samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It was for similar reasons that we already had to turn down a request from your industry association in 2015 to operate non-interest-bearing sight deposit accounts for the pension funds. 7 Quite fundamentally, the introduction of a ‘fourth contributor’ in the form of the SNB would seem to depart from the rationale on which the occupational pension system is founded. So how can the SNB make any contribution to the health of the pension system? By consistently and credibly pursuing a policy geared to price stability, the SNB is contributing significantly to a solid foundation. In the long term this will facilitate economic growth and prosperity in Switzerland and, in particular, also safeguard purchasing power. Ultimately, this  7  cf. Moser, Dewet (2015), Herausforderungen der aktuellen Geldpolitik [‘Monetary policy challenges currently facing the SNB’], speech at the general meeting of the Association of Swiss Pension Funds (ASIP), Zurich, 8 May. Page 6/8  is one of the decisive factors in ensuring that our country can afford a social security network that is resilient and remains fundable. Stable prices are thus very important for pension fund members. However, price stability is also of utmost importance for the socially disadvantaged and pensioners, as they are scarcely able to protect themselves against an inflation-related loss of purchasing power. Like the pension system, price stability plays a key role in the Swiss success story. It is an accomplishment that is greatly valued – and today almost taken for granted – by the general public.

Longer life expectancy – success story and challenge Ladies and gentlemen, the low interest rate environment is a challenging situation for pension funds. And I cannot even give you an idea of when Switzerland will be able to return to positive interest rates. All I can say is that the timing will greatly depend on developments in the global economy and the performance of the international financial markets. Another challenge that is sure to preoccupy you as pension fund managers is that of rising life expectancy – on the face of it a very gratifying development and, indeed, one of humanity’s success stories. Rising life expectancy is not only influencing the propensity to save but is also having a direct impact on the pension funds. Given an unchanged retirement age, it steadily lengthens the average duration of pension payments. This in turn results in higher payments and extra strain on the pension funds. The consequences of these developments are clear. Lower inflation and reduced real rates of interest are resulting in lower nominal interest rates and are thus diminishing the pension funds’ earnings prospects. On the benefits side, increased life expectancy means that pensions are being drawn for longer, thus increasing the volume of savings capital needed to finance these benefits. As a result, the system becomes unbalanced. Price stability – the SNB’s contribution to a healthy pension system What could be done to find a workable solution? Which measures would make sense and which would not?
14  Model estimates of the short-term relation between the repo rate and household indebtedness indicate that the average effects may be relatively small: a 1 per cent lower repo rate over a period of one year, and which gradually reverts, will give rise to an approximately 4 percentage points higher level of indebtedness as a percentage of disposable income. Similar estimates of the relation between housing prices and the repo rate also show small effects – see Sveriges Riksbank (2011) Chapter 2.1.However, estimates of short-term relations might underestimate the total effects of the repo rate on household indebtedness. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and having a potentially better target attainment in the long run is thus very unclear. On the other hand, the costs in terms of poorer target attainment a couple of years ahead are very clear. Other tools than the repo rate could moreover influence household debt more effectively. Various types of tax tools are probably particularly potent, such as tax deduction regulations and property taxation, but at the same time these are the most politically sensitive. So-called macroprudential policy tools are probably more effective than monetary policy in influencing debt in the household sector. Finansinspektionen, which has been given the main responsibility for these tools, has already used several of them and has signalled that it will remain vigilant with regard to risks linked to household indebtedness. This should reasonably have an effect on the monetary policy trade-offs.

But we have done a lot to lean against this – most importantly our holistic approach to Pillar 2A, our success in getting Basel to lower very significantly the standardised risk-weight for lower-LTV mortgages, our introduction of the modular approach for IRB applications and the introduction of a leverage ratio into our regime. 1 Besides these 17 new UK banks, the PRA also authorised new banks to meet ring-fencing requirements and overseas banks. The total of all banks authorised by the PRA since its formation in 2013 is 39. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  2    Third, related moves that we have made on the insurance side including a New Insurers Unit, our proportionate Non-Directive Firms regime for small insurers outside the scope of Solvency II, our active use of what flexibility there is in Solvency II to lower the administrative burden for smaller firms, and our new regime for insurance-linked securities. My aim in mentioning these things is not to bore you, though I can see I may have succeeded in doing that, but to illustrate the simple point that the PRA has been very active in advancing its competition objective over the first five years of its existence. The objective has had a significant impact already: I would argue that, with the exception of the leverage ratio, we simply would not have done any of the things I’ve just mentioned if we did not have a competition objective.
