samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This fact alone suggests that something will have to give eventually, and this raises the interesting question of how these imbalances have persisted on a path that seems unsustainable with so little evidence of rising risk premia. Part of the answer seems to lie in the fact that these capital inflows into the United States, however, are not solely the result of the decisions of private actors, but reflect official intervention by countries with exchange rate regimes tied to the dollar, including those in Asia and the major oil exporters. Research at the Federal Reserve and outside suggests the scale of foreign official accumulation of U.S. assets has put downward pressure on U.S. interest rates, with estimates of the effect ranging from small to quite significant. If this is right, the apparent reduction in real rates is less likely to signal concern over expectations of future growth and future returns on investment, and is more likely to signal the special consequences of these exchange rate arrangements and their effects on private behavior, as well as the increase in international capital mobility. What then can we say about the implications of the pattern of imbalances we see today? 2  BIS Review 3/2006  The trajectory of the U.S. current account deficit has led most observers to conclude the U.S. external imbalance is unsustainably large and will have to come down over time.

The size and durability of the imbalances that characterize the world economy today reflect a myriad of different forces: from differences in actual and potential growth rates, the degree of openness of financial and product markets, the type of exchange rate regime in place, the borrowing requirements of the sovereign, the degree of financial market development, the extent of the official safety nets, to differences in attitudes toward risk and expectations about the future. The interactions of these forces are complex and vary over time. And this limits our capacity to judge the sustainable level of imbalances. On its face, the increase in the size of the U.S. current account deficit suggests that the United States has been the principal beneficiary of the increased availability of global savings and the greater apparent willingness of the world’s savers to invest outside their home countries. At the same time, however, it is not difficult to see that if the deficit continues to run at a level close to 7 percent of GDP—and most forecasts assume it will for some time—the net international investment position of the United States will deteriorate sharply, U.S. net obligations to the rest of the world will rise to a very substantial share of GDP, and a growing share of U.S. income will have to go to service those obligations.
Consequently, when decisions on the use of petroleum revenues are taken, weight must not only be given to long-term considerations and the distribution of wealth across generations, but also to developments in the real exchange rate and the competitiveness of the exposed sector over the short and medium term. Thank you for your attention. 2  See e.g. J. D. Sachs and A. M. Warner (2001)”The curse of natural resources” in European Economic Review 45, – 838. 3  See Akram, Farooq Q. (2003): “Reell likevektsvalutakurs for Norge” (Real equilibrium exchange rate for Norway), in Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift 118, pp 89-112.  pp 827

While this theory too may be somewhat true, it would certainly not provide too much comfort to the person who is suffering from inequality and poverty, if he/she were to find out that such a policy was being followed. That is why it is vital that the current Sri Lankan policy which is a pro-active one to consciously support the trickle down of economic benefits quickly, should be implemented fast, since it will surely help to reduce the social tension that would otherwise build up. Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding all our current efforts, we still have to accept that significant disparities remain despite the remarkable achievements that we have made so far. Hence, the challenge before policymakers is to continue to find ways to minimize disparities in wealth distribution without disturbing the overall efficiency in resource utilization or retarding the growth momentum. This is not a simple task, but is surely possible to do so. However, the common syndrome of this country is that many begin by saying: “we can’t”, or “we are too small” or “we are not in a position to do that” or some other negative claim. We have to, as a matter of urgency get out of that negative mentality. As we know, the Sri Lankan Government has embarked on the pro-poor pro-growth policy with a focus on balanced regional development.
For mortgages that are part of securitizations, the legal obstacles to loan modification that preserve value are substantial. Meanwhile, mortgage servicers lack the systems, processes, governance, resources and incentives to deal effectively with a large volume of delinquent borrowers – who often suffer poor customer treatment at a time of personal distress.8 The result is inefficiently low levels of mortgage modification, too few “short sales”9 by mutual agreement between distressed borrowers and lenders, and too much reliance on the foreclosure process. This process also has many legal impediments and has become even more inefficient as the volume of loans in the pipeline increases. One consequence has been lengthening delays in completing foreclosures – including unavoidable foreclosures. These delays have increased the economic damage caused by foreclosure and reduced recovery rates. The damage caused by inefficient foreclosures is worth emphasizing. It is not just the direct loss of value in terms of deterioration of homes that are ultimately foreclosed. In addition, as I have personally witnessed in my outreach visits across the New York Fed’s District, foreclosures impose significant costs on families, surrounding neighborhoods and communities. Unmaintained homes facing foreclosure drag down the value of nearby homes. Also, property taxes on non-foreclosed homes often go up due to a declining tax base and this puts additional downward pressure on housing prices. Foreclosures also undercut housing demand. Households that go through foreclosure need to repair their credit records and to accumulate new downpayments.

