samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The series spliced with the 2013 base CPI remains the official index, that is good for all legal and contractual purposes, including the calculation of the UF. In its analysis of the behavior of inflation, the Central Bank uses, as in the previous changes, the benchmark series, because, for the reasons just explained, the new CPI is a better thermometer of the evolution of inflationary pressures and because, since it will be governing in the coming years, the information of its past behavior is more useful for estimating its outlook. In doing so, an important difference is revealed with respect to the December estimates. Thus, while with the 2013=100 base the CPI accumulated a variation of 2.1% between February and December (eleven months), with the new basket and methodology (2018 = 100) it accumulated 1.7%. In the case of the CPIEFE index— which excludes food and energy—the figures were 2% and 1.5%, respectively. With this, at February the annual change in the CPI and the CPIEFE stood at 1.7% and 2% per year, respectively (figure 1). Compared with the change in the CPIEFE projected for this date in the December Monetary Policy Report, its current value is around 80 basis points lower. Beyond the methodological reasons behind the changes in the figures produced by the new CPI, it is important to understand the macroeconomic fundamentals of the lower actual inflation.

SPEECH  Measure Twice, Cut Once May 11, 2021 John C. Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer  Remarks at SOFR Symposium: The Final Year (Part II) (delivered via videoconference) As prepared for delivery It's a great pleasure once again to be sharing a platform with Andrew Bailey as we discuss the transition away from the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). While it's no surprise that our work often brings us together, Andrew and I have joined forces on this issue to such a great extent because the LIBOR transition is essential to the integrity of the global financial system. Given its ramifications for institutions, markets, and economies around the world, strong cooperation at the international level is of critical importance. As the saying goes, time flies, and it's hard to believe that we've reached 2021. It's been more than a decade since LIBOR has been exposed as a flawed and unreliable reference rate. And, with only 235 days until January 1, 2022, I am pleased to say that the endgame for LIBOR is clearly in sight.1 This transition has been a monumental feat. The enormous amount of progress was made possible by a significant and coordinated effort across the globe, as well as in the United States.
9  For the economists amongst you let me be more a little more precise: one would expect an impact on average unit labour costs but not on the marginal costs that matter for inflation. Suppose workers are paid wages equal to their marginal revenue products. In that case, all else equal, an extra job will have no impact on the ratio of the two (marginal costs). It will also have the same impact on aggregate output, in levels terms, as on aggregate wages. But because output is bigger than wages – GDP also includes gross capital income – the proportionate effect on output will be smaller, by a factor equal to the capital share of income (around a third). So when the compositional effects are positive – say they add 1% to average wages – you’d expect a slightly smaller proportionate rise in average productivity (around 2/3%) and a small rise, of around 1/3%, in the ratio of wages to productivity (average unit labour costs). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Bernanke, Ben S. and Powell, L. James, 1986, “The Cyclical Behavior of Industrial Labor Markets: A Comparison of the Prewar and Postwar Ears.” in: R.J. Gordon, ed., The American Business Cycle, Chicago: University of Chicago Press Chassamboulli, A., 2011, “Cyclical Upgrading of Labor and Employment Differences across Skill Groups”, B E Journal of Macroeconomics Goos, M. and A. Manning, 2007, “Lousy and lovely jobs: the rising polarisation of work in Britain”, The Review of Economics and Statistics Nickell, S., 1979.

