samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
How should we react? Not by less Europe. This would be a mistake if we want to take collective control of our destiny in this new world. But by a “better” Europe, less caught up in the detail, more focused on a few key priorities, and more efficient. To achieve this, Europe needs the energy of Germany and France, and of their remarkable friendship. I will now cite Chancellor Helmut Kohl: “The Germans and French must together build the hard core of the European Union – a union that sees itself not merely as a common market, but as a community of values, a democracy based on freedom, the rule of law and the social responsibility of the State”.3 Naturally I won’t talk to you this evening about the French election debate: I will simply say that as friends of France, you must not underestimate the strength of its institutions. I will talk to you even less about the German election debate. But I strongly believe that after these democratic elections, whatever the outcome, the governments of our two countries will have to confer to decide on a number of shared bilateral projects, and above all prepare a common initiative for Europe. Because for Germany and for France, the other country is certainly the best possible partner: there is no serious alternative, neither in the east nor the west for Germany, nor in the south for France.

This is the first time we intervened in the foreign exchange market since 1999. Relatively quickly after the interventions, the market began to function more normally. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Later in spring, the krone appreciated on the back of a rise in oil prices and reduced uncertainty in global financial markets. Recently, oil prices have been broadly at the same level as at the beginning of 2020, and the krone is somewhat stronger than prior to the Covid-19 outbreak. In spring 2020, risk premiums in the Norwegian money market rose considerably. Norges Bank took a range of measures to improve market liquidity and ensure pass-through of a lower policy rate to money market rates and bank lending rates. Among other things, Norges Bank offered banks extraordinary liquidity in both NOK and USD. In advance of the monetary policy meeting in May, financial market stress subsided and premiums in both the money and bond markets fell. The normalisation of liquidity policy is well underway. By the end of August 2021, all extraordinary loans from Norges Bank to banks will have been repaid, and the relaxation of collateral requirements for loans from Norges Bank will be reversed. Downturn in the Norwegian economy Activity in the Norwegian economy fell abruptly in 2020 Q2. The Covid-19 outbreak and extensive containment measures led to production halts and lower activity across a range of businesses. Mainland GDP was around 11 percent lower in April 2020 than in February the same year. Many employees were furloughed or made redundant.
These reform efforts might result in short term setback, but will certainly result in long term gains that promote sustainability and further enhance our competitiveness and business partnership with foreign partners. My talk this evening on Moving Thailand Towards a New Business and Financial Landscape will consist of three parts. First, I will briefly discuss Thailand’s current economic development. Second, I will elaborate on several important sets of recently enacted and upcoming laws that will upgrade Thailand’s business and financial landscape. Lastly, I will briefly discuss Bank of Thailand’s policies to support the new business and financial landscape. With regard to the current economic development, we expect the Thai economy to continue its recovery at the rate of around 3.2% in 2017 in spite of headwinds from the global economy and market volatility. Our fiscal stimulus programs and accommodative monetary policy continue to support the economy while export growth started to show sign of a more broad-based recovery. Nevertheless, there are challenges ahead, especially from a high level of household debt, which moderates consumption growth 1  while private investment remains subdued. In addition, the mourning period might have temporarily dampened some of the economic activities. We expect them to resume normalcy in the near future as the fundamental strengths of the Thai economy remain intact. Notably, our unemployment rate continues to dwell at a low level, while external stability is sound, with current account surplus expected to be around 7 percent of GDP this year, declining from 10% of GDP in 2016.

