samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Although it is a Herculean task, establishing an acceptable level of regional coordination to generate and facilitate trade and investment and ensuring that cross border flows take place safely and efficiently, without disrupting the national financial systems is an imperative. The rapidly changing global payment system infrastructure is challenging the existence of domestic and regional payment systems that are lagging behind in the pace of development of technology, communications and globalization. Each country has to reform their payment  BIS Review 79/2007  1  systems to keep up with advanced technologies and complex processes. Given the nature of cross border transactions, the need to mitigate risks involved in them and the high cost of quality infrastructure, it is advantageous for countries in the region to undertake reforms collectively in coordination with each other. A regional payment group can attract rich intellectual and resource capacity for payment system development in the region. Within the framework of a common payment initiative, all members can create productive and collective working relationships to address issues relating to the common quest for developing the national and regional payment systems. In this regard, the central banks should promote close coordination among experts in the region to strengthen the payment system infrastructure. 3. Case for a SAARC region payment initiative  The SAARC region-wide payment system has a long way to go in improving its performances, as many others have organized themselves better for the task.

Ranee Jayamaha: Policy framework for regional cooperation and the role of the central banks Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 6 July 2007. *  *  *  Thank you for this opportunity to share some thoughts on the need for cooperation to develop a regional payment initiative and the role of the central banks in that endeavour. 1. Background  As articulated by the Governor, the SAARC region’s trade and financial services are developing at a faster rate, with India achieving a rapid growth of around 8-9%. Most of the SAARC Group of countries, including India, have opened up or are considering to open their capital accounts in keeping up with global trends and the regional needs. Accordingly, trade and investment flows and demand for financial services will exceed the present levels over the next couple of years. Hence, payment system gains much importance as it is a critical facilitator in cross-border flows, as well as domestic transactions. It should be able to cater not only to the present needs, but also the future demands. For purposes of this presentation, the payment system is treated in a broader sense to encompass the payments, clearing and settlement systems. At a national level, some of the SAARC and ACU countries have already reformed or are about to reform their payment systems to minimize risks and increase safety and efficiency, although the degree of such reforms vary widely.
Rather than pretend that we can forecast the future, a more intelligent response is to reinforce the resilience of those parts of the financial system that we cannot permit to fail and encourage entry and exit in a free market in other parts. It is clear that we need to understand more about how stability affects risk-taking, leverage, and the “cycle of confidence”. My third example relates to the so-called “risk taking” channel of monetary policy. 19 Short-term policy rates, especially when they are, as now, exceptionally low, may encourage investors to take on more risk than they would otherwise wish as they “search for yield”. 20 Financial institutions with  15  There is a substantial literature on debt deflation, including Fisher (1933), Minsky (1982b), Bernanke and Gertler (1990), King (1993), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). 16  Minsky (1982a). More recently Geanakoplos (2010) has set out a theory of what he calls the “leverage cycle”. Again, this cycle is driven by sentiment, and has a self-reinforcing dynamic. In good times leverage increases and that helps to drive up asset prices as optimistic investors can access financing on easy terms. But at some point bad news puts the process into reverse. Losses trigger margin calls which force asset sales and cause a collapse in asset prices. The reason that such a cycle is costly is due to a series of externalities and market imperfections. 17  King (2003). 18  Taleb (2012). 19  A term coined by Borio and Zhu (2008).

