samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Table 1 Main international scenario assumptions (yearly averages) 2009  2010 (f) Jun.10  2011 (f)  Sep.10  Jun.10  2012 (f)  Sep.10  Sep.10  World GDP at PPP (annual change, %)  -0,6  4,3  4,3  4,0  3,8  4,7  World GDP at market exchange rate (annual change, %)  -2,0  3,2  3,3  3,0  2,9  3,9  Trading partners' GDP (annual change, %)  -0,2  4,4  4,4  3,7  3,5  4,6  WTI oil price $  62  77  77  80  79  82  LME copper price $  234  300  320  270  290  290  Terms of trade (annual change, %)  4,1  14,3  15,0  -7,2  -4,3  0,5  External prices, in $ (annual change, %)  -6,2  3,4  4,6  3,3  2,3  4,7  (f) Forecast Source: Central Bank of Chile.

This is pushing up hurdle rates on investment, swamping the impact of lower policy rates. Reducing uncertainty would turn a vicious cycle – in which falling equilibrium interest rates eat into policy space, exacerbating downside risks and pushing down equilibrium rates further – into a virtuous one, of rising equilibrium rates, increased policy space, and stronger global growth. “The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the current International Monetary and Financial System”, speech by Mark Carney at the Jackson Hole Symposium 2019. 3  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  III. Transforming payments During Benoît’s time at the ECB, the public provision of money has faced challenges from Bitcoin to stablecoins. The Bank of England has an open mind but not open door when it comes to such innovations. Unlike social media, for which standards and regulations are only now being developed after the technologies have been adopted by billions of users, the terms of engagement for any new systemic private payments system must be in force well in advance of any launch. And there are a host of issues that still need to be addressed – from maintaining the highest standards of operational resilience and managing financial risks, to addressing privacy and anti-money laundering concerns. Like Benoit, we recognise that these initiatives were not conceived in a vacuum; rather they seek to address long-standing problems in payments.
Federal fiscal consolidation appears to be over for now, and employment and spending are increasing at the state and local government level. That said, economic performance in this cycle has been disappointing compared to historical patterns. Even though household wealth relative to disposable income is nearly at its prefinancial crisis level and conditions in labor markets are substantially improved, consumer spending growth has been slower and the personal saving rate higher than what we would have expected based on past historical relationships. Similarly, even with low mortgage rates, single-family housing construction has been surprisingly sluggish. And, despite very accommodative financial conditions and record corporate profits, growth of business fixed investment has been tepid. Looking forward, my outlook for 2015 is that economic growth will be close to the pace of the past two years, supported by continued solid fundamentals and accommodative financial conditions. If I am correct, then this would lead to a further reduction of labor market slack, with the unemployment rate approaching 5 percent by the second half of the year. An important element of this forecast is continued strength in household spending. This strength is supported by the restored health of household balance sheets, improved household income prospects and the benefit of significantly lower energy prices. The data for the second half of 2014 reflect these positive forces: real personal consumption expenditures grew at a 3.2 annualized rate in the third quarter and a 4.4 percent rate in the fourth quarter.

At the same time, I believe that the Federal Reserve System’s monetary policy responsibilities are allocated appropriately by the Federal Open Market Committee, with New York playing an important role to ensure that monetary policy is executed effectively even during periods of duress. Of course, the Federal Reserve System and the New York Fed are not perfect institutions. That is why we always must strive, in an open and transparent manner, to improve what we do and how we do it, for the benefit of the American people. Thank you for your kind attention. I would now be happy to take some questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
It would also shift the composition of intra-regional trade from intermediate inputs for the production of goods for final demand to the traditional markets, to a more balanced composition with increased share to meet final demand within Asia. First, as the emerging economies, in particular Asia, gain importance as growth centres, the cumulative markets of Asia as export destinations will expand over time. The rapidly rising Asian middle income class will increase final demand for goods and services. Second, Asia can leverage on its immense diversity as a source of economic complementarities. The “Flying Geese Model” illustrates how Asia had, in the past, harness the diversity of the. Going forward, similar emphasis can be adapted beyond merely for the production of goods for final demand outside Asia, and draw on the different comparative advantages of the Asian economies. Financial integration as a third strategy The third strategy is the promotion of deeper financial integration. This is important for further advancing the economic development of the region. Financial integration is generally associated with capital mobility and refers to the extent to which an economy's financial system is interconnected with other financial markets. A fully integrated financial system will be one in which potential market participants, both in the banking sector and financial markets, adopt a single set of rules, have equal access and are treated equally.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2008, "Shaping Policy Reform and Peer Review in Southeast Asia: Integrating Economies Amid Diversity". Pangestu, Mari, 2006, "Visions of East Asia: Three Engines for a Way Forward", Chapter 13 in the World Bank publication "East Asian Visions: Perspectives on Economic Development". Rodrik, Dani, 1994, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich", NBER Working Paper No. 4964, November. Rodrik, Dani, 2006, "What's So Special about China's Exports? ", China & The World Economy, Vol. 14, No. 5, September-October. Rodrik, Dani, 2009, "Growth after the Crisis", Prepared for the Commission on Growth and Development. World Bank, 2006, "Dancing with Giants. China, India and the Global Economy", By Eds, L., Alan Winters and Shahid Yusuf. In this paper, Asia generally refers to the entire geographical region of Asia, but with specific emphasis on East Asia and South-East Asia. However, when the latter two are referred to in the paper, it is explicitly stated. Refers to Japan (rank: 2), P. R. China (3), India (12), Korea (15) and Indonesia (19) based on 2008 nominal GDP in USD terms. Rodrik, Dani, 2009, "Growth after the Crisis", Prepared for the Commission on Growth and Development. ASEAN-5 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. For example, for the newly industrialised Asian economies, private sector-driven growth began in earnest since the 1980s (Rodrik, Dani, 1994, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich", NBER Working Paper No. 4964, November).
Is the credit decision taken on the basis of such evaluation - how current is the financial information on the borrower with the bank? The market is a dynamic place, where change takes place all the time. It is imperative that credit officers of banks be given maximum exposure to the real sector - the numbers in financial statements must have a direct relationship to the real sector to reflect the current status of the borrower’s business? They should support the repayment programme undertaken by the borrower on which the Bank’s credit decision was predicated. You will see thus that information is critical to risk management without which you are groping in the dark and before long you will be faced with large losses. The emphasis should therefore be on the early identification of risk, which if addressed at the very initial stages, would not expose the bank to large scale losses at a later stage. Effective credit risk management is the key to the health of the banking industry today. It is not the resolution of NPA but the cause of NPA that should be addressed. Internal rating systems must be developed to afford an accurate and continuous picture of the level of risk exposure of the bank to individual credit risk so that timely action can be taken to soften the risk. Management Information Systems must be strengthened. Preventive and remedial actions should encompass additional capital, better internal controls and/or safer provisioning policies. Capital is not a substitute for sound risk management.

Sunil Mendis: Risk management in Sri Lankan banks in the changing environment Inaugural address by Mr Sunil Mendis, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the CRISILSLBA seminar on risk management in Sri Lankan banks in the changing environment, Colombo, 15-16 November 2004. *  *  *  Good morning ladies and gentlemen, Let me first thank the SLBA (Sri Lanka Banks Association) and the representatives from CRISIL India (Credit Rating Information Services of India Ltd) for the initiative taken to organize this Seminar on a very important aspect of banking business - risk management. As we all know, risk management in banking is a continuous process of planning, organizing and controlling a bank’s assets and liabilities, their volumes, maturities, rates and yields. This is the most simple definition that I can think of. However, its implications on banking business are what we concern ourselves with, especially from the regulatory point of view. In the context of Sri Lankan banks at least, of the major risks confronting financial institutions, credit risk remains the predominant or core risk. Risktaking is part and parcel of banking. The highly leveraged nature of banking business itself illustrates the risk exposure level of banks. Therefore, what is important is how we manage these risks, how we measure and price risk and above all what measures we take to mitigate these risks.
All Saudi Banks are on target to implement all 3 Pillars of the Basle II Capital Adequacy by January 2008, using the standardized approach. During the past decade, Saudi banks have made tremendous progress in terms of offering innovative products and services, introducing sophisticated technological delivery channels including ATMs, Internet and Phone Banking. In cooperation with SAMA, banks have set up advanced payment and settlement systems, including Automated Clearing Houses and real time gross value electronic funds transfer systems such as SPAN and SARIE. The introduction of technologically advanced systems has resulted in significantly improving the level and quality of customer service, a reduction in transactional costs and increase in efficiencies and strengthening controls. Regarding the capital market, a number of measures have been taken by the Capital Market Authority to deepen and broaden the market which will enhance its role in the development of the economy. The Capital Market Authority has been issuing licenses for setting up specialized companies devoted exclusively to conducting securities business in the Kingdom. So far, it has issued 70 licenses for the purpose. Our financial system is continuing to develop and grow in strength and sophistication. The insurance sector is being reorganized under the Cooperative Insurance Law of 2003, which has entrusted SAMA with the responsibility of supervising insurance business in the country. At the time of the enactment of the Law, there was only one licensed company namely National Cooperative Company for Insurance (NCCI) operating in the country. Other companies were unlicensed.

A key facet of the economic reforms has been the active participation of the private sector in all aspects of the economy particularly in the manufacturing, construction and services sectors. Now turning to the Kingdom’s goals and aspirations for the next decades. We have a clear vision that Saudi Arabia will represent an industrial hub among the region's countries, leveraging off on its strategic location, competitive supply of energy, size of the local market, ease of access to global markets, and the growing partnerships between the public and private sectors. This strategy fulfils our State’s goal of diversifying our economic production base away from Oil. For this purpose, we have encouraged and will continue to encourage the private sector by providing attractive incentives, including the setting up of industrial zones in various parts of the country, equipping them with various infrastructural facilities and by increasing the capital base of specialized credit institutions to provide long-term loans to entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the Saudi economy is facing a number of challenges the most important of which is the increasing rate of inflation. Although inflation was less than 1 percent on average in the last two decades, it rose to 2.2 percent in 2006 and it continued to increase during the last months, exceeding 4 percent in last August according to the Central Department of Statistics and Information. Our concern is that factors that caused accelerating inflation are still in existence.
Their approach to adding policy accommodation with a near-zero overnight policy rate has been to use outright purchases of assets, term lending schemes, and forward guidance on these policy tools.4 The policy of outright purchases of assets is often called quantitative easing (QE) because of the Bank of Japan’s earlier policy focused solely on increasing the size of the central bank’s liabilities.5 While QE is a useful catch-all term for this set of policies, it masks the fact that central banks make different choices in the assets they buy to expand their balance sheets.6 Central bank laws specifying which assets can be purchased and held outright vary, although nearly all central banks can buy and hold the debt issued by their sovereign.7 Indeed, most of the empirical work on the effectiveness of LSAPs is based on the analysis of sovereign debt purchases. More recently, a number of central banks have extended their purchases into the corporate debt and asset-backed securities markets. The Federal Reserve Act does not permit the purchase of privately issued debt such as corporate debt or privately issued ABS.

It is of paramount importance that the decision on ERM II entry be taken only when macroeconomic fundamentals provide for a realistic deadline for the entry into the euro system in, say, two or three years' time. Still, there are some really good arguments for as rapid a possible EMU accession... For an accession country, it is important that the experience of past enlargements has shown - high rates of real convergence can be achieved in connection with the EU accession. There are several explanations for this phenomenon, including full integration into the single market, reduction of various political and economic risks etc. Adopting the euro can support economic integration through a higher correlation in economic cycles - as well as lower transaction costs and lower risk premiums. It is also clear that EMU participation reduces monetary uncertainty. For instance, had it not been for the EMU, European financial markets could probably have been much more turbulent during the Asian and Russian crises and the recent slowdown of the global economy. For an accession country, a rapid ERM-EMU accession could mean a further rise in its international credibility - take, for example, the developments in Greece who clearly benefited from ERM2 credibility in 1999, after the Asian crisis.
5 [19]  colleague, Governor Stefan Ingves, has observed.11 Further back in time, the Riksbank had a large portfolio of Swedish securities, which eventually was sold off around the turn of the millennium, since it was not considered necessary for conducting monetary policy.12 As shown in Figure 6, the Riksbank's assets currently represent a large proportion of GDP in an historical perspective. However, as a percentage of the total financial assets in the Swedish economy, the proportion is barely visible. Kristin Forbes is professor at MIT and was a member of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee 2014-2017. In her speech at Jackson Hole last year, she pointed out, among other things, that the purchase of private assets was largely motivated in terms of 'credit easing', i.e. measures aimed at alleviating turbulence in financial markets.13 Therefore, she believes that an 'exit' should not be determined by how well the central bank's inflation target is met, but by the problems that the measures were aimed at, namely frictions and concerns on the financial markets. I think she has some good points, but, as I have mentioned, I do not think it is easy to make the division into normal quantitative easing and credit easing. There is a simple reason for this. Both the level of the policy rate and different types of risk premiums in the market determine the interest rates that ‘customers’, i.e. households and companies in Sweden, meet.

And at our meeting in June last year we decided to use the full framework, which meant that our asset purchases ended at SEK 700 billion. Our plan was then to merely maintain the holding, by compensating for principal payments. I will return to our most recent decision later on. Broadly speaking, the Riksbank's monetary policy response followed the same pattern as the major central banks, the ECB and the Federal Reserve, as is illustrated in Table 1. This is not so strange, given that the crisis affected many countries roughly at the same time and in the same way. Figure 2 shows our holdings of securities, while Figure 3 shows how much of the outstanding stock we have purchased in each respective market. On the whole, we now own roughly the same nominal amount of government bonds as covered bonds. Nevertheless, we have bought a considerably smaller share of the outstanding stock of covered bonds compared to government securities. This says something about the size of the market for covered bonds. 3 On 12 March 2020, the index on the Stockholm Stock Exchange fell by 11 per cent. 4 See, for example, Sveriges Riksbank (2021), Cunliffe (2022) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2022). 5 There have also been purchases of smaller amounts of securities with shorter maturities, in the form of treas-  ury bills and commercial paper. 6 The Riksbank also implemented a number of other measures as a result of the crisis.
10.02.2023  Moving the economic governance framework of the EU: towards more efficient fiscal rules in a more complete monetary union Warwick Economics Summit 2023 University of Warwick – Coventry, United Kingdom Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Thank you to the Coordination Team for inviting me to speak at this 2023 edition of the Warwick Economics Summit. I would like to congratulate the University of Warwick’s Department of Economics on encouraging its students to run this initiative, which has benefited from the words of highly distinguished participants since 2002. I am honoured to join this group of speakers that have shared with you their views on various matters that are key not only to our present but also to our future. Allow me to add that I am particularly glad to be able to do so this year in person after the recent pandemic years. In my remarks today I will address what I consider to be the key role that the fiscal governance framework of the European Union (EU) plays, or ought to play, and the ongoing review for its reform. I will also touch upon the European Commission’s recent orientations for the reform of the fiscal rules that were published last November. Please note that my words today are merely one more voice in the ongoing debate involving academics and other policymakers on the reform of the EU’s fiscal governance framework. Introduction The current economic context is one in which economic activity, even if more resilient that initially expected, is losing steam.

Likewise important from the standpoint of the industry’s resilience has been the deleveraging undergone by the Spanish non-financial private sector during this period. From 2010 to 2019 there was a decline of almost 30 pp of GDP in the household debt ratio; and in the case of the non-financial corporations sector, its net debt fell by more than 45 pp of GDP from 2010. 1  In any event, the most appropriate means of illustrating the banking sector’s resilience is through the stress tests we regularly perform as supervisors. In July, the ECB conducted a vulnerability analysis of the banks under its supervision. The aim was to test, prospectively, banks’ resilience to the shock caused by the pandemic. The results of this exercise for Spanish banks are very similar to those obtained at the Banco de España in the Forward Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks (FLESB) stress test exercise, whose final results were published in our autumn Financial Stability Report. In the baseline scenario considered by the Banco de España’s vulnerability exercise, which includes cumulative declines in euro area GDP in 2020, 2021 and 2022 of around 1.6%, the reduction in the solvency of Spanish banks as a whole was estimated at 2 pp for significant institutions with an international presence, at 1 pp for other significant institutions and at 0.8 pp for institutions under the direct supervision of the Banco de España, leaving them at 9.9%, 12% and 18.7% on average, respectively, above the prudential requirements established.