samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I just said, I subscribe to a 2 percent target for inflation over the long run. However, given how badly we are doing on our employment mandate, we need to be willing to take a risk on inflation going modestly higher in the short run if that is a consequence of polices aimed at lowering unemployment. With regard to the inflation marker, we have already experienced unduly low inflation of 1 percent; so against an objective of 2 percent, 3 percent inflation would be an equivalent policy loss to what we have already experienced. On the unemployment marker, a decline to 7 percent would be quite helpful. However, weighed against a conservative estimate for the natural rate of unemployment of 6 percent, it still represents a substantial policy loss. Indeed, weighed against a less conservative long-run estimate of the natural rate, it is a larger policy loss than that from 3 percent inflation. Accordingly, these triggers remain quite conservatively tilted in favor of disciplined inflation performance over enhanced growth and employment, and it would not be unreasonable to consider an even lower unemployment threshold before starting policy tightening. I would also highlight that while I believe that optimal policy would be consistent with inflation running above our 2 percent target for some time, this policy does not abandon the 2 percent target for long-run inflation. Indeed, I would support combining this policy with a formal statement of 2 percent as our longer-run inflation target in conjunction with reaffirming our commitment to flexible inflation-targeting.

Given the sharp drop in output during the recession and lackluster early recovery, GDP is currently below its potential by nearly 7 percent, or $ trillion dollars.1 Just prior to the recession, the unemployment rate averaged between 4-1/2 and 5 percent. It peaked at 10.1 percent during the recession and, as I just noted, is still 9.1 percent today. In terms of jobs, payroll employment is about 6-1/2 million below its pre-recession level. These are massive shortfalls in output and employment. It does not appear as if these gaps are going to be reduced significantly any time soon. Real GDP growth has been anemic so far this year. Gains in employment have slowed markedly. Even though credit conditions overall have been improving, many households and small businesses still seem to be having trouble getting credit. In addition, the repair process in residential real estate markets is painstakingly slow, and households are still in the process of paring debt and adapting to the huge losses in real estate and financial wealth that they experienced during the recession. I largely agree with economists such as Paul Krugman, Mike Woodford and others who see the economy as being in a liquidity trap: Short-term nominal interest rates are stuck near zero, even while desired saving still exceeds desired investment. This situation is the natural result of the abundance of caution exercised by many households and businesses that still worry that they have inadequate buffers of assets to cushion against unexpected shocks.
These achievements are important and they were hard won. We mustn’t take them for granted. But nor can we live in the past. So what are today’s challenges? I see these in three main areas: assessing current economic developments; effective communication; and understanding the new trends that will shape the future. (i)  Assessing current developments  Broadly speaking, the task for the MPC is to control inflationary pressure by ensuring that the level of aggregate demand in the economy is more or less in line with aggregate supply. The first and most basic challenge comes in translating this deceptively simple idea in to practice. It is hard enough to estimate how fast demand is growing now from incomplete, preliminary or just plain puzzling information. It is harder still, and even more important, to look ahead over the two or three year horizon relevant to setting interest rates. But that’s only part of the story. The rate at which demand can be allowed to rise without leading to an upturn in inflation depends both on how much spare capacity there is in the economy now and on factors that determine the future growth in supply, such as productivity and labour availability. And finally, we need to consider what effect our own actions will have on longer-term interest rates and through them on the wider economy. Inflation targeting provides a credible framework within which these complicated issues can be properly considered.

