samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Arthur Yuen: 12th Annual AML & Anti-Financial Crime Conference Speech by Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS) 12th Annual AML & AntiFinancial Crime Conference – APAC, 26 April 2021. * * *  What a difference three years makes 1. Good Morning, ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to participate once again in the ACAMS APAC Conference, and my congratulations to the organisers for putting together such an interesting programme. 2. Since the last time I spoke here in 2018, life and the world have changed beyond recognition. In addition to its consequences for human health, the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in far-reaching changes to the way financial services are delivered. Digital and online offerings have accelerated, while at the same time a multitude of opportunities has also opened up for those who would seek to abuse the global financial system. 3. For sure, we are focusing on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) issues over the next two days. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the core mandates that we have all been working very hard to deliver in this challenging period. And we have been broadly successful so far, by helping mitigate the economic disruption brought on by COVID-19 so that consumers and businesses can get through the pandemic and continue contributing to economic development. 4.

This will enable us to make possible further adjustments, for example regarding the liquidity rules that will apply as of 2015. The question of systemic risk is still outstanding and we will deal with it in 2011. Le Figaro – Are you in favour of more stringent requirements for larger banks, considered to be systemic? Christian Noyer – This should be an option rather than automatic. Who would have thought that Northern Rock or Bear Stearns could be regarded as systemic? I think that, in the context of each country, a wide variety of instruments is necessary to allow supervisors to ensure that banks increase their loss-absorbing capacity. In particular, the experience of national supervisors should be taken into account. In France, for example, we adjusted, as permitted by Basel II, the ratios required of each institution based on its risk profile. The experiment was conclusive. The amounts that each bank had to raise from the State during the crisis proved consistent with the requirements that we had determined. Other countries that have not had this experience are likely to implement automatic rules. Le Figaro – In the United States, some believe that European banks, and in particular French institutions, are undercapitalised relative to the size of their balance sheets... Christian Noyer – The idea that US banks all comply with Basel III and that efforts are only required in Europe is false. Those who believe this are victims of an accounting and prudential optical illusion.
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Transbank. 11  18  19  20  21  22  23  Figure 7  Unemployment and labor participation  Employment by occupational category  (percent)  (index, 2019-2023=100, deseasonalized series)  14  Unemployment rate  70  120  12  Labor participation rate (right axis) 65  110  10  60  Salaried  Other (*)  100 90 8  55  6  80  50 20  19  21  22  70  23  19  20  21  22  23  (*) Categories include employers, self employed, household help and unpaid family work. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 8  Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)  (index, 2013.I=100, real deseasonalized series)  120  GFCF  Construction & works  Machinery & equipment  110 100 90 80 70 13  14  15  16  17  18  Source: Central Bank of Chile. 12  19  20  21  22  23  Figure 9 IMCE (1)  EPN: Planned investments for the year (2)  (diffusion index)  100  75  (percent of firms responding "Yes")  Commerce  Construction  Manufacturing  IMCE w/o mining  60  40 50 20  25  0 18  19  20  21  22  0  23  Abr.21  Abr.22  Abr.23  (1) Monthly Business Confidence Index.

It is important to reiterate that we continue to project that the convergence requires the economy to have negative gaps for a few quarters, as this is necessary for the effects of the macroeconomic imbalances of previous years to dissipate. We must keep in mind that this is no simple process, nor is it risk-free. The road to inflation reaching 3% is still long and we must walk it while carefully analyzing each piece of information we receive. We all have witnessed the cost that high inflation means for families. Of the effort that every citizen of our country has had to make in order to make their income accommodate price increases beyond 6  what we were accustomed to. That is why, although this is not a cost-free process, the benefits of low and stable inflation are substantially higher, especially for the most vulnerable households. Although conditions are moving in a favorable direction, we cannot declare victory prematurely. Quite to the contrary, we must redouble our efforts and be very attentive to how the economy unfolds and its implications for inflation. True enough, this also means that we must take on many other challenges that these difficult years have left us with as a legacy. One such challenge is the need to rebuild the capacity of our economy to withstand adverse conditions. As we learned during the pandemic, the shocks that can affect us come not only from economic variables.
This policy has been complemented by three new extraordinary tools, designed to promote the more efficient and uniform transmission of expansionary monetary impulses and to foment a greater expansion of lending in the area. First, a new long-term refinancing facility has been set in place. Last September, the first of these fund-injection operations was carried out, and they will be extended to June 2016. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  These operations may have a maturity of up to 4 years and are carried out at a very attractive cost for banks: only 10 bp above the main refinancing operations rate, which is currently equivalent to a rate of 0.15%. So that these new long-term injections may translate into an increase in lending to the private sector, access to the funds has been tied both to the outstanding balances and to the flows of the credit extended by banks to households and firms. The ECB has also launched two new asset purchase programmes. The first, which is already under way, involves the acquisition of bonds issued by banks and backed by specific items on their balance sheets. This is the case, for example, of the various types of covered bonds traded in Spain. The second programme, which will be operational in the coming weeks, envisages the acquisition of securities derived from the securitisation of loans to households and firms.

