samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These have been complemented with initiatives to deepen the bond and equity markets, resulting in a more diversified financial infrastructure. Another priority area has been the development of the Islamic financial system as a viable component of the financial system. With more than two decades experience in developing Islamic finance, Malaysia today has a comprehensive Islamic financial system with all the core components of banking, takaful and the money and capital markets, and supported by a strong legal and supervisory framework. The assets mobilised by the Islamic banking sector have increased significantly to account for about 10% of the total assets of the banking system. In the Islamic capital market, outstanding Islamic bonds amounted to about 45% of the total outstanding bonds. As our domestic financial system develops and strengthens, Malaysia has gradually moved towards a more deregulated and liberalised environment. In the regulation of the banking institutions, a balance will be made between promoting competition and innovation, and maintaining prudence and stability. Regulations will continuously be reviewed to provide greater operational flexibility for banking institutions without compromising prudential objectives. The introduction of the new interest rate framework reflects the move to promote more efficient pricing in the banking system. As progress is achieved in enhancing the capacity and capability of domestic institutions, the financial sector will continue to be gradually liberalised. Moving forward, further deregulation will be undertaken to simplify and liberalise regulations and administrative rules for businesses.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Remaking Malaysia - investing in the New Malaysia Opening address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Euromoney Conference - “Remaking Malaysia: Investing in the New Malaysia”, Kuala Lumpur, 3 August 2004. *  *  *  Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Bismillahirrahmanirrahim and good morning, It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this conference on 'Remaking Malaysia and Investing in the New Malaysia'. We are most honoured today by the presence of Yang Amat Berhormat Dato' Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister and Finance Minister of Malaysia who has graciously accepted our invitation to deliver the Keynote Address of the Conference. This conference takes place at a time of strengthening economic conditions in the global and domestic economy. At the forefront of investors' minds is the sustainability of these trends. There is also much interest on the policy strategies being adopted and how Malaysia will reposition itself in this more competitive environment. This Conference has brought together key policy makers, investors, fund managers as well as leading corporate and government officials to discuss these issues. Building on the economic success that has been achieved for more than three decades, Malaysia is now taking the opportunity to reposition its strategies to ensure the sustainability of this strong growth performance.
A recent key milestones towards implementing ISO 20022 in the UK was the publication of the CHAPS ISO 20022 draft messages schemas and market guidance for making CHAPS payments. Draft messages and market guidance have been provided for the expected implementation phase of the ISO 20022 migration and we are seeking comments, via the Bank’s website,9 until 3 October 2019. And I would encourage all firms with an interest to review and comment to inform the final schema specification. Final specifications for the implementation phase of the ISO 20022 migration will be available by the end of 2019 – allowing firms to kick start their planning and preparations for ISO 20022 implementation in CHAPS. RTGS Renewal – engagement with the payments industry We have from the very start of the Programme – even before it could be described as a Programme - been working with industry to design and prepare for this change. This input is vital so we can shape and deliver 8  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/payments/rtgs-renewal-programme/iso-20022/iso-20022-consultationpaper.pdf?la=en&hash=BC6A2A1018A7AC4AEF13FEB47F5D7C8C86571799 9 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/payment-and-settlement/rtgs-renewal-programme/consultation-on-a-new-messaging-standard-foruk-payments-iso20022 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  the change industry want to see. We have a number of strategic and working level channels that allow us to seek input and advice from across the payments industry. These include the RTGS Renewal External Advisory Body, the Standards Advisory Panel and the CHAPS Strategic Advisory Forum.10 Membership spans current CHAPS direct and indirect participants (and not just the traditional large banks) and trade bodies, UK authorities, software vendors and corporate end users.

This experience is another example of the advantages to be had from abandoning indexation clauses, which are no more than a legacy of inflationary habits from a past firmly behind us, but whose continuing use has been a source of problems, as the Banco de España has reiterated. Improving our economy’s productivity in the medium and long run will require seeing through other, deeper structural reforms, including most notably sectoral liberalisation, the rationalisation of the public sector’s role in economic activity and improvements to the education system. These are reforms whose introduction needs time and whose effects will be deployed over a lengthy period; but the resolve to adopt them also has positive effects in the short run by improving expectations about our economy’s economic growth, which is particularly welcome in these testing times. Thank you. 6  BIS Review 129/2010
I believe that changing private sector expectations and reducing microeconomic constraints on the economy are key in Japan today. Japan historically has had a tremendous ability to capitalize on technological innovation. While productivity growth has been choppy - the result of cyclicality in the economy - there has been overall moderate growth. In the first half of 1999, in fact, GDP growth was unexpectedly strong, but it fell back in the second half of the year, owing largely to weaker private consumption. In 2000, most forecasters expect a renewal in growth, supported by a new round of fiscal stimulus, announced in November, and a broad-based recovery in business fixed investment. Developments in the euro area are very interesting. The bold and historic effort of 11 of the European community countries coming together to unite their economies in a common currency and to form a single market appears to be bearing fruit. In the run-up to the introduction of the euro, many of the euro area countries struggled to bring down their fiscal deficits and reduce inflation to a low level. These efforts were preceded throughout the 1980s and 1990s by measures to break down trade barriers and harmonize some regulations while eliminating others. Not surprisingly, these developments have coincided with both strong business  5  BIS Review 29/2000  fixed investment and labor productivity growth in manufacturing. Today, we see the euro markets starting to coalesce and expand.

Before turning to some of the deeper trends that may help account for the remarkably good performance in the past several years, I think some key points are worth noting. As 2000 gets under way, the US economy continues to enjoy astonishing job growth. Payroll employment growth has been fluctuating around 250,000 jobs per month since early 1996. Although job growth in February was considerably more modest, when figures for December and January are included, it looks as though the trend of roughly 250,000 jobs per month is still in place. The counterpart to strong job growth has been a steady decline in US unemployment rates. In January, unemployment in the United States fell to a 30-year low of 4%. This level held roughly steady in February. What is particularly noteworthy is that the percentage of the population employed, at 65%, is the highest it’s been in the postwar period. Of considerable importance is the fact that job growth in the last few years has been increasingly centered in the segments of the population in which unemployment has been most stubborn: the more disadvantaged parts of US society, including the inner cities. The unemployment rate for 16-19 year-olds, for example, was about 20% in 1992. It is now about 13-14%. Similar trends hold for decreases in minority unemployment rates. In addition, recent years have witnessed sharp gains in labor force participation rates for minorities. Along with strong employment growth have come gains in personal income.
In order to prevent an appreciation, the central bank has to intervene and buy foreign exchange. This leaves more time for capital inflows, and the accumulated capital inflow may grow. The economy starts becoming overheated, asset prices grow, and bubbles may develop. In order to prevent the situation from becoming more problematic, the central bank may consider what the IMF calls capital-flow management measures (CFMs), including capital controls (residency-based CMFs) (IMF 2011b). The authorities may also consider a fiscal contraction and financial-stability measures to improve the situation. This is a highly stylized and very simplified thought experiment. Still, I think it conveys an important insight, namely that a substantial part of the problem is due to the central bank’s unwillingness to accept the nominal and real appreciation, even though this appreciation is a natural equilibrium response to the lower world interest rate. Are the reasons for that unwillingness so important that they take precedence over the problematic consequences?7 More expansionary monetary policy in the U.S., for instance in the form of lower long rates due to LSAPs, tends to depreciate the dollar, all else equal. Does this mean that the U.S. is conducting a beggar-thy-neighbour policy that hurts other countries? I do not see it this way. 7  The policy response to recent capital inflows to emerging-market economies is further discussed in the IMF staff framework for policy advice on managing capital inflows, IMF (2011b).

MAS will allow a significantly rooted QFB to operate an additional 25 or up to 50 places of business, as part of an overall FTA package negotiated with the home countries of these QFBs. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  In September 2018, we announced that FinTechs and other non-bank financial institutions will be granted access to the FAST network for real time payments. This is a major step towards making our payments system open, accessible and competitive. 10. But we are in fact at the threshold of a further and more fundamental transformation in banking. The far reaching effects of digitalisation are stimulating a fundamental re-think of the role of banks, in most advanced financial centres. The ramifications go well beyond those ushered in by the technologies and business models of a decade or two ago. 11. We must take advantage of these opportunities that digital finance brings, and not be overtaken by the wave of changes taking place globally. 12. We must allow for greater competition and spur greater innovation in finance – competition between new and traditional business models, new players and incumbents, and different ways of using technology to serve business and individual customers better. We must also retain strong local anchors and trust in the banking system. These dual objectives  have guided our past liberalisation initiatives, and motivate our next moves. 13. As we embark on this new phase, however, it is worth reminding ourselves of our real purposes in finance.
I’ll always take an opportunity to quote something from the Lord of the Rings canon, so I’ll continue with the story analogy and say that for many people, these past few weeks have felt like we’ve been “There and Back Again.” We again find ourselves in a period of extraordinary difficulty. The emergence and rapid spread of the Omicron variant in the United States and around the world are resulting in new peaks of COVID infections and hospitalizations, as well as severe strains on the healthcare and essential services workforce. This is a reminder that the path of economic recovery continues to be driven by the course of the virus. In my remarks this morning, I’ll share more about what we’re seeing in the incoming data and how it relates to the economic picture in the United States and the world more broadly. I’ll also highlight the significant progress we’ve seen in the labor market and my outlook for inflation. Finally, I’ll discuss the Federal Reserve’s recent policy actions and what they mean for the future. Before I proceed, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. Economic Outlook When I look at the economy, it is through the lens of the Federal Reserve’s “dual mandate.” These are two goals set by Congress: maximum employment and price stability.

Given these goals, my focus is to study and understand the wide range of developments that affect employment, unemployment, and inflation as they play out in real time. As we start a new year, it’s worth highlighting the key economic developments of last year, which were defined by a very strong recovery, both here and abroad. Although we don’t have all the data yet, I expect that U.S. inflation-adjusted, or real, gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  about 5-1/2 percent last year, which would be the strongest growth rate between fourth quarters in over 35 years. The economic snap-back here and abroad has led to global supply-chain bottlenecks and imbalances between supply and demand that have contributed to a sharp rise in inflation. Inflation in the United States, based on the personal consumption expenditures price index, will likely exceed 5 percent in 2021, and inflation rates are elevated in many other countries, too. Looking ahead, I expect the current Omicron wave to slow growth in the next few months as people once again pull back from contact-intensive activities. I also expect that the Omicron wave will temporarily prolong and intensify labor supply challenges and supply-chain bottlenecks that we have been experiencing. Current staffing challenges for essential service workers in the healthcare, transportation, and education sectors will likely have a ripple effect too. But, once the Omicron wave subsides, the economy should return to a solid growth trajectory and these supply constraints on the economy should ebb over time.
So digital token money for financial market participants is not necessarily a prerequisite for achieving efficiency gains in the trading and settlement of security tokens. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, this brings me to my concluding remarks. There are a variety of interesting potential uses for digital tokens – including, for example, privately issued digital tokens in the form of stable coins, as well as state-issued digital token money for financial market participants. Stable coins have the potential to achieve broader acceptance than crypto tokens. The associated opportunities and risks have to been seen in a wider context. The benchmark for assessing utility, efficiency, reliability and security is set by the existing systems and the regulations governing comparable activities. Only once there is competition on equal terms will it become clear whether stable coins can be a useful and efficient complement to today’s cash and book money. Moreover, if security tokens become established in the financial sector, this will raise the question of whether state-issued digital token money will also be needed for the new financial market infrastructures, as a means of payment for financial market participants. Here, too, it will have to be demonstrated that such tokens offer advantages over the existing system of sight deposits at central banks. The SNB is following developments closely, and is actively involved in the debate, not least through its future participation in the BIS Innovation Hub I mentioned earlier. Thank you for your attention.

Our understanding of digital token money has been heavily influenced by cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Cyptocurrencies are privately issued currencies denominated in their own units of account. In our illustration, we refer to money based on cryptocurrencies as ‘crypto tokens’. Digital tokens can be issued in conjunction with a private cryptocurrency denominated in its own unit of account; but they can also use an official currency as their unit of account. On the one hand there are private issuers, who claim that the value of their tokens is stable against official currencies; in our illustration we assign this type of token money to the ‘stable coins’ category. However, state institutions such as central banks can also issue digital token money – the SNB, for example, could issue a Swiss franc token. Ladies and gentlemen, as you see, digital token money can take a number of forms. It is important that we understand the characteristics and implications of these various tokens, as they could influence the SNB’s mandate. I will now set out our thoughts on this topic. Privately issued digital token money Let me start by outlining our view of cryptocurrencies, before moving on to discuss stable coins and state-issued digital tokens. We believe that cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrencybased tokens are of only limited use as payment instruments, stores of value and units of account because they are subject to major fluctuations. Crypto tokens are more like speculative investment instruments than ‘good’ money in terms of their characteristics.
This amounts to 4.5 per cent of GDP for 2021, a sizeable amount of extraordinary spending indeed. Some countries have raised additional revenues to cover this by introducing windfall taxes on energy companies5. One positive side effect of higher inflation is that it reduces the ratio of government debt to GDP because nominal GDP grows fast. This good news has been offset though by the sharp rise in interest rates over the past year, and the most likely net effect is that interest payments on government debt will be higher in the years to come6. Inflation affects the fiscal balance through both revenues and spending and there are both positive and negative effects. Higher inflation may bring in more tax revenue relative to GDP if the brackets in the income tax system are left unchanged, but less revenue relative to GDP for excise taxes that are fixed in nominal terms. Spending may decline in relation to GDP if pensions and public sector wages adjust slowly, while discretionary support measures of the type we have seen applied in all the EU countries over the past year increase public spending. It is worth noting how high inflation can affect public finances in surprising and contradictory ways. During the first year of rising prices, the budget balance very often improves. The higher prices first make the tax base larger and there are higher revenues from consumption taxes, while at the same time there can be a long lag before many costs adjust.

This means there is a fiscal honeymoon in the first year of higher prices that creates the illusion for policymakers that there is additional room in the budget to spend. It is only during the next year or two as costs adjust and indexation mechanisms start to work that the painful reckoning comes due. Caution is therefore needed when any additional fiscal support measures are designed. Ongoing research at Eesti Pank has attempted to estimate the extent to which an unexpected rise in inflation would affect fiscal balances in the euro area using data from the mid-1990s to 2021, and has found that inflation has a sizeable positive effect on the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP7. The positive effect comes both from the expenditure side of the budget and from the revenue side. This is particularly true when there is a significant positive inflation surprise, meaning when actual inflation turns out to be higher than expected. Governments in Europe increased their spending in 2022 so they could fund energy subsidies, invest in their defence forces and provide the help needed by Ukraine. Despite this extra spending though, the fiscal picture has remained relatively benign in most countries and in the euro area overall. This also applies to Estonia, where preliminary data suggest that the fiscal deficit for 2022 will be around 1.2 per cent of GDP. This benign outcome can in large part be ascribed to the high inflation that we saw last year.
This is an effective instrument for increasing the prosperity of European citizens and one suited to playing a leading role in the international monetary system. It is also a magnet for other European countries whose integration into the area will give it greater worldwide influence. A dynamic process is now under way in the area in which those economies that are most flexible and best equipped with physical, technological and human capital will be those that most benefit from participation in the common European venture. To date, the Spanish economy has been able to draw on its progressive economic and monetary integration in Europe to move towards correcting some of its structural imbalances, to further real convergence with the core European countries and to pursue increasing external openness. In parallel, Spain has re-geared its economic policies towards stability and has pushed through the liberalisation of its financial, factor and product markets. This modernisation and openness drive has led to a substantial change in Spain's position in the world economy, which includes strategic ownership interests in certain regions in which it has invested strongly. Undoubtedly, the main challenge now facing the Spanish economy is to consolidate this position against a background of heightened competition, rapid technological change and future European Union enlargement. The Annual Report presented today illustrates the benefits that the Spanish economy has obtained from participation in Economic and Monetary Union, even under the particular circumstances of a generalised slowdown in the world economy, as was the case in 2001.

The Spanish economy The weakening of the international economy and the loss of buoyancy in the European economy contributed in 2001 to prolonging the gradual slowdown in activity in Spain in train since the previous year, when the first symptoms of the previous lengthy expansionary phase having run its course were discerned. Consumption and investment in construction were the main underpinnings of growth in our economy, while productive investment and exports were the chief components dampening it. That said, GDP increased by 2.8% in 2001, clearly above the figure of 1.5% posted in the euro area. The maintenance of high job creation rates during 2001, set against the slowing trend marked by general developments in the economy, and the favourable financial conditions in place contributed to sustaining household income and helped underpin consumer spending and residential investment. However, the declining course of investment in capital goods steepened in the face of heightening uncertainty, worsening expectations and slowing final demand, which the generous financial conditions were unable to offset. The effects on activity were reinforced by the fall in the growth rate of exports as from the early months of 2001.