samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It appears in a song sung by Ariel, to Ferdinand, a prince of Naples, after Ferdinand's father's apparent death by drowning: Full fathom five thy father lies, / Of his bones are coral made, / Those are pearls that were his eyes, / Nothing of him that doth fade, / but doth suffer a sea-change, / into something rich and strange, / Seanymphs hourly ring his knell, / Ding-dong. / Hark! now I hear them, ding-dong, bell. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Long-term government bond yields have fallen sharply in tandem (Chart 2), with US 10-year yields their lowest in two and a half years, 10 year gilt yields their lowest since the immediate aftermath of the referendum, and German 10-year bund yields their lowest ever. $ trillion of global investment-grade debt is now trading at negative yields. Lower discount rates have provided substantial support to equity prices, which are near all-time highs in the US despite an economic outlook that is becoming less robust and more uncertain. Chart 2: Long-term bond yields sharply lower too 10-year nominal government bond yields Per cent 3.5 US  3.0 2.5 2.0  UK  1.5 1.0 Euro area  0.5 0.0 -0.5  Jul. 18  Oct. 18  Jan. 19  Apr. 19  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Tradeweb and Bank calculations. The global outlook These market developments reflect a sea change driven by growing concerns over the impact of rising trade tensions and policy uncertainty.

We have a long history of working together and reaching remarkable useful consensus on critical issues when it matters most, this time will be no different. Honourable Ministers and Governors I am sure we have all had a very hectic day on discussing all these issues and look forward to a very relaxed evening. For those that have not had time to look around this beautiful and historic city I implore you to find time to explore our beautiful beaches and various historic sites. BIS Review 115/2010  1  I wish you fruitful deliberations and hope that Freetown would forever be remembered as the venue where key decisions affecting the African continent would be made. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 115/2010
Our central view is that the margin of slack is presently around 1–1½% of GDP, though I should stress the considerable degree of uncertainty around that estimate. I should also stress that this is a short-run concept, relevant to inflationary pressures a year or so ahead, and does not incorporate any endogenous improvement in productivity that may materialise in the wake of faster growth over a rather longer horizon. We have said that we are aiming to  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  close this gap over the next two or three years, while keeping inflation at around our 2% target. We have also said that when Bank Rate does rise, it is likely to do so only gradually and to a level that is likely to remain materially below its pre-crisis average of 5% for some while. That reflects: the continuing headwinds from public and private de-leveraging and continued weak growth in the euro area; continued downward pressure on global interest rates from high Chinese net savings; and the undue compression of risk premia during the run-up to the crisis. Let me now turn to asset purchases, our preferred tool for adding stimulus when Bank Rate reached its effective lower bound. Under this programme, the Bank acquired £ billion of longer-term UK government debt – equivalent to around 25% of annual GDP – comprising £ billion purchased between March 2009 and February 2010 and another £ billion acquired between October 2011 and November 2012.

Eva Srejber: Internationalisation and financial integration Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to The Bankers' Club, Gothenburg, 29 March 2001. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come to Gothenburg and speak about internationalisation and the ongoing process of integration in the financial markets. I intend to begin by putting developments on the financial markets in a historical perspective and then to deal with the forces behind current developments. I shall then focus more specifically on Europe and the role played by the euro and, finally, I shall briefly discuss the important work pursued by international organisations in strengthening the financial system and thus reducing the risk of crises arising. Globalisation from a historical perspective Over the past few decades we have seen how the global economy has been internationalised on a large scale and how deregulation and technological achievements, particularly within the IT field, have created new conditions for growth. During the same period, global purchasing power has more than doubled. And it is not only the western world that has benefited from the opportunities offered by internationalisation; many poor countries have managed to climb a few steps up the global income ladder. The Asian 'tiger' economies are good examples of this. A look back in time shows that this development is not unique.
The performance of Swedish two-year forward rates since the early summer illustrates this, see Figure 1. We can see that two-year forward rates, adjusted for a risk premium 3 , at the beginning of the summer were at approximately the same level as the money market agents’ two-year reporate expectations according to Prospera. Subsequently, however, there was a clear downward trend and from early June to mid-September the two-year forward rate fell by approximately 80 basis points. In my opinion, a substantial downward shift in monetary policy  3  The forward rates in Figure 1 are adjusted using a constant risk premium of approximately 25 basis points, which is a rough estimate of the average size of the risk premium for this time to maturity. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  expectations in this period was hardly realistic given the fact that the Swedish economy was, at the same time, surprisingly strong. Later, during the autumn, two-year forward rates increased and were roughly half a percentage point below the expectations in the surveys. An interpretation that I find more likely is that the development of forward rates in Figure 1 mainly reflects an international fall in risk premiums and, as so often in the past, it seems to be the development of interest rates in the United States that sets the tone. On this occasion it was probably the Federal Reserve’s plans to purchase additional long-term assets that had a downward effect on risk premiums.

