samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chart 1: Anxiety score (mean response)  Chart 2: HH and business consumer confidence 6 5  40  Headline consumer confidence (RHS)  30 20  4 3 2  -15  0 -10  -20  Overall business confidence (LHS)  -25  Jul-20  Apr-20  Jan-20  Oct-19  Jul-19  -35  Apr-19  -40  Jan-19  0  Oct-18  -30  Jul-18  -30  Apr-18  1  Jan-18  02-Jul  05-Aug  04-Jun  07-May  09-Apr  2019  2018  2017  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  -5 -10  10  -20  2011  0  Source: ONS  Sources: GfK/EC Consumer Confidence Survey, Lloyds  Note: Quarterly data to March 2020 and weekly data  Business Barometer  thereafter  Note: Headline consumer confidence is based on the average of five survey balances: general macroeconomic situation over the past 12 months and expectations for the next 12  The failure of consumer confidence to recover is particularly striking, given the complete recovery in consumption by households over the same period. Put differently, the historical correlation between consumer confidence and spending appears to have broken down (Chart 3). A wedge has emerged between peoples’ expectations and their spending, between their risk perceptions and economic reality. The same is true, to a somewhat lesser extent, among businesses. For households, that wedge might have arisen because of fears about future unemployment or inflation.

Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Sri Lanka and its battle against money laundering and terrorist financing activities Keynote address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Commonwealth Secretariat Programme on Financial Investigations Training, Colombo, 22-26 January 2007. *  *  *  Your Excellencies, Ladies & Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure that I welcome you to the inaugural ceremony of this conference and extend to all overseas participants and representatives a very warm welcome to our country. I am also very happy to be able to share a few thoughts with you at this Forum about the progress Sri Lanka has made in its battle against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing activities. Sri Lanka has given serious recognition to the need for preventing money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism in view of their adverse consequences both economic and social. In fact, Sri Lanka has been a victim of terrorist financing and suffered immensely by its consequences. As we all know, money laundering and financing of terrorism promote criminal activities, endanger financial system stability and misallocate resources into non-productive investments. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has a special concern about these adverse consequences, as it has a mandate to maintain financial system stability together with economic and price stability.
The first is that, five years on, very limited progress has been made in resolving one of the fundamental problems that helped make the crisis so devastating for so many economies: a deficient global financial architecture, which has been outgrown by the markets that use it. There have indeed been some reforms both internationally and in individual economies, and there is a much greater alertness to the threats to stability posed by volatile, high-velocity international capital flows. But much still remains to be done, and as capital flows get bigger, the risk of further crisis remains. Paradoxically, the risks are increased by a false sense of security brought on by two or three years’ absence of the kind of contagion that shook so many parts of the world in the nineties. The second observation is that, in the absence of international solutions, a number of economies in the region have adopted local approaches to the problem. Some have chosen to go slow or even step back from financial liberalisation through introducing or tightening restrictions and controls. While understandable - and in some cases effective as short-term measures - such an approach is regrettable because it shuts off many of the benefits, as well as the dangers, of globalisation. In Hong Kong, where controls of this kind are not practical because of the realisation that global links supply our lifeblood, we have taken a different approach. We have chosen to enhance policy credibility through greater transparency and through strengthening and tightening up our rule-based monetary system.

At the same time, higher rated corporate borrowers took advantage of lower yields to strengthen their balance sheets, accounting for 45% of total issuance. This was despite a general widening of credit spreads – which though they have come back some way from the peak levels of the autumn are – and are likely to remain – substantially wider than before the emerging markets crisis, reflecting a more sober assessment of relative credit risk. Against that, the bond markets generally benefited substantially from continuing low inflation and a further decline in inflationary expectations, so that yields have declined in virtually all the main currency sectors. In terms of government bonds they have come down by 100 basis points in the US, by 150 basis points in bunds, by close to 200 basis points in the sterling gilt market, and even by over 100 basis points in Japan before yields there began to back up late last year. Borrowers have been attracted by lower nominal borrowing costs; and investors in the market have been attracted by the prospect of rising values as yields have declined. Significantly, the decline in yields in the underlying government bond markets has typically more than offset the widening in spreads faced by lesser credits. In the US corporate bond market, for example, BBB spreads widened over the year from around 75 basis points to around 140 basis points, but because of the underlying fall in yields, yields paid by BBB borrowers actually fell from around 6½% to 6%.
And they have been effective in easing financial conditions and supporting the recovery. Yet it is clear that, for all central banks, the structural backdrop has made monetary policy normalisation slower. Consider lower growth. It is now clear that the long-run growth potential of major economies has been falling for a number of years. For example, the Consensus forecasts for long-run growth real GDP for the US – that is the average growth six to ten years – stood at 3.1% in early 2003. The latest figure is just 2.2%. Long-run growth forecasts for the euro area were revised down from 2.2% to 1.4% over the same period. These lower forecasts represent in part the impact of ageing populations, but also reflect the falling trend in total factor productivity.4 This affects monetary policy because slower growth in potential output reduces what is often referred to as the equilibrium interest rate.5 While not directly observable in the real world, this widely used concept is organised around the notion of an equilibrium level of the rate of interest where there is neither upward nor downward pressure on inflation. If the equilibrium rate falls, the margin above the effective lower bound becomes compressed, reducing the space in which central banks can operate to provide accommodative policy. One might reasonably ask why central banks did not identify this trend sooner. The answer seems to lie in an overreliance on pro-cyclical estimates of potential output.

