samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
State of the banking sector The macroeconomic environment dynamics, which is strongly influenced by internal political and geopolitical factors, presents new challenges to the banking sector as well. The sector is meeting these challenges in a strong position, both institutionally and as specific indicators. The institutional framework is determined to a great extent by the country's membership in the European Banking Union, one of the key euro area institutions, and also by the related close cooperation established between the BNB and the ECB. For example, our banking supervision is an inseparable part of the Single Supervisory Mechanism of the European Banking Union – from participation in the joint supervisory teams, through the horizontal networking, to the full-fledged participation in the decision-making process of the ECB Supervisory Board. In this sense, the Single Supervisory Mechanism is a high quality stamp with regard to the standards of the supervisory activities performed by the BNB, and with regard to the quality of the regulatory, prudential and analytical framework of the supervisory process. The consolidation of the institutional framework in addition to the reforms over the recent years explains the good state of the banking sector. I will illustrate this with some numbers: The liquidity coverage ratio at the end of October was 253.5%, and the liquidity buffer was BGN 38.4 billion with a continuing trend of growth of attracted funds; Capital adequacy according to the latest data is 20.47%, with the capital surplus above the general supervisory requirement for capital and macroprudential buffers standing at approximately BGN 2.9 billion.

Data gathering is the first step of understanding the nature of organizational culture. These three concepts—“connect,” “convene,” and “catalyze”—will continue to be our guiding principles on the issue of culture as we build on our current work and explore new initiatives. Like addressing cyber risks and climate change, the journey toward reforming culture in the banking and financial services industry is a long one. And there’s no single action that a regulator or a bank can take to make it happen. Getting it right is going to require the will and expertise of regulators, financial services firms, academics, and practitioners. And while changing organizational culture is a long-term, complex, and challenging task, I’m optimistic that we can and we will make progress. And the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is committed to being a partner on that journey. Thank you. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
On both counts, the financial industry can, and in fact ought to be, powerful agents of change. With a little ingenuity, digital finance can unlock new growth opportunities that were previously deemed to be not commercially viable. Indeed, disruptive innovations – whether in banking or beyond – often begin at the fringes of the market, such as the underserved and unserved segments. The much-lauded success of M-Pesa in Kenya is a shining example of this, where the humble mobile phone was transformed into a bank account for millions of people who were otherwise excluded by the financial system. We have our own success story in Malaysia with agent banks that were made possible with technology. Through the vastly expanded network of access points at a fraction of the cost involved to set up a branch, over 30,000 individuals who did not have bank accounts before now have access to banking services through agent banks. This is just the tip of the iceberg, with considerable potential that remains untapped – to achieve full financial inclusion with access to bank accounts for all Malaysians; to make it easier, through psychometric and big data analysis, for businesses that have no track record or collateral to qualify for financing as Malaysia embraces an innovation-led growth model; and to practice and influence sustainable business practices that protect our future. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  With digital finance, these are commercially viable possibilities.

