samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, to improve financial stability by a lower degree of financial integration would certainly be the wrong measure. We should not undo those reforms which have paved the way to financial integration and revert back to a retrenchment within the national borders. This is certainly not the right strategy for the euro area, and it would be undesirable at global level. Admittedly, financial integration generates greater interconnectedness, which in turn may increase the risk that failure in one part of the system may trigger chain reactions in the formation of expectations which could have a destabilizing effect. But financial isolation – the opposite of financial integration – is not the rational answer to such a risk. We nowadays live in a global world, where not only financial, but also economic and cultural links have become increasingly tighter. News spread instantaneously and shape global market sentiments; products are designed, assembled and sold in different countries; political events in a small region can send shockwaves around the world. It would be naïve to think that a country could isolate itself financially. And even if it were possible, the costs in terms of lost efficiency and productivity would far outweigh any possible benefit. 2  BIS Review 81/2010  2. Financial development – opportunities and risks  If financial integration is both an irreversible process and a process we do not wish to reverse, finance per se is not always good in any form and size. This is where we can and should have a reasonable and fruitful discussion.

The second half of my contribution will address in particular why an appropriately defined range for price stability and a narrow mandate are key factors in being able to conduct effective monetary policy over the longer term in an ever-changing environment. Here I will draw especially on the SNB’s experience, taking the Swiss perspective of a small open economy with an important currency. I. Aftershocks of the global financial crisis In the two decades prior to the global financial crisis, the nominal interest rate level had declined worldwide. On the one hand, central banks’ success in combatting inflation, coupled with cheap production opportunities resulting from an increasingly integrated global economy, had led to falling inflation rates. On the other hand, the real rate of interest had declined in many countries due to structural factors such as decreasing productivity growth and the ageing of the population. When the global financial crisis and the associated economic slump required a decisive easing in monetary policy, many central banks quickly reached the zero lower bound on interest rates. To continue to ensure an appropriately expansionary monetary policy in this situation, ‘unconventional’ measures then had to be introduced. Switzerland, too, was unable to escape these international developments. As a small open economy, in the wake of the financial crisis it was hit hard by the slump in global demand and the turbulence on the international financial markets. Our country’s situation was exacerbated by strong upward pressure on the Swiss franc.
The work which I am presenting to you today is divided into three sections. The first tells the history of the SNB over the first seventy-five years of its existence. As the previous commemorative publications have already dealt in detail with this period, it was no longer necessary to recount all the events again. We thought that it would be more interesting to take a fresh and critical look at certain episodes from a historical perspective. This is why we called upon the services of three distinguished economists and historians, asking them to explore this period, and leaving them free to choose the salient points of their analysis. Michael Bordo of Rutgers University and Harold James of Princeton University took a detailed look into the first half-century of the SNB, in other words, from its Jean-Pierre Roth SNB founding in 1907 to the end of the Second World War. An exciting yet troubled time, which included the surge in inflation that came in the aftermath of the First World War, the laborious return to the gold standard, the 1936 devaluation, and the SNB’s activities during the Second World War. Peter Bernholz of the University of Basel is the author of the second chapter within this first part. He devoted himself to the period from 1945 to the early 1980s, including the return to convertibility, the Bretton Woods period, the transition to flexible exchange rates and initial experiences with an autonomous monetary policy.

