samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indeed, for the majority of my time on the Committee – in 28 of the past 55 months, CPI inflation has been 3% or more. The official commentary of the MPC on this inflation over-run has been to emphasise one-off factors pushing up inflation, such as oil and commodity prices and the recent rise in VAT. Such factors do clearly contribute to the volatility of inflation, but they do not tell the whole story. Oil and commodity prices have similar effects across a wide range of countries which have a similar economic structure to the UK. But when we compare our recent inflation performance to other European economies – whether they are part of the euro area, or have independent monetary policies, as Sweden and Switzerland do, the UK’s inflation experience looks noticeably higher through the recession and into the recovery. Chart 2 Inflation in selected European economies Annual percentage change in consumer prices 4.5 UK  Euro-Area  Sweden  Switzerland  4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 2007-08 average  2009-10 average  Latest  Source: Thompson Datastream  As Chart 2 shows, our consumer price inflation has been around 1.5–2.5% above our peer group of European economies through the recessionary period and this gap appears to be persisting into the recovery. The recent VAT increase cannot account for this inflation gap,  2  Total UK employment according to the latest Labour Force Survey was 29.23 millions compared with 29.07 millions in the third quarter of 2006.

This year, we are going to make such a review as well. We have been targeting inflation for five years by now. Over this period, we were able to maintain inflation close to the target for quite a long time. By the moment, the financial sector and, largely, the society and businesses have a better understanding how this works. Professional market participants have their inflation expectations anchored at the long-term target, and, importantly, this influences long-term interest rates. Some parameters of our policy were associated with the fact that we were launching inflation targeting at the stage of disinflation when we were lowering inflation from high levels. For instance, we set our target as a point in order to anchor inflation expectations at it. We avoided setting a range fearing that inflation expectations might get stuck at the upper bound. In our opinion, the target rate conformed to the level of the market maturity. However, it has changed somewhat over this period. The operational procedure we selected was also in line with the market structure. Today, we need to find out whether this structure has changed so that we now need certain adjustments in our procedure. We are going to analyse the above issues and some other aspects within our review. We will carry out comprehensive work in this regard. At first, we will perform research and analysis engaging our research divisions who will test particular hypotheses.
As I have explained, the benefits of EMU will not come in a quasi-automatic way. While monetary policy will make its contribution by following policies that maintain price stability, other economic policies must be implemented to ensure that the opportunities of the single currency are achieved. Monetary policy alone - however well designed and implemented - cannot solve Europe’ s economic problems. Policy-makers in all areas must be determined to take proper account of the new environment of Stage Three of EMU and its consequences when forming their policies. 3  BIS Review 50/1999

The new series of Albanian banknotes combines maximum security, modern design, artistic communication of the historical message, and a longer lifespan. It consists of six denominations: 200, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000 and 10000 lek. While the first two denominations – 200 and 5000 lek, 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  issued in 2017 – are ready to be put in circulation in September 2019, the other banknotes of the series will be put in circulation gradually over the coming years and will be legal tender alongside the existing denominations. The presentation of the new series demonstrates the continued commitment of the Bank of Albania to further enhance the quality and security of banknotes in circulation. Both these attributes guarantee the absolute integrity of our banknotes and represent with dignity the Bank of Albania and the Albanian state itself. In this context, today’s ceremony marks the culmination of a voluminous work started four years ago. In addition to Bank staff, many renowned academics, historians, Albanologists, numismatists and experts from the most experienced companies in the field of banknote production have actively and intensively provided their invaluable contribution. The combination and cooperation of specialists from various fields of expertise, coupled with the latest technological innovations in banknote printing, enabled the refinement and presentation of a new series of banknotes which are simple to use, boast a contemporary design and strike a balance between innovation and current tradition.
Andrew Bailey: Innovation to serve the public interest Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at the City UK Annual Conference, 15 June 2021. * * * It’s a pleasure to be participating in the City UK Annual Conference. Amongst the themes you have chosen, I will focus on innovation, and how we think about and assist innovation as public policy makers. In doing so, I will draw on our work on payments and digital currency, including an important paper on the latter that we published last week. To cut to the end briefly, I believe that as public policy makers we have to be clear on the rules of the road that innovation needs to follow to serve the public interest, and in doing so be clear that innovation can rightly challenge those rules and cause them to adapt. But, what we cannot have is a world where innovation gets a free pass to ignore the public interest. The odds of such an approach not ending well are too high. It follows that as public policy makers we need to provide a lead in setting out these rules of the road and be prepared to think openly about how they can be fitted to changing circumstances. This requires early engagement, something we are seeking to do on digital currency. Playing catch up with public policy is not a recipe for success.

