samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Digital Transformation Fintech opportunities and risks Implementing the Bali Fintech Agenda  Intervention of Mr. Abdellatif Jouahri Governor of Bank Al-Maghrib  Rabat, 13 March 2019  Dear colleagues and friends, Ladies and Gentlemen, It gives me real pleasure to be addressing you in this opening session of the Regional Conference for Africa and the Middle East, held by Bank AlMaghrib and the International Monetary Fund, on the digital transformation and the implementation of the Bali Fintech Agenda. I would like to start by thanking you all for your presence today, and wish a pleasant stay in Morocco to those of you attending from abroad. I would also like to thank the International Monetary Fund, particularly the entire staff of the Monetary and Capital Market Department, for having accompanied us for months in preparing this conference. My warmest thanks go to the Department Head, Mr. Adrian Tobias, and to his deputy Mr. Ghiath Shabsigh, with whom we have worked closely. I am also delighted by the strong participation of central banks and regional and international institutions; I am confident that many colleagues here had to adjust their schedules to take part in this conference witch shows the importance they attach to the issue we are addressing today. The idea of this meeting emerged two years earlier, in our quest for expertise and experience with regard to the approaches and policies to cope with digital revolution.

Experience of previous financial crises shows that they are usually followed by long periods of weaker growth, higher unemployment and seriously weakened public finances.10 GDP fell in both the United States and the euro area in 2009 and unemployment increased. Inflation fell rapidly, mainly because the earlier increases in the prices of energy and food turned into price decreases. However, there were other parts of the world that were not affected by the crisis to any great extent. Countries such as China and India continued to enjoy high rates of growth. The financial crisis mainly affected Sweden through the fall in the international demand for Swedish exports. GDP fell by 5.9 per cent between 2007 and 2009, but then increased by 5.5 per cent in 2010. Already a year after the downturn had bottomed out, production had returned to more or less the same level as before the crisis. But GDP was still far below the level that a postulated trend increase without the crisis would have led to (see Figure 11). Unemployment peaked at almost 9 per cent at the turn of the year 2009/2010. The increase in unemployment was much less than predicted in the Riksbank’s earlier forecasts and much less than indicated by normal Okun links between GDP growth and unemployment.11 This is probably because the crisis primarily affected the industrial sector with substantial effects on GDP but smaller effects on employment, while activity in other parts of the economy was kept up by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies (see Figure 12).
We, at the Central Bank, will be working intensively for permanent achievement and sustainability in all matters related to price stability and financial stability, particularly monetary policies, with the pride and sense of responsibility of celebrating the centenary of our Republic, at the Istanbul Financial Center, the construction of which will be completed this year. Distinguished Guests, Concluding my remarks, I would like to thank my esteemed colleagues for their painstaking efforts to support our Bank in its activities, and also would like to pay my respects to you all for your participation. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

On the other hand, challenges and opportunities introduced by technological development for central bank policies and decision-making, financial inclusion and financial instruments, are phenomena that affect not only the central bank but also the rest of the society. It is, therefore, necessary to study, analyse and address such phenomena based on facts and best scientific analysis. We value international cooperation in these fields as a very important contributor to coping with such challenges and undertaking visionary policies. Notably, the selected format for providing technical assistance enables the output objectives of the cooperation to be tailored to the characteristics of the Albanian economy and dedicated to the Bank of Albania and its decision-making and operational framework. The technical assistance consists of a set of activities that include all the phases and methods of learning and, at the same time, contributes to all concrete and flexible policy-making processes at the central bank. Activities under the programme range from lectures to practical implementation of the knowledge and application in specific projects, in accordance with the priorities of the Bank of Albania. The selection of a serious partner is another important aspect for the success of this agreement. The Graduate Institute Geneva has become an important partner for the Bank of Albania, contributing with its academic staff as well as collaborators it selects among renowned professors and experts of economics, finance and banking.
We are both children of the successful German central bank, the Bundesbank. We have sprung from the same intellectual model, where the target is price stability, the management are appointed by the political system and the actual work is done at an arm's length from party politics. ·  In my opinion, the value of conducting a national interest rate and exchange rate policy is exaggerated in the EMU debate. On the other hand, it is conceivable that situations might arise where strongly stabilising fiscal policy measures are necessary. It would then be necessary to find institutional solutions to help the government and parliament to make the necessary long-term decisions and to do so even in situations where they may be politically difficult and even risky. Here I think it is possible to draw on some experiences of the Riksbank's actions in recent years. Clear targets, transparent analyses and discussions, combined with regular assessments, can put pressure on the political system to take action in time. ·  4  As representative of the Riksbank, I have been able to experience at first hand the closed doors to the meeting rooms of Europe and the fact that we have lost influence. During the early years, when the ECB was being built up, we sat at the decision-making table.

