samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Both of these differences may help to explain why the Canadian financial system and macroeconomy were less affected by the global financial crisis than the United States. 11  Imposition of tighter rules and regulations may also be politically unpopular. BIS Review 43/2010  7  employment might be high relative to the benefits of a somewhat smaller bubble. This seems likely to be the case in most instances. Historical experience does not suggest that bubbles are very sensitive to the level of short-term interest rates. That said, there is some evidence that a tighter monetary policy will reduce desired leverage in the financial system by flattening the yield curve and reducing the profitability of maturity transformation activities. 12 To the extent this is true, that may imply a somewhat more favorable trade-off in “leaning against” a bubble. More research is needed on this subject. For now at least, monetary policy appears to be inferior to macroprudential tools that seek either to limit the size of prospective bubbles or to strengthen the financial system so that it is more resilient when asset prices fall sharply. In conclusion, let me underscore the challenge that central bankers face in combating asset price bubbles. Doing so effectively requires us to be successful in both identifying the incipient bubble and in developing and implementing a response that will limit bubble growth and avert a destructive asset price crash. This is not easy because asset bubbles are hard to recognize in real time and each asset bubble is different.

The financial support through the banks’ credit market during the crisis years has been moderate, but permanent, therefore supporting the economic recovery of the economy. Anyway, in May 2013, the annual credit growth was 3.7%, pointing to a gradually slowing pace during 2012 and first half of 2013. Possible reasons for such trends in the credit market are: effects of financial deleverage process of foreign parent banks, banks’ deteriorating risk perceptions against the backdrop of still anemic economic activity and uncertainty regarding the global environment, and the present (though moderate) increase of credit risk in the system, as well as the potential. The NPL ratio reached 11.4% in the first quarter of 2013 being one the main challenges for the banking system that is closely monitored by the NBRM. Still, it is among the lowest in the group of the EU candidate countries. Regarding the future prospects for credit flows it can be noted that stable funding sources (loan-deposit coverage ratio of around 90%), strong liquidity position, and capital adequacy ratio continuously being twice as high than the minimum required, point to room for further increase of lending in the domestic economy. The improvement of the banking sector regulation in view of further implementation of the Basle and EU standards will remain being a high priority on the agenda in this field.
The Riksbank's forecast, like that of other analysts, was that the international recovery would be slower and more prolonged. There were several reasons for this, including geopolitical unease and increased caution among households and firms in the wake of the stock market fall. The conditions for a clear recovery in the euro area were perceived as poorer than we had earlier believed, which made a recovery in other countries, including Sweden, more difficult. The more negative economic outlook, with inflation prospects below the target of 2 per cent, meant that we decided to cut the repo rate during the summer by a total of 0.75 percentage points. The rate is currently at 2.75 per cent. Minor changes in outlook for economic activity So far, international developments have been largely in line with our assessments from the summer. The expansionary policy now appears to be taking effect in certain areas, particularly the United States, where signs of a recovery are becoming more apparent and the risks of a setback appear more slight. The Asian economies are also developing relatively strongly. On the other hand, the prospects for the euro area still appear to be gloomy. In time, the expected upturn in the United States is expected to support a gradual upturn in Europe. All in all, the Riksbank's assessment is that GDP growth in the OECD area will be 1.9 per cent this year, 2.8 per cent in 2004 and 2.6 per cent in 2005.

This means that the number of hours worked could increase by an average of 0.8 per cent annually instead of 0.4 per cent  4  BIS Review 44/2003  during the period up to 2008. If it was also possible to break the negative trend for persons born abroad and bring them into the labour market to a greater extent than now, this would also increase the number of hours worked. In 2002, 75 per cent of the working-age population was employed on average, while the figure for those born abroad was 60 per cent. If it were possible to increase the employment rate for this group to the national average, the number of hours worked would increase by approximately 0.1 percentage points more up to 2008. Ensuring that persons with a non-Swedish background can enter the labour market is a central issue, partly because the net addition to the working-age population will come from this group over the coming decade. If no measures are taken to increase the labour supply, the Swedish economy's long-term growth prospects are likely to be subdued for a fairly long period. The Riksbank usually states that the potential growth rate lies in the interval 2-2.5 per cent. If nothing is done, it is likely that potential growth will decline. In concrete terms, this means that the Swedish economy could reach its capacity ceiling at an earlier stage.
Each has a potentially important bearing on systemic resilience and hence on the social benefits of restrictions. (a)  Modularity  In 1973, Nobel-prizing winning economist Robert Merton showed that the value of a portfolio of options is at least as great as the value of an option on the portfolio. 15 On the face of it, this seems to fly in the face of modern portfolio theory, of which Merton himself was of course one of the key architects. Whatever happened to the benefits of portfolio diversification? The answer can be found in an unlikely source – Al’Qaeda. Although the precise organisational form of Al’Qaeda is not known with certainty, two structural characteristics are clear. First, it operates not as a centralised, integrated organisation but rather as a highly decentralised and loose network of small terrorist cells. Second, as events have shown, Al’Qaeda has exhibited considerable systemic resilience in the face of repeated and on-going attempts to bring about its collapse. These two characteristics are closely connected. A series of decentralised cells, loosely bonded, make infiltration of the entire Al’Qaeda network extremely unlikely. If any one cell is incapacitated, the likelihood of this undermining the operations of other cells is severely reduced. That, of course, is precisely why Al’Qaeda has chosen this organisational form. 15  6  Merton (1973). BIS Review 40/2010  Al’Qaeda is a prime example of modularity and its effects in strengthening systemic resilience.

Against this economic backdrop, and amid heated banker-bashing, it is easy to see how the social benefits of segregation were perceived as far outweighing the private costs at the time. Kennedy (1973) describes how “Stock dealings which had made bankers rich and respected in the era of affluence now glared as scarlet sins in the age of depression. Disillusionment with speculators and securities merchants carried over from investment bankers to commercial bankers; the two were often the same, and an embittered public did not care to make fine distinctions”. Glass and Steagall made just such a distinction. They underpinned it with legislation, signed by President Roosevelt in June 1933. As with McFadden, Glass-Steagall appears to have been effective from the 1930s right up until the latter part of the 1980s. Measures of concentration in the US banking system  14  Chapman and Westerfield (1942). BIS Review 40/2010  5  remained broadly flat between the 1930s and the late 1980s (Chart 2). But competitive pressures were building from the late 1970s onwards. Strains on US commercial banks intensified from alternative lending vehicles (such as mutual funds and commercial paper markets) and from overseas banks. The private costs of restrictions were rising. Legislators responded. After 1988, securities affiliates within BHCs were permitted, though were still subject to strict limits. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act revoked the restrictions of Glass-Steagall, allowing co-mingling of investment and commercial banking.
Conversely, our financial institutions gained access to the single European market, a factor which encouraged additional inward foreign investment into the sector. At the same time, the last exchange controls were removed. The adoption of the euro last January was a further step in the integration process into the single market. Financial transactions across the euro area can now take place without incurring exchange rate risks. Furthermore, Maltese banks now have access to the Eurosystem facilities available to credit institutions within the euro area. These include a variety of instruments designed to provide short-term liquidity, as well as standing deposit and lending facilities. At the same time, euro adoption entailed a reduction in the minimum reserve requirements that Maltese banks had to comply with, resulting in the release of additional funds into the banking system. Euro adoption also led to improvements in the financial infrastructure supporting the Maltese economy. In November 2007, Malta formed part of the first group of countries that joined TARGET2, the payment system used by the Eurosystem for the settlement of large value  BIS Review 155/2008  1  interbank transfers in euro. Maltese banks can use TARGET2 to carry out transfers with other banks in Malta and throughout the euro area rapidly, safely and effectively. The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), launched in January this year, is a further step towards closer financial integration and aims at making retail payments across the euro area as easy as they currently are within national boundaries.

