samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  The World Bank projected Developing East Asia (including China) to grow by 5.3% in 2009; South Asia by 3.7% and Middle East and North Africa by 3.0%. BIS Review 57/2009  1  force an acceleration of structural economic change in Asia. The drive towards greater domestic consumption, as well as greater Asia intra-regional trade, investment and consumption, will take on greater urgency. The growth of intra-Asia trade and investments will be driven by both bottom-up initiatives as businesses expand their ties, as well as top-down policy measures as governments enter into agreements on free trade and economic cooperation. A recent survey by the ADB Institute found that a higher than expected 22% of responding firms use preferences accorded by free trade agreement (FTA) and more are planning to do so. 3 China, Japan and Korea have implemented their FTAs with ASEAN. The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA was signed in February 2009. Singapore has signed FTAs with the GCC and Jordan, and we can expect more of such pacts within Asia in the future. Cross-border capital flows between the GCC and East Asia will grow significantly in the coming years. With this forced pace of global re-balancing, the relative economic weight of Asia will rise. This would be a positive development for the global economy, as more engines of growth provide greater resilience. Financial services and Islamic finance However, it is crucial that our optimism does not turn into hubris. Economies in our region face many important challenges.

In the coming years, as the Shariah principles of using capital to build productive capacity gain wider recognition, Islamic Finance will assume a more prominent role. Estimates of global Islamic Finance assets today range from $ billion to $ 1 trillion and one consultancy firm estimates this could potentially grow to $ trillion by 2012. 4 Countries in Asia are using Islamic Finance to fund urban development and public infrastructure projects to meet the growing demands of their populations. The ADB estimates that Asian countries would need more than $ trillion of infrastructure investment between  3  Kawai and Wignaraja, “The Asian "Noodle Bowl": Is It Serious for Business?” Asian Development Bank Institute Working Paper Series No. 136, April 2009. 4  Oliver Wyman, “The Next Chapter in Islamic Finance - Higher Rewards but Higher Risks”, April 2009. 2  BIS Review 57/2009  2010 and 2020. 5 International financial institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank are active in funding worthwhile investment projects. The global sukuk market remains a relatively new asset class with much room to grow out. In 2007, Asian currency-denominated sukuk outstanding grew by almost 50% but the market contracted by only 1.5% to $ billion at end-2008. 6 Around $ billion in sovereign sukuk issuance will come from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore in the first half of 2009, and more private sector issuers are expected to tap the sukuk market and to attract new investors and clients.
Timothy F Geithner: Liquidity and financial markets Keynote address by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 8th Annual Risk Convention and Exhibition, Global Association of Risk Professionals, New York, 28 February 2007. *  *  *  We have been in a period that market participants have characterized as one of exceptional liquidity. This is both a reflection of, and has contributed to, the ongoing expansion in the world economy. I want to focus my remarks today on the role of liquidity in markets, and what supervisors and market participants can do to make markets more robust against the shocks that we know will occur from time to time. These remarks are directed to a general phenomenon related to developments in the financial markets in recent years, and not to the specific conditions of the moment. Liquidity plays a central role in the functioning of financial markets. Structural changes in the financial system that have been underway for some time increase the importance of market liquidity. The allocation of capital increasingly relies on securities markets, where funds for investment in the real economy are raised through the direct issuance of securities to investors. A greater diversity of financial institutions, institutions other than banks, now play a more active role in the provision of credit and liquidity. Liquidity can mean many different things.

