samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We made this explicit in November 2020 when announcing our most recent £ programme of QE purchases, which we consciously decided to continue for an unusually long period through to “around the end of 2021”: we said in our Minutes that “risk management considerations implied that policy should lean strongly against downside risks to the outlook.” That purchase programme is still under way, with over £ of purchases completed as of today. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  For the same reason we gave forward guidance in November that we “did not intend to tighten monetary policy at least until there was clear evidence that significant progress was being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% inflation target sustainably.” And we highlighted the asymmetry in our assessment of the risks to activity and inflation by noting that “if the outlook for inflation weakened, the Committee stood ready to take whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit”. Figure 2: The MPC’s May MPR forecasts  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Our latest forecast, published in our May 2021 MPR and shown in Figure 2, represented a further evolution of our view of the outlook. The economic news since our February 2021 Report had been substantially positive. Activity had been stronger than expected and Covid restrictions had been eased slightly earlier than expected, partly due to the success of the vaccination programme in the UK.

As of now the near-term strength in UK inflation is expected to be transitory, and surveys of households, businesses and professional forecasters are consistent with UK inflation remaining well anchored. One measure of inflation expectations that has picked up since the start of 2021 is the five year UK inflation swap rate, five years forward: a key indicator of longer-term financial market inflation expectations and one to which the MPC naturally pays close attention. As Figure 3 shows, this measure is historically relatively stable for the UK. In fact some of the larger historical moves have reflected uncertainty about possible changes to how the underlying RPI index is calculated, rather than fundamental shifts in inflation expectations. And as Figure 4 shows, it fell by much less, and rebounded more quickly, than equivalent measures in other economies. That history of stability means that while the recent pick-up in the indicator is not especially large in a historical or international context, it is still worth noting. Unlike some of the other risk indicators that I have been discussing, it has also decreased rather than increased since May, in line with the broader falls in nominal yields that I flagged earlier. And while shorter-horizon market inflation expectations did increase in  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10  response to this morning’s CPI release, the reaction in the five year five year rate was more muted. Nevertheless it remains about 15 basis points higher than at the start of the year.
•  Lastly, even if some regions of the country are experiencing a scarcity of housing, there is no evidence of a real estate bubble developing such as we saw at the end of the 1980s. The inflation outlook thus remains positive. We are projecting an inflation rate of about 0.5% this year and 1% next year. It is unlikely that, in the months ahead, we will again see inflation rates below zero, as we did last March. Negative inflation would require a steep fall in the price of oil. The debate over deflation, which was so topical barely a year ago, is by and large no longer one of our concerns and has disappeared from the discussions among central bankers. Our interest rate cut in March 2003 was intended to protect us against such a development. The goal has been achieved. The need for reforms Events in recent years have shown once again that there is no way we can make ourselves impervious to disturbances emanating from the world’s markets. Such disturbances will inevitably impact on the development of our economy. This does not mean, however, that we are completely at their mercy: for a small country such as Switzerland, the best defence against external shocks is an efficient and flexible economy, capable of standing up to competition and adapting swiftly to changes in the international environment. However, we must also ensure that the problems caused by our internal structures, which are sometimes not ideally suited to current challenges, do not gain the upper hand.

In a statement to the press after our meeting, the members of the Committee noted that we expect to take account of the remaining issues and complete the text of the New Accord in the coming months and not later than mid-year 2004. This period of time will also allow us to take better note of domestic consultations underway in some jurisdictions. The comment letters we received covered a wide range of issues. Most of the comments focused on credit risk. While this is not a major focus of today’s conference, I would like to call your attention to the proposals that the Committee has developed to revise the treatment of credit losses. As you know, CP3 calibrated regulatory capital on the basis of both unexpected and a portion of expected credit losses. This was intended as a practical compromise to account for differences in national accounting practices and supervisory authority regarding provisioning. Based on views expressed by the RMA and other respondents, and in light of our own continued research, the Committee now intends to align regulatory capital more closely to economic capital by calibrating it on the basis of unexpected credit losses alone. A supplementary mechanism will help to encourage banks to provide sufficiently for expected credit losses. This proposal can be found on the website of the Bank for International Settlements, and the Committee has invited public comment through the end of this year.
If Hong Kong is to become a “Brand” for financial services, it must be able to offer “quality” financial products and services. This means that we should have ample supply of financial products and services that: (a)  can effectively meet the needs of customers, be they individuals or corporates;  (b)  are competitively priced; and  (c)  are efficiently distributed through a network of intermediaries that treat customers fairly. 5. So where does Hong Kong stand now in terms of “quality”? If we benchmark Hong Kong against any of our regional peers, I would say Hong Kong stands out as one of the best in this regard. It is hard to pinpoint any key areas in which Hong Kong would have a material gap in offering a suitable and competitive product to meet the financial needs of the customers. 6. That said, it is wrong for us to feel complacent. The fact that we are good and competitive now does not mean we will remain so in the future. It is like “逆水行舟， 不進則退”, “rowing a boat upstream, you either move forward or you drift backward”, but this principle is becoming even more relevant and important lately because of three recent trends: (a)  the world’s financial landscape is changing very fast, especially in the context of the China’s growth story and the internationalisation of RMB and the Belt and Road Strategy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  7.

