samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In my November 2013 speech, I noted that an important foundation for making the resolution of our largest banking firms feasible would be to require, at the holding company level, sufficient minimum amounts of long-term debt that could be used to absorb losses in a single point of entry resolution. Important progress has been made on this front, both in the form of the Federal Reserve’s recent issuance of a proposed rule to establish long-term debt and total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements for U.S. GSIBs and the announcement last week by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) of an agreed upon international minimum TLAC standard. It is notable that in several important respects the proposed U.S. rules are stronger than the FSB standard. With these new proposed requirements, if losses were to wipe out a firm’s capital and push a firm into resolution, a sufficient amount of long-term unsecured debt would be available to absorb additional losses through a “bail in” process, recapitalizing the firm with no taxpayer  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  bailout and without generating systemic financial contagion. These proposed requirements should also improve market discipline by ensuring that each GSIB has a class of creditors who are clearly “at risk,” and therefore have an incentive to monitor the firm’s risk-taking. In my 2013 speech, I also called for further work to address the challenges in a resolution scenario posed by potentially disruptive close-out of cross-border derivatives contracts. Here too, important progress has been achieved over the past two years.

Second, a set of resolutionrelated reforms are intended to limit the consequences to the financial sector if a failure by such an institution still were to occur. Given the limited time on this panel, I will not review in detail the post-crisis comprehensive capital and liquidity framework that the Federal Reserve has put in place. However, from the perspective of addressing too big to fail, it is important to highlight the Federal Reserve rule finalized this year that imposes risk-based capital surcharges on the handful of U.S. global systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs). Under this framework, a GSIB’s riskbased capital surcharge will reflect the degree to which its failure would impact the financial system. In effect, the risk-based capital surcharge confronts each U.S. GSIB with the choice to either reduce its systemic footprint or instead to hold more capital. The policy approach to too big to fail recognizes, of course, that we can reduce but cannot completely eliminate the possibility of a large financial institution’s failure. Therefore, a second aim of our post-crisis reforms has been to limit the adverse consequences that would result if a large financial institution were to fail. That is, large financial firms need to be capable of being successfully resolved without creating unacceptable collateral damage to the rest of the financial system and to the economy.
One possible answer, of course, is that when Thomas Jefferson became President in 1801, he quickly realized that the economic consequences of dismantling Hamilton’s financial structure would be dramatic for his presidency, his party and the country. Moreover, there is evidence that Jefferson may have indirectly given a commitment to the Federalists to preserve at least part of the Hamiltonian financial system in order to break the political deadlock during the Presidential election. What is perhaps most remarkable, however, is that Gallatin seems to have come to appreciate the genius of Hamilton’s system and advised Jefferson accordingly. In an attempt to firmly discredit Hamilton, Jefferson – shortly after becoming President – asked Gallatin to examine the archives and uncover the “blunders and frauds of Hamilton”. After searching “with a very good appetite”, Gallatin went back to Jefferson with the following remarkable assessment: “I have found the most perfect system ever formed. Any change that should be made in it would injure it. Hamilton made no blunders, committed no frauds. He did nothing wrong.” Indeed Gallatin went on to say that Hamilton had done such an outstanding job as the first Secretary of the Treasury that he had turned the post into a sinecure for all future occupants. As for the Bank of the United States, Gallatin proclaimed that “it had been wisely and skillfully managed”. 28 4. What can we learn from Gallatin’s financial achievements today? What lessons can we draw today from Gallatin’s economic policies?

Three areas in particular are discussed: •  Data and Communications: to allow a better understanding of network dynamics following a shock and thereby inform public communications. For example, learning from epidemiological experience in dealing with SARs, or from macroeconomic experience after the Great Depression, putting in place a system to map the global financial network and communicate to the public about its dynamics;  •  Regulation: to ensure appropriate control of the damaging network consequences of the failure of large, interconnected institutions. For example learning from experience in epidemiology by seeking actively to vaccinate the “super-spreaders” to avert financial contagion; and  •  Restructuring: to ensure the financial network is structured so as to reduce the chances of future systemic collapse. For example, learning from experience with engineering networks through more widespread implementation of central counterparties and intra-system netting arrangements, which reduce the financial network’s dimensionality and complexity. Networks and finance are not complete strangers. There has been growing interest among network theorists in applying their techniques to financial phenomena over the past few years. For example, network techniques have already been applied extensively to the  2  BIS Review 53/2009  dynamics of payment systems and inter-bank networks. 1 But the financial crisis of the past two years provides both a greater body of evidence, and a stronger incentive, to apply the lessons from other network disciplines to the pressing problems facing financial policymakers today.
But in the long run, attempts, for example, to make the economy grow faster than its long-term sustainable rate would only result in higher inflation without any change in output or employment. As I mentioned, the economy’s long-term capacity is limited by the size of the factors of production and their productivity. These factors cannot be governed by monetary policy. By changing the interest rate, the Riksbank can affect actual output growth in the short term but not the potential, long-term growth rate. Monetary policy can possibly indirectly lay the foundation for good growth in the long term by ensuring that our payment and price-setting system functions in an efficient and confidence-inspiring manner. What determines long-term growth? As you understand from what I have said this far, it is important for the Riksbank to make a good assessment of the Swedish economy’s potential growth capacity in order to conduct successful monetary policy. We therefore return to this issue fairly often in, for instance, our Inflation Reports. One difficulty is that potential output and potential growth cannot be observed directly in the same way as actual GDP and employment. Instead, the measure must be estimated using statistical methods and there are a number of these, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. In other words, there are several different ways of drawing the orange line in Figure 1, and the different methods have demonstrated fairly differing results. The Riksbank therefore uses several different methods of calculating the output gap.

Inflation rates have been falling in most countries and they have registered appreciable expansion in economic activities with GDP growth rates averaging at about 5% in 2007. In addition, most countries have become more democratic in political circles, giving more say to the public on the running of governments and their institutions. Distinguished Participants, allow me now to turn to the subject we are gathered here for, that is, “Central Bank Governance”. Good corporate governance is generally acknowledged as  BIS Review 26/2008  1  important in economic management. In this regard, Central bank governance is arguably defined by a number of key-concepts or pillars, which together should form the basis of an effective legal framework governing a central bank and on which central bank governance should rest, that is, operational independence, democratic accountability and transparency. Despite its common usage, it is not always very clear what central bank transparency amounts to. Generally, two definitions of transparency can be distinguished in the policyoriented literature. Firstly, central bank transparency is referred to as the activities of the central bank in providing information. Thus, in this case, transparency has been defined as the degree to which information on policy actions is available. However, a somewhat broader approach to transparency includes the public’s understanding of the decisions taken by the monetary authorities and the reasoning behind it.
The picture for the petroleum and offshore supply industry is mixed. Operators’ production of oil and gas is high. Some sectors of the offshore supply industry experienced a difficult fourth quarter, but are more optimistic about this year. The maintenance and modification market is showing steady, although moderate, growth. Most companies report stable employment. Extensive rationalisation and restructuring measures are still on the agenda in organisations and enterprises, and so far, growth is being absorbed by excess capacity or by increased productivity. Wholesale and retail trade and the building and construction sectors are increasing their workforces. All industries continue to report that highly qualified labour is in ample supply. Of the Norwegian counties exporting traditional goods, Rogaland is the third largest. The public sector and some private service industries are as important for employment in Rogaland as they are in the rest of Norway, but the share of employment in these sectors is lower than the national average. Manufacturing and oil and gas production are important in Rogaland, but the internationally exposed sector is also relatively large. Employment in Rogaland is mainly concentrated in engineering, shipbuilding and construction of oil platforms. Many are also employed in the food and beverage industry, and Rogaland is an important farming county. The labour market in Norway has improved. The number of persons employed in Norway began to increase in summer 2003 and unemployment stabilised. Employment in distributive trades has increased.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the economic outlook Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at SR-banken, Stavanger, 19 March 2004. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 11 March, Inflation Report 1/04 and on previous speeches. The Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. The target is symmetrical - it is just as important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low as an inflation rate that is too high. The inflation target provides economic agents with an anchor for inflation expectations. It therefore influences their decisions concerning saving, investment, budgets and wages. History shows that there is no long-term trade-off between lower unemployment or stronger economic growth and higher inflation. We witnessed this in the 1980s when growth was low and inflation high. The task of monetary policy is to provide a nominal anchor. Low and stable inflation is such an anchor. There are several reasons why it is an advantage for inflation to be higher than zero: •  The structure of the economy is in flux. Demand for labour with different qualifications is changing. This requires changes in relative wages. There are rigidities in nominal wage growth.
I was very keen to deliver this speech upon the invitation of my friend, Professor Otmar Issing. I profoundly believe that culture is at the heart of the European project. The cultural unity of Europe is based on the recognition of, and an openness to, its cultural diversity. Europe benefits greatly from the mix of cultures. This is the core concept of the ECB Cultural Days. 3. In times of crisis, culture can be seen as a luxury, a remedy or a refuge. The past two years must have been very difficult for you, presenting you with many challenges and a very heavy workload. What works of art helped you to unwind during this period? Particularly in very demanding and challenging crises, it is important to remain composed, to be able to stand back from immediate events and to develop as sound and as lucid a judgement as possible. I think that, in times like these, it helps more than ever to read a good Ismail Kadare book or a beautiful Heine poem, or to stand in quiet contemplation in front of a Caravaggio painting at the Städel. 4. Turning to the ECB Cultural Days: how did the idea come about and what is the connection between culture and central banking? I have always felt that there is a profound link between the European Union and its cultural identity. I trust this belief is widely shared by ECB staff and our Executive Board, Governing Council and General Council.

Hence, it is crucial to continue our common discussions with the American authorities in order to limit redundancies and inconsistencies, of information decrease the risks of regulatory arbitrage or overlaps, whilst our common objective remains the safety and soundness of financial market infrastructures. Constructive dialogue between rule making agencies is essential. 2.2 In the field of regulatory and accounting standards, I would like to point out that convergence is highly needed in order to allow users of financial reporting, especially regulators, analysts, and market participants to draw relevant comparisons between banks. –  Firstly, let me say briefly that the largest European banks have strengthened their robustness during the last two years and are, at least, as robust as their US peers1: •  1  The top European Banks have seen their revenues increase by 8.6% on average from 2009 to 2010 (up 2.5% for the main US banks over the same  The following figures are based on calculations made with a sample of 17 large European and American banks: JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, HSBC, RBS, Barclays, Santander, BBVA, BNPP, SG, Groupe Crédit Agricole, UBS, Crédit Suisse, Deutsche Bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  period). All banks have benefited from a decline in their costs of risk (–43% for US banks and –30% for European banks, from 2009 to 2010).
In these cases, the existing general prudential framework requires that banks reclassify exposures as restructured or in default in a timely and adequate manner. The actions of the banks in this regard will also engage 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  the supervisory process as important input information in the supervisory review and evaluation by the Bulgarian National Bank. The above outlines the framework for action in the short term. The main points of this framework are: continuing the previously adopted anti-crisis measures for as long as necessary, including with regard to the dividends, the risk exposures and the countercyclical capital buffer; maintaining the high capital and liquidity requirements, in this regard we are ready to respond to a scenario in which the banks may have to operate temporarily under the combined capital buffers requirement; and implementation of the newly adopted EBA framework for a moratorium on loan repayments. We are ready to activate additional measures if the development of the situation so requires. It is very important in the difficult environment, in which we find ourselves, and strongly committed to anti-crisis measures, not to lose our strategic focus, which is aimed at successfully continuing and finalising the project we started a few years ago for joining the euro area. The Bulgarian National Bank has serious responsibilities in this process and has been ceaselessly pursuing them.

