samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
-  We will, however, where appropriate, raise the issue of consolidation in meetings with banks' board of directors and management, and will encourage them to make it part of their strategic planning. -  We will also do what we can to provide appropriate incentives for banks to think seriously about consolidation, in particular by removing potential barriers to competition such as the last remaining controls on interest rates. -  We will not erect artificial barriers to acquisition of local banks by foreign banks, which would be contrary to Hong Kong's traditional free market ethos and our commitments under WTO. -  We note the view that is sometimes expressed that it would be desirable for Hong Kong to retain a core of strong, locally owned banks. This is something that we would support, but it is not something that we can deliver. Rather, it would depend on whether the local banks can agree to merge among themselves. -  We will do what we can to facilitate individual transactions that are put to us for consideration. This will include giving prompt advice on what is acceptable from a banking regulatory point of view. We will also look sympathetically at the use of acceptable debt instruments to finance mergers as opposed to our previous preference for equity or cash. This reflects modern trends in capital management.

Whatever the motivation, a series of transactions have recently taken place that show that the pace of consolidation is picking up in Hong Kong. Last year, for example, we saw the acquisition by Standard Chartered of the credit card and retail banking business of Chase Manhattan and the purchase by Bank of East Asia of First Pacific Bank. This year, Development Bank of Singapore is in the process of acquiring Dao Heng Bank with the intention of eventually combining it with its existing locally incorporated subsidiary. Two of the Mainland banks, Bank of China and ICBC, are also consolidating their Hong Kong operations. The Bank of China move is particularly significant since it will create the second largest banking group incorporated in Hong Kong. What we have not so far seen in Hong Kong is merger among indigenous banks that are more or less of equal footing. This is perhaps not surprising. Such mergers are generally more difficult to arrange than straightforward acquisitions of a smaller bank by a larger bank. In the latter case, the acquirer is in a position to decide what it wants to do as regards management and staff changes, harmonisation of systems and the introduction of new products. With a true merger, these matters have to be settled by consensus, which may not be easy. Who for example is going to be the chairman or chief executive? It is probably better to avoid the Japanese solution of sharing each of these responsibilities among more than one individual.
In contrast to risk in investment decisions, which can be measured, compensated with profitability or mitigated with insurance, uncertainty can make it difficult to make decisions or lead to postponing them pending the availability of more information. This does not mean that uncertainty is a black-or-white issue, or that it must be completely eliminated for an economy to function. Uncertainty is intrinsic to a changing environment, exposed to exogenous influences or to the evolution of society and markets, especially in countries undergoing transformations as part of their development process. However, the level of uncertainty does matter and there are probably certain thresholds beyond which its burden on the economy becomes very costly. That said, the next question is whether anything can be done to reduce uncertainty when it becomes too high. In this respect, both theory and experience indicate that uncertainty is not a totally exogenous variable and that it can be bounded on the basis of greater credibility of stakeholders, systems, and processes. In particular, a diversity of possible states can be limited to the extent that their course is dominated by the predictable action of the relevant agents and the processes in which their actions are framed. In the case of monetary policy, for example, special value is placed on anchoring expectations around an inflation rate close to the authorities’ target. This increases the effectiveness of said authorities’ decisions, aligning agents’ behavior with the achievement of said targets.

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And contrary to common perceptions, this is not only about bringing general government deficits under the 3% line, but it is also about bringing them closer to balance or to surplus in the medium term so that fiscal space can be used in the event of a recession. But even ex ante solvent governments can come under pressure in the face of very large shocks. Absent national stabilisers, such as an autonomous monetary policy and exchange rate, such shocks have already tested the cohesion of the currency union as a whole. This is why a common monetary policy needs a complement in the form of a common fiscal instrument that can support – under proper democratic control – aggregate demand if need be. Many of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reform proposals that are currently being discussed would help bolster these three lines of defence. Enhancing national ownership of structural reform efforts, for example, could help make our economies more agile. A true capital markets union, leveraging the benefits of fintech innovation, would significantly boost the capacity of our financial markets to diversify and reduce risk, while the ECB has often argued that a European deposit insurance scheme is a precondition for a truly integrated banking system and safe money. And the Single Market still has a lot of untapped potential, in particular in the field of services. These should be priorities. More credible fiscal rules and greater market discipline would strengthen the second line of defence.

