samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
17  Here we are referring to total debt as a percentage of annual disposable income. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  How could various measures be expected to influence expenditure – in terms of direct loan costs, such as interest, and other loan-related cash flows, such as amortisation payments – for these households? We can assume for the sake of simplicity that the interest rate on the mortgage loan is initially 4 per cent for all households. We also assume that our households have a variable interest rate, that they do not amortise their loans at all and that they have no savings. Capital buffers have limited effects on wallets One of the more accepted macroprudential policy tools is the so-called countercyclical capital buffers, which are being introduced as a result of the new Basel regulatory framework. This means that it will be possible to make an extra capital adequacy demand of the banks in good (read: overheated) times that can be reduced again in less good times. Say that the banks are now subjected to countercyclical capital buffers and increase their capital adequacy ratio by a total of 2.5 percentage points. Say also that the banks pass on all of the cost for the increased capital adequacy requirement to their mortgage customers.

I The Changing Policy Landscape, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, 2012. Dynan, Karen (2012), Is a Household Debt Overhang Holding Back Consumption? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2012. Eichengreen, B., M. El-Erian, A. Fraga, T. Ito, J. Pisani-Ferry, E. Prasad, R. Rajan, M. Ramos, C. Reinhart, H. Rey, D. Rodrik, K. Rogoff, H.S. Shin, A. Velasco, B. Weder di Mauro and Y. Yu (2011), Rethinking Central Banking, Brookings Institution. ESRB (2014), The ESRB Handbook on Operationalising Macro-prudential Policy in the Banking Sector . European Systemic Risk Board. Geanakoplos, John (2009), The Leverage Cycle. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1715. Gungor, Sermin and Jesus Sierra (2014), Search-for-Yield in Canadian Fixed-Income Mutual Funds and Monetary Policy. Bank of Canada Working Paper 2014-3. Haldane, Andrew (2010), The $ Billion Question, speech on 30 March 2010, Bank of England. H M Treasury (2013), Review of the monetary policy framework. March 2013. Ingves, Stefan (2010), Monetary policy and financial stability – some future challenges. Speech at the Swedish Economics Association, Stockholm, 17 May. Jauch, Sebastian and Watzka, Sebastian (2013), The Effect of Household Debt Deleveraging on Unemployment Evidence from Spanish Provinces. Conference paper, Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung. 16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Kamin, Steven B. (2010), Financial Globalization and Monetary Policy, International Finance Discussion Papers Number 1002, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Klein, Michael W. (2012), Capital Controls: Gates vs Walls. Brookings papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2012, 317–355.
The value of dubious transactions in the financial system continued to decline last year, and this is a stable trend of recent years. The slides show data over several years. Cashing-out transactions halved, while illegal overseas withdrawals shrank by 20%. These are last year figures. The development of digital technologies increases potential cyber-risks. We are controlling cyber resilience of financial organisations. The Bank of Russia continuously monitors cyber-attacks and operates a system of information exchange and support for market participants. As regards the protection of households against fraud, our objective is to minimise the period of time between the moments when a Ponzi scheme or an organisation that illegally provides financial services is revealed and liquidated. This requires large-scale monitoring. Last year, we established two special-purpose centres in our Krasnodar and Khabarovsk branches, which helped us detect fraudulent entities more promptly. Last year, we revealed 168 Ponzi schemes, which is 25% more than the year before. We are working together with law enforcement agencies, including regional authorities. It is law enforcement agencies that bear responsibility for putting an end to the activity of such illegal entities. Illegal lenders pose the greatest threat to the public. Under the guise of microfinance organisations (that is why microfinance organisations often face criticism), they offer loans which are sometimes secured against housing, and afterwards demand that borrowers repay enormous amounts of money. Illegal lenders usually operate via the Internet and we must stop their activity.

