samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
All these elements contributed to a credit boom throughout the Spanish economy, particularly in the real estate sector. In this context, let me add that – crucially – the Bank of Spain reacted very well: notably by introducing a strict regulatory system for special purpose vehicles which significantly restricted regulatory capital arbitrage, and by introducing dynamic provisions, which may have reduced the very high credit supply in the good years. Without those measures the credit boom could have been even bigger.7 Moreover, the provision  1  See also Stiglitz et al. (2000); Matutes and Vives (2000), and Martínez-Miera and Repullo (2010). 2  See Kalemli-Ozcan, Pappaioannou and Peydró (2010). 3  See Allen and Gale (2000). 4  See Brunnermeier and Petersen (2009). 5  See Mian and Sufi (2009); Maddaloni and Peydró (2011); Jiménez, Mian, Peydró and Sufi (2011), Altunbas, Marqués and Gambacorta (2010). 6  See Pérez-Quirós (2000); Adrian and Shin (2009); Allen and Rogoff (2011); Rajan and Diamond (2009); Jiménez et al. (2011); Jiménez and Saurina (2006). 7  See Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina (2011). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  buffers have been vital during the crisis as they have allowed banks to continue supporting credit availability. The crisis calls for change Some key features of the recent crisis have been, in my view, the fragility both on the liability and asset sides of banks, coupled with a densely interlinked global financial sector.

1 COVID-19 to Add as Many as 150 Million Extreme Poor by 2021 (worldbank.org) 2 COVID crisis to push global unemployment over 200 million mark in 2022 | | UN News 3 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/06/pdf/inequality-and-covid-19-ferreira.pdf  4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Jacqueline Loh: Enhancing linkages between Asia and the Middle East Welcome address by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 6th World Islamic Banking Conference Asia Summit, Singapore, 3 June 2015. *  *  *  Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. To all our foreign guests, a warm welcome to Singapore Introduction 1. I am very honoured to be invited to deliver the Welcome Address for the 6th World Islamic Banking Conference Asia Summit. I am pleased that this conference continues to attract a growing number of industry professionals from Asia and the Middle East, with total attendance more than doubling since it was launched in 2010. This underscores the bright prospects for Islamic finance in Asia. Growing Asia-Middle East connectivity 2. Trade and investment flows between Asia and the Middle East have grown substantially over the last decade, supported by strong domestic demand and investment opportunities in both regions. This growing connectivity is expected to strengthen in the coming years, notwithstanding uncertainties in the global outlook. Let me share 3 key observations. 3. Firstly, trade between the two regions continues to grow strongly. In the past decade, exports from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to Asia expanded five-fold, and growth of GCC’s exports to Asia has surpassed that to the rest of the world. Asia’s exports to GCC have also increased five times, registering an annual growth rate of 15% over the past ten years. 4. Secondly, inter-regional investments are growing.

Strangely, however, these worries appear to be emerging. So we need to be clear: the rise in rates, if conducted in an orderly and well-managed fashion, will be favourable for the financial sector. It should bolster French banks’ profitability by increasing their net interest margins. For insurers, it will allow them to change the composition of their portfolios with the inclusion of higher-return assets; and this, combined with the distribution of profit-sharing reserves, will allow them to continue offering close to market rates of return on euro-denominated contracts, and limit redemptions. Financial institutions will nonetheless have to guard against any potential adverse effects in terms of unrealised financial losses, and on the solvency of certain borrowers that are excessively “leveraged”. But overall, interest rates – which have been  Page 8 of 8 exceptionally accommodative for borrowers since 2015 – will remain favourable and very bearable for the entire economy compared with historical standards. Last, among the challenges facing the financial system, I need to mention the rising threat of cyber risk. Exposure to this risk has increased considerably with the digitalisation of our working methods, and in particular the growing use of remote working; it is being further exacerbated by the possibility that Russian authorities might resort to cyber attacks as part of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. So far, we have not observed any rise in cyber incidents targeted at financial institutions since February, but they need to remain vigilant.
The current target range lies between 0.25% and 1.25%. We reacted to the increasing signs from Switzerland and abroad that point to a delay in the economic recovery and slower-than-anticipated economic growth in 2002. We now forecast the average growth rate for real GDP to fall clearly short of 1% in 2002. In addition, the further appreciation of the Swiss franc tightened the monetary conditions, which were regarded to be undesirable under the current environment. Concluding remarks It is more than one year that we are in this difficult economic situation. The loss in business confidence began with the downturn in economic activity lead by a sharp correction in capital spending. The path to economic recovery has been recently overshadowed by the loss in investor confidence, which found its origins in the highly publicized scandals involving fraudulent balance sheets. This setback in investor confidence undermined the required trust in financial markets that the right rules are in place and that those rules are being enforced. Although I am confident that stronger rules will merge to restore trust in financial markets, consensus will not be achieved overnight. Corporations must continue to build on the social capital that is entrusted in them by investors. They should promote the efficient operation of financial matters, and optimize the benefits that markets can bring to everyone in society.

Since the upturn in 1993, annual GDP growth has averaged 3–4 per cent, while inflation has stopped at 1 per cent. This is impressive, not least compared with the 1970s and 1980s, when growth averaged little more than 2 per cent and inflation over 8 per cent. Moreover, open unemployment has fallen in just four years from 9 to less than 4 per cent. Today, when Sweden again faces an economic downturn, the initial position is considerably better than earlier. Inflation is low. There is no sign of large financial imbalances. Foreign trade is generating surpluses. The government budget is also in surplus and government debt has been reduced from about 80 per cent of GDP to 50–55 per cent. An economic policy synthesis This brief review clearly illustrates the interaction of theory and practice over the years. New features in economic development raise new questions. New theories provide answers that are sometimes incorporated in practical politics. This influences developments and raises new questions. In view of this, there is every reason to be humble. We are no doubt as far from the end of history in this field as in others. Perhaps one can discern the outlines of a synthesis between the classical approaches and the ideas of Keynes. As I see it, such a synthesis can rest on three pillars: •  The basic condition for a good economic development is markets that function properly, with rules that are clear and firm.
This has functioned as an important tool, particularly in analysing and illustrating the effects on inflation of our own interest rate changes. The CPIX has also held a special status in comparison with other measures of inflation. For various reasons this will not be the case in future; the CPIX will be phased out. We will instead introduce another measure that can better capture the effects of our policy. But the intention is not for this measure to hold a special position in the way that the CPIX has done. I will return to this soon. The change we are now making means that the forecasts, analyses and comments in our reports will focus more directly on CPI inflation. This probably gives rise to a number of questions; not least among you here today. The most obvious one is probably whether this will have consequences for future monetary policy. To answer this question I would first like to say a few words about the need for alternative measures of inflation in general. I shall also describe how the role played by the CPIX in our analysis has changed over time. Then we will come to what the phasing out of the CPIX means for monetary policy. Different measures of inflation are needed The Riksbank has a target defined in terms of the change in the CPI. However, the development in the CPI cannot always guide monetary policy on its own – there is no such universal measure.

With the promising economic potentials ahead of us, I would like to reemphasize our shared vision of “What we shall expect to see for the future of the Greater Mekong Subregion” and “How we can achieve such prosperity.” 4. I picture the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) in the next twenty years as a much more connected and integrated region: a region where we are not only connected solely by a river, but by various modes of transportation, where one can travel conveniently, where trade and investment can flow across efficiently, and where prosperity can be widely enjoyed even by those in the rural areas. Although we are not yet there, I strongly believe that this vision can come true. 5. We always hear the saying “Rome was not built in a day”. Thus, we have to start working together towards our shared vision starting today. There is a great deal of preparatory work to be done; but in my view, some of the most crucial tasks are infrastructure development and businesses access to funds. The first task is channelling intraregional funds to infrastructure projects, followed by the second task of promoting economic growth and equality within the region through enhancing financial markets and supporting private financing. Ladies and Gentlemen, 6. Let me highlight key issues on the first preparatory work, which is financing infrastructure development. The ADB has already committed at least 9 billion US dollars1 to fund its GMS development projects in the pipeline.
The increase in doubtful assets and defaults in US mortgages has set in motion a global process of upward revision of credit risk premiums, which in the climate of economic boom of recent years had sunk to very low, barely discriminatory levels, prompting what was probably excessive investment in potentially high-risk activities. These investments were further driven by the proliferation of new financial intermediaries specialised in the credit risk transfer markets to which I referred earlier. In particular, in the current bout of turbulence a major role has been played by institutions that raise funds by issuing very short-term fixed-income securities and use the proceeds to acquire structured products linked to long-term loans, including US sub-prime mortgages. The liquidity risks associated with such practices have been clearly under-estimated by these specialised institutions. And the consequences have been felt in the money markets because some credit institutions agreed to provide liquidity to these specialised institutions if, upon maturity, the latter did not manage to roll over the funds raised via the issuance of securities. This led to a serious liquidity crisis in the money markets of a good number of industrialised economies, including the euro area. Central banks, and the ECB in particular, reacted rapidly and implemented emergency processes to inject the amounts of liquidity demanded by the market. This prevented the lack of liquidity from compounding the crisis and sent a message of calm and reassurance to the markets.

