samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Given the prevailing wage moderation, this acceleration in activity has been particularly propitious for job creation: the euro-area unemployment rate has declined by one percentage point since October 1999 and stood at 8.9% in October 2000. Surging oil prices and the depreciation in the euro’s effective exchange rate have fuelled a marked rise in inflationary pressure since the autumn of 1999. Inflation as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) thus rose above the 2% threshold in the twelve months to February 2000. In November 2000, the year-on-year increase amounted to 2.9%. There have also been increasing signs of pressure on the productive system, with the appearance of production bottlenecks and rising capacity utilisation rates throughout the euro area. The latter work out to 84.7% for the fourth quarter of 2000, i.e. almost three points above their long-term average of 81.8%. In addition, the value of imports rose substantially under the combined impact of buoyant economic activity, an almost two-fold increase in oil prices and the euro’s depreciation. As a result, the current account, which had shown a surplus, shrank to a slight deficit. Robust growth for the French economy Following the trend initiated in 1999, the French economy enjoyed robust growth. Although the growth rate levelled off somewhat in the third quarter, it should remain sustained given the renewed confidence expressed by households and the business prospects of the industrial sector, where our surveys indicate that order books are well-filled.

Banks with CDO exposure have already made full provision and recognized losses in line with IAS 39, and presently all sub-prime related CDO positions have been unwound. More importantly, Thai banks also do not have investment in US GSE securities. This is another positive point that will help insulate the banks from any further spillovers. Reflecting this, the direct impact of the turmoil so far, on the Thai banking sector, has been limited. Second, on the issue of liquidity and financing, banks in Thailand are predominantly domestic-owned. Hence, they rely more on deposit funding rather than external funding. Domestic funding is a more stable source of funding and is not affected by the turmoil. This feature will help cushion Thai banks from the effects of the global credit crunch. BIS Review 111/2008  1  Third, fundamentals of the Thai banking system have improved and the key fundamentals are sound and resilient. As a sector, banks in Thailand have enjoyed good profits for the past seven years and are well capitalized with the BIS capital adequacy ratio at 15.2 percent at end of June this year. Over the years, better risk management, improved asset quality, greater provisioning coverage against losses, and the regulatory and supervisory frameworks that meet international standards, have significantly improved the overall risk profile of the sector. As for the most recent quarter, net profit of 57 billion baht was registered in the second quarter of this year.
All three aspects of this principle – “lending freely”, “good collateral” and a “penal rate”, are problematic at the international level. An effective LOLR must be willing to lend whatever it takes to prevent a liquidity run. The more credible is the LOLR, the less the resources that are required to be lent in practice. Domestic LOLRs have credibility. But for a prospective ILOLR the decision for a group of countries, either jointly or via the IMF, to lend large sums to another country will always be difficult. In a world of nation states, it is unreasonable to suppose that political considerations will not enter the choice of recipient of such largesse. And the greater the political uncertainty about the willingness to act as an ILOLR, the larger the amount of funding that will be required. In turn, the operation will appear less credible, and the authorities are caught in a vicious circle. The current resources of the IMF – between $ billion and $ billion depending on how they are measured – are wholly inadequate for an ILOLR. Nor are resources on the appropriate scale likely to be forthcoming. Moreover, serious moral hazard arises when the private sector ignores the risks of lending to a country because it believes that the country would be bailed out by the international community in the event of a liquidity crisis. And investors are encouraged to lend to emerging markets in forms – short-term debt – which are more likely to be bailed out.