Historical overview One of the more dramatic developments in the final decades of the last century was the sharp fall in inflation worldwide. This remarkable phenomenon brought inflation almost everywhere to levels not seen for the best part of fifty years. Set against the long sweep of history, it is the 1970s and 1980s that now stand out - as a major, but time limited, episode of high global inflation.2 In the UK, the period since 1992 has seen a shift to low and stable inflation combined with sustained economic growth, and steadily falling unemployment. Slightly miraculous as these developments may still seem to the generation that came of age during the Great Inflation of the 1970s - remember ‘stagflation’? - the happy fact is that for anyone in their mid-thirties, low inflation, steady growth and low interest rates are the norm. Success has many parents, and the trend to low inflation is no exception. But there is a broad consensus that better monetary policies run by more independent and more open central banks can claim a significant share of the credit. The Short History of Twentieth Century Monetary Policy goes roughly as follows. For the first time since the collapse of Bretton Woods - arguably since the Gold Standard - after decades of unhappy experiments with fine tuning, incomes policies and monetary targets, buffeted by the explosive growth of financial markets and often misled by economic dogma, governments have finally found an approach to monetary policy that seems to work.
Now these are immensely difficult judgements. They depend in part upon one’s perception about the starting position - that is how close we are to BIS Review 55/1998  -3-  full capacity utilisation to begin with. And they depend upon not just the direction, but the rate of change and the timing, of changes in the different components of aggregate demand. It is hardly surprising that the various members of the MPC should - within this common framework of analysis - reach, essentially marginally, different conclusions, reflecting their individual judgements as to the balance of risks. Indeed it would have been incredible if they had not reached marginally different conclusions. What is unusual - and what outside observers are I think still getting used to is that different possible interpretations of the data and different possible judgements are openly displayed in the minutes of our meetings, which also record the way in which each member votes. Some people now seem to find this open discussion of alternative views confusing. My own view is that it can only contribute to the effectiveness of monetary policy if the public at large better understand the nature of the issues and the uncertainties surrounding them. But our procedures have had one, by me at least, unforeseen, and I think regrettable, consequence, in that it has focused excessive attention upon the way in which individual members of the Committee vote leading to their over-simple categorisation as either hawks or doves.

The interest rate decision showed simply that what were always fine judgements changed with the facts - as I can assure you they will in future, in either direction. BIS Review 55/1998
Indeed, the real benefit to be gained under Basel II environment comes from improved standards of loan underwriting and more accurate quantification of risks that can subsequently translate into enhanced performance. Acceptance of collateral is only to mitigate loss severity should a default take place. In an increasingly more competitive marketplace, the emphasis is on maximizing risk-adjusted returns on capital and maintaining an optimal asset portfolio that reflects the risk tolerance level of the institution. In such an environment, overemphasis on collateral is certainly not viable. Ladies and Gentlemen, Bank Negara Malaysia will adopt four key principles in the implementation of Basel II in Malaysia: Firstly, the need to accommodate capacity building efforts, with strong emphasis on gradual enhancement to risk management framework for all banking institutions; Secondly, a more flexible timeframe that allows capacity building measures to be implemented; Thirdly, an emphasis on strong business justification instead of regulatory mandate for the adoption of IRB approaches; and Finally, an enhanced supervisory methodology to assess internal models and advanced risk management systems. Malaysia will adopt a two-phased approach for Basel II These principles would be implemented in a two-phased approach. The first phase will begin in January 2008 where all banks will adopt the standardized approach for credit risks and basic indicator approach for operational risks. Banking institutions would be required to submit to Bank Negara Malaysia parallel calculation of capital adequacy on a monthly basis for one year prior to the implementation of the standardized approach.

In any event, based on the experience of Spain and other countries, I consider that in all key aspects of the resolution process, the direct involvement of the supervisor is crucial to avoid information gaps, prevent duplications and ensure efficient use of the resources employed to monitor financial institutions. 5  Conclusions  To conclude, I believe that as resolution authorities we have a very exciting policy agenda in front of us. Indeed, it is hard to think of other policy tasks which are so closely related to such a large number of first-order public objectives such as financial stability, the orderly functioning of the capital markets and the integrity of the public finances. Yet it is clear that, since resolution policy is arguably in its childhood as a recognised policy area, we still lack something like a comprehensive manual to guide our actions in the field. Therefore our decisions must often be taken as if we were exploring an uncharted territory full of legal and economic risks. That is why I think that events like this, which allow competent authorities to exchange experiences and thoughts, are no doubt extremely useful in counteracting our uncertainty until a sufficiently large store of knowledge, if not doctrine, becomes available. I wish to thank Antonio Carrascosa, Mario Delgado and the rest of the FROB team involved in the organisation of this conference, and all of you for your participation. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Also, the programming of smart contracts on a distributed network might add further gains in efficiency, by providing for the automation of processes. This is so, especially, in the case of complex contracts that give rise to multiple transactions distributed over time or conditional upon one another. Other innovations receiving less media attention than cryptotokens nevertheless appear to be more mature and are, in practice, exerting a notable impact on the way in which financial institutions in general, and banks in particular, provide their services. I am referring specifically to big data, artificial intelligence and what is known as cloud computing. Big data offer clear potential for enhancing and personalising the supply of financial services. True, financial institutions have for some time been using massive data processing techniques to enhance knowledge of their customers and to personalise their services. However, these possibilities have now been boosted thanks to the growing volume of information that is available in digital formats, cheaper storage costs and the increase in computing power. The moves in big data are in fact boosting the development of other technologies that go beyond mere data processing. This is the case of artificial intelligence and automatic learning. They have numerous applications in the financial sector and are directed not only at end-products and customer relations, but are also transforming other financial servicesprovision facets, including banks’ in-house operations in areas such as risk management or regulatory compliance. The use of virtual agents or virtual recognition is already contributing to enhancing users’ relationship with financial services-providers.

