samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
[This is made more challenging by the increasing weight of EMEs in the global economy, and the declining share of the US, which means demand for US-denominated safe assets is likely rise faster than their supply.] 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  In theory, the increases in both DCP and capital flows at risk suggest a greater focus on targeting the bilateral exchange rate against the dollar (through adding terms involving terms of trade misalignments and deviations from the law of one price to central banks’ monetary policy objective functions, and tools such as capital flow management measures (“CFM”)).26 In practice, either could be highly destabilising. It is far better as a first response to focus on core price stability objectives, and to explain transparently if foreign shocks are altering the trade-off required to best achieve it. Monetary policy makers’ mandates are necessarily parsimonious, focusing on a small set of macroeconomic variables – price stability and maintaining output around potential. While some shocks drive inflation and output in the same direction, others push inflation away from target without proportional effects on activity, confronting monetary policymakers with a trade-off between these two objectives.

22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  22  Chart 12a: UK monetary policy trade-offs in successive 2-year ahead Inflation Report projections 3.0  Inflation (%)  2.5  August 2016  August 2019  2.0 -1.0 Excess supply (%)  -0.5  0.0  0.5  1.0  1.5  2.0 Excess  Preferred trade-off if λ=0.1  1.5  Preferred trade-off if λ=1 1.0  Chart 12b: UK monetary policy trade-offs in successive 3-year ahead Inflation Report projections 3.0  August 2016  Inflation (%)  2.5  August 2019  2.0 -1.0 Excess supply (%)  -0.5  0.0  0.5  1.0  1.5  2.0 Excess  Preferred trade-off if λ=0.1  1.5  Preferred trade-off if λ=1 1.0  Notes to Chart 12: Each observation shows the central projection for spare capacity or excess demand at the end of the second / third year of the forecast period (the 'Year 2' or ‘Year 3’ point) on the horizontal axis against the central projection for four-quarter CPI inflation at Year 2 / Year 3 on the vertical axis from successive Inflation Reports. See ’Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney, 16 January 2017, for further details and discussion. 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  23
Krzysztof Rybiński: SEPA and the payment system in Poland Speech by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at the 13th Bank Forum “Regulatory changes in European banking – outcomes for banks and the economy in Poland”, Warsaw, 14 March 2007. *  *  *  Welcome to the session devoted to the SEPA project – Single Euro Payments Area – in the context of the Polish payment system. When you google SEPA, the first website on the results list is the site of the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, but what closely follows is the ECB’s website on SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area). The pagerank of both these sites is 6, which means that they are important in the Internet. Since the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins in 2002, consumers have been able to make cash payments throughout the euro area from a single purse using a single currency. The SEPA project represents the next major step towards closer European integration; it will allow consumers to make cashless payments throughout the euro area from a single account under the same basic conditions, regardless of their location. In 2002, the banking industry took up this challenging project by creating the European Payments Council (EPC). The EPC is defining the new rules and procedures for euro payments.

2  BIS Review 29/2007  Point-of-sale terminals in the euro area will become increasingly standardised. As a consequence, there will be a wider choice of terminal providers, and merchants will be able to accept a wider range of cards with a single terminal. The increased competition between payment card systems should also drive down fees. This is a vision of anticipated benefits for an integrated Europe, but the questions I would like to ask the panelists and all of you today are as follows: Will SEPA reinforce the competitiveness of Polish entrepreneurs? ; How fast should we act? ; What roles are there to be played and who should play them so as to ensure the success of the Polish economy, enterprises and consumers in the SEPA era? It seems to me that these are the key questions to be answered now so that Forum SEPA Polska could develop, in the months to come, an optimal strategy for launching new payment products in the Polish market. Let’s also have a look at our own local situation. By providing new payment instruments and euro area-wide infrastructures, SEPA will ensure that banks expand their business and compete on a euro area level, as any bank can offer its services more easily to any individual in the euro area. Banks can also expand their business by offering their customers value-added services on top of the SEPA products.
Our April 1995 derivatives survey showed US firms (including securities houses) accounting for around 40% of turnover in both foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives. We therefore attach particular importance to international regulatory cooperation; and as the trend towards globalisation and multi-functionality continues it is becoming increasingly necessary. The Barings and Daiwa cases have highlighted the difficulty that banks can experience in controlling operations which are far from their head offices. Barings, in particular, demonstrated that losses in a subsidiary in a remote location, in a unit which was not thought to be assuming any significant market risk, can be big enough to bring about the failure of the parent. So home and host supervisors have a mutual interest in the health of the subsidiaries. Regulators will rightly be blamed if any reluctance on their part to work together either exacerbates a crisis or fails to prevent one that could otherwise have been avoided. It is possible to argue that an individual regulator can successfully meet his own objectives, by seeking to build firewalls between his entity and the rest of the group to which it belongs. These might include restrictions or even prohibitions on both financial exposures and operational interlinkages. In addition capital adequacy and other requirements might be set at a more onerous level than if the potential for parental support was taken into account. Such measures may be the best that can be achieved at present; they certainly provide host supervisors with a measure of comfort.

