samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Strategising the exit of measures in the recovery phase Ladies and gentlemen, let me share some of our thinking in approaching the exit strategy, which in part, is informed by our experience from past crises: 1. First, given the uncertainties, we continue to be vigilant and therefore remain prepared to dip into our policy toolkit to manage some of the risks and spillovers from support measures that we instituted. In our context, the extension of repayment assistance programme has been accompanied by strengthened supervisory expectations on monitoring and stress testing of exposures under repayment assistance. Further, we have also increased supervisory reporting requirements on such exposures and focused monitoring on more forward-looking indicators such as banks’ internal MFRS 9 staging of exposures for purposes of macro- and micro-prudential surveillance to facilitate timely decision-making. 2. Second, frequent engagements with banks have helped to provide timely and steady steer in ensuring their support of the recovery, without compromising resilience. For example, banks were not only expected to allocate resources and management attention to support repayment assistance efforts, but also effectively monitor the attendant risks arising from these efforts. As a result, we saw banks strengthening their own capacity to cope with the sharp increase in debt restructuring applications and support tailored repayment assistance plans for viable borrowers. In addition, notwithstanding the flexibilities granted under accounting standards, banks have maintained prudent asset classification and provisioning practices when assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness.

That said, it is equally important for policymakers to ensure that mechanisms for swift NPL resolution remain appropriate, not only to prevent an accumulation of legacy NPLs in the banking sector but also to provide borrowers impacted by this pandemic an opportunity to bounce back once the crisis abates. Such a balanced approach helps to preserve the value and productive capacity of borrowers in turn limiting long-term damage to the economy. For Malaysia, work is underway to strengthen legislation which will expand the coverage of businesses that can benefit from court-sanctioned recovery mechanisms. This will help flatten the insolvency curve and avoid more permanent scarring, if NPL cases were to spike. Admittedly, this is an area where there are opportunities to do more and one where all of us can potentially learn from each other. Concluding remarks Let me conclude. Looking ahead, we are cautiously optimistic that the tide may be finally turning in this crisis. However, we certainly can’t conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic is firmly behind us. We humbly admit that the virus has wrong footed us several times. The hallmark of good policymakers is to, as the saying goes, “hope for the best, but prepare for the worst”.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The next wave for the financial system in Malaysia Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 12th Malaysian Banking Summit organised by ASLI "Taking the Leap in Paradigm Shift of Banking – New Wave, New Ventures", Kuala Lumpur, 5 June 2008. *  *  *  In this recent decade we have seen a period of profound modernisation of the Malaysian banking sector. Today, the banking sector has evolved from facilitating and supporting the economic growth process to becoming a significant source of growth. Innovation and product pioneering has proliferated the diversity of products and services offered. The adoption of best business practices, the use of new technologies, systematic cross selling and the new means of interface with consumers have become more pervasive. The banking system is also significantly stronger, reinforced by strengthened institutional structures, enhanced financial safety nets and developed financial markets, that includes one of the most developed bond markets in this region. Progressive deregulation and liberalisation have increased the flexibilities for banking institutions to capitalise on new business opportunities, both onshore and overseas. The strengthened incentives and more competitive environment have also prompted continuous performance improvements. Indeed, these developments have well positioned the banking sector to take the next leap forward. It is my pleasure to be here this morning to speak at this year's Malaysian Banking Summit which has focussed on the theme, the next wave for the banking system in Malaysia.

