samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This led Asian firms to rely on short-term bank financing to fund longer-term projects, thus exposing themselves to maturity mismatches. Further, when the banks got into trouble, the firms were left with no alternative avenues to raise working capital. Thin capital markets accentuated price movements when investor preferences shifted. As a result, the economies’ ability to absorb shocks was severely impaired. So across the region, steps are now being taken to develop capital markets. Fourthly, there is now greater recognition that effective prudential oversight and corporate governance are critical to maintaining a sound financial system. Many Asian countries fell short in these areas, and are now striving to remedy the weaknesses. They need to establish rigorous supervisory regimes, foster a sound credit culture in banks, and apply international standards of accounting, disclosure, and loan classification. In this respect, the Basel-based committees, BIS, OECD, and other standard setting bodies have done valuable work, promulgating standards on banking supervision, risk management, corporate governance and public disclosure. Few would claim that these standards are Western cultural impositions, and that Asian banks and companies need different norms more suited to their societies and stage of development. Fifthly, there have been stronger calls to improve the workings of the international financial system, rather than adopt a hands-off approach. No plausible alternative to the existing market-based system has emerged. But the consensus view is that the robustness of the system can be improved, in particular through better monitoring, and greater transparency among market participants. This is work in progress.

Caleb M Fundanga: Framework of cooperation between the Bank of Zambia and the University of Zambia Opening remarks by Mr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the University of Zambia, Lusaka, 30 June 2010. *  *  *  The Vice Chancellor, University of Zambia – Prof. Stephen Simukanga The Deputy Governor – Administration and University Council Chairperson – Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula Distinguished Professors and Lecturers from UNZA Colleagues from the Bank Members of the Press Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen; It gives me great delight, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to this important signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the University of Zambia. The MoU that we are about to sign today provides a framework for the support to the Economics Department and Research activities in the Department. Ladies and Gentlemen; the Bank of Zambia continues to view the University of Zambia and the Copperbelt University as strategic partners in the economic development of Zambia. It is for this reason that the Bank has for several years now been involved in the support of various capacity building programmes at the two tertiary learning institutions.
If anything, recent developments suggest that the remaining spare capacity in the economy is being absorbed a little more rapidly than had been expected, and that inflation remains likely to overshoot the 2% target over the next three years. The MPC’s reaction function is clear. The continued erosion of slack lessens the trade-off that the MPC is required to balance and, all else equal, reduces the MPC’s tolerance of above-target inflation. As the Committee stated last week, if the economy continues to follow a path consistent with the prospect of a continued erosion of slack and a gradual rise in underlying inflationary pressure then, with the further lessening in the trade-off that this would imply, some withdrawal of monetary stimulus is likely to be appropriate over the coming months in order to return inflation sustainably to target. The case for a modest monetary tightening is reinforced by the possibility that global r* may be rising, meaning that monetary policy has to move in order to stand still. Any prospective increases in Bank Rate would be expected to be at a gradual pace and to a limited extent, and to be consistent with monetary policy continuing to provide substantial support to the economy. There remain considerable risks to the UK outlook, which include the response of households, businesses and financial markets to developments related to the process of EU withdrawal. The MPC will respond to these developments as they occur insofar as they affect the behaviour of households and businesses, and the outlook for inflation.

