samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These are some of our unique strengths, and it is not easy for others to replicate them, at least in the short term. With all these developments, where should we go next? At the policy level, I believe it would be important to build an effective two-way channel to increase interaction between the RMB onshore and offshore markets. A potential area that can be explored is to promote the use of RMB for conducting crossborder real economic activities such as FDI and ODI. Given the significant share of Hong Kong in Mainland’s FDI and ODI, building such a two-way channel will also be conducive to the sustainable development of the offshore RMB market in Hong Kong. On this, I am glad to see that the People’s Bank of China has, as I briefly mentioned a few minutes ago, recently launched a pilot scheme, under which ODIs by Mainland Chinese enterprises are allowed to be settled in RMB upon approval of relevant Mainland authorities. As for FDI in RMB, there have already been some pilot cases (such as McDonald’s) and it is hoped that the relevant arrangement can be formalised in due course. Apart from FDI and ODI, we have been in close communication with the Mainland authorities to explore other possible channels. In particular, we welcome the announcement of the People’s Bank of China in August last year regarding the introduction of a pilot scheme allowing eligible entities in Hong Kong to make use of their RMB funds to invest in the Mainland’s interbank bond market.

Today I will highlight two aspects that I believe are key drivers for Hong Kong’s growth in the next few years. The first is the gradual financial liberalisation in Mainland China and the second is the wider external use of the renminbi (RMB). The gradual financial liberalisation in mainland China In the gradual financial liberalisation process in Mainland China, we can observe three key patterns: inflows being de-regulated before outflows, direct investment flows being liberalised before portfolio investment flows, and collective investment schemes being relaxed before individual investors. Specifically, during the early stages of Mainland China’s reform process, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, only Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was encouraged. Hong Kong has been the largest source of FDI for the Mainland, accounting for more than half of the total amount in 2009. In the opposite direction, Mainland China’s Overseas Direct Investment (ODI) has also been liberalised gradually over the years. Hong Kong has been the largest recipient of ODI flows from the Mainland. At present, about 60% of ODI from the Mainland has gone to Hong Kong or via Hong Kong to other places. The significant share of Hong Kong in Mainland’s FDI and ODI underscores the unique role of Hong Kong as a gateway for foreign enterprises to access the Mainland market, while at the same time being a springboard for Mainland institutions to gain exposure to international markets. With respect to portfolio investment flows, market attention has been focusing on portfolio flows from advanced economies towards Mainland China.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Global markets outlook Opening speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Global Markets Outlook Conference Series 2007, organised by Deutsche Bank, Bangkok, 8 January 2007. *  *  *  Thank you very much and good morning, First, let me thank Deutsche Bank for inviting me to give the opening remark this morning. Last year, I was also honoured with the same opportunity, so I am very pleased to be back doing this again this year, addressing this important conference. A lot of things have happened to both the global markets and to Thailand since the time we met last year. And compared to last year, to be speaking on the economy and the markets this year, I think, is much more challenging. At this time, although the mood in the markets is positive, I think considerable uncertainty still looms in the global economy to the extent that even the best of our analysts still do not seem to be coming to a common view on the key issues. For example, the pace of global slowdown and how much further would the US dollar need to adjust. But, this is, in essence, the nature of markets, and a variety of views will provide the markets with the needed latitude and balance for its continued growth and stability. So, I very much look forward to today's conference, and to the presentation on some of these issues, as well as on this year's outlook.

This line of research points to the wide range of subjects that interest Thomas Philippon already shown in his 2007 book “Un capitalisme d´héritiers: la crise française du travail” 12  6  See speech by Vítor Constâncio: Banking Union: meaning and implications for the future of banking at the Banking Union Conference, Navarra University, Madrid 24 April 2014. 7  See the opening speech entitled “The implications of bail-in rules for bank activity and stability” by Benoît Cœuré at the conference “Financing the recovery after the crisis – the roles of bank profitability, stability and regulation”, held at Bocconi University on 30 September 2013. 8  Acharya, V., L. H. Pedersen, T. Philippon and M. Richardson, (2010) “Measuring Systemic Risk,” working paper. 9  See, for example, the Vox article entitled “Finance and growth: Too much of a good thing?” by Thorsten Beck, 27 October 2013. 10  Philippon, T., (2010), “Financiers versus Engineers: Should the Financial Sector be Taxed or Subsidized?”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(3), 158–182. 11  Philippon, T. and A. Reshef, (2012) “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 1909–2006”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), 1551–1609. 12  Philippon, T., (2007) “Un capitalisme d´héritiers: la crise française du travail”, Éditions Seuil. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  where he musters a lot of empirical evidence to show that the labour crisis in France stems from bad employers-employees relations associated with a system that “preserves inheritance, direct or sociological”.
It has become commonplace that shadow banking somehow exacerbated the boom, and complicated the rescue efforts of the authorities during the bust. 1 That is true. But there has been relatively little discussion about what this means for policy. We do not need to get too bogged down in defining what is meant by “banking” here. I mean it simply to refer to firms that take on-demand or highly liquid deposits, and use those liquid savings to provide term loans to households, firms and other parts of the financial system. Banks are, therefore, absolutely central to the monetary and payment system; and they are also vital to the credit system. They are leveraged; they run maturity mismatches; and their net worth is often uncertain. So they are exposed to runs, with spillovers to the rest of the system and the economy more widely. Reflecting that, they have long functioned within the terms of an established social contract with the authorities. 2 It has involved industry-financed deposit insurance (and now special resolution regimes); prudential regulation and supervision; and liquidity insurance from central banks. That regime reflects the spillovers (“negative externalities”) that flow from bank failure. But precisely because the regime aims to place a higher weight on the safety and soundness of banking than banks and their shareholders would themselves, it sets up incentives for some types of business to be booked outside the banking system.

The authorities had always been clear that they competed with commercial banks in credit markets (including before the repeal of Glass Steagal), but they were not regarded as monetary institutions and so they did not have access to central banks’ liquidity-insurance facilities and were not regulated alongside commercial banks. It turned out that this was a misthink; or, rather, that over time it was overtaken by developments in parts of their business. During the crisis, the big US securities dealers suffered a liquidity run on two fronts. Repo markets closed to some of them; I shall come back to that later. Also, hedge fund prime-brokerage clients withdrew surplus balances (and transferred trading positions, with the associated collateral, to banks). Some dealers had been using them to finance their business, effectively on-lending “deposits” into the credit and securities markets. And some of them could not easily raise the funds to repay. As a sense of this spread, the demand for repayment inevitably intensified, into a panic. Whatever the details of the law in the US, the UK and elsewhere, the dealers’ prime brokerage services seem to have taken them into the core monetary territory of banks. Lehmans was running a bank, perhaps without knowing it. The dealers, or at least their prime brokerage outfits, should have been banks, with access to the central bank’s Window and subject, at entity and group level, to US led bank regulation. Alternatively, they should not have been providing de facto demand deposit services and using those deposits to finance themselves.
I welcome this as a step in the right direction and hope that more will follow.   On the fiscal side, it is important that we see progress in Washington in addressing the long-term fiscal challenges facing the country in a manner that is credible and supports economic recovery. Not only is this important to reassure households and business that the U.S. budget is on a sustainable path, but also this would be important from a larger confidence perspective – demonstrating to our citizens and the world that the political process can still work to make tough choices in the national interest. In this regard, the ability of the so-called Congressional “Super Committee” to reach agreement on a way forward is an important opportunity that I hope is not squandered. Regional economic conditions Now, how has the region fared during the downturn and its aftermath? Based on the New York Fed’s indexes,1 the downturn in the economy in New York City ended in November of 2009. Since then, the city’s economy has been on the mend and, as of September, the recovery continues at a healthy clip. The local economy has fared better than the nation during this deep recession and slow recovery. Employment fell by a smaller percentage in the city than it did nationally. During the recovery, New York City has already regained half of the net jobs lost during the recession.

As of August, the 12-month change for a broad measure of consumer prices was 2.9 percent, almost double the change in the year before. However, the bulk of that increase was due directly to the run-up of energy and commodity prices, which tend to bounce around a lot. Measures of the underlying rate of inflation have moved up too, but by less and to levels broadly consistent with price stability. I expect those to subside soon, as well. It is important to remember that a year ago the worry was that deflation – meaning a persistent, widespread decline in prices – might take hold. Deflation tends to inhibit growth because people and companies have a harder time paying down debt and may defer investments and purchases when prices and wages are falling. Avoiding outright deflation is a very good thing. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Thus, barring more energy price jumps, I expect inflation to fall late this year and next. Moreover – and this is crucial – households’ inflation expectations remain well anchored. Low and stable inflation expectations help us to deliver low and stable inflation. In light of the current weak outlook, the FOMC has announced that we expect to keep shortterm interest rates exceptionally low at least through mid-2013 and will change the composition of the assets the Fed holds to provide additional support for growth. In addition, we have discussed the range of policy tools available to promote a stronger economic recovery even as we keep inflation pressures in check.
Interest rates in France are also among the lowest in Europe: the average nominal rate on new bank loans is currently less than 2% compared with 5% in 2007. Lastly, SMEs generally have little difficulty obtaining investment loans: according to the Banque de France’s survey, in the third quarter of 2015, 92% of loan applications were accepted (i.e. at least 75% of the amount requested was granted), although there is still room for improvement in the case of VSEs. At the same time, bond financing is increasing. The trend towards the diversification of debt financing appears to be more marked in France than in neighbouring European countries, with companies increasingly turning to capital markets to meet their funding needs. The disintermediation rate, that is the share of bond financing in overall corporate debt, has risen from 24.2% in 2008 to 38.6% in 2015, compared with respective rates of 14.1% and 13.5% for Germany and Italy. Nonetheless, in France, market financing is mainly the preserve of large corporations, accounting for some 70% of their total financial debt, compared with 25% for mid-caps and less than 5% for SMEs. Yet forcing them to switch to disintermediated financing would make little sense: this diversification of funding has to remain optional, driven by demand from companies themselves, rather than being imposed according to a set timetable and predefined objectives. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  c) The priority of increasing equity funding can be achieved via several channels.

Richard W Fisher: ¡Ándale Pues! Get on with advancing hispanic prosperity through education Remarks by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, at the Hispanic Economic Experience Conference, Dallas, Texas, 16 June 2011. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. I am here today not simply to say bienvenido and welcome you to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas with un fuerte abrazo, but to underscore the importance I attach to our achieving a better understanding of the Hispanic economic experience and, very importantly, the potential for greater Hispanic advancement within the U.S. economy. Let me cut to the quick: Hispanics are underachieving in our society, especially in Texas. Here are the data:   There are some 50 million Americans who identify themselves as Hispanics. This number is up 43 percent over the last decade. Roughly 66 percent, or some 32 million, self-identify as Méxicanos.   Texas has the second-largest Hispanic population, after California: 9.5 million Hispanics, the vast majority of whom are of Mexican origin, live here. A majority of them are native born, whereas in the rest of the United States, a majority are foreign born. In other words, the majority of Hispanics who live in Texas are as American as I am; some maybe more so, as I am a first-generation American born of immigrant parents.
The mission statement of the Eurosystem very well reflects this by stating that, beyond the overriding objective of maintaining price stability, “we aim to safeguard financial stability and promote European financial integration.” In the light of the recent events, the benefits of financial integration are sometimes put into question and it may look like that the two objectives – safeguarding financial stability and promoting financial integration – potentially conflict with each other. It is exactly because we live in an increasingly interconnected world that the crisis has been so severe and widespread. So why should we – after the recent crisis – still promote financial integration? And still believe in the reconcilability of financial integration and financial stability? I will argue that financial integration is not only a fact, it is absolutely necessary for the functioning of the euro area economy. It is an irreversible process which should be promoted. While it may be true that financial integration poses some risks to financial stability – such as contagion fostered by greater interconnectedness – the benefits stemming from financial integration far outweigh its costs. I will try to convince you that – instead of containing financial integration – our efforts need to be directed at a better understanding of the different forms of financial development, particularly related to two aspects, namely complexity and size. Opaque products, when difficult to understand, may lead to mispricing of risks and distorted allocation of resources.

