samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Labour costs1) in manufacturing: Norway and trading partners Percentage change in hourly costs  8  8 7  7  Norway 6  6  5  5  Trading partners  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1)  1  Labour costs per hour  0  0 1991 1993 1995 1997 Sources: Statistics Norway, TRCIS/IMF and Norges Bank  1999  2001  SG Gausdal 31.01.03  Since 1998, wage growth in Norway has been markedly higher than that of our trading partners. Until spring 2001, the monetary policy objective implied that, over time, wage growth had to be reduced to the level in Europe. The inflation target of 2½ per cent implies that wage growth over time can hover around 4½ per cent. This takes into account that productivity growth in Norway has been around 2 per cent over the past twenty years. If wage growth is higher than 4½ per cent, monetary policy generally has to be tight in order to counter inflation. This will normally lead to deteriorating competitiveness in the business sector. If wage growth is lower than 4½ per cent, monetary policy normally has to be eased to counter inflation that is too low. This can result in a weaker krone and an improvement in competitiveness in the business sector. The difference between current wage growth and the long-term equilibrium level of 4½ per cent can be 2 referred to as the wage gap for the Norwegian economy.

To some extent, this is inevitable, and it is normal that items like intangible assets should be prominent in good times; but when the sky darkens and the clouds become heavy, the rain can start at a moment’s notice, and little may be left of those assets when the air clears. So we must take care in this as well as in other things. By law, the Central Bank of Iceland is assigned a clearly defined role. The Bank takes that role very seriously. It does not ask to be spared criticism of its work and its decisions, but it would appreciate some support in its attempt to keep inflation within tolerable limits. If we are successful in that endeavour, all Icelanders will benefit. If we all work together, we can reduce interest rates sooner and more quickly. BIS Review 131/2007  5
This is the main reason why MAS introduced the Total Debt Servicing Ratio (TDSR) framework. During our inspections, we picked up some worrying practices. •  4  Most of them are in property loans –  A couple with combined household income of $ was able to obtain a new housing loan of $ Their monthly installments on this new loan and their existing loan obligations came to more than 90% of their combined monthly income. –  The bank’s decision to approve the loan was based solely on fact that couple had savings deposit of $ This is not prudent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  •  We picked up similar instances for car loans –  Some applicants of car loans borrowed close to 100% of the value of car, with little or no down payment, for what is essentially a depreciating asset. –  This is also not prudent. We also found cases of excessive borrowing through credit cards –  A concerned mother called MAS for assistance: her 24-year old son had been paying only the minimum sum on his credit card bills and steadily chalking up debts. –  She requested MAS to stop financial institutions from issuing credit cards to those who have not been making full payment on their credit card bills. Over last three years, MAS has introduced variety of measures to contain excessive borrowing against the backdrop of highly loose monetary conditions globally.

•  There is broad based strength in both financial intermediation and asset management activities. Inflation forecast revised down to 2–3% but core inflation pressures will persist For the first time in three years, CPI inflation has come down closer to historical trends and within MAS’ comfort range. •  CPI-All Items inflation averaged 4.2% over 2010–12. Car prices and imputed accommodation costs contributed around 60% to overall inflation during this period. •  But this year, there has been a clear and significant step-down in inflation. CPI-All Items inflation in H1 is estimated to have dipped below 3%. CPI-All Items inflation forecast for 2013 is therefore revised down to 2–3%, from 3–4% previously. •  The sharp fall in car prices following the tightening of financing restrictions on motor vehicle loans is a major factor. COE prices have risen recently and could be volatile for the rest of year, but this should be accommodated within the 2–3% inflation forecast range. •  Accommodation costs are also increasing at a slower pace. More completed housing units are coming on stream, easing the pressure on market rentals. But MAS’ Core Inflation, which excludes car prices and imputed accommodation costs, will show moderate increase to around 2% or slightly above by end-2013, due to continuing tightness in labour market. •  This is a percentage point lower than recent peak in Q1 2012, and in line with the historical average. •  The Core Inflation forecast for 2013, therefore, remains at 1.5 to 2.5%.
It is nevertheless relevant to raise the question as to whether monetary policy in general has been too expansionary. I would, however, point out that monetary policy must be evaluated in relation to the decision-making basis that existed at the time the decisions were made. Given the decision-making basis prevailing in 1999, it seemed likely that the Norwegian economy would experience a growth pause and that price and cost inflation would fall. Moreover, the international financial market was fragile as a result of the many financial crises the previous year. As new information gradually pointed to higher growth in Norway and internationally, coupled with the prospect of higher-than-expected price and cost inflation, we raised the interest rate. It may be that the combination of the decline in interest rates in 1999 and the brighter international growth outlook, partly reflected in higher oil prices, had an impact on expectations formation that we underestimated. Today, the krone exchange rate is approximately in the initial range, while inflation is higher than the level aimed at by the ECB. However, the interest rate is oriented towards bringing price and cost inflation down towards this level. If price and cost inflation remains too high, this will translate into a weak and unstable krone exchange rate sooner or later. 12  BIS Review 7/2001  Conclusion In the conduct of monetary policy we have two objectives. First, we have a long-term perspective where building confidence and credibility is important for ensuring nominal stability.

