samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Unemployment rates in some parts of the UK, such as the North East and Northern Ireland, remain several percentage points above the national average. And those unemployed for more than one year remain above their long-term average. •  Even among those with a job, there remains a sizable number who wish to work longer hours than are currently available to them. Surveys suggest three and a half million people would like to work for longer, or around 10% of the working population (Chart 5). On average, they wish to work an extra 11 hours per week. These people are not unemployed, but they are under-employed. •  Another dimension of under-employment is the extent to which people are using their skills in the workplace. Under-utilised skills are as much an economic waste as under-utilised time. At present, there are around 5 million people whose skills are mismatched, or are over-qualified, for the job they are doing. This number has increased by two percentage points since the start of the crisis. •  Even for those who have found work, levels of job security appear to be lower than in the past. Around 6.4% of all employees in the UK are on temporary contracts. Rates of self-employment have risen from 12% a decade ago to around 15% now. For some firms and workers, those trends are a welcome sign of job flexibility. But not for all. Around a third of temporary contract workers would prefer a permanent contract.

This pattern is embodied in the MPC’s forecasts, with wages projected to outpace productivity in the next few years (Chart 31). Put differently, growth in unit wage costs is expected to pick up and the labour share to rise fairly sharply (Chart 32). That path is certainly plausible if cyclical factors are the key drivers of the low labour share. But there may be alternative forces at play. If substitutability between labour and capital is higher than in the past, labour’s bargaining power and share of income might be commensurably lower, as we have seen across a number of countries before and after the crisis. So how different might the MPC’s projections look if the labour share was, say, flat rather than rising over the next few years? Charts 32 and 33 show the path of wage growth and inflation that would imply. Wage growth is weaker, averaging around 3¼% rather than 4½% at the year three point. So too is consumption given weaker take-home pay, though this is largely offset by stronger company profits and higher investment, leaving aggregate output little altered. The upshot is a materially lower path for inflation than contained in November’s Inflation Report: inflation reaches around 1.6% at the two-year horizon and remains around these  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  levels. That would put the balance of risks squarely towards a more protracted undershoot of the inflation target, even without any downdraught from external prices and demand.
In this context, primarily the measures taken in direct crisis management will be withdrawn, and, as is the case in the rest of the world, the exit strategy will be a cautious and gradual process that safeguards financial stability in our country as well. I would like to end my remarks by extending my regards to all the participating academicians and policy-makers for their contributions to the “Global Crises and Economic Governance” congress. Also, I would like to thank, once more, the staff of İnönü University and everybody for their contributions to the conference. BIS Review 79/2010  7

Today, with a mobile penetration rate of 145%, internet transactions are becoming more prevalent. Last year, Malaysians spent 23% more on online shopping platforms compared to 2015. This is consistent with what is happening around the globe. The number and value of non-cash transactions have increased steadily in recent years. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Balance between paper and digital However, despite these observations, central banks around the globe expect cash to stay necessary and never go away. There are several reasons for this but ultimately they boil down to having a good mix of both. Think about the printed book. There are some things that an e-book simply cannot offer. You can’t turn down a corner, leaf through the pages, or crack a spine. However conversely, reading off a tablet or Kindle saves you the hassle of lugging around heavy books or lengthy academic articles – especially when you do not need to read them from cover to cover. As a policy maker, I would think that there are three elements, or the ‘3S’, that we should consider in determining an optimal balance of paper and digital, cash and cashless. Security The first consideration is security. Counterfeiting is as old as money itself. However, cash has become more secure in recent years. In Malaysia, the amount of counterfeits discovered reduced by 25% in the past year. The currency industry is continuing to make good progress in enhancing security features.
In recent years, however, similar effects have come from the deregulation of electricity and telecom markets, as well as from the EU’s agricultural reform. Meanwhile, the temporarily lower rate of inflation has meant that real wage growth has exceeded expectations and thereby acted as a general demand stimulus. Strictly speaking, as I mentioned, the latter effects fade away, even in the case of a series of positive shocks that last for some time. This is countered by the oil price increases, an example - at least in part - of a negative supply shock. It should be added, however, that a part of the process which the rising oil price represents has to do with the better global activity, which normally leads to a general increase in commodity prices. The higher oil prices accordingly tend to push prices up and curb output. But so far the combined impact of all the supply shocks seems to be positive: temporarily lower inflation and stronger demand growth. A third factor that has contributed to the favourable price trend is the general increase in competition. This has made it difficult for firms to raise their prices in order to improve profit margins as they usually do in this phase of the business cycle. To some extent this may also be because firms know that price impulses from that quarter will inevitably cause the Riksbank to raise the instrumental rate.

Another consequence of higher productivity growth is that inflation tends to be held back in that unit labour costs are curbed. Labour costs are the dominant item of expenditure in the economy as a whole. Everything suggests that the higher productivity growth in Sweden has contributed to the favourable economic development since the end of the crisis in the early 1990s. But there are other explanations, too. Labour market working better than expected One is the workings of the labour market. Many studies have shown that, at least in a formal sense, Sweden’s labour market is characterised by more or less the same rigidities as continental Europe. So there was every reason to suspect that after the crisis in the early 1990s, unemployment would also stick at a high level in Sweden. Here are some of the grounds for this: •  Labour demand is liable to be low in a labour market that is heavily regulated. Firms are reluctant to recruit because of uncertainty about being able to cut costs if economic activity were to decline. •  Labour supply may be affected after unemployment has risen as steeply as it did in the early 1990s. People are excluded from the labour market. Long-term unemployment may leave competence out of line with what firms are now looking for. The determination to find a job can be affected both by a long period of unemployment and by the structure of unemployment insurance.
In some cases, the banks’ legal obligations actually coincide with the time the customer pays, i.e. long before the actual interbank transaction. For this reason, an assessment of the risk in interbank systems must be based on a thorough analysis of settlement times for the most important payment services. As a central bank, we are naturally concerned that the entire payment system functions smoothly. If important systems for payment services fail, robust interbank systems will obviously be of limited use. At the very worst, extensive problems in systems for payment services might reduce the public’s confidence in deposits, leading to a transition to cash payments. Therefore, we need to be aware of the interplay between the interbank systems and the systems for payment services. BIS Review 7/2000  2  Second, the risk in the payment system can be reduced by increased use of gross settlement in the central bank - but there are costs attached to such a conversion. An increasing number of countries, including Norway, have introduced gross settlement systems RTGS systems - for large-value transfers.1 The conversion from net to gross settlement for large payments can eliminate credit risk and, thus, a fundamental cause of systemic risk from an interbank settlement. However, such conversion is not cost-free. Let me briefly mention two disadvantages of gross settlement: -  First, it is evident that gross settlement does not completely eliminate the danger of systemic risk.

BIS Review 7/2000  12  4.3.2. The importance of “proper” incentives  It is important to have incentives which reflect the real costs connected to various payment services if participants are to come up with their own solutions balancing risk against efficiency. A pertinent example may be the regulations concerning loans in the central bank. It is a basic responsibility of the banks to ensure that liquidity is sufficient to cover settlement. The main rule for settlement in Norges Bank is that there shall be adequate cover in the account. If, for one reason or another, a bank does not have sufficient cover, it must turn to the market for financing. If necessary, the settlement should in part or in its entirety be delayed so as to give the institution enough time to obtain sufficient liquidity. Too easy access to loans in the central bank in situations where financial stability is not at risk involves costs in that it weakens banks’ incentives to address elements of risk in the payment systems and presents the customer with prices which do not reflect the risk attached to various payment services. 4.3.3. The importance of competition  The stipulated regulatory framework affects competition, such as who is allowed to initiate new payment services. Competition is important, both for improving the use of known, reliable payment services and for the development of new services.
Being able to understand the FinTech revolution and to ensure that this contributes to economic stability and people’s welfare is one crucial way to remain trustworthy. 19

Next, we need to address skills, jobs, and careers in an integrated manner. Finally, workforce transformation must become a core business capability for all firms. The main effect of technology is to transform jobs rather than to destroy existing ones or create new ones. Research1 has found that technology changes tasks within jobs rather than displaces entire jobs. 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  In other words, some tasks within jobs are made redundant by technology, but new tasks are created within that job or combined with tasks from other jobs. Let me share with you some insights from the financial sector. MAS commissioned Ernst & Young to study the impact on jobs in the financial sector from two specific technologies – data analytics and automation. The study looked at 121 distinct job roles in the financial industry, broken down by the various tasks within each role. It then examined how data analytics and automation are likely to change the tasks within each job role. It also identified the skills that would be necessary to perform any new tasks created. The study found that one in three job roles in the financial sector will be heavily transformed by data analytics and automation. This means that some tasks will be automated and others substituted by data analytics. The remaining tasks will converge into new job roles that require more judgement and customisation – both of which require new skillsets.
I also have a number of specific remarks and views to make on the aspects of East Asian financial markets to be discussed in the next sessions. But for the benefit of time, I think I should leave them for later opportunity. For now, let me close by saying a little bit about the role of policy. Government policies, in my view, have played an important role in the current development of East Asian financial markets. The key policy, of course, has been the implementation of financial sector reform which has resulted in a much improved financial system, especially the banking sector. Policies have been directed at developing the region’s capital markets too, especially the bond market. Policy coordination has also been strengthened to increase regional financial integration and to develop a policy coordination framework that can help the region deal better with the likelihood of a crisis. I am referring here to the CMI or the Chiang Mai Initiative and its surveillance process. But while policies have been important, the process of financial market development in East Asia has essentially been left to the market, in the sense that the process is basically a market-driven one. But on account of what is perceived to be a slow progress, question arises whether policy should do more. My view is that the process should continue to be market-driven and not policy-driven. But there are areas that government policies can do more, especially on issues that involve efforts on a region-wide basis.

The challenge here is to promote greater roles of Asia’s own financial institutions without compromising the open, competitive, and level playing field that has been the hallmark of the region’s financial markets. The fourth observation is the concern about the attendant risk associated with increased financial flows and integration. With increased flows, the region’s financial markets are susceptible to greater risks and spillovers from the international financial markets. The issue then is whether a better system is needed to help mitigate and manage these risks. And the fifth is the concern about the region-wide benefits of the efforts we are doing on financial market development and integration, given the vast diversity of the economies and markets in the region. Ideally, regional financial development should be a win-win situation. Nonetheless, the uneven pace of development and unbalanced focus could risk hallowing out the region’s financial system. And if this happens, it could sow a seed for future instabilities. I think these observations and concerns are important, and in a way they point to the issues that should be addressed in our next step of financial reform. And it is in this context that I see the World Bank Flagship study on East Asian financial markets to be timely. And from what I heard this morning, significant benefits and insights can probably be gained from this study, and be useful to our future works in the region.
4  BIS Review 43/2006  demand for highly-qualified labour in relation to less qualified. However, the possibility that increased competition from low-wage countries is also part of the explanation cannot be entirely ruled out. So far, it appears as though Sweden has managed the structural transformation well. The Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS) demonstrates in a study that Swedish-owned industrial companies which increased the number of their employees in low-wage countries during the 1990s at the same time increased their demand for labour with higher education in Sweden. This is in line with the development that has taken place in the United States and the United Kingdom. According to the Swedish Labour Market Administration’s figures on redundancy notification and ITPS’s media monitoring, few jobs moved abroad as a result of companies transferring their operations abroad during 2005. 4 In total, the number of jobs was 2 000-4 000, of which 1 500 involved a move to another EU country. The major challenge for the future probably does not lie in the number of jobs moving abroad, but in managing the transition required to make it possible to create new jobs as new employment is created mainly in other countries/regions/sectors. This demands a good corporate climate and a good capacity to attract knowledge and capital. It requires flexibility in the labour market so that employees can retrain as smoothly as possible, and move to new sectors and new regions. If this is not successful, then structural unemployment could become entrenched at high levels.