The fiscal authorities have no choice but to come to terms with the need to bring about a better balance between taxes and spending and to not only bend the curve, but reverse the inexorable growth in federal debt accumulation. This is the stuff of the great negotiations taking place among the executive branch and the two houses of Congress. This is no small chore. The parties involved must stop the hemorrhaging without inducing cardiac arrest; they must solve the long-run debt and deficit problem without, in the short run, pushing the economy back into recession, creating still more unemployment. And they must not only confront their addiction to debt and spending beyond their means, but they must reorganize the tax system, redirect the money they collect and rewrite the regulations they create so as to be competitive in a world that wants to beat us at our own game. This is an essential point. It will not be enough to reach a deal on the debt ceiling or on partially reining in deficits. In the post-Cold War, post-Bamboo Curtain world, there are many governments and great swathes of people outside the United States that want to attract investment and improve their lot. We are being challenged as the place to invest job-creating capital. Our fiscal and regulatory authorities do not operate in a vacuum; we live in a globalized, interconnected world where money is free to go to wherever it earns the best return.
0609  0209  1008  0608  0208  1007  0607  0207  1006  0606  0206  -1  Processed Unprocessed 16,70  -0,43 0608 0708 0808 0908 1008 1108 1208 0109 0209 0309 0409 0509 0609 0709 0809 0909  27 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3  2,5  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Given the current economic climate, assumptions on foreign economic activity remain increasingly important in building medium-term forecasts. Therefore, as I have mentioned earlier in my speech, better-than-expected growth figures regarding the second quarter and continued recovery in leading indicators pertaining to economic activity in the third quarter together has bolstered perceptions that the worst part of the crisis is over. Accordingly, while producing medium-term forecasts, assumptions pertaining to global economic activity have been revised slightly upwards compared to those in the July Inflation Report and the forecasts were made on the assumption that external demand would remain weak for an extended period (Table 1). Furthermore, revised forecasts envisage world interest rates to remain low for an extended period of time. Regarding fiscal policy, it is assumed that the consistent framework outlined in the Medium Term Program (MTP) will be implemented and further enhanced by structural measures that would strengthen fiscal discipline. In this respect, it is assumed that the fiscal stance will remain expansionary – but less so than the one in 2009throughout 2010, and fiscal tightening will gradually be adopted starting from 2011.

Currently, weak domestic demand conditions limit the passthrough stemming from upside cost-push shocks. Therefore, the CBRT will accommodate volatility in commodity prices, especially in the short-term when domestic resource utilization remains at depressed levels. However, if an uptrend in commodity prices reflects a strong and durable rebound in global activity that may, in turn, create inflationary pressures, then  18  BIS Review 143/2009  monetary policy will react accordingly to keep inflation in line with medium term inflation targets. Distinguished members of the press, The CBRT has been taking the necessary measures to contain the adverse effects of global financial turmoil on the domestic economy. However, prudent monetary policy is necessary but not sufficient to maintain the resilience of the economy against the global crisis. Stronger commitment to fiscal discipline, alongside the structural reform agenda in the medium-term, is also critical to facilitate expectations management and to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy decisions. In this respect, utmost importance is attached to commitment to the harmonization with and convergence to policies of the European Union, as well as timely implementation of structural reforms. I would like to underline that we will be closely monitoring developments pertaining to public finance while determining our medium-term monetary policy strategies. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 143/2009  19
The Standing Facilities which had played this role were re-launched as the Operational Standing Facilities (OSFs), more clearly intended to cope with operational disruptions and short-term market volatility. More recently, in June 2010, the Bank replaced the temporary eLTRs with permanent Indexed Long-Term Repo (ILTRs) operations that regularly offer the system 3 and 6 month liquidity, against a wide pool of eligible collateral. In designing its permanent liquidity insurance operations, the Bank was very mindful of the need to balance the benefits to systemic stability, the incentives for banks to manage liquidity risk prudently, and the need to minimise the risk taken onto the Bank’s balance sheet. In particular, the aim of the Bank has been to leave the credit and market risks associated with collateral with the counterparty, so that we only provide the intended liquidity insurance and not any official underwriting of the underlying risks. Underpinning these objectives are some additional underlying principles: (a)  the Bank does not accept any collateral that it feels it cannot value and then riskmanage effectively;  (b)  the Bank’s prices for lending in its liquidity insurance operations can vary with the liquidity of the collateral delivered and the amount lent, so that use of these facilities only becomes attractive in stressed conditions. These principles ensure that the Bank can manage its own risks prudently and that counterparties are encouraged to manage their risks similarly. Eligibility The Bank’s risk preferences are very different from those in commercial financial institutions.

