samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Second, yields rose globally in the summer on the back of expectations that the US Federal Reserve was about to taper its asset purchase program; more recently they fell back when the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) unexpectedly decided not to begin phasing out its asset purchases at its September meeting. Given the relatively high degree of substitutability between UK gilts and US treasuries, and assuming that long-term inflation expectations are anchored in both countries, it is reasonable to expect a high degree of correlation of UK long rates with US long rates. But one might expect the correlation to be less pronounced at the short end of the curve, where differences in cyclical positions – and therefore differences in monetary stances – should come to the fore. Strong co-movement should only be seen if either the shock is common in nature, or the international transmission of a shock from one country to the other is strong. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Now, as it happens, measures of co-movement have generally been high since the start of the financial crisis. In the earlier phase of the crisis, when contagion through financial markets was particularly strong, it was reasonable to believe that what happened in the United States was critical to the outlook here. That seems less plausible now, given the substantial progress in repairing the banking systems in the two countries.

Since the start of the crisis, output per hour worked has fallen by around 5%, leaving it more than 15% below where it would have been if it had simply continued growing at its pre-crisis trend rate. As discussed in past Inflation Reports, as well as numerous speeches by MPC members, there are a variety of explanations for this weak productivity performance. These include: specific factors, such as the decline in North Sea oil production and an exaggeration of productivity growth in the financial sector before the crisis; the hoarding of overhead and skilled labour through the downturn; unusually low rates of investment on the back of heightened uncertainty about the outlook; the adoption of more labour-intensive production techniques, encouraged by the high degree of wage moderation; thick-market externalities, which make it easier to find and transact business when demand is strong; and a misallocation of credit as banks repair their balance sheets, with heightened forbearance shown on existing loans to low productivity firms, coupled with caution as regards lending to risky businesses that offer the prospect of higher productivity. Some of these mechanisms depressing productivity can be expected to unwind naturally as demand recovers. But others might take longer and require the restoration of the banking system to full health. And some of the lost productivity growth may prove to be permanent, for instance because of the foregone opportunities for learning by doing.
Ladies and gentlemen, Moving from the financial side to the real side, let me share with you the Monetary Policy Committee’s latest assessment to summarize where the Thai economy stands at the moment. This year, the Thai economy is projected to gradually recover, driven mainly by government spending and the tourism sector. Government spending, mainly through small investment projects, has lent support to the recent economic recovery. Contribution from large-scale infrastructure projects is expected to become more evident in the latter half of this year. Meanwhile, tourism has been an important growth driver, with a broad-based improvement in a number of tourists from China and other regions. In 2016, we estimate that more than 32 million foreign tourists, improving from 30 million last year, will choose Thailand as one of their destinations. In addition, the Thai economy has benefited from expansion of investment in certain sectors, notably those related to telecommunication and alternative energy. Exports of goods to CLMV countries, which now account for around 10 percent of our total exports, has supported economic growth and has potential to grow further, despite a decline in export volumes of oil in recent months due to temporary factors. Overall, the Monetary Policy Committee forecasts that the economy will grow at 3.1 percent in 2016, picking up from a growth rate of 2.8 percent in 2015 and 0.9 percent in 2014. However, I must admit that overall momentum of the Thai economic recovery remains slow at this stage.

