samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I further call on the media to play its rightful role in educating the masses and the youth in particular on the  2  BIS Review 103/2010  importance of entrepreneurship and indeed to give more coverage to Zambians who have succeeded in entrepreneurship in order for our youths to be motivated. I also wish to urge other banks and financial institutions to emulate Intermarket Banking Corporation to develop such well meaning initiatives for this is indeed good Corporate Social Responsibility. I am sure that there are a number of entrepreneurs all over Zambia who are in dire need of that seed capital as well as the initial push to realize their dreams. I have in mind here the very innovative entrepreneurs in Mutendere, Kalingalinga, Garden Compound, Mandevu and several other industrial clusters in our country who are trying to do their best but lack the necessary support in form of finance and education. As I conclude, I wish all the teams that have been shortlisted tonight continued success in future. Unfortunately, there can be only one winner of the overall award but each nominee is already a winner and should feel proud of their nomination and deserving of recognition and our congratulations. I hope that all of you whether you win the award or not will develop your businesses ideas into a reality in future. To the winners, I heartily congratulate you and urge you to make the best use of the K100 Million Prize.

And this resilience had a reason. It created the confidence for banks to finally get lending again …  It has allowed some turbulence to be withstood too. Cast your minds back to July 2016. In the wake of the referendum, markets were pricing in a severe downturn in the UK economy and property markets. 3  Financial crises often lead to a long run reduction in GDP, with a persistent decline in output relative to pre-crisis trends. Bank estimates based on the impact of historical financial crises in a sample of advanced economies, reported in Brooke et. Al. (2015), suggest that the average cost of a financial crisis has been 73% of GDP, which translates to a cost of roughly £ per capita if a financial crisis had taken place in 2016. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  Bank and property company share prices were consistent with a rise in unemployment to 7.5%, falls in residential and commercial property prices of 15-20% and a cumulative 4% reduction in GDP growth. But banks had been tested – in public – against a shock twice as severe as that. So confidence in the banking system was maintained. Remarkably by past standards, banks’ funding costs moved very little. We were able to do the opposite of what regulation had typically done in the past: we could release, rather than build, bank capital. Banks didn’t need to rein in. And credit continued to flow.
It was the first time we had done so since the introduction of the repo as a monetary policy instrument. At the same time, we undertook a significant reduction in the repo rate used for our transactions. Our aim was to compensate the higher risk premiums through a lower repo rate, and to move the threemonth Libor back into the middle of the target range. The desired reaction ensued within a few days and the three-month Libor stabilised at 2.75%. We thereby neutralised the monetary policy impact of the higher risk premium. As announced a short while ago, we will also be supplying the market with ample liquidity as we approach the end of the year, and will be conducting longer term repo transactions with this in mind. At the operational level, steering the three-month Libor proved to be a challenge, due to the high and fluctuating level of the risk premium. Simultaneously, the benefits of our operational flexibility became very clear. Since we are generally present in the market on a daily basis with short-term repo transactions, we were in a position to adjust liquidity measures to individual market conditions. Over the past few months, we have made consistent use of this flexibility; first, by providing the banking system with generous amounts of seven-day money, gradually lowering the repo rates as we did so, and second, by absorbing liquidity that was no longer required as soon as the call money rate declined.

In this way, it was possible to retain overall liquidity in the bank system at an appropriate level. As you will see in graph 3, the average level of bank sight deposits changed very little throughout the year, if we compare each minimum reserve period with the next. Our other operational processes have also stood up well in the turmoil of the past few months. Payment transactions carried out between banks in the SIC system ran smoothly at all times, although banks have made greater use of SNB intraday loan facilities. In order to bridge liquidity bottlenecks at the end of the day, the National Bank provides a liquidityshortage financing facility to banks. This allows them to obtain liquidity on a temporary basis 2  BIS Review 150/2007  when needed, provided they have a limit with the SNB and provided this limit is continually covered with eligible securities. The continual coverage of the limits ensures that the banks have access to a liquidity cushion, even in critical situations. Actual use of the limits is generally restrained, and this has also been the case in recent months. Lessons learnt I would like to draw your attention to some of the lessons that we have already learnt from the current crisis. I will mention four points. First, the worldwide money market upheaval clearly shows how highly integrated international financial markets are today. Local crises can spread around the globe in a flash. The money market crisis is unlikely to have been overcome yet.
But the scale of maturity transformation undertaken today produces private benefits and social costs. We have seen from the experience of first Iceland, and now Ireland, the results that can follow from allowing a banking system to become too large relative to national output without having first solved the “too important to fail” problem. 4. Finding a solution  Many remedies for reducing the riskiness of our financial system have been proposed, ranging from higher capital requirements on banks to functional separation and other more radical ideas. The guiding principle of any change should be to ensure that the costs of maturity transformation – the costs of periodic financial crises – fall on those who enjoy the benefits of maturity transformation – the reduced cost of financial intermediation. All proposals should be evaluated by this simple criterion. The first, and most obvious, response to the divergence between private benefits and social costs is the imposition of a permanent tax on the activity of maturity transformation to “internalise the externalities”. Such a tax, or levy, has been discussed by the G7, and introduced in the UK. The principle that the “polluter pays” for the costs they impose on others is an old one, going back at least to Pigou in the 1920s. The main practical problem is to calibrate the costs to maturity transformation. The loss of world output from the financial crisis is enormous, even though such a crisis might be considered a once in a generation, or even once in a century, event.

