samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chart 3: Occupational representation Per cent 100 80 60 40 20 0 1994  2019  White male  1994  2019  White female  1994  2019  Ethnic minority male  1994  2019  Ethnic minority female  Managers, professional and associates  Administrative  Skilled trade  Personal, sales and customer  Process and plant  Elementary  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Chart 4 shows the composition of the UK labour market by sector. The vast majority of men across both ethnic sub-samples work in the ‘industry’ sector (including manufacturing, utilities and mining) and trade and transport sectors. The latter is particularly important for ethnic minority males, where close to 40% of this sub-group works. On the other hand, the public sector is dominated by females of both ethnicity backgrounds. The share of people working in professional services and finance is similar across the board. Chart 4: Sectoral representation Per cent 100  80  60  40  20  0 1994  2019  1994  White male Industry  2019  White female Public  1994  2019  Ethnic minority male  Trade and transport  Professional  1994  2019  Ethnic minority female Finance  Other  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. (b)  Pay Trends  Table 1 shows summary statistics of the distribution of earnings across gender and ethnicity.

A common challenge our emerging economies are facing is the need to speed up convergence towards the development level of mature economies. In order to achieve this, the responsible policymaker should be concerned with steady progress and not with delivering bouts of accelerated growth, which may turn out to be reversible. This brings us to the need to address bottlenecks to potential growth – even though in Central and Eastern Europe, for instance, growth is now much stronger than in the euro area, most countries have still work to do in order to ensure that potential growth matches the catching-up needs. At least in the non-euro EU members in Eastern Europe, bottlenecks to sustainable growth usually stem from structural impediments to labour supply (high emigration, low participation rate, decline in working age population, skill mismatch), inefficiencies in public administration, quality of institutions, in general, and in some cases, inadequate infrastructure. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  While inflation has reemerged in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, in most cases it remains tepid (broadly, around 2 percent). Nevertheless, it has spiked in such cases as Romania and Turkey, where it currently stands at 5 percent and 11 percent respectively. Part of this reemergence is related to the global cycle, as it comes from international commodity prices, with idiosyncratic supply-side factors and domestic demand pressures accounting for the rest of the explanation.
To illustrate what we are doing today we can use a simple equation that describes the banks' lending rate – that is the rate charged to households and companies – as the repo rate plus a premium. Image 4: Monetary policy and financial stability are interlinked  itlending = it + m(ct ,...)  The size of this premium depends on the bank's demand for compensation for, for example, credit risks, any differences in periods to maturity and the need to retain sufficient capital to cover the loans. What we are doing now is partly to control the first term, that is the policy rate, and partly to attempt to influence the second term, that is the risk premiums that are today reflected in large credit spreads as a result of the financial turmoil. To do this we must use tools from both of the toolboxes. It is against this background that we can view the monetary policy measures of a more or less unconventional nature that are now being taken in various parts of the world. I will now try to discuss this in a little more detail. Unconventional monetary policy As I mentioned earlier, the central banks have reduced policy rates quickly and dramatically in order to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis. At the end of last year, the US central bank cut its policy rate target to an interval of 0-0.25 per cent.

Then comes a layer that describes the financial landscape. This consists of financial players, institutions, markets and  1  Joseph Mallord William Turner (1775–1851), British artist most famous for his Romantic landscape paintings, whose style can be said to have paved the way for Impressionism. BIS Review 41/2009  1  instruments. Over this there is yet another layer that describes the regulatory landscape, that is the special legislation, regulations and supervisory arrangements that cover the activities of financial companies. Somewhere in the middle of the picture, symbolised by the steam boat that is trying to navigate the right course through the snow storm, we have the Riksbank which is fighting to both meet the inflation target and safeguard the stability of the payment system. For the Riksbank, as for steam boats at sea, the room for manoeuvre is determined by the conditions in the surrounding landscape. We have to understand how the weather, visibility and other prevailing factors affect our chances of steering the boat in the right direction. This becomes particularly important when conditions are difficult, when there is a snow storm raging at sea. This – in a nutshell – is what my speech today will be about. First, however, it may be interesting to look at how we sailed into the storm. From fair weather to the perfect storm – what went wrong? The metaphor of the different layers in Turner's painting can be used to describe the causes of the current crisis.
Risk analysis and buffer-raising will also be a challenge for Eesti Pank in the forthcoming periods. The central bank just finished its first year as a member of the euro area, with one of the lowest equity to monetary policy assets ratios among euro area central banks. We must bear in mind that the revenues and expenditures of monetary policy operations are shared within the Eurosystem in proportion to the central bank’s participation in the total capital. The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank thus resolved to raise the central bank’s capital adequacy ratio to the average level of euro area central banks in the long term. In order to bring the ratio into line with Eesti Pank’s participation in the Eurosystem, the capital adequacy ratio must be raised. This means that the central bank’s equity must be raised from 0.37 billion euros to approximately 1.3 billion euros. Eesti Pank’s equity currently stands at 0.07% of the Eurosystem’s total equity, while Eesti Pank’s participation in the Eurosystem stands at 0.26%. [QUO VADIS, EURO AREA?] 1. It is not only the central banks that can contribute to a successful exit from the crisis – the governments of member states must, as soon as possible, implement the measures taken and agreements made by the European Council and the euro area heads of state and government. Closer cooperation in the field of economic policy, along with clear-cut, functional rules, serve the interests of all members. 2.

12  08  09 Assets  10 Net  -12.000
In this current environment, the emerging economies are challenged by both the weakening global growth and the spillovers arising from the policy actions in the major advanced economies. While continuing to register reasonable economic growth, the momentum of the growth has moderated in most emerging economies, affected by slowing external demand and uncertainty in the financial markets. Nevertheless, current ongoing shifts occurring in the emerging economies have contributed to sustaining our economies. It is the growing importance of domestic demand in most of the emerging economies in Asia that is creating a  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  huge cumulative domestic market, and this is resulting in greater regional integration with an increase in intra-regional trade. Greater regional and inter-regional integration of the emerging economies through the proliferation of interlocking networks of trade, investment and finance, has contributed to provide mutually reinforcing support to economic activity in the emerging economies. In Malaysia, the decline in external demand while affecting overall growth, has been partially offset by stronger domestic demand, following the robust resumption of private consumption and investment activities, and the diversification of exports to the regional economies. In addition, the wide-ranging reforms implemented since the Asian financial crisis have resulted in strengthened financial intermediaries and a more developed financial system. This has allowed for the economy to better intermediate the volatile cross-border flows without disruption to the financial system.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Big shift – traversing the complexities of a new world Luncheon address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Khazanah Megatrends Forum 2012: “Big shift – traversing the complexities of a new world”, Kuala Lumpur, 2 October 2012. *  *  *  The global economy has now entered into a period of slower economic growth despite the significant and wide ranging pro-growth policies that have been implemented across the world. Why then has the world not been able to achieve a sustained long-lasting recovery? What has been holding back this prospect? In addition, the rapid and significant changes in the global environment have also brought with them new demands and new challenges. Our understanding of the factors that are containing the global growth prospects and the consequence of the new environment will better position us to face the fundamentally new landscape and to manage its consequent challenges. Let me first thank Khazanah for the invitation to speak at this Khazanah Megatrends Forum. The topic on the Big Shift that is being experienced in the world today is indeed highly relevant. While the international and national attention is currently focused on the immediate challenges of the global environment, equally important, however, is to recognise the long-term changes that will reshape our future. The first part of my remarks today will focus on the immediate challenges of the global economy, taking into account the fundamental factors that are likely to affect the growth outlook.
Norman T L Chan: The risk of asset-price bubbles Speech by Mr Norman TL Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Economic Summit, Hong Kong, 14 December 2009. *  *  *  Introduction 1. I am very honoured to have this opportunity to speak to you today at the Hong Kong Economic Summit. Potential risks of an asset bubble 2. Recently, many people in Hong Kong have become concerned about the emergence of an asset-price bubble. As we all know, interest rates are now very low due to the extremely loose monetary policies around the world. Attracted by a promising outlook for economic recovery, large amounts of funds have flowed into Asia, including Hong Kong. From October last year up to now, more than $ billion have flowed into the Hong Kong dollar. This will certainly exert an upward pressure on local asset markets. I am sure you are all aware that the Hong Kong asset markets have become very active again. In particular, the prices of residential properties rose for 10 consecutive months from the beginning of this year, and prices and turnover have returned to levels we saw before the financial crisis. Many people are asking whether there is already a bubble. 3. Bull markets normally occur in times of rapid economic growth, abundant liquidity and strong investment sentiment. However, as to how far a bull market can develop before it becomes a bubble, there is no easy answer.

As the fundamental role of the financial system is financial intermediation, or the channelling of funds from those who have a surplus of it to those in need of it, the comparison should usefully be made in respect of the three channels of financial intermediation, namely, that of banking, equity and debt. The total assets of the banking system of Hong Kong are equivalent to 21% of those of the Mainland. You may think that this is not high; but if you put this along with similar comparisons for population, which is only 0.5%, or gross domestic product, which is 8%, you can appreciate the significance of the banking system of Hong Kong in the context of the country as a whole. What is more, the quality of assets in the banking system of Hong Kong is superior and the efficiency in financial intermediation, in mobilising savings in the form of deposits into the hands of borrowers who are credit-worthy, is also a lot higher. Capitalisation of the equity market of Hong Kong is 2.6 times that of the Mainland. The amount of funds raised in the past ten years in Hong Kong, through Initial Public Offerings (IPO) and other fundraising activities, is nine times that on the Mainland. The turnover value in 2005 was about 1.5 times that on the Mainland, and Hong Kong also has an active derivatives market, which traded 25 million contracts in stock futures and options last year.
That is the purpose of my comments today: to diagnose some of market failures or frictions in stress-testing practices highlighted by the crisis; and, more speculatively, to suggest some practical ways in which stress-testing might deliver answers which are “roughly right”. The Golden Decade To understand the recent failures in risk management, some history is instructive. Prior to the current financial crisis, the previous two low tide marks for the financial system and risk management were the stock market crash of October 1987 and the failure of the hedge fund LTCM in September 1998. Both prompted a sea-change in risk management practices and technologies. BIS Review 18/2009  1  The October 1987 crash in many respects marked the birth of Value at Risk (VaR) as a key risk management tool in financial firms. By 1989, Dennis Weatherstone, JP Morgan’s thenchairman, called for a “4:15 Report”, which combined all of the firm’s data on market risk in one place. That report should contain information sufficient to answer the question “How much could JPM lose if tomorrow turns out to be a relatively bad day?” With this as the top-down edict, it is perhaps unsurprising that JP Morgan were an earlydeveloper and early-adopter of VaR. By 1996, they had published their methodology and the detail of the parameterisation of their risk models. In 1998 RiskMetrics Group, an independent for-profit business, spun off the JP Morgan methodology and began offering consultancy services to the risk management community.

Suffice to say, time is very unlikely to tell whether Mr Viniar’s empirical observation proves correct. Fortunately, there is a simpler explanation – the model was wrong. Of course, all models are wrong. The only model that is not wrong is reality and reality is not, by definition, a model. But risk management models have during this crisis proved themselves wrong in a more fundamental sense. They failed Keynes’ test – that it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong. With hindsight, these models were both very precise and very wrong. For that reason, 2008 might well be remembered as the year stress-testing failed. Failed those institutions who invested in it in the hope it would transform their management of risk. Failed the authorities who had relied – perhaps over-relied – on the signal it provided about financial firms’ risk management capabilities. And, perhaps most important of all, failed the financial system as a whole by contributing, first, to the decade of credit boom and, latterly, the credit bust. That is a stark conclusion. But it is a conclusion which is hard to escape. When tested against real stress, large parts of the financial system seized-up and a number of financial institutions failed. Against that backdrop, now is as good a time as any for candour about what went wrong.
At the same time, because of our large petroleum revenues, the Norwegian authorities do not face the same budget constraints on their fiscal policy as other countries faced when they introduced inflation targets. Several of the OECD countries have substantial budget surpluses now, however. Finland expects a budget surplus of 5.3 3 per cent of GDP this year. New Zealand and Ireland have introduced fund schemes where they invest their budget surpluses in anticipation of higher pension disbursements later in this century. The new Regulation on Monetary Policy was adopted on 29 March 2001. Section 1: Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. Norges Bank's implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the 1  From 1931-1933 Sweden had a regime defined as "and with all existing means to preserve the domestic purchasing power of the Swedish krona" (my translation). This must be interpreted as an inflation target. 2  A. Schaechter, M. R. Stone og M. Zelmer: "Adopting Inflastion Targeting: Practical Issues for Emerging Market Countries". IMF Occasional Paper 202. Washington 2000. 3  OECD Economic Outlook no. 69 - table "General government financial balances"  BIS Review51/2001  1  first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation.

The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2½ per cent over time. In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account. Storting Report no. 29 of 2001, "Guidelines for economic policy" states: "Consumer price inflation is expected to remain within an interval of +/-1 percentage point around the target." The inflation target of 2½ per cent over time is slightly higher than the targets in Sweden, Canada and the euro area, but corresponds to targets in the United Kingdom and Australia. In the US, consumer price inflation has been somewhat higher the last ten years. The target is approximately in line with the average inflation rate in Norway in the 1990s. In our view, with its change in monetary policy, the Government has recognised low inflation as a benefit in itself. History has shown that high inflation does not result in either sustained economic growth or lower unemployment rates. A track record of low inflation since 1990 has provided Norges Bank with a good basis for implementing monetary policy even though, as I mentioned, the inflation target was introduced during an upturn. Higher interest rates curb demand for goods and services and reduce inflation. Lower interest rates have the opposite effect. If evidence suggests that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased.
In the 18 months since 1 January 1999 when the euro was introduced the US current account deficit was something over $ compared with net long-term capital inflows of nearly $ Meanwhile the Eurozone was in small current account surplus but saw net direct investment and portfolio outflows of some $ The conventional “fundamentals” - which one would still expect to reassert themselves in due course - have been overridden for the time being by these massive international capital flows. To the extent that the capital flows have indeed been driven by an improvement in prospective rates of return in the US associated with the productivity “shock” - and I freely acknowledge that this explanation may be oversimplistic - one would expect that at some point it would be discounted through a change in relative asset values, including the change in the exchange rate. The problem is that we simply do not know how close we are to that point - or indeed whether we have already passed it. Putting that question to the market was, for me, the real point of the recent G7 intervention. We all need to understand much more about the nature of the capital flows and in particular about what motivates the market participants who initiate them. My immediate point, however, is that on the basis of what we do know it seems unlikely that the euro’s weakness in the foreign exchange market is pushed by any obvious macro-economic failure in the Eurozone.

Moreover, the investment environment in Saudi Arabia has improved, and the Kingdom has obtained the eighth rank at the global level for attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), according to the UNCTAD’s report. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has recently been lauded by FATFS’s report issued at the end of last June for its commitment to the nine Special Recommendations related to Terrorism Financing combined with the forty Recommendations on Anti-money laundering. As a result, Saudi Arabia occupies the first rank at the Arab level, and one of the G-20’s top  2  BIS Review 128/2010  ten positions. The tribute paid to the Kingdom is as an appreciation by the international community of the Saudi efforts in combating the crimes of money laundering and financing of terrorism, and it highlights the soundness of the Saudi stance stemming from its adherence to the tolerant Shari’a, implementation of the resolutions of the UN and Security Counsel and implementation of the best practices in this field. All these achievements have been accomplished by the grace of Allah Almighty, and then thanks to Your diligence and guidance, may Allah safeguard You. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of the first countries giving priority to combating the phenomenon of money laundering and financing of terrorism. In addition, it has been in the lead in combating this phenomenon due to its security, social and economic repercussions.