samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So far, banks have managed to adapt effectively to the situation and financial markets have carried on working properly. But further contingency plans are needed ahead of any potentially extreme operational events that this crisis may cause. 15  It should in any event be stressed that the Spanish non-financial private sector is facing this situation in a more favourable financial position than it was in before the global financial crisis. The financial situation of the household sector as a whole has improved significantly in the wake of the global financial crisis. Specifically, its debt ratio has fallen by almost 30 pp of GDP since 2010. In the case of non-financial corporations, the sector’s net debt level has fallen by more than 45 pp of GDP since 2010 and, in fact, it stands below the euro area average. Moreover, the sector now has a bigger volume of liquid assets. 16  In parallel, the Spanish banking sector has also significantly enhanced the quality of its balance sheet over the past decade, which leaves it better placed to absorb this crisis and to continue providing the financing the economy needs. With regard to balance sheet quality, the NPL ratio has fallen by more than 9 pp to 4.8% in 2020 Q1 since peaking in 2013. Over this same period, moreover, the weight of refinanced exposures on the asset side has fallen by 9 pp.

This figure was in contrast to the rise of almost 160,000 in Social Security registrations in the same period in 2019. In any event, the Social Security figures provide a partial view of the consequences of the current crisis on the labour market. An even larger contingent of employees, some 3.4 million, have availed themselves of temporary lay-off arrangements (known as ERTE by their Spanish name). As you are aware, ERTEs entail the formal maintenance of the contractual relationship, pending the resumption of activity, although there is no actual employment benefit. Moreover, 1.3 million self-employed workers have applied for the benefit for the cessation of activity. 7  No indicators (other than some qualitative ones) are available yet for Q2, meaning it would be premature to project the decline in GDP in this quarter. In any event, given that the number of weeks affected by the lockdown is much greater than in Q1, a significant acceleration in the fall in GDP is to be expected.1 Beyond the short term, estimates of the duration and depth of the effects of the shock on the economy are still subject to much uncertainty. In principle, if these uncertainties clear over the coming months, a rebound in activity into the second half of the year might be expected. But that will depend broadly on two types of factors. The first relates to the future course of the illness.
In the United States it is common that the bonds issued by institutions are tied to different parts of the credit portfolio, which have different risks. These types of instrument have been an attractive investment for many investors in recent years, as the return on more traditional investment instruments, such as government bonds, has been considered too low. The high demand for the higher risk parts of the portfolio, which includes subprime, have meant that the banks’ financing costs for the higher risk loans have declined in recent years. This may have encouraged the rapid growth in the subprime market in the United States. The US method of securitisation is very rare in the Swedish mortgage market. In Sweden, mortgages are traditionally financed through the institutions and banks  4  BIS Review 56/2007  issuing bonds with the total assets as collateral. If a Swedish bank were to have a larger percentage of loans with poorer credit ratings, it would mean that the total financing cost would rise. Although the market for subprime in Sweden is currently small, it is conceivable that it could grow with time. Essentially, this is a positive development as it enables more households to enter the housing market. More types of mortgage do not necessarily mean that credit management in mortgage institutions will deteriorate.

And although our instruments have changed our conviction and mission have not. Some might wish that we use our armoury for other purposes. But we will not be moved. We are an independent institution. Our rules are non-negotiable and we do not act for the benefit of interest groups or individual countries. Nor can financial stability considerations override our primary objective. Monetary dominance will always prevail. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Funding of pensions  The savings market in various countries 31.12.2000. As a share of GDP 2.5 Pension funds Securities funds Life insurance  2 1.5 1 0.5 0  um mark land ance many eland Italy lands rw ay tugal Spain eden rland lgi r Fr Ger Ir Fin Sw itze No Por Be Den the Sw Ne  UK  Source : OECD SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  The organisation of the pension system in Norway will also be of considerable importance to the local government sector as a big employer. The securities market will also be influenced by the pension system Norway will have in the future. Life insurance companies and pension funds are major operators in the Norwegian securities market. • Design of a new pension system: - "Pay-as-you-go" - Fund-based schemes: – Defined contribution – Defined benefit  • Who should bear the risk? SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  In Norway, the bulk of pensions are funded through the pay-as-you-go system. It is the taxation of current income that pays for the National Insurance Scheme’s current pension benefits. For the vast majority of western countries, estimates show that substantial tax increases will be needed to cope with the ageing of the population. The alternative to the pay-as-you-go system is to build up funds prior to the payment of pensions. These funds can consist of different assets such as stocks and bonds.