Paul Tucker: Central counterparties – the agenda Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at the European Commission Conference on “European Post Trading Landscape: The Road Ahead”, Brussels, 24 October 2011. *  *  *  Thank you very much for inviting me today. The map for post-trade infrastructure is being redrawn, here in the EU, in the US, and in Asia, under the policies of the G20 and Financial Stability Board. This renewed focus on the plumbing of the financial system is welcome to central bankers. I should like to make just four points1. All starting from the proposition that the safety and soundness of central counterparties (CCPs) is absolutely vital to preserving stability in global capital markets. 1. Organisational structure  Some years ago, there was a debate about whether the authorities should favour “horizontal integration” or “vertical integration” of trading, clearing and settlement infrastructure. Events have taken their course, and vertically integrated groups – concretely, of exchanges owning clearing houses – have become commonplace. The authorities need policies to address this. One dimension is competition. The Commission are focussed on that.

But, looking ahead, we must surely establish a system that can extend beyond that “first base”. First, we need policies that extend across markets. If we apply them only to OTC contracts, exchange-traded contracts might be subject to different requirements. And if we applied such minima only to, say, futures, we could see the economic substance of futures synthesized via cash repo markets on looser terms. The same applies to other products and markets. Generally, we should take care to avoid regimes that give market participants incentives to chose between economically equivalent transactions and post-trade processing on the basis of different margin or haircut requirements. Secondly, we have to recognise that economic and financial conditions change – sometimes beyond our wildest dreams – so any minima set for one period may not be at all suitable for  2  2  See Tucker, P M W, “Clearing houses as system risk managers”, June 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  another. We need, therefore, to be able to vary any such minima as threats to stability evolve (crudely, cyclically). You will recognise in this an echo of the plans for varying bank capital requirements. This is all part of an evolving macroprudential toolkit. As a contribution to that, EMIR should make explicit provision for macroprudential tools. The initial text did not do so, I think mainly because macroprudential thinking has been advancing as the crisis has evolved, but I understand that the Parliament’s text does take a step in this direction.
Second, before the Fund can commit its support, the country must develop, in consultation with its advisors, and outline to the Fund and its creditors, a credible and monitorable framework for cooperatively achieving a viable debt restructuring, one that leaves the country with a sustainable debt burden. The issues of appropriate adjustment and appropriate broad terms of proposed restructuring are closely intertwined and need to be assessed in tandem. For the Fund, it should be an essential prerequisite that the country demonstrate at the outset that its approach has credible prospects for enlisting broad creditor concurrence, and for being consistent with the country’s macroeconomic framework and payment prospects. Reaffirming these conditions as the foundation for Fund support in restructuring or arrears cases would be a useful contribution to the system, and would leave the Fund better positioned to contribute to the favorable resolution of future crises that involve restructurings. BIS Review 37/2004  5  Strengthening the Fund’s financial instruments The Fund has taken a number of important steps to make its financial instruments more effective for dealing with the challenges inherent in a world with ever more integrated national financial systems. The reforms of late 90’s - the increase in the size of the Fund and its supplemental borrowing arrangements, the launch of new facilities that offered the means for large-scale lending at penalty rates in carefully circumscribed cases, the introduction of greater flexibility in the phasing of resources, and in how those resources could be used to reestablish confidence - were extremely important.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Advancing financial inclusion to its next level Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) 2014 Global Policy Forum – “Advancing financial inclusion to its next level”, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 10 September 2014. *  *  *  It is my very great honour to be invited to speak at this year’s AFI Global Policy Forum in beautiful Trinidad and Tobago. First of all, on behalf of Malaysia, let me express how greatly honoured we are to be given this opportunity to host the headquarters of AFI. Malaysia is strongly committed to the financial inclusion cause and will strive to the fullest and best of our ability to provide the necessary support to AFI towards achieving its objectives. This is an exciting time for advancing the global financial inclusion agenda, as the world economic recovery gains further progress and as there is increasing world attention and priority being accorded to achieving financial inclusion and to an economic progress that is more inclusive. While stability and growth has been restored in many parts of the world, all of us recognise that economic growth, no matter how stellar, will begin to fade when inequality sets in, and as income disparities widen. Additionally, experience has shown that financial crisis and economic recession entrenches the cycle of poverty.
