samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Early commentators on the developing international monetary system,  8  BIS Review 112/2008  combining a mixture of floating and fixed-rate exchange rates (so-called Bretton Woods II), 16 were inclined to the view that current account imbalances would prove sustainable – essentially because Asia would, they assumed, continue to finance the USA’s savings deficit. But, as has become apparent over time, that seemed to rely on the invisible hand smoothing over the counterpart imbalances within some net debtor economies, notably the USA; or, more crudely, of it making no difference that, in aggregate, American households had effectively given up saving. Given the now widely acknowledged ex ante imbalance a few years ago between global investment and Asian-fuelled global saving, this was associated with a compression of longterm risk-free rates and an associated rise in asset prices. And given frictions elsewhere in the system, including the US GSE’s guarantees reducing the headline returns on primemortgage securitisations, that contributed to compression in risk premia. And that, I fear, fuelled a “search for yield” in which investors, having enjoyed the extraordinary windfall gains that accompany rising asset prices, extrapolated forward their elevated ex post returns into ex ante requirements (Diagram A). 17 (Such extrapolation amounts to a bubble, but via the channel of a requirement or target rather than, directly, a simple expectation.) There’s only one way to deliver on such requirements in those conditions: take more risk and hope no one prices for it. Leverage and maturity transformation were the order of the day.

Mr Bäckström asks the question “Is there a new economy?”  Speech given by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at a conference arranged by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and Veckans Affärer, held in Stockholm on 25 January 2000. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to attend this conference and discuss matters to do with the question “Is there a new economy?”. Besides considering that issue, I shall be looking at other factors that may affect economic developments in Sweden, together with their implications for the future construction of monetary policy. Monetary policy aims at promoting economic stability The Riksbank’s primary concern is, as we all know, the future path of inflation. But our deliberations about how to keep inflation at a low and stable level can equally well be described as the Riksbank’s endeavour, with the aid of the repo rate, to ensure that the economic trend in Sweden continues to be favourable. This is because in most situations the task assigned us by the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) - “to maintain price stability” - amounts to acting so that the development of production and employment in Sweden is as stable as possible. There have certainly been times when a tightening of Swedish monetary and fiscal policy has led to an economic downturn and increased unemployment.
A key objective for this is to mitigate the problem of ‘rolling bad apples’ within the Malaysian financial industry. Conclusion Business ethics has become a popular topic in the world of finance. We must be careful not to pay lip service to the hype. We must be careful not to pretend that it can be addressed with simplistic solutions. We must instead take a holistic, thoughtful and realistic approach in building a culture of professionalism and ethics. Allow me to conclude here by leaving you with three key messages– First – we cannot afford to underestimate the power and danger of “bad barrels”. The evidence demands that we focus carefully on cultivating a “system” and designing “situations” that encourage continuous ethical behaviour. This is a shared responsibility. As I have said, regulators play a crucial role in articulating the letter of the law. But it is the private sector leadership that determines whether its moral spirit will be pursued. Second – we must not neglect the uncomfortable reality that there are “bad apples” out there. A clear message needs to be sent out, that the financial industry does not have room for these. Fair, proportionate and transparent disciplinary action will be central in communicating this message. Finally – the entire financial sector must embrace the language of ethics and objectivity. Just like in any human relationship – trust, honesty and integrity are moral values which must permeate through the business.

