samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I am sure you are all aware, these provisions will allow banking groups to make one application for approval in relation to the group as a whole, and will require the relevant supervisors to co-operate in trying to reach a common agreement on the application. Should it prove not possible to reach agreement within six months, the consolidated supervisor will have the power and responsibility to take the decision. This is a significant development in the regulatory framework, giving the consolidated supervisor the possibility to take decisions with an impact that reaches outside the national jurisdiction. I am aware that the European Banking Federation believes that full consolidated supervision should be determined now as the ultimate objective for the EU regulatory and supervisory framework, but I believe that we have to approach this carefully, and see how the new provisions work in practice in this more restricted area. I also think that it is important to recognise and respect the legitimate concerns of host supervisors. As I have already mentioned, the banking systems of some of the new EU member states are predominantly made up of incoming institutions. We should ensure that host supervisors are able to access sufficient information on the institutions operating locally and, where necessary, in relation to  BIS Review 84/2005  3  the wider group. The capital requirements directive also includes provisions in this respect and notes the need to take account of the significance of the institution in local markets.

4  BIS Review 84/2005  I believe that we need to combine these four vertical and horizontal aspects – together with enhanced supervisory transparency at all levels – in order to have the most effective and efficient system. Conclusion In concluding my intervention today, I would be the first to admit that the ideas I have mentioned today are not revolutionary, but I believe that an evolutionary and balanced approach is the best way forward and provides the greatest chances of success. The flip-side of the coin in this evolutionary approach is that the responsibility to deliver is greater. But if we do not succeed in meeting our objectives, we should not be afraid to explore other, more radical solutions. The costs of non integration is too high. I would also like to re-emphasise that we have the possibility to make rapid and real progress in promoting an effective and efficient framework for European banking supervision. This should not only help us to achieve our goals within the EU, but could also promote greater convergence beyond the EU. Allow me to put my Basel hat on for a couple of final comments on related challenges of the Basel Committee. At a more global level, we face the same consistency issue in the implementation of Basel II, and as I said, in this case, Europe can lead this process, we in Europe have more instruments to do it, and the example can be very helpful for the Basel process.
These tools pertain largely to depository institutions (DIs or “banks”) and include the discount rate – that is, the rate at which banks borrow from the discount window, the Fed’s lending facility administered through the twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks – and policies around reserves held by depository institutions at the Fed (including reserve requirements, and more recently, the payment of interest on reserve balances and term deposits). 1 However, it’s important to note that each of these tools is merely a means to an end, used to influence financial conditions in order to achieve the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate. Since 1936, the New York Fed has been selected each year by the FOMC as the Bank within the System responsible for the execution of OMOs. Within the New York Fed, the Desk, under the guidance of a manager of the SOMA selected by the FOMC – currently me – is responsible for conducting open market operations under the authorization and direction of the FOMC. 2 In practice, the FOMC’s operating objective for OMOs – for example, a target rate for overnight interest rates or a specified amount of assets to purchase – is communicated to the Desk through a policy “directive” that the Committee votes on at the conclusion of each meeting. This directive specifically instructs the Desk to conduct transactions for the SOMA in furtherance of the desired operating objective.

For the SNB, the focus is on measures that reinforce the long-term resilience of our financial system with a view to future financial market crises. BIS Review 101/2008  1
Most recently, they have been falling once again. The same is true in the euro-area and, to lesser extent, in the US. So far, inflation expectations in the UK have held up and, on a central view, the Bank expects inflation to be on target at a 2–3 year horizon. But this tiger needs careful handling. Even in the UK, some measures of household inflation expectations have fallen slightly over the course of this year. The tiger has stirred. Wearing my MPC hat, and with UK inflation already below target, this is something I am watching like a dove. For financial stability, quashing myopia-induced crisis biases is at an earlier stage. The long history of past financial crises attests to that. Tellingly, history often ascribes political structures and incentives a key role in determining which countries are most susceptible to crisis. 54 It tells us why financial regulation has repeatedly failed the marshmallow test. Nonetheless, there are institutional grounds for optimism. In the UK, the FPC and PRA have been created as independent regulatory policy bodies housed under the Bank of England. They are a direct response to past crisis myopia. They mimic the changes made to monetary policy 16 years ago and, at root, were done for the same reasons. For the FPC and PRA, still in their infancy, it is far too early to tell whether they will be able to quell future crises more effectively than regimes in the past. Nonetheless, there are encouraging straws in the wind.

o  But monetary stimulus and steady pipeline of infrastructure projects will support growth in H2. o  Latest indicators, including services and manufacturing PMIs, suggest economy is stabilising  In ASEAN, o o  pick-up in infrastructure spending should support domestic demand strengthening US economy should provide gradual uplift to exports  4. Second, domestic non-tradable sectors should remain resilient. •  Construction industry will be supported by further capacity expansion in transport infrastructure. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  Demand for services such as education and healthcare expected to stay firm. 5. Third, financial services should continue to pull up overall growth. •  Underpinned by bank intermediation, fund management and risk management activities, reflecting demand from both domestic and regional markets. So, growth was weak in H1 but is not expected to weaken further. 6. On YoY basis, GDP growth came in at 2.3% in H1 2015. 7. MAS and MTI are reviewing growth forecast for 2015, taking into account weaker outturn in H1 as well as support factors in H2. But risks on global macro front have increased. 8. MAS closely monitoring three key risks in external environment. •  First, Greece. Situation remains highly fluid and uncertain. •  •  o  Failure by Greek government to implement measures agreed with international creditors could spark renewed market jitters. o  Could dampen confidence and recovery in wider Euro area, with spillover effects on rest of world. Second, China. Downside risks have increased.
the ratio of persons over the age of 67 to persons aged 20 to 66, will rise sharply in the years ahead. The National Insurance Scheme’s spending on old age and disability pensions, based on current social security rules, is increasing. The return on the Petroleum Fund can only cover a small portion of higher pension expenditure. According to Ministry of Finance calculations, a funding requirement equivalent to 6 per cent of GDP will still not be covered in 2060 given an oil price of NOK 230 (at constant prices) or around USD 35 per barrel. This is a relatively high estimate in terms of average prices in the last ten years, but at the same time oil futures are now far higher than this. Increased saving today may be a way to address this challenge, but this is not enough in itself. In the long term, the most important factor will be how we manage our national wealth. Thank you for your attention. 7/7

This is where we should bring our Ziel, our strategic objective, into our field of vision. And even more so since MREL requirements in the European Union are, on the whole, far more stringent than the TLAC international standards and their translation into other jurisdictions’ regulations. * ** Let me conclude by saying that, in 2022, after the first seven years of existence of the single resolution mechanism, it may be time to recall what Clausewitz rightly identified as the greatest difficulty: “to adhere steadfastly in execution to the principles which we have adopted.” That does not mean showing rigidity in technical implementation, on the contrary. It means taking a risk-based approach and conducting a balanced analysis of the best way forward in order to serve these principles in a relevant way. I will end my speech with another phrase of Roman wisdom: in medio stat virtus, virtue lies in the middle. I thank you for your attention.
(2) Percentage corresponds only to FCIC1 and FCIC2 The LCL is limited to the reserve requirement of each banking company. These measures were complemented by a bank bond purchase program. Sources Central Bank of Chile based on the International Monetary Fund, central banks and budget offices. Peru  Table 2  Domestic scenario  (annual change, percent)  2019  2020 (f)  2021 (f)  MP Report Jun.20 GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Gross fixed nominal capital formation (% of GDP)  1.1 1.0 1.5 4.2 0.8 -2.3 -2.3 -3.9 18.9 22.4  MP Report Sep.20  -7.5/-5.5 -10.4 -6.8 -15.9 -4.2 -0.3 -14.1 0.8 17.5 20.0  -5.5/-4.5 -7.1 -5.6 -10.6 -4.2 -2.2 -9.4 -1.4 18.5 21.0  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Without it, we cannot imagine to successfully cope with the challenges ahead of us, especially now, when the European integration is becoming more realistic, which means intensive preparations for the future monetary integration. All of this requires an unconditional consistency in the price stability and the exchange rate of the domestic currency, a supervisory setup that is close to the European one, as well as institutional capacity for a quality dialogue with the European monetary authority. In the end, on behalf of the central bank team and on my behalf, I would like to thank and pay a tribute to the previous governors and managements and to all those who have been part of the central bank in the years behind, the ones that selflessly dedicated themselves and managed to build an institution that is independent, transparent, highly professional and respected in the international community. I would also like to thank the professionals who are a part of our team today – they are the foundation of the values that we constantly build, following the only path to our European future. Even today, 28 years after the monetary independence, we stand firm ahead of new challenges and I assure you that we will succeed by guaranteeing the stability of the denar and price stability, which are the best contributions that a central bank can make for the prosperity of our society. Congratulations on the 28th anniversary of the monetary independence! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is another manifestation of interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies: the more successful the central bank is in terms of securing sustainable price stability, the larger is the room for manoeuvre used by the Government to build up budget deficit and government debt to pursue a countercyclical policy. Actually, there is no choice whether the government debt is good or bad. Any medicine can be fatal, or at least toxic, if overdosed. The same is true of the government debt: it can easily turn out from a basis for the financial system development to its grave digger. This is one of the reasons which cannot help being taken into account in shaping fiscal policy. While assessing the size of potential development of the Russian debt market, one cannot help taking into account several material risk factors. The first one is various off-balancesheet budget liabilities, explicit and implicit ones. The case of Vnesheconombank shows that they may be rather significant. Therefore, balancing federal budget alone without accounting for debt accumulation by the regions is insufficient. Such factor as population aging and the need to finance the growing costs of pension provision in the next five to ten years cannot be ruled out either. The second factor is high uncertainty in the global commodity markets, first of all, the oil market. This is another argument in favour of using conservative scenarios. Finally, there is uncertainty with regard to the duration of the period of low oil prices.

But the total amount of the macroeconomically stable debt burden is, unfortunately, an absolute value not depending on the period, during which the debt is being accumulated. The lack of clear fiscal strategy in the future can destabilise the markets already now. Whether the government debt is good or bad, as I have already mentioned, is a sham question to a certain extent. Another sham question is a choice between the financial stability and economic growth. Both the central bank and the Ministry of Finance are being quite often criticised for focusing monetary and fiscal policies respectively on the problem of financial stability to the detriment of economic growth. In actual fact, economic growth is impossible without financial stability. While a stable budget is the basis of financial stability. It is possible to stake money, including government one, at the microlevel, at the level of small specific projects. To take risks at the macrolevel means to endanger economic growth and social stability. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  An important question is how to finance the deficit: through reserves or through debt? Strictly speaking, both options lead to growth in net debt (net of reserves) and consequently to debt burden accumulation. That is why this choice is also a sham one to a large extent. Nevertheless, since the commodity market risks are high, we believe that today the priority should be given to debt financing and keeping reserves for more complicated scenarios, when the access to debt financing is even more difficult.
Integrity, loyalty, reliability and a willingness to serve must go hand in hand with specialist knowledge as well as urbanity and a gift for languages. Our social environment and our educational system basically provide a good starting point. Nevertheless, gaps in specialised training and international experience are still cause for complaint. On a material level, the primary factors are political and economic stability. Both are guaranteed to a high degree. It cannot be overlooked, however, that other countries have made considerable progress in this respect. In the context of the legal order, banking secrecy is currently at the centre of attention. Applying it is, and remains, a tightrope walk. What is basically undisputed is an adequate protection of the private sphere. This should not, however, lead to such protection being exploited for dubious business deals. In an international context, valid law takes account of this problem in the form of regulations on mutual judicial assistance in criminal matters, which include insider transactions and money laundering. One way or another, it cannot be overlooked that legal regulations must be supported by an appropriate business mentality. Problems in the grey area between business as usual and unlawfulness can also affect the integrity of a financial centre. The relevant environment is, of course, also influenced by fiscal regulations. Here, too, one might refer to a tightrope walk. The implications of subjecting financial transactions to fiscal charges and of spreading the tax burden evenly must be weighed against each other.

