samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As part of its mandate, the Committee undertakes an objective review on the legislation and proposes the necessary amendments on existing Malaysian laws which are applicable to execute the whole chain of Islamic financial practices. Since its inception, the Law Harmonisation Committee has reviewed seventeen (17) laws in Malaysia and identified the areas that require legislative amendments so that Islamic financial transactions can be conducted in the most legally efficient manner. The work of the Committee will continue to remain relevant as the Islamic financial markets continue to expand and develop new products and business models. This mandate of the Committee will not only ensure that non-Shariah compliant elements in the legal provisions are harmonised, it will also ensure that our laws are facilitative to Islamic financial transactions. Another major milestone in Malaysia, is the new legal framework for Islamic banking and takaful, which is currently undergoing the legislative process towards its enactment. This new legal framework, will not only streamline the legal requirements across sectors, but will also ensure that the law is reflective of the nature and features of Shariah contracts and that the degree of regulation is commensurate with the level of risks that Islamic financial institutions, markets and products pose to the overall financial system. The greater clarity on the legal and prudential requirements underpinned by Shariah principles will enable participants of the Islamic financial system to align to their practices and expectations accordingly when undertaking Islamic financial business and transactions.

These are just a few examples of the important work accomplished by the international financial institutions and various experts. Your presence here at this Conference is the best testament to how the solutions and ways for crisis prevention are still evolving, situations being reassessed, and tools being refined. Ladies and Gentlemen, There has been a saying that “every crisis is a new crisis” - we don't have the same kind of crisis twice - and this indeed is a scary thought. We can come up with a how - to book on solving banking problems and crisis resolution, but the challenges are still enormous. I would like to reiterate the point made earlier that prevention is key because once a weak bank explodes into a full-blown crisis, the depth and complexity of problems could be of the magnitude that is unimaginable. It is with these thoughts in mind that I would have to sum up with this simple message: a supervisor can never be complacent. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Asian crisis started from Thailand slightly over six years ago, and it induced a train of international coordination programs and discussions to prevent a recurrence and means to manage it. I hope this conference will add to our knowledge of supervisory tools that can aid participating supervisors to better meet the challenges of weak bank resolution and systemic crisis regardless of the stages of economic development and forms of financial system.
The announcement of the agreement between Bear Stearns and JPMorgan Chase and the announcement of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility were finalized just before Asian markets opened on Sunday night, and the announcement of these actions helped avert the damage that would have accompanied default. On Monday morning, March 17, the $ billion back-to-back non-recourse loan through JPMorgan Chase to Bear was repaid to the Fed, with weekend interest of nearly $ million. The Primary Dealer Credit Facility was made available to the market. And at the request of and with the full cooperation of the SEC, examiners from the New York Fed were sent into the major investment banks to give the Federal Reserve the direct capacity to assess the financial condition of these institutions. Discussions were also continuing regarding the details of the Fed’s financial arrangement with JPMorgan Chase. Our legal teams engaged in the meticulous work of finalizing the legal structure of the lending arrangement that had been agreed to in principle, including defining the precise pool of collateral and related hedges that would secure the $ billion loan. At the same time, several infirmities became evident in the agreement between JPMorgan and Bear during the week of March 17th that needed to be cured. Negotiations between the two sets of counterparties proceeded almost immediately between the New York Fed and JPMorgan Chase on the one hand, and between JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns on the other. The New York Fed and JPMorgan discussed the details for the secured financing.

At 5:00 a.m., we participated in a conference call with our colleagues at the Board of Governors and the Treasury to review the options and decide on the way forward. After careful deliberation, together we decided on a course of action that would at least buy some time to explore options to mitigate the foreseeable damage to the financial system. With the support of the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman Bernanke and the Board of Governors agreed that the New York Fed would extend an overnight non-recourse loan through the discount window to JPMorgan Chase, so that JPMorgan Chase could then “on-lend” that money to Bear Stearns. This action was designed to allow us to get to the weekend, and to enable us to pursue work along two tracks: first, for Bear to continue to explore options with other financial institutions that might enable it to avoid bankruptcy; and second, for policymakers to continue the work begun on Thursday night to try to contain the risk to financial markets in the event no privatesector solution proved possible. Over the course of that day, March 14, Bear was downgraded by the credit rating agencies, and the flight of customer business from Bear accelerated. This set in motion a chain of decisions across the financial system as market participants prepared for the possibility that Bear would not be open for business once Asian markets opened on Sunday night.
This Summit indeed provides an opportunity for bankers and the private sector to discuss the issues facing the banking industry. It is now just over a year since the release of the Financial Sector Masterplan. It is therefore also a good time to undertake stock taking. Today, I would like to take the opportunity to discuss the progress that has been achieved over the recent year. I would also like to discuss some of the critical issues in the strategies that are being adopted by the banking institutions in charting their strategic course to enhance capacity and capability to achieve improved effectiveness and competitiveness. During the period of slower economic growth in 2001, following the global downturn in the technology sector, the banking sector clearly demonstrated its resilience and underlying strength. During this period, domestic sources of growth was important in sustaining the economy. Access to financing in this environment was therefore particularly important. The strengthened position of the banking sector in terms of quality of portfolio, capitalisation and profitability enabled them to continue to perform their intermediation function without disruption. The banking sector generally remained profitable and financially sound during this period. At the end of this first quarter, the risk weighted capital ratio was sustained at 12.5%. Profitability of the banking industry had also continued for the third consecutive year since the Asian crisis.

