samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And our goal here is not only to manage climate change-related risks, but also to align incentives to make sure the transition is adequately financed. As time goes by and our ability to achieve a 1.5 to 2°C scenario is being seriously challenged, the amount needed to finance the transition is increasing steadily. This quantitative challenge is linked to the massive investment  Page 4 sur 6 required to promote further development of technologies, notably carbon capture and storage and electricity generation from renewable sources. The amounts at stake vary, but as an illustration, the last Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, published last October, estimates that until 2050, the energy-related mitigation investments to limit warming to 1.5°C reach USD 900 billion per year vi. The needs are so considerable that public financing alone will never be sufficient. But, per year this amount represents less than 1% of the 2017 gross world product. The burden is a heavy one, but it is far from insurmountable if we join forces. Let me turn to the private sector before coming back to central banks. 1 / Fortunately, the private sector is already showing a growing interest in green finance. I could cite many examples, including the sharp rise in the global climate-aligned bonds market which reached on outstanding amount of USD 1.45 trillion vii in 2018 or the success of the issuance of France’s first green sovereign bond in January 2017. All this looks very promising… but it is still insufficient.

Allow me to briefly remind you of some figures on Spain’s exposure to Latin America as a whole; this exposure is particularly relevant in terms of the stock of direct investment, given that around 31% of all Spanish foreign direct investment assets are located in the region. Particularly prominent are the positions in Brazil and Mexico. Trade is likewise significant, with 4.8% and 7.8% of all Spanish exports of goods and services, respectively, heading to the region. Since the early 1990s, the internationalisation of Spanish banking has largely focused on Latin America, in addition to the European Union, the United States and Turkey. Consequently, the region has taken on considerable significance for the Spanish banking 1  https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SSICOM/20200115/Plan_Estrategico_2024_en.pdf. 1  system. Indeed, on pre-pandemic data, Spanish banks' exposures2 to Latin America represent nearly one-fifth of the system’s total and around 30% of the exposures located outside of Spain.3 Accordingly, the region’s economic performance has very considerable influence on the balance sheets of Spanish banks, while the risks stemming from these exposures could potentially become systemic. Clearly, the economic situation in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, has been severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The human cost is significant. Since the onset of the pandemic, there have been more than 650,0004 deaths in the region, nearly 26% of the world total, when it accounts for just 8% of the global population.
And this, as a general rule, is the essence of market discipline. Investors who stand to lose their own money will be more cautious than investors who can offload losses onto someone else. But, as I said earlier, markets have not always exerted discipline. During the crisis, bank failures were rare. But why? Well, first, there was a lack of tools to resolve failing banks – particularly across borders. And second, there were fears of contagion and a meltdown of the entire financial system. So, in the end, governments often stepped in and propped up failing banks with public funds. There was no chance for the market to impose discipline. This has changed. In Europe, we now have a single resolution mechanism for banks. It was designed to ensure that banks can fail in an orderly manner without damaging the financial system. This new mechanism has recently passed its first series of tests. Generally speaking, it was successful, although some adjustments are still needed. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  In any case, we have taken a big step towards more market discipline in the European banking sector. To sum up, a stable banking sector is supported by three pillars: regulation, supervision and market discipline. Since the crisis, we have made these three pillars stronger. Now we have to make sure that they remain in good shape and share the load in a balanced way. Otherwise, we will not reap all the benefits of the transformation that has taken place in banking supervision.

