samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The risks we face are: first that we may increase interest rates too fast or push them up too far, with an unnecessary loss of growth, and second that we may raise rates too slowly with a cost in higher inflation and potentially higher interest rates and a sharper slowdown in the end. I voted for a further increase earlier this month partly because I was not convinced that current rates would be sufficient to bring credit growth and nominal demand back to their long term sustainable path. I also felt that the impact of moving too slowly on the credibility of the regime and thus the future prospects for the economy was of greater concern, given the robust rate of growth, than an unnecessary slowdown in activity. In reviewing the position again in future months I will be watching the trends in the growth of credit and money carefully. BIS Review 73/2007  7  8  BIS Review 73/2007  BIS Review 73/2007  9  10  BIS Review 73/2007  BIS Review 73/2007  11

Major progress has been made in terms of fiscal consolidation and the enhancement of the euro area governance framework. But we are not there yet. Governments need to urgently implement their fiscal consolidation programmes and to accompany these with well-designed structural reforms in the labour and product markets. The new fiscal and macroeconomic rules of the European governance framework need to be implemented to the letter. And the crisis management mechanisms at the euro area level need to be designed so as to ensure financial stability in the euro area. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Implementation of the New Accord  (a)  Overview  Today, the Committee is close to finalizing the new capital framework, and I know that many banks and supervisors in different countries have already begun to think about the practical implications  2  BIS Review 7/2003  surrounding implementation. This second stage of the Basel II effort is close on the horizon, and both banks and supervisors must give serious thought to what they need to do to get ready. I’d like to spend a few moments describing some of the efforts currently underway. It is no secret that implementation of the New Accord will require a substantial resource commitment on the part of banks and supervisors alike. I think it is important to emphasize that the efforts banks will need to undertake to comply with Basel II build on the efforts that some large and well-managed banks already had in train before the new framework was contemplated. I know that many banks are devoting more attention to enhance tracking and assessment of the quality of the loans they make. Further, banks have been looking to strengthen their credit assessments by employing experts who do not stand to gain from overly favorable reviews. Time and effort has also been invested in working to pull all of this together in a management information and control system that produces timely and accurate reports for senior management review.

