samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
No, it would not be wise to always and everywhere trust central bankers with our money, but, yes, there are good reasons to trust central banks, if they are designed as solid and independent institutions with a clearly defined mandate. Institutions limit the faith we need to place into the omniscience and benevolence of individual decision-makers and provide a more lasting and reliable basis for trust and credibility. 4. Reputation and accountability: the role of central banks in society  Properly designed institutions provide the basis for trust and confidence. However, this trust must be earned, maintained and confirmed through action over time. Like individuals, institutions become  BIS Review 96/2000  6  carriers of reputation as a function of their past behaviour. This reputation forms the basis for expectations of future behaviour. In the case of the European Central Bank, the institutional preconditions for credible and successful monetary policy are in place. The European Central Bank is built on trustworthy institutional foundations. As a new institution, however, it started out without a track record and thus cannot rely on an established reputation. The statutes and institutional setup of the ECB have worked very well to date and the Governing Council of the ECB has taken its monetary policy decisions in full independence. However, to firmly establish trust and reputation takes time. Trust is deepened and reputation is built when it is tested in difficult circumstances and when it is maintained over an extended period of time.

Inflation - like war, to which it is often closely associated - destroys the fruit of honest labour, it devalues savings and investment, it erodes the social fabric of society and ultimately puts the very foundations of democracy and freedom at risk. This is one of the lessons of the bitter history of the 20th century, which was a century of hyperinflation in the wake of wars and wars in the wake of hyperinflation. No one has described the deleterious effects of inflation more vividly than Stefan Zweig has done in his book “Die Welt von Gestern” on Germany in the 1920s. He depicts the sense of distrust, despondency, desolation and despair that hyperinflation brought to Germany in 1923 (in the wake of the first world war) from which the fragile democratic and economic institutions of the young Republic were never really to recover (thus preparing the ground for the Second World War). Zweig contrasts this with the pre-war “golden age of security”, when “it paid to put money year for year in safe investments”, when “the saver was not yet robbed”, the “honest deceived” but when the “most patient, not the speculators had the greatest profit”. He concludes “that nothing has rendered the German people so embittered, so full of hatred, so ready for Hitler as this inflation” (own translation). From this one could establish not just an economic case but an ethical obligation to maintain price stability.
A long upturn followed from 1992 to 2008. National income rose by an annual rate of 5.4 per cent in this period, far higher than the rate of output growth in the mainland economy. Income growth was even higher than in the post-war period in the 1950s and 1960s. BIS Review 44/2010  1  Major structural reforms Behind these favourable developments were the major structural reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that resulted in an expanded production capacity in the Norwegian economy. Capital and credit markets were liberalised. It became easier to establish and build up new businesses. The EEA and WTO agreements resulted in stronger competition and increased flows of goods and services, labour and capital. As a result of the 1992 tax reform, the welfare state could be funded with reduced impact on wealth creation. The framework conditions for the electricity market, telecom market, aviation and broadcasting were changed. Trade was liberalised. State-owned companies were listed on the stock exchange and new forms of managing public agencies were developed. Industrial policy no longer kept unprofitable enterprises afloat. Subsequently, the business sector experienced a long period of high productivity growth. Moreover, shifting forces have driven the economy. In the wake of the crisis around 1990, labour costs decreased to a low level compared with Norway’s trading partners and wage settlements were moderate. In 1995, the cost level was 10 to 12 per cent below Norway’s average for the oil age from 1970 until now.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Ten theories on the economic relationship Switzerland Europe Summary of a speech by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to the Arbeitgeberverband Basel, Basel, 8 September 2004. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The relationship between Switzerland and the EU is close in so many ways that it appears almost stronger than that among many member states themselves. The debate on a possible integration into the EU as a logical consequence should be as broad-based as possible. Economically speaking, the issue has become more pressing since the introduction of the euro, as Switzerland is now surrounded by a single-currency area. Switzerland’s weaker economic growth is also frequently quoted as an argument in favour of integration, since the necessary domestic structural reforms would then be easier to realise. However, one tends to overlook the fact that the national authorities would continue to be responsible for implementing reforms and that, moreover, the absorption potential of autonomous monetary and fiscal policies would be forfeited. Even with an independent policy, Switzerland is in a position to outperform if it again focuses on its strengths of flexibility and openness. The independent monetary policy has helped to keep inflation in Switzerland at a low level for decades. This and the diversification properties of the Swiss franc make capital cheaper in Switzerland by approximately 1.5 percentage points (interest premium).
Specifically, staff estimate that the APP and the PEPP had jointly compressed the ten-year GDP-weighted risk premia of the four largest euro area countries by around 180 basis points by the end of 2020. Revisions in market expectations about the evolution of the size of our balance sheet over the coming years are estimated to have reversed around 40 basis points of this peak impact since September 2021. Conclusion All this suggests, and with this I would like to conclude, that portfolio rebalancing effects are relevant market drivers, both when central banks intend to expand their balance sheet and when they plan to reduce it. Prospects of QT are therefore likely to have complemented the tightening from changes in our key policy rates before balance sheet run-off actually began, thereby contributing to a timely return of inflation to our 2% target. Over time, balance sheet run-off will reduce our market footprint, improve market liquidity and lower the Eurosystem’s exposure to credit and duration risk, recovering valuable policy space. By how much we will ultimately reduce our bond holdings will mainly depend on the demand for central bank reserves, stemming both from autonomous factors and from the banking sector, as well as the operational framework that we intend to implement in the medium run. Thank you. Annexes 2 March 2023 Quantitative tightening: rationale and market impact    ENGLISH  1. See, for example, Andrade, P. et al.

[11] Balance sheet run-off, together with higher expected net issuance, will gradually help alleviate the underlying tensions. It will increase the amount of government bonds in the hands of private investors and thereby help smooth the plumbing of the financial system. Over time, QT will be more efficient in alleviating general asset scarcity per unit of balance sheet change than the repayments of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs). While recent repayments have rechannelled government bonds that had been pledged with the Eurosystem back to the market, the release of high-quality collateral that is particularly scarce in repo markets has been limited (Slide 7, left-hand side). This is because banks do not tend to mobilise their safest and most liquid assets as collateral with the Eurosystem, partly reflecting the introduction of collateral easing measures during the pandemic. The impact of QT on the availability of sovereign bonds, by contrast, depends on the composition of maturing securities in our public sector purchase programme (PSPP) portfolio for which the share of higher-rated jurisdictions is substantially larger than for the collateral freed up by the TLTRO repayments (Slide 7, right-hand side). Withdrawing accommodation in support of desired monetary policy stance The third consideration relates to the effect of the stock of our monetary policy bond holdings on our policy stance. We have clarified that our key interest rates are currently the primary tool for restoring price stability.
My purpose this morning has been to cast those questions in the context of the political economy conditions in which individual central banks are constituted and operate, using the UK’s MPC as an example. Central bank independence is a solution to a political economy problem – time inconsistency. Precisely how that problem is resolved may legitimately vary from country to country. In the UK, it was achieved only after democratically elected politicians had done some of the politically contentious heavy lifting in bringing inflation down, and after a period in which the case for price stability had been made. The monetary regime introduced in 1997 was necessary to embed credibility. Its detailed design properly reflected UK circumstances. Circumstances elsewhere differ, and so details in central banking practices vary. But not every central bank practice everywhere may be optimal, and what is feasible for each country’s monetary system alters over time. We therefore need to learn from each other, without imagining that all design features travel safely: learning without proselytising. Academic research plays a huge role in keeping us intellectually honest, and so in progressing those debates. 34  See Tucker, P. M. W., “Reflections on operating inflation targeting”, speech at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, July 2006. BIS Review 66/2007  9

Starting with the institutional limitations, the key innovation of the SSM is that it creates genuinely European supervision, by which I mean supervision on both core and peripheral banks. From November next year, every bank in Europe will be part of the same system. This puts supervisors in a better position to prevent boom-bust cycles caused by excessive cross-border lending – and if they fail to do so, there will be collective responsibility for that failure. In line with the subsidiarity principle, European supervision will involve centralised and decentralised elements. For the big significant banks (around 130), the ECB will be the direct responsible supervisor, but supervision will take place at both the European and national levels. We will integrate these levels by setting up Joint Supervisory Teams (JST) for each significant bank. Let me use the example of Santander to illustrate how this will work. For the parts of the banking group resident within the SSM, there will be a core supervisory team comprising of staff from both the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs) in the countries where Santander is active – that is 9 within the euro area. Within this team there will be a national coordinator for each country, drawn from the respective NCA, and an overall coordinator, who will be an ECB staff member. The national coordinators will manage the permanent experts working at the national level, while the ECB coordinator will ensure quality and take responsibility for output sent to the Supervisory Board.
First, its health-care system is competent in epidemiological management, more professional, and better equipped than that of most of its peers in the region. Proof of this is the high and growing volume of COVID-19 tests that have been applied, which make it possible to identify cases and isolate the sick or potentially infected. Second, Chile has accumulated economic buffers over the years thanks to financial and fiscal responsibility policies, and sound institutions to apply them. Thus, its space for fiscal, monetary, and financial policy making is also bigger than that of many countries. Third, its social protection system, despite imperfections, has the means to swiftly reach the lower-income households and workers risking their continuity in their jobs. At the same time, however, we must recognize our weaknesses, such as an important fraction of informal jobs, struggling productive sectors, and high uncertainty due to the social crisis that broke out last October. The risk that the institutional framework cannot bring new episodes of violence under control is a big concern in the country. The strength of our economic policy framework has been reflected in Chile’s rapid and forceful response to the spread of COVID-19 with measures to curtail and mitigate its economic impact. In the CBC, this has translated into more than ten measures adopted to boost the monetary stimulus, strengthen credit, and reduce financial volatility.

