samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Strong enforcement action is necessary so that offenders pay for the consequences of their illegal activities. The authorities recognise the need for firm actions to investigate and punish wrongdoers to deter illegal behaviour. As part of our stepped-up surveillance, MAS officers had visited some so-called investment seminars. Where we have found breaches of securities law, enforcement actions have been taken. We have also referred cases involving potential Penal Code offences to the CAD. In recent months, following investigations by CAD, an individual behind a company RBI Holding Pte Ltd was charged with multiple counts of forgery and cheating offences for his involvement in fraudulent investment schemes. In a separate case, an individual was charged with cheating offences for promoting schemes that promised investors a 97% return on their investment. 37 I have mentioned the MAS-CAD joint investigation. The police has also set up a centralised anti-scam centre in CAD to tackle all forms of scams so as to enable them to intervene quickly to disrupt scammers’ operations. 38 Finally, it is worth reiterating that one should not plunge into an investment just because it promises a high return. Avoid buying a product on impulse or herd instinct or name-familiarity. Construct a well-diversified investment portfolio that is aligned with your investment objective and risk tolerance. Today’s seminar will certainly cover these investing principles in more detail. Conclusion 39 Let me conclude. All stakeholders in the capital marketplace have a role in good corporate governance and effective market discipline.

Another benefit of a clear framework, which I think has received too little attention in academic circles, but which in my opinion has been important for the favourable outcome, is that it helps bolster both the internal work and the economic discussion. Other considerations than those purely related to inflation have most likely been put to a more rigorous intellectual test than would otherwise have been the case, which I think has been useful. However, the fact that inflation targeting has worked well does not mean, of course, that all problems have been solved and that there are no more issues worth discussing; if that were so, there would have been no reason to arrange this conference. By way of introduction, I intend to describe some Swedish experiences of a problem area in inflation targeting that I see as one of the more significant, perhaps even the most significant - how to deal with the trade-off between stabilising inflation and stabilising the real economy. I will focus in this regard on two of the areas central to this conference how policy is implemented and communicated. The inflation-real economy trade-off Flexible inflation targeting policy It is presumably safe to say that all inflation-targeting countries today conduct what Lars Svensson would call a flexible rather than a strict inflation targeting policy, even though the degree of flexibility  BIS Review 45/2005  1  probably varies somewhat from country to country. In other words, they are not, to use Mervyn King’s well-known expression, “inflation nutters”, i.e.
Short-term interest rates – which are currently at 5½% – actually peaked last year at 7½%. For much of my 37 years at the Bank I’d have given my eye-teeth for them to trough at 7½%. Long-term interest rates, which have recently been at around 4½%, are lower than they’ve been since the late 1950’s. That’s certainly good for the economy as a whole, though I recognise that it does not necessarily feel good to people living on interest on their savings, even though those savings keep their real value far better than during the earlier period of high inflation. The public sector’s balance sheet is in excellent shape compared with most of the rest of the world – and the Government’s borrowing requirement position is strong and sustainable. And  3  BIS Review 19/1999  the same is true of the balance sheets of the banking system, and of both the household and corporate sectors. And on top of all that, England beat the Springboks at rugby – even if our cricketers didn’t do so well down under! Yet all that one reads about – all that anyone wants to talk about apparently – is the bad news. So let me not disappoint you this evening, and now come on to the bad news. Where are we now? By around the beginning of 1997 it was becoming clear that we were once again in danger of having too much of a good thing.

