samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In making our streets clean and free from litter, it is not enough to station one health inspector at the corner of every street to catch offenders (there are simply not enough health inspectors to go round anyway), nor is it enough to raise the fines against littering to a draconian level because people will still litter if they think they can avoid being caught. The best way to keep our streets clean or cleaner, in my view, is to nurture the value among our citizens that littering is morally bad and should not be indulged in even when no health inspector is around and there is a low chance of being caught. In the context of the financial-services sector, the best way to uphold the integrity of the markets and trustworthiness of the industry is for the stakeholders to nurture and cherish a culture and values that encourage and support honesty of the practitioners and  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  restrain the institutions from placing the maximization of profit above the interests of the customers. This may all sound very idealistic and is “easier said than done”. We all understand that it will take a long time, years and even decades, to change people’s mindset and values. However, no IFC is built overnight. It has taken London and New York many, many decades to become what they are today. The race to become among the top IFCs in the world is a long term endeavour.

I would note this is something the Committee was able to anticipate before the referendum, the minutes of the MPC’s May 2016 meeting stating that “[t]he implications for the direction of monetary policy will depend on the relative magnitudes of the demand, supply and exchange rate effects.” And my colleague Ben Broadbent has recently set out in more detail what this means in the particular context of Brexit. True to this statement, the MPC has set monetary policy since the referendum on the basis of its assessment of how those effects are interacting. This is made difficult by the large, uncertain and sometimes offsetting implications of the decision to leave the EU. So it is not surprising that even though all Committee members sign up to the framework I have laid out, their individual assessment of the economic outlook has differed along the way. Decide Which brings me to the second phase of ‘end to end’ monetary policy: Decide. In the MPC’s meeting at the start of this month, a majority of its members thought that the evolution of supply and demand was such that the margin of slack in the economy now seemed fairly limited, and that underlying inflationary pressures had shown some signs of picking up. As a result, they judged that this reduced the degree to which it was appropriate for the MPC to tolerate an extended period of above-target inflation, and that a small reduction in stimulus was warranted.
we use cookies together, youtoare theagree blueprint serve the foundation forcan our global This isbythe house we're going to live in for a long time. Let's build it to last. reviewing our Privacy Statement. 1 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, ARRC Commends Decisions Outlining the Definitive Endgame for  LIBOR, March 5, 2021. 2 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, Progress Report: The Transition from U.S. Dollar LIBOR, March  31, 2021. 3 John C. Williams, 901 Days, Remarks at Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA),  New York, July 15, 2019. 4 Forum on Ongoing Innovation in Reference Rates for Commercial Lending, Presentation materials,  Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, November 18, 2020. 5 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, ARRC Identifies Market Indicators to Support a Recommendation  of a Forward-Looking SOFR Term Rate, May 6, 2021. 6 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, Second Report, March 2018. 7 John C. Williams, 537 Days: Time Is Still Ticking, Remarks at LIBOR: Entering the Endgame, Webinar,  July 13, 2020. See also: Financial Stability Board, Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, November 20, 2020; and Bank of England Financial Policy Committee, Interim Financial Stability Report, May 2020. 8 Alternative Reference Rates Committee, The ARRC Selects a Broad Repo Rate as its Preferred Alternative  Reference Rate, June 22, 2017. 9 John C. Williams, 537 Days: Time Is Still Ticking, Remarks at LIBOR: Entering the Endgame, Webinar,  July 13, 2020. See also: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, IOSCO Compliance, as of May 2021.

