samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
China was the first country to enter lockdown and the first to record a V-shaped growth rebound. In other Asian countries, more eﬀective virus containment meant that domestic economic activity was less severely aﬀected than in other parts of the world. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2021/riding-the-growth-momentum-in-asia  1/11  12/02/2021  "Riding the Growth Momentum in Asia" – Keynote Speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), …  Quickly restoring production capacity played into Asia’s strong presence in global value chains. Asian merchandise exports held up well, as global consumers spent more on goods while access to services was restricted. Asian exports of medical supplies and electronics expanded. 3. While large swathes of the world are gripped by renewed waves of COVID-19 infections today, eﬀective vaccination programmes and unprecedented policy support are expected to support a strong recovery in the second half of 2021. The World Bank forecasts global growth at 4.0% this year; with growth in East Asia at 5.9%. ASEAN economies are expected to expand by 5.0% in 2021, also surpassing the performance of regions beyond Asia. [3] 4. There are however, still considerable uncertainties on the horizon. These include the course of the pandemic, progress on vaccination, the possibility of governments mistiming the withdrawal of policy support, and the evolution of US-China trade and investment relations. 5.

In 2012, that figure rose to 22%. By 2017, Western firms expect Asia to contribute 32%. However, this will still be below Asia’s estimated 35% share of the global economy in 2017.” 5. The use of RMB is now catching up with China’s rising economic clout. Starting from scratch in 2009, the portion of China’s trade settled in the RMB quickly surged to 20% in 2014, amounting to 6.6 trillian yuan, equivalent to more than $ trillion. And, in the same year, over 30% and 16% of China’s inward and outward direct investment respectively were denominated in the RMB. Increasingly, MNCs will find it advantageous and necessary to trade with their Asian counterparts, and to conduct the related financing, investment and hedging activities in the RMB. 6. In parallel, riding on her rapid economic growth in the past decades, Mainland China now has a growing cluster of home grown MNCs in a wide range of sectors. Chinese companies now account for 95 of the Fortune 500 companies. These MNCs are now flexing their muscles in the international arena, typically starting with trade and eventually venturing into mergers and acquisitions and global portfolio investment. We can safely assume that they will take even bolder steps with the supportive policies under the “One Belt, One Road” strategy, bringing new business and business partners for other global MNCs. 7. These favourable macro trends are indeed good news to the corporate treasurers.
Thanks to various payment systems, we can avoid this inconvenience. This not only has a value in making our everyday life easier; there is also a  BIS Review 75/2001  1  large economic value, as we are able to use our time for other things rather than queuing to pay bills. The Government Inquiry on the future of the financial sector presented last year estimated the value of this at more than 7 per cent of GDP, which corresponds to approximately SEK 150 billion. This indicates the importance of properly functioning, stable payment systems. Mutual fund investment plays an important part in the financial system's other role. This concerns converting savings into investments. Without financial markets each investment would have to be financed by the actual investor, whether it was a question of buying a house or starting up a company. The financial markets' economic contribution here is that they make it possible to distinguish between the decision to save and to invest, so that the investor does not need to save all the necessary money before making the investment. This enables the implementation of many projects that would not otherwise see the light of day. However, the financial sector does not merely make it possible to distinguish between these decisions; it also makes it possible to solve the conflict of interests that often prevails between the saver and the investor. A saver often wants to be able to get his money back quickly if the need arises.

They would probably result in further reinforcement of fluctuations, as activity - and thus liquidity - on the markets would decline. As representative of a central bank, I would also like to point out that nor do I believe that monetary policy alone can counteract exaggerated movements on the financial markets. On the other hand, a clear monetary policy, aimed at price stability, is necessary in the work on maintaining financial stability. It facilitates economic decision-making in society. However, part of the solution must lie in breaking the pattern that causes players to behave in exactly the same way as one another. Increased transparency with regard to countries' and companies' economic status is an important step in the right direction here. Developments in technology have demolished many of the barriers that previously hampered the spread of this type of information. However, this requires that authorities and companies make use of the opportunity and actually release important information. We at the Riksbank, like many other Swedish authorities, have for quite some time now made use of the advantages of the Internet in this context. All important information is published on our website, which is easily accessible to most people. This applies regardless of whether one is an analyst at a major bank or whether one is a private person. Information technology has thus created a powerful instrument, which can be used to counteract the 'follow the leader' behaviour.
For this purpose, it will be important for the banks to build on their strengths and minimise their weaknesses. With regard to the former, our banks start from a relatively strong position since their fundamentals have not been weakened by the financial crisis. The existence of a sound regulatory system, effective risk management practices and prudent lending policies have combined to minimise the banks’ exposure to bad or dubiously-valued assets. Investment portfolios are in fact highly diversified, with minimal holdings of asset-backed securities, while the domestically-oriented banks’ measured approach to credit is reflected in loan-to-deposit and residential loan-to-value ratios that average around 79% and 73%, respectively. One of the lessons learned from the crisis is that a bank’s funding model is crucial. The reliance by a number of international banks on wholesale funding proved to be a major source of weakness in time of stress. In contrast, Maltese banks have traditionally relied on retail deposits to fund their lending operations, a source of liquidity that has proved more reliable. This explains the banks’ high liquidity ratios, currently averaging 46%. The steady supply of liquidity, combined with a sustained demand, have permitted the credit channel to remain intact, despite the ongoing global turmoil. As a matter of fact, bank lending to the private sector grew by 9.7% in the twelve months to April 2009, compared with 8.7% in the preceding twelve months. Another lesson concerns the importance of a strong capital base.

On the domestic front, fast aggregate demand growth continues to be an important source of inflation risks, particularly amid increasing evidence of limits to the expansion of supply – and despite the robust behavior of fixed-capital investment. Moreover, it is clearer now that additional increases in aggregate supply depend on increases in the investment rate of the economy, a process that requires time. In this context, the Central Bank evaluates that the consistent reduction of the unbalances between the pace of expansion of supply and demand continues to be crucial in the design of monetary policy. The Brazilian Central Bank adopts a strategy aimed at avoiding inflation volatility. This approach takes into account the time lags in the transmission mechanism and has proved to be the most adequate to deal with uncertainties intrinsic in the process of monetary policy formulation and implementation. Thus the importance of developing an appropriate analytical framework for monetary policy, including forecasts and the balance of risks to inflation, as well as the preemptive stance in the decision-making process of the Monetary Policy Committee. In the current circumstances, there is a potential risk that economic agents start to attribute a higher probability that inflation increases will become persistent, a fact that would reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy. The Central Bank stresses that the performance of monetary policy tends to be more effective when the deterioration of inflation dynamics is in the early stages, rather than when it is more established.
As I will discuss shortly, although there may be a potential role for central banks here, CCPs, at a minimum, must have their own liquidity resources as the first line of defense. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Fourth, there needs to be a viable resolution regime for CCPs. This is needed to ensure that the CCP either can be recapitalized and recover or, if necessary, wound down in an orderly way without disrupting the provision of essential market services. Also, a resolution regime is necessary to ensure that a central bank that might lend to a CCP in extremis will be repaid. To help ensure that these safeguards are met, a major part of the reform effort is to establish a strong set of principles for financial market infrastructures. These principles must embody the four safeguards and ensure that the infrastructure can withstand any stresses that could plausibly occur. The process of developing such a set of principles began about two years ago and is now nearing completion. So why the new principles and what do they embody? During the crisis, financial market infrastructures performed very well. In fact, FMIs were actually a source of strength. They enabled market participants to settle obligations when they came due in a timely way. Also, their robustness gave confidence to market participants that they could continue to trade, knowing that the transactions would almost certainly be settled and cleared without difficulty.

It’s useful that governments look into that and look at the various tools that could be effective and which could correspond to the various goals that they want to pursue, including making sure that the policies followed by member states receiving EFSF support are aimed at restoring a sound fiscal and the appropriate competitiveness. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The baseline scenario reflects those events that are believed to be the most likely to occur with the information at hand at the closing of this Report. There are risk scenarios, however, which if materialized, may reshape the macroeconomic environment and, therefore, may modify the course of monetary policy. On this opportunity, having evaluated the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance is downward biased for output and unbiased for inflation. Abroad, one first risk has to do with the behavior of emerging economies, especially China. The latter risk has been present in several Reports already and has recently been exacerbated because of growing doubts posed by the fragility of the Chinese financial system and the overall increase in the risk perception of the emerging world. In particular, adeterioration in the Chinese economy would have first-order effects on Chile and the group of emerging economies, spreading through both real and financial channels. Of particular importance is its impact on the prices of commodities, including copper, as well as on the growth of other important trading partners. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the vulnerabilities that some emerging economies have accumulated may generate new episodes of volatility It is also possible for the recovery process in the U.S. to end up being stronger than expected. The timing of its effects shows different signs.

Core inflation will hover around 3 percent throughout the same horizon (figure 7). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The current account deficit of the balance of payments is forecast to stand at 3.6 percent of GDP in 2014, up a little from 2013, but below the December estimate. Behind it is the expected decline in the copper price this year, which more than offsets the lower growth foreseen in domestic demand and imports. This implies that, measured at trend prices, the deficit will narrow further, approaching 3 percent of GDP. As for GDP, the rate of total investment will go slightly above 23 percent in nominal terms (somewhat more than 25 percent in real terms), while national savings should amount to 19.5 percent (table 2). Aside from the already discussed trajectories foreseen for domestic growth and the world economy, this forecast uses as a working assumption that nominal wages will be adjusted in line with productivity and the inflation target. It also uses as a methodological assumption that the real exchange rate will remain stable, considering that it is now inside the range believed to be consistent with its long-term fundamentals. Finally, the baseline scenario uses as a working methodological assumption that the MPR will follow a trend comparable with the one that can be derived by the prices of financial assets prevailing at the statistical closing of this Report (figure 8).
Source: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators  Some progress made In the same way as the weak performance of the European economy today is undermining the economic outlook for Sweden, better growth potential in Europe would benefit the Swedish economy going forward. Eight of Sweden’s 10 most important export markets are in Europe and five of them are euro countries.7 It is of course therefore gratifying that work is underway at the EU level to restore confidence in economic policy. In early March, 25 countries signed the so-called fiscal compact, which entails stricter monitoring of the  5  See the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the European Commission’s measure of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP. 6  See Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Art and Zoido-Lobatón, Pablo (1999) Governance Matters. Policy Research Working Paper no. 2196. World Bank. 7  Sweden’s ten most important export markets in 2011 in order of rank: Germany, Norway, UK, USA, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, France, Belgium and China. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Member Countries’ budget work and a greater possibility to impose sanctions on those countries that have excessive debts or deficits. These are measures that can help to increase the credibility of the countries’ budget discipline and reduce the risk of future debt crises. Progress has also been made in putting together a second support package for Greece.

Hence the in depth investigations led by the ECB with the NCBs of the Eurosystem. A digital euro would contribute to the anchoring role of central bank money by offering to the general public CBM in a form that would be complementary to banknotes and adapted to the growing demand of the public for digital payments. In addition, a digital euro would contribute to strengthening our strategic autonomy. To conclude, let me just stress that it is not clear to me what is going to be the destiny of digital finance and the shape that the financial landscape will eventually take as a result, in the medium run. Market forces will decide. But what is clear to me is the role we, as a central bank, should play, which is to make sure that the shape evolves in a confidence prone regulatory and operational framework, which implies that we play an active role to help build that framework on both aspects, in line with our mandate. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
As I looked at the faces of the students gathered in that vast auditorium, I could see in their eyes a reflection of the gloom and doom of the time. Here is what I told these young investors that dark morning: “… the current economic and financial predicament represents a potential gold mine rather than a minefield. Historically, great investors have made their money by climbing a wall of worry rather than letting a woeful consensus cow them. … Your job as investors is … to ferret out from the generalmarket malaise good financial and business operators whose franchises and prospects are overdiscounted at current prices. Were I you … I would be licking my chops at the opportunities that always abound in times of adversity. … There are a lot of dollar bills that can be found in the debris of the current markets that can be picked up for nickels and dimes.” Of course, I would not mention this today had I been wrong! Currently, the right hand side of the balance sheet of most any well-managed market-traded business is chock-full of restructured, cheap debt and leaner common stock, while the left side is bulging with surplus cash. The S&P closed yesterday at 1,819, the Nasdaq at 4,113 and the Dow at 16,258 – a plateau over two times above the valley into which they had descended in 2009. And, again, there are the signs of conspicuous consumption I mentioned earlier that reflect a fully robust stock market.

Petar Goshev: Problems in measuring inflation Opening speech by Mr Petar Goshev, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the workshop “Problems in measuring inflation” organized by the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 22 May 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, Please allow me to welcome you on behalf of the Central Bank, to thank you for your participation in today's workshop, and to wish a fruitful day for all of us present here today. This is the third workshop in the past two years, organized, or as it is now the case, co-organized by the Central Bank, which along with the international conferences and seminars on expert level, which increase in number, have been our new component of activities aimed at: increasing our own professional capacity, opening of the National Bank to the domestic and international expert community for the purpose of mutual improvement of the abilities to identify and solve the problems in the area of macroeconomics and for increasing the transparency in our communication with the public. Today's workshop has been organized in cooperation with the State Statistical Office, and the topic of discussion are the problems related to measuring of inflation. I do not think it is necessary to explain why the State Statistical Office: the State Statistical Office produces the data on inflation, while the National Bank is one of the main users of those data. Why this subject – problems in measuring inflation?
In the years prior to the 2007–2012 crisis, which in our case coincided with the early years of the ECB, a certain consensus emerged among the advanced economies regarding the role and functioning of central banks. These were designed as independent entities, that is, not subject to direct control by governments, with a clear mandate to ensure price stability, in addition to full employment in some jurisdictions, such as the United States. The price stability mandate is normally expressed as a numerical inflation target, frequently 2% or, as in the case of the ECB, a rate below, but close to, 2%. To achieve its price stability target, the central bank adjusts the general level of interest rates on the funding raised – via bank loans or in the debt markets – by agents in the real economy (businesses, households and governments). Although the central bank controls the nominal interest rate, it is the “real” interest rate – that is, the nominal rate less expected inflation – that is relevant for households’ and businesses’ spending decisions. For instance, a nominal interest rate of 2% when expected inflation is 4% is much more expansive than a nominal interest rate of 1% in a noninflationary setting. Given that the prices that determine inflation are partly rigid, the central bank may influence the real interest rate by adjusting nominal rates.

Faced with this situation, the digital euro could be a vehicle for retaining the option whereby citizens have access to the central bank’s safe money and avoiding the risks that would arise from total dependence on private means of payment. However, before launching a digital euro we must resolve many questions. Only thus will we be in a position to respond to the challenges and react swiftly where necessary. For one thing, we have to acquire practical experience regarding the possibilities technology offers for the operational design of this digital euro. Within the Eurosystem we must consider, among other matters, what the most appropriate technology would be, how we should shape it to ensure maximum resilience and how we would have to involve the private sector in the provision of the digital euro. Purely technical issues aside, we must further analyse the macroeconomic and financial consequences of a digital euro in the different scenarios identified, as there are basic aspects regarding the potential impact of the digital euro on the economy that would have to be clarified before taking a decision on issuing it. By way of example, I would highlight the need to minimise the adverse impact that potential banking disintermediation would have on financial stability, or the possible effects of the digital euro on situations of financial instability. These aspects probably require an additional analytical push to ensure that these unwanted secondary effects can be avoided.