Without forgetting the difficulties that a prolonged period of low inflation entails for reducing debt ratios and for price-competitiveness, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the adjustment witnessed in Spanish relative prices and costs vis-à-vis the euro area has been crucial to explaining the sound performance of the external sector, whose contribution continues to be vital for the recovery. Overall, the outlook for the Spanish economy remains favourable, although not free from risks. Spain has so far shown resilience in the face of the worsening international setting. But this should not lead us to believe that the loss of momentum in our external markets, and in particular in the euro area, may be fully averted. In addition, at home, the need to see through both private- and public-sector deleveraging might detract from the recovery capacity of domestic expenditure. The State Budget for 2015 The Draft State and Social Security Budget currently under discussion is framed in a macroeconomic setting in which real GDP would increase by 2% in 2015, as a result of the fresh momentum of national demand, which would contribute 1.8%, and of a small rise in the contribution of net external demand, to 0.2% of GDP. The process of job creation would firm, reaching a growth rate of over 1%, and taking the unemployment rate down to around 23% in annual average terms.
One point worth noting is that the volatility of international financial markets has diminished. In the domestic monetary policy front, a significant development of recent months has been increased inflation, which is now above 4 percent in annual terms. Although this was expected to some extent because of inflation’s previous level and especially because of the normal pass-through of the exchange rate depreciation to domestic prices, the actual figure exceeded not only our latest IPoM’s forecasts but also private expectations. Our projection scenario assumes that inflation rising above 4 percent is a temporary phenomenon and that it will return to 3 percent annually within our normal monetary policy horizon, a vision that is also reflected in medium-term private inflation expectations, which have remained at 3 percent. In this context, the Board has communicated that it will consider the possibility of making additional cuts to the monetary policy rate in line with the evolution of domestic and external macroeconomic conditions and its implications on the inflationary outlook. The slowdown in output and demand should take pressure off future prices, but in an environment of already expansionary monetary policy and where prices have risen above projections, it is necessary that the Central Bank carefully weigh the risks surrounding its decisions. Let me now share with you our baseline scenario and the main risks we have covered in the two reports I am presenting. Macroeconomic scenario The y-o-y variation of the different CPI measurements has increased significantly in recent months, and as I said, more than foreseen.

Figure 4 Current account (*)  (percent of GDP)  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6 05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  (*) Accumulated in one moving year. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 Interest rates on Central Bank of Chile bonds (*)  (percent)  8.5  8.5  7.5  7.5  6.5  6.5  5.5  5.5  4.5  4.5  3.5  3.5  2.5  2.5  1.5  1.5 03  04  05  5-year BCUs  06  07  08  09  10-year BCUs  10  11  10-year BCPs  12  13  14  5-year BCPs  (*) Monthly averages. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 6 Domestic companies' funding cost (*)  (percent)  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  Jul.05  Abr.07  Feb.09 Base  Nov.10  Jul.12  May.14  Spread  (*) Considers UF-indexed private AA companies' bonds at about 5 year maturities. Dotted vertical line Source: Central Bank of Chile based on information from the Santiago Stock Exchange.
Household debt has increased at a faster pace than income in the last ten years. Norges Bank’s calculations indicate that the sharp rise in house prices in recent years may explain a large share of debt growth. Higher house prices have a fairly long-lasting effect on household debt growth. As a result, credit growth will remain high for a fairly long period even though the rise in house prices is expected to slow. Given the assumptions underlying our projections, it is likely that debt will continue to grow at a faster pace than disposable income through the entire projection period. As a result of high credit growth, the household debt burden has increased over the past year. The debt burden is currently record high. Due to unusually low interest rates, the interest burden is, nevertheless, relatively low. A normalisation of interest rates will increase households’ net interest expenses, but according to the projections the interest burden will not be higher than it was at the end of the 1990s. If there are expectations of persistently low interest rates, there is a risk that the debt burden may increase more than assumed in the projections. Net interest expenses will then also be higher than assumed. In addition, households will be vulnerable if unexpected disturbances result in higher than expected interest rates. Challenges ahead Oil gives us an economic base that is not available to many other countries.

