samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
15  The FROB is also responsible for the management and future divestment of the State’s holdings – resulting from the government support provided during the crisis – in the capital of banks subject to restructuring plans. 10  budget, balance sheet and profit and loss account, which are submitted to Parliament via the Government. The Banco de España also regularly submits reports to Parliament, such as the Annual Report, the Institutional Report, the Report on Banking Supervision and the Report on Sanctioning Measures. Stipulated as part of this accountability before Parliament is the Governor’s appearance before the Economic Committee of the Congress of Deputies, to present the Annual Report prepared by our institution. This report provides a detailed assessment of developments in the Spanish economy and its main challenges. Likewise, the Governor of the Banco de España is expected to regularly appear before the Parliamentary and Senate Budget Committees to assess the content of the Draft State and Social Security Budget. Complementing these regular appearances, there have been occasional testimonies before various committees, such as the recent appearance before the Parliamentary Committee for the Social and Economic Reconstruction of Spain after COVID-19. In my opinion, this accountability mechanism should be reinforced with more regular appearances by the Governor before Parliament. Specifically, it may be appropriate for the Governor to appear periodically to present the Banco de España’s view of the economic situation, monetary policy and the financial system, and to report on the institution’s actions and plans within the various areas under its remit.

I will leave this for the presentation by Kate Sweetman, the main author of this study. Broadly, the Asian Leadership Index demystifies that attributes leaders in Asia must develop if they are to engage the people they lead. The Asian Leadership Index does not propose a new leadership model. Rather, it identifies a number of areas for behavioural change that are needed based on the attributes that respondents indicated are currently missing in their leaders, reinforced with suggestions on how leaders might move forward with greater influence and impact. In conducting this research, it is hoped that it generates thinking on these leadership issues and contribute towards the development of the new generation of effective leaders in Asia. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
It explains why the offshore RMB business in Hong Kong has grown by leaps and bounds within just a year after the introduction of the cross-border RMB trade settlement in July last year. RMB services for all types of enterprises as well as personal financial and wealth management RMB products, including insurances, investment products and funds, have been launched one after another and have been welcomed by the public and investors. Hong Kong can play a part in expanding and deepening RMB offshore business by serving as the “window”, “testing ground” and “firewall” for RMB’s internationalisation and make important contribution to the gradual relaxation of restrictions on capital accounts in China and the gradual move towards free convertibility of RMB. I would like to emphasise that China has made remarkable achievements with its reform and opening up in the past 30 years and Hong Kong has made major and irreplaceable contributions in numerous aspects in the process. After we have reviewed the past, we will have to look forward to the future. I believe that under the principle of “one country two system”, Hong Kong will continue to contribute to the continuous development of China, the modernisation of its financial system, and its linking to the international markets, helping to develop China as a fully “moderately affluent” community. Thank you very much. BIS Review 166/2010  3

Only by applying the same definitions worldwide, can the soundness of individual banks be compared internationally. It avoids the possibility of financial institutions engaging in arbitrage through the establishment of complex cross-border legal structures. These international decisions are also far-reaching in their importance because they predetermine the options and limitations faced by national regulators. However, implementation at national level is ultimately decisive. In particular, it is the deciding factor as far as financial institutions in any one country are concerned. In this respect, an international minimum standard cannot suffice when it comes to addressing specific national problems. For instance, at the moment, the Basel III package does not address the issue of systemically important banks, which fundamentally concerns Switzerland. Because of this concern, proposals that go beyond Basel III were presented in the report of the committee of experts. Central banks as the lender of last resort for markets? I will now move on to another point, which is directly related to the topic of this conference – liquidity. Since markets are constantly undergoing dynamic processes of adjustment, it is clear that another crisis can never be completely ruled out. Complete security is impossible. 8  The introduction of a leverage ratio is also planned within the Basel III framework. BIS Review 146/2010  5  Consequently, at times, the markets will be unable to provide sufficient liquidity in an efficient manner. In such cases it is essential that central banks are able to step into the breach temporarily as lender of last resort.
Calculations made show that the crises that took place between 1975 and 1997 have on average cost developing countries 10 per cent of GDP in lost production.1 The corresponding cost for emerging economies was 12 per cent. Most of the crises - around 30 of them - have taken place in emerging economies. Oversight of the financial system is necessary because the system fulfils important functions and the effects of a financial crisis can be extensive. The banks’ inherent properties make oversight particularly difficult. Their methods of financing - deposits or loans from other banks - could rapidly disappear, while their assets take longer to realise. Problems in one individual bank could spread to other banks and thus create risks for the entire system. One reason for this is that the banks have liabilities to one another because of loans or securities trading or quite simply because they all participate in the payment system. Another reason is that they all have similar operations and can therefore suffer in the same ways if problems arise in the world around them. As in the case of the Swedish banking crisis, contagion effects can arise merely as  1  “Financial crises’ characteristics and indicators of vulnerability”, IMF World Economic Outlook, May 1998, Chapter 4. BIS Review 68/2004  1  a result of other operators suspecting that there are links between the institutions, even if this is not the case. These suspicions can be self-fulfilling prophecies.

