On our side, we are ready to face any outcome: the financial industry has been prepared. Even with a 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  welcome withdrawal agreement, all aspects of a possible trade agreement and its financial services component will still have to be negotiated in 2020. The uncertainty surrounding Brexit will therefore continue. Whatever, the UK will continue to participate in international forums where cooperation will be much needed to face our common challenges, including with Japan. In this respect, I would like to stress the strong convergence between France and Japan on numerous international issues, and notably the defense of a multilateral order, taxation, digital regulation and green finance. The excellent cooperation between our respective G7 and G20 Presidencies this year proved it eloquently. I also heartily welcome the cooperation agreement that was signed between Paris Europlace and FinCityTokyo in June. Now, we have to look beyond Brexit. We expect Europe’s financial services architecture to move from being monocentric, centred on the City of London, to a more polycentric model. Paris has major assets which it can build on to enhance its central role in this post-Brexit European financial architecture. Firstly, it benefits from a strong financial ecosystem: our capital city is a leader in key activities such as life and non-life insurance and in asset management; it is home to four of the euro area’s eight global systemically important banks, and to two of the three European Supervisory Authorities – ESMA and the EBA.

Secondly, we need to revisit the second (monetary) pillar in light of financial stability concerns – which are increasing. Monetary and macroprudential policies have traditionally been guided by a separation principle2. But in practice, macroprudential tools have limitations, while over the past years we have considerably extended the monetary toolkit. As a result, it may now sometimes make sense to approach monetary policy decisions in order to deliver the monetary stance called for by our price stability objective while choosing the appropriate combination of instruments that minimize risks to financial stability. Such a soft coordination is more promising than a strict separation. Lastly, how should we incorporate climate change in our monetary policy analysis? It affects price stability in the long run, and the value of our collateral, notwithstanding the fact that “a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment”3 belongs to our secondary objectives in the EU Treaty. Speaking about financial stability, let me add a few words on Basel III. The agreement reached in December 2017 is the finalisation of an unprecedented and fruitful regulatory effort that began in 2009. I strongly reiterate that: it is a fair and reasonable compromise. The US had to accept the permanent recognition of internal models elsewhere, although their banks don’t use them; and both Europe and Japan had to accept an increased comparability of these internal models, leading to some increase in their capital requirements. Some people, starting with banks themselves, are now contesting the agreement.