samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In parallel to assessing future economic prospects, the European Central Bank’s governing council looks independently at the dynamics of money and credit aggregates. This has proved very useful in the past to detect long-term risks to price stability, in both directions. The message today is clear: both money and credit are growing very slowly in the euro area as a whole. The M3 money-supply aggregate grew by 2.1% in September. These trends do not signal deflation, but warrant monitoring and vigilance when facing an uncertain future. Obviously, intentions may not always suffice and must be backed, when necessary, by appropriate and timely actions. Recent decisions by the governing council regarding both policy rates and liquidity provision show that we are ready to make the necessary decisions. Many instruments remain available should further risks materialize. There should be no doubt that the Eurosystem will ensure that price stability, as currently defined, will be maintained in the euro area. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

They should comply not only in form but in substance as well. For example, in relation to debt collection, it is not enough that they have incorporated the relevant provisions of the Code into the service agreement with their debt collection agents. They should also pro-actively check that their agents are actually following these provisions when collecting debts. •  Secondly, AIs should ensure that all complaints are dealt with fairly and thoroughly. Again it is not enough that there are efficient complaint handling policies and procedures in place. It is more important that such policies and procedures are conscientiously implemented by their staff. Where a complaint is justified, AIs should be prepared to offer the complainant restitution or compensation. •  Thirdly, AIs should ensure adequate levels of transparency in the provision of banking products and services. This is very important given the proliferation of more innovative and sophisticated products in the retail banking market. AIs must let their customers know the true cost of credit and ensure that all advertising and promotional materials do not contain misleading information. Self-regulation would not be a success without the involvement of the industry associations. Over the past six months, the industry associations have taken on a much more active role in developing the Code of Banking Practice. They have set up the Code of Banking Practice Committee, which has so far been effective in enhancing the role of the industry in self-regulation of market conduct.
Any agreements concerning wage increases should take their lead from the underlying inflation. These recommendations apply to both wage increases and, where applicable, to potential wage guarantee clauses. Arrangements such as these have already been used by the social partners in the past and have proven a useful tool for protecting jobs, making firms more competitive and spurring economic growth.10 Fifth, these guidelines on wage developments should be accompanied by explicit commitments to moderate profit margins. Only then will such wage restraint actually make firms more competitive, while, in turn, limiting the extent to which rising energy input costs are passed through to other goods and services in the economy. And some sort of mechanism would have to be set in place to ensure this restraint in profit margins can be verified. The simulations performed using the Quarterly Macroeconometric Model of the Banco de España (MTBE) underscore the benefits of a successful incomes policy. The MTBE  8  The weight of energy inputs in production and exposure to international competition vary considerably across sectors and firms. 9  To varying degrees, these types of clauses mean that, regardless of the type of underlying shock, any potential future price rises automatically pass through to wage increases, thereby triggering the second-round effects we hope to avoid.

The persistence and intensity of inflationary pressures reflect a combination of various demand and supply factors. Notable among the demand factors are the relatively strong recovery in activity following its collapse in 2020 and the changing consumption patterns as a consequence of the pandemic and the measures adopted to contain it. Among the supply factors, the higher price of energy - with major strains in the gas market - and the disruption to global supply chains stand out. This high global inflation environment was also reflected in expectations of monetary policy normalisation and, in consequence, a moderate tightening of private-sector financing conditions. 1  As at global level, the repercussions of the war for the Spanish economy are highly uncertain. Spain’s direct exposure to the countries at war is low. However, the invasion of Ukraine has also changed the economic environment and represents, at a time when the recovery from the pandemic remains incomplete, a new shock that can be expected to entail adverse consequences in the coming quarters for economic activity and inflationary pressures through various channels. Of these channels, the most important is probably commodity markets, including markets for both energy and non-energy commodities, in particular foodstuffs and metals, of which Russia and Ukraine are both significant global producers and exporters. Spain’s direct exposure to these imports is relatively low; for example, in 2019 only 6% of its total energy purchases from the rest of the world came from Russia.
Braunerhjelm, P., Ganslandt, M., Nyberg, S., Stennek, J. and Wahl, N. (2002), Gränslös konkurrens – Sverige i ett integrerat Europa (Unbounded competion – Sweden in an integrated Europe), SNS förlag. David, P. (1990), “The Dynamo and the Computer: An Historical Perspective on the Modern Productivity Paradox”, American Economic Review 80, May, 355-361. Forsling, G. and Lindström, T. (2004), ”Labor Quality and Productivity: Does Talent Make Capital Dance?”, Background Facts on Economic Statistics, 7, Economic Statistics Department, Statistics Sweden. Greenwood, J. and Krusell, P. (2007), “Growth accounting with investment-specific technological progress: A discussion of two approaches”, Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 1300-1310. Jorgenson, D., Ho, M. och Stiroh, K. (2006), “Potential Growth of the U.S. Economy: Will the Productivity Resurgence Continue?” Business Economics, January, 7-16. Swedish Competition Authority (2002), Competition in Sweden 2002, Swedish Competition Authority’s report series 2002:4. Lundgren, S. (ed. ), Edquist, H. and Wallgren, A. (2007), Tillväxt i otakt (Growth out of time), SNS Förlag. Romer, D. (2005), Advanced Macroeconomics, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 3rd edition. Solow, R. (1956), ”A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, no. 1 (February), 56-94. Solow, R. (1957), “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function”, Review of Economics and Statistics 39, no. 3, 313-330. Stiroh, K. (2001), “What Drives Productivity Growth?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, March. 6  BIS Review 61/2007