Is EMU membership important for Sweden to gain influence? Finally, I intend to discuss what I personally consider to be the most important aspect of the EMU issue - how Sweden's opportunity to take responsibility and exercise influence in an international economic policy context will be affected by the result of the referendum. Here I am speaking not primarily as Riksbank governor of six months but on the basis of my experiences over almost 20 years, as civil servant in the Ministry of Finance under three finance ministers and later as deputy governor of the Riksbank, representing Sweden in numerous international forums. My first reflection concerns Sweden's influence now, compared with before. As I see it, Sweden's influence has declined considerably, which is not always made clear in the general debate. The most important reason for this erosion of Sweden's position is that we, as I mentioned earlier, have declined in economic strength in relation to almost all of the other industrial nations. In addition, there is a more positive aspect here, namely that a number of former developing countries have made considerable economic progress and are now important players in the international economic policy game. The result is that we now sit at fewer decision-making tables than at any other point during the post-war period and we carry less weight at those tables where we have retained a place. One expression of this is that an ever-declining number of Swedes now hold central positions in economic policy and financial contexts.
Christine Lagarde: Learning the right lessons from the past Speech by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of the awarding of the Prix Turgot 2021, Paris, 2 June 2021. * * * It is a great pleasure to be here once again in Bercy, which brings back so many memories. I am very grateful to Jean-Claude Trichet and the Cercle Turgot for bestowing this prize on me. It is an honour to join such an illustrious group of recipients. Anne-Robert, Jacques Turgot himself said that “the whole mass of humanity … marches constantly, though slowly, toward greater perfection”. When I reflect on my career as a policymaker in Paris, Washington and Frankfurt, these words resonate with me greatly. History never moves in a straight line. Day-to-day, it can be hard to perceive any direction at all. But I do believe that, in retrospect, we can make out a clear path towards progress. After two decades working in the private sector, I have held public office throughout two decades of crises – a period when Europe has been severely put to the test. But each crisis has taught us a valuable lesson – and we have had the humility to learn. It is thanks to those past lessons that we have been able to respond to the pandemic effectively.

I believe that we can say something similar about the arc of progress. Europe moves forward in stops and starts. It often learns lessons the hard way. But its arc bends towards a stronger and more united Europe for all citizens. The common currency 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  reflects this continued progress, with support for the euro at its highest level on record at 80%, up from 66% a decade ago.8 This should give us hope as we look to the future. And it should give us confidence that, even when Europe may seem divided or lacking in direction, there is a thread guiding us forwards. Over my career, I have had the privilege to watch this process unfold up close, to share in its highs and lows. I have been lucky enough to see it from three different perspectives – national, European and global. And I am honoured to continue working to take Europe forwards. I am very pleased to see the contributions of the European Central Bank recognised through my acceptance of this prize. Thank you. 1 Common Equity Tier 1. European Banking Authority (2020), “Basel III monitoring exercise – results based on  data as of 31 December 2019”, December. 2 Lagarde, C. (2019), “The future of the euro area economy”, speech at the Frankfurt European Banking  Congress, 22 November.
Our ignorance of how people behave under uncertainty, together with the presence of feedbacks between behaviour, outturns and beliefs, highlights some of the difficulties and pitfalls of economic policy making. Second, the recognition that beliefs and behaviour play an important role in the dynamics of the system affects the type of policy actions that are desirable. Ensuring that panic did not spread is one reason why guaranteeing all bank deposits following the run on Northern Rock in September 2007 was necessary. Third, communication is part of the policy response to uncertainty. In this respect, economic and financial systems differ from physical systems. In the latter, there is no-one listening. The control strategy in a physical system is defined by a scheme that relates the settings of policy instruments to certain features of the environment (e.g. fire left booster rocket if rocket veers to left of target). But in an economic system – because people’s beliefs about future policy actions affect their behaviour today – the control strategy has to comprise not only a plan for setting the instruments (e.g. raise Bank Rate if expected inflation rises) but also a plan to condition beliefs about how policy makers would respond in future. That involves communication. 6. Communication  A communication strategy involves deciding how much information to communicate, and in what form. Revealing information entails costs and benefits. An optimal communication strategy balances those costs and benefits. Consider first the benefits. Information is valuable and can improve the quality of decisions.

