samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Gower put forward the pros and cons of much supervision continuing to be undertaken by the DTI (in practice, largely self-regulating) or the establishment of a self-standing commission. His recommendation at the time was that the DTI continue in its role, allowing the firms to self-regulate, until such a time that ‘it is apparent that a substantial volume of day-to-day Governmental regulation and supervision will have to be undertaken… [at which point] a self-standing Commission answerable to the Secretary of State should be 38  established and the Governmental role undertaken by it’ . The debate about the most appropriate institutional setup for the supervision of financial services in the UK continued to rage on. Fast-forward to 1997 and the responsibility for insurance supervision was being passed to the newly-created Financial Services Authority (FSA). Around the same time, the Government announced that it would transfer full operational responsibility for monetary policy to the Bank of England, ably supported by my colleague Sir Jon Cunliffe in his former mandarin incarnation, and – as part of that change – the supervisory function for the banking sector was transferred to the FSA. In a statement to the House of Commons on 20 May 1997, Gordon Brown noted the “strong case for bringing 39  the regulation of banking, securities and insurance together under one roof” , noting that firms by this point managed their businesses on a group-wide basis and that the new regulatory structure would reflect the increasingly integrated financial markets of the day.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Financial integration and stability in Europe Opening remarks by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Conference on "Financial Integration and Stability in Europe", organised by the Bank of Spain, the European Central Bank and the Center for Financial Studies, Madrid, 30 November 2006. *  *  *  Good morning ladies and gentleman. First of all, allow me to welcome you. We are really delighted to host this conference at the Banco de España in Madrid. Some of you are perhaps too young to remember, but it was here in Madrid, in 1989, that the European Council decided to embark on the first stage of Economic and Monetary Union, as envisaged in the Delors Report which was the catalyst for the EMU process. I would like to start my intervention today with a quote from the Delors Report; a quote that refers to financial integration. Simplifying, it said the following: The objective of a single financial area, in which all monetary and financial instruments circulate freely, and banking, securities and insurance services are offered uniformly throughout the area, would be fully implemented through the approval and enforcement of the necessary Community directives. You can appreciate the appealing simplicity of its definition of an integrated financial market: one where all monetary and financial instruments circulate freely, and where banking, securities and insurance services are offered uniformly.
What makes Singapore attractive as an international financial and wealth management centre? Wealth desires stability. Singapore’s political and economic stability, transparency in governance, and sound and predictable regulation, are often cited by private bankers and clients alike as the fundamentals underpinning its attraction. Efficiency, connectivity, and sound infrastructure are added advantages. Singapore has been ranked by the World Bank, for the sixth year running, as the easiest place to do business in the world. Perhaps the decisive advantage is the larger financial eco-system that exists in Singapore. Strong capabilities in asset management, foreign exchange and derivatives trading, coupled with deep and liquid capital markets – these are the ingredients that make Singapore the ideal base for the intermediation of wealth in Asia. But to use a common phrase in the industry, past trends are no guarantee of future performance. Whether Singapore continues to do well in wealth management will depend critically on three imperatives.   First, we must raise competencies in the industry.   Second, we must enhance market conduct.   Third, we must keep the financial sector clean. Strong competencies Let me begin with raising competencies. The wealth management industry in Asia is facing a shortage of talent. Private banks are rapidly expanding to meet the needs of a growing affluent class. If Singapore is to sustain its growth as a wealth management centre, there is an urgent need to raise competency levels in the industry and to build a strong pipeline of talent.

