samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The proportion of BAME employees is around 17%, greater than the proportion for the UK as a whole. Representation at senior management remains much lower at 5%, but is increasing. 56  Walton and Spencer (2009). 57  Page (2010). 58  Davies (2015)  59  Resolution Foundation (2015)  60  Although around half of that reflects the fact that there is a greater proportion of women working part time than men. 61  European Women on Boards (2016)  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Like many other organisations, the Bank has sought to support diversity through a range of diversity networks covering, among other things, gender, ethnicity, LGBT, mental health, disability, caring and some of the main religions. One of my responsibilities is as Executive Sponsor of the Bank’s Ethnic Minority Network. This Network has put in place some valuable new initiatives to support greater ethnic diversity across the Bank over recent years, including reciprocal mentoring schemes and an Afro-Caribbean Scholarship Programme which funds students through university. The Bank has also recently signed up to UPstanding – an initiative to showcase BAME professionals working in the US, UK and Ireland. Plainly, there is further to go along these identity-based dimensions of diversity, in the Bank and more broadly. But there is wind in society’s sails, as well as in the Bank’s, on these dimensions of diversity, which gives good grounds for optimism about the future.

These biases in behaviour are similar in spirit, but different in form, to those of primitive man. Both generate negative sentiment towards strangers or the “out-group”. In ancient times, biases were based on the physical identity of strangers; they were overt and visible. Today, many biases are based on the social identity of strangers; they are often covert and subtle. Where primitive man had conscious biases, modern man often has unconscious ones too. 14 That these biases are sometimes covert, rather than overt, does not diminish their importance for society. Unconscious biases are likely to be just as prevalent, and sometimes as pernicious, as conscious one. And precisely because they are harder to detect, sometimes even among those exhibiting these behaviours, unconscious biases are more likely to go unnoticed, and thus unchallenged, than conscious ones. As conscious biases were violent and visible, unconscious biases are silent and invisible. The Sneetches is, at one level, a children’s story with a moral message. At another, it is a case study in social identity theory, a parable for modern times. Even in advanced economies with little fear of conflict or infection, with laws against discrimination and with social norms favouring diversity, we all remain Sneetches. Our biased minds are in part a neurological hangover from our hunter-gatherer past and in part a sociological side-effect of our multicultural present. Either way, these biases are embedded in our brains and behaviours. Diversity as a social good Saying that behavioural biases among individuals are understandable is one thing.
Although we always stress the importance of improving productivity in agriculture and industry sectors, a similar significance should be assigned to the services sector as well. Despite the growing weight in services in economies, productivity growth in services has been slow in many countries and the share of the working-age population employed in services remains low in many countries. If we wish to strengthen economic growth and improve the foundations for the future performance of our economy, the services sector will need to do better. But strengthening growth performance is not the only challenge that we are facing. We are also confronted with the growing globalization of services and with rapid technological change posing the huge challenge of keeping the momentum in the services sector. Addressing such challenges and strengthening the potential of services to foster employment would be definitely through increased productivity and innovation. Certainly a productive services sector would deliver more benefits in a highly competitive environment. Sri Lanka’s telecommunication sector is a good example. In which areas have we been below par? Although Sri Lanka has a huge potential in services such as education, health and tourism, we haven’t done enough. So, also, has it been in the case of ports, financial services, including banking. We have not been able to reduce prices and charges through increased productivity. We may need to open domestic services markets to create new job opportunities and foster innovation and productivity.

This response by the prudential authorities, along with the monetary and fiscal policy measures adopted, has allowed the initial impact of the shock to be absorbed, it has smoothed the provision of credit to the economy and it has prevented the materialisation of  3  See the speech by the Governor of the Banco de España “Retos y políticas para la estabilidad financiera ante la pandemia”, October 2020. 5  a systemic risk in the financial system that would have heightened the crisis further and made it more persistent Looking ahead, however, set against the uneven and uncertain recovery I described earlier we cannot rule out two outcomes: that the risks identified materialise, and that their impact and persistence are greater than expected. In this respect, the economic and supervisory authorities must continue to closely monitor banks and financial markets so that they may continue providing the necessary flow of credit to the economy. We must continue adopting measures to mitigate the risks and, naturally, we must stand ready to respond appropriately should these risks materialise. In the banking area, this response can only be pan-European, given the commitment to the Banking Union and the need to avoid the financial fragmentation problems that might stem from an exclusively national response. European fiscal policy The ECB’s monetary policy measures and action taken by the regulatory authorities have been forceful, aimed at delivering a common, truly European, response to the economic crisis associated with the pandemic.
7  Text from Olav H. Hauge (2002): “Lagnaden gjer mange til heltar. Aforsimar i utval”, Det Norske Samlaget. Translated by Helle Snellingen and Veronica Harrington, staff translators, Norges Bank. 8  From Olav H. Hauge (1988): ”Mange års røynsle med pil og boge – 99 dikt av Olav H. Hauge”, Det Norske Samlaget. Translated by Helle Snellingen and Veronica Harrington, staff translators, Norges Bank. BIS Review 18/2008  9  10  BIS Review 18/2008  BIS Review 18/2008  11  12  BIS Review 18/2008  BIS Review 18/2008  13  14  BIS Review 18/2008  BIS Review 18/2008  15  16  BIS Review 18/2008  BIS Review 18/2008  17  18  BIS Review 18/2008  BIS Review 18/2008  19  20  BIS Review 18/2008  BIS Review 18/2008  21

In particular, the rapid surge in prices over the last year, has been brought under control and inflation has been declining in recent months, through easing the pressures on household' budgets and reducing uncertainties for enterprises. At the same time, the banking sector appears sound, indicators on the stability of both public and external debt have been improving, the financial environment is calm, and enterprises and households' balance sheets remain solid. These achievements are not a result of chance. They reflect, among other things, adequate and coordinated monetary, financial and fiscal policies and the results of continuous structural reforms which we have undertaken in the financial sector. The proportional and timely reaction of these policies has minimised the immediate consequences of shocks and has safeguarded the production capacity of Albania. In parallel, continuous structural reforms have strengthened the flexibility and resilience of the Albanian economy, by helping both the monetary and financial stability of Albania. 1/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In my remarks today, I will provide an overview on the main directions of the Bank of Albania's work throughout 2022 and its results. I would then like to share a brief summary of our expectations and highlight some of our primary objectives for 2023. ***  1. The outlook for the economy, price stability and the Bank of Albania's monetary policy The global geopolitical and economic environment experienced upheaval in a radical and unexpected manner at the outset of 2022, due to the Russian unjustified invasion of Ukraine.
1   The EU should continue and complete institutional reforms, by finalising the Banking Union, the aspects regarding the operationalisation of EDIS (European Deposit Insurance Scheme), by setting MREL (minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities) for banking groups; moreover, the EU should move towards a fiscal union without debt mutualisation, should leave less room for discretion and comply with rules once they have been adopted, it should clarify the fine balance between the consolidated microprudential supervision of banks and national accountability in terms of resolution.  But maybe the most important factor for the cohesion and coherence of the European project is the success in safeguarding the four fundamental freedoms: the free movement of capital, goods, services, and above all persons within the Union. A Union that would waive these principles would no longer be the Union that was established in 1957 and that Romania joined 10 years ago. As regards Romania:  Romania has accomplished a lot in the past ten years: nominal convergence, real convergence in part, financial stability, it has gained market confidence and has implemented structural reforms.  In order to carry on with real convergence, Romania has to exploit its growth potential and to get as close as possible to full employment.  With a view to achieving these goals, we should focus on a number of issues related to real convergence which were less debated in the first ten years.

Initially, about three-quarters of the GDP’s increase came from manufacturing, which represents only about 20 per cent of Sweden’s economy. This meant that bottlenecks occurred fairly quickly, accompanied by various types of inflationary impulses. Our relatively small industrial sector cannot be expected to sustain a growth rate that is higher than the total economy achieved in the 1970s and 1980s. The problem with the dual economy -- a flourishing export-related industrial sector and a rather weak recovery in sectors with a more domestic orientation -- stemmed in part from low confidence in economic policy’s determination and ability to keep inflation low in the longer run. This in turn was a consequence of Sweden’s poor record in this respect, coupled with serious problems with government finances. Long bond rates fluctuated widely and in 1994 and 1995 they actually climbed to the levels of the years of high inflation. The exchange rate continued along its depreciating path from the 1970s and 1980s. For the Riksbank, the lack of confidence in the direction of economic policy left little room for manoeuvre. Although the instrumental rate was lowered during the spring of 1994, virtually all the market rates and particularly those for longer maturities rose. Sweden was approaching a point where economic policy had to demonstrate that the focus on stability was a firm commitment. The monetary tightening and, perhaps to an even greater extent, the fiscal consolidation gradually generated increased confidence in Sweden’s readiness and ability to achieve low long-term inflation.
Twelve-month change. Percent 16  16  10  10  4  4  –2  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  Inflation Inflation target Five-year moving average  –2  Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  Norway has a flexible inflation targeting regime.4 Monetary policy also aims to promote high and stable employment and mitigate the build-up of financial imbalances. High employment is beneficial for economic growth, for financing social benefit schemes and for the financial and living situation of individuals. Financial imbalances can lead to a pronounced economic downturn. This is why we will, especially in an environment of very low interest rates, also take into consideration the risk of imbalances building up in the credit and housing markets. Even so, monetary policy cannot take primary responsibility for maintaining financial stability, which must be ensured by means of regulation and supervision of financial institutions. MONETARY POLICY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PROMOTING EMPLOYMENT The inflation target is symmetric. We seek to avoid both too high inflation and too low inflation. On the other hand, the objective of high and stable employment is asymmetric – the more people in employment, the better. Since unemployment more readily moves up than down, we should respond quickly by cutting the policy rate when economic activity abruptly declines. For the same reason, we should be patient about raising the policy rate to avoid restraining the recovery too early.

By slowing the rate tightening cycle somewhat so that labour demand increases, the central bank can contribute to promoting employment. But when employment rises sharply and rapidly, wage growth has a tendency to accelerate. Inflation usually follows suit. As shown in the Chart 5, we have previously experienced that the rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services accelerates in the wake of a sharp rise in employment. Chart 5 When employment rises rapidly, inflation tends to follow suit Four-quarter change. Percent 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  –1  –1  –2  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005  2008  2011  2014  2017  Employment growth, moving average Domestic goods and services inflation six quarters later  –2  Sources: Statistics Norway and Norges Bank  6  The role of monetary policy is to promote maximum employment without causing inflation to accelerate. Monetary policy cannot take primary responsibility for employment. Entry into the labour market is determined by the education system, the social benefit system and labour market policy. An increase in labour supply will create more room in the next round for an increase in employment without causing inflation to accelerate. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 17 FEBRUARY 2022  THE LABOUR MARKET IMPROVED RAPIDLY Monetary policy is a first line of defence in stabilisation policy. Economic downturns are countered by rate cuts (Chart 6).
Only national authorities can decide when to adopt Basel II. Members of the Basel Committee believe that it is beneficial for all countries to move in the direction of Basel II, but the timing for its ultimate adoption should be determined by each country’s own circumstances, and not necessarily the timetable for Basel Committee members. At the same time, I should note that many bankers and supervisors from emerging market countries, including India, were very active in sharing their views and suggestions with the Committee to help make the Basel II framework relevant to banks in many different markets. Indeed, the Reserve Bank of India has played an important role in sharing the perspective of an emerging market country through its participation in the Basel Committee’s Core Principles Liaison Group. In addition, representatives of Indian banks shared their views and even data on how they would be affected by the new framework. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to all of our colleagues in India who contributed to improving the quality and applicability of the new framework. Unlike the 1988 Accord, which was relatively simple to adopt, Basel II is admittedly more complex and demands more of banks and supervisors. Therefore, the Committee does not expect Basel II to be  2  BIS Review 68/2004  adopted as widely and quickly as the 1988 Accord, at least at the outset. However, we expect and hope that the number of countries that adopt the new framework will grow over time.

Jaime Caruana: Basel II - emerging market perspectives Keynote remarks by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, for a panel discussion on “Basel II - Emerging Market Perspectives”, Bankers’ Conference 2004, New Delhi, 11 November 2004. *  *  *  Thank you, for your kind introduction and opening thoughts on the significance of the new capital framework in emerging market countries. I would like to thank as well the Indian Bankers Association and our host institution, Punjab National Bank, for inviting me to take part in your conference. It is an honour to be asked to share some of my thoughts on Basel II and its implications for a country such as India. I must confess that it is a still greater privilege for me to hear your thoughts directly on this new standard and the role it may play in a large, rapidly growing dynamic economy. A discussion on India adds the perspective of a country whose banking sector has been undergoing an important period of transition. The scale of that transformation is evident in the global aspirations that Indian banking organisations are now pursuing, as the title of this conference suggests. I would like to continue our discussion of Basel II first by discussing briefly why the Committee felt that the international capital standard needed to be revised and how Basel II addresses the Committee’s goals for it.
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  our inflation targeting regime should be flexible. Hence, the interest rate path should provide a reasonable balance between the path for inflation and the path for overall capacity utilisation in the economy. We have learned that stabilising inflation involves important trade-offs in a small open economy. Let me elaborate a bit on this point: Shortly after we adopted inflation targeting in 2002–2003, efforts to dampen inflationary pressures resulted in a strong krone appreciation, with strong impacts on the economy. Later, in the mid-2000s, when inflation was low while at the same time growth was strong, low interest rates at home and abroad contributed to amplifying the cyclical upturn in Norway. In the light of our experience, it is fair to say that our inflation targeting regime has become more flexible over time. The third criterion is that the interest rate path should reflect a robust monetary policy. By this we mean that the interest rate should be set so that monetary policy mitigates the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. Moreover, acceptable developments in inflation and output should be likely under alternative assumptions about the functioning of the economy. Implementing these concerns analytically is not straightforward, however. We are working intensively to refine our approach to these concerns in our analytical framework. [Chart: Criteria for an appropriate interest rate path] This chart illustrates how the forecasts for the key policy rate, output and inflation evolve when the various criteria are taken into account.

Judgement is applied when responding to shocks, and a specific reaction function will only provide a simplified representation of the central bank reaction pattern. Regular information about policy intentions is therefore necessary for the public to learn and revise their expectations. This is also the rationale for forward guidance. In theory, forward guidance may also work as a commitment device and help the central bank stabilise the economy in a more efficient way. 4 The merits of this are debated, and it may be most relevant in a situation where the interest rate has reached a lower bound. Forward guidance about how the central bank plans to reach its targets may nevertheless help establish confidence among agents that the objectives will actually be achieved. Forward guidance may thereby indirectly make an inflation target more credible, and thus contribute to anchoring inflation expectations. For forward guidance to work as intended, there are some preconditions. First, economic agents must indeed understand the announced reaction pattern. A second, and related issue, is that the conditionality of the guidance must be understood. A commonly raised concern is that the public might perceive the guidance as unconditional promises rather than conditional statements. Yet another requirement is that the guidance must affect the agents’ expectations. I will address these issues in more detail when I discuss our experience of forward guidance in Norway. Many central banks started to provide some kind of forward guidance in the late 1990s.
Whether or not these initiatives lead over time towards greater "convergence" of our financial systems in some structural sense – as they may – taken together with national deregulation they should at least contribute to greater competition, including cross-border competition, and help to improve the effectiveness of our financial systems in terms of the key criterion which I suggested earlier in my remarks. That is particularly true, at least potentially, of the steps proposed to advance the European single financial market, as set out in the Commission's Financial Services Action Plan, because of its broad scope. But progress has so far been painfully slow. In that context I welcome the recent emphasis on closer and more active co-operation between financial regulators within Europe, regardless of national regulatory structures. And I particularly welcome the proposals put forward by Alexandre Lamfalussy and his "Wise Men" for accelerating progress on measures that would encourage greater efficiency in Europe's securities markets. But there is clearly a great deal more that we can do in this whole area. Such changes in national financial services regulation, and related international and regional actions, taken together with increasing awareness in many parts of the world of the potential advantages of opening national financial markets to international competition, provide an encouraging environment for a second main driver of change in our financial systems – globalisation.

But it is a challenge, too, for the financial authorities who need to balance the need for market competition with the maintenance of minimum prudential and business behavioural standards by individual financial institutions, and the need to preserve overall macro-level financial stability. How far we are succeeding in meeting this challenge is, to my mind, the essential criterion against which we should seek to assess the development of our financial systems. Against that background let me now try to identify some of the main drivers of change that have been, and are, affecting all our financial systems to varying degrees. The first is financial deregulation, that is to say the relaxation of controls designed to override market forces in either an overall macro-economic or a directional sense. In the case of the UK this extends back very importantly to the abolition of exchange controls and direct controls over bank lending over twenty years ago, to enabling building societies (our principal mortgage providers) to extend their range of financial services activities, to the opening up of membership of the Stock Exchange and broader capital market intermediation and so on. Deregulation in this sense was both encouraged by, and in turn contributed to, increasingly intense competition within the financial services industry, including a blurring of traditional distinctions between different types of financial institution.