samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Soon after that, in December 2017, eight central banks and regulators founded the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System. In only three years the Network spread over five continents and its membership rose to 89 central bankers and regulators and 13 observers, among which are the ECB, EBA, EIOPA, BIS, IMF, the World Bank, EBRD and other development banks. The NGFS is engaged in an extraordinary analytical and intellectual effort. It has paved the way for more profound analytical work and prepared guidance on how to incorporate climate and environmental risks in all the areas of central banking – from monetary policy to financial stability, 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  research and banking supervision. It is therefore my great honour that my dear colleague Frank Elderson, Member of the Governing Council and Vice-Chair of Supervisory Board of the ECB, and also the Chair and, I dare say, the spiritus movens of the NGFS is here with us. Frank is going to deliver a keynote speech on the main topic of today’s conference. Let me now share with you my personal viewpoint on the appropriate response of central banks to the climate emergency. It is unquestionable that climate change and the devastation of nature cause risks that, if materialized, could seriously harm our lives and our economies. It is the job of central bankers to be vigilant about all the risks that might jeopardize the stability of the financial system.

On our part, it is undoubtedly the case that the inflation target is necessary as a lodestar in order for monetary policy to be able to contribute to creating good conditions for long-term growth. BIS Review 98/2000  6
Ten years of historically low interest rates and large-scale asset purchases give cause for reflection. An important question is what responsibilities should rest with a central bank. A related theme is what is meant by the objective of low and stable inflation. Chart: Inflation in Norway The primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain monetary stability, as part of the central bank’s responsibility for the monetary system. Inflation that is either too high or too low has undesired consequences, such as arbitrary wealth redistribution, underinvestment and resource misallocations. The result is lower activity and lower welfare. Since 1990, an increasing number of countries have chosen to link monetary stability to a numerical inflation target. Since the financial crisis, all of these countries have maintained their inflation targeting regimes. This reflects the overall positive experience with this framework. It did not get in the way of a powerful response to the financial crisis. In Norway too, inflation targeting has functioned well. Inflation has remained low and stable since it came down in the early 1990s, and the inflation target has anchored inflation expectations. During the period of inflation targeting, the Norwegian economy has been exposed to major shocks. A flexible inflation targeting regime has helped dampen their impact on output and employment. Employment variability has been lower since 2001 than in previous periods. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Lessons have been learned along the way. Initially, central banks had high ambitions to steer inflation to target within a clearly defined time horizon.

In the near term, however, a lower numerical target implies a slightly less expansionary monetary policy as actual inflation is somewhat closer to target. But because the inflation targeting regime is flexible, with weight given to developments in output and employment, the effect on the key policy rate in the short to medium term will be marginal. Let me conclude. The global economy finally appears to have recovered from the prolonged weakness that followed the financial crisis. Growth has also strengthened in Norway after the decline following the oil price collapse. The outlook for the Norwegian economy suggests that the key policy rate may be increased this year for the first time in seven years – this is a good sign. 1 See for example Wheeler G. (2014): “Reflections on 25 years of Inflation Targeting”, Reserve Bank of New  Zealand, speech delivered on 28 November 2014 and Norges Bank (2017): “Experience with the monetary policy framework in Norway since 2001”, Norges Bank Papers 1/2017. 2 See Ministry of Finance (2018): “New regulation on monetary policy,” Press release of 2 March 2018, or Meld. St.  8 (2017–2018). Ny forskrift for pengepolitikken. (White Paper from the Ministry of Finance. In Norwegian only.) 3 See Norges Bank (2018): “Modernisation of the Regulation on Monetary Policy”,Norges Bank´s letter of 28  February 2018 to the Ministry of Finance. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Spain and Cyprus have seen improvements of 20–25 percentage points, while for Portugal the figure is around 15 percentage points. In each case, the largest part of the improvement has come from relative cost adjustments rather than changes in the nominal exchange rate. What is less well known is that we have also seen cost adjustments in surplus countries. In Germany, ULC growth relative to the euro area has accelerated strongly in recent years, on the back of more robust wage growth and slowing productivity. That has translated into a small correction in its cost position relative to its euro area partners. However, thanks to the depreciation of the euro exchange rate, Germany’s competitive position relative to the rest of the world has also improved during the crisis. Stable rebalancing Still, all this does not mean that the rebalancing process has reached its steady state, for two reasons. First, the fact that rebalancing has been achieved, to some extent, by falling potential growth is hardly satisfactory. We cannot have a situation where rebalancing only holds if potential growth remains low and unemployment high. Remember that, despite the notable improvements since 2013, in several stressed countries employment is still more than 10% below 2008 levels. Any external rebalancing that does not generate jobs is not one that will last. Achieving both external rebalancing and high employment requires a better reallocation of available resources, which means shifting resources to the tradable sector and, more generally, to the most productive firms operating within each sector of the economy.

