samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The unemployment rate has decreased close to its record lows, while the number of vacant jobs has approached its record high. To fill the new jobs, we need either an inflow of labour migrants, or a redistribution of the current labour force among regions, industries, and enterprises. This process is objectively slower than the return of the available labour force to work during the period of the recovery growth. A higher competition for specialists between employers is promoting the conditions for an increase in wages. It is essential that a rise in wages is consistent with the growth of labour productivity in the relevant sectors. Otherwise, it will entail higher costs which enterprises will pass on to consumers, and the rise in nominal wages will be ultimately absorbed by inflation. We keep our GDP forecast unchanged for the next year and further on. An additional tightening of monetary policy aimed at returning inflation to the target is coherent with the positive contribution of external demand and investments from the National Wealth Fund made to aggregate demand. GDP will increase by 4–4.5% this year and by 2–3% further on, which is in line with the sustainable growth path. Monetary conditions have changed only slightly after the September meeting. An increase in market rates following the rise in the key rate currently has only a limited effect on them. This is largely associated with the impact of higher inflation expectations.

However, the experience of the subsequent waves of the pandemic has proven that restrictions are impacting demand increasingly less, whereas supply contracts when enterprises are forced to suspend operations. We consider that restrictions rather have a proinflationary influence now. The industries that directly depend on restrictions, primarily services, will be affected most considerably. The Government has introduced support measures to aid the most vulnerable industries, first of all small and medium-sized enterprises and their employees. The Bank of Russia, on its part, has allocated a limit of 60 billion rubles within a special 4% refinancing programme for the banks that would issue loans on preferential terms to small and mediumsized enterprises affected by restrictions. We have also recommended that banks and microfinance organisations should approve 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  restructuring applications for those individuals and entrepreneurs who need this. I will now speak about our future decisions. It has become more probable that the level of the key rate will be higher, and the period during which the key rate might stay at this elevated level will be longer than we assumed in our previous forecast. According to our baseline forecast, the key rate will average 7.3–8.3% per annum next year, and 5.5–6.5% per annum in 2023. In other words, the key rate will return to its long-term neutral range no earlier than in the middle of 2023. Thank you for attention. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Figure 1: A stylised depiction of the monetary policy trade-off  The blue line in the figure is the Phillips curve, which summarises the structure of the economy and, in particular, how changes in demand, via the output 9  gap, affect inflation. The economy’s equilibrium is at the intersection of these two lines. In the case of an inflationary shock that induces a trade-off, the Phillips curve shifts up, as shown in the figure. Monetary policy needs to tighten to lower pressure on resources and reduce inflationary pressures, such that the economy ends up on the  9  Originally formulated by Phillips (1958), albeit as a relationship between wage growth and unemployment. See: Phillips, A. W. (1958). "The Relationship between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in the United Kingdom 1861-1957". Economica, 25 (100): 283–299. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  5  red line, consistent with the policymaker’s preferences (as shown by the dotted arrows in the figure). The slope of the Phillips curve is crucial in determining in the size of the fall in output needed to reduce inflation to an acceptable level – the sacrifice ratio. Figure 2: Stylised policy responses  Frequently, the economy experiences shocks that drive inflation and output in the same direction. These shocks to aggregate demand can include variations in government consumption, households’ desire to consume, or business’ desire to invest. Increases in demand put pressure on the use of resources, causing prices to rise.

