samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Even more importantly, longer-term real rates are also below or around these levels, reflecting that the market considers that monetary policy not only is expansionary now, but is expected to remain so for some time, in line with the communications of the Bank itself. The lower interest rates are reflected not only in the record-low level of risk-free rates, but also in that borrowing costs are now very low by historic standards. This applies both to mortgage loans and to commercial and consumer loans. The exchange rate has also reacted. In nominal terms, the peso is now about 35% below its levels of mid-2013. Compared with other countries, however, the behavior of our currency has been similar, so that multilateral and real depreciation have been less. Finally, from the perspective of other countries that have had cycles similar to ours, monetary policy rates in Chile are among the lowest in real terms. Nonetheless, we must recognize that, even in normal situations, the effectiveness of monetary policy is not guaranteed, but depends on its correct implementation. This means respecting certain basic principles. Monetary policy, first and foremost, must be coherent with its policy framework and the situation of the country. This implies refraining from favoring short-term objectives, but rather calibrate the monetary impulse in such a way that projected inflation stands at 3% over a two-year horizon. Consistency is especially important to avoid unnecessary ups and downs in the economy causing market confusion.

Rather, by adopting a neutral stance, the pace with which the euro acquires its international role - whether as a trade currency, an investment currency or as a reserve currency - will be left primarily to market forces. However, if the Eurosystem is successful in maintaining price stability, confidence in the single currency will automatically foster the euro’s international role. The exchange rate of the euro is to be regarded, primarily, as the outcome of current and expected monetary and fiscal policies as well as of cyclical and other economic developments. At the moment, the European economy is clearly recovering and the outlook is favourable, with economic growth accelerating in the direction of 3%. As a result, the euro has a strong potential for appreciation. This is also firmly based on internal price stability and a sound current account position. *** Before I draw to a close, allow me finally to return to another of those peculiarities of EMU that can sometimes confound the external observer. If any of you have travelled to a euro area country over the past 12 months, you may have been misled into thinking that what you saw change hands were not euro, but rather French francs, Deutsche Mark or Italian lira. In that case, you would be only partially correct. While national banknotes and coins remain in circulation for the time being, they are no longer, despite appearances, actual currencies in their own right.
At the time, the Central Bank’s senior management objected vociferously to this bifurcation, as I mentioned in my speech at last year’s Annual Meeting. If there is any single factor that foreign experts have identified as the main cause of the 2008 collapse, it is the fact that responsibility for and supervision of the financial system were spread across a large number of ministries and institutions, with the result that no single party had an all-encompassing overview, no single party was actually accountable, no single party had adequate power, and no single party had enough muscle to intervene in the course of events. But now, Iceland’s financial supervision and other central bank activities have joined forces again after a separation of 22 years, and the merger has been a successful one. Now we have a single institution that is responsible for financial stability and has all of the necessary information on the financial system and developments in systemic risk within it. The future of monetary policy lies in the expansion of the policy toolbox and the coordination of monetary, macroprudential, and supervisory policy instruments within a single institution. Here lie the opportunities for Iceland’s tiny currency area. The Central Bank will also need to use its balance sheet – such as by intervening in the foreign exchange market – to ensure effective  monetary policy transmission and ward off potential financial side effects. We have been successful in this regard.

