samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These fora, where finance ministers, central bank governors, and financial regulators meet regularly with each other and with their private sector counterparts, have achieved an important voice in the global financial community in recent years. In the area of banking supervision, EMEAP – comprising ASEAN 5, China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, plus Australia and New Zealand – has representatives in the various BIS committees and working group, which set the international standards for financial regulations. In fact, Thailand currently represents the EMEAP group in the Accord Implementation Group. Through such avenues, the authorities in Asia Pacific region have and will continue to influence the evolution of the global standards. The goal is to ensure that these standards are suitable to the context of our economies and financial systems, based on feedbacks and dialogues with our regional banks. Ladies and Gentlemen, We all agree that the challenges for Asian economies and Asian banks are higher going forward. To ensure financial and economic stability to support long-term growth, the authorities need to foster closer policy coordination among regulators, domestically and internationally, as well as having continuous dialogue with market participants. Where possible, closer regional cooperation in the areas of surveillance and financing should be promoted further. Domestically, greater macroeconomic policy flexibility hinges on augmenting monetary and fiscal policies with financial policies that mitigate contagion risks in financial markets. In any case, a policy should be implemented carefully, avoiding overreaction that could increase distortion and instability in the economic and financial systems.

A rational domestic demand and import policies will be required (with a 5.3% rise in imports, given the oil price growth), in order to keep the current account deficit at about 6.5% of GDP (EUR 3 billion), the same as in the current year. Of course, this implies a continuation of heavy dependence on foreign sources of financing in 2010. (2)  Given stagnation in direct and portfolio investments (EUR 2.1 billion in 2009 vs. EUR 2.3 billion in 2010), this would mean that: −  the current account deficit will have to be financed by foreign borrowing;  −  the external debt-to-GDP ratio will increase from 83% last year and about 93% in 2009, to about 100%, which is feasible, but will certainly not improve the country’s credit rating, and the question is to what extent the global downward trend in interest rates can carry over to this country. This is all too important, as we know that in 2010:  (3)  −  total debt repayments (EUR 8.3 billion in principal and EUR 1.4 billion in interest) will amount to EUR 9.6 billion (EUR 10.8 billion in 2009); and  −  total utilisation of foreign sources of financing will stand at EUR 12.6 billion (13.5 billion in 2009). The anticipated fiscal deficit reduction, in terms of consolidated general government (including HAC), from HRK 15 billion to HRK 12.1 billion, i.e.
So, have we done enough in terms of financial inclusion? 14. The pandemic has taught us that we must deepen our commitment to financial inclusion. And we should try to weave that into our financial development objectives going forward. In fact, our ability to enhance the financial inclusion role can be helped hugely by technology. With technology, our banking system can provide a more equitable and fairer access to banking services for all. 15. And this brings me to the second role the financial system can play – to build a smarter financial system. Let me share with you an example of how a smarter financial system can help promote financial inclusion. For a long time, SMEs have found it difficult to obtain bank financing without collateral, because banks lack reliable and timely financial data to assess the repayment ability of SMEs. 16. We believe that the introduction of the Commercial Data Interchange can help address this long-standing pain point. This next-generation financial data infrastructure can facilitate banks’ access to customers’ commercial data with their consent. With such data, banks can apply advanced data analytical tools for credit risk assessment. This could allow corporates, especially SMEs, without sufficient collateral or credit history to borrow more quickly, easily and at a lower cost. It is a win-win situation as this will also enhance banks’ risk management capability and unleash new business opportunities. 17. So, we strongly encourage banks, large or small, to embrace digital transformation to provide fair and efficient financial services to customers.

HKMA, as both a banking regulator and market facilitator, has the role of creating a conducive environment for this to happen. Therefore, we have launched a new Fintech 2025 strategy recently and will work hand in hand with the industry along this fintech journey. 18. Of course, we are mindful that technology can be a double-edged sword. If done properly, technology can enhance financial inclusion. But there are always risks. For example, the improper use of artificial intelligence and machine learning may lead to biased outcomes and even exclusion. Ill-constructed “model-based” lending could unfairly discriminate against some SMEs. And from a conduct risk perspective, customers could be advised to invest in products not in their best interests. Therefore, it is necessary to properly manage such risks and ensure fairness in the algorithms through rigorous validation and testing. 19. In other words, building a smarter financial system is not just about how much technology content we inject into it. What is more important is whether the outcome for customers is more inclusive and efficient, and whether banks can better manage the risks involved. 20. If we look at another key development priority pursued by the HKMA – Green and Sustainable 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Finance – similar financial exclusion concerns could also arise. It is important that when we gear towards a greener financial system, we should also have financial inclusion in mind. This is the third role of the financial system that I want to talk about. 21.
Norges Bank has recently estimated a relation for house prices. The model contains effects of the housing stock, the unemployment rate, banks’ lending rates after tax, total wage income in the economy and an indicator of household expectations concerning their own financial situation and the Norwegian economy. In the work on the relation, we did not find any evidence to suggest that migration or demographic conditions have strong direct effects on house prices. However, demographic changes may affect prices indirectly by affecting overall wage income in the economy. The estimated relation provides a good explanation of house price developments in recent years. High wage income has pushed up house prices. The contribution from interest rate changes has also been high in the last two years but has diminished somewhat recently. In the model, interest rate changes have a strong short-term effect. House prices in Norway have risen substantially since 1995. House prices have also risen rapidly in many other countries. The IMF has expressed concern that house prices may be too high in relation to fundamentals in some countries. In Norway, there have been signs recently of a slower rise in house prices. The seasonally adjusted, monthly rise has been low since November 2004, but it edged up again in April. On the other hand, the time it takes to sell a dwelling has declined further, whereas the number of dwellings sold remains high. Housing starts increased substantially in 2004 as a result of high house prices, low interest rates and a favourable economic outlook.

Switzerland’s only major drawback is the fact that it is a lightweight in the geopolitical arena, which makes it almost impossible for it to defend itself against protectionist tendencies and discriminatory measures taken by big countries. The Swiss government must therefore take a strong stand on behalf of free trade, while also ensuring that the private sector operates within the best possible framework for its further development. Ultimately, our future welfare depends on the vitality of the private sector, not on any state intervention. BIS Review 166/2009  1
Let me elaborate a bit more on these three themes: the need for an encompassing and integrated set of data, the achievements of, and outlook for, euro area statistics and the ECB’s framework for analysing this information. Monetary policy and the need for an encompassing and integrated set of data If we lived in the world of macroeconomic textbooks, a few simple models with a limited set of variables would be a sufficient basis for monetary policy-making and the statistical requirements could be kept to a minimum. As we all know, the real world is much more complex and, therefore, information needs are much more elaborated. In such a world, a rich and integrated set of data is needed because macroeconomic models, synthetic indicators and unconnected statistical indicators are often too rough a guide to the current and likely future development of the economy. As mentioned before, central banks have to take decisions under conditions of constant uncertainty. The economy is never at rest. A multitude of disturbances of diverse nature affect the economy all the time: financial shocks, demand shocks, supply shocks etc., and these cannot easily be distinguished in real time, let alone foreseen. In their attempts to identify disturbances and track how they spread through the economy, central banks are assisted by models. But too often, existing models are not sufficiently sophisticated instruments to identify shocks. For one thing, their focus may be too narrow, in a way that makes them  BIS Review 67/2004  1  unduly selective.

Less than a decade ago, we did not even have the statistical requirements for the Monetary Union, let alone the statistics themselves for the euro area. Today, euro area statistics compare favourably with those of other major countries in many respects. A concrete example is the monthly balance of payments for the euro area and the availability of a timely, flash estimate of the euro area Harmonised  2  BIS Review 67/2004  Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Moreover, the ECB compiles an elaborate and timely set of monthly statistics on monetary developments in the euro area and interest rates. Statistical preparations had to start early, due to the long lead times involved. On average, it takes around 18 months from inception to delivery of a new set of statistics that involves the collection of additional information from economic agents. While there is still room for improvement, which I will explain later on, I feel confident that the ECB has now at its disposal a solid set of statistics of sufficient quality for the conduct of monetary policy. Let me share with you some of the success factors and ‘lessons to learn’ from this development process. First and foremost, the achievements have been possible thanks to the intensive and fruitful cooperation and coordination with other statistical agencies.
In others, the fiscal position is strong enough to stabilize the debt dynamics, but provides little buffer against adverse shocks, and very little room for fiscal policy to help cushion the effects of such a shock. 2  BIS Review 37/2004  •  Important challenges remain in the financial area as well. In many countries, large public sector debt burdens have left banking systems highly exposed to the sovereign, constraining authorities’ room for maneuver. There are also problems in banks’ corporate and consumer loan books, and a number of banking systems also have a large share of foreign currency denominated liabilities, in some cases held by non-residents. •  The durability of recent improvements in external positions, which reflect weak domestic demand in many countries, is also open to question. As domestic demand strengthens, external balances could move into deficit again, which in some cases will reintroduce a greater external risk. •  And in many cases, the financial exposure of the IMF and the multilateral development banks is already high. These balance sheet challenges took a long time to develop, and they will take a long time to reverse. They are the legacy of years of past fiscal decisions, magnified by the impact of crises on growth, the exchange rate, and the financial sector. They leave an exacting set of policy challenges.

We assess the models banks use to measure risk and the scenarios used to stress test exposures, but the banks have the responsibility for designing and running the risk management infrastructure. By looking across a broad range of world class financial institutions, we have a good sense of the evolving frontier of best practice in risk management which we can then use to help benchmark other institutions and pull common practice closer to that frontier. For a number of reasons, this can’t be the model for the Fund’s relationships with its members. But it provides an interesting prism in thinking about surveillance. The Fund has explored a number of ideas to strengthen the surveillance framework. One of the most promising is to establish a process with more frequent, published staff assessments of performance against a medium-term framework designed by the member country. That assessment could convey a  4  BIS Review 37/2004  clear judgement about the degree of progress being made in reducing vulnerabilities, improving resilience, and strengthening the structural underpinnings of growth. Analysis of public and external debt trends, benchmarked against sustainability and vulnerability thresholds, and stress tests for relevant shocks could play a key role in this process. There are compelling arguments for combining such a framework with contingent access to Fund resources. Surveillance today does not provide a meaningful check on ex ante policies, and resources are only made available when the financial need is acute.
Further details including transcripts of the oral evidence sessions are available on the Committee’s website. As set out most recently by Andrew Bailey in his 2020 Jackson Hole speech and accompanying paper. The supporting paper for Andrew Bailey’s Jackson Hole speech, mentioned above, gives a good overview of the evidence for the UK, as does Box B of the IEO report, while the 2019 BIS Committee on the Global Financial System report on unconventional monetary policy tools summarises the cross country evidence, as does Ben Bernanke’s 2020 AEA Presidential Lecture. 18 The Bank has actively contributed to work on this topic, with a notable contribution, for example, by Bunn, P, Pugh, A and Yeates, C (2018) "The distributional impact of monetary policy easing in the UK between 2008 and 2014." 15 16 17  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  Figure 5: Stylised QE transmission mechanism  Taken from the supporting paper for Andrew Bailey’s Jackson Hole speech.

Tarisa Watanagase: Prospects and challenges for the Thai economy in 2010 Dinner talk by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the British Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 30 November 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank the British Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to be here tonight. It is my pleasure to join you once again at this prominent annual gathering. Last year we had a fruitful discussion on “What determines the future of the Thai economy”. If you may recall, I imparted on the audience some words of wisdom for all policymakers, which is to smooth short-term pain, and to achieve long-term gain. Last year’s speech took care of the latter part, in which the key message was a call for collective efforts to raise the economy’s potential output in order to achieve sustainable long-run prosperity. We, however, did not spend much time on the former part as we were yet to witness the complete fallout from the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Today, we all know that our get-together last September was at the onset of the greatest economic contraction over the last 60 years. The collapse of Lehman Brothers on Sep 15, 2008 created a gigantic shockwave in the world financial markets with its ripples subsequently evolving into an economic tsunami that wiped out so much economic wellbeing all over the world.
Fernando Restoy: European banking sector – situation and challenges Speech by Mr Fernando Restoy, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, based on the address delivered at the UIMP seminar “¿Qué hemos aprendido de la crisis?” (“What have we learned from the crisis?”), organised by the APIE (Association of Economics Journalists), Madrid, 17 June 2016. *  *  *  Thank you, Miguel Ángel, for your introduction. As you know, it is a pleasure to be here once again in Santander, participating in the closure of the seminar organised by the APIE (Association of Economics Journalists) at the Menéndez Pelayo International University (UIMP). As always, I greatly appreciate having been invited to what has become a traditional event on the calendar. Some days back in the course of a meeting, a renowned economics practitioner told me how complex it can be for interested citizens to obtain a well-founded view of the situation of the Spanish banking system. This struck me as a very appropriate remark. Despite the extensive work by the Banco de España and other public and private agencies to compile and disseminate information and analysis on banks, it is not always easy to gain proper insight into the sector as a whole. That is why I would like to take the opportunity today to offer an in-depth analysis of the situation and outlook for Spanish and European financial institutions in the context of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).

The existence of more banks with a pan-European outlook would amount to a private national risk pooling mechanism that would help weaken the link between the macroeconomic risks existing in each country and the stability of its banking system, adding robustness to the monetary and banking union. It is therefore important to identify and attempt to eliminate those obstacles that continue to hinder such banking consolidation in Europe, in spite of the establishment of the banking union. In particular, we must consider whether regulation and supervisory practices tend to unduly penalise geographical diversification of a bank’s business. It would also be desirable to ascertain whether the current structure of the industry in various countries, characterised by the existence of numerous banks that are not listed public companies and that maintain strong links with national business sectors, hampers the participation of foreign competitors, whether directly or through acquisitions. All told, in the short or medium term it is likely that the need to continue reducing costs will encourage bank mergers and acquisitions within each country in order to harness potential economies of scale. In the largest European countries, there would seem to be room for more consolidation. In fact, in many countries the level of concentration in the industry, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is below that which might be considered to pose a possible threat to competition (see Chart 8).
In such a situation the EU member states have a “common interest” in discussing how confidence in economic policy can be enhanced. During the spring there has been a discussion in Sweden about the exchange rate tendency in connection with the move to Stage Three of EMU. What will happen if, for instance, companies adopt the euro as their unit of account? The Riksbank has underscored that it does not see any strong reasons for large currency outflows on account of the monetary union. And if such outflows were to occur and the krona suddenly weakened, we consider that countervailing forces would act in financial markets. The value of a currency is determined by numerous factors, of which the most important is confidence in the country’s economic policy. The general trend towards internationalisation in recent years has entailed relatively large currency outflows due to portfolio diversification among resident investors. But at the same time the krona has displayed an appreciating trend as growing confidence in economic policy generated a compensatory currency inflow. All in all, conditions for a stable exchange rate between the krona and the single currency should be good. There are many indications that the European Central Bank will define a price stability target that resembles Sweden’s. Similar inflation trends, together with confidence in economic policy as a whole, should result not only in stable nominal and real exchange rates between the euro and the krona but also in conditions for a reasonable valuation of the krona.

And, where there are coordination issues we will stand ready to assist the market in solving them. What we are asking from you is to engage with the Working Group. As I’ve already said, we are under no illusions that transition will be easy. That is why it is so important that you help identify the challenges and opportunities of adopting SONIA more broadly. The Working Group has produced a paper which seeks your input on a number of specific questions. Please do respond. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  It also invites participation in the work of the Group over coming months. Please do get involved in shaping the future of sterling markets – starting from now. I am looking forward to hearing your thoughts this morning. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7