Other episodes, by contrast, such as the “new economy” crisis had a more far-reaching impact, albeit of varying intensity and duration in the different geographical areas. Unfortunately, these experiences are no precedent for diagnosing the potential scope of the current episode, which exhibits many new features, including the fact that it is especially concentrated in the Western heartland of the industrialised countries. The recent past has seen turbulence in Asia, Latin America and eastern Europe. Now, in contrast, the shocks are mainly affecting the United States and the more developed European countries. Let me thus take an eminently European perspective as I examine more closely some of the main features at play here. This approach will also help me to look at its implications for euro monetary policy, which I believe is the most logical way to address the possible impact on the Spanish economy. I wish to begin by emphasising the non-existence in the euro area of the sub-prime mortgages that are accepted practice in the United States. Therefore, in the first analysis, the rise in doubtful assets in the United States should affect only the European financial intermediaries that acquired securities linked to sub-prime mortgage loans originated in that economy. However, the propagation of contagion is not confined to the influence of this channel alone, but rather is transmitted through a wider range of shocks.
What happens here is important and will be relevant in affecting how successful we respond collectively and globally to the climate challenge. The second trend that is very important and that we have to make sure that we are wellpositioned for is digital. On this front, I am happy to report that we have made better progress than we have made on the green or climate front. The Bank of Thailand, in particular, has been actively engaged throughout and has not been behind the curve. We have demonstrated in terms of outcomes that we have done and have not lagged others in this increasingly important area. Page 7 of 9  We have put in place, the kind of digital infrastructure that we need to allow for digital financial services that are likely to become more and more important in the future. This has been something that is top-of-mind for us and remains one of our key strategic priorities. What have we done in this area? First, on digital payments, we were among the first countries to have introduced the standardized QR code to assist payments. We have seen a very good uptake on that. QR codes in Thailand are now in very broad use. I am happy to see that it really helps to improve access and inclusion. We have seen, for example, vendors using QR codes for payment purposes. I think that has been a welcomed development in trying to address our long-standing issues in trying to improve inclusion on the financial front.

Nonetheless, comparing that with our net international reserves of 280 billion US dollars, this shows that our external vulnerability is extremely low while our stability on the external front remains intact. Another example of our resiliency on the external front is our low vulnerability to the possibility of another taper tantrum or a yield spike. A yield spike in the global financial markets is not likely to have a high impact on the Thai economy for a couple of reasons. First, in terms of the transmission of a global yield spike to domestic bond yields, Thailand's bond markets rely on non-resident financing less than other countries. Therefore, transmission from a global yield spike to a local yield spike is not likely to be as sharp as one might see in other Page 2 of 9  countries. However, even if there were to be a local yield spike, transmission to the real economy is also likely to be muted as 90 percent of the private sector financing in Thailand is still bank-based. Meanwhile, only ten percent of the private sector financing relies on bonds, which consists mostly of large corporates that are quite solid in terms of their balance sheets. Nonetheless, a local yield spike as a result of a possible taper tantrum would not have a high impact on banks. This is because, in Thailand, close to 97 percent of banks are financed through deposits and not through the wholesale market.
In hindsight we know that inflation gradually fell and that it happened earlier in Sweden than in other countries –  2 [13]  discounting the effect of interest-rate changes, inflation fell from around 2 per cent during 2010 to around 1 per cent in 2012. When inflation then fell further in late 2013 and early 2014, despite brighter economic signals, it became necessary for the Riksbank to focus more and more on bringing inflation back to the target. This was particularly urgent bearing in mind that the long period of low inflation had begun to leave its mark on inflation expectations. To bring up inflation and help anchor inflation expectations to the target, the Riksbank cut the repo rate to 0 per cent in 2014 and then gradually down to –0.5 per cent in the following years. As a way of making monetary policy more expansionary, we also began purchasing government bonds at the start of 2015. At that point, the ECB had begun buying assets on a large scale to stimulate demand and bring up inflation. There was a concern that the Swedish krona might strengthen significantly against the euro as a result of this and that this would further prolong the period of below-target inflation. Monetary policy needed to protect the economy against such a development. Today, we can observe that the extremely low interest rate and the Riksbank’s asset purchases have contributed to economic activity growing ever stronger.