Initially, we planned that this restructuring option and incentives for banks to restructure loans would remain effective until 30 September, but then we decided to extend these measures until the end of the year. The number of loan restructuring applications is currently going down, but restructuring is still requested. Many companies have not had enough time to recover. Furthermore, they could also be affected by restrictions implemented in a range of regions. Therefore, just a few days ago we decided to extend this option for SME loan restructuring until the end of 2021 Q1, and this applies to both new and repeated restructurings. We are certainly going to monitor further how the situation changes. Moreover, I would like to remind you that we extended the regulatory relaxations for banks related to provisioning for restructured loans until 1 July. This privilege is also available to large corporates until 1 April. This concession period will also cover loans that will be restructured in 2021 Q1. In addition, we recommend that lenders and credit history bureaus do not take into account these restructurings as a negative factor in borrowers’ credit histories. I know that many small and medium-sized enterprises focused on this issue and this is a sensitive topic for them. I would like to thank OPORA RUSSIA for becoming the mediator in the process of loan restructuring.
Because banks no longer seek to lend out their excess reserves, there is no increase in the amount of credit outstanding, no redeposit of the excess reserves, no increase in economic activity and no risk that excessive credit creation will fuel an inflationary spiral. 2  That rate is unlikely to spur too much lending right now given the constraints on credit availability, but at some future date it undoubtedly would be too low once the recovery is sufficiently advanced and credit conditions improved. 3  For a more detailed discussion of monetary policy implementation under a regime in which the central bank pays interest on reserves, see: Todd Keister, Antoine Martin, and James J. McAndrews (2008), "Divorcing Money from Monetary Policy," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, Vol. 14 (2), 4156; and Todd Keister and James J. McAndrews (2009), "Why Are Banks Holding So Many Excess Reserves?" Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 380. 4  BIS Review 94/2009  For this dynamic to work correctly, the Federal Reserve needs to set an IOER rate consistent with the amount of required reserves, money supply and credit outstanding consistent with its dual mandate of full employment and price stability. If demand for credit exceeds what is appropriate, the Federal Reserve raises the IOER rate to reduce demand. If the demand for credit is insufficient to push the economy to full employment, then the Federal Reserve reduces the IOER rate, recognizing that the IOER rate cannot fall below zero.

Since the mid-1990s, a main purpose of the economic policy framework has been to shelter the economy from fluctuations in oil prices. The set-up of the Government Pension Fund Global and the fiscal rule for petroleum revenue spending is one important defence mechanism in this context. The government’s net cash flow from the petroleum industry is transferred in its entirety to the Government Pension Fund Global. A transfer from the Fund to cover a non-oil budget deficit requires a decision by the Norwegian parliament. In addition to preserving the real value of the Fund for the benefit of future generations, this set-up insulates the budget from short-term fluctuations in petroleum revenues. It also leaves space for fiscal policy to counteract economic downturns. In effect, since 2013, the increase in oil revenue spending has roughly matched the fall in oil investment. Monetary policy has also played a role. Our monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5% over time. Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. With confidence in the inflation target among economic agents, monetary policy in Norway has been able to contribute to stabilising the business cycle. Lower income from oil exports following the fall in the oil price meant cost-competitiveness needed to improve. A floating exchange rate greatly facilitated this process.
FTD: To cope with the crisis the European Central Bank used non-standard measures. The Securities Markets Programme, special treatment for government bonds of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, the liquidity provision for banks. How far does the ECB go with its special rules? Trichet: We can not accept to put in questions our role as the anchor of stability and confidence in the euro area and in Europe. If a country defaults, we can no longer accept as normal eligible collateral defaulted bonds issued by the government of that country. Because, in the eyes of the Governing Council, this would impair our ability to be an anchor of confidence and stability. FTD: What does the ECB say to the fact that, in the context of the second package for Greece, governments have nonetheless been talking about solutions such as a debt rollover or a partial debt buyback, which could lead to default? Trichet: The responsibility for this lies with the governments. The governments have been warned, in no uncertain terms and using all possible means. I have said so publicly. I have explained in detail to the Heads of State and Government and to the finance ministers, on several occasions, that, if a country defaults, we will no longer be able to accept its defaulted government bonds as normal eligible collateral. The governments would then have to step in themselves to put things right. That would then be their duty. FTD: What does that mean in concrete terms?

Some critics fear the stress tests will now lead to speculation against certain banks. Do you think this fear is justified? Trichet: I welcome the publication of the EU-wide stress-testing exercise, which was prepared and conducted by the EBA (European Banking Authority) and the national supervisory authorities. I trust it is an important tool to enhance transparency in the EU banking system. I also support the EBA recommendations to promptly remedy the capital shortfall of the banks that do not meet the threshold ratio of 5 % core Tier 1 capital (as of end-April) and to strengthen the capital position of those banks that are above but close to the threshold. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Success in this endeavour is not just a question of thinking things through in a consistent way but, above all, of adopting a persevering and workmanlike approach. Economic stability in the sense of a balanced development of the economy as a whole is the sine qua non for a financial centre. It is essential if investors are to gain sufficient confidence in the prospect of sustainable business success. Stable prices, low interest rates, modest rates of taxation and a solid currency are the crucial factors. To what extent - if at all - is a financial centre reliant on its economic hinterland? This question is less easy to answer. Although a well-balanced interdependency might seem to be desirable here as well, this is not necessarily confirmed by experience. In fact, there never seems to have been any close correlation, and with modern technology enhancing the mobility of people, goods and services, the links have become even looser. Our two countries at least are proof of the fact that there need not be any close correlation between the importance of a country’s economy and that of its financial sector. Talking about economic stability, I referred to the need for perseverance. This is precisely where I see the link with social and political stability. The central task of any community is to provide its members with the greatest possible degree of security, freedom and general welfare.

