samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Federal Government and the central bank of the USA have channelled funds worth over 787 billion dollars into banking and the private sector. In the European Union, the fiscal stimulus amounts to 1.8% of GDP and to 225 billion euro. Banks have received direct support and state guarantees in the amount of 393 billion euro. Such massive intervention has put brakes on the rate of recession. The past couple of months' stabilisation in the global economy has come at a high price. Major economies face rapidly expanded fiscal deficits and central banks' balance sheets and total volume of base money have promptly increased. Therefore it cannot be said for sure whether the current "green shoots" refer to a new growth cycle. Only structural reforms and maintaining confidence in fiscal and monetary policy can help the economy out of the crisis on a more permanent basis. When speaking about this year's forecasts, the EU economy as a whole is expected to undergo a 4% recession. Small economies which are more dependent on exports and international capital flows suffer from the crisis disproportionally more. Sweden and Finland, our close neighbours, can expect a recession of up to 4.7%. As we know, the global financial crisis and the collapse of markets caused serious difficulties to several new Member States.

This was the reason why Singapore had initiated the Asia-Middle East Dialogue (AMED). AMED would help to share developmental experience, promote greater understanding and serve as a bridge between the two regions. Before stepping down as Prime Minister, I stepped up Singapore's relations with the Middle East, and continue to do so in my present capacity. In the past three years, I have visited almost all the Middle Eastern and the Maghreb countries – Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, the Gulf States, Iran, Israel and the Palestinian Territories – to name a few. Trade and investment between Singapore and the Middle East have shot up. To date, Singapore companies have secured more than $ billion worth of projects. Funds from the Middle East managed in Singapore have increased to around $ billion. But there is room for greater growth. I have started a second round of visits to the Middle East, beginning with Abu Dhabi this year. I want to further strengthen Singapore's relations with them. Let me now turn to the theme of today's conference – integrating awqaf into the Islamic financial sector. I have dealt at some length on relations between Asia and the Middle East because I wanted to put this conference in a larger context. The evolution of awqaf and Islamic finance is in a sense about how Muslims are adapting traditional concepts to modern living and how Islamic finance is moving out of the Middle East into the rest of the world.
Financial integration is a strong complement to trade integration and a critical component of the overall AEC project. Deeper financial integration will yield substantial benefits for ASEAN economies. •  It will support economic growth by helping to mobilise surplus savings more efficiently and channelling them to productive investment opportunities in the region. •  It will strengthen resilience to external shocks by helping to deepen and broaden capital markets. •  It will promote financial inclusion by helping to expand the reach of financial services to a wider community that is currently under-banked and under-insured. The ASEAN Financial Integration Framework (AFIF), adopted by ASEAN Central Bank Governors and endorsed by ASEAN Finance Ministers in 2011, envisages a more integrated financial region by 2020. AFIF sets out the following key thrusts: •  remove restrictions to the intra-ASEAN provision of financial services by ASEAN financial institutions;  •  build capacity and infrastructure to develop and integrate the ASEAN capital markets  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  liberalise the flow of capital across the ASEAN region  •  harmonise payments and settlements systems  •  strengthen capacity building, regional financing arrangements, and regional surveillance  The pace of financial integration has, however, lagged behind trade integration. In part, this is deliberate. In part, this is disappointing. The slower pace is deliberate in the sense that financial integration is more complex than trade integration and requires more time.

Other indicators – such as long-term unemployment, the rate of involuntary part time work, and the job finding rate – also point to more slack in labor markets than that indicated by the unemployment rate alone. In addition, it is hard to imagine a robust labor market without solid growth in wages. With productivity growth of around 1 to 2 percent and an inflation target of around 2 percent, we should be seeing wages and benefits rising at around a 3 to 4 percent rate. But that is clearly not the case. Although some in-demand occupations may be experiencing stronger wage growth, overall compensation growth has been around 2 percent over the past six years. Taken altogether, these and other measures lead me to conclude that there remains significant underutilization of labor resources – and likely somewhat more slack than what is indicated by the unemployment rate alone. So, while good progress has been made, we have yet to achieve our full-employment goal. Too-low inflation The other element of our dual mandate is stable prices. The Fed defines its target as 2 percent inflation over the medium term, with inflation being measured as the rate of change in the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index. Earlier in the year, the inflation rate had been well below that target, at 1-1/4 percent. It has moved up a little since then, but inflation is still only 1-1/2 percent, still leaving a significant gap from our 2 percent target.
Low import prices, increased efficiency and intensified competition in both product and labour markets are probably the main reasons why inflation is still very low, even three years into this upturn. When economic developments are marked by favourable developments on the supply side both internationally and in Norway, the challenges facing monetary policy are different from those arising when developments are marked by demand-side conditions. A favourable supply-side shock may result in both lower inflation and higher output. A conflict may now arise between stabilising inflation at target and stabilising developments in output and employment. Not all supply-side disturbances will be of the same nature. Some may increase potential output permanently and enable the economy, at least for a period, to grow more rapidly than normal. Monetary policy should not counteract this. Higher productivity growth leads, for example, to lower inflation as well as to an increase in potential output in the economy. A sustained increase in competition in domestic markets will reduce prices and profit margins. At the same time, production will increase. In efficient markets, an increase in supply will normally generate higher demand without the need for a monetary policy response. The effects of globalisation are more intricate. Increased trade contributes to cheaper imported goods and increased potential consumption, but not necessarily to increased potential output. There probably have been some disturbances on the supply-side that may be associated with a permanent increase in potential output in Norway.

