samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
LNG capacity start-ups in Australia and North America which will boost new LNG supplies amidst stagnating demand will put more pressure on LNG prices, hence further disrupting the LNG market. Due to low oil and LNG prices, the profitability of oil majors and National Oil Companies (NOCs) has been severely eroded. The impact has been pronounced. More than 300,000 oil and gas workers have been laid off globally since mid-2014; some USD 380 billion of global oil and gas projects have been deferred or cancelled; and more than USD 150 billion worth of assets have been planned for disposal or divestment. Given Malaysia’s openness and high financial and trade integration with the rest of the world, the Malaysian economy is not isolated from these developments. On the external front, lower global demand continues to weigh down on Malaysia’s export performance. Investment activities especially in the upstream oil and gas sector, contracted for the first time since the global financial crisis in 2015, after expanding by an average of 16% from 2010 to 2014. However, investment activity in the manufacturing and services sectors remained  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  resilient, and is expected to underpin investment growth moving forward. Private consumption remained relatively resilient and anchored domestic growth, especially during the first half of the year, driven by sustained income and employment levels. Going forward, domestic demand is expected to remain a key driver of economic growth in Malaysia. We should expect Malaysian economic growth to range between 4.0 to 4.5 % for 2016.

But the severity of the crisis increased dramatically following the failure of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008. Confidence in the very essence of banking – as well as in individual financial institutions – was shaken to its core and the most severe banking crisis for almost a century was triggered. As we now know, this led to a deep and highly synchronised global recession. Output in virtually every corner of the world fell sharply. Global trade flows contracted by a staggering 15% in the two quarters following the failure of Lehmans. Over the same period, output at home is estimated to have fallen by 4 1/4% – the largest fall in UK GDP over a two-quarter period since quarterly records began. The speed and severity of the downturn cannot be explained solely by the tightening in credit conditions. The impact of the banking crisis was greatly amplified by the accompanying collapse in business and household confidence. Firms’ concerns about their ability to access the working capital needed to run their businesses was compounded by the bleak and uncertain prospects for demand. In response, production was slashed and business spending was severely curtailed. Stock levels were run down at an unprecedented pace, as companies met demand from existing inventories and economised on working capital. Faced with growing spare capacity there was little incentive for businesses to invest in new plant and machinery, and capital expenditure contracted by almost 20% in the first six months of 2009 alone.
Hong Kong will shortly have a state-of-the-art facility for conducting US dollar transactions in Asian time. The benefits of this for both local business and international customers, in both trade and finance, should be considerable. I take this opportunity to thank and congratulate those who have worked hard to bring the project to its present advanced stage in so short a time, and I wish every success to all who will be involved in translating the design into reality. BIS Review 22/2000  2

Comparing this set of conditions to that in 2010, the recent slowing of inflation has been less widespread across core goods and core services, and inflation expectations so far have declined less appreciably than they did in 2010. Thus, my best guess is that core goods prices will begin to firm in the months ahead as global demand begins to strengthen and inventories get into better alignment with sales. 1  2  CoreLogic Report Shows Home Prices Rise by 12.1 Percent Year Over Year in April. BIS central bankers’ speeches  As is always the case, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding this forecast. Moreover, there is always the possibility of some unforeseen shock. Thus, we will be monitoring U.S. and global economic conditions very carefully and will adjust our views on the likely path for growth, inflation and the unemployment rate accordingly in response to new information. At its meeting last week, the FOMC decided to continue its accommodative policy stance. It reaffirmed its expectation that the current low range for the federal funds rate target will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5 percent, so long as inflation and inflation expectations remain well-behaved. It is important to remember that these conditions are thresholds, not triggers. The FOMC also maintained its purchases of $ billion per month in agency MBS and $ billion per month in Treasury securities, with a stated goal of promoting a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook in a context of price stability.
Forward-looking models can be set up in ways where things go wrong for a while. In particular, by allowing agents to learn more or less gradually that the monetary authority really does mean it about achieving its target for inflation (or some other nominal variable) 12 . Everything still turns out okay eventually, but the route can be a bit bumpy. Experiments of that kind can help policymakers to think through, in a disciplined way, what might happen if inflation expectations were to become dislodged. But, so far, they do not do much to help us know what to look for in identifying whether inflation expectations are in the process of becoming dislodged. We do not know enough about how households and firms form their expectations – how much forward7 looking, how much backward-looking – to be able to model the process rigorously. That is not part of the ‘information set’ of policymakers in today’s world. What this underlines is that policymakers may well not be able to rely on their models to help them terribly much when the stakes are highest; ie when our credibility may be fragile. They are tools to help us think. But they don’t tell us the answers. Crucially, we have to make judgments about whether medium-term inflation expectations are, in fact, securely anchored. We need to resist falling into the trap of thinking that the nominal side is now, and forever, nicely looked after by some miracle of credibility.

