samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If this is the case, then indeed the rules are just ‘burdens’, rather than instruments to assist banks’ operations and safeguard confidence in the financial system. Compliance therefore, is merely a means to an end. It is a process that enables us to achieve certain outcomes. Having the right controls in place merely gets us to the starting line. The real race is in creating and sustaining an environment where everyone in the organisation is involved 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  in preventing the systematic abuse of the financial system. This process is not a sprint, but a marathon of endurance and perseverance. To drive the point, someone once asked, “How many compliance officers does it take to change a lightbulb?” The answer is three, one to change it, one to check it and one to check it again, and file a report. This illustrates how compliance can often be seen as an end to itself, forgetting that it should be focusing on the end game, the quality of light emitted. From the regulator’s perspective, rules have progressively evolved from detailed prescriptions in the past, to standards and best practices today. This is due to the rapid pace of innovation, increasing complexity of financial services and the realisation, that a ‘one-size-fits-all’, micromanaging and prescription-based approach is not an optimal approach in regulation. Thus, institutions have more latitude in implementing these standards at the micro level.

However, continued relative stability of the exchange rate of the kwacha against major currencies is heavily dependent on longer term initiatives for sustained improvement in the supply of foreign exchange. Among these strategies is a sustained increase in export earnings through the stimulation and maintenance of a strong export sector. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me now turn to the other part of the topic, namely, the process of foreign payments. The Bank of Zambia has issued Directives that put limits on cash transactions in foreign exchange with authorised dealers. For instance, bureaux de change cannot transact in excess of US dollars 1,000 or equivalent foreign currency per transaction per day with any one individual. This arises from their primary purpose of being money changers. The corresponding limit for commercial banks is US dollars 5,000 or equivalent foreign currency per transaction per day for account holders and US dollars 1,000 or equivalent foreign currency for non-account holders. It is important to stress that these limits for commercial banks pertain to cash transactions only. Account holders and nonaccount holders alike wishing to transact above these limits can do so by choosing other modes of payments, such as, direct transfers, drafts, etc. Any remittance in excess of US dollars 5,000 has to be channelled through commercial banks and the person remitting the funds is required to support the transaction with appropriate documentation for statistical purposes, as well as guarding against money laundering and financing of terrorism.
Third, broad SSM membership could diminish the distortions to the single financial market caused by the divergent fiscal positions of sovereigns, as Member States that are part of the SSM will also have access to the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). This presupposes, however, that the SRM is set up with strong powers, which I consider essential. At this stage, we expect several non-euro area Member States to join the SSM. The negotiations on the SSM Regulation have satisfactorily addressed most of their concerns. However, some countries seem to require that more clarity on the functioning of the SRM is provided before they reach their final decision, in particular on the issue of a common fiscal backstop and how “out” Member States could contribute to or benefit from it. In my view, this should not be an obstacle to a positive decision because any participant country in the SSM will also participate in the SRM and benefit from it. From the ECB’s perspective, it is essential that the SRM comprises a Single Resolution Authority and single fund financed by ex-ante and risk-based contributions from the banking sector itself. To remove any doubts over resolution financing, the fund should be able to draw on a common backstop if needed – possibly a credit line from the ESM. Any credit would be repaid via additional levies on banks and thus be fiscally neutral in the medium term. This construction raises certain institutional questions which cannot be answered today, not least related to membership of the ESM.

