samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A banking union is necessary for the smooth functioning of a monetary union for the following three reasons: •  It breaks the link between banks and sovereigns by bringing banking supervision and crisis management to the federal level. With the banking union, banks will be considered as euro area institutions over and above their nationality; it will ensure that credit conditions in the euro area will not depend on where you are but on who you are, which is what should be expected of an efficient financial market. •  It allows re-integration of the European banking system. A supra-national supervisor is in fact better placed to assess the risks of cross-border activities and therefore to protect and encourage such activities; it is not subject to national biases that can lead to the temptation of economic introversion. It is therefore more credible and strengthens stability and confidence in the area;  •  Moreover, it restores the full efficacy of monetary policy. If our monetary policy impulses are not transmitted uniformly to all of the area’s countries because of the bank-sovereign link, it undermines the very foundation of Europe’s monetary union; remember that three quarters of the financing of the euro area’s economy consists of bank loans. By breaking this link, a banking union would restore the federal dimension of monetary policy. Today the first pillar of the banking union is being constructed: the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

To assist supervisors in developing and applying more consistent standards, the Committee created the Accord Implementation Group, or “AIG”, precisely to share experiences and encourage shared approaches. This group, which is chaired by Nick Le Pan, the Canadian Superintendent of Financial Institutions, has already been long at work and provides a forum for supervisors to compare notes on practical matters. As a result, we expect that supervisors will apply the New Accord more consistently at home, thereby promoting a more level playing field across countries as well. Based on the AIG’s work to date, the Committee published a paper this past August on the “high level principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord”. In this paper, we reiterate our view that the traditional allocation of responsibilities to home and host supervisors will continue. Cooperation will be critical to the effective supervision of institutions under the New Accord, especially considering the challenges an internationally active bank will face in receiving the initial approval to adopt, and then validate, advanced approaches to credit and operational risk at home and in host jurisdictions. Similarly, supervisors will need to find practical ways to cooperate in the evaluations of capital adequacy under pillar 2 and ongoing reviews of compliance with the minimum operational requirements of the New Accord. At the same time, Pillar 3 - market discipline - draws on the power of markets to help ensure that banks do not hold unrealistically low amounts of capital for operational risk.
CPIF inflation has shown significantly more stable development than CPI, which includes the effects on mortgage interest expenditure of the drastic interest rate cuts implemented during the crisis, as well as the recent interest rate increases. Inflationary pressures are starting to increase in tandem with the economic recovery. This means that the repo rate has also been increased from the very low level of 0.25 per cent that prevailed one year ago to 1.5 per cent today. This allows us to safeguard the balance of Sweden’s economy and simultaneously attain the inflation target of 2 per cent. Where are we going? Having come this far, it may be appropriate to stop and spend a moment reflecting over the financial crisis and long-term economic development. As I mentioned in my introduction, the period from the mid-1990s until the financial crisis was characterised by good growth, low inflation and decreasing variation in output and prices. In addition, the financial crisis was preceded by a period of about 60 years of unbroken growth in the world economy. So we could ask ourselves: are crises of the type we have just experienced “improbable events” that take place perhaps once in fifty years and something we just have to accept? My answer is both yes and no. We have learned that financial crises are extremely costly. Governments and central banks are now busy discussing different measures both to reduce the likelihood of crises arising and to mitigate the consequences of any such crises.

