samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is because the bank lending rate is also a function of financial regulations (placed on banks to enhance financial stability and consumer protection), as these tend to increase banks’ costs which, to a certain extent, are passed on to customers in the form of an increased interest rate margin. This concept can be illustrated in the stylised equation for the lending rate by adding a variable ( ) which designates regulations affecting the interest rate margin:  This equation is, of course, a simplification, but it is useful for illustrative purposes. It shows how some static macroprudential instruments, such as increased capital or reserve requirements, will affect the interest rate margin in a “one-off shift” when they are introduced, which will affect the transmission mechanism during the period of adjustment. However, there are also likely to be dynamic macroprudential instruments, such as time-varying countercyclical capital buffers, aimed at ensuring that macroprudential policy can influence the availability and pricing of credit throughout the cycle. These time-varying instruments will affect the transmission mechanism on an ongoing basis as they change over time. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  But the instruments are not perfect substitutes While the effects of monetary and macroprudential instruments may overlap, they are not perfect substitutes. 9 As stated earlier, the macroprudential policy toolkit is likely to include a diverse range of instruments that operate in different ways on different elements of the financial system. And the effect of these instruments on policy objectives other than macroprudential policy will also vary.

Household income has been sharply restricted, particularly in 1995–96. So have public activities. In one respect, moreover, the outlook is still troublesome, namely as regards employment. Despite the economic recovery, a rapid expansion of employment has proved difficult to achieve. It is worth noting, however, that the number of private sector jobs, in services in particular, has in fact been rising continuously since 1995. But this has not made up sufficiently for the contraction of employment during the 1990s in, for example, the public sector and construction. After this review of developments in recent years, I shall now discuss the Riksbank’s appraisal of the coming twenty-four months, which is the period we need to consider when conducting monetary policy. 3. The message in June In the latest inflation report last June the Riksbank presented an economic forecast for Sweden and its implications for the path of inflation up to the middle of the year 2000. Our assessment was that the trends in recent years, with high growth and low inflation, would continue in the years ahead. The economic upswing was assumed to continue in the forecast period, with annual growth rates around 2.5 per cent this year and 3 per cent in the next two years. The forecast involved an increasing contribution from rising domestic demand, accompanied by a successive fall-off in export growth. Private consumption was expected to pick up, partly in view of rising household income.
These are: whether the UK economy has achieved sustainable convergence with the economies of the single currency; whether there is sufficient flexibility in the UK economy to adapt to change and other unexpected economic events; whether joining the single currency would create better conditions for businesses to make long-term decisions to invest in the UK; the impact membership would have on the UK financial services industry; and ultimately whether joining the single currency would be good for employment. It would then submit a favourable decision to Parliament, and the British people in a referendum. The Chancellor recognised that it was unrealistic to think that a decision could be reached during the lifetime of the present Parliament, which runs to May 2002 at the latest. But he stressed that in the meantime the UK should nevertheless prepare - not only for introduction of the euro on the Continent on 1 January 1999 - which we of course did very effectively - but also for our own eventual participation. The Chancellor’s statement was the first by a British Government to accept the principle of monetary union. It recognised that the single currency will affect us whether we are in fact in or out - and that it is clearly in our own national interest to do all that we can to ensure that the euro is successful.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: Britain and Europe  Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE, Governor of the Bank of England, at The British Swiss Chamber of Commerce Lunch, held in Zürich, on 12 September 2000. *  *  *  I agreed to talk briefly about Britain and Europe - and then respond to questions. I will in fact talk more specifically about Britain and the euro from my perspective at the Bank of England. But let me make clear, from the outset, that monetary union is fundamentally a political rather than an economic issue. It necessarily involves the deliberate pooling of national sovereignty over important aspects of public policy, in the interest not just of collective economic advantage, but of a perceived wider political harmony within Europe. As a central banker, I have nothing to say about the politics of monetary union - that’s for elected politicians and clearly political opinion is divided - not just in the UK - about how far and certainly how fast to go in the sensitive matter of pooling national sovereignty. But monetary union is also an economic issue and that is my concern. So what are the economic pros and cons? The arguments on either side are in fact now reasonably well defined in the UK where there has already been an intense and protracted debate - though different opinions inevitably attach different weights to them.
However, it is also conceivable that the full impact of the supply shocks has not yet become evident on growth and inflation. To sum up, the oil price and its effects on growth and inflation are a significant source of uncertainty that we are grappling with in our assessment of growth prospects and the inflation outlook. Low long-term interest rates In the financial markets recent developments have been characterised by a continuation of low longterm interest rates and a stable krona. The low bond yields are somewhat puzzling. Even though corporate earnings have continued to increase in line with the continued strengthening of international economic activity, investment in many countries has not picked up to the same extent. While the willingness to invest has been relatively low in industrialised nations, regarded from a cyclical perspective, saving has also been high in certain oil-producing countries and in several Asian economies. The combination of a restrained willingness to invest and a high saving rate could, in other words, have contributed to the low bond yields. In addition, however, interest rates around the world in recent years may have been depressed by more transitory factors such as temporarily low risk premiums, effects of changed rules for pension saving and Asian countries’ build-up of their foreign exchange reserves. A fast rise in bond yields cannot be ruled out when these conditions normalise. That in turn could have repercussions for the real economy, partly through the effect on housing prices, household wealth and consumption.