With that in mind, today I would like to touch on four areas of particular relevance as we navigate this digital world: First, the role of digital leadership; Second, ensuring the quality of growth in the financial sector; Third, future-proofing the workforce; and Fourth, preparing our society for digital finance  Digital leadership in the face of changing market dynamics Let me turn first to digital leadership. Strong digital leadership starts with an acceptance of a new normal. Historically, finance has been a close-knit community. But the barriers to entry are being lifted by technology. As I alluded to earlier, this has blurred the boundaries of what it means to be a bank, or a financial services provider. As a result, banks are no longer just competing with other banks. Non-traditional players – such as fintech firms and platform-based companies – are increasingly well-positioned to offer financial services. Digital disruptors want to not only gain market share, but to transform the market itself. This is reflected in the willingness to take loss-leading positions when entering a market. The changing market dynamics raise some important strategic questions for banks – including how banks will choose to fundamentally approach competition, what this means for existing business models, and what outcomes this will entail both in the short and longer term. One strategy has been to leverage opportunities for collaboration – whether among existing players or new entrants. We see this emerging as an increasingly important, if not inevitable, response globally on several fronts.
Ardian Fullani: Agreement between the Bank of Albania and the Competition Authority Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, Tirana, 17 July 2007. *  *  *  Dear participants, I am pleased to have concluded this co-operation agreement between the Bank of Albania and the Competition Authority. In observance of the legal responsibilities of the institutions we represent, this agreement concludes the formal basis for cooperative efforts, in terms of achieving the objective of enhancing the competition conditions, in which the banking and financial activity is being conducted. Fair competition promotes the efficiency in the banking business and refines the composition and the functioning of the banking market, by providing significant services to clients and the public at large, being users of banking and financial services. It has been for some years now that the Albanian economy and the financial system are in an intensive process of integration into the regional economies and markets. This process requires the improvement of the legal and regulative framework for developing the business and the enhancement of the human and institutional capacities to cope with the challenges deriving from the economic openness and the enhancement of competition.

Paris Europlace International Financial Forum – Paris, Wednesday 12th July 2017 Roundtable 3: capitalizing on the new G20 regulatory steps  Introductory remarks by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be with you today to introduce this roundtable, which could not be more topical, just a few days after the leaders of the G20 met in Hamburg. From London in 2009 to Hamburg last week, there is only 450 miles as the crow flies; but there has been considerable progress in terms of financial regulation. Thanks to international cooperation between the 20 major economies, the resilience of the global financial system has significantly improved in eight years, without impeding the financing of the economy or global economic growth. We can all be proud of these achievements, but there is no room for complacency today. Let me elaborate on what I see as the three priorities for further work, and the two requirements to consolidate what we have achieved so far. ** 1. Three priority areas where further work is needed. First, we have to finalise the Basel III framework, “without further significantly increasing overall capital requirements across the banking sector, while promoting a level playing field”.
Stefan Ingves: Cross-border banking regulation – a way forward: the European case Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Conference on International Financial Instability: Cross-Border Banking and National Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, 16 October 2006. *  *  *  Introduction It is an honor for me to address this distinguished audience on a very timely topic. I have spent many years dealing with distressed banks in my own and by now a large number of other countries. One conclusion I have drawn from this rather odd line of work is that efficient banking regulation is needed both to reduce the risk that banks run into problems and to minimize the externalities that arise if banks actually fail. At the national level, many countries – including my own – still need to implement regulations to ensure that these risks are fully mitigated. Let me also take this opportunity to congratulate the organizers on their choice of subject for this conference. The importance of the international dimension of the regulatory set-up is growing steadily. It is only now that many banks are becoming truly cross-border, with substantial retail activities in several countries. At the same time banking regulation, in terms of supervision, oversight, deposit guarantee schemes and responsibility for financial stability, remains predominantly national. This imposes additional challenges for financial regulators. These challenges are particularly acute in Europe given the rapid growth of cross-border banks on that continent. However, the issues raised are of global concern.

Furthermore, the work conducted by the EOFS does not replace the oversight by the national central banks. They still need to oversee the banks as a part of their mandate on financial stability. 4  BIS Review 96/2006  The creation of an EOFS could, if the organization is successful, be seen as the embryo to a fullfledged European supervisor – a future European FSA. It is much too early to tell whether such a development is feasible. First the EOFS would have to prove that it can produce added-value in terms of information gathering and assessments with real supervisory resources beyond that of a talk shop. To be honest, my approach is not without problems either. It would make the regulatory structure somewhat more complex and it would increase the regulatory burden on the cross-border banks by adding a new agency for reporting. However, in my view, we need to achieve a greater coordination of the information gathering and assessments. Sometimes you need to settle for the second-best solution when the first-best is not possible. Given the problems that I have sketched, a natural question is why my proposed solution has a purely European focus. The growth of cross-border banking is not unique to Europe, even if the development of truly cross-border banks is accelerating fast in Europe – perhaps faster than in other regions. The reason for my European focus is that there is, within the EU, a common regulatory framework, which includes the establishment of joint organizations.
Please do explore potential strategic alliance opportunities in Islamic finance, especially in takaful and retakaful with your Malaysian counterparts. Thank you. 6  BIS Review 129/2007

