samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
During the crisis years production with a low level of productivity was put out of business and unemployment increased which led to an increase in the labour productivity measured. This one-off effect raised the level of productivity growth but at the same time meant that a large percentage of society's available resources was not utilised. 2  BIS Review 16/2003  In connection with and directly after the crisis there were also a number of changes in the Swedish economy that have affected developments since then. New regulations were established for fiscal policy, with an expenditure ceiling and surplus target. At the same time, monetary policy was successfully aimed at safeguarding low inflation. Also during the 1990s a number of markets were deregulated and opened to domestic and international competition. In addition, Sweden joined the EU. This development entails an increased international integration of product and labour markets, which should have had a favourable effect on productivity growth. A further explanation is the shifting between sectors in the Swedish economy. During the 1960s and 1970s there was a rapid growth in employment in the public sector, while the private sector declined. Following the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s the situation was reversed (Figure 4). As productivity growth in the public sector is probably lower than productivity growth in the private sector, this development results in a rise in productivity for the economy as a whole.

Conference of the ACPR – Palais Brongniart, 8 June 2018 The major issues at stake in the review of prudential supervision of banks  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France, Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR)  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 of 6 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you to this conference of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR), which this morning focuses on major issues at stake in the review of prudential supervision of banks. The subject is not new, but it is always topical. Let me first stress the greater degree of security already achieved in prudential matters: the agreement of 7 December 2017 on the finalisation of Basel III and the now standard use of macroprudential instruments. I will then touch on what remains to be done in Europe, specifically the completion of the Banking Union, an essential step. ** I. The implementation of the Basel III agreement of 7 December 2017  in Europe, fully respecting the envisaged timetable, is essential The finalisation of Basel III – and not of Basel IV, definitely not – brings to an end a decade of regulatory efforts which have considerably strengthened the resilience of the international banking system. I reiterate that the agreement of 7 December 2017 is the best possible agreement for France and for Europe.
In plain language, this means that the bank needs to have sufficient resources at its disposal to be able to carry out its tasks without being governed by subventions from the government. When the Riksbank carries out its tasks, this usually has consequences for the Riksbank’s balance sheet. Most of the instruments the Riksbank uses to steer the interest rate are also items on the balance sheet. The Riksbank currently steers the interest rate through its monopoly on supplying a payment system for transferring money between the banks (including the Riksbank) and above all by determining the conditions for this. It is mainly the conditions for the banks’ deposits and loans with the Riksbank that are used as an instrument to steer interest rates in the economy. Prior to the financial crisis, the transactions in the Riksbank’s different instruments were relatively small, but this changed during the financial crisis. Then we used our balance sheet to supply the banks with liquidity. Up to autumn 2008, the Riksbank’s balance sheet was around SEK 200 billion, but it increased dramatically during the crisis to at most SEK 763 billion in July 2009. The reason the balance sheet more than tripled was that the Riksbank began lending large amounts in US dollars and Swedish krona to the Swedish banks from October 2008. The dollar loans were largely funded by the Riksbank in its turn borrowing dollars from the Federal Reserve.

I have also tried to show how this affects the bank’s capacity to make a profit. Some changes are the result of active decisions by the Riksbank. Decisions the Riksbank has made as a preventive measure to be sufficiently prepared to manage a changed situation. I am of course mainly thinking of the reinforcement of the foreign currency reserve here, but also the decision to acquire a portfolio of Swedish securities again. Other changes, such as the decline in the use of cash and international interest rates, are beyond the Riksbank’s control. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Changes in the Riksbank’s balance sheet will lead to the bank’s profits slowly shrinking. We must therefore consider more carefully than before how we can best fund our assets. The expected rise in interest rates has a much greater effect on the bank’s profits in the short term, but on the other hand the effect is temporary. Although there is no lack of challenges, the Riksbank is financially strong. This is important to be able to perform our task in the best possible way. The bank has substantial equity, which may well be needed if the Riksbank is forced to adopt unconventional methods to bring up inflation. Finally: Does the Riksbank have to make a profit? Yes, it does actually. We must be able to cover our costs. And we must be able to build up buffers.
While there may be differences in the operational arrangements and in the nature of activities undertaken by global players in emerging markets in Asia and Latin America, the significance of their presence in the financial systems in both regions makes this dialogue session most relevant and timely. In Malaysia, foreign banks' account for almost 30% of the total assets of the banking industry. In the context of cross-border banking, the local incorporation of all foreign-owned banking institutions' branches in 1994 has contributed towards the strengthening of Bank Negara Malaysia's supervisory oversight over the activities of foreign-owned banking institutions in Malaysia. The capital and resources dedicated to support the domestic subsidiary operations reflects the commitment of the foreign-owned banking institutions in the country. In addition, it has also facilitated the assessment of the financial soundness of local operations of foreign banks. While the merits of different operational arrangements are a matter of much debate, particularly in terms of business flexibility, the subsidiary structure of foreign-owned banking institutions in Malaysia has facilitated the consistent application of rules and regulations by Bank Negara Malaysia to the entire banking system. The increasing significance of the foreign institutions, along with the different operational structures were key factors that influenced the design of the early cross-border supervisory framework. This is detailed in the Basel Concordat, that outlined the principles for supervision of foreign banks by home and host authorities, issued by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS) in 1983.

