samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In order to promote the use of LEI at the start of the financial reporting obligations in the European Union, United States and other jurisdictions, an interim pre-LEI system has been agreed. The same report also identified potential data gaps, such as the availability of collateral information which would be necessary to evaluate exposure, and therefore risks, appropriately. Here in the European Union, for example, entities are required to report collateral information, whereas in the United States no such requirement exists. So, even if access issues are standardised across the board, a lot of data issues will still remain. In short, I see three main issues that have to be addressed. First, information gaps still exist, either due to a lack of or differences in reporting requirements. Second, data are fragmented across trade repositories and jurisdictions. And third, there are still obstacles impeding authorities’ access to data. In February 1999, in his report to the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors that led to the establishment of the Financial Stability Forum, Hans Tietmeyer called for “arrangements for the surveillance of global vulnerabilities, including the pooling of information available to the international financial institutions and the international regulatory groupings”. This was almost 15 years ago and we are not yet there. In fact, at the current stage, no authority has a complete overview of the risks in OTC derivatives markets or is able to examine the global network of OTC derivatives in depth.

We expect this share will increase continuously as the clearing obligation comes into effect in many countries. Progress is, however, different among asset classes, and substantial scope still exists for further increasing central clearing. A number of challenges still remain. Let me mention two key points in this regard. First, I would like to recall that the introduction of mandatory clearing obligations raises new challenges in terms of the distribution and management of financial risk beyond the risk concentration in central counterparties. Indeed, mandatory clearing implies that an increasing share of the risks arising from OTC derivatives transactions will also be concentrated in a few major clearing banks. This is because the mandatory clearing requirement implies that a larger pool of market participants will need to have access to central counterparties, while only a small part of this pool will be able to access the counterparties directly. Indeed, central counterparties need to ensure that their direct members meet adequate standards in terms of financial soundness, technical and operational capacity, and product expertise. The enforcement of robust standards in this area is a critical first layer of defence against counterparty risk and ensures that central counterparties are able to swiftly manage a potential default situation. It is clear, however, that many market participants will not meet these stringent requirements and will therefore need to access central counterparties indirectly via a direct clearing member. A number of risks are associated with this development.
Competition includes wider factors, for example: the range of firms competing in the market; barriers to entry, expansion or exit; and incentives to innovate and compete. But the two concepts are linked; competition is what drives innovation and ultimately drives productivity and long-term competitiveness. On the other hand, measures designed primarily to make one part of the market more competitive than another, through measures that favour one group of firms over another, will reduce innovation and productivity and be damaging in the long run. So facilitating competition brings the right type of competitiveness. Fresh in the memory is an example of how we have had regard to competitiveness, as required in the 2  Chancellor’s letter to the PRC . We worked closely with HMT, the FCA and industry to design a new, 3  commercially viable framework for Insurance Special Purpose Vehicles (ISPVs). Given growth in the insurance linked securities (ILS) market, this is a good opportunity for the UK as we are one of the first Solvency II jurisdictions to have done this. The framework went live in December 2017 and very shortly thereafter the PRA authorised its first ILS vehicle. 2  In March 2017, the Chancellor of the Exchequer sent a letter to the Governor of the Bank of England recommending that the PRA should have regard to considerations including: competition; growth; competitiveness; innovation; trade; and better outcomes for consumers.

