samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This can also weigh on productivity as older workers may have a harder time adapting to new technologies. Another important demographic factor is increasing longevity which would also, for a given retirement age, increase savings. Lastly, inequalities – both on a global level and within countries – can also affect demand [slide 6]. Growing income inequality within countries – even if it remains significantly lower in 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  continental Europe – implies reduced relative spending power for low-income households, which have a high propensity to consume. More inclusive societies with fewer unemployed and more even income distribution would most likely result in more dynamic demand. 3. Are we witnessing a permanent slowdown in the pace of technological progress? The debate between techno-pessimists and techno-optimists over the future pace of innovation is well-known. It resulted from the slowdown in productivity and in the contribution of ICT to growth in the mid-2000s, even before the Great Recession. For the United States, there was a downward break in the productivity trend as early as 2006. In fact, the diffusion of technology can suffer from two types of lag: a time-lag, but also a spacelag. Time-lags refer to the delay in incorporating innovations efficiently into the production process, as the required structural adaptation of the economy and learning processes can take decades. What stage of diffusion are we at for ICTs? Have structures in individual firms evolved sufficiently to allow them to reap the full benefits of ICTs?

Dozens of banks were affected in this manner. Even more alarming is how long it takes to detect successful cyber penetrations. According to a study8, the median time it takes to discover a cyber attack is 146 days. This means that of all the cyber attacks in the world happening this week (in April), more than half of them will not be detected until after Labour Day in September. It is not inconceivable that a future financial crisis could be precipitated by a cyber attack. The regulatory and supervisory framework for cyber risk management is still evolving. Two areas are likely to figure prominently. First, we need some common risk management standards in cyber defence. Given how inter-connected systems across the global financial industry are, common standards for the swift recovery of critical functions disrupted by a cyber attack will help reduce systemic vulnerabilities. Given how often cyber incidents stem from compromised user IDs and passwords, a global minimum standard for robust authentication for online financial services is worth considering. Second, we need to encourage sharing of cyber intelligence within the financial industry. This will heighten the industry’s collective situational awareness, so that it can respond more quickly and more effectively to impending cyber threats. Regulators can help to establish common infrastructure, processes and protocols to facilitate this. 7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  A good example is the US Financial Services – Information Sharing & Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC).
It draws on two stylised approaches to resolution: a so-called “single point of entry” approach, under which resolution of a whole group is executed, primarily by the home authority and mainly at the level of the parent or holding company; and, secondly, a “multiple point of entry” approach whereby co-ordinated actions are taken by a number authorities along national, regional or functional lines. There is, of course, a spectrum between those two poles. Identifying the resolution strategy that is most likely best suited to each specific firm is very important. The strategy must be relatively easy to understand – a strategy that cannot be explained concisely to top officials in central banks and regulators is not a strategy at all. But although authorities should try to identify a preferred strategy and should be as transparent as possible, I should caution that what turns out to be the best approach in the event of distress will depend on the circumstances. The suggestion of a “Presumptive Path”, being aired by some in the market, is somewhat unrealistic, at least in its strongest form. Public authorities with statutory obligations to maintain stability cannot bind themselves to detailed strategies that in the event might not work as well as an alternative. At the planning stage, whether a single- or a multiple-point-of-entry strategy looks more feasible will depend upon a group’s organisational and financial structure. It is likely that some groups will need to adapt themselves in order to remove impediments to resolution. Much of that will be case by case.

