samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In my view as well as in the conclusions by all the analyses that focus on this issue, Albania has huge potential, to a large extent unutilised, to support a sustainable economic growth, convergent to the economies of our trade partner countries in the euro area. Despite shortterm difficulties, originating largely from external sources, the fundamentals of Albania’s economic development remain sound. The macroeconomic stability, natural resources, structure and cost of the labour force, render the long-term investment in the Albanian economy an investment with a guaranteed return. In invite you all to be partake in this vision; engage even more intensively in supporting the Albanian economy with loans and financial services; and explore new areas and directions for the country’s economic development. I am confident that this is not only the best service you may provide to Albania, but also the best strategy to ensure sustainable and profitable development of the banking industry in Albania. In unison, we should not allow short-term problems to be transformed into weaknesses and lost opportunities in the long run. You will always find in the Bank of Albania an institution that is fully determined to comply with its objective on price and financial stability; a fair and farsighted regulator on banking supervision; an efficient administrator of liquidity and financial markets; and a profoundly professional institution and provider of useful macroeconomic analyses. Finally, I would like to make my most sincere wishes for a successful New Year 2013 in your professional career and personal life! Thank you.

Banking services should be provided in accordance with the clients’ financial literacy, in any case highlighting, the benefits and the risks that customers may incur as they use your bank products. In the context of its role as the supervisory and regulatory authority of banking operations, the Bank of Albania will continue to carefully monitor and address the challenges facing this  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  activity. Our regulatory framework and supervisory and operational activities will be adapted to provide all the necessary support for the banking activity to be safe and have multiple benefits for the banking industry, customers, and the economy in general. The professional and continuous communication with you will be at the basis of our activity, to identify together the best solutions that address your needs and those of other interest groups. Dear bank managers, In conclusion, I would like to bring to your attention one of the biggest lessons learned from the crisis of the latest global financial system, which I think remains applicable for Albania: concentration on short-term time horizons is counterproductive to both individual financial institutions that engage in them, and the overall financial system and economy of a country. In this context, I invite you all to be farsighted in your analyses and decision-making processes with regard to the future of the economy of Albania and its banking industry.
Of course, the authorities must stand firm about the figure 2½ if the inflation target is to anchor long-term expectations and if we shall reap the long-term benefits of this conduct of monetary policy. Monetary policy affects the economy with a lag. The current level of inflation does not provide an adequate basis for determining the level at which interest rates should be set today. Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effects of an interest rate change occurs within two years. Two years is thus a reasonable time horizon for achieving the inflation target. Economic agents can act on the assumption that the inflation rate will be 2½ per cent. If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. There is symmetry here. It is equally important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low, as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high. The global economy has experienced a slowdown during the last year. The downturn in the US has had contagion effects on European and Asian economies through its impact on world trade and the financial markets. Capital markets are global, and when revenues decline in the US, enterprises with operations in many countries also reduce investment and operating expenses in Europe and Asia.

Normally, this will lead to an appreciation of the krone, with a further reduction in earnings and employment. Manufacturing will, therefore, feel the effects of excessively high wage growth to an even greater extent than earlier. At present, the labour market is relatively tight, which is reflected in high wage growth. In other countries, the situation is different, with sluggish economic development and declining inflation. As a result, interest rates are higher in Norway than in other countries. According to the guideline for fiscal policy, the use of petroleum revenues will increase every year for a number of years ahead. This will sustain the demand for labour. The service industries will need more resources. The contest for labour resources will intensify. To contain inflation, monetary policy must probably be fairly tight in the years ahead. Since 1997, labour costs have increased by between 5 and 7 per cent per year. Nevertheless, the increase in consumer prices has been about 2½ per cent the last couple of years. The krone exchange rate has appreciated since the summer of 2000 as a result of a wider interest rate differential between Norway and other countries. Combined with low growth abroad and increased trade with low-cost countries such as China, this has led to a slower rise in import prices. A higher rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services reflects an increase in labour costs in Norway. As the world economy recovers, import price inflation will probably edge up.
In July, CPI inflation increased by 0.7 per cent compared with July last year, and CPIF inflation increased by 0.8 per cent. This was completely in line with our forecasts and with market expectations. Information on developments in the real economy during the third quarter is so far limited to the business and consumer tendency surveys for July and to the purchasing managers’ index for July. The National Institute of Economic  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Research’s economic tendency survey fell in July and is at a level indicating that growth in the economy is weaker than normal. The confidence indicator for households did rise compared with June, and then to a level just above the historical average. Another bright spot was that the indicator for the manufacturing industry rose. This is in line with the indications from thepurchasing managers’ index for the manufacturing industry, which also rose in July. However, one must exercise caution in drawing conclusions on the basis of changes in individual months. Appreciation of the krona during the summer Another significant factor this summer has been the large appreciation of the krona in relation to the euro. This, together with the fact that the krona has increased in value against other currencies, too, means that it has appreciated in trade-weighted terms this summer. Our forecast in July was that the krona would strengthen, given the relatively good economic developments in Sweden and given our robust public finances.