It means that we should move beyond the north-south divide which has too often shaped past discussions on EMU. Economic fragmentation is receding on our continent, thanks to a broad cyclical recovery, the ECB’s actions and the bold reforms initiated in several countries. We should be careful not to allow 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  political fragmentation to jeopardise these achievements. Ultimately, what matters is that we strike the right balance between solidarity and responsibility and that we embrace a vision which secures the integrity and resilience of the euro area. We all know that this is not easy. But failure to do so would leave the ECB alone at the forefront of macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area. This is a risk not worth taking. Thank you. 1 See Cœuré, B. (2018), “The euro area’s three lines of defence”, speech at the conference “Deepening of EMU”,  Ljubljana, 2 February. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
In the really long term, the recent level is more normal than the relatively low figures in the 1970s and 1980s. This accordingly means that the potential annual growth rate could be between 2 and 2.5%. A feature of the picture in the United States that I touched on earlier is the combination of high productivity growth and an investment boom. One factor behind the investment activity appears to have been the high profit expectations associated with the new technology. The massive investment has paved the way in turn for good productivity growth in that it has introduced new technology and led to a higher capital input per employee. No corresponding pattern is discernible in Sweden. It was mainly in connection with rapidly rising capacity utilisation in 1992-94 that industrial productivity improved. Productivity growth since then has been more normal. Manufacturing investment has risen but not as markedly as in the United States. It should be borne in mind, however, that compared with the United States, resource utilisation in Sweden was considerably lower in the 1990s. This can explain a part of the upswing for productivity, particularly in 1992-94, at the same time as it implies a weaker propensity to invest, either to save labour or to expand capacity in response to growing demand. Against this background it will be interesting to see how the Swedish economy performs when resource utilisation is high again. Briefly, then, it looks as though the inflation process in Sweden has been modified in recent years.

Sweden also tops the United States in the domain of mobile Internet, as witness both Microsoft’s decision to locate the development of such systems here and the first WAP phones in Swedish shops. Internet use in Sweden is also well in line with the United States. Market surveys by IT consultants admittedly indicate that in relation to total retailing, Internet shopping for goods is somewhat higher in the United States but Sweden is ahead of many other countries in Europe. Most of the portals and e-commerce sites are also American. But a considerably higher proportion of Swedish banking is done on the Internet and Sweden has been an early starter with models for Internet business-to-business transactions. We also know that in the latter part of the 1990s, IT-related sectors, including the successful telecom industry, accounted for almost a tenth of manufacturing output in Sweden. Figures from the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries show a remarkable increase during the decade, from a share of just over 2% in 1993 to more than 12% in 1999. According to the same source, one fifth of Sweden’s GDP growth from 1995 to 1998 came from the IT and telecom sector. Comparing statistics can be difficult but a similar indicator - from the Department of Commerce - of the IT and telecom sector’s share of GDP growth in the United States shows that in the same period this sector made approximately the same contribution there. 3.2 Another important aspect in America has been efficient markets and strong competition.
Russia’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine has brought supply security back to the top of the agenda for all major economies, most saliently for energy. And over the longer term, it is likely to accelerate the global transition to clean energy production as a way to increase climate and energy security. But such technologies are highly resource-intensive in their installation phase. Getting the global economy on a path to meet the Paris Agreement goals could see total mineral demand from clean energy technologies quadrupling by 2040. [7] This threatens a new era of competition for resources. Challenges for Europe in 2023 As this new global map takes shape, we enter 2023 facing three big challenges. The first challenge is to reconsider how we can best protect Europe’s critical interests in a fast-changing world. As an economy that is very open to trade and deeply integrated into global supply chains, we are vulnerable to geopolitical headwinds. For example, 35% of Europe’s manufacturing output is absorbed outside the EU, much more than for the United States or China. So, as the next chapter in the globalisation story is being written, we need to ensure that Europe is a leader, not just a follower. And as the French President and German Chancellor have recently argued, we have the capacity to do so. [8] Already now, Europe is the top trading partner for 80 countries, compared to just over 20 countries for the United States.

