samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That would be a regime in which central banks would, in effect, be lender of second resort (ie as soon as some markets closed up) rather than LOLR (broadly understood). The equilibrium would surely be one in which less of banks’ balance sheets were liquid in the markets than is desirable; and in which the banking system in aggregate could run excess liquidity risk from a systemic perspective. Haven’t we seen the results of that already? Isn’t the purpose of regulatory standards to avoid that? Our own favored approach is that the regulators should define the “liquidity buffer” to comprise high-quality securities that can reliably be traded or exchanged in liquid markets, including in stressed circumstances. In practice, that would mean focusing on government bonds in many economies. 22  21  See Chapman G, Emblow, A and Michael I (2000), “Banking System Liquidity: Developments and Issues”, Financial Stability Review, Issue 9, December 2000.

In other words, a central bank policy of lending against only the best assets is likely to prove time inconsistent when it comes to the crunch. This is not an ivory tower problem. It is a real problem. It is why the Bank of England confirmed last year that we do stand ready, via our public facilities, to lend against a wide range of collateral, subject crucially to appropriate haircuts and other terms. To do otherwise would be futile; it would lack credibility. And to do so is consistent with Bagehot’s dictum that central banks should lend against “everything which in common times is good ‘banking security’ ”. 12 The Bank has already published an initial list of collateral eligible in its dedicated liquidityinsurance facilities. Looking ahead, the Bank plans to expand the list, and to promulgate detailed eligibility criteria reflecting its risk tolerance and experience gained from managing  England’s Market Operations: A consultative paper by the Bank of England”, October 2008. Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada, has also set out his principles for the Bank of Canada’s liquidity provision. 10  Broadly, if the monetary authority thinks it can achieve above “trend” output growth or employment for a while by reducing interest rates, it may be tempted to let inflation temporarily rise above the rate it has promised to deliver.
One cause may be the large-scale investment in IT undertaken by companies at the end of the 1990s. But it is also possible that the continued economic upturn will be followed by a rapid decline in productivity growth. Our assessment today is that the high growth in productivity will last somewhat longer than assumed in the previous Inflation Report and the forecast for average productivity growth therefore has been revised up slightly over the forecast period. 1  The comparison refers to the forecast based on the assumption that the repo rate evolves in line with implied forward interest rates, which in the previous Report was presented in a box. 6/7  Inflation rising but still low Inflation has risen somewhat recently but remains low. In September this year, the annual CPI and UND1X inflation rates stood at 0.6 per cent and 1.0 per cent, respectively. That is slightly higher than we forecast in June, owing mainly to the unexpectedly high oil price. In the coming years, mounting domestic cost pressures are anticipated to contribute to a rise in domestic inflation. However, the rate of this increase is estimated to be modest due to both continued fairly strong productivity growth and stiff competition. That imported inflation in recent years has been contained is due, among other things, to the strengthening of the krona and the fact that there has been a substitution in favour of cheaper imported goods.

Of course, I was a little uncertain as to whether I should just be pleased about this. But I think there is reason to be; it shows namely that we have a monetary policy regime which is stable and not dependent on single individuals. Inflation targeting – some thoughts on the future As I have mentioned, the macroeconomic outcome for Sweden has been relatively good over the past decade. Of course, this does not prevent there being questions worth discussing and much that can be improved. This also applies in the field of monetary policy. An important question in this context is what one can expect from monetary policy. If the expectations are excessive, there is a risk they will lead to the wrong issues being discussed and, if the worst comes to the worst, to political discontent that will undermine the current monetary policy system. Reasonable expectations According to the Sveriges Riksbank Act, the Riksbank is to safeguard price stability. We have chosen to implement this by keeping inflation at a target level of 2 per cent. The fact that the legislator has been clear that low inflation should be the target for monetary policy and nothing else, such as high growth or low unemployment, is because inflation is the only factor the Riksbank can govern in the long term. It is therefore unwise, and perhaps even counterproductive, to give a different impression.
These steps served to stabilize private currency issuers and their currencies, but there were other benefits of the approach that are easy to overlook: we disincentivized less desirable products—wildcat notes (that is, by imposing taxes on them); certain key participants in the system—specifically the custodian banks and trust companies—were already regulated institutions; bank notes had a certain level of transparency built in—a holder’s right to receive payment and from whom was literally written on the face of the note; and for all intents and purposes, federal law and regulation were ubiquitous. We have also developed comprehensive regulatory schemes targeted at other widely-used financial products as they have evolved, including recent work to regulate swap transactions. If digital currencies reach critical mass, we may want to draw on lessons from these efforts and consider whether tools for regulating systemically important activities are fit for purpose. The designation process under the Dodd-Frank Act for systemically important financial institutions may be instructive here, regardless of whether it is directly applicable to digital currencies. In this process, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has the authority to designate for enhanced regulation and supervision certain financial institutions, financial market infrastructures, and payments, clearing, and settlement (PCS) activities, to the extent that FSOC determines the organization or activity to be systemically important.

19 Source: https://www.investing.com/crypto/currencies 20 Application of FinCEN Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or  Using Virtual Currency 21 31 CFR § 1022.10. 22 Chairman Jay Clayton, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement on  Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 2017). Clayton is applying the “Howey” test, a product of the court case SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,which sets out the criteria for determining whether an instrument qualifies as an “investment contract” (and thus a security) for the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933. 328 U.S. § 293 (1946). An investment contract is “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” Id. 23 Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement on Digital Asset Securities  Issuance and Trading (Nov. 2018). 24 Marine Bank v. Weaver, 452 U.S. 551, ___ (1982). 25 The Commodity Exchange Act defines commodity to include, among other things,  “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.” 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9). At least to district courts have interpreted this to cover virtual currencies. E.g., CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, 334 F.Supp.3d 492, 498 (D. Mass., Sept. 26, 2018) 26 CFTC Release Number 7678-18, CFTC Charges Randall Crater, Mark Gillespie,  and My Big Coin Pay, Inc. with Fraud and Misappropriation in Ongoing Virtual Currency Scam (Jan. 24, 2018).
Michael C Bonello: Pursuing faster growth in a stable macroeconomic environment Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Annual Dinner of the Institute of Financial Services, St. Julians, 10 November 2005. *  *  *  Prime Minister, Parliamentary Secretary, Excellencies, Ladies & Gentlemen, I should first of all like to thank the President and Council of the Institute of Financial Services for inviting me once again to their annual dinner. Over the past six years I have been able to observe with satisfaction how the Institute has successfully adapted itself to the steady expansion of Malta’s financial services industry, and to the demand this growth has generated for a diversified range of professional expertise. One planned innovation which I consider most appropriate is the Certificate in Mortgage Advice and Practice that is partly based on Maltese law. This annual occasion also affords me a welcome opportunity to share with a distinguished audience of bankers and their corporate guests the Bank’s thinking on a subject of topical interest. In today’s complex global environment several issues spontaneously present themselves as likely candidates for further analysis. For us in Malta, the major policy challenge at this time is to return the economy to a path of higher and sustained growth. The facts speak for themselves.

It would seem, therefore, that no significant growth could  BIS Review 84/2005  1  be expected next year if the underlying pace of economic activity does not accelerate from this year’s level. The increase in Malta’s fuel bill is also roughly equivalent to the narrowing of the fiscal deficit achieved over the past seven years. In the circumstances, it would be foolish to allow the progress made at considerable cost to be blown away by this external shock. An attempt to cushion the increase in the oil price through borrowing may be economically justifiable in terms of sustaining the incipient recovery suggested by recent GDP data. On the other hand, any borrowing would have to be serviced; and, because it would constitute interference with market signals, it could also retard the process of economic adjustment. The only long-term remedy to counteract the effects of higher fuel prices is to expand productivity and output, and therefore incomes. Indeed, the oil price shock is another compelling reason, if one were needed, for redoubling our efforts to energize the economy. … and by a higher dependency ratio due to population ageing. The third challenge is the demographic shift caused by population ageing, such that the ratio of the working age to the dependent population is expected to shrink from almost four- to just over two-toone by the late 2020s. Some effects of this trend are already being felt this year as the first cohorts of the baby-boom generation reach retirement age.
The risk management function typically promotes the use of common risk measures across business lines. It can then report the firm-wide risk data to senior management. Even though no single model for organising an integrated risk management function has become dominant, all firms that establish integrated risk management units are highly dependent on the quality of their information technology to collect, analyse and report firm-wide data efficiently and effectively. Some participants have found that the greatest challenge in developing a centralised risk management structure lies in constructing compatible and efficient management information systems across all of their businesses. As a result, they devote substantial resources in terms of personnel and expenditures to the maintenance and enhancement of their management information systems. This trend is important for two reasons. For one thing, comprehensive firm-wide assessment of risk and consistent reporting helps to ensure that the firm is aware of the wide range of risks to which it is exposed, that it understands the relative  4  BIS Review 8/2005  importance of various risks and how they may interact, and that the firm is less likely to ignore material sources of risk. This facilitates early detection and resolution of problems. For another, this integrated risk management function requires a balance between the centralisation of some functions within the group as a whole, and the need to be close to local markets to incorporate better knowledge of local needs, risks, sensitivities and regulations.

The depreciation in the Kwacha was largely on account of reductions in emerging market premia due to continued interest rate hikes in major global economies, which resulted in reduced participation by foreign portfolio investors in the domestic securities market, a change in the commodities market sentiment aligned with lowering copper prices and uncertainty associated with the run-up to September 28, 2006 elections and the period immediately following the elections. 5. Another important milestone in 2006 was the licensing of credit reference bureau. As you are all aware, one important objective of a credit reference bureau is to help separate truant borrowers from good borrowers thereby help reduce the cost of borrowing in Zambia. As you endeavor to deliver daily targets of newspapers and electronic media that are in a hurry to report on a daily basis, there also needs to be some commitment to create a longer term trail of rigorously investigated news that is backed by authoritative evidence. Bank of Zambia, commercial banks, the Central Statistics Office and other information providers amass a lot of detail that is reflective of what has happened in the economy. I would encourage business and financial writers to  BIS Review 10/2007  1  monitor and highlight trends that can help us forecast where our economy and business sector is actually headed. If economic indicators are tracked effectively by the media and progress highlighted, it helps to generate even greater confidence in those seeking to make Zambia an investment destination.
Do you believe Greece can manage without restructuring its debt, and how likely is it able to do without one? Let me first point out that I am saddened by the fact that this public discussion and market speculation is taking place because it is quite damaging to the euro area overall. As you know the Greek government at the moment is implementing a tough but appropriate programme of reform for the Greek economy. This programme was evaluated by the IMF and the European Commission, in liaison with the ECB. This evaluation has determined that the debt-deficit dynamics of Greece are indeed sustainable, as long as the programme is being successfully implemented. With this in mind, I am puzzled by the continuing questioning of the sustainability of the Greek debt. In my mind, restructuring of the Greek debt is not necessary as long as Greece continues to implement the programme that is in place. But more importantly, I believe that a restructuring of the Greek debt would be unwise. Under the circumstances, restructuring would be quite damaging to the Greek economy. In addition I believe it would be quite damaging to the euro area overall because of the possibility of contagion effects. Since restructuring is both undesirable and unnecessary I believe that it is not helpful for officials in the EU to keep bringing it up. Q. Even though officials continue saying that restructuring is undesirable, this does not appear to have convinced the markets.

Inflation prospects difficult to assess One consequence of the Riksbank basing its analysis on conditions in Sweden — and not being guided by the actions of other central banks — is that in the past the repo rate has been held at a considerably lower level than in the United States. There have also been periods when our instrumental rate has been below that of the European Central Bank. The central factor when the Riksbank sets its instrumental rate is the prospects for inflation one to two years ahead. A prospect of inflation above the 2 per cent target normally leads to a repo rate increase, while if inflation is expected to be lower than the target level, the repo rate should normally be lowered, and if the rate of price increases is forecast to lie around the target level of 2 per cent, the rate should be left unchanged. The economic outlook in the rest of the world ought to imply a weak tendency in Sweden as well, with an attendant easing of inflationary pressure and consequently a further reduction of the repo rate. However, the decision-making situation is not that simple. Three things in particular make the picture more complicated: ·  Firstly, inflation is currently above the Riksbank’s 2 per cent target. The greater part of the increase is admittedly attributable to a number of clearly defined transitory factors that are calculated to drop out next spring. Food prices, for example, moved up in connection with mad-cow and foot-and-mouth disease.
The introduction of the euro has been a strong catalyst for mergers and acquisitions in the euro area. The European M & A market seems to be amongst the most dynamic in the world: with operations totalling over 1,000 billion euros in 1999, it is now catching up on the American market. The euro has brought about significant changes for participants in financial markets and has fostered structural developments in the financial industry. This is true both on euro-area money markets and on capital markets. From the beginning of Stage Three of EMU, cross-border transactions in the money market increased so as to represent more than 50% of the total activity in all segments of the money market. The unsecured deposit interbank market—which is mostly concentrated on shorter maturities—exhibits a  4  BIS Review 11/2001  very high degree of integration. The integration of interest-rate markets within the euro area is a key achievement which deserves to be underscored. EONIA and EURIBOR have provided the market with uniform benchmarks fully accepted by all market participants. The diagnosis is the same in the shortterm derivatives market, whose integration, standardisation and depth have increased. This is reflected, for instance, in the scale of daily transactions and the huge expansion of the euro interestrate swap market. These structural changes in the euro area money market have generated significant moves by market participants, who have concentrated their euro cash management activity and have benefited from better liquidity on the secondary market.

On the financial side, we can see that the number of borrowers who are unable to repay their loans is increasing rapidly. Both foreign and domestic banks must make corresponding provisions for losses, which has made an impact on, for instance, Swedbank’s and SEB’s interim reports. As consumption demand will be weak for many years, the way out of the crisis must be through investment and exports. This is only possible if competitiveness improves through further reductions in real wages. Moreover, demand from abroad must increase from the low levels experienced during the crisis. Finally, I would like to stress for the sake of clarity that the Riksbank, and thus the Swedish taxpayers, has not lost any money on the transactions with the Baltic countries. Those who have suffered financial losses are the banks’ shareholders, who have been forced to compensate for the losses with new capital. But there is also another loss – in addition to the economic contraction which the citizens of the Baltic countries currently suffer from – that is more important, and this concerns the Swedish economy as a whole. When banks make losses abroad they do not have the same possibilities to provide loans in Sweden, and thus our country may have poorer economic development. The Riksbank has done all it can to prevent such a negative development. 6  BIS Review 11/2010
“Experts,” who were regarded as the handmaiden of this system, were seen as responsible for many of these ills and skepticism about their credibility loomed large in the debate about Brexit. In addition to experts having been seen to have “got it wrong,” their monopoly on opinion has been weakened by technology. Social media and the internet have contributed to a disintermediation of experts as information has become more widely available, news has become more targeted to individual interests and preferences, and as people increasingly choose who to trust and follow. Who needs experts when you have Facebook, Google, Mumsnet and Twitter? Better to rely on oneself and one’s network of friends over a set of experts in the pockets of corporations, political parties and banks. I want to explore these developments because I think they speak to some of the most important issues of our time. They will determine the quality of politics and policy in the future, who is trusted and why. There are also some important lessons for policy makers as well as for universities which are the factories for producing experts and the place in which a great deal of expert debate occurs. What have the experts ever done for us? Recall the scene in the Monty Python skit, the Life of Brian, in which a group named the People’s Front of Judea is organizing a rebellion against the Roman empire.

Over time a policy that quickly subdues inflationary impulses would probably result in more stable inflation, but there would be a risk of substantial fluctuations in the real economy. We have chosen a two-year horizon for monetary policy because this is considered to give sufficient scope in most cases to ensure a good and stable development of the real economy. However, the rate at which it is desirable to bring inflation back on target in an individual case depends on what shocks  2  BIS Review 96/2006  the economy has suffered and how substantial they are. Sometimes the deviations from target can be so large that there is reason to allow inflation to return to target beyond the normal two-year horizon. In these cases, we shall explain this in connection with our decisions. Back when the new Sveriges Riksbank Act came into force in 1999 and a new Executive Board entered office, the Riksbank published a clarification of monetary policy, where it was pointed out that the horizon might need to be longer when the economy was subjected to large shocks 1 . The new element is that we are clearer on the point that the choice of time horizon concerns a desire to alleviate the consequences for the real economy. Another new element since last year is that we make forecasts under the assumption that the repo rate will develop in line with market expectations, as these are reflected in implied forward rates.