samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the near term, CPI inflation is very likely to rise to materially above our 2% target. The question is whether that unavoidable temporary rise will remain just that, temporary; or whether it will feed into medium-term expectations of inflation, and so get reflected in wages and prices going forward and, thus, in domestically-generated inflation. Given this unusual combination of significant downside and upside risks to the medium-term inflation outlook, the broad policy strategy is to offset some but not all of the adverse shock to demand from tighter credit conditions. And to do so by changing Bank Rate gradually and with transparency about that broad strategy. To be clear, this approach probably means allowing a degree of slack to develop in the economy, in the interests of avoiding taking risks with inflation on the upside. Only by underpinning the credibility of the nominal anchor provided by the MPC’s commitment to the inflation target will we maintain scope to cushion the real economy from the effects of the stresses in the international financial system. If we implement this strategy successfully, we will be able to provide more durable support for demand and activity. If, by contrast, we were to adopt a course that let the inflation genie out of the bottle, we would find ourselves needing to tighten policy, exacerbating the slowdown in activity. That broad strategy is not a recipe for inaction.

Then, when the economy reopened, we saw strong pent-up demand for services. Since the start of the pandemic, the volatility of durable goods consumption has been almost ten times higher than during the preceding two decades, and almost 30 times higher for services. This has led to inflation broadening into both industrial goods and services. Today, around threequarters of the items in the core inflation basket have inflation rates above 2%. The second shock has been Russia’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine. Even before the invasion, OPEC+ production cuts and capital constraints on US shale producers were restricting energy supply. This resulted in a spike in energy prices which was a major factor in our underestimation of inflation. [2] But the invasion has hugely aggravated the supply squeeze and sent energy prices to extraordinary levels, making it all the more challenging to forecast inflation. European gas and electricity prices are up 105% and 75%, respectively, since the months before the invasion[3], and around 650% and 450%, respectively, since the first half of 2021. This surge in energy prices has directly contributed around 30% to the headline inflation rate since the start of this year and, indirectly, has added to the broadening of price pressures across the economy. In fact, the models used by the national central banks indicate that the indirect effects of higher energy costs are currently contributing around one-third to core inflation. The persistence of inflation Collectively, these shocks have pushed inflation a long way from our target.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  A third factor that has added difficulty to monetary policy management is a renewed concern over capital flows towards the emerging world. The change in investors’ mood has made them look for other markets in which to invest, and has led to a widespread appreciation of emerging countries’ currencies. As usual, this has rekindled a debate that was present in our discussions a year back, as to the convenience of implementing measures to avoid currencies from appreciating. Last year several emerging economies, among them Chile, intervened their exchange markets using different mechanisms. This year some emerging economies have continued to do so. Clearly, the discussion as to the convenience or not of performing such actions remains unresolved. The first thing to bear in mind is that in small open economies, all efforts to persistently keep the exchange rate at levels beyond margins aligned with the fundamentals, particularly at overvalued levels, are not sustainable and may eventually generate higher inflation. We are convinced that a floating exchange rate regime is the most appropriate one for the Chilean economy, as it facilitates macroeconomic and external accounts adjustments. Nonetheless, certain circumstances may lead the Central Bank to intervene in the forex market, either to maintain an adequate international reserve position or to respond to overreactions of the exchange parity beyond its long-term fundamentals. However, there are costs associated to this type of intervention.

