samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If a shock is sufficiently large, the financial network may consequently act as a conduit for transmitting rather than absorbing risk. So the flip side of greater integration is that it may have lowered the frequency but increased the magnitude of potential financial crises. 1 3 Improving the toolkit for financial stability analysis is consequently a very high priority for public authorities and for major financial institutions. Enhancing the capability to model the financial system under stress is the key challenge. 4 In recent years, many central banks and supervisory agencies, charged with the public policy goal of supporting the maintenance of financial stability, have sought to develop a socalled “top down” or “macro” stress-testing capability. Utilising information on balance sheet exposures, the authorities draw on macroeconomic and financial models to try to assess the impact of adverse shocks on the financial system. Several inter-related high level objectives can perhaps be set for an “ideal” stress test: •  To assess the vulnerability of the financial system to extreme but plausible shocks  •  To improve the understanding of the transmission of shocks through the financial system (and, in a worst case, the potential propagation of financial crises)  •  To identify “weak spots” in the financial system, to guide risk reduction priorities and crisis management planning  1  Systemic risk in modern financial systems: analytics and policy design by Prasanna Gai, Nigel Jenkinson and Sujit Kapadia, Journal of Risk Finance Vol8, No2, 2007.

When operational, such distributions should help guide judgements on how overall financial system vulnerability is changing. But the approach should also provide considerable additional information on pressure points within the system and on the channels of transmission and potential contagion. 14 I believe that this broad approach offers an important step forwards in the development of an analytically and empirically robust framework for financial stability work. Of course it is analytically hugely challenging – modelling non-linear tail events with endogenous strategic interactions is always going to be tough! The results will inevitably be subject to major uncertainty. But the approach does start to provide a consistent and coherent framework which should substantially improve the value of top-down stress tests and of risk assessment work. 15 A particular “operational” aim is to use the results to help improve the focus of risk reduction work and crisis management planning, for example through the identification of  BIS Review 81/2007  7  “weak points” in the financial system and through improved assessment of the impact of policy interventions. An important element of risk reduction work is to influence the behaviour of financial firms. “Bottom-up” or firm-level stress-testing practices have developed rapidly in recent years. But one challenge is that, as for the authorities, it is hard for individual firms to gauge the likely “systemic impact” of particular shocks, which takes into account macro and financial system interactions and feedback effects.
6 7  The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review or CCAR. Dent and Westwood (2016) includes a comparison of international concurrent stress-testing practices. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Balance Sheet Impact So what has been the impact of these regulatory reform measures on banks’ overall resilience? One simple set of resilience metrics focusses on bank balance sheet measures of solvency and liquidity. Comparisons of international banks’ balance sheets are made difficult by changes over time in both the definitions of variables and the sample of banks. We consider a panel of international banks, designated as either global systemically-important (G-SIB) by the FSB in 2016, or domestic systemically-important (D-SIB). This gives a panel of 30 G-SIBs and about 160 D-SIBs.8 For each bank, we consider two solvency-based metrics (leverage and risk-weighted capital) and two liquidity-based metrics (a simple liquid asset ratio and the ratio of loans to deposits). These measures do not map precisely to Basel definitions.9 Chart 4 looks at a measure of banks’ Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratios. For both G-SIBs and D-SIBs in our sample, these have risen significantly over the past decade, almost doubling from around 7-8% to around 13-14%. A very similar picture emerges for leverage ratios (Chart 5). These have also roughly doubled over the past decade, from around 3% to around 6%. On these metrics, there has been a material strengthening in solvency-based standards among systemically-important banks over the past decade.