These preparations, both in the financial and the real economies, are the preparations which prospective ‘ins’ need to make, in particular. But there are of course preparations in financial markets which apply to everyone. We are in no doubt that the introduction of the euro in 1999, if the current timetable is maintained, will have profound consequences for financial markets, initially for wholesale markets, and later for the retail financial sector too. It is incumbent on all central banks to seek to ensure that the financial markets in which they sit are as well prepared as they can be for this momentous change. We must also ensure that the central banks themselves are well prepared. At the Bank of England we now have a steering group, which I chair, focused on preparing the Bank itself. We have made a clear decision that the Bank will be ready for UK membership of EMU in January 1999, if a future government decides that that is the right course for the country. But our more important work in the short term is focused on preparing the City of London and on preparing the financial infrastructure which the City will need to maintain its position as the most innovative and dynamic financial market in Europe. I should emphasise that we see the City as a financial market for the whole of Europe, not just for the United Kingdom.
See for example Campbell, J, Pflueger, C and Viceira, L (2015), “Monetary policy drivers of bond and equity risks”, mimeo. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  19  xxii  See Carney, M. (2013), “The Spirit of the Season”, Speech to The Economic Club of New York, December; and Vlieghe, G (2016), “Debt, Demographics and the Distribution of Income: New challenges for monetary policy”, Speech at the London School of Economics, January. xxiii High inflation also tends to be volatile, which distorts price signals and reduces investment by raising the cost of capital. That, in turn, could harm real income growth. xxiv This is why average earnings tend to move counter-cyclicality as changes in the composition of employment boost average wages in the initial stages of a downturn and reduce them as the downturn subsides. See also Broadbent, B (2015), “Compositional shifts in the labour market”, speech given at ‘Understanding the Great Recession: from micro to macro’ Conference, Bank of England. xxv For a discussion in the UK context, see Hills, J., Cunliffe, J., Gambaro, L., and Obolenskaya, P. (2013), “Winners and Losers in the Crisis: The Changing Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK 2007-2010”, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE. xxvi Oreopoulos, P., von Wachter, T. and Heisz, A., (2012) “The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1): 1-29. xxvii See Blanchard, O. and Summers, L. (1986), "Hysteresis and European Unemployment", in Fischer, S. (ed.

We are honoured today to have the presence of Tan Sri Mohamed Hashim, Dato’ Dr. Zainal Abidin and Hajjah Siti Jameah, siblings of Governor Ismail Ali, as well as Mr. Ahmad Kamal, Governor Ismail Ali’s son. I am also honoured to welcome back to the Bank those who have worked alongside Governor Ismail Ali. Equally important, we are grateful to have with us the international central banking community, who are travelling to Bali for the IMF and World Bank Group Annual Meetings and have taken time from your busy schedules for this occasion. This indeed underscores the appreciation towards central bank cooperation built on trust and friendship. This book is to honour Governor Ismail Ali as a nation builder; a titan of the Malaysian economic and financial sector. He was an unassuming man but he powered the wheels of the nation – and each turn on the wheel left a mark on history. We have spoken to more than twenty individuals who were close to Governor Ismail Ali and dedicated hundreds of pages to his life. But, it is certain that we have yet to do justice in capturing the breadth and depth of his persona. Governor Ismail Ali had a far-reaching impact, not only on the country’s economic and financial landscape, but also on the personal and professional lives of many. As we were completing this book, we discovered there are others who carried untold stories of him, from here and abroad, each with another brushstroke to add to the portrait of his vision.
The relative size of the programme, representing just 1.6% of the euro area GDP against 13.7% of GDP that has been bought by the Bank of England or the 11.4% purchased by the Federal Reserve, makes it easier to implement. The ECB continues to comply strictly to its mandate to ensure price stability and does not allow inflation to increase as a way of easing the burden of the debt. On this point we disagree with from some of the suggestions made recently by Professor Rogoff. The inflation tax is a blunt tool whose accidental effects would reflect mainly ex-ante institutional features (such as the degree of indexation or the maturity structure of liabilities) rather than the actual necessity to adjust. More importantly, Professor Rogoff has said himself, inflating the debt away would unduly jeopardise the most precious capital of the ECB and of any independent central bank, namely its credibility. The ECB will never debase the currency, as our record shows: we have remarkably preserved both internal and external value of the euro by keeping inflation low and inflation expectations well-anchored. As we have learnt and repeatedly experienced, credibility and in particular the ability to anchor inflation expectations are crucial for the smooth functioning of monetary policy. Their key role has been highlighted again and again during the financial crisis, particularly in preventing the danger of an entrenchment of deflationary expectations. The euro area is a highly integrated economic and financial area which needs to be managed through common decisions.