The main questions in the LFS are about employment status: do you have a job and, if not, are you looking for one? (If your answer to the second question is “yes” you are counted as unemployed, if “no”, economically “inactive”.) As well as these headline numbers,  the UK and the terms of trade have been broadly constant in recent years. Thus the only source of real wage growth, over time, is productivity growth. 4  The inverse relationship between the NAIRU and productivity growth has been noted in many countries (Staiger et al (2001), Slacacek (2005)) nor is real wage resistance the only possible reason for the link. More micro-founded approaches to the labour market, based on the costs of job search, also predict a negative relationship between trend productivity growth and the natural rate of unemployment. In that setting, in which employers trade off the cost of search against the prospective surplus from a new job, lower expected growth in productivity reduces the present value of that surplus and lowers the rate of job creation. The canonical description of this “capitalisation” effect is due to Pissarides (2000). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the ONS’s monthly labour market release publishes standard summary statistics about the duration of unemployment and the reasons for inactivity. But, at least since 1994, the LFS has also included a host of questions about the characteristics of employees and their jobs. These are listed in Table 1.
In net terms, these changes have contributed positively to the Bank’s net worth (dotted line in Figure 16), which had remained negative for many years due to the historical weight of Subordinated Debt, the effect of the exchange rate mismatch between assets and liabilities, and a negative rate differential (between local debt and international reserves). Not only does the higher profitability of domestic assets contribute to close this gap, but the reduction of the Bank’s long-term debt stock (through repurchases) will reduce the financial burden for the next years. In practice, while greater returns are being received on local assets, on liabilities the Bank is paying ever lower rates, a situation that will continue for a long period of time. In addition, the peso has depreciated due to the mismatch between a high proportion of foreign currency assets (reserves) and local currency liabilities (bonds and monetary base). These factors combined have generated a positive value of the net worth for the first time in many years 7, which in previous projections was only foreseen in 2028. With the ups and downs of the currency in the short term, net worth will fluctuate around its current values during the next few years, to settle in positive numbers towards the end of 2025. These long-term projections are of a dynamic nature and are constantly reassessed, including the desired level of reserves.

This is based on significant differences that exist, between the core-crisis countries and the countries affected by contagion, in the relative strength of the economic fundamentals, the state of the banking sector, and the perception of risk by investors. However, beyond the initial recovery, sustained economic decoupling will be difficult without a major restructuring in the sources of growth which, in the case of Asia, calls for a reorientation of the growth driver from exports to domestic demand. Making this transition safely in this era of globalized finance will be the next important challenge for emerging markets in Asia. In the past ten years, the share of domestic demand in the region’s GDP fell by 6.3 percentage point, and the share is now 12.3 percentage point below its peak in 1994. Moving the ratio back will require major restructuring in both the demand and the supply sides of the economy, which needs to be supported by policies that redirect economic incentives from savings to domestic consumption and investment. Such task is gigantic. Chief amongst the polices needed to support this transition will be the development of the region’s financial system, to ensure an efficient intermediation of savings into productive investment. This is really the key issue where the challenge and the constraint to economic decoupling lies. One of the prime reasons underlying the current global imbalance is the limited capacity of the financial systems in emerging markets to generate investment from their local savings.
Nevertheless, monetary policy might usefully be engaged to avert it. c.  Globalisation and the pervasiveness of the law of one price  Returning to the factors behind current price trends, there is one aspect of globalisation which may be especially relevant. This is the rapid expansion of the range of globally traded output (in contrast to efficiency gains within some pre-defined range), with resultant implications for prices. In the past it was common to observe more rapid domestic inflation in economies enjoying faster productivity growth, as wages rose and the prices of non-tradables accelerated, dragging up the consumer price index. This mechanism, based on an assumed clear analytic distinction between price behaviour of tradables and non-tradables, may still be at work, but surely it is not as powerful as it used to be. The range of tradables is expanding relative to that of non-tradables. While it has long been acknowledged that progressively more goods are becoming tradable because of, for example, advances in freight transportation, the revolution in respect of services may now be more significant. Thus, many services which were in the past produced only in the country where they were consumed can nowadays be outsourced offshore or accessed from somewhere else in the world at the click of a mouse - back-office processing, multi-functional call-centre services, legal advice, logistics management, design services for everything from clothes to buildings, and even certain forms of medical consultation or education, to name but a few.

To this end, the Bank promotes consumer awareness and financial literacy by disseminating information through quarterly media briefs, road shows, and attendance at annual agricultural shows and trade fairs. The Bank of Zambia also consolidates tariff guides of all deposit taking financial institutions and publishes this information in a form suitable to make immediate and easy comparisons. The purpose of this quarterly publication is to enable customers shop around in order to get value for money from services provided by banks and to cause banks to be competitive in the manner they set fees and charges. Further, through the activities of the Financial Sector Development Plan, the BoZ intends to spearhead the development of a national financial education strategy in order to galvanise the efforts of various stakeholders in the delivery of financial services. The Bank also publishes a lot of information on the banking sector and the economy in general on its website www.boz.zm. I wish to urge all consumers who may have access to the internet, to make it a habit to visit the Bank of Zambia website on a regular basis. Further, the Bank will provide excerpts from the Banking and Financial Services Act to provide some highlights on some of the consumer protection provisions in the Law. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 30/2010
With the various renminbi financial infrastructure that has been put in place to support trade, investment and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  financial flows between Malaysia and China, this trend is expected to increase. Malaysian entities with large regional network should consider using Malaysia as the centre for their regional renminbi transactions and thus contribute towards greater economies of scale over time. This would in turn enable the transactions to be conducted in the most efficient and cost effective way. Conclusion Let me conclude my remarks. In a short time span of six years since 2009, the renminbi has accomplished much of its goals but there is still a long journey ahead as most international currencies have evolved over several decades. The impact of the Chinese economy on Asia has been significant with many countries now counting China as their largest trading partner, and in some cases, among the largest foreign investors. Reflective of the underlying fundamental economic changes, the rise of the renminbi, although gradual, is inevitable with important implications not only to Asia but to the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, the renminbi is more important to Asia than anywhere else. Given this, Asia including Malaysia must be ready for this transition of the increased internationalisation of the renminbi and its potential role with Asia’s integration path and thus contributing towards further unlocking the potential of the region. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The conduits and SIVs are greatly diminished where they are not being wound up altogether. And the money market and other funds that stepped away from these off-balance-sheet vehicles are not willing at least yet to buy ABS directly. Finding new homes for these securities is bound to take time. So long as there are known to be reluctant holders, even long term real money investors will tend to hold back to see whether prices are driven lower in coming months by forced sales. On the other side many issuers are reluctant to accept the prices on offer today since they could become benchmarks for the future. Lessons from the crisis The story is far from over but it is still possible to identify some lessons. The past seven months have taught market participants a lot about the risks and limitations of the new markets and their business models; their responses will be the most powerful force for change. On the official side, a recent consultative document has set out proposed responses by the UK tripartite authorities. 3 Internationally, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which draws together central banks, supervisors and finance ministries from the main financial centres, is co-ordinating an action plan for authorities to develop and implement recommendations across a number of areas (Chart 7).
The effect of globalization is the establishment of international financial conglomerates. In the case of an economic crisis, the conglomerates may channel it through to other markets. Such companies could be very important for the stability of the financial system in a country or region. Their bankruptcy may evoke a crisis, even in a steadily growing economy and even in the situation when the financial problems have stemmed from a foreign market. The lack of standard procedure for solving problems of international financial institutions impairs prevention and solving of financial crises. The existing safety net established by national economic authorities is frequently a source of moral hazard for large  11  Issing O. “The globalization of financial market”, 2000, www.ecb.int. 12  Lutkowski K., “Mechanizm przepływów kapitałowych w epoce globalizacji” in: ”Globalizacja od A do Z”, NBP 2004. 13  Małecki W., Sławiński A., Piasecki R., Żuławska U. “Kryzysy walutowe”, PWN, Warsaw 2001. 14  Mishkin F.C. “Is Globalization Beneficial?”, NBER Working Paper 11891, 2005. 15  Kamisky G. L, Reinhart C.M. “The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Problems”, American Economic Review 89, 1999, pp. 473–500. Caprio G., Klingebiel D. “Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises”, the World Bank , mimeo, 2003. 16  Rajan R. G. “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” NBER Working Paper 11728, 2005.