Henrique Meirelles: Brazil-Argentina Local Currency Payment System Speech by Mr Henrique Meirelles, Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil, at the Inauguration of the Brazil-Argentina Local Currency System, Buenos Aires, 2 October 2008. *  *  *  It is an honor to attend today the launching of the Brazil-Argentina Local Currency Payments System (SML). I am certain that this initiative will be a watershed in the bilateral relations between the two nations. Coincidentally, the new system kicks off in a period of financial turmoil and liquidity crunch in international trade, in which cooperation among central banks becomes fundamental to facilitate trade and to deepen economic ties. Central banks are responsible for ensuring adequate international payments systems. In processes of economic, financial and trade integration, the objective is to establish an efficient payments structure for intra-regional transactions. When flexible and unobstructed payments systems are available, trade transactions flow with greater ease and lower costs, and financial flows tend to intensify. This is what we expect from the new SML system. Initial obstacles have been overcome. The mechanism of the SML will trigger significant changes in the way in which companies export and import. In Brazil, exporters may now operate in real, while Argentine businesspeople may operate in pesos. Each one of our countries established a consistent framework for management of the system.
Now let me go over the baseline scenario. In this scenario, piecemeal policy averts a systemic crisis and leads to a prolonged recovery. In the baseline scenario, progress in implementing policy remains bogged down by internal politics but makes sporadic progress, especially once the possibility of a systemic crisis becomes all too real. This scenario is basically a continuation of the present state of affairs with which you are all familiar. Global capital markets are in flux. And global trade slows down. The recovery process is long and drawn out and the authorities eventually make progress on fiscal integration and banking union. So which scenario will be likely? This is the big question mark. There is considerable uncertainty due to the ups and downs of internal politics. But political imperative to maintain the union has always been strong. And a strong union needs a stable common currency and economic growth. Once the crisis becomes imminent and threatens the union, authorities will have no choice but to take decisive action to avert a systemic crisis. So those are of my views of how the Euro crisis will play out. Let us move to the second question: can Thailand grow through the Euro crisis? Yes, long-term sources of growth remain but adjustment pain will be unavoidable. In a globalized world, nobody is immune from the euro crisis. In fact, there are already signs that Asian exports, Thailand’s included, are slowing. Amid a slowing global economy, this drag on growth is unavoidable in the short-term.

Incoming data will need to be carefully analyzed to determine the severity of the impact on the overall Thai economy. On the exchange rate, we maintain a managed-float regime. The Thai baht has been quite volatile of late amid concerns over the euro. Nevertheless, it remains broadly in line with economic fundamentals and thus is market determined. The exchange rate should be managed sparingly and only in unusual circumstances of market dysfunction or economic misalignment. By allowing the exchange rate to be market determined, it can serve as an automatic stabilizer in the short-term and as an important price signal and catalyst for structural change in the long-term – an issue I touched on earlier within the context of unleashing domestic engines of growth. Nevertheless, should the euro crisis result in market dysfunction or significant misalignment of the exchange rate, exchange rate intervention to stabilize markets or re-align exchange rates with fundamentals may be warranted. On macroprudential policy, a framework is needed as the Bank of Thailand’s mandate covers both monetary and financial stability. Macroprudential policy focuses on financial stability. Monetary policy focuses primarily on price stability. Macroprudential and interest rate instruments therefore primarily serve different objectives. Prudential measures constitute the first line of defense against financial imbalances by serving as “sand in the wheel”, so as to dampen the financial cycle, weaken pro-cyclicality, and hence reduce the propagation of financial shocks. The interest rate tool, in comparison, is too blunt.
In other words, bankers have, by assumption, short horizons. They aim to maximise their reputation in the market at the end of this period. 4 At the beginning of each period, each bank originates a risky asset, the return on which depends on (i) the banker’s ability, which can be high or low, and (ii) the macro state, which can be good or bad. Both are unobservable to the market. The macro state is good with probability . High bank ability and a good macro state increase the probability of positive asset returns. That is, when the macro state is bad, assets turn out to be bad, irrespective of bankers’ ability. But when the macro state is good, both high and low ability bankers achieve high returns with some probability, with high ability types always achieving high returns and low ability types achieving high returns with probability . Asset returns are realised in the middle of each period and are observed only by banks. If the asset is good, banks make a profit (normalised to be a negligible amount). If the asset is bad, banks face a loss of –1. Because of their short horizons, bankers care about both the present value of their asset returns and their reputation in the market, where is the probability assigned by the market to a banker being high ability. The market is unable to observe banks’ actions directly, so instead infers bankers’ ability from observed bank earnings. Banks’ earnings are affected by their choices when returns are low.

