samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Now I have the privilege of working with leaders like Roger Ferguson, the Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Jerry Hawke, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency. Their hard work, and the hard work of the other supervisors participating in the discussions, have strengthened the quality of the capital rules. They and others have helped to ensure that the New Accord will be flexible, forward-looking, and fit for the service of twenty-first century banking. The process of revising the rules has involved formidable challenges. That should come as no surprise. Capital requirements make up the foundation of the regulatory framework. Even more importantly, capital is a key ingredient to the health of the banking sector. The changes we are proposing to ensure that banks hold adequate capital will have broad implications not just for the banking sector, but also for financial markets and the broader economy. But the new Basel Accord is about more than just capital, it is also about keeping a level playing field and about reinforcing incentives to foster sound risk management though three reinforcing pillars: risk sensitive minimum capital requirements, coordinated supervisory review, and enhanced market discipline through greater transparency. Supervisors and risk managers know that a bank’s management and controls make up its first and most important line of defence. The New Basel Accord seeks to capture the relationship between capital adequacy and risk management.

Future Work: Full Credit Risk Modelling The Committee will spend the next few months considering these and other themes carefully and finding ways to balance the complexity of the New Accord against the need for appropriate sensitivity to risk; to ensure that the assumptions supporting the rules are appropriately conservative, but not excessively so; and to apply the rules consistently to protect and promote competition in the global banking market. But when the ink dries on the New Accord, rest assured that the Basel Committee will not be adjourning. Just from the comment letters we received, we can already identify a wide range of issues ahead to continue to find new ways to advance risk management, to promote greater transparency, and to strengthen the stability of the financial sector. I’d like to conclude by mentioning just two of the potential items on our agenda for future work once the New Accord is implemented. The first would be to consider the benefits of full credit risk models in the calculation of minimal capital requirements. In theory, a bank’s capital requirements would then reflect to the greatest degree the economic benefits of diversification in its balance sheet. In fact, the Committee did at one point evaluate whether advanced banks should be permitted to estimate the degree to which their assets might behave similarly or default together in the New Basel Accord. As you know, we decided that we are not quite there yet.
In any event, mention should be made of the contribution of monetary policy and the significance of the decision adopted in January this year to enlarge the securities purchase programme with the inclusion of government debt securities. Since then, we have witnessed not only further monetary easing and the depreciation of the euro, but also a more uniform transmission of expansionary impulses to the various countries in the area and, in particular, to those such as Spain which were comparatively more affected by the fragmentation of European financial markets. The latest monetary policy measures have translated into a significant improvement in the Spanish economy’s financing conditions. This improvement is visible not only in the lower cost of new funds, but also in a progressive – but slow – normalisation of credit in Spain. Aggregate balances continue to post negative rates of change, reflecting the headway in the deleveraging of our households and firms; however, these rates are increasingly less negative and are compatible with the growth of new financing flows. Performance of and outlook for the Spanish economy On preliminary estimates in late July, the Spanish economy is expected to have grown by 1% in the second quarter of this year. This growth rate highlights the dynamism of the current recovery phase, now under way for two years. Recent indicators suggest this expansionary trajectory will hold in the second half of the year.

The recovery in output has come in step with a more expansionary behaviour of employment than might have been foreseen on past patterns. According to official Spanish labour force data, from the second quarter of 2014 to the same period this year numbers employed are estimated to have increased by more than half a million, making for an appreciable reduction in the unemployment rate. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The greater flexibility enjoyed by firms, following the reforms approved in 2012, in adjusting their working conditions to the macroeconomic and competitive setting has no doubt provided for the creation of new jobs and, therefore, for the expansion of economic activity. If the dynamics of the past 18 months hold, the increase in employment might place the unemployment rate at around 20% in the fourth quarter of 2016. As to prices, the increases in activity and employment have been accompanied by very low inflation rates. The fall in oil prices has prompted declines in the general level of prices over much of the past year. Yet core inflation, the indicator that excludes energy and fresh food prices, has moved on a rising course over the year. And while still at moderate levels, this indicator’s recent trajectory suggests the risks of entering an overly prolonged period of very low inflation have progressively been dispelled. While in July the overall price index posted growth of 0.1%, influenced by fuel prices, inflation at the end of the year is expected to be around 1%.
Even as we prepare for the worst, we will strive for the best. Singapore – and our financial sector in particular – are well-placed to thrive in the postCOVID world. We have deep connectivity to Asia, which will be the region earliest to emerge from COVID19 and register the fastest growth rates. We have a high degree of digitalisation, which will be a key source of competitive advantage in the future. We have made a good start on the journey towards sustainability, which will be a growing priority as the world grapples with climate change. Our odds are better than good. Let me stop here and I will be happy to take your questions. 1. [1] On a seasonally adjusted basis, weighted by country shares in Singapore’s non-oil domestic exports. [2] 14 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  1. [2] Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam. 1. [3] On a NODX-weighted basis. 1. [4] IMF Working Paper (June 2020), “Who will Bear the Brunt of Lockdown Policies? Evidence from Tele-workability Measures Across Countries”. 1. [5] This includes FinTech jobs in the overall economy, but excludes jobs in holding companies. The employment increase of 6,400 for the financial and insurance sector in 2019, published by MOM, includes holding companies. 1. [6] These numbers exclude holding companies, which is consistent with the ITM-based definition of financial services. At last year’s MAS annual report media conference, it was stated that the 3-year average growth rate during 2016–2018 was 4.1%.

The upswing in the global economy spread to the Norwegian economy through strong export growth and higher prices for Norwegian exports. At the same time, demand in the sheltered sector remained buoyant. There was also slippage in government budget spending allocations throughout 1999. Private consumption continues to rise, fixed investment is increasing in service sectors, and unemployment remains low. The decline in petroleum investment is necessitating restructuring and lower production levels in some Norwegian manufacturing sectors. Developments so far indicate that this turnaround has been offset by continued high employment growth in the public sector, private services and non-petroleum-related manufacturing. Chart 10 Wage shares by industry Labour costs as a percentage of factor income  However, enterprises’ financial position is vulnerable. The growth in labour costs in the latter half of the 1990s left its mark on profitability. Both in manufacturing and other industries, labour costs as a percentage of factor income have increased since the mid-1990s. The analysis in the June 2000 Inflation Report indicates that consumer price inflation in 2001 and 2002 may exceed levels which are consistent with exchange rate stability over time. The risk of rising wage and price inflation has increased, while there now appears to be little risk of a pronounced recession over the next two years.
This should include “an IMF standing liquidity facility.’’ The global financial safety net is the best insurance we can get against the risks created by economic divergence and it comes at a limited cost. ** So, in conclusion, we as central bankers should be predictable without being pre-committed. In other words, we should give clarity without pretending to certainty. Voltaire summed this up nicely in 1770: “Doubt is an uncomfortable condition, but certainty is a ridiculous one.”4 In these times of doubt, the Governing Council of the ECB is committed to give as much clarity as possible; clarity, not certainty, which is neither possible nor desirable. Thank you for your attention. 1 Brainard, W. (1967), « Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy » the American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May, pp. 411–425. 2 Blinder, A. (1999), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, the Lionel Robbins lectures, MIT Press, Cambridge  Massachusetts. 3 Rey, H. (2013) “Dilemma not Trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence”, Jackson  Hole conference proceedings, Kansas City Fed. 4 Letter to Frederick William, Prince of Prussia (28 November 1770). 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

AMCESFI is structured as a collegiate body in which the senior officials from the aforementioned institutions participate. It is entrusted with the oversight of the financial system as a whole, acting in an advisory capacity with respect to the proposed macroprudential measures put forward by the sectoral authorities. 5  The need for coordination in this field is also very necessary at the supranational level, and in particular in Europe since the creation of the Banking Union, which centralises at the European Central Bank (ECB) the supervision of the significant banks in the 21 EU countries.3 In this respect, although decisions on macroprudential instruments in Europe are in the hands of national authorities, the ECB scrutinises these national banking authorities’ proposed macroprudential policy measures to ensure that they are consistent across the euro area countries. In particular, the ECB is empowered to tighten the measures applied by national authorities to specific instruments envisaged in Community banking legislation. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), on which the heads of the EU central banks and regulatory and supervisory authorities for banks, securities, insurance and pension funds sit, has been in place since 2011. The ESRB, whose Advisory Technical Committee it is my honour to chair, has macroprudential oversight functions and is empowered to issue opinions, warnings and recommendations on matters relating to the emergence of systemic risks, and the suitability of macroprudential measures proposed at the national level.
This focus is appropriate. Like other central banks, our monetary policy mandate concerns domestic objectives: maximum sustainable employment and price stability. Our monetary policy actions, however, often have global consequences that, in turn, influence the U.S. economy and financial markets. At the same time, external factors can impact the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the U.S. and influence the effectiveness of our monetary policy in achieving our objectives. We cannot appropriately calibrate policy without keeping these spillover and feedback effects in mind. In some cases, these effects can be significant. An example is the market volatility we saw in the spring and summer of 2013 during the so-called “taper tantrum.” In the U.S., we saw a spike in Treasury yields, with the 10-year rate rising by more than 100 basis points from early May of that year before peaking in September. Financial markets in emerging market economies (EME) were hit hard as well, with declines in equity prices, a widening in sovereign debt spreads and a sharp increase in foreign exchange volatility. Volatility in EME financial markets re-emerged last summer and has continued into this year. For EMEs as a group, declines in equity prices and currency values have been larger than what we experienced during the taper tantrum. The recent episode, however, appears to largely reflect concerns about risks emanating from EMEs themselves, rather than concerns about the direction of Fed policy. Three related concerns appear to be at the forefront. First, there has been a broad-based slowdown in EME growth.

In addition, the fiscal 2016 budget package passed at the end of last year, which extended a number of tax breaks and eased caps on spending, means that fiscal policy should provide a moderate stimulus this year. I believe that these positive factors should be sufficient to offset weakness in manufacturing and business-fixed investment. Putting this all together, I expect real GDP growth of about 2 percent in 2016, slightly below the average pace of growth in this expansion, and a bit above my estimate of the potential growth of the U.S. economy. If this materializes, then we should see some further reduction in the unemployment rate to around my estimate of the rate – about 4¾ percent – that I view as consistent with stable inflation over the long term. Turning to the outlook for inflation, headline inflation on a year-over-year basis has begun to rise as the sharp falls in energy prices in late 2014 and early 2015 are removed from the calculations. However, inflation still remains well below the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent objective. As the FOMC has noted in its statements, this continued low inflation is partly due to recent further declines in energy prices and ongoing impacts of a stronger dollar on nonenergy import prices. Although energy prices will eventually stop falling and the dollar will stop appreciating, these factors appear to have had a more persistent depressing influence on inflation than previously anticipated.
Ong Chong Tee: Financial integration – a collective effort towards efficient and resilient markets Speech by Mr Ong Chong Tee, Deputy Managing Director (Financial Supervision) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch Event for EU-Asia -Pacific Forum on Financial Regulation, Singapore, 14 October 2016. * * * Mr Olivier Guersent, Director General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (European Commission) Dr Michael Pulch, EU Ambassador to Singapore, Mr Ashley Alder, Chair of the IOSCO Board and Chief Executive of Hong Kong SFC, Mr Ryozo Himino, APRC Chairman and Vice-Minister of International Affairs, Japan FSA, Mr Paul Andrews, IOSCO Secretary General, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, On behalf of all my colleagues at the MAS, let me extend a warm welcome to everyone at this launch event of the EU - Asia- Pacific Forum on Financial Regulation. It is a privilege and honour for the MAS to host this inaugural forum on financial regulation between the EU authorities and members of the IOSCO Asia-Pacific Regional Committee (APRC). This launch event will no doubt set the stage for the in-depth closed-door discussions to follow over the course of today. The impetus for this forum is a recognition that the financial markets of Europe and Asia are increasingly inter-connected. One measure, for example, is the total portfolio assets held by investors from the largest five EU economies1, in the Asia and Pacific region 2.

Due to their unique role and concentration of positions, non-banks such as global insurers, global central counterparties and large asset managing entities undoubtedly entail systemic risks that have to be carefully monitored and mitigated. This is already acknowledged by standard setters (CPMI-IOSCO) and by the Financial Stability Board and would probably deserve a specific conference. What makes banks specific among systemic institutions is the presence of implicit subsidies and this feature is the main focus of today’s conference. Allow me to elaborate a bit on the TBTF problem and the implicit subsidy To prevent the collapse of the global financial system, governments in major jurisdictions stepped in by bailing out some financial institutions or by providing public guarantee to unsecured bank-debt holders. This use of tax-payers money for preventing private losses entailed sizeable direct costs for governments, in terms of both political support and fiscal implications. A more indirect, but equally important concern is that these interventions – aimed at stabilizing markets – may have reinforced market perceptions that some financial firms are too important-to-fail. When markets anticipate that some financial firms will benefit from future public support, their uninsured creditors have little incentives to charge a rate commensurate with the risk of their investment. These institutions thus enjoy a funding cost advantage – in essence an implicit public subsidy. This implicit subsidy raises two important concerns for financial stability. First, it encourages risk-taking by the entities concerned, which are not subject to a proper creditors’ market discipline.
The Bank of England could publish all of the many documents which it creates internally each month. But that would simply make it harder for the really important information to get through. Less can be more. We could have minute by minute revisions to weather forecasts or terrorism threat estimates, but that might overwhelm genuine flood or bomb warnings to which we want people to respond. 16 Second, communication can sometimes aggravate market failures. Suppose the RSPB knows a secret location where rare birds are nesting. To preserve biodiversity, there may be a great benefit to ensuring the birds can nest undisturbed. If the RSPB reveals its secret, bird watchers may converge on the location. Here, less than full transparency mitigates the problem. An example in the same spirit is whether or not use by commercial banks of the Bank of England’s lending facilities should be concealed. If use of the facility were made public,  15  For an exposition of the credibility problem in monetary policy, see Kydland and Prescott (1977); for an account of the benefits of central bank independence, see Fischer (1994). 16  This idea has received theoretical attention recently following the encouragement of Sims (2003). He sketches a model in which agents are “rationally inattentive”, focusing only on information which they diagnose makes an important contribution to minimising forecast errors.

Maintaining a stable currency safeguards purchasing power over time and ensures the currency’s continuity across the territory, so that every individual can spend that currency anywhere and at any time and enjoy the same ability to purchase necessary goods and services. Back in the 18th century, France's authorities found themselves unable to guarantee this stability. After the bankruptcy of the John Law note-issuing bank in 1720 and several other  2  failed attempts to set up a central bank,5 the hyperinflation fuelled by monetary financing of the Revolutionary Wars and the ensuing default on two-thirds of France’s public debt in 1797 had destroyed confidence in the currency.6 The most pressing task facing the Consulate government was to rebuild the foundations of that trust, which it did by authorising the establishment of the Banque de France in 1800 and anchoring the value of the franc through the creation of the Germinal franc in 1803. In establishing the Banque de France, France set up a central bank that was capable, because it was trusted by the French people, of offering an “elastic” money supply, to use the economic jargon, that is, of adjusting the money supply to suit the needs of the economy. In this way, the foundations for an active lender-of-last-resort policy were laid very early, providing a means to combat financial crises and thus support the economy.
If the banking community itself turns out to be unable to resist the temptation of descending into practices that are abusive for consumers, we will be responding adequately. As I have already said, the first issue of our concern is misselling and hard selling. We believed the banking community to be interested in retaining people in the financial market and keeping their funds inside the financial system. We were hoping that banks would be able to agree upon selling rules and would not offer such a product to a client that would be disappointing, striving to sign one contract, would not be misleading about product prices or conceal additional services. The associations of financial market participants jointly developed selling standards two years ago already. Eventually, as little as 20 banks have joined these standards, and even these banks fail to comply with them. As you remember, we have held several discussions on this topic, emphasising that if the banking community does not comply with the standards itself, we will have to request legislative authorities to adopt adequate regulation. Disappointingly, that negative episode we have also discussed when investment life insurance policies were being sold through banks was followed by the sales of complex structured products. This implies that even such a dramatic episode as investment life insurance has had no influence on abusive practices in banks’ sales under agency agreements. Therefore, we were forced to request legislative authorities to grant us the powers to stipulate selling rules through our regulation.

Increasing scarcity in that segment of the cash 5 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  market then also translated into a persistent rise in the specialness premia of such bonds, even when abstracting from year-end effects. Our decision to accept cash as collateral in securities lending, and to allow purchases below the DFR, contributed to relieving this pressure. Premia across maturity buckets are now broadly similar. The relatively low specialness premia for bonds with shorter maturities, in turn, also suggests that the majority of holders of such bonds – mainly non-euro area investors without access to our deposit facility, as I illustrated in a previous speech – were, and remain, generally willing to provide them in sufficient quantity in the repo market.10 Yet, this chart also reinforces the point I made earlier about the flow and stock effects of our purchases: with the effective supply of bonds gradually shrinking over time as a result of our purchases, specialness premia have been persistently inching upwards.11 While stock effects reinforce one of the key transmission channels of the APP by increasing the “value for money” – the bang for the buck – of new net purchases in terms of their impact on financial conditions, we also need to be mindful that a shortage of government bonds may over time adversely affect the intermediation capacity of repo markets. There are two reasons for this. First, government bonds are the main type of collateral used in repo markets, primarily because of their safety and liquidity.