samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But we live in a world of second best, and even very approximate measures would do better than nothing at all. I will stop here, knowing, once again, that I have raised more questions than I have provided answers. But looking at what is happening in this very moment, in our economies, it is necessary to think "out of the box" and look at all possibilities. Those in charge of macroeconomic policies are doing just that. Those responsible for financial regulation should not hesitate to emulate them, at least partially. Thank you for your attention. References Aglietta M. at B. Mojon (2008), Central Banking, in A. Berger, Ph. Molyneux and J. Wilson (eds), The Handbook of Banking, Oxford University Press. Alessi L. and C. Detken (2009), “Real Time” Early Warning Indicators for Costly Boom-Bust Cycles: A Role for Global Liquidity, European Central Bank Mimeo. Allen, F. and D. Gale (2000), Bubbles and crises, The Economic Journal 110, 236-55. Bernanke B., M. Gertler and S. Gilchrist (1999), The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework, in. J. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds), The Handbook of Macroeconomics, North Holland. Blanchard, O. (2008), The Crisis: Basic Mechanisms, and Appropriate Policies, MIT Working Paper 09-01. Borio C. and P. Lowe (2002), Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus, BIS Working Paper 114. Borio, Claudio (2008), The macroprudential approach to regulation and supervision: where do we stand? Mimeo. BIS Review 37/2009  5  Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole (1997), Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and the Real Sector.

But we feel that the costs of delayed action may sometimes outweigh its benefits, as postponing the inevitable and failing to accept the changed reality will lead to additional unnecessary costs. One should not want to keep alive old structures that clearly cannot be sustainable in the changed world for longer than necessary. This is a waste of limited resources and reduces long-term productivity. There is a saying that “a crisis should not be wasted” – negative shocks to an economy should lead to productivity gains. Our experience shows that quick decision-making and decisive policy actions can shorten the period of uncertainty that also weighs on economic activity. People and entrepreneurs in countries with delayed reforms overreact, leading to a higher level of risk aversion than necessary. Overshooting in risk aversion results in lost jobs and postponed investments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Estonia, for example, lost almost 20% of its GDP during the crisis. By now we have regained the pre-crisis level, contrary to many countries that preferred to delay the necessary reforms. Some of them still face years of decreasing economic output. In summary, I would like to stress that prolonged fiscal consolidation and structural reforms can lead to unnecessary costs to the society. Some countries have chosen to delay the pain and take only gradual steps with their structural reforms, but this has in fact resulted in a reduction of the overall economic activity to the extent that might be no less than the shortterm cost of a quicker adjustment.
This may seem unreasonably low for loans that may be a considerable source of risk accumulation in the financial system as a whole. This also raises the question of whether lower limits for risk weights for residential mortgage loans for banks using internal models should be incorporated into a new regulatory framework. Crisis management and systemic risk Even with a sound, long-term framework, situations will arise where a crisis management system is needed. Such a system is also important for preventing crises. With a credible crisis management system, a bank can continue providing key banking services when it encounters problems, while the owners and unsecured creditors bear the losses. This is the most important instrument we have to counter moral hazard in the financial system. The system for crisis management in Norway was never put to the test during the financial crisis. International experience nevertheless suggests that changes to the Norwegian system should be made in order to improve it and enhance its credibility. Banks should be required to draw up plans for winding up operations without putting financial stability in jeopardy. For it to be credible, banks must have transparent group structures. In addition, clear rules should be introduced to define when the authorities are to intervene and apply the crisis resolution tools in a problem bank. This must occur before the problems in a bank become so serious that it can no longer operate without external recapitalisation. The authorities must have instruments that can be applied rapidly in such an early intervention.

