samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Sweden, by contrast, the demand for cash has fallen sharply in recent years and the central bank is actively considering the costs and benefits of issuing its own ‘e-krona’: see for instance http://www.riksbank.se/en/Financialstability/Payments/Does-Sweden-need-the-e-krona/. 5 Similar themes were recently also highlighted by Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the IMF, at the Bank of England’s conference on monetary policy independence, 20 years on: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/09/28/sp092917-centralbanking-and-fintech-a-brave-new-world. 6 See for instance the Governor’s speech in April 2017: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech974.pdf, a compendium of the Bank’s work on digital currencies: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/cbdc.aspx, and the recent report by the Financial Stability Board: http://www.fsb.org/2017/06/financial-stability-implications-from-fintech/. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Now these clearly aren’t the goals of traditional private sector accelerators, which aim to make money by helping nascent businesses refine the design of their products in ways likely to attract both investors and customers. We make no financial investment in the firms we work with. But we do I think share the 7  underlying objective of ‘accelerated mutual learning-by-doing’ – since central banks are likely to be key stakeholders for many forms of FinTech over the medium term, both in shaping the rules that bear on them, and as technology users.

For these assessments, we augment input from our research departments with critical information about local economic conditions supplied by our boards of directors, regional advisory councils and conversations with local stakeholders. You may know that one of my councils, the Upstate New York Regional Advisory Board, is designed specifically to provide me with timely information from this area. In this way, decisions by the FOMC are continually informed by views gathered from all parts of the country, including Upstate New York. One thing that makes my job even more interesting is that New York has some roles unique within the Fed. Let me tell you about some of them. We, alone, implement monetary policy. At the direction of the FOMC, we buy and sell Treasury securities. We are also the eyes and ears of the Fed on Wall Street, and we supervise many of the largest financial institutions in  BIS Review 141/2010  1  the country. We operate Fedwire® – the conduit for large money transfers between banks. And, we provide banking services to the U.S. Treasury, and central banks and governments from around the world. Finally, I must mention that the New York Fed’s district could be the most diverse in the System: ranging from the urban density of Manhattan to the forested sparseness of the northern Adirondacks, to the Caribbean islands of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. All in all, there is a lot to keep my colleagues and me quite busy – even in normal times.
New generations are used to surrendering their privacy, to renounce their data sovereignty in favour of digital payment and social network providers. Some social networks even work that way - to make your own digital identification or to verify it is exactly You or Me out there on the web. Public concern over digital privacy has been identified in the 2021 document "Public consultation on a digital euro" and the idea of a unique digital identity for citizens in the EU is being developed by the European Commission. [5] This tendency is also at the heart of the digital euro project, and the digital euro will offer the highest levels of privacy for the citizens. Let me assure you that the central bank has no interest in peoples' payment behaviour, nor will we store or even see any of people's personal data. So, considering that our role is to act in the best public interest and at the same time, we see a proliferation of digital payment channels offered by various private entities or even networks without recognizable issuers, isn't it right to think that we also need to offer our citizens digital version of public money? To offer our citizens a way to access public money in the digital sphere? Or, to paraphrase ECB President Christine Lagarde, "Don't we all need to have access to public money in the digital age?".

Sheku Sambadeen Sesay: Issues relating to Africa in the context of the global financial and economic crisis Statement by Mr Sheku Sambadeen Sesay, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the dinner in honour of the delegates for the African Caucus Meeting, hosted by the Bank of Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 August 2010. *  *  *  Ministers of Finance Governors of central banks Head of delegations Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen On behalf of the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma and the Board and Directors of the Bank of Sierra Leone, it is my profound pleasure to extend a warm welcome to all distinguished personalities assembled here this evening. I believe that since your arrival here in Freetown you have had a taste of the typical African hospitality which is very true of the people of Freetown. As you are aware this is my first meeting since my appointment as Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone in June this year. Our meeting is taking place at a critical period. Our countries are experiencing the effects of the slow down in the world economy triggered by the global financial crisis. As we are all aware this recent challenge far exceeds the capabilities of any single country. These challenges require international coordinations and inter-governmental collaboration which makes it imperative for us to work together.
While this theory too may be somewhat true, it would certainly not provide too much comfort to the person who is suffering from inequality and poverty, if he/she were to find out that such a policy was being followed. That is why it is vital that the current Sri Lankan policy which is a pro-active one to consciously support the trickle down of economic benefits quickly, should be implemented fast, since it will surely help to reduce the social tension that would otherwise build up. Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding all our current efforts, we still have to accept that significant disparities remain despite the remarkable achievements that we have made so far. Hence, the challenge before policymakers is to continue to find ways to minimize disparities in wealth distribution without disturbing the overall efficiency in resource utilization or retarding the growth momentum. This is not a simple task, but is surely possible to do so. However, the common syndrome of this country is that many begin by saying: “we can’t”, or “we are too small” or “we are not in a position to do that” or some other negative claim. We have to, as a matter of urgency get out of that negative mentality. As we know, the Sri Lankan Government has embarked on the pro-poor pro-growth policy with a focus on balanced regional development.

