samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Central Bank of Malta’s preparatory process for integration in the Eurosystem has undoubtedly benefited from its participation in ESCB committees and from the bilateral contacts established with many Eurosystem central banks, including the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, our partner in the Twinning Arrangement on communication strategy in which we participated with Cyprus. Some Eurosystem central banks, moreover, have responded favourably to requests for entering into cooperative arrangements with the Bank for the implementation of specific operations, such as in the field of reserve management. As for the public mood, price perceptions will probably remain a source of apprehension, at least in the immediate period ahead. Although 68% of Maltese respondents who participated in the latest Eurobarometer survey said that they are in favour of a relatively early euro adoption, some responses to the other questions suggest that the Maltese are not indifferent to what they hear about the possible negative effects of the single currency. The percentage of respondents who consider that the euro will be of personal or national benefit, 2 for example, is smaller than that of those who favour early adoption. And the main concern is not unlike that in the current euro area Member States. It is not about the ability of the ECB to deliver price stability over the medium-term. It is primarily about a temporary increase in price levels after the changeover, a fear which has been reinforced by what is reported in the Italian media.

Indeed, 65% of Maltese respondents believe that the euro will result in a one-time increase in prices. And this despite the fact that around 60% considered that the euro will deliver price stability in the medium-term; and that a large majority are aware of the various initiatives that are being taken to limit price abuse and consider that the dual display of prices 3 is helping people get used to the new currency. 4  2  53% and 43%, respectively. 3  According to the April 2007 NSO survey, 91.4% of respondents. 4  The first observation is based on the results of Flash Eurobarometer Survey No. 207. The second and third observations are based on the National Statistics Office survey which was conducted a few weeks after the completion of fieldwork for the Eurobarometer survey. While corroborating many of the findings reported in the Eurobarometer survey, including the same level of concern about potential price abuses, the NSO survey reveals some facts which are not discernible through the questions featuring in the Eurobarometer survey, including the two reported here. BIS Review 77/2007  3  What is equally striking is the fact that while a high level of education and young age are correlated with a positive attitude towards the euro, there is no discernible pattern across age groups or education levels when it comes to expectations about the potential inflationary impact of the changeover. Apprehension is widespread.
In order to address these myths and remove investors’ doubts and anxiety, the PBOC, clearly stated in 1996 the monetary relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland. The relationship can be best summarised as “one country, two currencies, two monetary systems and two mutually independent monetary authorities”. 10. The “mutually independent monetary systems” of Hong Kong and the Mainland reflect the differences in economic and financial developments between the two places. The two systems operate in a mutually independent manner. One does not precede or follow the other. Their relationship is different from the administrative relationship between the Central Government and the local government. In my view, the basic principles and policies governing the monetary relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland can be summarized in the following ways. (A) Laws, regulations, policies and management rules relating to monetary affairs promulgated on the Mainland are not applicable to Hong Kong. The HKSAR government, on its own, formulates monetary legislation and regulations as well as draws up and implements financial and monetary policies. 11. The fact that mainland monetary laws and regulations are not applicable in Hong Kong mainly reflects the difference in social and economic systems, economic and financial developments and regulatory standards between the two. The Mainland is in transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy. The legal framework relating to monetary affairs is still being modified. There are still a lot of restrictions in respect of monetary and financial issues.

The Hong Kong dollar and the Renminbi continue to circulate as legal tender in Hong Kong and the mainland respectively. The Hong Kong dollar is treated as a foreign currency in the mainland. Likewise, the Renminbi is treated as a foreign currency in Hong Kong. 15. The Basic Law has provided for the legal status of the Hong Kong dollar. The Renminbi is still not yet freely convertible. However, even if it becomes freely convertible, it will only be one of the many foreign currencies traded in Hong Kong’s forex market. As for the cross-border circulation of the banknotes of the Hong Kong dollar and the Renminbi, this is a natural consequences of the close relationship between the two places. This phenomenon was in existence long before the handover. The legal status of the Hong Kong dollar will not be affected and the Hong Kong dollar will not be replaced as a result. 16. The issuance arrangements for the Hong Kong dollar remain independent. Hong Kong dollar bank notes continue to be issued by the three note-issuing banks under the authorisation of the HKSAR government. Under the linked exchange rate system, the note-issuing banks provide 100% backing in US dollar according to the fixed rate of $ to $ In order to ensure that all the Hong Kong dollar notes and coins in circulation comply with the monetary rule of the Currency Board System, we have improved our coins issuance mechanism so that it operates in exactly the same way as the notes issuance mechanism.
Implications of the new environment for financial stability oversight  It will be clear from the litany of issues I have just mentioned - new players, new products, new risk transfer techniques and interconnections - that the changes in today’s financial world are indeed quite profound in relation to financial stability oversight. But are they net benign or net negative? The world here is sometimes portrayed as being in two designated camps. This may be a bit of a parody, but I am sure the two protagonists would forgive my little sketch. The bullish view is led by Governor Greenspan. This holds that, in the new financial world, banks now possess the enhanced ability to disperse risk - to offload risk to others, be they investors, insurance companies or whatever. The banks have thereby been able to weather a variety of shocks, which in an earlier age might well have engendered financial instability. The Asian crisis, Russia, 9/11, Enron: I could go on. In each case the banks came through and the financial system has demonstrated greater resilience as derivatives and sophisticated risk transfer processes have dispersed risk to a wider audience. The bearish camp is led by Warren Buffett. This points out the opacity of today’s world: the difficulty of spotting risk concentrations; or judging the behavioural expectations in the face of given types of shock. My view would be that both schools of thought are right! I think in reality it depends on your vantage point. There has been improved capital formation.

Lessons from the crisis The high equity share, the capacity to increase the risk level in certain periods and the need for diversification are derived from the Fund’s characteristics. Let me now review some of the lessons from the financial crisis that have also shaped the development of the Fund’s strategy. These changes are closer to the centre of the European debt crisis. The risk tolerance of the Fund is to a large degree defined by the strategic equity share, which, as I mentioned, is 60 per cent. Since the Fund is heavily exposed to risk by virtue of its relatively high equity share, the function of government bonds is in essence to reduce the overall volatility of the portfolio. From this perspective, the most important role for government bonds is to hedge the equity portfolio. The hedge is best achieved by holding liquid government bonds with high credit quality. Typically, this entails an overweight of the safest, low-yield government bonds. Conversely, high-yield government bonds are more volatile, and thus they do not serve the overall purpose as a hedge in a global portfolio. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Slide 14: Fixed income: new benchmark The Fund’s benchmark index for bonds is divided into 70 percent public and 30 percent corporate debt. Previously, the allocation in the bond portfolio was based on market weights, and thus the portfolio was allocated in proportion to volume of the sovereign debt issued by each country.
US Treasury (2011), “Financial Stability Oversight Council 2011 Annual Report” available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/FSOCAR2011.pdf Walker, D (2009), “A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities”, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf  BIS central bankers’ speeches  17  Figure 1: Payoff profile for bank equity  Figure 2: Payoff profile for bank equity with higher leverage  18  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3: Payout profiles for bank equity and debt  BIS central bankers’ speeches  19  Chart 1: Estimated distribution of UK banks’ assets to GDP  Source: Sheppard, D.K (1971) and Bank of England. (a) Data before 1974 are from Sheppard, D.K (1971). The definition of UK banking sector assets is broader after 1966, but using a narrower definition throughout gives the same growth profile. (b) Data after 1974 include total assets of UK resident banks from Bank of England data. Assets of the Bank of England’s Issue department and Asset Purchase Facility are excluded. Notes: The density estimates are based on a normal kernel function and a number of observations in each subsample. Chart 2: Estimated distribution of UK banks’ return on assets  Source: Capie, F and Billing, M (2004), BBA and Bank calculations. Notes: The density estimates are based on a normal kernel function and a number of observations in each subsample. There is a definitional change in the sample in 1967 and again in 2010.

By 2007, CEO compensation would have reached $ million. That is precisely in line with their actual payouts. If you believed ROE were a reliable performance metric, US bank CEOs would have had a watertight defence back in 2007. Indeed, it was the L’Oreal defence: because we’re worth it. But experience since suggests this performance was cosmetic. ROE flattered returns, and hence compensation, in the upswing. That is hardly surprising since it puts risk ahead of return and short-term ahead of long-term performance. When the downswing came, the volatility of equity returns sent many banks to the wall. Equity-based incentive contracts helped propel them there. Firm-level evidence could not be clearer. In 2006, the top 5 equity stakes of US bank CEOs ran as follows: Dick Fuld (Lehman Brothers), James Cayne (Bear Stearns), Stan O’Neal (Merrill Lynch), John Mack (Morgan Stanley) and Angelo Mozilo (Countrywide) (Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)). We know how these disaster movies ended. So having been divorced for almost two hundred years, ownership and control have been reunited. But they are an odd couple. Their marriage contract encourages both partners to behave in a volatile, short-term fashion. The marriage itself is destined to last less than a year. In the mid-19th century, unlimited liability was said to be deterring investors of “fortune, intelligence and respectability”. For very different reasons, today’s governance arrangements might be suffering the same fate. Banking and public policy The previous sections identified four forces which have shaped risk-taking incentives for over a century.
European venture capital is to be boosted, in order to provide European startups with the funds that they otherwise seek from the United States. More generally, it is the Capital Markets Union and the Banking Union that must now make progress, and progress together, because they are complementary and offer synergies.4 While we are working together seriously to achieve a "Green Deal", we must also do so to establish a "Green Financing Union": the latter is a prerequisite for the former, and is not just a matter of financial technicalities. I will conclude by quoting Konrad Adenauer, who was Chancellor from 1949 to 1963: "If two people always have the same opinion, both are of no use".5 The Franco-German couple (or engine) has always been the driver for finding common ground from positions that were often initially at odds. These very disagreements are what makes this relationship valuable, and also provide it with its potential for momentum. In this current, severe crisis, it is up to us to revive it and help Europe get back on track. Thank you for your attention. 3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  1 Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency 2 Update on business conditions, published on 9 November 2022 by the Banque de  France. These aggregate figures weigh each of the three sectors (market services, industry and construction) following their importance in global added value.

In doing so, we have removed a substantial part of our accommodative monetary policy, and are clearly approaching the "normalisation range", which can be estimated to be around 2% in the euro area. We should reach this level in December. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Beyond this, I believe that we will probably continue to raise rates, but we may do so in a more flexible and possibly less rapid manner - "jumbo" rate hikes will not become a new habit. A favourable condition to interrupt rate hikes would be clear signs of a turnaround in the core inflation trend. Faced with persistent inflation, we have therefore demonstrated our resolve to bring it down towards our target level. I will reiterate here our forecast, our commitment and our capacity: together with the Governing Council, alongside Christine Lagarde, we are going to bring inflation down towards 2% within two or three years. II. What we differ on today: fiscal measures and energy prices This is the most difficult issue today, for fundamental reasons, not just questions of timing or of personalities. The first steps towards the necessary European coordination have already been taken: taxation of 'inframarginal' electricity producers; principle of collective gas purchases. The Banque de France is not an energy specialist; I would just like to mention two shared lessons. The first is from France: fiscal measures, taken at the domestic level to help households cope with rising energy prices, may be politically necessary as well as effective in smoothing the inflation shock.
The Bank of Albania has continued the practice of organising scientific conferences and national and international forums to share opinions with national and international partners and groups of interest. The Bank of Albania is committed in expanding financial literacy, for an informed public understands better and responds more adequately to the decisions of the central bank. Also, a financially literate public manages better its personal finances. This commitment is further concretised with the establishment of the Museum of the Bank of Albania. During 2017, a range of informing and educational activities were organised at the Museum of the Bank of Albania with the participation of academics from various fields to share their knowledge with the public at large. The Bank of Albania has strengthened the cooperation with the national and international institutions, through information sharing, and consultation and joint projects. During 2017, a number of memoranda of cooperation were signed with national and international partners. Good governance in terms of the performance of the work processes, the efficiency in using the resources and risk management, is an element of the Bank of Albania’s accountability. In this light, I would like to mention the main improvements that have taken place in terms of internal audit systems. The internal audit at the Bank of Albania is an independent activity from the management, ensured through the Inspector General, appointed by the Parliament. 8/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  6. Internal audit The Operational Risk Management function was consolidated over 2017.

