Out of this intellectual vacuum, a new framework for regulation has been born – macroprudential regulation. This explicitly recognises the links that might tie together individual nodes in the financial system. These might arise from correlated asset exposures, the type of which has historically emerged during the upswings and downswings of the credit cycle (Aikman et al (2015)). Or they might emerge from financial exposures, on- or off-balance sheet, between intermediaries operating in the global financial web (Haldane and May (2011), Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May (2012)). Over the past decade, a lot has been written in the area of macroprudential policy (Galati and Moessner (2013), Aikman et al (2013), Freixas et al (2015)). A sizeable number of countries are now undertaking macroprudential policy in some shape or form. Table 5 in the Annex provides a rough summary of current international macroprudential practices (for a more comprehensive overview, see Cerutti et al (2017)). By any historical metric, however, macroprudential policy remains a fledgling framework. Understandably, many of its key facets remain contentious. And the macroprudential policies put in place internationally so far are more notable for their differences than their similarities. This is providing a diverse body of case law. We discuss two key aspects of this framework: its appropriate objectives; and the choice of instruments. Objectives of Macroprudential Policy  The Bank of England entered the debate on the potential role of macroprudential policy in a discussion paper published in 2009 (Bank of England (2009)).

Our coverage is comprehensive – banks, merchant banks, finance companies, insurance companies, capital market services licensees, licensed trust companies, financial advisers, insurance brokers, exempt fund managers, moneychangers, and remittance houses. Financial intermediaries are held to rigorous client due diligence requirements. They are required to verify the bona fides of their customers and assess their risk profiles. Where particular customers, business relationships, or transactions present a higher risk of money laundering or terrorism financing, enhanced customer due diligence is required. Singapore’s AML/CFT regime was evaluated three years ago by the Financial Action Task Force or FATF, the global standard setter for AML/CFT. FATF assessed that Singapore operates a strict and rigorous AML/CFT regime, centred on a comprehensive and sound legal, institutional, policy, and supervisory framework. Can we do more? Let me cite three areas. First, MAS is considering a tougher penalty regime for violations of AML/CFT. In a recent announcement, the Attorney General has stated that Singapore will seek tougher penalties for white-collar criminals. MAS is in full alignment with this. We will ensure that financial crime  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  does not pay in Singapore and that those who jeopardise Singapore’s hard-earned reputation as a financial centre of integrity face severe consequences. Second, Singapore intends to make criminal the laundering of proceeds from tax offences. This is a pre-emptive move. In February next year, FATF is expected to take a decision on this matter.