samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But the risks that these and other businesses bring to the system certainly matter. And the channels through which this crisis spread underline the need for more transparency around key financing markets. For example, too few realised the significance for the system of how the securities lending markets had developed. Central banks ought to be able to make a contribution to this, sitting as they do at the centre of the mainstream repo markets and through standing ready to discount a wide range of securities in their liquidityinsurance facilities. But there is a key job for prudential supervisors and securities regulators in ensuring that leverage and maturity mismatch is understood and transparent. For those forms of financial intermediation that are dependent on banks for leverage and liquidity, it may be that we can develop macroprudential instruments that could be deployed to restrain excess by influencing banks’ supply of credit to them. That is another major area of work. 15 But where a form of shadow banking provides an alternative home for liquid savings, offering de facto deposit and monetary services, then I think we should be ready to bring them into the banking world itself. In the latest episode, constant-Net Asset Value, instant-access money funds and the prime brokerage units of the dealers seem to have been examples of that. We have not seen the last of regulatory arbitrage.

So I don’t find the argument convincing that we have to keep up the pressure. It is also not our task. It would not be democratic for a central bank to dictate to elected governments what they have to do. BILD: Mr Draghi, in your first interview with BILD four years ago, we spoke a lot about Greece. The country has still not got back on its feet, even though it has received hundreds of billions in emergency loans. When will the madness end? Draghi: Clearly, last year was an economic setback for Greece. Now everyone is aware that there can be no growth without reforms. And what the country and its people need above all is growth. Greece has implemented many reforms in the past few months and is committed to the path of reform. BILD: Is the euro a part of the solution for Greece, or a part of the problem? Draghi: Greece’s challenges have little to do with the euro. It would have to implement reforms in any case. In the euro area, Greece can do that with the support of its partners. But one thing must be clear: who belongs in the euro area and who does not is not for the ECB to decide. That is a matter for the Member States. BILD: They are now more fractious than ever. Is that the biggest danger for Europe? 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Draghi: We are experiencing several crises which are all interconnected and reinforce each other.
Chart 1 shows that the decline in yields in the euro area was somewhat greater than in the US. The yields on ten-year German government bonds have fallen by almost 20 basis points since the end of June. In France and Italy, the decline in yields was more pronounced. Meanwhile, yields on ten-year US treasury bonds have changed relatively little. On the Swiss capital market, almost the entire yield curve has shifted downwards again since mid-year. Yields on Confederation bonds with terms of up to 13 years are currently in negative territory. This corresponds to three-quarters of the outstanding volume. At the beginning of December, the yield on ten-year Confederation bonds reached a new low of –0.4%. Most recently, it was trading at –0.25% or about 40 basis points lower than mid-year. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  How negative interest works In the second part of my remarks today, I will talk about the way in which negative interest works. Since January, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has been charging negative interest of –0.75% on sight deposits held by banks and other financial market participants at the SNB. Negative interest is a key instrument in our monetary policy. Together with our willingness to intervene on the foreign exchange market, it counteracts the overvaluation of the Swiss franc. When calculating negative interest, the SNB grants the banks exemptions so that the banking system does not have to carry the full burden resulting from the high level of sight deposits.

To sum up, despite the fact that nearly half of the CPI is composed of energy, food, and administered goods prices, it is evident that monetary policy is still capable of keeping the main inflation trend under control via other items. As stated also in the last two years’ monetary policy statements, the inflation target would be changed only if sharp and long-term deviations from the target occur due to factors beyond the control of the monetary policy such that the medium-term targets no longer make sense. Within this framework, while considering the possibility that inflation might be exceeding the target for a while in the short run, the Central Bank maintains the 4 percent inflation target hinging on the evaluation that the general trend of inflation is downwards. The forecasts presented in the Inflation Reports will continue to refer to two-year periods. In phases when inflation is above the target, the forecasts presented in the Inflation Report become more important. The forecasts inform the public about the path that inflation will follow while moving towards the medium term target. In other words, the reference value established for economic units is the inflation forecast in the short-run and the inflation target in the long-run. Another message that inflation forecasts contain is the monetary policy stance.
Third parties like the media and research analysts also have a role to play. They can shine the spotlight on exemplary companies as well as highlight questionable practices. Let me cite two commendable initiatives. •  The National University of Singapore and the Business Times have developed and publish regularly a Governance and Transparency Index, which assesses and ranks companies based on their corporate governance practices and the transparency of their financial results. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  The Securities Investors Association (Singapore) will introduce a new corporate governance page on its website to provide investors with more information on the corporate governance practices of the top 100 companies selected through the use of a corporate governance scorecard. 15. It is also encouraging to see an increase in local media coverage of corporate governance issues. But there is one area where I believe the media can do better. Media reports following a company’s AGM tend to focus excessively on the remuneration of the CEO and the directors, with precious little commentary on the company’s performance, business strategies, or risk management. I am not suggesting that remuneration issues are not appropriate areas for scrutiny – they very much are – but we need a more holistic assessment of our companies, and the media plays an important educational role in this regard, especially for retail investors. Building board competencies 16. A second area where we need to go beyond the rules is in raising the competency levels of our Boards.

