samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the FSAP assessment also strongly supports our goal to ensure that our regulatory and supervisory responses keep pace with the financial intermediaries and the products they offer. In this endeavor, the Bank of Thailand has put emphasis on robust stress testing, enhanced counterparty risk management, and safe and efficient market infrastructures. Our financial and legal infrastructures will continue to be strengthened particularly through the introduction of a number of legislations and amendments. The new Deposit Insurance Act and the Financial Institutions Business Act are in the pipeline. Specifically, the Financial Institutions Business Act will stipulate prompt corrective action and grant the Bank of Thailand power to conduct supervision on a consolidated basis. In addition, it will also foster supervisory independence and the ability to supervise a broader set of systemically important institutions, including non-banks, as well as provide the central bank with a clear and transparent mandate on consumer protection. On financial sector development policy, as you may already know, our current Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) will move into its second phase. This second phase will put emphasis on increased competition and consideration on potential entry of new players to further enhance financial efficiency and resiliency.

A recovery is expected towards the end of the year, albeit a tentative one, given that the deterioration in the employment outlook, the erosion of purchasing power and the fall in property prices look set to weigh on consumer sentiment and income. Europe represents the second pole in the global economy. Although the continent enjoyed strong growth during the first quarter of 2008, the remainder of the year should see a slowdown. A number of factors will contribute to this loss of momentum. First, the strong euro and the sharp downturn in the US economy are dampening exports. The sub-prime crisis has led to a tightening of credit conditions, while consumer confidence has deteriorated. This will have a knock-on effect on consumer spending. However, the slowdown in Europe will be much less pronounced than in the US, although the subsequent pick-up in economic activity will also probably be gradual. BIS Review 80/2008  1  The Asian economies, which constitute the third major hub, continue to exhibit strong growth as a whole, since they remain virtually unaffected by the slowdown in the US economy. Nevertheless, they have been hit by rising commodity and food prices, which are seriously reducing incomes. Regional variations aside, it would therefore be reasonable to conclude that the global economy, as a whole, is not witnessing a significant slowdown at present – as opposed to one of the rather more alarming scenarios that were only recently being mooted.
The global economic and financial landscape is currently at an important turning point, as we transition to a fundamentally changed future. The challenges facing us in this environment are manifold. We therefore want to have the skills for this future – to be well equipped to effectively manage our future. Sasana Kijang aims to provide such a platform to pursue this human capital development agenda to become a centre of excellence for learning with the state of the art facilities. Sasana Kijang also reflects our commitment for regional and international collaboration and cooperation. It is our intention for Sasana Kijang to provide a platform for the meeting of minds and to harness the wealth of expertise in the field of Central Banking and finance. As a centre for collaboration, Sasana Kijang has wide ranging facilities for regional and international meetings, seminars and conferences. These facilities are also shared with the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN) Research and Training Centre and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) which are now located in Sasana Kijang. For the SEACEN Centre, it is hoped that all the available facilities will support its enhanced role in the region, particularly, as financial and economic integration in Asia intensifies. For the IFSB, an international organisation that was established as a result of the collaborative efforts of regulators from different parts of the world, it is hoped that it will facilitate further collaboration in the development of Islamic finance and in safeguarding its soundness and stability.

The architectural concept of Sasana Kijang is also inspired from our earliest form of currency that was used in the third century and which denotes a harmony of simplicity and class. And the facade design of the building is derived from the geometric patterns of the traditional Malaysian songket fabric which is woven with intricate gold and silver threads which creates a strong bond, thus giving the fabric its strength and elegance. This is similar to the Central Banking community that is interlinked through our similar objectives and bonded through collaboration and strategic alliances. Other features of the building is the extensive use of glass which allows for the greater use of natural light. The building also features a range of green technologies as part of our commitment and responsibility to the environment. Finally, another important part of Sasana Kijang is the Bank Negara Malaysia Currency and Economics Museum and the Art Gallery that will be opened to the public. These collections that have been built since the earliest days of our Bank over a period of more than five  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  decades aim to foster greater understanding on the history of our currencies and of our economy and financial system, and also represents our support to contemporary art in Malaysia and thus contribute towards preserving the heritage of our country. Allow me now to invite Yang Amat Berhormat, Dato’ Sri Mohd. Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak to deliver his address and to officially launch Sasana Kijang.
In total, the euro area generated a trade surplus of more than 1% of its GDP in 2012 compared with around zero in previous years. We expect this surplus to continue growing in the coming years. The speed and depth of the reforms underway in euro area economies is unprecedented. They have undertaken reforms in the areas most important for competitiveness, growth and the sustainability of public finances such as labour markets, products markets, social security, pension systems, etc. These reforms are a prerequisite for dynamic and sustainable growth in the future and they must be vigorously pursued. In addition to this very clear determination at the different national levels to reduce deficits and introduce the necessary reforms, Europe has equipped itself with a new disciplinary framework. The Heads of State signed a new fiscal compact over a year ago that fixes very strict rules and gives very extensive powers to the European Commission to assess the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  compliance of Member States. This new compact goes hand in hand with the introduction of rules for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances. It is important to understand what these institutional advances represent: in effect, they represent a new Treaty creating very strong commitments for the States via rules that are far better calibrated and far more binding than those in place when European monetary union began. 3. Monetary Union is to be enhanced with a banking union.

