samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The crisis, besides all else, evoked negative public attitudes in relation to banks. Although not a lev of Bulgarian taxpayers has been spent to bail out banks and it would be unfair to place the Bulgarian banks next to those that continue to receive capital support from many governments and central banks, we should be aware of such attitudes. A short list runs like this: “… banks are the ones to blame for the crisis; besides they do not show commitment to the problems of businesses during these hard times”; “… interest rates and taxes in Bulgaria are high”; “… banks enjoy regulatory comfort,” etc, etc. 2  BIS Review 169/2010  Have we got sufficient evidence to expect that such attitudes will dissipate any time soon? And what is our response? There is more than just one side to this problem, because the majority of the population lacks a basic financial knowledge. Others are not responsible enough in managing their own money. I agree with you when you feel indignation at the lack of objectivity in much of the criticism against commercial banks. But we can’t change people. The important thing is to do anything we possibly can to give our clients the maximum correctness. You could step in and play an important role by streamlining your business practices with regard to servicing clients. “He who works, makes mistakes” Mistakes however should be owned and rectified in a prompt manner.

With the implementation of TARGET2 and BISERA7, banks and their customers have at their disposal a reliable and secure infrastructure for processing small and large payments in euro. This is a proper opportunity to invite any of you who, for one reason or another, have not yet availed of the advantages entailed in joining these two systems to do so. The most direct and broadest everyday contact of the general public with the banking system is through the banknote and coin related services provided to individuals and businesses. This year’s great event in this area was the commencement of operations of the BNB Cash Centre in Sofia. Our Cash Centre is one of the state-of-the-art facilities for storage and processing of banknotes and coins within the European System of Central Banks, meeting the highest requirements to security and convenience of the serviced banks and CIT companies. Through it the BNB has also met its obligations with regard to currency distribution and destruction of unfit currency. In its newly opened cash centre the BNB continues to provide to its customers standard currency-related services. However, this is the proper time to share with you that more and more often we receive at the BNB complaints by citizens that banks have refused to exchange damaged Bulgarian banknotes or that customers have received such banknotes in ATM cash withdrawal transactions. This necessitates the conclusion that banks do not strictly observe the BNB requirements to the quality of banknotes and coins.
They don’t eliminate the risks that borrowers and lenders take on when entering into a loan. All debt carries risk. Our role is not to protect individuals from their own actions, whether they are borrowers or shareholders in lenders like car companies or banks. Our defence lines safeguard everyone else - the wider economy - from collateral damage. They mean there’s every prospect that we can make the economy a safer place than it has been in the past and that we can stop watching endless repeats of Debt Strikes Back. I look forward to collaborating with my fellow worriers here at the Institute in future. And the Bank of England looks forward to hearing from the people of Liverpool at our Future Forum in November. We’ll be engaging with local schools and the public to talk about – and crucially, listen to – how the financial world affects your life. For now, settle back with your popcorn and watch the – oddly, not yet highly grossing – new blockbuster: the Return of the Regulator. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  Annex Chart 1. Annual growth in UK real economy credit and UK nominal GDP  Chart 2.

373–409 and Cochrane, John, H. (2011), “Inflation and Debt”, National Affairs 9, Fall 2011, pp. 56–78. 11  Letting the central bank itself determine the employment target is no solution, either. As discussed in the section on criticism of a lack of clarity, assessing what could be an appropriate target level/equilibrium level entails considerable problems. 12  A press release in connection with the Federal Reserve introducing an inflation target on 25 January 2012 stated that: “The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market. These factors may change over time and may not be directly  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  One can illustrate the fact that the long-run level of employment is determined by factors other than monetary policy in different ways. Following the crisis in the 1990s, unemployment and the employment rate have varied around an apparently unchanged long-run level, despite the policy rate having been both relatively high and very low during this period. Although there is a relationship between monetary policy and the labour market in the short run, monetary policy does not seem to have influenced the labour market on average. Despite periods of very strong growth and economic activity, unemployment has never been lower than just under 6 per cent, with an average rate of around 7 per cent since 2000. An overwhelming proportion of unemployment is thus structural rather than cyclical. This picture is also supported by unemployment varying substantially between groups.
As you know, regarding interest rates, the Governing Council early December decided to lower the key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points, following a 25 basis point decrease on 3 November 2011. As regards the short-term growth outlook for the euro area, the intensified financial market tensions are continuing to dampen economic activity in the euro area and the outlook remains subject to high uncertainty. Euro area economic activity should recover, albeit very gradually, in the course of 2012, as also projected by Eurosystem staff in early December. Substantial downside risks to this economic outlook nevertheless remain. With regard to price developments, inflation was 3.0% in November. Inflation is likely to stay above 2% for several months to come, before declining to below 2%, which view is also broadly confirmed in the December staff projections. Given the environment of weaker growth in the euro area and globally, underlying cost, wage and price pressures in the euro area should also remain modest. Risks to the medium-term outlook for price developments remain broadly balanced. The latest monetary data reflect the heightened uncertainty in financial markets. Looking beyond short-term volatility, the monetary analysis indicates that the underlying pace of monetary expansion remains moderate. The Governing Council of the ECB is determined to ensure that inflation expectations continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Let me now turn to the latest non-standard measures.

Instead, they often use the easier approach (which has proved wrong) to group countries and entire regions by meaningless geographical characteristics, and these are simply “labelled” along with superficial and clichéd conclusions. Such geographical approach that fails to take into account the very diverse economic structures, institutional environment, or even political and historical traditions, may well be appropriate in meteorology, but definitely not in economic analyses! I believe that today’s conference will touch on this range of issues too. That is why I expect to have some of the above-mentioned issues analysed today at your forum. Seeking useful ideas and working solutions for exiting the crisis would continue, as the crisis itself is not over yet. We are far from having ensured that lasting recovery of the economy back to the rates of growth that correspond to its potential. In Bulgaria and in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Europe as a whole the risks to economic development remain, as can be seen from the continuing flows of negative data – limited consumption, weak investment interest, subdued labour market, volatile financial markets. I wish you fruitful discussions and success to your forum! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
This outturn was largely attributed to the decline in annual food inflation to 2.8% from 3.8% recorded in June 2010 as non-food inflation increased to 12.5% from 11.8% during the same period. The decline in food inflation was on account of price reductions on cereals, various vegetables, various beef products, mutton and dried kapenta, due to improved seasonal supply factors. Annual non-food inflation increased on account of pass-through effects of the Kwacha exchange rate depreciation, coupled with higher transport fares and the upward adjustment of electricity tariffs by an average of 25.6% during the period under review. Money supply and domestic credit Preliminary estimates indicate that growth in broad money (M3), comprehensively defined to include foreign currency deposits, was 7.2% in the third quarter of 2010 down from 13.3% as at end-June 2010, and was above the 4.0% projected quarterly growth rate. In absolute terms, M3 is estimated to have increased to K17,898.9 billion from K16,698.3 billion in June 2010. The outturn in M3 was largely due to the increase in both Net Domestic Assets (NDA) and Net Foreign Assets (NFA). On an annual basis, M3 growth increased to 32.0% in September 2010 from 27.7% in June 2010. This outturn was due to the rise in NDA by 96.9% (June 2010, rose by 58.2%) primarily on account of increased lending to government. However, the NFA fell by 9.8% compared with a fall of 1.2% recorded in June 2010.

The Governing Council today also decided on further details of how the Eurosystem will buy assets with yields below the interest rate on the deposit facility under its public sector purchase programme. These decisions will be published in a separate press release at 15.30 CET. The monetary policy decisions taken in December 2016 have succeeded in preserving the very favourable financing conditions that are necessary to secure a sustained convergence of inflation rates towards levels below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Borrowing conditions for firms and households continue to benefit from the pass-through of our measures. As expected, headline inflation has increased lately, largely owing to base effects in energy prices, but underlying inflation pressures remain subdued. The Governing Council will continue to look through changes in HICP inflation if judged to be transient and to have no implication for the medium-term outlook for price stability. A very substantial degree of monetary accommodation is needed for euro area inflation pressures to build up and support headline inflation in the medium term. If warranted to achieve its objective, the Governing Council will act by using all the instruments available within its mandate. In particular, if the outlook becomes less favourable, or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, we stand ready to increase our asset purchase programme in terms of size and/or duration. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis.
But as we strengthen international regulation, we must not lower our guard in terms of ethics. Ten years later, this would generate the opposite imbalance to that of 2007–08. In other words, there's a risk that the pendulum could swing back the other way. 2. Ethics must permeate the day-to-day practices and culture of financial institutions. Over and above the good intentions, declarations and codes of conduct, which did nothing to prevent the excesses that caused the 2008 crisis, the challenge now is for all actors from the bottom to the top of these organisations to adopt an ethical approach. As the "Banking Conduct and Culture" report of the Group of Thirty, which brought together private and central bankers and academics, asserted, the "tone from the top" must have an "echo from the bottom". This begins with the Boards of Directors and the management teams, who must always be exemplary, and who need to realise that their behaviour is scrutinised at all times for indications of what is acceptable and what is not, irrespective of their declarations of intent. Actions speak louder than words. It then requires employees to be trained and informed on ethical standards on a regular basis and not only on their first day on the job. Situations change; new developments can be an opportunity to reconsider existing practices; stakeholder expectations evolve. Ethics – just like technical issues – must be subject to constant communication and ongoing training. And this is no easy task.

A monetary policy that is guided by an inflation target is basically concerned with adapting the development of demand to the economy’s long-term growth. That is not easy, I can assure you, and our chances should not be exaggerated. Towards the end of last year, however, activity in the Swedish economy did begin to slow to a growth rate that can result in a stable long term development. The last time we met, early in October, we discussed the situation in these terms and I concluded that if the strong economic upswing were to continue, it would be necessary to raise the repo rate. Other central banks around the world had been facing a similar situation for some time. The U.S. Federal Reserve, for example, had raised its instrumental rate successively during 1999 and 2000 to 6.5 per cent. Last year the European Central Bank raised its rate to 4.75 per cent and the Bank of England’s rate was increased to 6.0 per cent. I recall that last year many observers counted on relatively large interest rate hikes in Sweden as well. They thought they saw signs that the Swedish economy was on the way to becoming overheated and argued rather vigorously that the Riksbank therefore ought to act quickly — starting in the autumn of 1999 and continuing with further steps up to last summer — in order to avert the threat they saw looming on the horizon.
The important aspect of developing this work is in providing a common vocabulary in which policymakers can discuss the possible impact of a problem. This may also help to provide a framework for deciding whether to intervene in a crisis, as well as helping to understand who may be interested in intervening. BIS Review 112/2006  3  And fourth: the types of measures we have available in a crisis. I outlined earlier a number of challenges in resolving a crisis involving a large complex financial institution, and the obstacles we may face in addressing them. The Contact Group 2002 report on legal underpinnings 4 provided more detail on the extent to which different legal regimes created vulnerabilities in managing crises. Through discussion of hypothetical problems for real firms we may get closer to understanding more concretely what these obstacles will look like in practice and therefore what we might want to put in place to mitigate them. Put another way, it is potentially a way to develop practical solutions, or at least a practical understanding of the specific issues we might face, within the parameters of our current legal and fiscal set up. What we learn from firm-focussed interest groups should also put us in a better position to tackle some of the thorny issues we face.

Financial stability, as I have suggested on several occasions, can be achieved only by the interaction of three basic necessities: sound leadership at the firm level, strong prudential regulation and supervision, and effective market discipline. These three elements provide the foundation for the health and soundness of the financial system as a whole. Sound leadership at the firm level is the first bulwark against financial system instability. It begins with good corporate governance: capable and experienced directors and management, a coherent strategy and business plan, and clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Boards of directors are meant to oversee the development of the overall strategy of the organization and the decisions made by senior management in pursuit of those strategic objectives. This means that individuals with skills and competencies consistent with the institution's strategic focus must be represented. In addition, boards should establish clear guidelines regarding the independence of their directors. The Senior management is meant to set the business strategy, oversee day-to-day decisions, and ensure that these decisions support the long-term objectives and policies as determined by the board. To ensure financial stability, execution of the overall objectives of the firm must be supported by rigorous internal controls and effective risk management. An effective internal control apparatus is critical to provide reasonable assurance that the information produced by the organization is timely and reliable and that errors and irregularities are discovered and corrected promptly.
José De Gregorio: Economic growth in Chile and copper Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the CESCO conference “1984-2009, 25 Años de la Industria del Cobre y su impacto en Chile”, Santiago, 1 September 2009. I thank Mariana García for her valuable contribution in preparing this work. *  *  *  I want to begin by thanking you for inviting me to this Conference celebrating the copper and mining research center CESCO’s twenty-fifth birthday. It is an honor to have the opportunity to speak about the impact of the mining industry, and of copper especially, on Chile’s development, given its importance for the country and in which I have great professional interest. Chile is abundant in natural resources. One of the most distinctive characteristics of our economy is its large mining sector, particularly of copper, which places it as the world’s main copper producer. As a country we were blessed by nature with this enormous treasure. But as with every benefit, there can be related costs and risks that must be assessed. For a long time, natural resources have been part of the discussion about economic development. Many years ago, natural resources were thought to be destined to a path of permanent price decline, which served as an argument to push forced industrialization. Such a vision proved to be based on wrong grounds. Nonetheless, development-related problems within the context of natural resource abundance have made their way back to the academic discussion in recent years.

The reserves accumulation carried out by the Bank in the past few years, as well as management thereof – details are provided in an Appendix – should suffice to confront extreme episodes. Chile also has sovereign wealth funds that could help alleviate the financing needs in case of increased external tensions as well. The foreign funds of institutional investors can also act as stabilizing agents in this sense. On the other hand, we must always bear in mind that any intervention has associated costs. First, it can blur the objective of the Central Bank: inflation or exchange rate target. In our case, we have dealt with this problem by carrying out transparent, sterilized interventions, with a publicly known timetable that does not conflict with the formulation of monetary policy. In addition, our communication has been straightforward in stating that the objective of our monetary policy is price stability. Second, an intervention entails a significant financial cost for the Central Bank and the country. International reserves are invested in highly liquid assets abroad, whose yield is lower than the interest paid on the debt securities in pesos that are used to sterilize the purchase. In the current scenario, in which external-domestic interest rate differentials are significant and expected to remain so for some time, the financial cost of holding reserves is substantial and negatively affects the Bank’s balance sheet continually.
Correlations between forecasts and outcomes for the different variables Annual rates of change 1,0  0,8  0,8  0,6  0,6  0,4  0,4  0,2  0,2  Per cent  1,0  0,0  0,0 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  -0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,8  -0,2  GDP Employed CPIX CPI GDP per employed  -1,0  -0,4 -0,6 -0,8 -1,0  Forecast horizon (quarterly)  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 138/2007  11  Figure 10. Mean error for forecasts, an annual rate Percentage points 0,80  0,80  0,60  0,60  0,40  0,40  0,20  0,20  0,00  0,00  -0,20  -0,20  -0,40  -0,40  -0,60  -0,60  -0,80  -0,80 0  1  2  3  4  GDP  Employment  CPIX  5 CPI  6  7  8  GDP/ empolyment  Forecast horizon (quarterly)  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 11. Ranking for GDP following year Per cent Note. The Y-axis shows how large a percentage of times analysts have been better than the percentage of analysts as illustrated in the X-axis. In order to see how large a proportion of times the Riksbank has been better than 50 per cent of other analysts, see 50 on the X-axis, then study the red column on the Y-axis.

Although there is a considerable stock of equity in owner-occupied housing, with banks tightening the supply of both secured and unsecured credit, consumers will find it more difficult to borrow to finance spending. So in 2008 it is likely that a less buoyant housing market will go hand in hand with slower growth of consumer spending. Tighter credit conditions mean that, as a nation, we are likely to save more of our income this year than in the recent past. In the short run, that will slow economic activity, possibly quite sharply. And there is a risk that weaker activity and lower asset prices could result in another round of losses for banks and a further tightening of credit conditions. The adjustment which not only the British but the world economy is experiencing is necessary as the imbalances, between spending and saving and between domestic demand and trade, unwind. As part of a longer-run rebalancing of the UK economy, an increase in our national saving rate, both private and public, is necessary. The low level of national saving is apparent from the current account deficit – our new net borrowing from overseas – which in  2  BIS Review 8/2008  the third quarter of last year was, relative to GDP, the biggest in the past fifty years and the largest in the G7. It is possible to run a current account deficit for a considerable period. Australia, for example, has done so in every year since 1974.