According to the World Development Report of the United Nations, of the world’s 6 billion people, 2.8 billion (almost half) live on less than two dollars a day, and 1.2 billion (a fifth) live on less than a dollar a day. Also, the average income in the richest 20 countries is 37 times the average in the poorest 20, a gap that has doubled in the past 40 years. Hence, the distribution of global gains is extraordinarily unequal. Worldwide inequality persists even on the socio-human front. Although in general, human conditions have improved more in the past century than in the entirety of previous history, particularly in health and technological capabilities, several inequalities still exist. For example, in the poorest countries, only 4 out of 5 children live to celebrate their fifth birthdays, while in rich countries this ratio is over 99 per cent. While in rich countries fewer than 5 per cent of all children under five are malnourished, in poor countries as many as 50 per cent are. Hence, there is a huge imbalance and inequality in distribution of socio-economic gains as well. In this context, it is also heartening to note that strategies of reducing poverty have evolved over the past several decades in response to broadened understanding and rethinking of the complexity of development. As we are aware, in the 1950s and 60s, many economic and political planners viewed large investments in physical capital and infrastructure as the primary means of development.
I mentioned earlier that there were over 950 public commitments to the Code on the Global Index. But only 85 of those are from the buyside – and only a handful more represent platform, infrastructure or technology operators (Chart 6). The GFXC has recognised some of the practical challenges faced by smaller firms when signing up to the Code, and has prepared new material to help ease this process.17 But we need more of the largest firms too: 17 of the largest 30 global asset managers are still not signed up (Table 2). That’s $ trillion of investors’ funds without a voice in the use and development of the Code. Chart 6: Public commitments to the FX Global Code18  Source: Global Index of public registers as of 9 September. Signing up to the Foreign Exchange Global Code should be high on the agenda for the CEO of every major asset management firm. It deepens trust: between you and your clients, your counterparties and your regulators. It strengthens corporate governance: providing a ready-made blueprint for best practice within your firm. That is especially true for UK firms, which will fall under the Senior Managers Regime from the end of 2019. Behaviour that is in line with the Code will tend to indicate a person subject to the Regime is meeting their obligation to observe 'proper standards of market conduct.'

The firm has access to a pool of liquidity providers, and will compare pre-trade price quotes, perhaps making use of proprietary TCA tools from those providing liquidity. It might execute some trades electronically. But it has bigger costs to worry about than FX trade execution alone – including the broader bundle of services it needs across asset classes. And it is conscious that larger FX trades involve material risk, including as a result of market dynamics it doesn’t necessarily understand. So it will also work to maintain broader relationships with liquidity providers – and will tend to revert to voice trading with a trusted counterparty for larger orders, or at times of heightened volatility. It may not always have complete clarity on the basis on which such trades are executed (internalised vs externally traded, principal vs agent) or rejected. And it recognises that, in seeking quotes, it may be leaking information about its position. But broadly speaking it is content with the service it receives on FX, and feels it has bigger fish to fry elsewhere. In many ways, it is hard to label this case ‘bad’. The firm is trying to inform itself about market trends. But it recognises that FX is a professional market, whose complexities it needs assistance to navigate. It knows it may not always be getting the finest price, or the perfect service – but feels that the cost/benefit case for investing in a lot of extra data or understanding is not in its favour.
In the case of the future development of industrial nations in Europe and North America, we can expect that it will be negatively affected by the need to consolidate government finances, which have suffered greatly during the recession. All in all, this entails certain risks to developments abroad in the period ahead. With regard to the Executive Board’s monetary policy decisions, one question is why we have not revised up the interest rate path now that economic activity appears to have improved and conditions in the financial markets are beginning to normalise. The forecasts made in December, like those in October, contain revisions that have a counteracting effect when it comes to our decision. On the one hand there has been some upward revision to the forecasts for Swedish GDP and resource utilisation, which would indicate a need for a  BIS Review 3/2010  1  somewhat tighter monetary policy. But at the same time there has been a downward revision of the forecast for inflation, which would indicate a need for more expansionary monetary policy. The question then is what the net effect of these counteracting tendencies will be in terms of what is a well-balanced monetary policy. My opinion is that they in principle counteract one another and that there was thus justification for maintaining the interest rate path that we have had since the monetary policy decision in July.

