samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I agree that this would be the case if all property buyers used their savings and did not need to borrow from banks. However, I do not believe that none of the purchasers of luxury properties borrow from banks. Some buyers do not approach banks for mortgages because they still have time before completing the transactions, or because they do not intend to hold the flats for a long time. I also do not believe that the markets for small and medium-sized residential flats could have become so active without abundant credit from banks. I therefore believe that the prudential measures that we have taken and good risk management by banks will help stop asset-price bubbles from forming. 10. While banks will help to control the risks, members of the public and corporations in Hong Kong also need to be more alert. They should consider what they can afford and not borrow too much at a time when interest rates are so low to avoid getting into financial difficulties when interest rates rise again. But I can see that this is not easy. As hot money continues to flow into Hong Kong, it pushes the market higher. If this continues, people may get into a mistaken mindset that the market can only go up and overlook the risk that capital and hot would might one day reverse course without warning. 11. Finally, I would like to share with you an article I read last week.

Additionally, it provides for a new resolution procedure for large financial companies, a creation of a new agency responsible for implementing and enforcing compliance with consumer financial laws, introduces more rigorous regulatory capital requirements, affects significant changes in the regulation of OTC derivatives, includes reform of the regulation of credit rating agencies, implements changes to corporate governance and executive compensation practices, incorporates the Volcker Rule, requires registration of advisers to certain private funds, and affects significant changes in the securitization market. In the EU, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive MiFID is an important step in the biggest overhaul of financial markets regulation in the EU for a decade. However, the new regulatory framework consists of Directive (MiFID 2) and Regulation on markets in financial instruments (MiFIR). It is an integral part of the EU’s strategy to address the effects of the financial crisis, but at the same time aims to bring greater transparency to markets and to strengthen investor protection. These changes are a key for restoring the trust in the EU financial markets. In reaction to the global financial crisis, the EU has also introduced the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) that initiates a reporting obligation for OTC derivatives, a clearing obligation for eligible OTC derivatives, measures to reduce counterparty credit risk and operational risk for bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives, common rules for central counterparties (CCPs) and trade repositories (TRs), and rules on the establishment of interoperability between CCPs.
For example, the recent reports issued by the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG), which is composed of regulators from five major countries, indicated that the banking regulators both here and abroad should have been tougher in the assessment of the quality of management, of governance, and in terms of these banks’ risk management  1  There is a growing body of economics literature on this issue that links monetary policy to leverage. See, for example, Tobias Adrian and Hyun Shin, manuscript in preparation for the forthcoming Handbook of Monetary Economics, volume 3, currently circulated as Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 398, October 2009. 2  BIS Review 161/2009  capabilities. 2 We should also have pushed harder for better management information systems and more simplified corporate organizations and structures. We should have done more to identify best practices in terms of risk management, liquidity, capital, and compensation and pushed harder to force the laggards to move to best practice standards. We are learning a lot about how to do supervision better and are working aggressively to apply those lessons to our current practices. The Supervisory Capital Assessment Process or SCAP is an important example of the value of broad, horizontal examinations. In the SCAP, the Federal Reserve worked in conjunction with other U.S. regulators to assess the impact of a stress economic environment on the 19 largest banking organizations in the country simultaneously. This approach made the SCAP a particularly powerful exercise.

I have highlighted this example because it provides a stark illustration of two critical shortcomings in our current regulatory system. The first is the fact that a large, systemically important institution like AIG was able to slip through the cracks in our regulatory structure and put our entire system at risk. The second is the lack of an effective resolution regime for large bank holding companies and nonbank financial institutions. Absent such a regime, a commitment to support a failing firm inevitably results in the loss of leverage in negotiating with counterparties and creditors. Turning now to another difficult issue, it is deeply offensive to Americans, including me, and runs counter to basic notions of justice and fairness, that some of the very same individuals and financial firms that precipitated this crisis have also benefited so directly from the response to the crisis. This has occurred at the same time that many Americans have lost  4  AIG was supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and state insurance commissioners. Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were supervised by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were supervised by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and Washington Mutual and Indy Mac were supervised by the OTS. The Fed's involvement with many of these firms came only through its lender of last resort role. BIS Review 161/2009  5  their jobs and hard-earned savings. The public outrage this situation has produced is understandable.
The lack of structural reforms is, in my view, a major cause of the difference in the growth potential in Europe compared with the US and with some other advanced industrialized economies. The structural reforms identified in the Lisbon agenda have the potential to increase both labour productivity growth and labour utilisation, and therefore the long-term growth potential of the European economy. The experience of European countries which have undertaken some courageous and successful reforms show that it pays off. For instance, since the beginning of the EMU in 1999 the euro area has witnessed an increase of more than 12 million in the number of people employed, while from 1990 to 1998, the number of people employed only increased by around 3 millions. It is clear that major structural reforms are not easy to achieve, but pursuing resolutely such reforms is especially needed in the current environment, where the European economy is facing a number of important challenges, including rapid technological change, accelerating globalisation as well as ageing populations. According to the European Commission’s and  4  Source EUKLEMS. BIS Review 82/2007  3  ECB projections, the impact of ageing populations alone could reduce on average potential output growth in Europe by nearly half by 2040, if structural reforms are not carried out 5 . There is today a unique opportunity for European governments to take advantage of the present favourable growth developments to push ahead with the structural reforms that have been already agreed upon but are still far from being achieved.

