samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This working assumption is based on the information made public by the tax authority. Possible adjustments to amounts and characteristics shall be incorporated as defined by the authority. This includes the formal definition 4  of fiscal policy that the Administration must make through a decree within the first 90 days of its mandate. Finally, the public discussion on changes in fiscal figures reinforces the need to improve the institutional framework around the issue. Any policy based on rules is effective only if it is predictable, which relies on the stability and clarity of its methodology, the commitment to comply with it and the transparency of its effective compliance. In any case, for the projections in this Report to come true, especially in terms of growth, an attentive and constructive attitude from all sectors is required. The Chilean economy may continue to grow in the short term because it has no major limitations on the macroeconomic side. The activity gap with respect to its potential is still significant, the current account deficit is moderate, financial conditions are favorable and inflation is low. If the plans of gradual normalization of monetary policy in the developed countries remain in place, the external conditions will continue to be good. Finally, the Central Bank will maintain the monetary impulse until it sees clear signs of inflation converging to the target and will then withdraw it gradually. However, this recovery of growth will occur most certainly, if investment recovers accordingly.

Hervé Hannoun: The Banque de France’s view on gold and comments on the euro  Speech by Mr Hervé Hannoun, First Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, at a dinner organised by Goldman Sachs on the occasion of the Financial Times Gold Conference held on 26 June 2000. * * *  Introduction: silver and gold Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and privilege for me to be speaking here in the Hôtel des Invalides in front of such a distinguished audience. The organisers gave you the opportunity to visit Napoléon’s tomb. So let me, as an introduction, highlight some historical facts, which may not be so far away from the topics I intend to discuss later. Two hundred years ago, the First Consul Napoléon Bonaparte created the Banque de France with himself as one of the shareholders. At the same time, Napoléon built a monetary regime based on a bimetal system (a combined gold and silver standard) that prevailed throughout the 19th century. At that time, many currencies in the world were based on a gold standard, while a few had a silver standard. France had defined the Germinal franc - which remained absolutely stable for almost 120 years - with respect to its weight in both silver and gold. One Germinal franc was equivalent to 5 grams of silver and to 322 milligrams of gold; the famous 20 franc coin, called the Napoléon, was issued at that time (with a weight of 6.45 grams).
Benoît Cœuré: Asset purchases, financial regulation and repo market activity Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the ERCC General Meeting on "The repo market: market conditions and operational challenges", Brussels, 14 November 2017. * * * Let me thank the organisers for inviting me here today.1 The repo market is a cornerstone in the transmission of monetary policy. In its traditional role, it is a prime short-term funding market for banks. Before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, secured transactions accounted for around a third of the daily turnover in euro area money markets according to money market statistical reporting (MMSR) data. Today, their share is closer to two-thirds. Movements in short-term repo rates therefore change the market-based financing conditions for banks and, hence, their conditions for trading with their ultimate customers – firms and households. This means that repo rates are a prime channel through which changes in the monetary policy stance are transmitted to the broader financial market and the real economy. In addition, the repo market plays an important intermediation role in the financial system by being the main vehicle for sourcing and financing government bonds. In this role, the repo market critically supports the liquidity of the bond market. It offers investors the possibility to finance long positions and to borrow securities to deliver into short positions. Interruptions in the repo market may therefore affect the entire term structure of interest rates.

I will also provide empirical evidence that challenges the view that financial regulation has adversely impacted repo market activity so far. But I will also argue that further evidence is needed to draw conclusions on this matter. 1 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  Asset purchases and repo market activity Let me start with the impact of central bank asset purchases on recent repo market activity. Asset purchases may have two broad effects on repo markets. The first is their impact on excess liquidity. With central banks exchanging large amounts of reserves for longer-dated securities, banks may no longer need to tap the interbank market, both secured and unsecured, to manage their short-term liquidity needs. As a result, trading volumes may fall. The second effect is closer to one of the main transmission channels of asset purchase programmes, namely portfolio rebalancing. In imperfect financial markets, those in need of scarce securities, or those who have a special preference for them, need to bid harder to obtain them, thereby pushing up their price and lowering their yield – which then delivers financial conditions supportive of higher output and prices in the real economy. There is growing empirical evidence that this channel has been very effective in the euro area.4 The flip side to this is that, although purchases are conducted in the secondary cash market, price adjustments in this market can also be expected to affect conditions in the repo market. A simple way to think about this is through short-selling.
Identifying and analysing factors that can give rise to financial imbalances is and will remain an important part of the Riksbank’s work. The Riksbank needs this analysis for several reasons. As I mentioned earlier, the Riksbank has responsibility for promoting a safe and efficient payment system. We must also understand if monetary policy risks contributing to financial imbalances arising. Moreover, a development of the economy that proves to be unsustainable will affect the way in which inflation develops and what type of monetary policy it is appropriate to conduct. The financial stability council will give us a forum where we can and shall openly present our analyses of financial risks and recommendations for supervisory measures. In the recent Monetary Policy Update our forecasts was based on no new macroprudential policy measures being introduced. But how will my view of a suitable monetary policy be affected if such measures are implemented? The answer depends entirely on the measures implemented and their effects. 10  The scenarios shown in Figure 7 should primarily be regarded as an illustration of the different alternatives. The repo-rate path there does not coincide with the one I have advocated at the monetary policy meetings. 11  The Riksbank (2013c). 12  A central element of uncertainty is how the repo rate affects the degree of household indebtedness. The Riksbank’s estimates imply that the debt ratio will increase when the repo rate is cut, but that the increase will be small.

Turning to price developments, let me first recall that, over recent months, annual rates of consumer price inflation have been affected by several factors of a special or temporary nature. This volatile pattern was broadly anticipated. However, annual inflation rates are currently somewhat higher than was expected a few months ago, with early estimates for March pointing to a figure of 2.5%. This is mainly because oil prices have again risen significantly in the more recent period. If sustained, higher oil prices would also have an impact on inflation rates in the remainder of 2002. While inflation rates are expected to fall to below 2% later in the coming months, this decline may possibly be less pronounced than was foreseen, and inflation rates during this year could turn out to be somewhat higher than previously expected. Beyond the shorter term, upward pressure on prices from aggregate demand should, in the light of current projections of a gradual economic recovery in the euro area, remain contained. In addition, the outlook for inflation is fundamentally dependent on wage moderation. Such moderation is important not only in order to contain risks to price stability but also to foster employment growth. As I have already noted on earlier occasions, there is some cause for concern with regard to ongoing wage negotiations. BIS Review 22/2002  1  Fiscal policies in the euro area can also contribute to the maintenance of a favourable outlook for non-inflationary growth.
Savings in the USA 12  12  10  10  8  8 6  6 Savings ratio Sparkvot  4  Forecast Prognos  4  2  2  0 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003  0  Source: US Department of Commerce  2. Unemployment in the USA, the euro area, Germany and France 14  14  USA Euroområdet Euro area Germany Tyskland  12  12  Frankrike France  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2 1993  2 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Eurostat, Federal Labor Office, National Employment Office  3. Euro area inflation Percentage 12-month change 3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0 0.5  1.0  HICP  0.5  Underlying inflation (HICP excl. energy and unprocessd food)  0.0  Ap r- 0 0 Ju n00 A ug -0 0 O ct -0 D 0 ec -0 0 Fe b01 Ap r- 0 1 Ju n01 A ug -0 1 O ct -0 D 1 ec -0 1 Fe b02 Ap r- 0 2  0.0  Source: Eurostat  8  BIS Review 37/2002  4. Number of employed in total, excl.

