samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
15  In a letter of 27 June 2008, the Ministry of Finance has asked the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway to assess the need for regulatory revisions to the Norwegian Banks’ Guarantee Fund. BIS Review 110/2008  7  Conclusion The experience so far is that inflation targeting has provided a good basis for stabilising inflation and inflation expectations. Interest rate setting and interest rate forecasts have also contributed to stabilising output and employment and prices in property markets. In some areas, regulations and frameworks can result in amplifications of fluctuations in asset prices and credit flows. For example, tax subsidisation of homeownership can be a source of recurrent instability in house prices and credit. The turbulence in financial markets has prompted many countries to consider measures to improve regulation and the functioning of markets. In Norway, the authorities can also strengthen the work on preventing systemic risk. With our cross-border banks, broader Nordic cooperation, particularly between finance ministries and supervisory authorities, would be appropriate. But there is also work to be done at home. Norges Bank is proposing, for example, revisions to the Norwegian Banks’ Guarantee Fund with a view to reducing moral hazard. Thank you for your attention. 8  BIS Review 110/2008  BIS Review 110/2008  9  10  BIS Review 110/2008  BIS Review 110/2008  11  12  BIS Review 110/2008  BIS Review 110/2008  13  14  BIS Review 110/2008  BIS Review 110/2008  15  16  BIS Review 110/2008

Strong and bold entrepreneurial and political leadership is now required to see the necessary changes for the financial system through, as demonstrated today by the G20 leaders in Pittsburgh. Clearly, there are many areas in financial regulation that can and in many cases should be improved. Given what is at stake, there is clearly a need to prioritize. I have briefly laid out to you this evening where I see those priorities. Thank you for your hospitality and patience. BIS Review 115/2009  5
First, the regulatory response that will enable the operating framework for finance and payments to adapt to the new challenges. Second, the adjustments that banks must make. Third, initiatives by the Banque de France to lead by example and support participants as they engage in the necessary transformations. 2.1 The regulatory responses to these challenges seek to ensure that risks are better controlled and to create a change-friendly framework [SLIDE 6]  For starters, let’s talk about the regulatory responses being initiated by lawmakers alongside regulatory and supervisory authorities. In terms of the digital transition, the regulations are intended to nurture innovation while ensuring that it is subject to the “same activities, same risks, same rules” principle. In the case of DeFi, this principle is applied via a square of guarantees designed to ensure equal security, compliance, responsibility and accessibility relative to the situation for traditional financial services. [SLIDE 6] Accordingly, the Banque de France supports the adoption of several key pieces of legislation that are currently being discussed by the European Parliament and the Council. First, the draft Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) is set to improve the financial sector’s digital operational resilience by harmonising the applicable requirements and by making certain critical IT services providers, including cloud services providers, subject to direct regulation. Second, in 2020, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation that we hope to see adopted during France’s presidency of the EU Council.

Could these reinvestments exceed € billion next year, could they be closer to € billion, for example? The reinvestments are quite mechanical. They derive from past investment policy. As you know, we are committed to being very transparent. We are publishing the reinvestments 12 months in advance so you will have the numbers when they come. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  There is some flexibility when it comes to reinvestments. Can the ECB and some national central banks reinvest a government bond into a corporate bond, or viceversa? That is not something we’ve discussed. That will be a technical discussion. What I don’t expect is any departure from the principle of capital key investment of government bonds, which has been a key principle at the heart of our public sector purchase programme. There are reports about some kind of “operation twist” from the ECB about buying longterm bonds. Is this happening? As I said, that’s not something we’ve discussed. That’s something you’re planning to discuss? That’s something that’s on the table? We will discuss the reinvestment policy; that will be a technical discussion. I don’t think it’s a major aspect of our monetary policy. With Brexit it seems like we’ve had a major step; on Friday night, after 12 hours of discussions, Theresa May managed to get some kind of blueprint. Do you see this as good news or bad news? The ECB is not part of the negotiations.
This is what happened when the Bretton Woods system collapsed after the Federal Reserve was no longer obligated to redeem dollars for gold. Today’s monetary system may even be more fragile. Gold and silver belong to the past. Today it is deposit money and paper money that prevail. People must be confident that deposit money can be converted into paper money. The central bank must promise that the value of paper money is maintained. If people do not believe that the central bank will keep its promise, they will want neither deposit money nor paper money. Money will then lose its value. Other currencies or goods with direct utility value will take over as a means of exchange and a means for storing value. This reduces the effectiveness of the economic system. We are of the view that it is an important but demanding task to safeguard the value of money. It is our own economic policy that determines the value of our money in the long term. It is therefore important to remember that price stability does not come about on its own. Thank you for your attention. References •  Borlaug, E. (1999) “Noregs Bank: Grunntrekk i administrasjon, oppgåver og historie (Norges Bank: basic aspects of administration, tasks and history)”, Norges Bank. •  Ecklund, G. J. (2008) “Creating a new role for an old central bank: The Bank of Norway 1945-1954”, Series of Dissertations 2/2008, BI Norwegian School of Management, Oslo.

Recent examples include the volatility of technology stocks, the growing size of telecom debt or the problems of the Japanese insurance industry. Much of the work is published in the Bank’s Financial Stability Review which is intended to promote public understanding of financial stability. The most important part of the FSR is an assessment of the global conjuncture and potential risks to the UK financial system. Emerging market economies have attracted particular attention in recent years. Not only were these countries the source of the most recent shock to the international financial system in 1998 but, since that time, they have been a major focus in international groups such as the FSF. The work to strengthen the financial system has centred as much on crisis prevention as crisis resolution. Under crisis prevention, the accent has been on improved disclosure, establishing new international standards for transparency for governments and private sector firms in the publication of economic and financial data. In terms of crisis resolution, discussion has turned to the role of the official sector, and the IMF and World Bank more particularly, in helping countries that get into difficulty. Many of the crises in emerging market economies have been marked by a sudden withdrawal of private sector capital, including outflows to private sector creditors of official funds intended to stabilise the position and reverse this capital flight.
Wage moderation is a key factor in favouring the expansion of employment and in helping to create the conditions for a sustainable increase in the potential growth rate of the euro area economy. Current estimates for trend potential growth in the euro area are in the order of 2-2½%. There is much scope for raising potential growth in the euro area. The ECB will make its contribution by focusing on maintaining price stability in the medium term. But other policy actors also have to take up their responsibilities. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines for 2002, which have just been approved in Seville, place the emphasis quite rightly on the need for further structural reforms in the euro area. I understand that this view is also shared in the draft resolution. The future welfare of euro area citizens will also depend to a large extent on the prudent conduct of fiscal policies. The solidarity pact of our monetary union requires all participants to maintain a mediumterm perspective in compliance with the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. This implies that budgetary positions in all countries should be close to balance or in surplus over the business cycle as a whole in order to allow sufficient room for a smooth functioning of automatic stabilisers. We have seen some worrying developments in fiscal policy in some countries over the last few months.

We therefore recall the importance for those countries that still have not achieved a balanced budget position to honour their commitments to catch up with the other countries of the euro area by 2003/04. Let me now turn to some other issues raised in the draft resolution on the ECB’s Annual Report. We welcome the draft resolution’s clear support for the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. The draft resolution concludes that short-term movements in monetary aggregates should not be overemphasised and that there should not be any mechanical reaction to deviations of M3 growth from the reference value. This is fully in line with the ECB’s monetary policy strategy and practice. The first pillar of our strategy, which gives a prominent role to the analysis of monetary developments, is based on the empirical evidence of a close and stable relationship between money and prices in the euro area over the medium term. There is no evidence yet to suggest that this link has weakened over time. The ECB is fully aware that monetary developments may be subject to portfolio shifts in the short term, which are not directly related to future spending decisions. Indeed, what matters is to identify and understand the underlying reasons for monetary developments in order to assess the implications for the risks to price stability over the medium term. In this respect, the analysis of monetary developments has provided useful guidance to the ECB’s monetary policy also over the past year.
Indeed, after inflation had moved on a markedly rising trend in the first half of 2008, prices slowed sharply in the closing months of the year as a result of the abrupt turnaround in oil and food prices and of the marked sluggishness of demand. This deceleration has become more pronounced in 2009 to date, with the annual rate of change of the CPI falling in March, April and May (-0.9% in this latter month). While the CPI trajectory reflects the correction of some price rises in the most volatile components in the opening months of 2008, the ongoing recession, which is severely affecting consumption, is prompting an adjustment in prices and margins that is beginning to impact services and the other less volatile components. And this means that the price growth differential with the euro area has turned negative, and will foreseeably remain so in the coming months. The CPI is expected to continue to temporarily post negative rates of change in the coming months and, once the statistical effect linked to higher oil prices in the first half of 2008 is stripped out, inflation should resume positive although very moderate rates of change. This price behaviour is in line with the improvements in competitiveness required to lessen the scope and costs of the recession, to prompt the necessary adjustments and to embark on a sound recovery.

