samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, in 2013, we set up the Moroccan Foundation for Financial Education, and introduced, in the 2014 Banking Law, payment institutions with a scope of activity limited to small-value transactions. As a result, several stakeholders  2  took various and disparate initiatives, which prompted us to federate them to develop a National Financial Inclusion Strategy. To this end, we proceeded from a situation analysis based on objective supply and demand data, which were collected through field surveys, mainly the Findex survey conducted by the World Bank in several countries. The paradoxical finding which emerged is that, based on indicators such as credit or deposit-to-GDP ratios or the FSAP assessment, Morocco’s financial system proves to be deep if compared internationally, but suffers from significant inequalities in terms of access. To give you some figures, the share of adults holding an account is estimated by the Findex survey at 34 percent at the national level. This proportion ranges from 20 percent in rural areas to 37 percent for urban dwellers, from 17 percent for women to 41 percent for men and from 16 percent for young people under 25 to 33 percent for those aged 25 and over. Based on these data, it became clear that priority should be given to targeting the most disadvantaged groups in order to reduce the gaps.

Besides, as Fintech was experiencing significant growth and was becoming a promising lever, the first measure to undertake was to introduce mobile payment, considering the high mobile phone penetration rate, which reaches 130 percent and allows coverage of almost the whole population. To  this  end,  we  have  developed,  together  with  the  National  Telecommunications Regulatory Agency, a national low-cost, secure, interoperable and real-time mobile payment solution. This offer is to be provided not only by banks and telecom operators, but also by payment institutions which formed an alternative network, and which we had begun to license based on strict specifications. 3  However, the adherence of retail merchants, necessary for a large-scale deployment of this solution, is still low, as that many of them still operate in the informal sector. Subsequently, we were prompted to collaborate with the Ministry of Finance in order to introduce tax incentives in the 2020 Finance Act. Today, we are rather optimistic. These incentives, combined with communication and awareness-raising efforts, will hopefully give a new impetus to this solution and contribute to a greater integration into the formal economy and to a reduced use of cash. Mobile payment has undoubtedly been one of the main levers of financial inclusion in Morocco, but certainly not the only one. We have also strived towards turning microfinance and micro insurance into channels of inclusion. To this end, the applicable amending legal texts have been finalized and are in the process of being approved.
We always kept the possibility, while providing the banking system with unlimited amounts of liquidity, to change the interest rates of all our facilities. And, obviously, this remains true today. Because asset purchases played a very limited role in our operational framework, the unprecedented expansion in our balance sheet was never a source of concern. By essence, repo facilities are self expiring and self exiting. A vivid illustration will come in July when our one year long term operation expires and our balance sheet will contract by a third. A very useful complement comes from the systematic sterilization of our more recent asset purchases. Our interventions have had significant effects on monetary and market conditions in the Euro zone. Liquidity conditions improved markedly. The decrease in policy rates, from 4.25 % in September 2008 to 1 % in May 2009 was largely passed-though to bank lending. This return to more favourable conditions has supported economic recovery. 2  BIS Review 76/2010  During this period, four main factors have contributed to the success and efficiency of our operations:   First, our credibility. At no time during the crisis have inflation expectations significantly deviated from our definition of price stability. This was most apparent, and crucial, during those months when headline inflation stayed in negative territory, the output gap was itself strongly negative and the risks of deflation could have materialized. With inflationary expectations strongly anchored around 2%, the “zero lower bound” never really was a problem.

It reminds us if need be that crisis management is a difficult and potentially long lasting task and that we should always keep in mind that our policies have effects not only the current course of events but also through the expectation of the private sector that they may be repeated in the future. It is therefore timely to reflect upon the past, present and future course of Central Banks’ actions. I – The seeds of financial instability It is paradoxical that the crisis took place after a protracted period of nominal and real stability. In particular, inflation had remained low and remarkably stable for nearly two decades. This unprecedented degree of price stability mostly reflects a combination of central banks’ credibility and the effects of a benign economic environment. This macroeconomic stability has however not prevented deep imbalances – macroeconomic and financial – to grow in parallel, reinforcing one another. The abundance of savings in the world, specifically in emerging economies, prevented real long term interest rates from rising and stimulated the pace of credit expansion, especially in the US. Indeed, when policy rates were raised in 2004 in the US and late 2005 in the euro area, long term rates responded much less than in previous interest rate cycles and the yield curve flattened unexpectedly. Over the same period, financial markets have gone through deep structural changes. Financial innovation and extensive financial engineering fuelled a “search for yield” through increased risk taking.
Mr Bäckström covers monetary policy in Sweden from 1996 to 1998 Opening remarks by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, the Swedish central bank, before the Standing Committee on Finance in Stockholm on 18 May 1999. Introduction In the period 1996–98 the annual rates of inflation, measured with the CPI, were 0.8, 0.9 and 0.4 per cent, respectively. This means that in each of these years the change in the CPI not only deviated from monetary policy’s 2 per cent target for price stability but was also outside the lower tolerance limit of 1 per cent inflation. The Riksbank has indeed made assessments that subsequently proved to be a bit off the mark. As a result we have also made decisions that, looking back when the outcome was known, could have been somewhat different. But on the whole, the result of monetary policy in this period seems to be acceptable. In my opening remarks I intend to give this appraisal more substance. One major reason why CPI inflation has been low in the past three years is that the price trend has been affected by some specific price movements that monetary policy neither can nor should aim to counter fully. If the Riksbank attempts to counter such price movements, the result might be unnecessarily costly for the economy, that is, exaggerated fluctuations in economic activity as well as in the financial markets. It was against this background that the new Executive Board of the Riksbank clarified the inflation target earlier this spring.

Factors such as indirect taxes have effects on consumer prices that are transitory; they normally disappear after a time unless long-term inflation expectations have been affected. Conclusion The CPI is the target variable for monetary policy. Measured with the CPI, inflation is to be 2 per cent in a longer, annual perspective. There are grounds, however, for sometimes departing from this target. Short-run deviations from the target should not be attributed automatically to a faulty formulation of monetary policy. This presupposes, however, that clearly identifiable, transitory price movements are involved that monetary policy neither can nor should aim to counter. It is therefore important to look at the factors behind the CPI figures when appraising monetary policy. 7KHUHDVRQIRUOHWWLQJGHYLDWLRQVRFFXULVWKDWRWKHUZLVHWKHHFRQRP\ZRXOGEHGHVWDELOLVHG OHDGLQJVRRQHURUODWHUWRXQQHFHVVDU\HFRQRPLFFRVWVWKDWLVWRVD\H[DJJHUDWHGIOXFWXDWLRQV LQERWKWKHUHDOHFRQRP\DQGWKHILQDQFLDOPDUNHWV  11  BIS Review 61/1999
Here indeed we have a backlog, and we need to cross over to this new system in order to reduce costs for the financial sector and ultimately reduce the cost of credit. This will also result in cheaper loans. We will be carrying out tests on the market of new technologies, such as distributed ledger technology based on a blockchain technology, and we have already begun this process in order to implement the regulation of new technologies rationally, protecting the markets from risks. At the beginning of this speech I mentioned the strategic objectives of the Bank of Russia. These are our key priorities. You may have noticed that the tasks we set ourselves four years ago and those for the year 2016, which I have been speaking about today, as well as challenges of the future, are all, of course, related to each other. We consider it to be very important to respect the principles of continuity, consistency and predictability. We will no doubt be responding with flexibility to any given situation. The situation is volatile, there is a lot of uncertainty in the world. We will have to react in accordance with the challenges presented to us. But the consistency of our policy, I think, is very important. The preservation of trust is vital to development, as well as to financial markets. This is a key category – trust in the financial market and trust in monetary policy have been the most influential factors in terms of economic growth.

Waves of financial innovations from new players, but also from incumbents on the market, create massive changes in the financial industry. In this light, the highlight of the conference is embracing changes, that is opening doors to financial innovations in the payment landscape, while preventing disruptions to the financial markets and to the overall financial stability. New wave of digitalization can have wide ranging positive effects on the economy – it spurs innovation and productivity, transforms public and private services, contribute to higher financial inclusion by reaching underserved households and overall, improve wellbeing of the society as information, knowledge and data become more widely available. Benefits go hand in hand with challenges to jobs and skills needed, to taxation, financial markets, and invite new thinking on how to preserve fundamentals such as privacy and security, as well as how to preserve monetary and financial stability. Financial innovations, underpinned by digitalization, have a potential to gradually reshape the financial sector. “The Pulse of Fintech” report of KPMG1 shows that Fintech investment globally more than doubled during 2018, and reached $ billion. In addition, while new startups sprouted across emerging fintech subsectors, highly mature areas like payments saw some consolidation through mergers and acquisitions of big developed players. Reports also show that highest number of fintech service providers are in the payments, clearing and settlement category, thus, giving them the potential to gradually undertake a paradigm shift in the payment landscape.
The scope of the directive may also include hitherto unregulated technical service providers supporting payment services. Next, the future architecture of payment services in the European Union will be built on immediate payments. In this regard, the Commission plans to assess the need for a statutory obligation to participate in the SEPA scheme of the European Payments Committee for immediate credit transfer in euros (SCT Inst.). To encourage the use of immediate payments, consideration is being given to requiring that immediate payment fees be no higher than ordinary credit transfer fees. In Bulgaria, Borika AD, in close cooperation with the BNB as an operator of the real-time gross settlement payment system (RINGS), is in an advanced stage of development of a project for immediate payments in BGN, based on the requirements of the SEPA scheme for immediate credit translations (SCT Inst.). The ambition of the company is in 2021 for the payment service 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  providers in the country to be able to provide their customers with immediate credit transfers in BGN. Interconnection and interoperability between the various payment systems providing clearing and settlement is required to ensure cross-border reachability in the execution of immediate credit transfers in euro. In July 2020, the ECB announced its decision to introduce measures to ensure a trans-European scope of immediate payments in euro by the end of 2021. As a result, all payment service providers that have joined the SCT Inst scheme will be required.

Incidents of the Libor being manipulated, whether already admitted or suspected, are problematic for the reputation of the banks involved, and for the financial sector as a whole. This discussion  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  on the Libor is also significant for us, because we use the three-month Libor in the implementation of monetary policy. No Swiss franc Libor distortions relevant to monetary policy have thus far been ascertained. Furthermore, an SNB survey conducted among banks this year confirmed that the Libor remains an important variable for credit transactions, namely for mortgages. Of the banks surveyed, 80% indicated that they use the Libor as a benchmark for pricing loans. It also continues to play a key role in the pricing of financial products and derivatives. Neither the sharp decline in unsecured loans on the interbank market nor the incidents of manipulation have so far changed this. In July 2012, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK was commissioned to undertake a review on reforming the Libor. At the end of September, the working group convened for this purpose presented its findings in the Wheatley Review, which included a series of proposed measures. These aim to prevent further attempts at manipulation, and to restore confidence in the Libor. The report recommends, inter alia, that rate-setting processes and their oversight be improved, and that certain maturities and currencies be withdrawn. Under the proposals, the three-month Swiss franc Libor will continue to be determined.
On the other hand, from the perspectives of consumers themselves, greater demand for funds and financial services is often constrained by limited financial access. The appropriate course of policy on financial institutions must take into consideration challenges posed by these trends of changes. In this context, the Bank of Thailand sees three policy priorities going forward: (1) to preserve the soundness of the financial institution system, (2) to enhance the efficiency of financial intermediation, and (3) to place emphasis on consumer protection. The soundness of financial institutions is the major foundation of macroeconomic stability. Currently, financial institutions are in top conditions, with NPL ratio last year as low as 3.6 despite credit expansion of 11.3 per cent. Banks’ capital is also much higher than recommended international standards. This strong soundness must be preserved. The Bank  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  of Thailand will continue to apply micro-prudential approach to the regulation of financial institutions, to ensure that financial institutions put in place appropriate risk management framework, are prudent in extending credits, and maintain sufficient level of capital according to new international standards such as the Basel III guideline. The recent global economic crisis highlights the importance of extending the coverage of supervision to foster the soundness of system as a whole, in addition to individual institutions. “Systemic risk”, in particular, can pose serious threat to macroeconomic stability at large.

