samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is also necessary to take steps to restore the banking system to health as soon as possible. This means forcing banks to cut their capital distributions early and to raise new capital in a timely way even if such capital-raising results in the forced dilution of existing shareholders. With respect to bank capital, we saw two unwelcome behaviors during the crisis that central banks and other banking regulators need to lean against. Banks were reluctant to cut their capital distributions because of worries that this would signal weakness. Of course, these capital distributions just made the banks and the banking system weaker. Also, we saw that banks were reluctant to raise capital to guard against particularly bad states of the world because they thought this might unnecessarily dilute their shareholders should such bad states of the world not materialize. Of course, the collective action of banks to not raise this additional capital made the banking system weaker than it would otherwise have been. This in turn made the possibility of the particularly bad states of the world more likely. In such circumstances – which the U.S. faced in 2009 and arguably the Eurozone faces today – it is essential for the authorities to force sufficient capital into the system. The subtlety here is that in a time of stress it is necessary to overcapitalize the banking system relative to the base case scenario in order to ensure financial stability and an ongoing supply of credit to the real economy in a stress scenario.

In undertaking the research, we have worked closely with external stakeholders from the cash industry and have already engaged with the public through several independently-managed focus groups. And we have consulted other countries that have undertaken research into different banknote materials, of which several have already switched to the use of polymer, including Australia and Canada. Based on this research, we are confident that printing our banknotes on polymer would bring several benefits: First, polymer notes are more secure. Polymer notes are harder to counterfeit and allow for the inclusion of “windows” or clear portions in the design, which considerably enhances counterfeit resilience. Such features also allow users to check whether notes are genuine quickly and easily. Second, polymer notes are more durable and resistant to damage. As a result, polymer banknotes last at least two-and-a-half times longer than notes printed on paper. And because polymer banknotes last longer, they don’t need to be replaced so frequently, meaning they are cheaper to produce. Third, polymer banknotes repel dirt and moisture better than paper banknotes, and so stay cleaner for longer, reducing the incidence of ‘tatty’ notes. Finally, polymer banknotes are more environmentally friendly than paper notes. Given these benefits, we are confident that a switch to printing notes on polymer makes sense. But we also recognise that the public takes pride in their banknotes, and that changes to the design and format of notes are consequently of great interest. Because of this, we have decided to consult with the public before making any final decisions.
In Norway, Norges Bank will inform the authorities that measures other than those available to the Bank are required if a situation arises where we are unable to return the exchange rate to its initial range without causing inflation or a deflationary recession. This implies a greater focus in the conduct of fiscal policy on factors that influence the exposed sector of the economy. This is consistent with our concern that the economy may run into a Dutch disease. 10. Economic developments  From looking at the principles of Norwegian economic policy, let us turn to Norges Bank’s view of the current situation. The high and steady rate of growth from 1992 and onwards has been moderated this year. The overall picture indicates that the exchange rate is stable, while the economy is showing signs of cooling off. BIS Review 121/1999  12  Each quarter Norges Bank presents an inflation report with an assessment of the outlook for the Norwegian economy and for price inflation for the next two years. The projections in the Inflation Report provide a basis for the Bank’s conduct of monetary policy. The Inflation Report published in September indicates that price and cost inflation in Norway will gradually slow to the level aimed at in the euro area. Among other things, this is based on the assumption that growth in public expenditure will be approximately in line with the trend rate of growth in the mainland economy. For 1999 Norges Bank expects a growth rate of ½%.

