samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Unlike in most industries, however, low margins for a mutual are very unlikely to result in shareholder revolt or a missive to management to gear-up or get-out. They are a reflection of corporate governance working for stakeholders, here defined broadly to include depositors and borrowers. In this way, mutuality reduces the scope for misaligned incentives between shareholders and depositors which might otherwise arise in a joint stock bank. This is not to suggest that mutuality is a panacea. For example, it does not address the potential incentive problem between stakeholders and the public sector. Indeed, it could even potentially worsen this problem as shareholders and depositors are one and the same under mutuality and so must rank equally in the event of a payout from the public purse. Moreover, profit margins in the building society sector are currently under some pressure as a result of low Bank rate and increased competition for prime residential loans. Some building societies have also hit bad loan problems. Although painful in the short-term, these margin pressures ought in time to abate. So in the heartland of mutuality, I am happy to say that reports of the death of the building society sector are greatly exaggerated. Indeed, mutuality may do a better job of aligning stakeholder incentives than some alternative forms of corporate governance. It is a depressing but telling fact that, of the demutualised former UK building societies, none is today in independent ownership. Thrift, mutuality and relationship-building have long underpinned banking in Yorkshire.

But, looking ahead, we must surely establish a system that can extend beyond that “first base”. First, we need policies that extend across markets. If we apply them only to OTC contracts, exchange-traded contracts might be subject to different requirements. And if we applied such minima only to, say, futures, we could see the economic substance of futures synthesized via cash repo markets on looser terms. The same applies to other products and markets. Generally, we should take care to avoid regimes that give market participants incentives to chose between economically equivalent transactions and post-trade processing on the basis of different margin or haircut requirements. Secondly, we have to recognise that economic and financial conditions change – sometimes beyond our wildest dreams – so any minima set for one period may not be at all suitable for  2  2  See Tucker, P M W, “Clearing houses as system risk managers”, June 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  another. We need, therefore, to be able to vary any such minima as threats to stability evolve (crudely, cyclically). You will recognise in this an echo of the plans for varying bank capital requirements. This is all part of an evolving macroprudential toolkit. As a contribution to that, EMIR should make explicit provision for macroprudential tools. The initial text did not do so, I think mainly because macroprudential thinking has been advancing as the crisis has evolved, but I understand that the Parliament’s text does take a step in this direction.
Although growth is expected to moderate, most economies will continue to see a reasonable growth performance. The region will, however, continue to face inflationary pressures arising from high commodity and energy prices. This is however, expected to recede with the substantial correction that has recently taken place following the slower pace of global growth. The Asian region is expected to weather this challenging period with the growing intraregional trade and the expansion of its economic links with Eastern Europe and Russia, the Middle East and Latin America. At the same time, increased infrastructure spending in several of the large economies will provide further support to domestic demand. In addition,  BIS Review 99/2008  1  the strengthened economic fundamentals of the Asian economies, including the high level of reserves, low external debt, strengthened financial systems and improved fiscal position, will allow the flexibility to better manage the risks to the economy and the financial systems. In this environment, the implementation of Basel II presents a powerful lever for banks to significantly enhance both their long term resilience and their competitive advantage. It promises greater financial stability through the closer alignment of risk with capital. To realise the full benefits from the implementation of Basel II, its multi-faceted dimensions need to be well understood and well integrated with the financial structures, institutional practices, and supervisory systems.

Secondly, the more advanced approaches of Basel II are calibrated to the environment of the G10 countries, with significant acceleration of capital charges as the probability of default ratings deteriorate. To the extent that this inappropriately amplifies economic cycles by inducing the systemic misperception of risk in emerging economies, this can exacerbate a credit crunch during periods of weak economic performance. 2  BIS Review 99/2008  Thirdly, the anticipation of lower regulatory capital requirements and hence, a competitive cost advantage, provides a strong incentive for banks especially in the developed countries to move towards the more advanced approach under Basel II. This could result in an uneven competition between the domestic and international foreign banks operating in the domestic financial system. Capability gaps in the adoption of the more onerous approaches under Basel II may place domestic banks at a competitive disadvantage in such countries. These considerations have meant that for many emerging economies, the translation of the Basel II framework to suit the local environment needs to be approached carefully. The Basel II text provides a range of options which can be considered by national supervisors to rebalance the calibration of Basel II to reflect the local environment. It is also important that Basel II is implemented as part, and not in isolation of, the overall financial sector development programme. This has been Malaysia's approach.
The Federal Reserve was therefore able to achieve the desired level of the federal funds rate, its policy target, by making slight adjustments in the supply of reserves in the system, so that it intersected the demand at that rate.3 On a typical day, implementing monetary policy entailed forecasting the level of reserves that would achieve the targeted level of the federal funds rate, and then, if necessary, conducting open-market operations to add or remove reserves. Nowadays, however, reserves are no longer scarce. The supply of reserves now fluctuates widely around roughly two trillion dollars, compared to remaining tightly around ten billion dollars in mid-2007. This largely reflects the effect of the large-scale asset purchase programs, the last of which concluded in 2014, and the FOMC’s subsequent direction to maintain the size of the balance sheet by reinvesting principal repayments. Because the stock of reserves is so large, it is impractical to use open market operations to quickly reduce reserves back to the point where the federal funds rate can be controlled with scarcity, at least for now.4 Our current framework relies, instead, on providing the market with two overnight investment opportunities to help steer money market rates: interest on reserves (IOR) and the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility.