This leads to the limiting case of proposals such as Professor Kotlikoff’s idea to introduce what he calls “limited purpose banking” (Kotlikoff, 2010). That would ensure that each pool of investments made by a bank is turned into a mutual fund with no maturity mismatch. There is no possibility of alchemy. It is an idea worthy of further study. Another avenue of reform is some form of functional separation. The Volcker Rule is one example. Another, more fundamental, example would be to divorce the payment system from risky lending activity – that is to prevent fractional reserve banking (for example, as proposed by Fisher, 1936, Friedman, 1960, Tobin, 1987 and more recently by Kay, 2009). In essence these proposals recognise that if banks undertake risky activities then it is highly dangerous to allow such “gambling” to take place on the same balance sheet as is used to support the payments system, and other crucial parts of the financial infrastructure. And eliminating fractional reserve banking explicitly recognises that the pretence that risk-free deposits can be supported by risky assets is alchemy. If there is a need for genuinely safe  8  BIS Review 140/2010  deposits the only way they can be provided, while ensuring costs and benefits are fully aligned, is to insist such deposits do not coexist with risky assets. The advantage of these types of more fundamental proposals is that no tax or capital requirement needs to be calibrated. And if successfully enforced then they certainly would be robust measures.
A single curve would have many potential benefits:   It is the logical completion of the move away from LIBOR discounting to SONIA-referencing OIS discounting begun a decade ago, eliminating the basis between swap exposures and how they are valued, and thereby simplifying risk management of swaps portfolios;    It could simplify the risks arising from the optionality embedded in certain products such as credit facilities where funds can be drawn across multiple tenors of benchmark reference rates;    It would simplify curve construction and validation processes;  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  8    A switch from term to overnight compounding would provide customers with the scope to construct a more complete interest rate hedge by using the minimum possible period for each observation 5; and    It could help guide further ‘electronification’ of the sterling market, through the provision of executable quotes and central limit order books, which itself could provide new opportunities for product development. The potential role that a well-specified SONIA curve could play in helping to price cash instruments has been the subject of a great deal of discussion amongst market participants. Many issuers have found it easier than had been initially expected simply to use compounded realised SONIA as a reference rate. This has rapidly become a convention for a range of sterling Floating Rate Notes and securitisations; and recent announcements suggest similar approaches are also feasible for a range of corporate bonds and loans.

