samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This means a greater regulatory burden for all and greater inconvenience to market participants, and possibly implications for the legal and institutional arrangements for regulation. Fourth, this approach may involve tighter rules for the markets. The critics may again say that this will further erode market freedom. But should we be so dogmatic? In any case, it is all a matter of degree. In the end, it is the public interest that counts. Is there, for example, anything wrong in restrictions against the holding of large dominating positions in any particular market, or against the taking of market moving activities? The purpose of a market is price discovery. There is no objection for buying low and selling high, and I would wish anybody who is attempting that the best of luck. But there is no legitimate reason for anybody to be operating in a market in a manner that has the sole aim of moving the price in order to make a profit. Tighter rules aside, it is interesting, and indeed slightly worrying, to note that stronger forms of restrictions and controls have been gaining currency among some monetary authorities or regulators in the past two years. These range from restrictions on domestic credit to some forms of exchange controls. This response is quite understandable and may be a reflection of the failure of the international financial architecture to accommodate the needs of small markets. But it is also regrettable, given the enormous benefit that international capital has brought to the region.

And the G20 fulfilled the most optimistic anticipations as it reacted promptly and strongly to the crisis. Beyond this, the G20 has also agreed on an ambitious policy agenda, aiming for the long run. The G20 Roadmap does not only aim at one particular aspect of the global economy; it is very encompassing. One aspect of it is macrorebalancing, another is on financial regulation and global financial safety nets. The G20 agenda is focused on crisis prevention by coordination in order to avoid, or at least dampen overheating and boom/bust cycles. How are these issues related? First I will briefly tackle the important question of the link between the financial crisis and global imbalances. Second, I will go through the main implications of this link and outline the key features of the policy agenda of the G20. In this second part I will mostly focus on the so-called “G20 Framework for a Strong, Sustainable  BIS Review 93/2010  1  and Balanced Growth” and on financial safety nets. In the last section I will focus on financial regulation issues more specifically. Why and how do the financial crisis and global imbalances interact? An overwhelming body of research has established the clear relation between global imbalances and financial issues, some of which were behind the financial crisis. Indeed, global imbalances were not just the result of cyclical factors, such as business cycle fluctuations, changes in oil and other commodity prices, etc.
37  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  the hours immediately after the de-pegging. By analysing trade repository data on forward contracts for the Swiss franc-euro exchange rate, some of the drivers behind these moves could be detected. 40  For example, high-frequency movements in the Swiss exchange rate can be compared to the volume of trades in forward contracts. These trades can be further decomposed by counterparty – for example, large dealer banks versus end-investors. This type of decomposition technique shows that it was the withdrawal of liquidity by the large dealer banks that caused the overshoot of the franc – a classic sign during times of 41  market turmoil. This move partially reversed once dealers resumed market-making. The trade repository data can also be used to assess whether the franc de-pegging had any lasting impact on market functioning. The Bank’s research found it did, with a persistent fragmentation in the franc forwards market. Liquidity and inter-dealer activity was structurally lower, and market volatility persistently higher, after this episode. The extra granularity of these data makes it possible to tell a quasi-causal story about the drivers behind the V-shaped movement in asset markets after the de-pegging. Using tick-by-tick and trade-by-trade data side-by-side allows identification of the triggers and amplifiers, in a way which would not otherwise be possible. A second example of research using higher-velocity data to improve our understanding of economic dynamics comes from the labour market.

