samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Over time, the inflation target and labour productivity set the standard for wage growth. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 11/2002  13

the government on organic  In line with the international appetite to  agriculture, mainly due to the  promote green financing, the Central  multiple benefits that accrue from it,  Bank has also joined the Sustainable  the Central Bank expects to promote  Banking Network (SBN) of the  commercial scale organic agriculture  International Finance Corporation (IFC),  and dairy entrepreneurs through the  which is a knowledge and capacity  establishment of formal agribusiness societies and multi-stakeholder enterprises. building platform for financial regulators and banking associations of emerging markets on sustainable finance. As a   A Loan Scheme for Promoting Rooftop  member of the SBN, we would focus on  Solar Power Generation: A new loan  sustainable banking practices to help  scheme, funded by ADB, will be  banks to effectively manage  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  31  environmental and social risks in the  finance, with the support of IFC, we  projects they finance and support  intend to conduct a workshop for the  businesses that are greener, climate  senior staff of banking institutions in Sri  friendly and socially inclusive. As an  Lanka during the first quarter of 2017.  important step towards sustainable  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  32  6.
The Financial Stability Board’s Official Sector Steering Group (OSSG) has indicated its support for ISDA to include such a trigger to avoid fragmentation between cleared and uncleared derivatives.10 Derivatives contracts account for 95 percent of the exposure to U.S. dollar LIBOR, so universal changes to these contracts would be a significant leap forward. If the market signs up to the ISDA protocol when it’s published, it will be a considerable milestone and will go a long way toward reducing risks to firms, markets, and the financial system. In addition, the ARRC has released four sets of recommended fallback language for different types of cash products and has published potential paths forward for adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs).11 While mortgages are a small part of the overall exposure, it’s vitally important that consumers understand what the changes being made mean in real terms. Last week, the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, the OCC, and other agencies released a proposal on adjusting margin requirements for covered swap entities that, among other things, are meant to remove unintended hurdles to signing the ISDA protocol and moving away from LIBOR.12 The Financial Accounting Standards Board has similarly released an exposure draft with proposals to smooth the transition from an accounting perspective.13 Finally, earlier this year, the SEC staff issued a statement highlighting risks and disclosures for market participants to evaluate proactively as they transition away from LIBOR.14  The Challenges Ahead 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Progress has been made, but there’s still much to do.

We will enrol eligible applicants in Deal Fridays, a programme jointly organised by MAS and Enterprise Singapore, where they will gain access to the investor community. 7/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  Conclusion The future of Money, Finance, and the Internet will have far-reaching effects on economies and societies. It is important that public authorities and the financial and technology communities work together to shape that future, so that Money, Finance, and the Internet can be forces for good, helping to expand economic opportunity, enhance social inclusion, foster stability, and protect our planet. Ultimately, Money, Finance and the Internet must serve the people who use them. MAS is committed to partnering you on this exciting journey. Have a great FinTech Festival! 8/8  BIS central bankers' speeches
Lest you get carried away with excitement, I must note that some of the acceleration in activity will be a function of inventory adjustment, and much will stem from an unwinding of the disruption caused by the Japanese earthquake and tsunami as the Japanese make up for supply interruptions to the auto and other industries faster than many thought possible. Looking beyond 2011, I hope that growth above 3 percent can be sustained, again assuming the fiscal authorities get it right. As Jim has referenced, I may have called the bottom of the recession in the summer of 2009 well before most anybody else did, but I made the point in that Dallas Morning News interview that going forward, we were going to have a slow slog.8 I have said many times since then that, in light of the fact that we were recovering from “post-traumatic shock syndrome” stemming from the Panic of 2008 and 2009, economic recovery would proceed hesitantly, taking two steps forward and one step back until it finds its new legs. We took a step backward in the first half; I expect we will proceed forward, however haltingly, in the second half and into 2012. 6  Eminent Economists: Their Life Philosophies, ed. Michael Szenberg, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 7  “Consumer and Business Spending to Spur Expanding U.S. Economy,” by Phil Izzo and Justin Lahart, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 2011.

Even surveys of small businesses – most recently, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s survey of companies with less than $ million in sales and fewer than 500 employees – indicate that fewer than 10 percent of small enterprises (which employ half of the private sector’s workers) are having problems accessing credit.3 The National Federation of Independent Business specifically noted just yesterday that “91 percent [of those surveyed in June] reported that all their credit needs were met or that they were not interested in borrowing.”4 U.S. banks and businesses are awash in liquidity. Adding more is not the answer to our problems. With monetary policy having reached the limits of accommodation, and the federal government at sixes and sevens, what then is the foreseeable economic outlook? Are we going to grow through the rest of the year and on into the next, or are we going to dip back into recession? Forecasting economic growth is not a precise business. Economics is an art form, not a science; it is very judgmental and subjective. The FOMC is composed of 17 thoughtful, introspective and deliberate men and women. Five of the members serve full time in Washington as Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, appointed by presidents of the United States with the approval of Congress.
Our housing market has indeed a lot of growth potential: it is true that mortgage lending has yet to become as common as it is in many other countries. However, we should bear in mind, first, that mortgage debt has been taking years to accumulate there and, second and most important, the accumulation of this debt should tally with a rise in household incomes. Hence the need to prevent the emergence of a bubble in this market and the real risks this bubble would carry, in order of priority, for people, developers and banks. This sector needs a long-term development 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  plan based on market principles. I cannot agree more with the Speaker on this subject: the government’s concessional lending programme indeed helped stave off market failure at times of crises. At this point in time however, we are seeing that demand for mortgage loans is in a way increasingly translating into a stampede, leading to unjustified price growth in several regions. Ultimately, developers and banks stand to take advantage of this programme, rather than consumers. It would do no harm to support them; however, our key objective is the availability of housing. We should focus increasingly on targeted support programmes, which includes the efforts to support the overall supply and demand balance. Let me explain: there are more and more consumers willing to make use of low rates and take out mortgage loans. They could service the debt, but they have no money for the down payment.

Once the testing system is fully operational and we are convinced of its efficiency, these restrictions will be gradually lifted. We believe that at this juncture it is our responsibility to protect our investors. We might as well move forward some of the law regulations — those making customers’ qualification tests mandatory — from April 2022 to at least 1 October 2021. At the time, we went along with market players and provided for a fairly comfortable and soft transition period in the law. We had an extensive discussion with Federation Council members. It stands to reason however that the major shift in the situation calls on us to take meaningful action to protect consumer rights. I admit that financial institutions themselves are unlikely to welcome this proposal, and their feedback will be negative. This is where we count on you to help, just as we have always counted on your support of our initiatives related to efficient consumer right protection in the financial market. The key reason for this is the nature of financial institutions: they are financial intermediaries which should operate in the interest of businesses and consumers, just like the Speaker said. We therefore believe that now is the time for prompt and serious discussion of this matter to make a decision. I am now handing over the floor to Sergey Shvetsov, who will enlarge on these and other initiatives I have presented.
The first series of initiatives announced on 2 December 2016, seeks to provide greater room for the onshore ringgit hedging for both resident and non-residents. The focus was on ensuring better access to the onshore financial market. In particular, residents can now hedge without providing underlying documents up to certain limits, while registered non-resident investors have the flexibility to carry out dynamic hedging. At the same time, the scope of the appointed overseas office framework was widened to provide greater avenues for non-residents to access the onshore financial market. 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second series of initiatives announced on 13 April 2017, introduced greater flexibility for investors to manage currency and interest rate risks. Registered investors can now conduct full dynamic hedging and resident investors can now conduct short-selling for Malaysian government securities. All these flexibilities are expected to increase the ease of hedging business risks. The aim is to promote a two-way liquidity in the onshore financial market. At the end of the day, we envision that the implementation of these initiatives will make the domestic financial market a market of choice, where prices are determined by the real economy devoid of speculative and damaging activities. In this respect, we have introduced initiative that enables non-resident investors to access and hedge ringgit assets in the domestic markets.

Good internal governance and due diligence, supported by robust internal surveillance and reporting mechanisms; and 5. Compliance to prevailing rules, regulations and market codes while extending full cooperation to the authorities. The Principles should be universally applied, internalised and practiced by all parties that transact in the Malaysian financial market. These Principles must be demonstrated consistently in the daily conduct of market participants. Outcomes of the Adherence to the Principles will result in a well-functioning market The Principles are intended to result in a fair and effective financial market that efficiently intermediates the funding needs of the economy and resilient in the face of shocks. One particular aspect of the Principles is on the adherence to rules and regulations, a critical pillar of financial stability, and a Code of Conduct expanded to explicitly prohibit transactions in unauthorised markets. This includes, in particular, the NDF market. These Principles ought to result in three key outcomes: 1. Firstly, balanced perspectives when formulating policy and assessing market development. Such balance is needed between growth and stability, whereby growth of the financial market must be consistent with economic fundamentals. We have seen in many instances how the size of the financial market can be disconnected, and has grown too large for the real economy. Most of the activities in these outsized markets do not contribute to sustainable growth and consist mainly of speculative activities.
Personally, I thought that an unchanged repo rate gave a better balanced monetary policy in July than a cut would have done. Monetary policy was already expansionary, and our forecast was that inflation would attain the target of 2 per cent and that the real economy would reach sustainable levels within the forecast period. I also believe that there are risks in having low interest rates over a long period of time – risks that unsustainable behaviours and imbalances will arise in connection with the build-up of debt. Such risks also need to be considered in our assessments, while we try to ensure that we attain the inflation target and stabilise the real economy. Having said this, we also emphasised in July that there was considerable uncertainty over future developments. As I mentioned before, we assumed in our assessment that the problems in the euro area would be managed in such a way that a deeper crisis could be avoided. If the financial unease were to escalate, the situation for monetary policy would of course be quite different and policy would probably need to be even more expansionary. However, if credible measures were put in place, confidence could also return sooner than expected, which could increase demand in the Swedish economy. This might justify a higher repo-rate path. Developments during the summer So, what has happened since the July monetary policy meeting? To begin with, we can note that the storm clouds are still hovering over Europe.

Risks in the euro area – focus on Greece and Spain The concern on the financial markets stemmed of course from the public finance situation and problems in the banking sector in the euro area. Concerns increased during the spring, mainly due to developments in Greece and Spain. The situation following the parliamentary election in Greece in May fuelled speculations of an EMU exit. After a new election in mid-June, the political parties that support the savings programme managed to form a new government. However, it was still uncertain whether the new government would be able to implement adequate measures. At the same time, Spain continued to have problems with its public finances and yields on their government bonds rose. The problems in the Spanish banking sector also became more acute. In June, the Eurogroup promised to provide loans of up to EUR 100 billion to enable the Spanish banks to increase their capital adequacy, and the Spanish government formally applied for  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  assistance. Increased concern over the situation in Spain also meant that Italy and the country’s large sovereign debt attracted greater attention. At the end of June, just before our monetary policy meeting, the European Council decided on a number of measures to stabilise the situation in the euro area in the short term. The focus was on how the EFSF funding programme and later the ESM can be used.
The integration of the financial markets caused the crisis to spread swiftly, while the vital role of the credit system in free market economies transformed it into a global recession, hitting the East and South-East European countries as well. The experience gained so far has allowed a better acknowledgment of the causes that led to the crisis and the factors that triggered and accelerated its spreading, and a reassessment of the diverse supervisory and regulatory practices. I would like our discussions on the crisis to focus on two directions: what we learnt and what we could not learn from the crisis. Among the numerous aspects debated at length, I would like to distinguish three of them: the dichotomy between the state and the market, the degree of confidence in the forecast models, and the importance of coordinating the pre-emptive measures. With respect to the “state vs. market” debate, I would like to re-stress my unwavering confidence in the market and our commitment as policy-makers to make it operate by the rules and efficiently 24/24. The last few years have witnessed the rapid development of forest models and techniques. Avoiding the tendency to underestimate their high importance to the day-to-day work of every analyst and policy-maker, we have to be aware of the restraints in these models and of the risks arising from the excessive reliance on them.

I once told a friend of mine that small open economies, as is the case with the Balkan economies, are net importer of goods, services and crises. The crisis did not originate in the region. It was gradually transmitted as a result of the integration of the region with the global markets and economy and a consequence of the presence of large international banking groups. Our countries are all as similar as they are different. Consequently, the form, outburst and consequences of the crisis were as similar as they were different. The economic and social structure, the level of convergence and integration with the global markets, the legal and institutional norms and the nature of exchange rate regimes in particular, have established the features of the crisis for each country. The experience of the distinguished governors present in this conference will throw light on the above aspects. As regards the Albanian case, the last 12 months have been challenging for the banking industry. Despite the turbulent times, the banking system has in no case shown any signs of panic or confusion. The Bank of Albania considers that the rationale behind is the prudence shown in the recent years with respect to the banking system’s financial stability. The high level of resilience and the quick recovery were a consequence of a number of important decisions.
And UK GDP has now risen for 38 consecutive quarters (albeit in the case of 2001 Q4, only just! ), the longest continuous expansion since post-war records began. Achieving low and stable inflation is the best contribution that monetary policy can make to the wider economic goals of sustainable growth and employment. Having an inflation target certainly does not mean that we ignore  BIS Review 18/2002  1  real activity. We have discretion over how rapidly we try to bring inflation back to target when and if it diverges from 2½%. And we regularly publish our best estimate about the likely future path of growth up to a two year horizon. But the aim of policy is clear - we do what is necessary to keep inflation on target. As you know, there are nine of us on the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee, and we meet once a month to make our interest rate decision. This is a rigorous process, and rightly so. But, of course, agreement on process need not, and does not, imply universal agreement on the appropriate stance of policy, as our minutes show. Indeed, an industry has grown up geared to guessing MPC members' personal habits, psychoanalysing our personalities and classifying us into different species of the aviary. But it is important to recognise, I think, that disagreements are evidence of the strength of the system, not its weakness.

We have to understand that monetary policy alone cannot ensure price stability without the appropriate fiscal discipline at the overall level of the Economic and Monetary Union. For my part, I would give three economic justifications for the Treaty provisions that gave rise to the Stability and Growth Pact. Firstly, by coordinating the fiscal policies of the Member States of the Monetary Union, the Pact ensures a good policy mix within the euro area. This is essential for monetary policy. Since Europe does not have a significant federal budget, just as Europe has no federal government, the sum of the national budgets must serve as an overall budget for the area as a whole. This calls for close mutual surveillance and coordination of fiscal policies within the euro area. That is the reason why sanctions, including fines, can be decided against bad behaviours. Europe has not practised benign neglect as regards fiscal policy: it has given the Council, which is the political body at the centre of Europe much more influence and power on the fiscal policy of Member States that in any existing federation or confederation. Secondly, the Pact helps prevent well-run economics from having to bear unjustified risk premia by setting up a system of penalties for excessive deficits. Thirdly, the Stability Pact allows us to disprove the assertion that the euro area has no automatic stabilisers in the event of asymmetric shocks to a member economy.
The time it takes for a change in the interest rate to affect inflation and demand will vary. During the period in which a change in the interest rate affects output and inflation - and often before monetary policy has an effect - the economy will be influenced by a number of direct and indirect disturbances. Therefore, we cannot fine-tune inflation. In our open economy, the exchange rate channel is one of several channels through which monetary policy operates. How much the exchange rate appreciates as a result of a rise in key rates depends on a number of factors. The effect of the exchange rate channel may therefore vary over time. The more the krone appreciates as a result of a rise in interest rates, the less the key rate must be raised in order to reduce inflation when tightening policy is appropriate. The level of the real exchange rate affects the activity level in business and industry. We take account of the exchange rate channel and the effect of the krone exchange rate on domestic activity and inflation when preparing our inflation projections. Thus, the exchange rate influences the setting of interest rates. There is no underlying perception of what the correct exchange rate level in the long term should be for the conduct of monetary policy or, of course, of what the correct industry structure should be in the long term. This is consistent with an operational target of low and stable inflation and with the conduct of inflation targeting in other countries.

Instead, imbalances in the labour market would be counteracted by means of a counter-cyclical policy. Substantial emphasis was placed on the importance of wage formation for developments in employment. Only when wage growth dropped below the level of our trading partners did unemployment begin to fall and the manufacturing sector began to pick up. Thus, the fixed exchange rate policy was not introduced in order to strengthen the internationally exposed business sector. On the contrary, it was a breach in the approach whereby monetary policy and “exchange rate policy” had been oriented towards safeguarding these sectors. The fixed exchange rate was an intermediate target for achieving low and stable inflation. The exchange rate remained stable until the autumn of 1996, partly because wage growth was low and aggregate demand did not contribute to pressures in the economy. Gradually, the krone began to fluctuate more. The experience of the last half of the 1990s showed that monetary policy cannot fine-tune the exchange rate. Developments in international financial markets provided fertile ground for more pronounced fluctuations. And more fundamentally, when labour market pressures rose and incomes policy failed, exchange rate developments were no longer providing signals for wage formation and fiscal policy. High petroleum revenues, fiscal slippage and expectations of increased use of petroleum revenues contributed to this. Therefore, the exchange rate was no longer suitable as a nominal anchor. The introduction of new guidelines for economic policy in March 2001 and the conduct of fiscal policy have altered the interplay between economic policy components.