samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Interest rates on lek-denominated loans did not fully respond to the easing monetary policy signals due to the higher credit risk premiums in particular branches of the economy. New information supports our previous projection that the GDP growth will remain below its potential in the quarters ahead, owing to the moderate contribution of foreign demand, lack of fiscal stimulus and sluggish domestic demand. The two main components of the latter, consumption and private investment, remain slow. The incomplete utilisation of capacities, coupled with the slow rise in wages and unit labour costs, are expected to exert contained inflationary pressures in the period ahead. Economic agents’ inflation expectations are anchored close to the target. They, however, may be subject to the response to global developments in the short run. The gradually subsiding supply-side shocks in the period ahead, the termination of base effects’ impact and the extended effect of the Bank of Albania’s stimulating policy are expected to be followed by an rising inflation trend, thereby approaching the Bank of Albania’s target in the medium run. The Bank of Albania has continuously eased the monetary policy in the recent months, aiming at meeting the inflation target in the medium run, and keeping the inflation expectations and risk premiums in the economy under control. This policy has aimed at responding to a situation where the main obstacle to the recovery of private sector demand and foreign direct investment relates to the uncertainty for the future and approach to risk, in the short and medium run.

In short, the adoption of the advanced Basel II models should be seen from a perspective of realism and the pursuit of excellence. As far as the Banco de España is concerned, quality takes precedence over any consideration of timing in the adoption of the advanced approaches. As I have already mentioned, the implementation of the New Capital Accord will pose serious challenges for the institutions, which will be expected to step up the efforts they have no doubt already begun to make. The need to increase these efforts has become even more pressing since 11 May this year, when the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision approved the text of the Accord, which will be released at the end of June. Also prominent in the area of regulatory reforms, which will involve significant challenges and whose implementation is imminent, is the introduction of the International Accounting Standards (IAS). In accordance with the mandate of the European Union, these standards will affect the preparation of the annual accounts of groups with securities listed on any regulated market of the Union from 1 January 2005. The challenges associated with the introduction of the IAS not only relate to the technical adaptation that will be required to comply with them; some of these standards may affect institutions’ business strategy, since aspects such as provisions and the consolidation and amortisation of goodwill will be changed.
The global financial crisis (plus the sovereign debt crisis in the case of the euro area) resulted in a considerable amount of slack in labour markets and capacity utilisation. In the euro area, the post-crisis focus on fiscal consolidation meant that the fiscal stance was not supportive of domestic demand until quite recently. Given these forces, the ECB has adopted an accommodative monetary stance, which has been characterised since 2014 by a combination of: (a) a negative policy rate; (b) an asset purchase programme; (c) targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs); and (d) forward guidance on the path of policy instruments. This policy stance has been successful in warding off deflation risk and, more recently, in supporting a resurgence in wage inflation (through the accumulated reduction in labour market slack). However, ongoing monetary accommodation is still required in order to ensure the robust convergence of price inflation to our aim. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  This sustained period of below-target inflation reflects both the extent of post-crisis slack in the economy and the inherent gradualism of inflation adjustment in this environment. In particular, while above-target inflation can be countered by sharp monetary tightening, lower bound limits on policy space mean that policy easing measures must take the form of less-sharp adjustments that are maintained over an extended horizon.

