samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Responsibility would lie with the national supervisor to determine the approach most suitable for its banks. We expect that the new capital treatment will provide much better support for the healthy growth of equity financing and venture capital markets than the current Accord. 4  BIS Review 27/2001  Summary of changes and need for standards These important changes – modifying the capital charges, permitting greater recognition of collateral and trade receivables, and increasing the flexibility of the treatment of equity – should go a long way toward ensuring that banks that lend to small and medium-sized businesses are not disadvantaged under the internal ratings-based approach of the new Accord. I’d like to take a moment to speak more broadly about the internal ratings-based approach. I think it is a significant and innovative step for banks’ internal ratings to play a major role in their capital requirements – a step that plays very strongly into our goal of better aligning capital requirements and risks. To do this effectively, we need to ensure that a bank’s internal rating system enjoys an appropriate degree of credibility and consistency when used in determining regulatory capital. Accordingly, we are striving to develop a meaningful set of minimum standards. While I have focused on the first “pillar” of the new Accord, namely the minimum capital requirements, it’s important to remember that there are two other pillars vital to the new framework: supervisory review and market discipline.

William J McDonough: Bank supervision and credit standards under Basel II – perspectives for SMEs Remarks by Mr William J McDonough, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Gürzenich Köln, Cologne, Germany, 25 April 2002. *  *  *  Introduction Graf von Hohenthal, Herr Dr. Breuer, members of the panel, “meine Damen und Herren…” It is an honor to join your discussion on the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to ensure that the international rules on capital adequacy serve the needs of twenty-first century banking effectively. What makes this a special privilege for me is the opportunity to meet so many entrepreneurs, owners of small and medium-sized businesses, and others who make up the real engines of the economy. Your interest in the work of the Basel Committee reminds us all that we must look beyond the banking sector to ensure that the foundation we lay provides for the stability and growth of the entire economy. I have long emphasized that the role of supervisors is not to hinder growth or profit, but rather to promote the responsible pursuit of opportunity and innovation. As we improve the rules for bank capital, we must certainly keep this mandate in mind and consider the effects that changes to those rules may have on the economy.
It is just this stability in the fundamental conditions for economic activities that was no doubt important for the process that resulted in the industrial revolution, which in itself was full of commercial risks and uncertainties. Improvement in opportunities for change A similar gloss can be applied to the realignment of economic policy from the second half of the 1980s. There have been a number of reforms aimed at creating stability and opportunities. The credit and currency markets have been deregulated, components of the social security system have been reformed, a tax reform has been implemented, targets have been established for government finances, price stability is enshrined in law and the Riksbank has been given an independent status. All this represents good possibilities of the Swedish economy facing a stable future as we step over the threshold to a new millennium. It is important that wage formation also functions properly. It remains to be seen whether the Swedish economy has changed in this area. Otherwise, there is a risk that firms will be under pressure from two fronts. Profitability will be depressed both by increased competition and by rising wage costs. Investment will be held back and the transformation will proceed too slowly or not at all. There will then be no quick renewal of capital stocks. Companies will not draw the benefit of the new information technology at a sufficiently rapid rate and will then lag behind.

The more recent surge in oil prices has naturally spurred the set-up of new funds in countries where new extraction capacities have emerged as profitable. Non-commodity funds Non-commodity SWFs are mainly born out of foreign exchange interventions, and can be regarded as “spillovers” from international reserves that can no longer be properly managed within the standard framework of official reserve assets. One of the questions to be discussed is whether they correspond to the same rationale as commodity funds, and to what extent they can be considered to have the same sound basis. Comments FX reserves are typically invested in safe and liquid assets such as T-bills, T-bonds or shortterm collateralised deposits. The emphasis on liquidity risk control in the prudent management of reserves logically results from their possible use in foreign exchange interventions. But SWFs are clearly designed to invest in less-liquid and riskier assets that provide higher returns than the typical assets held in official reserves. Whereas the objective of reasonable returns was typically mentioned last, as “subject to liquidity and other risk constraints”, in the IMF Guidelines on reserve management, excess returns clearly feature as a primary  BIS Review 119/2007  5  objective of SWFs. A central reason for this reordering of objectives is of course the much longer-term horizon of these funds, which entails greater tolerance of short-term fluctuations in returns.
32  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  18  For much of the first few hundred years of the Bank’s history, its public communication largely took the form of an annual speech by the Governor of the day to the bankers and merchants of the City of London at the Lord Major’s Mansion House Banquet, literally a stone’s throw from the Bank. The public audience for this singular act of public communication was about as diverse a set of white, male, middle-aged, slightly-pissed financiers as it is possible to assemble. Body language can sometimes substitute for the spoken word. So it was at the Bank of England in the 1920s, when the Governor’s “eyebrows” famously became one of the Bank’s means of externally communicating. The Governor’s eyebrows were, in a way, a primitive form of emoji: sterling crisis – sad face, bad pre-MPC presentation – very sad face. Nonetheless, for even the most malleable-faced Governor, the eyebrows were an imperfect communications medium. Beginning in the 1960s, a sea-change began in central bank communication practices, at first slowly. Speeches by the Governor and other officials increased, by the 1960s averaging around five per year. They were matched by other communication innovations. December 1960 saw the first edition of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, which is still going strong. There was roughly a doubling in the number of speeches by Bank officials in each subsequent decade.

One of the main parameters of the National Strategy to promote financial literacy and financial education in Cyprus relates to the need of the establishment of a permanent Committee, which will be responsible for the national strategy implementation. The ad hoc Committee continues to operate for a transitional period until this permanent Committee is convened. For the time being, significant preparatory work has been undertaken by the CBC, particularly as regards the designing of the detailed governance structure of the new permanent Committee. Another piece of preparatory work undertaken since the adoption of the National Strategy last June, is the launching of an OECD technical assistance project, in the context of a 250,000 euro grant from the European Commission, in relation to the implementation of specific actions for the promotion of financial literacy in Cyprus. The work on the agreed pillars of the project is progressing according to plan, with close collaboration between CBC staff and OECD technocrats. These pillars are, first, the conduct of an updated national survey on financial literacy in Cyprus, second, the development of a website and application for smart devices that would provide useful information and financial calculators and tools to the public, and third, the development of a "train the trainers" program for adults, which would focus on strengthening financial education. The abovementioned preparatory work undertaken at the CBC, will be utilised as input by the permanent Committee for the implementation of the National Strategy in Cyprus.
BIS Review 59/2008  3  In relation to this, Malaysia has taken a three-prong strategic initiative to promote greater mutual respect of the Shariah views. The first is to recognise the principle of mutual respect in Shariah opinions issued in other jurisdictions by a recognized Shariah committee for transactions undertaken in Malaysia. In addition to the key role of a centralized Shariah Advisory Council as the reference point for all Shariah matters in Islamic finance, Malaysia welcomes Shariah rulings by other Shariah committees that are deemed to be deduced through generally accepted rigorous principles, processes and rules. The second initiative is to have strong resource foundation supported by a pool of qualified and competent Shariah talent, as well as to accord more emphasis on extensive Shariah research in Islamic finance. Given the rapid global growth of Islamic finance, there is an urgent need to meet the talent demand for Shariah scholars with strong interest in the strategic development of the Islamic finance industry. From the supply side, the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) established in 2006 has made significant progress with more than 1000 registered students in its professional Islamic finance certification. It also has 28 PhD students and has recently launched a Masters Programme in Islamic finance. The Islamic Banking and Finance Institute Malaysia (IBFIM) also offers a structured, modular training solutions for Shariah advisers focusing on practical and operational aspects of Islamic banking and takaful.

This implies that we will continue to exert downward pressure on the yield curve by keeping our stock of asset holdings at a high level for a prolonged period of time, and we could specify it in our communication. 2/ Perhaps the most unconventional policy tool is the use of negative interest rates. Negative interest rates have their limitations; I have already stressed them in the past.vii And at our Governing Council’s meeting in Tallinn last June, we clarified these limitations in our forward guidance stating that we do not intend to lower our deposit facility rate below its current level of -0.40%. But slightly negative interest rates have their virtues. First, by removing the zero lower bound constraint on expectations of future short-term interest rates, they contribute to easing financial conditions by lowering rates along the curve, with a positive impact on the demand for credit by firms. Second, the negative deposit facility rate (DFR) positively interacts with asset purchases. Indeed, the portfolio rebalancing effect of QE is reinforced by the negative DFR, as banks with excess liquidity holdings have a stronger incentive to put their reserves to work. And, so far, we have not seen significantly detrimental effects of negative rates on the profitability of banks, notably thanks to the favourable fact that the slope of the yield curve has remained positive. 3/ Our forward guidance provides further indications as to the future path of our monetary policy; and by steering expectations, it has an impact on the yield curve.
We have been able to draw lessons from both positive and negative outcomes of  14  BIS Review 15/2010  such a policy in the 1970s and around 1990. There may be material here for a “handbook” of effective Keynesian use of instruments. First, when demand for goods and services and inflation prospects fall, the interest rate is lowered. At the same time, the automatic stabilisers in the budgets will work when tax revenues fall and benefit payments increase. When the fall in demand for goods and services is so steep that an interest rate close to zero is not sufficient, tax rates are reduced or government measures are applied. The measures should not influence long-term public sector priorities such as the size of the welfare state or the permanent tax level. When the economy turns, as it now has in Norway, the rule is that fiscal policy should be tightened fairly rapidly. This provides room for growth in the business sector. When public expenditure has been reduced, the key rate can then be increased to a normal level. According to the fiscal policy guidelines, petroleum revenues should be phased in gradually into the economy, approximately in pace with the expected real return on the Government Pension Fund Global, which is estimated at 4 per cent. In periods of high or rapidly rising unemployment, petroleum revenue spending can be increased, and inversely fiscal retrenchment is needed during periods of high economic activity and resource shortages.

Global economic activity has weakened in recent months. Although GDP growth is likely to pick up again somewhat after stagnating in the second half of 2018, the inflation outlook for this year and next is subdued. In addition to this, given the economic and political uncertainty in many countries, the situation on the financial and foreign exchange markets remains fragile. Page 6/8  Against the current backdrop, our unconventional monetary policy with the negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary remains both essential and appropriate. And this is in part also because it does not attach greater weight to any individual issues over others, and is instead at all times focused on the interests of Switzerland as a whole. The negative interest rate has its place among the instruments at the SNB’s disposal, which include conventional and unconventional measures alike. It is incumbent on us to use the instruments best suited to tackling the situation at hand. However, I would like to stress one thing: I am convinced that we will at some point return to positive interest rates. I cannot tell you now when exactly that will be. This will hinge on developments in inflation, growth and exchange rates going forward. Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to conclude by taking this opportunity, also on behalf of my Governing Board colleagues Fritz Zurbrügg and Andréa Maechler, to thank our employees for their hard work and dedication.
Then there is economic policy’s commitment to stability, with price stability as a statutory objective, as well as a successful consolidation of the government finances. In the inflation forecast we are presenting today, productivity growth is judged to be marginally higher than we foresaw in the June forecast. That in itself is a sign that the economy is functioning better. The Riksbank’s assessment of productivity has been revised gradually over the past few years. Higher productivity means that more can be produced with the same input of resources. So a lasting improvement raises the economy’s potential long-term output. The higher productivity growth does not seem to be solely connected with the economy’s upward phase. Whereas productivity growth in the period from 1974 to 1993, for example, averaged less than 1.5% a year, the average rate since 1994 has been almost 2%. At the same time I want to underscore that there are not yet any clear signs of the kind of accelerating productivity growth which has occurred in the United States. One explanation for the discrepancy between our economies may lie in the different ways in which productivity is measured in the United States and in Europe. There are also some indications that productivity growth may accelerate in the future but they are still too uncertain to support any more far-reaching conclusions in the formation of monetary policy.

Urban Bäckström: The current situation for monetary policy  Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, before the Standing Committee on Finance, Stockholm, on 10 October 2000. *  *  *  It is gratifying to be able to note, as on so many of my previous appearances here, that economic developments in Sweden are impressive. Having achieved a growth rate in the past six years that averages 3%, it seems that our economy is now expanding at an annual rate of around 3 to 4%. Employment has really taken off. To date this year the number of people in work is 70,000 higher than in the same period of 1999. I can also note, once again, that notwithstanding the rapid economic growth, the rate of inflation has remained moderate. But these favourable developments do not mean that the Riksbank can sit back and relax. The path ahead contains a number of risks to which we must be alert. What lies behind the favourable economic trend? A basic factor behind the Swedish economy’s favourable path is, in my opinion, the economic policy realignment that has been carried out in the past decade and a half. Credit and currency markets have been deregulated, the tax system has been reformed, components of the transfers system have been modified and competitive pressure has increased. All this has helped improve the workings of our economy.
As we consider the possibilities for the offshore RMB market, it is instructive to review the development of the Eurodollar market. What are the key underlying elements that have driven the growth of the Eurodollar market and how do they feature in the current offshore RMB market environment? The Eurodollar market as a comparison A close examination of the differences and similarities between the two markets can help shed light on how offshore RMB market activities might evolve as well as how its further development can be fostered. Let’s compare the two markets using four sets of characteristics. Economic weight and trade centrality The first set of characteristics involves economic weight and trade centrality. The Eurodollar market is an offshore market for the currency of a country that has both. Similarly, the offshore RMB market is supported by China’s rapidly expanding economy and its substantial trade links with other parts of the world, given its status as the world’s second largest economy and largest trading nation. Indeed, these are two important macro trends that are driving offshore RMB market activities now and in the future. In roughly three years since the relevant policies were liberalised, currently some 10% of Mainland China’s total trade, about 12% of foreign direct investment into China and about 4% of outward direct investment from China are settled in RMB. 1  Mr Tony Shale, Chief Executive Officer, Euromoney Institutional Investor, Asia. 2  Mr Richard Morrow, Editor, Asiamoney.

The questions about trend productivity and other matters that may have altered the relationship between growth and inflation are one of several elements of uncertainty in the Riksbank’s forecasting  3  BIS Review 28/2000  work. When constructing assessments and material for decisions it is therefore important to check what is happening and be alert to any signs of changes that should be taken into account. The current assessment The Inflation Report we are publishing today presents a picture of the Swedish economy that remains bright, with good growth and moderate, though rising inflation. External economic prospects have gone on improving. It is above all GDP growth in the US economy that continues to be remarkably positive but it also looks as though growth in the euro area and the United Kingdom could be higher than assumed earlier. International consumer prices, however, are not expected to move up to the same extent. Less relaxed monetary policies among a number of central banks and growing pressure from international competition are judged to hold external prices back. But partly because the krona is not expected to appreciate quite as rapidly as we counted on earlier, import prices to producers are now assumed to be somewhat higher. On account of strong competition, however, we do not foresee a full pass-through to consumer prices. Domestic demand is also expected to be stronger than we foresaw in the December Report, notwithstanding the subsequent repo rate increase of 0.5 percentage points.
There has long been acceptance of the fact that central banks should be free to cut or raise rates in pursuit of domestic policy objectives, even though such actions might indirectly impact exchange rates. Now that some central banks are constrained by the zero lower bound, it seems only natural that this understanding should carry over to domestic asset purchases for domestic policy purposes. Such purchases represent just another channel to influence local financial conditions and thereby spur growth. This is quite different from deliberately targeting exchange rates through exchange market interventions or other means, which could indeed be problematic. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The current system of market-determined exchange rates among the major advanced economies brings to mind the old quip about democracy being the worst possible system...except for all the others. While it is hardly perfect, it does work to smooth adjustments across countries facing different macroeconomic circumstances and provides domestic policy makers with important and necessary room for maneuver. Let me close with a few thoughts on the emerging world, against the backdrop of trends and challenges facing the mature economies. As we all know, the role of the emerging markets has changed dramatically over the last decade and a half. The emerging market economies are now an increasingly important source of dynamism, stability, and profitability for the world economy and financial system.

Recent runs on short-term bank liabilities and the fiscal crisis in the euro area are a clear example of this. No one wants to be the last one to withdraw his deposits from a tottering bank, sell bonds issued by a country heading for insolvency, or rid himself of the currency of a country facing an imminent balance of payments crisis and potentially unsustainable debt burden, even though it may only be unsustainable provided that other investors think it is. The capital controls stopped a run on Iceland’s currency. In a sense, they also undermined confidence for the long term – that is, investors’ confidence that Iceland’s economy and public sector finances could achieve balance and sustainability in the absence of controls, knowing that the fragile balance created by the controls is based on coercing many investors to hold króna assets. Ultimately, confidence can be established only under conditions of free trade, not through coerced transactions. Fortunately, however, investors’ view on the Icelandic economy is diverse. Some understand quite well that behind the cloud of dust swirling in the wake of Iceland’s financial collapse is a country fraught with opportunity. When the dust has settled, Iceland’s net international investment position may turn out to be lower than it has been in decades, and in spite of sizeable gross debt, the Treasury’s net debt position indicates that it will be possible to reduce gross debt rapidly, if the programme of fiscal consolidation set forth is followed strictly.