samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Q2 alone, the share of non-cash payments in retail rose by 5 p.p. to almost 69%. The fact that the Russian financial sector as a whole is successfully implementing innovations does not mean that this process is proceeding evenly, or that players of different sizes are managing to move to these new rails equally as easily. On the one hand, the development of new technologies requires investment, information systems are expensive, and as Mr Aksakov also mentioned, it is necessary to think about joint systems. The Bank of Russia is certain that, this being said, small players can offer rather competitive services but to do so they need to be given access to common infrastructure solutions. This will make it possible to greatly increase competition and therefore improve conditions for consumers. That is why we created the Faster Payments System and we are developing biometrics. The Faster Payments System, incidentally, is successfully operating with a continually increasing turnover. Since the beginning of the year, the number of banks connected to the system has increased threefold to 109. The volume of transactions has increased fivefold to 307 billion rubles, and the number of operations has grown almost sixfold — 39 million transfers were made. Biometrics is developing at a slower pace. Mr Aksakov also spoke about problems in this sector and in legislation here, but this is not a reason to give up.

We have permitted that reserves on such loans may temporarily not be increased so that banks can carry out this large-scale, really large-scale, programme, spread losses over time, and enable businesses and households to regain their creditworthiness. But in the short term, I urge banks to do this. Banks must assess the real loan portfolio quality. It is very important that the recognition of losses on non-refundable loans is not overly delayed. I understand that banks will want to drag out this regulatory easing, but “delaying” the recognition of losses can lead to banks not being able to direct resources to lending to effective companies. Having non-performing assets on the balance sheet reduces investor confidence. There are many examples in global practice where there was a delay in recognising bad assets: the “lost decade” in Japan in the 90s, the situation in a number of European countries following the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, and our own experience in 2008–2009. Therefore, we have decided to gradually phase out regulatory easing. We will really phase it out, as Mt Aksakov has urged, carefully. But the phase-out is necessary. And the banks that made use of the easing will have to build up reserves in full for loans to large companies by 1 April next year, and for household loans and loans to SMEs — by 1 July next year within a timeline convenient to them. Banks can also use capital that has been formed to meet capital adequacy buffers but with appropriate restrictions on profit distribution.
European Monetary Union There are now 9 months until the member countries of the European Union, which meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and become members of the European Monetary Union, adopt a new currency, the euro. There is now little to suggest that this will not happen on January 1, 1999 and the European Central Bank will be established this coming July 1. The Central Bank has thought it necessary to follow these developments closely, not least in order to be able to analyze the impact on Iceland and the options available to Iceland in the new environment. In June 1997, the Central Bank released a report European Monetary Union, Creation and Impact. The Bank will release interim reports on this issue as the occasion warrants. At this stage, it is premature to say what impact the Monetary Union will have on Icelandic exchange rate policy or on the options Iceland will face. I will, nevertheless, say a few words about the subject as it appears from the perspective of the Central Bank. The outlook is now that 11 countries will form the Monetary Union at the outset. These countries account for only 33 percent of Iceland’s external goods trade. The initial impact will therefore not be nearly as significant as has been suggested in the domestic debate. Only when the United Kingdom joins the Monetary Union will more than one half of Iceland’s goods trade be with countries in the union.

The changes that the Central Bank implemented at the beginning of March concerning repurchase agreements had two components. On the one hand, the definition of the collateral that qualified for repurchase agreements was widened to include again, after an intermission, all market listed government guaranteed securities and central bank certificates of deposit. The purpose of this change is to level the positions of the various government securities, as varying positions in regard to liquidity transactions with the Central Bank can influence their relative market yields. It is clear that such limitations do not exist among Iceland’s neighbours. In addition, the stock of outstanding Treasury bills has shrunk in the recent period, which has caused a shortage of these bills for deposit banks to use in their repurchase agreements with the Central Bank. The other change is, as mentioned before, that the practice of offering repurchase agreements on tap has been abolished and replaced by a weekly auction of the agreements, as is done in many industrial countries. The Central Bank can at its discretion choose to auction reverse repurchase agreements instead of straightforward repurchase agreements. Neither of these changes alters the course of monetary policy. However, they did have the effect of reversing the rise in money market rates that had occurred in January and February, when the interbank rate rose to 8.3 percent because of the shortage of Treasury bills on the market.
As a result, they expect that, as the FOMC increases the federal funds rate over time, other interest rates might not rise one-forone with it. As one consequence of this, they express a concern that the Federal Reserve might see greater use of its ON RRP operations over time as monetary policy is tightened, because the rates offered on these operations—presumably rising one-for-one with changes in the target federal funds rate range—will become increasingly attractive relative to other market rates, which they expect to rise more slowly. To date, at least, this does not appear to be happening. I think this paper makes an important point about transmission: monetary control does not stop at the effective federal funds rate, and our framework must ensure that the stance of monetary policy is passed through into other money market rates. However, I am less persuaded that the data supports Darrell and Arvind’s concern about the present efficacy of the framework. First, I think the recent pickup in dispersion we see in money markets might not tell us much about what will happen going forward. A lot of what has happened in money markets in recent years may relate to one-off factors associated with money market fund reform and with liftoff from the zero lower bound.