Many more have also made inquiries which I am very glad to see. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me now turn to the concluding part of my talk tonight. Amid the volatile global financial climate, Thailand’s strong external positions will serve as buffers against financial shocks. The private sector’s prudent financial management and policymakers’ credible policy will allow us to successfully ride with the global tides. In the real sector, the Thai economy is expected to maintain its gradual recovery path, driven mainly by government spending and tourism. Exports of goods, on the other hand, is subject to a slowdown in trading partners’ economies and structural constraints of the Thai industries. Inflationary pressure remains subdued, but the headline inflation will gradually rise in line with a recent pick up in oil prices. Against this backdrop, monetary policy stance will remain adequately accommodative to support economic activities, while safeguarding financial stability. Over a longer horizon, the Bank of Thailand is committed to creating financial infrastructure and nurturing the financial eco-system to help lift up growth potentials of the Thai economy. We aim to promote financial innovation, financial inclusion and  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  financial literacy, as strong foundations for sustainable economic development. With regard to the payment systems, the new infrastructures are being built to support the transition towards the digital economy. Rules and regulations on exchange-rate management are to be relaxed further for greater flexibility of investors and multinational companies.
Prevention of systemic risk At the same time, developments in other countries, and probably also in Norway, have shown that financial and property markets can be a source of instability in prices, output and employment. The US is facing a deep crisis in its financial system. Extensive intervention on the part of the government authorities and the central bank, most recently by placing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship, has probably mitigated the effects, but confidence in banks and financial undertakings has not been restored. European financial markets are also marked by turbulence and uncertainty. Even in Denmark – after nearly 25 years of a highly successful economic policy – a medium-sized bank has failed. 2 These problems have prompted many countries to review regulations and the functioning of financial and credit markets. Financial and credit markets in Norway have changed considerably over the past 10-20 years, resulting in substantial welfare gains. Enterprises now have access to credit at a more correct interest rate. Households have greater opportunities to smooth saving and  2  See statement by Governor Nils Bernstein, Danmarks Nationalbank, at the press conference about Roskilde Bank, 25 August 2008. (www.danmarksnationalbank.dk). 2  BIS Review 110/2008  consumption over a lifetime. Less rationing and higher required returns have boosted the growth potential of our economy. Since the end of June 2007, money and credit markets in other countries have been characterised by sharp fluctuations, tight liquidity and reduced risk appetite.

From 2003 and up to the end of 2007, growth in the Norwegian economy was high and gathered momentum both more quickly and more markedly than in the business cycles in the1980s and 1990s. The interest rate has by and large curbed the effects. The interest rate was low in the years between 2003 and 2005 while activity in the economy was still moderate, and has gradually been raised since then. Because inflation was low, the interest rate was kept low in a period of high growth and increasing capacity utilisation. Three factors were important: First, labour has flowed into Norway from other countries. The opening of the labour market to the new EU countries has provided us with access to a reserve of labour. Inward labour migration rose towards the end of the cyclical upturn and has contributed to sustaining the high level of growth. In 2007, the population expanded by more than 56 000, with net immigration at 40 000. This is the highest population growth ever recorded in Norway. Second, businesses in Norway have become increasingly efficient, resulting in lower costs. It has been profitable to hire more employees despite the high wage level in Norway. The business sector has made use of new technology and businesses have been restructured. The many sweeping reforms of the 1980s and 1990s – the fundamental shift in the Norwegian economy 1 – resulted in more efficient markets. Over the past few years, we have reaped the benefits of the measures implemented then.
As I have previously mentioned on several occasions, sustainability of the favorable labor market outlook in 2010 is contingent on implementation of the required reforms for enhancing productivity and flexibility in the market. These reforms would also contribute to Turkey’s social security system by promoting registered employment. 23. Real labor costs, which have gradually been increasing since the second quarter of 2010, remained flat in the final quarter. Unemployment rates hovering above pre-crisis levels continued to contain the rise in unit labor costs, becoming the primary factor restricting the run-up in services prices in 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Esteemed Guests, 24. In 2010, the foreign trade deficit soared amid weak external demand and the rapid recovery in the domestic demand. In addition to the surge in the foreign trade deficit, the runup in services expenditures further aggravated the current account deficit. In this period, transportation costs also increased due to rise in imports. Thus, the current account deficit, which was down to USD 14.3 billion in 2009, reached USD 48.6 billion in 2010. 25. Recent data indicate that the surge in imports continued in the January-February period in line with the robust domestic demand, and exports continued to recover gradually owing to weak external demand. However, the political unrest in North Africa slows down the recovery in Turkey’s exports, and also pushes up our imports through oil price hikes.

As a matter of fact, the contribution of private consumption and investment spending to the recovery in advanced economies has not currently reached the desired level. The ongoing balancesheet restructuring across households and firms, and the consequent slow and protracted recovery in employment and credit conditions put a cap on private consumption and investment. Furthermore, persisting and mounting concerns over the sustainability of sovereign debt continue to pose downside risks on global economic activity, especially in the euro area. The growing discrepancy between advanced and emerging economies, which became more pronounced in the post-crisis period, is expected to continue for an extended period of time. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  5. The divergence in the pace of recovery between these two country groups has undoubtedly significant implications for inflation and monetary policy. Yet, before moving on to global inflation and the monetary policy outlook, I find it useful to mention the upward trend in commodity prices observed with the recovery process since this upsurge is becoming even more significant for both the global inflation outlook and the monetary policy. 6. The recovery in global economic activity has also been manifested in commodity prices, and the upward trend in commodity prices, which started following the peak of the crisis, continued throughout 2010. In this period, the strong course of economic activity in China and India, two countries that account for a significant share of global commodity demand, reinforced the upward trend in commodity prices.
Economic activity In Switzerland, economic activity has stabilised somewhat in the last two quarters despite the delay in the global economic upswing. After having been on a decline during four quarters, GDP slightly exceeded the previous period's level in the second and third quarters 2002. Positive stimuli emanated from the development of exports and from consumption. Nevertheless, the economic situation in Switzerland remains tight. The deterioration on the labour market and the fall in stock market prices are depressing consumer sentiment and available income. Incoming orders and the order backlog in the export sector remain at an unsatisfactory level, a sign that the recovery in exports is still uncertain. Capacity utilisation in manufacturing and in construction continues to fall short of the desired level, while corporate investment activity is currently at a very low ebb. The present growth slump in Switzerland can only be overcome if both exports and equipment investment increase consistently. We expect exports to grow markedly in line with the international economic upswing in the second half of 2003. Equipment investment should follow with a slight time lag. Until the middle of next year, however, the Swiss economy is likely to grow only very moderately. Until then, unemployment could therefore continue to rise. Private consumption, which has long been the mainstay of economic activity, will pick up only slowly next year. Real economic activity should increase by just over 1% in 2003, while for this year we expect zero growth.

As another example, many of you have probably heard of the recently passed Volcker Rule, named after another former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker. The Volcker rule can be seen as a watered down version of the Glass-Steagall Act. Recognizing that it is difficult to separate investment banks and commercial banks entirely, the Volcker Rule prohibits commercial banks from short-term proprietary trading of securities, derivatives, futures, and options on these instruments. The goal is that eliminating these risky practices will make banks safer and at the same time force them to refocus on core banking businesses which in turn should benefit consumers. Basel III and the Volcker Rule are just two examples of re-regulation. There are several others, notably the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act, the OTC derivatives markets reform, and the proposed oversight and regulation of shadow banking. Taken all together, these make a comprehensive set of regulatory reforms that will busy both regulators and financial institutions over the next several years. I would like to stress however that, for financial institutions, the compliance with the new regulations is not a one-way process, but a two-way one that you can help shape through industry consultation and collaboration with regulators. The challenges for country regulators are whether and when to adopt certain parts of international standards that may be irrelevant, too stringent, or lead to new risks for the domestic industry.
But beyond that it certainly means, too, that “outs”, or potential “pre-ins”, should not attempt to exploit any perceived -- and certainly short-term -- advantage from the additional policy freedoms they might have on the outside, but should, for example, persist in macro-economic, fiscal and monetary, discipline in parallel with the EMU countries. But it also means that the “in” countries, for their part, have an identical self-interest in maintaining an open and constructive relationship with the “outs”/“pre-ins”. Otherwise we would all be cutting off our nose to spite our face. I make this general point, Mr. Chairman, because this context seems to me to be relevant to any assessment of the economic prospect, of the economy as a whole or of any particular sector, within or without the euro-area. In the rest of my remarks I assume that, in or out, we will be operating within a constructive, co-operative, environment throughout the EU, for the powerful reason that that is in everyone’s interest. BIS Review 106/1997  -2Against that background let me turn to the prospects for the City. I will, in fact, concentrate on the case in which the UK does not participate in EMU in the first wave, because in the alternative case, the UK in scenario, while there may be uncertainty about the overall macro-economic implications, there is little reason to suppose that there would be any adverse implications for the City in particular.

Mr. George looks at the prospects for the City of London - in or out of EMU Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E.A.J.George, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs Conference in London, on 24/10/97. Prospects for the City -- in or out of EMU Mr. Chairman, you have asked me to speak specifically about “the prospects for the City - or out of EMU”. You -- very kindly in recent circumstances -- did not ask me to discuss the wider pros and cons, either of the project as a whole, or of UK membership. But perhaps I might nevertheless begin by making a more general point. Perfectly reasonable people can legitimately disagree about EMU, both in principle and about the appropriate timing and pace of monetary integration. On the project as a whole, most analysts would acknowledge that there are real potential benefits, but that there are also real risks to be set against them; and most would acknowledge that those risks will increase if the politics of EMU are allowed to run ahead of the economics, so that countries are allowed, or even encouraged, to participate, without first having achieved genuine, and sustainable, economic convergence -- in substance and not just some technical accounting form. On the question of British membership the new Labour Government has spoken of ‘formidable obstacles’ to this country joining EMU in the first wave.
We can do this either by repo of bonds held on the Bank’s balance sheet or by offering to supply one-week Bank of England bills at Bank Rate. 8 Longer-term repos have a monetary objective in part. It is not necessarily efficient to lend very large amounts of cash every week in short-term repos. It would imply that the market was consistently short of cash in large size on a week-by-week basis, perhaps putting unnecessary strain on the inter-bank lending market and on the Bank’s operations. That strain could, perhaps, cause unwanted volatility in overnight rates. By lending a proportion of the cash for longer term – three months or more – the Bank can ensure that the size of shortterm repo operations are set at an appropriate level. Using longer-term repos to meet financial stability objectives has grown in importance during the financial market crisis. They can provide liquidity support in at least three dimensions: maturity, size and collateral type. The inter-bank market has been quite disrupted at times during the past three years. Counterparty credit concerns have limited unsecured lending, and liquidity was sometimes hoarded. A range of asset managers increased their holdings of cash at increasingly short maturity – ultimately in overnight accounts – concentrated in what they assessed to be the safest banks.

Why the buy-side should buy into the FX Global Code  Remarks given by Andrew Hauser, Executive Director, Markets At London FX Hive Live 6 December 2018  I am very grateful to Frederick Ladbury, Ed Kent, David Edmunds, Grigoria Christodoulou, Rohan Churm, David Clark and David Puth for their help with, or input to, these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Introduction Thank you very much for the invitation to speak with you today. Much of your agenda is rightly focused on the future: on how to exploit new technology; how to trade with new platforms and market participants; and how to meet ever more demanding customer needs. That relentless push to innovate is one of the great strengths of the global FX markets, and it is a privilege to be part of that conversation. Against that backdrop, my own remarks – on getting the buy-side signed up to the FX Global Code – might seem a little backward looking. I hope to convince you otherwise. At a time when FX markets are evolving rapidly, there has never been a more important time for investors active in those markets – all of you – to be shaping, and adopting, the norms, conventions and standards embodied in the Code. You are a vital part of the market, and play a crucial role in maintaining market discipline.
As a member of the European Economic Area Iceland is obliged to transpose into national law all existing and future EU legislation in the field of financial services. This has implied important changes in the financial system in Iceland. The EEA negotiations themselves intensified a trend towards liberalisation that started with the deregulation of interest rates in the mid 1980s and culminated in the liberalisation of the bulk of cross-border capital flows by 1995. Important rationalisation has also taken place in the Icelandic financial system. Until 1999, two of the main commercial banks were fully government owned and so were a host of so-called investment credit funds. The funds were unified in a single privatised institution which subsequently merged with Íslandsbanki in 2000 to become the then largest commercial bank. The withdrawal of the government from ownership of financial institutions was finalised in March 2003 when the government sold its last shares in the commercial banks. Already by mid April a decision had been taken to merge one of the two former government owned banks, Búnaðarbanki, with Kaupþing Bank ltd. The new bank will be the largest commercial bank in Iceland and one of the 10 largest in the Nordic countries. The privatisation of the credit institutions has thus already created ample opportunities for rationalisation and will continue to do so in the period ahead.

And under the related Certification Regime, firms must also annually assess and certify the fitness and propriety of a wide range of risk-taking employees. To help meet all of these expectations, Senior Managers can draw on market standards in order to explain and promote good practice, assess their risk-takers, and build a strong culture. 9  See the BIS Press Release on the FX Global Code , available at: https://www.bis.org/press/p170525.htm. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  There are encouraging signs that the SMR is already beginning to make a difference. For firms, it is clarifying and improving governance, accountability and decision-making processes. Senior Managers are increasingly focusing on building cultures of risk awareness, openness and ethical behaviour. In the words of one chair “responsibility for culture has moved to the top of my agenda.”  10  For supervisors, the regime is helping identify weaknesses in governance and accountability, and to assess the fitness and propriety of senior managers and others in positions of responsibility, and whether the firm has an appropriate culture, and is encouraging the necessary changes. In the first instance, consistent or widespread shortcomings would have consequences for compensation. More persistent failings could increase the capital that must be set aside for operational risks, and in the extreme, could influence our judgements regarding the fitness and propriety of senior managers. Over time, market codes may become more firmly embedded still, something on which the FCA is currently consulting.