samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, the share of household after-tax income that families owe for servicing debts and paying for housing (including property taxes, homeowners insurance and rents) has declined sharply over the past two years and is now back to levels last seen in the late 1990s. Households have cut the total amount of debt they owe. They are also refinancing outstanding debt to take advantage of the lowest mortgage interest rates since the mid 1950s. We expect the increased rate of mortgage refinancing now in place to continue over the near term. This represents another means by which households can free up income for other uses. Now, let’s consider the slow housing recovery. Housing market activity – both new construction and sales – remains depressed. On the construction side, total housing starts are running at just 600,000 units per year (seasonally-adjusted) in recent months. This is up from 530,000 units at the trough in the first quarter of 2009 but it is still extremely low by the standards of the last 50 years. In fact, the rate of new construction is so low that there is barely any net growth in the U.S. housing stock these days. One reason why so little housing is being built is that many existing homes stand vacant. We estimate that there are roughly 3 million vacant housing units more than usual. And more vacancies are added daily as the foreclosure process moves homes from families to mortgage lenders.

Since the number of homes cannot adjust quickly, rising demand during a boom typically leads to rapid rises in prices and unregulated rents. Eventually, of course, the amount of housing supplied responds to changes in demand. So, how did the economic expansion and contraction affect New York City’s housing market? For a mature city, the city saw an unusually strong boom in housing sales, construction and prices. This expansion actually began in 1996 and continued even in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack. Since 2007, however, New York City’s market has turned down. This decline started later than the nation’s and prices have fallen less sharply. Now, prices appear to have stabilized. This pattern can also be seen in Manhattan’s rental market. After a long period of rising rents, the market weakened substantially from 2007 to 2009, and rents have rebounded moderately in 2010. New York City has not been spared from the high rates of mortgage delinquencies characteristic of this recession. Manhattan’s delinquency rates are elevated although they remain markedly below the national average. By contrast, pockets of distress are much more prevalent in the outer boroughs, all of which have delinquency rates, per owner-occupied unit, above the national average. The relatively mild recession and the recovery in the City are lending support to both home prices and sales. Also positive, compared with the rest of the country, are the City’s low mortgage leverage rates and a low share of homes with underwater mortgages.
The impact of monetary policy occurs with long and variable lags. Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effects occurs within two years. A time horizon of two years when setting interest rates allows monetary policy to contribute to stabilising production. This horizon prevents monetary policy in itself from causing unnecessary fluctuations in the economy. The sharp rise in labour costs in recent years carries with it a potential for higher unemployment. The interest rate is an effective instrument for countering lower demand and growing unemployment when measures to stimulate demand do not translate into higher wage growth or unstable financial markets. However, there is little monetary policy can do to prevent an increase in unemployment that is driven by high cost inflation. A pre-condition for an effective interplay between wage settlements and monetary policy is that the response pattern in monetary policy is known and consistent. When the response pattern in monetary policy is known and consistent over time, the social partners can take into account monetary policy responses when negotiating wages. In 2002, wage growth was higher than we had expected up to the wage settlement in the spring of 2002. In spite of the rise in unemployment, the wage settlement in 2002 indicated that the social partners still perceived the labour market as tight. Preliminary figures indicate annual wage growth between 5½ og 6% in 2002, which is substantially higher than projected.

We have taken into account that an interest rate change will affect the krone exchange rate. It is assumed that monetary policy credibility remains intact. Developments in the krone exchange rate have a considerable impact on inflation in a small economy such as Norway. Our analyses, which are based on relationships in the Norwegian economy over the past 20-30 years, indicate that it takes some time for the effects of a lasting change in the exchange rate to pass through to consumer price inflation. The effect seems to be strongest the second year and then shows a gradual decline. A sustained appreciation of the effective krone exchange rate of 5% could reduce the rise in consumer prices by a quarter percentage point the first year, by close to half a 2 percentage point the second year and about a quarter percentage point the third year . Our analyses indicate that a sustained increase in wage growth of 1 percentage point will, in isolation, push up consumer price inflation by a quarter percentage point the first year and half a percentage point the second year. The mandate implies that the interest rate must be adapted to the outlook for the Norwegian economy. If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½% with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½% with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. This orientation of monetary policy will normally also contribute to stabilising output and employment.
Heng Swee Keat: The first Shariah-compliant ETF in Singapore Congratulatory remarks by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch of Daiwa FTSE Shariah Japan 100 ETF at SGX Centre, Singapore, 27 May 2008. *  *  *  President and CEO, Daiwa Asset Management, Mr Michihito Higuchi Vice-President and Head of Listings, Singapore Exchange, Mr Lawrence Wong Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am pleased to join you at this ceremony to mark the debut of the Daiwa FTSE Shariah Japan 100 Exchange Traded Fund (ETF), the first Shariah-compliant exchange traded fund to be launched in Singapore. The Daiwa FTSE Shariah Japan 100 ETF will provide retail and institutional investors the opportunity to access the Japanese capital markets via a Shariah-compliant product traded on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). ETFs are one of the fastest growing asset classes in the investment funds industry. They aim to track the performance of indices and provide access to a wide variety of markets. As at the end of 2007, global assets managed via ETFs are estimated to have increased by 41% over the previous year to reach about $ billion while the total number of primary listings has increased by 64% to 1,171. There are currently 18 ETFs listed on SGX covering regional markets such as the AsiaPacific and ASEAN, and individual markets such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, as well as alternative investments such as gold and commodities.

One of the most important is determined by what we know about the functioning of the economy and the effects of monetary policy. Not everyone agrees, however, that transparency is a good thing for attaining financial stability. Many people argue that so-called constructive ambiguity is the best way to avoid problems of moral hazard in the banking industry. I believe, however, that transparency is important in this area as well. Banks that are "too big to fail" from a systemic point of view will in any case count on support from the government. Especially when it comes to countries like Sweden, which experienced a severe banking crisis not so long ago, it is likely that support to banks that encounter financial problems will be expected if nothing else is being communicated. Another risk associated with constructive ambiguity is that it could limit the motivation of central banks to seriously consider what to do in a crisis. In other words, it could provide an excuse for not thinking the issues through. However, if you are not prepared, you could easily become the bank's prisoner in a time of crisis. Through deeper analysis of the "too big to fail" problem and open communication of crisis strategies, it should be possible if anything to mitigate the moral hazard problem. If you can show that the banks do not need to be systemically important, it should make banks even more uncertain about the possibility of receiving support than any policy of constructive ambiguity.
In 2012, the Chilean economy will grow in the 3.75%–4.75% range, after growing 6.2% in 2011 (table 2). In this scenario, headline inflation will drop to around  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  3% in the first half of 2012, and will hover around that figure through the end of the projection horizon, this time the fourth quarter of 2013 (figure 7). These projections use as a working assumption that the real exchange rate will be fairly unchanged over the next two years, based on our assessment of its current level, which is within the range that is thought to be consistent with its long-term fundamentals. The appreciation of the dollar in the global market has also affected the Chilean peso. The peso/dollar parity has depreciated around 10% between the statistical cutoff of this and the latest Monetary Policy Report. Over the same period, the level of the real exchange rate has also risen, almost 4%. This behavior of the dollar has eased to some extent the exchange rate pressures that were being felt in emerging economies by mid-year (figure 8). Regarding monetary policy, in a baseline scenario where the effects of external uncertainty over our economy are bounded, the working assumption used is that the MPR will follow a path that in the short term is comparable with what can be inferred from the various expectations surveys (figure 9).

The news is mostly good—longer-run inflation expectations in the United States have remained remarkably stable at levels broadly consistent with the FOMC’s longer-run goal. Inflation uncertainty has increased, but this does not appear to be due to unmoored longer-run expectations. The one surprising wrinkle worth further study is the increasing divergence in views about future inflation, including the high share of those expecting deflation, and what this portends for the future. Table and Figures References Armantier, Olivier, Fatima Boumahdi, Gizem Kosar, Jason Somerville, Giorgio Topa, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and John C. Williams. “What Do Consumers Think Will Happen to Inflation?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, May 26, 2022. Armantier, Olivier, Leo Goldman, Gizem Kosar, Giorgio Topa, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and John C. Williams, “What Are Consumers’ Inflation Expectations Telling Us Today?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, February 14, 2022. By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. Armantier, Olivier, Gizem Kosar, Jason Somerville, Giorgio Topa, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and John C. Williams. “The Curious Case of the Rise in Deflation Expectations,” Staff Report 1037, October 2022. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, January 24, 2012. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2020 Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, August 27, 2020.
I will explain tax and banking reforms in more detail in the forthcoming parts of my speech. Improving economic productivity is fundamental for achieving price stability and concurrent sustainable growth in the long run, that is to say an increase in real income and welfare. A rise in total factor productivity is expected to be one of the core dynamics of sustainable growth to be attained in the next 10 years in Turkey. The manufacturing industry has recently witnessed a boost in productivity. The critical point here is that increases in productivity should be reflected on all sectors and become sustainable. Therefore, it is very important that labor education and institutional governance is improved through research and development of technology, which will provide a constant increase in total factor productivity. Graph 11: Partial Productivity and Real Earning Indices (1997=100) 170.0 Productivity  150.0  Real Earning  130.0 110.0 90.0 70.0  2004Q3  2004Q1  2003Q3  2003Q1  2002Q3  2002Q1  2001Q3  2001Q1  2000Q3  2000Q1  1999Q3  1999Q1  1998Q3  1998Q1  1997Q3  1997Q1  50.0  Source: SIS. Sustainable increase in employment In Turkey, sustainable growth depends on the increases in productivity and capital stock as well as on the enhancement of labor supply and labor quality. For this reason, determination of the structural obstacles standing in the way of employment and the establishment of policies aimed at their removal bear much significance.

Bandid Nijathaworn: The current financial crisis, lessons learned, and future implications Keynote address by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 11th SEACEN Conference of Directors of Supervision of Asia-Pacific Economies, Bangkok, 29 July 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Speakers, Participants, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to be giving this morning’s keynote address for the opening of the eleventh SEACEN Conference of Directors of Supervision of Asia-Pacific Economies under the theme: “The Current Financial Crisis, Lessons Learned, and Future Implications.” This forum gives us an excellent opportunity, at this crucial juncture, to discuss the recent global financial crisis and to share amongst ourselves the experience as well as the lessons learned, so that we can further strengthen and improve our financial systems and supervision. Looking at the agenda, it is certain that the discussion in the next two days will be a most valuable one. So far, the SEACEN economies, one way or another, have all been affected by the current global financial turmoil. As central bankers and regulators, we are faced with the important task of putting in place future regulation, and the obvious place to start is to ask the questions whether the crisis could have been prevented or mitigated in the first place, and how the lessons learned from the current crisis can be used to prevent the next crisis. These are not easy questions to answer.
(2016) document similar patterns in real interest rates around the world. 6. Within our central framework for understanding its determinants, R* is the price that equilibrates supply and demand in the capital market. On one side of the market, households accumulate wealth and use capital as a means of storing that wealth. Households’ accumulation of wealth is the result of their desire to smooth lifetime consumption. On the other side of the market, firms require capital to produce. They choose the optimal quantity of capital to use, equalising the marginal costs and marginal returns. See Bank of England (2018) for details. 7. See Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2022). 8. Estimates of the underlying trends in the structural factors that drive Global R* are obtained for 1950–2015. The trends are extracted using a statistical filter and to avoid so-called ‘end point’ problems the latest data are omitted. Given the frequency of the releases of some data series and because the model focuses on a five-year real interest rate, the sample period therefore ends in 2015. See Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2022) for details. 9. The table also shows that varying the simulation assumptions results in simulations that imply falls in Global R* that vary between 1.1 and 3.3 percentage points. 10. As shown in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2022), the dynamic paths of the structural model simulation and statistical estimate differ more in other parts of the sample period, so do not imply exactly that same change in Global R* over all subsamples. 11.

