samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The number of payments made in the UK continues to increase too and reached a record 39 billion in 2018, with a value of more than £ trillion.2 We are also experiencing a period of rapid change in the way payments are being made (one can even hire an electric bike using an app) by consumers and businesses, and in the companies and technologies behind them. At SIBOS I spoke3 about the Bank of England’s engagement with innovation and future trends in payments, both through our response to the Future of Finance Report4 and our work to renew the UK’s Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) service. This is an ambitious programme which will be delivered over the next few years. Our vision for RTGS is defined by: increased resilience; greater access; wider interoperability; improved user functionality; and strengthened end to end risk management. Today I will focus on the steps we are taking right now on the fifth of these to enhance the resilience in payments. Operational risk and resilience are in the spotlight like never before, with the FCA reporting a 187% increase in technology outages from 2017 to 2018.5 The joint Discussion Paper the Bank, PRA and FCA published last year6 started a dialogue on the operational resilience of the financial system, and the individual firms and Financial Market Infrastructures within it. I will discuss resilience through a payments lens.

Our contacts in the money market fund industry could foresee, based on their own business plans and discussions with their clients, that these reforms would lead to a substantial shift in money market fund assets. Substantial amounts were expected to come out of prime funds and into government-only funds, which generally hold Treasury securities, repo against Treasury collateral, or similar ultra-low-risk assets. As a result, this reallocation was expected to bring about somewhat lower rates on Treasury bills and repo backed by Treasury collateral, and somewhat higher unsecured rates. It is important that the monetary policy implementation framework take note of changes to the broader financial market landscape, including its regulatory structure, and adapt as necessary in response to such changes. Ahead of the reforms, our focus, which I discussed in a speech in early 2016, was on whether the reforms would have an impact on the transmission of monetary policy that might require such adaptation. In particular, we wanted to observe whether markets remained sufficiently competitive to allow for robust control of rates, and see whether the shifts in volume—particularly the anticipated upswing in demand for government-fund-eligible assets— would impair competition.12 We also wanted to see whether linkages across markets remained strong enough to ensure that policy was transmitted in accordance with the FOMC’s forecasts, especially given prime funds’ broad investment scope, and their ability to reallocate across markets according to relative value.13 The size of the reallocation ended up being quite a bit larger than most had expected.
An important element in the framework is the strong collaboration between the supervisor and deposit insurer in promoting discipline in the banking system. As the supervisor, recognition is given to sound risk management practices demonstrated by banking institutions to have greater business flexibility, while the deposit insurer, through a differential premium system, provides incentives for financial institutions to adopt sound financial and business practices. In adopting this framework, clear accountabilities have been critical in ensuring that there is no duplication in efforts so that the banks would not be over burdened by overlapping regulation and submission requirements. There was also a need to ensure close cooperation and collaboration between the supervisor and the deposit insurer to ensure the intervention and resolution actions instituted by the deposit insurer, would not be to the detriment of the system as a whole. These resolution powers would be invoked by the deposit insurer following notification by the Central Bank that a member institution was likely to cease to be viable. It is in this context, the strategic alliance between the Central Bank and the deposit insurer was formed as a basis for cooperation to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system. In Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia is mandated with the responsibility of safeguarding and ensuring the stability of the financial system. The overall supervision of the financial institutions remains within the functions of Bank Negara Malaysia.

