samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I said I would come back to Simple, Transparent and Comparable (STC) securitisation. Unfortunately, we have done our best to confuse people by using a bewildering range of acronyms and terms for this project – STC, SST, STS, qualifying, high quality etc. Today I  1  The case for a better functioning securitisation market in the European Union: a discussion paper, European Central Bank and Bank of England, May 2014. 2  Joint response from the Bank of England and the European Central Bank to the Consultation Document of the European Commission: ‘An EU framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation’, March 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  am using the STC term developed by the taskforce of global banking and securities regulators that I co-chair. But I can reassure you that these will be brought together into a single set of criteria in European legislation. I believe the intention is that they will then be applied consistently across different sectors – for example, banks, insurers and funds – and different regulations – for example capital and liquidity. I see the aims of the STC criteria as threefold. First, to help investors. An STC securitisation should meet the “What You See Is What You Get” principle. The structure should not have hidden traps or complications, allowing investors to focus on analysing the credit quality of the underlying assets. But, importantly, the STC criteria are not a credit opinion on those assets and STC will certainly not mean “risk free”. Second, to help issuers.

As outlined in the Financial Sector Master Plan, the strategies to achieve an adequate and effective consumer protection infrastructure involves: •  A comprehensive and structured consumer education programme;  •  Increased transparency by the financial institutions on the products and services being offered;  •  Legal redress for consumers to deal with grievances arising from the purchase of financial products and services;  •  Expansion in the role of the Banking Mediation Bureau to cover the full range of retail banking related consumer complaints and educating banking consumers of the ways in dealing with the available courses of action;  •  The implementation of Anti-Trust regulation to define the process by which abuses that are detrimental to consumers can be addressed; and finally  •  Establishing a deposit insurance fund to not only create incentives for prudent management by the banking institutions but also to assure protection to small depositors. The objective is to promote a more market oriented consumer protection framework. Ladies and Gentlemen, This new millennium brings with it new opportunities and challenges to both the financial institutions and to the consumers. As we advance forward we can expect an increasing array of choices open to consumers. In making financial decisions, consumers require information on a wide range of matters and details about the processes and documentation involved, the relevant fees and charges to be incurred and the risks and benefits of each type of product or service.
Only a highly professional and independent institution can successfully deal with the hart times, which are not rare here. The latest example of this is the COVID-19 pandemic, which although a struggle for human health and life, is also a struggle for policymakers to maintain macroeconomic stability and reduce the impact on the economy. Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to all current and former colleagues and collaborators, who with their contribution have contributed to what we are today – a modern central bank that operates in accordance with the latest and highest international standards and best international practices and stands out as a positive example in the central banking community. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Congratulations on the 29th anniversary of the monetary independence! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Explanation (3): Uncertain business case – “The Code is a useful guide to market conventions, but that doesn’t mean we need to sign up. The Code is really about the sell-side putting its house in order – the buy-side has nothing to apologise for. At best, the Code just reiterates what we already do; at worst, it’s more regulation in disguise.” This is for me the most important observation to address, and vital for securing the buy-in of CEOs and Boards. In putting together that case, I think there are five points worth stressing:  7  https://www.nex.com/insights/20180904-fx-code-changing-behaviour. 8  https://www.globalfxc.org/press/p181129a.htm 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7    First, the Code provides a simple and powerful ‘off the shelf’ way to educate and promulgate globally-recognised best practice amongst your FX trading and operations staff internally, complementing other tools and regulations;    Second, it sends a clear signal to your sell-side counterparties of the standards you expect them to uphold in their dealings with you, and your intention to hold them to account for those standards – strengthening market discipline and sending a clear collective message that the buy-side expects the highest standards of service for their customers;    Third, in demonstrating a commitment to best practice both by your own traders and from those you trade with externally, it gives your firm a competitive advantage in the market for investors and other customers.
–  And lastly, the Stability and Growth Pact disproves the assertion that the euro area has no automatic stabilisers in the event of asymmetric shocks to a Member State. Indeed, by urging governments to aim at a fiscal position "close to balance or in surplus" in the medium term, the Pact enables them to allow budget deficits to increase during periods of specific national difficulties without exceeding the 3% reference value. In short, it enables countries  BIS Review 96/2001  3  to create a fiscal buffer during periods of normal economic conditions. This buffer can be drawn on to counter economic divergences or asymmetric shocks during economic downturns. But of course, the extent to which Governments can let automatic stabilisers play strictly depends on the initial level of the fiscal balance; obviously countries which still have fiscal deficits have less room than countries with budgets close to balance or in surplus. II. The Euro itself is a catalyst for further progress  While many acknowledge that the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 was broadly successful, one may ask, at this juncture, what the conditions are for the full and ongoing success of the euro in the medium and long term. What is very encouraging in this respect is the fact that, in a number of areas, the euro in itself appears to be a catalyst for meeting these conditions. 1.