That does not prevent us from constantly monitoring the measures’ efficiency and from standing ready to make new decisions. As we say in the Report, the Bank is always vigilant to respond to the challenges that will be posed by new risk scenarios. Let me now describe our appraisal of the economic outlook and related risks. 2. The macroeconomic scenario As I said, the spread of COVID-19 is having massive effects on the world economy. At first, most concerns were focused on China and world trade, given China’s weight in global value chains. As the virus has spread to other continents, fears have increased that the speed of contagion may overwhelm hospital capacity, with high costs in lost human lives and well-being. In view of this, most governments have been adopting drastic sanitary policies to slow down the spread of the virus, which, together with the natural fear of the population, has had a significant impact on the economy. In particular, measures to prevent person-to-person contact, such as suspending educational activities, closing down borders, internal sanitary cordons and collective quarantines, have paralyzed entire sectors—especially services—, affecting logistics chains and compromising the cash flow of businesses in many countries. The unprecedented magnitude of these phenomena and their dissemination on a global scale has been reflected in a deterioration of world financial conditions, the most significant since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Central banks and governments in several countries have announced substantial measures to mitigate the impact on income and placate market fears.
Comparing Charts 2 and 15, there is little correlation between levels of wages and the change in them over recent years. In other words, the regional distribution of incomes does not appear to have changed materially during the period of monetary loosening. The same is true of unemployment rates (Charts 9 and 12a). There is some evidence of the higher-wealth regions benefitting more than the lower-wealth regions over the period since the crisis (Chart 3 and 13a). (c) Recent Monetary Policy In August this year, in the light of the EU referendum result, the Bank’s MPC undertook a further round of monetary policy easing. Interest rates were lowered further, to 0.25%. And the MPC agreed to undertake a further £ billion of asset purchases, of which gilts comprised £ billion and corporate bonds £ billion. The Bank also introduced a Term Funding Scheme (TFS) to facilitate the pass-through of lower official interest rates to the retail interest rates facing households and companies. It is too early to assess what impact this further monetary policy loosening will have on activity and unemployment. Estimates from the Bank’s model suggest it could increase activity by around 0.5% over a three year horizon and support around an extra 100,000 jobs. In an environment of heightened uncertainty about future growth and jobs, these gains are not to be sniffed at. In the period since the MPC’s easing in August, there have been two pieces of material news about the performance of the economy.

