samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The authorities’ view was that since the conflict had ended, there was an urgent need to reconstruct the terror-affected areas, which covered almost one third of the country’s land mass, and two thirds of its coastal belt. New economic activities had to be promoted for the peace dividend to be realized. Such new activities would necessitate a high import expenditure, which in turn, would create new capacity for economic growth. In such circumstances, if the Sri Lankan Rupee were to depreciate I sharply, it would lead to a significant reduction in the imports necessary for reconstruction and a slow-down of new economic activities. Those outcomes, together with the resulting higher levels of inflation would have kept Sri Lanka trapped in the vicious cycle. Accordingly, through negotiations, the Sri Lankan authorities were able to convince the IMF that Sri Lanka would commit itself to building its reserves, but would do so, while allowing the exchange rate to adjust according to economic fundamentals and market conditions, instead of forcing an artificial, sharp depreciation of the currency. The Sri Lankan authorities also took the view that lower tax rates would spur growth and ultimately increase revenues, and based on such view, they were able to convince the IMF that it would be better to lower tax rates and encourage economic activity. Subsequent economic outcomes have since confirmed the wisdom of both these moves by the Sri Lankan authorities!

Caleb M Fundanga: Launch of Info-Zambia Bank student loan scheme Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the launch of the Indo-Zambia Bank Student Loan Scheme, Mulungushi University, Kabwe, 21 April 2009. *  *  *  HON. MINISTER OF EDUCATION, PROFESSOR GEOFFREY LUNGWANGWA, MP THE CHAIRMAN OF MULUNGUSHI UNIVERSITY COUNCIL, MR COSTAIN CHILALA THE VICE CHANCELLOR OF MULUNGUSHI UNIVERSITY, PROFESSOR VERNON CHINENE THE CHAIRPERSON OF INDO-ZAMBIA BANK LIMITED, MRS O MOYO THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF INDO-ZAMBIA BANK LIMITED, MR S R SHUKLA MEMBERS OF STAFF OF MULUNGUSHI UNIVERSITY AND INDO-ZAMBIA BANK LIMITED MEMBERS OF THE PRESS INVITED GUESTS LADIES AND GENTLEMEN I am grateful to the Vice Chancellor of Mulungushi University, Professor Chinene, for extending an invitation to me to witness the Launch of the Student Loan Scheme by our Minister of Education Hon. Professor Lungwangwa. Chairperson, I am reliably informed that the Student Loan Scheme being launched today is the latest among the many product initiatives that Indo Zambia Bank Limited will be launching in the near future . The Student Loan Scheme represents a major shift from the traditional loan schemes that have for a long time characterised traditional banking models in Zambia. Chairperson, the Bank of Zambia supports the introduction of innovative products such as the Student Loan Scheme, a service that will allow parents and guardians who bank with Indo Zambia Bank Limited to access loans to meet University fees for their children at concessionary rates. Hon.
Therefore, we discussed this topic already last year, but we have now progressed to the active phase of the efforts aimed at establishing the centralised information service Know Your Customer, or KYC, as we have got used to saying. This platform will make it possible to reduce the number of banks’ refusals and companies’ expenses for the communication with banks. Clients’ risks will be assessed not by banks, but by the platform developed by the Bank of Russia that will classify companies into three risk groups according to the traffic light principle. Banks will be able to focus only on the group having these risk signs and on the analysis of the operations of clients involving potentially higher risks. We are going to launch this platform into regular operation at the end of 2021 and then scale it up so as to embrace all credit institutions by the end of 2022 Q1. Of course, we believe that it will make life easier for SMEs. We have also discussed how to improve this platform together with you. The second issue is the Faster Payments System (FPS). Initially, we launched it to enable P2P transfers. We can see that it is highly requested. However, right from the beginning, we have built this system considering the needs of retailers and small businesses and comprehending that this system may help SMEs cut costs significantly. The FPS addresses the issue of high acquiring fees and considerably reduces costs for trade and service companies.

