samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I shall come to this episode later on. But first I should like to go a little more deeply into the characteristics of international capital flows. I shall then discuss the implications, practical and philosophical, that they have for free and open markets, which collectively make up an increasingly seamless international financial system, but which continue to rely largely on their own limited resources when they encounter the problems that this system throws up. International capital flows 4. Like wind currents and weather patterns, international capital flows carry with them a mixture of benefits and risks. Let me try briefly to pin down what makes them so powerful and so protean in their effects on the international financial landscape. I find it helpful, as a mnemonic, to think of their main characteristics in terms of what I shall refer to as the six ‘V’s: Virtue, Volume, Variety, Velocity, Volatility, and Viciousness. 5. By Virtue, I mean simply that international capital flows, by promoting an efficient and balanced use of financial resources, bring enormous benefits throughout the world. Over the past few decades they have been of crucial importance in developing new economies and revitalising old ones. When they work smoothly, international capital flows help to relieve shortages of capital in previously segmented markets. They provide a competitive environment that encourages innovation. And, by affording better returns to investors, they help to put spare capital to the best possible use.

Given what we have been through in Hong Kong and in this region in the last twenty months, we are eager that the momentum on this issue should not be lost, and that it should not require the disruptions and dislocations of another major financial crisis for the importance of preventive action to be driven home. 7  BIS Review 35/1999
Unlike the situation today, not only banks, but also households and companies would be able to open an account with the SNB. There might also be other forms of digital central bank money for the public, e.g. digital banknotes which would be issued rather like private cryptocurrencies. From an economic perspective, however, the features of the different forms of digital central bank money are largely identical. Therefore, when I speak about digital central bank money, I will continue to use the example of money held at the SNB in the form of a sight deposit account. 10 Implementation throws up a number of practical questions: How would eligibility for digital SNB money be defined? Would residence in Switzerland be the decisive factor? What account holder due diligence would the SNB have to carry out as part of compliance? What services might account holders expect? Would deposits generate interest and, if so, at what rate? In addition, would it be possible to invest all of one’s assets at the SNB, or would there be an upper limit? Depending on the answers to these questions, the economic impact of broader access to digital central bank money could vary greatly. This evening, we are principally interested in the implications for commercial banks’ money and credit creation. Much would depend on the structuring of any sight deposit accounts, most especially with respect to interest rates.

In other words, why is inflation higher than what we have experienced historically, and is monetary policy responding in an optimal way? Implications for Inflation First, it is important to recognise the complex interplay of demand and supply factors underpinning the recent price developments in Singapore. Demand-side pressures on prices have built up as domestic economic activity rebounded strongly from the Great Recession of 2008/09. Regional demand has been firm, supporting the continued expansion of many of our services industries, while strong employment conditions in Singapore have underpinned robust consumption growth for a range of goods and services. Sustained low global interest rates and capital inflows have supported the demand for housing – a point I will return to later. At the same time, supply-side factors have become more significant, with the immediate constraints in labour and housing markets pushing up domestic costs. These reflect structural capacity constraints in the economy. Policy measures are being put in place to help the economy transit to a more sustainable model of productivity-led growth, as Singapore’s reliance on foreign workers is reduced. As the economy adapts and productivity growth rises, price pressures are likely to subside and provide a lift to real wages, making Singaporean workers better off. Implications for monetary policy My second observation is that the monetary policy stance has to be carefully calibrated to take into account the multiple influences on consumer prices. Monetary policy should act decisively to ease short-term inflationary pressures driven by strong demand, through applying an appropriate constraint on overall economic activity.
We are actively promoting all these areas, capitalizing on our reputation and brand name. Singapore welcomed 380,000 Indian tourists in 2002, 11% more than the year before. We especially value Indian visitors, who stay longer and spend more than tourists from elsewhere. To attract more tourists from India, we have relaxed visa requirements, and made multiple entry visas more available. We are also wooing corporate customers from the region, to use our financial, legal and other professional services. Many Indian companies choose Singapore as the venue for their arbitration proceedings. We liberalised our financial sector thus freeing our capital markets and wealth management industry to grow. Indian companies that are expanding need capital, and will find Singapore a viable location to raise funds, be it debt or equity. The companies can tap into a large and growing investor base in Singapore. Close to 200 international fund management firms and 150 venture capitalists operate out of Singapore, managing over $ billion in assets. To support the growth of our economy, we are investing heavily in human capital, upgrading our skills and refreshing our knowledge. But in a small country of three million people, the talent pool is never big enough. We will therefore continue to attract talent globally. Over the years, we have benefited greatly from an inflow of talent from India, as well as of NRIs from around the world, and we will  BIS Review 3/2004  3  continue to welcome them.