Goh Chok Tong: Integration of Awqaf (Islamic endowment) in the Islamic financial sector Speech Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister of the Republic of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the opening ceremony of the Singapore International WAQF Conference 2007, Singapore, 6 March 2007. *  *  *  Excellencies and Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen A very good morning to all of you, and a very warm welcome to our guests from the Middle East and the region. I hope you will find time from your busy schedule of meetings to enjoy the sights, sounds and culinary delights of Singapore. For Singapore offers you a unique experience – we are traditional yet modern, Asian but cosmopolitan, geographically small but with a large global outlook. Singapore is indeed honoured to host this first international conference in the region on waqf. I congratulate the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), the Islamic Research and Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank Group and the Kuwait Awqaf Public Foundation for taking the initiative to organise this event. We look forward to more such meetings. Asia and Middle East rediscovering each other Asia and the Middle East have had a long and fruitful history of exchanges. Links between our two regions are ancient. Long before Marco Polo travelled to China, Arab merchants were already doing business in Asia using overland and sea routes.
BIS Review 70/2002  3  Sector composition of NOREX exchanges. September 2002 100 % 90 % 80 % 70 % 60 % 50 % 40 % 30 % 20 % 10 % 0% Stockholm Industrials and materials Financial services  Copenhagen  Oslo  IT/Telecom Energy  Consumer goods and services Other  Source: NOREX SG 240802  Correlation with world index. USD based price indexes 1  0,8 Dec 93 - 97  0,6  1998-2002  0,4  0,2 Denmark  Finland  Norway  Sweden  Source: EcoWin / Financial Times SG 240802  FDI to/from the US. Total at end 2001. Per cent of GDP 12 to US 10  from US  8 6 4 2 0  Sweden  Denmark  Finland  Norway  Source: National Central Banks, IMF SG 240802  4  BIS Review 70/2002  The links with the US economy are many and complex. The US is one of our major trading partners. But the ties are perhaps even more evident in the capital markets. All the Nordic countries have relatively large direct investments in the US economy. In addition, US capital markets today have a decisive impact on developments around the globe. American capital has also been important for investments in the Nordic economies. US direct investments in Norway. End of year 2000 . M ining and extraction incl.

1990=100 140  140  Norway  130  130  120  120  US  110  100  100  90 1990  110  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  90 2002  1)Business sector 2)Mainland Norway excl public sector Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Norges Bank SG 240802  Business productivity growth has been high throughout the 1990s. The chart shows development of productivity per working hour in Norway and the US. Unfortunately, I don’t have comparable figures for the other Nordic countries. I do, however, believe that they all, with the possible exception of Iceland, have had stronger productivity growth than the US over the period. BIS Review 70/2002  1  Government employment and revenues. Per cent of total employment and GDP 2001  Government employment  40  Denmark  30  Norway Sweden  Finland  20  Iceland US  10  0 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  Current tax and non-tax receipts Source: OECD SG 240802  Most Nordic countries have large public sectors, reflecting the fact that many services such as health and education are produced within the public sector. This is especially the case in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. General government financial balance and current account balance. Per cent of GDP.
Such a transfer would be especially paradoxical since sustainable development has become a key priority and the quality of the environment passed on to future generations has never before to such an extent inspired and guided public action. * The French economy must now be allowed to fulfil its potential. While globalisation offers opportunities, it also creates numerous insecurities. The accumulation of such sentiment may result in slowing down or preventing the necessary reforms. But because the world economy  6  BIS Review 92/2007  is changing rapidly, the refusal to adapt would lead, inevitably, to weaker growth for France and greater insecurity for all French citizens, especially those that are least protected. This dilemma is not peculiar to France. All the other European countries are experiencing this friction between the natural desire for greater security and the unavoidable need to adapt. It is important for each country, according to its traditions and culture, to find the means of taking up this challenge. However, France boasts numerous and decisive advantages: Europe’s most dynamic demography; a high level of energy independence, which is an inestimable advantage in these times of economic and geopolitical uncertainty with regard to supplies; active and dynamic companies, which have been able to take ample advantage of the opportunities afforded by globalisation; and lastly a highly-skilled workforce which, to some extent, accounts for France’s high hourly productivity levels. These advantages must therefore enable France to achieve strong growth that creates jobs in a stable monetary environment. This opportunity must be seized.

Since December 2004, key interest rates have risen from 2.25% to 5.25% in the United States, from 4.75% to 5.75% in the United Kingdom and from 2.00% to 4.00% in the euro area. As regards the latter, the seven increases in interest rates implemented since December 2005 have, as mentioned above, been accompanied by strong GDP growth, and during this period monetary policy has ensured price stability at the same time as more than two million jobs were created. The ECB’s monetary policy stance has aimed, in accordance with the Treaty, to maintain price stability over the long term. In sync with the consolidation of growth in the euro area, it has gradually been adjusted upwards, with the Governing Council striving consistently to calibrate interest rates as precisely as possible to allow growth to firm, while ensuring it is not jeopardised by mounting inflationary pressures. Price stability is foremost among the objectives assigned to central banks in all countries. This is not a random choice. It is the fruit of experience. Many countries have attempted, over recent decades – and particularly after the oil shocks at the end of the last century – to stimulate growth via expansive monetary policies. All of these attempts failed. Inflation rose, sometimes to very high levels, without there being any improvement in employment. Two lessons have been learned from this period, which still inform the conduct of monetary policy today.
17  Lastly, the Draft Budget envisages an inflation rate of 0.9% in 2021, mid-range between the two scenarios considered in the Banco de España’s September projections (inflation of 1% under scenario 1 and of 0.8% under scenario 2). However, as I indicated earlier, the price dynamics observed since these projection scenarios were published would clearly introduce a downward bias. A further bias – also downward – would come from the downside risks to which I have already referred affecting the future course of activity. Before analysing the main lines of action of budgetary policy for 2021 defined in the Draft Budget, I first wish to outline the basic principles that, in my opinion, should guide budgetary policy in the circumstances in which we now find ourselves. First, the budgetary policy stance over the coming year must be clearly expansionary. Bearing in mind the incomplete, unequal and fragile nature of the ongoing economic recovery, and the considerable downside risks it faces, the stimulus measures cannot be prematurely withdrawn. Second, budgetary policy must be selective. Despite the huge injection of funds that the European monies will entail, the magnitude of the challenges facing the Spanish economy in both the short and the medium term – including, without doubt, the need to undertake an ambitious fiscal consolidation process in the coming years – means that public resources must be used highly efficiently.

