samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But compensation plans bear some degree of responsibility as well. Annual bonuses that reward immediate book value without reflecting tail risk to the organization reinforce short termism. Changing the time horizon for compensation will be a significant feature of meaningful cultural reform. 10 Conclusion The principal benefit to a financial services firm in having a strong ethical culture is the avoidance of bad banker behavior. Bad banker behavior often leads to enforcement actions that can carry significant monetary fines, that can inflict destructive damage to the organization’s reputation, and in the worst case, that can cause the death of a franchise (recalling that all financial services firms depend upon public confidence to survive). A strong ethical culture also attracts the best and the brightest personnel, who will seek out the bank as the place to build a career doing high quality work, for fair compensation, with people they like and respect. As for those with whom the bank does business, they may come to see the organization as customer focused, looking to serve them well, and not turning them into the next “profit opportunity.” Finally, from the perspective of the supervisory community, an industry comprising personnel who have a strong ethical culture will be a safer and sounder industry, certainly safer and sounder than an industry full of miscreants. This could be a powerful factor toward financial stability. Thank you for your kind attention. 7  Christine Lagarde, “Economic Inclusion and Financial Integrity,” Address to the Conference on Inclusive Capitalism,” May 27, 2014.

In better run firms, the rules are built on a foundation of the shared and well‐understood values of the institution. These values reflect a bank’s public function as a financial intermediary and recognize the privileges that come with a banking charter. 4 In other firms, however, compliance rules can be undermined by the values of the organization, resulting in an unhealthy dissonance. For example, if there are elaborate rules for complying with the tax laws of a particular jurisdiction, but the organizational value is to facilitate flight capital, a mixed message may be sent that tax compliance rules are just technicalities. Similarly, in the area of economic sanctions, if the sanction is perceived as something technical and implicating only a single currency, the bank might be sending an unintended message – that we comply with the sanction only because it represents a mandatory but silly rule of a single sovereign issuing a specific currency, and not because the sanction seeks to address a problem that all should find abhorrent, like financing a jurisdiction engaged in genocide. 5 What to leave out Thinking about culture like a package, there are some things that I would leave out. Again, without being exhaustive, here are three examples. First, I would leave out any depiction of the persons that an organization does business with as “counterparties.” If you went to your doctor and overheard her refer to you in conversation with office personnel as a “counterparty,” rather than as a “patient,” would you worry? I would.
This risk is emphasised by the fact that far from all of the exporter companies can claim to have a comprehensive natural hedge against currency risks. In some cases companies raise foreign currency debt which is not fully covered by inflows from export activities. In 2008–09 and 2014–15, the Bank of Russia’s assets were used to refinance external loans which had been raised by commodity companies. It is therefore essential to keep monitoring the risks of excessive external debt accumulation, for which purpose the Bank of Russia has instated monitoring of companies’ foreign currency debt levels. Among the many tools for macroprudential risk management are the measures taken by the Bank of Russia towards the deforexation of the economy. Given that in Russia, phases of the financial cycle largely correlate with phases of the commodity cycle, we think these measures need to be countercyclical – allowing banks to accumulate capital during periods of credit expansion and then use it as a cushion in periods of credit crunch. This approach will smooth out the sharpness of fluctuations in the financial cycle and reduce financial stability risks. 4) On credit risk in the banking sector First of all, it must be noted that for the most part credit risks in the corporate segment did in fact come to pass. If we look at the statistics, over the past six months the share of overdue loans has remained virtually unchanged, coming to 6.7% on 1 March 2017.

But if you look at the facts, total deposits in Hong Kong’s banking system rose by almost 3% in 2019. They increased by another 7.8% in the first eight months of this year. In simple terms, the strength of the Hong Kong dollar and this expansion of the deposit base tell us that there is more money coming in than going out. 13. Our banking system continues to be robust. Hong Kong’s banks have among the highest capital adequacy and liquidity ratios in the world. And despite a difficult operating environment, our classified loan ratio is still low – around 0.8%. And that resilience provides room for our banks to continue lending and providing relief measures to customers during the COVID-19 outbreak. 14. And our capital markets are thriving. Hong Kong was the world’s leading IPO centre last year. Although global markets were tested by extreme volatility in the first quarter, our capital markets have continued to function without incident. As several large Chinese companies that had listed in the US seek secondary listings in Hong Kong this year, we should once again achieve a very high ranking in the global IPO league table. 15. None of this happened by luck or by chance. The resilience we see now is the result of sustained efforts over many years. It’s the result of building capital and liquidity buffers into the banking system; and prudently managing the reserves that support the Linked Exchange Rate System.
Figure 2 Contributions to monthly CPI inflation (*) (accumulated in moving six-month periods, percentage points) 3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 Jun.11  Dec.11 Goods CPIEFE  Jun.12  Dic.12  Jun.12  Services CPIEFE  Foods  Dic.13 Energy  CPI  (*) Starting in January 2014, calculations are based on the new indices with base year 2013=100, so they may not be strictly comparable with earlier figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 3  Private consumption (annual change, percent)  Investment (annual change, percent)  60  60  72  45  45  54  54  30  30  36  36  15  15  18  18  0  0  0  0  -15  -15  -18  -18  -30  -30  -36  -36  09  10  11  Durable goods  12  13  72  12 09 10 11 13 14 Construction and engineering works  14  Non-durable goods  Machinery & equipment  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

It also uses as a working assumption that nominal wages will be adjusted in line with productivity and the inflation target. The baseline scenario also uses as a methodological assumption that the MPR will follow a path comparable to that that can be inferred from the prices of financial assets outstanding at the statistical closing of this Monetary Policy Report (figure 8). The baseline scenario reflects the events that are believed to be more likely to occur with the information at hand at the closing of this Report. However, there are risk scenarios which, if materialized, may reshape the macroeconomic outlook and thus the course of monetary policy. This time, having evaluated the alternative scenarios, the Board believes that the risk balance for both output and inflation, is unbiased. Internationally, the biggest risk continues to be linked to the Chinese economy and its financial system. This risk has significant impact, considering China’s weight in the commodities market, copper included, and its importance in world trade. Besides, one cannot rule out the vulnerabilities in other emerging economies resulting in new episodes of volatility. The risks relating with the United States withdrawing its monetary stimulus programs and the Eurozone’s macro-financial situation have diminished, but are still capable of widening the fluctuations in the global financial markets. In particular, the current context of lower sovereign premiums could trigger a sharper reversal. Still, the improved performance of the U.S. economy would also mean a stronger impulse from abroad. Locally, the main risk has to do with the short-term inflation outlook.
The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has permitted banks and financial institutions to establish exchange houses in several countries to enhance accessibility by remitters. More recently, the Central Bank has taken a keen interest to enhance remittance flows into the country. From a payment system improvement point of view, it is essential for Sri Lanka to consider using wireless ATMs and E-Banking systems in rural areas to facilitate speedy disbursement of funds. As has been the case in the Philippines, Mobile Commerce (MCom) through SMART Padala (Philippines) and global G-Cash services should be introduced in Sri Lanka. In the meantime, internet-based transfer services such as wire transfers, automated clearing house transfers and cheque transfers should be further facilitated. Sri Lanka should take steps to reduce high remittance fees from remitting countries, such as Japan, Italy and the US by building up partnerships with banks in these countries as well as money transfer companies. In Sri Lanka too, Telecom services and Dialogue GSM are planning to introduce SMART Cards to connect remittance receivers and their bankers. As the SMART card system may require the use of agents in outstations, the banks involved should register these agents and provide on-line banking facilities to them. While the telephone company ensures the security of money transfers, the agents and banks should attempt to reduce cost of money transfers as well as mitigating risks involved in this activity. In addition to the banking sector, Sri Lanka should speed up the linking of Sri Lanka's postal system with the global postal network.

1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005(a)  1,065  1,315  1,984  3,807  5,522  6,347  Textile and Garments  110  293  628  1,853  2,982  2,895  Tea  373  442  495  481  701  810  All Other Exports  582  581  862  1,474  1,839  2,642  Export Earnings (Services)  279  329  531  821  953  1,540  Worker Remittances  152  292  401  790  1,160  1968  Foreign Direct Investment  43  24  34  28  175  272  Foreign Loans and Grants  307  517  526  847  422  972  Inflows  9  14  13  21  15  19  Trade balance  15  40  57  53  65  76  Loans and grants  50  56  76  93  275  197  Total imports  7  14  15  15  16  22  GDP  4  5  5  6  7  8  Export Earnings (Goods)  Worker Remittances, as a % of Total current account  (a) Provisional  As shown in the table above, in 2005, remittances increased to $ 1,968 mn, indicating a 22.6% growth compared to 2004.
Economic activity began to recover in mid-2013. Since then, real GDP in the euro area has expanded steadily, if moderately, until by the second half of 2015 it had reached its pre-crisis level. However, the unemployment rate in the euro area remains relatively high, though it has fallen from a peak of above 12% in 2013 to below 10% today. Against the backdrop of a tentative recovery, and with euro area banks having to clean up their balance sheets and restrict lending, inflation in the euro area began a prolonged downward trend. Inflation in the euro area fell to 0.4% in 2014, zero in 2015 and just 0.2% last year. At these rates, inflation was considerably below the ECB target. Indeed, by mid2014 disinflationary pressures in the euro area were clear. The concern was that Inflation expectations, which were firmly anchored until then, could lose their moorings. This would lead to a self-sustained deflationary spiral that would further weaken the euro area economy. At this stage, the conduct of monetary policy ran into another constraint. As we have seen, by May 2009 the Governing Council had cut the main refinancing rate to 1.0%. The main refinancing rate was lowered to 0.25% in November 2013, while the rate on the ECB’s overnight deposit facility was reduced to zero. The Governing Council now faced a dilemma: although the economic situation demanded further monetary stimulus, official interest rates could not fall much further. Nominal interest rates cannot fall far below zero.

Svein Gjedrem: Hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs Introduction by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a public hearing before the Storting's Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs, together with Mrs Kristin Halvorsen, Minister of Finance, and Mr Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, Director General of The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, Oslo, 13 February 2009. *  *  *  Government finance fund and government bond fund The crisis in the banking sector was initially a problem of liquidity. In October and November, there was considerable turbulence and fear was spreading among banks. Credit premiums were high. The situation has improved. The improvement is to a considerable extent the result of action taken by the authorities. The swap arrangement whereby banks can exchange covered bonds for government paper has been important. The arrangement is oriented towards larger banks, and a number of banks have made use of this facility, in an amount so far totalling more than NOK 70 billion. Norges Bank has proposed an extension of the arrangement to provide banks with funding at 5-year maturities. Maturities so far have been up to 3 years. The extension is important to ensure that maturity dates do not all fall within a short period. The arrangement provides banks with Treasury bills. Banks have used these as collateral for loans, sold them or kept them as liquidity reserves. There has been high demand for Treasury bills.
12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  12  Chart 14: Surveys of business investment  Chart 15: Housing market indicators have  intentions have weakened  recovered  Source: Bank of England, BCC, CBI, CBI/PwC, Markit/CIPS and  Source: RICS survey and ONS  Bank calculations  But if I had to pick out three possible candidates, one would be the underlying momentum in domestic demand, which now looks to have been stronger than we thought at the time. Another could be the speed with which sterling’s depreciation, and the more general easing in financial conditions, have supported the economy. The foreign exchange market attempts to price long-run risk and, to my mind, the currency fell after the referendum for fear of what the result might ultimately mean for the UK’s access to global markets. But if that is a risk for the longer term, once the UK’s new trading arrangements come into force, those arrangements are for the time being unchanged. Against that backdrop, the fall in the exchange rate will help to support activity, cushioning the impact of greater uncertainty. While that was expected, the effect could be coming through faster than we’d anticipated. Finally, the near-term impact on housing activity may be more moderate than we feared (Chart 15). Because it’s a highly durable asset, investment in housing should in principle be subject to the same swings in uncertainty that affect business spending. But housing activity is in general well correlated with consumption, which is holding up better.

See Haddow et al. (2013) and also Bloom (2009) 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6  Specific effects of uncertainty about the impact of EU exit  Let me make a few additional points that may be particularly relevant in the current context: First, this uncertainty effect applies to all sunk-cost decisions about the future – in particular, it would make firms more hesitant about scrapping capacity, not just adding to it. That’s not to say that such decisions are never taken. If a firm gets genuine news that makes a particular activity unprofitable, it may well come to the point where it has to withdraw, writing off the capacity involved. But uncertainty per se raises the bar for all such decisions, disinvestment and new investment alike. So a lack of clarity about the UK’s future trading relationships needn’t result in visible, headline-grabbing closures of productive capacity. The effect is likely to be more insidious: decisions to expand, that might otherwise have been taken, are delayed. Chart 8: Correlation with uncertainty is higher for  Second, one would also expect the impact to be  slower-lived investments  more acute for long-lived (low-depreciation) investments – buildings more than IT equipment, for example. Intuitively, this is because their consequences last longer – the slower the rate of depreciation on a particular investment, the less like consumption it becomes. In the data, the correlation with uncertainty does seem to be higher for longer-lived investments (Chart 8).
During time, the banking sector has increased the number of branches, has improved its products to the public and has increased its intermediating role to provide an important contribution in the economic development of the country. At the same time, the entrance of well-know European banking groups from Austria, Greece, Italy and France, has been associated with consolidation in the banking industry. As it is the case in the entire region, the banking sector dominates the financial sector in our country. Our supervisory work aims at adopting the best international standards in the field. As a result, our legal and regulatory framework is considered to be consistent in achieving our objective of a stable and sound development of the banking activity, and is continuously improved. From the practical aspect, we combine both regulatory and risk based supervision. BIS Review 43/2009  1  The data reported from the banking sector are analyzed off-site and verified on-site. We also try to stay in close contacts and cooperate with foreign supervisory authorities, as an important instrument in improving the effectiveness of the supervisory work. Nowadays, the assets of the banking sector represent around 87 percent of the country’s GDP. Loan portfolio has reached around 37 percent of GDP. Due to increasing competition after the privatization, its growth has been very strong in the last 4 years, albeit starting from a low base. Deposits represent around 80 percent of the banking sector liabilities, and the loan/deposit ratio stood at around 62 percent.

It has benefited from economic reforms that have provided development opportunities for our business sector, have opened markets, have increased competition, have stimulated flexible labor markets and have increased social revenues. Both fiscal and monetary policies have been cautious in providing the necessary stimulus to the economic growth, by being consistent and disciplined in the pursuit of their objectives to achieve fiscal consolidation and ensure a low-inflation environment. The size of the annual budget deficit in relation to GDP has been between 3 %, leaping to 5.7 % for 2008, while the public debt has been stable, reaching up to around 55.6 % for 2008. The annual inflation growth rate has been for a long time within the corridor defined by the Bank of Albania of 2 4 percent (and close to the Bank of Albania target of 3 percent), indicating success in anchoring market participants expectations for price developments in the economy. This steady good economic performance has been supported by a flexible exchange rate that has been instrumental in supporting and maintaining a balanced growth, by maintaining the right incentives for interaction between domestic and foreign counterparties. Fundamental changes have occurred in the financial sector too, thanks to consistent and successful reforms in the last decade. Nowadays the banking sector in Albania counts 16 banks, all in private hands, where the foreign capital dominates.
© Swiss National Bank

But the steep rise in implied future yields five years ahead suggests that inflation is expected to be higher in the medium term. That could be associated with expectations of softer macro-economic discipline, perhaps more specifically reflecting market uncertainty about EMU in the light of the ongoing debate about prospective membership and about how far the ECB will in practice be free to pursue its statutory task of maintaining price stability. It may, on the other hand, simply reflect some kind of market imperfection. The same analysis can be applied to Italy and Spain, for example, to try to assess market expectations about their possible membership of EMU as part of the first wave. It shows that notwithstanding the recent falls in short-term interest rates in those countries - which can largely be explained by their improved economic performance - 5 years forward yields remain significantly higher than those in Germany and France suggesting that early EMU membership is not at all certain in the eyes of the markets. BIS Review 22/1997  -4-  What can we conclude from all this, Mr. Chairman? Well, the conclusions that I draw are essentially threefold and hardly very surprising. I conclude, first, that markets at present are reasonably persuaded that the world economy as a whole will remain relatively stable at least by comparison with much of the post war period.