16 The U.S. regulatory capital rules include two leverage ratios: the tier 1 leverage ratio and the supplementary  leverage ratio (SLR). The tier 1 leverage ratio applies to all banking organizations subject to the regulatory capital rules. It is measured as tier 1 capital divided by weekly or daily average total consolidated assets. The minimum tier 1 leverage ratio requirement is 4 percent and is currently in effect. The SLR is effective January 1, 2018 with public disclosure requirement in effect starting in January 1, 2015, and will apply only to “advanced approaches banking organizations” That are defined as those with at least $ billion in total consolidated assets or at least $ billion in consolidated on-balance sheet foreign exposures. It will be measured as tier 1 capital divided by total leverage exposure, which equals the daily average of total consolidated assets plus month-end average of certain off-balance-sheet exposures. The minimum SLR requirement will be 3 percent. In addition, there will be an enhanced SLR requirement applicable to U.S. top-tier bank holding companies identified as globally systemically important banking organizations (G-SIBs). The enhanced requirement consists of a 2 percent leverage buffer above the minimum SLR requirement, for a total of 5 percent. 17 Burhouse, Feid, French and Ligon, “Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward, Looking  Back,” January 14, 2003. 18 Other financial regulations, such as the G-SIB surcharge and the FDIC assessment fee, have similar economic  effects.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Financial integration, development and stability – lessons from the crisis (introductory remarks) Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the conference “Financial integration and stability: the legacy of the crisis”, sponsored and organised by the European Central Bank and the European Commission, Frankfurt am Main, 12 April 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to welcome you to this conference on financial integration and stability, jointly organised by the ECB and the European Commission. I would like to thank in particular Commissioner Barnier for participating in this event, and his services for the smooth coorganisation of it. This joint conference is an illustration of the very good cooperation that exists since a long time between the two institutions. The European Commission is in the driving seat on all what concerns financial integration. The ECB also a strong interest in this topic, because of the implications for the single monetary policy, our primary mandate, and also on financial stability and the operation of payment systems, areas where we have a statutory responsibility. The very good cooperation between our institutions has intensified in the wake of the financial crisis. Let me just mention the recommendations and guidance we developed in the course of last year on support measures for banks in difficulties. This joint work limited the risk of unilateral and uncoordinated support measures by governments and was therefore crucial in maintaining a level playing field and in preserving the Single Market.