Lesson 7: Banks’ profits were the problem – but are now the solution The shock to global banks’ profitability from the crisis has been sharp and severe (Charts 11). Judging by the response of banks’ equity prices, it may also be prolonged. Despite the recent recovery, the market capitalisation of global banks has fallen by $ trillion since the crisis began. In part, this is a reflection of banks’ business models having been reassessed. But it also reflects fears of future intervention to curtail banks’ risk-taking and profit-seeking. As unfashionable as it may sound, it is important that banks’ profitability picks up, sharply and durably, in the period ahead. From a systemic perspective, this is in the interests of both the financial system and the real economy. In the short term, lending by banks is a necessary condition for recovery in the real economy. And a recovery in lending is best achieved if banks believe new loans will be profitable. Some of the pre-conditions for profitable lending are already in place. For example, margins on new lending have widened fairly sharply, as new lending terms have been re-priced (Chart 12). In other industries, this would serve as the price signal inducing existing banks to begin lending and for new banks to enter the lending market seeking market share. Over the medium-term, global banks have a hefty repayment schedule to governments and central banks. Encouragingly, the flow of repayment has already commenced for some banks.
7 In line with, and in full support of these efforts, the Swiss authorities are convinced that a more robust capital framework needs to be built around the following features: First, the amount and quality of capital need to be increased very substantially. In the medium term, this will be feasible without giving rise to drastic adjustments at banks that might be harmful to the overall economy. The key to this will be a sufficiently long time horizon and, crucially, more discipline in retaining earnings. The outlook for future earnings is by definition uncertain. Nonetheless, if we review the banks that have received public support, it is striking that many of them paid out more in dividends and share buybacks during the years preceding the crisis than they subsequently faced in losses. Second, as a supplement to the risk-based capital requirements, a simple, commonly and coherently defined leverage ratio restriction needs to be introduced, of the sort already applied in a number of major financial centres. A leverage ratio prevents the build-up of excessive leverage and serves as a backstop to the complex, but fallible risk-based capital requirements. Fundamentally, anybody who claims that the leverage ratio is a useless or even a counterproductive complementary regulatory instrument is arguing that gross exposure doesn’t matter. If there is one lesson we should learn from the crisis, it surely is that gross exposure manifestly matters a great deal. Third, to address procyclicality, banks will have to build up capital buffers above the minimum requirements in good times.

One of the explanations for these insufficient holdings of liquidity was that the stress scenarios considered by banks were far too optimistic. While secured funding remained the most stable source of refinancing, it was much less stable than banks and regulators had assumed. 11 Liquidity problems at individual banks have imposed considerable stress on the entire international system. To prevent a destabilization, central banks had to provide massive liquidity support. In some countries, this support has been provided against collateral of poor quality and even on an unsecured basis. As in the area of capital, the Basel Committee is moving rapidly towards an international liquidity standard for banks. This standard should incorporate the following basic features to be effective: The standard should reflect an adverse scenario, including a significant loss of confidence from depositors and a severe disruption of secured funding. Moreover, the standard should require banks to hold a buffer consisting of assets whose liquidity and value is robust to massive disruptions in the financial markets. Overall, the standard should materially improve banks’ liquidity positions and make their funding more robust. In Switzerland, liquidity requirements for the big banks are in the process of being comprehensively revised. In line with the features I have just outlined, the new regime will ensure that the big banks are able to cover their potential liquidity needs in the event of a widespread loss of market confidence. The new regulation will enter into force in spring 2010.
They play a critical role in making financial markets more efficient by reducing information frictions, lowering transactions costs and mitigating the moral hazard. At the same time, as recent enforcement actions and criminal investigations have made all too clear, some of these reference rates have been systematically manipulated by individuals at key financial institutions. The assumption that the design in how these rates are constructed would be resistant to attempts at manipulation has turned out to be wrong, and the belief in the integrity of these rates has turned out to be misplaced. What this means should be obvious to all of us. Reform is required if we are to restore confidence in the financial system. In my remarks today, I will discuss the outlines of such a reform including those important steps that are already underway, and those steps that still must be taken. As always, my remarks reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System. The most recognized and prevalent of the reference interest rates is the London Interbank Offered Rate, typically referred to as LIBOR, which measures the cost of unsecured, interbank borrowing across different currencies and tenors. The development of LIBOR goes back to the rapid expansion of the Eurodollar market in London beginning in the 1970s. This was a market that developed, in part, as a means of circumventing the Regulation Q deposit interest rate ceilings in the United States.

