samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Sabine Lautenschläger: 20 years of ESCB statistics - past achievements and future challenges Speech by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, at the Ninth ECB Statistics Conference "20 years of ESCB statistics: What's next", Frankfurt am Main, 10 July 2018. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, I believe the words of the late US politician Daniel Moynihan are a good starting point tonight. He famously said, “Everyone is entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts”. I would add that the best opinions are certainly rooted in facts. And, since we seem to have entered the age of “alternative facts”, I have been reflecting on what real facts are, and how to defend them. And it’s not just the age of “alternative facts”; it’s also the age of “fake news”. Still, neither of these concepts is entirely new. For as long as there has been public discourse, people have been tempted to propagate their own take on reality. And not all of them have been able to resist this temptation. But still, something has changed. Today, Twitter and other tools allow almost anyone to communicate with the general public. And fake news is most successful in creating alternative facts when people stop trusting traditional sources of information. This is what’s happening right now, all around us. Traditional media have come under attack.

But we must also admit that there is not just scope, but also a need, to apply judgement when producing good data and statistics. And trust plays a key role here. People can trust the ECB and the national central banks to apply expert judgement when it is needed. In my speech today, I will focus on key ingredients that have been crucial in building up the ECB’s good reputation over the past 20 years. The first is to have good data and to use them well when taking decisions. The second is to ensure good cooperation. The third is to keep pace with changing times. Good data for good decisions 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I am aware that the need for good data may seem self-explanatory, especially for an audience of statisticians. But that doesn’t make it less important, particularly in the case of the ECB. The stakes are extremely high: whether for monetary policy or banking supervision, our decisions impact the lives of over 340 million people. This gives the data we use, and the analysis we carry out, enormous importance. Our data need to be reliable and our statistics sound. Only then will they be able to form the basis for good decisions. But not all data are created equal. Even well-collected data may fall short of answering the burning questions of our experts. With the 2008 crisis, for example, we learned the hard way why better and more granular data are necessary.
It has benefited from economic reforms that have provided development opportunities for our business sector, have opened markets, have increased competition, have stimulated flexible labor markets and have increased social revenues. Both fiscal and monetary policies have been cautious in providing the necessary stimulus to the economic growth, by being consistent and disciplined in the pursuit of their objectives to achieve fiscal consolidation and ensure a low-inflation environment. The size of the annual budget deficit in relation to GDP has been between 3 %, leaping to 5.7 % for 2008, while the public debt has been stable, reaching up to around 55.6 % for 2008. The annual inflation growth rate has been for a long time within the corridor defined by the Bank of Albania of 2 4 percent (and close to the Bank of Albania target of 3 percent), indicating success in anchoring market participants expectations for price developments in the economy. This steady good economic performance has been supported by a flexible exchange rate that has been instrumental in supporting and maintaining a balanced growth, by maintaining the right incentives for interaction between domestic and foreign counterparties. Fundamental changes have occurred in the financial sector too, thanks to consistent and successful reforms in the last decade. Nowadays the banking sector in Albania counts 16 banks, all in private hands, where the foreign capital dominates.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Increased availability and use of official statistics in the Republic of North Macedonia Introduction speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the marking of the European Statistics Day, Skopje, 19 October 2021. *** Your Excellency Ms. Forsgren Bengtsson, Dear Mr. Simovski and Mr. Stymne, Dear State secretary Ms Gaber, Distinguished speakers, representatives of the non-government sector, colleagues and participantsFor a second year in a row, we are marking the European Statistics Day in specific circumstances, shaped by the global pandemics. The health crisis has infiltrated itself into every single pore of our societies disrupting the world we know. Statistics has not been an exception whatsoever. At the time the crisis hit, statistics area in global terms was already facing many challenges. Producers of statistics were coping with lingering tasks that came as a side effect of the global financial crisis in 2008. Although the lack of statistics was not a cause of this crisis, still it revealed significant data gaps and underlined a need of more frequent, comprehensive and granular data to strengthen policy-making infrastructure. The second challenge rested in unprecedented digitalisation and data proliferation, by both private and public entities. It challenged official statistical producers, which serve as the primary source of data, to innovate their data and data sources, but even more to work intensively on setting proper data governance frameworks.
