samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Namely, the final report on the Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia contained 138 recommendations addressing the gaps in terms of the EU benchmarks established in 11 areas of central banking. It is my pleasure to point out that some of them have already been implemented, and some of them have been incorporated in the Strategic Plan of the NBRM, that is in the National Bank’s Plan of Activities for this year. However, the overall implementation of the recommendations will require additional technical assistance in terms of experience and knowledge of the ECB and the national central banks of the EU. Therefore, the inclusion of the NBRM in this regional project, which aims to facilitate the preparations for the implementation of the recommendations we received in the report on the Needs Analysis Programme for the NBRM, by establishing a Plan for their implementation, is very important. It will be the basis for the preparation and the implementation of a subsequent project, as well as the basis for further planning and promotion of the bilateral cooperation with the central banks with which the NBRM already has a traditional cooperation, but also for the establishing of a cooperation with other European central banks. The implementation of these and similar projects by the ECB and the EU in recent years, unequivocally confirms their continued determination, commitment and dedication to assist the central banks of the Western Balkan countries on their way to joining the ESCB, and later the Euro system.

On the other hand, the realization of such projects enables strengthening of the cooperation between the central banks of the region and the central banks of the EU, which is inevitable in the process of integrating the entire region in the EU. Let me finally thank the ECB and the EU for enabling the NBRM to participate in this project. I wish success for all the institutions involved in the project in anticipation of even greater cooperation and I thank our hosts for organizing this event. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Eva Srejber: The transmission mechanism Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Umeå University, Umeå, 15 May 2001. *  *  *  The Riksbank has a statutory duty to maintain price stability. However, it has the power to decide how to operationalise monetary policy and the monetary policy strategy that is to guide the monetary policy decisions. In the annual assessments of the performance of the Riksbank made by the Riksdag Finance Committee, both the objective and the strategy adopted have won acceptance. Monetary policy is governed by an inflation target expressed as the annual rate measured by CPI is to be limited to 2 per cent with a tolerance interval of ± 1 percentage point. However, the decision to define price stability as a reduction in the value of the krona by two per cent per year in relation to the basket of goods and services consumed by Swedish households is by no means self-evident. In principle, another rate of price increases, other weighted combinations of goods and services, financial assets or currencies could serve as the anchor in relation to which the value of the krona is to be kept stable. When the inflation target was adopted in 1993, conditions did not favour a return to any form of fixed exchange rate.

In my remarks of a year ago, I mentioned that we are at a period of historic transition with regard to the development of the offshore RMB market. Looking at the development of the Eurodollar and offshore RMB markets side-by-side, as we just did, gives us a unique perspective on how things might play out in the long run. Indeed, as the offshore RMB market reaches maturity, there will no doubt be volumes of literature written by financial historians that compare the birth and development of these two markets. While developments so far have been encouraging, we are still at the initial phase of RMB offshore market development. The policy headroom to develop RMB business is already present, and we at the HKMA will continue to provide a safe and efficient financial infrastructure for the conduct of RMB offshore activities. But the most important of all, I would encourage businesses and financial institutions to make full use of such opportunities already available and promote the development of a wide range of RMB services and financial products. Forums like this one help us prepare for the future by examining what has transpired, making comparisons and exploring business opportunities and collaborative initiatives. I am eager to work together with all of you in shaping what is to come. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
If so, that could herald the beginning of the end of the protracted post-crisis super-cycle of weak investment. At a regional level, the global recovery appears to have a broad base across the world. Most regions of the world have seen growth upgrades over the past six months. Currently, countries representing around 80% 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  of global output are expected to be growing above-trend, meaning the global output gap is shrinking. The simultaneity of that uptick in regional growth should give it greater momentum, given the increased importance these days of cross-border spillovers, in trade and finance, and integrated global supply chains. A second reason for greater resilience in world growth since the start of the year is reduced political and policy uncertainty. For anyone who has lived through the UK’s political undulations of the past few weeks, or who is consuming a daily diet of world news, blogs and tweets, that may sound like an odd statement. But, viewed in the round, political and policy risks in a number of countries have eased significantly since the start of the year. At the start of the year, there was widespread media and market concern about changes to economic, trade and foreign policy in the US. By and large, the worst of these fears have failed to materialise. At the start of the year, there were fears of a populist surge through Europe.

Third, to increase our prudence towards the financial system stability, we adopted new techniques for a more comprehensive systemic risk assessment, enriched stress test exercises with the “bottom up” approach and improved models for the indirect credit risk assessment. The twinning project concentrated most of its resources on supervision and financial stability. In addition to constant motivation for improving the regulatory framework, supervision activities and risk administration, this priority becomes even more necessary given added challenges related to specific developments over the past years. The Bank of Albania has undertaken a number of actions to face and overcome these challenges. For the fourth consecutive year, the Albanian economy has been under the influence of the global economic and financial crisis. Its latest stage, the sovereign debt crisis and its interrelation with the balance sheets of the financial system have placed us on the frontline. Our two main trading and financial partner countries, Greece and Italy, have been severely hit by the crisis. Against this unfavourable landscape, the Albanian economy has grown and has maintained its financial soundness. Private agents have an overall sound financial position, relatively low debt levels and positive savings rates. In contrast to other countries in the region, the Albanian financial system has continued to lend to the economy, although at slower pace and somewhat tighter terms. Building on an appropriate and flexible regulatory framework, this response has been determinant to encourage the restructuring of the economy and guide it towards profitable sectors.
I shall confine myself largely to what is happening in Europe. The increasing globalisation of financial markets is one pressure for change across the world. But in western Europe, the Maastricht Treaty and the preparations for Economic and Monetary Union are requiring central banks to review their statutes and to align their operating procedures. But I also want to talk about the central banks of Eastern Europe. They are feeling similar pressures several hope that their countries will accede to the European Union within five years or so - but their origins are very different. In 1989 most of the state banks of central and eastern Europe had little understanding of the rôle of a central bank in a market economy. Since then they have had rapidly to acquire the knowledge and skills needed to tackle acute inflationary pressures while many of their leading banks were effectively bankrupt. At the Bank of England, we have been actively involved in helping them by drawing on our own experience as central bankers, adapting the lessons we have ourselves learned over the years to the unique circumstances of the transition economies. Much of this effort has been channelled through our Centre for Central Banking Studies which we established in 1990 to provide technical assistance and training to other central banks.

There is clearly the expected positive relationship with population, but the ratio varies hugely: a central bank on the highest of the three parallel lines has ten times the staff per million population as one on the lowest line. The extent of this dispersion is more apparent in Figure 5 which shows the number of staff per million population for the large countries. With only around 3,500 people - down by more than 50% over the last twenty years and still falling fast - the Bank of England itself is one of the most modestly staffed in relation to its population. In contrast to the significant results found by Fry et al. from their sample of developing countries, regression analysis on the industrial country data shows only weak evidence of small economies of scale. Nor did other variables tested on industrial countries yield any significant results. As for the transition economies, their staff numbers generally conform to those in industrial countries with similar populations. The exception is the Bank of Russia, whose staff looks abnormally large. Some of these central banks are still growing as they seek to carry out their new functions; but one or two, like the National Bank of Hungary, are already reviewing what they are doing and how they do it, and are slimming down. By the end of this year, they expect to have 40% fewer staff than two years ago.
Table 1 shows peak levels of the primary fiscal deficit in the UK during the global financial and Covid crises. The degree of fiscal support has plainly been materially larger – more than twice as large. And relative to the size of the economy’s output gap, which is smaller than at the time of the global financial crisis, this degree of fiscal support has been larger still and multiplies of the output gap. Table 1: Peak Fiscal Deficits in the Global Financial and Covid Crises Peak primary balance (a)  Peak output gap (b)  Global Financial Crisis  -8.3  -4.2  Covid Pandemic  -18.0  -3.1  Source: OBR and Bank of England Note: (a) % of GDP. (b) % of potential GDP. Fiscal numbers for pandemic are based on OBR November 2020 forecast for FY 2019-20. The appropriate degree of fiscal support to close the output gap has recently been a source of debate in the United States. 21 There, the fiscal response is prospectively larger than in the UK, and the output gap smaller, meaning the upside risks to demand and inflationary are likely to be larger. 21  For example, see Olivier Blanchard here. 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  21  (e) Psychological Scarring A final potential difference from the past concerns the degree of psychological scarring of risk appetite among household and companies as a result of crisis.