But withdrawing from internationally-agreed minimum requirements which apply to globally-active entities – such as the FRTB or the NSFR standards, I want to insist on the Trading Book – would be completely different and a source of great concern for all. Any temptation of competitive deregulation would be a lose-lose game which would increase the risks of a new financial crisis and therefore weigh on economic growth. International cooperation on financial sector regulation is our common good, and, fortunately, the Hamburg G20 Summit reaffirmed it. The second requirement is to carefully assess the impact of these new financial regulations. The Banque de France has supported the work of the FSB from its inception, notably to build the “policy evaluation framework” to assess the effects of G20 reforms. This was endorsed by the Leaders of the G20 at the Hamburg Summit. This is a key part of the credibility of global financial reforms. Ex-post evaluations will make it possible to assess whether G20 financial regulatory reforms have actually achieved their intended outcomes. Going forward, these evaluations are meant to provide a basis for the possible fine-tuning of post-crisis regulatory reforms, where relevant. What matters now is to make sure that this framework is used in a timely manner. To this end, a tight schedule should be defined by the end of the year, so that the first evaluations can be carried out in 2018. ** Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude by a word on the Paris ecosystem in a post-Brexit Europe.
‘Cardus on Cricket: A Selection from the Cricket Writing of Sir Neville Cardus’ Souvenir Press  1  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  Fundamentally, this is due to the fact that Libor is trying to measure a market – the market for unsecured wholesale term lending to banks – that is no longer sufficiently active. The low levels of underlying activity make it fragile and more susceptible to liquidity and amplification effects in financial markets. In the three-month sterling Libor rate, which is commonly referenced in many loan agreements in the UK, the proportion of ‘transaction based’ submissions only rose above 10% of relevant data supporting that rate once in the year up to March.2 In the week of 16 March this year, as central bank policy rates were reduced to historically low levels, making cheaper funding available to banks, ‘transaction based’ submissions in three-month sterling Libor fell to zero.3 Over half of the 35 published Libor rates across all currencies contained no transaction based submissions at all during that same week. At the same time Libor rates, and therefore costs for borrowers, spiked upwards based on firms’ expert judgement. By contrast, the value of transactions underpinning SONIA, the chosen alternative in sterling markets, increased from an average of around £ billion per day to over £ billion in April. Now let me emphasise, as I have said before, we have no reason to believe there is misconduct related to the Libor rates today.

How innovative is an ECB allowed to be, which as a start-up from the year 1999 is in many ways itself an innovation, and as a custodian of a currency without a state can only partly be compared with other central banks. Of course I can only give you today, less than a week before our ECB Governing Council meeting, some general reflections from my personal point of view. I think we can all readily agree that innovation cannot be an end in itself. The ECB must and will act only in accordance with its mandate. Price stability is the guiding principle of our actions. The definition of our mandate does not allow for innovations. Moreover, in uncertain times of crisis a clear focus is not less, but doubly important. Central banks therefore have a particularly strong understanding of tradition, and for a good reason: monetary policy is all about trust, reliability and consistency. Innovative measures must therefore be judged against our mandate of maintaining and creating price stability. As with any decision, innovation demands a sober analysis of the costs and benefits, the opportunities and risks. Allow me to slip briefly into legalese: innovative monetary policy measures, too, should be suitable to achieve their objective. Since monetary policy measures also have side effects, a central bank should use the mildest means to achieve the fewest possible side effects. Low inflation rates and the catalogue of measures So what does this mean for the current situation? Unanimous monetary policy can and must maintain price stability.
Peter Praet: Transition of the financial system in the wake of the financial crisis Speech by Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the 8th Annual European Market Liquidity Conference of the Association of Financial Markets in Europe, London, 13 February 2013. *  *  *  Introduction It is a pleasure for me to give this keynote address on the occasion of AFME’s 8th Annual European Market Liquidity Conference. The ECB has a vested interest in the efficient functioning of financial markets and, in particular, in their liquidity. In this context, I will also address the important topic of trade transparency, including AFME’s work regarding the posttrade transparency calibration under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II). Restructuring funding and markets: central bank and market initiatives The ongoing transition of the financial system in the wake of the financial crisis is driven by market initiatives, regulators and central banks. Before addressing financial regulation, let me start with some thoughts regarding the contributions of the central bank and respective market participants. As we know, bank funding channels have changed significantly during the crisis. Several of the measures implemented by the ECB, notably the three-year longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) and the adjustments in our collateral policy, have been effective in alleviating bank funding constraints and containing the risks of a disorderly bank deleveraging process.

While this implies that a one-size-fits-all level of transparency is unlikely to exist, a number of economic forces are omnipresent and therefore allow us to draw some conclusions from the academic literature on post-trade transparency. In those market segments that the MiFID II review aims to address, liquidity providers play a central role as they intermediate between end investors and thereby help to secure a wellfunctioning marketplace. Yet an efficient and resilient market requires a sufficient level of competition. Several studies6 show that a lack of transparency can be a serious threat to a level playing field because intermediaries may use their private knowledge of customer order flow as an informational advantage that allows them to exert market power. Therefore,  3  See opinion of the ECB of 25 January 2012 on a proposal for a Directive on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and a proposal for a Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2012/5). 4  In particular the Money Market Contact Group, the newly established Bond Market Contact Group, the Foreign Exchange Contact Group and the Operations Managers Contact Group (see the ECB website for more information on these groups).
That minimum requirement must however be well-parametrised to take into account the special nature of the different institutions while preserving a level playing field both nationally and internationally. 3  The European case  Let me now expand a bit more on the European resolution framework which has played a key role in the policy response to the financial and institutional crisis in the EU and is subject to relevant specific challenges. The involvement of national governments in the resolution of the financial crisis established a perverse destabilising link between sovereign and financial risks which was at the root of the severe turmoil in public debt markets that started in 2010. That turmoil challenged the very existence of the single currency as it caused the reemergence of a country risk component in all relevant asset prices and impaired the correct functioning of the monetary union. The reaction by the authorities was to adopt an ambitious common framework not only for the prevention of banking crises – through the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) – but also for the resolution of those crisis through the newly founded Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SRM ensures not only that the resolution framework will be harmonised in the euro area – as provided by the BRRD – but also that resolution policy, at least for SSM countries, will be managed centrally by a Single Resolution Board (SRB), which will enjoy a high degree of 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  autonomy.

9  STRUCTURAL CHANGES AND NEW CHALLENGES  NORGES BANK  We have always know that activity on the Norwegian shelf would eventually decline. After a half-century of oil production, about half of estimated total reserves have been extracted.3 About half of what remains has not yet been discovered. In recent years, known oil resources have shown little increase (Chart 10). There is also the question of how much of what remains would be profitable to extract. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 13 FEBRUARY 2020  Chart 10 Fewer large discoveries. Reserve growth. In millions of scm of oil equivalents 1800  1800  1600  1600  1400  1400  1200  1200  1000  1000  800  800  600  600  400  400  200  200 0  0 1967  1974  1981  1988  1995  2002  2009  2016  Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate  The offshore oil industry features investments that generate income for a long time ahead. For many fields, the exploratory, development and production phases span several decades. The Johan Sverdrup field, where production recently started, will according to plan remain in production for at least 40 years. Exploration and field development decisions have always been based on estimated futures prices for oil and gas. Uncertainty linked to future profitability has also been a key factor. Today, global climate challenges add to that uncertainty. More and more people are waking up to the gravity of climate change.
Fourth, the banks are accountable for having their external auditors submit their audit program to the Bank of Thailand every year and for allowing the auditors to supply all documents to supervisors upon request. In addition, the auditors must report the banks’ material non-compliance with any laws or regulations derived from the Commercial Banking Act as well as any material internal control deficiencies. If any auditors fail to meet these requirements, the Bank of Thailand will either oppose the appointment of such auditors and/or revoke their existing appointment. On the supervisory side, the greatest reduction in supervisors’ workload is in internal control and irregularities assessment. Our supervisors use these two reports to determine the breadth and depth of on-site examination planning. For example, if supervisors determine that the external auditors’ work on internal control assessment is adequate, our examination efforts in this area may be reduced. Delegation of these two tasks aligns with the Basel guidelines, as they are both within the external auditors’ technical and practical competence. BIS Review 55/2004  1  The Bank of Thailand has long recognized that to derive the greatest benefits from external auditors, the auditors need to have a good understanding of not only prudential regulations, but also key supervisory concerns at the client banking institutions.

In closing, I want to reiterate that external auditors have truly been one of our key partners in the quest for greater financial stability. Thailand’s financial industry is currently in the midst of structural changes with the implementation of our Financial Sector Master Plan. One of the goals of the master plan is to promote greater competition, which in turn, may result in the evolution of bigger and more complex financial institutions. Against this background, our supervisors will need to fully embrace a risk-based supervisory philosophy and its focus on the quality of internal controls and risk management systems. Therefore, our relationship with external auditors will become even more important in the years ahead as we seek to strengthen banks’ risk management systems and enhance fnancial stability. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 55/2004
2  BIS Review 25/2003  What is the rationale for this activity, which is now consuming a significant proportion of the Fund’s resources? The Asian crisis demonstrated that poorly regulated financial systems, particularly banking systems, could themselves be a cause of crisis, even where the macro-economic position might look relatively stable. In the case of countries like Indonesia, Korea and Thailand it became clear after the event that their banks were heavily exposed to currency risk through unhedged dollar borrowings. Furthermore, that the regulators in those countries had paid little attention to this mismatch, and indeed little attention to credit quality. In many cases banks were far too close to the companies to which they lent. There had been a rapid expansion of connected lending and little policing of large exposures, so banks were highly vulnerable to individual corporate collapses. That, in turn, precipitated the crisis in the banking system which turned an economic adjustment into a full blown systemic collapse. Certainly, it will take some time for this IMF assessment programme to bear fruit and it will be crucial to turn initial assessments into effective long-term mitigation and implementation strategies. This will require both political commitment and, where appropriate, technical assistance. But there are signs that more developing countries now appreciate the importance of independent systems of financial regulation, and that the Finance Minister’s best friend may not necessarily be the right choice as head of banking supervision, particularly not if his family owns a large slice of the banking system.

In doing so I have posed a question. Is the Global Regulatory System fit for purpose in the 21st Century? We could all save time if I answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and sat down. But I will indulge myself with a few reflections, based on eight years as a regulator, before I give you my considered response. The Asian crisis and its aftermath In the immediate aftermath of the Asian financial crises of 1997-98, there were widespread calls for a fundamental reform of the international financial architecture. It was argued that the traumas of Korea, Indonesia and Thailand, pointed to fundamental weaknesses in the international financial system. These were countries with relatively sound fiscal positions, enjoying rapid economic growth, yet when a crisis of confidence hit, their financial systems collapsed with alarming speed. This experience, which took the international financial institutions by surprise, appeared to demonstrate both that the IMF’s financial surveillance was inadequate, and that its crisis management tools were similarly lacking. Though it is also appropriate to point out that the markets did not see the crisis coming either. There are those like Jeffrey Sachs and, from a different perspective, Joe Stiglitz, who have used this failure to mount a major assault on the policies and practices of the Fund over many years. These disputes rumble on, as Stigiltz’s ill-tempered ad hominem attack on Stanley Fischer (in Globalization and Its Discontents) demonstrated. Personality-driven disputes are entertaining for the press.
Thus, significant progress has been achieved. However, the future may still add to the extraordinary challenges we are now confronted with. I rely on the academic community to help the policymakers in the decisive decisions they will have to take. Thank you for your attention. I wish you all a fruitful and stimulating conference. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

The IFRS Foundation plans to set up by the end of this year an International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) as a global standard setter. An IFRS work group is already developing a prototype climate reporting standard. The IFRS work group’s recommendations on the prototype will be reviewed by a technical expert group co-chaired by MAS and the US Securities and Exchange Commission, under IOSCO’s Sustainable Finance Taskforce. The expert group will assess if the prototype could be a basis for developing the ISSB’s standards. MAS and SGX will set out roadmaps for mandatory climate-related financial disclosures by financial institutions and listed entities respectively. The roadmap will take a phased approach. A more ambitious timeline can be considered for listed entities that are larger or more exposed to climate risks. Larger financial institutions can similarly be prioritised. These details will be worked out in consultation with the industry in the coming months. SGX will soon consult the industry on making climate-related reporting in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). SGX already subjects listed entities to annual sustainability reporting on a “comply or explain” basis, but without specifying any particular framework for them to follow. The TCFD recommendations provide a good baseline disclosure framework. They have gained broad acceptance internationally and will be the basis for future ISSB climate reporting standards. MAS will consult the industry later this year on mandatory climate-related disclosures by financial institutions.