samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Contributory factors are a falling rate of inflation, fiscal stimuli and, not least, a labour market with no dramatic changes, at least at present. Moreover, real interest rates are low. All this probably reduces the risk of private consumption continuing to weaken. At the same time there are many indications that the reduction of equity wealth in recent years has had an appreciable negative effect on purchases of consumer durables. So there are good reasons for supposing that it will be some time before households are again prepared to invest in new cars and other capital goods. Consumption may therefore remain weak for somewhat longer. In other words, there is a risk that,  BIS Review 82/2001  3  despite the weak exchange rate and low real interest rates, the Swedish economy will recover more slowly than expected earlier. To sum up, a number of factors point to a gradual economic recovery in Sweden in the course of next year. This picture could still be changed by many things. One factor is the terrorist attacks and their aftermath. Another is, of course, the extent of the economic adjustment that occurs in the United States as a consequence of the imbalances that have accumulated in recent years. Monetary policy Swedish monetary policy in the past year has had to consider an economic slowdown on the one hand and a depreciating currency on the other.

This shock was accompanied by a strong tightening in the euro area’s financial conditions. Financial markets began to discount significant declines in economic activity and an escalation in public and private debt as various governments announced lockdown plans to counter the virus. That pushed interest rates on sovereign and corporate debt markets upwards, a movement which, had it not been curtailed in time, ran the risk of amplifying the fall in aggregate demand and, by extension, in inflation. Faced with these circumstances, on the ECB Governing Council we acted rapidly and forcefully. In particular, we announced on 18 March the launch of the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP), which allows the ECB to purchase public and private sector bonds and other debt instruments. The PEPP had an initial envelope of € billion (6.6% of euro area GDP in 2020) and was scheduled to last until end-2020. It paved the way for a gradual easing of financing conditions which has continued to date. The targeted longerterm refinancing operations (TLTROs) for the banking sector were also very successful. For example, in the June 2020 operation, participating banks received a total of € trillion, a record for Eurosystem refinancing operations.
Foreseeably, a phase of gradual growth will begin over the course of the coming year, based on a continuing positive contribution of external demand and on a progressive pass-through of the improvement in the world economy to business investment and employment. On average, however, 2010 might still see a moderate decline in activity, the result above all of the carry-over effects of the negative rates in 2009. The growth path in 2010 might also be affected by the VAT rise announced for next July, since this measure might bring forward  BIS Review 151/2009  3  some spending decisions to the second quarter, raising demand and activity in this period but reducing them in the second half of the year. This slow path of recovery in activity broadly matches the government's macroeconomic forecasts on which the State Budget for 2010 is based. The setting I have described highlights the significant challenges the Spanish economy faces. For the recovery to materialise and firm, the Spanish economy must first check and then absorb unemployment, restore health to business and household finances, rebuild confidence in the economy's productive capacity and reduce the large budget deficit. To achieve these goals, I reiterate that it is vital to adopt an ambitious agenda of reforms. The economic policies pursued since the start of the crisis have focused on countering in the short run a very adverse economic and financial situation, and there is broad consensus that the efforts made have contributed positively to this end.