Thereafter, the MPC expected that inflation was more likely than not to fall back and be below target for a period [Slide 5]. You can see that the most likely outcome, shown in the darkest band, was for inflation to stay below the target at the end of the forecast period. But the MPC also saw upside risks to that projection, stemming from the possibility that the current high level of inflation might become embedded in inflation expectations, so making inflation itself more persistent. To make these risks easier to discern, the MPC also makes available charts of the cross section of the probability distribution at particular points on the forecast horizon, like the one shown in [Slide 6]. The upside risks mean that at the end of the forecast horizon, the MPC judged that inflation was as likely to be above the target as below it. We can see this in the chart, because the narrower bands towards the left hand side mean that the mass below the vertical line marking 2% is about the same as the mass above it. But why do we show our projections like this? Many other economic forecasters publish their forecast as a single, most likely outcome. In our view, this sort of forecast is not very informative, as the actual probability of it being correct is very close to zero. In contrast, the whole distribution contains much more information. What matters for policy is the entire distribution of outcomes.
But it would be unwise to simply assume the market will bottom out at these levels for three reasons. First, expectations of house price declines can easily be self-fulfilling. The feared loss in value can overwhelm the benefit of low mortgage rates, leading would-be buyers to sit out the market. Second, with home construction at minimal levels, housing supply cannot decline in response to weak demand. Home prices thus are very sensitive to shifts in demand and credit supply. If access to mortgage credit for home purchases is unduly restricted, the market-clearing price for housing will be lower than it would be if access to mortgage credit was less constrained. Third, in contrast to the efficient mechanisms in place in the commercial property market to work-out troubled debt, the infrastructure of the residential mortgage market is wholly 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  inadequate to deal with a systemic shock to the housing market. Left alone, this flawed structure will destroy much more value in housing than is necessary. In a recent speech I called for a comprehensive approach to housing policy.

Irma Rosenberg: My time at the Riksbank – some final reflections on challenges along the way Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at SEB, Stockholm, 8 December 2008. *  *  *  On a chilly day in January 1976 I crossed the threshold of the newly-built Riksbank building for the first time. It was true that all employees were moving into the new building that day, which contributed to the more or less organised chaos of furniture gone adrift and employees trying to find their new offices. But for me it was probably an extra special day. It was my first day at work. And it was my first job outside of the university after taking my PhD. Almost 33 years have passed since that day in January. And as I leave the Riksbank at the end of the year one could say that I have come full circle. It was where I began my career. In 1986 I left the bank, but in January 2003 I once again crossed the threshold at Brunkebergstorg 11, then as one of the six members of the Executive Board. This will now be my final full-time job. The years have been eventful ones, with more than a little drama from time to time.
To prevent a system-wide increase in merchant fees, the Payment Card Reform Framework would moderate the increases in payment card acceptance cost. This would be achieved by subjecting interchange fees to ceilings which are set based on objective and transparent criteria. In addition, the framework also seeks to address distortions in the payment card market in order to foster an efficient, transparent and competitive payment card industry in Malaysia. b. Enhancing the payment card infrastructure  To complement the Payment Card Reform Framework, the banking industry has committed to invest approximately RM1.1 billion over the next 6 years for industry-wide infrastructure development to further enhance the payment card security and expand the Point-Of-Sale terminal network. This would make Malaysia’s payment card landscape more competitive. The infrastructure development that would be undertaken by the industry includes, among others:  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  the expansion of the Point-Of-Sale network by an additional 570,000 Point-Of-Sale terminals, especially among the lower tier merchants;  •  the adoption of Chip and PIN, which is a more secure cardholder verification method for purchase transactions, by 1 January 2017; and  •  the migration of the domestic debit card from its proprietary standard to the internationally-recognised EMV standard equipped with contactless functionality by 1 January 2018. These developments are exciting changes in store for the payments sector. With it, comes an enormous opportunity to expand business and enhance value to consumers.

In 2013, our cash-in-circulation over GDP is 6% compared to only 2% to 4% in advanced countries. In terms of payment card usage, our payment card transaction per capita is relatively low, at only 13 transactions per capita in 2013. This is far below the level of payment card usage in the advanced countries with an average of more than 200 transactions per capita. It is also important to note that Malaysia has a higher proportion of credit card usage compared to debit card usage, with a ratio of 7 credit card transactions for every debit card transaction. In contrast, debit card usage is more prevalent in the advanced economies, at an average of 6 debit card transactions for every credit card transaction. The debit card is a more cost-effective payment instrument compared to the credit card. Greater use of debit cards would minimise the country’s retail payment cost and contribute to greater savings and efficiency. In this respect, the banking industry can play the important role of taking more proactive measures to widen the payment card acceptance infrastructure, and promote actively the usage of debit cards to the general public. It is a mutually beneficial relationship. Consumers can conduct their financial transactions in a safe, convenient and efficient manner while the banking industry can benefit through reduction in the cost of handling and managing cash. High potential for debit cards to displace cash in Malaysia Cash is an expensive payment instrument which imposes an unnecessary cost to the economy.
Different countries may also have different priorities in terms of resources for supervision and crisis management or in terms of their regulatory structures. One reason may be that the financial systems differ quite significantly between countries. Additionally, in crisis management, the use of public funds can never be completely ruled out. In a cross-border context, serious conflicts of interest can arise when it comes to agreeing on how to share the potential burden of such interventions. All these challenges have a common theme. Increasingly, national financial stability is becoming dependent on the activities of banks and authorities in foreign countries. Also, given the roles and responsibilities of these authorities, conflicts of interest are likely to occur. The typical illustration of this problem is a bank being of limited size in the home country while having a systemically important branch abroad. While a potential failure of the bank would not create any substantial disturbance in the home-country economy the consequences to the host country could be destructive. As the host country, in the event of failure, is likely to end up with the bulk of the bill for resolving the crisis, the incentives to conduct close supervision of the bank are substantial. For the home-country on other hand the same incentives do not exist. Financial integration also raises a number of practical issues. Do the present legal frameworks provide authorities with the necessary tools for supervising cross-border banking groups in an efficient way?

Another challenge is that decisions and actions by national authorities are likely to have considerable implications for the financial stability in foreign economies. This is of course particularly true in cases where foreign operations are run through branches, meaning that they are subject to foreign supervision. However, in Europe at least, the consolidating supervisor has an increased influence also on foreign subsidiaries, within the new capital regulation – the Basel II-framework. In the Nordea case – which is now a group with a subsidiary structure – the Swedish consolidating supervisor has a possibility to influence the risk management of the group as a whole but also in the different subsidiaries. Now, Nordea has announced plans to convert its subsidiaries in the Nordic countries into branches. When, and if, this plan eventually becomes a reality, Swedish authorities will have the full  2  BIS Review 83/2007  responsibility for supervising three foreign branches, all of which may be of systemic importance in the different host countries. A third challenge is that the legal distinction between branches and subsidiaries is becoming blurred. Increasingly banking groups are starting to organize themselves along business lines rather than along legal and national lines, concentrating various functions to different centres of competence. There are several examples of this trend. Again Nordea is one illustrative example.