The financial support through the banks’ credit market during the crisis years has been moderate, but permanent, therefore supporting the economic recovery of the economy. Anyway, in May 2013, the annual credit growth was 3.7%, pointing to a gradually slowing pace during 2012 and first half of 2013. Possible reasons for such trends in the credit market are: effects of financial deleverage process of foreign parent banks, banks’ deteriorating risk perceptions against the backdrop of still anemic economic activity and uncertainty regarding the global environment, and the present (though moderate) increase of credit risk in the system, as well as the potential. The NPL ratio reached 11.4% in the first quarter of 2013 being one the main challenges for the banking system that is closely monitored by the NBRM. Still, it is among the lowest in the group of the EU candidate countries. Regarding the future prospects for credit flows it can be noted that stable funding sources (loan-deposit coverage ratio of around 90%), strong liquidity position, and capital adequacy ratio continuously being twice as high than the minimum required, point to room for further increase of lending in the domestic economy. The improvement of the banking sector regulation in view of further implementation of the Basle and EU standards will remain being a high priority on the agenda in this field.
Gent Sejko: The need to reinforce understanding of economic developments and their relation to policy Welcome remarks by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 12th SEE Economic Research Workshop, Tirana, 6 December 2018. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen! It is a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you today to our 12th research workshop. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our guests from academia and central banks who for 12 years have made this workshop one of the best and well-recognized economic and financial research events in Albania and in the region. Let me also thank all of our distinguished chairs, speakers and discussants for their engagement here today. The papers that will be presented and discussed during these 2 days will cover a wide range of economic and financial issues that concern central banks. The topics on monetary policy, financial stability, risk and novel methodologies are all very relevant to the daily activity of central banks and as such are very important to us. The Bank of Albania is involved in decision- making on all these issues and we provide our active support to it through our research. Along with the papers that are going to be presented today in the panels, we have also decided to include and present in the poster presentations, tomorrow, some of our ongoing projects.

The crisis, for example, had a different impact on the Albanian economy, from what we had historically experienced. At the time, the Albanian economy did not seem to be vulnerable to the foreign sector. Subsequent analysis, however, showed that domestic imbalances had built and, indeed, made the economy vulnerable to a foreign credibility shock. It is crucial that research in central banks focus on available information and methodologies, which scrutinize existing paradigms, making this information useful to policymaking, before it becomes or leads to vulnerabilities. In light of the financial and human capital constraints faced by central banks in small, open economies, such as Albania, we believe that it is important for these topics to be discussed, in this workshop, with fellow researchers from academia and other central banks. I would like to encourage our researchers to publish their papers in relevant, peer-reviewed 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  journals as the most important certification of their work. This will make your research projects more useful and facilitate speedy implementation in mainstream policy making. Despite recent success in publications, one of the things that I hear the most is that there is not much research interest in the scientific study of small, developing or emerging market economies like Albania. From my prospective, I think that there is interest in the scientific study of small, developing or emerging market economies such as Albania, because of the particular and distinguishing characteristics of our economy, which can be different from those represented in mainstream research findings.