samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Absent a forceful policy response, the consequences would be lower incomes for working families, higher borrowing costs for housing, education, and the expenses of everyday life, lower value of retirement savings and rising unemployment. Federal Reserve response The Federal Reserve has taken a series of policy actions to help contain the risks to the economy posed by this financial crisis. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reduced the nominal federal funds rate target by 300 basis points since August of 2007. Alongside these appropriately aggressive monetary actions, the Federal Reserve has taken a series of initiatives aimed at improving market liquidity and overall market functioning. A more detailed description of these liquidity initiatives is included as Annex I. These actions are designed to allow financial intermediaries to finance with the central bank assets they can no longer finance as easily in the market. And in this way these liquidity facilities reduce the need for those institutions to take the types of actions, such as selling other assets into distressed markets or withdrawing credit lines extended to other financial institutions, that would serve to amplify the pressures in markets. In addition to these monetary policy and liquidity actions, the Federal Reserve has been working with community groups and housing advocates across the country to help homeowners navigate the complex challenges of higher resets and falling home prices.

I am the vice-chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, the Fed committee that sets monetary policy to promote its statutory goals of full employment and price stability. Last week, the committee reaffirmed that it currently anticipates that the Federal Reserve’s federal funds rate target will remain exceptionally low – which I understand to mean at its current level – at least through late 2014. The FOMC also voted to provide additional support for economic activity by extending its maturity extension program – popularly referred to as Operation Twist – through the end of the year. This extension means that we will be buying an additional $ billion of longer term Treasury securities, paid for by selling or redeeming the same amount of shorter term Treasuries. This action reduces the supply of longer dated Treasury securities on the market and lowers longer term interest rates relative to where they would otherwise be in the absence of such a program. That puts downward pressure on corporate borrowing costs and mortgage rates, and supports asset prices such as housing and equities – all of which promotes growth. In addition, the FOMC adopted new language to describe its policy outlook, stating that it is “prepared to take further action as appropriate to promote a stronger economic recovery and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.” I will let those words speak for themselves. Local economic conditions Now let me turn to economic conditions in Puerto Rico.
In July, the Central Bank of Malta joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System, a collaborative structure that aims to green the financial system and strengthen the efforts of the financial sector in achieving the Paris climate agreement goals. This includes mobilising capital for green and low-carbon investments. Staff members have joined work streams to further research in this area and adopt a number of proposals. Furthermore, the Central Bank of Malta is also represented in the Sustainable Advisory Committee of the Bank for International Settlements and is working in aligning our international portfolio towards holding more green bonds. Page | 6

Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -8-  -  Financing is provided to economic entities without direct impact on government funds, since cost is only incurred when debtors default on payment. Risk and accountability sharing between the banks and the government allows each to focus on its main role. Reducing inflationary pressures that result from direct liquidity injections. The scheme caters to specific sectors, comes with specific terms, and is time-bound with a clearly defined deadline. The Committee has presented this proposal in its final format to the Council of Ministers with the proposed draft law that would regulate the scheme, the next step is putting the matter before the National Assembly for review and the enactment of the law. Conclusion As we continue to strive on the two fronts of Lives and Livelihoods, people remain central and while striving to protect them against the pandemic, we should not overlook their livelihoods. This is undoubtedly a colossal and unprecedented challenge, and one that requires bridging the gap and approximating the two tracks towards an intricate balance that allows for a smoothly running economy and a return to the highest levels possible of economic activity without compromising safety measures and preventative health protocols to avoid new waves of infection. This challenge could only be conquered through collaboration and through minding all health recommendations and state-issued controls by all parties in this blessed land, as normality is gradually restored. A severe pandemic yields lessons to be gleaned.
In my opinion, making the monetary policy framework more specific in this way would make monetary policy, simpler, clearer and more robust. The preparations before each policy meeting could focus on calculating forecasts of CPIF inflation and unemployment for different repo-rate paths. These forecasts, together with an assessment of the sustainable rate of unemployment, would summarise all the information the members of the Executive Board would need to make their decisions and choose between the various repo-rate paths. The decisions would be easy to explain and the explanations would be clear. This would also make it easy to evaluate monetary policy. It would become more robust because all the information and all the assessments that affect the forecasts and the sustainable rate of unemployment could be incorporated into the decision-making process in a systematic way. In order to avoid monetary policy being unclear in the future, I believe that the Riksbank’s decisions and communication should not give the impression that monetary policy has any objectives other than stabilising inflation and resource utilisation. On this basis, I entered a reservation at the latest monetary policy meeting and advocated leaving the repo rate unchanged and then a lower repo-rate path than the path in the main scenario, as such a lower path would better stabilise inflation measured in terms of the CPIF and resource utilisation measured in terms of the unemployment gap. References Barro, Robert J., and David B. Gordon (1983), “A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model”, Journal of Political Economy 91, 589–610.

In the years leading up to the start of the crisis there was a dearth of prudential supervision, but I am quite prepared to acknowledge that there have been periods where the opposite has been true. My point here is that I don’t think the system of integrated regulation demonstrated the ability to deliver a stable equilibrium of conduct and prudential supervision. Third, there was something of an inbuilt tendency within integrated regulation to play down the active debate of issues where conduct and prudential regulators found themselves with potentially conflicting objectives. There are several important reasons why reform of financial regulation will in my view be an important step forward. It starts with establishing very clear public policy objectives for financial regulation to which we, as the regulators, are fully committed. For both banks and insurance companies, the PRA will have the objective of promoting the safety and soundness of firms. Consistent with this objective, it will focus on the potential harm that firms can cause to the stability of the financial system in the UK. We define a stable financial system as one that is resilient in providing the critical financial services that the economy needs. And this supply of services is a necessary condition for a healthy and  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  successful economy, as demonstrated by the costs imposed by the financial crisis on the public and society at large.
The financial stability risks in the US and China warrant close monitoring, simply given the size of their economies and financial markets, not to mention the build-up of leverage. In the US, financial stresses are most apparent in the credit markets. Corporate debt has increased by 30% since the crisis, and much of the funds raised has gone into stock buybacks or to highly leveraged corporates. The Institute of International Finance estimates that about 8% of US firms (by assets) are unable to cover their annual interest payments. Unanticipated increases in lending rates or a slowdown in earnings growth could tip these vulnerable firms into bankruptcy. In China, the Bank for International Settlements has estimated total leverage in the system has reached nearly 260% of GDP in 2017. The risk is of a hard landing in the overheated Chinese property market, which has been fuelled by rapid lending by trust companies and asset managers. Chinese authorities have made reducing systemic financial risks a key priority but have to tread very carefully to avoid destabilising the financial system in the process. Conclusion Let me conclude. There are good reasons to be optimistic about growth in 2018. The Goldilocks scenario – at least for this year – is a reasonable baseline view. But we need to be watchful of the three bears who may show up at the front door any time: inflation, protectionism, financial instability.

My point is that the Fed needs to examine and perfect the transmission mechanism under its purview just as intensely as it looks at monetary policy per se. And we must be ever-mindful that the central bank cannot carry the load alone, as Chairman Bernanke and others of us have often said. Indeed, there is great danger in any temptation to do so. A recent Economist article aptly summarized my perspective on this as follows: “Above all, there is a moral hazard in central-bank activism. It risks encouraging governments to sit back and let others do the work that they find too difficult themselves.”2 If I believe further accommodation or some jujitsu with the yield curve will do the trick and ignite sustainable aggregate demand, I will support it. But the bar for such action remains very high for me until the fiscal authorities do their job, just as we have done ours. And if they do, further monetary accommodation may not even be necessary. With that, I’ll stop. And in the best tradition of central banking, I’d be happy to avoid answering any questions you might have. 2  6  “The World Economy: Central Bankers to the Rescue?” The Economist, Aug. 13, 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches
Lastly, most spending is temporary and non-recurring, which will make it hopefully possible, once the crisis is over, to return to a sound and sustainable fiscal path. II. Can reconstruction now strengthen Europe and the Franco-German alliance? After the emergency phase, the time has come to exit the crisis. We Europeans have common objectives here: to support growth during the recovery phase, but above all to invest for the future (climate change, digital, health, etc. ), in a world that is increasingly uncertain. To achieve this, Europe has four concrete and innovative levers at its disposal: an unprecedented recovery plan, a Financing Union for private savings, its single market, and its commitment to fight global warming. An unprecedented recovery plan The Franco-German initiative of 18 May, and the subsequent European agreement of 21 July, have been a major step forward for European financial solidarity. This is an unprecedented act of solidarity towards the countries most affected by a pandemic, which is itself unparalleled. For the first time, a common European-wide fund to finance final expenditure has been adopted, representing over half of the package (EUR 390 billion). This is not only a strong political signal, but also an economic rebalancing of the policy-mix in the euro area, which lays the groundwork for a real common fiscal policy. The ECB's Governing Council has long advocated that monetary policy should not be “the only game in town” in Europe. This is very good news.

