samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In fact, the high private debt of 236% in Cyprus relative to the euro area average of  4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  140% and the European Commission's threshold of 133%, combined with the high percentage of loans in Cyprus with floating interest rate, makes them particularly sensitive to the higher interest rate era that we are entering. At the current juncture, the prudent CBC supervisory Debt-Service-to-Income ratio (DSTI) tool, defined as a household's total monthly debt payments divided by its monthly net disposable income that is in place in Cyprus, is expected to somewhat mitigate the negative impact of higher lending rates. Nevertheless, extra vigilance and concerted action is required at all levels to address these debt risks and minimise any crowding out effects. Let me conclude. Debt, both private and public, is essential for any economy as it is one of the main sources to finance vital growth components, such as investment and consumption. Excessively high debt however, both public and private, has a negative impact on a country's growth rate. In most cases, the impact becomes more pronounced as debt accumulates and may also lead to financial stability issues. Even though many efforts have been made in recent years by international and national regulatory bodies to implement a more sound financial architecture and to strengthen financial system regulation and oversight, new vulnerabilities, such as the pandemic crisis and the war in Ukraine, have increased the risks of rising private and public debt.

I should add that we are seeking new opportunities for discussion with accounting standards-setting bodies and private sector accounting professionals. The Status of the New Accord The Committee is currently reviewing carefully these responses and other issues that the industry raised. In relation to pillar 3, we are evaluating closely what should be reported publicly, versus what can remain confidential. We are refining the rules so that they will help secure a more level playing field without being overly burdensome. We are aligning our reporting requirements with those emerging from accounting standards. In terms of the way forward, as you may know, in mid-October the Committee reached an important agreement on a work plan for taking these and other issues into account, and significant progress was made on major issues. What is most important to the Committee is the quality and consistency of the new Accord. At the same time, we recognised the need to provide banks with as much certainty as possible while they plan and prepare for the adoption of the new rules. In our last meeting in Madrid, the members of the Committee agreed on the importance of finalising the New Accord expeditiously and in a manner that is technically and prudentially sound. We noted in a statement to the press that we expect to address the remaining issues and complete the text of the New Accord in the coming months and no later than mid-year 2004.
All gains arising from disposals of shares and real properties which have been held for more than 10 years will be treated as non-taxable capital gains. For assets held for less than 10 years, IRAS would look at the facts of individual cases to decide whether capital or income treatment is appropriate. The Government will also waive stamp duty on sales of all shares and properties where the gains are considered capital in nature. These concessions will not apply to gains arising from the disposal of shares which have previously been claimed as trading stock for tax purposes, or gains on disposals of real properties by banks’ property development companies. However, where income tax is payable arising from a mandated sale of assets that does not qualify for capital gains tax exemption, the Government will give the banks three years to settle the amount. This package will apply only to assets required to be disposed of under the restructuring exercise, and will only cover disposals made within the three-year period allowed by MAS for the restructuring. Conclusion MAS has discussed our plans with the local banks. They agree with the policy direction proposed. They have suggested some modifications to the MAS proposals, which wherever possible MAS has incorporated. Our approach is pragmatic, not purist. Our circumstances are different from other countries. We need to strike the right balance, to find the framework that suits our economy, and which recognises the historical developments that have brought about the present situation.

In addressing these threats, it is important to operate under the assumption that it is not a matter of “if” but rather “when” these threats will occur, and focusing solely on “protection” and “detection” is no longer sufficient. In other words, cybersecurity alone is not enough, but we also need to proactively think about cyber resilience: how do we not only prepare, but also withstand and recover from disruptions. In the short time I have today, I’d like to highlight three key drivers for effective cyber resilience. First, cyber resilience is not only the responsibility of a company’s IT department, but rather an important, organization-wide agenda. The board of directors and senior management must understand and endeavor to prioritize cyber risk management frameworks into the organization’s operation. This includes making sure that cyber resilience policies put in place are applied effectively, setting a clear organizational structure that includes the roles and responsibilities of staff across all levels, establishing a risk management process according to international practices, and ensuring that employees are always vigilant on cyber security issues. The Bank of Thailand, for example, requires financial institutions to have at least one member with IT knowledge or IT-related experiences to be on the board of directors. We also organize regular capacity-building courses for board members and high-level executives from Thai financial institutions to provide them with the knowledge and 2  understanding of how to address cyber threats.
The present situation – with free movement of goods, capital and labour, but without monetary and fiscal integration – is probably the best solution for us. •  Since we are so well integrated, why don't we peg the franc to the euro instead of pursuing an independent monetary policy? Wouldn't this help eliminate the exchange rate risk, without giving up monetary flexibility entirely? •  There is no such thing as a free lunch in monetary affairs! It is not at all certain that a peg would engender the foreign exchange stability that exporters dream of. We have learned from our experience with flexible exchange rates that any explicit foreign exchange target stimulates the appetite of speculators instead of calming the atmosphere. And this would be especially true if our pegging decision were to be taken unilaterally, without the prospect of a full and permanent integration into the euro area. Today, with global markets and global speculation, it would be an illusion to believe that a central bank can defend a specific exchange rate target unless there is strong convergence of economic fundamentals with the economy whose currency it is pegging the domestic currency to. Furthermore, a nominal peg against the euro would do little to stabilise the real value of the Swiss franc – the only thing that matters for the international competitiveness of the Swiss economy – or to stabilise the franc vis-à-vis third currencies, especially the US dollar.

Let me show you the hidden side of Switzerland. You will see that modern Switzerland is adjusting rapidly to the changing reality of the world economy. Let's consider a few facts: •  With 7.5 million people, Switzerland is indeed a small country. Although we have no natural resources, we have a highly developed economy and a GDP per capita that clearly exceeds the European average. Contrary to the situation among some of our neighbours, our population is still growing, thanks to immigration. Our foreign population now represents about 20% of the total population and 25% of the labour force. Despite strong immigration, our unemployment rate – 3.5% – is relatively low. •  Switzerland remains a slow-growing country when compared to the United States. Our weak growth performance is due in part to the full employment, the relatively high level of personal income and the limited scope for domestic investment. However, in recent years, the Swiss economy has been doing better than its neighbouring countries in terms of growth and employment, and also in terms of price stability. Obviously, the fact that we are not a member of the European Union is not an obstacle to our development. •  Switzerland is increasingly becoming a service-producing country. The flagship of our service industry is the financial sector, which expanded markedly in the 90s and now accounts for 15% of our GDP – more than the machine tool industry and the chemical industry together.
In this respect there are some notable differences in Sweden. External competition in markets for goods has also tended to grow in Sweden. Since the mid-1980s the traditionally high GDP share for imports has almost doubled. Domestic competition has also increased, for instance in markets that have recently been deregulated - electricity and telecommunications, of which the latter is particularly strategic for IT. Even so, price levels in Sweden are still high in many areas - higher than in most other EU countries as well as compared with the United States. Differences in taxation clearly play a part but so does a lack of competition. This in turn may have to do with the degree to which markets for goods are  BIS Review 18/2000  4  regulated. In the OECD index of product market regulation, Sweden is admittedly lower than many other EU countries but appreciably higher than the United States. A breakthrough for the new economy is also dependent on the situation in factor markets. The Swedish risk capital market has undergone major improvements and relative to GDP is now the third largest in Europe, after the United Kingdom and Ireland. And whereas in 1983 it was only a quarter of the relative size of the risk capital market in the United States, by 1998 it had already become half as large. A notable feature in recent years is the greatly increased input of foreign capital.

In addition, as a result of the financial crisis in the international markets, the trading of some securities, which were previously considered as favourite to the investors, has become challenging Second, the differences in the size of the banking sector’s institutions, the collateral’s quantity and quality, and the restrictions for the direct exposure among institutions hamper the circulation of liquid funds in the interbank market in the duly time and extent. Third, given the enhanced competition, there is a risk that significant disproportions arise between assets and liabilities in the balance sheet, with regard to type of currency and maturity term; Fourth, some institutions have also turned to borrowing from parent banks in order to maintain the lending promptness and size; Fifth, owing to objective factors that have conditioned the lack of efficiency, the banking sector at home has been characterized by very high liquidity levels. Given the enhanced competition and improved efficiency, it is objectively expected that liquidity indicators being to shift downward. These factors hamper the setting of the optimum liquidity level, in which the enhanced efficiency in fund use does not shackle the institution’s capacity to cope with the business risks. All these elements provide evidence for the need that the banks’ governing structures follow practices that allow the institution itself to meet the expected liquidity needs independently, however, having options which improve their capacity to generate liquidity in urgent cases.
John C Williams: Reading the recovery Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Council on Foreign Relations, 14 January 2022. * * * As prepared for delivery Good morning, everyone, and Happy New Year. Thank you, Charles, for that introduction. And thanks to Richard Haass for the opportunity to speak with the members of the Council on Foreign Relations once again. For the past two years, I’ve begun my remarks by saying how much I wish we could meet together in person. This time, I really was hoping for a chance to rewrite the script. After seeing so much progress on vaccinations over the past year and a moderation in COVID-19 infections during the fall, just a short time ago many of us had expected that we’d soon be turning the page. The story of the pandemic is a complicated one. It is writing itself as we live it, and the storyline has been far from predictable. This is, first and foremost, a health crisis. The unusual and extraordinary nature of the situation means that circumstances are constantly evolving. For the economy, this has meant that what we’ve experienced is unlike any recession or recovery we’ve seen—or read about—in the past. While there have been significant improvements in the overall economy, setbacks persist in some areas, and new challenges have appeared.

The next step in reducing monetary accommodation to the economy will be to gradually bring the target range for the federal funds rate from its current very-low level back to more normal levels. Given the clear signs of a very strong labor market, we are approaching a decision to get that process underway. The timing of such decisions will be based on a careful consideration of a wide range of data and information, with a clear eye on our maximum employment and price stability goals. Conclusion As we turn a page on the new year, it’s clear that we have not yet reached the end of this pandemic story. But despite the challenges, I am hopeful of a continued strong recovery this year. 1 Gianluca Benigno, Julian di Giovanni, Jan J. J. Groen, and Adam I. Noble, A New Barometer of Global Supply  Chain Pressures, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, January 4, 2022. 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, December 15,  2021. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
In addition, putting the first line in charge of risk management has efficiency and effectiveness benefits, since the first line can adapt risk solutions to its specific needs and nimbly respond when the risk environment changes. The Bank’s second line of defense – independent risk management areas including my Group, the Risk Group – provides independent assessment and oversight of the risks taken by the first line as well as frameworks that provide a common structure for risk management processes and practices. The second line also provides an integrated view of risk to senior stakeholders through consolidated analysis of the Bank’s risks. A second key insight of the three lines model is that a layered defense increases safety and reliability by providing an independent check that reduces the chance of error. The second line is the second layer, and provides a view of risk that is independent of the business area’s assessment. What is the value-add from having this type of second opinion? To start, while the business has the deepest understanding of its environment, operations, and objectives, the second line offers a perspective based on expertise in risk identification, analysis, and mitigation that is informed by its institution-wide view of operations and risks. This allows the second line to provide unique insights by aggregating risks across business lines, identifying interactions across risk types, and spotting anomalies in risk exposures or risk practices that deserve additional attention.

