samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the run-up to the EU entry and a few years before the outbreak of the global crisis, the National Bank of Romania faced an economic and financial context that could be deemed as exceptional. Massive capital inflows occurred given the existence of a significant interest rate differential and abundant global liquidity, in the context of the gradual removal of capital controls due to the requirements of the forthcoming EU membership. This led to a rapid rise in forex credit, a sizeable nominal appreciation of the domestic currency, and booming domestic demand. In this case, trying to cool down the economy through the standard recipe of policy rate hikes would have been pointless, if not outright detrimental, by prompting even more capital inflows and nominal appreciation, thus creating a vicious circle. So the context called for the use of unconventional instruments. Such departures from conventional practices involved the full use of direct FX interventions, allowing market interest rates to fall significantly below the policy rate through liquidity management, the active recourse to reserve requirements and deploying administrative measures to control credit growth. To give you just a few examples, they involved enforcing a maximum loan-to-value ratio, introducing debt service ceilings relative to households’ monthly disposable income (the scope of which was subsequently expanded to include non-bank financial institutions engaged in lending), setting limits to banks’ forex exposure vis-à-vis unhedged borrowers, and using differentiated coefficients in stress tests (higher for EUR than local currency exposures, with even stricter coefficients for CHF- and USD-denominated credit).

One priority has been to take account of the e-banking developments I have already mentioned. A particular landmark was the guideline on virtual banks which we issued in May of this year. I will not go into the details of this except to say that it was first drafted when the dot.com frenzy was at its peak, and I believe that the cautionary notes that we uttered have stood the test of time. In particular, our guideline stressed that virtual banks must have substance rather than being a concept, and that  BIS Review 93/2000  2  virtual banks are subject to the same risks as conventional banks and should be subject to the same prudential criteria. Essentially, we were warning of the need not to be blinded by the technology. We also warned against over-aggressive pricing and of the need to strike an appropriate balance between acquisition of market share and earning a reasonable return. As with other new banks that we authorise, we would normally expect a virtual bank to be making a profit by the end of its third year. This was criticised in some quarters as being unrealistic and not in keeping with the internet business model. However, as events have turned out, it was that model that was unrealistic rather than our guideline. Under our current rules, it is not possible to establish from scratch a new locally incorporated virtual, or indeed conventional, bank in Hong Kong.
As public servants they contribute every day to delivering our mission to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability. The changes we are making public today will ensure they can continue to do that important work effectively. 7. Open about our business  The Bank’s balance sheet has been at the heart of the financial system for over 300 years, and remains our most important policy tool. The innovations and adaptations in recent years have meant that it has been central to the flexible and effective response to all of the major policy challenges faced by the Bank since the onset of the financial crisis. And I am sure it will be a vital part of everything we do in future. Over that period, we have re-learnt one of Bagehot’s lessons – that ambiguity is rarely constructive. Policy is at its most effective when it is clearly communicated. We have taken major steps to improve communications around our monetary policy decisions, the framework we use to provide liquidity to the financial system, and the way we use Market Intelligence. Those changes show that the Bank of England is not just “open for business,” we are also “open about our business.”  11  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/mireview.aspx.