The International Financial Corporation (IFC) – an institution member of the World Bank Group that Romania joined in 1991 – has supported the Romanian banking sector by investing in various Romanian banks, especially during the privatization process. I welcome the current involvement of the World Bank in projects that aim to improve the health and education sectors, to reduce poverty, as well as projects focused on climate issues. Lastly, I thank you for the invitation to take part in this event. I am honored to be here, celebrating 30 years of renewed partnership and cooperation between Romania and the World Bank. To the team in Bucharest Office of the World Bank – which I considered, during these 30 years, as being competent and dedicated, aligned with our endeavors – I extend my warmest congratulations. Happy anniversary! At the same time, I would like to take the opportunity to express my appreciation for the management and staff of the World Bank in Washington for their work in pursuing the Bank's mission to foster sustainable development and promote social prosperity around the world. Thank you for your attention! 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Autonomous monetary policy: Autonomous monetary policy is a kind of “absorber” of economic shocks. It is meant to reduce their impact and smooth the economic cycle. It prevents an economic contraction being borne by the unemployed and those on low incomes more than is necessary. Domestic monetary policy does that via the Czech National Bank. Certainly, the more flexible is your economy (public finances, the labour market and so on), the easier it is to cope with shocks and the less monetary policy is needed. However, the case of the Eurozone shows how tricky it is when the absorber in the form of monetary policy is switched off and nothing replaces it. The shocks are bigger and hurt more. Listeners themselves can answer the question of whether the labour market and labour law are likely 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  be made more or less flexible (and dismissals made easier) in the future. In doing so, they will answer the question of whether there will be a need in the future for more or less domestic monetary policy in the Czech Republic, a country whose conservative population is so averse to upswings and downswings. 3. The “convergence trilemma”: The standard “monetary trilemma”, which you know very well (a country cannot simultaneously have a fixed exchange rate, an open capital account and autonomous monetary policy), is accompanied in a converging economy of our kind with something I call the “convergence trilemma”.

Germany gained unification in exchange for the euro. The southern countries (Italy, France and Spain) gained the stability of the German mark because they were unable to create such a currency at home. And those who were tied to the German mark long before the euro was created (Austria and the Netherlands) simply remained bound to Frankfurt after the Eurozone was established, only the Bundesbank building was replaced all of a sudden by the ECB building. There’s no basic euro story like this in the Czech Republic. Why should we try to create one artificially? Our story is one of maintaining monetary stability across regimes and governments and of keeping the koruna as the name of our currency continuously since the time of Emperor Franz Joseph (his monetary reform established a new currency – the crown, or koruna – throughout the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1892) regardless of totalitarianism and the horrors of the 20th century. Neither the Nazis, nor the Communists had any tendency to rename the currency and kept this old monarchist name despite otherwise changing basically everything, and for the worse. Our country – unlike the rest of the Central Europe – has never experienced hyperinflation in its modern history, and this monetary stability has always served the entrenched mentality of small Czech savers well. Domestic scepticism about the euro – that’s our authentic Czech story. 6.
We will be working with firms to make sure these expectations are clear, and will also ensure that the way in which the transitionals apply is transparent to  2  Full version of the speech "Milestones of preparation for Solvency II"  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  all market participants. This includes how transitional measures might apply to books of business that are subject to a Part VII transfer, and the frequency with which some of the transitional measures need to be re-calculated. The cap on the level of benefit firms can derive from the technical provisions transitional presents a practical challenge, given that it will require firms to be able to produce estimates of their solvency position on an ICAS basis for a period after the end of that regime. Clearly it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to expect ICAS models to be maintained and run once Solvency II has been implemented. Therefore we will be exploring with firms ways in which they might be able to satisfy the requirement to approximate ICAS solvency positions in a cost-effective and efficient way. Conclusion I will add a very quick word on the process of internal model approvals before summing up. I consider it vital that our approval process is entirely consistent across firms, and that the timing and communication of our decisions is consistent with orderly markets.

We are in a different place with insurance: we consider that the levels of capitalisation secured under the current regime are consistent with our objectives, and therefore, unlike in the banking case, we see a low risk to those objectives in allowing firms plenty of time to adapt to the new standard. European legislators foresaw this and therefore (very sensibly in my view) included within the Directive transitional measures which allow firms significant breathing space as they adapt to the new regime. As a safeguard, the benefit from the transitional deduction from technical provisions (TDTP) is capped to make sure financial resources cannot drop below those required under the current UK regime as a result of using the transitional. The practical expression of the stance I have just described is therefore that the Bank will allow full use of transitional measures by those firms that qualify to use them, and that the transitional asset created by the TDTP will qualify as Tier 1 capital. This is consistent with the approach being taken across Europe, and I was glad to see Gabriel Bernardino’s recent comments on this topic. He said: ‘‘It is also fundamental that market analysts and investors understand that Solvency II adjustments and transitional measures are a legitimate part of the regime.