samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
d. Fourth, to position the financial system to facilitate an orderly transition to a greener economy. e. Fifth, to advance value-based finance through Islamic finance leadership. 31. These aspirations paint a picture of a dynamic and vibrant future. That is indeed what we hope and strive for. We ought to be excited about the prospects and possibilities of the future – but we must ensure it is built upon a bedrock of resilience, so that whatever progress we secure is not short-lived. 32. For the financial sector, decades of continuous effort to strengthen the financial system – be it to build buffers or to implement measures to deepen and develop our financial sector – has been crucial to ensure that it can support economic growth. In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis, the comprehensive reforms of the banking sector resulted in more robust and well managed institutions. This in turn supported a more resilient banking sector and enabled banks to achieve greater scale to serve the broadening needs of a diversifying economy and expansion in the region. We also advanced strategies to deepen our bond markets, to be a stable and alternative source of funding for the economy. 33. I can remember how tough it was to push those reforms though, and to get them done but those efforts meant that when the GFC happened, Malaysia’s financial sector was in a strong position to withstand the shock.

The system of (interest-bearing) minimum reserves has contributed towards smoothing out daily liquidity fluctuations in the money market, whilst the “standing facilities” effectively limit fluctuations in the money market interest rate. The efficiency of this set of instruments can be demonstrated by the fact that the Eurosystem has been able to manage to date without having recourse to any fine-tuning operations in the money market. In fact, developments in short-term money market interest rates have thus far been exceptionally stable and money market rates have been relatively close to the interest rates at which the ECB has provided liquidity through its weekly main refinancing operations. This is a notable success, as is the extremely rapid integration of the money markets in the euro area, in which, since January, temporary interest rate differentials have been rapidly eliminated during the day through arbitrage by active market participants. Initial monetary policy decisions Conditions at the start of the introduction of the euro were favourable, given a rate of inflation of below 2% (measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices) and moderate monetary growth rates in the two years leading up to the beginning of Monetary Union. However, the outlook in the euro area became increasingly gloomy in the second half of 1998 as a result of the crises in Asia and in Russia, thereby causing inflationary pressure to weaken further. The central banks of the participating countries reacted by reducing short-term interest rates.
The financial stability environment in the euro area overall remains favourable, but it has become somewhat more challenging in recent months. The results of the European stress test published last Friday show that euro area banks are increasingly resilient to financial shocks. This also reflects the continuing economic expansion, which has strengthened private and public balance sheets alike. Still, there are risks. These include liquidity risks in the non-bank financial sector that could be transmitted to the broader financial system. Developments in this area should be closely monitored, and the regulatory and supervisory framework for non-banks needs to be strengthened. Asset prices also require close monitoring. While there is currently no compelling evidence of overstretched asset valuations at the euro area level, we are seeing some localised risks. However, euro area monetary policy is not the appropriate tool with which to address such risks. They call instead for targeted macroprudential policies, which can be tailored to local and sectoral conditions. The recent decisions by the Central Bank of Ireland are an example of how macroprudential policy can promote financial stability. As regards Brexit, with negotiations ongoing and less than five months to go until the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, it is essential to prepare for all possible outcomes, including a no-deal scenario. While the direct trade effects of a hard Brexit would be limited for the euro area as a whole, Ireland is more exposed due to its very close trade relations with the United Kingdom.

The euro area economic outlook Ten years after the start of the global financial crisis, the euro area economy is performing well – and has been for some time. We have now seen 22 consecutive quarters of economic growth, while over 9 million jobs have been created and the unemployment rate has declined to 8.1%, its lowest level since November 2008. The Irish economy has seen a particularly strong expansion in recent years. Ireland is now growing at the fastest pace of any euro area country. Unemployment has been falling too, and now stands well below the euro area average. This is all the more impressive given the severe crisis Ireland went through and the legacies it is dealing with, including high private debt and arrears. Looking ahead, while some sector-specific data and selected survey results have been somewhat weaker than expected, the latest incoming information overall suggests that the broad-based expansion in the euro area, and in Ireland, is set to continue. Against this background, euro area inflation is expected to continue to converge towards the ECB’s objective of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Getting to this point has required considerable monetary policy support. The euro area is looking back on several years of exceptionally low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy measures. The ECB’s key interest rates have been at unprecedented low levels since 2009. They have been supported by a series of unconventional measures, introduced in the face of a protracted recession and persistently low inflation.
Institutional autonomy should be seen as a factor that, rather than isolating the Bank from the rest of the country, makes it particularly responsible for being proactive in responding to its needs. What is important is for the Bank's response to the new challenges to be timely, well planned and effective, drawing on feedback, coordination and cooperation with other players. In this process the Senate plays a key role. It is through this Honorable House that we account for our management. Dialogue with the Senate is essential as feedback of our work and as a source of new challenges. The ongoing changes will add new opportunities to strengthen this link. In particular, the adjustments to the monetary policy process will transform the current presentation of the MP Report to the Finance Committee or to this plenary in a session where the senators will have more time to formulate their questions and comments. We expect, likewise, to develop mechanisms for a more comprehensive account of our management, covering all the issues under the responsibility of the Bank. My sincere thanks for your attention and I am available for any inquiries that the honorable senators may wish to make.