This position was subsequently formalised in the new Bank of England Act which came into effect in June of last year. That Act now defines the Bank’s objective as “the maintenance of price stability, and, subject to that, to support the Government’s economic policy, including its objectives for growth and employment”. Under the Act the Chancellor tells the Bank what precisely we are to understand by “price stability” and he has done this by setting a target of 2½% for a particular measure of retail price inflation (RPIX – which is the RPI excluding mortgage interest payments); and although the Act provides for the Chancellor to set the target each year, the expectation is that it is in practice set for the medium to longer term. That is the political decision. The task of achieving that target – the technical implementation of monetary policy – is then delegated, transparently and accountably, to the MPC. The Government no longer has the power – as it had under the 1946 Bank of England Act – to issue directions to the Bank in the field of monetary policy, except, in the terms of the new Act, “in extreme economic circumstances”. So the objective of monetary policy these days, in this immediate sense, could hardly be clearer; and that objective is accepted across a broad part of the political spectrum. But it is important to understand that this objective – of permanent effective price stability – is not simply an end in itself.
As a rule, Switzerland has lower interest rates than other countries, one of the reasons for this being that investors value the security of Swiss franc investments. Following the outbreak of the financial crisis, many central banks quickly lowered their policy rates towards zero. This meant Swiss money market rates were practically at the same level as those of other countries. Amid the prevailing uncertainty at that time, the demand for Swiss francs rose sharply. To counter the extreme upward pressure, and thus ward off the threat of a severe recession coupled with deflation, we introduced the minimum exchange rate in 2011. This initially brought calm to the situation. Owing to international developments, it became apparent at the beginning of 2015 that the minimum exchange rate was no longer sustainable. To limit the appreciation of the Swiss franc after its discontinuation, we set a negative interest rate of −0.75%. The impact of negative interest proved considerable, as it helped stabilise the exchange rate situation in short order. Without it, the franc would have been significantly stronger in recent years, which would have been highly detrimental to the Swiss economy and would have jeopardised price stability. And, ladies and gentlemen, negative interest remains central to our monetary policy to this day.

Thirachai Phuvanat naranubala: Preparing for rapid growth Speech by Mr Thirachai Phuvanat naranubala, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Payment Card Business Forum, Bangkok, 28 June 2002. *  *  *  Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to be invited to address this meeting of prominent members of the financial community from the neighbouring countries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam as well as some of the familiar faces from the Thai financial institutions. The dynamism of the payment service industry in this region is fast catching the attention of international community, and the future promises yet more potential. The theme of this seminar, "Preparing for Rapid Growth" is certainly very timely. I am sure the discussion will focus on both the return and the risks involved. But timely as it is, and growth is certainly a good thing, but when growth is rapid, there always is a danger. Thus, discussion on international best practices, risk management and good corporate governance at this early phase of growth is extremely important. These good things take time to build up. Economic growth in South East Asia This year we are seeing most South East Asian economies firmly back on the path of recovery. They are poised to regain their growth potentials. Luckily, the tragic event of September 11th has not pushed them off this steady course. This improvement is reflected in the improved sovereign ratings which has allowed many countries to re-access the international financial market with new bond issues.
We are doing more work to isolate the impact of these factors as part of the ongoing cost-benefits analysis underlying these tools. Putting all of this together, I would conclude that the rationale for the FPC’s action remains sound in the light of subsequent evidence and that the action itself was effective at preventing further build up in the tail of more indebted households, and more importantly that it continues to function as an insurance policy. More work is in train to assess whether the FPC’s actions may have affected the evolution of house prices and transactions but even if we assume there was no broader impact of this kind, the work published by the Bank today suggests strongly that the policies have functioned as intended. They have restrained the buildup of more highly indebted households that would otherwise leave the economy and subsequently the financial system more vulnerable in a downturn. There are two interesting postscripts to the FPC’s 2014 actions. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  12  First, the Committee when it took its decisions left open the possibility that these tools – LTI flow limit and affordability test – might be part of the time varying macro-prudential toolkit. Subsequent consideration by the Committee in 2017, concluded that while the calibration might need to be varied over time, the limits themselves functioned as necessary insurance and should be seen as part of the regulatory system rather than as temporary measures.

