samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
d. At least two non-economic factors are involved in the drop in women’s labor participation: (i) the difficulty in accessing services affected by sanitary restrictions, most notably the suspension of face-to-face classes in the school and pre-school system for almost a year and a half now; and (ii) the pressure generated by the Page 9 of 27  unequal distribution of household work responsibilities and the care of children, the elderly and the sick, on women, a byproduct of the country’s ingrained cultural patterns. Certainly, the lower participation of women in paid employment does not mean that they have reduced their responsibilities or their contribution to the country. The flip side of a fall in paid employment is an increase in unpaid work at home. Here, it should be noted that, in times of greater macroeconomic normality, its value was estimated to be close to 21 percent of GDP. Of this figure, about two-thirds was produced by women. Preliminary estimates indicate that, by 2020, the value of unpaid work in the home would have increased to 26 percent of GDP.2 This increase is estimated to have affected women the most, who contributed more than twice as much as men to this increase, with a 25 percent rise in the volume of unpaid housework in their hands. The CBC is currently coordinating with the INE to collect information on time use, which will help refine these estimates.

BIS Review 61/2010  7  Figure 1  Output gaps  GDP  (percent)  (annualized quarterly change, percent)  6  6  12  12  4  4  8  8  2  2  0  0  4  4  -2  -2  0  0  -4  -4  -4  -4  -6  -6  -8  -8  -8 -12  -12  -8 08  II  III  IV  09  II  III  IV  08  Dec. ’09 Report (1)  II  III  IV  09  II  III  IV  Mar. ’10 Report (2)  (1) Fourth quarter of 2009 indicators correspond to forecasts in the baseline scenario. (2) Closing of National Accounts as published in March. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2 Retail sales and new car sales  (indices, 2003=100, seasonally-adjusted series)  160  240  140  200  120  160  100  120  80  80 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Non-durable goods (1) New cars Durable goods (1)  Perception indices (2) 80  80  70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30 04  30  05 06 07 08 09 IPEC current situation IPEC situation in 12 months IMCE current situation IMCE situation in 6 months  10  (1) Sold during moving quarter.
An additional, but not incidental, point on endpoint security: I observe a reluctance across the industry to share information about endpoint security experiences for fear that such transparency may expose an individual institution to concerns about its internal information security control environment. This is an understandable but parochial response which, collectively, has the potential to expose a network to considerable risk, especially if it inhibits socialization of known threat vectors and techniques. A solution to this vexing dynamic could be industry-led, operatorled, or supervisory-led. The impulse does not particularly matter; developing a venue for the coordinated sharing of endpoint intelligence and experience across the industry matters profoundly, and represents a fundamental mutual interest, compelling both leadership and collaboration. Conclusion I do not presume answers to these questions, and merely observe that they are important ones to inspire reflection in the collective pursuit of resilience and security for the anchor elements of our nation’s financial system. What better venue than The Clearing House’s payments symposium and annual conference to continue this discussion? In response to this generational challenge, let us be sure not to construct an inflexible Maginot line whose rigidities are easily subverted by a creative and nimble adversary.

At the same time, uncertainty about the effect of interest rate changes has increased, suggesting a cautious approach to interest rate setting. 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  The rise in interest rates affects consumption through various mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms operate with a lag. Household disposable income will be affected by slightly more subdued growth in employment and wages. Higher interest rates may also curb the rise in house prices, resulting in a smaller rise in housing wealth than would otherwise have been the case. Other consequences of an interest rate increase will have a more direct impact on private consumption. First, higher interest rates push up the cost of consumption today relative to consumption tomorrow. Debt-financed consumption becomes more costly, while saving provides a higher return, pointing towards lower consumption today. Credible signals that the interest rate will remain at a higher level ahead may amplify this effect. Second, the interest rate increase has a direct impact on household disposable income. The strength of this channel will depend on the overall debt level and the distribution of debt (Gerdrup et al (2018)). While higher interest rates means increased expenses for some, interest income increases for others. If housing wealth is disregarded, Norwegian households as a whole are in a net debt position. As higher interest rates means higher net interest expenses, a higher interest rate level will in isolation reduce household purchasing power. Chart: Household debt has increased The elevated debt level has amplified this effect.
However, the financial reforms and development of the financial systems in Asia during this decade since the Asian crisis have, to a significant extent, insulated our financial systems from these developments. However, the openness of the Asian economies have resulted in a significantly slower growth with economic contraction occurring in several countries. In the immediate future, several favourable factors will support growth in Asia. Strong fundamentals, pro-growth policies and structural factors will support an early recovery. This is also being reinforced by greater regional integration. Going forward into the future, the global shifts taking place calls for a new economic model, one that would leverage on regional strengths, address the current and future risks and recognise the new global opportunities. In the context of these developments, this conference will be discussing these issues and the new directions that are likely to emerge for Asia. Also important are the lessons that we can draw from the European experience. The agenda is for us to discuss the alternative economic models for the future, including the financial aspects and the role of policies and the international institutions. It is hoped that this will contribute to an increased appreciation and understanding of Asia and its changing role in the global economy. In closing, I would like to once again thank you for your participation in this conference. The bringing together of speakers from Europe and Asia to discuss these important issues is likely to result in stimulating discussions. I wish you a successful and productive conference.

