samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The state of our economy shows that the fiscal framework is sound. BIS Review 16/2009  13  From 2008 to 2009 – during the downturn – the government budget will stimulate the mainland economy by the equivalent of 5 per cent of GDP, or NOK 90 billion. Half will automatically be channelled through unemployment benefit, which will cushion the impact on purchasing power for those who lose their jobs, and through lower taxes for households and firms, without an attendant reduction in government expenditure. The remainder comprises active measures and the gradual increase in petroleum revenue spending. Credibility is enhanced when fiscal policy adheres to the same strategy over several years and when the automatic stabilisers are also allowed to operate when tax revenues are high. As a result, the Norwegian government can spend money during a downturn without prompting a rise in consumer saving in order to meet future tax expenses and without pushing up yields on government securities as a result. The government still has freedom of manoeuvre. The operational objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation with annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. Over the past ten years, inflation has  14  BIS Review 16/2009  averaged 2 per cent, which is close to but somewhat lower than the target, and it fluctuates to a lesser extent than previously.

Emerging market economies in Asia, Europe and Latin America have accounted for an increasing share of global output. Several hundred million people have been lifted out of poverty. So what went wrong? Or in the words of Rimbereid: “And the cause of the depression? Theories conflict, as if surrounding a virus not yet discovered. Was it due to the far too unrestricted life of share trading? Or was it because the hand of the state constantly interfered with its unnatural contagion? Or did the virus worm its way into the calculating machine itself?” 4  4  6  Øyvind Rimbereid (2008): Herbarium, p.56. (Unofficial translation by Norges Bank’s translators). BIS Review 16/2009  Substantial trade imbalances developed between industrialised countries, particularly the US, on the one hand and emerging market economies, particularly China, on the other. This is partly due to government budget deficits and low private saving in the US since the 1990s, and partly due to export-led growth in China, particularly over the past few years, combined with strong competitiveness and a managed exchange rate. In short, rich countries borrowed and developing countries saved. The imbalances grew when oil and other commodity prices rose markedly. Financial market participants found it too difficult to channel capital. Longterm interest rates were too low, the search for yield too aggressive and compensation for risk-taking too meagre. With long-term loans in ample supply, demand for residential and other property became excessive in almost the entire western world.
In short, many workers in the UK have not in fact had that pay rise. •  Partly in consequence, the number of people earning less than the living wage is currently estimated to be around 5.8 million. That is 700,000 people more than in 2013. That fraction ought to shrink in future, once the statutory National Living Wage is introduced. The Bank itself is already a London Living Wage employer. •  The New Economics Foundation has recently constructed a summary measure of the number of secure jobs which allow for a reasonable standard of living (NEF (2015)). From 2011 to 2014, despite the number of people in employment rising sharply, the proportion in secure and well-paid jobs declined by around 2 percentage points. It currently stands at a remarkable 19.2 million people. So how do we make sense of these rather disparate patterns? By looking through a historical lens, I want to try to provide some perspective on these current trends and, more speculatively, their implications for future jobs and wages. The “lump of labour” fallacy Over the longer run, technology may be the single most important force shaping the fortunes of jobs and wages. That has meant, through the ages, the relationship between technology and jobs has been a recurring, and sometimes contentious, one. Debates on the potentially negative impact of technology on jobs – so-called technological unemployment – go back at least to the invention of the wheel (Woirol (1996)).

In common with other forecasters, the MPC has consistently been surprised by the weakness of wages, given the strong cyclical bounce in job creation. It has over-predicted the path of wages in recent years (Chart 29). There are a number of possible explanations for this wage weakness. One is that there is simply greater labour market slack in the economy than we have estimated. Another is that the narrowing of slack is having less impact on wage pressures than in the past – the slope of the so-called Phillips curve is flatter. There is international evidence of the Phillips curve having flattened over recent decades (IMF (2006, 2013), BIS (2014)). That might arise because technology has made it easier and cheaper than ever before to substitute labour for capital, man for machine. That is the very essence of the Second Machine Age hypothesis. It would manifest itself in weaker than expected wage growth and a secular fall in the labour share of income, both of which we have seen in a number of countries. The central projection in the November Inflation Report assumes the labour share reverts over time to its historical mean, with the fruits of productivity harvested by labour and capital in line with their historical shares. And because wages have lagged behind productivity for several years, this implies the labour share is currently at a cyclical low, but would be expected to mean-revert in the period ahead.
It has the drive and solutions to bring our economy forward and the wisdom and compassion to help all Singaporeans. The government is paying particular attention to those in the lower-income group to help them and ensure that they, like the rest of Singapore, benefit from globalisation. It is a strong and pragmatic government with integrity and sound values. It gives the country a clear sense of direction, anticipates and solves problems, rallies the people towards common goals and takes care of all Singaporeans. The challenge for Singapore is how to keep on producing an exceptional government. Without exceptional government, Singapore will lose its influence internationally, become a mediocre country and be marginalised. This brings me to the second critical success factor – talent. While good governance provides the necessary conditions for growth – political stability, social harmony, justice and equal opportunities – what drives the economy and Singapore forward is talent. We need talent in the public and private sectors, in the arts and the social sector, in government institutions, in NGOs and the people sector, and in business and the economy. Countries now actively compete for talent to power their economy. They want to attract foreign talent while retaining their own. Even China which has 1.3 billion people wants to attract back its overseas Chinese talent and import foreign talent. 2  BIS Review 55/2007  To ensure that Singapore continues to have a strong talent base, we have to build, attract and retain talent.

We will continue to invest heavily in our people, especially our young, and equip the next generation with the right skills and cutting edge knowledge. We will continue to welcome global talent. To enhance Singapore’s magnetic pull, we are developing Singapore into a truly global city – a “cool” and “happening” place, with social and cultural vibrancy, good educational institutions, clean, green and safe environment and iconic international sporting events like F1 Grand Prix. But the strongest pull in this magnet is economic growth. Without economic opportunities, talent will not come or stay. What of the future? We did not foresee the Asian Financial Crisis coming in May 1997. Despite keeping a close watch, we may still miss something or misinterpret a blip on the radar screen. This is why I have emphasised the importance of maintaining the virtuous cycle of good governance and talent to generate growth. This is the best strategy to face whatever challenges ahead. Sustaining this virtuous cycle must be the task of all Singaporeans. Let me now say a few words about how I see the role of the SICC in Singapore’s future development. Given the diverse markets in which SICC members operate, your chamber can play an important role in helping our companies internationalise and seize global opportunities. The SICC can help your members move into new areas of growth like the Middle East. I am glad to note that more links and collaboration are being forged between SICC and your counterparts in the Middle East.
Ninth, I agree there is evident fear among the certain existing EU members, including Germany, that once Poland, Hungary, Slovakia or Latvia enter the EMU, the euro could be weaken. I do not find any rational argument supporting this preposition. Firstly, as I pointed out, earlier date of entry would mobilise the candidate countries to complete the structural reforms. Secondly, candidate countries combined make up for only around 6% of the enlarged EU GDP. Any negative impact the enlargement might have, which is unlikely, in any case will be highly subdued. Thirdly, I think the reason behind the relative weakness of the euro, is not Greece or Portugal or the other EMU members but something different. The entry of Poland and other countries into the EMU, assuming they complete reforms, will not weaken the euro at all. Finally, as for today there are differences in the rate of inflation given the BS Effect in the EMU countries, hence why should be a problem for others, with inflation only marginally different from the EU average, to join the Eurozone? Tenth, earlier entry of the candidate countries into EMU would allow them to start reaping the related advantages (more price transparency, reduced transformation costs, stronger macroeconomic framework) at the earlier date. Summarising, we should not oppose nominal and real convergence. One should not assume there is an unavoidable conflict between the two. Firstly, results of nominal convergence, a low inflation rate among them, are one of the foundations of the long-term economic growth.

One of the difficulties faced in trying to encourage this business is that the major providers, such as the so-called “monoline” insurance corporations in the United States, may not find it profitable to work on what for them may be relatively small, plain vanilla deals, when compared to the fees available from larger and more complex deals in North America. Another problem is that such companies tend not to look to enhance securities with original ratings below triple B. This in turn raises questions about fundamental credit quality in the region as well as about the potentially wider role for rating agencies. Another area where we might expect to see further innovation is the securitisation of pools of assets such as mortgages or receivables. We have recently witnessed the resurgence of the mortgage-backed security market in Hong Kong, spearheaded by the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. This market has the potential to develop even further if the property market recovers buoyancy. But there is also probably scope for more activity in the securitisation of such things as credit card receivables, leasing receivables and the like. These could form attractive debt securities, although, as we have seen with so many issues of securities, the existence of the securities does not necessarily mean that there is an active market in them after the initial placement or sale. Thus, we are by no means standing still.
Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment when setting interest rates. The Norwegian economy has in general exhibited solid growth since the beginning of the 1990s, although with a mild setback in 2002 and 2003. Over the past four years, the mainland economy has been in a sharp upturn, with annual growth averaging well over 4 per cent and particularly vigorous growth in 2007. Growth is now slowing markedly in the Norwegian economy. Household consumption has stagnated and house prices are falling. Growth in the Norwegian economy has slowed, while inflation has accelerated. In October, the year-on-year rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 5.5 per cent. Electricity prices rose sharply through summer after unusually low prices last year. Underlying inflation has also picked up. Inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary changes in energy prices (CPIXE) was 3½ per cent in October. Wage growth is markedly higher and productivity growth has slowed considerably. The high rate of cost inflation has led to a faster rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. Prices for imported consumer goods are no longer falling and are now on the rise. The slowdown in the real economy is expected to start pushing down inflation towards next  BIS Review 143/2008  3  summer. Higher unemployment and weaker corporate profitability will probably lead to low pay increases in the wage negotiations next spring.

The fall in terms of trade may nevertheless imply that the krone exchange rate does not return to previous heights. A weaker krone may contribute to underpinning profitability in the export sector. Cost competitiveness in manufacturing has improved in recent quarters. Effects on output, employment and inflation The financial turbulence has weakened the outlook for investment and consumption in many regions of the world. Against the backdrop of losses and structural changes in the financial sector, many large financial institutions will for a long period ahead seek to increase their interest rate margins, reduce lending and risk. Lending standards have been tightened, particularly in the US and the UK, but also in the euro area. Output has fallen in the US, the euro area and the UK, and growth may be negative in the coming quarters. In emerging economies, the cyclical downturn has also come into growing evidence. In several countries, economic growth is being pulled down by both lower market growth in other countries and reduced access to credit. Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. In recent years, inflation has on average been somewhat lower, but fairly close to 2.5 per cent. Low and stable inflation is the most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments, providing firms and households with an anchor for inflation expectations.
The euro is also at the heart of vast international trade links. It now boasts a solid track record spanning nearly 25 years, making it a credible complement to the dollar as a safe asset. Objectively, one challenge remains: some may consider that the euro has become a sort of geopolitical proxy for the dollar since Europe decided - for excellent reasons - to take part in the sanctions against Russia. For my part, I have noted that investors rightly continue to see the euro and the dollar as two very distinct currencies. If it is to assert itself even more firmly as one of the anchors of the IMS, the euro must benefit from support which the Commission x has begun to provide, notably through stimulus measures via capital markets. xi In my view, this support must now be relayed by the ECB and all of us, the central banks of the Eurosystem. Since the introduction of the euro, the Eurosystem has adopted a neutral stance regarding the development of the international role of the euro. Admittedly, this role is not one of the objectives of the Treaty: the euro was created for internal purposes, and not primarily to act as an international currency. But the fears expressed at the time of a potential loss of control over monetary policy are no longer justified; a strengthening of the international role of the euro would now even be associated with greater autonomy and a reduced impact of exchange rate shocks on inflation.

All these forces could lead to changes to some of the balances of the current international monetary system. Admittedly, despite its gradual erosion from around 65% in 2016 to 58% in 2022, the weight of the dollar is likely to remain strong in the medium and long term. vii However, many currencies, including not only the euro but also the Canadian and Australian dollars, are already being increasingly used as reserve assets. A collective move towards a more multipolar international financial system therefore seems to be underway. However, a confrontational (non-) system, or disorderly fragmentation, would only lead to instability and inefficiency. viii In order to increase monetary confidence, we also need to preserve certain virtues of the current IMS: stable, based on collective rules, market-oriented, and that offers widely accepted safe assets. Page 4 sur 6 III. The euro as a complementary asset for a more multilateral IMS We Europeans must be proactive and involved in what depends on us: the euro should play a greater international role. It is already the second most widely used currency in the world, but its current weight, around 20% by most measures, ix does not reflect its potential. As an emblem of the qualities of the type of IMS one would wish for, it is the currency of a jurisdiction with strong and stable democratic institutions, independent central banks, the rule of law and deep financial markets. It is supported by a soft power based on compliance with international rules, multilateralism and openness.
There is also a game park, a well stocked curio market and the Mukuni Cultural Village, among the many attractions. I therefore urge you to find time or indeed stay an extra day or more to sample this special menu that Livingstone has to offer. Chairperson, Central Bank of Zambia is honoured and delighted to co-host the second AFRACA Forum that begins today, the 23rd and ends on 25th September, 2008. AFRACA is an association of Central Banks and financial institutions involved in the provision of financial services to the rural population in Africa and increasing access to financial services in general. Its membership of 94 institutions consists of central banks, commercial banks, agricultural banks, development and cooperative banks, other financial institutions and microfinance operators whose networks spread throughout 26 African countries. It is through workshops and fora of this nature, among other events, that AFRACA endeavours to disseminate information and share experiences among members and other industry stakeholders across the continent. Following the first Central Banks Forum held in Accra, Ghana and in view of the need to deliberate further on the topical issue of financial inclusiveness, AFRACA felt it necessary to hold the second Central Banks Forum under the theme, “Promoting Financial Inclusiveness”. The main objectives of this second forum are to harness current views on promoting financial inclusiveness, draw lessons and recommend strategies for improvement of the levels of access to financial services, particularly among the rural communities in our countries.

I would therefore, like to implore all delegates to engage fully in these discussions and make the most of the wealth of knowledge and experience represented in the house. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my pleasure and privilege once again to welcome you to the second AFRACA Central Banks’ Forum. I now wish to invite our distinguished Guest of Honour, the Minister of Finance and National Planning, Honourable Ng’andu P. Magande MP, to officially open this Forum. Honourable Minister! BIS Review 118/2008  3
Financial stability Our interest in stability and efficiency reaches of course beyond the money market itself. We have a broader interest in a robust financial system. The transition from a bank requesting liquidity to a bank with longer-term funding requirements, and perhaps solvency problems, can be blurred. Like other lenders, Norges Bank has to decide on the collateral it is prepared to accept for the loans it provides and be qualified to evaluate the financial strength of borrowers. As lender of last resort, we must also be able to assess whether problems in individual banks could jeopardise the stability of the financial system as a whole. The financial crisis has revealed major weaknesses in the financial system. Work is in progress across the board on proposals for revising the regulatory framework and introducing new regulations. It has become increasingly clear that supervision must encompass the financial system as a whole and not be limited to the individual financial institution or the individual financial market. The term used to refer to this supervision of the financial sector is macroprudential policy, which has to be based on analyses of the financial sector as a whole.

The FPC reviews its housing actions regularly and will publish the results of its 2019 review, including, as I have said, an updated cost-benefit analysis. The Bank of England work published today is, in the same way, intended to contribute to that necessary transparency and accountability. I began this talk today by recollecting how the Bank had learned, slowly, from the crisis of 1846 about the need to support credit to the economy in a crisis rather than restrict it. I hope likewise, we have learned one of the lessons of the 2008 crisis that higher household indebtedness increases macroeconomic and macrofinancial vulnerability in a crisis and needs to be considered within macroprudential policies. The Committee has discretion to decide which types of debt to include – the 2014 measures only acted on owner-occupier mortgage debt. 23  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13  References Andersen, Asger Lau, Charlotte Duus, and Thais Lærkholm Jensen (2016), Household debt and spending during the financial crisis: Evidence from Danish micro data, European Economic Review, 89, pp. 96-115. Anson, Mike, David Bholat, Miao Kang and Ryland Thomas (2017), The Bank of England as lender of last resort: new historical evidence from daily transactional data, Staff Working Paper No. 691, Bank of England. Anson, Mike, David Bholat, Miao Kang, Kilian Rieder and Ryland Thomas (2019), The Bank of England and central bank credit rationing during the crisis of 1847: frosted glass or raised eyebrows? Staff Working Paper No.794, Bank of England.