The number of cross-border REITs listed on the Singapore Exchange has increased, further consolidating Singapore’s status as a regional REITs hub. These REITs offer global investors exposure to properties throughout Asia Pacific via the Singapore market, including properties in China, Hong Kong, Australia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Japan. To sharpen Singapore’s edge as an Asian REITs hub, it is crucial for us to maintain a conducive environment both for issuers and for investors. To this end, MAS regularly reviews its regulatory regime to keep pace with market development while providing adequate safeguards for investors and issuers, in close consultation with the industry,. Despite substantial growth in market capitalization of REITs in Asia, from approximately $ billion in 2005 to $ billion in 2006, estimates suggest that the current market only represents 4% of investible-grade real estate in Asia, whereas in Australia estimates lie in the region of 50% to 60%. This suggests immense potential for increased securitization of Asian real estate assets, and for diversification beyond the conventional types of properties. Innovations in property finance The success of our REIT market has also spurred growth in other areas. Take for example our debt market. Singapore-listed REITs have also been large issuers of commercial mortgage-backed securities, contributing 20% of all issuance of mortgage-backed securities in Asia-ex-Japan last year. Indeed, Asia’s largest ever commercial mortgage-backed security was issued jointly by two Singapore REITs – CapitaMall Trust and CapitaCommercial Trust.
In such circumstances, both borrowers and lenders may experience losses and bankruptcies, depleting the future supply of credit. A banking system that encourages lending to companies or individuals in excess of their ability to repay is one that hurts not just borrowers, but society as a whole. Goal of the New Accord In promoting the efficient use of banks’ capital resources, the member countries of the Basel Committee are revising a now outdated international agreement on the minimum level of capital banks are required to hold. That original 1988 agreement was relatively uncomplicated and represented an important first step in the development of an internationally acceptable standard. It has since been overtaken by advances in the financial sector – and in the economy. New technology, the globalization of financial markets, and innovative financial products and services have changed the way that banks measure and manage credit, market, and operational risks in a manner that the 1988 Accord could not anticipate. Let me be clear about this: the 1988 Accord is broken. It no longer meets the needs of sophisticated, twenty-first century markets. The new Accord will do just that. Our goal for revising the Accord is to go beyond a rules-based structure and instead encourage banks themselves to identify, measure, and manage their risks appropriately. In particular, banks making use of the most sophisticated approach in the new Accord will increasingly be able to rely on their own internal ratings of credit exposures when determining how much capital to hold.

I would be happy to talk about them during the discussion if you would like to hear more. Timing of the New Accord Let me close by telling you where we are in the process. To make sure that we get the new Accord right, members of the Committee and I felt it was important to continue to solicit and evaluate feedback from the industry in a variety of ways. Empirical exercises (or the quantitative impact studies as they are called) will be an important part of this dialogue, both those underway now and the more comprehensive study that will be undertaken in October. The exercise we are designing for the autumn will provide banks with the opportunity to assess the impact of a fully specified proposal. It will be targeted to a wide set of banks worldwide, after which, the Committee will release its proposal for a third and final round of formal consultation. We expect the consultation will be relatively brief given all of the discussion and assessment that has taken place. Let me stop here. I would be delighted to answer your questions. BIS Review 27/2002  5
These developments are symptomatic of profound changes in the global economy, as world growth has increasingly been powered by resource hungry emerging markets, and as financial markets in developed countries have taken off and, in the process, become more tightly linked to one another. I will talk about both developments, before coming back to discuss the outlook for inflation and growth in the UK, and the implications for policy. Financial crisis The crisis in financial markets last August was triggered by a slump in the US housing market. This, of course, is acting as a direct drag on US activity. Any slowing in the US  BIS Review 22/2008  1  economy stands to affect the UK in the traditional way, through influencing trade flows. The size of this effect will depend on how other trading partners are affected and how policymakers react. But the really striking feature of recent experience has been how the US housing crisis has reverberated through the highly integrated and sophisticated financial markets of North America and Western Europe. Six months after global securitisation markets seized up, in response to uncertainties about the scale and location of losses arising from rising defaults on US sub prime mortgages, some credit markets are still not trading at all, and others remain very illiquid. And each week seems to highlight some new dimension of the ensuing disruption to core financial markets.

On inflation expectations, we pay close attention to a wide range of information drawn from surveys, and financial market prices, recognising that they are all, in different ways, tricky to interpret. We also need to be mindful of the risk that any further increases in the prices of everyday items like food and energy will heighten public perceptions of inflation, and raise expectations about the future overall rate of CPI inflation. Conclusion The outlook for the economy looks very different now from a year ago. We are seeing some powerful global forces playing out, in financial markets, in commodity markets, and in the world’s largest economies. Their impact on the UK is highly uncertain, partly because they  BIS Review 22/2008  5  are hard to understand and to predict, and partly because much will depend on the way policymakers around the world respond. The MPC will need to respond continuously and flexibly to its assessment of the changing balance of two key risks. On the one hand, there is a risk that demand will slow too sharply, but on the other there is a risk that a temporary shock to inflation will prove persistent. A temporary pick-up in inflation – by itself – does not mean that the Committee needs to tolerate a significant weakening in demand. But if inflation expectations appear to be persistently elevated, then the Committee will need to tolerate more slack to keep inflation on target.
Even in one market in one country, the introduction of major changes in securities settlement systems can lead to teething problems, both in the central IT infrastructure and for individual institutions as they learn how to apply the changes. Yet in the case of EMU, a number of Member States will switch to the euro more or less simultaneously at the start. That carries considerable risks of confusion and error, unless there is an extensive programme across Europe to explain the changes required in detail first. This is not of course, a particular problem for the UK. (ii) Market framework for the use of the euro BIS Review 106/1997  -5The second important aspect of preparation is the development of a comprehensive market framework for the use of the euro in London. The euro regulations help to provide the legal part of the framework as I understand you discussed yesterday. To make sure that the euro market in London, as elsewhere in Europe, is as deep and liquid as possible, we also need to harmonise market conventions on new issues of securities in the euro money and bond markets, and conventions in the foreign exchange markets. Market associations now agree on the basis on which conventions in these markets should be harmonised, and the Bank has encouraged their initiative. The problem has been to see how EU-wide decisions will be taken. Harmonised practices may develop spontaneously in the markets, but there is no guarantee of this.

