samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One of the fundamental economic policy insights from the period of “the Great Moderation” and the crisis years after this is that low and stable inflation, combined with robust growth, without any direct signs of overheating, is no guarantee that the financial side of the economy will be problem-free. In brief: price stability is not sufficient to prevent financial imbalances.3 One lesson learnt from this is that the economic policy toolbox needs to be extended. In addition to the tools already available for fiscal policy, monetary policy and the supervision of individual financial institutions, new tools are needed and old tools may require modification to be more usable in counteracting the type of financial imbalances that contributed to the crisis. There is broad agreement on this. And in recent years there has been intensive work around the world on defining and implementing this so-called macroprudential policy. Does monetary policy also need to give greater consideration to financial imbalances? However, the insight that price stability does not prevent financial imbalances from arising has also raised a question of principle in central banks. Has the focus on price stability, which has been the basis for monetary policy, been too narrow? Financial imbalances can aggravate economic downswings with severely negative effects on unemployment and economic growth. If it gets really bad, the imbalances may even result in a financial crisis. Should monetary policy therefore put greater effort than before into preventing financial balances from building up?

This calls for an intensification of the cooperation between the authorities and the big banks so as to enhance the transparency and comparability when evaluating the resilience of the Swiss big banks. Within the context of this cooperation, it should also be ensured that the cost/benefit ratio of such an exercise remains adequate. BIS Review 67/2007  3
Foreseeably, demographic changes will affect consumption and saving patterns and tend to reduce productivity growth. This is why I must stress that addressing the population challenge calls for the adoption of a multidisciplinary strategy. Among other aspects, this strategy must encourage the participation of older workers, tailor migratory policy to labour market needs and boost the birth rate. In this scenario, education and vocational training policies are crucial. 8/18  Fourthly, the unemployment rate remains very high (14.7% in 2019 Q1), despite the fact that since the onset of the recovery almost 2.5 million jobs have been created. Moreover, around 45% of the unemployed have been looking for a job for a year or more. Improving the employability of the most vulnerable groups – namely youths and elderly workers, in particular the least skilled – is essential to reduce this scourge and thus help correct the strong rise in wage inequality that stemmed from the crisis. In this respect, it would be desirable to improve the human capital of the least skilled unemployed and to align job training measures to employers’ demands. These measures should be structured to fit others aimed at reducing the high temporary employment ratio, in light of its negative influence on human capital accumulation – to which I shall refer later – and, once again, on inequality. Indeed, despite trending more favourably over the past year, the temporary employment ratio stood in 2019 Q1 at almost 26%, far above that in other European countries.

This would indicate that at 4/18  least some of the correction of the external adjustment is of a structural nature, and associated with the aforementioned cumulative gains in competitiveness and with the increased geographical diversification of exports and of the number of firms selling their products regularly to the rest of the world. Also worthy of mention is the notable deleveraging by the non-financial private sector, at a very advanced stage in the case both of non-financial corporations and of households. In the case of non-financial corporations, for example, the debt-to-GDP ratio, after falling more than 40 percentage points (pp) from its peak, stands below the average for euro area firms. Significantly, too, there has been intense recapitalisation and restructuring in the banking sector. Yet as I shall explain, the sector continues to face a very complex environment demanding high adaptability. Under the projected baseline scenario for growth of the Spanish economy, however, the Banco de España expects a gradual slowdown in the rate of change of GDP to figures more closely in line with its potential growth. On our estimates, that would be around 1.5%. This gradual easing in growth reflects the progressive exhaustion of some of the abovementioned factors, such as the expansionary demand policies and, in particular, monetary policy. This scenario of gradual deceleration is, moreover, part of a complex and uncertain global context. Here there are doubts about the intensity and the pace of growth in the global economy, in particular the euro area, which is Spain’s main export market.
Mark Carney: One Bank Research Agenda – Launch Conference Opening remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the Launch Conference for the Bank of England’s One Bank Research Agenda, London, 25 February 2015. *  *  *  I am delighted to open the Launch Conference for the Bank of England’s One Bank Research Agenda – an ambitious and wide-ranging framework to transform the way research is done at the Bank. The Agenda aims to improve the coordination of our research across all policy areas, to make the best use of our data, and to cultivate an extensive research community that spans the Bank and beyond. The Bank of England has a single timeless mission: to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability. To borrow from Keynes, to deliver that mission we must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of the future. And we must do more. Our default cannot be Keynes’ “madmen in authority… distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back”. 1 We need contemporaneous and open collaboration between researchers and policymakers. This will require both changes to our research focus such as developing a deeper understanding of the interrelationships between microprudential, macroprudential and monetary policies as well as changes to the way that we perform research at the Bank, including the development of a more open, permeable and policy-driven approach.

