samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The emphasis in the new Accord on improved data standards should not be interpreted solely as a requirement to determine regulatory capital requirements, but rather as a foundation for risk management practices that will strengthen the value of the banking franchise. In addition to building on the current state of risk management practices, Basel II also promotes continued improvements in those practices. As I emphasized a moment ago, bank supervisors now are heavily focused on critically assessing risk management and control systems - where we find shortcomings, we constantly urge banks to make risk management improvements. Those shortcomings can reflect individual firm failings, in which case, we press the individual firms to bring their approaches up to the evolving best practices of well managed competitors. But the shortcomings can also reflect more systematic problems across the industry - necessitating supervisory efforts to move the industry ahead more broadly to improve its standards. Clearly, both through the microjudgments for individual firms and through the issuance of broader public guidance to address crossindustry concerns, the supervisory process is critical in ensuring improvements in risk management practices. Basel II can materially reinforce these efforts by setting strong qualification standards and capital incentives for firms to measure risk more accurately. Historically, the supervisory method for evaluating credit risk at banks in the U.S. focused on the identification of individual commercial loans that were already troubled.

Lastly, the institutions that underpin the euro area are in the process of being strengthened extremely rapidly as a result of the crisis. •  I just mentioned the substantially reinforced fiscal and macroeconomic discipline framework: it needs to be recognised that this is a very important step given the transfers of sovereignty that it represents. We are moving towards a stronger economic union;  •  The European Stability Mechanism has a firepower of EUR 700 billion to directly buy government bonds, provide collateral or lend funds. It will also be able to directly lend money to banks in difficulty without increasing the debt of their home countries. It is a powerful crisis resolution tool that Europe has equipped itself with;  •  The work on the establishment of the banking union is moving forward rapidly too. The Commission’s report that was submitted a few weeks ago sets out a clear framework: all banks in the euro area will quickly become subject to a single supervisory mechanism under the authority of the ECB. Day-to-day supervision will be performed by the national supervisors, in accordance with the principle of decentralisation that has already proved its effectiveness in the implementation of the single monetary policy within the Eurosystem. The principle underlying this single supervisory mechanism is that the severity of the crisis in the euro area has largely been due to the vicious circle that developed between banking and sovereign risk.
Starting with the first pillar of the monetary policy strategy of the ECB, monetary data for December 2000 confirmed the gradual moderation of the growth of monetary aggregates which has been observed since the spring of last year. According to the latest data, the three-month average of the annual growth rates of M3 in the months from October to December 2000 stood at 5.0%, which was slightly lower than the average of 5.1% recorded for the period from September to November 2000. Therefore, after the recent slowdown in monetary growth, the risks to price stability from the monetary side have become increasingly balanced. Caution still needs to be exercised, however, given the continued dynamics in credit growth to the private sector and the upward deviation of M3 from the reference value in the past. Turning to the examination under the second pillar, broadly similar indications are emerging, as inflationary impulses resulting from previous developments in oil prices and the external value of the euro are gradually diminishing. As regards economic activity, uncertainty concerning the external environment for the euro area has increased, mainly related to signals that the slowdown in growth in the United States may be more significant than earlier expected. This is likely to result, directly and via a spillover to other regions, in some deceleration of growth in the world economy. World real GDP growth, which in 2000 posted its strongest performance for many years, may therefore moderate in 2001 but will still remain at an acceptable level.

Owing to the crucial importance of this matter, and given the responsibility of the Eurosystem as a whole in achieving a smooth cash changeover, a legal framework has been established. The Guideline will enable all those involved to become familiar with the basic rules to be followed in preparing for the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins. This ECB Guideline will be published today on the ECB's website and shortly in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Second, yesterday evening the members of the Governing Council were given a presentation by Publicis, the communication agency selected to assist in conducting the Eurosystem's Euro 2002 Information Campaign, on the current status of the campaign. This focused in particular on the creative concept of the mass media campaign, which will start in September 2001. A website dedicated to the Euro 2002 Information Campaign has now been launched in all 11 official languages of the European Community (www.euro.ecb.int). The website currently contains a section on the euro banknotes and coins. Further sections will be added over the next two weeks to help specialist groups and the general public to prepare for the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins. These sections will be updated throughout the year. We are now at your disposal for questions. 2  BIS Review 8/2001
Briefly, the important components of the solution for the financial sector were as follows: 1. The Government, later confirmed by Parliament, issued an unlimited guarantee stating that no depositors or other counterparties to Swedish credit institutions would suffer any losses. This was a fundamental measure in order to restore confidence in the Swedish banks both from domestic and from foreign depositors and other counterparties. The results showed themselves rather quickly, e.g., in the form of renewed interbank credit lines with foreign banks. Also the Swedish public remained calm and there were no runs on the banks. However, the government (Parliament) guarantee and the other measures must also be made known to all interested parties. 2. The mandate to implement the support policies was given to a new agency, the Bank Support Authority, which was at arm’s length from the political sphere but accountable to the Government. To avoid conflicts of interest, it was found appropriate not to have the Support Authority in either the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank or the Financial Supervisory Authority. BIS Review 65/1998  -5-  3. A common framework of measures was constructed for support of the banking system. A strategy for deciding which banks to reconstruct and which to liquidate was developed and explained to the general public. The measures were designed to minimise costs for the Government and the risk of moral hazard.

Among other things, restoring confidence involves being transparent about the problems and about the measures for dealing with them. It also means that measures are implemented as stated by the responsible authorities, without any deviations in timing or application. Just the suspicion that specific industries or other interest groups may be receiving unjustifiably favourable treatment would quickly erode any confidence. 2. Transparency is important. A severe crisis wipes confidence out - rightly so. We realised that it was up to Sweden to regain it. To do so, all the cards had to be on the table. The extent of the losses and the magnitude of the bad loans had to be revealed in their entirety and valuation had to be prudent. If you hide losses initially or are overly optimistic in valuations, you risk having to apply again to the international investment community or to taxpayers for additional support. This, in my view, might jeopardise confidence and legitimacy. It is also necessary to have highly transparent and fair “rules of the game” for government support to the financial sector, not least to avoid political bickering. The responsibility for transparency falls primarily on two parties: the authorities and the banks. The authorities must be transparent about the broad framework for the solution of the crisis and the banks must be transparent about their losses and other deficiencies, financial position and need for external support. 3. Someone must take the losses.
Second, if the effects of QE are more powerful in crisis states of the world, we may need to ensure that we have enough headroom in the future to repeat it. The determinants of QE unwind may therefore be more subtle than previously thought, and the Covid crisis offers a new lens through which to assess its role. This leads to what may be regarded as the most speculative of the conclusions, but it strikes me as important as we look to the decade ahead. It follows from the state contingent nature of the effects of QE, and the argument for going “big and fast” in such situations, that the central bank balance sheet may have 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  more of a counter-cyclical role and function than the evidence of the last decade alone would suggest, at least in certain circumstances. We need to work through what lessons this may have for the appropriate future path of central bank balance sheets, including the pace and timing of any future unwind of asset purchases. But one conclusion is that it could be preferable, and consistent with setting monetary conditions consistent with the inflation target, to seek to ensure there is sufficient headroom for more potent expansion in central bank balance sheets when needed in the future – to “go big” and “go fast” decisively. That begs questions about when does the need for headroom become an issue? What are the limits?

It is thus not a permanent instrument for boosting capital, but rather a temporary requirement to be employed in exceptional circumstances. The countercyclical buffer is an important element in the macroprudential toolkit. I would therefore now like to take a brief look at the progress made in the area of macroprudential policy in Switzerland from the SNB’s perspective. Progress in structuring the macroprudential policy framework At its news conference one year ago, the SNB drew attention to the absence of an adequate set of instruments in the area of macroprudential policy. This was in response to a request by the Parliament’s Control Committees to evaluate our mandate and set of instruments relating to financial stability. So what are the key milestones that have been achieved this year in establishing a framework for macroprudential oversight in Switzerland, in relation both to instruments and to the division of responsibilities? Firstly, with regard to the above-mentioned countercyclical buffer, the financial stability task force led by the FDF has taken concrete steps towards implementing an important  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  macroprudential instrument. In addition, the proposed structure of this buffer provides for a clear division of responsibilities: After consulting with FINMA, the SNB submits a request to the Federal Council regarding the activation and the level of the buffer. The Federal Council then makes the final decision. Secondly, in the context of the implementation of the “too big to fail” regulations, the decision-making authority with regard to systemic importance was clearly defined.
Table 2 Domestic scenario (annual change, percent) 2012  2013 (e) Report, Jun.14  Report, Sep.14  2014 (f) Report, Jun.14  Report, Mar.14  2015 (f) Report, Sep.14  Report, Sep.14  GDP  5.4  4.1  4.1  3.0-4.0  2.5-3.5  1.75-2.25  3.0-4.0  Domestic demand  6.9  3.4  3.4  3.3  1.7  0.1  3.4  Domestic demand (w/o inventory change)  7.1  4.2  4.2  3.3  2.4  1.0  3.2  12.2  0.4  0.4  0.8  -0.7  -4.1  1.8  Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption  5.6  5.4  5.4  4.1  3.4  2.6  3.6  Goods and services exports  1.1  4.3  4.3  3.2  3.2  2.4  3.8  Goods and services imports  5.0  2.2  2.2  2.4  -1.1  -3.9  4.0  Current account (% of GDP)  -3.4  -3.4  -3.4  -3.6  -2.5  -1.8  -2.2  Gross national saving (% of GDP)  21.7  20.5  20.5  19.5  19.9  19.8  19.7  December CPI  1.5  3.0  3.0  3.0  4.0  4.1  2.8  December CPIEFE  1.5  2.1  2.1  2.8  3.7  3.4  2.5  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In May this year, ICBC partnered DBS Bank and OCBC Bank to issue its first green loan in Singapore, to the value of SGD 730 million. More can be done to mobilise private sector capital to support the green agenda in Asia. Strengthening Disaster Risk Insurance The third area for co-operation is insuring against disaster risks, like pandemics, natural catastrophes, and climate change. This is critical as the Western Region continues to invest in infrastructure development including along the ILSTC. The Western Region is highly exposed to natural catastrophes, and the Yangtze River floods this year were the worst seen in decades. Understanding risk exposures and strengthening financial risk management helps protect lives, livelihoods and public assets. Insurance players and academic experts in Chongqing and Singapore can work together to better assess and model the Western Region’s risks. They can develop together climate and disaster risk financing solutions such as: traditional insurance and reinsurance; regional catastrophe risk pools; and catastrophe bonds. Conclusion 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I am confident that our efforts under the CCI will help usher us towards a more inclusive, sustainable and resilient future. Let us make use of the next 5 years to cement financial integration between China and ASEAN, so that we emerge stronger from the COVID-19 crisis. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Again I am happy to inform you that the central bank in partnership with the Bankers Association of Zambia are in the process of developing credit reference bureau guidelines and will in the near future issue licences to deserving companies. Lastly, but not the least, the issue of lack of an effective secondary financial market in Zambia is being addressed with Commencement of work on the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP). Let me join the Honourable Minister of Finance in wishing Barclays Bank Zambia PLC the very best of success with the launch of the Home Loan product. I thank you!! BIS Review 6/2006  1

The need for this involvement is heightened by the entry into force in 2018 of the new standard (IFRS 9) under which banks will switch from using the concept of incurred loss to that of expected loss in order to calculate the credit portfolio provision. This standard is undoubtedly an improvement on the current situation, since it enhances the measurement of the risks of loans and receivables. At the same time, it significantly increases the complexity of calculating provisions and, thus, increases the risk of heterogeneous application across banks, which is something the supervisor should be aiming to mitigate. The work under way in the Basel Committee on this matter is therefore very timely. My comments so far imply that there are in practice significant obstacles to satisfying the legitimate expectations that a rigorous and granular supervision will help moderate the intensity of the regulatory changes needed to promote financial stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The regulatory frameworks in force and different supervisory cultures, along with the difficulty of becoming more involved in accounting practices, often place considerable limits on the intensity of supervision attainable. This explains why the actions of the authorities to prevent financial crises largely rest on the definition of clear and demanding prudential standards to underpin the work of supervisors.
It won't be a "cliff decision": a realisation phase will instead aim at preparing gradually and with experiments for a possible issuance by 2027. In a complementary manner, since 2020, the Banque de France and the BIS Innovation Hub have been conducting experiments on a wholesale CBDC, which attracts less public interest but has strong business cases. Today, I say this to commercial banks: don't be afraid! If a CBDC is needed and decided as a matter of public interest, don't oppose it. But participate actively in setting its designing, its parameters and mode of operation. There is no question of disintermediating existing or future private financial players. Money has for centuries been a positive and innovative partnership between public and private players. Notwithstanding our sometimes unwarranted old fashioned image, we central banks are keen to continue succeeding in our innovator's role with the private sector, not work against it. All economic agents need an anchor that guarantees the trust in the value of money, and central banks are the only ones fully able to preserve it. * ** To conclude, we are about halfway through a fascinating bildungsroman that has already offered many surprises, and will probably offer many more. As a committed reader and even stakeholder in this novel, I strongly hope that the plot overall unravels in the consistent way I described earlier.

For the first time, big techs may now be touching on the limits of their core business models, and might seek further diversification, as financial activities already account for around 11% of their revenuesvi. So the question is: will this breakthrough in finance happen at all? Time will tell, but in my view, disintermediation by big techs remains a plausible scenario. The massive and prosperous tech firms can learn from their difficulties and enter into the space of banking and finance. This raises the question of the conditions under which big techs could broaden their reach. 2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  II. Maturity and consistency years ahead? In a bildungsroman, the early and learning years are eventually followed by the maturity years, which hopefully coincide with greater consistency. In this particular case, big techs are not the only ones to mature as time and digital innovation proceed: financial institutions and supervisors must also mature and modernize. The regulatory environment has to stay up-to-date and preserve financial stability, without bringing the technological revolution to a halt. While the sound principle "same activity, same risk, same regulatory outcome" remains fully valid, several international institutions – including the BIS and the IMF – have recently called for a "hybrid approach"vii: home supervisors should implement an entity-based approach that would encompass all big tech's activities and risks, and host supervisors should implement an activity-based approach. It opens up interesting perspectives, although it can only be carried out in the medium-term due to the regulatory evolutions it implies.
When debt approaches an unsustainable level, investors will demand higher compensation for new loans and interest rates on loans will rise, hence the snowball effect. (See Chart: Fiscal deficit and Public debt.) Large deficits have a direct impact on sovereign debt. From 2007 to 2010, fiscal deficits in euro area countries rose from 0.6 per cent of GDP to 6.6 per cent. In the same period, public debt rose from 66 per cent of GDP to 85 per cent, and there are prospects that debt will approach 100 per cent of GDP in the next few years. Fiscal deficits in the UK and the US will reach 11–12 per cent this year and public debt is rising rapidly to high levels. In order to rein in this development, fiscal tightening must be implemented and government budgets must be brought into surplus. This can be particularly costly in downturns. Several European countries have recently announced tax increases and cuts in expenditure. This typically involves raising the retirement age, broad-based wage reductions and lower welfare spending. These sharp measures may well boost growth capacity in these countries in the long term, but in the short run they will result in lower demand for goods and services and probably lower activity. Since several countries are tightening fiscal policy at the same time, export markets may also shrink. However, reduced fiscal deficits will hopefully restore confidence in economic policy so that growth in household and corporate consumption and investment resumes. (See Chart: Sweden and Finland in the 1990s.)

About 10 per cent of Norwegian municipalities are currently in this position and are on the Norwegian ROBEK list. 14 A firm hand such as this is lacking in the euro area. 5. The Norwegian government’s long-term obligations  The Norwegian government’s financial position contrasts sharply with developments abroad. While government debt in Europe is approaching 100 per cent of GDP, the Norwegian government has net financial assets exceeding 100 per cent of GDP. We have been lucky because we discovered oil and gas. The Norwegian state with its large territory – or should we say territorial waters – has been adept at reaping the economic rent from petroleum activities and managed to set aside a large portion of our petroleum revenues. Although the Norwegian government is not in a net debt position, it does have obligations under welfare schemes. These are not liabilities in the same legal sense as debt, but nor are they schemes that can easily be changed. The Supreme Court has established that future national insurance entitlements are protected, in principle, by Article 97 of the Norwegian Constitution prohibiting legislation with retroactive effect, but that changes to national insurance entitlements will only be in contravention of the Constitution if they are “clearly unreasonable or unjust”. 15 This gives the political authorities the freedom to adjust their obligations.