samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Philipp Hildebrand: Global and Swiss economic outlook – overview for 2011/12 Introductory remarks by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Berne, 15 December 2011. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank (SNB) reaffirms its commitment to the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. It will continue to enforce this minimum rate with the utmost determination. It is prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities. The target range for the Libor remains at 0.0–0.25%, and the SNB continues to aim for a three-month Libor close to zero. Even at the current rate, the Swiss franc is still high and should continue to weaken over time. The SNB stands ready to take further measures at any time if the economic outlook and the risk of deflation so require. In the third quarter, the global economy picked up again slightly, thanks to positive stimuli from Japan, the US and China. Growth in Europe, however, remained weak and the economic outlook for the euro area deteriorated. In Switzerland, the pace of growth slowed considerably in the third quarter. The substantial appreciation of the Swiss franc over the summer is weighing heavily on the Swiss economy. For 2011 as a whole, real GDP growth of 1.5–2.0% can be expected. This is only because of the favourable economic development in the first half of the year. For 2012, the SNB is expecting economic growth in the order of 0.5%.

The international outlook continues to be highly uncertain. A further escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis cannot be ruled out. This would have grave consequences for the international financial system. Moreover, given our country’s close relations with the euro area, Switzerland’s economic prospects are highly dependent on how the crisis develops. Compared to the previous quarter, the SNB’s conditional inflation forecast has once again been adjusted downwards. In the short term, inflation will dip into negative territory sooner, owing to the effects of the earlier currency appreciation, which have been stronger than expected. In the longer term, the worsening of the growth outlook for the euro area is dampening inflation. The forecast for 2011 shows an inflation rate of 0.2%. For 2012, the SNB is expecting inflation of –0.3% and for 2013, of 0.4%. These forecasts are based on the assumption of a three-month Libor of 0% and a depreciating Swiss franc. In the foreseeable future, there is no risk of inflation in Switzerland. If foreign demand were to fall off more sharply than expected, downside risks to price stability would emerge. Global economic outlook Following a very weak second quarter, the global economy picked up again slightly in the third quarter, benefiting from the resumption of production following the earthquake disaster in Japan. The decline in commodity prices during the third quarter also had a positive effect. In Japan, the US and China in particular, aggregate economic activity strengthened slightly. In the euro area, on the other hand, economic growth was weak.
It has not yet been established what kind of transition scenario we would have in Sweden. Nor is it yet clear how much time would be required, partly because the political process has not yet chosen a transition scenario and partly because changes are constantly being made in operations and IT systems that affect the time required for a potential transition. Examples of measures that reduce the time required for a potential membership are that IT systems that are being modernised for other reasons are designed to also process euros. Within the Riksbank we are working on reducing the length of time calculated as necessary for the production of Swedish euro coins. The result of our preparations and those of the financial sector are reported, as I mentioned earlier, in regular progress reports. Number 8 will be published in May. Conclusion In the event of a "yes" in a Swedish referendum on full participation in the third stage of the EMU, the whole of society needs to prepare for a cash changeover, and many decisions need to be taken as to how we shall proceed. In this situation Sweden would be under slightly different conditions than the current euro countries, as euro banknotes and coins already exist in the market. This is a circumstance that we must take into account in our planning, but despite this we will have considerable assistance from the fact that twelve countries have already implemented an introduction of the euro. We all have a lot to learn from studying their methods.

4  BIS Review 23/2002
Third, irrespective of the exchange rate regime, there must BIS Review 109/1997  be a commitment to a stable currency, and this means strong external reserves, low inflation and a sound banking system. Asset prices and the exchange rate regime 23. The Asian market turmoil also raises the question as to whether the exchange rate regime matters. I believe the debate about whether the nominal exchange rate should be floating or fixed misses the point in Asia. The real issue is the real effective exchange rate of the economy, namely, its underlying productivity and global competitiveness. 24. For example, there is a mistaken perception that fixed exchange rates give rise to asset bubbles. But if you look at the recent evidence of asset price bubbles in advanced economies, asset price bubbles also occurred in the 1980s in countries with flexible exchange rates, such as Japan, Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. Asset price appreciation cannot be tackled alone by interest rates, since there are multiple reasons for such appreciation 25. In Asia, we can perhaps identify four main reasons:  •  First, the Asian household has always looked upon house ownership not only as a social necessity, but also as the best hedge against inflation. •  Second, Asia is a young market, experiencing a high rate of urbanization. The strong demand for housing arising from demographics alone will fairly quickly eliminate excess capacity in many economies. •  Third, housing supply constraints also gave rise to high housing costs.

Yes, it was the result of hard work, high savings, stable governments and good aspirations. But no one can deny that Asian corporations rank amongst some of the most productive and efficient in the world. Perhaps we were victims of our own success. Global capital inflows were the most sincere form of flattery, and those of us who succumbed to the easy money have now wakened to new challenges and risks. 38. Asia is now in a new growth league, with greater global competition. The adjustments will not be easy, especially building stronger and more robust financial systems to handle the new risks of globalization. There is a new realism in Asia, that however painful the adjustment, BIS Review 109/1997  -8-  we have to make the necessary changes. As competition intensifies at all levels, there can be no reversal to the globalization, and we simply have to recognize that we live in one globe and we share the same growing pains. I am confident that Asia’s basic strength of flexibility, realism and pragmatic policies will see the region through, with a little bit of help from the IMF. In the words of Mr. Michel Camdessus, IMF Managing Director, what has happened is a blessing in disguise. Asia will emerge stronger and more resilient, and it will continue to be a pillar of growth in the new global economy. BIS Review 109/1997
It’s therefore worth taking some time to think about what we as the prudential regulator and the insurance industry have already learnt from the current crisis –including how the Solvency II regime has responded. None of us knows how the full effects of the coronavirus pandemic will unfold. Our aim at the Bank, alongside colleagues at the FCA and within government, is to build a bridge across the economic disruption created by the pandemic and help UK businesses, consumers and the financial sector to the other side. Insurers will need to be on the front foot in identifying the potential impacts on their longer-term business models in order to meet changing customer expectations. Covid-19: what role has Solvency II played in the industry’s response? I have talked previously about the principles of Solvency II that the PRA supports - a whole balance sheet, market consistent approach to regulatory solvency, and focus on good governance and risk management 1. The adequacy of firms’ capital and risk management during this global, systemic event is certainly being tested. The information we have from the largest UK insurers shows the industry was well-capitalised going into this crisis and has so far remained so, with aggregate solvency ratios around 150% 2. But given the exceptional uncertainty generated by the current crisis, we expect insurers to increase their monitoring of the additional risks presented by Covid‐ 19, and where necessary to update their risk and capital assessments accordingly.

Ida Wolden Bache: Norges Bank is raising the policy rate to bring down inflation Introductory statement by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a press conference following the announcement of the policy rate, Oslo, 3 November 2022. *** Accompanying charts of the speech. Introduction Chart 1: Policy rate raised from 2.25 to 2.5 percent Norges Bank's Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee decided unanimously to raise the policy rate by 0.25 percentage point to 2.5 percent. Norges Bank's task is to keep inflation low and stable. The operational target is inflation of close to 2 per cent over time. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability over time. Economic activity is high in Norway, and unemployment is at a historically low level. At the same time, we are seeing that some areas of the economy are cooling down. Inflation is very high. Many people are experiencing how demanding it can be to cope with rapid and unexpected price increases. High inflation is weakening households' purchasing power and hampering economic decision making for both firms and households. We believe that a higher policy rate is needed to curb inflation. In its deliberations, the Committee was concerned with balancing the risk of tightening too much against the risk of tightening too little.
Measured by GDP per capita, Norway now ranks close to the top. Even if we disregard the oil sector’s contribution to growth for a moment, Norway’s mainland economy has shown relatively robust developments. The ripple effects from activities on the continental shelf to the wider economy have been wide-ranging. A growing number of firms have targeted the oil industry. A state-of-the-art oil service industry has emerged. For many firms, the contracts on the Norwegian continental shelf have been a springboard to new export markets. Although Norway’s oil age began 40 years ago, the past 15 years stand out. From the end of the 1990s to 2013, the price of North Sea oil rose from about USD 10 to over USD 100 per barrel. High oil prices and a profitable petroleum production industry have been accompanied by record-high oil investment in recent years. Increased spending of petroleum revenues over the fiscal budget has provided a growth impetus to domestic demand. Employment has remained high and unemployment low for many years, even when the financial crisis hit in 2008. It was made clear at an early stage that Norway’s oil and gas resources belong to the Norwegian people and should be managed on their behalf. The tax system for private and state-owned oil companies and framework conditions for the petroleum industry were designed so that the bulk of the large resource rents generated by the industry would accrue to the Norwegian state. We have avoided making public sector budgets dependent on volatile income.

Øystein Olsen: Oil and the Norwegian economy – the challenges ahead Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a lunch hosted by Danske Bank Markets, New York City, 27 March 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying slides can be found on the Norges Bank’s website: Slides (PDF). It’s a great pleasure to be in New York City again and an honour to be invited to give a lunch presentation here today. As Norges Bank, a week ago, published its latest monetary policy report, the economic outlook and the considerations behind the interest rate decision naturally warrant some attention in my speech today. First, however, I would like to give some background information on the economic policy framework in Norway, focusing on the sovereign wealth fund – the Government Pension Fund Global – the fiscal rule and Norges Bank’s foreign exchange transfers to the fund. Norway is a small, open, natural resource-rich economy. About a quarter of our GDP is related to oil and gas extraction, and a large share of our petroleum production is exported. The oil and gas industry has played a vital role for the strong growth in our economy over the past 40 years. When the first oil was brought to the surface in 1971, GDP per capita in Norway was lower than the average for a western economy. The picture has reversed since then. We have gradually caught up to the wealthiest nations.
John C Williams: Fulfilling our economic potential Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Association for Neighborhood & Housing Development 2019 Annual Conference, New York City, 11 April 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery  Introduction Thank you for that warm welcome. As you may be aware, last year I moved from San Francisco to take on the role of President of the New York Fed. In many ways California and New York are like different countries—the weather is a big adjustment, for starters! But through my meetings with community leaders and visits to the Bronx and Brooklyn, I’ve come to appreciate that we’re facing a lot of the same issues in my new home that I saw in the San Francisco Bay Area. The main topics of discussion—displacement as a result of gentrification, inequitable growth, and a critical shortage of affordable housing—are all ones we were grappling with on the West Coast as well. These issues are complex and challenging, and there are no easy answers, so I want to start by saying thank you for all the important work you do. There are a couple of topics I want to talk about today. The first is why the work you do is so important, and the second is the role I see the Federal Reserve Bank of New York can play in supporting you today, and going forward.

But what fundamentally distinguishes today’s situation from, say, that of 2014–2015 is that regulatory easing was, in fact, just one additional comfort factor in a period of difficult conditions, and not “the last chance” or the only way to stay afloat. Undoubtedly, in the conditions of the epidemic, it helped greatly that Russian banks boast a high level of digitalisation. Almost all services were available online, and of those in demand on a daily almost all were available. Even before the epidemic, most banking customers extensively used remote services, but even those who previously rarely used remote services started using them without great difficulty. In my speech today, I would like to focus on two clusters of issues. The first deals directly with the impact the epidemic had on the banking business, the current situation, and the measures we are taking to ensure that going forward banks are resilient in their operations. The second concerns what comes next, how to develop the banking business with allowance for the long-term repercussions of the pandemic. How does the current situation look? In the last few months, we have seen a gradual recovery in business activity, the financial markets are stabilising, and lending is also recovering. It has to be said that the economy shrunk less than many expected. The recovery may be uneven, but it is proceeding broadly in line with our forecasts. In particular, this can be seen in our monitoring of sectoral financial flows, which we started conducting during the pandemic.
José De Gregorio: The Central Bank of Chile’s financial stability and monetary policy Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Senate at the presentation of the financial stability and monetary policy report, Valparaíso, 20 December 2010. *  *  *  Introduction Mr. President of the Finance Committee, senator Camilo Escalona, honorable senators, I am grateful for the Committee’s invitation to the Board of the Central Bank of Chile to share our vision on recent macroeconomic and financial developments, their outlook and implications for monetary policy. They make up the content of our Monetary Policy Report (IPoM) of December 2010 and our Financial Stability Report (IEF) for the second-half 2010. When we presented our third IPoM of the year last September, we said that expansionary policies applied during 2009 had borne fruit and set the ground for sound growth in the Chilean economy. Today, we see that as a result our country will grow by around 5.2% this year, despite the effects of the earthquake and tsunami of last February. Also, prospects for 2011 are favorable, with projected growth in the range of 5.5 to 6.5%. Inflation has approached the 3% target, but more gradually than foreseen. In this behavior there have been transitory factors related with the peso appreciation since mid-year. Our projections are consistent with inflation hovering around the 3% target during the next 24 months. Chile is facing an unusual international scenario.

