samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
1 Notwithstanding the fact that the EU has introduced additional proportionality measures in its updated Capital Requirements Regulation. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  As the host of a very large international financial centre, we also have a global responsibility to maintain high prudential standards in the UK. This is important for the Bank of England’s objective of financial stability, but it also makes sense for industrial policy for the UK financial services industry: we want people to bring their money to the City for the right reasons, not the wrong ones, and we have no interest whatsoever in a race-to-the-bottom approach to financial regulation. And it was very good to see the Chancellor making this same point clearly in his wide-ranging address to the House of Commons on Monday. None of that is to say that nothing will change as we leave the EU. Financial regulation is constantly developing as financial services change, and it is clear that neither the EU nor the UK wishes to be shackled in lockstep with the other as these developments occur in both jurisdictions. But of course financial regulators tend to be interested in similar things, we coordinate with each other across borders constantly, and we hammer out international agreements at the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee, and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors in order to keep us moving forward together as we tackle issues like climate change, cyber and operational resilience.

Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s banking sector Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the end-year reception, organized by the Albanian Association of Banks, Tirana, 23 December 2011. *  *  *  Dear bank executives, Dear participants, This end-year event with the Albanian Association of Banks, turned into a tradition of communication between the banking sector and the Bank of Albania, provides an excellent opportunity to make a short resume of the results achieved by this sector in this year as well as to identify its challenges in the upcoming year. The banking sector managed to finish off 2011 successfully. Its role in supporting Albania’s economic activity was crucial, while prudence was made to guarantee its financial soundness. In this regard, the supervisory role of the Bank of Albania has provided an extraordinary contribution. Banking supervision has been proactive and preventive by creating, at the same time, the necessary space for flexible banking activity management. Amendments to the law “On banks in the Republic of Albania”, a number of amendments to the banking regulatory framework as well as the physical interaction through on-site inspections have contributed to enhanced immunity and dampened negative effects generated by the global crisis. The Bank of Albania has periodically conducted stress tests on specific banks to ensure that the banking sector’s security and functionality is never put in doubt.
For those who take the view that asset bubbles cannot be identified with certainty, it is neither appropriate nor necessary for the government to take action to burst them. Support for this view comes from the stock market crash in 1987 and the collapse of the IT bubble in 2000. In both cases, central banks were able to stabilise the financial market rapidly by aggressively cutting interest rates and injecting large amounts of liquidity into the market, and the economy and employment quickly resumed their upward paths. But the situation may be very different this time. Because the property and financial markets were closely inter-locked, risks were dispersed by the bundling of sub-prime securities and other financial derivatives, and a large bubble formed. The bursting of this bubble caused great damage to the European and US economies and people in Europe and America have had to pay an unprecedented price. The US government used $ billion to bail out banks and car manufacturers, and the UK government spent GBP 76 billion on rescuing the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank alone. Many European governments have also bailed out their banking systems, including the injection of capital into large banks by the Dutch and Belgian governments. 6. Based on experience in Asia in the past two decades, I believe asset-price bubbles, rather than inflation, pose the greatest risk to financial stability. My reasons for thinking this are many and complex, and we may discuss them on another occasion.

•  More specifically, the new regulations were guided by five main objectives: i)  To increase the resilience of the banking sector (solvency and liquidity ratios);  ii)  To prevent excessive leverage and maturity transformation (leverage and net stable funding ratios);  iii)  To reduce market risk and increase market transparency (reform of over-thecounter derivatives, Basel 2.5 on market risk);  iv)  To limit systemic risks (macroprudential rules, identification of and specific rules for systemic institutions, rules for bank resolution);  iv)  To fight “casino finance” (rules on the separation of certain speculative banking activities). •  Throughout the preparation of the new regulations, the idea was never to suffocate banks with overly restrictive rules. The regulators tried to calibrate the rules in a balanced manner, and took into account the reality of the situations these banks face – and the risk that, rather than limiting dangerous banking activities, the rules might in fact drive banks to shift them into unregulated entities. France, in particular,  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  worked hard to make sure that the “pendulum theory” did not mean regulation was set at a level that would prevent banks from continuing to finance the economy. I’m thinking of two examples in particular: the improvement of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) at the start of the year and the balanced choices made by both French and German political authorities on the separation of banking activities.
But it is lack of trust – and hence credit – that may shape the recovery. Based on past evidence, as the Governor has noted recently, we might anticipate a protracted period of repair. Repairing trust – the low road to reform So what might be needed, beyond time, to repair trust in the financial system? A raft of reforms to the financial system, nationally and internationally, is currently being assembled. These measures will aim to strengthen banks’ financial resources, risk management practices and governance. They are about bringing regulatory rules into the 21st century. This is the high road to reform – for example, higher buffers of capital and liquidity and higher standards of risk management. If successful, these reforms will help cleanse bank balance sheets. It is an open question, however, whether these efforts will be sufficient to restore public trust in the financial system. One reason why regulation might not be the whole answer is that trust in financial regulation is itself one of the casualties of crisis. Regulation is seen by some as part of the problem, not the solution. More generally, in repairing public trust, it would be preferable if banks were seen to be initiating root and branch reform themselves, rather than having it thrust upon them by regulators. This would be the low road to reform. Low because it would not require any new or complex regulatory apparatus. Low because it would not need international negotiation or agreement on the contractual fineprint.

