samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
After discontinuing its net asset purchases (as of the announcement in December 2021 for the PEPP), the ECB Governing Council decided to raise its key rates at an unprecedented rate, by a total of 250 basis points in five months, between July and December 2022. Some felt that we started these rises too late: we can argue over whether it should have come a few weeks earlier – which would not have changed much – but I would just like to remind you of the initial doubts voiced by many economists over the inflationary shock, which was still seen as temporary a year ago, and notably concentrated in the energy supply. We needed to analyse and form an opinion: as soon as inflation clearly became more widespread and more persistent, we acted quickly and with force. At the end of 2022, monetary policy reached what we call “the neutral rate” zone, which is the theoretical equilibrium rate at which there is neither monetary expansion nor contraction of inflation. The Banque de France estimates that, in real terms, this neutral rate is currently just above 0% in the euro area – it is higher in the United States – and hence around 2% in nominal terms. It was a sprint race as we had to get to at least this neutral rate as fast as possible. Clearly we have gone beyond that today, and as a result have entered “restrictive” territory in the technical sense.

Particularly, the role of media is vital in this campaign, which through the transmission power to the public, has the skill to affect the mentality and communication pattern of the public at large. School, is another key factor for the establishment and cultivation of a new mentality. School may help for disrupting this 55-year chain and not transmitting it to the young generation. On behalf of the Bank of Albania, I invite all the participating institutions, and more broadly, to join us in this meaningful and demanding commitment to educate the Albanian public, with a view to abandoning forever the use of these outdated terms in the economic and financial interactions, and definitely turning it into a linguistic relict. I warmly thank you for the insofar contribution and allow me to recall once again that our currency is neither “old” nor “new”, but simply Lek! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Asia’s share of global wealth Let us start by taking a look at Asia’s share of global wealth to see how far it has come, and where it is projected to go. Back in 1980, Asia accounted for 19% of global GDP in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms. Today, Asia’s share stands at 35%. In 2020, this is expected to rise to 45%. Compare this with America and the EU. Each accounted for roughly 21% of global GDP in 1980 and 2005. Both are expected to see their share drop to 19% by 2020. Let us look at another measure. Asia’s share of global exports in 1980 was 14%. It doubled to 27% in 2006. By 2020, this is expected to rise to 35%. The picture is the same for Asia’s share of global outward FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) stock. In 1980 it was 5.9%. By last year, it doubled to 11.4%. It is expected to grow to 20% in 2020. What this suggests is that Asia is no longer just a recipient of investments from US and Europe. Increasingly, Asia will become a major source of FDI for the rest of the world. In terms of private wealth, a 2006 Merrill-Lynch study noted that Asia-Pacific contains 27% of the global population of High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) and 23% of global HNWI wealth. Merrill-Lynch expects private wealth in Asia-Pacific to exceed $ by 2010, growing at an annual growth rate of 6.7%, outpacing the global rate.

Poland and Hungary stand at around 67 percent (both posting values of no more than 45 percent in 2000), Czechia at 86 percent (from 61 percent in 2000) and Bulgaria at 47 percent (against 24 percent in 2000). As a matter of fact, Romania boasts the fastest growth rate in the group of peer countries with similar trends. Can we, therefore, say that this is proof of a successful catching-up in real terms? Furthermore, can we claim that having a flexible policy framework (including a managed floating exchange rate) helped us in this respect? Allow me to assert that more time is needed in order for these questions to be appropriately answered. However, a general remark can be made: the EU and NATO anchors helped us all make progress as concerns real convergence. The second lesson derives from the answer to the following question: did the strategic decisions on the exchange rate regime and monetary policy framework matter? It is known that some countries in the region (Romania, Poland, Czechia, Hungary) opted for flexible exchange rate arrangements and adopted inflation targeting, while others (Bulgaria and the Baltic states) resorted to a fixed exchange rate regime under a currency board. At first sight, it seems that the latter group of countries are better prepared in terms of euro adoption (the Baltic states have already taken this step but they, being much smaller and more open economies, are a special case), given the fiscal discipline pursued and the nominal convergence stage in those economies.
At the same time it is important to set the interest rates in a way that avoids directly subsidising the bank system. In addition to the Riksbank’s measures the Swedish banks have received other forms of support during the financial crisis. They have also been able to borrow from other central banks. As part of the government’s stability package, with effect from December 2008 financial institutions can apply to have their borrowing guaranteed by the government through the Swedish National Debt Office. At present nine financial institutions have received loans amounting to just over SEK 300 billion with such guarantees. All in all, the bank lending supported by the Riksbank and by the Swedish National Debt Office amounted at most to almost SEK 800 billion in July this year (Figure 10). BIS Review 160/2009  9  Figure 10 The Riksbank’s lending and government-guaranteed borrowing SEK billion 900 800  900 Emissions guaranteed by the Swedish National Debt Office The Riksbank's lending  800  700  700  600  600  500  500  400  400  300  300  200  200  100  100  0 Jul-08  0 Oct-08  Jan-09  Apr-09  Jul-09  Oct-09  Sources: The Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank. To summarise, the measures to safeguard financial stability during the financial crisis were mainly aimed at quickly providing the banks with wide scale funding in SEK and USD.

