samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For a longer-term perspective, Chart 4 shows an estimate of UK TFP back to 1 AD, alongside GDP per head. The measurement problems in GDP and productivity were probably more acute then than now. Nonetheless, the “hockey-stick” profiles of both GDP and TFP are striking, both in their own right and in their similarity. Over the long haul, GDP and TFP have moved in lockstep. For many centuries prior to the Industrial Revolution, productivity and GDP growth in the UK averaged only around 0.01% per year. Each generation was only around 0.3% better off than their parents – a scarcely noticeable improvement. Secular stagnation in living standards and innovation persisted for many centuries. History suggests both secular innovation and secular stagnation have, at different times, been the norm. Although productivity growth has picked up since the Industrial Revolution, it has still been subject to significant twists and turns. Chart 5 plots UK labour market productivity since 1760, decomposed into the contribution from additional capital per worker (“capital deepening”) and TFP. Both have fluctuated significantly and have made substantial contributions to UK productivity growth over time. 33  Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Chart 6 looks more closely at the historical evolution of UK TFP growth. Trends in TFP have been far from constant, with decadal spans when productivity has averaged little more than zero and others where it has averaged close to 2%.

Chart 22: Firm level productivity distributions  a) Region  b) Industry  32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  32  c) Export status  d) Foreign ownership  e) Innovation  f)  Size  g) Leverage  Source: ONS, ONS Research Database, BvD and Bank calculations. Notes: These charts plot the kernel density distribution of labour productivity (real GVA per employee) across Great Britain. Chart (e) uses unweighted firm data. Chart (g) shows data BvD rather than VML firm-level data and is not directly comparable to the other charts. 33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  Chart 23 – Firm exports and productivity  Source: BvD and Bahaj, Foulis, Gal and Pinter (2016). Notes: Results from a Pooled Regression (slope=0.34; t-value=12.2), data for 2013. Table 3 – Median productivity growth by firm size*  Number of employees 6-10 11-20 21-50 >50  2.8 2.5 1.8 1.2  Source: BvD Notes: Data for 1998 -2013; Three-year cumulative growth. Chart 24: Monetary policy counterfactual experiment based on company accounts data a) Interest Cover Ratio  b) Leverage Density  0.15  Before intervention 0.10  After intervention  0.05  ICR = 1 0.00 -5 0 Interest cover ratio  5  10  15  34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  c) Productivity – scenario 1  d) Productivity – scenario 2  Source: BvD and Bank calculations.
Tim Harford began this lecture series last autumn by noting that he was an economist because of Peter, as is true, I am sure, of many people joining us today. I can actually take it further. I was first enthused by economics by one of Peter’s students, the late Ken Durham, like Peter also a great teacher and educator, who taught me economics at school and encouraged me to apply to Brasenose College. The only bit of the whole application process to Brasenose which went well was my economics interview with Peter, which I remember as much more of a friendly conversation than an interrogation. That set the tone and started an unbroken trend for every one of my interactions with Peter over the next 37 years, whether in Brasenose, or over one of his famed pastoral teas in the café in the Oxford covered market, at one of the seminars he would invite me to give to his students at the Bank’s CCBS while he was its Director, through to more recently in the Bank of England since I started working there. Everyone who knew Peter has their own fund of these stories and you can and should read many of them in the online Condolence Book set up by the University of Birmingham. To give one personal memory of Peter’s wonderfully warm and encouraging approach: in our final year at Brasenose we each had to do a long essay and present it to the rest of the class.

We are, again, watching this carefully, and it is why in 2010 we implemented the Building Societies Sourcebook to encourage appropriate risk management of lending and funding. The latter will be supported in future when we implement the net stable funding ratio which is the international standard to discourage reliance on short-term funding. We are also increasingly focussed on operational risks and the prudential implications of conduct risk, as I know are societies. I want to pick out one area of operational risk which is important, namely IT systems risk. One aspect of this is the cost and complexity of updating legacy IT systems in the face of growing demands on those systems from innovation in products. Cyber risk is also very high on our list of priorities. I recognise that not all societies have an internet presence, though I do know, of course, that you all use the internet. We will be seeking to ensure that cyber risk is properly tackled by societies as appropriate. In saying this, I am not seeking to pick out societies from other firms that we supervise, but we do think that these risks are in important respects common to all firms. Societies have generally been less affected than the large banks by conduct mis-selling costs, though not fully immune.
7  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  9  Chart 5: Households and businesses have consistently expected increases in interest rates to be gradual and limited Per cent 6  2014 Q1 Pre-crisis average level of Bank Rate (5.2%)  2015 Q1  5  2016 Q1 2017 Q1  4  2018 Q1 3  2019 Q1  2 1 0 0  1  2  3 Years ahead  4  5  6  The experience in the euro area and UK demonstrates how guidance can be effective in managing expectations as circumstances change. As intended, “limited and gradual” guidance has dampened interest rate volatility (Chart 6) and reduced the correlation between interest rate volatility and economic uncertainty (Chart 7). Both developments have increased the degree of monetary policy stimulus, thereby reinforcing the recovery during turbulent times. Chart 6: Interest rate volatility has remained low since guidance was provided Standard deviation of option-implied distributions for 3m Libor in 12 months' time, UK and US August 2013 guidance issued 3m US LIBOR (12m ahead)  Basis points 200 180 160  standard deviation February 2014 guidance issued  140 120  EU referendum  100 80 60 40  3m UK LIBOR (12m ahead) standard deviation  20 0  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) and Bank calculations.

As a consequence, even as the recovery strengthened and survey indicators of output growth reached levels previously associated with sharp policy tightenings (Chart 4), market expectations about the future path of policy remained subdued (Chart 3). Participants understood the conditionality of guidance, as they and the MPC learnt that there was still considerable spare capacity in the economy. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  8  Chart 4: Forward market interest rates rose only modestly as unemployment fell towards 7% Data published showing Percent unemployment fell to 6.9% 4.0  August 2013 guidance issued  February 2014 guidance issued  3.5 3.0  Counterfactual path for Bank Rate based on historic correlation with survey indicators of output growth  2.5 2.0 1.5  UK 1 year instantaneous forward OIS rates  1.0 0.5 0.0  Jan. 12  Jul. 12  Jan. 13  Jul. 13  Jan. 14  Jul. 14  The MPC’s second use of guidance responded to another structural development: the sharp fall in the equilibrium real interest rate, or r*. Out of that guidance came the phrase ‘limited and gradual’, so often repeated it is now part of the monetary policy furniture. In fact, it recently celebrated its fifth birthday.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: The challenges to the Spanish banking system in the face of the global crisis Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the 50th anniversary of ESADE, Barcelona, 30 October 2008. *  *  *  I have the pleasure of celebrating today with you the 50th anniversary of this institution. Over this half-century, ESADE has earned a reputation as one of the most prestigious business schools in the world. Education and training is the most important factor driving economic and social development. I therefore wish to begin by congratulating you on the work you have done and encouraging you to continue on this path. The crisis besetting the international financial system will henceforth be a mandatory topic of study in your classrooms. The events unfolding continuously since August 2007, and with particular virulence since September this year, make the current crisis the most serious one in living memory. This crisis, like others before it, manifested itself as a loss of confidence by the agents participating in the financial markets. Nevertheless, there are features which make it different: its degree of complexity, its global span and the speed with which the problems spread from one financial system to another are unprecedented. The current situation is further complicated by the notable weakness of the global economy. In these circumstances, the interrelatedness of financial and economic factors further contributes to the deterioration of the situation.

