samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
8  A fuller explanation is in Tucker P M W (2006b), “Macro, asset price and financial system uncertainties”, Roy Bridge Memorial Lecture at the Annual Conference of the ACI – Financial Markets Association, London, December 2006, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Spring 2007, pp 122-130. 9  The composition of the balance sheets of Large and Complex Banks is discussed at greater length in Tucker P M W (2006b), op. cit. 10  Report on “Towards Greater Financial Stability: A Private Sector Perspective” by the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, July 2005. BIS Review 44/2007  5  within their own firms. My sense is that that view is shared by at least some Chief Risk Officers. Greater transparency of such stress testing would not only shed light on the risks retained by the banking system, it might also have a productive effect on incentives – rather as greater transparency has enhanced monetary policy making. What happens when the music stops: ex ante preparation for stress But of course severe stress cannot be ruled out. Central banks and practitioners therefore expend effort thinking about what will happen if and when the music stops. As the Bank’s latest Financial Stability Report discusses, the official sector has stepped up its practice exercises of various kinds. The private sector analogue to crisis resolution is the “workout”, in which a company is restructured under the shadow of insolvency. In a world characterised by bank intermediation, workouts typically involved bank syndicates co-ordinated by a few lead banks.

Faced with that, a central bank’s instrument – used, where necessary, in collaboration with its regulatory and finance ministry partners – is to supply the system  6  Chaplin G, Emblow A and Michael I (2000), “Banking system liquidity: developments and issues”, Bank of England Financial Stability Review, December 2000, pp 93-112. 4  BIS Review 44/2007  with an increased quantity of its money, without necessarily changing its price. Given the need to take collateral to protect against risk, and to charge a premium to create the right incentives, establishing a routine framework for such operations without creating moral hazard remains “work in progress” for the international central banking community. 7 So it would seem that there is a good deal to welcome in the greater dispersion of risk made possible by modern instruments, markets and institutions. But there are most certainly qualifications to such an apparently alluring conclusion. b)  The banking system’s residual risk, stress testing and transparency  The banking system retains risk in a number of ways, both pre- and post-risk transfer, and its aggregate balance sheet has in fact expanded considerably. 8 Pre-risk transfer, banks and dealers hold, or finance, warehouses of portfolios of loans to households and corporates on their way to securitisation, 9 meaning that the banking system can still find itself “holding the parcel” when the music stops. Post-risk transfer, some risk is contingently retained by virtue of banks and dealers financing the acquisition of risk by hedge funds and others.
The post-crisis period should not be about restarting things exactly as they were before; it should be a transformation towards an economy that is more productive and “better” in three respects: more digital, more environmentally-conscious, more qualified – we must never forget the battle of skills, which is the most important one, albeit the least frequently discussed. Page 3 of 4  Support for businesses should also shift from the widespread provision of liquidity to a more selective solvency-based phase that targets those firms that are economically viable but have been financially weakened by the crisis. The public mechanism is there, with sufficient funds (EUR 20 billion of outstanding loans with a 30% public guarantee). It is up to you to use it well. I have two wishes in this respect: it is better to try out several instruments in parallel, not just crowdlending but also subordinated bonds and other solutions. And not just banks, but also insurers and funds. Financers-distributors should also be co-investors, and bear some of the private risk – a minority share of course – themselves. If the public purse were to shoulder 100% of the risk, we would lack that vital selectivity based not only on a budgetary requirement, but also on the need for economic productivity. 3/ The third challenge is to keep on course with our regulatory security, in the direction of Basel, in the East.

On 1 January this year, the United Kingdom lost its financial passport. We had actively prepared for this, and fortunately the continuity of financial services has been maintained. Despite the pandemic, by end-2020, more than close to 2,500 jobs had already been transferred and around 50 British entities authorised, with the relocation to France of at least EUR 170 billion of assets. More relocations are expected and should be speeded up over 2021. On a more structural level, Brexit means that Europe has to develop its own financial autonomy. We need to reinforce our market infrastructures, especially for the clearing of interest rate instruments, with the strengths of the Paris marketplace. We also need a genuine “Financing Union” to channel Europe’s savings surplus – close to EUR 220 billion – more efficiently into productive investment. It is now – otherwise it will never happen – that we need to seize the dual opportunity offered by Brexit and the reconstruction to truly build a Capital Markets Union: I stand alongside the AMF and its Chairman in saying this. 2/ It is precisely this private investment that will prove decisive in supporting the economic reconstruction. In this reconstruction, we Europeans will have to be Schumpeterians while also remaining Keynesian: in 2020, the US economy, so to our West, proved twice as resilient as Europe’s.
In fact, to break away from a potentially vicious cycle of debt, the Central Bank has made prudent debt management a bank-wide strategic priority in its mission to ensure debt sustainability. As you all know, the Central Bank is responsible for raising, managing and servicing of government debt and carries out its functions with the objective of ensuring that the government’s financing requirements are met at the lowest possible cost in a timely manner, while ensuring the sustainability of debt obtained on behalf of the government. Following what was outlined in the previous Road Map, several measures were implemented in 2017 to enhance the transparency of debt management operations. In July 2017, a new hybrid primary issuance system for Treasury bonds was introduced to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the domestic borrowings of the government. We have also published an issuance calendar for government securities in the Central Bank website on a rolling basis to improve the transparency and predictability of the primary auction process and government securities market. Looking ahead, in 2018, we will continue to work towards enhancing the security, efficiency and transparency in public debt management further. Subject to the enactment of the Liability Management Act, in early 2018, liability management measures will be executed in order to improve the underlying risk profile of the public debt stock. This would enable us to minimise the refinancing risk by altering the maturity profile of the outstanding debt stock.

Actions will be taken to amend/repeal Financial  23  Transactions Reporting Act No 6 of 2006 (FTRA) and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, No. 05 of 2006 (PMLA) in line with international recommendations. We will also facilitate and coordinate with stakeholders to amend the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA), NGO Act and Trust Ordinance. In 2014, an AML/CFT National Risk Assessment (NRA) was conducted by the Central Bank with the support of more than 70 professionals representing key stakeholders. In 2018, we will take actions to update this NRA report. We will also coordinate with the Information and Communication Technology Agency of Sri Lanka (ICTA) to assist stakeholders to develop individual databases to maintain statistics in relation to AML/CFT. Moreover, we will coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and other stakeholders to implement UN Resolutions on proliferation financing (UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 2231). Further, we will continue to coordinate with the international community, including the Egmont Group, to fulfil our international obligations and to strengthen cooperation. During the year 2017, the Central Bank continued to strengthen the regulatory framework for the microfinance sector by issuing directions to licensed microfinance companies and principles, standards and guidelines to the Registrar of Voluntary Social Service Organisations, for the regulation and supervision of Microfinance NGOs.
Here, too, money and goods can be exchanged simultaneously on a DvP basis, but the challenge lies in coordinating processes across different infrastructures, each with a different underlying technology. Traditional financial market infrastructures use the synchronised settlement model for settling securities transactions, for example by coordinating the RTGS system with the securities settlement system. 7  The SNB is examining three models for token settlement Let me now turn to the question of how token transactions could be settled in central bank money. Given the potential of DLT and tokenisation, the SNB sees the need to take a close look at secure and efficient payment settlement in a token ecosystem. We are therefore launching a project in which we are testing three models in productive payment and settlement infrastructures (cf. slide 10). To this end, we are working with regulated financial market infrastructures and other market participants. The first model involves synchronised settlement (cf. slide 11). A link to the SIC system synchronises the settlement of tokenised securities with the settlement of payments. This ‘RTGS link’ was tested, together with SIX and the BIS Innovation Hub, in Phase I of Project Helvetia. Such synchronisation was shown to be technically feasible. Nevertheless, this model has significant disadvantages compared to integrated settlement, as DLT functionalities were limited. As part of the project, we are currently examining whether these disadvantages can be minimised by adjusting the SIC system or the link itself.