First-generation crypto-assets were born of a desire to create a disintermediated means of payment that would not have an issuer and that would circulate on decentralised settlement infrastructures beyond the control of banks and governments. As a result of this, their actual footprint remains marginal, however much media attention they may receive. Furthermore, as intermediaries in exchanges, these assets are far less efficient than our existing currencies, for a variety of reasons, including their volatile prices, transaction costs and transaction times, which make it hard to use these assets as a means of payment, plus the risks to which users and service providers are exposed. Stablecoins seek to remedy the shortcomings of first-generation 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  crypto-assets, especially their volatility, by being backed by real assets. But even with Stablecoins, the whole crypto-asset payment chain remains highly exposed to a range of risks, from legal, financial and operational risks, to major vulnerabilities in terms of money laundering and terrorist financing, and consumer and investor information and protection issues, including a non-zero risk of capital loss even in the case of Stablecoins. There are also issues, in our countries upholding the Rule of Law and in our regulated market economies, in terms of complying with core competition and privacy principles.
In this context, we currently find ourselves at a crossroads in what refers to the pace of the governance reform agenda. Despite evident progress since the peak of the crisis, the building of a more cohesive monetary union, as proposed in the Van Rompuy’s Report of June 2012 (the so-called Four Presidents’ Report) and in the Juncker’s Report of June 2015 (the so-called Five Presidents’ Report), is, we all know that, a very difficult task. As a matter of fact, there has been no significant step forward since the establishment of the Single Resolution Fund in June 2014. Recently, several initiatives have attempted to re-launch the debate on the future of euro area’s governance, including, in December 2017, the European Commission’s report on “Further steps towards completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union: A roadmap”, or, in January of the present year, the Center for Economic Policy Research’s report on “Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform”, which, as many of you probably know, we discussed in a recent seminar here at the Banco de España. The package of reform measures put forward by the EC cover a broad set of issues, from the completion of the Banking Union and the design of mechanisms that reconcile market discipline and risk sharing to the establishment of a European Union Finance Minister. The panelists today will share their views and analysis on these central issues. Let me briefly reflect upon them.

1 Transferring this additional duration risk to the Federal Reserve’s portfolio, and hence out of the portfolios of market participants, was one channel through which the asset purchase program was intended to have its effect on financial conditions. This “portfolio balance” channel has been discussed by Chairman Bernanke on several occasions. 2 This view associates the amount of policy stimulus with the stock of assets, or more precisely with the amount of duration risk, that the Federal Reserve takes onto its balance sheet. Policy achievements of LSAP2 The purpose of the asset purchase program was to help the Federal Reserve achieve the economic objectives of full employment and stable prices that it was given by Congress. I believe that the program delivered what could have been expected from it. In particular, let me highlight its success along two dimensions. First, the LSAP2 program made broad financial conditions more accommodative. This conclusion can be drawn from the behavior of financial markets from late August 2010 to the program’s implementation date in November 2010 – a period during which market participants moved from seeing such a program as a remote possibility to expecting it with near certainty. 3 Asset price movements over this period included a decline in real interest rates, a narrowing of risks spreads, an increase in equity prices, and a decline in the dollar – exactly the pattern that one would expect to be generated from additional monetary policy accommodation.
It is about growing the Singaporean talent base as well as being a magnet for the world’s talents. It is about a vibrant entrepreneurial and innovation base, characterised by a lot of start-ups, a lot of experimentation, and a lot of R&D. A key aspect of dynamism is also high rates of churn in the labour and capital resources in our firms: There needs to be continuous flux and reallocation of resources in response to changing economic and market conditions. Both capital and labour need to be nimble and highly adaptive. The structure of the Singapore economy is well suited for sustaining our dynamism. Singapore’s strong advanced manufacturing and related trade and logistics activities are internationally competitive. In modern services, comprising financial, professional services, and info- communications technology, we enjoy an international hub status. Together, these sectors make up some 40% of our economy. If our domestic services can be further professionalised – job by job, each worker possessing deep skills and delivering a high quality of service, we will be a dynamic economy. Finally, dynamism must be about our people. We must remain an open society. 16 / 17  BIS central bankers' speeches  Not just in being open to foreign trade, investment, and talent, but being deeply connected to the rest of the world. Not just attracting foreign talent to Singapore but Singaporeans venturing abroad as our companies and industries internationalise.