In short, the banking sector will have to live with a structure of higher financial costs, which will squeeze the net interest margin and, therefore, the capacity to generate revenues. This situation, common to all financial institutions at the international level, may be partly relieved in Spain, insofar as a high percentage of the financing of Spanish institutions is granted at a variable rate, which allows them to adjust interest rates more rapidly to the general market risk premium, helping to keep their interest rate spreads more stable. The second challenge is lower demand for credit both from households and businesses. The lower demand for credit is a natural response to a weaker economic climate than in previous years. However, this response will be larger in the case of those economic agents who, after years of very notable growth in their indebtedness, have begun a process of financial deleverage. For banks, this will mean a smaller volume of activity, that is to say, slower growth or even contraction of their business. In the past, banks responded to narrowing margins (income less financial costs) by increasing their volume of lending. However, this lever will not be available in the coming years, or at least not with the same strength, since lending can be expected to continue to decelerate, and to grow at below the economy’s nominal growth rate. Also, a smaller volume of activity puts further pressure on results, since overheads cannot be spread across a larger volume of activity.
Initiatives to raise youth knowledge and financial education in Spain, and the evaluation thereof Since 2012, various international OECD and G-20 initiatives have given expression to the importance of implementing national financial education strategies. Hence, since the end of the last decade, various initiatives have been launched in Spain in this area in the public and private sectors alike. Since 2008, the Banco de España and the CNMV have, in collaboration with other public and private agencies and institutions, committed themselves to contributing to improving citizens’ financial literacy through the National Financial Education Plan. The Plan has three basic features: i) generality, so as not to exclude any segment of the population and to cover all financial products and services; ii) cooperation, within both the public and private spheres; and iii) continuity over time, given the very nature of the objectives. As earlier stated, one of the population groups showing the lowest levels of financial literacy is that of young adults. A key element of the FEP is, then, the promotion of financial literacy in schools. In the case of schoolgoers, the notion of “financial education” refers to the teaching of knowledge, skills, behaviour, values and aptitudes that help students take 6/8  informed and sensible financial decisions in their everyday life, preparing them to better face the basic financial challenges they will encounter throughout their adult life. Starting in the 2012-2013 academic year, and following the pertinent evaluation of a pilot scheme8, a programme aimed at secondary education students has been developed.

In other words, the variable cost is negligible today and the fixed cost is reasonable. Today, therefore, we can find powerful computers and the Internet at most workplaces and in many homes. The costs are so low that many have the financial scope to utilise computers and the Internet, at least in industrial nations. This spread also means that the time and cost involved in the telegraph boy’s running around is eliminated. In other words, it is this spread that means that today’s IT most probably has much greater significance than telegraphy had a hundred years ago. Speculation and technology So far during the ongoing technological revolution, we have seen both a powerful rise and a considerable decline in the value at the stock exchange. If we compare this with earlier periods when major technological changes had a breakthrough or became more widely used, we can conclude that the sequence of events has varied greatly. We have had several periods of extensive speculation in connection with breakthroughs for new technologies that have resulted in financial and real shocks. We have also had periods when these changes have occurred more gradually, without any major shocks. One example of the former is the speculation during the early 1920s that resulted in an economic decline. A further example is the international shock we had following the wave of speculation in the then ‘new economy share’ - the railways - in the 1870s. This led to a very weak international development over a period of almost 20 years.
The MPR is likely to be held at its technical minimum over the next 24 months; FCIC funds are provided over a 4-year horizon, and even short-term liquidity facilities will remain in place until early 2021. 16. Still, some challenges remain on three fronts: a. Lending to large corporations. For a number of years, big corporations have been tapping international and domestic corporate bond markets. They faced the Covid-19 crisis with rather sizeable cash holdings from bond issuing in the first quarter and the drawdown of bank credit lines. Yet this liquidity will not last forever. Reactivating the corporate bond market is key to prevent largescale corporations from crowding out SMEs from access to bank lending. The government and the CMF have adjusted regulations to speed up bond issuing and the Central Bank asset purchase program is likely to trickle down to corporate bonds, but more government action may be needed in order to reduce risk over these assets. b. Expanding non-conventional tools. Right now, the Central Bank has limited reach in the asset market, since the Constitution forbids it from buying Treasury bonds even in the secondary market as well as nonfinancial corporate bonds. A Constitutional reform is making good progress in Congress to remove the first constraint. c. Recovering private consumption and investment. Consumer and firms’ expectations have plummeted in the last eight months, responding to the social crisis, first, and to the risk-off mood of the Covid-19 pandemic, later. Private consumption and Investment are expected to drop 6% and 12% this year.

