samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the current circumstance, the Federal Reserve’s liquidity programs act on the asset side of the balance sheet as the Fed lends funds against less liquid collateral and expands its asset holdings via purchases of agency debt, agency MBS and Treasuries. The goals are to slow down the pace of deleveraging to reduce the risk of catastrophic failure, improve market function and ease financial market conditions. In contrast, the Bank of Japan worked on the liability side of the balance. Their goal was to expand the amount of excess reserves held by the banking system so that the banks would be more willing to expand their credit provisions. Although the Fed’s activities have led to a big jump in excess reserves, this increase is incidental – a byproduct rather than goal of the asset-oriented programs. Second, as a consequence of this my point, the size of the balance sheet, is not a good metric for measuring the impact of the Fed’s facilities or the amount of stimulus that the Fed is providing via these programs. For example, consider the impact of the Fed facilities on rollover risk. A Fed facility that eliminates rollover risk might not be used at all. There might be no balance sheet impact. Nevertheless, the facility could have an important impact on market function and financial market conditions. It is not possible to mechanically map the size of the balance sheet back onto the impact on financial market conditions.

Benoît Cœuré: Cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures Introductory remarks by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the High-Level Meeting on Cyber Resilience, Frankfurt am Main, 19 June 2017. * * *  Introduction It is a pleasure to welcome you here today to this strategic high-level meeting on cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures. The aim of bringing together high-level representatives from large European market infrastructures, critical service providers and public authorities is threefold: First we would like to gain a deeper understanding of the cyber threat landscape in Europe. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) will make a presentation on the cyber threat landscape and its relevance for the financial sector. Second, we will share with you the Eurosystem’s cyber strategy for financial market infrastructures and also explain ECB Banking Supervision’s approach to the issue of bank cyber resilience. Third, we would like to hear your views on how we can all collaborate in a trusted environment to enhance the cyber resilience of financial market infrastructures. More specifically, we would like to assess with you how much interest there is in creating a highlevel cyber resilience forum for pan-European financial market infrastructures, critical service providers and competent authorities. Before we start, let me briefly set the scene.
This would cause both an inward shift, and steepening of, the Phillips curve, raising the price level and increasing its responsiveness to upward demand pressures. The UK has been a particular beneficiary of demographic trends over recent years. The UK working age population has risen, on average, by over ½% per year over the past two decades. It has also experienced rising rates of labour market participation, in particular among older workers and women. The first, and possibly both, of those factors are now in reverse gear. The share of the total UK population of working age has been falling since 2008. Globally, dependency ratios – the fraction of the population not in the workforce – is forecast to start rising from around now for the first time since the 1970s (Chart 15). This rise in dependency ratios is fastest in high-income countries, such as the UK. Until recently, this effect had been more than offset by rises in the UK population. But that, too, is changing. Recent estimates suggest the UK population may have shrunk by as much as 1.3 million people over the past year.18 If these demographic trends continue – a smaller population fewer of whom are in work – this would turn the demographic tailwinds of the past decade into a headwind looking ahead, constraining supply and potentially amplifying inflationary forces. 16  Friedman (1961). Goodhart and Pradhan (2020). 18 See O’Connor and Portes (2021). The authors themselves describe this estimate as an upper bound.

