samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In short, some sort of European investment agency, whether in the form of a new or an existing euro area body, with the capacity to issue bonds, might be able to target an optimal fiscal policy stance, while providing the economy with more safe assets, thus facilitating monetary policy transmission, increasing the international role of the euro and completing the Banking and Capital Markets Union. Twenty years ago, the euro was seen, in Christian Noyer’s words, as a catalyst for integration. This view is now as valid as it was then. In order to achieve price stability, the single currency generates the need to pursue sound economic policies. But it is clear now that monetary integration does not immediately lead to financial integration. This is an ongoing process, and the governance framework to guarantee the success of the European project is still developing. We must endeavour to achieve completion of the Capital Markets Union and the Banking Union. This will also require progress towards the Fiscal Union. A European safe asset lies at the heart of all of these initiatives. But, more often than not, the heart is the most difficult place to reach. I am sure that these two days will bring advanced research and a constructive exchange of views to bear on this and other important areas of the euro area architecture. Thank you for your attention. 8/8

Christian Noyer: Inflation, Europe’s response to the debt crisis, emerging-market economies and priorities for the G-20 – interview in The Wall Street Journal Interview with Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, in The Wall Street Journal, Paris, conducted by Mr Brian Blackstone and Ms Nathalie Boschat on 24 January 2011 and published on 26 January 2011. *  *  *  WSJ: The European Central Bank recently toughened its stance on inflation. How concerned are you about the risks of inflation taking hold in the euro zone? Noyer: The uptick in inflation is mostly due to the rise in oil and commodity prices. Core inflation has remained relatively subdued. By nature, that [the rise in inflation] should be temporary. Our projections show that the inflation rate should come back to a zone perfectly in line with our definition of price stability during the course of 2011. As a central bank, we are very attentive to the only risks that exist in such a situation, which is that there might be second-round effects – an acceleration of inflation due to other causes – wages and other dynamics of internal costs. This is why we are vigilant about all those evolutions. I am quite confident that we will be able to keep inflation at bay. That includes sending the message that we will never tolerate that inflation could become entrenched.
The role of the Riksbank in this situation is, when necessary, to be able to provide liquidity assistance at short notice. With today’s Swedish banking system, it may also be necessary to provide such assistance in foreign currencies. We therefore asked the National Debt Office on two occasions to borrow foreign currency on our behalf to strengthen the currency reserve. All in all, we borrowed foreign currency to a value equivalent to SEK 200 billion. However, the foreign currency reserve has grown by SEK 325 billion, while the strengthening by means of the National Debt Office loans amounted to SEK 200 billion. The difference is partly due to the krona being weak during 2014 and the value of the foreign currency reserve, measured in krona, therefore having increased. The krona depreciation is also visible in the fact that the value of the foreign currency loans, which a year ago was SEK 193 billion, now amounts to SEK 228 billion. But the foreign currency reserve has also grown as a result of the return on the bonds in the foreign currency reserve being reinvested in new bonds instead of used to pay dividends to the government. As a result of this, the Riksbank has instead had to borrow from the banks that are its monetary policy counterparties to pay the dividends.

Margarita Delgado: Role of the financial sphere in accelerating decarbonisation Speech by Ms Margarita Delgado, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, at an event jointly organised by the Bank of Spain, the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Ministry for the Economy and the Ministry for the Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge, 3 December 2020. * * * Good morning, and thank you all for being here, whether in person or online, attending this event jointly organised by the Banco de España, the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Ministry for the Economy and the Ministry for the Ecological Transition and the Demographic Challenge, which aims to boost the role of the financial sphere in the process of decarbonisation. The transformation of our economy into a more sustainable model is an unavoidable necessity to which we have committed ourselves as a society and which we have agreed with our European partners. The draft climate change law includes a set of measures that essentially impact what we call the real economy. There are references to the role of the financial sector in just a couple of its articles. A priori, that would seem natural and logical. Evidently, the CO2 reduction targets directly affect energy production, transport, mining and industrial processes in general. But anybody might well consider that the effects on the services sector or, of course, the banking industry should not be so significant.
In the scenario we consider to be the most likely given present-day and expected conditions, the larger part of the adjustment to the MPR we began in June 2010, and which has amounted to an increase of 475 basis points, has already been completed. In this scenario, we use as a working assumption that the MPR will be within the range of values that have historically been considered neutral. However, we must keep in mind that the behavior of both the domestic and the external economy in the past several years may have changed those ranges, introducing a high degree of uncertainty about the true short-term level of the neutral MPR. All in all, exactly how far and when we will take the MPR in the current cycle is something the Board will be analyzing with incoming information on the evolution of the Chilean economy and the international scenario. It is worth pausing for a few moments to take a look at the evolution of the world economy. In our most likely scenario, we estimate that the world will continue to add momentum to Chile’s GDP growth, although gradually declining in the coming quarters. However, as I already mentioned, there are important risks. Developed economies may enter a stage where output fails to pick up and new economic policy efforts are needed to boost growth. The big problem they are facing is the exhaustion of their traditional policy tools.

Figure 10 Employment & unemployment (1) (index, centered on mean of period 1990-2011)  Real wages (2) (annual change, percent)  40  40  9  9  20  20  6  6  0  0  3  3  -20  -20  0  0  -40  -40 -3  -3  90 93 96 99 02 05 08 11 Unempl. Employment  01  03 L.C. 05  07  09  11  Rem. Index  (1) Seasonally-adjusted series. (2) Dashed lines show average for period 2001-2011. Source: Ricaurte, M. 2011. “Indicadores de Mercado Laboral para la Comparación de las Crisis Asiática y Financiera Internacional”. Preliminary document. Central Bank of Chile, June. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 11 Private consumption and income  (annual change, percent)  15  15  12  12  9  9  6  6  3  3  0  0  -3  -3 04  05  06  Wage mass  07  08  Private consumption  09  10  11  Private disposable income (*)  (*) Yearly moving average. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
I think banks have been reassured about the possible negative impact of negative rates on some of them. They know we will not take rates into absurdly negative territory. But we can never rule out further moves. That would not be credible anyway. Over the last few months the ECB has been suggesting that it has done its part in the euro zone recovery, and has been asking governments to do theirs. At the same time, it insists it could do even more if needed, and that its toolbox is far from empty. Isn’t that partly contradictory? The roles of the ECB and governments are different. Our job is to bring inflation back to its near-2% level. That’s our mandate; you could say that’s our contract. Whenever we have doubts that the goal will be reached, we act. Monetary policy has a short-to-medium-term horizon. We think it is up to governments to act to foster long-term growth. According to the European Commission, potential growth in the euro area is at around 1% today. It was almost twice that in the years before the crisis. And we think that structural and fiscal policy must be used wherever there is scope to do so, in terms of both quantity and quality. But it is not the ECB’s role to go into detail about what governments should do. The founding treaties are explicit and give us different roles. The idea that the central bank should be the gendarme of economic policy among euro area countries simply doesn’t work.

Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Politico Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, and Politico, conducted by Mr Pierre Briançon on 23 March 2016, and published on 30 March 2016. *  *  *  The last Governing Council meeting on 10 March seemed to be marked by some ambiguity on negative interest rates. On the one hand, the message was that rates wouldn’t get much lower. On the other, there was the signal that there could be exceptions… The question we are always trying to address is how to design our policy so that it is effective in the situation we face at a given moment. The package announced on 10 March was very potent, both in intensity and in sheer volume. Negative interest rates are not our main instrument, they just support our overall policy. And looking ahead, we’re not short of instruments – our choice is quite large. We will be able to deal with adverse situations if necessary. You indicated that the ECB wasn’t deaf to the banking sector’s concerns about the impact of negative rates on banks’ profitability. Banks’ profitability has improved when you look at the global overall impact of our monetary policy, that is, stronger credit demand and lower risk in the economy. And, as a matter of fact, the interest margin of banks has gone up, not down. Of course, the impact is different depending on banks’ business models and on how negative the rates are.
It is a symbol to which people are attached in meta-economical - if not religious - terms. The Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey, once stated: “I want the Queen’s head on the bank notes. The point about national identity is very important. I don’t want to become French or German.” Personally, I do not feel less German, only because I share a currency with fellow Europeans, just as presumably the Welsh, for example, can retain a strong sense of identity despite sharing the same money with the English. I also believe that a European identity - with its own shared symbols and characteristics - can happily co-exist with, and even re-enforce, national, regional and local identities. Nevertheless, symbols matter. The euro reflects the economic reality that now binds together those countries which have adopted it as their currency. It will also inevitably be regarded as a broader symbol of a shared future and destiny. Whatever the wider goals and ambitions of European integration may be, one thing is clear. The first and foremost objective of European Monetary Union was not simply to create a common currency but a stable currency. This is the promise that Europe needs to fulfil on a lasting basis. A stable money is too important to just be regarded as an instrument for other political ambitions. The reverse is true: without stable money all further ambition will come to nothing. Jaques Rueff in the 1950s famously claimed that “Europe will be built on money or it will not be built”.

Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards low and stable inflation. This is the most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments in the long term. Low and stable inflation provides enterprises and households with an anchor for inflation expectations. In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given both to variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. Flexible inflation targeting builds a bridge between the long-term objective of monetary policy, which is to keep inflation on target and provide an anchor for inflation expectations, and the short-term objective of stabilising economic developments. Transparency surrounding Norges Bank’s assessments of monetary policy trade-offs enhances economic agents’ understanding of how economic news influences the interest rate. In recent years, it has become easier to read the Bank’s intentions. As a result, monetary policy has become more effective. The background material for the Executive Board’s monetary policy meetings is published and the assessments underlying the interest rate decisions are explained. As from last autumn, the Bank publishes its own interest rate forecast. From using technical assumptions and others’ assessments, we have taken ownership of the interest rate path in our projections. Even though  BIS Review 44/2006  1  considerable uncertainty still remains, it becomes easier for economic agents to assess interest rate developments. Weak growth in the world economy early this decade led to low interest rates in many countries.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Second Summit Meeting of Central Banks on Inflation Targeting, Santiago de Chile, 14 November 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Let me thank Governor Corbo for his kind invitation to speak at this Second Summit Meeting of Central Banks on Inflation Targeting, hosted by the Central Bank of Chile. It is for me a privilege and a great pleasure to be here in Santiago and to have the opportunity to address this distinguished audience. I would like to begin my intervention today by recalling two important events that took place in 1999. In that year, the Central Bank of Chile adopted a full-fledged inflation targeting strategy with a floating exchange rate. This monetary regime has served Chile well, providing a coherent and transparent framework that is credible in society at large because all the economic agents clearly understand the policy objectives and the rationale for decisions. 1999 was the same year that the Governing Council of the European Central Bank took up the responsibility for conducting a single monetary policy for the entire euro area, after a prolonged period of intensive preparations and successful economic convergence.

Minister, this Loan Scheme being launched today provides a real opportunity for human capital development, which is necessary for national development. It enables children who would otherwise be excluded from the educational system have decent opportunities to receive education, as their parents can now access loans specifically targeted at meeting their educational expenses. Ladies and Gentlemen, a nation’s development depends on the levels of skills among its people and it is our expectation that the launch of this Scheme will contribute towards this noble cause. To this end, I would like to encourage parents and guardians to use the Student Loan Scheme in order to realise the vision of educating their children. Chairperson, what we are witnessing today represents an initiative by banks to respond to the needs of the community. As the Central Bank, we commend your bank for this initiative, which was borne out of the identified need to develop financial products that address problems in our society. Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me end by reminding players in the banking sector that as new products and services emerge, different or heightened levels of risk also emerge. The challenges that financial innovation poses for public policy and the regulatory framework in ensuring financial stability are enormous and cannot be over looked. In this regard, let me call upon the management of Indo-Zambia Bank to not only look at the benefits, but more also on the risks that accompany financial innovation.
More than ever, corporations’ fortunes and survival are now more closely linked. New realities require new paradigms. Co-opetition. How we cope with the new realities will depend on our ability to re-set our minds and leverage on networks to create value; at the customer, the firm, and at the system levels. There is enormous potential in re-defining strategies in competition and cooperation. Imagine the possibilities that could be achieved with strategic investments in shared infrastructure and the ability to share data securely across individuals and entities. We could significantly reduce costs, improve access, deliver superior customer experience which was previously not possible, with the network of shared information, better management and improved resilience against risks. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  A new paradigm on stability It has been 10 years since the global financial crisis. The global insurance industry is now on stronger and more stable foundation. Industry leaders and supervisors may be satisfied with what was achieved since then, but there is certainly no room for complacency. Achieving stability objectives will become more challenging as the complexities of risk identification increase. We know that insurance companies can create systemic risks, even though we may differ in our views over the intensity of such risks. There is a ‘constructive tension’, arising from the need to significantly strengthen regulation and supervision while balancing the need for growth, development and innovation. In a world characterised by fierce competition, complex product offerings and evolving customers’ needs, there is always the risk of administering excessive and complicated regulations.

Without wishing to preempt what you shall be taught, I wish to only explain that good corporate governance is one of our strategic objectives and its inclusion as a strategic objective reflects our commitment to align our operations with world best practices, consistent with our vision ‘to be a world class central bank’. The module on Risk Management was included to provide you with knowledge that will enable you appreciate why the Bank has introduced the Risk Management Department. Director - Risk Management will do a presentation during which he will explain what risk management is all about and its relevance to Bank of Zambia. Finally, the inclusion of a module on the Core Functions of the Bank of Zambia is designed to provide you with knowledge on the operations for which the Bank was established. This is important for a number of reasons. First, we want to have a cadre of enlightened and well informed managers who will portray a positive image of the Bank and reflect our standing as a world-class Bank. As managers, you have to have a reasonable understanding of how the Bank’s core activities departments operate and are organised. Second, as managers, especially as “world-class” employees, you are also expected, by the public, to  BIS Review 125/2006  1  have a reasonable grasp of issues pertaining to core operations of the Bank.
The Committee had to set out how it thought about the world, first of all for itself, and then for the outside world. You can still see evidence of all this activity on the Bank’s website – in speeches describing how the MPC saw the world, and in books which set out the MPC’s models of the economy. But the world does not stand still. Over the last decade, the Committee, and the Bank staff who support it, have had to confront some enormous changes in the economic environment. The Committee’s thinking has had to evolve to meet this challenge. Without going into detail – that would require another speech – let me give you a flavour of some of the questions with which we have been grappling during my own time on the Committee alone. First, we have had to understand the implications of some very big movements in asset prices, both domestically and globally. House prices have risen steadily, tripling since 1997, to reach record levels relative to household incomes and rents. Share prices soared in the run up to the millennium, then slumped, but have subsequently recovered. There has been a long running debate among central bankers about how they should respond to asset price booms – and possible busts – with some arguing that there is a case for taking pre-emptive action, over and above what might be warranted to meet the inflation target over the normal two to three year horizon.

1 The change has been stunning. To be fair though, it predates the formation of the MPC by several years; and other countries have experienced a similar, if not so pronounced, improvement in performance. There is considerable agreement that better monetary policy is partly responsible for this better outcome, though there is an ongoing debate about exactly how much was also due to unusually benign global economic conditions, including the impact of globalisation. Whatever the outcome of that debate, we clearly cannot bank on a trouble-free future. But we can and should look hard at the way our current monetary policy framework is operating, to give it the best chance of coping, if necessary, with a harsher climate. So tonight I want to consider what was so special about the MPC; and ten years on, ask how age and success has changed it; and what we can do to preserve its youthful vigour. 2  Historical background  The MPC has come to personify the monetary policy framework that was put in place when Gordon Brown made the Bank of England independent in 1997. But by monetary policy frameworks, I mean the broader set of rules and procedures for taking decisions about interest rates. Prior to 1992, such frameworks often took the form of a commitment to maintain a fixed exchange rate, most recently as a member of the ERM. But these proved hard to sustain – sterling was repeatedly devalued, at great political cost to the Government of the day.