samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One difficulty is, for example, that the financial sector is often rather underdeveloped in the models used by central banks in their analysis work. At present, fairly intensive efforts are being made in many areas to better include financial variables in the central banks’ forecast models. Another, not unrelated, problem is that property prices and borrowing are occasionally driven by psychological factors – exaggerated optimism and high risk propensity in upturns and the opposite effect in downturns. It is, of course, primarily this kind of development that leaning against the wind is an attempt to counteract. However, such factors are difficult to capture in economic models, as these are often based on the assumption that participants will act in a rational manner. In other words, it is difficult for a model to generate a scenario such as that represented by the unbroken curve in the figure. Even so, we know that such scenarios occur. It is part of human nature to reassure oneself by believing that “this time is different”, which, at the end of the day, is seldom the case. 5 The difficulty in making forecasts that capture and quantify the risks that may be associated with a credit-driven property boom has meant that monetary policies that lean against the wind are often described as the adoption of “extra action” or the increase of the interest rate “over and above” the forecasts for inflation and the real economy by the central bank.

Nonetheless, I believe there are good conditions for development work within this area to result in equally healthy returns as the efforts expended upon developing monetary policy over the last fifteen to twenty years. The application of time-varying regulations also raises the issue of what would be an appropriate form of institutional organisation. Different countries have chosen different solutions as regards the allocation of responsibility. One common feature is for the central bank frequently to have a certain responsibility for financial stability via its role as lender of last resort. In certain countries, the central bank also has responsibility for supervision and the application of regulations. Meanwhile, in other countries, such as Sweden, responsibility for regulatory and supervisory matters is placed with a separate supervisory authority. This means that, in Sweden, it is the Riksbank that controls the policy rate and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, that controls regulations. For some time, a discussion has taken place on the international level regarding the role central banks should play in matters of supervision and the application of rules. Ideas regarding the application of more time-varying regulations are adding fresh fuel to this debate. Utilising the expression for the rule of action above in the equation for the lending rate allows different institutional arrangements to be illustrated. In the previous equation for the lending rate, the regulations were described as a time-varying variable.
Because the monetary policy impulse works through its impact on financial market conditions, I don’t see why the Fed would want to act in a way that deliberately made this linkage less predictable. In actuality, I have been pushing in the opposite direction. By explaining the importance of financial conditions as part of our monetary policy decisions, I am trying to tighten the linkage. Balance Sheet Normalization I’d like to wrap up my comments tonight by discussing the likely next step in the monetary policy normalization process: beginning to allow maturing Treasuries and agency MBS paydowns to run off the Fed’s balance sheet, in contrast to our current practice of reinvesting all of the proceeds. As you are aware, following the June FOMC meeting we issued an addendum to our Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.3 In that addendum, the FOMC outlined how it planned to gradually reduce the Fed’s securities holdings over time. Namely, when that program is implemented, the FOMC will decrease its reinvestments in an orderly way, with repayments reinvested only to the extent they exceed gradually rising caps. For maturing Treasury securities, the FOMC anticipates that the monthly cap will be $ billion initially and will increase in steps of $ billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches $ billion. For repayments of agency MBS, the monthly cap will be $ billion initially and will increase in steps of $ billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches $ billion.

With that background, I would like to comment on some of the criticism of Fed policy decisions. Some of the commentary surrounding the FOMC’s June decision to raise the federal funds rate 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  target by 25 basis points illustrates the current tension between “too low” inflation and “too buoyant” financial conditions. On one hand, some observers question the decision to reduce policy accommodation given that inflation has fallen somewhat further below our objective. I would respond to these concerns by noting that monetary policy is still accommodative and that financial conditions have eased. In addition, the long and variable lags between monetary policy adjustments and their impact on the economy imply that the FOMC may need to remove accommodation even when inflation is below its goal. In particular, if the unemployment rate were already below its longer-run natural rate, as may be the case currently, the impact on wage growth and price inflation would still likely take some time to become evident. This would be particularly true if inflation expectations were well-anchored at or slightly below our 2 percent objective, as is the case currently. On the other hand, some Fed watchers have argued that we are helping to create financial asset bubbles by not removing accommodation more quickly. My view is that asset valuations are not particularly troublesome given the economic environment in which we’ve been—that is, a long period of moderate growth, low inflation, low interest rates, and low recession risks.
According to the Constitution, the Norwegian parliament was “to supervise the monetary affairs”. When the major powers used force to implement the provision of the Treaty of Kiel uniting Norway with Sweden, the Constitution needed to be adapted to the new realpolitik. However, the parliament managed to insert a new article in the November version of the constitution. It established an independent central bank, ensuring that Norway would have its own independent monetary system. The actual Norges Bank Act was not established until 1816. The first deposits were recorded in the books in 1817. At the time there were no functioning banks in Norway. However, there was manufacturing, consumption, barter, investment and trade. There was also a  BIS Review 154/2010  1  rudimentary credit market and monetary system. Commercial credit was available, savers met investors and bills of exchange were discounted. But these markets were rather inefficient: their margins were high, the supply of credit meagre and uncertainty high. Most activities associated nowadays with a monetary system took place in the “unregulated markets,” to use the current term. Accounts were kept, but not always in the numéraire we think of today. For example, this is described in the local history of Karlsøy and Helgøy, up in northern Norway, where at that time accounts were sometimes kept in commodities such as cod liver oil, saithe or flour. However, one of these unregulated markets functioned even more poorly than the others, namely the long-term credit market.

