However, with less than three years of being fully transparent about our future policy intentions, it is too early to draw a conclusion regarding macroeconomic stability. An intermediate objective of communication is to provide a better understanding of the Bank’s reaction pattern. One test of this to consider the volatility of market interest rates on the day Norges Bank decides the interest rate. If the new communication approach has been successful, one should expect that the interest rate decisions are more predictable. Chart 5 shows the magnitude of market rate changes on the day the interest rate is decided. We see that volatility in market interest rates has on average been smaller after we started publishing our interest rate forecasts. Although one cannot exclude the possibility that the reduction in volatility is caused by other factors than policy communication, it seems that our reaction pattern has become somewhat better understood. One internal effect of publishing interest rate forecasts is that it provides discipline in the internal decision process and good incentives for the staff. I have observed how transparency has changed the motivation and discipline of the economists within Norges Bank. By publishing our own interest rate forecast, each sector expert will see how his or her judgment might affect policy. Moreover, by following the principle that what is communicated externally should reflect the internal decision process, we need to think extra hard about what we do internally. Transparency makes the public better capable of evaluating the central bank’s analyses and policy assessments.

Monetary policy has also benefited from a better government finance situation now compared with 10-20 years ago when there was a trend rise in debt ratios, i.e. government debt as a percentage of GDP, in the majority of OECD countries. Healthier government finances are contributing to stronger macroeconomic performance. Lower borrowing requirements in the public sector contribute firstly to lower real interest rates, which stimulate investment and growth. Secondly, stable government finances boost the credibility of monetary policy. During periods of large deficits and burgeoning government debt there is always a risk from a lender’s point of view that the government will attempt to reduce the real burden of the debt by eroding its real value through increased inflation. The high interest rate levels that Sweden experienced in the wake of the crisis years 1991-93, when nominal long-term rates stood at 12 per cent, was a result of high risk premiums on Swedish bonds owing to lenders’ concerns after a period in which the government debt had risen dramatically. Thirdly, balanced government finances allow automatic stabilisers to have their full effect. This means that demand can be sustained in the economy thanks to unemployment benefit and other factors when economic activity slows if the government finances are in such shape that there is sufficient economic leeway to finance the automatic stabilisers. Generally speaking a more stable climate benefits the economy in many ways. Lower inflation brings with it lower volatility in inflation.