samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
While regulation must not front-run innovation, regulators must run alongside innovation •  We must know what’s going on and be ready: either to promote or to restrain. There are three ways in which MAS does this. One, we actively engage FinTech firms to better understand emerging innovations and help them design their solutions for financial services. Take for example cloud computing. •  •  Our traditional approach was to deal only with regulated FIs, not their service providers –  But with cloud solutions proliferating, we changed tack  –  Many of these solutions offered strong efficiencies and cost savings but not all models met our regulatory requirements for data integrity and protection. So we engaged in dialogue directly with cloud service providers to explain our concerns and at the same time understand the technology –  The service providers then came up with solutions that met our concerns  –  And we modified our requirements to take account of new business models and technological capabilities. Two, we allow our FIs to experiment with new technologies in a safe environment. FIs do not have to seek MAS’ permission to try new things. •  Responsibility lies with boards and management to assess the risks and put in place adequate safeguards  •  But with many innovations, it is not always possible to anticipate every vulnerability or whether there is a risk of breaching regulation. •  Sometimes, as Nike puts it, you have to “just do it”.

–  We are also exploring an “all-in-one” addressing system, that will enable us to pay someone electronically using the payee’s mobile number, email address, social network account, or other proxies. No need to know the payee’s bank account number. Two, seamless data sharing through publication of open Application Programming Interfaces, or APIs. –  We just had a two-day API conference earlier this week, where industry players shared their views on how we can take the API strategy forward. –  MAS is working with FIs to leverage on new technologies to share aggregated data to improve market and risk analyses, forecasts and projections. We are committed to building a Smart Financial Centre, where innovation is pervasive and technology is used widely to: •  Increase efficiency  •  Manage risks better  •  Create new opportunities  •  Improve people’s lives. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
63  See the Box ‘Changes to Section 5 of the Inflation Report’ on page 49 of the May 2013 Bank of England Inflation Report. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  correlated (Chart 15). 64 So too, often more dramatically, have been its forecast errors for real wages and productivity. To some degree this is understandable, as the MPC adapts to the unfolding landscape. 65 But can we do much better? We must. This brings me to my final point. The Bank is about to embark on what will be, in the area of research, a cultural revolution. To caricature slightly, Bank research in the past was typically used to nourish and support the Bank’s policy thinking and framework. Relatively rarely was it used to challenge that prevailing policy orthodoxy, at least in public. That is about to change. As part of its strategic plan, the Bank has decided to cut the umbilical cord. In future, it will carry out, and publish externally, research covering the whole waterfront of policy issues it faces, monetary, financial and regulatory. Through new publications, we will put into the public domain research and analysis which as often challenges as supports the prevailing policy orthodoxy on certain key issues. This research will hopefully act as spur and springboard for new policy thinking, and perhaps in time policy change, on key central bank issues of the day, whatever they may be. It will act as another bulwark against hubris, over-confidence and groupthink.

Growth has been supported by buoyant domestic demand and a pick-up in net exports. Financing conditions for firms have been very favourable, supporting investment, while private consumption has benefited from low levels of inflation. [Slide 3] This steady economic growth has translated to the labour market bringing close to 8 million workers [7.8m] back to employment since 2013, more than offsetting the losses experienced during the crisis. Annual growth in employment has reached its highest level since 2008 and the unemployment rate fell to 8.7% in the fourth quarter of 2017, the lowest rate for nine years. Looking ahead, unemployment is expected to further decrease to reach 7.2% in 2020, in spite of an increase in the participation rate. [Slide 4] In France, GDP growth is robust, averaging 2.0% in 2017. Expansion is expected to continue at a sustained pace in 2018, supported by strong domestic demand and a notable increase in exports. Investment should remain robust thanks to favourable financing conditions and the positive business outlook. Net exports are expected to pick up in 2018 and be supportive of growth. The upswing is expected to continue in 2019–2020 with a GDP growth rate which should remain above-potential growth, despite a slight slackening in global demand. [Slide 5] In France too, the ongoing recovery has led to a strong decline in the unemployment rate which fell to 8.9% in the fourth quarter of 2017.
And even in the US, nearly all “SPE groups” will need to ensure that there exists intra-group debt, issued by key subsidiaries around the world to the holding company, that can be written down when a distressed subsidiary would otherwise need to be resolved. For “MPE groups”, many will need to do more to organise themselves into well-defined regional and functional subgroups, perhaps with regional or functional intermediate holding companies, which could be subjected to SPE resolutions. And these groups will need to ensure that common services, such as IT, are provided by stand-alone entities under contracts that are robust enough to survive the break up of the group. There will be implications for the regulatory regime too. As I see it, the amount of equity that a host regulator requires to be held in a subsidiary over and above the Basel minimum may vary according to whether it is part of an “SPE group” in which the parent/holding company is a source of strength through resolution. Where that is the case, it may be possible to shade the subsidiary’s capital structure from equity to subordinated debt issued to the HoldCo. Where the group as a whole is not a source of strength in resolution, a subsidiary may need more equity than otherwise. What I am describing would entail some recasting of the key pillars of international supervisory cooperation: the Basel Concordat, Core Principles of Supervision, and Capital Accord.3 (3)  There is no such thing as a “bailin bond”. Bailin is a resolution tool.

Shkëlqim Cani: Review of the Albanian economy Statement by Dr Shkëlqim Cani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, for Euromoney Yearbooks, Global banking and financial policy review, Tirana, 9 August 2004. *  *  *  The Albanian economy experienced a recovered pulse of economic growth over the year 2003. Positive developments are marked in respect of consolidating the country’s macroeconomic stability, economic growth and a sound development of the financial system. A recovery in economic activity and 6% growth of Gross Domestic Product in real terms was proved by all sectors of the economy, but was particularly evident in the construction, transport and services sectors, which are the most dynamic sectors of Albanian economy. The year 2003 was characterised by a low inflation rate, within 2%-4% of the targeted range. The inflation rate as of December was 3.3%, meeting the Bank of Albania (BoA) target. Despite the various factors this low rate emerged from a diligent management of the domestic demand as an outcome of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. BoA’s monetary policy has been a moderate one throughout 2003. Such a trend will continue during 2004 and was recently reflected by the reduction of the core interest rate in the economy. Since April 2003 the REPO rate has been lowered by 2.5%. The 6% REPO rate, decided on May 12, 2004, is the lowest ever in the Albanian economy. The policy aims to reduce borrowing costs in the economy and maintain price and financial stability.
Gent Sejko: Financial inclusion, governance, tackling nonperforming loans, and Albania’s milestones for 2020 Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the meeting organised by the Albanian Association of Banks, Tirana, 12 February 2020. * * * Dear ladies and gentlemen, It is always a pleasure for me to attend meetings and round tables with representatives of banks operating in Albania. They are also an excellent opportunity to discuss and harmonise our efforts for a stable deepening and expansion of the financial market, as one of the core pillars of the economy and the main driver for sustaining development and enhancing the public’s welfare. I would like, in my brief address, to bring to your attention some highlights of 2019, regarding the contribution of the banking and financial systems, as well as some milestones for 2020. Let me first focus on the overall state of affairs in the Albanian economy. The devastating earthquake that hit Albania on 26 November 2019 was a major event with a strong impact for 2019, on all the sectors of economy and the whole society. It was an unexpected shock giving rise to economic and psychological consequences in the affected areas and beyond. On the other hand, it was a difficult test, and I may say that all banks passed it successfully, in terms of continuity of financial market’s critical functions.

Broad diversification of the GPFG’s investments is in line with Markowitz’s theory. The GPFG’s investment strategy contributes to an acceptable risk-return profile for the fund. At the same time, with ownership shares in 9000 companies, the GPFG is also broadly exposed 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  to conditions and events with dimensions other than the effect on financial risk, related to how a company deals with a specific incident or more fundamental aspects of its operation. A global listed company that is criticised for its activities will almost without exception include the GPFG as one of its shareholders. Questions will sometimes be asked about why the fund is invested in the company and what action is being taken to follow up the fund’s investment. If questions are often raised about whether the GPFG is being managed in what is considered a responsible manner, support for the investment strategy may be affected. This could in turn increase the risk that we will not achieve our primary objective of enabling current and future generations to benefit from Norway’s petroleum wealth. The number of questions related to individual investments cannot be reduced by diversification. On the contrary, the number will increase with the breadth of the GPFG’s investments. The portfolio contains a large number of companies that could run into difficulties. A possible way of managing this type of risk is to exclude companies from the portfolio.
But the same arithmetic applies: such price level shocks need have no long-term impact on the inflation rate. In the medium term the real upside risks to inflation lie at home – in whether we see “second round” rises in wages and prices in the domestic economy. It is to counter those pressures that the MPC have judged it necessary over the last year for growth to slow and create a margin of spare capacity in our economy. That makes it more difficult for companies to raise prices and puts more pressure on them to restrain their costs. It also re-emphasises our determination to get inflation back to the 2% target and thus influences the expectations of financial markets, price setters, wage negotiators and households generally. And expectations themselves have an important impact on inflation. Broadly, the higher households’ expect inflation to be, the less they are likely to save today. Inflation expectations also shape workers’ wage demands as they try to protect their standard of living. And companies’ expectations will shape the prices they set as well as their willingness to concede cost increases. We know from the inflations of the 70s, 80s, and early 90s that raising interest rates will in time bring inflation down, even when expectations of future inflation are high. But we also know how painful that process is. It works through the increased threat of bankruptcy and unemployment. That forces a change in peoples’ behaviour and their hearts and minds and expectations follow.

