samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We now have the same policy commitment to price stability as the rest of the world. That leaves around 40 per cent of the depreciation to account for. Our work at the Riksbank suggests that in the 1970s and ’80s, the major part of the real exchange rate’s weakening can be attributed to deteriorating terms of trade, low GDP and productivity growth compared with the rest of the world and growing external debt. One of the models we have used indicates that about three-quarters of the depreciation stemmed from relatively poorer growth in Sweden and about a quarter to worsening terms of trade. The picture in the 1990s looks different. As far as we can tell at present, in the past decade neither productivity nor GDP growth has been poorer than in the rest of the world (Fig. 1). So in this respect, too, there seems to have been a change for the better. It is partly against this background that the krona’s persistently weak average path in the latter part of the 1990s is surprising. BIS Review 75/2001  3  Fig 1.

Fiscal policies might play a bigger stabilisation role without neglecting the constraints associated with current high debt levels and the implications of demographic changes for the public budget. In both cases, structural policies to expand productivity growth will ease the difficulties associated with the fulfilment by both monetary and fiscal authorities of their stabilisation functions. Macroprudential policies can also be used as additional macroeconomic stabilisation mechanisms, in addition to their role in guaranteeing financial stability. And all of this will have to be achieved while keeping a close eye on financial developments and innovations that will have to meet new demands, mainly to do with the insurance of the longevity risk in an ageing, lowinterest-rate world. 16
This was one of the reasons why we changed over  1  At present the central banks in Iceland, Norway, New Zealand and Sweden publish their own paths for the policy rate. BIS Review 112/2007  1  in autumn 2005 to basing our assessments on the assumption that the repo rate would develop in line with market expectations. But although this was a more realistic assumption, it was still the case that the forecasts did not necessarily reflect the Riksbank’s assessment of the most probable economic development. This is because market expectations do not necessarily agree with the interest rate path the Riksbank considers to be most appropriate. Now that our analyses are based on our own path for the repo rate, they describe the course of events we are actually expecting to see. This has several advantages. For one thing, it is possible to say something about how accurate our forecasts have been and how well the Riksbank has done its job. And for another thing it will also be easier to internally evaluate and improve the models and methods of working used as a basis for our forecasts. Finally, it makes it more worthwhile to compare our picture of the economy with the picture painted by other forecasters. Reasoning and considerations made clearer The second advantage of an own interest rate forecast is that it becomes easier to show why we believe in a particular policy and how we reason when we make our decisions.

We have just witnessed the signing of MOUs between the SICC and the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi Chambers’ of Commerce and Industry. I also encourage SICC to collaborate with IE Singapore and the Singapore Business Federation to organise more networking platforms to forge partnerships between foreign and local companies. For instance, given our knowledge and connections, Singapore can serve as a bridge for Middle Eastern investors interested in going into China. Finally, let me once again congratulate the SICC on your 170th Anniversary and wish the SICC and its members continued success. Thank you. BIS Review 55/2007  3
This has contributed to fuel a longstanding experience in addressing safety and efficiency issues and trade-offs from a public policy perspective that I would like to refer to, in order to draw a few lessons that you might be willing to consider in the course of the debates you will have today. Over the past decade, the financial sector has changed considerably with the emergence of the Internet and the use of new information technologies. This is particularly true for payment means. The introduction of chip and PIN in France in the early nineties, and then all across Europe in the past few years is a great example of how innovation can bring about efficiency but also safety benefits to the payments chain. Such introduction has indeed contributed in making card payments highly secure at the point of sale. However, innovations have also brought about new challenges in terms of risks to address. This is notably the case with the development of distant payments allowed by the Internet. As underlined in the report on card fraud published by the ECB in February 2014, fraud on “card not present” transactions, mainly via the internet, increased by nearly 21% in 2012 in the SEPA area, and accounted for 60% of all fraud losses on cards issued inside the SEPA. Fortunately, the vulnerabilities at the root of those frauds are well identified and important efforts are underway both by public authorities and the private sector to address them.

Some have suggested tiered remuneration for different holding amounts in order to influence incentives and ensure appropriate integration into the monetary system.10 In the case of stablecoins, central banks don’t directly control interest that might be paid on these instruments. However, incentives created by remuneration policies could have important influences on the structure and relative demand for private and public digital currencies. Depending on how the regulatory and policy environment for financial innovation evolves, stablecoins could be issued by banks or other regulated entities that could have access to interest-bearing accounts at central banks. In this case, the rate of remuneration stablecoin issuers earn on their accounts might influence the rate paid to stablecoin holders, and the role of the instruments in the broader monetary ecosystem.11 Of course, implementation issues are not the only important consideration for remuneration of digital currencies, but it should be one consideration. Choices about the remuneration of new central bank liabilities, like CBDC, and of the accounts of private stablecoin issuers, could have an important influence on the incentives created by monetary policy implementation frameworks. Given this, central banks should take a holistic approach to considering the impact of their remuneration policies on the ecosystem of both private and public currencies. Pillar 2: Liquidity supply This brings me to the second pillar of interest rate control: liquidity supply. In order for central banks’ remuneration rates to effectively achieve interest rate control, central banks supply reserves in appropriate quantities to achieve the interest rate target.
This reflects several factors. First, such institutions hold assets that are carried mainly on the books on an accrual basis. Compared with mark-to-market assets, such assets adjust much more slowly to changes in market conditions and the economic environment. Second, many of these banks have a much more concentrated exposure to commercial real estate, a sector that remains under considerable pressure. Not only have capitalization rates risen sharply – meaning the investors will pay much less for a dollar of rental income than before – but the rental income streams on these properties also have declined as the performance of the U.S. economy has declined. Together, these two factors have pushed U.S. commercial real estate prices down by about 40 percent to 50 percent from the peak reached in 2006. Loan losses in commercial real estate and consumer and mortgage loans seem likely to continue to pressure smaller banks for some time to come. This in turn means that credit availability to households and small businesses will still be curtailed. The improvement in the overall health of the financial system and in market function has allowed the Federal Reserve to phase out many of the special liquidity facilities that were enacted in response to the crisis. These facilities were generally successful in achieving their objectives – helping to restore confidence and rebuild market liquidity in a way that safeguarded the taxpayers’ interests.

This would include not just decisions to purchase products, but also in their day-to-day actions such as in their spending and saving habits. It should also include understanding how we can help consumers avoid making mistakes, such as to fall into scams – not just investment scams and get-rich-  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  quick-schemes, but also scams that use social engineering to trick customers into divulging their banking and payment security credentials. As all of us here would know too well, scams have been gaining significant momentum since the pandemic, and continues to be a sinister threat not just in Malaysia but also in other countries. Recognising this threat, BNM has instructed banks to step up security measures to protect their customers, and is working closely with law enforcement agencies to ensure swift action against perpetrators. But while these measures are necessary, they will not be sufficient without the first line of defence – that is, for consumers to remain vigilant, knowing how to avoid getting duped. This is ultimately a matter of financial and digital literacy. For this, the evidence-backed approach that today's Symposium is committed to in educating financial consumers will be a crucial part of the whole-of-nation approach needed to combat scams. Before I end my speech, I would like to reiterate that financial education is more relevant than ever in the post-pandemic era.
In late November, the annual growth of budget revenues was only 2 percent, almost entirely reflecting the low pace of generating the tax revenues. On the other hand, public expenditures have maintained high growth rates, accounting for 16.4 percent in November. The budget deficit reached ALL 65 billion in November. The deficit has been mostly financed through foreign borrowing and privatization receipts, dampening the pressures in the domestic financial market Rapid growth of expenditure and budget deficit during 2009 has further increased the public debt level, accounting for 58 per cent of GDP at the end of November. The Bank of Albania deems that the future budget policy orientation towards fiscal consolidation, aiming at reducing the public debt, is now a prerequisite for the macroeconomic stability in the country. As we have constantly stated, the public debt reduction will mitigate the pressure of the public sector on the financial markets, creating more room for the private sector. Consolidation of public finances will also lower the risk premiums in the economy and will raise the monetary policy effectiveness. Monetary supply slowed down further in the second half, reflecting to a great extent, the ever lower credit growth. Annual growth of private sector loan portfolio slowed down to 10 percent in November. Unlike the first six months of 2009, when credit growth curbing was more  BIS Review 11/2010  3  affected by the tightened supply, in the second half of the year the credit performance was dictated by decreased demand for loans.

News conference  Berne, 15 June 2017 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and gentlemen It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I will begin by explaining our monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation. I will then hand over to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will present this year’s Financial Stability Report. After that, Andréa Maechler will review developments on the financial markets. Finally, we will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions. Monetary policy decision  Let me begin with our monetary policy decision and the inflation forecast. We are maintaining our expansionary monetary policy, with the aim of stabilising price developments and supporting economic activity. Interest on sight deposits at the SNB is to remain at –0.75% and the target range for the three-month Libor is unchanged at between –1.25% and –0.25%. We will remain active in the foreign exchange market as necessary, while taking the overall currency situation into consideration. The negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market are intended to make Swiss franc investments less attractive, thereby easing pressure on the currency. The Swiss franc is still significantly overvalued. The new conditional inflation forecast differs little from that of March. We continue to anticipate an inflation rate of 0.3% for the current year. For 2018, the forecast has fallen slightly to 0.3%, from 0.4% in the previous quarter.
In total, sterling money market funds saw outflows of around £ or 10% of their total assets, in the eight days between 12th and 20th March last year. At first, the outflows were met by running down their holdings of cash, but as the outflows increased, they sought to liquidate some 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  of their bank assets – CDs and CP. But they found that the market for those assets – which typically comes primarily from dealers buying back their own paper – was closed. The dash for cash meant that the tide was flowing fast against them. As the regulatory system currently works, if MMFs’ liquid asset ratios fall towards prescribed thresholds, and they are unable to top up their liquid assets (cash) through sales, they are able to ‘gate’ or impose fees on investors, in other words decline to provide immediate liquidity. As with banks, the broader danger of this situation – which is a threat to financial stability – is that such a problem in one fund could trigger contagion to other funds, through fear that they might have the same problem, and thus lead to a highly destabilising run on money market funds. These thresholds can, therefore, also affect the behaviour of fund managers, making liquidity buffers not usable in times of stress, for fear this would fuel investors’ desire to run.

These figures are similar to those presented in previous years, reflecting that the Board has not changed its view on the medium-term productive capacity of the Chilean economy. However, we cannot ignore the fact that, because in recent years the growth rates of investment and productivity have been below their trend levels, short-term productive capacity has suffered. Actually, the Board estimates that the potential growth of the economy is now around 2.5%, a little short of previous estimates. Adjustments to the monetary policy making process Another area where we are making progress is in the transparency and communication of our monetary policy decisions. The Bank conducts its monetary policy in an inflation targeting framework, which, to function correctly needs to properly communicate its actions and the reasons behind them, as well as a good diagnosis of the evolution of the economy, locally and internationally. The adoption of these decisions and their communication are structured around the Monetary Policy Meetings and the Monetary Policy Report, whose organization, priority, content and dissemination are currently based on procedures and standards that were mostly established in the first half of the 2000s. After a thorough internal assessment based on accumulated experience and international best practices, the Bank Board has decided to make some modifications to its monetary policy decision-making and communication process. Essentially, the number of Monetary Policy Meetings (MPM) is reduced from twelve to eight per year, to align them with the most common practice among the central banks of low-inflation countries (figure 14).
Through the provision of long-term finance that is naturally enabled by the long-term liabilities taken on, insurers also play a vital role in supporting risk-taking and growth in the real economy. There are two trends within the UK life insurance sector that I’d like to cover today, their benefits but also the risks arising from them: The first trend – in two parts – relates to reinsurance: (a) the continued high level of longevity reinsurance; and (b) the emergence of more complex so-called ‘funded reinsurance’. The second trend concerns the continued growth of untraded or illiquid assets in life insurers’ portfolios. There are good business and risk management arguments for both of these strategies, which can  Page 3  also lead to improved pricing for customers. However, over-indulgence in either – or indeed both – could actually result in concentration risks increasing at individual firm-level and in the system as a whole. I’ll look first at why and how these trends have developed, and then set out what the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) expects of insurers’ boards and senior management in relation to their risk management. Longevity reinsurance For firms writing new annuity business, the continued use of longevity reinsurance is one area where concentration risk may arise. The long-term nature of longevity risk – i.e. exposure to the risk that annuitants live longer than expected – makes annuity writing capital-intensive, which has a strong impact on pricing. A longevity reinsurance industry has developed to manage this impact.

