samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Today, central banks are facing a triple challenge from: i) a rapidly changing economic backdrop that has transformed the nature of the underlying policy challenge; ii) shifting conceptual frameworks needed to guide policy; and iii) emerging institutional pressure points on policy mandates and central bank independence. In other words, what needs to be done has changed, how to do it has become unclear, and why it should be done is subject to greater scrutiny. For central banks tasked with maintainingeconomic and financial stability, it is as if the ground is literally shifting beneath our feet. Hence the theme of the conference today: "Central Banking Amidst Shifting Ground". We are exceptionally fortunate to have such a distinguished list of speakers and panelists with us to share their insights and experiences on these issues. To set the stage, let me elaborate on the three key fault lines that central banks will have to navigate at this critical juncture. A rapidly changing economic backdrop The first fault line, reflecting the rapidly changing economic backdrop, is palpable. Inflation has returned with a vengeance, catching everyone by surprise. The strong post-pandemic rebound in global aggregate demand combined with a large rotation of that demand from services to goods put huge pressure on global supply chains, which was unable to respond. This was compounded by a surge in commodity prices in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. Supply constraints have clearly taken prominence, and their impact may well extend beyond the immediate horizon.

Agreements signed in 2023 – affecting around 1.5 million workers – provide for an average wage rise of 4.3%. 2  See the results of the Banco de España Business Activity Survey. 3  Indeed, while Eurosystem financing amounted to 10% of Spanish banks’ consolidated liabilities in 2020-2021 (3% in 2007), that figure fell by nearly 5 pp in 2022. 3  an increase in deposits.4 However, these fell in 2023 Q1 by nearly 2.5%, especially among firms.5 In 2022, the average interest expense on bank liabilities increased by nearly 60 bp compared with the 2020-2021 average, to stand at 1.1%, still slightly below pre-pandemic levels. This change highlights the fact that the rise in the 12-month EURIBOR has only partially passed through to deposit costs, far less than in previous monetary tightening cycles.6 Banks’ comfortable liquidity position helps to explain this. Similarly, the fall in the cost of equity – by 2 pp between December 2021 and May 2023, when it reached 6.6% – has cushioned the rise in the cost of borrowing from banks.7 The cost of equity rose during February and March 2023, mainly owing to the higher equity market risk premium, although the increases have been moderate. The liquidity coverage ratio stood at 173% at March 2023, much higher than the required minimum threshold and likewise above pre-pandemic levels8. Meanwhile, the net stable funding ratio stood at 130% at December 2022, again above the minimum requirement of 100%.
By working closely to deepen risk management, and to enhance the ground knowledge in each region, we can contribute to sustainable growth. On this note, I wish you another very successful conference in Bahrain. BIS Review 163/2009  3

The social costs are in the end equal to the aggregate cost represented by the higher interest rates that the governments of all the other countries have to pay for their debt because of the fiscal irresponsibility of the original country. The difference between private and social costs implies a market inefficiency calling for some form of intervention whose objective is to internalise these kinds of externalities. In other words, the countries that pursue activities which risk causing contagion need to be constrained in pursuing such activities or “pay a price” which is proportional to the expected costs to the other countries which are affected by the contagion. This provides them with incentives to reduce the activities that could trigger contagion. Given that the possibility of contagion is well known from the literature and economic history, we should mind about both the preventive and corrective policies. In the case of sovereign contagion preventive policy options would include, fiscal rules and governance mechanisms that avoid excessive deficits or high stocks of public debt. Ex post policy options aimed at addressing the fall-out from sovereign contagion would include liquidity provision by central banks to financial markets, the recapitalisation of fragile banks and the swift implementation of growth enhancing structural policies and fiscal adjustment measures to regain market confidence in national economies and governments and offset the adverse effects of contagion. It goes without saying that – as a rule – prevention is by far preferable to addressing the problems that arise from contagion ex post.
As always, what I have to say here reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. Also, I speak for myself rather than for CPSS and IOSCO. Turning to my first topic, the financial crisis exposed many shortcomings with respect to the OTC derivatives market. For example, the use of OTC derivatives referencing private-label mortgage-backed securities that held poor quality subprime and alt-A mortgages multiplied the amount of gains and losses in the financial system. There were not only the losses on the actual mortgages, but also on the CDS that were linked to these mortgages through the OTC derivatives market. This increased the stress on the system when the referenced subprime and alt-A mortgages began to perform poorly. Moreover, the structural characteristics of the over-the-counter derivatives market itself amplified the shocks created by the housing bust in several ways. First, the collateral calls generated by sharp movements in the mark-to-market value of the OTC derivative trades drained liquidity buffers and provoked the fire sales of assets. These fire sales increased volatility and provoked still greater margin calls. This dynamic was one reason why the market prices of these assets overshot to the downside – that is they fell more than needed simply to reflect the increase in expected credit losses. In other words, the illiquidity risk premiums embedded into the prices of these assets became very large.

You can take a look at our first example of this – the November Inflation Report –online, at www.inflationreport.co.uk. This afternoon’s event will showcase a selection of the materials we are planning to run alongside these changes in our communications to help explain to people about the Bank’s work. To bring that to life, the first session will kick off with three of my colleagues – Ben, Sam and Jon –explaining to you what the Bank is doing on some topical issues, things that are influencing the Bank’s policies and the role we play in the economy right now. The questions they will answer are:   Why did the Bank change interest rates earlier this month?   What we are doing to keep banks safe? ; and    What are we doing in response to the vote to leave the EU to ensure the Brexit process is as smooth as possible? Through our dialogue with you today, we will enrich our understanding of how we can meet our objective more effectively, and we hope you will gain a better understanding of what the Bank does and how it is going about it. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Before handing back to Ranvir, I’d like to thank Speakers for Schools, We Are Futures, Economy.org and Rethinking Economics – the key stakeholders that have helped us with this morning’s events and who have been working with us to develop our educational resources.
Such views should take into consideration the interests of European and Polish consumers, the interests of Polish banks and the interests of the institutions comprising the infrastructure of the Polish payment system. Moreover, they should be coherent with the assumptions of the Lisbon Strategy, i.e. with the obligation to prepare the European Union economy for global challenges of the 21st century. A separate issue is to specify the pace of works in Poland as regards the implementation of SEPA standards and mechanisms that have already been worked out. According to the timetable approved by the EPC, Poland will have to comply with SEPA standards for euro transactions already in 2008. However, the lack of established date for Poland’s accession to the euro area means that Poland should have more time to implement solutions specific for SEPA, which would mean that necessary investments and changes could be spread over time. On the other hand, it seems that early involvement of Polish banks and infrastructural institutions in the approved solutions, e.g. through the implementation of mechanisms to lower costs in the sector, through increased efficiency and attractiveness of offered payment services and through strengthened security of financial transactions, could be extremely significant for increasing their own competitive edge on the overall European scale. Thus, it seems that the above dilemma over the appropriate pace of works should be thoroughly analysed by the banking community and infrastructural institutions.

The move to increase the resources for money laundering and terrorism financing investigations by the domestic law enforcement agencies, which currently is the emerging trend, needs to be supported with swift actions from the FIU and prompt response from reporting institutions. Another is that, at the international level, Malaysia will continue to enhance multilateral and bilateral relationships. I am happy to inform that we have recently concluded an MoU with the National Bank of Cambodia, bringing the total number of MoUs signed to 18. We have and will continue to provide assistance to countries in the Asia/Pacific region. Second is to provide greater focus in enhancing the competency and capacity of key stakeholders, i.e., the analysts, law enforcement officers and compliance officers. Despite the unfavourable economic condition, human resources and capacity building remain as one of our top focus. We plan to roll out capacity building programmes for analysts and enforcement officers covering fundamental, intermediate and advance level training programmes. The Certified Financial Investigators Programme, or CFIP, i.e., our flagship basic programme for financial investigators has produced 83 investigators with knowledge on the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001, as well as financial investigation techniques. We are open to collaborate with our foreign counterparts to conduct advanced level workshops. The third area is to further improve the quality of analysis. High quality STRs underpins an effective mechanism as quality STRs provide valuable intelligence for investigations.
Income and wage determination is fairly centralised, and the social partners evaluate the effects of wage outcomes on employment. 2. In a number of countries that have switched to a monetary policy regime based on inflation targeting, fiscal policy is oriented towards reducing government debt and deficits. In Norway, fiscal policy has traditionally played an important role in demand management. This task is facilitated by the fact that the Norwegian government has greater financial leeway than most other countries, due to its oil revenues. Norwegian government authorities receive substantial revenues from the extraction of oil in the North Sea. Norway is the world’s second largest exporter of oil, and the budget surplus is currently approximately 11% of GDP. Oil revenues increase consumption possibilities. However, it is a challenge to manage these resources in a way that increases welfare for both current and future generations. A rapid expansion of the sheltered sector based on uncertain and perhaps temporary increases in petroleum revenues may lead to the situation called Dutch disease. To manage its resources, Norway has created the Government Petroleum Fund, which receives revenues from the petroleum sector, transfers the amount necessary to produce a balanced government budget and invests the surplus abroad. As long as the increase in petroleum income is kept outside the domestic economy, there will be less need for structural change and thus less need for exchange rates to change.

There are, however, some institutional responses that will take place if the Bank is not able to return the exchange rate back to its initial range, as defined by the mandate, without contributing to inflation or a deflationary recession. I will come back to this issue later in my speech. 1  BIS Review 101/2000  The base drift problem If the inflation rate in Norway deviates from the inflation rate in the euro countries, the nominal exchange rate will need to adjust over time. However, some of you may object that stabilising the Norwegian inflation rate at the level aimed at by the euro countries may not be sufficient to stabilise the nominal exchange rate. The reason is that inflation in both Norway and the euro countries will be subject to stochastic shocks. This means that even if the expected inflation rates in Norway and the euro countries were the same, the actual inflation rates would deviate. Technically speaking, the relative price levels will be subject to base drift, and so will the nominal exchange rate. Professor Larry Ball has discussed this in a paper on Norwegian monetary policy. Keeping the relative price level constant would require that we target the price level and not the inflation rate. However, in the 1920s Norway experienced that a policy aimed at achieving a specific level for the purchasing power of money led to substantial macroeconomic instability.
But the total amount of the macroeconomically stable debt burden is, unfortunately, an absolute value not depending on the period, during which the debt is being accumulated. The lack of clear fiscal strategy in the future can destabilise the markets already now. Whether the government debt is good or bad, as I have already mentioned, is a sham question to a certain extent. Another sham question is a choice between the financial stability and economic growth. Both the central bank and the Ministry of Finance are being quite often criticised for focusing monetary and fiscal policies respectively on the problem of financial stability to the detriment of economic growth. In actual fact, economic growth is impossible without financial stability. While a stable budget is the basis of financial stability. It is possible to stake money, including government one, at the microlevel, at the level of small specific projects. To take risks at the macrolevel means to endanger economic growth and social stability. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  An important question is how to finance the deficit: through reserves or through debt? Strictly speaking, both options lead to growth in net debt (net of reserves) and consequently to debt burden accumulation. That is why this choice is also a sham one to a large extent. Nevertheless, since the commodity market risks are high, we believe that today the priority should be given to debt financing and keeping reserves for more complicated scenarios, when the access to debt financing is even more difficult.

All these developments contributed to the growth of the Kingdom’s economy and enhanced the stability of its financial sector. Domestic banks’ capital adequacy ratio (Basel Standard) stood at 17.8 percent at the end of the second quarter of 2014, exceeding the prescribed rate of 8 percent. In addition, stress tests conducted periodically by SAMA on commercial banks showed good results. Banking services witnessed further expansion throughout the Kingdom. Commercial banks’ branches increased by 53.8 percent to 1,862 at the end of July 2014, compared to 1,211 at the end of July 2004. In recognition of the importance of using latest technological developments in the banking field, SAMA worked with domestic banks on the introduction of the latest secure banking technology. In this regard, the value of transactions carried out through SARIE system picked up to SAR 54.6 trillion in 2013 from SAR 8.1 trillion in 2004. Moreover, the total number of transactions executed through ATMs went up to 1,335.5 million in 2013 from 412.1 million in 2004. During the same period, the total number of transactions carried out through POS terminals increased to 294.1 million with a total value of SAR 144.3 billion from 52.1 million with a total value of SAR 23.9 billion. The number of bills paid through SADAD system increased to 160.8 million with a value of SAR 176.6 billion in 2013 from 43.5 million with a value of SAR 22.0 billion in 2007.
They have no connection at all to money. They may have extrinsic value – you may like to collect them for instance, and as such they are a highly risky investment opportunity. Their value can fluctuate quite wildly, unsurprisingly. They strike me as unsuited to the world of payments, where certainty of value matters. The next innovation is alternative payments such as e-money, which in Europe has grown under the auspices of the Second Electronic Money Directive (EMD2) and the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2). To be clear, this has been translated into the UK as part of the on-shoring of EU law in the context of Brexit. This regime creates something which is more money-like in the sense of commercial bank money, but doesn’t have the same direct link to fiat money, and the safeguarding regime does not have all the features of deposit protection. It is therefore a hybrid. We must ensure that users fully understand the difference in protection, and I suspect at the moment that is not widely the case. The standards are less developed than those for banks, there is no depositor protection scheme, and firms are subject to only limited capital and liquidity requirements. Finally, there is no resolution or administration regime. This means that if firm failed, holders of its ‘money’ would be forced to pursue any recovery through a corporate insolvency procedure, which would neither be quick nor guarantee their funds back. The third innovation, and the one on which I will focus more, is so-called stablecoins.

Mervyn King: The international monetary system Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the “Advancing Enterprise 2005” conference, London, 4 February 2005. *  *  *  Later today the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors meet in London. Markets are speculating on what the communiqué will or will not say about exchange rates. On such matters a private exchange of views might serve us rather better than a public statement. What is a matter for public discussion, however, is the mix of exchange rate regimes we see in the world today, and the consequences for international monetary stability. The current international monetary system comprises three large currency blocs: the dollar, the euro, and an Asian bloc of currencies that are to varying degrees fixed against the dollar. These blocs, of broadly comparable size, produce more than twothirds of world output in total. Given their size, the choice of exchange rate regime of one bloc has a significant effect on the options available to the others. Countries have always faced constraints in choosing their exchange rate regime. Any country can have only two out of the following three – an independent monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate and an open capital account. At various times countries have tried – and failed – to have all three. But in a world of large currency blocs decisions about exchange rate policies are interdependent.
Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts Welcome address by Ms Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Joint IFRS Foundation &amp; MASB Regional Workshop “IFRS 17 Insurance Contracts”, Kuala Lumpur, 17 May 2018. * * * Good morning ladies and gentlemen and welcome to today’s Regional Workshop on IFRS 17 Standards for Insurance Contracts, jointly organised by the IFRS Foundation and the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB). Allow me first of all to congratulate the IFRS Foundation and MASB for putting this workshop together, with an impressive line-up of experts and practitioners to share their knowledge and insights on IFRS 17. We are especially privileged to have with us today two senior members of the IASB Board Mr. Darrel Scott and Mr. Amaro Gomez, both of whom have been with the IASB for more than 10 years. The strong interest in IFRS 17 and its importance both to financial systems and businesses are clear from the turnout today, with more than 250 participants from over 15 countries, representing industry players, accounting firms, national standard setting bodies and financial regulators. It is an honour for me to offer some brief remarks this morning to kick off today’s workshop. On my way here, I recalled a joke in which a lady was once told by her doctor that she would only have six months to live. Understandably very distraught, she asks the doctor for advice on what she should do.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Financial crises – impact and challenges for Spain Opening speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the “XIX Encuentro del sector financiero”, organised by Deloitte-ABC, Madrid, 10 April 2012. *  *  *  Good morning, Four years have gone by since the Federal Reserve had to bail out Bear Stearns and what was then known as “turbulences” began, ultimately turning into the most serious crisis the developed countries have faced since the Great Depression in the 1930s. A year earlier, Spain had begun to feel the effects of the exhaustion of a long phase of disproportionate expansion, in the form of a build-up of private debt and a loss of competitiveness. The latter, under way before Spain joined the euro, was fuelled by the low interest rates that suited the euro area as a whole, prompting an extraordinary deficit on the current-account balance. The joint outbreak of these two crises, the international one and the domestic one in Spain, led output to fall and public revenue to collapse. And this, together with a further increase in public spending aimed at softening the recession, meant that the budget surplus run from 2005 to 2007 turned into a deficit in 2008 and came to exceed 11% of GDP in 2009. If this were not enough, in April 2010 a third crisis hit Spain: the sovereign debt crisis or the euro crisis.