Mr. Heikensten answers eight questions on monetary policy in Sweden Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Lars Heikensten, at The Economics Association in Umeå on 19/2/98. Introduction During the 1990s monetary policy has been the subject of intensive discussion. This is not surprising, given the serious crisis in the Swedish economy at the beginning of the decade and the role that monetary policy played both then and as the crisis was building up. Since that time, monetary policy has had an explicit role to safeguard independently the value of money – a role that is new in Sweden in the post-war period. With a floating exchange rate, the decisions currently made by the Riksbank on its instrumental rate are very real and important to the behaviour of households and businesses and to economic growth. The monetary policy discussion has evolved over time. Questions and statements about monetary policy’s basic objective of price stability that were very frequent a couple of years ago are less so today. Understanding of the Riksbank’s actions seems to have increased. We are presently trying to evaluate this by asking the public how it views the Riksbank’s work and by following the media and newsletters written by the market’s players. It is also possible to form an opinion based on the market’s reactions to changes in the instrumental rates as to whether the policy is understandable.
ASEAN: A growth centre in the global economy ASEAN has emerged centre stage in the global economy and has been recognised as one of the most dynamic regions in the world. The region has sustained high economic growth with a long-term average GDP growth of 5.3%, higher than the global growth average of 3.6%. Currently, as a single entity, ASEAN is the 6th largest economy in the world with a GDP close to USD2.5 trillion. With a projected annual GDP growth of 5.4% 1 over the next six years, the region is poised to reach an economic size of USD3.7 trillion by 2020, four times the size it was a decade ago. The strong growth and dynamism of the region is supported by its favourable demographic structure. With a population of more than 630 million people and a burgeoning middle class, ASEAN is rapidly transforming into a thriving hub for consumer demand. By 2020, ASEAN is expected to account for more than USD2 trillion of additional consumption. This is being reinforced by rising incomes in the region, with per capita income almost trebling in this recent decade. The rapid progress of economic integration in ASEAN has enabled the region to harness the benefits arising from the diversity and complementarities that exist across the ASEAN economies. Amid the strengthening of cross-border supply chains in the region, intra-ASEAN trade and investment activity have increased significantly over these recent 15 years.

Moreover, these economic agents tend to put the blame on the falling inflation for the worsening of their situation. These economic agents that fail to harmonize with this new process are the ones who resist the most to the fight against inflation. This adaptation problem also prevents these economic agents from seeing the advantages offered by price stability. In this context, the most important development in fight against inflation is that credibility of current policies have improved, whereas the inflation target has increasingly become a more credible nominal anchor for a majority of the economic agents in Turkey. In other words, the inflation target was taken as a reference more extensively. Further developments will facilitate the adaptation of economy to changing dynamics and support maintenance of the price stability as well. Distinguished guests, Before discussing the effects of the falling inflation on economy, let me elaborate the importance of price stability for economies. As we all know, the primary objective of economic policies is to provide sustainable growth and to increase employment throughout the country. The role of monetary policies has been misunderstood for a long time. This wrong assumption is that the increase in inflation and growth are parallel to each other and growth rates can be accelerated by loosening the monetary policy. Frankly speaking, in the framework of early economics literature, this assumption can only be verified in the short term, in countries where inflation rates are low and there is no credibility gap in monetary policies.