According to the World Bank, 170 million people in the ten member states of ASEAN with mobile phones remain unbanked. Some 53 million people still receive agriculture payments in cash. Financial technology or FinTech is making significant headway in bringing these under-served markets into the formal financial economy. Example: Digital financial transactions have increased by 30% in Thailand from 2014 to 2017. The FinTech revolution in Southeast Asia is being driven by three forces. First, there is a thriving FinTech start-up scene in ASEAN. These start-ups are building large digital businesses and changing the face of financial services while doing so. Take for example Wing in Cambodia, Wave Money in Myanmar, Momo in Vietnam, and MatchMove in Singapore. They have quickly scaled by providing unbanked individuals with the means to store value and transact digitally. And by extending their services to SMEs, these FinTech firms are facilitating the digitalisation of entire supply chains. Second, the advent of pervasive e-commerce platforms has provided an Asian model for financial inclusion. These platforms rapidly develop a consumer base and offer a broad stack of services, expanding into areas such as payments and credit. E-commerce platforms are among the best-funded ASEAN businesses. Grab, Go-Jek, Carousell, and Lazada have together raised nearly $ billion in 2018. According to a study by Google and Temasek, e-commerce is projected to grow explosively in ASEAN, from $ billion in 2015 to $ billion in 2025.
The United States will be directly affected in several important ways by the start of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, or EMU. I would like to review some of the main channels through which EMU is likely to affect American business and policymaking over the next several years. Further, I think it may be useful to highlight some of the important similarities and differences between the currency union that exists in the United States today and the currency union that you are in the process of creating in Europe. The most obvious implication of the start of EMU for the United States -- as well as for the world community -- is the coming into existence of a new currency, the euro, which is intended to function as a major international currency alongside the U.S. dollar. I should make clear at the outset that it would be a mistake to think that the United States looks at this prospect with concern, as if the introduction of the euro could somehow compromise the ability of the United States to continue to conduct trade and financial transactions with the rest of the world. As you well know, the dollar is currently used in roughly 50 percent of world trade transactions and in at least one side of 80 percent of world financial transactions. The introduction of another major international currency will neither harm the depth and liquidity of the dollar market nor hinder the ability of the United States to conduct its external transactions smoothly.

In addition, capital might also flow in the opposite direction, as non-European firms and governments tap the euro-denominated capital market as an efficient source of funds, in the same way as European businesses and governments have chosen to borrow dollars in recent decades. While the potential benefits of a more integrated European capital market in the long run are apparent, a number of observers have suggested that the economics of EMU -- as well as its plain mechanics -- may have unwelcome consequences for the dollar and world trade. More specifically, some have argued, EMU may cause a short-run glut of dollars in the international capital markets, leading the dollar to depreciate and the euro to appreciate, with resulting undesirable effects on trade flows. The reason there could be a dollar glut, these observers maintain, is that EMU would eliminate the need for intra-European intervention, reduce the importance of exchange rate management, and allow national central banks to pool reserves for external intervention, thus generally reducing the European central banks’ need for dollar reserves. Moreover, if the euro were BIS Review 109/1997  -4-  to become an attractive reserve currency for non-European central banks, the dollar glut could become even more severe.
The work for implementation of this project was inaugurated on November 2004, with the participation of senior managers of the World Bank. During 2004, the Bank of Albania, together with the banking system and the Ministry of Finance designed a number of operations, which were intended to reduce cash in economy. In view of meeting these commitments during 2004, a number of concrete steps were taken, among which I would highlight the following: completion on January 2004 of the interbank payment system, initiation of the big project for building the Automated Electronic Clearing House and the transfer of wages of public administration personnel through a bank account. Both above projects are regarded as an essential infrastructure, connecting almost the whole banking system. The implementation of the systems is done in accordance with best international standards and principles, based on modern and up date technology. On the other hand, I would emphasize that we have also organized meetings with various groups and representatives of economic interest, who not only have helped us to better understand our weak points, but have also served for clarifying mutual benefits to the participants. We are determined to continue our efforts in this direction even during 2005. Therefore, we are working to complete the project on small-size payments in time, to start cooperation with the World Bank for creating a credit information register.

Ardian Fullani: Recent financial and economic developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, while presenting the 2004 Annual Report to the Albanian Parliament Audience, Tirana, 9 April 2005. *  *  *  Honored deputies, I am here with you presenting my first address as Governor of the Bank of Albania, to share with you the Bank of Albania estimations on the economic developments of year 2004, to present our viewpoints on the Albanian economy perspective for the years to come, and to present some other important aspects of the Bank of Albania activity during this period. Bank of Albania is an institution that plays a crucial role in the decision-making of economic and financial policies and for establishing and maintaining the financial stability of the country. For this purpose, on behalf of the institution I govern, I would welcome any opinion, comment or suggestion relating to the past, the present and the future of the institutional development, of monetary policy and banking supervision. Albanian economy during 2004 According to the Bank of Albania estimates, the development of the Albanian economy over 2004 was in line with the objectives of the strategy on the economic development of the country. Based on the latest estimates, it results that Albanian economy grew by 6.0 percent in real terms, keeping the average development rate of the last five years.
And I am convinced that today’s conference will play an important role in sharing developments in the frontier economies – the next wave of emerging economies which will contribute to the regional and global growth and prosperity. 17. Last but not least, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our cohosts, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), who make the conference possible. I wish you all a successful conference and look forward to your discussions. 18. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

David Rule: Simple, transparent and comparable securitisation Speech by Mr David Rule, Executive Director for Prudential Policy of the Bank of England, at Global ABS, Barcelona, 17 June 2015. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to speak at Global ABS 2015. For the past couple of years the Bank of England has been working with the ECB to consider what can be done to foster the development of robust and well-functioning securitisation markets in the EU. Last year we published a joint discussion paper 1 and received helpful feedback from a wide range of commentators. One theme was support for defining the characteristics of simple, transparent and comparable securitisation – more on that in a moment. More recently, we published a joint response 2 in support of the European Commission’s consultation on securitisation and look forward to the Commission’s forthcoming legislative proposals. A key objective of the Capital Markets Union in Europe is a financial system in which stable market-based funding complements bank lending as a source of finance for the economy. Securitisation can be an important part of that stable, market-based funding, alongside other markets such as equities, bonds and private placements. Banks can use securitisation to diversify their funding and transfer risk on underlying loans. Importantly, non-banks can also finance lending through securitisation. Banks and non-banks can use securitisation to help match the maturity of their liabilities to their assets. This is particularly important in the context of housing finance.
With knowledge of the exposure, it does not take a rocket scientist to figure out some scenarios. It turns out that, during the last exercise, such calculations would produce very reassuring numbers. But, for some reason, they were never made public by most analysts. Just as an illustration, the total exposure of French banks to sovereign debt in Southern Europe is 38% of total Tier 1 (13% without Italy). I will let you draw your own conclusions. Even in an apocalyptic scenario, only a small fraction of French banks’ Tier 1 ratio would be compromised. The same results apply, with some variations, to other countries. Conclusion Let me now conclude. Like all other major advanced economies, the euro area is facing big challenges in adjusting to the post-crisis environment. For all, these challenges relate to long-term fiscal sustainability. They are neither bigger nor smaller for the euro area than for the United States, the United Kingdom or Japan. They may be more complicated to solve because, by nature, our governance is more complex and we face specific collective action problems. It may take us longer to deal with difficulties as they appear, and we are paying a price for this relative inertia. But problems are being tackled, reforms are being implemented and I am convinced that, in the end, the euro area will emerge as a stronger and more robust entity than before the crisis.

In short, in just one year, since May 2010, the EU has embarked on a radical overhaul of its economic governance, while managing the sovereign crisis. This is a great achievement, especially considering the multiplicity of actors involved and the creativity of the response, which also had to take account of public opinion. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Positive developments Looking at aggregate numbers, it is very difficult to understand many of the concerns expressed on the euro area. The euro area is the only major currency area with its external accounts in balance, and which therefore does not depend on external finance. This is an essential element of robustness. For outside investors, it provides a strong guarantee of long term solvency. Its aggregate fiscal balance (with a deficit of 6.3% of GDP in 2010) is the most favorable of all advanced economies (10.5% for the United States, 9.6% for the United Kingdom and 7.7% for Japan). The same holds true for public debt, which stands at 92% of GDP, close to that of the United States (93%), and much lower than that of Japan (200%). Looking at national fiscal situations, most analysts would acknowledge the magnitude of the efforts undertaken. Yet, some tend to take a very pessimistic view about future outcomes. In short, their argument is that the euro area, and more specifically, its periphery, will be unable to return to normal growth anytime in the foreseeable future.