samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The European Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC), which is the advisory arm of the EU Council of Economic and Finance Ministers, will also be involved, as will central banks and ministers of Member States outside the euro area. The latter, however, will act in a consultative capacity. At no point in the process, therefore, would the Central Bank of Malta or the government be able to establish the central parity rate, or modify it, on their own. This is standard procedure and statements suggesting otherwise are incorrect. Other than the central parity rate, there are two further decisions to be taken: the date of entry and the method of participation in ERM II. What about the date of entry in ERM II? Has this been decided? Although eligibility for entry in ERM II is not dependent on the fulfilment of a set of formal criteria, it is presumed that only Member States making progress in convergence can join the mechanism. Consequently, the formal application process for ERM II is normally preceded by an examination of the prospective applicant's economy. In Malta's case, an assessment was conducted earlier this year by the European Commission. The results will be discussed at a Eurogroup meeting in early April. Subject to a positive outcome, one would expect the Maltese authorities to make a formal application. If such an application is made, the Economic and Financial Committee would consider it during one of its subsequent meetings.

And today, perhaps even on your way here, you listened to a streaming service on your phone or watch using voice commands. There's been much innovation over the years, and many improvements in terms of convenience and costs, but at the most basic level we are still doing the same thing: enjoying music. It's how we're doing it that's changed. The same is true with money and payments. Both are fundamentally changing through technological transformations. As happened with the delivery of music, the pace of technological advancement is accelerating, and it's clearing the way to do things faster or more efficiently. On top of that, the development of digital currencies has boomed. This includes cryptocurrencies that are not fully backed by other assets. It also includes stablecoins that are fully backed by safe and liquid assets, and central bank digital currencies (CBDC). Both stablecoins and CBDC that are fully backed by safe assets have the potential to be a new way to hold money and make payments. While all of this innovation opens up possibilities to do things differently than the past, it also carries risks. Just like listening to music, the "how" may change, but the "what" will remain the same. As we look ahead, it's important to remember that even as the technology changes, the role of the central bank has not. It is and will always be to supply money and liquidity to bring stability to the economy and financial system.
How do you ensure as wide, diverse and representative a set of citizens as possible? How do you engage citizens who might not understand or trust the Bank? How much time needs to be set aside to enable the deliberative process to be fruitful? And how many people should you engage to get the balance right between diversity and deliberation? We are working with a range of partners, including the RSA, to come up with answers. The plan would be to set up one citizen panel for each of the Bank’s 12 regional agencies. With roughly 25 citizens per panel, this would give us a non-expert panel of around 300 people. This is edging up towards the mid-point of the Wagner/Vinaimont range and just shy of the Athenian boule. By using digital technology, we would aim to connect these citizen panels to allow national, as well as regional, deliberation. This is deliberative democracy in practice. As with the judicial system, it will involve a blend of expert and non-experts. As with juries and judges, there will be a structured process for deliberation. As in the legal system, the role of the non-experts (citizen panels) is to help establish the facts and of the experts (MPC) to set policy. What’s good enough for decisions on incarceration is good enough for decisions on inflation. Conclusion  Central banks, like all public institutions, were created by the public to serve the public.

The same is true when the assets are people. The diversity benefits in moving from 2 to 4 people are large compared with the diversity benefits of going from 102 to 104 people. There are probably diminishing returns to diversity. The second factor important for the wisdom of crowds is deliberation. Complex decisions require an investment of time, a period of deliberation. This is needed to understand a complex problem, consider it from different angles, to test it with different solutions. Solving complex problems does not in general call for instinctive, “fast thinking” of the type described by Daniel Kahneman in his famous book, Thinking Fast and Slow. 30  It instead calls for “slow thinking”, for System 2 rather than System 1 thinking. Time is also important when harvesting the benefits of interactions within a diverse group. It takes time for groups to explore and test their ideas, winnowing out the winners and filtering out the losers. It takes time for people to change their minds. As with diversity, there are decreasing returns to deliberation time. Research suggests that spending as little as 1 hour on a complex problem can improve performance by 10%. 31  These  benefits are likely to be smaller when moving from 100 to 101 hours spent on the same problem. While diversity and deliberation are the cornerstones of the wisdom of crowds, it is clear that crowds are not always and everywhere wise.
Since the summer, the exchange rate has fallen by almost 20%; and oil prices have fallen by around two-thirds, both of which will boost demand. No one can know at what point the impact of all this stimulus will have a visible effect on activity; the lags in economic policy are notoriously long and unpredictable. But welldesigned policies implemented within a consistent policy framework will eventually work. BIS Review 8/2009  5  1. Ten largest monthly falls in UK equity prices  Percentage change on a year earlier  South Sea  Aug-Sep 1720  Black Monday  Oct-Nov 1987  South Sea  Sep-Oct 1720  10 Se p-10 O ct 2008  10 Sep-10 Oct 2008  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Nov-Dec 1973  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Jul-Aug 1974  France fall to Germany  Jun-Jul 1940  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Feb-Mar 1974  Unexpected rate hike  Aug-Sep 1981  Oil shock & secondary bank crisis  Nov-Dec 1974  2. Chinese electricity production 30 20 10 0 September 2008  -20 Jan 01  -60  -40 -20 Percent change  Jan 03  Jan 05  4.