Although we are providing clarity around how the central bank would react in the event of market-wide or large idiosyncratic stress, it is important that some of our facilities retain elements of discretion. For example, the benefits of Discount Window Facility and Emergency Liquidity Assistance could be undermined by immediate disclosure, if speculation about individual firms were to threaten financial stability. In this respect, both the Winters and the Plenderleith reports recognised that a lag between usage and public disclosure can provide a good balance between our financial stability objectives and our duty to be accountable to the public. 5. Co-ordinating liquidity support with micro-prudential policy  Historically, one of the arguments for having ambiguity over the Bank’s provision of liquidity insurance, particularly against a wide range of collateral, was that clarity would induce moral hazard. The more certain banks could be of the availability of liquidity insurance, the less incentive they would have to manage their own liquidity prudently through private markets. Acting as a mitigant against this, the expansion of the Bank’s liquidity provision capabilities has gone hand in hand with two other key developments: the introduction of stronger liquidity regulation requiring banks to hold more liquid assets (Figure 3), 8 and the creation of a resolution regime which makes it more credible that firms will be allowed to fail in an orderly manner. Taken together, liquidity insurance, the resolution regime and microprudential supervision provide a framework of incentives for banks to manage their liquidity.
But it needs to be complemented by action from the public and private sectors in individual jurisdictions to determine where progress is needed and how to best implement it through a range of projects and changes, in time to meet the 2027 targets. 1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  I encourage central banks, payment system operators, providers, participants, and users from all countries – including all those at the conference today and extending well beyond the G20 – to work together to enhance cross-border payments. We can continue learning from each other and refining our approaches via international forums led by the FSB and Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) – such as the annual Payment Summit with senior industry representatives, the new Industry Taskforces 4, 5 working jointly with the IMF and World Bank on identifying appropriate technical assistance, and the new Central Banks' Community of Practice6. At the Bank of England, we are already making tangible progress towards enhancing cross-border payments. We are currently undertaking a transformational RTGS Renewal Programme to deliver a range of new features and capabilities for payments. This will include several features highlighted in the priority focus areas – such as the adoption of ISO20022 this summer, reducing barriers to access RTGS, and enhancing user functionality such as Application Programme Interfaces (APIs).

William C Dudley: “Remarks at the New York Fed’s Economic Press Briefing on the Regional Economy” Opening remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Press Briefing on the Regional Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 18 August 2016. *  *  *  Jaison Abel, Jason Bram, Hunter Clark, Giacomo De Giorgi, Richard Deitz, Jack Gutt, Andrew Haughwout and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. Good morning and welcome to the New York Fed’s Economic Press Briefing. I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak with the journalists covering our region. You are an important communication channel to the people in our District. This morning I want to focus on economic conditions in our region, giving particular attention to job growth. I also want to discuss our ongoing work on Puerto Rico. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. The New York Fed is deeply committed to serving our region. This commitment manifests itself in several ways. We produce business surveys and local economic indexes to help our constituents track regional economic conditions. My staff writes papers and blog posts on economic issues important to our region. We meet with a number of advisory boards comprised of community and business leaders.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Building institutions to support economic development Special lecture by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the SEACEN Conference on Central Bank Cooperation and Mandates “Building Institutions to Support Economic Development”, Sasana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2016. *  *  *  Introduction It is my great pleasure and honour to speak at this conference in honour of Dr. Puey Ungphakorn on the subject of “Building Institutions to Support Economic Development”. The topic is highly relevant in the current environment which places greater demands on institutions given the significant structural shifts that are taking place in the global landscape and the changing character of the economic cycles that has brought with it a great many new challenges that need to be managed. Given that building institutions is about creating a positive environment for the economy to function, one that will shape the incentive structure that will drive economic activity and encourage the efficient use of resources, the new evolving environment would place a further urgency for institutional building. There is thus a great motivation for building effective institutions to serve this purpose. In particular, the urgency is for strong institutions that will transcend the passage of time and will ensure the path towards sustainable economic growth and development. Experience has shown us that institutions are pivotal to any economic success. However, institutional building is in itself an arduous task. And building institutions that are relevant for the future is even more challenging.