When evaluating whether the interest rate level is appropriate, one must consider the quality of the analyses of developments in the Norwegian and international economy, as well as the trade-offs that have been made. When we look back and assess interest-rate setting, we must also take into account the reasons for the deviations from the target. For the average annual rise in consumer prices over time to be the same as the inflation target, the disturbances that affect the economy must be fairly symmetrical. Price inflation has been lower than the inflation target for a longer period and the interest rate is being set with a view to gradually closing the inflation gap. The aim is not for inflation to overshoot the target to the same extent a few years ahead. Therefore, when we in retrospect assess interest-rate setting, we cannot solely look at average CPI inflation. Monetary policy must also be seen in the light of historical inflation. In the 1970s and 1980s, inflation was very high and volatile. The economy did not at that time have a nominal anchor. Since the beginning of the 1990s, inflation has been low and stable, both internationally and in Norway. While inflation in the 1970s and 1980s varied between 4 and 15 per cent, inflation has generally remained in the interval 1½ - 3½ per cent since 1990. The economy now has a nominal anchor.
As percentage of GDP, 2001 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Ge  rm  any  No  rw a  y  F in  lan  d De  nm  ar k  F ra  nc e  Sw  ed e  n  UK  US  Sources : BIS/OECD SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  The turnover and issue volume in the market increased sharply up to the mid-1990s. However, Norwegian companies use the bond market on a far more limited scale than companies in comparable countries. Solid state finances also help to explain the limited size of the private bond market in Norway. A well functioning government bond market can stimulate the private segment of the debt securities market. In most countries, the state has a sizeable borrowing requirement, with a high level of debt. Even though its borrowing requirement is small, the Norwegian government also places emphasis on a well functioning bond market in its government debt policy. Government debt issues are confined to few and large standardised loans. This contributes to higher turnover in the secondary market and hence greater liquidity. With ample liquidity and low risk, government bond rates can serve as a benchmark for private bonds. Effective interest rates on government bonds and private bonds 5-10 year maturity. Per cent 9 8  9 8  Private bonds  7  7  6  6  5  Government bonds  4 Ja n .

And according to the Bank’s baseline forecast, the outlook is good: continued strong GDP growth and full employment; a current account surplus throughout the forecast horizon; the prospect that Icelanders will soon own more assets abroad than foreign nationals own in Iceland; and inflation at target for the entire period. One can ask, in view of this, why some observers are so dissatisfied with monetary policy. I will discuss this in more detail later on. But there are significant risks, and we must be on the watch for them. There is an obvious risk of economic overheating. The labour market could spiral out of control. Economic policy mistakes could take place – for instance, if fiscal policy begins to pull too strongly in a different direction from monetary policy. We have seen the repercussions of this before. I will now turn to the main topics of my speech today: the level of interest rates in their long-term context, the foreign exchange market, and possible changes to the monetary policy framework. Level of interest rates During the run-up to the recent Parliamentary elections, there was considerable discussion of the level of interest rates in Iceland. If we are to come to a sensible conclusion on whether the nominal interest rate set by monetary policy is appropriate or not in terms of inflation, inflation expectations, the business cycle, a plausible estimate of the equilibrium real rate, and foreign interest rates, it is important that the discussion be based on facts.
The City of Bradford is itself normalising, after a long period of painful adjustment. It has shown real resilience and an indomitable spirit during those lean years. There are now reasons for optimism about the City’s future, as civic and commercial investment return and confidence among businesses and residents builds. Those characteristics – resilience, spirit, optimism, investment, confidence – are ones the UK economy has also had to exhibit of late. They are ones it will continue to need over the next few years during what is likely to be a bumpy ride. Thank you. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  Annex  Chart 1: Successive Inflation Report forecasts of wage growth from 2012 Four-quarter wage growth, per cent  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017  Data  Sources: ONS and Bank of England calculations. Notes: ‘Data’ refers to whole economy total pay (average weekly earnings). Other lines show forecast vintages. Chart 2: Fitted and ‘inexplicable’ component of wage growth Four-quarter wage growth, per cent  8 6 4 2 0 -2  -4 -6 2010  2012 Residuals  2014 Data  2016 Explained by equation  Sources: ONS and Bank of England calculations. Note: ‘Data’ refers to private sector total pay (average weekly earnings).