In my view, that now points to a gradual withdrawal of some of the stimulus we provided to the economy in more difficult circumstances last year – not so much as to undermine the recovery, but to keep it on a low inflation path, consistent with the Committee’s remit. 7  10  See Sentance (2009a) and Sentance (2009b) for a more detailed discussion. BIS Review 99/2010  References Eurostat (2010) “Regional GDP per inhabitant in 2007”, Press Release 25/2010 – 18 February 2010 Lee, N. (2010) “No city left behind”, published by the Work Foundation, July 2010 Sentance, A. (2009a) “Monetary policy in turbulent times” Speech at the Agricultural Engineers Association Annual Conference, Institution of Civil Engineers in London on 21 April 2009 Sentance, A. (2009b) “Energy and environmental challenges in the new global economy” Speech at the British Institute of Energy Economics Sustainable Energy Seminar, London on 21 September 2009  BIS Review 99/2010  11
In particular, in developing our financial ecosystem, we are helping the financial sector fill the capacity gap in knowledge, talent and data. We are also taking steps to create a more supportive platform to enable green and sustainable finance to take off, not just in Hong Kong but also on the Mainland and in the region as a whole. In terms of technology, we have laid solid foundations that have already made virtual banking and faster payments a part of daily life. We are now accelerating the digital transformation by encouraging all banks to harness the power of data to promote financial efficiency and inclusion. We are pioneering research and pilot schemes in domestic and cross-border central-bank digital currencies. We are very pleased that the PBoC is our close partner in the m-CBDC Bridge project and the technical trials for cross-boundary use of e-CNY. Conclusion There is much more to say about these exciting topics, and I have no doubt that much more will be said during this afternoon’s seminar. I began with the question of whether Hong Kong has the attributes of an IFC. My answer is a clear and resounding “yes”. Yes, because of what we have achieved collectively through building our ecosystem and our resilience; and yes, because of what is achievable in future through the many opportunities that lie ahead. I now look forward to what promises to be a very interesting and productive afternoon. Thank you. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Petroleum revenues are gradually phased into the economy, approximately in pace with the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund.” The first sentence can be seen as a justification for a gradual phasing in of petroleum revenues. A phasing in of revenues based on using the expected real return on the Petroleum Fund must be said to be reasonably controlled and gradual. Another aspect is that the plans do not call for using the actual wealth. However, the expansionary impetus to the economy in any one year will depend on the time profile for the accumulation of capital in the Petroleum Fund. 8  BIS Review 7/2002  There was broad support in the Storting for the guidelines. Both the previous and current Government have placed considerable emphasis on adhering to these guidelines in the government budget for 2002. The use of petroleum revenues is calculated on the basis of the structural, non-oil deficit. This means that, in general, changes in activity levels in the economy do not influence the use of petroleum revenues. This also implies that fiscal policy will contribute to curbing fluctuations through automatic stabilisers. In years with a high level of activity, the actual budget deficit will be smaller than the structural deficit. In years with a low level of activity, the actual deficit will be higher. It is the level, and not changes in economic activity, that influences the structural deficit.
But am I painting too black a picture? What is the outlook for Icelanders’ foreign debts and re-financing needs in the next few years? This subject has been discussed repeatedly in the recent past, and opinions vary. Some go so far as to maintain that the economy will collapse under the weight of its debt and the Treasury will become insolvent. Fortunately, a careful analysis of the available information reveals this turn of events to be unlikely. There is still considerable uncertainty about what the Icelandic economy’s net external position will be once the air clears after the fall of the banks. Currently underway is a process involving writing down the private sector’s external assets and liabilities, with offsetting transactions in many instances because of bankruptcy proceedings. According to official balance of payments figures, Iceland’s net external liabilities amounted to 5.6 trillion krónur at the end of 2009, or nearly four times GDP, and about 0.4 trillion krónur without the failed banks, or just under one-third of GDP. The underlying position that can be expected to emerge once the dust has settled will probably lie somewhere between the position excluding the failed banks and the position that reigned in Iceland during the decade before the crisis. The exact result will depend, among other things, on the distribution of domestic and foreign creditors in the creditor group and the classification of the old banks’ assets as domestic and foreign. The Central Bank has made regular efforts to assess this.

Although a great deal remains unknown about what happened in the financial institutions that collapsed and in the preparation of Government responses before and after the crisis struck, we also know a great deal about what was lacking in regulatory framework and supervision – particularly the elements that Iceland shares with many other countries. In the international arena, there has been extensive discussion of the flaws in regulation and supervision, and improvements are being implemented already. The Central Bank of Iceland is keeping close track of this work, not least through its membership to the Bank for International Settlements in Basel and its collaboration in European and Nordic fora. To my mind, the most important weaknesses in this regard – and they are not limited to Iceland – are the following: First, too much attention was paid to risks in individual institutions, while a comprehensive assessment of risk in the financial system as a whole was much less developed. The old adage – that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts – was forgotten. Second, the institutional framework was flawed, in that it did not promote such a comprehensive assessment of risk. It was unclear who was responsible for responding to systemic risk, and there were too few tools for addressing it, such as variable capital requirements and other restrictions to combat lending and asset bubbles and set limits on risk appetite. Third, liquidity risk was underestimated, not least risk related to liquidity management between currencies and financial institutions’ re-financing in foreign currency.
Comparing this set of conditions to that in 2010, the recent slowing of inflation has been less widespread across core goods and core services, and inflation expectations so far have declined less appreciably than they did in 2010. Thus, my best guess is that core goods prices will begin to firm in the months ahead as global demand begins to strengthen and inventories get into better alignment with sales. 1  2  CoreLogic Report Shows Home Prices Rise by 12.1 Percent Year Over Year in April. BIS central bankers’ speeches  As is always the case, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding this forecast. Moreover, there is always the possibility of some unforeseen shock. Thus, we will be monitoring U.S. and global economic conditions very carefully and will adjust our views on the likely path for growth, inflation and the unemployment rate accordingly in response to new information. At its meeting last week, the FOMC decided to continue its accommodative policy stance. It reaffirmed its expectation that the current low range for the federal funds rate target will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6.5 percent, so long as inflation and inflation expectations remain well-behaved. It is important to remember that these conditions are thresholds, not triggers. The FOMC also maintained its purchases of $ billion per month in agency MBS and $ billion per month in Treasury securities, with a stated goal of promoting a substantial improvement in the labor market outlook in a context of price stability.

