samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
FMC members became the bridge between the regulator and the industry at large in the implementation of the many initiatives that have seen us through to this day. I see quite a few of the FMC members tonight and I understand that many have continued to contribute and help Bank Negara Malaysia further shape the development of our financial markets. Thank you to all, and especially to Dato’ Lee Kok Kwan for previously leading FMAM to become the success it is today. The fact is, three years on, we have not only weathered the volatility and challenges then. The financial markets have actually moved from strength to strength. Amidst heightened global volatility, not to mention the many domestic political upheavals and uncertainty of the recent years, it is a wonder that the Malaysian financial market has continued to grow consistently. The onshore foreign exchange market has expanded from an average daily trading volume of USD8.1 billion in 2016 to USD 12.3 billion today. This is mirrored by the growth of the ringgit bond market which stood at RM1.2 trillion in 2016 to reach RM1.5 trillion now. Despite our markets growing larger, stability has been a key feature as witnessed by a moderate level of volatility in the onshore markets. The 1-month USDMYR implied volatility hovers around 3 to 4 percent compared to a high of 12 percent in 2016, supported by a much less disconcerting level of nonresident holdings of government bonds at 22% compared to 34% back then.

Financial market conditions are expected to be increasingly complex with rapid changes in technological advancements. The ever-changing geopolitical positioning also continuously shifts investment priorities and risk appetite. Closer to home, while domestic growth is expected to remain sustainable, many uncertainties and challenges persist, and thus it is critical to ask ourselves, how do we respond? With the current 10-year Financial Sector Blueprint approaching the end of its horizon in 2020, the time has come to chart our path for further development. At the Bank, we are in the midst of 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  much research, analysis and formulating possible paths for our future. Based on this, we will be looking to engage financial markets stakeholders to set the framework for market development over the next five years. We have set a shorter horizon, acknowledging that in this era, changes occur rapidly and the longer horizon is rife with greater uncertainty than before. While these discussions are ongoing, I wish to share three main focus areas for the next plan as follows: Firstly, given the active adoption of advanced technology in all aspects of our lives, the digitisation of the financial markets is not only an obvious step forward but an inevitable one. With evolving business practices and economic activities, there is urgency for us to adapt and elevate our infrastructure to ensure that our markets remain competitive and dynamic, while preserving an environment of financial and market stability.
Work is now underway in various international forums to develop a toolbox for macroprudential policy. So far, however, relatively few specialised macroprudential-policy tools have emerged. The tool that is probably attracting most attention at the moment consists of the countercyclical capital buffers that have been adopted within the framework of the Basel III Accord. The aims of these buffers are to make the banks more resilient and to dampen the cycles in credit growth and asset prices. The idea is that the authorities should force the banks to hold extra capital in good times, when lending is beginning to increase too quickly, in order to be able to reduce capital requirements later when times are not so good. This will make it more expensive for the banks to build up risks in good times at the same time as buffers are created that the banks can use in bad times when the risks materialise. However, this thus means that there must be a national authority that can decide when the countercyclical buffers should be turned on and off. The tools that can be characterised as “specialised” macroprudential-policy tools also include capital requirement surcharges for systemically-important financial institutions. Apart from this, most of the tools that can be considered for macroprudential policy are those that in one way or another are already included in financial supervision’s toolbox. These include, for example, the so-called mortgage cap, although this is usually justified in terms of consumer protection.

With no reciprocity, although 𝜙𝑠𝐻 = −6, the foreign banks’ market share and leakage are calibrated jointly as 𝜙𝐹 𝑓  1  𝑠 ( 𝐻 (1−𝑓) = − ), a leakage of one-third, in line with the estimate of Aiyar et al (2014). And 𝑘1𝐹 = 0, so that the  𝜙𝑠  3  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  13  increase in resilience is proportional to the amount of domestic credit provided by domestic banks: this is set as 𝑓 = 0.11, also in line with Aiyar et al (2014). Both channels make the CCyB less effective without reciprocity. The credit leakage makes the leaning channel one-third smaller, while the assumption that resilience is lower when foreign banks hold less capital against domestic credit makes the resilience channel 11% smaller. In both the models with and without reciprocity, both countries are assumed to minimise loss functions analogous to those in appendix 2, containing only their own national objectives of inflation and output deviations, and the domestic crisis probability. 1  9)  𝐿 = (𝜋12 + 𝜆𝑦12 ) + (1 − 𝛾1 )𝛽𝐸1 𝐿2,𝑁𝐶 + 𝛾1 (1 + 𝜁)𝛽𝐸1 𝐿2,𝐶  10)  𝐿∗ = (𝜋1∗2 + 𝜆𝑦1∗2 ) + (1 − 𝛾1∗ )𝛽𝐸1 𝐿∗2,𝑁𝐶 + 𝛾1∗ (1 + 𝜁)𝛽𝐸1 𝐿∗2,𝐶  2  1 2  Domestic loss function Foreign loss function  Each policymaker takes the setting of the other’s policy as given when optimising according to their own individual loss function.
