samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Evidently, traditional banking has a series of tried and tested protocols that help fend off or allow for a prompt response to situations of fraud, which are well-suited to the current needs of these population segments. In any event, it is an inescapable fact that, going forward, digital customers will continue to grow in importance. And so too is the emergence of new competitors, known as BigTech and FinTech. Allow me to turn to these now. It is widely known that these new players generally do not try to offer a full range of financial services. Instead they harness the possibilities that new technologies afford to target very specific niches, while steering clear of other activities, such as the business of taking deposits, which entail more stringent regulatory and supervisory requirements. As the report indicates, this can prompt a disintegration of the value chain. We have shifted from a situation in which many users interacted exclusively with a single financial institution to one in which, for example, a user can have an account at a bank, order payments through another provider’s interface and use a third party’s payment instrument. This situation could potentially lead to some banks losing touch with customers, one of the main strengths of their business model, and being relegated to performing back-office tasks that generate scant value. This is detrimental for the bank in two ways: first, the relationship with the customer is weakened and becomes less stable.

Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula: Bank of Zambia’s key policy initiatives Speech by Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula, Deputy Governor (Administration) of the Bank of Zambia, at the Bankers Association of Zambia Bankers Annual Ball, Lusaka, 14 September 2012. *  *  *  •  The Chairperson, Bankers Association of Zambia, Mr Friday Ndhlovu,  •  Managing Directors and Chief Executive Officers of Member Banks,  •  Managing Directors & Associations,  •  Management and Staff of Member Banks,  •  Distinguished Invited Guests,  •  Members of the Press,  •  Ladies and Gentlemen. and  Chief  Executive  Officers  of  Various  Institutions  Good evening, Before I deliver my speech this evening, I would like us to observe a minute of silence in honour of the Late Mrs Margaret Ndhlovu, wife of Mr Friday Ndhlovu who passed on late last month. As the saying goes, behind every successful man, there is a woman. Our prayers and thoughts go out to the Ndhlovu family as they come to terms with the loss. Distinguished invited guests, it is my honour and privilege to officiate at this year’s Bankers Annual Ball for the Bankers Association of Zambia. It is also my pleasure to warmly welcome Mr Friday Ndhlovu, the Managing Director of Investrust Bank Plc and the In-coming Chairperson of the Association who is taking over from Ms Charity Lumpa who will be assuming a new role within the Ecobank Group in Lome, Togo.
It is worth emphasising that for no fewer than 12 years before the launch of the euro, six of the currencies which now make up the euro - and represent close to two thirds of the GDP of the euro area - had proven to be remarkably stable, not being subject to any realignment within the E.R.M. This high level of confidence is also supported by the homogeneous functioning of the Eurosystem: the European monetary team, composed of the ECB and the national central banks of the -nowtwelve euro area countries as we have welcome, on the 1st of January 2001, a new member, the Bank of Greece. All the components of the Eurosystem work constantly hand in hand. The Eurosystem is a single monetary team, with the ECB acting as a coach and the NCBs as the players on the field, with a single team spirit and this team spirit is one of the priceless assets of the euro area. c/ Third, the credibility of the Eurosystem rests, fundamentally, on its stability-oriented monetary policy strategy. I would like to allay the fears and doubts expressed by some observers as regards the clarity of our monetary policy strategy. The Maastricht Treaty has given us a mandate for maintaining price stability. We have decided to be as clear and as transparent as possible by announcing a clear definition of price stability, featuring a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area of below 2%.