Indeed, interest on the public debt has trended downward from 4.7 percent of potential GDP in 1990 to 3.2 percent in 2007 to just 2.1 percent in 2012 as the average interest rate on Treasury securities has dropped from 9 percent to 5 percent, then to its recent level of 2½ percent. Rates obviously cannot continue to fall, though, so the cost of servicing debt is sure to increase, even if the size of the debt relative to the economy stabilizes. The canary in the mine: capital investment Capital investment is the economy’s canary in the mine because it’s often the first thing to succumb to uncertainty. Also, once undertaken, capital investment is costly to reverse. Investment has certainly been unusually sluggish in the wake of the recent recession. Going back to when our data begin, in 1947, net investment as a percent of GDP has fluctuated around a constant mean of 5.6 percent.4 It boomed in the late 1990s, reaching 8.1 percent of GDP, its highest level in over 50 years. The only higher quarter on record was the second quarter of 1950 (shortly after John Taylor and I came into this world, although I am not implying causality). Its peak during the 2001–07 expansion was an unremarkable 6.9 percent, but the subsequent plunge was unprecedented in the post-World War II data: The U.S. capital stock actually shrank during the second half of 2009.
As the financial markets have begun to normalise, the krona has strengthened, and there is reason to believe it will continue to strengthen if the normalisation continues. But at the same time, renewed unrest could lead to further periods with a weaker krona exchange rate. The assessment of the development of the exchange rate during the coming period is, as always, very uncertain. Concluding remarks The development of the exchange rate is very important to a small, open economy like Sweden’s. The effects of the exchange rate on the economy can be divided up into effects on inflation and effects on the real economy, which are mainly through international trade. BIS Review 3/2010  13  It is very difficult to forecast exchange rates accurately, but there are good reasons, at least in the slightly longer term, to expect the krona to appreciate. At the same time, experiences show that the krona rate is sensitive to the unrest in the financial markets. The conditions in the financial markets have normalised and the krona has strengthened this year. A continued normalisation of the financial markets points to a continued strengthening of the krona. If the unrest increases again the krona may once again weaken in the short term. However, this possibility is not included in the Riksbank’s main scenario. If the krona strengthens in the future, as indicated by our forecasts, one can expect this to subdue GDP growth somewhat and to keep down inflation.

According to the Police, the number of financial scams reported in Malaysia has risen to an alarming 1,883 cases between 2015 up to the 1st quarter of 2017, accumulating a total loss of RM379 million. This suggests that greed and ignorance can give way to rational financial decisions for many victims. Based on these observations, a lot more is left to be desired on the state of financial literacy to realise financial well-being for Malaysians. It is acknowledged that improving financial literacy is an intricate and long term journey. Through continuous and effective financial education, consumers would be able to improve their understanding of financial products and services, and develop skills and confidence to make informed financial decisions in their daily life. Financial education would encourage consumers to better manage their finances, plan for the future and manage risks associated to financial matters. While we agree that financial education plays an important role in elevating financial literacy, engaging in financial education alone is insufficient. It is equally important that the acquired knowledge and skills are put into practice and lead to a positive change in behaviour towards a healthy financial lifestyle. To this effect, initiatives to improve financial literacy must be implemented holistically. The ultimate aim is to promote sustainable behavioural changes at all life stages.
However, the rise in salaries for white-collar workers may also reflect weak cost control in enterprises and organisations following a long period of expansion. A precondition for interplay that functions well is that monetary policy is known and remains firm. The best thing Norges Bank can do to contribute to good interplay between the various components of economic policy and wage formation is therefore to be transparent about its analyses and assessments of economic developments. 3  Various game situations between fiscal and monetary policy are described in the literature. Some of these games are discussed in Kai Leitemo (2000): “Samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken under et underliggende inflasjonsmål for en liten åpen økonomi” (The interplay between fiscal and monetary policy under an underlying inflation target for a small, open economy) in Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift No. 2/2000, and in Erling Steigum (2000): “Samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken ved et inflasjonsmål” (The interplay between fiscal and monetary policy with an inflation target) in the book Perspektiver på pengepolitikken (Perspectives on monetary policy), edited by Jan F. Qvigstad and Øistein Røisland. 4  This is the game theory known as the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 5  Cf. descriptions in the Stackelberg equilibrium game theory.

