samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So should its content, for instance: "since early 2018, nine of the biggest international banks have increased the assets booked at their eurozone entities more than sixfold to almost € trillion"; "if any city can make claim to being the bloc's new pre-eminent hub, it's Paris", "many executives who spoke to Bloomberg said they expect headcount to keep growing from local hiring [in Paris]". Indeed, Paris is the only financial center to offer such a wide range of financial activities, from global asset management to insurance and banking. Beyond the large number of subsidiaries established in or relocated to Paris since Brexit – at least thirty banks, twenty asset managers, several market platforms for instance –, we should also consider the activities performed through branches in Paris, especially trading rooms and desks, which are sometimes far more significant than the subsidiaries to which they are legally bound. Contrary to other cities, which have attracted one or two kinds of financial services, Paris is the only one to have benefited from relocations on all segments of the financial industry. More importantly still, these moves were not one-off events: the momentum has lastingly shifted from London to continental Europe. We observe a steady shift, which shows no sign of losing steam.

The emerging economies, although they did not experience the same problems, must take advantage of this opportunity to review their own situation, to draw lessons about what worked well or not, and to advance in the task of perfecting their financial systems. Chile’s institutional arrangements as regards financial stability have generally worked well in recent decades. This is borne out by the present strength of its financial system and the way in which it came through the recent crisis without major problems. But there are pending tasks and challenges. Large financial reforms may not perhaps be required but there is room for improvements in various areas. They include the need to create a mechanism for coordination and communication at the highest level with a focus on financial stability in which the government, the BCCH and the different financial sector supervisors participate. This would allow the BCCH to make its points of view known formally to the relevant authorities. Similarly, in a context in which financial activities have become increasingly complex, the bodies responsible for supervision need to be strengthened institutionally. From this point of view, particular attention should be paid to the resources assigned to them and their capacity to issue norms and regulation in a world that calls for constant adjustments and changes. Finally, it would be advisable for the BCCH to have a more active role in defining prudential regulation. In some cases, this role already exists but could be extended to other norms with systemic implications.
Ambassador Iimura has agreed – and I thank him profusely for this – to make the introductory speech to remind us of the importance of this anniversary and the celebrations that will take place throughout the year. In order to celebrate this historic anniversary, we decided to organise this symposium in a place that itself has a very rich history: the Golden Gallery of the Hôtel de Toulouse. I will mention in passing that 200 years ago this year the Banque de France chose the Hôtel de Toulouse for its head office. I will not, this morning, go into great depth about the history of this place. Nevertheless, on a day like this, given over to History, I will just say that this gallery was designed in the early 17th century by François Mansart for M. de La Vrillière, a minister of Louis XIII, and was then renovated in the style of the day at the beginning of the following century by Robert de Cotte, the First Architect of Louis XIV, for the Count of Toulouse (the legitimated son of the Sun King), its new owner. Although this symposium is being held in Paris in the most prestigious part of the Banque de France, it is, nonetheless, a joint symposium of the Banque de France and the Bank of Japan. Indeed, without the remarkable efforts of the Representative Office of the Bank of Japan in Paris, which has played a leading role in its organisation, this symposium would never have seen the day.

This applied both internationally and in Sweden. It was partly due to the confidence crisis suffered by the business sector as a result of corporate scandals in the United States and a number of large-scale bankruptcies. This contributed to a new stock market fall. The threat of war in Iraq and the ensuing outbreak of war for a time created greater uncertainty over the global economy than usual. The lack of clearly positive economic signals once the acute stage of the war was over, contributed to an increasingly pessimistic view of the economic situation during the first half of 2003. The weaker economic activity was also reflected in the Riksbank’s inflation and growth forecasts, and the repo rate was cut by a total of one percentage point during spring and summer 2003. During the second half of 2003 the views of economic activity became slightly more optimistic again. It now appears that economic growth in Sweden and the United States during 2003 was largely as we had expected at the beginning of the year. In Sweden, investment showed a much poorer growth than expected during 2003, but this was counteracted by good growth in consumption, in both the private and public sector, and by favourable developments in foreign trade. One could therefore say that the Riksbank, in common with other analysts, became overly pessimistic in connection with the Iraq war, at least with regard to the view of economic growth in the United States and Sweden.
3  The Law on Developing the Ecosystem of Emerging Businesses, better known as the StartUps Law, was enacted with the aim of spurring entrepreneurship and R&D&I activity, to this end setting in place a range of tax and employment incentives for R&D&I, while also streamlining the administrative formalities for setting up new innovative firms. Meanwhile, the new Science Law has set a target for government funding of R&D&I at 1.25% of GDP in 2030. The second factor is the low level of Spain’s human capital, particularly in terms of its population’s technological expertise and digital skills, which has much to do with its limited capacity to innovate and absorb knowledge.8 Despite a notable improvement in recent decades, the educational attainment level of employers, the self-employed and employees in Spain is lower than the euro area average.9 Moreover, the high early school leavers rate, while clearly tending downwards, continues to point to weaknesses in the education system.10 In addition to boosting the level of human capital, it is essential in the current technological and demographic environment to ensure that the education system and vocational training cater to the far-reaching structural changes under way. On this subject, allow me to make four observations: 1 Encouraging the young to take more of an interest in vocational training would help cut the numbers leaving school early and ease the shortage of specialist technical workers.

Similarly, the number of those aged 19 in higher vocational training (as a percentage of the total of those either enrolled in these programmes or at university) increased from 20% to 25% over the same period. 12  On Eurostat data for 2020, 24% of students in tertiary education in Spain are enrolled in a field related to the natural sciences, mathematics, statistics, information and communication technologies, engineering, manufacturing and construction, compared with 28% in the euro area. In the Global Innovation Index (WIPO, 2022), Spain is ranked 61 out of 109 countries by number of science and engineering graduates. 4  school students, according to the OECD’s PISA database. Improving in this area calls for better trained, more professional teachers able to teach based on best practices. 3 Longer working lives, which will be unavoidable given current demographic trends, increase the need for sufficiently skilled, versatile workers able to switch jobs and lines of work over their working lives, especially in a context in which certain professional skills are rapidly becoming obsolete and the cognitive skills of the older population are increasingly deteriorating.13 Having workers take part in lifelong learning will require combating job instability, lowering the institutional barriers to business growth and helping to ensure that the training on offer at universities and vocational training centres caters to the changing demands of the job market. 4 Education spending in Spain is slightly below that seen in the euro area (on average, 4.2% and 4.7% of GDP, respectively, between 2010 and 2021).
They can also resort to undrawn amounts on their credit lines with financial institutions, to new borrowing, such as new bank loans and debt issuances, to divestments, or to new capital contributions from their members. This list of sources of liquidity for firms highlights the important role of economic policy measures in alleviating the effects of the crisis on the business sector. At the European level, the powerful monetary policy response from the European Central Bank (ECB) has proved essential for facilitating the financing of all European firms against this backdrop of high uncertainty, heading off financial fragmentation problems like those experienced as a result of the last crisis. Besides the approval of a new, very large asset purchase programme, this response has included the provision of liquidity to financial institutions under very favourable conditions providing they meet certain business lending targets. In Spain, the public guarantee programmes for loans to firms, which are managed by the Official Credit Institute (ICO)2 and have reduced the risk taken on by banks when lending in such uncertain circumstances, have been crucial, as have the measures to allow for more flexibility in temporary layoffs and short-time work arrangements (ERTE by their Spanish abbreviation) and the payment deferrals on certain tax obligations, among other measures. 2  ICO COVID-19 Guarantee Facility, approved through Royal Decree-Law 8/2020 of 17 March 2020.

Once the state of alert had been declared, the number of sales through public deeds plummeted to a record low in April, falling by approximately 70% year-onyear. In subsequent months the situation improved, although falls of 20% (compared with the previous year) were still being posted in June. In this setting, house prices are estimated to have remained on the gradually slowing path that dates back to the end of 2018, although according to the latest available data, corresponding to June, they are still posting positive growth. Like the economy as a whole, housing investment recorded an unprecedented downturn in 2020 Q2. According to the preliminary Quarterly National Accounts estimate, this component fell by more than 30% compared with the same period in 2019, returning to the lows recorded in the previous crisis. Indicator trends appear to anticipate an upturn in housing investment in Q3, although it is expected to remain below the pre-pandemic level, owing to the worsening outlook for households. Over a longer horizon, the extent to which the housing market will eventually recover once the health crisis is behind us will depend on the degree of persistence of its adverse economic and financial effects. 9  The impact on the financial sector The banking sector The crisis triggered by the pandemic has clearly accentuated the credit, market and operational risks facing the banking sector.
In such circumstances, the only way to maintain the competitiveness of the Macedonian producers was the specialization and exports of lower quality products. These developments did not generate inflationary pressures, which caused absence of real appreciation that was evident in the other transition countries. In the past several years, Macedonia is quickly moving closer to the more advanced transition economies. Several years in a row we have achieved positive and stable growth rates, equaling 5.1% in 2007, which is the highest growth rate since independence. Even though economic growth rates are lower than the ones in Baltic countries as well as some of the countries in the region, this is a sure sign for the acceleration of the process of real convergence. This process is also supported by the foreign direct and portfolio investments (6.3% of GDP in 2007) and the faster credit expansion, with annual growth rate of 39% in 2007. As far as nominal convergence is concerned, Macedonia is facing challenges that are common for most of the economies in the region and elsewhere. Since the last quarter of 2007, we are having an acceleration of the inflation rate, which is mostly caused by the global rise of food and energy prices. Therefore, the uncertainty regarding the movement of these prices, as well as the expectations for pressures initiated by the process of real convergence are the main challenges for monetary policy in the medium term.

The annual inflation, which to a large extend reflects past price dynamics, can keep rising up to the middle of the year. However, in a year, i.e. in March 2016, inflation will slow down to the level of about 9% amid the decrease in the monthly and quarterly price growth. While making the decisions regarding interest rates, we take into consideration not the current inflation that is essentially historical, and cannot be affected by our decision. We rely on inflation forecast. Third, we forecast gradual decrease in inflation expectations. Surveys already show evident signs of such a decline. In case no new shocks occur, this process will persist facilitated by the slowdown in current inflation. Therefore, real interest rates which should be calculated with regard to the expected inflation will stay in the positive range providing for antiinflationary nature of monetary policy. Nevertheless, it is persistently high inflation expectations, as well as risks of the upward revision of tariffs of natural monopolies, fiscal policy easing, and possible accelerated growth of nominal wages that we consider to be the main risks for our policy and our inflation forecast. I would like to note that, when taking the today’s decision, the Board of Directors was guided by the goal to decrease inflation to 4% in 2017 and to further maintain it close to this level as it was stated in the Guidelines for the Single State Monetary Policy. We have repeatedly expressed our intention to reach this level step by step taking into account the economic conditions.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 17:  Chart 18:  Real lending growth rates  UK credit-GDP gap(a)(b) percentage points 35  Percentage changes on year earlier 30 Norway (1988=0) Sweden (1990=0)  25  30  Finland (1990=0)  20  25  United Kingdom (2007=0)  15  20  10 5  15 +  0 5  10 5  10 0  15 3  2  1 - 0+ 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 10  -5  Years from start of crisis  -10 80  Sources: Bank of England, central bank financial stability reports, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. 85  90  95  00  05  10  Sources: IMF and Bank calculations. (a) Based on the guidance variable for the Basel III countercyclical buffer. Credit is defined as M4 lending. The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the percentage point difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its trend, where the trend is based on a one-sided HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 400,000. (b) Last data point is Q1 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  15

However, less than 5% of the losses were insured, compared to 40% in developed countries2. Over the last five years, the region experienced a series of high-profile and very painful disasters such as the Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan, floods in Thailand, and the Super Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Losses from these three disasters are estimated to be close to USD 360 billion3, about the average GDP of the Philippines and Thailand in 2012. As these economies were underinsured, the bulk of the financial burden was ultimately borne by the governments. 4. The development of catastrophe risk management in Asia is still at a nascent stage, compared to more mature markets in the US and Europe. Yet Asia is expected to continue to experience a rise in natural catastrophe losses, as a result of climate change, and rapid population growth, urbanization as well as economic concentration in heavily exposed regions. So With this confluence of factors, the financial burden from natural catastrophes is expected to intensify. 1  “Source: EM-DAT – The International Disaster Database”. 2  “Risk Financing is Key to Building Resilience Against Disasters – Study”, ABD, 31 January 2013. 3  “Based on Swiss Re and Aon Benfield’s estimates”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Minding the protection gap in natural catastrophe risk management 5. Going forward, governments can no longer act as the “insurer of last resort”.
Another distinguishing feature of the countries up on the right of Figure 1 is that they have not yet experienced any major fall in their housing market with an ensuing fall in aggregate demand. This is something that has happened in most of the countries down on the left of the figure. One could say that the countries that have managed well so far have felt the effects of the crisis through weaker development abroad, but have managed to avoid major problems in their own credit and housing markets. However, not surprisingly, the risks linked to developments in household debt and the housing market are currently high up on the policy agenda in several of the countries that have managed well so far, in the same way that they are here in Sweden. Repo rate only marginally higher One thing that is worth emphasising is that when I say that the repo rate has been a little higher than it would otherwise have been, I do mean a little higher. It has not been a case of the Riksbank using high interest rates to stop an upturn in lending and housing prices by depressing the whole economy. In that case, we would have had a much poorer development than is indicated in Figures 1 and 2. When it comes down to it, the repo rate has not been higher than 1 per cent for around one year now. Sometimes it is claimed that even this is a high level.

Financial and monetary conditions Our monetary policy tightening continues to be reflected in risk-free interest rates and broader financing conditions. Funding conditions are tighter for banks and credit is becoming more expensive for firms and households. In April lending rates reached their highest level in more than a decade, standing at 4.4 per cent for business loans and 3.4 per cent for mortgages. These higher borrowing rates, together with tighter credit supply conditions and lower loan demand, have further weakened credit dynamics. The annual growth of loans to firms declined again in April, to 4.6 per cent. The month-on-month changes have been negative on average since November. Loans to households grew at an annual rate of 2.5 per cent in April and increased only marginally month on month. Weak bank lending and the reduction in the Eurosystem balance sheet led to a continued decline in annual broad money growth to 1.9 per cent in April. Month-on-month changes in broad money have been negative since December. In line with our monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council thoroughly assessed the links between monetary policy and financial stability. The financial stability outlook has remained challenging since our last review in December 2022. Tighter financing conditions are raising banks' funding costs and the credit risk of outstanding loans. Together with the recent tensions in the US banking system, these factors could give rise to systemic stress and depress economic growth in the short term.
•  Financing new investment through state bonds could well prove inefficient and harmful for the Estonian economy as a whole, even if the investments are in good projects. The low unemployment and rapid wage rises that we see at the moment  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  would cause a large part of the extra money gained from the emission of state bonds to be lost, as infrastructure projects would cost much more than before. Large state construction projects that can only be temporary in nature would also cause economic and social problems in Estonia, because once the large projects finish, a great number of those working on them would find themselves unemployed, having left jobs in other sectors. •  It must be understood that Estonia already profits from the purchases of bonds by the central banks of the euro area. Financial markets act as a series of communicating vessels, so that when interest rates in one area fall, the effect is passed on to other areas. The lower interest rates in the euro area mean that Estonian companies and households can borrow more cheaply, and were it necessary the Estonian state could also borrow more cheaply. If easier financing conditions spur on the European economy, Estonian exporters will be among the winners, and this is the goal towards which the bond purchase programme is striving.

In the Basel I era, I remember that conversations with banks often began with them saying: “we are happy to discuss risk-based capital requirements as you the supervisors measure them, but that is not how we manage risk”. This statement would not have been bad had the Basel I approach acted as a restraint on how firms took risk, whether or not it was how they measured risk. Unfortunately, that was at best only partially true. Basel II is much criticised, and there is much to criticise, but one thing we should not forget is that it had barely been implemented when the financial crisis began, indeed Basel II was not implemented in the US at all. The excessive leverage and risk-taking had grown up in the Basel I world. Interestingly, in the US, unlike in Europe, banks were effectively constrained from balance sheet expansion by a regulatory leverage ratio. But their response to this constraint appears  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  to have been to seek a higher return on equity through holding riskier assets drawn from, for instance, sub-prime and leveraged loans. When we look at the causes and types of bank failures in the crisis, the point is often made in this country that the problems appear to have been located in mortgage and commercial property lending as much as investment banking. That is true.