As a result, we are now experiencing a fairly typical cyclical recovery of consumer spending on durable goods. For example, light-weight motor vehicles sold at a seasonally-adjusted annual rate of 15.3 million in May, not far from the 16.1 million sales in 2007. Similarly, after five years in which housing production was well below what is consistent with underlying demographic trends, it now appears that we have worked off the excess supply of housing built up during the boom years of the last decade. Housing starts and sales are now on a clear upward trend, and a widely followed national home price index is up around  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  12 percent over the twelve months ending in April.1 Indeed, anecdotal reports suggest that this higher-than-expected increase in home prices is due to a lack of homes for sale. Unfortunately, the improvements in consumer spending on durable goods and housing are not yet showing through in the overall GDP growth rate due to the significant headwinds that we continue to face. First, federal fiscal policy has recently become quite contractionary. Estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) indicate that this fiscal restraint is on the order of 1.75 percentage points of potential GDP this year. In the period since 1960, there have been only two previous episodes of fiscal contraction of this order of magnitude – 1969 and 1987 – both of which occurred when the economy was on a more solid footing than it is today.
It also reflects the Bank’s desire to accelerate the development of the industry and promote its continuous renewal by making it easier for qualified individuals to offer their expertise and services, thereby expanding access for the public to financial advice while continuously raising the bar in innovative solutions for those seeking advice. We believe the new capital requirement strikes a better balance between the traits that we want to nurture within the industry and the financial commitment that remains important to ensure that those who we license are invested in the development and success of their firms. The Bank, in close consultation with AFA as well as the Malaysian Financial Planning Council (MFPC) and Financial Planning Association of Malaysia (FPAM), has also reviewed and agreed to an expanded list of minimum qualifications to become a financial adviser’s representative. The review identified four core areas of knowledge – namely financial  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  planning, risk management, insurance planning and investment planning – which are considered essential to equip a financial adviser’s representative to provide proper advice on insurance or takaful solutions. These areas have been preserved under the expanded list of minimum qualifications, while allowing greater flexibility for other qualifications to be included. This change has halved the cost and time required for individuals to attain the qualification requirements.

An additional dimension of the monetary policy decision of last Friday is to clearly separate the implications for the MPR of recalibrating the monetary impulse in the face of the current configuration of structural parameters and economic variables, of the responses that might be necessary in the face of the evolution of macroeconomic conditions. As I have stressed in this presentation, the world economy is experiencing a delicate moment, where a declining phase of the cycle is combined with high policy uncertainty in the world's leading economies and where financial markets rely heavily—perhaps too much—on the will of the central banks to react to episodes of volatility. Although the world economy continues to grow, we note with concern the escalation and expansion of trade conflicts, a stagnation of international trade, deteriorating expectations and frequent episodes of market volatility. In these circumstances, as we have pointed out before, the Chilean economy, despite its commercial and financial openness, has powerful buffers, given by the exchange rate, the depth of the domestic financial market and the anchoring of expectations. However, it also has room for robust policy responses, particularly of monetary policy. Having solved the past imbalances of the MPR helps us identify future phenomena and apply the proper responses. On other occasions we have said that the Central Bank of Chile is prepared to face new challenges. Recent decisions include an additional element in this statement: the evidence that we have the capacity to identify important changes and react with the necessary speed.
Such an economy would need to ensure maximum scope for fiscal policy to buffer shocks that would otherwise lead to unacceptable swings in unemployment. This would require a rather conservative underlying fiscal policy in normal times to avoid a loss of confidence at times when fiscal stimulus is needed. Similarly, a very open economy that chooses a flexible exchange rate regime must ensure that its policies are set in a long-term framework that establishes a clear anchor for inflation. Otherwise, external shocks that cause large movements in the exchange rate can lead to policy uncertainties and broader instability. These lessons have been learnt well, and the view that overall macroeconomic policies must complement the functioning of the exchange rate regime is now generally accepted. Unfortunately, the challenges do not end there. Ensuring that macroeconomic policies are mutually consistent is merely a necessary — not sufficient — condition for ensuring stability in a world experiencing an explosion in capital flows. The volume, velocity and volatility of global capital movements introduce a whole new dimension to policy making — a dimension that is relatively recent, and one that we are only gradually learning to deal with. How do capital flows affect the sustainability of exchange rate and monetary policies? There is a school of thought that maintains that mobile international capital can play a useful global role as a sort of ‘policeman’ of sound policies.

