samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moreover, the Governor shall be heard by the Minister for the Economy about the appointment of six members of the Governing Council. Propose to the Governing Council the Council members that shall form part of the Executive Commission. Propose to the Executive Commission the appointment and dismissal of the Directors General, for ratification by the Governing Council. The Governor shall have the powers delegated by the Governing Council or the Executive Commission. 2 Powers of the Deputy Governor     Manage, at the highest level, the common internal services of the Banco de España. Stand in for the Governor when the post is vacant or in the event of the latter’s absence or illness. The Deputy Governor shall have the powers delegated by the Governor, the Governing Council or the Executive Commission. 3 Powers of the Governing Council   Approve the general guidelines of action of the Banco de España so that it may fulfil the functions entrusted to it.   Debate monetary policy matters and supervise the Banco de España’s contribution to implementation of the monetary policy of the European System of Central Banks by the Executive Commission, all in accordance with the ECB’s guidelines and instructions and observing the independence and professional secrecy obligation of the Governor as a member of the ECB’s governing bodies.

The supervisory model is relevant from many standpoints, since it may have a bearing on how efficiently and effectively the goals pursued are attained and ought to resolve possible conflicts of interest across the different areas supervised. In this connection, it should be noted that, after the 2008 global financial crisis, some countries have changed their supervisory models, broadly speaking, by adopting more integrated models and increasing the role of central banks. Among these integrated models I wish to highlight one structured around two separate bodies: a central bank,13 charged with prudential supervision, i.e. the solvency of banks, securities firms and insurance companies, and a second body to oversee all intermediaries’ conduct and protect the investors and customers of various financial products and services. 11  The Directors General, the staff representative and the General Secretary of the Banco de España also attend the Governing Council’s meetings in a non-voting capacity. In addition, the General Secretary acts as the Governing Council's secretary. 12  For a more detailed discussion on this matter, see F. Restoy (2016), La organización de la supervisión financiera, or J. Segura (2018), “La supervisión financiera”, Chapter 3 of Reguladores y supervisores económicos independientes: el caso español, coordinated by J. Segura. For a recent description of supervisory models around the world, see D. Calvo, J.C. Crisanto, S. Hohl and O. Pascual Gutiérrez (2018), “Financial supervisory architecture: what has changed after the crisis?”, FSI Insights on policy implementation, No 8.
Economic and political philosophers from Adam Smith (1759) to Hayek (1960) have long recognised that beliefs are part of inherited social capital, which provides the social framework for the free market. Social capital refers to the links, shared values and beliefs in a society which encourage individuals not only to take responsibility for themselves and their families but also to trust each other and work collaboratively to support each other. 9 So what values and beliefs are the foundations of inclusive capitalism? 10 Clearly to succeed in the global economy, dynamism is essential. To align incentives across generations, a long-term perspective is required. For markets to sustain their legitimacy, they need to be not only effective but also fair. Nowhere is that need more acute than in financial markets; finance has to be trusted. And to value others demands engaged citizens who recognise their obligations to each other. In short, there needs to be a sense of society. Social capital has been eroded These beliefs and values are not necessarily fixed; they need to be nurtured. My core point is that, just as any revolution eats its children, unchecked market fundamentalism can devour the social capital essential for the long-term dynamism of capitalism itself. To counteract this tendency, individuals and their firms must have a sense of their responsibilities for the broader system. All ideologies are prone to extremes. Capitalism loses its sense of moderation when the belief in the power of the market enters the realm of faith.

