samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The productivity gains to the economy can be more long lasting than the petroleum industry itself. And never forget: The real test of how a petroleum producing country has managed its fortune, will come when the boom in the petroleum industry ends. Oil and gas resources do not last forever. Emphasis should therefore be given to further development of human capital as the primary source of long-term prosperity and wealth. Thank you for your attention. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Macroeconomic developments and main assumptions  Now, I will talk about the macroeconomic outlook and our assumptions on which our forecasts are based. First, I will summarize the recent inflation developments, and then continue with the domestic and foreign demand outlook upon which we based our projections. In the fourth quarter of 2015, consumer price inflation (CPI) increased by about 0.86 points quarter-on-quarter to 8.81 percent, overshooting both the projections of the October Inflation Report and the uncertainty band around the year-end inflation target (Chart 11). Unprocessed food prices were the main drivers of this higher-than-forecasted rise in annual inflation. In fact, inflation excluding unprocessed food and tobacco was close to the October Inflation Report forecast in this period (Chart 12). The lagged effects of the Turkish lira depreciation were particularly evident through the core goods channel. Yet, the continued fall of import prices in the fourth quarter limited the rise in CPI inflation. Chart 11. October Inflation Forecasts and Realizations (Percent)  Chart 12. October Inflation Forecasts and Realizations Excluding Unprocessed Food and Tobacco (Percent)  * Shaded region indicates the 70 percent confidence interval for the forecast. Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. In the fourth quarter, despite the decline in USD-denominated import prices, cost pressures on inflation continued due to food prices and exchange rate developments. We see that these rising cost factors limit the improvement of the underlying trend of core inflation BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  (Chart 13).
Using this fiscal space mostly to reduce government debt would facilitate demand management and reduce any need for indirect tax hikes, therefore providing more flexibility regarding the conduct of countercyclical monetary policy. In this respect, should fiscal discipline be implemented through institutional and structural improvements, such as enacting and establishing the fiscal rule, it would be possible to keep policy rates at singledigit levels over the medium term. Since the last quarter of 2008, the CBT has focused on containing the adverse effects of the global crisis on the domestic economy without conflicting with its primary objective of maintaining price stability and this has to a large extent been achieved. Monetary policy will continue to focus on price stability in the period ahead. Strengthening the commitment to fiscal discipline and the structural reform agenda would support the improvement of Turkey’s sovereign risk, and thus facilitate macroeconomic and price stability. Before concluding my speech, I would like to reiterate that timely implementation of the structural reforms envisaged by the Medium Term Program and the EU accession process remains to be of utmost importance. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 133/2010  17

I don't suggest that that interest rate risk will go away altogether - though if I could make just one comment on the current macro-economic situation you'll be discussing in a moment, it would be to caution you against placing too much weight on the steepness of the short-term interbank interest rate futures curve as an indicator of the likely course of official short-term interest rates - at least in the UK: our impression is that it includes quite a significant term premium. But even if interest rates are some degree less volatile, in a context of overall monetary stability, we certainly won't avoid sectoral imbalances such as we have seen over the past year or so; nor can we exclude policy failures in individual countries, which can, as we saw in the Asia crisis but happily not in the present case of Argentina, have wider repercussions. So I suspect you will have your work cut out in pricing and managing credit risk in your necessarily more diversified bond portfolios. You have a difficult job. But the efficiency with which the market allocates financial resources depends upon your doing it well. It is a heavy responsibility. But the official community equally has a responsibility to help in so far as it can. And we can help, I think, in three main ways.
The scope is relatively moderate, but appears nonetheless to have reduced bottleneck tendencies in some industries where demand has increased sharply. Traditionally, many workers from our neighbouring countries have contributed when the labour market in this country has been tight. In 2001, close to 30, 000 persons resident in Sweden were employed in Norway for all or part of the year. Swedes who have registered as residents in Norway come in addition. An increased supply of labour from new EU member states to Norwegian enterprises may lead to a higher-than-normal increase in potential output for a period. Many of the foreign workers work for a shorter period in Norway without being employed in a Norwegian enterprise. Examples include foreign contractors and self-employed in the construction industry who carry out various building projects in Norway, as well as others who carry out other types of projects. Aker Kværner, for example, has contracted 300 consultants in India who are working from India on the Ormen Lange project in the western part of Norway. An increase in the use of these short-term contracts will appear as an increase in Norway’s service imports, which contributes to increasing the supply of goods and services without drawing on domestic resources. Protectionist measures may dampen the impact on the Norwegian economy of an increased supply of labour from the new EU member states. The transitional rules from 1 May last year stipulate that foreign workers shall have Norwegian wages and working conditions.