Second, progress is being made to reduce the vulnerabilities intrinsic to the derivatives markets. We, regulators, tend to think that clearing and settling those derivatives through CCCPs will considerably reduce aggregate counterparty risk, limit the contagion channels, hence strengthening the whole financial system’s robustness. I am fully aware that there are doubts, in some parts of the financial community, on the opportunity of such an evolution. There are fears it will lead to greater standardization of derivative products and less flexible markets overall. This is clearly a case, where the optimum trade-off between efficiency and stability is different according to the market and regulator’s point of view. But, of course,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  regulators’ views are naturally finding their way into legislation, especially on this issue, as you know, in the United States. More generally, when any new financial regulations are designed, two polar views were expressed. One view is that regulatory reforms will take a significant toll on the economy. The argument is because they would raise, in this case, the cost of funding for the economy. It is feared that financial institutions will then pass this cost on to the private sector through an increase in lending rates or worse abandon certain financing segments. This would in turn have a negative effect on output growth.
More persons employed and prospects of higher wage growth will contribute to lifting income. Despite higher interest rates, there are prospects that most households will experience an improvement in purchasing power in the coming years. The risk outlook is dominated by global developments. Over the past year, rising protectionism and political uncertainty have weighed on global growth. The UK’s relations with the EU have yet to be clarified. If trade tensions deepen, growth among trading partners may be lower than we projected in March. The uncertainty surrounding global developments and the effects of monetary policy suggests a cautious approach to interest rate setting. Our most recent monetary policy meeting was held yesterday, and we published the decision earlier today. Since the publication of our March projections, capacity utilisation appears to be rising as expected, while inflation has been a little higher than projected. Global uncertainty persists. At its monetary policy meeting, the Executive Board decided to keep the policy rate unchanged at 1.0 percent. The Executive Board’s current assessment of the outlook and balance of risks suggests that the policy rate will most likely be raised in June. Our mission is to deliver low and stable inflation, while contributing to high and stable output and employment. Should economic developments diverge from our current projections, the policy rate path will be adjusted. Thank you for your attention. 1 Available in Norwegian only. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

If productivity growth were high, one might expect that the return on capital might also be elevated, putting upward pressure on real rates. The late 1990s surge in productivity growth during the internet technology boom seems to be a good example of this type of phenomenon. If the growth in labor input and productivity were positively related with the equilibrium real short-term rate, then in the current environment this would be consistent with a relatively low r*. The potential labor force has grown very slowly in recent years (less than a ½ percent annual rate over the past five years), and productivity growth has been subdued – running at only 1 to 1½ percent annual rate on average over the past few years. In sum, by focusing on the components rather than on the overall real potential GDP growth rate, one might find stronger and more persistent relationships with the equilibrium real short-term interest rate. The second issue that I want to briefly explore concerns the degree of uncertainty about the equilibrium real short-term rate and its implications for monetary policy. The paper argues quite convincingly, I think, that when this uncertainty is high, then an inertial policy rule may be preferable – that is, would lead to higher expected welfare. While I think this is true, I also think it is important not to overstate the implications of this conclusion in today’s environment. Currently, short-term rates in the U.S. are low relative to the standard formulation of the 1999 Taylor Rule.
This is necessary to ensure a balanced economic development and an inflation rate in line with our target. Our repo rate forecast is exactly that – a forecast, not a promise. But it is nevertheless important that anyone borrowing money to buy a home or for other reasons should include a sufficient margin, taking into account that today's low interest rates will not last for ever. Let me linger a bit with the housing market and interest rates as these subjects have much discussed recently. BIS Review 138/2009  3  Monetary policy and house prices One issue that has been taken up, not least in the media, is that the policy we are now conducting could possibly contribute to a further rise in house prices, despite the weak economic activity. This could in turn increase the risk of imbalances arising in the housing market. It is true that the Riksbank’s policy, by affecting interest expenditure, has significance for the way housing prices develop, although many other factors are also important. But the policy we are currently conducting is what we consider to be necessary to attain the inflation target and to provide sufficient support for the recovery in the Swedish economy. We cannot adapt monetary policy on the basis of individual markets as long as we do not regard this as something that affects our ability to meet the inflation target and to safeguard financial stability. But this does not mean that we do not care about house price movements.

During the interval they have an encounter with Global’s friend from the time he was a student. It turns out that he recently got married and his wife used to work with Global on a project several years ago. They decide to go for a drink together. Using their communicators they choose a cosy restaurant next to the theatre and book a table. After the performance they are all in great mood, and recall the beginning of the 21st century with amusement. The waiter discreetly charges Global’s non-contact e-wallet for actually ordered dishes. John can easily accept the payments after he comes back home. Global registers all transaction details in his financial organizer build into the communicator. Thanks to it he can track and analyze his transactions and schedule expenses. He is fully in control of his finances. His personal communicator receives financial operations on an ongoing basis, and confirms or accepts them. Once a weak it receives a financial e-analysis drawing Global’s attention to offers better tailored to his appetite for risk and lifestyle. Small hours. Mr. and Mrs. Global are coming back home. Why have I told you this story? Why does a central banker tell stories about future instead of delivering a 30-minute speech of the success achieved by the National Bank of Poland and its partners in building a safe, efficient and modern payment infrastructure in Poland? The reason for this is that we have to prepare for the future.
Subsequently, yields rose on Icelandic bank bonds in the secondary market. These new conditions prompted extensive discussion by analysts with international banks and others about the position of the Icelandic banks. Attention focused in particular on the banks’ business model, i.e. their high degree of leverage. It was pointed out that deposits account for a smaller share of the banks’ funding that is customary among  2  BIS Review 46/2006  comparable banks in other countries. Thus Icelandic banks are more dependent on access to credit than is the norm. Also, the banks’ enormous expansion has been noted and some observers wondered if it has not been unduly rapid. Whether or not the banks’ positions and strategies deserve to be called into question is immaterial. The banks must take this dialogue seriously, by providing much more transparent information, correcting obvious misrepresentations and responding earnestly to criticism that may be justified. This is precisely what they have been doing in various ways and the results are already beginning to appear. Macroeconomic imbalances, rapid banking sector growth and recent negative press prompted foreign investors to raise Iceland’s risk profile. Higher required yields in the secondary market for bank bonds and for Credit Default Swaps indicate that the banks’ financing costs have risen, at least for the time being. While there is nothing unusual about such a development, what is surprising is how much wider spreads have been required relative to the terms offered to banks with comparable credit ratings.

We have witnessed significant progress amidst the orderly development of the takaful industry, which growth is underpinned by the holistic and pragmatic approach taken in developing the Islamic financial industry. The market has become more diverse, as there has been tremendous increase in the number of takaful operators operating in Malaysia, where from having a single takaful operator in 1984, we now have 9 takaful operators, 4 retakaful operators and one international takaful operator. In Labuan International Business and Financial Centre, there is also strong presence of the takaful industry, where its takaful market comprises 14 retakaful operators. The market segment for takaful has also widened over the years to meet the financial needs of the economy as its appeals and value propositions have transcended beyond religious reasons. Product offerings by takaful operators have further broadened to cater to the differentiated needs of customers, with family takaful products now dominating the market with a share of 78 percent of net contribution, as compared to general takaful products that dominated a share of 63 percent back in 1984. The takaful industry exhibits high potential, as demonstrated by its robust expansion with annual growth rate of total assets and contributions averaging between 20 percent and 26 percent over the period of 2004 to 2009. Globally, Malaysia also signifies its presence in the takaful market, being the second largest takaful market in the world as its total assets of $ billion dominated 26 percent of total global takaful assets in 2009.
Such ideas could, of course, be met with skepticism and run up against logistical problems that may seem insurmountable. Nevertheless, they need to be discussed, as they could provide a concrete way of recognizing that each medium-sized or developing country must have a more equitable share of responsibility for the future of the world economy, a share that they believe is unjustly denied them in the present institutional arrangements of the international financial system. * * * Now, at the end of this analysis of a number of key issues confronting the world economy, it is perhaps appropriate to come back for one minute to the central messages of our eminent predecessors of the Lunar Society two hundred years ago. I am told that they included: • •  4  the value of drawing lessons and inspiration from various disciplines and from the experience in different countries; the need to establish and disseminate standards so quality would be upheld and trade would flourish; and  This decision must be taken by an 85 percent majority and thus requires the active support of all G-7 members. BIS Review 43/1998  -9-  • •  a deep concern for the social implications of economic change and a keen desire to improve education; and, of course, a strong sense of purpose and confidence in the promises of their new world. No doubt these messages could strike a chord with many people today, including why not? - the stellar group that will assemble in Birmingham.

There is more than conventional rhetoric in these words. This mention, in a document essentially devoted to the handling of financial crisis, surely testifies to the recognition by the world’s financial leaders that the success or failure of poor countries in finding their own way toward integration and development in an interdependent world will have a major influence on what the twenty-first century will be. This means that the solidity of our new architecture will crucially depend on the way in which, for the poorest countries, monetary and financial strategies, on the one hand, and poverty alleviation strategies, on the other hand, are made mutually reinforcing. Poverty alleviation is chiefly, of course, the task of the World Bank, the regional development banks and bilateral donors. Among the latter, it is quite encouraging, indeed, to see the energy and enthusiasm with which the British Minister for Development - an MP from Birmingham, as a matter of fact! - Ms. Clare Short, is promoting the DAC Target of reducing by one half the proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty by 2015. 3 These objectives are ambitious, but they remain realistic, provided industrial countries join forces in stopping the present decline of development assistance and implement their agreed commitment to support, as needed, countries that truly own their national strategies for sustainable development. Among the latter, I would agree that particular priority be given to post - conflict countries where we must join forces to give new chances to reconciliation, peace and development.
Euro area (as of 1999) and German (before 1999) recessions are identified, respectively, by the CEPR and the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), with the exception of the German recession at the beginning of the 1970s identified by the OECD composite leading indicators. Latest observation: October 2019. At the same time, despite the unprecedented low level of the yield curve, the fact that the slope of the euro area yield curve is fairly flat (but slightly positive) is not at all unusual from a historical perspective (see Chart 2). [5] The yield curve is a central element in the transmission of monetary policy. Standard and non-standard monetary policy instruments affect the whole of the term structure, which in turn is a key determinant of the financing conditions of the economy. Some rates in the euro area economy – such as corporate bond rates or mortgage loan rates – are based on longer-term risk-free yields, while others – such as bank loan rates for firms – are mostly priced off shorter maturities. [6] The financing conditions prevailing for firms and households in turn affect the level of economic activity and inflation. While current monetary policy is an important factor affecting the yield curve, beliefs about future monetary policy and risk premia also play a role. In turn, these depend on a host of factors which determine the inflation or growth outlook of market participants and the evolution of risk premia.

Or, even if investors do not differ greatly in their attitudes toward duration risk, they may require lower compensation for holding duration risk when they have smaller amounts of it in their portfolios.” [25] Vayanos, D. and Vila, J. (2009), “A preferred-habitat model of the term structure of interest rates”, NBER Working Paper, No 15487. [26] For the euro area, flow effects are found to be small, yet sometimes significant, see, e.g., the overview in Arrata, W. and Nguyen, B. (2017), “Price impact of bond supply shocks: Evidence from the Eurosystem’s asset purchase program”, Banque de France Working Paper, No 623; as well as De Santis, R. and Holm-Hadulla, F. (2017), “Flow effects of central bank asset purchases on euro area sovereign bond yields: evidence from a natural experiment”, Working Paper Series, No 2052, ECB; or Schlepper, K., Ryordan, R., Hofer, H., and Schrimpf, A. (2017), “Scarcity effects of QE: a transaction-level analysis in the Bund market”, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, 06/2017. [27] For quantifying the yield curve impact via the duration channel in the United States and the euro area, see respectively Li, C. and Wei, M. (2013), “Term structure modelling with supply factors and the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase programs”, International Journal of Central Banking, 9(1), pp. 3–39; and Eser, F., Lemke, W., Nyholm, K., Radde, S. and Vladu, A. (2019), “Tracing the impact of the ECB’s asset purchase programme on the yield curve”, Working Paper Series, No 2293, ECB. [28] See, e.g., Hammermann, F., Leonard, K., Nardelli, S. and von Landesberger, J.