samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Ardian Fullani: Educating and inspiring Albania’s young generation Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 2011 end-year reception, Tirana, 21 December 2011. *  *  *  Honourable Minister, Your Excellencies Ambassadors, Honourable Members of Parliament, Dear representatives of the banking system and the media, Dear participants, I would like to welcome and thank you for your participation. Your presence today is a special pleasure for me personally and the Bank of Albania. My special thanks go to the former members of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, whose term in office has ended. I personally appreciate the seriousness and commitment they have dedicated to their work, a precious contribution to Bank of Albania’s institutional furtherance. Thanking them once again for their professional work, allow me to welcome the newly appointed members of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, renowned public figures with an unquestionable professional career. They come from diverse fields of professional careers and will bring in added value to the Bank of Albania, contributing to a wider coverage of the institution’s functions. I am confident that the Bank of Albania, in its activity, will continue to incorporate best international standards as regards decision-making, independence, accountability, transparency and governance. I believe that a healthy economy that generates stable growth needs a developed financial sector in terms of its depth and width; a flexible banking system, which manages public’s deposits cautiously and channels them efficiently to fund the economy.

Dear participants, At the conclusion of my address today, I would like to draw your attention on a consolidated annual publication of the Bank of Albania – our Calendar 2012, the jubilee year of the 100th anniversary of Albania’s Declaration of Independence. Calendar 2012 features a cycle of contemporary works of art, which elegantly combine traditional and modern elements. This artistic ingenuity provides a varicoloured and loyal depiction of the long and toilsome journey of the Bank of Albania and the Lek through good and bad days, times of war and peace, subtle and radical changes. These fellow travellers have always succeeded in renewing and strengthening their shared foundation, which is your trust and confidence. This thread sews together in this calendar, art and the Bank of Albania, as two components that create, uphold and promote values. The Calendar is an artful portraying of our central banks traits such as stability, independence, confidence, transparency and financial literacy, which nourish our dream of a common European future. This future rests in our hands like a golden globe of prosperity and happiness.
It would do so by imposing a moratorium on legal proceedings against the company which could be extended for up to 6 months or even beyond with the consent of the creditors. During this time a provisional supervisor would take control of the company and formulate a restructuring proposal to be put to creditors which are bound by the moratorium. A statutory framework of this kind has its own drawbacks, but the general view seems to  BIS Review 45/1999  4  be that it would be particularly useful in giving a breathing space to smaller companies and freeing the lead banks from the effort of having to keep creditor banks in line in such cases. The non-statutory form of workout will however still be required even if the proposed legislation on provisional supervision goes ahead. To make this work more effectively, it would appear to be timely to review the operation of the HKAB Guidelines a year after they were launched. It may be desirable to issue additional guidelines on various aspects of the workout process, for example on the role of the steering committee, the operation of a standstill or the provision of new money. There may also be scope for clarification of the role of the investigating accountants, in particular whether they should be appointed by the borrower, as at present, or by the banks.

Apart from upgrading professional competency, consideration will also be given to the technical competency of company directors and other staff involved in the insurance business. We will work with industry to formulate an insurance manpower development strategy. We envisage industry players, training providers and tertiary institutions co-operating to develop programmes that will enhance professionalism in the insurance industry. Conclusion MAS will continue to work together with the insurance industry to achieve international best practices and standards. Over the past two years, MAS has worked hard to build a closer partnership with the financial sector. We will continue to promote an open environment and consult actively with the private sector for its views. The relationship between the regulator and the regulated should be arms length but not adversarial. The regulator has to be firm, but also friendly. Market practitioners can help regulators generate ideas, keep abreast of market developments, anticipate global trends and review  4  BIS Review 44/2002  our financial sector strategies. Candid, thoughtful feedback, including dissenting views, go a long way to ensure that policies are pragmatic and remain relevant. We hope that such a regulatory environment will help to develop well-managed insurers in Singapore, who will take up new challenges, and play a more active and productive role in upgrading our insurance industry, and thus our financial sector as a whole. I wish you fruitful deliberations. BIS Review 44/2002  5
By clarifying that the Governing Council expects its key policy rates to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019, we increased transparency around our near-term policy intentions, which investors could then reflect in their asset allocation strategies.6 It may therefore not be surprising to see capital flows by euro area residents being rather unreactive to the nearing end of the APP, thereby limiting any abrupt and adverse spillovers from policy normalisation in the euro area to global financial conditions. I would call this the “international stock effect” of our APP. Moreover, the benefits go both ways, meaning that our forward guidance is also likely to have contributed to reduce the sensitivity of euro area rates to foreign spillovers. On my last slide you can see that ECB researchers, using the Diebold-Yilmaz methodology, find that spillovers from US Treasury bonds to German Bunds – the yellow line – have remained remarkably stable, at low levels, over the past year or so, despite the continued upward pressure on long-term US Treasury yields.

“Working Together for Sustainable Growth” Special Address by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob Governor of the Bank of Thailand WFE General Assembly & Annual Meeting Programme 6 September 2017 | Grand Hyatt Erawan Bangkok, Thailand Khun Kesara Manchusree, President of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Ms. Nandini Sukumar, Chief Executive Officer of World Federation of Exchanges, Chairpersons, Presidents, Chief Executive Officers and top management of leading global exchanges, Ladies and gentlemen, A very good evening to you all. First of all, I would like to thank the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) for inviting me to be a part of this annual event. I must admit that while I was at the SET, I looked forward to participating in this forum every year, as it often generated good new ideas and reaffirmed our commitments to enhance capital market for the benefit of the global economy. I am delighted to be back at the WFE General Assembly and Annual Meeting. But this year, I join the meeting in another capacity - wearing a different hat. It is my great honour and pleasure to be among distinguished guests and former colleagues. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me start by saying that it is an exciting time for the Thai economy and our region. The Thai economy continues to expand at a faster-than-expected pace. We are witnessing strong growth in exports and tourism. Government large-scale infrastructure investments are making good progress.
The outcome is obviously the major uncertainty affecting us all. The other major external influence on the economic situation in this country is the development of the exchange rate. Depending on who you speak to sterling is variously described as dangerously weak, at a 15-year low, against the dollar, or as unsustainably strong, close to its peak, against the euro. The truth is that sterling's effective exchange rate has been relatively stable for most of the past 2 ½ years – at about 105 on the standard index, plus or minus 5%. The bilateral rates that are frequently quoted in fact tell us very little about sterling: they are essentially a reflection of the persistent general strength of the dollar on the one hand and the persistent general weakness of the euro on the other, resulting from sustained capital inflows to the United States in large part from the Eurozone. It was widely expected that, with the slowdown in the US economy, and associated weakening of US earnings expectations and stock prices, these capital flows would moderate, causing the dollar to weaken and a corresponding recovery in the euro. That clearly has not, yet, occurred, although – given the size of the US external imbalance – it is difficult to see how an exchange rate adjustment can ultimately be avoided. In the meantime, the stronger dollar – and higher oil prices – have added to inflationary pressures elsewhere.

But, in the event exchange rates moved in the wrong direction, illustrating the unpredictable – even perverse – relationship between relative interest rate and exchange rate movements at least in the short term. That ought to be a salutary lesson to those who imply that monetary policy can be directed to controlling both inflation and the exchange rate at the same time! So there is not much that we can do directly, through monetary policy, to affect the various external influences weighing upon our economy. But we can attempt to offset their effects, by encouraging the growth of private sector domestic demand to try to keep overall demand in the economy growing in line with potential supply. And that in effect is what we have done through our recent interest rate cuts. This approach is not, however, without risks. It involves accepting – at least while the dampening external influences persist – a growing imbalance between the internationally-exposed and the domestically-oriented sectors. If we did not accept that, then overall demand and output would be lower, and inflation would tend to fall further below target. But the imbalance cannot continue to grow indefinitely. At some point the elastic is likely to break – quite possibly through a sharp exchange rate  2  BIS Review 56/2001  adjustment. And at that point, having deliberately stimulated domestic demand growth, we would need to rein it back. But we could then find its momentum hard to stop. I am not suggesting that we are necessarily approaching that point.
In fact, when the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) was first introduced, the Bank was effectively operating as an agent for the Government: the purchases were financed by the issue of treasury bills, not by the Bank, and the Government indemnified the Bank against any losses. Had the Government wanted to, the purchases could have been designed and operated as a fiscal operation and not implemented by the Bank. But the correspondence from the Chancellor makes it clear that the purchase of private sector assets (i) was intended to improve the functioning of markets and so was consistent with a MMLR function and (ii) it simultaneously provided a framework for asset purchases as a monetary policy operation by the MPC and so the Facility had to be designed to be compatible with that. 5  Once the programme of quantitative easing was established, the corporate purchases were funded by creating central bank reserves. But that was consistent with implementing the MPC’s monetary policy. BIS Review 23/2010  3  Motivating the APF schemes The Bank’s initial APF interventions focussed on sterling corporate bonds and commercial paper. These markets are relatively small. At the end of 2006, before the onset of the crisis, the outstanding stock of sterling non-financial commercial paper was around £ and sterling non-financial corporate bonds totalled around £ That is low compared with the stock of commercial bank lending (lending by UK resident banks to UK non-financial corporates was £ at end 2006). But despite their relatively small size, these markets are vitally important.

Commercial paper Commercial paper (CP) is a common way for larger firms to manage their day-to-day cash needs. And insufficient cash flow is one of the key ingredients in corporate failures. At the start of 2009, commercial paper spreads were way above any estimate consistent with the risk involved: they implied default rates around 50% higher than witnessed in the Great Depression. This market seemed like a prime candidate in which the APF should intervene – and so facilitate otherwise credit-worthy firms in maintaining their access to short-term finance. In trying to catalyse a market, the Bank could not operate like a private investor or bank which would make purely discretionary judgements about whose CP to buy. Rather, a facility was set up which, in principle, any firm could access if they met fairly broad criteria. The APF offered to buy up to three-month CP at spreads which were significantly below those in the market at the time, but which were significantly above those expected to prevail in normal conditions. Initially this would help to drive market spreads down and the APF would then revert to providing a “backstop” offer. In this way the scheme was set up to be self-liquidating as normal market conditions returned. There were some important restrictions. Most notably, only broadly investment grade paper could be bought, consistent with the terms initially set out by the Chancellor and so limiting the degree of credit risk taken.
My period at the Riksbank is not ending in a quiet phasing out, but rather on a crescendo. Being involved and trying to contribute to ensuring that the Swedish economy can cope with difficult periods as well as possible is one of the most challenging and stimulating parts of the job as member of the Executive Board of the Riksbank. This was one important reason why I returned to the Bank six years ago. But now I will nevertheless leave the Bank when my period of office comes to a close. There is much that I am already aware that I am going to miss. For instance, doing what I am doing right now, giving a speech to well-informed and interested listeners, and receiving their questions and comments on economic developments. I will also miss the more day-to-day work at the Bank. As I believe you will have noticed from my speech today, I consider there is a willingness to change at the Riksbank – positive driving force to develop and become better at what we do. It is a very stimulating environment to work in. It is this corporate culture and all of the devoted employees who create it, that I will miss most of all. As I now leave my post as member of the Executive Board, it feels comforting to know that this driving force for development exists in our organisation.

The view that the central bank should only react if the forecasts indicate problems may appear reasonable, but there are some uncertainties in this, particularly with regard to how this should be translated into practical policy. In situations where house prices and lending are rising very quickly, the central bank can see risks in this development, even if it cannot be sure whether a bubble is building up. It may then be difficult and even inappropriate to remain completely passive, even if the main line of the forecasts is that developments will be balanced. If house prices were then to plummet and pull down demand and inflation, the consequences could be very severe, which is clearly illustrated by the current financial crisis. The conclusion the Riksbank has reached with regard to monetary policy is therefore that this type of risk may need to be taken into consideration in a different way than the normal procedure, via the forecasts for inflation and the real economy. As indicated in the policy document "Monetary Policy in Sweden", this could be done by beginning a phase of interest rate increases slightly earlier than would otherwise have been the case, or by postponing a phase of interest rate increases. In addition, we highlight and warn against various types of risk, for instance in our speeches and reports. This was how we acted for instance in 2006.
This is partly because these can cause instability in both the real economy and prices when the bubble bursts and partly because the stability of the banking system could be threatened. Measures to avoid financial imbalances being built up are thus motivated on the basis of both of the Riksbank's objectives; to maintain price stability and to promote a safe and efficient payment system. However, the question is how effective the interest rate is as a weapon – perhaps other means can be utilised. Examples of such measures are monitoring the financial institutions and making capital adequacy requirements of them. The analyses made by the Riksbank in its Financial Stability Report are also aimed at drawing the attention of the banks and other authorities to any problems and they thus play a role in this context. BIS Review 39/2001  3  How great are the problems created by the imbalances in the USA? Is there a risk that the imbalances in the American economy are so great that the process of adaptation back towards a balance will dramatically intensify and prolong the economic slowdown? It can be noted that none of the ten major economic analysts of the American economy assesses that the USA will suffer a recession during the next few years. Firstly, it is probable that the growth potential that can be created by developments in technology is far from exhausted. There should thus be good reason for at least some of the optimism that has comprised a basis for earlier developments.

The most likely situation is therefore that although the high level of indebtedness, the large deficit in savings in both the household and corporate sectors, combined with over-investment in certain sectors, will subdue growth for a time, there will be no dramatic or prolonged economic recession. However, in order to increase saving in the economy and thus correct the constant deficit on the current account, it is necessary that growth is not primarily driven by increases in consumption. Net export and investment should instead be the motors behind growth to a larger extent than before. Bringing about this state of affairs requires a weaker dollar exchange rate. One can therefore look with scepticism on the idea that tax cuts will bring the American economy out of its decline. How will Sweden be affected? The American economy affects developments in the rest of the world through many different channels, with exports to the USA as the most direct channel and the one where the effects are easiest measured. However, exports to the USA are only responsible for a couple of per cent of GDP in Sweden and have a similar significance for the euro area. Spread effects via the expectations that largely govern consumption, investments and the stock market are probably much greater, although more difficult to measure. Nevertheless, there are numerous indications that the Swedish economy is more sensitive to developments in the USA than the economies in the euro area.
The capital shortfalls identified in the 2012 stress tests were corrected by recapitalisation measures that combined capital increases at some banks, burdensharing mechanisms and the contribution of public funds in eight banking groups that were unable to cover their needs by their own means. More recently, an appreciable number of banks have taken advantage of improved market conditions to issue various capital instruments (for an amount of over € billion since the start of the year). Moreover, banks have generally pursued a policy of containing dividend payouts and returns on deposits, following the recommendations made by the Banco de España. 2. The second main flaw in our financial system was a disproportionate exposure to assets with highly pro-cyclical credit quality and, in particular, to the real estate sector. This vulnerability was corrected through two main channels: by increasing the volume of development risk provisioning required in 2012 and, of course, by establishing SAREB, the external asset management company to which all the real estate exposure of the most vulnerable institutions was transferred. More recently, the level of coverage of credit portfolio risk was reinforced by the review, by the Banco de España, of the criteria for classifying refinanced and restructured loans by risk and, therefore, of the level of provisioning required. All these steps, on top of the traditionally conservative provisioning policies followed in Spain, reduced the latent risk on balance sheets and increased coverage, and are largely responsible for the Spanish banking sector’s generally satisfactory results in the asset quality review. 3.

In particular, banks will have to learn to live with the considerable increase in regulatory demands. These will arise especially from the imminent entry into force of the liquidity and provisioning requirements included in the Basel III Accord, and from the foreseeable introduction of additional measures, such as those that will demand separation in some cases between the investment banking business (proprietary trading, market-making, etc.) and the traditional banking business, or that will require banks to have liabilities available that may be converted into equity in the event of resolution. At the same time, greater restrictions can be expected on the admittance of internal asset risk assessment models when they represent savings in regulatory capital. In turn, within the framework of the SSM, work can be expected to begin to try to harmonise the regulatory differences that persist (for example, in the calendars for application of the capital deductions established in Basel III) as well as supervisory practices (for example, relating to the approval of internal risk assessment models). Insofar as greater harmonisation can be expected to be conducive to stricter supervisory practices, in each area the new supervisory framework will generally tend to raise the bar for all European banks. Hence, in order to adapt to the new regulatory and supervisory environment, many banks will need to make further efforts to strengthen their own funds.