samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In conclusion, I would add that a distinctive feature that makes remittances particularly important instruments for the economic development is their relative stability compared to private capital and financial flows. In contrast to financial flows that showed a high volatility during 1990s, remittances continued to flow much more steadily. In terms of the “life cycle” duration of individual remittances, theory holds that the longer the duration of migrant status, the lower the probability of large flows of remittances. This urges us to speed up our efforts to exploit the potential of remittances sooner rather than later. Their immense role calls for new ways of achieving a sustainable growth, a full formalization and higher effectiveness of remittances. Obviously, this is not a battle we can win today. It requires a lot of attention, good will, but also a complete enforcement strategy. Thank you. BIS Review 16/2006  3

Charts 22a to 22f look at different cuts of the data according to: (a) the UK region in which the company is based; (b) the sector in which the company operates; (c) whether the company exports overseas; (d) whether the company is foreign-owned; (e) whether the company has introduced new products and processes in the preceding three years; (f) the size of the firm; and (g) the company’s leverage. 50 51  Andrews et al (2015). With thanks to John Van Reenen for making these data available to us. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  Beginning with the regional picture, it is well-known that there are sharp differences in average productivity across UK regions. 52  For example, the UK’s highest productivity region (London) is around 75% more  productive than its lowest (the North East). Nonetheless, if we look at the regional distribution of productivity, the similarities are more striking than the differences (Chart 22a). Every region has the same long, thin upper tail of frontier companies and a short, fat lower tail of laggard firms. It is true, as a matter of arithmetic, that the upper tail of frontier companies is somewhat larger, and the lower tail of laggards shorter, in London than in, say, the North East. But the key point is that every region has plenty of both types of firm. Regional differences are not the main factor explaining the UK’s long tail of firms nor why this tail is longer in the UK than elsewhere.
The fact that the equilibrium real federal funds rate is likely to be lower for a long time underscores the need for caution in applying the benchmark Taylor Rule as a guide to the appropriate stance of monetary policy. As typically applied, the Taylor Rule assumes an equilibrium real rate of interest of 2 percent. This seems much too high in the current economic environment in which headwinds persist, and somewhat too high even when these headwinds fully dissipate. The next question I wish to consider is how the Fed will likely manage its balance sheet as the taper process is completed and lift-off eventually occurs. Unlike previous normalizations of monetary policy, which only involved the level of short-term rates, this prospective tightening cycle also involves considerations with respect to the size and composition of our balance sheet. The Committee stated in its June 2011 exit principles that changes in shortterm rates will be the primary means for adjusting monetary policy post-liftoff, not discretionary shifts in the balance sheet. In other words, the balance sheet will be set on automatic pilot. I believe this approach still very much applies. However, the language in the June 2011 exit principles concerning agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) sales no longer applies.

To the extent that the overnight RRP rate were set very close or equal to the interest rate on excess reserves (IOER) without caps, then this might result in a large amount of disintermediation out of banks through money market funds and other financial intermediaries into the facility. This could encourage further development of the shadow banking system. If this were deemed undesirable, this would argue for a wider spread between the overnight RRP and the IOER in order to reduce the volume of flows into the facility. The second issue is the facility’s potential impact on financial stability. In particular, would such a facility make financial instability less likely? And, when financial stress did occur, would such a facility amplify or dampen financial strains? On the first point, it seems that such a facility would tend to make financial instability less likely. The overnight RRP facility allows us to make a short-term safe asset more widely available to a broad range of financial market participants. The provision of short-term safe assets by the official sector might crowd out the private creation of runnable money-like liquid assets. This might enhance financial stability by reducing the likelihood of a financial crisis. However, if a financial crisis were to occur, the existence of a full allotment, overnight, RRP facility might exacerbate instability by encouraging runs out of more risky assets into the facility. That is because the supply of a full allotment facility would be completely elastic at the given fixed rate.
3 As measured by the change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance, European Commission (2021),  “European Economic Forecast” – Spring 2021 4 McKinsey (2021), “The future of work after COVID-19”. 5 Bloom, N. et al. (2012), “Really Uncertain Business Cycles”, NBER Working Paper Series, No 18245, National  Bureau of Economic Research, July. 6 Batini, N., di Serio, M., Fragetta, M., Melina, G. and Waldron, A. (2021), “Building Back Better: How Big Are Green  Spending Multipliers?”, IMF Working Papers, No 87, International Monetary Fund, March. 7 Darvas, Z. and Tagliapietra, S. (2021), “Setting Europe’s economic recovery in motion: a first look at national  plans”, Bruegel, 29 April. 8 European Commission (2021), “The euro area”, Flash Eurobarometer 488, May. 80% of thosesurveyed believe  that having the euro is a good thing for the EU and 70% say the same aboutthe euro and their country. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