This massive and rapid action was welcomed but raised questions, particularly in Germany: is the ECB not going beyond its mandate, endangering price stability? And even more "fundamentally ", where do these thousands of billions created all of a sudden come from? I will start with the second question: the specific feature of a central bank is its ability to create money virtually and without limits. However, it must be borne in mind that the money created by central banks is never simply “given away” permanently: it is loaned for a limited period; and it is channelled into the economy and eventually comes back to the central bank. The central bank can buy time through its monetary creation, and this is important. But it cannot sustainably increase wealth; only our work and economic growth can. I will now return to the first question, on whether or not we are fulfilling our mandate. In its founding Treaties, and under the legitimacy afforded to it by economic actors and public opinion, the ECB’s measures are bound by two interlinked anchors: its price stability mandate and its independence. They are inherited from the Bundesbank and in my view vital. Independence : the ECB is subject to neither national governments, nor to the pressures of the financial markets nor of passing trends. The ECB’s monetary policy must continue to support economic activity, for the sake of its own mandate of price stability.
For sterling borrowers, that bridge is built on the foundations of SONIA – the Sterling Overnight Index Average, produced every day by us at the Bank of England and based – unlike LIBOR – at around 60 billion pounds of real, daily transactions1;  -  And, second, while that work has been underway, we’ve shored up the old LIBOR bridge, through the FCA’s agreement with LIBOR panel banks to continue providing submissions to the benchmark. But those repairs were only ever temporary. The FCA can’t replace those markets that used to underpin LIBOR submissions: they are gone forever. And the FCA’s agreement with the panel banks runs out at the end of 2021. From 2022, therefore, the availability of LIBOR cannot be guaranteed. Something that is unsafe today will become lethal at the end of next year. 1  The Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA) is administered by the Bank and reflects the average of the interest rates that banks pay to borrow sterling overnight from other financial institutions See www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/sonia-benchmark. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  Avoiding that outcome is what we’re here today to discuss. But before we dive into the detail I want to leave you with three key messages: -  First, LIBOR transition affects every company that borrows in sterling. You cannot ignore it, or hope that it goes away: you need to act well before the end of 2021. -  But, second, there is time if you start now.

Both commercial property prices and housing prices have risen substantially for many years and although we have been able to see that the rates of increase have slowed down slightly in recent months, they are still high. I believe that property prices may well continue rising at a fairly high rate over the coming period. But in the slightly longer term such a rapid increase is not sustainable. Why is the Riksbank interested in the property market? The fact that the Riksbank is interested in what is happening in the property market is based on the tasks we have been given by the Swedish Parliament. One is that we shall ensure that inflation is kept at a reasonable level, more precisely at two per cent a year. The other is that we shall safeguard the stability of the financial system. The way the property market develops can have significance for both of these tasks. Property often functions as collateral for the loans the banks grant to households and companies. If the properties are not reasonably valued; if prices have been pushed up through exaggerated optimism or speculation, there is a risk of a heavy price fall. During the crisis of the 1990s it was falling property prices, particularly office premises, that were the cause of major losses for the Swedish banks. Developments in the property market can also affect activity in the real economy. For instance, rising house prices reduce households’ loans in relation to the value of their assets.
16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  (b) Climbing the Jobs Ladder As the economy recovered after the crisis, so did aggregate jobs growth. In response, workers began to climb the jobs ladder, with transition rates between jobs rising. We would expect this to have then boosted aggregate pay and productivity, as workers rotated into higher-paying, more productive firms. In practice, this process appears to have been sluggish for pay and to have stalled for productivity. Why? There appear to have been two effects at play in slowing the rate of climb up the jobs ladder. First, although the rate of jobs transition picked up, it did so only slowly, especially given the degree of underlying strength in the jobs market. Despite picking up, the velocity of circulation in the labour market has remained relatively subdued in the face of the biggest jobs bonanza since the Second World War. Job-to-job transition rates have only just reached their pre-crisis levels after seven years (Chart 13). And that still leaves them around 25-30% below their peaks in the 1970s and 1980s. This relatively subdued pattern is even more striking if we compare transition rates with the degree of tightness in the labour market, defined by the V/U ratio (Chart 19). This suggests job-to-job transitions have not really picked-up at all over recent years, when measured relative to the strength of the jobs market.

Also, I invite you to maintain your positive approach to expand financing to the Albanian economy in addition to qualitatively increasing the banking products in a quantitative manner. *** Dear ladies and gentlemen, Year 2022 as well triggered some unexpected shocks for the banking sector (the war in Ukraine, fluctuations in markets of financial instruments and recently the increase in interest rates). The banking sector, despite the lingering effect of these shocks on the profitability rate, re-affirmed once more the stability and the security this sector provides to depositors and investors. Throughout 2022, the activity of banking sector recorded a prudential increase across all indicators, above 6% growth of total assets and similar expansion rates in main items. The funds of individual depositors, who preferred the foreign currency as the main instrument of their savings, largely underpinned this upturn. The financing manner of credit portfolio and the upsurge in the foreign currency investments in securities reflected the ample supply in foreign currency. The amount of non-performing loans reduced again this year, by around ALL 2 billion, thus strengthening the stability of this multi-year trend, further down to 5%, from 5.68%. In 2022, the portfolio of financial instruments - unlike the previous years - provided a negative contribution to the overall level of banking system profitability. The interest rate hikes and the uncertainties caused by the war in Ukraine yielded subsequent shocks to the market values of these portfolios.
Institutions supplying such services are quite simply too important to fail. Everyone knows it. So, highly risky banking institutions enjoy implicit public sector support. In turn, public support  4  BIS Review 140/2010  incentivises banks to take on yet more risk, knowing that, if things go well, they will reap the rewards while the public sector will foot the bill if things go wrong. Greater risk begets greater size, most probably greater importance to the functioning of the economy, higher implicit public subsidies, and hence yet larger incentives to take risk – described by Martin Wolf as the “financial doomsday machine”. The failure in the crisis was not one of intellectual imagination or economic science to understand these issues. Economists recognised that distorted incentives, whether arising from implicit public subsidies, asymmetric information or a host of other imperfections, will cause a market-based outcome to be sub-optimal from the perspective of society. This idea has been at the centre of modern economics since the extraordinary series of papers written by Arrow and Debreu in the 1950s (Arrow, 1951; Debreu, 1951; Arrow and Debreu, 1954). The real failure was a lapse into hubris – we came to believe that crises created by massive maturity transformation were problems that no longer applied to modern banking, that they belonged to an era in which people wore whiskers and top hats.

Along with the above-mentioned measures, we have also extended the maturity of the FX deposit borrowed by the banks from one week to one month, and reduce the lending rate from 10 percent to 7 percent for USD and 9 percent for Euro in the FX market. Needless to say, as the high level of volatility in global financial markets prevails, the Central Bank of Turkey will sustain its vigilance and will stand ready to take additional measures prudently within its means in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the financial system. Dear Colleagues, In the last part of my speech, let me say a couple of words about the current financial turmoil. This recent episode provides a good example of how, in a financially integrated environment, a country specific shock can spill over rapidly to seemingly distant markets and countries. The problems, which started in sub-prime mortgage markets in the United States, have spread to the whole financial system all around the world and reached a point that threatens the global economic stability. This shows that countries share not only benefits of financial integration but also the risks associated with it. In my opinion the most important lesson that we should derive from the current turmoil is the need for a global lender of last resort mechanism.
A more developed market for securitisation may be one way of tackling this problem. It requires, however, assistance from the authorities in the form of a simplified regulatory framework. A well-developed market for gilt-edged bonds may also work in the same direction, but this also requires the approval of the authorities. A general reflection is that the financial innovations in a new market develop best if they are controlled by the wishes of investors and issuers. It is impossible to say what these wishes will be like in future. The role of authorities is to create a body of rules that provides scope for changes and preferably avoids locking the market into special structures or instruments. The Swedish housing loan institutions are well run and should have good opportunities for borrowing competitively in the European market however it develops. However, no one can borrow without systematically building up relations with the funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors which make up the so-called investor base. All the Swedish institutions have a task here in the market for euro. BIS Review 113/1999  6

As a Thammasat Economics alumnus, it is an honor and a great pleasure to be ‘home’ addressing the distinguished guests and participants of this prominent conference. Thank you. BIS Review 62/2002  5