samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The EMU is an event with far-reaching consequences; in one way or the other all countries will be affected by it. Unlike the effect of a currency area, a customs union or a free trade area, a monetary union can affect in various degrees all countries, irrespective of whether they are in or out. This general fact, together with the signing a Customs Union (CU) Agreement with the EU, make EMU even more important for Turkey than for other countries outside the EMU. Therefore, I believe that the Turkish Central Bank has a predominant role to play in informing and educating all Turkish entities about the choices and implications of EMU. As you all know, Turkey is one of the potential countries to join the EU. I would say that our country’s ultimate aim is to become a full member of the EU; therefore first we need to adapt to European standards in many areas. The steps Turkey took on the way to the CU are also steps taken to ensure full integration in EMU. After these general remarks I would like to look at the issue from Turkey’s perspective. So far, the measures taken to support the independence of the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) are remarkable. Recently, the Central Bank Law was amended and now limits have been set on the so-called “short-term advances” which the Treasury is legally entitled to obtain from the Central Bank.

BIS Review 105/1997  -2For a currency union to function “smoothly and in a sustainable way, it is absolutely necessary that all participants agree on either a single common policy or closely coordinated policies”. All costs and benefits of the union must be shared equally. Any member acting with the “free-rider” mentality, and benefiting from the system at the expense of the others, will eventually cause the system to disintegrate. Therefore, a single common currency requires a single monetary policy with a clearly defined target, which is price stability. This basic principle of monetary policy has already been embedded in the Maastricht Treaty. And the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has been made responsible for achieving it. In order for the ESCB to fulfil the task assigned to it, it must act in full independence from national governments or from European institutions. The ESCB Governing Council, which is composed of the Board of Management of the ESCB and the governors of the participating central banks, will not be representing respective national interests. Although there are some differences between the two systems, the ESCB is like the Federal Reserve System of the US. For the ESCB to act independently, individual national central banks must already be acting independently of their governments, because the ESCB will be built on individual national central banks. That is why the Maastricht Treaty made it obligatory for the national governments to grant independence to their central banks in the period leading to the formation of the ESCB.
They reflect Supervisory Council’s monetary policy decisions, the underlying factors and expected results. The periodic reports of the Bank of Albania publish comprehensive analysis on economic and financial developments, the outlook for the short and long term, and the performance of the banking sector along with the risks facing the financial stability of Albania. Events organised with representatives of the banking system, business community, specialised international institutions are another aspect of our communication with the public. Examples include the Forum on “Promoting credit growth” in April 2015, “Albania Financial Forum III” organised with the International Monetary Fund in June 2015, and a meeting with the banking system discussing on “The economy and banks: present and future challenges” in September 2015. viii. Public education  The launching of the Museum of the Bank of Albania was the main highlight in the area of public education. Designed as an inter-disciplinary museum, it integrates numismatic, historic and educational functions, which contribute to enhancing the financial literacy of the public in general and of the younger generation in particular. ix. European integration  Another important aspect of our work has been the contribution of the Bank of Albania in the context of approximation to the European Union. The Bank of Albania has intensified its cooperation with the European Central Bank, central banks of the European System, and European structures that regulate financial aspects in the EU.

BIS Review 59/2008  3  In relation to this, Malaysia has taken a three-prong strategic initiative to promote greater mutual respect of the Shariah views. The first is to recognise the principle of mutual respect in Shariah opinions issued in other jurisdictions by a recognized Shariah committee for transactions undertaken in Malaysia. In addition to the key role of a centralized Shariah Advisory Council as the reference point for all Shariah matters in Islamic finance, Malaysia welcomes Shariah rulings by other Shariah committees that are deemed to be deduced through generally accepted rigorous principles, processes and rules. The second initiative is to have strong resource foundation supported by a pool of qualified and competent Shariah talent, as well as to accord more emphasis on extensive Shariah research in Islamic finance. Given the rapid global growth of Islamic finance, there is an urgent need to meet the talent demand for Shariah scholars with strong interest in the strategic development of the Islamic finance industry. From the supply side, the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) established in 2006 has made significant progress with more than 1000 registered students in its professional Islamic finance certification. It also has 28 PhD students and has recently launched a Masters Programme in Islamic finance. The Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM) also offers a structured, modular training solutions for Shariah advisers focusing on practical and operational aspects of Islamic banking and takaful.
Given abundance of water resources in the country, as earlier alluded to, the potential for development of hydro-power for both domestic and exports is quite high. Current estimates show that the country’s hydropower resource potential stands at 6,000 mega watts (MW) while the installed capacity is somewhere around 1,715.5 MW. These estimates are a testimony to the great potential this sector has. I am aware of several investment plans that ZESCO has put in place and which are aimed at exploiting this potential. Ladies and Gentlemen, the opportunities identified above do not just happen. Zambians must make a conscious effort to exploit the opportunities identified. We must not view Government efforts of promoting investments opportunities as meant for foreigners only. To facilitate long-term planning for the productive sector, the Bank of Zambia will continue with measures that would achieve and maintain low and stable inflation and interest rates as well as a relatively stable exchange rate. This would provide a foundation for value addition in industries such as agro-processing, manufacturing, construction, and tourism, which is key to sustainable development. It is imperative that as a country, we move from being raw materials producers only to value addition in a stable macroeconomic environment. Apart from appropriate monetary policy and prudent fiscal policy, the stability in the foreign exchange market is important in achieving low and stable inflation. The objective of the Bank in this respect would be to achieve a non-volatile but competitive exchange rate.

Ladies and Gentlemen, at this juncture, I would like to mention that the macroeconomic gains attained in the recent past will need consolidating in 2006 and onwards. You will agree with me that the macroeconomic gains attained have set the stage for sustained future growth of our economy, employment creation and poverty reduction. In this regard, allow me now turn to the future growth focus of our economy. Mr. Chairman, Zambia has articulated its long-term development objectives in the National Long Term Vision 2030. Part of this vision is enshrined in the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP); 20062010 whose theme is: “Broad Based Wealth and Job Creation through Citizenry Participation and Technological Advancement”. This calls for policies that accelerate and sustain economic growth, and which enable the poor to participate in, and benefit from the growth process. In this respect the broad macroeconomic objectives for the Plan period 2006-2010 are as follows: -  To accelerate pro-poor economic growth;  -  To reduce and stabilise inflation; and  -  To sustain a viable balance of payments and external and domestic debt position. What then do we see as the sources of economic growth and employment creation in future? Ladies and Gentlemen, we see the growth of the Zambia economy being driven by increased activities in agriculture, mining, export-led manufacturing, tourism and energy. Agriculture Mr Chairman, this sector possesses great potential to make higher contributions to the country’s growth and employment aspirations given the abundant arable land and water supply.
The decline in commodity prices, above all crude oil, will curb inflation further over the short term. We continue to assume that global economic growth will gradually firm over the course of next year. The considerable fall in oil prices should be a contributory factor. However, the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  prospects for individual countries vary widely. For the US, we are expecting that growth will remain robust over the next few quarters, leading to better utilisation of economic capacity. For the euro area, by contrast, we have revised the growth forecast downwards once more, and the outlook for this region remains very subdued. The picture for the emerging economies is mixed. China will continue to be a driver of the global economy, although it is likely to see a gradual weakening of growth. For India, growth prospects are picking up again. The outlook for Brazil and Russia, by contrast, remains muted. Overall, the global economic outlook is still very uncertain and dominated by downside risks – the most important of which are the continuing difficult conditions in the euro area and a possible escalation in geopolitical tensions. Swiss economic outlook I will now look at economic developments in Switzerland. Following a weak second quarter, real GDP growth was unexpectedly favourable in the third. On the demand side, the increase was supported predominantly by goods exports, with manufacturing the main beneficiary of the strong export demand.

