samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  earlier and by a somewhat greater extent over the forecast period than anticipated at the time of the November Report”. Given that, why didn’t we vote in May to raise Bank Rate? The key thing to note here is the dependence on the data. Did the economy evolve broadly in line with our February projections? The simple answer to that question is no. Instead from early April we were faced with a string of much less encouraging data for the early part of the year. The March PMIs fell sharply and only partially reversed in April. Inflation surprised on the downside. GDP growth in Q1 was 0.1%. Consumer confidence fell. And consumer credit growth slowed sharply in March. Of course as always with data, there were more layers to the story. Most importantly, our staff analysis suggested the low GDP growth figure was likely to be heavily influenced by the bad weather we had in March. That was partly because the weather is likely to have had a dampening effect on activity – and the pattern of activity was consistent with this. And partly because GDP is typically revised up more than usual after periods of heavy snow: this chart (Chart 10) illustrates the size of revisions in previous periods of snow.

And, lastly, while it is still early days, our judgements on the behaviour of the economy so far in 2018, and the effects of the snow, appear to have been borne out. Nevertheless, our view of the outlook and the prescription for monetary policy remains conditional on the data, how they evolve and what pointers they give to the future. It is likely that supply, demand and the exchange rate will continue to move around as Brexit negotiations progress and external conditions change. 17  And the data and the outlook will change to reflect all of these. 16  Again, for more details see Box 5, “How has the economy evolved relative to the February 2017 Report”, in the Prospects for Inflation section of the May 2018 Inflation Report. In fact inflation overshot by a little more than we had expected, partly reflecting the rise in oil prices over the previous year, demand rotated by a greater degree than we had expected, and productivity growth slowed by more than we had expected. And, as discussed above, demand fell back by less than we had initially predicted in the August 2016 Inflation Report. But the broad shape of the economic response to Brexit was in line with what we had forecast in February 2017.
So, from a cyclical perspective, the economy is in reasonably good shape. Over the longer term, however, the U.S. economy faces significant challenges. On the positive side, economic expansions don’t die of old age, and there appear to be few imbalances in the economy that could lead to the current expansion ending. But, in order for this to remain the case, it is important that fiscal policy and monetary policy are well aligned going forward. It is also important that the United States retains sufficient fiscal capacity so that fiscal policy can support the economy when the next cyclical downturn does occur. If fiscal policy can play a greater role in promoting macroeconomic stability, it would likely reduce the need for monetary authorities to take extraordinary actions to support economic activity. There are other structural issues worth noting. In particular, productivity growth has been anemic over the past few years, while income inequality has increased and income mobility remains low. As a consequence, the gains in living standards generated by the current business expansion have been modest compared to previous expansions, and these gains have not been widely shared. Much more could be done both locally and nationally to increase the economy’s potential to perform better for a broader array of our citizens. The outlook for growth and inflation The U.S. economy has been expanding at a moderate rate. Growth has averaged about 1.8 percent this year and seems likely to continue at or slightly above this pace in 2017.

They have all done high quality research and have secured good placements, two of them at the Banco de España. I am sure that we will see many papers from their theses appearing in academic journals. The 20 students who graduate today from the Master in Economics and Finance come from seven different countries: Argentina, Australia, Colombia, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Italy, and Spain. They will join more than 700 alumni of CEMFI's Master programme. Most of the students of this year's class will continue their graduate studies towards a PhD, five of them at CEMFI, while the rest have found or are about to find jobs in accordance with their high qualifications. It is for me a great privilege and honour to be given the opportunity to present the certificates of the Master Degree in Economics and Finance to the students in the graduating class. I am also pleased to announce the winner of the "Luis Ángel Rojo Prize" for the best student of the class of 2023 of the Master in Economics and Finance. The winner is: Kenneth Lai. Congratulations to Kenneth and to all the students in the graduating class. Finally, I would like to conclude my remarks by once again thanking Manuel Arellano, Samuel Bentolila, and Rafael Repullo for their commitment to CEMFI over more than 30 years.
Moreover, the Government Bill (1997/98:40) lays down that in order to increase the possibility of democratic control, the statutory objective should be given its specific content by the Riksbank. Furthermore, in the prefatory documents it is said that as an authority under parliament, the Riksbank shall self-evidently support the general goals of economic policy, for example sustainable growth and full employment, in so far as they do not conflict with the objective of price stability. It was not considered necessary to legislate these obligations. 2. The inflation target and price effects of deregulations  Market deregulation can have considerable effects on price formation. The immediate effect of a deregulation is often that the price falls, sometimes almost at once, so that the rate of inflation is lowered for the time being. All else equal, the rate of inflation then returns to the initial level as the months on which the statistical comparison is based move forward. Normally, however, deregulations also affect the conditions for competition and price formation in the longer run. I should add here that rising competitive pressure can also affect productivity but the economic effect of productivity growth is something I shall be considering later. A particular, limited deregulation need not call for measures of monetary policy.

The economy needed a new nominal anchor in order to return to a disinflation path. Inflation targeting was chosen as “the best of all bad” alternatives at the time. Such a sudden switch from a fixed exchange rate system to inflation targeting required a radical and fast change in the central bank’s mentality. This was perhaps the biggest challenge that the CNB had to face. Over the past five years it has involved much work on improving our forecasting tools, leading to substantial development in our internal analytical processes. At the beginning of 2002, the CNB settled on a new forecasting process. This integrates expert judgment and short-term analyses – which were the key pillars of the CNB’s forecasting tool-kit in the first years of inflation targeting – with a macroeconomic model that provides a consistent framework for the policy analysis. An important element of this step was a switch from a forecast with a fixed-interest-rate assumption to an unconditional forecast that includes a reaction function of the central bank. The initially established quarterly projection model was a small-scale model belonging to the second generation of such models. It was thus relatively simple and arguably missed many important links in the economy. Nevertheless, it was already quite close to the state-of-theart among the inflation-targeting central banks around the world, and intense work has been in progress to build a higher-generation model. As a result from July 2008 the CNB’s forecast is based on latest generation general equilibrium model, which is fully based on micro specifications.
One reason was that the assumption of a constant repo rate often resulted in our forecasts for inflation differing from those of other forecasters; being higher when inflation was rising and lower when inflation was declining. This caused confusion in the discussions on monetary policy. Since October last year, our forecasts are instead based on the technical assumption that the repo rate will develop in line with market expectations regarding the future repo rate, as expressed in the implied forward rates. This has made it easier to compare ourselves with other inflation forecasters and also to assess our monetary policy. 2 The new interest rate assumption we now apply means that we can no longer use our old policy rule. If the forecast with a constant repo rate was close to two per cent, the repo rate would be held unchanged according to the old policy rule. If the forecast according to the new outlook shows inflation close to two per cent, the repo rate will normally develop in the way reflected by market expectations. This could mean that the repo rate, given the underlying inflation forecast, should be raised or lowered in a number of stages over the coming two-year period. The new outlook thus means that the monetary policy discussion is based on an interest rate path throughout the entire forecast period, while the old policy rule only took into account what should be done at the time the decision was made.

The increase in the repo rate is in line with the repo rate path expected by the market and which was used as a basis for the inflation forecast. On the one hand, the high GDP growth indicates that inflation could rise more quickly in future than we assumed in June. But on the other hand, productivity has been slightly stronger than expected, which has contributed to holding back cost developments and the rate of increase in unit labour costs. This has a dampening effect on inflation. However, there are indications that the labour market is beginning to strengthen, which should contribute to rising cost pressures. Our overall assessment was that inflation will increase and will be in line with the target a couple of years ahead, given that the repo rate is increased approximately in line with market expectations. Our assessment at the monetary policy meeting was that the upside risks and downside risks were roughly equal. Among the upside risks we mentioned were higher energy, oil and electricity prices, with a risk of contagion effects and a higher rate of wage increase following on from good growth in the economy. The downside risks included the continued strong domestic productivity growth and international price pressures. With regard to household indebtedness and house prices, we expect that the growth rates will slow down, but we have not yet seen any certain signs of this. The picture painted earlier in the year still remains largely unchanged.
Mr Carse tackles the subject of “restructuring and workouts” in Hong Kong Speech by Mr David Carse, a Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to the American Chamber of Commerce YPC/Financial Services Committees Luncheon Meeting, held in Hong Kong on 29 April 1999. Ladies and gentlemen, I am very grateful to Amcham for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today on the subject of restructuring and workouts. I am conscious of the fact that I am following in the footsteps of Chris Barlow of PriceWaterhouseCoopers who spoke to a different gathering of Amcham on the same subject only a month ago. To return to the subject so soon may seem like overkill, but I think that it is a reflection of the fact that there are few more important issues for Hong Kong and indeed the region as a whole at present. As the Governor of the Central Bank of Thailand has rightly said: “Debt restructuring is the key to an early economic recovery based on the survival of viable business operations, while providing creditors the opportunity for maximum loan recovery.” In this speech, I intend to offer some thoughts on how the process is going in Hong Kong and how perhaps it might be improved, as well as explaining the role of the HKMA in workouts. A workout can be defined simply as a private contractual arrangement to assist companies in financial difficulties.

It would do so by imposing a moratorium on legal proceedings against the company which could be extended for up to 6 months or even beyond with the consent of the creditors. During this time a provisional supervisor would take control of the company and formulate a restructuring proposal to be put to creditors which are bound by the moratorium. A statutory framework of this kind has its own drawbacks, but the general view seems to  BIS Review 45/1999  4  be that it would be particularly useful in giving a breathing space to smaller companies and freeing the lead banks from the effort of having to keep creditor banks in line in such cases. The non-statutory form of workout will however still be required even if the proposed legislation on provisional supervision goes ahead. To make this work more effectively, it would appear to be timely to review the operation of the HKAB Guidelines a year after they were launched. It may be desirable to issue additional guidelines on various aspects of the workout process, for example on the role of the steering committee, the operation of a standstill or the provision of new money. There may also be scope for clarification of the role of the investigating accountants, in particular whether they should be appointed by the borrower, as at present, or by the banks.
But the digitisation of payments is diminishing the role of cash and its capacity to provide an effective monetary anchor. A central bank digital currency would offer a digital, risk-free standard and facilitate convertibility among different forms of private digital money. It would uphold the singleness of money and protect monetary sovereignty. We are advancing with our digital euro project and aim to complete our investigation phase later this year. Furthermore, the tokenisation of digital finance may require central banks to modify their technological infrastructure supporting the issuance of central bank money for wholesale transactions. This could involve establishing a bridge between market distributed ledger technology (DLT) platforms and central bank infrastructures, or a new DLT-based wholesale settlement service with DLT-based central bank money. [41] We will involve the market in the exploratory work that we have recently announced. [42]  Conclusion To conclude, crypto-assets have been promoted as decentralised alternatives promising more resilient financial services. However, the reality does not live up to that promise. The blockchain technology underpinning crypto-assets can be extremely slow, energy-intensive and insufficiently scalable. The practicality of crypto-assets for everyday transactions is low due to their complex handling and significant price volatility. To address these drawbacks, the crypto ecosystem has changed its narrative, favouring more centralised forms of organisation that emphasise crypto speculation and quick profit. But recent events have exposed the fragility of the crypto ecosystem, demonstrating how quickly confidence in crypto-assets can evaporate.

Jean-Pierre Roth: No frontiers in monetary policy – from the fight to avoid internationalisation of the currency to the internationalisation of monetary policy Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Institute of International Studies, Zurich, 6 May 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In view of the challenges with which it has been faced, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) demonstrated its adaptability time and again. Over the past thirty years, for instance, it abandoned its endeavours to prevent the use of the Swiss franc as an international currency. Moreover, it has gradually incorporated international elements into its monetary policy strategy and its monetary policy instruments. The goal when making these adjustments was always to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in order to protect the country from any inflationary trend. In managing the current crisis, both the internationalised monetary policy strategy and the internationalised policy instruments have served the SNB well thus far. BIS Review 552009  1
The range of risks to be met by international business is thus far broader  3  The Economist, Global Finance Survey May 2003. BIS Review 120/2006  3  than in the past and demands permanent monitoring and continuous improvement of risk management at all levels. Financial, operational and reputational risks are all new by-products of globalisation, and we are only just beginning to come to terms with them. A survey of corporate directors quoted by the Economist in 2004 showed that a clear identification of risks is still too difficult for many well trained CEOs: 36% of the corporate directors polled actually admitted that they did not fully understand the risks faced by their company. Implications for the private sector With globalisation, your lives have undoubtedly become more difficult. Operating at a global level is infinitely more complex than the regional approach of the past. Globalisation is a challenge for business management. It entails many sources of uncertainties but also offers many vehicles to cope with risk. Can we beat these new risks? No. We must prepare ourselves to face them. We can only insure against some risks, but we cannot predict where the next blow will come from. I think that this is the most important characteristic of our times. What has increased is not our insecurity. We are, in many respects, safer than in the past. This, I hope, is what I have managed to convey to you.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and wage growth Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the general assembly of the Employers’ Organisation NAVO, 11 June 2002. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 22 May and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Norway’s economic policy is based on the guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy. The guideline for fiscal policy states that the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget shall be equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund. This means that all the capital in the Fund is being utilised. Monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. Historically, periods of high inflation have always been followed by a downturn. Low and stable inflation therefore fosters stability in the economy. Establishing guidelines for economic policy is not new. Both fiscal and monetary policy have been subject to a rules-based framework throughout the post-war period, with the exception of the last half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Monetary policy has had a clear anchor since 1986. The phasing in of petroleum revenues in the central government budget shall be equivalent to the expected return on the Petroleum Fund. Most of the phasing in of petroleum revenues will take place over the next ten years.
In doing so, we have endeavored to ensure that the “New Basel Accord” is not merely another set of rules, but rather a framework that recognizes the important innovations in risk management that banks have achieved and encourages continued improvement over time. In my remarks today, I’d like to share with you some thoughts on how bank supervisors have worked to embrace and encourage those developments. My remarks will cover three related areas. I’ll begin with thoughts on how enhancements in banks’ risk management processes, driven by business imperatives, have concurrently led supervisors to move to a more process-oriented, risk-focused approach to supervision. Next, I’ll spend a few moments discussing how provisions in the New Basel Accord - or “Basel II” - support further changes in our supervisory approach, and promote further enhancements in risk management. Finally, I will describe how these developments will be coming together in our supervisory approach going forward - particularly in terms of our supervisory expectations for management of market risk, credit risk, and operational risk by large banking organizations. While I will offer my views as a former banker and now as a bank supervisor, I believe that many of the themes offer insight for other sectors of the financial services industry as well. BIS Review 5/2003  1  Complementary effort by Banks and Supervisors to Assess Risk Let me begin by sharing some thoughts on the efforts banks themselves have undertaken to develop a more forward-looking approach to risk management.

Moreover, it intends to allow already established companies or start-ups that aim to provide payment services to be involved in other business activities allowing them to diversify the business risk and freedom to grow. Open Banking – Benefits, challenges and risks Digital disruption is the driver that enables banks to keep pace with customer demands. By adopting the right digital business model, banks can take advantage of open banking to unleash new business value. Being an open bank means operating like a platform company, with a business model that connects people and processes with assets and a technology infrastructure to manage internal and external users’ interactions. Open banking—a platform-based business approach— is a new way of how banks generate value, born out of the increasing pressures from regulations and competitors. Outside the banking domain, industry leaders like Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Alibaba are unleashing technology’s power by developing platform-based business models and taking advantage of the strategies they enable. Since the beginning of 2018, sharing proprietary data with third parties is not an option for European banks, with PSD2 in the European Union. Investments are being made to make this a reality; almost $ billion was invested in PSD2 enabled services in 2016 (up to 200 percent from 2015)1. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In the core of Open banking are the application programming interfaces (APIs), which has also been used and facilitated by eBay starting in early 2000s, and also by technological giants like Google, Apple, Uber, and so on.