samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
See Söderberg (2018) for a description of the development of means of payment. 2 [25]  rates, where a small number of central banks in practice conducted monetary policy for the entire world and thus ‘lent’ their credibility. 2 In Sweden, this system of fixed exchange rates did not function so well and this led to several major devaluations. The larger central banks also lost credibility for various reasons and the global economy underwent a period of high inflation in the 1970s and 1980s. Independent central bank with inflation target replaces gold The global developments over the past 30 years have entailed major changes to the monetary policy landscape, not least in Sweden. During the 1980s, work began in the leading countries of the world economy on rebuilding the confidence in monetary policy that had been lost in the 1970s. 3 At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden experienced a severe financial crisis following the rapid winding up of several decades of hard regulation of the financial markets. During the crisis, there was strong pressure to devaluate and the defence of the fixed exchange rate finally became untenable. When the Riksbank abandoned the fixed exchange rate, monetary policy sought a new way to promote price stability, and Sweden joined the global trend of reinforcing the credibility of monetary policy. The answer became a more independent Riksbank with an explicit inflation target, and Sweden became one of the first countries in the world to try this new path.

Cycles of the past Let me start with the bad news. The Forum has assuredly not solved the problem of boom and bust in the commercial property market. Indeed, the environment today – slow recovery from a jarring commercial property bust – is eerily reminiscent of the situation twenty years ago when the Forum began. As Yogi Berra reportedly said, it is a case of déjà vu all over again. The Forum was born out of the commercial property crash of the early 1990s. Between 1989 and 1993, UK commercial property prices fell by 27%. This followed a long period of rising prices, high liquidity, expansive lending and weakening credit standards. These ingredients combined to create a classic pro-cyclical spiral. Higher valuations supported ever-larger  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  loans on ever-finer terms, boosting valuations still further. When that pro-cyclical spiral went into reverse, it left banks, developers and investors all licking their wounds. Today, the situation is much the same. Commercial property prices are 37% below their peak. For secondary properties, they are more like 50% below their peak. This fall-to-earth came after a long wave of rising commercial property prices, deeper liquidity and rapid and, in many cases, imprudent lending practices. The subsequent crash has left banks, developers and investors not just licking their wounds but in some cases requiring life support. The commercial property bust has contributed to several UK banks departing the high street and the economy suffering its most painful contraction since at least the 1930s.
Niklaus Blattner: Recent financial and economic developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Niklaus Blattner, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Geneva, 17 June 2004. *  *  *  The new National Bank Act obliges the Swiss National Bank to contribute to the stability of the financial system. In performing this task, the National Bank focuses on the stability of the banking sector and of the financial market infrastructure. Implementation rests on three pillars: first, regular analysis and assessment of the banking system (referred to as “macroprudential oversight of the banking sector”); second, oversight of systemically important payment and securities settlement systems (referred to as “system oversight”); and third, if preventive oversight is not adequate, crisis management measures. Today I will be talking mainly about the first and second areas of our activities with reference to the Financial Stability Report 2004. You have already received this document (subject to an embargo). I will also talk about emergency liquidity assistance, which is one of the instruments used to deal with crisis situations. And I will draw your attention to another publication appearing today: the summary of the 2003 statistical yearbook “The Banks in Switzerland ”. While this statistical publication focuses on reporting, the Financial Stability Report ventures into the domain of analysis and evaluation. Macroprudential oversight of the banking sector The Swiss National Bank follows developments in the banking sector from the macroprudential angle.

