samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
An improved solution, called “Straks 2.0”, was introduced in 2020 and is used by all the banks. Straks 2.0 is a clear advance on the previous solution. Before Straks 2.0, the payee’s account was credited before interbank settlement had been completed. The payee’s bank ran the risk that the funds from the payer’s bank might not arrive as agreed. For all practical purposes, this risk has now been removed, with liquidity set aside at the central bank to guarantee settlement. Although the removal of settlement risk is a positive step, this is not enough. The real-time payment infrastructure must be further developed. Today, real-time payments are made almost exclusively between private individuals, through Vipps and online banking. The infrastructure must better facilitate payments for businesses and the public sector. It must also allow for more innovation of services on top of this infrastructure. Solutions both in the infrastructure and in banks must be established in line with international messaging standards. Like several other central banks, Norges Bank is considering whether to expand its role as payment system operator. We are now exploring whether real-time payments should be settled directly in Norges Bank. This would give us greater opportunities to influence developments. 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Two alternatives for real-time settlement in Norges Bank are being considered. The first alternative is to establish a system whereby Norges Bank is itself responsible for management, development and operation. The second is to join the Eurosystem’s TIPS solution.

In other words, whilst these may be a set of more or less necessary conditions for market development, they are unlikely to prove sufficient. However good the infrastructure may be, it is the issuers, investors and financial intermediaries which eventually determine whether there is a active market or not. Here in Hong Kong the debt market has grown significantly in the recent past, and the increase in issues by non-financial corporates has been encouraging. But we cannot escape the fact that we are still a relatively small market and that, despite the increases in primary issuance, secondary activity remains subdued. “So”, people ask me, “what is the Hong Kong Monetary Authority going to do about it?” In fact I am not particularly comfortable with the implied presumption that we should be the first port of call when any problems or deficiencies are identified. Thus, while I should like to take this opportunity to explain what we are in fact doing or intending to do, I want also to indicate what, in my view, we cannot or should not do. We are involved in the working group established by the Securities and Futures Commission to review Hong Kong’s laws and regulations relating to offers of securities. Over the years, several of the procedures have become outdated or have failed adequately to accommodate market innovations. In some instances they are an obstacle to bond market development. There are some complex legal and administrative issues here, which will take time to address.
Say that the banks’ lending rate increases by 2 percentage points from 4 to 6 per cent and, as in the other examples, our households have variable interest rates. It is becoming increasingly common that households borrow at a variable interest rate. At the beginning of the 2000s, one quarter of all mortgages were at variable interest rates, now the figure is one half. This situation means that changes in interest rates have a faster and increasingly severe impact on households with a high level of indebtedness. For our household in Upplands Väsby, interest expenditure would increase by just over SEK 2,000 per month, or by 4.6 per cent of disposable income, given our assumptions in general. For our households in Luleå, interest expenditure would increase by almost SEK 1,300, which corresponds to 3.3 per cent of disposable income. For our highly-indebted Stockholm household, the effect is much greater, of course, namely SEK 4,600 per month after tax, which is 8.4 per cent of disposable income. To summarise, there are thus several measures that could be taken to influence households’ incentives to take loans. With regard to the countercyclical capital buffers, the rough calculations I have presented indicate that they would need to be raised quite a lot more than the 2.5 per cent we have estimated to have the same effect on households as an interest rate raise of 2 percentage points. But as I pointed out, increased capital adequacy requirements are of course important and reasonable in themselves as they strengthen the banks’ resilience.

