samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Concluding Remarks To conclude this discussion: I remain highly confident that the FOMC’s framework for the normalization of the stance of monetary policy—both in the overnight market and in the balance sheet—will continue to proceed smoothly, without unnecessary surprise, disruption, or volatility in financial markets. The monetary policy implementation framework continues to provide the FOMC with excellent control over overnight money market rates, and has proven its ability, including recently through the technical adjustment, to flexibly respond to new developments. Although term money market rates have fluctuated recently in response to a variety of drivers, these markets continue to act as a deep and liquid source of wholesale funding to firms around the world while appropriately incorporating the FOMC’s monetary policy stance. Before I go, allow me to offer a few last thoughts on economic and financial stability as monetary policy normalization proceeds. The real rate of interest in the United States has been rising, and it seems that, before long, investors will be able to earn a positive real rate of return by investing even in riskless, overnight dollar assets. Now, there is nothing especially magical about “crossing the boundary” between negative and positive real rates, and I do not expect  12  anything out of the ordinary to happen when we do. But, it does seem a notable signpost on the road to a more normal monetary policy.

Hence, approximation of the auditing role with the best and contemporary international standards, learning about specifics and characteristics of the audited entities, and further  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  intensification of inter-institutional cooperation during the processes are some of the elements having a key role in the work and results of this institution. In conclusion, I am fully confident that, by promoting the above-stated factors, the ALSAI will continue to perform at its best vis-a-vis the duties and challenges imposed by current developments and will succeed in accomplishing its mission towards the improvement of institutional governance. Thanking you for your attention, I wish you success in your work in 2016. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
If you were a worrier like me, would you worry that we are putting off alternative approaches until new problems exhaust old solutions? Would you worry about how effectively we will respond if a digital currency achieves critical mass? Governor Quarles highlighted this latter concern in his recent remarks at the European Banking Federation.31 He noted that stable coins do not pose risk to financial stability today but that they bring with them the potential for scale that could pose regulatory challenges from a financial stability standpoint in the future. But knowing that regulators in the U.S. are already dealing with concerns over fraud and the prospect of other forms of misconduct related to digital currencies, and acknowledging  Governors Quarles’ concerns about financial stability, would it behoove us to start identifying areas of focus for crafting a regulatory response that is more proactive? Pablo Hernández de Cos, Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and Governor of the Bank of Spain, remarked in November that digital currencies “do not reliably perform the standard functions of money and are unsafe to rely on as a medium of exchange or store of value.”32 That sounds like a problem. We have dealt with a somewhat similar problem before. Under the National Bank Act, the United States chose to reform its currency system by adopting a new regulatory regime for national banks—the would-be issuers of stable private currencies (that is, national bank notes)—and by crafting requirements for these issuers to backstop their currencies with safer government-issued bonds.

2 Gerald P. Dwyer Jr., Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, and Free Banking in the  United States, Economic Review 6 (FRB Atlanta Dec. 1996) (hereinafter “Dwyer”). 3 Dwyer 4. 4 Dwyer 6. 5 Dwyer fn. 13. 6 Dwyer 6. 7 Dwyer 6. 8 Dwyer 2. 9 Arthur A. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, Free Banking, Wildcat Banking, and  Shinplasters, Quarterly Review 13 (FRB Minn. Fall 1982) (hereinafter “Rolnick”). 10 Dwyer 7. 11 Dwyer 5. 12 Rolnick 16. Specifically, the states varied on whether security for the notes would  be measured in par or market value. 13 Rosa Lastra, Central Bank and Bank Regulation, 204 (Sept. 1991) (Ph.D. thesis  London School of Economics) (on file with author DM # 172574). 14 John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years 237 (Werner Co. 1896) available  at https://archive.org/details/johnshermansreco00sher/page/236. 15 Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United  States, 1867-1960 17, 21 (1963) (hereinafter “Friedman”). 16 See e.g., 12 USC §26 (Comptroller to determine if institution is engaged in the  business of banking). 17 See Dwyer 16. 18 In 1935, the Treasury redeemed all debt that backed national bank notes. The  Glass-Steagall Act, passed in 1933 in the midst of the Great Depression, also shifted the calculus for holders of national bank notes. The act introduced deposit insurance and divided commercial and investment banking, each of which served to remove disincentives against holding deposits with banks.
I would like to thank Matthew Willison, Hugh Burns, Nicolo Fraccaroli and David Swallow for their assistance in preparing these remarks 11  References Antoniades, A and Calomiris, C W (2018), ‘Mortgage market credit conditions and US presidential elections’, NBER Working Paper 24459. Agarwal, S, Lucca, D, Seru, A, and Trebbi, F (2014), ‘Inconsistent regulators: evidence from banking’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.129, pages 889-938. Barth, J R, Lin, C, Ma, Y, Seade, J, and Song, F M (2013b), ‘Do bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?’, Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol.37(8), pages 2879-2892. Barth, J R, Caprio, G and Levine, R (2013), ‘Bank regulation and supervision in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011’, NBER Working Paper 18733. Ben-David, I, Cerulli, G, Fiordelisi, F, and Marquez-Ibanez, D (2018), ‘Seeking my supervisor: evidence from the centralization of banking supervision in Europe’, Mimeo. Bodea, C and Hicks, R (2015), ‘Price stability and central bank independence: discipline, credibility, and democratic institutions’, International Organization, Vol.69(1), pages 35-61. Dagher, J (2018), ‘Regulatory cycles: revisiting the political economy of financial crises’, IMF Working Paper WP/18/8 Dincer, N N and Eichengreen, B (2012), ‘The architecture and governance of financial supervision: sources and implications’, International Finance, Vol.15(3), pages 309-25. Fraccaroli, N, Sowerbutts, R, and Whitworth, A (2019), ‘Does regulatory and supervisory independence affect financial stability’, Forthcoming. Garriga, A C (2016), ‘Central bank independence in the world: a new data set’, International Interactions, Vol.42(5), pages 849-68.

Forbes, K. (2016), “Global economic tsunamis: Coincidence, common shocks or contagion?”, Speech at Imperial College, 22 September 2016 Grote, R and Marauhn, T (2006), The Regulation of International Financial Markets, Perspectives for Reform. Cambridge University Press Hoggarth, G, Jung, C and Reinhardt, D (forthcoming), “Capital inflows — the good, the bad and the bubbly”, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper IMF (2016), Global Financial Stability Report, April  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  15  IMF-FSB-BIS (2016), “Elements of Effective Macroprudential Policies – Lessons from International Experience” Laeven, L and Valencia, F (2013), “Systemic Banking Crises Database”, IMF Economic Review 61(2): 225– 270 Reinhardt, D and Sowerbutts, R (2015) “Regulatory arbitrage in action: evidence from banking flows and macroprudential policy”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 546 Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K (2009), “This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly”.
In such economies the internal market is far too small for firms to enjoy sufficient economies of scale that enable them to be competitive internationally. Moreover, these economies wield little market power in the global economy. Ultimately, the realities of rigid labour and product markets and unsound fiscal policies always catch up. Exchange rate adjustment alone is unable to restore or improve living standards. Therefore, a fixed exchange rate policy provides incentives for prudent fiscal behaviour as well as for policies that promote productivity and competitiveness. These policies are crucial to avoid large current account deficits, depletion of foreign exchange reserves, and currency depreciation. Depreciation increases inflation and deters investment if market-oriented reforms in product and labour market policies remain absent and fiscal discipline is missing. Diversification of an economy’s production base and of the markets it targets insulate an economy from shocks more effectively than exchange rate flexibility. In conclusion, I hope I have shown how the Central Bank of Malta has journeyed from a monetary and exchange rate policy based on a currency peg – an arrangement common to many Mediterranean central banks today – to membership of a single currency area. I contend that we have managed this transition successfully. At the same time, we cannot afford to lose the focus on internal discipline and external competitiveness that served us so well over the last five decades.

Maintaining an exchange rate peg over such a long time span is hard, though changes to the composition of the currency basket allowed some flexibility. Throughout this period, the lira was only devalued once, in 1992, in the wake of the turbulence seen in Europe, which saw the pound sterling ejected from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the devaluation of the Italian lira among others. Otherwise, the Bank’s determination to maintain the peg never wavered. We never blinked. The ability to maintain the peg may have been partly due to restrictions on trade and stringent controls on capital movements, at least in the early decades. By the mid-1990s, however, trade and financial market liberalisation meant that these factors became less and less important. Instead, major reforms in 1994 brought about fuller independence for the Central Bank and a gradual liberalisation of interest rates amid increasing recognition that, in the absence of capital controls, monetary policy had to be more actively oriented towards maintaining the peg. Throughout, the lira was buttressed by a healthy stock of external reserves. The Central Bank of Malta was legally bound to maintain reserves equivalent to at least 60% of the monetary base, but in 3  For a review of Malta’s monetary and exchange rate policy over the years, see Anton Caruana Galizia (1989) “Malta’s exchange rate policy since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system” in the Central Bank of Malta Quarterly Review, June 1989 and Aaron G Grech (2003) “The framework of monetary policy in Malta”.
The financial sector can support Asian economies in two ways - adapt to the inevitable, and adjust for the better. First, in face of climate change, we will need to adapt and protect our assets and people. We can do so by investing in climate-resilient infrastructure and insuring against climate and disaster risks. Invest in climate-resilient infrastructure: Many parts of Asia are building out the infrastructure, and we can take this chance to build for resilience. ADB estimates that $ trillion investments are required for climate-adjusted infrastructure in the region by 2030. Today, the infrastructure asset class constitutes only a small portion of assets under management [14] . There is much headway for growth, amidst a pressing need to mobilise private capital to climate resilient infrastructure as an asset class to bridge this financing gap. To that extent, Infrastructure Asia was set up in April 2018 to serve as a platform to connect local and international stakeholders across the value chain for joint projects to meet Asia’s growing infrastructure needs. I would encourage market participants to leverage on Infrastructure Asia’s network, knowledge and expertise. Insure against climate and disaster risks: Asia bears the brunt of economic losses arising from natural disasters and climate change will amplify the impact. Yet, Asia remains under-insured. Insured losses for natural catastrophes account for only 15% of total economic losses, compared to 34% globally for period 2010 – 2019 [15] .

One developing area is the need for common green financing language that can crowd in private financing required to green Asia’s economies. Concerns about green washing and the lack of clarity on what constitutes green or transition activities can impede financing flows to these activities. MAS is therefore working with the financial sector to assess the potential of a taxonomy for Singapore-based financial institutions, to facilitate the financial sector to channel capital more eﬀectively to support Asia’s green and transition needs. We are also a member of the International Platform on Sustainable Finance, and will contribute to global eﬀorts in establishing greater inter-operability between existing taxonomies. 23. I note that one of the three panels today will discuss sustainability issues. I believe that this will be the start of the many more useful sessions that the Asian Financial Markets Forum will put together, and this will provide us valuable insights as we continue to progress on the sustainability agenda. Conclusion 24. To conclude, Asian financial markets are in good stead to support the positive growth momentum in Asian economies in this new decade, and the building of a more sustainable world. 25. I thank ACI for organising this event, providing us a front seat and a chance to contribute to the meaningful conversations on important issues to the region. 26. I wish you a fruitful discussion ahead. Thank you. ***  [1] World Bank, January 2021, “Global Economic Prospects.” [2] IMF, October 2020, “World Economic Outlook.” [3] See footnote 1.
There was consensus among the panelists that board members play a critical role in a firm’s governance structure and culture. Moreover, corporate boards independently assess whether management is setting the right tone and hold management accountable for any gaps between a firm’s values and its actual business practices. Proposed guidance from the Federal Reserve suggests that the responsibilities of an effective board of directors include setting strategy and risk tolerance, supporting independent risk management, managing information flows, ensuring appropriate expertise, and holding senior management accountable for effective execution.6 Behavioral indicators can help boards understand their firms’ cultures and identify potential trouble spots within the organization. Corporate boards use various methods to obtain information and assess culture, such as meeting with many levels of employees, receiving thirdparty assessments, and conducting 360 reviews of the CEO and top leaders. Organizations like the U.K. Banking Standards Board (BSB) can provide outside benchmarking data against which to measure the culture within one’s own firm. 7 Corporate boards for financial firms may also import practices and lessons from other industries. Finally, the board members that participated in the New York Fed’s workshop agreed that a board’s own culture matters; it needs independent 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  voices, diverse perspectives, and opportunity for debate.

William C Dudley: Student loans and household finance Opening remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Convening on Student Loan Data Conference, New York City, 4 March 2015. *  *  *  Andrew Haughwout, Joseph Tracy and Wilbert van der Klaauw assisted in preparing these remarks. Good morning. I’m happy to welcome you to the New York Fed for this workshop that is intended to increase our understanding of student debt and how it affects individuals, their families and the economy. I am delighted to see such widespread and growing interest in this important topic. Making continued progress on understanding these issues will depend critically on efforts to identify and address existing data gaps that hamper its study. I am particularly happy to welcome Deputy Secretary Sarah Bloom Raskin, who has spoken frequently and eloquently in the past about the need for improvements in student loan servicing and debt collection, the macroeconomic consequences of increased student debt, and the need for better data and analysis. I look forward to her remarks today. Before I make some specific comments on student debt, let me take a step back and say a few words on household finance more generally. As always, what I say represents my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System.1 There are several reasons the New York Fed has increased its focus on household finance.
The objective of safeguarding the stability of the financial and payment systems has a long history in central banking. Indeed, it can be argued that the role of lender of last resort, that allows central banks to reduce the likelihood of a financial crisis, existed before its more modern role of preserving price-level and macroeconomic stability. Thus, the call by some authors to central banks to consider financial stability as a mandate appears to be based on the experience of specific institutions and jurisdictions rather than on a historical and global perspective (Peek et al., 2015). However, the global financial crisis that began in 2008 highlighted the importance of the goal of financial stability and prompted an intense international debate on the need for a policy framework that would explicitly focus on this objective since its achievement would not be guaranteed by just macroeconomic stability and good prudential regulation and supervision. This new policy framework, aimed at preserving financial stability, is what has come to be known as macroprudential policy. Although at first the purpose, tools and implementation of macroprudential policies were unclear, the heated debate of some years has gradually created some common beliefs and visions. For example, significant consensus has been reached that the objective of macroprudential policy is to reduce the systemic risk resulting from credit being too procyclical and from interconnections between financial institutions, among other factors.

Although this concern has been present for quite some time in many central banks, including the Central Bank of Chile, the international debate has stressed the need to have a macroprudencial policy framework in place, with its own tools to tackle this objective. Countries have already begun to consider this framework as one of the pillars that sustain a good economic policy. Having been spared a crisis or acute stress from a financial crisis since the early 1980s, and in particular after the latest crisis, has allowed us to watch this debate with prudence and pragmatism, without needing to take hasty policy measures. We already have some of them in place, but as the international debate on these policies is settling and the evidence about  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the efficiency and costs of different tools accumulates, it will be important that we assess their efficiency and carefully study if we should introduce additional tools in our general framework. Thank you. References Akinci, O. and J. Olmstead-Rumsey (2015). How Effective are Macroprudential Policies? An Empirical Investigation, mimeo. Bruno, V., I. Shim and H. Shin (2015). Comparative assessment of macroprudential policies. BIS Working Paper no 502. Cerutti, E., S. Claessens and M.L. Laeven (2015). The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence (No. 15–61). Working paper 15/61. International Monetary Fund. Claessens, S., S.R. Ghosh and R. Mihet (2013). Macro-prudential policies to mitigate financial system vulnerabilities. Journal of International Money and Finance, 39, 153–185. Kuttner, K.N. and I. Shim (2013).
William C Dudley: “US Economy in a Snapshot” Opening remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Press Briefing on the US Economy in a Snapshot, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 19 May 2016. *  *  *  Jonathan McCarthy, Paolo Pesenti, Robert Rich and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. Welcome to our Economic Press Briefing. Today we are going to introduce you to a data product that we have been making available to the public, U.S. Economy in a Snapshot. My role is to put this product in the broader context of the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) communication strategy about the economy and policy. My colleague Robert Rich will then walk you through the structure of the product and discuss excerpts from the May release. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. Conventional U.S. monetary policy is conducted by targeting the level of the federal funds rate—an overnight interest rate on bank reserves. Few participants in our economy have any direct interaction with this interest rate. How, then, is controlling this interest rate such an important part of setting monetary policy and steering an 18 trillion dollar economy toward the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate objectives of maximum sustainable employment and price stability? This is the remarkable aspect of monetary policy.

All of these help the public to understand our assessment of economic conditions through the lenses of these different types of forecasts. When asked about the trajectory for the monetary policy stance, I always point out that it is data dependent. The FOMC calibrates the stance of monetary policy to best achieve our twin objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable employment, taking into account our forecast for how the economy is evolving. This forecast reflects the ongoing flow of the data. Data releases that are close to our expectations have little additional impact on the forecast, while data releases that deviate significantly from our expectations can lead to more significant revisions of the forecast. It is, therefore, important for market participants and households to be able to follow the data along with the FOMC and to understand how we are likely to interpret and react to incoming data. While market analysts readily have access to economic and financial data, this access is not widely available to everyone. To help fill this information gap, for the past year we have been  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  making available on our website a monthly publication called U.S. Economy in a Snapshot. This publication contains a set of key data charts as well as commentary by our staff economists. The purpose is to provide interested readers easy access to clear and concise presentations of important economic information. The associated commentary provides some pertinent observations one might draw from the data.