As Libor is a reference rate that is used globally for large volumes of contracts, it is quite inacceptable that individual banks should casually report incorrect figures. The Riksbank has long followed developments concerning the corresponding reference rate in Sweden, known as Stibor. We are currently carrying out our own investigation into how Stibor is determined and we also have an on-going dialogue with the Swedish banks on how they need to strengthen governance and increase transparency with regard to Stibor. I assume that Swedish banks will take heed of what has happened with Libor and help reinforce confidence in Stibor. It is  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  possible that we may need to wait and see what happens with Libor before we can establish a better model for Stibor, but meanwhile Swedish banks should make it clear to the market and the general public how Stibor is set on a daily basis and what controls and checks exist in the current organisational framework. The Riksbank’s investigation is not yet complete, but will be presented during the autumn. Weak developments in Europe and some uncertainty over the strength of the US recovery If we move on to the economic statistics released during the summer, they have mostly concerned developments during the second quarter, that is, up to the end of June. However, there have also been some indicators for the third quarter. To summarise, one can say that developments abroad have largely been in line with the assessments we made in July.
Along with two other agencies, the Fed is reviewing the foreclosure practices at the major bank mortgage servicers. We are also keeping an eye on banks’ potential liabilities where they made representations about mortgages bought by investors that may not have been correct in all cases. We want to ensure that the housing finance business is supported by robust back-office operations – for processing of new mortgages as well as foreclosures – so that homebuyers and investors have full confidence in the process. We are monitoring developments closely in order to evaluate any potential impact on housing or financial markets and the overall economy. Economic conditions in Upstate New York Now let me turn to economic conditions in Upstate New York. It is no secret that this region has struggled with weak economic growth and population loss in recent decades. The region has experienced some very painful economic restructuring, particularly as it lost so many of its high-paying manufacturing jobs. Yet the process has yielded a productive and more diversified economy, with a larger service sector. For this and other reasons I will discuss, the Upstate New York economy has weathered the Great Recession relatively well. While the Upstate economy generally underperformed the nation during the 1980s and 1990s, its recent experience has been quite different. During the Great Recession, Upstate New York’s job losses began later than they did for the United States as a whole, and those losses were generally less severe.