Households’ distribution of income and credit is more uneven in CEE than in euro-area; and corporate balance sheets have not been repaired to the same extent as the banks’ balance sheets were. As for the alternatives on the supply-side, the capital market is thin, and the role of the other financial institutions is less important than that of banks – although there are some differences in country-level data. This leads us to another challenge which has become increasingly important in non-euro Member States: the sovereign-bank nexus. Indeed, banks operating in non-euro area countries 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  are more exposed to the domestic sovereign debt, as they hold a higher share of it. However, sovereign securities are the only highly liquid assets available in large amounts in small markets; hence banks have no realistic alternative to build liquidity buffers. Moreover, government debt levels in CEE are much lower than the euro-area average. The contrast between high banks’ exposures to sovereign debt and low government debt in noneuro countries emphasizes the structural challenges in these countries. Any solution for addressing the sovereign-banks nexus should account for the specificities of non-euro Member States, and in general of emerging countries not issuing debt in a reserve currency. In the spirit of European integration, any limit should be addressed to the banks’ group level, not at the subsidiaries level – a solution which would help preventing fire sales and would not affect financial stability in these countries.
Up to now we have only seen isolated capital outflows but we need to keep an eye on that. In the 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  event of large outflows from investment funds, the main concern would be to prevent an excessive fall in prices caused by fire sales – that is, distressed sales of assets at large price discounts. On Sunday, the world’s central banks decided on extensive coordinated measures. The ECB announced a first major package on Thursday. What is the point of all that if the financial crisis has not yet set in? The situation in financial markets is already very tense. Last Thursday, we decided to provide abundant and very cheap liquidity to the banking system. That is the primary task of central banks at present. On Sunday, in a coordinated effort with other major international central banks, we took measures to provide banks with cheap US dollar liquidity. We did so because banks in some countries, especially Japan, had been finding it harder to access US dollars. The US Federal Reserve slashed interest rates. The ECB stepped up its asset purchases. But none of this seems to have had the desired effect. Equity prices continued to fall. What is going wrong? The ECB’s package was very comprehensive. But market volatility is partly masking the effects. Moreover, not all market participants seem to have immediately understood all of the components of the programme.

The additional net asset purchases in particular will help to counter the self-reinforcing dynamics on the bond markets. We are helped by the operational flexibility of the asset purchase programme, which we are already using to its full extent. So did the ECB communicate poorly? The key message of the programme should be clear. The ECB stands ready to do everything within its mandate to counter market disruptions that impair the transmission of its monetary policy, because monetary policy cannot otherwise be effective. This is the unanimous decision of the Governing Council. Is it perhaps the case that central banks are simply powerless in this crisis? No, but monetary policy cannot resolve this crisis on its own. We also need a strong fiscal response, ideally at European level. Most economists agree that fiscal policy is currently the most important instrument with which to counter the crisis. Why? The ECB can provide banks with liquidity, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the banks will actually lend to companies that are struggling because of the virus. That’s where the government comes in. It can support the economy by issuing credit guarantees, for example. The package of measures adopted by the German government on Friday contained guarantees of that kind. Other Member States have agreed on similar measures. The fiscal response at the international level hardly looks coordinated. Is that a problem? Absolutely. We need a strong, joint fiscal policy response in Europe. This crisis is not limited to individual Member States.
Hence, the current account deficit has been 13.9 billion USD in 2009, while the ratio of current account deficit to GDP fell from 5.6 percent in 2008 to 2.2 percent in 2009. 8  BIS Review 68/2010  Current Account Balance/GDP* 3 (Percent)  2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -7 01-I  02-II  03-III  04-IV  06-I  07-II  08-III  09-IV  *Annualized data. Source: CBRT. Distinguished Guests, 24. Uncertainties led by the global crisis adversely affected the credit market in Turkey as well. On the supply side, 2009 is evaluated as a year in which the banks were cautious in lending basically due to risk perceptions. On the demand side, the demand for investment loans has been on a decline because of the slowdown in economic activity. On the other hand, the willingness of firms to restructure their debts emerged as a significant factor that increased credit demand.

As supervisors we do not think in terms of countries, but of banks’ business and risk profiles. Each bank operates differently and therefore has to face different problems; it would be unwise not to see them individually. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
But even if we could, I don’t see how in practice we could use our single instrument (the overnight interest rate) to target both consumer price inflation and asset prices – especially when one remembers that there are lots of different asset prices and that questions of disequilibria about them may run in different directions. Having said that, there is no denying that asset prices can be a serious complication for monetary policy. And I think I would want to register just a slight qualification to a strong version of the proposition that the central bank should simply – as if it could be simple – ‘mop up’ after a bubble has burst. Policymakers need to take care that the measures they take to offset the impact on aggregate demand of one type of imbalance unravelling do not themselves create or exacerbate imbalances elsewhere in the economy, including in other asset markets. In other words, policymakers need to guard against one imbalance leading to another. That view is, I believe, quite consistent with inflation targeting. The simple set up I described in my introductory remarks had two relevant features. First, the policymaker’s objective (or loss) function was set as a quadratic in inflation and output. And as I described, that can be unpacked as caring about both systematic biases from the target and the volatility of inflation. Second, the policymaker cares not just about today (or tomorrow) but about the future.