In particular, there have been substantial declines in industrial goods prices over the past year, while services prices, traditionally prone to very high rates of increase, have eased substantially and have even been growing at a lower rate than in the euro area in recent months. Admittedly, this negative inflation differential is very closely linked to the weakness of demand in Spain. But it is a promising sign of the competitiveness on which the pick-up in activity should be based, so it is important that this price moderation should be preserved in the near future. As I said earlier, there are two adverse consequences of the way in which these imbalances are being corrected: the excessive toll imposed on employment by the crisis, owing to the poor functioning endemic in our labour market, and the deterioration of public finances. Job destruction began with great virulence in construction and subsequently spread to manufacturing industry and market services. It was centred above all on temporary contracts, given the prevailing duality in the labour market. In recent months employment has continued to fall, although the State Fund for Local Investment has slackened the effect. The unemployment rate skyrocketed from 8% in 2007 to almost 18% in the third quarter this year, when it stabilised due partly to the strong slowdown in the growth rate of the labour force. This slower labour force growth was the consequence of part of the population being discouraged by poor employment prospects and of the return of some immigrants to their countries of origin.
Secondly, FOMCA can serve as a medium to inspire the thinking and outlook of various nongovernmental consumer groups – in order to place higher importance for financial education in their agenda. Engagements with associations for women, parents, youths, athletes and even artistes can help convey financial education concerns and realign mind-sets at the organisational level. Financial education is also a two-way process. For it to be impactful, consumers themselves need to play a role and take charge of their financial well-being. Rather than ‘living for today’, the culture of ‘living within means’ should take centre stage in our society. This paradigm shift is critical to generate a financially responsible society. The third and final thrust is “Commitment”. Let me quote Abraham Lincoln, “Commitment is what transfers a promise into reality”. Unless full commitment is made, elevating literacy levels and achieving financial well-being will remain as only hopes and dreams of Malaysians. The FE Network is committed to play a leadership role to achieve the targeted outcomes of our national strategy. I urge other stakeholders to join us and to embark on this journey together. Commitment from various agencies at different levels is pertinent, especially in areas where they have the greatest strength. Financial education initiatives under the national strategy will be inclusive, be evaluated and enhanced over time to ensure that they remain relevant and impactful. To this end, I encourage the agencies represented here today to identify the levers that contribute to better financial decisions by consumers in different circumstances through consumer behavioural studies.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Insurance in a world of disruption Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the 9th International Insurance Conference, Paris, 27 October 2017. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to be here today as supervisor in my capacity as President of the ACPR, and also as guarantor of the smooth financing of our economy in my capacity as Governor. In these two respects, the insurance sector is both close to me and important to me. Thank you for inviting me to speak on this theme of disruption. To put it more clearly, and as you have pointed out, Mr. President [Bernard Spitz], the world is in turmoil in many ways. This undeniably represents a challenge for insurers, but also a motivation: the raison d'être of insurance has always been to be a vector of protection and stability in the midst of uncertainty. This morning, I would like to stress the essential role that insurance must play in our economy, by emphasising two areas: its financing and its digitalisation. But before that, I would like to mention the very recent developments in monetary policy. I. Our monetary policy is in itself a source of stability Yesterday, at the Governing Council presided by Mario Draghi, we took the important decision to reduce our net monthly asset purchases by half – to EUR 30 billion – until September 2018.
The relative rigidity of the rules governing the conduct of budgetary policy, when compared with other economic policies, is no accident. In line with what I said earlier, these restraints serve the purpose of preventing individual Member States from pursuing unsound budgetary policies, which - perhaps more than any other type of policy - might otherwise hamper monetary policy and impact negatively on the market’s perception of the euro area as a whole. *** Having emphasised the importance of sound budgetary and structural policies, let me now turn to a subject which is even closer to the heart of a European central banker, namely the role of the single monetary policy in the euro area. In contrast to the economic pillar of EMU, there is, of course, only one monetary policy and, in formulating and conducting this policy, the Eurosystem has one overriding or, as the Treaty establishing the European Community calls it, “primary objective” which is to maintain price stability over the medium term. For this purpose, price stability has since been defined by the Eurosystem as a year-on-year increase of less than 2% in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices in the euro area as a whole. Anything above (inflation) or below this (deflation) is considered to be inconsistent with price stability. Price stability is to be maintained over the medium term. Given the long lags with which monetary policy impacts the price level, short-term movements in the price level, due, for instance, to volatile movements in commodity prices, cannot be controlled.