Exactly how the problems will take shape can vary, but it is almost always a question of some sector having become “over-leveraged”, which sooner or later leads to problems. Here I will assume that it is household indebtedness that is the main problem. At some stage, it becomes evident that the credit boom and the increased indebtedness have been based on too optimistic expectations and calculations. A lot more people will want to sell rather than buy the asset that formed the basis for the credit expansion and its price therefore falls. Let us assume that, as with the most recent crisis, it mainly concerns housing. The banks become cautious and reduce their lending, as the value of the collateral declines. Households’ assets have now fallen in value substantially, but the size of the loans remains unchanged. To attain a better balance between assets and debts, households reduce their consumption and begin to save. In addition to the fact that the credit supply declines as a result of the banks becoming more cautious, the demand for loans also declines. This adjustment in households’ balance sheets gives a fall in demand, which in practice has often proved fairly prolonged.3 This process often leads to a substantial weakening in public finances, too, partly because of the rapid decline in economic activity and partly because the banking system may in a worst case scenario require support. This development means that the business cycle and the financial cycle take a simultaneous downturn, as in Figure 1.
I urge more financial institutions to come onboard these internship programmes, so that we can more purposefully build a strong Singaporean talent pipeline for the financial sector. JOB RETENTION THROUGH UPSKILLING  https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/gearing-up-for-new-and-evolving-jobs-in-financial-services  15/18  04/12/2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authorit…  The third dimension of our jobs and skills agenda is job retention – to keep the existing workforce employable and relevant through continuous upskilling. We are going about this task in a systematic and rigorous manner. First, MAS and IBF conducted a detailed study on the impact of automation and data analytics over the next 3-5 years on job tasks and skills needs across 121 job roles in the financial sector. This study helped prioritise our eﬀorts in working with FIs to reskill and redeploy 5,300 employees in consumer banking, insurance, and operations, whose jobs were identified as likely to change significantly. To-date, 1,700 workers have completed their training and have been successfully redeployed into new jobs, probably avoiding retrenchments that might otherwise have taken place. Next, MAS and IBF worked with SkillsFuture Singapore to develop a skills framework for financial services, building on IBF’s competency standards for the skills required in financial sector jobs. This framework has become the reference standard for jobs and skills in the financial services sector. What does this mean?

Mr President, no company can sustainably grow if it does not provide mechanisms by which employees can influence their working lives. Labour is more than a commodity. Unlike non-living factors of production, such as, machinery and raw materials, the work of human beings raises questions about the impact of work and work relations. As you review your collective agreement frameworks, I wish to remind you that there are a lot of common interests and important interdependencies between employers and employees despite the apparent conflicting interests. For instance firms need workers and workers need jobs. Ladies and gentlemen, there can be no true bargaining without prudent and effective leadership on either side of the table. This kind of leadership is required for us to achieve our collective objectives. We are desirous of seeing a Union leadership, which is well-informed and constantly upgrading their leadership skills for the attainment of organisational goals and workers welfare. In conclusion, I wish to once again implore you to actively participate and take a keen interest in the deliberations of this Forum. It is my expectation that you will have an opportunity to carry out an appraisal of your individual and collective skills and how they impact upon the job market and workers welfare in the financial sector. With these remarks, Ladies and Gentleman, I declare this Forum officially open. I Thank You  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
31  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  31  Table 2: Regressions of investment, R&D and productivity on UK-listed firms’ mark-ups Investment rate  Innovation rate  Log TFP  Log labour productivity  0.095*** (0.027)  0.023*** (0.009)  0.097*** (0.026)  -0.036 (0.045)  -0.041** (0.017)  -0.018** (0.008)  0.162*** (0.014)  0.041 (0.034)  -0.002 (0.006)  -0.000 (0.002)  -0.054*** (0.005)  -0.022** (0.013)  -0.011 (0.012)  -0.007** (0.003)  0.005 (0.006)  0.019 (0.013)  0.018 (0.012)  0.009*** (0.003)  -0.010** (0.004)  -0.018 (0.014)  Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  N  21874  7386  28371  21268  0.058  0.057  0.305  0.054  Log mark-up Log mark-up squared TFP distance Log mark-up * TFP distance (interaction term) Log mark-up squared * TFP distance (interaction term)  R  2  Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bank calculations. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 In regressions associated with columns 1 and 2, lagged Tobin’s Q and the lagged sales-to-assets ratio were included as controls. In regressions associated with columns 3 and 4, the terms involving TFP distance are lagged by one year. ‘Investment rate’ defined as capital expenditure as a proportion of the previous year’s net property, plant and equipment level (PPE).

6  BIS Review 65/2009  Conclusion While Maltese banks have been spared the full impact of the financial crisis, in the years ahead they will be operating in an environment that is likely to have changed as a result of the crisis. Our banks, too, will face tougher regulation, higher capital requirements and, perhaps, also scarcer funding. They will have to strengthen their capacity to manage risk and growth itself. The small size of the domestic market, moreover, will require them to be more innovative and outward looking, exploiting the opportunities of the Single Market and of Malta’s strategic location on the EU’s southernmost frontier. Only in this way will they be able to compete and continue to play a vital role in support of a modernising and growing economy. BIS Review 65/2009  7
A factor that may have contributed to the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices being smaller after the Asian and Russian crises is that importers turned away from traditional trading partners in the United States, for instance, in favour of countries whose currencies have not appreciated against the krona. Our imports from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, for example, have increased markedly since 1995. It is conceivable that the krona’s depreciation at the time of the Asian and Russian crises has been exaggerated because the TCW index measures the exchange rate against the most important industrialised countries and uses weights based on export and import shares from 1989-90. In order to throw light on this, we have constructed a simple, broader preliminary import-weighted index that covers 44 countries. The results again show that the krona was weak in 1998 and 1999 but not as weak as the TCW index indicated. One reason why the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices became smaller than expected may have to do with changes in the composition of imports. There are, however, also reasons for supposing that the krona’s direct pass-through to inflation has decreased. Simple estimations indicate a marked reduction in the early 1990s, followed by some further fall (Fig. 2). A variety of factors may have contributed to this. •  Exchange rate movements, upwards or downwards, may now be perceived as a more transient phenomenon, whereas the devaluations under the fixed exchange rate regime were regarded as more permanent.