Jean-Pierre Roth: SNB commemorative publication “The Swiss National Bank 1907-2007” Remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the launch of the commemorative publication “The Swiss National Bank 1907–2007”, Zurich, 21 June 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen It is with pleasure and some pride that I present our commemorative publication today or – as the German language puts it so well – our festschrift, or celebratory work. There is indeed good reason to celebrate. One hundred years of doing business, crowned for the most part with success, certainly warrants celebration. The publication of a festschrift is one of the events being held to mark this anniversary. It is the fourth such work to be published, following on from those of 1932, 1957 and 1982. It is somewhat different, however, insofar as it commemorates an entire century of the National Bank’s existence. We wanted this commemorative publication to be a learned work, which at the same time is accessible to a very broad readership. We wanted it to be both unpretentious and modern, yet in keeping with the tradition of the previous works. I make no secret of the fact that significant resources were deployed to prepare the book. Work first started over three years ago and some fifty or so bank employees were involved in the project.
First, the efforts already made on the fiscal front by euro area countries are already bearing fruit: the primary position of the euro area should be close to balance by the end of 2012, which is a remarkable achievement compared to the other major economic areas (Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom will all run deficits of around 9%, 6% and 5% respectively). At the current juncture, this is clearly an asset for us and an element of confidence both for the markets and economic agents, and needs to be further enhanced. In addition to these efforts at the national level, a stronger framework for common discipline has been put in place, which represents a major step forward towards a more integrated economic union. The legislative package (known as the “six-pack”) which came into force last December considerably reinforces the Stability and Growth Pact: the surveillance powers of the European Commission regarding national budgets have been enhanced, sanctions have become quasi-automatic and the public debt and public spending criteria are being more closely monitored. In addition, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance puts in place a new “fiscal compact”, notably including the requirement that the annual structural government deficit does not exceed 0.5% of GDP. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  At current debt levels, economic agents would respond to loose fiscal policy by delaying their own private spending. The financial markets would continue to impose very punitive interest rates on our countries to compensate for the uncertainty surrounding the fiscal outlook.

BIS Review 150/2007  1  The financial sector weaknesses are being addressed through a public and private sector partnership. The implementation structure is chaired by the Secretary to the Treasury at Ministry of Finance and National Planning with the secretariat function responsible for the coordination of activities based at the Bank of Zambia. Mr Chairman, the goal of the FSDP is to have a financial system that is stable and marketbased in order to support efficient resource mobilization necessary for economic diversification and sustainable growth. A number of reforms have already been undertaken under this plan. For instance, a Credit Reference Bureau has been established and we expect it to be operational in the coming year. In addition, studies have also been taken to comprehend the constraints to broader access financial services. One of the outputs of the FSDP has been a market knowledge study called Finscope Zambia which is a nationally representative survey of the use of, and demand for, financial services. It provides insights into how consumers source their income and manage their financial lives. This is the first time a survey like this has been conducted in Zambia and provides valuable information for players in the financial market. The survey, which was conducted in 2005, notes that very few Zambians use the formal financial sector. The report reveals that most Zambians prefer to invest in non-financial instruments such as a business, livestock, land or agriculture equipment.
At this time, it may not be possible to move towards this system as there is not enough political support and many operational hurdles remain to be overcome. Nevertheless, it is important for the IMF to continue its work on how to broaden the use of SDR in all aspects of an international currency (i.e. store of value, medium of exchange and unit of account). Ladies and Gentlemen, 10. In closing, I would like to stress that the international monetary system is certainly in a period of transition. I do not expect a big bang, but a long and gradual process arising from macroeconomic and structural adjustments. Policy dialogue and cooperation between current and prospective reserve-issuing countries will play an important role in ensuring this smooth transition. As there are so many uncertainties along the way, it would take great leadership from some advanced and major emerging market economies to move the world forward towards a more stable international monetary system. Thank you  1  The Triffin dilemma is the conflict between domestic and international objectives of reserve issuing country. This is due to its duty to supply the world with extra currency, which may cause a loss of confidence in its currency. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In fact findings show that the implications of this in the long term for the ability of households and businesses to get a loan are relatively modest – although there is considerable uncertainty around this result. As such, while other risks may arise during a transitionary phase, the most significant risk arises from the potential for stablecoins in particular to undermine confidence in money and payments, and hence in the wider financial system. As we discussed a few minutes ago, the risk of a loss of confidence in the credibility and stability of private money is not theoretical. Loss of confidence in private money can be a major threat to financial stability. But it is equally true that private money can be made acceptable as a widespread means of payment – indeed, as I covered earlier, the vast majority of money held for transactions in the United Kingdom is already private. So, with the right regulation, a stablecoin could potentially be made safe for wide-scale use. Our existing regulatory framework seeks to ensure that the public is able to trust the reliability and stability of the money it uses every day. Banks are subject to extensive rules and requirements to ensure that consumers can use privately-issued money with confidence and interchangeably with cash. These core rules and requirements were developed over time – in many cases via trial and error, with new rules introduced following financial crises.
Moreover, the outlook regarding the course of the factors that pose risk to achieving the inflation target, which are outside the area of impact of monetary policy is summarized in the introduction section and the likely policy reaction against such risks is discussed. These risk factors are listed as the course of oil prices, housing price increases, the acceleration in price increases of those items, which are determinant in the inflation of the goods group, such as fresh fruits, oil, basic metals and gold, global risk appetite and international liquidity conditions. Detailed analyses of developments in inflation, supply-demand, the financial sector and public finance, which have been examined within the framework of the information they contain relating to the medium-term tendency of inflation are presented in the following four chapters. In the last chapter of the Inflation Report, updated assumptions on fundamental macroeconomic variables are compared and contrasted with the assumptions of the previous Inflation Report and inflation and the output gap forecasts produced on the basis of these assumptions are analyzed. BIS Review 67/2006  1  Furthermore, the likely risks that may lead to an apparent upward or downward deviation in inflation forecasts are explicated in detail. In this Inflation Report, a number of boxes have been prepared in order to shed light on certain subjects of interest as in the previous Report.

Challenges for financial markets Speech given by Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Authority Board  Association for Financial Markets in Europe Annual dinner, London Thursday 3 November 2016  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  I am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak tonight at the annual dinner of the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME). The Bank of England has throughout its history had a close association with financial markets and with the institutions that support them. Indeed, the Bank was instrumental in the creation in 1914 of one of AFME’s distant ancestors – the quaintly named Accepting Houses Committee. The outbreak of the First World War and consequent disruption of international payments threatened to bring down the London markets and the international merchant banks that supported them. The Bank enabled a moratorium on war disrupted payments and offered to purchase the war disrupted bills. One contemporary historian of the City hailed this as “the greatest evidence of London’s strength as a financial centre that could have been desired or dreamt of”. 1  Over the following century, the Accepting Houses Committee became the forum of the City’s most influential merchant banks; its members enjoyed the implicit backing of the Bank of England. The Committee eventually became part of the London Investment Banking Association which merged with the European part of SIFMA to create AFME in 2009.
During this process, the banks may suffer loan losses that in a worst case scenario could become so great that the banks fail or need assistance. This would threaten financial stability. By holding the repo rate higher, they say that the central bank can reduce the risk of this happening. While a higher interest rate means that demand is lower and unemployment higher than would otherwise have been the case, and that inflation may undershoot the target, this “insurance premium” may be worth paying if it means that one can avoid a much worse outcome in the future. This would appear to be the reasoning pursued. This chain of reasoning may appear fairly intuitive. But it contains at least a couple of critical statements that require closer examination. The first statement is that the level of household debt in Sweden today entails sufficiently large risks that it needs to be addressed. The second is that a higher repo rate could tangibly reduce these risks and that the lower risk is worth the lower inflation and higher unemployment caused by the higher repo rate. That is, the insurance premium in terms of lower inflation and higher unemployment is worth paying. There is also a third statement implied, that is, that there is no better instrument available, with greater or the same effect on the risks and less effect on inflation and unemployment. Let me examine these statements more closely, starting with the second and third ones.

However, in the case of the Riksbank, the differences between the minority and the majority have been so great and so persistent that it has become evident that they are not merely temporary differences in, for instance, the assessment of economic developments. It rather seems to be a case of more profound differences in the ways of regarding monetary policy and what it can achieve. This need not necessarily be a problem, either. But it does require, at least, that a thorough analysis is made of the differences and that one attempts to evaluate, as far as possible, both points of view. The arguments in favour of a higher policy rate So how has the policy conducted by the Riksbank in recent years been justified? Why hasn’t the Executive Board wanted to conduct the more expansionary policy advocated by the  1  See, for example, Calmfors (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  minority? Such a policy would have had better target attainment in terms of inflation and unemployment, with higher inflation closer to the target and lower unemployment closer to a long-run sustainable rate. My view is that the arguments have not been particularly clear, at least earlier on, and that the stated motives have varied.2 Recently, however, the arguments appear to have converged somewhat.
Indeed, the East Asian region has the potential to enhance its capacity to deal with the risks and vulnerabilities and the potential to continue its growth process. While countries in the East Asian region have many common characteristics, they are also diverse in several aspects. Common features include openness and export orientation and a high rate of growth of manufactured exports. Most countries have a high rate of capital accumulation supported by a high rate of savings. Macroeconomic stability has prevailed in most countries. Inflation has been relatively low and any external imbalances were of manageable proportions while the fiscal deficits have been modest and Government debt levels have been kept low. The countries in the region are, however, diverse in terms of natural resource endowments, the stage of financial sector development, the degree of market orientation of their economies, the choice of exchange rate regime and the degree of public policy activism. The overall growth strategy of the region has essentially been based on an export -oriented industrialisation drive. This model, which is based on high savings and investments, has indeed served the region well. In the current environment of slower growth, the strategies adopted by several of the East Asian economies have been to implement a series of pro-growth policies to contain the impact of the global slowdown on the domestic economy. The strong initial conditions in an environment of an improving outlook in the major economies, lends support for increased optimism for stronger growth in the near term.

The Joint Assessments also play a crucial role in identifying the medium-term economic policy priorities and the Accession Partnerships do likewise with regard to the establishment of priorities for EU technical assistance. Following the tremendous efforts of the last few years, we have now arrived at a stage in which there are no less than 12 applications for EU membership currently under consideration, ten of these from transition countries. Moreover six of the 12 have already begun accession negotiations. When addressing the issue of enlargement, we may ask ourselves what exactly should be required of a member state of the European Union and on what criteria should the eligibility of a candidate country be assessed? Of course, these are not usually questions asked of central bankers and it is certainly not my intention to provide answers to them. As I mentioned earlier, central bankers are not politicians. But, fortunately, there is no need for me to provide answers, since these issues have already been addressed within the context of the current enlargement process. I am referring here to the so-called “Copenhagen criteria”. As I am sure you are aware, these criteria were formulated at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 with a view to defining a level playing field and ensuring the equal treatment of applicant states.
(2003), “Monetary Policy and Real Stabilization”, NBER Working Papers 9486, National Bureau of Economic Research. 2  BIS Review 29/2006  time period. But then the usual theoretical models for inflation targeting do not take into account the credibility aspects. If the economic agents are very uncertain as to how the central bank intends to manage target deviations, this may in the long run reduce confidence in the inflation target. It is therefore important to also include these aspects in practical considerations. One means of ensuring confidence in the inflation target is for the central bank to specify in advance what length of deviations from target can normally be accepted. This is how the two-year horizon should be regarded; it sets this type of limit and states how much consideration we can normally give to developments in the real economy. Flexibility in monetary policy should certainly not be allowed to reduce confidence in the inflation target in the long term, and this is why the Riksbank has chosen, in normal circumstances, to bring inflation back on target within a two-year horizon. At the same time, it is not feasible to set restrictions on monetary policy that will always be one hundred per cent binding, regardless of the economic situation. There may – exceptionally – be situations where the consequences of bringing inflation back on target within two years may lead to unacceptable fluctuations in economic activity. When the Riksbank judges that such a situation has arisen, it should make this quite clear.

Only in this manner electronic payment advantages and all other facilities will be equal to you and to all the public in general throughout the territory of the Republic of Albania. I believe, in the spirit of this reasoning, we shall establish real opportunities for a harmonised geographical progress, providing a concrete contribution to the growth of country’s welfare. 2  BIS Review 6/2005