So on that point, there is no ambiguity at all. We are also strongly thinking that better coordination for big cross-border institutions is absolutely necessary; even if we could cope with all the issues at stake in the present circumstances, we should not forget that. It's clear that we can improve the present framework and we have to improve it. Some avenues have already been suggested by Ecofin. There has already been a consensus on appropriate Memoranda of Understanding. But going further in this direction also seems important. At this stage, I have to say, I do not have a full-fledged Governing Council position. We are still reflecting, and we will see what will be the position of the Governing Council. But I understand that the European Parliament has carried out several works which have been done within the suggestion that the ECB would play a particular role in this domain for the coordination of surveillance for cross-border institutions – a little bit like in the US. The Federal Reserve has a position which concentrates very much on the big cross-border institutions. And I see also suggestions coming from the private sector, coming from the industry, that we could play a more important role in this domain.

We are a country that is, in terms of population and employment, quite significantly dependent on agriculture, about 30 percent of our labor forces is tied to agriculture. So obviously, higher temperatures and higher risk of droughts and floods will severely hit the agricultural sector. Thailand is also highly dependent on tourism, the beach tourism, and so substantial rises in sea levels will hit our country very hard. Therefore, as a country that is very vulnerable to climate change, I think it is beholden upon us to take much stronger initiatives on the climate change and the green front. Page 6 of 9  On Thailand’s development on the green front, I welcome a lot of initiatives that happened in Thailand, especially in the capital markets. We have seen the Stock Exchange of Thailand launching the Thailand Sustainability Index, which is an index composing of green and sustainable listed firms. We have seen our colleagues at the Security Exchange Commission undertaking welcomed initiatives with the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) bonds, which are seeing a significant growth in Thailand. I would also like to see that progress on the banking side catching up that of the capital market as the banking side, both in Thailand and globally, still lags in terms of green and climate initiatives that have already been undertaken by capital market participants. Thus, we, at the Bank of Thailand, will do our best to make sure that the banking sector catches up and does play its role as needed.
I am sure that its long experience, accumulated knowledge and proficient staff make the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey an institution that can fulfil these expectations. I am proud of this institution. I owe a great debt of gratitude to my colleagues, who have greatly contributed to our accomplishments and to our policy implementation. BIS Review 47/1997

The fiscal deficit, on the other hand, represents a significant hurdle as it is currently about double the 3% of GDP limit. Related to the deficit is the size of the public debt, which exceeds the 60% threshold. The main determining factor in the timing of the adoption of the euro, therefore, is the speed with which fiscal consolidation can be achieved, bearing in mind that the euro area will not technically be in a position to accept newcomers before 2007. If the Government embarks on the relatively fast track of fiscal consolidation implied by Malta’s Pre-Accession Economic Programme, we would need to enter ERM II in 2005. Should this track be chosen, however, it would be vital that the planned pace of consolidation be maintained. In this way the benefits of an early adoption of the euro would be reaped, and the lira’s stay in ERM II would be  BIS Review 50/2003  5  smooth, with no noticeable shocks in the transition from the current basket system to the single currency. If, on the other hand, there are slippages in the rate of fiscal consolidation, the stay in ERM II would have to be prolonged and the adoption of the euro postponed. This would attract negative attention from the international financial markets, resulting in a reduced credibility of our economic policy and in pressures on the exchange rate and the interest rate.
