samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
•  Timetables could be improved - linking them more closely to national processes. •  Using the now more developed measures of cyclical balances could also be useful in this context. In general, I think it is important to enable the Commission to dig deeper into these areas and to increase the comparability between different countries. On the basis of this work the Commission’s role should be strengthened as regards giving “early warnings” and proposing measures. I also believe that the Commission should have the task of emphasising its analyses and going public more than it does today, thereby being more effective in the general debate in the individual member states. III. My third point has to do with consolidating the fiscal institutions and regulations at national level. Here a lot more can be done. One aspect that too often seems to be forgotten in the debate on the pact is that a balanced, countercyclical fiscal policy is not just a common European interest; it is in the individual interest of each country. Some politicians contribute to this misunderstanding when they depict the commonly adopted criteria as an unreasonable burden from “accountants in Brussels”. One manifestation of the same attitude is the recurring problems with the data that are sent to the Commission. Instead of having a transparent process, increasingly unrealistic figures are being delivered. There are several examples of governments reporting data before an election that after the election proved to be misleading.

•  There is a growing cluster of Chinese asset managers that are keen to set up in Singapore, attracted by our pan-Asian focus and broad base of international investors. •  They cover a broad spectrum of investments, ranging from traditional asset managers to hedge funds to private equity funds. Conclusion Let me conclude. The biggest story for Asia in the last three decades has been the rise of China. Asia’s biggest story in the next three decades will be the transformation of China. It will not be an easy transition, as China deals with the challenges of debt, deflation, and demographics. There will be dislocations and bouts of volatility along the way, with spillovers into Asia. But if China successfully addresses its vulnerabilities and restructures its economy, it will pave the way for more sustained growth and a more advanced economy. The new China that will emerge will open up new opportunities for Asian economies. The RMB will become more international and Chinese corporates and financial institutions more global. Singapore is well-positioned to partner Chinese companies in their regional journey and deepen China’s connectivity to Asia through trade and investment. The next chapter of ChinaSingapore financial partnership will be exciting and rewarding. I wish you fruitful discussions and a pleasant stay in Singapore. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Not surprisingly, too, there is also strong political resistance in many countries, including notably the United States, to the idea that public - taxpayers’ - money should be used to bail out private creditors, especially foreign creditors. Alternative external financing need not come solely from the public sector. Private finance would, in principle, serve the same purpose, and in many situations market price adjustments may be sufficient to stem the capital outflow. But given the extent of the loss of confidence in the present case it would be optimistic to think that other private lenders were queuing up to volunteer to stand in place of those that are rushing for the exit. In practice in the present situation private support means persuading existing creditors that their assets will be better protected if they are prepared to leave them in place. And they may be prepared to do so, if all other major creditors agree to do the same, especially if official support is being made available in parallel. But in this case, too, difficult judgments have to be made. There is a danger  BIS Review 5/1998  -4-  that, if private creditors have to be in effect coerced into staying put, they will immediately cut their positions elsewhere, while they can, adding to the international contagion. Achieving a reasonable balance between market and macro-economic policy adjustment and official and private financing was never going to be easy.

And while, in this country particularly, we are having to work harder to keep her from tasting Father Bear’s porridge, there are now signs that the porridge itself may be beginning to cool down - as it needs to do, quite soon and quite quickly, if we are not to see inflation pick up. Some US business people - and certainly some British business people - engaged in international trade are understandably discomforted by the recent strength of our respective exchange rates - not vis-à-vis each other because the dollar-sterling rate has been relatively stable, but against the rest of the world. But the domestic environment, here and in the United States, remains - actually and prospectively - relatively benign. We are though both exposed to the chilly winds now blowing from Asia. And I should like to devote the rest of my remarks to discussing the problems in Asia and considering just how serious a threat they pose to the global economy. I emphasise “problems” in this context because it is important to recognise that the situation in Asia differs materially from one country to another, even though they are all inevitably affected to varying degrees - through their close commercial links with each other by the present economic weakness in the region as a whole. Let me begin with a few words on Japan. Japan is of course much the largest economy in Asia.
The situation in Sweden’s financial markets then improved as the measures for consolidating government finances began to bite, prospects for Sweden’s economy brightened and international developments became more stable. During 1995 the Swedish krona became markedly stronger and long-term interest rates declined. This trend continued during 1996, when the Riksbank rapidly lowered the repo rate. At the end of 1996 the level of the TCW exchange rate index was 114, which was inside the Riksbank’s estimated interval for long-term equilibrium. For about two years, from the summer of 1996 to the summer of 1998, the krona stayed inside a relatively narrow interval in relation to the German mark, about 3 per cent around a mean level of 4,40. In effective TCW terms, however, the krona weakened. There are good reasons for supposing that this was due to other factors than problems with credibility. The link between exchange rate movements and the long-term interest rate differential was no longer discernible, which indicates that the krona’s path now had less to do with aspects of credibility. The main explanation for the weaker exchange rate in this period lay rather in cyclical differences. Stronger economic growth in the UK and the United States caused the dollar and sterling to appreciate against the krona. Turbulent autumn In the autumn of 1998 the krona weakened again, mainly, in the Riksbank’s opinion, on account of international turbulence.