26 May 2022  Keynote Speech at ASIFMA China Capital Markets Conference Edmond Lau, Deputy Chief Executive, Hong Kong Monetary Authority Onshore Market Development 1. Good morning. I’m delighted to join you virtually at this year’s China Capital Markets Conference. First of all, let me take this opportunity to thank ASIFMA for organising this event and inviting me to speak. 2. Today’s agenda focuses on onshore market developments. I would like to share my thoughts on the significance of recent developments in onshore capital markets, as well as the opportunities for international investors. 3. Mainland capital markets are experiencing a period of significant growth, with onshore equity and fixed income markets currently the second largest in the world. However, international investors’ exposure to China’s capital markets remains relatively small. Only around 4% of onshore equities and 3% of onshore bonds are owned by foreign investors, which is low by international standards and far smaller than China’s weight in the global economy. 4. We are pleased to see the Mainland’s continued commitment to open up onshore capital markets in recent years. The latest developments to facilitate foreign investors’ access to the onshore markets and adopt international standards have been encouraging and welcomed by the industry. Let me highlight a few of them here. 5. First, with the removal of foreign ownership limits, global financial institutions are able to further expand their footprint in China by taking majority or full ownership in their onshore subsidiaries.
I think we’ve done a reasonable job in developing rules and regulations to address the causes of the last crisis, and firms are in the process of building the resilience to withstand those types of shocks. But, cyber adds an element to planning for the next crisis that goes beyond what additional capital and liquidity can provide to the system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  I recognize that the topic seems daunting, but it has to be addressed soon, if you want to survive and not just comply with regulations. It is an area that will continue to warrant attention across the industry – and will require a level of coordination and collaboration between the public and private sectors to address in a meaningful way. In many respects, I think we are all in this one together. 3. Enhancing coordination and communication  The final area I wanted to highlight is coordination and communication. The theme of enhancing coordination among supervisory and regulatory bodies is an ongoing one that I addressed last year and one that you may hear me speak about again next year. Each year, I do think we make progress, but as increased attention is placed on ensuring the effective implementation of local (or host country) rules and regulations, we need to ensure we don’t lose sight of the need to continue to work effectively across jurisdictions in supervising the largest firms.

The last point that I want to make is that I disagree with those economists who speak of the difficulty of anticipating the East Asian crisis, since these countries had assembled all the ingredients of a perfect crisis recipe: •  An appreciated exchange rate;  •  A high and worsening ratio of short-term debt to usable foreign reserves;  •  Untransparent off-balance-sheet items in the banking sector;  •  A widening current account deficit;  •  Steep growth of domestic credits;  •  And a continuous decline, during recent years, in emerging markets’ borrowing spreads without matching improvement in their economic fundamentals. If someone should combine all these elements, it is conceivable that they might succeed in creating a crisis. But the world’s financial centers turned away from the existence of this perfect crisis recipe and turned toward the Turkish economy, for which, ignoring the developments in East Asia, they predicted a crisis during the last couple of years. The Turkish economy does not satisfy the perfect crisis recipe described above. Of course we have high inflation, a high nominal budget deficit, and high short-term domestic debt, but on the other hand Turkey’s exchange rate policy, current account situation, the nature of its short-term external debt, and other fundamentals do not indicate an alarming situation. The East Asian crisis should have greatly improved the ability of economists to predict an episode. I would be glad to see some evidence of this improvement. BIS Review 50/1998
Thus, any surprises in the evolution of the US monetary policy could affect  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  financial conditions – like they did in May of 2013 –, raising credit costs in world markets, reversing portfolio flows and depreciating emerging-country currencies against the US dollar. The beginning of a new cycle of quantitative expansion by the European Central Bank, plus similar announcements by the Bank of Japan, might reduce the likelihood and impact of these volatility episodes, depending on how these unconventional policies ultimately reflect in global lending conditions. A different risk has to do with the slowdown of emerging economies resulting in reduced capital flows. This because their assets become less attractive, all the more so in Latin America. A scenario in which the recent drop in commodity prices is prolonged or intensified, or where doubts about China’s performance resurge strongly, might trigger this kind of event. The scene may become more complex if at the same time long-term rates go up in the US, increasing the cost of external funding. It should also be considered that an increase in the cost of external financing could put upward pressure on local long-term interest rates. The decline in external and domestic long-term interest rates has motivated bond issues in both markets and local demand for type-3 mutual funds.

14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 13 Consumer credit flows and Interest rate, UF50 - UF200 (annual rate, thousands of UFs) 60  6.000  48  4.500  36  3.000  24  1.500  12  0  Jun.12  Oct.12 Feb.13 P90  Jun.13  Mediana  Oct.13 Feb.14 P99  P95  Jun.14  Sep.14  TMC Flujos  (*) Statistics weighted by amount; periods adjusted to the month of TMC change; flows normalized by effective number of days. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF data. Figure 14 Impact of various scenarios on capital adequacy index (1)(2) (actual net worth over risk-weighted assets) 18  18  16  16  14  14  12  12  10  10  8  8 Jun. 14 25th percentile - 75%  Escenario base Median  Escenario de estrés System  Max. (3) Mín. (1) Figures weighted by each institution's core capital. (2) Estimates do not consider foreign trade and th  treasury banks. (3) Max figures correspond to 90 percentile. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF data.
To this end, we must reinforce our capacities and our understanding of economic and financial developments and their relation to policy tools, in order to properly respond to potential risks. This may be done by improving our current knowledge of past shocks, development, and the implications of potential shocks. Experience has shown that this knowledge is comprehensive only when it is the result of a rigorous and competent research process. Last but not least, we have to continue our policy efforts to strengthen the relationship between researchers and policy makers. I believe that these efforts can increase both from research and from the end users of the research 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  product. Ladies and Gentlemen! The research papers to be presented in this workshop reflect the serious thoughts and discussions of expert researchers on major issues. These include not only the work of the Bank of Albania, but also the work done in other central banks and academia. The topics cover a wide range of very useful issues. I hope that the research presented at today’s workshop will spark vigorous debate and allow the sharing of diverse opinions that will help each other improve and strengthen your work form a different perspective. I invite you all and the Bank of Albania’s researchers to use this activity to learn something new, and as a platform to strengthen the cooperation for your own and your institutions’ benefit. I would like to end my speech by wishing you a productive and successful workshop!

The Island has been suffering from a vicious cycle. As employment declines, people move to the mainland to find jobs. Accordingly, economic activity and tax revenues decline, forcing the government to raise taxes and cut spending, which further reduces employment and prompts still more residents to move. At this point, the outlook for anyone who has been living here must be bleak, and it may be hard to imagine this situation turning around anytime soon. And yet, history tells us that a turnaround, though not inevitable, is indeed achievable. Lessons from past crises New York City is probably the most famous example of a municipality that experienced a major fiscal crisis, recovered and is now thriving. New York City’s experience is viewed, in retrospect, as a major success, and some, including myself, have pointed to it as a hopeful example of what 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  could come to pass in Puerto Rico. But, there are important caveats to the New York City story and its applicability to the Commonwealth. Like Puerto Rico, New York City experienced a number of years of both political and economic pain as a result of its fiscal crisis in the 1970s. On the political side, New York City residents lost a large measure of their ability to chart their own fiscal direction for several years. Decisions about tax and spending policies were removed from elected city officials.
While most economies were able to recover in just over a year, in the decade that followed, wide ranging financial reforms were implemented. In addition, the development of the financial markets and the financial infrastructure were aggressively pursued to strengthen the capacity of the financial system. The legal framework and the regulatory and supervisory framework of the financial sector were also strengthened. Several important lessons from the crisis were also addressed, in particular, avoiding the excessive accumulation of debt whether by the household, corporate, financial sector or the public sector. Measures were taken to avoid the build-up of such  BIS Review 94/2010  1  leverage and excesses largely through prudential regulation. In addition, buffers were built during the good times. These reforms have yielded tremendous payoffs for Asia. With more developed financial markets and with better capitalised banking institutions equipped with strengthened risk management and governance practices, Asia did not experience any disruptions in financial intermediation during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. The continued access to financing has in fact been important in sustaining domestic demand and in supporting Asia’s rebound from the recent global crisis. The International Monetary Fund estimates that the emerging economies in Asia will grow by an average annual rate of 8.6% in the next five years. Asia is therefore very much part of the global shift that is taking place in which the economic power in the world will become increasingly more dispersed with the emergence of several growth centres in the global economy.

Simon M Potter: The Federal Reserve and central bank cooperation over the past 100 years Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for the Commemoration of the Centennial of the Federal Reserve's US Dollar Account Services to the Global Official Sector, New York City, 20 December 2017. * * *  Introduction Distinguished representatives of the global central banking community and official sector, current and former central bank account operations staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve System colleagues, I am honored to speak at this commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the opening of the first dollar accounts for central banks around the world on the books of the Federal Reserve.1 And it is, of course, very apt that we gather here in a room whose namesake, Benjamin Strong, was more than anyone else responsible for their establishment. On May 3, 1917, the Federal Reserve signed its first reciprocal account agreement with a foreign central bank, the Bank of England, entailing the establishment of nostro2 and custody accounts on each other’s books. This was soon followed by agreements with several other central banks, including the Banque de France, Bank of Italy, and Bank of Japan. These early agreements were instrumental in helping the newly-established Federal Reserve forge a global role for itself as an institution and for the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency.
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In this regard, the ECB supports both private-sector and European Commission initiatives to encourage further integration, such as the follow-up to the report of the Commission’s Forum Group on Mortgage Credit. Infrastructure Integration of financial markets cannot take place without an integrated payment, clearing and settlement infrastructure. This brings me to the third component of the financial system, the financial infrastructure, which also gives me the opportunity to illustrate some cases of where the ECB has taken direct action. TARGET is one such example. Had TARGET not been operational from the first day of Monetary Union, there would have been no means of transferring liquidity from a country with a liquidity surplus to a country with a liquidity deficit. Consequently, we would not have had a single but several money markets, which would have made monetary policy far more difficult to implement. Over time, TARGET has continuously increased its market share in large value payments in euro. TARGET's market share is now around 90% of the total traffic value compared to 70% at the moment when the euro was launched. At the same time, the domestic component has remained at roughly three quarters of the total traffic value. However, our ambitions did not stop in 1999. We are currently building TARGET2, which is due to go live in 2007 and will replace the current decentralised system with a single technical platform.
Falling commodity prices The development of commodity prices has likewise affected the rate of inflation in the past three calendar years. The international economic slowdown meant that in the course of 1998 international commodity prices began to fall relatively sharply. It can be mentioned, for example, that towards the end of 1998 just the lower prices for coffee, petrol and domestic heating oil had a downward effect on Swedish CPI inflation of 0.4 percentage points. As in the case of changes in taxes and interest rates, there are distinct direct effects that may deviate from the more long-term impact on demand. 1. CPI and underlying inflation 1996-98 Annual average, per cent CPI  U N D 1X  U N D IN H X  4  3  2 .1 1 .5  2  0 .7 1  0 1 9 9 6 -1 9 9 8  UND1X = CPI excluding interest expenditure, taxes and subsidies UNDINHX = UND1X excluding goods that are mainly imported  BIS Review 61/1999  2  2. CPI and underlying inflation 1996 Annual average, per cent CPI  U N D 1X  U N D IN H X  4  2 .8 3  2 .2  2  0 .8 1  0 1996  UND1X = CPI excluding interest expenditure, taxes and subsidies UNDINHX = UND1X excluding goods that are mainly imported  3.

If the Riksbank had left the repo rate at 8.91 per cent – its level before the cuts were initiated early in 1996 – then the direct interest expenditure effect could have been avoided. Economic activity would have gradually weakened, however, and this would have pushed down the CPI excluding the interest expenditure effect. But that would have taken time and to begin with the macroeconomic effect would have been rather small. Sooner or later, however, the macroeconomic effect would have begun to surpass the interest effect on the CPI. In theory, that could have been prevented by raising the interest rate and thereby increasing the interest expenditure effect. Such a strategy could have been implemented for a time but in the end the economy would have become so sluggish that the macroeconomic effect would still have gained the upper hand. The situation would probably have caused the exchange rate to collapse. The marked depreciation would have led to rising import prices and perhaps CPI inflation would then have moved back up to the targeted rate. That is what could have happened, though I want to stress that the scenario is theoretical and hypothetical. The Riksbank would have fulfilled the CPI target but at the cost of marked instability in interest rates and the exchange rate as well as in the real economy. I find it hard to believe that such a strategy would have been supported for any length of time by either the political system or people in general.