20  Rajan (2005) argues that the “search for yield” was an important ingredient in the story of the crisis. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  long-term commitments (pension funds and insurance companies, for example) need to match the yield they promised on their liabilities, with the yield on their assets. When interest rates are high, they can invest in safe assets to generate the necessary revenue. When interest rates are low, however, they are forced to invest in riskier assets to continue to meet their target nominal rate of return. That tends to push down risk premia and lower the price of borrowing. Other investors too find it difficult to accept that in a world of low nominal and real interest rates equilibrium rates of return will not meet their previous expectations. 21 If these mechanisms are important, the financial cycle may be heavily influenced by monetary policy, especially when interest rates are low. That also creates the possibility of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. All three examples suggest that the conventional analysis of the trade-off between the volatility of inflation and the volatility of output is likely to be far too optimistic. Does this add up to a case for “leaning against the wind” of rising asset prices rather than waiting to “mop” up after the bust? Certainly we have seen that monetary policy cannot fully offset the effects of financial crises for two reasons. First, crises may impact output before the response of monetary policy is felt.
As an early contributor to this industry, I am at least partly to blame. The estimates  of gross job loss span a pretty wide range, but lie anywhere between 10% and 50% of the global workforce, depending on whether it is jobs or tasks that are assumed to be displaced (Table 1 summarises). Even at the lower end of this range, the societal impact would be significant. At the upper end, they would be truly transformative. If the truth lies in between, this could still make the jobs loss from the Fourth Industrial Revolution greater than its predecessors. And if so, then the potential societal costs – such as rising wage inequality and threats to social cohesion – could also be as great as ever previously. 50  Some of the potentially powerful effects of automation on jobs and wages are already apparent. In the US, each industrial robot per thousand workers has been found to reduce the employment rate by 0.2-0.3 percentage points and wages by 0.25-0.5%. 51  52  In Europe, results are more mixed. Research  suggests that technology may have been the largest single contributor to falling labour shares over the recent past. 53  Whether these effects on jobs and pay will be temporary or permanent is far harder to judge. At this stage of the technological cycle, the evidence is more likely to be picking up the shorter-term displacement effects of 48  Haldane (2015b) Haldane (2015b). 50 Schwab (2017). 51 Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017).

This strongly implies it is not the greater incidence of ideas-fuelled booms after 1750 that accounts for the growth inflexion. The explanation lies instead in the dramatic fall in both the probability and cost of GDP contractions. Recessions have occurred only 30% of the time since 1700 and only 17% of the time since 1900. During these periods, growth has averaged minus 2.2% per year since 1700 and minus 3.4% per year since 1900. Since 1750, recessions have become far less frequent and less painful. It is the avoidance of deep recessions that differentiates the Golden Era from its Malthusian predecessor. Where does this leave our story of growth? Well, the story that better fits the facts appears to be one in which the conveyor belt of ideas and innovation has been continuous over the centuries, causing lengthy if lumpy ideas-fuelled expansions. But whereas prior to the Industrial Revolution this conveyor belt was regularly halted by recessions, more recently these interruptions have been far fewer and less costly. Put differently, the real revolution in living standards after 1750 came about not exclusively, or perhaps even mainly, from the surge in ideas and technologies. Rather, it resulted from societies having found some means of avoiding the subsequent recessionary bullets. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, these killed expansions dead. After it, societies appear to have found some effective means of dodging them. A Second “i” on Growth  To understand growth, then, we need to explain why economies become less recession-prone after 1750.
I would like to conclude this brief tribute to Benjamin Franklin by quoting one of his phrases that makes an encouraging link  BIS Review 4/2006  1  between success and risk: “there are many ways not to succeed, but the most certain is not to take risks”. Let me turn now to my main topic which is to provide you with an overview of the Single monetary policy of the Eurosystem that consists of the European Central Bank and the 12 national central banks of euro area member states and of its main features and achievements. Quite paradoxically, - The single currency for a long time met with the scepticism from many observers, who regarded it as unrealistic first to launch a new currency and second to envisage a single monetary policy for a group of countries that, despite rapid convergence, continued to display major differences. Interestingly enough, the assumption made by some observers and market participants that the entry interest rates in the Euro on 1 January 1999 would be some kind of average of the interest rates of the composing currencies proved to be wrong.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Swiss outlook and global developments Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Icon Roadshow Euro 2008, Frankfurt am Main, 17 March 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The Swiss economy looks back on a number of successful years during which it was a very active participant in the growth of the world economy. The export sector rapidly expanded its presence in the new markets, thereby making an important contribution to this development. What was remarkable was that the increased foreign activities were not detrimental to Switzerland as a production location. On the contrary, the Swiss location benefited overall. Reforms aimed at strengthening and opening up Switzerland as a business location have also made a substantial contribution to economic prosperity in recent years. The turbulence on the financial markets that erupted in mid-2007 is unlikely to leave the Swiss economy unscathed. The export sector, including the banks, will be affected by the slowdown in the international economy. An additional factor is the substantial rise in the value of the Swiss franc over the past few months against the euro and the US dollar. However, we are already in a position to learn quite a bit from the financial market turmoil.
In a financial crisis of these proportions, “outside money” – an asset that is not a liability for anybody else than a central bank – becomes the sole trustworthy store of value. 4 Only a central bank, the monopoly provider of outside money, can respond to the scrambles for liquidity. The ECB injected its funding capacity into a market vacuum left wide open by bank retrenchment, dealer defaults and investor panic. In these conditions, inter-temporal financial arbitrage – of the type I described above – becomes impaired. The power of banks and dealers to engage in or finance inter-temporal trades of liquidity balances is degraded. So the main conduit of monetary policy – which depends on those trades – is lost. The ECB had to open a new channel, the “liquidity channel”, to get round the roadblocks facing the interest rate channel (see slide 4). More precisely, the ECB acted in two dimensions. It sought to alleviate the difficulties experienced by banks in getting liquidity from the interbank market, which was putting pressure on the assets side of banks’ balance sheets and increasing the risks of hindering credit supply. At the same time, it sought to restore the normal pass-through from short-term money market (lending) rates to other market and bank interest rates.