A clear articulation of the FOMC’s goals and an explanation of how it views its policy misses and plans to correct them help the public better anticipate the Fed’s policy actions. In turn, the public’s improved understanding of FOMC policy actions increases their efficacy by reducing uncertainty over future financial conditions and how those actions might evolve with changes in the economic environment. So, what we clearly need is a scorecard that communicates our accountability in a straightforward manner. Keeping score when there are two goals  I like to illustrate our balanced approach to achieving our dual-mandate goals with what I refer to as a bull’s-eye scorecard (chart 3). The bull’s-eye in the center illustrates where we would like to be. In this case, the goals are 2 percent inflation over the medium term and unemployment at its natural rate, taken here to be 5–1/4 percent, which is my long-run projection. The scorecard shows an equal weighting of policy misses around our inflation and unemployment objectives; that is, each circular ring is a collection of unemployment and inflation rates that should be equally uncomfortable for FOMC participants. 3 For example, it tells us how the 9 percent unemployment rate we faced back in September 2011 can be depicted in “inflation-loss equivalent units” by showing the inflation rate that gives an equivalent loss when unemployment is at its sustainable rate. The answer is 5–1/2 percent inflation!
Deloitte and Central bank Audit submit a joint auditor’s report on the annual financial reporting for the Fund. The Government has submitted a draft bill recommending that the Supervisory Council should appoint an external auditor. This would be in line with international developments and best practice in this field. The Executive Board is Norges Bank’s executive authority. The Executive Board has increased its oversight of investment management in recent years. In 2006, an advisory board was set up to support the Executive Board in the field of investment management. The board comprises four experts with extensive experience from large funds and institutions managing equities, fixed income instruments and other assets. Previously, Central Bank Audit was also responsible for Norges Bank’s internal auditing. When Deloitte was made responsible for the financial auditing of the Fund’s accounts, the Executive Board’s audit committee and an internal audit unit were also established. The audit committee comprises three of the Executive Board’s external members. The committee serves as a preparatory body for the Executive Board on matters relating to risk management and internal control. In 2008, the Executive Board issued a new job description and investment mandate for the executive director of NBIM. The organisation of NBIM is based on the executive director’s responsibility and authority as general manager of NBIM, which includes reporting directly to the Executive Board and regular supervision by the governor of Norges bank on behalf of the Executive Board.

4  BIS Review 53/2009  Governance model MINISTRY OF FINANCE ON BEHALF OF GOVERNMENT  STORTING (Norwegian parliament)  NORGES BANK’s EXECUTIVE BOARD  NORGES BANK’s SUPERVISORY COUNCIL  CENTRAL BANK AUDIT  2  Management structure of Norges Bank NORGES BANK’s EXECUTIVE BOARD and EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT AUDIT COMMITTEE  Executive Board’s investment management advisory board NORGES BANK’s INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT  INTERNAL AUDIT UNIT  3  BIS Review 53/2009  5  Long-term o wnership 1.50%  1.50% Europe Americas  1.25%  1.25%  Asia and Oceania 1.00%  1.00%  0.75%  0.75%  0.50%  0.50%  0.25%  0.25%  0.00%  0.00% 98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08 Sources: FTSE and Norges Bank 4  Government assets Fall in market value in 2008. In billions of NOK  Government Pension Fund – Nor way  -30  Government direct o wnership1  -230  Government share of subsea petroleum reserves2 Government Pension Fund – Global3  -2 200 -130 (-630)  Household housing wealth 4  -400  1) Decrease in value adjusted for dividends. Companies listed on the stock exchange 2) Fall in value of the govern ment share of subsea petroleum reserves with a decline in the price of oil fro m NOK 500 to NOK 300 per barrel.
Sheku Sambadeen Sesay: Economic overview, trends and challenges Statement by Mr Sheku Sambadeen Sesay, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the Governor’s annual dinner, Freetown, 28 January 2011. *  *  *  His Excellency, The President, Dr. Ernest Bai-Koroma and Mrs Sia Koroma, Honourable, Vice President, Chief Alhaji Sam Sumana and Mrs Khadija Sumana, Honourable Cabinet Ministers, Honorable Speaker and Members of Parliament, Her Lordship, the Chief Justice, Your Worship, the Mayor of the Municipality of Freetown, Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corp, Chairmen of the Board of Directors and Chief Executives of Commercial Banks and Other Financial Institutions, President of the Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry, Representatives of the Private sector, Members of the Fourth Estate, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen. On behalf of the Board of Directors, Management and staff of the Bank of Sierra Leone, I am honoured by your presence once again at the Bank’s Annual Dinner, my second as Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone. As our country celebrates 50 years of independence, it is but appropriate that the Bank of Sierra Leone marks this milestone in the company of H.E. The President, the Hon. Vice President, the First Lady and Wife of the Hon. Vice President, along with other dignitaries. Before I proceed, kindly permit me to request you to stand and join us in observing a moment’s silence in memory of our departed colleagues and pensioners who were with us last year. May their souls rest in peace.