That said, I expect that growth, over the near term, will slow somewhat from the pace we saw during the second half of last year. In particular, during the current quarter, unusually cold and snowy weather will undoubtedly depress activity somewhat – especially with respect to construction activity, but also to a lesser extent in areas such as retail spending. Also, as mentioned above, some special, one-time factors, such as very rapid growth of exports and sustained inventory building, are unlikely to be repeated over the first half of this year. Moreover, while there is now a much better balance between supply and demand in the housing market, that market is still adjusting to the roughly 100 basis point increase in mortgage interest rates that occurred in mid-2013. I do expect that growth will be strong enough to lead to continued improvement in labor market conditions. I must caution, however, that the outlook for the unemployment rate is unusually uncertain. If our assessment is correct, at some point an improving labor market should cause the labor force participation rate to stabilize or rise a bit as currently discouraged workers begin looking for work. Such developments could result in a more muted rate of decline of the unemployment rate despite the faster growth. Finally, as the expansion continues, I expect inflation to gradually rise toward the FOMC’s objective of 2 percent as measured by the PCE deflator.
These measures could be perceived as innovative: •  it has provided full allotment at a fixed interest rate in all its refinancing operations;  •  it has expanded the range of eligible collateral in this context; and,  •  in close cooperation with other central banks, it has taken measures to improve global funding conditions in various currencies. Allow me to add here, on a personal basis, a word of caution: we, as central bankers, have the obligation to remain prudent. First, not to set the wrong incentives for market participants. Second, central banks need to be aware of any operational and reputational risks associated with the adoption of new measures and less traditional instruments, notably for the balance sheet of the Eurosystem and, ultimately, for the credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy. Not to mention the potential impact on central bank independence. The reputation of the ECB is firmly based on the credibility of its commitment to price stability. This credibility must by no means be put at stake. Likewise, in its monetary policy decisions, the ECB has not shied away from taking some highly unusual but appropriate steps. Within the space of less than one month, on 8 October and 6 November, the ECB lowered its key rates by 100 basis points in total. These moves were remarkable and unique in the ECB’s ten-year history – in terms of magnitude, timing and rapidity.

While EMU highlights the need for flexible economies, the euro cannot be blamed for the emergence of those imbalances. Rather, this largely reflects a lack of adjustment in a number of Member States. This is particularly true for those euro area countries whose adjustment mechanisms and responsiveness to exogenous shocks is still rather slow. To allow euro area economies to develop their growth potential and to reap the full economic benefits of EMU, it remains indispensable that the countries concerned bring their structural reforms and fiscal consolidation measures more into line with the conditions and rules of monetary union. Overall, the ECB has done well to overcome these difficulties. However, the current global financial distress poses challenges of a significant and unprecedented nature to the ECB and  BIS Review 139/2008  1  other central banks around the globe. With this crisis, EMU is now ultimately experiencing a real test. In these demanding times, some widely-recognised core principles have helped the ECB to weather the storm. The Maastricht Treaty assigns a clear and unambiguous mandate to the ECB to maintain price stability. It also grants the ECB full independence from political influence to fulfil this mandate. Besides these institutional safety belts, monetary policy needs to be forward-looking, medium-term oriented and underpinned by a comprehensive analytical framework. Given the monetary nature of inflation over the longer term, such a framework must include a thorough analysis of monetary and credit developments to allow for wellinformed and consistent decision-making.
Figure 6 Interest rates in pesos and dollars in the local market (percentage) 14  14  12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  Jan.08  Apr.08  Jul.08  Oct.08  Stock Exchange-90 days  Jan.09  Apr.09  Jul.09  Oct.09  Libor + 90-day on-shore spread  Sources: Bloomberg and Central Bank of Chile. 8  BIS Review 145/2009  Table 1 Monetary policy rate and expectations according to EES (percentage) Actual level  Expected for Expected 2 same month months ahead  Expected for Dec.09  Oct. 2008  8.25  8.50  8.50  7.00  Dec. 2008  8.25  8.25  7.75  6.25  Feb. 2009  4.75  6.25  5.00  4.00  Nov. 2008  8.25  Jan. 2009  8.25  7.25  Mar. 2009  8.25  7.50  2.25  6.75  3.13  2.50  6.63 5.50  2.00  Source: Economic Expectations Survey (EES), Central Bank of Chile.

