samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to preliminary data from INSTAT, the Albanian economy grew 0.44% in 2013, from 1.2% in 2012. The economic activity dynamics reflected the contraction in the services sector, especially tourism, whereas the production sector contributed positively, driven by investments in infrastructure, further growth of exports and rise in agricultural produce. Aggregate demand was weak, reflecting the weak private sector demand for consumption and investments. This component continued to be negatively affected by the low economic agents’ confidence, slower income and relatively tight financing conditions. The general elections held last year elevated the uncertainties in economic agents and financial markets, hence decelerating their consumption and investments in the post-election period. Foreign demand and public expenditure contributed positively to economic growth, but they did not manage to fully offset the sluggish private demand. The external sector was characterised by relative stability of the current account deficit and increase in the country’s foreign currency reserve. Exports of goods surged 13.5%, reflecting the improved economic situation in Albania’s neighbouring countries and the structural improvements in certain sectors of the economy. Furthermore, imports of goods were 1.8% lower from a year earlier, as a result of the weak domestic demand. These developments materialised in the correction of the trade deficit by 13.5% in annual terms. Moreover, the balance of services deteriorated significantly, due to the fall of net exports in tourism. Main foreign currency inflows during 2013 were in the form of net foreign investments.

(3) In 2004, the foreign reserves stood at Euro 717 million, and in 2011 (April) they climbed to Euro 1 872 million, which is by 2.6 times more, and always ample to respond to the occasional imbalances in the foreign exchange market. (4) The crucial question would be: Was the banking system making enough credits i.e. was the National Bank disabling the “smooth” lending to the private sector, or was it the opposite? The figures speak for themselves! In the seven-year period from 1997 to 2003, the average annual credit growth equaled 11.6% and in the seven-year period from 2004 to 2010, it equaled 23.1%, which is by two times faster. The comparison between the credit growth and the GDP growth shows that in the 2004–2010 period, the nominal credit growth was by 3.12 times faster relative to the nominal GDP growth, while the credit real growth was by 5.7 times higher relative to the real GDP growth. Should this difference be even greater? (5) The banking system also improved substantially. It remained undamaged even during the Great Recession. i. The solvency remained high. The capital adequacy ratio was preserved to a very good level of 16.4%. The liquidity, after the worrying downward trend (2007, 2008 and early 2009), was reestablished, thanks to the undertaken measures, to a very solid level. In March 2009, the liquid assets constituted 20.2% of the total assets, and in December 2010 it made up 30.7%. The household deposit-liquid asset coverage ratio increased from 44.6% to 61.9%.
REFERENCES Asdrubali, P., B. Sorensen and O. Yosha (1996), “Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963–1990”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(4): 1081–1110. Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council. Beck, R., L. Dedola, A. Giovannini and A. Popov (2016), “Financial integration and risk sharing in a monetary union”, ECB Report Financial Integration in Europe, Special Feature A. Brunnermeier, M., L. Garicano, M. Pagano, R. Reis, T. Santos, D. Thesmar, S. Nieuwerburg and D. Vayanos (2011), “European Safe Bonds”, The Euronomics Group. Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive IV includes: Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36/EU) (CRD), which must be implemented through national law, and Capital Requirements Regulation (575/2013) (CRR), which applies to firms across the EU. Carmassi, J., S. Dobkowitz, J. Evrard, L. Parisi, A. Silva and M. Wedow (2018), “Completing the Banking Union with a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: who is afraid of crosssubsidisation?”, ECB Occasional Paper 208, April 2018. Claessens, S. (2016), “Regulation and Structural Change in Financial Systems”, in The Future of the International Monetary and Financial Architecture, ECB Forum on Central Banking Conference Proceedings, 188–222.

