samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And whether the bail-in is effected by use of a bail-in tool in an operating bank or by application of a bridge bank tool at holding company level. It represents the realisations that if we are to end TBTF we must have bail-ins instead of bail-outs so losses can fall on investors not on taxpayers. And that the bail-in must enable continuity in a firm’s operations to avoid interruption to critical functions and to buy time for an orderly reorganisation of the firm to the extent necessary to deal with the problem that first caused the failure. This shared understanding at FSB, and the desire to meet the goal set by G20 Leaders to end TBTF and the risk of taxpayer bail-outs as soon as possible, has driven a focus on seeking changes at firms so that they can be stabilised and enter resolution safely without disruption to critical functions.

On the one hand, global trade may continue to grow more rapidly than expected, thereby supporting euro area exports. Moreover, strong business confidence could provide more support to domestic economic activity in the euro area than is currently expected. On the other hand, downside risks relate to the tensions in some segments of the financial markets and their potential spillover to the euro area real economy. Further downside risks relate to renewed increases in oil and other commodity prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. With regard to price developments, euro area annual HICP inflation was 2.4% in January 2011, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 2.2% in December. This further increase was broadly anticipated and largely reflects higher energy prices. Looking ahead to the next  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  few months, inflation rates could temporarily increase further and are likely to stay slightly above 2% for most of 2011, before moderating again around the turn of the year. Overall, we continue to see evidence of short-term upward pressure on overall inflation, mainly owing to energy and commodity prices. Such pressure is also discernible in the earlier stages of the production process. These developments have not so far affected our assessment that price developments will remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. At the same time, very close monitoring is warranted.
Luis M Linde: Overview of the Spanish economy and progress on banking union in Europe Testimony by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Parliamentary Budget Committee in connection with the draft State Budget for 2015, Madrid, 1 October 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, As is habitually the case, my appearance before this Committee at the start of the parliamentary process to discuss and approve the Budget will focus on the developments in and the outlook and challenges for the Spanish economy, which are the framework for economic policy measures. On this occasion I shall also refer, at the end of my address, to the progress on banking union in Europe. As you know, the Single Supervisory Mechanism will begin to operate in early November, marking a milestone on the road taken to overcome the fragilities in the architecture of the European Monetary Union. The external setting of the Spanish economy I shall begin with a reference to the external setting of the Spanish economy and to the monetary policy we share with the euro area countries. The world economy remains on a course of progressive recovery which, on available forecasts, could place GDP growth at a rate of around 3.5% this year, and closer to 4% in 2015. The performance of the different global regions remains, however, very uneven. While recovery is firming in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the Japanese economy appears to be losing momentum.

In closing, I want to reiterate that external auditors have truly been one of our key partners in the quest for greater financial stability. Thailand’s financial industry is currently in the midst of structural changes with the implementation of our Financial Sector Master Plan. One of the goals of the master plan is to promote greater competition, which in turn, may result in the evolution of bigger and more complex financial institutions. Against this background, our supervisors will need to fully embrace a risk-based supervisory philosophy and its focus on the quality of internal controls and risk management systems. Therefore, our relationship with external auditors will become even more important in the years ahead as we seek to strengthen banks’ risk management systems and enhance fnancial stability. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 55/2004
Norges Bank’s mandate reads as follows: Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s internal and external value,  1  If clothing prices had risen at the same pace as other consumer prices, the overall saving for households is estimated at about NOK 10 billion in 2002. BIS Review 65/2002  3  contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. The first paragraph of the mandate sets forth its intentions. The last paragraph specifies what Norges Bank is required to do. The first sentence in the mandate refers to the value of the krone. Stability in the internal value of the krone implies that inflation must be low and stable. Low and stable inflation fosters economic growth and stability in financial and property markets. The regulation also states that monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the external value of the krone. The krone exchange rate fluctuates from day to day, from week to week, and from month to month. We have free international trade and free capital movements. We do not have the instruments for fine-tuning the exchange rate.

If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. This orientation of monetary policy will normally also contribute to stabilising output and employment. A time horizon of two years when setting interest rates allows monetary policy to contribute to stabilising production. This horizon prevents monetary policy in itself from causing unnecessary fluctuations in the economy. A relevant example is the outlook for the next two years. Against the background of the recent years’ appreciation of the krone, consumer price inflation is projected to be lower than the inflation target over the next year and then move up towards 2½ per cent in two years. As an alternative, we could have sought to achieve the inflation target of 2½ per cent using a time horizon of six months to one year. We would then have had to reduce the interest rate sharply this summer. This would have amplified the pressures in the Norwegian economy that are so clearly reflected in wage developments and household credit demand. In all likelihood, this would have required marked interest rate increases one to one and a half years ahead. Strict inflation targeting of this type would thus have resulted in more pronounced fluctuations in the interest rate and in aggregate demand and employment.
Two of them focus on improving cross-border payments by working on interoperability between CBDCs with innovative solutions, such as a liquidity management tool based on decentralised finance technology (AMM, automated market maker), which we upgraded in the first half of 2022. The third experiment aims at deepening previous ones on the use of central bank money as a safe settlement asset for tokenised securities, together with other European partners. It involves issuing and distributing tokenised bonds on a blockchain. ***  Let me conclude by recalling that in the 1980s it was decided to design and build a large glass pyramid in its courtyard of the Louvre. This disruptive architecture by I.M. Peï was first met with outrage, as critics considered it incompatible with classical style. It was nonetheless built, and has since then become a cherished symbol of the Louvre. I hope that we central bankers will find our way to make tokenisation fit in the existing architecture, while regulating it to the extent necessary. Thank you for your attention. And I would now like to hand the floor over to Ms Mairead McGuinness. Page 6 sur 5 Villeroy de Galhau, F., Central banks and finance in the face of a triple revolution, speech, 25 November 2021 Villeroy de Galhau, F., Ethics of currency: a possible guide for central bankers?, Michel Camdessus Central Banking Lecture, 14 September 2022 iii See for instance Waller, C.J., CBDC - A Solution in Search of a Problem?

Regarding the euro area, a digital euro would also contribute to supporting monetary sovereignty and strategic autonomy, by preventing the use of external digital assets – such as private crypto assets and non-euro CBDCs – as settlement assets, and by facilitating the emergence of a pan-European payment solution at the point of sale, which could serve as a vehicle for the use of a digital euro. But such a digital euro could and should be decentralised in its implementation, in the spirit of public / private partnerships mentioned earlier. On the other side of a mountain, you will obviously always find a side that is less exposed to the sun; here, this northern face is wholesale CBDC. It currently attracts little public interest, although it poses relatively less complex legal issues, and has two strong business cases. First, a wholesale CBDC could significantly contribute to improving cross-border and cross-currency payments, a topic on which we have made progress over the past year. Following a first report delivered to the G20 in July 2021, the Future of Payments Working Group of the BIS has recently finalised a new report outlining options for access and interoperability of CBDCs for cross-border payments. Second, a wholesale CBDC could accompany the tokenisation of securities as a safe and liquid settlement asset for them on a blockchain technology. Failing to offer market participants a wholesale CBDC could open the door to an extensive use of socalled stablecoins, which would pose a systemic risk.
The crucial insight emphasised by these models is that expectations matter, and provide a mechanism through which policy makers can seek to influence activity at the zero bound. This is an important channel of monetary transmission and one I will return to. But the argument that monetary policy can work only through expectations management is not a robust result. It rests on very particular assumptions. In this class of models, financial markets are assumed to be complete and frictionless and the representative agent is able to arbitrage across all financial markets. As such, all non-aggregate risk in the economy can be hedged perfectly and asset prices depend only on state-contingent payoffs. Under these assumptions, demand curves for financial assets are perfectly elastic. But in the real world it seems plausible that demand curves for assets, in addition to money, are downward sloping to some degree, in which case changes in their relative supplies can affect their relative prices. It is this which gives quantitative easing its traction. Half a century ago Tobin (1958), in pioneering work on portfolio allocation, recognised that a range of assets, in addition to money, are likely to be imperfect substitutes. But Tobin did not articulate fully the frictions that could generate such imperfect substitutability. More recently, there has been rapid development in micro models of the source of financial frictions which can motivate imperfect substitutability. Recent examples include Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Vayanos and Weill (2008).

Moreover, this will have to be done against a complicated macroeconomic backdrop in Europe, where economic conditions  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  are still prone to vulnerability and interest rates remain very low, acting as a brake on improvements in the quality of loanable assets, growth in lending and recovery in interest margins. That said, at the Banco de España we are convinced that Spain’s banks will successfully adapt to all these challenges, adjusting where necessary their business strategies, improving where possible their efficiency levels and harnessing any opportunities the market may offer to continue to bolster their balance sheets in keeping with the new demands. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Chart 24: Changes in effective exchange rate indices and domestic demand surprises Per cent 15  pp 1.5  10  1.0  5  0.5  0  0.0  -5  -0.5  -10 Apr-13  -1.0 Aug-13  Dec-13  UK DD (RHS) US DD (RHS) £ (LHS)  Apr-14  Aug-14 EA DD (RHS) € (LHS) $ (LHS)  Sources: Consensus, FRB, ECB, BoE and Bank calculations. Notes: Domestic demand series show revisions to average domestic demand growth relative to main trading partners. With inflation expectations having adjusted, how might this affect wage and inflation behaviour? Table 1 shows estimates of two estimated Phillips curves, which include the typical wage-determinants, such as productivity, but also include (lagged) measures of inflation expectations for households (at a 2-year horizon) and financial markets (at a 5-year horizon). Both expectations measures are statistically significant in explaining wage growth. Every one percentage point fall in inflation expectations results in a similarly-sized fall in wage growth the next period. With household expectations having fallen 90bp, and financial market expectations by 40bp over the past year, this implies they would be exerting a significant drag on wage growth at present. That is consistent with survey evidence from the Bank’s agents, whose contacts cite falling inflation expectations as the most important factor currently holding back wage settlements.14  14  From the recent Agents’ survey on pay and labour costs (Bank of England (2015a)).

Rather, the New York Fed's actions have consistently been directed at securing its objectives as lender. As any lender in our position would do, the New York Fed has put into place a loan agreement that contains covenants designed to help ensure ultimate repayment of the loan – but these creditor's rights do not create an ability to manage AIG. Responsibility for AIG's day-to-day affairs continues to rest with AIG's chief executive officer, Edward Liddy, under the oversight of AIG's board of directors. Mr. Liddy, who has only become involved with AIG in a public-spirited attempt to resolve its troubled affairs, has  BIS Review 35/2009  1  made strides in dealing with AIG's opaque corporate structure, lack of centralized controls and complex risk exposures, but much remains to be done. In light of the inherent conflicts that would arise from either the U.S. government or the Federal Reserve exerting ownership control over the world's largest insurer, the Federal Reserve, with the support of the Treasury Department, directed in the loan agreement that an approximately 77.9 percent equity interest in AIG be issued to an independent trust established for the sole benefit of the United States Treasury. The trust, which now holds that controlling equity interest, is overseen by three independent trustees who are of the highest integrity and who have considerable experience leading major companies.
European integration is a dynamic project, permanently under construction, which is today facing up to the challenges of a global economic recession and an international financial crisis of proportions unseen in many years. Over ten years ago, before the euro was created, there was an academic debate turning on the theory of optimal currency areas, which questioned whether a single interest rate and, therefore, a single monetary policy could possibly be appropriate for such diverse countries. Ten years after the birth of the euro those of us who joined EMU, and many of those who did not, acknowledge the enormous advantages of being inside the monetary union. Today, the contribution of the single currency in lessening uncertainty for economic agents is clear. The enormous advantages of moderate inflation, of interest rates with a limited range of volatility and of the fact that companies need not consider the exchange rate when buying and selling in an area with almost three hundred and thirty million consumers, are obvious. The upshot is stability, which is a valuable contribution to growth, as we have seen in other, similar-sized monetary areas such as the United States, and we should build on it. We should also celebrate the institutional success of the Eurosystem. The ECB has fulfilled the goal entrusted to it by the Treaty, of keeping inflation expectations anchored, even at very difficult times. And the Eurosystem is in itself a truly fascinating experiment.