London has averaged 3.3% annual growth since the financial crisis while Sydney has averaged around 2.9%. San Jose (which encompasses Silicon Valley) has averaged 2.7% p.a. It is hard to imagine a dynamic city growing at less than 2% or worse still, 1.5%. It will be unattractive to investors and talent, including the city’s own investors and talented people. A reasonably good rate of growth helps to create opportunities and preserve a sense of progress and hope, particularly among the young. It will also facilitate upward social mobility. 11 / 17  BIS central bankers' speeches  The experience of other leading cities suggests that demographics is not destiny. Yes, vibrant cities do attract people – and their additions to the labour force add to growth. But the main source of their growth and dynamism is not headcount but productivity. This is not an in-depth study but it appears that about two-thirds of overall GDP growth in the cities shown is due to productivity improvements. In comparison, productivity has accounted for about half of Singapore’s GDP growth. There is clearly scope for us to do better and thereby sustain our dynamism. How can we do this? 12 / 17  BIS central bankers' speeches  First, Singapore has scope to reap the human capital dividends that are arising from the continuous investments we have made in education and training in past decades. As recently as 2000, 45% of the resident workforce had below secondary school education, and only 12% had university education.
The Global Outlook Speech given by Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England  Financial Times event in Frobisher Hall, the Barbican 12 February 2019  I am grateful to Clare Macallan, Daisy McGregor and James Benford for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Thomas Viegas, Cian O’Neill, Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Jon Bridges, Simon Whitaker, Emil Iordanov, Anina Thiel and Robert Gilhooly for background research and analysis. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It sometimes seems that everything in our world is connected. It is a pleasure to meet in Frobisher Hall today. This hall is named after Sir Martin Frobisher, an English navigator who explored Canada’s eastern arctic coast in the 16th century in search of new trade routes. His connection to the Barbican is that most of him is buried in the St Giles-in-the-Fields churchyard. (His heart and entrails are in St Andrew’s Church in Plymouth). Martin Frobisher is perhaps more famous in Canada than in his native land. One of the great bays in the eastern arctic is named after him. The capital of Nunavut, Iqaluit, lies at the innermost end of Frobisher Bay. Nine years ago this month Iqaluit hosted the G7 meeting that marked the start of the euro crisis. Events that still reverberate today including in the environs of the Barbican. While the debate in the United Kingdom has been understandably dominated by Brexit, the world has been otherwise engaged.

François Villeroy de Galhau: The Banking Union ─ Time to move forward again Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France, at the Eurofi Financial Forum, Ljubljana, 10 September 2021. * * * I would have liked to be in Ljubljana today, but I extend my warmest thanks online to David Wright and Didier Cahen for making this event possible. During the acute phase of the crisis, EU governments and the ECB did the right thing in supporting economies, so that we can now bounce back quickly. The European banking system proved its resilience, and contrary to many exaggerated fears, there will be no tsunami of corporate insolvencies, and hence no major rise in NPLs. However, now that firefighters have been successful, it is time to turn to our architects to start building again: Europe must finally unlock the full potential of its Banking Union. This morning I will be in the same vein as Andrea Enria’s impressive speech yesterday, which I fully welcome and support. Today, I will first discuss where we stand including the ongoing deadlock in the Banking Union, before elaborating on the pragmatic solutions we can come up with. I. Banking Union: it is time to move forward again Where we stand. After a strong initial impulse having achieved an efficient first pillar – supervision –, Banking Union now lacks momentum and remains incomplete. Let us be frank: the project has come to a complete standstill.