After this I shall discuss in greater depth the individual items on the balance sheet, to see how they have been affected over the past year. I shall conclude by looking ahead and discussing the question of when and how the extraordinary measures can be phased out. The Riksbank’s balance sheet Let us begin by looking at how the Riksbank’s balance sheet looks in rough outline under normal circumstances and at how it has changed during the crisis. The Riksbank’s balance sheet, like those of other companies and organisations, reflects the activities we conduct. The liabilities side shows how our activities are financed and the assets side show what the financing is used for (Figure 1). Figure 1 The Riksbank’s balance sheet  Assets Gold and foreign currency reserve Lending to banks Other assets  Liabilities Banknotes and coins Deposits from banks Other liabilities Own capital  Under normal circumstances the Riksbank primarily finances itself by issuing banknotes and coins and through its own capital. Banknotes and coins in circulation normally comprise the largest individual item on the liabilities side. Own capital is the next largest. In addition, the  BIS Review 160/2009  1  liabilities side in principle consists of deposits from banks and the item “Miscellaneous”. These items are usually small and less important than banknotes and coins and own capital. The Riksbank’s assets normally consist mainly of gold and the foreign currency reserve.
There are two important ingredients: Our explicit inflation objective is 2 percent, and this is to be achieved over the long run. As recently as 2005, many FOMC participants preferred to describe a range of inflation outcomes as being consistent with our inflation mandate instead of stating it as a single number.3 Our current statement narrows our objective to 2 percent. It also sees this as an average that we aim to achieve over the long run, in recognition of the obvious realism that inflation may deviate from this goal from time to time owing to economic challenges, conflicts in achieving the dual mandate objectives and difficulties in the policy transmission channels. The statement also notes that maximum employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors, which are difficult to measure and may change over time. Hence, we cannot and do not specify a fixed, time-invariant goal for it. But FOMC participants can provide their current assessments of goal variables related to the achievement of maximum employment. We do so using the central tendency of FOMC participants’ projections for the rate that unemployment would converge to in the absence of further shocks to the economy. As of January 2012, this rate is 5-1/4 to 6 percent. The statement also indicates that policy will seek to mitigate deviations in inflation and unemployment from these longer-run goals, and addresses the weighting of relevant costs and benefits when trying to close these gaps.

It never crossed my mind back then that one day I would be working on the problem of how to provide monetary accommodation in an economy with massive unemployment, very low inflation (perhaps even too low) and a policy rate stuck at the zero lower bound. With the exception of scholars of the Great Depression, back in the 1980s today’s policy challenges were not on anyone’s radar screen. Of course, that changed with the developments in Japan during the 1990s. More macroeconomists began thinking about liquidity traps and the monetary policy tools to help escape from them. These analyses gained momentum following Paul Krugman’s Brookings paper in 1998.1 They focused both on the use of the central bank’s balance sheet to provide accommodation and on communication about policy goals and forward guidance about the path for policy instruments. Much of this latter work was done within the New Keynesian paradigm, since communications are central to the policy transmission mechanism in those models.2 For obvious reasons, such research has come back into vogue today. The nonstandard policies emphasized by these lines of research have been important elements in the Federal Reserve’s toolkit over the past four years. The Federal Reserve engaged in two waves of large-scale asset purchases (March 2009 and November 2010), and, more recently, extended the maturity of the assets on our books (September 2011).
The manufacturing sector, however,  BIS Review 117/2006  3  has recently seen high productivity gains and some stabilisation of unit labour costs relative to the euro area countries. Turning to inflation, we have seen two very different trajectories in 2006. In the first half of the year, price increases were very high, driven by labour costs and by widening margins, but especially by higher oil prices. The 12-month rate of increase of the CPI held at close to 4% until July, with a differential in relation to the euro area that at one point was 1.8 percentage points (pp), above the average differential observed since 1999. However, the decline in oil prices that began in August has swiftly passed through to prices in the Spanish economy. As a result, the CPI rate stood at 2.5% in October, 1.4 pp below the July rate. That enabled the differential with the euro area countries to be cut by 1 pp, to slightly below the average in recent years. The improvement in underlying inflation was, however, very limited, and this variable is holding at a rate of close to 3%. Admittedly, 2006 may possibly close with a growth rate somewhat higher than that of the previous year. But the outlook for 2007 points to a slight slowdown in GDP growth, as part of a continuation of the patterns in recent quarters I have described to you.

Yet despite this narrowing of the gap between the contributions of national and external demand to growth that I have referred to before, the expansion of the Spanish economy in 2006 has essentially been underpinned by the buoyancy of domestic spending. In particular, gross capital formation has retained considerable strength, while only private consumption and government consumption have slowed slightly in the year to date. The somewhat less dynamic behaviour of private consumption in the first three quarters of 2006 is a result of the interplay of numerous factors whose effects, in some cases, have tended to counter each other. The losses of purchasing power caused by the high inflation rates in the first half of the year have affected household disposable income and, therefore, they will have tended to reduce consumer  2  BIS Review 117/2006  spending. Further, the increase in borrowing costs following the successive rises in official interest rates by the ECB must have curtailed the spending capacity of some sectors of households. Conversely, intense job creation - running at a rate of over 3% - and the notable rise in household wealth are factors that should have sustained the growth of private consumption. Regarding household wealth, it should be pointed out that, although house prices have begun to show signs of slowing, there have continued to be very significant stock market rises in 2006, outpacing those in recent years, which were already considerable. As I mentioned earlier, gross capital formation has been very robust throughout 2006.
9 [14]  year through the liquidity insurance provided by a strong foreign currency reserve. Depending on how the Government chose to design the charge or premium for this insurance, it could further strengthen the incentive for the banks to reduce their liquidity risks in foreign currency. Financial technology has changed our means of payment I began by talking about Johan Palmstruch. Let me return to him now and discuss a subject that also affects the Riksbank’s ability to carry out its tasks, namely financial innovations and the development of new financial technology, or “FinTech” as it is known in some circles. Johan Palmstruch was a financial innovator of his time. He was the one who introduced banknotes with standardised denominations – a real global innovation in the 17th century. The printing presses made it possible to mass produce these standardised banknotes. The banknotes were much lighter and easier to transport than the heavy copperplates that they were used to dealing with. Sweden had a copper standard at that time. After Stockholms Banco collapsed, it was not until the 1830s that the financial sector in Sweden really took off. Private banking firms emerged, and some of them began to issue their own banknotes. They continued doing so until the early 20th century, when the Riksbank was granted a monopoly on issuing banknotes so that the state could gain a firmer grip on price stability and standardise payments.

The moderation in the contraction of the aggregate stock of credit points to an increase of new lending operations, which is consistent with the economic recovery. In fact, the information available on new credit transactions suggests that the segment of lending to SMEs has started to recover. And in the most recent period, this trend has gradually spread to the other credit categories, such as in the case of credit extended for house purchases. What are the determinants behind these recent developments? In my view, demand-side factors are playing a relevant role in the incipient recovery in credit flows. The improvement in growth and employment prospects and the reduction in aggregate uncertainty have all resulted in an increase in current and expected income, expanding the willingness of agents to spend and their ability to take on new debts while reducing the risk perceived by lenders. In parallel with the recovery in the demand for investment, we have witnessed an improvement in the financial position of borrowers. Specifically, from the peak observed in mid-2010, the gap between debt ratios in Spain and the euro area average has fallen from 37 pp to 9 pp in the case of corporates and from 20 pp to 9 pp in the case of households. But credit flows are also being stimulated in the current juncture by several factors more directly connected with the supply side.
The fact that a lack of good financial governance increases the likelihood of O-ring-like accidents, with potentially devastating effects on the economy, should make sound financial governance an economic and political priority. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Furthermore, the start of Stage Three of EMU has also eliminated short-term intra-EU exchange rate volatility and exchange rate risks, and has thereby encouraged trade and investment. In addition, the benefits of economic integration afforded by the development of the Single Market are enhanced by the elimination of the transaction costs of exchanging different currencies, a direct result of the introduction of the euro. While they are difficult to measure, they effectively form an additional layer of protection for domestic producers. The single currency makes prices across the euro area directly comparable, which should increase competition and hence efficiency and economic growth in the area. A number of further positive effects on economic growth flow from the elimination of separate currencies in the euro area countries. One benefit is the potential for the reduction of risk premia built into real interest rates, which, in turn, will stimulate productive investment. Another benefit is that by facilitating the development of deep and integrated capital markets, the single currency should further reduce long-term rates via the elimination of an illiquidity premium. In addition, a wider and deeper capital market in the euro area will improve intermediation between savers and investors. Ensuring the benefits: stability-oriented policies It should be emphasised, however, that the true benefits of EMU derive from the fact that it is a unique opportunity to shape a macroeconomic environment conducive to stability, growth and employment, and to foster structural change which is needed to maintain or restore medium to longterm dynamism in the European economies.
Yet, at around 1%, they are still close to the long-term average inflation rate. Interest rates, too, have remained very low across all maturities in the past few quarters. Mortgage rates have declined further, reaching a new low in October. Government bond rates have also fallen to new lows. My colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will discuss developments on the financial markets in more detail. Despite falling mortgage rates, mortgage lending growth slowed again. At the same time, real estate prices continued to rise. However, as in 2013, price momentum is weaker than in previous years. This suggests that the measures to contain developments on the mortgage and real estate markets are starting to have an impact. Yet the imbalances that have built up on these markets in recent years remain the same. It is still too early for an all-clear. The SNB will continue to monitor the situation closely. My colleague Jean-Pierre Danthine will discuss this topic in more detail in his presentation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Since the last monetary policy assessment, the Swiss franc has moved closer to the minimum exchange rate, and has thus strengthened against the euro once again. At the same time, both it and the euro have depreciated against the US dollar. Overall, the exportweighted real external value of the Swiss franc is virtually unchanged compared to last year, and thus continues to lie considerably above its long-term average. The Swiss franc is still high.