These include better risk management, a modern range of products offered to customers, or the development of new distribution channels, to name just a few. Regional integration within the EU, however, means that the application of a uniform bank or insurance licence (i.e. taking up activity in any Member State under a licence obtained in the home country) may cause certain asymmetry in the availability of data and a conflict of interest between supervisors of the host country on the one hand, and institution owners and supervisors from the home country on the other. Such conflict may occur as a result of transformation of foreign bank subsidiaries, operating under local laws and fully supervised by the supervisory authorities of the host country, into branches supervised by foreign supervisory authorities. Individual foreign bank branches operating in the new EU Member States frequently constitute a vital element of the banking system, both in terms of the value of assets and deposits, operations on the domestic interbank market and the share in settlements in the payment system. Therefore, they are described as institutions of systemic importance for the domestic market. At the same time, they are not always equally important components of an international banking group, in terms of their size and the profit generated. In such a case, a relatively low importance of an institution may result in less focus on its supervision, both by the foreign bank and the supervisory authority of the home country in which the given bank has obtained its licence.
The premise is that even if money has no systematic and immediate influence on prices, it can provide valuable and specific information on future inflation, at time horizons stretching beyond those usually adopted for the construction of central bank inflation projections. Because of the long-term relation between money growth and inflation, money has leading indicator properties on future price developments. Though it is fair to say that the apparent link between monetary developments and inflation has deteriorated over the recent years, there is still strong statistical evidence of a link between monetary growth and inflation at a low frequency. This relation holds for the euro area, but also for the US, the UK and large OECD countries, with monetary trends systematically leading inflation trends. 4 The implication referred to is the need to cross-check the information on inflationary pressures and risks to price stability; this cross-checking implies that we bring together and compare different analytical strategies and that we systematically use all the information relevant to decision making. The main issue is to ensure that risks to price stability over the medium term do not materialize and that medium to longer-term inflation expectations remain solidly anchored at levels consistent with the price stability objective. Such anchoring is a prerequisite for monetary policy to make an ongoing contribution towards supporting sustainable economic growth as well as job creation.

Christian Noyer: Three questions on inflation and money Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the European Economics and Financial Centre (EEFC), London, 11 September 2007. *  *  *  Keeping inflation in check is Central Banks' main objective. Understanding the inflation process is Central Banks main concern. In recent years, we can take satisfaction in the fact that price stability has been achieved in most countries. At the same time, inflation dynamics may have become more complex. Our ability to consolidate our past successes in the future may well depend on our capacity to further deepen our knowledge on what, ultimately, determines the inflation rate. Today, I would like to address three specific questions which have been extensively discussed, but not yet fully answered, in the academic and policy-making community: what is the impact of globalisation on inflation? Has the inflation – output trade-off changed as a consequence? And, finally, how can money aggregates help us in our efforts to achieve price stability? Globalisation and inflation In the last twenty years, greater integration in goods, services, labour and capital markets has coincided with stable and low inflation. Is there a link? Globalisation has made a significant contribution to price stability. With new large new players (such as China and India, or Eastern European countries) entering the world economy, cheap imports have become available to developed countries. The fall in import prices in developed economies allowed real consumption wages to grow without impacting real production wages.
Zdeněk Tůma: Education as investment in human capital Speech by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, for the graduation ceremony, The New Anglo-American College, Prague, 20 June 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, It is my pleasure to be here today and to share with you some thoughts that concern the role of education as an investment in human capital in the long-term development of our economy and society in general. Today it’s commonplace for politicians to swear by concepts like investment in education, knowledge-based economy or the effect of education on long-term economic growth. They are also quick to add something about the necessity to pay for university education, at least those on the right wing of the political spectrum. Don’t worry, we haven’t met today to assess individual political ideas, and we all know that sometimes it’s a long road from what politicians say to what they do. However, the fact that you are sitting here today indicates that viewing education as an investment has its place in today’s society regardless of political preferences. I would like to use this opportunity to point out that although the concept of investment in education may be somewhat misused and can have unfortunate overtones for somebody, it has a rigorous theoretical foundation and is of high empirical relevance.

Faced with these features, those of us involved in developing the Code quickly decided that it had to be based on a set of high-level principles. This enabled us to cut through much of the complexity within the market and should result in the Code providing greater constancy in advice than a detailed set of rules could achieve in such a fast-moving market. 1  See Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Transactions (1996), known as the Allsopp Report, prepared by the BIS Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS); www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d17.pdf. 2 http://www.bis.org/press/p150511.htm 3 www.globalfxc.org 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  The diversity of the market also led us to deploy a uniquely collaborative approach when developing the Code, with officials from central banks across the globe working with senior representatives from sell side, buy side, non-bank participants and infrastructure providers. Feedback was also sought from members of the various regional foreign exchange committees. The aim – which I firmly believe we met – was to publish a Code that was well informed by the full diversity of market participants and had the legitimacy to be adopted voluntarily. It will be important to maintain that collaborative spirit as we move forward. The Global Foreign Exchange Committee, or GFXC, was formed to facilitate exactly that. The Committee, which I currently chair, comprises public and private sector representatives from 16 of the largest FX trading centres, and has a mandate to promote and maintain and the Code.