samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another important factor that was influential in the first half of 2006 was an accelerated increase in the prices of crude oil and other commodity prices in the international markets. This increase, accompanied by the depreciation of the Turkish Lira led to a rise in domestic energy prices and so played a key role in increasing the inflation figures. A slow-down in price increases has been observed as of August due to the decrease in the prices of gold and oil in the international markets, stabilization in the financial markets with the re-appreciation of the Turkish Lira and the effect of the decisiveness in the fight against inflation over expectations. Nevertheless, inflation remained high due to the sustained upward trend in the unprocessed food products, Ramadan-based effects and the belated reflections of the depreciation experienced in the Turkish Lira following that date. Looking at the end-year inflation in the main expenditures groups, we see that the annual inflation remains below the target in clothing, footwear and communications groups, whereas it goes beyond the target in all other groups. In this respect, rigidity of inflation in the services group constituted an important handicap against the fight against inflation in 2006 as it did in the previous years. End-year inflation became 12.2 percent in this group. Rents in the services group showed a great increase and an annual inflation rate of 20 percent remained above the general consumer inflation.

A rapid transition process is experienced from the agricultural sector to the sectors other than agriculture as a result of the structural change that the economy goes through. The share of the agricultural sector in total employment decreased from 38 percent in 2001 to 28 percent in September 2006. It is expected that the transition from the agricultural sector to the sectors other than agriculture within the process of structural change in our country will continue in the coming years Additionally, high employment taxes observed in the sectoral structure of employment restricts the rise in employment on the one hand; and causes employment to shift to unregistered activities on the other. The increase in the unregistered employment prevents the increases in employment to be permanent and increases volatility. Working age population keeps growing due to the high rate of population growth in our country. The limited educational facilities to meet the labor power having the demanded qualifications vis-a-vis the increasing working age population and the lack of labor possessing the qualifications compatible with the structural change in the economy are the other problems detaining the possible improvements in the labor market. All these problems prevent the unemployment rates to fall in a speed parallel to the increase in employment. However, the problem of unemployment having social consequences besides economic ones renders the solution of this problem inevitable. Therefore, long-term supply-side policies should be put into effect in order to find a permanent solution to the problem of unemployment.
This may happen in part because the EMU countries have chosen to subscribe to a set of common guidelines on the magnitude of their fiscal deficits, and in part because these countries will compete for a common pool of savings in an integrated capital market. The prospect of market-based discipline on the fiscal policies pursued by the EMU countries is not so different from the situation faced by individual states and municipalities in the United States. The need for these entities to tap a common capital market to finance their deficits places their actions under a stricter market test than they would face if they could rely mainly on captive local savings. The municipal bond market in the United States is today a very active and competitive market, where yield differences on public debt reflect investors’ perceptions of default risk, and inefficient state and local administrations are quickly penalized for fiscal profligacy. Similar markets are likely to evolve in Europe after 1999. In fact, the major rating agencies are already planning for European issues of government debt following the creation of EMU. By all accounts, the agencies expect these ratings to mirror those currently assigned to countries’ foreign currency debt, with fiscal factors driving rating changes once EMU is well under way. As I hope I have made clear in my remarks this evening, we in the United States, as elsewhere, have been observing the progress toward monetary unification in Europe with great interest.

This willingness of American workers to move themselves and their family is a cultural characteristic of our people, no doubt based in the history of the United States as a nation of immigrants. To complement its high degree of labor mobility, the United States also has in place a federal fiscal system that allows the federal government to channel large transfers from fast-growing regions to slow-growing regions. Progressive income taxation, a high elasticity of corporate tax profits to changes in income, and an integrated federal budget are the main components of this system. In contrast to the United States, Europe is characterized by a more segmented labor market and very limited integration of its national fiscal systems. Both these characteristics limit the ability not only of Europe’s private sector to shift resources in response to regional recessions, but also of Europe’s public sector to compensate for this rigidity. This lack of flexibility is widely acknowledged to be one of the root causes of the high unemployment rates that Europe has experienced during the last decade. But, we may well ask, does it necessarily follow that because of the greater rigidity of its labor markets and the lack of a federal fiscal system, Europe cannot accommodate a common currency and instead needs to rely on periodic exchange rate adjustments as surrogates for productive flexibility? I do not think so.
A stable financial system cannot be based on questionable and opaque risk assessments. To regain confidence in these calculations, banks should make sure that their RWA calculations are transparent and traceable. In particular, they have to ensure that changes in RWAs over time, and differences in published RWAs between institutions, can be explained and economically accounted for. Third, the ongoing work on recovery and resolution plans should be pursued with total determination. If required for the guaranteed maintenance of systemically important functions, changes in the current organisational structure should be explored and initiated without delay. Fourth, on the regulatory side, further progress in defining the key elements of a viable resolution and recovery strategy for globally active banks is needed. In the absence of global bank insolvency legislation, this necessitates close coordination among regulators across borders. Specifically, further steps are necessary to guarantee that resolution measures – such as a bail-in – ordered by the home regulator are mutually recognised by foreign authorities. In this regard, it is encouraging that the resolution and recovery plans for our big banks are being developed in close collaboration with the foreign regulatory authorities concerned. Let me finish with some words regarding the cyclical risks. Mortgage volumes and real estate prices continue to grow at rates significantly above those justified by fundamental factors such as income and population growth. This means that the imbalances, which are already large, are increasing further.

