samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Basing an analysis on such an assumption is therefore not a reasonable way of evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of leaning against the wind. One needs to assume not just that the Riksbank has lied about its motives, but also that well-known and prominent external economic analysts have said one thing but really meant another. Nevertheless, this is the starting point for the counterfactual analysis many appear to rely on when drawing conclusions about the Riksbank’s monetary policy.8 In Sweden, this analysis has been given considerable scope, for instance on Dagens Nyheter newspaper’s editorial pages, where the Riksbank’s policy has been described as more or less incomprehensible and contrary to the prevailing opinion at that time – an ”interest-rate increasing experiment in summer 2010”.9 One might think it is strange that the claim that the Riksbank’s repo-rate increases were only about leaning against the wind, and moreover that the increases were made contrary to prevailing opinion, has become so widely spread. After all, one does not need to make a more in-depth check of the facts than I have provided here to see that neither claim is correct. It doesn’t require very much digging to be able to conclude that not only the Riksbank but also external domestic and international economic analysts found it natural, even after the repo rate had been raised to 2 per cent, that the increases would continue – and this without any particular reference to household debt.

Examples are the slowdown in international economic activity which became evident during the second half of 2011 and the fall in inflation at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014. It is easy to verify that these events were difficult to predict – and not merely something that everyone but the Riksbank was aware of in advance – by examining how forecasters in general viewed developments at the time. Thus, I think it is quite clear that the current low inflation is not a logical and predictable consequence of the repo rate not being held at 0.25 per cent after the crisis. As I mentioned at the start, there is an international debate on to what extent the central banks’ policy rates should be used as a complement to macroprudential measures to try to prevent lending and housing prices from rising too quickly, or more generally to counteract the build-up of financial imbalances. This is an important discussion and it would be very unfortunate if the critics’ alarmist but incorrect conclusions regarding the Swedish experiences, which can roughly be summarised as ”don’t try this at home – you may burn down your house”, were to be regarded as a truth in the debate. It is important that monetary policy is evaluated. But one condition for drawing the right conclusions is that the evaluation is based on a correct description of what has actually happened. The recent criticism has, in my opinion, become alienated from actual events.
But, as I said earlier, it is quite conceivable that given the range and speed of regulatory reforms, there are parts of the framework that might not work in the way we intended. As I mentioned, the Open Forum on 11 November will be another opportunity to assess this issue. The aim is to bring stakeholders together from across financial markets to discuss how we build markets for the public good. Second, changes in market structure and the ability of technology to connect buyers and sellers may increase liquidity. There are a number of suggestions that with the growth of assets under management asset managers and institutional investors may in future need to deal more  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  directly with each other and might be better placed to take on some of their risks. Technological change would certainly make this increasingly feasible. It remains for me, however, an open question whether such liquidity would be resilient in times of stress. Automated markets may have driven down costs, but are possibly less resilient. Dealer-intermediated markets, on the other hand, may have become more costly, but possibly more resilient. In a forthcoming speech, my colleague Minouche Shafik will discuss the changes in market structure that we have seen since the financial crisis and what they mean for market functioning.

Such effort can be as close as forming an alliance to pool the necessary data for model development, or as loose as sharing the costs of training and seminar similar to the one we are having here today. I should now end my talk. It has been a pleasure to share with you a regulator’s perspective on the implementation of Basel II and IFRS. I hope my remarks and observations have been useful. We are traveling on an important and challenging path towards achieving a robust and resilient financial system, and steady progress is being made. You, as a key stakeholder, are also an important part of this journey. I wish the rest of the seminar great success and accomplish its objective, and be interesting and educating to all. Thank you very much. 4  BIS Review 114/2007
The Baltic states and Sweden are naturally closes to our interests, so I will focus primarily on these countries. And as all financial crises are in various ways linked to the banks' loans on the property markets, I also see this seminar as an excellent opportunity to discuss these markets too. We have heard and seen little more than negative news over the last 12 months and most forecasters, including the Riksbank, have underestimated the strength of the international economic downturn. Now, however, we are beginning to see increasingly distinct signs of a stabilisation of the global economy, above all on the financial markets. I therefore intend to conclude my speech by saying a few words about this. The economic integration of the Baltic region is increasing The Baltic region consists of eight countries. They are all members of the European Union (EU) and the region has a total population of almost 72 million. 1 This is more than 15 per cent of the total population of the EU member states. 2 Throughout the course of history, the countries in the region have had close links with each other, not least because of common economic interests. The Hanseatic League is a thing of the past, but the ties between the countries have not weakened, quite the reverse. The economic links are now stronger than ever and a large part of the countries' trade takes place within the region. However, the integration does not relate to trade alone.

