samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me begin with the banking sector. Because this is a heavily regulated sector, regulatory design failures (or possibly even system design failures) could equally well be the source of inefficient outcomes. When thinking about public debt, it is also clear that distorted market mechanisms are unlikely to be the only culprit. But even in the case of household indebtedness, I would argue that cognitive or behavioural biases as well as other forms of psychological influence (e.g. emotions) are equally important as a potential explanation – even if less recognised. These biases imply that individual decision-making may deviate from the principles of rational choice on which the welfare theorems are based (and on which our understanding of the performance of the market system is founded). If the basic assumptions about rational behaviour do not hold, the decentralised decisions of individuals can – plausibly – lead to sub-optimal market outcomes. Indebtedness of banks, sovereigns and households Let us now turn to the factors explaining the excessive indebtedness of banks, sovereigns and households. In the case of excessive leverage in the banking sector we can make a conventional and probably little disputed diagnosis. It is widely accepted that one main cause of over-leverage in banking is the existence of distorted incentives, originating from faulty, or defective, system design and regulation. The move from Basel II to Basel III is an explicit acknowledgement that capital and liquidity requirements ahead of the crisis were too lax. This was particularly the case for too-big-to-fail institutions.

As for the indebtedness of sovereigns, the key word is “prudence”: countries should make sure that they use the good times to lower their debt to GDP ratio so as to have a buffer for bad times. In general, the future cost of stabilising the debt to GDP ratio should be better taken into account when evaluating the benefits of countercyclical macroeconomic policies. And, given the electoral and political biases I have mentioned, the benefits of institutions promoting fiscal discipline should be taken on board. The constitutional debt brake rule (“Schuldenbremse”), adopted in 2002 by a very large majority of the Swiss people, is an excellent case in point. It has effectively led to a significant reduction in the public debt to GDP ratio in Switzerland, from above 50% in 2002 to below 40% today, with a target of 31% for 2015. This reduction in sovereign debt has had no negative consequences for the momentum of Swiss economic growth. On the contrary, before the Great Recession, Swiss GDP growth rates were above trend for five years in a row. Even if it can be argued that we benefited from lucky timing, the Swiss success with this form of commitment is an  7  Time-inconsistent preferences should not be confused with “impatience”. 8  For theoretical and empirical references on hyperbolic discounting and the self-control problem see, among others: O’Donoghue, R. (1999): Doing it now or later, American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No.1. ; Benton, M. et al.
6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Flows of workers and their bargaining power are, in turn, affected by structural features of the labour market. A rise in job insecurity will reduce flows of workers between jobs and their bargaining strength. A fall in the degree of unionisation and collective bargaining in the labour market, and a rise in the degree of automation and concentration in the company sector, will also reduce workers’ pay power. We discuss each in turn. If these structural forces were reducing workers’ bargaining power, we might expect them to receive a declining share of the income pie – a fall in the “labour share”. Internationally, there is strong evidence of the 8  labour share having fallen across a large number of developed countries. Structural factors, such as rising levels of automation and falling rates of unionisation, are typically found to have been an important contributor to those falls in international labour shares. 9  At face value, the UK appears to have bucked those trends. Chart 12 plots the UK labour share since 1955. Over the past two decades, it has been broadly flat. The UK labour share in 1990 was 50%, largely unchanged from today. In the UK, there appear to be fewer signs of any significant shift in the bargaining power of workers having resulted in them taking away a smaller slice of the income pie. I will discuss some of the reasons for that below.