Since 2007, the level of Spanish GDP has fallen by seven percentage points; that said, perhaps the most representative measure of the severity of the crisis has been the labour market, with unemployment falling by 19% and a major increase in the unemployment rate, which affected 26% of the labour force at the close of 2013. The crisis has moreover entailed a substantial readjustment in the composition of GDP, with a strong decline in national demand, broadly across all its different components, but a fall of even greater depth in investment in construction. Late last year, the cumulative decline in investment in construction was 50% compared with its level in the pre-crisis years. Adding to the collapse in residential investment from 2010, following the onset of the public spending adjustment plans, was the decline in non-residential construction, where civil engineering is to be found. Naturally, the external environment has played a major role in the origins and unfolding of our crisis. The contraction in world trade during the 2009 recession strongly affected our exports. However, as from 2011, net external demand has been markedly buoyant, mitigating the contractionary effect of the fall in domestic demand on activity, and it has provided for the correction of some of the macroeconomic imbalances I shall refer to. Further, the climate of uncertainty which took hold on international financial markets and the subsequent fall-off in financing flows had a more marked impact on those economies, such as Spain, which are more reliant on external saving.
But this is a collective action problem where seemingly rational individual inaction makes our collective future problems much bigger. So we must not let perfection be the enemy of progress. And after all, managing uncertainty is what you do all the time. Be brave here too. 6/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  I will leave you with an encouragement (again) to each play your role, and to make the most of this important network. I would like to thank Jenny Clark, Tim Rawlings, Chris Faint, David Swallow and Theresa Löber for their help producing this speech. 1 In pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot, net global GHG  emissions are projected to fall by 43% below 2019 levels by 2030. See IPCC (2023), ' AR6 Synthesis Report: Climate Change 2023Opens in a new window' 2 World Economic Forum (2022), 'Analysis: Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels hits  record high in 2022Opens in a new window' 3 From around 0.1% in 2012 to above 4% in 2021. See The City UK (2022), 'Green  finance: a quantitative assessment of market trendsOpens in a new window' 4 40% of homes in England now have an EPC rating of B and C or better.

1 Draghi, M. Welcome address at the Eighth ECB Statistics Conference, Central Bank Statistics: moving beyond  the aggregates, Frankfurt am Main, 6 July 2016. www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160706.en.html  3/3  Available  at  the  ECB  web  site:  BIS central bankers' speeches
Evidence from our Agents round the country, as well as official statistics, suggests that the labour market is tightening, and firms are having difficulty in filling some vacancies, despite the inflow of workers from the rest of the EU. These are straws in the wind, but if we delay taking action until inflation has taken off, it will be more difficult to bring it down again without causing the economy to slow sharply. That’s why our interest rate decisions need to reflect a view of likely inflationary pressures that looks a couple of years ahead. Our central forecast is that the economy will continue to grow strongly over the next year before easing back towards its longer term average, as both household and public spending slow down a bit. But any central forecast is subject to a wide margin of uncertainty, and there are a number of key risks. The housing market is one. Obviously, there are many aspects of housing which have nothing to do with monetary policy. It is striking that fewer houses were built in 2001 than in any year since the Second World War; and over 12% fewer houses were built in the ten years to 2002 than in the previous decade.

That’s how we like it: and the lesson you should draw from our readiness to tighten policy over the past seven months is that we are on the case. I hope that will give you the confidence to focus on your main business; creating wealth and ‘making people happy’. BIS Review 41/2004  3
At an international level the Financial Stability Board has commenced a holistic review of resilience in the non-bank financial intermediation sector in light of the Covid-19 shock, due to be delivered to the G20 summit in November. The Bank and FCA are actively participating in the FSB’s review. 11  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  will remain low for some time (Figure 9). But for me, the key point to emphasise is that our current guidance reflects the ongoing uncertainties and means that the burden of proof for any future tightening is high. One other point I want to make on forward guidance is that I see it as particularly valuable in reinforcing the effects of other tools. In general I think it makes sense to think of different monetary policy tools as complements rather than substitutes. And that is particularly true of forward guidance. It can serve to enhance the impact of individual policy actions by clarifying policy maker intentions, and can link separate policy actions together into a coherent package – in the words of the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System, providing “connecting material” and “giving meaning”. That is consistent with how the MPC have used it in the past and in its current incarnation. c. Negative rates – in the toolbox The final tool that I want to cover today is Bank Rate, and specifically the question of whether Bank Rate could go negative.