A final word on central counterparties (CCP): I would like to acknowledge the valuable proposals recently made by the European Commission to insist that those CCPs whose activities are “super-systemic” for the EU market establish themselves in the European Union. They are a step in the right direction and represent the only viable mechanism to guarantee that European authorities and national central banks in particular, can control and manage the risks that CCPs are likely to pose to the financial stability of the European Union. Once the provisions on the resolution of CCPs have been finalised, the compensation framework within the EU will have been improved considerably. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  * * * Let me conclude with a general remark that concerns the economy: we need a system to assess, ex post, the economic effects of the reforms. France fully supports the work of the FSB to develop a structured analytical framework, which Germany has rightly included in its priorities for its G20 presidency. Europe, and Germany and France in particular, now has a special duty to protect financial regulation – a regulation that is sensitive to risk, balanced in its treatment of banks and nonbanks and binds the entire international community. Generally, that is what we’ve been doing well since 2009, and it is what continues to inspire us. Thank you for your attention and I wish you an excellent conference. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Together with the mutually reinforcing pillars II and III, of regulatory review and market discipline, Basle II represents a formidable tool to insulate banks against inherent risks in the highly leveraged business of banking. In this process, we must be mindful of the fact that Basle II has been built on the experiences and risk parameters of developed, sophisticated economies. Through customization to suit conditions and markets in emerging economies, which have fundamentally different characteristics, the principles of Basel II should be appropriately adapted to suit such conditions. The “one size fits all” solution of Basle I will not suit the complexities of Basle II. The markets in which we operate have their own peculiarities and their own cultures. Promoting international best practice in such a culture is, indeed, a challenge which demands a fundamental change in credit cultures, attitudes, and policies. The will to change is important and in the case of banking institutions, has to be mandated, if it is to be in the best interests of the major stakeholders, the depositors. Full implementation of Basel II is, indeed, demanding for banking institutions and regulators alike. Capacity building is an imperative on both sides, as is the framework for good risk management built on risk models. The supervisory capacity to assess and validate these models must be enhanced and developed. The magnitude of the investment in technology by the banks must be justified in a business sense. We must ensure that the cost of compliance does not outweigh the benefits from Basle II.
There Ought to Be a Law Another uncertainty is the possibility of legislation in United States, the United Kingdom, or the European Union to ease the transition. In the U.S., the ARRC has proposed that New York State should, by the force of law, substitute a rate based on the Secured Overnight Financing Rate for LIBOR in contracts that would otherwise have no workable fallback when LIBOR ceases.8But again, this solution is aimed at contracts that don’t specify another fallback and can’t be amended to do so—primarily floating-rate bonds. We can hope that the New York legislature will take up this proposal in its next session, but obviously it has a lot of other pressing business these days, and no one can guarantee that there will be a legislative Hail Mary. And even if there is, it would not displace non-LIBOR fallbacks that are written into existing contracts, which may not be the alternative you’d prefer. The lesson here is that for every exposure you have to LIBOR, do everything you can right now to make sure it provides for the end of LIBOR in clear terms. Do not wait for the state cavalry to ride to your rescue. In the UK, the government has said it will give the FCA new powers to smooth the transition,9 and there has been speculation about what the FCA will do with those powers. The UK legislation takes a very different approach from the proposed New York law.

On the international level, the FSB and the Basel Committee have urged the authorities in each jurisdiction to identify the remaining transition issues and increase the intensity of their supervisory actions when the preparations of individual banks are unsatisfactory.24 The Basel Committee has also put out FAQs on benchmark reform under the Basel Framework.25 In the United States, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) has emphasized the financial, legal, operational, and consumer protection risks of the upcoming transition and announced that the supervisory focus on evaluating institutions’ preparedness will increase in the rest of 2020 and 2021.26 And the SEC has identified registrant preparedness for the transition away from LIBOR as an examination program priority for the coming fiscal year.27 So be prepared to answer questions about how you’re planning for the end of LIBOR across your business. Conclusion Given how deeply embedded LIBOR is in products and systems across the commercial landscape, the transition away from LIBOR is a huge undertaking that presents a whole array of risks. There remain a host of uncertainties about the end of LIBOR, but very little uncertainty about what firms should do to prepare for it. A year and a half ago, I talked about ongoing consultations and said that the way forward for the vast majority of LIBOR-based instruments was rapidly becoming clear. Well, those consultations have concluded, and the way forward, for all types of LIBOR instruments, is now clear indeed. 1 Raymond Check assisted in preparing these remarks.
Interestingly, interest rates were not included in the commission's report as a means of influencing economic activity and inflation. The view at this time too, especially from a political point of view, was that the interest rate was to mainly be regarded as a cost factor.17 Nevertheless, the policy during the Second World War was much more successful than that during the First World War. There was no post-war recession, and the inflation peak were short-lived and was not followed by any appreciable deflation.18 Developments during the Korean War in 1950-53 followed the same pattern, with a high but short-lived peak in inflation. The upturn was preceded by a devaluation against the dollar in 1949, which Sweden and a number of European countries carried out to meet the competition from American industry. After the outbreak of the war, international inflation rose sharply. The price increases on commodities were particularly high. Profits in the Swedish manufacturing industry rose 13 Wetterberg (2009), p. 270. 14 Boianovsky (1998). 15 Jonung (2000). 16 See, for example, Jonung (2017). 17 Wetterberg (2009), p. 314. The Social Democratic Government’s post-war policies were focused on full em-  ployment and keeping interest rates down, known as low interest-rate policy. Instead, fiscal policy would steer economic activity. The Riksbank opposed the low interest-rate policy and Riksbank Governor Ivar Rooth tendered his resignation in 1948. 18 According to Statistics Sweden's annual statistics, inflation was −0.4 per cent in 1944 and 1945.

West Bengal has been ruled by the Indian communists for almost 30 years. The Chief Minister wanted to promote foreign investments into West Bengal. His aim was to capture 25 percent of India's IT outsourcing market by 2010. He said that the Indian communists had drawn lessons from the collapse of the former Soviet Union and China's economic reforms. The choice was stark and simple: either perform or perish. 25. The recent bomb attacks in New Delhi have not affected India's growth trajectory. The Indian Government has responded swiftly and with determination. I have full confidence that it will be on top of the security situation. As India grows, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects that by 2010, India's exports will more than double, while imports will nearly triple. The consumer market could then be worth $ billion, making it one of the top five globally. To sustain an annual growth rate of 8 percent would require a huge injection of investments, both foreign and domestic, over the next decade. It is this immense demand for infrastructure, education, healthcare and consumer goods that will continue to draw foreign investors and businesses to India. A reinvigorated ASEAN 26. Let me now move on to ASEAN. 27. Prospects for Southeast Asia have brightened considerably. Regional economies have remained stable, despite the recent Bali bombings. 28. With China and India becoming big players in the international market, Southeast Asia has no choice but to respond strategically.
Svein Gjedrem: The central bank’s instruments Lecture by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME)/BI Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, 6 September 2010. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The lecture is based on the assessments presented at the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 11 August and Monetary Policy Report 2/10. *  *  *  The international financial crisis revealed weaknesses in the financial system and put economic policy to the test. In order to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis, central banks reduced key rates to low levels and increased liquidity supply sharply. In addition, a number of extraordinary measures were implemented. The economic situation The financial crisis had its origins in an abundant supply of credit, market participants who took increasingly higher risk and a lack of oversight on the part of banks, companies and the authorities. The crisis resulted in a sharp downturn in the world economy. Since the crisis, growth has been vigorous in emerging economies while the recovery in western economies has been moderate. Global economic growth at market prices is now expected to be about 3½ this year, and 4½ per cent in purchasing power parity terms. There have been pressure tendencies in some emerging economies, with higher inflation in India and Brazil and rising asset prices in China.

The question is whether continued high growth in parts of Asia can sustain activity in the world economy. Four conditions are limiting growth in the western world: 1. Debt among households and banks is high. 2. Interest rates cannot be lowered further. 3. Many countries have high public debt levels and several governments are facing a financial crisis. 4. Real exchange rates are strong. The combination of high household debt and expectations of weak growth is pushing up saving. Low interest rates are not sufficient to boost investment and consumption in an environment of sharply reduced confidence in growth ahead, while both lenders and borrowers are seeking to reduce their debt. Central bank interest rates cannot be lowered further, but it has been communicated that interest rates will be kept low for a long period. Central banks have purchased government securities and private bonds in order to keep long-term interest rates low and are of the view that these quantitative easing measures have been effective. BIS Review 113/2010  1  Sovereign debt to GDP in the G7  As a result of the fiscal policy measures, government debt in major advanced economies is now as high, measured as a percentage of GDP, as in the wake of World War II after a period of debt-financed military spending. The high level of public debt limits the scope for further fiscal impetus to boost economic activity.