Michael C Bonello: Financial crisis impact on the Maltese economy Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the annual dinner of the Malta Institute of Financial Services – Malta, Saint Julian’s, 5 December 2008. *  *  *  I would first of all like to thank you, Mr President, and your Council for inviting me to address the members of your Institute and their guests. I would also like to commend IFS Malta’s growing contribution to the Maltese economy through its learning activities, and in particular its involvement in the Education Council. I understand that it has also been participating actively in the work of the European Banking Training Network, and that it will next year start offering the Foundation Degree Programme of the University of Kent and the IFS School of Finance. When I addressed this distinguished gathering a year ago, the world was a very different place. At the time, the ECB forecast a euro area growth rate of around 2% for 2009; now the talk is about the likely depth and duration of the incipient recession. A year ago we were concerned about the upside risks to inflation; only twelve months later the prospects are of inflation falling well below the ECB’s price stability objective. What has gone so terribly wrong, so quickly? In The Great Crash, 1929, J.K. Galbraith noted that “Far more important than rate of interest and the supply of credit is the mood”.
Bandid Nijathaworn: The pursuit of monetary and financial stability in emerging market economies 1 Speech by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a Public Lecture at the Centre for Banking Studies of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 23 July 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here today in Colombo, and am honoured by the invitation that has been extended to me by the Centre for Banking Studies of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to give this evening’s public lecture. The Bank of Thailand and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has a long history of mutual friendship and cooperation. So, I am deeply touched by the invitation, and am privileged to join the long list of eminent speakers and scholars who have previously participated in this prestigious lecture series. The topic of my lecture this evening is the Pursuit of Monetary and Financial Stability in Emerging Market Economies. The lecture is drawn from the research done at the Bank of Thailand on the same topic. The research paper was first presented last year at a seminar at the Bank of England, and the lecture today is an updated version of that paper. What the research attempts to do is to examine the challenge faced by emerging market economies in the pursuit of monetary and financial stability.

BIS Review 98/2008  7  Market-driven financial market developments need the support of critical infrastructure, namely: (1) Information that allows efficient decision making and pricing on various asset markets, financial as well as related markets such as real estate market, which are still very lacking in many emerging markets, and may be an area of public support. (2) Legal reforms to ensure an enabling environment for innovation in products and business models for the financial system. And (3) Human resource with proper competency in modern financial and risk management are scarce and is becoming a bottleneck for development. The authority may need to step in to facilitate training and accredition of professional standards, if it has external benefits. Notwithstanding these challenges, however, notable progress has been made by emerging markets in the past decade, much of which is catalysed by comprehensive economic reform in which market-oriented economic and financial liberalization have been the main features. For East Asia, despite the progress made, significant gap still exists in diversification, efficiency and robustness when compared to the role played by financial markets in developed economies. Looking ahead, in addition to the pressure from globalization, the shift in demographic structure will also be an additional pressure. This is to say some smaller emerging markets will face an aging population and the increase in demand for wealth management, while the supply of local products are limited for diversification. This will pose challenges for inter-temporal allocation of resource and risk.
This figure is still far from the medium-term structural budgetary balance, convergence to which is required by the so-called “preventive arm” of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) applicable in Spain since July. It is therefore a priority to make headway in cleaning up the public finances so as to reduce this source of vulnerability of the economy and to be able to make full use of national fiscal policy as an effective macroeconomic stabilisation instrument in the event of a sharper economic slowdown in the future. In addition, this improvement in the budgetary situation must be compatible with other challenges which the public finances will have to face in coming years, including most notably the consequences of population ageing, which I will discuss later. A third and final area of vulnerability of the economy to which I would like to refer is the external debt. Despite the correction achieved to date in the form of current-account surpluses, much work still remains to be done, as shown by the negative net international 9/18  investment position and the gross debt, which stood, respectively, at around 80% and 170% of GDP in the second quarter of 2019. To continue correcting these two magnitudes, the external surpluses will have to be sustained over time, which in turn will require further headway in the gains in competitiveness achieved in the last few years.

