samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The size of the effect varies significantly across countries, however; the UK is a little below average. 14 This depends, of course, on whether the good/service in the supply chain is sold on to become a final good/service in the same country or exported. 15 This is true both across countries and over time. See Auer, R, Borio, C and Filardo, A (2017), ibid. 16 See Cesa-Bianchi, A, Kindberg-Hanlon, G, Nelson, B and Thwaites, G, Bank of England, forthcoming. The speed at which changes in import prices are passed through to final goods is likely to differ across products. For example, for the UK, consumer food and energy prices appear to respond more quickly than the prices of other goods and services. In part, that appears to be because margins at each point in the supply chain are tight. For food, it also partly reflects the fact some imported food is already the final consumption good – i.e. the supply chain is short. 17 See Goldberg, L and Campa, J (2010), ‘The sensitivity of the CPI to exchange rates: distribution margins, imported inputs, and trade exposure’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 92, Issue 2, pages 392-407. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  arguably, as work by the IMF and others has shown,  18  technological progress has played a more significant  role. Technology, not globalisation, is estimated to be the main reason why labour’s share of income has been falling across advanced economies.

Christian Noyer: There will be no break-up of the euro area – interview in Sud Ouest Interview with Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, in Sud Ouest, Bordeaux, conducted by Mr Bernard Broustet on 17 January 2011. *  *  *  Sud Ouest: How is our economy faring? Christian Noyer: The economy is picking up. The third quarter of 2010 was slightly disappointing, but the fourth was better, with estimated growth of 0.6%. This trend is expected to continue in early 2011, even though a number of factors call for caution: the automobile sector could slow down due to the phasing out of the scrappage scheme, and the fiscal retrenchment measures implemented in some European countries may weigh on demand. But, all in all, growth is there. Sud Ouest: Will household consumption, which is the main driver of growth in France, be impacted by higher inflation? Christian Noyer: The surge in inflation that we are now observing at the start of year can be ascribed to higher energy and commodity prices. Current price levels appear particularly high when compared to the exceptionally low levels seen at end-2009. This difference will no doubt become less marked in the coming months. Given the unemployment rate and the still low capacity utilisation rate, I think that it is unlikely that the rise in commodity prices could result in second round effects in our economy.
As tax revenue has meanwhile declined as demand has weakened substantially, this has led to large budget deficits and rapidly growing government debt. What many countries also appear to have in common is that the recovery is sluggish, even after the financial sector has once again begun to function reasonably well. A possible contributory explanation for this is that households no longer want to have such large debts and prefer to reduce these rather than increase consumption. Of course, we do not know that we will face the same problems that other countries have faced. For instance, we have not experienced the same construction boom that many of the hardest-hit countries went through. But the difficulties faced in other countries underscore how essential it is to try to bring about a gentle slowing down in credit growth and property prices in Sweden. What has been done? What have we done so far with regard to developments in household debt and housing prices? Different agents have contributed in different ways. The Riksbank has raised the repo rate a number of times and further increases are forecast. These increases are part of our monetary policy, but of course also affect the housing market. Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) has recommended a maximum loan-to-value level, a mortgage ceiling. The Swedish Bankers’ Association has issued recommendations on the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  requirement for amortisation for new mortgages.

