samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And the securities industry, while they’re making some money, it’s not at all as profitable as it was back in the days of 2005, 2006, before the great financial crisis. Now that profitability was a little bit ephemeral because it was not built on a strong foundation. Since then, the city I think has become a lot more diversified. Tourism has become more important. Technology – the technology sector really is about the same size now as the financial services sector. We still see pretty good manufacturing. The hollowing out of the city in terms of manufacturing seems to be over. In fact, manufacturing employment is actually doing pretty well in the city, in certain parts of Queens. It’s actually quite supportive. So, in general, it’s a pretty positive story. The city still faces challenges. I think one of the most significant ones is going to be: how does the change in the conversation about trade and immigration affect people’s willingness to visit New York City? I think there is some prospect that international tourism to New York could decline over the next few years, and that would be something that would hurt the hospitality industry in New York City. 2 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  So, that’s something that we’re going to have to keep a close eye on. Dr. Olajide Oladipo: Thank you. The Dodd-Frank Act, which is often referred to as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, placed regulations on the financial industry.

We have made constant and joint efforts so that the conclusions and recommendations left by ALSAI become a useful, guiding, helpful, and corrective tool. In view of the insofar experience, this combination is an essential component in the work of audit institutions. I have believed and still do believe that auditing is a key instrument, which serves to further perfecting public sector governance. The ALSAI has contributed and will continue to contribute to identifying various problems facing public institutions, divergences from legal and regulatory framework, with subsequent financial effects, and their correction, in accordance with legal requirements and international standards. Focusing on the future role of ALSAI, I am confident it will increase the contribution to perfecting the three main dimensions – oversight, analysis, and vision – of public governance. More specifically, •  With regard to the oversight dimension, the great dilemma is whether public entities are accomplishing their mission in detecting and preventing corruption;  •  With regard to the analysis dimension, the great dilemma is whether these institutions are making responsible decisions about economic policies, development programmes, operations and the achieved results;  •  With regard to the long-term vision dimension, the great dilemma is whether the right directions and future challenges facing auditors are properly determined.
Countries are expected to anchor fiscal prudence in national rules, creating a much more “vertically integrated” concept of governance. All these measures were unthinkable four years ago. If we look at the conclusions of Euro Summit on 26 October – dismissed by some observers as insufficient – we see even more radical steps envisaged for the future. Euro area countries have committed to adopt balanced budget rules. They have agreed to base their budgets on independent growth forecasts. They have agreed to stick to the recommendations of the Commission when implementing the Stability and Growth Pact. Countries in the Excessive Deficit Procedure – which is currently 14 out of 17 euro area countries – will allow the Commission to examine draft national budgets and monitor budget execution. Although some of the recent governance reforms, like those that formed part of the so-called “Six-pack” proposed by the European Commission, fall short of the “quantum leap” that the ECB had long advocated for the euro area, they still represent significant progress relative to the situation prevailing before the crisis. The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility and future European Stability Mechanism could also not have been imagined in 2007. The euro area has institutionalised the provision of sovereign liquidity and agreed to a Treaty change to ensure its legality. As the new facilities have developed, they have acquired a range of tools.

