samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For the societies of free-trading, networked countries to prosper, they must first re-distribute some of the gains from trade and technology, and then re-skill and reconnect all of their citizens. By doing so, they can put individuals back in control. For free trade to benefit all requires some redistribution. There are limits, of course, because of fiscal constraints at the macro level and the need to maintain incentives at the micro level. Fostering dependency on the state is no way to increase human agency, even though a safety net is needed to cushion shocks and smooth adjustment. Redistribution and fairness also means turning back the tide of stateless corporations. As the Prime Minister recently stressed, companies must be rooted and pay tax somewhere: businesses operating across borders “have responsibilities … in terms, for example, of payment of tax.” They must recognise “the role that they play in local communities and the responsibilities that they have in any country they are operating in to abide by the rules.”  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  15  That is why the G20’s BEPS initiative, which will allow all countries to work together to implement measures against tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, is so important. And that is why the G20 might at least consider, as Larry Summers has suggested, a minimum tax on reported earnings to be paid somewhere.

For example, if a migrant worker in the US wishes to transfer USD 500 to his family in Sri Lanka, he prefers to go to informal systems like Hawala and Undial because of the high charges and commissions in the formal banking sector. Under the informal money transfer systems, the dollars may stay in the US or get to Sri Lanka at a later time. The Hawala agent's representatives in Sri Lanka provide Sri Lankan rupees to the migrant's family speedily and at a relatively low cost. If dollars are retained with the Hawala agent in the US, Sri Lanka's banking sector lose the opportunity of using foreign currency and, therefore, the country does not gain any benefit from the worker remittance. If the Hawala agent sends dollars at a very later date to replenish the equivalent of Sri Lankan rupees, again there is an opportunity cost to the country as foreign currency is not available when needed. There is also a possibility of the Hawala agent sending dollars to Sri Lanka through an un-known courier service, but such dollars may not get to the banking sector at all. It is difficult to institutionalize remittances of illegal immigrants as such immigrants do not wish to identify themselves to the formal banking and financial institutions in the host country. Hawala and Undial systems are popular among illegal immigrants. It is, therefore, important for the remittance receiving countries, where possible, to compete with informal systems and divert remittances to the formal banking channels.
When interest rates and capital flow allow it, the króna appreciates, whether people like it or not. When there is a credibility loss in the market, either in Iceland or abroad, the króna will depreciate suddenly and sharply, and when there are tremors and rumblings in the economy, domestic or foreign, the  BIS Review 131/2007  1  exchange rate tends to resemble a Meteorological Office seismograph. In short, the króna functions just like any other currency, and if it did not react in this way to these conditions, we should complain loudly indeed. Globalisation has made a massive impact on all markets and all currencies, and there is little doubt that, until now, it has lightened the load borne by central banks and central bankers in the battle against inflation. This could well change in the future, so that central banks will not have it as easy as they have recently. Peoples and nations that have hitherto been isolated from the principles governing most Western nations have been entering the world of international business in the past few decades. At first that entry was slow, careful, and even ponderous, but it has gained pace and become bolder year by year. The new entrants are China and India, either of which is larger in terms of population than the US and the EU combined.

Economic activity began to recover in mid-2013. Since then, real GDP in the euro area has expanded steadily, if moderately, until by the second half of 2015 it had reached its pre-crisis level. However, the unemployment rate in the euro area remains relatively high, though it has fallen from a peak of above 12% in 2013 to below 10% today. Against the backdrop of a tentative recovery, and with euro area banks having to clean up their balance sheets and restrict lending, inflation in the euro area began a prolonged downward trend. Inflation in the euro area fell to 0.4% in 2014, zero in 2015 and just 0.2% last year. At these rates, inflation was considerably below the ECB target. Indeed, by mid2014 disinflationary pressures in the euro area were clear. The concern was that Inflation expectations, which were firmly anchored until then, could lose their moorings. This would lead to a self-sustained deflationary spiral that would further weaken the euro area economy. At this stage, the conduct of monetary policy ran into another constraint. As we have seen, by May 2009 the Governing Council had cut the main refinancing rate to 1.0%. The main refinancing rate was lowered to 0.25% in November 2013, while the rate on the ECB’s overnight deposit facility was reduced to zero. The Governing Council now faced a dilemma: although the economic situation demanded further monetary stimulus, official interest rates could not fall much further. Nominal interest rates cannot fall far below zero.
They are a down-payment on our commitment to use our new powers to tailor rules and to make the UK a better place to operate a financial firm, without compromising on safety. Page 7  We plan more. We are looking more broadly at the whole structure of rules around remuneration and we are committed to publishing proposals to simplify capital requirements for the simpler regime. Ideas for how we can simplify rules for larger mid-tier firms are under development. On that subject, I want to draw attention to analysis we have published today about the impacts of the Basel 3.1 proposals we are consulting on and of some earlier reforms. [23] The analysis shows how these will together help to narrow the gap between capital requirements for mortgages under the Standardised Approach used by the majority of smaller banks and the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach used by bigger banks. This analysis shows how we are already levelling the playing field to facilitate effective competition between small and large banks. In this case, our analysis shows why we expect the gap between capital required for mortgages under the Standardised Approach and capital required under IRB to narrow significantly. [24] These findings will inform our approach to simpler regime capital requirements for small firms. Deepening our understanding As we continue our work, we must continue to draw on global best practice when pursuing our new objective.

In particular cases where monetary policy is supported by capital controls, however, internet banking may make enforcement of such controls more difficult, since it would be operationally easier for those wishing to evade regulations to maintain offshore bank accounts. Of course, every bank in reputable jurisdictions has in place rigorous procedures to combat money-laundering, but these procedures do not normally result in customers being turned away if they are merely trying to escape capital controls or the tax regime in their home countries. Similar considerations lead some observers to enquire whether the internet might encourage substitution out of the national currency, resulting in dollarisation and also perhaps weakening the central bank’s influence over domestic monetary conditions. If internet facilities enable or encourage people either to economise on the usage of money (for example by netting payments due among two or more parties or by practising barter) or to reduce the frequency of movements of money (for example by leaving export receipts in an internet account in order to pay for imports, rather than repatriating them first), then there may be a prospect of a general reduction in transactions traffic in all currencies. The usage of some may fall more than others. I do not, however, see anything particularly sinister in such developments, except to the extent that the internet might facilitate avoidance of rules on remittances.
Because the monetary policy impulse works through its impact on financial market conditions, I don’t see why the Fed would want to act in a way that deliberately made this linkage less predictable. In actuality, I have been pushing in the opposite direction. By explaining the importance of financial conditions as part of our monetary policy decisions, I am trying to tighten the linkage. Balance Sheet Normalization I’d like to wrap up my comments tonight by discussing the likely next step in the monetary policy normalization process: beginning to allow maturing Treasuries and agency MBS paydowns to run off the Fed’s balance sheet, in contrast to our current practice of reinvesting all of the proceeds. As you are aware, following the June FOMC meeting we issued an addendum to our Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.3 In that addendum, the FOMC outlined how it planned to gradually reduce the Fed’s securities holdings over time. Namely, when that program is implemented, the FOMC will decrease its reinvestments in an orderly way, with repayments reinvested only to the extent they exceed gradually rising caps. For maturing Treasury securities, the FOMC anticipates that the monthly cap will be $ billion initially and will increase in steps of $ billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches $ billion. For repayments of agency MBS, the monthly cap will be $ billion initially and will increase in steps of $ billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches $ billion.

865–934, New York: Elsevier North-Holland. Micco, Alejandro and Ugo Panizza (2006), “Bank Ownership and Lending Behavior,” Economic Letters, Vol. 93, Issue 2, pp. 248–254. Micco, Alejandro, Ugo Panizza and Monica Yanez (2007) “Bank Ownership and Performance. Does Politics Matter?,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 219–241. Rajan, Raghuram (2010), Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Reddy, Y.V. (2012), “Society, Economic Policies and the Financial Sector,” Per-Jacobsson Lecture, BIS. www.bis.org/events/agm2012/sp120624.htm. 4
30  BIS Review 111/2010  Chart 2 Macroeconomic Volatility Measures  United States 7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0 1966  1970  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990  1994  1998  2002  2006  2010  United Kingdom 7  6  5  4  3  2  1  0 1966  1970  BIS Review 111/2010  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990  1994  1998  2002  2006  2010  31  32  Chart 3a Impulse Responses for United States United States  Volatility shock Supply shock  Demand shock Credit demand shock Credit supply shock  BIS Review 111/2010  Monetary policy shock House price shock  Macrovolatility  Inflation  GDP growth  Change in bond spread  Real credit growth  Policy rate  House price inflation  Chart 3b BIS Review 111/2010  Impulse Responses for United Kingdom United Kingdom  Volatility shock  Supply shock  Demand shock Credit demand shock Credit supply shock Monetary policy shock House price shock  Macrovolatility  Inflation  GDP growth  Change in bond spread  Real credit growth  Policy rate  House price inflation  33  Chart 4a Historical Decompositions: United States Real credit growth (ann %)  Real house price inflation (ann %) 15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  ‐5  ‐5  ‐10  ‐10 ‐15  ‐15 1970  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990  1994  1998  2002  2006  2010  1970  1974  1978  Federal Funds rate (%)  1982  1986  1990  1994  1998  2002  2006  2010  GDP growth (ann %) 20  10 8  15  6 10  4 2  5  0 0  ‐2 ‐4  ‐5  ‐6 ‐10 1970  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990  1994  1998  2002  2006  2010  ‐8 1970  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990  1994  1998  2002  2006  2010  Legend:1 Trend Aggregate demand and supply shocks Credit market shocks  Macro volatility shock Monetary policy shock House price shock  1  Aggregate demand and supply shocks” is the net impact of the aggregate demand shock and the aggregate supply shock.

Ravi Menon: Emerging Asia – restructuring for sustained growth Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at JP Morgan Singapore’s 50th Anniversary Dinner, Singapore, 31 October 2014. *  *  *  Mr Jamie Dimon, Chairman & CEO, JP Morgan Chase & Co Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen I am delighted to join you this evening to mark JP Morgan’s 50 years in Singapore. During these last 50 years, JPM Singapore has grown to become an important node in the bank’s global network.   It is the Asia hub for commodities and treasury services.   It is the hub for FX and private banking in South and Southeast Asia.   JPM Singapore entities together employ about 2,800 people. This is projected to increase to 3,500 over the next few years. JPM has had an even longer presence in Asia – close to a century.   JPM has thus had a front row seat witnessing Asia’s remarkable transformation and shift in the global economic centre of gravity to the region.   And it is now positioned to participate in the next exciting chapter of the Asian growth story. As we approach 2015, the economies of Emerging Asia are at an inflection point.   Externally, they have to deal with the normalisation of monetary policy and interest rates in the United States.   Domestically, they have to sustain growth and macro stability amidst ongoing structural reforms.
The failure to satisfy such a margin call could lead to the liquidation of the position. This approach to risk management can transform credit risk into liquidity risk. In most circumstances, the impact of this is unexceptional. Other institutions will find the new prices attractive and step in and buy. In exceptional circumstances, however, as creditors and counterparties seek to reduce their exposure to future losses, actions intended to limit individual exposure to risk may instead increase overall risk. We do not know very much about what makes markets more or less vulnerable to this type of acute shock. This is in part because liquidity itself is not easy to measure. A broad range of indicators tells us something about funding liquidity, including growth in monetary aggregates, in financial assets and different forms of borrowing or credit. Other measures, such as movements in bid-ask spreads, the level of interest rates, changes in asset prices and risk premia, along with the level of volatility and expectations of future volatility, and turnover volume or other measures of market depth, help us evaluate market liquidity. Yet none of the measures provides a reliable way of judging how vulnerable markets are to a reversal, or the scale of damage that might accompany a reversal. BIS Review 19/2007  1  These measurement limitations are similar to those that make it difficult to judge when, and by what magnitude, asset prices deviate from fundamental values at any given point in time.

These efforts will all contribute to a more resilient system, one that is better able to withstand the effects of a major decline in asset prices or deterioration in credit. Are there other tools that policy makers and market participants could use to address this risk? Some policy makers have argued that public disclosure of information could help reduce the risk of future systemic financial crisis, by preventing the buildup of "excessive" leverage or concentrations of risk. The principal focus of attention, as in the immediate wake of the failure of Long Term Capital Management, has been on two quite different types of public disclosure. The first is information that would make it easier to evaluate the overall leverage or risk profile of major hedge funds and their counterparties, and thereby judge their vulnerability to a sharp movement in asset prices. The second is information about the actual positions of individual funds or institutions: information that would make it easier to identify concentrated exposures to specific risk factors, and thereby assess more accurately the potential impact of the failure of a major fund or institutions on the market as a whole. These pose very different challenges and offer different benefits. There are a number of crude measures of overall risk profile that, if disclosed to the market, would give counterparties information they do not now typically get about the risk of failure of the fund.
It has helped to raise living standards, built a single European market, launched the single European currency, the euro, and strengthened Europe’s voice in the world. As a central banker, I would argue that the draft Constitution has incorporated the substance of the EMU chapters of the Maastricht Treaty, while also introducing clarifications, additions and updates to the existing texts where necessary and appropriate. Clearly it is now up to the governments of the Member States to move forward in the Intergovernmental Conference. My wish for the draft Constitution is that it will achieve the same success as the economic and monetary policy part of the Maastricht Treaty. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 45/2003

