samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To me, Raeburn’s work provides a fitting visual metaphor for the ideal countenance of a central banker: The Reverend Walker skating forward confidently and with grace upon a notably uneven, rocky surface on an icy, dark, blustery day. An alternative depiction is Edvard Munch’s The Scream from Norway’s Gunderson Collection, now on temporary exhibit at the National Gallery. (There are four versions of this pastel, one of which recently sold for $ million at auction at Sotheby’s. If you haven’t been into Edinburgh to see the Gunderson version, I am sure you read about Sotheby’s record-setting auction.) 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In sharp contrast to Raeburn’s painting of composure, The Scream depicts a panicked form. In an autobiographical epigraph, Munch wrote that he conceived of the painting after a period of exhaustion and despair: “I stopped and leaned against the balustrade, almost dead with fatigue. Above the blue-black fjord hung the clouds, red as blood and tongues of fire. My friends had left me, and alone, trembling with anguish, I became aware of the vast, infinite cry of nature”.1  I am going to conclude by suggesting that the image that best behooves central bankers as guardians of financial stability and agents of economic potential is that of Henry Raeburn’s Reverend Walker. To be sure, central bankers everywhere are fatigued and exhausted and increasingly friendless.

The global expansion has also resulted in high prices for many Norwegian export goods. The increase in oil prices over the past 4-5 years has been very important. High oil prices over a longer period have  BIS Review 28/2007  3  boosted oil investments and there are prospects that the high investment level will be sustained in the coming years. Oil prices peaked around USD 75 per barrel in summer 2006. Later in autumn, prices fell. Current futures prices indicate that market participants believe prices will remain above USD 60 per barrel in the coming years. A fall in prices in a number of commodity markets at the beginning of 2007 raised the question of whether the pronounced price rise of recent years was being reversed. The experience of previous commodity price cycles indicates that rising prices gradually lead to increased supply and reduced demand. This in turn leads to a fall in prices. Following a long period of expansion, international financial markets were marked by unrest around the end of February. It is still too early to say whether the turbulence signals a weakening of global growth prospects. Increased integration of China, India and other emerging economies into world trade, in conjunction with lower tariffs and reduced trade barriers, has led to a decline in prices for imported finished goods. This effect has been strengthened by a significant increase in the share of imports from low-cost countries.
It is essential to channel them more towards financing the two major transformations of the coming decade: the ecological and digital transformations. As regards the economic situation, listening to more than 8,000 companies, we will publish our next monthly survey on Tuesday 11 January, and will provide a first assessment of the effects of the fifth wave. We remain confident that they will be relatively limited: we have learned over the past two years that every Covid wave, however serious, has diminishing economic effects. In our December projection, we showed that even an adverse scenario of further severe health restrictions – which is not the case today – would not prevent the French economy from returning by next year to the GDP trajectory it would have followed in the absence of the Covid crisis. These possible restrictions would admittedly reduce average growth in 2022, but this should be fully offset by additional growth in 2023. The other short-term issue is of course that of inflation: it is now close to its peak in our country (December showing first signs of stabilisation) and in the euro area. While remaining very vigilant, we believe that supply difficulties and energy pressures should gradually subside over the course of the year. We should then return not to the low inflation of the past, but to a new inflation regime close to our 2% target, with monetary policy normalising in stages accordingly.

With regard to inflation, one may ask “how much is too much?”. I  believe that the answer does not lie in pinning down certain numbers, but in the commitment to maintain a relatively low and stable inflation in the medium and long run. Experience has taught me that inflation is an insidious disease that should not be treated carelessly. With respect to real convergence, a question raised by many is “how fast is  fast enough?”. Again, I would not look for a certain figure; I would tackle this issue by approaching real convergence not as a race where the fastest track is also the right one, but rather as a complex process giving the steady runner (a marathoner rather than a sprinter) the opportunity to reap most of the potential benefits, while avoiding excessive risks. Much like the fable about the turtle and the rabbit, which we all know how it ends... Beyond targets and levels, and irrespective of the convergence gap an economy faces or the monetary policy regime a central bank opts for, what matters for both real convergence and price stability (as part of nominal convergence) is the consistency and the sustainability of the effort. In other words, being and staying on the right track. Thank you. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
A financial crisis or unrest in the financial system means, as I mentioned earlier, that we will find it more difficult to affect the economy through monetary policy, as the transmission mechanism changes. Changes in the repo rate then do not affect the interest rates that households and companies meet in the same way as under more normal circumstances, which we of course must take into account in our monetary policy decisions. The dependency goes both ways. The monetary policy conducted can affect the risk of a financial crisis, and we must also take this into account. For example, the repo rate influences housing prices, credit granting and general financial risktaking in the economy. To create an adequate basis for making the monetary policy decisions, the Riksbank needs to analyse these effects. One recent example is the question of how the market for government bonds is affected by the Riksbank buying a large percentage of the outstanding stock. The Riksbank's purchases have meant that a relatively large share of the government bonds have not been available for trading in the market. The Riksbank therefore analyses regularly whether this might affect market functioning and ultimately financial stability. We can thus draw the conclusion that the Riksbank’s work on promoting financial stability has close links to monetary policy, both in operational and analytical terms. Financial stability is a prerequisite for a smoothly-functioning monetary policy, at the same time as monetary policy can impact the risk of a financial crisis.

