samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Digital currencies are developing in in the absence of a comprehensive regulatory system, and there are countless digital currencies, with countless idiosyncrasies, and countless entities of varying quality that can issue them. According to one source, there are currently nearly 3000 digital currencies but I doubt anyone really knows the true number. 19 While we have not seen issuers of digital currencies hold shards of glass, lead, and nails in reserve, we have seen digital currencies with no backing by design—Bitcoin being the prime example—digital currencies backed by other volatile digital currencies—for those who put a premium on safety—and digital currencies styled after Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Kanye West—though Mr. West’s lawyers made sure that Coinye never really got off the ground. The analogy between the current era and the wildcat era isn’t perfect, of course. History rhymes after all; it doesn’t repeat. In contrast to the wildcat era, various federal regulators have demonstrated a willingness to apply existing regulatory tools to digital currencies. But, policy makers and regulators are also still monitoring developments in digital currencies, and we have not fully formulated a cohesive policy response. Whether we like it or not, however, we are beginning to confront at least two questions similar to those that policymakers addressed in the waning days of the wildcat era: 1. Should national governments restrict unsafe or particularly volatile private currencies? 2. Should national governments limit private currency issuance to tightly regulated institutions so that governments can incentivize or mandate certain desirable features?

Some might look at this list, and want a faster, ready-made solution. I can hear them now: “Why not just put this activity in the banking system and borrow a more robust regulatory structure?” I think we should consider that, but bank regulation may not be fit for purpose. History rhymes; it doesn’t repeat—that’s the last time I will use that line. So, at the same time we consider what banks will or should be going forward, we also should consider some more fundamental questions: (i) What is the most practical approach? (ii) What approach gives us the right balance of functional and risk-based regulation? (iii) What approach is the most neutral to technological change? (iv) What approach provides the clarity to the greatest extent possible (recognizing that every model will have its faults)? (v) What approach will last to and through the next cycle of innovation? I mentioned the SEC earlier. The SEC analyzes digital currencies using a test that the Supreme Court formulated almost 90 years ago—that is mind boggling, but for what the SEC does, it is also still very relevant—this is something worth striving for. You might be surprised that I don’t have the answer to what the next 90 years of digital currency regulation will look like, but I hope to have the opportunity to explore this issue with some of you. Thank you. 1 Many thanks to Joseph Torregrossa and Thomas Noone for their assistance with  these remarks.
These were designed to boost confidence by demonstrating that we were conscious of the risks of a credit crunch. Since those actions, conditions in money markets have eased considerably. The benchmark 3-month interbank lending rate has fallen by around 75 basis points relative to expected policy rates. But conditions are not yet back to normal and remain fragile. Although central banks can and will respond to the consequences of strains in the banking system for their economies, the solution to the underlying problem does not rest with them but with the banks and financial markets themselves. Banks must reveal losses promptly, and, most importantly, raise new capital where necessary. But these developments in financial markets and the banking system have started to affect activity in the economy more widely. Interest rates charged to both households and companies have risen relative to Bank Rate, reversing the relative fall in the year or so before last August. And our own survey of credit conditions last month revealed that lenders intend to tighten conditions further this year. This tightening is unlikely to be short-lived. Tighter conditions will discourage borrowing to finance spending on residential and commercial property, on business investment and on consumption. The impact on property prices is already clearly visible. Commercial property prices have fallen by 12% since the middle of last year. And, after rising sharply earlier in 2007, house prices stagnated in the final quarter.

Although we have little control over the strength of the economic winds buffeting our economy, our framework of inflation targeting does, as I said in my first speech as Governor almost five years ago, provide a seaworthy vessel. We cannot avoid some volatility in the short run and it is important that everyone understands the limits to the ability of central banks to smooth the economy. But, by keeping our eye firmly on the need to keep inflation close to target in the medium term, we can reach the calmer waters of low inflation, steady growth and a better balanced economy. And our policy framework will, I hope, allow you not to be overwhelmed by the headlines and to focus on what really matters for our future prosperity – the successful running of your own businesses. 4  BIS Review 8/2008
It is obvious that the risk inherent in such activity may easily become too high. And the solution is in itself simple enough: The authorities should require higher equity ratios for banks, so that owners must absorb a larger share of the losses if things go wrong. Another solution to this might be the one Governor Rygg chose in his day: Close insolvent banks and place the losses where they belong. If the authorities intervene and bail out one bank, expectations are created that they will also bail out others. We may then end up with a system in which banks take excessive risk, potentially increasing the likelihood of new and greater banking crises in the future. Therefore, banks should not be bailed out. We are facing a dilemma. Bailing out banks increases the risk of instability in the long term. Yet the cost of refraining is even greater instability in the short term. Once the crisis has arisen, there is no escaping it. If banks are facing sizeable losses, then someone must bear those losses. If we do not allow the Treasury to bear the losses through support for the banks, the populace will still be affected, especially if the consequence is a systemic crisis and economic downturn. This dilemma is what is called a time-inconsistency problem. In principle, it may be desirable to allow insolvent banks to fail, but there will be valid reasons to depart from this principle when actually faced with the decision.

Johnsen underscored the seriousness of the potential consequences for the Norwegian economy if the Government did not intervene resolutely in the crisis: 9 “The gravity of the situation is simply this: A collapse of the banks will also break the backbone of the Norwegian economy. If we do not implement extensive measures now, a good many ordinary people may lose their savings.” But the Minister of Finance made an important reservation. In the same account, he also stated that the banks’ owners could not expect to escape unscathed: “At the same time, the instruments are designed so that banks themselves will have a principal responsibility for solving their financial problems. They will not simply be able to send the bill for their misjudgements to the government.” That was also the case in practice. The shares in banks that lost all their equity capital were written down to zero, in line with the principles pertaining to the bankruptcy of other enterprises. The capital injections banks received were made on the condition that they restored order to their organisations while cutting unnecessary costs. In other words: we bailed out the financial system, but not the banks’ owners. On the other hand, practically no creditors lost their assets, even in the banks that had lost more than their equity. Creditors were bailed out through the government’s recapitalisation of the failed banks. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Banking Law Commission was tasked with drafting a new law on crisis resolution.
And I believe that the future of Regtech in Hong Kong is very bright, and there are opportunities for everyone. 25. Thank you for joining us on our Regtech journey. Before I finish, let me take this opportunity to express my heartfelt thanks to so many distinguished speakers who have taken time out of their respective busy schedule to contribute towards the discussion sessions today. I should of course also thank everyone of you participating in this event from around the world. I’m confident that the event will deliver rich rewards for all of us. Thank you very much. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

•  Trade between ASEAN and China is at a record $ billion. •  This large and growing cross border trade will fuel greater RMB trade settlement activity in Singapore over time. The RMB clearing bank will be an important channel for RMB liquidity to circulate between Singapore and China. 4. Singapore’s deep and liquid capital markets will be able to support RMB financing needs in the region. We have already seen companies here issuing RMB-denominated bonds. The Singapore Exchange has announced that it is ready to quote, trade, clear and settle RMB-denominated securities. We can expect the range of RMB-denominated product offerings to expand, as regional corporates raise RMB financing through bond issuances and equity listings, to tap on the strong investor base in the region. 5. There will also be strong and growing demand for RMB trade services. There is a critical mass of international trading companies based in Singapore that will demand such services. With the new RMB clearing arrangements, we can expect financial institutions based in Singapore to reach out to local and regional corporates and investors, and encourage greater participation in the offshore RMB market. 6. MAS is delighted to have ICBC Singapore as our RMB clearing bank. ICBC Singapore has considerable experience in RMB business and is well placed to launch a reliable and efficient RMB clearing service. With the QFB privileges it now enjoys, ICBC is committed to growing its business in Singapore.
His comments reflect the fact that crypto-assets have unique financial, monetary and technical features that set them apart from the currencies and payment instruments issued by financial institutions and central banks and which form the foundation of our monetary system in Europe. They have no issuer for whom the assets act as a guarantee of value. They do not have a guaranteed fixed exchange rate with the currency issued by the central bank, which forms the basis of our payment system because it is the only one with legal tender status, i.e. which must be accepted by everyone. And they rely for their circulation on blockchain, a decentralised and distributed ledger system using cryptographic techniques. These unique features largely explain the widely varying views that we hear today about the outlook for crypto-assets, keeping in mind that, for now, they constitute a marginal share of holdings of economic agents and within the global economy. At their peak in January 2018, total outstanding crypto-assets represented EUR 330 billion; in comparison, the euro area’s M1 monetary aggregate amounted to EUR 7.5 trillion. Some see crypto-assets as disruptive innovations poised to radically overhaul the way that our monetary and financing system works, changing it for the better. Others believe that these are innovations that still need to find their market.

In the U.S., for example, on average about 90, mostly smaller, banks per year have been resolved since 2008 and this had no impact on the solvency of the sovereign. Political union can, and shall, develop hand-in-hand with fiscal, economic and financial union. The sharing of powers and of accountability can move in parallel. We should not forget that 60 years of European integration have already created a significant degree of political union. Decisions are made by an EU Council filled by national ministers and by a directly elected European Parliament. The challenge is to further increase the legitimacy of these bodies commensurate with increasing their responsibilities and to seek ways to better anchor European processes at the national level. A more solid political foundation should allow for agreement on a basic principle: that it is neither sustainable nor legitimate for countries to pursue national policies that can cause economic harm for others. This constraint has to be built into how countries design their economic and social models. The only sustainable model is one that is consistent with the terms of a common currency. Countries have to live within their means. Competition and labour markets have to be reinvigorated. Banks have to conform to the highest regulatory standards and focus on serving the real economy. This is not the end, but the renewal of the European social model. From the ECB’s perspective, a strong economic union is an essential complement to the single monetary policy. Building this will require a structured process with correct sequencing.
Lastly, I would like to emphasise that a key issue in discussions on changes in regulation and supervision is the search for ways to mitigate the problem of moral hazard associated with so-called systemic institutions. Some of the more perverse consequences of the crisis have manifested themselves in these institutions, i.e. those which, owing to their size, their inter-connectedness or the difficulty of replacement of their business areas, are too “big” to allow them to fail. The governments of most developed economies have had to intervene to avoid the consequences of their failure for the system as a whole, at a considerable cost to the public coffers of these countries. The treatment of these systemic institutions is a cornerstone of the reforms proposed by the G20. The wide variety of work under way includes most notably improving countries’ restructuring and resolution capabilities, i.e. the ability to disaggregate the balance sheet of these institutions, and reducing the likelihood and systemic impact of their possible bankruptcy or severe financial stress. In this respect, the members of the FSB undertook to ensure that cross-border institutions have a restructuring plan whereby these can obtain emergency liquidity and deleverage their financial position to improve solvency, and that they have a detailed resolution plan if they are unable to continue operating. That said, the solution to the problem of systemic institutions must be a global one and encompass many other measures.

Such formulas were probably unavoidable in countries that have seen the bulk of their banking systems collapse, but are absolutely inappropriate for Spain’s circumstances, where most of the sector is essentially healthy. On the other, the capacity of the Banco de España has been reinforced to act effectively when it is necessary to take control of banks and, in turn, an appropriate framework has been set in place so that those banks that so require may access the funds needed to restructure. Even if still currently viable, they are encouraged in this way to go ahead with restructuring, which allows them to be prepared to lend without problems once the recovery arrives and the current declining pattern of the demand for credit turns around. These measures – implemented in the Royal Decree Law creating the FROB (Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of Banks) – have been adopted with a broad Parliamentary consensus, enjoying the support of the two main parties, in a similar fashion to the consensus behind the swift response of our authorities to the closure of the wholesale markets. The latter event saw the approval of Royal Decree Laws for the fund for the acquisition of financial assets and for State backing of bond issues by credit institutions, both of which initiatives smoothed the way for the wholesale funding of much of the Spanish banking system at a most delicate juncture in the crisis.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  7.0  Measures to reduce interest rates  Although interest rates have trended downwards in the recent past with commercial banks average lending rate at 26.2% in March 2011 from 54.5% in 2001, the reduction is not in tandem with the fall in inflation and yield rates on government securities. The Government and the Bank of Zambia continue to take measures to provide macroeconomic stability necessary for the reduction of interest rates in Zambia. Some of the measures undertaken so far include the following: (i)  Inflation: the other challenge with regard to lowering lending rates is to attain and sustain low (preferably single digit) annual inflation. An upward trend in inflation is undesirable, as it raises inflationary expectations causing banks to increase their lending rates. Prior to 2006 inflation in Zambia was persistently high and above single digit. However, from 2006 inflation has been contained in single digit except from the 2008 when the financial crisis resulted in the increase of inflation to 16.6%. Inflation was recorded at 7.9% in December 2010 from 30.1% in January 2001. This has resulted in a fall in interest rates with banks Average Lending Rate coming down to 26.2% in March 2011 from 54.5% in December 2001. (ii)  Domestic financing: to contribute to efforts aimed at lowering lending interest rates, the Government has adopted prudent fiscal policies with domestic borrowing significantly reducing over the recent years.

Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy: Brief overview of the Saudi Arabian insurance industry Speech by His Excellency Dr Abdulrahman A Al-Hamidy, Vice Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), at the First Symposium on Insurance, held at the Institute of Banking, Riyadh, 22–23 March 2011. *  *  *  It gives me pleasure to welcome you all to the first symposium that the Saudi insurance industry has organized in collaboration with the Institute of Banking. I hope more such events will be organized to discuss future plans to expand insurance activities, and to set up mechanisms to improve the working environment of the insurance industry to enable it to serve better. Dear Audience, Thanks to Allah, that the Saudi economy has witnessed considerable economic and social development since the turn of the century. This has largely resulted from the restructuring of the economy and improvement in the regulatory apparatus that has greatly facilitated domestic and foreign investment and thereby has helped enhance the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy. The non-oil real GDP has grown by an annual average of 4.4 percent in the past five years. The private sector production went up by 4.5 percent and its contribution to real GDP increased to 48.8 percent in 2010 from 45.5 percent in 2006.
Resolution regimes: rolling back the implicit subsidy from the state The most fundamental effects prospectively flow from making orderly resolution credible for the largest and most complex firms. Funding costs for any banks where bailout was STILL confidently expected would be heavily subsidised, as in the past. Where there was uncertainty, there would tend to be somewhat subsidised funding combined with a bias to shorter-term financing which could run at signs of trouble. But such “regimes”, if they merit that description, are unsustainable. Policy is clear: taxpayers should not provide solvency support to banks. Instead, losses exceeding a bank’s equity base should fall on bondholders and other uninsured creditors, in line with the creditor hierarchy that would apply in bankruptcy.1 Other things being equal, exposing the holders of bank bonds to risk will tend to increase the overall cost of finance for banks during normal times compared with the past. Earning a fixed return but exposed to downside risk, investors in, especially, longer-term debt will be a source of market discipline. That is likely to incentivise banks to be better capitalised than in the past – through some combination of less levered balance sheets and less risky business activities. For society at large, the counterpart is that, with a lower probability of failure and credible plans in place to resolve banks without recourse to public funds, government bond yields should be lower than otherwise and the public finances more resilient.

For a discussion of those agency issues, see Tucker (2013), “Competition, the pressure for returns and stability”, a chapter in book edited by Dombret and Lucius (2013), Stability of the Financial System: Illusion or Feasible Concept? BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  resolution regimes are, therefore, necessary to give bank investors and managers incentives to adopt a prudent capital structure. But even then a bank’s private choice of capital structure will not deliver a satisfactory outcome for society as a whole due to the spillovers and negative externalities of failure. Resolution can help to reduce those spillovers, but banks must be required to have an overall capital structure that makes orderly resolution feasible. I shall return to that after bringing in another set of considerations. Costs of raising equity So far this discussion has essentially been what economists call an exercise in comparative statics: would you choose to finance a new bank mainly with debt or mainly with equity? I have skated over what happens when a firm thinks about changing its capital structure. There are two issues. The first arises from asymmetric information. That can make equity issuance expensive if investors worry that a new issue signals that management believe the share price is too high, ie the assets and earnings streams are worth less than the market has thought. That can occur even if a bank was not in jeopardy, just not as well capitalised as it should be.
Not only can banks no longer securitize assets as before, but assets that they thought were off their books have come back on. BIS Review 48/2009  1  Although the deleveraging process is inevitable following periods when the financial system has become overextended, it does matter how this deleveraging process takes place. In the current crisis, the deleveraging process at times has been very violent and dangerous, with powerful reinforcing feedback loops intensifying the process. During these episodes, bystanders who did not engage in excess may be trampled and fail. This may exacerbate the tightening in financial conditions, intensifying the constraint on credit availability and the downward pressure on economic activity. For example, in March 2008, in the run-up to Bear Stearns’ demise, the deleveraging process intensified. Market volatility increased; this caused lenders to increase the haircuts they assessed against collateral to secure their lending. The higher haircuts, in turn, squeezed highly leveraged investors who were forced to sell assets. This drove down asset prices and increased price volatility further, leading to still-higher haircuts. This intensified the deleveraging process, which led to more mark-to-market losses. The Federal Reserve’s facilities for banks and dealers have been designed, in part, to slow down the deleveraging process. The TAF, the TSLF and the PDCF have provided assurance to banks and dealers that they have a place where they can obtain funding for their less liquid collateral.

The challenge will be deciding on the best option, not in finding a workable approach. Thank you for your attention. I am happy to take any questions. BIS Review 48/2009  5