The SNB is taking an active part in these reform efforts. It is represented on the relevant committees and plays a supportive role by participating in discussions with market participants, as well as with Swiss and foreign authorities. Reforms have been implemented at international level, particularly as far as the Libor is concerned. They focus on standardising the interest rate calculation by the panel banks and making it more transaction-based. However, volume in the market segment underlying the Libor remains low. At national level, the main emphasis is on the replacement of the TOIS fixing. 1 The TOIS fixing is a panel-based reference interest rate for the unsecured call money market and is used  1 TOIS stands for Tomorrow/Next Overnight Indexed Swap. Page 3/7  Berne, 15 December 2016 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  for interest rate derivatives. Despite extensive reform efforts, no stable long-term solution has been found. Underlying trading volume continues to be very low and other banks are unwilling to report interest rate conditions. For this reason, the TOIS fixing will be abandoned as of end-2017. SARON, the reference interest rate for secured call money, will be used in its place. SARON was launched by the SNB in cooperation with SIX in 2009. We are confident that it will establish itself as a key Swiss franc reference rate. Further work will be coordinated by a working group comprising financial sector representatives. Key information on this topic is publicly available on the SNB’s website.
This is part of the broader issue that I noted at the outset about the ability of non-bank finance to insure against severe but plausible liquidity stress. It is an issue that the FSB should take forward as part of its work programme on enhancing liquidity resilience in the NBFI sector. Prompt and transparent margining and, where possible, central clearing are essential to the resilience of the financial system. In times of stress, margin requirements will increase – as I said earlier that is a feature of the system, not a bug. But at the same time we need to do everything possible to ensure that the impact is not unnecessarily pro-cyclical, that market participants have the tools to prepare and manage that impact and that they do so. The March 2020 ‘dash for cash’ has given us a valuable lesson, we should not waste it. 1 Ben Bernanke has pointed out that panics can be a major cause of credit crunches. Reforms that avoid such  panic reduce the likelihood that financial stress transmits to real economy stress. 2 FSB (2017) Report on effectiveness of derivatives reforms. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

FRBSF Working Paper # 99-13. http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/workingp/wp99-13.pdf  BIS Review 82/2000  2  increase in equilibrium rates. The large federal budget surplus has increased the supply of national saving, while the rising trade deficit was matched by an increased supply of capital from abroad. But overall, it appears that we would have been contributing to an inflationary monetary policy if we had tried to hold real rates at their old levels. The other two reasons support an actual tightening of the stance of policy. Inflation tends to decline initially when productivity accelerates in response to a technology shock, because increases in labor compensation tend to lag behind increases in productivity growth. Eventually, though, the shock wears off, as the rate of productivity growth stops increasing and wages accelerate to catch up. So a technology shock is a “golden opportunity” - initially, it gives us lower inflation without a slowdown in growth or a rise in unemployment. However, to lock in the benefits and keep inflation at the new lower level, monetary policy would have to tighten. After all, in the end, inflation is determined by monetary policy, not by productivity growth. The final reason has to do with the “permanent income hypothesis”. A technology shock raises the prospect that incomes will continue to be higher in the future: in other words, permanent income may increase. This could mean that we will see an increase in spending before the additional capacity comes on line.
**  2003 average until November 2003. *  Almost all the 2003 data are forecasts. Source: INSTAT, Ministry of Finances, Bank of Albania and IMF estimations. *** As a conclusion, I would like to underline once again that the Bank of Albania does not make its policy decisions separately, but following carefully all the developments of the economy, and this is really important for the public to understand. As it is now a tradition, the monetary policy of the Bank of Albania is part of the general economic development program of the country. As such, it can’t be but a range of decisions and measures, which in good harmony with the other policies, the fiscal one, etc.,  2  BIS Review 8/2004  aim at economy growth and reduction of the poverty in the country. The coordination of monetary and fiscal policies could be achieved in the mid-term development program of the country, a program covering a three-year time span. The extensive logic of this program gives a crucial importance to keeping up macroeconomic stability. Keeping up macroeconomic stability serves as a bridging gap between the monetary policy and the fiscal one. Hence, the monetary policy is committed in keeping up price stability, whereas the fiscal one controls the budget deficit. These macroeconomic indicators are strongly related to one another: fulfilling each of them requires, as a basic condition, the observance of the other objectives.

Table 1: General economic indicators 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003*  Real growth of the GDP (in %)  9.1  -10.3  12.7  8.9  7.7  6.8  4.7  6.0  Number of employees (in thousand)  1,116  1,107  1,085  1,065  1,068  920.5  920  927  Unemployment percentage  12.4  14.9  17.8  18.2  16.8  16.4  15.8  15.2  17.4  42.1  8.7  -1  4.2  3.5  2.1  3.0  M3 aggregate growth  44  28  21  22  12  20  6  9.5  M3 aggregate velocity  1.82  1.72  1.92  1.73  1.64  1.51  1.58  1.66  MoB growth  14  52  -6  19  22  20  10  -3.3  New credit to the economy (Lek billion)  7.4  3.98  5.8  8  24  40.6  62.6  70.6  Inflation percentage (y-o-y)  Lek deposits (Lek million)  72,831  89,495 130,940 158,326 165,261 186,211 193,886 223,500  Budget deficit (in % of the GDP)  -11.4  -13.2  -11.3  -11.9  -9.1  -8.3  -6.2  -4.6  Domestic debt (in % of the GDP)  30.7  36.18  35.12  36.31  41.01  39.42  38.49  39.1  Current account (in % of the GDP)  -11.5  -12.03  -6.12  -7.34  -7.1  -6.1  -8.9  -8.5  Internal debt (in % of the GDP)  29.2  33.2  31.8  29.1  30.2  28.2  24.9  23.7  Average exchange rate lek/usd  104.5  148.9  150.6  137.7  143.7  143.48  140.15  123.1**  146.9  132.58  128.5  132.4  137.9**  Average exchange rate lek/euro  Note:* The GDP calculation is made by INSTAT with a different methodology, only for 1996-2000.
Foreign currency purchases prevented the Swiss franc from rising against the euro, and in addition the exchange rate of the euro against the Swiss franc has been significantly less volatile. Chart 1 shows the substantial increase in our holdings of foreign exchange reserves as a result of the interventions. Positive conclusions can also be drawn with regard to the bond purchases, which helped to reduce risk premia in the Swiss capital market. To date, bond purchases have totalled around CHF 3 billion. However, we have hardly made any purchases since mid-September due to the substantial improvement on the Swiss franc bond market. BIS Review 167/2009  1  These measures were accompanied by a substantial expansion of the balance sheet (charts 1 and 2): from around CHF 110 billion before the crisis, the SNB’s total assets reached a peak of CHF 245 billion in April of this year. The figure then began to decline, reaching around CHF 210 billion in November. On the asset side of the balance sheet, the fall in foreign currency swaps was mainly responsible for this drop. On the liabilities side, the domestic banks’ sight deposits played the most important role. These have fallen from a weekly peak of CHF 81 billion at the end of April to CHF 47 billion at the end of November. However, liquidity in the banking system is still very high. Before the crisis, sight deposits amounted to an average of some CHF 5 billion only.

Like the provisions, this forms part of the SNB’s equity capital. In the short term it helps to absorb any losses, while in the longer term it is transferred to the Confederation and the cantons as a distribution of profits. If it were not for the distribution reserve, the SNB’s resilience could only be guaranteed to a limited degree. There are two reasons for this: for one thing, a need for measures to safeguard the system could arise unexpectedly, greatly increasing the risks faced by the SNB suddenly; and for another, these risks are significantly higher because of the permanently expanded balance sheet. The SNB has therefore decided to additionally strengthen its equity capital, and thus its balance sheet. The SNB’s ability in the long term to respond to a crisis must not be dependent on the distribution reserve. This is only possible if the SNB increases its provisions from their current level. In the past, it increased its provisions each year at a rate equal to average nominal GDP growth for the previous five years. The SNB now intends to double this allocation in financial years 2009–2013: instead of approximately CHF 1.5 billion, some CHF 3.0 billion will now be allocated to provisions in 2009. Strengthening provisions will reduce the potential for future profit distributions to the Confederation and the cantons. On a current view, however, the annual profit distribution of CHF 2.5 billion can be expected to be maintained until 2017, when the current agreement on profit distribution lapses.