10  For example Australia, Canada, New Zealand. 2  BIS Review 46/2006  markets about the steady-state rate of inflation being targeted. In other words, a point target makes communication somewhat more straightforward. Of course, that is not the same as saying that we can guarantee to deliver inflation outturns consistently in line with the target over an economic cycle. Shocks, and even policy mistakes, will cause inflation to deviate from target. Explaining such deviations matters. Especially when being reappointed for a further term, MPC members are typically asked by the House of Commons’ Treasury Select Committee whether the MPC has made any big mistakes 11 . In response, we often talk about luck, diligence etc. But I think that the best test – perhaps the only important test – is whether medium-to-long-term inflation expectations have been dislodged from the target. In the UK, expectations have generally been in line with our target since the Bank was given operational independence. But as the recent slight tick up in some measures illustrates, we have to be constantly vigilant. By contrast, an uncomfortable amount of commentary – academic and in the media – proceeds as if that particular battle is won for all time; the ‘death of inflation’ school of thought. Indeed, seductively, these days ‘victory’ tends to be inscribed in to the economic models used by central banks as an input to their forecasts.
Everyone who produces inflation forecasts knows that it is difficult to exactly assess monthly changes and there is nothing remarkable about a forecast deviation of 0.2 percentage points. A factor that contributed to the forecast error was that Statistics Sweden, when it published the new figures, also downwardly revised the inflation figures for the period January to the end of July this year. It is of course unfortunate that miscalculations are made in a variable that is of such central importance to the Riksbank and many others, but it should be pointed out that this is very rare. The revision attracted a lot of media attention and there was speculation that the Riksbank would have decided differently if this miscalculation had been known at the time the decision was made. The July figure for the CPI was then 4.4 per cent, while the revised figure is 4.1 per cent. Allow me therefore to comment briefly on this. It need hardly be said that my decision, and that of the two colleagues who also entered a reservation, to recommend an unchanged interest rate would not have been effected. Whether it would have affected the decision of the majority I cannot of course say. But it should be remembered that it is the processing and analysis of a great quantity of information that leads to the overall assessment of economic development and inflation prospects. And it is the forecast derived from this information that largely determines the interest rate decision.

As my colleague, David Miles, argued in a speech to the Home Builders Federation earlier this year5, we are presently in a transition from a precrisis world with compressed risk premia and in some cases imprudently generous loan-tovalue and loan-to-income ratios, to a more sustainable equilibrium with lower ratios. That implies a period during which first-time buyers and those hoping to move up the housing ladder save the necessary extra equity, low transactions and a fall in the share of owneroccupiers. That is pretty much what we have seen and the transition has been made harder by the squeeze in real incomes. The prospective moderation in the squeeze on real household incomes should help those saving for a deposit to get onto, or move up, the housing ladder. So, as well as supporting consumer spending, it should also help support mortgage demand. That would, no doubt, be a most welcome development to you, as well as to the households themselves. On that note, let me finish by hoping that the rest of your conference today proves most stimulating and valuable. Thank you! 3  In fact using the PAYE system would probably be the easiest way to implement such a scheme. Moreover, if the Government were actually to send out vouchers redeemable into cash it might well fall foul of the prohibition on monetary finance contained in the Lisbon Treaty.
Svein Gjedrem: The economic situation and monetary policy in Norway Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), for Norges Bank’s regional network, arranged by Kunnskapsparken Bodø, in Sandnessjøen, 4 September 2006. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 16 August and Inflation Report 2/06. *  *  *  The economic situation The cyclical upturn in the Norwegian economy continues. Corporate sector profitability is solid. Companies are borrowing and investing. Employment is rising at a fast pace, unemployment is falling and household demand is still on the increase. Capacity utilisation in the economy is rising and a growing number of enterprises are facing constraints. Statistics Norway’s business tendency survey for the second quarter is still giving positive signals regarding developments in Norwegian manufacturing. A clear majority of industrial leaders assess the general outlook for the third quarter as more positive than for the second quarter. At the same time, consumer price inflation excluding energy products remains low and is lower than the inflation target. Norges Bank seeks to set the interest rate with a view to achieving a reasonable balance between the objective of stabilising inflation at target and the objective of stabilising developments in output and employment.

