samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Manufacturing and mining are expected to benefit from increased capital imports which should increase capacity utilisation, particularly among most mines. High construction activities are expected to be sustained in 2014, mainly in roads, commercial structures and housing estates. With increased output in the growth sectors, Zambia’s external sector is projected to improve supported by continued growth of nontraditional exports. Inflation is expected to be low at 6.5% at the end of the year. Given the foregoing, the medium to long-term economic growth prospects for Zambia remain bright. The country is expected to continue attracting Foreign Direct Investment inflows as it grows. As a result of this robust economic performance and bright future prospects, the Zambian economy recently obtained a US $ billion Eurobond, reflecting continued investor confidence in the country. I am also proud to state that recently, the IMF rated  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Zambia as one of the fastest growing African economies with growth projected above 7.0 percent in 2014. Ladies and Gentlemen, as the economy grows and as the business environment remains attractive, the need for accurate, current information and news about the domestic economy and financial markets, the region and wider global market becomes ever more critical. It is imperative, therefore, that your reporting is understandable, relevant, reliable verifiable, and comparable.

Lars Nyberg: The Baltic region in the shadow of the financial crisis Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Intervalor and Baltic Property Trust, Stockholm, 9 September 2009. *  *  *  The global financial crisis has now been with us for over two years. It began in the summer of 2007 with anxiety about all the complicated credit instruments that had been issued using subprime US mortgages as collateral. However, the most acute phase of the crisis began almost exactly a year ago when the investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection. This was followed by such a rapid and extensive decline in liquidity in the international banking system that it led to a global financial crisis that also hit Sweden. The financial crisis accelerated and reinforced the economic downturn that had already begun. As a result, production around the world has fallen to an extent that we have not seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The countries in the Baltic region, which are the subject of today's discussion, have also suffered. The Baltic states, that is Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, have been hit hardest by the crisis. As a couple of the Swedish banks dominate the Baltic banking system, this has had consequences here in Sweden too. Today, I intend to speak about how we at the Riksbank view the economic development of, and financial stability in, the Baltic region.
In Norway and other countries, the period of very high and variable inflation and high inflation expectations was interrupted towards the end of the 1980s. We have seen the benefits of this in the 1990s and thus far in this decade. The effects of persistently high oil prices and the generally strong rise in commodity prices internationally cannot be compared to the experience of the 1970s and 1980s. Monetary policy is now delegated to central banks whose objective is to maintain low and stable inflation, and which are not of the view that there is a positive trade-off between inflation and economic growth in the long term. Inflation expectations are entrenched at a low, stable level. Even though inflation during the past 15 to 20 years has been under control, consumer price inflation has nevertheless in periods varied somewhat from one month to the next. A large portion of the variations may be explained by tax changes and variations in energy prices. These fluctuations have generally had transitory effects on the CPI. When assessing actual price inflation in the recent past, in the present and in the near term, we do not take account of the rise and fall in individual prices, but we look at whether the general price level in the economy exhibits a persistent increase. Indicators of underlying inflation seek to reduce or exclude movements that are due to temporary disturbances and that should be disregarded when the interest rate is set.

For us  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  to achieve this goal, the BOT will adhere to our economic and financial stability mandates while reaching out to other public policy dimensions to promote a common vision of all policymakers to achieve a more competitive Thai economy. This common vision must however reflect the desired policy result based on real needs of the people. Through outreach and humility, we will also engage more with our stakeholders in pursuit of Thailand’s sustainable economic wellbeing so that Thailand can cross the transitional gateway and stand on the world stage with strength and stability. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
My stance was based on the assessment that we could have given a slightly smaller impulse to further indebtedness and at the same time contributed to bringing inflation and inflation expectations back on target by limiting the cut to 0.25 percentage points and at the same time signalling a willingness to wait before increasing the rate again until 2016, even if this looked as though it might mean that inflation would overshoot the target. Economic activity in Sweden is now beginning to improve, supported by very low interest rates charged to households and companies and by stronger developments abroad. However, our forecasts are, as I have argued, quite uncertain, especially a couple of years ahead. Anyone wanting to know more definitely what will happen needs a crystal ball that can describe all the situations that will arise here in Sweden and abroad over the coming years. However, there is no such crystal ball, so as always when making decisions in an uncertain situation we will have to deal with what happens as it comes. 3  Poloz, Stephen S., “Monetary Policy as Risk Management”, speech on 12 December 2013. Several central bank governors have expressed this opinion, including Alan Greenspan in the speech ”Monetary Policy under Uncertainty” on 29 August 2003.

Unclear international developments – unclear conditions for monetary policy There is greater geopolitical uncertainty in our immediate area than there has been for a long time. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine could escalate, trigger more far-reaching sanctions, put further downward pressure on demand in parts of Europe and push energy prices up or down. We are monitoring developments closely, taking note of other analysts’ assessments and working with different scenarios, but it is of course difficult to assess the probability of an escalating conflict and to quantify what potential effects it might have. Another uncertainty factor concerns the situation in the euro-area banking sector. The European Central Bank’s review of banks’ assets (Asset Quality Review) and accompanying stress tests, which will be published soon, can strengthen confidence in the banks and thereby hopefully give new vitality to the banking sector, which has so far hampered a muchneeded recovery through restrained credit granting and high interest rates on bank loans. But the problems in the Portuguese, Bulgarian and Austrian banks that have surfaced over the summer imply that some problems remain and there is a risk that the review will either point to extensive problems or be perceived as insufficient. Another extremely important condition for monetary policy in Sweden is the shape that monetary policy abroad will take and what effects it will have on growth, inflation and exchange rates.
Owing to a high employment rate, the number of employed persons as a share of the working-age population is now close to the level prevailing before the sharp fall in oil prices in 2014. In 2018, employment rose in most sectors of the Norwegian economy, including oil-related industries. More people entered the labour market, but unemployment nonetheless edged down. There are signs of growing pressures in the economy. A rising number of Regional Network contacts report little spare capacity. A number of employers report difficulties in finding skilled and experienced labour. In the wake of the oil price decline, wage growth has been moderate. The improvement in the labour market has contributed to a pick-up in wage growth in recent years. At the same time, inflation has been high. As a result, real wage growth has been low, with little improvement in household purchasing power. Chart: Consumer prices 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Consumer price inflation edged up through 2018, primarily reflecting a sharp increase in electricity prices. Underlying inflation also moved up, partly owing to the pick-up in wage growth and higher imported inflation. Annual consumer price inflation (CPI) was 2.7 percent in 2018. Persistently high debt growth has added to the vulnerability of the household sector. High house price inflation has fuelled debt growth. In 2018, house price inflation was low, and debt growth eased somewhat. Debt nevertheless grew faster than household disposable income.

In September 2018, Norges Bank raised the policy rate for the first time in over seven years. The rate was raised further in March of this year, and is now 1 percent. Gradual interest rate normalisation means that the Norwegian economy is faring well. The rate hikes were signalled well in advance. Norges Bank places substantial emphasis on clear and effective communication of policy rate prospects. Our main channel of communication is the Monetary Policy Report, which contains a thorough assessment of information about developments in the Norwegian economy and the background for the monetary policy decision. In order to reach a broader audience, we communicate through different channels. We give speeches and presentations throughout the country where we address local business leaders, the financial industry or university and college students. In 2018, we launched a new product on our website – Pengepolitikken kort fortalt [Monetary policy in brief].1 This product is aimed in particular at those looking for background on the interest rate decision in a more simplified and relatable version. The message, of course, is the same as in our Monetary Policy Report. Chart: GDP for Norway’s trading partners Let me return to economic developments. Norway’s trading partners have experienced a broad economic upturn in recent years. This has led to a considerable improvement in labour market conditions, and wage growth has gradually begun to rise. In 2018, growth among trading partners slowed somewhat, particularly in Europe. Heightened uncertainty had likely contributed to dampening growth.
This increase in the balance sheets of central banks (reserves) has been pointed out as a source of inconsistency with future price stability. Increasing interest rates to secure price stability in the future will require undoing those operations, which could threaten financial stability. But central banks that are facing this challenge have an instrument that may be very useful in this situation: they have the ability to pay an interest rate on those reserves different from the monetary policy rate. This additional instrument should be enough to secure a smooth exit from their current situation without affecting price stability (see Cúrdia and Woodford, 2010). Again, price stability and ex-post financial stability are mutually consistent. Nevertheless, some analysts have argued that if some unconventional policy interventions have been too extended, price and financial stability may not be consistent from an intertemporal perspective. In effect, some dimensions of unconventional monetary policy, in particular credit policy, involve a fiscal dimension. It has been argued that those fiscal aspects are likely to threaten monetary policy independence and therefore jeopardize price stability (Goodfriend, 2010). Although these concerns are relevant, I think that the key solution to them will be strengthening independence of central banks and generating a more resilient financial system as discussed before. Let me close by addressing the conditionality statement that I made regarding dealing with financial shocks and price stability a while back. In the past, some emerging market economies were incapable of implementing countercyclical monetary policy.

Crisis management instead of screening Allow me to remind you of the crises we have had due to lack of competitiveness and that Sweden is an economy open to trading. During the 1970s Sweden suffered crises in the iron and steel industry, and in the pulp and paper industry. The Swedish shipyard industry met its end. Problems arose due to high Swedish payroll expenses and the fact that new producers from countries with lower costs entered the market. 2  BIS Review 9/2002  How did we react to these crises? Extensive rationalisation programmes were implemented, production was made more efficient and companies were closed down. Today, Sweden has one of the world's most efficient steel industries. It is the same with the forest industry. Sweden did not choose screening and tariff protection for the bleeding industries; we chose to become more efficient through restructuring and retaining our openness. Sweden handled the problems arising when the currency was over-valued in around 1990 in a similar way, which led to failing confidence in the fixed exchange rate regime. Our country ended up with a currency crisis that triggered a property crisis and a crisis in the banking system. The political parties put their differences to one side and worked together on consolidating the banks and then the central government finances. We chose not to reregulate the capital market, but to retain openness, as in the crisis of the 1970s.
Puerto Rico endured a serious downturn lasting for over five years and is now just beginning to show signs of stabilization. Why was the downturn in our region less severe than in many other parts of the country? Part of the reason is that the effects of the housing boom and bust on the region’s economy were less consequential. Of course, we have seen declines in construction employment, losses of housing equity and people losing their homes. However, as in most mature regions, the housing market tends to be less influential here than it is in parts of the country where population growth has been more rapid. This is particularly true across much of Upstate New York, which experienced little in the way of a construction boom, home price growth or subprime mortgage penetration. While many areas in downstate New York and northern New Jersey did experience a more significant boom and bust, the changes there were not on the same scale as in hard-hit states, such as Nevada, Arizona or Florida. Also, while the financial crisis was a key driving force behind the recession, employment in New York City was not affected nearly as much as some had predicted. Instead, it turned out that the finance sector held up better than expected. The pace of recovery in our region, though somewhat stronger than at the national level, has nonetheless been disappointing. Growth has been weak and the unemployment rate has remained stubbornly high. This slow pace of recovery continued into the second quarter of 2011.

Be assured that I am committed to supporting the implementation of the National Strategy on Financial Education through such campaigns. Ladies and Gentlemen The World Savings Day celebrations would not be successful without recognising individual and organizational contributions towards improving financial literacy in Zambia. In this regard, awards will be presented under nine categories namely: 1. Exceptional individual contribution to financial education, 2. Outstanding theme interpretation; 3. Exceptional leadership in financial literacy; 4. Champions award; 5. Most innovative financial education programme; 6. Outstanding financial literacy footprint; 7. Exceptional financial literacy media outreach; 8. Outstanding initiative by an educator; and 9. Best savings product of the year. I am delighted to grace this year's World Savings Day award presentation and wish the nominated participants all the best. In conclusion, I would like to thank the organisers and stakeholders under our partnership arrangement, in particular, the Bankers Association of Zambia, Securities and Exchange Commission, Pensions and Insurance Authority, Rural Finance Expansion Programme and DSIK for their continued support to the World Savings Day celebrations every year. THANK YOU  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
This Forum is an important platform to have that exchange of insights which can enhance our understanding of the risks and opportunities in this region, allowing us to navigate the future better. We can also have a better steer if we ingrain the Asian acumen, which is o en built upon relevant work experiences in the region. To support this objective, MAS has been grooming more Singaporeans to be leaders and specialists, including giving them international exposure through the iPOST scheme, which supports overseas postings of Singaporeans to the region and beyond. MAS, IBF, and the financial industry will continue to work together to prepare our workforce with the skills for the future by developing a strong talent pipeline to enter the sector, and reskilling and redeploying local professionals into functions where jobs are growing. Adapt and adjust for a sustainable future https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2021/riding-the-growth-momentum-in-asia  6/11  12/02/2021  "Riding the Growth Momentum in Asia" – Keynote Speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), …  17. Second, there is increased expectation on the financial sector to play a greater role in enabling a more sustainable future. Global warming has led to more frequent and severe natural disasters. Asia will be one of the hardest hit with its densely-populated lowlying coastal cities. Over the last two decades, 7 out of 10 of the countries that were most aﬀected by climate risk events were in Asia [13] . 18.

This is patently unfair, and scrapping such 21 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  policies would help increase economic mobility. 21I really don’t see how our best universities can continue to justify this practice. Yes, fund-raising might suffer slightly over time—but I suspect the impact would be very small. More importantly, do we really want to encourage what is essentially a “donate to admit” policy at our major universities? Such an approach only preserves the status quo and constrains economic mobility. The research shows that upward mobility differs substantially across colleges. Ivy League schools are good at producing top earners, but, as I noted, they accept very few lower-income students, so their impact on income mobility is small. Meanwhile, other schools with economically diverse student bodies produce few high earners, and their impact is likewise small. Then there are certain schools—some of which can be found in the CUNY and California state systems—that manage to produce a large number of high earners from economically diverse student bodies. Learning exactly how they do it and how it can be replicated strikes me as a first-order question for further study. While I am distressed by the high and increasing levels of inequality and diminished mobility that our economy has delivered over the last several decades, I remain optimistic about the future. There is more attention now to inequality and low intergenerational mobility than I can recall at any time during my professional life.
A telling example is our decision to implement the exchange rate floor vis-à-vis the euro that I mentioned above: with the initiative’s legal limitation in place, we would have been forced during our defence of the minimum exchange rate not only to buy euros, but also to buy gold in large quantities. Our defence of the minimum exchange rate would thus have involved huge costs, which would almost certainly have caused foreign exchange markets to doubt our resolve to enforce the rate by all means. Even worse consequences would result from the initiative’s proposal to prohibit the sale of gold at any time. An increase in gold holdings could not be reversed, even if necessary from a monetary policy perspective. In combination with the obligation to hold at least 20% of total assets in gold, this could gradually lead the SNB into a situation where its assets would mainly consist of gold: each extension of the balance sheet for monetary policy reasons would necessitate gold purchases, but whenever the balance sheet needed to be reduced again for the same reasons, we would not be able to resell our gold holdings. This would severely restrict our room for manoeuvre. Furthermore, because gold pays no interest or dividends, the SNB’s ability to generate profits and distribute them to the Confederation and the Cantons would be impaired. As a final point, note that currency reserves which cannot be sold are not truly reserves.

Most importantly, many governments entered the crisis with high levels of public debt and, with the crisis already putting pressure on their budgets, they were reluctant to spend yet more. So even after having exhausted their conventional policy tools, central banks found that they were the only ones left to support weak recoveries. With many of them mandated to react to below-potential output, they turned to unconventional policies. 5 While their motives were somewhat different, all the major central banks resorted to either one or both of two measures: quantitative easing – the large-scale purchase of long-term securities, and forward guidance – the commitment to keep short-term interest rates low for a  2  Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2010). 3  Liquidity provision to distressed financial institutions typically occurred in the context of state intervention and state capital injections to ensure the solvency of these institutions. In Switzerland, the SNB acted as lender of last resort by providing liquidity assistance to UBS in October 2008, once the bank’s solvency was guaranteed by a capital injection from the Swiss government. 4  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue convincingly that it was the reduction in the money supply that caused the large drops in output and prices between 1929 and 1933, and that this drop in the money supply was amplified by the large-scale bank failures in that period, which the Fed did not prevent through lender of last resort action.