samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For the financial channel, it will be mainly through a spike in risk aversion and drying up of bank credit, quite similar to 2008. Already, we have seen some retraction in the Eurozone banks’ trade finance activities in Asia, but the local and global banks have stepped in to fill the void. Financial market stresses will be felt most keenly in capital flows, currency markets, and interbank funding. There could be larger and more volatile capital flows. We must be prepared for both excessive inflows as well as outflows. This could in turn have either upward pressures or downward pressures on the Singapore Dollar. Interbank funding could tighten further. We are keeping a close watch on market liquidity conditions, especially in the availability of US Dollar funding. Finally, the impact on safety and soundness of financial institutions. Financial institutions operating in Singapore have limited direct exposure to peripheral Europe. But if the crisis spreads to core Europe, the contagion could be larger. MAS is closely monitoring banks’ lending exposures and funding profiles. Given our close links to global financial networks, we will not be unaffected. But our financial system is sound and we should be able to weather the storm. Our local banks – at the core of the financial system – have strong capital and liquidity positions. They have very good asset quality, with non-performing loans ratio at just 1.3%. We have been carrying out periodic industry-wide stress tests.

Ravi Menon: Monetary Authority of Singapore’s Annual Report 2011/12 Opening remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s Annual Report 2011/12 Press Conference, Singapore, 25 July 2012. *  *  *  Good morning. Welcome to MAS’ annual report press conference. I will focus on five key areas today. First, what is happening on the growth and inflation front; second, what does it mean for MAS’ monetary policy; third, how is MAS managing risks to our economic and financial stability; fourth, what MAS is doing to make our financial sector stronger; and fifth, how we are positioning Singapore’s financial centre for growth. Let me start with the economy. Growth and inflation Singapore economy remains on track to grow at 1–3% this year Singapore’s GDP growth averaged 4.2%1 in the first half of this year. But the growth momentum is clearly slowing. The average growth in the second half of the year is likely to be slower than in the first half of the year. This is not unexpected, and has been factored into whole year growth forecast of 1–3%. The global economy is slipping into a synchronised slowdown. The latest business surveys in all major jurisdictions have turned more negative. There is greater uncertainty in the US economy compared to three months ago, especially with respect to the labour market. The Eurozone remains mired in recession with no early end in sight. Financial market stresses have eased somewhat but the underlying vulnerabilities remain.
Blundell, R, Crawford, C, Jin, W (2013), ‘What can wages and employment tell us about the UK’s productivity puzzle?’, IFS Working Paper W13/11. Broadbent, B (2012), ‘Productivity and the allocation of resources’, Bank of England, speech at Durham Business School, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2012/speech599.pdf Bryson, A, Forth, J and Askenazy, P (2014), ‘Productivity Puzzles in Europe: a Comparison of the UK, France, Germany and Spain’, presented at the NIESR ‘Productivity and Firm Growth’ conference. Brynjolfsson, E and McAfee, A (2011), ‘Race against the machine: how the digital revolution is accelerating innovation, driving productivity and irreversibly transforming employment and the economy’, Digital Frontier Press Lexington, Massachusetts. Brynjolfsson, E and McAfee, A (2014), ‘The Second Machine Age: work, progress and prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies’, Norton and Company, New York. Byrne, D, Fernald, J, Reinsdorf, M (2016), ‘Does the United States have a productivity slowdown or a measurement problem?’, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, Spring. Calligaris, S, Del Gatto, M, Hassan, F, Ottaviano, G and Schivardi, F (2016) ‘Italy’s productivity conundrum: A study on resource misallocation in Italy’, European Economy Discussion Paper No 30, European Commission. Chodorow-Reich, G (2014), ‘The employment effects of credit market disruptions: Firm-level evidence from the 2008-09 financial crisis’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 129 (1). Comin, D and Mestieri, M (2013), ‘Technology diffusion: measurement, causes and consequences’, NBER Working Paper No. 19052 Cowen, T (2011), ‘The great stagnation: How America ate all the low-hanging fruit of modern history, got sick and will (eventually) feel better’, Penguin eSpecial:Dutton, New York.

Productivity puzzles Speech given by Andrew G Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England  London School of Economics 20 March 2017  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Sandra Batten, Shiv Chowla, Fergus Cumming, Adriana Fernandes, Jeremy Franklin, Dena Jacobs, Gabor Pinter, Alex (Sasha) Naumov and Jessica Verlander for their help in preparing the text. I would like to thank Omar Ahmed, Saleem Bahaj, Giuseppe Berlingieri, Phillip Bond, Sara Calligaris, Greg Clark, Chiara Criscuolo, Angus Foulis, Peter Gal, Richard Harrison, David Hendry, Bill Janeway, Casey Murphy, Lukasz Rachel, John Van Reenen, Michael Saunders, Patrick Schneider and colleagues at the ONS Research Database for their comments and contributions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  By common assent, economists do not agree on much. I have lost count of the number of jokes about economists whose punchline ends “and they still couldn’t reach a conclusion”. That is why Harry S Truman, when President of the United States, famously yearned for a one-handed economist. Whether or not this critique is fair, the issue I will discuss tonight is one on which economists do agree: productivity matters.
It has fat-tails, with the probability  25 20  mass of big rises or falls larger than implied by a normal distribution. For example, the  15  probability of a 10% movement in house prices  10  in any given year is twice as large as normality  5  would imply. 0 -5  Capturing these cyclical dynamics, and fattailed properties, of the housing market is not straightforward using aggregate models. These models typically rely, as inputs, on a small number of macro-economic variables, such as incomes and interest rates. They have  -10 1846 1866 1886 1906 1926 1946 1966 1986 2006 Source: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2016); Bank calculations. Notes: The chart shows the Hodrick-Prescott trend in annual house price growth data (where lambda=6.25). Data during WWI and WWII are interpolated. a mixed track record in explaining and predicting housing market behaviour. One reason for this poor performance may be that the housing market comprises not one but many sub-markets - a rental market, sales market, a mortgage market etc. Moreover, there are multiple players operating in these markets - renters, landlords, owner-occupiers, mortgage lenders and regulators – each with distinctive characteristics, such as age, income, gearing and location. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  27  It is the interaction between these multiple agents in multiple markets which shapes the dynamics of the housing market. Aggregate models suppress these within-system interactions.

In addition, on account of the high liquidity levels prevailing in the banking system, reserve requirements were introduced. The capital structure of the banks was also strengthened through new share issues and an augmentation of internal reserves, while a capital market, in the form of the Malta Stock Exchange, was set up. Supporting economic reforms included a relaxation of the extensive system of import controls, the partial lifting of wage-price controls and an overhaul of the income tax system. The introduction of reserve requirements and of open market operations by the Central Bank of Malta in 1994 opened the way for the removal of administered interest rates. At the same time, the Bank encouraged banks to manage their liquid assets more actively, setting the stage for the development of an interbank market. The Central Bank of Malta’s engagement in open market operations was followed by the establishment of a market-driven interest rate structure, which is, of course, of paramount importance for the transmission of monetary policy signals. The Bank began to use weekly auctions to influence the size of the monetary base, while gaining control over the excess liquidity in the banking system. Maximum interest rates on bank loans and advances were linked to the Central Bank’s discount rate, injecting some flexibility into the interest rate structure. Soon after, preferential lending rates were abolished, with a margin of three percentage points above the discount rate being permitted for almost  BIS Review 31/2004  1  all categories of lending.
What was unusual this time was that the Riksbank also needed to provide the banks with funding in dollars and to provide other central banks with euros. I will return to this later. The future The financial crisis led to a global realisation of the need to reform the regulations governing the financial sector. I will now give an overall description of some of the work currently underway to reform these regulations. I will start with the international work, continue with the Swedish regulations and then address our internal work at the Riksbank. Wide-ranging international work on the prevention of new financial crises At present, comprehensive international work is underway to adjust the framework of the financial sector. The aim is to strengthen resilience towards similar financial crises in the future. This work is being carried out by several different international bodies, for example the G20,4 the IMF, the FSB,5 the Basel Committee and the European Union. The first three of these are primarily focused on negotiation and agreements dealing with the direction of work, while the latter two are focused on the formulation of regulations and decisions concerning these. The Basel Committee has agreed to tighten the regulations for banks. The banks will be required to maintain more and better capital than under previous regulations. One important element of the new regulations is that the banks ought to build up capital in good times that they can use to deal with losses in bad times.

One risk we emphasised at that point was that of overheating in the Baltic countries. Two of the Swedish banks had large and growing operations in these countries, meaning that a sudden slowdown in the economies of these countries could have led to significant loan losses for the Swedish banks. In particular, we analysed the banks’ resilience towards a sudden economic downturn in the Baltic countries. The stress tests we conducted indicated that the banks had enough capital to cope with such a development. Another risk we emphasised before the crisis was the rapid rates of increase in household indebtedness and in housing prices. One repeated statement was that we did not regard this as being an urgent problem, but that the development was not sustainable in the longer term. At this point, we could observe that housing prices and household indebtedness had increased by about 150 per cent over a ten-year period. At the same time, households’ disposable incomes had only increased by about 50 per cent. There may indeed be reasons for household debt to increase significantly faster than income for a period, but, over the longer term, this is not sustainable. A third risk we emphasised was that the price of risk was very low in a historical perspective. The low risk premiums could indicate that the investors had not received sufficient compensation for the risk they undertook in the purchase of various types of assets.
It included a wide spectrum of measures, including the long-term repo based on broad spectrum of collaterals and introduction of special liquidity patterns enabling the banks to swap illiquid assets for Treasury Bills for a period of up to three years. Incredible, unseen till now. However, some knew, others maybe did not, that is far from sufficient. That the liquidity injecting has vital role only to delay, prolong the immediate, forthcoming collapse. That such steps can help to overcome the crisis only until the elimination of the actual reasons that were spreading the distrust. Also, to help understanding the severity of the fundamental problem and to postpone the inevitable day for calling to account. "Exactly as the high temperature, the fever (as Mervin King wrote) is by itself a symptom for the basic condition, thus the freezing of the interbank and money markets was a symptom for deeper structural problems in the banking sector". That is why another group of measures had to follow. The new, additional measures were designed to eliminate the fear arising from the thought and the facts that the banks are insolvent. To ensure that the banks have enough capital to survive the harsh economic plummeting and hence, to enable them to continue lending on normal criteria for the good credits.

Ida Wolden Bache: A somewhat faster rise in the policy rate Speech by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), during "Arendalsuka", on the outlook for the Norwegian economy and the policy rate decision, Arendal, 18 August 2022. * * * Accompanying slides of the speech. Good afternoon everyone and let me first of all thank Sparebanken Sør for allowing us to use this lovely building. This was once the Arendal branch of Norges Bank. The branch was closed in 1989, and at that time inflation in Norway was on its way down from a high level. Today, after a long period of low and stable inflation, inflation is again high. The central bank’s role is to ensure price stability and promote economic stability. The decisions we take affect people’s finances. I was acutely aware of this responsibility, as were the other members of the Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee, when we convened yesterday to set the policy rate. Chart: A somewhat faster rise in the policy rate After thorough discussions, we decided to raise the policy rate by 0.5 percentage point to 1.75 percent. The decision was unanimous. This means that we are raising the policy rate somewhat faster than indicated by the policy rate forecast published in June. The policy rate will most likely be raised further in September.
Establishing an effective communication policy was particularly important for a young institution that did not have its own track record, as was the case when the ECB started its operations in 1999. The ECB operates in a multilingual and multicultural environment. We have to address a significant number of audiences in each culture, the general public, opinion leaders, social partners, financial markets and, of course, the media as our partners who are key in the process of transmission of our messages to the audiences. These groups have different expectations with regard to the quantity and nature of our communications. For our communication policy to be effective, we have to make sure that our messages are transmitted in a consistent and timely manner throughout the euro area, and that there is an equal treatment of media across countries. In the presence of 23 official languages in the European Union and 13 official languages in the euro area, it is very important to ensure that the very same message is conveyed to citizens in all countries, and that appropriate translations are made. In addition to providing these translations of the ECB’s official communications in all languages spoken by the euro area countries, a number of channels are used to ensure full respect of the single voice principle. The Eurosystem-wide external communication activities of the national central banks are coordinated by the ECB. Due consideration has been given to the different cultures of communication existing in the euro area.