It is important to focus on the nature of capital flows not the nationality of investors concerned. Hence the resolution of crises involves more than simply restructuring liabilities to foreign banks or overseas investors. The problems created by the volatility of short-term debt flows require a structural solution. 3. Purist solutions  How can we design an appropriate infrastructure for the international capital market to prevent, or at least limit the frequency of, crises? To return to our transport analogy, there is clearly a case for eliminating blind spots on the road or lengthening the runway. But this is not enough. We also need to think about how the emergency services should respond to a crash. The purist is led naturally to consider solutions of two opposite kinds. One, which maintains open and free capital movements, is to create an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). The second, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is to reinstate permanent capital controls. Consider first the merits of an ILOLR. The obvious institution to play that role would be the IMF, and its First Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, provided a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of an ILOLR earlier this year.4 Although not new, the concept of an ILOLR has, in polite official circles, become the facility that dare not speak its name. The principle of a lender of last resort was described by Thornton and Bagehot in the nineteenth century as a willingness to lend freely against good collateral at a penal rate.
Before proceeding to a more in-depth analysis of the topic, allow me to clarify an issue that was subject to previous public debate. The National Bank of Romania has nothing against wage hikes. Quite the opposite, we might say. The Romanian economy could only benefit from an increasingly fast rise in wages, in order to enjoy a higher living standard, surmount the historical disparities that separate us from the Western economies and put a stop to labour force migration. Nonetheless, we must analyse with a clear mind and assert bluntly that a mismatch between pay rises and labour productivity gains is unsustainable. Wage hikes in excess of labour productivity are not likely to bring about a higher living standard, but on the contrary, they may lead to a lower living standard, given that, sooner or later, the disparity between the two fundamental indicators will entail a fast-paced rise in prices, the weakening of domestic currency, external indebtedness. All this has a negative influence on  BIS Review 162/2008  1  investment and delays the achievement of real convergence of the economy rather than speed it up. Over the past few years, annual productivity gains came in at impressive 10% and beyond each year. Multiple factors stood behind this performance, such as the initial low level, the significant decline – even if not always illustrated by statistical indicators – in the population working in agriculture and, highly important, the strong increase in investment.

In this vein, I must specify that, once Romania joined the European Union and the National Bank of Romania became a member of the European System of Central Banks, we are not only entitled, but also bound to present our viewpoint where we see that fundamental equilibria of the economy may be jeopardised by a particular development. Hence, I will refer to the NBR’s objective to ensure and maintain price stability and bring inflation rate down to a level compatible with its capacity as a member of the Eurosystem. Generally, a lower inflation rate is associated with a slower economic growth and even with recession. However, this phenomenon occurs only when there is a contradiction in the economic policy mix and when subdued inflation is not the primary objective of other policies, particularly fiscal and income policies. When the policy mix is balanced, inflation rate may be curbed while maintaining a sustained growth pace. Behind this development stand mainly foreign direct investment inflows which enhance the productive capacity of the economy and ensure the sustainable financing of a relatively high external deficit. In Romania’s case, the experts working with the central bank as well as the independent analysts estimated that the national economy may further rise at a fast clip amid alleviating inflationary pressures, even in the context of a current account deficit of 8-10% of GDP. Nevertheless, in order for capital inflows to continue, Romania’s economy must stay attractive.
Further regulation in specific areas where Swedish banks are particularly vulnerable may also be necessary. Here I am mainly referring to the Swedish banks’ extensive market funding, particularly from abroad, which I discussed earlier. And which has in many ways enabled the expansion in the banks’ mortgage stocks. There is international work on producing new regulations in this area, too. When the work regarding the technical details for liquidity regulation is complete, we must also decide how and when the regulations should be introduced in Sweden, taking into account the structure of our financial sector. Don’t forget the supply side In talking about the housing market I have mostly talked about the demand side and how we can ensure a balanced development there. This is what much of the general debate has concerned. But I would like to conclude with some words on the supply side, or housing construction, and what role this plays and has played earlier. While this is something that is fairly often discussed in this context, I nevertheless feel it deserves a little more attention. One of the explanations usually put forward for the high housing prices is that relatively little new housing has been built in the past fifteen years or so (Figure 4). The low level of construction is what is usually termed a “fundamental explanation” of the upswing in house prices. And this is probably true.