Likewise, markets may not capture external concerns: they may focus on the immediate needs of direct participants rather than those of depositors, customers, or the public. That is why transparency is one “pillar” of Basel II’s three-pillar approach. The pillars we selected are meant to complement and to supplement each other. The first pillar - which specifies the minimum capital requirements - constitutes a very direct approach to supervision. By applying a uniform set of rules to banks, the first pillar adds transparency to the regulatory process and makes it easier to compare banks to gain a sense of their relative degrees of solvency. On the other hand, uniform rules have certain drawbacks. They tend to be inflexible and therefore might preclude or ignore innovation. Applying uniform rules may also fail to account for a bank’s unusual businesses or risk profile. The second pillar, supervisory review, addresses some of those drawbacks. It introduces judgement into the policy mix. Banks and supervisors will exercise discretion in determining capital needs relevant to their particular businesses and risk profiles. That degree of discretion makes the supervisory framework more flexible and better able to adapt to change and innovation. In a way, we might think of the second pillar as being analogous to the “principles-based” policy approach that some have advocated in accounting and financial reporting. Yet relying on a system that would permit discretion without boundaries would have its shortcomings as well.
Ardian Fullani: Key policy issues for remittances in transition economies - a view point from a recipient country Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the high level conference organised by the EBRD and sponsored by Switzerland, London, 28 September 2005. *  *  *  Remittances these days can easily classify as one of the most important sources of finance assisting the convergence of developing nations, to the point of overshadowing conventional funding like bank credit. The flow of remittances worldwide goes beyond 100 billion USD per year, with developing countries being recipients of more than 60 percent of this considerable amount. Remittances’ estimations in these countries often exceed trade inflows, or foreign financing and investment. Therefore, they have become an important device for channelling funds and resources from developed countries toward countries in need. Moreover, remittances, like foreign direct investments (FDI), are regarded as very stable and safe capital flow, helping developing countries to achieve sustainable high growth rates. In recent years, we have seen a growing awareness about emigrants’ remittances as an important financial source for development. This issue was included in the G8 meeting agenda of 2004 and in the spring meeting of IMF and World Bank earlier this year, emphasizing the growing significance of migration, and with it, of migrants’ remittances, calling for intensification of efforts to improve and identify their causes, as well as to establish an environment that could enhance the impact of remittances on development process.

Here, the government has to incite the establishment of other companies as well as apply the reduced taxes. Another way of amplifying competition in the sector is by pressing on price transparency. Remittances, as mentioned earlier, are also affected by economic and financial situation in beneficiary country. International experience brings many examples to illustrate this point. After a constant growth of remittances in Philippines, as a result of improvements in the investments environment in the early 90s, they became very shaky as the financial crisis affected the Asian countries at the end of the 90s. Likewise, Turkey after experiencing a stable growth of remittances during the 90s, saw a drastic fall as the financial crisis broke out in 1999-2000. However, an interesting observation in these cases is that, the fall of remittances and their volatility were lower than those of private capital flows. Remittances seem to react less to economic ups and downs compared to other capital flows displaying considerable stability over time (Ratha, 2003). In this context, countries with high remittance percentage relative to other capital flows could be more immune to capital drain during crises. Remittances are not simply expression of emigrants’ fondness to assist their families in adverse situations. They also represent an important financial source that augments capital inflows and investments in economy. Remittances may have a positive impact not only on the volume but also on the quality of investments.
Chart 9A: Word cloud for “recession” topic in  Chart 9B: Fraction of speaking time devoted to  FOMC transcripts  “recession” topic in FOMC meeting, by speaker Recessions Median  Minimum Maximum  Proportion of speaker's time 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05  2008  2006  2004  2002  2000  1998  1996  1994  1992  1990  1988  0  Source: Hansen, McMahon and Prat (2014). Source: Hansen, McMahon and Prat (2014). Notes: Each word cloud represents the probability distribution of  Notes: The procedure estimates the allocation of each  words within a given topic; the size of the word indicates its  speaker’s time in the FOMC transcripts to a topic which we label  probability of occurring within that topic. “recession”. The chart shows a three-month moving average of the results for the first day of each FOMC meeting. The three lines show the proportion for the median FOMC member and the range around it. Shaded areas are NBER-dated recessions.

Sources: Danker and Luecke (2005), Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), Plosser (2011), Warsh (2014), Cordemans (2015), Blinder et al (2017), Praet (2017), Bank of Japan. 36  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  36  Table 2: 2013 forward guidance survey results Effect on expectations for the next change in Bank Rate Remain low for Rise sooner longer than No than Don't know previously change previously expected expected Percentages of households Percentages of companies, survey by Markit (Bank’s agents)  Percentages of households Percentages of companies, survey by Markit (Bank’s agents)  23  43  13  22  45 (47)  34 (31)  14 (19)  7 (4)  Effect on confidence Slightly No less change confident  Much more confident  Slightly more confident  1  14  56  7 (12)  51 (62)  39 (24)  Much less confident  Don't know  12  4  13  3 (1)  0 (0)  0 (0)  Sources: Bank/GfK NOP survey and Markit. See February 2014 Inflation Report for more detail on the survey questions. 37  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  37  References  Acemoglu, D and Robinson, J (2012), Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Random House Inc. Adams, P and Hunt, S (2013), ‘Encouraging consumers to claim redress: evidence from a field trial’, Financial Conduct Authority, Occasional Paper, No.2.
Mr Gjedrem reports on economic perspectives in Norway Annual address by the Governor of the Central Bank of Norway, Mr Svein Gjedrem, at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank on 18/02/99. Background Twenty-two years ago, in 1977, the Norwegian economy witnessed the onset of a deep crisis. An economic recession in industrial countries, high price and wage inflation in Norway and the expansion of public welfare services resulted in large current account deficits. Thirteen years ago, in 1986, the Norwegian economy was also in a difficult situation. A debt-financed upswing in consumption and investment, a fall in oil prices and a reduction in working hours gave rise to major imbalances in the Norwegian economy. In 1998 clouds again gathered over the economic horizon. Costs rose to a high level in Norway compared with other countries, oil prices fell, and the current account balance deteriorated sharply. This signalled a period of sluggish growth following six years of a strong upswing in economic growth and employment. The krone depreciated and interest rates were raised. There are many features that distinguish the three turning points in economic developments. However, one common denominator is the sudden shift in the assessment of future oil revenues. Fluctuations in petroleum revenues have proved to be a source of instability in the mainland economy. Following the last two turning points, the Norwegian economy went through a period of major restructuring, particularly at the end of the 1980s. Today the situation in the Norwegian economy is different.