Chart 9 compares the 90th, 95th, and 99th percentile with the median and shows that the main change is at the top. If we break that top percentile down further, we see a more dramatic widening. This is not just true of the City or of the UK. The average CEO in the UK earns around 100 times more than the average worker but there is an even wider gap in the US, with the average pay of CEOs over 250 times that of the average worker in 2005, having risen from around 100 times in 1995. In 1999 Eddie George likened the change in the City since Big Bang to Wimbledon. 4 The UK still prospered by providing the venue even though most of the players were foreign. Today I think the Premiership may provide an even better analogy. That is partly because foreigners now own an increasing number of the venues as well as supplying many of the players. That is a striking illustration of Britain’s openness to foreign ownership which sets it some way apart from most other countries both in Europe and America. But it is also because both the City and the Premiership have become the centres of global industries with a dramatic impact on revenues and on earnings. One of my first footballing heroes was Johnny Haynes, the David Beckham of his day as a passer of a football.
Mr. Held would like to thank his other colleagues at the Federal Reserve who  provided comments and corrections. 2 Michael Held, SOFR and the Transition from LIBOR, February 26, 2019.  https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  5/6  30/09/2020  The LIBOR Countdown Has Not Stopped - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  3 FCA, Impact of the coronavirus on firms' LIBOR transition plans, March 3, 2020; see also Letter from Randal Quarles to G20  Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 4 Libor death notice could be served this year--FCA, Risk.net, June 22, 2020. 5 FSB Statement on the Impact of Covid-19 on Global Benchmark Reform, July 1, 2020. 6 ARRC Recommended Best Practices for Completing the Transition from LIBOR. 7 For example, see Internal Systems & Processes: Transition Aid for SOFR Adoption and the Practical Implementation Checklist for  SOFR Adoption. 8 Proposed Legislative Solution to Minimize Legal Uncertainty and Adverse Economic Impact Associated with LIBOR Transition. 9 Statement by Rishi Sunak, Chancellor of the Exchequer, June 23, 2020. 10 Edwin Schooling Latter, LIBOR transition-the critical tasks ahead of us in the second half of 2020, August 3, 2020. 11 Commission's proposal to amend EU rules on financial benchmarks. 12 Fact Sheet: IBOR Fallbacks. 13 ARRC Announces Recommendation of a Spread Adjustment Methodology for Cash Products; ARRC Announces Further Details  Regarding it Recommendation of Spread Adjustments for Cash Products. 14 ARRC Releases Request for Proposals for the Publication of Forward-Looking Term Rates.

through the adjustment of domestic prices and costs relative to external ones, and by curbing government spending and revenue shortfalls, in real terms. This is what the Spanish economy has, with great effort, been achieving since 2012. In the truly difficult circumstances of 2012, Spain avoided a bail-out that would have been very painful in many ways, and certainly from an economic and social standpoint. Spain never lost its access to the capital markets. Admittedly at very high interest rates, and with very large risk premiums, our Treasury was always able to fund itself on the markets, because the markets, while mindful of the risks involved, very quickly appreciated (I am referring to the summer of 2012) the seriousness and decisiveness of the corrective action being taken. Spain reacted as a responsible and loyal European Union and Monetary Union member. It did not attempt to shift the blame onto anyone else, even though the euro crisis, which affected us very directly, obviously did not arise exclusively, or originally, in the Spanish economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  To call the correction of unsustainable imbalances (like the balance of payments deficits of 2007 and 2008, of around 10% of GDP, and the budget deficits, which ranged from 9% to 11% between 2009 and 2012) austerity, is not really a very good description of reality. Changing direction when on a path towards impossible and unsustainable situations is not “austerity” but common sense and, in a very real sense, patriotism.
And three points on what it will mean. On the “how”, the first thing to say is that going forward, banks are being required to carry considerably more capital and liquidity. Second, as is now well known within the industry, the international authorities have agreed a blueprint for resolution regimes to manage the failure of so-called Systemically Important Financial Institutions in an orderly way. G20 Leaders have committed to legislate that regime into their domestic systems where necessary. All resolution regimes have the effect of distributing the losses of distressed financial firms – ie losses already or prospectively exceeding equity – across unsecured, uninsured creditors. That is the only place losses can go if taxpayers are to be spared. “Bailin” has focussed minds on this, but is in fact just one method, albeit a very important one, for ensuring that uninsured creditors take losses. Those “how” points are very familiar. A few comments, therefore, on possible implications – all of which, looking ahead, point towards the crucial importance of our capital markets. First, in a world of less leveraged banks, a business model of Originate and Warehouse – because that is what it became by the middle of the past decade – is unlikely to be viable. Maybe a genuine model of Originate and Distribute will emerge, with something like agencytype market making and trading. Second, holders of bank paper – especially bonds – will be living in a different world. They will have a big incentive to monitor the riskiness of banks.

