samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One prime example of this preventive work is the recent joint statements from the CNMV and the Banco de España warning the general public of the risks in relation to crypto-assets. Another example, specific to financial education, is the set of actions envisaged under the National Financial Education Plan. 1  We support this preventive work by exercising our corrective powers, wherever regulations and jurisdiction so allow, and by advocating legislative initiatives with regulators and legislators to remedy any shortcomings that we identify. The main strength of this protocol is that it deepens the cooperation needed to efficiently and effectively carry out our functions. This collaboration will also help to delimit each signatory’s respective field of action. Close cooperation between supervisors is particularly important in this domain, since we are often confronted with schemes that do not fit easily within a single regulatory field or sphere of competence. The idea is to avoid any grey areas where potential criminals can commit financial fraud. Not only are financial supervisors involved in the protocol, but so too are players as important and diverse as the public prosecution service, law enforcement authorities and associations representing notaries, registrars, the financial sector and the media. This, we are certain, will be a critical advantage in our efforts to combat financial fraud in both the preventive and corrective dimension. A warm welcome, then, to this initiative, which will have the Banco de España’s full support. 2

While some degree of forbearance may be unavoidable and even appropriate under the right conditions, it is at best a temporary measure. It is critical that forbearance not become institutionalized,  2  BIS Review 10/2001  but be tied directly to actions by both bankers and supervisors to address underlying problems. •  Governments are not good long-term asset managers. Prolonged government holding of impaired assets is not likely to enhance their value, nor aid in the restoration of market liquidity. •  Governments are not good commercial bankers. Delayed privatization of nationalized banks always means higher future costs, and usually inhibits fundamental reform. •  Government-directed lending means future fiscal losses. Similarly, efforts to stimulate credit growth by nonmarket forces in the context of a banking crisis at best buy additional time, and usually dig a deeper hole. •  Foreign investment in domestic financial sectors can yield important benefits. Foreign direct investment in the banking sector can provide much-needed capital resources, technology and knowledge transfer, and a more diversified capital and funding base in the event of future economic instability. •  Financial sectors are only as healthy as their borrowers. Without corresponding corporate sector restructuring, financial sector rescue efforts are likely to be necessary in the future. •  Strong financial systems depend on a reliable and credible legal system. In the absence of a strong legal system, borrowers lack appropriate incentives to repay. •  There are no "quick fixes" to financial sector problems.
“Nothing is so boundless as the sea, nothing so patient.”1 So begins Alexander Kielland’s first novel. Kielland, who was born and raised in Stavanger, could scarcely suspect the inconceivable wealth the sea was so patiently concealing under the sea floor. The discovery of oil was the start of an amazing era for the Norwegian economy. When the first oil was brought to the surface in 1971, income levels in Norway were low compared with other western countries (see Chart 1). The picture has reversed since then. We have gradually caught up to the wealthiest nations. Measured by GDP per capita, Norway now ranks at the top (see Chart 2). The large revenues from the oil industry have been managed soundly. Norway’s economy is in good order. Well-functioning institutions and a high degree of trust between different groups in society provided a good starting point. At an early stage, it was established that the oil and gas resources belong to the Norwegian people. The tax system and framework conditions for the petroleum industry were designed so that the large revenues would accrue to the state. The stage was set for greater prosperity, with prospects for growth in both public and private consumption. The discovery of oil in the North Sea provided ample opportunities for Norwegian business and industry. The extraction of oil at great sea depths would require the development of new technologies.

Large shares of the sizeable oil revenues were transferred to our sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). GPFG assets are now more than double the GDP of Norway’s mainland economy. High oil prices and a profitable petroleum production industry have been accompanied by record-high oil investment in recent years (see Chart 4). The level in 2014 was equivalent to overall investment in domestic non-oil industries. The positive spillovers to the oil service industry and other private operators have been substantial. Employment has remained high and unemployment low, even when the financial crisis hit in 2008. The Norwegian economy has made use of favourable winds and seized the opportunities offered. The other side of the coin is an economy that has become increasingly dependent on oil, and thereby more vulnerable to changes in oil prices and petroleum revenues. The vulnerability manifests itself in several ways. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A large share of the business sector and the labour market is now linked to the oil industry. A relatively small share is directly employed in the oil and gas production industry. But if account is taken of all the suppliers to the petroleum sector, about 1 in 9 jobs in Norway, a total of 300 000, are linked to the oil industry.2 Exports from Norway to the oil industry in other countries account for a growing share of this activity, and this may be a path forward in the face of a decline in petroleum investment in Norway.
According to micro simulations conducted by Banco de España staff, 68% of firms would have liquidity shortfalls2 between  2  The definition used here considers that a firm has a liquidity shortfall when cash inflows, basically arising from the sales of products or services, are below the payments relating to their operating activity (supplies, rentals, financial expenses and personnel costs) and those arising from their decisions to invest in fixed assets and debt repayments. 3  April and December 2020, almost 10 pp higher than under a counterfactual scenario of no pandemic3. It is estimated that the corporate sector’s overall liquidity shortfalls between Q2 and Q4 2020 will amount to around EUR 230 billion. Ignoring liquidity needs associated with investment in fixed assets, which are less relevant for liquidity risks as this expenditure has a lower degree of commitment and can more easily be avoided, the liquidity shortfall during the same period is estimated to be around EUR 25 bn higher than under the no-pandemic counterfactual scenario. Additionally, results show that more than half of these liquidity needs could not be covered through the use of both firms’ liquid assets and the undrawn amounts of their credit lines. These simulations also show that a prominent portion of firms’ aggregate liquidity needs would be generated by companies of low credit quality, which are expected to have more difficulty gaining access to credit, especially in periods of high uncertainty and increasing concerns over credit risks.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 18 December 2020. * * * Today, we have kept our key rate at the level of 4.25% per annum. As regards our view of the economic situation, there have been no significant changes since October’s meeting of the Board of Directors. However, inflation is driven by diverse factors. The Board of Directors now does not consider that the ratio of proinflationary and disinflationary factors and risks is clearly shifted towards disinflationary ones, as has been estimated earlier. I would like to dwell on the aspects we were taking into account when making our decision today. Firstly, current annual inflation notably exceeds the path assumed in our October’s forecast. Inflation is expected to be in the range of 4.6–4.9% as of the end of 2020. Price growth has accelerated due to a number of factors, including the situation in individual food markets. Prices have become more volatile in these markets primarily because of the rise in global food prices and the weaker ruble. Exchange rate movements are also affecting non-food prices. According to our estimates, prices are driven by the pass-through of not only the ruble’s weakening in autumn, but also its changes since spring 2020. In spring, manufacturers and retailers could defer the pass-through of the weaker ruble to prices amid subdued demand and inventories accumulated earlier at previous input prices.
However, they do not benefit from the same regulatory safeguards that aim to put a limit on those risks and to ensure that they are properly recognised, monitored and managed. Moreover, crypto-asset infrastructures and activities, beyond expanding outside the regulatory perimeter, have done so by including products, services and practices that carry certain specificities. From a risk perspective, these specific features may either amplify traditional vulnerabilities or introduce new ones, and should fall within the scope of regulation and supervision. Let me illustrate this point with two examples. The first concerns financial integrity risk. Attention should be paid to this risk for two reasons: first, because, as shown by our supervisory experience at the ACPR, AMLCFT controls by service providers appear to be difficult to grasp and master, and are sometimes not performed in the crypto ecosystem, and second, because investors have the possibility of using and holding crypto-assets pseudonymously. The second concerns cyber risk. It is currently the number one operational risk for financial players, and it has the ability to jeopardise the stability of the entire financial system. The exposure of the crypto ecosystem to this risk could be exacerbated by its technical specificities, including the recourse to blockchains, and the introduction of new points of vulnerability such as bridges between blockchains and so-called oracles that feed data into blockchains. In my opinion, the repeatedly successful cyberattacks aimed at crypto players are a warning signal that should capture the attention of regulators and supervisors.

Managing their liabilities in such a way as to ensure that these vital services continue to be provided, and citizens view that they are getting appropriate value in exchange for their taxes is a daunting challenge. I am happy to see such a distinguished group assembled here at the Bank to address this challenge. Good luck in your work and I look forward to learning of the results of today’s discussions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Perhaps from your point of view it should be called insourcing. If risks are properly identified and priced, the PFI potentially can provide the longerterm bond-type investments that many of you are seeking. It offers great opportunities to all of you. This revolution has only just begun. 20 A third issue that is particularly relevant now is technology. It has undoubtedly contributed to property obsolescence. But technology is potentially an important ally, and in more senses than one. Developments in building and construction techniques, as well as smaller and more powerful machinery and computer technology, facilitate the construction of buildings BIS Review 11/1997  -5-  that meet occupiers’ needs. Information technology enhances the usability and efficiency of property as an asset class. Just as Mr. Otis made skyscrapers possible, one of you will create completely new configurations of site exploitation - or develop new and integrated relationships between different buildings. The automobile and advertising have entirely altered the shape, size, appearance and location of shops in the USA - and to a lesser extent here. But today’s offices still look pretty much to me like those designed by Frank Lloyd Wright. Is there scope for an IT driven revolution in the next eight years in which the working environment is transformed into a virtual reality? I do not know but I am convinced we ain’t seen nothing yet. 21 The fourth factor could make an important difference - greater market liquidity and instruments such as derivatives which will facilitate short-term tactical positiontaking or investment.

During the period of rapid digital transformations, there is no denying that digital divide can worsen, especially in emerging economies. There will be those with access, are able to take advantage of technological advancement, and prosper; and those who lack access or capability to leverage on modern technology, fall behind, and perish. Finding that right balancing will certainly be a challenge for us, central bankers, but it can be an area where international collaboration and networking platforms, like the SEACEN Centre, can play a role. Refining the knowns, looking ahead for the unknowns, and balancing our actions. These are how we should approach our policy questions. I am glad the SEACEN and its organizers have selected a number of topics that will allow us to think deeply about digital transformations and implications for central banks and encourage that future SEACEN activities put even greater emphasis on how we can balance our policy actions and enhance collaboration among members in this new area. I would also like to thank the group of scholars and practitioners here with us today, who will share their thoughts on many important topics, help broaden our perceptions of the knowns, and shed some lights on the unknowns. 3/4  And on this note, allow me to introduce Governor Duvvuri Subbarao, Former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India and currently a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies of the National University of Singapore.
In terms of solvency, the position of the Spanish banking industry has improved significantly in recent years, thanks to the reforms implemented in the industry, the strengthening of regulation and supervision, and the recovery in economic activity that has taken place in Spain. It should be recalled that the regulatory response to the financial crisis led to a substantial increase in capital requirements, as part of a raft of measures geared to minimising the probability of bank crises and to reducing their impact if they do occur, in particular in terms of the use of public funds. Not only were the own funds requirements increased for institutions but also the quality of own funds (i.e. their loss absorbing capacity) was improved, through the introduction of a number of more restrictive criteria for the determination of eligible capital, known as “common equity tier 1” (CET1). Thus, in terms of CET1, although the Spanish banking system still has a ratio below that of the main European countries, its strengthening in recent years has been notable: by more than one percentage point on average since its introduction in 2014. As at December 2016 this ratio for the Spanish banking industry as a whole reached 12.8%, exceeding the regulatory minimum requirements and standing not far from the average for banks supervised by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which is close to 14%.

Matters such as the privacy of personal information, security, the risk of cyberattacks or even the risk of exclusion, must 6/8  be monitored and, where appropriate, duly regulated. Regulation has to achieve a balance, protecting financial stability and confidence in the system, without unjustifiably hindering the exploitation of these technological innovations by industry and society in general. It is still too soon to gauge the impact of the technological revolution on the traditional banking sector. I believe that technological innovations will complement traditional banking activities, but to achieve this banks must be sufficiently flexible and dynamic to reap the benefits of technological innovation. There is no question that innovation is also favouring the proliferation of new fintech firms, of highly varying profiles and business models, which may conceivably compete with traditional banks in a specific part of the banking value chain, but are more likely to engage in new ancillary services. One example is joint financing through online platforms, known as “crowdfunding”. It is an alternative source of financing which may offer certain improvements over traditional banking in terms of convenience, speed and cost. But risks have also been identified, such as a potential increase in fraud or greater weaknesses in terms of investor confidence. There is a well-known case of a Swedish P2P platform which went bankrupt late last year after the detection of malpractices in credit extension, prompting a fall in the activity of the sector and closer regulatory attention.
The risks in global financial integration However, along with the benefits, there are also risks from the growing financial integration. A more integrated global financial system has a tendency to amplify financial shocks and transmit them throughout the system. As Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the US FED, once put it, “These global financial markets, engendered by the rapid proliferation of cross-border financial flows and products, have developed a capability of transmitting mistakes at a far faster pace throughout the financial system in ways that were unknown a generation ago.” 1  1  2  Alan Greenspan, Understanding today’s international financial system, 34th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 7 May 1998. BIS central bankers’ speeches  This could not have been better illustrated then how the financial crisis in the major economies spread to the rest of the world through the network of financial relationships. The consequent conflagration in the global financial markets had a significant negative impact on economies around the world. For EMEs, the subsequent actions of the policymakers in the crisis-affected economies have created additional significant policy challenges in trying to manage the cross-border contagion in the form volatility of their exchange rates and financial markets. Malaysia was not spared from this volatility. We have experienced the contagion from what was happening in the major economies.

