samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Control design and execution take place in a world in which there is uncertainty about whether 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  there is a problem, what the problem is, what to do about it, when to do something, and what the effects of what we do will be. We can make better decisions when we understand and manage that uncertainty. There is also uncertainty about threats. We will never be able to envision the characteristics of all future causes of disruption. Even when we plan effectively, we will be surprised again. And, like any other system, the control system will exhibit performance variability. For these reasons, we can’t rely solely on prevention. Resilience requires the ability to withstand and recover when threats make it through preventive barriers, so a strong control system must incorporate preventive, detective, and corrective controls. Perhaps because we are overoptimistic about prevention, detective and corrective controls sometimes get second-class billing. For many threats, time is not on our side; the impact grows as the detection time increases. That’s the case with “dwell time” for cyber breaches, which is the amount of time attackers are on your network before you detect them.9 It’s important to decide how long you are willing to wait to find out that you have a problem, and then use that as a requirement to design detective controls. Underinvesting in corrective controls is problematic too.

Some focus on assets, others focus on organizational units, and yet others look at specific parts of processes. The result can be a set of assessments with potentially inconsistent coverage and disconnected recommendations. So, an appealing alternative to counter that trend and bridge siloed assessments is to integrate risk assessments. A unified approach can bring together risk and business professionals to understand and manage the risks to critical processes. The idea is to create a common picture of gaps and then design coordinated action plans that can target improvements in resilience. Let’s focus on business continuity to see how an integrated risk approach can strengthen resilience.5 Business continuity programs have traditionally been designed to restore critical physical or technology infrastructures that can be disrupted by threats like extreme weather or loss of power. So, a business continuity plan might involve arranging for a backup data center if the primary data center goes down due to a hurricane. Within an organization, different business areas may develop their own plans that are focused on their specific business needs and priorities. An integrated business continuity plan is one that is designed to protect critical organizational processes and their essential assets from the full range of relevant threats. An integrated approach begins with organizational objectives. This bridges a gap between what good looks like to an individual business and what it looks like to the organization as a whole.
We believe Project Guardian can help pave the way for the next evolution of financial markets in Singapore We want to create a future where: any asset can be fractionalised; no market is too big to access; trading costs are drastically reduced; and trust can be established with greater transparency and better accountability We invite everyone to join us on this exciting journey of tokenisation. Submit your proposals to our FinTech Regulatory Sandbox for live experimentation. As you can see from the examples of Project Ubin+, Project Orchid, and Project Guardian, there is much more to the digital asset ecosystem than cryptocurrencies. The real value in the crypto industry comes not from speculating in cryptocurrencies but from tokenising assets and placing them on a distributed ledger for use cases that increase economic efficiency or enhance social inclusion. The question is often asked: does Singapore want to be a crypto asset hub? If a crypto hub is about experimenting with programmable money, yes we want to be a crypto hub. If it is about applying digital assets for use cases like atomic settlement, yes we want to be a crypto hub. If it is about tokenising real and financial assets to increase efficiency and reduce risks in financial transactions, yes we want to be a crypto hub. 8/11  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  But if it is about trading and speculating in cryptocurrencies, that is not the kind of crypto hub we want to be.

