samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Andrew Bailey: The outlook for financial regulation in the UK Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Executive Director for Banking Services and Chief Cashier of the Bank of England, on a regional visit to Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 10 January 2011. *  *  *  Andrew Bailey will become the deputy chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) on its creation. Thank you to Linda Urquart for inviting me to speak today and Morton Fraser for allowing us to use your venue. I would also like to thank Will Dowson, the Bank’s Agent for Scotland for the assistance that he has given me, and for the work that he does to ensure that the Bank is well connected to the UK’s most important financial centre after London. Will worked for me when he first joined the Bank as a graduate entrant, and I can assure you, drawing on that experience, Will is an excellent person to ensure that the Bank and you as our contacts in Scotland are well informed and understand the relevant developments that affect each of us, and of course that we in the Bank understand the state of the economy in Scotland and the financial sector here. It is quite right that first and foremost our Agents support the needs of monetary policy and the MPC. The information that they gather from you, their contacts, makes a real difference to the monetary policy process. There is a parallel in our responsibilities for ensuring financial stability.

In an important financial centre like Edinburgh, we need to be well connected, and to understand your assessment of the threats to financial stability and we need to explain what we are doing to tackle these threats. Our market intelligence function under my colleague Paul Fisher plays an important role here, and is in frequent contact with the Scottish financial community. This contact will be even more important under the new arrangements in which the Bank will be responsible for macroprudential policy and its focus on the stability of the financial system, with a new policy making body, the Financial Policy Committee, or FPC. Alongside and feeding into the Bank’s macroprudential role will be our new responsibility for microprudential supervision of deposit takers, insurers and major securities dealers, also in a new body, the Prudential Regulation Authority, or PRA. It is therefore a period of major change at the Bank, and we are taking very seriously our role in building a system of regulation in the UK that must meet the very reasonable expectations of the public for a safer and sounder financial system. The overarching objective for the Bank is to put the stability of the financial system at the heart of the mission of financial regulation. We are now in the fourth year since the financial crisis started in the middle of 2007. The Scottish banking system took a pounding during the earlier stages of the crisis.
Christian Noyer: The power of monetary policy Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Paris Europlace Financial Forum, Tokyo, 25 November 2014. *  *  *  Two weeks ago, I had the privilege to chair in Paris our triennial Banque de France Symposium. Governor Kuroda made us the great favor to participate. At that Symposium, one speaker remarked that, during the financial crisis, Central Banks in most countries had been (quote) “the only game in town” (end quote). And he went on wondering whether this would still be the case in the future. This observation captures the essence of my remarks today. I would like to talk about the power of monetary policy in the current – low inflation – environment. Central Banks have been all powerful and decisive in fighting off the biggest financial crisis of the last 70 years. And they succeeded in avoiding a prolonged recession and the collapse of our financial system. Today, however, they are facing a different challenge. Growth has been disappointing in many parts of the world and forecasts have been constantly revised downward. Even more worrisome for central banks, inflation has persistently undershot our definition of price stability. For the euro area, it has declined from 2.5% in 2012 to 0.3% in annual terms, as of last September. This drop in inflation has occurred despite the most accommodating monetary conditions ever witnessed in Europe.

Whether they are, or not, correctly implemented will make a big difference in our capacity to quickly return to price stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
First, the financial crisis has shown that a large, highly developed and internationally integrated banking industry means risks as well as growth opportunities. In particular, the crisis clearly demonstrated that some individual banks are so important for the economy that they have to be rescued by the state in the event of a crisis. This is the “too big to fail” (TBTF) issue. Because of the de facto state guarantee associated with the TBTF issue, the borrowing costs of these kinds of bank are implicitly subsidised. As a result, competition is distorted in favour of these banks. In particular, however, the implicit state guarantee creates incentives to take on excessive risk. In Switzerland, this problem was particularly acute before the financial crisis. As is well known, the global expansion and exposure of the big banks in the area of investment banking meant that, in autumn 2008, UBS found itself in a precarious situation. Since UBS was an integral pillar of the domestic loan and deposit market, the Swiss economy would have suffered enormous damage if the bank had collapsed. With the transfer of illiquid assets amounting to almost USD 40 billion to the stabilisation fund of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the subscription to mandatory convertible notes by the Confederation, UBS was stabilised and this danger was averted. Luckily we are now able to say that the endeavour was ultimately brought to a successful conclusion – even earning a profit for the Confederation and the SNB.

This reflects lower international commodity and producer prices, a slower increase in global consumer prices and a stronger krone exchange rate. As these effects wane, and if global economic growth picks up in line with expectations, import price inflation may reach a more normal level. If growth in the global economy picks up again as we have assumed, we expect consumer price inflation to be about 2½ per cent in two years. Meanwhile, consumer price inflation may be somewhat lower due to the downturn abroad and the decline in prices for imported goods. Norges Bank presented its most recent Inflation Report in October 2001. In the light of international developments, and other factors, we considered the probability that inflation two years ahead would be lower than 2½ per cent to be greater than the probability that it would be higher. This was the basis for Norges Bank’s decision to reduce its key rate by 0.5 percentage point to 6.5 per cent in December. Norges Bank’s assessment of the outlook for inflation remained unchanged following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 23 January this year. BIS Review 8/2002  3  4  BIS Review 8/2002  BIS Review 8/2002  5  6  BIS Review 8/2002  BIS Review 8/2002  7  8  BIS Review 8/2002  BIS Review 8/2002  9  10  BIS Review 8/2002  BIS Review 8/2002  11  12  BIS Review 8/2002
So why is the growth of domestic demand also so high in Sweden, compared, for example, with the United States and the euro area? There are several explanations for this. To start with, Sweden’s public finances are in good shape in an international comparison, which means that there will be no need for fiscal policy tightening in the period ahead. In addition, household saving in Sweden was high before the crisis broke out. Saving increased further in conjunction with the crisis, presumably due to the general uncertainty prevailing. Moreover, household confidence has recovered strongly, as various types of survey have shown. Together with relatively sizable incomes, this has made it possible for consumption to recover. A further favourable factor is that, in the end, the Swedish financial system was never fully drawn into the financial crisis. Towards a normalisation of GDP and inflation – even for the repo rate Let me refer back to Slide 3, which shows the policy rates of Sweden, the euro area and the United States. The policy rates of both the United States and the euro area remain on extremely low levels. This emphasises that the situation in these countries is far from being “business as usual”. Part of this can be explained by the development of public finances. In the euro area, unease remains high over how countries such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland will cope with their long-term commitments.

There are many indications that the significance of the emerging economies for Swedish exports will continue to increase in the period ahead. This is an example of an important gradual change that has taken place independently of the financial crisis and which will affect developments in the future. It could perhaps be said that the crisis has contributed towards shedding light upon the increased significance of the emerging economies, as these are now driving the recovery of the global economy. Interestingly enough, the composition of products in Sweden’s exports, which was a disadvantage for Sweden when the crisis erupted, has now been turned into an advantage. There is a natural explanation for this: just as purchases of goods of this type (large amounts of which are exported by Sweden) were easy to postpone, so are they also easy to resume. However, over the last year or so, the krona has appreciated considerably, reducing the impetus previously provided by the weakened exchange rate (see Slide 5). At the same time, exports are far from being the only part of the Swedish economy that has grown. Domestic demand in the form of consumption and investments has developed very  3  This was entirely in line with the Riksbank’s forecast from February, which also predicted GDP growth of 5.5 per cent for 2010. 4  The slide shows percentages of goods exports, which constitute about two-thirds of Sweden’s total exports. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  strongly.
Il Sole 24 Ore: The EU plan to help Greece relies on bilateral aid from EMU countries and on the involvement of the International Monetary Fund. The ECB was clearly against the IMF participation. What do you make of the EU plan? Trichet: I was not against the IMF involvement in itself. I was against the involvement of the IMF alone. I have always been in favour of the maximum level of responsibility exerted by the governments of the euro area as is prescribed by the Stability and Growth Pact. The pact is at the very heart of EMU: it calls for member countries to assess and judge the fiscal policies of their peers; this peer’s surveillance can impose sanctions. In the days preceding the EU meetings, I called all governments to live up to their treaty responsibility and to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact which is essential for the EMU to function well. From this point of view, the declaration of the euro area Heads of State or Government is appropriate. It is also a good and workable solution. Il Sole 24 Ore: Do you expect it will be used? Trichet: At this moment in time I don’t expect this mechanism to be necessary. Greece should proceed with its recovery program in a very determined way as committed in front of the Eurogroup. Il Sole 24 Ore: Is a default of Greece a distinct possibility as some commentators seems to expect?

And I trust the Germans as well as the Italians, the French, the Spanish, the Dutch and all other fellow citizens were all aware of this aspect when they joined EMU. By the way Germany demonstrated how attached it is to the single currency when it argued in favour of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is precisely based on peer responsibility and peer pressure and is a vivid illustration of how our destinies are interconnected. Therefore, yes, I believe that Germany is fully aware of the fact that we are sharing a common destiny. Remember in the run up to the Maastricht treaty: both Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl were at the forefront of European integration with their peers, following in the footsteps, in particular, of Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi. Il Sole 24 Ore: Regarding Germany, the French finance minister did criticize its economic model based on exports rather than internal demand, pointing out that its partners cannot count sufficiently on German imports. Are you in agreement with Christine Lagarde? Trichet: No, and for a number of reasons. Firstly, had Germany not increase its competitiveness in the first 11 years of EMU by keeping its costs and inflation under control, the euro area as a whole would have had the threat of higher inflation and therefore a tougher monetary policy. Secondly, Germany, with a large current account surplus, is financing the current account deficit of other countries members of the euro area.
In the area of strengthening the consumer protection infrastructure, the agenda covers a wide spectrum of initiatives involving infrastructure and institutional capacity development that includes financial education, advisory services, distress management, rehabilitation and putting in place avenues for redress. Recent initiatives include evolving a more effective Financial Mediation Bureau (FMB) to ensure that consumers of all financial service providers under the purview of the Central Bank have recourse to an independent, fair and impartial dispute resolution mechanism. Earlier this year a deposit insurance scheme was introduced to further strengthen incentives for financial institutions to adopt sound financial and business practices and enhance public confidence in the financial system by providing explicit protection on deposits. Bank Negara Malaysia is also currently finalising the details for the establishment of a credit counselling and debt management agency to be introduced early next year, with the aim of providing individuals with credit counselling and assistance in restructuring of their debts. To promote financial education at an early age, Bank Negara Malaysia embarked on an education programme in schools on basic financial knowledge in partnership with the Education Ministry since 1997. Further, in collaboration with the financial industry's associations, Bank Negara Malaysia launched a ten year Consumer Education Programme (CEP) for the banking and insurance sectors. We are now in the fifth year of this programme. Extensive information is being disseminated via the spectrum of distribution channels including newspapers, radio, websites, branches of financial institutions and outreach programmes.

Forums like this one provide a good opportunity for regulators to share information and insights, to discuss the issues and challenges at hand, explore potential areas for cooperation and lay the groundwork for future partnerships. Drawing on the experience and expertise of various countries, this forum provide a platform for participants to work together towards developing global best practice standards on consumer protection and education issues. I look forward to the outcome of your deliberations in fostering greater consumer protection and education. 4  BIS Review 86/2005
The projection also assumes that the investment projects postponed this year will be resumed, as derived from the Survey of the Capital Goods Corporation (CBC) of the second quarter of this year. The highly expansionary monetary policy, the increase in public investment and the reactivation measures announced by the government will also support the recovery. Non-mining investment will increase next year, but it will be less dynamic than was expected before the pandemic, given the higher corporate indebtedness that has been necessary to cover the cash deficits of recent quarters. Considering all of the above, this MP Report estimates that GFCF will contract 10.6% annually, and then grow 8% and 4.9% annually in 2021 and 2022, respectively. The projections in this MP Report consider that this and next year the Treasury will provide a significant boost to the economy, consistent with the various measures announced by the government. However, they assume that this boost will gradually fade out as the economy converges to its trend growth rates and the recently announced fiscal consolidation process begins. Regarding the Current Account balance, contradicting the June MP Report, it is projected to be negative this year and next. This assumes that liquidity constraints for households and businesses will be lower than expected, due to government measures to support household income and the withdrawal of part of pension savings. Plus, a slightly lower than expected deterioration in investment, as well as somewhat better prospects for recovery.

It includes the FBS of 27 August, the EES of August and the forward curve derived from the 10-day average of financial assets at the statistical cut-off date. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 16  Central Bank of Chile’s balance sheet (*) (per cent of GDP)  40  40  30  30 Liabilities  20  20 Assets  10  10 Equity  0 -10  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  0  20(f)  21(f)  -10  (*) Data effective until the second quarter of 2020. Diamonds correspond to the projections at the end of 2020 and 2021 for each series. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 20  Figure 17  Real GDP per capital (thousands of pesos)  9.000  8.000  8.000  7.000  7.000  6.000  6.000  5.000  5.000  4.000  4.000  3.000  3.000  2.000  2.000  80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20(f) 22(f) 24(f)  9.000  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Asia does not have the equivalent of a London or New York. Tokyo is mainly domestic in orientation, while the smaller centres of Hong Kong and Singapore play more of a regional role. The economics of concentration This trend towards a mega financial centre complemented by smaller specialised centres in each time zone has persisted, even though technology has allowed market players to obtain information and transact on it, virtually anywhere. Why has this concentration in activity happened? Firstly, technology has itself created tremendous economies of scale. This is especially so in commoditised markets such as foreign exchange and electronic financial services, and in infrastructural facilities for payments and settlements, back-office processing and call centres. Secondly, critical mass of talent has become more important, with the growing complexity and multi-faceted nature of finance. Talented and enterprising investment bankers, fund managers and currency traders work best when they can interact with other equally bright and capable people, to strike deals, develop new products, exploit investment and business opportunities, and service clients. Executing financial deals requires a combination of top talent not only in finance and business, but also in law, accounting, project management, and information technology. Few centres have the full spread of necessary skills; fewer still have a critical mass of them. And for all the wonders of telecommunications and the internet, there is no substitute as yet for face to face interaction between two parties making a complex deal. Thirdly, issuers and investors in capital markets are placing a growing premium on liquidity.

However, we should focus our resources first on activities where we have a natural advantage, or can build up a capability. We must push in the same direction as market forces, and not against them. Our main approach to developing the financial centre should therefore be to establish a level playing field with transparent rules and the right environment, so that market forces can operate and innovation can flourish. Active promotion of specific activities complements this. Conclusion The major changes in the financial industry compel financial centres to adapt and evolve, or else be bypassed and rendered irrelevant. Singapore aspires to be one of the financial centres in Asia, and a node in the global network of financial markets. By implementing the right policies and strategies vigorously, we hope to develop and grow as a financial centre, serving Asia and contributing to its development and prosperity. 4  BIS Review 50/2001
This is expected to be a catalyst in the provision of end-to-end financial services, particularly in a ‘low touch’ environment. The financial industry is taking steps to ensure safe and secure introduction of e-KYC, with several banks planning to launch e-KYC solutions in the coming months with more to follow in 2021. We are also currently in the final stages of developing the licensing framework for digital banking, which we envision can enhance access to affordable and quality financial solutions, particularly for the underserved and hard-to-reach market segments. From our sandbox experience, we also observe similar digital alternatives and solutions being developed in the insurance and takaful sector. Our shift towards e-payments has also been sustained, with a 47% increase in the volume of transactions made through internet and mobile banking, and a 260% increase in active e-wallet users between August 2019 and 2020. Furthermore, good progress has been made in enabling the interoperability of e-wallet services offered by banks and non-bank e-money issuers. Looking ahead, Bank Negara Malaysia 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  will continue to focus on fostering well-designed regulations to facilitate digitalisation and innovation in financial services. All these efforts are intended to support the financial services industry accelerate its transition to an age of digitalisation and innovation. We have high hopes for Islamic Finance to capitalise on this. In 2017, we launched the Value-Based Intermediation (VBI) initiative.

Thomas Jordan: Government debt and the independence of monetary policy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 21st Internationales Europa Forum Luzern, 8 November 2011. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Monetary policymakers are not responsible for fiscal policy, yet they still have to take an active interest in government finances. The current financial and debt crisis reminds us that unsound government budgets can compromise independent monetary policy in the long term. Excessive debt carries the risk that fiscal policy can no longer be effectively implemented. It is therefore no surprise that this responsibility gets passed to the central bank, which is thought to be able to solve all manner of problems by simply printing more money. Faced with this situation, the central bank must – either under political pressure or by having to weigh up all the relevant factors – contribute to state financing or take quasi-fiscal policy measures. This can lead to a gradual loss of its effective independence and – in an extreme case – to it losing its statutory independence. Only an independent central bank, however, can pursue its goal of ensuring price stability in a credible way. The debt situation in Switzerland is much better than that of other comparable countries.