Ravi Menon: Introducing Mark Carney Introductory remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 2014 Monetary Authority of Singapore Lecture, Singapore, 17 November 2014. *  *  *  Mr Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman, MAS, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Ambassadors, distinguished guests, friends and colleagues, good morning, Welcome to the eighth MAS Lecture. First held in 2000, the MAS Lecture has over the years featured several eminent members of the international financial community who have offered their perspectives on important economic and financial issues. Today, Mark Carney joins that distinguished band of leaders in finance, and it is my pleasure to introduce him. Carney has the rare distinction of serving as governor for not just one central bank but two: •  From 2008 to 2013, Carney was Governor of the Bank of Canada, playing a major role in helping Canada avoid the worst effects of the Global Financial Crisis. •  And since the middle of last year, he has been Governor of the Bank of England, the first time that a non-Briton has taken the helm of that hallowed institution in its 320-year history. •  Perhaps the transition was made easier by the fact that the appointments of both the Governor of the Bank of England and that of the Bank of Canada are made in the name of the Queen.
With regard to the specific topic of my lecture this evening, I expect the GIC to demonstrate leadership in the coming months to help shape an agreement with the governments of the most important mature countries on a set of guidelines for SWFs that will hopefully help to address the challenges I discussed this evening. To summarise, SWFs have become an important source of capital flowing from the periphery to the core of today’s global economy. As such, they can play a constructive role in mature markets. At the same time, SWFs pose a challenge to the international community. The challenge is to preclude an outcome where the activities of SWFs trigger policy responses in mature markets that ultimately lead us down the path of financial protectionism. It is in the interest of mature markets and developing countries alike to avoid such an outcome. A set of guidelines addressing the threat of politically driven investment decisions and resurging state involvement in the global economy represent the best currently available option to respond to the challenge of SWFs. Let me close with a broader Swiss perspective. Switzerland has in absolute terms the sixth largest current account surplus in the world. Last year, foreign investments by Swiss companies and Swiss individuals generated net income receipts equivalent to 12 per cent of our GDP, or approximately CHF 60 billion. In other words, we are experts at making profitable cross-border investments. This means that we have as strong an incentive as virtually any country in keeping global financial markets open.

The South East Asian countries saw an increase in savings and a fall in investment in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. 2 Since then, these countries have generally continued to pursue a macroeconomic policy mix in support of an export-led growth strategy which sustains these savings-investment patterns. Meanwhile, in the oil exporting countries, export revenues have been boosted by the increase in the price of oil since 2000. You can see this in slide 4. Since domestic investments in these countries have not increased at the same pace, the result has been a rise in net savings in the oil exporting countries. The two surplus regions have one thing in common. In both cases, foreign assets are accumulated almost entirely by the official sector. In the oil exporting countries, oil revenues primarily accrue to governments. Higher oil revenues therefore translate into higher government budget surpluses. In South East Asia, where the currencies shadow the dollar, foreign assets are accumulated primarily by the central banks in the form of official foreign exchange reserve accumulation. Slide 5 shows that the global macroeconomic imbalances have led to a rapid accumulation of global official foreign exchange reserves. 3 Let me now leave you with five stylized facts about SWFs. First, as I already pointed out, SWFs are not a new phenomenon. With its Caisse des Dépots et Consignations, France set up a SWF in 1816. 4 Slide 6 shows the year of establishment of each of the 14 largest SWFs currently in operation.
However, to meet the requirements applicable from the beginning of 2020 – i.e. after the phase-in period – action will need to be taken. This is particularly the case as regards meeting the leverage ratio requirements, but also as regards gone-concern instruments. The latter are used to recapitalise a bank in the event of imminent insolvency without recourse to government support. This is achieved by writing off designated debt instruments or converting them into equity. In addition to the reforms at national level, reforms are also underway on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s international capital framework. It is likely that riskweighted assets will increase as a result of these international reforms. This expected increase has, as far as possible, been factored into the calibration of the revised Swiss ‘too big to fail’ regulations. All of these reforms – especially the higher leverage ratio requirements – will result in a further strengthening of the Swiss big banks’ resilience. In light of the fact that, in an international comparison, these two institutions are particularly large relative to the economy, this strengthening is necessary for two reasons. First, the big banks’ loss potential relative to their capitalisation is substantial. Given their significance to the Swiss economy, it is important that the big banks remain adequately capitalised, even in the event of such losses occurring. Second, while leverage ratios at both Swiss big banks have improved by international standards, they are still below the average for large globally active banks. The SNB welcomes and supports these reforms.

