samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And although the number of people in the scheme continued to decline through August and September, that made no visible impression on indicators of labour-market tightness. Tax-financed rises in government spending needn’t be inflationary because there is an offsetting hit to demand in the private sector. But the current increase has been largely deficit financed so far. 7  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  12  So far as we can tell, and although there were still 1.1 million jobs furloughed in the final week of September, just prior to its end, nor has there been any visible effect now that the CJRS has formally closed. There is obviously more to come on this: we’ll get the first post-furlough release of the Labour Force Survey, for October, just at the time of next week’s policy meeting. But we know already that there’s been no decline in vacancy numbers for that month, no tick-up in surveys of labour availability, and no sign either of any increase in benefit claims (Chart 18). In fact, they all went in the opposite direction: the labour market looks to have tightened further. Chart 17. Public sector employment has risen significantly during the pandemic Dec 2019 = 100 Public services  Chart 18.

In these “exceptional circumstances” the MPC’s remit requires explicitly that Committee balance these considerations and, if necessary, that it set policy with a view to taking somewhat longer to return inflation to target3. For these considerations to matter, clearly, these “trade-off-inducing” shocks should be sufficiently persistent, or sufficiently foreseeable, to affect inflation further into the future than the usual policy lags. I’ll return to these points in the conclusion. Before then I want to look at the latest evidence on traded goods prices – trying to define a little more precisely what how word “transitory” should be understood in this context – and then the domestic labour market. “In exceptional circumstances, shocks to the economy may be particularly large or the effects of shocks may persist over an extended period, or both. In such circumstances, the MPC is likely to be faced with more significant trade-offs between the speed with which it aims to bring inflation back to the target and the consideration that should be placed on the variability of output. In forming and communicating its judgements the Committee should promote understanding of the trade-offs inherent in setting monetary policy to meet a forward-looking inflation target while giving due consideration to output volatility”. 3  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Will inflation in traded goods prices prove “transitory” (and what have people meant by the word anyway)?
The MPC’s central projection in the May Inflation Report is that the pace of output growth will slow. But a slowdown in economic growth is not, in itself, sufficient to hit the inflation target. The central issue for monetary policy is whether total BIS Review 53/1998  -2nominal demand will slow sufficiently quickly to prevent retail price inflation rising when the favourable effects of a high exchange rate and lower commodity prices wear off. The extent to which domestic demand growth slows down is crucial. At present, we are relying on a sharp deterioration in the trade balance to keep output growth down to levels that do not lead to rising inflationary pressure. But in the longer-run domestic demand growth must fall from its present rate of 3½ - 4% to something closer to trend. During 1997 as a whole, consumption grew by 5%. That growth rate is already moderating. And the MPC’s central projection is for a further slowdown in domestic demand during this year. That is likely to be brought about by a combination of the fiscal and monetary tightening that has been put in place over the past year or so. But there are real uncertainties. There is a risk that consumption may prove stubbornly buoyant. Real personal disposable income increased by 4.2% last year, and the ratio of net financial wealth of households to their income reached an all-time high of over 3. Those factors will support consumption.

As regards negative interest rates, although there is no conclusive evidence to date that they have adversely affected the supply of bank credit, we cannot rule out that maintaining rates at very low levels for an additional, potentially extended, period of time, could ultimately have some negative consequences for the bank-based transmission of monetary policy. In this regard, the mitigating measures adopted by the ECB, consisting of a tiered system for remunerating excess liquidity holdings, are intended to soften the negative impact on bank profitability of the new reduction in reserve remuneration, and thus ensure the expansionary effect on activity and inflation of any additional cuts to interest rates in the current setting. 2. Banking sector profitability This is the economic environment that banks, economic agents and, in particular, financial institutions will face in coming years. If I may, I will now move on to analyse the developments in Spanish banking sector profitability and the determinants thereof. Profitability is one of the main variables that characterise the financial position of banks and it provides the first line of defence against adverse shocks. Indeed, the volume of a bank’s profits determines the return its owners can earn on the capital invested. This, duly adjusted for the risks assumed, will affect the bank’s valuation. Moreover, profit levels determine the margin these agents have available to address shocks. Indeed, low profitability reduces the possibility of generating capital internally through retained earnings.
But, the slow process of decision making in Europe, the difficulties of policy implementation and the debate around the burden-sharing of the crisis have limited the positive effects of those policies on confidence and credibility. In this setting, the ECB and the Eurosystem have played a central role. While safeguarding their paramount objective of price stability, their actions have been directed to re- establish the proper functioning of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, as shown by the recent decisions by the Governing Council on the O[utright] M[onetary] T[ransactions] initiative. Some big steps have been taken on the institutional front at the European level. Fiscal rules have been strengthened and refined, governance reinforced and, in the financial sphere, great progress is being made to establish a common supervisory framework. In parallel, national constitutions have been adapted in several countries – Germany, Spain and others – to comply with these new requirements. This overview of the problems and challenges in Europe may be compared with the evolution of Latin America during the crisis and its aftermath. The Latin American performance during the crisis shows that these countries have drawn the lessons from the similar episodes they went through in the late nineties and early 2000’s. In particular, I would highlight two characteristics of the economic setting that has made the region so resilient to the external shock this time: the improved macroeconomic framework – underpinned by price stability – and the reinforcement of financial stability.