This increased transparency has contributed to monetary policy effectiveness. 1  See, for example, Cukierman, A. and A. Meltzer (1986), “A theory of ambiguity, credibility, and inflation”, Econometrica, Vol. 54, pp. 1099-1128. BIS Review 6/2008  1  The announcement of a numerical benchmark for price stability, in particular, has proven a powerful instrument to foster transparency by enhancing the public’s understanding of the given central bank’s objectives. In its pursuit of price stability, the ECB’s Governing Council, for example, has made clear that it aims to maintain inflation rates below and close to 2% over the medium term. By announcing a quantitative definition of price stability, the ECB has provided a focal point for the formation of medium-term inflation expectations, “close to, but below 2%”, and has made a significant contribution to the long-term predictability of inflation developments and monetary policy. Central banks are prudent in their communication to always preserve their credibility in all circumstances. Let me also say that prudence in communication finds solid justification, not least, in the existence of a multitude of audiences with different needs. 2 Effective communication has clear benefits. First, and certainly more fundamentally, it fosters the longterm predictability of monetary policy. This helps reduce uncertainty about inflation and the costs associated with such uncertainty for consumers and investors. With its communications, a central bank can influence the formation of inflation expectations, and ensure that they remain anchored at the levels consistent with the central bank’s objective.
Will there be a budget, a macroeconomic forecast and a medium-term fiscal programme and what will be the parameters, a question that has a direct bearing on the Maastricht criteria? Will there be a decision about the mandate and horizon for action of the Central Bank's Governor and management? Because, and let me finish with this, with a caretaker government and an 'acting' management of the Central Bank the entry into the euro area is just not going to happen. Mr. Speaker, I and my colleagues in the Governing Council are available to answer the questions that the members of Parliament may have. 4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

For example, quality engagements with first-time buyers and the underserved will go a long way in closing the huge protection gap which remains our most important priority right now. We will also be looking more closely at the experience with direct distribution channels to date. We would like to see greater impact from direct channels, including online or mobile platforms, in supporting higher insurance penetration. Today, the Millennials and iGeneration expect significant technological innovations in the entire chain of insurance experience – from product comparisons, purchase, claims, and customer support. The industry cannot ignore this fact as they will become the key customer segment in the near future. Further attention also needs to be given to the role of shared infrastructure to support insurance undertakings, building further on the fraud and motor insurance databases. From the Bank’s perspective, our aim is to facilitate innovation in three main ways. First is by lowering the barriers to innovation and competition. This is achieved by providing an environment through the regulatory sandbox for the industry, including non-insurance firms, to test innovations without costly regulatory reprisals. It also allows the Bank to appropriately tailor our rules to better suit innovations as we too, learn from observing the solutions that are tested in the sandbox. Second is through proportionality. We aim to better reflect proportionality in our regulatory framework.
At this point, one specific question often arises: If we are so well integrated, why don't we peg the franc to the euro instead of pursuing an independent monetary policy? Wouldn't this help eliminate the exchange rate risk, without giving up monetary flexibility entirely? The answer is that there is no certainty that a peg would engender the foreign exchange stability that exporters sometimes dream of. We have learned from our experience with flexible exchange rates that any explicit foreign exchange target stimulates the appetite of speculators instead of calming the situation. And this would be especially true if our pegging decision were to be taken unilaterally, without the prospect of a full and permanent integration into the euro area. Today, with global markets and global speculation, it is an illusion to believe that a central bank can defend a specific exchange rate target. The only exception would be if the economy whose currency serves as the peg were strongly convergent with the domestic economy. BIS Review 85/2006  3  Furthermore, a nominal peg against the euro would do little to stabilise the real value of the Swiss franc – the only thing that matters for the international competitiveness of the Swiss economy – or to stabilise the franc vis-à-vis third currencies, especially the US dollar. Last but not least, Switzerland enjoys the lowest interest rates in Europe.

Furthermore, the calm that has characterised the foreign exchange market in Europe since the disappearance of national currencies has mitigated speculative pressures on the franc. When the euro was launched, its exchange rate against the Swiss franc was 1.60; now it is only 1-2 cents below this rate – in other words, almost unchanged. On the whole, the euro has stabilised the monetary scene in Europe, and our currency is therefore less volatile than before. To be sure, floating rates still mean volatility, especially in the case of market disruption. At times, the Swiss franc has been pushed up to levels no longer compatible with the economic reality of our country’s fundamentals. However, these episodes have usually lasted for a limited period only. After September 11 and before the outbreak of the war in Iraq, the safe-haven function of the franc triggered a 10% appreciation in our currency against the euro. As a consequence, we pursued a more aggressive interest rate policy than the ECB in order to lower the attractiveness of our currency and give our economy some room for manoeuvre. Also, in the current business cycle, with a rapidly growing Swiss economy, we started lifting interest rates earlier than – and independently of – the ECB. In the last two years, we have already increased interest rates on six occasions.