samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In our view, financial literacy has become a necessity, taking into consideration not only the level of economic, banking and technological development, but also the importance and significance of information in today’s global setting. * * *  Honourable Chair, Honourable Members of the Committee, In conclusion, I would like to highlight that, over 2016, the Bank of Albania has showed initiative and devotion in addressing the challenges we have faced. The positive results of our work show that we are on the right direction. Nevertheless, I think that for successful institutions there is always something more to do. They are guided by the medium and long-term objectives; they invest to enhance the professional standards and increase their capacities though the preparation, strengthening of independence, accountability, transparency and good governance. This credo of ours will be a guide for our action plans in the future. Thank you for your attention! 1 This Memorandum was signed by the Bank of Albania, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Development,  Tourism, Trade and Entrepreneurship and the Albanian Association of Banks. 8/8  BIS central bankers' speeches

Expressing my sincere gratitude to the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Macedonia, the National Institution Stobi and the Embassy of the United States in the Republic of Macedonia, I invite His Excellency, the Ambassador of the United States, Paul Wohlers and the Minister of Culture of the Republic of Macedonia, Elizabeta Kancheska-Milevska to take the floor. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The outcome is obviously the major uncertainty affecting us all. The other major external influence on the economic situation in this country is the development of the exchange rate. Depending on who you speak to sterling is variously described as dangerously weak, at a 15-year low, against the dollar, or as unsustainably strong, close to its peak, against the euro. The truth is that sterling's effective exchange rate has been relatively stable for most of the past 2 ½ years – at about 105 on the standard index, plus or minus 5%. The bilateral rates that are frequently quoted in fact tell us very little about sterling: they are essentially a reflection of the persistent general strength of the dollar on the one hand and the persistent general weakness of the euro on the other, resulting from sustained capital inflows to the United States in large part from the Eurozone. It was widely expected that, with the slowdown in the US economy, and associated weakening of US earnings expectations and stock prices, these capital flows would moderate, causing the dollar to weaken and a corresponding recovery in the euro. That clearly has not, yet, occurred, although – given the size of the US external imbalance – it is difficult to see how an exchange rate adjustment can ultimately be avoided. In the meantime, the stronger dollar – and higher oil prices – have added to inflationary pressures elsewhere.

In our case, total productivity – the variable that seeks to approximate the level of efficiency of the economy and which depends, among other factors, on the effects of technological improvements and on the efficiency of the institutions and the regulations in place within an economy – worsened significantly during the years of expansion prior to the crisis, posting slightly negative rates as from 2000. Despite some improvement as from 2008, linked to the disappearance of unproductive firms, Spain continues to post significantly lower productivity growth than the average for the developed economies. There are simplistic analyses that would seek to explain these developments by resorting to singular and even anecdotal macroeconomic aspects; but the factors that appear to lie behind our mediocre productivity performance are varied and complex. Apart from the fact that Spain has significantly lower levels of technological capital than other developed countries, factors are often cited such as the high costs and administrative obstacles facing business start-ups, the low level of competition in certain sectors and the small size of our companies. Low productivity can also be related to some of the labour market aspects I referred to earlier, such as the disconnection between remuneration conditions and the specific situation of each firm, and labour market duality, which hamper the reallocation of resources across companies and human capital accumulation decisions. Conclusions To conclude, allow me first to refer to the situation of the euro area, and then to the Spanish economy, on the road to recovery from the crisis.
Number of unemployed in vulnerable groups and total of other registered unemployed Total number of unemployed individuals registered with Employment Office 250 000  250 000 Vulnerable groups Other groups  200 000  200 000  150 000  150 000  100 000  100 000  50 000  50 000 04  06  08  10  12  Note. Trend-adjusted values. Number of remaining job-seekers at end of month. Source: Employment Office  Figure 16. Unemployment and the development of the housing market Unemployed as a percentage of the labour force, index 2007=100. The figures in brackets present the fall in real housing prices from the peak to the trough. 350  350 Ireland (-40.5 per cent) Spain (-22.5 per cent)  300  300  USA (-22.7 per cent)  250  250  Sweden (-0.0 per cent)  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50 00  02  04  06  08  10  Source: The OECD  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 17. Inflation in Sweden Annual percentage change The CPIF is the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate. 5  5 CPIF  4  4  CPI  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 06  08  10  12  14  Note.

Reforming the international monetary and financial system and preserving monetary and financial stability in financially integrated small and open economies Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, panel comments in the 50th Anniversary Conference of the Central Bank of Malta, Valletta, 4 May 2018. Let me begin by congratulating all at the Central Bank of Malta on the Bank’s 50th anniversary and thank Governor Vella for the invitation to speak at this conference. I spoke in a Central Bank of Malta conference here in Valetta around the middle of the 1990s. At that time Iceland had more or less fully liberalised its capital account and had a pegged exchange rate. Malta also had a pegged exchange rate but still had some capital controls. The world has changed since then and our understanding of it even more. We in Iceland went towards a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting, while you entered monetary union. Overall, we have both done well, but our road in Iceland has been bumpier. The heading of this panel is Challenges facing central banks after the financial crisis. That is a big menu. For my introductory remarks I choose two related issues that have been high on my mind for years, both as a policy maker in a small, open and financially integrated economy and during my tenure at the BIS.
Looking beyond the regulatory viewpoint, the trend towards greater development of the capital markets could be further encouraged if headway is made in creating a Capital 10/11  Markets Union which, together with the culmination of Banking Union, would allow a better allocation of risk within the Economic and Monetary Union. These changes in the structure of financial markets, in conjunction with the emergence of new technologies, clearly represent a challenge for banks, particularly in the current context of low profits among Europe’s banking systems. In any event, at this point in time the ultimate impact of new technologies on the structure of the financial system is highly uncertain, as it will depend on various factors, including the future regulatory treatment of new players. Conclusions To conclude, Spanish credit institutions have improved significantly in terms of their solvency, profitability and asset quality in recent years. Despite this progress, the Spanish banking sector still faces important challenges, challenges which it largely shares with other euro area banking systems. The most significant of these challenges are: (i) stepping up the pace of sales of unproductive assets; (ii) strengthening capital and liabilities suitable for internal recapitalisation; (iii) building the sector's reputation by avoiding the risk of inappropriate conduct; (iv) confronting the challenge of making profits without undue easing of lending standards; and (v) utilising new technologies, which are both a major challenge for the sector and an opportunity for institutions that can harness them.

12.12.2018  Opening of the 14th banking industry meeting: should we reinvent banks or improve their management? IESE Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning. I should like to thank the IESE for its kind invitation to open the 14th edition of the banking industry meeting. This gives me an excellent opportunity to review the progress made by the Spanish banking industry and the main challenges it currently faces. Let me start, however, with a brief explanation regarding the content of my speech. As a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank I am, as of today, subject to a “quiet period”, before a meeting at which monetary policy decisions are due to be taken. Accordingly, my reflections in this speech should not be interpreted as indicating the monetary or economic outlook (see Chart 1). Following the last crisis, Spanish banks have carried out a major balance sheet clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring which, over the last four and a half years, has notably improved the situation of the industry in terms of its basic parameters, such as asset quality, profitability and solvency. Starting with asset quality, between December 2013 and June 2018 the reduction in nonperforming loans and foreclosed real estate assets has been very notable. Also, the return on equity has turned positive again and is above the euro area average, following its collapse in 2012, to minus 25%.
At the end of their working life, the funds available are an additional source of retirement income. The virtue of these systems is that they do not deter worker mobility. This is so in Austria because, by not forgoing their "established rights", it is workers themselves who manage the accumulated resources during periods in which they are unemployed. Also, this arrangement offers protection to all workers, even those whose previous terms of employment have been short-lived. In Denmark, the choice was of a system which firmly supports the unemployed (with substantial unemployment subsidies and intensive training programmes) in a setting in which, however, firing costs are very low. Just as 50 years ago the external sector crisis obliged Spain to change its trade protection policy, the current, serious unemployment crisis should lead us to examine what we can change in our labour market, given what other countries have done with very favourable results. Admittedly, this is nothing new, since the Banco de España has reiterated in its annual reports, at least in the past 10 years, the need for such reform. What is new is that reform has now become absolutely vital; otherwise, when we emerge from the current crisis, and in the absence of the instruments that were used in the past, we will be liable to grow far below what we did in previous decades. The reform of labour institutions is a pressing task, since the short-run effects on hiring are absolutely necessary in the current circumstances.

But we require action on another front, even though the effects are longer-term. I refer to education. Undoubtedly, progress in education is Spain's most important outstanding task in respect of economic growth, enhanced productivity, fairer income distribution and also the attainment of low unemployment. True, Spain has advanced in some fields here, such as university education and business schools. But we continue to take up the rear as regards the average quality of our citizens’ educational attainment, with the serious consequences this entails. It is well known that countries with a better educated population are characterised by having higher wages, lower unemployment rates and a higher labour market participation rate. For example, both in Denmark and in the United Kingdom, more than two-thirds of the population have a post-compulsory education qualification, as against only 50% in the case of Spain. In both countries, the average worker has 30% higher spending power than Spanish workers, and their unemployment rates in 2007 were 3% and 5%, respectively, less than half the level in Spain. This relationship between training and wages is explained by the fact that more highly educated workers are more efficient, and therefore obtain higher wages, and by the fact that employers always prefer to fire the least productive workers.
The basic principle of Islamic banking is the sharing of profit and loss and the prohibition of usury. Simply put, interest is prohibited, but profit sharing is not. The distinctive elements of Islamic finance could be listed as:   Its ethical element (the prohibition of usury and exploitation of the borrower),    The preference for trading in real assets (rather than synthetic products),    Partnership between the investor and investee,    and its governance structure (requiring a Shariah council). Although their interest-free business model makes participation banks more stable compared to conventional banks by protecting them from interest rate risk, it actually makes their liquidity risk management more difficult. Liquidity risk is directly related to the ability of a bank to maintain sufficient funds to meet its commitments, which may, in turn, be related to its ability to attract deposits or sell its assets. As institutions engaged in many kinds of banking activities, Islamic banks also have to meet their liquidity needs and obligations to ensure the smooth running of their business. However, the very nature of these banks with their objective of avoiding interest in any form makes it difficult and costly for them to meet their liquidity needs due to conventional mechanisms of liquidity management. As a new and improving banking model, Islamic banking has some shortages in comparison with their conventional counterparts. In the conventional banking system with a welldeveloped interbank money market, a variety of instruments are available for the banks.

19  20  See Figure 3 in Flodén (2016). 21  See af Jochnick (2015). Flodén (2016). Sims (2016) discusses more generally how large balance sheets risk weakening the financial independence of central banks. 22  This conclusion is not self-evident, however. One could also argue the opposite and say that the Riksbank, as a result of low interest rates and small amount of cost-free capital, should seek higher returns. And in normal times, government bonds with long maturities can be expected to give a return that is higher than the anticipated funding costs via the repo rate. Such a search for yield is associated with risks and will sometimes succeed, sometimes fail. It is therefore hardly a sustainable strategy for an institution like the Riksbank, which is now celebrating its 350th anniversary and is striving for an equally long future existence. 23  16 [16]
If the weakness in finance sector productivity has been a result of households and firms paying down debt – a process which has now largely run its course – then you might  Chart 5: Frequency of mentions of  Chart 6: Sectoral contributions to the  “productivity” in the Inflation Report  slowdown in productivity growth  Mentions per million words  Percentage  ICT  4000  2.5  Prof. & scientific  3500  Finance  2.0  Manufacturing  1.5  3000  Other  2500  Total  1.0 0.5  2000  0.0  1500  -0.5  1000  -1.0  500  -1.5  0 1997  -2.0  2001  2005  2009  2013  2017  1997-07  2008-09  2010-17  Difference (2010-17 minus 199707)  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  expect to see an increasing contribution from finance in the coming years, and perhaps also spillovers to professional services and other complementary industries.4 This would help underpin the pickup in productivity growth that we are forecasting at the aggregate level. I am less confident, because I put more weight on the view that pre-crisis growth in finance sector productivity was simply unsustainable. Much of the apparent growth in finance sector productivity before the crisis reflected profits on the risky lending that led to the crisis itself.

To achieve quality and continuity in this area, a central bank must be able to attract and retain staff versed in monetary economics, market operations and many other fields. Only if a central bank's finances are insulated from daily politics, can it compete freely with the private sector in the access to human resources. Transparency A second condition for successful monetary independence is a well-communicated monetary policy strategy. Policymakers need to announce clearly what they are trying to achieve in both the long and the short term, and with what means. Transparency of this kind makes it easier for market participants to judge the likely course of future monetary action. As a consequence, monetary policy changes rarely cause major fluctuations in financial markets, and the central bank can set interest rates to achieve the goal of price stability without having to fear financial distress. The SNB attaches great weight to communication. Our monetary policy goal is clearly spelt out in the National Bank Act and in our monetary policy concept. Our interest rate decisions are communicated together with an explanation that includes our inflation forecast, which is based on the assumption that interest rates remain constant. This allows the market to understand how we judge future developments in the absence of monetary policy changes and thus makes it possible to infer the likely direction of future interest rate adjustments. In between monetary policy decisions, my two colleagues in the Governing Board and I give frequent speeches – as today – to clarify our view on things.
Asia’s imports of consumer goods as well as modern services, such as telecommunications, information, and financial services, have risen sharply over the past decade. Second, sustained investments to build up physical and human capital. China’s fixed asset investment in education and infrastructure has expanded rapidly, growing by about 20% annually since 2009. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have ramped up development spending to address infrastructure deficits. Vietnam has been making heavy investments in education, at almost 20% of total public expenditure. This is beginning to show results in its global ranking in PISA – the Programme for International Student Assessments. Third, growing economic integration within the region. Asia already has extensive cross-border production networks, particularly in the electronics and automobile industries. China’s Belt and Road Initiative will facilitate not just infrastructure investment in the region but, more importantly, strengthen connectivity. As new projects gain traction, there will be increased regional flows of trade, capital, and people in the next five to ten years. Finally, I want to touch on a new source of untapped potential – the CLMV countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. They are increasingly plugged into the global economy and regional supply chains, participating as downstream manufacturers in regional production networks. In Vietnam, manufacturing now makes up a third of the economy. - Vietnam has developed into one of the world’s top electronics exporters, with Samsung producing about 40% of its phones there.

In plain language, this means that the bank needs to have sufficient resources at its disposal to be able to carry out its tasks without being governed by subventions from the government. When the Riksbank carries out its tasks, this usually has consequences for the Riksbank’s balance sheet. Most of the instruments the Riksbank uses to steer the interest rate are also items on the balance sheet. The Riksbank currently steers the interest rate through its monopoly on supplying a payment system for transferring money between the banks (including the Riksbank) and above all by determining the conditions for this. It is mainly the conditions for the banks’ deposits and loans with the Riksbank that are used as an instrument to steer interest rates in the economy. Prior to the financial crisis, the transactions in the Riksbank’s different instruments were relatively small, but this changed during the financial crisis. Then we used our balance sheet to supply the banks with liquidity. Up to autumn 2008, the Riksbank’s balance sheet was around SEK 200 billion, but it increased dramatically during the crisis to at most SEK 763 billion in July 2009. The reason the balance sheet more than tripled was that the Riksbank began lending large amounts in US dollars and Swedish krona to the Swedish banks from October 2008. The dollar loans were largely funded by the Riksbank in its turn borrowing dollars from the Federal Reserve.
At some point the "insurance premium" becomes too large, but I do not think this can be said to have happened yet. 17  For a comprehensive survey of the valuation of the Swedish housing market, see Sørensen (2013), in which the following conclusion is drawn (p. 71-72): “[A] cautious reading of the evidence gives reason to expect downward pressure on Swedish real house prices in the years to come. And if the Swedish economy were to be hit by a large negative shock, the downward adjustment of house prices could become more rapid than the analysis … would suggest.”  18  See Dagens Industri (2013b). 19  Bernanke (2010) describes the difficulties experienced by the Federal Reserve in determining whether or not the housing market in the United States was over-valued. 20  Similar ideas can be found in, for instance, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2013), p. 7: “[G]iven what we have learned about the costs of inaction, higher type I errors (assuming that it is a bubble and acting accordingly, when in fact the increase reflects fundamentals) in exchange for lower type II errors (assuming the increase reflects fundamentals, when in fact it is a bubble) may well be justified.”  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Are better instruments than the policy rate already available? The third question concerns the access to other tools than the repo rate for managing risk. Those who are critical of using the repo rate claim that there are already other and bettersuited instruments available.

If the central bank fails to do this, the market will certainly come up 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  with some alternatives for this purpose. In this connection, you are no doubt aware that the HKMA has just launched the Faster Payment System a few days ago. Once the system goes live on 30 September, people in Hong Kong will be able to enjoy almost instantaneous P2P payments, making use of either mobile phone number or email address, free of charge to the users. While the Distributed Ledger Technology used in crypto-assets creates many issues, the technology has shown great potential in many other applications. For example, the HKMA and the banks in Hong Kong will soon launch a digital trade (d) finance platform using DLT. We are also in the process of developing a DLT interface that can link the domestic trade finance platform with those of other trading partners, such as Singapore, on a bilateral basis. This new interface is expected to be launched sometime next year. Despite some improvements made in the past few years, cross-border payments, especially retail or small value, remain inefficient and costly. This is unsatisfactory as it is not conducive to financial inclusion in relation to remittances by SMEs or (e) individuals. In this connection, I am pleased to note that progress is being made recently, as some banks and non-bank e-wallet operators are now developing new cross-border payment channels, making use of DLT in some instances, that would result in faster and cheaper services for users.