samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Although this split had its merits historically, the changing scale, nature and sophistication of cyber and other threats to the stability of payment systems mean there is a compelling financial stability case for being able to provide end-to-end risk management within one organisation. In recent months the Bank has worked closely with the shareholders, users, management and staff of CHAPS Co to bring about a smooth and orderly transition and avoid any disruption to the service provided. On Monday last week, former CHAPS Co staff took their new seats in the Bank of England, and by 7am more than 22,000 transactions had been completed on the Bank’s infrastructure with a value of £ In the first week, approximately 862,000 transactions were completed, with a value of £ including wholesale  5  Bailey (2017) 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  interbank payments, mortgages, company invoices and much more. In short, it was business as usual for banks and their customers. Like our administration of SONIA the combined RTGS and CHAPS service will benefit from best practice governance arrangements, including a new Board which will meet for the first time in December, chaired by me and with four independent members recruited through a competitive process. We will also continue to benefit from the voice of CHAPS users, through the establishment of a new Strategic Advisory Forum for senior industry representatives. Conclusion  Let me recap on how I see end to end monetary policy.

The well-defined objectives of monetary policy have provided a strong foundation on which the MPC can base its decisions over the course of the crucial period up to and beyond the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. But to be successful, monetary, and indeed financial stability, policy must be effectively delivered. That requires the efficient implementation of decisions. And it requires stable and effective core sterling markets and payments infrastructure. The Bank has a long history of outstanding execution of decisions, of scanning the horizon for emerging vulnerabilities in markets, and of using its position to address them. In keeping with this history, these are things I will prioritise in my term as Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking. Beyond Define, Decide, Deliver, there is of course ‘Describe’. Improving our communications internally and externally is a key priority of the Bank’s Vision 2020 strategy, because better communication will support our mission to deliver monetary and financial stability. A new focus of our communications is on schools. We started last week in Merseyside and over the next year Bank staff are visiting 200 schools covering 9% of the pupil population. But engaging with traditional stakeholders remains important, on which note let me take some of your questions. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  References Bailey, A, (2017) ‘The future of LIBOR,’ Speech given at Bloomberg, available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/the-future-of-libor Broadbent, B.
From today’s perspective, these three issues refer – more or less directly – to the basic challenges that will have to be tackled to make the present uneven and unbalanced global recovery sustainable. With this in mind, I will organise my Opening Remarks around these three topics. First, I will deal with global rebalancing and how to achieve it in a context of diverging economic prospects for advanced and emerging market economies. Second, I will address the recent behaviour of global financial flows and the challenges that emerging market economies face in this regard, including the risk of asset price overvaluation. And finally, I will touch briefly upon the need to enhance policy cooperation at the global level, especially as some economies progressively leave the worst of the crisis behind. Let me move now to the first issue: global rebalancing and the world economic outlook. Although global imbalances were considered one of the major risks facing the world economy before the crisis, such risks did not finally materialise in the expected form of a disorderly adjustment of exchange rates, with disruptive effects on global financial stability. Nevertheless, even if large and unsustainable deficits financed by the accumulation of reserves by surplus emerging economies were not the ultimate cause of the global economic and financial crisis, it can still be argued that they provided support for the build-up of the financial excesses that led to it.

However, limiting upward exchange rate flexibility may attract more capital inflows, on the expectation of future appreciations, turning thereby into a self-defeating strategy. In summary, choosing the right policy mix has become a challenging task for many emerging market economies, all the more so in the absence of a globally coordinated policy response. Faced with these uncertain times, Latin American economies are applying a mix of policies to attain their multiple objectives and minimise risks. The mix includes, to differing degrees of intensity, monetary policy tightening, foreign exchange interventions and reserve accumulation, macro-prudential policies and, in some cases, capital controls. The use of capital controls has traditionally been controversial, because they distort markets while their effectiveness is not backed by empirical evidence. But we must acknowledge that there has been a shift in opinion in their favour – at least as a last-resort instrument – even among institutions such as the IMF. In turn, this shift probably reflects a change in the perceived balance of benefits and costs associated with financial excesses. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that capital controls can also entail negative externalities for the global economy. While fully convinced of the benefits of financial globalisation, a topic to which we devoted our Seminar in 2006, I am concerned by the risks of financial deglobalisation arising in the wake of the crisis.
In fact, the market itself has this evaluation. Comparing with the effects in other countries, the last three episodes of increased volatility and tension in world financial markets have had very limited effects on the Chilean economy (Figure 6). BIS Review 97/2007  7  Figure 6: Exchange rates (local currency units per US dollar, percent change) May 2006(1) Argentina Australia Brazil Chile Eurozone Hungary Indonesia Japan Malaysia Mexico New Zealand Philippines Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Turkey United Kingdom  1,5 5,8 8,0 7,3 1,6 7,0 6,6 5,2 2,9 5,4 3,3 4,0 6,1 0,1 20,3 3,2 20,3 2,3  February 2007 (2)  August 2007 (3)  0,0 3,0 2,6 1,0 0,7 0,7 2,0 -4,2 0,7 1,0 5,2 1,0 0,6 0,4 5,9 1,2 5,1 2,2  1,7 Argentina 10,3 Australia 8,8 Brazil 1,9 Chile 2,4 Eurozone 5,1 Hungary 3,3 Indonesia -6,3 Japan 2,3 Malaysia 3,1 Mexico 13,6 New Zealand 4,1 Philippines 1,8 Poland 1,4 Russia 6,8 South Africa 2,9 South Korea 7,0 Turkey 3,4 United Kingdom  (1) Shows variation between 10 May and 27 June. (2) Shows variation between 26 February and 5 March. (3) Shows variation between 19 July and 17 August. Source: Bloomberg.

Long-term interest rates (variation in basis points) May 2006(1) Argentina Australia Brazil Chile Eurozone Hungary Indonesia Japan Malaysia Mexico New Zealand Philippines Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Turkey United Kingdom USA  February 2007 (2) -4 15 25 11 108 118 -9 30 50 9 -72 -11 122 -679 4 8  --18 35 -7 -8 6 7 -4 -3 -6 -12 --5 0 20 -75 -9 -13  August 2007 (3) 382 Argentina -36 Australia 90 Brazil -8 Chile -26 Eurozone 53 Hungary 112 Indonesia -33 Japan 23 Malaysia 27 Mexico -60 New Zealand -- Philippines 12 Poland 26 Russia 3 South Africa -- South Korea 161 Turkey -34 United Kingdom -33 USA  (1) Shows variation between 10 May and 27 June. (2) Shows variation between 26 February and 5 March. (3) Shows variation between 19 July and 17 August. Source: Bloomberg. Something very simple reflects the proper functioning of our economy: in a moment where the world has seen a major retraction of credit operations, in Chile companies have continued to place long-term bonds in the private market. 8  BIS Review 97/2007  Conclusions It follows, then, that the Chilean economy has resumed a strong growth after the unexpected slowdown in the third quarter of last year. In parallel, due mainly to a different supply-side shocks, inflation has risen considerably. In this setting, monetary policy must, aside from anticipating the inflationary consequences of the business cycle, prevent second-round effects related to these shocks.
Charles Bean: The economic outlook Remarks by Mr Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the National Farmers’ Union Conference, Birmingham, 16 February 2009. *  *  *  The weather is at the forefront of farmers’ minds but rarely crosses that of a central banker except when, as two weeks ago, a dump of snow brings London to a standstill. But economists’ lack of interest in the weather was not always the case. William Stanley Jevons, one of the great Victorian economists, thought sunspot activity was the key to understanding economic cycles. Sunspots affected the weather, which in turn determined crop yields, demand and output in what was still a largely rural economy. No one takes this theory of cycles literally. But it is a useful metaphor for the way unforeseen shocks can switch an economy from one path to another. Today, the global and British economies have suffered such a shock, though one that is man-made in origin rather than extra-terrestrial. The origins of the crisis lie in the balmy economic weather prevailing in the decade or so before mid-2007. Growth was steady and inflation low and stable in the United Kingdom and other advanced economies, while rapid development in China, India and other emerging market economies was lifting millions out of poverty. Economic stability boosted confidence and encouraged an expansion of credit. Moreover, high levels of savings in some Asian economies, coupled with loose US monetary policy, drove global real interest rates unusually low.

As Asia gathers strength and has a more forceful impact on the global economy, opportunities arise for Asia to shape a global order of greater stability, sustainable growth and shared prosperity. One area that Asia has begun to recognise is the importance of a more balanced growth strategy both for the benefits of Asia and the world in general. Indeed, three particular trends within Asia are already emerging and they will continue to gain momentum as policy places greater focus on them. First is the balancing of an outwardoriented development strategy with efforts to promote the greater role of domestic demand. For some Asian economies, this takes the form of promoting domestic investment activity to meet the immense development needs within Asia, as well as to accelerate the transformation of Asian economies towards higher value-added output. For many, policy content to build broader social safety net and institutions to increase the role of private consumption in contributing to growth is gaining importance. The second trend in Asia is the acceleration of regional economic integration as intraregional trade and investment flows rise rapidly and financial markets are increasingly interlinked. Following the rapid trade liberalisation across Asia to improve market access is the growing pace of intra-regional investment flows. Increasingly, a vast market for goods and services will be created. Within Asia, as China becomes the locus of economic growth and transformation, the speed of ASEAN economic integration as one common market will provide added support to Asia’s pace of growth and dynamism.
This will  the Ministry of Finance, which will be  enhance price guidance to the market  reviewed quarterly. This will enhance the  and would result in increased liquidity  transparency and predictability of the  due to price discovery and transparency. primary auction process in the government securities market. Such initiatives will provide the same information to all market participants thereby ensuring the availability of information on potential transactions well in advance. Further, with the intention of enhancing the transparency of our operations, since June 2016, a decision is in place not to accept more than the aggregated offered amount at an auction although the Central Bank may accept less than the amount offered. The Primary Auction Rules for government securities will also be published in order to improve transparency and the standardisation of the procedures. Meanwhile, the current auction process is being reviewed, and the draft outcome of this review has been shared with the World Bank and the IMF. The Central Bank expects to get the draft auction system validated by these international organisations before going live with it. We hope to do this in the first quarter of 2017. We have also  The Bloomberg Trading Platform has  invited a consultant from the US  also been introduced for government  Treasury to look into a number of areas,  securities trading.

The Swiss Value Chain, run by the three companies, is of vital importance for the implementation of monetary policy. There is no alternative infrastructure for our monetary policy operations. Therefore, we will keep a very close watch on further developments in this area. 3. Developments in the financial markets  The positive underlying sentiment in the international financial markets remained largely unchanged in the first half of 2007, despite some turbulence in the stock markets, which was rather strong at times, and some difficulties in the US sub-prime mortgage market. On 27 February, after a correction in the Chinese stock market, major falls in share prices were recorded worldwide. The price decline temporarily gave rise to fears that the current bull market, which has lasted for many years now, could come to an end. After only a few days, however, the markets returned to normal. A few weeks later, most share indices had already compensated the losses (figure 1). A further correction has occurred in the past few days. However, despite this turbulence, the rise in implicit volatilities – a measure of expected uncertainty – has been relatively insignificant and shortlived in historical terms. Implicit volatilities are still at a very low level (figure 2). In addition, interest premiums on credit risks both for companies and emerging economies remain low, although yields on long-term government bonds have increased markedly since the beginning of March.
For more than three decades, ASEAN has sustained high economic growth. ASEAN is currently one of the fastest-growing and most dynamic regions in the world. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), economic growth in the region is expected to be sustained at an average of 5.3% over the next five years to reach USD3.6 trillion by 2019, five times the size it was a decade ago. Additionally, is also the significant increase in the middle class population in ASEAN. With a population of more than 600 million people, this trend will create a significant final demand in the global economy. This is reinforced by rising income in the region. Per capita income in ASEAN has almost trebled in this recent decade. ASEAN is therefore becoming a thriving hub in consumer demand. By 2020, ASEAN is estimated to contribute to more than half of the total global middle class population, representing more than USD2 trillion of new consumption within the region. Along with the development of more robust cross-border supply chains in the region, economic integration of ASEAN has occurred on several fronts. In particular, intra-regional trade and investment activity has increased significantly in this recent 15 years. Since 1990, ASEAN intra-regional trade has grown from 18% to 24% of total trade, and intra-regional investment has quadrupled since 2000, from 4% to 17% of total investment. While there has been a trend towards greater intra-regional trade and investment, financial integration in the region has lagged behind.

Similarly, many euro-sceptics characterize the euro as a pure “political” or geopolitical, project – clearly implying that it has no economic rationale. It will come as no surprise to you that I do not share this view. Obviously, the creation of the euro has been underpinned by a broad political vision and ambition. But there was – and still is – a strong economic rationale in solidifying economic and financial integration in Western Europe by the creation of a single currency. This economic rationale is clearly perceived by investors and market participants who have made the euro the second world currency for investing in financial assets and holding foreign exchange reserves. This being said, history has also shown that the geography of the international monetary system may undergo fast and abrupt changes. Over decades and centuries, new currencies emerge and existing ones disappear as major vehicles for international trade and investment. Geopolitical changes may trigger such evolutions. But some endogenous dynamics are also at work. Past some stages, or “tipping points”, the use of a currency may expand or shrink quickly due to network and scale effects: the more people use a currency, the more attractive it becomes. This begs the question of possible “spheres of influence” appearing in the future with significant evolutions in the respective role and weight of existing currencies. In my remarks, I will simply define such “spheres of influence” as parts of the world economic system where the use of a specific currency might dominate.
Even if we need to wait for the Parliament's proposal and the outcome of the trialogue discussions, this agreement is overall positive. On the supervision side, it provides the European Union with all the prudential ratios of the international framework. It also provides for the gradual introduction of the revised market risk framework, the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), which is still being finalised in Basel. In addition, a first step has been taken towards recognising the euro area as a single jurisdiction, in which cross-border exposures within the Banking Union are considered domestic exposures for measuring the systemic importance of European banks. On the resolution side, we have obtained an agreement to broaden the subordination requirement of the Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) to  Page 4 of 6 beyond global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), thereby reducing the threshold effect between G-SIBs and other banks. In addition, the text defines a subordinated debt ceiling, very close to the international Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) standard. However, this agreement contains a number of more problematic aspects about which we shall remain vigilant. To name but one, as regards the internal MREL, cross-border exemptions within the Banking Union similar to the methodology for calculating the capital surcharge for systemic banks would have been desirable.

Such a step would only be taken in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, and all the sums borrowed would  Page 5 of 6 be gradually repaid by the banking sector. Rather, it is about building confidence in bank resolution in Europe by showing that it will always be able to intervene effectively in the event of a crisis. Such a system will also encourage the lifting of the constraints imposed by certain national authorities on capital and liquidity flows. I regard the European Commission's proposal to set up a backstop through a credit line provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a top priority. We also need a common scheme for providing liquidity to financially sound banks after resolution which is in line with euro area monetary policy rules. Of course, a compromise will have to be found in order to make headway on the third pillar of the Banking Union, deposit insurance. Once we have completed the resolution framework, we will be less in need of a shared European scheme. A pragmatic approach could be to introduce a system of loans between national deposit guarantee schemes (DGS), with guarantee mechanisms to ensure that liquidity advances do not lead to losses for the lending DGS. This would lead to a sharing of liquidity without sharing risks, which would be a first step towards shoring up financial sector confidence and strengthening depositor protection.
It also has an established capacity to judge whether a systemic crisis may occur as a result of an institution’s financial problems. The Riksbank is able to make this judgement by virtue of its role as provider of the central payment system and the responsibilities attached to this, its presence in financial markets and its general knowledge of the state of the economic and financial system. Other authorities typically have greater obstacles to reacting fast, as they do not in most cases have instruments or resources readily available for these sorts of operations. There may also be difficult political considerations that have to be taken. For example, a minority government may need to seek support from other parties to use budgetary resources, a support that may be hard to get or at least take some time. However, this is not to be taken as an argument for governments to use the central bank as a provider of support because it does not want to use budgetary resources. The central bank should be independent and control its own resources. The conclusion of this is that ELA operations should have the role in the general crisis management infrastructure of dealing with quickly emerging problems. Where problems arise gradually, other measures available to supervisory authorities and governments are more likely to be used. ELA should be seen as a means for handling acute problems, so that the authorities gain time to decide whether other crisis management measures are needed, such as restructuring of troubled institutions.

Lars Nyberg: The infrastructure of emergency liquidity assistance - what is required in today’s financial system? Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the CGFS regional meeting in Tokyo, Bank of Japan, on 22 May 2000. *  *  *  Sweden experienced a severe banking crisis in the beginning of the 1990s. To manage the crisis, the authorities had to implement measures that averted a complete breakdown of the financial system while attempting to limit the costs to taxpayers. In addition, it was imperative for the authorities to consider whether or not their actions would contribute to future moral hazard problems. During the crisis, an effective division of labour developed between the authorities involved, namely the Ministry of Finance, the Riksbank, the central bank, Finansinspektionen, the financial supervisory authority and the Bank Support Authority. As the crisis progressed, the Riksbank provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) twice, acting in its role as “lender of last resort”. The remarks in this note are largely drawn from the Riksbank’s experiences in this crisis, and how these experiences can be used to assessing the role of ELA in a general crisis management infrastructure. When discussing the infrastructure that is in place to handle financial crises, two aspects are of primary importance. First, ELA must be put in the context of the overall methods of crisis management that the authorities would employ should a financial crisis occur. ELA is not a measure that can or should be used in every financial crisis.