samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But our own position is becoming more difficult. For some years we have been able to finance current account deficits by borrowing, often through banks, at unusually low interest rates on world capital markets. Such borrowing is now becoming more expensive. Unless we spend less and save more, our current account position will deteriorate. If we are to raise our national saving rate without overall demand, output and employment suffering in the medium term, we will need to export more and import less. Such a rebalancing is helped by the fall in sterling’s effective exchange rate. Sterling has fallen, against a trade-weighted basket of currencies by almost 10% since August. And financial markets are pricing in a significant probability of a further decline in the exchange rate during this year. A lower average level of the exchange rate can, by supporting overall economic activity, help protect us from the worst effects of the wind blowing across the Atlantic. But, by pushing up import prices, it will exacerbate the impact of the other wind now buffeting the UK economy, which comes from the east – the inflationary effect of higher energy and food prices. Strong growth of demand, particularly from China, India and other emerging markets in Asia, has been a key driver of the sustained rises in commodity prices over recent years, most notably oil prices. Inflation has picked up in the industrialised world. It is now 3.1% in the euro area and 4.1% in the United States.

We want to assess to what extent and under what conditions it could improve the efficiency and security of settlement of financial assets transactions, while preserving the fundamental role of central bank money in the smooth and safe execution of these transactions. The Banque de France also takes an active part in the work conducted by the Eurosystem under the aegis of the ECB in relation to a digital retail euro. The challenge is to assess whether and how a digital central bank euro is needed. As we do when analysing market developments, our analysis encompasses all the potential impacts of such innovation. We need to ensure that we 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  do not compromise more general public objectives such as monetary and financial stability, organise coexistence with other forms of public money and commercial banks, and promote innovation and efficiency in the financial system. Naturally, our experiment is not limited to questions of digital central bank money. As part of our observation on the development of crypto-assets, we plan to participate in market experiments to help define the role of supervisors in this ecosystem. I’ll stop there to give way to the two round tables of this webinar. The two themes chosen are: “Crypto-assets, risks and regulation” and “Crypto-assets, what will become a standard?”. They seem to me to be two very complementary ways of addressing the issues that I have highlighted. I am sure that the cross-section of American and European views will add to the debate.
Investments are spread across most markets, countries and currencies to achieve broad exposure to global growth and value creation, and ensure good risk diversification. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The fund was established in 1990, during Norway’s deepest recession in the postwar period. At the time, it was not obvious that the fund would gain much in value. The government ran budget deficits in the following years. The first capital transfer to the fund was made in 1996, reflecting a net fiscal surplus. From then on, the value of the fund started to increase rapidly. Higher oil revenues towards 2000 led to calls for higher spending. Political pressure to spend more evolved. A fiscal rule was established in response to this development. The aim was to phase petroleum revenues into the economy gradually. The fiscal rule guides the annual transfers from the fund to the fiscal budget. It limits average petroleum revenue spending over the cycle to the expected real return on the fund – currently estimated at 3 percent – over a business cycle. The rule established a long term petroleum revenue spending strategy. The government may deviate from the 3 percent rule depending on the circumstances. If the economy is facing a severe downturn, there should be room for a more expansionary policy. During the great financial crisis, the Norwegian government was able to allow public spending to increase in order to counteract the downturn.

Øystein Olsen: Managing natural resources - lessons from Norway Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the seminar &quot;Preparing Mozambique for natural gas&quot;, Bank of Mozambique, Maputo, 27 March 2019. * * * Accompanying slides. Let me start by expressing my heart-felt sympathy for the victims of the cyclone that struck your country. I am both honoured and saddened to be here at this difficult time. I can hardly imagine the pain and sorrow so many of your people are now experiencing. Mozambique is a country of great beauty and is now an emerging leader in the natural gas industry.. For Norway, on the other hand, petroleum production peaked some years ago. As a nation, we have benefited tremendously from the revenues and the activities. Let me share some of our experiences with you. Norway is a small, open economy, which was transformed by the discovery of oil on our continental shelf almost 50 years ago. Back in 1970, the year after the first discovery, income levels were relatively low compared with other western countries. That picture has changed completely. Today, Norway ranks among the richest countries in the world. For some countries, natural resource discoveries have been identified as a curse. For Norway, the discovery of oil has been a blessing. We have managed to transform oil and gas resources into real and financial assets.
00-05  2006  2007  2008 (e)  2.9 2.4 3.1 2.2 1.5 10.0 5.5 2.7 2.7 3.0  3.8 2.9 2.5 1.9 1.6 9.4 4.8 3.0 3.1 3.1  5.1 3.9 2.8 2.9 2.0 11.6 5.5 5.6 3.0 4.6  5.2 3.8 2.0 2.7 2.4 13.0 5.9 5.7 3.2 5.0  3.2 2.2 1.1 0.9 -0.6 9.0 3.0 4.2 1.0 3.0  2009 (f) Report May'09 -1.2 -2.3 -3.0 -3.5 -7.2 6.5 -1.9 -2.0 -1.7 -1.5  2010 (f)  June IPoM meeting May'09 S S S T S S S T = S  -1.1 -2.2 -2.7 -4.1 -6.8 7.3 -1.8 -2.6 -1.7 -1.4  2.1 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.9 7.5 1.4 1.5 0.9 2.0  June meeting S S S = = S S S S S  2.3 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 7.8 2.1 1.9 1.3 2.3  (*) Regional growth are weighted average by world GPP participation in IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO, April 2009) (e) Estimated; (f) Forecasted. Fuente: Central Bank of Chile base on investment bank data, Consensus Forecast and IMF. Commodity prices have posted substantial increases in the past few weeks. Both copper and oil have seen their prices rise more than 50% since the end of 2008. The copper price hike reflects increased demand, especially from China. In the case of the oil price, the increase began showing in domestic prices, partly offset by the recent appreciation of the peso. Little by little, dislocations in international financial markets are being fixed.

According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation was 0.3% in November 2014, after 0.4% in October. Compared with the previous month, this mainly reflects a stronger fall in energy price inflation and a somewhat lower annual increase in services prices. Taking into account the current environment of very low rates of inflation, it will be important to assess the broader impact of recent oil price developments on mediumterm inflation trends and to avoid spillovers to inflation expectations and wage formation. Against the background of recent oil price developments, it is crucial to recall that forecasts and projections are based on technical assumptions, especially for oil prices and exchange rates. On the basis of information available in mid-November, at the time the December 2014 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area were finalised, annual HICP inflation was foreseen to reach 0.5% in 2014, 0.7% in 2015 and 1.3% in 2016. In comparison with the September 2014 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, they have been revised significantly downwards. These revisions reflect mainly lower oil prices in euro terms and the impact of the downwardly revised outlook for growth, but they do not yet incorporate the fall in oil prices over the past few weeks following the cut-off date for the projections. Over the coming months, annual HICP inflation rates could experience renewed downward movements, given the recent further decline in oil prices. The Governing Council will continue to closely monitor the risks to the outlook for price developments over the medium term.
I will not attempt to describe this chart; it would take too long and, even if I had the time, I doubt I would have the ability. These were the self-same constraints – time, complexity – which faced investors in these products. Due diligence was the casualty. End-investors in these instruments were no more likely to know the name of the companies in their portfolios than the name of the cow or pig in their exotic hot dog. To illustrate, consider an investor conducting due diligence on a set of financial claims: RMBS, ABS CDOs and CDO2. How many pages of documentation would a diligent investor need to read to understand these products? Table 2 provides the answer. For simpler products, this is just about feasible – for example, around 200 pages, on average, for an RMBS investor. But an investor in a CDO2 would need to read in excess of 1 billion pages to understand fully the ingredients. With a PhD in mathematics under one arm and a Diploma in speed-reading under the other, this task would have tried the patience of even the most diligent investor. With no time to read the small-print, the instruments were instead devoured whole. Food poisoning and a lengthy loss of appetite have been the predictable consequences. Though it had aimed to dampen institutional risk, innovation in financial instruments served to amplify further network fragility. Diversity and stability A final dimension to network robustness concerns the effects of diversity.

For example, similar effects of diversity have been found in studies of the resilience of crops to pathogen outbreaks; in the robustness of savannas and grassland to drought; and in morbidity and mortality rates among humans facing disease and infection. 21 Diversity of the gene pool, it seems, improves durability. The financial system has mirrored the fortunes of the fisheries, for many of the same reasons. Since the start of 2007, 23 of the largest European and US banks have seen their market capitalisation fall by 90% or more – the fisheries equivalent of collapse. But what took marine eco-systems two hundred years to achieve has been delivered by financial engineers in two. In explaining the collapse in fish and finance, lack of diversity seems to be a common denominator. Within the financial sector, diversity appears to have been reduced for two separate, but related, reasons: the pursuit of return; and the management of risk. The pursuit of yield resulted in a return on equity race among all types of financial firm. As they collectively migrated to high-yield activities, business strategies came to be replicated across the financial sector. Imitation became the sincerest form of flattery. So savings cooperatives transformed themselves into private commercial banks. Commercial banks ventured into investment banking. Investment banks developed in-house hedge funds through large proprietary trading desks. Funds of hedge funds competed with traditional investment funds. And investment funds – pension, money market mutual, insurance – imported the risk the others were shedding.
What is the right mix of central bank tools between buy/sell and lending/repo facilities? Where lending is preferred, which firms do we need to reach to maintain stability; how do ensure we  Page 4  can reach them (legally and operationally); and what terms and conditions should they face? What are the pros and cons of establishing standing facilities, whose terms and conditions are known in advance; versus simply ensuring we are ready to act in a more discretionary ways as/when required? Like the Beatles’ ‘glass onion’ in my title,[4] these lessons are not meant to be complex or novel. They bear a wholly intentional family resemblance to the Bagehot principle: a recognition that liquidity risk (in this case, arising in capital markets rather than banks) may threaten system-wide stability; that central banks may have an important role to play in providing a public backstop at scale; but they should do so on terms that minimise risks to public money and complement, rather than substitute for, market incentives. And they draw heavily on a literature on the Market Maker or Last Resort (MMLR) dating back at least to the start of the Global Financial Crisis. [5] As others have noted, despite this extended history, progress towards institutionalising these insights has been uneven. I hope that the BIS work, coupled with our sadly growing set of live case studies, can help accelerate that process. Let me elaborate a little on each of my four lessons.

Some have suggested that separation could have been further assured by sterilising the impact of the operation on the quantity of central banks reserves, e.g. through the issuance of Bank of England bills. But the extra reserves created, for such a limited period, cannot have materially affected monetary conditions under the current ample-reserves floor system, and were therefore judged less likely to increase any residual uncertainty about the monetary stance than the sudden, short-lived introduction of a new instrument. 17. Bank of England completes unwind of recent financial stability gilt purchases | Bank of England  Accompanying slides
27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Annex  Chart 1: Advanced economy volatility of growth and inflation Standard deviation of inflation 3.5 3.0 1980 - 1998 2.5 2.0 1.5 2009 - 2018  1.0  1999 - 2008  0.5 0.0 0.5  1.0  1.5  2.0  Standard deviation of GDP growth Sources: IMF and Bank calculations. Notes: Calculations use April 2018 IMF World Economic Outlook, with data at annual frequency. 2018 assumed to be data. Figure 1: Word cloud for terms associated with ‘uncertainty’ in Agents’ reports  Sources: Bank of England Notes: Refers to Agents’ reports compiled between 1 January and late-August 2018. 28  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  28  Chart 2: Frequency of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘Brexit’ appearing in Agents’ reports Share of paragraphs in Agency visit write-ups referencing term (per cent)  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Uncertainty  Brexit/referendum  Sources: Bank of England. Chart 3: Inflation forecast errors of different groups since 2008 (RMSE) pp 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0  1yr  2yr  3yr**  Sources: Bank of England/TNS Inflation Attitudes Survey, Barclays Basix, YouGov/CitiGroup, HMT, CBI and Bank calculations. Notes: Forecast errors since 2008Q2. Some measures start a few quarters later than 2008Q2, or have missing observations. Individual measures are included when there are no more than three missing observations.

Peter Praet: Reforms and growth in the euro area Speech by Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Panel intervention “Fixing finance”, The Economist’s Lisbon Summit, Lisbon, 18 February 2014. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be in Portugal today, where we are now seeing signs of a stabilisation in the economy. Economic activity is recovering, the unemployment rate is falling – although from very high levels – and the current account is in surplus. While it will take years for the scars left by the crisis on the economy and society to fade, confidence has been steadily improving during the recent months. Real GDP has been growing at positive rates since the second quarter of 2013 and the most recent information from industrial production, sales, and merchandise trade confirm that this trend is continuing. Other euro area countries that have been hit hard by the crisis are also now beginning down the recovery path, while financial markets have started a more benign pricing of sovereign and private credit risk. All this is thanks to the progress that has been made in macroeconomic, structural and financial repair since the onset of the financial crisis. Especially since mid-2010, the start of the sovereign debt crisis, decisive action has been taken at national and European levels.
At the Bank of England, we place a very strong emphasis on learning from best practice around the world. Given the transformative outcomes in the Chinese economy and fintech sector, for example the rapid growth of digital payments, we know there is a lot we can learn. It is for this reason that the Bank of England is engaging in dialogue on these topics through a programme led by our Centre for Central Banking Studies, supported by the UK government. The wider UK government is also engaging with China on fintech issues through the UK Government’s Prosperity Fund. The second priority is to leverage existing forums to promote global co-operation and co-ordination on technology issues. Regulators across the globe are not always going to agree on what technologies they want to use and how they fit into regulatory frameworks. However, global financial institutions for policy coordination such as the FSB, BIS and IMF provide important forums in which we can highlight concerns and work to find agreement where it exists. At the Bank of England we want to work with our partners to ensure we harness the benefits of technology in a way that maintains financial stability. And we want to work with our international partners to ensure fintech is supported by international cooperation, rather than creating new dislocation. We believe these goals are achievable and that if met, they herald the promise of a better finance for the people we serve, both in the UK and in China and globally.

In particular, I will stress the importance of three dimensions of openness: o  Being open to new ideas;  o  Being open to new businesses entering financial services; and  o  Being open to improving our own operations. “New Economy, New Finance, New Bank”, available online at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/report/2019/response-to-the-future-of-finance-report.pdf. 1  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Openness to New Ideas  Being open to new ideas and new ways of doing things is crucial for innovation. New approaches can improve the quality and inclusiveness of the financial services our people receive. However, this openness should not compromise our existing standards. Instead, we must weigh potential benefits to efficiency and resilience, against potential risks to financial stability. Let me give an example from our work in the U.K on machine learning that clarifies our approach. New general purpose technologies like AI and machine learning hold the promise of increasing economic productivity and providing better products across the economy, including in financial services. However, if not overseen appropriately, this technology could introduce new risks and enhance existing ones. The challenges posed by AI/ML are well documented - I will not dwell on them here. AI raises a range of ethical, operational, consumer protection, and competition issues. What is more, these issues are not theoretical. We have already seen the potential for new financial risks from technology during flash crashes in algorithmic trading, reminding us of the potential for introducing new instability.
Banks can satisfy some of their demand for liquidity by participating in these auctions. As the participating banks are then no longer as dependent on the secured interbank market for obtaining the desired amount of liquidity, aggregate demand for overnight liquidity in the repo market falls, thereby reducing upward pressures on SARON. We also wish to note that, over time, liquidity can be redistributed between banks via other channels than just the repo market. For instance, liquidity redistribution may take place via the transfer of customer deposits and longer-term deposits between banks. Naturally, such adjustment processes take some time. Let me summarise the key points we have made so far. The steering of short-term money market rates continues to work – even in negative territory. Three interest rates play a key role  Page 10/13  here. The SNB policy rate is used to communicate the monetary policy decision and, in particular, the desired stance of monetary policy. The negative interest rate on sight deposits that commercial banks hold at the SNB is the main instrument with which the SNB implements monetary policy on the money market. The exemption thresholds allow the burden on the banking system to be reduced without jeopardising the SNB’s ability to keep secured short-term money market rates, in particular SARON, close to its policy rate. As you can see, the SNB has the instruments needed to steer money market interest rates, including during times when these interest rates are in negative territory.

A key characteristic of the Swiss Money Market Value Chain is that it provides access to about 150 banks and other financial market participants using a single platform and a common set of rules. Another characteristic is that the SNB has direct access to this platform, through which it also conducts its monetary policy operations. The broad array of participants, the high degree of standardisation, and the fact that interbank trades and SNB monetary policy operations in the money market are conducted on the same platform help foster market liquidity, transparency and trust among participants. The advantages of a common platform are particularly apparent in times of financial distress, when it is vital that liquidity redistribution and monetary policy operations continue to function seamlessly. The Swiss Money Market Value Chain is designed to respond rapidly to technological innovations and to market participants’ needs. Its underlying technology has been adapted and renewed on a rolling basis over the past two decades, mostly in small increments. However, larger components have also been overhauled from time to time. Four years ago, for instance, the trading platform itself was replaced. Since then, the CO:RE platform has been in use. On Page 11/13  the CO:RE platform, participants can both carry out bilateral transactions and either place or ‘hit’ quotes that are visible to all. Trading on a common platform and using standardised contracts increases market liquidity. The prices of completed transactions are visible to all participants, creating a high degree of transparency.