You may recall that just a year ago the main problem faced by emerging economies was how to deal with inflationary pressures, given the narrowing of domestic capacity gaps and the rise in prices of commodities in international markets. This happened at the same time as the two-speed recovery process I just mentioned was accompanied by an interest rate differential that redirected capital flows towards emerging markets, exerting strong pressures to appreciate our currencies. Our concern then was the pace at which we would lower impulse to our economies, taking care that it did not intensify pressures on the exchange rate and cause new imbalances. Only six months later our major concern had changed dramatically. The intensification of financial tensions in the developed economies drastically changed our perception of the future of the global economy. Financial markets drastically picked up this change of mood  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  and very quickly we saw, among other developments, drops in stock prices, hikes in risk premiums, and reductions in the prices of commodities. The tough discussions held in the United States on fiscal issues, together with the weakness of its economic data towards mid-year, fueled these negative perceptions. Overall, emerging economies dramatically changed their perceptions and communication as to the future of monetary policy.
All the users of this information should be aware that this information does not substitute or duplicate the official macroeconomic statistics. These qualitative indicators are compiled on the basis of opinions and expectations of the interviewed economic agents. I would like to be more concrete relate to this point. The Bank of Albania, having the awareness, independence and a certain degree of institutional transparency, and aiming at achieving high professionalism, plays an active and proactive role in the country’s economic development. Economic analysis is under direct function of the monetary policy decision-making process. In essence, the decision-making precedes the medium-term developments, sustaining the maintaining of price stability as the primary policy target drafted and implemented by the Bank of Albania. Profound analysis of the past, present and future developments of the economy contribute to appropriate decision-making. I assure you that building a complete “picture” of the present and the future of an economy is a rather difficult process, not only for an emerging economy, such as that of Albania, but also for the most advanced economies of the world. Economic and financial developments are accompanied by elements of insecurity, which have become, as you already know, dominant in last two years. Making decisions on the future of this already globalised world of economic links, requires professional maturity. Assessing and selecting appropriate and reliable statistical information requires profound intuitive abilities. Making the selected data bank beneficial to the decisionmaking, requires analytical foresight.

William C Dudley: The national and regional economy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the Business Council of Fairfield County, Stamford, Connecticut, 2 July 2013. *  *  *  Good afternoon. I am pleased to be here with the Business Council of Fairfield County. I am told that your meetings are very inclusive – that you routinely invite education professionals, executives of local not-for-profit agencies and community leaders as well as business leaders. In doing so, you assemble the type of broad Main Street audience that I most enjoy addressing. So, thank you for inviting me here today. Today I want to talk a bit about the outlook for the nation and the region. As many of you know, I was scheduled to speak at this forum on October 29 of last year but that meeting had to be postponed because of the arrival of Superstorm Sandy which hit on that very day. The region covered by the New York Fed was at the center of the storm, and Fairfield County, as well as parts of the Connecticut shoreline suffered extensive damage. Immediately following the storm, our Regional and Community Outreach function worked with all of the affected areas as part of a needs assessment.
Furthermore, the general liberalisation of capital controls on domestic residents will take place once the largest obstacles have been successfully removed or neutralised and when certain economic criteria have been fulfilled, such as adequate FX reserves, market access for the sovereign and the banks, a wellbalanced and growing economy, etc. The aim is to minimise the risk of capital flight. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Icelandic authorities have emphasised public disclosure and transparency of relevant information about the liberalisation strategy. Last year, the solution to the failed banks’ estates, as well as the economic analysis on which it was based, was presented in a comprehensive manner. A few days ago, a bill of legislation on the treatment of offshore krónur was passed by Parliament. An English translation of the bill was posted on the website of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, along with the Explanatory Notes and a Q&A (with links on the Central Bank website). Yesterday the Central Bank published terms of a foreign currency auction directed at offshore krónur, to be held on 16 June. This speech is, of course, part of the process of disclosure and explanation. Furthermore, in a week or two, the Central Bank will issue a special publication on the economic analysis of capital account liberalisation in Iceland.

That strategy, however, did not include a solution to the problem of the old banks. The split between the old and new banks was only finalised towards the end of 2010, and in any case, the old banks were largely exempted from the controls until March 2012. The current strategy is based on a guiding principle and a set of criteria that any proposed solutions would have to fulfil. If I explain these to you now, you will better understand what we have done to date and what is forthcoming. An overall guiding principle in the design of the liberalisation strategy was that it should entail comprehensive, cautious, and clearly communicated solutions, allowing the country to lift capital controls without undue risks to macroeconomic and financial stability. The strategy is comprehensive in the sense of mitigating, in a sufficient manner, the risk that excessive capital outflows would overburden Iceland’s small foreign exchange market and inflict systemic negative externalities on the general public. In particular, it involved reducing the size of capital outflows associated with the resolution of the failed banks’ estates through composition agreements based on explicit stability conditions, with a Pigouvian tax as a necessary backstop mechanism. The strategy is cautious in the sense that liberalisation is planned, timed, and sequenced so that the largest challenges are solved sequentially, in a manner that mitigates the risk of disorderly dynamics in the foreign exchange market.
I will start with that of promoting innovation without undermining the integration of the European market. 1- In the area of payments, we face a number of challenges, not least that of exchanges between financial intermediaries The development of the tokenisation of financial assets could lead to a proliferation of new infrastructures that would no longer be interoperable with each other, leading to a risk of market and liquidity fragmentation. 2- This trade-off between innovation and fragmentation risk is also reflected in the settlement asset itself used in payment chains. If we take the example of stablecoins, their use for the settlement of tokenised financial assets could undermine the stability and efficiency of settlement transactions for new assets by fragmenting the field of settlement assets. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  B- To reduce this risk of fragmentation, we have two levers. 1- The first is cooperation between private players to support the efforts of the public authorities to establish a regulatory framework that is clear, proportionate and flexible enough to take account of rapid changes in the market and innovation. In this respect, there are certainly lessons to be learned from the framework developed for open banking. For example, the deployment of the APIs I mentioned earlier proved to be more complex than expected due to heterogeneous applications, late developments and the lack of an underlying business model. In this light, two key principles could guide us. On the one hand, institutional players can act as a catalyst for private initiatives on standardisation.

Mojmír Hampl: Is the euro zone still an attractive target for countries outside the euro? A view from the Czech Republic Speaking points by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the conference “Are we on the verge of a new Euro Crisis?”, Copenhagen, 4 September 2018. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, Good afternoon. First of all, let me thank Lars Christensen for his kind invitation to speak here today in front of such a distinguished audience. It is really an honour for me and I am also glad to be in Copenhagen again. In this talk I will try to shed some light on what appears to be a puzzling attitude of some new EU member countries towards the common currency. I will use the example of my home country, the Czech Republic. It entered the EU in 2004 and has no opt-out from euro adoption, so legally we are obliged to join and to make every effort to enter the Eurozone as soon as possible. Yet no major political force in our country pushes for euro adoption at the moment. Talks about joining the Eurozone are simply not part of the political agenda, and we now have a fourth or so government in a row declaring that this issue will be left “for the next government after the next elections” – so it is being postponed to political infinity. The antechamber for euro adoption, the ERM II, is not being considered either.
And we agreed a new governance structure, giving the second line a key role as independent counsel to our Board’s Audit and Risk Committee, establishing a new Executive Risk Committee and working-level challenge forums, and securing space for risk challenge on all new policy proposals. Now all of this will sound very familiar to you as risk professionals – and that in a sense is the point. In some cases, it is just central banks catching up! But in other cases we have had to blaze a new trail – reflecting the unusual nature of some aspects of risk management at a central bank. To illustrate those points, let me take you through a few brief case studies of specific issues we have dealt with in our early months of operation. The new second line in action: five case studies  (i)  Purchases of government debt for monetary policy purposes (‘Quantitative Easing’)  The introduction of the new second line has in some cases primarily formalised and hardwired approaches which had already been evolving as the balance sheet expanded. By far the largest single item on the Bank’s current balance sheet reflects the outright holding of some £ of UK government bonds (or ‘gilts’) in notional terms, purchased on behalf of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee as part of the implementation of their unconventional monetary policy – often known as ‘quantitative easing’.