Distinguished Guests, ladies and gentlemen The Bank of Zambia decided to formally adopt the MUKUYU Slave Tree as an on going project under its Corporate Social Responsibility Programme. Substantial resources, both human and otherwise, have gone into this project. The Bank’s aim was to assist Kabwe Municipal Council leaders to firstly restore the tree to some form of heritage status. Further, the Bank wanted to preserve and secure its  BIS Review 1/2007  1  immediate surroundings in order to provide a place of rest and recreation for members of the public. The exercise was also aimed at restoring levels of beauty and elegance to the MUKUYU TREE, thereby not only rekindling its former glory, but also hopefully contributing to Kabwe’s efforts to set a firm foot on the road to economic recovery through the much-heralded tourism sector. With our humble efforts, we hope that the MUKUYU Tree is now fit to be a real “meeting place” to provide a place of rest for members of the public who wish to seek refuge under its large and leafy shade. Additionally we hope that this initial humble step has contributed to the restoration of the beauty and elegance of the MUKUYU TREE to its former glory. It is, therefore, my pleasure to be here today not only in my capacity as Governor of the Bank of Zambia, but also as a Zambian citizen, to celebrate and commemorate this occasion which takes us back to many years in history.
A more restrained approach would be to use countercyclical policy not so much to lean against the cycle but to increase the resilience of the system further by putting in more protection as risks build up in exuberant times. Others remain unconvinced that there is much of a role for time-varying macroprudential policy at all and argue that it is better to bake all the necessary resilience into a very strong standing framework of standards and rules. There is certainly no easy way to estimate where we are in the credit cycle and the impact of macroprudential tools – while there are guides there are no simple rules. Against that background, I want to highlight some of the steps the FPC has taken in this area. First, using macroprudential policy to address changing risks depends upon a clear assessment of risks and of the action necessary to address them. The institutional incentives will inevitably tend to drive macroprudential authorities to the identification of all possible – and if we are not careful, some impossible – risks. Failure to spot a risk is worse than  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  spotting one too many. The outcome of this dynamic, however, can too easily be a lack of clarity and focus: an assessment that identifies everything but actually identifies nothing. With this in mind, the FPC has changed the structure and content of its bi-annual Financial Stability Report (FSR).

In the post war economy with closed capital and current accounts the banking system was tightly controlled by government. It was an instrument of macroeconomic management and of financial repression in order to repay the national debt. As the Chairman of Lloyds Bank at the time described it, “It was like driving a powerful car at twenty miles an hour. The banks were anaesthetised – it was a kind of dream life”. But, from the beginning of the 1970s, as the financial sector was increasingly liberalised and globalised, the old risks returned. It became apparent by 1979 that the Governor’s eyebrows needed to be bolstered with statutory regulation and supervision of banks. As capital accounts were increasingly opened up and cross border competition grew, the need for a more level playing field between internationally active banks became more apparent. Liberalisation led to a shift towards more explicit prudential standards starting with the 1975 Basel Concordat – the forerunner of today’s Basel standards. The focus was very much on promoting the safety and soundness of individual firms. Much less attention was given to the fact that the risks in the financial system are greater than the sum of the risks in its parts. Central banks were no strangers to such systemic risks. Indeed, they were recognised at the time – the forerunner of today’s Basel Committee identified them and even coined the term “macro-prudential” risks to distinguish and separate them from “micro-prudential” or firm specific risks that were the subject of the Basel Accords.
Finally, it is only the speculators that  4  BIS Review 40/2004  are fuelling the rise in prices. While they know that the price increases are exaggerated, they do not know when the situation will turn. The slightest signs of an imminent change lead to large-scale selloffs, and prices plunge. In well-developed markets, participants that judge the price increases to be excessive always have the possibility to make a profit by taking offsetting positions. Uncertainty over when the situation will turn, coupled with reward systems that encourage short-term gains, are likely to result in an insufficient number of investors taking offsetting positions. Financial accelerator effects most likely lead to a situation where rising asset prices, regardless of whether they are being driven by short-term investors, also affect the real economy and thus can contribute to overinvestment. As regards house prices, the risk of a purely speculatively driven rise ought to be lower. This is true especially of economies such as the Swedish one, where regulations make it very difficult to own and let houses and apartments for speculative purposes. Empirical studies also indicate that the risk propensity of investors and lenders appears to increase according as economic activity strengthens, while it decreases markedly during economic declines. So, when economic activity has been improving over a long period, investors appear to interpret this as meaning that growth will continue to rise at the same high rate, without taking account of the risk of a slowdown.