Hopefully, the report can contribute to a well-informed debate on the stability of the Swedish financial system and influence those participating in the system. The Riksbank can also use the Financial Stability Report to show how we work to achieve the objectives the Riksdag has set us. The layout of the report provides a good insight into the way we work. It begins with a review of international events, describing growth and prices in the financial markets and on various assets. In this context, the analyses and assessments of developments outside the Swedish borders play an increasing role, in line with the ongoing internationalisation process. After describing the environment in which the banks and their borrowers operate, we devote a chapter to a survey of how the borrowers - households and firms - have been affected. What is the level of indebtedness and the ability to service debts? Are there any risks entailed in their actions? If things go well for the banks’ borrowers, they normally go well for the banks. Developments over the past five years, with the Swedish banks increasingly investing abroad, have meant that a substantial percentage of their borrowers are in other countries - mainly in the Baltic region. This means that our analyses cannot focus exclusively on Sweden; we must also take into account developments in, for instance, neighbouring Nordic countries. The banks own actions can also affect the stability of the payment system. What strategic choices do the banks make?
While the mainstream thinking recognises that zero interest rates and QE are not without side effects, they still believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. Only history will tell. How should Hong Kong adjust to the US exit from QE? 18. Let me offer my two cents on the future outlook. The US interest rate will quite possibly start to normalise next week. The US economy will continue to grow at a moderate pace, and the US dollar should remain strong for a period of time. However, it is hard to predict how interest rates, bond yields, fund flows and asset markets will react as we are again entering uncharted waters, much the same as when QE was first launched. Moreover, economies interact with each other and respond to external factors differently, thus making it more difficult to predict market responses. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: a period of difficult adjustment lies ahead for EMEs. Energy and commodity prices will continue to be suppressed. EMEs will continue to witness capital outflows, currency depreciation, economic slowdown and downward pressure on their asset markets. And, Hong Kong will not be immune. We should be prepared to face a period of capital outflows, rising interest rates and slower growth. Asset markets, including the property market, will also face downward pressure. However, if there is an orderly adjustment to asset and property prices, this could provide a respite for prospective homebuyers and business owners squeezed by hefty rents.

Decline in US potential GDP  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Jean-Pierre Roth: Switzerland in the EU environment Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Polish-Swiss Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Warsaw, 16 June 2003. *  1. *  *  Introduction  Last weekend the Polish people gave the green light to Poland’s membership of the European Union. This means that in May next year your country will be seeing the crowning of its political efforts of the last 10 years: its accession, alongside nine other states, to the European Union. I congratulate you and share your happiness. The integration within the EU of the countries of the former eastern bloc certainly represents a decisive milestone on the way to creating a peaceful, secure and prosperous Europe. Of all the accession countries, Poland is Switzerland’s most important economic partner. Trade between our two countries has doubled since 1995. Poland and Switzerland can also look back on more than ten years of continuing fruitful cooperation within the same constituency at the International Monetary Fund. Your EU membership and further integration will help to reinforce the economic ties between our two countries. The Polish poet and Nobel prize-winner Czeslaw Milosz once said that Eastern Europe generally knew much more about the West than the West did about the East. I have no doubt that this is especially true in your case, as members of the Polish-Swiss Chamber of Industry and Commerce.

London has more foreign banking institutions than any other financial centre, and it is the largest financial centre for cross-border bank lending. London is the world’s leading centre for foreign exchange business, with average daily net turnover six times that of Frankfurt. More foreign exchange business in dollars, Deutsche Mark and French francs takes place in London than in each currency’s country of origin. London is the principal centre for the international bond markets, with 60% of primary international bond syndication and 75% of secondary market trading. The London Stock Exchange is the world’s largest centre for the listing and trading of foreign equities, and LIFFE is the largest financial futures exchange in the world outside Chicago. London is also one of the largest centres for the fund management of institutional equities, and one of the largest centres for insurance business. London’s position derives from the critical mass of markets and financial services available, and the concentration of the strongest financial businesses from all over the world. London’s strengths include a long track record of innovation and capitalising on new opportunities. The most well-known example is the creation of the Eurodollar markets, which US firms in London did so much to promote. London is the home of the English language. It is in a convenient time-zone between Asia in the morning and New York in the afternoon. It has an abundance of trading and other financial skills and professional support services - in law, accountancy, tax, property and communications.
Last year, the Ministry decided that the Fund should prepare the ground for investing in real estate at 5 per cent of the strategic benchmark portfolio. In time, this may reduce the fixed income share to 35 per cent. Under the Fund’s investment strategy, more equities are purchased when equity prices fall and fewer when prices rise. Thus, the Fund purchased a large volume of equities in the  BIS Review 58/2009  3  period 2001-2003 and is buying a considerable volume now. Of the equities now held, 40 per cent were acquired in 2008 when prices were falling. The Fund currently owns a little more than 1¼ per cent of listed European equities, and the Fund’s average ownership share in international equity markets was ¾ per cent at the turn of the year, with allocations to equities accounting for close to 50 per cent at that time. The Government Pension Fund – Global is invested in almost 7900 equities and bonds from 2200 different issuers. Although the Fund is well diversified, its size means that it will have large individual positions in capital markets. The largest equity holdings include multinational companies like Royal Dutch Shell, Nestlé, BP, Exxon Mobil Corporation and Novartis, to name a few. Since summer 2008, the Ministry of Finance has allowed the Fund to hold up to 10 per cent of a company’s shares.

For Norway and other countries that are dependent on exports of oil, gas and other commodities, government revenues and current account surpluses are reduced. This will most likely curb the growth of sovereign wealth funds in the near-term future. BIS Review 58/2009  1  The financial crisis dealt a heavy blow to investors all over the world, as global equity prices plummeted. International stock exchanges lost more of their value in 2008 than in any other single year in recent history. Absolute results, especially with regard to equities, were highly abnormal. An investor such as the Government Pension Fund – Global will possibly earn more in the long term because of wide fluctuations in equity values. Many investors have suffered losses on equities. As a result of this experience, required returns will be higher in the future. For investments in fixed income markets, the picture is more varied. The crisis resulted in large and unexpected fluctuations in various parts of the fixed income market. While government bonds in some countries were regarded as “safe havens”, with a subsequent surge in prices, segments of the fixed income market were hit by higher credit premiums and dwindling liquidity. The crisis presented major challenges for risk management. Historical relationships between risk factors collapsed, and liquidity was greatly reduced in most markets. Market volatility was very high in both equity and fixed income markets, and market movements were on par with the most volatile periods of the past century.
For the more immediate future, the projections indicate that inflation will remain very high due to continued pressures from energy and food prices and pipeline pressures in the pricing chain, in addition to the effects of the economic reopening and the global supply shortages. But looking further ahead, in the absence of new disruptions, energy costs should stabilise and supply bottlenecks should ease. This, together with the ongoing monetary policy normalisation, should support the return of inflation to our target. In this setting, the performance of the labour market and inflation expectations are key. Unemployment in the euro area fell to an all-time low of 6.6% in May. Job vacancies across many sectors show robust demand for labour. Wage growth has continued to increase gradually over the last few months, but still remains contained overall. Most measures of  2  long-term inflation expectations currently stand at around 2%, although recent above-target revisions to some indicators warrant continued monitoring. The Eurosystem projections published in June showed that inflation would remain very high for most of 2022, averaging 6.8%, before declining gradually from 2023 to 3.5%. It would then converge towards the ECB’s inflation target in the second half of 2024 (2.1%). The expected decline in 2023 and 2024 mainly reflects an anticipated moderation in energy and food commodity prices in the absence of additional shocks, as embedded in futures prices. In addition, the ongoing normalisation of monetary policy will contribute to the moderation in inflation, with the usual transmission lags.

Third, at an ad hoc meeting held in June, we decided to activate the flexibility in reinvestment of redemptions coming due in the PEPP portfolio, as the first line of defence to counter the pandemic-related risks to the transmission mechanism being seen. Fourth, at the latest meeting of the Governing Council held last Thursday, we decided to raise all three ECB policy rates by 50 bp, taking the deposit facility rate to 0%, thus moving out of negative territory for the first time since 2014. At the same time, we approved the new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), designed to safeguard the transmission of monetary policy. That is, we felt that a larger increase than signalled at the previous meeting was required, for two reasons. First, the updated assessment of the risks to inflation, including the materialisation of certain upside risks in the short term. Second, we took into account the reinforced support for the effective transmission of monetary policy provided by the new TPI. This 50 bp hike means an accelerated exit from negative interest rates, but does not imply a higher terminal rate in the hiking cycle. The pace at which we approach that level will be determined by the incoming data that we observe at our future meetings and how they affect our medium-term inflation target of 2%. In other words, our interest rate decisions will be made on a meeting-by-meeting basis.
To put this in context, in the preceding 3 decades stretching back to the 1960s, annual GDP growth deviated from its 10 year average by more than 1 percentage point about half of the time (about 20 quarters in each 10 year period). 2  BIS Review 80/2008  employers and employees are less likely to adjust their prices and wages to a surprise movement in inflation. In other words, their expectation of inflation in the medium-term remains low, stable and anchored at the target. And that has helped to contribute not only to the stability of inflation, but output as well. Reforms to both the labour market and monetary policy have undoubtedly played an important role in the reduction in output volatility and emergence of a stable, low inflation environment. But there was a third factor at play that was probably also quite fundamental. Over the first decade of the MPC the economic cycles in the rest of the world were generally moderate, although not without excitement. And there is good evidence to suggest that the integration of emerging economies, such as China, into the global economy was beneficial to countries like the UK. The share of Chinese goods in total UK goods imports has almost tripled in money terms over the past fifteen years to around 8 per cent, and it’s likely that much of the content of imports from elsewhere originated in China. This rising share of Chinese imports has reduced manufactured imported goods prices relative to other prices and wages.

In particular, there were three episodes between the mid-1970s and early 1990s, when inflation rose very sharply, and at around the same time output contracted. While there are many in the room that don’t need reminding, I thought I would just give the younger members of the audience a reminder of just how desperate those times were (Chart 1). In 1975, RPI inflation peaked just shy of a staggering 27% while at the same time output fell. It was this era that entrenched the term “stagflation” in the minds of the public. Inflation fell back sharply over the subsequent year or so, only to rear its head again in 1979-80 – this time peaking at around 22%. Once again output contracted and unemployment rose sharply (Chart 2). A third and final bout of rising inflation and falling output occurred in the early 1990s, with the unemployment rate once again rising above 10%. On average, inflation in the 1970s was around 13% and 7.5% in the 1980s. The UK macroeconomic framework Why was it that output and inflation were so volatile then and why has economic performance improved so much in the past 10 years? These questions are vital as we face more uncertain times ahead and to ensure that we avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. I would point to three main factors. There have been changes to the structure of the UK economy that have made it more flexible and adaptable.