samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2009. “Global Imbalances and Financial Fragility,” American Economic Review, May. Lewis, W. Arthur (1954). “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,” Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 22, pp. 139–91. Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh et Alan M. Taylor (2010), “Financial Stability, the Trilemma, and International Reserves,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pp 57–94. Rajan, Raghuram G. (2010), Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Princeton University Press. Wei, Shang-Jin and Jiandong Ju (2010) “Domestic Institutions and the Bypass Effect of Financial Globalization” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, forthcoming. BIS Review 170/2010  5

Second, the fact that the degree of  1  This number refers to the change in the high-employment budget deficit for fiscal year 2013 as estimated by the CBO in March. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  restraint lessens next fiscal year could understate the actual impact on the economy because the full impact of some of this year’s cuts may not yet have been fully felt. For example, consider university research spending that depends, in part, on federal grants. As the grant budget falls under sequestration, this will eventually squeeze university budgets over time and likely lead to additional belt-tightening. Next, let’s take a deeper look at how the major sectors of the private economy that might play a role in the strengthening story are doing currently: consumption, housing, business investment and trade. When we’re done, I think you’ll agree that there still are some reasons for caution. Turning first to consumer spending, such spending has remained fairly subdued outside of interest rate-sensitive consumer durables. In July, for example, real personal consumption expenditures were flat, and it is unlikely that third quarter consumption growth will be much above a 2 percent annual rate. Moreover, the drivers of consumer spending do not look particularly supportive. In particular, real disposable income growth has grown at less than a 1 percent annual pace since March. Furthermore, the recent data do not yet clearly indicate a firming in the income growth rate, or the two important components of labor income growth – hours and compensation.
Annual return in the US Per cent 60  60  40  40  20  20  0  0 -20  -20  Equities  Fixed income instruments -40  -40  -60  -60 1925  1935  1945  1955  1965  1975  1985  1995  Sources: Ibbotson Associates and Datastream  An investor will only invest in high-risk vehicles if it is reasonable to expect compensation for the risk. The compensation for high risk in the stock market is a far higher average return for equities compared  2  For further details, see Hylland (1991) “Statens Reservefond - et forsøk fra politikerne på å binde sin egen handlefrihet?” (The State Reserve Fund - An attempt by politicians to restrict their scope for manoeuvre?). Unpublished paper, University of Oslo. with bonds. Since 1926, the annual return on US equities has on average been 4.8 percentage points higher than the return on bonds. Also in most ten-year periods, investing in US equities has been profitable, with the exception of the depression in the 1930s and the last half of the 1970s. Equity returns have been negative after ten years only in the years between 1928 and 1938, in other words on equity investments made the year before the 1929 stock market crash. It may also be worth noting that equities purchased during recessions - such as in the mid-1930s and mid-1970s - brought solid returns ten years later. This picture is the same for most other countries.

The type of regulation to which it should be subject is also uncertain. Irrespective of what the future may hold, banks’ classical role remains fundamental today to economic development. In the absence of deep secondary markets at the European level, where it would be possible to convert long-term funding into liquidity through the market, the banking sector is still the main vehicle through which savers’ wish to have their savings available can be reconciled with the need of those demanding funds to have stable funding over time.1 Naturally, this does not mean that credit growth should always be positive, as we were painfully reminded by the crisis. In this respect, the debt ratios of households and firms in Spain reached excessive levels of 85% and 133% of GDP, respectively, before the crisis broke. Fortunately, since their 2008/2009 peak, debt ratios have moved on a markedly downward trend, converging late last year with the average EU levels of 60% for households and 90% for firms. Bank lending has been decreasing throughout this period of household and corporate deleveraging. Nonetheless, this decrease has recently reversed. Specifically, if we look at 12-month cumulative data, the net flow of financing granted to households turned positive in June 2018, posting a year-on-year growth rate of 0.5% in April 2019. Firms’ net global financing flows have also held at positive levels since October, attaining year-on-year growth of 2.6% in April 2019.
BIS Review 26/1998  -7One final point that I would make in connection with state law initiatives is what lawyers call conflicts of laws law -- that is, most of the legislative efforts just described do not address the degree to which the state enacting the legislation will recognize electronic signatures created in compliance with another state’s statutory scheme. These statutes also generally fail to address the validity of unsigned electronic documents or the evidentiary use of electronic records generally. If you are interested in learning more about these statutes, you might want to visit the www.mbc.com web site. This web site provides a summary of all existing and pending digital and electronic signature legislation in the United States with links to the actual legislation where possible. Like the states, Congress is also divided on the appropriate scope and content of electronic authentication legislation. In September 1997, the House passed “The Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1997”. If passed by the Senate, that act would establish a national policy panel for digital signatures. The panel, which would be composed of Federal and state Government as well as private technical and legal experts and interested members of the public, would serve as a forum for exploring all relevant factors associated with the development of a national digital signature infrastructure. The panel would be expected to produce model practices and procedures for CAs, standards to ensure consistency among jurisdictions that license CAs, and audit standards for CAs.

Moreover, the basic goal of any Government regulation should be to ensure competition, protect intellectual property and privacy, prevent fraud, foster transparency, support commercial transactions, and facilitate dispute resolution. The fourth principle directs the Government to recognize the unique qualities of the Internet in relation to existing regulatory models. We should not assume, for example, that the regulatory frameworks established over the past sixty years for telecommunications, radio, and television apply to the Internet. The Framework specifically directs the Government to review, and revise or eliminate existing laws and regulations that may hinder electronic commerce to reflect the needs of the new electronic age. Finally, in the fifth principle, the Framework announces what, to many, is the most important principle in connection with electronic commerce and the Internet, namely that electronic commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a global basis. In this regard, the United States Government has identified nine areas where international agreements are needed to preserve the Internet as a non-regulatory medium, one in which competition and consumer choice will largely shape the market-place. The nine areas are: (1) customs and taxation; (2) electronic payments; (3) a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce; (4) intellectual property protection; (5) privacy; (6) security; (7) telecommunications infrastructure and information technology; (8) content; and (9) technical standards. These nine areas are discussed in some detail in the Framework.
The first is to familiarize yourself with this new environment – to get to know new colleagues, to learn about the culture of the workplace, and basically to settle in. Some may find this phase more challenging than others, especially if they were easily shaken by cultural shocks. Once you have settled in the new place, you may discover certain shortcomings of yours are constraining your career advances. These shortcomings may already be existing, but are only exposed by the new job. Fixing these shortfalls is the second step in the transition. Finally, to make a significant progress in the career, you will have to set the bar for yourself, and strive to reach it through learning and development. This will require insights to identify one’s strengths, and skills to take advantage of them given the dynamics of the working environment. The stages of economic development may be thought of in a similar vein, consisting of three pillars. The first pillar is to ensure that the economy ‘settles in’ the new global environment smoothly, and remains resilient against new types of shocks. The second pillar is to identify and fix structural shortfalls that may have hindered economic development in the past, and could become even more binding in the future. The last pillar is to lay out a clearer long-term plan for strengthening and developing the economy, leveraging on its strength and the opportunities presented by the evolving landscape.

In turn, the stabilising arm of the autonomous national fiscal policies was tasked with addressing idiosyncratic shocks and cyclical slippages, while guaranteeing fiscal sustainability. However, the independent conduct of fiscal policy in a monetary union has inherent externalities that warrant some constraints. The EMU was built on the basis of placing full responsibility for fiscal policy decision-making and implementation on the governments of the individual Member States, without interfering with the conduct of monetary policy. In this sense, the independence of the central bank was reinforced by two means: i) the prohibition of monetary financing and ii) a virtuous conduct of fiscal policy to avoid calling into question the independence of the monetary authority. The consequences of fiscal actions were thus the sole responsibility of the individual Member States. For this reason, a “no bail-out clause” was included in the Treaty. The main objective of this clause was that financial markets should play a disciplining role by requiring different risk premia according to the underlying fiscal fundamentals. At the same time, limits were set to the deficit and public debt of the Member States that where later complemented by the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). There were two additional reasons for this. The first is that financial markets could not always be trusted to act as a deterrent against unsound policies.
Charles Bean: The economic outlook Speech by Mr Charles Bean, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy of the Bank of England, to the Council of Mortgage Lenders, Mortgage Industry Conference & Exhibition, London, 3 November 2011. *  *  *  Good morning and thank you for that kind introduction! In the very early part of this year, with the recovery from the 2008–9 recession seemingly becoming more solidly based and inflation running at double our 2% inflation target, the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee, of which I am a member, was edging towards starting to withdraw some of the considerable monetary stimulus we had injected during the downturn. Indeed, as recently as our May meeting, a third of the Committee were voting to raise Bank Rate from its emergency level of 0.5 per cent. Although I did not join them in voting to raise Bank Rate, I did view the arguments for and against a tightening as being finely balanced. Now, just a few months later, the Committee has unanimously voted to re-start its programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of additional central bank reserves, also known as quantitative easing. In my address this morning, I thought I would say a few words about why the Committee’s view of the outlook has shifted so dramatically and what we can expect additional purchases to achieve. As I said, earlier this year the recovery seemed broadly on track. But, as time has passed, so it has seemed less secure.

2  Examples of these stronger and pro-business rules are: (i) The procedures for investors to register their investment in order to benefit from protection under the agreement, are outlined clearly so that the procedures are transparent to investors; (ii) Policy-makers can more easily consider the views and feedback of the business community, as the ACIA has a consultations mechanism giving ASEAN countries an official platform to stay engaged on ACIA matters and its implementation; and (iii) The ACIA has a robust Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism which will give investors additional recourse to seek redress or compensation if they have been treated unfairly by a government. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The appointment of a Renminbi clearing bank in Singapore brings new functionality to the Singapore financial system. The build-up of Renminbi liquidity in Singapore will encourage financial institutions in Singapore to develop and offer a wider range of Renminbi products and services. This will help meet the financing, investment, and risk management needs of the market. It will also strengthen the role of Singapore as a leading global financial centre that serves Asia and beyond. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Besides the RCEP, Singapore is also actively engaged in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the TPP. The TPP negotiations currently involve 11 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States. It aims to bring comprehensive duty-free market access as well as reduced restrictions on services, investment and government procurement.
In periods of zero interest rates, such purchases help to counter the risk of deflation. The Swiss economy faces an exceptionally difficult year in 2009. Economic activity is set to pick up again gradually over the course of 2010, thanks to the extremely expansive monetary policy. This is, however, conditional upon an economic recovery by our main trading partners, as well as a return to stability on financial markets. The SNB measures are also aimed at reducing the risk of deflation in Switzerland. Despite the creation of massive amounts of liquidity, the SNB remains committed to ensuring price stability in the future. We will use all means at our disposal to reduce liquidity again in good time, so as to prevent any upsurge of inflation in Switzerland once the crisis has ended. BIS Review 33/2009  1

This is welcome for financial stability, especially for mortgages. But as a result, the pass-through of higher policy rates is more gradual. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The origin and sectorial composition of inflation matters. The current surge in inflation does not primarily originate in overheated demand but in supply shocks. This has implication for the transmission lags. (i) The rise in the price of commodities and input costs was at the root of inflation. Their pass-through to producer prices and subsequently to CPI inflation might be asymmetric, faster and more complete on the way up than on the way down. It implies that the current decline in energy and input costs may not fully translate yet into lower inflation. (ii) Services inflation, in part fuelled by wage developments, has gradually but steadily surged over recent quarters, and is likely to become the dominant source of inflation in the euro area. Historically, services are the most persistent and important component of both headline and core inflation, and their share in consumption increased significantly in the last decades. They are less directly sensitive to interest rates; the dampening effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand will be felt, but it will take more time. What conclusions can be drawn for monetary policy ? a. In the usual alleged time lag of one to two years for monetary transmission, our economic situation is presently closer to the upper range.
The one fresh wrinkle is that with estimates of the neutral real interest rate much lower than those that prevailed 20 years ago, the ZLB is likely to be an even more powerful force than was imagined in 1999.17 In approaching this question today, we should take lessons from the conference held in Woodstock 20 years ago: Bring together leading researchers and policymakers, draw out the best and most creative thinking, and take a long-run view of how we can navigate the environment before us. I am happy to say that this process is already in train, with the Fed’s framework review incorporating perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders, culminating in an academic conference next week in Chicago. Conclusion In closing, I want to add a personal thanks to Ken West for all he has done to promote outstanding research that is both innovative and relevant to the real-world problems that central banks face. And my best wishes for the JMCB, which I hope may continue its illustrious record for the next 50 years. As a researcher and policymaker, the one thing I am certain about is that fostering an open and active dialogue between researchers and policymakers is the best way for us to succeed in our work. Thank you. 1 For references to the early literature, see James Clouse, Dale Henderson, Athanasios Orphanides, David H.  Small, and P. A. Tinsley, Monetary Policy When the Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate Is Zero, The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp.

Figure 13: Crude Oil (Brent) (USD/Barrel) 150  Crude Oil  130  110  90  70  07.08  05.08  03.08  01.08  11.07  09.07  07.07  05.07  03.07  01.07  50  Source: Bloomberg. 10  BIS Review 100/2008  Members of the Press and Dear Guests, Our revised forecasts envisage slightly higher food inflation in 2008 and 2009 compared to the April Inflation Report. Although unprocessed food prices followed a relatively favorable course, processed food inflation is likely to stay at high levels for while, given the elevated course of agricultural commodity prices. Against this backdrop, we have raised the assumptions for food inflation from 13 percent to 14 percent for the year 2008, and from 8 percent to 9 percent for the year 2009. These changes have led to an upward revision in our inflation forecasts by about 30 basis points, for both 2008 and 2009. The projections envisage gradually moderating food inflation throughout the forecast horizon. In this context, assumption for 2010 food inflation is 7 percent. According to the framework drawn so far, we now forecast inflation to be around 10.6 percent at the end of 2008. Under the assumption of a limited tightening towards the end of 2008, our medium term forecasts suggest that, with 70 percent probability, inflation will be between 5.9 and 9.3 percent (mid-point 7.6) at the end of 2009, and between 4 percent and 7.8 percent (mid-point 5.9) at the end of 2010 (Figure 14).
In the event of a crisis it can only hope that the home country will take the host country’s situation into account when managing the crisis. The home country, on the other hand, faces a situation where it could be necessary for its central bank to provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to support a bank which has a large part of its activities in other countries. Should the bank need to be reconstructed it would be the home country’s tax payers that would have to foot the bill – either by supplying the necessary capital to the bank or by supporting the deposit guarantee system with the funds needed to pay out insurance to the bank’s depositors. The imbalance between home and host countries may be further deepened by differences in size between the two countries. One case will be that of a big home country and a smaller host country. The banking group’s exposure to the host country is then probably relatively small on a consolidated basis. This results in the home country authorities spending relatively limited resources – in terms of staff – on the foreign subsidiary’s activities in the host country. If such a banking group runs into problems, the home country authorities will not necessarily view it as systemic, while the host country authorities certainly will do. How to deal with the home-host asymmetry?

Finally, I will comment more specifically on some of these challenges, and in connection to that also discuss some of the proposed alternative ways of responding to these challenges. The Swedish case Before the banking crisis in the early 1990s, the cooperation between the Riksbank and the Swedish FSA (then the Banking Inspection) was limited to high-level contacts. In their day-to-day activities, however, the two authorities worked in different silos – the Riksbank with monetary and exchange rate policy and the FSA with regulating and supervising financial institutions. The crisis made it very clear to the Swedish authorities that there is a strong link between soundness of financial institutions and macro financial stability, and hence a need for close cooperation between the FSA and the central bank. This economic link is mirrored by a parallel link spanning at least three aspects of regulatory involvement in the financial sector – crisis prevention, crisis management and crisis resolution. In Sweden, these aspects of regulatory involvement are shared between the supervisor, the central bank and the Ministry of Finance. In crisis prevention, the supervisor has the tools for regulating and supervising the institutions, while the central bank might play a supporting role through monitoring the stability of the system and the links to the real economy. In crisis management, the supervisor lacks the financial resources to back any intervention, while the central bank has the power to act as a lender of last resort.