samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Is enough being done on this score? From my vantage point, it is far easier to see areas in need of improvement on the structural side than to detect any clear momentum toward addressing them. In the U.S., greater clarity around policies in areas such as trade, tax reform, energy, environmental regulation, and the strategy for fiscal adjustment would help extend investment horizons, increasing the prospect that accommodative financial conditions will have their intended effect. In Japan, the new government is talking about structural reform, and policymakers have identified many areas where the business climate could be improved. In fact, I suspect that Japan’s success in durably boosting growth will hinge as much or more on progress on the structural front, as on developments in monetary or fiscal policy. Robust regulation and oversight can also improve the cost-benefit calculus. Here, let me say a few words about the ongoing global regulatory reform process. As you know, the scope and scale of the regulatory response to the crisis of 2008 has been quite ambitious – some would say too ambitious. Nonetheless, the scale should be understandable against the backdrop of the weaknesses revealed in the crisis, and the economic and financial fallout that resulted. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  And the reality is that a great deal has been accomplished, both in establishing goals, and in progress toward those goals. That is not to suggest that I am equally enamored with everything that has been done, or the way in which it has been done.

The reform effort has many moving parts, and further efforts are clearly needed to ensure that those parts fit together, and that the various parties work together. And these reforms are yet to be fully implemented, let alone tested over a full credit cycle. Of course, building a stronger system is not just about regulatory reform. Changes in institutional governance and culture are also needed. Many of the problems that surfaced during the crisis and more recently reflect a culture that emphasizes short-term gain over institutional sustainability – a culture in which regulation is viewed as an obstacle to be arbitraged or circumvented, rather than as an additional check on broadly shared objectives. That needs to change if progress is to take root. Making sure that happens will require a realignment of incentives, and strong leadership from the top. All of this will take time. The question is, how much time do we have? While risk-taking has been somewhat constrained in the aftermath of the crisis and the resulting uncertainties in the macro environment, we are beginning to see signs of things heating up in some areas of the markets: e.g., record issuance of junk bonds and emerging market debt, including enthusiastic take-up for issuers from “frontier markets” with little to no prior presence in the capital markets; increased leveraged buyouts; weakening covenants; and a rebirth of the collateralized loan obligation market. Complacency at this point would not be a good thing.
Ravi Menon: Three “C”s of a good payment instrument Welcome address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), at the Currency Conference 2011, Singapore, 3 October 2011. *  *  *  Why cash is still king Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning and a warm welcome to Singapore and the 2011 Currency Conference. Singapore is honoured and delighted to host this flagship event. The late Mr John Shepherd-Barron, who pioneered in 1967 the development of the Automated Teller Machine, or ATM, said during a 2007 interview: “Money costs money to transport. I am therefore predicting the demise of cash within three to five years.” Shepherd-Barron believed fervently that we would soon be swiping our mobile phones at till points, even for small transactions. We have indeed seen an increasing use of cashless payments at point-of-sale. Electronic payment alternatives have mushroomed in many countries, ranging from contactless stored value cards in Singapore to real-time settlement of electronic fund transfers in the United Kingdom. But cash remains “king”. Even in advanced economies. This is especially so for person-toperson transactions and micro-payments. Take high-tech Singapore. The use of electronic payments has proliferated rapidly in recent years. Yet, currency-in-circulation has been growing at an average 7 per cent per annum during the last ten years. This has reflected demand from a growing population and a growing economy. Less well known is how the demand for cash globally is being driven by tourism.

Confidence in a currency comes not only from its security but also its availability, especially during times of uncertainty. Central banks and financial institutions must have robust business continuity measures to ensure adequate supply of cash to meet surges in demand and the resilience of national payment systems. The second “C” is convenience. Although cash is widely used and accepted in our society today, e-payment alternatives such as mobile payments and electronic wallets are gaining popularity. The “tap-and-go” feature of contactless cards is much in sync with the hurried lifestyles of today, hence the growing popularity of these cards. Convenience is an important consideration in developments within the cashless space of payments. In 2008, for the first time, GIRO overtook cheques by volume of transactions in Singapore. In fact, GIRO itself – which is based on batch processing – will be eventually overtaken by straight-through, real-time payments systems. The third “C” is cost-effectiveness. Handling cash is costly. According to a 2010 study by Retail Banking Research, the cost of distributing, managing, handling, processing and recycling cash in Europe is estimated at € billion. This is equal to 0.6 per cent of Europe’s GDP. How to reduce the cost of cash without compromising confidence and convenience? A number of countries are exploring alternative note substrates and coinage materials to increase their durability, quality, security, and cost effectiveness. Besides managing manufacturing costs, countries are looking at the end-to-end costs of currency distribution and collection.
2023 Paris Finance Forum – Paris, 5 July 2023 Regulation and innovation: the yin and yang of the financial sector  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 of 6 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a real pleasure to be taking part in the Paris Finance Forum and I wish to warmly thank Augustin de Romanet for his invitation, and Europlace for their work. Europlace has contributed to the growing interest in the Paris financial centre in the wake of Brexit. As I have the privilege of speaking this lunchtime, I shall begin with dessert. According to an excellent Bloomberg article,i "If any city can make claim to being the European Union’s new pre-eminent hub, it’s Paris". Paris is the only financial centre to offer a broad range of financial activities – from global asset management to insurance and banking and market activities – and it has benefited from the relocation of all segments of the financial industry. Paris has now overtaken London as Europe's largest financial centre in terms of stock market capitalisation. With the presence of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), there is also a 'regulatory hub' – to which I should add the ACPR, generally recognised as an exacting but extremely competent supervisor. The Paris financial centre is therefore a good illustration of harmonious coexistence between regulation and innovation. In my view, these are the yin and yang of the financial sector.

Benoît Cœuré: Short-term crisis management and long-term vision – how Europe responds to the crisis Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at CEMLA’s 60th Anniversary Commemorative Conference “Central Bank cooperation at the beginning of the 21st century”, Mexico City, 20 July 2012. *  *  *  I wish to thank Jonathan Yiangou for his contribution to this speech. I remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. Ladies and gentlemen, Thank you very much for inviting me to speak at this session on central bank cooperation in times of crises. From the euro area perspective, central bank cooperation has worked very well during the crisis. We have had continuous dialogue since the early stages of the crisis in 2007, which continues to the present day. Our network of currency swap lines with the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Japan and Bank of Canada have helped ensure foreign liquidity for the euro area and euro liquidity abroad. There has also been successful international cooperation through the IMF. Overall, these measures have played an important role in easing strains in financial markets. As the success of this cooperation is broadly recognized, I would like to use my intervention today to discuss a different and more contested issue: the management of the crisis by the euro area authorities. When I travel outside of Europe, I am often struck by the level of misunderstanding of the euro area’s approach.
If problems arise in parts of the financial system, operators can find alternative sources of credit. A larger bond market would enhance financial stability. This is also the case in Norway. New investment and risk management instruments Structural changes and strong growth over the past decades have led to more perfect financial markets. This has made the markets more efficient and improved the distribution of resources and risk between operators, sectors and regions, and over time. There is rapid growth in product development in financial markets, and trading in instruments for the transfer of credit risk is rising. Greater focus on risk management by banks and other operators generates demand for these products. The emergence of new instruments is being driven forward by intensified competition, technological developments and new, more risk-based capital adequacy requirements. In many countries, there has been a tendency towards separating those who provide loans and who assess and price the risk, from those who take over the loans and bear the risk. Through securitisation, banks can sell entire loan portfolios to special purpose vehicles that issue bonds that are collateralised by these loans. It is the buyers of these bonds that bear the risk. Such special purpose vehicles are not subject to capital adequacy requirements or supervision. Asset-backed bonds are a similar instrument where bond holders have collateral in loans that banks have transferred to a mortgage company. Mortgage companies are subject to supervision and capital adequacy requirements. Efforts are being made to allow these instruments in Norway.

Losses were low on loans to the household sector compared with loans to the enterprise sector during the banking crisis at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Despite high real interest rates and a decline in income, households were largely able to service their debt. High interest expenses and a decline in income, however, led to a reduction in household consumption. This led subsequently to lower turnover in the enterprise sector and weakened profitability and debt-servicing capacity. In this way, households contributed to an increase in banks’ losses on loans to the enterprise sector. The higher the household debt burden is, the stronger the spillover effect can be from households to enterprises. 4. The stability of the financial system  Given the current picture, a sharp increase in bank losses is not likely in the near future. This is also the assessment of the IMF, which recently evaluated the Norwegian financial system. The IMF concluded that the Norwegian financial system is solid and well managed, and that short-term vulnerabilities are low. Even with a strong negative shock to the economy, losses are expected to be far lower than during the banking crisis. This is probably because of the increase in the share of loans to households, for which losses are normally not very high, and because enterprises are now in a far stronger financial position than they were at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.
There are signs of stretched valuations on stock and real estate markets, and global corporate and sovereign debt levels are high. This makes the banking sector vulnerable to corrections in these markets, triggered for example by a sudden increase in interest rates or a deterioration in economic prospects. As a central bank with a mandate to contribute to financial stability, the Swiss National Bank monitors these developments closely. In particular, we focus on the Swiss real estate and mortgage markets, given growing signs of vulnerabilities in these markets as well as their relevance for the Swiss banking system. Before I dig deeper with an assessment of current vulnerabilities both abroad and in Switzerland, let me take stock of our experience with macroprudential policy so far. In order to do so, let me start by recalling the objectives of macroprudential policy, and the instruments policymakers use to achieve them. Macroprudential policy: objectives and instruments Objectives  The GFC demonstrated how costly financial crises can be, both in terms of output and from a broader social perspective. This experience is also backed by research, which highlights that recessions associated with a financial crisis tend to be deeper and longer lasting than ‘normal’ (non-financial) recessions. This is especially the case if the preceding expansion was characterised by stronger-than-average credit and real estate price growth.

The absence to date of underlying inflationary pressures is also seen in the moderate evolution of labour costs and of the indicators of long-term inflationary expectations. However, the upside risks to inflation have been growing in step with the improvement in activity and employment, which might drive the pass-through to consumer prices and wages of past rises in energy product prices. Faced with this, the ECB decided to readjust monetary conditions by raising its official interest rates on five occasions since December 2005. These measures have proved necessary to keep inflationary expectations anchored at lower levels, against a background of strengthening aggregate demand and a gradual move closer towards the potential level of output. In any event, I should stress that at present, even following these interest rate rises, the financial conditions in place remain conducive to economic activity. Having a monetary policy geared to ensuring price stability is a vital requirement for economic dynamism to be sustainable. However, monetary policy can in no way supplant the other economic policies which, in fact, are of paramount importance for the growth of our economies. In particular, the European authorities must strive more resolutely to eliminate the structural obstacles holding back growth potential. The relatively disappointing results in terms of economic expansion in the euro area in the past decade are due, above all, to the scant dynamism of labour productivity which, in turn, is largely a response to the relatively modest pace of innovation, and its spread and application to the rest of the economy.
Stefan Ingves: Policy rate setting and the monetary policy steering system Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Handelsbanken, Stockholm, 28 April 2008. *  *  *  During the autumn and spring the international financial markets have been marked by considerable uncertainty and turmoil. The situation has caused several central banks to take extraordinary measures, while for instance the Riksbank has not seen any reason to do so. One reason why central banks have acted differently is that the financial crisis has affected different countries to differing degrees. In Sweden we have not observed any major problems as a result of the financial crisis. This is linked to the fact that Swedish banks have not been exposed to the US subprime market to any great extent. Nor has there been any distrust of Swedish banks, which have a good capacity to deal with unexpected negative events. Ultimately, it is a question of a broad view that Swedish banks do not have problems. Another reason why central banks have acted differently is the differences in monetary policy steering systems between countries. It is therefore important to create an understanding of how the Swedish monetary policy steering system works. In my speech today I will talk about monetary policy from the production of the background material for making a decision until the decision has been implemented. I will focus on how an interest rate decision is put into practice.

Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 6 December 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Rehn. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. Owing to high energy prices and increases in indirect taxes in some euro area countries, HICP inflation rates have been elevated for some time. More recently they have declined, as anticipated, and are expected to fall below 2% in 2013. Over the policy-relevant horizon, inflation rates should remain in line with price stability. The underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. Inflation expectations for the euro area remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The economic weakness in the euro area is expected to extend into next year. In particular, necessary balance sheet adjustments in financial and non-financial sectors and persistent uncertainty will continue to weigh on economic activity.
First, the international economic outlook has deteriorated markedly, impacting heavily on forecasts for the Swiss economy. Second, the financial market crisis has intensified since midSeptember. Finally, prices for raw materials and oil have plummeted and this, combined with the worsening of the economic outlook, has led to a marked improvement in the inflation outlook. I will deal with these three points in turn. Global economic outlook In September, our main focus was the possibility of sharply contracting growth in the most advanced economies. Now, we know that economic activity will decline simultaneously in the US and Europe, while it will slow appreciably in emerging economies. Whether one can call this a recession or not depends on the definition used, and is now merely a question of semantics. In the US, GDP is likely to decline substantially during the current quarter, following its slight contraction in the third quarter. Industrial production, which had hitherto been remarkably stable, fell sharply by 4% between July and October. Moreover, unemployment, which had also been stable for some time, rose rapidly, reaching 6.7% in November – a level not seen since 1994. The sudden worsening of the situation is above all due to the fall in household spending. Households saw their financial situation deteriorate sharply due to the loss in value of their real estate and financial assets, while also suffering – until recently – a progressive erosion of their purchasing power through the continuous rise in fuel prices.

Strict inflation targeting of this type would thus have resulted in more pronounced fluctuations in the interest rate and in aggregate demand and production. BIS Review 66/2002  3
The Treasury’s Request for Information, and comments on various SEC and CFTC proposals, have provided thoughtful perspectives on the evolution of Treasury market structure. We have also benefited from consultation with groups such as the Treasury Markets Practices Group (TMPG), which is made up of market professionals committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the Treasury market. Continued engagement between the official sector and the public on the Treasury market remains necessary to help to manage its evolution, and to best maintain its efficient function and integrity. Those of you who transact in this market have a crucial perspective on how the Treasury market works and what information is useful for evaluating its function. Engagement between the official and private sectors can also facilitate the development of timely solutions to important issues in the industry. Such efforts include the best practices the TMPG has produced for the Treasury, agency debt and agency MBS markets, 4 and the Group of 30’s recommendations on banking culture and conduct5―an issue I believe the financial industry must continue to work on.6 In fact, it is this type of collaboration―between a wide array of market participants and official agencies―that helps different perspectives come together to create effective practices.7 In addition to engagement with the public, the Joint Member Agencies have continued their interagency collaboration. We have been working together to share information and help shape the most effective path forward for public policy.

What considerations need to be made regarding Treasury market clearance practices given the growth in activity by participants who are not central counterparty members? Will the evolving settlement marketplace introduce new challenges to Treasury market participants? How must practices and culture evolve as market structure does? And, how will the interplay of all of these issues affect the future of the Treasury market? Today’s conference provides an excellent opportunity to discuss these issues. Thank you for coming. I look forward to today’s dialogue and the ongoing engagement between the Joint Member Agencies and the public as we all strive to ensure the continued sound functioning of this essential marketplace. 1 Joint Staff Report: The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Board of  Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, July 13, 2015. 2 Ellen Correia Golay, Frank Keane and Nathaniel Wuerffel assisted in preparing these remarks. 3 The Joint Member Agencies are the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal  Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 4 Best Practices for Treasury, Agency Debt, and Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities Markets , Treasury  Markets Practices Group, Revised February 2016. 5 Banking Conduct and Culture, Group of 30, July 2015.