samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
All of this helped transform the city from an increasingly blighted urban landscape to the vibrant economy of today. And, New York City is not the only example of a major turnaround. Now-dynamic cities such as Washington, D.C., Pittsburgh, and Seattle also went through wrenching economic and fiscal contractions. While Puerto Rico’s path to prosperity will not look exactly like that of New York or other cities, history can provide valuable lessons, as well as hope for a better future. The same can be said for the U.S. Virgin Islands. In addition, Puerto Rico has a number of unique attributes and endowments that it can leverage as it seeks a path toward prosperity, including its educated and bilingual workforce, its proximity and access to markets on the U.S. mainland, and its extensive experience as a host to various major U.S. multinational corporations. But, a recovery is not going to happen on its own. We at the New York Fed have made a number of suggestions over the years that we think can help improve Puerto Rico’s competitiveness and economic prospects.2 Some of these issues are now being addressed, and still more are at least being discussed. Among others, lowering the costs and disincentives to doing business, helping Island residents develop and use their human capital, and improving labor market opportunities are all important steps that must be taken. On the fiscal side, the Financial Oversight and Management Board and the Commonwealth together will be making a series of difficult choices over the coming months.

At the same time as monetary policy is aimed at attaining the inflation target, it is also supposed to “support the objectives of general economic policy for the purpose of attaining sustainable growth and a high level of employment”. The Riksbank does this by not merely striving to stabilise inflation around the inflation target, but also striving to stabilise the real economy, that is, production and employment. The Riksbank thus conducts what is known as flexible inflation targeting. Flexible here means that the Riksbank does not focus solely on inflation. To be rather more concrete, one might say that every time we make a decision we try to find a forecast path for the repo rate that means monetary will be, as we say, well-balanced. This means that we try to find an appropriate balance between stabilising inflation around the inflation target and stabilising the real economy. One way of illustrating this balance is to say that the deviations arising during the forecast period between, on one hand, inflation and the inflation target, and, on the other, the real economy and a trend, may not become too great. …and in theory It is common in the literature to describe flexible inflation targeting as the central bank minimising a loss function that is a weighted sum of a measure of the variation in inflation and the variation in the real economy.
But the intention – the international commitment to macro-economic stability – is clear. Acceptance of the aim of macro-economic stability served to bring into sharper focus the structural, supply side, of the economy – that is the whole raft of influences that can affect the underlying growth rate of capacity and thus the growth rate of aggregate demand that can be sustained. And here, too, there has been a strengthening international presumption in favour of open markets and free competition – both domestically and internationally – with a continuing strong presumption against predatory trade or exchange rate manipulation. The justification is that undistorted competition contributes to potential global economic growth through increased efficiency and the more effective allocation of productive resources. Faster growth in turn provides a more favourable context for addressing social concerns, including the issue of poverty. The international presumption in favour of free markets in itself is somewhat remarkable, given that, at the micro-economic level, increased competition invariably constitutes a threat to established producers – and their employees – who might well be tempted to urge protection in one form or another on their national governments. Consumers, who benefit from such competition, tend to be less vocal or well organised. The threat of protectionism is never, therefore, far away. But in fact the presumption in favour of competition has proved encouragingly robust. And that is not just in relation to international trade.

In this context, the idea of a global currency did not prosper in the academic debates – and even less so in policy discussions. One recent exception stands out, to which I would like to pay a special tribute. In 2010, Michel Camdessus launched the Palais Royal initiative. This initiative sheds light on the shortcomings of the International Financial System, in particular its global governance and an overreliance on a single central currency. The initiative suggested a greater role for SDRs and enhanced cooperation between the World Bank, the IMF and the G20. However, other major projects have in parallel been assigned higher priority for instance the successful creation and development of the euro - or have been dictated by necessity - for instance the strengthening of the global financial safety net (GFSN) induced by the great financial crisis and then the Covid crisis. That said, there have been significant progress such as the increase of IMF resources, the two special drawing rights (SDR) allocations (including the last one of 650 billion USD in 2021) and the creation of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) on the 1st of May by the IMF, which will help deliver the G20 commitment to rechannelling at least 100 billion USD of this allocation to the countries in need. 2. The dangers of a fragmented financial system But there are dangers ahead. We have to avoid shifting from a dollar-dominated system to a confrontational non-system with, for instance, a dollar world opposed to a renminbi world.
This has not yet become a significant issue because most depository institutions offering on-line services still have brick-and-mortar branches, on to which current definitions of a CRA community are based. Still, for exclusively on-line depository institutions, the CRA issue will become increasingly important as their market share grows. Some early discussions with the relevant compliance supervisors may be in order. I also note that this also raises interesting questions on the definition of the relevant geographic market in the analysis of bank mergers. Furthermore, considering the CRA issue brings forth another, broader issue: what is the role of nonbanks in the realm of Internet financial services, particularly payment services, which are still largely the province of banks and other regulated depository institutions? Because banks have been so intricately involved in the United States payments system, banks today face unique regulatory burdens: CRA, reserve requirements, deposit insurance premiums, and the costs of good supervision and good supervisors. If nonbanks begin to take significant market share away from banks because of an inherently lower cost structure, that raises real questions about a level playing field and whether or not banks can ever fairly compete. If nonbanks begin offering through the Internet many of the payment services, or alternatives to the payment services now offered exclusively by banks, that raises real concerns about the ultimate value of a bank charter, and what it really means to be a “bank.” Or is this “banking”?

