samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These market inefficiencies also lie behind – at least in part – the changes in inequality in Spain during the crisis. Over the course of the Spanish recession, strong job destruction, concentrated among certain groups, and the precariousness of many contractual relationships that arose from this more uncertain macroeconomic setting prompted growth in inequality in per capita income, despite the fact that wage differences among workers oscillated less than in other developed economies. The current upturn and, in particular, strong employment creation are allowing some correction of per capita income inequality. However, looking ahead, additional reductions in the indicators of income inequality will depend on continuing reductions in unemployment, which requires improvements in the employability of the lesser-skilled and an increase in the hours actually worked by employees with lower wages. In any event, the causes behind the dynamics of inequality and its effects are complex, and learning about them will involve analysing in depth the various key facets (wages, household income, consumption and wealth, among others), this being an essential requisite for designing public policies conducive to socially sustainable growth. Against this background, allow me to refer to the discussions surrounding the national minimum wage. The Annual Report mentions the effect of the increases approved in 2017 and 2018, of 8% and 4%, respectively.

The Exchange Fund Notes have a transparent and efficient price discovery system – up-to-date prices and yields can be easily found in newspapers and the financial media. But we all should not forget, of course, that the prices of Exchange Fund Notes can go up as well as down, depending on the level of interest rates. End of commercial. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 31/2005
Leasi Papali’i Tommy Scanlan: Samoa’s economy, interest rates and the expanded mandate of its central bank Address by Mr Leasi Papali’i Tommy Scanlan, Governor of the Central Bank of Samoa, on the induction of new graduates to the Samoa Institute of Accountants, Apia, 25 March 2010. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen 1. Introduction  At the outset, I want to thank the President and her Committee for inviting me to address you on this special occasion. It is indeed both a privilege and an honour for me to be here this evening. In 1970, when the Minister of Finance (Hon. Niko Lee Hang) and I attended form 4 at Saint Joseph’s College, we were told that a number of students in our class will need to take “physics” as an option, while the rest will take “accounting” or “bookkeeping”, as it was called in those days. Physics was a relatively new subject at that time, and they needed some guinea pigs to continue their experiment with. And, that was where we came in. We were never given the chance to decide which subject to take. So, from 1970 to 1972, nine of us studied physics while the rest of our colleagues studied accounting. I can never forget what one of the best accounting teachers in the country in those days used to say to us. He said, “you can study physics all your life, but none of you will ever go to the moon”.

And, in line with this objective, foreign investments abroad by residents have been discouraged, to ensure that there are sufficient funds available for domestic investments. This stance of monetary policy will be reviewed when Government’s Budget for 2010/11 is finalized in June this year. Now let me say something briefly about interest rates. BIS Review 49/2010  3  4. Interest rates and bank fees  Ladies and Gentlemen, in the past twelve months or so, there has been much criticism by the private sector and the public at large of our relatively high interest rate environment. This debate has been ongoing since the outbreak of the global recession two years ago. Reflecting the continued easing of monetary policy, the Central Bank’s official interest rates have declined steeply to record low levels. Consequently, the commercial banks’ deposit rates have also fallen sharply. In the event, the commercial banks’ weighted average lending rate has declined to 10.7 percent in January this year, from 12.5 percent in March 2008. The commercial banks have undertaken to effect further reductions in their lending rates in the near future. These further reductions reflect the maturity of several long term wholesale deposits which have been reinvested at lower rates. In the medium to long term, the Central Bank is aiming at reducing the interest rates in Samoa, to be closer to those of our major trading partners (such as Fiji).
William C Dudley: Is the active use of macroprudential tools institutionally realistic? Panel remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the “Macroprudential Monetary Policy”, 59th Economic Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, 3 October 2015. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to be here today and to have the opportunity to talk about the potential use of macroprudential tools in the United States. Before I respond to Adam Posen, I’d like to make a few general comments on macroprudential tools. I am interested in such tools both as a U.S. policymaker and in my role as chair of the Committee on the Global Financial System of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a body that has done considerable work in this area in recent years. What I have to say today represents my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System.1 The use of macroprudential tools has gotten considerable attention for several reasons. Some countries have implemented macroprudential measures with respect to the housing market that may have limited the extent of home price appreciation and made their financial systems more resilient when the boom unwound. Other countries have implemented countercyclical capital requirements that have made their banking systems more resilient. Thus, the hope is that U.S. policymakers can learn from these international experiences and incorporate effective macroprudential tools into our toolkit that could be used to limit financial stability risks.

There is no better or more effective policy in the short term for addressing the impact of population ageing and of scant population growth on pensions than to stimulate employment and enhance the system’s overall productivity. Thank you very much. 5
8 builds and extends on work done at the BIS. 9 It shows how credit and asset prices share cyclical similarities, captured in a synthetic financial cycle index that outperforms credit-to-GDP gap measures in predicting systemic banking crises, on a horizon of up to three years. They also demonstrate how the financial cycle is different from the business cycle. Based on this research, we conclude that financial variables (credit volumes and asset prices) in EU countries have historically exhibited higher average volatility than economic variables (volume of activity in goods and labour markets, as well as consumer prices). Financial cycles have also exhibited a higher duration than business cycles on average. Lastly, asymmetries appear to exist, whereby financial cycles tend to build up slowly and correct more abruptly. Taken together, these findings have at least two policy implications. First, they establish a rationale for differentiated financial and macroeconomic policies, and are thereby fundamental to the newly established macroprudential policy area. Policies targeting financial cycles, such as countercyclical macroprudential policies, can act as a powerful complement to policies targeting the business cycle, such as monetary policy. Policy trade-offs may emerge in the short-run, as the propensity for such cyclical divergence seems to be greatest at short frequencies. Second, the results present a strong case for a differentiated national application of macroprudential policies, amid a far from complete convergence of country financial cycles.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 23 July 2021. * * * Good afternoon, We have made the decision to raise the key rate by 100 basis points to 6.50% per annum. Our today’s decision is based on the updated macroeconomic forecast that was significantly revised. The growth of the Russian economy sped up in the second quarter, and inflationary pressure turned out to be higher and more persistent than forecast. Some sectors are already demonstrating signs of overheating. Inflation expectations also continued to go up. Given the observed trends, we have revised our inflation forecast upwards by one point. This year, it will equal 5.7–6.2%. The important step in our policy, which we have made today, is needed to bring inflation back to the target. We expect inflation to slow down to 4.0–4.5% next year and stay close to 4% further on. Nonetheless, our policy will not contain the steady rates of economic growth. I would now dwell on the factors behind our today’s decision. I will start out with inflation. As of 19 July, inflation was 6.5% in annualised terms. This is considerably above the target and is close to five-year peaks. High growth rates are driven by both temporary and steady factors. According to our estimates, steady factors dominate at the moment.
I’m perfectly – I think it makes sense to look at the Dodd-Frank Act, to see which parts are working and which parts are not working so well. I mean, when I sort of think about the Dodd-Frank Act, I think there’s really two things that we’re trying to accomplish here. Number one, we’re trying to make the probability of failure of large complex financial institutions a lot lower than it was before. So that means more capital, more liquidity, better governance, better risk management. And we want to keep all those things. And the second thing we’re trying to do is that if a firm does get into trouble, we can actually allow it to fail without it threatening to take down the rest of the financial system. So that means you need good resolution regimes, and you need a financial system where you don’t have a lot of vulnerabilities. You know, one thing, for example, that we’ve accomplished over the last year is we’ve had money market fund reform. Money market funds were one of the accelerants of the crisis after Lehman Brothers failed. So, fixing the financial system to address some of those structural weaknesses is also important. So I think keeping that part of Dodd-Frank, central clearing of derivatives, I think is 8 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  something that makes the financial system more robust. Keeping all those parts I think makes a lot of sense. Volcker Rule?

In fact, some positive elements stand out from the evolution of the Spanish economy in recent years, such as, for example, the ability to continue to run external surpluses during the upswing, something that was not normal in previous recoveries, and which would indicate that at least part of the correction of the external imbalance is structural in nature, and is associated with cumulative improvements in competitiveness and the increase in the geographical diversification of exports and in the number of firms that regularly export to the rest of the world. This growing internationalisation of Spanish companies has served, in  7/18  turn, to stimulate business investment and employment. Indeed, more than 2.5 million jobs have been created since the beginning of the recovery. Also notable in recent years has been the deleveraging carried out by the non-financial private sector. This has reached a very advanced stage, both in the case of non-financial firms and households. For example, the debt to GDP ratio of Spanish companies has been reduced by more than 40 pp from its peak and it is now below the average level in the euro area. In the same vein, I would like to highlight the intense process of banking industry rationalisation, recapitalisation and restructuring. This has led to a more efficient allocation of capital across firms and sectors, which, as we will see later, has contributed to productivity growth.
And the Treasury is also consulting on how investment banking distress should be handled in the light of the problems with the Lehmans insolvency and administration since last autumn. 7 Cross-border resolutions There is also a vital cross-border element to all of this, which absolutely must be recognised and tackled if we are to establish sounder foundations for a world of free, global capital markets. 6  I owe that expression to my colleague Paul Fisher. 7  See, HM Treasury (2009), “Developing effective resolution arrangements for investment banks”, May 2009. 6  BIS Review 83/2009  Around thirty-five years ago the founding document of the rules of the game for international banking was issued: the Basel Concordat for the supervision of internationally active banks. Although updated in the early 1980s to embrace consolidated supervision in the wake of Banco Ambrosiano’s collapse, its essential precepts have remained unchanged. 8 Home supervisors carry the responsibility for consolidated supervision. Broadly, hosts carry little or no responsibility for branches, other than for liquidity, although it is not easy to pin down what that means; but hosts carry somewhat greater responsibility for the soundness of subsidiaries. (Within well-defined regional areas, variants can operate: eg passporting within the EU.) The point of rehearsing all that familiar stuff is that the division of labour for supervision of banks during peacetime absolutely must be consistent with the insolvency and other regimes that would operate in the event of failure or distress.

Its key conclusions were: 1) when closing a multinational bank, supervisors should pay attention to the nature and timing of communications among themselves and of their communications with creditors, shareholders and management; 2) the nature of liquidation rules may be relevant to the manner in which multinational banks are supervised; 3) differences in liquidation rules across jurisdictions in a windingup can affect returns to depositors and other creditors and the operations of deposit protection schemes; and 4) coordination and cooperation between liquidators can affect the returns to creditors in a liquidation and can be affected by the role of supervisors in a liquidation. BIS Review 83/2009  7  adopted the Credit Institutions Reorganisation and Winding-Up Directive, albeit after quite a delay in 2001, under which a single-entity regime was introduced for the resolution of any bank incorporated in the EEA, applying to the parent bank and also to all its branches throughout the EEA. A little less than a decade after the BCBS’s report on the lessons from BCCI, the FSF/G10/BCBS produced a joint report on the orderly wind down of large and complex financial institutions. It was a good report. It called for a range of things, including Factbooks on key firms; contingency funding plans; wider crisis management plans; and so on. Perhaps most important, it underlined that, at that time, no one really knew how to wind down an LCFI. Quite a conclusion. A good one. It is a pity that the report wasn’t published.
(f)  Reduction of poverty  Usually, some people think that achievement of low inflation is not important to the achievement of MDGs. This assertion should be dismissed using macroeconomic analysis and modelling, which I expect the participants at this workshop to actively be involved in. Even a simple econometric analysis will show that high inflation in a country erode peoples’ disposable incomes and, therefore, reduces their purchasing power, particularly the vulnerable that may not have the resources and skills to hedge or protect themselves against  1  2  http://www.unmillennuimproject.org/reports/fullreport.htm. BIS Review 123/2007  the effects of high inflation. Attainment of low and stable inflation, therefore, leads to people particularly the poor being able to afford to buy the goods and services that they need in order for them to lead a decent life. Low inflation implies that more people will have stable or improved income that may raise them above the poverty datum line and thus reduce the high incidences of poverty. Financial system stability In addition to the attainment of price stability using monetary policy, the central bank’s other pillar is the responsibility of ensuring financial system stability. Financial system stability is the prevention of disruptions to the financial sector that are likely to cause significant costs to real output. It compliments monetary policy implementation, as monetary policies are transmitted through financial institutions. If the financial system is unstable, monetary policy will not be effective.

With these few words, Mr Chairman, I would like to urge you, the participants, to be interactive in your discussions as this is one of the ways the workshop would add value to your knowledge and skills. I wish you fruitful discussions as you share your valuable experiences in macroeconomic analysis and modelling in support of Millennium Development Goals. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 123/2007  3
But the consequences for economic stability will be determined, among other things, by the weight of each one and by the response of monetary policy and other economic policies. In any case, it is clear that something has to give. As Chart 1 shows, we are undergoing a period of several years during which unit labour costs are growing well in excess of the level that is consistent with the inflation target. At the same time, productivity growth is very weak. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  If the Central Bank’s most recent forecast materialises, the result will be as is shown in Chart 2: the real exchange rate and wage share will rise far above their historical averages, and the tension in the labour market will be amplified even further. But I consider it unlikely that this will be the outcome. Either the adjustment will take place through some combination of higher inflation and higher unemployment, or positive shocks will provide some assistance; for example, the improvement in terms of trade will be greater and more lasting, productivity growth will be stronger, and interest payments to abroad will be lower because of reduced external debt and improved credit ratings. It will be very interesting to see how things develop in the next few years. It would be imprudent, however, for economic policy and contingency planning to rely blindly on positive shocks. And then there is inflation.

But transmission through the exchange rate channel is uncertain and volatile, as the exchange rate is also an asset price that fluctuates with speculative capital flows and can deviate from equilibrium over time, only to correct quite suddenly. Unless the financial system is even better protected, this process can interact very badly with financial stability, as was the case in Iceland during the financial crisis. In its publications “Monetary policy in Iceland after capital controls” and “Prudential rules following capital controls”,2 the Central Bank has described the framework that it considers appropriate to replace the pre-crisis framework. Much of what is described in the two reports has already been put in place, but the final brushstrokes remain undone. We intervene in the foreign exchange market; i.e., we have a managed float and not a free-floating currency. We have adopted prudential rules that greatly reduce the banks’ opportunities to take risks with their foreign currency balance sheets. We have established a Financial Stability Council and a Systemic Risk Committee in order to monitor financial system risk more effectively than we did previously, and we are developing prudential rules and macroprudential tools to respond to systemic risk. This will make the conduct of monetary policy easier. And in addition, I hope that statutory amendments will be passed soon in order to put brakes on foreign-denominated lending to resident borrowers without foreign currency income and assets.
And unemployment has continued to decline fairly steadily to just over 3% - its lowest rate for more than a quarter of a century. Now don't get me wrong. I'm not for a moment suggesting that we have finally reached the promised land. I'm very well aware that there are many people in this country - no doubt including many here tonight - for whom economic life is still pretty tough. My post bag never let's me forget that! For most of the time since I last spoke to you we have in particular been confronted with a very difficult international economic and financial environment. This began with the Asia crisis. But it was followed a couple of years later by a sharp economic slowdown, into mild recession, in the major industrial countries. And that was accompanied by a sustained fall in global equity markets from their "irrationally exuberant" peaks - aggravated and protracted by the threat of terrorism following 9/11 and by corporate governance and accounting failures in the United States. Most recently, of course, uncertainty surrounding the possibility of war with Iraq has weighed heavily on sentiment. All of this, together with the persistent weakness - until relatively recently - of the euro exchange rate, has made conditions intensely difficult for internationally-exposed business in the UK, including much of the manufacturing sector; and that, in turn, has been reflected not just in weak net external demand but also in declining business investment in this country and elsewhere in the industrial world.

Jarle Bergo: The economic situation, global uncertainty and monetary policy Speech by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Annual General Meeting of ACI Norge – The Financial Markets Association, Oslo, 6 September 2007. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 15 August and in Monetary Policy Report 2/07. *  *  *  Introduction First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting me to your Annual General Meeting. In modern central banks, increasing emphasis is placed on transparency and communication, and we feel that coming here to talk about monetary policy is an important part of our work to increase understanding of our activities. This has not always been the case in all central banks. For example, it was not until 1994 that the Federal Reserve began to publish its interest rate decisions. Until that time, market participants had to follow changes in market interest rates in order to guess what decision the central bank had taken. I assume that most of you present here today are glad that time is past. In this address, I will first discuss economic developments in Norway, and the orientation of monetary policy. I will then comment on the turbulence in international financial markets in recent weeks.