samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To this regard, in 2021, we authorized the use of the Chilean Peso for cross-border transactions, including derivatives settled through the delivery of CLP, opening, and holding of bank accounts by non-residents, and credits to non-residents or persons without a domicile in Chile and deposits or investment abroad by Chilean residents. The Central Bank has also promoted the opening of correspondent accounts in Peso. Clear rules regarding tax reporting of the foreign and local banks on the new correspondent accounts in Pesos, as proposed by the Government through an amendment to the Tax Code, will also play a relevant role in this regard and will allow to operationalize the internationalization of our currency. b) Financial Market Infrastructure. In relation to the second point, a more integrated financial system also requires a consistent and efficient payment and financial market infrastructure environment. Either for local payments in foreign currency or for cross-border payments, it is important to make available to the market the necessary infrastructure for a safer exchange. In recent years, important progress has been made in this regard: (i) new regulation for Large-Value Clearing Houses for transactions denominated in US Dollars (FX transactions); settlement for those transactions in the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system and for 9  operations in US Dollars of local Central Counterparties; and (ii) the operation of the OTC Derivatives Trade Repository.

Atchana Waiquamdee: Brief look at financial market indicators Opening remarks by Dr Atchana Waiquamdee, Deputy Governor for Monetary Stability, Bank of Thailand, at the Workshop on Financial Market Indicators, Bangkok, 7 June 2007. *  *  *  Good morning, and allow me to welcome you to Bangkok, and to this morning’s Workshop on Financial Market Indicators. The issue we are about to discuss today, namely the use financial indicators, itself is not a new topic. Especially in more developed financial markets, the use of financial indicators has been integral to the well-functioning of markets. In those cases, utilizing financial market indicators in the policy-making process is nothing new. In many of the emerging markets of Asia, however, this has not been the case. Financial indicators in the emerging markets have been more difficult to come by, and even much more difficult to interpret – due largely to gaps in market development. Yet, as the financial markets of Asian economies began to gather both depth and breadth, more and more financial market indicators are becoming readily available for policy use. Since the availability of the indicators in emerging markets is rather recent and the fundamental conditions in these markets are still very dissimilar to those of the more matured ones, the use of financial market indicators in emerging markets for policy purposes merits much thought and attention. So what exactly are we talking about when referring to financial market indicators?
If that is not enough, a final safeguard is built into our new forward guidance framework. The Bank’s independent Financial Policy Committee has the task of warning publicly if persistently low interest rates are leading to vulnerabilities that cannot be contained by other means. In short, we are providing the stimulus the economy needs, but in a disciplined way to secure price and financial stability. Conclusion Let me finish by drawing the pieces of the jigsaw together. Developments at home and abroad suggest that conditions are in place for growth to be sustained into the medium-term – though at a pace that is likely to be measured rather than rapid. Households have reduced their debt levels and are now spending out of income. The outlook for the world economy and our major export markets is a bit better. The extreme risks in the euro area have been substantially reduced. The global financial system is being repaired. There will still be bumps in the road ahead. A few can be foreseen, others will surprise. Emerging market economies – the engine of global growth in recent years – are under strain as capital flows back to recovering advanced economies. A few less well-managed financial institutions still have a long journey ahead to rebuild their balance sheets and are vulnerable to shocks until they do so. Progress in Europe will remain uneven. We cannot control all these events.

Given that ‘administered and regulated’ price increases will continue to push up on inflation over the next two years, the MPC is prepared to bring inflation back to the target over two years or a little longer. Rest assured, however, that we will bring inflation back to target – and at each point we will ensure that risks to price stability are contained. Our forward guidance builds in important safeguards of price stability. If there are any signs of underlying inflation pressures building such that it seems inflation 18–24 months ahead will be 2.5% or more, or if medium term inflation expectations are no longer sufficiently well anchored, then the guidance on interest rates no longer applies. These safeguards give ample flexibility to bring inflation back to target at the appropriate pace, while ensuring that risks to price stability are contained. Market reaction to forward guidance Much has been made of the upward movements in market interest rates since our announcement of forward guidance. Let me give you my perspective. There has been a generalised upward move in long-term yields in advanced economies, including the UK, over the past month. The main common driver is speculation that the US Federal Reserve will soon reduce the pace of its asset purchases. That has – not surprisingly – affected yields in other countries because safe, liquid sovereign bonds of the world’s largest economies are close substitutes for each other. In the UK, these movements have been reinforced by growing expectations of recovery.
Kołakowski, for his part, did not return to Poland when his visiting fellowship ended soon afterward, but defected and became a leading critic of Marxist theory and practice and one of the intellectual fathers of Solidarity and the fall of Communism. 9  Myhre, Jan Eivind (2012): “Norsk historie 1814–1905: Å byggje ein stat og skape ein nasjon” [Norwegian history 1814–1905: Building a state and creating a nation]. 10  The level of trust in a society is influenced by many conditions. It may be that the recent years’ large migration flows are eroding the trust that has prevailed in Norway earlier. However, immigrants have in fact adopted surprisingly rapidly the level of confidence in their new home country. See also Dag Wollebæk (2013): Truer innvandringen tilliten? [Does immigration undermine trust? ], Article in Aftenposten. Alexander Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden at the Norwegian School of Economics are also working on these issues (see e.g. http://paraplyen.nhh.no/paraplyen/arkiv/2012/juni/tillitstesten/). See also Algan and Cahuc (2010): “Inherited Trust and Growth”, American Economic Review 100 (5), pp. 2060–92, who document a strong causal relationship between trust and economic prosperity. 11  Johannes Steen (1827–1906) was born in Christiania (now Oslo). After completing a higher degree in philology at the University of Christiania in 1848, Steen held a number of positions in the school system and was for many years the headmaster of the Stavanger Latin School. Steen was also a member of the Storting and prime minister.

A more positive alternative is to mutualise debt with more robust countries: this is, of course, the post-war Marshall Plan, but it necessitates a global or European solidarity that is unfortunately uncertain. However we do it, we will have to bear higher public debts for longer, even though the burden will be lighter if interest rates remain very low. And this brings me to monetary policy. 3/ How to use monetary policy? Here again, let’s begin with what is most certain: inflation should remain weak during the period; it had already fallen to 0.6% in France and 0.7% in the euro area in March. Of course, supply is restricted; but demand will only recover gradually, and oil prices are expected to remain low. Therefore, over the long term the Eurosystem will have to contend with, if not necessarily a risk of deflation, then at least inflation that is too low for the definition of price stability (close to 2% over the medium term), especially given that annual inflation has been running at only 1.3% for a decade. This will thus mean that we not only have the possibility, but also the obligation to maintain very low interest rates and ample non-conventional instruments, including public and private sector purchase programmes, long into the future. This low inflation – particularly if it is persistent – is fuelling some far more speculative and complex thinking on post-crisis monetary policy.
The direction of some of the trends we have seen in the last few weeks is not unwelcome, in particular the stronger euro and weaker dollar, and the reduction in oil prices; and a soft landing looks more likely as a result. But the speed of the adjustment remains a cause for concern. It is important that the irrational exuberance that marked the run-up in equity prices to their peak last year should not give way to irrational despondency. The view among central bank governors meeting recently in Basel was  2  BIS Review 4/2001  that while the next few months may be difficult, for the year as a whole the US economy will continue to grow, by perhaps 2-3%, and the overall world economy - helped by steady growth in the euro area would grow again this year above its long-term average. No doubt this is a slowdown compared to recent rates of growth and a downward revision of earlier expectations of growth for the year, but it is not a downturn in the sense of contracting activity. A soft landing in the US with the associated benefits for the global economy still therefore seems to me the most likely outcome. Implications for the UK Turning to the UK, the need to avoid irrational despondency is even more apparent. While a slowdown in the US will have some impact on the UK, the direct trade affect will be relatively small.

A fundamental change within the first Pillar - capital levels - compared to the original Accord is that improved risk management in banks has allowed the proposed new Accord to incorporate greater sensitivity of credit risk capital charges. There will be a menu of approaches, depending on the sophistication of the bank. A 'standard' approach differentiates between credit exposures on the basis of external ratings. A 'foundation' internal ratings based approach will allow banks to differentiate between credit exposures on the basis of their internal estimates of borrower default probabilities; and an 'advanced' approach allows other inputs required to assess credit risk also to be provided by the bank, rather than the regulator. In addition to all this, there will be for the first time an explicit capital charge for operational risk. Systemic Implications of the Revised Accord What I have described so far is how the Accord is intended to be applied to individual banks. But given the Bank of England's responsibilities for the stability of the financial system as a whole, our principal concern is with the overall impact on the system. The Basel Committee has said that the new Accord is intended broadly to deliver the same level of bank capital on average across banks as at present. How should we assess the adequacy of this from the viewpoint of overall financial stability? As I suggested earlier, the role of bank capital is to provide a buffer sufficient to cover unexpected losses.
I think this is because banks and regulators came to believe capital was very costly. In particular the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) offset (that equity becomes less risky, and so less expensive, as gearing falls) was ignored. A failure to understand the exact details of the M-M theorem is of course understandable – it is a theoretical result and one which was originally described in an academic article. But it was – and remains – surprising to me that the most basic bit of the story – that if a bank has less debt gearing then the volatility of the returns on its equity will be lower and that this will have an impact on the required rate of return on it – seems to have been largely ignored by many people running banks 4 . Anyone  4  Merton Miller (1995) makes the essential point with typical clarity: “And dearly, if a bank were earning only 8 percent on average on its loan portfolio, financing that portfolio with 12 percent money wouldn't make a lot of sense. But the cost of equity is not a fixed number; it's a function that depends both on the risk of the firm's earning assets and the degree of leverage in the firm's capital structure. The 12 percent figure I quoted is merely one point on that function reflecting the average business risk and average leverage position of American equities.

Caleb M Fundanga: Supporting education in Zambia Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Masomo Education Foundation Scholarship Presentation, Lusaka, 21 November 2008. *  *  *  • The President, Masomo Education Foundation, Mr. Chisanga Puta-Chekwe • Hon Members of Parliament present • The Chairman, Selection Committee, Dr Silane Mwenechanya • Managing Director of Barclays Bank (Z) Ltd, Mr Zafar Masud • Representatives from the University of Zambia • Mr. John Mwanakatwe • Representatives from the Canadian High Commission in Zambia • Members of the Press • Distinguished invited guests • Ladies and gentlemen It is an honour and privilege for me to officiate at this scholarship award presentation. I am most humbled because I am the second ever guest of honour to grace such an event following, a distinguished academician who officiated at the fist ceremony. This is someone who has inspired a lot of Zambians including me to be what we are today. He was one of the first Zambians to graduate with a university degree and has not looked back thereafter. He has continued to inspire and encourage others to climb the education ladder to the top. Ladies and Gentlemen, let us all stand and recognize the presence of one of Zambia’s finest academician, lawyer and writer, Mr. John Mwanakatwe. Ladies and Gentlemen, in the short history of post independence Zambia, we can take pride at the achievements scored in the area of education, thus far.
I, myself, found the idea rather interesting at the end of the nineties, when the collapse of several Romanian banks influenced the decision-making process at the National Bank of Romania. I realized at the moment how costly it was in terms of reputation for a central bank to be in charge of supervision and prudential regulation – not to mention that the separation appeared quite fashionable after the newly-established FSA had become operational in the UK. At the same time, I vividly remember the conflict between price stability and financial stability, when I had to mediate the divergent positions taken during Board meetings by the deputy governors coordinating the two functions, not by virtue of personal affiliations, but due to the very nature of the specific task they had been entrusted with. Romania opted for preserving banking supervision as a prerogative of the central bank, despite some talks on “outsourcing” this activity. Moreover, the concern for ensuring and strengthening financial stability in Romania was visible in several significant changes of the institutional framework, which were operated prior to the outbreak of the global economic and financial crisis. Specifically, the NBR’s Financial Stability Department was created as early as 2004, with the first edition of the annual Financial Stability Report being released two years later. The year 2007 saw the establishment of the National Committee for Financial Stability, whose key objective is to ensure the exchange of relevant information, as well as to prevent, appraise and manage any issues with a potentially systemic impact.

As the post-pandemic recovery became better established last year, these risks receded – and the need to maintain an ‘ultra-accommodative’ stance receded with them. What’s more, the risks themselves became more symmetric, especially as Bank Rate moved away from its lower bound, and concerns about monetary policy transmission and downward nominal rigidities diminished. As a result, the case for ‘buying insurance’ using monetary easing via QE fell away. By its nature, an asymmetric ‘risk management’ approach to setting monetary policy designed to protect against skewed downside risk is inevitably somewhat over-stimulative should those downside risks not materialise. The challenge is then to manage the impact of this insurance premium, and ensure that it does not lead to departures of inflation from target. Just to be clear, I don’t see this insurance premium as being an important driver of inflation’s rise above target over the past year. That rise follows from new shocks to the UK economy, which I will discuss in a moment. Rather than in the form of inflation, the insurance premium to protect against downside risks through risk management has been paid in complicating what was anyway set to be a challenging process of monetary policy normalisation. By the autumn of 2021, the need to start tightening the monetary policy stance was becoming more evident as those new inflationary shocks mounted. That process was always likely to prove challenging.
The starting point in revising laws is therefore to ensure that the governing laws allow for the conduct of Islamic finance business. A closely related goal is to consider removing elements in existing laws, including the non-regulatory laws, which may render the conduct of Islamic finance business uncompetitive or inefficient. Initial considerations would involve changes to ensure that Islamic finance is placed on a level playing field with conventional finance. The purposes and objectives of the governing laws for Islamic finance are known to be largely similar to conventional finance from the financial regulation standpoint. Notwithstanding this, an ideal approach is devising a legal framework for Islamic finance that sanctions the statutory obligations for Shariah compliance in the governing law. This approach however, may not be feasible as preference for religions concerns can be seen to be contradictory to the principles of secularism and parity of beliefs rights in certain jurisdictions. We may need alternative approaches. I will revisit and elaborate on these points in greater detail at a later part of this speech. In Malaysia, the new Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 explicitly codifies the duality of the Malaysian financial system which shall consist of the conventional financial system and the Islamic financial system. In this regard, Malaysia has taken the approach to enact regulatory laws that are, at least for banking and takaful (Islamic insurance) industry, separate from conventional finance as the legal foundation for the conduct of Islamic finance business.

Following the finalisation of the Basel III reform in December 2017, the main focus for financial regulation is no longer bank solvency, but non-bank liquidity. We nonetheless need to avoid making two mistakes. The first would be to favour one sector over another, be it banks or shadow banking: the existence of opportunities for regulatory arbitrage could to lead to the transfer of capital-intensive activities to less regulated, or even unregulated entities, which would be counterproductive. The other mistake would be to impose banking regulation on shadow banking, as the risks are not the same; in particular, the same 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  capital requirements cannot be applied. At the global level, the non-bank sector needs to be provided with microprudential and macroprudential regulations that are tailored to its particular business model and risks. With regard to macroprudential regulation, France is a pioneer in this field with its decision to introduce, as of 1 July this year, a measure regarding large enterprises that also takes into account their market debt. We shall publish details on how it will work this week. But we need to be honest with ourselves and admit that our experience of using macroprudential tools outside the bank sector is still very limited. One of our priorities in terms of regulation should also be to develop liquidity management tools for investment funds, and to refine the measurement of their leverage, two issues that, fortunately, the FSB has already identified.
In fact, the market itself has this evaluation. Comparing with the effects in other countries, the last three episodes of increased volatility and tension in world financial markets have had very limited effects on the Chilean economy (Figure 6). BIS Review 97/2007  7  Figure 6: Exchange rates (local currency units per US dollar, percent change) May 2006(1) Argentina Australia Brazil Chile Eurozone Hungary Indonesia Japan Malaysia Mexico New Zealand Philippines Poland Russia South Africa South Korea Turkey United Kingdom  1,5 5,8 8,0 7,3 1,6 7,0 6,6 5,2 2,9 5,4 3,3 4,0 6,1 0,1 20,3 3,2 20,3 2,3  February 2007 (2)  August 2007 (3)  0,0 3,0 2,6 1,0 0,7 0,7 2,0 -4,2 0,7 1,0 5,2 1,0 0,6 0,4 5,9 1,2 5,1 2,2  1,7 Argentina 10,3 Australia 8,8 Brazil 1,9 Chile 2,4 Eurozone 5,1 Hungary 3,3 Indonesia -6,3 Japan 2,3 Malaysia 3,1 Mexico 13,6 New Zealand 4,1 Philippines 1,8 Poland 1,4 Russia 6,8 South Africa 2,9 South Korea 7,0 Turkey 3,4 United Kingdom  (1) Shows variation between 10 May and 27 June. (2) Shows variation between 26 February and 5 March. (3) Shows variation between 19 July and 17 August. Source: Bloomberg.

Weak growth in Switzerland, however, may be explained mainly by the conspicuous productivity gap between the innovative export sector and the domestic sector set in its traditional structures. The reason for this lethargy of the domestic sector is a dense network of regulations which limit competition and obstruct technical progress. The result is an excessively high domestic price level from which not only consumers but also exporters suffer. Growth-promoting measures must therefore aim primarily at wedging impediments to competition in the domestic sector. BIS Review 49/2003  1