samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On 1 July, we returned risk weights for consumer loans to the pre-pandemic level. However, given recent months’ data, we will soon make a decision on additional macroprudential measures to cool down this segment of the retail market. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  I will now speak on possible risks to the forecast. Proinflationary risks continue to prevail. We consider that the main risk is a potential anchoring of inflation expectations at a high level. Fuelled by high inflation expectations, temporary growth might become sustained. There is a slight increase in risks associated with a possible faster normalisation of monetary policies in advanced economies. As a result, market volatility in emerging market economies might intensify, which can affect exchange rate and inflation expectations. There are also certain risks caused by structural changes in the labour market due to the pandemic. The demand for some professions is declining, whereas the demand for others is rising. This is confirmed by data on a record-high increase in vacant jobs. Adjusting to the new needs of the economy requires time for specialist retraining. Consequently, this provokes local staff shortages. The situation is aggravated even more due to the restrictions on the inflow of labour migrants, which affects construction and seasonal agricultural works most seriously. The situation in the labour market might increase companies’ costs. Proinflationary risks associated with the environment in global commodity markets persist. Nonetheless, June—July recorded the first signs of a decline in world prices.

Replenishing their inventories, companies substantially increased their demand for commodities worldwide. Russia is a major producer of key commodities. High demand for Russian exports spurs economic growth this year. As companies complete their inventories, the effect of this factor will be tapering off gradually. The growth of oil export quantities will also be supported by the easing of the OPEC+ oil production cuts in response to the recovery of demand. Taking this into consideration, we have raised the oil price path in our forecast by 5 US dollars per barrel in the next three years. According to our preliminary estimates, the expansion of oil output under the new OPEC+ agreements will add about 0.1 pp to GDP growth this year and 0.2–0.3 pp next year. Another important growth driver is domestic demand, including both consumer and investment demand. Considering these trends, we have revised our economic growth forecast for this year upwards from 3–4% to 4–4.5%. After the recovery, the economy will expand at a pace close to its potential. We forecast that GDP will equal 2–3% in the next two years. The possibility to achieve higher economic growth rates will depend both on the expansion of production and logistics capacities and on labour resources, their expertise and performance. T hird. Monetary conditions have been progressively adjusting to the earlier increases in the key rate, but are still accommodative.
The explanation for the time lag before this has become visible could be that it takes time to learn the new technology and to reorganise the company in order to benefit from the advantages in terms of increased productivity from earlier investments. If the strong productivity growth proves to be permanent, it means that the economy can grow at a more rapid rate without inflation accelerating. One question concerns the consequences of the poor employment situation and strong productivity growth for the outcome of wage negotiations and wage developments as a whole. If the labour market is functioning efficiently, the weak labour market situation should result in modest wage increases. Unfortunately, we know that, historically, this has not always been the case. The good productivity growth may also make it difficult for firms to withstand higher wage demands. It could become particularly worrying if the wage negotiations assume that the improvement in productivity is permanent and it later begins to decline again. It now looks as though recent wage developments may have been calmer than expected. In the December Inflation Report we made a downward revision to the forecast for unit labour costs in the business sector for all three years covered by the forecast. This was because of the slightly lower rate of wage increases and a slightly more favourable development in productivity. The question of whether there is motivation for a further adjustment in the same direction is one that will be discussed at our monetary policy meeting in February.