We now have the same policy commitment to price stability as the rest of the world. That leaves around 40 per cent of the depreciation to account for. Our work at the Riksbank suggests that in the 1970s and ’80s, the major part of the real exchange rate’s weakening can be attributed to deteriorating terms of trade, low GDP and productivity growth compared with the rest of the world and growing external debt. One of the models we have used indicates that about three-quarters of the depreciation stemmed from relatively poorer growth in Sweden and about a quarter to worsening terms of trade. The picture in the 1990s looks different. As far as we can tell at present, in the past decade neither productivity nor GDP growth has been poorer than in the rest of the world (Fig. 1). So in this respect, too, there seems to have been a change for the better. It is partly against this background that the krona’s persistently weak average path in the latter part of the 1990s is surprising. BIS Review 75/2001  3  Fig 1.
By end 2008, savings in the stabilization fund (FRR) , totaled DA 4113 billion ( equivalent to $ billion);  •  domestically financing the economy’s large investments, in the context of excess saving rates over investment rates;  •  developing the bond segment of the financial market, with access limited to domestic investors;  •  Advancing the restructuring of the banking sector following failure and bankruptcy of small private banks which resulted in withdrawing their licences over 2003-2006 while compensating depositors through the Deposits Guarantee Fund. The strengthened macroeconomic stability, as evidenced by subdued inflation (4.4 % in 2008 despite the surge in world commodity prices) and a real exchange rate of the Dinar near its equilibrium level, as well as important foreign exchange reserves $ billion, by end 2008) and low external debt, have constituted sound safeguards against the inherent shocks of the current international financial crisis. In addition, indirect monetary policy instruments (deposit auctions, marginal deposit facility, …) have been successfully used to limit the impact of structural excess liquidity on inflation. Although the direct contagion impact of the international financial crisis on the Algerian banking system is limited, in view of its small exposure to international financial markets, increased attention is directed to further strengthening and preserving its soundness. In this regard, the required minimum capital for banks and financial institutions have recently been substantially increased to strengthen their resilience and increase their lending capacity.

(e) Payment systems The Governing Council endorsed a list of eligible securities settlement systems following an assessment of such systems against standards that had previously been laid down for their use in the credit operations of the ESCB. The list, which indicates those securities settlement systems that will be used by the ESCB and the conditions for their use, will be set out in the “General Documentation”, to which I have already referred. In addition, the Governing Council approved a report on the “Assessment of EU securities settlement systems against the standards for their use in ESCB credit operations”. It is intended to release this report during the next couple of weeks. BIS Review 72/1998
Things did not end well for Johan Palmstruch. There were no rules to limit the loans that could be issued by the bank, and Stockholms Banco’s loans far outstripped the value of the copper and silver held by the bank. Confidence in the banknotes began to evaporate, and their value fell. Demand to redeem the banknotes for copper and silver was high, but Stockholms Banco did not have enough metal to meet the demand, and Sweden experienced its first banking crisis. The bank was declared bankrupt and was liquidated. Johan Palmstruch was sentenced to death for irresponsible accounting. The death sentence was subsequently commuted, but Palmstruch had to spend the rest of his life in prison. Nonetheless, the Stockholms Banco crisis left a permanent legacy: in 1668, the authority to conduct banking operations was transferred to a bank that was later to become the Riksbank, under the direct control of the Swedish parliament, Riksdagen.1 The world’s first central bank was born.2  What is money? So what is money exactly? The simple answer is that money is a means of payment. It is also a universally recognised common unit of account. Money has therefore a key role in all financial transactions – it is a practical means of assigning value to goods and services and of settling trades. To perform these functions, money must have a fairly stable value. People will only accept money as payment if they believe it can be used again as a method of payment in the future.