In this context, it is a logical next step that supervisory colleges encompassing home and host central banks and regulators from this region cooperate in having a greater input in the Basel Committee’s deliberations. Not only will this make everyone more aware of the variety of banking practices that exist in this region, but in conferring together at a senior level, during and between college meetings, central bankers and supervisors will secure a reasonable agreement between all parties as the best course on Basel III implementation. The National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia continues to be committed to the adoption of the principles and frameworks contained in the Basel guidance papers. In adopting this commitment we take care that implementation is adjusted to our circumstances. In order for individual rules not to harm the bank business in hand specifically, and the economy in general, overall regulation should allow the wise exercise of judgement or discretion by the banks applying it and by the regulator overseeing that application. I wish you, the European Banking Federation Associates’, a successful Meeting today and a pleasant stay in the Republic of Macedonia. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
3  The unemployed also includes people who have been offered work starting within three months, assuming that they would have been able to work on the date of the survey or to start within 14 days. 4  Open unemployment is a definition used by the Swedish Public Employment Service to refer to jobseekers who are actively looking for work, who are able to enter the labour market immediately, and who are not participating in a labour market policy programme. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, it is not certain how actual unemployment is to be defined if the intention is to measure the spare capacity of the labour market. Youth unemployment can be taken as an example. In October 2007, Statistics Sweden went over to reporting unemployment according to an internationally-established standard. Full-time students who have looked for work and could have worked were now reported as unemployed. This change meant that unemployment in the age group 15–24 increased strongly, even though this group’s main activity was studying. The number of people unemployed in relation to the number of people in the labour force in the category young people was about 25 per cent in 2010. Using the previous reporting method, unemployment would have been 15 per cent.5 For total unemployment, the changed method meant that measured unemployment increased by about 2 percentage points. Neither is it clear how individuals participating in labour market policy programmes should be classified.

