samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With the new amendments of the regulation, the requirement for holding portion of the foreign exchange deposits collected by the banks on their accounts abroad was reduced. This measure is expected to have positive effect on the banks' credit supply in the economy. Monetary Policy in 2001 Monetary policy projection for 2001 has been defined in the macroeconomic policy package incorporated in the arrangement with the International Monetary Fund. Primarily, the 2001 monetary policy will be directed towards preservation of stable macroeconomic environment, as a precondition for achieving long-term sustainable economic growth. The projected economic growth will be supported through the adequate money and credits supply, simultaneously designing the monetary policy in a manner that will not endanger the price stability. Monetary Strategy In 2001, the NBRM will continue implementing the monetary strategy of targeting the exchange rate, thus remaining a nominal anchor in the Macedonian economy. Thus, in 2001, the nominal exchange rate of the Denar against the Deutsche Mark will also be preserved at the targeted level of Denar 31 per one Deutsche Mark. The preservation of the stable Denar exchange rate, as an intermediate goal, will be directed towards achieving the ultimate objective of the monetary policy – the price stability. In addition, the annual inflation rate measured through the costs of living index, is projected to equal 1.2% (December 2001 / December 2000).

Table 3: Results for regressions of non-performing loans as % of total loans on the Regulatory-Supervisory Independence Index  Regulatory-Supervisory Independence Index  (1) (a)  (2) (a)  -1.194 ***  -1.300 **  (0.405)  (0.495)  Regulatory-Supervisory Independence Index  -0.970 **  lagged by one year  (0.322)  Observations  29,782  28,002  Adjusted R2  0.227  0.245  (a) The regression equation includes bank fixed effects, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors, which are clustered at the country level, are reported in parentheses. The results are robust under different specifications, including using a set of bank-specific control variables (total assets, z-score, cost-to-income ratio, efficiency ratio, total debt, total liabilities, total gross loans) and country-specific GDP growth. This association is there even as the set of control variables in the regression is varied. The association is also persistent: the coefficient on the reforms lagged by one year is similar in magnitude and statistical significance. The association is also economically significant. A reform that increases the index in a given year is associated with a 1.3 percentage point reduction in the rate non-performing loans and a 0.97 percentage point reduction in the subsequent year, all else equal. These results are consistent with what other papers have found. Dincer and Eichengreen (2012) find that lower non-performing loans relative to GDP in countries in which the supervisor is independent of the government.
Its key conclusions were: 1) when closing a multinational bank, supervisors should pay attention to the nature and timing of communications among themselves and of their communications with creditors, shareholders and management; 2) the nature of liquidation rules may be relevant to the manner in which multinational banks are supervised; 3) differences in liquidation rules across jurisdictions in a windingup can affect returns to depositors and other creditors and the operations of deposit protection schemes; and 4) coordination and cooperation between liquidators can affect the returns to creditors in a liquidation and can be affected by the role of supervisors in a liquidation. BIS Review 83/2009  7  adopted the Credit Institutions Reorganisation and Winding-Up Directive, albeit after quite a delay in 2001, under which a single-entity regime was introduced for the resolution of any bank incorporated in the EEA, applying to the parent bank and also to all its branches throughout the EEA. A little less than a decade after the BCBS’s report on the lessons from BCCI, the FSF/G10/BCBS produced a joint report on the orderly wind down of large and complex financial institutions. It was a good report. It called for a range of things, including Factbooks on key firms; contingency funding plans; wider crisis management plans; and so on. Perhaps most important, it underlined that, at that time, no one really knew how to wind down an LCFI. Quite a conclusion. A good one. It is a pity that the report wasn’t published.

