samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Import prices  Services prices  Annual percentage change  Annual percentage change  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  5  Australia USA United Kingdom Norway Canada Sweden  4  3  -5  Australia USA United Kingdom Norway Canada Sweden  -10 -15 10  11  12  13  5  4  3  2  2  1  1  -5 -10 -15  14  0  0 10  11  12  13  14  Note. In Figure 2b, the data for Australia is quarterly, while the data for other countries is monthly. For Sweden, Norway, the euro area and the United Kingdom, the data refers to services prices in the HICP and for others in the CPI. Sources: National sources and Statistics Sweden  9  The KIX index for policy rates only includes the euro area, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its composition has been governed by the relevance of the respective country’s policy rate for pricing on the foreign exchange and financial markets. For a more detailed explanation, see Sveriges Riksbank (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Slower domestic demand and low inflation expectations also contribute The impact of monetary policy via the exchange rate can be primarily observed in prices of internationally-traded goods. However, a monetary policy that leans against the wind also has effects on inflation in that it dampens domestic demand.

Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  One would need to raise the repo rate substantially, perhaps by several percentage points, to have a tangible effect on the risks linked to indebtedness. But the effect would then also be much higher unemployment and a much lower inflation. Such a monetary policy stance does not appear appropriate, and would in any circumstance not be compatible with an inflation target. The estimated effect of the repo rate on the debt ratio is very uncertain, so it is not impossible that the actual effect is much greater. At the same time, it is also possible that the actual effect is zero, or even that it would go in the opposite direction so that the debt ratio rises when the interest rate is raised.13 This could be possible, as the interest rate not only affects indebtedness, it also affects disposable incomes through its impact on economic activity and inflation. A higher interest rate is expected to have a negative effect on both indebtedness and disposable incomes. The ratio between them can therefore in principle rise or fall, even if it appears to be the latter in practice. Although I consider that indebtedness in the Swedish household sector comprises a risk to macroeconomic developments in Sweden, I am extremely doubtful about managing this risk by means of a monetary policy that leans against the wind. The cost appears to be high: inflation is pushed down in a situation where it is already low and unemployment becomes unnecessarily high.
Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir: Brief overview of Islamic banking and finance Speech by Mr Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Official Launch of Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006, Kuala Lumpur, 24 November 2006. *  *  *  It is indeed an honour to be here this morning at the launching of the Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006, organized by the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM). It was exactly five years ago that all of us witnessed the launching of the first Islamic Banking and Takaful Week by the then Deputy Prime Minister, Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. And now, after those years, Alhamdulillah, we are pleased with the positive impact of the comprehensive awareness campaign in the year 2001 as it has paved the way to subsequent nationwide annual campaigns on financial awareness in Islamic banking and finance. In this regard, I wish to congratulate all financial institutions involved for providing their unwavering support in this virtuous endeavour. Before I proceed, allow me to take this opportunity to welcome our exhibitors, both local and foreign, who will be participating in the Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Finance Expo 2006. We believe that your participation will benefit the patrons to this expo.

All in all, it can be noted that the Riksbank overestimated the outcome for inflation in 2009 to approximately the same extent as the average for other forecasters, although with the exception of July and September 2008 when the Riksbank’s forecasts overestimated the prospects for inflation to a higher degree than other forecasters (see Figure 8). This was because energy prices increased more than expected during the spring, which led to inflation reaching over 4 per cent in the summer of 2008. The Riksbank thus saw a risk that the substantial increases in the prices of food and oil would also lead to rapid increases in other prices. Unusually high inflation expectations also contributed to this assessment. With regard to the outcome for GDP growth, the Riksbank’s overestimation was approximately the same as the average of the other forecasters. All of the forecasters continued to overestimate GDP growth for 2009 even during the first quarter of 2009. In other words, no forecaster predicted the economic downturn sooner than any other. How accurate are the Riksbank’s forecasts? As monetary policy is based on forecasts it is important that the Riksbank’s forecasts are acceptably accurate. However, it is not possible to assess accuracy by analysing the forecasts for a single year. Even forecasters with a good average accuracy may be less successful in an individual year. A fairer assessment requires a longer observation period.
Rerunning our Phillips curve models using this broader measure of slack, or equivalently, a measure of “core” employment only, leads to the prediction errors for inflation becoming measurably smaller. Look at how the gap between actual and predicted inflation largely disappears on slide 5, in particular for the recent history. All this essentially means that it may take longer for inflation to gain steam and wage pressure might only start to rise meaningfully once adjustments in the “intensive margin” take hold – that is, once those who want to work more hours also succeed in doing so and once those who are still willing to work, but not currently counted as unemployed, are reabsorbed. Indeed, hours worked per employee have not recovered since the double-dip recession. So what is the link between these developments and hysteresis? To be sure, the increasing prevalence of part-time and temporary work reflects several factors – including, in part, important structural reforms in many euro area economies that have helped strengthen the resilience of the euro area. 4/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  Yet, the compositional effects we are seeing in the labour market may also reflect more crisisrelated factors, in particular uncertainty about the strength and durability of the recovery and pessimism about the long-term impact of the downturn on growth.