Peter Praet: Interview in La Libre Belgique Interview with Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in La Libre Belgique, conducted by Ms Isabelle de Laminne and Mr Vincent Slits and published on 21 December 2015. *  *  *  What is the situation in the euro area on the eve of 2016? How do you see the coming years? The economic outlook has improved, in an environment where interest rates are low and oil prices have fallen sharply. The positive effects of the structural reforms in a number of countries, such as Spain and Ireland, should also be underscored. These factors have had positive effects on the labour market and on the economic recovery. Fiscal policies will be more neutral too, even slightly expansionary. In fact, they will contribute 0.1% to GDP growth in the euro area in 2016 and 2017. Enormous fiscal efforts have been made, although debt levels are still too high. However, we must bear in mind that real GDP in the euro area in the first quarter of 2016 will barely return to its level of early 2008. This means that over the last eight years the GDP of the euro area has not grown in real terms, on average, even though countries like Germany saw reasonable growth. Other countries have experienced a severe fall in their living standards for a very long period of time. This poses a number of problems.
Monetary policy must then be conducted in a flexible way based on the available information. This means, for instance that assessments of whether financial imbalances are being built up and the risks that are associated with this must be taken into consideration in some way when monetary policy decisions are made. And even if the possibility for an individual central bank to influence a strong international stock exchange increase through interest rate hikes is very limited, nothing will be improved by an excessively expansive monetary policy. The increase in share prices is moreover often followed up by a price increase in the real estate market and in contrast to the stock exchange, this is local and thereby to a greater extent dependent on the national interest rates. A more in-depth analysis of the quantity of money and expansion of credit can give leads as to what happened with household and corporate balance sheets and in the financial institutions, In certain periods, it can therefore be justified to give the analysis of lending and monetary policy increased weight. The complexity of the transmission mechanism combined with the necessity of clarity and openness sets considerable challenges for monetary policy decision-makers. It is important to avoid simplifying to such an extent, in the endeavour to create understanding of what one is doing, that one compromises one's freedom of action. BIS Review 40/2001  5

Let me expand on these aspects. The normal operation of markets and financial intermediaries requires the availability of a broad spectrum of assets with sufficient liquidity and bounded counterparty risk, including so-called “safe assets”. This is even more the case in turbulent times, as investors tend to react to increases in uncertainty by turning to assets with a lower level of perceived risk. As Holmstrom and Tirole1 put it, a safe asset is an instrument that allows wealth to be transferred from one point in time to another without any nominal loss. If you allow me the metaphor, the supply of a broad enough set of assets is the infrastructure in an electricity grid. A large enough infrastructure is needed to ensure the grid’s smooth functioning, in  1  Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole, “Private and Public Supply of Liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No 1 (February 1998), pp. 1-40 (40 pages). 4/8  particular, to allow it to withstand episodes of high demand. If not, the system is prone to disruptions and even blackouts. There is a wide consensus regarding the existence of a secular shortage of safe assets at global level. To put it simply, there is not much highly-rated paper available once holdings in monetary policy portfolios are discounted. This phenomenon has become more acute since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis, given that some eurodenominated sovereigns have seen their ratings downgraded, in part due to the persistence of an incomplete EMU.
In part this reflects a significant spike in economic policy uncertainty and the related risk that protectionism could prove more pervasive, persistent and damaging than previously expected. As I will discuss in a moment, these headwinds are now restraining business investment globally and could push down on the global equilibrium interest rate, exacerbating concerns about limited monetary policy space. Long-term government bond yields have fallen sharply alongside the falls in expected policy rates. US 10year yields are near three-year lows, and 10-year gilt yields and German 10-year bund yields are their lowest ever. Around $ trillion of global debt is now trading at negative yields. As material as these global developments are, the UK outlook hinges on the nature and timing of Brexit. The UK economy contracted slightly last quarter and surveys point to stagnation in this one. Looking through Brexit-related volatility, it is likely that underlying growth is positive but muted. The biggest economic headwind is weak business investment, which has stagnated over the past few years, despite limited spare capacity, robust balance sheets, supportive financial conditions and a highly competitive exchange rate. There is overwhelming evidence that this is a direct result of uncertainties over the UK’s future trading relationship with the EU, and it serves as a warning to others of the potential impact of persistent trade tensions on global business confidence and activity. The UK economy could follow multiple possible paths depending on how Brexit progresses with material implications for the stance of monetary policy.

