samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
MAS has played a critical role in Singapore’s economic development – keeping inflation low, managing Singapore’s official foreign reserves, preserving financial stability, and promoting Singapore’s development as an international financial centre. What MAS has achieved reflects the strategic vision of its past leaders – its Chairmen and Managing Directors – and deep professionalism of generations of MAS officers. They worked hard, to keep our exchange rate strong, our reserves healthy, and our financial sector safe yet dynamic. MAS was fortunate in the outstanding leaders it has had. This evening, we are honoured to have one of them, PM Lee address us. PM has a long history with MAS. This is the third time he is speaking at a MAS anniversary; he spoke to us when we were 30 years old, then 40 years, and now when we’re 50. And of course, PM was Chairman of MAS from 1998 to 2004, when he spearheaded a series of bold reforms to liberalise the financial sector. But MAS could not have done it alone – even with its exceptional staff and outstanding leaders. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  MAS has succeeded because Singapore has succeeded. If Singapore’s public finances were not strong, our monetary policies would not have worked as well. If Singapore did not have a sound legal and enforcement framework, our regulatory policies would not have worked as well.

Ravi Menon: MAS Marks 50 Years Serving Singapore Welcome remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at MAS 50th Anniversary Partners Appreciation Evening, 7 October 2021. * * * Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman and Board Members of MAS, ESM Goh Chok Tong, Friends and Family of MAS Welcome to the MAS’ 50th Anniversary Partners Appreciation Evening – the first in a series of events to commemorate our Golden Jubilee. This evening is a time for thanksgiving. There are about 50 of us here at the MAS Building and about 800 friends and family joining us virtually. This includes our friends from the financial industry, consumer and governance groups, tripartite partners, academic institutions, and international organisations. And of course, our family – past and present staff and leaders of MAS and our colleagues in the broader Public Service. This is a special occasion for me personally. I joined MAS in 1987 and have spent most of my professional career here. So much of what I have learnt and how I have evolved, I owe it to the many bosses and colleagues I worked with in MAS over the years. MAS was already a highly competent organisation in 1987, and I have seen it grow over the decades to become what it is today – a central bank and financial regulator highly regarded among its international peers and the global financial industry.
“Sustainable Regimes of Capital Movements in Accession Countries”, CEPR. Buiter, W.H. and Grafe, C. (2002). “Anchor, Float or Abandon Ship: Exchange Rate Regimes for the Accession Countries”, EBRD 10 Year Anniversary Conference. European Central Bank, (2003). “Policy Position of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on Exchange Rate Issues Relating to the Acceding Countries.’  4  BIS Review 1/2007

Dimitar Bogov: Improving education and access for children and youth to financial services Address by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the 3rd Annual Regional Meeting for Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Skopje, 2–3 October 2014. *  *  *  Dear Ministers, Esteemed guests, Dear ladies and gentlemen, It is my honor and privilege to welcome you all here in Skopje, Macedonia to this important event for the region of Europe and Central Asia. The aim of this meeting is to gather together in one place the regional leading policy-makers, financial institutions and experts that are engaged in the issues of children and youth access to financial services, financial inclusion and financial education, employability and entrepreneurship opportunities, to share success stories and challenges. There has been some progress made in these fields because of the existence of international movements such as Child and Youth Finance International that are keen to develop a generation that will be better prepared to prevent future financial crisis by increasing the financial education, access to finance, employability and entrepreneurship skills of children and youth. On a global level, significant progress has been achieved in advancing the mentioned priorities. Important steps have already been made in the area of improving access to financial services in the previous years. Access needs to be complemented by the quality of the financial services. The quality of financial services and the participation in the financial system is equally important for all participants in the system.
Preparing a plan for reducing euroisation in our economy is a joint commitment by a number of authorities and the Bank of Albania is in the process of identifying measures that may be taken in this regard. Amid a complex and challenging economic and financial environment, the coordination of the monetary, micro and macro-prudential policies assumes primary importance in promoting monetary and financial stability. In 2016, the Bank of Albania has worked with the same intensity in all three aspects, aiming at an optimum calibration for them. Following, is an overview of our work for maintaining and promoting financial stability. 3. Promoting financial stability and sound lending In accordance with its mandate and institutional responsibilities, the Bank of Albania is jointly responsible for safeguarding financial stability in Albania. It communicates its assessment on the financial stability regularly, and coordinates its policies with other institutions, through the Financial Stability Advisory Group (FSAG). With regard to financial stability, during 2016, we continued to work for drafting a comprehensive framework of the macro-prudential policy and constructing macro-prudential instruments. This framework is based on recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board and standards of the Financial Stability Board. Moreover, in accordance with its institutional mandate and responsibilities, the Bank of Albania is tasked with safeguarding the stability of the banking system and addressing potential risks that may jeopardise it.

In the meantime, credit risk is the main risk to which the banking sector remains exposed. This risk becomes even more present as a result of its persistence and continuous problems that banks face in the process of collateral enforcement. Following the rise in non-performing loans in the first half of the year and their fall in the second half, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans fell to 18.2% at the end of 2016, at the same level as in the previous year. Therefore, the reduction of non-performing loans and creation of stimuli to boost sound lending has been and remains a priority issue for us. The Bank of Albania has worked in several aspects to address this problem. First, the assessment of the credit risk and the recoverability of non-performing loans have been subject to intensive monitoring during our on-site examinations. In parallel, we have maintained a prudent approach in assessing lending policies and practices applied by banks. Second, the Bank of Albania has fulfilled its engagements under the National Plan for the Reduction of Non-performing loans. In this regard, the Bank of Albania has made regulatory amendments to clarify the concept of non-performing loans write off and the administration of properties taken into ownership as a result of collateral enforcement. Moreover, the Bank of Albania has cooperated with the IMF to review the regulatory framework about the licencing of companies that purchase bad debt.
2 As for the household sector, even though the level of debt had risen somewhat in the recent years, approximately 85% of GDP last year, the decelerating growth provides us a relief. The transparent and prudent macroeconomic policy frameworks, used for both fiscal and monetary policy, also command trust from investors and the public. For these reasons, the reputable credit agencies have still reaffirmed their positive assessment of the Thai economy. Indeed, the recent economic conditions have underscored the importance of preserving sound macroeconomic fundamentals in order to create resilience in the face of unexpected shocks. Domestically, the recent economic slowdown has put some small businesses and indebted households under financial strains. Loan quality has deteriorated somewhat, with NPL increasing slightly as a result, but these risks have been contained to specific sectors. The banking system and corporate sector remain strong and have coped with the slowdown well, owing to their improved risk management policies. Externally, like many emerging markets, Thailand faced a couple episodes of capital flow volatility in recent years. The economy, however, has withstood these challenges reasonably well. For instance, during the “Taper Tantrum” in May 2013 and our own political unrest towards the end of 2013, Thai baht had swung by more than 10 percent in a year, fluctuating from 30 baht per US dollar to 28 and back to close to 33 baht. Despite this volatility, market reactions (in terms of outflows) have been relatively dampened.

The rationale behind ERM II is that, if a country succeeds in maintaining the value of its currency against the euro within the fluctuation bands for a period of two years, then it would be reasonable to assume that the country would be able to deal with the binding constraints of EMU. During this phase, accession countries will have to prove that they are able to put up with the disciplines inherent in a fixed exchange rate without imbalances arising in other sectors of the economy. That is why accession to EMU is conditional on prior participation in ERM II. Furthermore, it would be unfair on the twelve euro area countries if the EU were to demand less stringent conditions of the present wave of accession countries. Upon EU accession and during the ERM II phase, Malta, like the other accession countries, would have the status of a “country with a derogation”. Since ERM II neither entails the formal transfer of monetary policy responsibilities to the ECB nor the replacement of the domestic currency by the euro, it will not, as I have already indicated, involve any significant departure from current practice, although it offers more flexibility than our current fixed exchange rate regime, which does not involve any fluctuation band. Another difference is that the obligation to defend the central exchange rate under ERM II would be binding on both the ECB and the Central Bank of Malta. Both institutions would be expected to intervene to preserve that value.
The Annual Report I present today analyses closely the different factors bearing on this diagnosis, and I shall now refer briefly to them. Spanish inflation has continued trending at a high rate, above that of the euro area, with the differential between the two widening. Although the Spanish economy is more dependent on oil imports than other countries in the area, the inflationary performance cannot be attributed to the direct impact of the strong hike in oil prices in 2005 and early 2006. Indeed, the underlying inflation (excluding energy and unprocessed food prices) differential with the euro area has widened more than that of the overall index, a pattern that has been exacerbated in the opening months of this year in which industrial goods prices have accelerated. Looking at the determinants of the inflation differential on the costs side, it can be seen that, unlike in previous stages, the relative increase in margins has contributed more to the deterioration than the rise in unit labour costs. The widening of margins behind this behaviour has been more marked in the activities less exposed to competition, such as construction and services, which is also where demand pressures have been sharpest. Wage increases agreed under collective bargaining have not diminished and the impact of the indexation clauses is proving considerable both in 2005 and in 2006.

According to Bank of Albania periodic estimates, the public expectations have converged, mostly around 1-3 percent. In the meantime, the business expectations on price performance have reflected a high volatility. The monetary policy and the consolidation of macroeconomic stability have played an important role in anchoring the expectations of public at large to Bank of Albania’s inflation targeted rate. 3. Money supply  During the major part of 2006, monetary indicators have reflected the stabilised demand for monetary assets. The average M3 growth rate resulted to 12 percent. The demand for money of the public sector grew by 3.3 percent during 2006. This relatively low borrowing has balanced the high lending rates of the private sector, positively impacting on the maintaining of monetary stability. In compliance with the trend noticed over the latest years, monetary developments have been characterised by shifting to longer-term monetary assets. Currency outside banks has followed the general trend of the demand for money. The currency outside banks to M3 stood at 24.2 percent at year-end or 1.7 percentage points less than in the previous year. In nominal terms, the currency outside banks grew by ALL 13.6 billion or 9.1 percent. The macroeconomic environment during 2006 has been favourable for a steady growth of banking system lek deposits. The positive real interest rates have been associated with further rise of lek deposits. They rose by 38 billion during 2006, satisfying the needs of the economy for ALL 35.9 billion and the needs of the government for credit in ALL.
Without appropriate selection criteria, there could be a poor redistribution of limited productive resources, keeping low-productivity firms running or providing support to companies that do not need it. Also, an inadequate design could unintendedly leave out viable firms that face solvency problems. Heterogeneity across firms in terms of pre-crisis productivity, profitability and indebtedness, and the asymmetric sectoral impact of the COVID-19 crisis suggest that the potential impact of such support programmes can differ significantly depending on their specific design. Thus, the allocation mechanisms of public support should be properly designed to selectively channel the aid to those viable firms with solvency challenges. In parallel, it is also pertinent to consider the way in which private initiatives and the reform of debt restructuring procedures can also help preserve the business continuity of viable firms. Debt restructurings can be carried out through formal insolvency proceedings in courts of law or also through out-of-court proceedings, either through pre-insolvency legal mechanisms or through private renegotiations. Court proceedings tend to be lengthy and costly processes, reducing the business value of the firms involved and often leading to their liquidation, and the success of private renegotiations in out-of-court proceedings can be limited, among other aspects, by collective action problems.

While risks in property markets reflect national differences, other risks such as misconduct have more common determinants. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In the past five years, misconduct penalties imposed on EU banks have totalled € Those costs have direct implications for the real economy. At 5% leverage, that capital could have supported € trillion of lending capacity. More fundamentally, repeated episodes of misconduct undercut public trust in the system.2 The ESRB’s work has helped catalyse sensible actions to begin the process to rebuild that trust. First, it has proposed capturing misconduct costs in stress tests to ensure banks remain resilient even under severe outcomes. The Bank of England has followed this approach in its most recent stress test which included and additional £ of misconduct costs. These costs were calibrated to have a low likelihood of being exceeded and are therefore, by design, much larger than the amounts already provided for by banks. Second, the ESRB has also proposed tackling misconduct at source by increasing individual accountability. This can be done by reforming remuneration – using variable pay, combined with Malus and Clawback, to hard-wire stronger incentives for good behaviour within firms. The UK is committed to this approach with the toughest remuneration regime in the EU, including the longest deferrals and claw backs. However, the effectiveness of such measures across the EU is being tempered by the bonus cap.
Whereas in previous years it barely registered as a risk, now close to a third of global CEOs are ‘extremely concerned’ about the threat climate change poses to their organisation’s growth prospects. 4  A transition in action So how far is this transition in thinking translating into action? First, governments. In reaching agreement in Paris, global leaders took political action to mitigate the catastrophic impact of climate change. They committed to curbing carbon emissions to limit the rise in global average temperatures relative to those in the pre-industrial world to 2°C, and to pursue additional efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C. Governments are taking some of the necessary policy actions. For example, in the UK, the Government published its Clean Growth Strategy last year, including policies to make homes, businesses and transport more energy efficient, and to lower the carbon intensity of the UK’s energy supply. EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) reforms agreed last year, and due to come into effect from 2021, have driven carbon prices above € per tonne for the first time in six years. Even so, the national determined contributions towards meeting the Paris goals, summed to no more than 2.7°C, making it clear climate policy will need to tighten further if the Paris commitments are to be achieved. 3  It also sees $ trillion of investment in clean energy technologies and energy efficiency – and the share of oil and coal in power generation falls to 6%, which is burned with accompanying carbon capture and storage technology.

These three most important elements are dependent on developments abroad, international financial markets, and global demand for commodities. The Swiss franc exchange rate, by comparison, does not play a decisive role. There is thus no contradiction between having a strong Swiss franc and a large current account surplus. Nor is the surplus a suitable measure for assessing Switzerland's share in global imbalances. It is much more the case that Switzerland and its extensive level of direct investment abroad contributes significantly to balanced global economic growth. SNB monetary policy is focused on ensuring price stability. In so doing, it takes due account of economic developments. To fulfil this mandate, the SNB must secure appropriate monetary conditions. The current account surplus does not play a role in monetary policy. In an open economy like Switzerland, however, sizeable exchange rate fluctuations have a strong impact on production and prices. In the current environment, and with interest rates close to zero, the minimum exchange rate is therefore the correct monetary policy instrument. The SNB will continue to enforce it with the utmost determination. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
This view is traditionally associated with the economic historian Charles P. Kindleberger. His 1973 book, The World in Depression 1929–1939, proved a catalyst for what eventually became known as hegemonic stability theory. For a brief discussion, see The Economist (2013), “Railroads and hegemons”, 10 October. 4. Georgieva, K. (2023), “Confronting Fragmentation Where It Matters Most: Trade, Debt, and Climate Action”, 16 January. See also Aiyar, S. et al. (2023), “Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism”, IMF Staff Discussion Notes, SDN/ 2023/001, 15 January. 5. The White House (2022), “Fact sheet: How the Inflation Reduction Act Will Help Small Businesses”, 12 September. 6. For example, one recent survey finds that the share of firms planning to regionalise their supply chain rose from 25% in April 2021 to 45% in April 2022. See McKinsey (2022), “Taking the pulse of shifting supply chains”, 26 August. 7. International Energy Agency (2022), “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, World Energy Outlook Special Report, Revised Version, March. 8. Macron, E. and Scholz, O. (2023), “Deutschland und Frankreich – Unser Europa für die nächste Generation gestalten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 January. 9. European Commission, “EU position in world trade”. 10. European Commission (2021), “Strategy for Financing the Transition to a Sustainable Economy”, COM/2021/390 final, 6 July. 11. World Economic Forum (2022), “Digital solutions can reduce global emissions by up to 20%”, 23 May. 12. De Haas, R. and Popov, A. (2019), “Finance and carbon emissions”, Working Paper Series, No 2318, ECB, September; Popov, A.

Russia’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine has brought supply security back to the top of the agenda for all major economies, most saliently for energy. And over the longer term, it is likely to accelerate the global transition to clean energy production as a way to increase climate and energy security. But such technologies are highly resource-intensive in their installation phase. Getting the global economy on a path to meet the Paris Agreement goals could see total mineral demand from clean energy technologies quadrupling by 2040. [7] This threatens a new era of competition for resources. Challenges for Europe in 2023 As this new global map takes shape, we enter 2023 facing three big challenges. The first challenge is to reconsider how we can best protect Europe’s critical interests in a fast-changing world. As an economy that is very open to trade and deeply integrated into global supply chains, we are vulnerable to geopolitical headwinds. For example, 35% of Europe’s manufacturing output is absorbed outside the EU, much more than for the United States or China. So, as the next chapter in the globalisation story is being written, we need to ensure that Europe is a leader, not just a follower. And as the French President and German Chancellor have recently argued, we have the capacity to do so. [8] Already now, Europe is the top trading partner for 80 countries, compared to just over 20 countries for the United States.