This would imply formal, systematic coordination between the different facilities to allow synchronised provisioning of liquidity during crises. Apart from the fact that any significant transfer of power from national to supranational authorities is extremely difficult to achieve, I am not yet convinced that a global financial safety net of this kind is necessary or even desirable. First, concerns about moral hazard must be taken seriously. Second, we have to be careful not to undermine established mechanisms at the national level. Finally, let us not forget that it is only the central banks that can create liquidity as needed. And their cooperation has proven to be very effective during the recent crisis. Let me now shortly outline the topic of the five panels of today’s conference. The first panel will discuss policy discipline and spillovers in an interconnected global economy. It will assess proposals for improving the surveillance of the system and global policy cooperation. The second panel will deal with global liquidity provision in systemic crises. It will evaluate the adequacy of currently available facilities and proposals on expanding them. The third panel focuses on capital flow management. It will follow up on the recently initiated discussion about a new, more uniform and balanced approach. The fourth panel will discuss the desirability and feasibility of a multi-polar currency and reserve system, and the fifth panel will wrap up and outline realistic objectives for 2011 and beyond. I am looking forward to a lively discussion and open exchange of views.
According to data collected by the Bank for International Settlements, here in the United States, for example, the total potential costs of various support measures taken – capital injections, asset purchases, and guarantees of bank debt – amount to about 40 per cent of GDP. For some European countries, these numbers are even higher. While in some cases governments and central banks have been able to reduce their exposures, sometimes even with a profit, the involvement of the public sector remains important. The ultimate outcomes of these involvements are uncertain. Moreover, the consequences of the crisis in terms of job  1  Ben S. Bernanke gave a thorough overview of the various measures taken worldwide in his speech “Reflections on a Year of Crisis” at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, on 21 August 2009. BIS Review 115/2009  1  and wealth losses, huge increases in discretionary and non-discretionary public spending, and dramatic declines in public revenue is bound to be enormous. In some countries, public debt is set to rise at a pace never seen before in peace time. At the end, the citizens of our respective countries will have to foot the bill, one way or another. The second reason is that the crisis also generates important intangible costs which are often overlooked. Confidence in the financial sector and those running it has been severely damaged.

If shareholders know that they have to absorb potential  2  Barry Eichengreen and Michael D. Bordo: “Crises now and then: What lessons from the last era of financial globalization?”, NBER working paper 8715, January 2002. 3  “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience”, April 2008, and the recommendations and principles to strengthen financial systems that the FSB published on 2 April 2009. 2  BIS Review 115/2009  future losses rather than passing them on to taxpayers, they will likely become less willing to let management engage in excessively risky activities. Ultimately, this incentive effect can help make future crises less likely. Strengthening capital requirements The crisis has nakedly exposed the dangers of excessive leverage. It also revealed a number of fundamental weaknesses of existing capital requirements. While model-driven risk-weighted capital requirements are sensible and should be maintained, they are not perfect and very likely never will be. Most of us have had to learn the hard way that the modeling of risk involves substantial risks itself. Despite risk-weighted capital ratios that in most cases exceeded the regulatory minima, leverage was a key source of vulnerability going into the crisis. Excessive leverage not only intensified the impact of mistakes on the financial situation of individual banks. It also amplified the crisis as ongoing deleveraging in the industry inevitably put downward pressure on financial markets and on the real economy. It is now also clear that banks were undercapitalized at the start of the crisis.
Changes in the nature of financial intermediation have also played a role in improving the overall resilience and performance of the U.S. financial system that was evident in this latest period of economic recession and financial stress. Four different types of changes are particularly important. •  Innovation in financial technology continues to expand the opportunities for financial institutions to separate and distribute, and to manage and hedge, different types of risk. •  The increasingly greater role played by the capital markets in the financial intermediation process relative to banks - both relative to the past and compared with most other major economies - has improved the capacity of our system to handle stress. Loans and securities held by commercial banks today account for less than 20 percent of overall U.S. credit market debt, roughly two--thirds of their 1975 levels. •  The increases in the sophistication of risk management techniques and enhancements to risk management processes have delivered substantial improvements in how banks and other financial institutions actually manage risk in practice. Banks, for example, have aligned their pricing of credit products much more closely with credit risk. •  The increased scale of cross-border financial intermediation, the growing role of securitized financial instruments in those overall flows, and the growth in the size and breadth of financial institutions with global operations may also mean that, as shocks are transmitted more rapidly, they are diffused more broadly. These are positive developments, and they are likely to be enduring.