Thus, along with more incentives to promote short sales, steps should be taken to facilitate the timely and orderly absorption of these properties back into the market including as renteroccupied housing. An interagency group including the Federal Reserve is working on issues relating to REO-to-rental conversions. Appropriate policies would simultaneously lessen downward pressure on home prices and upward pressure on rents. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Among other steps, investors could be encouraged to purchase REO to be made available as rental housing. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could increase the number of loans offered to individual investors, provided the investor puts up an adequate amount of equity for each mortgage. And REO properties in a given locality could be bundled for sale. The government might consider a package of tax incentives for purchases of REO that are used as rental properties. Such incentives might include a reduction of the current 27½ year depreciation period and/or a reduction of capital gains tax liability if the property is held for a minimum period, such as five years. One idea developed by my staff – let’s call it “homes for heroes” – would be to create a new tax credit or other home purchase subsidy specifically for veterans of our foreign wars that would enable these veterans to purchase such properties at a discount.
The projections for inflation were the highest ever published by the Bank, while the forecasts for output growth were the lowest ever published. In other words, these projections highlighted the difficult trade-off facing the MPC in keeping inflation close to target, while supporting output and jobs growth in the economy. In the MPC’s judgement in November, managing this trade-off was best achieved by maintaining the current monetary policy stance, with a neutral bias on the direction of the next move in interest rates. Consistent with this neutral bias, the MPC judged the risks to inflation and output to be broadly symmetric and, given heightened uncertainty since the referendum, larger than usual. My own personal judgement on the appropriate monetary policy stance is close to the MPC consensus. In August, I believed the risks to inflation and output lay to the downside, even after the stimulus measures. 20  See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/decisionmakerpanel.aspx. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  12  That is why I supported forward guidance on a further lowering of interest rates in the run-up to the end of the year, provided the economy evolved in line with the MPC’s projections for inflation and output at the time. In the event, output has out-performed those expectations, while expectations of inflation have picked up, largely as a result of sterling’s depreciation. That configuration now leaves me comfortable with the current stance of monetary policy, with no bias on the direction of the next move in interest rates.