Well-known problems and deficiencies With regard to measures involving correcting well-known problems and deficiencies, I see three main priorities. One priority is to gain a better overview of the mortgage market. Although we have information on aggregate changes and mean values with regard to household indebtedness,  2  For a review of how different studies evaluated the housing market in the United States prior to the crash, see Gerardi, K.S., C. L. Foote and P.S. Willen, (2010), “Reasonable People Did Disagree: Optimism and Pessimism About the U.S. Housing Market Before the Crash”, Public Policy Discussion Papers No 10–5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  how much of their income goes on paying interest, etc., this type of data can disguise a substantial underlying variation. If we view it uncritically, there is a risk we will be lulled into a false sense of security. It may be enough for some households to be so much in debt that a fairly modest increase in the mortgage rate forces them to sell their homes. If a sufficiently large number are in this situation, it may start up a spiral of falling prices forcing further sales and leading to further price falls. But as I said, we do not know how many households are in this situation. We also need to gain a better idea of the extent to which households amortise their loans. We hope to achieve this now.
Norman Chan: Facilitating financial innovation in Hong Kong Welcoming remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Fintech Day, Hong Kong, 25 October 2017. * * * Good morning, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. 1. This is the second year that the HKMA organises a Fintech Day. I am pleased to say that, compared with the much smaller venue at PMQ last year, we have almost 1,000 participants attending today’s event, which is double of the participation last year. This is a clear demonstration of the very rapid growth in the interest as well as progress in the field of fintech in Hong Kong. 2. Talking about progress, I would like to update you on the latest developments since I announced a “New Era of Smart Banking” on 29 September at the annual conference of the Hong Kong Institute of Bankers. You may recall that I mentioned seven initiatives to prepare Hong Kong to enter into the Smart Banking Era: a Faster Payment System, Supervisory Sandbox 2.0, Virtual Banking, Open API, Banking Made Easy, Cross-border Collaboration, and Research and Talent Development. Although it is only less than a month after my announcement, I am pleased to report on the encouraging progress made in respect of two of these seven initiatives, i.e. cross-border collaboration, and research and talent development. Cross-border collaboration Singapore 3. One of the key characteristics of Fintech is that it is borderless.

Finally, I wish you a productive and fruitful time here at the HKMA Fintech Day, and trust that you will benefit from today’s rich plenary and parallel sessions. 21. Thank you very much. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
From the perspective of developed countries, the main risk arises from the possibility the prolonged very low inflation, or the occurrence of deflation, to produce  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  significant negative effects on the economic activity and public debt sustainability. This risk is particularly pronounced in the euro zone, where the longer underperformance of inflation in comparison with the target would cause a decline in longer-term inflation expectations, which in the absence of room for loosening the monetary policy would lead to higher real interest rates and consequently, to lower economic activity. In the medium run, the risks to the global economy arise from the possibility of lower potential growth of developed economies and developing countries, as well as the possibility of prolonged economic stagnation of the developed countries (the so-called secular stagnation). The risk of secular stagnation is particularly pronounced for the countries of the euro zone, where the constantly low domestic demand due to lower investment and higher private savings would have negative effects on economic growth and productivity in the long run. Yet, the challenges for growth in the forthcoming period are not related only to the external environment. Namely, this is a period in which it appears that the room provided by the macroeconomic policies for supporting further growth is largely exhausted. Macroeconomic policies have played a key role in the post-crisis economic recovery, but they require gradual consolidation in order to prevent the emergence of imbalances in the economy.

Hearing of François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France,  Before the Finance Committee of the French National Assembly Paris, 1 March 2023  Page 1 sur 5 Mr President, Mr Rapporteur General, Ladies and Gentlemen Thank you for welcoming me to this hearing today, the first of 2023. The economic context is sending out mixed signals, with rather good news regarding economic activity, but significant inflation and uncertainty, and the Russian war against Ukraine still in the background. I will first seek to shed light on these economic signals and the resulting monetary policy developments (I), before discussing the effect of monetary policy on the financing conditions of the economy, i.e. businesses, households and public debt (II). I. No recession, but still too high inflation  Although it slowed down - as expected - at the turn of winter 2022-23 in France and in Europe, economic activity is faring better than expected, as confirmed month after month by our monthly business survey of 8,500 companies. Average purchasing power was finally preserved in 2022. The risk of recession that was hanging over our economies can now be dismissed, barring a major global event. We will update our quarterly macroeconomic projections on 20 March. In France, growth is expected to be slightly positive in 2023 - a priori slightly higher than the +0.3% forecast in December - before picking up again in 2024.
In any financial market, misconduct is often driven by greed and greed is something no system could be tempered proof. Greed creates mistrust. And mistrust damages confidence. But greed can be mitigated. This can be achieved by establishing a system of consequence management. It is certainly possible to limit or mitigate cases of greed if as a collective, we would not tolerate any case of wrong doing within our community. As a group, we should expect individuals to behave according to the highest professional standards and held accountable for their actions. On this aspect, PPKM had instituted a mechanism to prevent staff with questionable conduct from moving freely between banks without full disclosure of his or her professional history. It is in the interest of the industry that PPKM continue the role as a gatekeeper in setting professional standard with a view to uphold the highest standard of professionalism and conduct among its members. And, this brings me to a third point, we need to enhance market participant’s professional qualification, knowledge and skill set. Financial market is dynamic and evolving, and players need to keep abreast of both domestic and global developments. There are ample financial market courses and programmes offered here in Kuala Lumpur, however majority of these program are still at entry level courses.