Thank you for your attention. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
A remarkable growth in trade However, in one area the figures show clearly how great the changeover has been: trade. Many who have not had the opportunity to study the former planned economies in central and eastern Europe believe that they, for historical reasons, are fairly closed and that their trade is relatively Russiaoriented. In actual fact, the candidate countries are among Europe's most open economies, with a larger percentage of trade in their GDP, and a larger percentage of this trade with EU countries, than many EU countries have themselves. The EU's trade with the 10 candidate countries is increasing more rapidly than that with any other geographical area in the world. During the period 1995-2000, i.e. in just five years, this trade has doubled. The percentage of intermediate goods (components) for western companies is growing, as is the percentage of goods with a high technology content. There are numerous examples of how eastern European companies are specialising to adapt to sophisticated co-operation with western European companies. Hungary is now competing with Ireland to attract the assembly of computers and cars, Estonia is a large sub-contractor to both Swedish clothing firms and to Ericsson, Nokia and their suppliers. st  Eastern Europe may be Europe's major opportunity at the beginning of the 21 century, after having trailed behind the USA in terms of growth at the end of the 1990s.

Eva Srejber: A reunited Europe – the roles played by Sweden and the Riksbank Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, to the Baltik Financial Network, Stockholm, 13 February 2002. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me here to speak of and discuss this important subject with such a knowledgeable public. The enlargement will change Europe and Sweden and will also affect the Riksbank. For those of us in western Europe, this is an important opportunity to regain the right geographical, economic and historical perspectives. We talk about "eastern Europe", despite the fact that Prague and Ljubljana lie west of Stockholm, we forget that Riga and Tallinn are actually closer to Stockholm than Gothenburg. We often still have a mental curtain where the iron curtain once prevailed. Now this division will soon be at an end. A hundred million Europeans, who lived under a totalitarian Communist dictatorship for half a century, can now finally return to a single European community. The political dimension is undoubtedly the most important. The new community confirms democracy and thereby guarantees peace and stability throughout Europe, which will in turn provide a good foundation for growth and development. Today I intend to say a few words about an important facet of the EU enlargement, namely the economic consequences, which will affect the work of the Riksbank more directly.
Vítor Constâncio: Comprehensive assessment press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 26 October 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying slides can be found on the European central Banks’ website: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ ssm/assessment/shared/pdf/141026_presentation-slides.pdf  Welcome to this press conference about the results of the comprehensive assessment. And at the start, let me make four points. The first one is to underline that the comprehensive assessment has unique features. Namely, it combines an asset quality review with a macro stress test, which indeed is a very unique feature. Second, it disclosed a very detailed methodology, called manuals, for both components of the exercise and for the respective quality control of banks’ reporting. Third, the implementation of the exercise involved many thousands of experts, including about 5,000 independent private firms. More than 800 individual portfolios were in the scope of the exercise, representing almost 60% of total risk-weighted assets of the banks and implying the analysis of credit of 119,000 borrowers of the banks. And fourth, the exercise provides, with unprecedented transparency, a vast array of data from banks’ balance sheets and from the final results. The massive nature of the exercise deserves to be acknowledged. And its results are credible, because they stem from an accurate methodology, from a rigorous implementation and from a demanding central quality control of the results.

The second point I wanted to make is that the conclusion of the exercise was preceded by a significant amount of front-loaded measures taken by the banks. Since July last year SSM banks have undertaken various measures to strengthen their balance sheets by more than € billion, including € billion of capital increases. These front-loaded measures are part of the overall successful outcome of the exercise. Some of the measures taken in 2013 had an impact on what could be detected by the exercise, and so reduced the results of the exercise accordingly. And some of the measures taken in 2014 count for the mitigation of the capital shortfalls that were found. Third point, the comprehensive assessment provides the ECB SSM with substantial information on the banks that will fall under its direct supervision and will help its efforts in creating a level playing field for supervision in the future. And fourth, the repairing of the banks’ balance sheets that will follow the results, and the resilience revealed by the vast majority of the banks in spite of the severity of the exercise, guarantee that the economic recovery will not be hampered by credit supply restrictions coming from the banking sector, provided that there is enough aggregate demand. I will now go through the slides. Let me underline the main results of the exercise. A total of € billion capital shortfalls were identified across 25 participating banks as a joint result of the AQR and the stress test.
On the former, recent experience suggests five lessons for emerging markets: (1)  Create a do-it-yourself (DIY) LOLR, with the aim of providing self-insurance against a liquidity crisis. There are several ways of providing such insurance. One is to build up large foreign currency reserves. This has already been taken to heart by emerging markets. China has substantial foreign exchange reserves $ billion at the end of June). And Korea, perhaps the best example of a country suffering a liquidity run on its banking system in terms of foreign currency, has raised its reserves from a low point of $ billion in November 1997 to a current high of $ billion in August. It is unfortunate that the absence of more efficient solutions to the risk of crises means that scarce capital might be deployed in this inefficient way. Building up net reserves – via current account surpluses – will reduce world demand at a time when the  5  BIS Review 95/1999  US economy is unlikely to provide as large a stimulus as over the past five years. An alternative is to create gross reserves by borrowing from abroad and investing the proceeds in liquid international securities. Both methods involve costs.