Basle Report Findings As you know, I chair the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, comprised of bank supervisors from the G-10 countries who coordinate supervisory policy for internationally active banks. While the Committee does not have formal legal enforcement powers, its conclusions and recommendations are widely implemented, both in G-10 countries and many others. In late January, the Committee issued a report dealing with the relationship between 1  BIS Review 27/1999  banks and highly-leveraged institutions, or “HLIs”. The Committee’ s report provides a framework for addressing the broader issues raised by the LTCM episode, the policy responses of supervisors, and some key risk management challenges for the banking industry going forward. In the United States, the Federal Reserve System, the New York State Banking Department, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have conducted target reviews of a number of large-bank dealings with hedge funds. These reviews contributed to the Committee’ s work, to the Federal Reserve System’ s issuance on February 1 of new guidance to financial examiners and banks, and to similar guidance from the Comptroller of the Currency issued in January. These new standards emphasize the need for improvements in the credit risk management process at banks. The new standards will likely be complemented by a study of the implications of the LTCM episode by the President’ s Working Group on Financial Markets.
These percentage changes have then been weighed together using TCW weights to a percentage change in the TCW index compared with the value of the index at the date of the survey. 16  A classical study of this is Meese and Rogoff (1983). See also Cheung, Chinn and Pasqual (2005). 17  This is known as covered interest parity, and means that the forward rate in relation to the current exchange rate corresponds to the interest rate differential between the countries. The reasoning is as follows: If one exchanges kronor for dollars, invests in a US one-year bond and then in one year’s time exchanges them back to kronor according to the current forward rate, the investment contains no exchange rate risk. The yield is therefore the same as that given by investing in a Swedish one-year bond. Uncovered interest parity means that the interest rate differential corresponds to an equally large expected change in the exchange rate. In our example this means that one exchanges the money for kronor in one year’s time at the current exchange rate, which entails an exchange rate risk. 18  See, for example, Froot and Thaler (1990). 19  This phenomenon has been called the forward premium puzzle. BIS Review 3/2010  7  in the carry trade, for instance, in connection with the Asian crisis in 1997–98, when “high interest rate currencies” in Asia weakened drastically against the dollar and the yen, and the carry positions had to be settled quickly.

However, the importer must initially choose between raising the price in kronor to compensate for the higher purchase price and reducing the company’s own margins. Let us assume that the price Swedish cheese importer has to pay is set at 10 euro per kilo, and that the price set for customers in shops in Sweden is 120 kronor. The exchange rate is  2  BIS Review 3/2010  initially 10 kronor/euro. The purchase price thus corresponds to 100 kronor per kilo. The Swedish importer thus has a profit margin of 20 per cent of the purchase price. 1 If the krona depreciates by 15 per cent, to 11.5 kronor per euro, the import price in kronor is 15 per cent higher, or 115 kronor per kilo. To retain a profit margin of 20 per cent of the purchase price, the price offered to customers in Sweden also needs to be raised by 15 per cent, from 120 kronor to 138 kronor per kilo. In this case the pass-through of the exchange rate to the price of the cheese will be complete, as both the exchange rate and the price of the cheese change by 15 per cent. However, this can be expected to lead to lower sales, as consumers may choose to buy, for instance, Swedish cheese instead of French. It is therefore not necessarily the most profitable pricing strategy. Another alternative for the importer is to hold the price in kronor completely unchanged.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 2 Longer-term measures of option-implied volatility GBP/USD 3m option volatility GBP/USD 2y option volatility 3m S&P variance swap rate 2y S&P variance swap rate 3m10y normalised imlied vol on USD IR (LHS) 2y10y normalised imlied vol on USD IR (LHS)  Basis points 160  Per cent 45  140  40  120  35 30  100  25  80  20  60  15  40  10  20 0 Jan 10  5 Jul 10  Jan 11  Jul 11  Jan 12  Jul 12  Jan 13  Jul 13  Jan 14  Jul 14  Jan 15  0  Sources: Barclays Live, Bloomberg. Implied volatilities are “normalised” by the level of interest rates, so the data show the volatility of absolute (rather than percentage) changes in swap rates. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3 Impact of asset price news on volatility in UK equity and debt markets Conditional daily volatility (%)  Pre-crisis credit (Jan 2001 - Jun 2007) Post-crisis credit (April 2009 - Jan 2015)  1.8  Pre-crisis equity (Jan 2001 - Jun 2007)  1.6  Post-crisis equity (April 2009 - Jan 2015)  1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2  -3%  -2%  -1% 0% 1% Unexpected daily change in price (per cent)  2%  0.0  Sources: Bank of American Merrill Lynch, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.