Our benchmarking work has, for the first time, given supervisors meaningful information on international benchmarks against which they can compare their domestic banks. Many supervisors are responsible for only a handful of IRB banks, and it can be difficult to generate reliable benchmarks from a small sample. But our studies have provided supervisors with a much clearer picture of how their banks stack up against their international peers, and supervisory action is already being taken against a number of the outlier banks that are on the low side.   Similarly, the Committee’s RCAP jurisdictional assessments are having an impact by reducing variability due to undesirable differences in national regulations. These may often seem to be small issues of technical detail, but they can have a material impact on capital outcomes. To the extent these differences are removed, they can add to the consistency of outcomes. The Committee is also looking at the issue of national discretions and Pillar 2, and it is investigating whether more can be done to reduce variability from these sources by elinimating discretion where possible, and strengthening supervisory guidance on model validation, review and approval.   Since transparency (or lack thereof) of bank modelling practices is at the heart of the problem, during 2014 the Committee plans to propose enhancements to Pillar 3. The aim is to provide banks’ external stakeholders with information to better understand banks’ risk profiles and risk-weighted asset differences.
Bank of England  Page 1  Monetary policy and central bank asset purchases: Substitutes and complements − speech by Huw Pill Beesley Lecture given at the Institute of Directors, London 23 November 2022  The views expressed in this speech are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would particularly like to thank Saba Alam, Rohan Churm, Rich Harrison, Jack Meaning and Fergal Shortall for helpful discussions in the preparation of this speech. The text has also benefitted from helpful comments from Andrew Bailey, Jamie Bell, Ben Broadbent, Sarah Breeden, Alan Castle, Swati Dhingra,  Bank of England  Page 2  Andrew Hauser, Catherine Mann, Dave Ramsden, Martin Seneca, Silvana Tenreyro and Danny Walker, for which I am most grateful. Opinions (and all remaining errors and omissions) are my own. Bank of England  Page 3  Speech Good evening everyone. It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here at the Institute of Directors and participate in the long-running Beesley Lecture series. As his prodigious academic record and contributions to public policy attest, Professor Michael Beesley was among the most influential industrial and regulatory economists of his day. With the passage of time, his advocacy of road pricing in the 1960s looks increasingly prescient. And, even after almost four decades, his guidance of privatisation and shaping of the subsequent regulatory environment continue to govern the structure of important UK network industries, such as rail and telecoms.

In sum, on Eurostat's current population projections, prepared in 2008, the dependency ratio (the over65s as a proportion of the working-age population) might more than double between 2008 and 2050 from 24% to almost 59%. Everybody is aware of the consequences of these population developments for the sustainability of our pay-as-you-go pension system. Growing pressure would build up on pension spending, meaning that the models currently available, including those devised by the Economy and Finance and Labour and Social Security Ministries which incorporate all the legislative amendments approved in recent years, show that this public spending item would double over the time period referred to above. As a result, the system could run a rising deficit as from 2025. It should also be highlighted that the latest demographic developments, in particular the heightened migrant inflows into Spain, do not resolve the problem. At best, the inflow of working-age immigrants holds back the increase in the dependency ratio derived from population ageing and, therefore, delays the emergence of the problems. But the full scale of these problems will persist. How can we tackle the challenge that demographics pose for our pension system? The scale of the problem calls for a three-pronged strategy. First, the strategy should be far-reaching, i.e. blending measures on different fronts. Specifically, the measures should pursue healthy public finances, implement structural reforms in the economy and seek to reform the pension system, as I shall now expand upon. Second, discussion of these measures should not stretch out over time.
This will help banks to identify fraud related accounts earlier – sleeper accounts before they are activated for example, and in doing so reduce the potential harm to victims. And thirdly, we are today 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  issuing guidance based on some of the good practices developed by our FMLIT banks, particularly with regard to how they integrate external information, data and alerts into their AML/CFT systems, and the use of data analytics tools more widely and other Regtech applications to produce better, more targeted outcomes. There has never been a clearer understanding of the overall objective across the public and private sectors to – improve the quality of data and intelligence going into the AML/CFT eco-system to drive better results – and the role of information sharing in achieving that. Conclusion 32. The priorities that I just highlighted – to be more adaptable in our implementation efforts, leveraging Regtech adoption, and the need to push further on information sharing – are intended to be a starting point to stimulate discussions over the coming two days. 33. And just as we at the HKMA, as a regulator, strive to make our regime increasingly focused on outcomes and effectiveness, I want to encourage all of you, whatever your sector or role in AML/CFT, to work with us in transforming our collective approach.

Our guidance also underlines another important point that as far as Regtech adoption is concerned, the human element remains critical to identifying and developing the skills required to advance AML/CFT Regtech adoption, while being supported by a culture and 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  capacity of innovation. 25. This issue of the human element and the need to put in proper capacity is, of course, easier said than done. Data and other highly trained specialists are certainly essential to the adoption of certain AML/CFT Regtech solutions. However, data specialists have to work with experienced AML professionals, who continue to be vital to building and maintaining an effective control framework. We have found that the balance between these skills differs depending on where an institution is on its Regtech adoption journey. Data specialists are often not required until institutions begin experimenting with more advanced technologies. 26. Those banks that achieve the right balance often emphasise building effective partnerships between staff with different skill sets and fostering an iterative mindset. This is where I think ACAMS has a very important role to play in the next few years in continuing to build capacity in AML/CFT and making practitioners aware of the part that technology can play in making their work more effective and efficient, better equipping them to collaborate with data specialists who can support them in delivering the work. 27.
One natural question raised by that episode, though, is whether the need for such a large scale intervention could be avoided by addressing the structural causes of the “dash for cash”, and if not whether central banks should have facilities to provide the necessary liquidity to the financial system more efficiently. Those are topics that I don’t have time to get into in detail today but they are hugely important questions for central banks and ones with which the FPC is actively engaging.12 In the meantime the MPC has made clear that it stands ready to respond to any re-emergence of market dysfunction, and so avoid any associated tightening in monetary and financial conditions, as appropriate. b. Forward guidance – a high bar to tightening The second tool I want to consider is forward guidance – in other words future commitments on interest rates and other policy tools. Like QE, forward guidance is a tool the MPC had used several times before this crisis. In its 2013 review of the MPC remit, HM Treasury explicitly clarified that the Committee had the ability to deploy forward guidance as a policy tool, including where appropriate making it conditional on future developments.

In policy meetings during the Autumn of 2011, I started to warn of a growing state of dysfunction as some markets – such as for bank funding – closed completely, others saw bid-offer spreads widen and those firms perceived to be weak found their credit lines from fellow banks being cut. The situation was growing very dangerous. To a large extent it was the ECB three-year LTROs which dealt with that dysfunction – leading to the reopening of bank funding markets in particular.
When the building was planned and constructed during the early part of the twentieth century, the gold was seen as a real vulnerability. It was conceivable that someone would try to rob the Bank and steal the gold. The only time that’s happened was in the Bruce Willis movie Die Hard 3, which, to be clear, was only a movie! A lot of that owes to the skill of the architects of the building, and the law enforcement who protect it. But the other reason is that the risks we face today in 2019 look very different to the ones we were planning for in 1921. For a thief today, it’s easier to use a laptop to buy some stolen credit card details online and commit fraud than it is to plan a Hollywood-style bank heist. And that’s what I’m going to say a few words about—the changing nature of risk—before handing over to this evening’s keynote speaker, John Dugan, Chair of Citigroup. In previous decades it was easier to identify risk and what to do about it. You could see it, measure it, and fortify against it. But, as the world has changed, so have the risks that demand our attention and our resources. The new risks are harder to predict and inherently ambiguous: Steel and concrete can do little to protect us. Our reliance on technology means we need to think differently about cyber risk. The importance of innovation and intellectual property means we need to look for new approaches to talent and culture.

I’m looking forward to his insights and I know they will be the catalyst for some rich discussion. Please join me in welcoming John Dugan. 1 The information in this speech on the history of the New York Fed’s headquarters building comes from About  the Building on the New York Fed’s website. 2 Citigroup, Third Quarter 2019 Results and Key Metrics, October 15, 2019. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches