samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the UK, however, core inflation is now more than 1.5 per cent and seems to be on the rise. So far, moderate wage growth in both Europe and the US suggests that employees have not been compensated for the rise in energy prices. If the increase in oil prices is perceived as long-lasting, this may result in higher inflation expectations, higher wage demands and a more pronounced pass-through to other prices. Over the past few months, key rates have been raised in the US, Canada and New Zealand, while the UK key rate has been reduced by 0.25 percentage point. Key rates remain low among many of our trading partners. Market participants seem to expect a gradual increase in key rates in the period ahead, and at a somewhat faster pace than expected last summer. Towards the end of 2006, key rates in the US and the UK are expected to be around 4½ per cent. For the euro area and Sweden, key rates are expected to be considerably lower, at a little less than 2¾ per cent and 2½ per cent respectively. In recent months, global long-term interest rates have also edged up again somewhat. This reflects stronger inflationary impulses as a result of high energy prices. Market participants’ long-term inflation expectations, measured as the difference between nominal and real government bond yields, have shown a small increase since last summer. Low interest rates and expectations of continued low real interest rates are sustaining the cyclical upturn in Norway.

The fact that euro area is not witnessing a strong pickup in wages should not make us complacent: the risks to inflation are on the upside. The latest Eurostat data show that the bulk of inflation is due to the cost of energy (40.8%), but there are signs of it spreading to non-energy industrial goods and to services, whose prices grew by 5.5% and 4.3% respectively in the year up to September 2022. Price and financial stability are important drivers of foreign direct investments that foster international economic integration by creating long-lasting ties between countries, promoting economic development through access to foreign markets and technology dissemination. As such foreign direct investments bear particular significance in the catching up process of Emerging Market Developing Economies. The ECB Governing Council is well aware of the risks inherent in policy normalisation and for this purpose a sequencing approach has been adopted. Net asset purchases were halted first, then a series of rates hike began. At the same time, the proceeds of  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  matured securities are being fully reinvested. Interestrates are the marginal tool to alter the policy stance and the hiking cycle isintended to settle rates at a level consistent with inflation converging towards the target. Frontloading interest rate hikes has also been shown to lower the risk of the economy suffering a hard landing later on.
The assessment of the Executive Board members was that cutting the repo rate from 3.75 to 2 per cent was necessary both to dampen the fall in production and employment and to attain the inflation target of 2 per cent. The situation in the financial markets both in Sweden and abroad had not improved appreciably, despite central banks and governments around the world implementing forceful measures. The markets for medium and long-term borrowing were functioning poorly, and sometimes not at all, and liquidity premiums were still high. The financial crisis had severely hampered access to credit and we could see clearly how this was reinforcing the downturn in the development of the economy. GDP had begun to fall in important parts of the world around us, economic indicators were at historically low levels and share prices had fallen drastically in recent months. Energy and food prices had fallen substantially since the peak in the middle of the year and this brought some relief for households. The downturn also contributed to a fall in inflation and in this way there was greater scope to counteract the negative developments by cutting policy rates, both in Sweden and abroad. Our earlier forecast was that the Swedish economy would be tangibly affected by the financial crisis and that there would be a sharp downturn in international economic activity.

The idea was that a fixed exchange rate for the krona would mean that inflation in Sweden was adapted in the long term to inflation in the countries with currencies to which the krona was pegged. Confidence in the fixed exchange rate would mean that the expectations of inflation in Sweden would largely be the same as the expectations in the countries to which we were thus linked. But in Sweden, as in many other countries, it proved impossible to prevent inflation soaring with a fixed exchange rate regime. Other countries which tried to control inflation by means of targets for the money supply also faced problems. The Riksbank announced its inflation target in January 1993, after the krona had been allowed to float earlier in the autumn with a great hullabaloo. The Bank then announced that the target for monetary policy would be to hold the annual change in the consumer price index at 2 per cent. The target would formally apply with effect from 1995. In this way Sweden became one of the first countries to choose to formulate its monetary policy in terms of an explicit inflation target. BIS Review 2/2008  1  Despite being aware that it would be difficult to attain the target exactly, the Riksbank chose to formulate the target with a specific figure for inflation. One of the most important reasons for this was to try to create an anchor around which inflation expectations could be stabilised.
I take this opportunity to emphasise that, in addition to the need for expanding and deepening the financial market, it is necessary to increasingly pay attention to the management of risk that accompanies any financial investment. We are witnesses of a rapid technological evolution, which has practically eliminated physical boundaries, has eased access to electronic investment platforms, and has rendered very difficult the supervision and regulation of many innovative financial instruments that are traded in these platforms. The phenomenon of informality coupled with the speed of innovation in the field of financial instruments are a real risk for every investor that is naively driven by profit and does not stop to analyse the magnitude and nature of risk to which he is exposed. Anyhow, inclusion should take place carefully, relying on specialised financial intermediaries and auxiliaries, whose activity is regulated and supervised by a legitimate authority in Albania or abroad. Dear participants, The depth and expansion of the financial markets determines the set of financial instruments eligible for trading, in a broad spectrum from the maturity perspective. These instruments are nothing more than consecutive steps in the monetary policy decisions pass-through mechanism. The whole process of instrument trading serves to determine the value of assets, the price of risk and savings, and, eventually, the propensity toward consumption, savings or investments. In this sense, the existence, completeness, and effectiveness of the financial market play a significant role in the monetary policy pass-through.

The agreement for a minimum corporate tax rate for multinational enterprises, spurred by the G20 with the OECD’s invaluable support and ratified by more than 130 countries that account for more the 90% of world GDP, is a good example of the benefits that international cooperation can generate in the digital era. Furthermore, supply issues, which have led to shortages and strains on prices during both the pandemic and now the war in Ukraine, strengthen the case for boosting international cooperation. In its latest World Economic Outlook, the International Monetary Fund concluded that these supply issues should not lead us to lessen our economic openness. On the contrary, its analyses point to the international diversification of imports and improved substitutability of the sources of inputs from different countries to boost value chains’ resilience. Signing new bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and strengthening pre-existing ones, which would afford greater certainty to trade relations while reducing their cost, would also help attain this goal. To conclude, I believe that, by sharing experiences and outlooks, fora such as this one help gain a deeper understanding of the challenges that we, the economic and monetary authorities, must face. I hope that you are able to benefit fully from the discussions held over the coming days and wish you a pleasant stay in Seville. 2
BIS Review 75/2001  3  The broad use of statistical risk models can have a similar effect. It is, of course, a good thing to use risk models as an aid and we can conclude that they have enabled great progress in the management of financial risks. However, there is an evident problem here. When an increasing number of players are using the same models, they are also likely to react in a similar way when there is unease on the markets, which can reinforce fluctuations and trigger new signals from the models, and so on. What is rational for one individual institute may in this case be irrational as a whole. Increased transparency reduces risk of herd behaviour So is it possible to counteract this type of behaviour? Allow me to begin by emphasising that economic risk-taking in itself is an important factor behind economic growth. However, risk-taking also means that not all investments will bear fruit. This is why we have created national bankruptcy regulations enabling businesses to be liquidated in an orderly manner. For the same reason, we must assume that financial crises will emerge even in the future. On the other hand, we must of course do all we can to avoid such crises spreading unnecessarily. I should also like to stress that I do not believe that different types of taxes aimed at reducing the turnover on the markets are a practicable route forward.

I would like to remind you that as far back as this summer the oil price exceeded $ Therefore the baseline scenario is built on the basis of the average annual oil price in 2015, which will be slightly below the average price in 2014. Further on, we project a gradual downward  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  adjustment of the average annual oil price. If necessary, we shall review the base assumptions of oil price before submitting the final draft of the document to the State Duma. Another difference of the forecast prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development is in the fact that its projected 2015 inflation is 5.0–6.0%, which is higher than the forecast of the Bank of Russia. In our assumptions we expect the exhaustion of the factors that have caused the rise in inflation this year, and in the baseline scenario, we assume that the inflation will reach 4–4.5%. According to our estimates, the difference between the key parameters of the federal budget, calculated on the basis of the forecast of the Ministry of Economic Development (this is the way the draft budget is calculated) and the one calculated on the basis of the Bank of Russia forecast, is also insignificant. The federal budget deficit in 2015–2017 will remain low.
A raft of measures have moved shadow banking into the light, eliminating its toxic elements and ensuring more resilient market based finance. And, perhaps most importantly, the crisis led to a reformed governance structure with the creation of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), accountable to both the G20 Finance Ministers and Governors and to the G20 leaders. The FSB brings together the central banks, regulators, and finance ministries of jurisdictions representing around 90% of the global financial system. It has a broad mandate to promote financial stability, monitor and assess risks, and coordinate standard setting bodies to ensure no regulatory gaps. The FSB has driven the great reform programme to address the fault lines exposed by the crisis. That programme is largely complete and in its implementation phase. We cannot and do not need to be forever in a post crisis reform phase. But, looking forward, there is always the danger that we fall behind again. The progress we have made in governance since the crisis gives us the ability to prevent this from happening. We have far better institutional machinery today, through the FSB and G20 to bring governance into line with new risks and challenges before rather than after a crisis. The FSB’s work on cryptoassets in 2018 is a good example. The G20 identified the rapid growth of cryptoassets as a potential problem and tasked the FSB with analysing the risks posed. In the space of less than a year the FSB concluded that cryptoassets did not currently pose financial stability risks.

Analysis of cross-border investment banking 2000–2014. Journal of Economic Geography, 18(1), 1-33. 1 2  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  But while financial markets and financial centres need to be supported and governed by the right regulatory framework, one cannot regulate deep capital markets into being, and certainly not global ones. The development of market-based finance in the EU has, in my view, more to gain than lose from access to the markets, expertise and concentration of financial activity in London – from partnership rather than rivalry with the global financial centre on its doorstep. We cannot, of course, read the future and predict how the financial arteries and veins now connecting the UK and EU will develop now the UK is no longer a member of the EU. What we can say, with some confidence, however, is that though the financial connections between us will change and adapt, they will not be severed. The UK, and the global financial centre we host, will remain open to access from the EU and its members as we are open to access from the US and Asia. And unless the EU and its members want to reverse their integration into the global financial sector – and I see no real signs of that - there will continue to be strong financial sector connections between us.
The implementation of the SSM and the resolution structure should be closely coordinated, which means that proposals on the latter will be needed in 2013. Yet the exact structure of the deposit insurance scheme will depend also on what reforms are enacted after the recommendations of the Liikanen Report, 3 published last week, that aim to protect retail  2  See “A contribution from the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee to the discussion on the European Commission’s banking union proposals” at http://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc /Reports_ASC_1210.pdf?490dce9cc2a2bf39b76ae4b06604b0ca  3  See “High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-level_expert_group/report_en.pdf  4  banking  sector”  at  BIS central bankers’ speeches  depositors from excessive risk-taking by banks with structural measures that would reshape the industry. Common challenges to both the resolution structure and deposit insurance scheme will be to agree on adequate ex ante burden-sharing rules between governments that provide market participants with the right incentives while preserving financial stability, and adequately deal with legacy issues. The final form of the banking union will appropriately reflect these considerations, and we are confident that implementation will start as planned with the establishment of the SSM in early 2013.

Moreover, within the euro area there would no longer be a host or a home supervisor, and this arrangement should ensure that cross-border allocation of capital and liquidity would be primarily driven by business considerations. Banks’ funding costs should start to indicate again their individual creditworthiness, without the premia that reflect their sovereign’s fiscal position or redenomination risk. A common resolution fund would decrease the too-big-to-fail problem and thus reduce moral hazard; furthermore, it would spread the burden of resolution rather than saddling any single sovereign with it. Finally, depositors would not need to consider shifting their funds across the continent in search of a safe haven, as all banks would offer the same insurance coverage. Of course, as with all structural changes and new institutional constructions, setting up a fully-fledged banking union will take some time. The most urgent component of the banking union is in my view the SSM, which should enter into force as early as possible in 2013 to allow the ECB to prepare for its new tasks, with full accountability and a governance structure that strictly separates monetary policy from supervisory decisions. I won’t go into the details of the current proposal put forward by the European Commission. For this, since we are at a research-oriented conference, I would refer you to the report 2 on the European Commission’s banking union proposals which has just been published by the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board.
•  The start of this decade saw a number of high-profile corporate scandals involving misconduct at the highest levels and breakdowns of internal control and compliance processes. In the U.S., extensive accounting fraud at Enron and WorldCom contributed to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which clearly places new obligations on covered firms. Other countries have not been immune to instances of accounting mismanagement, as evidenced by the example of Parmalat in Italy. •  The events of September 11, 2001 and subsequent emphasis on terrorism were the impetus for the USA Patriot Act, which substantially increased the compliance obligations of banks and other financial services firms. In particular, while firms have long been expected to have knowledge of the people that they do business with, Title III of this act - which focuses on international money laundering - puts an even stronger onus on financial firms to “know their customers” and keep a close watch on how they use their accounts. A combination of these new legislative initiatives and increased public scrutiny has led the supervisory community to place greater emphasis on compliance enforcement. •  Some of this is coming from relatively new sources - for example, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (or FinCEN), after it was upgraded to bureau status at the Treasury Department, has become more active in addressing financial abuses. And various State Attorneys General, such as in New York State, have been particularly aggressive in recent years in pursuing cases in the financial services industry.

As we emphasised in our monetary strategy review approved in July 2021, financial stability should be seen as a prerequisite for price stability.1 In addition, we took a further step in the process of tightening our monetary policy stance in response to the outlook for euro area inflation, which is projected to remain too high for too long. In line with our intentions already anticipated at our February meeting, we increased interest rates by 50 basis points (bp), bringing the deposit facility rate (DFR) to 3%. This represents a cumulative increase of 350 bp since July last year. As to our future monetary policy path, the financial tensions that broke out before our meeting imply an additional element of uncertainty around the growth and inflation baseline scenario. This extra uncertainty makes the data-dependent approach for our decisions even more important. Our future monetary policy will depend on how the different sources of risks, including those witnessed on the financial markets in the last few weeks, materialise. We also provided more detail on what will guide our assessment of the inflation outlook and, therefore, our monetary policy decisions. In particular, we announced that this assessment will depend on three main factors. First, incoming economic and financial data. Second, the of underlying inflation dynamics. And lastly, the strength of monetary policy transmission. I will now elaborate on these three factors. The first is our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data.
We are making headway in our strategy to position Singapore as an e-trading hub for FX, facilitating better price discovery during Asian hours and better execution for players in the region. XTX Markets, a global FX liquidity provider, has announced its plans to set up its pricing and trading engine in Singapore. We are working with other key banks and e-trading platforms in the pipeline. JOBS AND SKILLS Let me move on to the second pillar of the ITM—jobs and skills. More finance professionals are going for training and development. Some 27,000 financial industry professionals have benefited from SkillsFuture programmes during 2016-2017. There remains, however, a shortfall of specialised talent in IT—which we are addressing in two ways: MAS, IMDA, the Institute of Banking and Finance and institutes of higher learning are working together to deepen the local IT talent pool at the entry level. IBF is engaging financial institutions on developing local IT talent through company-led training and professional conversion programmes (PCPs). We have ramped up efforts to reskill and redeploy banking professionals into emerging roles. Job roles are changing as banks pivot towards digital banking models over time. We must ensure that our banking professionals can take on these new roles. More than 3,000 consumer banking employees will be reskilled through a PCP over the next two years, acquiring relevant skills in sales, product development, and digital engagement.

Clearly, we tried to explain to the citizens and I think that they understood well, that the deposits stay here in Macedonia, and that they are not taken abroad, they are invested in the Macedonian economy and there is absolutely no reason for fear for losing the deposits. Speaking of banks, the companies are those being less credited than the households. Does it mean that the banks do not trust the economy? It is fact that the last year, year and a half, the banks have been more focused on the households, and less to the companies. The main reason for that is the higher risk with the companies, because the bad placements with the enterprises got higher in the last two years, while with the households, they stagnate, or even decrease. It certainly has reflection on the bank perception and their behavior. However, with the introduction of the reserve requirement instrument, the rise in the savings deposits become evident, but can such instrument stimulate the credit growth, as well? Yes, in the recent 12 months, we have taken several measures, especially with the reserve requirement, which were directed towards: firstly, stimulation of the crediting and secondly, changes in the savings structure in favor of the Denar savings for the account of the Euro savings.