These extra protection measures include audio recording of the marketing process, segregation of investment corner from the main banking hall or counters, and a mandatory 2-day pre-investment cooling off period for vulnerable and inexperienced investors. (b) Banks must take extra care in marketing and distributing investment products to their customers. They must remain vigilant throughout the entire distribution process, from product due diligence, risk assessment of the products, suitability assessment of the customers, training for the frontline staff and control and governance of the sales process. Universal banking vs. narrow banking 8. Let me move to the second issue, with a different meaning attached to the phrase “universal banking”. Here, “universal banking” refers to a business model in which banks are allowed to conduct their own proprietary trading and market making in addition to trading on behalf of their customers and offering other traditional banking services and products. This is another area which has attracted heated debate and a diversity of views. 9. We’ve seen the Volcker Rule in the US and we’ve heard the Governor of the Bank of England speak out in favour of narrow banks. Their concerns spring from the potential ability of the universal banks to leverage their cheaper sources of funds obtained from public deposits for risky ventures to raise the return on equity and to meet ever rising shareholders’ expectations.
Earlier this year, City Development issued the 7th and 8th tranches from their programme for a total amount of $ We are encouraged that more sukuk issuances are also in the pipeline. Just recently, Swiber, a major Singapore-listed company engaged in offshore EPIC (Engineering, Procurement, Installation and Construction) services in Asia Pacific, Middle East and Latin America, announced its intentions to set up a sukuk programme in Singapore in the coming months. These developments suggest that the growth potential for Islamic finance in Singapore has yet to be fully realised, and that Singapore can play a role in giving growth of cross-border Islamic financing an even greater push. Towards this end, MAS is presently working with other government agencies and the industry to identify and address time-to market issues to further facilitate Islamic finance activities in Singapore. This includes looking into providing greater clarity and certainty in the regulatory and tax treatment to expedite the issuance of sukuk and other Islamic capital market instruments. 6  “Beyond Borders: The GCC and Asia could Rev up their economies – and the Islamic Finance Market”, Standard & Poor’s Rating Services, Sep 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The need to raise competency and develop talent to support the growth of the industry cannot be overstated. Singapore Management University (SMU) has successfully completed its first Masters programme in Islamic Law and Finance; and SMU has reiterated its commitment to support efforts at growing the human capital for the Islamic finance industry.

First, large exchange rate appreciations have not resulted in external adjustment of the Swiss current account. Instead, key components of the Swiss current account are determined by structural factors that behave independently of the exchange rate. Second, there are good and legitimate reasons for countries to have current account deficits and surpluses to smooth their output and consumption. And third, independent central banks need to fulfill their mandate of price stability in an inter-dependent environment that constrains their policy choices. More specifically, the SNB has had to – and still has to – ensure that monetary conditions do not become restrictive for Switzerland in the face of extreme exchange rate appreciation and deflationary risks. The critique does not take these three points into account. Structural factors and Switzerland’s surplus Let me first address the question of specific structural factors in the Swiss current account surplus, and why this surplus is not a reflection of Swiss franc weakness. In a nutshell, these factors are more closely correlated with external developments in real economic activity than with exchange rate movements. I’d like to highlight these structural factors with the help of three figures. Figure 2 shows the current account surplus and the real trade-weighted exchange rate of the Swiss franc. I have two observations here: In the short run, when the franc appreciates in real terms, the surplus in the current account does not automatically decline. Nor does the surplus automatically increase when the franc depreciates.
Flexible job markets are important particularly in a monetary union. Exchange rate adjustments are not possible in response to economic developments and changes in competitiveness. Therefore, wage policy in the individual countries bears a special responsibility. It largely determines labour costs and thus a country’s competitiveness. It must take into account productivity, the employment situation and the competitiveness of the respective country. The relative cost competitiveness of the various economies in the euro area has to be monitored very closely. The present situation should be a catalyst, pushing further forward structural reforms in the euro countries. The EU’s Lisbon strategy – which aims to make Europe’s economy more dynamic and competitive – and the completion of the internal market, for example in the services sector, are very important items on the European agenda which should not be forgotten in the present circumstances. Enlargement of the euro area Many of the challenges confronting the ECB are shared with other central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan. These include overcoming the financial market disruption and the economic downturn. Over the longer term, there is globalisation, with the rise of emerging market economies such as China and India, the rapid advances in science and technology and the ageing of our population. All these phenomena affect the economic environment in which central banks conduct monetary policy.