674. Cielenska, O, Joseph, A, Shreyas, U, Tanner, J and Vasios, M (2017), ‘Gauging market dynamics using trade repository data: the case of the Swiss franc de-pegging’, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper, No. 41. Cœuré, B (2017), ‘Policy analysis with big data’, speech at the conference on “Economic and Financial Regulation in the Era of Big Data”. Coyle, D (2014), GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History, Princeton University Press. Duffie, D, Gârleanu, N and Pedersen, L (2005), ‘Over-the-Counter Markets’, Econometrica, Vol. 73, No.6, pp. 1815-1847. Dwoskin, E (2015), ‘New Report Puts Numbers on Data Scientist Trend’, Wall Street Journal, 7 October. Economist (2017), ‘The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data’, article on 6 May 2017. Ericsson (2017), Ericsson Mobility Report, November 2017. Farrell, D and Wheat, C (2015), ‘Profiles of Local Consumer Commerce’, JPMorgan Chase & Co. Institute. Financial Stability Board (2010), ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms’, Financial Stability Board. Fouquet, R and Broadberry, S (2015), ‘Seven Centuries of European Economic Growth and Decline’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 227-244. Ginsberg, J, Hohebbi, M, Patel, R, Brammer, L, Smolinski, M and Brilliant, L (2009), ‘Detecting influenza epidemics using search engine data’, Nature, Vol. 457, pp. 1012-1014. Goldsmith-Pinkham, P, Hirtle, B and Lucca, D (2016), ‘Parsing the Content of Bank Supervision’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 770.
Early on during the COVID-19 crisis, several macroeconomists including Martin Eichenbaum and Jason Furman recognised that the global pandemic was imposing an unfamiliar mix of shocks. It was not simply that the pandemic lowered aggregate supply by making workers ill, or that mobility restrictions reduced demand from private consumption. Instead, dynamic interactions between the supply and demand disturbances were causing discontinuous shifts. 5 The current spate of inflationary shocks, including those catalysed by geopolitical events in February, has also highlighted that the supply side can be pertinent for business cycle gyrations, alongside the more commonly-recognised aggregate demand fluctuations. Supply-side factors can no longer be regarded as low-frequency phenomena relevant only as determinants of long-term growth. Rather, in a globalised world, shocks in one jurisdiction can lead to gridlock in production via supply chain linkages, leading to short-term effects on growth and inflation in other economies. These coordination failures within and across industries, are most relevant today. 6 Second, once the nature of the shock is properly characterised, the appropriate policy response needs to be brought to bear. Policies clearly need to be carefully fashioned. Traditional fiscal pump-priming was not appropriate for dealing with strict lockdowns during the pandemic, while tighter monetary policy would not directly alleviate supplyside, cost-push, inflationary pressures. Complicating the picture, when multiple types of shocks are in play, coordination across different policy instruments becomes imperative.

The regulation of financial services created in the wake of the digital wave must be tailored to its specific risks. To this end, we must adhere to two principles of action. The first principle is an absolute guarantee of payment and transaction security. In the framework of its mandate to oversee the security of payment instruments, the Banque de France strives to promote innovative, effective and safe payment solutions. In this respect, it ensures that the emergence of new players and new solutions does not reduce security. Central banks are also trying to take a proactive approach towards the digital transition, to avoid being left behind by the highly technical nature of certain innovations. For instance, discussions are underway at the Banque de France over how to monitor the development of initiatives concerning blockchain technology, both in terms of the possibilities it offers and the issues it raises notably in terms of security. The second principle is a proportionate adaptation of regulations and supervision to address the development of fintechs. The regulation applied to these new players should avoid stifling innovations that may be beneficial to consumers and, more generally, to the economy and society; but at the same time it should also guarantee consumer protection and address issues of financial stability. Specific regulations, allowing for a gradual adjustment of regulatory intensity, might be better suited to preventing the risks generated by fintech firms.
These figures are currently distorted by the sharp fall in mobile phone fees, but the Bank of Japan continues to expect CPI inflation to be only close to 1.1% in 2022 and 2023. Not so long ago, many commentators were worried about a possible “Japanification” of the euro area. They were wrong, and should be reassured today: the ECB’s resolute action has been successful in preventing this risk and avoided falling into a trap where economic agents’ expectations remain deflationary (“deflationary mind” as the Japanese often say). These differences between the United States, Japan and the euro area explain the different paces of their monetary reactions. The ECB remains very vigilant about prices and wages dynamics, and will gradually adjust its monetary policy to firmly ensure that inflation recedes soon and then stabilises around its 2% target over the medium term. In our case, we think that 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  this gradual and sequential approach – first tapering, second lift off, and eventually downsizing – is appropriate. But we keep our full optionality about the speed of this sequence, and will definitely be data driven. II. Two great transformations are underway The present Covid crisis and inflation hump – serious though they are – should not let us forget the two “Great transformations” – the ecological and the digital ones – that we will all have to pursue in the long run.

Unlike the earlier decades, when Gulf countries were obliged to recycle their additional revenues into the global economy due to limited absorptive capacity in the region; currently, existing and projected needs of this region indicate that a significant percentage of the additional flows can be invested and put to many productive uses in the local economies. Also, the Gulf countries wish to continue to be attractive to international financial flows in form of foreign direct investments to encourage partnerships and for transfer of knowledge and technology. This is essential for deepening and broadening the economies and opening of new industrial and infrastructure sectors. I will be touching upon these challenges in some detail in my speech. Dear Audience, As we well know, a well-developed and efficiently functioning financial system is an essential prerequisite for sustained economic growth. By intermediating between savers and borrowers, it promotes saving and investments and also induces an efficient allocation of investable funds. The global integration of financial markets over the past two decades has opened up new vistas for resource mobilization and more efficient deployment of investable funds worldwide. At the same time, however, market integration exposes domestic financial systems to new risks and vulnerabilities. Shocks that occur in one market are now easily and quickly transmitted to other markets turning into a contagion that can affect an entire region. It is, therefore, imperative that a domestic financial system is strong enough to cope with the increased risk associated with globalization in general and integration of the financial markets in particular.
J D Rogers: Debt reporting in Sierra Leone Keynote address by Dr J D Rogers, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the opening ceremony of the WAIFEM Regional Course on Debt Reporting and the IMF/World Bank Debt Compilers Guide, at the Bank of Sierra Leone recreational complex, Kingtom, 7 August 2006. *  *  *  Director General, West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM), Officials of the Commonwealth Secretariat & The International Monetary Fund (IMF), Distinguished Guests, Course Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen. 1.0  Introduction  On behalf of the President, His Excellency, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba, the Government and people of the Republic of Sierra Leone, I am pleased to bid you all a warm welcome to Freetown. Let me start by expressing our sincere thanks and appreciation to the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM), the Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for choosing Sierra Leone as the venue for this Regional Course on Debt Reporting and the IMF/World Bank Debt Compilers Guide. The theme of the course is relevant and timely. Let me thank the organizers of the course for this initiative which would go a long way to strengthening overall debt management capacity in the sub-region. Ladies and Gentlemen, 2.0  Principles for compilation of gross external debt position  The need for comprehensive, comparable, and reliable data on external debt for informed decisions by policymakers, financial markets and other users of economic statistics cannot be over stressed.

The Governors look forward toward greater collaboration between WAIFEM and these institutions in the years ahead. On this note I have the honour to declare the course open. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 79/2006  3
Accordingly, the interest rate on the pool was slightly below overnight Treasury repo rates in the market.47 To ease the Desk’s job in the daily forecasting of autonomous factors, tight limits were imposed on customers’ ability to rapidly vary the size of their investment in the pool. Since the crisis, the New York Fed has continued to provide the pool as a service. Investments in the pool continue to be paid the market-based rate I mentioned. Figure 16 contains some statistics on this rate relative to a measure of the broad market rate. We do not use the foreign pool as a means for implementing monetary policy, and the change in the composition of Federal Reserve liabilities it can generate has little to no impact in unsecured markets because of the large amount of reserves in the system. Recall that the current operating framework is not based on reserves scarcity. Use of the foreign pool has grown over the last year and a half, from a bit under $ billion in mid-2014 to about $ billion on February 17. This growth isn’t associated with liftoff, and it isn’t because we have changed the way in which the interest rate is calculated.