Therefore, there is cause for some optimism concerning the possibility of shielding the mainland economy from the effects of swings in oil prices. In the long run, however, petroleum revenues and their use will affect the level of costs in Norway. An increase in oil prices may generate expectations of higher use of petroleum revenues in the future, particularly if high oil prices are expected to persist. Such expectations may exert appreciation pressures on the krone. It may also generate expectations of higher returns in the Norwegian stock market than in foreign markets, which also can and has contributed to an appreciation of the krone. Our assessment is that developments in oil prices and an increased cash flow have been responsible for the appreciation of the krone since the spring of 2004. We are approaching a peak in petroleum production in Norway and must expect a substantial reduction in the next decades. In addition, there is considerable uncertainty associated with future petroleum production. In recent years, there has been a tendency to overestimate projections for production a couple of years ahead. It is especially demanding to estimate production for the many large fields that have reached maximum capacity. The fiscal rule provides a long-term anchor for fiscal policy. It provides a stable framework that contributes to curbing some of the fluctuations in the Norwegian economy. Nonetheless, the use of petroleum revenues in the Norwegian economy has been increasing over the past few years. Petroleum investment has increased significantly.
Stefan Ingves: The relationship between the Swedish Riksbank and the Riksdag Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Sveriges Riksdag (Swedish parliament), Stockholm, 8 June 2007. *  *  *  Independence and opportunities for evaluation and accountability Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to today’s conference. Of course it is both an honour and an inspiration to have the opportunity to discuss in such knowledgeable company the Riksbank’s relationship to the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) and what this means for monetary policy. In recent decades many central banks have become increasingly independent in relation to the political system. This also applies to the Riksbank. At the same time, these institutions, which have often been fairly closed and secretive, have become more open and clear with regard to their objectives, motives and means. Many central banks now conduct monetary policy with more or less explicit price stability targets and the Riksbank was one of the first to introduce this type of quantified target for inflation at the beginning of the 1990s. Both our price stability objective and our independence have been written in the law since 1999. This contributes to strengthening the credibility of monetary policy. The fact that increased independence has gone hand in hand with greater openness and clarity – what is usually called transparency in central bank language – is not particularly strange. For an independent authority to gain general acceptance and legitimacy, there must be good opportunities for evaluation and accountability.

Growth and employment will be stronger in Europe if we combine more reforms where they are needed, such as in France and Italy, and more fiscal support in those countries with room for manoeuvre, such as Germany. In practice, for such a collective economic strategy to exist, the euro area needs an institution that fosters confidence: it could consist of a euro area “Finance Minister”. The third step, in the longer term, would be a European fiscal capacity. It comes at the end as it requires more convergence and more confidence. A genuine euro budget would be a stabilisation tool and could include, for example, a euro area-wide unemployment insurance scheme. It could also be used to finance certain “European public goods” such as digital technology, the energy transition or the integration of refugees. And in the long term, it could directly issue common debt and even raise taxes. Let me sum up. Since the beginning of the crisis, Europe has been able to strengthen itself and to build a set of instruments and mechanisms that have significantly increased its resilience (Banking Union, the ESM, the enhanced SGP, etc.). It is now a matter of continuing this progress and not seeing Brexit as a shock to the euro area but rather as an opportunity to pursue, in a structured way, the setting-up of a better Economic Union. And at the core of Europe, France has made progress, which needs to be accelerated.
And, we are putting more emphasis on senior level contact in the new approach. We want to deliver key messages very clearly to senior management and boards, and we want to know how your governance works in practice. I will give one example of this approach in recent months, returning to Solvency II. It was clear to me by the end of last summer that we were facing a long delay in the directive on top of a bill that, as I have said, was indefensible and ever rising. We have had extensive contact with chief executives and the Association of British Insurers in recent months, with the overarching objective that this cannot go on. I think we have reached a sensible conclusion which at least makes the best of where we find ourselves. Where possible and sensible we will use the work done on Solvency II to date to bolster our existing ICAS regime, though I should stress that we are quite comfortable with the core of ICAS and believe that we can use it as the framework to build the PRA approach until such time as Solvency II appears. I hope that this change of approach both alleviates the costs and helps to create a less pressured environment in which we can seek to obtain a better framework for prudential supervision of insurers in the future than would otherwise be the case. There is too much at stake for the industry and the economy to compromise on this objective.

Andrew Bailey: The evolution of insurance regulation – a shifting scope and new frontiers Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Executive Director and Member of the Financial Policy Committee, Bank of England; Managing Director of the Prudential Business Unit, Financial Services Authority, at the Nicholas Barbon Lecture, London, 6 February 2013. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to give this Nicholas Barbon Lecture. And, thank you for giving me the opportunity to remind myself of the career of Nicholas Barbon – I say “remind myself” because a long time ago I was an economic historian. Barbon is certainly one of the founders – if not the founder – of the insurance industry in London in the late seventeenth century. He was first a builder, indeed, he wrote a tract called “an apology for the builder” in which he defended new construction in London on the grounds that cities created employment and wealth. Barbon was probably the leading builder of the time and he offered an integrated service because he pioneered house insurance. Indeed there are observations that Barbon’s business was to build, insure, and re-build your house when it fell down. These days you would be in FSA enforcement if you tried that one. But Barbon was also one of the early economic theorists in a period at the end of the seventeenth century when economic theory flourished, before it went into abeyance until Adam Smith and David Hume came onto the scene.
Progress so far The G20 roadmap on cross-border payments is now well into its second year. Considerable progress has been made meeting the actions, and developing a strong understanding of the issues and publishing best practice and guidance. There has also been tangible progress towards the desired outcomes. I will mention a few examples from the CPMI led building blocks, to whet your appetite, but should stress that this is not an exhaustive list. Building block 9: The CPMI received multiple responses to its October 2021 call for ideas on expanding payment-versus-payment for FX transactions. These responses have helped inform a consultative report that will be published in the summer. Building block 10: The Reserve Bank of Australia is working towards expanding access to  Page 4  domestic payment systems for non-bank payment service providers (PSPs). [10] And the Central Bank of India has reviewed access criteria in 2021 and expanded access to certain categories of non-bank payment system operators. [11] Building block 12: The US Fed has extended Fedwire operating hours in 2021, it is now operational for 22 hours per day, 5 days per week. [12] The European Central Bank is planning to extend operating hours as part of the go-live of the consolidation project in November 2022. Building block 13: In May 2022 Sveriges Riksbank and TIPS have established a connection with the goal to use TIPS services to settle non-euro currencies in central bank money.

A similar view emerges from the talks conducted every quarter with over 200 companies by the SNB’s delegates for regional economic relations. Inflation expectations are thus within the range that is consistent with the SNB’s definition of price stability. Like inflation expectations, short and long-term interest rates in Switzerland have hardly changed since summer. Short-term money market rates have remained close to –0.75%, and the yield on ten-year Confederation bonds has fluctuated between 0% and –0.2%. The interest rate differential with the euro area has been largely stable. By contrast, the interest rate differential with the US has widened somewhat, due to higher US interest rates resulting from tighter monetary policy. There has, however, been movement since June with respect to exchange rates. Over the past six months, the Swiss franc has depreciated against the euro by about 7%. In addition, since the last monetary policy assessment in September, a mild weakening has occurred against the US dollar. The trade-weighted nominal exchange rate for the Swiss franc is currently about 5% lower than in June. The depreciation in real terms is roughly similar. The weakening of the Swiss franc has contributed to reducing the overvaluation. However, the franc is still highly valued. What lies behind these exchange rate movements? In the first phase, from June to September, the Swiss franc depreciated against the euro, while remaining largely stable against the US Page 3/4  Berne, 14 December 2017 Thomas Jordan  News conference  dollar.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  driven by the housing market, seen in the 10 year upswing of the last cycle. Trees cannot in the end grow to the sky. The debt stock of course tends to change relatively slowly. Credit is growing broadly in line with GDP. If it were to resume growing more than twice as fast as GDP, it could take a number of years for debt to income to retain its pre-crisis peak. But just as financial cycles build up over a number of years, the risks they pose are perhaps best managed over time. Given the vulnerability that already exists and the powerful drivers in the UK, particularly the housing market, if credit began again to grow faster than GDP, I would want to think about action to manage the financial stability risks sooner rather than later. References Aikman, D., Haldane, A. G. and Nelson, B. D. (2015), Curbing the Credit Cycle. The Economic Journal, 125: 1072–1109. doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12113. Arcand, J-L, Berkes, E and Panizza, U (2012), “Too much finance?”, IMF Working Paper No. 12/161. Borio, C (2012), “The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?”, BIS Working Paper No 395, December. Cecchetti, S, G, Mohanty, M, S, Zampolli, F (2011), “The real effects of debt”, BIS Working Paper No 352, September. Crowe, C., Dell’Ariccia, G., Igan, D., and Rabanal, P., (2011) “How to Deal with Real Estate Booms: Lessons from Country Experiences”, IMF Working Paper, WP/11/91.

The new thing would be to combine those ingredients together, at scale. The question of whether to do so is complex, and beyond the scope of my remarks today. The UK will publish a consultation on this issue later this year. But the implications for central bank balance sheets will also depend heavily on how any CBDC is designed: on who can hold it, where it can be used, how much can be held, and whether it is interest-bearing (Table 1). The Bank of England’s work in this area is available at: UK central bank digital currency | Bank of England. 1  Bank of England  Page 3  Source: Bank of England  Design choices that placed the economic features of CBDC close to today’s banknotes might have relatively limited implications for central bank balance sheets, at least in normal economic conditions. Choices that positioned the economic features of CBDC closer to today’s retail commercial bank deposits could have a more material impact. To give some sense of potential scale, Chart 1 compares two stylised benchmarks – the stock of banknotes; and 20% of retail commercial bank deposits2 – to the size of central bank balance sheets between the period before the Global Financial Crisis and today. In the UK, the upper end of that benchmark range is nearly half the size of the Bank of England’s balance sheet today, and six times that in 2007.
As Mr. Aninat (Former Deputy Managing Director of IMF) said once, and I’ll quote his own words, “Historical experience shows that financial crises are here to stay; and dealing with unfolding crises in real time poses perhaps the most demanding and certainly the most stressful challenge to any central banker”3. As a result, it is widely accepted that financial stability is an important issue for policy makers that they basically cannot ignore. Furthermore, economic literature and experiences of countries also showed that in order to reach sustainable growth and sustainable increase in employment, the key components of the economy are, in addition to indispensable price stability, a sound financial system and a financially stable environment. Dear Guests, For the efficient allocation of resources in an economy, financial intermediation should also function efficiently so that firms can find sources to produce more. As we keep dwelling on the banking sector particularly, banks play a vital role in the economy, matching supply of capital with demand, so knowing how a downturn affects these institutions is important in understanding national economies’ dynamics4. Developments in financial markets have two important implications on the global economy and economic policies: Firstly, stronger a country’s fundamentals are, less vulnerable it is to distortions caused by intensive capital movements. Hence, the importance of macroeconomic stability and strong fundamentals. However, contrary to the general belief, turmoil in global markets in the 90’s also showed that macroeconomic stability in general or price stability in particular does not necessarily guarantee financial stability.

The introduction of the euro has profoundly changed the environment in which the Swiss economy operates. Since 1999, the Swiss franc has coexisted quite harmoniously with the euro. In fact, the franc has been more stable against the euro than it was against the D mark. This is good news for Swiss companies exporting to the European market. On the other hand, such companies have to contend with a greater concentration of foreign-exchange risks. They are responding to this challenge with hedging policies that are more active than those pursued in the past. Pegging the franc to the euro in order to eliminate exchange-rate risks would entail more problems than advantages, as it would inevitably push up the level of interest rates in Switzerland. Against this backdrop, the National Bank is continuing to pursue an independent monetary policy that takes account not only of economic trends and inflation forecasts but also of the situation on the foreign exchange markets. BIS Review 10/2004  1