So, imposing new trade barriers – or “bilateral deals” – on some trade partners not only has almost no chance of eliminating the overall current account deficit, but it also threatens long-run economic growth. Alternatively, it would also be misleading for countries to carry out non-cooperative domestic macroeconomic policies. Competitive devaluations first: after some unilateral and unfortunate declarations last week, several of us on the Governing Council of the ECB felt the need to reiterate that during the last IMF Annual Meetings in DC last October we committed with all our partners to a multilateral approach saying that, I quote, “we will not target our exchange rates for competitive purposes”. Any deviation from this common rule would be at the cost of breaking mutual trust and global growth. Speaking of the Governing Council of the ECB, let me say a few words on our monetary policy. It is following, with confidence and with patience, a path of gradual normalisation. But one shouldn’t focus excessively on the sole instrument of monthly net asset purchases: whether we end them in September or taper them somewhat more gradually is not a “deep existential” question… There are two more important issues: First, we prefer, as in Irish dancing, a four-hand reel rather than a solo; we will rely more and more on the entire policy package, including the sizeable stock of acquired assets, the forthcoming reinvestments and the forward guidance on interest rates. And we will follow a predictable sequence.
Beyond climate change, the NGFS is acting as a great catalyst on nature-related issues. In light of its March report, the NGFS launched in April a Nature-Related Risks Taskforce co-chaired by Sylvie Goulard, Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, and Saskia de Vries from DNB, with the objectives to incorporating nature-related risks into the NGFS’s long standing workstreams within the next two years. As much as possible, let us have interim deliverables earlier.  Conceptual framing and research:  as a problem well-stated is a  problem half-solved. Bridging methodological shortcomings and data gaps is a crucial pre-requisite for action, before jumping to any conclusions on the prudential or monetary front – these must come in due time. Our priority as  Page 11 sur 13 central banks and supervisors is thus to build the capacity to further analyse and study empirical evidence of the financial implications of biodiversity and naturerelated risks. At the Banque de France, we are fully committed to this effort, thanks to a dedicated team of experts within the Climate Change Centre (CCC) who contribute both to NGFS and BDF research advances. We will strive to provide state of the art metrics, financial assessment, and, hopefully in a near future, scenarios analysis. The work plan of the NGFS Taskforce includes the development of a unique conceptual framework adapted to our activities, which will be key to build a common understanding and address the knowledge, capacity and methodological gaps that we face.