It would not be easy to reduce the central government deficit in a situation with declining oil revenues. We might, of course, be fortunate enough to experience a rise in oil prices again, so that we do not have to deal with this problem. Perhaps the oil price is abnormally low at present. But it is important to be aware that the government, in expanding welfare programmes and public sector activities, has not taken due account of the possibility that oil prices will remain low over a longer period. 15  BIS Review 20/1999  We have already witnessed a depreciation of the krone in response to the deterioration in Norway’s terms of trade. This may reflect expectations of continued low oil prices and lower revenues in the long term. This also compromises confidence in the government’s long-term financial position. It is risky to increase expenditure and reduce taxes when there is doubt regarding the long-term balance of the economy. An expansionary fiscal policy could increase uncertainty and the fluctuations in the exchange rate, and reduce Norges Bank’s freedom of manoeuvre. On the contrary, fiscal policy should be oriented to provide room for lower interest rates that can counter a cyclical downturn in an environment of stable wage and price inflation. The authorities must be very cautious about further embedding fixed long-term priorities in the central government budget.
And that gets to both the nature of interactions between insurance and banking on the one hand and to the environment in which we all operate - the areas of accounting, regulation, payment and settlement and law, the broad infrastructure if you will - on the other. In simpler days, it hadn’t occurred to most people that the world of insurance could be relevant to the issue of overall financial stability. The worlds of insurance and banking were relatively distant from each other as were the worlds of securities and banking. Separate silos, if you will. But today insurance companies are an important factor in mitigating risks which earlier would have been contained within the banking world. I’m talking about risks like debtor default. And now, there is increasing overlap and interaction with banks and capital markets. A personal anecdote might help to make that point; and also highlight my view that the breaking down of the silos is a pretty recent phenomenon. I well remember a time in the 1970s. As an investment banker, I used to handle capital market deals in the early days of the eurobond market. I began to observe that, even though I couldn’t articulate what was going on with precision, there were areas of the insurance industry which seemed to be taking similar types of risk as banks, but charging a wholly different price. I remember talking to my friends in the insurance broking industry about it. One or two of them are here in the audience!

Very often leaders are ahead because they are supported, respected and loved by their followers or, in this case, passengers, who actually want them to take the front seats and lead. 7. On the question of what constitutes good and long lasting leadership, there exists tremendous amount of academic research and literature, which I do not propose to talk about. What I would like to say today is to draw on the teaching by one of our great ancient teachers, Confucius. More than two thousand years ago, Confucius taught his students how to become a “Gentleman” or “Jun Zi (君子)”. What strikes me most as the qualities of a successful “Jun Zi” or “Leader” are the three words used by Confucius: “Wisdom”, “Morality” and “Courage” ( 智、仁、勇). I strongly believe that Confucius’ teaching was right not only in ancient times but also in the modern world. As a master degree graduate in the specialised fields of business and finance, you clearly are knowledgeable, but you may not be wise. So you need wisdom, a quality that can only be acquired with a sense of modesty and humility, understanding fully there are more things that you don’t know than you know. Treat learning as a life long process that won’t stop even after you have graduated from the university. Success is your desired destination but you must not seek to achieve your goal with immoral means.
It also includes having in place the nominating and remuneration committee to ensure the right persons for the job are appointed and that the reward or penalty are commensurate with the accountability and performance. Indeed the prophet refers to this in the words, "whoever employs a person out of favouritism and there is someone who is better than that person, he has committed breach of trust with God, His prophet and all Muslims". The risk management committee needs to review the risks peculiar to Islamic finance and consider the means by which they should be managed. Expertise needs to be developed to address the audit for the Shariah risk. The audit committee therefore needs to examine not only the risks associated with banking operations, but also complementing the Shariah Committee in ensuring full compliance with the Shariah principles. The role of the Shariah committee may also be expanded beyond product approval, in particular to strengthen the governance of the Islamic financial institutions by ensuring for each new product, proper disclosure is made and the rights of the customers and the responsibilities of the Islamic banking institutions are clearly provided. Fourthly, the role of the regulator in strengthening the standards and best practices in inculcating good governance. The government and regulator has an important role in putting in place an enabling environment that supports the development of a strong governance structure and that provides for enforcement. In Malaysia, corporate governance reform is a priority agenda.

This framework must set out the functions of each component and level of governance in a manner to ensure accountability of each respective jurisdiction with appropriate division of powers to avoid possible conflict of interests. In this context, consideration may be given to four main ingredients important to the governance framework for Islamic financial institutions. (i)  Firstly, to ensure that the guidance, standards and core principles are able to translate the values consistent with the injunctions of Shariah. The core values of honesty and integrity are key ingredients of the governance framework of the Islamic financial transactions with heavy reliance on the trust relationship. The significance of these core values is clearly highlighted in the Qur'an, Sunnah and the "fiqh". The banking institutions, as user of public funds must act in good faith for the benefit of all stakeholders. If the relationship between the financier and entrepreneur can be built on honesty, efficiency and equity, a durable equilibrium can be established that will serve the mutual interest of both parties. (ii)  Secondly, the governance framework needs to take into account the multi-faceted role performed by the Islamic financial institutions and treat all the relevant stakeholders fairly, including minority shareholders and the investment account holders. It is an embodiment of the concept of justice in Islam as stated in Qur'an, which is nearest to righteousness (taqwa) in the Islamic faith.
According to unofficial statistics, Swiss banks are entrusted with about one third of the totality of the world’s assets managed by banks in other countries than those where their clients are domiciled (so-called offshore wealth management), which places them well ahead of their competitors. Indeed, asset management and private banking are the strongest segments of Swiss banking, not only in terms of market shares, but also measured by revenues. For many observers, the success of our banks in asset management and private banking can only be explained by the existence of Switzerland’s banking secrecy. I think they misunderstand the meaning of this feature. In any case, it would be short-sighted to believe that a financial centre could insure its long-term development on a single factor. A successful strategy requires strong fundamentals: a competent and dedicated workforce, reliable services and products, and efficient infrastructures. I have no doubt that you share this view with me. Necessary characteristics of a successful financial centre How can we explain the long-lasting development of the finance industry in Switzerland? It is not the result of some public strategy or industrial policy. Instead it is the combined outcome of a number of factors which all point in the same direction. a)  An open-minded economy  Firstly, Switzerland, as a traditionally very open economy, was well placed to benefit from trade liberalisation and financial deregulation. We are used to see our economic performance being constantly challenged and directly dependent on our ability to adjust to a changing world environment.

Davíð Oddsson: Recent economic and financial developments in Iceland Speech by Mr Davíð Oddsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a seminar organised by the Iceland Chamber of Commerce, Reykjavik, 7 November 2006. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Iceland Chamber of Commerce for giving me the opportunity to say a few words here as has become customary at this time of year, following the Central Bank of Iceland’s interest rate decision and the publication of Monetary Bulletin. That publication provides indications of the position and outlook at the end of this year and what is to be expected over the forecast horizon of the next two years. Of course the Bank’s long-term forecasts are presented with due humility and respect towards the uncertainties that time may bring. Something of a milestone was reached on November 2 when the Board of Governors of the Central Bank decided to leave the policy interest rate unchanged at least until the next interest rate decision day, which was in fact brought forward to December 21. The last decision marked an end to 17 successive hikes on interest rate decision days. At this juncture it is uncertain whether a real turning point has been reached, because the decision was presented more as a deferral of a rise in the policy rate than as an end to the hike process. In other words, the data available to the Central Bank supported raising the policy rate still further.