Chea Chanto: Opening remarks at the BIS Advanced Reserve Management workshop Opening remarks by H.E. Chea Chanto, Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia, at the Advanced Reserve Management Workshop, Siem Reap, 21 April 2009. *  *  *  -  Mr. Eli Remolona, Chief Representative, BIS Asian Office,  -  Mrs. Miranda Tam, Deputy Chief Representative, BIS Asian Office,  -  Mr. Jean-Pierre Matt, Head of Financial Analysis of BIS Head Office,  -  Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,  Good morning! Today, I have the great pleasure and honor to be invited to deliver some opening remarks for the BIS workshop on Advanced Reserve Management. This is the first time that the BIS organize such a workshop in Cambodia and I hope there will be more opportunities to join together in the future. Taking this opportunity, I would like to express my warmest welcome to the BIS resource speakers from BIS Head Office and BIS Asian Office and central bank participants from the Asia and Pacific region to this workshop as well as to Cambodia. I sincerely appreciate the BIS for their selection of the ancient capital city of Angkor in Siem Reap province as the site for this workshop. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Let me share with you a brief outline of Cambodia’s economic development in recent years.
That to me argues for the policy strategy that best and carefully nurtures the slow healing that I now believe is increasingly taking hold. In that respect, I think, looking to the medium term, there remains a case for a little ‘stodginess’ yet. 24  As described in Rachel and Smith (2015), global preferences for saving and investment have shifted due to forces such as demographic change, changes to income distribution, increased precautionary saving in emerging markets, the falling relative price of capital and low public investment. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  References Bell, D and Blanchflower, D (2018) ‘The lack of wage growth and the falling NAIRU’ NBER working paper No.

Since then the picture in the UK has been clouded by the impact of the Brexit vote. The global picture however does I think provide evidence of the slow healing story. Having grown at rates below pre-crisis norms for the post-crisis period, the world saw an increase in growth rates from around the middle of 2016. That return to stronger growth was broad-based both in that it was true for the whole of the G7 – excluding the UK – and emerging markets in aggregate and that it was driven by a pick-up in investment not just consumption. At the same time, in the US, partly in response to very low levels of unemployment, pay and inflation have risen from subdued 1-2% to rates closer to 2-3% over 2015 to 2018. So is there still a case for any ‘stodginess’ in the approach to monetary policy in the UK? Headline CPI inflation is running at 2.4% above its 2% target. The overshoot, however, is entirely due to imported inflationary pressure. This has come primarily from the post referendum depreciation in sterling plus some more recent pressure from the increase in oil prices. The inflationary pressure from sterling’s depreciation is already passed its peak. In May the MPC forecast that CPI would be at 2.2% by the year end. The MPC’s remit is to keep inflation at target ‘at all times’.
An efficient, productive and resilient financial system supports and contributes to economic growth and the overall well-being of the people. In contrast, financial busts can have a destructive impact on the broader economy, impacting the livelihood of ordinary people. This is the painful lesson from the history of financial crises. Despite the huge amount of resources being invested in compliance, we still uncover many banking, market manipulation and rigging scandals. These cases illustrate again that rules, although necessary, are not sufficient to maintain the integrity of the financial system. These cases have damaged the confidence and trust of society in the system. One solution for this is a stronger focus on ethics and professional standards to take into account how actions impact the wider society. In other words, financial institutions must recognise and embrace their role as responsible corporate citizens. This means: Establishing a framework that promotes ethical behaviour and decisions; Going beyond what the letter of the law permits, to understanding and complying with its ‘spirit’; and Seeking opportunities to add value and contribute to the well-being of society. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Viewed from this perspective, the values of a responsible citizen are antithetical to money laundering, terrorism financing and illegal behavior. Anyone who is a responsible citizen will not engage in these activities and will actively seek to eradicate them.

Svein Gjedrem: Price stability is not self-generating Opening address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference on historical monetary statistics hosted by Norges Bank, Bogstad gård, Oslo, June 2005. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  Introduction We can learn from the past, so that we are better equipped to make the right choices in the future. This is the second conference on historical monetary statistics hosted by Norges Bank. The conference was arranged for the first time last year, when we presented a book on historical monetary statistics. The Bank’s objective has been to obtain data that can be used in research in two of the Bank’s core areas, monetary policy and financial stability. Our statistics are compiled in close cooperation with academic institutions, primarily the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Later today, Professor Ola. H. Grytten will be presenting historical wage statistics from 1730 up to 2004. Historical research can be used to shed light on economic relationships and perhaps reveal patterns. The next reasonable step would seem to be to search for the answer to the question “what is the norm?”  What is the norm? An examination of 500 years of price history in Norway is of particular interest to monetary policy. History shows that price stability is the norm, and that high inflation is a phenomenon associated with war, times of famine and the 1970s and 1980s.
For 2024, the growth range is reduced by an equivalent magnitude, between 1 and 2% (between 2 and 3% in December). By 2025, the economy is projected to grow between 2 and 3% annually (table 2). We project that private consumption will continue to adjust in the coming period. Compared to December, this part of spending will fall less sharply in 2023 and rise more moderately in 2024. This projection assumes greater slack in the labor market, consistent with the expected 6  performance of the economy. It also considers greater uncertainty due to the external situation and that the local monetary policy will remain contractionary for a longer period of time. Access to credit will imply a more restricted consumption than in previous quarters, in line with the financial burden and delinquency of households that have increased rapidly in recent quarters, especially among lower-income households. All in a context of tighter international financial conditions. Our March 2023 Bank Lending Survey already reports a perception of lower demand for consumer credit and tighter lending standards (figure 13). Investment will continue to perform poorly this year and next. This assessment assumes a more deteriorated external scenario, greater global uncertainty and financial conditions that will remain constrained. Survey information —prior to the turmoil in the external banking sector— showed low levels of investment planned for the coming quarters (figure 14). The current account deficit will continue to tighten, to values in the order of 4% of GDP by the end of this year.