(a) Spread of three-month Libor to three-month overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates. Five-day moving average . Chart 4: Major UK banks’ and LCFIs’ equity prices  Index: 2 July 2007 = 100  120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Jul. Oct. Jan. 2007  Apr. Jul. 08  Oct.  Jan.  Apr. 09  Sources: Bloomberg and Bank calculations. (a) Data to close of business on 12 June 2009. BIS Review 108/2009  11  Chart 5: BIS banks’ cross-border lending (a)  Percentage changes on a year earlier 25 20 15 10 5 + 0 Domestic lending  5  Cross-border lending  10 03  04  05  06  07  08  Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank for International Settlements and Bank calculations. (a) The data are weighted averages of fifteen banking systems, where the weights are based on the relative size of each banking system's cross-border claims on non-banks. Chart 6: Trust in different industries  *Source: 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer Report  12  BIS Review 108/2009  Chart 7: Contributions to annual lending growth to UK non-financial companies  Other monetary and financial institutions Foreign lenders Major UK-owned banks (b) Total  Percentage points 25 20 15 10 5  + 0  Source: Bank of England. (a) Chart shows twelve-month growth rate in the stock of lending. 04 05 groups of06 07HSBC, (b)03Includes consolidated banking Barclays, LBG, Nationwide and RBS.
Subsequently, the financial crisis created a recessionary economic environment in which global trade, stock market indices, and commodity prices, such as copper and cobalt, declined significantly. The global financial and economic crises thus negatively impacted on economies around the world through falling export demand and tourist receipts, declining commodity prices, reductions in the availability of credit and trade finance, and less inflow of remittances, foreign portfolio, direct investment and other capital flows. In response to this crisis, several actions were taken at global level by the major economies to address the root causes and the effects of the global financial and economic crises. These were fiscal and monetary policy stimulus measures aimed at boosting global consumption and investment demand in an effort to avoid a much sharper global contraction than that which has already occurred. Measures typically ranged from reduction of interest rates, tax cuts and increased Government spending in form of bail-outs of strategic institutions and in some cases virtual nationalisation. Concrete steps were also taken to reform the regulatory and supervisory frameworks governing the financial sector. Further, increased resources were provided to key multi-lateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions were also given the mandate to play a central role in leading the global response to the crisis and evaluating the efficacy of the various measures that had been implemented. III.

Conclusion  The Bank of Zambia and the Government will continue with efforts to deal with challenges from the global economic and financial crisis, which still remain significant and continue to threaten macroeconomic stability and the long term growth path of the economy. In this regard, focus will be on attainment of the following objectives: •  Maintaining macroeconomic stability;  •  Maintaining fiscal prudence to ensure that it does not become the source of instability;  •  Increasing or consolidating public and private sector investment in infrastructure that builds the long term productive capacity of the economy and helps to diversify the economic base;  •  Improving the business climate by lowering the cost of doing business; and  •  Harnessing regional markets as an alternative source of demand for exports as well as source of supply for goods and services, including energy. 6  BIS Review 161/2009
And, in turn, it could mean a reduction in the costs of risk transfer through securitisation or credit derivatives, with beneficial effects on banks' balance sheets and liquidity. However for this to happen, banks' internal ratings will need to carry credibility in the market and, for this, transparency is essential. The transparency proposals from the Basel Committee have come under a certain amount of fire for their volume and detail. But I would like the critics to dwell for a  BIS Review 15/2001  3  moment on the alternative: a world in which banks effectively set their own capital, with no assurance of consistency or comparability from one bank to another. This is an important debate and we are keen to listen to others' views before the proposals are finalised. Turning to the possible effect of Basel on capital flows more generally, including bank lending, undoubtedly the new risk sensitivity will tend towards changing conditions for certain borrowers and issuers. This is particularly marked in the sovereign context, where, based on current ratings, approximately twenty seven sovereign borrowers will incur a lower bank capital charge versus eleven incurring a higher one. Again I would stress that the cushion of capital which most banks maintain over and above their regulatory minimum will blur the impact of the Basel changes, since in these circumstances banks' lending and pricing decisions will not be constrained by the regulatory standard.

Taking into account the available information, our projections, force of action of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and other financial stability considerations, the Bank of Albania deems that the monetary policy will maintain a similar stimulating direction and range within similar parameters, over the medium term. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The rest of this paper goes through the new auction structure in more detail. The ILTR demand curve During the auction, counterparties submit their bids for reserves.13 Some bid against the narrow collateral set, others against the wider set and some against both (using a so-called “paired bid”).14 One could think of bids against each collateral set as separate. The auctions are uniform price so that all counterparties pay the lowest accepted rate (on each collateral set) regardless of their bids.15 In theory, this should mean that there is no incentive for banks to try to “game” the auctions, nor is there a need to speculate on other bidders’ behaviour. Instead, bids should reflect the true demand for reserves since, if their bids are accepted, they will either pay the rate they bid, or a lower one. 12  See Bank of England, Annual Report, 2009. This issue doesn’t arise in the short-term OMOs, as the term of the repo runs from one MPC decision to the next, so the difference between the rate we received in the OMO and that which we pay on reserves is fixed. 13  The Bank places no restriction on the number of bids submitted but places restrictions on the total value of bids received from a single participant. Participants may choose to submit multiple bids against either collateral set.

The MSB industry in Malaysia is also highly competitive, with among the lowest remittance costs in comparison with other markets. I know that this has been an issue of some concern among some players in the industry as margins have continued to narrow. As in any other industry, an environment of healthy competition that delivers more choice, provides better service and encourages innovation, generally benefits society. Tonight’s awards are a good example of MSB companies that have stepped up to deliver an outstanding customer experience in order to attract and retain customers. Many strategic partnerships between companies in the industry have also been formed over the 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  years in response to greater competition. This has unlocked value for the companies by opening up new business opportunities and increasing cost efficiencies. Throughout history, whether in an organisation, an industry or a nation, progress and development have always been achieved through a process of creative destruction, adjustment and evolution. The industry will continue to transform and evolve, and in the process, it become more efficient and advanced in delivering superior products and services to the public. Bank Negara Malaysia remains committed to ensuring that the market for money services continues to function efficiently and sustainably in the best interests of consumers, and a competitive market is an important part of this process. The industry’s remarkable development has not gone unnoticed. More than a few countries have been interested to study and learn from Malaysia’s experience.
It is not conceptually simple to design such an instrument as it should not, among many other complexities, compensate for weaknesses that can and should be addressed by policies and reforms. It is not legally simple because such an instrument should be consistent with the Treaty. And, as we have seen from our longstanding discussions, it is certainly not politically simple, regardless of the shape that such an instrument could take: from the provision of supranational public goods – like security, defence or migration – to a fully-fledged fiscal capacity. But the argument whereby risk-sharing may help to greatly reduce risk, or whereby solidarity, in some specific circumstances, contributes to efficient risk-reduction, is compelling in this case as well, and our work on the design and proper timeframe for such an instrument should continue. This year the ECB is celebrating its 20th birthday, and next year we will be able to mark twenty years of the euro. In those two decades the euro has become a feature of our lives and a symbol of our European identity. Three-quarters of euro area citizens now support the single currency. 30 And when people are asked to name the most important elements of European identity, the euro is the second element cited, after the values of democracy and freedom.31 The people of Europe have come to know the euro and trust the euro. But they also expect the euro to deliver the stability and prosperity it promised.

