samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
109 073  143  108 930  Riksbank Certificates  227 489  Swap agreements with FED and ECB  20 253  Loans through the SNDO  91 186  Repos foreign currency reserve  8 461  12 035  -3 574  Liability to IM F (SDR)  24 912  2 517  22 395  Other liabilities Provisions Revaluation accounts  11 705 257 33 170  4 277 206 20 063  7 428 51 13 107  Capital  64 025  58 247  5 778  Total liabilities  696 529  211 894  484 635  Assets, SEK million  227 489 82  20 171 91 186  Source: The Riksbank. BIS Review 160/2009  17

Being wholly-owned, the incorporation of the Islamic subsidiary will provide an opportunity to the group to enlarge the Islamic banking market to potential institutional investors, both domestic and foreign, who wish to participate in the Islamic financial activities through direct equity participation. The divestment of shares in the Islamic subsidiary allowable up to 49%, is subject to the condition that the Islamic subsidiary will remain as a subsidiary of the commercial bank. This option will provide the banking group with the opportunities to find a strategic partner for the Islamic subsidiary, thus diversifying the range of players available in the Islamic financial market. Indeed, foreign participation in the Islamic subsidiary would enable the group to tap on the regional and international business opportunities. In going forward, the move to issue new licences and accord legal status to the existing Islamic banking operations of the conventional banks is expected to accelerate the positioning of Malaysia as an attractive Islamic financial hub to the international financial community. In this regard, the Islamic financial players of other banking groups that have achieved the critical mass and strength are encouraged to explore the strategic advantage of the incorporation of an Islamic subsidiary, and in elevating the industry to a more dynamic and advanced phase of development including ventures abroad. There is a large business potential to be tapped in an environment of strong and rapid economic and financial development in the country and the region.
During the more extreme periods of the Asian crisis, however, one of the main concerns of market participants was the high level of uncertainty in the market about whether and to what extent lender of last resort support would be forthcoming should it be required. In fact, the liquidity shortages experienced during the more volatile periods may have been in part attributable to this market uncertainty. Arguably, this uncertainty may also have aggravated the credit crunch during the crisis periods. The introduction of the Discount Window in September 1998 has helped to ease this problem. A greater knowledge and awareness of the availability of a lender of last resort facility will, we hope, further help to reduce uncertainty, and will, in turn help to improve overall market liquidity in the event of future crises, should they arise. A formalised policy framework will also help the HKMA itself to ensure speed and consistency in considering whether or not to extend lender of last resort support. A quick response in an uncertain environment could be of vital importance in helping to restore stability and confidence to the banking system. But it must be acknowledged that there are also good arguments for not saying too much on the subject. The HKAB, while expressing general support for clarification, has rightly observed that the HKMA must be able to maintain sufficient flexibility to be able to handle widely differing situations, to deal with abrupt changes, and to take action in a timely way.

The recent competitive environment has actually fostered the gradual transformation of banking activities, with a greater emphasis on the "originate and distribute" business model. With this model, credit institutions arrange financings but quickly offload a substantial portion of their risks, for example through securitisation, and take payment – much more so than in the past – in the form of fees and commissions. But although activity in new products such as LBOs is helping to boost French banks' revenues and earnings, it is also a source of vulnerability. First, in terms of remuneration, fierce competition among credit institutions is not only exerting downward pressure on margins; it is encouraging "covenant-lite" deals – a worrying trend. These complex transactions are also beginning to generate new risks. On this point, there is a tendency towards longer underwriting periods, during which banks bear the bulk of the risk. Banks should also pay attention to the fact that counterparties such as hedge funds are becoming increasingly involved in this type of deals. Allow me two brief asides, if you will. First, with regard to LBOs, let me refer you to the study appended to the Annual Report. On the topic of hedge funds, I would remind you that the Banque de France devoted a special issue of its financial stability review to this subject and that the Commission Bancaire pays close attention to banks' involvement with this type of counterparty.
If inflation is more than one percentage point either side of the target, we are required to write to the Chancellor explaining the reasons for the miss and the steps we are taking to bring inflation back to target. There was a flurry of excitement earlier this year when inflation reached 1.8%, and many commentators thought that we might soon have to polish up our letter writing skills. But so far we have not had to put pen to paper. Of course, a number of factors have contributed to the stability in inflation. Monetary policy takes time to affect inflation, so inflation in the early part of this period reflects decisions taken before the MPC was formed. And in the short term at least prices can reflect factors other than monetary policy. But, judged against previous policy regimes in this country, inflation targeting has been successful. Of course, you might expect me to say that. But the growing credibility of the arrangements is also reflected in measures of expected inflation in coming years, most of which remain close to the 2½% target. People often ask if this relative success at targeting inflation has come at a cost in terms of lost output or employment. It is increasingly accepted, I think, that there is no such trade-off in the long run. And, looking at the recent UK data, it is hard to see any trade-off even in the short run. Output has now risen for 36 consecutive quarters, the longest continuous expansion since post-war records began.

All this will make for an interesting November round where, as I indicated earlier, we will look carefully at all the data, making our decision firmly in the light of the inflation target we have been set. Maintaining financial stability Having discussed monetary policy, I now want to turn to the other key role of the Bank of England - that of maintaining stability in the overall financial system. This does not, of course, mean that we  BIS Review 87/2001  3  supervise individual banks, building societies and investment firms. Since 1997, that role has been carried out by the FSA. The Bank, by contrast, is responsible for providing analysis of potential threats to the system as whole. We are responsible for financial system infrastructure, in particular payments systems. And, in exceptional circumstances, we would be responsible for undertaking official support operations to prevent difficulties in one institution affecting other parts of the financial system. Of course, we cannot do these jobs in isolation. Co-ordinating our system wide perspective with the FSA's daily supervisory responsibilities and the Treasury's legislative role is essential to the smooth functioning of the arrangements. A Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Bank, the FSA and the Treasury in October 1997, sets out our respective responsibilities, both in 'normal' times, and in a crisis. And we work hard to foster these relationships, helped by the fact that I am a member of the FSA Board and Howard Davies is a non-executive director of the Bank.
The challenge before us is how then should the financial system be developed and regulated so that these pitfalls will be avoided while at the same time remaining dynamic and innovative so that we can push our frontiers and gain the progress that we aspire. While innovation remains essential to economic progress, it needs to be within the context of stronger governance and sound risk management practices. Positive innovation can make enormous contributions to economic performance. The financial system has to deliver the essential financial services that would cater to the financial needs of all sectors of the economy – from households, small and medium enterprises, including to micro enterprises and to the corporate sector. The financial system also has to take into account the fundamental changes taking place in the global economy and the growing participation of emerging economies in the global economy. As we become more interlinked, financial systems also need to become more internationalized to facilitate and reinforce this trend. The role of the financial system is essentially to effectively intermediate and to meaningfully mobilize funds including from across borders to be channeled to productive economic activity. Such intermediation must be firmly anchored and aligned to the objective of generating sustainable and balanced growth, raising the standards of living, creating employment and promoting development. With clarity in the role of the financial system and the importance of its link to the economy, the range of the financial solutions offered needs to meet these highly differentiated and changing requirements.

John C Williams: The joys of spring Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 21st Annual Bronx Bankers Breakfast, Bronx, New York, 10 May 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery It’s an honor to be kicking off Bronx Week, and I’d like to thank Borough President Ruben Diaz, Jr., for the kind invitation. I first visited the Bronx—and first met Ruben—back in November, when I also spent time with students discussing their plans for the future. I was particularly impressed by their talent, energy, and enthusiasm, which is a true reflection of this vibrant and proud community. Today I’m going to share some brief remarks on the national and global economy. I’ll then discuss what that means for monetary policy today and going forward. For me, the most interesting part of this event is hearing and responding to your questions, so please, don’t be shy when I open the floor for discussion. I’ve warned you that monetary policy is on the agenda, so before I go any further, I have to give the usual Fed disclaimer that everything I say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. The U.S. Economy With that out of the way, let me start by saying the U.S. economy is in a very good place.
Mismatch Speech given by Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor Monetary Policy  Bank of England 22 July 2021  I’ve received helpful comments from colleagues at the Bank of England, both those on the MPC and also Matt Corder, Andrew Hauser, Fergal Shortall, and Brad Speigner. As you might expect for something with so many graphs I’ve also had lots of help with data. For that I must thank Nishat Anjum, Justin Beresford, Phil Bunn, Emil Iordanov, Zaar Khan, Hela Mrabet, Douglas Rendle and Brad Speigner, as well as Spencer Hill at Goldman Sachs for the numbers in Chart 12. I also want to give particular thanks to Mette Nielsen, for her fantastic work not just on this speech but throughout her time in the DGMP office. After nearly four years in this job Mette has finally escaped and is moving on to another. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Financial Policy Committee or the Monetary Policy Committee. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction and summary Good morning. We’re going through a period of very rapid economic growth. On a reasonable estimate GDP in the second quarter of this year was probably around 5% higher than in the first and more than 22% higher than a year earlier. That’s easily the fastest year-on-year rate of growth since quarterly estimates began in the mid-1950s, and probably a long time before that as well.

3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  happened over the past year isn’t a surprise, given the drop in employment (Chart 2 provides the comparison). Whatever their contribution to recent rates of inflation we can at any rate expect the effects of lower participation and the CJRS to fade soon enough. The participation rate is likely to rise again as the labour market recovers and the furlough scheme is being wound down. So today, in the interests of thinking about what might prove more persistent sources of inflation, I want to concentrate on other things, stuff that’s not directly evident from the aggregate data. In doing so I’ll be expanding on a theme – the broad description might be “mismatch” – that I touched on in a talk earlier this year and that my fellow MPC members Michael Saunders and Jonathan Haskel have also developed in their recent speeches3. One of the things I pointed out at that time was that, despite the weakness in aggregate UK consumption, some areas of spending had been pretty strong. Broadly speaking, and for understandable reasons, the pandemic had induced a sizeable shift in UK consumer spending from services to goods. And shifts in spending of this sort, at least until (and unless) they’re met by matching shifts in supply, tend to push up average prices. In part that’s just because retail goods prices tend to be more flexible than those of services.
Central Bank of Chile July 2020  “The Chilean Peso as an Eligible CLS Currency: Second Workshop CLS-CBC” Opening remarks by Mario Marcel, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile July 21st, 2020 – Santiago, Chile (via WebEx) I.  Welcoming remarks  Good morning everybody and welcome to the second joint workshop between CLS and the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) dedicated to the “Nostro” service, a fundamental business in the CLS payment system operation. This event is part of the process of incorporating a new currency into the CLS System. This belongs to the due diligence and analysis phase that CLS and the CBC are respectively finalizing. Then we should move to the implementation phase. This workshop complements the provision of information on CLS and the bilateral meetings that bankers have been holding with CLS and the CBC for some time, to assist banks in assessing the benefits, prospects and opportunities in participating in the system, either as a Settlement Member or Nostro. I am looking forward to the banking sector’s active participation in this workshop that features representatives of the Nostro banks and CLS experts. II. The Chilean Peso incorporation process  •  The process of incorporating the Chilean Peso in CLS, started last year when we sent the Letter of Intention to CLS to demonstrate our commitment to the process and initiate the engagement stage.

The launch of this scheme has opened up a channel for offshore RMB funds to invest on the Mainland. Market responses to this scheme have been very positive. As I mentioned at the beginning, Mainland China is now the second largest economy and the single largest source of new economic activities in the world. The increasing use of RMB in the international stage – although that will be a gradual process – will have profound implications on the global financial landscape in the years to come. Concluding remarks So, the trends are very clear. Now is a critical time for market players, including banks, financial institutions and asset management companies, to prepare themselves well for the unprecedented opportunities presented by China. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It is this macro-prudential perspective that I want to discuss today – specifically, to consider how macro-prudential policy will need to adapt, just as our health-care plans adapt, to be fit for the challenges of the future. Since the global financial crisis, the financial system has not been a cause of sustained economic instability. But this is no reason for complacency. The financial system is ever changing. And experience suggests our job may not yet be complete. So today, I will begin by setting out why financial stability is important and the role of macroprudential policy in delivering it. In so doing I hope to set out why it’s as important for the financial system to observe macro-prudential policies as it is for patients to stick to their health-care plans. I will then briefly set out some principles on which good macro-prudential policymaking is based. The rules of thumb that underlie our prescriptions if you like. And I will conclude by raising some challenges that macro-prudential policy is facing now, including my thoughts on the road ahead. Through that, I hope to set out how we need constantly to adapt macro-prudential policies, as we do with our health-care plans as lifestyles evolve. Interactions between financial stability and sustainable growth and the role for macroprudential policy Why is financial stability important? To understand why we place so much emphasis on a well-grounded macro-prudential framework, it’s important to understand why we care about financial stability in the first place.

UK household indebtedness is high (a)(b)(c)(d) by historical standards Household debt to income ratio (of which mortgages)  Probability  Household debt to income ratio (excluding mortgages)  Total household debt to income ratio  Per cent of income 160 140  120 100 80 60  Annual GDP Growth  40 20 0 1987 87  Sources: ONS and Bank of England. (a) Distribution in each quarter is derived from quantile regressions of Real GDP growth on composite measures of real economy leverage and asset prices. Methodology follows quite closely that of Adrian et al (2016), ‘Vulnerable Growth’. 91  95  99  03  07  11  15  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. (a) Total household debt to income ratio is calculated as gross debt as a percentage of a four-quarter moving sum of gross disposable income of the UK household and non-profit sector. Includes all liabilities of the household sector except for unfunded pension liabilities and financial derivatives of the non-profit sector. (b) Mortgage debt to income is calculated as total debt secured on dwellings as a percentage of a four-quarter moving sum of disposable income. (c) Non-mortgage debt is the residual of mortgage debt subtracted from total debt. (d) The household disposable income series is adjusted for FISIM and changes in pension entitlements. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18  Chart 7. UK house price to household income (a)(b) ratio House price to household income  Chart 8.
The Fund came through the financial crisis without suffering losses. Nevertheless, during and following the crisis we have gained valuable experience. This experience is important as a basis for the management strategy of the Fund ahead. A key part of Norges Bank’s management task is to advise the Fund’s owner on the need for changes in the investment strategy. The Fund’s investment strategy is based on the Fund’s comparative advantage and is formulated in a way that supports the mandate and limits defined by the owner. I would like to highlight the following issues from our strategy plan for 2011–2013:   regional allocation    composition of the fixed income benchmark    increased emphasis on absolute return  The purpose of the management of the Fund is to maximise its long-term international purchasing power. The return on the Fund must be used for importing goods and services. A key question for the investment strategy is to what extent international purchasing power is exposed to foreign exchange risk and how this foreign exchange risk can best be managed. Norway’s neighbouring countries are its largest trading partners and may be a natural choice for the investment of the Fund’s capital. This will provide an exchange rate hedge for future imports from these countries. On the other hand, changes in exchange rates will often be counteracted by differences in price developments between countries.

Prices have also risen considerably over the past year as a result of poor crop yields in many parts of the world following storms and drought. Our analyses of the outlook for the world economy and the Norwegian economy are based on the assumption that oil prices will remain at the current level. It is difficult to predict future prices with any assertion. Should oil prices show a marked decline, the oil fund mechanism will to a considerable extent shield the Norwegian economy from the short-term negative consequences of a fall in oil revenues. However, our petroleum wealth will be reduced. On the other hand, should oil prices continue to rise, the Government Pension Fund Global and the fiscal rule provide a sound and robust system for coping with higher revenues. The investment strategy for the Government Pension Fund Global Let me now turn to how the changes in the world’s economic geography influence the investment strategy of the Government Pension Fund Global. Chart: Norway’s terms of trade Norway has profited from globalisation, through both trade and capital markets. As a major commodity exporter we have benefitted from high commodity prices. At the same time, we have had access to cheap imports from emerging economies. Norway’s terms of trade have improved throughout the past decade. Norway’s national income has risen substantially throughout the oil age. Substantial current account surpluses and the buildup of the Government Pension Fund Global have also made Norway a significant exporter of capital.