Among the future challenges that are likely to confront Asia is the sustainability of our prevailing growth model given the consequences arising from the erosion of our demographic advantage, the rising indebtedness, the rising cost of living despite an apparent period of low inflation, the need to meet the massive infrastructure requirements and the need to address the rising income disparities and the environmental challenges. What then are the ways economic management can prepare us for the future? This will involve policies and reforms that will reduce leverage, that will address the widening BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  income disparities, that will effectively manage infrastructure development and urbanisation, that will accord environmental sustainability and finally that will accord importance to governance, accountability and integrity in the implementation and execution of the many endeavours to achieve a sustainable advancement. This implies an important role of institutional building that will support the ability to address these challenges. For most Central Banks in the emerging world, our mandate is broader. Most certainly we are expected to have a role in contributing to addressing many of these challenges both directly and indirectly. Some of these issues include financial inclusion, financing of infrastructure, putting in place financial and social safety nets, and environmental sustainability.
I suggest that:   the draw-down rate assumed in the Basel 3 Liquidity Coverage Ratio should be higher for committed lines to financial companies than for lines to non-financial companies. That is, banks should hold more liquid assets against such exposures. Without a policy of that kind, there will be a strong incentive for maturity-transformation to be undertaken off bank balance sheets but with an umbilical cord back to the banking system. It should apply not only to vehicles used for securitisation but more generally. Money funds Money funds do not use committed lines of credit from banks. Claims on money funds have, in effect, become monetary assets in the hands of savers. In parts of the world, especially the US, they are treated like current accounts. Given the restrictions on their asset holdings, they resemble narrow banks, in mutual-fund clothing. But for a normal mutual fund, as an open-ended investment vehicle, the value of investments in it fluctuates with the value of the vehicle’s asset portfolio. By contrast, most money funds hold themselves out as offering par under any circumstances; when they “break the buck”, they must unwind. Their investors run at that prospect; and so the funds themselves are flighty investors. Compared to most types of shadow banking, money funds do not borrow – in the usual sense. But by promising par, they are in effect incurring debt-like obligations. And they can be exposed to leverage.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: 10th year anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 10th Anniversary Dinner, Kuala Lumpur, 16 May 2013. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to welcome Your Excellencies and distinguished guests to this IFSB 10th Anniversary Dinner, organised in conjunction with the 10th IFSB Summit. Tonight is a landmark celebration of the 10th year anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), as we commemorate a decade of milestones and achievements of the IFSB and pay tribute to its members and industry stakeholders that have provided undivided support to the Board. Bank Negara Malaysia is indeed honoured to have the opportunity to host this 10th IFSB Summit, which is exactly ten years since we hosted the IFSB inauguration in November 2002. We are also very pleased to welcome back the Founding Members and many of the industry leaders that witnessed the inauguration of the IFSB. We are very honoured to have your presence at this Anniversary Dinner. It was in the year 2000 that the discussion began on the merits of establishing a dedicated organisation to develop a separate and distinct regulatory framework for the global Islamic finance industry.
The economic policy response in this second phase of the crisis Naturally, the economic policy response to this crisis should adapt to how the pandemic unfolds healthwise. At this second phase of the crisis, with the characteristics I mentioned, the economic policy response must combine two objectives: to support the recovery - which advises avoiding a premature withdrawal of the support measures that would raise the risk of economic growth undergoing more lasting damage - and to smooth the adjustment of the economy to the post-pandemic scenario. 3  The importance of European support To achieve these objectives, the economic policy response in this second phase of the crisis should have the firmly resolute backing of the European Union (EU). Indeed, given the enormous economic and financial interactions across the area’s various economies, joint action is the most effective means of ensuring that the economic effects of the pandemic will be overcome in a shorter time and at a lower cost to each and every country. This is particularly important in the current situation, where we face a global crisis, but which is exerting asymmetrical economic effects on the different countries. European action is particularly important so as to avoid an uneven exit from the crisis that bears down on overall economic growth for a longer period. These arguments, beyond those relating to necessary European solidarity, highlight the importance of the agreement reached by the European Council last Tuesday with the approval of the European recovery fund.

And even if you took a different view, and thought it was more likely that they’ll still be rising at that point, you would also need to judge the extent to which that would depress domestic demand and spending (especially at a time when, on current plans, tighter fiscal policy will be doing the same). Persistent rises in import prices introduce a trade-off between the MPC’s primary and secondary objectives, complicating the appropriate response to them. However, this is not the only source of inflation the economy is facing. Output in the private sector was still quite a bit smaller, in the third quarter of this year, than it was before the pandemic. Yet unemployment is barely any higher, in part because of strong hiring in the public sector. And other indicators – surveys, vacancies and wage growth (at least in certain sectors) – all point to a labour market that’s significantly Strictly speaking, in this context, it’s the price of imports relative to the price of exports that matters for national income. All big net exporters of goods also import some of them. But, because they’re net exporters, a big rise in their price in general – imports as well as exports – will raise national income. It’s a gain in the “terms of trade” rather than a decline. Regarding the underlying source of a rise in import prices one should distinguish something driven by real forces (in this case stronger demand for goods and impairments to supply) from a purely monetary increase.
A second approach to DIY LOLR is for emerging markets to create contingent credit facilities with international banks, as Argentina has done with its contingent repo facility, or try to set up collateralised loan facilities along the lines suggested by Martin Feldstein.6 A final approach to the DIY LOLR, in the absence of an effective multilateral ILOLR, is the creation of regional self-insurance funds. All of these approaches are likely to be pursued, to a greater or lesser extent, in the wake of recent financial crises. (2)  Manage the national balance sheet and, as far as possible, avoid maturity and currency mismatches. For a country without a track record of international borrowing, it is important to manage its external liquidity position, especially in foreign currency. The lack of foreign exchange controls means that it will be difficult to observe, let alone manage, the balance sheet of the entire private sector. But the key elements are those relating to the public and banking sectors. Governments already have information on these sectors. As important as anything is the need for self-awareness by the countries concerned of the state of their national balance sheet and the approach of impending liquidity difficulties. When governments and markets alike are informed of the potential for future financing difficulties, both sides have time to take preventive action. Of course, the use of derivative instruments and hedging techniques makes the assessment of risk exposure more difficult. But the effort must be made.