An efficient, productive and resilient financial system supports and contributes to economic growth and the overall well-being of the people. In contrast, financial busts can have a destructive impact on the broader economy, impacting the livelihood of ordinary people. This is the painful lesson from the history of financial crises. Despite the huge amount of resources being invested in compliance, we still uncover many banking, market manipulation and rigging scandals. These cases illustrate again that rules, although necessary, are not sufficient to maintain the integrity of the financial system. These cases have damaged the confidence and trust of society in the system. One solution for this is a stronger focus on ethics and professional standards to take into account how actions impact the wider society. In other words, financial institutions must recognise and embrace their role as responsible corporate citizens. This means: Establishing a framework that promotes ethical behaviour and decisions; Going beyond what the letter of the law permits, to understanding and complying with its ‘spirit’; and Seeking opportunities to add value and contribute to the well-being of society. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Viewed from this perspective, the values of a responsible citizen are antithetical to money laundering, terrorism financing and illegal behavior. Anyone who is a responsible citizen will not engage in these activities and will actively seek to eradicate them.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Switzerland in the midst of the euro area - situation and outlook Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the South Tyrolean Industrialists’ Association, Bozen, 14 October 2003. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In the past decade, the European currency landscape has undergone fundamental changes. The European Central Bank today enjoys an excellent reputation as an independent central bank. Within a very short time, the euro has become most significant as an investment currency, and it continues to gain ground. Since 2002, from the time it took physical form, it has also been legal tender in twelve EU countries. The introduction of the single currency has also had manifold implications for Switzerland. First of all, the euro has made business for Swiss companies easier. Foreign currency management has been facilitated, and the danger of currency turbulences, as witnessed under the European Monetary System EMS, has diminished. The euro is used as a payment instrument in Switzerland approximately to the same extent as formerly the national currencies of our immediate neighbours. It is possible that it will yet gain some significance in this respect. There is no risk, however, of it superseding the Swiss franc as payment instrument. As an investment and issuing currency, the euro represents increased competition, but the Swiss franc will remain an attractive diversification currency.

1 b) ... as their failure would come at too high an economic cost  If a ‘too big to fail’ bank gets into distress, it jeopardises not just itself but also the stability of the financial system as a whole and, as a direct consequence, the real economy. The high economic costs can be illustrated using two mechanisms. The higher the bank’s market share of lending business, the greater the probability that the economy will not be provided with enough liquidity if that bank gets into difficulties. First, finding alternative credit providers will take time. Second, in the event of the failure of a systemically important bank, the assets of households and companies will – at least  1  So even though in most cases – including here – the term used is ‘too big to fail’, it is not just an institution’s size that makes it systemically important. In addition to size and market share, its risk profile, economic interconnectedness and (organisational) complexity are important variables. As a result, the terms ‘too important to fail’, ‘too complex to fail’ and ‘too interconnected to fail’ are also used. Page 3/14  temporarily – be frozen, with the attendant negative impact on consumption and investment. Here too, the maxim applies: the higher the institution’s market share of deposit business, the greater the fallout in the event of a crisis. The second mechanism is based on the fact that, as I have already mentioned, banks are closely interconnected.
Regionally, we now have a number of financing arrangements, including the Chiang Mai initiative in Asia (established in 2000), the European Stability Mechanism (established in 2012), the Latin American Reserve Fund (established in 1991), the Arab Monetary Fund (established in 1976) and, most recently, the BRICS development bank (established in 2014)). Regional facilities now total around $ trillion. In addition, during the course of the crisis, bilateral foreign currency swap lines were agreed between around 14 central banks, in both advanced and emerging market countries. Although these swap lines were temporary, in October 2013 they were replaced by a set of permanent, and potentially unlimited, swap lines among a group of advanced economy central banks: the US, Canada, the UK, the euro-area, Switzerland and Japan. These four developments, in combination, are likely to have increased significantly the potential pool of liquidity insurance available to the global financial system in dealing with external financing shocks. The question is whether this degree of insurance has kept pace with the accompanying rising tide of global capital market integration. One metric for that is found by scaling countries’ foreign exchange reserves by a measure of financial globalisation – for example, total external assets (Chart 15). Despite the rapid rise in reserves, its ratio to external asset stocks has actually fallen since 1980, from 10% to around 8%. Second, official reserves have risen unevenly across countries: the degree of concentration in reserves has increased threefold since 2000.

As the Riksbank and the banks must have personnel in place, the system is only open during normal office hours, and even if these can be extended by an hour or so, it is not likely that we will operate it 24 hours a day. At the same time, we want all payments in Swedish krona to be settled in Riksbank money. This reduces counterparty risk in the financial system. If, for instance, a private bank were to run such a system, all participants would have a claim on that bank before the payments are settled. If that bank were to go bankrupt, all of the money would be lost. That risk does not exist if the central bank runs the system. Additionally, it would be preferable if the system were run by a competition neutral actor in the form of the central bank. We therefore want to ensure that all payments in Sweden will continue to be settled with us. However, instant payments require systems that can manage payments around the clock. The European Central bank, ECB, is in the process of developing a new technical platform called “Target Instant Payment Settlement” (TIPS). This will enable instant payments around the clock and it will be operational at the end of 2018. It will also be prepared to handle other currencies than the euro, for instance the krona.