Strike two comes from the fact that central banks are not subject to financial solvency constraints in the way that commercial banks are. And that, again, is because their ability to create fiat money means they can always meet liabilities denominated in our own currencies. As a result, there is nothing impossible about a central bank trading with negative capital. Indeed, some (particularly those defending foreign exchange rate pegs) have done just that (Table 1). Chart 1: Central banks as financial firefighters  Table 1: Example central bank equity ratios Equity /  Risk tolerance  Private financial system  Central banks Normal conditions  Liquidity crisis  Degree of systemic stress  Total assets (%) European Central Bank  16  Swiss National Bank  10  Bank of Japan  2  US Federal Reserve  1  Bank of England  1  Bank of Israel  –6  Central Bank of Chile  –7  Source: International Monetary Fund; Bank of England; central bank financial statements Equity and total assets are measured on an accounting basis so do not account for factors such as off-balance sheet exposures or government indemnities. Balance dates are February 2016 for the Bank of England, March 2016 for the Bank of Japan and end 2015 for other central banks.
While we should be proud of our many achievements these years past, we must also be ready to listen to others, particularly and attentively so to the European institutions which, lest we forget, have been buying us time so that we can see through our adjustments. It is not the time for pessimism, but nor is it for complacency. What we must do is fruitfully use the time we have. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: The challenges of surveillance and coordination Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the International Symposium of the Banque de France: Regulation in the Face of Global Imbalances, Paris, 4 March 2011. *  *  *  Introduction There is a broad consensus that the crisis we’ve been living through the last three years is the result of imbalances accumulated both at the macro and micro level, mainly in advanced economies. Surveillance of these imbalances was clearly insufficient. Any prescription to improve the resilience of our economies must thus include a strengthening of surveillance. I will concentrate in my remarks on macroeconomic issues. There has been a lot of discussion on what went wrong with surveillance, in particular at international level. The IMF should be praised, in particular, for having its own surveillance process independently evaluated. The results of this analysis were published in January this year.1 Maybe in Europe we should follow the same transparent and open procedure to get a better understanding of what didn’t work. The recommendations offered by the Independent Evaluation Office are mainly procedural and concern the workings of the IMF. They included creating an environment that encourages candour and diverse or even dissenting views; overcoming the silo mentality; speaking truth to power; and delivering clear and consistent messages. These are recommendations which should probably be taken to heart by other institutions too.
Christian Noyer: The eurosystem’s single monetary policy - a view from the inside Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the GIC Conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, 18 January 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure and honour for me to address the GIC conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Before entering into the heart of today’s topic, given the date of this conference, it would be difficult for me not to evoke the name and prodigious work of Benjamin Franklin who, to my mind, is the embodiment of the American dream. I could devote the whole of my address to Benjamin Franklin’s work, both because of its scope and the significance that it still has today, but that is not the subject of our conference. I shall therefore confine myself to recalling some of the major events and achievements in the life of this exceptional, intelligent man, endowed with extraordinary intellectual curiosity. If I were to sum up the life of this exceptional man in a few words, I would say, like most people, that he was an autobiographer, an essayist, a pamphleteer, a politician, a librarian, a publisher, an educationalist, a scientist, an inventor, a statesman, and a humorist. It is difficult to believe that one single man could be so multifaceted but Benjamin Franklin was all these things, and sometimes at the same time.

Christian Noyer: Inflation, Europe’s response to the debt crisis, emerging-market economies and priorities for the G-20 – interview in The Wall Street Journal Interview with Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, in The Wall Street Journal, Paris, conducted by Mr Brian Blackstone and Ms Nathalie Boschat on 24 January 2011 and published on 26 January 2011. *  *  *  WSJ: The European Central Bank recently toughened its stance on inflation. How concerned are you about the risks of inflation taking hold in the euro zone? Noyer: The uptick in inflation is mostly due to the rise in oil and commodity prices. Core inflation has remained relatively subdued. By nature, that [the rise in inflation] should be temporary. Our projections show that the inflation rate should come back to a zone perfectly in line with our definition of price stability during the course of 2011. As a central bank, we are very attentive to the only risks that exist in such a situation, which is that there might be second-round effects – an acceleration of inflation due to other causes – wages and other dynamics of internal costs. This is why we are vigilant about all those evolutions. I am quite confident that we will be able to keep inflation at bay. That includes sending the message that we will never tolerate that inflation could become entrenched.