5 In either circumstance, the Bank will need information on the bank’s liquidity position and planning, and a lot of detailed information on the collateral it would be offering. I therefore urge the BBA’s members to send the Bank (as well as, of course, the FSA) your Contingency Funding Plans; and, secondly, to pre-position collateral with us for the DWF. Overall, we need to engage together constructively on what information the authorities need in order to handle incipient or actual distress. 5  Paragraph 14 of the Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority says: "In exceptional circumstances, there may be a need for an operation which goes beyond the Bank's published framework for operations in the money market. Such a support operation is expected to happen very rarely and would normally only be undertaken in the case of a genuine threat to the stability of the financial system to avoid a serious disturbance in the UK economy." BIS Review 83/2009  5  Orderly wind down: writing “wills” There is a broader issue lurking in the background here, and in today’s environment we can and must address it openly. Last Friday, in the Bank’s latest Financial Stability Report, we emphasised the importance going forward of enhancing market discipline, notably through much better disclosures.
Meeting these challenges has not been straightforward in recent years as the euro area economy was hit by several shocks: financial instability in the aftermath of the stock market  6  BIS Review 113/2007  collapse in 2000, exceptionally high economic and geopolitical uncertainty between 2001 and 2003, just to name a few. -  First of all, we have to identify and account for temporary “special factors” or “distortions” that may affect monetary developments and blur their information content. To some extent it is the aim of the methodology developed at the ECB which allows for periodic adjustments to measured monetary aggregates in order to account for portfolio shifts which impact the demand for money without any incidence on future inflation. This approach has met with great success in the period 2000-2004, allowing the Eurosystem to enter an easing cycle despite a rapid growth of M3. -  Second, and more permanently, it is necessary to disentangle, in monetary and credit evolutions, those which reflect structural and permanent changes from those which simply result from moves in the level of interest rates and the position in the economic cycle. -  Finally, we must be able to assess whether these developments result from money supply shocks, in which case they clearly entail some risks to price stability, or whether they are caused by money demand shocks that may raise the desired level of money balances without necessarily impacting aggregate demand.

Growth dispersion is a natural phenomenon in any large economic area. Looking at the main trend, the degree of dispersion in real GDP growth rates across 12 euro area countries declined somewhat since 1999, reaching 1.5 percentage points in 2005, while for the largest countries it has remained close to 1 p.p. Let me recall that growth dispersion had been fluctuating around 2% since the 1970s. By comparison, the dispersion of real growth rates across the eight US statistical regions fluctuated around an average of 1.5 % between 1990 and 2002. This is not surprising since some stabilisation channels are at work in a currency area: in particular, a credible monetary policy should bring about a convergence of expected inflation towards the definition of price stability, leading progressively to the convergence of ex ante real rates across the area; moreover, lower inflation relative to other trading partners increases price competitiveness, which in turn counteracts the initial effect of higher real interest rates. 3. Appropriateness of the monetary policy stance  Has the monetary policy stance been appropriate? To try answering that delicate question, the literature of central bank watchers or observers has mainly focused on Taylor-type rules as a usual benchmark. Despite numerous caveats, such an approach can be very informative as it addresses several relevant issues such as: is the monetary policy decision process rule-based or rather discretionary? To what extent is the central bank too focused on price stability at the expense of, say, growth and employment?
A lot of our exports are in sectors which have a large carbon footprint and will be susceptible to policy measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism currently being put in place by the European Union (EU), as part of the EU green deal. So, what role can sustainable banking play in taking Thailand from where it is today to where it needs to be in terms of reducing its vulnerability to climate change? Banks in Thailand can play an important role in getting us to where we need to go. Banks play the predominant role in channeling credit to the private sector. Over 90 percent of private credit comes from the banking sector. So, banks will need to increasingly incorporate sustainability considerations into their lending decisions and increasingly need to improve disclosure on climate-related information. They will also need to improve their risk assessment tools. For all these to work, there needs to be a very clear tone from the top from these institutions. There has been progress to date. The Thai banking sector, including the Thai Bankers’ Association and the Association of International Banks in Thailand, have developed and adopted Sustainable Banking Guidelines in 2019. We have seen concrete steps taken by Thai Banks to incorporate sustainability into their business strategy. We have seen them setting up clear governance structure on sustainability issues such as dedicated sustainability committees, developing risk assessment tools, and disclosing ESG-related information.

This reasoning even led some governments to adopt policies with a bias to promote manufacturing in the belief that this would be the route to more rapid overall growth, although this seemed to ignore the demand side – that the public would become saturated with goods and increasingly desire to consume services. I don't know whether any of the protagonists of that school of thought are still alive today. If they are, and even if they could still identify some services where productivity has not advanced very much (hairdressers and taxis are among the usually quoted examples), they would be astonished at the productivity growth which has been apparent in banking and certain other service sectors around the world in recent years, as a result of the forces of globalised competition and the opportunities presented by technological advances. It is clear, therefore, that banking and other financial services not only provide essential support to development but also make their own contribution to national income. I am often asked questions such as what is the long-term growth prospect for this sector or how will the mix of activities within the sector evolve. The simple and honest answer is that I don't know. Plainly, there are limits to the likely domestic demand for these services. But that demand may be supplemented if overseas customers are attracted to use our local services, or, of course, diminished if local customers choose to satisfy some of their needs from overseas.
Thin Margin, a start-up that offers online money-changing at competitive exchange rates, is creating a hassle-free experience for its customers. LumenLab, is experimenting with distributed ledgers on gestational diabetes insurance, which can trigger claims payout automatically to the insured upon meeting certain conditions. This has been a learning journey for MAS too and we have been trying to improve how we manage the regulatory sandbox. We have streamlined our internal processes and made the sandbox application form more straightforward, reducing the processing time for sandbox applications. We are now exploring the idea of “pre-defined sandboxes” where firms can start their experiments more quickly without going through the rigorous review with the current caseby-case approach. CONCLUSION Let me wrap up. The global economy has had a good run so far and signs are that the rest of the year will be reasonably good. But as you know from following the World Cup, things do not always turn out as expected. The risks that could derail economic growth have heightened somewhat and bear close 10 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  watching. The financial sector has been doing well. Not only growing in importance as a global financial centre, but also serving Asia’s economic development, and facilitating Singapore’s transition to an innovative and digital economy while creating good jobs for Singaporeans. And Singapore has been able to do this, not only because of the strong partnership between the industry and MAS, but also the stability and trust that underpin the financial system.

Financial services growth was very weak in 2016, at just 1.8%, reflecting slower regional growth and trade. Growth rebounded strongly to 4.9% last year, driven by the strong performance of the fund management segment and steady growth in financial intermediation. The growth momentum has been sustained in the first half of this year and we are looking at another good year for financial services. We remain confident of meeting the 5-year average growth target of 4.3%. We saw a net increase of 7,800 jobs in financial services and FinTech over 2016 and 2017, close to our ITM target of 8,000 jobs. Job growth was mainly driven by the insurance and fund management industries, and to a lesser extent by the banking industry. IT has emerged as a key functional area driving hiring demand across financial services— some of the fastest growing job roles are in software development, cyber security, data analytics, artificial intelligence, and business process engineering. FinTech alone is estimated to have contributed close to 2,000 of the net jobs created during these two years. MAS expects job growth in financial services this year to exceed the ITM target. Let me now take stock of progress in each of the three pillars of the ITM: business strategies 6 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  jobs and skills; and innovation and technology. BUSINESS STRATEGIES I will start with our business strategies. Singapore continued to do well in asset management, with assets under management (AUM) increasing by an average 12.7% p.a. over 2016 and 2017.
** To conclude, let me quote a sentence attributed to one of the great British statesmen, Benjamin Disraeli: “circumstances are beyond human control, but our conduct is in our own power.” We are indeed going through a difficult period, which puts the friendship between our countries to the test. But we have to face it together. Our objective should be to reach a lasting and consistent agreement allowing our countries to remain closely linked to each other in the future. I believe that it is our common desire and interest. Thank you for your attention. i  House of Lords, report 2016 ; https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/81/81.pdf