Yet, at around 1%, they are still close to the long-term average inflation rate. Interest rates, too, have remained very low across all maturities in the past few quarters. Mortgage rates have declined further, reaching a new low in October. Government bond rates have also fallen to new lows. My colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will discuss developments on the financial markets in more detail. Despite falling mortgage rates, mortgage lending growth slowed again. At the same time, real estate prices continued to rise. However, as in 2013, price momentum is weaker than in previous years. This suggests that the measures to contain developments on the mortgage and real estate markets are starting to have an impact. Yet the imbalances that have built up on these markets in recent years remain the same. It is still too early for an all-clear. The SNB will continue to monitor the situation closely. My colleague Jean-Pierre Danthine will discuss this topic in more detail in his presentation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Since the last monetary policy assessment, the Swiss franc has moved closer to the minimum exchange rate, and has thus strengthened against the euro once again. At the same time, both it and the euro have depreciated against the US dollar. Overall, the exportweighted real external value of the Swiss franc is virtually unchanged compared to last year, and thus continues to lie considerably above its long-term average. The Swiss franc is still high.
In discharging this responsibility, policymakers must consider macro perspectives, be able to look further afield, evaluate risks, and take timely actions to manage these risks. The Global Financial Crisis provides a stark reminder that markets cannot be exclusively relied on to rein in excesses. Left to the market, there is always a tendency to overshoot. Market forces can at times deviate significantly from public interest. This is where policymakers step in to moderate these effects and steer markets back onto a sustainable path. This is infamously described as, central banks ‘taking away the punch bowl, just as the party gets going2’. One ‘party’ we saw developing was the imbalance in the foreign exchange market, more specifically in the ringgit non-deliverable forward (NDF) market. Measures taken by the Bank in December last year were aimed at further developing the onshore financial markets and limiting the influence of speculative pricing of the ringgit in the offshore market which had undermined the stability of the domestic foreign exchange market. Since the implementation of these measures, the exchange rate stabilised, with the 1-month implied volatility recording a lower average of 4.5%, against 9.9% before the measures were put in place. The average intraday movement recorded a daily average of 76 points while the bid-ask spread recorded an average of 25.0 basis points since end-February 2017. Of importance, the onshore foreign exchange market continues to record a healthy daily average volume of USD10 billion. Prior to the measures, the daily volume was around USD8 billion. The Malaysian bond market remains resilient.

The market is a strict master and serves painful punishment for mistakes or ill-thought initiatives. BIS Review 55/2002  3
World growth is slowing and is overshadowed by major uncertainties. According to the latest forecasts, world GDP should expand by 3.0% in 2019, down from 3.8% growth last year (IMF), largely as a result of the slowdown in emerging countries, especially China, and to a lesser extent in certain advanced economies. In the euro area, our forecasts are for 1.1% growth in 2019, down from 1.9% in 2018. The main uncertainties weighing on growth are the risks of an escalation in protectionist measures and of a no-deal Brexit which could lead to a tightening of financial conditions in Europe. The rising tendency in macroeconomic risk is helping to maintain and reinforce accommodative monetary policies, as well as the “low-for-long” direction of and expectations for interest rates. This low interest rate environment is fuelling an increase in household and corporate debt, in both advanced and emerging economies. In France, private sector debt reached 132.3% of GDP at end-2018 (+45 percentage points since 2000). Household debt has risen by 8 percentage points of GDP since the end of the crisis (59.8% of GDP). In Europe, bank profitability is coming under increasing pressure from a number of risks: The first of these is the maintenance of a low interest rate environment for a long time. This is not just the fault of the central banks: an accommodative monetary policy is justified in light of the euro area’s economic situation; but beyond this, low long rates also reflect a structural weakness in growth.

Since 2009, these institutions qualified as Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) have been defined as those whose “disorderly failure, due to their size, complexity and systemic interconnection, would cause significant disruption to the financial system as a whole and to economic activity". Banks designated as systemic at the global level by the FSB, and in France at the national level by the ACPR, are subject to enhanced supervision measures. In addition to the capital surcharges already mentioned, systemic banks must comply with specific requirements for the preparation of recovery plans to deal with crises. A resolution strategy could be implemented if recovery measures prove insufficient. This plan could include the use of bail-in mechanisms. ( c ) Making OTC derivatives markets safer: the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated the strength of market infrastructures. In particular, central counterparties (CCPs) have held up well. These entities play a very specific operational role in ensuring the successful settlement of securities transactions or the execution of derivative contracts by acting as an intermediary between counterparties. As a result, they are key players in the financial system. The very cautious risk management applied by CCPs and the existence of mechanisms to handle the defaults of their participants limit contagion phenomena. The resilience of CCPs has led international regulators to: (i) confirm their central role in controlling risks in the financial system, with multilateral clearing by CCPs being considered safer than bilateral clearing between participants.
We need to better understand what these shifts in the financial system imply for financial stability and the financing of the real economy. On the positive side, an increase in market-based finance can help to diversify the funding base of the real economy and investors are increasingly benefitting from diversification effects. However, as the risks arising from leverage and liquidity mismatches in investment funds are potentially systemic, we need to take a more ambitious policy approach to systemic risk. Extending the macroprudential framework to the asset management sector and developing policy tools to address emerging risks will be an important step in preparing for possible future stress scenarios. 1 Figures exclude money market funds (MMFs). 2 These include the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive, the  Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) and the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation (SFTR). 3 E.g. see International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 3: “The Asset Management  Industry and Financial Stability”, April, 2015. 4 See Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan on private-sector refinancing of LTCM before the Committee on  Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, October 1, 1998. 5 E.g. new data is reported under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD). 6 See FSB “Policy Recommendations to Address Structural Vulnerabilities from Asset Management Activities”, 12  January 2017.

In light of the current global and domestic developments, a common concern is that we may see a large and abrupt surge in risk premia, triggered or amplified by uncertainty about political actions or a shift in risk perception. At the same time, we are worried about the possible amplification of stress in financial markets through deleveraging and forced asset selling in a situation where asset prices are falling. Now that the banking sector is shrinking and becoming more resilient, our radar is shifting to the non-bank financial sector, which is more lightly regulated. In particular, we need a better understanding of the role of asset managers and of the broader vulnerabilities inherent to investment funds. The asset management sector now plays a much larger role in financial markets than it did ten years ago. It may harbour leverage and liquidity risks that could amplify any potential shock from a reassessment of risks in financial markets. I will now look in more detail at some longer-term developments and potential risks in the asset management sector. Risks associated with liquidity, leverage and interconnectedness in the investment fund sector One of the most notable developments since the financial crisis has been the rapid growth of asset management in the euro area and at global level. In the euro area, investment funds have been growing steadily, with total assets expanding by roughly 170% between 2008 and 2017 1, reflecting both continued net cash inflows and rising asset valuations.
Interest rates on local sovereign instruments have also remained below their historical averages. However, compared with the previous FSR, there has been an increase owing, to a large extent, to lower demand for local sovereign bonds by pension funds, as a consequence of affiliates migrating to higher-risk funds. Meanwhile, in the course of this year, non-resident investors doubled their share in the local market, although within relatively low ranges compared to other emerging economies. As I have just pointed out, steep rises in external interest rates are still a risk worth monitoring. In this sense, increases in the benchmark rate and the reduction in developed central banks' balance sheets would push up the term premiums, triggering a rise in local long-term rates. According to our estimates, this increase could amount to as much as 80% of the change observed in the external benchmark. In this context, potential changes in the assets managed by medium- and long-term debt mutual funds —the FM3s— are one vulnerability to be watched closely. This could become more complex if other market players —such as pension funds and non-resident investors— also liquidate their fixed-income positions, which could imply temporary disruptions in local debt markets, amplifying interest rate movements. A normalization of risk aversion levels would have an impact on the cost of foreign credit to emerging countries, including Chile, above the possible increases in the base rate. In the face of such normalization, Chile's risk premium would tend to increase, affecting entities needing to refinance their short-term liabilities.

Looking at the post-war period, whenever the unemployment rate has increased by more than 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points, the economy has always ended up in a full-blown recession with the unemployment rate rising by at least 1.9 percentage points. This is an outcome to avoid, especially given that in an economic downturn the last to be hired are often the first to be fired. The goal is the maximum sustainable level of employment – in other words, the most job opportunities for the most people over the long run. Some of you may be wondering whether the risk of a recession isn’t already quite high? And, if so, doesn’t this imply a need for special care in adjusting monetary policy? After all, the current economic expansion is more than six years old – a bit long in the tooth by post-war standards. Even so, recession risk did not play a major factor in my thinking. Economic expansions don’t simply die of old age. They primarily end either because monetary policy is kept too loose for too long, thereby necessitating a subsequent sharp tightening in monetary policy to prevent a significant inflation overshoot, or because some large adverse shock hits the economy that the central bank cannot easily offset. Mitigating the first risk of being forced to choke off the expansion argues for getting started with policy normalization now rather than holding off. With respect to the second risk of unanticipated shocks, this is obviously very difficult for the central bank to insulate the economy from.