Looking beyond current fiscal turbulences, let us think, for instance, of how euro area member countries would have absorbed the crisis with fifteen different currencies, fluctuating internal exchange rates, and, consequently, much higher volatility, uncertainty, risk premia and interest rates. This experiment speaks for itself. Let me add, also, that despite the perception of slow motion from European authorities, we share a great sense of urgency and solidarity. There is no benign neglect nor resignation/despair. The last type of reaction is support. It shows up in comments from a majority of observers and investors, especially in emerging economies: they praise the euro; they want it to succeed; but they sometimes question our collective ability, in current circumstances, to do what is necessary, to make the right decisions or make them at the right time and to set in place the proper framework for the future. These are the concerns I would now like to address. Where and how did it start? Most euro area and EU countries entered the crisis with significantly deteriorated fiscal positions, very far from the “structural balance objective”, which is the core of our fiscal framework and also the commitment made by Member States that adopted the euro. With the crisis, fiscal imbalances increased, not so much because of a rise in expenditure, but essentially through a massive loss in revenue.
MAS will allow a significantly rooted QFB to operate an additional 25 or up to 50 places of business, as part of an overall FTA package negotiated with the home countries of these QFBs. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  In September 2018, we announced that FinTechs and other non-bank financial institutions will be granted access to the FAST network for real time payments. This is a major step towards making our payments system open, accessible and competitive. 10. But we are in fact at the threshold of a further and more fundamental transformation in banking. The far reaching effects of digitalisation are stimulating a fundamental re-think of the role of banks, in most advanced financial centres. The ramifications go well beyond those ushered in by the technologies and business models of a decade or two ago. 11. We must take advantage of these opportunities that digital finance brings, and not be overtaken by the wave of changes taking place globally. 12. We must allow for greater competition and spur greater innovation in finance – competition between new and traditional business models, new players and incumbents, and different ways of using technology to serve business and individual customers better. We must also retain strong local anchors and trust in the banking system. These dual objectives  have guided our past liberalisation initiatives, and motivate our next moves. 13. As we embark on this new phase, however, it is worth reminding ourselves of our real purposes in finance.

We are also restricting the new licences to players anchored in Singapore for two reasons. First, so that we maintain a strong local core in our banking system, which must remain our objective as I explained earlier. Second, to avoid an unintended unilateral liberalisation of our full bank regime as a result of our WTO commitments. MAS will also issue up to three digital wholesale bank licences, which will be open to both local and foreign players. The digital wholesale banks will be introduced as a pilot, and 34. MAS will review whether to grant more such licences in the future. Safeguards 35. To ensure high-quality applicants, MAS will set prudent baseline requirements on track record and sustainability of business models. MAS will not allow value-destructive competition to the detriment of long-term financial system stability. We will also put in place safeguards to protect depositors, mitigate the risk of untested business models, and minimise costs to the financial system in the event of a failure. We will also ensure that digital banks will compete with incumbents on a level playing field. 36. As digital full banks will have access to retail deposits, MAS will phase in their permissible activities via a two-stage process to minimise risks to retail depositors. It will also be required to be a member of the deposit insurance scheme. A digital full bank will commence as a restricted digital bank to build up its business model and internal processes, and gradually progress to become a full functioning full bank.
Andrew Bailey: The case for an open financial system Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Financial and Professional Services Address, Mansion House, London, 10 February 2021. * * * As we look forward – and for so many reasons we must look forward – it is important to focus on the future of financial services, and the important role they play in our economy and internationally. This will be my focus today. I am going to look forward with the benefit of history and context and set out why open financial markets are in the interests of all – home and abroad – and something we should always strive for. I want to start with the Bretton Woods agreement towards the end of the Second World War. This was a fundamental and decisive commitment to an open world economy. This commitment did not come free at the time – the adjustment was hard for this country – and of course the more formal Bretton Woods system broke down in the 1970s. But that breakdown did not compromise the commitment shared broadly across nations to an open world economy. There have been times when the commitment has been sorely tested, but it has not been abandoned. What followed the breakdown was a shift of emphasis, not a free for all.

The question then arises of what sorts of safeguards and rules should apply to that trade? I mentioned earlier that one of the offspring of Bretton Woods was the GATT, subsequently the W TO. The focus of activity was for some considerable time on trade in goods not trade in services. Both goods and services trade depend on robust standards and the regulation of those standards, but trade in services is almost entirely about such standards. This trade has been substantially supported by the global standards to which I referred earlier, and which has allowed countries to defer to each other in terms of the prevailing rules and regulations. This means deferring to the rules of others to protect our citizens or firms when they choose to do business there. There is no doubt in my mind that the work done on global standards since the financial crisis has made this process easier to support and safer and improved the level of trust we have in each other. The European Union has pursued the approach of so-called equivalence, which on the face of it allows for deferring to other authorities where appropriate. The EU’s framework of equivalence in financial services is a patchwork across many different pieces of financial services legislation, taking different forms in different sub-sectors, and in some not present at all. Nor do the equivalence measures prescribe how the judgement should be made. As is well known, the post-Brexit equivalence process between the UK and EU has not been straightforward.
Whereas the expansionary stance of fiscal policies scarcely altered in the main developed countries, where public debt continued on a rising trend, the accommodative stance of monetary policies (though, overall, they also helped sustain growth in 2005) was gradually toned down. The main central banks – especially in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in the euro area – progressively raised interest rates and withdrew the unusual monetary stimulus of the previous years. This pattern will possibly also extend to Japan this year, making it likely that, for the first time in 15 years, there will be a phase of monetary policy tightening in the three major developed areas. In this respect, I should stress that the gradualness of the decisions adopted and central banks' clarity in transmitting them have steered financial market expectations, which has been conducive to their stability and has cushioned the impact of these measures on world growth. But beyond the generally still-expansionary stance of macroeconomic policies, I believe a significant factor that helps explain the buoyancy of the world economy in recent years is the broadly generous financial conditions that most countries have faced. Real and nominal interest rates at various terms, financial and real-estate asset prices and risk premia have, in general, held at very favourable levels for consumption and investment. In turn, the favourable expectations of economic growth, in a setting of abundant liquidity, fed into rising stock market trends and the reduction in risk premia on corporate and emerging-market debt.

Imports from countries where the price level is lower than in Norway are increasing, resulting in a fall in prices for a number of consumer goods. On the other hand, higher production in large countries such as China and India has led to higher prices for energy products. As a result, the overall rise in consumer prices has edged up both at home and abroad. The projections in the Inflation Report are based on an interest rate path that in the Executive Board’s assessment provides a reasonable balance between the objectives of monetary policy. Previously, we based our analysis on various technical assumptions concerning future interest rates. One such assumption was market interest rate expectations. As from Inflation Report 3/05, we now base our projections on an interest rate path that we consider reasonable. This gives Norges Bank more active ownership of the projections that are presented and of the uncertainty we believe surrounds these projections. The arguments favouring a very low interest rate in Norway are to some extent less relevant. The outlook and analyses suggest a gradual increase in the interest rate towards a more normal level, but we expect the adjustment to occur in small, not too frequent steps. Output growth is high and may in isolation suggest a more rapid increase in the interest rate ahead. This would reduce the risk of bottlenecks in the economy with rising cost inflation and continued debt build-up.
In addition, long term inflation expectations, as measured by the "5 years in 5 years" break even (or swap) inflation rate, has dropped significantly under 2%, perhaps reflecting the credibility created by our past actions. To be sure, we must remain vigilant as regards wage developments and the still possible second round effects from past price surges. But, overall, I would asses that our new monetary stance is in line with what is necessary, in current conditions, to fulfill our mandate. Let me now elaborate on two other set of policies, which, although not directly linked to the currency, contribute to underpin the strength and stability of the euro area. The crisis has given a new impetus to discussions on the proper architecture of financial supervision. In Europe, with market integration moving at a quick pace, supervisory structures will have to adapt. I am a strong supporter of the Lamfalussy process and believe that current efforts to improve and develop it deserve all our attention. But I would also argue that the process must be conducted with pragmatism and a constant look at reality rather than by reference are some theoretical scheme and vision, and I would like to take this opportunity to mention two lessons that I draw personally from events of the last 12 months. First, there are clear advantages in having banking supervision close to (or at least not too far away from) the Central Bank.

While there are no indications that banks in Hong Kong are abusing the rules on connected lending, there seems to be uncertainty among some banks as to how the rules work. We have therefore recommended that the board should ensure that the bank fully understands its legal obligations under the Banking Ordinance and establishes a detailed policy on connected lending. •  Third, the board should ensure that it receives the management letter from the external auditor without delay together with the comments of management. We have specified that the management letter should normally be received within four months from the year-end. Of course, this is not something that is totally within the control of the bank. I would therefore put in a plea to any bank auditors in the audience to submit the management letter without delay. •  Fourth, the board should maintain an appropriate level of checks and balances against the influence of management and/or the shareholder controllers in order to ensure that decisions are taken with the bank’s best interests in mind. The key issue here is the number of independent non-executive directors there should be on the board of banks. We recommend a minimum of three to ensure that there is a sufficient pool of independent directors to sit on the various committees of the board and to cover absences. •  Fifth, the board should establish an audit committee with written terms of reference specifying its authorities and duties.