With a young population, ASEAN has the third-largest labour force in the world, after China and India, with a fast-growing middle class given the rapidly rising affluence. By 2020, ASEAN is expected to account for more than USD2 trillion of additional consumption to the world economy. Motivation for ASEAN Integration A key factor that underpins the region’s potential is its progressive economic integration. ASEAN is one of the most diverse regions in the world – in terms of economic size, income level, resource endowment, economic structure, financial sector development, and economic systems. The region has therefore leveraged on its complementarities arising from this diversity. This is reflected in the increased cross-border production networks, and the significant increase in intra-regional trade and investment activities. Since 1990, ASEAN intraregional trade has grown from 18% to 24% of its total trade, and intra-regional investment  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  activities have now quadrupled since 2000, from 4% to 17% of its total investment. While there has been a trend towards greater intra-regional trade and investment, financial integration in the region has not progressed as significantly. ASEAN economies have, however, now reached that stage of development whereby greater regional financial integration can further unlock our growth potential. The push for regional financial integration is to bring about a more effective intermediation of funds, bringing the excess savings from one country to be channelled into productive investments in another.
Accordingly, further progress in establishing a sound legal infrastructure, covering both bankruptcy procedures and effective corporate governance, would seem to be very high on the list of priorities. It is also important to understand the dangers inherent in adjustable peg exchange rate systems. It is still far too early to draw the firm conclusion that the only viable exchange rate regimes, in all circumstances, are a free float on the one hand and a currency board or a monetary union on the other. Nevertheless, one common characteristic of the main crises of the recent past – Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia, Brazil and, for that matter, my own country Sweden – has been that the authorities had adopted a more or less rigid exchange rate regime that ultimately proved to be unsustainable. One clear lesson seems to be that, in many circumstances, once a weak peg comes under fire, defending it is often a losing battle, especially if the exchange rate does not properly reflect the development in the real economy. Another drawback to a fixed, but adjustable, peg is that it may stimulate excessive short-term capital inflow and thus in itself generate vulnerability because the central bank is seemingly absorbing the exchange rate risk. Against this background, a key question is the appropriate exit strategy to another exchange rate regime or a timely adjustment of the pegged exchange rate should the need arise.

An additional insight is that the simultaneous occurrence of foreign exchange rate crises and banking crises is probably the single most important reason why some countries have suffered much deeper recessions when their currency pegs collapsed or came under a severe speculative attack. The contractionary shock to most European countries in 1992-93 was clearly much smaller than for Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s and for Mexico in 1995 and Asian countries in 1997-98. 3  BIS Review 88/1999  Thus, authorities in countries that receive capital inflows should prepare for the day when the movement might reverse. Countries that are vulnerable in this regard should carefully consider the adequacy of their foreign exchange reserves, particularly in relation to their short-term external debt. Since large numbers of countries cannot build up their reserves by increasing their trade surpluses simultaneously, this would seem to argue for greater use of contingent lending facilities provided by the private sector. Given such arrangements, recourse to the new IMF Contingent Credit Lines would then add public sector to private sector affirmation that the domestic policies being followed by the borrowing country are sensible and sustainable. … but the international dimension should also be recognised To say that the key to avoiding future crises in emerging markets must be found in domestic reforms is not to deny that part of the solution may still lie in measures that change the way in which international financial markets sometimes operate.
We are grateful to Bundesbank for their active participation in this project – as well as in their specific role in the regional project on “Strengthening the Central Bank Capacities in the Western Balkans with a view to the Integration to the European System of Central Banks”. We would also like to thank National Bank of Romania and Banque de France for their involvement in this project. Last but not the least, I would like to thank staff members of the Bank of Albania intensively engaged in the design and implementation of the project. I do believe that, as with previous experiences, this project will be implemented and finalised successfully, contributing to the advancement of capacities in our institution. Thank You! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Philipp Hildebrand: Switzerland and global competition - an all-purpose strategy Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the University of St Gallen, St Gallen, 29 August 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Openness was one of the major factors that made Switzerland one of the richest countries in the world. A significant portion of our industry, and one upon which our current prosperity is based, is the direct or indirect outcome of foreign expertise and the efforts of foreign entrepreneurs. These people were attracted to Switzerland – particularly in the 19th century – by its openness and its stable, liberal environment. Openness promotes competition, innovation and progress, thereby securing sustained prosperity. But Switzerland strayed from the straight and narrow when it began erecting barriers to competition – barriers that provided ever greater protection to its domestic market. The ensuing insulation of the domestic market is probably one of the main reasons for Switzerland's growth slump today. External trade policies are always domestic market policies as well. Consequently, external trade policies have instruments that can be effective in opening up the domestic market from outside. This openness to external trade is of utmost importance, therefore, not only for exporters, but also for the domestic market. Being open towards Europe and towards other trading blocks is not mutually exclusive.
The Code of Banking Practice, which is a non-statutory code issued jointly by HKAB and the DTC Association with our endorsement, is the main tool for achieving this end, and, as  2  BIS Review 55/2001  you all know, the Code is currently being subjected to extensive revision and strengthening. This process is almost at an end and we believe that it will make the Code an even more effective tool. In addition to transparency, we hope that the banks, in making their decisions on fees and charges, will show some sensitivity to the needs of the more vulnerable members of society. We believe that, so far, banks are displaying such sensitivity. We also wish to ensure that there continues to be choice for customers. Again, we believe that there is choice, and that deregulation, new technology, new products are indeed combining with competition to provide a greater choice than ever before. We shall continue to monitor. This is a reasonably healthy picture. But it is time also, I think, to look at the current arrangements for consumer protection in the banking industry, to see whether improvements are needed, and if so, what they should be. The HKMA already plays an informal role in addressing consumer complaints, though we have no powers to settle disputes. Should we – or should someone else – be given such powers? Should there be sanctions for banks that fail to comply with codes of practice? How does Hong Kong compare with other jurisdictions in this area?