Between them, board members must have a good range of skills and experience, including, but not limited to, being well-versed in risk management. They must have a clear picture and a good understanding of the risks banks face and be ready and able to mitigate those risks. In addition, banks’ boards must be diverse – not just in terms of gender, but also in terms of broader diversity, as set out in EU law. [4] We have engaged with those banks which do not yet have diversity policies or internal targets for gender diversity at board level. As at the end of 2021, a third of the banks under our direct supervision did not meet their internal targets for gender representation at board level. Of course, the economic environment and the skills required to navigate the banking business keep evolving. Nowadays, a bank’s board should be well-versed in climate and environmental risks, as well as IT infrastructure and digitalisation strategies. We therefore encourage banks to nominate board members with adequate expertise in these areas. Digital banks are increasingly complex structures and cybersecurity has never been more important. However, at the end of 2021, only around a fifth of the euro area’s largest banks had sufficient IT expertise at board level. Increasing this ratio will be key for banks to navigate the digital era successfully. Behaviour and culture  The elements I have mentioned thus far make up the design and structure of a bank’s internal organisation.
Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, for the Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 14 July 2014. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Honourable Members, Allow me to start by congratulating all of you on your election to this House, and you, Mr Chairman, on your appointment as Chair of the committee in the new legislative period. The architects of Monetary Union conceived the ECB as a central bank with a clear mandate and with strong provisions for its independence. But for a public institution in a democratic society, independence can never come without being commensurately transparent and accountable to the elected representatives of the people. Our regular exchanges of views are a key channel for the ECB to discharge its duty of central bank accountability; hence, they plays an essential role in providing the ECB with the necessary legitimacy to fulfil the tasks assigned to it by the Treaties. To underscore our commitment to transparency, the ECB has recently decided to go a step further by publishing regular accounts of the monetary policy meetings of the Governing Council, which is intended to start in January next year. It is in this spirit that I am looking forward to our exchange of views over the next five years.

In the last legislative period, a great deal has been done to restore stability as a key prerequisite for economic dynamism. This has resulted in a return of confidence to the euro area. But high public and private debt, low growth and unacceptably high levels of unemployment are reminding us that the most pressing matter now is to bring the euro area back onto a path of shared prosperity. To achieve this, the focus in the next five years should lie on thoroughly implementing the reinforced policy framework that was agreed in the last term, and on further increasing the resilience of euro area countries’ economies. For us at the ECB, this means assuming a new role in the banking union by supervising the euro area banks as from November. With the comprehensive assessment exercise that we are currently conducting, we will contribute to putting euro area banks on a healthy footing, so as to enable them to provide financing to the real economy. For euro area Member States, this means undertaking the necessary structural reforms to foster growth, and to avoid any new build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. It also means continuing fiscal consolidation to rebalance public finances in line with the rules underpinning the Stability and Growth Pact. The euro area policy framework was strengthened considerably by the agreement between this House and the Council on the six-pack and the two-pack.
Business’ demand for loans persists to be the sole lending increase source, whereas loan to households continues to shrink in annual terms, for the fifth consecutive month. During this period there are transmitted also the first signals on an easing of lending standards from banks, but this step is applied only on large-sized business. Fiscal stimuli developed at more controlled paces in the first 4-month period of year, providing a lower contribution on the economic activity during this period. Fiscal policy has  BIS Review 77/2010  1  maintained an encouraging character, but at a lower rate relative to the same period of previous year. Budget deficit amounted to ALL 5.3 billion, contracted by 47 percent in annual terms. The low economic activity is reflected on the low growth by about 3 percent of budged revenues during the first 4-month period of year. On the other side, budget expense recorded a reduction by about 2 percent from the rate recorded in the previous year. Bank of Albania continues to draw the attention that, notwithstanding the short-term positive effects the fiscal stimuli may generate; the long-term stability of public sector should remain the main leader of fiscal policy. The lesson from the current problematic situation involving many European Union countries, is the indispensability for consolidation of public finances and for that purpose the implementation of important correcting measures at quickest time, is a target of strategic importance.