19% of jobs in EU15 have been threatened by offshoring 24 . It should be noted, however, that for the developed countries this process does not mean losses of jobs. Mankiw and Swagel 25 cite research results, according to which relocation of jobs abroad may be positively linked to an increase in employment in the home country of the relocating company. It stems from the fact that foreign branches do not compete but rather complement the hitherto activity of companies, and thus help to improve effectiveness and quality, and lower costs, which may lead to an increased market for products or services of the given company, what may in turn result in an increase in employment in the home country. It is first of all the countries capable of manufacturing products and rendering services at a competitive price that gain a major advantage in acquiring new investments and creating new jobs. It is worth adding that the growing significance of offshoring has an impact on the distribution of remuneration in the countries, whose participation in the globalisation process is increasing. The wages of unqualified workers from the developed countries are falling, while workers with higher qualifications from countries with lower labour costs are being better rewarded. Labour costs remain an important, although not a sole, factor of investment attractiveness of a given country. In A.T. Kearney’s research 26 countries from our region, i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, are in the top eleven offshoring locations.
Since we began the monetary policy normalization process, we have said that we will conduct this process gradually and cautiously, ensuring that the economy can adapt to a milder monetary stimulus and be on the lookout for changes in macroeconomic conditions that advise adjusting the pace of the process. The recent changes in the international economy and the new inflation measurement associated to the CPI updated belong to this class of changes. True to its commitment, the Bank has thoroughly examined these developments, factoring them into its projections, and has concluded that it is necessary to adjust the expected trajectory of monetary policy. Accordingly, we have put the normalization process on hold for some quarters, in order to allow inflation to go back to a path of convergence. In the same way, faced with the uncertainty regarding the value of the structural parameters on which the monetary policy is based after important economic changes, we have decided to include an update in the June Monetary Policy Report, which will allow us to gauge its future trajectory. These actions attest to the Bank’s commitment to its institutional mission, as well as its vocation to act on the basis of solid evidence and rigorous analysis of background information. In this way, we reflect our purpose of being an institution to which citizens can entrust the protection of price stability and financial stability, as essential determinants of their well-being. Thank you.

35 MAS issued a consultation paper earlier this week with proposals on the safeguards for retail investors in unconventional investment schemes. Let me elaborate here on our thinking and rationale. 36 Many retail consumers have ventured into unconventional and unregulated financial products promising higher yields. But these products may also entail risks that are not well understood by retail investors. MAS has therefore decided to extend to these unconventional products regulatory safeguards that apply to capital markets. 37 In extending boundaries of regulation, we are guided by the need to balance costs and benefits. •  If we take too broad-brush an approach, we could end up regulating all commercial arrangements involving some form of investment return. For example, buying gold jewellery or piece of art that could appreciate in value over time. This will only add to costs without advancing consumer interests. •  But if we craft the regulatory framework too narrowly, products may be deliberately structured to fall outside the regulatory perimeter. For example, restricting regulation to land-banking arrangements will fail to capture other schemes operating on similar premises, such as investments in ostrich farms or in plantations. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  38 Therefore, taking into account market developments in Singapore, MAS will selectively enhance regulatory safeguards for retail investors in buy-back arrangements involving precious metals, which has the same economic effect as borrowing cash from customers; and collectively managed investment schemes. The latter includes land-banking and forestry schemes.
Chart: From fishing to fish farming The nature of the fishing industry has also changed. The fish farming industry is one of our newest growth industries, and more than two-thirds of the supply of seafood now comes from fish farming. Through collaborative efforts in research and product development, fish farming methods have been developed to supply consumers with good-quality farmed salmon, available straight from the supermarket. But fortunately, many Norwegian consumers would say, the traditional tinned fish produced by the factory here in Lofoten for the past 100 years, is only a couple of shelves away. With rich fishing banks right outside the factory door, there is an ample supply of fresh fish. Historically, fishing in Lofoten has been an important source of income for the coastal population. The traditional fishing season at the beginning of the year still attracts fishermen from all over the country, but in numbers far lower than the up to 30 000 who used to take part. For three hectic months from mid-January each year, a variety of visitors, from fishermen and traders to watchmakers, travelling musicians and the odd snake oil salesman used to make their mark on this island community. Lofoten continues to attract visitors today – but now the fishermen’s cabins are filled with tourists. In just a few years, the number of tourist overnight stays in Nordland county has increased by 25 percent, with many visitors making the journey from faraway countries, tempted by the prospect of deep-sea fishing, sea kayaking and hiking.

