samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Money unlocks the specialism of labour in the pin factory and “the great increase in the quantity of work that 2  results.” And only money can solve the coincidence of wants between the butcher, the brewer, the baker and the student on a Friday evening. 3  1  ‘Stabilising an unstable economy’ Hyman Minsky, 1986 This is the quote as abbreviated on the £ The full quote is “this great increase in the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing”, Book 1, Chapter 1, Smith, A., (1776) ‘An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations’. 3 “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest”. Book 1, Chapter 2, ibid. 2  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Many of you probably don’t see Adam Smith notes too often. Not just because you’re impoverished students. Or because you live in Scotland where you’re more likely to encounter Sir Walter Scott or Nan 4  Shepherd on a banknote when you do have cash. But because you use electronic forms of money such as debit cards and mobile phones for your everyday purchases and go online for your larger ones. A number of you may hold other forms of electronic money – crypto or virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether or Scotcoin.

Although the appreciation of the dollar is likely to cause some further softness in import prices, the continued decline in resource slack as the economy expands should push in the opposite direction. In addition, longer-term household inflation expectations have been well maintained through this period of very low inflation, as indicated by our Survey of Consumer Expectations. The combination of stable expectations and declining slack should push inflation slowly back towards the FOMC’s objective. Monetary policy As the FOMC has consistently communicated, the timing of lift-off will depend on how the economic outlook evolves. As I have discussed, the labor market has improved substantially and I expect to see inflation begin to firm later this year. If this labor market improvement continues and the FOMC is reasonably confident that inflation will move back to our 2 percent objective over the medium-term, then it would be appropriate to begin to normalize interest rates. At the March meeting, the FOMC removed language from the statement that indicated that we would be patient in beginning the process of normalizing monetary policy. But, as Chair Yellen remarked in her most recent press conference, removal of “patient” from the statement does not indicate that we will be “impatient” to begin to normalize monetary policy. Rather, the timing of normalization will be data dependent and remains uncertain because the future evolution of the economy cannot be fully anticipated. Whenever the data support a decision to lift off, I think it is important to recognize what this would signify.
The minority negative or not statistically significant coefficients could be attributed to the low number of observations, as well as to various specific factors that temporarily interrupted the positive and strong relation between cumulative real wage gap and inflation gap. The estimated coefficients of cumulative real wage gap using the log-normalized data point to robust results and are more meaningful for policy makers. Results show that an increase/decrease of cumulative real wage gap by 10% led inflation gap to rise/deepen by 0.561% during the first wage adjustment episode, by 0.846% during the second wage adjustment episode and by 0.454% during the third wage adjustment episode. We deepen the robustness check analysis and test if the inflation gap accelerates after the cumulative real wage gap closes. In that respect, we estimated the slope of the post-crisis Phillips Curve before and after the cumulative real wage gap was closed. The results in the standard method, as well as the log-normalized method are presented attached. The log-normalized results show that a fall of the cumulative real wage gap by 10% corresponds to a decline of the inflation gap by 0.9%. On the other hand, a 10% increase of the cumulative real wage gap after closes leads to an increased inflation gap by 2.2%. This confirms the theoretical prediction that there a break in the slope of the curve, as the coefficients are higher after the cumulative wage gap closes than before this happens.

For example, Canada did not have a wage adjustment during the first historical period, but it experienced one during the second period. We refer to the latter as the second episode of wage adjustment in Canada. Peak years are country-specific; hence they are not the same in all countries. This means that the first wage adjustment episode, including the peak years, may have lasted, for example, 7 years in Italy, 8 years in Germany and France, 9 years in US, 20 years in Korea or 28 years (and counting) in Japan. Of the 35 countries analysed, 21 countries experienced the first historical episode of wage adjustments, 33 countries experienced the second historical episode of wage adjustments and only 2 countries experienced the third historical episode of wage adjustments. This is why the total number of observations is much higher for the second wage adjustment episode, compared against the first wage adjustment episode. In the case of the third wage adjustment episode, the total number of observations is much lower. And now we move to the juicy part. We present the graphical representation of our results for all OECD countries which experienced wage adjustments (21 countries for the first wage adjustment episode and 33 countries for the second wage adjustment episode). The results are statistically significant and with the expected sign for the first two adjustment episodes. For the third adjustment episode, the sign of the relationship is as predicted, but the number of observations is too limited to have statistical significance.
This reflects the fact that the Bank of England is among the lowest cost central banks in the world - with a fraction of the staff of the Bundesbank, the Banque de France or the Federal Reserve System even when adjustment is made for differences in function. The charge will certainly now be significantly lower to reflect inter-alia the transfer of banking supervision to the FSA. But I recognise that whatever our costs we need to be accountable for the resources that we use and the burden we place on the banking system. We will now be more accountable to Court, to the Government that will set the charge, to the banks themselves and the wider public through our Annual Report. The Bank’s functions Below the Court the new Bank will be organised administratively into three main subdivisions, reflecting our responsibilities for monetary stability and financial stability, each under a Deputy Governor, with the third subdivision responsible for all forms of financial market operations, under a senior Executive Director. The central services of the Bank, including personnel and finance, will report to the Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, who will remain responsible for the day-to-day management of the Bank. The main changes in the Bill affect our monetary stability and financial stability functions, which I will discuss in turn. Monetary Stability Let me start with monetary stability - although the new arrangements may be familiar to you not least because they are in place already!

Alongside the ongoing efforts by firms to get closer to the frontier of best practice in risk management, it is very important to see a substantial and sustained investment in improving the infrastructure that underpins the over-the-counter derivatives market. The major dealers in the credit derivatives market have begun a major effort to close the gap between the level of the business they are undertaking and their operational capacity to manage effectively the legal, operational and settlement risks in that business.
Table 1 The costs of higher capital requirements Benefits  Costs  Required Marginal Probability  present value,  present value,  of 1% rise in risk weighted  % of GDP  % of GDP  capital ratio  Extra Months in the Average Gap between Crises from 25 years  (1) Baseline  55%  4.25  0.077%  5.9  (2) 30% Modigliani-Miller effect  55%  3.25  0.059%  4.5  (3) Tax offset  55%  1.67  0.030%  2.3  (4) More Substitutes to Bank Finance  55%  0.80  0.015%  1.1  (5) Less Sensitive Investment  55%  0.32  0.006%  0.4  Temporary Impact on GDP from Crises  20%  0.32  0.016%  1.2  How do these costs measure against the benefits of a more robust banking sector and a lower frequency of banking crises? I will make the same assumptions as in the FSR, namely that if a bank crisis occurs the initial impact is to reduce output by 10% of GDP. That is almost exactly the amount by which UK GDP is now below the level it would have reached had it continued on the trajectory it was on up to 2007. I assume that three quarters of this reduction lasts for just five years, but that the other 2.5% of lost GDP is gone forever.

And should we change the goal of monetary policy to include a wider range of objectives that include maintaining the stability of the banking sector? 2  BIS Review 100/2010  Why were banks so fragile? On the eve of the crisis we had come to be in a situation where the capital of UK banks, relative to their assets, was around half the level that was typical fifty years earlier and probably around one third the level that was usual one hundred years ago (Chart 2). In the US the decline in bank capital over the past one hundred years is quite probably even larger. Chart 2  Chart 3  Capital levels relative to total holdings for UK banks  Liquidity ratio of the UK banking sector  Per cent 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001  Sources: United Kingdom: Sheppard, D (1971), The growth and role of UK financial institutions 1880–1962, Methuen, London; Billings, M and Capie, F (2007), “Capital in British banking”, 1920–1970, Business History, Vol 49(2), pages 139–162; BBA, published accounts and Bank calculations. (a) US data show equity as a percentage of assets (ratio of aggregate dollar value of bank book equity to aggregate dollar value of bank book assets). (b) UK data on the capital ratio show equity and reserves over total assets on a time-varying sample of banks, representing the majority of the UK banking system, in terms of assets.
UND1X, UNDINHX and import prices  UND1X, UNDINHX and import price for goods: outcome and scenario Percentage 12-month change 5  5  4  4  UNDINHX  3  3  2  2  1  1  UND1X 0  0  -1  -1  Import prices  -2 1998  -2 1999  2000  2001  2002  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Diagram 8. Wage costs and inflation  Development of labour costs in the business sector and of the CPI Per cent 25  25  Inflation Labour costs  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5 0  0 71  73  75  77  79  81  83  85  87  89  91  93  95  97  99  Sources: National Institute of Economic Research and Statistics Sweden  At this stage of economic recovery, the labour market has functioned better in some respects than the Riksbank, and many other observers too, expected. Nominal wage increases have, as I said before, been moderate and vacancies have been filled without this leading to any substantial shortages. At the same time, it would be premature to breathe a sigh of relief. The labour market and the wage formation system have not yet been tested to the full.

However, these were not the only reasons why it proved difficult to gain acceptance for a low-inflation policy in Sweden and why the thought of entrusting monetary policy to an independent institution raised doubts. The Keynesian tradition has been extremely strong among Swedish economists and across party lines ever since the 1930s. Therefore, the idea that the state can continuously control or influence the economic situation has probably been more persistent here than elsewhere. Our strong parliamentary tradition, which is based on the idea that all power derives from Parliament, has also played a part. Countries where power is shared more evenly among the political institutions have found it easier to accept the delegation of monetary policy to an independent authority. Having said this, it is worthwhile recalling that there is in fact a completely different Swedish tradition. The policy shift of the early 1990s is in fact a return to a long tradition of price stability that was temporarily interrupted for a few decades. Between 1870 and 1970, the average rate of annual inflation was about 2%. 1  BIS Review 39/2000  Diagram 1.
On the other hand, we are constantly holding the banking system under pressure not only for its further geographical extension, but also for raising its quality and inventory of payment instruments. The establishment of an ever update payment infrastructure, side skipping investments in technology or out-dated solutions, will be a clear orientation of the Bank of Albania. In this sense, there is room for further increasing the use of electronic credit cards, on which I have observed that certain banks have been very active. In the quality of the central bank, we welcome any rationalism in terms of simplifying and unifying the use of various cards issued by the banking system. *******  8  BIS Review 38/2005  Further to my speech, allow me to make a summary of the financial activity of the Bank of Albania over 2004: Meeting the objective of price stability and financial sustainability of the country has dictated the need for a more active policy by the Bank of Albania. Also, the developments of two main foreign currencies, Euro and US dollar, have had significant effects on the financial indicators and the Bank of Albania balance sheet. During 2004, the total assets of the Bank of Albania were increased by 4.8 percent, reflecting growth of foreign assets by 14.7 percent. The growth of the latter ones was due to two factors: the Bank of Albania intervention in foreign exchange market by purchases, and the converting of foreign currency government income.

Some indicators of the economy over the years  Real growth of GDP (in %)1 PBB (with current prices, in millions of Lek2) PBB (with current prices, in millions of USD) PBB (in USD per capita)3 Number of the employed (in thousands) Unemployment rate (in %)  1  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  8.9  7.7  6.5  4.7  6.0  6.0  488611  530900  588700  630000  695100  780100  3548.4  3694.5  4102.4  4496.8  5702.2  7,581  1052.0  1086.3  1329.0  1460.0  1833.5  2,434  1081.0  1068.0  1065.0  921.0  928.0  917.0  18.0  16.9  14.6  15.8  15.0  14.6  Data on GDP and its real growth for the period 1999-2000 are originated from INSTAT. For the rest data are estimates from Ministry of Finance, IMF and also data from Bank of Albania. 2  The table is being constructed based on the reviewed nominal GDP. 3  Nominal GDP converted at the average rate of the period.
So the contribution of energy and other commodity prices to inflation should fall back sharply as we go through the year. Of course, we cannot assume that the evolution of domestically-generated inflation is independent of these factors. Indeed, some countervailing pickup in the contribution of domestically-generated inflation is quite possible if businesses look to provide their employees with some recompense for the past squeeze in living standards. Moreover, one cannot rule out further adverse external price shocks. But a sharp fall in inflation is the most likely outcome and that in turn should mean that the squeeze on real household incomes will ease, providing some support for consumer spending. Even so, real income growth will still only be moderate and high levels of indebtedness may weigh on the spending of some households. Moreover, the uncertainties associated with the euro area are likely to persist, retarding growth there. Not only will that weigh on our exports, but funding conditions may also remain difficult, while British businesses are likely to remain cautious about investing and hiring. At its October meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee agreed that the outlook for UK output growth was markedly weaker than it had believed earlier in the year. Without action, and despite the present excessive level of inflation, the extra margin of slack meant that inflation would consequently be more likely to undershoot, rather than overshoot, the 2% target in the medium term. So it was against that background that we decided to re-start our asset purchases, buying another £ billion of gilts.

4  Data related to employment rates for the euro are available to 2007Q3 and 2006 for the United States. 5  Data refer to December 2007. 2  BIS Review 18/2008  to a certain extent, contributed to the disappointing productivity growth. However, this slowdown in labour productivity growth can be largely attributed to a marked deceleration of total factor productivity growth. Indeed, in the euro area and Spain, TFP growth decelerated from 1.4% over the period from 1980 to 1995 to 0.7% and 0.1% respectively between 1995 and 2007. There are many potential factors explaining the decline in total factor productivity growth. Among the most prominent causes are those structural features of the European economies that are undermining incentives, including innovations, to invest in real and human capital and that reduce the flexibility of firms to smoothly and quickly adjust to their new environment. Some empirical evidence has shown that the structural characteristics of the US economy – a more flexible labour market, a higher degree of competition in product markets and lower barriers to entry for new firms – were more conducive to exploiting the opportunities provided by the new technologies.
And because we share similar experiences – still fresh in our memories – of major banking crises in the Nordic countries, we have perhaps a head start when it comes to recognizing and trying to deal with these challenges on a Nordic level, even if much worksstill remains. Here, I might add that integration on a pan-Nordic level has also come a long way in the area of securities exchanges and clearing and settlement facilities. Of course, the integration of the financial infrastructure poses similar challenges for authorities to cross-border banking and some additional complications as well. However, today I will focus on the challenges posed by cross-border banks. And I must stress that these challenges are not merely a regional problem. Due to the dynamic changes in the banking landscape, they will indeed require solutions on a European level. My main message today is that increased coordination is imperative, and, in this, it is vitally important that future arrangements for supervision, crisis management and crisis resolution of cross-border banks must be dealt with jointly as a package, and not in isolation from each other. It is apparent that the solutions in any one of these areas will depend on the solutions in the other areas. In particular, it will be necessary to address the issue of burden-sharing arrangements for the eventuality that a border-crossing bank becomes insolvent. If we don’t, there is a great danger that crisis management fails and valuable time will be lost.

Despite EU regulations on consolidated supervision, there is always the risk that no supervisory authority will gain sufficient oversight of and insight into all parts of a banking group. The supervision is also complicated by the functional specialisation within the banks, which does not always follow the national and legal divisions. If, for instance, a banking group with operations in two countries has concentrated all of its credit risk management in its home country, it will probably be difficult for the host country’s supervisory authority to assess the total risk in the subsidiary. On top of problems of getting a fair overall picture, there is the problem of coordinating information. When several authorities in different countries are involved, the information flow may be  BIS Review 39/2006  3  slowed down. The MoU on Cooperation between Banking Supervisors, Central Banks, and Finance Ministries in the European Union in Financial Crisis Situations that was recently agreed among the 25 member states provides a useful framework for sharing information in a crisis. Decision making In a crisis you need the ability to make rapid decisions. For example, central banks might consider providing emergency liquidity assistance. In some cases, there might also be reasons to consider a swift take-over of the bank and temporarily placing it under public administration. For decisions like these, you would ideally need a clear line of command. It is difficult enough to organise efficient management of a national crisis.
Our guidance also underlines another important point that as far as Regtech adoption is concerned, the human element remains critical to identifying and developing the skills required to advance AML/CFT Regtech adoption, while being supported by a culture and 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  capacity of innovation. 25. This issue of the human element and the need to put in proper capacity is, of course, easier said than done. Data and other highly trained specialists are certainly essential to the adoption of certain AML/CFT Regtech solutions. However, data specialists have to work with experienced AML professionals, who continue to be vital to building and maintaining an effective control framework. We have found that the balance between these skills differs depending on where an institution is on its Regtech adoption journey. Data specialists are often not required until institutions begin experimenting with more advanced technologies. 26. Those banks that achieve the right balance often emphasise building effective partnerships between staff with different skill sets and fostering an iterative mindset. This is where I think ACAMS has a very important role to play in the next few years in continuing to build capacity in AML/CFT and making practitioners aware of the part that technology can play in making their work more effective and efficient, better equipping them to collaborate with data specialists who can support them in delivering the work. 27.

And here, let me circle back to one of the three themes that I deployed in my speech three years ago: the importance of information sharing. I think we need to push this line of effort further. I think this is the time for us to push to realise the full potential of information sharing in our AML efforts. 30. With the development in the past two to three years, public-private partnerships and similar information-sharing arrangements are now firmly at the centre of the global response to financial crime, having changed the way we work collaboratively to analyse and disrupt shared threats to deliver better and more solid results. We now see them as a key part of the response to the proliferation of online scams, including investment fraud. But I would also note that the global role of partnerships is still comparatively small relative to the scale of the threat from global financial crimes. 31. There is therefore a collective need globally to increase the tempo in these partnerships. Let me explain how we are doing that here in Hong Kong. First, we are increasing the number of banks which are members of the FMLIT from 10 to 15, which will increase the flow of data going into the system and help to reduce displacement risk. Secondly, we are taking steps through thematic work to improve the industry’s analytics capability.