Luis M Linde: The Spanish banking system – situation and challenges Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the University of Almeria, Almeria, 18 July 2016. *  *  *  Let me first thank the Universidad de Almería and all the sponsors for their invitation to participate in the inauguration of this three-day conference on cooperative banks. In my address I shall first briefly review the current situation of the Spanish banking system, including the cooperative sector, and the main challenges it faces. Secondly, I shall tackle some of the current regulatory developments in the banking sector, with a reference to the European regulation on bank recovery and resolution. Situation of and main challenges to the Spanish banking sector During the first half of 2016 global financial markets were markedly volatile, as a result of various factors. Firstly, forecasts of global economic growth have been revised downwards since the last quarter of 2015; secondly, the weakness shown by the emerging economies, particularly those most dependent on commodities exports; and, thirdly, the unstable social and political setting, compounded by the decision by UK citizens on 23 June to back the exit from the European Union. These factors have prompted a correction in asset prices on different markets which, though it eased from mid-February, has regained momentum since 23 June as a result of the increase in uncertainty and greater volatility.
Elvira Nabiullina: Current problems in the post-pandemic economic recovery Speech by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the plenary session of the Federation Council meeting, 22 September 2021. * * * Good afternoon, Ms Speaker and colleagues. Thank you very much for inviting me to speak today, on the first day of the autumn session. In my speech, I would like to focus on current problems in the post-pandemic economic recovery. Undoubtedly, we are pleased about its rapid pace. Yet, the economic rebound is bringing some side effects that we must counter to ensure the stability of our economy, the financial system, and ultimately, the well-being of our people. The economy has now returned to the growth path it would have been on but for the pandemic. Certainly, central to the successful delivery of anti-pandemic measures have been the Government’s budget support measures alongside the prompt efforts of lawmakers to set up a legal framework for anti-crisis response measures. In turn, we at the Bank of Russia have granted regulatory relaxations to banks to support consumers and businesses, and to restructure and issue new loans in this challenging period. Our monetary policy has been accommodative. It was only after we made sure that the economic recovery was becoming sustainable that we started to raise the key rate. Certainly, I will explain why we are doing this as I know that there are many questions on this subject.

Page 2 sur 7 Partly, because the not-so-good news is that inflation has changed in nature in the meantime. Indeed, core inflation (excluding energy and food prices), which accounts for no less than 70% of the consumption basket, remains strong and is proving sticky at 5.7%. In other words, inflation has become more broad-based, as also demonstrated by U.S. CPI this morning, and potentially more persistent. But the good news it that this is exactly what we central banks can and must fight back against. Our commitment at the ECB is unambiguous: to make sure that inflation returns towards 2% by the end of 2024 or the end of 2025. And rest assured we absolutely have the will and the capacity to deliver on this commitment. Faced with the surge in inflation, the ECB raised its policy rates at an unprecedented pace (+350 bp since July 2022) to reach a restrictive stance. Page 3 sur 7  But from now on, we are entering a new, more open phase of monetary policy; we are shifting from automatic pilot to navigation by instruments. What does that mean in practice? Our decisions on interest rates will be taken meeting by meeting. This navigation by instruments will especially rely on three cockpit dials: •  The outlook for headline inflation, based on our macroeconomic  projections. •  The dynamics of underlying inflation.
Turkey has achieved significant progress in this front, but today, I would like to put a special emphasis on the role of regulatory and supervisory institutions without getting into details. Establishment and effective implementations of institutions such as the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, the Turkish Competition Authority, the Energy Market Regulatory Authority, the Telecommunications Authority and many others have contributed to the development of a competitive, resilient and efficient economy in Turkey. It is not surprising that manufacturing, retail, energy and financial sectors have attracted the interest from foreign investors in recent years, as witnessed by over 40 billion USD foreign direct investment in the last two years. The good corporate governance practices have also contributed to the overall economic governance in the country. As a result of the steps taken in the four categories that I have just mentioned, Turkey has shown an impressive economic performance after 2001. The consumer price inflation declined to the single-digit territory. The GDP has continuously grown in the last 24 quarters. This strong growth performance was private sector driven and supported by continuous productivity gains. Along with the high economic growth, openness of the Turkish economy has also increased substantially. Exports increased by more than two-folds since 2001 and reached to USD 107 billion in 2007. The banking sector has strengthened significantly and became resilient to internal and external shocks. Finally, budget deficit and debt stock of the public are no longer sources of vulnerability.