Accession of new Member States to the EU and EMU Twelve countries from central, eastern and southern Europe are currently negotiating accession to the EU. According to the calendar endorsed by the European Council, new accessions will take place as st from the 1 of January 2004. It provides further evidence, if such were necessary, of the attractiveness of the European framework, which has provided us with both political stability and economic progress for almost half a century. The accession countries have accomplished significant progress in stabilising and strengthening their economies and institutions. Observing the accession countries since the beginning of the nineties, we see the huge improvements that these countries have made, in barely 10 years, on the road towards convergence with the EU. Nevertheless, there is also a general agreement on the fact that the gap in terms of average GDP per capita between the accession countries and the euro area, although diminishing, still remains quite significant. On average, GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity is around 44% of that of the euro area, while in terms of current exchange rates it is only around 22%. The size of the gap, combined with the limited growth differentials between the two groups of countries, suggests that the process of real convergence will be very gradual and will have to continue far beyond the tentative dates for EU accession.
With respect to electronic commerce, NCCUSL and the ALI have established a drafting committee that will recommend changes to the general definition provisions of the UCC located in Article 1. The drafting committee’s mandate is broad: consider and draft revisions and additions to Article 1 in light of developments since its adoption. One of the most significant developments that has occurred since the adoption of Article 1 is the shift from paper to electronic media. At a minimum, therefore, it is expected that Article 1 will be revised to recognize the validity of electronic signatures and electronic writings. Another effort rapidly proceeding under the auspices of NCCUSL and the ALI is a new UCC article on licenses which will govern not only traditional software contracts but any license of information (for example, books, movies, databases). In the process of addressing concerns unique to the information industry, the drafters have considered issues, such as electronic contracting, that every industry will likely need to consider. For example, the February 1998 draft of Article 2B provides that a “record” cannot be denied legal effect solely on the grounds that it is electronic. Article 2B also addresses the use of “attribution procedures” as a signature substitute in an electronic commerce environment. In this regard, Article 2B, as currently drafted, largely mirrors the concept of commercially reasonable security procedures found in Article 4A of the UCC governing funds transfers.

I challenge each of you to use this opportunity not just to recite your company’s or your agency’s views but to listen to the ideas and concerns of other conference participants and incorporate them into both public and private policy initiatives. BIS Review 26/1998
As of late June, the annual decline in actual registrations is estimated to have eased, such that the level of actual registrations was 11.4% down on the figure a year earlier. Should the epidemiological situation not change significantly, the recovery observed in Q2 will continue over the summer and give rise to high quarter-on-quarter growth in Q3. Nonetheless, interpreting this growth calls for caution, since we should not lose sight of the fact that the level of activity will continue to be significantly below that observed prior to the pandemic breaking, such that the process of recovery will be far from complete. We can thus talk of an incomplete recovery, using the first of the three adjectives I referred to at the start of my address. The conditioning factors I mention for the short-term outlook to materialise - the absence of any material changes in the course of the pandemic in Spain - are no minor matter. Indeed, economic developments would be adversely affected in the coming months, perhaps severely so, if the outbreaks seen in recent weeks in different territories after the easing of the restrictions on movement could not be controlled with local-level and temporary measures. Accordingly, health-related uncertainties will persist for some time until effective treatment for the illness or widespread access to a vaccine against the virus are achieved. Moreover, the doubts over economic developments in the coming quarters are not confined to the health area.

It is for this reason that we are gathered here today as stakeholders to share information on the progress to date and to adopt a strategic implementation framework for the work that remains to be done. Distinguished Guests, the tremendous support of the various stakeholders to the agenda of the FSDP cannot go unnoticed. The technical and financial support provided by a number of our development partners, including the Swedish Government, the World Bank, IMF, DFID, the United States Treasury and FIRST Initiative have gone a long way in slowly but surely making this vision a reality. The Bank of Zambia and the Government are, therefore, most indebted to our cooperating partners for helping us build capacity in our financial sector. Honourable Minister, the support of stakeholders from financial and other institutions on the various working groups has also been instrumental in facilitating the implementation of various FSDP activities. Further, the coordinating role of the FSDP Secretariat, anchored by the Bank of Zambia, has been key to the implementation of the FSDP. For this reason, we at the Bank of Zambia hope that the same level of technical, financial, material and morale support will be accorded to Phase II of the programme by all stakeholders. Ladies and Gentlemen, in recognising the critical role played by various stakeholders represented here, the work of the FSDP has, by design, taken a consultative approach in the identification of priority areas, formulation of strategies and the design of implementation frameworks.
The irony, of course, is that this country itself will not be a part of that first wave. That is a disappointment to some, but a relief to others - a point I’ll come back to - but, whatever view one takes about that, no-one, I think, can fail to recognise the huge achievement of all those who have laboured, with such determination, for so long, and against formidable difficulties, to bring the venture to this point, and I take my hat off to them. In the circumstances, Mr Chairman, I could hardly choose to speak about anything else this morning. The advent of the euro, on this broad basis, will, of course, have profound effects on financial activity, and on both providers and consumers of financial services, all around the world - including in our Mediterranean partner countries. And I should like to take this momentous development, in the broader context of the evolution of the European Union, as my theme. I recognise at the outset that the EU is, fundamentally, about politics, inspired by the need to ensure that Europe is never again devastated by war. I am only too happy to leave the debate about what that implies for the political organisation of Europe - including the relationship between European institutions and the individual member states - to the politicians. My interest is in the economic dimension of Europe - though I realise of course that economics and politics can’t in practice be separated quite as neatly as this distinction suggests.