Through its actions, it will continue to uphold the trust which has been placed in it thus far. 4  BIS Review 71/2007
Taking into account the write-  BIS Review 168/2009  5  downs on loans and securities recorded until end-October 2009 and the loan loss provisions until end-June 2009, the potential further write-downs of euro area banks until end-2010 could reach EUR 187 billion. The euro area insurance sector Turning to the euro area insurance sector, it continues to be confronted with challenging conditions. The results for the second and third quarters of the year remained rather subdued, as premiums written declined on average. Reduced demand for life insurance products, in particular unit-linked products – where the investment risk was borne by the policyholder – have contributed to lower premiums written. Premiums written growth in the non-life segments has been hampered by the weak economic environment, which kept demand from households and firms muted. However, investment income, which has benefited from the improvements in the capital markets after mid-March 2009, was on average higher than in previous periods. The improvement in investment income has, however, not been enough to avoid a broad-based decline in profitability. Large euro area insurers have continued to increase their investment exposure to government and corporate bonds during the first half of 2009, as they have continued to shift their investment strategies away from equities in an attempt to de-risk their investment exposures At the end of the first half of 2009, a sample of large euro area insurers had about 70% of their investments in bonds, up from about 50% at the end of 2007 (See Chart 13).

Exiting before the underlying strength of key financial institutions is sufficiently well established runs the risk of leaving some of them vulnerable to adverse disturbances, possibly even triggering renewed financial system stresses. Late exits, on the other hand, can entail the risk of distorting competition, creating moral hazard risks that come with downside protection – including the possibility of excessive risk-taking – as well as exacerbating risks for public finances. To cushion the risks that lie ahead, banks will need to be especially mindful in ensuring that they have adequate capital and liquidity buffers in place. If the circumstances require it, some banks may need to raise new and high-quality capital. In addition, some banks, especially those which have received state support, may need fundamental restructuring in order to  BIS Review 168/2009  7  confirm their long-term viability when such support is no longer available. This could involve the shrinking of balance sheets through the shedding of unviable businesses with a view to enhancing their profit-generating capacities. At the same time, banks should take full advantage of the recent recovery in their profitability to strengthen their capital positions, so that the necessary restructuring of businesses and the enhancement of shock-absorbing capacities do not impinge materially on the provision of credit to the economy. Thank you very much for your attention. I am now at your disposal for questions.
39  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  39  Annex  Chart 1: Level of real GDP in the Great Recession and Great Depression US  UK Index, Year 0 = 100  Index, Year 0 = 100  140  140  130  130  120 110  120  100  110  90 80  100  70 60 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  90 0  1  2  Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929) Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Germany  France Index, Year 0 = 100  0  1  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929)  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929) Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Index, Year 0 = 100  150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60  140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70  0  1  2  60 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929) Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Sources: ONS, Bank of England ‘Millennium of Data’ (2017), IMF WEO, Maddison Historical GDP Data and Bank calculations.