If we allow this culture of cynical greed to take root, it will undermine the public trust that is so critical to not just the growth but the viability of financial institutions. The leadership of financial institutions – Boards and senior management – owe a special duty of care to ensure that finance is trustworthy, socially redeeming, and economically purposeful. They must send a clear, unadulterated message, down to the last person in their organisation: “If it is not right, don’t do it. If it is not true, don’t say it.” 26. This is an area that MAS intends to engage the Boards and senior management of financial institutions on. Conclusion 27. We are making good progress in our corporate governance journey. We are now entering a new phase, and must go beyond rule reforms to create the conditions for good governance to flourish – developing a conducive ecosystem for market discipline, building up the competencies of our Board directors, and instilling a culture of ethical conduct and values. 28. I wish you all success in this important new phase of our corporate governance journey. 1  Joseph Barr, “From the Boardroom: The Role of the Professional Director”, Harvard Business Review, May-June 1976. 5. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
We are also learning about how best to prepare for the eventual normalization of monetary policy. For example, we may need to update our thinking with respect to the so-called exit principles that we published in June 2011 in order to bring them up to date with developments since then, and ensure they do not unnecessarily constrain our ability to conduct policy in the most effective way today. Those exit principles stated that we would first stop reinvesting, then raise short-term interest rates, and finally sell agency mortgage backed securities over a three-to-five year period. This seems stale in several respects. In particular, how does one time the end of reinvestment given that we now have economic thresholds that govern the timing of liftoff? Also, the thresholds are thresholds, not triggers. Thus it is hard to link the timing of the end of reinvestment to the unknown liftoff date for short-term rates. More broadly, it may be desirable to update our thinking around the path and composition of the balance sheet over time, in light of our capacity to shape this path in a way that mitigates potential costs and risks. For example, the agency MBS portfolio is substantially larger today than it was when the original exit principles were devised. To the extent that the Committee wants to reduce the risk of disrupting market functioning during normalization, it could decide to indicate that it will avoid selling the MBS portfolio during the early stages of the normalization process.

The recovery should also be resilient to potential slowdown in world economic growth given that the initial pick up this year is mostly driven by domestic demand while growth momentum next year mostly reflects the continued rebound in tourists from abroad, which tend not to be sensitive to global economic activity. Bilateral inbound tourist flows in the past are relatively resilient to home economic conditions. This reflected the fact that there is a lot of pent-up demand and Thailand is a cost-effective value for money destination. 2. Balance of risk has tilted towards inflation Headline inflation is expected to peak in Q3/22 and gradually return to target range next year, but what’s concerning is that core inflation is increasing. a. Headline inflation is uncomfortably high and above the target range. It has been around 7.6% in June and July, the highest in 14 years. The rise of headline inflation has been supply-side driven and largely concentrated in food and energy-related categories. There has not been any sign of demandside pressure unlike in the US and UK. However, the risks are titled to the upside given possibilities of broader and faster cost pass-through and rising demand pressures as the economy gains strength. b. Core inflation has continued increasing for 4 consecutive months mainly due to faster cost passthrough such as from raw foods to prepared food prices. This is a sign or an indication that inflation engine might get fully started.
Exchange rate regimes in the region are various, ranging from currency board in Bosnia and Herzegovina to almost free float within inflation targeting in Serbia. What is common is that during the transition process all these countries dedicated particular attention to their exchange rate regimes and they were mostly using fixed rates, which reflects their high trade openness and their efforts to establish strong monetary authority. Regardless of the exchange rate regime, the real exchange rate appreciation in the countries in the region has been considerable, although maybe a bit lower when compared to the new EU member states. As a result, these countries have been suffering from competitiveness loss as well. This can be clearly seen in the movement of their current account deficits, which are considerable in all of these countries. For instance, current account deficits in 2007 range from 3.1% of GDP in Macedonia to 36.2% of GDP in Montenegro. 13 However, SEEU  12  Source: EBRD Transition report 2007: November update and NBRM calculations. Data pertain to FDI. Data for 2007 are estimates. 13  Source: EBRD Transition report 2007: November update. BIS Review 74/2008  5  contains two distinct patterns of the structure of the balance of payments. The first is the conventional one for the transition countries, where the current account deficit is covered mostly with FDI and portfolio investments (e.g. Croatia).

