samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The objective of monetary policy  • Monetary policy is to be oriented towards low and stable inflation. • The inflation target is set at 2.5 per cent. SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  BIS Review 48/2002  1  Monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. The inflation target is set at 2½ per cent. When monetary policy is geared towards stabilising inflation, it also contributes to stabilising demand and production. Low and stable inflation fosters stability in the economy. The inflation target is the nominal anchor for the Norwegian economy. Low inflation is the objective, and the interest rate is the instrument. Monetary policy functions with considerable and variable lags. The current level of inflation does not provide an adequate basis for determining the level at which interest rates should be set today. Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effect of an interest rate change will occur within two years. Two years is therefore a reasonable time horizon for attaining the inflation target. Economic agents can act on the assumption that the inflation rate will be close to 2½ per cent over time. If it appears that inflation, with unchanged interest rates, will be higher than 2½ per cent, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation, with unchanged interest rates, will be lower than 2½ per cent, the interest rate will be reduced. There is symmetry here.

This development demonstrates the bank’s strong and long term commitment to be a significant player and contributor to the development of our financial sector, and the growth of the economy as a whole. The Bank of Zambia wishes to commend the Board of the Bank, Managing Director and his Team for these commendable developments. Ladies and Gentlemen, you will no doubt be aware of the crucial role that banks play in financial intermediation. The real challenge therefore is for all financial sector players to play their honest part in enhancing savings mobilization and to effectively channel the public’s savings to support financing of viable economic activities. as our economy continues to grow and per capita incomes increase, demand for financial services from both the corporate sector and the general public will continue to grow rapidly. Therefore, Zanaco’s wide branch network will strengthen its capacity to meet this growing demand for financial services. Managing Director, Distinguished invited Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia is always pleased to be invited to occasions such as the one we are witnessing today, because it gives us an opportunity to share with you and the public some of the key developments that are taking place in our financial sector and the economy at large. In this regard allow me to say something about what is currently the most topical issue not only in the financial sector but in the national economy as a whole.
Even though we have called a pause in our asset purchase programme, the effects of past purchases will continue to work through the economy for some time to come. The aim of quantitative easing is to boost the supply of money, push up a wide range of asset prices and facilitate finance through the capital markets, thus raising nominal demand in the economy. How well is quantitative easing working? Chart 3 shows, for the two days following each successive announcement about the scale of the asset purchase programme, the movements in: average gilt yields; the expected average level of Bank Rate over the same maturity (from Overnight Indexed Swap rates); and the spread between them 1 . That suggests gilt yields are lower as a result of the programme by a total of around one percentage point. Moreover, since the programme began, investment-grade corporate bond yields have fallen by almost four percentage points, equity prices have recouped half their  1  The impact is measured by the change over two days in the average 5 to 25 year (zero coupon) gilt spot rate.

While not questioning the basic framework, they suggest 3 that inflation targeting central banks should aim to hit a rather higher inflation rate of around 4%, so as to give more room to cut official interest rates in the face of a collapse in demand before they hit their natural floor of zero. Thus, during the years leading up to the crisis, Bank Rate averaged around 4½%–5% and inflation averaged around 2%, so the real interest rate averaged 2½%–3%. If instead, inflation had been averaging 4% and Bank Rate 6½%–7%, i.e. the same real interest rate as before, then we would have been able to lower Bank Rate by another two percentage points before it approached its lower limit. The thinking behind this seems entirely reasonable. But, aside from ignoring the fact that monetary policy, in the shape of asset purchases 4 , can still be effective even when the policy rate reaches zero, it underplays the costs of higher inflation. Inflation at 2% or less is  3  Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia and Paolo Mauro, “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”, International Monetary Fund, January 2010. 4  As well as more exotic options; see Willem Buiter, “Don’t Raise the Inflation Target, Remove the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates Instead”, Citibank , 5 March 2010. BIS Review 31/2010  5  generally felt to be low enough that businesses and households do not have to consciously plan for rising prices – it is “close enough” to price stability, in other words.
Expansionary policy can also be expected to boost activity and profits, which also tends to raise asset prices. But the case for monetary policy having a role in the run-up to the crisis comes less from these conventional monetary transmission channels and more from the idea that loose monetary policy particularly encouraged a shift into riskier asset classes, which then got out of hand – the so-called “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu, 2008). There are broadly three ways in which looser monetary policy encourages increased risktaking. First, and most conventionally, a lower yield on safe assets encourages substitution into higher-yielding risky assets, in the process driving up their prices. Second, some investors such as pension funds need to match the returns on their investments to their commitments. A reduction in the return on safe assets then encourages them to switch into high-yielding but riskier assets in an attempt to deliver nominal returns which match their liabilities – a “search for yield” (Rajan, 2005). Executive compensation linked to absolute returns has a similar effect. Finally, a slightly more complex mechanism is developed by Adrian and Shin (2009) and Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010). They argue that financial intermediaries target leverage ratios which are either constant (commercial banks) or pro-cyclical (investment banks).

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: The importance of savings for investment growth Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, on the occasion of the World Savings Day - celebration of the Macedonian Banking Association, Skopje, 30 October 2018. * * * Dear Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honor and pleasure for me to address you at today's event marking the World Savings Day - a day that banks and financial institutions around the world dedicate to promoting saving and raising awareness of the public about the benefits it brings. The saving is undoubtedly important from the aspect of both, individual and overall economic progress and maintenance of the macro financial stability. For each individual, or family, it is the principal and the most important step towards providing financial stability in a long run. By saving, we protect ourselves from unpredictable changes in the personal income dynamics, we more efficiently plan the longterm investments and we build sound foundations for maintaining stable finances throughout the lifetime. Saving is also beneficial for the entire society, as it is one of the key factors which the economy’s investment level depends on, which is a prerequisite for boosting the long-term economic potential. Usually, a significant portion of the savings is channeled into the banking system thus providing stable sources of financing to domestic banks, which is particularly important for the bank-centric financial systems, such as the Macedonian one, where the banks act as major financial intermediaries.
I don’t mean it would be completely smooth right now; it would be smoother in a year or so as more progress is made. But in extremis, it could be done now. That surely is a massive signal to bankers and markets. Europe has not yet reached the same point, but contrary to some commentary is not far behind. The necessary legislative regime is close to completion. In contrast to the US, however, many of the largest European – including UK – banking groups will need to reorganise in order to make themselves susceptible to either Single Point of Entry or Multiple Point of Entry resolution. That brings me to my second point. (2)  The Single Point of Entry versus Multiple Point of Entry resolution strategy distinction may be the most important innovation in banking policy in decades  We will learn to speak of banks and dealers as either “SPE groups” or “MPE groups”. Some technical developments don’t matter hugely. This one does. A lot will follow from it, as I will sketch in a moment. But first I should recap the difference between SPE and MPE resolution strategies. A single-point-of-entry or SPE resolution works downwards from the group’s top company – most simply, a pure holding company (Holdco). Losses in subsidiaries are first transferred up to Holdco. If Holdco is bankrupt as a result, the group needs resolving. The “bailin” tool is applied to Holdco, with the equity being written off and bonds converted as necessary into equity to recapitalise the group.

Reforms are all the more important to help the economy adapt smoothly to external shocks such as those currently observed. In many countries, governments also need to press ahead with fiscal consolidation and fiscal reform. Budget deficits in the euro area as a whole are expected to improve this year, but this will mainly be the result of strong economic growth and one-off revenues from the sale of UMTS licences. Abstracting from these factors, there has been little further progress in the consolidation of public finances on average. Moreover, current budget plans for 2001 imply that the average fiscal stance will be slightly more expansionary next year. For the first time since 1993, the primary balance ratio as a percentage of GDP for the euro area is expected to deteriorate in 2001. This somewhat more expansionary stance demonstrates that the reform strategies have, in some cases, been unbalanced. Many countries have enacted reductions in personal and corporate income taxation and social security contributions, but have not set ambitious expenditure ceilings. While the tax reforms currently being implemented or planned in a number of euro area countries are a welcome stimulus to the supply side, they need to be accompanied by restraint in government spending. The longer-term sustainability of budget positions also needs to be ensured in several countries with regard to the consequences of planned fiscal reforms, such as those of pension systems, and the reduction of taxes. The policy adjustments necessary to create the financial leeway for these reforms should be prepared now.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Lessons from the crisis and steps towards economic stability Keynote speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank (ECB), at the 9th Munich Economic Summit, Munich, 29 April 2010. *  *  *  Sehr geehrter Herr Bundespräsident, lieber Horst Köhler, Sehr geehrter Herr Chrobog, sehr geehrter Professor Sinn, Meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren, ich danke den Veranstaltern dieser Konferenz recht herzlich für die Einladung. Besonders dankbar bin ich für die Gelegenheit, im Anschluss an meinen langjährigen Freund Horst Köhler sprechen zu dürfen. Wir sind uns über einen langen Zeitraum hinweg in verschiedenen Positionen immer wieder begegnet und haben oft sehr eng zusammengearbeitet. It has always been an enormous pleasure to talk with him and to work with him. Both of us were engaged in the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty. That is where we met nearly twenty years ago. We were also heavily involved with the handling of the European Monetary System crisis in 1992/93. I remember that episode very well. It was a defining moment not only for the monetary integration of Europe. It remains in our memories as a vivid example of what close and friendly cooperation can do in very exceptional and demanding circumstances. In my remarks today I would first like to reflect on the lessons that I believe we can draw from today’s financial and economic crisis.