Completing Europe’s capital markets union (CMU) will be key to financing the green and digital transitions. Equity investors tend to have a greater appetite than banks for high-risk, high-return projects and equity finance tends to increase green innovation. [12] But the full and swift implementation of the Commission’s ambitious CMU Action Plan will be crucial here. Some progress is being made. The Commission has recently put forward proposals on harmonising national insolvency laws and facilitating public listing. It is also tackling issues that have held back the growth of European capital markets, like putting equity financing on an equal tax-footing with debt financing. And Europe’s recent agreement on a minimum level of taxation for large corporates will support tax harmonisation within the EU, the absence of which has often been seen as a barrier to capital market integration. [13]  The third big challenge facing Europe is the high inflation environment. And this, of course, is the challenge that concerns me the most. Inflation in Europe is far too high, partly due to our vulnerability to the changing geopolitics of energy. Decoupling from Russia last year pushed up energy inflation in the euro area to extraordinary levels. But while energy inflation has recently been coming down, underlying inflation continues to rise. As a result, it is vital that inflation rates above the ECB’s 2% target do not become entrenched in the economy. We must bring inflation down. And we will deliver on this goal.
Looking ahead, the level of RMB deposits may rise or fall from time to time. This is only natural as RMB financing and investment activities take place, and as RMB funds flow in and out of the system. It is what one would expect from the growing interaction between the onshore and offshore market. Similarly, the pricing of RMB funds, indicated by the offshore RMB interest rates, will also adjust in response to the fund flows, thereby restoring the balance in the supply and demand of RMB funds. So, is the RMB liquidity pool in Hong Kong big enough? I would respond that since the scope of RMB business has already expanded from merely deposit-taking to a much wider range of banking and financial activities, the amount of RMB customer deposit is only a partial measure of RMB liquidity or the overall state of play of RMB business in Hong Kong. What is more important is how efficient the pool of RMB is moving around the system. That is, whether we are seeing the channelling of RMB savings to investments, through bank lending, bond issuance and other activities. After all, financial business is about the circulation of money, rather than everyone holding a stagnant pool of money. The second question that I am often asked is whether the wider use of RMB and the development of offshore RMB business are still on a rising trajectory.

These changes should have no impact on the reform agenda and so I won’t pursue them further in this lecture. The PRA Board is independently responsible for delivering the PRA’s statutory objectives. It does this by making policies and rules, supervising authorised firms, giving directions, issuing guidance and carrying out other legislative functions. In practice the Board is the senior supervisory committee in the PRA, but delegates some of its functions to the PRA Chief Executive who in turn delegates to the management and staff. In 2014/15 the Board met physically 32 times and had one additional teleconference. That’s enough scene-setting. Let’s get on to the reforms themselves. Capital: banks Arguably the single most important objective of a prudential regulator is to make sure that firms have an appropriate level of capital. The objective is two-fold. First, there must be sufficient capital to absorb the losses that a firm might make, even under relatively pronounced stress. Second, after the stress, there should be sufficient capital left such that the firm can either (a) carry on its critical economic functions, with customers and market counterparties believing it remains safe and sound, enabling market access to funding and capital or (b) be safely wound up. It was evident during the financial crisis that the point at which a financial firm is no longer trusted by customers or counterparties can come before it runs out of capital completely or even approaches that level.
On average, total wage costs are expected to rise by just under 4 per cent per year during 2004-2005. Inflation in line with target Inflation has fallen back slightly in recent months, although less than expected. This is because energy prices have not fallen as forecast. However, when adjusted for energy prices, inflation has been lower than expected. This may be due to the fact that productivity has grown unusually strongly so far this year, while preliminary wage bargaining outcomes indicate slightly lower wage increases than expected. Over the coming months, energy prices are expected to remain at a relatively high level. Electricity prices are not anticipated to return to more normal levels until spring 2004. This means that they cannot be expected to subdue inflation over the coming year as much as was estimated during the summer. Instead, some of the restraining effect will be postponed. However, at the same time the forecast for underlying inflationary pressure is being revised upwards for 2004 and 2005, as a result of  2  BIS Review 44/2003  the slightly higher resource utilisation. As before, the future path of inflation will be greatly affected by fluctuations in energy prices. The krona exchange rate has been slightly weaker on average over the summer than the Riksbank had forecast in June. However, following the referendum the krona rate has strengthened relatively rapidly and is now in line with the earlier forecast.