RIX thus plays a very central role in the Swedish economy, as it is the economy's “circulatory system” through which the Riksbank acts when supplying liquidity to promote financial stability and also when conducting monetary policy. As a result of the increasing internationalisation, the rapid technological developments and the emergence of new regulations, RIX, like the central payment systems in many other countries, is currently facing strong pressure to change. One effect of these developments is that an increasing number of credit institutions and some other institutions want to be able to participate directly in the payment system, instead of through agents. With more participants in the RIX system, the concentration risks will decline, as there will be more institutions that have the possibility to borrow directly from the Riksbank, which is positive. But a larger number of institutions, and new types of institutions, becoming participants in RIX could also lead to the risks of other problems increasing, such as operational problems, money laundering, financial problems and cyber threats. It is therefore important that the Riksbank regularly oversees the participants in RIX and has the power of authority to make strong demands of them. Thus it is essential that the Sveriges Riksbank Act provides sufficient flexibility in this respect. Function as Lender of last resort – emergency liquidity assistance A third important part of the central banks’ responsibility for the efficiency and stability of the financial system is the task of providing emergency liquidity assistance.
Paul Fisher: The economic outlook – some remarks on monetary policy Speech by Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director for Markets of the Bank of England, to the Agency for Scotland, London, 23 May 2011. *  *  *  I would like to thank Ronnie Driver for his help in preparing this speech. For most of us, the current outlook for the UK economy is not a very attractive prospect. After experiencing a precipitous fall in demand during 2008/09, the latest estimates suggest that UK output in 2011 Q1 remained around 4% below its peak pre-crisis level. The Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) central projection published in its May Inflation Report, is for output to grow at around its historical trend rate (Chart 1), such that it would be mid-2012 before that previous peak level is regained (Chart 2). At the same time annual CPI inflation, far from being subdued by the recession, has picked up to 4½%. In the short-term it is likely to go higher still before, we expect, falling back towards the 2% target (Chart 3). All this poses a significant challenge for policy makers, not least because of the genuine hardships slow growth and high inflation cause for businesses and households up and down the country.

I see little evidence that inflation expectations might generate the start of a wage-price spiral for example. There are, however, immediate downside risks to the growth outlook. Although my central expectation is that the recent weakness will just be a soft patch, I do worry about a more  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  prolonged weakness in demand, and in particular, consumer spending. That could knock the recovery off course for a sustained period, shifting the balance of risks around medium-term inflation to the downside. With that risk in mind, putting up Bank Rate could be exactly the wrong thing to do at this precise moment. If it further damaged consumer confidence then it could be the marginal factor that makes a soft patch turn into something worse. Of course, at some point, Bank Rate will have to rise: interest rates will need to normalise if, once the spare capacity in the economy has been eliminated, monetary policy is to be consistent with the 2% target. And because of the lengthy lags involved, Bank Rate will need to start the long journey back to more normal settings well before the degree of spare capacity is eliminated. But for now, I believe there remains time to allow the economy to recover before the eventual tightening begins. I am not trying to give any hints today as to exactly when that will be. I honestly don’t know. I can only continue to assess the data and the outlook as it changes, month by month.
Financial markets have been a useful ally in this fight by rapidly anticipating, as early as 2022Q1, the policy normalisation and tightening path. Page 2 sur 14  Market rates (here the 10y OIS rate on the LHS panel) had already risen significantly before the ECB began raising rates in July 2022, reflecting the adjustment announced in December 2021 through the discontinuation of PEPP net asset purchases. The 2 year OIS rate, a good measure of the expected stance of policy, also increased from early 2022. It is now levelling off around 3%. The proxy rate translates broad financial conditions into a hypothetical equivalent short-term rate. It conveys a similar message: the removal of financial accommodation had already started well before the lift-off of the DFR in July 2022, and at a very rapid pace, with the proxy rate gaining 5 % over the last year (from -3% to 2%). Page 3 sur 14  These increases in market rates and the associated tightening of financial conditions are still being transmitted to broader credit conditions through the banking channel. Bank funding costs, including deposits from households and NFCs, as well as wholesale funding costs and securities – other than shares – are increasing. It is true that the pass-through of rate hikes to the remuneration of households’ sight deposit remains limited, but the transmission to the remuneration of term deposits and deposits redeemable at notice is much stronger, although incomplete.