In this year in particular, we are seeing a strengthening of the international dimension of our financial sector. This essentially serves to strengthen our economic and financial inter-linkages with the global economy. Some notable developments in this direction include the liberalisation of the foreign exchange administration rules earlier this year to allow for greater flexibility and efficiency in foreign exchange transactions as well as to increase foreign participation in issuing ringgit papers in our bond market and thus contribute to contribute toward enhancing the depth of the market. Another major development this year was the move to a managed float exchange rate regime for the ringgit. This is essentially to better position the nation to respond and benefit from the structural changes occurring in the region and the global economy. Other further developments to strengthen our international integration include the increase in foreign participation in our domestic financial system. This includes the issuance of new licences for foreign Islamic banks to operate in Malaysia, the issuance of new stock-broking licences to foreign players as well as increases in the permitted foreign interest in our Islamic subsidiaries and investment banks. All this will serve to enhance the international integration of the domestic financial system. The launch of the ABF Malaysian Bond Index Fund is also aimed at promoting greater integration among the regional bond markets. On the domestic front, the year 2005 marks a significant milestone for the merchant banking industry.
But across the financial world, investors and regulators are asking themselves whether it also brought costs that are only now becoming clear.” The way oversight of the financial system is split between the FSA, the Treasury and the Bank of England is in doubt. Gordon Brown’s reform of a decade ago means that those responsible for monitoring the banking system are separate from those who make the decision to intervene.] In understanding the factors that impinge on this particular case about Northern Rock, one will learn that the roles and tasks faced by the supervisors and the regulators are enormous. Supervisors need to keep a step ahead of financial market developments and innovations. We must not be oblivious or ignorant to the fact that, despite all the strength of legal framework, regulatory and supervisory arrangements we can have, we always learn that banks still fail, even those too big to fail collapsed at their own demise – some due to reasons other than risks. In other words, the supervision of banks cannot provide full or complete guarantee against banking failures. However, supervision can assist the banks in managing their risks by taking appropriate measures and precautions. After all, banks are vulnerable to errors in human judgment and the fragile confidence of depositors. Therefore, regulation and supervision is not a substitute for good management. That is the lesson we have to learn from many bank  2  BIS Review 142/2007  failures even in countries with the best regulatory systems.

With low resource utilisation one can expect that inflation will be pushed down as the pressure on wage and price increases will be low. The weak international demand is of course one factor that is beyond the Riksbank’s control and in this sense monetary policy  housing market. In the case of Australia, there are no clear signs that they have faced this kind of trade-off during the period following the financial crisis. This is clearer for the period 2002–2004, but then inflation stayed within the target interval of 2–3 per cent and was only close to the lower interval limit for one quarter. 6  See Sveriges Riksbank (2014a). 7  See Sveriges Riksbank (2014a). 8  See Nekarda and Ramey (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  cannot be blamed for the low inflationary pressure. At the same time, it is the role of monetary policy to counteract this type of downward pressure to stabilise inflation around the target. Monetary policy may have contributed in different ways Personally, I believe that the monetary policy conducted is an important contributory factor to the fall in inflation. The fact that household indebtedness is taken into account in the monetary policy decisions – and the repo rate is thus held somewhat higher than the prospects for inflation and resource utilisation have justified – has probably made the krona stronger than it would otherwise have been and also held back domestic demand.
Now we have in place a framework for the recovery and resolution of banks, something that we did not have two years ago. Serious steps forward have been made on all technical issues that are of key importance for the integration into the European financial infrastructure. I wish to point out something in the BNB’s work, something that may be difficult to see – it is the huge amount of experts’ work and the intensive technical consultations that we are having about our joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism II and the euro area. I’ve already had a suitable occasion to thank my colleagues in the central bank. Now it is a pleasure to thank you, too, for the very good results achieved in this sector. All the items on our agenda are not yet completed and we still have a lot to do. I will not go into details or numbers, but let me mention some of our today’s priorities. I will begin with the amendments to the Law on Credit Institutions which take effect from today. They create an appropriate legal framework for further consolidation of the BNB’s supervision model. You probably know that from today onwards all the most important decisions and administrative acts will have to be approved and issued by the Governing Council. The second group of most important issues relates to lending to so-called ‘related parties’. A legal framework has been created for better definition of this subject and for managing the relevant supervisory practices.