This working assumption is based on the information made public by the tax authority. Possible adjustments to amounts and characteristics shall be incorporated as defined by the authority. This includes the formal definition 4  of fiscal policy that the Administration must make through a decree within the first 90 days of its mandate. Finally, the public discussion on changes in fiscal figures reinforces the need to improve the institutional framework around the issue. Any policy based on rules is effective only if it is predictable, which relies on the stability and clarity of its methodology, the commitment to comply with it and the transparency of its effective compliance. In any case, for the projections in this Report to come true, especially in terms of growth, an attentive and constructive attitude from all sectors is required. The Chilean economy may continue to grow in the short term because it has no major limitations on the macroeconomic side. The activity gap with respect to its potential is still significant, the current account deficit is moderate, financial conditions are favorable and inflation is low. If the plans of gradual normalization of monetary policy in the developed countries remain in place, the external conditions will continue to be good. Finally, the Central Bank will maintain the monetary impulse until it sees clear signs of inflation converging to the target and will then withdraw it gradually. However, this recovery of growth will occur most certainly, if investment recovers accordingly.
I am very pleased to note that the academic part of our conference offers a wide range of contributions on many of the issues I have mentioned. I look forward to interesting discussions and an open exchange of views. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Andréa, who will chair the first panel. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

Mojmír Hampl: A digital currency useful for central banks? Speech by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the 7th BBVA Seminar for Public Sector Investors and Issuers, Bilbao, 27 February 2018. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, Let me begin by thanking BBVA for their kind invitation to this event. It is a pleasure to speak in front of this knowledgeable and receptive audience, and it is a pleasure for me in particular to be in Bilbao for the first time in my life. Cryptocurrencies, digital currencies, and especially bitcoin have become almost household names over the last couple of months. What is especially interesting and curious for this place – as some of you might know – is that among the hundreds of cryptocurrencies introduced in the last couple of years is one called “bilur”, which means “chain” in Euskara, the Basque language. Bilur is unique for being the first cryptocurrency explicitly linked to the price of oil. By the way, the second part of the label “cryptocurrency”, namely the currency part, is a misnomer in my eyes. No existing cryptocurrency for the time being conforms to the three basic functions of money: a store of value, a unit of account, and a medium of exchange. One cannot store value in an asset that can get 30%–50% cheaper or more expensive in a matter of days.
Based on what I’ve said today, let me identify four such questions:  -  First, do we understand why intermediaries struggled to make effective markets in core government bond, money and foreign exchange instruments at crucial moments during the crisis? Was it simply the sheer scale of the shock, combined with the operational challenges of remote working? Or did regulatory constraints also play a role? If there are circumstances where our traditional counterparties aren’t able to intermediate, do we need to fix that at source? Or do central banks need to change the design of their balance sheet facilities more profoundly to fill that gap? -  Second, are we comfortable with the central role played by highly-leveraged but thinly-capitalised non-banks in arbitraging between key financial markets, if the unwinding of those trades can amplify instability so starkly? -  Third, how do we deal with the risks posed to financial stability by the structural tendency for Money Market and some other open-ended funds to be prone to runs, without having to commit scarce public money to costly support facilities? -  And, fourth, how can we ensure timely transition away from LIBOR, whose weaknesses were highlighted so starkly by the crisis? The Bank’s Financial Policy Committee will be reflecting on these and other issues in the months ahead. Closer to home, there are lessons too for us in some of the ways of working that we’ve been forced to explore whilst in lockdown.

Seven Moments in Spring: Covid-19, financial markets and the Bank of England’s balance sheet operations Speech given by Andrew Hauser, Executive Director, Markets  Bloomberg, London 4 June 2020  I am grateful to Gregory Kidd for his help in writing this speech, and to Andrew Bailey, James Benford, Christine Boykiw, Ben Broadbent, Nicholas Butt, Rohan Churm, Victoria Cleland, Amber Evans, Michael Foster, Richard Gordon, Sarah Hall, Andrew Harley, Ronan Hodge, Al Hughes, Lance Jones, Adam Newell, Will Parry, Rhys Phillips, Jo Place, Eugenia Planas, Dave Ramsden and Tim Taylor for their advice, comments and guidance. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Introduction  I have always had a funny feeling about Friday the 13th – and 13 March 2020, Mark Carney’s last day in the office as Governor of the Bank of England, was no exception. Two days earlier, on Wednesday 11 March, the Bank and HM Treasury had launched an unprecedentedly comprehensive package of measures to respond to the rapidly growing economic consequences of the spread of Covid-19. Hailed globally as a shining example of how monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies could work together to reinforce one another, the combination of interest rate cuts, government spending, cheap funding and capital easing measures seemed sure to stabilise markets and restore some muchneeded confidence to households and businesses. So it cannot have been hugely welcome when, on Friday morning, with the removal vans waiting outside, I suggested the Bank’s Governors needed to meet again before the weekend.