At the same time, we have made banks aware of the supervisory consequences they will face if they fail to meet their climate and environmental risk management responsibilities. Deadlines will be closely monitored and, if necessary, enforcement action will be taken. The case for maintaining prudence While the prevailing macroeconomic tides and the inescapable currents of the climate and environment crises may have different causes, they nevertheless have something important in common. Even if we broadly understand their main characteristics and transmission channels from a qualitative perspective, the models that are being used to inform decision-making may be subject to pitfalls when quantitatively identifying and assessing the associated risks of the current environment. This is especially true when assessing the configuration of tides and currents in conjunction, in other words, when assessing how the macroeconomic environment and the climate and environmental crises interact. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Importantly, this applies both to the projection models that official institutions use to inform policymaking – as the ECB does in its monetary policy – and to the internal models that banks use to assess risk exposures. And while we can certainly draw lessons from historical episodes of low growth, high inflation, increasing interest rates and structural transformation, very few policymakers, supervisors or bank executives have hands-on experience of navigating this set of circumstances.

It means that, in our ongoing supervisory interactions with banks, we will be perceptive with our eyes, receptive with our ears and – whenever necessary and appropriate – insistent with our mouths and intrusive with our presence and through our actions. Attentive to risks. Always promoting prudence. To make sure that my future speaking notes can continue to refer to healthy and resilient banks in the euro area, irrespective of the tides and currents that come to our shores. Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit. 1 Lagarde, C. (2022), "Monetary policy in a high inflation environment: commitment and  clarity", lecture organised by Eesti Pank and dedicated to Professor Ragnar Nurkse, Tallinn, 4 November. 2 Nagel, J. (2022), "Die Pandemie und ihre ökonomischen Auswirkungen", speech at  the Wirtschaftsclub Karlsruhe, 10 November. 4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  3 Enria, A. (2002), "Better safe than sorry: banking supervision in the wake of  exogenous shocks", speech at the Austrian Financial Authority Supervisory Conference 2022, Vienna, 4 October. 4 ECB Banking Supervision (2020), "Guide on climate-related and environmental risks",  November. 5 ECB Banking Supervision (2022), "Thematic Review on Climate and Environmental  Risks 2022 – Final Results", 2 November. 5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
From a medium term perspective, therefore, such events cause less economic dislocation than disruptions that reflect inherent structural weaknesses in the economy. Even temporary shocks, however, do often expose deeper shortcomings if they are sizeable enough. In Thailand’s case, water management and crisis response systems have been shown to be inadequate. The government has rightly given high priority in addressing these gaps over the medium term. But in the immediate future, there is no question that Thailand will rebound quickly and strongly from the recent setback caused by the floods. I also believe that the country’s underlying economic strengths will continue to support dynamic growth going forward and allow our economy to weather the global economic headwinds. In my remarks this evening, I would like to first highlight Thailand’s fundamental strengths that underpin this positive outlook. Then I will move on to discuss the role of the Bank of Thailand (BOT) in further strengthening economic resiliency and enhancing competitiveness. Before I delve into the key themes of my talk today, let me briefly touch upon the challenges that we are now facing on the external front. With the ever closer integration of global markets for goods, services, and finance, it becomes harder to separate domestic economic prospects from the international context. This backdrop is presently quite challenging. Continuing strains in the Euro area and fragilities in major advanced economies elsewhere make for a highly uncertain global economy.