Thomas Jordan: Current monetary policy and its significance for the real economy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the General Meeting of the Aargauische Industrie- und Handelskammer, Wettingen, 20 May 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In the current situation, the challenges for the SNB’s monetary policy remain formidable. On the one hand, against the backdrop of the economic recovery we have witnessed since mid2009, there is a danger of inflationary tendencies and the renewed formation of a bubble. This is because the current monetary policy is too expansionary in the long term. On the other hand, downside risks are still present or are again reappearing, and should not be underestimated. They relate, in particular, to the further development of the debt crisis in Europe. A deterioration of this situation entails the danger for Switzerland of renewed deflation and recession as well as the risk of another destabilisation of the global financial system. Between these opposing risks the SNB must walk a fine line, moving in terrain that is constantly and rapidly changing, depending on which risk gains the upper hand. With a monetary policy strategy aimed at maintaining price stability, the SNB is well equipped to face these challenges. What are the short and medium-term consequences for the real economy of addressing these challenges?
It therefore has limited exposure to highly leveraged activities, such as complex derivatives and structured credit instruments. Indeed, Islamic finance emphasises a close link between financial transactions and real economic activity. Islamic finance thus serves the real economy. The recent financial crisis has therefore led to a greater appreciation on the distinct nature of Islamic finance in addition to its explicit in-built strengths that supports financial stability. These foundations have been reinforced by the global efforts taken to strengthen the international financial architecture of Islamic finance to safeguard financial stability and thus its sustainability. In the recent years, the intermediaries have also gained scale and the financial markets have gained depth and maturity. Among the institutional arrangements in the international Islamic financial system, is the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board in 2002 to set prudential standards while earlier in 1990, the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) was established to set the accounting standards for the financial industry. Various jurisdictions have now undertaken legal and regulatory reforms to pave the way for the offering of Islamic finance in their respective countries while ensuring attention to sustaining financial stability. These developments have been particularly important to the recent intensification of the internationalisation of Islamic finance which in turn contributes towards building bridges and forging greater linkages among a wider range of economies. Transitioning into the next stage of growth of Islamic finance It is of no doubt that we are now facing the most challenging economic and financial environment in decades.

To this end, the Bank of Zambia will ensure that the Committee that has been spearheading the development of these guidelines become a permanent one and meet every so often to make the necessary changes in an inclusive manner. Accordingly, you are all urged to forward any contributions you wish to make on an ongoing basis. Ladies and gentlemen, allow me now to welcome and thank Mr Mervin King for graciously agreeing to officially launch the guidelines. Mr. King is internationally renowned for his work on corporate governance, and in particular for his work on the King Committee of South Africa which issued its first report in 1994. The King Report, along with the Cadbury Report of the United Kingdom and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States have become key references on the subject and it is for this reason that we feel both proud and honoured to have Mr. King with us today. BIS Review 119/2006  1  It is now my honour and privilege to call upon Mr. King to launch the Corporate Governance Guidelines. Mr. King!