samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Even if in the very near-term the energy crisis may cause an increase in non-gas fossil fuel being used, the likelihood of a timely and orderly transition towards a low-carbon economy consistent with the EU's commitment to the Paris Agreement has increased. That being said, another record-breaking summer has confirmed that physical risks of climate change and environmental degradation are materialising ever more frequently, which will add to the risk of increased macroeconomic volatility until the transition has been completed. When the boat we all share is rocked to such an extent by external forces, we need to be able to count on internal anchors of stability. The ECB provides one of those crucial internal anchors by pursuing its mandate of maintaining price stability in the euro area as laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In line with that mandate, our primary concern is, as always, our primary objective: price stability. Inflation is currently far too high. The shocks that are hitting the euro area economy have not only led to a turning point in the outlook for economic activity but are also contributing to further upward price pressures that are much stronger and more persistent than we previously anticipated. This implies that inflation is likely to stay above our 2% target for an extended period. As a result, we accelerated the pace of monetary policy normalisation over the summer to ensure that monetary policy is consistent with inflation returning to our target in the medium term.

The projections will be published in the June and December issues of the ECB Monthly Bulletin, commencing in December 2000. Projections will be published for the growth rate of real GDP and its components and for HICP inflation. They will have a two-year horizon, so that the projections for both 2001 and 2002 will be published in December this year. In order to accurately reflect the degree of uncertainty attached to such exercises, the projections will be published in the form of ranges, based upon the average absolute errors made in previous national central bank and Eurosystem projections. The projections will be accompanied by a text describing their main features. I should emphasise that we use the word “projection” in order to signal that the published projections are the results of a scenario based on a set of underlying technical assumptions, including the assumption of unchanged monetary policy. This is the way forecasts are produced in many central banks in order to best inform monetary policy decision-makers. As the Eurosystem’s staff economic projections are the products of a technical exercise, which assumes, inter alia, that short-term interest rates and the exchange rate will not change over the forecast horizon, it should be clear that the staff projection will not, in general, be the best predictor of future outcomes, in particular for somewhat longer horizons. Rather, it represents a scenario which is likely to be falsified in practice, since monetary policy will always act to address any threats to price stability.
Tarisa Watanagase: Thailand’s economy in 2008 and preparations for the future Keynote address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the luncheon gathering of US and Thai business representatives to celebrate the 175th anniversary of Thai-US relations, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 29 April 2008. *  *  *  Excellencies, Distinguished US and Thai business representatives, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my honour and pleasure to accept the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ invitation to speak at this gathering of distinguished members of the US and Thai business corporations and to join you in celebrating the 175th anniversary of Thai-US relations. My goal today is to contribute to your understanding of the prospects of the Thai economy and investment environment in 2008 and beyond. My talk will comprise three parts. First, I would like to draw your attention to Thailand’s economic prospects and risks in the near term. Second, I will focus on some key challenges in enhancing the economy’s resiliency and competitiveness while managing those risks. Finally, I would like to highlight to you the roles of the Bank of Thailand in fostering economic and financial stability going forward. Ladies and Gentlemen, Since my last meeting with the American Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok last September, the economic tide has already turned in Thailand’s favour. In 2007, the Thai economy managed to grow by 4.8 percent for the whole year, given boost by GDP growth rate of 5.7 percent in the fourth quarter of the year.

Going forward, the policy mix will centre on the fiscal prudence and public investment in basic infrastructure and the Bank of Thailand’s commitment to maintaining economic and financial stability. These together should translate into moderate long-term cost of investment financing and sustained economic expansion for Thailand. We live in the global economic and financial environment that is highly uncertain. Policymakers need always to be aware of what is in store for us so that we use the policy room available to craft the right and flexible macroeconomic policy mix that is best suited to changing circumstances. At the same time, with the collaboration of our trade and investment partners, we must remain firmly committed on the national goal of enhancing the economy’s productivity and competitiveness. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 54/2008
This means that abrupt changes in prices or risk have a very low probability. The fallacy of this assumption has been clearly shown by Mandelbrot for stock prices, and it has been further demonstrated in many recent (and non recent) episodes for other asset prices and risk premia. Examples of the use of normal distribution in financial modelling would include the following: •  The most frequently used tool for risk measurement (VaR) frequently ignores "fat tail" risks. Many VaR measures are calibrated according to the expected loss of a portfolio under normal circumstances. Models with "fat tail" distributions are available, but seldom used, due to lack of reliable data over a sufficient period of time. •  Implied volatilities are usually extracted from option pricing, based on normal distribution. They are then used as inputs into trading strategies and models. As a result, the assumption of normal distribution widely "contaminates" the pricing, risk assessment and investment strategies across a whole range of markets and instruments. •  Finally, the pricing of many structured products is based on historical correlations among asset prices, with the assumption that those correlations are stable and do represent the ordinary state of nature. On the contrary, experience has shown that those correlations can change radically during a crisis, frequently collapsing to one, and take price movements to the extreme ends of the probability distribution. Procyclicality Many changes have been introduced in recent years to accounting and capital regimes in order to make them more risk sensitive.

Page 6 of 11  The quality of living may not be as well as they are used to, but still might be better than in other countries that do not have that rural sector nor informal social safety net to support them. These factors contributed to our long-standing resiliency and make Thailand, despite all of the problems, is still a good place to do business. The second reason is something that you probably heard many times so I will not go into much detail, is that our business and other infrastructures are acceptable. The logistic-type infrastructure and basic infrastructure - water and electricity- are adequate, and government’s investments in the context of the Eastern Economic Corridor, for example, U-tapao airport, or even some of the railway investments, are being undertaken. Overall, these infrastructures continue to improve. The other infrastructure that we have done a better job recently, is not just on the physical, nor logistics infrastructure but on the digital infrastructure. We have seen that the COVID-19 has actually speeded up some of the underlying trends towards digitalization. For example, we saw our digital payment system called Prompt Pay hit a record high in terms of the number of transactions as a result of the COVID crisis when everybody is shopping and making transactions online. We are also seeing a greater usage of digital technology even in the government support schemes.
Initially however, these effects may be hampered by practical issues such as different product standards. Laws and regulations that enforce common standards can thus be used to lay the ground for a further increase in competition. The possibility to create supervisory bodies means, for instance, that unwanted practices such as price dumping in certain markets now become more difficult. As for preparations in the above-mentioned aspects, the ambitious program outlined in the EAC Development Strategy bodes well. Another type of institution building concerns the common monetary policy and how it is to be handled. As is well described by for instance Alexandre Lamfalussy, the task of institution building in the European monetary unification process was formidable (Lamfalussy, 2006). A number of vested interests meant that a lot of things could have gone wrong. That the project was successful after all is attributed to “the exceptional convergence of several facts and influences” (p.2). Naming but a few, importantly, the initiators of the project were heads of state. Also, the central bankers were entrusted by the politicians, in issues concerning central banking, to play a major role in the forming of the Maastricht Treaty. Although this important document left open a number of issues, it was clear on the independence, institutionally as well as financially, of the European Central Bank and the national central banks within the European System of Central Banks. Furthermore, it made clear what the convergence criteria were for accession to the Euro area.

This is an important step that would provide additional room for the country’s rapid convergence and for Bank of Albania’s rapid and irreversible development in line with the models of its European counterparties. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Using the example of Germany, he argued that the primary common cause of low inflation and an independent central bank is society’s aversion to inflation. However, this did not change the consensus that independent inflation-targeting central banks were the most effective solution to the problem of inflationary bias. Central bankers enjoyed a growing, broad-based esteem. Charles Goodhart described these two decades as the NICE years – non-inflationary continuous expansion. The triumph for central banks was the widely accepted description of this era as the Great Moderation. This suggested that independent central bankers had delivered mankind from the age-old scourge of inflation. Central banks and supervision before the Global Financial Crisis The consensus that formed in the early period of central bank independence predominated prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). In 2018, Ed Balls identified the following main features. 1. A central bank should focus on meeting a price stability objective, usually defined by an explicit inflation target. The concept of “divine coincidence” introduced by Blanchard and Gali in 2007 implied that the central bank’s focus on low and stable inflation was closely linked with keeping output at its efficient level and maintaining full employment. The central bank therefore had primary responsibility for stabilising the business cycle. Monetary and fiscal policy could operate in isolation because the former could offset much of the latter’s macroeconomic impact. Financial stability was left within the purview of supervisors and regulators, rather than that of monetary policymakers. 2.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth had slowed from 5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009, to 3.7 percent in the first quarter of 2010 and to only 1.7 percent in the second quarter. Soft patches are common in expansions, but are difficult to distinguish from a more serious deterioration in an expansion. Examples of soft patches include the expansions of 1976 and 2002 (Chart 24). Foreign risks also appeared on the radar screen with growing concerns about debt sustainability in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This can be seen in the sharp rise in the sovereign risk spreads for these countries (Chart 25). At the same time, core consumer price index (CPI) inflation, which is used as an indicator of where overall inflation is heading, was low and trending downward (Chart 26). Given the FOMC’s dual mandate to promote price stability and maximum sustainable growth, the risk of a double-dip recession in 2011 was a concern. In more normal times, the FOMC could respond to this risk by deciding to reduce the fed funds rate. However, with the fed funds rate essentially at zero, other options had to be considered. At their November meeting, the FOMC decided to restart its large-scale asset purchases by announcing an intention to purchase an additional $ billion in Treasury securities. Again, as with its earlier asset purchase program, the intent was to improve financial market conditions and thereby reduce the risk of the economy stalling.
At the wake after 2008 global financial crisis, regulators actively strengthened regulatory frameworks by reforming agenda such as strengthen market infrastructure, effective supervision, resolution and addressing systemic important institutions. From the banks’ point of view, the implementation of the new stronger regulations at the time of post-crisis has undoubtedly caused burdens to implementation. From the Centre for the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI) survey, it indicated that, “regulation” is the greatest threat to the banking industry (from the survey, it climbed up from no. 6 in 2012 to no. 1 this year). As banks have encountered the higher costs to run businesses, some may seek for less regulated sectors and some seek for changes in their business models to deal with such a situation. It might be implied here that regulation is the key influence to changes. Therefore, it illustrates the need to find the right balance. As a consequence, regulators have to respond to those changes, updating and revising their regulatory frameworks to be more advance to keep up with the business models; hence, the regulatory schemes run consistently with the shifts of bank business models. 3. The main drivers  i. Current innovation and growth of banking sector  What is the main driver? I would like to pinpoint here that current innovation and growth of banking sector is one of the main drivers.

Tongurai Limpiti: Innovation and growth – finding the right balance Speech by Ms Tongurai Limpiti, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 3rd Thailand Financial Services Summit 2014 “Driving Growth through Innovation”, organized by IDC Financial Insights, Bangkok, 9 October 2014. *  *  *  Good morning. It is a pleasure to be with you today and I would like to thank the IDC Financial Insights for inviting me to deliver a keynote address today. The topic I cover today is “Innovation and Growth: Finding the Right Balance”, which is currently an interesting issue that we have to carefully watch. What do we see when we think about innovation and growth? We see that the financial sector nowadays is highly competitive due to the number of players and the approach of regional economic integration. We see that digital economy is becoming a reality; thus, IT investment is one of the keys to success as it enables financial institutions to broaden business market and strengthen their internal operation. As a central banker, we encourage all financial institutions to improve their operational efficiency and capacity through innovation and IT investments in order to be strong domestically and to be able to compete internationally. Increasing operational efficiency has been a focus of Thailand’s Financial Sector Blueprint I and II and IT infrastructure development will play a crucial role in the next phase of Financial Blueprint. Regulators will have to be prepared for such a change in order to ensure sustainability and economic growth. 1.
Conclusion The recent crisis put front and center the rising economic power of emerging countries. It has also demonstrated the vulnerabilities within the global system, especially across financial markets. Financial stability becomes a major concern for policy makers, which has the potential to reshape the monetary policy framework of central banks. Significant steps have been undertaken, but significant progress is still needed to tackle global imbalances. That involves not only revisiting economic policies, but also economic and institutional infrastructure that shapes them. As the quest for a new global order continues both in theoretical and practical levels; the predictability, balance and sustainability of the new global order will depend on the cooperative and coordinated efforts to establish a well-represented infrastructure. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Market finance and financial stability: will the stretch cause a strain? Speech given by Alex Brazier, Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk, Bank of England  The Brevan Howard Centre for Financial Analysis, Imperial College Business School, London Thursday 1 February 2018  I am grateful to Stephen Burgess, Shibo Feng, Harry Goodacre, Nowrin Hossain, Mike Joyce, Christiane Kneer, Javier Otegui, Liam Crowley-Reidy, Marek Rojicek and Ryland Thomas for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  We’ve now passed the tenth anniversary of the onset of the global financial crisis; a crisis created by a fragile financial system out of a correction in the US housing market. What could have been an economic downturn was turned into a disaster. In this country alone, more than one million people lost their jobs. And the legacy of those effects lives on today in lower levels of national income. Looking back over the decade, the economic cost of the crisis has been equivalent to £ per person in the UK. 1  Such crises should be remembered, and their anniversaries marked, because forgetting them risks repeating them. In this country, Parliament hard wired the memory of the crisis into the institutional fabric. It tasked the Bank of England with meeting a ‘macroprudential’ objective. Cutting through the language of the statute, it is to guard against the financial system disrupting growth of the wider economy; to guard against it turning corrections and downturns into crises and disasters.
USD based price indexes 1  0,8 Dec 93 - 1997  0,6  1998-2002  0,4  0,2 Denmark  Finland  Norway  Sweden  Source: EcoWin / Financial Times SG 240802  4  BIS Review 47/2002  Key interest rates in the Nordic countries 12,0 11,0 10,0  12,0 11,0 10,0  Iceland  9,0 8,0  9,0 8,0  Norway  7,0 6,0 5,0  7,0 6,0 5,0  Denmark  4,0 3,0  Sweden  2,0 1999  2000  Finland (EMU)  2001  4,0 3,0  2,0 2003  2002  SG 240802  Nominal effective exchange rates January 1990=100 130  130 Appreciation  120  Iceland (January 1997=100)  Denmark  110  110 Norway  100 90  120  100 90  Sweden  80  80 Finland  70  70  Depreciation  60  60 90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  Source: Bank of England and Central Bank of Iceland SG 240802  BIS Review 47/2002  5  Norway: Effective exchange rate and 12-month interest rate differential against trading partners 4,0  93  3,5  96  3,0  Interest rate differential (12 months) (left-hand scale)  99  2,5  102  2,0  105  Effective exchange rate (right-hand scale)  1,5 1,0 jan.99  108 111  jul.99  jan.00  jul.00  jan.01  jul.01  jan.02  jul.02  Source: Norges Bank SG 240802  Norway: Effective exchange rate 90  90  95  95  100  100  105  105  110 115 1990  Forward exchange rate (UIP)  110 115  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  Source: Norges Bank SG 240802  6  BIS Review 47/2002

As a compromise, the legal status of the new central bank was situated somewhere between that of a public and a private sector institution and it was given two head offices, one in Berne and one in Zurich. From the beginning, it thus occupied a special place in Switzerland’s political landscape. This special status has hardly changed over the years. In the 1930s, when devaluations and the abandonment of the gold standard often resulted in tighter government controls over central banks, the National Bank Act remained unchanged. Likewise, at the end of the Second World War, when many central banks were nationalised, the SNB remained a stock company open to private shareholders, and it has maintained this status to this day. Since 1973, following the abolition of fixed exchange rates and the introduction of an autonomous monetary policy, the circumstances under which this principle of independence is implemented have changed progressively. A growing need for transparency vis-à-vis the public and the authorities has emerged. This is why we have developed a strategy of active communication, and our relationship with the federal authorities has been gradually institutionalised. Nowadays, transparency and accountability have become principles of good governance for all independent central banks. In Switzerland, the revised National Bank Act of 2004 obliges the SNB to present an annual accountability report on the execution of its mandate to parliament. Application of rules Independence is not merely a theoretical concept, it must be lived constantly.