Interpreted broadly, this can include relatively simple indicators, such as interest rates, interest rate spreads, and returns. They include other measures related to the value of financial or tangible assets like bonds, stocks, housing, and gold. And of course they also include more sophisticated, data-intensive estimates of risk, which we hope to discuss today. For central banks, one of the main questions that arises is whether financial market indicators are useful in setting monetary policy. And if so, which ones are most useful for central banks, and for what purpose? In general, financial market indicators are used by central banks to: (1) gauge market sentiment with regards to expected changes to policy variables; (2) identify types and sources of shocks to the economy; and (3) predict future developments in economic activity and inflation. Such predictions of longer-term inflation are also useful in checking how markets view the credibility of the authorities’ commitments to their final price target. So financial indicators can be used to double check econometric and judgmental predictions as well as flag a problem of asset price misalignment, which may need to be addressed by policy. In addition, financial market indicators have the potential to reflect developments at critical stages of the transmission process. This is due to the fact that financial markets in general adjust faster than goods markets, and their prices are timelier and less prone to measurement error. Today’s workshop will give us the chance to discuss these and many other issues.
The Riksbank discusses a number of possible measures in its latest Financial Stability Report. Firstly, the Riksbank tries to influence developments by communicating our views on what is happening publicly and in the form of a dialogue with the banks. The Financial Stability Report plays a central role in this context. The Riksbank can in certain situations provide a more comprehensive picture of the risks than the individual market players, as the latter attaches greater importance to evaluating developments in their own portfolios. If the Riksbank believes that an unhealthy build-up of risk is occurring and our assessment has not had the intended influence on the individual market players, there are other measures that the Riksbank can take. In extreme cases, quantitative regulations may be introduced, such as raised required capital adequacy ratios or a reserve requirement. Nor can an increase in the repo rate be ruled out if financial stability is threatened. However, these are more far-reaching measures and would only be used if the build-up of risk was assessed to constitute an acute problem. The assessment of the situation made by the Riksbank and other authorities will always be marred by a large measure of uncertainty, as it is extremely difficult to evaluate how serious the build-up of risk actually is. If drastic measures are to be taken, the assessment must be based on a strong foundation. The development we can see today is, as I mentioned earlier, far from requiring any intervention.

Gent Sejko: The need to reinforce understanding of economic developments and their relation to policy Welcome remarks by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 12th SEE Economic Research Workshop, Tirana, 6 December 2018. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen! It is a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you today to our 12th research workshop. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our guests from academia and central banks who for 12 years have made this workshop one of the best and well-recognized economic and financial research events in Albania and in the region. Let me also thank all of our distinguished chairs, speakers and discussants for their engagement here today. The papers that will be presented and discussed during these 2 days will cover a wide range of economic and financial issues that concern central banks. The topics on monetary policy, financial stability, risk and novel methodologies are all very relevant to the daily activity of central banks and as such are very important to us. The Bank of Albania is involved in decision- making on all these issues and we provide our active support to it through our research. Along with the papers that are going to be presented today in the panels, we have also decided to include and present in the poster presentations, tomorrow, some of our ongoing projects.