samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
New technologies could allow operations all year round and 24/7, and reduce the number of intermediaries involved. -  A CBDC can also facilitate cross-border payments thanks to the use of distributed ledger technology and the interoperability of CBDC systems in different jurisdictions. We have this year joined forces with the SNB, the BIS innovation hub and a private sector consortium led by Accenture, within a project named JURAiii, which would allow the use of Swiss franc and euro CBDCs on a DLT platform. We are also working with the Monetary Authority of Singapore to test cross-currency payments with CBDCs. -  Existing market infrastructures (like T2S) and players, and future systems based on distributed ledger technology will need to be interoperable. Decentralised finance is still not mature enough to handle large volumes of transactions, and therefore will not replace conventional systems from one day to another: centralised and decentralised systems will have to coexist securely and efficiently. This is the purpose of two experiments that we recently completed respectively with SEBA Bank,iv for the settlement of listed securities, and with Euroclear/Agence France Trésor on a collateral operation involving a French OAT. 3/ When: getting ready to introduce a CBDC rapidly if necessary We therefore need to prepare ourselves, without hesitation, to introduce a CBDC rapidly if necessary:  Next July, the Governing Council could give the green light to launch an investigation phase, which could begin in the autumn and last until 2023.

1 / Why: incorporating digital innovations is an imperative I shall sum up some very strong trends as a “triangle of risks”:  First, on retail payments, over the last 18 months, cash has accelerated its decline while the share of dematerialised payments has increased twice as fast as before the crisis, from 51 % in 2019 to 70 % in the first half of 2021. There is also a strong shift towards the tokenisation of financial assets. This dual trend could lead to the marginalisation of the use of central bank money, be it in the form of banknotes or in settlement systems. We, as a central bank shall never abandon cash; but this commitment cannot be our sole response to technological change. Second, the emergence of BigTechs and new settlement assets  (crypto-assets  and  stablecoins)  could threaten  our  monetary  sovereignty and our mandate to safeguard financial stability. Third and final factor, the progress made by extra-European CBDCs and notably by the digital  yuan, already accessible in the major Chinese cities. The risk is clearly that Europe will lose momentum not just in its drive to strengthen the international role of the euro, but even in preserving it. The challenge here is also a geopolitical concern. 2/ How: reasserting the anchoring role of central bank money thanks to a holistic approach Faced with these challenges, we want to be proactive and move forward in partnership with commercial banks.
i The past growth path is calculated here using the December 2019 macroeconomic GDP projection, extrapolated from 2023 onwards using the potential GDP forecast at that time. ii F. Villeroy de Galhau, Europe’s growth gap reconciling Keynes and Schumpeter, Speech, March 2021. iii European Commission, Impact assessment, Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition, Commission staff working document, 2020. iv J. Pisani-Ferry, Climate policy is macroeconomic policy, and the implications will be significant, PIIE Policy Brief No.2120, August 2021. v T. Allen, J. Boissinot, L. Clerc, S. Dees, Developing climate transition scenarios to manage financial risks, Bulletin de la Banque de France No.237/9, by T. Allen, S. Dees, C. M. Caicedo Graciano, V. Chouard, L. Clerc, A. de Gaye, ... & L. Vernet, Climate-related scenarios for financial stability assessment: An application to France, 2020. Page 16 sur 15 vi  Spain and Italy have the lowest scores in the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), 252 and 250, respectively, in adult literacy, just behind France (262), compared to 284 for the Netherlands, 278 for Norway and 279 for Sweden. In France, 22% of workers are low-skilled, in Spain and Italy around 27%, in Sweden and Norway around 13%. Shares of high-skilled workers: France 8%, Spain 5%, Italy 3%, Sweden 16%, Norway 14% Based on PEICA 2012 and OECD 2013, qualifications in terms of skills.