The time-variation of lambda is illustrated in part by the fact that the regression estimating the MPC’s lambda leaves around two-thirds of the variation of inflation over the output gap unexplained, even in expectation and over the post-crisis period. So why isn’t the estimated lambda fixed, and what considerations inform its value in practice? 19  Yellen, J (2012), “Revolution and Evolution in Central Bank Communications”, November. Converting this to an equivalent value for the weight on the output gap depends on the Okun’s law coefficient one assumes, estimates for which vary. 20 Ilbas (2012) estimates the Smets-Wouters model under optimal commitment policy for the Volcker/Greenspan era and find a value of lambda on output growth of around ½. Dennis (2006) uses a semi-structural model and finds a weight of around 3 on the output gap, whereas Givens (2012) estimates a value of around 0.1 over a similar sample. Givens and Salami (2015) estimate a small New Keynesian model on post-Volker data and find a lambda on the output gap of around ¼. Sack (2000) finds a weight of around 0.8 on the unemployment gap over the period 1984-1998 using a VAR to describe the economy’s dynamics. Lakdawala (2016) allows for time variation in central bank preferences and finds that the weight on inflation relative to the output gap to have fluctuated over time, falling to low levels in the 1990s and early 2000s (implying a high relative weight on the output gap), before rising in the period leading up to the financial crisis.
When you know it’s there, it’s obvious. But when, as instructed , people are engrossed in the highs and lows of the basketball game, many fail to notice the bear. The risk of adjustment in the stretched prices (and compressed yields) in corporate debt markets are my moonwalking bear, hidden in plain sight. The icebergs can lurk beneath the surface of the system. They make navigation of markets uncertain and hazardous. Assessment of them requires diving into the cold, murky depths of the financial system. Excessive leverage and liquidity mismatches were the bergs of the financial crisis. They forced investors into firesales of assets, magnifying market adjustments, and sometimes even disrupting market functioning. In other words, they compromised market resilience. Those risks have been addressed. But we must stay alert to any possible new bergs of the future. To spot them emerging we need to dive into the detail of the system, to look at the incentives and constraints facing the participants. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  We’ll don our diving equipment later. Before we do, it’s worth asking who should care about hidden risk? Any manager focussed on risk and return will be interested in these bears and bergs. Failure to acknowledge them can damage performance. But while the risks mean some investors can have a bad day and others a good one, the ups and downs of asset markets don’t necessarily concern policymakers.

In these circumstances, had we allowed the exchange rate to adjust to market pressures within the 15 per cent band, the currency would have appreciated. 5. You seem to be playing down the efficacy of the fiscal deficit and of exchange rate adjustment as a means of jump starting the economy. What would you suggest instead? As I have already pointed out, the domestic factors which are contributing to the economy’s anaemic growth record are largely microeconomic in nature. I have also explained why deficit financing and changes in the nominal exchange rate cannot correct these weaknesses, still less produce sustainable growth. Policy orientation must eschew short-term palliatives. Like our competitors we must learn to come to terms with globalization. Reflecting on one simple fact should help in understanding what this means: the hourly cost of labour of an electronics operative in Malta is around $ compared with $ in Singapore and $ in China. Neither more government spending nor a devaluation can narrow that gap. Against this background, maintaining external competitiveness in the long run depends on continued moderation in wage growth, faster increases in labour productivity and sustainable budget positions. I make no claim to originality in proposing this prescription; it is shared by the EU Commission, the ECB and the IMF. I shall first address the last objective. Given that taxation levels are already high, fiscal consolidation should be achieved by cutting recurrent spending.
Infrastructure Asia harnesses the networks and collective capabilities of public sector agencies and private sector firms across the region to meet Asia’s infrastructure needs by (i) connecting partners in the 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  ecosystem; (ii) building capacity in demand markets; and (iii) providing top-level project advisory to improve bankability. Infrastructure Asia provides an open platform for Chinese (including Shanghai-based) infrastructure developers and financial institutions to partner players in Singapore in regional infrastructure projects. b. Furthermore, as infrastructure demand and foreign investments along the Belt and Road region increase, we expect a boost in demand for commodities and growth in commodity trade. Singapore’s strategic location in the crossroads of key trade flows has enabled commodity traders in Singapore to capture such opportunities. Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (“SPDB”) opened its first overseas commodity centre in Singapore in October this year, providing global commodity businesses with commodity-related financial services and solutions. c. Singapore banks are also embarking on BRI collaborations with Shanghai banks. UOB signed a MOU with SPDB in September this year to serve companies hoping to tap on BRI opportunities, providing financial solutions covering investment advisory, cross-border RMB transactions, syndicated loans, project and trade finance, and cash settlement. OCBC Bank signed its second MOU with Bank of Shanghai in April this year, leveraging each other’s strengths, networks and platforms to support customers in their BRI expansion plans, including access to OCBC’s funding and risk management solutions for Bank of Shanghai’s corporate clients.