And any review mechanism must take careful account of the implementation costs incurred by banks when the rules change. But it is costly, too, to persist with regulatory standards where they are clearly out of line with market practice. Real effort has been made to tie the Accord to best market practice and thus to changes that banks will need to introduce anyway. Going forward, the guiding principle, difficult I know to achieve in practice, should be to keep to a minimum the difference between expenditure that banks would be incurring in any event and that required by regulators. Part of the trick is to ensure sufficient continuity of core aspects of the standards, so that changes to basic IT systems etc are minimised or at any rate can take place over time. Time is, after all, a major help in this respect. Implementing systems changed as part of the software obsolescence cycle may involve only modest marginal cost. More immediate and discrete changes are always going to be more costly. These issues will clearly need further discussion. In the EU context, however, it is particularly important that the arrangements for revising any Directive reflect, if not the letter, at least the spirit of Lamfalussy. It would be wholly inappropriate to try to hard code all the detail of the pillar one rules in an EU Directive, as if these can necessarily stand for a long period of time.
-  Third, major advances in the services available to consumers of non-financial products have made them much more demanding of a similar consumer experience from banks and their peers. Younger consumers in particular now rely totally on their phones, and expect the same ease of use, choice and service integration they get from the so-called ‘GAFA’ (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon). Firms in Asia and elsewhere, such as Alipay and Tencent, unencumbered by legacy systems, have perhaps moved furthest and fastest in that direction. -  And, fourth, public authorities are putting more weight on competition, reflecting a frustration in some quarters with the pace of consumer-benefiting change, and a recognition that innovation and competition may actually boost, rather than harm, prudential stability, where it helps reduce single points of failure and replace operationally vulnerable legacy systems. In the UK, the Bank of England has a New Bank Start-up Unit and has recently broadened access to its Real-Time Gross 3  Settlement service ; the government created a new Payments Systems Regulator, focused on competition, and is implementing Open Banking, itself the result of recommendations from the CMA; and the FCA has pioneered the use of a so-called ‘regulatory sandbox’ as part of its Project Innovate. These are strong and persistent forces. The resulting technological change and innovation, though uncertain in timing, will have profound implications for the nature and range of financial services available to households and firms.

The last turmoil in the global and domestic financial markets has been a concrete proof of this fact. Thus, the dedollarization is not a straightforward process. As a clear evidence of this, the findings of Reinhart and her friends 13 show that only two countries, Israel and Poland, out of a total of 85 countries managed to achieve large and lasting declines in domestic dollarization. Accordingly, we can say that dedollarization is a difficult and long lasting process that is very much related with the macroeconomic stability and proper incentives. Hence, what we should do first is to continue with the current sound macroeconomic policies and structural reforms in a decisive way. Second, in order to start dedollarization, an active dedollarization strategy such as the so-called “carrot and stick approach” in the literature, which consists of regulations that will encourage the use of the Turkish currency, should be planned. However, as Ize and Levy-Yeyati 14 suggest, before launching an overly ambitious policy agenda, we should make all the necessary researches to understand the roots, risks and costs of dollarization and the implications of policy reforms made against it. I think, this conference provides a big opportunity for all of us to share our opinions and experiences and to enlighten our way of dedollarization. Distinguished Participants, I would like to conclude my words by repeating that I am very glad to welcome such distinguished economists from all over the world. I am sure that we have a lot to draw on the experiences of each other.
On the other hand, the deployment of innovation hubs and accelerators, which takes me to the last part of my address, may successfully contribute to maximising and better understanding the benefits of new technologies for society. Hence, they could encourage financial innovation and/or increase the adoption of these technologies by the supervisory authorities in their functions. Indeed, regulatory sandboxes try to find a balance between these two objectives: they are defined as controlled and delimited environments in which technology-based financial innovations can be tested and monitored by the supervisors, while minimising the risks to the financial system and  5/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  consumers. This is the main tool adopted by Spanish financial authorities since 2020 to respond to the emergence of new technologies in finance. The Spanish sandbox has opened up new ways for supervisory authorities to engage and cooperate with the fintech sector, whose players frequently do not have at their disposal other ways of interacting with financial authorities. More importantly, the sandbox has increased the participating firms' understanding of regulation and supervisory expectations and improved their regulatory compliance through their close interaction with the supervisor. The sandbox has also enhanced the supervisors' understanding of both the new technologies applied by the financial sector and their underlying benefits and risks, as well as of the potential regulatory barriers faced by innovators. Four cohorts have been run up until now, and the Banco de España has already published reports with the conclusions of six projects.

