samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another challenge is that decisions and actions by national authorities are likely to have considerable implications for the financial stability in foreign economies. This is of course particularly true in cases where foreign operations are run through branches, meaning that they are subject to foreign supervision. However, in Europe at least, the consolidating supervisor has an increased influence also on foreign subsidiaries, within the new capital regulation – the Basel II-framework. In the Nordea case – which is now a group with a subsidiary structure – the Swedish consolidating supervisor has a possibility to influence the risk management of the group as a whole but also in the different subsidiaries. Now, Nordea has announced plans to convert its subsidiaries in the Nordic countries into branches. When, and if, this plan eventually becomes a reality, Swedish authorities will have the full  2  BIS Review 83/2007  responsibility for supervising three foreign branches, all of which may be of systemic importance in the different host countries. A third challenge is that the legal distinction between branches and subsidiaries is becoming blurred. Increasingly banking groups are starting to organize themselves along business lines rather than along legal and national lines, concentrating various functions to different centres of competence. There are several examples of this trend. Again Nordea is one illustrative example.

In particular, potential real GDP growth in the U.S. appears to have declined in recent years – held down by slower productivity growth and demographic factors that are causing the workforce to grow more slowly. This is the main reason why I have cut my estimate of the longer-run federal funds rate in recent years. And I’m not alone. In the FOMC’s September Summary of Economic Projections, the median projection for the long-run federal funds rate was 3 ½ percent, 50 basis points below the level of two years earlier. My discussion about short-run r* and long-run r* has implications for how I think about monetary policy. The likelihood that we face a situation where the short-run r* is depressed, the economy is growing only slightly at an above-trend pace and inflation is too low relative to our objectives, suggests that we need to think carefully whether the time is right to begin to normalize monetary policy. Additionally, the likelihood that long-run r* is lower than it has been historically, suggests that after lift-off the upward trajectory of the short-term rates is likely to be quite shallow. Another factor that weighs on the timing and pace of normalization is risk management. What are the relative costs of going too early versus too late? As I see it, there are risks on both sides, and I think this explains why reasonable people can differ as to the appropriate path for the policy rate. Consider the two main risks of normalizing too quickly.
The Bank of Albania holds that last year’s successful harmonisation of the monetary policy with the fiscal policy should continue even further in 2011. Fiscal and monetary policies should aim at the stability of these indicators, in addition to supporting economic growth. The influence of supply and demand factors over the exchange rate or the national currency is expected to be balanced. Inflationary pressures are expected to be moderate this year, although prices of imported goods are an apparent risk. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Bank of Albania will maintain its monetary policy flexibility to prevent any undesired inflation development. Honourable participants, Next, I would like to dwell in more details on the banking sector situation and some issues that the Bank of Albania considers pivotal to the role of this sector in financial mediation and public relations, with a mutual benefit. In recent years, the banking sector, a driving force in the financial sector, has been a powerful supporter of the country’s economic growth through an active role in financial mediation. Certainly, banking activities involve risks, but the international financial crisis of the last three years proved that the banking sector in our country was stable and did not need public assistance to overcome the situation. Last year, the financial situation of the banking sector is assessed, generally, better than that of the preceding year. Regardless of the growing value of problematic loans, the banking sector marked a financial performance many times higher than that of 2009.

