samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
While expectations displayed a modest increase in January on the back of higher-than-expected inflation due to the surge in food prices in the last quarter of 2009 and on the back of tax adjustments that started to be implemented in early January, it is observed that the change in expectations remained more limited as maturities extended (Figure 11). 4  BIS Review 31/2010  In the last quarter of 2009, inflation displayed an upward trend on a global basis as well. Inflation rates that had plummeted all over the world due to downward pressures arising from demand and cost conditions since the second half of 2008, started to trend up in August 2009, particularly due to the low base of 2008 in commodity prices (Figure 12 and 13). 2. Monetary policy response  After commenting briefly on inflation developments, I would now like to cover the policies pursued by the Central Bank during the last quarter. BIS Review 31/2010  5  Anticipating that inflation would decrease sharply as of the last quarter of 2008, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) focused on alleviating the potentially harsh impact of the global financial crisis on the domestic economy. In this respect, the CBT has delivered sizeable cuts in policy rates, while providing liquidity support to facilitate the smooth operation of credit markets. The cumulative interest rate cuts between November 2008 and November 2009 reached 1,025 basis points, bringing Turkey’s policy rate closer to the average of emerging markets implementing inflation targeting regimes (Figure 14 and 15).

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Asian and Thai economies in a volatile world Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at The Nation’s 43rd Anniversary International Conference, Bangkok, 19 July 2013. *  *  *  Distinguished CEO and Chairman, Members of Asia News Network, Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a delight to address you on this auspicious occasion of The Nation’s 43rd anniversary. Let me congratulate you warmly, and wish you many flourishing years ahead. We gather here at an important juncture of what seems to be yet another shift in global economic and financial landscape. The three-speed world economy appears to be on a convergence course recently as China and some other emerging markets start to show signs of slowdown, while the US and Japan are gathering momentum. These changing global dynamics coinciding with market’s enthusiastic reactions to Federal Reserve’s signal of socalled “QE tapering” led to a sell-off of emerging market debt and equities, and reversal of foreign capital flows that had rushed into the region earlier this year. Living in a more volatile world The financial world has indeed become more volatile. Many factors intertwine to render such great financial market volatility we observe today.
This convergence has eliminated one major asymmetry and is getting the eurozone closer to the canonical model of the optimum currency area. The last observable reaction is support. It shows up in comments from a majority of observers and investors, especially in emerging economies: they praise the euro; they want it to succeed; but they sometimes wonder about our collective ability, in current circumstances, to do what is necessary, to make the right decisions or make them at the right time and to set in place the proper framework for the future. These are the concerns I want to address now. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Where and how did it start? Most Euro area and EU countries entered the crisis with significantly deteriorated fiscal positions. We were very far away from the “structural balance objective” which was the basic pillar of our fiscal framework. So, all countries were severely hit, not so much by an increase in expenditures but essentially through a massive loss of revenues. The IMF has shown that, in all advanced countries, including the US and UK, those losses account for around two third of the deterioration in fiscal positions which have been observed during the crisis. Fiscal deterioration was compounded, in some countries, by the size of blanket guarantees given to the banking sector. Those implicit liabilities only became apparent when difficulties materialized. As in the US and UK, fragilities in the banking sector stemmed from risks mostly taken in – or related to – the housing sector.

Ravi Menon: Skills for the future Welcome remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Institute of Banking and Finance Distinction Evening, Singapore, 29 September 2017. * * * Mr Lim Swee Say, Minister for Manpower Members of the IBF Council, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to the IBF Distinction Evening 2017. Tonight, we are honoured to have Mr Lim Swee Say, Minister for Manpower, as our Guest-ofHonour. Minister Lim, as you know, has been a lifelong passionate advocate for helping our workers build up their skills, grow in their jobs, and contribute to the economy. He will speak later in the evening on these issues – issues that are close to his heart – and also to all of us as part of the IBF community. The global economy is in a better place this year compared to last year. Let us take stock of where we are. The Singapore economy is on track to achieve slightly higher growth this year compared to 2016. And so is the financial sector. For the first five years after the global financial crisis, our financial sector grew twice as fast as the overall economy. Last year, for the first time, the financial sector grew slower than the overall economy, weighed down by weaker lending growth to the region. This year, the financial sector is expected to grow by 2.5-3.5%, slightly faster than the 2.03.0% expected for the overall economy.
Policymakers’ judgments on these costs, such as financial stability impacts, political economy ramifications, and the effect on the consolidated fiscal situation, will be critical in assessing the overall costs and benefits of LSAPs.12 These caveats are particularly important to bear in mind in looking at the agency MBS market, since many might argue that the main issuers in the agency market gained private benefits at the expense of the taxpayers in the period prior to the financial crisis.13  Overview of the U.S. Agency Mortgage Market In depth and liquidity, the agency MBS market is second only to the U.S. Treasury market domestically; it is also deeper than most foreign sovereign debt markets. The fixed-rate agency MBS market currently has roughly $ trillion outstanding, with an estimated average daily trading volume of approximately $ billion in 2016 year-to-date.14 In contrast, the slightly larger U.S. corporate market has an average daily trading volume of only $ billion per day.15 The substantial trading volume and liquidity of the agency MBS market are due, in large part, to the existence of the to-be-announced (TBA) MBS trading convention. This structure provides investors with the ability to trade a wide range of MBS with similar characteristics without requiring them to analyze the underlying details of each individual mortgage security, since any security with the same agency issuer, original maturity term, and coupon can be delivered into a single TBA contract. 16 This transforms a market of hundreds of thousands of individual mortgage securities into a limited number of homogenous TBA contracts.

With more than 2,500 Indian companies, 2,300 Chinese companies, and 2,000 Australian and New Zealand companies in Singapore, corporates have made Singapore their location of choice to tap into this growth. However, Singapore’s value transcends our physical proximity to the fastest growing regions of the world. Indeed, Daiwa’s extensive commitments and new activities in Singapore is the best testament of our successful efforts to create the best possible business environment. It highlights recognition of our stable and trusted environment, supported by reliable infrastructure, highly educated workforce and consistent and transparent government policies. To further enlarge the market, Singapore has forged important linkages to the rest of the world. We have built up a network of Free Trade Agreements with many of our key trading partners such as Japan, the US, India and Korea. Discussions are ongoing with the Gulf region and China for greater market access for Singapore-based entities. A Connectivity Agreement between Singapore and Vietnam will amongst others, deepen collaboration in financial services, and promises greater opportunities for businesses from both countries. Conclusion On this note, I would like to convey my heartiest congratulations to Daiwa Securities Group on your 35th anniversary in Singapore. The future of the region continues to shine bright and I encourage all to leverage on Singapore to tap into the region’s growth. I wish everyone a wonderful evening ahead. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 72/2007
That is of course just one example, among many, of how we are drawing on the various approaches to establish what is “best practice” as the basis for our supervisory activity. This process will not be completed by 4 November, but will rather be further refined over the coming years. Horizontal analyses and a level playing field Another considerable advantage of European banking supervision will be the possibility to draw comparisons across European countries and to establish a level playing field. The banking sectors of many European countries are dominated by a few large banks. The national supervisory bodies were therefore faced with the problem of having to assess circumstances on the basis of just one bank, or on that of a very small group of banks. I am not just thinking of the assessment of specific portfolios here, but also of the early identification of risks, which only become visible, or are at least easier to identify, in horizontal analysis. Although international working groups and the European Banking Authority (EBA) have addressed this problem, it is only with the establishment of the SSM that a quantum leap forward can be made. The SSM is able to draw on detailed supervisory information from across the euro area and prepare comparative analyses. And I am using the present tense here on purpose. With the ongoing comprehensive assessment, we are already active at the European level.

Exchanges with colleagues from market operations, payment systems and economic analysis will help the supervisors to develop a different viewpoint on current market developments, the importance of a specific institution for payments and the economic environment. One area in which cooperation will be particularly intensive is macro-prudential supervision. Our aim here is to bring together insights from both the macro-prudential and the micro-prudential areas, and to address undesirable developments in a targeted way. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, the European supervisory landscape is facing a major change. With the SSM, we have created a strong, new supervisor at the European level. The SSM will be able, and have the responsibility, not to do everything differently, but to do some things better. With the conclusion of the comprehensive assessment, and the publication of the results in the second half of October, and the start of our supervisory activity on 4 November, we have a few stressful months ahead of us. But we must also remember to occasionally pause for a moment and to reflect beyond the immediate tasks at hand. The SSM may have been created as a consequence of, and as a solution to, certain problems in Europe. But it is  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  destined to be able to achieve much more and – at least that is my hope – to have an effect over and beyond Europe. Thank you for your attention. I am now at your disposal for questions. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Jaime Caruana: The New Basel Capital Accord: why we need it and where we're at Remarks by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Fifth Meeting of the Asian Program of the Institute of International Finance, Beijing, 17 November 2003. *  *  *  I’d like to thank the Institute of International Finance and the Bank of China for hosting this discussion on the outlook for banking and finance in Asia. For many reasons, it seems especially appropriate to discuss this topic here in Beijing. The tremendous growth of China’s economy, its recent accession to the World Trade Organisation, and the wide scope of change that is occurring here has made China a reference for the world. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you some of the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to promote financial systems better able to sustain growth and more resilient during periods of distress. It is an honour to address this forum, but I must confess that I have come to listen and to learn. The message I am consistently hearing is on the one hand one of strong support for the principles of the New Capital Accord and on the other a desire for the best standard for financial systems in each country. Too many examples have illustrated the economic costs and social unrest that weakly capitalised and poorly managed banks can inflict on an economy.

While we might have been somewhat surprised by the number of responses that we received, we were not surprised by the hard work that was evident in the letters. On this note, I would like to offer the Committee’s appreciation to the banks, banking associations, including the members of the IIF, and public agencies in Asia and elsewhere that devoted considerable time and resources to the consultations. If you’ve been following our work since the first consultative paper was released in 1999, you know that the proposals have evolved and improved considerably thanks to the honest responses and letters that you and others shared with us. At the Committee’s meeting last month, all members acknowledged our responsibility to consider carefully all comments. At the same time, we recognised the need to resolve the open issues and release the New Accord as soon as possible so that banks can continue to prepare for the new rules. In a statement to the press after our meeting, the members of the Committee noted that we expect to take account of the remaining issues and complete the text of the New Accord in the coming months and not later than mid-year 2004. Let me briefly mention some of the issues present in the comment letters. Complexity and the balance with risk sensitivity and comparability Certainly a key issue that we are addressing is balancing the complexity of the agreement with the need to be sensitive to risk and to offer different kinds of banks comparable approaches.
David Clementi: Risk sensitivity and the New Basel Accord Speech by David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at a Financial Services Authority Conference: “Reforming Capital Adequacy for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Banks”, London, 10 April 2001. *  *  *  Introduction It is a great pleasure for me to be adding my remarks today to those of Bill McDonough and Howard Davies. I would first like to congratulate Bill, as chairman of the Basel Committee, on the very real achievement that this new capital framework represents. Products that are 'designed by committee' normally come in for some fairly trenchant criticism, but this one represents a new milestone in financial regulation, one which I believe will strongly influence how all financial firms, not just banks, come to be regulated in the future. I know it has been a lot of hard work, and I don't just mean the shoulder-strain involved in carrying the document onto airplanes! Unfortunately the hard work is not over yet, both for the authorities and for the banking community - even looking beyond finalisation of these proposals, supervisors and banks will of course have to see through a long and complex implementation process. But this is not to underestimate the progress that has been made and it is certainly a good moment to take stock of the proposals as they stand.

While the funding of green technology projects from conventional banking is encouraging, the same cannot be said of Islamic banks, based on the latest data available. The approved GTFS projects indicate that only two projects have received financing from two Islamic banks in 2013, compared to the past two years, where six and seven projects were funded by Islamic banks in 2012 and 2011 respectively, Moving ahead, due to the increasingly complex, diverse and rapidly-changing nature of green technology, there is a need to develop new and innovative financial solutions to facilitate the growth of green technology companies. The Islamic banks need to respond to these needs or risk missing the opportunities brought about by the green technology revolution. Of late, greater use of equity-based models in Islamic financial solutions has been observed. This includes participatory or equity based contracts such as Mudarabah and Musharakah that support entrepreneurial ventures. In Malaysia, the adoption of these contracts has increased from 1.4% in 2008 to 5.2% in 2012. The nature of these contracts provides immense opportunities for Islamic banks to leverage on the ‘green certified’ SMEs to use participatory contracts which advocate profit and risk sharing between banks and the borrowers. The Mudarabah contract can be modeled for various financing purposes for the SMEs, such as for one-off project financing, new start-up enterprises, investment funds and sukuk structure. The Musharakah structure is applicable for private equity and venture capital  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  investments.
Although it is not particularly likely that we in Sweden will be subjected to a strongly binding zero lower bound for the interest rate, it is wise to be prepared for this eventuality and to have carefully considered the monetary policy alternatives that would then be available, and which of these would be appropriate, depending on how serious the zero lower bound was. A zero lower bound on the interest rate means that the real interest rate is still too high to sufficiently stimulate the real economy, despite the policy rate being cut to zero. It is the real market rate that is important in the real economy, and this corresponds to the policy rate plus a spread arising due to various risk and liquidity premia, minus expected inflation. Although the policy rate is zero, nominal market rates are positive as a result of the spread. The various measures taken by central banks and other public authorities during the financial crisis to ensure that the financial markets function more efficiently and that the spreads decline thus fulfil a function that is at least as important, even if the repo rate is at zero. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that their stimulating effect is much smaller than the effect a central bank can achieve with measures that focus on inflation expectations. The major danger with a zero lower bound for the interest rate is that inflation expectations will be too low and even negative, and that the real interest rate will thus become too high.

It is possible that the level of inflation can become negative and that we will thus see deflation in some countries. Deflation for a short period is not a major problem. We even had this in Sweden a few years ago. But if deflation is prolonged, and especially if inflation expectations fall and deflation expectations arise, the situation can become very problematic. The combination of very low policy rates, a weak real economy and the risk of deflation has thus revived the debate about how monetary policy can and should be conducted in the event of a zero interest rate bound. In the 1990s, Japan experienced a long period with a zero interest rate, deflation and, compared with previous decades, weak real economic development. The experience gained in Japan has stimulated extensive discussion and a great deal of research at universities and central banks on monetary policy in connection with a zero interest rate bound. At Princeton University, Ben Bernanke, Paul Krugman and I conducted research on this subject. 3 The Japanese experience and the research conducted on monetary policy with a zero interest rate are now topical again. For Sweden, a scenario with deflation and a zero interest rate is as yet not particularly likely. However, at the Riksbank we must of course be prepared for all eventualities and consider what measures would be possible and appropriate in such a situation. We must also think about how we can minimise the risk of ending up in such a situation.
These include prudent regulation, more intensive supervision than that of other countries, a business model geared essentially to retail banking and sound management at most banks. But let me also stress – as it seems to me an example of what could be done now with the labour reform – that the government and the opposition, which has supported it in Parliament, have expeditiously agreed on a series of high-quality financial system reform measures that have proven most effective in preventing credit institutions’ problems from bringing the country’s economy to its knees. We should not forget that if, for instance, the legislation on the funds for the acquisition of financial assets and on guarantees for bank and savings-bank bond issues had not been approved, we would no doubt have witnessed a shut-down of wholesale funding on global markets and an abrupt contraction in credit that would have led to a deep recessionary spiral. Fortunately, this did not occur. That does not mean that credit standards are the same now as before the crisis. One of the most notable consequences has been the increase in risk aversion, which stood in the previous upturn at very low levels. This increased risk aversion translates into much stricter lending policies. As a result many companies, particularly small and medium-sized ones (for various reasons, such as the fact that they are not audited and are generally less capitalised than large companies), have seen their ability to obtain funding restricted, occasionally beyond what may be considered reasonable.

I also commend the Bank for adopting a “Whistle-blowing” policy to help ensure professional conduct is adhered to at all times. These measures, Mr Managing Director will work to your own Bank’s benefit. The Bank of Zambia stands ready to assist in any way in your quest for Best Practice. BIS Review 36/2007  1  4. Lending rates  On the banking front, we have witnessed Bank lending rates follow the downward trend. Mr Managing Director, these are positive indicators. I am aware that the perennial complaint from our local business houses has been the prohibitive interest rates charged by banks on credit facilities. There is need to continue work on reducing lending rates further as the current levels are still unbearable by most of our upcoming entrepreneurs. In certain fora, Mr Managing Director, the borrowing culture of Zambians has been heavily criticized. It is said that Zambians borrow with no intention of paying back. It is one of the reasons the Bank of Zambia is taking seriously the matter of the Credit Reference Bureau being operational as soon as possible. The Bank of Zambia is keen to ensure this negative perception is eradicated. 5. Banking services to the unbanked  Mr Managing Director, late last year Bank of Zambia launched the findings of the FISCOPE SURVEY, a survey which revealed that 68% of Zambian have no access to banking services.