About overall economy, a more sustainable development should be ensured, relating mainly to better control on trade deficit, supporting the sectors that actually contribute or may contribute to increasing exports in the country. Public authorities should strengthen their commitment to developing the non-bank financial market, which gradually leads to reduction of economic dependence on the banking sector condition and improves access to financing of a higher number of private entities. In this way, a greater opportunity would be provided to the financial system to finance projects in the agricultural sector, which has a high potential for ensuring competitive advantages in the Albanian economy. Allow me to conclude by emphasizing the Bank of Albania’s willingness to contribute, through its policies on monetary and financial stability, to maintaining a better climate of sound development of the financial and banking activity, as a condition for a greater financial support to business development in the country. I think that this forum will make a valuable contribution to setting some concrete development policies and projects, about which, I believe that the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank will offer its own support and expertise. Wishing success to the proceedings of this forum, I thank you for your attention! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Going forward, a deteriorating labor market would affect the sector, particularly those households with less financial capacity to face an income shock. Meanwhile, a scenario of higher rates would have a smaller impact on households' outstanding debts —as they are granted mostly at a fixed rate and long term— as opposed to new borrowing for buying a new home or refurbishing one. All in all, the aggregate impact of this scenario on the sector is greater if the macroeconomic effects of an in interest rate rise are factored in. The banking system's financial indicators remain healthy, although capitalization is lagging behind international standards (figure 14). Banking stabilized profitability and solvency indicators, keeping liquid and currency mismatches within bounds, and without making significant changes in its dividend policies. In terms of credit risk, quality has deteriorated in the individual evaluation of the commercial portfolio, which has been covered with increased collateral. Although this strategy allows reducing the idiosyncratic risk of each bank individually, it causes vulnerability of the banking industry to systemic events that simultaneously reduce the payment capacity of enterprises and erode collateral value. This is a risk factor that must be monitored considering that 45% of total bank lending belongs to this category. Stress tests indicate that an adverse scenario of a slight but prolonged fall in activity would pose a risk to banks comparable to one of a more severe scenario but with a faster recovery.

Figure 13 90-day delinquency rate (percent of loans)  6  12  Clearing houses and family subsidies (right axis)  5  10  4  8  3 Banks  6  Retail  2  4  1  2  0  0 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF, SUSESO and SVS data. 19  Figure 14  Capital adequacy ratio by country (*) (percent)  30  30 Ireland  Sweden  2017  26  26  Luxembourg New Zealand Norway  22  22  Denmark Germany France Czech Rep. Brazil Colombia Belgium Hungary Japan Switzerland México Peru Turkey Israel Canada Chile  18 14  U.S.  U.K.  18 14  10  10 10  15  2011  20  25  (*) Dotted line marks 45-degree angle. Green diamonds correspond to Latin American countries (red for Chile). Source: Central Bank of Chile using IMF (FSI) data.
The financial bubble contained all the classical elements, such as a surging credit growth and house price inflation. Norges Bank had to carry out several rescue operations to save banks that were in trouble. 1899 was probably the first year the Bank functioned as “lender of last resort”. If you take a walk around the neighbourhood, you will see the physical aftermath of this bubble. You will find buildings from the 1890s and from the 1920s onward, but virtually nothing built in the intervening period. The past years we have again been in troubled waters. In September 2008 the turbulence in financial markets developed into a full-blown global crisis. Money markets seized up. Confidence between banks vanished. Liquidity dried up, interest rates rose sharply and equity prices fell. The long-term lending market dried up. International developments were also felt in Norway. Up until then we could almost take a well-functioning money market for granted in this country. But in the autumn of 2008 the money market stopped functioning and medium-term funding for banks was problematic. Just as in 1816, Norges Bank acted as “market maker of last resort”. And so, the history of my own central bank, expanding the window from 25 years to 200 years, does not provide an unambiguous answer to the question of what defines a central bank. But even if we look at central banks in other countries, there are no clear answers. The way the financial crisis was handled varied across countries.

And the recovery of the euro – including its recovery against sterling – will help to ease the severe imbalance within our own economy between the domestically-orientated sectors which have typically been doing relatively well and those businesses and sectors that are most exposed to competition from the Eurozone and which have been having a rough time. That imbalance is, I know, a real concern up here north of the border, and it has more generally for some time been one of the most difficult issues confronting us in conducting monetary policy. But there are, of course, also major domestic uncertainties. What – as I have often explained before – we are seeking to do through monetary policy – in order to achieve the Government’s inflation target – is to keep overall nominal demand growth more or less continuously in line with the supply-side capacity of the economy to meet that demand. That is a necessary condition for maintaining our steady economic progress. But we cannot directly observe supply-side capacity in either product or labour markets, nor therefore anticipate just how it will develop, with any great precision, nor do we know precisely what is currently happening or is likely to happen to the rate of growth of aggregate demand in the economy anyway. Our forecasts and policy judgements are based upon very careful scrutiny of all the latest data available to us, informed by the best technical analysis we can muster.