Box 8 of the Review discusses recent market initiatives for improving the functioning of the credit derivatives market. As shown by the chart on the right, the structure of market participants on the two sides of the credit derivatives market has changed over the past three years. Among the buyers of credit protection, the share of banks has declined in favour of hedge funds and other investors, such as private equity firms. Among the sellers of protection, insurance companies have increased their share at the expense of banks. It is worth noting, however, that hedge funds have been active also on the issuing side of the credit derivatives markets which is a business typically characterised by lucrative fees. 5.2. Euro area banking sector  With regard to the financial situation of large euro area banks, the financial results, overall, paint a picture of a very profitable banking sector with rather comfortable solvency ratios. In most euro area countries, bank profits were driven by continuing cost control and volume growth in mortgage lending that more than compensated for the narrowing of interest rate margins. Moreover, banks have also benefited from a recovery in lending to the non-financial corporate sector, as well as from the buoyant growth in fees and commissions. It should also be kept in mind, however, that the introduction of new international accounting standards might have had an impact on banks’ profitability.
In any event, it is important to work for a level of debt that is more sustainable, particularly in the poorer countries. Much has in fact been done in this respect. The IMF’s and the World Bank’s joint initiative for debt relief for the poorest and most 1 indebted countries was launched in 1996. In contrast to earlier efforts here, this initiative assembled all a country’s creditors, including the international financial institutions, to provide debt relief. The aim was to reduce the debts of poor and heavily indebted countries to sustainable levels and combine this with better conditions for increased growth. In 1998 it was decided to increase and accelerate debt relief in the context of the initiative. To a large extent this decision was a result of representations by church and other non-government organisations. To date, 24 countries have been promised debt relief equivalent to a total of over USD 20 billion at current values. Debt relief for the countries included in the initiative is calculated to cost a total of USD 33 billion. It is envisaged that the funds which debt relief makes available in the countries concerned will be used in the first place for increased efforts to combat poverty. Why, it may be asked, do we not write off all the debts of the poorest countries? The amounts involved may seem relatively small for the international community as a whole but that is not the case in relation to the resources that are currently available.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: A macroprudential progress report Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Society for Financial Econometrics (SoFiE), Lugano, 11 October 2013. *  *  *  I would like to thank Till Ebner, Fabian Gunzinger and Patrick Saner for their very valuable support in drafting this speech. Introduction Five years ago, the failure of Lehman Brothers sent shockwaves through the global financial system. The failure of a relatively small but highly interconnected institution pushed the entire financial system and, eventually, the global economy to the brink of collapse. This painfully highlighted the fact that policymakers had underestimated systemic risk. Five years later, thanks to substantial efforts, we have a better – but admittedly still incomplete – understanding of what systemic risk is and what we should do about it. In general terms, systemic risk arises because an optimising financial institution does not fully account for the cost that its behaviour imposes on other financial institutions. Thus, in essence, the origin of systemic risk is a negative externality imposed by individual financial firms on the system. For analytical and regulatory purposes, it is useful to differentiate between structural and cyclical systemic risk. Structural systemic risk stems from institutions that are so large or so interconnected that their failure would threaten the stability of the entire system. These are the institutions that are “too big to fail” (TBTF) or “too interconnected to fail”.
What we have to do, in actually operating monetary policy is to monitor all the relevant evidence as it emerges for signs that the economy is proving to be either stronger or weaker than we expect, and modify our view of the prospect for inflation - and our monetary policy - in the light of that. And in that context I repeat the assurance, which I gave recently to the TUC in Blackpool, that we will act symmetrically. We will be - have been - just as rigorous in reducing interest rates with the overall evidence pointing to the balance of risks to inflation on the downside, as we have been - and will again be - in raising rates with the evidence pointing to a significant or sustained overshoot of the inflation target. Now there are those - perhaps even one or two of you here this evening - who regard this assurance as cold comfort. It misses the point - they say - because the present approach to monetary policy focuses too narrowly on inflation. What we want - they say - is a monetary policy which puts more emphasis on growth and employment. You hear this complaint not just in this country but increasingly these days in Continental Europe. I must say, President, that it leaves me totally bemused. What it suggests is that growth and price stability are seen as alternatives - you can have a bit more of one if you’re prepared to accept a bit less of the other.

Headlines: UK heads for credit crisis. Closed for credit. Credit card sales dive. Facts: bank and building society lending up by 0.7% in the latest month (September) and by 8.8% over the past year. Credit card lending was up by over 26% on a year ago. Headlines: House prices hit as recession clouds gather. Facts: house prices rose by 6.7% over the past year on the Halifax index and by 7.5% according to the Nationwide. Now I say all this, President, not to draw attention to the proclivity of headline writers, and some economic/financial commentators, to sensationalise. My serious point is that, especially at a time of unusual uncertainty as at present, we all need to focus more carefully than ever on the evolving facts, and on the more probable outcomes and not allow ourselves to become preoccupied with extreme, even if possible, outcomes. Against that background, let me offer you my own assessment of where the UK economy has come from and where it is headed. Since the recession of the early 1990s the economy as a whole has, as I say, grown at an average annual rate of just over 3% - well above trend.
The excesses, which were particularly evident in the stock markets, are the most notable expression of the interaction of the belief in the “new economy” with developments in financial markets. However, the growth in debt markets also played its role. The introduction of the euro and the start of the single monetary policy seem to have had a strong, positive impact on the possibilities for corporate issuers both financial and non-financial - to resort to corporate bond issuance as a financing source. In addition, this process was fuelled by the surge in mergers and acquisitions, as more and more companies prepared to grasp the opportunities of the new dynamic environment. Furthermore, issuance activity by certain sectors linked to the “new economy”, such as the telecommunications and high-tech sectors, promoted the development of certain segments of the bond markets, for example the market for high-yield bonds. 2  B. van Ark, “Measuring Productivity in the “New Economy”: Towards a European Perspective”, De Economist 148, No.1, 2000, pp.87-105. 2  BIS Review 23/2003  We all know where all this optimism about the “new economy” led to. Since March 2000, we have seen both a substantial decline in stock prices and rising financial imbalances. I shall now discuss the aftermath of the boom and burst period that we experienced in financial markets.

Durmuş Yilmaz: In search of an appropriate policy mix for emerging economies – monetary policy in Turkey in the aftermath of the global financial crisis Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Euromoney Central and Eastern European Forum, Vienna, 18 January 2010. *  *  *  Dear Guests, During the global financial crisis, almost all countries focused on containing potential adverse effects of the crisis on domestic economy; Turkey was not an exception. Following the intensification of the crisis, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) delivered sizeable and frontloaded cuts in policy rates, reaching 1025 basis points from November 2008 to November 2009. During this period the CBT not only cut policy rates rapidly, but also pursued a counter-cyclical liquidity policy to support the functioning of money and credit markets, thereby strengthen the impact of the rate reductions on economic activity. These efforts were successful in bringing back Turkey on a strong recovery track. The healthy household balance sheets and solid banking system allowed a rapid rebound in domestic demand. Starting from mid-2009, the Turkish economy has been facing a domestic demand driven rapid recovery. Meanwhile, strengthening capital inflows has further exacerbated the divergence between the domestic and external demand, creating new policy challenges. Rapidly widening current account deficit coupled with short term capital inflows and exchange rate appreciation called for a different approach to monetary policy.
As you know, a broad raft of measures was agreed last Thursday covering the three main spheres of action of the ECB throughout this crisis. The conventional monetary policy stance was additionally eased with a further cut in official rates which, for practical purposes, have now reached their lower bound. The horizon for the policy of generous liquidity provision was extended once more to 2016. And, lastly, a further step was taken in respect of unconventional measures with the launch of a new, four-year, long-term refinancing operation aimed and designed at promoting greater credit flow. As we know, neither the ECB nor monetary policy alone can resolve the problems at the root of the crisis still besetting the euro area. But decisions such as those last Thursday no doubt contribute to facilitating the action of other economic policy tools which, by their nature, may have a more powerful and lasting effect on growth and employment. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Also, the world market price of oil has moved higher than expected. Thus far, the stance of monetary policy has been based on the assumption that the rise in energy prices will be temporary. We have refrained from raising interest rates despite inflation being considerably higher than 2 per cent at times. An alternative way of explaining our approach is to say that we have focused on underlying, demand-driven inflation. Should energy prices remain elevated for a long period or continue to increase, inflation will of course exceed our forecasts thus far. This could have other implications for monetary policy if it were to have a marked impact on cost levels and begin to affect inflation expectations. The highly irregular developments in electricity prices are a considerable problem for many decisionmakers in the economy, not just for forecasters of inflation. A comparison of electricity price developments in Sweden and the euro area speaks volumes (see Chart 4). These developments raise important questions about how the electricity market functions, questions that concern both competition and the conditions for the production of electricity. Summary of the outlook Even when taking into account the factors I have just discussed, the outlook for economic activity and inflation has not changed much since August. The upturn in the US appears to be slightly more evident, with less risks of a setback. In Europe, the outlook is instead somewhat weaker. For Sweden, it seems likely that the economy will experience a rather normal recovery next year.