samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
- Significant institutions: NCAs play a pivotal role in the JSTs (they contribute the staff, experience and knowledge of the country’s institutions and banking system), and the on-site inspection teams are mostly from that country. Moreover, NCAs have an important role in a number of administrative procedures. For example, NCAs are responsible for submitting to the ECB the proposals relating to the “common procedures”. (iii) New tasks arising from membership of the SSM. The governors of NCBs and representatives from NCAs take part in the decision-making process in the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board of the ECB, respectively (not only decisions concerning institutions in their countries but also SSM decisions overall). In addition, the NCAs participate actively in a broad range of networks of experts and working groups set up by the SSM to conduct discussions at a technical level, particularly on issues of a horizontal nature. 13  For institutions operating in several countries, a “core JST” is set up, comprising an ECB coordinator (who is also the chair) and national sub-coordinators.

28(1) and 28(3) of the Statute) and alternative methods for measuring monetary income (Art. 32(3)). Lastly, very few decisions are taken unanimously; they require the attendance of all members at the meeting. The Recommendation of the ECB addressed to the European Council for the amendment of Art. 10(2) of the Statute (assignment of voting rights and rotation system in the Governing Council of the ECB) was adopted unanimously. 3  General Council can be regarded as a “transitional body” which will continue to exist while there are EU Member States which have not adopted the euro. Its functions include the monitoring of progress achieved in convergence by EU Member States which have not yet adopted the euro, advice on the necessary preparations for irrevocably fixing their exchange rates, supervising the operation of Exchange Rate Mechanism II, acting as a forum for the coordination of EU exchange rate and monetary policies, and assisting with certain activities, such as the advisory functions of the ECB. 2 Single Supervisory Mechanism: distribution of responsibilities between the ECB and the national competent authorities and decision-making processes As from 4 November 2014, the prudential supervision of credit institutions in euro area countries was transferred to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which other EU countries that have not yet adopted the euro may also join.5 This mechanism is structured as an integrated system, led by the ECB and involving the national competent authorities (NCAs), i.e. the supervisors of the participating countries.
Admati, A., DeMarzo, P., Hellwig, M. and Pfleiderer, P (2011), “Fallacies Irrelevant Facts and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is not Expensive” (March 23, 2011). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 86. Alessandri, P and Haldane, A (2010), “Banking on the state”, Bank of England. Amel, D and Barnes, C and Panetta, F and Salleo, C (2004), “Consolidation and efficiency in the financial sector: A review of the international evidence,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 2493-2519, October. Boot, A and Ratnovski L (2012), “Banking and Trading”, IMF Working Paper WP/12/238. Boyd, J and Heitz (2011), “The Social Costs and Benefits of Too-Big-To-Fail Banks: A bounding exercise”, Working Paper. Brunnermeier, M, Crockett, A, Goodhart, C, Persaud, A and Shin, H (2009), “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation,” London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. Cecchetti, S and Mohanty, M and Zampolli, F (2011). “The real effects of debt”, BIS Working Papers 352, Bank for International Settlements. Coase, R.H. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16. (Nov 1937), pp. 386–405. Davies, R and Tracey, B (2012), “Too big to be efficient? The impact of too big to fail factors on scale economies for banks”, Mimeo Easterly, W., Islam, R., and Stiglitz, J. (2000), "Shaken and Stirred, Explaining Growth Volatility," Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics.

