samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are still a sizable number of properties that are either in foreclosure or up for foreclosure sale, which has weighed down the local housing market. Yet, Fairfield County has not been the only place in the metro region to see a sluggish recovery – notably, both northern New Jersey and the Mid-Hudson Valley have yet to see employment return to their pre-recession peaks. This picture is in contrast with New York City’s economic performance, which has been exceptionally strong throughout this expansion, and has been a driver of growth for the whole tri-state region. Why is New York City seeing so much stronger job growth than Fairfield County? After all, it wasn’t so long ago that Stamford was attracting finance-sector jobs away from Manhattan. The answer lies in a mix of cyclical and secular trends. On the cyclical side, while finance employment has been sluggish in both New York City and Fairfield County, New York City is benefiting from strong employment gains in technology, construction, retailing and advertising – sectors that are not contributing to the same degree in Fairfield County. In addition, Stamford has had to deal with the relocations of UBS and RBS, while Fairfield faces the prospective relocation of GE. One potential long-term trend that is likely affecting the region is a renewed urbanization: that is, a gradual but broad-based shift of preferences to urban living, especially for younger generations. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, we saw a steady and widespread migration from cities to suburbs.

The third reason I believe that Basel II will promote financial stability is that it reinforces the need to implement sound policies in both capital and provisioning. I have already mentioned that no bank can maintain public trust for long if it lacks sufficient capital. One of the fundamental tenets of risk management and banking supervision is that banks need to create provisions to absorb expected losses and to have sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. Let me add here that given the unique positions of banks at the crossroads of businesses and consumers in every economy – and their special role as intermediaries of credit to both – nothing threatens financial stability more than the presence of poorly managed and poorly capitalised and provisioned banking institutions. I believe that Basel II will contribute to a more resilient and stable banking system that is capable of promoting sustainable economic growth. Adoption of Basel II: who and when? Let me turn now to my second point, which is the timing of adoption of the new framework in different countries. Whenever I speak with colleagues from other countries, I stress that only national authorities can decide when to adopt Basel II. While the Committee believes that the framework is appropriate for all economies and banks, no country should adopt Basel II until it is ready. This view has been expressed consistently by not only the Basel Committee, but by the IMF and World Bank as  2  BIS Review 45/2006  well.
In any case, such reforms are a necessary foundation for dynamic and sustainable growth in the future and they must be vigorously pursued. There is no doubt that the euro area as a whole will benefit from these national reforms that represent a significant asset for us in the global economy. 2.2. The challenge for the banking system: continuing to ensure that the economy is properly financed while strengthening the financial sector  The dilemma here is easy to understand: on the one hand, it is absolutely necessary to strengthen banks’ balance sheets to enable them to better absorb shocks, protect public finances and re-establish normal market functioning. On the other, a disorderly deleveraging would create enormous problems and add credit constraints to the many headwinds currently facing our economies. The euro area is currently making sure that these two objectives – although sometimes difficult to reconcile – are achieved. Banks are meeting their new capital requirements. The capital plans submitted to the European Banking Authority (EBA) indicate an intention to exceed the benchmarks set by  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  more than 20%. French banks already comply with the Basel 2.5 regulations. At the same time, bank lending seems to be stabilizing, although at a relatively low level. Banks are starting to assess their financial situation more positively and in many cases their willingness to grant loans is increasing. This would not have been possible without the strong support of the Eurosystem.

