samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This common platform would give both the Hong Kong and Malaysia financial markets the added critical mass for sukuk and boost liquidity in the secondary market, thus contributing towards the development of a global Islamic money market for a more efficient cross border liquidity management. The benefits that can be realised from the cooperation between our two markets are enormous. On that note, I wish to thank HKMA for hosting this joint conference and I bid the participants a productive endeavour. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

It was an important signal to the foreign exchange market that the change, which was expected, took place without a depreciation of the krona. On the contrary, the krona was linked to the ECU at a rate somewhat above the central exchange rate. A number of measures had preceded a formal change of the stabilisation policy. The most important document that marks a new direction is the Government’s budget statement in January 1991. The Minister of Finance and the Government wrote there that combating inflation was to be given precedence over other political goals. This decision was reflected in the budget by a 40 per cent reduction of appropriations for relief work. In spring 1993, unemployment rose month by month and it was clear that the Government was not giving priority to full employment in the same way as before. This was the first major change of course in stabilisation policy. Now it was combating inflation that was important by means of a fixed exchange rate. The change was well prepared by experiences of previous failures and by the intellectual debate on stabilisation policy that had begun in the USA during the 1970s. From the beginning of 1991, a price stability goal was applied. This was given priority over full employment. The means was a fixed exchange rate. Employers and trade unions would be forced to bear the consequences of excesses in wage formation. The exchange rate was to be maintained.
This, in turn, should benefit emerging market economies by improving the degree of confidence that they can have in the future level of capital inflows. This is very much related to the discussion about procyclicality, an important issue that we at the Committee have taken up and addressed seriously. In particular, some have suggested that the ratings-based approaches will drive up the cost of credit for borrowers precisely at times when its supply is falling, namely during downturns in the business cycle. This is a very complex point and deserves a whole lecture in itself. Given the time constraints today, I would like just to summarise my own views. Of course, I fully respect the different opinions that may exist on this issue, but in my opinion, there are some elements that make me think that the concerns over procyclicality are exaggerated. There is some degree of procyclicality inherent in banking behaviour. The question that we should consider is whether Basel II, or any regulation, will unduly exacerbate this behaviour. Furthermore, it is also important to consider the trend around which cycles will fluctuate. I think that under Basel II, in the context of a more efficient and sound financial system, fluctuations will occur around a superior trend. This superior trend represents a better relationship between the capacity of the economy to absorb risks and the ability of the banking system to provide credit. Furthermore, one cause of pro-cyclical behaviour is low capitalisation and weak risk management.

Norman Chan: Hong Kong's pivotal role in infrastructure financing Keynote speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Forum-cum-Dialogue on “Belt and Road Initiative: Infrastructure Financing”, Hong Kong, 15 October 2018. * * * Carrie (Leung), Susie (Cheung), Tony (Neoh), distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. I am pleased to be invited to attend today’s Forum. Before I talk about what role Hong Kong can play in facilitating the financing for infrastructure projects, it would be useful if I refer to the enormous gap between the gigantic funding needs of infrastructure projects in the emerging market economies (EMEs) and the huge pool of global capital looking for investment opportunities. 2. It is beyond doubt that many EMEs do have a desperate need to bring in foreign investments in infrastructure, such as power plants, ports, airports, roads, railways, etc., all of which will certainly help them raise not only their living standards but also their capability in production and external trade. There is also no doubt that on the other side, there are billions or trillions of dollars eagerly looking for investment opportunities, especially those that can bring in steady long-term returns to the investors. When I ask investors or bankers why they are not putting their money into infrastructure projects that are waiting to be built and financed, the answer is there is a lack of “bankable” or “investible” projects.
The History of Inflation Targeting Before I look forward, it’s worth looking back and highlighting that it’s now 30 years since the inception of inflation targeting. In 1989, the central bank of the small country of New Zealand announced that the main objective of its monetary policy was to target the inflation rate.1 In the subsequent decades, most central banks in major economies coalesced around this approach of aiming for a low, publicly announced inflation rate. For the past three decades, this approach has been remarkably successful at keeping inflation low and stable.2 The inflation targets have acted as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations, which play a big role in determining actual inflation. For anyone who was trying to get a mortgage at a double-digit interest rate or seeing prices go up and up back in the days of high inflation, it’s almost unthinkable that in 2020 central banks are pondering the opposite challenge: how to prevent inflation from being too low. But it’s the reality most policymakers face, and the one our monetary policy frameworks will need to grapple with long into the future. The Future of Inflation So, how did we arrive where we are today? Why is low inflation the current challenge, and why will that likely persist? 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  To answer these questions, we need to look at r-star, or the longer-run neutral rate of interest.

