samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
10 ECB (2020), Study on the payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area (SPACE), forthcoming. 11 ECB (2020), Impact of the pandemic on cash trends (IMPACT), forthcoming, 12 Legal tender status implies that acceptance of euro banknotes and coins for payments is mandatory (unless  explicitly agreed otherwise, for example owing to a lack of change), legally recognised for repayment of a debt, and at face value, without additional fees (in contrast, for example, to credit cards, for which additional payment fees are allowed). See Article 128(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 13 For example, TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS), managed by the Eurosystem, allows European  citizens to transfer funds in real time and around the clock, every single day of the year. In the design of a digital euro we will also look into the potential of distributed ledger technology. 14 See Bindseil, U. and Panetta, F., (2020), “Central bank digital currency remuneration in a world with low or  negative nominal interest rates”, VoxEU, October. 15 European Commission (2019), Standard Eurobarometer 92, December. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Here, I would like to draw the attention and explain that the concept “open banking” implies the creation of technological developments, with a view that the information of banks’ clients be open to third parties. In this regard, we should keep in mind that – though digitalisation is so far desired by all of us here – this development needs rather complex investments and regulations, which promote innovation in an environment that will guarantee a maximum security. Taking into account that the need for establishing a highly prudent environment turns more meaningful in case of Albania – where both financial education and inclusion are relatively low – the demand for market’s actors to make safe steps is quite important. Beyond “open banking” and the re-dimensioning of market through the introduction of new actors and services, I would like to mention the set of the undertaken regulatory measures and infrastructural developments, which have been focused exactly on the promotion of electronic payments in the framework of the National Retail Payments Strategy (NRPS). It is worthy emphasising that the so far implemented measures have driven to the successful accomplishment of the objectives defined in the Strategy since 2021. This success is a contribution of a broad gamma of actors, where banks in particular, and institutions, have played a key role.
This effort can often be successful because the agent is a relatively small group of people who hold all the relevant information and share very similar motivation, while principals tend to be much more numerous and less informed and their objectives are often highly differentiated. And so, corporate managers are often able to push through their will even if it goes against the interests of many shareholders; international organisations often take steps that their founding members do not like to see; and by the same token the EU administration is able to shape the integration process in ways that differ from what many member states previously intended. To give you just one banal illustration of this process: the remuneration of employees of international organisations and of Eurocrats is invariably higher than the remuneration they would be able to earn in similar positions at home. Therefore, the principals watch – with little joy, of course – a brain-drain in favour of their agent. Thus, an agent gets dominance over its principals and principals even contribute to this dominance. The observation that agents try to become more powerful than their principals is usually considered to be beyond the boundaries of political correctness, so we rarely hear about it. The same holds for another hindrance to proper execution of the European integration idea, namely the asymmetry among different principals, that is, among different member states of the EU.

These concerns are supported by the fact that as a member of the EU’s Economic and Financial Committee, I can watch the integration process every day on-line as an insider, so to say. The title of this conference stresses the fact that European integration started 60 years ago. You know that exactly 60 years ago a completely different project, originally aimed to build up something “brand new”, also appeared quite far away from Europe – in China. What irony of fate that after these sixty years it is now the Chinese who seem to be on their way up, running fast, while the European Union is stagnating or even descending economically. What bitterness, when one realises that on its way up, China is still a desperate and crazy communist regime that has just allowed its citizens a bit more freedom in the area of economic life. Of course, a part of the explanation lies in the fact of simple economic convergence. But without any doubt, the EU is losing its momentum. Not just now, in the crisis; this is a longer process. In the EU it seems to me that we have started concentrating more on conservation or preservation of the existing wealth, rather than on wealth creation. The question of why the European Union is not as economically powerful and efficient as it would like to be, is certainly complex.
This internal consistency explains why monetary policy is the only part of the EMU framework that has clearly functioned as designed. Fiscal policies were supposed to conform to the other form of governance, where countries would decide on and execute their own budgets, but within the strict constraints of the deficit and debt limits set in the Treaty. Those limits were supposed to be policed by markets, the Commission and other Member States, but in practice the incentives of the latter to enforce the rules were weak. This meant that de facto rules could be applied with discretion, while Member States themselves decided on how to exercise that discretion – in other words, the worst combination of the two forms. The result was that fiscal positions diverged significantly, which then created substantial spillovers for other euro area members. But perhaps more fundamentally, internal inconsistency meant that fiscal policy itself became ineffective in several jurisdictions. A number of governments either did not have the fiscal space to absorb the shock they faced in the early stage of the crisis, or they were unable to maintain the trust of the market when investors finally reacted – and over-reacted. Fiscal policy therefore had to effectively give up its stabilisation function – which is vital with a single monetary policy – and switch to convincing investors of debt sustainability. Prudential policies were also supposed to fit the decentralised model, although here the framework was even looser.

The resulting market fragmentation further increased sovereign risk, entrenched domestic banks as the marginal buyer of their sovereigns’ debt, and thus deepened this bank-sovereign nexus. Finally, the interaction between bank and sovereign risk jarred with the single monetary policy. A fragmented banking system not only impaired monetary policy transmission. But more fundamentally, it called into question the singleness of money. Money, it has to be remembered, is a liability of the banking system. Banknotes represent only a fraction of the money we use daily; the bulk of money is deposits. Thus, for there to be a truly single money, there has to be full fungibility of deposits across borders. If confidence in national banking systems diverges, such that a deposit in one jurisdiction is seen to worth less than a deposit in another, then money within the euro area is no longer unquestionably single. 3. Bringing consistency back  To sum up, the problems the euro area has faced derive from the fact that it did not learn its own lesson. The stability of European countries in the second half of the 20th century was based on providing their national economies with the right accord of rules, institutions and instruments to produce desirable market outcomes. Yet when it came to the euro area economy, these tried and tested principles were somehow overlooked. Several policy areas were governed inconsistently, with little reflection given to how the different cogs wheels would fit together.
Caleb M Fundanga: Fourth quarter 2010 media briefing Presented by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 18 February 2011. *  *  *  Executive summary 1. This brief examines monetary policy implementation and its outcomes in the fourth quarter of 2010. The brief also reviews other economic and financial sector developments, and concludes with an inflation outlook for the first quarter of 2011. Monetary policy 2. The focus of monetary policy during the fourth quarter of 2010 continued to be the achievement of the end-year annual inflation target of 8.0%. In this regard, the Bank of Zambia utilised largely Open Market Operations to maintain reserve money within the programmed growth path. This was supported by the auctioning of Government securities. Inflation 3. Quarterly overall inflation increased to 2.5% in December 2010 from 1.6% in the third quarter, and was above the 2.3% recorded in December 2009. This outturn was mainly attributed to the rise in food inflation to 3.6% from –0.1% in the previous quarter, as non-food inflation slowed down to 1.5% from 3.2% during the same period. 4. Similarly, the annual overall inflation rate rose to 7.9% in December 2010 from 7.7% in September 2010, but was in line with the end-year target of 8.0%. This outturn was largely on account of the rise in annual food inflation to 4.4% from 2.8% in September 2010, as annual non-food Inflation decreased to 11.3% from 12.5% during the same period. 5.

Much has been done, yet much remains to be done and we are determined to keep at it. I recognize fully that there can be no return to pre-crisis business as usual – whether on the part of the financial sector or on the part of regulators like ourselves. All in all, there is a lot to keep myself and my colleagues busy. National economic conditions The incoming data on the U.S. economy has been a bit more upbeat of late, suggesting that the recovery may be finally establishing a somewhat firmer footing. Real GDP expanded at a 3 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2011, the fastest growth since the first half of  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2010. The average monthly gain in nonfarm payroll employment moved up to 256,000 in January and February from 164,000 in the fourth quarter. Sales of light-weight motor vehicles rose to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 15.1 million in February, the highest since early 2008. The ISM nonmanufacturing index rose for the third consecutive month in February and now stands at its highest level in a year. Even the housing starts data have firmed somewhat, although from quite depressed levels. While these developments are certainly encouraging, it is far too soon to conclude that we are out of the woods.
Improving the state of the labor market, removing rigid labor market regulations, reducing the tax wedge, and more importantly enhancing the human capital through education reforms are essential to accelerate the growth rate of the economy on a sustainable basis. Second, Turkey is a net commodity importer in contrast to Latin American countries and South Africa. We need to import in excess of 35 billion USD worth of oil and natural gas each year, almost 5% of our GDP. Looking at the composition of the foreign trade, you can see that our imports are mainly commodities and intermediate goods, whereas industrial goods cover more than 90% of our total exports. Therefore, promoting Turkey's competitiveness is the key to her future success. 2  BIS Review 32/2008  Third, high domestic savings rate, which is high in emerging countries in Asia, is quite low in Turkey. It is around 20%. We need to attract foreign savings to finance investments. It is not surprising to observe a strong and direct positive relationship in Turkey between growth rate and current account deficit. Of course, the upward trend in energy prices has also contributed to the widening of the current account deficit to 5.8% in 2007. The current account deficit is a structural problem and a source of vulnerability. However, Turkey did not have difficulty in its financing in the last 6 years. In fact, the quality of foreign capital flows has improved sharply.

Javier Aríztegui: The financial crisis and the restructuring of the Spanish banking system Speech by Mr Javier Aríztegui, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the APIE (the Spanish Association of Economics Journalists) – UIMP (Menéndez Pelayo University) Course, Santander, 17 June 2011. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking the APIE (the Spanish Association of Economics Journalists) and the Menéndez Pelayo University for inviting me to deliver the closing address at this seminar, which has discussed matters of great interest for our economy and financial system. This is the third year I have come to Santander for this session, and the second year running that I will be briefly reflecting on the financial crisis and the restructuring of the banking system. That I should be here again is no strange occurrence. Indeed, it was foreseen by the organisers since we are experiencing the deepest and most extensive crisis in recent decades, and we face a far-reaching restructuring and reform of savings banks. But my address today is from a different perspective than that of my last visit. In June 2010 the Royal Decree-Law that created the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB by its acronym) had been in force for a year. One of its aims was to boost integration processes to create sounder and more efficient institutions.
Since then, especially during the nineties, economists documented several puzzles in the behavior of households' consumption. For example, the results by Deaton and Carroll show that the ability of households to smooth consumption was imperfect and heterogeneous. This evidence challenged the predictions of models with complete markets and a representative agent. One of the main milestones in this literature in the early nineties was the development of economic models with uninsurable income risk and credit constraints that displayed rich cross-sectional heterogeneity in income and wealth, the so-called heterogeneous agent models, or Bewley-Huggett economies. The main takeaway from these earlier models is that one could rationalize the low observed real interest rate, inconsistent with representative agent models with complete markets, in a model in which households have precautionary savings motives to insure against income shocks. In this framework, the degree of income uncertainty and credit constraints shape wealth inequality and imply a real interest rate in equilibrium that better resembles that in the data. Another key development was the widespread increase in access to large-scale microdata, which helped the profession to evaluate existing economic theories and build better economic models. Microdata has been a cornerstone to the inclusion of heterogeneity into macroeconomic models, as it allows a deeper understanding of individual behaviors. Without it, theoretical models could not be adequately tested.

Conference contents Let me now give a very brief overview of what we will hear in the next two days: The conference will start with the session "Transmission mechanism of shocks and policies" in which the paper by Adrien Auclert, Matt Rognlie, and Ludwig Straub analyzes the monetary and fiscal policy implications of shocks to energy prices in models with household heterogeneity and incomplete markets. Then, the paper by Emiliano Luttini, Ernesto Pastén, and Elisa Rubbo will shed some light on the heterogeneous effects of monetary policy across different households in Chile. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Then, the conference will move to the topic of "HANK Models", where the paper by Alisdair McKay and Christian Wolf will show us optimal policy rules in these types of models, and we will be able to contrast them to optimal rules in models without household heterogeneity and understand their main differences. The importance of the inclusion of heterogeneity for monetary policy analysis is not only about the understanding of the mechanisms that this implies, but also, and probably more important, is about whether these mechanisms are quantitatively relevant in changing the policy prescriptions. If so, it is fundamental for Central Banks to have the quantitative tools to solve and estimate these complex models. The paper by Marco Del Negro, William Chen, Shlok Goyal, Ethan Matlin, Donggyu Lee, Rebeca Sarfati, and Sikata Sengupta will show us one of the first steps toward achieving this goal.
The centralisation of supervision as well as the effective use of macroprudential tools should help identify and prevent the persistent accumulation of financial imbalances at an early stage. This will help ensure a more resilient and viable financial sector. A financial sector that is capable of contributing to sustainable growth. Second, it has demonstrated that we urgently need a European framework for the resolution of financial institutions. This should include a clear set of commonly known ex ante rules for bail-in, buffers of ‘bail-inable’ assets and depositor preference. Regarding the latter, the new framework should place depositors at the top of the creditor hierarchy and ensure that the role of DGS in resolution is limited to insuring eligible depositors. This will contribute to reducing the risks to financial stability by providing legal certainty and predictability to resolution. Third, it has revealed the pressing need to establish a single resolution mechanism (SRM). The SRM is a fundamental pillar of the banking union and is a necessary complement to the SSM. This requires a strong authority at its centre which should provide timely and impartial decision-making which minimises the costs of resolution. The SRM should have a European resolution fund at its disposal which should have access to a temporary and fiscally neutral public backstop. I thank you for your attention and stand at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

This in turn has led to sharp declines in rates for such loans to households and nonfinancial corporations. As the transmission of monetary policy works with lags, our policy action will progressively feed through to the economy in full. Hence, with all the measures taken, monetary policy has provided ongoing support for households and corporations. The Governing Council will ensure that, once the macroeconomic environment improves, the measures taken can be quickly unwound and the liquidity provided absorbed so that any threat to price stability over the medium to longer term can be effectively countered in a timely fashion. Indeed, as has been stressed many times, the Governing Council will continue to ensure a firm anchoring of medium-term inflation expectations. Such anchoring is indispensable to supporting sustainable growth and employment and contributes to financial stability. Accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. Regarding fiscal policies, the latest projections for euro area countries point to continued revisions to budget balance estimates and forecasts. Higher budget deficits and the fiscal impact of financial sector support measures will lead to significantly higher government debtto-GDP ratios. In addition, updated projections by the Economic Policy Committee of the EU show that most countries face a challenging task in dealing with the budgetary costs of an ageing population. Therefore, it is paramount that countries make a strong and credible commitment to a path of consolidation in order to return to sound fiscal positions, respecting fully the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact.
A stronger krone reduces the cost of imported goods and services for enterprises and households. Imported inflation is lower. So far this year, the import-weighted krone exchange rate has appreciated by about 3 per cent. Substantial uncertainty surrounding international economic developments There is considerable uncertainty attached to international economic developments. 4  BIS Review 47/2001  In the US, industrial output and retail sales have weakened markedly over the last three months. Between March and April employment declined by more than 200 000. GDP growth slowed from an annualised rate of a good 5 per cent in the first half of 2000 to about 1 per cent in the fourth quarter of last year and the first quarter of 2001. US equities, as measured for example by the Dow Jones index, declined markedly through 2000 and in the first quarter of this year. Stock markets in other countries also fell during this period. Equity prices have picked up again since the beginning of April, however. In addition, industrial commodity prices and oil prices have risen over the last month. Moreover, long-term interest rates have increased. These developments may indicate that many operators in financial markets and commodity markets have again become somewhat more optimistic about the prospects ahead. Household and business confidence also deteriorated through the latter half of last year and early this year, but has remained steady over the last two to three months, as illustrated by the confidence indicators in this chart.

In terms of solvency, the position of the Spanish banking industry has improved significantly in recent years, thanks to the reforms implemented in the industry, the strengthening of regulation and supervision, and the recovery in economic activity that has taken place in Spain. It should be recalled that the regulatory response to the financial crisis led to a substantial increase in capital requirements, as part of a raft of measures geared to minimising the probability of bank crises and to reducing their impact if they do occur, in particular in terms of the use of public funds. Not only were the own funds requirements increased for institutions but also the quality of own funds (i.e. their loss absorbing capacity) was improved, through the introduction of a number of more restrictive criteria for the determination of eligible capital, known as “common equity tier 1” (CET1). Thus, in terms of CET1, although the Spanish banking system still has a ratio below that of the main European countries, its strengthening in recent years has been notable: by more than one percentage point on average since its introduction in 2014. As at December 2016 this ratio for the Spanish banking industry as a whole reached 12.8%, exceeding the regulatory minimum requirements and standing not far from the average for banks supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is close to 14%.