SPEECH  Higher policy rate will curb inflation Introductory statement by Governor Ida Wolden Bache at press conference following announcement of the policy rate and publication of Monetary Policy Report 3/22 Chart 1 Policy rate raised Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee decided to raise the policy rate from 1.75% to 2.25% at its meeting on 21 September. The policy rate will most likely be raised further in November. Norges Bank’s task is to keep inflation low and stable. The operational target is inflation of close to 2 percent over time. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability over time. We are raising the policy rate with the aim of bringing down inflation. Price stability is important for the economy to function well. It reduces uncertainty and facilitates planning. Those with low incomes and small margins are normally the hardest hit when inflation suddenly surges. The main contribution monetary policy can make to promoting high employment over time is to ensure low and stable inflation. As long as there is confidence that inflation will remain low and stable, the costs of minor deviations from the target of 2 percent are fairly insubstantial. But if households and firms expect inflation to be elevated and high inflation is incorporated into price and wage setting, inflation may take root, and bringing it down again could prove difficult. Chart 2: Inflation is high Consumer price inflation is now rising rapidly both globally and in Norway.
Source: CBRT. Inflation and monetary policy outlook  Distinguished Members of the Press, Esteemed Guests, Having summarized our monetary policy stance and the impact of this stance on financial markets, I would now like to talk about the macroeconomic outlook and assumptions underlying our forecasts. First, I would like to summarize the recent inflation developments and then I will compare our short-term forecasts with the actual data recorded in the first quarter. As you might recall, in the October 2010 Inflation Report, we drew attention to the price hikes due to increases in unprocessed food and tobacco prices, which are beyond the control of the CBRT, and concluded that these items would leave sizeable room for disinflation. In fact, during the subsequent two quarters, inflation declined by 5.2 percentage points and dropped to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  4 percent in March, a level close to the lower bound of our January Inflation Report forecast (Chart 5). Chart 5. January 2011 Inflation Forecasts and Realizations  Forecast Range*  Uncertainty Band  Year-End Inflation Targets  12  Output Gap  Control Horizon  10 8 6 Percent  4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 Dec-13  Sep-13  Jun-13  Mar-13  Dec-12  Sep-12  Jun-12  Mar-12  Dec-11  Sep-11  Jun-11  Mar-11  Sep-10  Dec-10  Jun-10  Mar-10  Dec-09  -10  * Shaded region indicates the 70 percent confidence interval for the forecast.

Chart 14. Revisions to Oil and Import Price Assumptions Oil Prices (USD/bbl)  Import Prices (2003=100)  Source: Bloomberg, CBRT. Source: TurkStat, CBRT. Particularly due to supply-side developments, oil and other commodity prices remained considerably above our assumptions presented in the January Inflation Report (Chart 14). Hence, we revised our assumptions for oil and other commodity prices upwards (Table 2). As illustrated on the slide, these changes in assumptions led to an upward revision of about 50 basis points for the end-2011 inflation forecast and a slightly upward revision for the 2012 inflation forecast. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Table 2. Revisions to 2011 Assumptions  Oil (Annual Average, USD)  Prices  Import (Annual Percent Change)  Prices  Food Price (Year-end Percent Change)  Inflation  January 2011  April 2011  95  115  10.9  16.2  7.5  7.5  Another factor affecting 2011 inflation forecasts has been the tariff hike on fabrics and apparels. Although major uncertainties exist about how this development will be reflected on prices, we assumed that this would add to year-end inflation by about 50 basis points while revising our forecasts. Despite the recent benign course of food prices, we preserved our assumption regarding food inflation for end-2011 at 7.5 percent in view of the extreme volatility in unprocessed food prices and rapid increases in agricultural commodity prices (Table 2).
Mario Draghi: The path to recovery and the ECB’s role Speech by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the Symposium on Financial Stability and the Role of Central Banks, organised by the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main, 27 February 2014. *  *  *  Summary The euro area has made considerable progress on its reform agenda, says ECB President Mario Draghi. Speaking at a conference organised by Germany’s Bundesbank in Frankfurt he emphasises that euro area governments have improved their fiscal positions despite recessionary headwinds and stressed euro area countries have become more competitive. “In parallel, the architecture of EMU has been strengthened in ways that many would have considered inconceivable two years ago”, says Mr Draghi. The move towards a banking union is crucial not only for the functioning of the financial system, but also for the conduct of monetary policy. Since the beginning of the crisis the ECB’s Governing Council has taken decisive steps to engineer a monetary policy stance that is commensurate with the subdued medium-term inflation outlook. But standard monetary policy in the form of rate cuts was not enough to ensure an appropriate monetary policy stance, because unwarranted fears of euro break-up impaired the monetary transmission, he says. Against this background the ECB announced Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). Like all the ECB’s monetary policy measures, OMT served, says Mr Draghi, to ensure compliance with the bank’s price stability mandate.

The other is to fix structural shortcomings in the euro area architecture that had allowed imbalances to build up in the first place. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  On both counts, the euro area has made considerable progress. Despite strong recessionary headwinds, euro area governments have markedly improved their fiscal positions. Average government deficit ratios fell by more than a quarter over the last two years and, excluding interest payments, were approaching balance at the end of 2013. Simultaneously, most of the stressed euro area countries have made remarkable progress in gaining competitiveness. Over the past five years, the cumulative unit labour cost differential vis-à-vis the euro area have fallen by more than 20 percentage points in Ireland, around 15 percentage points in Greece and Spain, and almost 10 percentage points in Portugal. This was accompanied by substantial improvements in the export dynamics of these countries. Overall, we see the euro area’s economic recovery gradually taking hold, albeit at a slow and uneven pace. In parallel, the architecture of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been strengthened in ways that many would have considered inconceivable two years ago. Perhaps most important for monetary policy, and certainly most topical for this conference, are the concrete and ambitious steps towards a banking union. By establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), European policy-makers have demonstrated a firm commitment to a stringent and uniform application of common supervisory standards.
9  Moody’s and S&P have removed or reduced government support from the ratings of some UK and US banks. Fitch has revised the support assumptions for UK and US banks to remove the ‘Support Rating Floors’ that capture government support assumptions. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the cost of banking services and reduce return on equity. But those costs are the flipside of the removal of a subsidy – they are not wider social costs. It is essential that efforts to ensure even the largest banks can be resolved remain on track. In the UK, that includes the ringfencing of entities taking core deposits. Impediments to resolvability must continue to be addressed. If those efforts hit obstacles, higher equity requirements will be needed to achieve the same ends. The necessary protections for the real economy have to be bought. The only question is at what price. But even with an effective resolution backstop in place, the costs of systemic bank failure are far from insignificant. So the second part of our macroprudential approach is a baseline capital standard that makes economic disruption caused by a weak banking system extremely rare. But not more so. Our baseline – tier 1 capital of 13.5% of risk weighted assets, or around 3.75% of total assets – aims to do this. The dual key approach – risk-weighted capital and leverage – recognises the imperfections in risk weight models and guards against them.

Should the threat level rise above normal, so too will capital buffers. They’ll go as far as needed to ensure banks’ defences keep up with threats if they grow. And importantly, if threats materialise, or shrink, we’ll reduce our expectation for capital buffers back towards the baseline level. In doing this, we’re aiming to turn what’s happened in the past on its head. Bank capital buffers have been too small in the good times and needed to be built up in the bad. They were pro-cyclical and amplified the bad times. Now, we’re making them countercyclical. Buffers will built up from their base level as the risks grow, so they can be drawn down, if and when the risks materialise. In the bad times, banks will be able to absorb losses and move on to continue to serve the real economy. Our flexibility extends beyond moving capital buffers up and down. With higher baseline capital and leverage requirements now being reached, we are learning about the effects of those requirements on the provision of services to the real economy. Some of those effects have come into sharper focus in recent months. Sovereign repo markets have shown signs of reduced liquidity, for example. And there are also signs of reduced market-making activity in sovereign and corporate bond markets. None of these developments should make us rush to amend capital standards that have been put in place to protect the real economy.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  From my perspective, Japan’s experience with forward guidance for the policy rate, asset purchases and a more formal inflation goal are particularly instructive, as this helped inform the later use of such tools in the United States. In early 1999, the Bank of Japan said it would maintain its zero interest rate policy until “deflationary concerns” were “dispelled.” This commitment was lifted in August 2000, and the BoJ raised the policy rate by a quarter-point. However, the BoJ was subsequently obliged to reverse course, and reintroduced forward guidance in March 2001. This guidance was tied to the realization of a new inflation objective. With deflation intensifying, the Bank of Japan embarked on a quantitative easing (QE) program in 2001 designed to increase the size of the monetary base. The Bank of Japan engaged in purchases of JGBs that were large in scale, but confined to short-dated maturities. This reflected a view that such purchases primarily acted through the liabilities side of the central bank's balance sheet – pushing up the amount of reserves in the banking system. Because the growth of the monetary base was deemed the goal of policy, it was logical to purchase short-dated assets, which could be allowed to run off once a sustainable recovery was in place. The downside of this approach was that the purchases did not change the composition of the private sector’s balance sheet very much because the policy essentially resulted in the exchange of one short-term risk-free asset for another.