Since then, the financial system has developed around a well-managed and capitalized banking sector that is both healthy and competitive. This feature also rules out financial dominance of monetary policy in Chile. The CBC shares normative attributions with a specialized public institution, focusing on the formulation of financial regulations applicable to monetary markets. Chile’s financial system strength has been acclaimed by international credit rating agencies. Moody’s Financial Strength Ranking places Chile’s financial strength close to the top of industrial countries (figure 5). 2  BIS Review 68/2007  Monetary policy framework: Central Bank charter and its objectives Although the road to CBC autonomy began in the mid-1970s, the 1989 Constitutional Law of the CBC specified the Bank’s objectives and granted CBC the necessary instruments to comply with its legal mandate. Since 1989, the CBC is an autonomous, technical institution, governed by the Constitution, with full legal capacity, control of its equity, and of indefinite duration. The constitutional law establishes two objectives for the CBC. The first objective is to preserve the stability of Chile’s currency. This means avoiding loss of purchasing power due to inflation. The latter objective is achieved through ensuring that inflation remains low and stable. The second objective of the CBC is to ensure the normal functioning of domestic and external payments, by safeguarding the financial sector’s primary functions of credit and savings intermediation, provision of payment services, and proper risk allocation by financial markets. CBC’s Constitutional Law prohibits CBC credit to the government.
The problems are not a consequence of shortcomings in the borrowing instruments. I do not see any immediate need for new types of lending instruments, such as non-borrowing programs or a reintroduction of Contingency Credit Lines. There are already surveillance methods in place to deal with such situations, and today's borrowing instruments are sufficiently flexible to meet the existing requirements (and demand). Nor do I believe that the problems to any great extent are due to incorrect analysis or erroneous assessments, even though the situations faced by the Fund are often difficult and the advice given has been open to question from time to time. Nonetheless, there are a number of things that can be done in this area. Shortcomings still exist, as I mentioned earlier, as regards the Fund's participation in crisis resolution. There is scope for further development of those instruments that exist today. The reason why this has not happened is because some countries oppose it for political reasons. This brings me into the role that “political considerations” play for the IMF to work well. In my view, the central problems of the IMF are often political in nature. These problems exist at several different levels: •  Individual countries are sometimes for political reasons not willing to take the sometimes bitter medicine prescribed by the IMF’s staff and Executive Board and engage in serious dialogue.

The Riksbank therefore began its repo rate increases, but was force to back down when it became clear that the global economy was weaker than anticipated. Moreover, long-term inflation expectations fell. In 2015, the interest rate was cut to –0.5 per cent. The Riksbank also bought a large amount of government bonds to further stimulate economic development. The Riksbank has also reinforced the foreign currency reserves to have a better preparedness to give Swedish banks access to foreign currency in a crisis situation. Both of these measures led to the Riksbank's balance sheet becoming much larger than it was before (see Figure 1). The Riksbank's response to the coronavirus At the beginning of 2020, the world once again suffered a global economic crisis, this time in the form of the repercussions of the coronavirus outbreak. The measures taken to reduce the spread of the virus have had very large economic consequences and created a need for support measures from various authorities. The Riksbank’s role in the initial stage of the crisis has been to ensure that there is no lack of liquidity so that lending can continue and we can conduct an expansionary monetary policy to support the economy. We have therefore taken a large number of measures to reduce the economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. When it becomes clearer how lasting the crisis is likely to be, it may be appropriate to further adjust the expansiveness of our monetary policy.
13  Sending a strong message in this way at the outset of the resolution will  maximise the chances of stabilising the firm and if liability holders know their claims will be refinanced, reduce the risk of a further run. This need for clarity is understood at international level. FSB has just published a consultation paper on bail-in execution addressing a number of issues I have described including valuation and exchange mechanics. 14  Not least there are important home-host dependencies that need to be addressed. After all, in  a UK G-SIB resolution we will need to bail-in debt on both sides of the Atlantic, in the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) as well as Clearstream and Euroclear. This includes working through with market regulators the securities law issues that will arise through a bail-in, ensuring that disclosure and listing requirements continue to be satisfied. 13  See Box 2 – the Bank’s approach to providing liquidity in resolution in https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financialstability/resolution/boes-approach-to-resolution.pdf?la=en&hash=8213BE00D67C4CADB948D51FEBD164E136A70BE6 14 See FSB ‘ Principles on Bail-In Execution’ (2017) http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P301117-1.pdf 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  (c) Disclosure The third and final area I want to address is disclosure. A recurrent theme of my remarks has been the importance of ex ante disclosure to making resolution credible and to realising the benefits of increased market discipline.

We want debt investors to have the information they need to price risk and so support the proposals in the TLAC term sheet and Basel’s Pillar 3 Framework that require banks to disclose the rank ordering of their liability structure at legal entity level. As I have described, we want debtholders and other stakeholders to understand how we will use out resolution powers and so have published a document setting out our approach to resolution – otherwise 15  known as the Purple Book. The latest edition in October indicates how far we have come since we first  published the Purple Book in 2014. But we have further to go. It is our intention – which we indicated to the Treasury Select Committee in March – to publish summaries of the resolution plans for the major UK banks and our assessment of their resolvability. We will do this after the start of 2019 when ring-fencing, the first level of TLAC requirements and operational continuity in resolution arrangements are in place. As an institution we want to be open and accountable. As a resolution authority we need to be for it to work. There is a famous Chinese proverb that notes a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. On the resolution journey there have been a lot of steps – in fact we could all be forgiven for feeling footsore – but the thousand mile marker is coming into view. 15  See the Bank of England’s approach to resolution https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financialstability/resolution/boes-approach-to-resolution.pdf?la=en&hash=8213BE00D67C4CADB948D51FEBD164E136A70BE6 .
A second conclusion is that this shortage of an unequivocal measures means that problems may arise for monetary policy decision-makers. On the one hand, we need to test our way forward with regard to the available  I would especially like to thank Mårten Löf for helping me with this speech. Charlotta Edler, Marianne Sterner, Ulf Söderström and Anders Vredin have provided valuable comments. ∗  1 [19]  data and look at them from different aspects and for this we need the different measures. But we also need, on the other hand, to be clear and transparent with regard to the objective for monetary policy. I would say that we have seen examples of this conflict in recent years. It can be problematic if monetary policy decision-makers talk too much about underlying inflation, because the rest of the world can start to believe that the focus of monetary policy is shifting from the actual inflation rate to some other measure. Differentiate between lasting and temporary price movements We need some background to understand why these are important questions. According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, the objective for monetary policy is to maintain price stability. In 1993, the General Council of the Riksbank specified the operational target for monetary policy to be an annual rate of inflation of 2 per cent.

And at the same time, the average for the groups with low price volatility is also higher than the actual rate of inflation; 2.2 per cent compared with 1.6 per cent. It is common to divide the CPIF into separate indices for goods, services, energy and food. The prices of these large groups can have different determinants, which motivates sometimes wanting to distinguish between the price increases. 23 Service prices have the greatest weight among the components with the lowest volatility (Table 2). 24 There is more of a mixture among prices with high volatility, but all energy prices are included there. There are fewer services prices in the group with high volatility. 22 The fact that the average for other prices is so low is largely due to the inclusion of the component “home electronics”. It has an average rate of increase of -14 per cent during the period. 23 Consumer prices for energy and food are highly affected by the development of commodity prices on the world market, which justifies wanting to study these sub-groups separately from time to time. Costs also develop differently in different sectors. Costs normally increase more rapidly in service sectors than in goods sectors as wage increases are roughly the same in the different sectors while productivity increases more slowly in the service sector. 24 Their weight amounts to a good 70 per cent of the total weight of prices in Table 2. 13 [19]  It is not the same prices that are volatile all the time.
Ladies and Gentlemen, as we strive to achieve the Vision of becoming a middle income country by the year 2030, we shall no doubt be confronted with such and many more similar challenges both economically and politically. To be well prepared for such trying times ahead, we need to groom our best talents to assume leadership positions in all sectors of the economy. To achieve this vital task of nurturing our future leaders, the Government is trying its level best to provide education to all Zambians. The Government has done well thus far and should be implored to continue doing so. BIS Review 160/2008  1  However, providing education for the benefit of all citizens is never an easy task due to other budgetary pressures exerted by other competing sectors like Health, Agriculture, and Community Development etc. If we are to achieve education for the majority of our people, we need concerted efforts from all stakeholders including private institutions and charitable organisations like the Masomo Education Foundation. Mr President, I am informed that the objective of the Foundation is to educate young Zambians at local colleges. I am particularly pleased that the Foundation is utilizing local educational institutions. This should be commended as it demonstrates the confidence you have in the calibre of our learned colleagues at these institutions.

I therefore, urge the donors to the Foundation to increase their allocation in the coming year and in future. I also call on other well wishers in this room and outside to support this noble cause. Remember, an educated population is a pre-requisite to a country’s economic development. This year, the Masomo Scholarship is conferred on three exceptional and deserving young individuals in Ms Lenganji Nalwamba who is studying Electrical Engineering, Mr. Wapatwa Silungwe, studying Civil Engineering and Mr. Emmanuel Mwila who is pursuing Agricultural Economics. In congratulating you on this deserved achievement, let me remind you that as you accept this scholarship, you have an obligation and duty to the Masomo Foundation and to the nation at large. It is this strong sense of obligation, duty, and commitments to serve the nation that enabled our fathers and fore fathers serve the Nation wholeheartedly and brought us where we are today. As students with a Masomo Scholarship, each of you will be given a unique opportunity to prove yourself. I urge you to work hard and learn from others around you including those different from you and less endowed than you. Let me also mention that as a Masomo Scholar, your progress and performance will be closely monitored and you will be looked upon as role models. I urge you to set the standards for others to emulate. I am confident that all three of you will live up to the highest standards and will not disappoint us.
But more important is that these innovations have the potential to “unbundle” key banking functions, like payments, risk transformation, risk sharing, and capital allocation. This can shatter the architecture upon which central banks rely.2 Slide 11  The irruption of FinTech ▪ FinTech involves a number of developments that allow the unbundling of financial services ▪ Financial Stability Board | Technologically enabled innovation in financial services that could result in new business models, applications, processes or products with an associated material effect on the provision of financial services  ▪ The scope of products or activities is quite broad. Moreover, products or services that are nowadays commonly or massively used could have been considered FinTech, e.g. banknotes, cheques, credit cards, ATMs, an electronic transfers  [SLIDE 12] To understand the potential impact of FinTech on central banking and on economic development it is useful to identify specific dimensions of FinTech innovation, whose impact monetary policy, financial stability and economic development can be assessed one by one. These include the following:  1  FSB (2017), “Financial Stability Implications from Fin Tech, Supervisory and Regulatory Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention,” June 2017. 2 Carney, M. (2016), “Enabling the FinTech transformation: Revolution, Restoration or Reformation?” Speech delivered Lord Mayor's Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London at the Mansion House, on June 2016. 8  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  Slide 12  FinTech categories ▪ Five categories: 1. Payments, transfers, clearing, and settlement: closely linked with financial inclusion 2.

Being able to understand the FinTech revolution and to ensure that this contributes to economic stability and people’s welfare is one crucial way to remain trustworthy. 19
It may well be in the interest of the candidate countries to make this period as short as possible. Sixth, it is true that any country entering the EMU need to fix the exchange rate. One should not take for granted, however, that the longer the period of the intermediate regime the better, as it is not always true that longer wait produces more information about the proper rate of exchange. It may produce just more noise. Seventh, both further efficient disinflation and strengthening long-term economic growth require completion of certain structural reforms in the candidate countries. There is no way around it. In case of Poland, the liberalization of the labour market and increased participation rate is badly needed. Fiscal reforms must concentrate on rationalising the spending and not just increasing taxes. Privatisation needs to be completed and it should include the banking sector. We have to strengthen competition in fuel and energy sectors. Legal framework needs to be adjusted to be more efficient. The earlier deadline of the entry to the EU could act as a powerful motivating device to complete those reforms. I am a great believer in the deadlines and I think they help to achieve success. Delaying the entry could do more harm then good, as it could weaken the incentive to complete the necessary and often politically costly reforms. Eighth, flexibility of the rate of exchange is a poor substitute for structural reforms.

Secondly, the great harmoniser between the real and nominal convergence are the structural reforms. The more reforms one has implemented, the less costly the disinflation is and the stronger the longer term economic growth. I would finish up with the main point. The strategy on behalf of the European Union should be not to delay the entry of the candidate countries into EMU but to encourage the candidates to complete structural reforms. The cost of disinflation would be lowered and the long term economic would be helped. This is a win-win strategy as it helps the candidates and ensures the existing EU members that the new members would be economically stable and dynamic. Thank you very much. 2  BIS Review 1/2002