In addition to these forecasts, alternative scenarios on the inflation outlook and the global economy are discussed in the Risks section of the Inflation Report. You can examine the Report for details. While concluding my remarks, I would like to thank all my colleagues, who contributed to the Report, primarily those at the Research and Monetary Policy Department as well as the members of the Monetary Policy Committee, and thank every one of you for your participation. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches
I think that what I just said constitutes the essence of our contribution to the future: Let us do our best to make the economy move naturally towards a new equilibrium. All the institutions, policy-makers, administrators should be committed seriously to setting-up this new hotbed for our economy, so that as the years go by, it becomes attractive, competitive and profitable for every economic agent, either domestic or foreign. Getting away from the pressure exercised by the crisis whirlpool requires much optimism, energy and financial resources. At national level, ensuring steady foreign currency inflows, particularly in the form of foreign direct investments, remains a major priority. I think that the banking system has a prior role to play in this regard. It should be active in identification, promotion and financial backup. Thus the multiplier effect of foreign investments would gain a new dimension. Bailing the country out of the crisis spillovers requires not only energies, but also joint efforts. The irreversible path towards a democratic system of market economy requires financial architecture perfection and the country’s steady economic development in the long run. To this end, the drafting and implementation of wise development policies should be a constant, real and forward-looking priority, in full accordance with the European convergence framework. Only in this way we will harvest all comparative advantages that our country and the region and beyond provide to foreign investors. Let me finally emphasise once more that a well-capitalised banking system is a long-awaited development.

This forum, which was held on the eve of global turmoil outburst, indicated that the Albanian banking system had significantly increased its resilience. It addressed important matters related to: •  Transparency and customer services,  •  Risks related to foreign currency credit and consumer credit, as well as  •  Interbank market functions and monetary policy transmission in the economy. Today’s forum takes place in an important moment of the banking and financial system. After a hard year, it seems that the situation is becoming eventually normal. Therefore, I am confident that, figuratively, the third forum will have the consolidation of public confidence in the Albanian banking system as the main motif. Achievements in this regard are not lacking. Statistics show that deposit level is approaching steadily to its prior-crisis level, while ALL credit livening-up is continuing. Dear participants, Today’s meeting is held after some important financial and economic events dictated by the global crisis. Now that the situation has cleared up and has entered into an improvement stage, a thorough analysis is being made about its causes, about public authorities’ reaction and about actions to be taken, in order to raise the global financial system’s resilience. Now, allow me to deal briefly with the main features of this unmatched crisis, and then continue with some arguments on the functioning of the Albanian financial system and some necessary regulations for its further perfection.
No less than 150 companies with some connection to this information technology were introduced onto the New York stock exchange in 1901 and early 1902. In 1907 there was only one of these companies left that was making a profit and paying dividends, and even this company’s stock market value had halved since its introduction. As far as I know, no one then spoke of a “new economy” that would follow on from the technical developments, but this may be due to insufficient research on my part. Otherwise, the similarities are both striking and depressing. As we all know, if we cannot learn from history, we are doomed to repeat it. My other point is that the burst bubble has certainly made one of the stock market’s main tasks more difficult, namely conveying risk capital between savers and companies - it is no easy task at present to acquire risk capital through new share issues. However, this does not mean that the financial system as a whole is under threat. On the stock market, the banks act as intermediaries and are not directly affected by the downturn, as they only to a limited extent own or mortgage stock market shares. Of course, the income from portfolio management and share trading is declining, and many operators outside of the banks may experience problems, but this does not comprise a threat to the system. It is a completely different situation when a bubble on the property market bursts, as was the case in Sweden in the early 1990s.

We are tracking the situation closely, and will take further steps as these become necessary. Singaporeans must be psychologically prepared for the problem to stay with us for some time. Each of us will have to learn more about the disease, adjust our habits and take sensible precautions, so that we can protect ourselves, our families and the people around us, and carry on with our lives. SARS is not just a medical issue; it is a test of how well Singaporeans can respond collectively to resolve a serious problem facing our society. Synopsis The same ability to respond collectively is critical to our remaking of the Singapore economy. So far the debate on economic reforms has focussed predominantly on Singapore's present situation, and indeed on our immediate problems. We need to take a step back from the close-up snapshots of where we now are, and see our challenges in a historical and international perspective. The story of a country consciously restructuring its economy to adapt to a changed environment is not unique to today's Singapore. It is a recurring theme in world economic history. Tonight, I will explore the challenges of remaking the Singapore economy against the broader context offered by the lessons and experiences of history. In particular, the experiences of Japan, China and UK offer useful insights into the process of our ongoing reforms.
There are perhaps some who believe that deposit money will ultimately become the sole means of payment. Because Norwegian banks are well-run and well-capitalised, and because customer deposits are covered by the deposit guarantee scheme, we trust deposit money. As long as this is the case, using deposit money will be cheap and efficient for the consumer. But is it entirely unproblematic? Imagine an ordinary consumer, let’s call him Ola, in a future when cash is no longer in frequent use. Ola hasn’t been to a bank for many years. He hasn’t used cash for a long time. He pays for everything digitally. But now he’s worried. Over the past few weeks, there have been several major cyberattacks against the bank he uses. The bank’s systems have been down for hours at a time, and staff are working overtime to fix the problem. Ola decides he wants his money. He logs on to his online bank, which for the time being is still open. He considers his options: he could transfer his money to an account in another bank. Or he could transfer money to a pre-paid card. But Ola does not trust either option. Who is really behind these solutions? How safe are they now? Ola decides he wants cash and contacts his bank. But the bank cannot meet his request as it is currently unable to provide Norwegian banknotes. Ola faces the same options as before: use an account in another bank? or a payment card?

However, the banks experienced repeated crises, and in 1913, the Federal Reserve was established to stabilise the private banking system. In the post-war years, the value of western currencies was pegged to gold under the Bretton Woods system: an ounce of gold was worth USD 35. All the other member countries – including Norge – agreed to peg their currencies at a fixed rate to the US dollar. The gold standard was abandoned by President Nixon during the Vietnam War, and the traditional fixed exchange rate system was terminated in 1971. The value of money is no longer linked to precious metals. Today, money is so-called fiat money. The term derives from the Latin “fiat”, meaning “let it become”. In his book Sapiens – A Brief History of Humankind, Yuval Noah Harari writes: “Trust is the raw material from which all types of money are minted”. And he goes on: “..., the fact that another person believes in cowry shells, or dollars, or electronic data, is enough to strengthen our own belief in them, […]. Christians and Muslims who could not agree on religious beliefs could nevertheless agree on a monetary belief, because whereas religion asks us to believe in something, money asks us to believe that other people believe in something.”3 Money has value because – and only because – everyone believes in its value. Money is minted from trust. But how is this possible? How can money retain stable value in a system exclusively based on belief and trust? First, money must be usable.
2  BIS Review 1/2005  Another factor that needs to be reminded is that most tasks in the Central Bank are the outcome of teamwork. I have found instances where teamwork has been poor with only a few persons doing the bulk of work. It is necessary to build positive team relationships within the Bank and encourage co-operation between individuals and functional areas to achieve team goals. One of the intentions of sending the senior and middle management of the Central Bank on “Outward Bound” leadership training programmes was to promote the team building capabilities among the management and to expose the participating officers to situations which require strategic planning on a team level. I am sure those who participated in the “Outward Bound” programmes would agree that they have gained new insights on working as teams through their participation. We intend to send staff at all levels on such programmes in the future. I also wish to request all Trade Unions of the Bank to extend their fullest co-operation to the management to create a stimulating work environment in which employees would be able to advance in knowledge and acquire the necessary skills to meet challenges and effectively fulfill their responsibilities thereby transforming the Bank into a center for excellence with enhanced productivity and staffed with competent professionals. Towards this end, I would encourage the staff to have better exposure to the developments in the real sector. I have also reiterated the importance of dealing with the employees in a fair and equitable manner.

The management on its part is ready to listen to the employee grievances and problems but I would encourage you to also make innovative suggestions to address these grievances and solve problems. At the same time, I wish to emphasize the importance of displaying your loyalty and commitment to this institution at all times. Finally, I wish that all of you would get the strength and determination to overcome all the bottlenecks and hindrances before you in the New Year. BIS Review 1/2005  3
Here, the buyer makes a down payment equal to 20 percent of the asset value and borrows the other 80 percent of the purchase price in the form of a home mortgage. We would say that the borrower’s leverage is 5 (the asset value divided by the equity share). Now, it’s easy to see that reducing debt and reducing leverage are the same thing when asset values are constant. If the borrower in our example pays down half the mortgage and the house value doesn’t change, her leverage has fallen to 2.5. Unfortunately, house values fell from 2007 to 2011. So while households were trying their best to reduce their mortgage debt, their leverage was actually rising, since house values were falling much faster than debt. It was really only in 2012 that leverage in residential real estate began to fall, because house prices stopped declining faster than housing debt. In 2013, leverage continued to fall, even though net mortgage borrowing resumed, because house values rose even faster. I think this distinction is important, because if we think that households have been steadily deleveraging since 2008 we might wonder whether we were getting close to the finish line. 4  Meta Brown, Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, and Wilbert van der Klaauw (2011), Have Consumers Been Deleveraging? Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics blog, March. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  After all, the labor market has been recovering, albeit slowly, for several years.

The problems are not a consequence of shortcomings in the borrowing instruments. I do not see any immediate need for new types of lending instruments, such as non-borrowing programs or a reintroduction of Contingency Credit Lines. There are already surveillance methods in place to deal with such situations, and today's borrowing instruments are sufficiently flexible to meet the existing requirements (and demand). Nor do I believe that the problems to any great extent are due to incorrect analysis or erroneous assessments, even though the situations faced by the Fund are often difficult and the advice given has been open to question from time to time. Nonetheless, there are a number of things that can be done in this area. Shortcomings still exist, as I mentioned earlier, as regards the Fund's participation in crisis resolution. There is scope for further development of those instruments that exist today. The reason why this has not happened is because some countries oppose it for political reasons. This brings me into the role that “political considerations” play for the IMF to work well. In my view, the central problems of the IMF are often political in nature. These problems exist at several different levels: •  Individual countries are sometimes for political reasons not willing to take the sometimes bitter medicine prescribed by the IMF’s staff and Executive Board and engage in serious dialogue.
Of particular interest is that Indian actors are providing fresh interpretations of Ibsen’s work, both in India and in Norway. The topic of my speech today is Norwegian experiences in balancing economic development with macroeconomic stability from a historical perspective. As a background for the subject, let me start with a brief characteristic of Norway today from an economic perspective. First, Norway is a small, mountainous country with a population of only 4½ million people scattered across a land area that is one tenth of the size of India. Second, Norway’s economic growth has been favourable for many years, and the per capita income is among the highest in the world. An abundance of natural resources, not least oil and gas, and openness to trade and capital movements are important reasons for this. The petroleum sector’s share of GDP was approximately 24 per cent in 2005. Over the last 10 years, the government has earned higher petroleum revenues than it has spent. Today we have a sizeable Government Pension Fund, which invests all its funds globally. Globalisation and cyclical developments have been kind to the Norwegian economy. Prices for our imported goods are falling in relation to prices for goods we export. Norway’s terms of trade are improving. The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices is particularly strong, but the terms-of-trade gains for the mainland economy have also been high. One aspect of this is that trade in services with India is increasing.

Petroleum and luck is, however, not the whole story behind the high per capita income in Norway. We have also been successful in seizing the opportunities that have been offered by changing international environments. The foundations for the Norwegian welfare state were established some two hundred years back in history. Long-term economic developments The Napoleonic Wars, which tormented Europe in the early 19th century, brought some great changes to the face of Europe. Norway took this opportunity to adopt a constitution and establish a number of central governmental institutions, including a central bank. Norway was severely hit by the economic crisis that followed the war, and around 1820 Norway’s GDP per capita was lower than in many comparable countries. In the second half of the 1820s, a new period of economic expansion started. The upturn gathered momentum from the middle of the century. An event which had a considerable impact on Norwegian shipping and economic history took place in 1849 when England repealed all navigation acts regulating the right to transport goods to and from England and its colonies. BIS Review 22/2006  1  This new and more competition-friendly trade environment spurred a rapid build-up of the Norwegian commercial fleet. Norway suddenly became a major exporter of services. As the chart shows, the tonnage of the Norwegian commercial fleet increased almost six-fold from 1850 to 1880. By 1880, Norway had built up the world’s third largest commercial fleet.