samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
See The Wheatley Review of LIBOR: Final Report 15 9 See ICE LIBOR Quarterly Volume Report – Q1 2018 16 10 See Boston Consulting Group, Staying the Course in Banking, March 2, 2017 17 11 See FCA statement on LIBOR panels, November 24, 2017 18 12 See Andrew Bailey, The Future of LIBOR, July 27, 2017 19 13 See The Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Principles for Financial  Benchmarks: Final Report, July 2013 20 14 See the Financial Stability Board’s publications on financial benchmarks 21 15 See Remarks by Jerome H. Powell at the ARRC, November 2, 2017  6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

•  In any event, compliance processes should clearly spell out the roles of independent control personnel and provide for appropriate separation of duties. A key point to make is that,  2  BIS Review 76/2006  regardless of the compliance risk management framework employed, business line managers continue to "own" the compliance risk in their areas and should suffer real consequences in the event of compliance failures. This responsibility cannot fall just on the independent compliance functions. Emerging practices - such as when firms explicitly factor internal compliance metrics into management compensation or into the allocation of capital among business areas - will underscore compliance accountability even further. •  Rounding things out, management information systems should be in place to adequately monitor and assess compliance risks. For example, the sophistication of monitoring for money laundering is rapidly increasing. Institutions are using specialized software and MIS reports to detect patterns of transactions that warrant investigation, to identify accounts that are the subject of repeated suspicious activity reports, and to build better escalation protocols. A key take-away from this is that compliance professionals must be on top of technological advances that would allow them to do their jobs more effectively. Turning more specifically to the operations of foreign banks in the US - a question we are sometimes asked is whether there is, from our perspective, a best way to structure the relationship between the locally-based compliance functions and the rest of the organization.
But in summary, in the UK we have pioneered a model of open banking, using APIs that allow consumers to have better control over their banking data. If we can build the architecture and legal and technical safeguards, users can have sight of, and control permissions for, every use of their data. This approach has the potential to resolve many of the network effects in the data economy, making finance more competitive and more open. At the Bank of England, we are exploring the possibility of applying this approach to help small businesses harness the power of their data, drawing on some positive aspects of China’s experience with real-time data. We are championing the concept of a virtual credit file, which would aggregate user data from a range of public and private sources, allowing SMEs to share information easily and securely with potential creditors. This has the potential to yield enormous benefits for households and small private enterprises - opening up access to more diverse and competitive financing options, providing greater choice, better-targeted products and keener pricing. It has the potential to integrate the diverse set of potential lenders in the UK, both existing and new through an interoperable, user-permissioned system. Such an approach could significantly reduce the UK’s funding gap for SMEs – estimated to be up to £ or 1% of GDP – with significant benefits to employment and productivity given SMEs’ key role in driving these.

These movements can be explained by several factors: risk aversion, preference for liquidity, tightening of remuneration spreads, tax-regime uncertainty, “re-intermediation” of savings ahead of the new prudential rules (Basel III and Solvency II). I would like to emphasise just how complementary the approaches that will be presented to you in this first session can be. While the topic of savings touches upon a wide range of well-known macroeconomic issues, it is the individual decisions of households and their financial services providers that ultimately generate the fundamentals. II. Following on from this, what challenges do movements of household savings pose for the marketing of financial products? The rules framing the marketing of financial products play a fundamental role in modern economies because they contribute so much to consumer confidence, particularly when the consumer wishes to make long-term investments. In a highly complex economic environment, the advisory duty is an essential link in the chain between household satisfaction and the economic efficacy of their investments. The numerous questions concerning life-insurance received by the legal specialists on the ACP information platform bear witness to this reality. The marketing of financial products also raises questions of consumer protection. The financial services provider must take into account the client’s profile including his/her age, assets, investment horizon and degree of risk aversion, and adapt the investment opportunities offered accordingly so that the recommended investments are tailored to the client’s wishes and needs. Guaranteeing that savers receive the right information is therefore indispensable.
A second source of risk stems from the potential impact of crypto-assets on the smooth functioning of financial markets. Broadly speaking, wild swings in their prices may sway investor sentiment, triggering an overreaction that ends up influencing their behaviour in other markets. Equally, the need to respond to such volatility with frequent adjustments to the necessary collateral could precipitate sales of other asset classes. Indeed, the IMF has recently warned of a notable increase in the positive correlation between crypto-asset and capital markets, which has in certain cases increased by a factor of 35.22 These effects may be further aggravated in the event that alternatives such as stablecoin scale up. Specifically, an accumulation of redemption requests resulting from, for instance, widespread panic around such assets, could put money markets under strain and, by extension, spread to those institutions acting as custodians of the hedging assets. These problems can be exacerbated by certain emerging segments, for example decentralised finance or DeFi, which are highly leveraged and encourage feedback dynamics between unbacked cryptocurrencies and stablecoins. Further, these tensions could spill over into payment systems, as they would be forced to handle a very significant rise in transaction volumes that, in certain circumstances, could lead to delays in execution or even bring services to a standstill. A third source of vulnerability has to do with the impact on the banking sector.

