samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the same time, I take this opportunity to reiterate that the incidence of the specific products in question on the final result of inflation is minor and does not alter the inflation outlook presented on this occasion or that we have presented in the past (figure 3). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The world economy has begun moving towards a more balanced configuration in many dimensions, including a narrowing of the growth gap between developed and emerging economies, the normalization of financial conditions and the prices of commodities. On the output side, the slowdown of emerging economies, partly offset by stronger growth of some developed ones, results in a downward revision to Chile’s main trading partners’ growth forecast by two and five tenths of one point in 2013 and 2014, respectively, as compared with our March Monetary Policy Report (table 1). In the developed world, the performance of the United States stands out. Its upturn has been accompanied by growing private consumption and a gradual recovery of real estate, with positive numbers from the labor market, credit growth and consumer confidence. Plus the momentum of investment in the energy sector that are pulling costs down. The Japanese economy grew strongly in the first quarter of the year and short-term prospects have risen in response to the current policies of fiscal and monetary stimulus, but the sustainability of this improvement is yet to be seen. The outlook for the Eurozone continues to point to a contraction this year.

These pages will also be registered under the name jy2kcouncil.org in the near future. BIS Review 56/1998  -6-  the four Sponsoring Organizations (almost 600 contacts in over 170 countries), asking for assistance in coordinating the development of their country page. This also provided a further opportunity to raise the awareness of the Year 2000 problem at the most senior levels of financial market authorities and supervisors in countries around the world. Through the effort to develop this web site and other similar efforts by the Joint Year 2000 Council, I believe we can succeed at keeping the awareness of the issue at a very high level within the global financial supervisory community. Efforts to Improve Preparedness Of course, awareness of the Year 2000 problem is only the first step in addressing it. Global efforts to prepare for Year 2000 vary widely, and many countries believe that more coordinated national action will be necessary to tackle the problem as effectively as possible. At our second meeting of the Joint Year 2000 Council, a strong consensus emerged that a national government body in each country could play a helpful role in coordinating preparations for Y2K. While the Council did not have a strong view on what particular form or what specific authority such a body would require in each specific country, the Council members felt strongly that involvement in some fashion by the national government could be beneficial.
One of the biggest misconceptions is on its usage. Waqf is to benefit all. While waqf land has traditionally been used to build mosques, cemeteries or tahfiz schools, nothing in the Quran or 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Hadith prohibits wider use of waqf to meet the needs of the community. In fact, there is no requirement for a waqif or donor and beneficiary of waqf to be a Muslim. There are instances from past Islamic civilisation where the use of waqf extended beyond those that were directly related to the religion and specific needs of the Muslims. Waqf land and buildings were used to build schools, hospitals and infrastructure to benefit both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The Al-Azhar University is an excellent example of a waqf asset. This makes a lot of sense. It is obvious that waqf should be prioritised to improve education and health, critical ingredients for social mobility and a productive workforce. There are an estimated 300 square kilometres of waqf land – the size of the main island of Langkawi – in the country, and unfortunately, most of this land remains undeveloped. Think about all the needs that can be met by developing this land – affordable housing, schools and universities, hospitals, sports facilities, research centres and industrial complexes. While I acknowledge the challenges in developing this land, including ownership and registration issues, as well as limitations in financial resources, these are surmountable.

Ravi Menon: Asia – no room for complacency Keynote address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Paris Europlace Financial Forum, Singapore, 30 November 2011. *  *  *  Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of Banque de France, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, Good morning. For those of you who are coming from abroad, a warm welcome to Singapore. Deleveraging out of a debt overhang Molière, a French playwright considered to be one of the greatest masters of comedy, once offered this sobering thought: “Debts are like children; begot with pleasure and brought forth in pain”. Today, the pain he described is palpitating throughout the world and keeping many leaders in government, business, and finance awake at night. The advanced economies are awash in debt. Governments, households, and banks must reduce leverage to restore economic and financial sustainability. But history tells us that deleveraging, while necessary, leads to a prolonged period of slower growth punctuated by increased financial market volatility. The gross government debt-to-GDP ratio is 80% in the UK and in the Eurozone, 100% in the United States, and 230% in Japan. Sovereign debt in aggregate is today at levels not seen since the Second World War. Financial markets, which had hitherto tolerated the build-up in debt, have turned merciless against the Eurozone economies, driving up sovereign spreads and dragging down the ratings of those who hold sovereign paper.
The budget consolidation, the  2  BIS Review ? ?/2001  Government’s expenditure ceiling and balance targets have strongly contributed to achieving credibility in the price stability objective. It is was first when the budget consolidation in the mid-1990s had come quite a long way and optimism on the Swedish economy began to return that inflation expectations showed that the price stability objective had attained credibility. The Riksbank did not then need to counteract high inflation expectations by monetary policy. The United States important for future growth Inflation has not just been kept down by the fact that there have been a lot of unused resources until now and that inflation expectations have stabilised at a low level – we have also been aided the pressure on prices from deregulations and increased competition. However, it is no longer probable that this process will pull down inflation to the same extent in future. Some dampening of the rate of growth in coming years is therefore probably necessary if we are to avoid tendencies to overheating. This dampening can be achieved either by a more stringent monetary policy or by the economy dampening by itself. It now looks as if a slackening of the cycle is on its way led by developments in the United States. However, the strength and duration of this downturn is uncertain and depends among other things on future cyclical development in the United States and the effect that this has in Europe and Sweden.

For us as emerging country, with foreign bank presence, the global financial regulatory reforms also pose challenges, as they can possibly stimulate deleveraging, reduce access to financing and financing flows to the private sector. At the end, let me also avail myself of this opportunity to emphasize yet again our continuous efforts to align with the EU requirements in all areas of operation, especially the banking regulation and statistics, notwithstanding the efforts and the progress done in all other fields. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
In this example, given that the repo rate is left unchanged, it is assumed to lead to the inflation rate two years ahead being 1 per cent instead of 2 per cent. In this example we assume that the repo rate is reduced by 2 percentage points (in practice the Riksbank might prefer to proceed in steps because of uncertainties in the forecast but here a large cut is made immediately). The interest rate reduction counters the economic slowdown and UND1X inflation returns to the target two years ahead. A repo rate cut, however, lowers house mortgage interest expenditure and this has an immediate and opposite effect on the CPI. The effect is larger and shows up earlier than the impact on inflation from the economic slowdown. In the short run, the effect via interest expenditure accordingly smothers the effect from economic activity and there is therefore a sharp initial fall in CPI inflation. In this example, the falling interest rates are assumed to lower the rate of CPI inflation by 1.2 percentage points in the first year and 0.4 percentage points in the second.2 It is only after that, in up to three years time, that both CPI and UND1X inflation are back on target. The example shows that in retrospect, the Riksbank will turn out to be below the target for CPI inflation. This is a consequence of the Riksbank’s ambition to counter the shock from the international economic slowdown and thereby prevent inflation from falling further ahead.

Note, however, that inflation measured with UND1X is not affected; the rate remains stable around 2 per cent throughout the period. Neither are any monetary policy measures taken in this example, as long as inflation expectations do not change. The reason is that by the time a repo rate cut would elicit effects, the tax changes would no longer be affecting the inflation rate. This is evident from the absence of any effect on underlying inflation. Initially, moreover, the interest expenditure item in the CPI would move in the ‘wrong’ direction and lower CPI inflation even more. If medium-term inflation expectations were to be influenced, on the other hand, monetary policy action might be called for. An adjustment of expectations in the light of the tax change has consequences for underlying inflation, so that inflation may be below the target somewhat further ahead. 7  BIS Review 61/1999  9. Permanent and transitory inflation A schematic account Initial position Economic development stable, underlying inflation UNDINHX - in line with the target. 4  3 UNDINHX  Good coffee harvest and increased supply of oil. These commodities’ prices fall sharply in July year 0 and are then stable at the new, lower level. •CPI-inflation is lowered for a period of twelve months and so is UND1X. •But underlying inflation measured with UNDINHX remains stable.
23  These results are obtained from a regression analysis conducted at the Banco de España using information from more than one24 hundred individual banks in the euro area. Huennekes, F., and P. Köhler-Ulbrich (2023). “Box 7 What information does the euro area bank lending survey provide on future loan developments?”, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 8/2022. 8  and credit terms and conditions for loans to firms in the fourth quarter of 2022. This was the largest tightening reported since the euro area sovereign debt crisis. And banks expected a net tightening of a similar magnitude also for the first quarter of 2023 and reported a continued tightening of credit standards for loans to households. The evidence available shows a strong correlation between credit standards (as measured in the BLS) and loan growth developments a couple of quarters later, and likewise between credit growth and GDP growth.24 The first link in the chain (between credit standards and credit growth) is already evident. In particular, credit growth to firms has dropped markedly since the third quarter of last year. And, indeed, there is evidence of mortgage credit growth decelerating at a faster pace in those countries with initially larger house price overvaluations25.We should expect to see the latter link to real activity assert itself soon. In fact, although euro area activity avoided contraction in the last quarter of 2022, national accounts data have revealed notable weakness in domestic demand, with marked declines in both private consumption and investment.

More importantly, deepening the offshore RMB liquidity pool will enhance market efficiency and underpin the growth of offshore RMB activities, strengthening Hong Kong’s development as a leading offshore RMB hub and its unique role in the internationalisation of the RMB. 7. There have also been significant developments in the internationalisation of the RMB as well: The establishment of an RMB Liquidity Arrangement by the People’s Bank of China and the Bank for International Settlements, announced in June, will provide support to participating central banks in times of market fluctuation. The HKMA is pleased to join the initial group of participating central banks in the Asia-Pacific region. The inclusion of Chinese Government Bonds in FTSE Russell’s World Government Bond Index is testimony to the acceleration in the international use of the RMB. The increased prominence of the RMB in international trade and foreign currency reserves was underlined in May when the International Monetary Fund increased the RMB’s weighting in its Special Drawing Rights basket from 10.92% to 12.28%, the first time the weighting has been reviewed since the RMB was added to the basket in 2016. Opportunities ahead – development strategy 8. The liberalisation of the Mainland capital markets in recent years has resulted in rapid growth in cross-boundary capital flows. Hong Kong’s mutual market access schemes with the Mainland, like Stock Connect, Bond Connect and now ETF Connect, have further catalysed this process by encouraging greater portfolio investment into the Mainland. 9.
In the current circumstance, the Federal Reserve’s liquidity programs act on the asset side of the balance sheet as the Fed lends funds against less liquid collateral and expands its asset holdings via purchases of agency debt, agency MBS and Treasuries. The goals are to slow down the pace of deleveraging to reduce the risk of catastrophic failure, improve market function and ease financial market conditions. In contrast, the Bank of Japan worked on the liability side of the balance. Their goal was to expand the amount of excess reserves held by the banking system so that the banks would be more willing to expand their credit provisions. Although the Fed’s activities have led to a big jump in excess reserves, this increase is incidental – a byproduct rather than goal of the asset-oriented programs. Second, as a consequence of this my point, the size of the balance sheet, is not a good metric for measuring the impact of the Fed’s facilities or the amount of stimulus that the Fed is providing via these programs. For example, consider the impact of the Fed facilities on rollover risk. A Fed facility that eliminates rollover risk might not be used at all. There might be no balance sheet impact. Nevertheless, the facility could have an important impact on market function and financial market conditions. It is not possible to mechanically map the size of the balance sheet back onto the impact on financial market conditions.

William C Dudley: The Federal Reserve's liquidity facilities Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Vanderbilt University Conference on Financial Markets and Financial Policy Honoring Dewey Daane, Nashville, Tennessee, 18 April 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for having me here today. It is a great honor to be on a panel with Peter Fisher and Bill Poole. I am the neophyte here in terms of central banking experience! Before I begin, let me emphasize that my comments represent my own views and opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Open Market Committee or of the Federal Reserve System. I am going to talk today about the Fed’s provision of liquidity to banks and dealers and to market participants more generally. I would break down our actions into three broad classes. First, we addressed the acute seizing up of inter-bank financing markets. For banks, we introduced the Term Auction Facility in December 2007 and for the primary dealers, the Term Securities Lending Facility and Primary Dealer Credit Facility in March 2008. In addition, the Federal Reserve entered into FX swap agreements with major global central banks in order to channel dollar liquidity to banks overseas. Second, we expanded our provision of short term financing beyond banks and dealers in order to alleviate constraints on highly rated corporate borrowers.
These are in substance collective investments for which rules on public offerings and disclosure should apply. 39 One reason why consumers venture into unconventional and often risky products is that simple, lower cost products not easily available. MAS working to address this. 40 Following FAIR recommendation, MAS will introduce a direct channel through which consumers can purchase insurance products that focus on meeting their protection needs. Such products will be cheaper as consumers do not need to pay for distribution costs. The features of these products will also be largely standardised, making them easier to understand and compare across products. 41 By early next year, consumers who do not require financial advice will be able to purchase term and whole life insurance products, directly from insurers. MAS will be announcing details on this by the end of the month. 42 MAS is also working to facilitate better access to fixed income products. We are seeing growing retail investor interest in fixed income products, e.g. plain vanilla corporate bonds. While the risk-return profiles of such fixed income products are easier to understand they are not readily available to retail investors. 43 MAS reviewing how retail access to fixed income products can be improved. We are looking at how disclosure requirements can be streamlined for issuers satisfying certain criteria such as issuances of a certain size or with a track record. The idea is to make it easier for issuers to offer bonds to retail investors while maintaining sufficient safeguards.

The Banking Law that was enacted by Parliament in the summer of 1999, and the amendments made during the last month, were aimed at giving the banking system the necessary efficiency and soundness. In conclusion, let me summarise recent history. We have been working on this program for the past two years. Its technical excellence accurately reflects well the effort that has gone into it. I do not hesitate to say that the program is “comprehensive”, “strong”, “ambitious”, “bold” and “imaginative”, and most of all “achievable”. The willingness of the political authorities to execute this program is clear from the way they have taken the necessary but politically difficult economic decisions: quickly, without hesitation or second thoughts. The IMF and the World Bank have strongly endorsed the program, the former by approving for Turkey a three-year standby arrangement, and the latter by extending project credit. The prospect of membership negotiations with the European Union pursuant to the Helsinki decision provides an additional strong incentive to implement the program forcefully. There is a strong autonomous ownership of the program. The Government, the Parliament, policymakers, and the social partners all understand the great rewards, particularly in terms of reduced interest costs and stable growth, that will follow the program’s successful implementation. The markets’ reactions to the program have also been very positive. Interest rate declined from 100% last October to the 30s recently.
In the normal case, a well-balanced monetary policy means that the inflation forecast is close to the inflation target a couple of years ahead at the same time as the forecast for inflation and the real economy (production, employment and unemployment) does not fluctuate excessively. It thus a question of finding an appropriate balance between stabilising inflation and stabilising the real economy and resource utilisation. The Riksbank therefore conducts what is generally referred to as flexible inflation targeting. One might think that it should be enough to simply compare the outcome for inflation with the inflation target when assessing monetary policy. But it is not that simple, for two reasons. The first is that it takes time for changes in the repo rate to have an effect on inflation and the real economy. During this period of time, shocks may occur that can push the economy in a different direction than was forecast. The monetary policy adopted may have been right, but the Riksbank is unlucky and unforeseen shocks lead to inflation deviating from the target. BIS Review 32/2010  1  The monetary policy adopted may have been wrong, but the Riksbank is lucky and unforeseen shocks nevertheless lead to inflation hitting the target. The second is that flexible inflation targeting means that the Riksbank strives not only to stabilise inflation around the inflation target but also to stabilise resource utilisation around a normal level. This can sometimes entail a difficult balancing act.

BIS Review 32/2010  A box in the material for assessing monetary policy in 2009 describes a method for summarising the information in the alternative forecasts. This method uses an easily-grasped measure, a so-called mean squared gap, of how effectively an interest rate path can stabilise inflation around the inflation target and resource utilisation around a normal level. 6 Allow me to illustrate the method by using an example from the Monetary Policy Report published in October 2009, in which a box presented the method. Figure 6 shows the forecast development of inflation measured in terms of the CPIF and resource utilisation measured in terms of the output gap for the various repo-rate paths discussed in the Monetary Policy Report of October 2009. The various repo-rate paths are shown in Figure 6.a. The path in the middle is that of the main scenario, the repo rate path that the majority of the Executive Board chose at the meeting in October. The lower path is the one I advocated. Figure 6.b shows the forecasts for CPIF inflation that each repo-rate path was expected to give rise to. 7 The output gap, which is shown in Figure 6.d, is calculated in the same way as in the figures I presented earlier. Figure 6.c shows the mean squared gap. A lower mean squared gap for inflation entails a better acquisition of the inflation target; that is a better stabilisation of inflation around the inflation target.