samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The reasons behind this phenomenon are the decreasing expectations of investors as to the expected rate of return that compensates the assumed risk. At the same time, better transparency of enterprises (monitoring of the senior management, supervision over shareholders, and making them subject to the market discipline) entails a decrease in the agency costs that result from the mismatch of investment objectives between the management and the shareholders. As a consequence, enterprises can more easily raise funds for financing their initiatives. 7 Large companies are more inclined to promote regulations and laws that improve the transparency of financial markets and reduce the asymmetry of information among market participants. In addition, institutional reforms that improve the market transparency and the quality of communicated information are implemented, under the influence of investors. The deregulation that is taking place removes artificial market entry barriers and facilitates their smooth operation. Thus, globalization stimulates the financial market development, which in turn gives enterprises easier access to capital. Higher availability of funds may impact investments and in this way stimulate the economic growth. 8 Introduction of the euro has eliminated the FX risk and contributed to abolition of investment limits related to the items of securities portfolio denominated in foreign currency. This has lowered the cost of raising capital from 0.5 to 3 percentage points. At the same time, the convergence of those costs took place among the EU-15 within the same economy sectors.

The challenges  In my introductory comments, I suggested that much of the anxiety surrounding SWFs stems from the fact that their increasing presence in mature markets presents a challenge to some long-held assumptions about how the global economy works. Let me elaborate a little bit on three such assumptions. As you will see, they are very much interlinked. 7  This is shown in table 1 in the appendix. Sources: Truman (2007a, 2007b), IMF, Morgan Stanley, FT.  8  Morgan Stanley, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank and Merrill Lynch all recently produced estimates, ranging from USD 2.5 to 3.5 trillion. 9  Global reserves amounted to USD 4.7 trillion in the second quarter of 2007, according to IMF's COFER database. 10  2006 estimate by Mckinsey Global Institute. The size of pension fund assets held by OECD countries is estimated at USD 13.2 trillion by the OECD. 11  The estimates of Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley and Standard Chartered are, respectively, that SWFs will grow to USD 7.9 trillion by 2011, USD 9 trillion by 2015, USD 12 trillion in 2015 and USD 13.40 trillion by 2017. 12  According to SNB calculations, excess reserves of developing countries according to the Greenspan-Guidotti rule reached USD 2.5 trillion in the second quarter of 2007. 13  These are located in the US (Alaska Permanent Reserve Fund), Australia and Norway.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the economic situation Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Central Bank of Norway, at a meeting of the Troms Fish Farming Association, Harstad, 13 March 2003. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 5 March and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The Charts in pdf can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2½ per cent over time. Norges Bank sets the interest rate so that future inflation will be equal to the inflation target of 2½ per cent. Interest rates were reduced this winter in response to the change in the inflation outlook. The inflation projections were revised downwards as a result of weaker cyclical developments in the world economy, a sharp drop in interest rates internationally and a strong krone. In addition, the Norwegian business sector is feeling the effects of the high Norwegian cost level. Moreover, growth in domestic demand has slowed. Household purchasing power has been reduced as a result of higher electricity prices. The weak prospects at home and abroad are in turn having an impact on the Norwegian labour market and the outlook for wage growth and inflation in the years ahead.

The sharp rise in electricity prices may also affect other consumer prices. Wage developments this year and next will play an important role over the next one to two years. The inflation projections depend on the assumptions concerning the interest rate and the exchange rate. In the Inflation Report, we presented two alternative paths for the Norwegian economy. We judged that a gradual easing of monetary policy seemed appropriate. In one scenario, the tight monetary policy stance was held unchanged. Inflation then fell below target over the next few years. In another scenario, monetary policy was relaxed in line with market expectations. Inflation then moved up and was higher than the inflation target. Actual developments may, however, deviate from both paths. Norges Bank will continuously assess developments in the global economy, the Norwegian economy and the krone exchange rate, and set the interest rate with a view to achieving the inflation target. BIS Review 14/2003  5
From this perspective, the standardisation of data and the draft Non-Financial Reporting Directive - which will be discussed this year - for adoption hopefully next year, under the French Presidency - will be the battle to be fought in 2021. And it would be unacceptable - at a time when progress on climate change is moving in the right direction and Europe has won the first round of climate-related values - for Europe to lose the second round, i.e. that of measuring these values using standards and published data. 2.3 Incorporate climate risk, into order to reduce it in all of our operations and in the economy The third part of our triptych, the very core of our activity, and the most powerful: reducing our climate risk in concrete terms, through our asset purchase and  Page 6 sur 8 collateral policies. This ambition requires great dexterity; but it is rooted in a conviction: we have in our hands the tools to move forward, concretely, strongly. I propose to start decarbonising the ECB's balance sheet in a pragmatic, gradual and targeted manner for all corporate assets, whether they are held on the central bank's balance sheet (purchases) or taken as collateral, without including government securities. There are at least two arguments for such a priority: 1/ it is very difficult to differentiate between the climate policies of the euro area countries. 2/ Conversely, non-financial corporations are clearly identified as players whose activities are the most carbon intensive.

More specifically, the Eurosystem could use indicators that measure the effort that an issuer makes over a given period to reduce its carbon emissions compared with its peers in the same  Page 7 sur 8 economic sector. Here, we have most of the data. The most advanced 2° alignment methodologies, even if they have yet to be finalised, are advantageous in that they take into account both past efforts and future commitments to reduce "carbon" emissions over a predetermined horizon. This sector-specific and dynamic assessment over time provides a greater incentive and would prevent all issuers in carbon-intensive sectors from being blindly "punished" (contrary to an exclusion-based approach). For collateral, this asset valuation adjustment could be directly applied. But our ambition must equally apply at least as much to corporate bond purchase programmes. Here, we are obliged to purchase assets at the market price; but I believe it is possible and desirable to recalibrate the purchase limits per company (tilting) on the basis of climate criteria. For instance, the Eurosystem could limit its securities purchases from issuers whose climate performance is not compatible with the Paris agreement. Conversely, securities issued by "aligned" companies could be purchased in larger quantities. This approach, applying to all companies and our Corporate Sector Purchase Programme, would be more comprehensive than a Green QE, whose quantitative impact would be lower because it would be targeted at green bonds only.
At the PRA we have found this two way dialogue valuable in guiding the development of the Op Res policy, and in that spirit, my remarks today aim to keep you informed on the next steps on our Op Res roadmap. The need to focus on this topic has never been more pressing. Since our original Discussion Paper: the Covid pandemic; the ongoing shift of services to the Cloud; and, more recently, the terrible events in Ukraine have all brought fresh challenges to the overall operational resilience of the sector. This has included the need to shift to remote working at short notice, address the risk posed by dependencies on services and third party providers (including those located in highly disrupted areas of the world), and highlighted an increasing need to focus on cyber resilience. The good news is that the sector has, to date, shown itself to be resilient in the face of these challenges. However, while clear progress has been made, there is still distance to travel to a point where firms across the sector reach the level of operational resilience we expect to see. This has been highlighted by a variety of operational outages still occurring frequently, such as payment outages, app and website failures, and incidents at third party providers. These incidents often attract significant attention from both customers and the media, emphasising the need for demonstrable resilience to underpin broader confidence in the financial sector.

This builds on the two-way dialogue we have enjoyed to date, and industry bodies like UK Finance also have the opportunity to play a key part in facilitating information sharing and the building of expertise across the sector. In taking forward this work, we will continue to build on the close and collaborative approach we have taken to date with our fellow regulators; both domestically with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and also internationally though standard setting bodies like the Basel Committee, supervisory colleges and the bilateral engagement we have with other supervisors. We recognise the importance firms attach to a coordinated approach on this topic. Implications from other relevant upcoming policies Finally, I would also like to highlight some other areas of ongoing work that have implications for Op Res. In particular, the Bank of England’s (Bank) Cyber Stress Test5 and the work the Bank, FCA and PRA are undertaking with HM Treasury on potential ways to address the risks posed by Critical Third Parties (CTPs). We published information on the first of these, the Cyber Stress Test, in the FPC’s March 2022 record6. Whilst it is a distinct exercise to the topics I have outlined today, we expect the findings will prove valuable in informing thinking about operational resilience more broadly. And on the second topic, CTPs, this a complex topic and to make sure our thinking is fully informed by industry perspectives the FCA, Bank and PRA are planning to publish a joint Discussion Paper on CTPs in 2022.
Developments in the PRA’s supervision of annuity providers Speech given by Charlotte Gerken, Executive Director Insurance Supervision The 18th Conference on Bulk Annuities 29 April 2021  I would like to thank Anu Ralhan and Rob West for their help in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Thank you to Westminster and City for inviting me to speak at your bulk purchase annuities conference. At the time the 2020 conference was scheduled to take place, we were all grappling with the early impacts of the COVID 19 pandemic on our work, our lives and loved ones. In the months since, life insurers’ staff have worked hard and in challenging circumstances to serve their customers in very difficult times. As companies, life insurers have so far come through the pandemic well. That is not to say things have been perfect, but we recognise the commitment of firms and their staff to ensuring business continuity – particularly important when considering in the case of annuity providers that an annuity may be a substantial portion of the retirement income of the recipient.

A framework that takes some signals from market prices could be more forward looking, for example, recognising the market pricing of climate risks, rather than a backwards view of the risks of failure. However, any alternative framework may bring in new risks, potentially in being over risk-sensitive; or for example if provisions are linked to credit spreads, there may be incentives to value assets nearer the top end of the plausible range, understating the credit spread. While this is likely a smaller risk for traded corporate bonds, the shift to less liquid assets brings in greater scope for valuation uncertainty, which may also need to be factored into the FS. Conclusion  I have focussed today on risks inherent in the MA, in particular on risks from less liquid assets stemming from uncertainty about the credit rating, uncertainty around valuations, and uncertainty about the amount of MA benefit that should be taken as a credit to insurers’ balance sheets. These are all risks that insurers’ Boards and senior management need to be across and to understand the vulnerabilities in assumptions that have to be made. The MA is a significant benefit for firms, in bringing forward unrealised profits that are then available to be deployed to grow businesses, or to reward shareholders. However, an addition to the risk-free rate is appropriate for annuities where they are well matched, and the MA is a valuable source of resilience for annuity writers.
That’s how we like it: and the lesson you should draw from our readiness to tighten policy over the past seven months is that we are on the case. I hope that will give you the confidence to focus on your main business; creating wealth and ‘making people happy’. BIS Review 41/2004  3

This is further complemented by the proliferation of payment cards, particularly electronic money, which enables banking and payment services to be conducted without a bank account or visits to traditional bank branches. According to data from the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, or CGAP, there will be more than 120 mobile money schemes in developing countries by the end of 2009, more than double the number in 2008. CGAP estimates that by  BIS Review 162/2009  1  2012 some 1.7 billion people will have mobile phones but no bank account, and 20 percent will be using mobile money. A key challenge, to implement a commercially viable and workable mobile banking solution, especially where population density is low, is to achieve a critical mass of users required to reap economies of scale to keep transaction cost low. This is even more relevant if the aim is also to promote financial inclusion as financial services would have to be offered at affordable costs. Thus, a requirement for an open and interoperable mobile platform that facilitates the participation of many service providers and that offers a broad range of services is critical in developing a sustainable and efficient solution for both providers and users. The other type of branchless banking is the use of non-bank financial service providers, also referred to as Business Correspondents in certain jurisdictions.
This has complicated the Bank in its efforts to constrain inflation in recent times. One factor has been the changes that took place in the mortgage loan market in autumn 2004 when the commercial and savings banks began competing with the Housing Financing Fund (HFF). The Central Bank’s policy rate hikes impact the interest rates of non-indexed lending by commercial banks and savings banks and the non-indexed end of the domestic bond market. However, for a long time they had little impact on long-term interest rates. Some critics cite this as proof that the Central Bank of Iceland’s measures do not have the same effect as those of other central banks. Yet the development in Iceland is by no means an isolated occurrence. The US experience offers an immediate example. The Federal Reserve began raising its federal funds rate early in 2005 in progressive steps until early this year, from 1% to 5.25%. These hikes had no effect on long-term interest rates in the US, which have been broadly steady since 2005 apart with only minor fluctuations in either direction. US monetary authorities were puzzled by this development. I cite this example because it has been claimed that, unlike the Central Bank of Iceland’s decisions, the impact of changes in the Federal Reserve’s rates is immediately transmitted in full to long-term interest rates.