On the one hand, the hit to capital could be larger if firms’ risk appetite remains subdued or if the debts accumulated during the crisis act as a drag on investment. For example, in the UK Office for Budget Responsibility’s (OBR) downside  scenario, scarring reduces output by as much as 6%. 20  Baldwin and Freeman (2020). 20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  20  On the other hand, it is possible investment and the capital stock rebounds faster than in a typical recession – for example, if there is catch-up investment or if firms seize the opportunity created by the Covid crisis to improvement their digital estates and digital skills. This would reduce, but not eliminate, any scarring. The balance of these effects on investment is something I will discuss in a future lecture. (d) Fiscal Policy After the global financial crisis, the major tool of macro-economic demand management was monetary policy, which was loosened significantly in most countries. By contrast, fiscal policy in most countries was loosened only modestly and in some, including the UK, was tightened. This fiscal response added to the burden placed on monetary policy. The fiscal policy response to the Covid crisis has been very different. Although monetary policy has once again been loosened, fiscal policy has played the frontline role in stabilising the economy. Both the  fiscal/monetary mix, and the scale of the all-in supporting policy response, has as a result far exceeded that following the global financial crisis.
This lesson had been sorely learned from the Great Depression. The magnitude of the shocks hitting the world economy over the past year or so – as measured for example by the initial contraction in global industrial production – appears comparable with the Great Depression of the 1930s. 1 But, in the Great Depression, global industrial output declined fairly continuously for three full years. In contrast, global industrial output on this occasion seems to have broadly stabilised in a little over a year. There are many differences between now and the 1930s. However, I have little doubt that one of the key factors contributing to the quicker stabilisation of activity this time around has been the speed and decisiveness with which policy throughout the world responded to the twin threats of a failing banking system and falling confidence. At home, the Monetary Policy Committee cut interest rates from 5% to 0.5% in just six months. And with interest rates close to their lower bound, the Committee in March of this year voted to start a programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, otherwise known as “quantitative easing”. These extraordinary actions were intended to reduce the risk of inflation falling below the 2% inflation target that the Bank of England is mandated to meet. They do so in a number of ways. The reduction in Bank Rate by lowering interest payments on loans has improved many companies’ cash flows at a time when turnover is weak and working capital is scarce.

Caleb M Fundanga: Improving financial inclusion in Zambia Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Celpay Mobile Banking Conference, Lusaka, 16-17 September 2009. *  *  *  The Chairman of the Board, Celpay Zambia, Dr Jacob Mwanza; The Chief executive Officer, Celpay International, Mr L. Muchenje; Chief Executive Officers and Representatives of Banks and Financial Institutions present; Distinguished Invited Guests and Resource Persons; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen I wish to express my gratitude to Celpay Zambia Limited and in particular to Dr Jacob Mwanza, the Chairman of the Board, for inviting me to speak at this important conference. I am informed that the conference aims to pave the way for the future of mobile banking in the quest to improve financial inclusion in our country. Mr Chairman, the need to promote wider access to financial services through innovative products by financial institutions and other market players cannot be overemphasized. Financial services are a critical tool to ensure that entrepreneurs step onto the economic growth ladder and create a brighter future by tapping their own creativity in income generating activities. The provision of financial services to the majority of our people especially the small and micro entrepreneurs who are financially excluded is a key element in alleviating poverty in the country. Improved access to financial services enables availability of funds for investment in income generating activities that ensure that the public lay a foundation for better standards of living.
23.07.2020  Challenges for the Spanish economy in the face of the impact of the pandemic Webinar Economy, work and society in Spain. The impact of COVID-19. Spanish Economic and Social Council (CES) Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Honourable Minister for Labour and Social Economy, Chair of the Spanish Economic and Social Council, ladies and gentlemen, Good morning. It is a pleasure to be able to participate today in this presentation of the Annual Report of the Economic and Social Council (CES). As earlier highlighted, its content goes beyond the 2019 timeframe of events and delves into the challenges that the COVID19 pandemic entails for the economy, for social cohesion and for the labour market in Spain. In this respect, the CES and the Banco de España have concurred in recent weeks that our respective studies and annual reports should strive to be useful instruments that help society face these challenging times. An incipient, incomplete, uncertain and uneven recovery The COVID-19 pandemic has exacted a very high price in terms of human lives as well as deep-seated disruption to society and the economy. As a result, the dynamics marking the global and Spanish economic environment in late 2019 and early 2020 have been abruptly altered. Specifically, the pandemic and the lockdown measures to combat it have affected all economies most adversely.

And along with income-sustaining measures (such as the minimum living income), they will help reduce inequality in Spain. Inequality levels, which were higher at the onset of this crisis than at the start of the previous one, will probably rise further in the coming quarters, given that this crisis is affecting groups with relatively low incomes to a greater extent. Nor can we forget the need to address ongoing population ageing which, among other aspects, will most appreciably influence the behaviour of the labour market, growth dynamics and the main fiscal magnitudes in the coming decades. It is also a first-order challenge for our pension system. And, of course, the Spanish economy must be nimble and proactive so as to harness the new opportunities that arise from combating climate change and from the transition to a more sustainable economy, from the changes in the globalisation model and from the foreseeable acceleration in the digitalisation of the economy. The prompt design of a medium-term fiscal consolidation programme for gradual implementation once the crisis is behind us After the pandemic, the Spanish economy will post the highest levels of public debt in many decades, partly as a result of the necessary fiscal expansion in the short term. Accordingly, it is also necessary to design a plan to restore health to the public finances in the medium term, the application of which, in any event, will have to be postponed until the recovery is firmly rooted.
On the latest Banco de España estimates, GDP growth should be slightly over 3% this year and somewhat below that figure in 2016, meaning that growth in our economy will continue to outpace the euro area average. In terms of composition, national demand has continued to expand strongly. After several years of containment in household spending plans, the favourable course of their disposable income coupled with brighter job prospects and readier access to credit have been conducive to the growth of consumption. Real estate market indicators show a recovery in the sector which, while moderate and uneven across market segments and regions, is also contributing to rekindling household spending. The buoyancy of final demand and the progressive normalisation of financial conditions have continued exerting a positive effect on business investment. The firming of the recovery in the euro area economy has helped compensate for the recent loss of momentum in some non-Community markets, meaning that exports maintain high growth rates. Ongoing contributing factors are the gains in competitiveness in our economy, which reflect the containment of costs in recent years by Spanish firms and, more recently, the depreciation of the euro. Nonetheless, imports have responded forcefully to the pick-up in domestic spending (we should remember that gains and losses in competitiveness are felt abroad but also at home, in respect of imports), which has led, in net terms, to external demand generally not contributing to the increase in activity.

Those basing their arguments on past experiences in emerging economies fail to take into consideration the many differences in the case at hand: Greece is an advanced economy sharing a single currency with 16 other democracies which has signed up to a common set of rules, institutions and overriding objectives, notably macroeconomic and financial stability, together with the other countries of the European Union. Greece’s euro membership rules out debt-devaluation spirals and ensures price stability in the medium term. Its economy is highly integrated – via a number of channels, such as trade and financial flows – with other advanced economies both in Europe and around the world that can potentially act as contagion mechanisms. Greater economic integration has been accompanied by an increasing degree of institutional cooperation. At the same time, the country’s economy is affected by a number of structural weaknesses and rigidities that have resulted in the persistent accumulation of public and private sector imbalances. The thorough implementation of the comprehensive programme of structural reforms and fiscal consolidation negotiated with the international authorities is the only way forward which is fully consistent with the long-term interests of the people of Greece. To paraphrase the title of a study by IMF staff, 3 the debate on debt restructuring in a euro area country is unnecessary, undesirable and unhelpful.