With the encouragement of the Bank of England, the UK’s bank supervisors – today at the FSA, from next year at a new Prudential Regulation Authority within the Bank – are requiring deposit takers to advertise prominently the availability and terms of deposit insurance, in every branch, on every ATM, on every key webpage. Further, crucially, the UK’s Financial Services Compensation Scheme will ensure they can deliver rapid payout, ideally within 7 days. This requires banks to hold more information about their depositors than it seems they would choose on their own. It is perfectly reasonable for society to demand this. Once those conditions are met,2 the deposit insurance regime has the potential to revolutionalise retail banking. By assuring retail depositors of safety, new banks should find it easier, other things being equal, to establish a deposit base, lowering barriers to entry into banking. Later I shall come to who pays for this: it isn’t government and the taxpayer but the industry itself. Deposit insurance and resolution But we know from experience that liquidation and payout to insured depositors can be a seriously inferior way of handling the failure of some deposit-takers. That is because liquidation can entail a destruction of value, disruption to the provision of services, and other spillovers to the rest of financial system. Some of that can be avoided if, instead, we are able to transfer the insured deposit book and some good assets to another bank (or other  1  Paul Tucker is chairman of the FSB’s Resolution Steering Group.
For example, a “core” measure that relied exclusively on inflation in the services sector would have run above 2% in the pre-crisis era, when overall inflation was around 2%, in light of low inflation rates in goods prices. A “core” measure with a higher weight on goods prices would have shown the opposite. 22  For example, although they are uncertain, estimates of the pass-through of exchange rate movements to CPI inflation suggest that, on average a 1% appreciation reduces consumer prices by around 0.3%. Those effects take time, though they are mostly complete in around three years – consistent with complete but gradual passthrough of exchange rate changes to consumer prices. That likely reflects, among other things, rigidities in retailers’ pricing decisions. See the box on page 28 of the November 2015 Inflation Report for further discussion.

But if we can preserve stability and GDP growth next year while demonstrating that we can at least begin lifting the capital controls without compromising stability and confidence, our chances for a higher credit rating should improve markedly. Thank you. 1  4  For further information, see: the Governor’s comments at a panel discussion held at a BIS symposium entitled A world without risk-free assets? Bank for International Settlements, Basel, 8–9 January 2013. See: here. BIS central bankers’ speeches
Under the Basic Law, however, there appears only a corresponding general requirement. Article 76 states that once a bill has been passed by the Legislative Council, all that is required for it to take effect is signing and promulgation by the Chief Executive. In addition, Article 17 states that “laws enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for the record.” But this article also states that “the reporting for record shall not affect the entry into force of such laws.” 4. On the other hand, unlike the Royal Instructions, the Basic Law also prescribes in considerable detail the financial systems to be practised in the HKSAR. For example, Article 109 provides that the HKSAR government shall maintain the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Article 110 provides that the HKSAR government shall, on its own, formulate monetary and financial policies. Article 111 prescribes that the Hong Kong dollar, as the legal tender in the HKSAR, shall continue to circulate. Article 112 states that no foreign exchange control policies shall be applied in the HKSAR and that the Hong Kong dollar shall be freely convertible. Article 113 stipulates that the Exchange Fund of the HKSAR shall be managed and controlled by the government of the HKSAR.

Thomas Jordan: Monetary policy in a climate of increased uncertainty Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the SNB Money Market Event, Geneva, 1 November 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Uncertainty about the extent and distribution of losses from US “subprime” mortgages has resulted in a marked squeeze on financial markets. In particular, there is considerable uncertainty concerning the true valuation of securitised assets and structured products based on subprime mortgages. Demand for liquidity has surged. In certain instances, the crisis of confidence among financial market participants was so pronounced that some markets did not function at all. The “re-pricing of risk” has caused risk premia for most financial instruments to soar. Risk premia are important for the Swiss National Bank (SNB) for two reasons. On the one hand, they act as economic signals and should therefore be as unbiased as possible in the way they reflect underlying risks. In addition, there are certain risks attached to extreme values of risk premia. Abrupt and uncontrolled corrections could lead to instability on financial markets and interfere with their smooth functioning. On the other hand, risk premia affect the restrictiveness of monetary policy. An increase in such premia tightens monetary policy. The SNB monetary policy concept, where the three-month Libor is at the centre of the implementation of monetary policy, takes systematic account of changes in risk premia.
For that reason, our approach to liquidity insurance continues to evolve: •  In November 2014 we extended eligibility for membership of the Sterling Monetary Framework to include broker-dealers and Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs), giving non-banks access to our permanent liquidity insurance facilities for the first time. •  The range of acceptable collateral continues to extend: we have started to approve pools of auto loans and invoice finance receivables as eligible collateral for the first time. And we have started work to ensure there are no technical obstacles to our ability to accept equities as collateral should the need arise. 4  The Bank introduced US Dollar repo operations in September 2008, and their usage peaked at the equivalent of $ in October 2008. The Bank also provided a peak of $ to RBS via Emergency Liquidity Assistance. 5  The Bank’s commercial paper purchase schemes opened in February 2009 with a peak usage of £ The corporate bond purchase scheme opened in March 2009, with a peak usage of £  6  Plenderleith (2012) and Winters (2012). 7  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/redbook.aspx. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  The Bank will commence work in the second half of 2015 to assess the feasibility of establishing a Shari’ah compliant facility. By providing an additional highly liquid asset for Islamic banks, such a facility would be a significant step forward in their liquidity management capabilities. •  We are continuing to develop our capacity to lend in currencies other than sterling.

If the banking system has access to a large supply of unsecured credit from the central bank or other authorities, this may create problems in a crisis. The authorities will naturally have to place considerable emphasis on their own creditor position and thus reduce the emphasis placed on the considerations mentioned above. There is also a risk that the banks and guarantee funds will exploit this creditor relationship to reduce their own contribution to resolving a crisis. This problem is of less concern in Norway today than during the banking crisis. First, Norges Bank’s loans to banks are almost negligible. Second, collateral requirements apply to all the standard lending facilities. The role of lender of last resort is not clearly defined. The central bank shall ensure financial stability, but in order to ensure that institutions do not take support for granted, there must be uncertainty as to what type of situation would trigger the role of lender of last resort and the instruments that would be BIS Review 124/1999  6  used. This is often referred to as constructive ambiguity.
Romania is a supporter of this initiative as adhering to the Banking Union will strengthen financial stability and further increase confidence in the national banking sector through the harmonisation of supervisory practices and deposit guarantee schemes and avoiding regulatory arbitrage. In the long run, Banking Union will foster sustainable lending and economic growth (by reducing the fragmentation of the European financial markets). In the particular case of Romania, it makes even more sense to support the project given the share of foreign capital in our banking system. Furthermore, it is always preferable to have a voice in the setup of a mechanism the existence of which will affect all EU Member States, especially since – irrespective of their current choice – all will eventually end up as members. Our central bank will obviously be a major player in successfully reaching these objectives – sustainable nominal convergence, preparedness for euro adoption and strengthening financial stability through participation in the Banking Union. By doing this, it should contribute to providing the stable business environment that is required from the perspective of micro level decisions. Czech companies are already present as investors in Romania, with names such as CEZ, Zentiva, Hamé, and hopefully following this Forum more companies will join them. This should work both ways, as investment opportunities identified during the Forum discussions may also prompt Romanian companies to invest in the Czech Republic. Having said all this, I wish you to turn this event to good account and start fruitful business ventures.

We can look back at 18 consecutive quarters of economic growth; this is a robust, broad-based economic recovery. Now is the time to sort out the issue of non-performing loans. Banks need ambitious yet realistic plans to deal with their stocks of NPLs. And they need the right governance for these plans. Earlier this year, the ECB published its “Guidance to banks on non-performing loans”. Along these lines, and as part of our supervisory dialogue, we take a close look at the banks’ ability to manage their NPL stocks. We then scrutinise the plans devised by the banks to reduce those stocks. We will start providing our feedback later this month. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Banks have to carefully consider how they will react should any performing loans happen to become non-performing. So, with the future in mind, we have to ensure that the problem of NPLs does not recur. New NPLs should therefore be conservatively provisioned within a reasonable period of time. This would serve to strengthen the balance sheets of banks, enabling them to focus on their core business. That’s why we have drafted an addendum to our guidance on non-performing loans. It sets out how we expect banks to provision for future NPLs. The main goal is to have timely provisioning, which should prevent new NPLs from becoming a problem with systemic implications. But let me say that while our expectations are firm, there are no automatic actions attached to them.
Against the backdrop of these two external risks, Thailand, benefiting from ongoing adherence to policy discipline, is fortunate to have ample room for maneuvering a flexible policy mix going forward. Fiscal policy now aims at firming up growth and reviving confidence without worry on public debt sustainability. Concurrently, the monetary and exchange rate policies have room to safeguard economic stability and smooth out short-term fluctuations. On monetary policy, the Monetary Policy Committee has been holding the policy rate, in light of the fact that growth recovery has remained on track, while closely following inflation developments. As for the exchange rate management, the Bank of Thailand will maintain our principle under the managed float exchange rate system to let the exchange rate reflect the fundamentals of the economy. Indeed, to gain most from exchange rate flexibility, recognizing that US dollar is an invoice currency, we have consistently sought to limit the volatility of the Thai baht vsUS dollar exchange rate. In fact, the baht has been the least volatile currency in the region last year. Going forward, we will continue to take care of the short-term volatility when we deem it too disruptive to export or import price-quotation. Ladies and Gentlemen, In my talk with AMCHAM in Bangkok in September 2007, my key message was that Thailand’s future prosperity depends critically on capitalizing on and strengthening further the resiliency of our domestic economy. This is so that the economy can withstand volatility and safeguard against monetary and financial instability that may eventually disrupt real sector activities.

Jean-Pierre Roth: More growth a must Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Economic Forum, Thun, 27 May 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Since the mid-1970s now, economic growth in Switzerland has been significantly lower than that of other industrialised nations. In terms of per capita GDP among OECD countries, Switzerland lost its leading position during this time, falling back into the main field. Economic growth is vital, however, for the sustainability of our social security institutions. Demographic shifts will cause the ratio of pensioners to contributors to double in the next 30 years, with the result that tomorrow’s generation will be faced with a heavy burden – one that could be considerably lightened by higher growth rates. The soft growth in Switzerland is primarily attributable to the lack of competition in the domestic market. There are numerous known ways to boost growth which have proven successful in many other countries. So far, however, Switzerland unfortunately has neither grasped the importance of implementing these measures, nor does it have the political will to do so. Stronger economic growth can only be achieved by opening our domestic market to competition, contributing to the attractiveness of Switzerland as a business centre and strengthening our human capital.
In two reports 6, representatives of the private sector, the European Commission and the European Central Bank presented concrete recommendations on how, for example, regulatory barriers could be broken down. Almost 12 years have now passed since the second report was published and some of these proposals and recommendations have still not been implemented. For example, we still do not have an EU-wide framework for the treatment of interests in securities. Drawing once more on the comparison with the United States, a cross-border securities transaction costs at least ten times as much in Europe as it does in the United States. I think that makes it clear that Europe’s economy has a lot to gain from dismantling the relevant regulatory barriers as part of a capital markets union. 5  At that time with the caveat: “to the extent necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market”. 6  http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/first_giovannini_report_en.pdf. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/clearing/second_giovannini_report_en.pdf. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In addition to harmonised regulation for securities, we should also seek to implement a harmonised legal framework for crisis management. The Council Regulation on cross-border insolvency proceedings has provided a common regulatory framework governing, for example, jurisdictions and the recognition of court judgements. But within this framework, there are substantial national differences, such as regarding the extent to which various stakeholders are protected in the event of an insolvency. In my view, a single resolution framework for non-banks, i.e.

Yves Mersch: Advancing Monetary Union Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Euro Exhibition, Osnabrück, 25 January 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Euro banknotes and coins are not just a means of payment. The bridges and arches on our banknotes are a symbol of European integration. They stand for the fact that there is a lot which connects us within the Monetary Union, and that our once so divided continent has succeeded in overcoming these deep divisions, as the crisis has recently shown. Our common currency also therefore stands for shared values. “Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities” have been some of the accession criteria for membership of the EU since the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993; “Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.” 1 The recently published legal opinion of the Advocate General of the European Court of Justice in the case of Peter Gauweiler and the Die Linke party against the ECB on the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme also refers to these constitution-like shared legal values. This “constitutional compact” underlies European integration and includes the German constitutional principle of constitutional identity review – it does not exclude it.