The last few months have shown us an important advantage of the euro: in stormy seas it’s better to be on a large ship than in a small boat. In history – also in the economic history – it’s always a speculation to ask “What if…?” I want to do it nevertheless, because there are very well-founded hypotheses. One such hypothesis is: in addition to the financial market turmoil, the banking sector problems and an economic downturn, there would most likely be severe currency upheavals in Europe without the euro. We would likely face strong, erratic fluctuations between Europe’s national currencies. I call to mind in this context the crisis in the European Monetary System in 1992 and 1993. It was triggered, among other things, by a difficult European and international environment. We saw sharp tensions between individual national currencies. This led to abrupt shifts in competitiveness between individual countries. The European Union’s internal market and in particular the free movement of capital were subject to tension. Without the euro we would be facing similar difficulties today. The central banks would be in demand as crisis managers on an additional front. The euro does offer protection from distortions in the currency field which would worsen the current situation already marked by the financial markets’ turbulences and the global economic downturn. The commitment to the single currency of its founding fathers was visionary and trailblazing.
In its November statement, the Monetary Policy Committee implied that the Bank’s nominal rates could remain unchanged in coming months if developments were in line with the forecast and no additional pay rises were negotiated during the wage settlement review early this year. This has been borne out so far, and the Committee kept rates unchanged at its December, February, and March meetings. At present, the Central Bank’s effective real interest rate is positive by just under 1%. Although it has risen by nearly 2 percentage points in the past year, it is still below the equilibrium real rate once the economy has recovered and the slack has disappeared. If the economic recovery maintains its pace in coming months, it will therefore be necessary to withdraw the accommodative monetary stance still further. The pace at which this happens depends on economic developments, and the degree to which this normalisation takes place through higher nominal Central Bank rates will depend on future developments in inflation. Towards the end of last year and in the past several weeks, the Central Bank has sold foreign currency in the interbank market. The Bank also announced that it had temporarily suspended its programme of weekly foreign currency purchases. These measures were approved at an extraordinary meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee in early January. The intervention measures amount to 7 b.kr., including 4 b.kr. this year. In comparison, the Bank was a net buyer of foreign currency in the amount of 60 b.kr.

Norman T L Chan: How can the banking industry regain the moral and ethical high ground it once enjoyed before the Global Financial Crisis Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asian Banker Summit, Hong Kong, 15 April 2015. *  *  *  Emmanuel (Daniel), Helen (Wong), Hans (Eichel), Gary (Stern), Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. It is always good to see the Asian Banker Summit return to Hong Kong. It has been four years since our city last hosted the Summit in 2011 when I talked about the Monetary Authority’s supervisory philosophy on universal banking. A lot has happened since then. But of particular relevance to us here today are the significant waves of regulatory activity we have witnessed in those intervening years. Activity both in terms of rolling out new standards but also, very visibly, in enforcement action. Libor manipulation in 2012, followed by Forex rigging, sanctions breaches, money laundering and a fairly constant stream of mis-selling allegations – structured bonds, mortgages, Payment Protection Insurance. 2. Against this background, I have to say that I was pleased to see the thorny subject of ethical behaviour within the financial services industry as a key theme for this Summit, although I would like to confine my remarks today to the banking industry and not the entire financial services industry.
I agree with Raymond Goldschmidt,1 who said: “It is hard to define, but recognisable when encountered”. But any definition would surely refer to the crucial roles of confidence, resilience and reliable liquidity. These are the indicators if you like of what is a state of financial stability. In times of instability or crisis, that confidence - and with it liquidity - can evaporate. Bank runs are phenomena that result from loss of confidence: resulting from or causing withdrawal of liquidity. The fear of collapse of other non-bank financial institutions could also give rise to a drain on liquidity. The huge cost of preparing for Y2K was about preventing the dangers of loss of liquidity. And the horrific events of 9/11 required a temporary massive injection of liquidity. The starting point for this confidence is the players in the market place. It relies on integrity in individual firms and markets, effective standards and high quality prudential controls and risk management practices. But to underpin integrity and confidence in the financial system as a whole also requires financial stability oversight. In the first instance this relies on effective supervision. This is a key aspect of the prevention of financial instability. Financial stability oversight must also look at the system as a whole. So it is involved with the oversight of concentrations and of risk correlations, interrelationships and interdependencies. There is a premium on understanding channels of risk transfer and likely behaviour in response to shocks. This is what enables an appropriate policy response.

