samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One source of vulnerability in the face of rising geopolitical tensions is Europe’s high external dependency with respect to some products which are key to the EU economy, but which are imported from a handful of non-EU countries. China accounts for a large share of goods imports into the EU. China is also the main exporter to the EU of several electronic products (such as computers and optical devices), for which domestic production capacity is also relatively low. This situation is not unique to the EU. As a consequence, China is becoming the “OPEC of industrial inputs”.2 This dependence on Chinese imports already had significant consequences for the European manufacturing sector during the pandemic. There is evidence3 that the Chinese supply chain disruptions that occurred in the early months of the pandemic had a considerable impact on manufacturing output in the euro area, temporarily reducing it by 7%. The EU is also dependent on third countries for semiconductor production. European companies involved in the manufacture of these products concentrate almost exclusively on the upstream stage of the production chain, providing manufacturing equipment and high-purity materials used in chip production. However, European companies account for a negligible share of other critical stages of the production chain, such as chip design or assembly. They are also heavily dependent on foreign suppliers: almost 80% of the suppliers of European semiconductor companies are based outside the EU. 4  1  Io annou, D. and J. J. Pérez (co -leads) (2023).

On the other hand, financial globalisation may have reduced the natural rate of interest by increasing global demand for safe assets. With regard to all these factors, it is worth considering whether globalisation affects inflation via structural changes in markets, pricing behaviour or mark-ups. Its impact is ambiguous. On the one hand, as discussed above, trade and participation in global value chains could increase competition and generate strategic complementarities. On the other hand, it has been argued that the interplay between globalisation, digitalisation and the increase in importance of intangible assets may give rise to high-margin firms with considerable market power, lower pass-through of costs to prices 21 and implications for inflation volatility, the transmission of monetary policy and the natural interest rate. 16  Fo rbes, K. (2019). “Inflatio n dynamics: dead, do rmant o r determined abro ad? ”. Bro o kings Papers o n Eco nomic Activity, Fall. 17  In highly interlinked financial markets, lo ng-term interest rates and risky asset prices are expected to be increasingly affected by glo bal facto rs. 18  Geo rgiadis, G. and A. Mehl (2015). “Financial glo balisation and monetary po licy effectiveness”. Jo urnal o f International Eco no mics, 103, pp. 200-212. 19  Fo r example, as the exchange rate depreciates in respo nse to mo netary po licy lo osening, imported inputs used in the pro ductio n o f expo rts beco me mo re expensive, inducing expo rters to raise their ho me currency price.
This training is part of our broader focus on values. Values count heavily when assessing performance and reward. All managers – including myself – are assessed by colleagues on their values and behaviours – with direct and explicit feedback. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  We are monitoring the effect of all of these changes, including through regular staff surveys. We are aiming for further significant improvement in how our staff perceive the Bank’s support for diversity initiatives and goals over the next two years. There is more to do to reach our medium-term target, but we are encouraged by the momentum that we’ve established, we believe we have the right plan in place, and are heartened to see that our approach chimes with the conclusions in today’s report. Finally, we are conscious that sustained effort across the financial service sector will be selfreinforcing; we will all benefit from each other’s progress. So without further ado, I will pass over to the Economic Secretary to the Treasury so that she may tell you more about the Report and the broader initiative it supports. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The International Centre for Leadership in Finance is now in its 3 rd year of operations and more recently the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance was established to meet the increased demands of Islamic finance professionals, both in the domestic and international markets. The programmes carried out by the Institut Bank-bank Malaysia and Malaysian Insurance Institute has also been reviewed to meet the demands of the financial sector. Ladies and Gentlemen, While Malaysia has approached liberalisation in a gradual manner, our track record has shown that the process is accelerated when it brings benefits to the country. Financial liberalisation has on several occasions been brought forward. In particular, liberalisation has been focused on the new areas of growth that is, in the insurance sector, in Islamic finance and in investment banking. New licences in Islamic banking to foreign financial institutions and larger foreign equity participation in both Islamic banking subsidiaries and takaful operators, and in investment banking of up to 49% is aimed at achieving a more internationally integrated financial system. While liberalisation in the traditional sector will continue, its already highly liberalised status and its higher level of capacity relative to the economy does not introduce urgency to the liberalisation compared to the new growth areas. These traditional sectors may lead to overcrowding. The focus of a more rapid liberalisation is where significant market development are likely to take place. Emphasis would be towards attracting foreign players who are recognised as specialist in a specific segment.
BIS Review 56/1997  -4-  Figure 2  M o n e y M a r k e t Ag e n ts’ I n fla t io n E x p e c t a t io n s P e r ce n t 5  5  O c t . ’9 4  4  4 3  O c t . ’9 5 M a y ’9 6  CPI  3  N o v . ’9 ’9 6 2  2  F e b . ’9 ’9 7 1  1  0  0 -1  -1 94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  S o u rce s : S ta tis tics S w e d e n a n d P ro s pe ra R e s e a rch The way in which the instrumental interest rates are changed also has to do with credibility and tactics. If complete credibility in monetary policy and a low-inflation regime have not been achieved , it will naturally influence the pace with which interest rates are lowered or raised. In situations of this kind, the result may be that the central bank has its instrumental rates set at either a too high or a too low level compared with what would have been warranted in an environment of high credibility. Developments during 1996 can illustrate the effects on policy of both uncertainty and insufficient credibility.

Spencer Dale: Inflation targeting – learning the lessons from the financial crisis Speech by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the Society of Business Economists’ Annual Conference, London, 23 June 2009. I would like to thank Rohan Churm, Jens Larsen and Rob Wood for their considerable help in preparing these remarks. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. *  *  *  We are in the midst of a deep recession. Unlike recessions of the late twentieth century, this twenty-first century version is not the result of deliberate, but belated, attempts to slow the expansion of money spending in order to bring down inflation from very high levels. Inflation is close to the Government’s 2% target. This recession has at its heart a crisis in the banking system; a crisis that has strangled the supply of credit and undermined public confidence. For the first time in fifty years, the total amount of money spent in our economy during the first quarter of this year was lower than a year earlier. The era of “Great Stability” is over. The Great Stability followed hot on the heels of the introduction of the inflation targeting framework for monetary policy. Some attributed part of the improvement in economic performance to better policymaking. The abrupt end to that stability has, in turn, led the inflation targeting framework to be questioned.
Population ageing, by increasing the relative supply of savings, explains most of the fall across several advanced economies. A low or even negative natural interest rate poses new challenges for stabilisation policies. The lower bound on the nominal policy interest rate may more frequently be binding, and not just in episodes of acute crisis. This leads to the conclusion 3/5  that non-conventional monetary measures may ultimately be used more frequently than originally expected. In addition, many emerging economies face the gradual tightening of global financial conditions in a context of slowdown in their economic activity. In particular, this context is especially challenging for the economies that receive capital flows. In these cases, economic authorities must foster a stable macroeconomic environment and sound institutions that attract permanent capital flows. The widespread scant room for manoeuvre for the traditional stabilisation tools we have witnessed calls for the development of other policies to relieve monetary policy of the excessive role it has played post-crisis in maintaining financial stability. One of the lessons of the crisis is the importance of including new instruments in the policy toolkit, namely macroprudential policy. Therefore, it is essential to identify risks and vulnerabilities to the economy that may stem from the financial system affecting the real economy or vice versa. In any event, it is of paramount importance to develop the appropriate macroprudential instruments covering both bank and non-bank financial intermediation to tackle these risks in order to have a stable financial system with countercyclical buffers that support sustained economic growth.

Instead, we work closely together with the national supervisors. We also rely on their national expertise, and we rely on their experience. After all, they know a lot about the local circumstances, such as specific covered bond frameworks. Without them, European banking supervision would not work. In my view, working together, and placing our trust in each other, is a small price to pay for a safe and sound banking sector. And in the end, sharing control does not mean losing control – it may even mean the opposite. As members of the banking union, countries might actually gain control and influence. Together, they may be able to shape policies and rules which have an impact beyond the banking union itself. And they can also contribute to discussions at the global level, such as those of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. So, within the banking union, we share control over banking supervision. But the quest for a stable financial system does not stop there. It is crucial for financial stability that each bank is as safe and sound as it can be. But this alone is not enough. The health of each bank is not sufficient to ensure the health of the system. Things are a bit more complicated than that. When it comes to financial stability, the whole is more than the sum of its parts. If we want to limit risks in the whole system, we must do more than just monitor each part in isolation. We must cooperate.
But this is likely to reflect the delayed effects of the double-dip recession rather than structural changes to the economy. Conclusion  5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Let me conclude. Current financial market conditions have given rise to much comment. Concerns have been voiced that low long-term yields are a precursor to economic slowdown or recession. These concerns, however, are inconsistent with the marked rise in expected future short-term rates in some jurisdictions and the parallel increase in stock prices in many others. We currently see no concrete evidence of market uncertainty about the sustainability of the current economic expansion. We do see evidence, however, suggesting that market participants globally consider upside risks to future inflation to be limited at present. While this might be a natural corollary of the protracted period of low inflation, it may also be a matter of concern if it indicates complacency over future adjustments. However, we see no such risks in the euro area today. Accordingly, an ample degree of monetary stimulus remains necessary for underlying inflation pressures to continue to build up, and we expect the ECB’s key interest rates to remain at their present levels for an extended period of time, and well past the horizon of our net asset purchases. Thank you. 1 See Greenspan, A. (2005), Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S.  Senate, February 16. 2 See e.g.

