samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Table 2 International baseline scenario assumptions (annual change, percent)  Mar-21 Report  Jun-21 Report  Mar-21 Report  2021 (f) Jun-21 Report  Terms of trade  8.9  8.9  11.7  17.4  -3.4  -4.1  -4.4  -5.4  Trading partners' GDP  -2.3  -2.1  6.3  6.7  4.2  4.3  3.5  3.5  World GDP at PPP  -3.3  -3.2  6.2  6.5  4.4  4.4  3.5  3.5  Developed economies GDP at PPP  -5.1  -5.0  5.1  5.2  3.9  4.0  2.3  2.1  EMEs' GDP at PPP  -2.1  -2.1  7.0  7.3  4.7  4.7  4.3  4.4  2020  2022 (f) Mar-21 Jun-21 Report Report  2023 (f) Mar-21 Jun-21 Report Report  (level) LME copper price (USD cent/lb)  280  280  395  425  375  400  355  370  WTI-Brent average oil price (USD/barrel)  41  41  61  64  60  62  57  59  (f) = Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

The economic activity slowdown, low main products prices in the world markets, low monetary expansion in the economy and controlled inflationary expectations offset the inflationary pressures coming from exchange rate depreciation during 2009. The upward inflation trend during the last quarter of 2009 was expected by the Bank of Albania. It was formed mostly by transitory factors, which are not expected to generate steady inflationary pressures. In particular, this performance was influenced by rising food prices, which reflect the lagging effect of exchange rate depreciation, international markets conjunctures and structural problems of the Albanian market. These factors are expected to exert inflationary pressures during the first half of 2010, possibly added by expected reduction of agricultural products supply, as a result of the flooding that has lately occurred. However, stable core inflation trend and low inflation rate of non-traded goods confirm that inflationary pressures exerted by domestic demand are moderate. In the absence of other supply shocks, the slow progress of domestic demand, low growth of monetary supply and anchored inflationary expectations, are premises for keeping inflation within the target in the medium run. The Bank of Albania pursued a prudent monetary policy during 2009, creating a suitable environment for a balanced development of the economy and for keeping inflationary pressures under check. In the presence of downward inflationary pressures and steady expectations, the hints for slow domestic demand in the next period have motivated the progressive growth of monetary stimulus during 2009.
At the ECB, many measures of monetary liquidity are investigated and assessed for the implied risks to price stability. It is worth mentioning in this context that the various measures should not be regarded as mutually exclusive but rather as providing an encompassing view. An obvious measure characterising the rate of monetary expansion consists of the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3, a measure that tends to attract most attention in the public debate. 11  IMF (2003) “Deflation: Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options – Findings of an Interdepartmental Task Force”, p 15. 12  The steep drop in the growth rate in compensation per employee in 2009Q1 is mainly driven by strong downward developments in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. Note that, combined with the recent release of productivity growth (-3.6%), unit labour costs growth increased further, from 4.5% in 2008Q4 to 5.7% in 2009Q1, marking a new record high since the start of EMU. 13  See, for instance, McCandless, G. T. and W. E. Weber (1995), Some Monetary Facts, Federal Reserve of Minneapolis Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 2–11 or, for an alternative approach, Benati, L. (2009), Long Run Evidence on Money Growth and Inflation, ECB Working Paper, No 1027. 6  BIS Review 81/2009  As we can see in Chart 17, annual M3 growth decelerated further in the first quarter of 2009 compared with previous quarters.

This new set of powers has been introduced rather quickly –over a few short years – and this leaves us with a number of questions still awaiting answers. We need to better understand the effectiveness of the new instruments in improving the resilience of the financial system, in reducing systemic risks, and the trade-offs between different policy options. We also need to understand how macroprudential policies can affect risk-taking attitudes by different agents and to what extent the provision of credit to the real economy may be affected, especially during difficult periods. After a thorough analysis, it might be the case that the current macroprudential toolkit is still insufficient or incomplete. The European Union’s macroprudential framework is currently under review and different possibilities are being contemplated to fine-tune the applicable legislation and to introduce additional instruments. Over the last decade we have observed that bank-like activities are increasingly being undertaken by non-banks, in particular the so-called shadow banks. There is a debate about expanding the scope of the macroprudential instruments beyond the banking system. Another area of discussion is whether it will be necessary to introduce borrower-oriented instruments in order to address in a more effective way misalignments in real estate markets. For all these issues, your analyses and new insights are, indeed, important. So, we have ahead of us a large amount of work and avenues for research. As regards the Conference programme, some of the topics I referred to will be discussed today and tomorrow, as well as the interaction with other policies.
At present a higher level of economic growth is thus required to change the level of unemployment compared to the average historical relationship since 1980. The time lag between GDP and unemployment also appears to have increased during the 2000s. Thus, it now takes longer before the full impact of a change in growth has an effect on unemployment in Sweden. What is different this time? Part of the explanation for unemployment not having risen as much as one might have expected given the historical relationship could be that not all of the economy has suffered. The main fall in employment has been in the manufacturing industry, while the services sector, which is more labour intensive, has fared better. Last year exports fell by a good 13 per cent, while retail sales, for instance, only slowed down slightly. This is probably because the Swedish export industry was hard hit by the large fall in world trade, while the large economic policy stimulation helped hold up consumption. Industrial production fell by around 25 per cent between the peak in November 2007 and the trough in May 2009. However, the fall in the production of services was just over 10 per cent between the peak in December 2007 and the trough in June 2009. In recent months production in both sectors has stabilised. This has also had an effect on employment, which fell much more in the manufacturing industry than in the services sector.

Chris Salmon: Financial market volatility and liquidity – a cautionary note Speech by Mr Chris Salmon, Executive Director for Markets of the Bank of England, at the National Asset-Liability Management Europe symposium, London, 13 March 2015. *  *  *  I would like to thank Andrew Butcher, Jonathan Rand, Allison Parent, Joseph Noss, Olga Cielinska, Liam Crowley-Reidy, Sebastian Vismara, Lu Liu and Yuliya Baranova for their comments and contributions. As Executive Director for Markets at the Bank of England it is my job to manage the balance sheet, implementing various policy decisions that the Bank makes. I am also responsible for ensuring that the Bank extracts as much “market intelligence” from financial market developments as is possible to inform those decisions. But it’s not my job to set policy. Given that, my remarks will focus on the key insights we have drawn from financial market developments over the past year or so, in the context of what has been quite a dynamic period for monetary policy. But I will not speculate on the future course of policy by the Bank of England or any other central bank, nor the likely effectiveness of the different strategies employed by central banks to achieve their targets. And my punch line will reveal me to be the central banker that I am: there are reasons to be cautious. In particular, recent periods of financial market volatility suggest that there are reasons to be cautious about the robustness of liquidity in core financial markets.
Big data has brought us tools and techniques that can be applied to rapidly process large sets of traditional data too. This makes it much easier for us to realise projects like MMSR and AnaCredit and helps us to keep pace with an ever-changing world. AnaCredit, for instance, involves immense sets of extremely granular data, reflecting the far greater complexity and interconnectedness of today’s economy. To understand this complexity and assess the interconnections, we need a very detailed view. And this is exactly what AnaCredit gives us. Thanks to the granular data it provides, we will be better able to understand what is driving credit growth, making it easier to know whether such growth is healthy or not. MMSR, on the other hand, is about speed: money markets move fast and never stop. So taking a snapshot every now and then does not suffice. We need much faster data, and that’s what MMSR provides. It allows us to constantly assess who lends how much money to whom in the money market and at what rates. This gives us a very clear and quick picture of how the market is structured, how exposed players are to one another and how vulnerable they are. And MMSR helps us to keep pace in other ways too. Look at the important role benchmark rates play. They provide anchors for contracts in financial markets and are important for the 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  transmission of monetary policy.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and wage growth Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the general assembly of the Employers’ Organisation NAVO, 11 June 2002. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 22 May and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Norway’s economic policy is based on the guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy. The guideline for fiscal policy states that the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget shall be equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund. This means that all the capital in the Fund is being utilised. Monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. Historically, periods of high inflation have always been followed by a downturn. Low and stable inflation therefore fosters stability in the economy. Establishing guidelines for economic policy is not new. Both fiscal and monetary policy have been subject to a rules-based framework throughout the post-war period, with the exception of the last half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Monetary policy has had a clear anchor since 1986. The phasing in of petroleum revenues in the central government budget shall be equivalent to the expected return on the Petroleum Fund. Most of the phasing in of petroleum revenues will take place over the next ten years.
In their model, banks fund illiquid assets with liabilities payable on demand and provide an important form of insurance for depositors. So long as the demand of depositors for currency withdrawals are relatively uncorrelated, the bank provides a safe place for housing one’s savings while earning a rate of return higher than that available to people simply by storing currency. However, coordination failure, such as an instance when everyone thinks that everyone else will withdraw their deposit today, can give rise to instability and lead to bank runs. That general theory has been extended in many ways. One of the lessons of that work is that deposit insurance (backed by the government’s money creation power) and discount window access can mitigate or even eliminate bank runs. So why did we experience a crisis in 2007, one in which we in the United States did not observe widespread instances of depositors lined up outside of their banks demanding currency?3 During the decades from 1933 to 2007, and especially since the rapid growth of the market intermediated financial system in the 1980s, the financial system in the United States has grown in complexity and in reliance on financial institutions that aren’t commercial banks. Those institutions intermediate corporate bond markets, money markets for short-term credit, stock markets in which firms can issue equity claims, and derivative markets. All of these markets rely on non-banks such as dealers, finance companies, insurers, and many other types of specialists.

Therefore, as I’ll explain later, forward-looking comprehensive supervision of the financial system is a key element in attempting to distinguish a healthy expansion of credit from a more dangerous and fragile buildup of debt. Recipes In what follows, I’ll outline recent findings on some of the possible mechanisms that can generate a modern financial crisis, one that is not characterized, like the U.S. banking crisis in 1931–33 by depositors demanding currency from their banks. In particular, I’ll focus on two strands of research that identify mechanisms that can amplify small initial disturbances in the economy to produce significant financial distress. My review is selective, as I don’t aim to cover all the possible factors that researchers have suggested can contribute to financial crises, but instead to focus on two topics that reveal some of the main mechanisms at play. The first mechanism is the procyclicality of financial intermediary leverage; banks and other financial intermediaries, notably broker-dealers, increased their leverage during the growth years of the 2000s, issuing increasing amounts of debt, but little equity. But as financial volatility increased in 2007, they began to deleverage, a process that produced stresses for many institutions and people throughout the economy, much like the distress caused by classic bank runs. The second mechanism I’ll review is the role played by the private sector in creating moneylike assets, such as repos, commercial paper, and other short-term and ostensibly safe assets.
Consumption needs to be less dependent on perceived wealth gains, and investment to be more diversified, well beyond the construction sector. This will make participation rates more sustained. For what concerns the Spanish financial sector, it has long been a source of strength and national pride for this country. In many respects, Spain can be a leading example for global financial reform. I will say more on this later in my talk. Spain’s financial system has proved resilient to the shock in the early stage of the crisis. Supported by prudent regulation and supervision, the banking system in this country has built dynamic provisioning cushions during good times. And the traditional role of banking, founded on long-term relationships with customers, has largely been preserved. Looking forward, this is an important asset. But a solid future calls for some areas of adjustment in the way the financial industry behaves. The exceptional support of public policies will, at some point, have to be withdrawn. Private sector confidence in the future will need to replace policy intervention as the main spur of growth. The Asociación de Mercados Financieros and its members are an important link in the chain through which confidence will build and transmit to your customers. The obvious prescription for a sustainable return to stability is for many of you to simply look back at your past of prudent and sound management.

To most people, $ million may sound like a lot, but given that $ trillion of financial contracts reference U.S. dollar LIBOR, it’s really a drop in the ocean.1 As a result, submissions are largely based on judgment, as opposed to real numbers. When the LIBOR scandal erupted, it became clear that there had been fraud and collusion, both within and across financial services firms, in the pursuit of profit. The reliance on expert judgment, rather than actual data, makes the rate too vulnerable to manipulation. It’s readily apparent to all those in the industry—both firms and regulators—that LIBOR is fundamentally broken. Consequently, banks are increasingly reluctant to provide LIBOR submissions, adding to the level of risk around using the rate. The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has reached an agreement with banks to keep submitting rates through the end of 2021, but in 2022 the existence of LIBOR will no longer be guaranteed. In other words, LIBOR’s survival is assured for only another 901 days. Those in the market know the full scale of the risks this creates for the financial system. LIBOR isn’t just the rate that banks use to borrow from one another—it’s also the underlying rate on numerous derivatives and loan contracts. The $ trillion figure I mentioned earlier is the approximate total exposure to U.S. dollar LIBOR. That’s about 10 times U.S. gross domestic product.
Chart 6: Banks’ net interest margins Per cent 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1996  2000  2004 UK  2008 Euro area  2012 US  Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Notes: Data is sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis as that provides a consistent long-run international comparison of net interest margins. The broad post-financial crisis trend for UK banks in this data is consistent with the series for UK banks’ net interest margins published in the Bank’s Inflation Report in August 2016 (Chart C, Page 10). 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Chart 7: Contribution of changing sectoral composition to UK-listed firms’ mark-ups Cumulative change in mark-up since 1987 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 1988  1992  1996  2000  2004  2008  2012  2016  Market share changes (sector)  Mark-up growth (sector)  Net entry (sector)  Total change  Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bank calculations. Chart 8: UK-listed firms’ mark-up distribution over time 90th percentile  70th percentile  50th percentile  30th percentile  Mark-up (e.g. 1.2 = 20%) 3  10th percentile  2.5  2  1.5  1  0.5  0 1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005  2008  2011  2014  2017  Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bank calculations.

1,2  Labour markets have been subject to big structural shifts over recent years, including the secular fall in the degree of worker unionisation in a number of industries (for example, Schnabel (2013)), the emergence of the so-called “gig economy” (for example, Taylor (2017) and Katz and Krueger (2017)) and secular rise in the degree of globalisation and automation in the workplace (for example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)). Each of these shifts has led to a change in employment patterns and tenures and in workers’ bargaining power. These structural shifts have been used to help explain the secular fall in labour’s share of national income and the recent weakness of wage growth across a number of advanced economies (for example, Dao et al 3  (2017) and Abdih and Danninger (2017)). They have also been used to justify potential shifts in the position and/or the slope of the Phillips curve (for example, Blanchard (2016) and Kuttner and Robinson (2010)). Each of these potentially has a bearing on the setting of monetary policy. Yet, over the same period, structural shifts in the product market have been no less profound. They include the emergence of highly-integrated global supply chains, increasing the degree of specialisation of product markets (Baldwin (2016)); the blossoming of companies benefitting from global network economies of scale and scope, who acquire “superstar” status (Autor et al (2017)); and the rapid emergence of e-commerce and price-comparison technology (Cavallo (2017)).
The major counterparts to the adjustment of the US current account balance have continued to be the surplus economies of eastern Asia and the oil-exporting  1  The cut-off date for data included in the December 2009 FSR was 27 November 2009. BIS Review 168/2009  1  countries. The current account surplus of Japan is projected to narrow to 1.9% of GDP in 2009, while China’s current account surplus is forecast to decline by 2 percentage points to 7.8% GDP in 2009, as robust domestic demand has underpinned imports growth which has exceeded that of exports. However, this ongoing adjustment of global imbalances is rather fragile, as it remains largely driven by cyclical factors related to the financial crisis rather than by structural factors. Looking ahead, there is a risk of re-emergence of sizeable global imbalances stemming from various sources, including a possible widening of the US current account deficit as the economy recovers and if the substantial fiscal stimulus persists. Turning to external risks stemming more directly from the US economy, there were some positive developments, but vulnerabilities also remain. The US housing market has shown some signs of stabilisation over recent months. Both home sales and housing construction appear to have bottomed out since earlier this year, while the decline in house prices ceased in July 2009. The Case-Shiller futures price index for ten major US cities now indicates that house prices are expected to remain broadly flat over the next three years (see Chart 1).

Euro area equity markets continue to recover from the severe decline experienced during the financial crisis, supported by market optimism about the economic recovery and diminishing risk aversion. Valuation measures based on price/earnings ratios using long-term trailing earnings figures suggest that the markets are not particularly overvalued (see Chart 9). Alternative valuation measures, based on expectations of future earnings, provide different signals. Moreover, risks for stock market prices remain, in particular those associated with an economic recovery that could turn out to be weaker than expected by markets. The euro area banking sector Let me now turn to euro area financial institutions, starting with the large and complex banking groups. Conditions in the euro area banking sector have improved markedly in the first three quarters of 2009, on account of better-than-expected macroeconomic news and the concomitant rebound in the financial markets. The euro area banking sector has also benefited from the various financial system support measures and the macroeconomic policy stimulus. The earnings and profitability of euro area major banks have recovered significantly, and across the board, in the first three quarters of 2009, after a dismal performance in the second half of 2008. Nevertheless, the dispersion of profitability across LCBGs continues to be wide (see the left side of Chart 10). The examination of individual revenue categories sheds more light on the factors explaining euro area LCBGs’ recent favourable performance (see the right side of Chart 10).