samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When a faulty motorcycle is brought to a mechanic, he may simply jump to conclusions based on his  2  BIS Review 161/2008  previous knowledge. Instead of subjecting the motorcycle to a thorough scientific inquiry, he may conclude that the fault lies in a certain part or a certain mechanism. To reach this conclusion, he has not gathered the relevant information. The chances are that he may be correct or may not be correct. If he is correct, the repair performed on the basis of the diagnosis made with imperfect information will prove to be a success. But the mechanic in that case has behaved like a speculator and the outcome of speculation may have the chance of being a success or a failure. If it turns out to be a failure, the cost to the owner of the motorcycle would be enormous. In that case, since the correct repair has not been performed, the motorcycle will continue to remain faulty. Hence, a true scientist engaging himself in scientific inquiry should not be a speculator. Instead, he should be a person willing to follow the scientific method to arrive at conclusions. Decisions could be made by a mechanic attending to a faulty motorcycle by resorting to either inductivism or deductivism. The inductive approach requires the mechanic to look for evidence in the real world and come to conclusions. For instance, if we see crows that are black and if we continue to see black crows, we may conclude that all crows are black.

In this fast-changing environment, public policies should be agile and should help build innovation and growth • The success of the payment services directives (PSD1&2) has illustrated that the European legislation can accompany new trends and trigger innovation. With new settlement assets such as Global Stablecoins, the adaptation of existing regimes will have to fit into a larger regulatory framework, to be adopted at a global level. • Central banks need to have an in-depth understanding of innovation and souldn’t be afraid to “learn by doing”. The Banque de France is now engaging with the innovators from the private sector to conduct a program of 8 experiments, with a view to integrating a wholesale CBDC into innovative procedures for exchanging and settling tokenized financial assets. The expansion of the BIS Innovation Hub with the establishment, in Paris and Frankfurt, of the Eurosystem Centre will definitely accelerate the collaboration among central banks in innovative financial technologies. • We, the ECB and the Eurosysteme, may decide to issue a money in digital form. Let me be clear: we cannot allow ourselves to lag behind on CBDC. That may mean that we create if necessary a retail CBDC, in order to ensure the accessibility of central bank money for the general public, in particular in countries where the use of cash in payments is declining. And/or it may mean that we Europeans may decide to issue a wholesale CBDC, with the aim of improving the functioning of financial markets and institutions.
Let me limit my observations to the value of fiscal prudence and sustainability. Arguably, the most important lesson of Gallatin’s achievements is that public debt reduction requires unwavering political commitment to fiscal discipline. This lesson is certainly relevant in the context of today’s fiscal challenges. Gallatin faced an unexpected fiscal time bomb in the form of a war with Great Britain. The developed world now faces a predictable and rapidly ticking fiscal time bomb in the form of aging populations. The demographic strains on government budgets in the developed world are already visible. Pressures will almost certainly intensify in coming years. The implication is that in the not-too-distant future, spending on public goods and services will have to contract. Alternatively, taxes could be raised in an attempt to maintain the level of public  27  Wright and Cowen, op.cit. 28  For all these references, see Chernov, op.cit., p. 647. 6  BIS Review 106/2008  goods and services we currently enjoy. Given these longer-term fiscal strains, we should be building up a fiscal cushion rather than becoming more indebted. Allow me to review very briefly some trends in budget deficits and debt levels in the developed world. Historically, government budget deficits have been typically used to finance wars. War time deficits have then been compensated by surpluses in times of peace. This cycle of deficit finance and subsequent debt reduction is illustrated in fig 1. It shows historical deficits for G7 countries excluding Germany.

The principle of so-called “insignificant host”, as viewed from home supervisor’s perspective, may contradict with the agreed principle of the need for the host to oversee systemically important institutions. Thus, a host supervisor should receive better information and even be included in supervisory colleges by home supervisor, if the global bank branch operations are systemically important to the host economy. Colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, This is a challenging time, with new paradigm, and therefore leadership by all of us is required to ensure that we set a balanced agenda in our reforms going forward. I believe SEANZA forum would become all the more valuable in the future in cementing our network and friendship. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 146/2009
This came against the background of quite volatile movements in the global currency markets, which included, most notably, a sustained weakening of the US dollar against other currencies. At the risk of stating the obvious, an orderly depreciation of the US against other currencies is in Hong Kong's interests because it means that, because Hong Kong's currency is linked to the US dollar, Hong Kong also becomes more competitive. This larger point may have been overlooked in all of the fuss about the somewhat less significant strengthening of the Hong Kong dollar against the US dollar. With regard to the Mainland's currency, the political pressures from outside for an appreciation of the renminbi exchange rate have been prompted by the considerable attention that is being given in the US to the bilateral trade imbalance between the Mainland and the United States. The arguments for appreciation are that, from the US perspective, Chinese exports are undervalued and therefore unfairly competitive, and, from the Chinese perspective, the substantial capital inflow into the Mainland might carry long-term risks. Leaving aside the arguments about trade, let us look a little more closely at the question of capital inflow and how to manage it. First, to put things in perspective, it should be noted that the Mainland's current account surplus is really very small by international standards perhaps something around one per cent of GDP in the first half of 2003. This is much lower than the corresponding figures for many other economies.

Exports continue to grow, deflation has moderated, and unemployment appears to have peaked. Less easy to quantify is the change in mood, although it is, as I have said, shown to some extent in the activities in the markets, as well as in consumer spending. What is, I think, clear to every observer, however cynical, is that there has been, among all sectors of the community, a marked and quite sudden turnaround, from pessimism bordering on despair to a cheerful if cautious optimism. This comes as a huge relief after the gloom and despondency of the second quarter. Important initiatives, such as CEPA and the relaxation of restrictions on individual travellers from the Mainland, have undoubtedly helped to stimulate confidence. So too have the general - though by no means conclusive - signals that the world economy is also in better shape. It is also very likely that the recent surge in markets and the gradual growth in economic activity are part of a longer-term trend, going on for at least a year now, in which there have been underlying improvements in the Hong Kong economy. Deflation, under the discipline of the Link, has made Hong Kong more competitive: it is now a less expensive city in which to do business or take a holiday. The real effective exchange rate for the Hong Kong dollar - which is a true measure of the competitiveness of an economy - has declined by 24% over the past five years.
8  I remember this period very vividly, because I was fortunate to have the opportunity to discuss and debate the problems of current monetary policy, deflation and liquidity traps in a group of great economists at Princeton University that included Ben Bernanke (before he left to be a Governor at the Federal Reserve Board), Alan Blinder, Paul Krugman, Chris Sims and Michael Woodford. 9  See Svensson (2003a) for a discussion of policy options before and in a liquidity trap. 10  Kohn (2008), after extensive discussion, concludes that there is insufficient evidence that low interest rates would have contributed much to the house-price boom and that higher interest rates would have had much dampening effect on it. Del Negro, Marco, and Christopher Otrok (2007) find small effects of Fed monetary policy on house prices during 2001-2005, whereas Iacoviello, Matteo, and Stefano Neri (2008) find larger effects, although their including the Regulation-Q period in their sample may increase the apparent monetary policy effect on housing. BIS Review 112/2009  5  One obvious conclusion is that price stability is not enough to achieve financial stability (Carney 2009, White 2006). Good flexible inflation targeting by itself does not achieve financial stability, if anyone ever believed that. Specific policies and instruments are needed to ensure financial stability. Another conclusion is that interest-rate policy is not enough to achieve financial stability.

Through the CBC's  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  actions over the past years and its coordinating role in the Committee, we have shown that we consider the issue of utmost importance. Moreover, in line with recommendations by international bodies such as the World Bank, I would also like to express the willingness of the CBC to have a leading role in the implementation stage of the National Strategy. I am positive that both the State and the private stakeholders share my belief that investing in financial literacy undoubtedly means investing in a sound financial future for our country and its people. It is now time for Cyprus to take the bold step in this direction. I would like to wish you all a fruitful seminar and discussion. 1 Panayiotis C. Andreou & Dennis Philip, 2018. "Financial knowledge among university  students and implications for personal debt and fraudulent investments," Cyprus Economic Policy Review, University of Cyprus, Economics Research Centre, vol. 12(2), pages 3-23, December. 2 Financial Education Programs and Strategies Approaches and Available Resources,  January 2014, https://www.worldbank.org  4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
As for cooperation among authorities, the new resolution regime will take the form of a coordination framework. Accordingly, national authorities will ultimately maintain their discretion in the most important decisions, although they will be strongly encouraged to try to reach joint decisions on the ways to handle bank crises in resolution colleges. This is a realistic approach, already representing a major step forward. However, I think there may be a need for even more integration in the longer term. As an example, insolvency laws are addressed by neither the FSB standard nor the EU proposal – at least not its first phase of implementation – although they may well be important in practice. One also wonders whether there are other areas in which we could make progress. There were, and in fact continue to be, numerous proposals for the optimal European arrangement in the academic and policy sphere. Let me just mention three of them, which I find particularly inspiring. Most of you will be familiar with the influential arguments of Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, who have said that, as a form of coordination among national governments to handle cross-border bank crises, legally binding burden-sharing rules should be drawn up ex ante. Others, including David G. Mayes, have recommended adopting the prompt corrective action approach of the United States by designing a framework that would be based on stringent rules.

I think that monetary policy can best be understood in terms of the yield curve. The Riksbank implements its monetary policy by determining the repo rate, the interest rate the banks face when depositing money in accounts with the Riksbank overnight, or when borrowing money overnight. Thus, the Riksbank determines the short end of the yield curve. But the market determines the long end. Everything in between is a combination of the Riksbank’s influence and market forces. The long end is affected by many factors, not merely expectations of the repo rate. It may, as recently, be a question of a flight to safety, which has pushed up, for instance, Greek interest rates and pushed down American, German and Swedish interest rates. The Swedish yield curve is currently much lower than is consistent with the Riksbank’s repo-rate path (see Figure 14). Moreover, the banks’ lending rates are affected by other factors than the repo rate, which has led to increased spreads between the repo rate and the banks’ lending rates. This means that what is known as the transmission mechanism – how the Riksbank’s repo rate affects economic developments – has probably changed. But it is difficult to say how it has changed. On the whole, we should develop the financial part of our macroeconomic models to give greater consideration to the financial markets.
It is not surprising that these questions arise. But if they are to be discussed, it is important to separate the two tasks the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) has given us – monetary policy and financial stability. This may not be so easy, as the areas in many ways affect one another. However, I shall try to make things a little clearer. Two different tasks… What is happening right now is important, both with regard to financial stability and monetary policy. The financial turbulence has also been included in our analyses of both areas, ever since the problems connected to the mortgage market in the United States became apparent last summer. However the perspectives are different. The stability perspective concerns how the banks, the payment system and the financial system in general are affected by the financial crisis. The monetary policy perspective concerns how inflation and developments in production and employment may be affected. … which are in many ways linked As I recently mentioned, our two fields of activity are closely linked. The financial turbulence that has spread around the world to a large extent has its roots in the problems in the United States, linked to financial stability. This has led to extensive losses in the bank system in the rest of the world, to considerable uncertainty and poorer functioning in the financial markets. This is of course important to economic activity. However, economic activity in its turn affects factors that are important to financial stability.

How activist central banks can be is an issue where there seems to be quite a bit of disagreement so let me be more explicit by using the euro area as an example. Let us take the first ten years of the euro area and look at real-time estimates of the output gap as published by the IMF and by the European Commission (EC). (The information can conveniently be found on their websites.) Both organisations have suggested, virtually every spring since 1999, that the output gap for the year reported would be negative. If we compare these to recent retrospective estimates we observe a significant bias. The bias is mainly due to the fact that the experts are now more pessimistic about what potential output was in the euro area than they were in the past. This is not the experts’ fault. We simply cannot know in real time. And this applies not only to the size of the output gap, but even to its sign. In comparing what the experts tell us now and what they were telling us then, in real time, the sign of the output gap is revealed to be incorrect in more than half of the years in the first decade of the euro area. Consider the year 2006, the year before the financial turmoil began. According to the IMF and the EC, the euro area operated below its potential that year with the gap being around minus 1 percent (see Figure 1).
For example, the MPC’s monetary loosening added around £ per year to the average household’s net interest income, £ to their labour income and £ to their net wealth. The lower part of Figure 1 looks at the effects of non-financial channels on well-being, namely the reduction in the probability of unemployment, translated into income-equivalent units. 44  The increased probability of  being in a job adds in excess of £ each year for the average household. All in, this gives a boost to welfare for the average UK household of close to £ This is large relative to annual household income of £  As a memo item, and point of comparison, Figure 1 also shows an estimate of the annual cost of undertaking monetary policy, using data from the Bank of England’s accounts. 45  On a broad estimate, this annual cost  amounts to around £ per household per year. This “servicing charge” for monetary policy is clearly a very small fraction of the annual benefit to households from looser monetary policy over the period. The disaggregated analysis set out means that, in principle, a monetary policy scorecard like this could be fitted to any individual’s circumstances. As an illustration, Figures 2-4 show scorecards for three different hypothetical households: a renter under the age of 30; a 30-50 year old mortgagor; and a 50-plus home-owning household.

Altmann, R (2009), ‘Why quantitative easing is a disaster for pensions’, article in The Telegraph. Atkinson, A (2015), Inequality, Harvard University Press. Ball, L, Furceri, D, Leigh, D and Loungani, P (2013), ‘The Distributional Effects of Fiscal Consolidation’, IMF Working Paper, No. 13/151. Ball, R and Chernova, K (2008), ‘Absolute Income, Relative Income, and Happiness’, Social Indicators Research, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 497-529. Barnes, L, Feller, A, Haselswerdt, J and Porter, E (forthcoming), ‘Information, Knowledge and Attitudes: An Evaluation of the Taxpayer Receipt’, Journal of Politics. Brynjolfsson, E and McAfee, A (2016), The Second Machine Age – Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies, W. W. Norton & Company. Büchs, M, Bardsley, N and Duwe, S (2011), ‘Who bears the brunt? Distributional effects of climate change mitigation’, Critical Social Policy, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 285-307. Buiter, W (2014), ‘Central banks: Powerful, political and unaccountable?’, Journal of the British Academy, Vol. 2, pp. 269-303. Bunn, P, Drapper, L, Rowe, J and Shah, S (2015), ‘The potential impact of higher interest rates and further fiscal consolidation on households: evidence from the 2015 NMG Consulting survey’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2015 Q4, pp. 357-368. Bunn, P, Pugh, A and Yeates, C (2018), ‘The distributional impact of monetary policy easing in the UK between 2008 and 2014’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper, No. 720.
Similar to many economies in the region, commercial banks in Thailand will start maintaining capital according to Basel II by the end of next year, and by the end of 2009 for banks with the advanced approach. IAS 39, on the other hand, will be fully enforced by the Federation of Accounting Professions in the beginning of 2010. However, the Bank of Thailand has already adopted some parts of IAS 39, namely the impairment of assets since December last year, and we are now considering adjusting the related regulations to be in line with the concept of IAS 39. For Basel II, preparations on the supervision side started a number of years ago. The Bank has set up several internal working groups to study the guidelines and its suitability to the Thai market. Staff were sent abroad for training on Basel II implementation. Experts from other supervisory authorities and consultants were invited to hold seminar and training on the underlying concepts, applications, and supervision issues. The drafting of the Thai version of Basel II has been quite involving. During the drafting, the Bank of Thailand carefully studied other countries guidelines and consulted with other supervisors to gain insights on the suitability of Basel II to the Thai financial system. As a result, we have made some necessary adjustments to the guideline taking into consideration its practicality. Banks in Thailand have been consulted in the process so that the guideline does not impose extra unnecessary burden.

Recent crisis indicated that we all sail in the same waters and we may resist the waves, only if we confront these  2  BIS Review 30/2009  challenges together. Export is a generator of foreign currency flows needed so much for the currency stability, which is related to all other balances, financial system’s stability also included. Under these conditions, we should be aware that a joint action, of national importance, deeply patriotic for the values and future of the country is needed. Make the market more lively, more competitive and more innovative. Now the financial infrastructure is complete and it is up to you to use it more efficiently. It is the time to try to seek other balances in terms of foreign currency flows into the economy. Remittances have been important for a long time. They were the largest foreign currency serum in the economy. However, we should be aware that other indicators, such as exports and foreign direct investments will be prior items in the total foreign currency flows in the future. This should be realised by everyone and based on this ground, let us work together for the future. Dear participants, International initiatives are in the process. The Berlin meeting was extremely important in this regard. There was broadly discussed and converged into the idea that there is room for more coordinated actions, and protectionism is not the answer to the crisis. The London meeting will make new steps in this regard.