Are we finding the right balance in our controls between specificity of rules and the adaptability of principles? These and other questions will continue to focus us on improving and enhancing our policies and practices with the goal of supporting the Bank’s ability to manage risk within its risk tolerance. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Country crisis programmes and IMF stipulations A third topic in the ongoing globalisation debate is the role of the international financial institutions, not least in the management of financial crises in recent years. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has  4  BIS Review 2/2002  been criticised in particular from both the left and the right of the political spectrum. On the one hand the IMF has been accused of pumping in too much money in the form of massive support for countries with a medium income level and thereby disrupting the market’s normal credit assessments by protecting private creditors from losses. On the other hand, the measures required of individual countries have been said to be inappropriate and unduly harsh, leading to negative economic, social and political effects. During the past decade the IMF has provided support for countries with payment difficulties. This has amounted in practice to guaranteeing short loans in particular so that the country in question did not have to engage in onerous renegotiations with creditors and perhaps ultimately suspend payments, with serious potential consequences for its economy and standards of living. It is debatable whether this approach is sustainable in the longer run, although in each case acceptable alternatives have been hard to find at the time of the crisis. One consequence, of course, is that for such countries borrowing has been ‘cheaper’ than would otherwise have been the case.

A total write-off would use up all of the IMF’s resources for soft loans, accompanied by similar effects for other relevant institutions. That would leave nothing for future IMF soft loans to other poor member countries. Would that be a reasonable policy? Is it just those countries with the largest burden of debt that deserve most support? Put differently, given a certain amount of resources for combating poverty, would one concentrate them to just the most heavily indebted countries? I don’t think so. Then there is the problem that if the criterion for obtaining help is an earlier accumulation of large debts, what would this signify to potential borrowers in general? Here, too, it is thus a question of striking a difficult balance. It should be possible to waive debt, which is sometimes a major obstacle to development. But this must be done in ways that underpin a country’s ability both to generate growth on its own and to combat poverty. Moreover, the assistance must be acceptable to taxpayers in the donor countries, which in view of the nature of the regimes in some debtor countries, is not always easy. When all is said and done, poor-country debt cannot be waived unless people in rich countries are prepared to give up something in turn. It is only we — not some international organisations — that can transfer resources to the poor countries. 1  6  The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.
Effective bank-level management Primary responsibility for the safe and sound operation of a banking institution lies with its board of directors and senior management. Boards of directors should oversee the development of the overall strategy of the organization and the decisions made by senior management in pursuit of those strategic objectives. In effectively executing these responsibilities, boards make a critical contribution to the long-term success of the institution. This is a fundamental principal of banking that has not changed with technological advancement. Indeed, if anything, the greater complexity and sophistication of the  3  BIS Review 75/2000  modern financial services firm require more energy, effort and expertise from directors than ever before. I see two areas of board operation as being particularly crucial. First, banks and other financial institutions must ensure that specific skills and competencies, consistent with the institution’s strategic focus, are represented on their boards. Institutions that engage in complex credit or market activities, utilize sophisticated financial products, or expand their Internet or e-commerce capabilities, should include one or more board directors with pertinent expertise in such areas. Second, boards should establish clear guidelines regarding the independence of their directors. Generally, it is desirable for at least some directors, and perhaps a majority, to be independent and from outside the ranks of the management of the institution. Further, the board should set parameters regarding at what point, or under what circumstances, a director’s outside business interest becomes so significant as to raise questions of a possible conflict.

Similarly, the design adopted for the central bank in 1913 was also federated, with twelve independent Reserve Banks, each with its own capital and board of directors, overseen by a seven member Federal Reserve Board in Washington, with the Secretary of the Treasury serving as chair of the Board. This decentralized structure allayed the prevailing fear of concentrating power in either New York or Washington and, especially within the banking community, of ceding too much power to the federal government. Paul Warburg was an American banker who had emigrated to the United States from Europe. He was deeply involved in the debate about the appropriate structure of the central bank and described the concern as follows:  1  See America’s Bank: The Epic Struggle to Create the Federal Reserve, Roger Lowenstein, 2015. 2  President Wilson, who signed the Federal Reserve Act, described this new feature for the currency. “Suffice it here to say that it provides a currency which expands as it is needed and contracts when it is not needed: a currency which comes into existence in response to the call of every man who can show a going business and a concrete basis for extending credit to him, however obscure or prominent he may be, however big or little his business transactions.” Letter to Congressman Oscar Underwood, October 17, 1914, Wilson Papers, vol. 31. 3  In addition, the Federal Reserve was given the authority to clear checks on a nationwide basis.