Norges Bank has explained its interpretation of the Exchange Rate Regulation on several occasions, not least in a letter to the Ministry of Finance dated 21 October 1999, often referred to as the budget submission. When exercising discretion, Norges Bank attaches importance to fulfilling the fundamental preconditions for exchange rate stability. To ensure stability in the exchange rate against the euro, monetary policy instruments must be oriented towards reducing price and cost inflation to the level aimed at by the European Central Bank. At the same time, monetary policy must not in itself contribute to deflationary recessions, as this could undermine confidence in the krone. Hence, there is no conflict between gearing monetary policy instruments towards low and stable inflation and the objective of a stable krone exchange rate over time. In the budget submission, the Bank also provided information about key policy response patterns when price and cost developments and the basis for exchange rate stability are influenced by external factors. Price and cost inflation are influenced by monetary policy through a number of channels. When interest rates increase, it becomes more profitable to save and to postpone consumption until a later date. Interest expenses exceed interest income for households collectively, meaning that a rise in interest rates reduces real disposable income. The value of household wealth decreases, since interest rate rises normally lead to lower house prices and weaker trends in securities markets. Growth in private consumption and fixed investment slows. Lower demand for goods and services may also affect enterprises’ profit margins.
Measures will also be taken to increase awareness and educate the public on important information such as comprehensive lists of financial institutions authorised to accept deposits by the public and particulars about those that are being regulated by the Central Bank. Share ownership of banks will be broad-based to promote better corporate governance and to reduce the concentration of ownership and to address conflicts of interest that may arise due to large shareholdings. New policies on share ownership will be issued shortly, where a single entities’ material share ownership would be generally limited to 15 per cent of a bank’s share capital. A revised format for publication of banks’ financial statements in their annual reports will be introduced so as to improve disclosure requirements and provide more information to market participants. The Central Bank will also facilitate the adoption of the internationally accepted accounting and reporting standards such as IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 7 by banks. A continuous dialogue will be maintained with the external auditors and other relevant institutions with respect to the operations of banks, the publication of accounts and adoption of international accounting standards. The Central Bank’s currency management policies are also being formulated to ensure that Sri Lankan Rupee notes and coins are available to the public in required denominations upon demand. In achieving this, the Bank will forecast the currency demand and maintain a buffer stock of currency to meet the seasonal and any contingent demand.

Therefore, a widening of the collateral set accepted for monetary policy purposes should probably only be considered if this measure would substantially help a significant number of banks and if the set of assets were very narrow. In this case the lack of collateral obviously seems to be more of a systemic issue, and the central bank should consider taking action. In this respect, let me underscore two features of our collateral framework that have served us well in the recent period. First, access to funding is available to a broad set of counterparties. And second, the Eurosystem – whilst requiring high-quality standards – accepts a broad range of public and private fixed-income securities, as well as nonmarketable assets. Hence, sufficiency of collateral has not been an issue for the Eurosystem, even at the peak of the refinancing needs during the turmoil. Finally, moral hazard is a potential issue in individual banks’ emergency liquidity assistance. But here, it is up to the central banks and supervisors to ensure that in particular senior management and equity holders, and possibly debt holders, pay a sufficient price for the rescue. This issue has been discussed at length in the literature, the bulk of which convincingly argues that moral hazard issues can be taken into account in a satisfactory way in the design of the rescue mechanism.
Ravi Menon: Singapore as a centre for fund-raising in Asia Keynote speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore Exchange Capital Markets Symposium, 17 November 2021. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. Asia is becoming a global force in capital markets. In 2020, equity capital raised in the AsiaPacific region increased by two-thirds. Debt capital increased by 10%. The Asia-Pacific accounted for more than one third of global equity proceeds as well as one-third of debt issuance last year. There are three reasons why Asian capital markets are poised for continued rapid growth: dynamic companies with large fundraising needs; large pools of capital looking for investment opportunities; and effective platforms to match fundraising needs with capital Asia is fertile ground for innovative companies to thrive. With rising household incomes and increasingly tech-savvy consumers, Asian consumer markets are burgeoning. This has helped to spur a burst of entrepreneurship in Asia. We see this innovative energy across Asian cities, from Bangalore to Shenzhen, Jakarta to Manila, from Ho Chi Minh City to Bangkok, and of course Singapore. Asia is now home to a large number of high-growth companies, such as Carousell, Carro, Justco, MiRXES, and Ninja Van. To scale up, Asian companies need to raise capital. As these firms expand into more markets, they will need PE/VC funding, and eventually tap on the public markets. Asia has attracted substantial institutional funds from around the world.

Investors are demanding more transparency and they want the information they receive to be consistent and comparable. Issuers must account for the impact their actions have on the environment. There must be reliable disclosures and access to data for verification. SGX is spearheading efforts to enhance transparency in sustainable investments. Listed issuers on SGX have been making disclosures on sustainability since 2016. SGX is now developing a common sustainability disclosure portal, that will facilitate sustainability reporting for private companies and SMEs in the future. This will help promote more efficient pricing of corporates’ ESG activities, through for example, incorporating a green premium or a brown discount. It will also help to prepare private companies and SMEs for increasing scrutiny from investors, as well as customers and consumers who demand greater accountability. In conclusion, Singapore has a comprehensive capital markets ecosystem supported by active public-private partnership and well laid out strategies. These are exciting times for Asian capital markets. The Asian middle class continues to grow. There is a wave of entrepreneurial energy and innovation. Technology is enabling more inclusive capital markets. The imperative of transitioning to a lower carbon future will be an increasingly important preoccupation for the region’s capital markets. The Singapore capital markets aim to finance the next chapter of Asia’s growth— underpinned by sustainability, enabled by technology, and fuelled by innovation. Thank you. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
The extent to which banks and other enterprises use the system will probably depend on the price. All the national central banks in the EU area can join Target, whether or not their country is in the euro area. But there is a considerable risk of countries outside the euro area being in a worse position, for instance due to restrictions on intra-day borrowing in euro to counter fluctuations in the payment flows. We have vigorously opposed this threat of discrimination but the issue, along with others, has been deferred and will now be decided by the countries that join the euro area from the start. 3. Legal framework A clear legal framework for the euro is essential. Economic values, for instance in contracts, bank accounts and pension agreements, must be guaranteed during the changeover period from 1999 to 2002, when the euro and national currencies will exist side by side. The so-  BIS Review 14/1997  -6-  called continuity of contracts is regulated in one of the euro statutes but amendments to national laws will also be needed. Another legal issue concerns the national central banks. As regards the Riksbank, the Maastricht Treaty calls for a more independent statutory status. This means, for instance, that the status of the Governor must be clarified; grounds for his or her dismissal will have to be explicit, e.g. serious misconduct, etc. Neither will the Riksbank be able to accept directives, except of a statutory nature, from others, e.g. the Government.

What would happen if the threat of sanctions fails to act as a deterrent? Will the European political system be capable of punishing a member state? BIS Review 14/1997  -4-  The main features of the growth and stability pact have been established. It remains to draw up specific rules about, for example, the monitoring of exchange rate stability, the construction of the stability programme and the legal framework. Finally it may be worth mentioning that the monitoring routine and the excessive deficit procedure will be essentially the same for countries outside the euro area, except in one respect - the sanctions. 2. ERM 2 The Dublin meeting also decided that a new exchange rate arrangement, ERM 2, is to be set up as the dominant mechanism for the coordination of monetary policy and other economic policies between the member states in the euro area and those that remain outside. The system will resemble the existing ERM except that this is a multilateral system of rates for conversion between all the member currencies, while in ERM 2 the currencies of nonparticipating countries will be linked directly to the euro. The risk of systemic tensions with ERM 2 will probably be smaller than it has been earlier with ERM because the degree of convergence in the EU area is now greater. Moreover, the band on either side of the central rates will probably be relatively broad. The experience gained in 1992-93 has also resulted in a greater readiness to adjust rates when this is considered necessary.