samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But the basis should still be that preventive measures are not managed within the framework of monetary policy, but through the regulation of capital and liquidity in the banks, for example. The Riksbank's independence is important for maintaining confidence in the inflation target, but this does not prevent us from having an exchange of information, for instance with the Riksdag Committee on Finance and the Ministry of Finance on questions concerning the conditions for monetary policy. The policy rate should be the main tool of monetary policy. Asset purchases are particularly effective in financial crises and when markets are not functioning well. References Admati, A., M. Hellwig and R. Portes (2023), “Letter: The real threat to stability is not from bank runs”, Financial Times 19 May 2023. Akkaya, Y., C.-J. Belfrage, P. Di Casola and I. Strid (2023), “Effects of foreign and domestic central bank government bond purchases in a small open economy DSGE model: Evidence from Sweden before and during the coronavirus pandemic”, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper series, No. 421. Andersson, B., M. Beechey Österholm and P. Gustafsson (2022), “The Riksbank’s asset purchases 2015–2022”, no. 2. Australian Government (2023), “An RBA fit for the Future”, March 2023. Andersson, B., M. Jonsson and H. Lundvall (2020), “The new macroeconomic landscape after the global financial crisis”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2020:1. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2022), “Evaluation of the impact and efficacy of the Basel III reforms”, Bank for International Settlements.

Silicon Valley Bank was the 20th largest bank in the United States.8 Although the bank was large by Swedish standards – about 70 per cent of Swedbank’s size – it was small in the US market. I see the importance of small and medium-sized banks as a clear lesson from the crisis. As an authority with a financial stability mandate, we cannot ignore such banks. Even if the problems occur in relatively quiet periods, they can have unwanted spillover effects. When the problems became acute in Silicon Valley Bank, the concern spread quickly to other similar banks. The reason was probably that they had similar business models, risk profiles and so on. This led to a loss of confidence in these banks, too. The contagion risks became obvious. One lesson is that we should not only look at the size of individual banks, but also whether certain groups of banks are similar and thus exposed to similar risks. This means that even smaller banks as a group can become important for financial stability.9  8 In terms of total assets, see FDIC https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/financialreporting. 9 The global standards only apply to larger internationally active banks. The regulations applicable to smaller do-  mestic banks vary from country to country. In the EU, by and large the same regulations apply to all banks, but this is not the case in the United States, for example.
Another part of these reallocations (USD 37 billion at this stage) is about to become reality, by IMF Annual Meetings in October if everything goes according to plan, thanks to the newly created Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST). I am sure I agree with the Managing Director in wishing the RST to be higher in its amounts, quicker in its disbursements, and not too conditional in its provisions. Indeed if we want to fulfil our commitments, we have to care not only about the lending capacity of the RST, but also about demand for RST facilities. France will be true to its word and reallocate 4 billion SDRs, representing 20% of SDRs received. The IMF must play a greater role in crisis prevention for vulnerable countries. Despite recent initiatives, there is still considerable room for improvement to make the GFSN more effective for these countries, notably for prevention. This is even more pressing in a context of unstable geopolitics, looming food crisis, commodities price volatility and more frequent natural disasters linked to climate change. I therefore welcome the recent proposal of a new Food Shock Window. However, our efforts should not stop there. * ** As Sophocles wrote, “trust dies but mistrust blossoms”. Let me conclude by stressing that trust as a shared treasure also has a key human foundation, which  Page 10 sur 10 we have patiently built over time.