The conclusion was that underlying inflation excluding energy, which was assessed as the best mirror of cyclically-related inflationary pressure, was expected to be in line with the target 1-2 years ahead, and this was why the repo rate was left unchanged. The information received so far since December does not appear to significantly alter the picture of a recovery in economic growth. However, there may be a risk that the weak labour market situation will last longer than anticipated and have repercussions for growth and inflation through weaker private consumption. Now that we are in the midst of compiling the data on which to base our decision at the February meeting, it looks as though the new information received since December gives scope for a further slight downward adjustment to the forecast of domestic cost pressure. This is because it seems that labour market growth will be somewhat weaker than expected, and thereby also the rate of wage increases, and the fact that productivity growth during the first three quarters appears to have been somewhat more favourable than we had anticipated. The risk of contagion effects via energy prices also appears to have declined. However, as we said, we are in the midst of our forecasting work and not all of the information is complete as yet. Our monetary policy meeting will be held on 5 February and this is when the final decision on the repo rate will be made. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 7/2004
This is to do with the fact that it is general price levels that can be influenced by monetary policy, and not the prices of items such as meat or nails. This is also to do with the fact that the positive effects of stable monetary value manifest themselves precisely because the players in the economy can rely on purchasing power which is not undermined. At the same time the Riksbank has, in various contexts, maintained that there can be reasons for ignoring effects on inflation which are thought to be temporary. The reason for this is that it is not often possible to influence inflation quickly enough to counteract transitional price impulses without this leading to larger real disruptions. We have said, however, that we shall give as clear an account as possible of what the temporary effects are and how we deal with them. When examining the formulation of monetary policy in situations involving considerable pricemoderating effects, it can also be a good idea to give some reflection to the time perspective of monetary policy. One possibility is that the visible effects ebb away quickly, even though they occur beyond the normal policy horizon. In that case, presumably, one should be careful not to stimulate the economy too much. The opposite would apply if inflation were forced up strongly by some effect which could be expected to dissipate beyond the 2-year horizon. This is obviously a difficult question of judgement. Should a forecast change in prices be considered to be temporary or not?

Speeches 07 Jun 2022  Opening remarks at the Alliance for Green Commercial Banks Cornerstone Members Memorandum of Understanding Signing Ceremony Eddie Yue, Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority Distinguished guests and friends, 1. Good afternoon. It is my great pleasure to join you to celebrate another milestone of the Alliance for Green Commercial Banks. Today we are going to witness the signing of a memorandum of understanding that brings in five Cornerstone Members to the Alliance, welcome the on-boarding of four Global Partners and a Knowledge Partner, and publish the Alliance’s first thought leadership paper. 2. My special thanks to the IFC advisory team and the HKMA market outreach team for their hard work and close collaboration that brings out the biggest common denominator among various stakeholders. I would also like to personally thank the Cornerstone Members and Partners for their strong support and contribution throughout the engagement process. What we have achieved today is the product of collective efforts. 3. We at the HKMA feel privileged to have partnered with the IFC in launching the Asia chapter of the Alliance for Green Commercial Banks. This is an important joint commitment and undertaking to support financial institutions in Asia on their journey to become leading green institutions 4. Indeed Asia has the largest need for climate finance among the geographical regions. It is estimated that 66 trillion USD of climate investment is required for the region in the coming three decades.
The krona depreciated by around 15 per cent in a very short space of time during the financial crisis. What effects can this have on Sweden’s economy? The effects of the exchange rate on inflation One of the most important effects of changes in the exchange rate, and particularly important for a central bank with an inflation target, is how inflation is affected. We have seen that the nominal exchange rate of the krona depreciated by around 15 per cent over a short space of time in connection with the financial crisis. One way of trying to estimate how this affects inflation is to study pricing behaviour at company level. Let us assume that a company imports a product into Sweden. To make the example more concrete, let us assume that it imports cheese from France. When the krona weakens against the euro, the importing company has to decide how this will affect the price charged in kronor. Let us assume that the krona depreciates 15 per cent against the euro. The importing company probably has an agreement to buy the cheese for a particular price in euro. This means that the cheese will now cost the importer 15 per cent more in kronor. How much of this cost increase should then be passed on to the consumer price? In the long run, if the krona depreciation continues, the importer can perhaps negotiate a slightly lower purchase price in euro.

We in the Bank consider research as very important because it forms the basis upon which we formulate our policies and execute our operations. To underscore this point, the Bank of Zambia launched the BOZ Reader series a few years ago as a means of having articles of economic interest being published for the benefit of the Zambian public. The three publications of the BOZ Reader that have been published so far have largely contained articles prepared by BOZ members of staff. However, our intention has always been to have a wider network of contributors. With the signing of this agreement, we hope to see more economics related research being undertaken by faculty members in the Department of Economics on behalf of the Bank. We further urge the University of Zambia to be a key and keen contributor to the publications. The University of Zambia Economics Department should coordinate with our Economics Department on this matter. In addition to the research fund, the monthly salary supplementation for faculty members in the Economics Department has been adjusted up by 64%. Meanwhile, the Bank has continued to recognize academic excellence among economics students at UNZA. For this reason, the bank has been providing fully funded scholarships to five outstanding economics students at third and fourth year levels. This support is also expected to shift to postgraduate economics programmes as soon as the modalities are agreed between the two institutions.
Specifically, it is: “the uncouth idol of this deity at Puri in Orissa, annually dragged in procession on an enormous car”, crushing everything in its path. But Hindu or Muslim or whatever your faith, while one might consider Texans to on occasion be uncouth, there is no denying that our economy is an enormous job-creating car that enables and advances its devotees rather than crushing them. A job is the road to dignity and to the prosperity of any people, and Texas has become the most prosperous of states. Here is a graph depicting job growth in Texas versus the other large states that typically have drawn Indian and other investment and immigration:  For over two decades, we have outperformed the rest of the United States in job creation by a factor of more than 2 to 1. Over 23 years, only nine net new jobs have been created for every 100 that existed in New York in 1990, whereas in Texas, 66 jobs have been created. We have been especially prolific in creating jobs since the Great Recession waylaid the world at the end of 2007. Today, employment in Texas is 8.6 percent above its prerecession peak. The nation as a whole is 0.5 percent – zero point five percent – above its previous peak. However, if you take Texas out of the U.S. economy, statistically speaking, you see  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  that the U.S. ex-Texas still has not caught up to its prerecession employment levels.

Constantinos Herodotou: Introduction - 13th Limassol Economic Forum Introduction of Mr Constantinos Herodotou, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, at the 13th Limassol Economic Forum, Limassol, 21 October 2022. *** I would like to start with thanking Yiannis and Mario for accepting my invitation to participate in this panel discussion with me. – Mario, Obrigado por aceitar o meu convite. It is a pleasure to discuss the inflation challenges during these difficult times of high inflation and elevated economic uncertainty with my Governing Council colleagues and friends Mario and Yiannis. The war in Ukraine has disrupted the return to normality that we expected after the end of the pandemic lockdown periods. Central Banks around the world are facing the challenge to put under control excessive and persistent inflationary dynamics. So it is informative to look at the main components of these inflation dynamics, in other words which items drive inflation up the most. The war exacerbated massively cost push inflation, primarily through the energy price shock. In measuring energy inflation we include among others the prices of fuel, gas as well as electricity prices. This inflationary dynamic continues to persist with energy price pressures, in the most recent measure last month, being extraordinarily high at 40.7% compared to 38.6% in August. The second major contributor to inflation is food prices which grew by 11.8% in September compared with 10.6% in August. This is attributed to higher input costs related to the energy price increases, disruptions to trade in food commodities and adverse weather conditions.
When able to issue such assets, private issuers pay a very low interest rate, as others in the economy demand the apparent safety that those assets provide. That situation gives the private financial sector strong incentives to issue money-like claims. However, the excessive issuance of such instruments can lead, at some point, to a loss of confidence in them. In turn, that can reduce demand for these instruments and lead again to a rapid deleveraging by the issuers of these instruments. Much like the case that F.D.R. discussed for banks in the 1930s, the runs on these short-term debt instruments can lead to fire sales of assets by the institutions that were relying on the issuance of money-like instruments to finance their portfolios – and those sales cause distress for many others throughout the economy. Procyclical leverage of financial intermediaries In a series of papers, Tobias Adrian and coauthors have made a number of findings about the behavior of financial intermediaries, that is, banks, broker-dealers, and other financial companies, and how their leverage varies over time.

In fact, the crisis of 2007–09 was characterized by runs on all four of the money-like instruments I mentioned earlier, namely repo, asset-backed commercial paper, money market mutual fund shares, and auction-rate securities. Those runs can lead to selling off the loans or securities that were financed by the issuance of those instruments and also may initiate fire sales. A fire sale is caused when assets are sold at a time when many of the likely buyers of those assets do not have the capacity to purchase them, leading to severe downward price adjustments. These price movements create additional problems for other financial sector players, as the declining value of the securities that were sold often means that the value of the securities that they hold are also marked down, reducing their ability to obtain or retain financing to hold their portfolio of securities. This can lead to additional sales, worsening the fire sale conditions, in a negative feedback loop that amplifies the initial shock to the financial sector. The emphasis on fire sales when private intermediaries encounter difficulty rolling over their short-term debt is complemented by research that posits that the role of banks is to create and preserve liquidity of their money-like liabilities such as deposits, repos, and other short-term debt.11 In normal times, these instruments are very safe and it is believed by people and institutions that invest in them that no special monitoring of those instruments is needed.
However, the point is not to intervene to remedy problems of solvency resulting from wrong decisions regarding investment or resulting from insufficient capital. In this regard, a central bank is not in a position to deal with these problems, nor is it its job to. This is the responsibility of the political authorities. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, this has become clear in Europe. Only the heads of state and government, in their meeting in Paris prompted by President Sarkozy, were able to commit public funds to avoid several banks going under. The programme aimed at supporting banks’ capital and at guaranteeing bonds was a government initiative, even if the ECB made a technical contribution. And this is exactly how it should be. If something can be said to have gone wrong, it was with the implementation of the measures, not with the decision itself. The ECB has repeated its invitation to financial institutions many times to make full use of the state measures for increasing capitalisation in the banking system. If this doesn’t happen, there is a risk that the retroactive effect of the current recession on banks’ accounts will cause the banks ultimately to reduce their financing of the real sector, thereby further exacerbating the economic crisis. Evidently, there is not enough incentive for bank shareholders and bank managers to make use of such instruments, the shareholders out of fear that their shares will drop in value, and the managers for fear of operational and pay structure constraints.

A public fire service was introduced in Scotland in 1824 and in England in 1833.13 The Bank’s fire engines and firemen were stood down. This particular public good also arose, with a lag, from the destruction of 1666. From the ashes of the Great Fire emerged a new public infrastructure of laws, regulations and institutions. That supported a new private infrastructure of contracts, companies and services. And this mass flourishing created one of the world’s leading financial centres, a position London retains. The regeneration spawned by the Great Fire set the economy and society – as well as the Bank - on an entirely different course. Enlightenment Now? That is the story of fire. But it is a story repeated for most transformative innovation over the course of human history: a spark of imagination; a flame of creativity as an imagined future is made real; periodic destructive burn-outs; and an eventual mass flourishing.14 History tells us it is through this evolutionary process of creative destruction that economies grow and societies improve. But is the creative flame still burning? Prominent economists, such as Robert Gordon in the United States, have recently argued that the world may be, in Haldane’s terms, at risk of perishing for lack of wonder.15 This hypothesis has support, with falling returns on research and development spending. The low-hanging fruit of creative innovation may already have been picked, leaving slimmer pickings for future generations. These fears do need, though, to be set in some context.
The UK’s progress on resolvability Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking  At the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 26 February 2021  With thanks to Anika Duggal and Amy Lee for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Bank colleagues including Andrew Bailey, Adam Cull, Andrew Hewitt, Sasha Mills, Michael Salib, Ruth Smith, Tom Smith and Sam Woods for their many helpful comments and suggestions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Thank you for inviting me to come to speak at the virtual ICAEW. I can’t think of a better venue for my first speech on resolution – particularly because of the vital role which the accountancy profession plays in some of our key resolvability judgements and safeguards, which fundamentally underpin the credibility of the regime. The Bank of England is the UK’s Resolution Authority; within the Bank I took on Deputy Governor level responsibility for resolution a year ago. It has been a fascinating time for me to take on this important responsibility, allowing me to contribute to the ongoing shaping of our resolution regime as it develops towards its immediate goal. That goal, a strategic goal for the Bank, is ending ‘too big to fail’ by making sure the firms we supervise can fail in an orderly way no matter their size. Put more practically we committed to Parliament that major UK banks should be resolvable by 20221.

That goal is central to the PRA’s general objective to promote the safety and soundness of the firms we supervise, as well as to the Bank’s financial stability objective of ensuring that the UK financial system can serve UK households and businesses in bad times as well as good. I want to use my speech today to set out my thinking on where our resolution framework has got to as we move closer to our 2022 commitment, and convey three key messages relating to that commitment. First, that progress towards the commitment reflects a regime which is built on robust and coherent principles: credibility, transparency, flexibility and proportionality. Second, how we apply these principles to the operationalisation of our regime – specifically, through the Resolvability Assessment Framework which is key to ensuring our resolvability regime is ‘fit and ready’ – fit for purpose and ready for use: and where there have been some important developments this week which I want to update you on. And third, that resolvability is not a binary concept; even once the 2022 commitment is fulfilled the work doesn’t stop. 2022 will see us pass the important milestone for the resolvability of major banks – but the work to maintain and improve the resolvability of firms within the UK resolution regime will continue. Credibility and transparency in the making There are many previous milestones in the history of UK banks’ resolvability, or lack of it, very few of them positive.