UK regulatory structure and proposals for change Across the world we see a lively debate on how the regulatory cake should be cut. There has been change in France. The Australian Government has set up the Wallis Commission to look at the institutional arrangements there. Their first report has just been published. Reforms are in progress in Japan. In the US the new legislative season is about to open, with a number of runners and riders already saddled up in the financial regulation steeplechase. Similarly, in the UK, a variety of think tanks, and the opposition Labour Party, have produced proposals to amend, or in some cases fundamentally reorder, our regulatory structure. But, before describing these exciting proposals, perhaps a brief description of the British system would be in order. Responsibility for financial regulation in the UK is divided between two Government Departments. Department of Trade and Industry  STRUCTURE OF UK FINANCIAL REGULATION  HMTreasury  Insurance Companies Act 1982  Banking Act 1987  Financial Services Act 1986  Bank of England  Securities and Investments Board  Personal Investment Authority Retail Regulator  Investment Management Regulatory Organisation  Securities And Futures Authority  Insurance Companies  BIS Review 21/1997  Banks  Financial Advisers  Securities Houses  Fund Managers  -3-  Most falls to the Treasury, but prudential supervision of insurance companies is the responsibility of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
A message that emerged with great clarity and force from the non-financial sector participants was that there remains a major lack of trust in financial markets and financial institutions because of misconduct. Participants saw cultural and ethical changes as an essential component of restoring the social license for financial markets. The Bank of England is not responsible for market conduct and integrity in the UK. That task rests with the FCA under the very able leadership of my erstwhile colleague Andrew Bailey. But our overall responsibility for the financial stability of the UK, our prudential responsibility for the major wholesale financial firms and the Bank’s close and historic interaction with London as an international financial centre means we have a very active interest in the integrity and fairness of the wholesale financial ecosystem which is located here. That is why the Bank, alongside colleagues from the FCA and HMT, led the fair and effective markets review which reported last year and why we have made significant progress in ensuring that its recommendations are implemented. 8  7  See ‘From ‘ethical drift’ to ‘ethical lift’: Reversing the tide of misconduct on global financial markets’, Remarks given by Minouche Shafik, 20 October 2016, available at: www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2016/078.aspx.

However, in view of the risk exposures and the prevailing uncertainties in the economic environment, it is crucial that the big banks build up a sufficient base of loss-absorbing capital as swiftly as possible during this transition period. After adjusting for the not fully loss-absorbing components, the big banks’ remaining capital buffers are still thin in light of the aforementioned risks. Despite some improvement, leverage for both UBS and Credit Suisse is still high by international standards. Taking only fully loss-absorbing capital into account, the average capital ratio of both big banks amounted to less than 2% of total assets. Against this background, both big banks have already made major strides towards expanding their loss-absorbing capital base. To this end, Credit Suisse issued contingent convertible bonds (CoCos), while UBS retained its earnings. These important first steps have already significantly strengthened the big banks’ loss-absorbing capital base. They also show that the big banks should be in a good position to build up the necessary, additional capital buffer. Situation of domestically focused banks Allow me now to discuss the situation of banks with a domestic focus. The capitalisation of domestically focused banks was almost unchanged in comparison to 2009. The short but sharp recession in Switzerland in 2009 did not have any noticeable impact last year either. Write-downs and provisions were at a historical low. In a long-term comparison, profits remained at a high level overall.
Yves Mersch: Unveiling the new € banknote Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the unveiling of the new € banknote, Frankfurt am Main, 13 January 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you all for coming here today to the unveiling of the new ten euro banknote. We shall also be announcing the date of its introduction. Before we do that, let me briefly explain why we consider the issuance of a new banknote to be an important event. First of all, it’s a chance to consider how Europe’s single currency has grown. Euro banknotes and coins started circulating in 12 European countries on 1 January 2002. Today, 18 countries and 334 million people use the euro in their daily transactions. You can travel from Riga to Rome, or from Barcelona to Bratislava, and use the same notes and coins. Today is also an opportunity to take a look at what the euro symbolises. 12 years after the euro banknotes and coins were introduced, it’s easy for us to take them for granted and to forget what an ambitious, even bold, project it was to introduce the euro. The single currency has helped to bring millions of Europeans together, in all our diversity, and the banknotes and coins are a tangible symbol of our determination to support the European Union. When we say, “The Euro. Our Money”, we really mean it! And not just in Europe.

When you take a closer look you’ll see the new ten has the same new features as the new five: a portrait of Europa – a figure from Greek mythology – in both the hologram and the watermark, as well as the emerald number, which changes colour from green to deep blue when you tilt the note. Introducing a new banknote, especially one used as much as the ten, is a major undertaking. It requires a lot of planning and preparation to gradually replace the two billion or so ten euro notes currently in circulation. I would like to thank all who were involved in this process within the Eurosystem. I would also like to thank the banks, retailers and other cash-handling professionals, who will, in the end, put those new notes in your hands. I know that banknote equipment manufacturers and suppliers are already working hard to ensure that the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  machines are adapted in good time so that the introduction goes smoothly, and I want to thank them as well for the vital part they play. We are announcing the date of issuance and are sharing the required technical information well in advance to give all parties enough time to get ready. The new Europa series ten euro banknote will start circulating on Tuesday 23 September this year. And now it’s time to see the new ten euro banknote. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  Throughout our work on AI/ML we want to enable safe innovation. We are open to use of this technology, but with proper scrutiny to the practical details. This is how we balance the competing demands of our primary objectives, which include ensuring financial stability and ensuring safety and soundness of firms, and our secondary objectives such as promoting competition. Open to new firms entering  My second theme is the importance we at the Bank of England attach to being open to new firms entering markets. In addition to supporting new ideas and approaches, fintech is creating a more open, competitive and diverse financial ecosystem. At the Bank of England, we see more businesses working on identifying and solving global financial challenges as a welcome development. It is clear that on several dimensions today’s financial system offers an imperfect service, including the cost and efficiency of domestic and cross-border payments and access for the disadvantaged or excluded. We want to improve the service consumers and businesses receive, without compromising our regulatory perimeter or undermining the ‘same risk -same regulation’ principle that underpins our approach. At the heart of our vision for these improvements is putting consumers at the centre and empowering them to take full benefit from their data. I will discuss this in more detail at tomorrow’s panel session on SME financing.

Openness and integration – the new finance and new economy in a global context Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets & Banking  Bund Summit, Shanghai 27 October 2019  With thanks to Cormac Sullivan for his assistance in preparing these remarks and to Ashley Collins, Tom Mutton, Niamh Reynolds and Tom Smith for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Intro  It is my great privilege to address you today. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the China Finance 40 Forum, Huangpu District Government and the Shanghai Finance Institute for the opportunity to address this esteemed summit. I am here speaking on behalf of the Bank of England, the UK’s central bank, where I am the Deputy Governor with responsibility for our financial markets and banking policy and operations, a key element of which is fintech. China and the UK are both leading global centres of financial innovation. We share economies where commerce is rapidly becoming digital and financial systems are evolving in response. We share populations that are increasingly open to new finance providers and new financial products. We also share a common goal of ensuring regulators manage and regulate appropriately, to ensure the financial system remains sound, both domestically and globally. The UK financial sector is a national asset and a global public good. Our strong partnership with our Chinese colleagues is at the heart of that.
The Singapore Exchange Beijing representative office will, I am sure, play an important supporting role in bridging both China and Singapore’s equity capital markets, and servicing the current and future listed Chinese companies. It also demonstrates Singapore’s long-term commitment to China, and I believe both markets will stand to gain in the long run. As a Chinese saying goes, Spring is the season we sow the seeds in the fields. As the Singapore Exchange sows its promising seeds in China, I very much hope that both Singapore and the Chinese companies who choose Singapore as their financing location will enjoy the harvest of good fortune in time to come. With that, I would like to extend my heartiest congratulations once again to the Singapore Exchange for its representative office opening in Beijing. I encourage the exchange to play its role well in serving the specific needs of the Chinese companies with the ambition to grow regionally and in doing so, contribute to the strengthening partnership between the China and Singapore. Have a great evening, thank you. 2  BIS Review 46/2008