I will mention three of these challenges. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  2. But challenges remain to be addressed. 2.1. The challenge for each individual euro country: achieving strong fiscal consolidation while ensuring long-term growth  The first challenge is the seeming dilemma between fiscal consolidation and long-term growth. One thing is very clear: this crisis is fundamentally a sovereign debt crisis; hence the priority in order to exit it once and for all must be a return to a sustainable fiscal path. In fact, an impressive effort has already been made. The Portuguese deficit shrank from around 10% in 2009 to around 6% last year. The Italian deficit has been reined in from 5.4% in 2009 to 3.9% in 2011, and Italy actually ran a primary surplus of 1% last year, which is very rare among developed economies. The French deficit has been cut from 7.5% in 2009 to 5.3% in 2011. If we look at the aggregate picture for the euro area, we see that it is the economic zone that has tackled fiscal consolidation with the greatest intensity and the best results. According to the IMF (January 2012 fiscal monitor), after peaking at 6.5% of GDP in 2009, the public deficit in the euro area started to decline in 2010 and stood at around 4% by the end of 2011 (down by 40%). Over the same period, the US deficit was reduced from 13% to 9.5% (down by 27%) and the UK deficit from 10.4% to 8.6% (down by 17%).
This differs from the March forecast, which assumed a variation between plus and minus 0.5% for the year. For 2024, we expect growth between 1.25% and 2.25%, slightly higher than the range between 1% and 2% forecast in March. For 2025, GDP is projected to expand between 2% and 3%, the same range as in March. In this scenario, the activity gap will turn negative during the second half of 2023 and stay there for several quarters (figure 17). The projection continues to include an adjustment in spending concentrated in its imported component, especially in consumption. Private consumption is expected to continue to shrink this year, falling by 4.9% in 2023, compared with the 3.8% decline projected in March. Going forward, the speed of adjustment of this spending element is expected to be slower than in the first quarter. The projected path for consumption considers that the labor market performance will be consistent with the evolution of the business cycle, including dwindling hiring expectations and a gradual  4  rebound of labor participation. Consumption will be also negatively affected by consumers’ pessimism, tighter credit conditions and a heavier financial burden. The drop in consumption is consistent with a restructuring of household savings, following their massive use in previous years, which is a key factor in the smaller current-account deficit. Private savings already showed a recovery in the first quarter of the year. Going forward, its level will be above those of the past few years.

Its roots in the olden leeuwendaalder or the Dutch lion-thaler show not only its descent from the former Dutch coin (and therefore its being related to the US dollar), but also its European dimension as ever since its birth, shortly after the creation of the modern Romanian state, our leu currency was French. This means that the 1867 Monetary Law was designed in terms of the Latin Union, most of all France. The law stipulated that metal coins should be minted in French style. But our bonds with Europe were broader as the law set forth that the gold and silver coins issued by France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland (all members of the Latin Union) should be accepted by all exchange houses, along with the Romanian ones. Thus, Romania’s European aspirations were strongly asserted, while spreading to Germany through King Carol I of Hohenzollern, whose effigy was placed on the first Romanian gold and silver coins, and to Spain, Mr. González-Páramo, via its Latin spirit. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to restate here with you what I have often underlined throughout 2010 when we celebrated the NBR’s 130th anniversary since its establishment which made it the 16th central bank in the world in chronological order. The fact is that the history of the Romanian monetary system is closely linked to the history of the modern Romanian state. Feel free to discover this reality by visiting the space dedicated to the leu in the lobby of the Euro Exhibition.
Jon Cunliffe: A 21st century approach to dealing with failed banks Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at the1st Single Resolution Board Annual Conference, Brussels, 29 April 2016. *  *  *  It is hard now to think of a time when there was ever much sympathy for the owners of banks. The years following the financial crisis have been marked by a scarcely diminishing public anger about the bailing out of banks by the taxpayer; the ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ privatisation of bank profits and socialisation of bank losses. That has not always been the case. When the City of Glasgow Bank failed in 1878 there was a great outpouring of sympathy for the hardship faced by the bank’s shareholders. A relief fund to help them was established, raising nearly £ from members of the public – around £ million in today’s money – including through a public recitation of the works of Shakespeare. The government did not step in.1 The world, of course, was very different then. The shareholders of the City of Glasgow Bank, like the shareholders of many other British banks at the time, stood to lose much more than the value of their shares in the bank. They had unlimited liability for the losses of the bank. And the losses were large – about 50% of the bank’s assets.

• In recent years, in order to meet their price stability targets, many central banks have pursued a very expansionary policy, including low or even negative policy rates, as well as purchase programmes of securities. These policies have attracted criticism, saying they increase inequality, but I disagree. • Given the weak trend in growth in many countries, a less expansionary monetary policy than pursued during recent years would have led to higher unemployment than was the case. In that sense, monetary policy could be argued to have contributed to lower income inequalities, as unemployment could lead to large negative effects on household income. Many of those households, who would have experienced unemployment, would then have fallen to lower income deciles, contributing to higher income dispersion. Most studies that include the labour market effect come to the conclusion that the overall effect of expansionary monetary 1  See Deutsche Bundesbank (2016). 2 See Deutsche Bundesbank (2016). 2 [5]  policy on inequality is that it slightly decreases it. Or in short, the dampening effect of lower unemployment offsets the effects from higher share prices. But the overall effect seems, if any, to be small. • To sum up, the very expansionary monetary policy conducted during recent years in some countries could be argued to have had a positive net effect, albeit small, on equality. The positive employment effect normally seems to dominate over the negative effects 3. • We at the Riksbank don’t per se take equality into consideration when taking monetary policy decisions.
Javier Aríztegui: Reform of the banking system Speech by Mr Javier Aríztegui, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the 5th Conference for financial professionals, Barcelona, 26 November 2010. *  *  *  Good morning. Firstly, I would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to participate in this forum. In view of the programme and the participants, I am sure that this is a good opportunity to debate the challenges facing the Spanish banking system and what the future holds for it. I shall broach the subject of the transformations currently taking place at banks in two parts. The first part will describe developments in our banking sector since summer 2007 and the second will look in greater depth at the aspects I consider essential for assuring the progress which has already been achieved. At times like the present, when international financial markets are showing their aversion to risk and their discomfort with banking systems that are highly reliant on external financing, it is vital to consolidate this progress and to continue using transparency as the main means of showing investors the soundness of our banking system. From summer 2007 to date The crisis which erupted in summer 2007 has gone through various phases. At the risk of over-simplifying matters, I shall split it into three stages. The first phase was characterised by a widespread loss of confidence: the complex structured products created in previous years came to be considered “toxic”.

The immediate future: consolidating the measures taken and putting the reforms on a firm footing In recent weeks international financial market dynamics have continued to be influenced considerably by the high degree of risk aversion and by fragile confidence levels. There has been a resurgence of the doubts – first seen in the case of Greece – about the solvency of euro area Member States. The uncertainty over the euro area’s fiscal sustainability cannot be explained merely by the economic downturn and its impact on public finances. The measures taken by authorities to avoid the collapse of the financial system have involved, in the case of Ireland, guaranteeing the funds lent to the banking system by depositors and wholesale investors. Markets are suspicious about the ability of certain small States, with relatively large banking systems, to meet these commitments. The European Union has come to the aid of Ireland, which has experienced problems precisely because it used substantial amounts of public funds to shore up a banking system bloated with real estate assets, particularly offices and houses in the Dublin area. In Spain the situation is very different as regards both the public sector and the banking sector. Despite the substantial rise in the budget deficit in 2008 and 2009, public debt as a percentage of GDP remains relatively small in comparison with the euro area average, which is 20 percentage points higher.
For example, rising interest rates carry the risk of negative revaluations in banks' balance sheets. Under these conditions the BNB will continue to follow a conservative prudential policy aimed at further strengthening the capital position of banks through a series of microand macro-prudential measures. Therefore, at least in the short term, we see no reason to relax our prudential policy. The path to the euro area The path to the euro area has the potential to become a catalyst for processes that consolidate the political and macroeconomic framework. We have already witnessed such beginnings. Most recently, the parliament adopted a decision with a near-constitutional majority to speed up the process of preparing for the introduction of the euro with a target date of 1 January 2024. It is difficult to find another topic today that receives such impressive political support. The fulfilment of the nominal, so-called Maastricht, criteria – a mandatory condition for joining the euro area – implies the implementation of policies that are good for the country, even outside the context of the euro area, and thus would help to consolidate the macroeconomic framework. These policies are aimed at curbing and reducing inflation – the big topic of the day, as well as fiscal discipline, maintaining long-term interest rates at a healthy level for the economy, and maintaining currency stability. Despite the problems we face, Bulgaria is still positioned well in terms of the Maastricht criteria.