We will continue to be actively involved in the finalisation of the international reforms. The combined package of national and international reforms represents a decisive step in the process of resolving the ‘too big to fail’ issue in Switzerland. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Domestically focused banks: adequate resilience, despite substantial increase in mortgage exposure This brings me to the domestically focused banks. For these banks, whose activity centres on Swiss lending and deposit-taking business, I would like to highlight three developments. First, these banks’ risk exposure to the Swiss mortgage and residential real estate markets rose markedly in 2015, with their mortgage lending volume growing at a similarly robust pace as in the previous year. In addition, they further increased their affordability risk and interest rate risk exposure from maturity transformation, against a background of slightly higher imbalances on the mortgage and residential real estate markets. Second, in 2015, these banks’ interest rate margins stabilised at a low level, after having fallen steadily and significantly since the start of the low interest rate period at end-2008. This stabilisation is remarkable, given that pressure on interest rate margins continued last year. Swiss money and capital market rates fell once again in 2015. At the same time, the interest paid by banks on customer deposits remained largely unchanged. Thus, the difference between these two interest rates – the liability margin – narrowed further.
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Welcoming remarks - Vienna Initiative Full Forum Welcoming remarks by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, for the Vienna Initiative Full Forum, Skopje, 22-24 March 2023. *** Your excellences ambassadors, minister of finance, dear governors, chair of the Vienna initiative, distinguished representatives of European and International institutions Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great honor and pleasure to welcome you at the Annual Full Forum meeting of the Vienna Initiative. As Helen Keller said - "Alone we can do so little, together we can do so much." This saying lies in the essence of the Vienna Initiative – partnership among international institutions, public and private stakeholders whose common objective is safeguarding financial stability of CESEE region. Established at the height of the GFC to prevent nation-based uncoordinated policies that could led to systemic banking crisis, we have come a long way, expanding activities and fostering financial stability in the region. This initiative is particularly relevant for countries that still do not belong to the European Union family, do not have access to EU backstop facilities and as such are even more vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Collaboration and coordination is key in times of crisis. Unfortunately, in the last three years we are in the mode of "Perpetual crisis". Severe global shocks of unprecedented nature are hitting the world economy and unfolding into the "great return" of inflation and cost of living crisis.

Current developments pose one of the greatest stress tests to the globalization that in the last 4 decades through trade, financial and technological integration, brought many benefits, including marked decline in global inflation. The costs of de-globalized world can be severe - lower efficiency, higher costs and stronger and more persistent inflationary effects. Against this background, central banks need to be more humble. They cannot prevent the first-round effects of many of these shocks, but containing second round effects and anchoring inflation expectations has to be their focal point. This context prompted central banks to embark on the most synchronized and rapid monetary tightening in the last 50 years3. As interest rates hikes are taking hold, with easing supply pressures and stabilizing commodities prices, forecasts indicate that inflation will soften this year, both in advanced and developing economies. And indeed we already see signs of slowdown, but it is too early to claim victory over inflation. Core inflation in many countries remains persistent, with tight labor markets keeping pressures on wages. Nominal wage growth in the region last year was the highest following the GFCat 8.6% notably exceeding productivity gains (2.3%) thus contributing to rise in core inflation, which reached 7.4%. If this wide wage-productivity gap persists it can slow down inflation stabilization process and require longer ad stronger monetary policy reaction.
This would be bad for financial stability. The general view has now shifted and speaks clearly in favour of countries implementing an explicit deposit guarantee system, inscribed in legislation with all its terms and conditions. Such a system should focus on the small depositor. A major reason for such systems, apart from the aspect of protecting the small depositor, is that they greatly facilitate the resolution of problem bank situations and they may even prevent problems from occurring. In a situation where depositors hear negative rumours about their bank, guaranteed deposits might make them less inclined to “make a run on the bank” - to withdraw their cash and thus exacerbate the bank’s problems. A further major reason for introducing explicit guarantee systems is that experience from many banking crises has shown that the authorities feel obliged to reimburse depositors anyway, for political reasons. This is often done in an unpredictable and sometimes unfair manner favouring certain segments of the population. The cost of such implicit deposit protection is often higher than that of explicit guarantees. A guarantee system makes it easier for the authorities to close problem banks. Where such a system is lacking, the authorities tend to delay the unpleasant decision of closing a bank since they are afraid of the negative repercussions on depositors and other counterparties. But such supervisory forbearance only leads to growing problems and costs. It will always be difficult to close banks, but with a deposit guarantee at least the issue of the depositors is partly solved.

Of course, attention will have to be paid to these aspects in terms of the implementation of the new framework as well. C.3  Responses to further integration  Let me talk next about the challenges caused by the third development, progressing financial integration. I will first discuss some of the relevant European issues and then turn to global issues. EU/euro area issues In the EU there is first of all the challenge of increasing the efficiency of the complex regulatory process to meet the pace of innovation sustained by the markets and to increase regulatory convergence across countries in order to support integration and reduce the burden on financial institutions operating in several countries. The so-called Lamfalussy procedure - where some experience has already been gained in securities supervision - will seek to do precisely this, and will also improve the state of affairs in banking and insurance supervision. The deepening market integration experienced in the EU has given rise to the need for enhanced supervisory cooperation and common financial stability surveillance. As regards pure, micro-level supervisory cooperation, cooperation is being gradually stepped up through the “Lamfalussy procedure” and the establishment of the so-called level three committees, where supervisors exchange views - the primary aim being to achieve a consistent implementation of the existing legal framework. We need adequate cooperation between central banks and supervisory authorities as well as a safeguard in relation to crisis prevention.
This also applies to Rogaland. In recent year, non-residential investment has accounted for more than a third of total investment in services and distributive trades. The large investments in this sector in the latter half of the 1990s has led to a high non-residential vacancy rate. Statistics Norway’s new price index for non-residential commercial property shows that in Norway as a whole, prices peaked in the first half of 2001 and have since fallen by over 9 per cent up to the first half of 2003. This situation is likely to curb overall investment growth in the years ahead. In 2004, many companies will probably realise the gains provided by the efficiency measures that have been implemented. Continued brisk growth in household demand is expected to boost investment activity in 2005 and 2006. Petroleum investment will also increase as a result of the Orme Lange project. This is also the case for Rogaland. Our regional network reports that demand is on the increase, the market outlook for the next six months is favourable and corporate profitability has improved considerably. The economic upturn is primarily being reinforced and driven by stronger household demand, although without any substantial increase in investment or employment. The upturn has both broadened out and gained momentum in the past months. All sectors report stable or increasing demand and sales. The market outlook for the next six months in this county is very positive. Optimism does not translate into a stronger willingness to invest, however.

Norwegian households generally finance their mortgages at an interest rate that follows the short-term money market rate. Floating interest rates tend to vary widely over time. The interest rate level is very low at present, and long-term investments cannot rely on this interest rate spanning the life of a housing loan. According to money market expectations, the interest rate will eventually stabilise around 5½ per cent. This is consistent with an inflation target of 2½ per cent and a long-term real interest rate in line with the level abroad. This interest rate, with a mark-up for banks’ margins, provides a more realistic expression of the interest rate level that will apply over the loan’s life than the floating interest rate prevailing today. It may prove to be particularly challenging for borrowers to assess their debt-servicing capacity over time in a period when the interest rate is abnormally low. Such a low interest rate also places particular demands on banks in assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers. But experience has shown that the underlying cause of loan defaults can be overly optimistic assessments on the part of both the lender and borrower. House prices and developments in household credit influence consumption and housing investment. We seek to take account of these indirect effects in interest-rate setting. Household debt has increased sharply over the past decade.