Connectivity among centralised Shariah advisory authorities The final point is on increasing connectivity among centralised Shariah advisory authorities to promote mutual respect and knowledge-sharing. Islam has flourished with a strong foundation of knowledge, wisdom and tolerance among its scholars. Differences in ideas and open discourses to assess the veracity of knowledge – have always been practiced in many Islamic societies. While achieving consensus is ideal – full appreciation of differences in circumstances and considerations is equally important and necessary. I have observed over the years that the implementation of Islamic finance varies from one jurisdiction to another. Rightly so, this reflects the different stages of development and diversity in local customs, market conventions and cultural norms. I believe through frequent and constructive dialogue, Shariah boards and advisory authorities will become more appreciative of the many differences in business and economic environment – that lead to different Shariah interpretations. Concerted efforts to cultivate greater understanding of the variations in fiqh interpretations and approaches to Islamic finance development are positive steps towards harmonisation that can deliver certainty of Shariah implementation in the global Islamic financial system. This roundtable meeting organised today is just a starting point of a long journey. It is my hope that this meeting offers a productive networking opportunity for all of us to identify common issues; explore mutually beneficial opportunities; and implement positive changes in our financial systems.
Accordingly, the Central Bank is obliged to aim towards an annual rate of inflation which, measured in terms of the increase in the Consumer Price Index over a twelve-month period, should generally be as close as possible to 2½%. Inflation targeting was introduced in a climate where the economy was severely overheating. For this reason an adjustment period was set whereby the Central Bank should aim to attain the inflation target by no later than the end of 2003. In fact, this target had already been reached in November 2002. Now I shall turn to last year’s inflation developments in more detail. In 2001 inflation climbed rapidly, from 5.6% at the beginning of the year and hit a peak of 9.4% in January 2002. Last year, inflation slowed down steadily: it has been below the Central Bank’s target since November and around 2% over the past four months. In the beginning of August 2003 the twelve-month rise in the CPI measured 2%. While the CPI is used as the official inflation rate reference, two other indices are published, core indices which provide a clearer picture of the underlying rate of inflation. The core indices exclude price components that are either fairly volatile or more or less beyond the impact of monetary policy, or that reflect relative price changes that monetary policy should normally not respond to. Core Index I excludes prices of vegetables, fruit, agricultural products and petrol, and Core Index II excludes prices of public services as well.

Important baseline market practices that should apply to every firm – or CG “hygiene” requirements – are hardened by their inclusion in the SGX Listing Rules. Indeed, twelve basic requirements previously couched as guidelines have been shifted from the Code to the Listing Rules. In other aspects, the Code has been streamlined and elaborated in the Practice Guidance. In considering what should be mandatory in the SGX Listing Rules, Council members had carefully considered their effectiveness in supporting long-term business goals, and how the revised Code compares against international practices. There may be some concerns that some of the principles in the Code are subject to interpretation and gaming. I can understand such sentiments. This is why the MAS has also accepted the Council’s recommendation to set up a standing Corporate Governance Advisory Committee to monitor CG developments on a regular basis, and you can expect more details on this Committee once it is set up. There are other views calling on regulators to adopt quicker or harsher actions in response to CG violations. Some felt that directors should be held more accountable for their fiduciary duties, or breaches in their fiduciary duties. Investigations are usually complex and time-consuming affairs especially if there are crossborder elements involved. At the same time, it is important that our financial sector operates with a clear rule of law, as well as fair and transparent legal processes. This is to assure a trusted regime for everyone. We must allow for thorough investigations as a matter of legal and investigation integrity.
The outlook for price stability is also favourable, although inflation is expected to rise somewhat in the near future. This is mainly a result of the recent strong increase in energy prices. The fact that regional discrepancies in price increases amounted to up to 2 percentage points does not, by any means, conflict with this assessment. This phenomenon, which is almost typical for large-sized monetary areas and is also to be found in the United States, can reasonably be explained. *** So far, I have limited myself to considering the internal aspects of EMU, but the introduction of the euro also has implications that extend far beyond the boundaries of the European Union. As the currency of an economic area with a population of nearly 300 million people and one sixth of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), the euro is already the second most widely used currency in the world after the US dollar. Moreover, as investor confidence grows and as more EU Member States join the euro area, in particular following EU enlargement, the euro’s role as an international currency is destined to gain in importance. This is not to say that the Eurosystem will actively promote an international role for the euro, or that there is a policy of trying to supplant the US dollar as the world’s leading currency.