We at the ECB don’t want this phase  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  of low rates to become normality either. But we still have a pressing need for the low rates so as to get inflation firmly back to 2% and to protect the euro area recovery. But we are a long way from 2% inflation because of the low oil price. The ECB will have to lower its inflation forecast. Our next staff inflation projections are due in March. Already in January we said that inflation will only very slowly move back towards 2%. Compared with the situation in December we are seeing new downside risks. The main causes are the falling price of oil and a decline in global growth. In the past few days we have also seen greater volatility on the financial markets. If that continues for too long, it can also increase the risk of a rise in inflation being delayed. The continued low interest rates are unsettling savers, especially in Germany. What’s your advice to savers? We have to get inflation to below, but close to, 2% again; that has been our definition of price stability for a long time. Why are interest rates so low? Because the return on capital has declined in the economy. To keep the low interest phase as short as possible we need more private investment as well as government policies which create the conditions for profitable projects to emerge. Meanwhile we can help savers best by keeping policy interest rates low.
When I met a group of Japanese industrialists recently, they lamented that the target date of 2020 to achieve the ASEAN Economic Community was too far away. They urged ASEAN to integrate aster into one single market so that it would be an attractive destination for Japanese investments besides China. Terrorism and regional security are major problem areas. The fight against terror will continue for many years. Victory can only be achieved through a sustained and united global effort. The most important dimension of the fight is the ideological one - between mainstream Islam and the extremist elements. If the extremists are not defeated in this intra-Islam ideological fight, there will be a constant supply of terrorists out to create terror and chaos. Tensions have heightened in the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula. While Taiwan’s economy is becoming increasingly intertwined with China’s, politically, Taiwan appears to be taking steps to move permanently away from China. The risk of a miscalculation leading to military conflict is high in the next few years. The consequences of such a war will make the war in Iraq look like a skirmish. Asia will be in turmoil. Its development will be set back for many years. North Korea is another potential trouble spot. Fortunately, whatever their differences, the key players share a common interest in the peaceful containment of the issue. III. Five-year strategic plan  What does this mean for us in MAS? It means we have to anticipate events and plan for uncertainties.

Some firms have established their regional headquarters here. These companies have helped to broaden the range of products here beyond plain vanilla equity mutual fund products and develop more sophisticated skills and expertise. MAS has decided to place out an additional $ billion to external fund managers. The funds will be invested in Asian equity and fixed income markets. This recognises the investment opportunities in Asia and will also help to anchor and grow specialist skills in Asian investments in our financial centre. This will be on top of what GIC recently announced it will place out for external management. Liquidity and depth in Singapore’s treasury and capital markets is another critical success factor for our financial centre. Singapore can serve global issuers and investors as the gateway to ASEAN markets. We want to promote the ASEAN region as an asset class for capital markets investments. We will work with key players, including the Singapore Exchange (SGX), to forge regional exchange linkages, integrate market infrastructure, harmonise regulatory frameworks and promote regional electronic bond trading. SGX already has a link with the Australian Stock Exchange and is in discussions with Bursa Malaysia and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The ASEAN Finance Ministers agreed at their meeting in April to explore alliances and linkages among ASEAN securities markets to facilitate access to these less mature markets by international investors. A Linkages Task Force, chaired by MAS, will make its recommendations next year.