Working with the Bank of England’s Resolution team, the PRA will need closely to integrate recovery and resolution planning within its supervision; and in my view should embed a proactive intervention framework akin to the US Prompt Corrective Action within its supervisory approach to deal with the inevitable situations where firms get into the danger zone. Above  2  BIS Review 121/2010  all, these tools should support competition in the industry, by accepting that there will be winners and losers. In two years’ time, we will have a new system of financial regulation in the UK. Those of us involved can assure you that the transition is not a small task, but I can also assure you that the Bank is fully committed to working with the FSA to ensure a smooth transition. There is a great deal to be done to implement the new system of regulation, to articulate and build the public interest in financial stability, and thereby to improve the stability of the system itself. Basel III, macroprudential tools, countercyclical buffers, are all things that Adair and I get excited about. They are important foundations of good policy. But on their own they don’t win the public interest argument for financial stability. To do that, we have to build the case that the industry will serve the needs and interest of the public. The authorities cannot do this alone. Building confidence in the financial system takes effort and time. It is a common goal and in the interest of everyone.
This initiative grew out of the recognition of the fact that financial institutions and certain NGOs that were engaged in promoting various financial education activities and programme were operating in isolation. What was clearly missing was a coherent and well-co-ordinated strategy among these organisations for delivering an effective education to enhance financial literacy and inclusion. Consequently the FSDP identified the need to develop a coordinated approach to financial education as a meaningful way of bringing progress to this process. It therefore, started its intervention by commissioning a stock taking study of financial education efforts taking place in Zambia in order to establish its true status. DFID provided financial support in the form of technical assistance which enabled the FSDP to recruit FinMark Trust to carry out the study. Subsequently, a report was produced and presented to various stakeholders in November last year. The recommendations from the stakeholders meeting were then sent to the FSDP Steering Committee in April this year. This Committee endorsed the report and it is this report which is being launched today as the National Strategy on Financial Education for Zambia. Once launched, it will be implemented in earnest. Honourable Ministers, the activities that have been carried out under this programme have been made possible by the very generous financial support extended throughout the different phases of the programme by the IMF, World Bank, DFID, SIDA and the Government of the Republic of Zambia.

Low short-term interest rates in the US, Japan and euro area countries have been inducing investors to shift into more long-term securities, with an attendant fall in long-term interest rates. Supply and demand factors may also have contributed to pushing down long-term rates. New regulations for European life insurance companies have also led to an increase in their share of investments in debt instruments with longer maturities. BIS Review 21/2005  1  Economic developments and prospects Norges Bank’s key rate, the sight deposit rate, is at a historically low level. Real interest rates are also low. Between December 2002 and March 2004, the key rate was reduced by a total of 5.25 percentage points. It takes time for an interest rate reduction to have an impact on inflation. We are now seeing the effects of previous monetary policy decisions, some of which were taken two years ago. The first signs of the effects of the interest rate cuts appeared in the foreign exchange market. The interest rate differential against other countries narrowed. It became more attractive to borrow and less profitable to invest in the Norwegian krone. The movement in the krone was reversed, and it depreciated through 2003 and into 2004. The nominal krone exchange rate, measured by the trade-weighted index (TWI), is now approximately back to the level prevailing in the mid-1990s. However, the impact on the krone exchange rate has been considerably dampened because external interest rates have remained low.