It involves a Star Trek chair and a bank of monitors. It would involve tracking the global flow of funds in close to real time (from a Star Trek chair using a bank of monitors), in much the same way as happens with global weather systems and global internet traffic (Haldane (2011)). Its centre piece would be a global map of financial flows, charting spill-overs and correlations. Such a global financial surveillance system could serve a number of policy ends. It would allow policymakers to monitor the evolution of the financial system in real time, as it expanded, contracted and changed shape. It would also allow them to simulate and stresstest this system to help detect impending financial cliff-edges. The IMF would be the natural guardian of this global-financial-map-cum-stress-testing-machine. To give this concept some (literal and metaphorical) colour, Chart 18 shows a bank of heatmaps of correlations across a wide range of assets (safe and risky) and a large set of countries (advanced and emerging). There are shown at three dates – a pre-crisis period of calm, the Lehmans Brothers crisis of 2008 and at present. These correlations are grouped in two ways, by asset class and by country. The correlation matrix broadly matches the patterns from the earlier heatmaps. Temperatures appear to be rising over time, with flare-ups at times of crisis. With this map now encompassing a wider range of assets and countries, the strength of these correlations underscores the genuinely global nature of today’s international financial system.
Similar to many economies in the region, commercial banks in Thailand will start maintaining capital according to Basel II by the end of next year, and by the end of 2009 for banks with the advanced approach. IAS 39, on the other hand, will be fully enforced by the Federation of Accounting Professions in the beginning of 2010. However, the Bank of Thailand has already adopted some parts of IAS 39, namely the impairment of assets since December last year, and we are now considering adjusting the related regulations to be in line with the concept of IAS 39. For Basel II, preparations on the supervision side started a number of years ago. The Bank has set up several internal working groups to study the guidelines and its suitability to the Thai market. Staff were sent abroad for training on Basel II implementation. Experts from other supervisory authorities and consultants were invited to hold seminar and training on the underlying concepts, applications, and supervision issues. The drafting of the Thai version of Basel II has been quite involving. During the drafting, the Bank of Thailand carefully studied other countries guidelines and consulted with other supervisors to gain insights on the suitability of Basel II to the Thai financial system. As a result, we have made some necessary adjustments to the guideline taking into consideration its practicality. Banks in Thailand have been consulted in the process so that the guideline does not impose extra unnecessary burden.

Such effort can be as close as forming an alliance to pool the necessary data for model development, or as loose as sharing the costs of training and seminar similar to the one we are having here today. I should now end my talk. It has been a pleasure to share with you a regulator’s perspective on the implementation of Basel II and IFRS. I hope my remarks and observations have been useful. We are traveling on an important and challenging path towards achieving a robust and resilient financial system, and steady progress is being made. You, as a key stakeholder, are also an important part of this journey. I wish the rest of the seminar great success and accomplish its objective, and be interesting and educating to all. Thank you very much. 4  BIS Review 114/2007
Making sure the financial system is robust and resilient is probably the most important thing the central bank can do in this respect. I would like to turn now to the issue of how the initial step in normalization is going. The U.S. bond market response to lift-off has been very mild. There has been no bond market “taper tantrum” such as what occurred in 2013 when Chairman Bernanke discussed the possibility of tapering Federal Reserve asset purchases. Normalization is also going very well in the sense that, even with an extraordinarily large balance sheet, the tools we have developed to raise the federal funds rate (and other money market rates) have so far worked well. The federal funds rate is trading close to the middle of the new target range of 25 to 50 basis points and other money market rates have moved up in tandem. Why is this noteworthy? To explain, I’ll first have to provide some background on how monetary policy used to work before the crisis and then compare that regime with how it works now. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Before the financial crisis, banks valued reserves – even though the Federal Reserve paid no interest on them – because the Federal Reserve kept their supply scarce.

Role of the Bank of England  That brings me to the role of the Bank. Our work is focused on building resiliency to the risks from climate change into the financial system, so that it can steward the real economy to an orderly transition to net-zero. Being resilient means pro-actively managing climate risks and pre-emptively reducing them. This is central to the Bank’s mission. Indeed earlier this year climate change was made one of the Bank’s strategic priorities.8 I became the Executive Sponsor for the Bank’s work on climate change in 2016, at a time when there was only a handful of people at a handful of central banks working on climate-related issues. But since then the scope and depth of our work and that of other central banks has expanded significantly. We are working domestically and internationally with key stakeholders including government, industry, investors, regulators, and climate scientists to further this critical agenda. 8  Bank of England Annual Report 2020 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  Climate action at the Micro-level: Disclosure and Risk Management  So what are we asking financial firms to do? Put simply, they need to make financial decisions that take the risks and opportunities from climate change into account. The first step in achieving that is to have the right information. That is why the Bank has been making the case for some time for consistent, comparable, and comprehensive climate disclosures.