Is there a similar need to change the rules of the game for the international financial system? Capital markets do not operate on their own. They need an adequate legal and supporting infrastructure for participants to engage with each other. There is no magic wand that can be waved to create such an infrastructure internationally. Short of a world authority, what is required is a patient process of building such an infrastructure. Some have described this as a need for new architecture, others as a need for plumbing. I prefer to speak of bricklaying. But after innumerable meetings of ministers and governors, deputies, deputies’ deputies and so on, we still do not have an adequate building. Recent crises have shown that the need is not for a lavish palace, but simply a roof over our heads. We need to get to the point where less time is spent on the role of the IMF in handling crises and more on the role of the World Bank in promoting development. So where should we start? In order to answer that question it is necessary to understand the causes of recent financial crises. Without pretending to be comprehensive, I shall focus attention on the importance of balance sheets – national balance sheets – as the trigger for financial crises. I shall discuss four issues. First, I shall try to identify the problems underlying recent financial crises.
It should be underlined that this is a temporary situation and the predictability of monetary policy will increase in the upcoming period when the stability in the global economy is restored Decision-making process and the communication policy The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) will continue to meet once a month in 2009 as well, in accordance with the schedule announced beforehand. Monetary policy decisions at these meetings and their rationale will be made public on the website of the Central Bank in a press release posted at 7:00 p.m. on the same day. As in the previous year, the summary of the MPC Meeting will be released on the website of the Central Bank within eight working days, along with its English translation. As in previous years, the Inflation Report, which is the main communication tool of the monetary policy, will be published quarterly and introduced to the public at a press conference.

Therefore wooing investment into this institution should not be difficult task. Such investment will go a long way in enhancing the quality of graduates this Institution will produce. BIS Review 23/2009  1  Mr President, it is during times of crisis such as the one we are undergoing that graduates should assist the industry in coming up with well researched constructive proposals and solutions on how challenges may be addressed within the context of our local environment. The prevailing global financial meltdown is in fact an opportunity for the institute to critically review its core operations and determine if its flagship education and training programmes as well as other learning environment initiatives such as research, consultancy, counselling and continuous professional development activities are robust enough to adequately serve our financial services sector, both in times of buoyancy and during periods of turbulence. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am reliably informed that the Institute is negotiating strategic alliances that will ensure high quality international standard flagship education and training programmes for professionals in Zambia’s financial services industry. I am equally pleased to note that that the Institute has direct representatio n on two working groups of the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) – the Banking Working Group and the Human Resource Working Group. I have no doubt the FSDP stands to benefit from more representation from the Institute. I urge you Mr President and Council Members, to engage all the stakeholders in the financial sector including, Non-Bank Financial Institutions, Insurance Companies, Stock brokers and Pension Funds.
In general, it is helpful to conceptually distinguish financial-stability policy from monetary policy. Different economic policies, such as fiscal policy, monetary policy and labour market policy can be distinguished according to their objectives, the policy instruments that are suitable for achieving the relevant objectives, and the authority or authorities who control the instruments and are responsible for achieving the objectives. From this point of view, it is clear that monetary policy and financial-stability policy are very different, and understanding this distinction is important. Monetary policy, in the form of flexible inflation targeting, has the objective of stabilising inflation around the inflation target as well as resource utilisation around a normal level. Under normal circumstances, the suitable instruments are the policy rate and communication. In times of crisis, as we have seen during the current crisis, other more unconventional methods can be used, such as lending at a fixed interest rate at longer maturities, quantitative easing, and so on. Financial-stability policy has the objective of maintaining and promoting financial stability. Financial stability can be defined as a situation in which the financial system can fulfil its main functions of submitting payments, channelling saving into investment, and providing risk sharing without disruptions that have significant social costs. The available instruments are, under normal circumstances, supervision, regulation, and financial-stability reports with analyses and leading indicators that may provide early warnings of stability threats.

As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) or the Federal Reserve System. My attention today will be on three important questions: •  Why has the U.S. recovery been so sluggish and consistently weaker than expected? •  What should we, as monetary policymakers, do it about it? •  What other policy actions are needed to help ensure a timely transition to strong and sustainable growth? The disappointing recovery Turning to the first question, U.S. economic growth has been quite sluggish in recent years. For example, annualized real GDP (gross domestic product) growth has averaged only about 2.2 percent since the end of the recession in 2009. As a consequence, we have seen only modest improvement in the U.S. labor market. Not only has growth been slow, it has also been disappointing relative to the forecasters’ expectations. For example, the Blue Chip Consensus have been persistently too optimistic in recent years. This is illustrated in Exhibit 1 which shows how private sector forecasts for 2008 through 2013 have evolved over time. Two aspects of this exhibit are noteworthy. First, forecasters have consistently expected the U.S. economy to gather momentum over time. Second, with only one exception, the growth forecasts for each year have been revised downward over time, as the expected strengthening did not materialize. In contrast, as shown in Exhibit 2, there has been no notable pattern of forecast misses for inflation.
Two of these relate to the risks to price stability. One of these stipulates that our own projection for inflation 18–24 months ahead should be at least as likely to fall below 2.5% as to be above it. The other asks whether there is any evidence that measures of the inflation expectations of households, businesses and market participants have become insufficiently well-anchored to the target. At this stage, we do not see anything to worry about on this score. The third override condition, delegated to the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee, relates to whether the monetary policy stance is resulting in the build-up of dangerous financial stability risks. If the FPC cannot contain these risks using the range of recommendations and powers at its disposal, then it will alert the MPC, who will then decide whether an increase in Bank Rate is called for. Increasingly noisy commentary that a new housing bubble is brewing – and concerns that the second stage of the Help to Buy scheme will add fuel to the fire – may mean that this condition becomes material. I do not have time left today to do justice to this issue. But it is important to remember that mortgage approvals for house purchase are still running at a little over half their pre-crisis average and, outside London, house price inflation is still quite modest. So we appear to be still some way off seeing an unsustainable house-price boom on the back of excessive credit growth.

(a) (b) (c) (d)  8  Constant-maturity unweighted average of secondary market spreads to mid-swaps for the major UK lenders’ five-year euro senior unsecured bonds. Sterling. Spread over the relevant swap rate for fixed-rate retail bonds. Unweighted average of the five-year senior CDS premia for the major UK lenders. Constant-maturity unweighted average of secondary market spreads to mid-swaps for the major UK lenders’ five-year euro-denominated covered bonds, where available. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: Instantaneous forward yield curves(a) Percentage points May IR  Aug IR  5  Latest  4  3  2  1  0 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Sources: Bank of England and Bloomberg. (a) The May and August Inflation Report curves are based on the final day of the respective 15-day averages. The latest curve is from the 17 October. Chart 6: Economic ‘surprise’ indicators(a) Standard deviations United States  Euro area  0.8  United Kingdom  0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  Sources: Bloomberg and Bank of England calculations. (a) Moving average of unweighted data surprises over a 60-day rolling window. Data surprises for each variable are scaled by the historical standard deviation of surprises for that variable.