The financial crisis has followed a familiar pattern Our actions during a financial crisis are very important, but the main task in our work on financial stability must be to prevent crises. History has shown that financial crises arise when financial imbalances have built up over a long period. Our most important task is therefore to contain the build-up of imbalances and secure a robust financial system. No two financial crises are alike. However, similar features can often be identified in the runup to the crises. This slide illustrates three features. These elements were also prominent in the unfolding of the most recent global financial crisis.   The first feature is often a sharp and persistent rise in property and other asset prices.   The second, strong debt growth, is closely linked to the first. Rising debt and increasing property prices is a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Higher property prices lead to higher collateral values for loans. With easier access to credit, purchasing power increases.   Debt growth exceeds growth in bank deposits and banks must increasingly resort to market-based funding to finance the rise in lending. They become ever more reliant on market funding, which is often short term. When this cycle is allowed to continue for a period, the financial system becomes vulnerable.   Banks accumulate large loans secured on inflated collateral values.   Borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity becomes vulnerable to income loss.
The Asian economies were certainly not fault-free, but in general they not exhibit the classic signs of gross macroeconomic weakness that normally lead to a balance of payments crisis. Governments ran fairly prudent fiscal policies, savings were high and inflation rates reasonably low. Even if policy mistakes were made, the punishment does not really seem to fit the crime. 3. Why then have exchange rates fallen by as much as they have and why have economies in the region been so severely crippled? It is generally agreed that a large part of the answer lies in the weakness of financial and banking systems in the region, which have amplified the initial effects of external shocks and economic downturn. In essence, banking systems that were already in weak health before the crisis broke were not up to the task of intermediating large inflows of capital. They have been part of a vicious circle whereby loss of confidence in the currency leads to loss of confidence in the banking system that further undermines the currency. This is the “run on the country” syndrome. It therefore follows that strengthening of the banking system must be part of the cure of the Asian disease and the means of preventing a recurrence. Banking supervision has an important part to play in this strengthening - hence the topic of my speech today. The weaknesses in Asian banking systems 4.

"2 The Federal Open Market Committee lowered the target range for the federal funds rate to 0 to ¼ percent3 and increased purchases of Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities. The Board of Governors created new dollar liquidity arrangements with central banks, reflecting the global nature of the pandemic and its economic disruption.4 Together with other Federal banking agencies, the Board issued regulatory relief and guidance to banks encouraging them to meet the changing needs of customers,5 to use their capital and liquidity buffers to facilitate lending,6 and to access the discount window.7 Perhaps most prominently, the Fed has used its emergency powers in Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act to establish programs and facilities to keep the economy running.8 The Board of Governors created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility,9 the Commercial Paper Funding Facility,10 and the Money Market Liquidity Facility to provide relief for critical wholesale markets.11 Another facility supports lending to small businesses via the Small Business Administration's Paycheck Protection Program.12 Two commercial credit facilities provide liquidity for corporate bonds.13 The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility supports the markets for student loans, auto loans, and credit card loans.14 The Municipal Liquidity Facility helps state and local governments and agencies close revenue gaps.15 And facilities specifically targeting "Main Street"16 help sustain retail businesses and may expand to assist nonprofit institutions.17 For the last several months, implementing the Board of Governors' relief initiatives has been the priority of the New York Fed and our sister Reserve Banks.
Accordingly, with the view of providing policy direction to the financial sector, the Central Bank is in the process of developing a ‘Road Map for Sustainable Finance in Sri Lanka’. For this process, we are obtaining the technical assistance from International Finance Corporation of the World Bank (IFC-WB) and financial assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Going forward, we intend to launch the ‘Road Map for Sustainable Finance’ during 2019 which would serve as a reference for all stakeholders in formulating their own sustainable finance policies. 32  4. Policies Related to Ancillary and Agency Functions In addition to our core functions, we have effectively performed several ancillary and agency functions as well. We have performed these functions to support the smooth functioning of the economy and the financial system, thus contributing to strengthen the broader economy. Currency Management The Central Bank has the exclusive right to issue currency notes and coins on behalf of the government. During 2018, we continued to perform this function as per our mandate. In spite of increased use of technology driven non-cash modes of payment, demand for currency notes and coins increased in 2018 in line with the expansion of the economy. In 2018, we launched a new coinage and issued a commemorative currency note and a coin. Further, we have introduced policy measures against willfully altered, defaced or mutilated currency notes in order to preserve the quality of currency notes in Sri Lanka.

So it is logical to expect stabilization, and perhaps reduction of the level of banks’ bad loans. Banks which have huge excess liquidity, have reservations regarding lending to companies, and they locate the reason in the emphasized risks. Is the placement of those funds in Treasury bills and Central Bank bills a solution, even at the cost of a decline in the economy? The monetary policy is trying to trigger a certain behavior of the banks which it considers is appropriate at a particular time. But banks independently manage excess liquidity and it is their decision whether more will be placed in the form of loans or in risk-free securities. At the beginning of the second quarter, with several measures we released substantial excess liquidity placed in CB bills over the level that we considered it was necessary to be maintained. It is a fact that banks placed only a small part of that surplus in loans. One of the reasons is certainly the perception of banks for increased risks in the domestic and global economy. But just as important, if not even more important reason are the corporate strategies of the banking groups in the Euro area that are owners of the Macedonian banks. Some of these banking groups have serious problems in their home countries. Although their banks in Macedonia have excellent capitalization and record liquidity, they must implement the strategy of their foreign parent banks, which due to the insufficient capital, refrain from lending in all countries where they are present.
It was the Fintech of its day. On the back of this, markets for other types of insurance began to flourish, based on the same risk-pooling principle. Lloyds of London emerged in 1688. In the space of a decade, London became the pre-eminent insurance market in the world. And so it has remained. That first-mover advantage has locked in London’s dominance for 340 years. Within a mile’s radius of Monument today are hundreds of insurance companies writing billions of pounds of insurance contracts each working day. The Bank of England keeps an eye on this industry in its role as regulator. The impulse for that creative agglomeration came from the destruction of the Great Fire. 10 11  Museum of London and Demographia. https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/museum/history-and-stories/the-great-fire-of-london/ 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  A third creative response came during the 18th century. Until then, there was no public fire service in the UK. Companies hired private companies to fire-fight or had their own fire service. The Bank of England was in a particularly vulnerable position at the time, as one of the world’s largest paper factories. The Bank bought its own fire engines and hired its own firemen to help protect it from going up in smoke.12 With time, it became clear it made no sense for everyone to self-insure against fire risk. This risk was best collectivised through a municipal fire service - a “public good”, like lampposts and lighthouses.

Its students combine work and study, typically through part-time distance learning. It is the UK’s largest university with over 170,000 students. A future educational model needs importantly to embody this sort of flexibility – the flexibility to combine work and study through a career, with educational credits which accumulate over time and which are portable between institutions. The current post-18 model operates like a driving license – obtained during the early years but then rarely if ever refreshed or augmented. The future world of work may call for a model which is more like a training schedule for a marathon, which builds capacity over time. Creating the right incentives to engage in a career-long marathon training programme is not easy. There is a reason relatively few people run marathons and fewer still enjoy the experience. But a number of options are being tried. In 2016, Singapore introduced a credit system for lifelong training - SkillsFuture Credit. These credits can be drawn down at any stage of an individual’s career to support approved skills-related training. Denmark has a similar system in place for those displaced from work. Conclusion Creativity flowed from the Great Fire. The same will be true of the GSA. Our economies and societies will also need to reseed to harness the potential of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. For mass flourishing, our knowledge economy will need to evolve into a genuinely creative one. And our social institutions, including our educational institutions, may need to be radically reworked.
This is something that has to be renounced to enable us to perform our tasks properly and both attract and retain the best university graduates. An open internal dialogue with management is needed to promote an informal exchange of ideas. Taking responsibility and meeting deadlines must also be rewarded. It is easy to say that some mistakes are acceptable provided things get done but that attitude is by no means customary in a central bank. Last but not least, we must have an open attitude to the outside world, accept impulses and explain what we are doing. So what have we done in recent years to make the Riksbank a more modern place to work in? Here are some examples: ·  We have aimed for a better organisation by making it flatter and delegating more to heads of department and division. That in turn means that general objectives and tasks must be formulated clearly for all concerned so that everyone is aware they are not just piling stones on top of each other but actually helping to build a cathedral. ·  We have accentuated the analytical and academic profile. Our advisers are world-class academics and members of the staff have access to further education in Sweden as well as abroad. We have also made the basic operations more efficient. ·  Another aim has been to give staff a more flexible working life.

