samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Resolution of banking crises: The good, the bad, and the ugly. IMF Working Paper No. 10-146. International Monetary Fund. Lagarde, C. (2017). Central Banking and Fintech—A Brave New World? Speech given at Bank of England conference, London, 29 September. Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1992). The impact of institutional trading on stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 23-43. Lallour, A., & Mio, H. (2016). Do we need a stable funding ratio? Banks’ funding in the global financial crisis. Bank of England Staff Working Paper, No. 602. 59  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  59  Levine, R., Loayza, N., & Beck, T. (2000). Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes. Journal of Monetary Economics, 46(1), 31-77. Lorenzoni, G. (2008). Inefficient credit booms. The Review of Economic Studies, 75(3), 809-833. Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010). Final Report. Assessing the macroeconomic impact of the transition to stronger capital and liquidity requirements. December 2010. Malmendier, U., & Nagel, S. (2011). Depression babies: do macroeconomic experiences affect risk taking? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1), 373-416. Mariathasan, M., & Merrouche, O. (2014). The manipulation of Basel risk-weights. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 23(3), 300-321. Markowitz, H. (1952). Portfolio Selection. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 7(1), 77-91. Masera, R. (2014). CRR/CRD IV: the trees and the forest. PSL Quarterly Review, vol. 67 n. 271, 381-422. Mian, A., & Sufi, A. (2010). The great recession: Lessons from microeconomic data. The American Economic Review, 100(2), 51-56. Miles, D., Yang, J., & Marcheggiano, G. (2013). Optimal bank capital.

Dimitar Radev: Bulgaria in the eurozone – what is next for the business Speech by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the conference "Bulgaria in the eurozone – what is next for the business", organised by the American Chamber of Commerce in Bulgaria (AmCham), Sofia, 5 April 2023. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for the invitation. It is a real pleasure for me to be here at this Conference. Over the last few months, I have had the opportunity to attend several similar events. My personal impression is that the business is becoming more and more actively involved in Bulgaria's accession to the euro area and this is a very positive trend. I am going to dwell on three issues, trying not to repeat what Mr. Mihailov and Mr. Metodiev have said, which by the way I totally agree with. The three questions associated with the process of Bulgaria's accession to the euro area that I will focus on are: what is the starting position; what comes next; and what are the conditions needed for this process to finish successfully. Starting position Before we go into discussion on the next steps, we have to be very clear about what our starting position is.
Looking ahead, one of the benefits of this transparent process is that it has set the tone for discussions between banks and supervisors as industry practices evolve going forward. We have also greatly benefited from the dialogue we have maintained with our supervisory colleagues outside of the Basel Committee. I believe that it is in many countries’ best interest to adopt the new Framework when they are ready, so it is critical that supervisors in these countries be part of the Basel II conversations. The Basel Committee has established several mechanisms for heightened dialogue with our fellow supervisors, and we are fully committed to further enhancing this dialogue. Principles versus rules A third lesson I have learned is that it is important to strike the right balance between principles and rules. Of course, we want to ensure that banks apply principles in the same manner and that supervisors interpret them in the same way even in different jurisdictions. 4  BIS Review 46/2006  But while the temptation is to do this through ever more detailed rules, I am reminded of the words of the famous Surrealist painter Salvador Dalí, who said: “Have no fear of perfection—you’ll never reach it.” We have learned from the Basel II process that adding detail to the rules does not guarantee a level playing field or equal application. The marginal utility of adding detail falls rapidly as you move ahead in a process such as Basel II, so we need more than detail and prescriptiveness.

