samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Although I hope that the analysis will eventually develop to the extent that it is possible in a reasonably reliable way to take account of this type of risk in our forecasts we are not there yet. My view is that it may sometimes be justified to consider this kind of unforecastable risk  8  According to the theory of uncovered interest rate parity, the market expects the krona to weaken against the euro in the period ahead if Swedish interest rates are higher than those in the euro area. Uncovered interest rate parity also explains why the krona strengthened at the same time (and not afterwards) as Swedish interest rates increased relative to those in the euro area in 2010. However, the empirical support for uncovered interest rate parity is weak and there are many examples of deviations from the theory. For example, the krona strengthened more against the euro in 2010 than implied by uncovered interest rate parity. I refer to my speech “Many dimensions to well-balanced monetary policy”, dated 26 January 2011, for a more detailed discussion of the development of interest rates and the krona exchange rate in 2010. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  in our monetary policy decision-making. Ignoring such risks completely is, in my view, the same as saying that they do not exist, and that is a position that I would not want to defend.

Manuela Pfrunder, the graphic artist, has further developed her drafts and completed the design for the CHF 50 note, taking the technical aspects of banknote production into account. At its meeting of 29 August 2008, the SNB Bank Council approved the design of the new CHF 50 banknote and gave the go-ahead for the further work that is to be done. Preparations for the technical aspects of implementation of banknote production are now in full swing. A particular challenge is posed by the security features that will be used in the new banknote series for the first time. Based on the progress of work to date, the SNB is confident that the first banknote in the new series will be ready for production within the planned time period. The CHF 50 banknote will mark the beginning of the new series of banknotes and is scheduled to be issued in autumn 2010. The appearance of the new banknote and the security details for the entire series will be presented shortly before the scheduled issue date. 1  Nout Wellink, The Importance of Banking Supervision in Financial Stability, High Level Meeting, 17 November 2008, Beijing  BIS Review 157/2008  3
It means that any potential risks emerging from the introduction of a digital euro should be contained in both normal times and times of financial stress. We have been discussing these aspects in detail over the past few months. We are looking very closely at the risks to monetary policy transmission and financial stability that could be associated with the conversion of large parts of euro area bank deposits into digital euro. Deposits represent the main source of funding for euro area banks today. [14] If not well designed, a digital euro could lead to the substitution of an excessive amount of these deposits. Banks can respond to these outflows, managing the trade-off between funding cost and liquidity risk. [15] The attractiveness of commercial bank deposits will also influence the degree of substitution. But any undesirable consequences that may result from the issuance of digital euro for monetary policy, financial stability and the allocation of credit to the real economy should be minimised in advance by design. And it is indeed possible to design a digital euro with effective tools to prevent it from being used as a form of investment rather than solely as a means of payment. One such tool entails quantitative limits on individual holdings. [16] Another involves discouraging its use as a form of investment by applying disincentivising remuneration above a certain threshold, with larger holdings subject to less attractive rates.

Speech  The digital euro and the evolution of the financial system Introductory statement by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Brussels, 15 June 2022 I am pleased to join you here today to discuss the progress we have made in our digital euro project. A digital euro would enable Europeans to use public money for digital payments throughout the euro area – just like they can use cash for physical payments. Bringing central bank money into the digital era is a logical step as payments become increasingly digitalised. And this is critical for two main reasons. First, we need to preserve the role of public money as the anchor of the payments system in order to ensure the smooth coexistence, the convertibility and the complementarity of the various forms that money takes. A strong anchor is needed to protect the singleness of money, monetary sovereignty and the integrity of the financial system. Second, a digital euro would contribute to our strategic autonomy and economic efficiency by offering a European means of payment that could be used for any digital payment, would meet Europe’s societal objectives and would be based on a European infrastructure. We will design the digital euro in a way that makes it attractive to users, who would like to use it to pay anywhere.
and L.A. Dicks-Mireaux (1958), “The Excess Demand for Labour. A Study of Conditions in Great Britain, 1946-56”, Oxford Economic Papers 10, No. 1, 1-33. Forder, J. (2014), Macroeconomics and the Phillips Curve Myth, Oxford University Press. Friedman, M. (1968), “The Role of Monetary Policy”, American Economic Review 58(1), pp. 1–17. Karlsson, S. and P. Österholm (2018), “Is the US Phillips Curve Stable? Evidence from Bayesian VARs”, Working Paper 2018:5, School of Business, Örebro University. Karlsson, S. and P. Österholm (2018), “A Note on the Stability of the Swedish Phillips Curve”, Working Paper 2018:6, School of Business, Örebro University. Kinnwall, M. and A. Rune (2018), “Teknikföretagen: Riksbanken skapar bubblor” [Association of Swedish Engineering Industries: The Riksbank is creating bubbles], Debate article in Swedish in Dagens Industri, 29 March. Leduc, S. and J.D. Wilson (2017), “Has the Wage Phillips Curve Gone Dormant?”, Economic Letter 2017-30, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Murphy, A. (2018), “The Death of the Phillips Curve?”, Working Paper 1801, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Peneva, E.V. and J.B. Rudd (2017), “The Passthrough of Labor Costs to Price Inflation”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 49(8), pp. 1777-1802. Phelps, E.S. (1967), “Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation, and Optimal Employment over Time”, Economica 34(3), pp. 254–281. Phillips, A.W. (1958), “The Relation between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in the United Kingdom”, Economica 25(4), pp. 283–289. Samuelson, P. and R. Solow (1960), “Analytical Aspects of Anti-inflation Policy”, American Economic Review 50(2), pp. 177–194. 16 [16]