The bursting of a large property price bubble can have serious effects on financial intermediation. This could motivate an early monetary policy response. The cost of this pre-emptive strike strategy would have to be weighed against the fact that inflation and real activity will be lower than desired in the short term. Is this a price worth paying to maintain stability in the financial system? In order to answer that question, we need to know how sensitive the financial system is to a severe fall in property prices? Another problem with trying to act pre-emptively is, how do we spot the price bubble in time? So even though in a conflict between short-un price stability and financial stability, the latter were to be viewed as the more important, implementing such a policy could be fraught with substantial practical problems. The grounds for a pre-emptive strike against an equity price bubble are perhaps less compelling than for a property price bubble. The US experience from the 1987 stock market crash seems to be that, with an appropriately conducted monetary policy, the effects on real activity can be relatively small. With New York Stock Exchange order flows grossly out of balance on 19 October 1987, with the solvency of brokerages and clearing houses in doubt, banks were growing nervous and reluctant to lend. This was a clear case of systemic risk and before the market opened on 20 October the Fed affirmed its responsibilities to serve as a lender of last resort and also substantially eased monetary policy.
This pricing indicates, if anything, that the market prefers to hold government bonds rather than central bank reserves and hence that the Riksbank’s bond purchases are reducing the supply of the safest assets. Another indication of this is that the term premiums on government bonds have been very low, and probably negative, in recent years. 20 This suggests that government bonds with long maturities are not being priced with risk premiums in relation to Riksbank certificates or government securities with short maturities. 7 [16]  I have now discussed arguments that could indicate that the Riksbank should continue to maintain a large portfolio even in the future, and I don’t consider these arguments to be particularly strong. But does this mean that the size of the balance sheet has no significance or are there strong arguments indicating that the Riksbank’s balance sheet should be small? Arguments against substantial bond holdings in normal times Maintaining a large balance sheet can be associated with risks, but the nature of these risks depends both on the assets held by the central banks and how these are funded on the liability side. The risks may relate to the central bank’s financial position and ability to conduct monetary policy and simultaneously fund its own operations, as well as to its reputation and possibility to safeguard its independence in monetary policy issues. Plosser (2018) discusses risks to reputation and argues that the central bank must have a narrow mandate to be able to justify continued independence from the political sphere.

The support measures that may become relevant in special situations can either relate to market stabilisation, as was the case in the autumn of 2008, or to bond purchases as a complement to monetary policy when the policy rate is restricted by its lower bound. There is a great deal to suggest that real interest rates in Sweden and abroad will be lower in the future than they were during the decades preceding the financial crisis, partly as a result of demographic changes and a new saving pattern in the global economy. 15 As a consequence, several central banks, including the Riksbank, have revised down their assessments of what is a normal level for the policy rate. The likelihood is therefore greater than we will touch the lower bound for the repo rate in the event of economic slowdown. This means that we in the future more often may need to use bond purchases as a complement to the repo rate and repo rate forecast. So, even if I have argued that a portfolio of government bonds has a limited role to play in monetary policy in normal conditions, I nevertheless expect that the Riksbank, along with other central banks, will find itself in situations where bond purchases are justified as a complement to interest rate policy.
Analytically, the argument, as summarised in the main text, needs to be supplemented with a mechanism that somehow impedes checks and balances from preventing the overshooting of fundamentals. 8  Loutskina E. and P. E. Strahan (2006), “Securitisation and the declining impact of bank finance on loan supply: evidence from mortgage acceptance rates”, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Papers, No. 11983. And Estrella, A. (2002), “Securitization and the efficiacy of monetary policy”, Economic Policy Review, Vol. 8, No.1. 9  For an overview of early work see Kashyap, A. K. and J. C. Stein (1994),”Monetary policy and bank lending”, in G. N. Mankiw, ed., Monetary policy, Studies in Business Cycles, vol. 29. pp. 221-56. 4  BIS Review 149/2007  behaviour is invariant to its capital gearing or to the composition of its liabilities. 10 We do, therefore, face questions about the extent to which a shock to banks’ liquidity or capital resources can bring about a shift in credit conditions with macroeconomic effects that, other things being equal, monetary policy should seek to offset in order to maintain aggregate demand in line with aggregate supply. Over the past 15 years or so, when banks have seemed anything but restricted, easier access to liquidity or capital may have brought about a progressive relaxation of bank lending conditions. That this featured in commentary on monetary policy rather less than the recent manifest tightening may say no more than that sharp contractions attract more attention than gradual expansions.