A number of recent statistical studies also imply this conclusion, suggesting that these recent episodes are a part of a broader pattern, even if they were exceptional in their scale. The following chart, using the output of a model estimated by Bank staff, is representative of the statistical analysis just referred to 1. The chart compares the estimated impact on UK equity and corporate debt asset price volatility of a given price shock in the post-crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period (Chart 3). Post crisis, both corporate debt volatility and equity market volatility appear to have become more responsive to a given price shock. This pattern is also apparent when the model is applied to a number of other important asset markets, including for example US-listed equities. Liquidity was clearly affected on each of 15 October and 15 January. Measures of trading volumes, which provide one metric of liquidity, were reportedly high on both days for most affected markets. But the ability of market participants to trade without affecting prices, or in some cases, to trade at all, was clearly very limited at various points on these days. The intra-day loss of liquidity was probably even starker on 15 January, from what we can tell, with widespread feedback that foreign exchange trading platforms stopped quoting Swiss francs for periods of time, while liquidity in the Swiss fixed income market was all but lost on the day and remained impaired for a few days.
Since the inflation target was adopted in 1995, CPIF inflation has averaged 1.7 per cent per year, seldom dropping below 1 per cent or rising above 3 per cent. This is a significant change when compared with the high and sharply fluctuating inflation we experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. The changes made to the frameworks for wage formation are an important factor behind the lower and more stable inflation we see today. I am primarily thinking of the Industrial Agreement implemented in 1997, but also of similar but less far-reaching agreements in other areas of the labour market. I am also thinking of certain changes to the legislation and the establishment of the National Mediation Office. Another factor should be that resource utilisation has been kept at a lower level than previously, a level that is compatible with low and stable inflation. The increased credibility of monetary policy in terms of keeping inflation close to the inflation target of 2 per cent has probably also contributed. Inflation expectations over the longer term now lie close to the inflation target (Figure 24). Low wage increases during the forecast period This year, social partners will negotiate just over 550 collective agreements covering just over 3.3 million employees. The results of these negotiations will affect the wages of the  BIS Review 11/2010  5  majority of the country’s wage-earners, thereby being of great significance for economic development.

Through our monetary policy, we are attempting not only to keep inflation at a low and stable level, but also to support production and employment in the current recession. A divided economy The Swedish economy is divided, with a significantly worse situation in export-dependent industries than in the private service sector. Even though the lowest point of the recession has passed, we are still experiencing the effects of the crisis on world trade. The Swedish export market has experienced a significant decline. At the same time, the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies have enabled the activity level of those areas of the economy focused on the domestic market to be maintained. This is clearly reflected in the development of different sectors during the economic downturn. While industrial production fell by over 20 per cent during the year leading up to the start of 2009, the production of private services only declined by approximately 5 per cent during this period. This divided economy has also been visible in the labour market. The labour market in export industry dependent areas outside the major cities is far bleaker than it is in the servicedominated major cities. While industrial employment decreased by approximately 100 000 between the autumn of 2008 and the autumn of 2009, employment within the service sector remained largely unchanged (Figure 18). Low inflation during the forecast period We expect low inflation during the forecast period (Figure 19).
13 In Q1 2022 Financial Stability in Focus Bank of England sets out the role of cryptoassets and DeFi in the  financial system and identified potential risks associated with them. 14 Breeden (2022) talks about the economy’s transition to net-zero, and the role central banks can play to support  it. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches

This diversity of viewpoints is a key strength of the FOMC. In fact, I believe we make better decisions as a committee because we don’t all think alike. But we are united in our commitment to our dual mandate of maximum sustainable employment and price stability and in our belief that preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve in making monetary policy decisions is very much in the public interest. That independence allows us to make tough decisions based on data and analysis – insulated from short-term political considerations. At FOMC meetings, each Committee member presents a current outlook for his or her District and for the nation. In formulating these assessments, we consult with many sources – our boards of directors, regional advisory councils, community leaders and other key stakeholders. My meeting with you today is part of this systematic effort to understand what is going on at the grassroots level of our economy. To add to what I learn from my conversations, my colleagues and I at the New York Fed continually track conditions in our District, and we have created special tools for that purpose. For example, my staff tracks local household credit conditions, including the amount and type of personal debt and whether repayments are timely. We also conduct a periodic poll about the credit needs of small businesses, which are an important source of new jobs in the District.