These banking reforms, like all the others now under way (on public spending, pensions and the labour market), should surely have been carried out during the years of expansion, when everything seemed to be going well and the problems that would eventually surface because of the imbalances that were building up were blithely ignored. Unquestionably, we would not now be facing the problems then being incubated and which have now emerged with the crisis. Regarding what has been done so far, it would be unfair not to mention the contribution of the EU authorities, since although there were initially some serious communication and coordination problems, the fact is that subsequently they took appropriate measures aimed at imposing greater economic discipline and improving confidence, such as the reform of economic governance and the Stability and Growth Pact and the recent “Pact for the Euro”. And, of course we cannot overlook the ECB’s contribution with its policy of providing unlimited liquidity and its programmes to purchase covered bonds and the government bonds of the countries hit hardest by the crisis. In short, at this stage it can now be said that both the authorities and private agents have made considerable efforts in the right direction and that, as a result, the process of adjustment of the banking sector and of the Spanish economy as a whole is progressing reasonably well.
And an essentially sectoral solution, where payment system regulators and securities regulators do not cooperate in an integrated way, is inappropriate. Indeed, all official and private sector initiatives that can give an impetus to this debate are highly welcome. The CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems, the ISSA Recommendations 2000, and the Group of Thirty’s ongoing work all contribute to improving our understanding of the challenges we face. And it is only when issues are really understood that appropriate responses can be formulated and implemented. In Switzerland, as in several other countries, supervision of the securities clearing and settlement system is still work in progress. A draft of the revised National Bank Law has been submitted and will be discussed by Parliament in the near future. The revised law will presumably enter into force around 2004. It is intended to explicitly vest the responsibility of overseeing payment systems as well as securities clearing and settlement systems in the Swiss National Bank. The revised law will thus formally express that an efficient and secure financial market infrastructure is imperative for the implementation of monetary policy and for the stability of the financial system. The inclusion of clearing and settlement systems follows from the obvious fact that, given their linkages, these infrastructural functions are of considerable systemic importance. This is all the more true since the SNB has, for a few years now, implemented its monetary policy exclusively through repo transactions. The SNB can fulfil this expanded mandate only by closely cooperating with other authorities.

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Paul Tucker: The crisis management menu Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at the SUERF, CEPS and Belgian Financial Forum Conference: “Crisis Management at the Cross-Roads”, Brussels, 16 November 2009. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be here today. The current crisis has thrown up so many lessons in so many dimensions of the “rules of the game” for the financial system, that I congratulate the organisers on devoting a whole conference to crisis management. That in itself is a meaty enterprise. But a vital one. By way of setting the scene for today’s conference, I will offer the Bank of England’s perspective on the various components of a crisis management package: central bank liquidity insurance for viable firms and markets; firm recovery plans, and contingent capital; resolution plans for winding down failed businesses, including payouts from depositinsurance regimes; and official-sector support operations, including emergency liquidity assistance and Capital of Last Resort. Every country’s authorities need a policy on each of these components, because some day in the future our successors will find that, however good, the improvements our generation makes in the structure, regulation and supervision of the financial system will let them down. A thread that runs through the discussion is how to preserve the core financial services provided to the economy through periods of extreme stress without bailing out banks’ equity holders or uninsured wholesale creditors. That is the essence of the “Too Big/Important To Fail” debate.

