samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I believe that after the removal of the conversion limit, it will become more convenient for Hong Kong residents to participate in Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect and other RMB financial transactions. In addition, following the principle that offshore RMB businesses should be conducted according to the rules and practices in the offshore market, the prevailing restrictions on RMB cashnote conversions and banks’ RMB lending to Hong Kong residents will no longer be applicable. This will facilitate the launch of RMB investment products by financial institutions in Hong Kong, and raise the position of Hong Kong as an offshore RMB business centre to new heights. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

Denis Beau: The challenges of the digital euro Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the conference "The new challenges of financial regulation”, organised by Labex Réfi, Paris, 19 November 2021. * * * Over the past two years, most central banks around the world have been giving increasing thought to the idea of creating a digital form of their currency, a central bank digital currency (CBDC), to maintain the stabilising role of central bank money in a rapidly changing payments landscape: according to the BIS, about nine out of ten central banks have reported that they have launched studies.To date, only two retail CBDCs have been introduced (in Caribbean archipelagos: the Sand Dollar in the Bahamas and DCash for the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States), but over twenty pilot projects are underway around the world. This observation naturally raises questions about the timing, form and role of central bank money in tomorrow’s payments landscape and about the role of banks and commercial bank money in a world of stablecoins and central bank digital currencies.
Our efforts should not be just about coping with short-term fluctuations, but also about laying long-term foundation for Thailand’s future. That requires a forward-looking plan of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  action by all stakeholders. The Bank of Thailand, for our part, will continue to ensure a stable financial and economic environment, so that businesses can continue to thrive and individuals can enjoy better standards of living on a sustainable basis. Thank you and wish you all an enjoyable evening. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Since the economic expansion began in 1992, annual output growth has averaged just less than 3% while the rate of inflation has averaged just under 2 ½%. The number of people in employment last year(on the LFS measure) continued to rise fairly steadily to an all-time high; the number of unemployed people fell to below one million (on the claimant count measure) for the first time since December 1975, and the rate of unemployment fell to its lowest in more than 25 years in the United Kingdom as a whole, and to its lowest for more than 20 years in every individual region. But, my Lord Mayor, even if – as I at least continue to believe – we are living on an island, that does not make us immune from developments abroad. In particular, we are bound to be affected by current developments in the United States, both directly, and indirectly, through the knock-on effects on third countries, with those effects on the Eurozone particularly important for us. By this time last year it had become clear that, even on the most optimistic view of improving underlying productivity – as the application of new information and communications technologies spread through the American economy – the rate of growth in the US, of over 5%, was unsustainable in the light of increasing domestic and external imbalances. The pace of US domestic demand growth needed to slow – as of course it has.
Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration - the view of the ECB Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the Eurofi conference entitled “Europe’s single capital market: time to tackle the toughest challenges”, Luxembourg, 10 March 2005. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and gentlemen, It gave me great pleasure to accept the invitation to this conference, which addresses an issue of the highest importance to the ECB and the Eurosystem. With this in mind, I would like to express the ECB’s views on European financial integration. Let me start by reminding you that financial integration is achieved through an effective interplay of market forces in an environment of free competition, coordinated action by private actors and specific measures taken by public authorities. The ECB both supports and complements such steps. Our support for financial integration is not something we see as optional. On the contrary, we see it as an issue that is of great importance in the conduct of our own activities. Let me give the underlying reasons behind this stance. First, a well integrated financial system is pivotal to the smooth and effective implementation of monetary policy throughout the euro area. In this regard, I would also like to mention the ECB’s task of promoting the effective operation of payment systems, as well as its interest in the smooth running of securities settlement systems.

In Iceland and similar cases there is also a statistical issue here that needs to be acknowledged: the distinction between flows that actually entered or left the country at the time and those that were simply flowing offshore in both directions but were booked through the Icelandic headquarters and thus recorded in the country’s BP and IIP. The second lesson relates to the EU framework for cross-border banking, which clearly facilitated the cross- and off-border expansion of the Icelandic banks through the so-called European passport. It was and is deeply flawed. The basic problem is that the freedoms are not matched by public action and frameworks at the EU and EEA level. Bank size relative to country size was assumed to be a matter of no concern, and FX risk was largely ignored. Based on the Icelandic experience, a banking union makes perfect sense, but only fully for the eurozone, and even then it has to include all three elements – common supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance – in order to break the deadly embrace of banks and sovereigns. In the interim, I think small countries, especially those with their own currencies, will have to impose their own prudential measures in order to defend themselves against the risks they face. The third lesson relates to the structure of the financial sector in small, open economies in the absence of robust and credible international or regional safety nets.
Local banks recorded average growth in pre-tax profits of 15% per annum in the six years prior to the Asian crisis. Moreover, most banks remained profitable during the crisis itself and all continued to maintain high capital ratios. Financial distress was therefore not a driving force for merger, as it has been in other Asian countries. But there are signs that the consolidation process is gathering pace in Hong Kong. The reasons for this are to some extent the same as those elsewhere. These include increased competition from both domestic and global players, deregulation, the need to invest in new technology and the increased focus, even for family-owned businesses, on generating shareholder value. All this means that the life of a banker in Hong Kong is not an easy one at present. Some of the old certainties are breaking down. The removal of the remaining interest rate controls in a month's time will usher in a new era of full competition on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. While the surplus liquidity in the system may mitigate the immediate impact to some extent, banks will face new challenges on products, pricing, fees and charges, and asset and liability management. This comes on top of the challenges that the banks are already facing to generate new lending business. The residential property market, which has been the mainstay of most of the local banks' business, is currently drifting without clear direction, and mortgage business is still sluggish, as the latest figures for April demonstrated.

-  We will, however, where appropriate, raise the issue of consolidation in meetings with banks' board of directors and management, and will encourage them to make it part of their strategic planning. -  We will also do what we can to provide appropriate incentives for banks to think seriously about consolidation, in particular by removing potential barriers to competition such as the last remaining controls on interest rates. -  We will not erect artificial barriers to acquisition of local banks by foreign banks, which would be contrary to Hong Kong's traditional free market ethos and our commitments under WTO. -  We note the view that is sometimes expressed that it would be desirable for Hong Kong to retain a core of strong, locally owned banks. This is something that we would support, but it is not something that we can deliver. Rather, it would depend on whether the local banks can agree to merge among themselves. -  We will do what we can to facilitate individual transactions that are put to us for consideration. This will include giving prompt advice on what is acceptable from a banking regulatory point of view. We will also look sympathetically at the use of acceptable debt instruments to finance mergers as opposed to our previous preference for equity or cash. This reflects modern trends in capital management.
xxi But it is clear that there is a significant North-South divide in Europe in terms of education; and France – it must be said – is "southern" and inegalitarian. PISA studies show that France is the G7 country where academic performance of pupils is the most highly determined by their social environment. xxii This observation illustrates what the Nobel Prize winner Jean Tirole described as the “délit d’initié” or rigged system. xxiii This collective failure also contributes to a structural unemployment rate that is still too high in France, i.e. around 7 to 8%. This challenge is common in Southern Europe, and goes hand in hand with another one: at long last developing apprenticeships and vocational training. There are now fewer young people in apprenticeships in France, Italy and Spain combined than in Germany alone... while there are many more young people, and young people unemployed. It is not a paradox, but rather an explanation... and a call for action. The "Avenir Pro" law passed in France  Page 8 of 10  in 2018 must now be implemented, and Italy’s way out of economic stagnation can be achieved by taking the same tack. 2.3  Commitment to the environment and climate  The third requirement of the European model is a firm commitment to the environment and climate. This issue is currently the largest unifying factor among the young as well as older generations throughout the world. The last European elections showed this clearly.

Let us start with the very criticisms levelled today at the multilateral economic order, and at what has been called the "Washington Consensus". It was economically sound, but socially too weak. Globalisation has often been felt to have mainly benefited large corporations – and their tax evasion. Inequalities between countries – notably between the North and the  Page 5 of 10  South – have fortunately decreased; those within countries have increased. And your generation is demanding that we guarantee the protection of the planet. Behind these criticisms are often our very European values. This echoes the work of many researchers who highlight the diversity of capitalist models and seek to correct their excesses. vii I am thinking in particular of Marie-Laure Djelic, co-Dean of the Sciences Po School of Management, viii of Michel Aglietta who denounces the "excesses of financial capitalism" ix or of Dani Rodrik who highlights the dysfunctions of liberal capitalism. x At the beginning of the 1990s, Michel Albert theorised "Rhenish capitalism". xi Jean-Dominique Sénard is now calling for “responsible capitalism” in Europe. Europe, if it is bold enough, is in a good position to provide concrete answers to the expectations of the world's citizens. The new Commission, led by Ursula von der Leyen, has the means to achieve this ambition. In my view, the "European model" is articulated around four requirements: the fight against inequalities, the promotion of individual autonomy through education and knowledge building, the preservation of the climate, and the renewal of multilateralism.
This intensification of concerns has raised the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  threat of contagion from these countries, and the consequent financial market developments that have affected several other European countries have added to the risk of a spill-over to the largest European banking systems, including our own. So far, the threat has been limited. An important reason for this is that banks have done the right things over the last two years, namely to focus on their resilience by refinancing debt at longer maturities and raising their buffers of capital. It is hard work in an environment that is still affected by the crisis, but there is no doubting that it is the right thing to have done and continue to do. Sound banking is about having a strong capital base and a funding profile in terms of maturity that can withstand the sorts of shocks in the world that will happen from time to time. It is not about expanding your bank rapidly and funding the growth in the overnight money market. This need for adjustment also explains why at the Bank we are sticking firmly to the plan to allow the Special Liquidity Scheme to run-off on time a year from now. Over the last twelve months, banks have taken the necessary steps to move towards that goal.

This brings me back to the reforms in the UK. At their heart lies the objective of putting the stability of the financial system at the centre of the regulatory mission. You may say, “surely that’s not new”. I would disagree – our overriding objective must be to create a consensus of public opinion which will enable financial stability to be embedded as a public policy objective in the same way that in the wake of the 1970s, low inflation came to be adopted as a necessary condition for stable economic growth. Too often, I hear people say that achieving financial stability needs somehow to reflect a balance with other objectives, such as competition, consumer protection, and the like. I’m sorry, but while these objectives are of course very important, the best way to achieve them is by establishing a stable financial system. Of course, there are judgements to be made on what constitutes financial stability, but those are not judgements that should be a product of murky compromises with other objectives. The assessment of the failures of monetary policy in the 1970s should stand as a clear guide as to why we must establish a strong understanding of financial stability as the driving public policy objective for the financial system.
This makes it possible to offer a set of interactive graphs for dynamic data queries. In a first stage, statistics on activity, employment, sectors, finance, demographics, and mobility, among others, will be included. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the different institutions behind these sources that produce these series and that will allow us to offer them as a whole unit via this platform. Finally, given the access to new information and the opportunities created by technology, we will soon begin to publish experimental statistics in several areas of interest. These series do not meet the same standards as traditional statistics, but they are timely and reliable enough to be considered in economic analysis. Like some statistical institutions in developed economies, we believe that, although they are a little less accurate and subject to more periodic revisions, they are sufficiently useful to outweigh their potential disadvantages. Thus, during the second half of this year we will publish a daily retail trade index, an indicator that provides a preview of activity in part of the trade sector. In the same vein, we expect to publish intermediate consumption statistics, i.e. we will have purchase and sales transactions between companies in different regions, which will allow us to measure trade within and between regions, among other new indicators. In conclusion, I would like to reflect briefly on the current state of our economy and the important challenges we face.

On such markets, central government therefore usually applies regulations, such as those concerning the electricity network, for example, or actively runs the system, such as for the rail network, for example. Another characteristic of the payment market is the existence of positive network externalities. This means that when new users join a system, the utility increases for all participants, even those already in the system. Another example of a product with positive network effects is the telephone: the utility of having a telephone increases as more people join the telephone network, allowing you to call them. This means that coordinating different players on the market may lead to economic gains for society. Since utility increases with the number of users this means that the market has a tendency to eventually end up being dominated by a monopoly that takes over (a situation of natural monopoly, just as with economies of scale). The combination of economies of scale and network effects thus creates tendencies towards heavy concentration. Monopolies that maximise their returns will give rise to efficiency losses in the economy in general. 16 All in all, this suggests that it may be justifiable for central government to undertake the task of regulating the market, to reduce the power of monopolies, and as coordinator, to ensure that network externalities are internalised, which is exactly how it works in Sweden today. We can thus observe that, as money provides the necessary lubrication for all economic activity, efficient and secure forms of money are important for economic growth.
According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation was 1.8% in February 2013, down from 2.0% in January. The on-going decline in annual inflation rates mainly reflects the energy and food components of the price index. Looking ahead, while the monthly pattern of headline inflation rates may be somewhat volatile, underlying price pressures should remain contained given the environment of weak economic activity in the euro area. Inflation expectations are well-anchored and in line with price stability over the medium term. The March 2013 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area foresee annual HICP inflation in a range between 1.2% and 2.0% in 2013 and between 0.6% and 2.0% in 2014. In comparison with the December 2012 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the ranges are broadly unchanged. In the Governing Council’s assessment, risks to the outlook for price developments continue to be seen as broadly balanced over the medium term, with upside risks relating to stronger than expected increases in administered prices and indirect taxes, as well as higher oil prices, and downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity. Turning to the monetary analysis, monetary figures for January 2013 support our assessment that the underlying pace of monetary expansion continues to be subdued. The annual growth rate of M3 remained broadly unchanged at 3.5% in January, after 3.4% in December 2012. The annual rate of growth of the narrow monetary aggregate, M1, increased to 6.7% from 6.3% in December 2012.

Per Jansson: Swedish monetary policy after the financial crisis – myths and facts Speech by Mr Per Jansson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the SvD Bank Summit 2014, Stockholm, 3 December 2014. *  *  *  “The Riksbank has in recent years conducted a monetary policy experiment where it has aggressively, using a high repo rate, attempted to prevent household debt from rising. The results have been more or less devastating for the Swedish economy. Eventually, the Riksbank has realised that its policy was wrong and has made a 180 degree turn.” This is roughly how some critics have described the monetary policy conducted in recent years. This description has received quite a bit of attention and been widely spread, and many who follow the monetary policy debate have probably gained the impression that this is actually what has happened. I argue that this description is wrong and I now intend to explain why. I shall divide the criticism into three different parts, or claims, and discuss them one by one. I will present these claims in the form of quotations, but this does not necessarily mean they are exact quotations. However, they capture the spirit of the criticism and I believe that those who have followed the monetary policy debate will recognise them. It is important to meet the criticism, for several reasons One question one might begin with, is why it is so important to respond to these claims.
In this recession, there was an actual decline in consumption rather than just a slowdown (Chart 2). When households need to cut back on their consumption, they typically do so first with durable goods – for example, by delaying the decision to replace a car or to trade up to a nicer house. It is no surprise then that auto sales dropped significantly (Chart 3). Housing starts had been declining since late 2005, and the decline continued during the recession (Chart 4). Producers reacted quickly to the sharp decline in consumer demand, but inventories still rose sharply relative to sales (Chart 5). In order to realign production to the declining level of demand, firms quickly cut their staffing levels, which resulted in a rapid rise in unemployment across all age groups (Chart 6). From the peak in December 2007 to the end of the recession, private non-farm payroll employment declined by 7.3 million jobs – bringing employment below its level in January 2000 (Chart 7). The severity of the Great Recession is very apparent when you realize that an entire decade’s worth of job growth was lost. Household wealth declined sharply as well during the Great Recession due to losses both in equity and real-estate wealth. The household saving rate increased in reaction to this negative shock to household wealth (Chart 8). Several factors were likely behind the higher saving rate. First, as already noted, households likely increased their saving rate to begin to rebuild their wealth.

Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth had slowed from 5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009, to 3.7 percent in the first quarter of 2010 and to only 1.7 percent in the second quarter. Soft patches are common in expansions, but are difficult to distinguish from a more serious deterioration in an expansion. Examples of soft patches include the expansions of 1976 and 2002 (Chart 24). Foreign risks also appeared on the radar screen with growing concerns about debt sustainability in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. This can be seen in the sharp rise in the sovereign risk spreads for these countries (Chart 25). At the same time, core consumer price index (CPI) inflation, which is used as an indicator of where overall inflation is heading, was low and trending downward (Chart 26). Given the FOMC’s dual mandate to promote price stability and maximum sustainable growth, the risk of a double-dip recession in 2011 was a concern. In more normal times, the FOMC could respond to this risk by deciding to reduce the fed funds rate. However, with the fed funds rate essentially at zero, other options had to be considered. At their November meeting, the FOMC decided to restart its large-scale asset purchases by announcing an intention to purchase an additional $ billion in Treasury securities. Again, as with its earlier asset purchase program, the intent was to improve financial market conditions and thereby reduce the risk of the economy stalling.