*** The successful introduction of the euro represents one of the greatest achievements in modern European economic history and, in order to understand how it came to be that 11 European countries decided to relinquish their monetary sovereignty and adopt a common currency, one must first look back, at least briefly, over 50 years of European integration. The first concrete step towards achieving this goal was taken when the continent lay in ruin following the Second World War and six countries signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This Treaty not only led to the removal of barriers to trade and the creation of a “common market” in coal and steel products, but also transferred powers previously exercised by the Member States in the coal and steel sectors to a newly established and independent High Authority. This showed how economic integration could serve not only as a means of fostering increased trade and improving economic welfare, but also how it could act as a driving force behind greater political integration by increasing the interdependencies between the participating Member States. When, six years later, the same six countries signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the same approach was extended to virtually all sectors of the economy with the explicit aim of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and a common market within which goods, capital and labour would circulate freely.
It is therefore my intention that, following a thorough and consistent review of firms’ applications, we make final decisions on all models for firms for which we are the home supervisor in early December, and communicate those decisions to firms simultaneously at that point. Firms that do not have an internal model will, of course, enter the regime on the standard formula. In conclusion, we will faithfully implement Solvency II here in the UK. We will be proportionate, and we will be robust in the pursuit of our objectives. And in doing this: •  we will not use Solvency II to increase capital requirements across the insurance sector;  •  we will not keep the ICAS regime alive; and  •  we will give firms plenty of time to adapt to the new regime. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

However while such measures have removed near-term uncertainty, they could prove insufficient to provide a lasting change in the negative sentiment of investors on the mediumterm if budget deficits and debt situation are not considerably improved. In this context, European authorities have to show their strong level of cooperation and commitments to global and common solutions. Any unilateral and uncoordinated decision may notably prove to be less efficient and may amplify markets volatility. Finally, the removal of vulnerabilities in the banking sector is desirable to alleviate uncertainties. Effective risk management, transparency and robust business models are essential to strengthen banks’ resilience to shocks and to ensure adequate funding of real economy that underpins sustainable growth and financial stability. The effective and timely implementation of the G20 policy orientations is necessary to build the new international system on a solid and stable ground. This is notably the case for the G 20 provisions on the CDS market and on credit rating agencies. One cannot deny that certain OTC derivatives (CDS for instance) or certain types of transactions (short sales) are likely to exacerbate price movements or create instability that are detrimental to both issuers and investors. One may thus find it tempting to ban or drastically limit this type of operations and we indeed have observed national proposals going in that direction, including the bank of naked CDS, naked short sales or mandatory shorter time horizon for settling transactions. I am of the view that such measures may not be efficient and, worse, may be counterproductive.
It also sends a clear message that one is not prepared to bear the interest rate pain. It is a demonstration of weakness and the lack of resolve in the defence of the currency. This was the case in 1992 when sterling departed from the ERM. This was also the case I believe in the troubled Asian economies when they intervened both in the forward market as well as the spot market. 37. The academics have, in this connection, further argued that the contingent liability arising from these derivatives can be contained by limiting the amount involved and possibly also by suitable pricing mechanisms for such derivatives. But the fact of the matter is that the limited supply of such derivatives would benefit only those with access to the product and that there will be irresistible political demands for supplying it to all - speculators, those with a genuine need to hedge and the man on the street. Where would this end? More likely in misery than greater confidence in the currency link. The pricing of the derivative product is also a tricky issue. If one allows the free market to price the product, by auction or by tender, chances are that the price would reflect the market interest rate differential between the Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar, which would defeat the original purpose of the product of trying to dampen the interest rate pain.

There are many indications that international economic activity will continue to strengthen in the period ahead and that resource utilisation will gradually pick up. High productivity growth and weak resource utilisation have kept down cost developments in a number of industrialised countries. Coupled with the increased integration of low-cost countries into world trade this has contributed to low global inflationary pressures. In the period ahead, price pressures are expected to remain modest even though they will increase as economic conditions improve and there is a reduction in spare production capacity. That means that market interest rates are also anticipated to rise from today’s unusually low levels. There are positive signals emanating from the US economy while the euro area, and notably Germany, has seen somewhat weaker growth than expected. (Figure 6.) Overall, growth in Sweden’s export markets is forecast to be largely the same as in the previous Inflation Report. The Swedish economic recovery began in 2003 and it is predicted to continue during the forecast period. In 2004 robust international demand for Swedish exports contributed to the high economic growth. Manufacturing activity now appears to be entering a slightly slower phase. Indicators and data point to a continuation of firm, healthy growth, albeit at a somewhat lower rate than in early 2004. Growth in domestic demand is assumed to increase while the contribution to aggregate demand from net exports will diminish. (Table 1). In 2005 business investment and private consumption are anticipated to account for the majority of the pick-up in demand.
This will have a national dimension to it, a regional dimension in Europe through the EU’s new Systemic Risk Board, but it will also have a global dimension too. The extent of co-operation between nations will have to intensify in this area. In the monetary policy area, it is important that we listen to each other and understand each other but in a world of floating exchange rates we can, on the whole, go back to our countries and make our own decisions. In the financial stability area, I won’t say we have to co-ordinate with a capital “C” but we are going to have to move from listening to each other towards co-operation. That will be healthy, but not easy. And it might entail rethinking the division of labour between host and home prudential regulation. These areas of shadow banking and a macroprudential approach to supervision and regulation lie ahead for the FSB agenda and for the G20 agenda. They will sustain important parts of the reform programme into next year and beyond. BIS Review 145/2010  5

