samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With over half of total trade in Asia being intra-regional trade, and with this proportion still on an increasing trend, economies in the region are becoming increasingly interdependent among themselves, arguably more so than each of them depends on the developed economies in Europe and America. By comparison, the degree of financial integration in Asia is disproportionately low. For example, all of the Asian economies have probably lent more individually to the United States than they have collectively to other Asian economies. 4. Whether we like it or not, we now find ourselves in the unenviable position of holding a substantial part of our savings in the financial liabilities of an economy that does not save, fearing that a diversification of a small part of such holdings might lead to a sharp fall in the value of the rest, thus shooting ourselves in the foot. We also find ourselves somewhat stuck with recycling a large part of our savings through the developed markets back into the region in a much more volatile form, occasionally creating havoc in our monetary and financial systems. 5. We find ourselves - we are told - contributing to the global imbalance by saving too much and spending too little, although those that tell us pay little attention to the fact that we do have typhoons and heavy rains, earthquakes and tsunamis, and we need to ensure that we are able to help ourselves as much as possible in case of need.

If we can succeed in implementing the reforms that are still outstanding, there is a chance that economic growth can be propelled to a level beyond the current economic upswing. BIS Review 100/2006  1
Fiscal consolidation is expected to shave off a cumulative 2–2.5% points from GDP growth in the US, UK, and the Eurozone over the next three years. 11. Second, deleveraging by US households. Since the bursting of the credit bubble in 2008, US household debt has declined by 5% in absolute terms and 15% as a percentage of disposable incomes. More than two-thirds of the reduction in debt stock was due to default of mortgage and other consumer debt. It is hard to tell what is a sustainable level of household debt, but most estimates suggest that US households are just about a third to halfway through the deleveraging process. This means probably another 3–5 years of sub-par household consumption growth in the US. 12. Third, deleveraging by Eurozone banks. There are two factors at work here. One, the quality of Eurozone bank assets has come under pressure. Two, Eurozone banks are required to improve their capital adequacy positions so as to buffer against shocks. In particular, European banks are required to achieve a minimum core Tier 1 capital ratio of 9% by June this year. To the extent that banks cannot achieve the target capital ratios through retained earnings and capital raising, they will have to reduce their balance sheets. They can do this by selling assets or reducing lending. Both will have a dampening effect on economic activity. Given the global footprint of many Eurozone banks, the effects will be felt not just in Europe but elsewhere in the world.

First of all, the ECB’s accountability practices have evolved over time.3 With the launch of European banking supervision in 2014, specific accountability arrangements were established for the ECB’s supervisory arm. We also strengthened our relationship to reflect the greater complexity of the ECB’s monetary policy measures. For example, when the ECB was taking unprecedented action during the exceptional circumstances caused by the pandemic, I held an ad hoc exchange of views with the political group coordinators of this Committee. Moreover, we have agreed to interact more closely in the context of the ECB’s strategy review and ensure that our regular dialogues play a key role in how we inform about the exercise. The outcome of the review will also provide an opportunity for us to consider the ECB’s accountability practices. The ECB’s accountability has also been enhanced by a better flow of information between our 4 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  two institutions. As we discussed last February4, this requires us to continuously aspire to communicate as clearly and as openly as possible. As part of this endeavour and also in response to parliamentary and public demands, the ECB has already started providing more detailed information about its asset purchases and current holdings on its website. Today I can announce an additional transparency measure.
Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus: DFIs of the future - maximising development impact Welcome remarks by Ms Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the World Bank and Bank Negara Malaysia Forum on Performance Measurement for DFIs "DFIs of the Future: Maximising Development Impact", Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 2018. * * * I would like to thank the World Bank for collaborating with Bank Negara Malaysia to organise this important event as we think deeply about the future of development finance, especially on how we can elevate the role of development financial institutions in Malaysia to achieve greater development impact. This is timely as the country is charting its future direction. History tells us that economic development is a collective responsibility. The success story of Malaysia’s development journey over the past six decades is a testament to this. Our goal has always been to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, consistent with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development advocated by the United Nations. Thus, the development priorities of the nation and the materialisation of the 17 United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be key for us over the next few years. To this end, development financial institutions or DFIs in short, play a very crucial role. The first DFIs in Malaysia were established in the 1960s and 1970s as specialised financial institutions with specific mandates to develop strategic sectors, spanning agriculture, infrastructure, small and medium enterprises, export-oriented and high-technology industries.

As REFF provides risk mitigation 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  mechanisms such as guarantee and insurance in addition to financing, it has attracted the private sector as co-investors and guided the financial institutions to develop capacity in risk management of renewable energy projects. This demonstrates that with in-depth understanding of the sectors they are serving, DFIs can design solutions which achieve the desired impact, whilst crowding in private capital. Key Message 2 – Performance measurement framework anchored on developmental objectives will ensure alignment of business strategies to deliver the highest value My second point relates to adopting a performance measurement framework for DFIs that is anchored on development objectives. This is to ensure alignment of business strategies to deliver the highest value to society. DFIs play an important role in bridging financing gaps by participating in markets not adequately served by the private sector. These are often developing sectors and markets which are characterised by high risks and uncertainties. Therefore, by extension, we cannot evaluate DFIs using mere financial indicators as they are not adequate to capture the contributions of DFIs to the wider economy and growth of the nation. DFIs must also be measured by the additionalities they create.
3  Potential vulnerabilities to geopolitical risks also arise from an overreliance of EU participants on non-EU players in financial market infrastructures and digital financial services. This includes the dominant position of non-EU payment-related service providers in intermediating European payment transactions, the overreliance of EU market participants on third-country clearing services, and the rapid rise of non-EU “Big Tech” firms and the complexity of the crypto-ecosystem, which is dominated by a few large cryptoasset service providers (e.g. exchanges) often located outside the EU. In short, the EU - like many other economies around the world, including the UK - faces a number of external trade and financial vulnerabilities related to its high integration into global value chains and high dependence on certain imports, exports and non-domestic financial market infrastructures. New globalisation trends In the midst of numerous and strong geopolitical shocks, governments and firms are trying to reduce these vulnerabilities. It is obviously too early to know how and to what extent these attempts will affect globalisation trends, but they seem to be shifting from “dependence to diversification, from efficiency to security and from globalisation to regionalisation”. 8 First, companies are reducing their dependence on certain suppliers - i.e. seeking greater diversification - which can be very useful in reducing the impact of global supply shocks. Thus, according to some surveys, by the end of 2021 almost half of the companies had diversified their supplier base compared with only 5% that had implemented measures to return production to the company’s home country.

In the particular case of the EU, and with a view to at least partially offsetting the costs of deglobalisation and to ensure a more robust and resilient EU economy, in my view strategic autonomy policies should be accompanied by a substantial deepening of EU integration, particularly in those areas where integration is less advanced. In this regard, structural policies are needed at EU level to promote the integration and interconnection of EU markets - particularly energy markets - and to strengthen the single market, which will not only make it more resilient to shocks but will also increase competitiveness. Not only in the energy market, but also by promoting a genuine single market for services. Moreover, joint financing mechanisms must be put in place to safeguard this common effort without weighing too heavily or too unevenly on national public finances. Joint financing arrangements would enable EU institutions to finance large-scale programmes subject to a common quality standard and to evaluate their compliance in a homogeneous manner. Finally, it is essential to make progress in extending risk-sharing mechanisms - public and private - in the EU. This should be done in three ways. First, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) needs to equip itself with a permanent macroeconomic stabilisation capacity. Second, it is essential that the Banking Union be completed with the construction of an EU deposit guarantee system.
In contrast, a stronger impulse from public expenditure is expected, particularly from investment. On the private consumption side, we expect it to keep growing for the rest of the year at a slower pace than was forecast in June (table 2). Annual CPI inflation, still affected by high monthly variations early in the year and the direct effects of the recent depreciation of the peso will remain above 4 percent throughout the remainder of 2014. By 2015, in line with the lower inflationary pressures that are inferred from the cyclic evolution of the economy and the high basis of comparison, annual inflation of both the CPI and the CPIEFE will have a quick descent to 3 percent. Then it will hover around 3 percent until the end of the forecast horizon, this time the third quarter of 2016 (figure 9). This inflation trajectory is based on the assumption that the indirect effects of the nominal and real depreciation of our currency will be more than offset by the state of the capacity gaps over the projection horizon. The Board’s assessment yields that the current level of the real exchange rate (RER) is consistent with the cyclical state of the economy and the internal and external financial conditions, although it is slightly above the range of its estimated longterm values. As a methodological assumption, it considers that the exchange rate will have a slight appreciation in real terms over the long run, as the cyclical conditions of our economy normalize.

Getting over Covid  Speech given by Andrew Bailey Governor of the Bank of England  Resolution Foundation 8 March 2021  I am grateful to Lauren Barnes, John Barrdear, Philip Bunn, Andy Haldane, Jonathan Haskel, Karen Jude, David Latto, Clare Macallan, Nick McLaren, Marko Melolinna, Sophie Piton, Alex Rattan, Kate Reinold, Michael Saunders, Fergal Shortall, Brad Speigner, Silvana Tenreyro, Matt Tong, Jan Vlieghe, and Chris Young for their assistance in helping me prepare these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction It’s a great pleasure to be participating in a Resolution Foundation event today. I wish I could say what a pleasure it is to be at the Foundation, but that has to remain a hope for the future. I am going to talk today about the future, the post Covid future as the economy recovers from this traumatic experience. If I had to summarise the diagnosis, it’s positive but with large doses of cautionary realism. To summarise, after starting with some description and assessment of the Covid shock to the economy, I am going to draw out four important points:   Covid has been both a demand and supply shock to the economy, and the recovery therefore has to be in both elements, unusually so for recoveries I think. Absent a dual recovery, dealing with the issues that arise will be more difficult.
Mugur Isărescu: Building our place in Europe - young Romanians pushing the boundaries in technology Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the conference "Building our place in Europe - young Romanians pushing the boundaries in technology", Bucharest, 24 October 2016. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to have been invited to address some of the best and the brightest of Romania’s younger generation. I must say I am impressed that you have built such a strong community here in the UK, judging by the large number of people present and the fact that this reunion is at its ninth edition. I congratulate the Romanian Embassy in the UK, the British-Romanian Chamber of Commerce, the Raţiu Foundation and all the other entities involved in the organisation of this event. I am happy to see that Romanian authorities, academia and non-government organisations are working towards strengthening the connection with Romanians abroad. We, at the National Bank of Romania, are also very interested to make use of the expertise of Romanians who have studied or worked abroad. Let me be more specific: we have now around 75 employees who either got post-graduate degrees at Western universities or have working experience in top European institutions, such as the European Central Bank, the European Commission or the Eurostat. Moreover, our internship programme is open to undergraduates studying abroad and we are glad to see increasing interest from such applicants.

I don’t know whether you share my optimistic opinion and view, I do hope so, but either way, the fact that you are here on a Saturday shows that you want to stay connected, both with other members of the Romanian diaspora and with your home country. Thank you for your attention and I hope that at the end of the day you will have plenty of reasons to consider it a day well spent. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Paul Tucker: Monetary policy and the financial system Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Executive Director and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, at the Institutional Money Market Funds Association Annual Dinner, London, 2 April 2008. *  *  *  Alongside many others, the money market fund industry has for months now been grappling with turmoil and fragility across financial markets. It continues to pose serious challenges for all of us, and so I shall use this evening to summarise briefly a few of the strands in my own thinking about monetary policy and the financial system. Monetary policy First, monetary policy. The tightening of credit conditions domestically and internationally makes it likely that aggregate demand will slow, with a risk that it will slow considerably. There is, in consequence, a meaningful downwards threat to inflation over the medium term. Usually, the MPC would respond by cutting Bank Rate sufficiently to offset more or less entirely what we judged, over time, to be the impact of the tighter financial conditions on the path of spending, so as to ensure that aggregate demand remained broadly in line with the economy’s productive capacity. But conditions do not favour such a “business as usual” approach to demand management. That is because, alongside those downside risks to inflation, there are also upside risks to inflation over the medium term – and I am stressing “medium term” – stemming from the rise in commodity prices and the decline in sterling’s exchange rate.

The central projection in February’s Inflation Report was for inflation to return to close to the 2% target over the coming two to three years, conditional on the market’s expectation of further cuts in Bank Rate. But nor does the strategy determine a definite path for Bank Rate over the coming months. Each of us on the MPC must form a judgment month by month on which of the risks to the inflation outlook – from financial conditions or from rising costs – is proving more potent, and so a judgment on the degree to which we can set a course that underpins demand. Since the February Inflation Report, oil prices are around 10% higher, and sterling’s exchange rate around 4% lower, so the immediate cost pressures are worse. The good news is that, in the labour market, nominal earnings growth has so far remained subdued, notwithstanding the rise in near-term inflation expectations revealed by a range of surveys. BIS Review 38/2008  1  This is perhaps suggestive of the adjustment in real take-home pay made necessary by the sharp increase in firms’ costs due to the further rises in commodity prices. In manufacturing, firms’ input costs have risen sharply over the past twelve months; and output price inflation has reached nearly 6%. A big question is to what extent competition amongst retailers will dampen the pass through into retail prices. Anecdotally, retailers still sound as though they are competing fiercely on prices, and driving down other costs in order to maintain their margins.
I would only like to mention that the National Bank has commenced the activities for implementing BASEL II in the Macedonian banking system. Does and will this crisis have an impact on our economies? It already has and it will have an additional impact depending on its duration. The first blow is for the real sector. In all of our countries, depending on the structure of the economy, the export sector will be most severely hit. BIS Review 18/2009  5  Consensus Forecasts of October 2008, envisages that the growth of the US economy will equal 1.4% and in 2009 it will be 0%, with a projected fall of the personal consumption and faster decline in the investment consumption. The growth of the EU economy for 2008 has been adjusted downward (1.4%) and for 2009 it is 0.6%. For an illustration, 60% of the Macedonian export is in the EU countries. The trading conditions have already deteriorated and we project further deepening of the trade and the current account deficits, whereas the increased minus between the exports and the imports will act toward reducing our growth rate. We expect a negative impact also in the capital and financial accounts, but at this moment it is difficult to quantify it. Banking will not be hit directly. There is no exposure in risk-bearing financial instruments. Deposits are dispersed according to the regulations.

High settlement fees could discourage institutions and portfolio managers from taking full advantage of advances in risk management techniques. Finally, a high cost structure for securities settlements could influence competition among financial centres. The efficient processing of commercial and financial transactions, including those generated by securities trading, is a necessity in a marketplace as competitive as ours is in the United States today. In my view, we are likely to see much more competition among financial centres in the future because financial centres provide a source of high-paying jobs. Cities around the world will increasingly compete to be prime financial locations. In sum, your efforts in moving to T+1 are part of an industry-wide effort to reduce risk and thereby ensure that our payment and settlement system continues to work well under all conditions. We are supportive of your efforts and applaud your initiative because we all want our payment and settlement system to remain sound, secure and efficient as it adapts to the changing needs of our global economy. 3  BIS Review 93/2000
As always, we are monitoring developments carefully and in connection with the Monetary Policy Update in April will make a renewed assessment of the international outlook in which we will also take into account how events in Japan may affect the development of the global economy in the slightly longer term. Sweden At the latest monetary policy meeting in February, we decided to raise the repo rate from 1.25 per cent to 1.50 per cent and our assessment was that the repo rate would need to be increased to 3.6 per cent by the end of the forecast period, that is in three years’ time. My assessment was that we will need to raise the repo rate by 0.25 per cent at every meeting in 2011 to 2.75 per cent at the end of the year. This entails a somewhat steeper upward path in the second half of 2011 than the repo-rate path presented in the main scenario of the Monetary Policy Report. However, in light of the uncertainty about the development of interest rates, I did not enter a reservation against the repo-rate path but confined myself to commenting on this at the meeting (see Figure 17). I will now discuss my view of monetary policy in the years ahead in a little more detail and take the picture of the economic outlook presented in the latest Monetary Policy Report as my starting point.

I take such credibility risks extraordinarily seriously. The 1930s were an episode of even worse Fed policymaking. This was a period of far greater economic dislocation and hardship. When thinking about the 1930s, I find it useful to turn to the wisdom of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz from their book titled A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. Friedman and Schwartz discuss how monetary policy in the early 1930s actually contributed to the contraction, despite the fact that bank reserves increased significantly over that period. Broad monetary aggregates contracted, even though bank reserves were higher, because 1) banking panics and the weak real economy led the public to hoard cash and 2) banks wanted to increase reserve ratios as insurance against liquidity shortages and runs. As a result, the amount of lending supported by a given level of reserves fell dramatically, and the U.S. economy experienced a period of deflation. However, the Fed failed to see that it was running a restrictive monetary policy. One reason was they were striving to stay on the gold standard, which dictated policies to counter gold outflows. In addition, the Fed interpreted the excess reserves on banks’ books and the associated low level of money market interest rates as signs of an accommodative financial environment and so did not aggressively loosen monetary policy.