But beyond that it certainly means, too, that “outs”, or potential “pre-ins”, should not attempt to exploit any perceived -- and certainly short-term -- advantage from the additional policy freedoms they might have on the outside, but should, for example, persist in macro-economic, fiscal and monetary, discipline in parallel with the EMU countries. But it also means that the “in” countries, for their part, have an identical self-interest in maintaining an open and constructive relationship with the “outs”/“pre-ins”. Otherwise we would all be cutting off our nose to spite our face. I make this general point, Mr. Chairman, because this context seems to me to be relevant to any assessment of the economic prospect, of the economy as a whole or of any particular sector, within or without the euro-area. In the rest of my remarks I assume that, in or out, we will be operating within a constructive, co-operative, environment throughout the EU, for the powerful reason that that is in everyone’s interest. BIS Review 106/1997  -2Against that background let me turn to the prospects for the City. I will, in fact, concentrate on the case in which the UK does not participate in EMU in the first wave, because in the alternative case, the UK in scenario, while there may be uncertainty about the overall macro-economic implications, there is little reason to suppose that there would be any adverse implications for the City in particular.
In the modern literature, these risk premia are taken to be determined by how useful a financial asset is in helping households to smooth the path of their consumption. Assets that deliver low returns during bad times don’t contribute much to helping households sustain consumption, and so carry a higher risk premium. So risk premia might vary with the volatility of the asset return; the volatility of consumption; and with the correlation between asset returns and consumption. 16  See Dooley, M.P, Folkerts-Landau, D and Garber, P (2003), “An essay on the revised Bretton Woods System”, NBER Working Paper 9971. “System” is not quite the right word, because it is not the product of collective international thought and planning. 17  See Tucker, PMWT (2006) “Uncertainty, the implementation of monetary policy and the management of risk”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2006 Q2 pp 202-211. BIS Review 112/2008  9  Like other economic variables, such premia may change as their underlying determinants change, and given the nature of the “shocks” affecting the macroeconomy. All that is familiar, fairly orthodox stuff these days. Indeed, an extraordinary amount of work at the macro/financial frontier has been going on over recent years. But as John Cochrane has commented, “work has barely begun”. 18 From a policymakers’ perspective, that does seem to be the case.

4  BIS Review 37/2004  Conclusion I have drawn attention to five processes that are likely to have an impact on the banking industry in the future, if they are not already having an impact. Each of these will, of course, have a different degree of impact depending on the nature of the operations of each bank - though I think it is fair to say that no bank can ignore them. To be sure, facing up to them has important implications for the limited resources that banks have. In formulating business strategies for the coming five years, it is essential for bank management to take into account these processes in planning their affairs. This goes for the HKMA as well, since there are important implications for the manner in which we could perform our supervisory functions effectively. As I mentioned earlier, we are currently carrying out an internal review on this subject. As a result of this internal review, there may be a need for us to make adjustments to our supervisory policies; but there will be, as usual and as necessary, full consultation with the industry before we proceed. BIS Review 37/2004  5
So many notes were printed that the face value of cash in circulation jumped from 22 billion dinars at the end of 1991 to 584 billion only four years later. Inflation soared to an average of about 250% a year over the same period. As a result the smaller denomination notes became worthless in Southern Iraq. In the North, however, matters were rather different. Residents in that part of Iraq had no opportunity to exchange their notes. And it was no accident that, because of expropriation of cash in the banks by the Saddam regime, the holders of the high denomination notes were disproportionately in the North. Of the seven billion 25 dinar notes in circulation in Iraq at that time, about five billion circulated in Kurdish-controlled Iraq. So the Saddam dinar did not circulate in the North, and the old dinar notes continued to be used. They were known as the ‘Swiss’ dinar - so-called because although the notes had been printed by the British company De La Rue, the plates had been manufactured in Switzerland. The Swiss dinar developed a life of its own and in effect became the new currency in the North. No Swiss dinar notes were issued after 1989, and since there was no issuing authority there was at most a fixed, and probably a declining money stock in the North. As a result the Swiss and Saddam dinars developed into two separate currencies.

For ten years, therefore, Iraq had two currencies: one issued by the official government and the other backed by no government at all. The Swiss dinar continued to circulate in the North, even though backed by no formal government, central bank, nor any law of legal tender. For a fiat currency this was an unusual situation. Whatever gave the Swiss dinar its value was not the promise of the official Iraqi government, or indeed any other government.13 Although there was little or no trade between North and South Iraq, both the Swiss and Saddam dinars were traded against the dollar. The implied Swiss to Saddam dinar cross-exchange rate from 1997 onwards is shown in Chart 3.14  Chart 3: Saddam/Swiss Dinar exchange rate, Jul 1997-Oct 2003 Saddam/Swiss Dinars (log scale) 400  200  100  50 Jul-97  Jul-98  Jul-99  Jul-00  Jul-01  Jul-02  Jul-03  Source: United Nations, Central Bank of Iraq  After 1993 the Swiss dinar deviated from parity and rose to around 300 Saddam dinars to the Swiss dinar by the time Saddam’s regime was deposed in 2003. The appreciation of the Swiss dinar is  13  At no stage did the Kurdish groups lay claim to the Swiss dinar as their currency - they had no control over it - as shown by the interview given to Gulf News on 30 January 2003 by the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Barzani who said, “We don’t have our own currency”.
I would like to underscore that large spaces still exist for improvement and narrowing the gap between the Albanian market and the advanced markets, and to some extent between the regional markets, .They should, therefore, constitute our common challenge for the future. In the framework of encouraging market towards these innovative services, the Bank of Albania as the regulator and catalyser has undertaken recently a set of measures. In more concrete terms, the establishment of legal and regulatory basis for the e-money institutions, followed by the licensing of the first institution of this type in March 2015, constitutes a 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  premise to introduce the innovative services in the Albanian market of payments. The regulation of the activity of these institutions is based on the European practices not only in the framework of Albania’s adherence to the Single European Market, but also as one of the most optimum solutions in terms of security and efficiency at national level. The liberalisation of the payment systems market through the Law on Payment Systems will boost the development of the market. This legal framework provides the necessary space for private enterprises, and lays down the standards in terms of security and efficiency, and will support the development of a contemporary financial structure.

Jahn sent a telegram to Brofoss where he recommended that Norway devalue the krone to the same extent as the UK. By then the Ministry of Trade and Industry had already been informed of the UK decision through official channels. Then, without first consulting with the other members of the government, Brofoss decided that the Norwegian krone should be devalued by 30.5 per cent. After being instructed by Brofoss, Gunnar Jahn informed the IMF of the decision on behalf of the Norwegian government in a letter dated 17 September. See Gunhild J. Ecklund (2008): “Creating a new role for an old central bank: The Bank of Norway 1945–1954”, Series of Dissertations 2/2008, BI Norwegian School of Management, pp. 141–143 and William Jansen (1975): “Devalueringen i 1949” [The devaluation of 1949], History thesis, NTNU, Trondheim. 14  For more on the background for these decisions, see Gunnar Jahn, Alf Eriksen and Preben Munthe (1966): Norges Bank gjennom 150 år, [Norges Bank through 150 years] Norges Banks seddeltrykkeri, Oslo and Nicolai Rygg (1950): Norges Bank i mellomkrigstiden, [Norges Bank in the interwar period] Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo. 15  In 1965 the former director of Statistics Norway Odd Aukrust assessed the successes and mistakes in Norwegian economic policy since the Second World War. Concerning the devaluation decision in 1949 he writes: “This devaluation was probably the most important single economic decision made in this country since 1945, with a greater impact on prices and income distribution than any wage settlement.