As Hong Kong has to import almost all the raw materials and equipment, devaluation of the currency does not mean that the export prices would necessarily be lowered by the same extent of the devaluation. As you know better than I do, although price is always important, competitiveness does not depend on price alone, whether or not you are talking about manufactured goods or services. Competitiveness depends on a host of factors, including better cost control, innovation, entrepreneurship, marketing and constant striving to achieve productivity gains. In this context, I cannot help tell an old, but true, story involving a conversation with an American friend 6 or 7 years ago, when the $ was depreciating and the DM and the Yen surging to new highs. He was complaining that many countries, including the Southeast Asian economies, were manipulating their exchange rates to gain trade competitiveness. As a result, American goods were having a hard time selling overseas because they were too expensive. I told him that, while it may or may not be true that some countries were deliberately keeping their exchange rates low, the apparent difficulty experienced by US manufacturers to penetrate the Asian markets was not caused by pricing alone. For example, how could the Americans expect to sell their refrigerators to Hong Kong households if most of the refrigerators they tried to sell were almost as big as the kitchen of an average flat here in Hong Kong?
I will now briefly elaborate on the pros and cons of dollarization on a macro-economic level, thus not the operational implications. Whether an effect of dollarizing the economy is considered a positive or a negative, it could greatly differ between its advocates and its opponents. I will now briefly refer to some effects of dollarization: 1. Dollarization could lower transaction costs, especially when most payments to nonresidents are in US dollars. 2. Depending on the capital restrictions in place and the depth of the domestic banking sector, it could lead to reduced interest rates, thereby making it less costly to borrow. This could also be the case when acquiring an international loan, as there will be no exchange devaluation premiums on rates charged to local companies and the government. 3. Because of the elimination of exchange rate risk, dollarization could be beneficial to international trade and foreign investment. 4. The import of the monetary policy of the U.S., being the issuing country of the adopted currency, is unavoidable. This means that local policymakers are no longer in the position to use the exchange rate to absorb external shocks or to finance budget deficits by printing money. 5. Some of the tasks of the central bank, especially the function of lender of last resort, which is the credit line for local banks when experiencing financial stress, will disappear. This is typically linked to the ability of the central bank to print its country’s currency. 6.

GDP growth in Sweden slackens from the annual rates of 3 to 4 per cent in recent years to around 2.5 per cent in the coming years. The GDP figure for Q4 last year suggests that a fall-off has already begun. Some observers talk of a soft landing. Most things point to a downward adjustment of demand to the long-term trend rather than a regular downturn with the risk of a recession. In this situation it is a help that, after a number of years with good growth and price stability, the Swedish economy is soundly balanced and that the public finances are also in a comparatively good state. Combating inflation effectively and consolidating the government budget have increased the freedom of action in economic policy and made an economic slowdown relatively less difficult to handle. The adjustment we now foresee will occur through a variety of channels. Slacker international activity implies a slowing of exports. The decreased order inflow and less pronounced capacity restrictions tend in turn to dampen investment. With falling share prices and less optimism among households, the growth of private consumption becomes more subdued. Moreover, stock adjustments this year imply a temporary lowering of demand. In the labour market, the number of new job vacancies is already levelling off, which shows that the growth of employment will be slower in the coming years.
iv According to the legislative proposal by the European Commission on CBDC, presented on 28 June 2023. v Including record keeping, payments or access to a mobile application. vi BIS, Annual Economic Report 2023, III. Blueprint for the future monetary system: improving the old, enabling the new (bis.org). vii ECB, Eurosystem to explore new technologies for wholesale central bank money settlement , press release, April 2023 viii Adrian, T., Mancini-Griffoli, T., The Rise of Payment and Contracting Platforms (imf.org), Fintech Notes, IMF, June 2023. ii

Average annual inflation was 3.1% in the first quarter of the year, dropping by 0.4 percentage points from its average level of the third quarter and getting closer to Bank of Albania’s target. During 2010, inflation was influenced by increased administered prices, rising trend of basic goods prices, food products and oil prices in international markets, and underestimating tendencies of the exchange rate. Annual inflation increase to 3.4% in December was due to increased agricultural products prices, reflecting this increase in global markets. Yet, anchored expectations on price stability and disinflation pressures by the real economy balanced the action of the above-mentioned factors of demand on inflation, halting their transition to second round effects and stable inflation pressures. The Bank of Albania considers that the inflation rate is expected to range within our target of 3 per cent, during the entire year. The increasing effect on the inflation of supply factors is balanced by the negative output gap and existence of non-utilised capacities in the economy. Controlled inflation pressures and fiscal policy created space for a gradual increase of the monetary stimulus in the economy during 2010. The Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to reduce the key interest rate by 00.25 percentage points in July, taking it to the lowest historical level of 5.0%. In parallel with this move, the Bank of Albania supplied the interbank market with the necessary liquidity for a proper functioning of financial markets.