2  See ECB (2009), Financial Stability Review, Special Feature B for a discussion on the concept of systemic risk. 3  For an overview, see Bisias, D., M. Flood, A. W. Lo and S. Valavanis (2012), “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics”, Office of Financial Research Working Paper No. 0001, January. 4  Hollo, D., M. Kremer and M. Lo Duca (2012) “A Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress in the financial system”, ECB Working Paper No. 1426, March. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  short-term interest rate) in a MS-VAR, to illustrate the dynamic interaction of systemic financial instability and the macroeconomy in the euro area. 5 CATFIN, a VAR and Expected Shortfall measure at system-wide level calculated with non-normal distributions with fat tails, showing the predictive capacity of financial volatility regarding real economic downturns was proposed by Allen et al. 6 Similarly, Giglio et al. examine 19 measures of systemic risk for the US and 10 measures for the UK and the EU from the perspective of how well they forecast macroeconomic downturns. 7 They also build dimension-reduced risk indexes using principal components and partial quantile regression to demonstrate the robust performance of some indexes in anticipating future macroeconomic downturns. These efforts in developing composite indexes are complementary to the on-going research on the concept of a financial cycle as a sort of a generalisation of the old concept of credit cycle, distinct from the concept of the economic or business cycle. The ECB paper presented this morning by Hiebert et al.
Bluntly, it is no good assuming that an internationally active bank can be regulated as a single unit if, when distress comes, differences in the insolvency or resolution regimes of the various countries in which it operates effectively split the bank into a series of de facto distinct, local entities. The extra complications are legion, revolving around banking practice as well as resolution regimes. For example, if a group employs central liquidity management, as has been not uncommon, host supervisors and creditors may wake up the morning after a failure to find that all the group’s surplus liquidity is in another jurisdiction, available first to creditors there. This kind of thing can unhelpfully alter the incentives for home regulators to be full and frank in their exchanges with host supervisors. We should not overlook that when extolling the merits of colleges of supervisors. But those problems should, given sufficient will and common commitment, be trackable. Even more difficult are the entanglements and conflicts between home and host insolvency and resolution laws. There is, for example, a first-order difference between single-entity insolvency regimes and separate-entity regimes. 9 The latter, for example in the US for foreign banks, have the effect of de facto ring-fencing local assets for local depositors. And even in countries that basically operate a single-entity regime, some (including the UK) would have the option of putting a branch into liquidation pre-emptively to de facto ring fence it before the home authorities had established a whole-bank insolvency procedure. These issues are not new.

We should think about how market participants will react to the potential politicization of the monetary policy process. Knowing that a decision to raise interest rates today might be criticized by the GAO six months later, market participants could begin to worry about the Fed’s willingness to make tough choices in terms of tightening monetary policy. If that were the case, inflation expectations could become less well anchored. This, in turn, would make it more difficult to keep inflation under control, even if the fears of market participants about the Fed ultimately turned out to be unwarranted. Our monetary policy decisions are already public and a wide range of Fed officials explain the rationale for our actions. It has been well established around the world that monetary policy independence leads to better outcomes in terms of unemployment and inflation. In my view, any legislation that would cast doubts about the Fed’s independence in the conduct of monetary policy would not be beneficial to this country. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. 8  BIS Review 161/2009
Indeed, in mitigating inflationary pressures, an exchange rate appreciation restrains the MPR adjustments that could result from only the closing of the output gap. One working assumption we use in our projections is that the real exchange rate will change little into the long term. Any movements away from its trend are possible in a floating regime. Its potential financial effects on aggregate output and inflation will be definitely considered by the Board as an input for its future decisions. As we have demonstrated in the past, our monetary policy is highly flexible. It has contributed enormously to the good standing the Chilean economy enjoys today, in an environment of stable prices and restored employment and output. Now I will review the main features of the macroeconomic conditions we believe are the most likely for the next two years and its implications for inflation and monetary policy. Macroeconomic scenario The first closing of second-quarter National Accounts showed GDP growth at 6.5% y-o-y. In terms of velocity, the second quarter ended with an annualized quarterly variation of around 20% (figure 3). Domestic demand also grew above forecasts, driven by increased private consumption and a strong rebound of investment. Such dynamism has responded to not only temporary factors but also to more persistent ones. Among the temporary factors, what stands out is the immediate repair of the damages caused by the catastrophe of 27-F and the reversal of the dramatic contraction of domestic demand during 2009, associated to the then high levels of uncertainty.