The Bank of Thailand’s role Ladies and gentlemen, This leads us to the second part of my talk this evening. Although short-term volatility has often caught us by surprise, there is a pressing need to consider longer-term issues. And to support long-term perspective, the Bank of Thailand has set economic and financial environment to support such goal. The Bank of Thailand always attempts to strike the right balance between economic growth and macroeconomic stability. Monetary policy decision via interest rate setting has always been made while taking into consideration growth, inflation and financial stability dimensions. However, there are limitations that monetary policy cannot achieve. A single instrument, namely, the policy interest rate cannot target multiple objectives such as price stability, financial imbalances, exchange rate and capital flow simultaneously. The policy choices inevitably involve trade-offs between different objectives. Policymakers will have to weigh carefully the costs and benefits of a policy decision. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Although exchange rate is not the Bank of Thailand’s main policy tool, or an intermediate policy target, sharp exchange rate volatility can have significant impact on exporters and small businesses with less capacity to adjust. The Bank of Thailand, therefore, constantly monitors the impact of baht movement on the overall economy and stands ready to use policy instruments to prevent and manage dysfunctional market conditions and excessive speculation. Nevertheless, in the long-run, exchange rate should be determined by market mechanism and serve as an important price signal and catalyst for structural changes.
To judge a given situation, we must therefore consider the fundamentals behind the imbalance. For producers of non-renewable resources, it is important to remember that although extraction of a depletable resource is counted as income in the national accounts, these revenues are of a special kind. It would in many ways be more meaningful to view them as transformation of wealth – from natural resources underground to financial assets abroad. We would expect such producers to run substantial current account surpluses during the production period. As the graph illustrates, this has also been the case, in particular in the 2000s, when oil prices were high. In recent years these countries as a group have actually been in deficit, while Norway has had a small surplus, barely visible in the graph. HOW MUCH SHOULD OIL PRODUCERS SAVE? Exactly how much producers of non-renewable resources should save is a more complicated question. One potential yardstick is that savings should be sufficient to avoid the so-called “Dutch disease”. The phrase was originally coined to describe the strong decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands following the exploitation of natural gas resources in the 1960s and 1970s. The classic paper by Corden and Neary (1982)3 describes the key mechanisms behind this development. They describe two effects in an economy experiencing a boom in an extractive industry, like oil or natural gas. The first effect is the spending effect. An oil discovery will increase export revenues, allowing higher imports over time. Normally, demand for non-tradable goods will also increase.