This was why MAS introduced the Financial Advisers Act, or FAA, ten years ago. The FAA was a landmark regulatory reform, providing for consistency in the regulation of persons engaged in advisory activities:   across sectors: in insurance companies, banks, stockbrokers, and financial advisory firms; and    across products: life insurance, securities, futures, and unit trusts. Two years before the FA Act, an industry-led committee, the Committee for the Efficient Distribution of Life Insurance, or CEDLI, made far-reaching recommendations on minimum standards for the advisory process, and the competency of insurance agents. The FAA and CEDLI together helped transform the landscape for financial advisory services in Singapore. They have contributed to greater consistency and better quality in the advisory services provided on both life insurance and investment products. Disclosure practices have also improved. Life insurance coverage and financial investments among Singaporeans have grown over the last decade.   Life insurance as a percentage of the total assets of Singaporeans has nearly doubled from about 4% in 2000 to 7% in 2011.   Financial investments as a percentage of the total assets of Singaporeans has increased from about 14% in 2000 to 17% in 2011. But there are important gaps to fill. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We need to do better We have a large protection gap. The average Singaporean is still grossly underinsured.
Gorton, G and He, P (2008), “Bank Credit Cycles”, Review of Economic Studies 75(4), pp 1181–1214, Blackwell Publishing. Group of Thirty (2010), Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience: Macroprudential Policy,Tools, and Systems for the Future. Hamilton, J and Lin, G (1996), “Stock Market Volatility and the Business Cycle”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 573–593. Harvey, A.C., and Jaeger, A. (1993), “Detrending, Stylized Facts and The Business Cycle”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 8, 231–247. Holmstrom, B and Tirole, J (1997), “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3), pp 663–91, MIT Press. IMF (2009), “Lessons for monetary policy from asset price fluctuations”, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, October. IMF (2010), “Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System”, Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, April. Kay, J (2010), Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation. Kashyap, A K, Stein, J C and Hanson, S (2010), “A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation”, Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Perspectives. Keynes, J M (1931), “The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of Money Values”, Essays in Persuasion, Macmillan Publishers. Keynes, J M (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan Cambridge University Press. Kindleberger, C.P. (1978), Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Palgrave Macmillan. King, M (2010), “Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and back again”, Speech given at the Second Bagehot Lecture Buttonwood Gathering, New York City.

Table 3 The credit cycle and subsequent crises  Total peaks 1880–2008*  Crisis years** within 5 years following a peak  % peaks with crisis years within the following 5 years  Banking crisis within 5 years following a peak  % peaks with Banking crisis within the following 5 years  AUS  9  6  66.7%  2  22.2%  CAN  11  6  54.5%  2  18.2%  DEU  9  2  22.2%  1  11.1%  DNK  10  4  40.0%  3  30.0%  ESP  8  5  62.5%  2  25.0%  FRA  5  3  60.0%  1  20.0%  GBR  9  7  77.8%  3  33.3%  ITA  11  8  72.7%  6  54.5%  NLD  8  1  12.5%  1  12.5%  NOR  13  5  38.5%  2  15.4%  SWE  10  4  40.0%  2  20.0%  USA  9  6  66.7%  5  55.6%  112  57  50.9%  30  26.8%  * Interwar data missing for most countries. Data coverage incomplete for other countries e.g. only post-1945 data available for France. ** Defined as years in which either a banking crisis or a currency crisis or both (“twin crisis”) occur. Source: Bordo et. al. (2001) and Bank calculations.
Ivan Iskrov: Association of Banks in Bulgaria – 20 years Congratulatory address by Mr Ivan Iskrov, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, to the Association of Banks in Bulgaria on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Association’s Foundation, Sofia, 3 April 2012. *  *  *  Mr. President, Ladies and gentlemen, Dear colleagues and friends, It is a great honour and a pleasure for me to be here today commemorating with you the 20th Anniversary of the guild of the banking profession – the Association of Banks in Bulgaria. This is a perfect opportunity to congratulate the Association for the long way it successfully traversed, and along which it established itself as one of the most reputed trade associations in the Republic of Bulgaria. All these years the Association consistently assisted its members in pursuing their banking business and protecting their interests, all the while standing as a stable and constructive partner of the central bank, as the banking regulatory authority, of other government authorities, and of the representatives of the business. Therefore, we the members of the BNB Governing Council are all pleased to attend this occasion as a proof of the respect cherished by the central bank’s management for your work and professional achievements! Behind the ABB’s history stands the individual road of achievements, but also of challenges, of each one of the Association’s members.