Well-known problems and deficiencies With regard to measures involving correcting well-known problems and deficiencies, I see three main priorities. One priority is to gain a better overview of the mortgage market. Although we have information on aggregate changes and mean values with regard to household indebtedness,  2  For a review of how different studies evaluated the housing market in the United States prior to the crash, see Gerardi, K.S., C. L. Foote and P.S. Willen, (2010), “Reasonable People Did Disagree: Optimism and Pessimism About the U.S. Housing Market Before the Crash”, Public Policy Discussion Papers No 10–5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  how much of their income goes on paying interest, etc., this type of data can disguise a substantial underlying variation. If we view it uncritically, there is a risk we will be lulled into a false sense of security. It may be enough for some households to be so much in debt that a fairly modest increase in the mortgage rate forces them to sell their homes. If a sufficiently large number are in this situation, it may start up a spiral of falling prices forcing further sales and leading to further price falls. But as I said, we do not know how many households are in this situation. We also need to gain a better idea of the extent to which households amortise their loans. We hope to achieve this now.
What is more, the world economy is still characterised by profound imbalances, such as the deficit in US external accounts and the lack of flexibility in the Chinese monetary system. Turning now to monetary policy, there were often considerable disparities in 2005, for instance, the progressive hikes in the rate of interest in the United States at a time when monetary policy in Europe was characterised by a waiting-game approach. Despite these potentially destabilising factors, financial markets remained relatively calm. In currency markets, the dollar picked up in the wake of tighter US monetary policy, while the yen moved only slightly against the Swiss franc. The exchange rate of the euro against the Swiss franc fluctuated within a narrow range, thereby reflecting the strong convergence of fundamentals in Switzerland and the euro area. Over the past few months, the Swiss franc has even trended downward – a decline that is hard to explain given the low rate of Swiss inflation as compared to the rest of Europe. If this trend  2  BIS Review 34/2006  were to accelerate and give rise to an excessive relaxation in monetary conditions with respect to economic developments, a normalisation of interest rates would become even more essential. Generally speaking, the capacity of financial markets to absorb shocks and to cope with imbalances is one result of globalisation and the progress in financial intermediation. In addition to stimulating goods markets, globalisation has also enlarged and deepened financial markets, and is doing so to a growing extent.

Against this background, we at the Bank of Thailand see the global recovery continuing firmly in the short term despite the higher oil prices. This year, Thailand’s export market - as measured by GDP growth of our major trading partners - is expected to grow by about 5 percent. This growth will be the key factor supporting our exports this year. At the same time, Thailand’s exports to China continues to expand, though at a lower rate compared to last year’s. Hence, the effect of the slowing Chinese economy on our exports is a factor that should be monitored closely. For the first half of this year, I am happy to report that Thailand’s exports to Australia grew by 16.6 percent while imports from Australia grew by 38 percent. Australia is now Thailand’s 11th and 12th largest trading partner on exports and imports, respectively, claiming a share of 2.3 percent of Thailand’s total trade. And with the recent conclusion of the bilateral free trade agreement between our two countries, trade between our two economies is likely to grow and grow. As for the global financial markets, let me just say briefly that this year global financial markets have been dominated by the changing expectations about the pace and the timing of monetary policy tightening in the US. And this has led to a global repricing of financial assets and some reversal of international capital fows, especially away from emerging markets.
Presentation of the Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR) for 2022 Press conference, Wednesday 31 May 2023  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France Chairman of the ACPR  Page 1 of 9 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to welcome you to our yearly presentation of the Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR – Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority), in the company of Jean-Paul Faugère, Vice-Chairman of the ACPR, Alain Ménéménis, President of the Sanctions Committee, and Nathalie Aufauvre, Secretary General of the ACPR since January 2023. The events of 2022 and the beginning of 2023 have raised significant challenges, but also two valuable confirmations: that of the soundness of the French banking and insurance sector (I), and that of the European model of regulation and supervision (II). We nevertheless need to take reinforcement actions in the short and medium term (III). I. Major challenges that confirm the robustness of our financial system... 2022 will naturally remain the year when Russia invaded Ukraine. Geopolitical uncertainty spread to the financial sector, notably with the sharp rise in commodity prices and margin calls on their derivatives. This was compounded by other sources of volatility, in particular on the UK's sovereign debt, and the collapse of a number of crypto-assets.

As I explained, the structured convergence process towards the adoption of the euro which is laid down in the Treaty provides the best guarantee for a smooth inclusion and a mutually beneficial life in the monetary union. Against this background, unilateral euroisation is something which we would not support because this would be a way circumventing the stages foreseen by the Treaty. 2. I would like to point out that the house of EMU is built upon solid foundations. The house of EMU is open to newcomers; it is not a “closed shop”. However, we would like to welcome the newcomers through the front entrance, and not via the backdoor. 3. Since Iceland is a European state, it is of course entitled to apply for EU and subsequently euro area membership. I was asked to provide you with some more information about the time frame of this latter scenario. As Iceland is a member of the European Economic Area, its accession to the EU could proceed relatively smoothly. As for accession to the euro area, the minimum time between joining the EU and joining the euro area is two years. This is because the exchange rate convergence criterion foresees that an applicant euro area country must participate for at least two years – without severe tensions – in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II. This should allow the applicant country to demonstrate that it can manage its economy without recourse to excessive currency fluctuations, thus mimicking somewhat the conditions under a monetary union. 4.
Mugur Isărescu: The regional finance and investment for South East Europe Keynote address by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Euromoney Regional Finance and Investment Conference for South East Europe, Bucharest, 12 June 2014. *  *  *  Prime Minister, Ladies and gentlemen, It is an honour for me to be invited to speak in front of such a distinguished audience. I am very glad that, after three years “off”, Euromoney Conferences is re-launching the event in Romania. Time has come for Bucharest to host this important event, held for several years in Dubrovnik. The joy of giving the keynote address at this conference is bigger as I had the opportunity to read the first issues of Euromoney magazine while being a young research fellow at the World Economy Institute in the early ‘70s. For years it was one of my favourite magazines. Back in 1978, I also had the opportunity to visit the editorial offices in London. I could not help but notice that you have chosen a generous theme: “The Regional Finance and Investment for South East Europe” and you have set yourselves to approach themes that I am particularly interested in, like: pro-growth strategies in an age of austerity; what more can policy-makers do? ; how will governments incentivise overseas investors? ; how can the region increase EU fund absorption rates?

The sheer number of financial contracts that would have to be unraveled in the context of a default, the challenge that a former colleague of mine likes to refer to as "unscrambling the eggs," could exacerbate and prolong uncertainty, and complicate the process of resolution. As is typical during periods of rapid innovation, these markets grew much more quickly than did the supporting infrastructure. Take credit derivatives, for example. For most of the early years of this market, much of the post-trade processing system was not automated and required substantial manual intervention. Positions were assigned without the knowledge of counterparties. Confirmations backlogs rose to very high levels. As Alan Greenspan put it, the market was using 19th century methods of dealing with 21st century financial instruments. This created a greater risk of operational problems and uncertainty about exposures in the event of stress. The capacity of market participants to mitigate these risks by improving the infrastructure was hampered by classic collective action problems, magnified by the greater number and diversity of participants. All these challenges merit attention. They describe some of the risks that have accompanied the substantial benefits of credit market innovation. And they help illustrate why these broad changes in financial markets may have contributed to a system where the probability of a major crisis seems likely to be lower, but the losses associated with such a crisis may be greater or harder to mitigate. What should policymakers to do mitigate these risks?
In other words, domestic demand seems to be on the way to taking over as the main driving force for the ongoing expansion. It also looks as though last month’s Budget Bill will stimulate consumption in both the private and the public sector, above all next year. So we judge that fiscal policy will be more expansionary than we assumed in June. Today, moreover, there is the effect of a monetary policy that is more expansionary than at the time of our assessment in June. Of course we foresee that this, too, will contribute to a somewhat stronger increase in domestic demand than was assumed in June. Exports were weaker than expected in the first half-year but recent signals (monthly export statistics and business survey data on export orders) point to some increase. The favourable international trend is generating general conditions for good export growth. At present a weak krona is contributing to the stimulus. All this points to some acceleration of growth next year, followed by a good continuation in the following year. The labour market The situation in the labour market is still difficult to assess. Due to technical changes in the labour force surveys, interpreting recent developments has been particularly hazardous. With this reservation, there are some signs that the labour market is beginning to improve. The national accounts indicate that hours worked started to rise in the second quarter this year. So it looks as though firms’ possibilities of stepping up production without taking on more labour are becoming increasingly limited.

Our analysis of the risks in the forecast did, however, include the possibility of the slowdown being broad and pronounced. But the information received during the summer has supported the assessment that last spring’s dip in international activity was transient. At the same time, the continued increase in oil prices has to be weighed into the general assessment. It is hard to be certain about what has caused the high oil prices but there are many indications that an important factor is demand. The price rise is probably due to a combination of increased demand for oil from rapidly expanding economies such as China and India and the fact that production capacity has not yet been adjusted sufficiently. In recent months, it seems that another contributory factor has been uncertainty about the consequences of hurricane Katrina. It is reasonable to suppose that the oil price may fall back from the current high level but predicting the future price we should allow for is genuinely difficult. As to the consequences of the high oil price, it seems that the price rise to date has not appreciably curbed global growth. This is probably because many industrialised countries have become less dependent on oil. In Sweden, for example, oil’s contribution to energy supply has decreased from around 70 per cent in 1970 to just over 30 per cent in 2004. There has probably also been a balancing effect in that the high price of oil seems to have been generated in part by strong demand in Asia in particular.
A central authority and a national repository can significantly improve the ability to better distribute, monitor and manage the supply-demand imbalances. Developing a thriving rental market should also be on the agenda to temper the nation’s fixation on home ownership. Another issue that banks should be concerned with is the sizable surplus in commercial property. In contrast to affordable housing, the office and retail markets are in oversupply. In 2016, the vacancy rate for prime office space in the Klang Valley stood at 21.8%, outstripping the regional average of 6.2%1. Monthly rentals of prime office space in Kuala Lumpur are the lowest among regional cities. Over the next few years, the significant incoming supply of large projects is likely to aggravate supply conditions in this segment. Signs of oversupply are also emerging in the retail segment in major urban centres in Malaysia. This can be traced to the abundance of shopping malls. You may be surprised to learn that there are as many as twenty shopping malls just along the 40km stretch of the LDP highway. It is equally astonishing that the prime retail space per capita in cities like Johor, Penang and Kuala Lumpur is actually higher than regional megacities such as Shanghai and Beijing, and also higher income cities such as Singapore and Hong Kong. A significant increase in vacancy rates, and the ensuing price corrections, are risks that the Bank has highlighted as far back as 2013.

John C Williams: Building an equitable future Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Inequality Policy Forum: The Impacts of COVID-19 on Communities of Color and Policy Insights for an Equitable Economic Recovery, 24 September 2020. * * * Hello everyone, and welcome to the New York Fed’s third Economic Inequality Policy Forum. It’s a pleasure to speak with all of you who are joining us for this conversation. For me, today’s event is about sharing research and hearing your recommendations, so I’m going to keep my opening remarks brief. Before I continue, let me give the disclaimer that the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. Since the outbreak of the pandemic, we’ve seen severe economic pain, unprecedented levels of unemployment, and enormous uncertainty about the future. The health and economic effects of COVID-19 have created tremendous hardship for many Americans across the country, but they have been especially painful for communities of color. We know that people of color and Black people in particular have experienced higher rates of illness and death.
It would not be until 2011 that, with the reform of the FROB, the way was paved for capital contributions with public funds and, into 2012, with the MoU, for further injections of public funds and for the creation of Sareb. From a fiscal standpoint, the option of massive and early capital injections with public funds could, perhaps, have been viable in Spain until 2007, while public finances were still running a surplus and GDP growth stood above 3.5%; and there was still some leeway in 2008, despite the slowdown in growth and the increase in the fiscal deficit, which rose that year to 4.4% of GDP. Nonetheless, from 2009 it became very difficult, if not indeed impossible, against a background of recession, with a decline in GDP of 3.6% and a rapid deterioration in public finances. In 2009, the budget deficit climbed to 11% of GDP; and public debt increased in only two years by almost 20 pp of GDP to 52.8%, compared with 35.6% in 2007. It should moreover be borne in mind that Spanish credit institutions generally had, in the initial years of the crisis, high levels of provisioning and profitability, which probably contributed to generating excessive confidence in their ability to finance, through exclusively private means, the restructuring and strengthening of their capital.

The drafting of the Report took into account several constraints, two of which I would like to mention. 3/14  On one hand, the obligation to maintain the confidentiality of individual banks’ data. The Report contains ample information on credit institutions, including intervention processes and the public aid granted, but it cannot go into details linked to the supervision of individual institutions whose confidentiality is legally protected, or assess those matters that are currently the subject of proceedings initiated in the courts. As to the period studied, although 2008 is the year the crisis started, the analysis is from 2000, on the understanding that it is impossible to explain the crisis without reviewing its sources and causes, which go back to the previous decade. Moreover, the year 2014 has been chosen as the date to close off the period considered, bearing in mind that it was the end of this year that saw the start-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and that the measures envisaged in the Memorandum of Understanding entered into with the European Commission in July 2012 may be deemed to be concluded. In short, the seven years from 2008 to 2014 match quite closely the period which saw the emergence and development of the crisis, its treatment and the start of the recovery. The Report explains the measures applied, which should be considered in their macroeconomic and financial setting, one which progressively changed over the period in question.