Jean-Claude Trichet: The Euro - a major structural reform of the European economy Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Banque de France, at the NIKKEI Euro Symposium, London, 5 November 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and an honour for me to be speaking here today, at the Nikkei Euro Symposium, in front of such a distinguished audience. I am particularly pleased to express my views on the euro and its prospects following the launch of the notes and coins, which will be a reality within 8 weeks The economic and financial ties between Europe and Japan have been strengthened significantly over the recent period : European investors and companies have stepped up their market presence in Japan these last two years ; likewise, Japanese foreign direct investments in the Euro area and Japanese portfolio investments in euro since January 1999 have highlighted the confidence in the European single currency. I would like to explain why the euro and Monetary Union have been successful from the outset, and the conditions and prospects for building on this achievement. I will then discuss the historical event of the introduction of banknotes and coins at the end of this year. I. The euro and Monetary union are based on a credible monetary policy, and contribute to an APPROPRIATE economic and monetary equilibrium in Europe  1.
Monetary policy is unable to affect the economy’s long-term output capacity, which we judge to grow at somewhere around 2-2.5 per cent a year. But stability in the government finances and credibility for the inflation target give low interest rates and a safe investment climate, which in turn lays the foundations for a good economic performance in the long term. What monetary policy in fact can do is to stabilise demand growth in the short run and avoid a stop-go situation like in the 1980s. Let me describe this in somewhat simplified terms. One of the variables with which the Riksbank works is the output gap, which is the difference between the economy’s actual output and potential output. The output gap reflects cyclical variations in the economy. •  A negative output gap means that demand for goods, services and the factors of production is low and there are plenty of spare resources in the economy. Increases in prices and wages are small and inflation is usually below target. •  A positive gap means that actual output – demand-driven – exceeds potential output, the resource situation is tight, demand for labour exceeds supply, wages are being pushed up and inflation is normally above target. So the output gap gives a picture of demand pressures in the economy, and demand pressures in turn influence inflation. Monetary policy is essentially about choosing an interest rate level that affects demand in such a way that the size of the gap becomes as small as possible.

With the perspective that the passage of time accords, history will acknowledge JeanClaude’s leadership and his ability to maintain the appropriate degree of flexibility needed to respond to the crisis. These qualities were key to ensuring that the ECB and the Eurosystem were up to the task, contributing decisively, through the discharge of the responsibilities legally entrusted to each, to maintaining financial stability across the euro area. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Net savings by UK companies currently stand at around 1% of GDP. That means, when we look at household disposable income per head, we find it has essentially flat-lined since 2009 (Chart 4). Even as GDP has recovered, household incomes have essentially stagnated. Even the notion of the “average household” needs careful interpretation. Looking at a different “average” – the household in the centre of the distribution or median – suggests this flat-lining in disposable incomes may have pre-dated the crisis (Chart 4). Half of all UK households have seen no material recovery in their real disposable incomes since around 2005. Or, put more evocatively and provocatively, the majority of UK households have faced a “lost decade” of income. Next let’s look at employment. The aggregate numbers here are hugely impressive, with 2½ million new jobs created since 2010. The UK unemployment rate has fallen like a stone, from 8.5% in 2011 to around 5% currently. And the news gets better. Chart 5 breaks down these new jobs into full-time, part-time and self-employment. It is clear that the lion’s share of the jobs’ increase over the past few years is accounted for by rises in full-time work. This has been not just a jobs-rich recovery, but a full-time, jobs-rich recovery. Yet the nature of work may matter every bit as much as headline jobs numbers. Work is about more than just the money; it adds to life satisfaction and self-esteem and lowers anxiety and  4  4  Bernanke (2011).

In our simple example, imagine people’s satisfaction has a logarithmic relationship with income, consistent with diminishing marginal utility. Then, we find that social welfare is almost 10% lower after than before the changes, even though GDP is 5% higher. When it comes to assessing how societies are doing, the distribution of gains and losses really matters. The role of the Bank of England is to serve the good of the UK people, as it has been since its inception in 1694. Monetary policy is very unlikely to be the most effective tool for changing the distribution of gains and losses across society – other macroeconomic tools are better placed. And, indeed, doing so would be inconsistent with the Bank’s monetary policy mandate. But policymakers, including central banks, do need to dive beneath the statistical surface to understand the economy region by region, city by city, town by town, sector by sector, household by household. Indeed, that is the very purpose of regional visits like this one. The economic jigsaw Before turning to the distribution of outcomes, let me start by looking at measures of economic health for the economy as a whole. When it comes to economy-wide measures of activity, economists typically look at metrics such as output (often measured by GDP), employment (such as the number of people in jobs) and wealth (financial, property etc). These are, essentially, different pieces of the same economic jigsaw. Chart 1 plots these three measures over the past decade.
In that event, real economy loans could be financed instead by more expensive sources of funding, reducing the efficiency with which commercial banks extend credit. This could lead to greater reliance on non-banks for credit provision as some borrowers find it cheaper to seek credit opportunities outside the banking system. I should emphasise that our work – and the scenario we use to illustrate these effects in the paper – does not at this stage suggest that the impact on lending rates and credit provision is more than modest. So this does not look headline making. But, there is a lot of uncertainty around how this could work out. We don’t know much about the likely demand for digital money, or about how it will be remunerated, all of which is important for determining these effects. The authorities may also wish to limit the speed and scale of any transition to digital money in the interests of greater assurance that there will be no threat to financial stability. Continuing with the provision of credit, greater reliance on longer-term stable funding by banks could reduce the likelihood of a sharp deterioration in bank credit conditions. However, banks will 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  also be vulnerable to a deterioration in sentiment in wholesale funding markets. As a result, lending rates could be more volatile overall for those borrowers unable to access other sources of financing.

There are two external advisors who serve on the committee, providing independent thoughts and perspectives. The committee meets every six weeks on a pre-announced schedule. The main responsibilities of MPC comprises of: •  setting the direction of the monetary policy with the objective of maintaining price stability,  •  examining and approving the monetary conditions and policy stance report, and,  •  overseeing the quarterly Inflation Report. Why did we adopt and implement inflation targeting as our new policy anchor? As the fixed exchange rate was abandoned after the crisis, it was then necessary to have a new nominal anchor. At first the Bank of Thailand used monetary aggregates as its policy target under the IMF program. The Bank targeted domestic money supply in order to ensure macroeconomic consistency in order to obtain price stability. However, as in many countries in recent years, using money supply as a target did not work well with the Thai economy as the relationship between monetary aggregates and output became increasingly unstable. This was due to changes in people's spending behavior and the popularity of new money-related innovations, such as credit cards and electronic cash cards. After studies and experimental implementation, the Bank of Thailand formally adopted the inflation-targeting regime starting from May 2000. The new nominal anchor allows the Bank of Thailand to set an explicit target of core inflation in order to stabilize price condition. Since its adoption, a target of core inflation had been set at a range of 0-3.5 percent and remains so.
But it also drives up volatility due to risk illusion. Because riskadjusted returns are constant, this must entail an increase in the probability of there being a severe negative shock, so the probability of a crash rises. Chart 2 shows a simulation of the model when for 100 periods with normally distributed shocks. The frictionless benchmark model generates the path shown by the maroon line. As specified, the path is mean reverting, with movements in the macro state around trend. Allowing for reputational effects generates the blue path, giving a threshold level of fundamentals shown by the green dashed line. As the macro state hits the threshold, banks adopt risky policies to signal high ability. In this simulation this happens four times, in periods 3, 50, 68 and 72. Consider the threshold breach in period 72. As during the Great Moderation, the good macro state at first persists. The credit boom fuels high fundamentals. But while headline fundamentals have improved, risk-adjusted fundamentals have not. Eventually, this results in a crunch in credit and a sharp deterioration in the macro state, as risk is realised. 10  In particular, the Sharpe ratio (the expected value of fundamentals relative to their standard deviation) is constant across both regimes. BIS Review 168/2010  7  Now suppose that financial liberalisation generates heightened competition between banks, in the model. increasing the market premium on reputation. This raises the value of Chart 3 shows the effects of the reputational weight being raised . The threshold for risky policies falls.

4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  1 These remarks are based on a whitepaper: Misconduct Risk, Culture, and Supervision. I thank Stephanie  Chaly, Jim Hennessy, and Jackie McCormack for help preparing these remarks. 2 Gavin Finch, “World’s Biggest Banks Fined $ Billion Since Financial Crisis,” Bloomberg (March 2, 2017). 3 Gallup, Confidence in Institutions, In Depth: Topics A to Z (June 1-5, 2016). 4 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73–66, 48. Stat. 162, Section 30. 5 The term “cultural capital” has been defined differently in other contexts—i.e., defined as those symbols, skills  and tastes a person acquires overtime from parents, institutions and surroundings that can be used as resources to achieve mobility in a stratified society. See Pierre Bourdieu “The Forms of Capital,” Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education (1986). 6 Gary Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (1964). 7 See Thomas Noe, “A Survey of the Economic Theory of Reputation: Its Logic and Limits,” The Oxford Handbook  of Corporate Reputation, Timothy Pollock and Michael Barnett, eds. (July 2012). See Rebecca Demsetz, Marc Saidenberg, and Philip Strahan, “Banks with Something to Lose: The Disciplinary Role of Franchise Value,” Economic Policy Review, 2 (October 1996) and Michael Keeley, “Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking,” American Economic Review, 80(5), 1183–1200. 8 See “Consolidated Supervision Framework for Large Financial Institutions,” Supervision and Regulation Letter  12–17, December 17, 2012.
The economic situation Growth in the Norwegian economy has been strong since summer 2003. The reduction in Norges Bank’s key rate through 2003 and into 2004 resulted in low interest rates. Low interest rates have contributed to a relatively sharp rise in household demand throughout this upturn. At the same time, solid growth globally has generated increased demand for many Norwegian export goods and thereby high prices. Fixed investment in the petroleum sector has increased strongly, resulting in growing demand for goods and services supplied by mainland enterprises. Mainland fixed investment has also picked up gradually. The mainland economy expanded by 3.7 per cent in 2005. Growth in private services, construction and electricity production was strong. So far, a substantial share of output growth has been attributable to strong growth in person-hours worked. The fall in sickness absence in 2004 provided an additional supply of labour to enterprises, but sickness absence increased through 2005. Wage developments reflect and influence business cycles. Strong employment growth in the 1990s resulted in a rise in labour costs, which in turn had a dampening impact on growth. Moderate wage growth in recent years is being accompanied by a strong cyclical upturn. The increase in the number of employed has been relatively moderate throughout the upturn. Employment has shown a smaller rise than in previous cyclical upturns in the 1980s and 1990s, but this is now changing. The labour market continues to tighten at a rapid pace.

Having grown steadily before the pandemic, our exports accelerated and increased sharply after the pandemic, reaching USD 126 billion in the first half of 2022, up nearly 20% year-on-year. This marks a historical high for our exports in the first six months of any year. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  We identify three main reasons for our record-breaking export performance despite the armed conflict between our major trading partners. First, we see that Türkiye has become a key trade hub thanks to its increased relative advantages in the reshaped global market after the pandemic. Second, we observe that our exporters have the capacity to adapt rapidly to changing conditions by covering diverse products and destinations thanks to their resilient and flexible structure. I would like to discuss this point with you in more detail. As you know, Turkey has a much stronger export structure compared to many similar, neighboring or regional economies. This is supported by the high share of manufacturing in exports and the diversity of the number of destinations and exported products. The destination and product diversity of our exports doubled in 2022 compared to 2006. Around 29% of the increase in our exports between 2015 and 2022 was generated by new markets. The flexible and dynamic structure of our exporters protects our economy against external shocks. Our companies' flexibility in introducing new products and finding new markets allows them to compensate for possible losses in adverse conditions, including the current armed conflict.