samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
RWCR: High degree of freedom offered to banks increases incentives for gaming, especially under IRB approach. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18  Risk Rapid and unsustainable balance sheet expansion  First Best Mitigant LR: Requires banks to raise capital to support credit creation, regardless of asset composition. Second Best Mitigant NSFR: Limits reliance on short and mediumterm wholesale funding to support balance sheet expansion. Sudden withdrawal of funding due to firm-specific or short-lived market-wide loss of credibility  LCR: Assures available buffer of liquid assets to meet immediate outflows enabling survival of first stages of run/preparation for resolution if appropriate. Sustained loss of funding due to market-wide liquidity stress leading to slowburn insolvency  NSFR: Matches liquidity of assets against stability of liabilities to ensure bank is broadly resilient to a medium-term funding run. Crystallisation of systemic liquidity risk leading to a fire sales, liquidity hoarding, and/or a contraction in lending  NSFR: Reduces banks’ vulnerability to mediumterm liquidity risks and hence the probability of them being required to deleverage rapidly in periods of stress to shore up their liquidity position. NSFR: Reduces runnable fraction of liabilities, thus decreases ex-ante risk of being exposed to a run, but does not directly ensure bank has a buffer of usable shortterm liquidity. LCR: Assures available buffer of liquid assets to meet immediate outflows, but not that maturity transformation is sustainable beyond 30 day horizon. LCR: Reduces reliance on the most unstable short-dated liabilities.

It is well known that the cause of Turkey’s inflation is fiscal in nature. The last year in which Turkey had a budget surplus was 1970. The budget deficit increased steadily throughout the last decade, finally reaching double-digits in 1999. The fiscal imbalances have also caused difficulties in financing the deficit. Over the last couple of years the amount of external financing available for the budget deficit has declined, causing increased pressure on the domestic financial sector and an increase in the domestic debt. The ratio of cash domestic debt to GNP grew rapidly during the 1990s, finally reaching 24% of GNP in 1999. The increases in the deficit and in the level of domestic debt during recent years are mirrored in the levels of domestic interest rates. The increasing pressure on domestic borrowing has kept real interest rates at high levels, hovering around the mid-20s during the 1990s and rising to over 50% at frequent intervals. I think this brief recital of facts should be more than sufficient to explain why it is high time to face the predicament of the Turkish economy. A radical program is urgently needed to address Turkey’s deep-rooted problems, and it is my wish today to convince you that the program we have delivered to deal with them is well prepared and comprehensive. Let me summarise our goals and the overall strategy by which this program aims to achieve them.
Looking beyond this volatility, the pace of monetary expansion has clearly slowed since the last quarter of 2008. The flow of bank loans to non-financial corporations and households has remained subdued, reflecting in part the weakening in economic activity and the continued low levels of business and consumer confidence. A moderate monthly contraction in the outstanding amount of loans to non-financial corporations has been observed over recent months. These developments are mostly due to a decline in short-term lending, while the flow of loans with longer maturities has remained slightly positive. In this respect, it is important to note that past reductions in key ECB rates have continued to be passed on through lending rates to both non-financial corporations and households. The resulting improvement in financing conditions should provide ongoing support for economic activity in the period ahead. However, as we have stressed in the past given the challenges that lie ahead, banks should take appropriate measures to strengthen further their capital bases and, where necessary, take full advantage of government measures to support the financial sector, particularly as regards recapitalisation. To sum up, the current rates remain appropriate taking into account all the information and analyses that have become available since our meeting on 4 June 2009. The fall of annual inflation rates into negative territory in June is in line with previous expectations and reflects mainly temporary effects. After a return to positive inflation rates, we expect price developments to remain dampened over the policy-relevant horizon.

