samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The credibility of the central bank and our monetary policy is now a tangible reality for Albania. It is reflected in the trust of our economy in the national currency and its purchasing power in the future. The investment made by the Bank of Albania to earn the public trust has required a lot of efforts to be made, but they get rewarded multiple times with the greater opportunities we have now to stimulate the economy without prejudice to the inflation outlook. Against this background, the Bank of Albania has provided the necessary economic stimulus, while there is still room for other additional monetary stimulus in the medium run. The accommodative policies generally aim at boosting economic activity and domestic demand, in order to keep the consumer prices within the Bank of Albania’s target in the medium run. We have also other reasons to support economic growth. We believe that if the economy grows at its potential rate, there will be substantial impact on the improvement of public and private sectors’ and individuals’ financial balance sheets. Their capacity to pay off past-due financial liabilities will subsequently improve, and their creditworthiness will enhance. I think this is one of the challenges that, on one hand, would restore the macroeconomic equilibrium to the pre-crisis level and, on the other hand, would guarantee the financial sector’s stability in the long run.

The creation of these indicators, their calculation and rating in the relevant markets would create the conditions for the real assessment of the competitive advantages that this district has to offer. The help that the local authorities can give in identifying the competitive advantages and the provision of local statistics are perhaps the best investment they can make for the regional and national development. Today, more than ever before, all the attention of global economy is oriented towards the markets, as the best estimators of the competitive advantages in the global economy. The developments in these markets are bringing about the reconfiguration of the economic powers at a global level. The new commercial and financial trends appear to be in favour of the utilization of natural resources and competitive advantages, through investments in emerging economies, to later import them in the form of final products, ready for consumption. These are advantages for the Albanian economy, which, with the major structural reforms taking place (privatizations, natural and human resources, creativity and the entrepreneurship spirit), enjoys all the opportunities and should play an active role in the regional market and beyond, in the global market. I am optimistic and I do believe in our economy and its potentials. Thanking you for your attention, I welcome any comments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Diagram 2  M o n e y M a r k e t Ag e n ts’ In fla tio n E x p e cta tio n s P e r ce n t 5  5  O c t . ’ 94  4  4  O c t . ’ 95 M a y ’ 96  CPI  3  3  N o v . ’96 ’ 96 2  2  F e b .

The first two post-war decades, for example, when inflation was low, were considerably more stable than the 1970s and 1980s, when inflation was left to rise and there was a series of devaluations, with negative effects on productivity and growth. Moreover, the higher the rate of inflation, the more likely it is that the rate will fluctuate, which accentuates the uncertainty about future inflation. Savers and creditors then require higher compensation for risk: besides compensation for the expected rate of inflation, they will demand a premium for the degree of uncertainty about future inflation. This means higher real interest rates, which weaken the propensity to invest. Furthermore, the more inflation fluctuates and is difficult to forecast, the greater will be its arbitrary and random effects on the distribution of income and wealth. Inflation tends to redistribute from savers and lenders to borrowers, from those with fixed nominal incomes to those who pay such incomes, and so on. Clearly, such arbitrary redistributional effects are hardly in line with a distribution policy based on fairness. 2. Developments since the crisis Several years of good growth Since the upturn from the profound crisis in 1991-93, economic growth in Sweden has averaged 2.8 per cent, which is higher than we were accustomed to in the inflationary 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the composition of growth has been favourable, with exports and investment predominating (Diagram 1). It should be underscored that this has been accompanied by the lowest level of inflation for decades.
The economic activity at home is backed up by an improvement of the overall global climate, during the last two months, by attempting improvement signs of lending activity and by the seasonal effect of summer time. Global economy is being characterised by a more moderated downturn of the economic activity at industrialised countries, accompanied with a growth of the world trading activity and low inflationary pressures at global level. Nevertheless statistical data regarding the Albanian economy still remain at low level, the indirect indicators suggest this later is characterised by a positive economic growth, but slower compared to the succeeding years. The low pace of both retail sales and budget revenues increase, the exports slowdown, the lower expansion of lending to the economy and business and consumer’s confidence indexes show that Albanian economy is going through a slower growth phase relative to the one of previous year. This situation is also mirrored on the low inflationary pressures, revealed by the low level of core inflation, which is a proper appraiser of the domestic demand pressures. In August 2009, annual inflation pointed to 2.2 percent, remaining within the targeted band of the Bank of Albania, but close to its lower limit. Seasonal tendency of prices’ behaviour was confirmed to have the same intensity even during this period, by keeping the inflation value at the same rate with that of the preceding month.

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 taught us a number of painful lessons from volatile capital flows associated with such weak institutions. Since then, we have seen a large number of developing countries moving towards flexible exchange rate regime, adopting inflationtargeting framework, and improving the resilience of financial system. Yet, the challenges from volatile capital flows have become more intensified and we still see the implications of volatile capital flows on our economies. We are, therefore, very fortunate to have with us Mr. Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director of the IMF, and Mr. Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager of the BIS, to share their views and insight on this issue. I believe that we can greatly benefit from the IMF’s new surveillance framework, which put greater emphasis on the volatile financial market, as well as from the BIS expertise on analysis of capital flows during the morning session. I am certain that their perspectives will be useful in setting the tone for our further discussions on how to better prepare ourselves for the more intensified volatility of capital flows, which, I believe, have been rooted to our current economic environment. Ladies and Gentlemen, Following our discussions on the theme, we will have Dr. Perry Warjiyo and Mr. Richard Murray, our Executive Directors from the IMF to lead our discussions this afternoon on recent developments in global and regional economies with a view to identifying challenges ahead of us.
And the US could be the first country to show signs of a turnaround in inflation. 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Its output and unemployment gaps are more or less closed. And the recently announced tax cuts could end up boosting aggregate demand beyond the productive capacity of the economy. The structural factors could well be having a “one-off” effect on prices, rather than a continuing dampening impact on inflation. The disinflationary effects of globalisation may not persist for much longer. The world has already globalised considerably over the last two decades. With populist pressures, it is unlikely the trend will continue at the same pace. Technological change may still have some legs to run and its disinflationary effects may persist for a while longer. But will they be strong enough to offset the short-term inflationary pressures from tightening cyclical conditions? So what happens if inflation returns sooner or comes in higher than expected? Central banks will obviously have to tighten monetary policy faster and by more. That in itself should not derail economic growth as long as the tightening is done judiciously and credibly. No central bank wants to cure inflation by creating a recession. But monetary policy tightening has always been a tricky business fraught with risk. More so now, with the economy attuned to a prolonged period of very low interest rates for such a long time. An increase in interest rates could put considerable strain on debt service ratios and lead to sharp cutbacks in household and corporate spending.

Its recommendations have been approved by the IMF and the G8 and include a range of measures to fill particular gaps or put right particular faults in the regulatory system by: •  strengthening prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management; implementing Basle II and requiring more capital against, for example, off-balancesheet vehicles, securitisations and tail risk;  •  enhancing transparency and valuation particularly for complex structured financial products and off-balance sheet vehicles;  •  changing the role and uses of rating agencies, including by distinguishing ratings of corporates and structured products;  •  strengthening the authorities’ responsiveness to risk; and  •  increasing the robustness of arrangements for dealing with financial stress; ensuring central banks’ operational frameworks are flexible enough to deal with extraordinary situations in money markets and mechanisms for dealing with weak or failing banks are put in place. More generally we are discussing in the FSF how the authorities can go further in moderating the financial cycle. Of course monetary policy can play a role in this. One goal of monetary policy is to stabilise the economy in the face of shocks and central banks have always looked at credit and money growth as important indicators of the state of the economy. The rapid growth of credit in 2006 for example was one factor leading the MPC to start raising interest rates. However central banks have been wary of putting a lot of weight on disciplining financial markets by changing interest rates.
However, information on why the repo rate is being kept unchanged is in principle just as important for understanding the monetary policy conducted as is information on why the repo rate is being adjusted. Secondly, we have decided to make changes with regard to monetary policy signalling. By this I mean how we on the Executive Board of the Riksbank communicate what we intend to do with the interest rate. Now that we publish an entire path for the interest rate, the need to signal between the meetings has declined. Our conclusion is that there will not normally be any reason between the monetary policy meetings to give an indication of how the interest rate will be set. In exceptional cases, such as when an event occurs that radically changes the economic situation, while there is a long time to go until the next meeting, there may be reasons to signal between two monetary policy meetings. Of course the individual Executive Board members should continue to be able to express their own opinions publicly. But this is above all a question of afterwards clarifying and explaining personal deliberations made in connection with the monetary policy meetings. Differences of opinion within the Executive Board will also, as before, be made clear when the minutes of the meetings are published. This leads me on to the third change we have decided to make.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Secular stagnation and growth measurement Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Secular stagnation and growth measurement conference, organized by the Bank of France, Paris, 16 January 2017. * * * Accompanying slides Ladies and Gentlemen [slide 1], I am very pleased to welcome you all to Paris, for this conference on “secular stagnation and growth measurement”. We should always be cautious when using expressions as categorical as “secular stagnation”, and which describe the long term: Alvin Hansen, who coined it in 1938 with his famous “full recovery or stagnation”, lived long enough – until 1975 – to see thirty years of almost full recovery, instead of stagnation. Nevertheless, this risk, popularized again recently by Larry Summers, is a matter of concern for central bankers. Why? Because a persistent slowdown in trend output growth could make the economy more vulnerable to shocks that push the natural interest rate below the effective lower bound. Whether secular or lasting for many years, very slow growth and inflation also challenge the efficacy of conventional monetary policy tools. They can affect the sustainability of public and private debt. And beyond central banking concerns, they can also alter the functioning of our social models. Let me just clarify that I will not speak about monetary policy today, as we are in our “silent period” before the Governing Council meeting.
Nordic Summit 2021 – 25 May 2021 Inflation and monetary policy in a post-Covid-19 world  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque‐france.fr), Déborah Guedj (deborah.guedj@banque‐ france.fr)  Page 1 sur 9 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you today. Denmark and the Nordics are among the most successful countries in Europe, and even worldwide: a unique mix of economic innovation, social cohesion, and environmental commitment. But today, in the country which is with its currency at the closest frontier of the euro area, you invite me to speak about “Inflation and monetary policy in a postCovid-19 world”. As of 2006, Olivier Blanchard said : “Monetary policy can pretend to be close to science if it can be conducted using simple and robust rules […] Monetary policy must be closer to art if it is frequently confronted to new, poorly anticipated and poorly understood, contingenciesi.” The current debate on monetary policy is a perfect illustration. While a few years and even a year ago everybody feared the disappearance of inflation, the world is now worried by its comeback. While a few months ago the emergency support in the face of the Covid crisis was the No.1 concern, we are now talking about exit and post-Covid world. This is precisely the title of the speech you invited me to give.

Let me be crystal-clear: any hypothesis of a reduction of purchases partly for Q3 or the following quarters is purely speculative. As Christine Lagarde has said, we did not even discuss phasing out at our April Governing Council meeting. Our net purchase volumes will be freely determined until at least March 2022 by our commitment to preserve favorable financing conditions for all economic agents. Our monetary policy can be patient, as the euro area inflation is well below other jurisdictions. Page 5 sur 9 III. Is the ECB efficient in its results? Over the period 1999-2007, inflation averaged 2.1%. But the inflation rate has dropped to only 1.0 % between 2013 and 2019. This is a substantial shortfall. Headline inflation in the US (CPI) experienced a similar decline of 1.1%, having dropped from 2.7% to 1.6% between the two periods, although the gap to the target is smaller. In the euro area, according to Banque de France’s analysis, two factors explain most of the gap between the observed level of inflation and our targetiii. The first one is caused by the Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis.This set of crises has durably depressed demand and therefore prices, through the Phillips curve; while the slope of the Phillips curve seems to have decreased in recent decades, it is still positive. The Phillips curve remains well alive: in the bad news of “missing inflation”, this is the good news for monetary policy.
We decided instead to use top-down assessments of solvency based on market valuations. That pointed to a capital deficit for UK banks of around £ billion, well in excess of others’ estimates. When UK banks were finally recapitalised that Autumn, around £ billion was injected into them by the UK Government. Our calculations had been roughly right, good enough to save the ship. To this day, I believe that if greater amounts had been injected then – perhaps £ billion? - UK banks would have been more willing to lend and the recovery would have been less anaemic. It would have been better to be super-safe ex-ante than super-sorry ex-post. With the ship stabilised, in the UK and globally, the task now was to make it seaworthy. The Overton window of opportunity to affect radical regulatory reform was ajar. But what reform? Having helped explain the dynamics of a complex web during the financial crisis, complexity science could also help in its redesign. Although these regulatory reforms eventually fell short of my up-front ambitions in their scale and scope, they nonetheless moved the system to a decisively better place. The centrepiece of these banking reforms was so-called Basel 3, overseen by the Basel Committee on which I sat.21 The Basel 3 reforms eventually resulted in significant increases in the amounts of capital banks held; the introduction of an international regime for leverage and liquidity; a capital surcharge for the world’s “super-spreader” banks; and a system of counter-cyclical capital regulation to modulate credit cycles.

Denis Beau: The challenges of the digital euro Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the conference "The new challenges of financial regulation”, organised by Labex Réfi, Paris, 19 November 2021. * * * Over the past two years, most central banks around the world have been giving increasing thought to the idea of creating a digital form of their currency, a central bank digital currency (CBDC), to maintain the stabilising role of central bank money in a rapidly changing payments landscape: according to the BIS, about nine out of ten central banks have reported that they have launched studies.To date, only two retail CBDCs have been introduced (in Caribbean archipelagos: the Sand Dollar in the Bahamas and DCash for the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States), but over twenty pilot projects are underway around the world. This observation naturally raises questions about the timing, form and role of central bank money in tomorrow’s payments landscape and about the role of banks and commercial bank money in a world of stablecoins and central bank digital currencies.
However, the revision will work only if necessary policy stance is adopted. For this reason, the second pillar of monetary policy comprises the implementation of a monetary tightening that is consistent with the new inflation targets. Newly set targets are references that would help decision makers in the economy understand the reasoning behind the policy stance, i.e. the factors that have led to monetary tightening and the extent of monetary tightening if and when necessary. In other words, the Central Bank has announced, via the target revision, the limits of its tolerance to the first round impacts of supply side shocks. While concluding my speech, I would like to extend my thanks to the Central Bank of Argentina, and all other institutions and individuals who contributed to the organization of this significant event. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 109/2008

Low oil prices amplified the fall in investment in the petroleum sector. At the beginning of 1999, the outlook for the Norwegian economy seemed fairly bleak. In this situation, the possibility that Norway would enter a recession of a type that would further reduce confidence in the krone was considered a definite risk. This is why Norges Bank decided at the beginning of 1999 to reduce interest rates. Owing to the uncertainty associated with economic developments and the effects of interest rate changes, Norges Bank adopts a gradual approach to the setting of interest rates. Interest rates were therefore reduced in five steps by a total of 2.50 percentage points in the period from 28 January to 23 September 1999. The lowering of interest rates contributed to strengthening the krone. 6  BIS Review 7/2001  In mid-1999, Norges Bank considered the risk of a recession of a type that would reduce confidence in the krone to be substantially reduced. In addition to the reduction in interest rates, this was partly due to brighter prospects for international growth and higher commodity prices. However, we still envisaged a growth pause in the Norwegian economy. The projections for price and cost inflation in the next few years were then in accord with the corresponding aim for inflation for the ECB.
For instance, equity derivatives is a rapidly growing area, as it offers a more flexible alternative to investing in the underlying assets. This is especially attractive to institutional investors and hedge fund managers. To this end, SIBA is establishing a task force to explore the potential of equities derivatives and structured products. I understand the task force will identify the range of derivative products that Singapore could focus on, study the competitiveness of Singapore as an equity derivative centre, and determine the infrastructure necessary to support the growth of this industry. I look forward to the active participation of SIBA members in helping to grow the product offerings available here. Conclusion Over the last 30 years, SIBA has made significant contributions to the development of Singapore's investment banking industry and capital markets. Going forward, it is vital for the association to remain relevant in the ever-changing market environment in order to ensure its continued success. MAS is committed to working in partnership with SIBA, to develop Singapore's financial sector and to raise industry standards and best practices. We look forward to working closely with SIBA, and trust that SIBA will emerge as an even stronger industry champion of investment banking activities in Singapore in the years to come. Thank you. 3/3

[22] Just recently, the Eurosystem adjusted the pricing of the securities lending programme as of November 2020,[23] to reflect changes in euro area repo market conditions since December 2016 and to ensure that the Eurosystem securities lending facilities remain an effective backstop. This pricing adjustment has resulted in a pronounced increase in the ECB’s securities lending activity as measured by the outstanding balance of securities on loan. Counterparty feedback received to date suggests that the new pricing does not constitute a material change in policy but might help to alleviate some pressure in the repo market ahead of the year-end. There are two other factors that have further alleviated collateral scarcity after December 2016. First, the set of securities eligible for APP purchases was expanded in January 2017. Second, anecdotal evidence suggests that the use of private securities lending operations has increased. [24] The conference paper by Jank, Moench and Schneider (2019) investigates the re-use of collateral in response to scarcity induced by the Eurosystem’s large-scale asset purchases. [25] Since March 2020, excess liquidity and the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet have increased further, driven by the implementation of additional asset purchases under the PEPP and the APP, as well as the allotment of the TLTROs. Although the increase in asset purchases since March was substantial, scarcity effects have not become more pronounced. [26] Most importantly, COVID-19 related fiscal measures have led to a higher supply of government bonds, thus mitigating the effect of asset purchases on collateral scarcity.