In hindsight we know that inflation gradually fell and that it happened earlier in Sweden than in other countries –  2 [13]  discounting the effect of interest-rate changes, inflation fell from around 2 per cent during 2010 to around 1 per cent in 2012. When inflation then fell further in late 2013 and early 2014, despite brighter economic signals, it became necessary for the Riksbank to focus more and more on bringing inflation back to the target. This was particularly urgent bearing in mind that the long period of low inflation had begun to leave its mark on inflation expectations. To bring up inflation and help anchor inflation expectations to the target, the Riksbank cut the repo rate to 0 per cent in 2014 and then gradually down to –0.5 per cent in the following years. As a way of making monetary policy more expansionary, we also began purchasing government bonds at the start of 2015. At that point, the ECB had begun buying assets on a large scale to stimulate demand and bring up inflation. There was a concern that the Swedish krona might strengthen significantly against the euro as a result of this and that this would further prolong the period of below-target inflation. Monetary policy needed to protect the economy against such a development. Today, we can observe that the extremely low interest rate and the Riksbank’s asset purchases have contributed to economic activity growing ever stronger.
The lender is taking a risk on the option it offers the borrower to buy the car at a fixed price three years down the road. It’s not difficult to see how this could be self-reinforcing. If used car prices were to fall, and PCP purchasers opt to give back their cars as their contracts expire, the supply of used cars onto the market could increase substantially, pushing prices down further. The advent of PCP means – as the small print always says – the past may not be a good guide to the future. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  Mortgages  Developments in mortgage debt are much less striking than those in consumer debt and car finance. Mortgage lending has increased by just 3 % over the past year. But even here there are some tentative signs of boundaries being pushed. Lenders have been reporting that their objectives to grow market share are pressing them to make credit more available (Chart 16). But of course, not everyone can gain market share. Some of that fierce competition for business has shown up in reduced fees for those taking out a new mortgage. Nearly a half of mortgages were extended without fees in the first part of 2017 – four times the rate in 2011 (Chart 17). Boundaries are being pushed in less benign ways too. Lending at higher loan to income multiples has edged up.

I find this comes quite naturally – it’s worrying intelligently that’s hard.”  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Complacency gave way to crisis. Confidence in the banking system was destroyed. Although public bailouts – totalling $ across the G10 – shored it up, banks took emergency measures to protect themselves. The supply of loans collapsed. Companies and households were unable to refinance their debts. The result was economic disaster. In this country alone, close to a million jobs were lost and more than 100,000 businesses failed. Too much debt made the financial system, and the economy, unsafe. Too many people paid the price when those risks materialised. Since then there has been a programme of repair and reform. Britain’s households have paid down debt. The financial system has been made safer, simpler and fairer. 2  Banks, in particular, are much stronger. British banks have a capital base – their own shareholders’ money – that is more than 3 times stronger than it was ten years ago. They can absorb losses now that would have completely wiped them out ten years ago. During the repair of banks, there were suggestions that the repairs would hold back lending to the economy. That’s a bit like arguing that stopping to repair a punctured tyre holds back your progress towards your destination. Only once the puncture in the banking system was repaired was it able to get back to serving the economy.