Therefore, while the focus of my comments will be on the current situation and looking forward to the future, I hope you will allow me also to reflect on some of the things I have learned over the past years. In the first part of my intervention today, I will discuss the current state of the new framework for bank capital adequacy, or Basel II, as well as how supervisors are carrying out work related to Basel II and sound risk management practices. Second, I would like to discuss some of the key lessons that I’ve learned in the development of Basel II, which are factors that I believe will contribute not only to its successful implementation and longevity, but also more generally to financial stability and effective banking supervision. And I will close with some more detailed comments on a lesson we have learned during this process that I think has broader implications for risk management in general – that is, the importance of taking account of the macroeconomic perspective and the effects of the cycle. Basel II update One of Barcelona’s greatest claims to fame is its modernista architecture, exemplified by the work of Antoni Gaudí. The modernistas looked to the past for inspiration, but applied modern tools and techniques to create something new with a focus on intricate details. Of course, the Basel II Framework does not have the beauty of Gaudí’s Sagrada Família, but I nevertheless think that both supervisors and the industry have accomplished something similar.
The Riksbank balance sheet, 2006 and 2017 20  20 Other  Other Equity  16  16  Government bonds  12  12 Bank reserves Gold  8  8  Lending to banks  Gold  Other  Other Equity  4  Coins and notes FX Reserve  4  Coins and notes  FX Reserve  FX Debt  FX Debt  0  Assets  Liabilities  Assets  2006  Liabilities  0  2017  Note. Per cent of GDP Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 2. Central bank balance sheets before the financial crisis  Note. Per cent of GDP. Refers to 2006. The breakdown into asset and liability classes should be seen as indicative Sources: Respective central bank and national statistics sources  12 [16]  Figure 3. Central bank balance sheet totals, 2006 and 2017 140  140 2006  120  2017  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  20  20  0  RB  Fed  ECB  SNB  0  Note. Per cent of GDP Sources: Respective central bank and national statistics sources  Figure 4.

Scenario analysis can be an important and useful tool in the hands of financial institutions and their supervisors to guide such necessary 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  effort. Thanks a lot for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
The banks will also be forced to improve their liquidity through longer and more stable borrowing. The European Union has established a new authority, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and three new supervisory authorities, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The ESRB has the task of preventing crises in the financial system. Its work aims to identify risks to the stability of the financial system and, when necessary, to issue warnings or recommendations.6 One important element in the  4  The G20 (eng. Group of Twenty) is a group of nineteen major economies and the Europeiska unionen. Sverige is not included in the G20, but participates indirectly in the group’s work through its membership of the EU. 5  Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system. FSB was established in 2009 and replaced the Financial Stability Forum. The board includes all countries in the G20, including the EU, and Hong Kong, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and a number of international organizations and groups. 6  The General Board of the ESRB consists of the central bank governors and the heads of the supervisory authorities in the European Union. The Riksbank participates actively in the ESRB’s work. The Governor of the Riksbank, Stefan Ingves, has been appointed chairman in one of the two advisory bodies in the ESRB, the Advisory Technical Committee.

Finally, in the spring of 2009, we agreed to ask the Swedish National Debt Office to temporarily borrow a further SEK 100 billion in foreign currency, thereby reinforcing the foreign currency reserve to about SEK 300 billion. Including the agreements with the Fed and the ECB, the foreign currency reserve thus amounted to about SEK 600 billion in the autumn of 2009. Now it has decreased to about SEK 300 billion again and, according to an earlier decision, part of this is temporary.14 I was one of those who considered that the Riksbank’s own foreign currency reserve should be greater than SEK 300 billion, and this is an opinion that I still hold. My reason is that the Swedish banking system is still highly dependent on market funding in foreign currency. If the fiscal problems in Greece lead to the writing off of the Greek national debt, this may lead to renewed difficulties for the Swedish banks in obtaining funding in foreign currency. One alternative to retaining a good-sized currency reserve in the Riksbank would be for the banks to reduce their dependence on market funding in foreign currency. As I mentioned earlier, greater demands will be made on the banks’ liquidity through the Basel regulations. But they say nothing about requirements for preparedness regarding liquidity in foreign currency, something which is particularly important for us in Sweden. Imposing charges on  13  The agreement with the ECB is conditional to approval from the ECB in every single case.
In terms of transparency of letting people see what banks are doing with their deposits or their investment, or generally what banks are doing to the country even if they have no money in the bank, because this may well be important to them, we are having some difficulties since the old law was drafted with secrecy sort of more predominantly in mind than other features. In the new law, we will have no real difficulties but we are still trying to go through the exercise of finding some enabling clause in the present laws to allow us to enforce the banks to announce their NPL, related lending, fines and penalties at the end of every month, and also to announce it ourselves for better impact. This will take some time because the lawyers in the central bank and those from outside helping us with various operations at the moment differ over our ability to do this. But we intend to do it as soon as we can rather than later. In the general area of governance, things are also moving. The electronic commerce law and the electronic signature law have just passed the Cabinet. Whether it will pass Parliament in its last year of its life depends on whether the Government wishes to rush a lot of legislation through or whether it will delay them for fear of losing the election. I am inclined to think that it will be the former, as the Government does need more positive results to enhance its electability.