At the first stage, when businesses were especially stressed due to restrictions and uncertainty and because not all support programmes had gained momentum by then and banks had not yet adjusted their business processes since the number of restructuring applications was really enormous and nobody could have expected that, the Bank of Russia together with OPORA RUSSIA and other business associations created a ‘green line’ mechanism for businesses to apply to regarding any problems in their relations with banks. As a result, these were business associations who communicated with banks directly, and if they failed to solve a problem, the Bank of Russia intervened. This mechanism has proven to be efficient and highly requested. Therefore, we have decided to make it a permanent one. We are well aware that small companies may really face difficulties trying to gain banks’ consideration and loyalty towards them. Therefore, it is very good that they have their lobbyists, in the good sense of the word. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  As I have already said at the beginning, it is critical for us to make the communication between the financial sector in general and small businesses as easy as possible. This is not only related to the accessibility of loans. Today, I would like to dwell on three issues. Of course, there are also other aspects, but since time is limited I will focus on three issues. Firstly, this is certainly anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CTF).
The government having revised its Remit to the MPC, the Committee has, in effect, formally clarified that it is adopting a probing approach to policy in order to strike the right balance between risks to stability and the risks of sclerosis. To be clear, I do not see the Forward Guidance – and personally would not favour – committing the Committee to knowingly keeping policy loose beyond the point that would be prudent. I say that because, in parts of academia and the commentariat, the expression “low for long” is used in a rather special way to mean just that: that policy should be loose beyond the period that, ex post, would warrant special stimulus, in order actively to deliver a persistent rise in inflation and inflation expectations above target, thereby pushing down prevailing real rates of interest and so accelerating recovery.2 While not without insight on the mechanics of monetary stimulus, that stream of economic modelling makes the absolutely critical assumption that even as the monetary authority deliberately generates a persistent rise in inflation, its anti-inflation credibility remains 100% intact; later, the central bank simply announces that things are back to normal. That is utterly unrealistic. To re-iterate: the MPC’s forward guidance provides an articulated framework for a probing approach to policy, without a change in our preferences on inflation.3 Saying more about the Committee’s approach to policy in this way might be particularly valuable during a period when signs of recovery have become more apparent.

They too are predominantly retail, not wholesale banks, operating a very traditional business model, one that has largely shielded them from the problems of the international financial turmoil of these last years. They take deposits from (mainly) small local savers and make loans to (mainly) small or medium-sized local businesses and help people buy their houses by providing mortgages. Their officers, like those of the cooperative banks elsewhere, belong to the community in which they operate and generally know their customers and the local environment. In addition, one of them is involved in the European Investment Fund’s Jeremie programme, a programme designed specifically to help small and medium sized enterprises. The bank in question has committed over EUR 5 million over a period of three years to some 280 local SME beneficiaries under the programme. Indeed, one could say that it is mainly in their ownership structure that the local commercial banks, which are joint stock (or “shareholder value”) banks, differ from cooperative banks. In all other respects they are not very different. So that leaves us with the question: is there or is there not scope for setting up a cooperative bank in Malta? Is there or isn’t there space for such an institution? Or is the local market too small, while our community is being adequately served by the banks already operating here? I think it is not for me to answer these questions.
And the global nature of the economic downturn further highlighted the need for a rebalancing of trade flows between countries with large current account surpluses and deficits. Both adjustments are likely to occur only gradually and each has the potential to derail the recovery. I want to spend a little time today considering a third factor that will shape the recovery: the extent to which households need to rebuild their balance sheets following the big increase in household debt. Spend, spend, spend? Much has been said about the increase in household debt, both in terms of its role in the build up to the financial crisis and the extent to which it may dampen the recovery. The theme of much of this comment is that our current economic difficulties are a payback for past excesses. Households, it is said, were seduced by easy credit and rising asset prices, leading to a debt fuelled spending boom. As a result, we now face a period of retrenchment as we make amends for our former spendthrift ways. Like much conventional wisdom, these views contain a kernel of truth. But their repetition has led to exaggeration and distortion. Separating fact from fiction is vital when forming a view on the economic outlook. Consumer spending accounts for two-thirds of total demand in our economy; decisions made by consumers up and down the country will be critical in determining the strength and sustainability of the recovery.

Given the stronger focus of financial regulators on conduct and culture, such professional codes will matter greatly going forward as an important complement to regulatory standards. The FSPB is well placed to lead and support initiatives to establish standards of conduct for the financial industry. Its standards not only serve as useful frameworks for financial institutions and professional bodies to develop specific guidance for their own employees and members; they also serve to embody the industry’s collective commitment to socially responsible values and 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  ethics. For example, I noted with interest that the Professional Code being launched today commits to dealing with counterparties, including suppliers and agents that “subscribe to sound ethical principles”. Matters such as the environmental footprint or human rights record of third party providers are not typical obligations currently found in regulatory standards, yet, these are matters of great importance. They are a reflection of the values of the industry, and they matter to many conscientious consumers in this age of increasingly accessible information. Given the central role of financial services in any economy, these are issues likely to move from the periphery to increasingly important business considerations. At the global level, we are already seeing greater attention given to sustainable and responsible finance. In many cases, it will require the industry to draw on experience beyond the traditional core competencies of most financial services providers.
And it goes without saying that the ECB will not be acting in a legal vacuum – in considering the proportionality of its actions, it will have to take into account existing secondary law and justify any measures it takes. And the Court of Justice would be the ultimate arbiter to determine whether the ECB is respecting the principle of proportionality. Conclusion Let me conclude. It has become evident that disturbances affecting CCPs can have an impact on monetary policy, on payment systems and, ultimately, on price stability. The Commission’s proposal to amend the EMIR framework is a step in the right direction as it reflects the responsibilities of the ECB – as a central bank of issue – in the supervisory framework. However, we also need to adjust the ECB’s monetary policy toolkit to ensure it can fulfil its role. This requires amending Article 22 of the Statute in a manner that respects the principle of central bank independence and the ECB’s exclusive competence for monetary policy. Moreover, any change to Article 22 must preserve the ECB’s flexibility and autonomy to react to unforeseen circumstances and effectively address risks to its mandate. Ultimately, amending both EMIR and Article 22 will establish a comprehensive legal framework to address the risks CCPs pose to the Union – both its financial markets and its currency. It will ensure that the EU’s legislators, supervisors and central bank – acting in their respective roles – can adopt the wide range of measures needed to safeguard stability.

And, we understand better the tone at the top – even though the top is somewhere other than the U.S. – as well as the risk culture of the firm. It’s simply not enough to understand tone at the top in the U.S., if the top is really somewhere else. Three things that supervisors can do •  First, improve communication with firms. The counterpart to asking you to improve your communications with us is raising the expectation that we do the same. We need to be timelier in our communication of relevant findings in our supervisory efforts, and we need to shorten the time between the conclusion of supervisory work and our feedback to firms. More timely communication should also include sharing information in the earlier stages of our work, before all issues have been confirmed or facts sorted out, but at the point at which we suspect there’s something not quite right. This is important not just in the context of formal supervisory efforts like examinations, where we may have an early read on an issue, but also in areas where we see something or something has been flagged through other means and we raise it with you for discussion and attention as needed. Our communication needs to be more candid and direct. Too often I hear that our communication has too much “nuance” and that firms struggle to understand exactly what we are looking for.
The Federal Reserve has many responsibilities, most closely linked to the execution of U.S. monetary policy and the regulation and supervision of the U.S. financial system. In fact, the official title of the Federal Reserve Act includes the phrase “to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States,” so supervision has been a core responsibility of the Federal Reserve from the beginning. But what does “a more effective supervision of banking” mean? At the highest level, the Federal Reserve’s mission for supervision and regulation is to promote a safe, sound, and stable banking and financial system that supports the growth and stability of the U.S. economy and a fair and transparent consumer financial services market. That’s a lot, so it is useful to drill down a little; I can do that by describing what we do on an ongoing basis at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. At the New York Fed, we operate under delegated authority to supervise the financial institutions in the Second Federal Reserve District, which encompasses New York, parts of New Jersey and Connecticut, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This area includes enormous diversity in institutions from state member banks with total assets of less than $ million operating in a local community to bank holding companies with trillions of dollars of assets operating on a global scale.

My answer to the first question is that we should continue to bring these activities and entities within regulation, for three reasons. First, and most obviously, the need to protect consumers/investors. Whether or not one thinks it is sensible to invest or trade in the highly speculative assets that make up most of the activity in the crypto world, investors should be able to do so in transparent, fair and robust marketplaces, with the protections that they would get in conventional finance. There will probably always be some who prefer – for a variety of reasons – to invest and trade in an unregulated, opaque world. But we should not push the majority who do not want those risks into that world because there is no regulated alternative. My second reason is the need to protect financial stability. While the crypto world, as was demonstrated during last year’s crypto winter and last week’s FTX implosion is not at present large enough or interconnected enough with mainstream finance to threaten the stability of the financial system, its links with mainstream finance have been developing rapidly. We should not wait until it is large and connected to develop the regulatory frameworks necessary to prevent a crypto shock that could have a much greater destabilising impact. The experience in other areas of digitalisation has demonstrated the difficulty of retrofitting regulation on new technologies and new business models after they have reached systemic scale.
The international competition in the product and labour markets and the financial integration process will thus continue to increase during the foreseeable future. The deregulation implemented in Sweden in the 1990s in the communication and transport sector has probably already had its main impact on productivity. There is of course still scope for reforms to increase competition further and thereby also productivity. 14 But without such new initiatives the deregulation will probably not contribute as much to future growth. Investments in IT will probably fuel productivity for a long time. Earlier experiences show that major development phases, such as electricity and the combustion engine, affected productivity growth over several decades. 15 As yet we know very little about the delayed effects on productivity from earlier IT investments and reorganisations. Hopefully, the productivity project I mentioned earlier will increase this knowledge. All in all, the indications are that long-term productivity growth will be slightly lower than in the past 10-15 years. The Riksbank’s assessment is that the long-term rate of increase in productivity in the economy as a whole has fallen slightly to 2.25 per cent a year. This is lower than during the period 1995-2006, when productivity growth was on average 2.6 per cent a year, but slightly higher than the level of around 2 per cent a year that applies if the 1980s are included. The Riksbank’s assessment is well in line with what, for instance, the National Institute of Economic Research has assumed regarding long-term productivity growth in the economy.

In particular, important institutions cannot be allowed to stay outside in the sun during good times, but allowed to come inside the regulatory net when it is raining. •  We need a more robust capital regime for banks. Measures of regulatory capital lag far behind the real-time market-based measures of capital and risk. Moreover, the capital regime is procyclical. Banks are constrained in the amount of reserves they can build in good times as a buffer against cyclical downturns. Finally, banks balk at cutting dividends to conserve capital or replenishing the capital they sorely need in  6  BIS Review 28/2009  the middle of crisis. These incentives reinforce the downward pressure on the financial system during times of stress. •  We need a more effective regulatory system. We need a systemic risk authority that has both the responsibility and the powers to look across the entire financial system – both depository institutions and the capital markets. Our regulatory regime is incredibly balkanized, which makes coordination difficult and means that important information can fall between the cracks. It also leads to less accountability for supervisory shortcomings and failures, which is another area where we have to do better. This list is just a hint of the agenda that lies ahead. We need to put our financial system into the repair shop for intensive reconstruction.
In the US, the slowdown in growth has been more pronounced than expected by most observers when the first signs of a turnaround emerged last autumn. Industrial output has declined over the last 10 months and business investment has shrunk by almost 14 per cent, annualised, in the second quarter. Moreover, the impact on Europe and the emerging economies in Asia has been substantially greater than expected. The shift in perceptions of the outlook is reflected in the estimates from Consensus Forecasts. Since the beginning of the year, growth forecasts have been revised downwards by 2 percentage points in Japan, 1½ percentage points in Germany and 1 percentage point in the US. Not since 1974 has GDP growth been below 2½ per cent in all three countries. Growth among our trading partners has been revised downwards by 1 percentage point to a little less than 2 per cent, which is the lowest rate recorded since 1993. Growth forecasts for 2002 have also been adjusted downwards somewhat, but growth is still expected to pick up next year. However, there is substantial uncertainty associated with these forecasts. 12  BIS Review 74/2001  The forecasts are to a large extent based on the assumption that household consumption will continue to fuel growth in domestic demand, as has been the case in the US and Europe so far this year. This is expected because of the solid financial situation of the household sector in most industrial countries after many years of rising employment and real wage growth.

However, there have also been episodes where bubbles have accumulated in these markets, in the form of sharp increases in asset prices, while inflation has been low. The situation in Japan in the 1980s is an example. Price increases in property and financial markets may have a considerable impact on wage growth and consumer price inflation after a period. When the bubbles burst, the result may be an economic downturn. In this way, developments in financial and property markets may be a source of a more unstable inflation environment. In principle, it would be appropriate to use the interest rate to counter this. In practice, however, it is difficult to assess whether price trends in property and financial markets are sustainable. When Norges Bank concludes that the key rate should be changed, the change will in most cases be made gradually. This is because there is normally uncertainty about the situation in the economy, 2 potential disturbances to the economy and how fast an interest rate change will affect price inflation. But we will not always take a gradualist approach. A rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate is appropriate if monetary policy credibility is threatened. If special circumstances prompt Norges Bank to apply a different time horizon than two years, the Bank will provide an assessment of this. We will also do so if developments in financial markets or the property market warrant particular attention.