That points, I think, to keeping things as straightforward as possible, without glossing over uncertainties and risks. The two threads are intertwined. We have a better chance of keeping inflation expectations anchored to the target if the target is simple to communicate; and if we do not over elaborate, or slip in to being overly ambitious about, our conduct of cyclical policy. BIS Review 46/2006  11
Light is therefore Colour: Remarks at the launch of the new £ banknote Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  Turner Contemporary Gallery, Margate 10 October 2019  I would like to thank Clare Macallan for her assistance in preparing these remarks and Lizzie Levett and Lisa Young for providing background information. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  It is a pleasure to be back at Turner Contemporary in Margate to unveil the new £ banknote featuring JMW Turner. Banknote character Turner was a frequent visitor to Margate, drawn by “the skies over Thanet”, which he held to be “the loveliest in all Europe”. The East Kent coast inspired more than 100 of his works and this gallery stands on the site of Mrs Booth’s seafront guesthouse, where Turner stayed whenever he visited. Turner’s contribution to art extends well beyond this stretch of shoreline. He was precocious – exhibiting at the Royal Academy at 15, and becoming an Academician at 24 – as well as prolific, producing more than 550 oil paintings, 2,000 watercolours, and 30,000 sketches and drawings. Turner is rightly celebrated for his unique ability to capture light and highly varied atmospheric effects through use of vibrant colour and flowing brushwork; he often went to extremes in pursuit of the visceral artistic experience. His paintings blaze with the heat of the sun, shimmer in moonshine, and rumble under the weight of gathering storm clouds. These works transformed the field of landscape art.

I have already mentioned in my intervention how the financial crisis has blatantly revealed the flaws with this measurement and how in certain circumstances, namely when markets are dislocated, applying full fair value accounting to the financial statements of the banking sector raises financial stability concerns and does not provide decision-useful information to investors. Just to re-emphasise, the ECB strongly opposes a full fair value approach. In this context, convergence should not come at the expense of high-quality accounting standards. Finally, with regard to recent assertions made by the IASB and FASB that convergence is on track, I would like to highlight that we are not so optimistic. In this regard, putting in place a reconciliation mechanism that simply discloses figures at amortised cost and fair value for each item on the balance sheet would certainly not achieve the aim of convergence. As regards governance, which improvements do you envisage in relation to the elaboration of accounting rules? First, I would like to stress that the ECB fully supports the concept of “independent accounting standard setting”. In their April 2009 DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, when identifying the main areas of concern in the accounting area, the Leaders of the G20 never challenged this concept. Second, the ECB very much welcomes the recent efforts of the IASB with a view to enhancing their public accountability. We appreciate the open dialogue between the IASB and various stakeholders, including prudential supervisors, on various accounting issues.
Our Remit builds in important accountability and transparency mechanisms. One of which is the requirement for the Governor to write an open letter to the Chancellor if inflation moves away from its 2 per cent target by more than one percentage point. Inflation developments I am in the middle of a likely sequence of such open letters – I have another one due next month – on account of the record low inflation the UK is experiencing this year, currently at zero per cent. Such letters must explain, among other things, why inflation has deviated from target and what policy actions the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is taking in response. The “why” is straightforward. The bulk of the shortfall of inflation below target can be explained by the sharp fall in the prices of commodities and other imported goods since last year. Of these, the single most important factor has been the steep drop in energy prices globally. The rise in the value of sterling has also played an important role in lowering non-energy import prices, which have fallen over the past twelve months. The sum total of these effects has been to drag inflation below target by around 1½ percentage points. This temporary period of below-target inflation has provided a welcome boost to real household income. Inflation looking ahead The MPC’s intention is to return inflation to target in a sustainable manner within two years.

Looking through the blip in the first quarter, the economy has now been growing above trend for a year and unemployment has fallen sharply over the past two. Consumer confidence is around its highest level for over a decade. Businesses investment intentions are solid. Momentum in the housing market is showing signs of returning. 23 Survey data point to continued momentum in real activity over the remainder of this year. 22  Based on average quarterly GDP growth since 1993. 23  The impact of Buy to Let changes will be examined in August Inflation Report. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  To be sure, the international risks to the growth outlook remain. The situation in Greece is fluid, and the on-going slowdown in China could prove more significant. But on balance we can expect the global economy to proceed at a solid, not spectacular, pace. 24 Second, domestic costs need to continue to firm. After a period of particularly weak wage growth, which reflected a marked expansion in labour supply that is now largely absorbed, wage growth is picking up. 25 The recent growth in wages has been stronger than we had expected in May, though most of the upside news was in bonuses, which are a less reliable guide to firms’ future labour costs.
A concern for reputation incentivises banks to seek risky ventures (to keep dancing), the more so the better is the market’s prior on the macro state (the louder the music). We also posit as a larger proportion of banks set risky credit policies, the larger the incentive to pursue similarly risky policies. When others are posting positive earnings, the reputational loss from foreclosing and taking losses is that much greater. This is the “Keynes constraint”. It is better for your reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally. These conditions generate the potential for credit booms and busts. The better is the macro state, the greater banks’ incentive to pursue risky projects to preserve reputation, as the market attributes low earnings to low ability. But one bank’s announcement of positive earnings encourages others to announce positive earnings by setting risky policies too. In Rajan’s model this strategic complementarity between banks generates multiple equilibria: in sufficiently good states, banks coordinate on risky policies (“credit booms”), while in bad states they coordinate on tight policies (“credit crunches”). In between, either equilibrium is possible. Define the payoff function  . Substituting gives:  This captures the marginal return to adopting a risky policy. It allows us to define the regions of fundamentals over which risky policies and tight policies dominate respectively.

Deposits up to a specific quota are remunerated at the key policy rate, which is Norges Bank’s sight deposit rate. Deposits that exceed the quota are remunerated at a rate below the key policy rate, referred to as the reserve rate. 1 Banks that borrow overnight from Norges Bank pay the overnight lending (D-loan) rate. As shown in the chart, the reserve rate and the overnight lending rate are set respectively at 1 percentage point below and 1 percentage point above the key policy rate. 2 Interbank transactions take place throughout the day. The transactions are settled via the banks’ accounts with the central bank. Banks with deposits above the quota at the end of the day normally lend reserves overnight to banks with a negative balance in Norges Bank or to banks that have deposits below the quota. Chart: Norges Bank interest rates and market rate The interest rate on these transactions, called the overnight interbank rate (NOWA in Norway), is normally very close to the key policy rate. The interest rate corridor around the key policy rate is intended to promote reserve trading between banks and not between banks and the central bank. This contributes to an active interbank market and an efficient money market. In order to keep the overnight interbank rate close to the key policy rate, Norges Bank aims to keep banks’ total reserves below the sum of the quotas that can be remunerated at the key policy rate.
Historical evidence of prior European programmes recently analysed by Banco de España experts highlights the presence of substantial synergies between, on the one hand, the implementation of major investment plans and, on the other, the application of structural reforms geared to improving how the main product and factor markets function.2 The funds could actually also be used to mitigate the costs that these reforms sometimes incur for some cohorts in the short term, in the pursuit of the benefits that they would generate for society as a whole in the medium and long term. Again, it would be particularly desirable to properly evaluate the different alternative reforms. To duly nurture the debate and political decision-making, these assessments of the potential reforms must provide a comprehensive analysis. Estimations of their overall impact must be complemented with a better understanding of the microeconomic effects, in particular on the population groups most affected by the reforms, and of the impact during the transitional period until the public policies take full effect. These developments will enable the assessment to be better integrated into economic policymaking, by providing thoroughgoing information on the short, medium and long-term effects. The importance of the use of administrative data and making them available to researchers The second element I wish to refer to is the need to have data that inform the decision-making process.3 Data are also the raw material that feeds the evaluation process.

Another example is the recent agreement between the National Statistics Institute, the Tax Revenue Service, the Social Security and the Banco de España, as holders of a significant amount of administrative information and of granular data collected for statistical purposes, for the joint design of a collaborative data system to which researchers will have access, provided that the information to be used is for scientific purposes in the public interest. The purpose of this agreement is also to promote the future inclusion of other institutions that hold administrative records or other granular databases of research interest. It is our obligation as the participating authorities to put this agreement swiftly into practice, and to establish what might be an unprecedented landmark in information availability for economic research and evaluation purposes in Spain. The need to improve the economic and financial education of the population Quality data, technical ability, and analytical rigour and independence would thus seem to be the necessary ingredients for setting in place an assessment culture leading to the evidence-based formulation of public policies. In my view, this recipe will be like one for bread without yeast. A third key ingredient is needed: an appropriate economic and financial education for the public at large. With citizens able to critically internalise in their individual economic and financial decisions both the fundamental results of these independent evaluations and the various benefits and costs associated with different courses of action, it would be easier to set an assessment culture in place.