samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Adherence to this requirement will inject transparency, accountability and ensure the integrity of the financial system. It will prevent criminals from hiding their ownership of companies and assets through complex methods and vehicles. I last spoke at this conference in 2011. The theme of the 2011 conference was “Raising the bar in enforcement and compliance”. Looking back and taking stock of the present state, I am glad to see that the whole industry has matured and progressed in such a significant way. This is validated by the NCC report that the sector’s control measures for both money laundering and terrorism financing are strong. Further, fines imposed by the Bank on financial institutions has decreased over the past few years, reflecting the progress made by institutions in ensuring adequate controls. I hope the industry continues to strengthen its capability to fight crime. Another area in which progress has been made is the priority accorded within each institution to compliance. The focus of the compliance function has developed to become more comprehensive as financial institutions have a better understanding of the threats and risks involved. With increasing awareness of the direct and indirect costs of non-compliance, the compliance function is no longer viewed only as adherence to rules set by regulators, but is instead, an integral part of the organisation’s culture. The very fact that the theme of this 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  conference is on reshaping the future, governance and transparency is a testament to this.

In view of the potential of SMEs in the economy, significant emphasis has been accorded by the Government in developing and strengthening the capacity of the SMEs to contribute to the economy. Twelve Government Ministries and 38 Agencies are involved in supporting the development of SMEs. To ensure the effectiveness of the strategies to support SMEs, the Government established the National SME Development Council in June 2004. The Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, provides the policy direction of the programmes to support the SMEs, and to ensure that these programmes are implemented effectively. Bank Negara Malaysia is the Secretariat to the Council. The Government's commitment to promoting the role of the SME sector in the economy has been to provide an enabling environment for their development. A comprehensive approach has therefore been adopted. In 2007, a total of 190 key programmes, involving a financial commitment of RM3.7 billion, is being implemented by the Government, to strengthen the enabling infrastructure, to build the capacity and capability of the SMEs, and to enhance SME access to financing. Indeed, for access to financing, several key strategies and measures have already been implemented to ensure that SMEs, at different stages of the business life cycle, have adequate access to financing. The banking system continues to be the most significant source of financing in the economy. An important strategy to ensure access to financing by the SMEs has therefore been to increase access to financing from the banking institutions.
Second, the progressive normalisation of the real estate market, against a background in which the demographic factor and the buoyancy of employment are lending greater support to housing demand than in previous property cycles, would limit the effect of slower house price rises on consumption and soften the impact of the cyclical change on residential investment. At the same time, the step-up in private- and public-sector investment in recent years has raised the level of capitalisation of the economy following a prolonged period of intense job creation, and this should manifest itself in higher long-term potential growth. Although it is unlikely that the expansion of business investment and non-residential investment in construction will maintain the pace of recent quarters, the growth outlook for both spending components is, at first sight, favourable. In any event, it seems unlikely that productive investment alone can offset the lower contribution from household spending. Hence, as I pointed out in my previous testimony, the role of net external demand will be fundamental in making some containment of spending compatible with a continued growth rate of around 3%. As we have seen in the last few years, the contribution of this variable to growth depends very much on the performance of Spain’s export markets, but also on the competitiveness of Spanish production.

He did not seek to reduce the amount of capital held by the banking system but rather sought to increase the stability of the global financial system – a goal that would benefit not just banks, but more broadly businesses and consumers. To work toward greater financial stability, the Basel Committee is blending several policy approaches to replace the existing capital framework. As I have mentioned, Basel II consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first pillar aligns the minimum capital requirements more closely to banks’ actual underlying risks. Qualifying banks will rely partly on their own measures of those risks, a rule that helps to create economic incentives for banks to improve those measures. The second pillar – supervisory review – allows supervisors to evaluate each bank’s assessments of its own risks and to determine whether those assessments seem reasonable. The third pillar, market discipline, strengthens external incentives for prudent management. It strengthens the ability of marketplace participants to reward well managed banks and to penalise poorly managed ones by enhancing transparency in banks’ financial reporting. One might say that Basel II seeks an “efficient frontier” of policy objectives through the three pillars. Each pillar provides something that the other two cannot. Each is essential to achieving our overall objective of financial stability. The three pillars represent a far more sophisticated view of risk and a far more comprehensive approach to supervising bank capital than the “one-pillar” approach contained in the 1988 Basel Accord.
This downward trend is particularly pronounced in the first part of the sample, when the pay gap was falling by, on average, around half a percentage point per year. Since the GFC, however, the gender pay gap has flattened-off and has been essentially unchanged since 2007. At the same time gender pay gaps have been falling, female participation in the workforce has been steadily rising (Chart 7). Increased female participation may have contributed to the shrinking of the gender pay gap  8  Unconditional gaps are calculated using raw pay data from the LFS and will not attempt to account for individual or job characteristics. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  during the 1990s and early 2000s, as female representation in certain sectors and occupations expanded.9 But there is little evidence of these effects over the past decade, during which female participation in the workplace has, if anything, picked up pace but the gender pay gap has been sticky. Chart 7: Female participation rate and unconditional gender pay gap Gender pay gap (per cent) 31 29 1994‐2009  2010‐2019  27 25 23 21 19 17 15 52  53  54  55  56  57  58  Female participation (per cent) Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive gender pay gap in this chart means that women earn less than men.

38  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  38  Jarrell, S B and Stanley, T D (2004), 'Declining Bias and Gender Wage Discrimination? A Meta-Regression Analysis', Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 828-838. Lang, K (2007), Poverty and Discrimination, Princeton University Press. Lang, K and Lehmann, J-Y K (2012), 'Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: Theory and Empirics', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 959-1006. Lang, K and Manove, M (2011), 'Education and Labor Market Discrimination', American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 1467-96. Lewis, G B and Soo Oh, S (2009), 'A Major Difference? : Fields of Study and Male-Female Pay Differences in Federal Employment', The American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 107-124. Longhi, S and Brynin, M (2017), 'The ethnicity pay gap', Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research Report, No. 108. Manning, A and Swaffield, J (2005), 'The gender gap in early career wage growth', CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. McKinsey & Company (2016), 'The power of parity: Advancing women's equality in the United Kingdom', McKinsey Global Institute, September 2016. Neal, D A (2004), 'The Measured Black-White Wage Gap among Women is Too Small', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. S1, pp. S1-S28. Neal, D A and Johnson, W R (1996), 'The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage Differences', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, No. 5, pp. 869-895.
When the couple passes away, and if their children choose not to redeem the property, the bank will recover the outstanding loan with accrued interests by selling the property in the open market. Any surplus will be returned to the children of the borrowers or their designated estate. If there is any shortfall, the HKMC will take care of the difference because the borrowers, when taking out the Reverse Mortgage, have already bought insurance from the HKMC to cover the shortfall risk. This scheme would not have been commercially viable for the banks without the insurance provided by the HKMC to cover the potential shortfall risk due to either falling property prices, rising interest rates or increasing longevity of the borrowers. So far, over 2,500 households have joined the Reverse Mortgage Programme. The initial take-up rate was not fast but is picking up steadily. It has taken some time for Hong Kong people to get to understand and appreciate this new product. Also, it is quite common amongst Chinese parents wishing to pass their properties to their children without encumbrances, which will not be the case if they have joined the Reverse Mortgage Programme. However, there is increasing awareness amongst retirees that they do need to take care of themselves rather than suffering from a steady drop in living standards due to insufficient recurrent cash flows. Life Annuity Scheme 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  6.

We will present the results in the spring of next year. Page 2/2
Øystein Olsen: Financial imbalances – how can they be counteracted? Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) / BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, 30 September 2014. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. Accompanying slides can be found on the Central Bank of Norway’s website: http://www.norgesbank.no/pages/101441/Speech20140930_CME_Charts.pdf  First, let me thank the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) for taking the initiative for this annual event. This is an interesting arena for Norges Bank. The CME is an important meeting place for researchers and economists in banking and finance and provides a valuable forum to discuss the Norwegian and global economy and, not least, monetary policy. As usual, I look forward to your comments after my presentation. Chart: Inflation and GDP among our trading partners The after-effects of the financial crisis and the imbalances that developed in the lead-up to the crisis are still bearing down on the global economy. In many advanced economies, inflation is close to zero and economic activity remains below the pre-crisis level. In their efforts to put economies back on their feet, leading central banks have reached the limits of monetary policy. Policy rates have been low – close to zero – for almost six years. In addition, central banks have engaged in quantitative easing to keep long-term rates at a low level. The medicine has been necessary.

Chart: Early warning models for financial crises The chart shows estimated crisis probabilities for Norway based on various combinations of explanatory variables and trend estimation methods. A clear pattern is that crisis probabilities increased markedly in the years ahead of the banking crisis in 1988–1993 and ahead of the financial crisis in 2008–2009. Both of these periods featured rapid growth in credit and real estate prices, combined with a surge in banks’ wholesale funding ratio. The chart shows that the estimated crisis probabilities have declined since the financial crisis, although the spread between the predictions from different variants of the model is considerable. The relationship between the indicators and the probability of a crisis in the model is not linear. The greater the magnitude of the financial imbalances at the outset, the more pronounced the effect of an increase in credit growth or house price inflation will be. We have seen that financial imbalances often wind down in connection with crises. The ratio of household debt to GDP fell markedly in Norway in the wake of the 1990s banking crisis and it has fallen in countries such as Spain, the UK and the US after the financial crisis in 2008. In Norway, household debt has continued to grow faster than income, which may indicate that the vulnerabilities that built up prior to the crisis are still present. An assessment of systemic risk must include an analysis of both the probability and consequence of a crisis.
These have enabled banks to obtain long-term funding at beneficial interest rates, which may temporarily be as low as 1%, on the condition that the participating banks maintain their supply of credit to the real economy. And we also eased the collateral eligibility criteria for banks in the ECB’s refinancing operations, thus increasing the volume of funds they may obtain. The measures have been highly successful. In the June TLTRO-III operation, participating banks received liquidity for an amount of € trillion, an all-time high in Eurosystem refinancing operations. The available evidence suggests that banks are using a significant portion of the funding received to continue to provide liquidity to the real economy. We also approved a second block of measures, relating to the asset purchase programmes. Since end-February, financial conditions had tightened in the euro area, with both corporate and sovereign risk spreads widening considerably. And the spread widening in the euro area was uneven: countries that started from weaker fiscal positions, with higher debt levels, and those most affected by the first wave of the pandemic witnessed a much more pronounced increase in their financing costs. This cross-country financial fragmentation hindered the transmission of the single monetary policy to the whole of the euro area, and even posed a threat of a repeat of the 2012 sovereign debt crisis. In this context, in March the ECB announced the launch of the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP).

The impact that changes in Fed policy can have beyond our borders has led to calls for us to do more to internalize those impacts, or even that policymaking be internationally coordinated. As I’ve already noted, Fed policies have significant effects internationally, given the central place of U.S. markets in the global financial system and the dollar’s status as the leading global reserve currency. In pursuing our policy responsibilities, we seek to conduct policy transparently and based on clear principles. We are mindful of the global effects of  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Fed policy. Promoting growth and stability in the U.S., I believe, is the most important contribution we can make to growth and stability worldwide. There is, of course, the argument that Fed policy has been too accommodative for too long, creating risks for financial stability worldwide. Here, I think, it’s important to consider carefully the counterfactual. Would countries beyond our borders really have been better off with a weaker U.S. economy? The fundamental issue is whether U.S. monetary policy has helped support our dual objectives of stable prices and maximum sustainable growth and whether this is consistent with a healthy global economy. Moreover, it is far from clear that explicitly coordinated policy would produce better outcomes for the global economy generally, or the EMEs specifically. Central banks have challenges enough in tailoring policies to their domestic circumstances. I believe that it would be taking on too much to attempt to collectively fashion policy in reference to global conditions.
In that case, the proportion of lending at higher LTI multiples could increase sharply, leading to an increase in the cohorts of highly indebted households and as a consequence greater macro-economic and macro-financial vulnerability in stress. So we introduced the policies to insure against a material loosening in underwriting standards that would lead to a significant increase in the number of highly indebted households. The action was a major development for the FPC in that it addressed directly a credit related vulnerability on borrower as opposed to lender balance sheets. The Committee debated vigorously at the time whether such action fell within its responsibilities or whether it should confine itself more tightly to the risks and resilience within the financial system. It concluded, rightly in my view, that acting to prevent the possible sharp increase in highly indebted households was part of its statutory responsibility.12 We made it very clear at the time that our objective was to address aggregate high indebtedness, not house price growth. The Committee set out at the time in detail the reasons for the policy and its cost-benefit analysis. But it is important we continue to develop the analysis and evidence of why the policy makes sense and what impact it has had – to ensure we remain confident that the cost-benefit analysis stacks up.

Financial stability is a much more difficult concept to define. You know it by its absence of course. But by then it is usually too late. So it is fair to say that over the first years of the FPC we have been ‘learning by doing’, building out our thinking on what we should care about as we have been identifying and mitigating risks – and setting out our thinking so that stakeholders understand why we have acted as we have and how we are likely to act in the future. Based on 17 possible UK financial crises between the Bank’s foundation and 1846/1847 cited in Ashton (1959), Hoppit (1986) and Dimsdale and Hotson (2014). 2 Huang and Thomas (2016). 3 Anson et al (2019) and Anson et al (2017). 1  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Almost exactly five years ago the FPC took its first action directed at housing related debt and, crucially, action aimed at the resilience of borrowers rather than lenders. In doing so, the FPC adopted a broad view of its responsibilities – one that went beyond the risks and resilience of the financial system to the risks of leverage in the economy more generally. I want to look today at the reasoning behind that action and the evidence that has accumulated since about the risks the FPC was aiming to contain and the effectiveness of the action it took.
That estimate becomes very substantially smaller if we make less conservative assumptions and allow for several offsetting impacts from banks holding more capital. Specifically: 1. Allowing for a partial offset because as a bank holds more equity capital, its equity becomes less risky, and therefore requires a lower return. (A Modigliani-Miller effect – which I will assume is not zero but only 30% as big as it would be under perfect markets)  2. Allowing for the value to the government of the extra tax revenue received as a result of banks having more equity capital which is less tax sheltered than is debt. 10  BIS Review 133/2010  3. Allowing for a somewhat lower use of bank funding for investment than in the baseline. 4. Allowing for a lower sensitivity of investment and the capital stock to a rise in the cost of funds to non-financial firms. Table 2 shows how rapidly the estimated long-run economic cost of requiring higher bank capital falls as we sequentially allow for each of these offsets. I conclude from this that the long-run costs of having banks hold more capital is likely to be small – plausibly it is negligible. If that is so then the benefits of having much more robust banks would far exceed its costs. If it is right that the benefits of raising capital requirements to much higher levels far outweigh their economic cost, how we did we get into a situation that bank capital was so low relative to total assets?

From the onset of the financial crisis that started towards the end of 2007 real output in the UK has fallen about 10% relative to the upward path it might have been expected to follow. In Ireland the fall in economic activity has been greater: the level of output is about 13% lower than at the end of 2007; if one had expected growth of 3% a year – significantly lower than the average in the preceding 10 years – output is now more than 20% below where it seemed likely to be. I want to ask two questions about monetary policy prompted by the financial crisis and the resultant recession. First, should we fundamentally re-think the inflation targeting framework for monetary policy? Is the focus on a target for consumer price inflation flawed? This is a long-term issue. There is a second, in some ways more immediate, question. How should monetary policy be set now in what I hope it is not too optimistic to call the aftermath of the financial mess? In considering that issue I will be talking specifically about the UK, as befits a member of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) at the Bank of England. I want to start with the longer-term issue of the appropriate goals of monetary policy.