Concluding, I would like to underline that the Bank of Albania shall always be at the position the public expects it to be, in order to satisfy, at any given time, its legal responsibilities for price level and banking sector stability. In this process, state authorities, in particular the judiciary, would be needed to offer their indispensable cooperation and consider banking system issues a high priority, with the knowledge that a stable economic development of the country depends on it. The Bank of Albania calls on all relevant factors to accelerate their structural reforms on property title and execution of collateral as well as undertake a number of other administrative and bureaucratic regulations which affect banking system costs. Inviting you to openly discuss on these issues, I thank you for your attention! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Tokenised account balances at commercial banks correspond to account balances in the form of book money, except that these account balances are made available in the form of tokens on a distributed ledger. Tokenised account balances allow end users to exploit the potential of DLT. Private token money promises parity with book money by allowing tokenised money to be converted into book money at par value at any time. Like today’s account balances at commercial banks, tokenised account balances at commercial banks do not necessarily have  Page 8/11  to be backed one-to-one with high-quality liquid assets at all times. Stablecoins, as a rule, are collateralised. 6  Payment settlement of token transactions Another important question is how exactly should transactions be settled. There are two options (cf. slide 9). The first is integrated settlement, where both money and other assets exist in tokenised form on the same DLT infrastructure. This integration allows for the secure and efficient atomic settlement we talked about earlier. Technically, such integrated settlement would be possible with both private token money and CBDC. The second is synchronised settlement, where the cash leg of the transaction is not represented on the ledger but is synchronised with it. Both private book money and central bank book money can be used as the means of payment here. For transaction settlement, the transfer of tokenised assets on a DLT infrastructure is synchronised with the transfer of money in conventional payment systems.

On average, greater intermediation would likely support more economic activity in the short-run but with a higher probability of disruption later on.7 Finally, point C represents an outcome from a policy regime that is not efficient. A different mix of policies could increase intermediation or decrease risk (or both) with no associated trade-offs. Point C is never a good outcome. Examples of such policies might be a burdensome compliance regime for activities that a bank doesn’t engage in, redundant data requests from the official sector, or a risk management system that does not address the most material risks. To summarize, both point A and point B can be thought of as efficient outcomes, where the only way to support more financial intermediation is to accept higher risk. To be clear, one point on the efficient policy frontier is not necessarily better than another, and changes in policy to move between them reflect policymakers’ choices to promote social welfare. By contrast, point C is inefficient, and changes in the policy mix that push outcomes toward the efficient frontier are likely to be welfare-enhancing. The official sector should always be looking for opportunities to move the financial sector toward the frontier.
Islamic banking assets now account for 17.4% of the total banking assets of the Malaysian financial system while in the bond market, the sukuk market constitutes 57% of the total market as at end-2008. The product range has now also expanded into broad array of innovative instruments. Several innovative Islamic financial products have been introduced which included residential mortgage backed securities, commodity based financing, as well as investment and equity linked products based on musharakah, mudarabah and ijarah. Today, however, the international and domestic environment in which we are operating is going to become even more challenging. Delays in the resolution to the financial crisis in the advanced economies have resulted in a sharp and rapid deterioration in the recent months. The inability to stabilise conditions is highly likely to have a more protracted effect on the global economy. While there has been concerted monetary policy action and fiscal stimulus across the globe, confidence needs to be restored. This can however, only happen when the financial system in the crisis affected countries are repaired and credit continues to flow again, when markets continue to function efficiently and when prices reflects the value of the assets. While Malaysian banks are sound and well capitalised and our economy is not over leveraged and our external position remains strong, Malaysia as an open economy is already adversely affected by these global developments. The domestic conditions are expected to remain challenging in the coming quarters and a range of policy responses are being implemented.

In addition to these, is the strengthening of Malaysia's international linkages with other financial centres in the area of Islamic finance. Recently, Bank Negara Malaysia, under the MIFC agenda, signed an MOU with the UK Trade and Investment to promote the mutual development of Islamic finance and business linkages. In this respect Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia are encouraged to leverage on the MOU platform in building strategic partnerships with their counterparts to develop new value added activities and to expand the market. While these steps are being taken to strengthen our international inter-linkages in the area of Islamic finance, Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia need to continue to strengthen their capacity and capabilities to meet the significant challenges of the current and future environment. On this note, I wish to congratulate Public Bank Berhad on the official launch of Public Islamic Bank Berhad and for the commitment to contribute to the success of Islamic finance. Wishing Public Islamic Bank every success in its endeavours. 2  BIS Review 25/2009
This proved to be inadequate, and the baht continued with its appreciation. After a number of unsuccessful conventional measures, we resorted to the less conventional measure of imposing a reserve requirement on capital inflows in December 2006. The measure was designed to break the one-way momentum, to preserve overall economic stability, and to give the export sector time to adjust. To this end, it has succeeded. Other regional currencies continued to appreciate while the Thai baht had stabilized. The decision to impose the reserve requirement was a difficult one as it entailed a painful tradeoff between investor sentiment and export sector competitiveness as well as economic stability. In the end, cost-benefit analysis led us to choose the latter given the importance of export sector stability to the overall economy. Indeed, during the first three quarters of 2006, net exports accounted for 5.1 per cent out of 5.3 per cent GDP growth in total. Losing export sector stability will result in economic instability. As a small open economy, Thailand relies a great deal on international trade. Let me be clear that the reserve requirement was designed to preserve economic stability and to give time for the export sector, which includes many SME operations, to adjust. The reserve requirement was not designed to maintain a certain exchange-rate level. As such, the reserve requirement is not a permanent measure; it is temporary. In addition, the intended benefits of measures such as these will tend to decrease as people find ways to circumvent the regulation over time.