We are therefore assuming that domestic inflation will rise at a slow rate over the forecast period. Regarding the forecast for imported inflation, our assessment is that the effect of the price-dampening factors will decline somewhat. Although it can of course be assumed that the substitution for cheaper goods in imports will continue, rising global capacity pressures are expected to lead to higher international price pressures. Nor do we expect the krona exchange rate to continue to have the same price-dampening effect as it has had in recent years. The fact that cost pressures and capacity pressures will rise in Sweden is also judged to affect consumer prices of imported products since these are processed and distributed before being sold on in the Swedish market. All in all, therefore, there is reason, in my opinion, to believe that imported inflation excluding oil will rise gradually over the coming year. However, I believe that it may remain relatively low. Future monetary policy The assessment is thus that inflation will rise over the coming years, but at a relatively moderate rate. Compared with the assessment we made in June, it now appears that inflation may turn out somewhat higher. In the short term, this is primarily due to the higher oil price. In the longer term, it is the higher growth rate that indicates a slightly higher inflation rate than we had forecast in June. However, this is partly counteracted by the fact that the underlying productivity growth in the economy may need some upward revision.
Employment growth is projected to be fairly moderate this year in relation to growth in demand and output. Only a slight decrease in unemployment is projected for 2004. Unemployment is projected to edge down in 2005 and 2006. After several years of high wage growth, pay increases in last year’s settlement were more moderate. Annual wage growth was nonetheless 4½ per cent as substantial increases with effect from 2003 were awarded in the 2002 main wage settlement. Wage growth is projected to decline to 3¾ per cent this year. The labour market appears to be improving somewhat more rapidly than expected previously. In isolation, this may contribute to pushing up wage growth relative to previous projections. The effect is, however, expected to be more than offset by the prospects of very low inflation this year. In 2005 and 2006, wage growth is projected to increase as a result of a tighter labour market. In connection with the 2004 wage settlement, the Government has stated that proposals concerning employment-based pensions will be put forward this year, including proposals for certain minimum  BIS Review 23/2004  5  standards that will be apply to all employees that are not already included in more favourable schemes. The proposal implies that many private sector employees that are not currently covered by a company pension scheme will be included in the proposed scheme. The proportion of employees without any employment-based pension is greatest in retail trade, the hotel and restaurant sector and the construction industry.

We do not know yet how the initiative will be implemented and what effect it will have on our relationship to the EU. Consequently, the economic impact of the popular decision cannot really be properly quantified at the moment, and this is why it has not been included in our forecast. For 2014, we continue to expect economic growth of around 2%. Inflation in Switzerland and the SNB’s monetary policy The greater economic momentum which we are forecasting will gradually lead to a better utilisation of production capacity. The underutilisation which still prevails continues to restrain consumer prices in Switzerland. Declining inflation abroad and the slightly stronger Swiss franc are having a similar impact by dampening imported inflation. Thus the SNB’s inflation forecast shows that there is no risk of inflation in the foreseeable future. In 2014, inflation in Switzerland is likely to amount to only 0%. In addition, the international environment is still giving rise to high levels of uncertainty. Consequently, the danger that the Swiss franc, as a safe haven, might suddenly be subject to further upward pressure has not been averted. Short-term interest rates are practically zero. For this reason, the minimum exchange rate is the right tool to avoid an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions, since an appreciation of the Swiss franc would lead to a further decline in import prices and a renewed threat of deflation. Given this situation, the SNB is maintaining the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro.
For the UK, this is well documented for small-firm finance during the early-90s recession.6 Although the stability of output growth over the recent past happily deprives us of a proper test, there are reasons to think that cyclical swings in the availability of finance may now be somewhat less marked than in the past. In the first place, the greater stability brought by the new monetary regime may make a difference. Compared with the past, there should be less risk of the monetary authority delaying a response to incipient inflation until the point that it is forced to slam on the brakes, effectively engineering recession to quell inflation expectations and in the process contributing to a sharp spike in unemployment, loan defaults and bank losses. A more stable macroeconomic environment may also, by reducing the risks for new entrants, be one amongst a number of influences fostering competition. There is perhaps some circumstantial evidence of that in, for example, the decline in margins on personal loans (Chart 10). That would tend to reduce the credit constraints facing households. As does the increased availability of loan products that enable homeowners to borrow against the free equity in their houses. Broadly similar changes have been underway in business finance, where competition also comes from outside the banking sector through firms’ access to richer capital markets. The proportion of UK nonfinancial firms’ debt accounted for by bonds has risen from around 15% in 1990 to over 30% now (Chart 11).

But it is testimony to the strong credentials that Carney brought to these jobs: •  a solid academic grounding – with a PhD in Economics from Oxford University;  •  extensive experience in the private sector – having spent more than a decade at Goldman Sachs;  •  a background in public policy – working on a variety of economic issues at the Canadian Department of Finance; and  •  most important, a commitment to serve the larger good of society. •  Carney’s topic today is The Future of Financial Reform. He is uniquely well placed to talk about this, having lived and breathed financial reforms in the aftermath of the Crisis, especially as the Chairman of the Financial Stability Board. •  Under Carney’s leadership, the FSB has worked intensely to correct the fault lines that led to the Global Financial Crisis. •  The FSB, in partnership with various standard setting bodies, has presided over perhaps one of the boldest and most far-reaching set of regulatory reforms in recent memory. •  We look forward to hearing from Carney the progress and implications of that work, the new risks emerging on the financial horizon, and the forward agenda of the FSB. I have had the pleasure and privilege of working with Mark at many international meetings over the last three-and-a-half years, at the BIS, the FSB, and the IMF. There are many smart central bankers on the international circuit. There are also many sharp financial regulators.
The data needed for systemic risk monitoring and supervision are not necessarily “real-time” market data – information about trades and transactions that can be reported at high frequency when the events occur – but certainly data would need to be “timely”. What is considered to be “timely” will depend on its purpose, and decisions about how timely the data should be should not ignore the costs of collecting and making the data usable. For many supervisory needs, real-time data would be impractical to collect and analyze in a meaningful way and unnecessary. For example, while supervisors may indeed need to be able to quickly value the balance sheets of systemically important financial institutions, very frequent updates as transactions occur and market prices change could lead to more volatility in values than fundamental conditions would indicate and would be extraordinarily expensive to provide and maintain. Certainly, real-time data could be needed for regulators responsible for monitoring market functioning, and daily data would be helpful to measure end-of-day payment settlements and risk positions among the largest firms. But for supervising market participants, real-time market data could require enormous investments by regulators, institutions, and investors in order to be usable while yielding little net benefit. As policymakers consider redesign of a system of data collection, the goal should be data that are timely and best suited to the mission at hand. A second principle is that data collection be user-driven.

Also taking place in conjunction with this Forum is the ceremony for the inaugural “The Royal Award for Islamic Finance” under the auspices of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Securities Commission, to commemorate the contribution of the world’s most outstanding individuals in global Islamic finance. Let me conclude by taking this opportunity to record our appreciation to the many distinguished speakers for their contribution to GIFF 2010. Let me also once again, express our deep gratitude to the Prime Minister, Yang Amat Berhormat, Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak and to Duli Yang Teramat Mulia Raja Dr. Nazrin ibni Sultan Azlan Shah for gracing this Forum. Thank you. BIS Review 140/2010  3
But we need to make sure that digital solutions are crafted for clients who may have difficulties to read on a computer or mobile screen, or whose cognitive abilities could be declining. There is also a need to ensure sufficient protection against new fraudulent and deceptive strategies in the use of digital tools. Let me conclude in stressing that making a difference for financial inclusion is about finding what works to help those who need it. It means looking for innovative solutions while making  sure nobody is left out. To achieve this, innovation and support from the financial sector and public authorities go hand in hand. As a central bank, this forces us to think and act “out of the box” and to explore new ways of doing things. For Fintechs, this means you can count on our support for ideas that work toward a more inclusive and sustainable financial world. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  On that note, I am looking forward to these afternoon’s discussions to help us find new solutions for financial inclusion, together, and I wish you all very fruitful discussions. Thank you for your attention. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches

Dimitar Bogov: Economic and financial cycle spillovers – reconsidering domestic and cross border channels and policy responses Address by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the 5th Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial cycle spillovers – reconsidering domestic and cross border channels and policy responses”, Skopje, 7–8 April 2016. *  *  *  Dear Governors, Your Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear guests, Let me wish you a warm welcome to our fifth Annual Research Conference that we usually host to mark the anniversary of the country’s monetary independence. This year’s Conference is a kind of a small jubilee considering the fact that for five consecutive years we have been inviting policy makers and researchers from the region and wider to discuss main policy issues and research questions, creating useful interaction and mutual knowledge increment, on which we are very proud. In addition, this year’s Conference coincides with yet another great anniversary – celebration of 70 years of central banking activities in the Republic of Macedonia and the conference is among the events that mark this immense anniversary throughout the year. As you probably noticed, this year we have chosen quite comprehensive and challenging Conference topic: Economic and Financial Cycle Spillovers: Reconsidering Domestic and Cross Border Channels and Policy Responses. Although not a new issue, it has been fully indorsed in the last global crisis and considered to be one of its main lessons that is still widely explored in the central banking and academic community.
The value of cross-border payments is estimated to increase from almost $ trillion in 2017 – already a pretty substantial figure – to over $ trillion by 2027, equating to a rise of over $ trillion in just 10 years.1  1  https://www.bcg.com/en-ch/publications/interactives/global-payments-interactive-edition  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  Despite their importance, cross-border payments still suffer from a number of challenges around cost, speed, access and transparency. As a stylised fact, it can, in certain cases, take up to 10 days to transfer money to another country, it can cost up to 10% of the value of the transfer and be up to 10 times more expensive than a domestic payment. Admittedly, not all cross-border payments fit this mould, and there have been great advances in recent years. For example, in SWIFT GPI where more than one third of payments arrive within 30 minutes and almost all of them within 24 hours. But, across the overall cross-border market, there are still less than half of all payments being completed within 24 hours: this needs to change. In discussing cross-border payments, we are not just talking about big companies or countries. The World Bank estimates that flows of remittances to some economies are greater than 30% of their country’s GDP2 and we know that this problem often hits individuals and small companies hard.

Faster, cheaper, more transparent, and more inclusive cross-border payment services would have widespread benefits for citizens across the globe both directly and by supporting economic growth, international trade and global development. International work to enhance cross-border payments  The challenge of cross-border payments has been on the agenda for a long time. But bringing about change in this multi-dimensional area is not easy. It requires strong international collaboration and commitment. It was, therefore, very welcome that enhancing cross-border payments was set as a priority for the Saudi Arabian Presidency of the G20 this year. This important G20 initiative has been structured around a three-stage process at the international level:  Stage 1 was an assessment undertaken by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) working with other standard setting bodies, including the Committee for Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), to identify the challenges and frictions in cross-border payments. The work, which was published in April this year3, identified seven underlying frictions that together contribute to challenges around cost, speed, access and transparency of cross-border payments. While a number of these frictions are related to technology (such as legacy platforms, and fragmented and truncated data formats), it is not simply a technology issue. It is a multi-faceted challenge also including issues such as divergent compliance checks, differing operating hours of payment systems and the liquidity costs associated with funding payments. Stage 2 was the development of the building blocks needed to remove these frictions.