Supervisory Statement 1/20 Solvency II: Prudent Person Principle, section 2.3 (SS1/20 Solvency II: Prudent Person Principle (bankofengland.co.uk)  )  3. PRA calculations using annual returns data for year-end 2014 and Matching Adjustment (MA) Asset & Liability Data submissions by firms as at year-end 2020. 4. This refers only to assets in Component A of firms’ MA portfolios. See paragraph 4.5 of Supervisory Statement 7/18 for a definition of Component A. (Supervisory Statement 7/18 'Solvency II: Matching adjustment' (bankofengland.co.uk)  Page 15 ) 5. Solvency II Review: Matching Adjustment and reforms to the Fundamental Spread 6. PRA Discussion Paper 2/22 (DP2/22 – Potential Reforms to Risk Margin and Matching Adjustment within Solvency II | Bank of England)
But I believe that Thailand will persevere, and that we should continue to take all advantages that globalization has to offer for years to come. Our outlook for the Thai economy in the medium term remains positive. Our forecasts, once incorporating the risks I mentioned, show the Thai economy growing by 4-5 percent in 2007 and by 4-5 percent in 2008. The growth is expected to come mainly from exports, given healthy global conditions, additional government spending, and lower oil prices. These represent a respectable growth outlook for Thailand in light of the challenges and our focus on stability. BIS Review 20/2007  1  But a positive outlook by no means allows for complacency. We must constantly work to identify and manage the challenges. This leads me to my second point. What are the key challenges to the Thai economy in the near term? The first major challenge is that of financial globalization. On the financial system front, globalization brings complex financial instruments that require significant improvement in risk management, and the challenge of meeting international standards of Basel II and IAS 39. These are the manifestation of the forces of globalization that the Thai banking system is already facing, and will continue to face. The overall effect is that the financial system and the economy may be subject to heightened uncertainties. And unless we strengthen our ability to manage these risks and challenges, the vulnerability can exacerbate, with possible implications for our economic and financial stability.

This, in my view, is a major challenge for all of us in the financial community. The second major challenge to the Thai economy is how to cope successfully with volatile global financial markets and an appreciating baht. This challenge is the more pressing of the two. Let me explain why. Thailand, like many emerging market economies with a small and shallow financial market, is particularly vulnerable to fast-moving international capital. Such rapid movements of capital flows, if vastly out of line with our ability to absorb it, can have negative impacts on the export or import sectors, depending on the direction of the exchange rate movement. In our case, the recent surge in speculative capital inflows caused a rapid one-way appreciation of the baht relative to regional currencies. The appreciation momentum hardly reflected our economic fundamentals. Left unchecked, it could have presented a clear threat to growth and stability – beginning with export, a current engine of growth, trickling down to the real sector, and eventually harming financial stability. In dealing with currency appreciation, the prevailing wisdom of "letting the market work" has been given a chance. Yet the baht kept rising against almost all major and regional currencies at an alarming speed. Letting such rapid appreciation work itself out could have entailed significant risks to our agriculture sector, which employs nearly 40% of the labor force, and small and medium-sized firms in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector. We recognize that the real sector needs to adjust.
This certainly helps create an environment that facilitates economic growth and the population’s welfare. This is the main contribution that our institution can make to the development of our country, and the Board of the Central Bank of Chile is firmly committed to fulfilling this role. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 1 Current account balance $ billion) 300  300  200  200  100  100  0  0  -100  -100  -200  -200  -300  -300  -400  -400  00 Spain  02 Portugal  04 Italy  06 08 10 Greece Germany  France  Source: International Monetary Fund. Figure 2 Incidences on y-o-y CPI inflation (*) (percentage points) 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 10  Jul. 11  Energy (8.7%) Core CPI services (40.0 %) CPI  Jul. 12  Foodstuffs (18.9%) Core CPI goods (32.4 %)  (*) In parentheses, shares in 2009 CPI basket. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

Corporate debt shows a similar pattern, increasing along with economic activity, without any widespread deterioration of financial indicators. Thus, it is our view that the Chilean financial system has not suffered any material increase of its systemic vulnerabilities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  However, our Financial Stability Report also identifies some elements that might be sources of risk and that must be closely monitored. The construction and real estate sector has been strong lately. Activity in the real estate market has had stronger sales as a counterpart, for both housing and commercial use. While the vacancy rate in the commercial sector has remained low, the expected substantial expansion of supply and its inertia, especially in top-quality offices, is one factor that must be monitored closely given the risk scenarios facing economic activity. The evaluation of any new project should take this element into consideration. In the same token, aggregate housing prices have evolved in line with the economy’s level of interest rates and income. However, at some higher-priced districts, prices are still outgrowing their historic trends, possibly due to limited land available. It is important to keep in mind that the materialization of negative risk scenarios could lead to a breakdown in current price trends. The potential implications of this are price adjustments influencing the returns of executed projects and, additionally, the collaterals backing mortgage loans. With respect to household debt, two factors deserve careful attention. One is its rate of expansion.
In contrast, the ratios today stand at 31 percent and 27 percent, respectively. In terms of product mix, the economy neither depends on a specific commodity nor on a particular manufacturing sector. This has allowed for growth and  6/9  development of new industries to serve both domestic and external demands. Certainly, efforts to attract new investments in the EEC area will further enhance our ability to diversify, with establishment of industries of the future. The tourism industry is another well-diversified sector. With many unique destinations and attractions, the tourism industry is able to cater to wide range of customers in term of pricing and activities—from luxurious wellness centers for medical tourists to affordable accommodations for first-time foreign travelers. In fact, recent tourist patterns may have indicated that there is no longer low season in Thailand. The number of incoming foreign tourists has become relatively stable throughout the year with different mixes across different seasons. More importantly, given the choice of attraction and selection of price range, Thailand is in a unique position to attract many first-time foreign tourists, especially those rising middle class from China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Last but not least is the ability for the economy and Thai people to adapt to change. The notion of adaptability is important for economic resilience not just to respond to adverse events and uncertainties but also to cope with disruptive changes, especially against the backdrop of changing landscape brought about by technological advancement.

It’s not sufficient any more to be the best guy in the village; especially when there are an increasing number of villages on a global scale, with an ever increasing number of clever guys. •  From a convergence point of view, the sharing of experiences would avoid costly errors, while coordinated policies and steps would make a stronger case for a faster EU integration. We should demonstrate that the region is fit to enter the club, by firstly adopting the rules of the club among ourselves. In a more technical and concrete approach, the efforts of the public authorities in our region to achieve a real and meaningful cooperation should consider the followings: First, the mentality of the societies in our region should change. It is noted that this region has a history full of conflicts and many other disputes. It is now up to the young generations and to the people with an open-minded approach in our region, to find solutions and to promote behaviors that will build our future path toward Europe. Second, the commitment to full integration with the European Union, should serve as a solid platform for cooperation, and as an anchor for pursuing sound policies and coordinated structural reforms. Third, a very important precondition will be the strengthening of countries domestic anchors, specifically in the form of medium-term fiscal rules, fiscal councils, or embedding fiscal constraints in countries’ constitutions. Fourth, the legal basis that supports such international cooperation should be fully in place.
MAS has been working closely with financial institutions, institutes of higher learning, and other government agencies to expand our local talent pipeline and build a strong Singaporean Core. Let me clarify that a Singaporean Core strategy is not a “Singaporeans only” strategy. A “Singaporeans only” approach will be fatal for Singapore as a global financial centre as there are simply not enough locals to meet the fast-expanding specialist needs of financial institutions. Rather, promoting a strong Singaporean Core is about building good skills and capabilities in our local workforce and ensuring fair hiring opportunities. It is about helping to equip them to do well in their jobs and advance in their careers. MAS estimates that more than 3,000 Singapore Citizens held senior roles in the financial sector in 2020, a remarkable increase of more than 80% compared to 2016. The need for a strong local talent pipeline is something that the CEOs of global financial institutions in Singapore fully understand and agree with. A strong Singaporean Core gives ballast to their operations here and resilience in their staff capacity. It provides local and regional networks and a keen sense of customers and markets. Over the years, MAS has put in place several schemes to help develop entry level, professional, specialist and leadership talent for the financial sector. And we can do more. Let me highlight three areas of local talent that MAS is stepping up efforts in: polytechnic graduates; mid-career professionals from other sectors; and overseas Singaporeans working in finance and in technology. First, polytechnic graduates.