But with the aim of avoiding international fragmentation, we have to pay special attention and dedicate sufficient efforts then to cross-border interoperability, and hence to wholesale CBDC as a way to ensure it. The second paramount course of action is to reposition the IMF as a pivotal stakeholder, at the very heart of the global financial safety net (GFSN). Today,  Page 9 sur 10 IMF resources account for a smaller share of GFSN resources, but there has already been significant progress: the last general allocation that was carried out in August 2021 amounted to USD 650 billion and was, to quote Kristalina Georgieva, “a shot in the arm for the global economy at a time of unprecedented crisis.” However, developing economies are the primary users of SDRs and yet they have benefited much less from the general allocation: about two-thirds were directed at developed economies, as a result of existing rules. Reallocating SDRs is crucial in these current tense circumstances. The G7 commitment, taken up by the G20, to bring reallocations to USD 100 billion must be kept and implemented efficiently. We are not yet there. Part of these allocations have been allocated to the PRGT Fund to finance low-income countries, including an eventual Food Shock Window. Still, we have to find additional resources to finance the subsidy account of the PRGT.
While there is some variation in the results, the typical result – which was also obtained in the Riksbank’s own inquiry into the risks in the housing market5 – is that monetary policy has little effect on housing prices. A policy rate that is one percentage point higher, gives housing prices that are only around 3 per cent lower in 2–3 years. This means that one has to adjust the interest rate drastically to be able to affect housing prices and thus indirectly household indebtedness. This in turn has very negative effects in the form of higher unemployment and lower inflation. Reducing housing prices in Sweden (or preventing them from increasing further) by 10 per cent would appear to need such a large increase in the repo rate that GDP would fall by around 6 percentage points and unemployment would increase by roughly 3 percentage points (150,000 people).6 Using monetary policy and increasing the policy rate to push down housing prices thus has very high real economic costs – the insurance premium one has to pay in the form of increased unemployment is thus unreasonably high. As a comparison with the insurance premium of 6 per cent of GDP in the above example, it can be said that during the 1990s crisis GDP fell from the peak prior to the crisis in the third quarter of 1990 to the trough in the first quarter of 1993 by around 5 per cent.

The HKMA and BOT are fully committed to the successful implementation of this PvP link. Over the past year, exceptional effort has been made by BOT to engage Thai banks to encourage participation and adequate preparation for its implementation. On our side, apart from rendering support on the technical front, we have been in close dialogue with the participating banks of the USD RTGS system, especially those active in correspondent banking activities, to facilitate Thai banks to identify suitable correspondent banking service providers in Hong Kong. These efforts are bearing fruit. About half of the banks in Thailand, including most of those active in the FX market, participated in the pre-launch tests together with their USD correspondent banks in Hong Kong. On the back of the keen interest observed, I am confident that we will see sizeable flow of transactions through this link. 8. Expanding the footprint of the local financial market infrastructure is a strategy actively pursued by the HKMA to develop Hong Kong into a regional payment and settlement hub. This PvP link with Thailand is the third of its kind in the region, preceded by the launch of the links with Malaysia and Indonesia, in 2006 and 2010 respectively. According to the latest triennial survey on global FX market activity of the Bank for International Settlements, the average daily turnover in FX transactions in Asia increased by 27.5% from $ billion equivalent in April 2010 to $ billion equivalent in April 2013.
Christian Noyer: Challenges and outlook for the global economy Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at a press conference, Saint-Denis, Reunion, 14 November 2011. *  *  *  Secretary General of the Prefecture, Elected representatives, Consul General of China, Representatives of civil and military authorities, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to be here today. And not only because it is 20 degrees warmer than Paris at the moment, or because I spent the weekend enraptured by the beauty of your island and the friendliness of its people. I am particularly pleased to be here today because it is extremely important for me to have the opportunity to talk directly to local economic players throughout the French territory, listen to their views and explain our actions. Above all, in these complex times, such exchanges are tremendously valuable. I would especially like to extend my regards and thanks to the Mayor of Saint-Denis for receiving us in this beautiful venue. I will start by rapidly recalling the crisis to date and the solutions that have been implemented. In the past months we have witnessed a succession of serious and complex events. It is therefore logical that feelings of confusion and uncertainty have developed in society. I will thus attempt to provide some useful insights into the situation that we are currently facing.

I believe that two major mistakes were made: –  First, countries – including France and Germany – weakened the Pact by failing to comply with the provisions of its preventive arm (they were not in balance over the cycle but permanently close to the 3% deficit ceiling), or those of the corrective arm (they never abided by the sanctions). –  Second, the euro area did not equip itself at the outset with an instrument for monitoring competitiveness. The basic premise is important and simple: when joining a monetary area whose goal is to achieve a rate of inflation of just below 2%, changes in its unit production costs must be in line with this central bank objective. In all the countries that did not abide by this calculation and this discipline, year after year, there was a loss of competitiveness. The crux of the matter is that, as soon as countries were approved for euro area membership, they considered that they were protected simply because they belonged to a single currency area: as their fiscal or competitiveness gaps were no longer penalised by the markets that indiscriminately lent to all euro area Member States at the same rate. When doubts started to emerge, the markets reacted rapidly, violently and often excessively, although it must be said that real underlying problems existed. How the euro area sovereign debt crisis has been dealt with to date What have we done to tackle the urgent issues stemming from the crisis and to deal with the underlying problems?
This ensures that temporary liquidity issues arising from difficulties selling assets backing the value of stablecoins don’t result in firm failure; and A backstop to compensate depositors – or in this case coinholders – such as the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) (or in other countries deposit insurance), in case of failure. This ensures that, even if a firm fails, transactional deposits up to a certain amount remain exchangeable for central bank money. Notably – one of the key responses to the Northern Rock episode was to increase FSCS coverage in the United Kingdom. This is not to say the regulatory model for stablecoins needs to be identical to banks. It could include different applications of the above features. For example, if stablecoin operators are restricted to backing themselves in high quality liquid assets they won’t need regulation to cover credit risk. If they only back themselves in central bank reserves, which are inherently liquid, they don’t need liquidity facilities. Ultimately, the specific requirements may well be different from those applicable to banks, but the outcome will be the same – that systemic stablecoins used as money will offer the same protection to coin holders as commercial bank money. Conclusion The title of this speech is a cliché: Everything that is old is new again. But I am going to end on a different cliché: the definition of insanity (widely – and inaccurately – attributed to Albert Einstein) is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results.

Third, on the insurance side we have been putting a lot of effort into making sure that equity-release mortgage holdings are treated appropriately on insurance companies’ regulatory balance sheets. We think it likely that this product will grow in the UK for reasons unrelated to financial regulation, and that it makes sense for annuity-writers to be an important part of the picture. But this has been a classic example of a weak spot in the regulatory regime, which was simply not designed with this product strongly in mind. The result of this has been an excessively wide variation of approaches for these assets at insurance companies, with practices at the more aggressive end of the market presenting a risk in our view to policyholders and to our competition objective. We have therefore shored up this part of our framework and put in place a much more solid basis for this asset class going forward. I know that some building societies have exposures to this asset class as well, and would urge them to proceed with caution given the complexities involved. So even within the important but relatively straightforward asset class of UK residential mortgages there are several juicy topics for our horizon-scanning enthusiasts to get their teeth into. Fortunately, or unfortunately depending on your approach to life, there are further targets available if we move onto other asset classes – asset classes which I very much hope are much more remote to building societies!
The most recent significant development was the establishment of the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) that will issue highly rated short-term Islamic instruments to facilitate more efficient liquidity management of cross border investments. The global challenges call for a collaborative approach to strengthen the prospects for a global recovery. The way forward is also to recognise the relative strengths of different parts of the world and the potential to leverage on these strengths. The transformation of Asia in this new environment offers the prospects for a greater shared responsibility towards a greater shared prosperity in the world. 4  BIS Review 131/2010

John Gieve: Economic prospects and the policy challenge Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the Cityco Breakfast Meeting, Manchester, 16 January 2009. *  *  *  Introduction One of the things that strikes me most on coming back to Manchester is the pace at which the fabric of the city changes – and I was looking at this yesterday from up on the 23rd floor. It’s not much more than two years since I was last here but in that time the city centre has added about half a million square feet of retail space, more than 1½ million sq ft of new office space and nearly 8000 extra hotel beds (a 40% increase). All this development reflects the attractiveness of Manchester as a location for inward investment and even more importantly the strong growth in businesses indigenous to the city, many of which are represented today. But while I gather that nearly a million square feet of office space has been let again in 2008 it is clear that in Manchester, as elsewhere, the past year has been increasingly challenging for businesses of all types and the prospect is forbidding. The severity and nature of the challenges we face particularly in the banking sector makes it very difficult to predict where we will be in a year from now. And the pace of change means that it is even more true today than usual that we cannot rely for navigation on official statistics alone.
Eric S Rosengren: Considering the routes to a policy destination Speech by Mr Eric S Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York, 5 May 2010. Accompanying figures to this speech can be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston’s website. *  *  *  I am happy to be with you this evening. I appreciate your warm welcome, and your invitation to join the long and distinguished line of individuals who have addressed the Money Marketeers over the decades. 1 I have always taken some delight in Yogi Berra quotes. As a Red Sox fan, I could always hope that garbled metaphors by the legendary Yogi would be as confusing to the players as they were to the public, which might translate into opportunities when the Red Sox came to New York. Alas, in the early going this season it is not the Yankees that seem confused. Yogi Berra was not only a great catcher and manager, but also an astute observer of the obvious.

