samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, recent work using the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations shows a decline in longer-run inflation expectations by nearly half a percentage point over the last six years, to about 2-1/4 percent.7 This decline reflects both the low CPI inflation of recent years and demographic shifts, where members of older cohorts with high expectations (I’m afraid to say) die off. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  If inflation continues to underrun target levels similar to the past six years, the downward trend in inflation expectations will likely continue. But there is still time to avert this fate—in this case, it’s fortunate that the young are impressionable. If inflation is sustained at target levels consistently, a further downward trend in expectations can be forestalled. But expectations depend on deeds, not just words, which brings me to the issue of accountability. One reason inflation targeting has been so successful at keeping inflation low and stable is that policymakers held themselves accountable for consistently delivering low inflation near the target. Finally, as well as holding ourselves accountable, policymakers need to be transparent and communicate their actions and the rationale behind them. Much has been made about whether central banks can credibly commit to future actions and outcomes, but the experience with inflation targeting gives me encouragement. Inflation-targeting central banks have proved beyond a doubt that they could bring inflation down and keep it low and stable. This was not a foregone conclusion, and initially there were doubts about whether inflation targeting would succeed.

As I peer into the future, the question is not so much what is wrong with inflation targeting, but rather what we need to preserve and, in fact, strengthen it. Any evolution of the current framework should involve doubling down on fundamental principles that have proven to be successful. What do I mean by that? There are three fundamental elements of inflation targeting that will be crucial as central banks work to prevent inflation from drifting too low: well-anchored inflation expectations, accountability, and transparency. Inflation Expectations, Accountability, and Transparency The most critical element is anchoring inflation expectations at the right level. For those of you who lived through the 1970s and 1980s, the specter of high inflation probably still looms large. But millennials and Generation Z have never faced the prospect of paying 15 percent on a mortgage. It’s often claimed that we don’t really understand what drives inflation expectations. But, in fact, researchers have made significant progress on this topic. Research using a number of approaches has found that the history of inflation plays a big role in inflation expectations. Now, this does not mean that expectations are a mechanical average of past inflation, like in traditional versions of adaptive expectations. Instead, the key finding of this research is that inflation expectations depend on the historical behavior of inflation as shaped by the conduct of monetary policy.
Miroslav Singer: The role of creditors and debtors in the world economy Speech by Mr Miroslav Singer, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the World Banking and Finance Summit 2012, Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), London, 26 June 2012. *  *  *  1. First, let me apologize for not being an eloquent academician addressing world matters. I am a humble central banker from a small central bank in a far away country which some people know very little about. So, I fear I am not going to be a great substitute for the announced speaker. I understand that his speech was to have focused on how awful, extraordinary, and incredible it is that without German willingness to sponsor the solution to the eurozone crisis there is a strong chance that the financial crisis the eurozone faces will deepen even further. Not even daring to mimic, I will just raise few points and issues. Since I doubt I can add value with an analysis of Pacific trade and financial flow patterns carried out from the remote distance of Prague, I will ignore the global dimension of the current problems and instead focus on Europe. At the end, I will try to make up for this shortcoming with questions on global issues for the other panelists to elaborate on. 2. Now, let me give you a few facts about the Czech Republic:  a. It is a net creditor country in terms of its financial sector. b.