Regional seminar of the International Financial Corporation and Bank Al-Maghrib on  “Utilization of Public Credit Registry data for the Central Bank’s institutional functions”  Rabat, February 22, 2018 -----------------------Opening remarks by Mr. Abdellatif Jouahri Governor of Bank Al-Maghrib ------------------------  Excellency the Ambassador of Japan, IFC Country Manager for the Maghreb region, Ladies and gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to welcome you today to the Bank Al-Maghrib training center in Rabat for this seminar on the “Utilization of Public Credit Registry data for the Central Bank’s institutional functions”. I would first like to express my sincere thanks to all the participants and speakers for having accepted our invitation, and more particularly to the IFC representatives, Mr. Xavier REILLE and Mr. Oscar MADEDU, and their team here for their valuable contribution to preparing this meeting. I would also like to give special thanks to His Excellency Ambassador Takuji HANATANI and through him the Japanese Government, which has made a vital contribution to developing credit information-sharing infrastructure in Morocco. The relevance of this meeting lies in the sharing of experiences between the participating experts. The seminar panels, scheduled throughout the day, will set the stage for fruitful discussions between:    central banks which are well advanced in terms of operating credit registries or which are starting to set them up, on the one hand; and those which are preparing to meet the new challenges such registries impose in terms of micro and macro-prudential supervision and monetary policy, on the other hand.
The same may be said about the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, (TCFD). This Task Force, formed by 31 members entirely from the industry, was created in December 2015 at the request of the FSB to develop voluntary, consistent climate-related financial risk disclosures for use by companies in providing information to investors, lenders, insurers and other stakeholders. These disclosure standards are increasingly used by companies around the world. The emergence of the so-called “green bonds” is another case in point. These bonds were not created in response to any official initiative; indeedthe market is based entirely on private standards, such as the Green Bond Principles (GBP) issued by the ICMA in 2014. Obviously, the green bond market has grown following the demand from private investors willing to “put their money where their mouth is”. In this regard investors, corporates and clients demand information on the impact of business activities on the environment. This is why it is so important that we have in the EU finally agreed on this common taxonomy which, hopefully, after being endorsed by the European Parliament, should allow for a more comprehensive assessment of risks and enhanced transparency. In sum, the fight against climate change is clearly not solely a publicly driven initiative. It is no longer the official sector preaching to the rest of the society but rather a joint effort by all stakeholders: Governments, Central Banks, Supervisors and Official Institutions, along with Corporates, Financial Institutions and, ultimately, all individuals.

We need to be proactive. Accordingly, we are also launching several initiatives to help raise awareness of the importance of this issue, including workshops and meetings with the industry to learn more about how the sector is coping with climate change and to promote its transformation. There is certainly much to be done. But, to conclude on a positive note, I wanted to highlight the incredible pace at which initiatives are moving and changes are being introduced. Let me give you two examples. First, the NGFS was created barely two years ago, but in this very short lifespan it has managed to publish two comprehensive reports, guidance for central banks’ investments and, not least, its membership has surged from 8 to 51 members and 12 observers. The second example is rather obvious: just look at the composition and topics discussed on this panel today. They would have been quite unthinkable two years ago. Thank you very much. 5/5
To fulfil the Maastricht criteria, the candidate country’s public sector debt and deficits must be within specified limits, its inflation and longterm interest rates may not deviate beyond a certain limit from the levels in the three EU countries with the lowest inflation, and it must participate in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM-II, for at least two years. Denmark and the United Kingdom are the only countries permanently exempted from euro area membership, and new EU member countries are unlikely to receive such an exemption. Chapter 23 discusses the Maastricht criteria, and Chapter 21 describes ERM-II and how new member countries have fared under ERM-II. The conclusions of the analysis are far from unambiguous. The convergence that took place during the run-up to the euro collaboration proved risky for many countries, as capital inflows, declining interest rates, and increased optimism contributed to steep rises in asset prices and real exchange rates. This resulted in current account deficits and reduced competitiveness, which remained (and in some cases intensified) long after entry into the euro area, as the conversion rate upon entry into the currency area proved to be inconsistent with the underlying equilibrium exchange rate because of the above-mentioned developments (see Chapter 22). Similar developments could be seen before the financial crisis in countries participating in ERM-II, particularly the Baltics. ERM-II countries have avoided a currency crisis, however. Iceland can draw a number of lessons from this if it takes this path.

5  The young and already internationally renowned economist Jeffrey Sachs called on the then Secretary General of the OECD, Jean-Claude Paye, immediately after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. Sachs claimed that all that was needed to get the economy moving was to liberate Russia’s animal spirits. Paye demurred, saying that he thought that institutions would matter too. Sachs countered, saying “But you are French, and so you think that institutions are more important than they really are.” To which Paye replied “And you are young, and take your institutions too much for granted.” And then he added, almost as an afterthought, “If you do not have good, strong institutions, all you will get will be the mafia.” E-mail correspondence from John Llewellyn, former colleague of Paye’s, dated 3 November 2013. 6  Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2012): Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Crown Publishers, New York. 7  Acemoglu and Robinson are not alone in attempting to capture institutional differences using concept pairs. In a historically based social analysis, North, Weingast and Wallis use the distinction between natural state and open access societies as reference for stage of development. The former was a strongly hierarchical society with tightly woven personal bonds with a clear social order. Collaborating elites had a monopoly on violence and dictated the allocation of resources. In an open- access society, on the other hand, the state holds power but there are institutional constraints.
Taken together, these factors should underpin the growth of private consumption and investment, and thus that of domestic demand. The positive outlook for the euro area is also supported by external developments. The outlook for growth of the world economy, and thus for growth of euro area exports, has remained favourable. Forecasts of world growth have consistently been revised upwards over the past few months. Expectations of a period of sustained economic growth in the euro area can also be found in euro area bond markets. Overall, longer-term bond yields in the euro area have shown a very high level of stability in the course of this year, with fluctuations being contained within a relatively narrow range. The annual rate of increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) was 2.4% in July 2000. Recent consumer price developments in the euro area have been very much influenced by the strong rise in oil prices and the depreciation of the exchange rate of the euro. 1  BIS Review 74/2000  While monetary policy cannot address short-term developments in prices, it is imperative for monetary policy that medium-term upward pressure on prices be contained. The risk that the current pressure on the HICP might spill over onto costs and prices determined in the domestic economy must be taken seriously. This holds true in particular in the context of the favourable prospects for economic growth. The Governing Council reacted to this picture by raising the main ECB interest rates at its meeting on 31 August 2000.

An appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro would run counter to the relaxation in monetary conditions brought about through the interest rate channel. This is why the SNB will continue to act decisively to prevent any excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro. An assessment of monetary conditions can be misleading if it is based on prices, which, like currently the libor, have reached a bound. For this reason, an assessment based on quantities – money and credit – is particularly important in the current circumstances. The monetary base has increased substantially since October 2008, when the financial crisis entered a new phase following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We supplied the interbank market with sufficient liquidity to meet burgeoning demand in a climate of uncertainty, in order to prevent any increase in money market rates. Since then, precautionary base money demand has declined and we have reabsorbed liquidity accordingly. The monetary base has thus fallen by 28% compared to the peak recorded in April 2009. The level of sight deposits is, however, still almost ten times higher than before the crisis. There is thus a risk of excessive money creation once confidence is restored. Monetary conditions should not be judged in terms of banking sector liquidity, but rather on the basis of the liquidity available to households and firms – i.e. the monetary aggregates. M3 growth, which had been modest for a long time, has accelerated. In October, it reached an annual rate of 7.7%.
William C Dudley: The US economic and monetary policy outlook Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Club of Minnesota’s June Luncheon, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 5 June 2015. *  *  *  Good morning. It is a pleasure to be here in Minneapolis today and to have the chance to speak to all of you. As chairman of the Economic Club of New York, I particularly appreciate the role that the Economic Club of Minneapolis has played in organizing this event. In my remarks, I am going to focus on the economic outlook and the implications of that outlook for monetary policy. Today, I come before you as the proverbial two-armed economist. On one hand, the economy’s forward momentum has slowed sharply during the first half of the year and inflation remains below the level the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) views as consistent with price stability. On the other hand, I think it is also fair to say that we are still making progress towards our dual mandate objectives. However, recent solid job gains and a further decline in the unemployment rate have occurred only because productivity growth has slowed markedly. During the remainder of the year, I expect growth to pick up somewhat. However, productivity growth will also likely rise. So there remains some uncertainty about whether growth will be strong enough to lead to further improvement in the labor market.