This is an area where the Eurosystem and the European Commission have taken significant measures, but integration continues to be affected by legal, fiscal and technical issues. An important set of issues on which the panellist may want to comment relate to the regulatory reform process, where the G20 provides the strategic impetus, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) plays an important role in policy coordination, and the Committees and working groups (such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which is the emblematic Global Committee) the review of specific international standards. Important regulatory reforms are underway in Europe, as well as in the United States, and I want to elaborate on them because they have important implications for the ECB. As you know, the proposed reform for the financial supervisory framework in the EU will be based on two pillars. The micro-prudential pillar, the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), will be composed of the national supervisors and three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will form the macro-prudential pillar. Under the proposals of the European Commission, the ESAs will carry out a range of activities, including the issuance of binding and non-binding rules which will provide the basis of a so-called “single EU rulebook”. The ESAs will further promote a consistent application of EU legislation and of a common supervisory culture, and provide for mediation in the case of disagreements between national supervisors.
Let us identify the gaps and shortfalls and move forward from there. We must also hone the public sector’s ability to make incremental improvements and course corrections, as much as sweeping reforms. After all, correction mechanisms are what make governments smarter. Third, a strong and sustained focus on protecting and promoting the qualities of efficient and effective public institutions must define our path to becoming a high-income economy. Ultimately, attaining high income status must be commensurate with the governments’ ability to intervene less, but to intervene more smartly. As I bring my remarks to a close, let me be clear that although Malaysia’s journey to transition to a high-income economy will be challenging, it is not out of reach. The key is to have the right mindset and values so that we attain, not just the high-income target, but also the qualities of a developed nation and society. I look forward to an insightful discussion ahead about what it will take for us to cross the finish line. Thank you. 1 “Perspectives on Global Development 2019: Rethinking Development Strategies,” OECD. 2 Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey Data 3  Porter, M.E. and S. Stern (2002). “National Innovative Capacity,” The Global Competitiveness Report 2001– 2002. 4  Stoiljkovic, N. (2017). “The Paris Agreement is a $ trillion investment opportunity. How can we unlock it?,” World Economic Forum. 5 “Accelerating 4IR in ASEAN: An Action Plan for Manufacturers,” ATKearney (2019). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Your Excellency Allow me also to state one issue that is of particular importance to, especially, developing countries, like ours. It has been established that effective national capacity-building requires adoption of international best practices. But for a developing country to benefit from this process effectively it would require citizens who are not only technically competent, but also fluent in writing, reading and speaking major international languages, among which French is key. For this reason, most professionals from Anglophone countries, Zambia inclusive, have failed to secure jobs in international organisations, mainly on account of their inability to communicate in a major international language other than English, such as French, which most often is a requirement for securing employment in international organisations. In this connection, we are happy to sign this MoU, whose principal objectives are to: (a)  establish a framework in which the French embassy can facilitate capacity building in the French language among the Bank of Zambia employees;  (b)  promote multi-cultural awareness and appreciation of a diversity of languages necessary for bank staff to transact effectively and efficiently in social and professional fora where the knowledge of French would be beneficial; and  (c)  enhance opportunities for bilateral and/or multilateral co-operation between the Bank and relevant French-speaking authorities and clients.
By shadow banks, I mean the largely unregulated financial entities that take credit risk and/or engage in maturity transformation without access to explicit governmental backstops such as the Federal Reserve’s discount window and or deposit insurance. As we saw in the crisis, without such support, these institutions are vulnerable to runs. When this occurred, the shadow banking sector imploded in a way that imposed significant costs on the regulated sector. The risk is that tighter capital and liquidity requirements for the large financial institutions could push much of the business of credit intermediation and maturity transformation from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector. However, this risk is mitigated by the fact that shadow banks heavily rely on credit support and liquidity lines from the regulated sector. The costs of such facilities will be affected by the new capital and liquidity standards for banks. Thus, the economics of the shadow-banking sector are likely to change in a way that makes such activities less attractive. In addition, by increasing transparency and requiring some risk retention by issuers, Dodd-Frank should make the securitization markets in which shadow banks operate less likely to support poorly underwritten credit. Taken together, these changes mean it is less likely that there will be widespread movement of credit and maturity transformation from the regulated sector to the unregulated sector.

Fourth, the measure of risk-weighted assets – the denominator of the capital adequacy ratio – is constructed to better capture the risks that banks are taking in their activities. For example, the risks weights on trading account assets and for counterparty exposures have been increased substantially to reflect the lessons of the crisis. Note that due to better capture of the underlying risks, at least initially, aggregate risk-weighted assets in the system are likely to increase. This is not because the inherent riskiness of bank balance sheets has increased, but rather because that riskiness will be better captured. In addition to the 4.5 percent minimum common equity standard, there is also a new capital conservation buffer requirement equal to 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets. If a bank were to incur losses and fall deeper and deeper into this buffer, increasingly tough limitations would come into play in terms of the bank’s ability to make capital distributions by paying dividends or buying back shares. This capital conservation buffer is designed to forestall the type of behavior that we saw during the crisis – banks continuing to dissipate capital by paying out dividends in order to demonstrate that they were strong. Instead, banks will have an incentive to raise additional equity to exit the buffer and its restrictions on distributions.
Today, inflation is 9.3 per cent and the Riksbank, like other central banks around the world, has raised the policy rate in rather large steps. This is as good an illustration as any of how quickly and unexpectedly things have happened or, to refer to my initial quotation, that decades have happened within a few weeks. A natural conclusion is that this development was genuinely difficult to predict. There are, of course, things that we could have predicted better, such as the boost to inflation that came from the rapid recovery after the pandemic. However, it would also have been necessary to foresee, for example, that Russia would invade Ukraine in February 2022, that Russia would throttle its exports of natural gas to Europe and that this would bring electricity prices up to exceptionally high levels. Two opposing types of criticism of monetary policy There will always be those who claim, after the event, that things should have been anticipated – and not rarely that they themselves actually did so. One argument in the Swedish debate is that today’s high inflation is an obvious result of the expansionary policy previously pursued by the Riksbank and many other central banks, during the rather long period when the problem was the reverse; that is, it was difficult to bring inflation up to the target level.

The growing sophistication and complexity of financial activities, brought on by financial innovation and globalisation, have made risk management a key and important task for all banks. In particular, the integrity of real-time information on changing prices, valuation of financial position, and warning on breaches of internal control is most critical now for bank’s top management in taking timely and prudent decision. The recent episode in the global financial market has demonstrated again the costly implication of weaknesses in this area. For these reasons, information technology and its management has become a key part in business strategy as it can provide lever to create competitive edge and innovate business model, especially for providing customer reach in a cost-effective manner. But on top of this, pressure from competition and the need to cut costs also have forced banks to rethink their business models and strategies, leading to fundamental changes in the business process that include the proliferation of outsourcing, electronic banking, and the use of the internet. Again, while these developments are positive, they also expose banks to a different aspect of risk management, for example how to manage and control outsourced activities. Such an environment, if not properly managed, can lead to greater technological and security risk, as well as to malicious activities. For central banks, one of our key mandates is to ensure financial system stability.
While in 2017 the non-financial sectors (energy, transport, building and agriculture) led the way, banking is now the most advanced sector in disclosing information. Chart 3: Rates of disclosure against each TCFD recommendations by industry  Banking  Insurance  Energy  Materials & Buildings  Transport  Agri, Food & Forest  Tech & Media  Consumer Goods  a. Board Oversight  48%  29%  38%  37%  25%  22%  19%  29%  b. Management's Role  54%  35%  32%  35%  18%  26%  17%  40%  a. Risks and Opportunities  51%  39%  57%  50%  39%  40%  38%  50%  b. Impact on Organisation  55%  26%  64%  65%  34%  45%  25%  52%  c. Resilience of Strategy Risk Management a. Risk ID and Assessment Processes b. Risk Management Processes c. Integration into overall Risk Management Metrics and a. Climate-Related Metrics Targets  20%  12%  13%  12%  5%  4%  2%  6%  52%  30%  38%  41%  23%  24%  24%  22%  46%  33%  42%  39%  17%  26%  19%  23%  32%  16%  21%  18%  11%  9%  17%  21%  51%  27%  49%  63%  36%  45%  37%  55%  b.

Because the monetary policy impulse works through its impact on financial market conditions, I don’t see why the Fed would want to act in a way that deliberately made this linkage less predictable. In actuality, I have been pushing in the opposite direction. By explaining the importance of financial conditions as part of our monetary policy decisions, I am trying to tighten the linkage. Balance Sheet Normalization I’d like to wrap up my comments tonight by discussing the likely next step in the monetary policy normalization process: beginning to allow maturing Treasuries and agency MBS paydowns to run off the Fed’s balance sheet, in contrast to our current practice of reinvesting all of the proceeds. As you are aware, following the June FOMC meeting we issued an addendum to our Policy Normalization Principles and Plans.3 In that addendum, the FOMC outlined how it planned to gradually reduce the Fed’s securities holdings over time. Namely, when that program is implemented, the FOMC will decrease its reinvestments in an orderly way, with repayments reinvested only to the extent they exceed gradually rising caps. For maturing Treasury securities, the FOMC anticipates that the monthly cap will be $ billion initially and will increase in steps of $ billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches $ billion. For repayments of agency MBS, the monthly cap will be $ billion initially and will increase in steps of $ billion at three-month intervals over 12 months until it reaches $ billion.