But the extent to which continuing constraints on the supply of bank credit are likely to impede the recovery is less clear. On the one hand, banks still face significant challenges, especially in terms of the ease and cost at which they can refinance maturing funding. This is undoubtedly affecting the ability of some small firms to borrow at affordable rates. On the other hand, many companies started this recovery with increased levels of savings and so are in a position to finance increased investment if and when they wish to. And we have seen “creditless” recoveries in the past. For example, the corporate sector in aggregate repaid bank lending in each of the first three years of the 1990s recovery. I’m hopeful – but by no means certain – that strains within the banking system will exert increasingly less drag on the economy going forward. But what of the tailwinds that are pushing against these factors and ensuring that the burgeoning recovery continues? The most significant factor is the highly accommodative stance of monetary policy. As you know, Bank Rate remains at 0.5% and the stock of asset purchases – quantitative easing –  1  This is an annual survey conducted for the Bank by NMG Financial Services Consulting. This year’s survey was conducted between 24 and 30 September 2010 and covered almost 2000 households. Some results from this year’s survey featured in the November 2010 Inflation Report (pages 22–23).
To counter these centrifugal forces, we notably launched an unlimited provision of liquidity for a maturity of three years at our main refinancing rate and against a larger range of eligible collateral in December 2011. Proof of our credibility in keeping Mario Draghi’s word to do “whatever it takes to preserve the euro” (July 2012), the simple announcement of our Outright Monetary Transactions programme was sufficient to alleviate financial market strains. More recently, beginning 2014, we had to react to the risk of sliding into deflation, which was due to a combination of factors: the slowdown in global growth, the collapse of commodity prices and the persistent weakness in domestic demand. That is why we implemented a set of vigorous measures, including three main ingredients: asset purchases, forward guidance – both of which are measures that the Fed also put in place – and negative interest rates. The asset purchase programme – or QE – included first private debt instruments and then also public sector debt. Since April 2017, and till December 2017, purchases amount to EUR 60 billion per month, having been reduced from EUR 80 billion. The perhaps most unconventional policy is the use of negative interest rates. I emphasise this measure as the most unconventional because for most people, as well as in all economic models that I am aware of, nominal interest rates are positive.

For the future, on the most appropriate way to reduce the intensity of our accommodation when it becomes warranted, two principles should in my view guide us: these are prudence and effectiveness. We need to be prudent, because the recovery is still fragile. This amounts to asking whether the adjustment of inflation towards our target of below, but close to, 2% would continue without our monetary stimulus. At present, the ECB’s Governing Council does not think this is the case. Underlying inflation, without oil and food prices, remains below 1% and should, according to our forecasts, gradually pick up to 1.8% in 2019 according to the pace of wage increases. We also need to be effective, in the sense that, among our combination of various instruments, we should withdraw last the measures that are mostneeded to secure a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with our target. We will continue to assess the situation with great pragmatism. There is no predefined split between the doves and the hawks on the Governing Council, as is sometimes claimed. I am confident that our future strategy, as the present one, will be the result of a collective discussion and a cohesive decision. b. Institutional framework In parallel, the institutional framework of the euro area has been improved in response to the crisis. Member states have secured key steps to reinforce the resilience of the euro area for the future.
SPEECH  Quantitative tightening: rationale and market impact Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Money Market Contact Group meeting Frankfurt am Main, 2 March 2023 Eight years ago, we launched the asset purchase programme (APP). It was the first time the ECB employed quantitative easing (QE) to help secure price stability when the space for further policy rate cuts was becoming constrained by the effective lower bound. By now, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that the APP was successful in lowering long-term interest rates, stimulating economic activity and raising inflation at times when price pressures were unusually weak. [1] As risks to medium-term price stability had increased sharply, we decided in June 2022 to end net asset purchases under the APP as of July. In December, we announced that the APP portfolio would decline at a measured and predictable pace as of March 2023. This became effective yesterday when we started limiting reinvestments of maturing securities. Until the end of June 2023, the APP portfolio will decline by € billion per month on average. [2] For our corporate bond portfolio, the remaining reinvestments will be tilted more strongly towards issuers with a better climate performance, in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement and without prejudice to our primary mandate. [3] In the second quarter of this year, the Governing Council will reassess the pace of APP portfolio reduction. I will start my remarks today by presenting the rationale for conducting quantitative tightening (QT).

The most likely situation is therefore that although the high level of indebtedness, the large deficit in savings in both the household and corporate sectors, combined with over-investment in certain sectors, will subdue growth for a time, there will be no dramatic or prolonged economic recession. However, in order to increase saving in the economy and thus correct the constant deficit on the current account, it is necessary that growth is not primarily driven by increases in consumption. Net export and investment should instead be the motors behind growth to a larger extent than before. Bringing about this state of affairs requires a weaker dollar exchange rate. One can therefore look with scepticism on the idea that tax cuts will bring the American economy out of its decline. How will Sweden be affected? The American economy affects developments in the rest of the world through many different channels, with exports to the USA as the most direct channel and the one where the effects are easiest measured. However, exports to the USA are only responsible for a couple of per cent of GDP in Sweden and have a similar significance for the euro area. Spread effects via the expectations that largely govern consumption, investments and the stock market are probably much greater, although more difficult to measure. Nevertheless, there are numerous indications that the Swedish economy is more sensitive to developments in the USA than the economies in the euro area.