It is the duty of major economies, such as the United States, China, Japan, and, of course, the European Union to ensure that there are sufficient international policy dialogues and that they are successful. Without the economic cooperation and political will of the major economies, each and every country will be at risk. We all agree that difficult times require difficult choices. But there is one choice that should not be difficult: that is, the decision to stand together. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 20/2007  3
By contrast, the central bank essentially holds nothing but liquid assets – largely government securities (Chart 49). Shifting deposits away from commercial banks, and towards the central bank, would therefore make for a “narrower” banking system – a “narrow” bank being one whose assets are as liquid as its liabilities. In principle, it would also make for a safer one. Backed by liquid assets, rather than risky lending, deposits would become inherently more secure. They wouldn’t be vulnerable to “runs” and we would no longer need to insure them. 8  Nor is it a live issue for the Bank. As the Governor recently said to the House of Commons’ Treasury Committee, “May I…be absolutely clear: there are no plans to abolish cash at the Bank of England”. 9  The Bank of England’s balance sheet has obviously grown following QE. Those operations have been conducted via the Asset Purchase Facility (APF), which is not directly on the Bank’s balance sheet – strictly speaking, the blue bar in Chart 4 is not direct holdings of gilts but a loan from the Bank to the APF. But the APF itself holds only gilts and, even before QE, the vast majority of assets on the Bank’s balance sheet were government securities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The case for narrow banks has a long and distinguished pedigree. The classical economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo favoured such a system.

Philipp Hildebrand: Lessons from the financial market turbulence Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Jefferies prize-giving ceremony, Zurich, 27 August 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The current financial crisis is probably the most complex since the 1930s. The extent of international cooperation in overcoming it is greater than ever before. An important part in these activities is being played by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which was founded in 1998 and to which Switzerland has belonged since 2007. Six months after the start of the crisis, in April 2008, the FSF published a series of recommendations for enhancing the resilience of the international financial system. There are three main advantages to cooperating internationally in this way. First, it is easier to focus more clearly on identifying solutions. Second, it ensures that particular attention is paid to maintaining a level playing field when establishing regulatory measures. Third, it creates considerable pressure for any recommendations issued to be implemented in practice. The current crisis has shown that the Swiss banking system remains vulnerable to major shocks. As part of its statutory mandate to contribute to financial stability, the SNB has been monitoring developments since the start of the crisis very carefully. The lessons learned by the SNB from the crisis tie in with the recommendations of the FSF.
But our financial education outreach can progress faster, and reach many more people, if we make the most of our collaborations with the unions, community centres and other organisations are here today. I encourage all of you to work with MoneySENSE to bring financial education to residents in your neighbourhoods, to your workplaces, and to your members. In this regard, I am happy to know that NTUC is planning to organise MoneySENSE programmes for its members. MoneySENSE encourages students to be ambassadors of financial education 11. It is also important to begin young. The Ministry of Education (MOE) has promoted financial literacy in schools so that students get a basic sense of money matters and of the need to save and spend wisely, from young. Financial education messages are taught through subjects such as Social Studies and Civics and Moral Education at the primary and secondary levels. Our teachers have also been given resources and training to enable them to deliver financial literacy lessons effectively. (One of the resources well-received by teachers is a CD-ROM entitled 'Promoting Financial Literacy in Schools' which comprises illustrations and case-studies to facilitate class discussions on financial literacy matters and issues. Workshops focusing on hands-on activities are also conducted annually to enhance teachers' competency in financial literacy.) 12. About 30 schools, through MoneySENSE, have enhanced their financial literacy programmes by conducting enrichment activities. These include interactive board games on prudent money management, workshops on financial matters such as debt, insurance and financial planning and inter-school financial literacy competitions.