But we are not content with this and aim for a further improvement. The tasks as such, the proximity to economic policy and the international dimension should be sufficiently attractive. If, in addition, we can create an environment in which people can grow and feel they are an important part of the organisation, then I believe we can do still better. There are many connections between an open, clear relationship with the outside world on the one hand and our internal work on the other. Distinct goals have helped to focus internal operations and tighten the analysis. By making things less hush-hush we have also made it possible to include more people in a realistic discussion of monetary policy, for example. We are now open to criticism of a sharper and more specific nature and that has been good for us. The Riksbank's motto, Hinc robur et securitas (Hence strength and security), which used to allude to our earlier functions as the producer of notes and coins, for example, now refers at least as much to our analytical competence, the accuracy of our analyses and our efficiency as an authority. Management with an executive board One consequence of the new Riksbank Act, effective from the beginning of 1999, was that a new Executive Board, consisting of six members, is collectively responsible for all the Bank's operations.
Christian Noyer: Basel II – new challenges Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, before the Bank of Algeria and the Algerian financial community, Algiers, 16 December 2007. *  *  *  I am very pleased and honoured to be here and I wish to wholeheartedly thank my friend Mohamed Laksaci for inviting me to speak on the subject of Basel II. This subject is topical for two reasons: first, we have already entered into (or, in some countries, are about to enter into) the operational implementation of the new capital adequacy framework, which requires a greater-than-ever involvement of banks and supervisors; second, the current financial market turmoil raises questions as to the best way to implement this framework. In view of its topical nature, I will present a few thoughts on “Basel II: New challenges”, while attempting to focus on the practical aspects of the implementation of the new capital requirements. In this respect, and before moving on, I would like to thank the Bank of Algeria for its participation in the Group of French-Speaking supervisors, created at the meeting of Governors of central banks of French-speaking countries in June 2004 in Paris, which coincided with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s publication of the New Basel Capital Accord. I know that this Group is appreciated by many of its members as it enables them to exchange experiences and information and promotes best banking supervisory practices.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Global trends for the emerging market economies Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 22nd ACI Asia-Pacific Congress on Financial Markets in the K-economy, Kuala Lumpur, 31 October 2002. *  *  *  The recent decade has experienced a dramatic transformation of financial markets with far reaching implications on the growth prospects for the global economy. The single most important source of this change has been the rapid advancement in technology. Indeed, the revolutionary process brought about by the advances in technology has created new challenges and opportunities. These developments have been reinforced by the process of financial deregulation and liberalization. The recent decade has also witnessed a new wave of international crises, although in the more recent episodes, widespread contagion has been contained. Nevertheless, with highly volatile financial flows and heightened uncertainty in the global financial markets, the potential for contagion remains. It is my pleasure to be here at this 22nd ACI Asia Pacific Congress on Financial Markets in the K-economy. In this more globalised, digitised and knowledge-driven environment, the challenge of restoring calm in financial markets is no longer a challenge being encountered by small emerging market economies alone, but is also a challenge being faced by the larger advanced economies. These developments have indeed tested policy makers across the globe.
Eligible firms also had to contribute materially to the UK economy and must not be banks (other policies, as noted, had been introduced to help banks). And individual counterparty limits were imposed. Although disentangling the precise impact of the scheme from the global improvement in financial markets is difficult, it does appears to have been successful. Purchases peaked at around £ in late April 2009, at that time amounting to around one third of the sterling CP market. But, as I have stressed, the objective of the scheme was not to purchase a large quantity for its own sake. It was much more important that market spreads for the average issuer started to fall soon after the scheme was launched. Market spreads for all A1 rated sterling paper fell below APF spreads in August 2009 (Chart 3). By February 2010 nearly all firms who had sold CP to the APF were able to re-issue at cheaper rates in the market and the Bank’s CP holdings have fallen back to under £ That decline in usage, together with greater ability to issue in the market, indicates the improvement in market conditions which the scheme was intended to help bring about. I should note that, at the current moment, the need for firms to issue CP is at something of a low point. Investment-grade firms do not seem to have a strong demand for short-term cash and are concentrating on issuing longer-term debt.

Unless all participants provide appropriate contribution, the global economic recovery will not be safe and sustained. It is obvious that the emerging economies will be the major driving force behind the global  BIS Review 101/2010  1  growth but it remains crucial that each country with its capacity should make its contribution to revive global demand. Currently, there are intense debates within the global community, particularly inside the G20 and FSB, to restructure the financial system and put in place a radical and quite ambitious financial sector reform agenda. It is imperative to repair and rebuild a well functioning financial system that can support growth while maintaining financial stability. These reforms are wide ranging, including implementing new capital and liquidity standards, promoting principles for effective supervision, looking at ways to constrain moral hazard, developing cross-border resolution mechanisms, agreeing to reforms on OTC derivative markets to reduce systemic risk and improve market efficiency and integrity, and agreeing on a single set of high quality, global accounting standards. We very much welcome the work carried by the Basel Committee. Strengthening capital and improving liquidity standards should be seen as the main tools to reach a more resilient banking sector. Turkey’s experience shows that a sound capital base, appropriate liquidity and well supervised leverage are the key elements that assure a healthy banking system. The difficulties faced by advanced economies today may be unprecedented in scale, but not unique in nature.