A recent study analysing the experience of the Spanish labour market confirms this view: over time job finding rates become less and less responsive to improvements in the aggregate labour market.14 I would even go one step further, namely to question whether allowing inflation to overshoot would help address the more subtle forms of hysteresis in the economy linked to uncertainty and 7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  investment. I have no doubt that investment would have been much lower today were it not for the impulse generated by our policies. But central banks cannot address all of the underlying causes of weak capital formation. For example, if it is true that investment is being affected to some extent by weak long-term growth expectations, then monetary policy cannot be the whole answer – unless one believes in a very hard form of “reverse hysteresis”. The truth is that should weak long-term growth expectations indeed become self-fulfilling, then we would also see signs of hysteresis in the natural rate of interest, which economists frequently call "r-star". A lower r-star, in turn, would push the interest rate level at which policy becomes expansionary even lower – feeding concerns about the ability of monetary policy to address advanced cases of hysteresis. We don't want the central bank itself to fall into the “anxiety trap”. The answer therefore has to address the structural causes of low trend growth and long-term unemployment through policies supporting productivity and minimising both dualities in the labour market and social exclusion.
As I have mentioned earlier, some risks that endanger the continuation of the downward trend of inflation in the medium term do exist. The first risk is the continuation of the increases in crude oil prices. Other main risk factors include the rapid changes in global risk perceptions resulting from the monetary policies of developed countries and the fluctuations that might occur in financial markets accordingly. In case such a risk materializes, the Central Bank will act with a medium-term perspective, as it does today: It will not respond to temporary increases in inflation; however, it will closely monitor medium-term inflation expectations. Another risk factor is that by returning to old habits, variables other than the inflation target are taken as a reference in pricing behaviors. This represents the risk of deterioration in pricing behaviors. In order to prevent such a risk from materializing, the Central Bank will maintain its cautious stance until medium-term inflation expectations converge to the targets. One of the risk factors, which are important in the disinflation process and are closely monitored, is the price rigidity in the services sector. These sectors require implementations that will increase supply and competition. Additionally, the Central Bank carefully monitors the political risks that have come to the forefront more and more in the recent period. In this scope, in case it is foreseen that political developments in the country will have a negative effect on inflation, the Central Bank shall take the necessary measures.

No disruption was observed in foreign direct investment inflow during the fluctuations in financial markets that started in May. This development is a result of the success achieved in macroeconomic stability and also an indicator of confidence in the future. The inflow of foreign direct investment is expected to accelerate further, due to increased privatizations, company mergers and takeovers. Meanwhile, it is observed that hot money inflows, which lead to frequent discussions about the financing of the current account deficit, have lost pace due to the change in global liquidity conditions. Including net errors and omissions, the ratio of hot money to current account deficit, which was 103 percent on an annual basis by June 2005, decreased to 27.8 percent by June 2006. We expect that the above mentioned financing structure, which is composed heavily of long-term capital and foreign direct investments, will also continue in the upcoming years in the framework of the structural transformation process in the Turkish economy and the European Union full membership process. While evaluating the rates of current account deficit, it should be taken into account that the macroeconomic conditions in Turkey are different from those of the past. First of all, the short position of the banking sector is very limited compared to previous years and the financial sector is much more robust. Tight monetary and fiscal policies are decisively implemented. Foreign exchange reserves are high and the floating exchange rate regime is successfully fulfilling its shock-absorbing function.
22 As in most central banks, interest rate decisions in Norges Bank are entrusted to a committee. Committee deliberations are informed by advice given by the governor and deputy governor of Norges Bank. Norges Bank’s Executive Board has seven members. The number of committee members at other central banks varies between three and 22. 23 A committee of many members can draw on an ample supply of varied backgrounds and opinions, but a larger number will then also have to have a say in the final decision. While research has yet to determine the optimal committee size, Anne Sibert, one of the experts in this field, has said that the committee should be “dinner size”. 24 5. But groups are no guarantee for good decisions  Norges Bank’s Executive Board can be described as a collegial committee. The committee seeks consensus through deliberations and its members stand behind the final decision. The deliberative process does not necessarily lead to a better decision. When the group members share the same world view and thinking, groupthink can lead the members astray. There is typically little dissent in discussions where participants think alike. The group can therefore be convinced that their common standpoint must be right. 25 Nor is it unusual for independent thinking to be lost in a group setting. At an internal conference, the research department at Norges Bank was divided into three groups tasked with answering three sets of questions.

Øystein Olsen: Management of the Government Pension Fund Global Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting, Oslo, 3 May 2021. * * * Please note that the text below may differ from the actual address. I would like to thank the Committee for the invitation to speak on the Bank’s management of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). Norges Bank manages the GPFG with the objective of achieving the highest possible return over time within the limits of the investment mandate defined by the Ministry of Finance. The GPFG is to be managed within an adequate control and risk management framework and in a responsible and efficient manner with a high degree of transparency. The GPFG is managed to track the benchmark index fairly closely, ie the return largely tracks the return on the benchmark index. The benchmark index is defined by the Ministry of Finance and endorsed by the Storting. However, even though Norges Bank closely tracks the GPFG’s benchmark index, many large and small choices have to be made every day. These choices are based on a clear mandate from the authorities and a well thought-out investment strategy. The year 2020 was a special year for us all, including the GPFG. As for many others, working conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic have been demanding.
The fourth lesson is the benefits to long-term growth and stability that come from disciplined policy management and the pursuance of policy that enhances flexibility in the economic system. The 1997–1998 crisis has been an important lesson for Asia on this point. Disciplined policy reduces the risk of an internally-induced crisis due to policy error and provides the authorities with greater room and flexibility to deal with unexpected events or shocks. In the current crisis, the ability of many Asian economies to respond aggressively to the impact of the crisis without undermining policy credibility is a case in point. From my own experience, policy discipline relates closely to decisions that are made with a long-term perspective. The lack of discipline more than often reflects policy that focuses overwhelmingly on short-term outcome. In economics, emphasis on short-term outcome tends to reduce volatility initially but a cost of a much larger volatility and welfare loss at a later date as the needed adjustment is postponed. A long-term perspective, on the other hand, allows the adjustment to be spread out with lesser volatility and effects on economic welfare. Next, enhancing flexibility in the economy through policy that raises the role of the price mechanism in the allocation of resources is another crucial policy choice that can make important differences to the economies of emerging markets. Again, we in Asia learned this lesson well in the 1990’s.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Post-crisis challenges to emerging markets – what are at stake for central banks? Keynote address by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor for Monetary Stability of the Bank of Thailand, at the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN)/Bank of England Seminar on Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy Management, Brunei Darussalam, 22 March 2010. *  *  *  First, I want to thank SEACEN, the Centre for Central Banking Studies of the Bank of England, and Ministry of Finance, Brunei Darussalam for inviting me to deliver this morning’s keynote address. The SEACEN’s advanced course and seminar have always been an important learning forum for central bankers in Asia to discuss common challenges as well as to share practical experience. So, I very much appreciate the opportunity to be speaking to all of you today. On a personal note, it has also been a few years since I last spoke at this forum, as my responsibility at the Bank of Thailand as a deputy governor up to October last year changed from monetary policy to financial regulation and supervision. This brief tenure of overseeing financial stability, especially managing the financial system at the height of the global financial crisis, has been a valuable experience and makes me appreciate even more the responsibility, the complexity, and the challenge to central banking. And it is a reflection of this experience that I want to share with you this morning, on the post-crisis challenge to emerging economies and what are at stake for central banks.
This was to enable the Government to finance ambitious housing construction programmes and budget deficits that arose as a result of investment and social welfare measures. The banks themselves could decide who received the other half of their lending. However, the rate at which the lending could increase was determined by the Riksbank through “credit ceilings”. The idea was to keep credit expansion in line with economic developments and thus prevent inflation from accelerating. Moreover, the banks were encouraged to give priority to corporate lending so that the investment rate would not be threatened. Most of the loans to the private sector were made to large, international Swedish corporations. However, it was not only the banks’ credit volumes that were regulated; the price of the credit was also regulated. The Riksbank determined both the deposit and lending rates. The charges for various bank services were also regulated. This was intended to prevent unhealthy competition and protect account-holders and borrowers. The banks had to obtain permission to open branches in other towns in Sweden. This was to avoid too many banks establishing in one area so that competition became too stiff and profitability poor. In addition to the domestic regulations, there were also a number of regulations regarding crossborder capital flows. These were more or less entirely regulated. Companies and individuals were only  BIS Review 24/2006  1  permitted to invest if they could prove the financial necessity of the investment.

Yet, inflation remains the main concern for our fellow citizens - and in particular the most vulnerable among them - and for us. Admittedly, it has started to stabilise, or even to fall back to 8.6% in the euro area at the end of January in the context of a slowdown in energy prices. However, the first figures for February published yesterday for Spain and France call for vigilance, and for perseverance in our monetary action: inflation persists, for France at 7.2% according to the European Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, at 6.2% according to the national price index. According to our forecasts, it should reach its peak in the first half of 2023 and could have halved by the end of the year. But that is still too high, and core inflation, i.e. excluding energy and food, is still rising and amounts to 4.5% for France according to our estimates. The nature of inflation has indeed changed beyond the initial energy crisis: it is not only  Page 2 sur 5 higher but also more widespread, not just imported but also domestic, not just linked to a transitory supply shock but also potentially persistent. In light of this, no one can deny that monetary policy can and must respond. Here, I would like to emphasise not only our forecast, but also our commitment to bring inflation down to 2% by the end of 2024-25.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Rethinking microfinance norms Special address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Global Symposium on Microfinance, Kuala Lumpur, 22 May 2017. * * * Thank you for the opportunity to speak today at this Symposium. Bank Negara Malaysia is pleased to host this event together with the World Bank. We are also pleased to have Finance Minister II, Yang Berhormat Datuk Seri Johari Abdul Ghani present with us to address the audience here today. It has been almost six decades since the economist John Kenneth Galbraith observed that few things are more evident in modern social history than the declining interest in inequality as an economic issue. Today, financial and economic inclusion is given priority as a policy agenda, as the global economy confronts an environment of rising income inequality and tepid global growth. According to the World Bank, the distribution of income globally is highly unequal today with a Gini coefficient of 70.7, up from 68.4 in the 1980s. In some countries, income inequality has in fact risen sharply. The challenge of income inequality is even more prominent in Asia. A Working Paper published by the IMF in 2016, highlighted that in Asia, the average Gini coefficient has risen by 4 points from 36 in 1990 to 40 in 2013. Over the same period, the average Gini coefficient for the rest of the world rose by only 2 points.

From a financial stability perspective, it is about introducing riskier and less experienced borrowers into the financial system. Hence, the implementation aspect is critical, especially in the attempt to balance the trade-offs between financial stability and inclusion. This is never an easy task. For every success of microfinance, we have seen some failures. One example that comes to mind is the case of a large Asian economy in 2010 where the unrestrained growth of micro lending led to high debt stress among borrowers, financial instability, and sensationalized newspaper accounts of suicide among borrowers. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  However, these challenges must not sway our resolve to further the cause of microfinance. We must continue to find new and more efficient implementation strategies. Forums such as this give us an opportunity to examine these issues more closely, and share successes and pitfalls so that others might benefit. We therefore welcome the publication of the World Bank’s report on financial inclusion in Malaysia which we hope will also hold useful lessons for others. Malaysia has devoted significant focus to the sustainable development of microfinance over many years to boost growth and improve welfare. More than 75% of businesses in Malaysia are micro enterprises, and 40% of Malaysia’s households earn incomes below USD850 (RM3,650) a month. The view that distribution, not just aggregate growth matters, is therefore, a view that resonates strongly with us. William Faulkner, the famed American writer and Nobel laureate, once spoke of the all-important virtue of “trying until we get it right”.