The economy is currently beginning to recover from what many are calling the Great Recession. While real GDP began to increase in the third quarter of last year, growth so far has been insufficient to improve conditions much in the labor markets. This unfortunate reality can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the employment-to-population ratio over the past 30 years with the shading representing recessions. The decline of about five percentage points in the employment-to-population ratio in this recession is striking, as many workers have either become unemployed or dropped out of the work force. While it is not uncommon for the employment-to-population ratio to decline in a recession, Figure 2 shows how dramatic the decline has been in this recession, compared with previous ones. 2 The loss of jobs has been particularly acute in construction and manufacturing. The severity of the job losses in these male-dominated industries is one of the reasons that males in some age groups have experienced such a significant decline in their employment-to-population ratio, as shown in Figure 3. For example, the March unemployment rates for males between the ages of 20 and 24 was 18.4 per cent, more than 5 percentage points higher than for females in the same age group.
DNB-OMFIF Conference on Biodiversity – Amsterdam, 29 September 2022 Biodiversity, macroeconomics and finance: what we do know, what we don’t know yet, and what we have to do Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr), Déborah Guedj (deborah.guedj@banquefrance.fr)  Page 1 sur 13 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to be with you again today at this DNB-OMFIF conference on biodiversity. Let me start by sharing a memory: more than four years ago, I was here in Amsterdam for the very first conference of the nascent NGFS – and I must pay tribute to its first Chair Frank Elderson to whom we collectively owe a great deal for his passionate leadership on climate but also nature-related issues. At the time I called for green finance to be the “new frontier for the 21st century”. The substantial progress made since then on climate change – disclosure, stress tests, greening of the monetary policy – is undoubtedly a source of optimism; but it also gives rise to two concerns : (i) despite this progress, the fight against climate change is far from over (ii) on biodiversity, which we are discussing today, our knowledge and tools lag several years behind those on the climate. Today, I would like to share with you clearly and purposefully what we already know (A), and what we don’t know yet (B), before reflecting on what we have to do (C). A. What we do know 1.

When attempting to assess risks, we are indeed confronted with numerous conceptual challenges that require adapted tools: the diversity of drivers and impacts; uncertainty over the time horizon (which may be relatively short for biodiversity-related risks), the importance of tail risks and non-linearities associated with tipping points; the limited substitutability of ecosystem services (for instance, forests provide flood protection services that can only partially be replaced by costly infrastructure, while ignoring many other services provided by forests), interdependencies between phenomena (climate change, biodiversity, land use pollution and fresh water use, as mentioned earlier), etc. A particular issue relates to the need for data and metrics, which is targeted by several initiatives. These include the Global Biodiversity Score (GBS), developed by CDC Biodiversité using the GLOBIO model of the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) – hence a good example of fruitful French-Dutch cooperation. This tool assesses the impacts of economic activities on biodiversity and synthetizes them into one metric, the Mean Species  Page 7 sur 13 Abundance (MSA) km². It can be applied at the level of individual companies, but also allows for a global measure of our impacts: in 2010, losses were equivalent to 32% of biodiversity globally; by 2050, it is estimated that such losses could increase to 41.5%. Such an aggregated metric is not a silver bullet, but it helped us to better understand the materiality of the issues. Advances on these metrics will further enable efforts to bring forward biodiversity-related disclosure.