Rather, the current emphasis is on promoting an informal grouping of central banks called EMEAP (“Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks) which is exploring opportunities for cooperation in areas such as payment systems, reserves management and banking supervision. Among other things, this may provide the opportunity over time to develop a more distinctive and focused regional voice on international supervisory issues. Consolidated supervision I will now return to the topic which I raised at the beginning of my speech, which is how we view consolidated supervision from the receiving end. I suppose that it goes without saying that we are in favour of the concept of consolidated supervision. As an international financial centre, we are vulnerable to adverse developments in banks abroad and we rely heavily on the consolidated supervision of the supervisors of those banks. The ability to conduct consolidated supervision is a key factor in whether we regard the home supervision of a particular bank as adequate - which is one of the criteria for granting a banking licence in Hong Kong. Within the legal framework in Hong Kong we try to cooperate with overseas regulators to ensure that they can effectively undertake consolidated supervision. In particular, we allow home supervisors to carry out on-site examinations of their institutions in Hong Kong subject to obtaining our prior consent - which we have not hitherto withheld.
Let me briefly outline some of these roles: •  The MAS, as the statutory regulator, will monitor compliance with the laws and regulations that govern the integrity of the markets, seek enforcement of the laws, and propose amendments in order to keep them relevant in a changing market environment. We have undertaken a substantial review of our securities laws in the last year. Insider trading is now both a criminal and civil offence, and we have recently proposed to amend the laws to capture a wider pool of persons who seek to take advantage of inside information. The proposed new Securities and Futures Act (SFA), to be put to Parliament later this year, will contain other substantial changes. I will elaborate on one of these, concerning the 1 prospectus registration regime later in the speech. •  The Singapore Exchange (SGX), with its frontline interface with the industry and markets, plays a key role in preserving fair and transparent markets. It is responsible for the listing  1  The SFA would also incorporate the provisions concerning the raising of capital that are presently found in the Companies Act, thereby creating a single compendium of laws governing the securities industry. BIS Review 14/2001  1  rules for companies that raise capital and have their shares traded on the exchange. It is also responsible for ensuring that conditions exist for orderly trading of listed securities. •  The conduct of issuers themselves is at the core of a system of market discipline.

Regulation of SGX as a self-listed entity When the SGX was listed on itself (on its Securities Trading subsidiary), MAS assumed the role of frontline regulator for the listing and trading of SGX's shares. MAS was the approving authority for SGX's listing, and was directly responsible for vetting SGX's prospectus. We are also conducting surveillance of trading in SGX's shares, and monitoring the continuous disclosure of material information by SGX. MAS has powers under the Exchanges (Demutualisation and Merger) Act to issue directives to SGX to resolve any conflicts of interest arising from its self-listing. Such conflicts are also addressed in a Deed of Undertaking to the MAS. In keeping with the Deed, SGX has appointed a Conflicts Committee to deal with such issues, and MAS is the approving authority for the composition of the Committee. Revisiting the regulatory structure will be necessary The relationship between the regulator and the exchange is evolving internationally. Regulators are monitoring the effectiveness of self-regulation by the exchanges, and the division of responsibilities between regulators and exchanges. No single model has gained universal acceptance, and no model is regarded as good for all time in any jurisdiction. The present MAS-SGX regulatory arrangement has major elements in common with that in the major jurisdictions which have seen the exchanges demutualised, and in particular with arrangements in Australia. The UK approach is also similar, except that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has taken over the listing authority from the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
We think of Dodd-Frank as akin to what Dr. Seuss once wrote about medicine:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Interest margins for community and regional banks have been shrinking for some 20 years. To be sure, the low interest rates the Fed has engineered to bring the economy out of the death spiral threatened by the Financial Panic of 2007–09 exacerbated pressures on margins as we awaited the strengthening economy we are now beginning to experience. But adding the pills and the bills of extra layers of compliance and legal expenses generated by Dodd-Frank has compounded the difficulty of passing on profitable franchises to your banking heirs. This is why, Systemwide, the Fed has been sensitive to the situation of banks under $ billion, and especially sensitive to the situation of banks with less than $ billion in footings. To be sure, we are as committed as ever to safety and soundness and the application of the law; we always have been and always will be. But at the Dallas Fed, we believe we can apply the requisite discipline required to safeguard our banking system in a way that is beneficial to regional and community banks. We and our fellow Federal Reserve Banks have worked hard to instill a constructive and interactive relationship, rather than a hostile, purely formulaic one, with the banks we supervise.

