samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Financial Stability Report No.14 (2)/2017 Liviu Voinea, Deputy Governor Press conference, Bucharest, 4 December 2017  Your Excellences, Dear colleagues, Dear guests,  Thank you for your presence at the launch of the December 2017 issue of the Financial Stability Report, No. 14(2)/2017. Right beside me are three NBR directors who are ready to answer your questions: Mr Eugen Rădulescu, director of the Financial Stability Department, which prepared the Report – I wish to thank all the colleagues involved; Mr Emil Vonvea, director of the Bank Resolution Department – an area having the role to strengthen confidence in the banking sector – the Report also includes a section dedicated to resolution strategies; and Mr Tudor Grosu, director of the Macroeconomic Modelling and Forecasting Department, as part of the analyses in the Report are based on scenarios and econometric models to the development of which his department also contributed. I would like to thank the other departments which cooperated in the preparation of the Report, particularly the Economic Studies Department for the translation. This is the 14th financial stability report launched by the National Bank of Romania. I would like to point out that the Report we are releasing today has been discussed in two meetings of the NBR Board and was unanimously approved by the NBR Board in its meeting of 27 November 2017. The Report presents the risks to financial stability, in close correlation with domestic and international economic developments.

Indicators for credit risk and asset quality percent  percent  100  30  250  100  25  90  200  80  20  80  60  15  70  10  60  5  50  0  40  150 100  289 239  234 223  217  129  50  40 20  0  0 OSII group  Non-OSII group  Total Romanian banking sector  LCR – total LCR – EUR component cumulative market share (rhs) OSIIs – other systematically important institutions Note: Ratio of liquidity reserves to net cash outflows. The minimum required level is 80 percent. Source: NBR  Sep.14 Nov.14 Jan.15 Mar.15 May.15 Jul.15 Sep.15 Nov.15 Jan.16 Mar.16 May.16 Jul.16 Sep.16 Nov.16 Jan.17 Mar.17 May.17 Jul.17 Sep.17  120  300  NPL ratio restructured loans ratio ratio of non-performing exposures NPL coverage by provisions (rhs) Texas ratio (rhs) Source: NBR 9  Figure 13. Non-performing loan ratio The adjustment pace of the NPL ratio in the EU (September 2014 – June 2017) percent  25  percent 21.5  10  NPL ratio in Romania  8 6  20  4 2 15  0 -2 -4  7.96  10  -6 -8 -10  5  -12 -14 RO CY IE HU BG IT LT AT HR ES LV CZ SK GB DE DK BE FR PL NL FI SE LU PT GR Note: No data are available for SI, MT, EE.
In other words, under this definition, the CCyB should allow for the accumulation of shock absorption capacity that banks could use in the downward phase of the cycle to continue providing households and firms with the necessary credit flow. In many macroeconomic and financial contexts, the activation of the CCyB will be justified on the basis of the three objectives mentioned by the BCBS simultaneously. This would certainly have been the case in the boom period of the Spanish economy before the last financial crisis. However, there might be cases where, based on available data, only one or two of these objectives can warrant the activation of the CCyB. In particular, there have been numerous examples of economic recessions not preceded by excessive credit growth. This promptly begs the question: should these buffers be exclusively built when the credit cycle is in a boom phase, or also when the economy is buoyant, i.e. when the business cycle is expanding? In my view, sound arguments may justify the use of the countercyclical capital buffer to accumulate loss-aborbing capacity in good times to be used in bad times, even when there is no evidence of the emergence of excessive credit growth. The main argument, in my view, stems from the evidence that, even in those situations, when the recession comes, borrowers’ default rates rise, 5/11  negatively affecting the profit and loss account and the capital position of banks.

These complementary indicators are: house price imbalances, current account balance, change in credit relative to GDP (credit intensity) and the private sector debt burden. And as an additional important indicator, we are planning to incorporate the output gap, under the assumption that the position of the economy in the business cycle must also play a role in the activation of this tool. The usefulness of using different indicators is especially important in cases like ours, in which the Basel gap does not work well because of the shorter average duration of credit cycles in Spain. Given the time lag implementation in the CCyB, we also carefully monitor the forcasted values of the indicators. Admittedly, accepting the role of macroprudential policies as an additional set of macrostabilising tools increases the potential interactions with other macroeconomic policies. Indeed, the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies is particularly relevant in a monetary union such as Europe’s and makes a strong case that justifies the introduction of national macroprudential policies. This is because, in a monetary union, monetary policy is defined on the basis of the state of the economy in the Union as a whole and, in some circumstances, it might lead to financial conditions that are too loose for certain country conditions and, therefore, can generate pockets of financial risk in some countries. Activating domestic macroprudential policy by those national authorities in such circumstances will help precisely avoid the emergence of systemic crises.
I would like to thank Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Ben Broadbent, Victoria Cleland, Andrew Hauser and Tom Mutton for their comments. 1. To function money relies on a shared understanding that the relevant instrument can be used to calibrate, exchange, store and settle claims. For further discussion on this point see recent speeches ‘It’s Time to Talk about Money’ (2020) and ‘Do We Need Public Money (2021)’. 2. The Bank of England also issues reserves to financial institutions. This is a form of wholesale money that allows regulated firms to hold claims on the Bank of England. 3. Only the Bank of England issues banknotes in England and Wales, but six banks in Scotland and Northern Ireland also issue banknotes, backed largely by assets at the Bank of England. See Scottish and Northern Ireland banknotes | Bank of England and the Scottish and Northern Irish Banknotes Regulations (2009) for further details. 4. The Payments of Wages Act 1960, as amended by the Truck Act. 5. Some examples of programmable functionality might include: instantaneous currency exchanges with reduced settlement risk; more efficient real estate purchases whereby all parties’ transactions are executed simultaneously by a smart contract; or an automated payment made by a vehicle at a toll booth. 6. Financial Services and Markets Bill (2023) . In December 2022, the Bank of England published a consultation closing on 10 February, setting how it intends to use these new powers. ,  7. See for example Haldane, A.: ‘Seizing the Opportunities from Digital Finance’ (2020). 8.

Concluding, I would like to thank all the researchers, the speakers, the audience and our collaborators, who responded positively to our call for participation. With these words, I wish you all fruitful deliberations, I wish the conference all success and I wish all the guests an enjoyable stay in Tirana. Thank you! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Together these banks account for around 73% of the stock of lending to UK households and corporates. I should also note that a significant number of other institutions are close to signing up too and we will update this table in due course. In addition, we will publish the first set of drawdown data in December, although you will have seen that one bank has already announced that it has drawn £ and plans to draw more. That said, it will probably take some time for banks to review fully their lending plans, and it is likely that drawings from the FLS will be spread out over the full window to end-2013.

Øystein Olsen: Management of the Government Pension Fund Global Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting, Oslo, 2 May 2017. * * * In 2016, it was 20 years since the Ministry of Finance made the first capital transfer to the Government Petroleum Fund, as the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) was aptly named at the time. This transfer marked the start of a transformation of petroleum wealth in the form of oil and gas in the ground into financial assets invested outside Norway. Since the first capital transfer was made, the GPFG has grown considerably, to more than 2.5 times the size of GDP. The year 2016 also saw the first net withdrawal from the GPFG. Ahead, the value of the GPFG will therefore, to a greater extent than previously, depend on the return on the fund’s investments. The period of steady growth in the GPFG as a share of the economy is now probably over. The key variables determining the GPFG’s long-term performance have been specified by the Ministry of Finance and approved by the Storting. For its part, Norges Bank has developed its management assignment in accordance with the fund’s growth and in line with the owner’s mandate. At the same time, Norges Bank has focused on its role as advisor in the further development of the fund’s investment strategy.
Our latest bank lending survey reported a tightening of overall credit standards, which was stronger than banks had expected in the previous round and suggests that lending may weaken further. Weak lending has meant that money growth has also continued to decline. Conclusion Summing up, the inflation outlook continues to be too high for too long. In light of the ongoing high inflation pressures, the Governing Council today decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Overall, the incoming information broadly supports the assessment of the medium-term inflation outlook that we formed at our previous meeting. Headline inflation has declined over recent months, but underlying price pressures remain strong. At the same time, our past rate increases are being transmitted forcefully to euro area financing and monetary conditions, while the lags and strength of transmission to the real economy remain uncertain. Our future decisions will ensure that the policy rates will be brought to levels sufficiently restrictive to achieve a timely return of inflation to our two per cent medium-term target and will be kept at those levels for as long as necessary. We will continue to follow a data-dependent approach to determining the appropriate level and duration of restriction. In particular, our policy rate decisions will continue to be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

Employment has continued to grow and total hours worked exceed pre-pandemic levels. At the same time, the average number of hours worked remains somewhat below its pre-pandemic level and its recovery has stalled since mid-2022. As the energy crisis fades, governments should roll back the related support measures promptly and in a concerted manner to avoid driving up medium-term inflationary pressures, which would call for a stronger monetary policy response. Fiscal policies should be oriented towards making our economy more productive and gradually bringing down high public debt. Policies to enhance the euro area's supply capacity, especially in the energy sector, can also help reduce price pressures in the medium term. In this regard, we welcome the publication of the European Commission's legislative proposals for the reform of the EU's economic governance framework, which should be concluded soon. Inflation According to Eurostat's flash estimate, inflation was 7.0 per cent in April, after having dropped from 8.5 per cent in February to 6.9 per cent in March. While base effects led to some increase in energy price inflation, from -0.9 per cent in March to 2.5 per cent in April, the rate stands far below those recorded after the start of Russia's war against Ukraine. Food price inflation remains elevated, however, standing at 13.6 per cent in April, after 15.5 per cent in March. Price pressures remain strong. Inflation excluding energy and food was 5.6 per cent in April, having edged down slightly compared with March to return to its February level.
These elements resulted in a swelling of inventories, durable goods purchases and investments in machinery & equipment. Among the more persistent phenomena that are driving demand and output are the stimulative effect of monetary policy, in an environment where the agents’ balance sheets suffered no permanent damages from either the crisis or 27-F.  2  BIS Review 126/2010  Furthermore, different measures show that financial conditions have advanced toward normalization in recent months, with a more favorable scenario in terms of both interest rates and banks’ lending standards. According to the banking credit survey of the second quarter, credit access conditions were relaxed at the same time that a strengthening of demand was observed. Loans have continued to grow, and interest rates are still low (figure 4). This combines with the good performance of the labor market and expectations of consumers and firms in the optimistic or near-neutral levels. Reconstruction works in the aftermath of 27-F have affected domestic expenditures, albeit with a different composition than was foreseen immediately after the disaster. At first, everyone expected that public and private efforts would focus primarily on infrastructure and construction, but capital goods imports and inventory replacement ended up being much more significant. Still, the baseline scenario assumes that building investment will pick up substantially towards the end of this year and in 2011, with some moderation of investment in machinery & equipment, which is already visible.

BIS Review 126/2010  7  Figure 5 GDP growh in selected regions and countries (1) (2) (annual change, percent)  Monetary policy rates in the world (3) (percent) 14  14  12  12  10  10  8  8  0  6  6  -5  -5  4  4  2  2  -10  -10  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  00  02  04  06  América Latina EE.UU. Japón  08  10  0  0  02  04  06  08  10  Developed economies (4) Emerging economies (5) Chile  Asia ex Japón Zona Euro  (1) Regions are weighted by PPP as in WEO, April 2010. (2) Dots show growth forecasts for 2010 and 2011 respectively included in the baseline scenario of September 2010's Report. (3) Solid lines describe simple-averaged reference rates of each group of countries. Dots show averaged responses from analysts surveyed by Bloomberg during August 2010. These reflect expectations for September 2010, December 2010, March 2011 and June 2011. (4) Includes Canada, the Eurozone, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.. (5) Includes Brazil, Colombia, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Poland, South Africa, South Korea and Turkey. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on statistics institutes of each country, Bloomberg and IMF.
Also, we cannot ignore the risks stemming from the longer-term fiscal challenges that we face in the United States. But in the near-term, the most immediate domestic problems may recede rather than become more prevalent. On the housing side, stronger employment growth should lead to increased household formation, which should provide more support to housing demand. And anxieties about the large overhang of unsold homes represented by the foreclosure pipeline may overstate the magnitude of the excess supply of housing. Families that have lost their homes through foreclosures are likely to seek new homes as their income permits, even though many may re-enter the housing market as renters rather than buyers. On the state and local side, a rising economy should boost sales and income tax revenue and help narrow near-term fiscal shortfalls. 1 Moreover, although we do need to remain ever-watchful for signs that low interest rates could foster a buildup of financial excesses or bubbles that might pose a medium-term risk to both full employment and price stability, risk premia on U.S. financial assets do not appear unduly compressed at this juncture. On the inflation side of the ledger, there are some signs that core inflation is now stabilizing. However, both headline and core inflation remain below levels consistent with our dual mandate objectives – which most members of the FOMC consider to be 2 percent or a bit less on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) measure.

However, with the recent passage of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, many of these will no longer be subject to DFAST supervisory stress testing or could 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  participate only on a periodic basis. The very largest and most systemically important firms, including all domestic bank holding companies with assets exceeding $ billion, will continue to be required to participate in DFAST supervisory stress testing on an annual basis. These recent changes are consistent with an emphasis on structural macroprudential concerns, in that they focus the DFAST stress tests on the set of firms that are individually the most systemically important. The intention seems to be to balance the burden of the supervisory stress testing regime against the negative impact that distress at one of these firms could cause to other banks and the rest of the financial system—part of the broader tailoring of the regulatory framework to the size and risk profile of different types of institutions.3 At the same time, however, reducing the set of firms subject to annual DFAST supervisory stress testing seems less consistent with cyclical macroprudential concerns, as it could narrow the window that stress test results provide on the build-up of risks and the loss-absorbing capacity of the banking system.
Monetary policy has little to contribute in this regard, whereas fiscal policy and other economic policy instruments are decisive. Rapid wage growth over many years has led to a high domestic cost level. Measured in a common currency, the cost level in Norway relative to our trading partners is 20 percent higher than the historic average for Norway’s oil age. As a result of the high cost level, internationally exposed industries are vulnerable to weaker international growth, a fall in export prices and a stronger krone. The real value of the krone has increased in recent years, reflecting solid domestic economic growth, high oil prices and relatively weak growth among our trading partners. As long as there are no available resources in the Norwegian economy, increased petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget will push up the real value of the krone or undermine competitiveness. This is likely to continue as long as we plough more oil money into the economy. The petroleum fund mechanism and moderate and predictable petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget will nevertheless make a considerable contribution to stabilising economic developments ahead. By limiting petroleum revenue spending to the real return on the Fund, we can also ensure that future generations share the benefits provided by our petroleum wealth. House prices are at a historically high level. The rapid growth in household income has been a key factor behind the rise in house prices for some time.

Key policy rate is low because inflation is low and because the downturn abroad and a strong krone are dragging down on growth in some sectors in Norway. Very low interest rates abroad and high premiums in money and credit markets reinforce this picture. There are unusually wide differences between various interest rates, reflecting the high level of money  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  market and credit premiums. Many households are paying up to 4 percent on housing loans and interest rates on corporate loans range between 5 and 6 percent. When setting interest rates, the Bank does not give weight exclusively to bringing inflation back to target. Weight is also given to the effects of the interest rate on output and employment. At the same time, weight is given to the risk that a prolonged period of low interest rates can lead to elevated risk-taking and excessive debt accumulation in the household and business sector. Such imbalances may have spillover effects further ahead, with substantial effects on output and employment. In the March 2012 Monetary Policy Report, Norges Bank clarified how these considerations are expressed in the Bank’s response pattern. In that connection, the Bank adjusted the criteria to which it gives weight in interest rate forecasting. The key policy rate is set so that inflation is brought back to target. At the same time, inflation targeting is flexible, which means that the path for inflation should be weighed against developments in output and employments. Interest rate setting should also be robust.
Nevertheless, despite all the reservations, it should not be overlooked that a monetary union creates facts. The elimination of transaction costs and of exchange rate volatility helps to lower interest rates, stimulates trade and facilitates direct investment within the Monetary Union. The project of the European single market, which, among other things, also serves to encourage mobility among the workforce, is thus provided with further valuable stimuli. Moreover, the stability and growth pact contributes to the harmonisation of economic policy. Asymmetric shocks may thus become less important in the course of time. It is precisely this type of shock that has the most adverse effect on the functioning of a monetary union. 2  BIS Review 60/2002  3. Implications of the euro's launch for Switzerland  3.1. Implications for the Swiss economy and the Swiss franc as a means of payment  Like many enterprises in the euro area, Swiss companies benefit from the greater price transparency created by the euro for goods purchased from Euroland. Besides, this leads to enhanced domestic competitiveness with beneficial effects on national prosperity. A further positive effect for Switzerland results from the reduction in the number of European currencies. Hence, foreign currency management becomes easier. The danger of extreme exchange rate fluctuations such as the 70% real depreciation of the Italian lira between 1992 and 1995 has diminished drastically with the disappearance of the most volatile European currencies. Nevertheless, in a system of flexible exchange rates fluctuations can never be ruled out entirely.

i  Global Official Institutions Conference, 22 June 2023 Building together a future-proof banking and payment sector in Europe  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 of 6 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to be with you for this Global Official Institutions Conference organised by BNPP, and I extend my warmest thanks to Jean Lemierre, Chairman of BNPP’s board of directors, for his invitation to give this speech. Facing the obvious turbulence and challenges of the last 18 months, we come here from different perspectives. Let me focus nevertheless on some common features: I will take the European view, and not only the French one. And I will focus on two delicate interactions between public authorities and private sector financial institutions: -  the first one is about the recent past: why did the euro area escape the banking turmoil born in the US and in Switzerland, and can we be safe enough? (I)  -  the second one is about the next future: why should Central banks stand ready to issue a digital currency? (II)  I. Banking turmoil: three blessings and a funeral I spoke after SVB’s failure of ‘Three blessings and a funeral’. Let me start with the funeral, at least the one that we can welcome, but which, unfortunately, is not final. It should be the condemnation and the funeral of mismanagement.