The recent BIS report on macroprudential instruments – presented in our last meeting in Mexico – is an good step in that direction. However, the report and the discussion surrounding it also highlights the difficulties of setting up a proper macroprudential framework, at the local, regional and global level. Another lesson I would like to mention refers to the importance of a close cooperation between home and hosts supervisors, which has materialized in Supervisory Colleges, playing an important role in this context. Indeed, the setting up of the European Single Supervisory Mechanism, a process which will have its starting point next year, will entail new challenges for euro-zone supervisors, who will also need to develop new procedures in their relations with supervisors of other regions. Before concluding, I would like to thank Banco Central de Chile and President Vergara for the hospitality and the perfect organization of this event, the European Central Bank for the collaboration and support and all the participants for their interest. I wish all of you a very good continuation of the Seminar tomorrow and a very pleasant stay in Santiago de Chile. Muchas gracias a todos. Muito obrigado. Thank you very much for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Stefan Ingves: Comments on “An evaluation of Swedish monetary policy 1995-2005” Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 30 November 2006. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here! I would like to begin by thanking the authors, Professor Giavazzi and Professor Mishkin, for an interesting and comprehensive report. As we at the Riksbank have said earlier, we consider it a very good initiative by the Committee on Finance to commission two highly qualified external experts to make an evaluation of the monetary policy conducted over the past decade. As the Riksbank has an independent position, it is important that monetary policy should be regularly examined and evaluated. The Committee on Finance makes its own evaluation of monetary policy every year, but I nevertheless think it is a good idea to occasionally supplement these evaluations with reports made by external experts. It is a particular advantage that two foreign academics have carried out the examination. This gives an outside perspective on Swedish developments, which can be very valuable. As you can see, the report is fairly comprehensive and it is therefore impossible for me to mention all of the aspects that are covered. Let me just say as an overall comment that I feel the report has been very pleasant reading. Although the authors express criticism on some points, it is clear that their overall impression of Swedish monetary policy is very positive.

I believe, for instance, that it would not be an easy task to convey the message to the general public that as inflation had been, say, below target for a period of time, the Riksbank would endeavour to bring inflation up to, say, around 3 per cent for a period of perhaps a year. In my opinion, this could lead to considerable confusion with regard to the status of the 2 per cent target. There is a risk that it could be perceived as the Riksbank beginning to work with inflation targets that vary over time, which could also be said to be the case. I believe that in this type of world it would be more difficult to anchor expectations of future inflation. 2  BIS Review 117/2006  The authors claim that this method of conducting monetary policy would only entail a minor change in the current policy. I do not really agree with this. I consider that it would be a fairly major change in a system that, all in all, has been proved to work well. It would in any case be a much greater change than the ones we have made so far, such as abandoning the assumption of an unchanged repo rate and our earlier simple policy rule. Bearing in mind that the Riksbank, as is also noted in the report, has not found it entirely easy to communicate these relatively limited changes in its monetary policy system, it is somewhat surprising that the authors consider this change as minor.
In fact, these bouts of extreme instability have disrupted the potential growth trends, which in some cases have taken years to recover. On the whole, these episodes may be associated with too much financial liberalization too soon. The unique global backdrop, as well as the economic outcomes in terms of growth and volatility that I have just shared with you, presents a real dilemma and at times tension in emerging Asia. And nowhere is this tension more palpable than it is in the realm of exchange rate and capital account regimes. While benefits from trade integration are appreciated and shared by billions the world over, net benefits from international financial integration have not been so apparent in Asia and emerging economies in general. This is consistent with an observation that Asian emerging markets rely increasingly more on trade integration because it is judged to be a safer mode of risk-sharing with the world. As a result, while the pace of financial integration has far outstripped trade integration in advanced economies, it has only managed to keep pace with trade integration in emerging markets. 3 Ladies and Gentlemen, Asian economies and policymakers have come a long way in their attitude toward macroeconomic risk management since 1997. Countries have taken unilateral actions to promote economic and financial resiliency. Having appreciated the evidence that macroeconomic stability provides an environment that is conducive for sustained growth, Asian emerging markets have continued to pursue fiscal discipline and more flexible exchange rates on the whole.

Over time, they wish to move from incomplete financial market to a better world of risk-sharing, risk absorption, and diversification. But there is tension to be managed in the short run. Under Bretton Woods II, in which much of Asia is still tightly linked to the fortune of the US dollar, and in the context of ongoing “global imbalances,” emerging markets need to strike a balance between financial stability and financial development. In particular, when our markets and institutions are still developing, the struggle between financial integration and financial stability, enterprise and prudence, requires from us a deft balancing act. Ladies and Gentlemen, From a historical perspective, today’s emerging markets are unique in their common experience. This uniqueness is twofold. On the one hand, it is quite apparent that our openness has gained us immense benefit from global economic integration, the phenomenon denied to advanced economies when they started off. At the same time, and as a result of our openness, small developing economies face risks and volatilities that accompany financial globalization, the scale of which advanced economies never had to face in their early stages. In fact, sustained increase in living standards is a relatively new economic phenomenon to emerging markets. Having experienced modern economic growth after 1950, we are late comers. And having much to benefit from being late, it took us a much shorter time to treble our per-capita income than today’s advanced economies did between 1800 and 1950.
In addition, developing economies also have the distinct contexts and challenges to consider, especially on the expertise, data availability, and collaboration between public and private sector. Hence, this course is essential for us SEACEN regulators to understand and identify our gaps, learn the key rationale why such frameworks and tools are being recommended and, more importantly, the implementation of cutting-edge practices that have been tested and adopted internationally. We are greatly fortunate to have such a prominent list of experts to share their insights and experiences on these topics. I would like to end my remarks by emphasizing the importance of regulators' capacity and collaboration. Tackling sustainable finance and climate change is a challenging process and a long journey that cannot be accomplished by solely single entity. Not only do financial institutions, but central banks and financial regulators also need to learn, share, and accommodate these new approaches to ensure sufficient measures and readiness of the whole financial sector for climate risk management and green transition. I hope you all have a good learning experience and a successful course. Thank you very much. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

As my colleague Daleep Singh has said, we have adhered to three principles: robust and proactive transparency, strong and effective corporate governance, and accountability to our stakeholders.18 The New York Fed's staff has worked hard—and sometimes around the clock—to give effect to these principles. I am proud of my colleagues, and continue to be humbled and inspired by their deep knowledge of their fields, their brilliant creativity, and their selfless commitment to the Fed's mission—notwithstanding many personal hardships. Reflections on the Fed's Pandemic Response The Fed's work is ongoing, but it is worth pausing to reflect on lessons learned from our experience so far. The extent of the Fed's efforts raises legitimate questions about the role of the nation's central bank. Some "Fed watchers" have opined that the Fed "has effectively shifted from lender of last resort for banks to a commercial banker of last resort for the broader economy. "19 I don't know if I would go that far. The "lender of last resort" function—framed definitively by Walter Bagehot in the late nineteenth century—is not the Federal Reserve's only purpose. As I mentioned earlier, the Fed's job is to support the "U.S. economy overall." The Fed's monetary policy https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200625  1/4  The Federal Reserve’s Pandemic Response - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  mandate, for example, addresses the national employment and inflation objectives. The Fed runs a payment system, FedWire, on which the global economy depends for clearing U.S. dollar transactions.
The EU's statistics office Eurostat is currently investigating the possibility of including owner-occupied housing costs in the HICP in line with the net acquisition model, but it is unclear whether or when this will happen. It is worth pointing out – against the background of proposals of taking rising housing prices into account in the inflation measure – that changes in housing prices in all methods only have a limited impact on the index, or no impact at all. How monetary policy should be affected by changes in housing prices (or other asset prices) is therefore an issue which must principally be handled separately from the actual measure of inflation. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  interest-rate cuts since the inflation target was introduced, has contributed to CPI inflation falling substantially below CPIF inflation and remaining near zero for three years. Correspondingly, CPI inflation will be pushed upwards and exceed the target when the repo rate approaches historically more normal levels in the future. An extremely low rate of increase in CPI inflation therefore tends to be followed sooner or later by an unusually high rate of increase, and these periods can sometimes be relatively protracted. This could look something like Figure 4, for example. One could say that major, protracted interest rate movements lead to substantial and long-term surges in CPI inflation – more substantial and long-term than we previously believed would be the case.

We know little about what the world will look like in the future, and we should be careful not to casually abandon something which has essentially worked well. It is easy to forget previous problems as time passes, and to take for granted that certain things are simply working. This is a dangerous approach, however, which can lead to setbacks. Dismantling a framework can be done quickly, but building one up takes a long time and often involves major adjustment costs. In terms of the monetary policy framework, I am convinced that the flexible inflation targeting pursued by the Riksbank and most other central banks today will continue to be the most effective approach for the foreseeable future. This does not mean, however, that I oppose all forms of change and necessarily think that everything should remain exactly as it is today. If we want something to endure, we must be prepared to change it. To continue with the metaphor I used at the beginning: it is important to constantly maintain the vessel and make any adjustments and improvements required for it to keep functioning well, even under new circumstances.3 I would today like to highlight a few areas of the Swedish monetary policy framework about which there are grounds to open up a discussion, based on the experiences we have gathered over some twenty years of inflation targeting.4 It is perhaps mainly the experiences gained after the financial crisis which have increased the need for a serious discussion.
Demand for office and retail space is strong. The high hotel occupancy rates have spurred new interest in hotel developments. In private housing, annual take-up of uncompleted residential units has surpassed the previous high in 1994. The Government land sales programme will continue to provide new development opportunities in Singapore. Already, we have seen strong market interest supporting the development of the Marina Bay and Orchard Road areas. With the positive outlook for Singapore and the government’s strategic plans for development of key industries, investments in real estate from foreign investors have substantially increased. Investors in Singapore real estate now come from many countries, namely the U.S., Hong Kong, Australia, Germany, Japan, the Middle East and Indonesia. Singapore as a gateway to property finance Investment opportunities in Asia, including Singapore, have not gone unnoticed by global investors. Property and property-related assets are also gaining popularity with investors seeking high-yielding and predictable returns with exposure to capital gains. Attracted by the region’s rapid economic growth and positive outlook on Asia, global investment funds are increasing their allocation to Asia, specifically in Asian real estate. Singapore can play an important role as a gateway for global investors to access Asian opportunities via our capital markets. As a leading home for global fund managers, total assets under management in Singapore exceed $ billion with over 50% of these funds invested into Asia Pacific. The Singapore Exchange is an established listing venue for regional property companies based in Singapore as well as foreign property developers.

The need to move the goal from merely access to well-informed usage is increasingly recognised in the development community. • The World Bank’s Global Findex Database reports that 20% of bank account owners have not used their accounts in the past 12 months. As any entrepreneur joining us at the Festival would know, user acquisition is easy. It is simply a matter of good price and good marketing. User retention is the true test of the utility that a product provides. This is where the focus needs to shift. In other words, policy, infrastructure, and services aimed at improving financial inclusion need to genuinely make a difference in people’s lives so that inclusion is meaningful and sustained. • Products need to be designed with the end-user in mind, to delight rather than to perplex with technology. What is the role of central banks and regulators in ensuring that financial inclusion initiatives stick, while safeguarding that innovation delivers responsible, stable and inclusive outcomes for those most in need? Let me make two major points in this context. •  First, FinTech must offer interoperable solutions. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  • Second, the solutions must be embedded in the broader context of people’s lives and the daily operations of businesses. Financial products need interoperable rails to reach customers effectively. Let me cite two quick examples: identity and payments. Identity is the starting point in any digital transaction.