samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Other countries of the European Union, including the UK and France, are faring not much better, though the markets have been more accommodative of their plight so far. The whole Europe is in fact mired in the “debt abyss”. For all the hard efforts by the European Central Bank (ECB) to minimise the risk of a total euro collapse, President of the ECB, Mr Mario Draghi, once said that these were merely attempts to buy time, so that the euro zone countries could implement fiscal and structural reforms. Hopefully the markets would be convinced that these reforms would help those countries reduce government debt and regain competitiveness. As regards fiscal reforms, the EU agreed on and signed the Fiscal Compact in March 2012. If implemented, the European countries concerned will have to pursue rigorous deficit reduction plans and lower their total sovereign debt to GDP ratio to 60% or below within years. Take Italy as an example. It will have to keep on reducing its government debt by an amount equal to 3% of GDP annually for the next twenty years so as to reduce its current debt-to-GDP ratio of 120% to the target of 60%. This shows how formidable and painful it will be for the European countries to re-establish fiscal discipline. The short to medium term economic outlook for Europe is hardly optimistic. What I would like to point out here is that implementation of the Fiscal Compact will lead to significant deleveraging by the various European governments.

Under these circumstances, if asset price inflation is driven by excessive leveraging, in theory, asset prices might drop first in search for a new equilibrium, and then stabilise at that point. Subsequently, asset prices will resume rising alongside economic recovery and a rebound in people’s income. (2)  The second possibility is that quantitative easing produces the desired results. Asset prices go up, stimulating consumption, and employment improves significantly as a result. This buys time for the relevant authorities to carry out reforms to enhance productivity so that, ultimately, asset price increases will be supported by economic  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  fundamentals. This is, of course, a very desirable scenario as global economy will return to its normal growth path. I surely hope that this will be what eventually happens. (3)  What bothers me however is the third possibility, under which the process of deleveraging is disrupted by quantitative easing, leading to sharp increases in asset prices in the first place. Yet, since such increases are not supported by economic fundamentals, any increase in wealth will be seen as transient. As a result, households are unwilling to increase spending and in the end, the real economy fails to rebound. If inflationary pressure builds up alongside asset price increases, central banks may consider exiting the market and raise interest rates. When economic performance, inflation or monetary policy falls short of market expectation, asset prices might drop sharply and remain volatile.
This separation has been the critical factor behind the  BIS Review 160/2008  1  general decline in inflation that we have observed over the past decades. 1 But independence makes democratic accountability by the monetary authority all the more important. Many central banks have gone well beyond strict legal requirements in their pronouncements and communications than imposed by statutory accountability duties. The question is: Why? The reason rests on a simple though powerful insight: transparency renders monetary policy more effective. In a world in which policy-making by surprises has lost purpose, wide knowledge of the central bank’s preferences and objectives can only serve as a coordination device for private beliefs. Anchoring expectations around the objectives of policy help coordinate the reactions of economic behaviours to the macroeconomic shocks along the appropriate path of adjustment that the central bank wants the economy to follow. Many central banks have therefore started to communicate their firm commitment to a nominal anchor, through the announcement of a precise definition of price stability. In many cases, central banks have gone further and spelled out a more general monetary policy strategy, and the analytical framework that is used by policy makers to assess the risks to the achievement of the central bank’s objectives. A growing body of empirical evidence supports the assumption that transparent quantitative objectives and communication about the strategy reinforces monetary policy.

On the other hand, there are some constraining factors that hamper digitalization in South East Europe, including Macedonia, such as: the negative effects that the financial crisis had on the ability of banks to innovate, and the local mentality of the population which still does not show a sufficient level of confidence in online activities. Financial services industry in Macedonia is in essence still traditional, conservative industry, but is evolving. Banks strive to keep pace and fit in the new digital era by investing more and more funds in new products and financial innovations, as well as sponsoring software development conferences and new technologies. This is supported by relatively solid infrastructure for digitization in Macedonia which is readily available at satisfactory level. For example, 76% of households in Macedonia had access to internet in 2017 vis-à-vis 85% in the EU. On average, bank deponents have two payment accounts in Macedonia. However, only 7% of payment accounts held by the households can be used for electronic payments, while this share is relatively higher in case of legal entities (29%). The latter initiated 51% of the credit transfer in an electronic way, while the households initiated electronically only 20% of their credit transfers in 2017. The companies usually initiate their payments by using computers, while households rely mainly on computers (92% of electronic credit transfers), mobile phones (7% of electronic credit transfers) and ATM (1% of electronic credit transfers).
In the final analysis, the Bank of Thailand decided to tighten interest rates with the view that maintaining inflation stability, notwithstanding the short-term adverse impacts, was necessary for sustained economic stability and growth in the long run. I could go on with more of such examples from further back in time, but I am sure that you are well aware of them. However, the past is not always a good predictor of the future. And indeed, the Thai economy is currently faced with a new kind of challenge. This leads me to my second point. The preeminent challenge to the Thai economy in the medium term is how to cope with the unwinding of global imbalances, a slowdown in the world economy, volatile global financial markets, and an appreciating baht. Thailand, like many emerging market economies with a small and shallow financial market, is particularly vulnerable to fast-moving international capital. Such rapid movements of capital flows, if vastly out of line with the underlying economic fundamentals, can have negative impacts on the export or import sectors depending on the direction of exchange rate movement. In our case, the recent surge in speculative capital inflows has caused a rapid one-way appreciation of the baht relative to regional currencies. The appreciation, which was vastly out of line  BIS Review 20/2007  1  with our economic fundamentals, if left unchecked, could be detrimental to not only the export sector but also economic stability. In dealing with the rapid appreciation, conventional wisdom suggests an adherence to market mechanisms.

Caleb M Fundanga: Integrity and professionalism in finance, industry and business Keynote speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the ACCA Professionalism and Ethics Event for Employers, Lusaka, 7 November 2007. *  *  *  • The Chairman • Mr Sundeep Takwani, ACCA Head of Ethics and Regulation – Professional Standards • Mr Chintu Mulendema, ZICA President • Senior Government Officials • Heads of Corporates • All protocols observed • Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen I am honoured to stand before you to discuss the matter of “integrity and professionalism in finance, industry and business”. I commend ACCA Zambia for organising this forum which allows us to discuss matters which have long been considered of primary importance in the financial sector. I am certain that the importance of this subject extends beyond the financial sector to all sectors of the economy. Mr Chairman, this event, the first in the series of ACCA professionalism and ethics events to be held in Zambia coincides with the launch of the ACCA new professional qualification, which will be first examined in December 2007. Named the ACCA qualification, it will build on the success of the current professional scheme, which has become the world’s fastestgrowing international accounting qualification.
Hence, the extent of financial stability cannot be summarised in a single, simple financial variable. This type of measurement problem is in fact also apparent in the inflation rate and the resource utilisation. The formal inflation target for the Riksbank is measured using CPI, but we also use various measures of underlying inflation. In order to measure resource utilisation, we look at a series of different measures such as the GDP gap, unemployment gap and the employment gap. For inflation and resource utilisation, we have long learned to use different measures even though we know they are inherently uncertain. Applying that experience will be useful when it now comes to evaluating different measures of financial stability. Financial stability cannot be assessed by relying on various indicators alone, though. The reasons for the development must also be understood. It can be compared to the reasoning of central banks in assessing inflation. An increase in inflation does not in itself constitute a reason for increasing the policy rate. Appropriate monetary policy depends on the reason for the change. If the rise is due to price pressure from increased demand, the monetary policy will not be the same as it would have been had the rise been due to lower productivity. Similarly, rapid credit growth is not necessarily always a sign of lending being unsustainable and posing a threat to financial stability. A hot topic on that subject is how much house prices and the debt build-up of households should weigh in monetary policy assessment.

The reduction of the liability margin was offset by an increase in the asset margin, and by taking on greater interest rate risk. Third, domestically focused banks were able to maintain their level of resilience compared to the previous year, despite the increased risk exposure. Overall, their capitalisation is well above regulatory minimum requirements, and is also adequate according to SNB stress tests. The currently available capital surpluses at most banks would be sufficient to cover the losses projected in these stress tests. Given the level of prevailing risks, this is positive. However, the risks to financial stability could increase further. As we saw in 2015, even a lower momentum on the Swiss mortgage and residential real estate markets can cause imbalances on these markets to increase. This can happen, for instance, when combined with comparatively weaker developments in fundamentals such as GDP growth. Moreover, in a sustained period of low interest rates, real estate prices will remain subject to upward pressure. Another rise in prices or decline in yields could occur particularly in the residential investment property segment. This would increase the risk of a substantial correction in the event of an interest rate rise, which would put pressure both on leveraged investors and on the banks who finance their investments. At the same time, in an environment of persistently low interest rates, the pressure on interest rate margins would continue. Such pressure creates powerful incentives for banks to take on more risks.
Ravi Menon: Future of finance jobs Opening remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Chairman of the Institute of Banking and Finance, at the Launch of the Study on Future of Finance Jobs, Singapore, 23 April 2019. * * * Mrs Josephine Teo, Minister for Manpower, members of the IBF Council, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to IBF. IBF will be turning 45 this year. It is hard to imagine the financial sector today without the IBF. Not all countries have the equivalent of an IBF. Fewer still have as strong a collaboration as we do here in IBF – among financial institutions and between financial institutions and the regulator. And all for a common cause that has been consistent for the last 45 years – to equip the professionals in our financial sector to do their jobs better, and to make the Singapore financial centre more competitive IBF began life in much simpler times. Its primary aim in the 1970s through the 1990s was to provide training for the financial sector professionals. In the 2000s, IBF shifted its focus to setting competency standards and facilitating skills development for the industry. Looking to the future, the jobs and skills landscape in the financial industry is a lot more complex and uncertain. Technology is transforming finance – the way financial services are produced, distributed, and consumed. This means that jobs in financial services will also be transformed.

Second, we need to look at skills development, job placements, and career pathways in an integrated manner. We cannot look at skills in isolation from job roles. And we cannot look at job roles in isolation from careers. In other words, skills are the engine that will propel career mobility – laterally or upward. This is why IBF took two important steps last year. In April, IBF began to facilitate the implementation of Professional Conversion Programmes for the industry. Then, in August, IBF launched, together with our tripartite partners, the IBF Careers Connect, providing career advisory and job matching services. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  IBF is now the one-stop, single point of contact for all matters relating to jobs, skills, and careers in the financial industry. It is too early to tell if this new integrated approach will work, but the preliminary signs are promising. IBF has secured commitment from 19 financial institutions to reskill 4,000 existing finance professionals – to equip them with the skills necessary to take on new or expanded roles against the backdrop of transformed business activities. IBF has also provided career advisory and job matching services to more than 600 finance professionals whose jobs have been affected by change. Third, we cannot do business transformation without workforce transformation. But workforce transformation is a capability that financial institutions are only beginning to build up.
The provision of cloud services carries a systemic risk of operational resilience and some providers are already "Too Big To Fail": the interruption or failure of a few of the big techs’ systems could indeed impact financial stability and the economy in general, given the very high level of concentration of providers1 and the dependence of financial institutions using their services. Moreover, some of their financial activities, which are closely linked to those of traditional financial players but are carried out outside the regulated framework - and therefore without any constraints! - carry a strong risk of moral hazard which could again prove detrimental to financial stability. One  1  The four largest providers (Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, Alibaba Cloud) control 70% of the market (FSI Insights on policy implementation, Big Tech interdepencies, by Juan Carlos Crisanto et al, July 2022). 5  example among others: if they were to provide both brokerage services and credit scoring services, these companies could be inclined to generate more business in order to collect commissions, while reducing the attention paid to credit quality, in the absence of risk participation. But alongside the big techs, other players, at the crossroads of IT and finance - maybe you will soon join one of them, once you have graduated from your engineering school - are profoundly transforming the latter. They offer a wide range of services, particularly focused on cryptoassets.

Fourthly, our financial system is solvent and well regulated, which limits the possibility of appreciation bubbles being created by the prospect of inexpensive financing from abroad and abundant credit. We will continue to face important adjustments in the global economy, with exchange rate tensions in all the economies of the world because rigidity among the most important currencies persists. Recovery of the global economy will be gradual and will vary greatly from country to country. This situation presents a national task, which we must each take on board from our own perspective. In the Central Bank we are paying particular attention to the evolution of the exchange rate because we recognize that there has been rapid and substantial appreciation and we must be watchful that this does not hinder the vigorous growth of our economy. That growth will be long-lasting provided that we ensure stability. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 135/2010
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  interdealer and dealer-to-client – into a market with much broader access. Moreover, as new trading platforms have come online, the profile of FX market participants, and thus the way FX is traded, has changed. New participants, such as retail and smaller institutions – that are often engaged in high-frequency or high-speed trading – could begin executing on their home or office computers, or could connect their trading algorithms directly to the platforms. The expansion of both the universe of market participants and the infrastructure to support execution has brought many positive benefits to the market and global economy, but we should also be mindful of potential costs that might arise. In particular, it is important to consider the implications for the overall integrity of the market, which, as I noted earlier, relies on the ability of market participants to confidently and effectively transact at prices that reflect available market information. Technology has helped ease entry to the market, but the capital investments needed to keep up have also increased. Indeed, operating in fractions of milliseconds has become an important component toward achieving faster execution. Will this hinder the entrance of new participants in the future, particularly those who may not have the extensive resources required to keep up? In addition, while many market participants note the positive influence that technological changes have had on market functioning, including narrower bid-ask spreads. 7 it is unclear how these changes may affect the broader price discovery process or liquidity of markets overall.

Simon M Potter: Trends in foreign exchange markets and the challenges ahead Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2015 FX Week Conference, New York City, 14 July 2015. *  *  *  I would like to thank Robert Lerman and Jamie Pfeifer for their excellent assistance in the preparation of these remarks and colleagues in the global central bank community for numerous insightful comments and suggestions. Good morning. It’s a pleasure to be here. Let me extend my thanks to FX Week for the invitation to speak at this conference. Before I begin, I would like to note that my comments today reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The ability of households, corporations, and sovereigns across the world to safely and efficiently exchange assets denominated in one currency for assets denominated in another is essential to a healthy and robust global economy. These transactions can occur for myriad reasons – to support the flow of goods, services, and investment across national boundaries, to diversify the savings of retirees, or to hedge risks associated with manufacturing a particular type of product.
For one thing, while evidence suggests that quantitative easing in particular succeeded in lowering long-term borrowing rates, its effect on the real economy is less certain. 6 For another thing, such policies may have important side-effects: they may lead to additional risktaking in financial markets and thus contribute to financial instability, 7 and they can create spillover effects to the rest of the world – notably emerging markets, where capital flows in search of higher yield can fuel asset prices and currency movements. 8 A complete assessment of the positive and negative effects of these measures will thus have to wait until we have data on the full experience, that is, until the complete exit from these policies. An assessment of the effectiveness of the SNB’s minimum exchange rate is clearer: this measure has played a decisive role in addressing the imminent risk of deflationary developments and has thus been successful. Given the still weak economic environment, it remains the central tool to ensure that monetary conditions are appropriate and that the SNB’s primary objective of price stability is fulfilled. The period since the collapse of Lehman Brothers has also underlined the value of central banks being able to respond flexibly to unexpected circumstances. On 30 November, the Swiss electorate will vote on the so-called “gold initiative” (“Save our Swiss gold”, in full), which, paradoxically, would severely constrain the SNB’s room for manoeuvre in a future crisis. Let me digress for a few minutes to explain why the SNB is opposed to this initiative.

Over the following months, they also injected liquidity into markets that were on the verge of drying up, and acted as lenders of last resort by providing liquidity to distressed financial institutions. 3 The importance of providing liquidity and acting as lenders of last resort is the main lesson which central banks took away from the experience of the Great Depression, and it has been seen as their main role in times of financial distress ever since. 4 Thus, as regards central banks’ reaction in the early days of the crisis, what we saw was not them doing too much – it was them doing their job. For most, certainly for the SNB, they were doing what their mandates required them to do. Collectively, they helped stabilise economies and financial markets that were in danger of collapsing. Many challenges remain, to be sure, but avoiding a rerun of the 1930s does constitute a success. Supporting the weak recovery: unconventional monetary policy Once central banks had lowered nominal short-term interest rates all the way to zero, they hit a natural limit at which conventional monetary policy becomes powerless. Their decisive reaction, together with fiscal policy measures by governments, had succeeded in stopping the free-fall, but economies were still weak, unemployment rates high, and recoveries feeble. More action was clearly required. Conventional economic wisdom asserts that at the zero lower bound fiscal policy is the most effective lever on which to act. Unfortunately, most governments perceived themselves unable to do more for a variety of reasons.