samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Krzysztof Rybiński: Monetary policy challenges resulting from the rapid credit growth in the CEE Panel discussion by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at the National Bank of Poland International Conference of Central Bankers and Economic Educators “Monetary Policy Challenges Resulting from the Rapid Credit Growth in Converging Economies”, Warsaw, 23 November 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, In recent years we have witnessed a rapid growth of credit in CEE countries. Today, I would like to focus on globalisation as one of the main causes of such development. First, I will explain how globalisation contributed to recent credit growth in the CEE and then I will discuss what could be the possible consequences for the monetary policy of vanishing globalization “tail wind” in the nearest future. To start with, let us define the term globalisation, as its meaning is so broad, that when it is referred to in a discussion, various people understand various things. One of the definitions of globalisation is provided by the International Monetary Fund 1 , where it is construed as “the growing interdependence (integration) of national economies, in particular as a result of the growing international trade and financial flows”. Moreover, an element of globalisation that is worth mentioning is the fast flow of information and knowledge, which is the driving force behind globalisation processes. One should keep in mind that globalisation is not a completely new phenomenon.

Understanding of risks is key in ensuring that our AML/CFT measures are commensurate with the risks, in order for us to protect the financial institutions and the integrity of our financial system;  iii. Non-compliances will be viewed very seriously and strong regulatory and supervisory actions are to be expected;  iv. Cooperation and collaboration between financial institutions and LEAs are vital for an effective AML/CFT regime; and  v.  Legal, regulatory and operational frameworks alone are not sufficient without effective execution and overall implementation. Results would need to be measured based on the outcome and impact. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In relations to the Mutual Evaluation that will be undertaken from 13 to 25 November this year, I wish inform that some financial institutions will be called to meet the assessors during the on-site assessment in November. The purpose of the meeting is for the assessors to assess how effective AML/CFT measures are being implemented by the reporting institutions. We have identified several potential institutions as per the criteria given by the assessors. If your institution is being selected, you will receive formal notification from us in due course. Nevertheless, there are also high possibilities that the assessors may request to meet institutions of their choice during the on-site assessment.
I will thus comment on our current monetary policy at the end of my speech. Balance sheet expands due to measures against strong Swiss franc In the past few years, the SNB’s balance sheet total has risen sharply. Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, it has multiplied by a factor of six. At the end of last year, it came to around CHF 640 billion, or almost exactly the value added by the Swiss economy in 2015. The growth in the balance sheet total is attributable to a rise in Swiss franc liquidity and an expansion of our foreign currency investments. This brings me to my first question: how did the increase in foreign currency investments come about? The short answer is that it is the result of monetary policy measures which the SNB takes to maintain appropriate monetary conditions in Switzerland. Thus, foreign exchange market interventions, which the SNB has been using to counter the appreciation of the Swiss franc since spring 2009, have led to the increase in foreign currency investments and, in turn, the SNB’s balance sheet total. Thus a high level of foreign currency investments is not an objective in itself. On the contrary. It forms an integral part of monetary policy. As observers of our monetary policy, you will be familiar with the reasons why we are active in foreign exchange markets. In the wake of the crisis which encompassed global markets eight years ago, demand for safe investments, including Swiss francs, rose rapidly.

An essential component of these standards is the so-called “use test” that requires a system of internal ratings to be an integral part of a bank’s risk management and own assessment of capital adequacy. The internal reliance on these risk ratings will not only help supervisors gain confidence in the accuracy of a bank’s ratings system, but will also provide a key link to the proposed second pillar of the Accord, supervisory review. Other work on minimum capital requirements While the focus of my remarks has been on the internal ratings-based approach, the Committee also is working on other key aspects of the new framework, including revising the standardized approach, developing an expanded treatment of credit risk mitigation techniques and assessing a capital charge for operational risk. BIS Review 75/2000  8  Standardized approach The Basel Committee remains dedicated to revising the standardized approach as banks and supervisors in some countries may not yet have the necessary resources to implement an internal ratings-based method. To improve the risk sensitivity of the standardized approach, the Committee sought to establish capital requirements that recognized some differences in the probability of default between borrowers. At the same time, the Committee sought to be attentive to the views of many bankers and supervisors who wanted the standardized approach to remain simple so that banks of all sizes and levels of sophistication could implement it.
Yet in recent years, the central banks, including the SNB, have become quite creative and innovative when faced with difficult circumstances. However, two points need to be noted in this respect. On the one hand, central banks must never lose sight of their mandates. There should never be any doubt about their unflinching adherence to their stability mandates. On the other, it is important to recognise that monetary policy cannot be used to solve all economic problems. Otherwise we run the danger that, in the long term, monetary policy will no longer achieve its intended effects, and our money will deteriorate. As far as the Swiss monetary order is concerned, I am confident that the SNB is in a position to fulfil its mandate in the interests of the country – now and in the future –because of the backing it enjoys among the general public. My optimism is also founded in the history of the Swiss currency, which began moving in a positive direction after the memorable Ustertag of 1830. Admittedly, the efforts to achieve sound money in our country were not immediately crowned with success and it was a gradual process. However, our monetary order and institutions have enjoyed broad acceptance and a high level of basic trust for over 100 years now. This has made it possible, while adhering to the basic foundations of the monetary order, to carry out essential adjustments on repeated occasions, while at the same time allowing transient fashion trends to pass and forgoing experiments with uncertain outcomes.

A second important invariable in our more recent monetary history is the fact that, in this country, this fundamental trust and the culture of stability are deeply rooted. Making money even better? Alternatives to the present monetary order Can we make our sound money even better? In order to answer this question, let us begin by recalling the basic framework of the current monetary order. As an independent central bank, the SNB is required to pursue a monetary policy in the interests of the country as a whole. It has a mandate to ensure price stability while taking due account of the development of the economy. This mandate is the compass that guides all our actions. By guaranteeing price stability in word and deed over the years, the SNB, as an independent institution, has been able to build up its credibility. Credibility is the anchor needed so that the public at large has confidence in our paper currency. This confidence, in its turn, makes it possible for the SNB to react flexibly in the short-term to economic disruptions, because the public does not question its policies aimed at long-term stability. In view of the major economic and social importance of the monetary order, as outlined previously, it is legitimate and necessary that this order be subjected to repeated review. In this sense, we welcome the general growth in interest in the monetary system, following the turmoil of the financial crisis, and the fact that discussion on reform ideas is more lively than in the past.
According to The Economist (20-26 May 2023), the renminbi's share of trade finance has risen from 2% to 4.5% since February 2022. ii Voir notamment Solar PV Global Supply Chains, Agence internationale de l’énergie, juillet 2022 iii Triennal Central Bank Survey of foreign exchange and Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives in 2022, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) iv Horn, S., Reinhart, C., and Trebesch, C., China’s overseas lending, Journal of International Economics, November 2021 v Horn, S., Parks, B., Reinhart, C., and Trebesch, C., China as an International Lender of Last Resort, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2023 vi Eichengreen, B., Macaire, C., Mehl, A., Monnet, E. and Naef, A., Is Capital Account Convertibility Required for the Renminbi to Acquire Reserve Currency Status?, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2022 vii See in particular Weiss, C., Geopolitics and the U.S. dollar’s future as a reserve currency, International Finance Discussion Papers, Federal Reserve, October 2022 viii Farhi, E., and Maggiori, M., A Model of the International Monetary System, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2018 ix The international role of the euro, European Central Bank (ECB), June 2022 x Council Conclusions on the EU’s economic and financial strategic autonomy: one year after the Commission’s Communication, 29 March 2022 xi Capital Markets Recovery Package xii For example, to finance the NGEU recovery programme and macro-financial assistance for Ukraine. xiii Villeroy de Galhau, F., Multipolarity and the role of the euro in the International Financial System, speech, 16 May 2022 i

In fact those euro zone countries that have some sort of national transparent targets and evaluation of fiscal policy, such as Finland, have managed to retain some order in their public finances. The power of targets and transparency is that the public, with the help of comments from analysts in the media, can evaluate clearly how the government is doing in relation to a long-term norm. The idea of being on or off target is quite easy to grasp, and if the process is transparent, experts and the public alike will learn to trust the figures. In this area most countries still have a lot to do. It is a pity that  2  BIS Review 66/2004  government accounts, which affect everyone in a compulsory way, are less transparent, less well audited and less understood as the accounts of companies listed on the stock exchange, which only affect very few people and at their own risk. Sweden has a target of a 2 per cent surplus for the public sector over the business cycle, a figure that includes pension savings and that, given an ageing population, is in fact akin to targeting a balanced budget over the cycle. This target is present in the debate of every budget. The National Institute of Economic Research comments on the target and helps the public to understand it. This keeps the government accountable not only in the normal political sense but also in relation to the targets agreed upon.
Second, unilateral adoption of another currency is a solution that is hardly worth considering unless EMU membership has been ruled out for the foreseeable future, as it entails extra cost of purchase of new base money for the banking system (generally in the range of 70–100 b.kr. in recent years) and larger precautionary foreign exchange reserves (particularly if the banks are not foreign-owned). It would be pointless to pay that price for a few years’ benefit, plus the seigniorage that would revert permanently to the ECB. Currencies other than the euro have also been mentioned. But considering the characteristics required of such a currency, there is no other that comes close to being as beneficial for Iceland as the euro is. The most important characteristics of such a currency are the following:  7  Such a policy has proven successful in Denmark, but Denmark has a stronger economic framework than Iceland and enjoys ECB support through ERM II membership. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  1. The share of the currency area in Iceland’s external trade should be greater than that of other currencies and, preferably, Iceland should have a free trade agreement with the area in question that would contribute to economic integration with it. 2. The currency should be an international reserve currency, and the market for it should be deep enough to facilitate hedging against foreign exchange risk. 3. The currency area should be characterised by price stability and have a sound monetary policy framework.

Arnór Sighvatsson: Iceland’s future monetary and exchange rate regime Speech by Mr Arnór Sighvatsson, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a meeting of the Icelandic Federation of Labour, Reykjavík, 10 January 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen: In the wake of severe financial and monetary instability, it is appropriate for the Icelandic authorities to conduct a comprehensive review of Iceland’s exchange rate and monetary policy regime. The re-assessment must be based on an accurate diagnosis. The authorities should not only review the experience of recent years, but also grapple with the fundamental questions of why Iceland’s monetary policy track record has been so dismal, over nearly a century, that the Icelandic króna has depreciated by 99.95% against the Danish krone since the two currencies were uncoupled in 1920. Monetary policy generally faces two conflicting roles of the currency exchange rate: to be an anchor of monetary policy, on the one hand, and a tool for adjustment, on the other. During the Icelandic króna’s lifetime as an independent currency, exchange rate policy has moved along the axis between fixing and floating, but without managing to stop the virtually uninterrupted erosion of the króna’s purchasing power except for short periods of time. There could be four potential types of explanations for Iceland’s poor performance in the field of monetary policy, and corresponding types of measures for improving the performance: 1. First of all, the source of the problem might be the implementation of monetary policy or its framework.
According to surveys by the IET (Institute for Tourism Studies), the Balearic Islands was the second-ranked Spanish region in terms of incoming international tourists and of their expenditure, with almost 10 million visitors from January to September 2015 and with receipts of around € billion. Forecasts Let me move on now to our growth forecasts. The latest Banco de España projections, released in September, place the increase in GDP at 3.1% for 2015 as a whole, and at 2.7% for 2016, in line with those drawn up by the main international agencies and by private analysts. This growth is forecast to be underpinned by national demand, with moderately negative contributions by net external demand. Among the components of national demand, household consumption is expected to continue to be highly dynamic, supported by the favourable labour market performance and driven by the expansionary impact on disposable income of the fall in oil prices, the reduction in direct taxation and the refund of the “extra” December salary payment to public-sector employees. The current recovery in investment in construction is expected to run further, against a backdrop of improved financing conditions, while business investment will continue to post high rates of increase, in line with the strength of final demand. As regards foreign trade, there will be modest increases in exports, in a setting in which the improvement on euro area markets and the achievement of further gains in competitiveness are expected to be partly offset by the slowdown in other foreign markets.

This is particularly important given the lack of well-developed road and rail networks of the region. Countries in the GMS are addressing this through various projects, the main one being the road corridors. The North-South Corridor which connects Yunnan in China, with Myanmar, Laos and Thailand has been completed. Also, the East-West Corridor which links Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar is near completion. This will make the whole region more closely interconnected, hence investments in any of the GMS country stand to benefit the rest. 11. The final point is on the demand side. The GMS will enjoy a larger consumer market base with distinct needs and increased purchasing power. The AEC is home to over 600 million people. In tandem with this is the significant rise of the middle class population. The Asian Development Bank estimates that the share of ASEAN’s middle class is expected to increase to 65% by 2030.3 Moreover, ASEAN continues to pursue closer integration into the global economy through various Free Trade Agreements. This includes China and India, both superpowers at the crossroads of the GMS. Therefore, the AEC will also be an important gateway, connecting the GMS to major markets of the Asia-Pacific region. 12. The bright future is ours for the making. The GMS economies are blessed with abundant resources and promising growth prospects. With the realization of the AEC, the region’s opportunities will be multiplied. Yet there remain important challenges. The bright future is ours only if we work to overcome the challenges together.
1999 and 2000 forecast 10  80  Government debt  75 70  5  65 60 0  55 50 45  -5  40 35  Budget balance  -10  30 25 20  -15 90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  Source: National Institute of Economic Reasearch  In the June Inflation Report we noted that as a result of measures proposed in the Budget Bill, during 1999 and possibly also in 2000 fiscal policy would probably be more restrictive than the Riksbank had assumed earlier but would still become successively more expansionary. The restrictive economic effect of fiscal policy was accordingly judged to be less marked than in the period 1994 – 97. Our scenario assumed, however, that there would be no further tax cuts next year. We foresee a government financial surplus somewhat above 2 per cent of GDP but have thus assumed that it will be used to repay government debt. In 2001, on the other hand, we assume that any surplus in excess of 2 per cent of GDP will be transferred to households. The Swedish debate about tax cuts and increased spending has become more intense as the government budget moved out of the red and is expected to show continued and growing surpluses in the years ahead. That is hardly surprising. We had exactly the same debate in the 1980s as soon as the budget deficits had been eliminated.

29.04.2022  Presentation of the Action Plan against Financial Fraud* Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  *iEnglish translation of the original speech in Spanish. First Deputy Prime Minister, State Secretary for Security, Chair of the National Securities Market Commission, authorities, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. The protocol we sign here today stands as a milestone in our efforts to enhance and reinforce action against potentially fraudulent offers of financial products and services. It comes at a particularly opportune time, with several factors giving rise to an increase in financial fraud, most notably growing digitalisation. Moreover, it is an excellent example of how a problem for citizens can be addressed far more effectively through collaboration between different stakeholders, be they public or private. In the case of the Banco de España, apart from the evident microprudential and macroprudential concern for the security and resilience of the supervised entities’ IT systems, the impact that fraudulent use of technology may have on the citizens and firms that use banking or credit services has been a concern of ours for some time. Such fraud can also come at a high reputational cost to the financial system, the proper functioning of which depends on mutual trust between supply and demand.
This ceremony is therefore more than timely as the Government is working tirelessly towards empowering its citizens economically and at the same time increasingly diversifying the economy and promoting export led growth. It is for this reason, Mr President that the Government established the Citizen’s Economic Empowerment Fund under the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act of 2006 in order to promote empowerment of citizens in various economic activities. This signing ceremony is yet another indication of the growing investor confidence in Zambia’s economy. You will be glad to note that the country’s total investment pledges rose more than ten times over to US $ billion in 2007 from US $ million recorded in the year 2001. This is an indication of the vast investment potential and improving investor confidence due to the macroeconomic stability particularly lower inflation and the sound fiscal polices that the Government has put in place. Institutional capacity has also been enhanced with effective supervision of the financial system to promote efficient operations of the banking sector. Mr President, the mining sector continues to be the major economic activity in the country. Following the liberalisation of the sector and subsequent privatisation of the mines, Government has continued to facilitate mineral exploration by the private sector and created an attractive investment environment through the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. This has sustained renewed interest in mining, reflected in a complete rebound in the mining sector on the Copperbelt and North Western province start up of new mines.

Finally, let me once again welcome our guests, the experts from the Czech Republic, who will pass on the Czech experience in the realization of the decade-long EU project – the establishment of the Single European Payment Area – SEPA. I believe that today’s panel discussions will encourage all stakeholders in the national payment system of Macedonia in creating realistically achievable integration initiatives in the area of cross-border payments in euros, which would open new opportunities for Macedonian companies and citizens for effective and cheap payments in the economic exchanges with the European Union. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1