Pillar II – supervisory review process This is a critical and integral part of Basel II which aims at ensuring that banks have sufficient capital to support the risks in their business activities, encourage banks to develop and use better risk management techniques, and foster an active dialog between the banks and supervisors regarding capital adequacy and risk management standards. In this regard, banks are expected to have an internal process for assessing overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining the required level of capital, which is expected to be evaluated by the regulator, and intervene at an early stage to prevent banks’ capital from falling below prudent levels. Accordingly, the implementation of Pillar II will be an extension of the current regulatory practice and an elaboration and refinement rather than a radical change of existing practices. Where necessary, the Central Bank will consider imposing higher capital adequacy levels for certain banks, depending on their risk exposure. This is expected to result in developing a transparent and systematic approach for evaluating the capital assessment processes of the banks and refinement of the CBSL’s risk-based approach to supervision to cover the Pillar II aspects. Its aim is to ensure the quality of risk management standards rather than just setting capital against risks. In particular, the emphasis on other non-credit risks such as interest rate, market, liquidity, concentration, operational, strategic, legal and reputational risks should increase.
Fiscal policy has been fairly well adapted to the economic situation over the last decade. The active role it has played in demand management has functioned as an anchor for fiscal discipline. The Government Petroleum Fund is meant to be a buffer against changes in the terms of trade. In other countries this role must be filled by the exchange rate. Chart 12 How does the Norwegian regime differ from inflation targeting? • Co-operation: – Tradition of co-operation between political authorities and social partners – Wage-setting considering employment effects  • Fiscal policy: – Fiscal policy has financial leeway for stabilisation policy – Petroleum Fund buffer against terms of trade variability, not the exchange rate  • Monetary policy: – Different formulation of target – Different institutional setting Legg inn filadresse her  •  Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards stability of the exchange rate and not an explicit inflation target. The setting of interest rates will more or less be the same. Norges Bank focuses on keeping a low rate of inflation and on avoiding a situation in which monetary policy in itself contributes to a recession that may threaten the fundamental conditions for stability of the krone. •  The institutional set-up for monetary policy in Norway is different. In a country with inflation targeting, the central bank will inform the political authorities if the inflation target is not met.

According to data of the Ministry of Finance, the Kingdom registered a real surplus of SAR 180.3 billion (6.5 percent of GDP) in its budget during 2013. The public debt fell to SAR 75.1 billion (representing 2.7 percent of GDP). Moreover, the Kingdom achieved a surplus of SAR 486.8 billion (17.4 percent of GDP) in the current account of the balance of payments (compared to 22.4 percent in the preceding year). The inflation rate increased from 2.9 percent in 2012 to 3.5 percent in 2013. However, it is still under control. According to the latest data of the Central Department of Statistics and Information, the inflation annual rate declined to 2.8 percent during February 2014, given that the inflation rate in emerging and developing economies was estimated at 6.2 percent in 2013. Inflationary pressures in the Kingdom were due to the housing sector and food prices. At the time when a number of industrial countries are witnessing a decline in their credit rating, Fitch Credit Rating Agency promoted the Kingdom’s sovereign credit rating from (AA-) to (AA) with a stable outlook, strengthening confidence in our national economy and making it more attractive to investments. Ladies and gentlemen, Allow me to talk about activities supervised by SAMA. In the banking sector, domestic banks continued to play their roles in serving the national economy in accordance with latest secure technologies in the banking services field. Monetary base (M3) increased by 10.8 percent in 2013 (by 12.8 percent in January of this year).
Jean-Claude Trichet: Structural reforms in Europe Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the OECD Forum, Paris, 22 May 2006. *  *  *  It’s a pleasure for me to be here at the OECD Forum to share with you my views on structural reforms in Europe. I am particularly honoured to take part in this Forum given the leading role played by the OECD in shaping global discussions on economic, financial and, especially, structural issues, which are the topic of my intervention today. I wish also to pay my tribute to the outgoing Secretary General Donald Johnston for his outstanding leadership and, if he permits me to say that, for his deep friendship. Let me also welcome the new Secretary General Angel Gurria for whom I have esteem and confidence since 25 years! Economic performance of the euro area I would like first to start with a brief assessment of the euro area’s economic performance by recalling a few facts. Over the last years the euro area witnessed a slight improvement in the utilisation of labour, which increased on average by 0.2% per year between 2000 and 2004. 1 This mainly reflects the rise in the euro area employment rate from 61.5% in 2000 to 63.6% in 2005 2 which corresponds to the creation of more than 11 millions new jobs over the same period and to a decline in the aggregate unemployment rate from 10.5% to 8.6%.

Against this background, the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 led to a re-launch of the process by shifting the strategy’s focus more strongly on growth and employment. As an outcome of this process, all EU countries have prepared so-called National Reform Programmes that outline structural reform steps for the years 2005-2008 20 . These measures are designed to, among other things, enhance the sustainability and quality of public finances, promote flexible labour and product markets, support a favourable business environment, and ensure a fully operational EU internal market, including the markets for energy and services. Applying comprehensive structural reforms is of particular importance for the euro area countries, in order to increase wage and price flexibility and the resilience to shocks, facilitate structural adjustment, raise potential output growth and job creation, and reduce price pressures, thereby facilitating the task of the single monetary policy. Also the ECB’s monetary policy has a role to play in supporting the implementation of structural reforms. A credible monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability in the medium term contributes to a stable economic environment. In a stable macroeconomic context, it is not only easier to single out where reforms are needed, but the benefits of reforms are also made more visible, thus supporting their acceptance. In turn, structural reforms can also have important consequences for the transmission of a monetary policy which is committed to price stability.
The discussion is based on the analytical framework and so-called loss function used at Norges Bank.15 This includes the deviation of inflation from the inflation target, resource utilisation, the interest rate level in accordance with simple interest-rate rules and changes in the interest rate. Asset prices, the exchange rate and market rates can also be taken into account. Inflation The forecasts for inflation are sufficiently close to the inflation target to justify a repo rate increase and the presented repo-rate path. The forecast for CPI inflation is 2.4 per cent per year on average during the forecast period, while the forecast for CPIF inflation is 1.8 per cent. It is estimated that CPIF Inflation will be around 2 per cent at the end of the forecast period. However, there is considerable uncertainty concerning forecasts for inflation and in relation to this the deviations from the target may be regarded as small (see Figure 18). My assessment is, however, that the inflationary risks are primarily on the upside; in other words the risk of a higher rate of inflation than expected is greater than the risk of a lower rate of inflation. If inflation increases more than is expected in the Monetary Policy Report, it is, in my view, likely that the repo rate will need to be raised more quickly than predicted in the repo-rate path.

And I should like to take this opportunity above all to thank all of you - and the various organisations that you represent - for the tremendous support that you have given to me and to the Bank over so many years. I must begin, Gordon, by thanking you. In fact I’ve been immensely fortunate to have first Ken Clarke and then you, Gordon, in charge at the Treasury during my time as Governor. You shared the conviction that overall macro-economic stability - reflected in consistently low inflation - is a necessary condition for sustainable growth. That’s a conviction that is deeply embedded in my soul as a lifelong central banker - if indeed as a central banker I’m allowed to admit to having a soul! You inherited from Ken an inflation target in the form of a cap and a degree of transparency - and public accountability - that we’d never had before. And, in your own, very first - and inspired - decision as Chancellor, you advanced that approach radically further. You - rightly - kept the political responsibility for setting the inflation target - opting crucially for a symmetrical point target. But you devolved the technical responsibility for meeting that target to your new creation - the MPC - to which you appointed independent, external, experts in fields which are relevant to monetary policy to work with our team at the Bank. And you reinforced the procedures for transparency and accountability. In terms of the overall macro-economy this framework has served us well.
The development of the exchange rate has also contributed to the upturn in inflation. In a simple theoretical framework, the change in price level, i.e. inflation, is affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate. 5 But such a correlation is difficult to find. If we compare exchange rate fluctuations and inflation during the same period, the correlation is zero. However, the exchange rate influences inflation with a time lag. The correlation between inflation and exchange rate fluctuations twelve months previously is 0.19 in my data material. If we lag the exchange rate fluctuations a further twelve months, the correlation increases to 0.43. The maximum correlation (0.46) occurs when the time lag is 27 months. It now becomes clear that there is a positive correlation between exchange rate  In models where prices are rigid, the inflation rate is instead affected by the level of the exchange rate, or by the real exchange rate’s deviation from its long-term value. 5  12 [16]  fluctuations and inflation, see Figure 7. When the krona weakens, i.e. when the KIX-index increases, inflation also rises. Figure 7. Inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, 27-month time lag Annual percentage change 2.5  2.5  Inflation  2  2011  2018  2  1.5  1.5  1  1  0.5  0.5  0  -10  -5  0 5 Exchange rate fluctuations  10  15  0  Note. Moving averages over 12 months.

The independence of a central bank is not a law of nature, nor is it something that can be taken for granted politically. Rather, it exists because the public is convinced that price stability is a sensible objective that can best be ensured over the long term by delegating the responsibility to an independent central bank. This conviction is in turn based on solid scientific evidence. Independence in areas that go beyond a narrowly defined mandate is not democratically acceptable, nor does it have any scientific foundation. If the mandate is interpreted too broadly, or if legislators expand it beyond the core task of price stability, over time this will inevitably lead to public debate. Broader action by central banks might initially be welcomed by politicians and the general public, but that can quickly turn in the opposite direction. Overall, this would ultimately also entail the risk of constraints on the central bank’s independence in conducting monetary policy. Central banks should therefore advocate a narrowly defined mandate, and should not take on any tasks that require political decisions and for which they do not have effective instruments. The institutional framework in Switzerland tallies with these principles. The Constitution and law entrust the SNB, as an independent central bank, with the pursuit of monetary policy in the overall interests of the country. In order to legitimise its independence, the SNB has a clearly defined, narrow mandate that compels it to focus on ensuring price stability while taking due account of economic developments.