In particular, while macro-prudential powers will rest also with national authorities, the ECB will be able to use macro-prudential instruments, either at the request of national authorities or by deciding to adopt stricter measures than the ones adopted at national level. This implies an increased coordination function in the macro-prudential areas for countries within the SSM that will naturally create some overlap with the macro-prudential role of the ESRB for the wider EU. However, I expect the macro-prudential functions of both institutions to be complementary. The ESRB will play its role in adopting recommendations to help coordinating macroprudential decisions as provided for in EU Regulation (namely CRR), in particular with the countries that do not join the SSM. In addition, while the SSM will exclusively focus on banking systems, the ESRB has an additional macro-prudential function regarding the nonbank parts of the financial sector, and as such will be well placed to address cross-sectoral issues. Interplay with the other ESAs Finally, let me be very brief regarding the SSM’s interaction with ESMA and EIOPA. Although the supervision of markets and the insurance sector will remain with the national authorities,  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  ESMA and EIOPA will play important roles in the coordination of information sharing between the SSM and the national authorities. In particular, cooperation with EIOPA on the bank-led conglomerates will have to be very close given that the SSM is expected to take over their supplementary supervision.
What the crisis has indeed challenged is the widespread conviction that meeting one particular stability criterion, while necessary in order to achieve the others, is also a sufficient condition  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  to do so – after all, maintaining price stability, while valuable in itself, has proved insufficient to ward off major financial or macroeconomic instability. As a matter of fact, Andrew Crocket claimed ever since 2003 that the “peace dividend” yielded by the successful war against inflation had not lived up to expectations and therefore the battlefront against financial instability should not be overlooked. Regardless of how this battlefront is approached, it is of the essence to make sure that the tasks entrusted to the central bank are feasible. Otherwise, if the monetary authorities are overburdened with possibly conflicting goals, the major risk is to render them inefficient and unable to deliver a single one of their objectives. This is the very reason why the issue of central bank governance is so intricate and delicate: one needs to reconcile objectives that, under certain circumstances, might even prove incompatible. 2. Integrating or separating price and financial guardianship Given that the conference focuses on central bank and supervisory governance, allow me to touch on the issue of integrating price guardianship and financial guardianship within the central bank. As you probably remember, the idea that the two tasks should be completely separated has gained ground in the 1990s.

We have configured the activities and reporting lines in order to ensure full operational independence and to avoid conflicts of interest between the supervision and resolution functions. Of course, this takes place without prejudice to the exchange of information and cooperation obligations. To be more specific, supervisory decisions do not pose constrains to resolution-related ones. Moreover, the staff involved in performing the resolution function is structurally separated from the other NBR functions. 3. Romania: a short history of institutional changes for ensuring financial stability The global crisis has made obvious for all of us that price stability and financial stability are much more intertwined than we used to think. I believe this development has farther-reaching consequences when it comes to the future of central banking. As I pointed out in November last year at the World Policy Conference organised in Montreux, I cannot imagine a future where the explicit concern for financial stability and the macroprudential policy are not central banking fixtures. In Romania, the concern for ensuring and strengthening financial stability was visible in several significant changes of the institutional framework, operated already before the outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis. Specifically, the NBR’s Financial Stability Department was created as early as 2004, with the first edition of the annual Financial Stability Report – a report that will be published on a half-yearly basis starting this year – being released in 2006.
Further, in this macroeconomic environment, which also makes the prolongation of the period of low interest rates more likely, banks’ profitability will be subject to additional downward pressure. Against this backdrop, financial institutions should strive to improve the quality of their balance sheets, to raise efficiency and solvency levels and to increase their efforts so as to enhance their reputation. Economic policies should focus on reducing the vulnerabilities still in place in our economy, such as public and external debt, and on raising medium and long-term growth through the implementation of appropriate structural reforms. Lastly, macroprudential policy should concentrate on mitigating the potential generation of risks that may affect financial stability and on the accumulation of buffers for use, when needed, in more adverse macroeconomic scenarios. Thank you for your attention. 10/10

A prime example of this has been the Macro-prudential Research Network (MaRs), where researchers from the European System of Central Banks closely collaborated with experts from academia. The MaRs network was launched to develop core conceptual frameworks, models and tools providing research support to improve macro-prudential supervision in the EU. Its work, which was formally concluded last June, is summarised in a public report and represents a fine example of policy-relevant research. 1 To foster a constant communication with academics, the ECB also regularly organises seminars, conferences and workshops. These enable researchers, policy-makers and practitioners to meet and discuss the latest research findings and their implications for policy. In addition, to stimulate research at the highest academic standards, the ECB invites leading scholars to visit and conduct their research at the ECB, for example via the Wim Duisenberg Fellowship, and offers support to young researchers by funding five Lamfalussy Fellowships every year. Thomas Philippon’s contributions represent an excellent example of policy-relevant research. I will consider two main areas of his research which I find particularly interesting: the design of optimal interventions and the efficiency of the financial sector. In his 2012 paper, published as the lead article in the American Economic Review, Thomas and his co-author Vasiliki Skreta study the design of optimal public interventions in debt markets. The intervention aims at restoring an efficient level of investment when productive investments are forgone because firms face unfairly high interest rates due to adverse selection.
But certainly, some of the trends that we discuss are going to happen; digital, automation, work-from-anywhere, at least they open the potential for us to mitigate many of the weaknesses that have held the Thai economy back as well as open the potential for us to grow in a stronger and more sustainable manner going forward. I would like to thank again the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) for kindly inviting me to give a talk today and, even more importantly, to thank the JCC and its members Page 10 of 11  for the continued support in Thailand. I understand that you have been an integral and important part of our countries development and I certainly hope that you will continue to be so for the years to come. Thank you very much. Page 11 of 11