Page 6 sur 14 The plain lines correspond to the cycle started in 2022, whereas the dashed lines show the previous tightening cycle in 2005. The DFR is growing more rapidly than the MRO did in 2005. But the pace of the pass-through is relatively similar today compared to the previous cycle. Lending rates to NFCs (in red) are increasing today in line with policy rates, just as in 2005. They increased by almost 300 bp from January 2022 to March 2023, which represents 80% of the increase in the DFR over the same period. In-house econometric estimates2 indicate that the final 20% is expected to be passed on to lending rates by endyear. The transmission to lending rates for households might seem a bit slower today: They increased by about 210 bp from January 2022 to March 2023, which is a pace of growth comparable to 2005, despite a much faster rise in policy rates today. (2) Banks also report in the latest BLS3 that the demand for loans --either for firms or for mortgages-- decreased strongly in the first quarter of 2023. (3) Finally, credit standards for firms are tightening. While sometimes difficult to separate from lower demand, the pace of the tightening reported in the BLS is the highest since 2011. Against this backdrop, volumes of loans are decelerating, even though growth in outstanding amounts remains positive [+3.3% in the euro area for mortgages to households and +5.2% for loans to businesses].
However, having witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the revolutions of various colours in other communist countries, they will, like their elders, be extra careful in feeling the stones as they cross the river. They look at Singapore as one such stone in their river crossing. In 2004, I proposed to then-Prime Minister Phan Van Khai for Singapore and Vietnam to connect our economies. He took sometime to think over it before responding positively. Our two countries have since signed the Connectivity Agreement, which enables Vietnam to leverage on Singapore's strengths in sectors like finance, tourism, aviation, telecommunications and human resource development. Singapore is a base for MNCs and well-connected to other parts of the world through trade, communications and transportation. By connecting our economies, Vietnam plugs itself into the global grid. Indonesia Now, Indonesia. It has the potential to take off but more work needs to be done - on policies, institutions and implementation. Indonesia had enjoyed strong growth for three decades, from the 1970s to the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 grounded the Indonesian plane. But the engine is being overhauled and the plane refitted. Banks and firms have cleaned up their balance sheets. Macroeconomic indicators have improved. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has gathered a competent crew under him. The Indonesian plane is now on the runway and lining up for take-off. President Yudhoyono has implemented some difficult but much-needed reforms.

He has cut fuel subsidies, and carried through the unpopular decision to raise fuel prices to keep Indonesia's budget deficit from ballooning. Acceptance of the need for continued economic reforms by the population will build investor confidence. Investors remain concerned about unclear and inconsistent regulations as well as the security situation because of the threat of terrorism. They are also unhappy with the restrictive labour laws in the country. If these areas can be improved, foreign investments will stream in. Indonesia is a huge and sprawling archipelagic country consisting of almost 18,000 islands, making it very difficult for a concerted take-off in one single planeload. So it may be a better strategy to think in terms of building a fleet of smaller jets. Each one will take off when ready. Eventually, the entire fleet will take the whole country airborne. In other words, it may be more practical to focus first on some parts of this huge country. These parts can then demonstrate to the other regions what is needed to attract investors and generate growth. They can also generate the resources to help other parts to grow. Indonesia has now decided to use the strategy of SEZs to spearhead its growth. Singapore is working with Indonesia to develop SEZs in the nearby islands of Batam, Bintan and Karimun. When the SEZs in these islands succeed, they will provide the thrust and momentum for SEZs in other parts of the country to do likewise. 4  BIS Review 86/2006  Conclusion Let me conclude.
Our own experience from the Swedish budget consolidation process of the 1990s shows that it is important for the credibility of fiscal policy not just to make general statements about what needs to be done to achieve a balance, but also to make concrete decisions on the spending cuts and/or tax increases that are considered necessary. Experience also shows that it is important to base forecasts regarding improvements in public finances on cautious assumptions about economic growth. It may also be worth recalling that there is a link between fiscal policy tightening measures and interest rates. More stringent and credible tightening measures can lead to lower interest rates as they justify lower risk premiums and lower policy rates. The problems in Greece and other vulnerable countries In those countries where public finances are particularly strained, developments may be more dramatic if they prove unable to implement the necessary fiscal tightening measures in an orderly way. In a situation where there is a need to renew loans but no one wants to lend, there are in practice two choices, that is, to either default on debt payments or to stop paying wages to public employees, pensions and so on. Rapidly increasing interest rates and an exploding central government debt that leads to the suspension of payments are unfortunately entirely in line with the experience of previous episodes of financial crisis. 3 This would normally also lead to problems in the bank sector, which ultimately risks leading to a new financial crisis.

There was a spirited public debate whether such rate increases would invite more capital inflows. But we viewed that other factors, such as the strength of the domestic economy and high risk appetite of international investors, played a larger role in inducing capital inflows than a gradual increase in the policy rate. Our concern for medium-term financial stability was also a key element of policy deliberations at the time. Subsequently, things became more challenging as the Thai economy suffered domestic setbacks. As the boost from the government’s temporary stimulus measures dissipated at the start of this year, domestic demand slowed down markedly. At the same time, domestic credit growth was still quite high, stock prices continued to advance, and activity in the housing market remained brisk. Moreover, portfolio capital inflows continued and the baht was appreciating. This presented a dilemma and was an example of the difficulties posed by policy spillovers. Against the backdrop of weak global demand, we cut the policy interest rate. We contemplated the use of certain prudential measures, including those on capital flows, in order to complement domestic monetary policy as well as offset some of the impact of capital inflows on domestic financial conditions. But since the QE tapering talk began in earnest in May, the global financial environment changed dramatically, and with it the nature of the policy trade-offs. The communication by the Federal Reserve about possible tapering of its bond purchases was a key turning point for global financial markets. Financial conditions suddenly tightened in response.
Nominal rates have fallen even further during this period, for three reasons. First of all, inflation and inflation expectations were brought to target levels in major industrialised countries in the last two decades of the 20th century; therefore, it was not necessary to keep nominal and real rates as high as before. It could be said that the same development has taken place here in Iceland in the recent term. Second, global deflationary tendencies have been strong in recent years, following the inclusion of China and Russia in the global trading system and due to technological advances and developments in international production and value chains. Third, a pronounced economic slack in major industrialised countries after the financial crisis has led to much more accommodative monetary policy than would otherwise have prevailed in those countries. All of these factors combined have contributed to the current situation, where nominal central bank rates in leading industrialised economies are extremely low in historical terms. Actually, many observers consider them dangerously low as regards their potential impact on financial stability and the efficacy of the financial system. 4  What about Iceland in this context? The Central Bank’s key rate is the interest rate that determines short-term market rates at any given time. In the recent past, this has been the rate on seven-day term deposits, which is now 5.25%, as Chart 2 indicates.

Eva Srejber: Price stability and growth in Sweden  Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, in Malmö, on 4 September 2000. *  *  *  Sweden is now entering its third year with growth of over 3%. This year, GDP is expected to increase by over 4% and our assessments indicate continued annual growth rates averaging over 3% for the next two years. Despite the strength of the economy, inflation is low. Why doesn’t inflation rise more? What balances do we have to strike as monetary policy decisionmakers? These are the issues that I want to give my view on in today’s speech. Monetary policy strategy I would like to start by drawing attention to what guides us when we make monetary policy decisions, ie how we have formulated the monetary policy strategy. The new Riksbank Act, that came into force on 1 January 1999, confirmed by law that the objective of monetary policy is price stability. This objective was formulated in 1993 as an inflation target, where CPI is to total 2% with a tolerance interval of plus/minus one percentage point. One reason for adopting CPI was because it is well-known and measures the prices consumers encounter for a large part of their consumption. Two per cent was chosen, among other reasons, because it was considered to be at a good European level at that time.