It therefore seemed natural to begin basing monetary policy on forecasts of CPIX inflation, which disregards interest expenditure. If the CPIX was close to the target two years ahead, this was an indication that the interest rate did not need to be changed, even if the CPI deviated from 2 per cent. To put it simply, one could say that this was a means of creating flexibility in our policy without abandoning the policy rule. We still had CPI inflation as a target variable, but began to use another measure of inflation as a tool to attain the target. 2  BIS Review 73/2008  Increased credibility and flexibility As confidence in our inflation-targeting policy has increased, it has become possible to allow this flexibility to take other and perhaps more natural expressions than to emphasise another measure of inflation than the CPI to base our interest rate decisions on. Today we make forecasts three years ahead, based on an assessment of what is considered to be a suitable path for the repo rate. Given this way of working, the base for our decisions is not that a particular measure of inflation should always be at a certain level at an exact time horizon. The important thing is that CPI inflation develops in a way we consider to be reasonable during the forecast period. We can so to speak aim to stabilise the CPI directly. This normally means that the CPI should reach the target level within two years.
See the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s report and accompanying data file, “Projections for the SOMA Portfolio and Net Income (July 2017).” 15 These liabilities include Federal Reserve notes (U.S. dollar paper currency), the U.S. Treasury’s General  Account, deposits held by designated financial market utilities and government-sponsored enterprises, and reverse repos conducted with foreign and international account holders. On average, these line items summed to over $ billion in 2017, on top of more than $ trillion in Federal Reserve notes. Fed liabilities are discussed more thoroughly in Lorie Logan, “Implementing Monetary Policy: Perspective from the Open Market Trading Desk,” remarks before the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City, May 18, 2017. 16 It is worth noting that the size and structure of Fed’s securities portfolio and the role the portfolio played have  undergone substantial shifts at various times over the course of the Fed’s history, reflecting changes in policy implementation imperatives. See Meryam Bukhari et al, “The SOMA Portfolio through Time,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics (blog), August 12, 2013. 17 Throughout this discussion, I focus on forward guidance and use of the central bank’s balance sheet (through  large-scale purchases of additional assets and reinvestment policies, but not funding for lending programs) as possible tools. U.S. policymakers have shown little appetite to pursue negative nominal interest rates, although that is another unconventional tool used by several central banks in recent years.

In periods of zero interest rates, such purchases help to counter the risk of deflation. The Swiss economy faces an exceptionally difficult year in 2009. Economic activity is set to pick up again gradually over the course of 2010, thanks to the extremely expansive monetary policy. This is, however, conditional upon an economic recovery by our main trading partners, as well as a return to stability on financial markets. The SNB measures are also aimed at reducing the risk of deflation in Switzerland. Despite the creation of massive amounts of liquidity, the SNB remains committed to ensuring price stability in the future. We will use all means at our disposal to reduce liquidity again in good time, so as to prevent any upsurge of inflation in Switzerland once the crisis has ended. BIS Review 33/2009  1
Thomas Jordan: Challenges for Switzerland as a financial centre Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung) Capital Market Forum, Zurich, 3 September 2012. *  *  *  I would like to thank Raphael A. Auer for his support in writing this speech. I would also like to thank Daniel Heller, Rita Kobel and Peter Kuster for their insightful comments. Introduction “If you see a Swiss banker jumping out of a window, follow him, there is sure to be a profit in it.” This famous saying, attributed to the French writer and philosopher Voltaire, has been in circulation for more than two centuries. In recent years, however, the reputation that Swiss bankers have for turning a profit under all circumstances has been somewhat tarnished. Pressure on the Swiss financial centre has been intensifying, due mainly – but not exclusively – to the financial crisis. For banks domiciled in Switzerland, doing business and making money has become more difficult. But this is not the first time that Switzerland as a financial centre has faced stiff headwinds. Throughout our history, Swiss bankers have managed to draw the appropriate conclusions, and change course in time. Allow me, therefore, right at the outset, to say this: I am convinced that the Swiss financial centre will be successful in overcoming the many challenges ahead, and that it will remain an important pillar with regards to the wealth of our nation.

Our focus should now move to a consistent and rigorous implementation of the Basel III framework across the globe. Concluding remarks Ladies and Gentlemen, I have discussed the challenges Switzerland faces as a financial centre. While I consider these challenges to be high hurdles, they are not insurmountable. The Swiss financial industry has constantly adapted throughout its history; it will continue to adapt to the current challenges and continue to be successful. What can the SNB contribute to the success of the financial industry? I am convinced that an independent, stability-driven central bank with a clear mandate, willing and able to act forcefully if appropriate, is a necessary condition for a competitive and vibrant financial centre. However, this condition is far from being sufficient. In that spirit, allow me now to throw the ball into your court. The future of the Swiss financial industry is in your hands. It is your integrity, your power of innovation and your service to the customer that is pivotal for the Swiss financial industry. It is up to you to shape the future of this industry. While I certainly do not pretend to know the business decisions you will have to take in the years to come, I am pretty sure that jumping out of the window is not the best option. In this regard, it may be worthwhile remembering that Voltaire himself made a fortune, and went on to be celebrated as an old wise man – without, to my knowledge, ever following his own advice.
This meeting is taking place a little over one year after the start of the COVID-19 crisis, which has been characterised by its global scale, unprecedented intensity, high persistence and a very marked differential impact across sectors, countries and population groups. Currently, there are hopeful signs alongside causes for concern. On the positive side, the roll-out of the vaccination process, and the gradual approval of new vaccines and a brisker pace of manufacture and distribution, allow us to discern a scenario entailing the resolution of the health crisis and, consequently, the prolongation of the incipient economic recovery. Indeed, the latest IMF forecasts published last week envisage an upward revision of the forecast for global growth, compared with its projections in January. The latest figures highlight the buoyancy of the world’s two biggest economies, the United States and China, which will be among the few to have attained their prepandemic level of GDP before the end of this year. However, this favourable outlook runs in parallel with high uncertainty on several fronts. First, epidemiologically speaking, the emergence of new strains of the virus and doubts over the effectiveness of vaccines against them, coupled with the uneven pace of progress in the different countries’ vaccination calendars, raise questions about when we will manage to fully resolve the health crisis. And this unevenness, accompanied by other country-based idiosyncratic factors, is giving rise to appreciable and growing divergences in the pace of economic recovery globally.

Thirdly, the importance of the ECB’s flexibility as regards the recalibration and use of instruments should be highlighted. By way of illustration, the evolution of the economic crisis caused by the pandemic required an increase in the PEPP in June of € billion, and of € billion in December, up to a total of € trillion. The net purchase horizon was also extended until at least end-March 2022 and the maturing securities reinvestment horizon until at least end-2023. 4  In December we also decided to recalibrate the conditions of the TLTROs. We extended by 12 months, until June 2022, the period during which the reduced interest rate for banks meeting the lending target will be applicable, scheduling three additional quarterly operations between June and December 2021, and increasing the borrowing allowance of TLTRO funds each bank can obtain from 50% to 55% of its eligible loans. Another of our decisions was to extend until June 2022 the aforementioned collateral framework flexibility measures. But apart from this flexibility in the response over time, there is a key difference in the PEPP compared with the previous asset purchase programme (APP). Whereas the APP retains a relatively rigid structure regarding the distribution of asset purchases both over time and across jurisdictions, the PEPP afforded itself from the outset the possibility of concentrating these purchases in the most critical months of the crisis and in the countries which, at each point in time, have been subject to tighter financing conditions.
Researchers are already starting to fill this hole (the Gertler-Karadi model employed in Section 5 is but one example) and it is a reasonable bet that the literature will be in a very different place in a few years time. It may be tempting to think that these frictions will become less important when normal times return and therefore that the ability to model the behaviour of intermediaries will only be  BIS Review 111/2010  23  necessary during bad times. That would be, though, an error. Central bankers, as guardians of overall financial stability, need to understand the risks building up in the financial system better than we did during the run-up to the present crisis. That requires greater attention to such issues during good times. 4. Central bank independence. Nothing that has happened over the past decade or so suggests that the thinking behind the delegation of monetary policy to an operationally independent central bank is flawed. But the application of unorthodox policies during the crisis has inevitably forced the central banks concerned to work more closely with finance ministries and sometimes taken them into politically sensitive territory that they would rather not inhabit. Normal times should make it possible to retreat from these unorthodox policies, but a concern to circumscribe the central bank’s powers may well linger. 5. The pursuit of price stability. Because monetary policy failed to prevent the crisis, some have suggested that the emphasis on price stability has been misplaced and that inflation targeting has “failed”.

That’s too short a time for monetary policy to have much effect. Prices of other, non-energy traded goods aren’t quite as volatile, their direct effects take longer to feed through and therefore affect the overall rate of inflation for longer. But they’re still unlikely to have that much of an impact a couple of years ahead, the sort of timescales it takes monetary policy to have its peak effects. So although the pandemic was clearly much less disinflationary than central banks and other forecasters had predicted – the demand-shifting and supply-impairing effects on goods prices were very significant – it nonetheless seemed likely at the time that these effects would dissipate, along with the virus itself, within that medium-term horizon. I think there are some signs this has begun to happen. One of the higher-profile effects of the pandemic was a dramatic rise in the cost of shipping. Also well reported were the steep rises in prices and delivery times for computer chips and the cars on which they rely. In all three cases rates of inflation have fallen back markedly over the past few months (Charts 6a and 6b).
Since the remarkable work of the Pébereau Commission in 2005 on public debt, there has been a succession of plans for reform, from a General Revision of Public Policy (RGPP) under President Sarkozy, through Modernisation of Public Policy (MAP) under President Hollande, to Public Action 2022 under the current presidency. More recently, another revision of the Organic Budget Law adopted in 2021 aimed in particular to improve multi-year oversight of the public finances, by introducing a nominal public spending target in billions of euros [rather than in GDP points], as well as a three-year ministerial performance trajectory. Unfortunately, the first public finance planning act under this new framework is struggling to be adopted. The absence of an overall perspective, overlapping sectoral reforms and successive waves of decentralisation have resulted in a lack of consistency and "a loss of vision by the administration". i I am perfectly well aware of how difficult it is for politicians and our elected representatives to deal with the unrelenting pressure of urgency, exacerbated by a succession of unprecedented crises. However, the growing tyranny of "the news cycle" and of emotions tends to mask the structural challenges we face. De Tocqueville's thoughts on the Ancien Régime and the Revolution are strikingly apposite today: "[The government] seldom undertakes or soon abandons the most necessary reforms, which in order to succeed, demand a persevering energy". ii  Page 8 of 19 The increased use of assessment has also been a disappointment in terms of improving public sector efficiency.

And, when we rebound from the shock of the pandemic, the Mittelstand will have to be one of the drivers once again. The coronavirus is a double economic shock. Its effects have hit activity extremely hard, with GDP falling by 6.8% in the euro area last year and 5% in Germany. But it has also accelerated structural changes that will transform our lifestyles and our economies. According to some estimates, the pandemic has brought forward the digital transition in Europe by seven years. [4] And it is estimated that 20% of work hours will move permanently from office to home. [5] This will lead to new patterns of demand and new ways of living. So, our challenge will not only be to recover from the crisis, but also to adapt to the changes it has set in motion. And the Mittelstand – thanks to its agility, its focus on innovation and its commitment to competing by adding value – will have to be at the heart of this process. For now, however, the pandemic is still weighing heavily on our economies, and especially on firms in the services sector. While manufacturing has recovered quite well since the first lockdown last year, buoyed by solid global demand, activity in the services sector has remained subdued owing to the social distancing measures that are still in place today.