Mugur Isărescu: 130th anniversary of the National Bank of Romania Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Gala Concert of George Enescu Philharmonic Orchestra, Bucharest, 5 September 2010. *  *  *  Mister President of Romania Your Excellencies Distinguished audience Dear guests and friends of the National Bank of Romania Please allow me to welcome Mr Jean Claude Trichet, the President of the European Central Bank, our honoured guest here, at the Romanian Athenaeum, to the final act of our anniversary event. I would also like to greet President Ion Iliescu and Mr Emil Boc, the Prime Minister of Romania. I appreciate your honouring our invitation. My thanks go also to you all, governors, representatives of central banks and international financial institutions, and to all our Romanian and foreign guests. We are very happy to have you here with us this evening. We celebrate the 130th anniversary since the establishment of the National Bank of Romania, the 16th central bank in the world, according to the most widely accepted chronology. The birthday of our institution is on 29 April 1880, a day on which the Law on the establishment of the NBR was published in the Official Gazette. The commissioning of the Bank required a longer process that spanned over the entire 1880. On 5 September 1880 – precisely 130 years ago, the Bank’s Board held its first meeting.
Tucker interview by D. Smith, The Sunday Times 25 April 2004. 6  BIS Review 46/2006  Amongst others, Lars Svensson 18 and Michael Woodford have argued that central banks should publish the path they expect for the policy rate or the near-term path of inflation they are aiming for. The Norwegian and New Zealand central banks have been publishing policyrate paths for a short while. 19 The Bank of England does not. What do I – let me stress, personally – think about that? As others have pointed out, managing a scheme for voting by nine members on a path of rates would be pretty complex. Proposals have been made (eg for deriving a median path from individual members’ paths) 20 , but they seem to entertain the possibility of shifting majorities for different parts of the resulting path (or implied money market curve). That may add an extra complication to explaining policy. Indeed, more broadly, there would probably be a challenge in the area of communication. A single path for rates would, of course, be a misleading statement of the policymaker’s intentions; of its ‘reaction function’. The path policy takes will depend, very obviously, on the shocks that hit the economy in the future. But not only on that. Also on whether, even in the absence of new shocks affecting households and firms, the economy evolves on the path the central bank expected, including agents’ responses to past policy decisions and shocks.

We cannot achieve and maintain financial stability on our own. Above all, it requires recognition of the public interest in financial stability. Thirteen years ago, at the annual banquet for the Bankers and Merchants of the City, in June 1997, just over a month after the Election of that year, commenting on the new regulatory arrangements, the then Governor of the Bank, Eddie George, said that the direction of financial services regulation was driven in part “by a rising tide of public expectations in terms of both the prudential and the behavioural standards required of financial intermediaries”. Eddie George was undoubtedly correct that the public will and should expect more in terms of the standard of business of firms. But history now tells us – painfully – that on the way to higher standards there was a terrible lapse in which too many people in our industry forgot that preserving financial stability is the duty that we all owe to the public. The fact of the matter is that the public has every right to expect us to act in their interest. This means that we cannot have attitudes which put short-term gain first on the basis that the stability of the financial system can be tomorrow’s objective, for the next person. But in order to achieve this, we need to be very clear on the benefits of financial stability. One of the questions I get asked most frequently is how we will ensure that the lessons of the crisis stick.
22  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 9: Violent crime in Western Europe England  Netherlands and Belgium  Scandinavia  Germany and Switzerland  Homicides per 100,000 per year  80  Italy  70 60 50 40 30 20 10  1300  1400  1500  1600  1700  1800  1900  0  2000  Source: OurWorldinData.org, based on Eisner (2003). Chart 10: Death rate associated with state-based conflicts Deaths per milion people  Extrastate  250  Intrastate Interstate Internationalized Intrastate  200  Deaths per million people  150  100  50  1946  1956  1966  1976  1986  1996  2006  0  Source: Human Security Report Project, available at: http://www.hsrgroup.org/our-work/security-stats/Deathsfrom-Organized-Violence.aspx  BIS central bankers’ speeches  23  Chart 11: Government command of output as a percentage of GNP in England, 1285–2000 Government spending as a share of output, percent  100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10  1200  1300  1400  1500  1600  1700  1800  1900  0 2000  Source: Clark (2009).

In advanced economies, public investment has been on a gently downwards path for the past three decades (Chart 17). In the UK, public investment relative to GDP is a third of its level in 1970. There has been no deepening in the global capital stock for a generation, if anything the opposite. Given the role public investment has often played in the past in supporting private innovation, this is not an entirely comforting picture. 71 In sum, if history and empirical evidence is any guide, this cocktail of sociological factors, individually and in combination, could restrain growth. They could jeopardise the promise of the fourth industrial revolution. Pessimists’ concerns would be warranted. Conclusion Growth is a gift. Yet contrary to popular perceptions, it has not always kept on giving. Despite centuries of experience, the raw ingredients of growth remain something of a mystery. As best we can tell historically, they have been a complex mix of the sociological and the technological, typically acting in harmony. All three of the industrial revolutions since 1750 bear these hallmarks. Today, the growth picture is foggier. We have fear about secular stagnation at the same time as cheer about secular innovation. The technological tailwinds to growth are strong, but so too are the sociological headwinds. Buffeted by these cross-winds, future growth risks becoming suspended between the mundane and the miraculous. 67  Mischel (2014). 68  Urminsky and Zauberman (2014). 69  For example, Davies, Haldane, Nielson and Pezzini (2014).
Under normal circumstances, agreements covering several years are an advantage, as these reduce uncertainty regarding future price and wage developments. However, the current situation is not normal. This means that making contractual commitments in respect of agreements for longer periods of time may be difficult. As I mentioned in my introduction, I have no advice regarding the outcome of this year’s collective bargaining. Instead, I have tried to describe the economic setting for this collective bargaining. The necessary deliberations must be undertaken by the social partners together. Concluding remarks Wage formation has functioned well over the last ten to fifteen years. It has contributed to our success in maintaining inflation on a low and stable level, at the same time as real wages and growth have developed strongly. My hopes are that this year’s collective bargaining will contribute towards Sweden’s continued positive economic development, once the effects of the financial crisis have ebbed away. BIS Review 11/2010  7  Figures  8  BIS Review 11/2010  BIS Review 11/2010  9  10  BIS Review 11/2010  BIS Review 11/2010  11  12  BIS Review 11/2010  BIS Review 11/2010  13  14  BIS Review 11/2010  BIS Review 11/2010  15  16  BIS Review 11/2010

5  53% of the stock of bank loans to non-financial businesses pay a floating interest rate, and for an additional one third the interest rate is fixed for one year or less. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  As a result of the Bank of England’s actions, we can relax other requirements to help with the flow of credit. Balance sheet repair will give confidence to depositors and investors who provide funding to banks. With that market funding assured, banks can safely hold fewer liquid assets, such as government bonds, that act as a cushion to be sold in the event that investors withdraw their funding. Accordingly, I can confirm today that, for major banks and building societies meeting the minimum 7% capital threshold, the Bank of England will reduce the level of required liquid asset holdings. The effect will be to lower total required holdings by £ billion, once all eight major banks and building societies meet the capital threshold.6 That will help to underpin the supply of credit, since every pound currently held in liquid assets is a pound that could be lent to the real economy. Taken together, our actions create not just a more resilient system, but also one more able to support and sustain a recovery by serving the real economy. Crossing the threshold of balance sheet repair is not the end-point. The 7% capital threshold, like the 7% unemployment threshold, is only a staging post at which we assess our next steps.
In this pursuit, greater collaboration among the law enforcement agencies (LEAs) as well as between LEAs and the private sector is essential for us to efficiently and effectively connect and assess all relevant information, which will no doubt further strengthen our efforts to fight ML/TF/PF threats. In this respect, it is observed that the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is gaining momentum and is fast becoming known as a key success factor for effective information sharing in the 1 the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence AML/CFT/CPF ecosystem. To quote some examples, Taskforce (JMLIT) established by the United Kingdom in 2016 has prompted a key shift in 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  addressing ML/TF threats. As of June 2020, JMLIT has completed over 750 cases and detected more than 5,000 suspected accounts linked to financial crimes. Similar achievement was also experienced by the Fintel Alliance in Australia where within the span of one year between 2018 to 2019, over 300 cases were successfully completed through the partnership. Other countries within the region have also followed suit – Hong Kong’s Fraud and Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (FMLIT) and Singapore’s Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Industry Partnership (ACIP). In Malaysia, the PPP is undertaken through the Financial Intelligence Network (MyFINet), which involves collaboration and information sharing between LEAs such as the Central Bank, Royal Malaysia Police and Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, and private sectors such as financial institutions.

Zdeněk Tůma: The role of the EBRD in the transition process towards fully fledged market economies Statement by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank and EBRD Alternate Governor, at the 15th Annual Meeting of the EBRD Board of Governors, London, 22 May 2006. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Mr President, Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour to address the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors in London and I wish to express my appreciation also to the Government of United Kingdom and to the City of London for their hospitality. We are today participating in the fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors and we can look back on these years with considerable satisfaction regarding the role of the EBRD in the transition process towards fully fledged market economies. Many countries - including my country, the Czech Republic – have witnessed significant and considerable political and economic transformation. I am glad to say that the European Bank is one of those successful institutions that have significantly contributed to this process. The Board of Governors has today approved the Bank's strategy for the period 2006 – 2010 – the Capital Resources Review 3. The new strategy reflects the successful transition achieved in the “Advanced Countries” and the Bank's activities are being focussed towards the South-Eastern and Eastern countries of its operations. We support this move. In Central Europe the Bank focuses on just a few sectors today.
Eddie Yue: Hong Kong - the Asian hub for sustainable finance Opening remarks by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Euromoney’s 2nd Asia Sustainable & Responsible Capital Markets Forum, Hong Kong, 25 June 2019. * * * Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. I would like to thank Euromoney for inviting me to speak at this 2nd Asia Sustainable and Responsible Capital Markets Forum today. It is indeed an honour to have this opportunity to talk about this important topic, especially here in Hong Kong, where we place a high priority on and direct much effort towards developing our sustainable finance platform. 2. I understand that we will have a very comprehensive programme today, covering not just the potential of sustainable finance in the region and the role of different stakeholders, but also exciting developments of green bonds and other innovative products. Allow me then to focus my remarks on the bigger picture and on three areas in particular: (i) First, the potential for sustainable finance in Asia; (ii) Second, Hong Kong’s role as Asia’s hub for sustainable finance; and (iii) Third, some of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA)’s latest initiatives on this topic. Potential for sustainable finance in Asia 3. The effects of climate change are already visible around the world: more severe weather events, infrastructure damage, problems with food security, water resources, and even human health. No country or community is immune.

In 2022, when the oil price exceeds the cut-off level, the current account balance will return to positive territory and the accumulation of reserves will be resumed via fiscal rule-based foreign currency purchases. We do not expect a noticeable change in the private sector financial account balance over the forecast horizon. According to our estimates, the private sector financial account deficit will reduce from USD 18 billion in 2019 to USD 15 billion this year. This is linked to decline in GDP, decrease in economic revenues, as well as less possibilities for borrowing in foreign markets at the end of the first quarter — the start of the second quarter amid intensified volatility and uncertainty. Further ahead, as global markets stabilise, the potential for external bollowings will recover and this will pass through to a reduction in the private sector financial account deficit to USD 10 billion in 2021–2022. This baseline scenario, without doubt, has many uncertainty factors. They concern both the duration of the restrictions in Russia and worldwide, and the pace of recovery of the global and Russian economies. Besides, new spikes of volatility may occur in global financial and commodity markets. Therefore, in our discussions of the key rate decision and its path, we have a proper regard to the objective of sustaining financial stability. As I noted, the baseline forecast incorporates only the fiscal decisions already made by the Government. We assume that further on the situation may require additional decisions to support the economy.
Chris Salmon: Financial market volatility and liquidity – a cautionary note Speech by Mr Chris Salmon, Executive Director for Markets of the Bank of England, at the National Asset-Liability Management Europe symposium, London, 13 March 2015. *  *  *  I would like to thank Andrew Butcher, Jonathan Rand, Allison Parent, Joseph Noss, Olga Cielinska, Liam Crowley-Reidy, Sebastian Vismara, Lu Liu and Yuliya Baranova for their comments and contributions. As Executive Director for Markets at the Bank of England it is my job to manage the balance sheet, implementing various policy decisions that the Bank makes. I am also responsible for ensuring that the Bank extracts as much “market intelligence” from financial market developments as is possible to inform those decisions. But it’s not my job to set policy. Given that, my remarks will focus on the key insights we have drawn from financial market developments over the past year or so, in the context of what has been quite a dynamic period for monetary policy. But I will not speculate on the future course of policy by the Bank of England or any other central bank, nor the likely effectiveness of the different strategies employed by central banks to achieve their targets. And my punch line will reveal me to be the central banker that I am: there are reasons to be cautious. In particular, recent periods of financial market volatility suggest that there are reasons to be cautious about the robustness of liquidity in core financial markets.

A number of recent statistical studies also imply this conclusion, suggesting that these recent episodes are a part of a broader pattern, even if they were exceptional in their scale. The following chart, using the output of a model estimated by Bank staff, is representative of the statistical analysis just referred to 1. The chart compares the estimated impact on UK equity and corporate debt asset price volatility of a given price shock in the post-crisis period relative to the pre-crisis period (Chart 3). Post crisis, both corporate debt volatility and equity market volatility appear to have become more responsive to a given price shock. This pattern is also apparent when the model is applied to a number of other important asset markets, including for example US-listed equities. Liquidity was clearly affected on each of 15 October and 15 January. Measures of trading volumes, which provide one metric of liquidity, were reportedly high on both days for most affected markets. But the ability of market participants to trade without affecting prices, or in some cases, to trade at all, was clearly very limited at various points on these days. The intra-day loss of liquidity was probably even starker on 15 January, from what we can tell, with widespread feedback that foreign exchange trading platforms stopped quoting Swiss francs for periods of time, while liquidity in the Swiss fixed income market was all but lost on the day and remained impaired for a few days.