samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The history of money originates long ago and its developments are closely related to the people that have produced it. Its role is not limited to the economic functions; it is also a historic evidence of the minting or issuing country. It speaks about periods of economic crisis or downturns, of peace and prosperity, of successes and injustices. In this context, we decided to dedicate the First Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania to two main topics, which we think are the gist of its exhibitions and educational activities. 1. Findings, researches and discussions in the area of monetary production and circulation, the history of the economy and banking activity in Albania and Albanian historic territories, which contribute to accurate interpretation and updating of information transmitted to the visitors 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  through Museum collections. 2. The educational role of central bank museums in getting to know the history of money, and banking activities and enhancing financial literacy through exhibitions, education and innovation. For this purpose, we aim, therefore, to bring together foreign central bank experts to share their perspective on the management of central bank museums, collections and educational activities. This conference certainly underlines the commitment of the Bank of Albania to earnestly engage in both research and educational activities. We are very interested in enhancing cooperation with researchers, academia, peer museums, and specialised institutions in economic, historic and cultural heritage research.

Such cooperation is an excellent opportunity to Bank of Albania employees, who may benefit from valuable skills and expertise for our Museum. It would also contribute to new networking and collaboration in research activities. In light of promoting and furthering cooperation, we are committed to turning our Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania into an annual event. Also, in 2017, the Museum of the Bank of Albania will organise a cycle of lectures dubbed as “Nights of the Museum”, which will address a variety of topics, such as numismatics, banking history, economic and financial education, philately, art and architecture. These projects aim at developing another aspect of our work at the Museum, which would focus on social developments vis-a-vis museum objects. Dear participants, The first conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania coincides with the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the modern central bank of the Republic of Albania and a two-tier banking system. In these 25 years, the Bank of Albania has served to the country’s economic and financial development, supporting successfully the development of an efficient and stable financial system. It will continue to remain an institution with ambitious objectives in the field of European integration and approximation with the European Central Bank. Today, it is undertaking a new challenge: opening to the public, not only to communicate clearly its primary objectives, but also to contribute to helping the public learn about the history of money, art and tradition that it represents.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  price movements are large, LFT market-making is driving in the dark, stock-picking with a safety-pin. During the Flash Crash, many traders suffered just this problem. Message traffic resulted in delays in disseminating quotes for over 1000 stocks. These delays lasted for up to 35 seconds. As a result, discrepancies emerged between the prices of common stocks trading on different exchanges (Chart 13). Faced with such uncertainty, a number of market participants paused or halted trading. The equilibrating force of long-term investors went missing. Bargain-hunting shoppers simply had no price list. The combined effects of these inventory and information problems is to widen the bid-ask spreads LFT market-makers charge. Greater execution risk and uncertainty calls for a larger insurance premium. This, too, may have an adverse feedback effect on financial market pricing. That is because it is likely to render uncompetitive LFT firms relative to HFT firms able to charge tighter spreads. Market-making will increasingly congregate around HFT firms proffering these lower spreads. If the way to make money is to make markets, and the way to market markets is to make haste, the result is likely to be a race – an arms race to zero latency. Competitive forces will generate incentives to break the speed barrier, as this is the passport to lower spreads which is in turn the passport to making markets. This arms race to zero is precisely what has played out in financial markets over the past few years. Arms races rarely have a winner.

Measures of market volatility and correlation are two plausible metrics. 9 Chart 9 plots the volatility of, and correlation between, components of the S&P 500 since 1990. In general, the  6  Stoll (1978). 7  Glosten and Milgrom (1985). 8  This term has its origins in work by Diane Vaughan on NASA’s decision-making in the run-up to the space shuttle Challenger disaster in 1986, where repeated oversight of small problems culminated in a big problem (Vaughan (1996)). It has since been found in a much broader range of phenomena, where small cognitive biases have had disastrous physical consequences (Cliff (2010), Harford (2011)). 9  See also Brogaard (2010) and Zhang (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  relationship between volatility and correlation is positive. Higher volatility increases the degree of co-movement between stocks. Now consider how this volatility/correlation nexus has changed. This can be seen from the difference between the mass of blue dots (covering the period 1990 to 2004) and red dots (covering the period 2005 to 2010) in Chart 9. Two things have happened since 2005, coincident with the emergence of trading platform fragmentation and HFT. First, both volatility and correlation have been somewhat higher. Volatility is around 10 percentage points higher than in the earlier sample, while correlation is around 8 percentage points higher. Second, the slope of the volatility / correlation curve is steeper. Any rise in volatility now has a more pronounced cross-market effect than in the past.
This is to say that Europe must avoid a lost decade; this is to say that European policy-makers must be intelligent and fight causes instead of consequences. This is to say that Europe will be able to maintain its geo-economic and geopolitical influence. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The conclusion of this point of view is, put simply, that more recent innovations have not been as significant as those during earlier industrial revolutions.4 Others, such as Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson at MIT, say that the effects of digitalisation have passed under the radar and that we will see major productivity increases in the future when the new technologies are used more broadly in the business sector.5 Economic historian Joel Mokyr also points out that the productive potential in new technologies will lead to strong pressure for change in the economy.6 As you can hear, there are very differing views on the subject and the assessment of future productivity growth is a question we are constantly struggling with. We are in the “installation phase” Personally, I think that that model from Bart van Ark (2016) is useful when considering the different views. This distinguishes between an “installation phase” and a “deployment phase” for new technology. The first phase involves exploring new markets and growth is limited to a couple of companies. During the second phase the markets are consolidated and there is broad growth in the economy. One can imagine that Brynjolfsson and McAfee consider we are in the first phase, while Gordon thinks we have already passed the second phase. My assessment is that we are probably somewhere in the installation phase with regard to digitalisation.
Of equal importance, is the need to develop alternative sources of funding, such as the equity and bond markets, not simply to ensure a more balanced allocation of financial and economic resources within an economy but more importantly to attain greater diversification within the financial system, hence ensuring the efficient distribution of risks within the system. In addition, the integrity and credibility of the payments system and effectiveness of regulation and supervision would require the support of a comprehensive set of legislations, one that would need to evolve in tandem with the developments that are taking place in the financial landscape. It is also recognised that good corporate governance reinforces sound regulation and supervision. It contributes towards maintaining market confidence, and strengthens transparency and accountability. For corporate governance to work, good corporate practices need to be instilled and embedded in all aspects of the operations and at all levels within the organisation. To succeed in the new environment, institutions will require qualified board members and management teams that exhibit a high degree of professionalism. In addition, transparency and disclosure is essential, particularly in a rapidly changing environment and greater attention is being accorded to make banking systems more transparent. While the comprehensive and timely availability of financial information will enhance market discipline in  2  BIS Review 40/2003  emerging market economies, the disclosure of information must be complemented with the ability of the market players to analyse, digest and appropriately interpret the information to achieve the desired results.

Much of this “banking glut” 4 can be traced to the advanced economies: for example, around half of the gross inflows into the United States just before the crisis came from European institutions, rather than emerging economies. 5  3  See Borio and Disyatat (2011), Cecchetti (2011) and Tucker (2012) for more on this issue. 4  See Shin (2012). 5  See Borio and Disyatat (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Now global capital flows of this nature can be valuable. They help to oil the wheels of the international financial system, allowing saving to flow to where it can be most effectively used. They allow banks to diversify across national boundaries, reducing their susceptibility to idiosyncratic domestic shocks. And they increase the degree of competition within the domestic banking market. But by increasing the linkages between financial systems, they can also increase systemic vulnerabilities. In this case, banks became dependent on shortterm funding from overseas, rather than their traditional domestic deposit base. When investors re-trenched, that funding dried up and banks struggled to find viable alternative sources of funding. Ensuring gross capital flows are not excessive is just as important as avoiding excessive net capital flows. Moving to a sustainable equilibrium requires a narrowing in the international payments imbalances. And we have indeed seen such a narrowing since the start of the crisis.
Recent developments in the SIC system Amid all these longer-term visions, we should be careful not to overlook changes that are just around the corner – or indeed, have already been introduced. So let me return to the present and talk about developments in cashless payment transactions that are already having a tangible effect on central banks around the world. For obvious reasons, my remarks will be based on the situation in Switzerland. As I have already mentioned, one of the SNB’s statutory mandates is to facilitate and secure the operation of cashless payment systems. One of the key ways in which we perform this duty is through our strategic guidance of the SIC payment system. This includes approving technical changes to the system and the rules of conduct for system participants, fixing operating hours and rates, and deciding who is granted access to the SIC system. At the same time, the SIC system is operated not by us, but by SIX Interbank Clearing; system participants are involved in the decision-making process and therefore play a direct part. This configuration makes SIC a market solution. Another feature is that the SIC system is used to settle not only interbank payments, but also a large proportion of retail payments. 8 By virtue of its role in SIC, the SNB has a substantial influence on retail payments in Swiss francs and is, in turn, also impacted by dynamic forces at work in this area.

The city of Zug has recently even launched a pilot project allowing certain public services to be paid for using a crypto-currency. But even those of us who prefer more traditional payment methods can benefit from many innovations in Switzerland. For instance, cash can now be withdrawn from ATMs without a bank card – simply by using a smartphone. Like Switzerland, central banks are associated with stability and continuity. And yet, since the financial crisis, they too have had to adopt ever more inventive policies to shield their respective economies from serious harm. The Swiss National Bank has likewise had to mobilise its innovative resources. We have developed and deployed new monetary policy instruments, which have enabled us to carry out our mandate as fully as possible. When it comes to implementing monetary policy, financial market infrastructures are vital. In Switzerland, these infrastructures are run by SIX Group and the SNB is actively involved in shaping the strategic direction of certain functions. Without safe and efficient infrastructures we would be unable to fulfil our mandate. This fact alone explains our keen interest in ensuring their smooth operation. But our interest goes beyond monetary policy implementation. The infrastructures also play a major role in enabling the SNB to perform other statutory duties, such as facilitating and securing the operation of cashless payment systems and contributing to the stability of the financial system. As mentioned, the financial sector is experiencing a surge of innovation.
Notwithstanding some recent signs of improvement in the economic outlook, it is premature to declare the financial crisis over. From today’s perspective, the need for enhanced credit support remains. Therefore, for the time being central bank liquidity is likely to remain abundant. This does not mean, however, that the broader concept of liquidity in terms of monetary aggregates grows strongly. And it is this broader concept, not central bank liquidity itself, which is related to inflationary pressures over the medium term. Of course, central bank credit and broader monetary aggregates are linked over time. In a modern banking system, and in normal circumstances, central bank credit is largely used by banks – in the form of required reserves – to create bank credit, and expand deposits and broad money aggregates. So, an increased provision of central bank credit can lead – more or less automatically – to an increase in broad money. In current conditions, that link has been weakened, however. Today, banks – in the aggregate – tend to hold part of the central bank credit that they obtain in our refinancing operations not as a reserve against an expansion of loans and deposits, but in the form of  8  BIS Review 103/2009  excess reserves deposited with the Eurosystem. This attenuates the automatic link between the provision of central bank liquidity and broad money. And, as a consequence, it attenuates the inflationary potential of the Eurosystem’s outstanding credit to banks.

Rather, it lays out a framework and set of principles to govern actions in the face of circumstances in whatever form they take. The distinction between a strategy and a particular course of action is well known in monetary policy. A monetary policy strategy provides the framework for assessing economic circumstances and responding to ever changing contingencies. But a strategy does not spell out interest rate decisions in the future. In my view, the exit strategy from non-standard measures is comparable. As of today, we do not have all the information necessary to decide which exit path will be desirable or optimal from the perspective of tomorrow. But we have developed a set of criteria that will guide our future decisions. In this sense, exit considerations are subject to the same qualification that I always make when I speak on behalf of the Governing Council on monetary policy matters: we are not pre-committed. 4  BIS Review 103/2009  Accordingly, as of today, we are not committed to a particular timing or sequence of actions for the exit phase. But our future decisions will not be arbitrary. They will be guided by a framework. In my view, four cornerstones have to be considered in our approach to exit from non-standard measures: the link to our monetary policy strategy; the forward-looking initial design of the measures; our technical and institutional ability to act; and our reputation for swift and decisive action when it is required. BIS Review 103/2009  5  1.
The scale of the floods and the knock-on effects of natural catastrophes on global supply chains came as a rude surprise. The floods damaged more than 7000 industrial and manufacturing plants in 40 separate provinces. This affected countries with significant manufacturing capabilities in Thailand, most notably Japan. The majority of the insurance losses therefore came not from property damage, but from business interruption claims arising from the disruption to manufacturing and supply chains. It is therefore important that insurers have senior experts in the region who understand Asia’s multi-faceted and inter-connected risks. This will enable the industry to better price and underwrite regional risks, and achieve sustained growth. MAS will seek to increase the depth of expertise in Singapore by continuing to work with existing players to build up their specialty and reinsurance underwriting and broking capabilities as well as expand their regional hubs. MAS will also seek to increase breadth in the industry by promoting growth in emerging business lines, such as cyber risks. Lack of data is a key hurdle for cyber insurance in Asia. MAS is working with industry to create a test-bed for cyber risks where insurers and potential clients can come together to simulate loss events. •  Cyber insurers will be able to generate sets of valuable loss data and raise awareness about the value of specialty cyber insurance cover.

•  Clients will get the opportunity to stress-test their systems, assess the responsiveness of existing coverage to losses, and gain an appreciation of potential losses and the need for cyber insurance cover. Promote Asian demand Next, we want to promote insurance demand in Asia. Asia is already leading the world in premium growth. We seek to catalyse the development of insurance demand in the region via a three-pronged approach. First, enhancing cross-border access to regional markets. The ASEAN economies are working together on a comprehensive insurance liberalisation framework. •  We aspire to achieve substantial liberalisation by 2020 for all insurance sub-sectors, namely life insurance, non-life insurance, reinsurance and retrocession, insurance intermediation, and insurance auxiliary services. •  Insurers can expect to benefit from easier cross-border provision of services and substantial access across the ASEAN customer base from offices in any ASEAN member country. •  The framework is expected to be discussed at the ASEAN Finance Ministers’ Meeting next year. Second, increasing the pool of Asian risk data. Modelling and loss simulation are key tools to help insurers manage and price their exposures. Accurate and timely data are critical for risk models to predict the impact of a loss event. For example, to predict the vulnerability of an insured risk to catastrophes, a wide variety of data is required, such as geographic location,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  soil structures, rainfall, construction materials and urban density, just to name a few.
Inflation Forecast June 2002 with Libor at 1,25%  Annual average inflation in %  BIS Review 39/2002  2001  2002  2003  2004  1.0  0.9  1.3  1.6  3

The rationale behind ERM II is that, if a country succeeds in maintaining the value of its currency against the euro within the fluctuation bands for a period of two years, then it would be reasonable to assume that the country would be able to deal with the binding constraints of EMU. During this phase, accession countries will have to prove that they are able to put up with the disciplines inherent in a fixed exchange rate without imbalances arising in other sectors of the economy. That is why accession to EMU is conditional on prior participation in ERM II. Furthermore, it would be unfair on the twelve euro area countries if the EU were to demand less stringent conditions of the present wave of accession countries. Upon EU accession and during the ERM II phase, Malta, like the other accession countries, would have the status of a “country with a derogation”. Since ERM II neither entails the formal transfer of monetary policy responsibilities to the ECB nor the replacement of the domestic currency by the euro, it will not, as I have already indicated, involve any significant departure from current practice, although it offers more flexibility than our current fixed exchange rate regime, which does not involve any fluctuation band. Another difference is that the obligation to defend the central exchange rate under ERM II would be binding on both the ECB and the Central Bank of Malta. Both institutions would be expected to intervene to preserve that value.