samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is the same need therefore to make hard choices between alternative means, and the international process for making those choices is inevitably more complicated than in our national environment. To take some examples, there is substantial evidence that increasingly free world trade and increasing freedom of international capital flows are contributing to unprecedented rates of growth in the global economy as a whole and more rapidly rising living standards in almost every region of the global economy. It is certainly possible to argue even so that the free trade playing field remains tilted against poorer countries, or that it should be tilted more in their favour: distinguishing between self-interested protectionism and “fairness” or equality of competition is not wholly straightforward. But there would be a real cost to all of us, including particularly the poorer countries, if we were to be tempted to throw the baby out with the bath water and retreat behind trade barriers. 5  BIS Review 110/2000  Similarly we have recently seen all too clearly the damage that can be caused by the volatility of international capital flows - but we need to set that against the positive benefits - in terms of potential growth rates - that had previously resulted from massively greater private sector capital investment in many of the emerging markets, and which has now resumed.

So I don’t find the argument convincing that we have to keep up the pressure. It is also not our task. It would not be democratic for a central bank to dictate to elected governments what they have to do. BILD: Mr Draghi, in your first interview with BILD four years ago, we spoke a lot about Greece. The country has still not got back on its feet, even though it has received hundreds of billions in emergency loans. When will the madness end? Draghi: Clearly, last year was an economic setback for Greece. Now everyone is aware that there can be no growth without reforms. And what the country and its people need above all is growth. Greece has implemented many reforms in the past few months and is committed to the path of reform. BILD: Is the euro a part of the solution for Greece, or a part of the problem? Draghi: Greece’s challenges have little to do with the euro. It would have to implement reforms in any case. In the euro area, Greece can do that with the support of its partners. But one thing must be clear: who belongs in the euro area and who does not is not for the ECB to decide. That is a matter for the Member States. BILD: They are now more fractious than ever. Is that the biggest danger for Europe? 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Draghi: We are experiencing several crises which are all interconnected and reinforce each other.
But any discomfort I feel in that regard of course pales in comparison with the challenges facing those most directly exposed to the current cost of living crisis. We recognise the hardship associated with elevated inflation rates. For those who spend a higher proportion of their income on energy and food – unfortunately, a group particularly numerous among the less well off – recent price rises have imposed a significant squeeze on their real incomes. These are difficult times for many people. Our current experience is therefore a salutary reminder of the importance of price stability – what makes the MPC remaining ‘in the price stability business’ so crucial. It is essential we bring inflation back down to target, so as to reduce the uncertainties facing households and allow firms to plan for the future. Achieving price stability serves as an anchor for wider macroeconomic stability and prosperity. Page 4  The institutional framework for monetary policy – an independent central bank held to account for its pursuit of an explicit inflation target – is in place. For the first time in its twenty-five year history, that framework is being put to the test in an inflationary global environment. We have to meet that test successfully. Acting to achieve the 2% inflation target is now more important than ever. In the MPC, we have both the tools we need and the resolve it will take to restore price stability. Even in the face of current challenges, I am confident that we will succeed.

The scale, pace and timing of any further increases in Bank Rate will reflect the Committee’s assessment of the economic outlook and inflationary pressures. The Committee will be particularly alert to indications of more persistent inflationary pressures, and will if necessary act forcefully in response. I’ll conclude by offering a few observations on this language from my perspective. First, by focusing on the ‘scale, pace and timing’ of further changes in Bank Rate, the statement clearly widens the discussion beyond the interest rate decision at the next meeting. In my view, this represents the desirable introduction of greater flexibility in our communication of the policy outlook relative to the previous language. It thus reflects the uncertainties we face, and the likelihood that we will have to take finely-balanced decisions over rates not just in August but also beyond that, in the face of two-sided risks to the economic outlook into next year. Second, by referring to ‘any further increases in Bank Rate’, the introduction of greater flexibility does not obscure that the next change in Bank Rate is more likely to be in one direction rather than another. We are talking about rate increases, not rate decreases. At the same time, the reference to ‘any’ increases allows for the possibility of remaining on hold, which helps to capture the potential breadth of opinions on the Committee: after all, we have seen votes to keep Bank Rate unchanged in recent meetings.
Maja Kadievska-Vojnovik: Macedonia’s central bank reserve management strategy Opening remarks by Ms Maja Kadievska-Vojnovik, Vice-Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the RAMO – Reserve Management Advisory Programme, Skopje, 7 September 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, it is my pleasure to welcome you all, colleagues from 21 different countries, at the beginning of the Workshop on Settlement and Custodian Relations, organized by the World Bank as part of this year workshop agenda within the RAMP. It is a great honor for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia to host this workshop, as our institution joined the RAMP "family" very recently, in second half of 2014. We, at the NBRM, see World Bank Reserves Management Advisory Program as an unique opportunity to enhance investment management framework and operations on a sustainable basis. Additionally, RAMP facilitates sharing knowledge with other fellow participants in the Program, either by meeting on workshops and other events, as well as in direct communication between each other. But, organizing workshops in different countries enables also, meeting different cultures and enriching our knowledge in different ways. In that respect, allow me to briefly introduce our country, Macedonia. Located in the center of the Southern Balkans, the history of Macedonia tells how Macedonians were distinct nation, ethnically, linguistically and culturally different from our neighbors. The name "Macedonia" is the oldest existing name of a country on the European continent.