This Roadshow features posters of Singaporeans, from celebrities to the man-in-the-street, who share how they manage their money. It's worth reading the tips and messages they share and see how they can be applied in your lives. 18. I am also pleased to announce that in the coming weeks, MoneySENSE will launch a series of MoneySENSible awards. MoneySENSE will partner with the media on this. We will ask all of you to nominate people you know whom you think are doing a good job in managing their money. The awards will recognize individuals who have good and sensible habits in each of the three tiers of financial literacy: in basic money management: in financial planning, and in investments. Details will be announced in the next few weeks. Consumers need to take the initiative too 19. Each of us as individuals have to take responsibility for our own financial well being, and that of our family. We can start by getting basic knowledge on money matters. Lack of knowledge often  2  BIS Review 30/2006  results in bad decisions, which can hurt your financial situation. So we are bringing knowledge to more people. I understand that several financial planning associations, the Securities Investors Association of Singapore (SIAS) and Singapore College of Insurance (SCI) are working with MoneySENSE to deliver talks at various community centres.
There is no logic to having the public underwrite through deposit insurance or subsidize through protective regulation the risktaking ventures of large financial institutions and their executives. There is a substantial case to be made for separating the “public utility” – or traditional core function of banking – from the risk-taking function. To be sure, financial problems are not limited to large institutions and their complex, opaque and conflicted operations. Regional and community institutions that have, for the most part, stuck to the public utility function have faced their own difficulties, especially in the context of construction lending. But while over 300 banks failed during the crisis, another 7,000 did not. Community and regional banks that are not too big to fail appear to have succumbed less to the herdlike mentality and promiscuous financial behavior that affected their megabank peers. Moreover, when smaller banks got into deep trouble, regulators generally took them over and resolved them. In the treatment of big banks, regulators, for the most part, tiptoed around them. Failing big banks were allowed to lumber on, with government support, despite the extensive damage they wrought. Big banks that gambled and generated unsustainable losses received a huge public benefit: too-big-to-fail support. Postcrisis, the large institutions are even larger: The top 10 now account for 64 percent of assets, up from 58 percent before the crisis and substantially higher than the 25 percent they accounted for in 1990.

It is therefore no wonder that concerns about Icelandic sovereign debt default have largely evaporated. This can be seen in the spread on Iceland’s sovereign credit default swaps, which has fallen significantly this year and is currently at 288 basis points, well below those of Ireland and Portugal. Before turning to the outlook and near-term policy challenges, let me mention two important problems that Iceland will not face if present policies remain on course. The first is an unsustainable public debt level. As Graph 6 shows, the gross debt of Iceland’s general government (central and local government) exceeded 100% of GDP at the end of 2009. That is very high, of course, although there are countries with higher gross debt, as the graph shows. However, Iceland’s net public debt is significantly lower and is sustainable given the prospects for repayment of Treasury debt in net terms from 2013 onwards. In addition, if we factor in the Central Bank’s foreign exchange reserves, the bulk of net public debt is denominated in Icelandic krónur. But what about the unsettled Icesave debt? The answer is that it will not fundamentally change the picture, as present estimates of the amount and speed of recovery of the assets of the failed Landsbanki and indications of what might be on the table in terms of financing costs in a new settlement suggest that the net present value of the settlement will be significantly lower than in previous agreements.