(2008), “Optimal industrial structure in banking,” in Handbook of Financial Intermediation, Arnoud Boot and Anjan Thakor, eds. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 133–162. Miles D, Yang J and Marcheggiano, G (2012), “Optimal Bank Capital”, Economic Journal. Noss, J and Sowerbutts, R (2012), “The Implicit Subsidy of banks” Bank of England FS Papers Series, FS Paper No 15. Panizza, U and Arcand, J-L and Berkes, E (2012), “Too Much Finance?,” IMF Working Papers 12/161, International Monetary Fund. Philippon, T and Reshef, A, (2009), “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 1909–2006,” NBER Working Papers 14644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Pulley, L. B. and Y. M. Braunstein (1992), “A composite cost function for multiproduct firms with an application to economies of scope in banking”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 74(2), 221–30. Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K, (2010), “Growth in a Time of Debt,” American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 573–78, May. Segoviano, M and Goodhart, C (2009), “Banking Stability Measures,” IMF Working Paper 09/04 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). Schanz, J, Aikman, D, Collazos, P, Farag, M, Gregory, D and Kapadia, S (2011), “The long-term economic impact of higher capital levels”, Bank of England, Mimeo Tarullo, D (2012), “Financial Stability Regulation”, Speech At the Distinguished Jurist Lecture, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Wagner, W (2009), “In the Quest of Systemic Externalities: A Review of the Literature”, mimeo Wheelock, D.C., and Wilson P.W. (2012), “Do Large Banks have Lower Costs?
There were several reasons why I did not think it was a good idea. First, our forecast was that inflation would remain below the target in the near term, and was not expected to stabilise at 2 per cent until late 2022. Of importance here was also the fact that I could not see any appreciable upside risks for the inflation forecast either. Second, as I saw it, an increase in the interest rate in the near future could hardly be expected to lead to a greater probability of the downward trend in inflation expectations reversing. This worried me quite considerably as it can affect the inflation rate on which the labour market organisations base their forthcoming wage negotiations. Third, I felt there was reason to worry about the consequences of both the Federal Reserve and the ECB increasing their monetary policy stimuli while in Sweden, if the announced rate rise were to be implemented, we would be going in the opposite direction. Many analysts also interpreted the signals from the meeting in October as the Riksbank viewing the abolition of negative rates as an end in itself. This applies not only to analysts in Sweden but also internationally. A couple of examples are articles from Bloomberg and in the Financial Times, in which the authors argue that the Riksbank has now realised the problems of negative interest rates and is therefore keen to get away from them.

We – in this case I mean the IMF, its major creditors and the governments in the region – treated these cases as closer to the illiquidity extreme on the continuum, rather than to the insolvency extreme. In the Asian crisis countries, unlike in Russia or Argentina, there was no plausible case for arguing that the sovereign governments had accumulated debts they were unable to repay. A forced restructuring of the external debt of a country or a forced suspension of payments on those obligations would have made the crisis in Asia, and more broadly, substantially worse. These were not conditions of insolvency, but nor were they purely temporary liquidity problems that could have been addressed through the quick infusion of unconditional finance without any change in policies. The crisis economies all tried that strategy in the weeks and in some cases months before going to the IMF for assistance. Those strategies failed not simply because the governments ran out of reserves, but because they had failed to embrace a broader set of policy changes powerful enough to restore confidence in future stability and growth. It is worth emphasizing that the strategies ultimately adopted in each case were quite unorthodox and were certainly not uniform. Besides the novel approach adopted in terms of the scale and structure of financing and the degree of international cooperation in support of the programs, the policy packages were also notable in the degree of emphasis placed on, for example, financial-sector reform and improvements to disclosure.
This is due in part to the weakness of the euro, not least against the US dollar and the Japanese yen. On the other hand, the effective krone exchange rate - the krone exchange rate measured against an average of our trading partners’ currencies - has not been particularly strong. If Norges Bank were to respond to this situation by using the interest rate to attempt to fine-tune the krone exchange rate against the euro in the short term, this would lead to higher price and cost inflation. This would lay the foundation for subsequent instability in the krone exchange rate. 13  BIS Review 105/2000  The orientation of monetary policy in the past year (and in the future) Projections of future inflation and macroeconomic developments play an important part in the orientation of monetary policy. Norges Bank’s projections are published in quarterly Inflation Reports, which provide an overview of recent price trends and factors influencing price and cost inflation. These Inflation Reports contain a review of the outlook for the Norwegian economy, and the Bank’s projections of inflation with a two-year horizon. Norges Bank’s assessments are summarised in a leader in each report. If the Bank’s inflation projections, for a given interest rate scenario, do not approach the level of inflation aimed at by the euro area countries at a two to three-year horizon, this will constitute grounds for adjusting interest rates. This system has similarities with what Lars Svensson terms “inflation forecast targeting”.

Irma Rosenberg: Why is Swedish inflation so low? Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the shareholders’ meeting of SBAB - Sveriges Bostadsfinansieringsaktiebolag, Stockholm, 13 April 2005. *  *  *  Introduction Thank you for your invitation to come here today. Inflation today is low and has fallen short of our inflation target since the middle of 2003. There are several explanations for this. One obvious reason is that our own interest rate cuts affect an important component in the consumer price index (CPI), namely homeowners’ interest costs, which decrease as a result. Another is the developments in electricity prices, although we had largely foreseen the effects of these. The principal factors, however, seem to have been the recent years’ high productivity growth in the Swedish economy and the drop in import prices. Current inflation is not the decisive factor behind the interest rate decisions that we make today. That is because it takes 1-2 years before rate adjustments have their full impact on inflation. Consequently, our interest rate decisions are based on an assessment of inflation prospects in the coming years. The current inflation rate is the starting point for this assessment, however, and it is therefore important to understand the underlying reasons for why inflation is so low today. Another reason is that it may be warranted in some situations to allow inflation to deviate from target for a period that extends beyond the normal forecast horizon, which is something I will be coming back to.
However, towards 2017 non-mining investment should restart growing at a pace matching the recovery of the overall economy (figure 4). About the current account, we believe that this year’s deficit will be smaller than we thought in March and will show no big changes in 2017. In particular, the trade balance outperformed the March forecast in the first quarter, driven mainly by volume exports of goods, especially copper, and tourism-related services. Furthermore, a slowdown in capital goods imports is expected because of adjustments in investment. In addition, there are generally upward revisions to non-copper export prices. Consumption, meanwhile, continues to grow at around 2 percent. Details of the domestic economy’s baseline scenario are shown in table 1. In this context, we foresee further adjustments in the labor market in the coming quarters. Lately, annual growth in salaried employment slowed down significantly, to 0.5 percent in the last moving quarter. The national unemployment rate has adjusted more gradually, thanks to increased self-employment, so it is still low by historic patterns (figure 5). By regions, in the north of the country unemployment has risen more sharply than in other areas. Firms interviewed for May’s Business Perception Report – a quarterly publication of the Bank – reveal increased labor availability together with lower wage claims. Looking into the March survey of the University of Chile, we also see an increase in the unemployment rate in Greater Santiago, to 9.4 percent, confirming the weakening of the labor market.

The second question raised today is: What were the reasons for undertaking steps for financial sector reform? The recent financial crisis served as a reminder that the impaired financial system can have a significant impact on the functioning of the overall economy. Moreover, the 2007–08 financial crises was, to a great extent, a result of the failure of public authorities in the United States and Europe to adequately monitor and address systemic risk. By comparison, Asia and other parts of the world where memories of systemic financial crises were still fresh, had adopted more prudent policies and practices, and were less impacted by the subprimetriggered financial shockwaves. In order to make global finance more stable, the 2009 G20 summits in London and Pittsburg listed commitments on financial regulatory reform, pushing the financial regulation to the forefront of the global economic cooperation agenda at the level of political principles, which had until then, been mainly focused on trade and macroeconomic policy. The items on regulation can themselves be divided into two subgroups. On the one hand, the G20 decided to tighten or strengthen the regulatory framework applying to entities or activities that had already been regulated before the crisis.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Mobile payment – the next wave Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Payment System Forum & Exhibition 2017 "Mobile Payment: The Next Wave", Kuala Lumpur, 8 December 2017. * * * Welcome to the Payment System Forum & Exhibition 2017. This year’s theme ‘Mobile Payment: The Next Wave’ is the continuation of our country’s e-payment transformation that started seven years ago. In 2011, we launched the 10-year e-payment roadmap in the Financial Sector Blueprint 2011–2020. Various reform measures were instituted to remove pricing distortions, instill market incentives and induce competition to reduce costs in our effort to create a conducive environment to accelerate migration to e-payments. These measures have been effective in reducing Malaysia’s usage of cheques and fostering the adoption of e-payments. The total cheque volume has declined by 42% from 205 million cheques in 2011 to an estimated 120 million cheques in 2017. Electronic fund transfers have increased from 66 million transactions in 2011 to an estimated 329 million transactions in 2017, surpassing the number of cheques issued by almost three times. At the current rate of decline, we are likely to achieve the Financial Sector Blueprint target of reducing cheque usage to 100 million in the year 2019, one year ahead of schedule. Encouraging progress has also been made in the expansion of the point-of-sale (POS) terminal network.

In 2017 alone, Bank Negara Malaysia has processed applications from 43 new non-bank players, an increase of 91% compared to the past two years. This is in line with global developments where the size of the global payments industry has increased to account for 34 percent of overall banking revenues in 2016 and is projected to become a $ trillion dollar industry by 2020. This is a significant turning point. In essence, the traditional 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  payment channels are increasingly being replaced by nimble, innovative and lower cost alternatives. We must embrace the next wave of technological and e-payment transformation. As a nation, we need to rise and seize this exciting opportunity, take a proactive rather than a reactive role, and benefit from the enormous opportunities brought about by technology to improve our payment system’s security, efficiency, productivity. We need to bereft ourselves of the inertia to move forward with the times. There are a few strategies we ought to adopt, to reduce further the wastage arising from the cost of maintaining two parallel systems by accelerating the displacement of cheques, harness the pervasiveness of mobile payments to ensure reach, and focus on solving the last mile obstacles to enhance migration to e-payments. The enormous cost of maintaining two parallel systems Cheque is a very costly payment instrument to process compared to electronic fund transfer.
BIS Review 75/2001  3  The broad use of statistical risk models can have a similar effect. It is, of course, a good thing to use risk models as an aid and we can conclude that they have enabled great progress in the management of financial risks. However, there is an evident problem here. When an increasing number of players are using the same models, they are also likely to react in a similar way when there is unease on the markets, which can reinforce fluctuations and trigger new signals from the models, and so on. What is rational for one individual institute may in this case be irrational as a whole. Increased transparency reduces risk of herd behaviour So is it possible to counteract this type of behaviour? Allow me to begin by emphasising that economic risk-taking in itself is an important factor behind economic growth. However, risk-taking also means that not all investments will bear fruit. This is why we have created national bankruptcy regulations enabling businesses to be liquidated in an orderly manner. For the same reason, we must assume that financial crises will emerge even in the future. On the other hand, we must of course do all we can to avoid such crises spreading unnecessarily. I should also like to stress that I do not believe that different types of taxes aimed at reducing the turnover on the markets are a practicable route forward.

I shall not go into this work in any great depth here. Instead, I will discuss some factors that could contribute to strengthening movements on the financial markets in an unhealthy manner, and where we need to find other solutions to improve the functioning of the markets. These factors can also be more directly connected with mutual fund investment. Short-term evaluation and “follow the leader” behaviour The first thing that comes to mind here is the way many of the operations on the financial markets are evaluated. All too often the focus is on the short-term result. This applies in particular to the evaluation of various securities funds. Although many of you manage long-term savings that people intend to live on after retirement, you are nevertheless evaluated on the results you have achieved over the past year, the past few months or even the past few days. We have all seen the newspaper headlines declaring the winners and losers in mutual fund investment. Media coverage of developments on the financial markets certainly plays an important role for the transparency of these markets, but the focus on short-term results can create a vicious circle where investors and companies are constantly chasing the best possible result in the short term, despite the fact that this is not a good long-term strategy. Such behaviour can reinforce financial crises; for instance, through a fund manager not being given scope to wait until the crisis has abated, which could be rational in a long-term perspective.
The inflation target and consideration of the real economy The Riksbank has the statutory objective of maintaining a low and stable inflation rate, or of “maintaining price stability” as it is expressed in the Sveriges Riksbank Act. We have specified this task as ensuring that CPI inflation is around 2 per cent a year, with a tolerated deviation interval of +/1 one percentage point. As long as confidence in the inflation target is not threatened – or, as it is usually expressed, as long as the nominal anchor for setting prices and wages is not at risk – we also have the opportunity to take into consideration how the real economy, such as production and employment, develops. Although the latter has not been written into the Act, it was stated in the preliminary work to the new Sveriges Riksbank Act that came into force in 1999 that it was natural that the Riksbank should support the economic policy objectives of sustainable growth and high employment without neglecting the long-term price stability objective. This was considered a natural consequence of the Riksbank being an authority under the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament). It was therefore considered unnecessary to specify any further objective than price stability in the law text. There were probably also some fears that statutory objectives for the real economy could give the wrong impression – that monetary policy could also govern long-term developments in growth and employment, for example.

In many countries, including some European and in particular Asian states, we can observe an effective pursuit of a vision leading to success in the global economy and determination of the public administration to develop a country’s ability to drive innovation, that is to develop a factor determining the country’s success in the global economy of the 21st century. Examples may be found in a recent edition of The Economist, where the article entitled The Search for Talent names a number of activities pursued by public administration in many countries in order to attract well-educated foreigners. Ladies and Gentlemen, the 21st century has witnessed not only ‘the death of distance’ but also ‘the death of time’. Innovation is driven, efficiency is improving and value is created by companies for clients and by public administration for citizens at a significantly faster pace. In order to win in an increasingly competitive economy, it is not only necessary to move ahead, but to move ahead increasingly faster. And in the two areas I discussed, that is lack of vision and leadership and backwardness in e-government, we have to run, as the race has already begun, and we are still pondering whether we should start moving the left or right leg first. Poles are hardworking, talented and have entrepreneurial spirit. We are sufficiently predisposed to achieve success in the global economy.