Of course falls in house prices tend to coincide with a slowdown in the wider economy because they are affected by the same factors – notably falls in real income and employment. But they can also feed back into activity. First they slow housing investment and transaction flow which hits builders and related services like estate agents and conveyancers. The purchases of white goods and furniture tend to go hand in hand with transactions in the housing market. So the slowdown in the number of people moving home is likely to impact on spending on those goods. Falling house prices limit how much households and small businesses can borrow today and that pulls down consumption and investment. Also by reducing their expectations of what they will be able to borrow tomorrow either to compensate for a reduction in income or a need to spend, some households and firms may increase their precautionary savings. Finally, falling house prices redistribute wealth. Those who already own houses and expect to trade down in future and realise a capital gain, are worse off. On the other side, those hoping to trade up or who are not yet on the housing ladder are better off (although the tighter constraints on lending may mean they have to save a bigger deposit to enter the market). The former will tend to reduce their consumption; the latter will tend to do the  4  BIS Review 114/2008  opposite. In a perfect market these two effects might balance out.
The effect has been particularly significant in countries such as Spain, whose initial fiscal space was less than that of other countries, given its high starting level of public debt and structural budget deficit. 2  This amount – around € billion – could cover a volume of losses equivalent to almost twice the current volume of bad loans in the system, i.e. approximately 8.2% of total lending to the resident private sector. 2  The ECB’s targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) during the crisis have also managed to prevent liquidity problems in the banking sector and have smoothed and encouraged lending by the sector to the economy. For example, in the June TLTRO III operation, the participating banks received a total of € trillion, a record amount in the Eurosystem’s refinancing operations. These operations continue to be significant and, at the last TLTRO auction, TLTRO III.7, settled on 18 March, € billion were allotted to the participating group of Eurosystem credit institutions. The European authorities with prudential powers adopted, in coordination with the national and international authorities, numerous decisions so that the financial system could contribute to overcoming the crisis. Supervisors thus reviewed their guidelines on capital and liquidity buffers, allowing banks temporarily to operate below the regulatory level set for some of these buffers. Various recommendations on limiting the distribution of dividends were also approved.

Cross-border European mergers would be particularly positive: they would deepen the banking union, reduce the sovereign-bank risk nexus, and provide greater potential for diversification. In this respect, the ECB Guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation in the banking sector specifically aims to enhance the predictability of supervisory actions for the market and thus help banks design merger plans that are prudentially sustainable, such that the resulting institution has a business plan that, when executed correctly, will add value. 10  Conclusions In sum, a banking sector that was initially healthier and more solvent and forceful economic policy action have allowed the initial impact of the shock of the pandemic to be absorbed and helped keep credit flowing to the economy, thereby preventing systemic risks from materialising. However, the ultimate impact of the crisis on the banking sector will depend both on its scale and duration and on the effectiveness of economic policies in alleviating its effects on households and firms. Economic policies (national, European and international; monetary, prudential and fiscal) should continue to support the economy, targeting the hardest-hit firms and population cohorts. In particular, supporting viable firms whose solvency has deteriorated after a year of crisis is crucial, to prevent the productive system and employment from being destroyed, which in turn would also damage the banking sector’s financial position, thereby hindering the recovery.
These are the generic skills that will become increasingly important across a range of finance jobs in the future. These are the skills our professionals will need to thrive and grow in a digital future. They will complement the domain expertise that are unique to industry segments. We developed with active industry collaboration, this new set of Standards which will focus on areas like data science, human centered design, tools for innovation, agile approaches to technology, and risk and governance in a digital world. We will not just learn to thrive in a digital world; we will also learn digitally! And so, to promote the learning of skills under the new Standard, besides the usual training programmes, IBF is developing Learn@IBF, a mobile learning app that will provide simple and concise information on these topics. You will get to see a preview of this app after this. I want to acknowledge our partners who helped to make this happen: Amazon, Facebook, IBM, Luma and Rainmaking Innovation as well as our institutes of higher learning, training providers and of course, all of you, our financial institutions who are part of the IBF Community. They provided and reviewed the content that will be posted on the app. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The next step is for financial institutions to work with their staff, particularly those in jobs undergoing transformation, to help them explore possible pathways and acquire the skills they need for the future.