So what are the implications of the U.S. experience? The context and purpose of any stress test should dictate the form it takes. Both the SCAP and CCAR models likely have some lessons for other such exercises, but in circumstances of market stress, the SCAP model is more relevant than the CCAR model. In such episodes, our experience suggests:   First, the stress scenario needs to be severe to be credible.   Second, disclosure of the results is needed at a sufficiently granular level so that private analysts can make their own independent assessment.   Third, the results need to be credible in terms of expected losses.   Fourth, there needs to be a credible capital backstop so that market participants can be sure banks will be able to raise the capital that they need under a stress environment, one way or another. One tricky issue is how to treat sovereign debt exposures. This was not an issue in the U.S. SCAP exercise. This is difficult because there is a complex interaction between fiscal soundness and bank soundness, which is very hard to model. This illustrates a wider point – that all situations are importantly distinct and that while we can all learn from each others’ experiences in this field, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It is important to avoid fragmentation of the infrastructure for clearing payment transactions in NOK, otherwise we will lose the advantages we have today. An efficient and secure common infrastructure must still be a main feature of the Norwegian payment system, whichever solution the industry ultimately chooses. Looking further ahead, a number of broad issues need to be addressed. Norges Bank will initiate a project to assess the payment and settlement system of tomorrow as a whole. The aim is to make active and constructive contributions to an efficient and secure payment system, today and in the future. We will seek long-term solutions to several of the issues mentioned above, in particular the following two key questions: Should we continue to have a completely domestic payment infrastructure in Norway, or could it become more international? How would we then solve issues related to national security? How should the infrastructure be changed to facilitate the services needed by end-users in the future? Should payments still be cleared before they reach the central bank, or is gross settlement the best option? The first phase of the project is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2019. Cyber security As the payment system is centralised and ICT-dependent, it is vulnerable to cyber attacks. If an attack were to succeed, payments could come to a halt and financial losses could occur. An attack could also result in unauthorised access to or manipulation of sensitive information.

FATF will consider these issues as part of its planned review of Recommendation 16 on wire transfers, to improve consistency and usability of message data, and enable more effective AML/CFT checks. It will also continue efforts to promote consistent implementation of the Travel Rule for virtual assets. The new FSB industry taskforce on Legal, Regulatory, and Supervisory matters, chaired by Carolyn Rogers from Bank of Canada, will help move the conversation forward in these areas. We hope to harness expert input from industry and provide guidance, working with national authorities and the international standard-setting bodies. Continued collaboration Improving the payments infrastructure will only be possible through successful collaboration. As policymakers and operators, we can improve the policies and core infrastructure to provide solid foundations for private innovation. The private sector needs to build on this to help deliver cheaper, faster, more transparent, and more accessible services to their customers. The new industry taskforces will play an important role. But this needs to be complemented by strong dialogue and actions in individual jurisdictions: exploring improvements to the domestic payment infrastructure, using the globally agreed frameworks. Page 8  Firms will likely need to continue to invest in their payments technology to be ready for upgrades to payment systems: such as the move to ISO 20022. The industry taskforce on Payment System Interoperability and Extension are developing a handy checklist to support firms on this journey. And importantly, firms should consider how to make the most of these changes.
6  In the case of portfolio investment and direct investment, Switzerland has high net assets abroad which, together, make up 84% of Swiss net wealth. However, in some years, the increase in the net international investment position attributable to current account surpluses has been cancelled out by currency-related losses on asset holdings abroad. 7  Since 2011, reserve assets have been a further important component of the net investment position. Switzerland has a net liability position in the “other investment” category, reflecting the strong linkages between the Swiss financial center and the rest of the world. 8  See “Merchanting in Switzerland”, in Swiss Balance of Payments 2012, Swiss National Bank. 9  See the discussion in Beusch, E., Döbeli, B., Fischer, A., and Yesin, P. (2013): “Merchanting and Current Account Balances”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute, WP 140. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  investment position, the special role of our country as an international financial center, and merchanting business. Consequently, Switzerland’s current account surplus did not arise because the Swiss franc was too weak. The real exchange rate does not play a decisive role in the structural factors responsible for this surplus. Narrow current account ranges: a bad idea In the context of resolving global imbalances, some would argue that each country’s current account should lie within a narrowly defined range.

It is thus necessary to keep watch on inflation expectations, to counteract expectations of falling inflation, and preferably to create expectations of higher inflation. In this type of situation it may be desirable to create expectations that actually exceed the inflation target. The Riksbank’s current regime, with a credible inflation target and the publication of forecasts, including their motivation, for inflation, the real economy and the repo rate, provides a very good base for maintaining confidence in monetary policy, for upholding inflation expectations and preventing them from falling too low, or even from falling unchecked. If, contrary to expectations, this should not prove sufficient, and inflation expectations were to threaten to become too low, it is possible that tightening the inflation target, in the form of a temporary target for prices, might work better. This type of temporary price target could be introduced in the form of an average inflation target, so that inflation over the coming five years should on average be 2 per cent. If inflation then falls below 2 per cent during a period of time, it must be kept above 2 per cent during a period of time to ensure the average will be 2 per cent. With a well-motivated average inflation target it may be easier to justify this monetary policy and to create confidence in allowing inflation to exceed 2 per cent during a period of time in order to provide a sufficiently low real interest rate.