Mr. Chan reports on the Hong Kong dollar post-July 1997 Speech by the Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Institute, Mr. Norman T.L. Chan, at the Hong Kong Business Summit ’97 organised by The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce on 4/12/97. I am honoured to have been invited by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce to attend Business Summit 1997. This year’s Summit carries special significance because this is the first Summit after the return of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China. As Hong Kong enters into a new era under the framework of “one country, two systems” and “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong”, our attention has recently been focused on the financial turmoil in the region and its effects on Hong Kong. In view of the limited time available, I do not propose to go into the background why this financial turmoil has occurred. I would instead like to take this opportunity to clarify a few points which have been the subjects of extensive debate recently. 2. Firstly, I should reiterate that the Government’s resolve in maintaining the linked exchange rate system is absolute. Given Hong Kong’s small and open economy, the link has been and will continue to be the most suitable arrangement for Hong Kong.
(2) Short term nominal interest rate minus CD. Sources: Bloomberg, OECD and Survey of Professional Forecasters. Figure 8 Banking credit approval standards (*)  Corporate credits (big and medium)  Consumption credits  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  -10  -10  -20  -20  -30  -30  -40  -40  -50  -50  -60  -60  -70 1t03  1t04 US  1t05 Euro area  1t06  1t07 UK  1t08 Japan  -70 1t03  1t04  1t05  US (credit cards) UK  1t06  1t07  1t08  Euro area Japan  (*) Positive value is more flexibility in credit approval. Sources: ECB, Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve. 12  BIS Review 124/2008  Figure 9 Oil WTI prices and GSCI grain and cereals and GSCI energy (dollars per barrel; index 01/01/2007=100) 240  160 140  200  120  160  100 120  80  80  60 40 Jan .07  May.07  Sep.07  Jan .08  May.08  40 Sep.08  GSCI energy GSCI grains and cereals  OIL WTI Source: Bloomberg. Figure 10 Annual inflation (*) (percentage) 10 8 6 4 2 0  07  Jul Latin America (1)  08 Asia EM (2)  Europe EM (3)  Jul G3 Economies(4)  (*) Geometric average of countries each region.

On the other hand, and as has been made apparent by the financial crisis, the world lent to the US, to a large extent to finance overvalued houses that were sold to families that could not afford them. Now we see confirmation that such an expansion was not a healthy one. Real-estate boom and financial crisis For several years, housing prices spiraled up in a number of developed economies (figure 3). There were lengthy debates whether a bubble was forming, that is, if prices were beyond what could be warranted by fundamentals (housing services provided by homes). For example, the World Economic Outlook of September 2004 (Terrones, 2004), analyzed what could happen if interest rates increased. This was three years before the collapse, which occurred within the context of a mild increase in US interest rates. First were subprime mortgages and banking losses, then the monoliners and Bear Sterns followed suit, as did mortgage credit providers (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae), insurance companies, other  1  This is Bernanke (2005)’s well-known saving glut, although it seems to apply mainly to China, because the fall in investment dominated in the rest of Asia (Laxton and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005). 2  See De Gregorio (2007). The depreciation would be larger if it did not consider that, as the US liabilities are in dollars, the depreciation reduces its debt (valuation effect; see, for example, Gorurinchas and Rey, 2007). Calculations are similar to those in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007). 2  BIS Review 124/2008  investment banks, and so on.
However, from Q4 this year we will make adjustments to our approach to the composition of this portfolio in order to incentivise companies to take actions contributing to an orderly transition to a net–zero economy. Given the relatively small scale of these holdings – in the context of sterling and global capital markets – we hope this change will by example influence how larger investors take account of climate risks in their own asset allocation decisions. Some may worry this change moves us away from central banks’ core responsibilities, into territory best left for governments. However, the case for taking this action is clear, it is in line with the change in the MPC’s remit I described earlier, and far from impeding the effective execution of our policy objectives, it may well contribute to a future outcome that delivers a more stable monetary and financial system. Conclusion I have spoken about the relevance of climate change and the transition to a net-zero economy to central banks. It is about faithfully executing our mission for monetary and financial stability, taking into account those structural shifts on the horizon. That brings with it several analytical challenges and demands new ways of thinking – we welcome this. But it is clear that the biggest component of the journey to net-zero rests not with central banks, but with government, through the delivery of sector-level climate policy pathways – without these the real economy cannot adjust effectively.

Challenges associated with climate change and the digitalisation of finance To conclude these remarks, I would like to say a few words about the role we can play as supervisors and central bankers to help banks on the path towards a sustainable economy and the digitalisation of finance. On the first point, the recent publication of the latest contribution to the IPCC’s1 6th Assessment Report reminds us of the urgent need for a transition to carbon neutrality. Supervisors have already started to assess the exposure of financial institutions to the resulting transition risks, in order to encourage them to identify, assess and manage these risks in the  1  Contribution of Working Group III of the IPCC published on 4 April 2022  4  same way as traditional risks - and the ACPR has played a pioneering role with the first stress test on climate risks. Climate risks will be gradually integrated into the prudential framework, starting with requirements under Pillars 2 and 3. Banks need to prepare for these future regulatory requirements, including those relating to climate risk stress tests and to transition plans. The latter are part of the CRD6 proposal, which is currently under negotiation. As regards Pillar 1, the integration of climate risks continues to be the subject of intense debate and I hope that the publication of an EBA consultation paper will enable us to move forward. However, the many methodological and data limitations will need to be addressed before new requirements are implemented.