This matters, not for issues of inclusivity or political correctness, but because common, mutually agreed standards are key to facilitating capital flows internationally. And more efficient allocation of capital internationally is vital for the developed and developing countries alike. But we have to recognise, at once, that committees composed of 150 members from every country in the United Nations are unlikely to be effective. To be effective, the standard-setting groups will need to remain relatively small, albeit differently balanced. So we must find methods, in addition to adjusting Committee memberships, which allow us to secure the benefit of the experience of others from different backgrounds. To get this benefit we must create the right sort of opportunities for dialogue, and ensure there is sufficient capacity amongst emerging market countries to propose constructive solutions. Of course Singapore, as a major financial centre, is probably in a position to share skills with others rather than require assistance. Nonetheless, the point remains that emerging markets themselves need to formulate their opinions effectively and to be listened to by the key committees. Formulating an opinion requires both technical skills and organisation. The UK has been active in strengthening the regulatory skill set in Emerging Markets. As a major contributor to the Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening (FIRST) initiative – a $ multi-donor capacity building programme for financial sectors in developing countries – we believe that resources must be both forthcoming and targeted appropriately.
But this does not prevent us from exchanging information on issues relevant to monetary policy and its target fulfilment with, for instance the Riksdag Committee on Finance and the Ministry of Finance. This could, for example, involve how we view resource utilisation in Sweden and abroad. How savings and consumption develop and why. Which shocks to the macroeconomy are permanent or temporary, or how the effects of major shocks to the economy should be analysed, such as during the pandemic. The policy rate should be the main tool of monetary policy and asset purchases should be made with caution. Such purchases are particularly effective to counteract financial crises. Asset purchases in the form of government bonds may be justified in time when monetary policy needs to become more expansionary, but the threshold for extensive bond purchases to safeguard the inflation target should be high. Asset purchases can have negative side effects, which should be closely monitored. For example, markets may start to perform less well or private actors whose securities are bought by the central bank may become accustomed to the fact that there is always some form of government support when making bad deals. Moreover, the economic consequences of large asset purchases are still unclear. We therefore need more analysis and knowledge of the effects. Having said that, I would still like to emphasise that asset purchases should remain part of our toolbox. High inflation It cannot have escaped anyone's attention that inflation is currently very high.

In that light, it is worth assessing the likely forces acting on inflation in the period ahead and possible alternative inflation scenarios, both to the upside and downside, around the central path. In a  highly-uncertain environment, where robust policy may call for avoiding tail outcomes rather than optimising around a central path, this scenario-based or risk-management approach seems particularly valuable. 2 I begin by discussing the powerful disinflationary forces at work over the past several decades at the global level. There is a reasonable chance these trends could persist, and indeed be amplified by the Covid crisis, posing downside inflation risks. In the following section, I then consider whether those disinflationary forces could abate, or even reverse, in the period ahead. If so, this would generate an upside inflationary scenario. Given high degrees of uncertainty, it would be spuriously precise to assign probabilities to either scenario. But given the width of the MPC’s fan charts both are clearly plausible paths, sufficiently so to weigh in monetary policymakers’ risk-management considerations when setting policy, now and looking forward. Friedrich von Hayek once referred to inflation control as akin to trying to catch a tiger by its tail. 3 That metaphor seems apt today. For many years, the inflationary tiger slept. The combined effects of  unprecedentedly large shocks, and unprecedentedly high degrees of policy support, have stirred it from its slumber. In this environment, the tiger-taming act facing central banks is a difficult and dangerous one.
Or as Joseph Schumpeter put it in 1934: “He (the banker) stands between those who wish to form new combinations and the possessors of productive means… He is the ephor (the overseer) of the exchange economy.”10 In fact, all the elements that have been identified in the finance and economics literature as the key functions of the financial sector are eventually directed towards the support of the real economy:   providing information about investment projects and allocating capital;    monitoring investments and exerting corporate governance after providing finance;    facilitating trading, diversification and management of risk;    and mobilizing and pooling savings.11  In providing these services, the financial industry plays its role to contribute to sustainable economic growth. I would argue that, during the recent years, the financial sector has lost focus in playing this role. In a period characterized   by search-for-yield with inadequate risk assessment and pricing,    by weak underwriting standards,    by inadequate risk management practices,    by fragile short-term funding of long-term assets,    by a proliferation of opaque financial products,    and by excessive leverage,  the financial sector has become to some extent self-referential. Rather than helping with a proper diversification and management of risk, the financial sector itself created a huge tail risk for the rest of the economy.