We need to know how we will work with and communicate with public authorities and with the private sector. There is a different set of factors which impact our decisions in this area. First, our “must do” roles are dependent on crisis preparation and an adequate general understanding of how the financial system operates, with all the complexities entailed. Second, while each national authority has its specific responsibilities to fulfil, the speed with which decisions would then need to be made and actions implemented make it also essential to act effectively as a single operational unit. In the UK the FSA, HMT and the Bank have developed mechanisms designed to turn this into reality and to provide necessary confidence to the market. And third through testing programmes, we can obtain feedback as to whether our efforts are likely to prove successful and to refine preparation as we go along. The costs to the economy of failure would be high and the expectation is that we would be well prepared. This puts a strong onus on collecting in advance up to date information on firms and markets, or being confident of its availability and source. And also of regular and exacting testing programmes – working with other authorities and with the private sector. 6. Conclusion  So in conclusion, the field of financial stability oversight presents us with plenty of challenges.
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: The denar was and remains one of the key pillars of the stability of the Macedonian economy Address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, on the 29th anniversary of the monetary independence, Skopje, 26 April 2021. * * * Monetary sovereignty is one of the main components of the sovereignty of any state. Today we mark 29 years since the laying of the foundations of our monetary independence – the day when the denar replaced the Yugoslav dinar, and the National Bank began to function as an independent central bank, facing numerous challenges in those turbulent times of separation from the former Yugoslav state. Looking back through years, we can freely say that the monetary independence took place in an extremely difficult period marked with high macroeconomic instability as its main feature. Frequent exchange rate devaluations, when there were almost no foreign reserves, along with structural problems, ignited inflation, which reached four-digit levels, and all this had strong effects on the economy and the living standards of citizens. The economy has been declining 1996, when economic growth of 1.2% was registered for the first time since independence. Hence, no doubt that establishing a stable macroeconomic environment required great courage, commitment and professionalism of the National Bank team. The efforts of the National Bank, together with other policy makers and the academic community, have played a key role in ceasing the inflation spiral and stabilizing the exchange rate of the domestic currency.

As a consequence, the purchases had only modest direct effects on financial conditions.4 Starting in 2006, when the initial wave of QE ended, the BoJ began to formalize its inflation goal in numerical terms. This was initially expressed as an “understanding of medium- to long-term price stability” based on individual policymakers’ views. The inflation objective went through several iterations before being defined in 2012 as a Committee “goal” of a positive range of 2 percent or lower, with a lower interim goal of 1 percent. Following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007–2008, Japan resumed QE, and gradually tightened the link between its policy actions and its objectives. By January 2012, the BoJ had committed to keep rates at the zero bound and to continue purchasing assets until the 1 percent goal was “in sight.” Several prominent Japanese experts have argued that there was a “start-stop” aspect to monetary policy during the 1990s and 2000s with reversals in policy beginning before deflationary expectations were eliminated.5 Fiscal policy also reversed abruptly on several occasions before economic recovery was firmly established. While Japan did enjoy a period of respectable real per capita growth in the mid-2000s, escape from deflation proved elusive. More than a decade after Japan’s bubble burst, the U.S. housing bubble burst. This exposed extensive vulnerabilities in our financial system and triggered a global financial crisis.6 Unlike Japan, we had the advantage of being able to learn from another nation’s recent experience.
In other words, the value of a natural resource is converted into a financial asset. The name of the Fund was chosen to reflect this. However, one weakness that may be associated with the Petroleum Fund is that the objective of saving is not sufficiently highlighted. The future use of revenues could have been made clearer either by choosing another name or by earmarking the capital for specific future uses, even though this would imply a constraint on the government’s scope for manoeuvre. The study that is being planned may analyse fundamental and practical aspects of establishing a link between the pension system in Norway and the assets in the Government Petroleum Fund. The National Insurance Fund’s investments are mainly confined to Norway. As a result, changes in the value of the Fund’s equity portfolio primarily reflect developments in Norwegian business and industry. The Fund has larger ownership interests in individual companies than the Petroleum Fund, and wider fluctuations in value. State ownership NOK bn  Financial investor  Strategic owner  15 0  High  10 0  Ris  50  k  Low  0 0 -1  1 -5  5-10  10-15  1 5 -4 0 4 0 - 4 9  5 0 -7 4 7 5 - 9 9  100  Ownership interests per enterprise  Petroleum Fund's equities  National Insurance Fund's equities  Direct ownership  As indicated in the chart, the government has substantial holdings in individual companies.

First, the government has shown little ability and willingness to impose clear and ambitious return requirements and control the financial risk in companies where it has a dominant stake. In addition, if the companies are underperforming, both jobs and regions will be adversely affected. Second, the government has not developed effective management of equity in the companies. The size of equity and the dividend policy seem to be randomly determined by historical factors. New equity management instruments, such as share buy-backs and extraordinary dividends, are seldom used. On the whole, it seems difficult for a state-owned enterprise and for the state as owner to acknowledge that a growth period may have come to an end and that the owners should invest their capital elsewhere. Third, the state as owner will always have a strong aversion to negative corporate events. On the other hand, the state will provide little extra rewards to a company that has boosted its return on equity by one or two percentage points. The result is an erosion of an important driving force behind growth. BIS Review 14/2001  11  In a state-owned enterprise the board or management of the company and the state as owner may have a common interest in overcapitalising the company because they will then both be on the safe side. Fourth, the state has complex and elaborate procedures for making decisions. Moreover, the procedures are designed to accommodate tasks other than the role of ownership.
This more balanced policy mix is an opportunity to engage in new ways of thinking and to strengthen the recovery via stronger economic coordination in Europe. The room for manoeuvre in economic policy is highly heterogeneous across European countries, and each country should use its capacity to improve the overall situation [Slide 6]. European countries have done quite a lot on their own, but now we can and must do more to coordinate demandside policies and structural reforms at the European level. To do so, I would like to make two proposals. 4/ Strengthen Investment First, we need to improve investment financing [Slide 7]. Our efforts should be put towards financing growth and innovation and towards finding the right mix between debt and equity financing solutions, while still preserving financial stability and consumer protection. In the EU, the European Commission has launched several initiatives to serve these objectives, particularly the Investment Plan and the Capital Markets Union. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, we need to focus on removing obstacles to investment, providing visibility and technical assistance to investment projects and making smarter use of new and existing financial resources. The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) drives the Investment Plan for Europe. It supports strategic investments in key areas such as infrastructure, education, research, innovation, as well as risk finance for small businesses. Through the use of limited public guarantees, it aims to foster private investments totalling EUR 315 billion in three years.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Liquidity - a challenge for banks Public lecture by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss National Bank Conference “Liquidity - a challenge for banks”, Zurich, 11 January 2005. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The resilience of the international financial system has been strengthened in recent years thanks to the extensive efforts of financial institutions, central banks and regulatory bodies. Nonetheless, given the steadily increasing volume of transactions in global financial markets, securing liquidity remains a fundamental task for banks. During times of crises, liquidity can suddenly contract or dry up altogether. The challenge for banks is to set up liquidity planning procedures to secure reliable liquidity sources for exceptional circumstances. Liquidity risks must be correctly assessed and assets must be secured to serve as collateral when necessary. In Switzerland, the repo market is the forward-looking liquidity management instrument for the banks. It minimises counterparty risk in lending and provides access to a crisis-resistant, collateralised interbank market. The Swiss National Bank is itself a participant in the repo market. It uses the repo platform to implement monetary policy and to provide for liquidity in both normal and exceptional circumstances. BIS Review 1/2005  1
Eddie Yue: Next phase of Hong Kong’s fintech journey – "Fintech 2025” Opening remarks by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at The Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) Fintech Seminar: Next Phase of Hong Kong’s Fintech Journey – "Fintech 2025", 8 June 2021. * * * 1. Good afternoon everyone. Thank you for taking out the time to attend this HKAB Fintech Seminar. I’m glad to be able to meet all of you online via this live stream. I’d like to take this opportunity to firstly thank the HKAB for organising the event and for inviting me to speak. 2. Today, it gives me great pleasure to share with you the HKMA’s new fintech strategy — Fintech 2025. 3. It is commonly accepted that the future of banking hinges on technology. The quality of any banking experience will, in today’s time, be very much correlated to how much of that experience is digital. 4. Banks in Hong Kong were early movers in Asia. We embraced digitalisation long before fintech came into the limelight. You have truly done a great job in using technology to streamline your banks’ operation and provide excellent customer experience. 5. The Fintech 2025 strategy we are announcing today aspires to help the financial sector adopt technology comprehensively by 2025; so that they will deliver fair and efficient financial services, benefitting Hong Kong people and the Hong Kong economy.

