samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Since the labour market is becoming ever more global, the demographic changes will be increasingly influential on local labour markets. According to UN estimates 3 , Europe’s population in 1950 was 547 million, in 2005 – 728 million, and is bound to decrease to 653 million in 2050, under the assumption that the present trends, including migrations, do not change significantly. It is estimated that over the next 45 years, when the European population drops by 75 million, the Asian population will grow by 1.3 billion, and the African population – by over a billion. At present, the share of the Asian, European and African population in the worlds’ population is 60%, 14%, and 11%, respectively. In 2050, according to UN projections, the respective shares will reach 57%, 21% and 7%. Fifty years ago, the number of Europeans exceeded that of the Africans by threefold; in fifty years, this trend will reverse. What do the data show? In my opinion, there are three vital and far-reaching conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, the Asian population will account for over a half of the world’s population, and if the economic growth continues to significantly exceed the growth dynamics in the US and Europe, Asia will become the world’s economic centre. Secondly, the share of Europe in the world's population will decrease threefold over a hundred years, i.e. in the period from 1950 to 2050.

If you asked who or what was the best chess player in the world today the answer would be a human, albeit a human working with a machine. Chess has followed a co-evolutionary arc. Perhaps this is simply a matter of time. But our brains themselves are far from static. This is not a case of technological hare racing neurological tortoise. Our brains are more energy-efficient than super-computers, by a factor of perhaps 1,000.35 One reason is because they are hyper-connected, with around 100 billion neurons each with 1,000-10,000 connections. No digital web comes even close to this scale of connectivity. Moreover, these connections are not static; they are hyper-flexible. Our brains are not a plug wired once. They are constantly re-wiring themselves, a phenomenon known as neuro-plasticity.36 Unlike biological adaptation, this re-wiring takes place relatively rapidly and can be significant. This rewiring is particularly significant at times of extreme shifts in environment – for example, personal trauma or technological change. Guttenberg’s printing press did not just spark Shakespeare’s imagination. It sparked a re-wiring of all of our brains.37 As communication switched from word to print, different neurological processes were needed for comprehension and deliberation. In response our brains adapted, as had our homo sapiens brains years earlier. The future AI revolution could generate a similar re-wiring of the super-computer between our ears. Perhaps it has already started. When the AlphaGo algorithm beat Lee Sedol in 2016 the decisive move came in Game 2, Move 37.
investing in products whose risks have not been fully understood. The third ingredient the turbulence has revealed in relation to this type of product has been the lack of transparency, both regarding the valuation models used and the degree of exposure assumed. The lack of confidence in the financial markets is largely related to a lack of information, to such an extent that financial institutions themselves have not trusted one another, prompting serious problems in interbank markets. Yet not all products related to securitisations are so complex or pose such valuation problems as those I have mentioned. The most straightforward securitisations, such as those used by Spanish financial institutions, are characterised by their use of well-diversified, granular portfolios made up of homogenous assets. In these conditions, the models available do not have product-valuation problems, and it is straightforward to calculate the expected losses associated with the bonds classified in the different tranches of the securitisation. What is more, in Spain's case, where no market segment comparable with the US subprime one has been developed, the quality of the securitised assets is very high. Not only have Spanish credit institutions not designed complex structured products, they have not invested in them either. In this respect, risk management has functioned correctly, since excessively risky products of which full understanding was lacking have been avoided:  BIS Review 62/2008  3  the absolute absence of direct and indirect exposures to US subprime mortgage loans is a clear example of this.

In addition, in cases pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/389 regarding corporate payment processes and protocols, a payment service provider will have to submit to the BNB an audit report performed by auditors with expertise in IT security and payments. The audit report should certify that those processes or payment protocols guarantee at least equivalent levels of security to those provided for strong customer authentication as per Article 100 of the Law on Payments Services and Payment Systems. The provider must notify the BNB of any change in the application of exemptions from strong customer authentication. In addition to these requirements, payment service providers applying the exemptions should perform the monitoring, as stated in Article 21 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389, and make the results available to BNB upon request. Charges on Cross-border Payments in Euro and Currency Conversion Charges Regulation (EU) 2019/5183 introduces the requirement for payment service providers in non-euro area Member States to levy equal charges for cross-border payments in euro and for corresponding national payments of the same value in the national currency of the respective Member State. Such a legal requirement has existed so far only in respect to equal charges for national and cross-border payments in euro. The requirement for equal charges will become mandatory for payment service providers as of 15 December, 2019.
Mr Yam on Europe and the euro: the view from Asia  Speech by Mr Joseph C K Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the XII International Frankfurt Banking Evening, on 14 March 2000. *  *  *  Introduction Mayor Roth, President Welteke, President Duisenberg, Governors, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, There can be few things more irritating than foreigners coming to your country and lecturing you on how much better things might be for you if only they were in charge. In my particular experience as a central banker there is no shortage of gratuitous advice on how one’s monetary and exchange rate policies might better be conducted. Of course, I have encountered a number of visiting bankers, businessmen and academics coming to Hong Kong who are particularly well informed, who have thought carefully through the issues, and whose advice is consequently much to be valued. But I fear that they may be in the minority. So, I certainly feel a bit awkward standing here. I don’t consider myself to be an expert in matters relating to the European economy or the euro, so I beg your forgiveness right from the start. My only defence is that you did actually invite me, so what I have to say is not entirely unsolicited. This speech is going to be largely about perceptions, or rather misperceptions, and how they may contrast with reality. Why? As I said, I am not an expert on the euro.

The need for this involvement is heightened by the entry into force in 2018 of the new standard (IFRS 9) under which banks will switch from using the concept of incurred loss to that of expected loss in order to calculate the credit portfolio provision. This standard is undoubtedly an improvement on the current situation, since it enhances the measurement of the risks of loans and receivables. At the same time, it significantly increases the complexity of calculating provisions and, thus, increases the risk of heterogeneous application across banks, which is something the supervisor should be aiming to mitigate. The work under way in the Basel Committee on this matter is therefore very timely. My comments so far imply that there are in practice significant obstacles to satisfying the legitimate expectations that a rigorous and granular supervision will help moderate the intensity of the regulatory changes needed to promote financial stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The regulatory frameworks in force and different supervisory cultures, along with the difficulty of becoming more involved in accounting practices, often place considerable limits on the intensity of supervision attainable. This explains why the actions of the authorities to prevent financial crises largely rest on the definition of clear and demanding prudential standards to underpin the work of supervisors.
This funding can be provided by the PMCCF either through purchases of eligible corporate bonds as the sole investor at issuance, or from purchases of portions of syndications at issuance. The secondary market corporate credit facility (SMCCF), also backed by the U.S. Treasury with funding from the Federal Reserve, will play an important complementary role to the PMCCF. Here again, there will be two mechanisms at work: the SMCCF may either purchase eligible corporate bonds with a remaining maturity of 5 years or less, or it can purchase U.S.-listed ETFs. For ETFs, the preponderance of holdings will be of ETFs whose primary investment objective is exposure to U.S. investment-grade corporate bonds, and the remainder will be in ETFs whose primary investment objective is exposure to U.S. high-yield corporate bonds. Taken together, the corporate credit facilities will have three main objectives when we go live in the coming weeks: first, to provide broad support for market functioning in secondary markets to allow for orderly and timely risk transfer in corporate credit; second, to support primary issuance for businesses at funding costs that better reflect normal liquidity conditions; and third, to reduce the incidence and severity of fire sales and/or indiscriminate liquidation. Municipal Liquidity Facility The last facility I’ll mention today is the municipal liquidity facility, which was designed to help 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  provide states, cities and counties with the funding needed to provide essential public services to their citizens.

BIS Review 69/2010  3  At a crisis meeting on 8–9 May, EU finance ministers therefore agreed on a EUR 500 billion European Financial Stabilisation mechanism to support countries unable to borrow in the market. The largest portion will be provided through loans guaranteed by individual euro area countries. The IMF will provide support in the form of loans upon application from an individual country, perhaps up to a total of EUR 250 billion. Several countries announced sharper spending cuts. The ECB will buy government and other bonds and offer extra loans to banks to promote the smooth functioning of markets. Moreover, the Federal Reserve has entered into agreements with other central banks to re-establish temporary dollar swap facilities to avoid failure in dollar funding markets. 3. Norwegian economy  To mitigate the effects of the financial crisis, central bank key rates were cut sharply in 2008 and are still close to zero in a number of countries. The key policy rate in Norway was also reduced from autumn 2008. Norges Bank also implemented a number of extraordinary measures to improve credit flows. Banks were provided with longer-term liquidity and direct access to US dollar liquidity, and collateral requirements for loans from Norges Bank were relaxed. On the advice of Norges Bank and a proposal from the Ministry of Finance, the Storting decided that banks would be entitled to exchange covered bonds for government securities.
The exchange rate would be able to move in response to the balance of payments, allowing monetary policy some latitude in reacting to domestic economic developments. In this framework, the real exchange rate appreciation that is a corollary of economic convergence could take place via nominal exchange rate appreciation. However, the introduction of a relatively wide fluctuation band could lead to unprecedented exchange rate volatility. In turn, this could jeopardise the Bank’s price stability objective. It may, therefore, be preferable to enter ERM II without a fluctuation band at all. This exchange rate strategy of course implies that the burden of adjustment to shocks will have to be borne by the real economy. In the first instance this means pursuing a prudent fiscal policy. The current aim of fiscal policy is indeed to reduce the deficit to GDP ratio to around 2.5% by 2004, from 5.3% last year and over 10% in the late 1990s. By restraining domestic absorption, a tighter fiscal stance will enhance the credibility of the exchange rate peg. Moreover, a smaller borrowing requirement will also free up resources for the private sector and contain upward pressure on interest rates, thereby stimulating economic growth. Finally, bringing the budget deficit closer to balance will then give fiscal policy the leeway it lacks today to respond to adverse shocks or cyclical downturns. The response to such disturbances will also depend on the degree of flexibility in the economy as a whole.

True, this situation also arises in other developed economies that are ahead in the cycle, as is the case of the United States, where the latest inflation figures have been surprisingly on the downside and wage pressures are also low. But in the euro area an added difficulty is the absence of mechanisms that provide for the support of other economic policies to monetary policy. And on this point we must look at fiscal policy. Fiscal policy in the EU In the case of fiscal policy, it is true that despite the improvement recorded in the euro area in recent years, the high levels of public debt leave little leeway in various countries to pursue an expansionary policy. These economies, Spain among them, should see through the process of fiscal consolidation, harnessing the room for manoeuvre that may result from changes in the composition of taxes towards figures more conducive to growth and a greater gearing of public spending towards investment, education and innovation. But nor are there mechanisms in the European framework to encourage economies that have a favourable budgetary situation and fiscal space to use them if the circumstances of the area as a whole so require. Euro area-wide fiscal policy is, at present, the result of the sum of national policies.
The broad implications of China’s WTO entry for Hong Kong are perhaps best divided into the nearterm impact and the longer-term impact. The near-term impact is, I think, unequivocally positive for Hong Kong. For general trade our estimates within the HKMA suggest that, although our domestic exports to the mainland will be largely unaffected by the WTO terms, our re-export trade, involving the movement of goods to and from the mainland through Hong Kong, will be considerably boosted, and should raise our annual GDP growth rate by somewhere between 0.5% to 1%. In terms of financial, technical and professional services, which are increasingly taking centre stage in Hong Kong’s economy, the near-term outlook is even more encouraging. These industries will be considerably boosted - and enriched - by the Chinese enterprises that are seeking to upgrade their BIS Review 68/2000  2  capabilities and governance methods to handle increased business and meet foreign competition, and by overseas investors who need advice on how to make the best of the opportunities on the mainland. There are clear signs that this boost is already in progress, in anticipation of WTO accession. The longer-term impact (let’s say beyond the five-year horizon) is less clear. It is quite reasonable to expect that Hong Kong’s intermediary role in many areas will be eroded, as traders on the mainland deal directly with the rest of the world.

Yet, the view from the market seems to be that, while a declining proportion (but not a declining amount) of China’s goods will physically pass through Hong Kong, Hong Kong companies will continue to play an important intermediary function in sourcing the products and identifying the markets. Beyond this, it is likely that Hong Kong’s role will gradually change from one of intermediary into one of proprietor. The further liberalisation of China’s economy offers immense opportunities for Hong Kong investors, who, apart from possessing the necessary wealth, have a number of distinct advantages. They have a common language and culture with their counterparts on the mainland. They have an immense and very detailed knowledge of the mainland business landscape, and a great deal of practical experience. They also have proximity and wellestablished connections. This will no doubt be a profound change in role for Hong Kong. But I also have no doubt that Hong Kong will be able to cope well, just as it did over its history of economic development, from entrepot to manufacturing centre to international business centre. Those of you who speak with businessmen and women in Hong Kong - who are the backbone of our economy - will probably hear that many of them are already establishing or reinforcing their links, or opening branch offices across the border in anticipation of China’s WTO entry. This trend is already quite evident in the larger companies.
However, the increasing fragmentation of capital markets which I described above, and which sometimes has led to a complete drying-up of certain financial market segments, has impaired the monetary transmission channel in the euro area. Monetary policy signals are no longer being transmitted properly to the real sector. The divergence in bank funding conditions is certainly a key factor, in addition to the country-specific economic situation, in explaining the differences in bank lending rates to non-financial corporations across euro area countries. These divergences are leading to a weakening of the pass-through of monetary policy decisions in some euro area countries. For example, among the five largest euro area countries, the maximum difference between short-term lending rates to non-financial corporations (for short-term loans over € million) reached more than 100 basis points in recent months. Across all euro area countries, the dispersion of such lending rates is greater now than it has ever been. In other words, conventional monetary policy has lost its effectiveness in some parts of the euro area. For the ECB, the singleness of its monetary policy has been at stake. Against this background, the ECB has resorted to so-called non-standard measures to ensure the effective transmission of its monetary policy across the euro area. Without a properly functioning transmission channel for its monetary policy, the ECB’s capability to maintain price stability is at risk. The ECB has modified its allotment procedures and its collateral policy. It has also lowered the rate of the minimum reserve requirements and introduced very longer-term refinancing operations.

Here, we would have to look at the circumstances of each case – whether, for example, the offshore internet bank advertised its services in the local Hong Kong press or accepted Hong Kong dollar deposits or refused to take deposits from a number of specified jurisdictions, but did not include Hong Kong among these. If we come across such cases of illegal advertisements targeted at Hong Kong, how would we deal with them? The easiest case would be where the bank itself is respectable and is based in an overseas location which is properly supervised. We could then write to the bank itself and to its supervisors to notify them of the advertising rules in Hong Kong, and request the bank either to comply with these rules or to add Hong Kong to the list of the jurisdictions from which it was not prepared to take deposits. If necessary, we would seek the cooperation of the home supervisor to enforce this request. It might also be necessary to supplement this with a reminder to local Internet Service Providers about the advertising rules in the Banking Ordinance and to seek their cooperation to block offending websites. The problem with this, however, is that the website in question may not actually be posted on the local ISP’s server – in which case, there may be little that the ISP can do. If the bank concerned is not respectable and it is based in an uncooperative jurisdiction, the situation would be more difficult to handle.
Most importantly, many governments entered the crisis with high levels of public debt and, with the crisis already putting pressure on their budgets, they were reluctant to spend yet more. So even after having exhausted their conventional policy tools, central banks found that they were the only ones left to support weak recoveries. With many of them mandated to react to below-potential output, they turned to unconventional policies. 5 While their motives were somewhat different, all the major central banks resorted to either one or both of two measures: quantitative easing – the large-scale purchase of long-term securities, and forward guidance – the commitment to keep short-term interest rates low for a  2  Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2010). 3  Liquidity provision to distressed financial institutions typically occurred in the context of state intervention and state capital injections to ensure the solvency of these institutions. In Switzerland, the SNB acted as lender of last resort by providing liquidity assistance to UBS in October 2008, once the bank’s solvency was guaranteed by a capital injection from the Swiss government. 4  Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue convincingly that it was the reduction in the money supply that caused the large drops in output and prices between 1929 and 1933, and that this drop in the money supply was amplified by the large-scale bank failures in that period, which the Fed did not prevent through lender of last resort action.

This was because the ASEAN economies did not have the preconditions to achieve such a monetary union and that the effort to achieve such preconditions would involve immense costs to the economies. It was therefore concluded that the region would instead be better served by greater regional financial integration to achieve the very same objectives of a greater shared economic prosperity for the region. Additionally, in Europe, the integration process is facilitated by a more centralised governance structure led by supra-national institutions while ASEAN has built on institutional arrangements and mechanisms that would facilitate financial integration that leverages on a network of committees for the governance process. ASEAN has also adopted a more flexible path that allows member countries to participate in the financial integration process based on the state of readiness. Of particular focus is the harmonisation of regulatory standards and supervisory practices, which is reinforced by capacity building initiatives and technical assistance to bring all member states to a similar level. This inclusive approach ensures that all member states mutually benefit from the integration process. Additionally, regional cooperation in the areas of surveillance arrangements, financial safety nets, and crisis management has been intensified to secure financial stability during the integration process. While much remains to be done, significant achievements in regional financial integration have already been met in recent years.