samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A predictable monetary policy, focused on a clearly defined inflation target, provides good guidance for wage negotiations. One of the main reasons why wage formation did not function satisfactorily during most of the 1980s was probably that stabilisation policy did not work. Inflation exceeded the official target on several occasions in that period and the labour market organisations had difficulty in discerning the rules of the game. One example of this is the government ambition of bringing inflation down in the mid-1980s: a crisis package was presented in 1983, aimed at inflation rates of 4% in 1994 and 3% in 1995; when inflation exceeded these targets, the employee organisations considered that a 5% ceiling on wage increases was no longer acceptable. Today’s confidence in the Riksbank’s current inflation target facilitates wage negotiations. The 1997 wage round, for instance, took the 2% inflation target as a starting point. The development of wages is always a central factor in inflation assessments, but the difficulties involved in forecasting wages are considerable. The indicators used by the Riksbank include data on wages and unit labour costs, shortage figures (bottlenecks) at industry level, wage drift and unemployment relative to unfilled job vacancies. Another factor of importance for monetary policy is the equilibrium level of unemployment, that is, the level of unemployment that is compatible with stable inflation. Attempts to push unemployment down below the equilibrium level with the aid of monetary stimuli are liable to just boost inflation. Maintaining an expansionary monetary stance cannot therefore generate permanently higher employment.

The Fund did encourage longer term investment into unit trusts and kick started the ETF market on the HKEx and elsewhere in Asia, where we now have a variety of ETFs covering a wide range of asset classes. The result has been the provision of more choice to investors, both retail and institutional, at lower cost than traditional unit trusts. As we enjoy our 10th anniversary celebration, I cannot help but wonder if the exit strategies currently on drawing boards around the world will be as successful as we were? Only time will tell. I wish you all a very pleasant day and once again many thanks to State Street for organizing this celebration. 2  BIS Review 142/2009
Supply and demand for funds, in turn, are determined by fundamental economic factors such as the time preference of households to consume today relative to consuming tomorrow, as well as the productivity of capital and demographic factors which determine future growth prospects. To arrive at market-quoted nominal interest rates, one must add to the real rate an inflation premium, which compensates the investor for the potential loss in the purchasing power of money over the term of the security. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  So, to shed light on the movement towards lower nominal interest rates since the 1980s, let us examine how these two components – the real interest rate and the inflation premium – have changed over that period. A secular downward shift A considerable part of the secular decline in nominal rates is the result of lower and more stable inflation rates in advanced economies, translating into reduced inflation expectations and a lower inflation premium (chart 2). Reduced volatility of inflation rates since the mid1980s – a development associated with the “Great Moderation” – has probably contributed to this.1 This reduction in the inflation premium and in volatility can, at least partly, be attributed to the success of central banks’ policies and their credible commitment to low and stable inflation, a commitment which has become the hallmark of modern central banking.

A lot of our exports are in sectors which have a large carbon footprint and will be susceptible to policy measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism currently being put in place by the European Union (EU), as part of the EU green deal. So, what role can sustainable banking play in taking Thailand from where it is today to where it needs to be in terms of reducing its vulnerability to climate change? Banks in Thailand can play an important role in getting us to where we need to go. Banks play the predominant role in channeling credit to the private sector. Over 90 percent of private credit comes from the banking sector. So, banks will need to increasingly incorporate sustainability considerations into their lending decisions and increasingly need to improve disclosure on climate-related information. They will also need to improve their risk assessment tools. For all these to work, there needs to be a very clear tone from the top from these institutions. There has been progress to date. The Thai banking sector, including the Thai Bankers’ Association and the Association of International Banks in Thailand, have developed and adopted Sustainable Banking Guidelines in 2019. We have seen concrete steps taken by Thai Banks to incorporate sustainability into their business strategy. We have seen them setting up clear governance structure on sustainability issues such as dedicated sustainability committees, developing risk assessment tools, and disclosing ESG-related information.
In November, the Leaders will, at their Summit in Singapore, issue a legally-binding blueprint to implement the ASEAN Economic Community. ASEAN will eventually evolve into a single market with free flow of goods, services, investment and talent. For investors, an integrated market of half a billion people will be an attractive investment proposition. For financial institutions, it will mean more projects to finance and more wealth to manage. ASEAN’s combined GDP of $ is larger than most economies. It is, in fact, bigger than India’s $ and more that a third of China’s $ In addition, the ASEAN Economic Community will boost the region’s GDP by 10%. To benefit from the growth of China and India, ASEAN is negotiating FTAs with these two giants. They are targeted for completion by 2010 and 2011 respectively. Besides China and India, ASEAN is also enhancing links with other economic centres. ASEAN signed a regional Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement (TIFA) with the US last August. It is negotiating FTAs with Japan, South Korea and Australia and New Zealand. And in May, ASEAN and the European Union decided to launch FTA talks. Political coalescence At the political level, Asia is also coalescing. However, political coalescence is progressing more slowly than economic integration. And it will be far less defined and institutionalised than what we see in the EU. Compared to Europe, Asia is more diverse politically and culturally. There are complexities and practical difficulties. However, the basic direction has been set.

Birgir Ísl Gunnarsson: The policy and objectives of the Central Bank of Iceland Article by Mr Birgir Ísl Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, published in the Morgunbladid Newspaper, in Reykjavík, 28 February 2003. *  *  *  When the Central Bank of Iceland became an independent institution in 1961 it was generally believed, both here in Iceland and abroad, that several different simultaneous objectives could be set for central banks. Low inflation, full employment and strong economic growth were among the objectives that people felt central banks should be able to achieve. Gradually it became clear that this would not work. In the work of a central bank, these objectives can come into conflict with one another, resulting in an economic fiasco. As a result, in recent years legislation on central banks has been altered in many countries and the banks assigned one principal objective: ensuring price stability. Inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, persistent inflation being the result of insufficient restraint in monetary policy. In the long term, monetary policy thus has an impact on price levels but less on economic growth and employment. With free movement of capital between countries, the principal instrument of a Central Bank is interest rates; in the long run this instrument can only achieve one macroeconomic objective, i.e. to ensure price stability.
Doubtless the Framework will continue to evolve in future, but the provision of such published facilities should help to make the system more resilient in the years to come. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

The financial crisis, and the associated expansion of the balance sheet to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system, was a true “game changer” for the Bank of England: the Sterling Monetary Framework has been almost completely redesigned over the past few years. The increased demand for liquidity insurance necessitated a large and rapid expansion in the scale of lending and the range of collateral the Bank took in its operations. 3  Further details are available in the Bank’s 2010 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/quarterlybulletin/qb100201.pdf  4  These operations were suspended when large-scale asset purchases commenced in March 2009. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the Autumn of 2007, the Bank extended the range of collateral acceptable in its LTRs (henceforth eLTRs) and increased their size somewhat. In April 2008, in the wake of Bear Stearns’ failure, the Bank introduced the SLS. Through that scheme, the Bank eventually lent £ of 9-month T-bills against a wide range of private-sector collateral – mostly UK RMBS backed by legacy mortgages – for up to 3 years. Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the Bank further extended the collateral allowed in eLTRs and initiated a massive expansion in its lending at the 3 month maturity, eventually peaking at £ in early 2009. In October 2008, the Bank also introduced a permanent Discount Window Facility (DWF), which can provide liquidity to counterparties on a bilateral basis against a wide range of collateral, ranging from US treasuries and German bunds to self-originated ABS.
Maintaining financial stability and trust are central to MAS’ mission. The annual report summarises our many regulatory and supervisory initiatives – to make derivatives markets safer, to enhance cyber security, to promote a good risk culture in our financial institutions. The annual report also devotes two pages of infographics to the enforcement actions MAS has taken against those who breach our regulations or fail to meet our standards. MAS does not tolerate: abuse of our financial system for money laundering or tax evasion; misconduct or manipulation in our securities markets; or mis-selling to consumers who place their trust and money in our financial institutions and their representatives. But being a no-nonsense regulator does not stand in the way of being also businessfriendly. For financial institutions who want to grow their business in Singapore, build up the skills of their employees, or want to innovate or experiment with new technologies, MAS is a happy partner and collaborator. 1 “The Goldilocks Economy – Will the Three Bears Return?”, Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director,  Monetary Authority of Singapore, at UBS Wealth Insights Conference, 15 January 2018. 11 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches

In the past, it has been very difficult for the Federal Reserve to engineer a soft landing for the economy when it had to tighten policy aggressively in order to keep inflation in check. Historically, once the unemployment rate rises above a small threshold of 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points, the next stop has always been a full-blown recession. I very much would want to avoid such an outcome. A long-lived economic expansion is always desirable, but especially so in the aftermath of the financial crisis and Great Recession. The second risk of delaying lift-off and normalizing more slowly is that the low level of the federal funds rate may be distorting financial markets and increasing financial stability risks. I don’t think this has yet occurred to any significant degree, but it is a real risk that we should continue to monitor closely. I see the risks right now of moving too quickly versus moving too slowly as nearly balanced. The weight that one puts on each undoubtedly influences one’s views on when the time will  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  be right to begin to normalize monetary policy and the appropriate short-term rate trajectory thereafter. Finally, in conclusion, a few words about the importance of financial conditions in thinking about the future path of short-term interest rates. Monetary policy does not work directly on the economy, but instead works through its effect on financial conditions. By financial conditions, I mean all those financial factors that weigh on spending, saving and borrowing decisions.
Accordingly, the Central Bank is obliged to aim towards an annual rate of inflation which, measured in terms of the increase in the Consumer Price Index over a twelve-month period, should generally be as close as possible to 2½%. Inflation targeting was introduced in a climate where the economy was severely overheating. For this reason an adjustment period was set for the Central Bank, whereby it should aim to attain the inflation target by no later than the end of 2003. We have reason to celebrate the fact that inflation had already reached the set target by November 2002. In 1996 a period of robust economic growth began in Iceland which did not come to an end until 2002. GDP growth in 2001 is estimated at 2.9%, which is more than in most industrialised countries that year. This growth phase ended with severe overheating of the economy. Among the forms this took was a current account deficit in excess of 10% of GDP in 2000 and twelve-month inflation which peaked in the beginning of 2002 at 9.4%. In 2002, a sharp turnaround took place in the Icelandic economy, under the strong influence of the Central Bank’s tight monetary stance. A small surplus was shown on the trade account and better external balance put the exchange rate of the króna on a surer footing. The króna appreciated substantially during the year after sharp depreciation in 2001, when it most likely dropped considerably below the equilibrium exchange rate.

In 2002, the Central Bank put forward proposals for the development of the securities settlement system which is operated on the basis of an agreement between the Central Bank, Central Securities Depository and Iceland Stock Exchange. Proposals included clarification of rules for the system’s operations, introduction of risk management, and expediting of payment orders from the Depository to the Central Bank and netting of them, so that credit institutions can be notified of their securities trading positions in order to prepare settlements which are made the following morning. Following amendments made to the Public Limited Companies Act in 2002, requests were made for securities settlements to be allowed in foreign currencies. The Central Bank has participated in examining the possibilities of developing a settlement system for securities in foreign currencies, in collaboration with the Central Securities Depository, Iceland Stock Exchange and the commercial banks. Such a system would clearly pose new settlement risks. It would presumably be an option in this respect to establish a system which would be entirely operated by Icelandic commercial banks. In all the work described here, the Central Bank has had a very good collaboration with financial institutions and other parties involved, and I would like to express my thanks for the close cooperation and good understanding that has been achieved among all the parties to this work. A number of important changes have occurred since the Central Bank published its last macroeconomic forecast in February.
Such is the case, for instance, with leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) and the socalled monolines, which specialise, as you know, in insuring the payment of numerous bonds, including those linked to the securitisation of US subprime mortgages. In these circumstances it is easy to understand why the profits reported by Spanish banks in 2007 have scarcely been affected by the financial turbulence and have continued to increase at a rate of around 19%, firmly underpinned by their improved efficiency ratios. Their profitability, both in terms of assets and in relation to capital, also grew compared with 2006. Indeed, the ROE stood at almost 20%. Profitability is obviously the first line of defence for Spanish banks against any adverse shock. But their resilience is also based on two other pillars: a significant volume of provisions, accumulated by the system during the period of strong credit growth thanks to the prudential mechanisms set in place by the Banco de España in the past; and a comfortable solvency position. To quantify these two aspects, loan loss provisions widely exceed doubtful assets, while the system’s solvency ratio, measured in accordance with the Basel regulatory standards, is 11.4%, 3.4 percentage points higher than required. These factors mean that Spanish credit institutions face the current situation from a position of soundness which, in the international context, is fairly unique. Soundness however is not a synonym for immunity and it would be imprudent, and not befitting a supervisor, to fail to consider thoroughly the potential risks.

But, the stress tests we have performed at the Banco de España to calibrate the potential scale of this risk for banks show, broadly speaking, that the policy followed in recent years of accumulating  4  BIS Review 44/2008  provisions and capital has given rise to a buffer that would enable shocks of an order of magnitude comparable to those experienced at the height of the crisis in the 90s to be absorbed. I now come to what I consider to be the main source of uncertainty at the present moment. This is none other than future developments on the international wholesale financing markets, where the possibilities of raising funds have been at extraordinarily restricted levels that are not in keeping with a developed international financial system. Spanish banks have so far largely managed to evade the consequences of this sudden financial market squeeze. Firstly, because their liabilities were issued at relatively long maturities, so that the need to refinance the loans granted is arising much more smoothly than in other systems in which the relative weight of short-term securities is greater. The low level of dependence on funds raised in the interbank deposit markets has been another mitigating factor. I should point out here that once the subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks have been excluded, whose liquidity management is strongly governed by the geographical diversification strategies decided by their parents, the rest of the Spanish credit system does not borrow in these markets but instead maintains a net credit position in them.
Public debt is of a somewhat different nature: we do not know if nor when the tragedy – a major confidence shock, for instance – may happen. But we know for sure that rising public debt is a growing risk hanging over us, and still more over our children and grandchildren. Let us therefore call it a “tragedy on the horizon”: a moving horizon – indeed nobody knows precisely where geographically the horizon lies –, but it will not be any less threatening. So what would our best response to this possible tragedy on the horizon be ? And what can we do to avoid it? Let me elaborate somewhat on a simple triptych (i) Monetary Policy (ii) Fiscal Policy and (iii) their renewed interactions. I. Monetary policy and the ECB mandate In order to address this unprecedented Covid crisis, the ECB acted boldly and rapidly, using all the tools at our disposal and inventing new ones such as the PEPP. By doing so, we successfully avoided both fragmentation and deflation. We rightly decided to keep a steady hand in the last Governing Council meeting, and I still think today that our present very accommodative monetary stance is appropriate. But steady hands are not tied hands: we have free hands for the future, and will be ready to act further if needed. Let me now turn to the ECB’s strategic review, on which work has restarted.

Thomas Jordan: Review of the Swiss economy and global economic outlook Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 13 December 2012. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank (SNB) is leaving the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro unchanged. The Swiss franc is still high. An appreciation of the Swiss franc would compromise price stability and would have serious consequences for the Swiss economy. Consequently, the SNB will continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination. It is prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. In addition, the SNB is leaving the target range for the three-month Libor at 0.0–0.25%. If necessary, it stands ready to take further measures at any time. Essentially, the SNB’s conditional inflation forecast is unchanged from its September forecast. In the short term, price movements will again be subdued by a somewhat weaker economy in the euro area. In addition, the impact which past appreciation of the Swiss franc is having on the price level is rather stronger than had originally been expected. From mid-2013 onwards, the path of the new conditional inflation forecast is almost identical to that of September. The forecast is based on an unchanged three-month Libor of 0.0% over the next three years. Given this assumption, the Swiss franc weakens over the forecast period. Nevertheless, forecast inflation remains low for the next few years.