information on all credit facilities extended by licensed banking institutions in Malaysia , as well as other institutions regulated by Bank Negara. While access to CCRIS is limited for the time being mostly to regulated financial institutions, we are encouraged by the progress made by private bureaus, such as the SME Credit Bureau, in providing access to credit information to a wider user base, as well as developing new value added products and services.
In addition, a cheque processing fee of 50 sen per cheque leaf will be imposed 11 months later on 1 April 2014. 4  Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland. 5  RM636 million (banks) + RM19 million (MyClear) + RM113 million (businesses). RM113 million for businesses was computed based on the ECB study that businesses incur a cost amounting to 0.012% of GDP. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The 11-month grace period before the implementation of the cheque processing fee is intended to afford both the public and the businesses ample time to familiarize with, adjust and migrate to using electronic payments such as the IBG for their payment transactions. Improving accessibility, security and convenience of electronic payments Based on a recent survey conducted on businesses, we have identified 4 key hindrances to the adoption of electronic payments, namely: •  Concern of the security of electronic payments  •  Difficulty to perform payment reconciliation  •  Low limit of electronic payment transaction  •  Lack of familiarity with electronic payments  In terms of security measures, banks have continued to invest significantly to ensure the safety of electronic payment transactions. Examples of security enhancements that have been undertaken include the migration to secure chip-based payment cards to address card counterfeiting fraud, the introduction of a second factor authentication to strengthen authorization of online banking transactions and the implementation of SMS alert to mitigate credit card fraud.

The return on real estate and infrastructure tends to follow a slightly different pattern than the return on equities and bonds. Investing in these asset classes is therefore expected to improve the GPFG’s risk-return trade-off. Looking ahead, the GPFG will likely reduce its allocation to bonds from today’s weight of 35 percent. For a long-term investor, this is a sensible adjustment. At the same time, it will signal that the authorities are willing to accept considerable fluctuations in the return and size of the GPFG, at least on a par with the volatility seen during the financial crisis. Even though a number of countries hold substantial foreign exchange reserves, Norway stands out. In almost no other country does the central bank manage such a large and diversified investment fund. The GPFG has delivered solid results, and its management model has been shown to be robust despite periods of rough weather. Transparency, accountability and the safety of capital invested are paramount. The organisation has been enlarged to manage a steadily growing and more diversified portfolio. Changes in the organisation of the GPFG may come. But whatever the future solution may be, the primary objective of investment management must remain firm: the highest possible return for the benefit of current and future generations. The GPFG should remain a financial investor. If the government were to use the GPFG for other purposes, it would limit the scope for achieving good returns and thereby Norway’s fiscal space.
As in parts of Europe, the United States is experiencing a major budget deficit and a growing national debt. In May this year, the US national debt reached the so-called debt ceiling, which limits how much the United States is allowed to borrow. This meant there was a risk that government grants and everything from salaries for government employees to interest payments on the national debt could not be paid. As the United States is the largest borrower in the world this led to a lot of unease on the financial markets. Reaching agreement on how to deal with this was made more difficult due to the political divisions between the Republicans and the Democrats. An agreement to raise the debt ceiling and reduce the federal deficit was actually reached at the end of June, but the strongly politicised process prior to the agreement and the fact that it was reached so late has created doubt about the United States’ ability to handle its national debt. The increasing concern about economic problems around the world is dampening the prospects for global growth. At the same time, the pressure that that is being put on the euro countries with weak public finances means that more countries in the euro area can be expected to tighten fiscal policy even further than was previously assumed. This applies not only to relatively small economies like Greece, Portugal and Ireland but also to larger economies such as Spain and Italy, and perhaps France too.

This has risen sharply in the past couple of  5  years and to historic highs; it fell back in the most recent,  4  April, data, but remains high. Against the backdrop I  3  have been discussing of slowing global growth, trade  2  tensions and Brexit uncertainty, that is not surprising. 1  But it suggests a policy environment that could  0  potentially be challenging. -1  Many of the drivers of elevated policy uncertainty are  Differences from averages since 2002 (number of standard deviations)  -2 2002  2006  2010  2014  Policy uncertainty  2018 VIX  fundamentally shocks to supply, which monetary policy is not able to offset, rather than demand. But they could introduce a more complicated policy trade-off for the  The policy uncertainty index is available at http://www.policyuncertainty.com/. This chart shows data to end-April. MPC. And they represent risks to financial stability which the FPC needs to be mindful of and prepared to respond to. That is particularly the case given the apparent disconnect between this measure of policy uncertainty and measures of market uncertainty, for example the VIX measure of US equity market uncertainty which is also shown on the chart. The VIX has risen far less than the policy uncertainty index in recent months, suggesting market participants see relatively little risk of major disruption.
8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  We therefore face a trade-off between simplicity and calibration. A focused approach would impose the fewest requirements, but those that were applied might have to be conservatively calibrated in order to maintain resilience. A streamlined approach would lead to less conservatively calibrated, but more complex requirements, when compared to the focused approach. Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off, along with a second trade-off between simplicity and minimising barriers to growth. This second trade-off arises because a focused approach would be very different to the requirements a growing firm would face after it moved out of the simpler regime. It might therefore be more difficult for a small firm to grow out of a focused regime, as it would effectively have to gear up to meet a whole new set of requirements. Figure 1: Illustration of the characteristics of a ‘focused’ and a ‘streamlined’ approach  In practice, there are a spectrum of approaches we can take between the extreme cases of a very focused approach which is like the requirements we have in place for credit unions, and a slightly streamlined approach which is almost the same as requirements for larger banks and building societies. And different approaches might work better for different sorts of requirements. For example, the right approach for capital requirements might differ from the right approach for liquidity requirements. What this way of describing different approaches provides us with is clarification of the choices and trade-offs we face.

The simpler regime will, of course, only apply to firms which are not internationally active because internationally active firms will remain subject to Basel standards. We therefore also ask for views about how we should identify which firms are not internationally active. Decisions about scope will be important because, speaking generally, the more alike the firms in scope are, the simpler the regime can be. For example, 40% of the existing rules and technical standards for credit risk relate to the internal ratings based approach.3 If just those firms which only use the standardised approach were eligible for the simpler regime, these rules could be entirely removed. But, on the other hand, too restrictive a scope will mean fewer firms are able to benefit from the simpler regime. That is why we want to receive comments about where we should draw the line for a first step which delivers meaningful simplification for a worthwhile number of firms. These choices will determine which banks are affected by the simpler regime. As I say, these are likely to be smaller non-systemic banks as we focus on taking the first step towards building a strong and simple framework. But before moving on I would like to draw your attention to two other important reviews that the Bank aims to consult on this summer.
First is a relative shift of dependence on foreign savings, as against domestic savings, as a source of funding domestic (fixed and portfolio) investments. Second is reduced availability of such funding, as evidenced by Asia being a net exporter  2  BIS Review 66/2004  of capital. To be sure, there has correspondingly been more efficient allocation and use of scarce funding on a global basis, made possible by the freer mobility of capital and the freer convertibility of currencies. But there has also been a change in the dynamics of financial intermediation in Asia, in that there is a process of recycling of Asian funds through the developed markets back into Asia that has become quite significant. And not only is it significant, it is also quite potent and demanding. Whether we like it or not, the behaviour of foreign savings in the hands of foreign financial intermediaries is quite different from that of domestic savings. To start with, they are more volatile than domestic savings and more sensitive to shifts in market sentiment and in macro-economic policies, to a degree that has proven, in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, to be brutally destabilising. Given also the existence of some forbearance, in terms of, for example, the disclosure of activities and the maintenance of concentrated positions, in the interest of sustaining the presence of foreign financial intermediaries and foreign savings, there is a much greater likelihood of market overshooting.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Towards creating an Islamic Financial System as an integral part of the International Financial System - strategies and challenges Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Asian Islamic Banking & Finance Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 21 September 2004. *  *  *  “The integration of Islamic finance with international financial markets and institutions has demonstrated its viability, competitiveness, resilience and sustainability as a form of financial intermediation. This trend has contributed towards facilitating greater cross border flows in terms of increased trade and investment transactions thereby strengthening the global economic and financial linkages. As this international integration process intensifies, it not only raises the prospects for more balanced global growth but also allows for greater diversification of risks thus contributing towards greater global stability. At the core of this financial globalisation process is the robustness and resilience of the domestic Islamic financial system. The development of a sustainable Islamic financial system that is able to withstand the challenges of the uncertainties and instabilities inherent in the global financial system, thus not only requires an effective global financial architecture but a system that is also supported by an appropriate, comprehensive and sound domestic financial infrastructure. These mutually reinforcing structures would not only accentuate wealth creation and foster greater potential for trade but would also promote global financial stability and breakthroughs in new business relationships”.
In the third quarter, the U.S. exceeded market consensus expectations  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and, although inventory accumulation played a part, the improved performance of the housing and labor markets, combined with better entrepreneurial and consumer expectations, the behavior of stock and other asset prices and, in particular, the lower intensity of the fiscal adjustment suggest that next year the country will outperform its 2013 figures. The recovery of the Japanese economy is still ongoing, but the tax increases announced for 2014 will taper economic growth. The Eurozone posted positive growth for the second consecutive quarter, although less than expected by the consensus. Worth noting were the slower growth of Germany and the contraction of the French economy and, on a positive note, that some of the peripheral economies grew again. Emerging economies have slowed down further and consensus forecasts have seen new downward revisions. In China, after a substantial correction to its growth projections in the first half of the year, recent data show growth stabilizing around 7.5 percent, quite less than in recent years, however. The baseline scenario assumes that the Chinese economy will slow further to reach 7.2 percent annually in 2015, which points to the need to continue to restructure its sources of growth and resolve some of the vulnerabilities of its financial system. In the rest of the emerging world, economic activity continues to moderate, leading some economies to lower their benchmark rates.

In this trajectory, the maturation of the mining investment cycle discussed in previous Reports has played a major role. In addition, the extraordinary imports of transport materials of the last quarter of 2012 did not continue into this year, and imports of other capital goods were weak in the past few months. Consumption has also slowed down, although its adjustment has proceeded gradually, because of still tight labor market conditions, real wages growing strongly and consumer expectations still optimistic, although less so than in the first half of the year. The deceleration of private consumption is expected to continue over the coming months coupled with a not so strong labor market, a vision that is grounded on our business perception report Informe de Percepciones de Negocios. CPI inflation has been below expectations, mainly reflecting the drop in international fuel prices, which more than offset the seasonal price increases of some perishable foods and the peso depreciation. Thus, in October the CPI rose 1.5% y-o-y, which again placed it temporarily below the tolerance range. In contrast, the core measure CPIEFE brought no major surprises and continued to increase up to 1.6% annually in the same month. Two years ahead inflation expectations remain around 3% (figure 3). In the international financial markets, movements in the last few months have been largely determined by news about the future course of monetary and fiscal policies in the United States.
This observation shows that inflation target, to a significant extent, continue to serve as an anchor and that economic agents expect the disinflation process to continue in the medium term. Nevertheless, the fact that currently medium-term inflation expectations are significantly above our medium term target of 4 percent necessitates a cautious policy stance 1 . Figure 10: Medium-Term Inflation Expectations* 9 12-Month  24-Month  8  7  6  5  0108  1107  0907  0707  0507  0307  0107  1106  0906  0706  0506  0306  0106  1105  0905  0705  0505  0305  0105  4  Expectations regarding the period after 24 months have been published since May 2006. Source: CBRT. 1  As of January, one-year and two-year ahead inflation expectations are 6.01 percent and 5.17 percent, respectively. BIS Review 20/2008  7  3. Inflation and monetary policy outlook  Distinguished Guests and Press Members, After summarizing inflation and monetary policy developments in 2007, in this part of my speech, I would like to share our evaluations on inflation and the monetary policy outlook. First of all, I would like to summarize several factors that might enable the disinflation process to continue in the upcoming period: Annual percentage change in CPI excluding food, energy and tobacco imply an inflation trend of 4.8 percent (Figure 11) 2 . In other words, underlying inflation in the past year was not far away from the medium-term targets.

It said that: “The authorities’ commitment to a rules-based and non-interventionist approach should enhance the economy’s ability to withstand the recent regional and financial market turmoil.” “As in the past, the mission strongly endorses the authorities’ continued commitment to the linked exchange rate system.” “Appropriately, the authorities have taken forceful action during the past two weeks to tighten significantly monetary conditions, and have successfully demonstrated their ability and commitment to defend the link.” “It is important to recognize that allowing interest rates to rise in response to exchange market pressures is an essential element of the currency board mechanism that lies at the heart of Hong Kong’s monetary arrangements.” BIS Review 115/1997  -4-  “Recent events demonstrate that the system is working exactly as intended ...” “Our discussions with market participants have indicated a widely-held consensus that the prudential and regulatory oversight of the financial sector is strong, which has helped underpin confidence in the system.” 16. But what the internationally renowned doctor, in the form of the IMF, says may not always be universally acceptable, particularly for those who may have been innocent parties having to suffer the pain of market adjustment, inevitable as it may be. It is quite understandable therefore that there will always be grievances and consequently calls for prescriptions for pain killers and other preventive medicine.
In fact to varying degrees, reflecting differing assessments of how far our particular currency areas are expected to be affected by the world slowdown and different starting points, relating both to our assessment of trends in domestic demand, and of how close we were initially to full capacity, both the UK and the Euro-zone, as well as the US, have acted fairly aggressively to reduce interest rates since the autumn; and Japan has moved to more active fiscal stimulus. And if the global economic prospect, and net external demand in the industrial countries, were to deteriorate further, then it would be right to contemplate further moves in the same direction – consistently with our aim of effective price stability. What we all aim to do – as I said earlier – is to keep aggregate demand in line with the supply capacity of our economies. We have no interest in the creation of unnecessary spare capacity in our economies as a whole, nor in a fall in the underlying general price level. But that will still inevitably mean a sharp deterioration in the balance of payments of the industrial countries, collectively and probably individually, reflecting the imbalance between external and domestic demand growth in the industrial economies. And that in turn is bound to mean substantial pressure on the internationally-exposed sectors of the economy, not just in this country but throughout the industrial world, and we are already seeing ample evidence of that.

The strong exchange rate gave us somewhat more time than we would otherwise have had to bring about this domestic slowdown – it meant that monetary policy did not need to be tightened as aggressively as would have been necessary otherwise. But we could not avoid tightening policy altogether, even though we realised that this would be likely to increase the pressures on the internationally-exposed sectors, because in anything other than the short term that would have put the whole economy – including the internationally-exposed sectors we were trying to shelter – at risk of accelerating inflation. I would remind you that right up until the summer of last year we were seeing signs of increasing pressures in the labour market, even in the manufacturing sector – reflected in increasing skills shortages and recruitment difficulties, in the employment/unemployment data, and in gradually increasing pay settlements. The uncomfortable reality, as I’ve said very often before, is that monetary policy can only target the economy as a whole – it can’t seek to protect individual firms, or sectors, or regions, however much we might wish it otherwise. That – as I’ve discovered – is not exactly a popular idea, but there’s no question that that is the reality of it. Over the past year the world – and I mean the world – has changed very substantially.