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Stripping out the effects of the two World Wars, this ratio has declined fairly steadily, from around 15% in 1830 to around 5% at the start of this century. Financial panics over this period did little to interrupt the downward trend. Events of the past two years have dramatically altered that picture. In relation to GDP, base money in the UK has risen by a factor of four – easily the highest financial crisis multiplier ever. 8 It has reached a peak last witnessed almost two centuries ago. Past liquidity crises are foothills by comparison with recent Himalayan heights. Measures of central bank balance sheet expansion under-estimate the scale of liquidity support provided during this crisis. As in Harman’s time, there has been a widening of the collateral taken by most central banks in their operations. 9 The taking of imaginative forms of collateral has a history which predates central banking: in the 12th century, King Baldwin II of Jerusalem secured a loan using his beard as collateral. Nonetheless, recent efforts are probably unprecedented in scope. Collateral swaps, typically not involving beards but often requiring haircuts, have also played a significant role during this crisis. They too do not expand base money, but do liquefy banks’ balance sheets. And guarantees of wholesale liabilities have similarly served as an important liquidity insurance device for a number of countries. Together, these two instruments have totalled between 10% and 40% of GDP across the UK, US and euro-area.