samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Instead it is technological and organisational advances, together with innovations, that have largely been the driving forces behind productivity. During the 1990s a number of markets in Sweden were opened up to competition. This included the markets for electricity, telecommunications, post and a large part of the transport sector. At the same time, there was a general reinforcement of the competition policy through the establishment of the Swedish Competition Authority and the introduction in Sweden of a new, stricter law on competition. When competition stiffens, companies are forced to become more efficient and cost-conscious, which leads to an increase in productivity. Studies by the OECD indicate a clear relationship between deregulation of product markets and productivity growth. 3 This factor has probably been significant for the relatively rapid increase in productivity during the past 10-15 years. One important aspect in today’s globalised knowledge-based society is that competition promotes innovation and thereby productivity. 4 To avoid being driven out of the market companies are forced to constantly improve existing products and processes and also to develop new ones. Sweden is at the forefront in Europe and pointed out as an innovation leader alongside Denmark and Finland, for instance. 5 Another explanation for the growth in productivity in Sweden, as in many other countries, has been that the percentage of highly educated persons in the labour force has shown an increase trend, partly as a result of technological developments.

The significance of IT is visible in two ways; in production and use. If we look at the production of IT, we can observe that the telecom industry's share of total industry is relatively large in Sweden compared with many other countries. This means that the rapid development in productivity that has occurred in the telecom sector has contributed to pushing up productivity growth in the business sector as a whole. If we instead look at use of IT, Sweden has a relatively large share of IT capital in the total capital stock, compared with other countries. Sweden is in this respect more like the United States than continental Europe. The use of IT means that one can simplify and automate the work so that those who work can carry out more tasks in a shorter time, that is, productivity increases. The financial sector is very skilled at making use of IT to increase productivity. Its customers currently carry out many simple tasks from home in front of their computers instead of going to a bank office. During the second half of the 1990s, major investments were made in IT capital. These investments accounted for approximately half of the growth in productivity during the period 1996-2000 (see Figure 4). The investment upturn was broken in connection with the IT bubble bursting at the beginning of the 2000s. After that the contribution from IT capital to productivity growth has declined substantially.
But until we figure it out, it’s going to be a very rough ride.” The task at hand for everybody is to figure this out, urgently, even though you might not yet have a fire in your backyard. BIS Review 85/1998

One point of interest is that the railway construction also gave Gothenburgers the decisive influence in determining the time in the 19th century. It was the railways that ensured that the whole of Sweden followed the same time. Prior to the railways, time was determined by the sun. It was 12 noon when the sun stood at its highest point in the sky, regardless of which part of the country one was in. This meant that there was a time difference of 52 minutes between the most eastern and western parts of Sweden. When the western trunk line between Stockholm and Gothenburg was complete, it was necessary to have the same time so that the timetables would work, and Gothenburg time became the standard. This period of liberalisation and internationalisation of the world economy was abruptly broken off by the outbreak of war in 1914 and was replaced by national isolation. Although Sweden was largely an open economy during parts of the interwar period, it was not until after the Second World War that this isolation was broken at a global level. For the past couple of decades we have been in a clear period of internationalisation and financial integration. Same driving forces now as then Today, information technology and communications technology have replaced the railways as symbols for economic progress, but the driving forces are basically the same now as they were then and the interaction between the financial markets and other parts of the economy plays the same important role.
Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Financial integration and stability – efficiency gains vs pitfalls Keynote address by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the conference “Heterogeneous Nations and Globalized Financial Markets: New Challenges for Central Banks”, organised by the National Bank of Poland, Warsaw, 11 June 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen 1 , It is a pleasure for me to speak at this conference today here in Warsaw. Heterogeneous nations and globalized financial markets – the title of this conference – are an old phenomenon. In fact, in the late medieval ages of the 14th to the 16th century, the Kingdom of Poland, the Holy Roman Empire and the Hanseatic area have formed a well financially integrated area contributing to more specialization in trade and hence to economic growth at that time. In fact, despite the existence of many currencies, money was easy to transport and so financial integration was rather more advanced than the integration of markets for goods. The Kingdom of Poland was playing a particular role for the financial integration at that time as a key provider of silver from its silver mines for the coin production, also for the neighbouring regions. 2 In today’s modern economies, we think of financial integration having mainly two positive impacts. First, to improve the allocative efficiency of capital, and second, to help the diversification of risks.