The average annual real rate of GDP growth in Bulgaria in the period 1998–2011 stood at 4% and the real cumulative growth in the same period was 63.5%. At the same time, the added value posted by the sector, classified by the national statistics as “finance and insurance”, boasted an average annual real growth of 13.3%, and cumulatively for the same period – a notable 384.9%. All that time, around 1/6 of the country’s GDP growth was contributed by this sector, which is largely dominated and represented by the banks. Besides being a factor of economic growth, the banking system has played a significant role for attracting foreign direct investments to Bulgaria. A total of BGN 76.6 billion in foreign  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  direct investments inflow was registered over the period from 1998 to 2011, of which over 1/6 (BGN 11.9 billion) were direct investments in the banking sector in particular. Not lastly, the banking sector accounts for a large part of the “brightest” share in Bulgaria’s economy. The role of banks in Bulgaria should not be considered in isolation from the fact that they are among the biggest and most immaculate employers. In 2011 the number of full-time employees in the banking system reached 33 677 at year-end. With the BGN 77.6 million in tax costs and BGN 722.8 million in personnel costs paid in 2011 only, for example, the banking sector ranks among the largest taxpayers and contributors to the social security system in Bulgaria.
1 The market value of most carbon-intensive industries has already been impacted. And re-pricing may occur rapidly and abruptly. What is less clear at present is how we should react to such a development since the horizon at which climate change risks materialise largely exceeds the traditional horizon of most economic agents, and notably financial players. This is what Mark Carney famously referred to as the “tragedy of the horizon”. 2 We all agree that a higher carbon price would send the right economic signal. But we are aware of how difficult international decision-making is in this area. Given my responsibility, and while awaiting such decisions, the following questions thus arise: how to ensure that investors and financial intermediaries are aware of their actual exposure to risks? And how to prevent a misallocation of capital to carbon-intensive sectors or stranded assets? To address these questions, I will start by stressing that, fortunately, the financial sector and civil society are already mobilised (I). Next, I will discuss the need for public intervention to ensure an alignment of interests (II). I/ The financial sector and civil society are already mobilised. 1  Cf. Moody’s, “Impact of carbon reduction policies is rising globally”, March 2015. 2  Mark Carney, “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability”, speech given at Lloyd’s of London, 29 September 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This mobilisation, which has yielded progress, appears to have occurred in three main phases.

For central banks or prudential authorities, three questions arise: that of financing –and interaction with monetary policy–, that of information – and of disclosure–, and lastly that of time horizons –and stress tests–. 1. The question of financing: what interaction with monetary policy? Climate change is likely to affect the price of goods and services. It has a direct impact on food prices. But it will also more generally affect growth and the allocation of resources. Against this backdrop, central banks should remain vigilant about, and possibly monitor the economic consequences of climate change. And monetary policy will have to play its role of contributing to a smoother rebalancing of price structures, in line with its price stability mandate. Article 2 of the European System of Central Banks statute states: “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Community, with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community [economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment…the raising of the standard of living and quality of life]. Some would like to go a step further, using the quantitative easing tool to help finance the energy transition, purchasing “green” assets, granting favourable treatment to green assets that are eligible as collateral, or setting up dedicated long-term facilities; the list of possibilities is long. However, we must bear in mind the ultimate aim of monetary policy. It is designed to achieve macroeconomic objectives, not sector-specific goals.
For ethnic minorities, where university degrees from abroad often end up in this category, the penalty is a lot smaller, at around 24%, compared with non-ethnic minorities. (b)  Age. Compared to the earnings of the 25-29 age group, each subsequent age group earns more up  to around the mid-50s, where the earnings ‘premium’ flattens out a bit. For example, those aged 45-49 earn a pay premium, on average, of around 19% compared with those aged 25-29. This pay premium is notably larger for white men than women or ethnic minorities. Men aged 45-49 earn an “extra” wage premium of around 10% compared with the other sub-groups. 31  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  31  (c)  Part-time and non-permanent work. Part-time work, compared with full-time employment, reduces  earnings across all four sub-groups, on average by 16%. This discount is larger for white men (22%) than for ethnic minorities and white women (10%). If employment is not permanent, this also reduces earnings across the sub-groups, with white men again being affected the most (10% reduction in pay). (d)  Children under 2. Viewed on its own, having a child under 2 appears to have a positive effect on the  earnings of both white men and women, of 6% and 1% respectively. For ethnic minority men, the effect is not statistically significant while for ethnic minority women earnings are reduced by 1%.

The Goldin specification is:  (5) ln  ∝  Where  ∗  ∗  =  1 0  female male  We regress the natural log of average gross hourly pay on a binary female coefficient and a set of controls, wider than the ones used in Goldin (2014). The set of controls comprises both individual and job-specific characteristics. It includes: age, female-age group interactions, usual hours worked, public or private sector, full time or part time, contract type, whether born in the UK, has a child under 2, female and child under 2  26  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  26  interaction, occupation, female and occupation interaction, educational qualifications, tenure, region of home and sector (Annex Table 1A).11 Once we take account of these factors, Table 2 suggests that there was, on average, a conditional gender pay gap of just under -15% between 1994 and 2019.12 This gender pay gap is highly statistically significant. To understand how it has changed over time, we split the sample into five periods (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013, 2014-2019) and re-estimate (5). As Chart 22 shows, the gender pay gap has fallen over time, though it remains around -10% and is statistically significant by the end. Table 2: Gender pay gap for specification (5)  Female Observations  Coefficient  Pay gap, per cent  Number of observations for females  -0.159***  -15%  291,859  (-11.17) 537,177  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations.
During the last six months, my colleagues from the Governing Board and I have held frequent meetings with representatives of the business community; these discussions were very heated. It is therefore clear to me that adjustments to a strong currency do not happen just like that. On the contrary. Adjustment processes as a result of appreciation shocks are always very painful. Underlying these processes is a great willingness to take risks on the part of companies and investors, and a high level of commitment and flexibility from employees. In addition, our eight delegates for regional economic relations are constantly in touch with companies from different industries throughout Switzerland. The results of the special survey on the effects of Swiss franc appreciation conducted in the last two quarters show that a large portion (70%) of the companies surveyed are being negatively affected by Swiss franc appreciation. Many companies’ margins have come under pressure. However, the surveys also illustrate how quickly – and differently – companies have reacted to the challenges. The fact that our most current survey suggests a slightly improved economic outlook is encouraging. Economic developments abroad are even more crucial for Swiss exports than the exchange rate. The importance of global economic trends for our country can be clearly seen in chart 2. It shows that downturns in world trade and dips in growth in Switzerland occur almost concurrently. But the characteristics of demand from abroad differ in important ways.

This reluctance can partly be explained by the fact that retail bank customers regard cash holdings as an attractive alternative to bank deposits, and could withdraw their deposits if interest rates turn negative, thereby depriving the banks of an important refinancing source. Thus, uncertainty over the collective behaviour of bank customers could be seen as a factor dissuading banks from passing on negative interest rates. As a result, banks’ liability margins – the difference between the interest on a maturity-matched alternative funding source and the interest on deposits – have dipped into negative territory.4 This is clearly illustrated in chart 6. Banks have responded to the pressure on liability margins by raising mortgage rates (i.e. by increasing the asset margin). In principle, the slight rise in mortgage rates is good news from a financial stability standpoint. So can negative interest rates even be regarded as a tool to combat imbalances on the  2  Cf., for instance, O. Jordà, M.HP. Schularick & A.M. Taylor, Betting the House, NBER Working Paper 20771, 2014, M.D. Bordo & J. Landon-Lane, Does Expansionary Monetary Policy Cause Asset Price Booms; Some Historical and Empirical Evidence, NBER Working Paper 19585, 2013, or L. Gambacorta, The Risks of Low Interest Rates, Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, 29, 64: 14-31, 2011. 3  The same applies to all bank loans. 4  The bank’s total margin is made up of three components: asset margin, liability margin and transformation margin, minus any hedging costs (so-called structural contribution).