The “economics” of Europe starts from familiar arguments in favour of free trade and competition as the most effective means of ensuring that productive resources are efficiently deployed, promoting specialisation in areas of comparative advantage - and thereby satisfying consumer demands more effectively and increasing aggregate, macro-economic, welfare. These arguments apply, in principle quite generally - as much to international trade and competition as to regional trade and competition or indeed to trade and competition within individual national markets. The macro-economic benefits are less immediately obvious at the micro-economic level. Existing activity is threatened by greater competition, and there is a natural temptation - to employees, their employers and their national governments - to seek to defend their established activity through protective action in one form or another. The benefits of greater competition, and of the removal of barriers or distortions to free trade, on the other hand, flow essentially from the future activity that is likely to result - so that they are much less tangible. And the benefits - anyway in the short-term - do not necessarily accrue evenly across the free trade area - they accrue to those that are flexible and adaptable enough to take advantage of the new opportunities that free trade offers.
However, it remains stronger than expected, mainly supported by private consumption, with households continuing to spend their stock of savings, strong and widespread jobs growth and unemployment at very low levels. In addition, the inflation path may be conditioned by the end of the zero-COVID policy in China and the subsequent reopening of the Chinese economy. Once the surge in infections has passed, the Chinese economy will foreseeably regain dynamism supported by consumption, amid a recovery in mobility and the more contact-intensive activities, along with the release of pent-up demand. Although there is much uncertainty about the extent of this reopening, in January the IMF revised up China's GDP growth outlook for 2023 by 0.8 pp to 5.4%. This growth will have an impact on global economic activity and inflation. Increased Chinese demand will boost euro area activity through the exports channel and thus also drive inflation. In addition, China will exert significant inflationary pressures on energy commodities and metals, as it is one of the world's largest consumers of these items. IMF staff estimated that Chinese domestic demand rising by 1 pp of GDP would lead to an increase in oil prices of almost 10% and in metals prices of between 6% and 12% over a one-year horizon. 12 An increase in China’s gas consumption could also have a particularly strong impact on gas prices, taking into account that China played a very significant dampening role in 2022, when its demand for liquefied natural gas declined by 20%.

Indeed, the growth rate of real nonfinancial corporate bonds outstanding during this expansion has been roughly similar to that of previous expansions (Figure 7). A similar pattern is evident in the commercial paper market (Figure 8). Notwithstanding the robust performance of debt markets during this expansion, the sharper decline in outstanding bank loans to businesses that I mentioned earlier was likely a contributing factor to the slower economic recovery we have observed this time around. These developments appear to have had adverse consequences on the cost and availability of credit for bank-dependent borrowers. Also, in the early years of this recovery, bankdependent firms appear to have deleveraged more and invested less than firms with access to capital markets. So, the impairment of banks’ ability to extend credit still has the potential to hinder investment and adversely affect the overall economy. We see similar correlations when it comes to lending to households. The expansion in auto lending that commenced in 2010 coincided with a recovery in auto sales, which have now essentially regained the ground they lost during the recession. Until recent quarters, overall consumption growth has been slow, consistent with a pattern of slow growth in credit card balances. The most obvious case is mortgages where – after a massive tightening from 2007 to early 2010 – underwriting standards remain very tight. This tightness, especially for nonprime borrowers, has likely been a factor behind a persistently sluggish housing market that has held back this recovery relative to earlier ones.
The higher the long-term sustainable growth rate, the higher the actual growth rate can be without resource utilisation becoming so high that inflation takes off and the Riksbank is forced to intervene to subdue demand. However, the Riksbank cannot do much to affect long-term developments in growth. This is governed by other factors, particularly productivity development and labour supply. Productivity growth improved substantially from the mid-1990s and has since remained at a much higher level than during the 1980s. It is probable that several factors lie behind this development, including macroeconomic stabilisation, increased openness towards the outside world and tougher competition. Up to the beginning of the 21st century, the increase in productivity growth also reflected the expansion of the IT sector and investments made in information technology. The question is now to what extent this development is permanent. Our assessment in the October Inflation Report is that economic activity has to some extent had a positive effect on recent developments and that the rate of increase in productivity will therefore fall over the coming years - although probably to an average level above that of the 1980s. 5  SOU 2004:2, Vem tjänar på att arbeta? (Who benefits from working? ), Long-term Planning Commission Report 2003/04, appendix 14. B. Eklind et al., Fritzes, Stockholm and the National Institute of Economic Research, The Swedish Economy, August 2004. BIS Review 64/2004  7  The number of hours worked has also developed relatively favourably since the mid-1990s.

On the other hand, it is in general not much more expensive to produce a large number of payments than a small number of payments due to the benefits provided by economies of scale. However, it takes some time before a new system can reap these benefits. The costs for building, manning and maintaining such a technical system are rather high and it is only when the system is in place that costs begin to fall. Then the cost of processing an additional payment is almost zero. The average cost of making a payment thus falls as the number of payments increases. The price per transaction that the producer can charge without running at a loss is therefore low. Already established payment services that handle large volumes of payments therefore have a cost advantage. The larger the volume the established service has, the greater is its advantage. The situation for a new service is exactly the opposite. At least initially, a new service will have a small number of payments to distribute the fixed costs between. In order not to price itself out of the market, the new service will have to run at a loss until it has achieved a sufficiently high volume. A new service thus has a significant cost disadvantage compared with an established service. Second, a new system has to compete against the so-called network effects. The classic example of a network effect is telephony. Being the first person to have a telephone offers no advantages.
Many questions, including the following, should be answered when developing the vision of SEPA PL: -  what is the target model of the European payment infrastructure and how to make sure that economies of scale are used on the single payment market in order to lower the costs of services for consumers, the appropriate competition is simultaneously provided and specific niche needs of each country are met;  -  what is the best pace for implementing changes, considering the lack of straightforward declarations of the government regarding the date of Poland’s accession to the euro area;  The experience gained so far suggests that the maintenance of the national payment infrastructure is beneficial for Poland. For instance, the launch of Euro-Elixir and Sorbnet-Euro significantly reduced fees for cross-border payments in correspondent banking. So far, the decrease in prices has benefited mainly banks while their clients have felt the positive effects to a lesser extent. The National Bank of Poland hopes that clients of banks will soon more strongly experience positive price developments brought by the modern, safe and effective infrastructure of euro payments. Such a development would indicate undoubtedly that the National Bank of Poland should strengthen its activities to counter the marginalisation of the Polish settlement and payment infrastructure because the existence of a national payment infrastructure would not only support payments specific to Poland (such as ZUS – Social Insurance Institution payments and payments to tax offices), but also bring unquestionable benefits to Polish citizens and companies.

This is why the National Bank of Poland appreciates the establishment of Forum SEPA Polska by the Polish banking community and is deeply convinced that all programmes and decisions worked out and made in the course of such cooperation will increase the satisfaction of Poles who use services of national banks through making product offers more attractive, through increasing security and level of services and through reducing their prices. Inhabitants of the euro area obtained many benefits upon the introduction of the euro in the cashless turnover in 1999 and in cash handling in 2001. Transaction costs of foreign currency exchange disappeared, home bias on financial markets was reduced, risk premium decreased and the euro has become an important currency in which securities are issued on international financial markets. Menzie Chinn and Jakob Frankel, well-known American economists project that if Great Britain joins the euro area, the euro will replace the dollar as the international reserve currency 2 as early as in the late second decade of the 21st century, which might entail additional benefits for European consumers  1  See also S Quinn and W Roberds “An Economic Explanation of the Early Bank of Amsterdam, Debasement, Bills of Exchange, and the Emergence of the First Central Bank”, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2006-13, September 2006. 2  M Chinn, J Frankel, “Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar As Leading International Reserve Currency?”, presented at NBER Conference, Newport, RI, 1-2 June 2005.