2 John C. Williams, Inflation Targeting and the Global Financial Crisis: Successes and Challenges, Essay  presentation to the South African Reserve Bank Conference on Fourteen Years of Inflation Targeting in South Africa and the Challenge of a Changing Mandate, Pretoria, South Africa, October 31, 2014. 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. 4 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest. 5 John C. Williams, Living Life Near the ZLB, Remarks at 2019 Annual Meeting of the Central Bank Research  Association (CEBRA), New York, July 18, 2019. 6 John C. Williams, Monetary Policy in a Low R-Star World, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, FRBSF  Economic Letter, August 15, 2016. 7 This statement is based on ongoing research with New York Fed Research staff using Survey of Consumer  Expectations data and a version of the Malmendier-Nagel (2016) model of expectations formation (Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel . “Learning from Inflation Experiences,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  121, No. 1, 53 – 87 [gated version].). As such, it differs from the median measures of 1-year and 3-year inflation expectations released monthly by the New York Fed. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
16 Haldane (2017b). 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Golden Age of central banks, speculating on whether “peak central bank” had been reached. Some asked openly whether central bank independence was appropriate, at least on financial stability matters. I am not as pessimistic or as fatalistic as that. But I do think some of those concerns about understanding, trust and legitimacy are real. In response to them, new efforts may be needed to close the understanding and trust deficits and bridge the transparency and accountability gaps. Doing so would, I believe, leave central banks even better-informed and better-placed to deliver their core mandates in future. Here is why. Correcting the Deficits  My answer comes in two, inter-related, parts. Let me take these in turn. First, building understanding among the general public in the economy, financial system and central banks. Most people would think an improved understanding of the economy among the general public is desirable. It makes for improved decision-making by people on important everyday decisions on spending, saving, borrowing and working. The better those individual decisions (the micro), the more stable the economy and financial system are likely to be (the macro). Improved public understanding of the economy is in that sense win-win, benefitting policymakers and the public alike. But it is possible the benefits of improved public understanding in stabilising the economy and financial system have been underestimated. “Popular narratives” among the public might be more important in driving macro-economic behaviour than in the past.

This would need to be every bit as radical as the first, but would require central banks to engage with, and draw on, the general public – their “folk wisdom” – as never before. Central banks were put on earth to serve the public. The second revolution is about putting the public more firmly into public institutions. At a time of raised expectations and lowered trust, a reinforcement of central banks’ social contract with society could make them even more effective in the period ahead, whether you are the Bank of England (into its fourth century) or the Bank of Estonia (commencing its second). Let me start by saying a word about the central bank revolution of the recent past, before turning to the present and the future and the challenges and changes that may lie ahead in engaging the general public. The Bank of England has already begun taking important steps towards increasing its engagement. Some 1  For example, Tucker (2018). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  of the steps taken by central banks may have relevance to other public institutions, many of which face similar challenges of raised expectations and diminished trust among the general public. A Central Bank Revolution You do not typically associate central banks with revolution, unless the “r” is silent. Yet I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that, over the course of recent decades, a revolution has swept through pretty much every central bank on the planet.
Cash changeover positive but entails practical challenges It is not only the banks’ services that need to become more user-friendly, cost-effective and certain over time, our banknotes and coins also need to develop in the same way. When the new banknotes and coins are introduced, starting next year, the size and weight of the banknotes and some of the coins will decline and two new denominations will be introduced; the 2-krona coin and the 200-krona banknote. The banknotes and coins will thus become much more user-friendly and will be cheaper to handle. Safety is also increased through the new security features. I believe that we all agree these improvements are positive for all parties concerned. However, as with electronic payments, the introduction of the new banknotes and coins will give rise to some practical problems and friction during a transitional period. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Firstly, there is a huge amount of banknotes that are to be replaced; 300 million banknotes are to be withdrawn and around as many are to be put into circulation. For coins the figure is 500 million to be distributed in both directions. Secondly, Sweden has one of the world’s most automated cash systems. This means that all appropriate equipment in Sweden must be adapted to be able to handle the new banknotes and coins.