FPS operates 24 x 7, which means that users can initiate or receive a payment or fund transfer any time throughout the year. It will be very user-friendly as mobile phone numbers or email addresses can be used for receiving HKD or RMB funds. Settlement between banks is real-time, and Hong Kong is one of the few jurisdictions achieving real-time settlement in a retail payment infrastructure. Both banks and SVFs can participate in FPS. This creates a retail payment ecosystem that facilitates money transfers among users of banks and SVFs. The full interconnectivity of all payment participants is, again, likely to be one of first in the world. In addition to FPS, the HKMA is leading a working group to work on a common QR code standard for retail payments. A common QR code standard will facilitate merchants, especially SMEs, in using one single QR code to accept different payment schemes. This would certainly help promote the wider use of mobile retail payments in Hong Kong. 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  (B)  Supervisory Sandbox 2.0  The HKMA will upgrade the existing Fintech Supervisory Sandbox to Sandbox 2.0. There will be three new features in this enhanced version. First, we will set up a Fintech Supervisory Chatroom that would engage the stakeholders at a much earlier stage of project development. The Chatroom will be manned by experts from our Fintech Facilitation Office and Banking Supervision Department.
Basel II, in my view, is fundamentally about better risk management and corporate governance on the part of banks, as well as improved banking supervision and greater transparency. It is also about increasing the stability of the global financial system, to the benefit not only of banks, but also consumers and businesses. The new capital framework attempts to achieve these objectives with three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first pillar aligns minimum capital requirements more closely with banks’ actual underlying risks. Qualifying banks may also rely partly on their own measures of those risks, which will help to create economic incentives to improve those measures. In concept the first pillar is similar to the existing capital framework in that it provides a measure of capital relative to risk. What is new are the second and third pillars. The second pillar – supervisory review – allows supervisors to evaluate a bank’s assessment of its own risks and determine whether that assessment seems reasonable. It is not enough for a bank or its supervisors to rely on the calculation of minimum capital under the first pillar. Supervisors should provide an extra set of eyes to verify that the bank understands its risk profile and is sufficiently capitalised against its risks. The third pillar – market discipline – ensures that the market provides yet another set of eyes. The third pillar is intended to strengthen incentives for prudent risk management. Greater transparency in banks’ financial reporting should allow marketplace participants to better reward well-managed banks and penalise poorly-managed ones.

These disruptions are also reflected in the monetary, financial and payments spheres – which we scrutinize as central banks and supervisors –, where digitalisation is bringing about a triple revolution – and it is far from over: (i) First, the arrival of new players: new actors born from the tech world – Fintechs and Bigtechs – are challenging historical players with radically new approaches to financial services and at present much less regulation; (ii) Second, the emergence of new assets: crypto-assets from the blockchain universe in the form of tokens: they will not be credible as “crypto-currencies”, but could be used as settlement means – think of stablecoins for instance; (iii) Lastly, the emergence of decentralised market infrastructures: new technologies tend to reduce the use of proven centralised settlement systems. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  These revolutions offer the potential for increased market efficiency while reducing costs and time. But they entail several risks, and they could lead to significant concentration effects among a few dominant private networks: these would in practice “re-intermediate”, but without the trust and regulation associated with the architecture of the monetary and financial edifice that we – public and private players – have built together over a period of decades. In the face of this major challenge, we need to both innovate and regulate.
If I may digress briefly into anecdote, I recall that Bill McDonough once related that he had asked his staff why, under the market risk amendment to the capital accord, it had been decided to apply a three-times multiplier to the outcome of VAR models. Why three times? The answer came back that three times was selected because “two times was too low and four times was too high”. I imagine that the process of selecting 4% minimum equity was very similar to this. The selection of a capital ratio ought, ideally, to depend upon answers to the following questions: what is the risk we are trying to limit? What is a good measure of that risk? What residual level of risk are we willing to tolerate? And how do we fix a capital level so as to achieve that residual level? These questions were not explicitly addressed back in 1988, although possibly we can infer some of the implicit answers from the regime that was established. However, although neither 1988’s Accord’s measure of risk nor its selection of the minimum capital ratio may have been scientifically derived, the Committee’s statement that we will at least maintain the overall level of capital in the system indicates that, ex post, they are reasonably happy with what the 1988 Accord achieved. But what exactly do they mean by this statement? And how do we go about achieving their intended outcome? Is it, indeed, a reasonable outcome to strive for? I will try to address these questions.