Ravi Menon: Skills for the future Welcome remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Institute of Banking and Finance Distinction Evening, Singapore, 29 September 2017. * * * Mr Lim Swee Say, Minister for Manpower Members of the IBF Council, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to the IBF Distinction Evening 2017. Tonight, we are honoured to have Mr Lim Swee Say, Minister for Manpower, as our Guest-ofHonour. Minister Lim, as you know, has been a lifelong passionate advocate for helping our workers build up their skills, grow in their jobs, and contribute to the economy. He will speak later in the evening on these issues – issues that are close to his heart – and also to all of us as part of the IBF community. The global economy is in a better place this year compared to last year. Let us take stock of where we are. The Singapore economy is on track to achieve slightly higher growth this year compared to 2016. And so is the financial sector. For the first five years after the global financial crisis, our financial sector grew twice as fast as the overall economy. Last year, for the first time, the financial sector grew slower than the overall economy, weighed down by weaker lending growth to the region. This year, the financial sector is expected to grow by 2.5-3.5%, slightly faster than the 2.03.0% expected for the overall economy.
Moreover, the negotiating position of those in employment becomes gradually stronger and this may affect the outcome of wage negotiations. There have already been some wage demands that represent growing tensions. The Riksbank obviously has to keep a close eye on all this and take any steps that may be necessary in good time. And, as I said, the longer the upward phase lasts, the greater is the probability of coming close to the capacity ceiling, even though this cannot be identified exactly. Another question concerns the speed at which it is healthy for the economy to approach this ceiling. Today’s repo rate cannot hold over a complete cycle It follows that, over a complete business cycle, the monetary stance cannot remain as expansionary as it is at present. With a repo rate at the current low level of 3.25%, the economy would expand too rapidly and reach a point where overheating occurs, leading to shortages and rising rates of wage and price inflation. Our Executive Board expressed such ideas unanimously as recently as last month. The economic advantage of looking ahead and raising the interest rate in good time is evident from what has happened in the US economy since the beginning of 1994. In February that year the Federal Reserve initiated interest rate increases and since then the rate has fluctuated between 4.5% and 6%, which are more normal levels. This succeeded in preventing - let me repeat, in preventing - an increase in inflation without causing the economy to enter a recession.

That would provide gone-concern loss-absorbency for new improved resolution regimes to draw on. A still richer Accord might include instruments that aid recovery by converting into equity in the face of meaningful but not life-threatening losses. This approach moves away from seeing runnable short-term wholesale debt as a source of discipline on banks, to instead seeing longer-term bonds as providing a mass de manoeuvre for recapitalising distressed banks. Not all forms of leverage are the same. But no static regime can ever be enough. If they were, crises would not recur. That is why the new macroprudential authorities, such as the Bank of England’s FPC, will be able temporarily to adjust capital requirements when circumstances warrant. I have stressed that it is oversimplistic to think of macroprudential interventions to improve capital adequacy as always inevitably leading to higher funding costs and tighter credit conditions. It will depend upon the prevailing circumstances: whether the banks started out with solid balance sheets, what the market knows and thinks. The FPC will need to be transparent in order to build understanding of its actions. 15  I worry about the withering away of a market for bankers’ acceptances; claims by one company on another, but guaranteed by one or more banks, and historically eligible for discount at central banks. As I have said before, corporate treasurers, bankers and central banks could usefully work together on this.