This thinking process has culminated in a strategy that we call Fintech 2025, which I am pleased to share with you here. . All Banks go fintech 14. The first part of our fintech strategy is called “all banks go fintech”. In short, we want banks to go “all in” with fintech, and fully digitalise their operations, from front-end to back-end. 15. The future is full of uncertainties. This is something we have all witnessed first-hand over the past two years with the pandemic. Challenges and interruptions to day-to-day activities, including banking activities, can happen unannounced. The only thing certain and that has been a constant throughout these ups and downs is digitalisation. 16. Indeed, the banking industry also recognises the value of digitalisation. At least we like to think this is why banks have so positively embraced the HKMA’s fintech drive so far - rather than due to any regulatory pressure! Jokes aside, I trust the figures I quoted earlier are proof that the earlier Smart Banking initiatives have laid a strong foundation for our banks to take this next step in their fintech journey. 17. The HKMA is keen to support banks during this process. Under the Fintech 2025 strategy, we will be rolling out a Tech Baseline Assessment to help the HKMA identify those areas that we may be able to offer support. As part of this exercise, we will be inviting banks to submit a Three Year Plan for technology adoption within Q4 2021.
Mr Duisenberg focuses on maintaining price stability in the euro area  Speech by Mr Willem Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the Swiss Banking Congress in Zurich on 10 September 1999. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I was only too pleased to accept your invitation to this place of price stability between Lake Constance and the Dufourspitze, to report to you on the first experiences with the euro. No other country in Europe can rival the success of Switzerland in combating inflation, and this is something of which you can be very proud. With the introduction of the single currency in Europe, European integration has scaled new heights. Since the beginning of this year, the Governing Council of the ECB has been responsible for the stability of the euro. Monetary Union means that for the whole of the euro area there is only one single monetary policy. The aim of this policy is to achieve price stability in the euro area as a whole. This means that there can no longer be a monetary policy designed to meet the needs of individual Member States. Therefore, it will be more important than ever for individual Member States to push on determinedly with fiscal consolidation and to carry out structural reforms with the aim of enhancing the flexibility of the commodity and employment markets and improving the incentives for the creation and taking-up of employment. The Governing Council of the ECB determines the single monetary policy centrally.

This caused the average interest rate level in those countries of the future euro area to be lowered considerably before the beginning of Monetary Union. The close cooperation which had always existed between the European central banks was increasingly stepped up in the final months of 1998 between those countries participating in Stage Three of Monetary Union. The coordinated reduction of central bank rates in December 1998 to 3% made it perfectly clear that, de facto, Monetary Union had already begun before the start of Stage Three. Looking at economic developments, in the first few months of this year there have been an increasing number of indications that the negative effects of the crises in Asia and Russia on growth and employment in the euro area could be more serious than was first expected. With the apparent slowdown in economic growth in the euro area, the risks that the 2% threshold for the tolerable rate of inflation would be exceeded in the foreseeable future evaporated. This forecast was also reflected in the revisions to the inflation forecasts of international organisations. At the beginning of April 1999, the Governing Council of the ECB therefore decided to reduce the interest rates on the main refinancing operations by 50 basis points to 2.5%, as well as the rates on the standing facilities to 1.5% and 3.5% respectively. The M3 monetary aggregate did expand such that it was slightly above the reference value at the beginning of 1999.