On the supply side, the weakness in activity passed through to all productive branches, but with particular force to construction and industry. Employment was rapidly eroded following fourteen years of uninterrupted job creation. In late 2008 and early 2009, job destruction was most intense and, since the labour supply remained notably strong, the unemployment rate surged to 17.4% in the first quarter of the year, bearing down most on the young and the lesser skilled. 4  BIS Review 79/2009  Regrettably, this high unemployment figure shows that one of the risks I referred to when presenting the Annual Report for 2007 has materialised. I insisted then on the need to prevent the adjustment of the Spanish economy from falling predominantly on employment, as in previous recessions, since that would have significant adverse multiplier effects on demand and activity, via disposable income and future income expectations. And as stated, this is proving precisely to be one of the most powerful channels for the propagation of contractionary trends. One of the traditional behavioural patterns of the Spanish economy is thus recurring, revealing the persistent weaknesses in its institutional framework and arrangements that must be corrected. The high increases in labour costs witnessed last year, reflecting the rise in inflation in the first half of the year, were not favourable to employment. Wage cost pressures have only begun to abate in 2009, in line with improved inflation expectations, following the declines in the rate of change of the CPI in recent months.
As you remember, around this period of last year, one of the issues that had attracted a lot of public attention was the continued influx of fund flows into the emerging markets including Thailand. But this theme has suddenly changed when the US Federal Reserve signaled in May its intention to scale down, and eventually terminate, its asset purchasing program. The signaling immediately sparked turbulence in capital and currency markets in emerging economies and certainly serves as a recurring reminder that the linkages in the international economy are as psychological as they are mechanical. From June to August, Thailand, like other economies in the region, continued to witness further episodes of outflows as investors continued to reform their expectations towards the exact tapering timeline. 4. In the recent months, turbulence in the markets seems to have somewhat been moderated. This possibly reflects the fact that much has been priced in during the earlier outflow episodes, as well as the fact that it has been clearer to the markets now that any further tapering by the Fed will likely be done in an incremental manner. This is, however, not to say that short-term volatilities are no longer with us. The challenges going forward for policymakers are, therefore, not only to have the right set of policy responses in place to deal with these short-term volatilities, but also to make sure that all the market participants are well prepared for the scenarios that could be expected. 5.

With several factors both internal and external having materialized over the last several weeks, one can already see that 2014 will be yet another challenging year for the Thai economy. However, with cooperation from all sides, I hope we shall be able to weather the upcoming storms with a common vision and readiness, and that a clear blue sky is beckoning in the distance. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
If we look at the period from the 1970s to today, economic growth has been higher since the 1990s when inflation was low than it was in the 1970s and 1980s when inflation was high. Over time, interest rate setting only has an impact on inflation. Output is determined by real factors such as the supply of labour, capital and technology and by productivity developments. Nevertheless, monetary policy can have an impact on the real economy in the short and medium term. Actual output will normally deviate from trend output, which is determined by developments in real factors. If output is higher than implied by these factors, price and cost inflation will pick up. Stabilising output developments means seeking to influence actual output so that the economy grows at a pace that is consistent with price and cost stability. In line with this, the operational target of monetary policy is low and stable inflation, with annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. A plan for petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget was drawn up in 2001. Government revenues from the sale of oil and gas are invested in the Government Pension Fund – Global (the petroleum fund). The plan is to spend the expected real rate of return on the Fund each year, i.e.

The liberalisation of the economy did not reduce its characteristic fluctuations. We are now coming to the end of a period of very rapid expansion. It started back in 2003 when construction commenced of a large aluminium smelter in the eastern part of the country and an associated power plant. The overall size of this investment was equivalent to over 30% of GDP in 2003, the year that construction started. It therefore gave a very large boost to the Icelandic economy. In the latter half of 2004, the Icelandic banks began to compete head on with the State Housing Finance Fund (HFF) which had traditionally been the main provider of mortgage loans to households. The banks’ entry into the market was no doubt the result of the HFF’s ambition to increase its market share in the provision of mortgage finance. The banks had normally provided only a limited share of mortgage finance. They were in that respect different from banks in many neighbouring countries which have traditionally provided mortgage loans and thus have a stable portfolio of such loans on their balance sheet. The entry of the banks into the market led to significant changes. Households could now borrow against collateral in their existing real estate, that is, they could take equity out of their investment. This they did with vigour. The overall result was that credit grew briskly, real estate prices rose rapidly and private consumption expanded sharply, leading to inflationary pressures and a widening current account deficit.
The aspirations of ten Central Banks and the Islamic Development Bank – was to lay the foundation for the development of a sound and stable Islamic financial system that will pave the way for its successful integration as a viable and credible component of the global financial system. A decade later, the IFSB has build a solid international reputation as a credible standard-setting body for Islamic finance, with the IFSB charting its achievements in increasing regulatory cooperation, encouraging uniformity of regulatory frameworks and enhancing the monitoring of financial risks in the Islamic financial system. The current global landscape of the Islamic financial system, with enhanced stability and resilience that has contributed to the vibrant growth and internationalisation of Islamic finance is a realisation of the aspiration and vision of the IFSB Founding Members. The efforts are largely attributable to the unwavering commitment and dedication of the members of the IFSB that have relentlessly pursued the goals. The increasing support for the IFSB, signified by its continuous growth of membership over the decade would ensure a progressive continuity in the work of the Founding Members. There are now 187 members from 43 jurisdictions. Malaysia is honoured to host the IFSB here in Kuala Lumpur, and is committed to provide full support in the journey to achieve a sound and resilient Islamic financial services industry.

BIS Review 77/1999  6  Forecast underlying inflation (UND1X) Percentage 12-month change 4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 95  96  97  98  99  00  01  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Increased employment is also foreseen and in the June Inflation Report we counted on a reduction of unemployment to below 5 per cent in two years time. Against this background, in the period 1999– 2001 the average annual rate of wage increases is judged to be 3.5–4 per cent. That seems to be consistent with a forecast annual rate of productivity growth of 1.5–2 percent and the same order of inflation expectations among the labour market organisations. I should perhaps underscore that this is a forecast, not a desired rate of wage increases. A lower nominal wage rise would create better conditions for a quicker increase in employment. How wages actually develop and the consequences of this for inflation and monetary policy will depend in large measure on how the labour market turns out to function in the coming upward phase. The Riksbank will be keeping a watchful eye on the available indicators. The estimates of the NAIRU and the output gap suggest that inflationary pressure is rising and that in our forecast period the economy will approach or even reach full capacity utilisation.
I would like to say that the matters always crucially depended on the competence, potential and the positive political will of those who represent and manifest the people’s sovereignty. It will be so in future, as well. 3) In the globalized world, when it became apparent that the systemic crises exceed the borders of one national jurisdiction easily, the issue of the global financial architecture and the issue of coordination, gain extremely high significance. The new regulatory architecture I spoke about at the beginning, the examples for cooperation of the concerned governments and central banks during this crisis are truly encouraging. However, this path is full of scyllas and haribdas. Many obstacles need to be overcome. The paradigm “think globally, act locally” was and it still is very much manipulated by the local leaders who need the votes of the local voters to be as they like it. This mentality guarantees no financial stability. This path needs a lot of work. VI. Where is the Republic of Macedonia with respect to these trends? Our general policy is to adhere to the suggestions and the recommendations of the Basle Committee. Regarding the modification in the defining of the core capital, the current methodology on determining the banks’ capital adequacy already contains the approach proposed by the Basle Committee as regards to the deductable items.

This Leadership Energy Summit will hear from the experience of successful individuals on the source of their energy in generating outcomes and results that have made a difference. We will also learn about other sources of energy from which we can tap on and strengthen. This is the challenge of the new generation of leaders if they will truly be able to make lasting and meaningful changes in their environment. On this note, let me wish you a highly energised Summit. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3