The Economic Journal, 123(567), 1-37. Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261-297. Moody’s (2010). Revisions to Moody’s Hybrid Tool Kit. July 1. Morris, S., & Shin, H. S. (2016). Illiquidity component of credit risk. International Economic Review, 57(4), 1135-1148. Morris, S., Shim, I., & Shin, H. S. (2017). Redemption risk and cash hoarding by asset managers. Journal of Monetary Economics. Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press. Peek, J., & Rosengren, E. (1995). Bank regulation and the credit crunch. Journal of Banking & Finance, 19(3), 679-692. Philippon, T. (2015). Has the US finance industry become less efficient? On the theory and measurement of financial intermediation. The American Economic Review, 105(4), 1408-1438. Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A. B., & Boesky, H. (2010). Shadow banking. Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009). This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton University Press. Romer, C. & Romer, D. (2017). Why some times are different: macroeconomic policy and the aftermath of financial crises. Mimeo. October. Sarin, N., & Summers, L. H. (2016). Understanding Bank Risk through Market Measures. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2016(2), 57-127. Schularick, M., & Taylor, A. M. (2012). Credit booms gone bust: monetary policy, leverage cycles, and financial crises, 1870–2008. The American Economic Review, 102(2), 1029-1061. SEC (2017). Report to Congress. Access to Capital and Market Liquidity. August 2017. Sheldon, G. (1996).
2  Woodford, M. (2005), “Central-Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness,” paper presented at FRB Kansas City Symposium on “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future,” Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 25-27, 2005. 3  Providing forecasts based on both a constant interest rate and market expectations give information not only about the sign but may also give some guidance about the range. See, for example, the following citation from the Bank of England’s Inflation Report of February 2008: “Under market interest rates, the central projection for inflation was a little above the target in the medium term, while under constant interest rates, it was below the target.” This suggests that the likely interest rate path lies somewhere between a constant rate and market expectations. BIS Review 94/2008  1  second central bank with endogenous interest rate assumptions, following the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, who introduced it in 1997. More recently, the Swedish Riksbank, the Czech National Bank, and the Central Bank of Iceland have also started to publish interest rate forecasts. Publishing endogenous interest rate paths raises a number of issues, and there is disagreement among both academics and central bankers on whether being that precise about future policy intentions is beneficial or not. The key issue in the debate is whether such communication implies guidance or noise. Some of the arguments for transparency relate to the beneficial effects when private agents understand the central bank’s reaction function, such that market interest rates will adjust more appropriately to economic news.

We therefore need to encourage innovation but also ensure that people trust innovations. At the Banque de France, we have taken various steps to promote innovation. First, we appointed a start-up correspondent at the national level [Maurice Oms], and we will soon have start-up correspondents in the regional French Tech capitals. The Banque de France’s innovation laboratory, the Lab, is working with numerous actors in the field. This year, we inaugurated a new site in Singapore, one of the epicentres of the Fintech industry. And recently, Paris was selected alongside Frankfurt to house the European branch of the BIS’s Innovation Hub. At the ACPR, we are doing our utmost to facilitate contact with Fintechs at all stages. First, there 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  is a single point of entry: the Fintech-Innovation Unit. Since 2016, it has met and advised between 100 and 150 project leaders per year, to help them flesh out the initial outline of their project before potentially submitting it for approval. The approval procedure has also been simplified with the creation of a digital portal, and we have adapted certain procedures to recent developments: introduction of a streamlined post-Brexit procedure in 2019, and of a simplified procedure for a large number of payment service providers (PSPs) in 2020. On top of this, in our day-to-day supervision, we apply the regulation using a proportional approach. For example, for small establishments, we allow a single individual to hold more than one key positions.
There is still a rationale for central banks to hold gold. 2. Gold selling  After having listed all the good reasons for holding gold, you will not be surprised if I reiterate that we have no plans to sell gold! The leading official holders of gold have not changed their attitude in this respect. Neither the American Federal Reserve System, nor the German Bundesbank, nor the Bank of Italy, nor the Banque de France have any plan to sell gold. 3. Gold lending  Concerning gold lending, the Banque de France, as most of you probably know, is definitely not among the active players in the market. Quite the contrary, alongside the other major holders, it has refrained from an active management of its gold holdings. The Banque de France has always adopted a very prudent and rather conservative approach, acknowledging the fact that the issue of gold lending is a matter of common interest to the major holders. Two main reasons are traditionally put forward to justify gold lending: –  The first one refers to a question of principle. Foreign currency assets are actively managed. Why not extend this management to gold insofar as gold is considered to be part of a country’s external reserves? –  The second reason is that central banks obviously have to take into account profit and loss account considerations. From this standpoint, gold should provide a return just like other assets.