The financial bubble contained all the classical elements, such as a surging credit growth and house price inflation. Norges Bank had to carry out several rescue operations to save banks that were in trouble. 1899 was probably the first year the Bank functioned as “lender of last resort”. If you take a walk around the neighbourhood, you will see the physical aftermath of this bubble. You will find buildings from the 1890s and from the 1920s onward, but virtually nothing built in the intervening period. The past years we have again been in troubled waters. In September 2008 the turbulence in financial markets developed into a full-blown global crisis. Money markets seized up. Confidence between banks vanished. Liquidity dried up, interest rates rose sharply and equity prices fell. The long-term lending market dried up. International developments were also felt in Norway. Up until then we could almost take a well-functioning money market for granted in this country. But in the autumn of 2008 the money market stopped functioning and medium-term funding for banks was problematic. Just as in 1816, Norges Bank acted as “market maker of last resort”. And so, the history of my own central bank, expanding the window from 25 years to 200 years, does not provide an unambiguous answer to the question of what defines a central bank. But even if we look at central banks in other countries, there are no clear answers. The way the financial crisis was handled varied across countries.
Over the next five years, it is estimated that Asia will need USD1 trillion in terms of infrastructure investment and is in search of new partnerships and strategic investors to co-invest in these undertakings. This trend would benefit the economic regions with high savings and surpluses such as Asia and the Middle East because it would promote intermediation of a part of the surplus funds in the region to be channelled to productive investments in the region. Several financial centres in the West, Middle East and Asia are now introducing Islamic finance as an integral part of their financial markets to offer the wide range of financial products and services. This trend is envisaged to stretch the New Silk Road from East Asia and Middle East and extend to Europe and the rest of the world. Indeed, we are already seeing the participation of global investors and the international financial community. The Malaysian experience Let me share with you Malaysia's experience in developing on Islamic financial system in a highly liberalised environment. Malaysia has developed a comprehensive Islamic financial system that includes the banking and takaful industries, and the Islamic money and capital markets – a matrix which mutually reinforces the integrity and stability of the Islamic financial system. Significant progress has in particular, been achieved, in the development of the Malaysian sukuk, or Islamic bond market. The Malaysian sukuk market has now evolved into the world's largest Islamic bond market.

The level of 4.0% will be reached by 2017. In addition to scenario II, scenario III assumes a more significant decline in oil prices, i.e. down to $ per barrel in 2017. The GDP growth rate in this scenario slows down to less than 1%. The scenario forecasts the use of the Reserve Fund within the framework of existing budget rules in order to stabilise the situation in the economy. As a result, the fiscal policy, in our opinion, will make a more pronounced positive contribution to the aggregate demand dynamics. In scenarios II and III the reduction of inflation to the medium-term target of 4.0% will require more time than in the baseline scenario; we believe it possible to reach this level in 2017. According to the forecast, the inflation will be 6–6.5% in 2015, 4.5–5.0% in 2016 and 4.0–4.5% in 2017. In both alternative scenarios, the Bank of Russia will focus on ensuring financial stability, preventing the reduction of confidence in the domestic financial system and national currency. To do this, we will be ready to use additional tools, including non-standard ones that have not been applied earlier. Currently, the Bank of Russia is also developing the so-called stress scenario – an emergency scenario, which implies a sharp and more significant drop in oil prices over the forecasted horizon. We consider the possibility of adding this scenario to the Guidelines at the next stage of the document finalisation.
Ravi Menon: A vibrant carbon market for a low carbon future Opening remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Climate Impact X Announcement Event, Singapore, 20 May 2021. * * * Minister for National Development Mr Desmond Lee, ladies and gentleman, good afternoon. Let me start with the big picture. To limit global warming to 1.5°C, global annual greenhouse gas emissions need to be halved by 2030 and reduced to net-zero by 2050. Yet, the trajectory of carbon emissions is still on a steady uptrend. Just on energy needs alone, demand in Asia is projected to double in 2030. Economic development will drive demand for fossil fuels, which is still the cheapest way to generate electricity in many parts of Asia. The switch to cleaner energy sources cannot be made in one leap. Coal accounts for about half of Asia’s total energy supply today. We need to shift the energy mix progressively, first to relatively less emissions-intensive fuels like natural gas, and then to renewables. This shift will require fundamental infrastructure changes: refurbishing power plants to generate cleaner fuels; and upgrading the power grids to manage different energy sources and to minimise the intermittency of renewables. To make this progressive shift to a low-carbon future, Asia will need a lot more transition financing than is available today. To spur more green finance for transition, we need to have two things in place: a price on carbon, and a market for trading carbon credits.

•  Local governments are now allowed to raise funds in the bond market, reducing their reliance on land sales to fund expenditures. •  And earlier this week, on 1 May, China replaced all business turnover taxes with a more efficient value-added tax (VAT). But work remains in the areas of reducing off-budget spending, strengthening social spending, and refining environmental and property taxes. Domestic financial liberalisation is another area where the glass is half full and half empty. A lack of depth and sophistication in China’s domestic financial market has limited the returns on household savings, indirectly crimping their purchasing power. It has also restricted financing to promising businesses. •  China has taken the important step of liberalising interest rates. •  But it also needs to develop deeper and broader capital markets. This will help better price risk capital and ensure that financing flows to more productive economic activities. China has proceeded with capital account liberalisation in a careful and systematic way, “crossing the river by feeling the stones”. •  Since 2008, the use of RMB outside China has been permitted for all current account transactions. •  Capital account transactions in RMB were subject to various quotas and schemes, which have been progressively expanded. •  And late last year, China allowed foreign institutions to issue bonds in China’s onshore interbank bond market for the first time.
The fact that interest rates have fallen, and are now at historically low levels, means that the level where the central banks’ policy rates are “neutral”— that is, neither expansionary nor contractionary – has also developed in a similar manner. The relationship between the neutral interest rate and monetary policy can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 4. The neutral interest rate is represented by the broken line. When central banks conduct monetary policy via the policy rate, they change it in the way described in the solid line. An interest rate that is lower than the neutral one stimulates demand and inflation, while an interest rate that is higher than the neutral one has the opposite effect. Central banks cannot set interest rates independently of the neutral interest rate, but must take it into account. As the neutral interest rate is currently at a historically low level, the central bank's policy rate needs to be very low to have an expansionary effect. This has meant that policy rates in many countries today are at or close to the lower bound, and would have been even lower if this had been considered possible. In other words, monetary policy is currently being squeezed from two sides — the pandemic and fall in demand that is subduing inflation on the one hand, and the conditions that make it difficult to cut the rate to counteract this on the other. 2 Skingsley (2016).