The fundamental goals of the program are: •  to eliminate inflation,  •  to achieve a sustainable fiscal position,  •  to establish a more equitable and efficient distribution of resources,  •  and to increase the growth potential of the economy. 1  BIS Review 9/2000  The program will accomplish these goals through a number of policy reorientations. The primary fiscal balance will shift, in the first year, from deficit to a surplus position consistent with long-term fiscal sustainability, and will remain high until the price stability has been established in the economy. To reinforce program credibility and support the fiscal stabilisation, the program’s design is front loaded, with most of the required structural measures being taken at the outset. A first priority will be to diversify the financing of the deficit. Net external financing for the public sector will increase, and this, together with the primary surplus and other measures, will make it possible to lower the level of real domestic interest rates. A strong and credible exchange rate policy, established at the beginning of the program, will break the cycle of the public’s inflationary expectations based on past experience. Both monetary policy and public sector wage policy are being subordinated to the exchange rate target. Now let me go into some details of this strategy. Action to eliminate, quickly and permanently, the high public sector deficit is among the priorities of the program.
The bulk of the high growth in central government allocations translates into strong growth in household consumption, while growth in public services production is moderate. This is only to be expected when there is a steep increase in public sector allocations in an economy where there are no available resources. In the long run, wages must be commensurate with the value added that is generated by workers. Real wage growth is thus determined over time by developments in labour productivity in all sectors of the economy. If historical productivity growth trends persist, the long-term rate of growth in labour costs that is compatible with the inflation target is 4½ per cent. The outcome of the wage settlements we have observed in recent years is not consistent with this. During the 1990s, we saw that unemployment declined as long as wage growth in Norway was lower than wage growth among trading partners. This came to a halt in 1998, when the social partners rejected the policy of wage moderation. Unemployment stopped falling. The sharp rise in labour costs in recent years carries with it a potential for higher unemployment. Annual wage growth is projected to range between 5½ and 6 per cent this year, and substantial pay increases have already been awarded with effect from 2003. When real wage growth is higher than productivity growth, corporate profitability deteriorates. Firms will then hire fewer people and shed labour. This also leads to a heightened conflict between budget limits and service production requirements in the public sector.

Clothing prices, as measured in the consumer price index, have fallen by 15 per cent since 1995. In comparison, other consumer prices  2  BIS Review 65/2002  have on average risen at about the same rate in the same period. In 2002, cheaper clothes will save Norwegian consumers about NOK 4-5 billion.1 I would like to highlight two factors that have had a particular influence on economic policy when we compare today’s situation with the situation 30 years ago. •  The phasing-in of a large petroleum sector and thereafter of the revenues from this sector. •  Development of the Norwegian financial market and its integration in the global market. Norway's large petroleum revenues pose considerable challenges to economic policy. Norway’s export revenues and central government revenues can be expected to be high as long as production remains high. At the same time, we know from experience that revenues may vary sharply from year to year. As a result of the high level of earnings and fluctuations in these revenues, the most important contribution fiscal policy can make to stabilising the Norwegian economy is to provide a sound, longterm strategy for the use of petroleum revenues. Attempts to use the central government budget to fine-tune economic activity may achieve the opposite of what is intended if these attempts are perceived as a break with the long-term strategy for the phasing-in of petroleum revenues. Second, economic agents look to the future today when they make decisions about consumption and investment, wages and prices.
In general, the lower such risk premia are, the greater the interest rate differential with abroad, and the lower the exchange rate is, the more favourable the conditions for lifting controls of this type. This is because the exchange rate is supported by a larger risk-adjusted interest rate differential and expectations of currency appreciation are more likely to outweigh expectations of depreciation. In my opinion, all of the conditions for a marked decline in risk premia should be in place in the next few months. Inflation will also fall somewhat further in the near future. Consequently, I am of the opinion that plans to lift the capital controls do not change the fact that there is still some room for further reduction of interest rates. Last Wednesday, in connection with the Bank’s interest rate announcement, I issued a statement on the capital controls. There is no reason to repeat it in full here, as it is available on the internet, but the thrust of it is that no broad-based steps will be taken to lift controls on capital outflows until March 2011 at the earliest, and before that is done, a revised financial account liberalisation strategy will be publicised. The intervening months will be used to lay the foundations for potential liberalisation. To all appearances, the statement was well received, and bond market yields fell markedly thereafter. As I said at the beginning of my speech today, monetary policy implementation is unusually complex at present.