This, however, is only the “first sight” scenario. European unemployment is largely structural, meaning that although there is a demand for labor on the part of the firms, this demand is not necessarily matched by the supply on the labor market. Under these circumstances, the labor market could constitute a bottleneck for growth and lead to inflationary pressure. To prevent inflation from rising, the European Central Bank would have to further increase interest rates. Clearly, structural adjustments are of the essence in Europe. In the absence of flexibility, the unemployment rate cannot be lowered significantly and doubts exist about the actual room of maneuver of the monetary authorities. Expected growth for Switzerland, on the other hand, looks quite moderate by international standards. Thus, one might think that there is little danger of inflation and that the Swiss National Bank should further support the seemingly fragile economic upturn. A look at the labor market, however, shows another picture. Unemployment has fallen steadily since the summer of 1997 to a low rate of 2.3% only. Its recent increase to 2.6% is due to seasonal factors. Moreover, there are already clear signs of a shortage on the labor market. Stronger growth could thus fuel the well-known wage-price spiral. Under these circumstances, a further tightening of monetary policy is a realistic hypothesis. To make things even more difficult, there is a high degree of uncertainty concerning the development of labor productivity in both Europe and Switzerland.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Contemporary issues in Islamic finance and equity-based financing Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Conference on Contemporary Issues in Islamic Home, Personal and Auto Financing, jointly organised by the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance (IIiBF), the Bar Council Syariah Law Committee (SLC) and the Consumers Association of Penang (CAP), Kuala Lumpur, 2 April 2010. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to this seminar and for giving me the opportunity to speak on contemporary issues in Islamic finance. I shall attempt to touch on some issues that, to my mind is important. I will also touch on the subject of equity-based financing, a topic that has attracted a lot of discussion lately. But I must remind you that I’m not a scholar, nor am I an expert on Islamic finance. What I will offer is my experience in dealing with the promotion and development of Islamic finance in Malaysia over the last 10 years and the general experience of over 25 years with the conventional financial system. Therefore, my focus and emphasis would be purely from a practitioner point of view, experience that comes from the need for pragmatism in translating shariah principles and rulings into public policy, development initiatives and formulation of framework on regulation and supervision for the Islamic finance industry. I would try to provoke some questions on some issues that have attracted attention lately.

Ultimately, leverage combined with inept asset management strategies will lead to hedge fund failures. These are likely to occur in the future as they have in the past. It is not inconceivable that expansionary monetary policy and the resulting global liquidity boost provide fertile grounds for the rise and fall of hedge funds. In the event of hedge fund failures, investors – for the most part wealthy individuals – will lose money. In some cases, these amounts could be vast. Nonetheless, such losses have no bearing on the stability of the financial system and should be of no concern to policy makers. What financial and economic policy makers must be concerned with are hedge fund failures or hedge fund activities that undermine the stability of the global financial system. Prudent and disciplined risk management methods, operations and processes in the global investment banks provide the most reliable defense against an erosion of lending standards and the potentially hazardous consequences of the use of excessive leverage in the hedge fund industry. BIS Review 8/2005  5  Graph 1  12000  1200  10000  1000  8000  800  6000  600  4000  400  2000  200  0  AuM in USD bn  Number of funds  Number of Hedge Funds and Assets under Management  0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 No.