However, what seems more challenging to me is being able to reach the delicate balance between achieving our policy objectives and, at the same time, avoiding collateral damage, to the transmission of monetary policy and particularly to the stability of the financial system. It would probably be short-sighted to think that a CBDC would have no impact on the financial system. Of course it may replace cash to some extent, but it is difficult to believe that it will not attract a fraction of deposits as well. This means that a CBDC could have implications for financial stability, monetary policy, and the allocation of credit to the real economy. However, dispensing with its issuance in order to preserve the status quo is not an option either. Let me explain. We are in the middle of a  3/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  whirlwind of change, so the question should not be "what should we do to avoid change?" but rather, "what should we do to ensure the stability of the financial system, in the midst of change?". That said, CBDCs may come in different shapes and forms; therefore, adequate design and implementation are needed in order to minimise their impact. This is not a minor task and requires careful analysis. There are many interlinked design options and they all have to be considered, both individually and holistically, in order to ensure they are a perfect fit. This is, in fact, what the Eurosystem is currently doing in the context of the digital euro.
Resource utilisation is important for monetary policy When we members of the Executive Board make decisions on monetary policy we take into account both inflation and resource utilisation. Our monetary policy is normally aimed at attaining the inflation target of two per cent a couple of years ahead. If we are also able to support economic policy in general without neglecting the inflation target, then we do so. At present this means that we can also use monetary policy to try to mitigate the current economic recession. It is fairly easy to follow inflation. Inflation is measured by means of a well-established and relatively uncontroversial instrument, the annual change in the consumer price index – the CPI. Of course, there are other measures of inflation that we regularly follow, such as the CPI with a fixed interest rate – the CPIF, the CPI with a fixed interest rate excluding energy, the EU-harmonised measure HICP, and a number of measures of what is known as underlying inflation. But we always clearly state that it is the CPI that is our target variable. We only use the other inflation measures to analyse and better understand developments in inflation. However, it is much more difficult to determine the degree of resource utilisation. On a general level, resource utilisation refers to how much of the available labour and capital assets are used. In practice, one tries to measure it in several different ways. For example, GDP in relation to trend GDP, employment ratio, unemployment and capacity utilisation.

But the connection probably still remains, albeit in a weaker form. This means that in our monetary policy we also have to take into account what effects resource utilisation has on inflation in the slightly longer term. I will return to this issue later on. Different measures of resource utilisation There is no clear-cut means of defining resource utilisation, nor of measuring it. When one tries to measure resource utilisation one is faced with different alternatives. For example, one can draw conclusions regarding resource utilisation in the economy by comparing output or employment with a trend, normal or ideal level. Examples of this approach include the GDP gap, the employment gap and the flexprice gap. Another alternative with regard to measuring resource utilisation is to use as a base responses to direct questions put to companies regarding, for instance, their utilisation of labour and capital. Both of these approaches have inherent difficulties. In the first case, one must relate actual output or employment to a trend, normal or ideal level that is difficult to determine, and in the second case one must rely on the companies’ own assessments of their resource utilisation. GDP gap A common means of measuring resource utilisation is to relate actual GDP to a long-term or trend level of GDP. This GDP level is also often called potential GDP, despite the word potential implying that GDP cannot be greater than this level.
Moreover, the 2004‐2007 period was one of prosperity and stability across the developing world. Of course, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 derailed everything, but it is difficult to argue that it was the consequence of the hiking cycle of the mid 2000s. If anything, it might have been the consequence of the lack of a timely normalization. Hence, although there are many common features in the 1994 and 2004 cycles, the consequences were very different. What I want to do in this talk is to identify a few features that help us reflect why this was the case. I think this is useful to extract some lessons for the current process of monetary policy normalization in the US. 1994‐2004 normalization Cycles As a starting point, it is important to notice that the 1994 and 2004 episodes are comparable for two reasons. First, the Federal Reserve started hiking in a context of inflation above 2% and the unemployment rate around 6%. This is of course a simplified characterization of the business cycle, but it offers a good base for comparison. Beyond that, the monetary policy adjustment in the United States looks quite similar in both cases. Not only is the size and speed of the hikes in Fed Funds’ rate comparable.

First, the Bank of Thailand will ensure ample liquidity in the system in order to accommodate the economic recovery. As policy normalization by the Fed is imminent, the risk of liquidity withdrawal from Emerging Markets increases. We anticipate limited impact on the overall Thai economy as markets have priced in the Fed’s initial hike. Besides, it is widely expected that the Fed fund rates would rise gradually from then on. As for now, despite the slow economic growth in Thailand, the overall credit to the private sector continues to expand at around 5 per cent. Furthermore, enterprises have issued a sizable amount of corporate bonds, leveraging on lower yields compared to last year. Commercial banks’ liquidity position is stable. All these are indications of favorable domestic financing conditions. Should a sudden reversal scenario occurs, the Bank of Thailand would make sure that liquidity will not become an impediment to economic recovery. The Bank of Thailand will also ensure that “cost of funds” is accommodative to the ongoing recovery. The two pre-emptive cuts in the policy interest rate earlier this year, in response to greater downside risks to growth, have eased domestic cost of funds. In addition, low inflationary pressure gives room for monetary policy to remain accommodative. This would ensure that the overall monetary conditions are conducive to the economic recovery. Nevertheless, we keep a cautious eye on risks to financial stability, especially under the prolonged low interest rate environment. Household debt, although it has stabilized, remains high in relation to GDP.