It is worth noting that the Board of the Central Bank of Chile believes that the risk of an even weaker performance of the world economy is still latent and is more likely to occur than is a more optimistic scenario. A lasting recuperation of the developed world calls for a reduction in the current-account deficits accumulated before the crisis. Some advanced economies like the U.S. must reduce their trade imbalances, but their possibility of basing growth on their external sectors is limited. In the Eurozone, the rigidities associated to the common currency slow the exchange rate adjustment inside the region. In China, high savings and exchange rate interventions lock the parities’ adjustments. At the national level, third-quarter figures for output and demand continued to show strong dynamism, although with some deceleration compared with the first half (figure 5). In that quarter, GDP rose 7% annually, with a velocity of 8.1%. In aggregate, third-quarter output was in line with the baseline scenario we had foreseen in September, but with a different composition both on the output side and on the expenditures side. From the expenditures standpoint, it is worth mentioning the moderation of the durable components of demand – i.e., purchases of durable goods and investment in machinery & equipment – with respect to indicators for the first half. Investment, although at a slower pace than forecast in September, continued to expand during the third quarter, driven by imports of machinery & equipment. Meanwhile, non-durable private consumption outperformed expectations again.
Against this backdrop, I am going to focus my remarks today on bank profitability. Returning banks to sustainable rates of profitability is a key step towards ensuring that the sector remains resilient, particularly in the face of slowing economic momentum and the potential for market distress. Euro area banks have certainly improved their profitability in recent years. Their return on equity reached 6% at the end of 2018, up from 3% two years earlier. But their profitability remains below their long-run cost of capital, which most banks estimate to be in the range of 8-10%.1Low profitability prospects translate into low bank valuations, as observed in price-to-book ratios well below one, hindering the ability to raise capital, where needed. European bank profitability has been structurally weak since well before unconventional monetary policy measures were introduced. Broadly speaking, the sources of that weakness can be divided into cyclical factors, cost inefficiencies and competitive challenges arising from outside the sector. Before discussing these sources, let me begin by reminding you why bank profitability is important. Why bank profitability matters Clearly, bank profitability matters for financial stability. Profits are the first line of defence against losses from credit impairment. Retained earnings are an important source of capital, enabling banks to build strong buffers to absorb additional losses.

On the basis of the 2018 European-wide stress test data, we estimate that the banks’ behavioural reaction to the adverse scenario exacerbates the fall in GDP by a further 1.6% with respect to the initial shock, which itself further depletes banks’ capital.7  Cyclical factors Given that important link between bank behaviour and the cycle, let me turn to the cyclical factors affecting bank profitability in the euro area. The economic expansion continued through 2018, although with a sizeable reduction in the pace of growth relative to the previous year. Since the trough, the number of people in employment has increased by over 10 million. While the data since the end of 2018 have been weak – notably in manufacturing and the external sector – the economic fundamentals remain in place to support continued expansion. The economic expansion and employment growth have supported bank profitability. Loan growth has been robust in recent years, with higher volumes helping to mitigate margin compression.8 The stock of non-performing loans (NPLs) has been substantially reduced. Outstanding NPLs fell by € billion in 2018 and the aggregate ratio dropped to 3.8% of significant banks’ loans at the end of 2018, from 7% at the end of 2015. NPLs represent a double drag on bank profitability. First, NPLs have to be recognised and provisioned for, reducing current profitability. Indeed, the major driver of the increase in bank profitability over the past two years has been the smaller flow of new impairments.