samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Our monetary strategy ensures a continuity from the monetary policies previously conducted by the national central banks, which now belong to the Eurosystem. This strategy has been well received by financial markets and the general public. In particular, the relatively low yields on long-term euro-denominated bonds confirm that the Eurosystem has retained the credibility store it inherited. d)  Lastly, the credibility of the euro also results from the Eurosystem's constant efforts in terms of transparency and communication. I must stress here that the Eurosystem is one of the most transparent central banks in the world. Once a month, immediately after the ECB Governing Council meeting, the President of the ECB holds a press conference which starts with a precise report of the assessment of the Governing Council, and which is made available in real time on the ECB website. The Eurosystem was the first central bank in the world to introduce, on 1 January 1999, the concept of regular, frequent, real-time communication in the domain of monetary policy. Other major central banks have since decided to follow us. Being accountable, for an independent institution in a modern democracy – or, as it is the case for the Eurosystem, in a subtle constellation of democracies like the European Union – means being accountable to public opinion.

In this respect, both public speeches and testimonies by the President of the ECB to the attention of the European Institutions and public opinion, as well as those by the Governors of National Central Banks to the attention of national Institutions and public opinion, are of vital significance. Indeed, a crucial part of our collective duty consists in tirelessly explaining the reasons and the arguments that underpin the decisions of the Governing Council. In December 2000, the Eurosystem decided to release, for the first time, its euro area economic staff projections, with a view to improving transparency and communication. 2  BIS Review 96/2001  Thus, from the point of view of the accountability of the central bank in a democratic society – that is to say the duty to explain, justify, convince, whenever possible, and take full responsibility vis-à-vis public opinion for decisions taken –, the Eurosystem strives to meet the highest standards of the main central banks in the world. 2. The euro significantly contributes to growth in Europe by enhancing the co-ordination of economic policies  A few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great number of sceptics, in Europe as well as in the rest of the world, that the euro would really be launched. Many observers believed that the single monetary policy would never succeed ! Facts have disproved this conclusion. However, other observers still sometimes evoke the supposed fragility of the euro area stemming from the supposed economic and structural divergences between euro area countries.
This increases the possibility that some investors – and issuers, for that matter – misunderstand the riskiness of an instrument. As a consequence, expected return may not appropriately reflect the true risk. When the true risk of an instrument starts to reveal itself, sharp corrections in the market may follow. The recent subprime crisis is one example of how new and complex instruments can give rise to global financial turmoil. Problems stemming from over-optimistic price expectations for the US housing market have spread to investors and financial institutions all over the world. The wide dispersion of the financial turmoil took many of us by surprise. Not to mention where problems turned up; in German Landesbanken, in large investment banks and in Norwegian hydro-electricity-rich municipalities, to name but a few. 1  Ben S. Bernanke (2006): ”Opening remarks” at ”The new economic geography: Effects and policy implications”, A symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 2  Alan Greenspan (2007): ”The age of turbulence”, The Penguin Press, New York. 2  BIS Review 14/2008  One lesson from the current financial turmoil is that the expected advantages of securitisation have been somewhat exaggerated. Securitisation was believed to make markets deeper and more liquid and – most importantly – to provide continuous pricing. Recent events have shown that this is not necessarily true for all markets at all times. In times of distress and uncertainty, some financial market segments can cease to function.

Are there any other objectives than price stability and financial stability that may be suitable for a modern central bank? Many countries also have objectives for developments in the real economy written into the regulatory framework governing the central bank’s activities. For instance, in the US legislation it says that the Federal Reserve shall promote ”maximum employment”, while the British legislation says that the Bank of England shall support ”the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment”. In Sweden there is no specific objective for real economic developments written into the law, but it is nevertheless considered to be understood that the  4  See, for instance, Oosterloo, S. and J. de Haan, (2003), ”A Survey of Institutional Frameworks for Financial Stability”, Occasional Studies Vol.I/No. 4, De Nederlandsche Bank, for an overview of how the task of promoting financial stability is dealt with in different central banks’ regulations and in practice. 4  BIS Review 52/2006  Riksbank – as an authority under the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament – shall support the objectives of economic policy with the aim of attaining sustainable growth and a high level of employment. Exactly how the objectives are worded thus varies considerably between countries, often depending on the fact that changes and modifications have gradually been made to regulations originally written much earlier. I dare to claim nevertheless that the essence of modern central banks’ wording of their objectives is the same.
Often these barriers are consistent across firms. Perhaps most notable is the requirement for loss absorbency – establishing a liability structure for G-SIBs that is consistent with bail-in, not bail-out. Again, there has been significant progress here. The Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued a consultation document 2 on a minimum standard for Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) last November and is committed to producing a final standard ahead of the G20 summit next month in Antalya. This will be a major step on the road to ending “Too Big to Fail.” Additionally, we need to pursue the same TBTF agenda for other types of G-SIFIs, in particular central counterparties (CCPs). I want to spend some time today talking to what – if anything – can be taken from the resolution of banks that is relevant for CCPs. Context for CCP resolution CCPs form a key part of the global financial landscape. They have become ever more important since the crisis. This will continue as mandatory central clearing is introduced around the world. Addressing the systemic risks associated with over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets is one of the reasons why G20 leaders introduced mandatory central clearing. People tell us that we have thus created in CCPs concentration risk and critical nodes. This is true in part, but we did this on the basis that in CCPs risks could be better recognised and identified, better managed and reduced via better netting.

With today’s interest rate increase, we are also raising the interest rate on sight deposits above the threshold. For domestic banks, this threshold is calculated on the basis of their minimum reserve requirements. 1 By remunerating sight deposits above the threshold now at 0.5%, we ensure that our tighter monetary policy will continue to be passed through efficiently to interest rates in the money market overall. 1  Further information is available in the Instruction sheet governing interest on sight deposits. Page 1/2  Berne, 15 December 2022 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Page 2/2
In both cases, the National Bank would react with adequate means. To conclude my remarks, I would like to reiterate what role the exchange rate plays in our monetary-policy decision-making process. We live in a system with flexible exchange rates. Such a system is very advantageous for Switzerland, but once in a while exchange rate fluctuations have to be reckoned with. We are currently going through a period characterised by a strong Swiss franc. In the past, there have always been phases during which the Swiss franc tended to be very strong. Experience has also shown, though, that there have always been corrective phases as well. It is the National Bank's responsibility to maintain price stability in the medium term, thus creating a favourable environment for the development of all sectors of the economy. For monetary policy, the exchange rate is an extremely important measure, as it influences the price level directly via import prices as well as indirectly via capacity utilisation in the export sector, and thus via economic growth. Particularly the last nine months exemplify the strong influence of the exchange rate on Switzerland's monetary policy. We always neutralised the tightening of monetary conditions, which was brought about by the appreciation of the Swiss franc, and rendered Swiss franc investments less attractive. We are aware of the fact that these measures do not provide relief to all sectors of the economy at the same time or to the same extent.

That is, that we know the range of outcomes that might happen and how the economy works and, insofar as is possible, given uncertainty, that we correctly analyse the available information to weight the probability of those. A famous corollary of this is the efficient markets hypothesis – that it is not possible to systematically ‘beat the market’. The stronger form of the hypothesis posits that market prices fully reflect all available information – that the price reflects the likely future revenue streams. But even if the price does deviate from that fundamental level, it may be rational for investors to remain in the market – as Chuck Prince famously put it, to keep dancing so long as the music is playing. The rewards of the game may be worth the risk of being stuck without a proverbial chair at the end. And even if they are not, sitting on the sidelines may not be a winning career move if promotions and funding flow to those with a reputation for high returns. It may be rational to stay with the herd, as Keynes said “it is better for reputation to fail conventionally”.11 Rational expectations do not mean that the future matches expectations and corrections are avoided – when new information arises, agents react to that. If the information is material for a financial asset, for example a change in Roman property ownership laws in AD 33, the adjustment can be large.
Thomas Jordan: Real estate prices falling in the US, rising in Switzerland – implications for the SNB’s monetary policy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft, Chur, 18 December 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Developments in the real estate market are important for monetary policy. Real estate markets can influence inflation and economic cycles, but also the stability of the financial system. Property bubbles can result in a massive misdirection of capital and thus give rise to lengthy and difficult adjustment processes. Therefore, the SNB closely monitors developments on the real estate markets both in Switzerland and abroad. The economic outlook is still clouded by undesirable developments on the US real estate market, notably in the period 2004-2006. Given the size of the United States and the broad international spread of investments in the US mortgage market, these distortions have had a serious impact on the world’s financial markets and on global economic development. For some years now, Switzerland too has been experiencing a construction boom and a relatively sharp rise in property prices in certain regions and in given market segments. Comparison of the Swiss and US real estate markets shows, however, that these markets differ in a number of key respects.

Loan growth in July increased to 11.8 percent while deposits including bill of exchange grew by 1.9 percent. Liquidity in the system remains adequate, with loan/deposit ratio excluding interbank transactions at 90.1 percent in July. On asset quality, gross NPL ratio edged downward to 6.4 percent in June. These numbers show that the performance of the Thai banking sector is quite robust, and is well positioned to support the economy. Fourth, a more difficult picture to assess is the impact of the turmoil on the economy and how this would translate into the impact on the banking sector. So far, notwithstanding the less helpful global environment, the Thai economy has performed relatively well, with growth averaging 5.7 percent in the first half of this year. But going forward, market participants expect the economy to become more affected by the slowing global economy. Our own forecast also sees growth to be less buoyant in the second half of the year, reflecting a more adverse impact on exports. But overall, the momentum of growth should not be too adversely affected given the support that growth could gain from domestic demand which is being supported by high farm income, continued credit availability, and supportive fiscal policy. Moreover, lower oil prices and monetary policy that focuses on inflation should provide a stable price environment conducive to domestic demand and to export competitiveness. Also, continued current account surpluses, lower external indebtedness, and high domestic savings have made the economy’s financial conditions more stable, by reducing its dependency on capital flows.
Moreover, costs could outweigh the potential benefits. If agents consider the downturn not only to be ineffective but also to compromise the achievement of the inflation target, a much less expansionary monetary policy could be necessary to realign inflation expectations. Thus, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on our ability to timely diagnose the state of the economy and its implications on inflation, to respond consistently in setting the policy rate, giving it sufficient persistence to operate and generate the necessary credibility for markets to respond in accordance with the expected results of these interventions. At the Central Bank we are committed to ensuring these conditions. With this, monetary policy will continue to contribute to the country's welfare by maintaining low and stable inflation, cushioning the volatility of the business cycle. Likewise, although the Central Bank does not have the instruments to directly influence the growth potential of the country, it can indirectly contribute by preventing the loss of welfare that results from economic volatility; reducing uncertainty to encourage investment, production, employment and consumption decisions, and contributing to make the financial sector safer and more efficient for the benefit of the entire population. Thank you.

If there's one thing the pandemic taught us, it's the need for adaptability in overcoming challenges. More so in today's workforce, with the multifaceted issues arising from technology, sustainability, demographics and other structural changes. Consequently, talent planning and management must move in tandem with these changes. What do I mean by that? Several priorities are fundamental to pave the way for a better, more productive and rewarding future of work: First, leveraging analytics to forecast talent needs and to better measure workforce performance and productivity. By regularly analysing and monitoring employee performance and engagement metrics, organisations can determine the strategic talent acquisition, development and management decisions required. This will prepare the workforce for the challenges they will face going into the future. Second, developing a fast, agile and coherent workforce investment strategy. Several key elements include identifying workers who are being displaced from their roles, establishing appropriate internal committees to manage the displacement, funding reskilling and upskilling, motivating employee engagement in this process, and tracking the long-term success of such transitions. This should also account for specific needs by segments such as older workers, mothers returning to the workforce and contract employees. Third, introducing agile HR and organisational policies to enhance workforce flexibility and productivity. Given the recent success of remote working, many organisations are looking to capitalise on productivity and efficiency gains by establishing an effective hybrid working model that supports both office and remote working.
It kept on pestering the innocent third party for one month until after the Police had found out which bank it was acting for and a complaint was lodged to the HKMA against that bank. But the explanations given by the bank, both to the complainant and ourselves, about how the mistaken identity could have arisen and about what measures would be taken to prevent this sort of thing from recurring, were not satisfactory. Without going into details, these explanations raised more questions than they answered. This, in our view, gave rise to general supervisory concerns both about the bank and its business practices, and about practices relating to debt collection generally. We therefore took this matter up with the Code of Banking Practice Committee, and the industry associations have since reminded their members to improve monitoring of the performance of debt collection agencies. We have also tightened up our own monitoring of this issue, as you are aware through our letter issued at the end of last month. More than half of the complaints we receive are about debt collection: not all are necessarily as extreme as the case I have described, but many, in our view, raise similar supervisory concerns. Taking action on the question of bad business practices in the use of debt collection agencies was, in my view, clearly within the MA's powers under section 7(2), since it could threaten the reputation not only of the bank concerned but also of the banking system as a whole.

Countries with larger fiscal deficits have had a more procyclical policy both in good times and in bad times. A Commission paper finds a significant impact of elections on procyclicality, especially procyclical tax cuts. In addition, the structural deficits are most likely higher than presumed. With lower potential growth, the ECB will need to push the brakes earlier and more forcefully than most people assume. Hence, the long awaited help from growth to fix the deficit problems and the debt-to-GDP ratios will most likely not materialize. Deficits and debts could  4  BIS Review 88/2006  deteriorate even further when pressures from an ageing population will kick in within the next five years. Is there a solution? Let me first note an interesting development: 1999-2004 the average yearly fiscal deficit in the euro area has been 1.9 per cent of GDP while the average yearly (unweighted) surplus of the three old outcountries (the UK, Denmark and Sweden) has been 1.1 per cent of GDP. This despite the fact that the UK has moved from a comfortable surplus position to a deficit of 3.3% of GDP in 2004. Some euro-sceptics will of course attribute this difference to monetary union itself but I think the difference is rather that all three out-countries have been forced to find new ways of building a strong national macroeconomic framework based on clearly stated goals and a transparent evaluation of how these goals are to be met, in addition to the common EU rules.
Foreign direct investment in Algeria is a relatively recent development and has notably followed the achievement of balance of payments viability. For the past six years (2003–2008), total FDIs amounted $ billion 8.7, of which 47.3% from EU countries and  BIS Review 168/2009  3  25.2% from Asian and Middle-Eastern and North African countries. The share of FDIs in the hydrocarbon sector in total FDIs, which reached 55% in 2005, has gradually declined to 42% on average during the recent years. Non-hydrocarbon sectors which attracted FDIs include the banking sector, chemical industry, food industry, electricity sector, water desalination, and construction material. The exchange rate policy is conducted by the Bank of Algeria in the context of a managed float regime of the dinar vis-à-vis the currencies of Algeria’s main trade partners. Since 2004, with a real effective exchange rate (REER) around the equilibrium level as determined by the economy’s fundamentals, exchange rate policy is well in line with external stability, the latter being anchored to a notably strong net external financial position. In operational terms, the Bank of Algeria intervenes in the interbank market to ensure that movements in the nominal exchange rate do not affect the long term equilibrium of the real effective exchange rate of the dinar.

In this context, despite high volatility of consumer prices and exchange rates in trading partners, including the sharp decline in oil prices in the second half of 2008 (one of the main fundamentals in Algeria’s economy), the REER has remained near its equilibrium level and the external financial position remains comfortable. 4  BIS Review 168/2009