I wish you a very fruitful conference. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In my opinion, moreover, they have had a favourable effect on the Riksbank’s internal atmosphere and efficiency. 6  BIS Review 75/2001  As regards currency market interventions, we should likewise naturally aim to be as open and distinct as possible. The arguments about credibility and legitimacy apply here as well. There is also reason to believe that interventions will be more successful if they are perceived as a monetary policy signal, with information about the central bank’s assessment of price developments and thereby the future path of the instrumental rate. When the Riksbank intervened last June we made a point of demonstrating that the measure’s context was monetary policy. The measure was announced and communicated in speeches by Urban Bäckström and myself. At the time of the first intervention, moreover, the Executive Board issued a press notice and Urban Bäckström took part in a broadcast interview in which a good deal of time was devoted to this issue. The degree of openness was also substantial in the sense that we informed our counterparties that the interventions had been made and confirmed this when questions were asked. Moreover, the size of the interventions could be calculated later from the weekly publications of the Riksbank’s balance sheet. So on this occasion we were more transparent and distinct than is customary with currency interventions, compared both with our earlier record and with most other central banks. We did, however, depart from the customary procedure in one respect.

In addition, we consider other relevant information that is available, not least the exchange rate that can be said to be more fundamentally reasonable. Which of these three approaches is most appropriate - given that game situations and the risk of sudden shifts could be disregarded - is not self-evident. Personally I cannot see why we should not treat the exchange rate in much the same way as other forecast variables. We normally try to consider all the relevant information that can be gathered on a particular variable. It seems reasonable to do so in this case, too. Another matter is the considerable degree of uncertainty that surrounds virtually all forecast variables and particularly the exchange rate. That is why we also produce an assessment of risks. Our policy is then based on an overall assessment, including a valuation of the various risks. Exchange rate theories It is often said that for the conduct of economic policy, the best help in practice is a good theory. In the case of exchange rates, however, the relevant theories have not been particularly successful at either explaining or predicting movements of the Swedish krona or other currencies in recent years. A basic difficulty with theories for determining exchange rates is the fact that an exchange rate is a nominal price, whereas economic analysis is constructed to explain relative prices.
If we rely on strong macroeconomic policy, the principles of an open economy and future-looking investment, Estonia will continue to have all the possibilities for defeating the crisis. But what are the national economy level measures the government should take and how should they support the financial system? Here I start with a firm standpoint that the fixed exchange rate of the kroon to the euro is the pillar of Estonia's economic policy and the accession to the euro area as soon as possible is its logical continuation. The experience of the past half a year show that monetary policy that is based on the fixed exchange rate and the currency board supports economic stability also in more difficult times. But how does the fixed exchange rate help us overcome the crisis? First of all, it helps stabilise inflation expectations and stop price rises. Price corrections after the accession to the EU were sharper then we expected. The opening of the labour market and price rises of many goods in the global market had a strong impact on Estonia. This stage, which was, in a sense, unavoidable and paradoxically also the result of successful reforms at the start of the century, is now over. The price level is expected to decline somewhat both this and next year. Second of all, the currency board arrangement brought about a relatively fast correction in several sectors of the economy, which displayed clear signs of overheating after the accession to the EU.

Another possibility is that low long-term rates reflect unusually strong demand for long-term securities, for example, by pension funds seeking to improve the match between the durations of their assets and liabilities, by holders of mortgage-backed securities seeking to maintain the durations of their portfolios, or by foreign central banks that have been acquiring dollars. China may have been playing an especially large role, as its central bank has intervened in foreign exchange markets to peg the renminbi at a low level against the dollar. Of course, last week the People’s Bank of China announced that it had revalued the renminbi against the dollar by 2.1 percent, with the stated intention of managing the renminbi’s exchange value against an unspecified currency basket. This is not a large revaluation, but some observers think that it is the beginning of a much bigger move over time. If this is the case, we may gain a better understanding of the impact, if any, that Chinese exchange rate policy has had on U.S. bond rates. An alternative to “special factors” as an explanation for the low level of long-term yields is the possibility that the flat yield curve reflects the market’s assessment that bad news is on the horizon. In other words, investors may expect only modest increases in the funds rate in the future because they think that the drags I’ve described will keep demand on the weak side for some time to come.
This has been reinforced by increased liquidity in the international financial system in search of higher returns and greater diversification of risk. Since the issuance of the first sovereign global Islamic sukuk by the Government of Malaysia in 2002, there has been a series of other issues by the governments of United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Pakistan. An increased number of multilateral agencies have  BIS Review 88/2007  1  also issued sukuks to finance development projects. In addition, both government agencies and the corporate sector have considered the sukuk market as an attractive instrument of financing. Thirdly, there is a great number of global players such as investment banks, Islamic banks and securities firms that are involved in the issuance of sukuk in the international financial markets. A large number of Western banks are also providing Islamic financial services taking advantage of the opportunities and to provide customised products and services to their customers. Fourthly, the established international financial centres have also shown interests to have an active role in promoting the development of the sukuk market including enacting the appropriate legislative provisions. These developments would augur well for the development of the sukuk market. Finally, the regulatory and supervisory paradigm continues to evolve. Indeed, the recent decade had witnessed significant global shifts in the approach to regulation and supervision across many countries. In addition, the harmonisation of standards and practices is also important.

Subsequent to the FOMC’s decision, a compromise was reached on extending the Bush tax rates in conjunction with additional fiscal stimulus measures for 2011. The flow of economic data as 2010 came to a close on balance indicated that the economy was in fact regaining its lost momentum. Economists began to mark up their forecasts for 2011 economic growth. This recent improvement in the economic outlook is welcomed news. We should keep in mind, though, that there is considerable uncertainty associated with every economic forecast. There are both upside and downside risks that could cause actual economic growth this year to deviate from the consensus forecast. One important downside risk to the outlook is associated with housing markets. Following the end of the homebuyer tax credits, there was a sharp drop-off in home sales. In addition, the firming of house prices noted earlier has given way to renewed house price declines in many markets (Chart 27). There still remains a significant excess supply of housing that will exert downward pressure on house prices and new construction (Chart 28). Given the very low level of new home construction, the primary driver of this excess supply of housing is the on-going foreclosure process. The foreclosure pipeline continues to grow (Chart 29). How far along are we at resolving the foreclosure  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  problem?
As more instruments that transfer risk are added to the balance sheets of financial institutions, so leverage and connectivity  2  BIS Review 70/2006  grow. While some of these connections might constitute a "perfect hedge", they can leave the system more vulnerable to both counterparty risk and the liquidity of these markets. The precise extent to which market participants are now connected through interlocking obligations is difficult to gauge, but the UK interbank market provides some clues. Over 70% of the total lending in the market is accounted for by 15 institutions. And the major UK banks’ large exposures to the main foreign-owned LCFIs are almost two-thirds of Tier 1 capital. The rising correlation between the share prices of major UK banks and foreign-owned LCFIs also provides a hint of the growing interconnections (Chart 4). At the same time, rapid innovation in new financial instruments poses challenges within the financial system. As I have already discussed, these developments are likely to be positive in the long run, allowing market participants greater scope to diversify and manage risk. But in the short run, newer products, such as structured credit derivatives, do pose challenges. We simply do not have experience of how they behave in the full range of market conditions. The models that have been built by banks and other players in the market to value and hedge positions in these instruments are more sophisticated than ever before, but they are not proven in adversity.

It establishes a framework for cooperation on three joint responsibilities – first identifying risks to the stability of the UK financial system, second reducing the risks where we can, and third managing crises if they occur. The Bank contributes to all three. •  We bring to the assessment of risks both the expertise in economic analysis that we have developed as the monetary authority and the experience that gives us as a participant as well as an observer of financial markets. •  We can help to reduce risks directly through our engagement with payment systems and by working with the FSA at home, and with other financial authorities abroad, to improve the resilience of the financial system. •  As Lender of Last Resort, we can contribute to the resolution of crises either by supplying liquidity to the market in general or, in rare circumstances, acting as the channel of support or facilitating transactions for individual institutions. The new MoU makes plain that the decision to authorise support operations rests with the Chancellor following independent advice from both the Bank and the FSA. Our concern is with the stability and resilience of the financial system as a whole. Inevitably that causes us to focus on the major UK banks, markets and infrastructure at the centre of our economy, not because they are the most likely to run into problems but because an incident that doesn’t affect them will not become a crisis for the system as a whole.
One of the things that the Federal Reserve runs – the New York Fed runs – is called FedWire, so if you have to wire money, if someone needs the money immediately, you can wire that through a New York clearinghouse in the CHIPS system, or you can wire that through FedWire. It’s really important that – and FedWire interacts with lots of institutions around the country. We need to make sure that all those institutions that interact with FedWire also have their systems secured. So, it’s a big issue. We spend a lot of resources on it. We’re going to continue to spend a lot of resources on it. We take it very seriously. Audience Member: We welcome you to Jamaica. I’d just like to ask, there have been some other regulatory measures taken over the past couple of decades. As I understand it, they repealed the GlassSteagall Act and also passed the Sarbanes-Oxley laws. Would you say that these things had any effect on the 2008 recession, or has Congress been more responsible than not for the recession? President Dudley: I think that – well, I think Sarbanes-Oxley is actually – was basically about good financial reporting, good financial accounting. Accountability of the people at the top of the house for all the financial records and statements. The Federal Reserve is not subject by law to Sarbanes-Oxley, but we actually follow Sarbanes-Oxley nevertheless. We think it’s good governance.

Such price increases are all the more remarkable given that these prices had tended to stagnate in recent years. This jump in the price of commodities was mainly attributable to the continuous growth in domestic demand in the emerging markets and low extraction and production capacity. In our opinion, this situation is not likely to change in any direction in the short term. Although partially offset by the weak US dollar, the rise in the oil price during the final quarter of 2007 triggered a sharp increase in inflation – from 0.7% in September to 2% in December. The price rises of other commodities were also significant, but they only had a minor impact on inflation in Switzerland. In fact, commodities are not directly included in the reference basket used to calculate the price index, which means that their price increases only had a minor impact in this respect. However, the indirect effects, i.e. higher prices for goods and services as a result of higher production costs, constitute a much more serious inflationary risk. Having said this, the related impact last year was modest because many companies chose not to pass on their higher costs to consumers, given the considerable competitive pressure in numerous markets. Moreover, the relatively moderate increase in wage costs and gains in productivity over the last few years allowed companies to absorb a good part of the additional costs they had incurred as a result of higher commodity prices.
Norman T L Chan: Monetary policy’s effect on wealth distribution and a way forward for policymakers Welcoming remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Joint Conference, Hong Kong, 23 May 2019. * * * 1. Good morning, President Bullard, Director Hirtle, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to this conference jointly organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. I would especially like to thank our overseas guests who have travelled a long way to be with us today. 2. Over the past 40 years, the global economy has undergone impressive growth and transformation. From 1980 to 2018, PPP-adjusted real per capita GDP in advanced economies and emerging market economies have increased by 94% and 205% respectively1, driven by globalisation, open markets, technological advancements, and the general trend of falling inflation. 3. But the news is not all good. While the world economy has done well on the whole, economic inequality has widened noticeably at the same time. Just take a look at the Gini coefficient, which is a commonly cited measure of income inequality.

•  Trust that asset managers and investment brokers are acting in the clients’ interest and not front-running them is key to the investment process. The licensing and regulation of financial institutions confers a degree of legitimacy on them. But being a bank, an insurance company or a capital markets intermediary is not just about holding an official stamp to collect and manage funds. •  As Mark Carney puts it, financial institutions also need a social licence to operate. 2  •  They earn this social licence through a track record of exemplary conduct and a reputation for integrity and prudence. •  Their obligations towards their customers and counterparties must be based on not just a contractual obligation but a moral one as well. Getting the culture right What accounts for the repeated cases of misconduct in the global financial industry? Weaknesses in governance, risk management, and operational controls have allowed unbridled risk-taking and encouraged some individuals to push, and in several cases, break the bounds of what is permissible. Since the financial crisis, the international regulatory community has issued directions and guidance to tighten financial institutions’ governance standards and curb excessive risk-taking. But weaknesses in governance and control, grave as they were in some financial institutions, cannot fully account for the spate of misconduct. There are deeper issues of trust, ethics and culture in the financial industry that we need to confront. First, finance is at risk becoming more “de-personalised”.