samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It requires time and effort to consider the issues to be addressed at company AGMs, and not least: We may be confronted with uncomfortable questions. The fund now owns around 1 per cent of the world’s listed companies. This is both a lot and a little. For less than 0.1 per cent of the global population to own 1 per cent of global equities is a lot. But 1 per cent may seem too little to exert ownership influence. Nonetheless, we have chosen to exercise our voting rights. In many companies, ownership is spread across many shareholders, in which case even a 1 per cent interest is a large stake. The fund also has larger holdings – up to 10 per cent – in a number of companies, which gives us the opportunity to steer companies in what we consider to be the right direction. Voting is governed by a few main principles. 30 As a minority shareholder, equal treatment of shareholders and board accountability are two key elements of our long-term management. In addition, as the fund is invested in a wide range of companies with a long investment horizon, our concerns must go beyond the purely business-related. A manufacturing enterprise that emits pollutants and harms neighbouring enterprises may not be of concern to the enterprise itself. But it is of concern to us because we own shares in the enterprises affected by the pollution. Water management and climate change are two of our strategic focus areas.

European DORA regulation published at the end of 2022, whose implementing decrees are currently being drafted, will allow for a better management of cyber risk, which has been particularly significant in recent months. Page 8 of 9  France was ranked first in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing by the FATF in its May 2022 assessment report. We must pursue our efforts to remain exemplary and play a leading role at international and European level, in particular in connection with the French bid to host the new European authority (AMLA) in in this area. As regards climate risk, despite major advances in terms of transparency and disclosure standards, the first dedicated stress tests - including the one pioneered by the ACPR - showed that preparation for physical and transitional risks could still be improved. As regards the insurance sector, EIOPA has conducted a first stress test on European supplementary occupational pension schemes. The ACPR has continued its work with insurers to prepare for the next exercise, which will take place in 2023 and whose results will be published in the first half of 2024. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, as a number of recent episodes of market volatility have shown, non-bank finance poses an increasingly important systemic risk and needs to be better regulated, both at the microprudential and macroprudential levels, in order to control leverage and contain liquidity risk.
Emerging markets can do a great deal to increase these by adopting modern accounting standards, a transparent legal framework, and a stable market-friendly environment to which foreign investors will be prepared to commit long-term investments. Second, ways must be found to reduce the volatility of short-term flows of bank finance. The key is to avoid maturity and currency mismatches on the national balance sheet. That is easier said than done, and similar mismatches on the balance sheets of domestic financial institutions have caused financial collapses on a regular basis in the industrialised world. Before turning to the question of how such mismatches might be limited if not prevented, let me mention two other contributory factors to recent crises. The first was overvalued real exchange rates, reflecting attempts to maintain fixed nominal exchange rates beyond their economic shelf life. Not  3  Obstfeld, M (1998), “The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?”, NBER Working Paper 6559, mimeo. 3  BIS Review 95/1999  only did such attempts contribute to a crisis when the nominal peg could no longer be sustained, but they also contributed to the illusion that it might be profitable to borrow at lower interest rates in foreign currency and invest at higher rates domestically, thus exacerbating the balance sheet mismatches. The second is that capital outflows do not result solely from the actions of overseas residents. Capital flight by domestic residents has been a factor in increasing the scale of outflows from a number of emerging markets.

The case for “transparency about transparency” is the case for honesty in economic policy. Some progress has been made. Pilot transparency reports on the UK and Argentina have been produced by IMF staff. Other pilot reports are to come. Australia has published a self-assessment transparency report. The need now is to make the production of Transparency Reports an integral part of the Article IV process. There is no reason for further delay. Transparency Reports should always be published. I very much hope that the IMF will make rapid progress towards the regular production and publication of Transparency Reports on each country. This practical measure could do a great deal to enhance the performance of all economic actors involved in the international capital market. 6. Conclusions  Unrestricted capital mobility and the absence of an ILOLR are not a recipe for a stable international financial system. Short-term interbank flows are the Achilles heel of present arrangements, leading to both currency and maturity mismatches. Throw in a predilection of emerging markets for pegged exchange rates and you have a dangerous cocktail. Purist solutions – whether of an ILOLR or a return to permanent capital controls – are, for good reasons, unlikely to be pursued. What is needed now are some practical steps forward. Central to any such programme is the need to monitor and manage the national balance BIS Review 95/1999  8  sheet. The objective cannot be to eliminate the risk of financial crises. The middle way will not do that.
This may be easier said than done as leveraging can bring transient prosperity and euphoria to everyone. To avoid committing such mistakes and the pains of de-leveraging in the future, we must stay alert and discipline ourselves not to over-spend;  (b)  Beware of wrong signals resulting from market failures, which may induce borrowers to wrongly believe that access to low-cost funds will never be cut off and prosperity and affluence funded by borrowing is legitimate and sustainable;  (c)  Strengthen market regulation to reduce the risk of market failures. Major reforms to be introduced include enhancing the policy functions for maintaining financial stability; implementing appropriate counter-cyclical regulatory measures when necessary; strengthening bank capital and liquidity requirements (Basel III); and increasing the regulation of credit rating agencies. Most of these reforms are still at various stages of implementation and may not be ready remedies for the current debt crisis in the US and Europe;  (d)  Understand and accept that there is no clever or easy way out of the trap of excessive leverage. While innovative financial derivatives may facilitate borrowing and leverage, or even conceal them, no financial engineering can reduce debt and achieve de-leveraging without the required reduction in public spending and the economic and social pains that the de-leveraging process generates. (e)  While the government should step in to help if the financial system or the whole economy gets into trouble, this is feasible only if the government has the fiscal headroom to foot the bill.

Having said that, I would still venture to identify the root cause of the Global Financial Crisis. In so doing, it is inevitable that one has to simplify and generalise matters considerably so as to draw some conclusions. 2. In my view, regardless of the causes of the global imbalances, both the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and the current European sovereign debt crisis have been driven by excessive leverage in private and public sectors alike in the major industrial economies, resulting in dangerously high levels of debts. In 1980, the average debt level of the 18 major industrial economies was at 165% of GDP. In 2010, the ratio rose drastically to 320% of GDP. In the US, the debt-to-GDP ratio remained stable at 150% from mid-1950s to early 1980s, but the ratio rose sharply and steadily to slightly under 300% in 2010. 3. Why did households, companies and governments borrow so much more than before in the past decade or two? Some put the blame on financial innovation, such as securitisation, which made it much easier to obtain finance or gearing. Some suggest that declining real interest rates in the US and other major economies since the 1990s have increased the ease and affordability of debts and leverage. Some others believed that the Great Moderation beginning in the mid-1980s has nurtured a euphoric view that economic prosperity, job security, income growth and continued rise in asset prices could be taken for granted.
The limits of monetary policy and the importance of fiscal policy Here is the rub. As mentioned, the FOMC sets monetary policy for the nation, for all 50 states – its influence is uniform across America. The same rate of interest is charged on bank loans to businesses and individuals in Texas as is charged New Yorkers or the good people of Illinois or Californians; Texans pay the same rates on mortgages and so on. Why is it that the Texas economy has radically outperformed the rest of the states? A cheap answer is to revert to the hackneyed argument that Texas has oil and gas. It is true that we produce as much oil as Norway and almost as much natural gas as Canada. And we have some 60 percent of the refineries of the United States. But remember that the numbers I showed you are employment numbers. Only 2 percent of employment in Texas is directly generated by oil and gas and mining and related services. We are grateful that we are energy rich. But we are a diversified economy not unlike the United States, where business and financial services, health care, travel and leisure activities and education account for similar portions of our workforce. Why, then, do we outperform the rest of the United States? 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  To me, the answer is obvious: We have state and local governments whose tax, spending and regulatory policies are oriented toward job creation.

In a world of low growth, the political rhetoric in some major economies has tended to focus more on the costs and less on the benefits. That is unfortunate, because given the current circumstances of the global economy, it is likely that we need deeper and fairer integration. For emerging economies in Asia and Latin America, the question for us is whether deeper economic and financial integration offers a feasible path towards unlocking sustainable growth of our economies? How do we mitigate the costs and maximise the benefits? The World Bank theme paper for this conference provides a useful starting point for thinking about these issues. I will leave it to the learned speakers today to ponder on that. I will just briefly share my perspective on this issue with respect to ASEAN and Malaysia. Asian regional economic and financial integration The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 contains ASEAN’s vision of regional economic and financial integration over the next 10 years. When it came to formulating the 2025 Blueprint, the issue of the nature of integration has always been central. The fundamental challenge remains on how to use regional integration to leverage on ASEAN’s diversity in terms of economic size and structure, income levels, resource endowments and stage of financial sector development. Here, in the interest of time, l will just focus on ASEAN financial integration. I remember that soon after the Asian Financial Crisis, there was a lot of interest in looking at the European model of a single currency.
And indeed, inflation targeting would seem to have much to recommend it, provided that it is approached not as a panacea, but rather as a pragmatic organizing framework for policy. In other words, policy frameworks such as inflation targeting can be useful where they signal a disposition towards continuous and predictable communication, and a forward-looking, informative policy approach. But as I said, inflation targeting per se is not a sure-fire solution - for example, the costs of disinflation do not appear to be lower in inflation-targeting countries - nor is it a prerequisite for effective communication and ultimately effective policy. Role of fiscal policy Clearly, crisis prevention through promoting stable and sustainable conditions in the macro economy is not solely the province of central banks. Sound fiscal policies are needed to complement the effectiveness of even the soundest monetary policies. Chronically loose fiscal policy is a persistent 5  BIS Review 57/2000  threat to macroeconomic stability through the build-up of internal and/or external debts that can be devastating. For the countries of East Asia, the public sector’s generally low initial indebtedness provided important latitude for dealing with the recent crises. Governments had room to stimulate aggregate demand recovery through fiscal ease; moreover, extensions of public guarantees and capital helped to contain the banking crises.

But even if all organisations that were in trouble had been rescued, it would have remained necessary for central banks and governments on both sides of the Atlantic to take extremely bold measures in order to be prepared for systemic liquidity and insolvency risks. Question: How do you explain the fact that, despite the ongoing banking crisis, the ECB’s statistics do not yet indicate the existence of a credit crunch in the euro area? Answer: What is true is that we see a certain weakening in the dynamics of loans to enterprises. But the rate of growth of outstanding loans to non-financial corporations has remained robust in double-digit figures. However, since bank lending standards have been tightening significantly for some time and the financial crisis entered a new phase only in mid-September, we must observe all developments very closely and remain attentive to new facts and figures. Question: The major investor Warren Buffett once described credit derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction”. Do you share this view? Answer: I wouldn’t necessarily use that formulation myself. But the level of complexity and lack of transparency reached in the production, marketing and selling of these financial market instruments indeed proved to be destructive and contributed substantially to the fragility of financial markets. 2  BIS Review 1/2009  Question: The reputation of the ECB has been strengthened by the crisis. Has it also profited financially from the brisk demand for the greater amount of liquidity made available?
There are however a few things that make our situation even more problematic than that of other large economies. First, the decline in trend growth has gone much further here than in, for instance, the US: the European Commission estimates potential output growth in the euro area to be about 1% this year, half  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  of the equivalent figure for the US. In contrast, the difference in 1992 was small: euro area potential output growth was estimated at 2.6%, compared with 2.8% for the US. [5] Although this is already a serious problem in itself[6], a close examination of the composition of potential output uncovers the full extent of the problem. Total factor productivity in the US has consistently outperformed the euro area for the last 15 years and is expected to continue doing also in the coming decade[7]. In other words, using Paul Krugman’s famous words, the euro area trend growth risks becoming a product of “perspiration rather than inspiration”[8]. There are two issues associated with this observation. First, as we know from the growth literature, input-based growth risks incurring diminishing returns. Second, in an imperfect monetary union, it raises the question of how those inputs are being allocated. Indeed, when it comes to allocating capital, we are still making a bad job of allocating and utilising existing resources[9].

Thomas Jordan: Current challenges for the Swiss National Bank in the area of monetary policy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event of the Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 27 March 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  With its forecast that GDP will grow by 1.5%-2.0% and the average inflation rate will amount to 2%, the National Bank is cautiously optimistic for the Swiss economy in 2008. However, since the summer of 2007, the international environment has taken a clear turn for the worse: Financial markets are in a serious crisis, the major economies are weakening and inflation rates are rising worldwide. This means that the SNB’s monetary policy is facing challenges on several fronts simultaneously. With regard to economic growth, the SNB is called upon to assess the consequences of the international financial crisis for the Swiss economy as precisely as possible and to analyse their implications for monetary policy correctly and at an early stage. On the inflation front, it must ensure that the measures taken in connection with the financial market crisis do not jeopardise the credibility of a monetary policy geared to long-term price stability or shake established inflation expectations. Finally, the challenge in the money market is two-fold.
In addition, as financial markets in Asia become more developed, the markets now have the capacity to transact large quantities with cost effective pricing. In 2011, Malaysia issued the first 10 year global sovereign USD Sukuk, with the issuance size of 2 billion, under an innovative Shariah principle of Wakala which recorded the lowest absolute yields achieved by an Asian sovereign for a new USD issuance. Another recent landmark issuance on the domestic front is by PLUS Berhad, the largest toll operator in Malaysia, with the issuance of a record size of RM30.6 billion programme, equivalent to USD9.7 billion, with maturities ranging from 5 years to 27 years. The depth and breadth of Asian capital markets have drawn investors to expand their investment activities to this region. Even central banks, as traditionally conservative investors, are also venturing into investing part of their reserves, in each other’s markets. Bank Negara Malaysia, has since 2003, gradually embarked on investments in regional markets. This includes investments in the Indian rupee market. As an approved Foreign Institutional Investor, we have also been able to actively participate in the Indian rupee market. Progression in the Malaysian financial markets Progressive efforts have been made to transform Malaysia’s financial sector with a major dimension of the transformation involving achieving greater regional integration. Following a decade, institutional and financial infrastructure development that focused on enhancing domestic capacity of the financial sector while evolving a more competitive environment.

The International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) was therefore established in 2010 as a collaborative effort between 12 central banks and two multilateral organizations to facilitate effective liquidity management solutions through the periodic issuance of short-term Shariah-compliant financial instruments. Let me now conclude my remarks. This decade has been a defining moment for Asia, characterized by rapid global expansion and increased internationalisation. Among the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  important trends are the significant actions taken by many emerging economies in Asia towards increased liberalisation as well initiatives toward strengthening of cross-border linkages. Moving forward, it is essential for us to continue to establish strong collaboration given the dynamic nature of the economies and financial markets today. As the new decade beckons the prospects for new opportunities, our ability to capitalize on these opportunities and realize its potential will be increasingly determined by our capability and capacity in building such strong and lasting regional and global linkages. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
In the case of Romania, I could say we have already taken important steps towards joining the banking union: no public funds were resorted to after the crisis outbreak to support the banking system and now its liquidity and solvency ratios are well above the prudential thresholds. While the NPL ratio has declined from a peak of around 22 percent in 2014 to 4.8 percent in February 2019, profitability returned and credit growth has started to pick up. Indeed, we have to be aware that there is a fragmented banking landscape in Europe and a danger of further fragmentation, as well as other threats facing the financial system. Yet, whenever I see a problem, I say to myself that it is our job to address them. This means we should stand ready to deal with all the challenges that need to be overcome. Whenever things seem to look bad in the EU, I remember the words of Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the EU project: “Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”. Time has proved him right and I trust his words will always remain true. Besides, we need to value that Europe is united in diversity. Diversity is an outstanding asset for Europe, and it should not be regarded as a permanent liability. In trying times it is essential to capitalise on what unites us. And many things already created bridges between us well before the creation of the EU.

Mugur Isărescu: Is European financial integration stalling? Opening remarks by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the EUROFI High Level Seminar, Bucharest, 3 April 2019. * * * Honourable guests, Ladies and gentlemen, Please allow me to welcome you here, at the Royal Palace. We are honoured to host here, in Bucharest, so many outstanding guests at such a landmark event. It is a perfect occasion to exchange views and liaise with representatives of public and banking authorities and of the financial industry across the European Union. During the talks over the past few days, and particularly on the occasion of the EUROFI Highlevel Seminar, I heard strong voices from the banking community which were rather pessimistic about the prospects of further banking and financial integration. We, at the Eastern frontier of the EU, are compelled to take a more positive outlook regarding the future of our continent. Speaking about the difficulties of the financial sector in Europe, it is important to point out the positive aspects and evolutions as well. Certainly, favourable developments have taken place all over Europe and we should acknowledge them and move forward with more confidence. Specifically, financial fragmentation has been mitigated as a result of broad-based non-standard policy measures taken by the ECB. Looking ahead, completing the Economic and Monetary Union, which involves risk-sharing tools and risk-reduction efforts, is the way forward to address financial fragmentation.