2  BIS Review 13/2005
Monetary policy should then counteract falling inflation particularly strongly if there is a risk that the policy rate will otherwise reach its lower bound.17 But the danger of deflation should not be exaggerated The low inflation in Sweden and the euro area has recently led to much discussion on the risks of deflation, that is, a general fall in price levels.18 Although I am worried that Swedish inflation has been too low for several years, I believe that the debate on deflation is sometimes too foreboding and that it often focuses on the wrong risks. To begin with, I do not see a lengthy period with falling prices as a likely scenario for Sweden. Growth is relatively strong, which should contribute to a rise in prices. Moreover, we have the scope to counteract falling prices with more expansionary monetary policy. The repo rate can be cut by at least 50 basis points before the lower bound is reached. If this were not enough, we could draw up other monetary policy measures that would contribute to a rise in inflation. Moreover, nothing dramatic will happen merely because inflation falls below zero and is weakly negative rather than weakly positive. The problems of low inflation that I have listed above gradually increase when inflation is lower and this will of course continue to apply when inflation is negative.

Today's forum therefore seems to fit in very well with the European spirit now sweeping Hong Kong, and I congratulate the organisers on putting together a very lively and topical programme. It is a particular pleasure to be presenting together with Christian Noyer, Governor of the Banque de France. He has made some very thoughtful remarks on the first question for discussion. I intend to comment on the second question: "Can the euro be a benchmark for Asian monetary co-operation?" But before I address this question, we need to ask another question: how ready is Asia for closer monetary co-operation? We are, I think, all aware of the considerable differences in the political systems, the cultures, the historical backgrounds, and the economic, financial and monetary systems of the countries in this region. I think it is largely accepted that these differences are greater than the differences between the various economies that make up the euro zone. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate them. Nor should we overlook the regional integration already in progress in the trade, financial and monetary spheres. Let me briefly outline these three forms of integration. About half of total trade in the Asia region is intra-regional trade. Trade integration has been largely market-driven, and the process has stimulated the signing of various free trade agreements, which will, in turn, encourage further trade integration in the region.
The enthusiasm and momentum for them is apparent both from what the market tells us and from recent surveys. A clear message from our wide range of property contacts is that greater liquidity is essential if commercial property is to remain attractive as an asset class. There is equally a clear message that successful development of securitisation and derivatives will not on its own be the saviour of commercial property. But without it property will not turn in a performance which can stand comparison with competing assets. We need a mature, liquid cash market in property with a healthy derivative market to permit successful management of risk. These are essential characteristics of efficient markets which are necessary for efficient use of property by users as a factor of production. Without such a development there is a risk that the costs of doing business in the UK will be uncompetitively high. I do not know how, or indeed whether, the obstacles to the development of such markets can be easily found. But I regard these issues as nationally important. Conclusion 22 So, what is likely to happen in the next eight years? Let me sum up my vision. 23 The current strong commitment to keeping inflation in check will create conditions more conducive to rational long-term decisions. Commercial property is still to a large extent a longer-term asset and should benefit from this environment.

Mugur Isărescu: 130th anniversary of the National Bank of Romania Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Gala Concert of George Enescu Philharmonic Orchestra, Bucharest, 5 September 2010. *  *  *  Mister President of Romania Your Excellencies Distinguished audience Dear guests and friends of the National Bank of Romania Please allow me to welcome Mr Jean Claude Trichet, the President of the European Central Bank, our honoured guest here, at the Romanian Athenaeum, to the final act of our anniversary event. I would also like to greet President Ion Iliescu and Mr Emil Boc, the Prime Minister of Romania. I appreciate your honouring our invitation. My thanks go also to you all, governors, representatives of central banks and international financial institutions, and to all our Romanian and foreign guests. We are very happy to have you here with us this evening. We celebrate the 130th anniversary since the establishment of the National Bank of Romania, the 16th central bank in the world, according to the most widely accepted chronology. The birthday of our institution is on 29 April 1880, a day on which the Law on the establishment of the NBR was published in the Official Gazette. The commissioning of the Bank required a longer process that spanned over the entire 1880. On 5 September 1880 – precisely 130 years ago, the Bank’s Board held its first meeting.