If our monetary policy impulses are not transmitted uniformly to all of the area’s countries because of the bank-sovereign link, it undermines the very foundation of Europe’s monetary union; remember that three quarters of the financing of the euro area’s economy consists of bank loans. By breaking this link, a banking union would restore the federal dimension of monetary policy. Today the first pillar of the banking union is being constructed: the Single Supervisory Mechanism. We are currently working on legal issues, on identifying systemically important banks within the euro area, on the supervisory model, on the future data reporting and, of course, on the asset quality review that will be undertaken before we take on the responsibility of supervision. The governance structure we have adopted will guarantee that, while the Governing Council will keep the decision power, there will be no conflict of interest between monetary policy and banking supervision. On the contrary, more consistent supervision across the euro area should allow for the early detection of potential risks and imbalances and, ultimately, improve the transmission of monetary policy. This is a fundamental first step and its rapid implementation will be a major success for the euro area. But, alone, it cannot achieve the objectives of a banking union. That is why we must rapidly construct its two other pillars: a supranational bank resolution authority and a unified deposit insurance system.
I think this is something we may now need to reconsider for at least a couple of reasons. Monetary policy and fiscal policy are probably more dependent on each other than we usually think, and this dependence has become even clearer as the macroeconomic environment has changed quite a lot in recent decades. For quite long periods, it may indeed work well if monetary policy is focused on maintaining the inflation target and fiscal policy on keeping track of public finances – that they manage their own business, so to speak. Indirectly, the two policy areas nevertheless provide valuable support to each other. Assume, for example, that inflation begins to rise rapidly and risks becoming persistently too high, and that the central bank therefore raises interest rates in order to dampen demand in the economy. The higher interest rate increases government interest expenditure and weakens public finances. Of course, how much depends, among other things, on how large the debt is from the start and by how much the central bank raises the interest rate. If the economic agents trust that fiscal policy will stabilise public debt, they will expect taxes to be raised or expenditure to be reduced, or both. They will adjust their behaviour accordingly and  9  A policy regime with active monetary policy and more passive fiscal policy is sometimes called a regime with ‘monetary dominance’; see, for example, Leeper (2018, 2021). 6 [17]  hold back on their consumption and investments in preparation for the expected tightening.

It has come to symbolize our commitment to collaboration and consultation within the SADC Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) and annually marks our contribution to the process of regional economic co-operation and integration. It is in this light that the Bank of Zambia applauds the favourable response from all central banks, individuals and other institutions represented here for allowing their members of staff to attend this event. As Bank of Zambia, we believe this event provides an excellent opportunity for exchanging views and sharing ideas in improving our national payment arrangements to foster economic growth and integration. Ladies and Gentlemen, lessons from the development of payment systems in the European Union and the United States of America provide a useful guide for emerging market economies such as ours. That be as it may, recent technological advancements and developments in China and India are also instructive as they glaringly indicate that it is possible to leap frog some of the historical development experiences of these major industrialized economies. However, it is without a doubt that this will require the concerted efforts and commitment of all those involved in the transformation of national payment systems to stay the course as challenges are abound. For instance, it is quite clear that consumer demand for payment services largely outstrip supply and more work needs to go into improving the outreach, efficiency and pricing of existing payment arrangements.
Jean-Pierre Danthine: Calmer waters after the storm? Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event, Zurich, 18 March 2010. * I. *  *  Looking back  We are emerging from a financial and economic crisis of major proportions. The extent of value destruction during the last two and a half years may well match the losses registered during the Great Depression. The lessons we will draw from this historical episode should leave us wiser. They will alter, in some fundamental ways, our understanding of finance and macroeconomics and hopefully, as well, the behaviour of economic participants – with a better designed economic system. Today I will begin by looking back and reviewing some of the main events that have occurred since the last Money Market Event which happened to coincide with the turning point of the financial crisis. I will then look forward and describe how the SNB perceives the immediate future. Finally I will briefly address two of the most pressing challenges confronting us – exiting from unconventional monetary policy measures and rethinking financial regulation. Let me turn my attention to where it all started, that is, the US real estate sector. During a long period of low interest rates, low risk premia, subdued volatilities and general economic optimism, US house prices increased in an unprecedented wave to the end of 2006, at which point the bubble burst.