These two key features of the British and Australian systems illustrate how the arrangements in Hong Kong do not go as far as, or are less formalised than, those in other jurisdictions. This may have something to do with different philosophical approaches: in Hong Kong the tradition has been a freemarket one, which entails a very low level of government involvement in business relationships. But as the Hong Kong market becomes more sophisticated and more competitive, and as consumer issues are coming more to the fore, it may be useful to consider whether Hong Kong should follow the path of other jurisdictions. At this early stage of discussion, there seem to be three broad options, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first is some form of self-regulation by the banking industry. The second is to provide a specific mandate to the regulator, that is the HKMA. The third is to place the responsibility in the hands of an Ombudsman. There are a number of issues – some philosophical, some practical – that will need to be taken into account in deciding in the fullness of time where the responsibility would lie. As far as the HKMA is concerned, the arguments for and against are, I suggest, finely balanced. One argument holds that a more formal role for the HKMA in this area might create a conflict of interest between our prudential regulation and consumer protection roles.
It is therefore necessary to monitor competitiveness even more closely than before through indicators such as unit production costs and the tax and regulatory framework. The close multilateral surveillance and the frank discussions provided in the context, inter alia, of the Eurogroup, will help monitor competitiveness trends with a view to ensure early warnings and appropriate reactions. Let me address, in conclusion, two questions: the issue of sustainable growth and the present diagnosis of the Eurosystem as regards the balance of risks. Growth: Central bankers are sometimes portrayed as being excessively cautious and reserved with respect to economic growth. On the contrary, we are very much in favour of growth. First and foremost, because the objective of monetary policy—price stability—is a necessary condition for longst term, robust growth. At the press conference following the ECB Governing Council on 1 February, Wim DUISENBERG said very clearly on behalf of all of us that "within the euro area, the maintenance of price stability over the medium term (…) will provide an important contribution to the achievement of sustained non-inflationary economic growth and will also support a further solid and sustainable expansion of the world economy ”. Not only are we aiming at sustainable non-inflationary steady growth through our action but also via all our recommendations : we are resolutely anti-Malthusian in all fields of the economy, that is we support innovation, liberalisation and growth incentives. We are anti-Malthusian as regards scientific and technical progress.

This intertwining of the communication of the European monetary team with the European and national institutions and the full body of the civil societies is currently underestimated. Wim DUISENBERG attends hearings at the European Parliament in Brussels as often as Alan GREENSPAN does on the Hill in Washington. Each national governor explains in his own language (so in total in ten languages), through the lens of twelve different cultures the same message from the  2  BIS Review 11/2001  Eurosystem. To improve its transparency and its communication even further, the Eurosystem decided to publish for the first time in December 2000 Staff Economic Projections for the euro area. In terms of transparency and accountability—namely the duty to explain, justify, whenever possible convince, and in any case, being fully responsible vis-à-vis public opinion for decisions taken- I think that the Eurosystem meets the best practices of the main central banks in the world. I.2. Co-ordination of economic policies A few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great number of skeptical people, in Europe as well as in the rest of the world, that the euro was really to be set up. Many observers pointed to its presumed contradictions and alleged inconsistencies: claiming, for example, that the economic divergences and structural gaps among euro-area countries would be too large to ensure a viable monetary union or that the lack of co-ordination between economic policies would deprive the area of an appropriate policy-mix, and could not be achieved without a political federation.