Rather than building up buffers during “the good times”, increased tax revenues associated with the pre-crisis housing booms were treated as structural rather than cyclical, justified by models demonstrating new growth trends. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Taken together, this meant that some of the euro area countries entered the global financial crisis in an unnecessarily vulnerable position. This explains to a large extent the situation we are now in. However, these policy failures were also made possible by a general failure to acknowledge the new governance responsibilities associated with membership of EMU. Put simply, “keeping your own house in order” is necessary, but not sufficient, in a highly integrated monetary union. It is the responsibility of every euro area government to exercise vigorous and effective mutual surveillance over others’ policies. As a crisis in a country like Greece representing only 2% of euro area GDP can become systemic, disregarding EMU governance may come at a high cost to taxpayers. Yet the latter was the attitude prevailing prior to the crisis. The Stability and Growth Pact – the set of EU level rules for guiding fiscal policies – was never properly implemented. Member States tended to adopt a principle of “non-interference” over each others’ policies. Peer pressure, on which the framework was predicated, gave way to peer support. By watering-down of SGP in 2004–05, the largest euro area countries signalled that they had no stake in the rules.
The assets managed by their foreign subsidiaries are estimated to be worth more than € trillion, adding to the € trillion euro managed out of Paris. Finally, with regard to the regulatory aspects, and to meet international requirements, France believes that regulation is a major competitive driver. First because trust, investor protection and market robustness are essential and, second, because the regulatory process and better regulation principles are worked out to accompany financial innovation in accordance with prudential principles. Our regulators are taking driving initiatives to harmonise the European regulatory framework and facilitate the integration of the European financial market in order to increase its critical mass and therefore its efficiency even for non-European investors and issuers. That is why also the French market is continually being upgraded to the highest standards of ethics and corporate governance so that French companies comply with best international practices. Ladies and Gentlemen, As we can see, globalization and structural changes are driving all of us to conduct business in a different way and offer new and major opportunities, especially through the development of crossborder activities. In this context, Paris EUROPLACE is a key player at the European and global level and the Paris financial center currently offers the best opportunities and environment to invest in Europe. Let me conclude by mentioning that Paris EUROPLACE is today launching a financial services cluster dedicated to financial innovation and the development of new value added projects between academic research and industrial companies with the participation of market professionals, universities and research centers.

[11]  The upshot is that more firms have been protected and more jobs have been saved. Without the ECB’s policies, we estimate that over one million more people would have lost their jobs. [12]  But we are not out of the woods yet. With the tremendous progress made on vaccine technology, we can now see the light at the end of the tunnel. But we still cannot see exactly how long that tunnel is. We will continue to face a period of high uncertainty until more people have been vaccinated against the virus. In this setting, it is crucial that the bridge for SMEs remains in place for as long as needed. The ECB will help ensure that firms and families can access the finance they need to weather this storm – and that they can do so in the confidence that financing conditions will not tighten prematurely. That commitment is the best way to provide certainty to all sectors of the economy and to bring stability back to the euro area swiftly. And this, in turn, is the best contribution we can make to delivering on our mandate of price stability. 5/8  As Goethe said, “Im Idealen kommt alles auf die élans, im Realen auf die Beharrlichkeit an.”[13] Reality is currently hard for many firms and the future remains uncertain. And so we will persist and persevere until the pandemic emergency has passed.
13.11.2020  The European response to the COVID‑-19 crisis Opening address - Fundación Internacional Olof Palme Conference Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  *English translation of the original speech in Spanish  Why joint European action was/is necessary As in the rest of the world, the COVID-19 outbreak has triggered in the euro area a health and economic crisis that is unprecedented in recent history. Against this backdrop, the economic policy response has had to be very forceful to mitigate the short-term economic effects and to prevent those effects from becoming persistent and affecting growth in the medium and long-term. The fact that this crisis is global also means that a coordinated response among the different countries is more effective both in combating the pandemic and as regards the capacity to facilitate economic recovery for all. The need for a coordinated response is particularly evident for European Union (EU) Member States, given the very high level of economic and financial interconnectedness. This is especially true in the euro area, because it shares a common currency, which increases both the economic benefits of joint action and the negative consequences of possible inaction. Although the shock triggered by the pandemic is global, this crisis is affecting the EU unevenly, reinforcing the reasons for acting jointly at the supranational level. Several dimensions of heterogeneity are particularly significant in this setting. First, the crisis associated with the pandemic is having a highly significant heterogenous impact at sectoral level.

And unemployment has fallen from a peak of 10½% on a claimant count basis at the beginning of 1993 to the present rate of 4%. That is the lowest for 20 years in the UK as a whole, and just about the lowest in nearly every region. In Yorkshire and Humberside unemployment is 4.7%, the lowest rate since June 1980. Our problem - and it is a real problem, as we have recognised for some time - is the imbalance, within the overall economy, between the domestically-oriented businesses and sectors, and those that are most internationally exposed. In part that imbalance is a hangover from the slowdown in global activity from the end of 1997 through to the start of 1999 - though the welcome recovery in global demand means that this influence is now diminishing. The more important factor now is the persistent weakness of the euro - not exclusively against sterling but equally against the dollar and the yen. The impact is particularly severe on the UK because of the closer ties between our economy and that of the Eurozone. I’ve not heard a wholly convincing explanation for the euro’s persistent weakness. Many analysts relate it to market concerns about structural rigidities in some parts of the Eurozone, which are encouraging direct capital outflows attracted elsewhere by higher prospective earnings growth. Whatever the cause, few of those I talk to expect the weakness of the euro to persist.
7/15  Implementation of Basel III  I have previously referred to the need for banks to plan their future capital requirements, whether as a result of their business projections or of regulatory changes. In this connection, the importance of strengthening, as far as possible, current capital levels should be interpreted against the background of the challenge – a further challenge – entailed by the entry into force of the final stage of Basel III. Last week the EBA published an update of the estimated impact that the implementation of the outstanding elements of Basel III will have on European Union (EU) banks. According to this estimate, risk-weighted assets (RWAs) will increase in the EU as a whole by 24.4%, meaning additional capital totalling € billion in order to respond to new needs. Naturally, we should qualify these figures. Let us not forget that they reflect estimates made under conservative assumptions that banks will not adjust their portfolios to lessen the attendant impact. The EBA itself indicates that needs would fall to € billion if banks decided to retain all their profits during the transitory period. The reforms will not affect all banks equally. Large banks, in particular those that use internal models (IRB), will be most affected, with the impact being restricted to an 11.3% increase in RWAs for medium-sized banks and of only 5.5% for the smallest banks. The main impact will stem from the application of the regulatory floor for those risk-weighted assets calculated using the internal ratings-based approach.

By now all persons, goods, services and capital can move freely from one country to another. This is the case for France and Germany. Trade is a good example of this integration. The share of French imports coming from Germany is currently about 19%, while the share of German imports coming from France is about 15%. Each country is the other's first trading partner. Beyond these gross figures, it is interesting to note that this trade is largely made of complementary goods as opposed to substitutable goods, thus increasing interdependence. This interdependence is not only commercial, it is more generally macroeconomic. Econometric work has indeed shown that French and German GDPs are closely correlated. This means that national economic policies cannot deviate excessively from each other. These foundations progressively convinced France and Germany that they needed a common monetary destiny As I said earlier, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system led European Governements to organize monetary relations between each other. France and Germany were among the most prominent actors in this strategy. I personally see two main elements in this common destiny: the creation of the European monetary system (EMS) in 1979 and the emergence of a conceptual convergence between our two countries as regards monetary issues. The creation of the European Monetary System in March 1979 highlights best the cooperation between France and Germany.
Then, the collapse of a major financial player mid-September 2008 transformed a large-scale crisis of confidence into a global financial panic. Financial intermediaries scrambled to restore liquidity buffers, shed risk and tightened lending conditions. Collectively, they engaged in a large-scale process of “deleveraging”. Credit spreads surged and trading activity in a large number of markets collapsed. In these unprecedented circumstances, the ECB’s primary mission was to preserve price stability, in line with our definition – below 2% but close to 2% – and therefore contribute to financial stability. As the inflationary pressures seen over the summer of 2008 receded, we swiftly reduced our policy interest rate in a tight series of steps down to 1%. This interest rate level has not been experienced in the countries of the euro area at any time in recent history. In parallel, we had to tackle the paralysis of inter-bank transactions in the money market. As you know, the flow of credit is primarily channelled by banks in the euro area. A complete breakdown in the funding relationships that constitute the money market would have derailed the bank lending channel altogether. The interruption of the bank lending channel would have made our policy action ineffective. It could have turned the financial crisis into a profound depression. This is what motivated the second tier of our approach to crisis management: what we refer to as our policy of “enhanced credit support”.

For what concerns the ECB and the entire Eurosystem team, with Banco de España as a very active member of the team, our 330 million fellow citizens in the euro area ask that we continue to deliver price stability over the medium term, in line with our definition – less than 2% but close to 2%. Our determination to anchor solidly inflation expectations has served us well since the introduction of the euro, including in the recent period of crisis, by helping to avoid the materialisation of the risk of deflation. 6  BIS Review 150/2009  The euro area can count on us to continue to be a solid anchor of stability and confidence in these challenging times. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 150/2009  7
The upgrade of CGO has been effected utilising CREST software -- deliberately, in order to align those two electronic settlement systems -- CGO for gilts, CREST for equities -- more closely. This was a considerable technical achievement, because the operating processes in the two markets are different -- equities settle on T+5, gilts on T+1 (and in some cases T+0); the equity market comprises a large number of relatively moderate-value deals, the gilt market a smaller number of much higher-value deals; hence delay in settlement in gilts is much more disruptive, and needs to be much less frequent, than in equities. Overcoming these differences has been a considerable challenge to the Bank team and I would like to pay tribute to their dedication and expertise and to their achievement in bringing the CGO upgrade to a successful and so far smooth launch just last week. I say this without immodesty because, though I was closely involved in overseeing the project, it was their technical proficiency that delivered the goods. 37. But this achievement has a wider significance. By utilising CREST software in CGO, we have now achieved for the market much of the benefit sought by those who favour a merger of the two systems. In particular, both utilise the same hardware, and the same software application; they operate on the same networks; and users can access both systems via a single terminal using a common gateway.

This is that the new single-currency, euro, markets develop trading practices and standards of conduct, and the necessary infrastructure, that will genuinely facilitate integration. In terms of infrastructure, for example, real-time, same-day wholesale payments are essential to tie together money market activity conducted in different centres in the same instrument in the single currency; and similarly, linkages may also need to be considered between different settlement systems. Common trading practices, and market conventions, will also need to be developed. The lead here lies in many cases with market participants themselves, and with the systems they have developed to serve their trading needs. But it is a process we are very familiar with in London, where we have sought when necessary to encourage just such common initiatives in order to enhance the effectiveness of international trading activity in London. And with an eye on EMU, we have encouraged trading activity in the ECU, particularly in the money markets: hence, for example, the regular programme of monthly auctions for UK government ECU treasury bills, and the quarterly auctions of UK government three-year ECU notes, which have been running for some years. Because of the international flavour of our markets, and because we are conscious that these markets will want to trade the full range of euro instruments in London, we will continue to support initiatives aimed at achieving the necessary market structure where we feel we can make a contribution. Reforms in the London markets  BIS Review 110/1997  -7-  35.
The trend of increasing debt among households, combined with a large share of mortgages at variable rates, may also have meant that households’ sensitivity to fluctuations in house prices and interest rates has increased over time. Several international studies imply that a high level of debt in itself can aggravate the negative effects of a fall in house prices on consumption.2 Since we published the inquiry into the risks in the Swedish housing market, house prices have levelled off, and household debt has increased at a slower rate. It is important to remember that this development is probably partly explained by the monetary policy conducted; for instance, the repo rate was raised in connection with the strong recovery after the financial crisis, and as I mentioned, we have taken into account the risks linked to household debt in our repo-rate decisions over the past year. Another possible reason for the slower developments is the mortgage cap, to which I will return later. As household debt in Sweden is still high, and higher than in many of the countries that have suffered major problems, I still consider the risks to be substantial (see Figure 5). 1  See, for instance, Sveriges Riksbank (2011), The Riksbank’s inquiry into risks in the Swedish housing market. 2  See, for instance, IMF (2012), World Economic Outlook, April, and also R. Glick and K.J. Lancing (2010), “Global Household Leverage, House Prices, and Consumption”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter 1.

To address the pressing issues facing home and host country relations in this context, the Vienna Initiative was relaunched as “The Vienna Initiative II”. It focuses on fostering homehost authority coordination to support stable cross-border banking, and help protect the economy from disorderly deleveraging. As a member of the Steering Committee of the Vienna Initiative II, I have underlined the need for a more effective home-host coordination, promoting Albania’s position as a host country. Given the geographical proximity and high exposure to recent developments in the EU  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  financial markets, I am confident that our countries would significantly benefit from developing a regional perspective on risks and opportunities arising from such developments, and major supervisory reforms at the regional level. In this context, Albania’s membership in the Steering Committee of the Vienna Initiative, and the Working Group on Banking Union and Emerging Europe is a solid foundation to build upon and synthesize the common concerns of our countries vis-á-vis EU authorities. Allow me now to summarize the insofar position of the Bank of Albania, articulated in the framework of the Vienna Initiative II, and propose a number of discussion topics, which I am confident will lead to a fruitful exchange of views today. The Bank of Albania has called for effective mechanisms to restore healthy lending to the economies of non-EU countries, where systemic subsidiaries of EU banking groups operate. In this context, EU authorities and EU banking groups should provide their active contribution.