When interest rates are low or negative, it is relatively attractive to hold cash (as opposed to bank deposits, for example) as a store of value. The increase in interest rates since June has meant that there is once again less of an incentive to hold cash. Against this backdrop, the value of banknotes in circulation fell by around CHF 10 billion to CHF 81 billion between June and October. Returns of the 1000-franc notes in particular were substantial, totalling CHF 7.7 billion. We expect this decline to continue. Nevertheless, demand for cash as a store of value is likely to persist. Companies and households consider such a safety net to be important. Page 1/2  Berne, 15 December 2022 Martin Schlegel  News conference  Of course, cash is not only used to store value, but also to make payments. Small denominations in particular play an important role here. The decline in banknotes in circulation observed since June is not related to the use of cash for payment purposes. The rise in interest rates has had no impact on the small denominations (cf. chart 2). While the growth rate for the small denominations dipped during the pandemic, demand has rebounded since early 2022 and has stabilised. Despite the general increase in the demand for cash, the use of cash for payments has declined in recent years. We are currently investigating changes in the use of cash as a payment method in our 2022 ‘Survey on payment methods’.
Banks would have to extend the maturity of funding sources (long-term securities or extend the maturity of loans) or convert long-term loans to short-term loans with negative implications for the effects for the growth. Extension of the maturity of the funding structure would also imply higher cost of financing. Within the emerging markets, the main concerns arise from the mismatch between the funding that is actually being stable in some of the EE’s and the funding that is defined as a stable one within the Basel III regulation. Some of the examples that we can run through are countries like Saudi Arabia and South Africa, where the deposits of the public sector entities and the wholesale funding are the most stable one, but are not treated as such within the new regulatory framework. The above can be considered as direct impact of transmission of the new liquidity framework to the EE’s, but the indirect impact should not be neglected at all. The new liquidity rules will probably change the assets structure in the balance sheets in some of the large banks in the AE’s. In a world of rapid financial integration, many of these banks have subsidiaries in the emerging world and if the liquidity is managed on consolidated level, this can imply possible liquidity shortages in the host country.

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Key issues in Asian financial markets Keynote address by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ACI (The Financial Markets Association) 52nd World Congress, Singapore, 15 March 2013. *  *  *  Mr. Manfred Wiebogen, ACI Global President Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen 1. I am delighted to be here today with all of you. 2. The last time Singapore hosted the ACI Congress was back in 2001. In fact, it was just before 9/11. The world was in a very different place. Asia too was so different from today. The wounds of the Asian crisis of the late 90s were still fresh. Investor confidence in the various countries in the region was uneven. And Asian capital markets were by and large in their infancy. The new financial landscape 3. We are now in a new phase in global finance. Global finance is deleveraging, after the great credit bubble that began more than a decade ago and came to an end in 2007. But deleveraging still has some way to go, and some years to go, before the overall level of leverage relative to economic activity gets back to a sustainable level. 4. The pace of deleveraging has been moderated so far by central banks, who have taken onto their balance sheets unprecedented levels of both public and private sector debt. Their actions have reduced the risks of catastrophe.
But over the same period, Malaysians have also been investing abroad. The stock of resident private sector investments abroad increased almost nine-fold to $ billion. About half of this was in the form of direct investments and another half in the form of portfolio and other investments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  About 67% of the stock of foreign investments in Malaysia is in the form of portfolio and other investments. This reflects the high openness of Malaysia’s capital account and the significant deepening of its financial markets. As a consequence, foreign interest in our markets has increased. Even as our equity market has grown, so has non-resident participation, keeping non-resident’s share fairly steady at around 24%. In the bond market, non-resident holdings of Malaysian Government Securities has increased steadily since 2009, and now accounts for a relatively stable share of about 47% of total outstanding MGS. Given the more significant foreign presence in our financial markets, the definition of Malaysia’s external debt was expanded to include foreign holding of ringgit financial assets. About 40% of Malaysia’s redefined external debt is ringgit denominated debt held by nonresidents. In the years before the crisis, there was also a relatively strong correlation between the performance of the Malaysian bond and equity markets and the international markets, particularly those in the US. Since the crisis, that relationship has diminished significantly as the large amounts of liquidity has flowed back and forth between the emerging market economies (EMEs) and the AEs.

The adverse global environment since the onset of the crisis in the AEs has reduced the contribution of the external sector to growth. Since 2007, the contribution of net exports to real GDP growth has been negative with the sole exception of 2014. This is in large part the outcome of the weak global growth which has reduced global demand for our exports, combined with strong domestic demand that has increased imports. Over the longer term, the contribution of the external sector will need to expand to support a healthy and sustainable economy. With respect to this, we need to continue focusing on strengthening our economic relationships with other countries. The ASEAN Economic Community is one opportunity for us to do so. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement that is current being negotiated by 12 countries, including Malaysia, is another. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusion In conclusion, it seems to me that Malaysia will over time become even more integrated with the global economy and financial system. This is necessary if Malaysia is to grow and prosper. We need global markets and we need foreign investment. So far, we have done a credible job of ensuring that the Malaysian economy and financial system evolves in response to domestic, regional and global developments. But, as I have sought to highlight in my speech, globalisation, particularly financial globalisation, also brings difficult challenges and risks. And those challenges are not likely to go away.
Summing up, our assessment of the macroeconomic scenario, beyond the recent data and the adjustment in the GDP range and the inflation projection for 2018, is not very different when viewed from a longer perspective, that is, considering the period 2018/2020. For all the above we believe that our economy still needs a positive monetary impulse over the next two years. Certainly this impulse will be withdrawn as the gaps close and inflation converges to 3%, but when will this withdrawal begin will depend on the evolution of our macroeconomy, which we do not see happening before the end of this year. It is important to bear in mind that although we see a balance of risks biased upwards on domestic activity, on the negative side the main risks come from abroad. The smaller slack for monetary policy making in the United States, the renewed divergence with other developed economies and its pressure on currencies; the political tensions in the Eurozone; the oil price increase and associated geopolitical risks configure a complex scenario for the emerging world. This is especially true for economies that are seen as more vulnerable, either because their macroeconomic fundamentals are weak and/or because they do not possess the institutional characteristics that allow them to deal with external shocks and implement counter-cyclical policies. The link between institutional characteristics and macroeconomic fundamentals with the financial results when facing a stressful episode has been widely documented.

Especially important in this regard is to moderate and possibly reverse the course of public indebtedness, adopt a framework to capitalize the banking system and ensure a sustainable evolution of household borrowing. The signals of the government regarding the orientation of its fiscal policy, its backing of the new General Banking Act and the reactivation of its search for mechanisms to consolidate borrowers’ financial information are very 6  positive in this regard. Equally valuable in dealing with future turbulences seems to be to strengthen fiscal institutions by enhancing the status and autonomy of the Fiscal Advisory Council, as well as acknowledging the role of institutional investors in the Chilean economy in the face of future reforms. Dear senators, the Chilean economy is progressing in the recovery of growth and the closing of gaps. Rather than a result, this is a good start for a more favorable stage of the business cycle. Many challenges lie ahead. It is important to deepen the recovery of investment, that the labor market be strengthened and that competitive advantages be exploited to make this recovery more self-sustained and shared. Greater long-term growth calls for more structural changes that will help raise productivity. The Central Bank will be there to ensure that imbalances or vulnerabilities do not incubate in the process, which later may require more costly adjustments. Together we also have the responsibility to strengthen those factors that allow us to better withstand external shocks that will sooner or later be felt.