(a) The 2018 H2 counterfactual for stock LTI ratios takes the 2018 H2 distribution shown in Chart 3 and removes the estimated impact of FPC policy on the flow of new lending to date. The impact of FPC policy is estimated with a combination of model outputs and analysis of trends in high LTI lending over time. Assessing what could have happened if we had not introduced these policies, or if the macro environment was different, is more difficult. But we can use the models to look at some counterfactuals, the ‘what ifs’ – modelling the stock under different macroeconomic scenarios and assumptions about lender and borrower behaviour and FPC policy.22 House prices and mortgage activity have been relatively subdued over the past 5 years – with house price and income growth slightly lower than the central forecast prior to the introduction of housing tools in 2014 and markedly fewer housing transactions than we were expecting. So the policy impact – both costs and benefits – have been relatively small to date. What would mortgage indebtedness look like if the policy hadn’t been there: if house prices, and activity, had followed the paths they actually followed but the FPC policies had not been in place? We can estimate the distribution of LTI in the stock of borrowers today if the 22  See Levina et al (2019) for more detail on methodology. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  policies had not been in place.
That is not to say the macroprudential angle was ignored, but there was certainly a view – quite prevalent in the pre-crisis world – that if banks were individually stable, the financial system would itself stay upright. During the Great Moderation, little appetite existed for new tools and international regulations of a macroprudential nature, even if the Committee could have foreseen all of the looming threats. The financial crisis brought home the lesson that financial stability could not be assured only through the use of microprudential tools. And so Basel III represents another important step in the Committee’s development. Basel III has substantially enhanced the microprudential framework. And, in the countercyclical buffer, it has also introduced the first international agreement on a macroprudential tool. Subsequent work on the framework for systemically important banks (both global and domestic) has further expanded the Committee’s input into this relatively new field – a trend that is unlikely to be reversed. My fifth key influence on the Committee’s evolution is also quite recent, and hence its eventual impact on the Committee’s work is still difficult to foresee: its role in monitoring the implementation of Committee standards. Post-crisis, the Committee has not only expanded its membership, but it has also taken on the role of monitoring the implementation of the standards agreed by its members.

Stefan Ingves: The evolution of the Basel Committee Welcome and keynote address by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at a symposium to mark 25 years of the Basel Capital Accord “25 years of international financial regulation: Challenges and opportunities”, Basel, 26 September 2013. *  *  *  Good morning everyone. On behalf of the Basel Committee, I would like to welcome you to today’s symposium, which the Committee is hosting to mark 25 years since the first Basel Accord on bank capital was established. And let me at the same time also acknowledge Jaime Caruana and the BIS, not only for hosting this event, but also for their unwavering support of the Committee over the past almost 40 years. As many of you know, the Basel Committee started out in 1974 as the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. In the aftermath of the Herstatt collapse, the G10 Governors of the day were seeking ways to preserve and promote the stability of the international financial system. It is worth reflecting during the morning, as we discuss the Committee’s achievements to date, that the basic problems we encounter today – poorly run institutions, interconnectedness and financial instability – are the same as those faced by the Committee when it was founded. This is not to imply that nothing has been achieved: on the contrary, a great deal has been done and the world has benefited greatly.
This is perhaps most relevant in times of unease on the financial markets, and the Riksbank may have reason to act both to maintain financial stability and to counteract disturbances on certain markets as well as to attain the inflation target. The Act also contains explicit wording to the effect that the Riksbank's measures shall be fit for purpose and that the intended result shall be in reasonable proportion to the costs and risks to the Riksbank and to central government finances. It has in fact always been a general principle that authorities should act proportionately. But the fact that this is now explicitly stated in the Sveriges Riksbank Act may also require us to justify our decisions more clearly. Clear motives make it easier, for instance, to examine and evaluate the Riksbank. With regard to our independence, particularly concerning monetary policy, it is important that our principal, the Riksdag, as representative of the Swedish people, follows up and evaluates the Riksbank's activities in an efficient manner. With the new act, the Finance Committee will have more resources for this. Exceptional reasons for the Riksbank to buy private securities One change in the new act concerns the conditions for the Riksbank to trade in private securities. The Riksbank can buy and sell Swedish government securities and private, i. e. non-government, securities. Our monetary policy toolbox in this respect remains the same as before. But now there is a more restrictive view of when trade in private securities can be relevant.

The Riksbank has a target for inflation, not for the krona exchange rate – but the exchange rate affects inflation The krona and the role it plays, and will play, for inflation in the future is an issue that has been in focus in the economic debate. The Riksbank discussed this in connection with our decision in February. In brief, our assessment was that the weakening of the krona towards the end of last year is contributing to raising underlying inflation to some extent now at the beginning of 2023. But given that the krona has weakened over a long period of time, it is at the same time uncertain how companies take the exchange rate into account and how great the impact will be on inflation in the period ahead. Another reason why we talked a lot about the krona in February was to dispel the myth that the Riksbank is now completely disinterested in the exchange rate. We wanted to emphasise that the Riksbank actually follows the development of the krona closely. At the same time, I pointed out that this does not mean that we have an explicit or implicit target for the exchange rate. The Riksbank has an inflation target and we adjust monetary policy to stabilise inflation around this target. But there is, as I said, a link between the development of the krona and inflation. If the exchange rate weakens substantially, this leads to higher inflation prospects, which requires adjusting monetary policy. This is true.
It seems natural to believe that greater losses would occur if there were repeated mistakes in economic projections of a one-sided nature. An example would be repeated extreme optimism or extreme pessimism in the face of reasonable evidence to the contrary. Such bouts could be due to mistakes about cyclical factors or a misunderstanding of the changing structure of the economy. At the policymaking level, a continuing pattern of not taking appropriate policy actions in the face of a changing economic outlook or structure would presumably lead to poor outcomes against medium-term goals. Now, caution in policymaking can be a virtue. But at some point, when the weight of the evidence is large, continued delays in action could erode credibility. In general, although a policymaker’s credibility account is credited and debited on a regular basis, the most substantial credibility losses come in two varieties: 1) really large and systematic deviations of outcomes from ex ante chosen policy objectives; and 2) a substantial misunderstanding of policy objectives. Monetary economists often point to the poor economic experiences of the 1970s and 1930s as times when the Federal Reserve’s credibility account was debited substantially because of both of these factors. I believe the current liquidity trap environment following the 2008 financial crisis is similarly challenging today’s policymakers. So far, I believe we have done the right thing.

Turkey has a good record for structural issues. We have liberalized the trade and capital accounts of the balance of payments for about two decades. We have a flexible labor market. High domestic savings is one of the main characteristics of the economy. Market oriented economy is another aspect of the structural component of Turkey. Right now, Turkey has four important structural reforms on its agenda, not only as a part of the disinflation effort but also because they are essential for changing the environment. Thus, these structural reforms are vital for adapting to the changing global environment. They consist of reforming the banking sector, the social security system, agricultural subsidies, and privatization. Some of these reforms have already been approved by parliament, and the others are in the pipeline. The new Banking Act which was approved by parliament in June has the following four general objectives: •  to close the legal loopholes;  •  to implement the international supervisory regulations;  •  to assign the supervision of banking organizations to an independent agency; and  •  to make some adjustments regarding the process of founding and operating banks. In particular, the twenty-five Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision drawn up by the Bank for International Settlements in 1997 have been endorsed in the amendments to the Banking Act. As a result, the amendments are consistent with modern principles of effective banking supervision.
Let me also, in this regard, implore participants to visit the various stands in the Financial Exhibition and engage the financial service providers for additional insights into the theme for this year’s Month of the Woman Entrepreneur which is: “Accelerating Women’s Economic Empowerment – Key to Job and Wealth Creation” under the sub theme: “Financial Inclusion.” Lastly, I wish to sincerely thank Lee Anne Singh, a woman entrepreneur for graciously providing the exhibition tent free of charge. I would also like to thank the Banks and other financial service providers that have responded at short notice to mount the Financial Exhibition. Take full advantage of their presence here. As I conclude, I wish you all the very best in your deliberations over the next two days, and declare, with these few words, this national conference officially open. I thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

This answers to the call that often comes from industry that we should nail down everything in Cooperation Agreements (CoAgs) or work towards some kind of global treaty. I do not think this is necessary to ensure resolution will work effectively. There is a level of detail and complexity in the resolution plans that does not lend itself to a quasi-legal document like a CoAG. But more importantly emphasis on CoAgs misses how the process has evolved. The metaphor originally conceived for resolution plans was living wills. This was powerful, comprehensible by all. It captured the notion that the failure of large banks would not be left to chance in future but instead would be worked through in advance and part of what it would be to be a responsible, regulated entity. But it also gave the impression that each plan would be idiosyncratic, unique to the firm. In fact, as time as gone on it has become clear that for G-SIBs many of the elements of the plans are similar and the identified barriers generic. Indeed discussions in CMGs for individual G-SIBs has translated into minimum requirements for resolvability at the level of the FSB. In the way that we are removing barriers, we are expressly setting out to provide a platform for cooperation to work, ensuring that home and host interests in this process are aligned. The FSB’s TLAC standard is a good example of how the dynamic of resolution planning in CMGs has provided the impetus for the policy changes.