But over the same period, Malaysians have also been investing abroad. The stock of resident private sector investments abroad increased almost nine-fold to $ billion. About half of this was in the form of direct investments and another half in the form of portfolio and other investments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  About 67% of the stock of foreign investments in Malaysia is in the form of portfolio and other investments. This reflects the high openness of Malaysia’s capital account and the significant deepening of its financial markets. As a consequence, foreign interest in our markets has increased. Even as our equity market has grown, so has non-resident participation, keeping non-resident’s share fairly steady at around 24%. In the bond market, non-resident holdings of Malaysian Government Securities has increased steadily since 2009, and now accounts for a relatively stable share of about 47% of total outstanding MGS. Given the more significant foreign presence in our financial markets, the definition of Malaysia’s external debt was expanded to include foreign holding of ringgit financial assets. About 40% of Malaysia’s redefined external debt is ringgit denominated debt held by nonresidents. In the years before the crisis, there was also a relatively strong correlation between the performance of the Malaysian bond and equity markets and the international markets, particularly those in the US. Since the crisis, that relationship has diminished significantly as the large amounts of liquidity has flowed back and forth between the emerging market economies (EMEs) and the AEs.
The value of the Norwegian krone against the Deutsche mark was nearly halved between 1973 and 1987. We paid about 2 kroner for 1 mark in 1973 and close to 4 kroner in 1987. Since 1987, the krone exchange rate against the Deutsche mark has remained more or less unchanged. During this period, price inflation in Norway has been no higher than that in Germany. We cannot be sure how fast the inflation differential between Norway and other countries will translate into changes in nominal exchange rates in the future. Nevertheless, we must expect that any differences in the rate of inflation may be a key cause of changes in the nominal krone exchange rate over time. The Norwegian monetary authorities abandoned the devaluation approach in 1986. From 1986 to 1992 Norway had a fixed exchange rate with a defined central rate and fluctuation margins. This system was abandoned in 1992 following extensive speculation against the krone in connection with the turbulence in European exchange markets. After the krone was allowed to float on 10 December 1992, the guidelines for monetary policy were also revised. Monetary policy was still oriented towards the objective of krone exchange rate stability, but no specific central rate with fluctuation margins was stipulated. The krone depreciated slightly in 1992, but thereafter it remained relatively stable. Looking back at developments in the Norwegian foreign exchange market in the 1990s, no significant change really appears to have occurred in 1992. However, there was a marked shift in January 1997.

In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank places emphasis on satisfying the fundamental preconditions for exchange rate stability against the euro: instruments must be oriented with a view to reducing price and cost inflation to the level aimed at by the European Central Bank (ECB). At the BIS Review 105/2000  8  same time, monetary policy must not in itself contribute to deflationary recessions, as this could undermine confidence in the krone. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the main objective of the ECB is the maintenance of price stability. The ECB has defined price stability as inflation of less than 2%. Inflation in Norway cannot remain higher than inflation in the euro area year after year without this having consequences for the exchange rate of the Norwegian krone against the euro. If price and cost inflation remains higher than the rate of increase aimed at by the ECB over a long period, our experience indicates that the krone will depreciate against the euro sooner or later. Norges Bank must therefore counter such a development. There are institutional differences between the Norwegian monetary policy regime and monetary policy in countries with an inflation target. Norges Bank will inform the government authorities (via the Ministry of Finance) if measures other than those available to the central bank are required in the event that the krone exchange rate cannot be returned to its initial range without creating inflation or a deflationary recession.