As new liquidity-providers enter the market, execution certainty and price efficiency might be expected to improve. Inventory and information risk would thereby fall and, with it, bid-ask spreads. Some of the early empirical fingerprints suggest just such a pattern. For example, Brogaard (2010) analyses the effects of HFT on 26 NASDAQ-listed stocks. HFT is estimated to have reduced the price impact of a 100-share trade by $ For a 1000-share trade, the price impact is reduced by $ In other words, HFT boosts the market’s absorptive capacity. Consistent with that, Hendershott et al (2010) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) find evidence of algorithmic trading and HFT having narrowed bid-ask spreads. Chart 8 plots a measure of bid-ask spreads on UK equities over the past decade, normalising them by a measure of market volatility to strip out volatility spikes. It confirms the pattern from earlier studies. Bid-ask spreads have fallen by an order of magnitude since 2004, from around 0.023 to 0.002 percentage points. On this metric, market liquidity and efficiency appear to have improved. HFT has greased the wheels of modern finance. But bid-ask spreads can sometimes conceal as much as they reveal. For example, by normalising on volatility, Chart 8 air-brushes out what might be most interesting: normalising volatility might normalise abnormality. It risks falling foul of what sociologists call “normalisation of deviance” – that is, ignoring small changes which might later culminate in an extreme event. 8 So is there any evidence of increasing abnormality in market prices over the past few years?
Accordingly, we continue to estimate that the current high level of inflation will be temporary, a vision that is shared by market agents, as inflation expectations one and two years ahead have remained around 3 percent (figure 4). As I said at the beginning, the biggest news in several months comes from domestic demand and output, which posted a quite weaker performance than our forecasts. In the second quarter GDP grew 1.9 percent while domestic demand dropped 0.9 percent annually (figure 5). Expenditure’s poor performance permeated its every component, where worth noting was the fast deterioration of the most persistent ones, such as non-durable consumption and investment in construction and engineering works. By sectors, trade, especially wholesale, fell in annual terms, while a large number of manufacturing branches posted meager results. Only those most linked to the export sector show marginally more favorable figures. The evolution of expenditure has also driven a reduction in imports, causing a sharper adjustment to the current account (figure 6). In fact, while a year ago the annual deficit of the current account amounted to 4 percent of GDP and was expected to increase further, at the end of the second quarter it was at 2.4 percent of GDP and is now expected to end the year at 1.8 percent of GDP. This level, plus the peso depreciation and its effects on exports, mean that we can look at this variable’s future behavior with ease.

14  Report, Sept. 14  2016 (f) Report, Sept. 14  (annual change, percent) 3.4  3.9  3.9  3.8  3.9  2.4 1.0 1.6 7.3 5.4 4.1 2.0  2.1 0.8 1.0 7.3 5.4 4.0 1.7  2.9 1.5 1.1 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.4  3.1 1.7 1.0 7.2 6.2 4.4 3.0  3.0 1.7 1.5 7.2 6.2 4.5 2.6  3.2 1.8 1.2 7.0 6.5 4.8 3.3  300 106  310 108  315 106  (levels) 285 101  290 103  305 104  300 101  -0.9  -0.5  -0.8  -0.5  3.5  3.3  3.2  3.8  3.7  3.7  4.4  (annual change, percent) -0.2  -1.1  -1.5  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Bloomberg, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries.