samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They will add twenty-five percent to Europe’s population, twenty-three percent to Europe’s land mass and nine percent to European GDP on a purchasing power parity basis. Average GDP per capita in Europe will therefore decline by thirteen percent to a level slightly above sixty percent of that of the United States. Fifteen years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the new member states are keen to compete on the internal market. The adjustment process will entail important challenges to both newcomers and old-timers. On balance, I remain confident that in the longer term, the growth contribution to the European Union will be a positive one. In a world of rapid change and integration, countries with a long history of open economies and societies are well positioned to reap economic and social benefits. Both of our countries doubtlessly fit into that category. Note that in a recent global survey, Switzerland was voted the third most open country in the world. The challenge will be to maintain our ability to adapt to changing external conditions. On the important issue of domestic structural reform, Switzerland would be misguided to consider EMU membership as a strategy for curing domestic problems. Instead, we have much to learn from our friends across the English Channel on how to reform a domestic economy on the basis of domestic needs. Thank you.

Mario Draghi: ECB press conference - introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, and Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 7 March 2019. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Dombrovskis. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we have conducted a thorough assessment of the economic and inflation outlook, also taking into account the latest staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. As a result, the Governing Council took the following decisions in the pursuit of its price stability objective. First, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We now expect them to remain at their present levels at least through the end of 2019, and in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Second, we intend to continue reinvesting, in full, the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the asset purchase programme for an extended period of time past the date when we start raising the key ECB interest rates, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation.
Elvira Nabiullina: The Russian economic situation and Bank of Russia’s forecast Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in follow-up of Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 11 December 2014. *  *  *  Good afternoon! Today the Bank of Russia Board of Directors has decided to raise the key rate to 10.5% per annum. In the recent months, domestic inflation accelerated significantly and inflation expectations increased. According to our estimates, annual inflation will approximate 10% in 2014. The acceleration of inflation results from both the impact of the external trade restrictions and specific factors in the food market (which will add about 2.3 pp to the total inflation at yearend), and considerable ruble depreciation (that will contribute 2.6 pp). According to the Bank of Russia estimates, the impact of these factors will persist in 2015 Q1 resulting in stable increased inflation expectations and spreading inflationary pressure to the markets of goods and services not directly related to imports and sanctions. Meanwhile, the direct impact of ruble depreciation is time-limited and, according to our estimates, may be largely exhausted during the next six-month period. Tighter monetary policy of the Bank of Russia will contribute to limiting secondary effects, cooling inflation expectations and slowing price growth. Should inflation risks aggravate, the Bank of Russia is ready to further raise the key rate in order to prevent acceleration of inflation and loss of control over it. Monetary policy easing can be considered when inflation and inflation expectations show a stable downward trend.

While the export sector has continuously managed to achieve high productivity growth rates, productivity has lagged behind dramatically in the domestic sector of the economy. Since the domestic sector continues to represent the bulk of the Swiss economy (approximately 60% of GDP), the poor performance of the domestically oriented sectors undermines the growth potential of the Swiss economy.9 In light of the rapidly deteriorating  7  There are numerous useful definitions of globalization. Here I make reference to the one used by Ngaire Woods, ed. (2000): “The Political Economy of Globalization”, New York: St. Martin’s Press. 8  As a percentage of GDP, Switzerland’s current account surplus is exceeded only by that of Singapore. Switzerland holds net foreign assets of about 135% of GDP which is unmatched in the world. The biggest part of the Swiss current account surplus is therefore derived from the interest earned on these assets (36 billion CHF vs. a surplus of 25 billion CHF from services and a 4.5 billion surplus from trade in 2002). 9  GDP growth in Switzerland is underestimated by the official statistics because these do not fully take into account the improvement of the terms of trade that are regularly realised by the tradable sector (see Ulrich Kohli (2002): “Veränderungen der Terms of Trade und reales BIP” (Terms-of-Trade Changes and Real GDP: Evidence from Switzerland (with English summary), Schweizerische Nationalbank Quartalsheft, June, pp. 54-63.
But what is the ideal institutional structure that would allow us to update, change and simplify these rules? This is a timely question. Less than a month and a half ago, the UK exited the EU. The implementation period is due to last until the end of this year. While we are in the implementation period, the Government and the regulators will continue to onshore any new financial regulations and standards coming from the EU that take effect this year. And at the end of the implementation period, the UK will be left with the same complex set of EU law and regulations onshored in a way that replicates the rather unique way the EU – as a supranational institution – the area of financial services. The technical detail of the prudential requirements will sit in a dispersed variety of places: primary legislation, a range of statutory instruments, on-shored binding technical standards, and PRA rules and guidance. This ‘patchwork’ naturally makes the framework difficult for firms to navigate – particularly smaller firms with more limited resources to devote to compliance. It is partly for that reason that the previous Chancellor Philip Hammond announced in the 2019 Spring Statement that HM Treasury will be reviewing the post-exit regulatory framework.

Outside the UK, the model of independent regulators with mandates making rules is common practice in most other jurisdictions. The need for operational independence is reflected in the Basel Core Principles for banking supervision.8 All jurisdictions represented in the Basel Committee implemented the Basel 3 reforms through regulators’ rules or guidelines rather than primary legislation, with the exceptions of the EU, with its very specific supranational structure, and Switzerland, with its unique federal structure. Details of the FPC’s objectives and primary responsibilities are set out in section 9C of the Bank of England Act 1998. In particular, the FPC is charged with ‘the identification of, monitoring of, and taking of action to remove or reduce, systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system’, but this does not ‘require or authorise the Committee to exercise its functions in a way that would in its opinion be likely to have a significant adverse effect on the capacity of the financial sector to contribute to the growth of the UK economy in the medium or long term’. For a more detailed discussion of the FPC’s mandate, see my colleague Alex Brazier’s May 2019 speech, ‘Citizens in service, not people in power’, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2019/citizens-in-service-not-people-in-power-speech-byalex-brazier.pdf.
Furthermore, Sweden is one of the absolute leaders in information technology (IT), both as regards Internet users and in broader terms such as the number of computers and mobile phones. In such surveys, the United States usually comes out top. The Internet makes it simple to obtain information, communicate with others and trade in goods and services. Price comparisons are already feasible and one can buy some goods and services, not least bank services. In these ways the Internet cuts distances, overcomes borders, contributes to a more competitive environment and enables consumers to be better informed. Everyone can get the information he or she needs easily and painlessly, often dispensing with intermediaries. Besides affecting consumer behaviour, the Internet and information technology in general have consequences for production processes. In addition to more informed consumers, we have firms with better oversight of production, material inputs, distribution processes and sales. Information technology compared with the railways Simplifying somewhat, the advent of the Internet can be compared with the era of railroad construction in Sweden in the second half of the 19th century. In the initial phase, there was a boom for those who constructed the railways and manufactured rolling stock. In the closing decade of the century, Swedish firms began to produce locomotives; previously that had been the preserve of British manufacturers. The Swedish firms took over the domestic market and were even able to export their products. Much the same happened with the manufacture of passenger carriages and goods wagons.

It is just as important a prerequisite for increasing prosperity now that the world is on its way into a new millennium as it was over a hundred years ago when Sweden was industrialised. The smoother we make such a continuous transformation, the greater the chances will be of looking forward to a new fantastic century. 9  BIS Review 137/1999
It is imperative that a lot more local businesses engage in economic sectors like mining, manufacturing, construction and tourism in order to effectively contribute to the country’s economic development. This can only be possible through innovation and risk taking by indigenous companies with the potential to grow and succeed not only in Zambia but also in international markets. BIS Review 103/2010  1  Moreover, entrepreneurship can play a central role in assisting our country meet the various challenges that it faces today. For instance, entrepreneurship can assist in addressing the challenges arising from:   Low levels of employment;    Social exclusion;    Low levels of competitive products and services in the economy; and    Urbanisation and rural poverty. In order to minimize the adverse effects that arise from these challenges, there is a need to both sustain a high level of entrepreneurial activity in general and to maximise the number of new businesses that are innovative, and that aspire to, and are capable of achieving significant growth. However, if we are to build a much greater number of competitive and innovative businesses in Zambia, then we will need to see many new businesses being created now and in the years ahead. We need to ensure that the culture of entrepreneurship becomes embedded in all our people at a very young age.

Our new conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate is 1.5% over the entire forecast horizon (cf. chart 1). Stronger second-round effects and the fact that inflationary pressure from abroad has increased again mean that, despite the raising of the SNB policy rate, the new forecast is higher through to mid-2025 than in December. The new forecast puts average annual inflation at 2.6% for 2023, and 2.0% for 2024 and 2025 (cf. table 1). Without today’s policy rate increase, the inflation forecast would be even higher over the medium term. Uncertainty regarding price developments going forward remains high, and there is above all the risk of elevated inflation becoming embedded. Global economic outlook  What is the economic outlook? The global economy hardly grew in the fourth quarter. Nevertheless, Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 will likely be slightly less weak overall than expected in December. Inflation is currently clearly above central banks’ targets in many countries. Against this background, numerous central banks have tightened their monetary policy further. The growth outlook for the global economy in the coming quarters remains subdued. At the same time, inflation is likely to remain elevated worldwide for the time being. Over the medium term, however, it should return to more moderate levels, not least thanks to monetary policy and due to the economic slowdown. Our scenario for the global economy is subject to significant risks, in particular due to the recent turmoil in the global financial sector.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Another area where there needs to be greater international cooperation is in defining the roles of home and host countries especially during times of stress. What is the responsibility, for example, of the host country to provide lender-of–last- resort liquidity to foreign firms operating in their jurisdiction? At what stage, if any, does that responsibility shift to home country? Should these responsibilities change depending on the degree of information exchange or the degree or duration of stress? On the resolution front, we know that the benefits of a harmonized global regime would be substantial. By providing greater transparency to investors and depositors about the rules of the game in the event of distress, such a regime would likely reduce the likelihood of runs and financial panics while also allowing financial intermediation to occur on a global basis. However, it is proving challenging for some jurisdictions to provide clarity around how an orderly resolution would be implemented in practice. At the same time, this lack of clarity within jurisdictions is contributing to and exacerbated by the lack of a harmonized approach across different legal and regulatory regimes. Many questions must be answered: How would different creditor and counterparty claims be treated? Who would provide the bridge financing to facilitate the orderly liquidation? Would the home country regime ensure equal treatment of all banks’ claims around the world, regardless of jurisdiction or legal entity? Would there be clarity about this, ex ante?

In order for the U.S. to reduce its dependence on consumption and to increase its exports, there need to be offsetting adjustments in other countries, such as China. Thus, the key issue to consider in crafting internationally coordinated macroeconomic policy is not whether these adjustments will ultimately take place. They will take place because they have to take place. Instead, the issue for policymakers is whether the policies we put in place will allow adjustments to occur in a way that is consistent with a stable global economy, high levels of employment, and low inflation. At times, the situation is akin to the Prisoner’s Dilemma – a non-cooperative approach will lead to inferior results for both players compared to a cooperative approach in which each side foregoes the chance for highest potential payoff in exchange for the payoff that maximizes returns jointly. But effective cooperation that leads to higher joint returns is difficult in this game because of the complexity of the inter-linkages and the political and institutional constraints that constrain the scope for action at the national level. In macroeconomic terms, the prospects for achieving a more cooperative solution can be enhanced by policy transparency so that the policy goals and reaction function of each authority can be well understood by others. This again applies both within and across countries. For example, the Federal Reserve is making efforts to provide greater clarity about its inflation objective in the context of the dual mandate.
If, however, specific factors related to globalisation or decrease in the risk premium are the cause of persisting low long-term interest rates, the short-term interest rate should be higher in order to achieve appropriate restrictiveness of the monetary policy resulting from the entire yield curve. While it is difficult to assess which hypothesis is correct, central banks, as sailors did in the old days, should apply two iron rules: firstly, frequently determine their position, secondly, use as many waypoints as possible. This means that, especially where new phenomena emerge or there are structural transformations, the monetary policy must not be described using just a few simple indicators, as e.g. inflation and output gap in the Taylor rule. Monetary policy decisions should rather be a product of a complex analysis of a number of indicators and data and cross-checked with qualitative information. In turn, another Federal Reserve governor, Donald Kohn 29 , devoted his recent address to the analysis of when and on what conditions the central banks should respond to rapid changes of asset prices. In Kohn’s opinion, there are two possible approaches. According to one of them, described as the conventional monetary policy, the central bank focuses on stabilising the inflation, treats changes in asset prices as an exogenous process and does not attempt to influence asset prices whatsoever.

There has been a political agreement with the Parliament on two other files (Cross Border Distribution of Funds and European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) Refit). And I understand they have reached a general approach on the European system of financial supervision (ESFS) file, at the Council level. I am sure we will keep up the good work and efforts on every side will have a positive outcome. The future might be uncertain, but we can surely try to better prepare for it. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Mark Carney: The spirit of the season Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, to the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 9 December 2013. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. It is always a pleasure to be in New York during the festive season. At this time of year in this city everything seems possible. However for some time now, appearances have deceived. The hopes and dreams of the holiday season have gone unfulfilled as the bright lights of December have given way to the grim realities of January. Around this time every year policymakers, investors and economists take stock. For four of the past five years, perhaps caught up in the seasonal spirit of goodwill, they have rendered the same verdict: the outgoing year was disappointing but the incoming one will be better (Chart 1). This year is no different. The IMF, the Bank of England and private forecasters all predict faster growth in the advanced and global economies in 2014. Will such hopes again be dashed once the New Year dawns? More profoundly, as the string of disappointments lengthens, some are raising deeper questions. It is being suggested that a malign spirit, a spectre of Christmases past, haunts our future. In particular, no less an authority than Larry Summers has raised the prospect that “secular stagnation” could be the root cause of past excess and current weakness.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of Russia’s economic and financial developments in 2015 Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the plenary meeting of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 14 June 2016. *  *  *  Good afternoon, dear colleagues! Today we present the latest Annual Report of the Bank of Russia to the 6th State Duma. First of all, I would like to thank the deputies for the legislative efforts, which we took together to both develop the financial system and protect the rights of financial services consumers, and for the efficient cooperation with the Bank of Russia. As many as 130 laws affecting the financial sector have been adopted over these three years. Now, let’s look at the Bank of Russia’s performance in 2015. A sharp deterioration in external environment in late 2014 – early 2015 (oil price drop and sanctions) triggered turbulence in the external market and followed by a surge in inflation. These developments required measures to stabilise the situation and help the economy adjust to the worsened conditions. The first one is a transition to a floating exchange rate of the ruble. This is a pivotal systemic measure. Though this transition was not a smooth one, I would like to stress, should we have failed to take this step, according to our estimates, the economic downturn could have been deeper. Now the floating exchange rate works as an embedded economic stabiliser that mitigates the external shocks.