At the moment we are sure that risks to price stability undermining are eliminated, we will apply monetary measures appropriate for the slower economic growth. Маy pressures be coming from the fiscal policy? So far, they have not, and I hope it will remain that way. The best confirmation of that are the balances in the economy. After all, exactly because of that, we had room for the so far most relaxed monetary policy without jeopardizing the stability of prices, Denar exchange rate and the banking system. Banks’ non-performing loans will decrease This year, liquidity was the biggest problem of the companies. The figures showed that the indebtedness in the real sector is huge, over Euro 5 billion, with the country’s debt to the companies being over Euro 220 million. In such circumstances, banks have reduced lending to firms to a minimum and they struggle with the growth of bad loans. Can we expect the situation to improve? In the statistics that are known to me I have not found such figures. However, when economic growth and exports slow down and budgetary payments are late, usually the liquidity of companies deteriorates. Therefore they are late in the settlement of obligations to the banks. Despite that, non-performing loans of the Macedonian banks amount to about 10 percent, which is the lowest share in the region from Slovenia to Greece. Announced debt repayments from the budget will contribute to the reduction of the debts among companies, and finally debts toward the banks.
The most immediate one is the uncertainty over the outcome of the Brexit vote. Even if we don’t want it, prudence requires that we prepare ourselves for the possibility of a no-deal Brexit, the impact of which would be more significant for the United Kingdom than for the euro area. However, any consequences for financial stability must and can be managed. But there are also considerable uncertainties outside Europe. The US cycle appears to be reaching maturity after an expansionary phase that began in mid-2009, but it is still far too early to worry about a recession. Growth should remain robust at around 2.3% compared with 3% in 2018, although at the expense of an ill-timed fiscal stimulus. There are greater uncertainties overshadowing the Chinese economy. The latest activity indicators have been weak. An escalation in trade tensions could lower Chinese GDP growth by up to 1.5 percentage points6 over a two year horizon. The slowdown could also encourage authorities to stimulate the economy, leading to increases in already high levels of corporate debt (155% of GDP compared with 106% in the euro area)7 and in the risks to financial stability. Our second challenge is impatience. Thirty years ago, independence was conceived as a response to the temptation to make trade-offs between growth and price stability. But the real temptation, which is even stronger today, is to trade off long-term interests in favour of the short term. Financial markets are frequently characterised by short-termism and bouts of extreme volatility.

Ladies and Gentlemen, In this context, from an emerging market perspective, the question, therefore, goes way beyond just how to cope with the current turmoil, but reaches deep down into the direction of market development over the medium to longer term as well. Within the realm of central banks, for example, the traditional science of monetary policy has so far been based on the idea that the central bank’s objective should be to maximize the economic well-being of the people in the country by minimizing the deviations of inflation from its optimal rate and the deviations of real economic activity from its so-called natural growth path. However, today it is clear that the central bank’s role in fostering financial stability is essential and this role will become more prominent in the world of increasing financial integration. Experiences of the recent crises indicate that monitoring financial imbalances is crucial in preventing financial turmoil from occurring. It has long been recognized that a weak financial system undermines the efficacy of monetary policy measures and can overburden the monetary authorities. For this reason, it may be desirable for prudential policy frameworks to be strengthened, thereby addressing the build-up and unwinding of the imbalances more effectively. In this context, the Bank of Thailand has also monitored seven areas of financial imbalances, including those in the financial market, real estate, household and corporate sectors on a regular basis.
38  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  38  Jarrell, S B and Stanley, T D (2004), 'Declining Bias and Gender Wage Discrimination? A Meta-Regression Analysis', Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 828-838. Lang, K (2007), Poverty and Discrimination, Princeton University Press. Lang, K and Lehmann, J-Y K (2012), 'Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: Theory and Empirics', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 959-1006. Lang, K and Manove, M (2011), 'Education and Labor Market Discrimination', American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 1467-96. Lewis, G B and Soo Oh, S (2009), 'A Major Difference? : Fields of Study and Male-Female Pay Differences in Federal Employment', The American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 107-124. Longhi, S and Brynin, M (2017), 'The ethnicity pay gap', Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research Report, No. 108. Manning, A and Swaffield, J (2005), 'The gender gap in early career wage growth', CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. McKinsey & Company (2016), 'The power of parity: Advancing women's equality in the United Kingdom', McKinsey Global Institute, September 2016. Neal, D A (2004), 'The Measured Black-White Wage Gap among Women is Too Small', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. S1, pp. S1-S28. Neal, D A and Johnson, W R (1996), 'The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage Differences', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, No. 5, pp. 869-895.