Second, innovative financing solutions. To meet Asia’s green financing needs, it is not enough to rely on just the public sector or the banking sector. We need innovative platforms to catalyse capital flows to marginally bankable but worthy green projects. In Singapore, one of our sovereign wealth funds, Temasek, has partnered HSBC to set up a debt financing platform to invest in marginally bankable sustainable infrastructure projects in Asia. We need new instruments such as blended finance to draw in different types of financers. Government agencies and multilateral development banks can potentially help to derisk sustainability projects by taking on first loss equity or providing a guarantee, to help crowd-in more private sector financing. This includes not just commercial banks but also capital providers such as foundations and family offices. We need to deploy technical assistance alongside financing. This is to support a range of activities such as project preparation, project implementation, and even training and capacity building to achieve maximum development impact. Third, financial supervision. Regulators are in a strong position to steward the financial system towards net zero through supervising financial institutions’ management of climate related risks. The Network for Greening the Financial System, or NGFS, plays a key role in helping to mainstream climate-related risk management. The NGFS has just issued a report highlighting the different paths that supervisors can take towards a set of internationally aligned supervisory practices. We strongly support the NGFS Declaration1 to green the financial system. The MAS is progressively embedding climate risk considerations in its supervisory framework.
The composition of the Governing Board may be a problem; the appointment of members of Parliament to the Governing Board runs counter to traditions in Central Europe. 4. Debt conversion and issues The countries that join the euro area may - and it is also envisaged that they will issue treasury paper denominated in euro. A member state wishing to convert its stock of debt into euro will be allowed to initiate the appropriate measures. A member state may also take steps whereby private issuers and marketplaces (e.g. the Stockholm Stock Exchange, OM and the Securities Register Centre) can switch to euro in the changeover period. Many institutions and agents are in fact planning to do this. All private economic agents are to be free to choose between using euro from the start of Stage Three and waiting until the changeover has been completed. However, the agents in the Swedish securities market, banks, financial institutions, the Securities Register Centre, the Stockholm Stock Exchange, OM and others are unanimously in favour of a “big-bang” solution, that is, a quick, concerted changeover from kronor to euro right from the turn of 1998. 5. Banknotes and coins Euro banknotes and coins will not be introduced until the beginning of 2002. For a time, commerce will have to cope with two sets of prices, one in krona and the other in euro. A timetable for the substitution of banknotes and coins is to be fixed by each country.

Falling short of these principles can drive up medium-term inflationary pressures, which would call for a stronger monetary policy response. Moreover, fiscal policies should be oriented towards making economies more productive and gradually reducing high public debt. Finally, countries should implement structural policies for intensifying their efforts to green and digitalise their economies. Inflation Euro area headline inflation declined from its October peak, reflecting a drop in energy inflation. Downward base effects, an easing of energy commodity prices, and the impact of government measures to shield consumers from high energy prices all contributed to this decline. By contrast, food and core inflation rates continued to rise, partly as a result of the past surge in energy and other input costs still feeding through to consumer prices. Pent-up demand related to the reopening of the economy and the lagged impact of supply bottlenecks also continue to push prices up. At the same time, employees demanding compensation for the loss in purchasing power amid tight labour markets has translated into higher wage growth, while many firms in sectors facing constrained supply and resurgent demand raised their profit margins. We expect euro area inflation to continue to fall, as lagged price pressures fade out and tighter monetary policy increasingly dampens demand. However, historically high wage growth, related to tight labour markets and compensation for high inflation, will support core inflation over the projection horizon, as it gradually returns to rates around our target. This outlook remains surrounded by considerable uncertainty, with both upside and downside risks.
Enhancing Cross-border Payments - Stage 3 Roadmap (FSB Report 2020)  Page 9 8. Targets for Addressing the Four Challenges of Cross-Border Payments (FSB Report October 2021) 9. Trireme - DK findout! 10. Speech: Real-time payments in Australia 11. RBI to give some non-banks access to payments systems 12. Expansion of operating hours and associated changes for the Fedwire  and Fedwire Funds Service  s  13. Sweden completes first phase of migration to TIPS 14. TARGET consolidation: Timeline 15. Extending and aligning payment system operating hours for cross-border payments (CPMI Report May 2022) and Improving access to payment systems for cross-border payments: best-practices for self-assessments (CPMI Report May 2022) 16. Improving access to payment systems for cross-border payments: best-practices for  self-assessments (CPMI  Report May 2022) 17. Extending and aligning payment system operating hours for cross-border payments (CPMI Report May 2022) 18. RTGS Renewal Programme | Bank of England 19. Roadmap for Real-Time Gross Settlement Service Beyond 2024