Iceland’s sovereign CDS spread is higher than the underlying fundamentals warrant, and positive developments in the next few months could make quite an impact on it. Credit rating agencies and others have given us a clear indication of which factors are most important: reducing uncertainty about domestic financial institutions, resolving the Icesave dispute, and demonstrating signs of economic recovery. But where do we stand? Has the turnaround begun? According to the forecast published by the Central Bank last Wednesday, it has: seasonally adjusted GDP is projected to have grown between the second and third quarters of this year. This assumption is supported by various high-frequency indicators such as groceries turnover and payment card turnover. As the chart shows, we assume that this trend continued in the current quarter, although we expect growth to be somewhat less. In examining the chart, however, the viewer should bear in mind that quarterly GDP figures are quite volatile and measurements can show a small contraction in individual quarters, even though such a dip would not be considered to constitute an economic recession in the conventional sense. But in connection with the economic outlook, it is important to remember that consumer confidence appears to have taken a bit of a dive in the past few weeks (see Chart 2), concurrent with the beginning of the legislative session in early October and the demonstrations that took place at the time.
ii) Impact Tolerances The second is the requirement for firms to set impact tolerances for their IBS. Here, we expect firms to assume that disruption to IBS will occur and then set clearly defined time-based metrics, and well defined thresholds, at which the disruption would threaten regulatory objectives. iii) Mapping and Testing The third area is, following the identification of IBS and setting impact tolerances, we expect firms to perform mapping and testing so they are able to demonstrate their ability to stay within their impact tolerances. Firms’ testing strategies should incorporate the risks and vulnerabilities they will face in severe but plausible scenarios and then demonstrate how they will remediate any disruption in a timely manner. The experience gained from this testing can then inform how firms monitor risks to their operational resilience and increase the maturity of their overall processes. Policy interactions For the recent March 2022 deadline, firms had to meet the first two of these elements, namely identifying the IBS and setting impact tolerances. Looking ahead to the next key deadline, which is in 2025, firms will have to prove that they are able to remain within the impact tolerances that they have set out, and this is where the assurance gained from high quality testing will be key. I would also like to highlight the interaction of these expectations with the PRA’s outsourcing and third party risk management policy2, which was published at the same time as the policy on Op Res.

At the PRA we have found this two way dialogue valuable in guiding the development of the Op Res policy, and in that spirit, my remarks today aim to keep you informed on the next steps on our Op Res roadmap. The need to focus on this topic has never been more pressing. Since our original Discussion Paper: the Covid pandemic; the ongoing shift of services to the Cloud; and, more recently, the terrible events in Ukraine have all brought fresh challenges to the overall operational resilience of the sector. This has included the need to shift to remote working at short notice, address the risk posed by dependencies on services and third party providers (including those located in highly disrupted areas of the world), and highlighted an increasing need to focus on cyber resilience. The good news is that the sector has, to date, shown itself to be resilient in the face of these challenges. However, while clear progress has been made, there is still distance to travel to a point where firms across the sector reach the level of operational resilience we expect to see. This has been highlighted by a variety of operational outages still occurring frequently, such as payment outages, app and website failures, and incidents at third party providers. These incidents often attract significant attention from both customers and the media, emphasising the need for demonstrable resilience to underpin broader confidence in the financial sector.
Papali’I T Scanlan: Preventing money laundering and financing of terrorism in Samoa Speech by Mr Papali’I T Scanlan, Governor of the Central Bank of Samoa, at the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Activities Workshop for Non-Profit Organizations in Samoa, Apia, 13 May 2009. *  *  *  Dear Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, Good Morning. At the outset, I would like to welcome all of you to this Anti Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Activities workshop, which is specifically designed for NonProfit Organizations (or NPOs). Thank you for accepting our invitation, and especially for sparing the time to be with us this morning. The main objective of this one day workshop is to promote and enhance your individual Organization’s awareness and understanding of the important aspects involved in fighting the offences of money laundering and the financing of terrorism in Samoa. I understand that there are more than four hundred (400) NPOs registered with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labor (MCIL). However, we have adopted a selective approach with the assistance of MCIL in identifying yourselves, as being the important entities to kick start this “Awareness Raising Program.” On that note, I would like to thank the MCIL for the support provided to the Central Bank in coordinating this important event. Let me also thank several representatives of the various Government Ministries who are here with us today.

But, in recent years, there appears to have been an increase in the number of operators of dubious financial background who move from country to country taking advantage of gullible governments and private individuals and entities. Their intention is to defraud governments and people by convincing them to accept and/or invest in get-rich-quick projects that are later proven to be just pure scams. I should mention that we have come across a wide range of scams in the past, some of which have been repeated in several countries by different or most probably, the same operators. In the event, sharing of information about such experiences would benefit us all in our efforts to protect our financial system, not to mention our people, from such abuses. The features of scams touted around the Pacific are mostly similar, except a few cosmetic variations in some cases. Usually, substantial benefits are promised by the get-rich-quick operators in return for payments made by the victims or some contingent liabilities accepted by Governments and private individuals up front. Let me state some examples for your reference: i. Letters of Guarantee  ii. A loan for Indigenous Development  iii. A loan to a private company  iv. Sale of Passports  v.  The Nigerian Scam  vi. Lottery winnings  (The last two on the list have come up quite often through the internet and email messages. ) Capacity building Let me end with a word on capacity building.
The weakest area of the economy at the moment is probably private investment which has been continuously decelerating for a few months now. But the surging inflation has also put private consumption increasingly at risk. Indeed, the latest issue of Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts shows Thailand’s GDP growth falling over the next three quarters before recovering in the second quarter of 2009. Against this backdrop, the policy priority is to head off the rising inflationary pressure while keeping a close eye on downside risks to growth. This is normally already very difficult in the presence of cost-push shocks that create a short-run trade-off between inflation and output stabilization. What further complicates the current situation is that a prolonged period of oil shocks and inflation tends to divest funds from, as well as discourage, fixed capital investment and hence deteriorates what economists refer to as the economy’s potential output. This issue is especially important when the economy is energy inefficient. Let me elaborate further. Conceptually, potential output is the level of output which can be sustained over an extended period without exerting upward or downward pressure on inflation. When the actual level of output is above potential output, inflation tends to rise. Conversely, when the actual level of output is below potential output, inflation tends to fall.

But the tightness in the labor market may add inflationary pressure, a point in which I have already mentioned. Fourth, the private sector has shown much resiliency and adaptability. For example, in response to the appreciation of the baht, exporters have made increasing uses of foreign exchange hedging instruments. At the same time, the increasingly diversified export market structure has provided Thai exporters with cushions against the current slowdown in major advanced economies. As another example, many private firms, burned by the crisis experience, no longer over-leverage their balance sheets and turn to equity and retained earnings as major sources of funds. Fifth, the banking sector is now much healthier than even a few years ago. The BIS ratio of the entire banking system remained high at 15.3 per cent in May. Despite the economic slowdown, both ratios of gross NPL and net NPL to total loan declined slightly since the third quarter of last year. In fact, the outstanding amount of NPL declined in the last quarter. In addition, the implementation of IAS39 accounting standard in 2006-2007 and the preparation for the adoption of Basel II at the end of this year have together strengthened the stability of our banking system. With insignificant exposures to collateralized debt obligation (CDO) investments, the Thai banking sector as a whole is also immune to the U.S. sub-prime spillover. Last but not least, Thailand is among the world’s top places when it comes to the ease of starting and operating businesses.
According to data reported from INSTAT, real annual growth of the GDP amounted to 4.9%, that is, higher than figures recorded during the first two quarters of the year. Economic activity improvement relied mostly on trade, tourism and other services. The industry sector maintained the same contribution to the economic growth, while construction sector activities continued to shrink for the fourth consecutive quarter. Developments in demand components follow the tendencies of the beginning of the year and are in line with our previous assessments. Available data suggest that economic growth continued to be stimulated to a large extent by foreign demand; meanwhile fiscal consolidation during the second half of the year predictably yielded a slowing effect to the economic activity. Private consumption and investment remained low during the second half as well, despite improvement of financing conditions for the activity. Private consumption continues to be subject to a hesitating approach by consumers to spend and a low support by banks. Increased salaries, employment and remittances in the economy were not fully factorised in optimising individuals for the future, as proven by low levels of consumer confidence index for the third quarter of 2010. In addition, sluggish consumer demand and non-utilised capacities in the economy did not encourage businesses for new investments. However, with the improvement of financing conditions and further increase of demand, contrary to the first two quarters, private investments are considered to have given a positive contribution during the third quarter.

Average annual inflation was 3.1% in the first quarter of the year, dropping by 0.4 percentage points from its average level of the third quarter and getting closer to Bank of Albania’s target. During 2010, inflation was influenced by increased administered prices, rising trend of basic goods prices, food products and oil prices in international markets, and underestimating tendencies of the exchange rate. Annual inflation increase to 3.4% in December was due to increased agricultural products prices, reflecting this increase in global markets. Yet, anchored expectations on price stability and disinflation pressures by the real economy balanced the action of the above-mentioned factors of demand on inflation, halting their transition to second round effects and stable inflation pressures. The Bank of Albania considers that the inflation rate is expected to range within our target of 3 per cent, during the entire year. The increasing effect on the inflation of supply factors is balanced by the negative output gap and existence of non-utilised capacities in the economy. Controlled inflation pressures and fiscal policy created space for a gradual increase of the monetary stimulus in the economy during 2010. The Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to reduce the key interest rate by 00.25 percentage points in July, taking it to the lowest historical level of 5.0%. In parallel with this move, the Bank of Albania supplied the interbank market with the necessary liquidity for a proper functioning of financial markets.