samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The result of this was that the credit rating agency Moody’s lowered the credit ratings of several Danish banks  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  and loan loss insurance became more expensive. Moody’s justified this change by claiming that the implicit state guarantee had decreased. Major Swedish banks have a large share of market funding in foreign currency In addition, the major Swedish banks receive a large share of their funding – about half – from the financial markets. In addition, almost half of this market funding is in foreign currency. The integration of financial markets is basically a good thing. Much of foreign currency borrowing is necessary to meet lending needs. And market funding can be good for spreading financing risks. But at the same time, the risk of imported shocks increases. Borrowing in foreign currency for lending in Swedish kronor also increases dependence on the efficiency of the swap market. The liquidity risks taken by the major Swedish banks are also still larger than the European average. Unexpected negative events or disruptions on the international financial markets can thus cause considerable problems for the major banks and ultimately for the Swedish economy. Swedish banks have low risk weightings The low risk weightings in Sweden are particularly important for the Basel regulations on capital adequacy. At present, of course, the banks can calculate risk weights using internal risk-classification models based on historical data on loan losses. From an international perspective, these internal models generate very low risk weights for Swedish mortgages.

A capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent, added to a contra cyclical buffer, will create a stronger shock absorber than previously was the case. This contracyclical buffer is built up when times are good to then provide a safety margin during downturns. The capital adequacy requirement is also complemented with a pure leverage ratio measure, meaning that equity may not fall below 3 per cent of total assets. Under earlier frameworks, other capital, of lower quality, could have accounted for a large part of capital adequacy. This applies to both Additional Tier 1, i.e. other instruments that cover losses while the bank is active (going concern), and Tier 2, which is to say financing instruments that can cover losses if the bank should fail (gone concern) – for example, unsecured debts with long maturities that cannot be redeemed. The crisis has shown that, above all, it is Common Equity Tier 1 that can be counted on when the tide turns for the worse. All in all, the banks’ capital position will be strengthened considerably compared with previous regulations, contributing to the boosting of confidence in the individual banks and in the system as a whole. …clear measures for liquidity… In the autumn of 2008, we saw how a lack of confidence in the financial markets rapidly led to liquidity problems. So one priority for increasing financial stability has been to ensure the banks are able to manage liquidity problems in the short and long terms.
See Haddow et al. (2013) and also Bloom (2009) 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6  Specific effects of uncertainty about the impact of EU exit  Let me make a few additional points that may be particularly relevant in the current context: First, this uncertainty effect applies to all sunk-cost decisions about the future – in particular, it would make firms more hesitant about scrapping capacity, not just adding to it. That’s not to say that such decisions are never taken. If a firm gets genuine news that makes a particular activity unprofitable, it may well come to the point where it has to withdraw, writing off the capacity involved. But uncertainty per se raises the bar for all such decisions, disinvestment and new investment alike. So a lack of clarity about the UK’s future trading relationships needn’t result in visible, headline-grabbing closures of productive capacity. The effect is likely to be more insidious: decisions to expand, that might otherwise have been taken, are delayed. Chart 8: Correlation with uncertainty is higher for  Second, one would also expect the impact to be  slower-lived investments  more acute for long-lived (low-depreciation) investments – buildings more than IT equipment, for example. Intuitively, this is because their consequences last longer – the slower the rate of depreciation on a particular investment, the less like consumption it becomes. In the data, the correlation with uncertainty does seem to be higher for longer-lived investments (Chart 8).

This is, to say the least, a stretch. It’s not simply that it’s early days, though that’s certainty the case. (We haven’t even begun to talk about the terms of EU withdrawal as yet, let alone those of any new arrangements.) It’s also that many economic indicators are in general very noisy, even at the best of times. Retail sales, for example, are estimated to have fallen by 0.2% between July and August. Is this meaningful? Not really. The index is extremely volatile – the average monthly change in retail sales volumes is over a percentage point – and poorly correlated with quarterly GDP, even with consumption growth specifically. Looking at a broad range of indicators, there’s certainly nothing I can see to disturb the MPC’s view in August that consumer spending will be relatively unperturbed by the referendum result, and that it will continue to grow in line with household income. (Real household income growth is itself likely to decline slightly, as the benefit of falling commodity prices fades, but that’s a separate effect, one that would’ve occurred whatever the result of the referendum.) Business investment we expect to be more affected, for the reasons I’ve gone through today. But this too is a volatile series, one that’s also subject to significant revision: almost half the mature and early estimates of quarterly business investment growth actually have different signs. So if an early estimate points to a very large move, or if you see a trend over several quarters, it’s worth paying attention to.
We are now finalising our linkages with India's Unified Payments Interface and Malaysia's DuitNow. But such bilateral linkages take much time and resources to implement. Each new linkage requires a refresh in technical alignment between the two payment systems. It also entails accommodating domestic policies, such as on data privacy and security, sanctions screening and capital controls. Furthermore, the number of required links grows exponentially as the number of countries participating in the payments network increases. It would require some 190 links for 20 countries to be inter-linked on a bilateral basis. MAS has been working with the Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub on Project Nexus – a multilateral solution to link countries' real-time payment systems. With this solution, each country would only need to link its real-time payment system once to a Nexus gateway, which in turn provides direct connectivity to all the other countries already within the network. 2/11  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Furthermore, Nexus is a unified solution that coordinates payment, foreign exchange conversion, message translation as well as compliance, which would streamline the entire cross-border payment process. Project Nexus aims to address the challenges of speed, cost, access, and transparency. Users can look forward to: Faster speed. A payment transaction is cleared in 60 seconds, on a 24/7 basis. Lower cost. The aim is to meet the G20's target for cross-border retail payments of less than 3% of transfer value. Wider access. The model will enable connectivity for banks as well as non-bank financial institutions. Greater transparency.

That is well above the trend rate for the past 20 years, of just over 2%. Employment has increased by 1.2 million over this period, while unemployment has fallen almost month by month, on the familiar claimant count measure, from a peak of over 10% in 1993, to some 4.7% now. That is the lowest rate for 18 years. Meanwhile retail price inflation (on the Government’s target measure) has averaged around 2¾% - that’s the lowest for a generation. There’s not much evidence here that low inflation inevitably means low growth and employment. But, of course, we started this period with demand below capacity - with a fair amount of slack in the economy which we were gradually taking up. By last year it had become clear, in the evidence of rising capacity utilisation and of growing tightness in the labour market, that unless we acted to moderate the growth of demand we were at risk of overheating. That’s why we tightened policy over last summer - to slow things down before inflation took off - and to head off a subsequent recession. And although, as I say, you can never be sure - economic forecasting is a very uncertain business - a necessary slowdown rather than a more serious recession is what we think we’re seeing, and, as I understand it, that is what your own General Council thinks too. Our problem in slowing the economy down has been enormously complicated by the increasing imbalance between the domestic and the internationally-exposed sectors of the economy.
Others used price-based measures, such as swing pricing and redemption fees, to ensure trading costs were borne by redeeming investors. [19] However, if applied systematically in a stress scenario, such measures could even further limit the ability of firms and other financial institutions to raise liquidity. For instance, if MMFs had broadly suspended redemptions, some insurance corporations and pension funds may have found themselves unable to meet margin calls on their derivative exposures. Widespread suspensions may also have had adverse effects on the confidence in the wider financial sector, possibly amplifying risk-off behaviour. The role of monetary policy in stabilising financial markets Forceful monetary policy action, on both sides of the Atlantic, ultimately filled the void that was left by asset managers and regulators having limited liquidity management tools to curb systemic stress. The fast rise of the non-bank sector, however, meant that traditional monetary policy tools, such as increasing the money supply to banks and accepting broader collateral, were not sufficient. A frozen money market impaired the intermediation of liquidity from banks to non-banks. [20] In such disrupted conditions, central banks face two broad options. They either provide liquidity directly to non-banks – that is, they expand their role as lender of last resort – or they purchase large quantities of illiquid assets. A priori, there are no fundamental reasons to dismiss either of the two options.

These vulnerabilities have the potential to amplify procyclicality in the financial system, drain liquidity at a time when it is most needed and, ultimately, set in motion real-financial feedback loops that threaten the stability of our economies. The decisive policy actions taken by central banks in the spring helped stabilise financial markets by alleviating liquidity stress across a broad range of market segments and by strengthening the risk absorption capacity of market participants. Looking forward, however, our regulatory landscape needs to better reflect the fact that credit intermediation increasingly takes place outside the banking sector. The current policy framework needs to be developed further with a view to strengthening the ability of authorities to limit the build-up of systemic risk in the non-bank financial sector and curb stress if and when it arises. Thank you. [1] Recent research also suggests that the marginal contribution of market-based finance to economic growth may rise as countries become richer. See Langfield, S. and Pagano, M. (2016), “Bank bias in Europe: effects on systemic risk and growth”, Economic Policy, Vol. 31, No 85, pp. 51-106; and Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Feyen, E. and Levine, R. (2013), “  The Evolving Importance of Banks and Securities Markets”, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 27, No 3, pp. 476-490. [2] de Guindos, L., Panetta, F. and Schnabel, I. (2020), “Europe needs a fully fledged capital markets union – now more than ever”, The ECB Blog, 2 September. [3] Greenspan, A.
Tony Latter: Bond markets - where are we heading? Speech by Mr Tony Latter, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to the conference “The Credit Revolution: Charting Change in the Asian Debt Markets”, at the Conrad International, Hong Kong, on 12 July 2000. *  *  *  A notable feature of the world’s leading national bond markets over the past couple of years has been the adjustment required of both issuers and investors to the often remarkable shifts into surplus, or much reduced deficit, that have occurred in the financial positions of governments in most major economies - with the notable exception of Japan - as a result of the successful application of fiscal discipline, assisted in some cases by favourable economic growth or a beneficial cyclical position. This has led to significant net retirement of government debt, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, in January the US Treasury projected buy-backs of $ billion this year, and some observers now expect that figure to be exceeded. The design of debt retirement strategies has itself posed some unfamiliar, though perhaps not entirely unpleasant, challenges for the authorities, as they search for the most cost-effective means in terms of prospective interest savings, grapple with the novelty of reverse auctions, or consider how best to sustain and possibly reinforce liquidity of the key remaining benchmark issues. There are a number of significant consequences of this transformation of government finances for markets more generally.

Unfortunately, I do not have the time to elaborate on the first question. Instead I will say a few words about the second. Although the discussion about monetary policy and a productivity shock is taking place mostly in the United States, in the light of the impressive economic performance there and the acceleration in the rate of productivity growth, one could certainly ask: What about Europe? Europe is, on the one hand, now in a strong upward economic phase. In addition, new technology, especially the Internet and telecommunications, is gaining ground in many European countries. On the other hand, Europe also differs from the US. The rapid growth of US investment has not yet been seen in Europe. One could also argue that the existence of quite a few structural obstacles in Europe makes an acceleration of productivity growth less likely in the immediate future. A handful of countries - including the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and, more recently, Sweden and Finland - have achieved strong economic growth and in some cases also low inflation. But with the BIS Review 50/2000  2  exception of Ireland, these countries have not yet enjoyed the same strong productivity growth as the US. Nevertheless, the possibility of a productivity breakthrough also in Europe cannot be ruled out. It will probably depend on how well Europe succeeds in reforming microeconomic policy. Higher - or accelerating - productivity growth does indeed pose new challenges for monetary policy.
In some situations, it may be appropriate to take into account particularly unfavourable developments. In a period of increased cross-border labour flows, substantial technological advances, changes in competitive conditions and new trading patterns, Norway may, with our very open economy, have to accept somewhat greater variation in inflation and deviations from the target, as we have witnessed over the past two to three years. Challenges in an oil economy Petroleum revenues pose as mentioned special challenges to stabilisation policy. The experience of other countries that had received large, unexpected income from natural resources was not encouraging. The classic example is Spain’s substantial revenues from the colonisation of America in the 1600s. The historian David Landes 1 summarised the Spanish experience as follows: Landes stated that easy money is bad for a country. It is very tempting to live comfortably on this income and be less concerned about safeguarding other revenue sources. In that case, the country is poorly poised to cope with an end to easy money. 1  David Landes (1998): The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., N.Y.  BIS Review 22/2006  3  The oil age in Norway has spanned 30 years and it appears that it will continue for many years ahead. Petroleum activities give Norway an economic base that is not available to many other countries. But it also presents us with many challenges. First, petroleum wealth is part of Norway’s national wealth.