The Sveriges Riksbank Act also establishes that the Riksbank shall be autonomous, which means that we six members of the Executive Board, who make the decisions on the steering interest rates, may not seek or receive instructions from the government or parliament. The idea is that we are thus free to maintain price stability and will not be tempted to concentrate on short-term considerations when making our decisions. It may appear that this target forces the Riksbank to give lower priority to the development of the real economy. We only have a target for monetary policy. However, the preparatory work on the Riksbank Act stated that we shall “without setting aside the price stability target, support the objectives of the general economic policy with the aim of achieving sustainable growth and a high level of employment”. In any event, the assessments of the future path of the real economy play an important role in our decisions, as developments in economic activity are an important component in determining inflation. However, what is even more important is that there is no contradiction between good growth and price stability in the long term, quite the contrary. If we look at developments during the 1990s, growth after 1992 was on average 3.0 per cent a year, despite the fact that inflation had been below the target level for several years. Unemployment had at the same time declined from 9 per cent to around 4 per cent.
Svein Gjedrem: From oil and gas to financial assets – Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference “Commodities, the Economy and Money” in Calgary, Canada, 20 June 2008. *  *  *  Introduction Good morning and thank you for the invitation to this highly topical conference. I have been asked to talk about the “objectives and experience of the Norwegian oil fund”. In doing so, I will try to explain the set-up and purpose of the Fund and draw some preliminary conclusions about the outcome so far. Since Norway became an oil nation some 40 years ago, the petroleum sector has grown to become an important part of our economy. Today, petroleum accounts for approximately 25 per cent of Norway’s gross domestic product (GDP). And even though the production of oil is declining after peaking around the turn of the millennium, total petroleum production will remain high for many years to come. The economic challenges posed by petroleum extraction were widely recognised early on. As early as in 1974, the Norwegian parliament discussed these challenges in depth, and in the early 1980s, the idea of a fund that would stabilise petroleum revenue spending was launched. Due to domestic economic turmoil and financial crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it took time before the idea of a fund was turned into actual savings. Why a Pension Fund? The Government Petroleum Fund was formally established in 1990.

Norges Bank manages parts of the funds internally, while parts are managed by external managers appointed by the Bank on a commercial basis. Active management has become an important part of our investment operations. We believe that the search for excess return has had a strong disciplinary effect on the organisation. Transparency and disclosure of information is a key feature of the Fund. All investment principles and guidelines as well as strategic advice and second opinion reports are made public. We publish quarterly reports on Fund performance, which are presented at press conferences. The Fund’s annual report discloses a list of every single investment held at the end of the year, and also provides an overview of corporate governance work, including voting at general meetings. Initially, transparency was aimed at building confidence among Norwegians, but we have also seen that our policy of transparency is highly appreciated internationally. The challenges for the Norwegian economy The risk of “Dutch disease” 1 is often cited when discussing the impact of natural resource windfalls. 2 Dutch disease occurs when the basis for internationally exposed industries is eroded and fluctuations in economic activity are amplified. In our case, we can say “so far so good”. The economy has been fairly stable and oil price fluctuations have only had a moderate impact on our currency. Furthermore, while it is difficult to know how the economy would have developed without oil, we have a sort of “control group”.
It may partly reflect very low levels of current policy rates and any spillovers from that.3 It may also reflect the term premia for inflation that are currently very compressed in some countries, for example, the US and in the Euro area. And it may also be a symptom of a more entrenched pessimism – an over-pessimism in my view – about long-term economic prospects, possibly due to fears of the de-integration of the global economy or concerns about future effectiveness of monetary policy. But, more fundamentally, the very low level of market interest rates reflects an underlying structural trend – the fall in long-run real interest rates since the early 1980s4 – that has been the subject of a great deal of research. The literature has identified a large number of candidate explanations – both real and financial – for a structural decline in the long-run real interest rate. These include: demographic trends and, in particular, increased longevity; lower trend productivity growth; the liberalization of financial intermediation and an increase in the risk borne by individuals and households.5  The long-run equilibrium real interest rates determined by these factors are, of course, unobservable. There is a range of estimates for how far they have fallen.

This serves the interests of governments and taxpayers; but it is also in the fundamental interests of the financial system itself, since it is not impossible that a future crisis could outstrip the resources of monetary and fiscal policy, thus rendering it impossible to rescue systemically important banks. 2.  International approach  Consequently, there is broad international consensus between the relevant authorities on what the objectives of future regulatory measures should be. The Financial Stability Board (FSB), in which Switzerland is an active participant, has clearly formulated these objectives. The financial system must be brought to the point where it contributes to sustained economic growth. Never again must it be allowed to combine such high risks with such minimal safety buffers. Moreover, steps must be taken to avoid profits being privatised while losses are borne by the public at large. In essence, there are two ways of achieving this goal. The first approach is to adopt preventative measures aimed at reducing the probability of a bank collapse or a systemic crisis. This can be done by increasing safety buffers – for example, by imposing higher capital and liquidity requirements. The second approach is to take steps designed to reduce the costs of a crisis once it has already occurred.
Fritz Zurbrügg: The Swiss National Bank’s investment policy – some topical issues Speech by Mr Fritz Zurbrügg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event, Geneva, 20 November 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying slides can be found at the end of the speech. Ladies and gentlemen Welcome to the Money Market Event of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in Geneva. I am delighted to be able to speak to you today about some of the topical issues facing the SNB’s financial markets department. As usual, I shall share the floor with the head of the Money Market unit, Sébastien Kraenzlin. I shall focus my remarks on some of the investment policy challenges currently confronting the SNB. Related issues – specifically the steep rise in our currency reserves following our decision to purchase foreign exchange to enforce the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 against the euro – were the focus of attention some two years ago at this same event. Since then, our currency reserves, which are primarily made up of foreign exchange reserves and gold, have stabilised (slide 1). However, the question of how to manage these investments as advantageously as possible is still a major concern for us. In this context, I shall speak about two issues this evening: first, the importance of the Asia-Pacific markets for the SNB; and second, the role of gold in our currency reserves.

But Asia is still expected to grow faster than other emerging economies. •  In China, debt overhang and excess capacity will be a drag. But sustained monetary and fiscal stimulus measures should help to pre-empt a sharp slippage in economic activity. •  In the ASEAN countries, a slowdown in export growth will have a negative impact. But public infrastructure spending and private consumption on the back of higher real incomes due to the decline in oil prices should help to shore up growth. •  Overall, growth in Emerging Asia is likely to stay above 6% in 2015, not too far below last year’s 6.6%. Looking beyond this adjustment period, the medium- to longer-term outlook for Asia continues to be bright. Ultimately, economic fundamentals matter the most, and the longerterm drivers of growth in the region remain positive. •  First, demographics across much of the region remain favourable, with the proportion of the working age population continuing to rise in most Asian economies. •  Second, the emergence of a sizeable middle class and ongoing urbanisation will underpin a continued expansion in domestic consumption and investment. And Asia has the potential to do even better, if it continues to press ahead with deeper regional integration and domestic structural reforms. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Diversification for enhanced returns The significance of Asia’s growth and its implications for long-term investment returns are not lost to global asset managers.
As I explained, the structured convergence process towards the adoption of the euro which is laid down in the Treaty provides the best guarantee for a smooth inclusion and a mutually beneficial life in the monetary union. Against this background, unilateral euroisation is something which we would not support because this would be a way circumventing the stages foreseen by the Treaty. 2. I would like to point out that the house of EMU is built upon solid foundations. The house of EMU is open to newcomers; it is not a “closed shop”. However, we would like to welcome the newcomers through the front entrance, and not via the backdoor. 3. Since Iceland is a European state, it is of course entitled to apply for EU and subsequently euro area membership. I was asked to provide you with some more information about the time frame of this latter scenario. As Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area, its accession to the EU could proceed relatively smoothly. As for accession to the euro area, the minimum time between joining the EU and joining the euro area is two years. This is because the exchange rate convergence criterion foresees that an applicant euro area country must participate for at least two years – without severe tensions – in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II. This should allow the applicant country to demonstrate that it can manage its economy without recourse to excessive currency fluctuations, thus mimicking somewhat the conditions under a monetary union. 4.

A country that has joined the EU has the obligation to eventually join the euro area. However, it does not adopt the euro immediately upon its accession to the EU. Instead, it becomes what is called in EU-term a “Member State with a derogation”. Countries in the derogation phase have a number of obligations. •  Upon accession of the EU, new Member States are required to treat their exchange rate policy as a matter of common concern and to pursue price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. The Treaty foresees that at some point following accession, new Member States will join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). •  Moreover, they have to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern. The economic policies of these Member States become subject to coordination and surveillance at the EU level. This is an essential preparation for the monetary union. Members that once adopted the single currency have to put more emphasis on coordinating economic policies because monetary policy is no longer under national responsibility. III  But policy coordination is not sufficient. To join the euro area, Member States must fulfil a number of legal and economic convergence criteria. The legal convergence criteria oblige the euro area applicant countries to put in place the legal foundations for participation in the monetary union, of which central bank independence is a cornerstone.