Our Governing Council will do whatever it takes to fulfil our primary price stability mandate; have no doubt about that. It is therefore particularly important for the fiscal authorities to ensure debt sustainability in a context of rising interest rates. It is an understatement to say that this issue was far from dominating the French election campaign, so I will first develop the reasons why debt must remain a key issue (I), before discussing possible fiscal rules - including European ones (II). ** I. Why debt must remain at the forefront of economic concerns 1. Ensuring fiscal sustainability Faced with the Covid storm, the public authorities rightly activated both the fiscal and monetary levers. Public debts rose significantly in 2020 and 2021 to absorb  Page 2 of 9 the economic fallout of the crisis: an increase of 16% of GDP in France and 12% of GDP in the euro area. The “whatever it takes” was justified in 2020; however, the downside was that the massive increase in debt started to be considered trivial. Many of our fellow citizens, in good faith, do not understand why the French Treasury would refuse one-billion-euro spendings, when hundreds of billions were suddenly easy to find. Debt became unlimited and cost-free. This twofold illusion, which is so appealing, is our greatest danger today. What was an exceptional response to exceptional circumstances must not become a “new normal”.
At the moment, a German low-price retail chain is planning to establish itself on the Swedish market, which could have a dampening effect on prices. A high concentration of companies also increases the risk of forming cartels. Recently, several cartels, or suspected cartels, have been revealed in the building, aviation and petrol trades. According to a recently published SIFO survey, 80 per cent of small companies in Sweden and 50 per cent of large companies state that they believe cartels arise very often or quite often in Swedish trade and industry. In other words, consumers may be losing considerable sums of money. With regard to the "petrol cartel", amounts in the order of half a billion kronor were discussed. By eliminating market mechanisms, companies also avoid the competitive pressure that could otherwise ensure they make their operations more efficient and develop new products. In the long term, it also leads to a loss of competitiveness from an international perspective, lower growth and fewer jobs. The government has proposed measures against unlawful co-operation in the bill on combating cartels 10 that was put forward recently. The bill aims to make the war against cartels more efficient by allowing a company that exposes a cartel in future to avoid paying the fine for damage to competition or to have its fine reduced. The government also proposes a stronger confidentiality protection for those who report or provide information on cartels.

The FLS does not seek to allocate credit to particular parts of the economy directly – the Bank is not taking a view on this matter. But SMEs and first time home buyers in particular are thought to be credit hungry. Banks will collectively need to meet that demand if they are individually to make the most of the FLS. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Not necessarily every bank will support every sector. But if the big firms don’t then the smaller banks will. We are relying on the pressures of demand and supply, and competition, to ensure that credit flows to where there is demand. The normal business model of a bank is that their lending rates are related to their funding rates. The process for doing so is not immediate and funding from different sources – both retail and wholesale, secured and unsecured, might be used to support lending activities. There is no reason to think that the provision of cheaper funding via the FLS will cause a bank to change its business model in this regard. Indeed the incentives in the scheme are for banks and building societies to cut lending rates and hence lend more to get the cheapest funding. Since the scheme was announced we have seen widespread falls in funding costs across different sources and an equally wide variety of lending rate reductions.
The region as a whole is an active hive of experimentation in digital financial services, supported by favourable consumer demographics, particularly the digitally savvy youth. In Southeast Asia, digital financial services is estimated to contribute about 5% of the total revenue for the financial sector this year. This share is expected to more than double to 11% within the next five years, driven among others by digital lending, investment, remittance and insurance products. Here in Malaysia, the most recent demand side survey on financial capability and inclusion indicated that four in ten Malaysians utilise internet banking services, up from just one in ten as recently as three years before. This trend is expected to intensify, with the expansion in digital product offerings and growing acceptance of online financial services. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Building trust and confidence Digitalisation can also be a powerful force for sustainable financial inclusion. By lowering costs and increasing scale and reach, it has become a means for providing access to essential financial services such as e-payments, micro-insurance and online remittance to previously underserved segments. Other innovations such as banking and insurance aggregators are also helping consumers make better financial decisions, in turn, increasing their confidence in using financial services.

Safeguarding the interests of consumers without stifling innovation remains one of the most difficult balances to achieve for regulators. Regulators are constantly trading off considerations of privacy against efficiency; fragmentation against competition; access against risks of abuse. In the digital age, these trade-offs become impossible without equipping consumers with the information, knowledge and tools that they need to protect themselves and make decisions that are in their own best interests. It is only through a complementary mix of appropriate but not excessive regulation, and enlightened and confident consumers, that we will find the right balance of guiding the development of digital financial services so that it is neither hurried nor hampered, and remains sustainable and well-functioning to promote financial stability and inclusive growth. For Bank Negara Malaysia, our regulatory agenda is supported by a long-standing focus on financial education. This year, I am pleased to share that this has been elevated to a nationallevel priority with the launch of Malaysia’s first five-year National Strategy for Financial Literacy. A key focus of the strategy is helping consumers protect themselves against fraud and exploitation, and embrace innovation more confidently in the digital era. This needs to start with the young, but without neglecting those for whom the digital world is both unfamiliar and daunting. Specific challenges in a digital era Let me just mention a few of the specific challenges that financial services authorities will have to contend with in the digital era.
1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005(a)  1,065  1,315  1,984  3,807  5,522  6,347  Textile and Garments  110  293  628  1,853  2,982  2,895  Tea  373  442  495  481  701  810  All Other Exports  582  581  862  1,474  1,839  2,642  Export Earnings (Services)  279  329  531  821  953  1,540  Worker Remittances  152  292  401  790  1,160  1968  Foreign Direct Investment  43  24  34  28  175  272  Foreign Loans and Grants  307  517  526  847  422  972  Inflows  9  14  13  21  15  19  Trade balance  15  40  57  53  65  76  Loans and grants  50  56  76  93  275  197  Total imports  7  14  15  15  16  22  GDP  4  5  5  6  7  8  Export Earnings (Goods)  Worker Remittances, as a % of Total current account  (a) Provisional  As shown in the table above, in 2005, remittances increased to $ 1,968 mn, indicating a 22.6% growth compared to 2004.

Principle III: Remittance services should be supported by a sound, predictable, non-discriminatory and proportionate legal and regulatory framework The implementation of this principle requires special laws and regulations for remittances, while the existing or new laws should be sound, predictable, non-discriminatory and proportionate. Specially, for remittance corridors, (e.g. US-Mexico, US-Brazil, the Middle East-Philippines) both sending and receiving countries should cooperate with each other to sort out legal obstacles in transferring remittances. It is also noteworthy to consider avoiding dangers of over-regulation in remittance transfers. The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Acts can also deter some of the cross-border money transfers. The authorities responsible for implementation of these legislation should be mindful of the need to use judgment in dealing with genuine remittances. Principle IV: Competitive market conditions, including appropriate access to domestic payment infrastructures, should be fostered in the remittance industry. This requires the avoidance of exclusivity conditions as imposed on an agent choosing to offer only one remittance service and to promote several direct /indirect access to domestic payment systems in the country. Here too, the central banks have a role to play. The central banks and supervisors should  BIS Review 3/2007  5  work with competitive authorities to ensure consistent approaches and discourage exclusivity conditions. It is also important for supervisors to ensure that money transfer systems are not unnecessarily anti-competitive. Principle V: Remittance services should be supported by appropriate governance and risk management practices Good governance and risk management practices by all stakeholders make remittance service safer and help protect consumers.
On the counterpart side, there has been a further slight strengthening in the growth of loans to non-financial corporations, which rose to 1.0% in April, after 0.8% in March. The growth of loans to households was 3.4% in April, unchanged from the previous month. The latest data confirm a continued gradual strengthening in the annual growth of lending to the nonfinancial private sector. The overall size of bank balance sheets has remained broadly unchanged over the past few months, notwithstanding some volatility. It is important that banks continue to expand the provision of credit to the private sector in an environment of increasing demand. To address this challenge, where necessary, it is essential for banks to retain earnings, to turn to the market to strengthen further their capital bases or to take full advantage of government support measures for recapitalisation. In particular, banks that currently have limited access to market financing urgently need to increase their capital and their efficiency. To sum up, based on its regular economic and monetary analyses, the Governing Council decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. The information that has become available since our meeting on 5 May 2011 confirms continued upward pressure on overall inflation, mainly owing to energy and commodity prices. A cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis indicates that the underlying pace of monetary expansion is gradually recovering. Monetary liquidity remains ample, with the potential to accommodate price pressures in the euro area.

A number of data sets have already been, or are about to be, made available by the ESAs:   banking sector data, collected by the European Banking Authority (EBA) on a quarterly basis, relate to: supervisory data on solvency, credit risk and asset quality, earnings risk and balance sheet structure ( key risk indicators), as well as to data on large exposures, broken down by instrument and by sectoral and geographic counterpart, for samples of EU large banking groups;    insurance sector data collected by the European Insurance and Occupational Pension Funds Authority (EIOPA) on an annual basis and, possibly, at a higher frequency relate to aggregate solvency and profit-and-loss data for large EU insurance groups;    quarterly data provided by the European Securities Markets Authority (ESMA) refer to the number of shares admitted to trading in the European Economic Area (EEA), by country and by market, as well as to the list of EEA markets. 1  Council Regulation (EU) No 1096/2010 of 17 November 2010 conferring specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board (Official Journal of the European Union, L 331, 15.12.2010, pp. 162 ff.). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The ECB, in turn, is in the process of making datasets available to the ESRB and the ESAs that meet their requirements.