2 The Covid crisis has seen a further acceleration in the pace of digitalisation. Online sales have surged – coupled with a decline in the use of cash and less reliance on cards – and use of digital banking has increased. The Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee has been focusing on the macroeconomic impacts of the changes the pandemic has caused to what we buy, what we make and how we work, as I outlined in a speech I gave last November. 3 It’s a complex picture, and it’s still far too early to say what the long term economic effects of these developments will be. But what certainly has changed for good are our expectations of what services all of us should be able to access from our homes; which will see more work done such as my speech to you today .Digital finance, in all its forms, will be crucial to the recovery and to the post-Covid form of the economy. Into this changed landscape Ron Kalifa published his Independent Fintech Strategic Review earlier this year.4 The Bank welcomes this report, which provides a timely opportunity for us to reflect on our role and how Ron’s recommendations fit with our work to support safe innovation. So how do we see our role in the fintech landscape? At its most basic, I would say that private-sector innovation relies on public-sector foundations.
One concern at the time was that we were facing a global capital shortage, with increasing demand from the emerging, transitioning and developing countries at a time of strengthening economic activity and large government deficits across the industrial world. Referring generally in my remarks this morning to 10 year maturities, real yields - measured by our own indexed gilts - had indeed risen in 1994 by ¾% or more to close to 4%. But nominal yields had risen by substantially more - by something like 2% in the major markets - reflecting increased uncertainty no doubt, but clearly also worsening inflationary expectations. In my remarks on that occasion, I ventured to suggest that bond markets might just be exaggerating at least the inflationary risks, by underestimating three factors in particular: First, the commitment of governments and central banks all around the world to disciplined macro-economic policies. Secondly, the restraining effect of both the level of real yields and of structural unemployment particularly in Europe. And thirdly, the counter-inflationary effect of global competition and technological innovation. Now I seem to recollect that this suggestion was met with a degree of scepticism. That was not at all surprising. You had all heard that sort of optimism from the authorities before! But the fact is that since around the time of that first Euromoney Congress bond yields have nevertheless trended fairly consistently lower, and are now in many cases close to or even below the low point they had reached around the end of 1993.

So today’s orthodoxy ascribes to macro-economic policy the job of keeping demand in line with the capacity of the economy to meet that demand in the medium and longer term. Within this overall framework, monetary policy is allocated the specific task of achieving and maintaining effective price stability. This is not, as some commentators still seem to suggest, simply some doctrinaire end in itself. Inflation is seen rather as a symptom of imbalance between demand and supply in the economy. So what we are essentially aiming to do through monetary policy is to anticipate the emergence of that imbalance and head it off before it becomes entrenched. If we are successful in that, inflation will be lower, there will be less need for violent interest rate movements than in the past, and the economy will grow at a steadier, and more sustainable and predictable, rate. That, in turn, will encourage more rational, longer-term, economic decision-making and investment, which will help indirectly to improve underlying, supply-side, performance. Similarly, today’s macro-economic orthodoxy requires fiscal policy to be directed to restricting government borrowing to levels that can be sustained into the medium and longer term, without either forcing up real yields or implying the prospective need for progressively rising tax rates - which could otherwise damage the development of private sector economic activity. Now in some respects we have made considerable progress over the past two years and more.