samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the period ahead, the policy mix we implemented under the Liraization Strategy will continue to foster financial stability through healthy credit growth, and potential output through the financing cost channel, and will contribute positively to the supply-demand balance. As a result, an improvement in pricing behavior and inflation expectations and a permanent fall in inflation will be ensured. Esteemed Guests, In this part of my speech, I would like to talk about our monetary policy practices in 2022. In 2022, to reshape price stability within a sustainable context, we conducted a comprehensive policy framework review process that prioritizes the Turkish lira in all policy instruments. Accordingly, we implemented the Liraization Strategy, which we developed with a holistic approach. With the Liraization Strategy, we tried to eliminate the sensitivity of inflation and pricing behavior to the exchange rate in the short term. In the medium term, we aimed to strengthen the current account balance by supporting production and exports. With the macroprudential tools and FX-protected deposit products we have introduced to this end, we began the liraization process of the banking sector on both the asset and liability side. We adopted a targeted loan approach in terms of creating financial conditions that will ensure permanent improvement in the current account balance by increasing production and exports in our country. While implementing the Liraization Strategy, we updated our macroprudential policy set according to our targeted loan approach to contain the risks to financial stability and price stability along with interest rate cuts.

The fiscal surplus has reflected the simultaneous decline of public income and expenditure, respectively 5.3% and 5.5%, year on year. As regards expenditures, capital expenditures decreased whereas current expenditures increased during this period. Foreign trade data point to about 8.7% annual contraction of Albanian exports, in January, while imports annual growth rates slowed down to 4.5%. These developments in the foreign trade were materialised in wider trade deficit, which expanded by about 13.8% from a year  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  earlier. The performance of this indicator during the first two months of the year may be subject to temporary factors. Its dynamic and developments in the future will be monitored. Foreign demand has been the main driver of our aggregate demand over the last two years and, in Bank of Albania’s view, will continue to provide small positive impact in 2012. Monetary developments were in line with the performance of the real economy. Their analysis confirms the existence of low monetary inflationary pressures on the economy. Broad money, monetary aggregate M3, decelerated its annual growth to 8.1% in January. On the demand side, this performance has been affected by low demand for funds by the public and private sectors in January. Annual private sector credit pursued the downtrend that had started in the last quarter of 2011, settling at 9.9% in January. Its performance has reflected lower demand for credit by both businesses and households.
And, as with all the other denominations in the new series, it is narrower and shorter than the previous note. The theme of the 100-franc note is Switzerland’s humanitarian tradition, and the key motif is water. Both are reflected in the note’s core design elements. The hand and the globe are the main images on the front of the note. The hands are scooping up water, and isobars are depicted over the globe. Page 1/3  Berne, 3 September 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference on new banknotes  The back of the note shows an irrigation channel, or ‘suone’, feeding glacial meltwater down a cliff face to the fields below. A suone is a method of transporting water from high altitudes to lower-lying areas for irrigation purposes. In the past, such irrigation channels were used for land cultivation, especially in the Valais region. The image of a suone symbolises the treatment and distribution of water – a major component of Switzerland’s humanitarian and development aid effort. The key motif also plays an important role on the security strip, which features a network of waterways over the map of Switzerland, together with a list of the country’s longest rivers. The remaining security features, such as the transparent Swiss cross or the shimmering globe, are the same as those on all denominations of the new series – you will already be familiar with these.

The object depicted is linked to each note’s key motif. On the 20-franc note, the object is a butterfly, and on the 200-franc, a particle collision. The key motifs of the six notes are time, light, wind, water, matter and language. As I mentioned earlier, the security features are the same for all denominations. I hope you like the new banknote series as much as I do. Now that all the notes are here, people can choose their own favourite. Before I finish, I would like to take this opportunity to Page 2/3  Berne, 3 September 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference on new banknotes  express our heartfelt thanks to Manuela Pfrunder and her team, and to congratulate them on a tour de force in designing the series. And with that, I will hand you over to our Chairman, Thomas Jordan, who will look back over the project and the challenges it presented, both for the SNB and for our partners. Page 3/3
They are indeed service providers, usually unregulated, vulnerable to cyber risks and, in some cases creators of the most powerful new technologies, which could significantly contribute to spreading risks (application programming interfaces (API), artificial intelligence software, cloud computing structures, etc.). The lack of substitutability of some of these services increases the vulnerability of the financial sector. 2) The second consideration regards the embedding of security in systems from the earliest stages of conceptualisation. The CPMI-IOSCO guidance refers to this principle as “resilience by design”. It makes perfect sense, since it is the most efficient way to ensure the security of IT systems. This principle is however no doubt difficult to implement in the case of urgent and costly IT projects. This is why it requires a more proactive approach from executives and closer attention from regulators and supervisors. The same principle has already been emphasised in the European General Data Protection Regulation which entered into force some months ago. It gives us one more reason to enforce this principle. Page 2 sur 3 3) The third consideration regards speed: the capacities to resume critical activities within two hours after a cyber-attack, the two-hour Recovery Time Objective mentioned by Benoît. In this regard, in today’s environment it would be both unrealistic and unwise to resume activities without ensuring first that IT data have not been corrupted or that recovery of the activity affected does not trigger a higher risk exposure on its own, and for the whole financial ecosystem. II.

Eva Srejber: The power of transparency for macroeconomic discipline Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the 10th International Financial Economic Forum, Vienna, 11 November 2004. * * * The crisis encountered by the Stability and Growth Pact has put the new enlarged Europe at a crossroads: either we get our act together and produce better checks and balances in our institutions or we are going to move down a path of looser fiscal policy and tighter monetary policy. Both fiscal and monetary policy need the other to be predictable: a government needs the predictability of a transparent and consistent monetary policy to know how to conduct fiscal policy, and of course no monetary policy will be sustainable if poor fiscal policies lead to a rapid accumulation of debt. This is what Sweden witnessed in the 1980s and the 1990s. In the 1980s we had an unsustainable mix of fixed exchange rates and lax fiscal policy, which led to high inflation and eventually to a crisis that landed us with an even higher mountain of debt. When the regime collapsed in 1992 we introduced a target for inflation of two per cent, which today is hailed as a success. However, the real breakthrough for the new regime was in the mid 1990s when a forceful implementation of fiscal consolidation, supported by a broad political majority in parliament, made the whole macroeconomic set-up credible.
[see Chart 3] The counteracting effects of these global price pressures on euro area inflation can be observed more clearly if we take a look at the development of the overall Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and selected components (energy and non-energy industrial goods). [see Chart 4] The prices paid by consumers for energy products, which account for approximately 9% of euro area private consumption, surged at an average rate of 5.4% per annum following the series of sharp oil price increases over the period 1999-2007. But, the prices of other consumer goods, such as non-energy industrial goods, which account for over 30% of total private consumption, increased at a more moderate rate of 0.7% per annum on average during the same period. In an environment of significant and persistent changes in the relative prices of energy goods and agricultural products, the price increases of these goods, which are comparatively more visible to consumers than the relatively more stable prices of many other consumer goods, may, therefore, adversely affect inflation expectations. Consequently, it is crucial for monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations to price stability, and to ensure that secondround effects of increases in energy prices and other commodity prices on price and wagesetting do not materialise. All in all, the empirical evidence on how globalisation has directly affected consumer price inflation in the advanced economies reveals a rather muted impact.

But it was not until two hedge funds from Bear Stearns with active exposure in the sub-prime market had almost lost all their capital by June 2007 and when some rating agencies in early July announced that they would downgrade many asset-backed securities (ABSs) and collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) that a significant reassessment of the expected returns of structured finance products took place and AA and AAA-rated assetbacked securities (or ABS) also started falling in value. The following general re-pricing of risk [see Chart 15] and tensions in credit markets (e.g. also the corporate bond market) now affected several countries other than the US (e.g. the corporate bond markets in the US and Europe). Financial market liquidity for most structured credit products started evaporating [Chart 16]. Equity markets have also been affected by the increase in risk aversion and a general flight to quality. 19 As a consequence of inadequate risk management, and in particular liquidity risk management, the interbank money market came under pressure. Due to the complexity of pricing structured credit products and the lack of transparency of banks’ exposures to investment vehicles heavily in need of refinancing their ABS investments (which, at that time, were more or less fully illiquid), an adverse selection problem in the interbank market led to concerns about systemic risk. Banks were reluctant to lend to each other because of concerns about the counterparty’s exposure to sub-prime related assets and also uncertainty about their own liquidity needs.
Mr Duisenberg reports on the outcome of the latest meeting of the ECB Governing Council  Introductory statement given by Mr Willem Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, to the Press Conference, Frankfurt, on 9 September 1999. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, The Vice-President and I are here today to report on the outcome of today’s meetings of the General Council and the Governing Council of the ECB, which were attended by Mr de Silguy, European Commissioner. The Governing Council reviewed the outlook for price developments and the risks to price stability in the euro area, in line with its monetary policy strategy. As a result, the Governing Council decided not to change the prevailing ECB interest rates. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will thus remain 2.5%. In addition, the interest rate on the marginal lending facility will continue to be 3.5% and that on the deposit facility has been kept at 1.5%. Let me give you some details about our review of the latest information on monetary, financial and other economic developments, as well as about our latest assessment of the monetary policy stance and thereby explain the decisions taken today. With regard to monetary developments in the euro area, the 12-month growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3 increased from 5.3% in June to 5.6% in July 1999.

In some quarters, central banks are even judged to have a decisive influence on financial market prices. Insofar as it allows monetary policy objectives to be met, this is of course, from a central bank perspective, not unwelcome. Ultimately, the aim of all monetary policy measures is to ensure the effective transmission of monetary policy stimuli to the economy. This applies especially in exceptional times such as those we have experienced in recent years, marked by modest and fragile economic and price developments worldwide. 8  Significance for the implementation of monetary policy With the deployment of unconventional measures, implementation of monetary policy has become considerably more challenging. 9 This also applies to the SNB. First and foremost, we needed to gain a deeper understanding of the markets and refine our analytical tools. We have put a great deal of effort into these areas over recent years, as I will now illustrate with a few examples. Challenges in implementing negative interest  Turning to the implementation of negative interest first. As you know, at the beginning of 2015, the SNB started charging interest of –0.75% on sight deposits held by banks and other financial market participants at the SNB. There are a number of challenges in implementing negative interest rates, three of which I will briefly outline here. First, the potential for interest rate reductions further into negative territory is limited by the effective lower bound. This is determined, among other things, by the cost of holding cash.
High demand for oil combined with limited idle production capacity and uncertain production levels in many oil-producing countries have led to a sharp rise in oil prices and other energy prices. High energy prices are boosting investment in the petroleum and electricity sectors, with considerable impetus to the engineering industry. Increased trade has engendered higher demand for shipping services and favourable freight rates. This has in turn led to a boom in the shipbuilding industry. While oil prices are high, they are still lower than the prices that prevailed after the OPEC II shock in 1979. Norwegian oil production, on the other hand, has increased considerably since then. Price developments have also been favourable for many metals. Prices for fresh farmed salmon have also shown a pronounced rise in recent years. As consumers, we are benefiting from ongoing globalization through falling prices for many imported goods. After a shift towards a higher share of imports from low-cost countries, prices for Norway’s imported consumer goods have fallen virtually every year since the mid-1990s. BIS Review 50/2006  1  The change in clothing prices may serve as an illustration. Prices rose by around 3 per cent annually for a long period, but since 1995 they have been falling by about 6 per cent annually. This kink point coincides with the dismantling of barriers in the textile trade and with a period of rationalisation in retail trade in Norway. The magnitude of the current income shock is best seen in a longer, historical persepective.

The real exchange rate appreciated, and manufacturing industry was scaled back. Frequent devaluations from 1976 were unable in the long term to prevent a decline in the manufacturing sector. On the contrary, they proved to be selfreinforcing. The absence of a nominal anchor was one of the main reasons behind the pronounced swings in the Norwegian economy in the 1970s and 1980s. With a policy of low interest rates and devaluations, inflation took root. Nominal interest rates were kept at a low level even though inflation rose. The wide fluctuations culminated in a credit boom in the mid-1980s. Victor Norman recognized this mechanism. In 1986, he argued in a newspaper article 4 that: “We are again treading a path where monetary and fiscal policies amplify cyclical fluctuations instead of moderating them. We saw this clearly in 1982/1983 and again last year.” The value of petroleum exports can be quite volatile and uncertain. Petroleum exports rose rapidly until the oil price declined markedly in 1986. The recession after the credit bubble burst and after oil prices fell was deep. The recession was more severe than would have been the case if we had maintained a larger, competitive manufacturing sector. Norwegian manufacturing lost export market shares in the late 1980s in spite of booming conditions abroad and substantial capacity slack at home. The value of petroleum exports rose again to historically high levels in 2000. High petroleum revenues to the government made it increasingly challenging to smooth cyclical fluctuations by means of fiscal policy.
It became evident that these markets bear risks both for the individual financial institutions (microprudential) and for the financial system (macroprudential). Namely, OTC derivatives are traded bilaterally between banks, other financial institutions and  BIS Review 90/2010  5  corporations. They are not traded through the stock exchange, making difficulties in discovering where the last risk is located, i.e. who bears the last risk. Another set of tools should find a solution for the systemically important financial institutions, extremely complex question, extremely important for the systemic stability of the financial sector. Except for the general agreement about the need of adequate harmonization of the prudential regulation, as the systemically important financial institutions are almost all “crossborder” by their nature, so far no higher consensus on solutions regarding this matter has been reached. In the current discussion, basically there are two distinctive approaches, starting from three key features of the systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs): their size, complexity and inter-linkedness. According to one of the approaches, no institution is too big, complicated or linked to fail. In this sense, there are proposals to limit the size of the banks and to separate commercial from investment banking, disintegrate conglomerates by living wills, etc. Some argue that “this reasoning is controversial as the effectiveness of these measures depends on the specific features of a relatively small number of SIFIs; different countries will probably come up with different solutions”.

Caruana Jaime, “The great financial crisis: lessons for the design of Central banks” (2010), (Speech given at Colloquium in honour of L.Papademos, ECB, Frankfurt). 5. Carosio Giovanni, (2010), “Financial Stability and Macro-Prudential Supervision: Challenges for Central Banks” (OeNB – 38th Economic Conference). 6. Geraats M. Petra (2010), “Price and Financial Stability: Dual or Duelling Mandates?” (Paper for the 38th Economics Conference of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank). 7. Greenspan Alan (2010), “The Crisis” (Second Draft paper). 8. Hannoun Herve (2010), “Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework”, (speech prepared for 45th SEACEN Governors Conference, Siem Reap province, Cambodia). 9. Haldane G. Andrew (2010), “The $ billion question” Bank of England. BIS Review 90/2010  9  10. Krugman R. Paul, The Return of Depression Economics and Crisis of 2008. 11. Miles David (2009), Bank of England, “The Future Financial Landscape”. 12. “Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a stocktaking of issues and experiences” (CGFS Papers, No 38, 2010). 13. Orphanides Athanasios (2010), “Monetary Policy Lessons from the Crisis” (Paper for the 38th Economics Conference of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank). 14. Tarullo K. Daniel (2010), “Financial Regulatory Reform” (remarks given at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York). 15. White William (2009), “Modern Macroeconomics is on the Wrong Track”, (Finance and Development, December 2009). 10  BIS Review 90/2010
The impact that changes in Fed policy can have beyond our borders has led to calls for us to do more to internalize those impacts, or even further, to internationally coordinate policymaking. As I’ve already noted, we are mindful of the global effects of Fed policy, given the central place of U.S. markets in the global financial system and the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. Accordingly, we seek to conduct monetary policy transparently and based on clear principles. Promoting growth and stability in the U.S., I believe, is the most important contribution we can make to growth and stability worldwide. There is, of course, the argument that Fed policy has been too accommodative for too long, creating risks for financial stability worldwide. Here, I think it’s important to consider carefully the counterfactual. Would countries beyond our borders really have been better off with a weaker U.S. economy – an economy that might have required exceptional monetary policy accommodation for a much longer period of time? The fundamental issue is whether U.S. monetary policy has helped support our dual objectives of maximum employment in the context of price stability, and whether this support is consistent with a healthy global economy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  While explicit coordination looks neither feasible nor desirable, there may be more that central banks in general, and the Fed in particular, could do to be better global stewards. As an example, I would emphasize the importance of effective Fed communication.

But for this to occur, it will be important for market participants to appropriately discriminate across countries, rather than treating EMEs as a single group. The good news is that many EMEs generally appear to be better equipped today to handle the Fed’s prospective exit from its exceptional policy accommodation than they were during past tightening cycles. This reflects the fundamental reforms that EMEs have put in place over the past 15 years, as well as the hard lessons learned from past periods of market stress. Among the positives are: •  The absence of pegged exchange rate regimes that often came undone violently during periods of acute stress;  •  Improved debt service ratios and generally moderate external debt levels;  •  Larger foreign exchange reserve cushions;  •  Clearer and more coherent monetary policy frameworks, supporting what are now generally low to moderate inflation rates;  •  Generally improved fiscal discipline; and  •  Better capitalized banking systems, supported by strengthened regulatory and supervisory frameworks. Of course, progress has not been uniform across EMEs, and more work remains to further strengthen institutional structures in some countries. In particular, vulnerabilities remain in several important EMEs, and some have been hit by the sharp adverse turn in their terms of trade due to the recent fall in global commodity prices. Still, the fundamental improvements I’ve cited leave many EMEs better positioned than in the past to weather those times in the cycle when the external environment becomes more difficult.