Investors, on the other hand, were attracted by the relatively higher return in times of low investment rate levels and by the sense of security provided – among other things – by the assessment of rating agencies. The ultimate outcome was that instead of dispersing risks associated with bank lending, securitisation had the opposite effect of concentrating them in the banking system, with harmful consequences for financial stability. The size of the financial sector is another aspect which deserves close scrutiny. When the financial system grows too large it may eventually lead to a misallocation of resources. Of course, it has to be acknowledged that developed credit markets are important for business start-ups. However, while finance is a crucial element for the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, the recent financial crisis has also highlighted the role that large financial markets play in downside risk. A growing number of academics and opinion makers are questioning the theory that the effect of financial markets on growth is always positive and increasing. The relationship may well be non-linear: when of reasonable size, financial markets do help allocating resources efficiently and promote economic growth. However, as they grow larger, it may well be that financial markets may exert a decreasing marginal contribution to growth. In extreme cases, as the size of financial systems exceeds some threshold, their effect on growth could even turn negative.
Not only is the world more complex, but we need to devote real thought as to how best to operate and organise ourselves so as to contain risks. Defining the resources you need, and how to deploy them is challenging in itself. My prediction is that as the system’s complexity increases we will all find ourselves asking the same questions:  BIS Review 36/2005  7  Just what should we do? Why? And what effect will it have? 8  BIS Review 36/2005

• In recognition of such trends, the Singapore Exchange (“SGX”) has introduced a “comply or explain” regime for sustainability reporting in 2017, where listed companies are required to disclose and explain their sustainability practices. • ASEAN governments have also imposed regulatory drivers, to assist companies with identifying gaps and areas for improvements in their sustainability eworts [7] . For example, in the mining and minerals sectors, companies are subject to commonly-agreed-upon regional guidelines for assessing and reporting on the awected environment. 15 Đ Đ We are heartened that the WFE has taken the lead in advancing the sustainability agenda in two particular areas: • First, the integration of sustainability with commodity derivatives. The WFE has published a white paper that explores how commodity derivatives exchanges could create new mitigation or investment tools that respond to environmental challenges, and incorporate sustainability elements into existing contracts; Đ • Second, the adoption of sustainable practices and principles. The WFE has partnered the United Nations Sustainable Stock Exchanges to set out a  blueprint to support exchanges in embedding sustainability in their operations. 16 Đ Đ Overall, these eworts will drive wider discussions on sustainability as well as provide guidelines on how WFE members could adopt relevant sustainable practices and principles in their strategies for growth and operations.
The biggest risks are a global economic downturn, a  Page 2/4  Zurich, 22 September 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  worsening of the gas shortage in Europe and a power shortage in Switzerland. Furthermore, a resurgence of the coronavirus pandemic cannot be ruled out. Monetary policy tightening  Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to return to our monetary policy. I would like to explain today’s decision. Last quarter, our conditional inflation forecast indicated that, without a further tightening of monetary policy, inflation would be above the range consistent with price stability at the end of the forecast horizon. This meant that further interest rate increases might be needed to stabilise inflation in the range consistent with price stability over the medium term. This has turned out to be the case. While Switzerland’s inflation rate of 3.5% is low by international comparison, it is significantly above the 0% to 2% range we equate with price stability. There are also growing signs that higher prices are increasingly spreading to goods and services that are not directly affected by the war in Ukraine or the consequences of the pandemic. Information from our delegates for regional economic relations suggests that companies can more easily transfer higher costs to their sales prices. In addition, energy prices have continued to rise overall and are increasing inflationary pressure in many sectors. This heightens the risk of second-round effects. We have therefore concluded that a significant increase in the SNB policy rate is appropriate.