18 With an appropriate policy response, what should we expect to see in bank balance sheets, in broad money growth, following a credit-supply shock? It might be that the path for broad  15  See Kashyap, A. K., R. Rajan and J. C Stein (2002), “Banks as liquidity providers: an explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit-taking”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp 33–73. 16  Acharya, V. V., H. S. Shin and T. Yorulmazer (2007), “Fire sales, foreign entry and bank liquidity”, C.E.P.R Discussion Paper, No. 6309. 17  See Goodhart, C. A. E. (2007), “Whatever Became of the Monetary Aggregates?”, Peston Lecture at Queen Mary College, London; King M. A. (2007), “The MPC ten years on”, lecture to the Society of Business Economists, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Summer 2007, pp 272-85; and Tucker P. M. W. (2007), “Central banking and political economy: the example of the UK’s Monetary Policy Committee” speech at the Inflation Targeting, Central Bank Independence and Transparency Conference, Cambridge, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Autumn 2007, pp445-52. 18  There is an echo here of a channel stressed by Brunner & Melter, but with the impulse coming from the central bank’s short-term interest rate rather than the quantity of reserves, and the transmission into risk premia and so other asset prices coming via the expected path of the policy rate and broad money rather than via narrow money. BIS Review 149/2007  7  money should be unaltered in the medium term.
In Thailand, we already have chip card and OTP token such as the rabbit card and SmartPurse, but what we really wish to see in the very near future is something more standardized and widely use like UK Oyster and Hong Kong Octopus. Above all, incentive enhancement for people to use such new banking products, services and systems is the most essential driver to extend the business advancement and that security is the key challenging solution. 4. Conclusion  Today’s IT innovations have influenced our ways of living in many fields including banking industry and we all benefit from the new technologies; however, lessons learnt from past crises have taught and reminded all of us not to ignore what adverse effects might be  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  afterward. As a consequence, maintaining the right balance between banking innovation optimization and risk mitigation is the key in reciprocating the sustainability of growth. We should be more aware and prepared of any challenging IT innovations in order to prevent and mitigate such previous disasters we did encounter, and be more proactive in making policies and designing new models. Ladies and gentlemen, I do believe that the effective collaboration between supervisors and financial institutions is necessary to encourage sustainable growth of Thai banking system against evolving threats. With that, this summit is another move for financial institutions and related organizations to share information and ideas; hence, I wish you all a productive and fruitful discussion today. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Today's forum therefore seems to fit in very well with the European spirit now sweeping Hong Kong, and I congratulate the organisers on putting together a very lively and topical programme. It is a particular pleasure to be presenting together with Christian Noyer, Governor of the Banque de France. He has made some very thoughtful remarks on the first question for discussion. I intend to comment on the second question: "Can the euro be a benchmark for Asian monetary co-operation?" But before I address this question, we need to ask another question: how ready is Asia for closer monetary co-operation? We are, I think, all aware of the considerable differences in the political systems, the cultures, the historical backgrounds, and the economic, financial and monetary systems of the countries in this region. I think it is largely accepted that these differences are greater than the differences between the various economies that make up the euro zone. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate them. Nor should we overlook the regional integration already in progress in the trade, financial and monetary spheres. Let me briefly outline these three forms of integration. About half of total trade in the Asia region is intra-regional trade. Trade integration has been largely market-driven, and the process has stimulated the signing of various free trade agreements, which will, in turn, encourage further trade integration in the region.
These effects are reinforced by the fact that the National Accounts are based on the calculation assumption that there is no productivity increase in the public sector at all. During the second half of the 1990s in particular, there was a rapid development in information technology, which entailed greater efficiency in knowledge transfer between individuals and companies and between companies. The expansion of the IT sector was one of the corner-stones of this "new economy". The effect this actually had on productivity has been much discussed. It is clear that the IT sector itself, and in particular the telecom industry, was responsible for a significant part of productivity growth at the end of the 1990s. Developments were very uneven among the different industries, with the increase in productivity in "IT user" industries being much less impressive, despite large investments in IT products, than that in the "IT producer" sector. The latter is also clearly illustrated when the productivity increase in trade and industry is adjusted for the increase that took place in the telecom industry (Figure 5). When this sector is excluded, productivity during the second half of the 1990s increased by only 1.9 per cent a year, compared with 2.8 per cent if the sector is included. The telecom sector has now greatly declined in importance and there is apparent confusion over its future development. The important question for the Riksbank is what all of this entails for the development of long-term productivity growth in future.

According to the trend, we can actually only detect an increase during the second half of the 1990s, which was broken recently both due to economic activity and to more structural causes. Several factors lie behind this development. Once again it is natural to go back to the crisis years in the early 1990s. At that point the number of hours worked declined significantly as a result of the large fall in demand that took place. Parallel with this, structural changes were implemented. Young people on the verge of working life chose to continue studying, partly because of the lack of jobs, partly because developments on the labour market meant that higher educational demands were made. Another explanation could be that the number of older persons in the labour force also declined considerably during the same period. The labour supply in the age group 60-64 years fell by approximately 40,000 persons during the 1990s, despite the fact that this group's percentage of the population did not change significantly. In addition, the number of people taking early retirement increased at an alarming rate. Recently, as we are all aware, the amount of sick leave has increased. BIS Review 16/2003  3  Another factor that appears to have had some significance is that the Swedish labour market has not been able to make adequate use of the labour reserve comprised of inhabitants who were born abroad. The employment frequency among these people has been much lower than the employment frequency among people born in Sweden.
If inflation looks likely to exceed the Bank’s target limits in a long-term perspective, the Bank will raise its policy interest rate, or cut this rate if inflation is heading below the target limit. In preparing its inflation forecasts and regular assessment of the economic situation and outlook, the Central Bank examines a wide variety of indicators. These include both statistical data and information  BIS Review 12/2003  1  obtained from interviews with representatives of industry, special interest groups, credit institutions and others. Much of this statistical data is available on the Bank’s website. Decisions by the Central Bank’s Board of Governors are made following in-depth examination of these indicators, based on the Bank’s evaluation of the situation and prospects, the premises behind the inflation forecast and the inflation forecast itself. In accordance with the provisions of the Act which entered into force in the spring of 2001, the Board adopted internal rules on the preparation of, arguments for and presentation of its monetary policy decisions. The rules were formally approved at the beginning of 2002 and published in the quarterly Monetary Bulletin. The inflation target adopted in March 2001 removed the earlier fluctuation bands set for the ISK exchange rate and the exchange rate was floated. The new monetary policy framework was introduced under rather difficult conditions, with a sliding exchange rate and mounting inflation. It is fair to say that the tight monetary stance is the main reason that inflation receded as sharply as it did in 2002.

The banking crisis morphed into a sovereign debt crisis. In these countries credit contracted even further, aggravating the ongoing recession and further weakening the banking system in a vicious circle. Fears of potential sovereign default, with likely catastrophic impact on domestic banking sectors, caused interbank lending between countries to dry up and funding markets in the euro area became fragmented along national lines. This threatened the even transmission of monetary policy across the euro area. The interest rates faced by businesses and households – and indeed sovereigns – became increasingly divorced from movements in short-term central bank rates. The crisis that had started as a global crisis was now becoming the crisis of the euro. The financial sector played a significant role in not only propagating but also originating negative shocks to the economy. Financial frictions – largely absent from both the pre-crisis experience of developed economies and the canonical macroeconomic models – had become major drivers of the recession. The resulting crisis prompted academics to reassess existing economic paradigms and policymakers to adjust their frameworks. The rediscovery of the notion that policy may have a role in coordinating private expectations at times of severe uncertainty played a major part in the transition to today’s post-crisis world.