John Gieve: Stability and change Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Engineering Employers’ Federation North West, Warrington, 20 July 2006. *  *  *  I am delighted to be here today. The Bank of England has long connections with this region. We first set up offices in Manchester and Liverpool back in 1820s. That was a time when North West of England was a key hub in an emerging international economy, with the Port of Liverpool providing the gateway for industry in Lancashire and Cheshire to trade with the rest of the world, particularly textiles. The structure of the economy in the North West has of course changed markedly since those days and the region is now more associated with the aerospace, defence and pharmaceuticals industries than with textiles. Here as elsewhere, recent years have been a time of rapid change in the structure of industry and the economy. We may have been talking about globalisation for years but that doesn’t mean it is complete; in fact it is still gathering momentum. Macroeconomic stability: a platform for change In the face of that rate of change, it may seem paradoxical that among central banks the last 10 years have been known as the “Great Stability”. The UK is an example of that. Since 1992, when an explicit target for inflation was first introduced here, inflation has been stable and very close to its target.
The starting point for a global stablecoin should be based on single currencies. We should not run before we can walk. Setting standards early on  We must therefore set standards early on so that innovation can take place with confidence on what will be required. This gives certainty not only to regulators and users but also to innovators. Indeed, the international community has agreed that “no global stablecoin project should begin operation until the legal, regulatory and oversight challenges and risks… are adequately addressed, through appropriate designs and by adhering to regulation that is clear and proportionate to the risks.”6  However given the novel form, existing standards do not necessarily easily apply. There need to be minimum international standards for stablecoins. In addition any stablecoin with potential for wide scale use in the UK must meet our domestic expectations. A stablecoin which intends to launch with sterling-based activities in the UK should first meet relevant standards and be appropriately regulated. And if a sterling retail stablecoin wishes to operate at scale in the UK, then we will strongly consider the need for an entity to be incorporated in the UK. This is similar to the subsidiarisation of banks that we require if they are holding UK retail transactional customer deposits above a de minimis level.7  But a global stablecoin is a cross-border phenomenon. It can be operated in one jurisdiction, denominated in another’s currency and used by consumers in a third. The regulatory response must match this.

The mandate of the euro area’s central banks is clear on this subject and there is no reason to think that some other stray thoughts would let us deviate from our key goal. It should be stressed that the Governing Council of the European Central Bank is monitoring the economic situation very carefully and will not commit to future decisions in a form that would render the Council a prisoner of their own words. Public discussions include two extraneous arguments, based on which it has been claimed that the hands of the euro area’s central banks are tied and therefore they cannot fulfil their primary goal properly. Firstly, it has been presumed that banks’ situation in Europe is so weak that we cannot abandon the extraordinary monetary policy measures that made money supply easier for banks during the crisis. Secondly, it is claimed that until the fiscal situation of some euro area countries is not firmly under control and the new financial control mechanisms have not been implemented, central banks do not dare to focus on the threat of inflation. I do not wish to underestimate either argument. The situation in global money markets, including Europe, is not entirely risk-free yet and the leaders of Europe’s public financing are struggling to ensure that the amended fiscal framework would help avoid crises in the future. However, upon fulfilling their main goal, the euro area’s central banks are not limited by these concerns to the extent that they could or should ignore the price stability goal.
Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid: Leading in a disruptive world revolutionising Takaful Keynote address by Mr Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Takaful Rendezvous 2019 “Leading in a Disruptive World – Revolutionising Takaful”, Kuala Lumpur, 8 October 2019. * * * I am delighted to join all of you today at the 2019 Takaful Rendezvous. This is an important gathering for the finance and business community to exchange ideas on the opportunities and issues facing the global takaful industry. Our backdrop today is of an economy and environment that has seen remarkable changes and challenges that emerge in just a short period of time. While we have thought the financial crises of recent times were safely behind us, the global and domestic economy has been beset with an escalating trade war that has rippled far. This has affected the trade and investment climate worldwide and could bring about large downside risks. Malaysia’s economy will not be spared from this fallout. At the same time, we have a growing sense of urgency to deal with environmental challenges. Globally, the focus is shifting towards climate change and sustainability. Closer to home, we have just experienced an episode of the country’s now, alarmingly, annual haze seasonality. Undoubtedly, each one of us can feel the impact and risks from environmental degradation on the quality of our daily lives.

At the current stage of development, however, we need to shift from purely qualitative judgements to quantitative analyses of what has caused the real exchange rate appreciation trends in many accession countries. For example, the majority of empirical studies of the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect have concluded that this hypotheses explains only 1-2 percentage points (or even less) a year of the observed real appreciation in Central European countries. This necessitates searching for other influential factors and forecasting their development for the future. The implications of the real appreciation process are probably different for those countries with hard pegs against the euro compared with countries that have floating exchange rates. In the case of currency boards, the only channel of real appreciation is an inflation differential. As the Maastricht inflation criterion is relatively strict, even a relatively modest pace of real appreciation might lead to complications. It will be certainly interesting to hear today if these countries really perceive this challenge as serious and what alternative policies - such as fiscal policies and/or income policies they can use to overcome the problem successfully. For countries with more flexible exchange rates, the Maastricht exchange rate criterion is less binding, and a modest nominal appreciation trend can be accommodated within its fluctuation bands. It will be interesting to hear whether we all share this view. Another question is whether we see any implications of the real appreciation process for designing the details of our ERM2 membership, such as its duration or the chosen central parity.
This effort stems from a critical lesson from the crisis – that we need to better understand our firms and how they operate, including a greater understanding of how the governance of the firm works. We expect that by intensifying the supervisory relationship with those overseeing the health of the firm, we can improve the flow of information and dialogue. This should give us an earlier and clearer view into emerging business trends and risk strategies within the firm. It should give us a better sense of what the senior leaders and directors are thinking. And, it also creates a better dynamic where discussions are more frequent and less monumental so that dialogue flows more naturally through all means – not just in person, but also over the phone and via email. This effort extends not just to firms where we are the home country supervisor, but also to large global firms where we are the host supervisor. We realize the challenges in building any relationship, and the challenges in doing so across geographic boundaries, cultures and corporate entities are even more challenging. Nevertheless, where we have had success in building that dialogue and deepening the engagement with business leaders and directors of global firms, we have achieved a higher degree of understanding on both sides. As relationships develop, we have found more frequent, informal dialogue to be extremely productive for all involved. Firms are in a better position to understand what our concerns are and respond more appropriately and timely to these concerns.

With this approach, firms have an obligation to share relevant and significant issues around the globe with key host country supervisors on a timely basis. As well, firms need to share more global data – including key risk management reports – that allow host supervisors to better understand important vulnerabilities, as well as the overall condition of the firm. While information sharing among supervisors can address some of this, it’s insufficient to assume that key host country jurisdictions don’t need to have a view of the overall health of the company. And, finally, clarity – or transparency – of communication with supervisors needs to be a focus going forward. There are times when firms attempt to respond to questions or concerns with very narrow answers or with an overwhelming amount of paper. This generally leads to additional follow up – on both sides – and a lot of time and energy expended to resolve the outstanding questions. I encourage you to ask for clarity when we aren’t being clear and to try to understand better what we are looking for by asking more questions. One way that you can facilitate better information flows is to provide us with what you provide to senior management and board members, rather than producing something just for us. •  Second, invest in MIS. One of the key weaknesses identified during the last crisis was that information systems within firms weren’t robust enough to provide timely and accurate risk management information as events unfolded.
From that time, daily and monthly variations in the krone exchange rate show that the krone is floating. Our analyses suggest that oil price fluctuations are just one of several contributory factors behind the variation in the krone exchange rate in recent years.4 In the short term the krone exchange rate is also affected by uncertainty in the global economy and turbulence in international financial markets. The Exchange Rate Regulation - which is the mandate assigned to Norges Bank by the political authorities - states that monetary policy shall be aimed at maintaining a stable krone exchange rate  4  See Bernhardsen and Røisland (2000). 7  BIS Review 105/2000  against European currencies. Since 1 January 1999, Norges Bank has defined European currencies as the euro. The Exchange Rate Regulation takes into account that the krone exchange rate may remain outside its normal range. In the event of significant changes in the exchange rate, Norges Bank shall orient instruments with a view to returning the exchange rate over time to its initial range. The concept “significant changes” is not quantified. The term must be given an economic content. Norges Bank considers an exchange rate change to be significant if it influences expectations concerning price and cost inflation to the extent that the change in the exchange rate may become self-reinforcing.

If a situation arises where Norges Bank is not able to return the krone to its initial range without such consequences, as already mentioned, the Bank will inform the government authorities that measures  BIS Review 105/2000  10  other than those available to the Bank are required. This may involve recommendations concerning fiscal measures that make it possible to return the krone exchange rate to its initial range and to stabilise it. In the event of pronounced and prolonged shifts in the economy, fiscal policy and wage determination must contribute to restoring balance in the economy. However, if fundamental and permanent changes have taken place in the framework conditions for the Norwegian economy, it may also be appropriate to consider a revision of the guidelines for monetary policy. Monetary policy instruments In theory, Norges Bank conducts its monetary policy through two main instruments: the interest rate and exchange market interventions. However, in Norges Bank’s experience, extensive and sustained interventions to influence exchange rates have yielded poor results. Interventions can often lead to game situations in which market operators regard the central bank’s attempts to influence the exchange rate as an interesting opportunity to make a profit. Events in autumn 1992, at the start of 1997 and in autumn 1998 show that exchange market interventions cannot stem the pressure on the krone. This is why Norges Bank’s primary instrument of monetary policy is the interest rate. The interest rate is a powerful instrument for influencing cyclical trends, and thus inflation, in Norway.
In part the explanation for this encouraging development may lie in the dampening effect of the strong exchange rate or in the lower and more stable inflationary expectations we are now seeing. But other possible explanations include exceptional competitive pressure in goods markets, structural changes in labour market behaviour or an underlying improvement in productivity growth, or in some combination of all three. Whatever the underlying cause, it is possible that, at least for a time, we can sustain a higher rate of growth of overall demand and output without inflationary pressure than we could in the past. The jury frankly is still very much out on all of this. The difficulty is that most of these possible developments cannot be directly observed in the data, and, even if they could be, we would still not know whether or not, or for how long, they might persist. BIS Review 98/2000  2  We certainly have not closed our mind to a continuation of such benign “new economy” effects, indeed we make conscious allowance for them as best we can in our projections. But we cannot bank on them. All we can - and do - do is, continuously and meticulously, to monitor the evolving evidence. We watch it, in fact, like a dove. What that means is that while we can’t realistically rule out further interest rate increases, we don’t rule out the possibility that the next move will be downwards either. In the final analysis, Mr President, we have a choice.

No doubt at some point such perceptions will change - or the anticipated differences in future earnings growth be discounted by the change in asset prices, including the effect of exchange rates. There are some tentative signs that this may be beginning to happen. But in the meantime it is not at all clear that there is much that we could do - even if we wanted to - to weaken sterling against the euro by marginal changes in short-term interest rates. As it is our interest rate differential over the euro zone has halved since the euro started, while our exchange rate against the euro has appreciated by around 15%. We do already, of course, take full account of the exchange rate - and other prices - in both our forecasts and our policy decisions. Indeed, it was partly to avoid pushing sterling higher and so aggravating the imbalance within the economy, when we were not wholly convinced that we needed to take that risk in order to achieve the inflation target, that the Committee refrained from further monetary tightening over the past eight months. But looking ahead the risks and uncertainties are such that it would be unrealistic to suppose that we can altogether exclude the need for further tightening at some point.