The ECB and the entire European System of Central Banks stand ready to assume the macro-prudential supervision tasks envisaged in the report by the de Larosière Group and to provide the necessary analytical and logistical support to the Systemic Risk Council. For the new Council to function effectively, three key requirements will need to be fulfilled: First, in order to identify and assess the risks and vulnerabilities in the EU financial system as a whole, to issue risk warnings and to adopt related macro-prudential policy recommendations, the Systemic Risk Council will need to have an information base that draws on both macroand micro-prudential supervisory information. This will allow the use of all relevant information for assessing, among other things, the “interconnectedness” of financial institutions and markets and its implications for financial system stability. Close cooperation and well-functioning information-sharing mechanisms between the new Council, microprudential supervisors and the proposed European System of Financial Supervision will therefore be indispensible. Second, adequate institutional mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that the risk warnings and the related recommendations issued by the Systemic Risk Council are translated into effective action. The days when risk warnings were issued and very few listened – or wanted to listen – should be over! Third, for the Systemic Risk Council to be effective, legitimate and independent in its decision-making, a solid legal basis is  4  BIS Review 49/2009  essential.
This clearly reflects the IMF’s commitment to reforming its assistance and solidarity framework to help the most vulnerable countries. Similarly, the adequacy of the resources of multilateral development banks was reviewed and, for example, the capital of the Asian Development Bank was tripled. In order to enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of key players in the international financial architecture, the bolstering of resources must go hand in hand with a reform of their governance. As a European, I am perhaps not the best person to give my views on the governance of financial institutions, and of the IMF in particular because, for emerging countries to be given a fair representation, it is most often the representation of European countries that is called into question. You may therefore be tempted to interpret my suggestions negatively. I would, however, first like to say that the representation of European countries should not be contested: Europe is a diverse continent that encompasses small, new, and even emerging countries alongside large and established developed nations. Overall, it is somewhat under-represented in a community that is still made up of sovereign states.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: Does cash have a future? Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Assemblée Générale de l’Association des Alumni HEC, Lausanne, 8 May 2014. *  *  *  The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website: www.snb.ch. One of the traditional tasks of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) is to provide the economy with banknotes and coins. Since the establishment of the SNB, banknotes have constituted the most visible link to the population. As an everyday article of use, but also symbolically, banknotes embody the quality, security and stability of the SNB, and of Switzerland in general, not least of all also for the rest of the world. It is therefore of key importance that the SNB undertake the task of cash supply and distribution conscientiously. The role that banknotes play in the public’s trust in the institution and its decisions is not to be underestimated. In turn, this trust is an important prerequisite for the SNB to be able to fulfil its core monetary policy mandate, and thereby ensure price stability. Due to technological developments in the post-war period, the significance of cash declined, as measured in terms of economic performance. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, the demand for cash has hovered at a stable level, and since 2008, in the wake of the financial crisis, there has even been a marked increase.
At the same time, unemployment continued on a downward path and economic sentiment improved across the board. Some recent signals point to a slowdown, yet they seem to have more to do with temporary influences, growth prospects continuing to look strong. The past year recorded, on average, positive developments in EU candidate and potential candidate countries as well, in spite of GDP dynamics delivering a more mixed picture (from over 7 percent in Turkey to around 2 percent in Serbia and even stagnation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Nevertheless, the outlook is positive, with recent forecasts pointing to relatively robust growth in the coming years. However, against this relatively rosy background, I should highlight that our economies, even those that belong to the Eurozone, have still much to do in order to become robust and offer good living standards to most of their citizens. Some members of this Club, Romania included, had to go through very painful adjustments during the past decade, as the global crisis found them trapped in a pro-cyclical policy stance and it remains to be seen to what extent they will manage to break free from this pattern in the current good times; some need to fight high inflation, pressures on their currencies or to correct their external imbalances. Nevertheless, the common denominator of all our economies is having to deal with institutional weaknesses and the need to undertake reforms that should make them stronger.

We can enrich the modalities of such cooperation, keeping in mind that the basis of good cooperation is established in normal times, through regular contacts. Thank you. BIS Review 103/2006  3