samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Banks succeeded in withstanding the first wave of these shocks, remaining at positive territory, in terms of both system level and individual level. Meanwhile, measures are gradually being taken to adequately manage investment portfolio, in line with the established conditions. Capitalisation of the banking system has continued to grow this year as well, to 19.26%, from 18.53%, reflecting also the enhancement in the regulatory requirements on macroprudential reserves and the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). Both elements have strengthened the resilience and security of the banking system. The purchasing and then the merger of the OTP Bank with Alpha Bank drove to the further materialised consolidation of the banking system in 2022. This development introduced another important player in the group of large banks, which share above 70% of market, and it is expected to contribute positively towards a more competitive and expanded market. The segment of payments and the supportive infrastructure have also marked rather positive developments in terms of their processing during 2022, on the back of measures undertaken in the framework of the Albania National Retail Payments Strategy. The AIPS EURO system is already a reality, while your clients, consumers and businesses are experiencing its benefits, together with you. Based on available  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  statistics, we see that the euro-denominated interbank transactions within Albania have considerably picked up.

Gent Sejko: Achievements in 2022 and setting the milestones for 2023 Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Year-end event organised by the Albanian Association of Banks, Tirana, 15 December 2022. *** Honourable AAB Chairman, Dear ladies and gentlemen, As every year, it is a pleasure for me to joint this special meeting with banking industry, sharing our achievements and efforts made throughout the past year, the most meaningful experiences, and setting the milestones for 2023. Let me first focus on the overall performance of the Albanian economy. The sharp upsurge of prices and inflation in international markets in the wake of Russia's war against Ukraine shaped the performance of the Albanian economy over the course of 2022. This supply-side shock caused another steep challenge for the Albanian economy, driving to the need for a review of public economic policies and business-plans in both private sector and banking industry. In this context, I would like to highlight that the Albanian economy was in sound positions when this shock hit, following the rapid rebound from the pandemic-related shocks in 2021. Also, the monetary and financial stability was consolidated. The sound financial balance sheets of Albania, the strengthened confidence in banking system, and the reduced risk premia reflect this stability. Also, the latter is anchored in the positive experience that we both, public institutions and you, as financial sector, have gained in tackling such shocks.
The world’s economy continues to transform into one that prioritises knowledge-based production and services. 53% or more than half of global market capitalisation is now derived from intangible assets. For example the S&P 500 companies encompass over 80% of market value. IP, a major component of intangible assets, is now truly becomes the primary contributor to business value and wealth creation. The significance of IP is also not confined to the developed economies alone. Since 2010, East Asia has overtaken North America and Western Europe in the number of international patent filings. With deeper economic integration within Asia, this shifts has an important implications on the economic growth potential for businesses in the region. In Malaysia, IP has been growing steadily. The number of patent applications in 2013 has more than doubled than that in 1993. For trademarks, it has more than tripled. Despite these clear trends, we have yet to fully leverage the value and significance of intangibles, including IP in particular, as an important asset to create growth opportunities for businesses. This is especially true for innovative small and medium scaled enterprises whose value tends to be more closely linked to intangible assets. To a large extent, this is because IP issues are still not well understood. The financial industry has not devoted enough resources to this increasingly critical sector for future growth. Frameworks within financial institutions for lending against IP are consequently not well-developed.

So far the only specific agreement is to talk to each other. Concrete steps to reduce the scale of global imbalances have, to date, been notable by their absence. Smiling family photographs marking the attendance at international gatherings are no substitute for specific actions. Still, the G20 has laid its reputation on the line. It will be damaged if the framework comes to nought. Looking further ahead, the legitimacy and leadership of the G20 would be enhanced if it were seen as representing views of other countries too. That could be achieved if the G20 were to metamorphose into a Governing Council for the IMF, and at the same time acquire a procedure for voting on decisions. The economic message from the crisis is clear: low-saving countries will reduce their net borrowing from abroad and so will no longer be able to play the role of consumer of last resort. To maintain levels of economic activity, high-saving countries must expand domestic demand and allow their trade surpluses to shrink. This is easier said than done. It will require changes in prices and most obviously in real exchange rates – via either nominal exchange rates or domestic price levels. In themselves, proposals such as the creation of a new reserve currency do not solve the inconsistency puzzle unless they alter the desire of highsaving countries to run imbalances that are too high to last.
In economic terms these new  2  BIS Review 21/2003  investments will amount to over 30 per cent of one year’s GDP and increase Iceland’s annual production capacity of aluminium from 270 to 740 thousand tons. The economy appears to have already begun adapting to the coming projects as reflected in exchange rate movements. As can be seen in chart 2. the króna was quite stable from the spring of 2002 until late in the year. It then began to appreciate and continued to do so steadily until early February 2003. It seems that the recent rice of the exchange rate is primarily due to the effect of the proposed construction projects on expectations. The current assessment indicates that economic growth could easily end up in the range 2-2½ per cent this year and well over 3 per cent next year. The outlook is for inflation to remain close to the inflation target during 2003 but it could rise in 2004. As these are the most extensive construction projects in Icelandic history, sound economic management will be required to prevent overheating in the economy, inflation and instability. Although their scope will be considerable, the Central Bank’s analysis of the prospective development indicates that, given appropriate economic policy and some strengthening of the króna, significant part of which might already have taken place, economic stability could be maintained and inflation kept under control. While monetary policy will probably play the major role, fiscal policy will have to assist.