Recent data releases and survey information provide further indications that economic activity over the remainder of this year is likely to remain weak but should decline less strongly than was the case in the first quarter of 2009. This assessment incorporates adverse lagged effects, such as a further deterioration in labour markets, which are likely to materialise over the coming months. Looking ahead into next year, after a phase of stabilisation, a gradual recovery with positive  2  BIS Review 83/2009  quarterly growth rates is expected by mid-2010. Available indicators of inflation expectations over the medium to longer term remain firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. A cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis corroborates the assessment of low inflationary pressure, as money and credit indicators continue to be weak. Against this background, we expect the current episode of extremely low or negative inflation rates to be short-lived and price stability to be maintained over the medium term, thereby continuing to support the purchasing power of euro area households. As the transmission of monetary policy works with lags, our policy action should progressively feed through to the economy in full. Hence, with all the measures taken, monetary policy will provide ongoing support for households and corporations.
Is there a risk that the payments market will become an oligopoly, with high thresholds for competitors and where payment services are expensive? Can we ensure that those who do not have access to the banks’ services in the future will still be able to manage their payments in a safe and efficient way? What would happen in a future financial crisis, if the general public distrusts the banks and wants to withdraw savings in cash – but the banks no longer hold cash? 13 Withdrawals from ATMs have also declined significantly in recent years. In 2010, Swedes withdrew around SEK 225 billion and in 2015 they withdrew only SEK 153 billion. 14 See, for instance, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority's report on its task from the Government with regard to fundamental payment services, 27 February 2017: http://www.pts.se/sv/Dokument/Rapporter/Post/2017/Aterrapportering-av-PTS-regeringsuppdrag-inomgrundlaggande-betaltjanster---17-201-/ 15 To some extent the Riksbank has contributed to this development by reducing the number of cash depots in Sweden. See, for example, Daltung and Ericson (2004). 11 [14]  Central bank money will still be needed in the future These important questions must be answered. In my opinion, there is reason to examine whether the Riksbank should offer money in digital form to the general public. If the printing press made it possible to print banknotes in its time, then our current technology enables electronic payments.

2  A banking crisis every thirty years With this historical retrospective, I would like to remind you that as long as there have been banks, there have also been financial crises. And when financial crises have arisen, the state has often had to rush to the rescue in one way or another. In Sweden alone, severe banking crises have occurred no less than nine times in the past 250 years. 3 This entails, on average, one crisis every thirty years. 1 Thank you to Johan Molin, who has helped me write this speech. Valuable comments were received from Mats  Anderson, Christina Nordh Berntsson, Sara Edholm, David Forsman, Mattias Hector, Martin W. Johansson, Gabriel Söderberg and Anders Vredin. 2 See Wetterberg (2009). 3 See, for example, Hagberg (2007). 1 [14]  This speech is about how Sweden can counteract and mitigate the effect of such crises, and not least the significance of having an appropriately-designed foreign currency reserve to succeed in this. Johan Palmstruch’s banknotes were an innovation in their day, but now, 350 years later, we in Sweden are heading towards a cashless society, primarily due to new financial technology in the payments field. What this and some other development trends may entail for society and for the Riksbank is the subject of my speech today. The banks’ business models entail risks What is so special about banks that the government sometimes intervenes to counteract banking crises? Nothing like this happens when, for instance, a manufacturing or construction company collapses.
In the last rounds of interviews with our regional network, an increasing number of companies reported that wage growth in 2006 will be higher than budgeted early this year. The level of unemployment that is consistent with stable real wage growth is uncertain and probably varies over time. We have assumed that increased economic integration across countries, both in the form of an increase in inward labour migration and intensified competition in product markets, may have a dampening effect on wage demands for a given level of unemployment. In the period ahead, a tight labour market is expected to result in higher real wage growth. Nevertheless, it is assumed that labour inflows will have a dampening impact on wage demands, so that real wage growth will be a little lower in the next few years than in previous periods of equally low unemployment. The upward pressure on price and wage inflation given the level of current resource utilisation, as reflected in the output gap, is estimated to be lower than in the previous expansion even though the unemployment rate is at approximately the same low level. This is due in part to high productivity growth in recent years. Growth in disposable income has been high in recent years. Lower interest expenses and relatively high real wage growth have resulted in an increase in household purchasing power. The rise in house prices may also have fuelled growth in private consumption.