This is consistent with the research results; over very long periods of time, real exchange rates appear to “level off” and not show any special trend. In the very long run the theory of relative purchasing power parity thus appears to apply. 23 If the real exchange rate does not have any trend, it will return to its average in the long run. There are thus results in the academic research indicating that real exchange rates fulfil relative purchasing power parity in the very long run. 24 However, these results have little value for those trying to forecast exchange rate developments in the short and medium term. As I mentioned earlier, it is moreover the trade-weighted krona exchange rate that the Riksbank tries to forecast. Figure 5 showed only the development of the krona against the dollar. If we return to Figure 4, we can see that the real trade-weighted krona rate shows  22  Interestingly, there is research indicating that price differences for a Big Mac between countries even out over time in accordance with relative purchasing power parity. See, for example, Cumby (1996) and Parsley and Wei (2007). 23  See, for example, Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff (1996) for a scientific survey of the research into purchasing power parity. 24  See, for example, Taylor (2002)  10  BIS Review 3/2010  large variations over fairly long periods. 25 The krona is much weaker in real terms at the end of the period than at the beginning of the period.
In a situation such as the present one, in which the flatness of private spending is largely a result of uncertainty about the future course of the economy, demand-side policies should be acknowledged to be of limited effectiveness in countering the weaknesses of output growth. When agents view the future with some mistrust, measures that are intended to be expansionary and geared to increasing activity in the short term may well prove counter-productive if they are perceived as unsustainable or even harmful in the medium term. From this standpoint, it is vital for monetary policy conduct that the firmness of the central bank’s commitment to price stability be reiterated, as an essential requirement for ensuring a higher level of well-being in the medium term. The ECB’s actions have been consistent with this analysis: it has squared the reduction of interest rates to their lowest levels in recent decades, in step with the sluggish growth, with its drive to keep - through its actions and its communications policy - inflation expectations in line with its own definition of the objective of monetary policy. The medium and long-term view is likewise essential for orienting budgetary policy. In the current economic conditions the Annual Report describes, discretionary measures entailing a significant deterioration in budgetary balances cannot be expected to have generalised expansionary effects on activity. This is because such measures may inhibit private spending and tend to exacerbate the challenges posed by population ageing.

In this respect, it should further be borne in mind that the maintenance over a prolonged period of time of a strong expansion in domestic demand, driven by substantially generous monetary and financial conditions, entails pressures which, if they build up, may emerge precisely when some of the factors upholding growth begin to show signs of petering out. The foregoing comments indicate that the favourable growth prospects for the coming years cannot be taken as guaranteed over the longer term. The Banco de España has been signalling the fact that the prevailing growth pattern harbours certain risks that may emerge in the form of a deterioration in competitiveness and financial imbalances in the households and non-financial corporations sector. Although the trajectory of the Spanish economy has not yet been hampered by the emergence of these risks, any future deterioration could impair further progress in real convergence. Competitiveness can be undermined on several fronts. The first of these is the maintenance of a persistent inflation differential with the euro area. This differential is partly related to the fact the Spanish economy is ahead in the cycle, but it has also to do with the presence of elements of inertia in wage and price formation in Spain associated with structural shortcomings in certain markets for factors, goods and services. Another significant front is limited productivity growth, which is not only lower than in the United States but also than in most of the European countries.
In the second part of my address, I will look back to see briefly how we arrived at the current monetary policy setting, characterised, inter alia, by a historically large Eurosystem balance sheet. Against this background, I will analyse then the sequencing of our expected monetary policy normalisation process, with the focus on the potential impact of reducing the size of our balance sheet. I will end by touching on the how the monetary -fiscal policy mix should work in the current context. Recent ECB monetary policy decisions Over these months we have observed that both the scale and the persistence of the inflationary shock have been unusually high. According to the flash estimate, euro area HICP inflation surprised us again on the upside in October, reaching a historical high of 10.7%. A significant part of the shocks that are driving inflation up in Europe are on the supply side. They are the consequence of the sharp rise in energy and food commodity prices and of supply constraints that have contributed to manufacturing bottlenecks. What is more, the pass-through of these supply shocks to prices has been faster and stronger than in the past. Indeed, according to Banco de España estimates, close to 75% of the current inflation rate in the euro area is due to the direct and indirect effect of higher energy and food prices. But there is also a pent-up demand component from the post-pandemic recovery that, while weakening, is still driving up prices, especially in the services sector.

And last but not least, GDP growth has been relatively robust and the margin of spare capacity in the economy has been disappearing at the same time as inflation has been trending towards target. Many observers would consider this to be evidence that monetary policy has hardly been on the wrong track. Yesterday’s announcement that future interest rate movements would depend on wage developments in the labour market seems to have drawn some attention. But there seems to be some misunderstanding about what this means. Over time – but not necessarily at every moment in time – wages in the labour market as a whole – but not necessarily for each group – should rise by an amount equal to the inflation target plus productivity growth. How much this is depends, then, on productivity growth. At present, productivity growth appears to be low – about 1%. This means that the scope for wage increases consistent with the inflation target is 3.5%. What that means for wage settlements depends on the degree to which wage drift can be contained. Some groups could receive larger pay rises than this, but then others would have to have smaller increases. Sometimes there are grounds for this. Then it is important to bear in mind that this is a long-term relationship.
Fifth, central banks and regulatory authorities in most emerging economies in Asia have the broader mandate that includes a focus on the development of the financial sector as a means not only to enhance the growth and development potential, but also to reinforce a strong foundation for financial stability. In Malaysia, the development and reform of the financial sector in the decade that followed the Asian financial crisis has not only developed the financial sector to better serve the Malaysian economy, but it has also better positioned financial institutions to withstand the destabilising episodes emanating from external shocks. This has included strengthening financial intermediaries, not only in terms of scale but also in their financial positions, risk management and governance practices. This has contributed to more efficient financial intermediation while improving access to financing, particularly for small and medium scale businesses. Efforts to develop a vibrant capital market have meanwhile opened up alternative channels for financing, while mitigating concentration risk in the financial system and enhancing its ability to absorb large and volatile cross-border capital flows. These factors will place Asia on a firm foundation to achieve its growth and development goals. While public policy clearly has an important role, it is as important for the financial industry to align itself with the desired outcomes of sustainable growth within a longer term horizon.

There is a broad spectrum of regulations around the financial system; everything from rules on consumer protection to rules on how to act if an agent – a bank, company or household – becomes insolvent. If these micro-oriented rules are not properly designed, the risk of a credit-financed bubble increases, and the consequences can be even greater. This means there is an even greater need to actively counteract this type of development by pulling on the more macrooriented regulation lever, and this may entail rather difficult considerations. One could say that well-designed supervision can support a macroprudential policy in a similar way to a well-designed macroprudential policy supporting monetary policy. Does macroprudential policy require support from monetary policy? So will improvements in regulation and supervision be able to solve all of the problems? Unfortunately, I don’t think so. Quite regardless of which solutions we use, I am quite sure that we will not be totally immune to financial crises in the future. What I hope we can achieve is to ensure they are rarer and less severe. I also believe that there will always be situations where the regulation and supervision may need support from a monetary policy that “leans against the wind”. One reason is that experience shows that it is difficult to construct regulations that cannot be circumvented in one way or the other. The policy rate is certainly a blunt instrument, as it affects all lending in the economy.