Furthermore, developments in the domestic economy at the end of last decade were such that the stable exchange rate policy was gradually undermined. During the second half of the 1990´s, the Icelandic economy entered a period of high economic growth. Growth was initially well balanced and led by exports and increased investment in the private sector. But as it unfolded it became increasingly driven by consumption and investment in the non-traded goods sector, fuelled by a foreign financed credit expansion in the wake of intensified competition among lending institutions and a significant increase in credit availability. By 1998, signs of overheating were already increasingly visible in rising inflation and the ballooning current account deficit which climaxed in 2000 at 10 per cent of GDP. The Central Bank responded to the imbalances in the economy by tightening monetary policy. Through the effects of the tighter monetary policy, the exchange rate of the króna gradually appreciated as can be seen from Chart 1. In the spring of the year 2000 expectations in the market shifted for a variety of reasons; but concerns about the current account deficit and lower expectations of future economic growth were the most important. Subsequently the króna began to depreciate and continued to do so more or less uninterrupted, but on the whole in an orderly fashion, over a period of a year and a half until the end of November 2001. By that time, it had fallen from its peak by about a third against other currencies.
At maximum of 1 percentage point above the O/N borrowing rate of the Central Bank announced for the intra-day transactions and to reduce fluctuations in O/N interest rates, in cases where the liquidity shortage in the market is envisaged temporary and when the technical interest rate cut explained in paragraph 48 is not applied,  b. At approximately the mid point of the O/N borrowing and lending rates of the Central Bank, in cases where the liquidity shortage in the market is envisaged permanent and the technical interest rate cut explained in paragraph 48 is applied. (iv)  The weekly repo auctions will be executed at 11:00 and the results will be announced on Reuters’ CBTG page no later than 11:30. The traditional auction method will be used in auctions; in other words, the successful bidders will be evaluated with their own interest rates. (v)  In case of unforeseen excessive liquidity shortage during the day, which would exert excessive pressure on money market interest rates, the CBRT may announce “Intra-day Repo Auctions” in addition to the regular ones. (vi)  The primary dealer banks will be able to conduct repo transactions within the framework of open market operations, between 10.00–12.00 and 13.00–16.00 hours.

•  The statement entitled Summary of the Monetary Policy Committee Discussions will be published within 8 working days following the meeting with the title Summary of the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting, alongside its English translation. •  As of July 2006 the “Price Developments” report started to be published to provide an accurate understanding of inflation data. This report will be published within 2 working days following the announcement of inflation data. BIS Review 1/2007  5  •  Besides all these statements, presentations and speeches made by the Governor and the Committee members will be shared with the public from time to time. •  Moreover, the research papers, booklets, and technical notes published by the Central Bank and organized conferences will continue to be a part of the communication policy. The publication calendar for the Inflation Report and the Financial Stability Report along with the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting dates are presented in the Appendix. Meeting dates have been determined by taking into account such factors as official holidays, national and religious festivals, and the data flow calendar. Exchange rate policy and foreign exchange buying auctions Along with inflation targeting, the Central Bank will continue to implement a floating exchange rate regime in the upcoming period. In the floating exchange rate regime the FX rate is neither a target, nor a policy tool. The only variable that the Central Bank sets as target is inflation and the main policy tool to achieve this target is short-term interest rates.
That is not the case, and what we are doing is not about dragging the rest of the financial services industry into reform to solve a problem that is in essence only about the banks. We have to design a system that works effectively for all sectors of the industry. On that theme, I would like to start by reflecting for a few moments on the lessons of history. My main theme is that I think integrated regulation – by which I mean regulation which combines Prudential and Conduct of Business in one regulatory body with single teams of supervisors covering both – has not worked as effectively as it would need to do, for reasons that are deep-seated in the structure. I think there are a number of closely related reasons for this. First, on a rather practical point, I think it is hard for a single organisation to balance, particularly during a period of crisis, a wide range of very demanding issues which are individually rightly of great concern to the public and can come from anywhere in a landscape of around 25,000 authorised firms. Second, I think the evidence suggests that, over the last 15 years, there have been periods when either conduct or prudential supervision has been more in the ascendancy to the detriment of the other.

Today, I will first discuss the monetary policy measures that the ECB has taken to fulfil its mandate and what impact these have had on the real economy. I will then explain how steps to complete banking union and a capital markets union would not only support a strengthened EMU (along with fiscal and economic union, as well as democratic accountability) but also contribute to enhancing financial stability. As European developments need to be put into a wider perspective, I will also say a few words on ongoing discussions in international fora regarding global developments and international financial regulation. Monetary policy and its impact on the real economy 2015 was characterised by a modest economic recovery. However, inflation dynamics were weak and continued to deteriorate throughout the course of the year. Thus, after adopting our credit easing measures in the middle of 2014, we took further decisive action in 2015 to pursue our price stability mandate. Let me remind you that, in January last year, inflation in the euro area had moved into negative territory, the outlook on inflation had worsened significantly and market-based inflation expectations stood at historic lows. In this situation, we judged that our monetary policy measures had to be stepped up in view of our price stability mandate. Therefore, as of March 2015 we expanded our asset purchase programme (limited until then to covered bonds) to public sector securities.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the main policy response has focused on regulation. Indeed, there is a widespread consensus that the cause of the current financial meltdown stems from the failure or even the absence of regulation in important segments of the financial system. But it may also have implications for monetary policy, to which I turn now. BIS Review 74/2009  1  Some implications for monetary policy Central banks have been on the frontline since the crisis unfolded in the summer of 2007. A dramatic change occurred however after the collapse of Lehman Brothers where we had the sentiment that we were moving into uncharted territories: spreads reached unprecedented levels both on the money and credit markets, leading to a worsening of financing conditions across industrialised countries. Without action some important parts of the transmission mechanisms would have been significantly impaired. In such a context, major central banks embarked on unconventional policies by: •  Increasing central bank liquidity;  •  Influencing risk premia on private financial and credit instruments. Such policies are referred to as credit easing policies;  •  Pre-committing to conducting very low interest rate policies for as long as necessary in countries where the interest rate has already reached its lower bound. All these policies are set out as temporary policies and deemed to be used in times of stress only. It is obviously too early to gauge their overall impact.

So far, they have been effective with regard to market confidence, and have contributed to a significant reduction in various credit risk premia. One channel relies on portfolio composition effects. I know that some contributions presented here made that point in a very sophisticated framework, i.e. positive feedback effects may be generated through the greater liquidity of investing entrepreneurs. Obviously, the soundness of the financial system is critical to the success of these unconventional policies. These policies must be viewed as state contingent policies: they are conditional on the state of the economy. A significant part of the intervention is short-term oriented, as the acquisitions focus on short-maturity assets. Furthermore, the assets purchased are usually of very good quality. In most cases, and in particular in the Eurosystem, the increase in the monetary base is determined endogenously by the banking system, motivated by banks’ preference for liquidity and thus by the state of stress of the banking system. Finally, these measures tend to address aggregate risks. These unconventional measures would automatically unwind, as improvements in inter-bank and credit markets would reduce the need to use these facilities. Financial market indicators, risk premia components and their determinants as well as monetary indicators (inflation expectations in addition to monetary and credit developments) should be taken into account to carry out the assessment. Some implications for financial stability This crisis has triggered a debate regarding possible tools to be developed to prevent the build up of financial imbalances and design countercyclical regulatory policies.
Although the burden of servicing these debts is currently manageable because of the low level of mortgage interest rates, concerns about future servicing costs as interest rates normalise may lead the high stock of outstanding debt to weigh on these households’ spending. The possibility of unemployment may also encourage saving, though happily unemployment has so far risen by less than many observers, including the Monetary Policy Committee, feared. The relative robustness of employment, given the depth of the decline in output, owes something to the willingness of employees to accept low pay awards in the face of the downturn. Last year over a third of private sector pay settlements were pay freezes, and a recent survey of their business contacts carried out by the Bank’s regional Agents points to a similar outcome this year (Chart 2). Third, the Government allowed the fiscal deficit to rise in response to the downturn. That was helpful in cushioning the fall in demand. But the deficit now looks set to be around 12% of GDP this year, which is unsustainable in the medium term. That creates a difficult balancing act. Cutting spending and/or raising taxes is likely to result in lower domestic demand, though a failure to do so may lead long-term interest rates to rise, also hitting demand. The recent depreciation of sterling appears to owe something to heightened fears about the UK’s fiscal prospects.

All we can do on the Monetary Policy Committee is stand ready to react to those risks if and when they crystallise, either resuming asset purchases if further stimulation is required, or tightening policy through Bank Rate increases and ultimately asset sales. 4  BIS Review 31/2010  Let me now step back from the UK’s immediate economic prospects, to ask what recent experience has taught us about the broader monetary policy framework. After such a cataclysmic economic event, people have unsurprisingly questioned whether inflation targeting is the right regime or whether it needs to be modified or even abandoned. A variety of changes have been mooted. First, some commentators have suggested that the focus on inflation is misplaced at the current juncture, when surely the aim ought to be to get output up and unemployment down; at the very least the Committee’s objective ought to include a measure of activity, as, for instance, in the US Federal Reserve’s “dual” mandate. In my view, this criticism is misplaced as the Chancellor’s remit to the MPC already incorporates a subsidiary objective to support the Government’s aims with respect to growth and employment, providing that it does not jeopardise meeting the inflation target. When the economy experiences a contraction in demand, as in the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, other things equal, inflation tends to fall. The objectives of maintaining full employment and stabilising inflation are therefore aligned, and there is no inconsistency in these circumstances between boosting growth and meeting the inflation target.
These three arenas of uncertainty – macroeconomic, financial asset pricing, and the financial system – are of course intertwined, but I shall initially find it convenient to unbundle them. Macroeconomic and monetary policy uncertainties The characteristics of the Great Stability, as some economists call it1, are by now familiar. Essentially, low inflation on average; much less persistence in deviations of inflation from central banks’ explicit or implicit targets; and much lower volatility in both output growth and inflation2. Some of the credit is typically given to better monetary regimes, and I believe it should be. Yet policy makers also stress a wide range of uncertainties, threatening at least interruptions to the benign conditions of the past decade or so. This is not just an occupational disposition of central bankers. To varying degrees, these uncertainties do feature in real-world policy debates. I have argued previously3 that some risks – such as those posed by global current account imbalances – could not sensibly be factored in to policy settings ahead of their crystallising. But uncertainties about the structure of the economy and how monetary policy works do somehow have to feature in our policy judgments, as I can illustrate with the thinking behind my vote at the MPC’s November meeting4. Essentially, I balanced two quite different, but quite likely, views of the outlook, which I shall label Orthodox and Alternative.

What can the Federal Reserve bring to the table? First and foremost, we can convene the industry and, as needed, drive toward consensus. We can bring strong research and analysis to the table. We can synthesize the large volume of payments research developed by industry, think tanks, consultants and academics, as we’ve already done for ourselves, as well as provide research by Federal Reserve economists. We can analyze use cases, as we’ve done over the last six months. And to help shape the consensus, we can draw on the basic principles that have guided Federal Reserve provision of payments services over the postwar period: access, efficiency, security and resiliency. Historically, the Federal Reserve’s focus has been on the interbank clearing and settlement of payments, operating efficiency, such as the conversion from paper to electronics, technologies that extend and improve accessibility, and infrastructures and services that are robust to security threats. Moving forward our strategy maintains emphasis on those key areas, but expands our focus to the flow of a payments transaction from end to end, enduser to end-user. The vision is to make sure the core services we provide enable and encourage innovation among payments providers who serve the end-users at the two ends of the payment. The end-to-end view means that payment initiation and delivery of good funds to end-users in the future state need to be timely, cost-effective, safe and easy. When we talk about timeliness and a faster payments system, what exactly does that mean?