Remuneration schemes, for example, should support sustainable business rather than myopic trading. There is one over-arching issue that I would like to highlight: the financial industry has to reconsider its role in the economy. Returning to a role of serving the real economy would be desirable. “Financial engineers” may prefer to create ever more “sophisticated” financial products. But finance has to come back to the basics. Among the basic tasks of the financial industry is the supply of credit to the real economy. This too is a profitable business, the profits from which are justified because they are mirrored by the social value of the intermediation function. Businesses and individuals depend in particular on the steady supply of credit by banks. The ECB and the national central banks of the euro area have taken comprehensive measures during the crisis to help commercial banks and other financial institutions. When the turbulence started in August 2007, the ECB was the first central bank to step in by frontloading liquidity. After the intensification of the crisis in the autumn of 2008, we tackled the paralysis of interbank transactions in the money market. In addition to a swift and substantial reduction of our policy rate, in line with our primary objective of maintaining price stability over the medium term, we decided to implement a set of non-standard measures, which we collectively refer to as “enhanced credit support”. I explained these measures in detail here in Munich in a speech last July. These measures have significantly helped to maintain banks’ liquidity.
Penger og Kreditt 3/05, Norges Bank. 12  In a world of free capital movements, the fixed exchange rate policy came under pressure as the 1990s wore on. For Norway, the development of the oil industry and strong growth in oil revenues also played a decisive role when formulating the new economic policy guidelines adopted in 2001: the fiscal rule for fiscal policy and an inflation target for monetary policy. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 17 FEBRUARY 2022  This system has served us well for more than 20 years, during a period when the economy has also been buffeted by severe shocks. But we have learned lessons along the way. One lesson is that strictly rule-bound economic policy is not fit for purpose. For interest rate setting, this means that the conduct of monetary policy must be flexible and manage trade-offs between the outlook for inflation and developments in output and employment. And the fiscal rule can no longer serve as a strict budget guideline from one year to the next. Norges Bank has faced different challenges in its 206-year history. A lot has changed since Nicolai Rygg’s day. But economic cycles will continue to shift, and we need to be prepared for new, unforeseen crises. The central bank’s primary mission remains the same: to promote economic stability and ensure confidence in the monetary system. Thank you all for your kind attention during my time as Governor of Norges Bank. Central bank governors come and go, But not the central bank, as you well know.

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Annual address by Governor Øystein Olsen to the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank  THURSDAY 17 FEBRUARY 2022  Economic perspectives 2022  NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 17 FEBRUARY 2022  INTRODUCTION Today, nearly to the day, a hundred years have passed since the first annual address was delivered. The governor at that time, Nicolai Rygg, painted a gloomy picture. The speculative boom in Norway during the First World War had created a bubble that burst. A wave of losses ensued. The economy was marred by stagnation and bankruptcies. The problems in the business sector spread to the banks.1 If banks had failed, the problems facing businesses would have intensified. It was therefore crucial to make sure the banking system weathered the crisis. There was no disagreement about that. The main issue under heated debate was who should bear the losses and who should guarantee new capital. Not many weeks after the first annual address, Norges Bank had to step in to rescue one of the big banks. When the next big bank encountered problems, Norges Bank was again called upon to intervene. But Nicolai Rygg now put his foot down. The loans provided should be guaranteed by the State and not by Norges Bank. Not only did Nicolai Rygg have to deal with a banking crisis, but also an erosion in the value of the Norwegian krone due to periods of excessive money supply.
The short answer to this question, which I will now illustrate, is, on the one hand, to be a useful player in the FinTech ecosystem and, on the other hand, to promote and implement a regulatory framework and appropriate supervisory practices that foster both innovation and the stability of our financial system. * 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  In order to be a useful player in the Fintech ecosystem, we have two objectives: facilitate and  experiment Facilitate, firstly. This is what we are doing via the implementation of specific support tools. For instance, under the aegis of a national start-up correspondent, who is also the French Tech correspondent, the Banque de France has just deployed a network of regional start-up correspondents in each of the 13 French Tech capitals. Their mission is to be the key point of reference for rating start-ups and providing them with support and guidance thanks to their knowledge of funding mechanisms and of the main players in the ecosystem. As regards the ACPR, I no longer need to present theFinTech Innovation Unit, which has already held hundreds of meetings with start-ups since its creation. Its purpose is to provide an easily accessible entry point for those with innovative projects, giving them some initial regulatory guidance to help them shape their projects and then refer them to the right correspondents for the necessary registrations or authorisations. Naturally, our facilitation efforts are not limited to bilateral contacts alone.

In order to meet these challenges, it is imperative that this ecosystem transforms to accommodate changes in demand for financial products and services, the increased competition that is driving down profitability and the fast-growing need for operational resilience. In this context, a thriving, creative and efficient FinTech ecosystem may be a key element in the transformation of the financial system towards greater efficiency and resilience to shocks. This is why, as central banker and supervisor in charge of ensuring monetary and financial stability, I feel it is important to support this FinTech ecosystem and facilitate its smooth integration into the broader financial ecosystem. Naturally, I would like to make it clear that this integration does not,in my opinion, mean a convergence of players, a “harmonious” cooperation or a coordinated approach: the various players have different, sometimes even opposing goals, and that is how competition works. However, we should not systematically pit FinTechs against established players: there is a great variety of relationships between these two worlds, as we see every day. The potential for enriching the financial ecosystem and making it more efficient and resilient lies in strengthening the relationships between players and their diversity. What do we want to do and what are we doing at the Banque de France and the ACPR to support this development of the FinTech ecosystem?
The current account surplus increased to US $ million from a surplus of US $ million recorded the previous quarter, reflecting an increase in the merchandise trade surplus coupled with the narrowing of the services and income accounts deficits. Supporting the current account was the merchandise trade surplus which rose by 74.8% to US $ million in the quarter under review following an increase in exports as well as a decline in imports. Merchandise export earnings edged upward by 18.7% to US $ million, on account of increases in both metal and non-traditional export earnings. Metal export earnings recorded a 20.0% rise to US $ million during the reviewed period, following a rise in copper export earnings although earnings from cobalt fell. Cobalt export earnings declined by 0.5% to US $ million in the third quarter of 2010 due to a 13.8% drop in the average realised price to US $ per mt from US $ per mt ton in the second quarter. This was despite the increase in cobalt export volumes by 15.4% to 2,318.14 mt in the third quarter of 2010. During the reviewed period, non-traditional exports (NTEs) increased by 13.2% to US $ million. This was principally due to an increase in export earnings from cane sugar, cotton lint, electrical cables, fresh flowers, fruits and vegetables, and electricity products. Merchandise imports declined by 6.1% to US $ million during the reviewed quarter.

The survey findings indicated that agricultural activities still remained a major source of income for most Zambians but that this sector was largely under-served by financial service providers. The survey findings also showed that there was an increase in the number and types of banking services and products but that the uptake had remained unchanged as the focus of financial service providers appeared to be serving the same market, as opposed to enhancing financial inclusion. Overall, there was a marginal increase of 3.6 percentage points in financial access to 37.3% in 2009 from 33.7% in 2005. Developments in banking, currency and payment systems During the quarter, there was a continued improvement in the availability of electronic payment options. The number of Point of Sale (POS) terminals increased by 3.8% to 1,033 terminals (Quarter 2, 2010: 995). The volume of POS transactions also increased by 15% to 199,817 (Quarter 2, 2010: 173,606) while the values increased by 13% to K86 billion (Quarter 2, 2010: K76 billion). The number of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) increased by 4% to 468 ATMs (Quarter 2 2010: 450). The volume of ATM transactions also increased by 11% to 6,333,073 (Quarter 2 2010: 5,697,122) while the value increased by 16% to K2,898 billion (Quarter 2 2010: K2,498 billion). The Bank would like to continue urging the public to use electronic payment methods as they provide a more convenient, safer, efficient and effective way of making payments.