samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a consequence, I deem that we have created essential incentives towards establishing a sustained business climate where business decisions and plans are not exposed to risks arising from the uncertainty of inflationary erosion. Since almost a decade, Bank of Albania has been engaged in using all the capabilities to set up a modern payment infrastructure, in order to bring the banking system closer to the clients, making it open in relations with them. Thus, after implementing the Real Time Gross Settlements (RTGS) and Automated Electronic Clearing House (AECH) systems, we have already mobilised all our efforts to create the credit register. Currently, after the implementation of AECH system, we have provided one more opportunity not only to the banking system but also to periodic service businesses, so as to enhance its economic efficiency. On this occasion, we appeal to both parties, banks and businesses, to cooperate with each other for making more effectively use of the priorities provided by this new system. Bank of Albania deems that a banking system supports the economic growth when it is first of all a financially sound system. The emerging economies, like our economy, are generally characterized by a fragile stability. For this reason, Bank of Albania has attempted to take all-encompassing measures aiming at strengthening its supervisory capacities, in order to ensure a solid, sound and efficient banking system. The banking system performance: During 2005 impressive developments have been highlighted.

There are three ways we can achieve this: The first is by enhancing offshore RMB liquidity. As mentioned earlier, the HKMA’s currency swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China was enhanced in July. Apart from the overall increase in the size and removal of the need for renewal of the swap agreement, on the back of this, the HKMA enhanced its RMB Liquidity Facility, and the important changes include: Expansion of both intraday and overnight repos from RMB10 billion to RMB20 billion each, providing an additional RMB20 billion in liquidity to the market; Extension of the overnight repo operating hours from 6 pm to 5 am the next day (when the RMB RTGS system closes), making operation more flexible and streamlined, especially for those in other time zones; and Reduction of repo rates of the overnight repo, with the spread over CNH HIBOR lowered from 50 to 25 basis points. We will constantly monitor the need for further enhancements to keep RMB liquidity in Hong Kong at the optimal level. The second approach is to facilitate the development of more diverse offshore RMB products. The expansion and enhancement of the Connect schemes to promote the cross-boundary use of the RMB and facilitate further portfolio flows into and out of the Mainland is crucial. Southbound Trading under Bond Connect and Wealth Management Connect have created new opportunities for investors and increased the usage of the RMB in capital markets and wealth management. We will consider enhancements to Southbound Bond Connect to enrich Hong Kong’s bond market.
23  The ratio’s numerator (CET1) and denominator (risk-weighted assets (RWAs)) recorded similar declines (0.9% for CET1 and 1.1% for RWAs), so the ratio rose by barely 2 bp to 13.3% at end-2021. 11  The increase in the ratio between 2019 and 2020 was broad-based across banks. The distribution of the CET1 ratio in 2021 reflected convergence towards the central values of the distribution. Thus, solvency levels have increased at banks whose levels were lower and have decreased at banks whose levels were higher. To sum up, the Spanish banking industry has proved resilient to the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic, maintaining the supply of credit to the private sector and a correct solvency level. It has also been able to swiftly recover its profitability. Yet given the high level of uncertainty and the scale of the potential risks on the horizon, close monitoring of risk and prudent behaviour by banks remains particularly necessary. I will now move on to discuss the risks that lie ahead. Impact of the potential materialisation of the risks identified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine  Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered geopolitical tensions of uncertain severity and duration. The two main channels through which the conflict may have a significant economic impact are: first, the surge in energy and other commodity prices, with its accelerator effect on inflation and penalising effect on economic activity; and second, the negative impact of the war on world trade, business and household confidence, and financial uncertainty.