A negative pay gap in this table indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a positive pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts. 29  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  29  We can extend these specifications by considering interaction effects between gender and ethnicity. This is achieved by adding two dummy variables to the original specification (5):  (8) ln  ∝  Where  ∗  ∗  h  =  h  1 0  ∗  ∗  h  ∗  person does not belong to white ethnic group person belongs to white ethnic group  As shown in Table 4, we find that the conditional gender wage gap (for white women) remains around -15%. For female ethnic minorities this becomes larger at around -18%, suggesting an additional “pay bias”. This resolves another puzzle in the unconditional pay data. By contrast, ethnic minority men suffer no such additional bias. Indeed, at around -10 percentage points, their pay gap is smaller than for white women.
Despite the unfavorable developments in food prices, almost a year after monetary tightening, core inflation indicators displayed a significant deceleration starting from the second quarter of 2007. The effects of tightening were clearly visible on the prices of durable goods and services consistent with the slowdown in the economic activity in the related sectors. The weaker demand, coupled with a strong domestic currency, helped durables inflation to come down significantly (Figure 8). In this respect, services inflation also eased remarkably, declining by 3.6 percentage points throughout 2007. The improvement in  BIS Review 20/2008  5  services inflation spread across all sub-items. Especially, the fall in rent inflation, the stickiest component of services inflation, was significant (Figure 9). Figure 8: Durable Goods Prices (Annual Percentage Change)  18 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12  1007  0707  0407  0107  1006  0706  0406  0106  Durables (Excl.Gold) Furniture Electrical&Non-Electrical Appl. Automobile  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Figure 9: Services Group Sub-Items (Annual Percentage Change)  20  2006 2007  16 12 8 4 0 Transport Services  Rent  RestaurantsHotels  Other Services  Source: TURKSTAT, CB. The significant deceleration in the core inflation indicators set the ground for a relatively less restrictive monetary policy. Hence, we decided to start the measured easing cycle in September 2007 with a 25 basis-points cut, while continuing with 50 basis-points in the consecutive three meetings.

Essentially there is a risk that the single monetary policy - the single, one-size-fits-all, short-term interest rate - within the euro area, which is a necessary corollary of the single currency, will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic needs of each of the euro-member countries. There is no doubt that such risks exists. They may result from cyclical divergence. They may arise from differences in fiscal positions even though these are to be constrained through the Stability Pact. Or they may result from economic shocks of some sort that have a bigger impact on some countries than on others. The rise in oil prices in the early 1970’s or German reunification are classic examples. So the risk of divergent monetary policy needs within the euro area is real. And the damage it could cause if serious tensions between member countries were to emerge is substantial, because alternative adjustment mechanisms, such as labour migration or fiscal redistribution, that exist within individual countries, and which help to alleviate the similar regional tensions that arise at the national level, are simply not well-developed at the pan-European level.
This exercise proved to be both very useful and reassuring: thanks to the improvement of banks’ capital position with the implementation of Basel 3, and despite the high level of uncertainty triggered by the ongoing pandemic, it shows that the European banking system is resilient to a very severe adverse shock. 2.3 Stress testing should also prove helpful for banks to assess and manage their exposure to climate change related risks The forward-looking perspective of stress tests should prove particularly helpful for banks and their supervisors to handle emerging risks such as climate change. Building on the work carried out by the Network of central banks and supervisors for the Greening of the Financial System (NGFS): we, at the ACPR and Banque de France, have recently conducted such an exercise, with French Banks and Insurers. Beyond helping us identify at an early stage their shortcomings and limitations that we will need to overcome, such stress test have provided us with initial 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  assessment of climate change-related risks, exposures of French financial institutions, which appears actually to be moderate. But may be more importantly, it has proved helpful to us in incentivizing financial institutions to give the proper level of priority and resources to the monitoring and management of climate-related risks.

2.4 Stress testing should also prove helpful in informing macroprudential policies While stress tests have become an important part of the microprudential toolkit, they have also taken a key role in macroprudential analysis in recent years for financial crisis prevention purposes, enabling central banks and macroprudential authorities to assess the vulnerabilities of the financial system as a whole. Informing macroprudential policy with a comprehensive overview of the financial sector’s resilience is and will remain an essential objective for the future of stress testing. In that regard, improving the accuracy and relevance of our top-down models is one of our priorities at Banque de France, but also at the European level, to better use them in the macroprudential field. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches