samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 33/2004  5  (iii)  Bank specific supervisory CAR requirements. The third component is supervisory CAR. Like other supervisors, MAS may impose additional bank-specific supervisory CAR to address risks not adequately covered by the minimum requirement. MAS has refined the framework for setting these supervisory CAR add-ons. It takes advantage of MAS’ existing risk-based supervisory approach and is based on MAS’ risk assessment of individual banks. In line with international practice, these supervisory CAR add-ons will be kept confidential. Impact of the revisions The adjustments in our CAR framework will allow local banks to manage their capital more flexibly. Banks which have lower risk profiles and which are better managed will enjoy lower total regulatory CAR requirements than before. At the same time, the adjustments will maintain prudential standards observed by supervisors in other major financial centres, which tend to be more stringent than the minimum standards stipulated under the current Capital Accord. Overall, these changes will result in modest but meaningful reductions to the CAR requirements, but they may or may not translate into immediate capital reductions for the banks. Leading banks tend to maintain capital at levels well above regulatory minimums, and that will undoubtedly prove to be the case in Singapore as well. In managing their capital positions, banks will also take into account their future expansion plans, as well as the risks they potentially face in their business environment. Non-internationalisation of Singapore dolla $ policy The second policy adjustment concerns the non-internationalisation of Singapore dollar.

This is the first and most important challenge of the Basel Committee in the next few years. As part of this process we will adhere to the published schedule for our fifth quantitative impact study. And I believe that we already have the tools at our disposal to deal with any issues that arise from the QIS5 exercise, or that arise during this period of implementation. To be sure, a key element is not to add further details to Basel II, but rather to focus on achieving a quality implementation of the new Framework. Therefore, I do not anticipate any significant change to the Framework during the period bankers and regulators are tackling initial implementation challenges. But the main challenge is the cross border home host cooperation. On this point I would not underestimate the work and efforts that supervisors are devoting to this issue. One final related point. The staggered implementation, specially the timetable differences with EEUU raises transitional crossborder issues that will need to be managed through greater collaboration between the EU and US supervisors, but I can assure you that both sides are even more committed to this than before, and that our efforts will be redoubled in this respect. Ultimately, I hope that this commitment and effort will promote even more effective implementation. A second related challenge is to enhance the cooperation with non-G10 supervisors.
We have chosen a two-year horizon for monetary policy because this is considered to give sufficient scope in most cases to ensure acceptable developments in the real economy. However, the exact rate at which inflation should be brought back on target within this horizon will of course depend on the shocks the economy has suffered 4 . Sometimes the deviations from target can be so large that there is reason to allow inflation to return to target beyond the normal two-year horizon. In these cases, we shall explain this clearly in connection with our decisions. These thoughts on how to take into account developments in the real economy are of course not unique to the Riksbank. Although the formal guidelines may vary slightly from country to country, I believe it is correct to say that all central banks with an inflation target conduct flexible inflation targeting, that is, they give some consideration to real economic activity. In other words, we are not "inflation nutters” to borrow Mervyn King’s famous expression. Our aim is not in all situations to bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible and at any cost. At the same time, flexibility is part of the strategy that has gradually changed during the period with an inflation target. This is only natural as this type of flexible application of monetary policy assumes that there is considerable confidence in the inflation target – confidence that must first be won.

These goals and principles should include common requirements vis-à-vis GSC operators before they start their operations, such as clear and proper risk management policies and means, regarding their stabilisation mechanisms, legal certainty of users’ redemption rights and potential claims on underlying reserve assets, and regarding linkages and exposure between their core components and the other entities of the financial system. In addition, there is a need to agree on adequate cross-border oversight principles and schemes between authorities in charge of jurisdictions impacted by the potential circulation of stablecoins. To that end, we could take inspiration and review existing standards and principles for cross-border cooperation in the field of market infrastructures or AML-CFT. - Thirdly, making concrete efforts – including live experimentations – to address weaknesses of the current payment and settlement landscape Adjusting the regulatory and oversight frameworks might not be enough as we have to make sure stablecoins do not become a bad solution to a real problem. Our current financial system  order rests on multiple issuers of settlement assets linked to the anchor settlement asset provided by central banks. In order to preserve the incentives and benefits for innovation, efficiency and stability, central banks as issuers of the reference settlement asset need to revisit and possibly adapt the conditions under which they make that settlement asset available. In that perspective, central banks could, for instance, issue their money in digital form, the so-called concept of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC).
18  BIS Review 67/2009  Graph 28: Inflation Forecasts: Baseline and Alternative Scenarios 11 Base Scenario Late Recovery End-Year Inflation Target  Percent  9  7  5  3 4  1  2008  2 2009  3  4  1  2 2010  3  4  1  2 2011  3  4  1 2012  Distinguished guests, The developments in fiscal policy are another major factor that may affect the outlook for inflation and monetary policy. Recently, budget revenues have been declining in line with the slowdown in economic activity. Meanwhile, expenditures have been rising due to the counter-cyclical fiscal policy that was put into practice to mitigate the adverse effects of the global crisis on domestic economic activity, leading to a significant rise in the budget deficit. Probable adjustments in excise taxes and/or administered prices in order to stabilize the budget could cause some volatility in inflation over the short term. Moreover, higher financing requirement of the government might weaken the favorable impact of monetary policy decisions and the fiscal measures on economic activity. Therefore, in order to reap gains from the short-term expansionary fiscal policy, it is important to commit to a credible mediumterm fiscal framework that would ensure fiscal discipline and debt sustainability. Uncertainties regarding the magnitude of the impact of problems in global financial markets on the real economy still persist.

However, on each occasion there are also factors that dominate over the common pattern, for instance the current mortgage crisis in the United States and the ensuing contagion effects on the financial markets as a whole. It is partly because of this that the forecasts become uncertain. In addition, it is particularly difficult to predict the turning points in the cycle. As monetary policy acts with a time lag, it must nevertheless be based on forecasts of how we believe that growth and inflation will develop. As time passes, new information is received which may cause us to reconsider our earlier analyses. This means that the forecasts we make regarding, for instance, the repo rate are not promises, but a forecast that is just as uncertain as the other parts of the forecast. I shall try to put some perspective onto the current situation by first going over what we know about Swedish cyclical patterns and then discussing the prominent features of this particular recession. Do we know what governs economic cycles? At the beginning of the 20th century economic cycles were regarded as natural and unavoidable, often in the light of the variations in agricultural production. Then came Keynes in the 1930s with his classical analysis 2 where fluctuations in economic activity were regarded as a result of fluctuations in demand. According to Keynesianism, recessions should be combated by an active policy.
Singapore will fully align its regime to FATF’s new requirements; not only because we are a FATF member, but more importantly, we want to discourage tax evasion monies from attempting to enter our system. As other jurisdictions tighten their regimes and tax evasion monies seek cover, Singapore is sending a clear message that it neither wants nor will tolerate these illicit inflows. This being a significant policy move, we will conduct public consultations and welcome stakeholder inputs to shape a regime that is practical to implement and effective in outcome. Third, Singapore will step up its enforcement resources to deal with suspicious transactions reported by financial institutions. The Commercial Affairs Department will double the manpower of the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office and enhance its analytical and reporting systems to detect criminal activity and illicit funds. Rigorous supervision Having a good AML/CFT framework is not enough. It is necessary to ensure compliance with the framework through supervision. Since MAS’ supervisory activities are not as visible, let me say more about this. MAS uses a risk-based approach, evaluating the money laundering and terrorism financing risks of each institution by taking into account its business activities; types of customers, products and services; its geographical areas of operation, as well as the quality of the institution’s internal risk management systems and processes in mitigating the risks. MAS conducts both off-site surveillance and on-site inspections to check institutions’ compliance with AML/CFT requirements. This ensures that policies and procedures set out in the institutions’ manuals are adhered to on the ground.

Institutions deemed as having higher risk are subject to more frequent onsite inspections. Let me cite some outcomes from our inspections. Institutions that have failed to meet our requirements have been warned or reprimanded in writing. A few have been required to appoint external consultants to conduct a thorough review of their AML/CFT frameworks; others have been asked to increase the resources devoted to this function. In a couple of cases, where the frameworks and procedures were adequate but ineffective management oversight resulted in inadequate implementation, we have asked the senior management to be replaced. In all cases, MAS informs the institution’s parent supervisor of our findings and concerns. Our supervisory approach aims to be preventive in nature. This means that sanctions can be taken against financial institutions for weak AML/CFT controls, even if no predicate offence has occurred. Having reviewed our regulations and our supervisory and enforcement actions, the FATF assessors concluded, “Singapore’s AML/CFT sanctions regime is effective, proportionate, and dissuasive”. In a nutshell, while a lot has been done, our institutions can always do better. MAS is reviewing whether we need to increase our supervisory intensity and is considering if we should make public, sanctions against persistently or egregiously errant institutions. Strengthened cross-border co-operation The third prong of our efforts is international co-operation.
That may well be the perspective at desk level, but I suspect it is unfair to many CEOs, who have a  2  As the failure of Hong Kong’s futures clearing house demonstrated in 1987, very bad things happen if a central counterparty fails. Many lessons were drawn. BIS Review 71/2009  3  clear interest in the health, safety and soundness of the system. And if some didn’t recognise it before, they will now – as their predecessors did in the relatively recent past. The key industry associations can also play a constructive role in this whole area – as, indeed, they have in the past. This crisis would have been even worse if ISDA and others had not overseen the introduction of the collateralisation of derivatives-related counterparty credit exposures amongst the dealer community. But there are lessons about extending collateralisation, and standardising terms in vanilla instruments, beyond the dealer community in some circumstances. The debate is not just about clearing houses and post-trade infrastructure. The financial community must also be open to more trading in core, vanilla markets going via exchanges or other well-designed and open trading platforms. If well constructed, that could help to preserve liquidity when times are tough. We would, for example, like to see serious consideration of whether the corporate bond markets could benefit through something along those lines. Bank capital instruments The insurance industry is involved, one way or another, in everything I have touched on this morning.

And the flow of credit outside the banking system may improve, helping to support a recovery in nominal demand. Over the next quarter or so, amongst other indicators I will therefore be looking at what happens to firm and household money holdings, as well as credit flows and risk premia. The Bank’s Asset Purchase Facility schemes for corporate paper are designed to help catalyse that process. The fact that the Bank is buying relatively small amounts of paper may have been misunderstood by some. As the central bank, we are not operating the schemes in order to lend in scale to the real economy, but rather to help revive the markets. Some have described this variant of liquidity insurance as acting as “Market Maker of Last Resort”, and I recently aired some thoughts on the kind of principles that might guide central banks in this area. 1 They include consistency with monetary policy; avoiding undue risk to the central bank; acting as a catalyst; and avoiding attempts to prop up markets that would not be fundamentally viable once peacetime resumes. Yesterday, the Bank issued for consultation some ideas on how we might be able to extend our liquidity insurance, through the APF, to facilities for working capital finance. They cover a possible facility for secured commercial paper, where the underlying assets would be portfolios of SME trade-finance credit, and a facility for supply chain finance.
As Andre Gide said, “Trust those who seek the truth but doubt those who say they have found it.”  26  A good example of that is the use of “fan charts” in forecasts produced by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) which show the wide range of possible outcomes for a given set of initial circumstances. 27  However, conveying uncertainty increases the complexity of a message, making it increasingly difficult to do in a world where short form is paramount. For example, it is a lot easier to tweet “BoE forecasts growth of 2%” than it is to tweet “If economic circumstances identical to today were to prevail on 100 occasions, the best collective judgment of the MPC is that the mature estimate of GDP growth would lie above 2% on 50 occasions and below 2% on 50 occasions,” even though that would be a more accurate description of the true meaning of the fan charts. In short, the modern challenge for experts is how to communicate with brevity, but without bravado. 28  23  O'Neill, O. (2002) Reith Lectures: A Question of Trust. O’Neill, O. (2017) Questioning Trust, Routledge Handbook (Mineograph). 25 King, M. (2004), “What Fates Impose: Facing Up to Uncertainty,” Eighth British Academy Annual Lecture, December. 26 Gide, Andre (1952), Ainsi soit-il ou Le jeu sont-faits, Paris: Gallimard. 27 Another example is the Chicago Booth IGM Experts Panel, in which economists are asked not only for their responses, but also how confident they are in their answers.

We recommend that the audit committee should be made up of non-executive directors, the majority of whom should be independent. •  Sixth, board meetings should be held preferably on a monthly basis, but in any event no less than once every quarter. The board can only fulfil its leadership role if it meets frequently enough and receives sufficient information from management to be able to monitor the financial position and performance of the bank. •  Seventh, individual directors should attend at least half of the board meetings held in each financial year. We fully recognize that the effectiveness of a director cannot be measured simply by attendance at board meetings. But equally it is difficult for even the most competent individual to make a contribution if he or she does not turn up for meetings in the first place. •  Finally, the HKMA will meet the full board of directors of each bank every year. It is not the intention that the HKMA should participate in board meetings. Rather, we will meet with the board with the aim of strengthening communication between the HKMA and 3  BIS Review 24/2000  the board at the highest level. Among other things, this will give us the opportunity to give the board first hand information on the major findings about the bank that emerged from our onsite examinations and offsite reviews.
After a spectacular period of sustained growth during the 1980s, the Japanese economy has stagnated over the past six years, as Japan has struggled to overcome the fragility of its financial system in the aftermath of the infamous Japanese financial bubble. A constraining factor for much of this time has been a widespread resistance to the use of public funds to strengthen the financial system which has, in turn, constrained the financial system in its extension of domestic credit. Japan has been reluctant, too, given the size of its public debt, to use fiscal policy to stimulate the domestic economy. There is now evidence of a change of heart on both these fronts. Japan - which has an extraordinarily strong external position - was never at the eye of the storm which struck Asia around the middle of last year. But if, as I expect, these policy changes now lead to somewhat stronger domestic demand growth, and greater confidence BIS Review 5/1998  -2-  in Japanese financial institutions, that will make a crucial contribution to the stabilisation of the region as a whole. The storm struck essentially the ASEAN Four - Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia - spreading subsequently to South Korea and intermittently battering Hong Kong and elsewhere. It is still not wholly clear - to me at least - quite why the storm suddenly struck. Most crises of this sort have their origins in some evident macro-economic policy failure.

West Bengal has been ruled by the Indian communists for almost 30 years. The Chief Minister wanted to promote foreign investments into West Bengal. His aim was to capture 25 percent of India's IT outsourcing market by 2010. He said that the Indian communists had drawn lessons from the collapse of the former Soviet Union and China's economic reforms. The choice was stark and simple: either perform or perish. 25. The recent bomb attacks in New Delhi have not affected India's growth trajectory. The Indian Government has responded swiftly and with determination. I have full confidence that it will be on top of the security situation. As India grows, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects that by 2010, India's exports will more than double, while imports will nearly triple. The consumer market could then be worth $ billion, making it one of the top five globally. To sustain an annual growth rate of 8 percent would require a huge injection of investments, both foreign and domestic, over the next decade. It is this immense demand for infrastructure, education, healthcare and consumer goods that will continue to draw foreign investors and businesses to India. A reinvigorated ASEAN 26. Let me now move on to ASEAN. 27. Prospects for Southeast Asia have brightened considerably. Regional economies have remained stable, despite the recent Bali bombings. 28. With China and India becoming big players in the international market, Southeast Asia has no choice but to respond strategically.
(1997), “Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets”, European Economic Review 41, 1111–1146. Svensson, Lars E.O. (1999), “Inflation Targeting: Some Extensions”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101, 337–361. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2003), “Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4), 145–166. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2005), “Monetary Policy with Judgment: Forecast Targeting”, International Journal of Central Banking 1(1), 1–54. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2009a), “Evaluating Monetary Policy”, in Koenig, Evan, and Robert Leeson, eds., From the Great Moderation to the Great Deviation: A Round-Trip Journey Based on the Work of John B. Taylor, forthcoming, www.larseosvensson.net. BIS Review 16/2010  11  Svensson, Lars E.O. (2009b), “Flexible Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the Financial Crisis”, speech on September 21, 2009, www.riksbank.se. Taylor, John B. (2007), “Housing and Monetary Policy”, in Housing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, 463–476. Walsh, Carl E. (2009), “Using Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity”, in Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium. White, William R. (2006), “Is Price Stability Enough?”, BIS Working Paper No. 205, www.bis.org. Woodford, Michael (2007a), “The Case for Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2007. Woodford, Michael (2007a), “The Case for Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2007.

Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Expanding financial services in Sri Lanka Address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the opening of a new branch office in Jaffna by The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd, Jaffna, 11 February 2010. *  *  *  My dear friends, I am delighted to be here in Jaffna today for the opening of a new branch of HSBC, one of the market leaders in global banking. The history of the HSBC in Sri Lanka could be traced back to 1884, when it first commenced operations in Colombo. Today, the largest foreign bank operating in Sri Lanka has moved to Jaffna bringing banking to the doorsteps of people in the Northern Province. This is indeed a historic milestone. This development did not happen by chance. It did not take place automatically. With the liberation of our entire nation in May last year, the Government and the Central Bank have taken determined efforts to expand financial services, facilitate and stimulate economic activities, and develop infrastructure in the North and the East. In fact, I have personally participated at several bank branch openings during the last few months, and our officers have been following up the progress, and these outcomes are a result of such combined efforts.