Trade was roughly in balance. The oil price has rebounded somewhat recently, but is not expected to reach the levels we saw a few years ago. Thus, the high Norwegian current account surpluses may belong to the past. Given the uncertainties related to petroleum wealth, a spending rule more cautious than the permanent income rule seems to be a reasonable strategy. Political feasibility Allow me to round off this discussion with some reflections concerning practical policy. My point is that fiscal guidelines must be politically acceptable and understandable to the wider public. Simplicity and robustness are important concerns. Rules that are not adopted by policymakers carry little value. The Norwegian fiscal rule was introduced in 2001, exactly 30 years after the first oil was extracted from the Norwegian continental shelf. This illustrates that it was not straightforward to arrive at a strategy for how our natural resource wealth was going to be spent. The need to decouple current spending from current revenues was underscored early on, and potential mechanisms were discussed, but these concerns were not reflected in actual policy. In periods, all the oil and gas revenues and more were spent. The fund mechanism was established in 1990, during Norway’s deepest recession in the postwar period. At the time, it was not obvious that the fund would gain much value. The government ran budget deficits in the following years. A first deposit was made in 1996, reflecting a net fiscal surplus. From then on, the value of the fund started to increase quite rapidly.
And despite the good starting point, there are some quiet signals of the need to be alert in the UK. The level of debt relative to corporate profits has started slowly rising again. The evolution of corporate debt levels will bear close scrutiny in this market environment. 4. Is the banking system exposed to an adjustment of asset prices? The answer here is given by our stress test last year: Britain’s major banks are resilient to an economic and market stress more severe than the global financial crisis. The 2017 stress test subjected the banks to simultaneous UK and global recessions, a deep market shock and stressed estimates of conduct redress fines. The test included a sharp adjustment in corporate credit markets and commercial property markets. Sterling investment grade corporate bond yields were assumed to snap up almost 800bps as long-term gilt yields rose by over 500bps and credit spreads blew out. Commercial property prices were assumed to fall by 40%. 10  These are typically syndicated loans to large companies which have either high levels of indebtedness, a non-investment grade credit rating, or are owned by a private equity sponsor. For more information, see pages 30-31 of the November Financial Stability Report. 11 As a percentage of institutional leveraged loan issuance. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  More than 5% of UK and global business loans would have been impaired over the first two years of the test period.

William C Dudley: The role of the Federal Reserve – lessons from financial crises Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Annual Meeting of the Virginia Association of Economists, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, 31 March 2016. *  *  *  Kenneth Garbade, Jack Gutt, Joyce Hansen, Michael Held and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here today as part of the Virginia Association of Economists annual meeting at Virginia Military Institute and Washington and Lee University. This is an appropriate setting for the topic I will be addressing – the role of the Federal Reserve as the central bank of the United States. When the Federal Reserve Act was enacted in 1913, H. Parker Willis, who had been a professor at Washington and Lee University, played a critical role. He worked closely with Representative Carter Glass of Virginia in crafting the legislative proposal that established the Federal Reserve, and Willis became the first Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board in 1914. Of course, I’m tackling this subject today not just because H. Parker Willis was a professor here in Lexington. Instead, I’m addressing this issue because of the ongoing debate about the role of the Federal Reserve and its structure and governance. My purpose is to demystify the nation’s central bank and to respond to some of the critiques that we continue to face.
It is clearly important that Sweden and the other countries try to agree on an exchange rate that is as reasonable as possible. This is because the central rate that is set for participation in ERM II will very probably be the rate for the krona’s subsequent conversion to euro on joining the monetary union. Consequently it ought to be an exchange rate that is commensurable with real economic equilibrium; in other words, the rate the krona would have when Sweden’s economic resources are being fully utilised without this generating inflationary pressure and external debt is sustainable in the long run. At the same time, the problem of arriving at a reasonable rate should not be exaggerated. Any nominal exchange rate whatever could, in principle, be said to be commensurate with real economic balance. Via adjustments in wage and price levels relative to the rest of the world, the economy will sooner or latter attain its real equilibrium exchange rate. But the question, of course, is how extensive and costly the economic adjustments would be. Evidently, the goal must be to keep such costs to a minimum. All the negotiating parties have a strong practical interest in setting the rate correctly. An unduly weak krona would admittedly favour Swedish exports, but it would be disadvantageous for the competitive position of the other countries and could also lead in time to higher inflationary pressure in Sweden.

These developments, among others, have intensified the demand for electronic payment. As electronic payment facilitates the automation of payables and receivables, costs associated with paper and labour intensive processes, including potential errors in processing, would be sharply reduced or eliminated. Apart from lowering costs, electronic payment allows for better resource allocation, thus raising productivity and profitability of businesses. Electronic payment also improves cash flow forecasting, thereby resulting in more efficient liquidity management. Furthermore, customer service quality would also be enhanced with the provision of faster and more convenient means of payment. Businesses that respond to these opportunities and are effective in delivering their services will generate greater value for their customers and achieve competitiveness differentiation. The faster electronic payment displaces the use of cash, the less would be the need for the costly printing and supply of currency notes and coins. The same is also true for physical cheques. The strategic management of currency is an increasingly challenging task faced by most central banks. Apart from ensuring cost effective and high quality currency notes and coins, it also requires accurate forecasts of the demand for currency notes and coins, which varies seasonally and with economic activity. The higher acceptance of electronic payment not only improves the economic efficiency of a country, but also allows substantial cost savings to be gained. Studies have shown that widespread utilisation of electronic payment systems has the potential of contributing to at least 1% of a country’s GDP annually.