The SNB will carefully monitor implementation of the reform proposals for foreign exchange benchmarks and provide support, if necessary. In the case of interest rate benchmarks, the FSB’s work will continue with the further participation of the SNB. 2  Swiss Average Rate Overnight. 3  Tomorrow/Next Overnight Indexed Swap. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Elon Musk aside - we cannot diversify away from our exposure to the planet. Therefore, information disclosed by firms across jurisdictions needs to be consistent and comparable to be useful in driving decisions. That points to the need for further international collaboration on consistent approaches to disclosures requirements, for example the work of the IFRS’s proposed International Sustainability Standards Board can serve as a useful minimum baseline. See Enhancing banks’ and insurers’ approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change, April 2019 See Letter from Sam Woods ‘Managing climate-related financial risk – thematic feedback from the PRA’s review of firms’ SS3/19 plans and clarifications of expectations’, July 2020 6 Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 7 See UK joint regulator and government TCFD Taskforce: Interim Report and Roadmap, November 2020 4 5  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  Looking ahead, we need to ensure these initiatives are not only delivered but built on. To illustrate this, I believe there are some key areas of work we will all need to address over the coming period. For example, the quantitative mapping of the carbon intensity of firms or activities to financial risks and losses remains relatively unexplored. This is understandable – it is a complex area as data remain scarce, scenario analysis is still in its infancy, and worldwide, government climate policies do not yet fully internalise the cost of emissions.

Final domestic demand thus rose 2% in 2007, compared to 1.7% in the prior year. Thanks to burgeoning demand, employment was up sharply, with the unemployment rate edging down to 2.6% in seasonally adjusted terms by December. The Swiss economy is thus  BIS Review 50/2008  1  experiencing a period of virtually full employment and has been able to benefit from the flow of workers from the European Union and the flexibility this brings. The economic figures for 2007 are all the more pleasing given that prices have remained stable despite the hike in commodity prices. Over the year as a whole, prices increased by 0.7% on average. However, by December, inflation was up 2% – an acceleration primarily attributable to the sharp jump in the price of oil. In such a favourable climate, it was important for monetary policy not to stimulate the economy any further. By persisting with excessively low interest rates, we could have aggravated inflationary risks and thereby disturbed the macroeconomic equilibrium. The SNB therefore maintained its monetary normalisation course by lifting the Libor target range by 25 basis points on three occasions. The three-month Libor thus rose from 2.1% at the beginning of the year to 2.75% in September. In view of the considerable financial uncertainty and the effect this was having on growth prospects for 2008, we subsequently left the target range unchanged and stabilised the Libor at the 2.75% mark. We have since maintained this position.
Major variation between different groups  Cashflow effect on disposable household income of a rate increase of 1 percentage point 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  All borrower households (DTI ≈ 2.6)  10 per cent most highly indebted (DTI ≈ 8.7)  0  Note. Per cent. Refers to the average for each group. Within each group, the figure in paranthesis refers to the average debt-to-income (DTI) ratio. Source: The Riksbank  This variation among households can also have a bearing on the total effects on consumption. If the most highly indebted households adapt their consumption mostly in the event of a given change in income, the total effect will also be greater. As the interest rate affects housing prices, it can also affect the scope of households to consume by borrowing against their home as collateral. Currently, many households not only have high debts in relation to their disposable income but also in relation to the value of their home. But in order to ascertain how differences among households can affect total consumption, we would need better data on household assets. 15 From this perspective, there is therefore reason to proceed cautiously with rate rises, in light of the uncertainty surrounding how the most highly indebted households will act.

However, there is some difference between developments in the United States, where growth has remained strong and unemployment is at its lowest level in almost 50 years, and the euro area, where developments have been more subdued. Wages are now rising increasingly rapidly in countries like Germany and the United States and are helping to push up inflation. But despite these basically good prospects, we also see a substantial number of risks regarding developments abroad, which I will come back to at the end of my speech. For some time now, we have been in an economic boom in Sweden. This in turn is partly due to the expansionary monetary policy. Despite a partial slowdown in growth, output is still above its trend level (see Figure 2). It was striking that GDP fell between the second and third quarters of last year, but we believe most of this has to do with temporary factors, including the fact that household consumption of cars was brought forward to quarter 2 due to amended tax rules, which pushed down car sales in quarter 3. 2 [13]  Figure 2. Economic activity still strong in Sweden High output level 6  High pressure on the labour market 6  GDP gap  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6  -8  01  04  07  10  13  16  19  -8  Note. Left-hand graph.