2  Source: “Trade Transformed: The Emerging New Corridors of Trade Power”, Citibank (Oct 2011) & McKinsey. 3  Source: “Under Pressure: Funding in an Uncertain World”, Allen & Overy (Oct 2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  arising from revised Basel capital rules. Nevertheless, we are unlikely to see sudden dislocation in the Asian financing landscape because of the following: 6.1. First, Asian banks remain well-capitalised, and notwithstanding cost/deleveraging pressures, international banks will want to preserve their Asian franchises given Asia’s stronger growth potential relative to other regions. 6.2. Second, bank financing in Asia will adapt. Some banks have already begun to explore certain risk-transfer mechanisms (e.g. credit insurance) to continue extending credit, while complying with stricter capital rules. Other banks have shifted to “originate and distribute” models which allows them to play a role in long-term financing even as they scale back their provision of long-term loans. We expect banks in Asia to continually explore new models to remain relevant and constantly develop its expertise to meet Asia’s financing demands. 6.3. Third, growing role of non-bank capital to complement bank financing: The signs are very promising. From 2007-2011, the proportion of aggregate capital raised by private equity growth funds in Asia Pacific has almost doubled from 32% to 62%. On debt markets, we have seen strong issuance activity in Asia Pacific ex-Japan.
All this shows that there is enormous potential for the expansion of bilateral economic relations between our two countries. BIS Review 45/2005  1  Many politicians in Europe seem to forget that China, like all the other emerging economies in Asia and South America, has become one of the dynamic poles in the global economy in recent years. By contrast, Europe has trailed behind in terms of growth. This is precisely why globalisation makes sense for an economy open to international markets such as ours. For both historical and geographical reasons, our country is exposed to a considerable commercial risk in Europe: 60% of our exports are destined for European countries; accounting for 25%, Germany ranks first among our export markets. These European markets are no longer the most dynamic today, nor will they be in the future. It is essential that we step up the diversification process so as to ensure the expansion of our export sector. It is therefore in our own best interests to strengthen economic relations with Asia, in particular with China. Business relations between industrialised countries and China currently take centre stage in political discussions. In particular, harsh criticism has been levelled at China because of its exchange rate policy of pegging its currency to the US dollar despite the fact that it has made considerable progress in terms of efficiency.

In my view, floating rates are not a panacea, they can be volatile in the case of market disruption. At times, the Swiss franc was pushed to levels no longer compatible with the economic reality of our country’s fundamentals. These episodes lasted for only a limited time, however. Another advantage of a flexible Swiss franc is that changes in the international monetary system have little bearing on our currency which is largely determined by Switzerland’s economic realities. Consequently, the launch of the euro - a major event on the monetary scene in recent years - did not lead to the disappearance or the destabilisation of the franc as feared by some. Though the euro - for all intents and purposes - is accepted as a means of payment in Switzerland, there are not more euros in circulation now than there were French francs or German marks prior to the monetary integration. Furthermore, the calm that has characterised the foreign exchange market in Europe since the disappearance of the national currencies mitigated the speculative pressures on the franc. Our currency is therefore less volatile than before. Last but not least, contrary to the pessimistic assumption that the Swiss National Bank would have to shadow the policy of the European Central Bank, it was able to set its interest rates according to the needs of the Swiss economy. On the whole, our monetary regime passed the test imposed by the change in the European monetary system with flying colours.
The reason for this is that a crisis in the financial system has far-reaching consequences for the whole economy. The financial crisis causes large falls in production, rising unemployment and increased budget deficits as incomes fall and expenditure rises in the wake of the recession. There is thus a big difference, from society’s point of view, between banks in distress and ordinary companies suffering problems. This is why we need special regulations for the banks. It is no news to us Swedes that crises are extremely expensive. We only need to look back to the crisis in the 1990s for a reminder. But this time the crisis was on a global scale. For the first time since the Second World War we have experienced a fall in production in the world economy. It is clear that the world will suffer the consequences of this for a long time to come. But we Swedes have also been hit hard this time, too. Not least because we are a small, export-driven economy that is very vulnerable to developments abroad. Because when the credit taps are turned off, orders that have been made are withdrawn and no new ones are made. In 2009 total production in Sweden, GDP, fell by around 5 per cent – the largest fall in a single year since the 1940s. Such a large fall in the production flow entails an irrevocable dent in the long-term curve. Gone forever. If one converts it, it corresponds to about SEK 20,000 per Swedish inhabitant.

Market risk is the risk that the bank’s assets will vary in value in a way that was not anticipated, and this makes it difficult for the bank to get hold of capital without making a loss. For example, fluctuations in interest rates and exchange rates can affect the value of the assets. In addition to these risks, there are what are known as operational risks. This can involve, for instance, a technical system failing to function, or a human error that puts the bank at great risk. Some of you may remember how the British bank Barings collapsed in 1995 as a result of speculation and unchecked risks taken by a single employee. Risk management is about protecting oneself against such undesirable and unexpected outcomes. In short, one wants to take calculated risks. According to earlier agreements within the Basel Committee, the banks have the possibility to develop models themselves to calculate the size of their risks and this is an opportunity most of the major banks have used. Over time, their risk calculation models have become increasingly sophisticated. But during the crisis it turned out that not even the most advanced models managed to capture the real risks. Sometimes it was not the model that was inadequate; there was a lack of available data for assessing the risk. In many cases there was quite simply not enough historical data, as the financial instruments were such fresh inventions. You may have heard of various types of complicated derivative, such as CDOs, CDSs and so on.