On the regulatory side, thc adoption of a risk-focused supervisory framework entails a shift away from a rigid, rules based approach to regulation and towards more “incentive compatible” prudential standards. By “incentive compatible”, I am referring to broad, principles based standards that encourage banks to develop and continuously update their internal risk management systems to ensure that it is commcnsurate with the scope and complexity of its operations. While the benefits are obvious, there are also some consequences for the supervisory side of our business that may not be readily transparent. First, an emphasis an broad prudential standards - while useful rot fostering sound risk management practices - will inevitably create significant challenges for front-line supervisors. This is because they will need to rely much more on sound professional judgment and critical analysis, and less on rules-based compliance criteria, in order to make proper risk assessments. This in turn, will require supervisory staff members to have a fundamental grasp of risk-based supervisory concepts and how it is applied in the field. The challenge for every emerging market supervisory authority is to equip our front line supervisors with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities, in order to help make their transition to a risk-based framework as smooth as possible. At the Bank of Thailand, we have placed greater reliance an this risk-based philosophy during the past several years.
Rather, the intention is that each host authority should be able to carry out these responsibilities more effectively by relying to some extent on the work of others. It cannot possibly make sense for, say, 30 different supervisors to crawl over the controls centralised and concentrated in one location? We are keen to examine the practicability of allowing one co-ordinator to carry out the role defined above. Enthusiasm from the US has been more muted, although commercial BIS Review 21/1997  - 15 -  banks are, of course, already subjected to consolidated supervision. Here I know there are political issues at stake too, and any foreigner is well advised to tread carefully. I would hope, nevertheless, that these important issues can be considered carefully. More problematic is the position of the US investment banking groups who, uniquely amongst the banking and securities industries in major countries, are not subject to legislation requiring consolidated supervision. Some have banking subsidiaries in the UK, owned by companies established under Article XII of the New York State Banking Act. Accordingly these companies and their UK subsidiaries are subject to consolidated supervision by the New York State Banking Department. The involvement of a home country supervisor in this way gives us a degree of comfort which allows the ring-fencing to be less stringent than it would otherwise be. However this clearly falls a long way short of comprehensive consolidated supervision of the entire investment banking group.

Mr. Davies reviews current debates on regulatory structures governing the financial system Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. Howard Davies, held on 22/2/97 at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Financial Markets Conference entitled ‘Market and Regulatory Structures in a Global Environment’. It is conventional, and polite to say, at the beginning of a speech of this kind, that one is thrilled to have been asked to speak on the subject of the structure of financial regulation and that the topic is, of all the many preoccupations of human kind through the centuries, the one which generates the most enthusiasm and excitement in one’s breast. But I cannot bring myself to do it. You may think me ill-brought up to say this if so blame my parents - but I find the question of the structure of regulation to be quite resistible. I know that there are those who like nothing better than to draw new organigrams and to explore the manifold interfaces between regulatory agencies. (There are also people who find self-fulfilment collecting airline sick bags, or watching synchronised swimming. That is a matter for them.) But my lack of enthusiasm for the topic of regulatory structure is, I hope, not an emotional response. It is rationally based on two prior beliefs. First, that the relationship between structure and effectiveness is loose. I know of little evidence that structural reforms are quickly followed by an enhancement of the effectiveness of the activity in which those agencies are engaged.
Keeping interest rates at restrictive levels will over time reduce inflation by dampening demand and will also guard against the risk of a persistent upward shift in inflation expectations. Moreover, from the beginning of March 2023, the APP portfolio will decline at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem will not reinvest all of the principal payments from maturing securities. Our future policy rate decisions will continue to be data-dependent and determined meeting by meeting. We stand ready to adjust all of our instruments within our mandate to ensure that inflation returns to our medium-term target. We are now ready to take your questions. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

Industri kewangan Islam di Malaysia telah muncul sebagai satu komponen sistem kewangan yang berdaya maju dan berdaya saing, seiring dengan sistem kewangan konvensional dalam menyumbang kepada pembangunan dan pertumbuhan ekonomi negara. Kini kita telah memiliki lanskap kewangan Islam yang komprehensif, dan kejayaan kita dalam mengintegrasikannya telah menyumbang kepada proses pengantaraan kewangan domestik yang lebih progresif. Sehingga kini, perbankan Islam telah berjaya menjana aset sekitar RM90 bilion atau 10 peratus daripada juzuk pasaran. Industri takaful pula telah mencatat aset sejumlah hampir RM5.0 bilion. To further strengthen the Islamic financial system and sustain its growth, it is vital to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Islamic financial institutions in meeting the changing requirements of our economy. The Islamic financial infrastructure needs to be continually enhanced to meet the new, more complex and differentiated demands of the various economic activities of the respective sectors of our economy. Of importance is the need to provide a mechanism to ensure accessibility to information by the public on Islamic financial services and products. An extensive and structured education programme is thus key to enhance consumer and business awareness and knowledge on the products and services. It also represents part of the efforts to promote market integrity over the activities in the market. Of equal importance is also the need to strengthen the consumer protection infrastructure in Islamic finance. Effective dissemination of information will provide consumers and businesses with the necessary information to undertake the financial transactions with awareness of their rights and accountabilities.