3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  It has been said that regulators are pessimists in our DNA and always inclined to worry about things going wrong – and certainly, we cannot ignore the possibility of the failure of key FMIs no matter how remote, and this may occur in FMIs overseas. I started my speech this morning, noting the increasing connectedness between markets. This is true in the ‘life’ of a CCP - and can be true in its ‘death’ too. The failure of an internationally active CCP, that provides critical services in multiple jurisdictions, will have significant cross-border impact. When a CCP fails, its members are inevitably affected. Such members are likely to also have relationships with other financial institutions, or may trade and clear on other trading venues and CCPs. Through these network of interdependencies, the default of a CCP can trigger destabilising effects not only in the home market it serves directly, but outside of it. It is therefore important for authorities of jurisdictions that may be affected by a CCP’s failure to participate in that CCP’s resolution planning. Similar to the establishment of Supervisory Colleges to support ongoing supervisory co-operation, setting up Crisis Management Groups (CMG) for CCPs will allow the cross-border impact to be considered in resolution planning. In a failure situation, when resolution actions are time-sensitive, it may be necessary to limit the size of a CMG to enable efficient and effective discussions. But in normal times, resolution planning can benefit from a broader participation of relevant authorities.
The importance of cooperation between authorities and private agents There is considerable common interest in creating resilience in the financial sector, which is based on the agents’ dependence on one another. The entire system is dependent on the general public having confidence in the payment system as a whole. Cooperation between the agents in the financial markets is necessary to find joint solutions and to be able to benefit from economies of scale. BIS Review 98/2006  3  Moreover, it is important to ensure joint basic conditions, such as access to electricity, telecommunications, fuel and water. The Riksbank has actively conducted discussions in various contexts for some years now to disseminate information on how the payment system functions and how individual agents’ attitudes to business continuity and crisis recovery planning affect the system as a whole. These discussions have mainly been conducted in three contexts. One of them is the cooperation for economic security (SOES), which is called together by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency and where the participants include the Riksbank, Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority), the Swedish Social Insurance Administration and the National Labour Market Board. Another is the financial sector’s private-public sector cooperation body (FSPOS) that is called together by Finansinspektionen and consists of representatives of the Riksbank, Finansinspektionen, the Swedish Bankers’ Association, independent savings banks, securities companies and insurance companies.

However, given a significantly higher potential growth rate compared to the euro area, fiscal deficits can be correspondingly larger without the debt to GDP ratio increasing. Finally, there are several practical issues. The whole financial infrastructure must have time to prepare for the new legal tender and unit of account. In the case of Sweden, the plans prepared by banks and other financial institutions indicated that at least a couple of years would be needed to ensure a smooth transition to introducing the euro in Sweden. One factor contributing to the relatively long time lag was the complexity and old age of some of the IT-systems involved. In this respect I believe Uganda has a twofold advantage. First, the economy is relatively less dependent on electronic money and, second, the technological infrastructure is of a much younger date. The other side of the coin, if you will pardon the pun, is tangibles such as notes and coins. Here, authorities must ensure that enough time is given for production as well as distribution of the new currency. In a cash-based economy this will of course take relatively longer to prepare. Overall, the change-over preparations are less of a concern for the general public. What the average citizen usually finds most difficult is to get accustomed to the new unit of account. On the other hand, all companies, private and public owned alike, as well as government bodies, must prepare thoroughly for the transition.