Market depth measures how thick the central limit order book is at any point in time. If the CLOB is denser and thicker, then a large trade should result in a smaller price concession, everything else equal. Price impact measures how the price of a security changes in response to trades of a given size. To measure liquidity risk, we combine the various measures of liquidity discussed above into a single liquidity index. Large jumps in illiquidity are identified as days in which the liquidity index deteriorates by an unusually large amount. We benchmark this as moves of greater  1  2  Tobias Adrian, Dianne Dobbeck, James Egelhof, Michael Fleming, Joshua Frost, Lorie Logan, Michael McMorrow, Matthew Raskin, Ernst Schaumburg, Katherine Tilghman-Hill, Joseph Tracy and Nathaniel Wuerffel assisted in preparing these remarks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  than two standard deviations. Liquidity risk is calculated as the number of such jumps in illiquidity over a two-year rolling window. Constructed in this manner, we are implicitly assuming that the risk of an illiquidity event in the future is correlated with the frequency of such illiquidity events in the recent past. What does the available evidence show in terms of how liquidity has changed in recent years in the U.S. Treasury and corporate bond markets? With respect to the U.S. Treasury market, we do not find much evidence based on available measures consistent with a significant deterioration in liquidity.
Government debt and inflation Speech given by Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor Monetary Policy 2020 Annual Meeting of the Central Bank Research Association London School of Economics via videolink 2 September 2020  I’ve received helpful comments from colleagues at the Bank of England. I’d like to thank Jack Meaning, Nickie Shadbolt and Ryland Thomas and especially Mette Nielsen for their help in preparing the speech. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Financial Policy Committee or the Monetary Policy Committee. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Good afternoon. Thank you for asking me to speak to you today. This is an important and innovative time for central banks, across their many functions, and it’s vital we learn from our own and others’ research on the big questions. The Bank of England launched its new Agenda for Research1 yesterday and Andy Haldane will I’m sure want to tell you more about it in the panel following this talk. The topic I’ve chosen today certainly isn’t a new one. In fact, it’s almost as old as economics itself. I want to talk about “monetary finance” – what it is (and what it is not), what it’s worth and when it’s been used in the past. Old it may be, but there’s been quite a bit of talk about this topic very recently.

The Board of Governors recently decided to change the rules on required reserves, the first phase of which will enter into force today. The required reserve ratio will be lowered, thereby releasing liquidity for the banking system amounting to 8 b.kr., which ought to enable a reduction in interest rates in the banking system. Further changes are planned later in the year. By law, the Central Bank shall promote an efficient and safe financial system, including payment systems domestically and with foreign countries. Payment systems and securities settlement systems are important components of the financial system, which makes it vital to ensure that they are active and reliable. This may sound like a fairly modest task, but it can be compared to a building that obviously serves its purpose well – we rarely ponder the piping and wiring that are hidden from our sight yet are vital to ensure that the building functions properly. The same can be said of payment systems and settlement systems. The financial system would definitely not be tenable if secure systems for payment intermediation and settlements were not in place. The Central Bank has formulated a policy on these issues with the aim of adjusting Iceland’s systems to international standards. In doing so it has taken particular account of an assessment made by the International Monetary Fund in 2000, on the extent to which Iceland’s payment systems observe the so-called Core Principles. In the IMF’s view, Iceland fulfilled only three of the ten Principles at that time.
Given that the outstanding balances of lending in the short and medium term are not expected to grow in a similar way to how they did in the expansion prior to the crisis and such that they may offset the reduction in net interest income, the recovery in bank profitability will have to be based on the continuing adjustment of expenses, on the search for alternative sources of income and on improved efficiency. 5/8  In any event, in the search for profitable business, banks cannot ease off in their vigilance regarding lending standards. In the current setting, very high rates of credit expansion, as is occurring in the household bank lending segment for the purchase of consumer durables, might be indicative of an easing of risk acceptance and selection standards which, as past experience shows time and time again, ultimately translates into notable increases in nonperforming loans. Despite the limited weight of this business segment in Spanish banks’ overall credit portfolio, the rise in the volume of non-performing assets in this activity as a result of overly rapid credit growth should strike a note of caution: from being an alternative source of income it should not become a potential source of losses.

Would that be appropriate, and would it be feasible from a political perspective? 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I don’t think the answer here is black and white. On the one hand, every central bank has a national mandate. And I don’t think that will change in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, there is already some coordination – at the BIS, at the G7 and at the G20. The latest G20 summit has just ended. Little came of it. Are you disappointed? The summit was clearly overshadowed by events in Syria. I think the fact that the issue of tax avoidance and tax structuring is now being raised at G20 level is a positive development. There was some limited progress in terms of financial regulation. However, I was indeed disappointed by the decisions made in the area of fiscal policy, as the United States and Japan in particular – especially the latter – have no credible medium-term consolidation plans. These are required as a matter of great urgency. You have talked about the reform of the global financial system. Almost exactly five years after Lehman Brothers, where are we exactly? I do think that the global financial system has become more robust. However, it’s quite clear that we are not yet where we should be. Progress is urgently needed on the “too big to fail” issue, which primarily concerns the complexity of these institutions. The second issue is shadow banking. It is true that we have tightened up the regulation of banks.
The increase in public investment and spending had mainly contributed to the economic growth of the last semesters; their drop could weigh on the recovery even if the calibration and the path of fiscal adjustment are supposed to be fine-tuned to allow a sustainable fiscal consolidation without challenging a long-lasting economic recovery. Strong and unambiguous responses from European governments and the Eurosystem In such a context, the role of central banks and public authorities was crucial to restore confidence and ensure a proper functioning of financial markets. Drawing on the lessons learnt from the financial crisis in 2008–09, European governments and the Eurosystem have therefore rapidly resorted to strong, unprecedented and sizeable actions to contain those tensions and prevent their spill over to the real economy. We could briefly mention the actions of the Heads of States and the central banks. Government actions helped contain the pressures 1)  I first welcome the commitments from many European countries to strengthen their fiscal position which is a necessary step to restore the credibility of governments and the normalization of sovereign bond markets.

They may not be efficient since security prices are not formed in national contexts but on global markets. What would not be possible in Paris or Frankfurt could still be allowed in London or New York for instance. They may also be counterproductive since they could deter activities away from our market onto others and they could significantly alter the liquidity of securities aimed by the restriction since foreign investors may shy away from them and turn to other opportunities. Let me be clear, though, this does not mean that nothing should be done. On the contrary, I believe that instead of banning and creating incentives to relocate certain activities elsewhere or circumvent those rules, it is preferable to attract and better supervise. This can be done: -  First by integrating OTC markets into regulated and supervised market infrastructures such as trading platforms, trade repositories and CCPs. In the case of sovereign CDS this will mean that all CDS written on euro area sovereigns should be compensated in a CCP located in the euro area. Incidentally, that requires a fair amount of standardization of these single name CDS. -  Second, by enhancing transparency, both ex ante and ex post to improve our understanding of the price discovery mechanism and our knowledge of actual net positions of financial institutions. 4  BIS Review 84/2010  -  Finally, by improving risk management by agents active in these markets and ensuring that these practices are compatible with their risk profile.
Credit risk One purpose of the method we use to determine the currency allocation is to limit the need for very liquid assets, for earnings reasons. It is not possible to exclude these assets entirely. This is because we need very liquid assets in the important intervention currencies if we are to be able to intervene. A fairly large part of our assets must therefore consist of US and European government bonds. As I mentioned earlier, our need of this type of asset is limited under the current exchange rate regime. This gives us scope to invest some of our assets in securities with credit risks 10 , which provide higher interest. Assuming that the assets’ yield does not covary perfectly, this can raise the risk-adjusted earnings 11 . However, the Riksbank’s possibilities to make use of this are limited, as we currently invest solely in fixed-income securities. The covariation between different fixed-income securities is relatively high, regardless of whether they contain different degrees of credit risk. It should also be emphasised that an investment in credit bonds makes considerable demands of risk management, analysis and capital adequacy, in addition to that captured in risk measures such as volatility calculated on historical earnings. It is therefore also important to maintain a high degree of diversification within the credit risk segment by spreading investment over several different issuers and sectors. Our internal regulations give us relatively large scope to choose between different fixed-income asset types.

3 Official Norwegian Reports NOU 2017:13 New central bank act. Organisation of Norges Bank and the  Government Pension Fund Global (Summary in English). 4 Lie, E., J. T. Kobberrød, E. Thomassen and G. F. Rongved (2016): Norges Bank 1816–2016. Fagbokforlaget (in  Norwegian only). 5 Between 31 December 2007 and 31 December 2009, the average stake in listed companies worldwide  doubled. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches