samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Despite the intensification of our repo operations, tensions on the money market increased throughout the year owing to the ongoing deterioration of the economic and financial environment, and reached their peak in autumn. A particular source of difficulties was the  BIS Review 48/2009  1  extremely strong demand for Swiss francs coming from eastern European countries, where banks had granted Swiss-franc-denominated loans on a massive scale, refinancing themselves on the money markets. Since these banks have no access to our loans, they found themselves in a delicate position when the Swiss franc money market dried up. The increased demand for Swiss francs contributed to the rise in our interest rates, which we deemed undesirable from a monetary policy perspective. To satisfy demand from eastern European banks, we sought the support of the European Central Bank (ECB), to which we remitted Swiss francs under a euros against francs swap arrangement. The ECB then transferred these francs to its counterparties. Similar agreements – euros against Swiss francs – were subsequently concluded with the Polish central bank and the Hungarian central bank, enabling them to conduct analogous transactions in their respective countries. Moreover, to ensure a better distribution of francs across the market, the SNB itself engaged in swaps with its counterparties. By the end of 2008, our supply of Swiss francs to three central banks and a certain number of other banking institutions by means of swap transactions had reached a total of CHF 50 billion. Thus, the demand for liquidity was considerable across the board.

Among cryptoassets are what are generally known as cryptocurrencies, conceived for use as a means of payment, and those known as digital tokens, conceived for obtaining financing and which confer on the purchaser the right to receive remuneration, or to exercise certain rights. The Bitcoin is an example of the former. The so-called ICOs (Initial Coin Offerings) are an application of the latter. Both have been the subject of growing interest, and there are at present numerous and highly heterogeneous initiatives. While their impact so far on global financial stability is considered to be limited, they pose a series of risks, in areas such as consumer protection and the prevention of moneylaundering and the financing of terrorism, which the authorities monitor closely and on which they have issued warnings and statements. In this connection, it should be stressed that these are assets of a marked speculative nature, without the backing of supervisors and susceptible to fraud or price manipulation. They cannot be considered as money or as deposits, and they do not enjoy the protection of the regulations governing banking and investment products. It is worrying that, in a setting in which less than half the population understands the concept of compound interest rates, there is such demand for complex assets with these characteristics. Lastly, I wish to refer to the risk of authorising – owing to a lack of knowledge or of due care – access to personal information that would preferably have been kept private.
Over the past four years, the payment-related costs that your publican or bookseller pay (and ultimately pass on to you) have come down by 40% to around 8 pence per transaction. While these are small – and much better than Bitcoin – they remain non-negligible. That’s partly because there is limited scope for them to be competed away by innovators offering lower costs, faster speeds and more convenience, due to rigidities in the existing payments landscape, including restricted access to the UK’s major bank-to-bank payment system, Faster Payments (FPS). To put a number on it, indirect members of FPS face relatively high fees of around 37 pence per transaction. 31  In 2016, the Bank announced arrangements under which non-bank payment service providers (PSPs) could access RTGS, and therefore FPS directly, and we expect the first will join this spring. PSPs that make the most of this development and reach critical mass could see their per transaction costs fall below those of debit and credit card providers. And the competition provided by the PSPs should incentivise existing providers to innovate as well. Moreover, innovative PSPs could deliver a world where you can split a round in the pub electronically and instantaneously, needing nothing more from your friends than a QR code on their phone or their phone number. By so doing, electronic money will become more like its physical relative, allowing genuine, immediate peer-to-peer transactions, without the need for a middleman.

Whatever the merits of cryptocurrencies as money, authorities should be careful not to stifle innovations which could in the future improve financial stability; support more innovative, efficient and reliable payment services as well as have wider applications. 23  On the downside, at present, crypto-assets raise a host of issues around consumer and investor protection, market integrity, money laundering, terrorism financing, tax evasion, and the circumvention of capital controls and international sanctions. The Bank of England’s FPC is currently considering the risks posed to UK financial stability. And internationally the Financial Stability Board (FSB) will report to the G20 in Argentina later this month on the financial stability implications of crypto-assets. At present, in my view, crypto-assets do not appear to pose material risks to financial stability. This is in part because they are small relative to the financial system. Even at their recent peak, their combined global market capitalisation was less than 1% of global GDP. In comparison, at the height of the dotcom mania, the valuations of technology stocks were closer to about a third of global GDP. And just prior to the global financial crisis, the notional value of credit derivative swaps was 100%. In addition, major UK financial institutions have minimal exposures to the crypto-asset ecosystem. Looking ahead, financial stability risks could rise if retail participation significantly increased or linkages with the formal financial sector grew without material improvements in market integrity, anti-money laundering standards and cyber defences.
Road Map: Monetary and Financial Sector Policies for 2018 and Beyond  Delivered by  Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy Governor Central Bank of Sri Lanka 3 January 2018  1. Introduction Your Excellencies, Members of the Monetary Board, Senior Deputy Governor, Deputy Governors and Officials of the Central Bank, Distinguished Invitees, Ladies and Gentlemen, First, let me warmly welcome you to the presentation of this year’s Road Map. Continuing our tradition that was initiated in 2007, today we are pleased to present the eleventh Road Map of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. It is our belief that sharing our future policy direction and actions would help you to plan your business trajectory with more certainty. I hope this Road Map will enhance the transparency and clarity of our policies, which would help you to achieve your targets more effectively. The successful outcomes in your businesses would ultimately help us to implement our policies more effectively for the benefit of both the economy and people of Sri Lanka. The year 2017 was challenging. We have seen economy-wide effects due to inclement weather conditions. The drought and floods disturbed agriculture activities and agro based industrial activities. Spillover effects of these adverse weather conditions impacted the other sectors of the economy as well. As a result, economic growth is expected to be subdued and lower than we projected at the beginning of the year.

The existing criteria and selection process are undergoing a rigorous review to strengthen the current assessment process and uplift the quality of audits so that auditors are also abreast with the emerging risks and implications of the Basel III framework and the new accounting standards that are to be enforced within the next few years. With a view of facilitating risk management of emerging technologies and to encourage further digitalisation of banking operations, several policies will be introduced to define regulatory expectations on use of cloud computing and define minimum regulations on the use of relevant fintech solutions. Further, a comprehensive technology risk assessment programme would be conducted to assess and improve the technology risk resilience of banks. Over the last five years, while the banking sector has grown approximately by 15 per cent annually, the non-bank financial institutions sector has grown approximately by 20 per cent. Although the sector accounts for a comparatively small share of around 8 per cent of the total assets of the financial system, the rapid growth and broad outreach of the sector necessitate proactive supervision and regulatory guidance. While several regulations have been introduced to strengthen these institutions, some licensed finance companies have shown signs of stress, while the rapid expansion of certain others have been curtailed due to their lack of compliance with regulatory requirements. This reiterates the need for continued strengthening of the existing regulatory framework of non-bank financial institutions to ensure the soundness of the sector and contain its spillover effects on the whole system.
Anita Angelovska-Bezoska: Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska-Bezoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries, Brussels, 25 May 2018. * * * Dear Ministers, Dear representatives of the European Commission, European Central Bank and Eurostat, It is my great pleasure to join you on the regular Ministerial Dialogue. At the beginning, let me express our gratitude to the ECB, European Commission and Eurostat for their assessment of our Economic Reform Programme that outlines the ongoing, as well as forthcoming mediumterm reform priorities aimed at more competitive, flexible and resilient economy. Herewith, we appreciate the positive assessment of the monetary policy as well as the recommendation to continue “to conduct monetary policy consistent with the exchange rate peg, using available scope within this framework in line with safeguarding price stability” which is completely in line with central bank views on monetary policy strategic framework. In light of today’s thematic discussion on fiscal sectors reforms, we would like to express our support for the Ministry of Finance’s reforms oriented towards strengthening Public Finance Management system that besides improving the effectiveness of the use of public resources, will also foster the ongoing fiscal consolidation process.