First, it requires the active involvement of many different stakeholders, in particular Government agencies and very often a variety of NGOs, as well as financial institutions with specialized skills and knowledge. Second, the state of economic and social development of a society is an  BIS Review 88/2010  1  important determinant on the level and quality of financial inclusion. Third, what constitutes acceptable level of inclusion, in terms of access to finance, protection of personal rights and liberties, or assurance of retirement and healthcare benefits varies from one jurisdiction to another. For the reasons that I mentioned, there is no uniform global benchmark that can be used as a successful model for financial inclusion programs. Success stories and experiences are dispersed and often go unrecorded and to further the cause we need to reveals this situation. The financial inclusion agenda requires a systematic and internationally-recognized set of financial inclusion indicators that is meaningful and capable of assisting us in formulating developmental policies. Furthermore, enormous efficiency gains from the availability of such indicators can both reduce the cost of research and implementation as well as increase the effectiveness of the delivery and execution of the policies. Lessons learned in using financial inclusion data in the Malaysian context Let me to briefly share some of the lessons we have learnt in terms of using data to improve the policy formulation process, and develop a more efficient and inclusive financial sector.
Luis M Linde: An outlook on the Spanish economy Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), London, 9 February 2016. *  *  *  I would like to thank OMFIF and Mr. David Marsh for the invitation to participate in this Forum, an initiative that favours public and private sector interactions and the exchange of views on topics of common interest. According to the title of my intervention, I will comment on the current situation of the Spanish economy, with a special focus on developments in employment, the external sector and fiscal adjustment. I shall continue with a brief review of some of the reforms undertaken that have laid the foundations underpinning the recovery. I will continue with some references to the situation of the banking sector and the challenges it is confronted with; and I will conclude with some comments on the growth perspectives of the Spanish economy. Current performance of the Spanish economy The current performance of the Spanish economy shows robust growth, employment creation and a surplus in the external balance. The simultaneous occurrence of these three positive developments has not been very usual in recent decades in the Spanish economy. We should also mention the ongoing deleveraging process, which should be considered necessary and positive. The recovery of the Spanish economy started in the second half of 2013, following the severe contraction that took place in the preceding years.

If use of the franc were to be crowded out by the euro, the Swiss National Bank would have had little  2  BIS Review 32/2004  leverage left to influence monetary conditions in our own country. It would become a paper tiger! (c)  Third, even short of a “euroization” of the Swiss economy, we feared the loss of our monetary autonomy. Given the importance of the common currency for the Swiss economy, what else could the Swiss National Bank do other than follow the European Central Bank’s monetary policy and de facto integrate the franc into the euro zone? A gradually shrinking interest-rate differential between euro and Swiss franc investments as well as a loss in monetary autonomy would have resulted. How does our recent experience relate to these concerns? 3. Our experience as an independent monetary entity  (a)  The euro/Swiss franc relationship  Our fears of a euro destabilizing the Swiss franc did not materialize. Relative to the euro, and since its introduction, the franc has been fluctuating in a relatively narrow band of plus or minus 5 percent, about four times less than against the dollar during the same period. The Swiss franc appears now to be less affected by exchange rate shocks and more shielded from speculative movements.
But some have already begun to find their way into conventional finance[7] and there is a great deal of experimentation and development going on, both in the crypto world and in conventional finance. They offer the prospect of what is loosely called the ‘tokenisation’ of financial and other assets – including the ‘money’ that is used to settle - and thereby a more extensive, faster and more secure programming/automation of transactions. And they offer new ways to record the  ownership and the transferring of ownership, of assets - again including the transfer of money – which we generally call ‘payments’. One can certainly think now of possible use cases for such functionality. In the world of wholesale financial transactions, for example, they may make it possible to cut out intermediaries and make trading and settlement instantaneous. In retail payments, for example, they may enable functionality like micro-payments and more flexible programming of money for everyday uses. But perhaps more important may be the use cases we cannot see at present. A good illustration of this is the expansion of use cases for the smart phone which I am reasonably sure has far exceeded anything that could have been imagined when the first iPhone and apps were introduced in 2007. At launch the iPhone had just 15 apps, the app store opened the following year with around 500 apps which has grown such that today it holds over 2 million.

I wish you a productive and joyful conference ahead. 5