samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the fact that the crisis that arrived at the end of the 2000s was not the one that was expected does not mean that the expected crisis will not arrive at all. There is still a risk of a rapid correction of the global imbalances. This could lead to major problems for the global economy, which has hardly recovered yet from the crisis that we have just experienced. 26  See for example Krugman and Obstfeld, 2009. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  References Bayoumi, T. Tong, H. and Wei, S-J. 2010. “The Chinese corporate savings puzzle: a firmlevel cross-country perspective”. IMF Working Paper no.. Bernanke, B. 2005. “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit”, Sandridge Lecture, Richmond, Virginia, March 10. Bernanke, B. 2009. ”Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk”, Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, March 10. Blomberg, G. and Falk, M. “How do large current-account surpluses co-exist with a weak international investment position?” Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2006:1 Braconier, H. and Ekholm, K. 2011. ”Global imbalances and their consequences for the Swedish economy”, in ”Den orädde debattören. En vänbok till Bo Södersten” ("The fearless debater. A friend book Bo Södersten "), Mats Lundahl, Ekerlids Förlag, 2011 Caballero, R. J. 2006. ”On the Macroeconomics of Asset Shortages”, NBER Working Paper No. 12753. Feldstein, M. 2007. ”Why is the dollar so high?”, NBER Working Paper 13114. Hausmann, R. and Sturzenegger, F. 2005. “U.S.

19 It is difficult to assess whether the level of investment in Sweden can be regarded as having being unjustifiably low during the period in which the current account surplus has grown. Above all it is difficult to find any kind of reform that would generally have been able to increase the return on Swedish investments in particular and thus have led to a higher investment ratio. 18  The National Institute of Economic Research (2011) puts this forward as a possible explanation of the high level of household saving in Sweden. 19  The so-called Danell system implied a quick winding down of interest subsidies compared to the previous rules. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 6 Investment in the EU and Sweden Percentage of GDP 24  24  22  22  20  20  18  18  16  16  14  14 Sweden - total Sweden -excluding housing  12  12  EU -total EU -excluding housing  10  10 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  Source: Statistics Sweden  After the fixed exchange rate regime was abandoned in 1992, the krona depreciated by almost 30 per cent in trade-weighted terms. The krona has in principle not recovered from this weakening, although it has strengthened significantly recently.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The new Islamic finance landscape Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Islamic Financial Intelligence Summit (IFIS) 2011 “The new Islamic finance landscape”, Kuala Lumpur, 15 November 2011. *  *  *  This decade has witnessed dramatic changes in the Islamic financial landscape. As a dynamic industry, Islamic finance is responding to the forces of change emanating from the changing requirements of the real economy, the changing pattern and pace of globalisation and the wide spread financial reforms being undertaken at both the international and national levels. This transformation of the Islamic financial system is also taking place during the most challenging of times as the world enters the fifth year of the global financial crisis. A central aspect of the new Islamic financial landscape is also the increased focus on financial stability to enhance further its potential as a form of financial intermediation in an increasingly more challenging environment. It is my great pleasure to join this Islamic Financial Intelligence Summit organised by “The Banker” held this year in Kuala Lumpur, in association with Bank Negara Malaysia to speak on the subject on the “New Islamic Financial Landscape”. This event which is being held for the first time outside London brings together practitioners from the financial community from different parts of the world.

With considerable capacity to meet large investment requirements, opportunities therein lie in the more effective and efficient channelling of the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  sizeable surplus funds towards the vast productive investment opportunities within and across the emerging economies. These trends are being reinforced by the rapid expansion of financial institutions in emerging economies that have ventured beyond national borders. Financial institutions from the emerging economies have grown significantly in size and strength in this recent decade to now account for almost half of worldwide financial industry market value. Eight out of the twenty largest global banks, including the top two, are emerging market financial institutions. As the emerging market financial institutions continue to regionalise and internationalise, their role and importance can be expected to further expand. Another key development is the integration of financial markets amongst emerging economies, driven in part by the increased economic inter-linkages and the increased liberalisation trend in the financial sector. The rapid internationalisation of Islamic finance is reinforcing this trend and has enhanced the economic and financial connectivity between the emerging economies. The high level of savings and wealth accumulation in several of the emerging economies, including in Asia and the Middle East, need to be effectively channelled towards productive investments including for large infrastructure development. In this environment, Islamic finance has emerged as a viable and attractive form of intermediation including financing of large scale infrastructure projects.
Jon Cunliffe: Learning from the dash for cash – findings and next steps for margining practices Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at the Futures Industry Association (FIA) & Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) Asset Management Derivatives Forum 2022, Dana Point, California, 9 February 2022. * * * It is now nearly two years since the ‘dash for cash’ that swept through financial markets at the onset of the Covid pandemic. A great deal of work is underway by central banks and the international regulatory community to learn the lessons of that episode. And I want to talk today mainly about one element of that work: the examination of the role played by margin payments, both cleared and uncleared. But first, it is important to remind ourselves of just why we are engaged on this work and why it matters that we learn the lesson of that short lived but potentially extremely destructive episode. Unlike the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), more than 10 years ago, one senses that the 2020 ‘dash for cash’ is fading from memory. There are obvious reasons for this. The disruption did not last long. By early May 2020, order had returned to financial markets. There were no spectacular bank failures. Indeed, strengthened greatly by the post-GFC reforms, banks were able to meet the huge drawdown of credit facilities at the beginning of the crisis.

To put that view in its extreme form, there is little to learn from the ‘dash for cash’ and no policy action is required. The market was hit by an exogenous shock, central banks intervened promptly, as they were required to do, calm was restored and markets could function again. Job done. Up to a point, I have more sympathy for this view than for the first. But it is only up to a point. It is certainly unrealistic to expect the private sector, be it banks or markets, to be able to self-insure against all liquidity shocks, no matter how severe. That, indeed, is the underlying rationale for central banks backstopping the liquidity of the banking system. But the private sector, be it banks or non-banks, need to insure adequately against severe but plausible shocks. That is the basis on which we stress test and regulate banks. And, again as we have done on the banking side, we need to tackle features of the system that amplify and reinforce liquidity shocks. This is not simply about avoiding the moral hazard that can result if market participants believe they can simply leave the job of insuring against liquidity shocks in severe, market wide, stress events to the public sector.It is also because we should not presume that central banks will always be able to step in with massive bond purchases as they did in March 2020.
It could undermine banks’ profitability and their ability to meet regulatory requirements, and ultimately affect their capacity to finance the real economy. The issuance of a CBDC could alsoreduce the role of banking intermediaries in client relationships, depending on the architecture chosen by the Eurosystem, which could restrict access to client information. To avoid these undesirable consequences, it is essential that commercial banks be involved. Their input is needed, for example, to set limits and/or remuneration disincentives for CBDC holdings. In addition, choosing an intermediated architecture would allow us to exploit financial intermediaries’ expertise in customer interface management, and thus preserve the essential role they play in this field. b- Avoiding impediments to the conduct of monetary policy  Choices will also need to be made to avoid any adverse consequences for monetary policy conduct. The introduction of an unremunerated retail CBDC with no holding limit could make it difficult for central banks to pursue a negative interest rate policy, as market participants would prefer to hold the CBDC instead of assets remunerated at negative rates. This effect could be avoided by setting an appropriate level of remuneration for the CBDC. c. Improving the efficiency and integration of payment solutions Choices will also need to be made to ensure that the CBDC complements existing payment solutions, so that it can increase the efficiency and integration of certain market segments. This notably applies to cross-border payments.

In November we therefore reduced the repo rate in two steps from 4.10 to 3.60%. In December it was considered that both CPI and underlying inflation would be below the target in the coming one to two years. The downside risks were judged to predominate, mainly due to the uncertainty about the future course of international activity. The repo rate was reduced again, from 3.60 to 2.40%, accompanied by signals that no further interest rate adjustments would be made before the changeover to the new Executive Board. 1  BIS Review 111/1999  New statistics during the winter continued to show a weak international tendency. The Riksbank perceived a clear risk of this having negative effects on growth in Sweden, so that inflation prospects would also be affected. In February and March the new Executive Board therefore made two more repo rate cuts, from 3.60 to 2.90%. Improved prospects The mood swung as winter gave way to spring. The financial market unrest subsided, accompanied by the first signs that the development of activity was better than had been expected. At the monetary policy meeting on 22 April the Executive Board decided to keep the repo rate unchanged. A majority of the Board wanted to wait for a more comprehensive assessment of inflation prospects in connection with the June forecast before making any further interest rate adjustments. In the late spring and the summer it became clear that economic trends were more favourable than had been predicted earlier.
Caleb M Fundanga: The effects of the crisis on Africa Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the African Economic Research Consortium Senior Policy Seminar (SPS XI), Lusaka, 6 April 2009. *  *  *  The Executive Director, African Economic Research Consortium; Government and Central Bank Officials present; Distinguished Participants; Members of the Africa Economic Research Consortium; Ladies and Gentlemen. It is with great joy and gratitude that I welcome you all to Zambia and to this seminar. I wish to extend a warm welcome to all the international participants. I hope you will have a good stay in our beautiful and friendly city of Lusaka. I feel particularly honoured and grateful to officiate at this important seminar organized by the Institution I am proud to be associated with, the Africa Economic Research Consortium (AERC). Chairperson, let me begin by thanking you and AERC for choosing Zambia to host this important seminar. I am aware that since its establishment in 1988, the AERC has played a pivotal role in developing and harnessing resources in Africa both informational and human capital. Research, workshops and seminars such as this one have helped to strengthen the capacity of undertaking policy–relevant research into the problems facing the management of economies in sub-Saharan Africa. It has, through these interventions, undoubtedly contributed to the positive strides African economies have scored in the last decade with regard to economic governance and development.

Beyond equivalence assessments, we will consider the formation of supervisory colleges for our CCPs should they be deemed as internationally active. Putting recovery and resolution plans in place Allow me to share a final set of remarks on recovery and resolution plans. Even as we continue to strengthen the resilience and accessibility of CCPs, we must continue our efforts to ensure that recovery and resolution plans for CCPs are in place. There have been greater focus and thought given to arrangements to deal with default risks but it should also be recognised that other risks such as custody and investment risks can also pose a threat to a CCP's viability. Hence, in line with the CPMI-IOSCO report on Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures, MAS expects and will place priority to ensure our CCPs have clear arrangements to enable custody and investment losses to be allocated in a way which allows CCPs to be solvent and can continue to provide its critical services. At the same time, there must be appropriate governance arrangements and incentive structures to promote prudent risk management on the part of the CCP. Such arrangements can include providing transparency to member firms, having “Skin-InThe-Game” (SITG) contributions from the CCP, and putting in place oversight structures to oversee such safeguards.
In the audience today there are representatives from businesses across the East of England, from all sectors and sizes. No doubt the factors affecting your different businesses and sectors will vary. There are four features that are worth highlighting: First, weakness in productivity relative to pre-crisis isn’t unique to the UK. Part of that global weakness is likely to reflect weak investment, which fell during the crisis and has only recovered gradually since then. The expansion in global trade and broadening of supply chains in the decade prior to the crisis is likely to have been one factor contributing to robust total factor productivity growth during that period. Since then, growth in global trade and TFP have both been subdued. Second, the growth ‘puzzle’ – the weakness relative to pre-crisis trends – is concentrated in just a few sectors, with the finance and manufacturing sectors accounting for over half of the recent weakness. The Monetary Policy Committee’s latest Inflation Report, published two weeks ago, included a chart with 5  different sectors’ contributions to the whole economy labour productivity growth (Slide 4). The manufacturing and finance & insurance sectors made no contribution to average annual productivity growth in 2010-16. Pre-crisis, these sectors contributed around ¾pp to annual average productivity growth. So combined, they accounted for over half of the growth puzzle to 2016, despite employing only 11% of the workforce.

Svein Gjedrem: Globalisation and monetary policy Welcome address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norges Bank Conference on Monetary Policy “Jarle Bergo Colloquium: Globalisation and Monetary Policy”, Oslo, 7 March 2008. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to Norges Bank’s conference on monetary policy. The bi-annual conference on evaluation and assessment of monetary policy is a tradition at Norges Bank. This year the conference is being held in honour of my dear friend and colleague, Jarle Bergo, who is approaching the end of his twelve-year term as Deputy Governor of Norges Bank. He is now resigning office to take the position of Alternate Executive Director of the Nordic-Baltic Constituency at the IMF. Jarle Bergo started his career as an economist in Norges Bank in the late sixties. Over the years he has made crucial contributions both to the work of the Bank and to its organisation. I am sure that I speak for all of us who have had the pleasure of working closely with him when I say that he has also made a vital contribution to the atmosphere in the Bank through his pleasant manner and good humour. We have titled this conference “Jarle Bergo colloquium: Globalisation and Monetary Policy”. Both globalisation and monetary policy are themes wide enough to fill up numerous conferences by themselves, and only a few questions will be addressed here today.
In this regard, the involvement of multilateral agencies such as ADB would be very useful in that not only will it foster investors’ confidence if the multilateral agencies put in their own financial resources, but it will also help build the governments’ capacity in structuring projects, strengthening the PPP framework and improving project governance to make their infrastructure projects commercially viable. Secondly, shortfall in educational inputs has been seen as one of the major constraints for some developing economies to enhance productivity and move up the value chain. It has also been a major reason for the remaining pockets of poverty in the region, including in countries where substantial economic progress has been made but a substantial proportion of the population is still living in poverty. We encourage ADB to further strengthen its support for the educational sector and developing human capital, which are essential to enhancing competitiveness, eliminating poverty and addressing the rising inequality in developing Asia. Thirdly, intra-regional trade has been an important source of growth after the global financial crisis as regional economies increased their domestic demand and reduced their reliance on exports to advanced economies. As the global economy continues to rebalance, the prospect of the region to sustain its growth would very much depend on its ability to hold up domestic demand through sustained productivity enhancement as mentioned above, and further trade integration within the region.

We look forward to ADB’s continued engagement with its members to provide support that will cater for their changing needs as the region continues to progress and transform. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It has come back to a significant degree. Before the crisis, some argued that these patterns could be due to common shocks, convergence of monetary policy frameworks, and increased credibility of those frameworks. However, case studies, comparisons of the pre- and post-  3  crisis periods, and other observations make it more and more plausible that global financial integration is the main driver. The bottom line is that it is becoming more difficult to conduct independent monetary policy in small, open, and financially integrated economies, and although a flexible exchange rate is a necessary condition for doing so, it might not be sufficient, especially when we factor in the financial stability aspects. This, I think, is why we find on occasion that we are closer to facing a dilemma than a trilemma. I think it is still a trilemma, but with trade-offs of variable severity.2 What can individual countries do about this? First, those that have the option can enter a monetary union. That has its own pros and cons, as you all know very well. But for a SOE were the MU constitutes the biggest trading partner, issues of excess exchange rate volatility and domestic currency mismatches become much less pronounced. Second, they can give up on independent monetary policy while maintaining their own currency by either pegging the exchange rate or pegging interest rates to those of global rate setters. The problem with the first is that, as history shows, it can be difficult to maintain with free capital movements.

This study being presented today is, therefore, a welcome opportunity to reflect on the progress since 2009. Financial institutions have a role to play in ensuring financial services and products are available at reasonable terms, including fair and practical know your customer (KYC) assessments, the use of alternative collateral and flexible lines of credit to mention, but a few. To enhance income-generating activities from survival level to strong and viable businesses, in particular for women led enterprises, access to credit, banking and financial services and facilities is essential to fully develop small scale to businesses. The firm, robust and sustainable growth can only be founded on strong and viable Small and Medium Enterprises hence the need to financially empower enterprises is cardinal through financial inclusion. This lack of access to finance by our entrepreneurs is a major concern for both, the Bank of Zambia and Government. Ladies and Gentlemen, Allow me to outline some of the measures the Bank has been putting in place to accelerate access to finance for all citizens generally, and in particular for women The Bank of Zambia is the lead implementer of the Financial Sector Development Plan on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Zambia. As you may be aware, the Zambian government formulated the FSDP as a comprehensive strategy for addressing challenges in the Zambian financial sector. Under the second phase of the FSDP, access to finance by the various strata of society, including access based on gender is identified as a key challenge to be addressed.
•  So the PRA’s approach to prudential supervision entails making judgments of the kind:  •  Your bank isn’t as strong as you think it is  •  Cut back on the risk in your book  •  I’m afraid you’re not fit to run the bank  •  your business could not be resolved in an orderly way if it fails. •  This shift from rules to judgment changes the relationship between the regulator and business, and is an important example of what this series of talks is about. •  Challenge is how to make a judgment-based approach acceptable when we use it in earnest. Is our society really ready again for judgments from the Old Lady? •  Part of the solution is public law. The Bank must follow due process when it deploys its statutory powers, and that is subject to judicial review in the courts and appeal tribunals. •  But there is also a wider question about how society as a whole will keep us accountable or, more simply, just see what is going on during the periods, sometimes years, in which banks do not fail and the financial waters are – or at least seem to be – calm. Which brings me to our monetary and macroprudential roles, which indirectly touch every business, and household, in the country.

We need to be clear about what we can do and what we cannot do; we need to operate consistently within our remit; and above all we must be sufficiently transparent to make proper accountability realistic. That is what trust requires, and we are in the business of trust – trust in the value of money. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5