The risk margin reflects the price at which a third-party insurer would be willing to accept the risk in an arm’s length transaction. 2. Mortality risk is the cost that arises from individuals living less than expected while longevity risk is the cost of individuals living longer than expected. 3. i.e. as an alternative to capital from equity and debt markets, or bank lending. 4. DP2/22 – Potential Reforms to Risk Margin and Matching Adjustment within Solvency II 5. A recapture event can arise when the reinsurer defaults (no longer has adequate resources to fulfil a contract) or as a result of triggering recapture clauses in the reinsurance contract (downgrade, breach of solvency requirements, other regulatory or tax triggers). 6. Pension scheme have themselves reinsured in excess of £ of longevity since 2009 according to Hymans Robertson’s Risk Transfer Report 2021. 7. The insurer retains some of the smaller risks including inflation (which is often hedged separately), operational, and expense risk. It may also retain some of the credit risk. 8. This contrasts with a pure longevity swap where the insurer only exchanges fixed reinsurance fees for receivables that are based on deviations in the longevity experience from that assumed, hence there is no upfront capital transfer and hence no collateral requirements. 9.
Notwithstanding some more encouraging recent signs, there is still a possibility that continuing imbalance between domestic and external demand will need additional sedation or that it will eventually precipitate a sharp fall in the dollar and US asset prices. But the dollar has come off its recent peak and some of the exuberance may now have gone from equity prices - including some of the froth from the “new economy” sector, so the risks of sharp correction may be less than they were. Elsewhere, in Japan, after a long convalescence, there may now at last be some better prospect of a gradual but self-sustaining recovery in private sector demand. And there has been more substantial evidence in recent months of strengthening domestic demand and output growth across the Eurozone. That fully justified the European Central Bank’s gradual shift away from its earlier accommodating monetary policy stance; it may also have contributed to the beginnings of a recovery of the euro exchange rate towards a more comprehensible level. We are certainly not yet out of the woods - there is a long way to go before anyone can feel confident that we are in fact in sight of a more sustainable balance between the major industrial economies. But I am more hopeful that we are now at least moving in the right direction. And that is encouraging news for the UK. On a macro-economic overview, our own economy remains in pretty good shape.

These products were viewed as “safe” since, after all, the funds were only exposed for a short period of time, and in the case of repo, they were secured by collateral. On the demand side, setting aside any possible instabilities in this funding source, it was more profitable to use shorter-term funds to finance longer-term assets. In fact, the growing reliance on short-term wholesale funding to finance longer-term assets increased liquidity and maturity mismatch risk in the financial system. This was particularly dangerous because many of the assets being financed were structured-credit products, some of which were opaque, difficult to value and illiquid. In periods of market stress, these features increase the run risk by funding providers. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Short-term funding of longer-term assets is inherently unstable, especially in the presence of information and coordination problems. It can be rational for a funding provider to supply funds on a short-term basis, reasoning that it can exit if there is any uncertainty over the firm’s continued ability to roll over its funding from other sources. But, if the use of short-term funding becomes sufficiently widespread, the firm’s roll-over risk increases. In this situation, there is a strong incentive for each lender to “run” early if there is any uncertainty that could undermine the borrower’s ability to continue to roll over its funding from other sources.