The remarkable success of the Central and Eastern European countries of achieving EU membership after a thorough transformation and rapid growth of living standards undoubtedly holds a lot of recommendations and lessons for the South Eastern European countries. These countries had similar, maybe even more advanced starting positions than the other transition countries, but South Eastern Europe is now lagging far more behind in terms of progress towards the EU. However, we should bear in mind that the main reason for this is definitively the political instability and war conflicts in the region, which understandably prevented faster economic transformation and reforms. Luckily, it appears that political support for EU accession and the determination to pursue EU membership, including all the necessary economic and political reforms, are strengthening. In analyzing the economic developments in the region of South Eastern Europe, some notable differences with the CEE countries appear. South Eastern Europe has much lower pace of reforms and lower growth rates. Related to this, capital inflows in the region have been much smaller and have shown a much bigger dispersion among countries, ranging from 834 USD per capita in Albania to 3,932 USD per capita in Croatia, cumulatively in the period 1989-2007. 12 Credit expansion has been high, but has still to reach rates and length of the one seen in more advanced transition countries. Consequently, there have been less demand pressures as well as comparatively lower inflation than in the other countries, although inflation has been rising recently.
Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Update on the Singaporean economy Statement by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, delivered at the MAS Annual Report 2000/2001 media conference in Singapore on 12 July 2001. * 1  *  *  Introduction  MAS has had an eventful year, shaping monetary policy in a challenging and uncertain environment and continuing to liberalise and enhance standards in the financial sector. 2  Monetary policy  In January this year, MAS decided to maintain the existing exchange rate policy stance of allowing a modest appreciation of the trade-weighted Singapore dollar within an unchanged policy band. This policy was aimed at capping medium-term inflationary pressures, while continuing to be supportive of economic activity as growth came off its cyclical high and moderated to a slower pace. Economic activity slowed much more in the first half of 2001 than was expected, causing market sentiment to shift against the Singapore dollar. Strong demand for US dollars to fund merger and acquisition activities by domestic corporates, and a strengthening of the US dollar against the major currencies, exerted further downward pressure on the Singapore dollar. The $ weakened over the period, from the top of the policy band at the start of the year to the lower half of the band at end June. This trend was consistent with the change in underlying economic and market conditions.

f-NExT will assess the training needs of the financial sector holistically, and identify gaps in skills requirements. f-NExT will also strive to attract world-class training providers to set up in Singapore. Reputable training providers will be encouraged to set up more training centres to meet the industry's demands for specialised courses. IBF will gradually phase out training courses which overlap with programmes offered by other training providers. 4  International profile  As a leading financial centre, Singapore has a stake in a sound and stable international financial system. MAS is actively involved in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and initiatives undertaken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to strengthen national and cross border supervisory standards and capital adequacy of banks, market surveillance, and payments and settlement systems. MAS participates actively at the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), contributing to its work in developing principles and guidelines, which serve as global best practice standards. MAS is also an Executive Committee member of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which is the global standards-setting body for insurance supervision. Singapore is actively involved in regional financial fora, including ASEAN, APEC, the South East Asia Central Bank (SEACEN) Governors, and the Manila Framework Group. MAS is also engaged in expanded technical assistance to central banks and regulators in the Asia-Pacific over the past year, including training programmes on macroeconomic management and financial supervision.
I have already applauded the debate in Basel, and at the FSA, on developing a regime for supplementary capital requirements for firms that are especially interwoven into the system. I would add only two points this evening. First, just as top-down stress testing could be a useful input to utilising the “time series” instruments I have been outlining, so the “cross-sectional” add-ons would need to draw upon judgments about how distress at a particular firm would ripple through the system. Stress testing could be one useful part of that. But it would also require a deep knowledge of the plumbing of the financial system – the way payments, settlements and collateral transfers operate. And so my second point is that the debate about how best to regulate the banking system must not distract policymakers or practitioners from improving the plumbing, the infrastructure of our markets. This crisis would have been unimaginably worse without effectively collateralised payment systems, many over-the-counter derivative contracts and central-counterparty clearing houses. Although progress in those areas proceed below the radar of many, we must renew our emphasis on effective financial market infrastructure. Conclusions The current crisis has reminded everyone that our primary interest in regulating the banking sector is the preservation of systemic stability and so of the vital services banks perform in our economy and financial markets. There are two great lessons from the crisis. One is that important banks can fail and so we would be wise to have robust resolution regimes and plans.

4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  Figure 5: Market functioning indicators returned to normal levels following the MPC’s actions Stylistic summary of market functioning indicators  Figure 6: The MPC’s intervention lowered gilt yields  Figure 7: The Bank’s balance sheet has reached an unprecedented size  Gilt yields  Bank balance sheet as % of lagged nominal GDP  Sources: Bloomberg calculations  Finance  L.P  and  Bank  For some, these facts might suggest that the MPC is once again running out of policy room for manoeuvre. My own view is that this is not the case – we have policy tools still available, and scope remaining to use those tools. The question is not so much what tools are available as which is the best tool for the job at hand. 3. The state of the policy toolbox What I want to do for the rest of this talk is set out the current state of the policy toolbox. While I will include my personal view where appropriate, I am keen to draw as much as possible on recent MPC statements or judgements and on Bank analysis.
Any hasty short-term reactions, like the ones we have been attesting to over the course of the present year and in the early days of this week, bring about individual financial cost to those undertaking them, as well as financial cost to the economy. No economic agent is stronger than the foundations. The high volatility and uncertainty in the foreign exchange market do not have any real base. The euroisation of the economy is a visionary idea, not only for Albania but for the entire region as well, since its final aspiration is the membership into the European Union. It encourages the domestic and the regional market, and the European authorities, to speed up the convergence process. However, convergence in the Euro area is a derivative of continuous structural reforms and strengthening of financial systems, wherein the stability of  BIS Review 119/2009  1  the currency is of prime importance. There can be no European integration without a longterm equilibrium of the national and European currency. In the long run, the exchange rate will inevitably reflect the sound foundations of the Albanian economy, which are to remain so. The past years’ equilibriums remain real indicators of the potentials of the Albanian economy. In the long run, we remain deeply convinced of the benefits the free floating exchange rate regime brings about. It will be the passport to and the best support to the Albanian economy in its path to European integration.

I take this opportunity to invite all the economic agents to consider the benefits, that our national currency provides, impassively, as the best long-term instrument for protecting their savings and as the greatest buffer to wealth volatility. To Albania, the Lek has been, is and will remain a successful currency. The Lek serves as an anchor for all our European initiatives. In the last 17 years, the Lek has managed to withstand the inflationary pressures and the pressures deriving from the foreign markets. Therefore, it should be left alone. It should move freely on its path, concurrent with the market demand and supply. The Lek is the icon of the Albanian economy that will guide us through the European gates. I take this opportunity to invite the media to comprehend this message and transmit it to the public at large. Before giving the floor to our dear friend, I would like to briefly introduce Governor Yilmaz. Mr. Yilmaz obtained his BA in Economics from the City University of London and his MA degree from the University College, University of London. Mr. Yilmaz started to work in the Foreign Exchange Department at the Central Bank of Turkey in 1980. After a long and successful career, Mr. Yilmaz was appointed Executive Director of the Workers’ Remittances (Non-Residents FX Deposits) Department in 2002. One year later, in the Shareholders Ordinary General Meeting held on 7th April 2003, Mr. Yilmaz was elected Member of the Board of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.