So far, the repricing of assets and the unwinding of positions have been quite orderly and the financing of the US current account deficit continues to be smooth. In broad terms, bond yields have increased, equity prices have declined, and the US dollar has appreciated in nominal effective terms. In terms of policy, the key issue in the global economy now is how to manage the transition to a higher interest rates environment so as to safeguard economic stability in view of the continued firm growth. Another is the management of the risk that higher oil prices might affect the global recovery. And the third is the issue of addressing the major global imbalances without creating serious volatilities to the financial markets. Let me turn now to the domestic economy. This year a theme that has kept recurring in my presentation of the Thai economy is that of risks and adjustment. This is to say that, for Thailand, this year has been a year of greater risks and the key theme has been adjusting to risks as the global economic and financial environment has become less helpful. The key external pressure an the Thai economy throughout this year has been the higher oil prices, the higher global interest rates, and the potential impact an our exports of a slowing Chinese economy. This year, we also have our own domestic challenges.
Please take a look at the prototypes, study them, build upon them. What’s next? We are now preparing to extend Project Ubin beyond Singapore. We are pleased to announce a collaboration on cross-border payments with the Bank of Canada using blockchain technology. Deepening Financial Inclusion: ASEAN Financial Innovation Network Finally, we want to use FinTech to deepen financial inclusion across ASEAN. MAS and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation have teamed up to establish the ASEAN Financial Innovation Network (or “AFIN”). The goal of AFIN is to help banks and FinTechs in ASEAN collaborate, so as to broaden and deepen access to digital financial services across ASEAN. AFIN is working on a cloud-based industry platform which will do three things: It will allow banks to search for and connect to innovative FinTech offerings. It will give FinTech firms an opportunity to scale up their business across borders. It will provide an industry sandbox to test out cross-border solutions. Regional regulators will be invited as observers of the sandbox. Most of all, AFIN will provide a powerful platform to extend financial services to the millions of under-banked people in ASEAN. Conclusion Singapore is on the FinTech journey because we want to make pervasive a culture of innovation in our financial sector. We must have a restlessness to make things better, a spirit of enterprise to try new ways, a willingness to take manageable risks, and the resilience to bounce back from failure to try again … and again. But FinTech must safeguard trust and confidence.

This structural change may have some implications for payment systems and market infrastructures, especially in periods of financial distress. One important implication is that more than ever before, the smooth functioning of the financial system is dependent on the assumption that the option to trade can be exercised even under stressed market conditions. This is a natural consequence of the development of markets and instruments which are actively traded or that are held in the expectation that, should the need arise, they could be traded. Moreover, the new financial environment appears to be more reliant on the immediate availability of funding liquidity. Funding liquidity is critical for the orderly execution of trades and it can become scarce at times of distress, precisely when  3  For further details see Claudio E.V. Borio (2007): Change and constancy in the financial system: implications for financial distress and policy. 4  BIS Review 130/2007  it is most needed, as market participants cut credit lines and/or raise margin requirements to protect themselves against counterparty risks. In conclusion, the stability of the financial system is also dependent on the assumption of ample market liquidity and, most critically, of the smooth functioning of the payment systems and market infrastructures. Second, the complexity of the financial system has greatly increased. This complexity applies not only to individual financial instruments, but also to the financial system as a whole. Its various segments have become more closely interconnected and the linkages across them more opaque.
A value larger than 0 of a sector means that the UK  them any less true. has a revealed comparative advantage in that sector. 15  Paul Krugman (1998), irritated especially by opposition to international trade among contemporary intellectuals, suggested it may partly reflect a preference for the modern and unorthodox over long-established ideas, even when they’re still true: “[Try] telling an ambitious, energetic, forward-looking intellectual…that before he can start talking knowledgeably about globalisation he must wrap his mind around a difficult concept that was devised by a frock-coated banker 180 years ago”. 16 The Governor recently commented on the potential impact of Brexit on the cost of financial services in the EU (Carney (2017)) 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  References Acemoglu D., 1998, ‘Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Technical Change and Wage Inequality’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(4):1055-1089. Autor, D., Dorn D., and G. Hanson, 2013, ‘The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States’, American Economic Review, 103:6, pp. 2121-68. Autor, D., Katz L. and M. Kearney, 2006, ‘The polarisation of the U.S. labour market’, NBER Working Paper no. 11986. Baldwin R., 2011, ‘Trade and industrialisation after globalisation's 2nd unbundling: How building and joining a supply chain are different and why it matters’, NBER Working Paper No. 17716. Behar A., 2013, ‘The Endogenous Skill Bias of Technical Change and Inequality in Developing Countries’, IMF Working Paper no 50.

Jean-Pierre Roth: The position of the Swiss franc exchange rate in the Swiss National Bank monetary policy strategy Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, 19 December 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The exchange rate is an important factor in determining the domestic price level in Switzerland. Nevertheless, it is not a monetary policy goal for the Swiss National Bank and is only relevant insofar as it has an impact on future inflation. Our concerns about our currency's weakness should not be read as a hidden form of exchange rate policy but rather as genuine concern about future price stability. A sustained tendency to weakness on the part of the Swiss franc could trigger inflationary effects that – sooner or later – would have to be countered with monetary policy instruments taking the form of interest rate measures. In the medium-term, this could lead to a reduction in the interest spread between the Swiss franc and the euro. BIS Review 151/2007  1
Of course, this changing environment requires significant investment in technologies and human resources with added pressure on banks’ bottom line. Also it may potentially encourage more risk aversion, despite the ultra-accommodative monetary policy stance. It is critical, therefore, that regulators ensure a level playing field to avoid regulatory arbitrage and push banks to retrench, thus creating market gaps that can be exploited by  Page | 3  less regulated, or more importantly, by totally unregulated players. Today’s increasingly digitalised world enables these gaps to be filled with relative ease. Institutions must embrace innovation while exploiting more effectively and smartly the prevailing benign economic conditions, to discover new investment opportunities and niche markets. It is also an opportune time for banks to keep sight of their longer-term sustainability and maintain their efforts to repair their balance sheet, reduce concentrations and improve asset quality. This is what ultimately strengthens prospective future cash flows and what supports profitability. Banks are also, of course, entitled to set their own risk appetite. In well-functioning markets, business opportunities shunned by one bank will be taken up by a competitor, if the latter feels more confident that it can manage the underlying risks more effectively. There will always be a residual sort of non-bankable business, and we must accept this fact. If, however, a business in search of a bank is especially risky but legitimate, there is no reason why we should not welcome specialist legitimate players capable of withstanding the most rigorous standards of supervisor scrutiny.

Whereas in 2008 there were no women in the Central Bank’s Board of Directors, in 2013 there were two women Board directors, and in the current year, 2019, we continue to have two women Board Directors, that is half of the non-executive directors. In 2008, there were no female members of staff among the 31 employees in the top band, comprising the grades of senior executive, head and chief  Page | 5  officers. In 2013, there were 6 out of 38. Presently, in November 2019, there are 12 out of 45. Small steps forward indeed but not insignificant: a clear sign of progress is shown by the fact that if we take the key role of heads, whereas there was only one female head in 2014, there are now 6. The gender distribution of staff below the senior executive grade is predictably more equitable, with 56.7 per cent of all staff in the grades concerned being women, compared to 47.3 per cent in 2008. Conversely at the very top level, that of the Deputy Governors and the Governor, we have to date no woman. That at the very top of the European Central Bank, in the Governing Council, the situation is even less balanced than ours, is certainly no consolation for us. However, that the new President is a woman, Christine Lagarde, is hugely significant. *** As hinted during the launch of our Annual Report last May, the Bank is stepping up its involvement in sustainable finance.