Previous work by the Committee, embodied in a March 1996 report, recognized that settlement risk depends not only on the payments system infrastructure, but also on the way market participants use this infrastructure and manage their internal processes. A follow-up report was issued one week ago that applauded the progress made, while noting that there were further opportunities for private sector initiatives in reducing settlement risk. The central banks, of course, are ready to work closely with the private sector in achieving this goal. Closing Preventing future banking crises poses difficult issues for policymakers. Given the indispensable role that banks play in a nation’s economic well-being, all governments have found it important that financial institutions be subject to regulation or oversight. It is important to understand from the start, however, that there are limits to the supervisory process. Supervisors have limited ability, for example, to detect fraud. Most important, in a market-oriented banking system, bank directors and management must have the ability to set the bank’s overall course, to seek a BIS Review 64/1998  -6-  reasonable profit, and to innovate and experiment with new banking activities and products. In other words, supervision can not be so heavy-handed as to stifle competition and innovation. As such, the supervisory process has an inherent tension between the freedom banks need in order to earn reasonable profits and the latitude to take such large risks that their future could be endangered.
First of all, although the unemployment rate in the Turkish economy is quite high compared to the EU members, we observe that the total increase in employment throughout the year 2004 was much higher than that of the EU members and acceding countries. Another notable issue about the structure of our labour market is that Turkey s economy is moving from a labour intensive structure toward a capital intensive one. And it is a natural consequence that during this period some sectors are expanding while others are contracting. What this implies is that the structure of employment has also been changing. In fact, even though it is still  15  Under-Secretariat of State Planning Organization. 16  http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat. 17  International Labour Organization. 18  Böttcher, B. (2004). "Turkish Accession to the EU- The Way is the Goal". Deutche Bank Research. 19  International Labour Organization. 20  www.un.org. 6/8  high compared to the EU members, the share of the agricultural sector in total employment has been falling while that of services sector has been on the rise. And I believe that Turkey s young and dynamic demographic structure supports easier transfers between sectors and facilitates improvement in the sectoral dispersion of employment. Having mentioned all these demographic and labour market conditions of the EU and Turkey, I need to emphasize the importance of making further progress on educational reforms in Turkey.

In historical perspective, as you all know very well, the EU is a "sui generis" structure implying a legal, political and economic project of integration shaped around contemporary values. Quoting Prime Minister Tony Blair's own words; "This is a union of values, of solidarity between nations and people, of not just a common market in which we trade but a common political space in which we live as citizens." 1 On the other side, as Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, clearly stated; "the contemporary level of civilisation" has always been Turkey's main objective since its foundation as a republic out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, considering the main principles of the EU and Turkey's desire to reach the contemporary level of civilisation, Turkey's everlasting willingness to be a member of the EU shouldn't be surprising. Accordingly, Turkey had applied to the EU for full membership in 1959. During these 46 years, governments with different political views have been in charge. Despite some delays, setbacks and obstacles in relations with the Union all over this period, our aim of full membership has never changed. Also, the majority of the Turkish society has always been supporting the main goal of full membership. In fact, 68 percent of the public who answered the most recent questionnaire of Euro Barometer in 2005 responded in favour of full membership. The second point I want to make is about the whole process leading to the eventual membership of Turkey to the EU.
But under Basel II, this need is even more pronounced, especially for internationally active banks that wish to adopt one of the advanced approaches to credit or operational risk provided under Basel II. In fact, in many ways, Basel II is acting as a catalyst for enhanced co-operation. The Committee is finding ways to avoid the need for those firms to endure redundant or uncoordinated reviews of the systems and processes they develop to benefit from Basel II. The Accord Implementation Group, which is chaired by Nick Le Pan, the Canadian Superintendent of Financial Institutions and Vice-Chair of the Committee, has already undertaken a number of practical exercises to encourage supervisors from many countries inside and outside the Committee’s membership to consider how they will review those systems and processes for firms that operate across borders. The AIG, as this group is known, identified two key lessons for banks to consider that may help to ease the transition to Basel II. One lesson is that the more detailed, comprehensive, and clear a firm’s plans are for moving to one of the more advanced approaches to risk management, the better able supervisors will be to assess and evaluate those plans in a less intrusive manner. But a second lesson takes this one step further: it is also important for banks to share those plans broadly with their branches and subsidiaries worldwide.

The members of the Committee shared this concern when we decided to undertake work on the prudential treatment of certain trading-related exposures under Basel II. We do not intend to overhaul the capital rules for trading book exposures, but rather seek to address narrowly a handful of concerns that relate either to potential inconsistencies that could arise with the new treatment for banking book assets or that relate to a limited number of issues that have arisen since the adoption of the Market Risk Amendment. The implementation of Basel II With that, I would like to turn now to my third topic and report on our efforts to smooth the path from the existing capital standards to the new Basel II framework. On the regulatory side, supervisors are working with national authorities to transform the framework into enforceable rules and regulations, within the context of each jurisdiction’s process. This work is well underway in all of the Basel Committee member jurisdictions, but also in many other countries as well. On the supervisory side, let me mention three areas in particular where we are devoting resources to promote a seamless transition to the new framework. Calibration First, we are verifying that Basel II has been calibrated appropriately. The Committee has long stated its intention to conduct work to re-confirm that the new framework meets our objective to broadly maintain the aggregate level of capital requirements, while keeping incentives to adopt the more advanced approaches that are offered.
This group is responsible for promoting the consistency and quality of implementation of the New Accord and facilitating the exchange of information among national supervisors about bank and supervisory practices. Through the AIG, senior line supervisors - that is, the people who actually assess banks’ risk profiles - are seeking ways for examiners to validate and supervise internal risk assessment processes in a more consistent fashion across jurisdictions. Implications of Basel II on the supervisory approach We’ve also continued to think about how we should adjust our method of supervision to incorporate the tenets of the new framework, which brings me to the third and final area that I would like to address today. Naturally, allowing banks to rely on internal models in determining their capital requirements has led, and will continue to lead, to changes in our supervisory process. Fortunately, we have the benefit of some experience already at our side. In 1996, under the “market risk amendment” to the original Basel Accord, qualifying banks with large market risk positions were first permitted to incorporate internal estimates of the associated risk in their regulatory capital requirements. When determining whether a bank may rely on its market risk model for capital purposes, our examiners have had to evaluate the technical underpinnings of the model, as well as the risk management and control processes surrounding its implementation and use.

As for the European System of Central Banks, I can assure you that we stand ready to act as forcefully as necessary to ensure price stability and preserve the integrity of the euro, which is, today, our most precious common good. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
“Yield-Oriented Investors and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism.” Proceedings of the symposium Banking, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy. Svenson, Ola, and Goran Nilsson. 1986. “Mental Economics: Subjective Representations of Factors Related to Expected Inflation.” Journal of Economic Psychology 7: 327–49. Van der Klaauw, Wilbert, Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Giorgio Topa, Simon Potter, and Michael Bryan. 2008. “Rethinking the Measurement of Household Inflation Expectations: Preliminary Findings.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 359, December. Williamson, Maureen R., and Alexander J. Wearing. 1996. “Lay People’s Cognitive Models of the Economy.” Journal of Economic Psychology 17, no. 1 (February):3–38. BIS central bankers’ speeches  19

The report to Parliament underlying the establishment of the National Bank of Romania in 1880 saw Belgium as – and I quote – “a small but happy country”, which developed rapidly with the assistance of its national bank, rendering it a suitable model for the institutional set-up of Romania. As regards the neighbouring Netherlands, the name of Romania’s domestic currency – the leu (meaning lion) – comes from a Dutch silver coin very popular in this part of Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries: the lion-thaler. Crossing the channel, our most beloved Queen Marie was the granddaughter of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom. It was her son, King Charles II, who reconstructed this Royal Palace. Moving west again, let us not forget that the Irish writer Bram Stoker took Vlad the Impaler as an inspiration for his famous novel Dracula, creating a myth that Romania is frequently associated with. Returning to Romania’s monarchs, under whose reign the country saw a remarkable modernisation, they belonged to the German House of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. As for the economic ties with Germany, I would mention the fact that the name of the street where the Old Palace of the National Bank of Romania is located, i.e. Lipscani, derives from Leipzig (Lipsca in Romanian), the place where long ago local merchants used to bring their goods from. Going further back in time, the Saxons (originating also in the Luxembourg area) settled in Transylvania, which they called Siebenbürgen (seven fortified towns).
Source: Frey and Osborne (2013); Bank calculations. Notes: The UK probability of automation figures are based on estimates in Frey and Osborne (2013) matched against UK occupations.

I take such credibility risks extraordinarily seriously. The 1930s were an episode of even worse Fed policymaking. This was a period of far greater economic dislocation and hardship. When thinking about the 1930s, I find it useful to turn to the wisdom of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz from their book titled A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960. Friedman and Schwartz discuss how monetary policy in the early 1930s actually contributed to the contraction, despite the fact that bank reserves increased significantly over that period. Broad monetary aggregates contracted, even though bank reserves were higher, because 1) banking panics and the weak real economy led the public to hoard cash and 2) banks wanted to increase reserve ratios as insurance against liquidity shortages and runs. As a result, the amount of lending supported by a given level of reserves fell dramatically, and the U.S. economy experienced a period of deflation. However, the Fed failed to see that it was running a restrictive monetary policy. One reason was they were striving to stay on the gold standard, which dictated policies to counter gold outflows. In addition, the Fed interpreted the excess reserves on banks’ books and the associated low level of money market interest rates as signs of an accommodative financial environment and so did not aggressively loosen monetary policy.
Therefore, addressing the issue of inequality and deprivation while expanding the economy, has today become a great challenge to economic planners across the globe, and indeed to those in Sri Lanka as well. In other words, poverty alleviation has to become an integral part of the development process if true prosperity is to be ushered. That is one of the reasons why we at the Central Bank do not only track the traditional macro-economic fundamentals. We also track the indicators that tell us whether or not “wealth” is reaching the ordinary people of our country. In that context, let’s take a quick look at some of the fundamental indicators as well as discuss some other trends to assess as to how inequality, poverty and development is progressing in our country.

Inflation in many countries - including virtually all the industrial countries but not confined to them - is now consistently lower than it has been for ages. That in itself has contributed to lower interest rates and to the lower nominal bond yields that I have described. But, in addition to that, fiscal consolidation, which has lowered the combined government deficits of the G7 countries from around $ billion in 1994 to around $ billion last year, has helped to reduce real yields, notwithstanding the continuing demand for capital from the developing world. And the really good news is that this macro-economic discipline has been accompanied by sustained economic expansion, with world GDP as a whole growing at an annual rate of some 3½ - 4%. Now of course there have been quite marked differences in the performance of individual countries within this overall picture. Some of the transition economies have seen a brutal contraction of output which is only now beginning to stabilise. And there have been marked fluctuations in the growth rates of some of the emerging countries. Growth in parts of Asia, for example, is now moderating, cyclically, to a more sustainable pace, while parts of Latin America continue to recover from the set-back they suffered two years ago. Among the industrial countries, too, economic developments have diverged over the past two years.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the Riksbank and other analysts sometimes reach different conclusions on what can be considered a suitable change in the repo rate. However, according to Swedish law, independent responsibility for monetary policy has been delegated to the Riksbank. Naturally, we listen to all well-founded analyses but in each situation we must ultimately rely on our own assessment of the right monetary policy measure for achieving the inflation target. It is nevertheless important, and of course a very reasonable request, that we are able to explain and motivate our assessments and decisions. We achieve this through the publication of our Inflation Reports, press releases, speeches and the minutes of the monetary policy meetings. If we are open and clear with regard to our forecasts and assessments, it is easier for others to evaluate our monetary policy. This is particularly important as the effects of a repo rate decision are felt after a time lag. A public inflation forecast makes it possible to assess and evaluate the monetary policy stance at an early stage. An open discussion also contributes to increasing understanding of the inflation target. It is part of the strength of the monetary policy regulations that there has sometimes been rather lively discussion, without this having an effect on confidence in our main objectives. Another advantage of openness is that it gives forecasters, both inside and outside the Riksbank, the opportunity to make comparisons that help to sharpen our forecasting.

35–54, and Kaminsky, G. and C. Reinhart (1999). “The Twin Crises: Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems”, American Economic Review, 89, pp. 473–500. A well known example of complacency about East Asian growth is the 1993 World Bank report on “The East Asian Miracle”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  banking and balance of payments crises, could not happen in advanced economies.2 And yet this is exactly what happened in Europe ten years after the Asian crisis (see Chart 2). It seems therefore useful to look also at East Asia’s response to its crisis and see what lessons can be learned. One lesson is that a deep and fundamental restructuring of the domestic financial sector is necessary Given the financial nature of the Asian crisis, this was a key element in resolving it. Nonviable financial institutions were closed, viable institutions recapitalised and strengthened, value-impaired assets dealt with and the corporate sector restructured, including through foreign investment.3 These measures were implemented decisively. They were associated with a painful adjustment process in the crisis countries but, at the same time, they made a swift recovery possible. This experience contrasts with Japan’s experience in the late 1980s. Following the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble, there was by and large no rapid write-down of non-performing assets. Due to the low profitability of banks, it was believed that an immediate write-off of bad loans would prevent compliance with capital requirements.