Even as we prepare for the worst, we will strive for the best. Singapore – and our financial sector in particular – are well-placed to thrive in the postCOVID world. We have deep connectivity to Asia, which will be the region earliest to emerge from COVID19 and register the fastest growth rates. We have a high degree of digitalisation, which will be a key source of competitive advantage in the future. We have made a good start on the journey towards sustainability, which will be a growing priority as the world grapples with climate change. Our odds are better than good. Let me stop here and I will be happy to take your questions. 1. [1] On a seasonally adjusted basis, weighted by country shares in Singapore’s non-oil domestic exports. [2] 14 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  1. [2] Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam. 1. [3] On a NODX-weighted basis. 1. [4] IMF Working Paper (June 2020), “Who will Bear the Brunt of Lockdown Policies? Evidence from Tele-workability Measures Across Countries”. 1. [5] This includes FinTech jobs in the overall economy, but excludes jobs in holding companies. The employment increase of 6,400 for the financial and insurance sector in 2019, published by MOM, includes holding companies. 1. [6] These numbers exclude holding companies, which is consistent with the ITM-based definition of financial services. At last year’s MAS annual report media conference, it was stated that the 3-year average growth rate during 2016–2018 was 4.1%.
At the same time, households unaffected by the stockmarket fall that are younger and unconcerned about their future income may have continued to demand expensive dwellings since the interest costs have been so low. As the available statistics are mainly at an aggregated level, however, it is difficult to find evidence of the behaviour behind what we have seen. But if this interpretation holds, it is reasonable that consumption picks up when labour market uncertainty diminishes and when wealth has been restored by a combination of saving and rising asset prices. The current situation for monetary policy With that I shall move on to say something about our main scenario for economic developments in the years ahead. The international picture The outlook in the rest of the world is mainly bright. As we see it, international growth will remain high this year. Conditions are also favourable for a continuation of high growth in the next few years, although we do count on a somewhat more subdued rate than last year. Important driving forces are persistently strong economic activity in the USA and further powerful economic expansion in China and the rest of Asia. Last spring there were some signals that the slowdown in the international economy would be more marked than we had counted on earlier. It was mainly growth in the euro area that seemed to have become more subdued than expected. In June, our main assessment was that this amounted to a temporary dip in international activity.

A credit register will narrow the information gap that exists in the Maltese banking system by reducing asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. It also improves risk management thereby contributing to a better performing loan portfolio and as a result, a lower cost of capital. Ladies and gentlemen, let me close with a few concluding remarks. As you are well aware, the banking sector across the Euro area is passing through regulatory and supervisory changes that are sometimes viewed as expensive and imposing unnecessary burdens on the sector. This is a short-sighted assessment. Though dividend pay-outs may be lower in the short-run, their sustainability will be strengthened in the longer term. Similarly, higher bank capital does not necessarily lead to lower volumes of loans over the long run. Instead, a higher capital base mitigates balance sheet risk, lowers bank funding costs, hence allowing banks to charge a lower risk premium on their loans, to the advantage of both lenders and borrowers. The crisis has uncovered various shortcomings in corporate governance in the banking sector, mainly in areas like risk management and internal controls, compensation, corporate structures and transparency. Some Maltese banks have yet to adopt a number of necessary risk oversight practices that would ultimately benefit the banks and their stakeholders. What needs to be stressed is that reputation is a key asset of Malta’s financial system which cannot be taken for granted. Efforts to safeguard financial sector reputation need to be ongoing and undertaken by all concerned in the financial sector.
The unemployment rate is 8-1/4 percent – well above the rate anyone on the FOMC sees as being consistent with our longer-run goal; in my view, this is a substantially higher rate than one might attribute to supply-side factors, such as extended unemployment insurance and a heightened degree of mismatch in labor markets. Realistically, this is a 2-1/4 to 3 percentage point deviation from our current maximum employment objective. Because this occurred with nominal interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound since December 2008, I believe it’s hard to say that we are not in a liquidity trap. Recently, the U.S. data have been more encouraging, with the labor market improving and private demand showing a little more traction. Without a doubt, these are welcome developments. But even the more optimistic forecasts see output increasing only moderately above its potential growth rates; no one has an expectation for a surge in activity that would quickly close resource gaps. At the same time, the outlook for inflation is subdued, with most FOMC participants’ forecasts for increases in total personal consumption expenditures prices averaging roughly between 1-1/2 and 2 percent over the next three years. Furthermore, private sector long-run inflation expectations are quite well anchored.

So, in designing a policy to close resource gaps, I am going to take a careful look at the evolution of inflation and inflationary expectations to tell me if I am wrong about my assessment of the real-side shortfalls we need to fill. An explicit state-contingent policy Let me outline how this approach might work in practice. The Fed could sharpen its forward guidance by pledging to keep policy rates near zero until one of two events occurs. The first event would be if the unemployment rate moved below a 7 percent threshold. Reductions in the unemployment rate below this level would represent good progress toward the natural rate of unemployment; depending upon the state of inflation expectations, it might be time to lessen policy accommodation.7 The second event that would commit us to raise rates would be if inflation rises above a particular threshold that is clearly unacceptable. This trigger would be a safeguard against the possibility that our assessments of economic conditions and resource slack are wrong and the natural rate of unemployment is higher than 7 percent. If this were so, our experience from the 1970s suggests that a continuation of the low-rate policy would generate a further unexpected increase in inflation; by adjusting policy according to this trigger, the Fed would begin exiting from what would now evidently be excessive policy accommodation. We would not have the desired reductions in unemployment, but then again, there wouldn’t be anything that monetary policy could do about it.
The baseline scenario has been revised upwards from $ to $ a barrel; the high oil price scenario has been revised downwards from $ to $ Our oil price forecast for 2020–2021 remains unchanged. These adjustments have made no major impact on expected economic growth indicators in the context of the operating fiscal rule. Finalised data suggest GDP growth was 2.3% last year, above our expectations. Our estimates suggest that the accomplishment of major investment projects emerged as key enablers of this growth. With due regard for this, we, first, reconfirm our assessment of the nature of economic growth: the economy is close to its potential; its expansion does not create additional proinflationary pressure. Second, we keep our GDP growth estimate in the baseline scenario at 1.2-1.7% for this year. The growth rates will accelerate to 1.8-2.3% in 2020 and 2-3% in 2021 as the positive effect of national projects and structural reforms provided that these deliver. The oil price adjustments in the forecast carry implications for balance of payments indicators. In the baseline scenario, the forecast current account balance for this year has been upgraded from $ billion to $ billion, chiefly on the back of a higher value of oil and gas exports. The balance of the financial account of the private sector has also been raised from with $ billion to $ billion. This is based on the actual data for the first two months of the year along with greater opportunities for the buildup of foreign assets given the higher export revenues.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 22 March 2019. * * * Today, the Bank of Russia Board of Directors decided to keep the key rate at 7.75% p.a. We have every reason to believe that the decisions to raise the key rate made last year are most likely to be sufficient to bring annual inflation back to the near 4% target in the first half of 2020. Some indicators have performed better than we expected in December: foreign financial and commodity markets have stabilised, the VAT pass-through to prices is quite moderate, and inflation expectations have turned to decline. In these circumstances, inflation stands somewhat below our December forecast, while short-term proinflationary risks have softened. Given these trends, we expect end-2019 inflation to come in at a lower level of 4.7-5.2% instead of the 5-5.5% range forecast earlier. Let me set out in further detail the factors that were central to our decision. First, as I have mentioned, annual inflation in January-February proved somewhat lower than we expected at the end of last year, In February, it came in at 5.2%. Monthly price growth rates have already been going down. Annual inflation will pass its peak in March-April on the back of the base effect. Our updated estimates suggest that at its highest point inflation may surge to approx. 5.5%.