We could, in principle, go further than we have, and deliberately aim off in our monetary policy, in order to try to relieve the immediate pressure on the euro-exposed sectors. But that would necessarily involve taking more risk with our inflation target and with continuing stability in the economy as a whole. That is not consistent with our mandate. And it is not something that most business people I speak to - even from the suffering sectors - would want us to do. 3  BIS Review 98/2000
Moreover, the lending appetite of banks has improved and expectations for further loosening of lending conditions in the upcoming period have arisen. Accordingly, under the current conditions, where commercial loans tend to increase and this increase is spreading across more sectors, the spread between the interest rates of commercial loans and deposits are hovering at historically low levels, pointing to less tightness in credit supply (Figure 18). 3. Inflation and monetary policy outlook  Dear Guests, After summarizing our monetary policy stance and its impacts on the financial markets, I would now like to share with you the financial outlook and our assumptions underlying our forecasts. National income data released pertaining to the second quarter of 2010 are broadly consistent with the outlook presented in the July Inflation Report. While the relatively stable recovery in domestic demand continues, exports of goods and services have accelerated. In this context, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 10.3 percent compared to the same period last year, (Figure 19). Following the slowdown in the first quarter, the quarterly growth rate of national income began to reaccelerate on the back of high rate increases in exports and public construction sectors compared to the previous quarter, while private growth pursued a relatively more moderate course (Figure 20). Hence, while the GDP reached its pre-crisis level by the second quarter, the GDP excluding public expenditures hovers below the pre-crisis level.

Ardian Fullani: Post-crisis challenges for Southeast Europe Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the annual meeting of the European Fund for Southeast Europe, Tirana, 8 June 2011. *  *  *  Honourable Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure and privilege for me to be here today, in this distinguished panel, to greet the start of the 2011 annual meeting of the European Fund for Southeast Europe, or EFSE as we are used to call it. More than four years ago, I was invited to the launching ceremony of this wonderful incentive here in Tirana. Two years ago, at its annual meeting that took place in Novi Sad, the Albanian government became a shareholder to the Fund. Today, we are gathered here again, in the capital city of Albania, to make the balance of this institution’s work. I avail myself of the opportunity to thank the European Fund for Southeast Europe, for its contribution to our region, for its financial support and expertise provided for the financial market development, without leaving behind specifically the EFSE’s assistance to Albania through funding business projects at competitive terms, at a time when bank lending has posted slow paces of recovery. The grave financial crisis of modern times has induced much volatility in the global economy. Today, the situation is assessed as more improved.
8  BIS Review 129/2009  Chart 3: Changes in terms and conditions for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises (net percentages of banks reporting tightening terms and conditions)  Source: Euro area bank lending survey. Chart 4 - MFI loans to the private sector in the euro area (percentage changes)  Source: ECB. BIS Review 129/2009  9  Chart 5 - MFI loans to households in the euro area (percentage changes)  Source: ECB. Chart 6 - MFI loans to non-financial corporations in the euro area (percentage changes)  Source: ECB. 10  BIS Review 129/2009  Chart 7: Financial situation of euro area firms, change over the preceding six months (percentages of respondents)  Source: ECB/European Commission survey on the access to finance of SMEs. Chart 8: Outcome of the applications for external financing by euro area firms over the preceding six months (percentages of firms that have applied for external financing)  Source: ECB/European Commission survey on the access to finance of SMEs. BIS Review 129/2009  11  Chart 9: Availability of external financing for euro area firms, change over the preceding six months (percentages of respondents)  Source: ECB/European Commission survey on the access to finance of SMEs.

A breakdown of banks by size Against this background, it is not surprising that banks’ balance sheet constraints played a greater role during the recent financial turmoil, leading to a tightening of credit standards by banks, as shown in Chart 2. The bank lending survey for the euro area, from which this information is taken, distinguishes between large banks and smaller banks. In particular with respect to the greater relevance of smaller banks for SME financing, it is therefore of interest to distinguish between the lending  2  BIS Review 129/2009  of large banks and that of smaller banks in the euro area. Since mid-2007, and in particular during the initial phase of the financial turmoil, large banks have overall tightened their credit standards for loans to enterprises somewhat more than smaller banks. The outlook for the economy in general and for individual firms contributed most to the tightening, in Italy as well as in the euro area as a whole. The deteriorated access to capital market financing during the financial turmoil contributed significantly to the tightening of credit standards. It played a much more important role for large banks than for smaller banks, which rely less on capital market financing. The difficult liquidity conditions in the market also played a somewhat more important role for large banks, possibly because money market financing represents a greater share of their overall financing. All this may explain why the net tightening of credit standards was greater for large banks than it was for smaller banks.
They will need to weigh the costs and benefits of direct membership compared with the existing practice of using a settlement bank. The important point is that the RLBs are now in a position to make that choice based on their own business needs. If the RLBs feel that there are any remaining impediments to their joining the system we would be pleased to hear from them. Interest rate deregulation The first phase of interest deregulation also produced a muted response. This is not unexpected nor is it unwelcome. We are trying to avoid “big bang” deregulation that might be disruptive. Some banks have introduced new overnight deposit accounts, which pay interest above the savings account rate. But so far we have not seen any large-scale migration from savings accounts to 24-hour call accounts. This is perhaps not surprising given the ample liquidity in the banking system, which means that the banks have a reduced incentive to bid actively for fresh deposits. This is reflected in the unusually small differential between the interest rate on savings accounts and those on time deposits. For example, the gap between the savings account rate and the one-month time deposit rate was only about 0.5% at the end of August. This reduces the incentive for depositors to forego the loss of liquidity involved in switching into time deposits.

Global growth momentum has continued to slow down. At the same time, inflation in many countries is markedly above central banks’ targets. Accordingly, numerous central banks have further tightened their monetary policy. In our baseline scenario for the global economy, we expect this challenging situation to persist for now. Global economic growth is likely to be weak in the coming quarters, and inflation will remain elevated for the time being. Over the medium term, however, inflation abroad should return to more moderate levels, not least due to the increasingly tighter monetary policy in many countries. Our scenario for the global economy is subject to significant risks. The energy situation in Europe could worsen again. At the same time, high inflation could become embedded and require renewed stronger monetary policy responses abroad. Finally, the coronavirus pandemic remains an important source of risk for the global economy. Swiss economic outlook  What is the economic outlook for Switzerland? GDP grew at an annualised rate of 1.0% in the third quarter. Economic momentum thus remained similarly modest as in the preceding quarters. While many service industries fared well, there was a renewed slight decline in value added in manufacturing. The situation on the labour market remained positive. Employment continued to rise, and unemployment decreased again slightly. Overall production capacity has been well utilised. Switzerland’s GDP is likely to grow by around 2.0% this year. However, weaker demand from abroad and the high energy prices are likely to curb economic activity markedly in the coming year.
Such concerns about the short run are indeed analysed carefully each month by the Monetary Policy Committee, and the results of that analysis feed into our monthly interest rate decisions. Visits like this give me the chance to listen to you and learn from you and other businesses about what is happening on the ground - not just in the retail sector but in manufacturing and services more broadly. And my visit is the tip of an iceberg because we have a permanent Agency in the North West - staffed by members of the Bank who live and work here. BIS Review 4/2005  1  But I want to step back from the immediate conjuncture and look further ahead. More relevant for our future prosperity is the question not of whether we might save too much but whether we are saving too little. The level of income that will sustain us in the future depends critically upon how much as a nation we set aside today. In other words, what is happening to the national saving rate - the proportion of the net national product that is not consumed by either the private or public sector? Since the late 1960s the national saving rate has been declining fairly steadily, from over 10% to around 5%. Although saving rates elsewhere in the G7 have also fallen, they were higher than in the UK for most of the post-war period.

Gent Sejko: Digitalisation vs cash Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Albanian Association of Banks (AAB) Forum on “Digitalisation vs cash”, Pristina, 14 June 2022. * * * Honourable Deputy Prime Minister Ahmetaj, Honourable Minister of Finance and Economy Ibrahimaj, Dear Chairman of the Albanian Association of Banks, Dear guests, It is a pleasure to attend this Forum, which comes naturally as a further step and logical consequence of the joint discussions and round tables on digitalisation of financial services. I would like to highlight that the support and promotion of electronic payments, both in international experiences and the Albanian context, are seen as one of the most effective and powerful mechanisms for bolstering financial inclusion and further formalizing the economy. In this context, despite the discussions and needs for interaction and developments from the actors, it appears like the objectives and targets are increasingly converging, and in turn the created synergy, absolutely, will drive to an acceleration towards the meeting of the stated objectives. In this framework, there should be underscored that the Bank of Albania has already established the effective premises for the foundation of a digital revolution in the payment market, through the legal and regulatory framework in force. This framework may be considered avant-garde in the context of the European Union. Meanwhile, at regional level, Albania is the first country that has approved the legal and regulatory framework coupled with the promotion of “open banking” in the market.
Important issues on the political agenda in the future will be how the Nordic welfare model should be renewed to make it both economically and socially sustainable. Will we once again be able to serve as a model for other countries during the change that the whole of Europe now faces? Regardless of the chosen model, our demographic situation will require measures that result in a higher average number of hours worked, a larger number of workers e.g. pensioners, and an increase in immigration. This assumes that we want to keep or enhance our welfare system. 1  4  Swedish Association of Local Authorities, "Aktuellt om äldreomsorgen" (Current trends in geriatric care), October 2003. BIS Review 46/2003  Productivity growth can help When the long-term growth rate receives little or no contribution from the labour supply, dependency on labour productivity increases. Compared with other countries, Sweden has thus far performed well in terms of productivity growth. During the 1990s productivity has risen by 2 per cent per year or slightly more. This is a clear improvement on the 1980s when productivity growth was around 1 per cent per year, and even more so compared with the 1970s when the trend was actually negative. So it is productivity rather than the labour supply that has fuelled growth in recent years. This also applies to the other Nordic countries, al-though the labour supply has made a bigger contribution than in Sweden. The particularly steep rise in labour productivity during the 1990s was due to several factors.

But – and this is important – they are the basis for the regulations in the EU and thus also in Sweden. I would also like to stress that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions from the disruptions we have seen. Several authorities and global organisations are in the process of analysing the events and I do not want to anticipate these analyses or their conclusions. It will also probably take several years to agree on how the global standards should be amended. Nevertheless, today I would like to highlight three issues that I believe will characterise the global regulatory debate going forward and I will give my preliminary views on them. These are the deposit guarantee, the resolution framework and the requirements on banks. These issues are also highly relevant in Sweden. The deposit guarantee needs to be reviewed Let me start with perhaps the most important, difficult and relevant part, the deposit guarantee. Does it fulfil its function today or does it need adjusting? The vast majority of countries have some form of deposit guarantee, which usually covers the entire deposit up to a certain amount. In Sweden, it applies to the full amount, up to SEK 1 050 000 per depositor and bank. The idea is that savers should feel secure even if the bank runs into problems. This will reduce the risk of bank runs, which is important for promoting financial stability. From an economic perspective, there is a trade-off here.
But some of our fundamental strengths, ironically, have made us vulnerable to market manipulation. Our economy and our markets are small in relation to the rapidly growing volume of international capital. But they are liquid and open enough to be attractive for large players to seek to exploit the smallness of our markets and move prices to their benefit. And our policy response is highly predictable. This is particularly so with a rule-based monetary system in which capital outflow would, automatically and without discretionary decisions on the part of the authorities, lead to higher interest rates. I am convinced that much of the difficulty over the past year or so in Hong Kong arose not out of any problem in our economic fundamentals, but because, by being small, open and predictable, we are vulnerable to market manipulation. Given that there is not much we could do in the short term to enlarge the size of our markets, and given our firm commitment to openness, we had to resort to doing something unpredictable to defend ourselves. The episode last summer, when we made purchases in the stock and futures exchanges to defend our financial system against a concerted speculative attack, is so well known now, and has been so thoroughly debated at home and abroad, that I can dispense with most of the details. The facts, in brief, are as follows.

If redeeming investors receive the market price of the assets in the fund, but those assets have to be sold faster than it typically takes to obtain the market price, remaining investors may fear that the value of their share will be reduced as others redeem. This fear can be avoided – as it seems to be in blue-chip equity funds – when the redemption period of the fund is aligned with the sale period that’s needed to realise the market price of the assets it holds. In  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  18  principle it could be avoided too by pricing units of funds to capture any difference between the redemption period and the typical sale period of the assets. Liquidity isn’t costless. Of course, redemptions can be suspended – funds can be gated – to limit the selling pressure. But such measures are a double-edged sword. They can allow time for an orderly re-structuring of a fund, avoiding unnecessary fire sale pressure, but the expectation that such measures could be imposed tomorrow can create an incentive to be at the front of the redemption queue today. We saw in both 2008 and 2016 how fears and incentives like these can drive material outflows from funds invested in commercial property. And last December, as leveraged loan prices fell in global markets, investors in open-ended leveraged loan funds followed the example, redeeming $ of around $ invested in these funds.