samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On a sectoral basis, pledges in manufacturing were US $ million, real estate (US $ million), agro-processing (US $ million), services (US $ million), agriculture (US $ million), tourism (US $ million), construction (US $ million), ICT (US $ million), and mining (US $ million). 27. The pledges when fully executed are expected to generate 22,532 jobs (1,726 jobs: third quarter 2010) with the highest contribution from services at 12,763 jobs followed by agro-processing at 5,860 jobs. The rest were manufacturing (1,882 jobs), construction (847 jobs), agriculture (397 jobs), tourism (343 jobs), real estate (247 jobs), ICT (157 jobs) and mining (14 jobs). 28. Investment pledges for the year 2010 increased by 138.6% to US $ million from US $ million recorded in 2009. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 3 29. Preliminary estimates indicate that Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose by 7.1% in 2010 from 6.4% in 2009. This outturn was well above the target of 5% announced by the Minister of Finance and National Planning in his 2010 Budget Speech. 30. The GDP outturn was largely attributed to the growth in the agricultural, construction and mining sectors.   The 2010 agricultural harvest was the highest recorded in history, having produced over 2.8 million mt of maize; while the mining sector also benefitted from higher copper prices and production levels.   The growth in the construction sector emanated from increased residential, commercial and public infrastructure construction projects across the country by both Government and the private sector. 2  Lusaka, Livingstone, Mfuwe and Ndola.

Of course, such integration has to be brought to fruition in the other segments of the money market, i.e. the repo market and the short-term securities market. Further integration will enhance the efficiency of the euro area financial markets and will be beneficial to borrowers and investors alike. With regard to the capital markets, progress towards integration has been significant, both on the euro-denominated bond market and the equity market. The gross issuance of long-term debt securities denominated in euro amounted to 791 billion euro in 1999, against the equivalent of 902 billion euro for debt securities denominated in US dollars. The pace of euro-denominated issues remained brisk in the first three quarters of 2000 at 498 billion euros. According to the Bank for International Settlements, euro-area private sector borrowers have issued 76% of their debt in euros since 1 January 1999, compared with an average of 50% in the predecessor currencies since during the 1990s. Similarly, private borrowers resident outside the euro area issued more than a fifth of their international debt in euros from the beginning of 1999, roughly a twofold increase over the total share of the legacy currencies before the introduction of the euro. Furthermore, European investors have substantially diversified their bond portfolios since the introduction of the euro, encouraged by the removal of the exchange rate risk. This enables them to achieve higher rates of return for a given level of portfolio risk.
The fan chart for the interest rate serves a different purpose: It illustrates that the interest rate path is not a promise, but a forecast which is uncertain. Moreover, it reflects the central bank’s adjustment of the interest rate as a response to new economic developments, which are subject to uncertainty. Our experience is that market participants and the public understand that our forecast for the policy rate is indeed a forecast and not a promise. Let me now turn to the second ingredient; how Norges Bank responds to new developments (“shocks”). Monetary policy becomes more effective if market participants can react adequately to economic news. In order to convey a broader reaction pattern, Norges Bank indicates how the Bank would react should certain disturbances occur. However, since no central bank follows a specific reaction function mechanically, it would be misleading to present a single reaction function specified mathematically. Judgement is always applied when responding to shocks, and a specific reaction function will give a very simplified representation of the reaction pattern. There is thus a trade-off between misleading precision and uninformative generality. Norges Bank tries to balance this trade-off by applying various approaches to communicating the reaction pattern. First, the Bank presents alternative scenarios in the Monetary Policy Report. Chart 2 illustrates the interest rate response to a positive and negative shock to inflation respectively.

Finally, I will briefly touch upon another important aspect of monetary policy, namely how to make good collective decisions, and the role of the staff in the monetary policy decision process. Communicating future monetary policy intentions Most central banks communicate future policy intentions in one way or another. The majority of central banks communicate indirectly through forecasts based on technical interest rate assumptions, and by giving verbal signals about future interest rate decisions in policy statements and speeches. With such indirect communication, the market participants gain information about the sign of future interest rate decisions, but may have less information about the size. Until November 2005, Norges Bank used technical interest rate assumptions in the inflation forecasts, but also on some occasions commented on whether the Bank intended to follow a different policy than what seemed to be reflected in market interest rates. Thus, the Bank gave signals about the sign of future policy intentions relative to market expectations, but not on the size. 2 From November 2005, Norges Bank started to use endogenous interest rate forecasts in the Monetary Policy Report. Norges Bank was the second central bank with endogenous interest rate assumptions, following the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, who introduced it in 1997. More recently, the Swedish Riksbank and the Czech National Bank have also started to publish interest rate forecasts. 1  Woodford, M. (2005), “Central-Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness,” paper presented at FRB Kansas City Symposium on “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future,” Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 25-27, 2005.
The first reason relates to a possible reason why loan losses in Sweden have historically been low; namely that in times of difficulty the public sector has helped maintain the household sector’s debt-servicing ability through the Swedish social insurance system. In practice, this means that when the household sector’s debt-servicing ability is shaken, it affects firstly the individual, secondly public finances and only thirdly the lenders. This could mean that the banks lack an incentive to fully take into account the risks entailed in excessive credit-granting and high loan-to-value ratios. To put it another way, the risk weights we currently have for mortgages may be “correct” from the banks’ business point of view, but they are potentially too low in society’s broader perspective. The second reason for questioning the risk weights is that they are backward-looking. And as we all know, history doesn’t always repeat itself. This is one reason why I am concerned, despite the Riksbank’s own stress tests showing that the Swedish banks would not suffer particularly large loan losses, even if the situation in the mortgage market worsened significantly. One can’t help wondering whether it is reasonable that Sweden’s risk weights are among the lowest in Europe, while our households are among the most indebted. And their debts are increasing. I don’t think it is reasonable.

It assumes that the rest of the world has confidence in the Swedish housing market and the Swedish financial system. Historically, foreign investors have often been the most “fickle” in times of financial turbulence. If their confidence in the banks is damaged, for instance, through a heavy fall in housing prices, investors will either reduce their lending or charge more for loans. This could happen so quickly and in such large volumes that the banks might experience problems. The fact that we have not experienced a fall in housing prices is certainly one of the reasons why the effects of the crisis were milder for us, since it helped to sustain demand in the economy. But it is also a cause for concern, particularly as household debt has been increasing more than household income for a fairly long time. Ultimately, this is not sustainable. The danger is that this trend will continue so long that when it finally breaks it will be under dramatic forms and cause problems similar to those we have seen in other countries. We all want to avoid this happening. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The problems have varied from one country to another. In many countries the banks have suffered such severe problems that the state has had to intervene. At the same time as fiscal policy has been used to support the banking sector, it has also needed to uphold demand in the economy.
Innovation is important, but it must not come at the expense of stability or confidence in existing payment systems. The fourth challenge relates to the downside of digitalisation: cyber risks. Cashless payments are a particularly attractive target for cyber attacks. A lot is at stake for central banks in this regard too, as a loss of confidence in the payment system could ultimately undermine confidence in money. Tackling such risks may open up new business opportunities. Achieving significantly greater resilience to cyber risks could give Switzerland an important competitive edge in the future. In particular, it might be worth investing in a new, robust and secure data communications infrastructure. Promising solutions are currently being developed right here on our own doorstep. For example, a team from ETH Zurich has created SCION, a new internet architecture which enhances the security and reliability of internet communications considerably. This technology could form the basis of a secure Swiss finance network. For the  10  While such tokens would be backed by an official currency like the Swiss franc, they represent a claim on a given private sector provider, not on the central bank. Page 8/9  Swiss payments ecosystem in particular, this would allow secure and flexible communication between participants. To meet these four challenges and prepare for the digital future, the Swiss financial centre needs to engage in an open dialogue on strategic options. It is important that we reach consensus on what a robust, attractive and future-proof payment system in Switzerland should look like.

Speech  Embargo 28 March 2019, 6.00 pm  The evolution of payment systems in the digital age: A central bank perspective Money Market Event  Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser Member of the Governing Board / Alternate Member of the Governing Board ∗ Swiss National Bank Zurich, 28 March 2019 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2019 (speech given in German)  ∗  The speakers would like to thank Dirk Faltin, Mico Loretan and Andreas Wehrli for their support in drafting this speech. They also thank Giuseppe D’Alelio, Lukas Hauri, Sébastien Kraenzlin and Nicolas Stoffels as well as SNB Language Services. Page 1/9  Ladies and Gentlemen Welcome to the Swiss National Bank’s biannual Money Market Event. Tonight, we have chosen to focus on a subject that is becoming increasingly topical in light of developments in digitalisation: payment systems. This is a fascinating field, not just for the private sector, but also for central banks, as payment systems and monetary policy are closely interconnected. The SNB’s monetary policy is designed to ensure price stability, which in turn maintains confidence in the value of our currency. At our quarterly assessment last week, we decided to leave our expansionary monetary policy stance unchanged. For the year 2019, we expect growth of around 1.5% in Switzerland, compared to 2.5% growth in 2018. The inflation forecast has been revised downwards. We now expect an inflation rate of 0.3% for 2019. The Swiss franc is still highly valued and the situation on the foreign exchange market remains fragile.
Of course, the principles and continued testing are part of prudent planning, and do not imply that normalization will necessarily begin soon. As always, the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The committee’s normalization principles and plans Let me start by briefly reviewing the statement on normalization principles and plans that the FOMC published following its September meeting. Importantly, this statement is intended to provide the public with information about the eventual normalization process and does not signal a change in the current or future stance of policy. As the Committee indicated in its September post-meeting policy statement, it continues to anticipate that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. Many elements of the normalization principles and plans are similar to the principles adopted by the Committee in June 2011, while others have been revised in light of the changes since then in the size and composition of the System Open Market Account (SOMA), the Fed’s securities portfolio, as well as enhancements in the tools the Committee will have available to implement policy during normalization.

Deposit and credit growth of the banking sector continued, with revival in the lending to the corporate sector, accompanied with a decline of the NPL ratio in the first quarter of 2018 to 5.1%, due to claims collection. Current account deficit in 2017 additionally reduced to 1.3% of GDP, reflecting the positive contribution of the foreign capital companies on the export side, which indicates further strengthening of the economic fundamentals. Regarding the recommendation from the last year’s dialogue, the central bank prepared draft strategies for NPLs management and strengthening the use of local currency, both agreed 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  with the Ministry of Finance and currently subject to consultation with other relevant stakeholders. In both areas, as already being confirmed in the assessments and final conclusions, we have already achieved tangible results; however the adoption of these comprehensive strategies will put in place additional mechanisms to deal with these issues. In light of the challenging time that we have faced in recent years, we need to point to the maintenance of price and financial stability as important pillars of the macroeconomic stability, as well as the need to continue strengthening the fundamentals and resilience of the economy. Implementation of structural reforms and strengthening institutional capacities, including sound public finances, should remain main priorities for faster income convergence and EU integration. Thank you! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Bryant, Ralph, Dale Henderson and Torbjörn Becker, (2012), ”Maintaining financial stability in an open economy: Sweden in the global crisis and beyond”, SNS Förlag. Finocchiaro, Daria, Magnus Jonsson, Christian Nilsson, and Ingvar Strid, (2016), ”Socioeconomic effects of reducing household indebtedness”, Economic Review 2016:2, Sveriges Riksbank. Fischer, Stanley, (2016), ”Why are interest rates so low? Causes and implications”, speech, Economic Club of New York, October 2016. Gersbach, Hans, (2011), “A framework for two macro policy instruments: Money and banking combined”, CEPR Policy Insight No. 58. Gomme, Paul, B. Ravikumar and Peter Rupert, (2011), “The return to capital and the business cycle”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 14:2, pp. 262–278. Gomme, Paul, B. Ravikumar and Peter Rupert, (2015), ”Secular stagnation and returns on capital”, Economic Synopses, Number 19, 2015. Goodfriend, Marvin and Mervyn King, (2016), “Review of the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy 2010–2015”, Reports from the Riksdag 2015/16:RFR6. Gordon, Robert, (2012), “Is U.S. economic growth over? Faltering innovation confronts the six headwinds”, NBER Working Paper No. 18315. Hansen, Alvin, (1938), ”Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth”, speech, American Economic Association, December 1938. IMF (2016), ”Article IV consultation”, November 2016. Ingves, Stefan, (2007), “Housing and monetary policy: a view from an inflationtargeting central bank”, Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy, A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. 22 [23]  Jonsson, Magnus and Kevin Moran, (2014), “The linkages between monetary and macroprudential policies”, Economic Review, 2014:1, Sveriges Riksbank. Obstfeld, Maurice and Alan Taylor, (2004), ”Global capital markets: integration, crisis and growth”, Cambridge University Press.

Number of unemployed in vulnerable groups and total of other registered unemployed Total number of unemployed individuals registered with Employment Office 250 000  250 000 Vulnerable groups Other groups  200 000  200 000  150 000  150 000  100 000  100 000  50 000  50 000 04  06  08  10  12  Note. Trend-adjusted values. Number of remaining job-seekers at end of month. Source: Employment Office  Figure 16. Unemployment and the development of the housing market Unemployed as a percentage of the labour force, index 2007=100. The figures in brackets present the fall in real housing prices from the peak to the trough. 350  350 Ireland (-40.5 per cent) Spain (-22.5 per cent)  300  300  USA (-22.7 per cent)  250  250  Sweden (-0.0 per cent)  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50 00  02  04  06  08  10  Source: The OECD  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 17. Inflation in Sweden Annual percentage change The CPIF is the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate. 5  5 CPIF  4  4  CPI  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 06  08  10  12  14  Note.
A further component of economic policy’s new direction was Sweden’s membership of the European Union in 1995. Sectors that had previously been protected were now exposed to international competition. Stronger competition in a number of fields meant that prices for some goods and services began to be adjusted downwards towards European levels. This process may continue in the years to come, though we cannot take that for granted. There are a good many goods and services for which prices in Sweden are higher than elsewhere in Europe. The point I want to make is that in many respects the favourable economic trend in recent years stems from the economic policy realignment that began in the 1980s and has been in progress ever since. This conclusion has two positive implications. 1  BIS Review 84/2000  One is that the measures which have been taken have most probably contributed to what is happening now. The other is that a continued policy orientation on stability and credibility can yield even better results in the future. In the 1990s the new direction of economic policy was accompanied by rapid, worldwide advances in the new information technology, which is being adopted successively in various sectors in Sweden. This has lowered the thresholds for establishing and running companies. Existing production processes can be made more efficient. The internet has made information more accessible and many firms can cut transaction costs. There is less need to tie up capital by holding large stocks.

To achieve a reasonable return on capital, firms are obliged instead to make production more efficient and that tends to result in better productivity. Many factors have accordingly contributed to our economy’s good performance in recent years. A number of favourable circumstances have coincided, making it possible to combine high growth with price stability. Demand must be adjusted to growth sooner or later Looking ahead, most things suggest that the rapid growth can continue for a time. But in the end - though it is not clear when - demand for goods, services and labour will have to slacken and move more in line with what the long-term growth trend can sustain. Letting demand be too high for too long raises the prospect of accelerating inflation and ultimately a recession, with falling output and rising unemployment. The Riksbank must therefore do its utmost to avoid marked fluctuations in economic activity and endeavour to create conditions for sustainable growth. Demand can come into line with long-term growth as a result of a spontaneous economic slowdown, for instance in connection with a slackening of growth in the rest of the world. It can also result from a fall-off in household demand for durables after the high procurements in recent years. A further possibility is that the positive supply shocks fade, which would admittedly involve some increase in inflation but also a downward effect on demand.
Third, and connected with the previous condition, they should preserve the incentives to pursue sound fiscal policies. Ultimately, sound public finances are indispensable for the provision of a truly safe asset. Lastly, the sizable current account surplus and the strong overall fiscal position of the European Union, compared to those of other advanced economies, can be seen as a call for greater investment. Among the main areas of necessity, we should prepare our economies and citizens for challenges related to climate change, ageing and digitalisation. More importantly, the EU lags behind the US in terms of productivity growth. These challenges are widespread and common to all our economies, and therefore a common and  8  Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2018), “The search for a Euro Area safe asset”, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper, 18-3. 9 Brunnermeier et al. (2017), ESBies: Safety in the tranches, and ESRB (2018). 10 Zettelmeyer and Leandro (2019), “Beyond ESBies: safety without tranching”, in Risk sharing plus market discipline. A new paradigm for Euro Area reform. 7/8  safe source of financing would be tailor-made for them. It could also provide some stabilisation for the economy, as investment provides a safety net in times of economic distress.

Our task now is to ensure that liberalization and globalization remain productive processes, that our energies are devoted not just to short-term cures, but also to long-term preventive health. There are a number of initiatives that we might pursue, and I mention only a few of them with the aim of stimulating discussion. The first, and most urgent, is the reform of the international financial architecture to better regulate the volatile capital flows that contribute to market instability. This must include improved information and disclosure. The recent experience in this region has shown that problems were allowed to build up because of a lack of information about the full financial picture, both in terms of the destination and the source of the funds. Important steps are being taken in many Asian countries towards greater transparency in the public sector, and I am pleased to report that Hong Kong is playing a leading role in these efforts. But greater transparency among the regulators means that a serious asymmetry of information is emerging between the public and private sectors. We must now consider the need for greater disclosure on the investor side, since the virtual complete lack of information about the activities of huge global institutional investors poses risks to all participants in the markets - to other investors, to lenders, and to borrowers. A second part of this architectural reform must be improved prudential oversight of capital flows, since mere disclosure is no guarantee that behaviour will be prudent.