Without the need to focus on the regulatory responsibilities for the individual firms, we focus on what might disrupt the functioning of the financial system, and especially what might pose a threat to liquidity, and what can be done to mitigate it. We also need to be in a position to advise on the extent of possible financial support if major problems arise, and to provide that support if and as agreed. And the Treasury of course has to play a vital role in reflecting Government policy as a whole, with a particular scrutiny of developments which ultimately could bring into consideration the need for taxpayers’ money. On the global level things are very different. You could argue intellectually that, since national boundaries mean so little in relation to financial stability oversight, there is a case for creating a single global body. In reality of course we are nowhere near that, any more than we are to creating global Government itself. The difference in political and legal systems and culture, clearly make it  BIS Review 5/2004  7  impracticable. So for the time being, whether at a global or even an EU level, we have to rely on proxies and co-ordination. This proxy must be as effective as possible. This explains the activity to create and maintain robust international standards and practice in the institutions, and infrastructure of the global market.
Interestingly, interest rates were not included in the commission's report as a means of influencing economic activity and inflation. The view at this time too, especially from a political point of view, was that the interest rate was to mainly be regarded as a cost factor.17 Nevertheless, the policy during the Second World War was much more successful than that during the First World War. There was no post-war recession, and the inflation peak were short-lived and was not followed by any appreciable deflation.18 Developments during the Korean War in 1950-53 followed the same pattern, with a high but short-lived peak in inflation. The upturn was preceded by a devaluation against the dollar in 1949, which Sweden and a number of European countries carried out to meet the competition from American industry. After the outbreak of the war, international inflation rose sharply. The price increases on commodities were particularly high. Profits in the Swedish manufacturing industry rose 13 Wetterberg (2009), p. 270. 14 Boianovsky (1998). 15 Jonung (2000). 16 See, for example, Jonung (2017). 17 Wetterberg (2009), p. 314. The Social Democratic Government’s post-war policies were focused on full em-  ployment and keeping interest rates down, known as low interest-rate policy. Instead, fiscal policy would steer economic activity. The Riksbank opposed the low interest-rate policy and Riksbank Governor Ivar Rooth tendered his resignation in 1948. 18 According to Statistics Sweden's annual statistics, inflation was −0.4 per cent in 1944 and 1945.

This episode is also special because the high inflation was followed by a severe deflation, that is, a fall in the general price level, 1921-23. Fortunately, we have not experienced any such dramatic fluctuations in inflation since then. In his book “Money and Power” on the history of the Riksbank, Gunnar Wetterberg notes that at this time the Riksbank's governors were faced with a series of questions that neither they nor most other scholars knew how to deal with. The war and the first post-war years thus became a difficult time for monetary policy.8 The organisation of the monetary system played a major role in the course of inflation. Prior to the war, Sweden had a gold standard, which had been introduced in 1873 in connection with the establishment of the Scandinavian monetary union. The gold standard meant that the krona was linked to gold and that the Riksbank had an obligation to exchange notes for gold at a fixed price. This meant that the krona had a fixed exchange rate against other countries that had the equivalent system. The gold standard was abandoned in connection with the outbreak of war in 1914, and the same happened in other countries. In the countries directly involved in the war, the war efforts required rapid and immediate funding. Budget deficits grew and were financed by the government borrowing from the central bank, that is, through printing money. The money supply and price level thus rose sharply around the world.
This contraction in fiscal space represents a grave challenge to the implementation of critical investment expenditures in the education and health sectors and in building infrastructure that supports the proper functioning of the market economy and expands its reach, particularly into the rural areas, where the majority of the poor live. With deteriorating fiscal positions in the donor Government, there also remains a real risk of cuts in donor flows to  2  The MDGs are to: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development. 2  BIS Review 128/2009  developing countries. In Zambia for example, Government revenues during the first half of 2009 were 25% below the projections in the 2009 Budget, largely reflecting lower trade taxes as well as lower donor inflows. For Africa, as a whole, recent estimates by the IMF are that budget deficits will drop from a surplus of 2.8% of GDP in 2008 to a deficit of 5.4% of GDP in 2009 – with fiscal outturns deteriorating across both oil and non-oil commodity exporters. The global financial and economic crisis has also impacted Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and credit flows in Africa, with serious consequences on the ability of African economies to build their productive capacities.

Zambia has also benefitted from increased support from bi-lateral donors, with the prospect of additional resources being made available in the current calendar year from the European Union amounting to around 13% of all the grants that were scheduled to be received in 2009 from the EU and individual donors. Institutions such as the African Development Bank have also made changes to their procedures aimed at fast tracking the disbursement of critical development finance resources, against already approved projects. However, there are serious concerns that Africa has been disadvantaged in the allocation of resources made available by the international community – particularly to key institutions such as the AfDB. There is also concern that whilst the principle of increased resource flows through Institutions such as the IMF should be targeted beyond the traditional BoP needs has generally been accepted at a political level, there is some reluctance at the institutional level for institutions such as the IMF to venture outside of their traditional confines of their support. In Zambia, the Government has engaged our cooperating partners to ensure that the additional resource provided to help African countries deal with the global crisis can be utilized to do just that – and not be simply kept for a rainy day that ignores the current  4  BIS Review 128/2009  monsoon. In my own personal interaction with the IMF, I believe that in Zambia we do have a good common understanding on this issue.