In the aftermath of the crisis, the configuration of the world economy will be transformed as changes in the pattern of global demand take place, as demands for greater efficiency and lower costs occur, as actions are taken for a reduced role of government in the economy, as new regulatory regimes are being introduced, and as efforts are being undertaken to enhance our capacity to manage systemic financial crisis. Many of these changes will involve cross border arrangements and collaboration. We are all stakeholders with interest in what the post-recovery world will look like. Indeed, the issue of new economic models in the context of these developments is relevant not just to Asia but also for other parts of the world. We have seen how within the short period of less than a decade, the rapid escalation of debt-driven consumption in North America led to chronic financial and economic imbalances that has resulted in a significant economic dislocation on a global scale. Several lessons can be drawn from these developments. The Asian economic model for the future needs to be redefined if the economic progress is to be sustained, taking into account the global changes that are taking place. Asia's success which has been described as a “miracle” has been well documented. It has been acknowledged that “the miracle” is not the result of any one single factor but rather, a confluence of factors. Structural change and pro-growth policies were coalesced synergistically with hard work ethics.
The conclusion of this point of view is, put simply, that more recent innovations have not been as significant as those during earlier industrial revolutions.4 Others, such as Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson at MIT, say that the effects of digitalisation have passed under the radar and that we will see major productivity increases in the future when the new technologies are used more broadly in the business sector.5 Economic historian Joel Mokyr also points out that the productive potential in new technologies will lead to strong pressure for change in the economy.6 As you can hear, there are very differing views on the subject and the assessment of future productivity growth is a question we are constantly struggling with. We are in the “installation phase” Personally, I think that that model from Bart van Ark (2016) is useful when considering the different views. This distinguishes between an “installation phase” and a “deployment phase” for new technology. The first phase involves exploring new markets and growth is limited to a couple of companies. During the second phase the markets are consolidated and there is broad growth in the economy. One can imagine that Brynjolfsson and McAfee consider we are in the first phase, while Gordon thinks we have already passed the second phase. My assessment is that we are probably somewhere in the installation phase with regard to digitalisation.

The available supply and demand-side factor breakdowns reveal that in the euro area and Spain the former are predominantly behind the rise in, and persistence of, inflation. 10. The observed stylised facts reveal some important differences compared with the United States, where inflation is currently somewhat lower. Food is making a similar contribution, but that of the energy component is considerably smaller (around 20%). By contrast, the contribution of the core component is larger. Indeed, in August underlying inflation stood at 6.3%, with wage growth and the weight of demand-side factors being significantly higher. A key determinant of the economic outlook is the course of the war in Ukraine and its impact on energy markets Europe is particularly exposed to the economic effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, given its geographical proximity, its close trade and financial ties to Russia and, above all, its high dependence on fossil fuel imports from Russia, with limited capacity to replace them in the short term. At the outbreak of the war, gas imports from Russia accounted for approximately 40% of European gas consumption and 10% of its total energy consumption. The invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call for us about this vulnerability, which has materialised through the reduction of almost 85% in the natural gas supplied via pipelines from Russia.
Challenges and dilemmas for central banks and financial regulators  Slide 16  ▪  FinTech is not necessarily a threat to a central bank  ▪  Smets (2016) | FinTech offers good opportunities to central banks coming from the cost reduction implied by the DLT  ▪  The ability to align FinTech developments with central bank objectives depends on the regulations issued by central banks and financial authorities  Developments vs stability and trust o Inclusiveness vs risk of uninformed decisions o Decentralization, choice and competition vs. operational efficiency, economies of scale and client knowledge o Personal credit assessment and privacy  Challenges and dilemmas for central banks and financial regulators [SLIDE 16] FinTech is not necessarily a threat to a central bank, no matter how striking the contrast between its sobriety and the exuberance of FinTech developers. The Governor of the National Bank of Belgium Jan Smets,4 has argued that FinTech offers good opportunities to central banks coming from the cost reduction implied by the “distributed ledgers” technology; in his opinion, the greatest revolution of FinTech. The ability to align FinTech developments with the objectives of inflation control and financial stability depends to a large extent on the regulations issued by central banks and financial  4  Smets, J. (2016), “FinTech and Central Banks,” speech delivered at the Conference “FinTech and the Future of Retail Banking,” Brussels, 9 December, 2016. 13  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  authorities themselves.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: The state of the UK economy - some impressions Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, At the Northwest Development Agency/Bank of England Dinner, Manchester, 15 October 2002. *  *  *  The Bank has excellent contacts here in the North West - as indeed we have throughout the United Kingdom. We’ve been represented here - both in Manchester and Liverpool - for over 175 years; and I have no doubt that our present resident Agent, Tony Strachan - and his Deputies, Graeme Chaplin and Neil Ashbridge - are well known to many of you. They report regularly each month to the Monetary Policy Committee on the business climate - frequently attending our monthly briefing meetings to tell us face to face what it is you’re getting up to. You just can’t imagine the tales that they tell! It’s not that we don’t believe them - but we still feel the need to come and see for ourselves! The members of the MPC and other senior officials of the Bank are regular visitors up here. But this is the first occasion on which we have invaded you in such large numbers - with 10 of our non-executive Directors and all 9 members of the MPC plus over a dozen other officials - for a meeting of our Court - or Board - of Directors.
The relationship between labour input and future pensions has weakened. The link is especially weak in the contractual early retirement scheme (AFP). For most workers, the annual pension does not depend on when they choose to retire, as long as they are between 62 and 67 years of age. Nor does the age of retirement affect the size of the national insurance benefits after the age of 67. Hence, the earlier an employee retires, the higher the total pension benefit will be. A clearer link between labour input and future pensions may be achieved in a defined-contribution pension scheme. The total pension for individual employees will then be determined by the employee’s contributions and the return on these contributions. The annual pension is determined by the individual’s age of retirement and the total contribution. For every extra year of employment, the employee increases his pension wealth. In addition, the total pension wealth will be spread over a shorter retirement period. This means the longer a person remains in employment, the higher the annual pension will be. 12  BIS Review 11/2002  The main principle is that there should be a clear link between labour input and pensions. Such a link may also be established in a system where the individual receives an annual pension that is stipulated in advance. Sweden has recently implemented a pension reform that ensures that annual pension benefits increase in relation to the number of years the individual has worked.

Allocating even more capital to the Norwegian economy would probably lead to a rapid relocation of jobs to other countries, as the krone would tend to appreciate. Effect on industry structure The planned use of petroleum revenues will increase demand for public and private services. The guidelines imply an increase in the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget of around 3½ per cent of mainland GDP by 2010. This may entail an additional 60 000 person-years in the service sector. As long as there are labour shortages in Norway, a comparable decline in manufacturing employment is likely to occur. Although the phasing in of petroleum revenues is a gradual process, the contest for labour resources will intensify. As a result, monetary policy is likely to remain fairly tight in the years ahead. A high interest rate level may in periods result in a strong krone. This may accelerate the scaling back of manufacturing industry. However, in the long run monetary policy cannot influence overall employment or its distribution across industries. A lower interest rate would have resulted in higher price and cost inflation, which would also have weakened profitability in the manufacturing sector. The end result would have been the same for employment and production, but in addition we would have had to face the costs of high inflation. Even if employment and production in manufacturing are affected, the situation for Norwegian enterprises will not necessarily be negative.
As for the terms of trade, our estimate continues to assume an improvement over 2014, although not as big as was expected before. In the baseline scenario, in 2015 and 2016 copper and oil are expected to trade at somewhat higher prices than we thought in March (table 2). The Chilean economy has made a major adjustment in recent quarters, improving its external position and laying the foundation for a recovery without imbalances. This projection assumes that monetary policy will remain significantly expansionary and that fiscal policy will continue to contribute to expenditure growth in accordance with the fiscal rule and with the objectives set by the Administration. It also considers that the exchange rate depreciation accumulated since 2013 will continue to boost those tradable sectors that are more sensitive to the exchange rate. In addition, the price of fuels, which runs below the average of previous years, will continue to help reduce business costs and improve household income, even if its effects are smaller than expected a few months ago. As for inflation, in the baseline scenario the CPI should hover around 4 percent annually still for some months, and stabilize near 3 percent during 2016. The CPIEFE is expected to post an annual variation of close to 3 percent in 2016 and stay near that figure until the end of the projection horizon, this time the second quarter of 2017 (figure 7).

Let me suggest three broad areas. First, as researchers are removed from the fray of day-to-day action, you can step back and ask fundamental questions about risk management practices, identify gaps, and facilitate innovation in risk management techniques. I am pleased to learn about your credit rating project, which aims to provide rigour and transparency to the financial assessment of regional corporates. The value of such work is that it is grounded on sound empirical and theoretical work, with a clear focus on solving practical, impactful problems. In the same vein, RMI’s regular workshops and lecture series serve as useful platforms to present findings to the industry, and to encourage two-way discussions. MAS fully supports RMI’s initiatives to deepen its collaboration with the industry. Second, as a repository of knowledge on risk management, RMI plays an important role in education. RMI has been appointed as the lead provider on risk management under the  BIS Review 121/2009  3  Financial Industry Competency Standards (FICS). You have launched 50 accredited programmes across seven Risk Management job families over the past year. To support the role of Boards and senior management in risk management, I hope that RMI would consider appropriate executive programmes for Board members and senior management of financial institutions. I believe RMI can make an impact in enhancing the knowledge and capability of practitioners. Finally, I hope RMI can provide a focal point to bring in global thought leaders and practitioners on risk management, through your flagship RMI Annual Conference.
In the vast majority of cases, sovereign risk is overestimated or underestimated over a long period. This is because sovereign risk does not depend only on debt sustainability, but also on the political will to implement adjustment programmes, including privatisations and structural reforms. Second, at times markets have perverse incentives. In particular, large investors who have bought insurance against sovereign default, often without holding the underlying asset, stand to benefit greatly from the default and lobby in favour of it. They tend to encourage naïve governments to believe that debt restructuring can be done in an “orderly way”, distracting them from implementing the appropriate policy adjustment. Third, default or debt restructuring is a dramatic economic and social event for the country which experiences it – I would call it political “suicide” – which leads many into poverty, as experience has shown. It is thus rather peculiar for policy-makers to design policies mainly with the aim of punishing (or rewarding) certain categories of investors, rather than considering the ultimate consequences for the people. Finally, if the euro area were to go down the path of leaving it entirely up to the markets to decide which countries are solvent and which are not, it would put the euro at a disadvantage compared with all other major currencies.

6  BIS Review 158/2010  objectives, there would appear – all else being equal – to be a case for further action”. Since then, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has announced that interest rates will remain low and announced a new programme for buying government bonds (called Quantitative Easing, QE2). As we saw in Figure 3, GDP in the United States fell less than that in Sweden during the crisis. As I noted earlier, potential GDP in the United States may well have fallen more than that in Sweden. A correct GDP gap could then very easily be more negative in Sweden than in the United States. The repo rate is not a target variable that needs to be “normalised” Another argument in favour of raising the repo rate has been that it needs to be “normalised”. According to this argument, it would be better – all else being equal – to have a repo rate closer to a normal level. As the repo rate is now so abnormally low, a “crisis rate”, it should be raised or at least not cut, even if this means we are further from the inflation target and resource utilisation is even lower than normal. I do not agree with the normalisation argument. In my opinion, the repo rate and the repo rate path have no value in themselves – they are not target variables. A “normal repo rate” is not a target for monetary policy.