Experience has taught us, however, that bold visions hardly ever have a chance of being realised. It seems to make more sense to implement what has been recognised as appropriate in small, purposeful steps. Reform of the monetary constitution A monetary constitution comprises all regulations concerning the currency on a constitutional and statutory level. Our present monetary constitution still dates largely from the time of the establishment of the Swiss National Bank almost a hundred years ago. We are currently in the process of adapting it to modern requirements. These endeavours bear a direct relation to the reform of our fundamental law, the Federal Constitution, which was recently brought to an end. A central issue of these reform efforts, to which I shall restrict myself in the following remarks, concerns the severance of the Swiss franc’s link to gold. In actual practice, this link has been outdated for decades. It is, moreover, in direct contradiction to our commitments as a member of the International Monetary Fund. With the severance of the gold link, we will be free to act according to our own discretion with respect to the evaluation and utilisation of our gold holdings. The question therefore arises how to use this freedom of action. In attempting to answer this question, one must bear in mind that monetary reserves are of course indispensable for a central bank in fulfilling its tasks. This is particularly true in the case of a small, open economy with a significant financial sector.
On one hand, there is the so-called “convergence” in economic growth. I mean, countries with a higher per-capita income grow less on average than poorer countries, because the richer ones have more capital and are closer to the technological frontier, so they find it harder to sustain high growth rates. Therefore, it is only natural for a country that has achieved the level of development Chile has to grow at a slower pace than it did three decades ago. On the other hand are some more specific elements, like the end of the boom in commodity prices and mining investment. Also that the world is no longer what it was during that boom, and us being a small, open economy are touched by that. All of it affects and is consistent with our vision of lowering our trend growth to 3.5 percent. But, why are we having such trouble in achieving that level of growth? There are two – related – essential elements behind, where we are in debt: investment and productivity. If we cannot ensure stronger growth in investment, our projections of economic recovery will hardly be met and the labor market will deteriorate further. Obviously capital is a major production factor which by itself has significant effects. But not only that, investment is critical for us to be able to achieve productivity growth rates of close to 1 percent in our non-mining sectors, an essential element in our trend growth forecast.

Consistently with the volatility we have been seeing and the risks inherent to the international economy, our baseline scenario assumes that in the coming quarters international financial conditions will be, on average, less favorable than they were in the past two months. Our growth outlook for the world economy and our trading partners changes little from March: 3.2 and 3.0 percent, respectively, for the 2016–2017 average. Still, there is a significant revision to expected US growth: 1.9 percent in 2016 (2.3 percent in March). This estimate inputs the low output figure of the first quarter, which has to do both with the drop in energy investment and the weak external sector. In any case, aside from one-time data, services and labor indicators show a recovering trend and the baseline scenario foresees the economy resuming higher growth in 2017. It also estimates that the Chinese economy will be able to carry on with its adjustment process without seriously compromising its growth rates. But this process will not be free of difficulties. The terms of trade will drop again in 2016, although not as sharply as we assumed in the last Report, owing mainly to the evolution of non-copper export prices. Considering its trajectory of the past few months, the baseline scenario assumes that the copper price will average $ and $ per pound in 2016 and 2017, respectively. For oil, our forecast for the same two years is raised to $ and $ per barrel the Brent-WTI average (table 2).
Now, a few years ago the way we’d have investigated this would have been to get an analyst from our Policy Directorate to enter the mighty forest of UK financial regulation and hunt down any and all thresholds for our examination. However, last year – quietly and without great fanfare – our team started to turn this forest into a dataset better suited for textual analysis. I like to call this a machine-readable Rulebook but this upsets the experts in the PRA, so instead you should think of it as us having chopped up all of the rules into bite-sized elements and put each of those into a cell in a giant database. Our team is now publishing the code used for this effort, and a Staff Working Paper with early research findings from the data. One great benefit of this is that rather than tasking an unfortunate analyst with the Herculean endeavour of mapping all the thresholds, we are able to use a PRA robot to do the job instead.3 The PRA competition robot has returned from its daunting mission with interesting findings. First, there are 53 thresholds for deposit-takers, spread across all the main policy areas but with a concentration in capital (17), reporting (11) and remuneration (8).4 Second, 13 unique metrics are used to set thresholds. The most common, unsurprisingly, is simply assets – 26 of the 53. But even within these asset-based ones 16 different values are used to set the actual threshold.

Third, 20 of the thresholds result from EU regulations and/or Basel definitions. The other 33 are things we have done ourselves here in the UK. Fourth, if we crudely translate non-asset thresholds into an asset equivalent in order to be able to map all thresholds on one scale, then most are concentrated in the area below a size corresponding to £ in assets or deposits. 3 This bears out the prediction made last year by former PRA Executive Director James Proudman that the PRA would soon develop a form of ‘cyborg supervision’ involving humans and machines working closely together. 4 To identify thresholds, the robot ran a series of textual searches on the dataset. The search combined quantitative values £ € expressions related to thresholds (eg. less/more than, greater/smaller than, up to); and typical metrics used for thresholds (eg. assets, balance sheet, deposits, accounts). It also included thresholds, such those on executive pay and exposures, that are only indirectly linked with size. The results were then cross-checked and cleaned by subject matter specialists. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  One could make various observations about these findings. But one obvious question to ask is whether or not this is too complicated a picture. While it is a good thing for small firms that we exempt them from various bits of regulation, is there a case for making the gradient a bit easier to discern and climb as they grow? Should we rationalise and harmonise any of these thresholds?