Credit measures amount to some 15% of GDP, mainly around a medium-term liquidity facility to banks conditional on credit expansion. This provides 4-year loans at the 0.5% policy rate, conditional on growth in corporate and consumer lending, increasingly weighted towards SMEs. This has provided the liquidity match to a government scheme providing guarantees to working capital lending under favorable financial terms. c. Liquidity and other market-stabilizing measures add up to some 7% of GDP. These include a mediumto long-term asset purchases that also provide unconventional monetary policy tools. Page 2 of 3  Central Bank of Chile June 2020  d. The response of bank credit to the Central Bank’s FCIC and the government-funded FOGAPE guarantees has been largely positive. Corporate lending has been growing at 10% year-on-year over the last three months, making it the first case of countercyclical lending in recent history. e. In particular, banks have used liquidity to allow the drawdown of credit lines by corporations, 1.2 million rollover operations and 120,000 working capital loans with a SME share largely above historical averages. f.  Long-term interest rates have responded well to monetary policy decisions, forward guidance and non-conventional tools. After the June monetary policy meeting and the release of our Monetary Policy Report, 10-year bond rates dropped some 40 bp. g. Central Bank measures extend well beyond the immediate emergency and are likely to foster economic recovery once containment measures begin to roll back.
Notwithstanding the fact that people might derive utility from the pure fact of having in their wallets banknotes with Polish kings instead of European bridges, I have no idea how to measure this utility and how to compare it to the utility derived from more standard arguments of preference functions like consumption. For this reason I will speak in terms of standard macroeconomic variables, bearing in mind that this is certainly not the whole story. If economists speak about the advantages and disadvantages of joining a common currency area, they ultimately end up comparing the costs and benefits of accession. This is also the way I would like to proceed. However, bearing in mind that many issues have already been described in several voluminous reports (NBP 2004 for Poland, Csajbok, Csemerly 2002 for Hungary, HM Treasury 2003 for the UK), I will try to focus on issues which are less familiar to the general public or which are potential risk factors. The nature of these issues is that they are mainly concentrated on the cost side of the analysis. Thus, it might seem from my lecture, that I mainly care about the costs or that costs outweigh benefits. Let me, in the very beginning, stress that this is by no means the case.

Krzysztof Rybiński: The role of the EURO for the future of Poland Speech by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at the International Conference “The role of the EURO for the future of Poland”, Warsaw, 15 June 2007. *  *  *  Only a few months ago the eurozone was enlarged for the second time. Slovenia became the first of the twelve new member states of the EU and the thirteenth country to adopt the common European currency. Now two other countries, i.e. Malta and Cyprus, are knocking on the euro’s door, and others are lining up for the “monetary club membership”. This seems to be a good occasion to return to the, once lively, discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of joining the monetary union. Indeed, there are still more reasons to come back periodically to the euro cost & benefit debate, since we have more and more data, the world changes rapidly and even economic theory is subject to evolution. Let me illustrate this with one example. It has long been a widely accepted view that asymmetric shocks are the biggest threat to currency unions. Nowadays some respected economists think it may not be the case.
Such restricted access would effectively remove any distortions between the treatment of credit institutions that are domestic legal persons, but have majority Eurozone capital ownership (where access to euro liquidity may be done via parent banks), and the treatment applicable to banks which do not have capital originating in the Eurozone. Concluding remarks Summing up, it is my view that Romania should be part of all three pillars of the Banking Union – despite the sequenced manner in which they will inevitably come into being, all of them are required for the Banking Union to function effectively. I trust that adhering to this European project will strengthen financial stability, further increasing confidence in the national banking sector (through the harmonisation of supervisory practices and deposit guarantee schemes), as well as fostering sustainable lending and economic growth (by reducing fragmentation of European financial markets). My opinion that Romania should participate in the Banking Union may seem overly optimistic, but as a long-standing supporter of the European project, I believe that staying positive is the only way forward. Such an attitude was actually inspired by the many meetings I had over the years, in Frankfurt, Basel or Brussels, with some of the leading minds of Europe, among which Tomasso Padoa Schioppa, who said that “the crisis will possibly generate the means that are now lacking and get us closer to an accomplished Union”.

5  53% of the stock of bank loans to non-financial businesses pay a floating interest rate, and for an additional one third the interest rate is fixed for one year or less. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  As a result of the Bank of England’s actions, we can relax other requirements to help with the flow of credit. Balance sheet repair will give confidence to depositors and investors who provide funding to banks. With that market funding assured, banks can safely hold fewer liquid assets, such as government bonds, that act as a cushion to be sold in the event that investors withdraw their funding. Accordingly, I can confirm today that, for major banks and building societies meeting the minimum 7% capital threshold, the Bank of England will reduce the level of required liquid asset holdings. The effect will be to lower total required holdings by £ billion, once all eight major banks and building societies meet the capital threshold.6 That will help to underpin the supply of credit, since every pound currently held in liquid assets is a pound that could be lent to the real economy. Taken together, our actions create not just a more resilient system, but also one more able to support and sustain a recovery by serving the real economy. Crossing the threshold of balance sheet repair is not the end-point. The 7% capital threshold, like the 7% unemployment threshold, is only a staging post at which we assess our next steps.