samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In 2019, 6% of Spain’s energy imports (4.5% of total energy consumption) came from Russia, but this figure is much higher for countries such as Germany (17%) and Italy (22%). 2 In 2019, Spain’s exports of goods to Russia and Ukraine accounted for 0.7% and 0.2%, respectively, of its total goods exports, while the figures for the euro area were slightly higher, at 1.6% and 0.3%, respectively. 2  certain production processes could be significant, particularly in the context of trade and financial sanctions. iii. Finance. Although direct financial exposure to Russia and Ukraine is generally very limited among European firms and banks (especially, once again, among Spanish ones), since the beginning of the conflict financial market volatility has increased and financing conditions have tightened. In particular, euro area stock markets have fallen sharply, especially in Germany and Italy which both have greater relative exposure to Russia. Capital market financing costs for financial and non-financial corporations have also risen. And all this, in addition to the notable uncertainty about the possible medium and long-term implications of the exclusion of the Russian economy from international financial channels which could, for example, result in the growth of more opaque alternative financial channels or mechanisms. iv. Confidence. Lastly, the war in Ukraine is doubtless having an adverse effect on economic activity, owing to the difficulties economic agents are having foreseeing future economic developments, in particular the future path of their own incomes.

In any event, the recovery was still influenced by the course of the pandemic, partly as a result of the emergence of new variants of the virus. Another novel feature of economic performance in 2021 was the strong global surge in inflation. This was especially severe in both energy and non-energy commodities, after many years in which their price increases had remained at persistently low levels. The intensity and persistence of the inflation surge – fuelled by both demand and supply factors – systematically surprised on the upside. Notable among the demand factors are the relatively strong recovery in activity following the collapse in 2020 and the changing consumption patterns as a consequence of the pandemic and the measures adopted to contain it. Among the supply factors, global production and supply chain disruptions, as a consequence of the disruptions in the production of certain intermediate goods and in some modes of international goods transport, stand out. Both these aspects – a recovery influenced by the course of the pandemic and continuous upside inflation surprises – continued to determine the pace of the global economy at the start of 2022. Accordingly, before the invasion, analyst consensus forecasts broadly coincided in expecting a first quarter in which economic activity would decelerate somewhat as a consequence of the negative, but relatively limited, impact of the Omicron variant.
We believe that the direct contact with various social groups in different geographic regions (that is to each and every family), in addition to the traditional means of communication, press conferences, monetary policy or financial stability reports, is a very efficient tool and frequently determinant. BIS Review 115/2008  1  I would like to dwell today on some matters of interest to the entire audience. First I would like to make a brief outline of the Bank of Albania’s latest analysis of the economic and financial situation in Albania: In brief, three are the main developments of greatest interest to the audience: With regard to the international developments, the economic and financial situation has been very complex in the last months. Inflation has turned into a point of concern in most foreign economies, mainly driven by the high prices of raw materials, oil and food. In addition, economic activity in developed economies has experienced sharp turns. Euro area economy is at present in front of many questions, while the US and some Asian economies have shown slow rates of economic growth. Credit crisis has caused many reputable international institutions to experience large financial losses and its contamination process is still present. Recently, the two US mortgage giants, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which were on the verge of collapse, were subject to an unprecedented and costly rescue plan designed by the US Treasury Department.

How can they be managed more effectively? For a relatively long period of time, they have been vital to our country. According to a Bank of Albania survey on the first quarter of 2008, about 26% of Albanian households living in the territory of the Republic of Albania are recipients of remittances from abroad. Households’ geographical distribution indicates that 59% of recipient families live in the rural areas while the rest in the urban ones, receiving about 66% and 34% of total workers’ remittances, respectively. Remittances represent the most important component of rural families’ monthly income, accounting for about 40%. The largest part of workers’ remittances (about 70%) for the first quarter of 2008 was used for non-productive purposes. About 48% was used for consumption, which entails meeting households’ everyday needs for food, clothes, furniture, etc., 16% for construction and reconstruction and 10% for education and medical purposes. Around 19% of remittances are used for investment and savings, providing evidence for their economic impact on Albania. Despite these figures, their future prospective is yet unclear. The integration of Albanians into their host countries, their economic and financial situation and other similar reasons have a negative impact in the long term. Our analyses and assessments show that the difficult economic situation the developed economies have been experiencing, expressed in the economic slowdown, unemployment growth and increase of inflation, has also provided its impact on the performance of remittances which have grown less this year relative to the previous years.
The Swiss franc was overvalued against a broad range of currencies, resulting in a severe deterioration in the economic and inflation outlook for Switzerland, threatening severe consequences for the real economy. To turn this dramatic tide of events, at first the SNB increased its liquidity – in August 2011 alone, liquidity expansion amounted to CHF 170 billion. This measure, however, did not have a sustained effect. Finally, in September 2011, the SNB introduced a minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro as a temporary, exceptional measure (cf. chart 9). The SNB was thereby prepared to use its balance sheet to purchase foreign currency in order to stop the spread of panic. While this policy measure corrected the exceptional strength of the Swiss franc, the currency remained substantially overvalued. Nevertheless, the stabilisation of the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate allowed the Swiss economy to adjust to the new currency reality. In addition, the inflation outlook, which had worsened due to the strong Swiss franc, brightened again. The euro crisis impacted not just the economy in Switzerland, but also the economies and exchange rates of the other neighbouring countries under review. They, too, eased their 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  monetary policies. In Sweden, from the end of 2011 to the end of 2013, interest rates were lowered in successive steps to 1%; between 2010 and 2011, they had been raised to 2% on the back of robust economic growth.

Developments since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, however, have served as a reminder that monetary policy cannot always keep inflation and growth stable within a targeted range. This is true of both large and small currency areas. One reason is that the scale of the disruptions and distortions of recent years has been unusually large. Furthermore, the situation has been exacerbated by the fact that conventional interest rate policy has reached its limits. By introducing unconventional monetary policy measures, central banks have regained a certain room for manoeuvre. However, these unconventional measures cannot be deployed endlessly to achieve desirable monetary conditions. Interest rates, for example, cannot continue to be lowered into negative territory without at some point precipitating a flight to cash. Foreign exchange market interventions and quantitative easing programmes carry with them the increasing risk that a central bank’s ability to conduct monetary policy may be compromised in the long term. Furthermore, our practical experience of calibrating unconventional measures and of gauging their effects is still limited compared to that of the conventional interest rate instrument. In light of these reservations, unconventional measures must be used with caution, and their long-term consequences taken into consideration. They must also be continuously reassessed. Allow me now to illustrate how countries neighbouring the euro area have implemented their monetary policy since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, using Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden as examples.
The crisis severely eroded people’s trust in the industry, both here and abroad. Governments and regulators quickly got to work fixing the main deficiencies in the existing regulatory framework. These included requiring much stronger loss-absorbing capital to weather severe economic downturns, demanding greater liquidity cushions to withstand market and funding disruptions, and creating a robust resolution framework to protect both the economy and the taxpayer in the event of a failure of a systemically important firm. These changes were appropriate and necessary. We must not lose sight of their importance in safeguarding the soundness of the financial system and in ensuring that future generations do not have to suffer the economic trauma that we lived through this past decade. Bringing us to the present day, we are in a much, much better place, in terms of both the financial sector and the overall economy. We have a more robust regulatory regime in place, and banks are well positioned to survive future storms. Furthermore, our economy’s in great shape; we’re in the second-longest expansion in history, and economic data from both the United States and countries around the world continue to trend upwards. As a policymaker, solid growth, a strong labor market, and inflation near our target are all exactly what I want to see. Paradoxically, it’s precisely this sense that things have gotten so much better that worries me most.

John C Williams: Now is the time for banking culture reform Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Governance and Culture Reform Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 18 June 2018. * * *  Introduction It’s a pleasure to speak at today’s conference on this critically important issue, one that Bill Dudley and his colleagues have done tremendous work bringing to the forefront over the past few years. It’s also an honor to be sharing a stage with Bill today, and I’d like to thank him for his outstanding leadership of the New York Fed. I’ve learned a great deal from this conference, especially hearing the diverse perspectives and experiences of regulators from across the globe, industry leaders, and academic experts. The speakers and discussions have already covered a lot of ground, so I’ll keep my remarks brief. This afternoon I’m going to talk about the urgent need to focus our attention on banking culture in supervision and what that means in practice. Before I go any further, I have to give the usual Fed disclaimer that the views I express are my own, and not necessarily those of anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. The Good Times Are When to Get Your House in Order In the wake of the financial crisis and ensuing economic downturn, the world’s attention was trained on financial services.
It is, therefore, imperative for developers to adjust their product offerings and consider bringing their costs down. One of the ways would be to seriously explore leveraging on more advanced and cost-efficient construction technology, such as Industrialised Building System (IBS). As cost of construction remains one of the major determinants of house prices, increasing efficiency and lowering costs can lead to a more inclusive housing market. Beyond considerations for price points that reflect greater affordability for the buyer, developers also have the responsibility to build houses that cater to the modern needs of the public. Aspects of quality, sufficient amenities and safety must be considered as critical elements of modern living. Financial institutions also play an important role in the housing market through the provision of financing. The effective intermediation role of financial institutions is equally critical for a wellfunctioning housing market. In the provision of financing, financial institutions need to ensure that they lend responsibly to those who are deserving, capable and able to repay. Financial institutions need to protect the public interest by ensuring that buyers do not borrow beyond their means and fall into financial hardship. To this end, the financial institutions should also continue to provide effective and transformative financial services to ensure that society at large would benefit and thus, improve their quality of life. I take note that there are a few interesting sessions during this conference related to innovations in finance, including one on fintech.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Central banks’ response to the “tragedy on the horizon” Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the SUERF – Online Conference, 14 October 2020. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to join you today for this discussion that, although virtual, will be very real in terms of the strength of the ideas put forward. I am grateful to Michala Marcussen for offering me the opportunity to give this speech on such a dense topic: central banks’ response to the “tragedy on the horizon”. Faced with an unpredictable shock, the past eight months have driven the global economy into uncharted territory. However, one danger is certainly looming larger at the moment : our lasting addiction to public debt. Let me be clear: in the face of the unprecedented covid-shock, a massive and one-off recourse to public debt financing was both inevitable and desirable. However, we have entered this crisis with public debt levels, which were already very high in most countries, with few notable exceptions. The continuous rise of public debt, along with climate change, represent two of the main long-run challenges that we face today. In his famous 2015 speech, Mark Carney spoke of climate change as the “tragedy of the horizon”. With this, he meant that this tragedy is inevitable if we do not act, but it is in the long term, possibly leading to a “status quo bias”.
Obtaining and retaining the staff resources capable of dealing with Year 2000 issues will be another increasingly difficult problem. There is a limited pool of skilled technical staff to make needed changes, and demands on this pool are growing as the time draws closer. In the short run, the ability to add to this pool significantly through training is limited. Qualified outside consultants already are heavily committed and will become even more scarce over time. Obtaining equipment on which to conduct tests also often requires significant lead time. All of this suggests that controlling the cost of Year 2000 projects will be a problem for many institutions as resource prices are bid up. Already, we have seen many institutions increase their Year 2000 budgets several times, and by significant amounts, as they develop their detailed plans. Security also is likely to be of increasing concern as we move forward. As time pressures mount, there is a risk that shortcuts will be taken. The checking of credentials for new staff or outside contractors or consultants may be rushed and less rigorous. Date-dependent security applications may be turned off to facilitate testing. In an industry like ours, with so much interconnectivity, any compromise of security simply cannot be tolerated. BIS Review 87/1997  -3-  Every financial institution needs its own comprehensive project plan to address the Year 2000 problem. In the United States, bank supervisors have suggested an approach that includes a number of phases.

All of us need to make sure we are paying sufficient attention and applying appropriate resources to the Year 2000 issue. Only in that way will we be able to insure that the millennium changeover is an occasion for joy and optimism. BIS Review 87/1997
It’s a world that presents us with enormous new possibilities, but also enormous new challenges.” 2 In my presentation here today I will, not surprisingly, take a central banker’s view and ponder the challenges this new world might raise for a central bank trying to achieve both financial and nominal stability. Financial stability The last decade or so, we have witnessed increased financial integration and competition across national borders. The unleashing of international competition in financial markets is a positive development. By spreading and diversifying risk, financial markets have become more efficient and stable. Deeper and more mature markets tend to be better equipped to deal with uncertainty and distress. We have also witnessed the forging of new and ever more complex financial instruments. Increasing the set of available financial instruments creates more complete markets. It enhances the opportunities for households and enterprises to decouple consumption and investment from current income. Investors can take on or load off risks in a more tailored fashion than before and actively manage their exposures and relocate risks to those best equipped to bear them. Yet, the flip side of increased financial integration and diversification is the potential for more widespread contagion if something goes wrong. Furthermore, rapid innovation and increased complexity can make it difficult to assess the real underlying risks of the new instruments. It takes time for borrowers and lenders to learn the true characteristics of new instruments.

When no trading takes place, no updated prices are quoted. This represents a challenge for institutions, auditors and regulators trying to mark assets and liabilities to the market. This has amplified the impact on the financial sector of the defaults on subprime mortgages. In the absence of pricing, the balance sheets of financial institutions holding such instruments became opaque. Uncertainty about the potential loss of other banks and about their own future liquidity needs has made banks reluctant to lend to each other. To the surprise and dismay of many, the extremely efficient and well-functioning money market ground to halt. Central banks had to step in and provide liquidity to the banking system. When money markets go into gridlock, it is appropriate for central banks to ease banks’ liquidity problems, but they should do so at a price that maintains the incentive to restore the smooth functioning of the market. Losses and evaporating liquidity then hit the capital base of many financial institutions. So far, the most severe problems have been local or national, like the British bank Northern Rock and the Norwegian brokerage house Terra Securities. These problems were resolved by means of national remedies. But with increased integration and the emergence of crossborder banks, sooner or later we are bound to encounter a problem in a bank or financial institution that may be systemically important in several countries (but not necessarily in the home country).
Figure 7 Foreign credit flows to residents (billions of dollars) 3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.5  -1.0  -1.0  -1.5  -1.5  -2.0 Jan.07  Jul.07  Jan.08  New credits to banks  Jul.08  Jan.09  -2.0 Jul.09  New credits to non-banks  Net flow (*) (*) Discounting bank and non-bank amortizations from total new credits. Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS Review 145/2009  9  Figure 8 World growth (1) (annual change, percentage) 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12  80  84  88  92  96  00  04  World at market exchange rate  15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12  08  Chile (2)  (1) Gray area shows projections as from 2009. (2) Figures for growth in 2009 and 2010 stand for the midpoint of the range of projections shown in the Monetary Policy Report. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

This is done both because we recognize the lags with which monetary policy operates, and because of our concern about the costs in terms of output loss and employment of adjusting inflation to the target. If we do not do this, the adjustment would take much less time to complete. All this is common knowledge. But I feel it needs to be stressed in order to clear, yet one more time, the mistaken argument that the CBC does not consider the level of economic activity when making its decisions. Additionally it serves to insist on the issue that the current global financial crisis was not caused – as some argue – by monetary policy’s orientation to price stability, but by a tremendous failure in the financial systems of the developed world. Neither the private sector nor policymakers were able to foresee the danger of the imbalances that were accumulating during this decade. Today, the monetary and fiscal stimulus packages are precisely what have allowed the world economy, which suffered an initial shock similar to that of the Great Depression, to show a substantially better performance. This is particularly true in the case of Chile. The evolution of the economy and monetary policy from 2007 onwards In just three years, the Chilean economy has gone through two radically different episodes, although related to one another.