If however action were needed on financial stability, this would be effected chiefly through temporary liquidity instruments, which would not conflict with the increase in interest rates needed to ensure price stability. II. A plea for more focused multilateral cooperation Be they energy price pressures or financial spill-overs, the challenges currently faced by central banks require more than individual actions – they call for strong and effective multilateral impetus. I say it here in Washington, during the IMF Spring Meetings. However, the tide has been turning the other way since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As geopolitical rifts deepen and trust fades, it is becoming more and more difficult for the G20 to deliver on its mandate, despite remarkable efforts from the Indonesian and now the Indian presidency. We need to find pragmatic ways forward to overcome deadlocks in global action and adapt to the new realities. Alternatives to multilateral cooperation, such as regionalism, “minilateralism”, ii or “polylateralism” iii can usefully supplement it. Working on smaller scales, or relying on non-state actors could help achieve breakthroughs. Yet they cannot replace it. They lack the global reach of international state cooperation.iv Hence my call for a focused or pragmatic multilateralism. v The principle is simple: rather than pursuing an exaggerated ambition, focus at present multilateral efforts on a few selected global issues, where there are clear common interests.
The first such study dates back to 1980, but probably the best known and most cited article of its era is the 1993 one by Alesina and Summers. Although their analysis was by no means sophisticated, the authors cautiously concluded that central bank independence promotes lower inflation and its benefits probably outweigh its costs in the form of output volatility. In later interpretations, there was even talk of a “free lunch” for economies and governments that opt for an independent central bank. This article represented the mainstream view. Later studies refined the methodology but did not change anything fundamental about the finding, so it began to be accepted as the prevailing paradigm. The view that goal independence plays the main role gained a broad consensus. In the two decades leading up to the GFC, one central bank after another gained some form of independence and, hand in hand with that, low inflation was established in advanced economies. Alongside various forms of central bank independence, inflation targeting became the second pillar of optimal rule-based monetary policy. It introduced a high degree of transparency and predictability into monetary policy. Inflation targeting became a disciplining mechanism for central banks and simultaneously a tool for governments and the public to make central banks accountable. It marked a radical departure from the long-standing practice of “never explain, never excuse”. Yet critics can be found in every field. As early as 1993, for example, Adam Posen asserted that there was no reliably proven causality between independent central banks and low inflation.

Because, Ladies and Gentlemen, as I have repeatedly shared with my colleagues at the Bank, when requiring the tasks to be performed with 100% precision, rather than in a slapdash manner, we in the central bank have an asset even more valuable than its international reserves. This key asset is the reputation of the BNB and of each of its employees. I promised to your colleagues of the 39th National Assembly that I would never take part in fruitless discussions, neither would I refute any possible silly allegations of dishonourable people or of unqualified “know-it-all” experts. The people around me, however, know how painful it was for me to bear any stupidity or slander, not for my own credibility but for the confidence the Bulgarian society should have in our National Bank. The BNB is de jure and de facto the most independent public institution; it owes its independence to you – the elected representatives of the people, and reports only and solely to you, to the Bulgarian National Assembly. Therefore I felt I needed to have again assurance of your confidence after such a long and fierce pre-election competition. Dear Ladies and Gentlemen MPs, Only two months ago in this hall I reiterated, and I would like now to reconfirm, the three key principles I have abided by since 2003, for which I will try hard to be remembered as characterizing my work at the central bank – independence, predictability and transparency.