As you all know, the Joint Staff Report concluded that further work is necessary in light of the evolving structure of the Treasury market, and it also highlighted a series of additional steps that the official sector will take to evaluate its approach to this market. I remain very supportive of these efforts. In fact, this conference is among the first of those next steps, and presents a perfect opportunity to have a rich debate on the market’s evolving structure and the actions that may be appropriate in response. Thank you once again for coming here today. I look forward to our engagement and discussion. 4  The TMPG has since expanded its mandate to include the agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets. 5  A more recent and equally successful practice has also been instituted for the MBS market. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The international dimension I have discussed the interaction of the UK’s macroprudential regime with our domestic arrangements for microsupervision and for monetary policy. But the third set of interactions will be with our counterparts in other countries. This is especially important to the UK. London hosts what is probably the world’s most international financial centre. Crucially for us, it is not an entrepot. It is more than an important source of jobs and tax revenues. Many of the overseas firms active in the City are also active in providing services to parts of the UK’s real economy. We therefore have a double stake in their safety and soundness. If they get into distress, there are spillovers to UK financial firms through wholesale markets, but also at least a temporary reduction in the financial services available to UK firms and households. For all these reasons, the UK has a special stake in the adequacy of international standards for financial firms and markets. And, hosting many subsidiaries of major global firms, our supervisors need to play a special role in the collective consolidated supervision of internationally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). This extends into the macroprudential arena. At a global level, we are active participants in the Financial Stability Board. And, regionally, the UK authorities will be engaged in the European Supervisory Authorities. Our Governor is first Vice Chairman of the European Systemic Risk Board (on which I and Adair Turner, Chairman of the FSA, also sit).

On the US side of the Atlantic, some of you will recognise echoes here of the Paulson Plan for the creation of a financial stability authority in the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, FPC will have a responsibility to advise the government on when the perimeter of the PRA’s microprudential supervision should change. Very obviously, this is aimed at countering the risk of regulatory arbitrage undermining attempts to tighten up banking regulation. It also recognises that the shape of the financial system is bound to evolve in unexpected ways over the years. The regulatory regime needs to be adaptable. It is not all about banks: instruments addressed to network issues That underlines that the UK’s new macroprudential regime is not all about banks. For example, were it to be warranted, the FPC could potentially intervene via Recommendations or Directions to the microregulators on disclosures made around the issuance and structuring of securities; on the trading infrastructure of markets, to increase the likelihood that liquidity would prove resilient under stress; on limits on large exposures amongst different kinds of firm; and on the rules of the game for the many varieties of shadow banking. On the last, for example, it is no secret that, speaking only for myself, I should like to see the rules for money market mutual funds altered to address the “break the buck” problem.
Thomas Jordan: Swiss National Bank monetary policy in light of financial market disruptions Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 11 December 2008. *  *  *  Situation in the financial markets Looking at the financial markets, we currently find ourselves in a historically unprecedented situation. The financial crisis has escalated dramatically since September. In the course of the past three months, it has taken hold in almost every market segment around the globe. At the time of the last news conference in June, we had already experienced three waves of money market turbulence; now, a fourth wave has eclipsed all others (cf. chart 1). 1 The situation in the money markets has calmed somewhat since November. This is due in part to the measures taken by central banks and governments, in particular the generous amounts of liquidity injected into the system, the recapitalisation of banks, the provision of state guarantees for bank liabilities and the transfer of risk positions. After unsecured money markets had all but frozen in the autumn, central banks increasingly found themselves acting as lender of first resort, in other words, they were becoming the primary supplier of liquidity to the financial system. To this end, new monetary policy instruments and facilities were introduced, and the liquidity supply was expanded significantly.

*** The last few years have already been littered with outstanding achievements. It was not so long ago that most people doubted that the single currency would ever see the light of day. Then, when they saw that it would, they speculated that only a few countries would be able to join. But they underestimated the resolve of European governments to be part of this great step forward in Europe’s history. Since then, we have witnessed the two changeovers; the introduction of the euro in book-entry form and then in the form of banknotes and coins. Both went smoothly, not because they were easy, but because of the hard work of all involved. And of course, for nearly five years now, we have had a single monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank for the euro area. During this time, the Bank has not been without its critics. I have not been without my critics. The nature of that criticism depended on which newspapers you read. If you read the Anglo-Saxon press, then we paid too much attention to monetary growth. It seems that money shouldn’t matter for monetary policy. If you read the German press, well the story was different. Some said we communicated too little. Others said we communicated too much. When you are flanked on both sides, then you must be somewhere in the middle of the park. I conclude from this that we must have positioned ourselves more or less right.