Moreover, because it takes time for  2  For example, see Alan Blinder, “The Mystery of Declining Productivity Growth,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  technological advances to be adopted broadly throughout the economy, it seems unlikely that the productivity gains from recent innovations have yet been fully realized. Because I am uncertain about the near-term trends of GDP growth and productivity growth, I am also uncertain about whether we will see further progress in the labor market over the remainder of the year. There are many possible outcomes to consider. For example, if real GDP growth were to pick up more than productivity growth, then employment growth would likely remain sufficiently firm to lead to further tightening of the U.S. labor market. But, if the reverse occurs, then payroll gains could slow even as GDP growth strengthens. In contrast to my uncertainties about growth and the labor market, I am becoming more confident that inflation will return to our 2 percent objective over the medium term, as long as the labor market continues to improve – an important caveat. The reasons here are straightforward. First, a number of factors that threaten to keep inflation below our 2 percent objective appear to be transitory. In this camp, I put the sharp decline in oil and gasoline prices that began in mid-2014, and the weakness we have seen in nonpetroleum import prices due to the strength in the dollar.
3  See, inter alia: C. Borio and H. Zhu (2008), “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?” BIS working paper no. 268; G. Jiménez, S.R.G. Ongena, J-L. Peydro and J. Saurina Salas (2010), “Credit supply: Identifying balance sheet channels with loan applications and granted loans”, CEPR discussion paper no. 7655; Y. Altumbas, L. Gambacorta and D. Marques (2010), “Does monetary policy affect bank risk-taking?” ECB working paper no. 1166; and A. Maddaloni and J-L. Peydró (2009), “Bank risk-taking, securitisation, supervision and low interest rates: Evidence from lending standards”, ECB working paper, forthcoming. BIS Review 45/2010  1  Upside threats to price stability were certainly emerging prior to the crisis, on the back of surging commodity prices and strong global growth. Let’s not forget, for example, that US headline inflation increased from 2.3% on average in 2003 to 3.2% in 2006 and 3.8% in 2008 (See figure 1). Core inflation increased from 1.5% in 2003 to 2.5% in 2006 and 2.3% in 2008 (See figure 2). Euro area annual inflation reached 3.3% on average in 2008. 4 To contain these upside risks to price stability, a case can be made that interest rates should have been higher than was the case before the crisis. Figure 1 Overall inflation  Figure 2 Overall inflation excluding food and energy  Source: ECB, BLS and OECD. Note: Average annual inflation rates. 4  2  On the basis of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP).

This prompts us to ask: what were the flaws in the decision-making that resulted in – according to some observers – policy errors? And, more importantly, how can we correct these flaws – and avoid any repetition – in the future? Since the seminal contribution of Theil, 5 policy-making has been characterised as a “control problem”. Such a characterisation embodies three elements: clearly defining the policy objectives; articulating a model of the economy by which policy instrument settings and economic shocks are mapped into outcomes; and defining the information structure facing policy-makers. This last element determines the extent to which they can identify shocks and structural changes in real time. Using this approach as an organising framework, we can re-phrase our question: if central banks made mistakes in the run-up to the financial crisis, was this because they had the wrong objectives? Or used the wrong model? Or misread the conjunctural situation? Or were the errors a result of the combination of these three factors? 1. The objective of monetary policy  A large body of academic literature, stemming from the insights of Friedman and Phelps, provides the theoretical basis for establishing price stability as the objective of monetary policy. Such an approach found overwhelming empirical support in our experience of the Great Inflation during the 1970s. It has reached its apogee in the modern benchmark macroeconomic model, which articulates – on a state-of-the-art, micro-founded basis – the welfare costs of deviations from price stability.