My colleague Andréa Maechler will describe the adjustments to monetary policy implementation in more detail later. Page 1/4  Zurich, 22 September 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Inflation forecast  Let me now turn to inflation developments. Inflation rose to 3.5% in August and is likely to remain at an elevated level for the time being. The latest rise in inflation is principally due to higher prices for goods, especially energy and food. Our new conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate is 0.5% over the entire forecast horizon (cf. chart 1). Up to mid-2024, the forecast is above that of June. After that, it is lower due to the now tighter monetary policy. At the end of the forecast horizon, inflation stands at 2%. The new forecast puts average annual inflation at 3% for 2022, 2.4% for 2023 and 1.7% for 2024 (cf. table 1). Without today’s SNB policy rate increase, the inflation forecast would be significantly higher. Global economic outlook  I will now move on to the economic outlook. Global economic growth has slowed considerably in recent months. At the same time, inflation in many countries is markedly above targets. In response, numerous central banks have further tightened their monetary policy. In our baseline scenario, we expect this challenging situation to persist for now. Global economic growth is thus likely to remain weak in the coming quarters.
In the same way, the remuneration of fixed rate debt securities such as bonds only includes expected inflation and is thus vulnerable to any unexpected change in inflation. It has been empirically established that, as intuition suggests, the volatility of inflation increases as it rises, which implies that risk premia are generally not in line with the real level of inflation. I should add that inflation creates a well known fiscal bias when flows of interest to creditors include an inflation premium to cover the depreciation in the value of financial capital during a period of inflation, and this premium, which is not real income, is charged. 1  BIS Review 6/2000  In fact, in a situation where inflation rises unexpectedly a transfer of wealth occurs from the creditors to the debtors. This interferes with the optimal allocation of savings (I shall return to this issue) when the transfers of wealth do not correspond to the provision of a service or a real economic cost, but have all the characteristics of a “windfall profit” or an exceptional loss. It can also result in a reduction in the amount of savings in two ways: by discouraging agents’ propensity to save amounts subject to the monetary hazard; and (because of the bias resulting from the depreciation in the nominal value of debt and the fiscal distortion to which I referred) by transferring inflationary income from the private to the public sector, which has a lower saving ratio.

Commodity prices remain high by historic standards, consistently with the strength of emerging economies, some specific supply-side elements and the depreciation of the dollar. Worth noting are the recent sharp increases in the international prices of some foodstuffs and the copper price peaking at $ per pound (figure 4). The baseline scenario in the IPoM we are presenting today assumes that some of these factors will persist over the projection scenario. In the case of copper, even if it will not be as high as today, it will exceed September’s projections, at $ and $ per pound in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The price outlook for WTI oil is also revised up from September, to $ per barrel in the two years. The baseline scenario for the international economy is good, albeit with important associated risks. We expect an average growth rate of 4.2% for the world economy over the next two years, fairly high by historic standards, but around 0.3 percentage points below the market consensus forecast. This differential is based on the effects of the financial turbulences in Europe, tighter fiscal adjustment plans in the region and the absence of a vigorous recovery of demand in developed economies. In addition, because of the inflationary pressures present in some emerging economies, it is obvious they cannot continue to grow at the same pace they did this year (table 1).
On the contrary, we must convince the rest of the world that we have not refrained from adopting the euro so as to be able to devalue the krona if the going gets tough. The long-term positive effects of joining the monetary union should not be played down just because they are difficult to measure. The participating countries and markets are drawing closer to each other. This probably affects competition, investment flows and prices to a greater extent than traditional models are able to show. I believe that the costs of staying outside are particularly great at present and in the coming years, for instance as EMU generates far-reaching structural changes in the business sector. To this should be added the political arguments. Sweden has already lost influence in the area I am best able to assess, economic policy. This is particularly serious today as the global financial map is being redrawn and we need to assert our position as a small country in Europe. Others are better placed to pronounce on other areas but it seems logical that our positions there are also being weakened because we are not seen as a fully-fledged participant in EU cooperation. 5  BIS Review 92/1999  Finally it is a matter of weighing all these arguments against each other. The assessments involved, economic as well as political, are naturally difficult.

A recovery plan for maintaining a going concern. And a resolution plan for firms that, however regrettably, need to be laid to rest. The objective in each case is to maintain the financial system’s provision of essential services to the economy. Firms themselves need to play a leading role in drawing up “recovery plans”. At least two components are needed, roughly corresponding to liquidity and capital. First, a contingency funding plan (CFP). Too few banks of any size seem to have had one in any serious way. There was, for example, too little focus on the effects of ratings downgrades on collateral calls and on the availability of lines of credit. And too little attention was paid to core liquidity holdings: a treasury portfolio comprising the FRNs issued by other banks does not leave a distressed bank with many options in the face of system-wide stress. Banks need to know exactly what assets they hold in which securities-depository systems; how long it would take to deploy them; and which are eligible in which central banks’ routine facilities. Too few banks had that information readily to hand. Maybe they do now. They should. The FSA has very kindly agreed to share with the Bank of England the CFPs of banks (and building societies) where relevant to our functions. As well as helping us to discharge our financial stability responsibilities more broadly, this will be useful in making sense of requests to draw from our Discount Window Facility.
A lower policy rate may thus have less effect on lending rates than normal, weakening the impact of monetary policy. Over the past year, inflation among many of Norway’s trading partners has approached zero. For many years monetary policy was aimed at preventing high inflation, while it must now seek to avoid inflation that is too low. Central banks are in new territory. A period of low inflation is not necessarily a problem as long as confidence in the inflation target remains firm. But when the room for further policy rate cuts is close to being exhausted, steadily falling inflation could lead to a dangerous downward spiral. For every notch that expected future inflation falls, real interest rates rise. This has a contractionary effect on the economy. In recent years, concerns about falling inflation expectations have prompted central banks to cut policy rates further and to deploy unconventional measures. It has been argued that these monetary policy measures are necessary to avoid a further fall in inflation as a result of a stronger exchange rate. Interest rate cuts that lead to a currency depreciation push up inflation. But countries cannot all weaken their currencies at the same time. If many countries cut interest rates to boost inflation via a weaker currency, the benefit may not materialise, while interest rates remain too low with respect to other considerations. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The financial crisis created unusually strong headwinds in the global economy.

It would be naive to think that we can be right all the time. Nobody can be. We can only be less wrong. But more importantly, public support should not be built merely upon faith in an esoteric and aloof BIS Review 87/1998  -3-  HKMA being professional and acting in the best interest of Hong Kong. Whatever reputation the HKMA has been able to achieve, domestically and internationally, such support could never be sustained for long. We do run a system that, at times, inflicts considerable pain on the community. Many of the decisions taken by the HKMA are unpopular. The pain and the unpopular decisions may become too severe to bear just on the foundation of faith, particularly in the peculiar political setup of Hong Kong. 11. An essential part in the management of the political process concerning monetary issues, therefore, is to promote a better general understanding on those issues. This is not easy. Not only are those issues technical, but they are also changing all the time with the rapid changes in the global financial scene. Financial liberalization and the globalization of financial markets, encouraged by the advance of telecommunications and information technology, have drastically changed the behaviour of money. On top of all this, we have the complication that Hong Kong’s monetary system has really only started to take shape in the past ten years or so, as monetary reform measures were introduced to modernize it so it could cope with the demands and expectations of modern finance.
This was the path that most observers counted on last spring. It was, however, questioned by others, particularly outside the United States. In general, they foresaw a more protracted, U-shaped recovery. Time would be needed for the adjustment of the over-  2  BIS Review 86/2001  investments that excessive optimism had generated. There is a lag before measures of economic policy have tangible effects. In some quarters, finally, there is an even more pessimistic scenario, an L. This envisages that growth in the U.S. economy comes more or less to a halt as the imbalances undergo a painful correction and measures of economic policy have little effect. In my discussion with you last spring I believe I likened my version to a banana. This was because the Riksbank believed that in many respects the cyclical path would follow the normal pattern. An expansionary phase is usually followed by a period of slacker activity. The longer the upward trend has lasted, the more likely it is to take a pause. That made it difficult to believe in the V-shaped scenario that the financial markets were mainly counting on at that time. The path has been accentuated by the recoil from the excessive optimism that had attended the technological breakthrough and given rise to the notion of a new economy. With rising demand, the supply side of the American economy had been expanded on the basis of expectations that simply were not realistic.

Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 25 October 2018. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Dombrovskis. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We continue to expect them to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Regarding non-standard monetary policy measures, we will continue to make net purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) at the new monthly pace of € billion until the end of December 2018. We anticipate that, subject to incoming data confirming our medium-term inflation outlook, we will then end net purchases. We intend to reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the APP for an extended period of time after the end of our net asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation.