samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Final remarks The Norwegian economy has over the past four decades benefitted enormously from its rich natural resources. Lessons have been learned, and policy rules have been established for the management of our oil and gas reserves. For the moment, the petroleum industry both provides exposure to an entire global economy and shields us from the current low growth environment across the OECD area. However, it is too early to say whether Norway has managed to establish a framework that makes the economy robust enough to withstand strong fluctuations in our terms of trade. Our present framework has yet to be tested against a large and persistent negative oil price shock. I believe the real test of our framework will come when the present boom in the petroleum industry – at some point – is reversed. Norway’s oil and gas resources, though  11  Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association – College Retirement Equities Fund. 12  For more information on http://pii.law.harvard.edu/. 6  the  Harvard  Law  School  Program  on  Institutional  Investors,  see  BIS central bankers’ speeches  rich, will not last forever. As in any other country, emphasis should be given to further development of human capital as the primary source of long-term prosperity and wealth. Thank you for your attention.

Øystein Olsen: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 29 May 2012. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. The statement is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2011, Monetary Policy Report 1/12 and the Executive Board’s assessments in the period to the monetary policy meeting on 10 May. I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee and thank you for this opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s Financial Market Report. My statement here today is based on the Bank’s Annual Report, but also on the Executive Board’s assessments for the period to the most recent monetary policy meeting and new information. Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy is consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. At the same time, monetary policy shall contribute to stabilising developments in output and employment. When I was here last year, the key policy rate had just been raised to 2.25 per cent. Inflation was low at around 1¼ per cent, but there were prospects that growth in advanced economies was recovering and that both capacity utilisation and inflation in Norway would pick up.
In order to comment on whether the real interest rate today is low or high, it may therefore be more meaningful to look at a “representative” period when the structure of the economy was more similar to the current structure. It is most reasonable to examine a period in the recent past, for example the past 10-15 years. Markets were deregulated in this period, for example. For Norway, it would also be natural to study the period after 1994. In the period 1994-2002, the average real interest rate for Norway was 4.2 per cent, the UK 4.7 per cent and the US 3.4 per cent. Since 1994, the long-term real  3  Hammerstrøm, G and I. Lønning, “Kan vi tallfeste den nøytrale renten? (Is it possible to quantify the neutral interest rate?”). Penger og Kreditt 2/2000  4  BIS Review 46/2003  interest rate in Norway has varied between 3 and 6 per cent, reaching its highest level at the beginning of the period and its lowest in the years 1997-2001. Both the Norwegian and the global economy have now entered a period of low real interest rates. The low interest rate level must be viewed in the light of the possibility of persistently low inflation both in Norway and other countries. However, the real interest rate is not by any means as low as when inflation in Norway was high in the 1970s and 1980s.

Economic theory can contribute insight into the factors that determine the equilibrium rate, but attempts to quantify the equilibrium interest rate based on theory yield a broad interval for a possible level. Quantification also presents problems, as estimates must be made for unobserved variables such as consumer impatience. An estimate of the equilibrium interest rate in industrialised countries presented in the publication Penger og Kreditt 2/003 indicate an interval of 3-9 per cent. The upper limit in particular seems unreasonable in relation to observed real interest rates, for example. An alternative is to use historical average interest rates on the basis of an assumption that actual real interest rates will vary around the equilibrium interest rate. This method also poses problems. Each historical era will, for example, be affected by the specific characteristics of that era. Credit rationing, for example, has influenced interest rate formation for long periods. In addition, both population and productivity growth have varied over time. Throughout the period 1870-2003, the average for long-term real interest rates in Norway has remained close to the average in the UK and the US: Norway 2.2 per cent, the UK 2.0 per cent and the US 2.8 per cent. The economy has changed substantially in this period. Thus, the average for this period probably provides little indication of what a long-term equilibrium interest rate is today.
M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul: Bank of Thailand’s review of major economic events in Thailand during the past year A Statement by M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, on Thailand’s 1 Economic and Monetary Conditions: Bank of Thailand’s Public Report, 27 December 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, On the occasion of the New Year, the Bank of Thailand as one of the main national institutions would like to take this opportunity to review some of the major economic events during the year. We would also like to review the work that the Bank of Thailand has carried out in terms of economic policies and internal restructuring. This would also be a good opportunity to raise a number of issues, which the private sector may find important for consideration in the next year. In the past year, the Thai economy has continued to expand. However, the growth rate was more moderate than anticipated. Economic recovery was not broad-based, and there remain pockets of fragility. In the second half of the year, with the adverse effect of increased oil prices, consumer and investor sentiment deteriorated, leading to deceleration in domestic spending. As a result, inventories of finished products rose by 22 % from the same period of last year. At the same time stocks of finished products, which averaged around 15 days of sales last year, rose to 17 days of sales this year. Sectors that saw large increases in stocks were canned seafood, beverages, and automobiles.

At our monetary policy assessments in June and September, we indicated we would also consider selling foreign currency depending on the development of the exchange rate. Accordingly, we have sold foreign currency in recent months to ensure appropriate monetary conditions. We will also sell foreign currency in the future if this is appropriate from the monetary policy perspective. Conversely, we remain willing to buy foreign currency again if necessary, i.e. if there were to be excessive appreciation pressure. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. I now hand over to Martin Schlegel, who will speak about the latest developments with regard to cash. Page 3/4  Berne, 15 December 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Page 4/4
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Bank of Thailand’s policy direction in 2011 Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Bank of Thailand, Bangkok, 26 January 2011. *  *  *  With retrospect, the year 2010 testified to the strength and resilience of the Thai economy. Economic activity was able to continue uninterrupted, despite various unfavourable shocks such as political unrest, volatile capital flows, flood, and delayed economic recovery in some advanced economies. Policy measures, both monetary and fiscal, had been supporting factors. The economy expanded by as much as 8 per cent in 2010 as a result. Given the strong growth momentum and solid economic fundamentals, the Thai economic growth is expected to expand at 3–5 per cent this year. This pace of growth is consistent with the long-term potential growth of the economy, and is an indication that the economic activity has returned to its normal, more balanced state. This is in contrast with the catching up episode last year, characterized by extraordinary growth rate. As the economy operates closer to its potential, the demand pressure on prices will begin to accumulate, and consequently inflation is projected to be higher than those registered in the last couple of years. The rising costs, stemming largely from commodity prices, can further add to upward pressure on prices. Upside risks to inflation should return to focus this year, while the downside risks to growth should continue to abate. Meanwhile, many risk factors of the previous year may continue to pose threat.

On the other hand, from the perspectives of consumers themselves, greater demand for funds and financial services is often constrained by limited financial access. The appropriate course of policy on financial institutions must take into consideration challenges posed by these trends of changes. In this context, the Bank of Thailand sees three policy priorities going forward: (1) to preserve the soundness of the financial institution system, (2) to enhance the efficiency of financial intermediation, and (3) to place emphasis on consumer protection. The soundness of financial institutions is the major foundation of macroeconomic stability. Currently, financial institutions are in top conditions, with NPL ratio last year as low as 3.6 despite credit expansion of 11.3 per cent. Banks’ capital is also much higher than recommended international standards. This strong soundness must be preserved. The Bank  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  of Thailand will continue to apply micro-prudential approach to the regulation of financial institutions, to ensure that financial institutions put in place appropriate risk management framework, are prudent in extending credits, and maintain sufficient level of capital according to new international standards such as the Basel III guideline. The recent global economic crisis highlights the importance of extending the coverage of supervision to foster the soundness of system as a whole, in addition to individual institutions. “Systemic risk”, in particular, can pose serious threat to macroeconomic stability at large.
Tarisa Watanagase: Strengthening the banking and financial sector – what needs to be done? Speech by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at Finance Thailand, a seminar organised by The Banker Magazine and Financial Times Business, Bangkok, 22 February 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank The Banker Magazine and The Financial Times for the invitation. It is an honour, and indeed an opportunity, to join all of you here at this conference, and to share with you my thoughts at this very challenging juncture, not only for the global economy and financial system, but also at an important stage for development of Thailand’s economic and financial sector. The past three years have been one of the most turbulent periods in global economic development. On the global economy front, despite the signs of green shoots in the global economy, we are constantly reminded of the remaining fragility and vulnerability of such recovery in various hot spots around the world, with emerging new paradigm of risk, namely sovereign risk. For the global financial system, risk and challenges remain abound. The key challenge strikes at the heart of the global financial system – regaining trust. Trust in market mechanism, as well as its regulator, has been severely tested.