This means that resource utilisation, measured in terms of GDP, can increase or decrease without there being any simultaneous change in unemployment. Neither is it certain, after companies have decided to increase or decrease employment, that this will be reflected by changes in aggregate unemployment. As the size of the labour force also varies, for cyclical reasons among others, the level of unemployment will depend on the extent to which individuals leave, remain in or enter the labour market. … but the connection is not stable Monetary policy is forward-looking and must be based on forecasts. The practical conditions for forecasting actual unemployment are made more difficult by changes, over time, in the historical relationship between economic activity and the development of the labour market. During the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the Riksbank was surprised (as were other analysts) to see that unemployment did not increase more, considering the steep fall in  5  AKU, 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  output in the Swedish economy. The Swedish labour market coped comparatively well, both in comparison with how it is usually affected by falls in GDP and in comparison with developments in many other countries.6 The former point is illustrated by Figure 1.
A case in point is that in Portugal, where non-financial companies have a sort of single window to report the data required by the main Portuguese authorities (Tax Agency, National Statistical Institute, Mercantile Register, Central Bank). In particular, our neighbour has been able to build a single data platform to which every authority can subsequently resort to obtain the information they are entitled to access. I have seen that in the Spanish National Statistical Plan (PEN) for next year there is a reference to a project setting up a “Sistema Integrado de Información de las Empresas”, which I think is along the same lines. It could then contribute to significantly reducing firms’ reporting burden in the future. As concerns financial information, we should also be open to more efficient financial reporting and statistical production at the Banco de España and the ESCB level. The Banco de España is very much committed to this goal. In fact, we already have a strategy to simplify and rationalise regulatory reporting that is starting to bear results. The main aim is to alleviate the reporting burden and to improve data management by institutions and by the Banco de España itself. 7  On top of that, various initiatives have been taken as part of the Banco de España’s Strategic Plan (which runs to 2024) dealing with data management and transparency.

Opening up our data for analysis / transparency The current statistical revolution has gone hand in hand with substantial progress in empirical economics and modelling. Some years ago, macro literature often relied on representative agent models. That was a natural consequence of computational limitations. However, the aggregation of individual behaviour does not in general coincide with the behaviour of one average individual. That’s why this literature is now moving towards models with heterogeneous agents (each with distinct behaviour and a distinct reaction to policies), which allows not only for a more accurate representation of the economy, but also for the analysis of distributional issues, such as inequality. For such sophisticated analysis, detailed micro information is key. This is also true for empirical economics, and in particular for the evaluation of economic policies. Many policies target very specific groups of agents according to some individual- or location-specific characteristics. Moreover, one must take into account that the effects of policies depend on many individual features as well as on other contextual issues. Those two factors notably increase the heterogeneity of the effects of such measures. As a consequence, access to  3  massive data that do not limit the scope of the analysis on account of small sample biases is key for the evaluation of economic policies.
Precisely in relation to the recovery in credit flows, I will focus in the rest of my address on the task at the forefront of the Banco de España’s priorities: the reform and strengthening of our banking system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In 2012, in accordance with the regulations approved in the February–May period that year, banks undertook a major provisioning drive; and the Memorandum of Understanding and the financial assistance facility of up to € billion were negotiated with the European authorities. The effort by banks focused, above all, on setting aside provisions to strengthen the coverage of loans to the real estate development and construction sector and of foreclosures. Moreover, in keeping with the Memorandum, banks under restructuring or resolution were obliged to transfer to Sareb, at an agreed price, the assets belonging to the above-mentioned balance sheets segments. As a result of this transfer, and bearing in mind the write-downs made, Spanish banks’ exposure to these risks has been drastically reduced, from € billion as at end-2011 to € billion at end-2012. Alongside the most notable clean-up and provisioning drive, a recapitalisation and restructuring strategy was applied based on the analysis of balance sheets and on the tests based on stressed macroeconomic scenarios which concluded a year ago.

Luis M Linde: Profile of Professor Nicholas Bloom – winner of the XII Germán Bernácer Prize Opening remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XII Germán Bernácer Prize Ceremony, Madrid, 24 September 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen It is a great pleasure for me to introduce this award ceremony for the 12th Germán Bernácer Prize. First of all, let me once again thank the organizers and sponsors of the Prize. They have established an excellent programme to support economic research in the fields of macroeconomics, monetary policy, and financial economics. This is the 10th time that the Bernácer Prize award ceremony has taken place at the Banco de España. The continued support and backing of this initiative of the Observatory of the European Central Bank by the Banco de España is justified by its conviction of the importance of macroeconomic research, insofar as it concerns the functions to be performed by the European System of Central Banks. By recognizing the relevance of a prize like this, which has been awarded, in every instance, on the basis of academic excellence, the Banco de España reaffirms its commitment to economic research. As many of you know, this Prize commemorates a distinguished Spanish macroeconomist who worked at the Banco de España, as director of its Research Department, during the 1930s. Despite the isolation of the Spanish economics profession at that time, Germán Bernácer obtained substantial international recognition for his research contributions.