Dimitar Radev: Review of Bulgaria's economy and banking system Banker's Day' speech by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, to the Association of Banks in Bulgaria, Sofia, 5 December 2017. * * * Dear Colleagues, Dear Members of Parliament, Dear guests, First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation – on my behalf and on behalf of my colleagues in the BNB Governing Council. We are delighted to be with you this evening. The passing year 2017 was good both for the economy and for the banking system in Bulgaria. Perhaps, this has been the first year for a long time, in which there is more optimism than pessimism. The economy is developing at better rates than we anticipated early this year. The fiscal position is solid. The banking sector is in a very good state. Capital adequacy and liquidity ratios are above the average levels for the European Union. For a second consecutive year this sector’s profits nearly reach the highest historical levels. Lending continues to increase. We see a long-term downward trend in non-performing loans. We also have positive results from the accomplishment of the BNB’s main priorities. Generally, the measures adopted after the asset quality review and the stress test last year are being implemented successfully. The efficiency of banking supervision is improving and all independent observers of the developments in our banking sector point up this progress.
News conference  Berne, 13 June 2019 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and gentlemen It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I will begin by setting out our monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation, and will also be explaining an adjustment to our monetary policy strategy. I will then hand over to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will present this year’s Financial Stability Report. After that, Andréa Maechler will talk about the situation on the financial markets, the progress made in replacing the Libor, and the SNB joining the Network for Greening the Financial System. Finally, we will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions. Monetary policy decision and introduction of the SNB policy rate  Let me begin with our monetary policy decision. We are maintaining our expansionary monetary policy. Interest on sight deposits held by banks at the SNB remains at –0.75%, and we will continue to be active in the foreign exchange market as necessary, while taking the overall currency situation into consideration. Our expansionary monetary policy remains necessary. We thereby stabilise price developments and support economic activity. At our monetary policy assessment we also decided to make a small adjustment to our monetary policy strategy. We are now introducing the SNB policy rate, which will take over the function previously performed by the target range for the three-month Libor. The SNB policy rate currently stands at −0.75%.

This is drawn up quarterly, with each forecast having a horizon of three years. The inflation forecast gives us an indication as to whether our current monetary policy stance is appropriate for keeping future inflation within the range consistent with price stability. It is our compass, so to speak, showing us whether we are heading in the right direction. It plays another important role in that it gives the public an indication with regard to the need for monetary policy adjustments going forward. The inflation forecast is based on the assumption that a given interest rate remains unchanged over the entire forecast horizon. To date this has been the three-month Libor, and from now on it will be the SNB policy rate. This brings me to the third element of our monetary policy strategy. This determines how we communicate the level of money market rates we seek to maintain. To date, we have used the target range for the three-month Libor for this purpose. We will now do so by setting the SNB policy rate. In implementing our monetary policy, we will ensure that the secured short-term money market rates are close to the SNB policy rate. In this regard, we are focusing on SARON, the most representative of the short-term Swiss franc rates. SARON is an overnight rate. Given that we are now focusing on an overnight rate rather than a three-month rate, there is no further need for a target range.
In mid-2007, serious problems with structured products backed by sub-prime mortgages put an abrupt stop to the boom in securitisation. False incentives, inadequate control mechanisms, shortcomings in the rating system and insufficient personal responsibility on the part of investors were the main criticisms aimed at securitisation practices. What is important now, is to correct these deficiencies, so that the trust of market participants in these products can be restored. It would be wrong to ban the securitisation of mortgages, since these refinancing instruments generate substantial economic benefit and are an indispensable part of our modern financial system. The mortgage securitisation weaknesses revealed in the financial market crisis do not apply in the case of the Swiss mortgage bond. Consequently, it should definitely have the potential to play an even greater role in maturity-matched refinancing of mortgages in Switzerland in the future. In addition, banks can improve their liquidity by holding portfolios of Swiss mortgage bonds themselves. Mortgage bonds could be converted into liquidity quickly and simply, as required, by means of repo transactions – either in the Swiss franc interbank market or at the SNB. BIS Review 60/2008  1

20.06.2017  Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Parliamentary Committee on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness  Luis M. Linde Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, I appear before this Committee on the occasion of the presentation of the Banco de España Annual Report for 2016. I would like to begin by reviewing the most notable features of the current Spanish economic upswing, which began almost four years ago. I will then go on to describe the more immediate prospects for the Spanish economy, with reference to the Macroeconomic Projections Report published by the Bank on 13 June, and I will mention the main risks surrounding this outlook. Finally, I intend to address the main challenges for Spanish economic policy over a longer time horizon and to conclude with a brief reference to the challenges for the European project. The factors underlying the firming of the Spanish economic recovery According to the estimates available, Spanish GDP should have regained its pre-crisis level during the current quarter, after growing in 2015 and 2016 at a rate of 3.2%, which was notably higher than the rates recorded in the other main euro area economies and, in both years, higher than initially forecast. As regards the labour market situation, one of the main causes for concern for our economy and society, positive employment growth data are being recorded, which are also exceeding expectations.
As a result, by the late 1990’s the Basel Committee and leading institutions worldwide began discussions on ways for supervision to incorporate more sophisticated and sensitive measures of the risks that banks face. The initiative for these discussions can be attributed above all to William McDonough, who was until recently the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and my immediate predecessor as chairman of the Committee. Bill brought intellectual leadership, demanding standards, and tireless energy to a project whose size and implications became apparent only after bankers and supervisors had taken a long, hard look at how much the art of risk management had advanced in the short years since 1988. Throughout the five years of work on the New Accord, Bill McDonough convinced leaders in the industry, in central banks, and in supervisory agencies that merely updating the rules would be unsatisfactory. Instead, Bill sought to advance the state of the art in risk management across the industry and thereby promote greater stability in the global financial system. This would benefit not just bankers, but also businesses and consumers in all walks of life. It was truly a privilege to work with Bill on an initiative that would represent not just good banking policy, but most importantly good public policy, more broadly defined. Bill has since moved on to new challenges as head of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in Washington, but the U.S. delegation to the Basel Committee remains in excellent hands.

Details on our proposal can be found on the website of the Bank for International Settlements, and the Committee has invited public comment on the approach through the end of this year. In recommending this revision, the Committee seeks to ensure that risk management systems distinguish between losses that can be anticipated versus those that cannot. Moreover, the new framework would include explicit incentives for banks to address each kind of loss appropriately ensuring strong incentives for banks to provision properly against expected losses. Since the proposal would require only modest revisions to the text of CP3 and would not alter the underlying system and data requirements for banks wishing to adopt an advanced approach to credit risk, we expect that the revised treatment will conform closely to the work that banks have already completed to prepare for implementation. The work plan to improve the framework discussed during our last meeting identified several areas in addition to this important EL-UL issue. We think that this work plan is perfectly compatible with the original time schedule to implement the New Accord by yearend 2006. Other issues ahead: complexity Beyond the “EL/UL” issue, the Committee has put at the top of its work plan for the next few months several other credit-risk related issues that emerged in consultations. Of these matters, I’d especially like to highlight three, namely complexity, conservatism, and competition. Certainly, the complexity of the proposals continues to draw the public’s attention.
The current account surplus totalled FRF 236 billion in 1998, or 2.8% of GDP, comparable to the level recorded in 1997. With regard to monetary and financial developments, and particularly growth in monetary aggregates—which constitutes the internal intermediate objective of French monetary policy—, the means of payment covered by M1 posted a year-on-year rise of 3.1% in December 1998, after 6.5% in December 1997. Sight deposits paying regulated rates of interest included in M2 –M1 showed a yearon-year increase of 5.7% in December 1998, sharply down on the 9.2% recorded at the end of the previous year. Similarly, M2 progressed by 4.3%, less than the 7.8% rise recorded in 1997. The aggregate M3–M2, which covers liquid investments paying market rates of interest, stabilized in 1998  1  BIS Review 62/1999  with a 0.6% decline after the 8.2% drop recorded in 1997. This was mainly due to growth in money market UCITS, which rose by 4.1% after declining by 11.3% the previous year. The year-on-year increase in M3 was 2.7%, compared with 2.0% in December 1997. Growth in investment in contractual savings products recorded in the P1 investment aggregate maintained a sustained pace in 1998, and in all M3+P1 showed a year-on-year progression of 4.0%, against 5.1% in December 1997. Total domestic debt posted a year-on-year rise of 3.4% at the end of December.

However, four simple arguments form the basis of this recommendation: preserve, thanks to the confidence of investors, low medium- and longterm market interest rates, generate the financial resources necessary for productive sector investment, strengthen the confidence of the personal sector and bolster that of the corporate sector. It should be added that all Monetary Union member countries have to have budgets that are close to balance or in surplus, precisely in order to allow public finances to act, where necessary, as “automatic stabilizers” when economic conditions deteriorate. This point is essential, most particularly in the event of “asymmetric shocks”, i.e. particular economic difficulties affecting one member country, but not the others. –  Last, as it has done constantly in recent years, the Monetary Policy Council calls attention to the need to gradually reduce the ratio of public expenditure to GDP. According to OECD methodology, in France public spending amounts to 54.2% of GDP, well above the euro-area average of 48.7% and the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries average of 38.1%. Bringing this ratio back below 50% is a primary objective, even though it is timid in comparison with the performances of France’s partners. This greater rectitude in the management of public finances is a vital condition of competitiveness, growth and the development of employment in France.