While we welcomed greater engagement of emerging economies in the global regulatory reform process, such as in Basel Committee and various working groups, the key success factors are these: First, our inclusiveness at the policy development stage rather than just implementation stage, and secondly, on the inclusiveness in the supervisory colleges of global banks which are systemically important to our domestic financial system. Ladies and gentlemen, In closing, I would like to iterate that, the success in meeting these challenges, rests as much with us, as with the banking sector. Thus far, we are pleased with their efforts in strengthening risk management, not only in the process, but more importantly, the culture. Often, we are asked why our banking system has managed to remain resilient, while those with more sophisticated risk management system have suffered. I believe the key is, first of all, there is no gap between the risk profile of our banks and their risk management system, as well as our risk-based supervision. Our banks business model is less complex, mobilizing local and stable deposit, for on lending to domestic borrowers, with small investment portfolios, mostly in plain vanilla Thai government bond. They have very little exposure to less familiar risk such as overseas assets and complex products. But looking ahead, things will not stay this safe if both banks and the Bank of Thailand do not work closely to continuously strengthen risk management.
We are now explicitly charged with the objective of ensuring financial stability in the UK and by extension in the world’s leading financial centre. We no longer stand behind and  1 2  Hartley Withers. War and Lombard Street (1915), page 99. There are 1.1 million people employed in financial services in the UK – two-thirds of these jobs are located outside of London. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2  implicitly endorse the credit of the successors of the Accepting Houses. But an essential part of what we do still depends on understanding financial markets and the risks and benefits they create. The financial market ecosystem  The wave of financial globalisation that happened in the heyday of Cunliffe Bros came to an end with the outbreak of World War I. The world did not turn back to financial globalisation for another 60 years or so. But the current, second, wave of financial globalisation now outstrips its predecessor. One can see this in the numbers: external financial assets were 60% of global GDP in 1900, 20% in 1960 and are now around 180%. As part of this, financial markets have grown in size, reach and complexity, and despite the financial crisis have accelerated since the beginning of this century. Global stock market capitalisation is around $ trillion 3  – around 100% of global GDP – and has tripled in the last 20 years.

How confident are you about the state of the political European landscape now? Is there more of a momentum for reforms now? Constâncio: Crises are always bad for the social and political mood, and recoveries are always good. And so there is a bit of a recovery, which is becoming stronger, and that, of course, has had its effects, in the mood of societies, of public opinion, and also in the political sphere. That’s what I think the President indicated, and indeed, there were fears, especially from outsiders, that some of the political developments in some European countries would go in the direction of creating some doubts, which were dispelled. So that’s what he refers to. But throughout all this period there is one thing that is important to recall: if you go to the Eurobarometer that is the result of surveys in all Member States, you see throughout all these years, all these years, that the support for the euro – being in favour of the single currency, the euro – has been stable at around 70% of Europeans in the euro area countries; and that in all countries there was a majority supporting the euro. A majority in all countries. The numbers are different according to the different countries, but in all they are the majority. So this has been the support that the project has benefited from, and the present recovery has indeed reinforced those views. But we are talking about reforms as well.
Caleb M Fundanga: Central bank independence – a Zambian perspective Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, to the symposium “Central Bank Independence: Does it hurt the Treasury?”, Livingstone, 12-13 November 2007. *  *  *  The Chairperson The Guest of Honour, the Hon Minister of Finance and National Planning The Attorney General Honourable Minister of Southern Province Honourable Members of Parliament present Fellow Central Bank Governors present His Worship the Mayor of the City of Livingstone Deputy Central Bank Governors present Senior Treasury Officials present The Executive Secretary of SADC Members of the Diplomatic Corps and Representatives of International Organisations present Distinguished Invited Guests Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to you all to this important symposium entitled “Central Bank Independence: Does it Hurt the Treasury?” To our colleagues from outside Zambia, I wish to extend a special welcome to you to Zambia, in particular to Livingstone, our tourist capital. Like the rest of Zambia, Livingstone is a city of tranquility with an easygoing African charm. The city is not short of interesting sites and places to visit. It hosts the Victoria Falls, also known among the locals as “Mosi-o-Tunya, the Smoke that Thunders” and is one of the world’s seven wonders! There is also a game park, a well-stocked curio market and the Mukuni Cultural Village, among the many attractions.

In fact the issue of central bank independence, Ladies and Gentlemen, is as old as central banking itself, having been debated on and off over the past couple of hundred years. Many of the “transitional economies” of Eastern Europe also have adopted reforms aimed at  BIS Review 136/2007  1  making their central banks more independent. 19th and 20th century economists such as, David Ricardo and John Maynard Keynes have all added their views to the subject. There seem to be consensus that central banks must be given a charter which includes a strong commitment to price stability, and the freedom and sufficient scope to pursue it. This means that while central banks may not have goal independence, they should have instrument independence. One need not dwell on the desirability of price stability. Economies work better if investment and wage decisions are not thwarted and confused by high inflation. However, the fears in some respects are associated with the financing of fiscal deficits that governments in the developing world from time to time have to run to meet, for instance, social obligations or indeed provide public goods. This indeed is a genuine fear (including others that may be identified) that this symposium must address. There are arguments that there is a fundamental conflict between independence and an obligation to finance the budget deficit – a conflict which often is resolved at the expense of price stability.
In this regard, let us also recall that FINMA – together with the big banks and with the support of the SNB – has conducted a comparison of RWA calculated with the model-based approach and the standardised approach. The SNB suggests that banks consider the possibility of publishing the results of this analysis in appropriate form. In any case, the SNB remains convinced that banks which use the model-based approach for calculating their RWA must continue to improve their transparency with regard to their risks. Considerable  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  progress has been made already, especially in terms of disclosing changes in RWA broken down by cause. Publishing a parallel calculation of RWA based on the standardised approach would greatly contribute to building trust and market discipline. Enhanced transparency is likely to be a key component of the measures that the Basel Committee will put in consultation. Domestically focused commercial banks I would now like to turn to the situation of the domestically focused banks. Risks facing these banks are still primarily connected with the mortgage and real estate markets. These risks have largely remained unchanged at a high level over the past six months. In the last half year, the momentum in the mortgage market slowed, with annual growth in mortgage lending slightly less high than in the previous quarters. The mortgage volume continued to rise more steeply than GDP, but the difference between the two growth rates has become smaller.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: Swiss banks from a financial stability perspective Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 1 December 2014. *  *  *  In my remarks, I would like to look at the situation of the Swiss banks from a financial stability perspective, taking the big banks first and then moving on to a discussion of domestically focused banks. Strengthening the resilience of the big banks Since the last media news conference, the Swiss big banks have improved their capital situation once again. The Swiss National Bank recognises the considerable progress made in this area as regards both risk-weighted capital ratios and leverage ratios. It is also of the opinion that the strengthening of the big banks’ resilience must continue, for the following reasons. First, risks in the economic and financial environment remain high. In several of the adverse scenarios considered by the SNB, the estimated loss potential for the big banks continues to be substantial relative to their capitalisation. This is also the case when viewed in a historical perspective, as evidenced during the recent financial crisis. Second, while the big banks’ risk-weighted capital ratios are above the average for large globally active banks, the same still cannot be said for their leverage ratios.