Corporate bankruptcy law grew up as it became clear that market forces delivered losers as well as winners and that some orderly means was needed of dealing with the losers. In this way, bankruptcy law supports the market mechanism. The situation is no different in a sovereign context. A well-articulated framework for dealing with sovereign liquidity problems should reduce the inefficiencies and inequities of the current unstructured approach to standstills. It would support the international capital market mechanism. It would be no  7  BIS Review 70/2000  more likely to induce debtors to default than bankruptcy law is to induce corporate debtors to default. In neither case is default a soft option. We would of course hope and expect sovereign standstills to be the exception rather than the rule. But it is better to plan for all contingencies, and to articulate these plans, than have international public policy made on the hoof. In this respect, crisis-fighting shares many similarities with fire-fighting. Fire-prevention is ideal, but will never entirely prevent fires occurring. So it makes sense to have a fire-fighting plan, which everyone understands and abides by, to minimise the damage when fires do occur. Would standstills work? The issue of whether standstills should form a part of the official sector’s toolkit of responses remains under active debate. A number of arguments against the use of standstills have been made by policymakers, academics and the private sector. Let me try and articulate some of the concerns.
There are some speculations about the Stock Exchange in Vienna wanting to be the market for the region [Vienna is the second smallest SE in the EU.]. However, individual countries would prefer to either remain independent, or to cooperate more closely with some bigger partners - such as the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. As shown above, the financial sector is generally in good shape. There are some differences among the individual parts of the financial sector, but the main part [the banking sector] is as sound and  BIS Review 53/2003  9  strong as never before. This is due to several reasons, such as the improving legal environment, improving management, or even outright government financial assistance in the past. However, the greatest difference is due to the privatization to foreign banking institutions. These institutions have brought all the necessary components for successful long-term banking. The legislative and regulatory framework has been harmonized with the acqui communautaire. The harmonization has been confirmed by EC Peer reviews and by the multinational financial institutions (such as the IMF and World Bank during their FSAP process). Of course, there is still a lot of work to be done. The legislation and regulation shall be more streamlined, the area of law enforcement needs to function more efficiently, changes in accounting standards must be made. But these tasks are not related purely to the EU accession. They would have to be done under any circumstances. The financial sectors in the new member states are functioning efficiently, and are stable and competitive.

This alliance marks a new era in the global consolidation of financial markets, with its stocks traded continuously for 13 hours a day on two continents and offering corporate issuers and international investors the opportunity to deal in two of the world's major currencies, the US dollar and the euro. French banks today have a leading position in equity derivatives markets, with more than 25% of the worldwide market. New opportunities have arisen in this sector, with the development of the Asian instruments, which are still at an early stage, as well as products related to environmental and sustainable development issues. The French expertise in these markets is based on a strong education in mathematics and finance that leads to excellence in financial fields and a large pool of academic talent. In this chain of services, French banks are able to propose an end-to-end secured service based also on their leadership in post-trade and securities services. 2  BIS Review 51/2007  These market-driven services are reinforced by a strong and innovative “buyside” coming from the good position of the French asset management industry. Quality of services in the asset management industry is another key opportunity for international investors. Assets under management have tripled over the past ten years and consequently the French asset managers have built up a strong and global network and position Five of the largest French firms now rank among the top 25 asset management companies in the world, operating worldwide including in new fast-growing markets in Asia.
The correlation between Eurostoxx 50 and  BIS Review 71/2002  3  2  Financial stability  2.1  Like every modern and independent central bank, the Eurosystem and its individual components, the ECB and the national central banks of the euro area, have to fulfil two main functions: firstly, ensuring price stability, and secondly, preserving financial stability. Discussions about the role that central banks should play in circumstances of illiquidity or financial distress are as old as central banks themselves. The involvement of central banks in financial stability issues stems from the superiority of central bank money in the final settlement of transactions on financial markets. Central bank money enables market participants to have risk-free and low-cost working balances – risk-free because the counterpart risk on a central bank is assumed to be zero, low-cost because, in the TARGET system, the cost of intraday credit is limited to the opportunity cost of depositing the appropriate level of collateral. Therefore, central banks are concerned with the robustness of payment systems and the financial positions of banks participating in the money market, in order to prevent systemic risk that could stem, for instance, from the potential “domino effect” if a participant fails to meet its settlement obligations. Central banks are concerned also by financial stability from a monetary policy point of view. I would say that price stability can be regarded as the bedrock of financial stability, while financial stability is critical to the efficiency of monetary policy. Let me elaborate further on these two points.

Such fluctuations can also expose bank portfolios to a higher risk of losses, inducing banks to compensate for these risks by restricting credit. Let me stress that, although a price stability oriented monetary policy is conducive to financial stability over the long term, episodes of financial instability have been known to take place during periods of low inflation. Price stability must be therefore regarded as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Other parameters influence financial stability, among which financial integration is of particular interest from the point of view of a central bank in the Euro area. 2.2  The relationship between financial integration and financial stability is twofold:  •  First, the liquidity redistribution function has taken on a new dimension as participants in the market are dealing with a wider range of counterparties, and actually trade larger unit amounts. Some bank treasurers in Paris mention that the average face value in euro of single transaction today is equivalent to the face value of a transaction in French franc in 1998, that is, more than six times higher. •  Second, financial market integration is related to the trend towards the greater share of markets in the allocation of assets. At the end of 2000 financial assets in the euro area were  Dow Jones is 70% over the period January 1999- October 2002 (70% when the measure is based on SP500), and 100% between CAC and Eurostoxx50 (97% between DAX and Eurostoxx 50).
Eva Srejber: What role do asset prices and credit play in monetary policy Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at The Adam Smith Seminars, Thun, Switzerland, 30 June 2004. The references for the speech can be found on the Sveriges Riksbank’s website. *  *  *  I would like to begin by thanking you for inviting me for the third consecutive year to speak at the Adam Smith Seminars. Today I shall discuss the significance of asset prices and credit for economic stability. For several years now there has been a dramatic rise in many countries in the prices of owner-occupied housing as well as in household debt. In Australia, Spain and England, house prices have more than doubled since 1997. In Sweden, house prices have risen more than 70 per cent over the same period. Before the turn of the millennium it was mainly the sharply rising equity prices and highly indebted firms that were in focus. What has been driving these developments, what role has been played by monetary policy, and what are the possible future effects on the economy? These are questions I shall be discussing today. A strong expansion in credit and increasing asset prices have preceded almost all banking crises and the majority of deep recessions in countries around the world over the past one hundred years or so. In many cases inflation has at the same time been low and stable before the crisis.

First, I would start with regulations for small and medium-sized banking institutions. As I discussed earlier, we must ensure that the firms whose failure could impose the greatest costs on ordinary borrowers and savers have the capital, liquidity and risk management standards appropriate to that risk. But, the majority of banks in the United States do not come close to falling into this category. For smaller institutions, the regulatory and compliance burdens can be considerably lighter because the failure of such a firm will not impose large costs or stress on the broader financial system. Also, we must recognize that smaller firms have less ability to spread added compliance costs across their business. All else equal, an increase in compliance burden can create an unintended competitive advantage for larger institutions. We should also recognize the important role that smaller banking institutions have in supporting local communities around the country. The ability to lend to local businesses often depends on close bank-customer relationships, and on knowledge that is often difficult to develop when the home office is very distant. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  There have been efforts by regulators at the Federal Reserve and elsewhere to reduce the regulatory requirements for such institutions, and that is something that we should continue to work on. Lawmakers could also evaluate statutory thresholds to see if they should be raised to apply to fewer, larger institutions. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act sets a higher prudential regime for those firms with $ billion or more in assets.
This means that heavy and prolonged interventions may intensify the pressure on the krone over time, steadily increasing the necessary volume of intervention purchases. The foremost example of such a game situation in Norway’s exchange rate policy history was Friday 20 November 1992, when Norges Bank made intervention purchases for NOK 37 billion from the time the market opened until the time it closed. Intervention purchases amounting to NOK 14 billion were also made the previous day after Sweden allowed its currency to float. Norges Bank had thereby depleted its foreign exchange reserves by more than NOK 50 billion in the course of six trading hours over two days. Norges Bank does not want to intervene in such a way that this type of game situation arises. Nor can we expect other central banks to help us to an extent that makes a decisive contribution to our resistance. However, the Bank may use interventions to a limited extent if the krone moves substantially out of line with what we consider to be reasonable based on fundamentals or in the event of exceptional short-term volatility in thin markets. In such situations, we must assume that the risk of ending up in a game situation against exchange market players is marginal. The instrument available to Norges Bank for influencing economic fundamentals is the interest rate. If the exchange rate comes under pressure, Norges Bank can counter this over time by adjusting interest rates.

If interest rates had not moved up, the business sector could have continued to build up debt for a somewhat longer period, which would hardly have promoted long-term stability. Somewhat higher losses on corporate lending are now expected, although there is hardly any imminent risk to the financial strength of the banking system. However, there is cause for concern about the evolution of the structure of the Norwegian financial industry in the longer term. The free flow of capital in Europe paves the way for structural changes in the European financial industry. These changes will be prompted by the increased use of fund-based pension systems and the ever wider application of technology in the euro area. Banks in Europe will become larger, more efficient and more competitive, and securities markets will be larger and more liquid. Structural changes are also taking place in the financial industry in the Nordic countries. Nordic financial institutions are adjusting capacity, enhancing efficiency and realising economies of scale. The largest banks are developing their activities, with the Nordic area as their home market, by building up their branch networks or through acquisitions. Not many Norwegian financial institutions have found it profitable to participate in this process. The government’s ownership in the banking sector was expanded as part of the solution to the Norwegian banking crisis. It was not necessary to allow ownership to be permanent. Currently, the government owns the state banks, Postbanken and more than 50% of Norway’s two largest commercial banks.