Today, that fraction is less than 15%. There has also been a sharp fall in the fraction of shares held directly by individuals, from more than 50% in the 1960s to little more than 10% today. Today, these individual holdings tend to be indirect, operating through investment intermediaries of various types. That means the beneficial owners of shares – individuals – tend to have little direct communication with, involvement in, or indeed knowledge of, the firms in which they are investing. One consequence of a more dispersed and disinterested ownership structure is that it becomes harder to exert influence over management, increasing the risk of sub-optimal decision-making. 17 There is some empirical support for this hypothesis. For example, companies tend to have higher valuations when institutional shareholders are a large share of cashflow, perhaps reflecting their stewardship role in protecting the firm from excessive risk-taking (La Porta et al (2002), Claessens et al (2002)). (c)  Short-termism  A third friction in the manager/shareholder relationship, distinct but related, arises when different classes of shareholder have different rates of time preference. In particular, there have been concerns about the rising share of investors with excessively high discount rates and low holding periods – in other words, about “short-termism” (Kay (2012)). There is clear evidence of the investor scales having rebalanced in this direction over time. Average holding periods of shares have been in secular decline in a large number of countries for a number of decades (Chart 1).

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