The Code’s content reflects good practices where clarity is needed, and applies to all wholesale market participants, including sell-side, buy-side, trading platforms and other market infrastructure. The Code incorporates the principle of proportionality, given the diverse nature of market participants. The Code is now owned and maintained by the local Foreign Exchange Committees (or FXCs), through the Global Foreign Exchange Committee (or the GFXC). The GFXC is chaired by Mr Simon Potter, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and has two newly appointed Co-Vice Chairs from the private sector – Mr Adrian Boehler, Global Co-Head of FX Local Markets & Commodity Derivatives at BNP Paribas, and Mr Akira Hoshino, Managing Director and Head of Global Markets Trading at MUFG Bank. FX Global Code: A Look Back 5 Since the launch of the Code, we have been fully committed to promoting adherence in our respective markets by market participants, from both sell- and buy-sides, to the Code. One year on, the GFXC has done a “stock-take” of our achievements, and I will share some of these with you today. 6 First, on awareness and commitment to the Code. On this front, the GFXC, together with the FXCs in each jurisdiction, has made good progress. A key part of the Code is the Statement of Commitment. This is a single, common basis by which each market participant can demonstrate that it commits to adhere to the Code.
I’d like to close my remarks by highlighting some of the practical steps we are taking on the supervisory side to continue that progress. •  First, through collaboration and communication with other supervisors, both domestic and foreign, we are continuing to work across global firms to address issues together and break down barriers to sharing information and coordinating better among supervisors. I’d say this is still a work in progress. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Second, we need to continue to communicate our relevant supervisory findings in a timely manner and our communication needs to be candid and direct. Still too often I find that we don’t say what we mean the first time – and this leads to confusion and, at times, bad outcomes. •  Lastly, we need to be more proactive in establishing an open dialogue with the directors of the financial institutions we supervise. We look to the directors to flag for us the key risks that keep them up at night. And, it is our obligation to explain the intuition behind our supervisory concerns and the rationale for needed change. Thank you for your attention today. I would be happy to answer a few questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

In contrast, there are also concerns about the effects of continuing easy monetary conditions within Hong Kong. During the past few months, economic recovery has resulted in inflows of funds into the Hong Kong dollar to the extent that the Aggregate Balance of the banking system has become  BIS Review 37/2004  1  extraordinarily high (despite some outflows recently associated with the corrections in the financial markets). As you know, under the Currency Board system there is not much that we can do to dampen easy monetary conditions: this is a question that the Sub-Committee on Currency Board Operations of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee has given a great deal of thought to. If there continue to be capital inflows on the back of sustained growth and confidence in Hong Kong’s prospects, the current account surplus and continuing talks about a possible revaluation of the renminbi, the risk of overheating in the economy and in asset markets will increase. I am not suggesting that this will happen soon, or making a warning. But banks in particular will need to keep the situation under close watch and adopt appropriate risk mitigation measures if the market situation warrants it. Overheating is, after all, something of an unfamiliar risk after such a long period of economic difficulty, and we do not wish to be caught off our guard. Longer-term risks So much for the more immediate risks and potential risks, which both you as banks and we as supervisor must pay attention to.
The single standard will not only reduce system development costs of all participants but also allow for connectivity among various service providers, promoting the principles of open infrastructure and  3  interoperability. Specifically, each service provider does not need to develop their own QR Code format. In addition, merchants will be able to receive both domestic and international payment transactions, and they can accept funds from various sources including credit card, debit card, e-Wallet account and bank account. The second is introducing cost-efficient payment channel. QR Code payment is perfectly fit to new lifestyle of customers who usually have mobile phone with them and willing to use mobile payment. These customers can conveniently use their mobile application to read merchants’ QR Code to pay for their purchases. Merchants, especially SMEs, will be able to accept e-Payment with lower costs. They can have their QR Code and present to customers for scanning right away. One QR Code can be used to accept customer’s payments from various channels. Moreover, merchants can directly have payments deposited into their bank account or e-Wallet account that is linked with PromptPay service. With QR Code payment, cash flow management, bookkeeping, and reconciliation processes are much easier than those of cash transactions. This effectively eases operational burdens and reduces business costs. The third is enhancing payment security. Scanning QR Code via mobile application will increase security of payment card usage because customers are not required to provide their card or card information to merchants and thus have less concerns over frauds.

Speech at the Press Conference: Collaboration on Adopting Standardized QR Code for e-Payment Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor Wednesday 30 August 2017 Bank of Thailand ……………………………………………………… Executives from American Express, JCB International, Mastercard, VISA and UnionPay International President of Thai Bankers' Association President of Government Financial Institutions Council President of Association of International Banks President of Thailand Electronic Payment Trade Association President of the Telecommunications Association of Thailand under the Royal Patronage Press members and distinguished guests, I am very pleased that all payment service providers in Thailand are here to announce their collaboration on adopting QR Code standard for payments. This is considered an important milestone for which the standardized QR Code has been implemented in Thailand. It is also the first time that five international payment card network providers and Thai financial service providers have mutually agreed to adopt the same QR Code standard in providing payment services in Thailand. It is recognized that electronic payment (e-Payment) is a crucial component in driving a digital economy, where technologies have been utilized to deliver better services for consumers and businesses, to increase financial inclusion, to raise efficiency and to reduce costs; thus, enhancing the country’s competitiveness and supporting ‘ease of doing business’ principle.