The development of High Frequency Trading for instance – whose economic utility is by the way also questionable – could hamper the resilience of financial markets in times of stress. New services such as smart contracts embedded on a blockchain could create new shock transmission mechanisms or result in new forms of interconnectedness or pro-cyclicality that could be the sources of financial instability. Third, it could threaten market integration, especially in Europe after a decade of tremendous efforts to foster harmonization between financial markets. Such efforts are evidenced in the securities markets area, by the recent launch of the Target2 Securities platform in 2015, in the payments area, by the completion in 2016 of the second round of the SEPA project which now allows for fully harmonized credit transfers and direct debits denominated in euros, throughout the European Union. By contrast, the current profusion of new technologies, standards and protocols that are not fully interoperable, at least at this stage, constitutes a potential risk of market fragmentation. Additionally, they could lead to some kind of social fragmentation, if the new payment means are less accessible to the less welloff. 3. Against this background, public authorities play a key role in helping to reap the full benefits of innovation while preventing the threats it brings This implies first rethinking the regulation so as to strike the right balance between innovation and security.
It must be mentioned here that rising inflation was a main cause for the 1980 general strike, which resulted in over 40,000 public and private sector workers losing their jobs. Little wonder that the Central Bank of Sri Lanka started looking for a new framework to contain inflation and inflation expectations in the absence of the pegged exchange rate system. 8  Beginning of Monetary Aggregate Targeting in Sri Lanka The relationship between monetary expansion in terms of the amount of money held by the public and inflation has been well recognised in Sri Lanka from the beginning of central banking in the country. However, the first mentioning of “desired monetary targets” in a Central Bank annual report in Sri Lanka could be found in 1982. The 1982 annual report states that “the National Credit Plan for 1982 was formulated against the perspective of the prevailing monetary and credit policies. It attempted to rationalise the use of private sector credit among different sectors of the economy as an instrument of selective credit policy. Having taken into consideration the real growth, estimated rate of price increase and increased monetisation of the economy, the desired monetary targets were set in the Plan with a view to maintaining the consistency between financial and real output flows in the economy.

Weathering the challenges requires courage and professionalism. In addition, banking institutions should provide an environment where accountable and professional human capacities are in the service of the public and the institution. I am confident that you will prioritize the foregoing matters in 2011. I wish you success in your work and many wishes for the New Year! Thank you. BIS Review 174/2010  3
The drift towards bilateral- and trade-focused international economic policies which bypass existing channels of trade conflict resolution severely undermines global governance of international trade. On their own, EMs have little bargaining power, and engaging in bilateral relationships with large countries could result in trade distortions and uncertainties that lead to inefficient allocation of resources. In addition to the direct impact on trade, this bilateral- and trade-focused thinking could lead to another serious implication, especially from the perspective of macroeconomists who are well-represented in this room: the distortion of macroeconomic policy framework. The global imbalance analysis illustrates this issue nicely. The existing framework that was developed by the IFIs prior to the GFC and was adopted internationally has been pivotal in the way we made policies to address global imbalances in the past. I have talked earlier about how the current framework based on current account balance alone needs to progress with the changing environment, the excess liquidity in the global financial system, and take a broader view that includes capital flows. I am afraid that the current geopolitical environment will not allow us to progress forward in our thinking. Even the existing current-account based framework of global imbalances is being challenged by the bilateral worldview that focuses on bilateral trade. A currency intervention assessment framework that focuses narrowly on current account and bilateral trade balances and disregards other types of fund flows like portfolio flows is an example of thinking that distracts us from macroeconomic reasoning.

Miroslav Singer: Sovereign debt crisis in Europe – assessing the current European instruments – addressing the challenges ahead Speech by Mr Miroslav Singer, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Public Hearing, Brussels, 23 January 2012. *  *  *  Members of the European Parliament, Thank you for inviting me to this forum and giving me this opportunity to comment on the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The last few weeks have brought us three new events that are rightly or wrongly regarded as game changers and I would like to discuss the EFSF in the context of those events. They are: 1) the ECB’s long-term loans to commercial banks and the widening of the range of guarantees which the ECB accepts from commercial banks for them, 2) the fiscal pact and 3) the rating downgrades. I would like start by saying that the provision of liquidity to commercial banks in Europe by the ECB gives us time to define more precisely the mission, design and operation of the Facility as well its position among the institutions charged with resolving the debt crisis. If we want to reduce the probability that some European nations and their banking groups will face liquidity problems that they cannot solve by obtaining funds from the market, we need to eliminate the following uncertainties relating to the EFSF: 1. It is not clear what benefits we expect from the EFSF or how it is supposed to generate them.
We should take great care not to roll back this important achievement, or to water down its implementation to an extent that it would no longer be seen as a credible framework. Notwithstanding the significance of the reinforcements put in place for the policy framework, I believe that there is still room for further legislative action where the financial sector is concerned. In addition to a better performing banking sector, an increased role of capital markets could help to support both growth in Europe and the financing of the real economy. To fully reap the benefits of capital market integration, the regulatory environment needs to be harmonised further and, potentially, to be adapted. The joint paper of the ECB and the Bank of England on a better functioning securitisation market in the EU has set out a number of proposals in this regard. Furthermore, a better regulation of financial benchmarks is BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  necessary to restore the confidence and trust of citizens and market participants in the financial system. A swift adoption of the relevant Commission’s proposal is of utmost importance. Discussions will also continue on the shape and structure of our banking sector and the regulation of the shadow banking sector. Finally, over and beyond this focus on concrete short and medium-term measures, we should bear in mind that Economic and Monetary Union still remains an incomplete structure.