Singapore’s regulatory regime already meets or exceeds international norms, and this has enabled us to weather the financial crisis relatively well. Following the crisis, international regulatory standards are being raised. We are well-placed to meet them. Let me start with banking. MAS announced last month we will require Singaporeincorporated banks to meet Basel III capital requirements earlier than the Basel Committee’s schedule, and at a higher standard. Market reaction to this announcement has been positive because Singapore-incorporated banks are well-capitalised and in a strong position to meet MAS’ revised requirements. These requirements will help keep our banking system strong and safeguard our financial stability. Likewise for liquidity. Singapore was one of earliest jurisdictions to require banks to maintain minimum liquidity levels. Over the years, this has evolved to a risk-based liquidity risk supervision framework. Singapore banks are therefore well positioned to meet the new Basel liquidity ratios. Effective regulation is not just about setting high standards. It is also about creating market conditions that enable financial institutions to meet the standards. Take for instance the higher liquidity requirements under Basel III. MAS has taken steps to increase the availability of liquid assets in the market and collaborate with other central banks to expand eligible collateral in the MAS Standing Facility. Let me elaborate. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  We started issuing one-month MAS Bills in April this year. This has added about $ billion of high quality liquid assets for financial institutions. We have seen good interest in the Bills.
Sheku Sambadeen Sesay: Economic overview, trends and challenges Statement by Mr Sheku Sambadeen Sesay, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the Governor’s annual dinner, Freetown, 28 January 2011. *  *  *  His Excellency, The President, Dr. Ernest Bai-Koroma and Mrs Sia Koroma, Honourable, Vice President, Chief Alhaji Sam Sumana and Mrs Khadija Sumana, Honourable Cabinet Ministers, Honorable Speaker and Members of Parliament, Her Lordship, the Chief Justice, Your Worship, the Mayor of the Municipality of Freetown, Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corp, Chairmen of the Board of Directors and Chief Executives of Commercial Banks and Other Financial Institutions, President of the Sierra Leone Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry, Representatives of the Private sector, Members of the Fourth Estate, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen. On behalf of the Board of Directors, Management and staff of the Bank of Sierra Leone, I am honoured by your presence once again at the Bank’s Annual Dinner, my second as Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone. As our country celebrates 50 years of independence, it is but appropriate that the Bank of Sierra Leone marks this milestone in the company of H.E. The President, the Hon. Vice President, the First Lady and Wife of the Hon. Vice President, along with other dignitaries. Before I proceed, kindly permit me to request you to stand and join us in observing a moment’s silence in memory of our departed colleagues and pensioners who were with us last year. May their souls rest in peace.

In many respects, the United States and Europe face similar challenges and have similar goals. Today I want to focus on some of the challenges. On the regulatory side, there is considerable good news. In particular, substantial progress has been made in strengthening the global banking system. Capital and liquidity standards for internationally active banks have been raised significantly. This should reduce the risk of failure for these banks. Also, the financial system is being made more resilient and robust. For example, the global set of principles for financial market infrastructures has been updated and strengthened. Moreover, some steps have been taken to better deal with the failure of systemically important financial firms on a cross-border basis. Key attributes for resolution regimes have been promulgated by the Financial Stability Board. Efforts are underway to improve how we can work together in a coordinated way on a global basis. But more needs to be done. The impediments to an orderly cross-border resolution still need to be fully identified and dismantled. This is necessary to solve the so-called “too big to fail” problem. Also, cross-border regulatory cooperation needs to be further enhanced. This includes greater exchange of confidential supervisory information so that national regulators can be fully informed about the conditions of the banks that operate within their borders. It also requires efforts to ensure a level playing field across jurisdictions so that the focus is on promoting safety and soundness rather than on trying to protect, favor, or shield national champions.
Let me emphasise, before I go into this, what is actually obvious; a war entails much more than just economic consequences of the type the Riksbank has reason to observe in its Inflation Report - first and foremost considerable human suffering. Let me also say that in this field - i.e. geopolitics - we are of course amateurs, although we have tried to use our international contacts when putting together our forecast. The Riksbank's main scenario assumes a solution will be reached in the Iraq conflict that does not give any reason to significantly reconsider the picture we have of a gradual recovery in economic activity. The surveys we have made indicate that the macroeconomic consequences of a brief war will not be so different from a less dramatic development. In this sense one can say that our main scenario is consistent with both a peaceful solution and a brief war. The Inflation Report describes in greater detail how we assess the effects of a worse development, which is, of course, a possibility. A weaker recovery An increasing number of indicators over the past few months have given the impression that the international economic recovery will be more protracted than anticipated. The main difference from the assessment we made in the December report, is the deterioration in prospects for the euro area. All in all, our assessment is that international growth will be slightly lower this year than we believed when making our forecasts in December.

The background was that resource utilisation was still assessed as relatively high and economic activity was expected to strengthen significantly in the light of the policy pursued, with ensuing higher inflation. In addition, inflation was still high and there was uncertainty over this, partly connected with resource utilisation. However, the recovery began to slow down, partly in the wake of continued stock market falls. At the same time, the earlier assessment that the upturn in inflation during 2001 had been temporary was confirmed, as inflation was now in line with the target again, which reduced uncertainty over possible contagion effects. Given this development, the repo rate was lowered twice during the autumn, by 0.25 percentage points. There are important similarities and important differences between the situation now and then. Inflation has risen sharply now, as it did then, as a result of some easily discernible supply shocks, with what are probably fairly transitory effects. The geopolitical unrest has had negative effects on the global economy, ever since 11 September 2001. However, there are also important differences. The krona weakened at the beginning of 2001, which together with a tendency towards higher inflation expectations brought about an interest rate hike. Over the past year the krona has remained relatively stable against the euro and strengthened against the dollar. Expectations of economic activity were also different in 2001. That year, up to the early autumn, they were aimed at relatively high growth and a rise in resource utilisation, although growth expectations were slightly lower than a year earlier.
Each of us involved in making the policy rate decision has some version of the  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  theoretical framework in our head, even if it is probably often fairly implicit. At the other end of the process is the media image, with concrete repo rate decisions. The basic question is how we can best go from the simple theoretical analysis into actual policy. There is a balancing act to achieve here: On the one hand, one wants to retain sufficient clarity and structure in the process as given by the theoretical framework. But on the other hand, one does not want to provide an overly simple and thereby perhaps misleading picture of monetary policy and the deliberations that we have to make in practice. What I have talked about here today concerns the link between theory and practice, and more specifically why the connections between them are not so simple. The interesting but difficult challenges faced when going from theoretical analysis to practical policy are something the Riksbank – and presumably also other central banks – spends a lot of time and energy managing. These challenges may not be so well-known outside of the central bank world and I hope that I have now been able to provide some insight into them. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13

7 Thomas M. Mertens and John C. Williams, Tying Down the Anchor: Monetary Policy Rules and the Lower Bound  on Interest Rates, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper Series, May 2019. 8 Richard H. Clarida, Vice Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Federal Reserve’s 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Review of Its Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools and Communications Practices , speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, April 9, 2019. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
It then uses the probabilities of various paths for short-term interest rates, taken from financial markets, to produce a “fan” of outcomes over the next five years. At least if you believe what’s priced into financial markets there is only a one-in-seven chance that mortgage interest payments will return to the pre-crisis (post-inflation-targeting) average by the end of that period.7 7  The equivalent calculation for households’ aggregate interest payments, including on their non-mortgage debt, implies that the odds of getting back to the pre-crisis average are if anything marginally longer than this. This might seem puzzling, given the rise in unsecured debt in Chart 5, to levels well above the pre-crisis average. But what that Chart reveals is that the part of this aggregate whose payments are sensitive to interest rates – the more conventional liabilities in blue – has not risen above the pre-crisis average. Indeed it’s slightly below it. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  This makes it slightly puzzling to read (as one often does) that household debt is “unsustainably” high. This view is ubiquitous. My suspicion is that, at least in some cases, people come to it because they have in the back of their minds an alternative and rather attractive world in which we all have fewer debts but the same assets. In this imagined and happy place we’d all have lower mortgages but own the same houses. Firms too would have fewer liabilities but possess the same productive capital.

But remote events do happen – and by their nature we cannot always see them coming. Researchers at the World Bank have recorded 13 borderline or full-blown financial crises since the late 1970s, involving at least one Financial Stability Forum (FSF) member country. 1 And there are well known incidents not on the list: including the 1987 crash, the less developed countries’ debt crisis and LTCM’s near collapse. So we are fortunate in having a time of relative calm to work out together how we should react when a problem does arise. And we have in the FSF a body that was established “to co-ordinate the efforts of …various bodies in order to promote international financial stability, improve the functioning of markets, and reduce systemic risk” 2 . In its first 7 years, much of the FSF’s focus has been on the identification and assessment of risks in a rapidly changing financial system; it has played a valuable role in building a common understanding among authorities and among market participants of what the risks are and how they can be reduced. However, that level of progress has been less apparent on putting in place arrangements for handling and resolving cross-border crises. During that period a number of countries, including the UK, have improved their processes for handling financial crises – including for crises sparked by business continuity events.