The global economy has weakened and this is already affecting Singapore. Downside risks have grown, and some of these risks may have prolonged effects. We need to be alert but there is no need to be alarmed. There are pockets of resilience that should provide a degree of support to the global economy. The Singapore economy is in for a rougher ride but is well placed. Our economic fundamentals are robust and policy buffers are healthy. Asia’s growth, digital transformation, and the resilience in modern innovative services play to Singapore’s strengths. While external headwinds will slow Singapore’s pace of growth in the short term, domestic economic restructuring is proceeding well and will enable the economy to emerge stronger. The financial sector is a good example. Growth will be slower than last year given the sector’s exposure to the external environment. But the relentless effort by financial institutions to promote innovation, harness technology, transform jobs, and upskill the workforce, will position the sector well for the future. MAS will continue to closely partner the industry to make Singapore the leading global financial centre in Asia, supporting the region’s growth and creating good jobs for Singaporeans. Let me stop here and we will be happy to take your questions. 1 10 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  1 This refers to growth in the finance and insurance industry, excluding holding companies. The unadjusted  growth rate for the sector, published by DOS, was 5.8%.
The correction of asset prices and the economic contraction following this international global financial crisis has been on an unprecedented scale. Islamic finance is therefore confronted with the risks associated with these second round effects that need to be managed. This recent financial market turmoil in the advance economies also demonstrated the consequences of liquidity constraints. This has underscored the importance of a strong and well developed liquidity management infrastructure. An important aspect that needs to be urgently addressed in the Islamic financial industry is the need to enhance the ability of Islamic financial institutions to manage liquidity. This requires the development of Shariah compliant financial instruments that facilitate this and a well internationally functioning market infrastructure to facilitate cross border management of liquidity, so that liquidity risks are effectively managed. Malaysia has, for more than a decade now, an efficient functioning Islamic money market which has accorded greater monetary flexibility in the Islamic financial system. While the market is in domestic currency, it has drawn wider participation from the international financial community. As part of the global collaborative efforts to enhance the efficiency of Islamic financial institutions in managing liquidity at both national and across borders, a Liquidity Management Task Force was established by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) early this year to develop a liquidity management framework. Integral to the efforts in the development of Islamic finance, is also the strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory framework.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Islamic finance and financial stability Opening remarks by Mrs Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the BNM High Level Conference on Financial Stability, Bank Negara Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 24 November 2009. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to welcome you to Bank Negara Malaysia Conference on Financial Stability that is being held in conjunction with 15th IFSB Council Meeting and the 3rd IFSB Public Lecture on Financial Policy and Stability. This conference takes place at a time when there has been intense discussion by the international community on the necessary financial reforms at both the national and international level so that we will avoid such global crisis of such a scale in the future. This conference today provide us with an opportunity to reflect on the new challenges that are emerging from this global financial and economic crisis and discuss Islamic finance and the need to ensure not only its resilience but how it might contribute to global financial stability. Indeed, Islamic finance has a potential role in contributing not only to global financial stability but also towards a more balanced global growth. While Islamic finance by its very nature and its direct link to economic activity contributes to this process, the recognition of the new financial challenges ahead require further steps to be taken to strengthen its resilience and robustness.
But the only entity with sufficient financial and managerial resource to absorb a large asset or liability portfolio, without suffering chronic indigestion, is another big bank. So it was during the crisis – for example, Bear Stearns was swallowed by JP Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch by Bank of America and Washington Mutual by Citigroup. This makes for a rather uncomfortable evolutionary trajectory, with rising levels of banking concentration and ever-larger too-big-to-fail banks. Levels of banking concentration have risen in many countries since 2007, precisely because of such shot-gun marriages by oversized partners. In other words, resolving big banks may have helped yesterday’s too-big-tofail problem, but at the expense of worsening tomorrow’s. One way of avoiding this problem is to re-capitalise a bank by bailing-in its creditors, rather than transferring its assets. But resolution rules of this type are not problem-free either. Like all policy rules, they face what economists call a time-consistency problem. Whether a rule is followed in practice depends on the balance of costs and benefits at the time crisis strikes, not at the time the rule is written. That is why policy might in practice lack consistency over time – hence time-inconsistency. Consider that trade-off when a big, complex bank hits the rocks. On the one side is a simple, but certain, option – state bail-out. On the other is a complex, and less certain, option – resolution.

On various occasions, the reasons why they performed differently have been pointed out. On the one hand, their business is “traditional retail banking”, which hardly involves structured products that can ultimately become “toxic”. BIS Review 161/2010  1  On the other, Spanish banking regulation and supervision retained its conservative stance and did not follow the international trend which advocated low-intensity regulation and supervision. Well-known examples are “dynamic provisions” and the compulsory consolidation of any “off-balance-sheet structure” that might involve a risk. Nonetheless, our banking system has not been insulated from the consequences of the crisis. The sector built up imbalances during the long twelve-year expansionary period of our economy from 1995 to 2006. The interplay of these sectoral imbalances, which began to be tackled at end-2006 with the outbreak of the international crisis, suffices to explain the resulting impact. On the assets side, there was a strong, sustained increase in lending. Coming in unison with one of the defining features of the Spanish economy’s growth pattern, the exposure to real estate developers turned out to be excessive, all the more so considering that it is a highly cyclical activity which is currently contracting sharply. In this respect, it should be pointed out that in Spain there are fundamental differences between credit for real estate development and that extended to households for house purchase. Thus, while the former shows, as I have said, pronounced cyclical behaviour, retail mortgage lending is the type of credit which has the lowest default rates during recessions.
When quizzed for an explanation by a Parliamentary Committee in 1930, Montagu Norman replied: “I don’t have reasons, I have instincts”. But the public’s attitudes towards trust have altered and so too has the trust-building process. Faith in public institutions is no longer blind. Trust is no longer endowed anonymously. Instead it is built through direct connections, often personalised and localised. Trust is no longer centralised in institutions. Instead it is built on a distributed basis, peer-by-peer, across the network. In short, the Age of Innocence is over. As the public’s trust has shape-shifted, central banks and other public institutions have faced new challenges to their trust. Indeed, this helps explain the first revolution in central bank transparency practices. But the crisis has added cyclical push to this structural fall in trust. Central banks are no longer surfing a wave. They face instead a retreating tide. For them, too, the Age of Innocence may be over. While some loss of trust in central banks might have been expected, it is disappointing that the pre-crisis revolution in transparency practices did not provide a greater degree of insulation against it. Why was central banks’ stock of reputational capital, built steadily through various transparency initiatives, inadequate to protect them from the crisis storm? I think there were two factors at play. First, central banks have tools, such as interest rates and banking regulations, which support the whole of the economy and financial system.