We also use per-counterparty caps, and can use an aggregate cap. Evidence to date on control Now, let’s discuss what the data tell us about how well the framework performed. The distribution of traded rates in the federal funds market, shown in Figure 1, essentially made a parallel shift higher after liftoff. These data are drawn from the new FR 2420 data collection I discussed earlier, and they show an average over all days from liftoff to this past Wednesday, leaving out December 31. Nearly all trading occurred within the new range – it’s normal for there to be a little bit above the range – suggesting that our framework was broadly effective in moving traded rates upward. Because traded rates moved upward in this way, we have so far achieved an excellent level of control over the federal funds rate. Since December 17, the day after the FOMC meeting, the effective federal funds rate, calculated under its current methodology as a volume-weighted mean, has traded within the FOMC’s new 25-to-50-basis-point range on all but one day, which I’ll come back to. This is shown in Figure 2. The rate has averaged around 36 basis points, about 25 basis points above its average level over the analogous year-ago period, when the target range was zero to 25 basis points. Let’s consider the calculation of the effective rate for a moment.
More particularly, we anticipate an increase of up to 90% of the total volume expected by the time all participating central securities depositories (CSDs) connect to the platform. The next migration wave will also lead to an increase in the use of links between T2S markets that facilitate cross-border transactions. T2S has significantly contributed to the integration of post-trade processes across all participating markets. This has been achieved by the gradual implementation of the single rulebook, i.e. standards, rules and procedures, in the T2S market. Harmonisation measures necessary for ensuring efficient and safe cross-CSD settlement in T2S are fairly advanced. Monitoring has shown that, by the time they migrate to T2S, market communities are close to achieving full compliance with the T2S standards. Nevertheless, some gaps in compliance remain, for example in the area of corporate actions. These are complex business processes for asset servicing, which involve rules and procedures developed by a range of different actors. The newly established Advisory Group on Market Infrastructure for Securities and Collateral (AMI SeCo) will address these gaps in compliance, among others. This advisory group will also look at ways in which the existing methodology could be used as a blueprint for building a methodology to harmonise collateral management.1 In addition, the T2S harmonisation agenda has identified a number of regulatory and legal barriers to post-trade harmonisation that fall under the regulatory agenda. These relate, among others, to issues such as conflict of law and withholding tax procedures, which are expected to be tackled this year.

Yves Mersch: Digital transformation - Europe's integrated market of tomorrow Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Joint ECB and European Commission Conference "Into the future: Europe's digital integrated market", Frankfurt am Main, 31 January 2017. * * *  Introduction For over a decade the European Commission, the Eurosystem and the market have been working towards transforming what has up to now been a very fragmented financial market infrastructure in Europe into a more integrated one. This work is still ongoing and requires more effort. However, we are at a point now when progress has become tangible. In the first part of my speech, I will briefly take stock of where we stand, particularly with regard to the post-trade area. I will then address two areas where I still see gaps that are in the way of our achieving a truly integrated European financial market. The first area is securities issuance, the second instant payment settlement. In both these areas, digitalisation is opening up new opportunities, which requires action. We at the ECB stand ready to take action accordingly. Integration in the post-trade area Following the launch of T2S in summer 2015 and two further migration waves in 2016, the German market is due to migrate to T2S in less than a week’s time. This latest development is expected to bring a big increase in the volume of securities transactions being settled on the platform.
But it has got harder. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 1: UK inflation and output gap variances 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  Chart 2: The UK’s pre-crisis trade-off? 3  Inflation variance  Stylised ‘Taylor frontier’  1958-1992  2  1  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 3: The ‘Great Stability’ and crisis periods 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1 2008-2012  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  Chart 4: The true trade-off for the UK over 20 years? 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1 1993-2012  2008-2012  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: A preferable outcome? 3  Inflation variance  1958-1992  2  1  P  1993-2012  2008-2012  1993-2007 0 0  1  2  3  Output gap variance  Table 1: Monetary base  Data are month averages for UK, US, Japan and end month for the euro area. Sources: Bank of England, Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, ECB.

The deployment of responsibilities outside monetary policy cannot be divorced from the government in the same way as is possible for monetary policy. For example, in the area of financial stability and banking supervision, there will be times when public funds may be put at risk when rescuing or resolving a failing institution – and that decision is properly one for the finance ministry. It is far from straightforward for a central bank governor to be completely independent in terms of monetary policy, somewhat independent in terms of financial stability, and not at all independent in terms of operations that risk taxpayers’ money. The financial crisis has challenged our understanding of the objectives of monetary policy and exposed its limits. And, through the proliferation of instruments and resulting increase in responsibilities, it has complicated the question of central bank independence. So how should we respond to this more complex environment? We must keep sight of three important principles. First, although they should be realistic about what can be achieved, it is right that elected politicians and parliaments decide on the objectives of policy. Second, as we learned in the 1970s, if the central bank is to achieve price stability – its fundamental role – it must be sufficiently independent. And third, in order to protect that independence, its limits should be very clearly circumscribed, and we should be exceptionally careful with decisions that put public funds at risk. The challenge remains, as it was twenty years ago, to make “constrained discretion” work in practice.