The greater price transparency in the European market brought about by the euro’s launch also has an influence on Switzerland’s domestic economy, heightening awareness of the need for structural changes. Finally, initial fears that the exchange rate relation between the Swiss franc and the euro might be destabilised by the introduction of the euro have not come true. Notwithstanding a few fluctuations, the relation between the two currencies has remained remarkably stable. Overall, therefore, the cohabitation between the Swiss franc and the euro is definitely a “success story”. BIS Review 49/2003  1
The gold standard was suspended. The krone’s value against gold and pound sterling fell sharply in the boom during and after the First World War. Price inflation soared, accompanied by a speculative bubble with rising asset prices. When the bubble burst the boom came to an end, followed by deflationary recession and a banking crisis. The recession was probably exacerbated by the so-called parity policy pursued at that time, which aimed at returning the krone exchange rate to its pre-war value against gold. Inflation also accelerated during the Second World War. But unlike the interwar period, the years after 1945 were not marked by recession. With the exception of a few years of high price inflation during the Korean War, the postwar period featured low and stable inflation and buoyant economic growth. BIS Review 14/2000  2  Chart 3  Chart 4  3  BIS Review 14/2000  Chart 5  The fourth period of high inflation was different from the three previous ones. In the 1970s and 1980s inflation gradually increased. Although inflation rates were not as high as during the two world wars, inflation remained high for a longer period. The postwar fixed exchange rate system - the Bretton Woods System - collapsed in 1971. A few years later, the Yom Kippur War broke out and OPEC countries suspended oil deliveries, triggering the first oil crisis. The sharp rise in oil prices led to a recession in the western economies. Moreover, inflation took root in most countries.

So BIS Review 29/1998 ˝  -2-  that although we know that in principle at the macro-economic level free trade and competition are a powerful positive sum game - and although we have seen it clearly enough in practice - there are always likely to be visible - and vocal - losers. And that is bound to provoke outbursts of popular resistance. Against that background establishing and maintaining free trade to the extent that that has been achieved in the EU is in itself a remarkable achievement. But the EU has already in many areas gone well beyond just free trade, in establishing the single market. That involves more than the free movement of goods and services within Europe. It involves also the free movement of both labour and capital, as well as supporting European legislation to avoid market distortions from, for example, state aids, or government procurement, or restrictive practices within the private sector. This further pooling of sovereignty has essentially the same purpose - it is designed to reinforce the macro-economic benefits from free trade and competition and act as a stimulus to growth and employment by allocating resources still more effectively based on comparative advantage, enabling savings to flow to where they can be most productively invested and production to be located where it can be most effectively carried on to satisfy consumer demand. The advent of the euro represents a massive new step in the same direction.
The real interest rate is the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation. When the Riksbank cuts the repo rate the real repo rate also normally falls as inflation expectations are normally sluggish. In a situation with very weak aggregate demand, a low level of resource utilisation and low inflation a low and perhaps even a negative real interest rate is required to stimulate the real economy and thus, as far as possible, stabilise inflation around the inflation target and resource utilisation around a normal level. The Riksbank cannot, however, cut the repo rate more than to zero. But even if the repo rate is set at zero, the real interest rate may be too high to have the desired stimulation effect on the real economy. In such a situation monetary policy faces a binding zero lower bound for the interest rate. The major question is then how monetary policy should be conducted, to avoid a binding zero lower bound and to escape from such a situation by using means other than lowering the interest rate. Why is it not possible to reduce the nominal interest rate below zero? The reason is that money in the form of banknotes and coins yields a zero interest rate. If the interest rates for various accounts and securities such as Treasury bills and bonds were to become negative, households, firms and authorities would prefer to retain cash in the form of banknotes instead of lending it or depositing it.

To conclude the first part of my remarks, the crisis has revealed the need for economic policies, and monetary policy in particular, to have a largely medium-term orientation, rather than supporting the procyclical behaviour of agents. To this end, central banks must pay considerable attention to developments in the financial markets, both domestic and global, in order to identify potential imbalances and forestall their effect on monetary and financial stability. The analysis that I have just conducted with regard to monetary policy clearly needs to be extended to other policy areas, such as fiscal policy or financial regulation. It is essential to conduct an in-depth analysis of these subjects in order to fully understand which problems caused this crisis and how to rectify them in order to prevent them from happening again. An interesting aspect, in some ways worrying, is that despite the consensus that has developed with regard to the analysis of the past, and the causes of the crisis, there does not seem to be a great deal of willingness to incorporate the lessons learned into present and future behaviour. To paraphrase St Augustine, give economic policy-makers more chastity and continence, but not yet. It is this apparent contradiction that leads to the view that this level of analysis is insufficient. I believe that we need to ask an additional series of “why” questions in order to understand thoroughly what induced economic policy-makers to make certain choices. A traditional response to this question is the short-sightedness of politics, which also applies to economic policy.
Hedge fund managers are regulated like any other fund manager that manages third-party funds in 6 Singapore. Small or boutique fund managers, that manage funds for accredited investors , are subject to less stringent licensing requirements because investor protection concerns are less acute. Smaller 7 firms, with fewer than 30 qualified investors , are exempted from licensing. Hedge fund managers should find such operating structures conducive, as they are typically small outfits managing funds for a limited number of institutions and high net worth individuals. MAS applies the same risk-focused and differentiated approach to the marketing of hedge funds. MAS does not regulate offers of collective investment schemes and hedge funds to professional and institutional investors in the financial sector as these investors are adequately skilled to evaluate for themselves the investment characteristics of hedge funds. Similarly, financial institutions can offer hedge funds to sophisticated investors on the strength of an offering memo. MAS’ regulatory oversight of the marketing of hedge funds is focused on retail investors. Retail investors may not be familiar with the differences between a hedge fund and a typical collective investment scheme. In particular, key aspects such as legal structure, investment objectives, trading strategies and fees may not be fully appreciated. Unlike unit trusts where a growth fund usually invests in stocks and an income fund in bonds, there is no simple correlation between investment style and asset exposure for hedge funds.

More recently, the bursting of the technology and telecommunications bubbles, the wave of scandals that hit corporate America and the uncertainties in the US economy have led to a general decline in stock markets worldwide. This in turn provided fresh impetus for hedge funds as investors searched 3 for absolute returns. As one commentator put it, “Where else are they going to put their money?” . And the maths is compelling. From 1987 to 2001, the Hennessee Hedge Fund Index posted annualised returns of 18%, higher than the S&P’s 13.5%. 1  Brooks, C. and H.M. Kat, 2001, “The Statistical Properties of Hedge Fund Index Returns and Their Implications for Investors”. 8th Annual Hennessee Hedge Fund Manager Survey, 2002. 2  Financial Stability Forum, 11 Mar 2002, “The FSF Recommendations and Concerns Raised by Highly Leveraged Institutions: An Assessment”. 3  F-Times News, 10 Sep 2002. BIS Review 52/2002  1  The growing demand for hedge fund products has wrought changes on the supply side of the market. The prospect of untold riches has spurred on many former fund managers and proprietary traders to strike out on their own and set up new hedge funds. This year’s ranking of top 100 hedge funds by Institutional Investor magazine included several funds founded by “Tiger Cubs”, former employees of Tiger Management. Investors now have a wide array of hedge funds to pick from, instead of only a few prominent ones previously.
All major Swedish banks, clearing organisations, the Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank are participants in the Riksbank’s RIX system where weekly turnover corresponds to a little less than Sweden’s GDP. In practice, this means that participants have accounts in the Riksbank’s system in which they regulate debts to each other via transfers between their RIX accounts. A bank's balance in its RIX account forms a risk-free claim on the Riksbank. At some point during the day, the money thus ends up on the Riksbank's balance sheet, which is the meaning of the term ‘central bank money’, as I explained previously. The system has been constructed to manage major payments between the dominant players in the market in a secure manner. Private persons’ payments are lumped together into larger amounts before they pass through the system. It has been optimised to manage a smaller amount of payments of larger amounts with a very high level of security. The mean value of a payment sent through the system is about 35 million kronor. 19 The Riksbank also has regular contact with all participants, who also participate in training sessions, crisis exercises and so on. As the Riksbank and the banks must have personnel on site, opening hours are currently restricted to normal office hours. It is conceivable that the banks would have their own system to regulate payments with each other. But this would increase the counterparty risks in the financial system.

•  Clients will get the opportunity to stress-test their systems, assess the responsiveness of existing coverage to losses, and gain an appreciation of potential losses and the need for cyber insurance cover. Promote Asian demand Next, we want to promote insurance demand in Asia. Asia is already leading the world in premium growth. We seek to catalyse the development of insurance demand in the region via a three-pronged approach. First, enhancing cross-border access to regional markets. The ASEAN economies are working together on a comprehensive insurance liberalisation framework. •  We aspire to achieve substantial liberalisation by 2020 for all insurance sub-sectors, namely life insurance, non-life insurance, reinsurance and retrocession, insurance intermediation, and insurance auxiliary services. •  Insurers can expect to benefit from easier cross-border provision of services and substantial access across the ASEAN customer base from offices in any ASEAN member country. •  The framework is expected to be discussed at the ASEAN Finance Ministers’ Meeting next year. Second, increasing the pool of Asian risk data. Modelling and loss simulation are key tools to help insurers manage and price their exposures. Accurate and timely data are critical for risk models to predict the impact of a loss event. For example, to predict the vulnerability of an insured risk to catastrophes, a wide variety of data is required, such as geographic location,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  soil structures, rainfall, construction materials and urban density, just to name a few.
Indeed, real convergence is essential to create economic cohesion within EMU and promote integration between Members States, thereby helping to minimise the risk and the effects of asymetric shocks. The Eurosystem, and notably the Banque de France, is following the enlargement process with a great deal of attention. Let me stress a few points of particular relevance for the Eurosystem and for accession countries themselves, on the road towards catching up with the EU and achieving convergence. -  Firstly, nominal convergence with the EU constitutes a medium-term objective. The strict compliance with Maastricht criteria will be key for joining the euro area, but should not be seen as an immediate requirement to join the EU. Indeed, the EU Treaty calls, as a prerequisite for adopting the euro, for a high degree of sustainable convergence, which presumes that sufficient preliminary progress has been made towards real and structural convergence. Therefore, nominal and real convergence should be pursued in parallel, and are not conflicting. -  Secondly, I noted that many accession countries have already expressed their intention to join ERM II as soon as possible after EU entry. This intention is to be welcomed, although it should be clear that ERM II membership needs neither to happen immediately after EU accession in all cases, nor to be limited to only two years, which is the minimum for adoption of the euro. It would be misleading to consider ERM II as a mere “waiting room” before joining the euro.

This phenomenon has gained some interest in international media over the last couple of years. Let me give you some figures: The value of cash in circulation in relation to GDP has decreased steadily from approximately 10 per cent in 1950 to around 1.5 per cent today. Over the past decade even the nominal amount of cash in circulation has decreased, which is quite unique. The decrease has been substantial, between the peak in 2007 to 2016 the number of outstanding notes and coins decreased by more than a third. Most of this * I would like to thank Erik Lenntorp for his help in writing this text  1 [4]  decline has taken place in the last two to three years, driven partly by changing consumer habits, partly by our ongoing changeover of banknotes and coins. Value of banknotes and coins in circulation SEK billons (annual average)  Cash in Circulation/GDP  120  12,0%  100  10,0%  80  8,0%  60  6,0%  40  4,0%  20  2,0%  0  0,0% 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 Nominal value (SEK bn, left scale) Value in relation to GDP (per cent, right scale)  Note: Banks’ holdings are excluded. Sources: Statistics Sweden and Sveriges Riksbank. Although there are many drivers explaining the move from cash to electronic payments, I would like to highlight two actions by the Riksbank.
An interest rate that is kept at the current level for a long period might lead to a situation where capacity utilisation becomes too high further ahead. Bottlenecks may arise in some sectors of the economy, and the sharp rise in property prices and borrowing may persist for a longer period. This could be a source of instability in demand, output and inflation in the somewhat longer run. This implies, in isolation, a higher interest rate. At the same time, the current rate of inflation is low, and there are prospects of low inflation for a period ahead. The objective of bringing inflation back to the target of 2½ per cent and anchoring inflation expectations imply a continued expansionary monetary policy. The monetary policy assessments presented by Norges Bank in March indicated that the interest rate will rise after a period and at a gradual pace. Economic developments since then have been broadly in line with expectations. International key rates are rising, albeit slowly and from a low level. Although a gradual rise in the interest rate seems to provide a good balance between the different objectives, the Executive Board concluded that it is too early to increase the interest rate at this monetary policy meeting.” Low interest rates over a long period have contributed to strong growth in household borrowing. Both housing investment and house prices have risen sharply. House price inflation has slowed somewhat, but remains high. In 2004, housing starts were the highest in several years. Home refurbishment is probably also rising sharply.

In the run-up to the coming autumn Duma session we will come up with a package of amendments to legislation to allow the Bank of Russia to set up a special-purpose Banking Sector Consolidation Fund. This fund would be a participant in the equity of banks under resolution. Also, a dedicated management company would be created to provide operational management to a bank under resolution. In such a scheme, the central bank would oversee the bank turnaround programme. Capitalisation support would come in quickly, available immediately; where necessary, resolution would involve both reorganisation and merger. Either of these would be followed by sale of banks, recovered to a satisfactory financial condition. Thanks to the new model to migrate to, the processes of bank resolution are sure to become less inexpensive, faster, more manageable and overall more effective. We will see banks under resolution being reorganised so as to ensure that financial recovery yields maximum results and raises investment appeal of such banks. Concurrently, this will predetermine optimisation of the banking sector’s structure. Both commercial banks and private investors would be able to enjoy the outcomes as they acquire well performing banks and those with capital top-up. Apparently, the mechanism will be the subject for discussion with the bank community. Looking forward, I would like to tell you that we have looked into potential risks this approach involves. Here are our key findings. The risk of banking sector becoming nationalised. In our understanding, we are running no such risk, for two reasons.