And if Piketty is right, inequality trends are self-perpetuating as wealth begets wealth. Economic and financial stability That naturally begs the question of whether anything should be done. On the face of it, this is not the business of a central banker. There is considerable truth in that. The tools at the disposal of a central bank – interest rates, the money supply, regulation – have an impact on inequality which is, at best, indirect, inadvertent and transient. Central banks can do nothing, durably, to reshape long-term structural trends in the economy, much less in broader society. Yet inequality has appeared on central banks’ radar during the course of the crisis, sometimes flashing red. That is because, at least over the shorter-term, central bank policies can and probably have reshaped patterns of inequality. Some have gone further, arguing that central bank policies of extra-ordinary monetary accommodation have, by boosting asset prices and wealth, exacerbated inequalities (Saiki and Frost (2014)). In effect, central banks stand accused of having provided an extra spin to the Piketty cycle. It is worth viewing this claim in context. In response to the Great Recession, monetary policy globally went into overdrive. Interest rates fell to the floor and central bank money supply rose to the ceiling – so-called quantitative easing or QE. Interest rates have never been so low, nor central bank money supply so high (relative to money spending), in the Bank of England’s 320-year history. Extraordinary times heralded truly extraordinary measures.
Growth is also uneven, with the short-term prospects more favourable for the group of the advanced economies, and paler for the emerging and developing world. The risks in the latter group, which accounts for almost 60% of the global GDP and has contributed with more than 80% of the global growth since 2008, seem to be large and strong enough to constrain the growth of the world as a whole. It is not only the relatively slow global recovery that is worrisome. The fact that downside risks to the baseline growth scenario are prevalent, accentuates the uncertainty and fragility of the growth outlook. What are the main risks that should be pinpointed? First, there is the economic transformation and rebalancing in China, which is moving away from the previous model of export- and investment-led growth based on manufacturing towards a larger reliance on private consumption and services. Second, we are observing a large fall in oil and commodity prices, often reflecting concerns over the subdued global demand. Third, there is the gradual normalisation of Fed policy rates as opposed to the continued quantitative easing in most other advanced economies and the divergent monetary policy in emerging and developing economies. From a medium-to-long term perspective, all these trends could have a positive effect. Still, they also have short-term consequences, which pose significant downward risks for the global economy.

It is highly likely that the Chinese rebalancing will in the short term lead to slower economic growth, which could spill over to other economies via the well known trade, financial and confidence channels. In particular, the early evidence indicates that the Chinese slowdown is having stronger than expected effects on lower imports and lower commodity prices. In addition, such downward effects could be magnified by the possible accompanying turbulences in global foreign exchange and other financial markets. Second, the falling oil and commodity prices (and the expected persistence of low prices) could have negative effects on exports and economic growth in commodity-exporting emerging economies. This could also be reflected in further currency depreciations in these economies, which might in turn magnify corporate balance-sheet weaknesses, thus reinforcing negative growth feedbacks. Finally, divergent monetary policy moves between the US and most other economies that contribute to US dollar appreciation may have negative  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  effects, with higher borrowing costs for dollar-denominated borrowing by emerging market companies and sovereigns. Geopolitical tensions regarding Ukraine and the Middle East also imply continuous uncertainty, which increases borrowing costs and makes investment decisions more difficult. Related to this, the refugee crisis represents an additional political and systemic challenge in our countries. This applies particularly to fiscal costs and possible political instability arising from refugee accommodation and integration, which might affect macroeconomic policy and wider European political and economic integration projects.
The only result to be achieved will be higher inflation than desired – that is to say that, on average, the inflation target will be exceeded. Consequently, for monetary policy, the highest level of resource utilisation that is sustainable over the longer term is the normal level. Other economic policies than monetary policy, such as labour market policy and structural policies improving the workings of the economy and the degree of competition, are needed to raise production and employment above the level that today is normal for these variables. Consequently, if the inflation target is given priority, a higher than normal level of resource utilisation cannot be sought in monetary policy. Some people may believe that priority to the inflation target may entail ignoring the real economy entirely and only caring about stabilising inflation. This is an altogether too narrow approach and characterises a so-called “inflation nutter”, to use Mervyn King’s striking expression. It is called strict inflation targeting in the terminology I proposed.1 Giving priority to the inflation target does not, therefore, mean that monetary policy should not stabilise resource utilisation, but, instead, that it should stabilise resource utilisation around a normal level, rather than a higher one. The same concept can be expressed with different words. When it comes to the average level of inflation and resource utilisation, there is only one numerical target, namely the inflation target. There is no independent numerical target for resource utilisation.