In fact, non-residents only hold 29% of government securities which should include the Sukuk or MGII. Furthermore, most of the outflows by non-residents arise from the sale of short-term bonds associated with short-term views while investors of Malaysia’s long-term bonds have remained steadfast in their investment holdings. We also observe since October 2015 the non-resident portfolio flows has becomes positive. In 2015, as part of our effort to improve transparency, we have embarked on an initiative to gather statistics on the ultimate beneficiary owners of Malaysian bonds and sukuks to give the market a clearer picture on the types and behavior of investors in our market. Preliminary data showed that of the total non-resident holders of Malaysian debt securities, 70–80% were stable long-term investors while the remaining minority was short-term investors. We are now looking at measures on how we can enhance the disclosure requirements of our bond holdings to be even more transparent so that our financial market would be on par if not better than the best practices adopted by advanced markets. Over the years, we have liberalized the foreign exchange administrative rules to promote competitiveness and reduce cost of doing business, attract foreign investors and create business opportunities for our local players. Ringgit bonds were allowed to be traded freely offshore, with some restrictions placed on ringgit funding and FX derivatives markets to contain speculation, with the aim to ensure financial stability. An unintended consequence of this liberalization was the emergence of offshore transactions relating to Ringgit such as NDF and NDIRS.
From now on, we will hold press conferences after each monetary policy meeting, regardless of what decision has been taken. Until now we have only held a press conference if the repo rate has been adjusted or if we have published a Monetary Policy Report. But to understand the monetary policy conducted, it is equally important to explain why the repo rate has been held unchanged as to explain why the repo rate has been changed. By publishing our own interest rate forecasts and by holding press conferences after each monetary policy meeting we will provide more detailed and more regular information on the considerations taken by the Executive Board. We have also decided to make changes in our way of signalling. By signalling I mean how we communicate our monetary policy intentions. Previously, when we Executive Board members have gone out and talked about the current economic situation between the monetary policy meetings we have sometimes given indications of how we consider the repo rate should be set at the next meeting. This has been on the condition that it is clear that the points of view expressed are the individual member’s. The idea was that when the interest rate decision was taken at the monetary policy meeting, enough information on the different Executive Board members’ views would already have been given by degrees so that the decision would not surprise market agents.

For instance, in February we considered that the new information received since our previous monetary policy meetings in October and December did not justify the relatively large upward adjustments in the interest rate forecasts made by some other market analysts. The fact that other agents make their own assessments of how the interest rate will develop is essentially very positive. One of the arguments put forward against a central bank presenting its own forecast for the interest rate path was that the agents in the financial market would then stop making their own analyses of interest rate developments. However, these misgivings have proved unjustified. Opinions on the interest rate and future economic developments still differ, which is a natural consequence of the uncertainty regarding the future development of the economy. In particular those who operate in the financial markets know that we live in an uncertain world and for this reason the assessments of interest rate developments will continue to differ. Another argument against a central bank presenting its own forecast for the interest rate is that the central bank would lose credibility if the forecast proved to be wrong. It has also been speculated in various market comments that it would entail a loss of prestige for the central bank to revise its forecasts and that the central bank should therefore by wary of doing so.