samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Of course, digitalisation would not work without good internet connections. We, therefore, engaged Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) on possibility of boosting internet connections in the areas where we held the Greenback activities. With digitalisation, migrants can now send money home anywhere, anytime. This eliminates the need to travel great distance to the nearest town, which 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  can be costly and risky at times. The Project team experienced first-hand the numerous logistical challenges just to get into the plantations. A single journey can take about a 3-hour drive from town. Today, I am happy to note that Project Greenback in Sabah has produced encouraging results. We have sensitised close to 5,000 individuals. More than 1,600 of them have registered to use e-remittance channels. A total of RM6.9 million equivalent worth of remittances were sent from Sabah using echannels. The most encouraging result is that average remittance cost in Sabah has reduced significantly, to below 3%. 8 months ago, it was much higher. Although there is much to be done to increase the numbers, the outcomes are testament that our hard work and perseverance have paid off. We have reached an important milestone and this tells us that technology can be the gateway to financial inclusion. Technology has the potential to be a game changer.

Often, the money they send home is a critical lifeline for their families. Malaysia is also a major remittance sending country to other ASEAN nations. Last year, migrant workers in Malaysia sent 2 billion USD to Indonesia and the Philippines alone. For the recipient countries, these funds lifted many households out of poverty. In a way, they also supported the countries’ socio-economic developments. A new game plan: Digitalisation as gateway to greater financial inclusion This is where our work in Project Greenback 2.0 comes in. We started Project Greenback here in Sabah 8 months ago, with a new game plan – digitalisation. We considered the following factors – around 70% of the migrants here work in the agriculture and plantation sectors; they are scattered across the remote areas; but one good thing is that majority of them own smartphones. With this, we knew that it was an opportune time to go all out on digitalisation of remittance services. The implementation, however, will be an uphill task because of the geographical barriers we face in East Malaysia. To ensure we reach out to as many migrants as possible, we collaborated with the plantation companies and organised remittance talks and fairs in the plantations themselves. The participating banks facilitated the migrants to open bank accounts; and remittance service providers taught the migrants how to register and to use their e-remittance services. We also encouraged the plantation companies to pay the migrants’ salaries into their bank accounts to eliminate the use of cash for remittance transactions.
In  2  The effects are dependent on, for example, how the long-term interest rate is assumed to move when the repo rate is adjusted. In example 1 the estimates are based on the short- and long-term interest rates moving to the same extent, which has largely been the case in recent years. BIS Review 61/1999  6  such a situation it is therefore reasonable to base policy on an inflation forecast that excludes the direct effects on interest expenditure. 8. Permanent and transitory inflation A schematic account Initial position  4  Economic development stable, underlying inflation UND1X - in line with the target. 3 UND1X  Government and Parliament lower indirect taxes CPI-inflation is lowered for a period of twelve months but underlying inflation, measured with UND1X, remains stable. 2 CPI  1  0 0  1  2  3  Year  Example 2: altered indirect taxes In this example economic activity is stable and inflation in line with the target. Suddenly a cut in indirect taxes, for instance the tobacco tax or the property tax on private houses, is announced and approved. The cut is assumed to have a downward effect on CPI inflation of 0.7 percentage points in the current year. This, however, constitutes a one-off shift in the price level, not an effect that alters inflation’s trend. All else equal, 12 months later the rate of inflation will shift back up to the earlier level.

In the event of a deviation from the inflation target, the Riksbank has to decide how soon monetary policy should bring inflation back to the targeted rate. If this is done too quickly, it will exact a cost in the form of instability in the real economy and in financial markets. If it takes too long, on the other hand, inflation will fluctuate markedly, with the risk of a rising trend or even genuine deflation. Against this background, early this year the Executive Board elaborated on the inflation target and stated that, under certain specific circumstances, the Riksbank has reason to be more flexible in its interpretation.3 When I presented this to the Standing Committee in more detail 3  See Riksbank memorandum: ‘The Riksbank’s inflation target – clarification and appraisal’, 4 February 1999. 9  BIS Review 61/1999  last March, I noted that it amounted essentially to a codification of monetary policy practice in recent years. That is also what I have described today. There is another matter I want to take up concerning monetary policy and its result. It has to do with the outturn for 1998, when the annual change in the CPI was 0.4 per cent, while UND1X rose only 1 per cent and in some months was also outside the lower band limit. Could not an alternative interest rate policy have succeeded in preventing such a low outcome for underlying inflation?
As an early contributor to this industry, I am at least partly to blame. The estimates  of gross job loss span a pretty wide range, but lie anywhere between 10% and 50% of the global workforce, depending on whether it is jobs or tasks that are assumed to be displaced (Table 1 summarises). Even at the lower end of this range, the societal impact would be significant. At the upper end, they would be truly transformative. If the truth lies in between, this could still make the jobs loss from the Fourth Industrial Revolution greater than its predecessors. And if so, then the potential societal costs – such as rising wage inequality and threats to social cohesion – could also be as great as ever previously. 50  Some of the potentially powerful effects of automation on jobs and wages are already apparent. In the US, each industrial robot per thousand workers has been found to reduce the employment rate by 0.2-0.3 percentage points and wages by 0.25-0.5%. 51  52  In Europe, results are more mixed. Research  suggests that technology may have been the largest single contributor to falling labour shares over the recent past. 53  Whether these effects on jobs and pay will be temporary or permanent is far harder to judge. At this stage of the technological cycle, the evidence is more likely to be picking up the shorter-term displacement effects of 48  Haldane (2015b) Haldane (2015b). 50 Schwab (2017). 51 Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017).

11  th  In the second half of the 18 century in the UK, ideas began sprouting like morning mushrooms. These ideas emerged seemingly spontaneously and roughly contemporaneously. They were also relatively closely clustered geographically. They included James Hargreaves’ spinning jenny in 1764, Richard Arkwright’s water frame in 1769 and James Watt’s steam engine in 1775. In the fullness of time, these ideas began to revolutionise both industry and work. After a lengthy adoption lag, they spread across sectors and across regions. They migrated from being mere ideas to becoming “GPTs” or General Purpose Technologies. 12  In the process, they generated waves of investment in new  factories, machines, processes and infrastructures. There was, in the jargon, capital-deepening. Neo-Classical theories of economic growth are very clear what would be expected to happen next. 13  When  an outward shift in the economy’s technological frontier is combined with higher levels of physical capital, the fuse is lit on higher productivity among companies, higher wages among workers and, ultimately, higher living standards among societies. So it was during the Golden Era. Chart 2 plots productivity, wages and GDP per head in the UK since the Industrial Revolution. All three plateaued prior to 1750. Since then, all three have moved up in lockstep. Ideas and innovation have borne continuous fruit in higher productivity, pay and living standards. This fruit has been shared roughly equally between owners of companies (profits) and workers in companies (wages).
Quite simply, this is a matter of designing a set of rules and regulations that will counteract future economic crises at the same time as the socio-economic costs for these rules and regulations are limited. What will the new regulations cost? It is easy to get the impression that all of the new requirements I have reviewed will lead to drastically increased requirements regarding the banks’ capital. One common and highlyjustified question is therefore how the new regulations will affect the banks and their customers. In recent months, we have read in the headlines about how expensive the new rules will be, above all for private individuals with mortgages. According to the banks’ calculations, mortgage rates will go up by up to one percentage point. And yes, it is quite likely that the new regulations will force the banks to adjust their business models, which may lead to certain price increases. While it is too early to say exactly what these costs will amount to, the Riksbank judges that they will not be excessively high. Basel III is a gradual process that will begin to apply in 2013, but which will not have its full impact until 1 January 2019. Furthermore, the market is already placing high requirements on the banks’ capital, and we can note that the Swedish banks are coping well – they are well-capitalised in terms of both level and quality. So there should be no question of any extra costs for acquiring capital.

According to this methodology, spillovers from the euro area accounted for around half the variance in US Treasuries for most of 2015. And these spillovers have been regaining momentum since mid-2017. Strong correlation between international asset prices therefore doesn’t necessarily result from a common shock. Indeed, in the light of the strong idiosyncratic forces that have increasingly driven a wedge between the monetary policy cycles of advanced economies in recent years, portfolio rebalancing by private investors due to domestic shocks is likely to have increased over time. A dominant chase for yield by private investors, in turn, also distinguishes the current situation from that in 2005 and 2006, which was the last time global yield curves were unusually flat. Back then, purchases by foreign official institutions – themselves often reflecting large current account 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  surpluses in certain parts of the world – coincided to drive down long-term yields in the United States, whereas official investors have been net sellers of US long-term Treasuries over the past couple of years. You can see this clearly on my next slide. To the extent that private capital flows are more volatile, the ECB’s November 2017 Financial Stability Review noted the risk of a sudden repricing in fixed income markets should investors decide to rebalance their portfolios. Low inflation risk and bond term premia This brings me to my second factor.
For sure, if there is a lesson to be had from the crisis, it is that there is always a risk of another crisis; we cannot easily repeat the famous “this time is different” approach. But we are now better prepared. As a general approach, the main challenge is to fully implement the reforms and to closely monitor their impact on the financial sector, and if necessary, fine-tune them.  The interrelation between monetary and macroprudential policies. Under general circumstances, monetary policy and macroprudential policy complement each other. But, as shown by the run-up to the global financial crisis, there might be periods in which achieving monetary policy goals does not necessarily guarantee achieving macroprudential goals and vice versa; low interest rates had an influence on financial imbalances and excessive risk-taking while inflation was contained and the real economy did not show overheating pressures. This is a tradeoff which central banks will have to deal with. It would help to design an institutional set-up that ensures synergies and consistency among monetary, micro and macroprudential policies, but also separates ex-ante analysis, probably through Chinese wall-type structures. 5/6  3. The fintech challenge   “Fintech” is gradually entering into the financial sector. Information technologies can have important implications in terms of increasing competition and redefining the relationship between consumers and suppliers of financial services, fostering efficiency gains, better financial inclusion and improvements in quality through tailored services.

The response has been centred on three main layers: -  Strengthening of the microprudential framework with higher capital requirements (Basel III) and new resolution frameworks in most jurisdictions; The introduction of a separate and tighter framework for systemically important financial institutions The development of a new macroprudential policy framework addressing systemic risk   Enhanced international coordination. The global nature of the crisis required a global response and new international institutions to coordinate the regulation of the financial sector. At the global level we saw the creation of the Financial Stability Board and the intensification of the work at the Basel Committee (BCBS). In the case of the European Union, we have taken an important step towards financial integration, most notably with the activation of the Banking Union, currently comprising two elements: the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. There is a third necessary pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, which is still under political negotiations. III. Four broad challenges for central banks ahead:  1. Are we under a “new normal” macroeconomic environment for the macroeconomy and what does it mean for monetary policy? New normal? Debate about whether or not we are facing a new structural reality of secular stagnation that defines a “new normal” for the macroeconomy, characterised by low growth, low inflation and low real and nominal interest rates. Most estimates suggest that the natural interest rate (i.e.
The ECB has also made its liquidity provision facilities more accessible to the banking sector, in terms both of cost and volume, and it has relaxed the requirements made of assets pledged as collateral, in order to smooth financing to households, firms and the self-employed. All these measures have been effective in alleviating the financial tensions generated by the crisis. These tensions took the form of a strong rise in sovereign and corporate debt yields, which were then largely reversed. The ECB’s action has also helped keep bank lending flows 5  to companies notably robust in recent months and contributed to their cost holding at low levels. Also crucial for these dynamics have been the government-implemented public guarantee programmes for bank lending. The ECB measures have further provided considerable room for manoeuvre for national authorities. In this second phase of the crisis, in which the recovery in economic activity is, as I said, incomplete, fragile and uneven across sectors in countries, actual inflation and inflation expectations are holding at very low levels. And it is to be expected in the medium term that the weakness of demand will continue exerting downward pressure on prices. Against this background, on the ECB Governing Council we have made it clear that a high degree of monetary accommodation is needed to support the recovery and safeguard our price stability objective. Specifically, we have reiterated our commitment to do what it takes to support the euro area economy in these extremely difficult circumstances.

François Villeroy de Galhau: What can monetary policy do? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the House of Finance Days of Paris-Dauphine University, Paris, 14 March 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this first edition of the House of Finance Days of Paris-Dauphine University. In order to “[imagine] the finance of tomorrow” – to quote the theme of this event – it is essential to understand all facets, and in particular to be able to decipher the prevailing environment. Through its three main tasks, the Banque de France plays a key role as, firstly, it implements monetary strategy, as a member of the Eurosystem alongside the European Central Bank in Frankfurt; secondly, it ensures financial stability, by supervising the banks, insurance firms and, more generally, the financial system; and, lastly, it provides an economic service to households and SMEs/VSEs. Today I will focus on the monetary policy that we conduct in the framework of the Eurosystem. Monetary policy has long been considered a technical or even an austere subject. But, since 2008, it has been far more widely discussed: central banks in different countries have played a major role, and a role largely hailed as positive, in exiting the crisis. Today, however, their actions to address the persistence of very low inflation are subject to debate. I would first like to talk about our objective, then our instruments and their effectiveness.
From the mid-1800s an increasing number of countries chose to link the value of money to gold. The central banks were under the obligation to convert their currency at a fixed rate into gold on demand. At the same time, there were no import or export restrictions on gold. This gradually resulted in the establishment of an international fixed exchange rate system based on a gold standard. Chart 1  1  BIS Review 14/2000  Norway switched from the silver standard to the gold standard in 1874. The krone was introduced as a currency unit and we formed a monetary union with Sweden and Denmark. The gold standard and the monetary union were successful. The world economy and the Norwegian economy were expanding. Price levels were stable. In the 1900s periods of nominal stability, i.e. price and exchange rate stability, have also coincided with periods of steady and solid economic growth. Chart 2  The experience of the last century shows that consumer price inflation is ultimately associated with high growth in the money supply. However, the causal relationship between money supply and inflation may be unclear. Norway has experienced four episodes of high inflation in the last century: during and after the two world wars and the Korean War, and a 15-year period from the first half of the 1970s to the second half of the 1980s. During the First World War inflation accelerated sharply. The British war effort was partly financed by printing money. Price inflation accelerated in most countries, also in Norway.

Funding in securities markets is too expensive for the smallest enterprises. The securities market plays less of a role in Norway compared with other European countries and the US. The market for equity capital is particularly small in Norway. Norwegian companies often rely on foreign funding for new projects. The thin market for securities capital in Norway may be an obstacle to the development of the business sector. This means that it is essential that the banking system function smoothly. When they function, the strength of financial markets lies in their transparency and adaptability. Capital which is tied up in unprofitable activity can be freed up for other activities. Competition for capital contributes to creative destruction. 13  BIS Review 14/2000  Chart 15  Structural changes also take place within individual companies. One example is NOKIA. Thirty years ago, the forerunners of the world’s leading producer of cellular telephones were primarily producing telephone cables, rubber boots and tyres. At that time, the electronics division accounted for 3% of NOKIA’s turnover and employed 460 persons. However, research and product development led to a wider range of products. In 1988 NOKIA was the third largest producer of television sets in Europe and the largest producer of cellular telephone equipment in the Nordic area. NOKIA experienced a deep crisis in the beginning of the 1990s, as did many Finnish companies. NOKIA decided to concentrate on telecommunications. The split-up of the group was initiated from within the company. Non-core activities were spun off and sold.
But, as we have seen, when this filter does not work properly, and when lending standards are excessively loose, ultimately too many projects that prove non-viable are financed, destroying value for the economy. Lessons from the crisis One thing the crisis has reminded us of, sadly, is that financing a firm or individual which, a priori, has little chance of meeting its payment obligations is very poor business, for three reasons. First, economically, this is a bad agreement both for the customer concerned and for the bank. Second, it is too for the country’s legal system, which sees a significant increase in its workload, thereby delaying and hampering its workability. And third, from a social standpoint, what is involved is very poor business with harmful consequences for society in the form of dismissals and evictions. It is always better not to have granted a loan than to have to deal with a non-performing loan, although some error in granting loans is inevitable. Moreover, looking at our real estate bubble, it is likewise obvious that any loan should be granted thinking of the likelihood of both the principal and the associated interest being repaid, instead of basing oneself on the value of the collateral. Of course, the responsibility for analysing the ability to pay falls on the bank, not on the customer. Undoubtedly, applying strict standards means having to say “no” on many occasions to applications for funds.

The education and training system must be more forward-looking and cater to shifts we anticipate over the next 20 – 50 years. The key is to prepare the next generation with 21st century skills to meet these demands. Malaysia must secure innovation-driven growth in all parts of our economy. But we must set our minds to areas where the payoffs are the greatest. Three areas of opportunity come to mind: First, we must make best use of the resources which we are endowed with, such as to process commodities into chemicals and other derivatives to increase economic complexity. Agriculture productivity can also increase by adopting modern farming. Second, addressing climate change offers opportunities to attract investments and create high-quality jobs. The global economy needs USD23 trillion in green assets to meet the climate goals under the Paris Accord.4 Third, Malaysia is among the best positioned within Southeast Asia to embrace the fourth industrial revolution.5 Malaysia already has one foot through the door in each of these opportunities; we are major producers of petro- and oleo-chemicals, solar panels, as well as E&E components that will power future mobility. We must engage in serious conversations on moonshot strategies to build innovative industries and companies. Only then can we set the foundation for a sustainable, dynamic and competitive Malaysian economy. A society that is more inclusive Economic growth does not necessarily go hand in hand with social progress, particularly if growth only enriches the few. Thus, my second point is on improving social inclusivity.