samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is this fundamental difference that I intend to talk about today. On a general level one can say that the difference concerns the view of the risks linked to financial imbalances and to what extent monetary policy should be used to counteract such risks. It is primarily the latter that has come to be a recurring theme in the discussions on Swedish monetary policy. Here in Sweden, monetary policy has deliberately not accelerated more, despite the low inflation and low resource utilisation, with reference to the claim that a more expansionary monetary policy increases the risks linked to high household indebtedness. One justification for this deliberation is that the financial crisis has shown how high costs can be if these risks are allowed to increase and that it is therefore worth deviating from the inflation target and allowing a somewhat poorer development of the real economy to avoid indebtedness soaring too high and creating problems further ahead. I can very well understand the wish to prevent new crises and I am not categorically against conducting monetary in this way; leaning against the wind as it is usually called. But if one weighs the advantages of conducting this policy against the disadvantages, I reach the conclusion that there is no justification for it in Sweden today. As I see it, the advantages are small. We do not have a general credit boom in the Swedish economy that needs dampening.

This is a question that in itself does not concern the choice of whether or not we should have electronic trading. All business is settles, whether this is done through a traditional market-maker system or by electronic trading. Those buying fixed income instruments want to be sure of receiving what they have bought an those selling want to receive the money they have been promised, regardless of the trading form. On the other hand, it is clear that it would be desirable to take the opportunity to design a new system that would provide a good means of handling settlements. This is particularly important as the increased volumes hoped for, which are the whole point of the new system, will create increased risks in terms of settlement. Today settlement on the fixed income market is done by means of net settlement in VPC. This works well in many ways and the routines are perceived as manageable by the market players, as far as I understand it. However, the system is nevertheless obsolete and involves risks. If one of the parties involved failed to meet its payments during the daily settlement, for instance, if one party was forced to make a suspension of payments or simply lacked sufficient liquidity, the situation could become troublesome. The existing routines can be called into question. One can imagine situations where settlement is not achieved, which could have consequences for the liquidity of the banking system. From the point of view of financial stability, this is an unsatisfactory situation.
Therefore, after the appreciation momentum was broken, we gradually adjusted the measure to add flexibility without compromising the original objective of maintaining baht stability. Now, firms borrowing from abroad can either set aside the required reserves or fully hedge their loans. Similar flexibility will be extended to other types of inflows in due course. Capital outflows will be further liberalized while a better database of capital flows is being built. This leads me to my third and final point: how to deal with the challenge of global dynamism in the medium term. The critical challenge for the Thai economy is how to continuously improve its flexibility, efficiency, and competitiveness amid ever-changing global economic conditions and structure. In this respect, we need to engage in financial and real sector reforms and policies that promote a sound and stable macroeconomic environment. To mention a few examples, our financial and legal infrastructures will continue to be strengthened particularly through amendments and the introduction of a number of legislations such as the new Financial Institutions Act and the Deposit Insurance Act. The Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) will move into its second phase, with the review of the plan and an emphasis on increased competition and consideration on potential entry of new players to further enhance financial efficiency and resiliency. The real sector must also work continuously to improve productivity. Sustained economic growth cannot happen without productivity growth. To this end, significant real sector reforms have been made to raise real sector productivity, promote transparency, and strengthen governance.

It is the duty of major economies, such as the United States, China, Japan, and, of course, the European Union to ensure that there are sufficient international policy dialogues and that they are successful. Without the economic cooperation and political will of the major economies, each and every country will be at risk. We all agree that difficult times require difficult choices. But there is one choice that should not be difficult: that is, the decision to stand together. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 20/2007  3
There has been a marked easing in global monetary and fiscal policies; authorities around the world have also enacted substantial initiatives to revitalise the global banking system; the sharp falls in commodity prices will boost households’ purchasing power; and the marked depreciation in sterling should support demand, both at home and abroad, for domestically produced output. The scale of this stimulus is significantly greater than that seen at comparable stages of the recessions in the 1970s, 80s or 90s. But to repeat, there is huge uncertainty about the precise form and timing of the recovery and so this central path should be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism. In particular, I think the risks around this central path are weighted to the downside, reflecting the possibility that the actions taken by the authorities around the world to improve the availability of credit and to restore business and consumer confidence are slow to take effect. So there may still be more to do. Learning from past recessions When considering the likely scale and duration of this recession, it is natural to examine the experience from past recessions. And simple comparisons with recent recessions are not encouraging. For example, taking account of developments in Q1, output appears likely to have fallen by more in the first few quarters of this recession than in any of the preceding ones. But when making these comparisons, it is important to recognise that the parallels are far from perfect.

That deterioration followed the failure of Lehman Brothers, which triggered the most severe banking crisis for almost a century. Confidence in the very essence of banking – as well as in individual financial institutions – was shaken to its core and measures of financial market risk and uncertainty ballooned. The resulting contraction in the supply of credit has had a significant impact on the ability of households and companies to borrow and spend. But the nature of the downturn over the past six months cannot be explained solely in terms of the direct effects of the collapse of Lehman Brothers on the supply of credit. The impact of changes in credit conditions on investment and consumption decisions tends to be gradual, as existing loans mature and new contracts are negotiated. This contrasts with the dramatic pace at which economic activity and sentiment turned during the final quarter of last year. BIS Review 46/2009  1  Output, orders and investment all fell precipitously in a matter of months. Moreover, the downturn in economic activity was seemingly indiscriminate. Output in virtually every corner of the world fell sharply, irrespective of a country’s exposure to sub-prime loans, the state of its banking system, or its level of indebtedness. The effects of the shock were also felt far beyond its epicentre in the financial sector. Manufacturing output has been particularly hard hit, with UK manufacturing output estimated to have fallen by 4.9% in the fourth quarter of last year; the largest quarterly fall for over thirty years.
That tradition continues with the new £ JMW Turner will circulate alongside Winston Churchill on the £ and Jane Austen on the £ In 2021, Alan Turing will soon replace Boulton and Watt on the £ These individuals have advanced British thought, demonstrated exceptional leadership, and more generally helped to shape this diverse society and forge our common values. I’m delighted to be joined today to celebrate Turner’s continuing influence by one of our most eminent artists, someone whom Turner has influenced and one of Margate’s own. As precocious and prolific as Turner, a fellow Royal Academician, the master of confessional art and fittingly, past winner of the Turner Prize, please welcome Tracey Emin. Book I, Chapter 4 “On the Origin and Use of Money” of Smith, A (1776), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 6 A moniker used by Kocherlakota. See Kocherlakota, N (1998), “Money is Memory”, Journal of Economic Theory, 81 (2). 5  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4

It is now my pleasure to introduce Nancy Lee of Interise, Marlene Orozco from SLEI, and Claire Kramer from the New York Fed. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Figure 2  Manufacturing output (*) (annual change, percent)  Manufacturing PMI (Index, based=50)  30  30  60  60  20  20  55  55  10  10  50  50  0  0  45  45  -10  -10  40  40  -20  -20  35  35  08  09  India  10 Brazil  11  08 China  09 Brazil  10  11 China  (*) For China, data up to November 2011; for the rest, up to October. Source: Bloomberg. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 3 Interest rates in US dollars and pesos in local market (1) (porcentaje) 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 08  09  10  Interest rates on private sector bonds (1) (2) (porcentaje)  8  14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2  8  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  11  06  Libor + 90-day on-shore spread $ Libor + 180-day on-shore spread $  07  08  AAA  90-day deposits trated on Stock Exchange $ 180-day deposits trated on Stock Exchange $  09 AA  10  11 A  (1) Vertical dotted line marks statistical cutoff date of September's Report.

Here it is the commercial banks and other private sector stakeholders that choose the best technologies and solutions. The division of roles between central banks and commercial banks results in a good balance between safety and efficiency. At the first level, the central banks facilitate the settlement of interbank transactions on secure systems and in electronic central bank money. In so doing, they minimise the risks in the systemically important segment of payment transactions, beyond which the risks can be borne by the market. At this second level, settlement can take place via alternative channels, without necessarily having to be based on central bank money. This division of roles between central banks and commercial banks epitomises our current two-tier financial system. In the first tier, the central bank acts as the banker to the banks. In the second tier, the commercial banks act as the interface to the end customers. And it is the competing commercial banks that decide which services they want to provide for companies and private individuals. This system is efficient and proven. There is much more to fintech than just DLT In connection with fintech, I have so far focused mainly on DLT. However, there is of course much more to fintech than just DLT. In addition to DLT, a whole array of promising innovations could potentially be applied to traditional financial services. We need only think of mobile payments, robo advisers, crowd lending or big data.
The role of unemployment in our forward guidance It is important to be clear what role unemployment is – and is not – playing in the setting of monetary policy. If you remember just one thing from this talk, I would ask that you remember this: targeting a particular level of the unemployment rate is not a job for monetary policy. Monetary policy can’t control the level of unemployment in the long run: we can’t generate sustainably higher output or employment simply by printing more money. That way lies the horrors of the high and variable inflation rates of the 1970s and 80s. We forget those lessons at our peril. Monetary policy continues to have only one target: the 2% inflation target. Nor is unemployment a sufficient measure of slack in the economy on which to base our policy. The 1970s and 80s also taught us the foolishness of trying to control inflation by responding to movements in a single intermediate target. When we reach the 7% unemployment threshold, the Committee will reassess the state of the economy based on all available information and, on that basis, decide whether it should start to withdraw the current extraordinary levels of stimulus.2  2  Some (eg Taylor 2013) have suggested that the use of an unemployment threshold, together with an inflation target, might mark the beginnings of a transition to the setting of monetary policy according to some form of quasi-Taylor rule. But that misunderstands the role being played by the unemployment threshold.

Spencer Dale: Inflation targeting and the Monetary Policy Committee’s forward guidance Speech by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director, Monetary Policy, and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the International Journal of Central Banking Annual Conference, “Inflation targeting and its discontents”, Warsaw, 6 September 2013. *  *  *  A central theme of this conference has been to highlight potential shortcomings of inflation targeting and to consider potential alternatives. I believe that the traumatic events in the UK economy over the past five years have, in fact, strengthened the case for inflation targeting. The credibility of the inflation target has played a crucial role in anchoring inflation expectations over the past five years, a period in which inflation has been consistently above target. That credibility has been vital in giving the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) the flexibility to loosen monetary policy aggressively in order to support growth and jobs. But while it has not constrained the MPC’s freedom to act in support of the economy, the inflation target, on its own, has proved less well suited to addressing some of the exceptional communications challenges posed by the sustained combination of weak growth and elevated inflation. I would highlight two in particular: the need to make clear the central role that monetary policy has played in supporting output and employment; and the need to provide guidance about the Committee’s view of the appropriate trade-off between bringing inflation back to target and stimulating the recovery.
For incumbent players, this represents an existential challenge, and innovation is the only effective response. This digital revolution also means we have to strengthen our methods of regulation to deal with the Bigtechs, which are now an unavoidable feature of the market but are still on the margins of existing regulation. We need cross-border cooperation, but also cooperation that is cross-field, with authorities in competition, data protection and cybersecurity. The FSB, BIS and OECD should muster forces on this. Cyber risk, in particular, is more than ever in the spotlight, with the accelerating digitalisation of services and increased use of teleworking. In parallel, European banks must unite resolutely in the field of payments, and rapidly develop a shared offering: there is no alternative to the EPI, European Payment Initiative. This digital revolution is also putting creative pressure on our supervisory practices. Let me reiterate here that Fintechs are very welcome in the French financial landscape, and have the right to an open and attentive dialogue with the ACPR, including in the Fintech-Innovation Unit created in 2016. Artificial intelligence is providing fertile experimental ground for our interactions. In fact, the ACPR is organising its first techsprint on 30 June and 1 July this year. This friendly competition will invite participants to invent tools to explain the algorithms of tomorrow, using credit risk models. The call for applications is being published today on the ACPR website, and I invite all players in the field of AI to take part.

So yes, it is in our national interest that France remain committed to a full implementation of the December 2017 Basel III accord that is fair, definitive and reasonable: fair in the sense that there must be regulatory consistency with the United States, which appears to be fully guaranteed; definitive because there will be no Basel IV; and reasonable with regard to the application of the output floor. I support the application of the output floor at consolidated level for French banking groups, and solely for the calculation of the capital requirements defined in the Basel accord, as proposed by the Franco-German position. In insurance, Solvency II has enabled firms to confront the crisis on a very solid footing. But, as well as providing essential support for equity investment, the review of the regulation must allow us to strengthen the supervision and cooperation framework for cross-border activities. It is unacceptable that our national guarantee funds have to cover insurance payouts in the event of failures of cross-border insurers. Supervisors and guarantee funds in countries  of origin should be made to shoulder more responsibility. Our single market has its rules: freedom of movement does not imply free-riding! II. Five essential challenges still need to be addressed  In the short term, two challenges linked to the exit from the crisis Let us turn now to the challenges. The emergence from this crisis remains shrouded in uncertainty, and is very much conditional on the financial health of our firms.
The total market capitalisation of the largest global banks is currently only around $ trillion. Fully internalising the output costs of financial crises would risk putting banks on the same trajectory as the dinosaurs, with the levy playing the role of the meteorite. It could plausibly be argued that these output costs are a significant over-statement of the damage inflicted on the wider economy by the banks. Others are certainly not blameless for the crisis. For every reckless lender there is likely to be a feckless borrower. If a systemic tax is to be levied, a more precise measure may be needed of banks’ distinctive contribution to systemic risk. One such measure is provided by the (often implicit) fiscal subsidy provided to banks by the state to safeguard stability. Those implicit subsidies are easier to describe than measure. But one particularly simple proxy is provided by the rating agencies, a number of whom provide  2  The levy on US banks announced by the US government in January takes the $ billion loss and recoups it over 10 years rather than 20. 3  IMF (2009). 4  The results are plainly sensitive to the choice of discount rate and trend growth rate. Other things equal, the higher the discount rate and the lower the trend growth rate, the smaller the losses. 2  BIS Review 40/2010  both “support” and “standalone” credit ratings for the banks. The difference in these ratings encompasses the agencies’ judgement of the expected government support to banks.

Recently, a debate has begun on direct restrictions on some banking activities – in other words, prohibition. This is recognition of the social costs of systemic risk. Bankers are in uproar. This paper examines the costs of banking pollution and the role of regulation and restrictions in tackling it. In light of the crisis, this is the $ billion question. The last time such a debate was had in earnest followed the Great Depression. Evidence from then, from past crises and from other industries helps define the contours of today’s debate. This debate is still in its infancy. While it would be premature to be reaching policy conclusions, it is not too early to begin sifting the evidence. What does it suggest? Counting the systemic cost One important dimension of the debate concerns the social costs of systemic risk. Determining the scale of these social costs provides a measure of the task ahead. It helps calibrate the intervention necessary to tackle systemic risk, whether through regulation or restrictions. So how big a pollutant is banking? There is a large literature measuring the costs of past financial crises. 1 This is typically done by evaluating either the fiscal or the foregone output costs of crisis. On either measure, the costs of past financial crises appear to be large and long-lived, often in excess of 10% of pre-crisis GDP. What about the present crisis?
Less clear principles for policy in combination with reduced transparency regarding, for example, the reasons for making decisions, will hardly lead to a policy which will be more successful in the future. Many years' experience in the vicinity of economic policymakers suggests to me that the opposite is  4  BIS Review 38/2001  more probable. Among the most important things one can do in this type of work is to try to build up clear processes which contribute to decision data, based on good economic analyses, being produced in a systematic way. And that this decision data is subjected to as wide an examination as possible. I am convinced that our ambition to be as clear and open as possible has served us well. Starting with a numerical, symmetric objective and a guiding rule, in the way that we have done, we have been forced to think through every question with which we have been confronted in a more precise manner. This has resulted in our gradually increasing our understanding in a way which I think would hardly have been possible otherwise. Certainly it is not yet over, and in this context, future developments will place new demands on us and impose further intensification and exactitudes. There is also a connection between transparency in relation to the outside world on the one hand, and internal work on the other. In getting rid of secrecy we were able to introduce a more realistic debate on monetary policy.

Since its inception, SAMA has supported banks to develop human resources by establishing the Institute of Banking, which contributes to training and qualifying a large number of national cadres in the financial services sector. The Institute continues to professionally exercise this role and make efforts to cope with the developments in the financial and banking sector by providing information solutions and diverse educational programs consistent with individual bank needs. The Institute's programs have covered important banking fields, such as treasury, investment and credit, and contributed effectively to developing and qualifying national cadres. Thus, Saudization in the banking sector exceeded 85 percent by the end of the first half of 2006. Dear Audience, These developments, which have diversified and expanded the services provided in the Saudi market, have given rise to substantial challenges to financial institutions. One of the most important challenges is to provide a sufficient number of qualified human resources to meet the needs of these institutions. Despite the employment efforts made by banks to cope with this expansion, and though 4,246 employees were appointed during the first half of 2006, the total needs of these institutions are still not satisfied. Hence, SAMA has promptly exerted expeditious efforts in search for solutions to these challenges. To this end, it has instructed the Institute of Banking to study the situation and propose practical solutions to help banks bridge such gap over both the short and long terms.