samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
First, I would underscore the importance of good corporate governance, the basic elements of which include: •  independent and competent outside directors;  •  capable and experienced management;  •  a coherent corporate strategy and business plan; and  •  clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Together, these elements contribute to an overall operating process conducive to long-term health and prosperity. A tightly run ship with a disciplined crew led by an experienced and competent cadre of officers is far better able to survive a long journey that will inevitably confront sudden storms. Closely related to good corporate governance and critical to any banking institution’s well-being is a rigorous internal control apparatus. Of course, effective internal control systems have always been centrally important to sound banking. This point becomes clear if we consider for a moment their basic purposes: •  to provide reasonable assurance that the bank’s and its customers’ assets are safeguarded, that its information is timely and reliable, and that errors and irregularities are discovered and corrected promptly;  •  to promote the bank’s operational efficiency; and  •  to ensure compliance with managerial policies, laws, regulations and sound fiduciary principles. With these purposes in mind, it is clear that the success of any banking organization depends on the effectiveness of its internal control apparatus. And never has this been more true than today.

But the krone exchange rate also shows monthly and yearly fluctuations. The krone was strong towards the end of the previous cyclical expansion, but depreciated when interest rates declined in 2003. Thereafter, the krone appreciated again as growth in the Norwegian economy recovered. Over the past two years, the krone has appreciated by close to 5 per cent. Even though the krone has appreciated, inflation has picked up and is now fairly close to 2.5 per cent. While different measures of inflation as recently as last year were below 1½ per cent, the same measures are now between 2.1 and 3.3 per cent. The rise in the consumer price index (CPI) reflects the increase in electricity prices. Underlying inflation has also increased and is now assessed to be between 2 and 3¼ per cent. Prices for domestically produced goods and services are rising at a particularly fast pace. At the same time, prices for imported consumer goods are no longer falling. Higher inflation is expected one to two years ahead. BIS Review 45/2008  3  At the same time, growth in the Norwegian economy is strong. An ample supply of labour will allow growth in the Norwegian economy to hold up for a period ahead. Capacity utilisation is nevertheless likely to decline. Weaker growth in the world economy may have an impact on developments in the Norwegian export industry, which may gradually spill over to other business sectors in Norway.
13  “What should equities and bonds be worth in a risky world”, by David Miles, Vladimir Pillonca and Melanie Baker, Morgan Stanley research paper, September 2005. BIS Review 100/2010  11  Chart 8 Annual GDP growth: Comparing the economic model with actual data (1821–2001) probability  0.125  Frequency distribution of changes in GDP - Actual data 0.1  Predicted by the model (base case) 0.075  0.05  0.025  0 -40  -35  -30  -25  -20  -15  -10  -5  0  4  9  14  19  24  29  34  39  100 times annual change in log GDP  The implications for monetary policy I conclude from this that there are likely to be substantial benefits in having banks hold much more capital. Under plausible assumptions that would have a relatively low impact on the overall cost of debt in the economy but a big impact on the robustness of the banking system. In all the calculations described above I have been focussing on steady states and looking at the long run impacts of banks coming to have much more capital. I think those results mean that it would be desirable that banks come to hold much more capital. It is conceivable that raising large amounts of additional capital in a short period may be more costly. So the transition to higher levels of capital should probably be relatively long.

The role that microfinance institutions play in financial inclusion is therefore very crucial. Over the years, the microfinance institutions in Zambia have played a significant part in the provision of financial services, particularly for low-income households. Although access to finance remains low, microfinance institutions have had a somewhat positive impact on the economic activity of low income households, in both urban and rural areas. I am hopeful that the microfinance sector will continue to bridge the financing gap especially to the unserved population. However, the Bank of Zambia continues to receive a number of customer complaints on the high cost of micro loans in the country. It has been observed that the interest rates charged by some institutions exceeded 300% per annum in some cases. Furthermore, in most instances the effective rate of interest and other charges are not disclosed to the customers resulting in them paying much more that what was initially publicised to them. This has raised ethical questions regarding transparency and the role of microfinance institutions in poverty alleviation and economic development in Zambia. In addition, although, the interest rates of microfinance loans may vary significantly relative to the duration and size of the loan, it is incumbent upon all microfinance institutions to provide clear information on the cost of the loans and options available. It is also important for institutions to sensitise customers on what products may best suit their incomes and to educate them to borrow prudently.
There are very clear public policy objectives behind this announcement, which are not about financial stability but are about economic welfare. The key test for me – which I think is passed – is that the industry for which the PRA is the prudential regulator is in a sufficiently robust financial position from the point of view of its prudential standards that meeting and maintaining those standards should not get in the way of achieving the other public policy objective in terms of people’s welfare in old age. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A second important example on financial stability at work comes in the housing market in the UK. In the statement issued last week following its Policy Meeting, the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee noted the continued evidence of increasing momentum in the UK housing market. Although a number of indicators remain below their long-run average levels, including mortgage approvals, there has been a marked strengthening in activity. House prices are not only rising on the national average, by around 10% in the year to February, but also in the second half of last year there were increases in all regions of the country, though of course the scale of these increases is not even. The share of mortgages at higher loan to income ratios is greater than at any time since the measurement began in 2005, though the share of high loan to value lending remains low by historical standards.

There is another lesson that I draw from this history, namely that there must be some difficult impediments to achieving the goal of institutional stability in financial regulation. To start with, achieving consistency and clarity in identifying the objective of regulation has been a problem in the past. The new approach anchors the PRA’s primary objectives of the safety and soundness of firms and the protection of insurance policyholders in the broader goal of the stability of the financial system. This very clearly ties together micro and macro-prudential regulation, whose objectives are consistent. And, we now have a secondary objective around the competition implications of our actions, which I welcome. Just under two weeks ago we announced changes to the Bank of England’s strategy and structure. In doing so, we adopted a single mission, namely to promote the public good through achieving and maintaining financial and monetary stability. This single mission is much more than just the speak of management, it is a clear change intended to promote the integration of the Bank of England’s objectives of monetary and financial stability. This integration of objectives into a single mission represents a very deliberate decision that the Bank of England should not be organised as a series of silos defined by our different statutory objectives and by the structure of policy making committees given to us in legislation.
For now, we affirm the monetary policy stance announced in the April Monetary Policy Statement. WHY DID MAS RECORD A FINANCIAL LOSS AND IS IT CAUSE FOR CONCERN? I now turn to MAS' financial results. Let me start with the headline. MAS recorded a net loss of $ billion for FY22/23, reflecting the effects of monetary policy tightening to bring down inflation. This is the largest loss MAS has ever recorded. The loss was due to two factors: negative currency translation effects of a stronger Singapore Dollar; and  4/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  high interest expenses from mopping up excess liquidity in the banking system. I will explain these two factors in detail and address some pertinent questions: Is the loss cause for concern for MAS? Could the loss have been avoided or minimised? Does the loss affect the Government Budget? Let me start with currency translation effects. About 70% of the net loss or $ billion was due to the negative currency translation effects of a stronger Singapore Dollar. As we have explained on many past occasions, currency translation effects arise when MAS' Official Foreign Reserves (OFR) which are held in foreign currencies are reported in Singapore Dollars. If the Singapore Dollar weakens against the foreign currencies maintained in MAS' OFR, we will experience positive currency translation effects. Conversely, if the Singapore Dollar strengthens against the respective foreign currencies, we will experience negative currency translation effects.

News conference  Berne, 14 December 2017 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan Ladies and gentlemen It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I will begin by explaining our monetary policy decision and our assessment of the economic situation. I will then hand over to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will speak about current developments in the area of financial stability. After that, Andréa Maechler will review the situation on the financial markets and the progress in reference interest rate reform. Finally, we will – as ever – be pleased to take your questions. Monetary policy decision  Let me begin with our monetary policy decision and the inflation forecast. We are maintaining our expansionary monetary policy in order to stabilise price developments and support economic activity. Interest on sight deposits at the SNB is to remain at –0.75% and the target range for the three-month Libor is unchanged at between –1.25% and –0.25%. We will remain active in the foreign exchange market as necessary, while taking the overall currency situation into consideration. The Swiss franc has depreciated in recent months. The overvaluation has thereby decreased, yet overall the franc remains highly valued. The depreciation of the franc reflects the fact that safe havens are currently less sought after. However, this development is still fragile. Therefore, despite the easing of the situation, the negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary remain essential.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  fixed-rate, full allotment regime in its refinancing operations, offering unlimited liquidity to banks at a predictable cost against an expanded set of eligible collateral. The widening of collateral might be seen as a way to mitigate the adverse and destabilizing effects of shortterm funding “runs” relating to a deterioration of asset liquidity, but it can also be seen as a way to prevent large recourse to central bank liquidity by banks, who would otherwise be subject to funding outflows at a later stage of the crisis. Such a widening has to be accompanied by proper risk management measures, such as haircuts, to mitigate the increase of the risk profile of the central bank. The challenge for the central bank is to “buildin” the possibility to expand the set of eligible collateral while mitigating the incentives for banks to abuse it.20 Similarly, the LOLR’s function of providing emergency liquidity assistance has been criticised for provoking moral hazard by banks. Indeed, support that is considered as appropriate during the crisis might have perverse effects on the incentives of banks at a later stage. Banks may ex ante decide to take an excessive exposure to risk, knowing that the central bank will intervene if that risk materialises. Moreover, there is a fine line between liquidity and solvency needs, which in a crisis is often blurred. Central banks should therefore be particularly wary not to substitute for capital support that should be provided by shareholders, investors, or in last resort by governments.

Incentives on the liability side of banks’ balance sheet Having discussed how a bank can operate on the asset side of its balance sheet to improve LCR compliance, I now turn to the liability side of its balance sheet. A bank that faces the possibility of a LCR shortfall has the incentive to (i) decrease its reliance on short-term unsecured funding, (ii) decrease the 30 days net cash outflow, and (iii) to replace it by longer-term funding or, if this is too difficult or too expensive, by secured funding. Since outflow rates are zero for secured funding obtained from the central bank, but higher for secured funding obtained from other sources, the bank is more likely to borrow from the central bank by pledging non-HQLA assets, either in tender operations or in the marginal lending facility.14 As a result, this lessens the need of banks to seek funds in the short-term interbank market to ensure that the LCR requirement is met.15 A reduction in the reliance on short-term unsecured funding is an intended consequence of the LCR. However, the implementation of the LCR might then lead to an overall decline in unsecured money market activity, which could be problematic for the euro area. Money markets play a central role for monetary policy transmission in the euro area. This is because the euro area financial system is largely bank-based, and interbank money market interest rates represent the marginal cost of funding bank loans.
19  Figure 13 Total factor productivity (TFP) and per capita GDP, 2012-2014 average (*) 1.8  1.8  TFP level w/respect to US (US =1)  Chile  OECD  Latin America  Others  1.2  1.2  0.6  0.6  0.0  0 0  1  3 7 20 Per capita GDP thousands of $ of 2011, log scale  53  143  (*) Countries with population over one million and average PTF no higher than twice that of the United States. Blue dots show OECD member countries as of 2017 (Mexico included). Source: Central Bank of Chile using PWT 9.0 data. Table 3 Productivity growth breakdown: 2006 - 2015 (*) (percent) Productivity growth Productivity growth of firms continuing Reallocation across firms continuing Net turnover margin  0.97 1.23 1.03 -1.30  (*) Annual average of productivity growth breakdown between 2006 and 2015. Values scaled by average productivity. Parameters estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology calculated on 91 sectors. Source: Central Bank of Chile using data from Internal Revenue Service (SII), F22 and DJ1887. 20  Figure 14 Recent changes to MP meetings' frequency (1) Current Japan  2016  Israel  2017  S. Korea  2017  Eurozone  2015  U.K.  2015  Czech Rep.  2008  Previous  Norway (2)  2018  4  6  8  10  12  14  (1) Left of red dots is year in which the number of monetary policy meetings was reduced.

Thus, CPI inflation will end the year at 2.4% and the CPIEFE at 1.9%, both below June's forecasts. Going forward, core inflation is expected to fluctuate around 2% until mid-2018, heavily influenced by the effects of the recent peso appreciation, to gradually return to 3% thereafter. Meanwhile, as fruits and vegetables prices resume a similar dynamic to that of their historical averages, the CPI will return to the target by the second half of 2018. As I mentioned, this trajectory is based on the RER depreciating slightly over the projection horizon (figure 10). 5  As usual, a number of internal and external elements represent risks to these projections. Abroad, an ongoing concern is how the financial markets will respond to the monetary policy strategies of the main central banks of the developed world. After several years of highly expansionary monetary conditions, the economies have closed—or are on their way to close—their gaps and it is natural for monetary policy to begin to normalize, both in its more (rates) and less (balance sheet) conventional aspects. This entails risks because of the unprecedented timing and gradual pace of the process and its differences with market expectations. In the United States, there's also the doubts about fiscal management and its effects on growth, interest rates, and asset prices in general. Add the concerns about whether the recent low inflation figures in several developed countries are one-time or rather systematic events, plus risks associated with recent geopolitical tensions.
The UK is currently the single largest market for non-life insurance globally, with £ of annual premium (equating to c.7% of global insurance premiums) written through the London Market with 85% of this business undertaken in the UK by insurers which are themselves part of groups headquartered overseas.2 UK domiciled insurers alone rank fourth globally in written premiums and UK-domiciled insurers in the life and long-term savings sector manage over £ of assets.3 We have only been able to reach this position, and will only be able to maintain it in future, through open international insurance markets. The Government’s stated policy is to maintain and enhance the position of the UK as a leading international financial sector, and the insurance sector forms a key part of this. An important aspect of achieving this objective is how we ensure that the UK is open and competitive as a place to do business. But what does this mean in practice, and for the insurance sector in particular? One of the key changes wrought by Brexit is the increased role the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) now play in decisions regarding which EU insurers are permitted to operate in the UK market and how they are supervised.

“The pass-through of higher natural gas prices to inflation in the euro area and in Spain”, Box 4, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2022, Banco de España. 4  instance, the presence of global supply chain bottlenecks, the rapid intensification of demand once restrictions were lifted or the impact of changes in work and living habits, which led to increased consumption of housing-related goods and services. According to our estimates, demand factors were of minor importance at the beginning of 2022, but their contribution increased until the summer, stabilising at high levels thereafter. Supply-side factors – which were predominant at the beginning of 2022 – now explain around half of the deviation of euro area core inflation from its historical average. All in all, some core inflation components are beginning to show a certain degree of stabilisation, but the data suggest that inflationary pressures continue to broaden. By way of illustration, during most of 2022, pressures on core inflation were highly concentrated on specific expenditure items, such as household equipment and maintenance, transport, and activities involving more social contact.10 The aggregate price index of these items indicates some stabilisation in its year-on-year growth rate at the beginning of this year, albeit at high levels, over 7%.11 Excluding these expenditure components, the remaining basket of core items, which has a weight of over 30% in the HICP, has shown a very contained inflation rate throughout the inflationary episode.
Jean-Claude Trichet: The international financial architecture Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Bank of France, to the Foreign Policy Association, New York, 30 September 2002. *  *  *  I am delighted to be here in this great city, speaking to this prestigious association. Let me start by paying tribute to the Foreign Policy Association and to its contribution to the international debate with immense experience. Let me also say how Banque de France feels very close to the New Yorkers one year after the tragic events of September 11. As the French daily “Le Monde” rightly emphasised: “We are all Americans”. I am just coming back from the international monetary and financial meetings which take place every year in Washington. I am lucidly and cautiously confident that we will overcome present difficulties. And in my view there is no room either for undue pessimism or for any kind of complacency. What has happened during the recent period of time? Some financial markets have experienced sharp corrections and several large corporate firms have failed or been confronted with significant difficulties; meanwhile, a few major emerging market economies have got into deep financial troubles. However, financial systems have been so far resilient and the economic recovery is underway, although more slowly than first anticipated.

Why was it so hard to anticipate what would happen if there were losses on large numbers of bonds insured by monoline insurers which had relatively small amounts of capital? One reason why such risks may not be appreciated ex ante is over-reliance on local risk measures such as VaR (Value at Risk) or other historical average correlations, and not enough on severe stress tests over different horizons. For example, in the United States it was widely believed that house prices would not fall significantly nationally (it had never happened after the Great depression in the 1930s). We assert that, if one had stressed bank capital in the US with the explicit assumption that national residential real estate prices could go down 30 to 40%, and in some local markets more, most of the losses for US banks could have been correctly predicted (at least if the complexities of structured credit products were properly assessed6). The collapse of functioning inter-bank money markets and other “runon-the-bank” phenomena obviously added further costs, but the first-order effect was caused by residential house prices falling. The key, however, was to correctly predict what that kind of price drop would do to other market participants, and market structures, as well as to the individual firm. Extreme stress tests have served a crucial purpose after the crisis to re-establish confidence in banks, and might usefully play a wider role in more aspects of on-going bank oversight.