The hot pot business is just out of place as there is not even space in the shop to serve this kind of food.” 8. The couple suddenly realised at that very moment they had misunderstood the true reasons why their business had kept on falling. When they first set up the noodle shop, they were very serious about every minor detail – they scouted the New Territories to source the best quality flour to ensure that noodles were chewy. The husband went to the fish market at dawn to buy the fresh shrimps for the wonton and the wife woke up at four in the morning to make sure the soup base (湯底) was properly prepared. But they both had ceased doing that when the noodle shop business was doing well and such daily routines were no longer practised. So the noodles were no longer as chewy as before and the wontons were no longer tasty. As for the cafe and hot pot meals, they had very little idea on how to do them well and eventually their customers, one by one, turned away from the shop. 9. The takeaway of this story is that very often that market conditions or customer needs have changed and so we have to adapt. If a company does not or cannot adapt, then bad outcomes would ensue. However, it is more often the case that the formula and values leading to success in the past have been inadvertently eroded, if not forgotten totally.
By winning the battles for customer loyalty, value, efficiency, resilience and talent, banks can remain the dominant players in this space. The bank of the future will be completely unrecognizable from that of today. It will be closer to its customers, digitally enabled, and ahead of the curve when it comes to anticipating customer needs. It will be more efficient, more resilient and better able to address the economic and social challenges of the future. In the end, only collectively, we as the key stakeholders in this industry can take the difficult yet necessary steps required to shape the future of the banking industry. As Einstein said: “A new type of thinking is essential if mankind is to survive and move toward greater levels.”  Thank you.

Conclusion Singapore has not shied away from tough measures to remake our economy and maximise our chances in a difficult environment. These measures will enhance our competitiveness, strengthen our companies and consolidate our social cohesion. They will make our economy more flexible, resilient and able to adjust quickly to changing circumstances, and so help it to remain ahead in the race of nations. Although the media impression is that Southeast Asia has stagnated since the Asian Crisis, the reality is less gloomy. ASEAN economies have made progress in picking up the pieces and pursuing domestic reform and restructuring, albeit some more successfully than others. Between 1999-2001, ASEAN economies as a whole grew by about 4% per annum. Last year, an export-led slowdown on the back of a global electronics slump broke the recovery trend. But ASEAN economies weathered the downturn fairly well, with most still managing positive GDP growth. Most are running current account surpluses, in contrast to the large deficits that prevailed in 1997. From a macroeconomic standpoint, the countries have held up well and even shown a certain resilience. Reflecting this, ASEAN stockmarkets have generally performed better than their counterparts in the rest of the world thus far this year. Part of Southeast Asia’s negative image is attributable to political and security concerns, which are indeed real. A week or so after the Bali attack, these worries naturally loom large. Many observers, seized by the mood of the moment, are now forecasting the worst for the region.
Like many central banks in central Europe, the Riksbank has accordingly moved from a situation that pointed to the likelihood of a relatively quick succession of continued interest rate increases to one where the need of higher interest rates in the near future seems to have disappeared. With the bright inflation prospects and a strict interpretation of the Riksbank’s rule for monetary policy decisions, today there may even be grounds for considering a minor downward repo rate adjustment. What the Riksbank now has reason to consider is whether such an adjustment would lead to good conditions for stable economic development in the future.

As the title of my speech suggests, today I am going to lay out the reasons why I, along with my colleagues Jennifer Roush and Michelle Steinberg Ezer, believe that the benefits of the TIPS program exceed the costs of the program. Before saying anything more, let me emphasize that the views I express today are my own and those of my co-authors and, therefore, may not represent the views of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee. Also, let me note that Jennifer and Michelle are the main authors of this paper. I have ridden along on their coattails. My main contribution was to slow down completion as I had to fit in my very modest contributions around the unfolding financial crisis! Finally, you may be wondering why this is my first speech since I have become president – an odd subject to choose, perhaps, given the ongoing financial crisis? The answer is a simple one, our paper and this conference have been in train for a long time. It is just a coincidence that the conference and my becoming president of the New York Fed have happened to arrive at about the same time. The logic of issuing inflation-protected securities is straightforward. Wouldn’t some investors pay a premium – that is, accept a lower expected return – in exchange for guaranteed, full compensation for inflation? Because the United States and a number of other countries decided that the answer was likely to be “yes,” they developed an inflation-indexed government debt market.
Strikingly, most of that increase in lending wasn’t to families or businesses, but to other parts of the financial system. To finance this, banks were borrowing large amounts themselves. And this was their Achilles’ heel. By the end of 2006, some banks had borrowed as much as £ for every pound provided by their own shareholders. So even a small piece of bad news about the value of its assets would wipe out much of a bank’s capital, and leave depositors scurrying for the door. What made the situation worse was that the fortunes of banks had become closely tied together through transactions in complex and obscure financial instruments. So it was difficult to know which banks were safe and which weren’t. The result was an increasingly fragile banking system. So how did banks find themselves in such a precarious position? Banks are a vital part of our economy. They run the payment system, allowing us to pay our bills and receive our wages. They finance businesses investing in new ventures and families buying a new home. Without a banking system our economy would grind to a halt. Because of that, markets correctly believed that no government could let a bank fail since that would cause immense disruption to the economy. This meant that large banks in particular benefited from an implicit taxpayer guarantee, enabling them to borrow cheaply to finance their lending. In good times, banks took the benefits for their employees and shareholders, while in bad times the taxpayer bore the costs.