This has a direct bearing on ensuring financial stability. But because Basel II is developed from the current practice among banks in developed countries, some banks in emerging markets may have a large gap to fill. For example, in moving away from collateralbased to credit-based loan approval, banks must focus more on the ability to pay of customers and to make loan decisions in a forward looking manner. This requires a different set of expertise that focuses on risk assessment in the environment changing economic cycle and asset quality. (ii)  Information system and resource and capacity building  Next is the information system which is the most important foundation for achieving financial stability through capital adequacy. Whereas developed countries generally already have in place the necessary infrastructure in this regard, financial institutions in emerging countries have to build the system from the ground up, involving areas such as data collection, storage, analysis, and ways to effectively embed the information in the decision making process. This step may take more time and effort because it involves building a knowledge base for quantitative analytical skills and ability to apply international best practices to the unique local settings of emerging market. (iii)  Involvement of stakeholders  Another difficulty in Basel II implementation is that other players in the wider financial industry will be playing more active role in the banking sector’s risk assessment.
Back then employment could be generated through the reduction in wage costs that a devaluation entailed and thanks to the improvement in competitiveness that immediately came about in companies. But this formula is no longer viable, and thankfully so, because the benefits for Spain of being part of the euro far outweigh those of retaining the peseta in the long run. But if we accept this constraint now upon us, we must be consistent and accept that this time we can no longer, as we did on several occasions in the past, adjust our competitiveness and, therefore, increase our growth rate without changing our singular institutional framework. And in this forum I should mention the responsibility that large and small firms alike must embrace. With all due diligence they should adopt the organisational reforms and adapt their working procedures so as to enable them to use as soon as possible all the changes introduced into our legal and institutional framework aimed at making hiring easier. Let me move on now to the problems I mentioned at the start of my address. These concern the markets’ doubts, reflected in the higher cost that the Kingdom of Spain has been paying for a year to raise funding. Blaming this on greedy or evil markets would be a waste of time, and might distract us from the fact that these costs can only be reduced if we adopt the domestic measures and reforms needed as soon as possible.

I am convinced that, just as the need for fiscal consolidation or pension reform was ultimately recognised, so too will the unavoidable need to change our legal and institutional framework in such a way as to allow entrepreneurs to increase the supply of jobs and workers to decide whether to take them. In the past 50 years, Spain has made numerous reforms across its economic structure. Tariffs have been lifted and companies privatised, and competition has been fomented in many industries. Yet the institutional framework for employment has remained practically and essentially unchanged since the onset of democracy. Meanwhile, in recent decades, other economies, most notably the Nordic countries, have introduced so-called flexicurity, i.e. they have introduced the flexibility needed to reduce the unemployment rate and to increase wages where productivity is growing most, and they have at the same time maintained and even strengthened the social protection which is a hallmark of our European model of society. Finally, the measures I have mentioned are not the only ones that should be adopted. The reform agenda is an extensive one. For instance, it is essential to reduce administrative burdens, to simplify and coordinate economic regulation, and to alter oligopolistic structures, as was recently recommended by the Competition Board for the case of oil products. We could draw up a very extensive list of measures, but you will understand – and I hope appreciate – that, with limited time at my disposal, I have confined myself to what I consider most important and pressing.
Some of the "old" ones suffer loss of their bread-and-butter business. The outcome in the longer term is unclear. It is conceivable that banks cease to exist as integrated multi-product businesses. They become instead product specialists in a rather fragmented landscape, finding it tough to earn more than commodity profits even in areas where, in the case of the longer established banks, they used to enjoy niche advantages. The other scenario emanates from the same starting point of intense competition. But in this case the new entrants do not have the resources to continue with their generous initial terms for long enough to secure a firm business foundation. The established banks reluctantly but necessarily take on the newcomers aggressively, utilising their financial strength and making extra efforts to build robust relationships across a broad range of services and to exploit the underlying inertia that customers may exhibit. In other words, they use the internet to consolidate their relationships and to see off the competition. Customers are persuaded that it's not worth sacrificing the relationship for the sake of a few basis points. Some customers may be lost, but some of these may anyway be ones which the banks can afford to say goodbye to. As a variant to this model, the banks may adopt different brands for their internet services, exploiting any opportunities available from product differentiation and market segmentation, but retaining the capacity from their standpoint to manage multiple relationships with any individual customer as one. One can envisage many other outcomes besides these examples.

I will conclude by extending my appreciation to the organizing committee for extending me the invitation to this dinner. I wish you a very pleasant and enjoyable evening, and look forward to further strengthening the mutually beneficial relationship between Bank Negara Malaysia and the Persatuan. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 151/2010