This is reflected in the fact that the Danish Central Bank invariably alters its interest rates in the wake of announcements of changes in the European Central Bank (ECB) policy rate. Sweden and the UK have opted for inflation targeting as their monetary policy framework, which therefore does not have the objective of keeping these countries’ currencies stable against the Euro. European Central Bank The Maastricht Treaty stipulates monetary arrangements in the EMU. The EU countries created a framework for the ECB’s activities which was to some extent modelled on the Central Bank of Germany but differed in many ways from the arrangements in others. Various conditions were set which EU members had to fulfil in order to be granted EMU membership. On the one hand these related to major components of economic developments, such as inflation, fiscal deficit, government debt and interest rates. On the other hand they addressed the framework that the Maastricht Treaty lays down for monetary policy implementation in the EMU. This policy was consistent with growing support for the view that it was natural to set a simple target for central banks – i.e. promoting price stability – and to increase their independence from the political leadership in pursuing their main objectives, and to strengthen their financial independence. Another emphasis was that, at the same time as the central banks’ independence was strengthened, stricter demands would need to be made of them regarding transparency in their activities and actions, and regarding accountability towards the government and general public.
Under the influence of anonymity that cultivates “collective irresponsibility”, the temptation of “spend now and not having to repay” mind-set can easily overwhelm common sense in favour of populist policies with unsustainable fiscal consequences in the medium to longer run. How to get out of a government debt crisis: Painful deleveraging and resolute structural reforms 16. It seems clear enough even to people without training in economics that the solution to a crisis caused by excessive level of government debts is not through borrowing more money and piling up more debts. The solution must be through deleveraging over time in the overly indebted sectors. At the national level, three things must be done at the same time. First, the government must implement a credible fiscal consolidation programme to reduce public spending and increase revenues. Second, the government should, within the reduced budget, strive to allocate resources to infrastructural and other productive investments that could facilitate the return of healthy economic growth in the medium to long term. Third, the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  government must pursue structural reforms that would enhance the flexibility and capacity of the labour, product and services markets that would raise the productivity and competitiveness of the economy and its workers. 17. Of course, I appreciate that these three things are very hard to implement. However, I don’t think there is any short cut or easy way out. The adjustments after any financial crisis triggered by excessive debt are by nature very painful.

In the movie, several millions of refugees fled their villages and towns to go to Xi’an（西安）, where they hoped they could find food and help, but most of them did not make it and perished during the long journey. In desperation, many parents sold their children for a tiny sum of money or just a bowl of rice in order to survive a few more days. The movie presented graphically a shocking story, a tragedy of the very harsh reality and unspeakable human sufferings endured by our parents’ generation not that long ago. 3. Well, this very depressing and horrible scene was only a movie. We now live in a comfortable world in which food is abundant and there is no shortage of daily necessities. Most of us take good lives for granted. The ugly and unpleasant scenes of parents selling their children as depicted in the movie “1942” were something of the past and do not seem to have any relevance in modern times. Is it so? 4. For those of us who are parents, we are absolutely convinced and determined that we will do our utmost to protect our children. We will give them nothing but the best that we can afford so that they have a good life and a bright future. All of us here would find it unthinkable why any parents would want to give away or mortgage their children. So, why should I choose this subject for tonight’s theme?
This assessment should according to me follow a four-pronged approach, with four key indicators:  First, actual inflation data, focusing on underlying inflation, as this is the part for which monetary policy is relevant. In particular we should look at measures of HICP excluding energy and food, and at negotiated wage growth: by the way, we don’t see so far signs of a generalised wage-price spiral. A turning point – which we don’t see yet – will be when underlying inflation is peaking. 7  Page 8 sur 14  Alternative measures of underlying inflation are less noisy than the standard index excluding food and energy and thus can better signal the medium term inflationary pressures. Indeed, in the aftermath of the pandemic, the three alternative measures shown on this slide (persistent and common component of inflation, trimmediii and finecoreiv) have turned up earlier than the standard core index. And both in 2008 and in 2011-2012, they have also signalled earlier the easing of inflationary pressures.  Second, future inflation. We will obviously use our models and forecasts, but we should also give a strong attention to inflation expectations by financial markets and still more by economic agents: entrepreneurs and households are the real price- and wage-setters. Here so far, 3 to 5 year inflation expectations remain well anchored in markets, but with some mixed signals from businesses and households. Any sign of stronger de-anchoring would call for a stronger monetary reaction.

Euromoney Conferences: The Greater Mekong Investment Forum “Confidence in Connectivity of the GMS” Speech by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand Bangkok, June 1, 2017 Excellencies, Distinguished Speakers, Ladies and Gentlemen. A very good morning to you all. Let me first thank Mr. Tony Shale, the CEO of Euromoney Asia, for organizing this conference and inviting me to join you once again this year. It is always a great pleasure to speak at the GMS Investment Forum. Let me also extend a warm welcome to those of you who travelled from abroad. *** Ladies and gentlemen, Established way back in 1992, the GMS marks a quarter of a century milestone this year. To me, the GMS today is like a promising 25-year-old graduate from a prestigious university, full of energy and potential, on her way to making a mark in her career. The GMS is a dynamic region, linked by the richness of the great Mekong river, with abundant endowments and opportunities awaiting to be further explored. Last year, I expressed my confidence in the future of the GMS, as a result of synergy and connectivity that had been harnessed over the years. Today, I would like to once again reiterate the importance of regional connectivity, as prospects for trade and investment opportunities in the GMS have improved with a more positive global economic outlook.