Payments: A platform for innovation Speech given by Victoria Cleland, Executive Director; Banking, Payments & Innovation  SIBOS, London Tuesday 24 September 2019  With thanks to Sara Ward and Emma Playford. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  It is a great pleasure to be speaking today at the ‘UK payments infrastructure – renewing for growth’ event at Sibos. This year’s event is exciting for two reasons. First, it’s National Inclusion week here in the U.K.1 And, it’s a great coincidence that SIBOS has fallen during this week: at the heart of its agenda are discussions around how change and diversification in payments could lead to a more inclusive financial system. Second, this is the first Sibos conference to be held in London – and it is certainly an exciting time for so many global payments experts and innovators to be here. London has a long history at the heart of the global financial system. It continues to build on this expertise and is one of the leading fintech hubs in the world. It is home to an incredible pool of the world’s best and brightest talent, with 44,000 people already working in fintech, more than in Silicon Valley or New York.2 Investment into the UK’s fintech sector continues to grow and reached a record level of $ in the first half of 2019, which was nearly 85% of the 2018 total.3 And we can see that the UK fintech sector is maturing, evidenced by the size of increased investments.
This process of monetary normalization is favored by medium- and long-term inflation expectations well anchored around the target, where agents preview that the Central Bank will do whatever it takes to prevent inflation from deviating away from the target in the policy horizon. If inflation stays too high for too long, there is the risk of it affecting medium- and long-term inflation expectations more permanently, thus making convergence with the target more difficult and costlier. As usual, future changes to the monetary policy rate will depend on incoming information and its implications on projected inflation. 4  BIS Review 87/2007  Consistently, the higher inflation rates of the past several months has prompted a revision to market expectations with respect to the future course of monetary policy, switching from a prolonged maintenance of the rate to two to three rises of 25 basis points each before year’s end. Price stability is one factor behind long-term economic growth. In order to ensure that GDP will grow for a long time more than 5% – the estimated rate of trend GDP growth – while keeping inflation under control, it is necessary to increase the rate of trend GDP growth and this does not depend on demand elements but rather on factors determining the growth in supply, such as policies and institutions that affect the increase in the amount and quality of the labor force, the amount and quality of capital stock and the productivity with which both factors are used in production.

All these facts and numbers suggest that Hong Kong has the strongest foundation on which we can launch further efforts to advance the progress of RMB internationalisation. 10. The timing is also right – with the Mainland’s economic growth continuing to outperform. Macro aside, portfolio flow is another major driver. We are seeing increasing capital flows into the Mainland markets by international investors, driven by the inclusion of RMB assets in global indices and also the attractive yield pick-up and diversification benefits. In the other direction, there is also an increasing need for Mainland investors – be they individuals or institutions – to more efficiently manage their wealth and diversify the allocation through outward investments. A good part of these two-way portfolio flows will be conducted in RMB, and through Hong Kong. Some thoughts on “How” 11. So far, the level of the international use of RMB remains relatively low, and is not commensurate to the Mainland’s economic strength. For example, the Mainland is already the world’s largest trading nation, but the use of RMB for cross-border trade settlement is only in the range of 15 to 20% of its total trade volume. Some will argue that in order to 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  further boost the usage of RMB in trade settlement, we will need to see more active use of RMB as an investment currency in capital market transactions.
Turning to fiscal policies, euro area governments need to do their utmost to support fiscal sustainability by correcting excessive deficits in accordance with the agreed timetables and by moving to a structural balanced budget or surplus position over the medium term. Slippages in the implementation of fiscal consolidation plans of vulnerable countries must be corrected swiftly by structural fiscal improvements. With regard to the new provisions of the EU economic governance framework that recently came into force, it is crucial that all the elements be implemented rigorously. Only ambitious policies to prevent and correct macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances will foster public confidence in the soundness of policy actions, and thus strengthen overall economic sentiment. The Governing Council welcomes the European Council’s agreement to move to a stronger economic union, which was announced on 9 December 2011. The new fiscal compact, 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  comprising a fundamental restatement of the fiscal rules together with the fiscal commitments that euro area governments have made, is an important contribution to ensuring the long-run sustainability of public finances in the euro area countries. The wording of the rules needs to be unambiguous and effective. The further development of the European financial stability tools should make the operation of the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism more effective. The swift deployment of these tools is now urgently needed.

This pattern reflects the expectation that, in an environment of weaker growth in the euro area and globally, underlying cost, wage and price pressures in the euro area should remain modest. The Governing Council continues to view the risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments as broadly balanced. On the upside, the main risks relate to further increases in indirect taxes and administered prices, owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years, and possible increases in commodity prices. The main downside risks relate to the impact of weaker than expected growth in the euro area and globally. Turning to the monetary analysis, taking the appropriate medium-term perspective, the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be moderate. The annual growth rate of M3 decreased to 2.0% in November 2011, after 2.6% in October. As in the previous three months, monetary developments in November were affected by the heightened uncertainty in financial markets. The annual growth rate of loans to the private sector, adjusted for loan sales and securitisation, decreased to 1.9% in November, from 3.0% in October. The annual growth rates of loans to non-financial corporations and loans to households, adjusted for loan sales and securitisation, both moderated in November, and stood at 1.8% and 2.3% respectively, with slightly negative monthly flows observed for MFI loans to non-financial corporations.