This stands alongside various other efforts for training and standard-setting, including those by AIF, ICLIF, SIDC, FIDE Forum, PPKM and FSPB. I wish to take this opportunity to specifically commend the AIF and FSPB for their initiatives, including today’s event. These draw the much needed attention by the industry to this important subject. The system of values affecting behaviour does not only depend on the sector-wide legal and regulatory frameworks and the vibrancy of the professional community. Also, of crucial importance, is the role of the board and senior management in each organisation. As has been often repeated, these leaders set the tone from the top. This is established through official decisions and formal statements, including the corporate values and various codes of conduct. However, their role goes much further than that. More than their words, the board and senior management determine the prevailing values of the organisational ecosystem through their attitudes, actions and decisions – especially those relating to professionalism and integrity. Do they give the impression that the ends always justify the means? How vigorously do they question sudden surges in a business unit’s profitability? Are they willing to overlook ethically questionable actions so long as the firm is technically within the bounds of the law? How do they react to ethical failures and misconduct? How does compromising the policies of the organisation affect bonuses and promotion? Apart from the board and senior management, the system affecting each organisation is also determined by the shareholders.
This is again to help address the problems that SMEs have, not just during this COVID-19 period, but also to help them restructure their businesses post-COVID. Those are some examples of how we are ending up where we are today which is largely due to measures undertaken by the government to support the recovery as well as cushion the impact from the COVID-19. I would like to turn now for the second part of my talk today which is on what lies ahead given that the recovery is likely to take some time. Again, the contraction from the COVID-19 last year was 6 percent and we expect the economy to grow 3 percent this year. For the next year, we are looking at a GDP growth of about 4.7 percent. Therefore, we are expecting the economy to come back to the pre-COVID level at least in terms of the headline GDP sometime around the third quarter of next year. However, given the uneven nature of the recovery, it does not mean that everything would go back to what it was like before. Recovery in the service sectors will lag quite significantly; notably, sectors related to tourism where the current forecast foresees a period of almost 4-5 years until we are likely to see tourism come back to the pre-COVID level.

The Thai Economy: The Current State and the Way Forward Dr. Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, Governor of the Bank of Thailand Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) Seminar, The Athenee Hotel, 29 March 2021  Mr. Shoichi Ogiwara, President of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, JCC Board of Directors, JCC members, Distinguished guests,  It is a great pleasure and honor for me to be here this evening. I would like to speak on three topics today. The first topic is to discuss where we are today in the Thai economy. The second topic will be about where we are heading next and what to expect in terms of the economic outlook. Finally, I will conclude with the discussion of why I think, despite all of our problems, Thailand is still a good place to do business. I would like to start by sharing some thoughts on where we are in terms of the Thai economy. The short answer is the economy is recovering but slowly. When we were hit by the COVID-19 shock last year, we experienced a GDP contraction of about 6 percent. This year, we expect to register a GDP growth of about 3 percent. Therefore, even by the end of this year, our economy will still not be back to the pre-COVID-19 level. Why has the recovery been slow and perhaps even slower than other countries in the region. There are a couple of reasons I would like to share with you.
Increased mobility of capital, both in and out of countries, including Norway, could follow. As I indicated earlier, we, like others, have experienced increasing difficulty in maintaining a stable exchange rate in a world of large, unrestricted capital flows. The relative calm within the euro area during the recent turmoil linked to the financial crises in Asia and Russia and later Brazil could be indicative of future differences between Europe’s “ins” and “outs”. Finland, despite its dependence on raw materials and relatively large exports to Russia, was less adversely affected than the other Nordic countries. For Norway, success in maintaining a stable exchange rate could become more challenging in the new environment. BIS Review 16/1999  –3–  Use of the euro in Norway. Euro and the Norwegian banking industry Use of the euro in Norway I would now like to comment on how, and to what extent, Norwegian economic agents might be expected to use the euro in the future. There are many indications that the euro will be used more extensively in trade between Norway and euro countries than the currencies of the 11 member states combined today. Over time the euro will most likely be used on an even wider scale. Obviously, the euro would increase in importance in the Norwegian market should Sweden, Denmark and the UK join EMU. The euro may also play a role – though probably limited – as a settlement currency between residents.

This may make the market more receptive to private bonds, as investors may be willing to accept higher credit risk when seeking a return. This factor, combined with lower borrowing costs, may give medium-sized enterprises, which so far have had to rely on bank financing, increased access to the bond market. It should be emphasised that the expected increase in competition in securities markets in the euro area is not solely due to the single currency. Technological advances, deregulation and harmonisation of laws and regulations are important forces contributing to a freer flow of capital and services in the single market. There is little doubt, however, that the introduction of a single currency will make a major contribution to accelerating this process. In sum, trends influencing developments in the banking and financial industry such as deregulation, internationalisation, changes in customer behaviour and rapid technological advances – leading to intensified competition – have been there for some time and will continue. However, the establishment of monetary union will probably intensify existing trends, creating even greater challenges with regard to competition in the banking and financial industry. This brings me back to the basic proposition made in the introduction. In many respects, the euro will not give rise to fundamentally new challenges. It is highly likely, however, that the euro will accentuate challenges that are already present. And that, I think, goes for the UK as well as Norway. *  BIS Review 16/1999  *  *
Such coordination failure may arise not because the depositors or the interbank market participants think the bank is likely to be insolvent, but because they anticipate others will withdraw.2 The rationale of liquidity requirements is that they reduce the impact of uncertainty on the bank risk profile, since they allow the bank to withstand larger withdrawals. LOLR and deposit insurance are other ways to achieve the same means: mitigating the risk of a run. The difference is that liquidity requirements are internalised, while LOLR and deposit insurance are externalised to the central bank and to the taxpayers, respectively. Another difference is that liquidity requirements and deposit insurance exert their effects ex ante while LOLR happens after the fact. An additional micro-prudential benefit derived from liquidity requirements relates to a special role of liquid assets. By maintaining liquidity buffers in advance, banks commit to removing solvency risk from a portion of their portfolio. This limits solvency risk and encourages good risk management, acting as a prudential regulatory tool alongside other requirements, such as capital buffers or bail-inable debt, that also exert discipline on bank risk-taking behaviour.3 A counterargument is however that holding a large balance of liquid assets gives bank management too much discretion and can thus create agency problems.4 Liquidity standards should also be designed to mitigate adverse effects owing to inherently systemic characteristics of a liquidity crisis. The reaction of one bank to liquidity strains might create major liquidity strains for other banks.

We can now benefit from the lessons we learned the hard way from the profound financial and real crisis we suffered in 1982-1983. Chile has steadily built throughout the years solid macroeconomic and financial institutions that, although they do not shield us from world events, do permit us to adjust to external shocks at substantially lower costs than we would have faced in the past. Therefore, as we have also said since the current crisis turned into chaos, Chile has never been better prepared to weather a shock like the one we are now enduring. Proof of this is the enormous countercyclical effort of macroeconomic policies carried out in the context of a solid, stable financial system. In fact, with respect to October of last year, and compared with the rest of the world, ours has been one of the greatest easing efforts of monetary policy, and our monetary policy rate (MPR) is at its historic low (Figure 2). Such an expansionary monetary policy has been implemented within the context of a credible inflation targeting regime, which ensures its effectiveness facing shocks of the magnitude we are seeing now. Chile’s inflation was among the highest between early 2007 and October 2008, a period that saw commodity prices soar. Also, Chile’s inflation has been one of the fastest to drop (Figure 3).
Or does it represent more of an opportunity? Europe must show that it is a prosperous and secure area. In the short term migration will have an economic impact in the form of a fiscal expansion with some positive impact on growth. Germany’s fiscal situation is likely to deteriorate by around 0.3% to 0.4% of GDP in 2016 and 2017. This deterioration will be weaker in other countries. In the long term we will also have to look at the impact of the refugee crisis. This population is different, and care will have to be taken in integrating the migrants into the labour market, especially in Germany. In the medium term, from a demographic point of view, it can be a positive factor. The key issue is that of integrating migrants into the labour market in line with their profiles. All of these economic aspects are known and straightforward. From an economic perspective, this situation is not insurmountable; it is above all a political issue. The more integration we achieve at the economic level, the more it will be accepted politically. But all of this cannot be done in a day. Europe needs a young and well-trained workforce. We can create an opportunity out of a tragic situation, but it is not going to be easy. It is possible for a country to organise migration, and we have already done so in the past. The issue of security to combat the threat of terrorism will become a major challenge for governments in the months to come.

The priority in structural reform must be the rapid dissemination of these technological advances throughout society. And yes, because people expect too much from the ECB, if other actors rein in their efforts whenever we take action. We are seeing less of an effort on the public finance side. The ECB made it possible to avoid an outright depression in 2012 and 2013, and even the break-up of the euro. It will pursue an accommodative monetary policy for as long as is necessary. Without giving a date, this timescale is fairly long. It’s a long lasting endeavour. Additional risks have arisen from the slowdown in the emerging countries, risks that are pretty significant for the euro area. There are also downward pressures on prices in the manufacturing sector as a result of surplus output and the very high unemployment level. But monetary policy alone will not solve all the problems. Is the situation in Greece under control now? Discussions are ongoing and are still intensive at the political and technical levels, but the will to succeed is there and the atmosphere of the discussions has improved considerably. It is distinctly more positive than it was at the beginning of the year. A great deal of progress has already been made through these negotiations. Significant reforms have been voted in. The banks will be able to be recapitalised. Nevertheless, the situation remains very fragile in this country. After the debt crisis, isn’t the migration crisis the next threat to European cohesion?
Allow me to venture to select three lessons on the basis of what I have said so far. First: the simplest solution is often the best. Simple rules, whether for fiscal policy or banking regulation, will often prevent the worst errors. And when the yellow warning light starts flashing, action must be taken. Second: confidence is essential, also for economic policy. Confidence is easily eroded and difficult – and costly – to restore. Confidence must be earned. The resolution of today’s crisis will also follow a smoother path if there is confidence in institutions – banks, central banks and governments. Borrowing costs will then decrease more quickly, the need for government cuts will diminish accordingly, and the good times will return sooner. Third: we have no magic wand. If a country has real economic problems, real adjustments must be made to solve them.25 Central banks cannot solve the problems, but what they can do is lend money when there is none available elsewhere, giving countries more time to implement necessary reforms. Deficits must be reduced. Unrestrained printing of money has led to problems on many occasions through history. If printing money is not followed up by action – in euro area countries, in the UK and in the US – Mario Draghi, Mervyn King and Ben Bernanke run the risk of being recorded in history in the same chapter as the Scotsman John Law. The full title of my speech today is “Learning from history: truths and eternal truths”.

CEO Sandy Weill of Citigroup, the largest US bank before the crisis, said in July 2012 that repealing this act had contributed more than any other factor to the financial crisis. See also the article, “Roosevelt’s lessons for President Obama” by Marc Flandreau (2012), in The Global Journal (http://theglobaljournal.net/article/view/770/), where the author discusses historical perspectives on New Deal policies in the 1930s. 9  For decades, a number of policies have been implemented in a large number of countries, including Norway, to support home ownership. In Fault Lines (2010), Raghuram Rajan describes US housing market policies. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Big banks can easily give rise to big ideas about the importance of a country. But the financial crisis showed that big banks above all give rise to a political headache and a massive bill for taxpayers. Banks that are so large that they can undermine the entire financial system cannot easily be allowed to fail.10 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision seeks to ensure that different countries operate on a level playing field. While this is a good thing, the result was often compromise whereby the country with the weakest regulations set the standard. One must also recognise that the new rules introduced in the 1980s did not take into account banks’ ability and creativity in terms of circumventing these rules. Rules intended to mitigate the risk of financial instability actually encouraged banks to take on ever more risk. What do economists do when regulations do not work?
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In this setting, the main risk is that of doubts arising over the continuity of the macroeconomic, fiscal and financial re-balancing drive. Such doubts could prompt a deterioration of confidence and a fresh tightening of financing conditions which is highly significant for a country like Spain with a very high net debtor position, that is, ongoing net borrowing. Undoubtedly, therefore, in order to avoid reversals in the achievements attained, it is necessary to persevere with competitiveness-enhancing and fiscal consolidation policies, which provide the foundations for confidence, economic growth and job creation. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

The extraordinary speed of deposit withdrawals was driven by the widespread use of online banking and the rapid dissemination of news via social media and was compounded by the highly concentrated customer base. [1] In this ever-faster digital world, banks, supervisors, central banks and legislators need to review the tools for safeguarding liquidity conditions and financial stability. The turbulence seen in financial markets this spring is a timely reminder of the benefits of strong regulation and supervision. While adequate regulatory standards are the first line of defence against bank failures, they must be supported by a second line of defence in the form of steady, powerful and agile supervision. Harmonised and effective supervision and an enhanced resolution framework  ECB Banking Supervision has successfully developed and promoted harmonised supervisory practices. It started to closely monitor risks related to rising interest rates when the first signs of inflationary pressures emerged, long before the bank failures in the United States. The European Commission[2] and the European Court of Auditors[3] recently confirmed that the ECB has established itself as an effective and mature supervisory authority, and the ECB has already started to implement their recommendations. The EU has made considerable progress in crisis management by establishing a robust framework for dealing with banks in financial difficulties. While they are not a direct response to the recent turmoil, we strongly welcome the European Commission’s proposed changes to the crisis management and deposit insurance framework.