15  For a more detailed discussion, see “The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market”. www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr564.pdf  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  rather than rely on their ability to get out ahead of small retail investors when trouble materializes. The larger question Reforming the tri-party repo system and the money market mutual fund industry is essential and would make the financial system significantly more stable. But even after such reforms, we would still have a system in which a very significant share of financial intermediation activity vital to the economy takes place in markets and through institutions that have no direct access to an effective lender of last resort backstop.16 The financial crisis clearly demonstrated that we can no longer assume that in periods of stress banks will be willing to access lender of last resort loans and on-lend to the nonbank financial sector at sufficient scale to stabilize the system of market-based financial intermediation, as happened in earlier periods such as the commercial paper crisis in the mid-1970s. The financing needs outside the commercial banks may be too large relative to the capacity of the banking system, banks may be reluctant to lend to competitors, be concerned about their own liquidity and funding needs, or simply be deterred by elevated counterparty risk. We need to consider whether our current architecture is satisfactory.

Let me be clear. We must deal with the fire sale issue in tri-party repo and the heightened run risk it creates. I believe there are three potential ways forward, all of which are superior to the status quo. First, tri-party repo transactions could be restricted to open market operations (OMO) eligible collateral.11 Such collateral would likely remain quite liquid during a time of crisis.12 In addition, such collateral could, in a crisis, potentially be passed directly by a broker-dealer to the discount window under Section 13.13 authority, or, because of beneficial treatment under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, be financed by a banking affiliate that would then itself borrow at the discount window. Thus, one could construct an effective lender of last resort backstop for an OMO-eligible- only tri-party repo system. However, there are also some significant disadvantages to such an approach. The less liquid collateral could just migrate to be financed elsewhere, with associated run and fire sale risks. Also, given that housing finance reform could cause the agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be replaced by something different that was not OMO eligible under the Federal Reserve Act, the share of assets that are OMO eligible could diminish over time. Finally, this approach would do little to mitigate the risk of fire sales of a defaulted dealer’s collateral by its investors once a dealer is bankrupt.
Should any significant deviations between actual inflation and the monetary policy target occur, the Bank will provide an assessment of the reasons for this. 2  BIS Review 74/2001  Even though there was confidence in the implementation of monetary policy prior to the change in regulation, the communication of Norwegian monetary policy was clearly facilitated by the Government quantifying an inflation target. However, in our view the most important aspect of the shift to an inflation target is that political authorities clearly recognise that low inflation is a benefit in itself. History has shown that high inflation does not lead to sustained higher economic growth or lower unemployment. This recognition and the positive inflation track record in Norway since 1990 provide the Bank with a sound basis for conducting monetary policy. Implementation  In the light of the orientation of monetary policy in recent years, the new guidelines have been applied without any significant change in the conduct of monetary policy. The key rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment of the inflation outlook. Higher interest rates curb demand for goods and services and reduce inflation. Lower interest rates have the opposite effect. If evidence suggests that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. There is symmetry here.

In addition, we have been open about our response pattern, our analyses of economic developments and our assessment of monetary policy performance. Others are bound to judge the Bank in a critical light, not least this assembly. I hope and believe that you will find that our words and actions are compatible, and that in retrospect it will not be difficult to see the rationality in what we do, although it may on occasion seem surprising then and there. If we manage this, confidence in monetary policy should take firm hold and strengthen ahead. The basis for interest-rate setting and the present economic situation  By way of conclusion, I would like to address the basis for interest-rate setting and the present economic environment. The projections and analyses in the Inflation Report, in conjunction with our continuous assessment of the inflation outlook and developments in the money and foreign exchange market, form the basis for our decisions concerning interest rates. In the last Inflation Report published on June 20, price inflation was projected at 2½ per cent in 2003 on the assumption that interest rates remain unchanged. Norges Bank's assessment of the economic outlook was last presented in  BIS Review 74/2001  11  connection with the Executive Board's monetary policy meeting on 8 August. Both the analysis in the Inflation Report and developments since its publication indicated that at today's interest rate level, it is likely that the inflation target will be reached in the course of two years.
The crucial insight emphasised by these models is that expectations matter, and provide a mechanism through which policy makers can seek to influence activity at the zero bound. This is an important channel of monetary transmission and one I will return to. But the argument that monetary policy can work only through expectations management is not a robust result. It rests on very particular assumptions. In this class of models, financial markets are assumed to be complete and frictionless and the representative agent is able to arbitrage across all financial markets. As such, all non-aggregate risk in the economy can be hedged perfectly and asset prices depend only on state-contingent payoffs. Under these assumptions, demand curves for financial assets are perfectly elastic. But in the real world it seems plausible that demand curves for assets, in addition to money, are downward sloping to some degree, in which case changes in their relative supplies can affect their relative prices. It is this which gives quantitative easing its traction. Half a century ago Tobin (1958), in pioneering work on portfolio allocation, recognised that a range of assets, in addition to money, are likely to be imperfect substitutes. But Tobin did not articulate fully the frictions that could generate such imperfect substitutability. More recently, there has been rapid development in micro models of the source of financial frictions which can motivate imperfect substitutability. Recent examples include Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Vayanos and Weill (2008).

By early March last year, 40% had been wiped off the value of the FTSE companies; corporate bond spreads were at their widest since the 1970s; and banks continued to hoard liquidity, with spreads in the interbank market still around fifteen times higher than their pre-crisis levels. The financial crisis began in earnest in the summer of 2007, when the burgeoning sub-prime mortgage crisis began to pile pressure on banks. But it intensified dramatically following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, leading to the most severe banking crisis in living memory. The Monetary Policy Committee responded aggressively, cutting Bank Rate from 5% to 0.5% – its lowest ever level – in just five months. But the need for further monetary stimulus was clear. In principle, it would have been possible to cut Bank Rate a little further, to zero or even to a small negative number. But the structure of many traditional mortgage lenders’ balance sheets meant that lowering Bank Rate even further was likely to eat into their profitability and so intensify the credit crunch. Exactly what the monetary loosening was trying to avoid. Instead, the Bank decided to vary the size and composition of its balance sheet to inject money directly into the economy. And so QE was born. Since then the economy has stabilised, household and business confidence have recovered, and financial market conditions have improved.
As a consequence 6.8 percentage points of the 10.61 percent annual CPI inflation in July resulted from the direct impact of the rise in food and energy prices (Figure 1). BIS Review 100/2008  1  Figure 1: Contribution to Annual CPI Inflation 12 10  Core Goods  Services  Food and Energy*  Tobacco and Gold**  8 6 4 2  06.08  05.08  04.08  03.08  02.08  01.08  12.07  11.07  10.07  09.07  08.07  07.07  06.07  05.07  04.07  03.07  02.07  01.07  0  * Food and Energy: Food, non-alcoholic beverages and energy. ** Tobacco and Gold: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and gold. Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. Food price developments were determinant in inflation in the second quarter of the year. Although domestic weather conditions turned more favorable in the first half of 2008, lagged effects of last year’s poor harvest and continued elevation in agricultural commodity prices continued to keep processed food inflation at high levels. As a consequence, processed food inflation displayed a cumulative increase of 14.2 percent in the first half of the year (Figure 2). At this point, I would like to remind you that the July Inflation Report, soon to be published on our website, will provide a detailed explanation on the factors driving domestic food prices.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Rising oil prices – a challenge for monetary policy? Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Déjeuners de la Finance, Geneva, 2 November 2005. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Despite oil prices being at a historically high level, inflation has increased only slightly in recent quarters and growth appears to be robust. Are we to assume, therefore, that oil no longer plays an important role in today’s economic environment? What challenges does the current situation pose for monetary policy? For the first time, the steady rise in energy prices is not the result of a political boycott by oil-producing countries, but of an increase in energy demand, coming in particular from the newly industrialised countries in Asia. In other words, the rise in crude oil prices this time can be attributed to the strong growth in global economic activity. This does not mean, however, that the role of monetary policy has changed. Although core inflation currently appears to be under control in most countries, a persistent and continuous rise in energy costs could have an effect on all prices and wages in the long run, thereby jeopardising monetary stability. Notwithstanding the low level of inflation (excluding energy prices), it is vital that the monetary authorities maintain a forward-looking stance so as not to put their credibility on the line and to ensure long-term price stability. 1/1