But it also results in news narratives which are more likely to be self-reinforcing and self-referential than in the past. The echoes in this chamber are louder, reach further, last longer. They are also less likely to be balanced and objective. More powerful, but less balanced, popular narratives are a potentially destabilising influence on expectations and the economy. This research points in one direction. The case for improved public understanding of the economy and financial system has always been strong. But in a world where popular narratives are even more important in driving economic behaviour, and where these narratives may be even more susceptible to destabilisation, the case for improving public understanding is significantly reinforced. This is one blade of the scissors of public engagement. 24  This analysis uses company visit write-ups produced by the Bank’s Agents themselves, rather than contacts so is of course only a proxy for the latter’s views. 25 Newman et al (2016). 26 For example, Papacharissi (2002). 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  The second blade is building central banks’ understanding of the economy and financial system through the general public. This is newer, but I believe fertile, ground for central banks. Central banks pride themselves, rightly, on their technocratic skills and economic expertise. There are limits to that knowledge, as there are to knowledge in every domain and discipline. Those limits and uncertainties need importantly to be recognised when understanding the economy and when setting policy.

This was an institutional attempt to avoid the temptation to stoke the economy in the short-term, and to anchor inflation expectations in the longer-term, thereby building policy credibility. With these new policy powers came, reasonably enough, new responsibilities for central banks. For the first time in their histories, central banks needed to be far more open and transparent about their policy targets and actions. Why? Because it was through greater transparency that policy suspicions among the public could be allayed, thereby helping anchor inflation expectations in the economy. As unelected technocrats acting on society’s behalf, operational independence also called for new means of ensuring central banks were sufficiently accountable to society. Holding central banks’ feet to the flames called for greater public transparency and greater public scrutiny than ever previously. Trust in central banks could not be endowed by statute. It needed instead to be earned through experience and societal scrutiny. These forces brought about a revolution in central bank practices regarding transparency and accountability. Over the course of the past century, the number of Bank of England appearances before Parliament has risen around 20-fold; the number of publications issued has risen around 600-fold; and the number of words uttered has risen around 1,000-fold. You don’t need Tracy Chapman to tell you I’m talkin’ ‘bout a revolution. Elsewhere around the world, the pattern has been much the same. We have seen a rising tide of speeches, publications and parliamentary appearances by central banks.