Thirdly, much of the practical changeover work will occur in the retail trade and shops, partly because this is where we use cash and partly because the banks have cut down on their cash handling. However, conditions vary considerably in the retail trade with regard to, for instance, technical equipment and security. It is necessary to ensure the entire changeover functions in a way that is felt by the general public to be simple and secure. How should we deal with the challenges? To summarise, one can say that there are two groups of challenges on the Swedish payments market. One concerns the slightly longer-term challenges following on from developments on the payments market, and the other concerns more near-term challenges regarding the banknote and coin changeover. Let me begin with cash and the near-term challenges. The cash changeover 2015–2017 The Riksbank has over a long time, and since its planning began in 2008, had a dialogue with the various participants in the market regarding the banknote and coin changeover. This means that the banks, cash-in-transit companies and retail trade have been able to influence every part of the work, especially the timetable. This has been very important to the Riksbank, as we no longer play any role in the practical handling of cash. The timetable for the changeover has been divided into two stages and extends over a relatively long period, which means that all of those involved have had plenty of time to prepare.
4  The total number in employment (aged 16+) increased by 296,000 between the three months Nov 2009– January 2010 and Nov 2010 to Jan 2011, according to the latest labour Force Survey. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Chart 2 – Employment intentions* Bank of England Agents’ scores 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3  Manufacturing  -4  Services  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  -5 2011  *: Employment intention scores reflect firms’ expected changes in workforce size over the next 6 months. Source: Bank of England  Vacancy levels are also holding up well and employment surveys – such as the Bank of England’s Agents’ survey also show a reasonably positive picture for employment intentions, as Chart 2 shows. Business surveys from the early months of this year are also consistent with a continuing economic recovery. In the manufacturing sector, all the major business surveys published in the early months of this year – from the CBI, the British Chambers of Commerce, and purchasing managers – are showing record or near-record responses for output and orders, consistent with the strong growth reported by the official output figures. Indeed, the latest CBI Monthly Trends Enquiry of manufacturers, released today, shows one of the strongest responses for expected output growth that we have seen in the past two decades. But – sadly – manufacturing industry is now a small proportion of the UK economy.

This makes approaching reform both complex and sensitive at the industry level, and for the various and varied individual players. But reform is necessary, to put in place a regime for the UK that provides the right level of resilience and investment incentives into the long-term. This regime will build on the experience and unexpected shocks we have seen in recent years, and create the capacity to deal with whatever else the future might bring. Returning to my suitcase analogy, who would have thought in 2019, never mind 1990, that those carefully packed clothes for a 2020 holiday in the Caribbean would need to instead serve a staycation in the UK. Things change and the ability of MA portfolios to adapt to this is key. On the Solvency II review, we have been open with the possible reform options we’ve been developing in the pre-consultation phase of the review. This has had the benefit of generating a lot of feedback, particularly in the months since our quantitative and qualitative information requests. As mentioned, we recently published a Discussion Paper[6] alongside HM Treasury’s Consultation Document. We are now arranging further meetings to hear reactions to that Discussion Paper and will engage with all material provided to us. We will be asking many of you for more information in the next few weeks and months, because we need to explore further the areas that are important to us and the areas that you’ve said are important to you.
The Road to Glasgow Speech given by Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England, Finance Adviser to the Prime Minister for COP26  Guildhall 27 February 2020  I would like to thank Jennifer Nemeth for her assistance in drafting these remarks and Jennifer Bell, Sarah Breeden, Alice Carr, Iren Levina, Sini Matikainen and Harriet O’Brien for their input. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Introduction Sir David Attenborough’s prophetic introduction has exposed the scale of the challenges and hinted at the enormous opportunities before us. And the Secretary of State has just described the prospect of a lasting COP 26 legacy and the opportunity for finance to be the force for good we know it can be. Now is the time to answer these calls to action. Private finance will have a critical role to play in a successful transition to a net zero carbon economy. With the UK COP26 Presidency, in partnership with Italy, the world is watching. Today is all about action. The actions the private financial sector can take to support a whole economy transition. The actions that regulators, governments and countries will take to catalyse your efforts. The actions that our fellow citizens are demanding, and that future generations deserve. And you have already begun. Private finance is now increasingly focused on the opportunities and risks in the transition.

According to data collected by the Bank for International Settlements, here in the United States, for example, the total potential costs of various support measures taken – capital injections, asset purchases, and guarantees of bank debt – amount to about 40 per cent of GDP. For some European countries, these numbers are even higher. While in some cases governments and central banks have been able to reduce their exposures, sometimes even with a profit, the involvement of the public sector remains important. The ultimate outcomes of these involvements are uncertain. Moreover, the consequences of the crisis in terms of job  1  Ben S. Bernanke gave a thorough overview of the various measures taken worldwide in his speech “Reflections on a Year of Crisis” at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, on 21 August 2009. BIS Review 115/2009  1  and wealth losses, huge increases in discretionary and non-discretionary public spending, and dramatic declines in public revenue is bound to be enormous. In some countries, public debt is set to rise at a pace never seen before in peace time. At the end, the citizens of our respective countries will have to foot the bill, one way or another. The second reason is that the crisis also generates important intangible costs which are often overlooked. Confidence in the financial sector and those running it has been severely damaged.
At each monetary policy meeting it is therefore a matter of choosing the repo-rate path that according to the corresponding forecasts for inflation and unemployment best stabilises these around the inflation target and a long-run sustainable rate respectively. In recent years I have therefore entered reservations against the majority decision, preferring a lower repo-rate path as I consider this would lead to better target fulfilment for inflation and unemployment. Several objections to my view of monetary policy have been expressed in the monetary policy discussion. As far as I understand it, these objections are that monetary policy should have more objectives than stabilising inflation and unemployment or other real-economy objectives than stabilising unemployment. The objectives of price stability and the highest sustainable employment – from which stabilisation of inflation and unemployment follows – can thus be set aside for a period if one wants to slow down growth in mortgage lending or to hold interest rates at a higher level, as low interest rates are assumed to build up imbalances. But several objectives, and unclear ones, would risk making monetary policy arbitrary and disjointed. This is contrary to the government bill, according to which the delegation of monetary policy to an independent Riksbank requires a clear objective for monetary policy. This is to ensure there is no scope for arbitrary monetary policy and so that the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) can evaluate monetary policy on the basis of the established objectives.

To get an idea of what is possible, however, we can compare the results in other countries that have had a fixed inflation target as long as Sweden, that is, since the early 1990s. It is also reasonable to exempt the very first years of the new inflation-targeting regime for Sweden and other countries. Canada has had an inflation target since 1991, which from the end of 1995 is 2 per cent and its average inflation rate during the period 1996–2011 is 2.0 per cent. The United Kingdom has had an inflation target from the end of 1992, which was however modified in 2003/2004. Up to the end of 2003, the UK inflation target was 2.5 per cent, when measured using the RPIX price index, and the average inflation rate in 1996–2003 was 2.5 per cent. With effect from 2004 the United Kingdom has had an inflation target of 2 per cent for the CPI, which cannot be regarded as any significant change in level as inflation measured as the CPI is on average 0.75 percentage points lower than when measured using RPIX. 12 The average inflation rate for the period 2004–2007 was 2.0 per cent, while the average for the crisis years 2008–2011 is higher, at 3.4 per cent. However, given the higher rate of unemployment in the United Kingdom stemming from the crisis, a well-balanced monetary policy means that inflation should overshoot the target.