It also begs the question of what is preventing the diffusion of processes and technologies used in one firm to other firms operating in a similar region or sector. Are there barriers to technological diffusion, legal or competitive, which are stymieing productivity trickle-down? Are first-mover advantages and economies of scale simply larger for frontier firms these days, entrenching their advantages? Could more be done by frontier companies to promulgate their practices to companies lower down the supply-chain? I do not know the answers. But finding them strikes me as key for unlocking the growth and productivity potential of the long tail of companies and hence of UK PLC. Conclusion  The UK, perhaps more than any other country in the European Union, is an agglomeration of quite different micro-economies – micro-economies of high and low incomes, high and low skills, high and low investment, high and low productivities, Red and Blue Car regions. Closing these gaps would not only boost the size of the aggregate economic pie, but would lead to a more equitable distribution of its slices. 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  15  As much as anywhere in the UK, the North-East exemplifies some of those challenges. Incomes and productivities are towards the bottom of the UK league table and unemployment rates towards the top. In many ways it could be seen as a Red Car region. With these differences so large, it would be easy to view the UK glass, economically and socially, as half-empty.
No fluctuation margins are established, nor is there an appurtenant obligation on Norges Bank to intervene in the foreign exchange market.” Legg inn filadresse her  BIS Review 121/1999  8  The first sentence in the Regulation indicates that we have a managed float of the krone, based on the range of the exchange rate maintained since the krone was floated in December 1992. Instruments are to be oriented towards maintaining a stable krone exchange rate against European currencies. Norges Bank has chosen to define the term European currencies as the euro from 1 January 1999. The Regulation does not stipulate a central rate with specific fluctuation margins. Norges Bank interprets the concept initial range as a broad indication of a central rate around which the krone can fluctuate. The second sentence refers to significant changes in the exchange rate in relation to the initial range. It is important to note that the concept significant changes is not quantified. Significant must therefore be given an economic content. A reasonable interpretation is that a significant change is a change that influences expectations concerning price and cost inflation to the extent that changes in the exchange rate become self-reinforcing through a wage-price spiral. The expressions with a view to, over time, aimed at and based on also show that Norges Bank has considerable latitude for exercising discretion. 7. The instruments  Monetary policy is conducted through two main instruments - exchange-market interventions and the Bank’s key interest rates.

As long as the increase in petroleum income is kept outside the domestic economy, there will be less need for structural change and thus less need for exchange rates to change. The Petroleum Fund serves many purposes. It is a means of storing wealth and redistributing income from oil extraction between generations, of buffering against changes in oil prices, and of facilitating demand management. Thus, the Fund facilitates the fiscal policy tasks of maintaining the desired size of the exposed sector and stabilising the economy. Chart 6  Objectives of the Government Petroleum Fund  • Allocate wealth • Distribute income over generations • Serve as a buffer against variability in oil prices • Provide financial leeway for stabilisation  Legg inn filadresse her  5  BIS Review 121/1999  North Sea oil and gas reserves are part of Norway’s economic wealth. Extracting the oil and allocating the revenues to the Petroleum Fund is a way of transforming this wealth into financial assets abroad. The purpose of accumulating capital in the Fund is to redistribute petroleum revenues between generations and ensure the long-term stability of state finances. The larger the Fund, the less dependent Norway will be on petroleum revenues in the future, and the more prepared we will be to meet the challenge of an ageing population. Furthermore, the Petroleum Fund acts as a buffer against short-term variations in petroleum revenues by separating the cash flow from oil extraction from current expenditure.
Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 23 February 2006. The Diagrams to the speech  can be found on the website of the Sveriges Riksbank. *  *  *  Let me first of all thank you for the invitation to come here. This is my first hearing with the Committee on Finance and I hope that we will have a rewarding discussion on monetary policy. I shall begin with a brief report on our current assessment of the economic situation and future inflation prospects. Above all, I wish to clarify the reasoning as to why we are choosing to raise the repo rate now. Given that the recent monetary policy debate has revolved to a large extent around the objective of monetary policy, I would also like to take this opportunity to report our fundamental view of monetary policy strategy. My main message can be summarised thus: •  There is one objective for monetary policy and that is to maintain price stability. •  The task given to the Riksbank by the Riksdag and our method of working provide scope for taking other factors into account, such as growth and employment, as long as this does not jeopardise price stability. The inflation targeting policy has worked well in its present form and I therefore see no reason to change it.

Small businesses are the primary driver of job growth in the United States, they create economic opportunity in local communities, and they help drive innovation across the economy. The New York Fed and fellow Reserve Banks are supporting small business in a number of ways. First, by producing the annual Small Business Credit Survey, which is fielded by all 12 Reserve Banks, to provide timely information on the sector, how they are doing, their financing needs and their access to credit. Second, by providing a one-stop resource of all of our insights 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  and analysis to policymakers, community leaders, and service providers through the Fed Small Business website. Third, through regular meetings of our small business advisory councils, to get an understanding of real conditions on the ground. Fourth, through our Access to Capital Workshops, which provide technical assistance on access to credit for small businesses, covering topics like traditional lending, alternative and emerging sources of capital, and export financing. And, finally, through meetings like these. So, since small businesses matter to the health of our economy, and Latino-owned small businesses are the fastest growing, what do we know about them? The report, which will help inform much of today’s discussion, combines the results from the Federal Reserve’s Small Business Credit Survey, SLEI’s Survey of US Latino Business Owners and interviews conducted by SLEI and Interise, to offer a unique and unprecedented perspective into this entrepreneurial class.