According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, global growth was projected at 4.8 percent in 2010 with Asia and Latin America experiencing strong growth. Africa was also expected to experience robust growth, but growth in Europe was sluggish whilst in the United States, it remained subdued. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This uneven scenario in global growth has created several downside risks, including risks to the financial sector. There is no guarantee that the problems in the financial sector have been adequately addressed, but there have been concerted efforts to ensure that they do not recur. The introduction of new rules, in particular Basel III is expected to help in this direction, as Basel III will address issues including strengthening risk coverage of capital for banks, the buildup of capital buffers and the introduction of global minimum liquidity standards. However, countries are now realizing that in addition to these new rules there is the need for better supervision and the creation of crisis resolution mechanisms. Your Excellency, distinguished guests, despite the down side risks to the global economy, there is room for optimism which stems from the progress being made to repair and reform the financial sector, including developing macro prudential approaches to limit systemic risks. Monetary policy in the developed economies should remain accommodative in order to serve as the first line of defense in the event of a future shock.
The US economy in particular is on the road to recovery. Financial market participants see opportunities, not just problems. However, in a number of emerging economies volatile capital flows are creating problems. High debt growth and rising house prices may constitute a risk. The recovery abroad is fragile. The key policy rate is also low in Norway. Our inflation target is slightly higher than that of other European countries. As a result, inflation and nominal interest rates in Norway are also slightly higher. But prospects for a persistently low interest rate level internationally will inevitably also have consequences for Norway. The real interest rate in a small open economy cannot in the long run differ substantially from that of our closest trading partners. Given the prevailing long-term interest rates abroad, it will likely take a number of years for interest rates in Norway to move up towards a level that was previously considered to be normal. When the drafters of the Constitution gathered at Eidsvoll 200 years ago, there were no private banks in Norway. It was not until the latter half of the 1800s that a private banking system truly came into being. Norges Bank acquired its present-day role as lender of last resort. With private banking came banking crises. The 1899 crash in Christiania triggered the first serious banking crisis in Norway. A real estate bubble in the capital burst and house prices plummeted. It took more than 100 years for real house prices in Oslo to return to their pre-crisis level.

This is why the Fund is an integrated entity located in Norges Bank. Norges Bank works to preserve the Fund’s long-term financial value. Responsible investment is part of that task. As a long-term financial investor, the Fund stands to benefit from sound and sustainable growth in the companies and markets included in its investment universe. We use a variety of instruments to exercise our ownership rights. We engage in close dialogue with companies, investors and regulatory authorities. We vote at shareholder  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  meetings in line with pre-defined principles and publish our voting results on a regular basis. We also submit shareholder proposals and participate in consultations based on the fundamental principles that we apply in the exercise of ownership rights. Norges Bank integrates the considerations relating to corporate governance, the environment and social conditions into the investment process. Because the Fund is a longterm financial investor, we place considerable emphasis on our role as responsible investor. The overriding goal, which is the highest possible return at an acceptable level of risk, remains firmly established. If Norges Bank is assessed using criteria other than return and risk, its mission will become unclear. This might also impact return performance. There must be no doubt as to the objective of investment management. Norway’s enormous economic progress since 1814 has not been linear. Rapid population growth and food crises in the latter half of the 1800s led to the massive emigration of close to 1 million Norwegians to America.
There is a relatively high degree of correlation in the cyclical developments of euro area countries over a longer time period, and recent differences in growth rates have not been particularly unusual. Nevertheless, different cyclical positions may lead to variations in price pressures. Longer-term factors leading to national differences Turning to the longer-term factors, the trend rate of growth may be higher in some countries due to the process of “catching-up” in terms of productivity and living standards with other euro area countries. It is likely that this has been happening in some euro area countries over the past few decades. In others, the trend rate of growth may be higher due to the fact that the economy is at a more advanced state of liberalisation and deregulation. In terms of the current differences in inflation rates across euro area Member States, longer-term factors are important. It may first be noted that even if inflation rates for all individual goods were identical across countries, the overall rate of increase in consumer prices would differ because there are differences in tastes and preferences across countries and therefore the bundle of goods consumed, and thus the weights of the various goods in the overall price index, differs from country to country. This can also, of course, have consequences for short-term divergences in inflation rates across euro area countries. The “catching-up” effect for countries whose living standards are rising towards the average euro area level also has consequences for inflation differentials.

Analysis of data for price developments in various US cities over the past suggests not only that significant inflation differences occur within a monetary union, but also that they are at least as great as those currently prevailing between euro area countries. Thus, recent divergences in the euro area are by no means unusual. A further feature of the US data is that the observed divergences in inflation rates among these cities, although persistent, are not permanent. There is a tendency for price levels in individual cities to converge back towards their initial levels relative to the national average. It can be assumed that similar adjustment processes would also operate in the euro area. The role of other economic policies Differences in economic developments between countries within the euro area do not, therefore, always warrant an economic policy response. Action may, however, be necessary. For instance, when developments diverging from those in other countries threaten to trigger painful adjustment processes in the form of increasing unemployment. This can be avoided. If action is required it must be taken through other, national economic policies, in particular wage developments and fiscal policy. As said before, “Frankfurt” has no role to play in this area. As regards labour and product market developments, it is important, also for this reason, to reduce as far as possible existing rigidities, so as to allow wages and prices to adjust.
Through Hong Kong’s platform, international investors in the Islamic world can easily tap the appealing growth story of the Mainland. This is especially given the fact that many investors are now actively looking for investment opportunities in Asia, particularly Mainland China, to diversify their investment portfolios. At the same time, Mainland issuers can also make use of our platform to reach out to the increasingly wealthy investor base in the Islamic world. 12. Clearly, there is a strong foundation for both sides to work together to complement each other, grow the pie bigger and achieve a win-win proposition in developing Islamic finance. For this important reason, the HKMA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Bank Negara Malaysia in 2009 to strengthen mutual co-operation in the area of Islamic finance. We are very pleased to have worked closely with Bank Negara Malaysia to put together and bring this workshop to Hong Kong under the framework of the MoU. Building a deep talent pool is crucial for further development of the Islamic finance industry. Workshops of this kind will undoubtedly help to promote market awareness and knowledge of Islamic finance, while also providing an excellent forum for market players to exchange views and business contacts. We will continue to work closely with the Treasury Markets Association to raise the expertise in Islamic finance in Hong Kong. 13.

Fourth, the use of common assessment and risk management tools by market participants, and finally an excessive and shortsighted focus on “shareholder value” may also amplify swings. Prudential regulations may also occasionally have proven conducive to an excessive emphasis on the short term when assessing risks. What can the authorities do to counter these tendencies? Debate among academics, policymakers and market participants has been intense in recent years, and is far from settled. This is an area particularly open to discussion, where new ideas and new evidence are forthcoming. Indeed, the way monetary stability and financial stability interact with each other seems a particularly complex topic, and the impact of specific measures on both fields is uncertain. As far as monetary policy is concerned, the debate on whether it should react to asset prices has been one of the most interesting of recent years. Insofar as asset prices contain useful information that helps predict future price -and output- developments, they should clearly be included in the set of indicators the central bank uses for decision-making. This is not, however, as easy as it may sound. First, because empirical evidence on the usefulness of asset prices in predicting future price and output developments is not conclusive. And second, because the integration of asset prices in macroeconomic models poses a series of practical difficulties. 2  BIS Review 35/2002  Going one step further, a related question is whether monetary policy should react directly to asset prices, over and above the impact of the latter on inflationary prospects.
In general, one may say that the level of risk depends on three factors: speed and sustainability of GDP growth, sectoral concentration of exposure (real estate), and currency mismatch in borrowers' assets and liabilities. Faster GDP growth allows one to expect faster accumulation of assets and, therefore, faster improvement in the ability to service loans. However, estimating potential output growth is tricky. Such estimations are roughly based on the average of the past few years' performance. Today we think that potential output growth may be around 7 percent in Estonia. Let me remind you that a few years ago we thought it was 4 to 5 percent. Upward revisions are not the problem, of course, but there are also several examples of downward revisions: Portugal, Greece... even Poland. While credit growth has given a significant contribution to output growth, it is hardly sufficient in the long run. Too high indebtedness will limit output growth potential, as loan-servicing costs will eventually curb consumption and investment. The effects of economic slowdown or recession on loan quality may be quite different over the business cycles, however. All things considered, Estonian borrowers weathered the effects of the Russian crisis of 1998 relatively easily. However, one has to keep in mind two things. Firstly, the household credit to GDP ratio was at around 10 percent. Now it is around 30 percent. Secondly, the households' loan servicing ability did not deteriorate dangerously, as low-income households who suffered the most in that recession had not had access to credit.

In the current cycle there are more households with an access to credit, also from the lower income deciles, indicating the spread of the effects of the potential slowdown to a wider part of the economy. The second risk factor I would like to point out is the price level of real estate. Real estate prices have recently surged globally, and also in the Baltic countries. The possible factors behind this increase include rapid and relatively widespread income growth, favorable borrowing conditions, and international demand. However, despite these surges, absolute levels of real estate prices remain still about two times lower in Tallinn than in Helsinki, in line with the difference of overall price levels. There are signs that prices are now stabilized in nominal terms and may have slightly decreased in real terms. Nevertheless, relative prices of real estate have increased dramatically. Whereas the ratio of price of a square meter to monthly wages is about one in Helsinki, it exceeds two in Tallinn. The expectations of real estate price convergence fuel credit demand in Baltic countries but imply ever-increasing risks to  BIS Review 81/2006  3  both borrowers and lenders. (It is fair to say, though, that the majority of real estate loans are used for buying homes, not for speculation.) The third factor I wanted to mention - currency mismatch - has caught some attention from international observers. The issue is more nuanced than the classical approach.