In the last legislative period, a great deal has been done to restore stability as a key prerequisite for economic dynamism. This has resulted in a return of confidence to the euro area. But high public and private debt, low growth and unacceptably high levels of unemployment are reminding us that the most pressing matter now is to bring the euro area back onto a path of shared prosperity. To achieve this, the focus in the next five years should lie on thoroughly implementing the reinforced policy framework that was agreed in the last term, and on further increasing the resilience of euro area countries’ economies. For us at the ECB, this means assuming a new role in the banking union by supervising the euro area banks as from November. With the comprehensive assessment exercise that we are currently conducting, we will contribute to putting euro area banks on a healthy footing, so as to enable them to provide financing to the real economy. For euro area Member States, this means undertaking the necessary structural reforms to foster growth, and to avoid any new build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. It also means continuing fiscal consolidation to rebalance public finances in line with the rules underpinning the Stability and Growth Pact. The euro area policy framework was strengthened considerably by the agreement between this House and the Council on the six-pack and the two-pack.
There is no doubt that the spread of benchmarking allows fund managers and clients to better assess their performance against that of other funds. But, in a context of growing competition within the sector, it may well have increased mimetic behaviour. Some market participants operators (whose own compensation is closely linked to the relative, rather than absolute, profit and losses they generate) may indeed have come to the conclusion that it would be better to be wrong along with everybody else, rather than running the risk of being right alone. A striking example of rational mimetic behaviour is the influence that hedge funds enjoyed as "opinion leaders" and trend makers. By its nature, trend-following amplifies the imbalance that may at some point affect a market, potentially leading to vicious circles of price adjustments and liquidation of positions. Moreover, more and more participants are able to access directly to financial markets, while the expertise to deal with a larger set of technical information is not evenly distributed. This may also reinforce the role of “gurus”. ·  Third, index management: as a fund management technique, it has proven very popular on equity markets and may have contributed to exacerbating movements in financial asset prices. Because their goal is to mimic the performance of indices, “passive managers” try constantly to match the composition of their benchmark. They thus help to amplify market trends, buying more as the market rises and liquidating more as the market drops.

This conference will provide an opportunity to reassess our traditional views on many of the issues before us. On this note, I wish you a very engaging and substantive conference. 2  BIS Review 20/2009
23 years of experience in regulating and developing the Islamic financial system. ii. strong Islamic financial institutions comprising 12 Islamic banks. Of this, 3 are foreign Islamic financial institutions and 7 are Islamic subsidiaries of banking groups. There are also several Islamic windows of conventional banking institutions which are also lead arrangers of Islamic financial instruments. In the takaful industry, there are 9 takaful operators. iii. a strong Islamic capital market with 89 Islamic unit trust funds, 85 percent of Bursa Malaysia's counters are Shariah approved counters and 46 percent of the corporate bond market are Islamic bonds or sukuks. iv. a well established and comprehensive regulatory and Shariah governance framework in accordance with best practices, together with a tax neutrality policy. v.  a comprehensive legal and Shariah infrastructure. vi. well endowed with the critical mass and a wide array of Islamic products and services. vii. Talent development infrastructure. viii. a vibrant and active secondary market trading of the Islamic money and capital markets equipped with the state-of-the-art technology. We are now at the cross-road in the development of Islamic finance. We realise that we are strong at the domestic level, and we now need to strategise to elevate the industry to the next phase of development. During the keynote address yesterday, Governor has launched Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC) for the offering of Islamic financial products and services in international currencies from anywhere in Malaysia.

Before rejoining the IMF, where he had previously worked for 15 years in the European Department and the Monetary and Financial Systems Department, he was the Director for Financial Stability, as well as for Supervision Policy within the DNB, position that enabled the creation of the respective departments within the National Bank of Romania. Last, but not least, he shares his financial supervision knowledge as a Professor at Nyenrode Business University. It is my pleasure to offer the floor to Mr. Hilbers and thank him once again for being here with us today. 2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  His remarks will be followed by a recorded message from his World Bank counterpart, Executive Director Koen Davidse. Mr Davidse is a more recent, but also very good, friend of our country. With extensive knowledge in development policies, having worked with the United Nations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. Davidse has constantly supported the efforts for structural reforms and strengthening Romania's institutions in. Unfortunately, he couldn't join us physically today, but he is with us virtually. Thank you! 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches