samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
5 This proposal has yet to be realised. Parts of the inquiry's proposal were nevertheless implemented voluntarily but we consider that this coordination responsibility should be made statutory and provide the possibility to place binding requirements on the payment system’s participants. No authority currently has such a responsibility and neither is there an authority responsible for producing an overall risk and vulnerability analysis. Ability to create unlimited liquidity in SEK Among the Riksbank’s many tasks is the important role of providing liquidity in the event of a crisis. There are certainly good reasons to believe that the function of banks in society – facilitate payments, mediate credit, enable risk diversification – is more efficient as a result of competition among private players rather than being run by the state. But banking operations also have an inherent vulnerability. The banks’ funding is based to a considerable degree on short-term loans, for example deposits from the general public and short-term borrowing on the capital market. Their assets, on the other hand, often comprises lending of a more longterm nature. This mismatch in maturity and liquidity between debts and assets is typical for traditional banking operations and does not constitute a major problem as long as confidence is maintained in the banks’ debt-servicing ability. But if doubts arise, depositors may quickly try to withdraw their money – money that the bank cannot obtain in the short run. This causes a liquidity problem.

The fact that the central bank has a high degree of autonomy does not however mean that it is “independent” of political decisions. It is politicians who make decisions on how independent the central bank is to be. The degree of autonomy is reflected in several different conditions: how central bank executive boards are appointed, which people are appointed, what mandate they have, how the central bank’s operations are funded. The degree of autonomy can be different in different dimensions. There may also be a difference between how the autonomy manifests itself formally according to the law, and how it looks in practice. A central bank can, for example, have considerable formal autonomy when taking monetary policy decisions, whereas it may be strong dependent on political decisions for its funding. There is also a connection between the central bank’s mandate and its autonomy. The narrower the central bank’s mandate, the easier it will be for politicians to give it a higher degree of autonomy – and the easier it will be to evaluate the central bank. If the central bank has very broad, mandate, it may feel more natural for there to be a greater amount of political influence. To take two examples, among several: The Bank of England and Norges Bank both have significantly broader remits than the Riksbank, but they are less independent than the Riksbank, at least according to the legal frameworks. Central bank laws are not fixed for time eternal.
This is because making a payment is about more than just exchanging money for goods and services: it is a form of social interaction made possible by money, which has been described as “the most universal and most efficient system of mutual trust ever devised”7. Finally, a digital euro would increase privacy in digital payments thanks to the involvement of the central bank, which – unlike private suppliers of payment services – has no commercial interests related to consumer data. Ensuring privacy is an essential element of modern democracies and part of our European values. Payments must also respect people’s right to privacy in the digital era, and the design of a digital euro would have to respect this principle. This is a core aspect we will look at – indeed, we have already started exploring possible ways of enhancing privacy.8 At the same time, payments in a digital euro – just like any form of payment – would have to respect the rules on countering money laundering, the financing of terrorism and tax evasion. This would enable public authorities to combat any illegal activity more effectively. To summarise, the digital euro would still be a euro, only in digital form. It would both shape and promote the digitalisation of payments, while reducing the associated risks. This would in turn support the ongoing digitalisation and modernisation of the European economy.9  Why might we need a digital euro? A digital euro would be critically important in a number of scenarios, which are analysed in our report.

It is hard to conceive a general rule governing the use of capital controls to deal with massive capital inflows, but it is certainly more difficult to apply such controls in economies highly integrated to the world markets. Something that the evidence seems to suggest is that capital controls affect mainly the composition of the flows, not necessarily their magnitude. In that case, in order to affect the composition of international liabilities, in particular those intermediated by the banking sector, it would be more efficient to direct the eye toward financial regulation rather than to capital controls. In addition, macro-prudential regulations should be used to mitigate the procyclicality of capital flows. These measures could include BIS Review 72/2010  5  liquidity management policies, for instance imposing differentiated liquidity requirements for short-term and long-term financing flowing to banks or to other financial agents. Final remarks To conclude, we must first emphasize that global financial integration entails extensive benefits, as it allows to smooth expenditure fluctuations and to obtain resources to finance investments in countries with capital shortage. However, we have also learned that capital flows can be destabilizing, particularly when financial systems are fragile and macroeconomic policies inconsistent. Long-lasting boom periods have always presented challenges to macroeconomic policy making. Sadly, the passing from economic boom to a costly recession is a too recurrent experience for emerging economies, especially in Latin America.
We will need to know what issues to pay attention to, how those issues affect your business and find a common language to discuss them in a meaningful way. To this end, the Bank and Securities Commission Malaysia, are collaborating with the World Bank to develop a principles-based taxonomy to enable financial institutions in Malaysia to classify green assets consistently. This framework aims to support informed decisions and analysis of exposures to climate risk in fund raising, lending and investment activities. The Bank expects to issue the first draft of the taxonomy by the end of this year for industry feedback prior to its adoption. Second, we need to develop a more complete understanding of the impact of climaterelated risks to the Malaysian financial system and economy. In this regard, the Bank is actively involved in working together with the Central Banks and Supervisors Network of Greening the Financial System (NGFS) to develop an analytical framework to assess such risks. This entails sizing the impact of climate change on our financial system and economy, both in the central case and tail-end scenarios. This exercise also aims to estimate the relevant time frames in which these risks may materialise. To do so, we would need to better understand the transmission channels of climate-related risks, taking into consideration potential second-round effects and feedback loops.

In my remarks today, I will outline: Why climate change matters for the economy and for financial institutions, and; How we can and must work towards building climate resilience. Why climate change matters for the economy and financial institutions The financial sector is an important enabler of economic growth. The ability of financial institutions and authorities to identify and manage risks that can impair financial intermediation has direct consequences on the performance of the financial sector and the economy. These risks impact those we invest in, lend to, promise to cover and strive to create wealth with. Climate change impacts all of them, in increasingly significant and lasting ways. As we have seen in recent years, climate change is causing greater volatility in weather patterns. Globally, overall economic losses arising from natural disasters have been on an increasing trend for the past 40 years. In 2018, such losses amounted to USD160 billion – half the size of Malaysia’s economy, and among the costliest disaster year on record. Last year, Asia was the continent most affected by geophysical events, where typhoons, earthquakes, landslides and flash floods accounted for 43% of all events worldwide and for 74% of fatalities. While storms and droughts have long been familiar to this region, they have become more intense, more prolonged and more frequent. This translates into greater economic loss for governments, businesses and households – which in turn, can make its way into the financial system.
The reason for this is simple: insurance products can be complex and coupled with the sophisticated needs of clients such as individuals and SMEs, the human and personal touch of an agent can come in handy. It is these functions that will remain relevant in the Digital Economy; those that require intuition, discretion and sometimes, empathy; traits that are not easily programmable. Having said that, the Digital Economy will revamp the distribution landscape for general insurance and these changes are currently in progress as we speak. General insurance agents must accept and embrace the shifting business dynamics towards digitalisation. The agency force must not only reinvent themselves to reflect the latest digital trends, but also upgrade their capabilities in line with the latest technological developments. Thus, I would like to suggest three strategies that general insurance agents can take in not just surviving, but also thriving in the Malaysian Digital Economy, namely: First, improving the customer experience by enhancing your service capability. Compared to other financial products, such as banking products and investment products, insurance products are inherently more complex to understand. It is perhaps not a surprise that customer satisfaction of the local insurance industry is lower than other financial services industries. According to BrandIndex , in its study of the health of brand names in Malaysia, the top 5 insurance brands in Malaysia scored relatively lower than that of their top 5 counterparts in other financial service sectors (especially banking).

When the couple passes away, and if their children choose not to redeem the property, the bank will recover the outstanding loan with accrued interests by selling the property in the open market. Any surplus will be returned to the children of the borrowers or their designated estate. If there is any shortfall, the HKMC will take care of the difference because the borrowers, when taking out the Reverse Mortgage, have already bought insurance from the HKMC to cover the shortfall risk. This scheme would not have been commercially viable for the banks without the insurance provided by the HKMC to cover the potential shortfall risk due to either falling property prices, rising interest rates or increasing longevity of the borrowers. So far, over 2,500 households have joined the Reverse Mortgage Programme. The initial take-up rate was not fast but is picking up steadily. It has taken some time for Hong Kong people to get to understand and appreciate this new product. Also, it is quite common amongst Chinese parents wishing to pass their properties to their children without encumbrances, which will not be the case if they have joined the Reverse Mortgage Programme. However, there is increasing awareness amongst retirees that they do need to take care of themselves rather than suffering from a steady drop in living standards due to insufficient recurrent cash flows. Life Annuity Scheme 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  6.
The supervisory model is relevant from many standpoints, since it may have a bearing on how efficiently and effectively the goals pursued are attained and ought to resolve possible conflicts of interest across the different areas supervised. In this connection, it should be noted that, after the 2008 global financial crisis, some countries have changed their supervisory models, broadly speaking, by adopting more integrated models and increasing the role of central banks. Among these integrated models I wish to highlight one structured around two separate bodies: a central bank,13 charged with prudential supervision, i.e. the solvency of banks, securities firms and insurance companies, and a second body to oversee all intermediaries’ conduct and protect the investors and customers of various financial products and services. 11  The Directors General, the staff representative and the General Secretary of the Banco de España also attend the Governing Council’s meetings in a non-voting capacity. In addition, the General Secretary acts as the Governing Council's secretary. 12  For a more detailed discussion on this matter, see F. Restoy (2016), La organización de la supervisión financiera, or J. Segura (2018), “La supervisión financiera”, Chapter 3 of Reguladores y supervisores económicos independientes: el caso español, coordinated by J. Segura. For a recent description of supervisory models around the world, see D. Calvo, J.C. Crisanto, S. Hohl and O. Pascual Gutiérrez (2018), “Financial supervisory architecture: what has changed after the crisis?”, FSI Insights on policy implementation, No 8.

As a result of the substantial expansion of liquidity to combat the strength of the Swiss franc in August, some short-term interest rates turned negative. They have been close to zero since the previous monetary policy assessment. Long-term interest rates also declined further. The yield on ten-year Confederation bonds reached a new low. The expansionary effects of monetary policy are also evident in the growth of the money supply and in real interest rates, which have remained at a low level. Since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate on 6 September 2011, the Swiss franc exchange rate to the euro has been above CHF 1.20. Compared to August, the Swiss franc has even depreciated more against the US dollar than against the euro. Nevertheless, even at the current exchange rate, the Swiss franc is still high. In August, the SNB had substantially expanded Swiss franc liquidity, in order to weaken the heavily overvalued Swiss franc. Since then, banks’ sight deposits with the SNB have been at historically high levels. The SNB will continue to maintain liquidity at exceptionally high  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  levels, but has decided not to set a specific target level for sight deposits at present. My colleague Jean-Pierre Danthine will discuss the SNB’s liquidity measures and their effects in more detail. Both domestic mortgages and corporate lending in the real economy have continued to see robust growth. In the third quarter of 2011, lending standards and conditions for mortgages remained largely unchanged.
Ravi Menon: Singapore FinTech - innovation, inclusion, inspiration Presentation by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at Singapore FinTech Festival 2018, Singapore, 12 November 2018. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. What a man and what a story. Saqib’s story shows how technology can help find innovative solutions to real problems. It shows how innovation guided by empathy can help create a more inclusive society. And of course it is a story that is inspiration to all of us – to do better, to be better, to help others. That is why we asked Saqib to kick off the third edition of the Singapore FinTech Festival this morning. Because Saqib’s story exemplifies what Singapore’s own FinTech journey is all about – innovation, inclusion, inspiration. Innovation – because we want to find better ways of doing things. Inclusion – because we want to benefit as many people as possible. Inspiration – because amidst all challenges around us, there is hope in a better world. Please join me once again in thanking Saqib for being here with us today. Financial Services Built Around Us Welcome to the third edition of the Singapore FinTech Festival (SFF). This year, we have close to 40,000 participants from more than 100 countries. SFF has become the biggest annual gathering of the global FinTech community. You guys made it happen. Thank you all for your overwhelming and unstinting support.

There is UPOS, or unified point-of-sale terminal, that can accept all major credit card brands, whether using a smart chip, NFC, or QR code. And now we have SGQR, a single, standardised QR code that can represent multiple payment schemes; this is the first of its kind in the world. The pain point that remains – for banks, businesses, and individuals – is the cross-border payments and settlement of assets. Cross-border payments involve multiple currencies and cross-border settlements involve multiple assets, and there is no single trusted central party to do this. This is why we think distributed ledger technology holds promise in this area. Many of you are familiar with Project Ubin. It involves MAS and the financial industry here working closely. It aims to make cross-border payments and settlements cheaper and faster at no compromise in security or privacy, using blockchain technology. In 2016, Project Ubin demonstrated that banks could pay one another without going through MAS, using a blockchain based digital representation of the Singapore Dollar. Last year, Project Ubin successfully achieved decentralised netting of payments while preserving transactional privacy. This year, we have made two more advances. First, Project Ubin team has successfully harnessed blockchain technology for the settlement of tokenised assets. In the analogue world, payment and exchange of goods are done at the same time. In financial terms, we call this “delivery-vs-payment” or DvP. It eliminates settlement risk, i.e. sellers cannot abscond with money without delivering the goods.
In addition, in cases pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/389 regarding corporate payment processes and protocols, a payment service provider will have to submit to the BNB an audit report performed by auditors with expertise in IT security and payments. The audit report should certify that those processes or payment protocols guarantee at least equivalent levels of security to those provided for strong customer authentication as per Article 100 of the Law on Payments Services and Payment Systems. The provider must notify the BNB of any change in the application of exemptions from strong customer authentication. In addition to these requirements, payment service providers applying the exemptions should perform the monitoring, as stated in Article 21 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389, and make the results available to BNB upon request. Charges on Cross-border Payments in Euro and Currency Conversion Charges Regulation (EU) 2019/5183 introduces the requirement for payment service providers in non-euro area Member States to levy equal charges for cross-border payments in euro and for corresponding national payments of the same value in the national currency of the respective Member State. Such a legal requirement has existed so far only in respect to equal charges for national and cross-border payments in euro. The requirement for equal charges will become mandatory for payment service providers as of 15 December, 2019.

In addition to the requirement for equal charges, the new Regulation envisages requirements with respect to currency conversion charges related to card payments and electronic credit transfers which are expected to increase transparency and to ensure comparability in cases where a payment service user is faced with a choice between currency conversion alternatives f. According to the requirements concerning currency conversion charges related to card payments, payment service providers and the parties providing currency conversion services at an automated teller machine (ATM) or at the point of sale shall provide information prior to the initiation of the payment transaction for the total currency conversion charges expressed as a percentage mark-up over the latest available euro foreign exchange reference rates issued by the European Central Bank. In addition, the payer must also be provided, prior to the initiation of the payment transaction, with information about the amount to be paid to the payee in both the currency used by the payee and in the currency of the payer’s account. With regard to the requirements for currency conversion charges related to electronic credit transfers, payment service providers will be obliged to inform the payer prior to the initiation of the payment transaction about the expected currency conversion charges applied to the credit transfer, the expected amount of the credit transfer in the currency of the payer’s account, as well as about the expected amount which will be transferred to the payee in the currency used by the payee.
Figure 1 Countries experiencing drops in real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2008 (*) (percentage of sample) 100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  71  74  77  80  83  86  89  92  95  98  01  04  0  07  (*) Using the annualized quarterly GDP for a sample of 29 developed or emerging economies. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2 Monetary Policy Rate (MPR)  Change in MPR  MPR level  (basis points)  (percent)  Japan U.S. Canada Switzerland Israel Hong Kong U.K. Sweden Eurozone Chile Czech Rep. Norway South Korea Malaysia N. Zealand Australia Poland Peru Philippines India China Colombia Mexico Indonesia South Africa Hungary Turkey Brazil Argentina Russia Iceland  Chile Turkey N. Zealand U.K. India Norway Colombia Australia Sweden Israel South Africa South Korea Eurozone Hong Kong Brazil Canada Switzerland Iceland Poland Mexico Peru China Czech Rep. Indonesia U.S. Philippines Malaysia Japan Hungary Russia Argentina -800  -600  -400  -200  From 4 Sep. 2008 to 8 May 2009  0  200  0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  At 8 May 2009  Source: Bloomberg.

Another transmission channel of the global crisis has been the effect on domestic financial markets of the deteriorated financial conditions in developed economies together with the increase in the global risk perception. Despite reduced stress in the past several months, the world financial environment continues to cause concern. Still, conditions facing Chilean banks and firms to access external credit sources are more favorable than for other emerging economies, no sudden stop has occurred in external inflows, while the local bond market has taken a significant impulse. Chile’s foreign financing needs have been met easily, and the reduction in the current account deficit has lessened future requirements. Absence of tensions in this setting is reflected in the Chilean sovereign risk trend, in our country’s credit rating upgrade applied a few months back, and in the foreign currency interest rates in the domestic market. In addition, the change in risk perception and global financial conditions triggered a tightening of domestic lending standards, which has been offset by measures of monetary policy and liquidity provision. The interest rate cut applied by the banks has been evident, reflecting in consumer and commercial loan rates now hundreds of basis points below their peak in late 2008. Mortgage rates, meanwhile, have also declined, although somewhat less (Figure 6).