In recent weeks, the yields on German sovereign debt have on a few occasions started to move together with the yields of the periphery...  g.  Let’s turn our attention from clear fiscal solutions to monetary solutions and other ideas. Currently a lot of plans are being motivated by the idea that a eurozone-wide political commitment to a long-term plan for a deeper integration project is going to stabilize the markets. I will neglect the fact that to many observers these plans look like better or worse masked commitments to significant future fiscal transfers within the eurozone and that the markets are rather skeptical about Europe’s long-term projects. After all, the eurozone was one such project. In addition, the route to even the earliest targeted dates – in the second half of this decade – takes in one or more elections in most of the countries in question. Perhaps the markets would appreciate  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  a nearer-term plan, one that signals, for example, that political players are willing to shift the voting powers on some pan-European solutions to bigger economies with larger stakes and more resources to spend in absolute terms. h.  Let’s go back to Philip Coggan’s observation that a “majority in failure” breaks financial systems based on the interests of savers. There are seven clearly conservative creditor countries in the eurozone: Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Slovakia, Austria, and Luxembourg. Seven is some way short of a majority in a group of 17.
7  See Christine Lagarde, Economic Inclusion and Financial Integrity, Address to the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism, May 27, 2014, (“Trust is the lifeblood of the modern business economy. . . . To restore trust, we need a shift toward greater integrity and accountability. We need a stronger and systematic ethical dimension.”); Mark Carney, Rebuilding Trust in Global Banking, Speech at 7th Annual Thomas d’Aquino Lecture on Leadership, Ontario, February 25, 2013, (“The real economy relies on the financial system. And the financial system depends on trust. Indeed, trust is imbedded in the language of finance. The word credit is derived from the Latin, credere, which means ‘to have trust in.’”); Dudley, supra n. 1 (“Unless the financial i See generally Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust 15–17, 23–24, and 43–47 (2002) (distinguishing trust from trustworthiness).ndustry can rebuild the public trust, it cannot effectively perform its essential functions. For this reason alone, the industry must do much better.”). 8  See generally Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust 15–17, 23–24, and 43–47 (2002) (distinguishing trust from trustworthiness). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  untrustworthy or disloyal, will they choose to work in that firm? And, if they do, how will they behave toward the firm and its stakeholders? I am encouraged that the industry seems to understand the importance of reforming its culture. Consider for a moment the following data points.

Capital and liquidity requirements, and the enhanced testing surrounding them, have made banks and the financial system more resilient to stress. But those new laws, regulations, and standards have done little to curb banker misconduct. Each post-Crisis episode demonstrates a narrow cultural focus on short-term gain and disregard of broader social consequences. Last year the New York Fed challenged the industry to consider many factors that have contributed to recent, widespread misconduct. There are no simple answers and that discussion is continuing. This year, by contrast, our focus has been more on solutions-what’s working, and what is not. In both years, we have offered three messages to the industry. First, cultural problems are the industry’s responsibility to solve. The official sector can monitor progress and deliver feedback and recommendations. In fact, many individual supervisory findings are often symptoms of deeper cultural issues at a firm. But the banks themselves must actively reform and manage their cultures. Second, a bank’s implicit norms-especially those reinforced through incentives-must align with the public purpose of banking. Gerald Corrigan, more than three decades ago, presented a theory of banking based on the principle of reciprocity.6 Banks receive operating benefits unavailable to other industries because they provide important services to the public. For example, financial intermediation is enhanced through deposit insurance and access to the discount window. Public benefits, though, are not a gift. They are part of a quid pro quo.
Caleb M Fundanga: Corporate social responsibility in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Launch of the Mukuyu Tree (Slave Tree), Kabwe, 23 December 2006. *  *  *  • The Provincial Minister of Central Province • Hon. Sydney Chisanga, MP • Hon. Rev. Gladys Nyirongo, MP, Minister of Lands • Hon. Kakusa, MP • Your Worship, the Mayor of Kabwe, Mr Richard Yumbe • The Deputy Mayor of Kabwe, Mr Edward Phiri • The Town Clerk, Mrs Vivian Chikoti • Distinguished Invited Guests • Ladies and Gentlemen A very good afternoon to you all. It gives me immense pleasure to be here this afternoon in the town of Kabwe, which also happens to be the place in which I spent my childhood. As you are aware, we are here to celebrate the occasion of the lighting of the legendary MUKUYU TREE, popularly known as the Slave Tree. For many of you Kabwe residents present here, especially our senior citizens, this tree rekindles many happy memories of joyous occasions such as Christmas, Independence Day and Labour Day, when the TREE would shine brightly after being adorned with beautiful multi-fluorescent lights for all to admire. The MUKUYU TREE is one of Zambia’s national monuments. Its history spans more than a century of being part of the lives of the community in this area. Ladies and Gentlemen, This historic monument invokes memories of a sad but important aspect in our beautiful country’s history.

Svein Gjedrem: Globalisation and monetary policy Welcome address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norges Bank Conference on Monetary Policy “Jarle Bergo Colloquium: Globalisation and Monetary Policy”, Oslo, 7 March 2008. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to welcome you all to Norges Bank’s conference on monetary policy. The bi-annual conference on evaluation and assessment of monetary policy is a tradition at Norges Bank. This year the conference is being held in honour of my dear friend and colleague, Jarle Bergo, who is approaching the end of his twelve-year term as Deputy Governor of Norges Bank. He is now resigning office to take the position of Alternate Executive Director of the Nordic-Baltic Constituency at the IMF. Jarle Bergo started his career as an economist in Norges Bank in the late sixties. Over the years he has made crucial contributions both to the work of the Bank and to its organisation. I am sure that I speak for all of us who have had the pleasure of working closely with him when I say that he has also made a vital contribution to the atmosphere in the Bank through his pleasant manner and good humour. We have titled this conference “Jarle Bergo colloquium: Globalisation and Monetary Policy”. Both globalisation and monetary policy are themes wide enough to fill up numerous conferences by themselves, and only a few questions will be addressed here today.
The current low interest rate environment and the mildly expansionary fiscal stance on aggregate in the euro area provide a good opportunity for governments to minimise the short-run costs of labour market reforms. Finally, there are reforms in other areas of the economy that can compensate for some of short-term loss in disposable income that households might suffer in bad times[23]. Indeed, having the right sequence is a point often made: if you have to implement product and service market reforms as well as labour market reforms, then hold back with the latter[24]. The underlying reason is partly that the short-term negative macroeconomic effects are much greater when a liberalisation of, say, employment protection leads to a spike in unemployment than when product market reforms decrease excessive rents margins, to the immediate benefit of consumers. Another argument made is that product market reforms should be prioritised since they boost output regardless of the overall economic situation, and because they do not weigh on public finances. Why then have we seen exactly the opposite sequence in the euro area countries that have gone through significant reform in recent years, that is, labour market reforms before product and service market reforms? It’s because, unlike in the labour market, where a few changes can often produce major results, product and service market reforms are in practice made up of a huge array of small reforms.

A DSGE Model-Based Analysis of the Short-Term Effects of Structural Reforms in Labour and Product Markets”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 948, OECD Publishing. This study provides useful insights into the shortterm effects on structural reforms. [22]  See Vansteenkiste, I. (2016), “Did the Crisis Permanently Scar the Portuguese Labour Market? : Evidence from a Markov-Switching Beveridge Curve Analysis”, forthcoming. [23]  See OECD (2016) “Going for growth”. Chapter 2 of the report gives a good overview of the literature on reform priorities in a difficult macro context. [24]  See IMF (2016a), op. cit. [25]  A good example of the depth and detail of the Greek reform programme is given in “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece Fourth Review – April 2014”, European Commission Occasional Papers, 192, April 2014. [26]  See Monteagudo et al. : “The economic impact of the Services Directive: A first assessment following implementation, European Commission Economic Papers 456”, June 2012. [27]  According to European Commission AMECO database. The latest observation is 2013. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  [28]  See IMF (2016b), "Euro Area: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2016 Article IV Mission", 16 June, and Banerji, A. et al. (2015), "Building a Better Union: Incentivizing Structural Reform in the Euro Area", IMF Working Paper, WP/15/201, September. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Judging the performance of monetary policy isn’t an exact science but we can, over time, distinguish what works from what doesn’t. Things are rather different for macro-prudential policy. Financial stability is harder to define – there’s no monthly “FSI”. And while we know all too well what financial instability looks like, and what its costs can be, it’s more difficult to demonstrate a reduction in that risk, simply because serious problems in the financial system aren’t that common to begin with. 11  By that I do not mean we necessarily need better oversight of policy. We would all have a sense, I think, of the virtue of the separation of powers as a check on their possible abuse. “In the subordinate distribution of power…the aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other”, is how James Madison put it. That’s not the issue here: a second committee wasn’t created so it could keep an eye on the first and there are plenty of robust mechanisms – our public communications and press conferences and, more formally, the direct accountability to (and regular interrogations by) parliament – that already hold the various parts of the central bank to public account.

Chart 7: Canadian and Australian banks better  Chart 8: Real short-term interest rates were  capitalised than UK’s in 2005  generally lower in Canada and Australia Per cent 7 Australia  6  Canada  5  UK  4 3 2 1 0 -1 Sources: Bush, Guimaraes and Stremmel (2015). Tangible common equity as a share of total unweighted assets. 2005 and 2006 average. 10  1998  2000  2002  2004  Sources: Thompson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. See also Ferrero et al. (forthcoming). 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  II: Some simple mitigants If this is right then the gains from formal co-ordination might not be that significant. Even a single, “joined-up” committee would generally find itself reaching for macro-prudential tools to control financial risk and using interest rates to moderate cyclical swings in demand and inflation. Shortly, in the next section, I’ll offer a more positive reason to keep some distance between the two policies. Before that, I should point out that, even in instances where there may be gains from policy co-ordination, there are things you can do within the existing framework. One involves the appropriate choice of secondary objectives. As I’ve tried to explain, the case for cooperation is stronger the more severe and frequent any conflicts between the respective objectives. There’s a very general result that puts the same point the other way around: if you give the two committees exactly the same objectives there is no co-ordination problem.
Instead, policymakers would need to meet periodically to make difficult judgments faced with enormous uncertainty. I should touch on, although I do not have time to elaborate tonight, on three consequences of such an approach. First, this would be a data intensive endeavour. The macroprudential authority would probably need information on sectors to which the banking system was exposed going beyond anything that has been collected to date, particularly in the non-bank financial sector. Whether that renders this kind of approach overly ambitious is part of what we should all debate. Second, in a regime involving judgments, the macroprudential authorities would need to explain publicly the basis of their decisions and how they related to their mandate and specified objectives. Moreover, as in the monetary policy sphere, transparency might enhance the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments. That is because over time banks (and other lenders) would develop an appreciation of the circumstances in which the macroprudential toolkit might be deployed, requiring them to hold more capital or liquidity against a build-up of exposures. Third, the macroprudential authorities would need a deep and broad understanding of the financial system. While the big picture story of the current crisis is clear ex post, recognising it in advance would have required, amongst other things, looking under the bonnet of the structured finance industry and elsewhere to see the obscure way in which leverage and liquidity mismatches were accumulating. That would have helped an understanding of the expansion of bank balance sheets.

Eric S Rosengren: Considering the routes to a policy destination Speech by Mr Eric S Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, 5 May 2010. Accompanying figures to this speech can be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s website. *  *  *  I am happy to be with you this evening. I appreciate your warm welcome, and your invitation to join the long and distinguished line of individuals who have addressed the Money Marketeers over the decades. 1 I have always taken some delight in Yogi Berra quotes. As a Red Sox fan, I could always hope that garbled metaphors by the legendary Yogi would be as confusing to the players as they were to the public, which might translate into opportunities when the Red Sox came to New York. Alas, in the early going this season it is not the Yankees that seem confused. Yogi Berra was not only a great catcher and manager, but also an astute observer of the obvious.
Traditionally, Spain’s trade balance with our European partners has run a deficit. Two years ago, this deficit had already fallen to € billion, but the good news is that at the end of last year it ran a surplus of a similar amount, meaning that, last year alone, there was a favourable turnaround of € billion in terms of Spain’s trade balance with the countries of the Union. At a greater level of detail we can see how the non-energy goods balance improved from a deficit of € billion, i.e. 5% of GDP, in 2008 to a deficit of only € billion, i.e. 0.5% of GDP, at end-2011. And the balance of non-tourist services, which has traditionally run a deficit, moved into a surplus of € billion at end-2011 after posting a deficit of € billion in 2008. A further example of the progress made during these difficult years has been the restructuring of our credit institutions. The Lehman Brothers crisis forced many countries to adopt numerous measures during 2009 to repair their banking systems. As is known, in Spain’s case the direct effect of the international financial crisis – the sudden emergence of toxic assets on bank balance sheets – was minimal, thanks to the soundness of our regulation and supervision and to our banks’ business model. But the indirect effects of the international crisis, such as the decline in GDP and the drying up of bank funding, seriously affected our system.

It was also thought to be counterproductive, because of crowding out concerns in the presence of tight liquidity conditions in domestic financial markets and because of negative feed-back loops through higher risk premia. As a result, our fiscal policy is now locked on a consolidation path, aiming to bring the public debt below 60% of GDP within the end of this decade. This means the monetary policy remains the only countercyclical tool to stimulate economic activity. Taking everything into account, I believe fiscal consolidation, coupled to an expansionary monetary policy, delivers the correct policy mix in the country. However, given our experience so far, I would like to conclude my speech on three observations: –  First, monetary policy remains effective even in the presence of fiscal consolidation. In Albania, we have been able to steer interest rates into a downward trajectory and to stimulate credit growth in the domestic currency. However, the effectiveness of monetary policy is hampered by fiscal contraction. While the two policies moving in opposite directions would not be ideal in the best of times, it is doubly so in the presence of balance sheet adjustment in the private sector and heightened risk premia and deleveraging in the financial sector. –  Second, monetary policy can still achieve its goal of price stability in the presence of fiscal consolidation. However, this statement needs to be qualified further. On a longer term perspective, inflation remains a monetary phenomenon.