Assets are managed on behalf of end-investors, whether institutional (such as pension funds and life insurance companies) or retail, the former typically through Separately Managed Accounts, the latter through Collective Investment Schemes. The industry’s Assets Under Management (AUM) are currently estimated at around $ trillion globally (TheCityUK (2013)). 1 This is large. It is equal to around one year’s global GDP or around three quarters of the assets of the global banking industry. It has also grown fairly rapidly, with AUM roughly doubling over the past decade in dollar terms. The longer-term picture is more striking still. In the United States, AUM have risen almost fivefold relative to GDP since 1946, from around 50% of GDP to around 240% of GDP (Chart 1). In the United Kingdom this pattern has been replicated, but over a much shorter time period since around 1980 (Chart 2). Across most OECD countries, the patterns are similar. The asset management industry has, it appears, come of age. The drivers of this growth are reasonably well-understood. The pool of prospective global savers has become larger, older and richer, each of which tends to be a boon for the asset management industry. Since 1950, average life expectancy has risen by nearly 50%, world population has risen by a factor of three and world GDP per capita has risen by a factor of nearly 40. There is a strong cross-country correlation between GDP per capita and AUM relative to GDP (Chart 3).
Internal auditors report on these aspects to the top management of a central bank, while the external auditors do so to alert both the management and the legislators. Such compliance auditing is necessary and useful, but not sufficient to gauge the risks faced by a central bank and, accordingly, to take early prescriptive measures. A central bank may operate quite perfectly with regard to its internal procedures and systems. The accounts of a central bank may have been prepared having compliance to the best accounting standards. The external auditors may have given an unqualified certification to a central bank’s financial statements. In the eyes of the public, a central bank may have been projected as a model institution to be emulated by others. Yet, all these salutary features which pertain to a central bank’s past or current actions may hide the major risks it may be facing with regard to its future operations. It is the duty of the auditors to dig out these risk aspects and alert the management and, if necessary, the legislators, before it becomes too late to take any prescriptive measures. This poses a daunting challenge to the auditors of a central bank. A central bank, with its unrestrained resources, may have staffed itself with the best technical talents in the main field of its operations. Auditors are now required to assess their work and make judgments about the adequacy and the consequences of such work.

W A Wijewardena: Auditing the key policy functions of a central bank – views from the top Keynote address by Mr W A Wijewardena, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Seminar on “Effective Internal Audit for Central Banks”, Windsor, UK, 30 April 2009. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be construed as those representing the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. *  *  *  The primary objective of a central bank is to stabilise the value of its currency and continue to maintain that stability to facilitate long term economic growth. There could be other ancillary objectives assigned to a central bank, such as providing liquidity to the government to bridge its revenue and expenditure flows or refinancing banks’ loans to priority sectors. But the primary objective of a central bank takes precedence over any such ancillary objective and, if there is a conflict between the two, a central bank should always give priority to its primary objective 1 . This is because the success or failure of a central bank is gauged by its attainment of the primary objective and not the ancillary objectives. Even if a central bank has done well in realising its ancillary objectives, but failed in the primary objective, then, that central bank is deemed to have failed in its operations.
At the outset of the global crisis, the average private debt level reached around 96% of GDP (2009), doubling compared to 2000. The post-crisis adjustment was mostly visible in the Baltic countries, where half of the pre-crisis rise was reversed. In the CEE and SEE countries, the adjustment was lesser. According to the latest available data (2017), given the decoupling in the speed of the post-crisis adjustment, private debt level in the different sub-regions started to converge. The average private debt level in 2017 stood at around 82% of GDP, with Baltics hovering at around 90%, SEE at 84%, and in the CEE region, standing at 75% of GDP. 4  Chart 3. Total private debt  Chart 4. Change in private debt to GDP ratios  (in % of GDP)  (in percentage points)  140.0 120.0 100.0 80.0 60.0  CEE  SEE  Baltics  Region  2016  2014  2012  2010  2008  2006  2004  2002  40.0  *Region refers to all the countries in the sample from CEE, SEE and the Baltics. Source: IMF Global debt database. The crisis accentuated the risks of high private sector indebtedness as important source of macro-financial vulnerability. In the CESEE region, some of these risks came to the fore in their banking systems, in the form of significantly rising NPLs during the crisis, following the years of high credit growth.

Many countries came under the pressure to adjust their debt levels in line with the economic fundamentals that resulted in deleveraging process by households and corporates. The larger was the leverage build up pre crisis, the larger was deleveraging in its aftermath, in general. This particularly holds for the Baltics where private debt downscaled by 42 p.p. of GDP in 2017 from the peak in 2009. In CESEE region, deleveraging was most evident in Hungary and Slovenia, followed by Bulgaria as the most heavily indebted country pre-crisis. Yet, not all higher-debt countries managed to reduce their debt levels. Croatia, whose debt level rose substantially prior to the crisis, has only marginally deleveraged afterwards. There were also countries like Slovakia, North Macedonia, Poland and the Czech Republic, where the debt continued to rise further, yet, mostly from lower levels in the peak of the crisis. 5  Chart 5. Change in private debt to GDP ratios, 2009-2017  Chart 6. Private debt structure, 2017 (in percent of GDP)  (in percentage points)  *Region refers to all the countries in the sample from CEE, SEE and the Baltics. Source: IMF Global debt database. Cross-sector analysis reveals that the pre-crisis increase in private leverage was almost equally driven by corporate and household sector, as the context was conducive for rising debt across the board. Corporate debt on average rose by 25 p.p. of GDP in 2009 compared to 2000, but marked cross – country differences were visible.
The thought that injections of central bank money can be transmitted to the wider economy through risk premia, as well as through the risk-free rate, goes back at least to Brunner & Meltzer.12 It is precisely how the Monetary Policy Committee, and our international counterparts, regard Quantitative Easing as working – influencing term, liquidity and risk premia.13 And since prices are the “dual” of quantities, it is hard to see why there should be something special about injecting central bank money into the economy by buying assets rather than via our normal policy lever of the overnight interest rate (and expectations about its path). This prompts a number of conjectures. One is that maybe monetary policy did contribute to the widespread search for yield, not just along the yield curve but also, as Rajan suggested in 2005, into credit products to earn a spread compensating for illiquidity or complexity. Another conjecture, perhaps supported by other recent research,14 is that this may have a bearing on the phenomenon of cross-currency carry trades, and thus on the generation of “Global Liquidity”.

It means being ready temporarily to raise regulatory requirements above their minimum level when risks from the economic and financial environment exceed anything remotely calibrated into the standards that apply in broadly normal conditions. And it means promptly relaxing those extra requirements once the risk to stability has passed. This is a massive step. No one is pretending that the policy community knows how to cast it in terms of a numerical target or a uniquely useful set of indicators, against which society can monitor us. And that underlines the importance of Parliament itself approving the instruments granted to the FPC, and of our being sufficiently transparent to enable public scrutiny of and debate about our analysis and policy decisions. The Bank/FSA Discussion Paper on macroprudential instruments published last December was a contribution to that.25 Back to current account imbalances: they do matter But that is not all that we, policymakers, should be modest about. If, as I believe, macroprudential policy can prospectively fill a gap, we must not pretend that it can be a cure for everything. Even if we had avoided the worst consequences of seriously suboptimal gross capital flows – a badly overlevered banking system dependent on flighty wholesale funding – there would still have been the problem of unsustainable global current account imbalances. Whether the eventual adjustment would have been disorderly and how costly is hard to tell.