Detailed recommendations on the regulatory treatment of shadow banking are expected to be prepared only by 2012. In the EU, work on shadow banking, however is at a relatively early stage, currently focussing on a stocktaking of existing regulations and conducting a data sharing exercise. Finally, let me also mention that the development of effective bank resolution regimes, which has been on the top of the global and EU regulatory agendas, is also a key element of a successful policy response to the recent crisis. There is now a broad consensus that all distressed institutions, particularly systemic ones, should be dealt with by authorities in a way which safeguards the stability of the financial system as a whole and minimises public costs and economic disruption. In the US several banks were allowed to fail in an orderly manner in the recent years, which could provide an example for other countries as well concerning the set-up of an efficient resolution regime in a national context. However, it has to be acknowledged that most of these banks in the US were rather small compared to average European bank sizes and they were almost exclusively national based with no or very little cross-border operation. Therefore, substantial challenges remain for authorities around the globe to establish effective cross-border resolutions schemes, in particular for global systematically important banks.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Recent initiatives to promote financial inclusion Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 2006 Graduation Ceremony of the Malaysian Insurance Institute, Kuala Lumpur, 19 August 2006. *  *  *  Members of the Board of the Malaysian Insurance Institute, Faculty Members, Distinguished Guests, Graduating Students, Ladies and Gentlemen. Assalamualaikum dan salam sejahtera, Saya berasa amat berbangga dan berbesar hati kerana dapat turut serta meraikan kejayaan yang dicapai oleh para graduan MII pada hari ini. Majlis ini menandakan usaha berterusan industri insurans, khususnya MII, untuk meningkatkan tahap profesionalisme kakitangan industri insurans melalui pendidikan berterusan, serta kesungguhan industri insurans untuk sentiasa mempertingkatkan tahap perkhidmatan bagi menjana perkembangan industri. Tahniah dan syabas saya ucapkan kepada saudara dan saudari. Ladies and Gentlemen, Today, we recognise the achievement of yet another group of graduands of the MII. Let me again congratulate all the 642 individuals who have successfully completed their programmes, among whom are 276 who will receive the Masters in Business Administration, Associateship and Post-Graduate Diploma qualifications while 26 will receive the certification as Chartered Financial Consultants. There are also 340 individuals who will receive their undergraduate diplomas and certificates in various insurance-related fields. I am particularly pleased to welcome the graduands from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Thailand and Vietnam. The increasing participation of candidates from abroad is a welcome development as it adds an international dimension to the MII's programmes by promoting an exchange of cross-border experiences and expertise shared in the programmes.

The MOU implicitly recognises the inter-relationship between monetary and broader financial stability, which is fundamentally important: just as we could not hope to deliver monetary stability if the financial system was crashing around our ears, so, too, monetary stability is a very necessary though in itself still insufficient - condition for stability of the financial system. Specifically the MOU recognises the Bank’s role - as the bankers’ bank - at the heart of the payments system; and it recognises our capacity, in exceptional situations and subject to override by the Chancellor, to act as lender of last resort in order to limit systemic damage. The MOU acknowledges more broadly the Bank’s oversight role which enables us to advise on the financial stability implications of 1  BIS Review 49/2000  developments in domestic and international markets and payments systems; and it acknowledges finally also our role in promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial sector, with particular regard to international competitiveness, but which can also contribute to the robustness of the financial system.