However, since four of the national central banks which form part of the ESCB continue to conduct their own autonomous monetary policies, one cannot accurately refer to the ESCB as the authority responsible for conducting monetary policy in the euro area. We must instead use the term “Eurosystem”, which comprises the ECB and the 11 national central banks of those countries which have adopted the euro, and which has been adopted as a “user friendly” expression to denote the form in which the ESCB performs its tasks and responsibilities. The Eurosystem is set up, like the Federal Reserve System, in a distinctively decentralised manner. At the same time, however, the Eurosystem disposes of marked centralised structures, since the definition and implementation of the single monetary policy are carried out under the exclusive responsibility of BIS Review 4/2000  2  the decision-making bodies of the ECB. These are, first of all, the Governing Council, which defines the single monetary policy for the euro area and takes all other decisions of fundamental importance to the Eurosystem. The Members of the Governing Council are the Governors of the 11 national central banks and the six members of the Executive Board of the ECB. Basically, all decisions are taken by simple majority, whereby each member has one vote. The other important decision-making body is the Executive Board of the ECB, which is basically responsible for the implementation of monetary policy in accordance with the decisions taken by the Governing Council.
However, new vulnerabilities have emerged, especially a broadbased deterioration in the fiscal positions in a number of non-euro area EU countries, a number of which are currently under excessive deficit procedures. As Chart 8 on slide 13 illustrates, it needs to be kept in mind that the stock of outstanding foreign currency loans in these countries, while no longer increasing, remains sizeable, which makes the quality of exposed banks’ assets vulnerable to exchange rate risks. Given that the exposures to the CEE region are rather concentrated among some euro area countries’ banking sectors, the risks remain material in these cases. The third risk that has been identified within the euro area financial system is that of heightened financial market volatility if macroeconomic outcomes fail to live up to expectations. Until the increase in volatility experienced this month, the stock markets in the euro area had broadly stabilised after a strong recovery in 2009, which mainly reflected the impact of improving macroeconomic news and better corporate earnings prospects. Chart 9 on slide 14 shows that most conventional valuation measures, such as the long-term price-earnings ratio do not suggest that valuations are particularly high by historical standards. But there is a risk of heightened financial market volatility, if expectations of macroeconomic outcomes are disappointed. I would also like to briefly comment on the current state of the euro area securitisation markets. The securitisation markets were rendered dysfunctional by the financial crisis for a variety of micro and macroeconomic reasons.

Ravi Menon: Budget carefully, borrow responsibly, invest wisely Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch of the Tamil Financial Literacy Guide, Singapore, 16 November 2014. *  *  *  Mr Kumaran Barathan, CEO of SINDA Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Value of patience and prudence In the 1960s and 1970s, a psychology professor at Stanford University in the US conducted a study on children’s behaviour.   He offered each child a choice: get a marshmallow immediately or, if they waited a little longer, get two marshmallows.   Some children did not want to wait, or perhaps they had doubts about the professor keeping his word. So, they chose to have their sweet there and then.   Others were more patient and received two marshmallows, as promised. Fast forward 20 years. Follow-up studies were done on the same group of children.   Those children who had chosen to delay getting their marshmallow generally performed better in their lives.   They achieved better test results in school, for example.   And yes, they kept themselves in better shape too! The results have intrigued psychologists, social scientists, and educators ever since. Many more studies are being conducted and more elaborate theories are being proposed to explain them. But maybe our forefathers knew the answer all along: the value of patience and prudence; in other words, delay rewards today so that we can reap greater rewards tomorrow.