In the case of the U.S., this could include changes in immigration policy, infrastructure investments that remove bottlenecks and job training programs that improve the quality of human capital. Implications for U.S. monetary policy Undoubtedly, we will continue to learn as we seek to implement monetary policy most effectively. Let me give a few examples of how my own thinking may evolve. In terms of our asset purchase program, I believe we should be prepared to adjust the total amount of purchases to that needed to deliver a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook in the context of price stability. In doing this, we might adjust the pace of purchases up or down as the labor market and inflation outlook changes in a material way. For me, the base case forecast is not the sole consideration – how confident we are about that outcome is also important. Because the outlook is uncertain, I cannot be sure which way – up or down – the next change will be. But at some point, I expect to see sufficient evidence to make me more confident about the prospect for substantial improvement in the labor market outlook. At that time, in my view, it will be appropriate to reduce the pace at which we are adding accommodation through asset purchases. Over the coming months, how well the economy fights its way through the significant fiscal drag currently in force will be an important aspect of this judgment.
It is very difficult to increase the income level and change the saving tendency in the short term. For this reason, the domestic savings deficit should preferably be met by direct foreign capital investments. Graph 10: The Shares of Public and Private Investments in GNP  30 Public  25  Private  (%)  20 15 10 5  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  1991  1990  1989  1988  1987  0  Source: SIS. Due to the current economic program and the structural reforms in the scope of the program, a transition from a public sector-supported capital accumulation model to a private sector-supported accumulation model occurs, where market conditions are taken as indicators and criteria. The share of the private sector in the national income increases, whereas the share of the public sector declines. It is clear that the private sector-oriented growth plays a major role in achieving sustainable growth by boosting both exports and total industrial production. However, it should be noted that the private sector could not meet the expectations because it could not exploit sufficient resources. This was due to the dominance of the public sector borrowing requirement in the finance sector. Furthermore, the factors that slow down the capital accumulation process include the incomplete tax reform and the  12  BIS Review 36/2005  poor relationship between banking sector and real sector.

On the other hand, regulatedprice goods and non-food goods had a low and downward contribution to this month’s inflation. In line with Bank of Albania’s expectation, controlled inflationary pressures by the domestic economy, as well as anchored inflation expectations created a favourable environment for a rapid reduction of imported inflation effects. Consumer prices during 2011 were mainly affected by supply shocks, materialised in higher prices of imported goods and some products subject to excise, or with regulated prices. These effects appeared to be more moderate in July; in the absence of sudden shocks, they are expected to decrease further in the months ahead. Below-potential economic growth continued to generate controlled inflationary pressures on the demand side. Hence, core inflation stopped increasing and is set around the Bank of Albania’s target of 3%. Moreover, stabilisation of inflation expectations of economic agents and the prudent policy of the Bank of Albania regarding their anchoring are reflected in moderated second-round effects on inflation. (Following, I will describe in more detail economic highlights defining the inflation performance and their expected development.) Although in an unfavourable external environment characterised by added uncertainties in our trade partners, the Albanian economy continued to grow during the second quarter of 2011. In the absence of direct data, the Bank of Albania deems that economic growth during this period is similar to the one recorded in the preceding quarter, thus remaining below Albania’s potential growth rate.
In closing, once again, I would like to express our deepest appreciation to the Yang Berhormat Dato' Mustapa Mohamed, Minister of Higher Education for gracing this occasion and for accepting to witness INCEIF partnership with nine institutions of higher learning. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 125/2006

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Strengthening financial cooperation between China and Singapore Opening remarks by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Opening Ceremony of Monetary Authority of Singapore’s Beijing Representative Office, Beijing, 28 May 2013. *  *  *  Mr Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the People’s Bank of China Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen 1 Good afternoon. Thank you for taking the time to witness the opening of the Monetary of Authority of Singapore’s Beijing Representative Office. MAS’ first representative office in Asia 2 This is MAS’ first representative office in Asia. Three factors underpin our choice to base our first Asian representative office in China. China’s growth has significant implications for the Asian region and Singapore 3 All of us have an interest in the successful transformation of the world’s most dynamic economy. China’s 12th Five-Year Plan marks an important transition, with increased emphasis on urbanisation, services and social development, and consequently also greater reliance on private consumption as a source of economic growth. China is managing this transition in a pragmatic and purposeful manner. At the same time, many industrial enterprises in the coastal provinces are rapidly upgrading in response to rising wages and moving up the value chain. 4 These domestic changes in China are taking place at a time when other Asian nations too are moving up the curve of development. It will lead to growing connectivity between Asia and China, and new patterns of connectivity as well, in good and services.