In the model, the central bank therefore raises its policy rate to curb the rise in inflation and gradually bring it down. The tighter monetary stance, which in this model is represented by an increase in the real interest rate, results in a negative output gap. [10] The extent to which monetary policy should be tightened to achieve a reasonable trade-off depends on the impact of higher prices and costs on consumption and investment. In most New Keynesian models, a cost shock does not affect demand directly. This is because temporary disturbances have little impact on households’ permanent income and because households and firms can borrow and save freely in these models. In practice, however, many households have small financial buffers and limited borrowing capacity. A decline in purchasing power due to a higher interest rate and higher prices will compel these households to reduce consumption. In addition, higher costs can reduce firms’ profits and thereby business investment. Chart: Costs shock – monetary policy trade-offs These effects of a cost shock can be illustrated in a model with different types of households – a so-called TANK model. [11] The model assumes that there are two types of households. One group can spread the effect of a decline in real disposable income on consumption over time, that is to say they can smooth consumption. The other group, called hand-to-mouth households, spends all its disposable income in each period. The cost shock hits the hand-to-mouth households relatively hard, and aggregate demand falls.
Those who are in charge of monetary policy have strong tools at their disposal. Their responsibility is always heavy, due to the fact that their actions or failure to act impact on the entire population. In normal times, however, the impact of these strong tools is rather less acute, and the effects of monetary policy – both intended and non-intended – are usually easy to foresee. At the moment, this is more difficult because we are obliged to use unusual instruments. Consequently, at times like this the SNB bears a particularly high level of responsibility. We are therefore subjecting the impact of the measures we have taken so far to repeated and very fundamental review, and are approaching this task with a completely open mind. Conclusion I would like to conclude my presentation to you as follows. The SNB is fighting for price stability with total conviction and great commitment, while at the same time keeping the development of the economy in view. Within the context set by our monetary order, the SNB does its utmost, through its monetary policy, to ensure that our money retains its value, thereby remaining a sound pillar of our society. This is the SNB’s most important contribution  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  to ensuring the long-term attractiveness and competitiveness of the Swiss location, as well as the social cohesion of our population. By their nature, central banks tend to be conservative institutions.

In other words, the Swiss franc already faces competition, not only against the currencies of other countries but also against alternative non-governmental currencies. 8  4  For further information, cf. ‘Bericht des Bundesrates zu virtuellen Währungen’ (Federal Council report on virtual currencies, in German only) of 25 June 2014 (www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/ attachments/35361.pdf). BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, the key issue is rather different. A modern economy with a well-developed financial market requires a statutory means of payment. The Swiss franc is the official unit of currency in our country; Confederation coins as well as SNB banknotes and sight deposits are Switzerland’s statutory means of payment. Therefore these instruments must be accepted as payment in this country by every individual, without restriction, unless otherwise agreed. A statutory means of payment creates legal certainty and efficiency in everyday life. Consequently, the governmental Swiss franc is indispensable in Switzerland, even in a situation of competition with private currencies. Moreover, as long as a central bank fulfils its mandate diligently, I do not consider it likely that a private currency can pose any serious competition to a state currency. Return to a gold standard The second reform idea, the return to a gold standard, is directly linked to the financial crisis. In some circles there are fears of massive inflation in the short or long-term as a result of the unprecedented relaxation in monetary policy worldwide. The solution that is sometimes proposed is a return to a gold standard, in other words, pegging the currency to gold.