Warnock, F. and V. Warnock (2009), “International capital flows and U.S. interest rates”, Journal of  International Money and Finance, 28, pp. 903–919; and Caballero, R. and A. Krishnamurthy (2009), “Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility”, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 99:2, pp. 584–588. 3 See Cœuré, B. (2017), “The international dimension of the ECB’s asset purchase programme”, speech at the  Foreign Exchange Contact Group meeting, 11 July; and Cœuré, B. (2017), “Monetary policy, exchange rates and capital flows”, speech at the 18th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 3 November. 4 See e.g. Eggertsson, G. B. and M. Woodford (2003), “The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and OptimalMonetary  Policy”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity No 1, pp. 139–211. 5 See e.g. Culbertson, J. (1957), “The Term Structure of Interest Rates”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 71, pp. 485–517; and Vayanos, D. and J.-L. Vila (2009), “A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates”, NBER Working Paper, No 15487. 6 See e.g. Cœuré, B. (2015), “Embarking on public sector asset purchases”, speech at the Second International  Conference on Sovereign Bond Markets, Frankfurt, 10 March; and Altavilla, C., G. Carboni and R. Motto (2015), “Asset purchase programmes and financial markets: lessons from the euro area”, ECB Working Paper No 1864; and Blattner, T. and M. Joyce (2017), “Net debt supply shocks in the euro area and the implications for QE”, ECB Working Paper No 1957.
The Bank assesses all major financial education programmes to evaluate their effectiveness in meeting the intended objectives through a Financial Education Assessment Framework. The Framework, developed in 2013, assesses the impact of financial education programmes on the overall level of financial literacy and on changes in behaviour. Mobile applications have also been introduced to promote more informed financial decisions. These includes applications for personal money management, updates on important consumer news including financial fraud alerts issued by the Bank, and for consumers to make enquiries, obtain advice and raise their complaints with financial institutions. These mobile applications are customised for use in Malaysia and can be downloaded by individuals at no cost. It is envisaged that wider use of these applications will contribute towards enhancing financial competence. The financial education initiatives in Malaysia has been advanced through collaborative efforts by the public and private sectors. Key agencies involved have included the Credit Counselling and Debt Management Agency, the financial industry, consumer associations and the Employees Provident Fund (which has more than 14 million contributors) to ensure that messages on financial management address all the key issues in savings, debt, BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  investment and protection. These strategies are pursued together with the efforts to promote financial inclusion and to ensure fair treatment of financial consumers. It is important to recognise that the financial industry itself plays a pivotal role in helping consumers improve their financial well-being.

Then I would like to address some of the questions and issues about Basel II that banks and supervisors in emerging market countries have shared with me. After that, I look forward to hearing the thoughts of my fellow panelists and those of others on what Basel II might mean for the Indian banking sector. Why Basel II is necessary: an overview of the new capital framework Before we discuss how Basel II may affect banks in India, allow me to begin by addressing why the Basel Committee drafted Basel II. The Committee published the text of the new capital framework this past June. This marked the culmination of nearly six years of difficult work for supervisors and for banks. Why did we take such pains to revise the existing capital rules? After all, the 1988 Basel Accord was a tremendous success in many ways. I think that several factors led us to conclude that a new approach was necessary. As you know, the 1988 Accord established the first internationally accepted definition and measure of bank capital. It was adopted in over 100 countries. As a result, it became acknowledged as one of the benchmark measures of a bank’s financial health. While the simplicity of the 1988 Accord was an asset in promoting its acceptance, today its simplicity is quickly becoming a liability for some bankers and supervisors alike. Over the past 16 years, the methodologies for measuring and managing risk have evolved in ways that the architects of the 1988 Accord could not have anticipated.
Be assured that I am committed to supporting the implementation of the National Strategy on Financial Education through such campaigns. Ladies and Gentlemen The World Savings Day celebrations would not be successful without recognising individual and organizational contributions towards improving financial literacy in Zambia. In this regard, awards will be presented under nine categories namely: 1. Exceptional individual contribution to financial education, 2. Outstanding theme interpretation; 3. Exceptional leadership in financial literacy; 4. Champions award; 5. Most innovative financial education programme; 6. Outstanding financial literacy footprint; 7. Exceptional financial literacy media outreach; 8. Outstanding initiative by an educator; and 9. Best savings product of the year. I am delighted to grace this year's World Savings Day award presentation and wish the nominated participants all the best. In conclusion, I would like to thank the organisers and stakeholders under our partnership arrangement, in particular, the Bankers Association of Zambia, Securities and Exchange Commission, Pensions and Insurance Authority, Rural Finance Expansion Programme and DSIK for their continued support to the World Savings Day celebrations every year. THANK YOU  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

A gradual transition requires, as you here in Finland are well aware, that the exchange rate is fixed irreversibly from the date of joining the union and the euro becomes the national currency, while banknotes and coins in the old currency continue to remain legal tender during a transition period. During this period there is no compulsion to use the euro and nor is there any prohibition against it. The disadvantage of a gradual transition would be that, as euro banknotes and coins already exist in the euro zone, it may appear strange to the Swedish general public that they cannot use them fully in all transactions in Sweden right from the start. The advantages of a gradual transition are that the major technical and practical adaptations to the euro could be made in stages, while Sweden would be able to participate fully in all co-operation and decision-making forums in the euro zone from EMU membership, without having to wait until the practical work was finished. The most recent report states that in a gradual transition process the financial sector and central government sector would need 1-1.5 years from the time of a political decision until the SEK/EUR exchange rate was fixed in order to prepare. After this, a further one year would be needed for the financial sector and two years for the central government sector before euro banknotes and coins could replace the krona. This is 1-2 years shorter than the three years the current EMU countries have had to prepare.
Faced with the possibility that they would have to finance these vehicles themselves, banks with spare cash have hoarded it and have become reluctant to lend to other banks beyond very short maturities. That has been evident in the spreads between interbank lending rates and central bank interest rates in the UK and equally in the euro area and United States. The bottom line is that banks that had financed themselves by borrowing from their peers, or by securitising and selling their loan assets, found that their funding dried up. In the United Kingdom, Northern Rock was particularly exposed. It was able to borrow only at shorter and shorter maturities. The present financial crisis is of a most unusual nature in that it comes against a background of five years of strong growth of the world economy and a decade and more of remarkable economic stability at home. Moreover, most banking and financial crises in the past – from the failure of Overend and Gurney in 1866, to the collapse of BCCI in more recent times – were associated with bad loans and significant losses on assets. The remarkable fact about this crisis has been the relatively small size of the bad loans compared with the total assets of banks. The crisis has arisen instead from the way banks have managed their liabilities. What did the Bank of England – as the central bank – do for the banking system?

But fire services do not offer free insurance for people who smoke in bed or set fire to their own house, thereby encouraging them to take risks that endanger others. When it became clear that Northern Rock could not find funding elsewhere, it came to the tripartite authorities (FSA, Treasury and Bank) to seek financial support from the Bank of England. Rather than stabilise the situation, the actions of the authorities seemed, at least initially, to fan the flames. There are lessons for us to learn. And I will come to those in a minute. But let me return to the queues of depositors. Here is an extract from a local newspaper: “By noon on Friday, more than 40 … customers … were waiting in line at the branch … waiting upward of an hour and a half to withdraw money from their accounts.” “Anxious depositors clutching withdrawal slips filled the offices for a second straight day. … The company placed extra chairs in a waiting area and asked customers to write their names on a sign-in sheet.” This wasn’t Newcastle or London. It was Los Angeles on August 17 and 18. The bank experiencing the run was not Northern Rock but Countrywide, a US mortgage bank. It is a Tale of Two Banks – banks of similar sizes and facing similar difficulties with funding – just a few weeks apart. Like Northern Rock, Countrywide took risks and relied on short-term funding from investors. But the similarity ends there. There were two significant differences.