The use of this type of extreme scenarios, which are plausible but have a relatively low probability of occurring, is an integral characteristic of the main international stress tests and is consistent with the goals of prudential regulation which require that banks have sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses. The adverse scenario simulates a further increase in energy prices and a greater impact of bottlenecks on global trade. This drives up inflation and, consequently, accelerates the monetary policy response. It also entails a worsening of financial conditions.31 Under the severe scenario, the price shocks are slightly more significant than under the adverse one, but the main difference is the inclusion of a more marked worsening of households’ and firms’ confidence, which causes further falls in the main domestic demand variables (consumption and investment).32 The adverse scenarios for the foreign economies that are important to Spanish banks are calibrated so that their severity is consistent with the impact of the shocks on the Spanish economy. These scenarios thus enable a rigorous analysis of the banking sector’s resilience to the risks deriving from the current geopolitical setting. 31  Specifically, further increases in the sovereign risk premium and the spreads in bank lending to households and firms, and a decrease in the value of the assets that make up household wealth, with substantial falls in stock prices and house prices.
The firm had derivative portfolios at a number of CCPs across Europe, the US and Asia. All were auctioned, liquidated or transferred to other clearing participants by the CCPs in weeks, not years. And, with only one minor exception, this was achieved without exhausting the margin collateral the CCPs held. 1  I mention this aspect of the Lehman failure because it illustrates the drivers behind two of the key regulatory reforms we have made as a result of the financial crisis. First, incentivising and where appropriate mandating the greater use of central clearing for derivative transactions. And second, putting in place resolution regimes to ensure banks, particularly large, highly interconnected, wholesale market players, can fail without unleashing the disruption that followed the Lehman insolvency. I want to look today at the progress we have made in the post crisis reforms around derivatives and how we address the risks around the concentration of counterparty risk in CCPs – including what the objectives should be for a resolution regime for CCPs themselves. And I want to look also at the progress we have made, and the next steps we need to make, in putting in place an effective resolution regime for large banks internationally and in the UK. 1  The exception was HK Securities Clearing Corp (HKSCC) which made a loss to the CCP of approx. USD 20 mn, including cost and expenses. HKSCC announced it would claim this from LEH’s estate. Source Norman, P., 2011.

Domestic economic activity in much of Asia will inevitably be subdued, with knock-on effects elsewhere, and major imbalances are likely to emerge in international trading patterns. It is too soon to have any very clear view about the likely scale or duration of these economic effects. The IMF, in its Interim World Economic Outlook, based on information available to early December, has tentatively estimated that world gdp growth this year - at 3½% - might be around 1% lower than it had expected in the autumn. They expected much of the impact to fall on the Asian economies themselves - with forecast growth in the newly industrialised Asian economies falling by 2½%, whereas growth in the G7 countries was expected to be only about ¼% lower at 2¼%, with a substantially larger impact on Japan. My impression is that, notwithstanding these revisions, most analysts would still see the risks as being quite heavily on the downside. There have been suggestions that the dampening of activity, particularly in this country and in the US, as a result of these developments is welcome insofar as it will help to prevent the re-emergence of inflationary pressures. And that is true - up to a point, my Lord Copper. It is clearly not desirable that the necessary moderation of demand should be narrowly concentrated on those sectors that are exposed to international competition. And while some of the industrial countries can certainly tolerate significant external deficits for a time, persistent, large deficits would not be sustainable indefinitely.
This at a time when the CEECs already absorb around 33% of all FDI flows from the EU to emerging markets, and when this region is increasingly becoming the dominant sphere of 15 EU investors. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the pace of reform be accelerated, 16 irrespectively of whether Malta joins the EU or not. Against this background, it appears that securing access to the EU market will become increasingly difficult as a non-member. Membership, on the other hand, promises immediate benefits for local exporters, because any product made in Malta would not only have complete access to the EU, but would also benefit from any preferential treatment which the EU receives under the various reciprocal trade agreements it has with third countries, without the need for Malta to negotiate separate agreements and without being subject to country of origin limitations. The extent of this benefit could be substantial because the EU does not merely have reciprocal trade agreements with Northern and Eastern European countries and with its Southern Mediterranean partners, but has also finalised, or is close to finalising, similar agreements with more distant countries and regional blocs, including 17 18 Mexico, South Africa, Chile, Mercosur and the Gulf Co-operation Council . For many local firms EU membership would also translate into an opportunity to outsource inputs more cheaply, and for consumers a wider choice and cheaper products.

Emerging market countries have a much stronger fundamentals, better growth prospect and higher interest rates. These differences in fundamentals have attracted growing and significant capital flows to these parts of the world. Net private capital flows into emerging markets was projected by the Institute of International Finance to rise to USD825 billion by the end of 2010, representing a 42% increase from last year. Many analysts expect the recent Federal Reserve’s policy decision to purchase another USD600 billion of US Treasury bonds under “QE2” will intensify further flows to the region. Economists estimated that between a quarter to half of the QE2 liquidity will flood into emerging markets. The inflows if not managed properly will pose difficulties to Asian and emerging markets. Policymakers would face several predicaments from policy perspectives. The influx of capital inflows, have led to a rapid expansion of liquidity translating into rising prices, leading to concerns on asset bubbles and the possibility of overheating the economy. However, the impact on each economy will differ depending on the size of the inflows and the ability of those markets to manage the flows. The upward pressure on the exchange rates has also been significant as seen by the appreciation of regional currencies at an average of 4% on a real trade-weighted basis since beginning of the year. Understandably, such pace of appreciation has raised some concerns among businesses especially in highly open economies, where movements of exchange rates will certainly impact businesses.
In other words, the Riksbank is said to have “tricked” the social partners into setting wages too high in relation to the inflation that was later realised. 6  Several people have claimed that undershooting the inflation target has led to unnecessarily high unemployment. Assarsson, Bengt (2011), “Riksbanken måste ta sitt arbete på större allvar” (the Riksbank must take its work more seriously), debate article in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter, 2 May, 2011, is one example. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2012), “The Possible Unemployment Cost of Average Inflation below a Credible Target”, unpublished article, (http://people.su.se/~leosven/papers/Phillips.pdf), tries to quantify the number of people unnecessarily unemployed using an estimated Phillips curve. His calculation method implies that the reasons for CPI inflation undershooting the target are of no importance for the effects on unemployment. It also means that average CPIF inflation is unimportant in this context. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, it is far from clear what inflation expectations are used as a base for wage setting. In the long run, say five years, expectations are well anchored around the inflation target of two per cent. But in the shorter run, expectations vary more and follow actual inflation more closely. It may be that wage setting is based on the expectations in the somewhat shorter run. Expectations can be measured in different ways that give slightly different results.

Norges Bank’s Executive Board decided in June that the key policy rate should be in the interval ¾-1¾ per cent in the period to the publication of the next Monetary Policy Report on 28 October 2009, unless the Norwegian economy is exposed to new major shocks. In the assessment forming the basis for its monetary policy decision of 23 September, the Executive Board placed emphasis on underlying inflation, which is now below the inflation target. The krone has appreciated and will, in conjunction with continued low imported inflation, contribute to keeping inflation below target in the year ahead. This suggests that the key policy rate should be kept low for a period ahead. Growth in the Norwegian economy has picked up at a more rapid pace than was expected a few months ago. High activity in the oil industry and monetary and fiscal policy measures have contributed to supporting demand for goods and services. Employment is stable and it appears that unemployment will be considerably lower than expected, despite the decline in manufacturing and the building and construction industry. Low interest rates are contributing to renewed growth in household consumption. Higher capacity utilisation and low productivity growth may increase upward pressure on costs, pointing towards somewhat higher inflation and suggesting that the key policy rate should be raised earlier than projected in the June Monetary Policy Report. On balance, it was appropriate to keep the key policy rate unchanged at this meeting, although the Executive Board considered the alternative of increasing the key policy rate.
6 A central bank’s decision to act in this manner should not be interpreted – as has sometime happened – as indicating that the development of property prices and credit volumes is an end in itself of monetary policy. The reason that the central bank is leaning against the wind is, of course, that it thereby still expects to achieve a more stable development in the real economy and inflation. One could say that the central bank sees property prices and credit growth as indicators saying something about the way in which inflation and resource  5  “This time is different” is the title of a newly published book by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (Princeton University Press). The book analyses financial crises occurring over several hundred years. The title is a reference to the phenomenon that, even though it is common knowledge that crises occur every now and again, there seems to be a tendency to believe that, on just this occasion, there is probably no danger. 6  See for example Donald L. Kohn, “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices,” speech held 16 March 2006, Federal Reserve Board and Frederic S. Mishkin, “Housing and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism”, in Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, 2007. 14  BIS Review 68/2010  utilisation may develop over the longer term. However, it is clear that such a monetary policy places great demands upon a central bank’s communications.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Speech at the Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries, Brussels, 17 May 2019. * * * Dear Ministers, Dear representatives of the European Commission, European Central Bank and Eurostat, It is always a great pleasure to be part of the regular Ministerial Dialogue, having the opportunity to reflect on important issues that are in the spotlight of the economic agenda. At the same time it as an excellent occasion to express our appreciation on the provided assessments of the Economic Reform Programme. The main takeaways from these assessments have been important guidelines, mapping our policy actions, enhancing our capacity, and providing for faster closure of the existent gaps. Now, let me briefly reflect on the topic of Structural reforms for attracting foreign direct investment and increase resilience. There is no doubt that investments are one of the key ingredients for increasing the long-term potential of an economy. When it comes to emerging economies, commonly there is a need for additional cross – border capital, which can complement the insufficient domestic saving. The more these flows are comprised of FDIs, the higher the positive impact on productivity and competiveness. In the regional context, pre-crisis investments were an important growth driver, reaching close to 30% of GDP, while in the postcrisis period investment ratios has plunged.
Although this trio of major challenges have now been effectively addressed through the application of unconventional wisdom, Sri Lankan authorities realize that they must continue to practice innovation in order to reach their long term goals. At the same time, Sri Lanka must also preserve the country’s peaceful environment and political stability, in order to make these outcomes sustainable. In this regard, Sri Lanka is now facing a fresh challenge, where human rights advocates of the US and the West, are focusing on the last phases of the 30 year war on terror, and raising certain human rights issues and prescribing various “foreign” solutions to those perceived issues. In this situation too, just as conventional economists did not appreciate the practical benefits of the innovative economic strategies, theoretical human rights activists also do not seem to appreciate Sri Lanka’s strategy of ushering long lasting peace to its communities in a practical and effective manner, without inflicting further anxiety, pain and anguish on the people. Sri Lanka is a vibrant, practising democracy and a country with a 2500 year history, emerging out of a long and bloody conflict. It has the maturity and the ability to deal with issues confronting the country, in accordance with its own systems, culture and democratic traditions. So far, all Sri Lankans have been able to enjoy peace, by practising a hybrid system of restorative justice and rapid economic and political development.

In that background, it is vital that the country is not pushed into “foreign-grown” solutions of international agencies and others, who unfortunately, sometimes appear to be influenced by certain human rights crusaders, who have been well- known terror activists in the past. It is also worthy to recall that, in its commitment to the principle of restorative justice following the conflict, the Sri Lankan government has already granted amnesty to more than 11,000  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  former Tamil Tiger terrorists, some of whom have even committed grave crimes. In such circumstances, if the government were to open new investigations as proposed by some, it could turn the clock back and cause great anxiety to those offenders who have been forgiven, and may even lead to some of them reverting back to violence. At the same time, some of the proposed “foreign” interventions that seem to be narrowly focused on the conduct of the Sri Lankan armed forces only, could also be construed as unfair and/or selective treatment towards the Sri Lankan armed forces who defeated terrorism, and could lead to a consequent de-stabilization of the country. Practical wisdom would therefore suggest that reconciliation between communities must be allowed to follow a “home-grown” path in keeping with the time and space as set out by those who suffered the agony of terror, and those who are today responsible for maintaining the peace in the country.
Even more difficult, the potential benefits – better differentiation and rank ordering of risk – were undermined by the problems of calibrating overall capital standards, and poor implementation in the rush to achieve compliance. Under Basel I and II, capital ratios were too low to sustain confidence in banks, and thus the system as a whole, through a severe stress, as the crisis sadly demonstrated. The minimum Tier I ratio was 4% of Risk Weighted  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Assets. And, crucially as the Tier I ratio included capital instruments with the flaws I described earlier, the core (equity) ratio could be as low as 2%. In the trading book, under the Market Risk Amendment, capital requirements could be less than 1% of trading book assets. To illustrate this last point, here is a quote from the FSA’s report into the failure of RBS. “The capital regime was most deficient, moreover, in respect of the trading books of the banks, when required capital for many instruments was estimated using value-at-risk (VaR) approaches. The acquisition of ABN AMRO meant that RBS’s trading book assets almost doubled between end-2006 and end-2007. The low risk weights assigned to trading assets suggested that only £ of core tier 1 capital was held to cover potential trading losses which might result from assets carried at around £ on the firm’s balance sheet. In fact, in 2008, losses of £ arose in the credit trading area alone (a subset of total trading book assets).

Ong Chong Tee: The post-crisis financial landscape - what next? Remarks by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Society for Financial Studies Cavalcade Asia-Pacific Conference's Gala Dinner, Singapore, 13 December 2018. * * * Professor Laura Starks – President, Society for Financial Studies Professor Ron Masulis – Program Chair Professor Jun-Koo Kang – Associate Chair, Nanyang Technological University Professor Bernard Yeung – Dean and Stephen Riady Distinguished Professor, National University of Singapore, President, Asian Bureau of Financial & Economic Research Professor Massimo Massa – The Rothschild Chaired Professor of Banking, INSEAD Associate Professor Johan Sulaeman – Dean’s Chair, Department of Finance, NUS Business School Ladies and gentlemen, a very good evening. Thank you for inviting a few of my MAS colleagues and I to be here tonight. Introduction 1 The SFS Cavalcade conference is a distinguished forum that brings together some of the sharpest minds in the world of finance and research. 2 This evening, I thought I could share some perspectives of a financial regulator. My hope is to flag a few pertinent issues that could do well with more research insights and discussion. As the great Hungarian scientist Albert Szent-Gyorgyi once said: “Research is four things: brains with which to think, eyes with which to see, machines with which to measure and fourth, money”.