Panel d shows the equivalent forecasts for CPIF inflation.2 Panels e and f show equivalent forecasts for two measures of resource utilisation, the output gap in panel e and the hours gap in panel f.  2  One may ask why CPIF should be focused on and not CPI. In a situation in which extensive repo rate changes have very large direct effects on CPI, I consider it to be more appropriate to focus on stabilising CPIF around the inflation target, instead of CPI. BIS Review 22/2010  3  Panels b and c in Figure 1 also show the mean squared gaps, which were introduced in an article in the Monetary Policy Report in October 2009.3 The mean squared gap for inflation measures the deviation between the inflation forecast and the inflation target or, more precisely, the mean squared gap between the inflation forecast and the inflation target during the forecast period. A lower mean squared gap for inflation entails a forecast of inflation closer to the inflation target, that is a better stabilisation of inflation around the inflation target. The mean squared gap for resource utilisation, measured as the output gap or the hours gap, measures the deviation between the forecast for resource utilisation and normal resource utilisation – more precisely, as the average squared gap during the forecast period. A lower mean squared gap for resource utilisation thus entails a better stabilisation of resource utilisation around a normal level.
The risk management role of helping identify, evaluate, monitor, manage and control or mitigate these risks has become a crucial role in modern-day banking. Indeed, it is probably not exaggerating the importance of this to say that the quality of a bank's risk management has become one of the key determinants of a success of a bank. Basel II recognises the importance of these risks - and of the quality of risk management - by means of what is known as "Pillar 2". Under Pillar 2, there is an assessment firstly of all the risks a bank is running and, secondly, of its ability to manage these risks. This can lead to the bank being required to hold more capital to cover these risks, or to make improvements in its risk management. Pillar 2 therefore encourages banks to improve risk management, and gives capital incentives to do so. 1/5  I will say some more about this later on, but it is probably time at this point that I said a little about how Hong Kong is implementing Basel II. Hong Kong implementation We took a strategic decision early on in the Basel II process that Hong Kong should implement Basel II in accordance with the timetable recommended by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision for its own members. This means adoption of most of the approaches under the new framework from the start of 2007, and the more advanced approaches from the start of 2008.

The score is in turn mapped onto a particular range of capital ratios. Among the factors that this process will consider are the Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 risks that I have already mentioned. In addition, the SRP will take into account a variety of other factors such as reputation risk, strategic risk, and the quality of corporate governance. The inputs into this process will be derived primarily from our existing supervisory arrangements, such as off-site and on-site examinations. We believe that the SRP is capable of replacing the current, relatively subjective, approach to setting AI-specific minimum capital ratios with something more rigorous and objective. Like all good credit scoring systems, there will still be scope for expert judgement and, in my experience, there is no substitute for the supervisory smell-test. On the whole, however, we intend to base each AI's capital ratio on the output of this process. Once we have derived a score, and thus a corresponding capital ratio, for an individual AI, we will discuss the results of the SRP with the AI. Again, as in the review of IRB systems, the concept of supervisory dialogue will be important. It will be our aim to understand how each AI approaches the range of risks that exist outside Pillar 1, and to understand the mechanisms they have in place for identifying, monitoring and controlling those risks.
A cet égard, j’aimerais souligner la performance de la France. La France compte parmi les trois pays qui ont satisfait rigoureusement aux valeurs de référence de tous les critères de Maastricht, notamment celui en matière de dette publique. Notre stabilité des prix et le bas niveau de nos taux d’intérêt à long terme nous ont placés parmi les trois pays, avec l’Allemagne, ayant présenté les meilleurs résultats : conformément au Traité, nos résultats, avec ceux de deux autres économies, ont par conséquent servi de référence à l’évaluation de ceux de l’ensemble des pays. La Banque de France a contribué — directement et indirectement — à ces résultats, en mettant en œuvre une politique monétaire indépendante et crédible. A ce propos, je souhaite mettre en avant un point très important. En édifiant une union monétaire, les pays européens n’ont pas seulement fusionné leurs agrégats économiques, commerciaux, financiers et  BIS Review 22/1999  2  monétaires, faisant de la zone euro un partenaire de premier rang en termes de population (290 millions d’habitants), de taille du PIB, de commerce international ou de masse monétaire : ils ont entrepris de créer une zone solide et stable. En fait, l’Union monétaire n’est pas une simple addition arithmétique de résultats économiques nationaux. Elle a été créée en prenant comme référence les performances réalisées par les pays ayant présenté les meilleurs résultats en termes de stabilité monétaire.

L’objectif final du marché unique ne pouvait être atteint tant que des obstacles monétaires continuaient d’entraver la libre circulation des biens, des services et des capitaux par le biais de coûts de transaction et de risques de change intrinsèques. Demain, nos concitoyens bénéficieront de tous les avantages liés à l’utilisation d’un même instrument monétaire dans tout le continent européen, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui des Américains sur tout le territoire des États-Unis. Les avantages de la monnaie unique sont nombreux. La monnaie unique réduit l’incertitude et facilite les décisions d’investissement et de production. Elle permet une juste comparaison des prix à travers l’Europe et réduit les coûts de transaction. La zone de la monnaie unique sera caractérisée par la stabilité des prix et un faible niveau d’inflation. Ces facteurs, à leur tour, maintiendront et renforceront la confiance tout en procurant à l’économie européenne un environnement financier favorable. La simple existence de la monnaie unique permet d’emprunter davantage de capitaux dans de meilleures conditions, sur des marchés plus larges, plus profonds et plus liquides. 3. La mise en place de l’euro couronne parfaitement le processus de l’UEM étant donné qu’elle est fondée sur le respect strict des critères de convergence et sur la stabilité des prix. La convergence des États membres vers les meilleures performances économiques en est la conséquence. Selon un dicton français, il ne faut pas bâtir sur le sable. C’est pourquoi le traité de Maastricht a institué des critères de convergence auxquels les pays doivent se conformer durablement pour participer à l’Union monétaire.
What is the reason for this? It is largely due to developments in Sweden’s real economy in relation to other countries. The Riksbank’s forecasts for the exchange rate are based on changes in the real exchange rate reflecting differences in growth in relation to other countries and being consistent with foreign trade, being balanced in the long run. Relative growth and the current account explain changes in the real exchange rate Countries that have a higher GDP growth than their trading partners usually have a stronger real exchange rate. 26 The real trade-weighted krona rate has been on average 30 per cent weaker during the period since 1993 than it was in the 1970s. Figure 6 shows Sweden’s GDP in relation to TCW-weighted GDP abroad. We can see that Swedish GDP in relation to other countries fell heavily from the 1970s until the beginning of the 1990s. The Riksbank’s assessment is that the weakened exchange rate from the 1970s to the 1990s is linked to lower growth in Sweden than abroad. As we can see in Figure 6, Sweden has over the past 15 years recovered some of the relative GDP level and had higher growth than other countries. This tendency is expected to continue over the coming years, which would in this case imply a stronger real exchange rate. One factor that is often discussed in connection with the exchange rate is the development of the current account.

5 The results of the different studies differ somewhat, but the overall assessment based on research in this field is that a change in the exchange rate in the short term leads to a change that is half as great in import prices. The research has also shown that the pass-through of exchange rate changes on consumer prices is much less than on import prices. 6 The most obvious explanation for this is that import prices do not constitute the entire consumer price index (CPI), only around one third of it. 7 The fact that the percentage is so low is partly due to several domestic factors (transports, various types of service, and so on) affecting the final price for imported goods charged to the consumer. 8 As the example of the cheese importer showed, there may also  1  This example does not claim to offer a correct description of the Swedish cheese market, but merely serves as an illustration of the effects of changes in the exchange rate on inflation. 2  See, for example, Apel, Friberg and Hallsten (2004). 3  What is known as pricing to market is a reflection of this: in the example we use it would mean that the French exporter determines different prices for different export markets, such as Sweden. This could lead to a reduced tendency to change the price in Sweden as a result of exchange rate fluctuations.