Speeches  Published Date: 27 May 2022  Welcome Remarks by Mr Edward S. Robinson, Deputy Managing Director (Economic Policy) & Chief Economist, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 9th Asian Monetary Policy Forum on 27 May 2022  1 Good morning, MD MAS Mr Ravi Menon, President NUS and Chairman of the ABFER Council, Professor Tan Eng Chye, fellow central bankers, distinguished speakers, ladies and gentlemen. Together with my co-organisers, Professor Bernard Yeung and Professor Steve Davis, I am pleased to welcome you to the 2022 Asian Monetary Policy Forum. 2 In its ninth year now, the AMPF comes at an especially opportune time for macroeconomists to advance the discussion on emergent issues in the global economy. After the Great Moderation, the world has experienced a series of severe shocks, each presenting a stern test for policymakers. 3 The two most recent disruptions—the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict—have raised fresh issues for monetary economics and international finance. Soon after the Lehman crisis, Queen Elizabeth, during a visit to the LSE, posed an inconvenient question: “why didn’t anyone see this coming?” Conceivably if Her Majesty made another visit today, she may very well ask the same question about global inflation. A comprehensive research agenda to address this query would require pulling together at least four strands of concerns. 4 The first is about the need for a careful identification of each economic shock.
We also need to build bridges to the future and shape a recovery that makes our economies fit for the future. But bridges need solid foundations. Europe’s future must be built on strong democratic legitimacy. Europe’s citizens must be at the centre of the debate about the Europe that we want to build as we emerge from the crisis. As their elected representatives, you, together with the European Parliament, have a crucial role to play in making their voices heard. I now look forward to our debate. [1] In French: “J’ai toujours pensé que l’Europe se ferait dans les crises, et qu’elle serait la somme des solutions qu’on apporterait à ces crises.” See Monnet, J. (1976), Mémoires, Fayard, Paris. [2] In French: “[la Communauté européenne] elle-même n’est qu’une étape vers les formes d’organisation du monde de demain.” See Monnet, J., ibid., p. 617. [3] Following a significant drop in the first quarter of 2020, euro area real GDP fell by 11.8% in the second quarter, resulting in a record cumulative decline of 15.1% in the first half of the year. [4] ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, September 2020. [5] Milasi, S. et al. (2020), “  The potential for teleworking in Europe and the risk of a new digital divide”, VoxEU, 14 August. [6] Lagarde, C. (2020), “Payments in a digital world”, speech at the Deutsche Bundesbank online conference on banking and payments in the digital world, 10 September.

[7] 75% of people in 16 major countries expect their government to make environmental protection a priority when planning the postCOVID-19 recovery. See Ipsos  press release (published on 5 June 2020) about the results of a survey conducted between 21 and 24 May 2020 on the Global Advisor online platform. [8] Giuzio, M. et al. (2019), “Climate change and financial stability”, Financial Stability Review, ECB, May. [9] European Commission (2020), “  Identifying Europe's recovery needs”, Commission Staff Working Document, 27 May. [10] Through our ECB Listens portal, we are inviting euro area citizens, organisations and relevant stakeholders to contribute ideas and comments on the way we conduct monetary policy. European Central Bank Directorate General Communications Sonnemannstrasse 20, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany Tel. : +49 69 1344 7455, email: media@ecb.europa.eu Website: www.ecb.europa.eu Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged. Media contacts  Copyright 2020, European Central Bank
Options in the restructuring process Allow me now to turn to two questions: the options other than the strategy that was adopted; and why the reform and restructuring process under way since 2009 had to be reinforced, through the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding. As regards the options, I believe the debate mainly focuses on the early years of the crisis, between 2009 and 2011. The two scenarios usually mentioned are, first, not having bailed out non-solvent banks, facilitating their winding up; and second, as opposed to the gradual strategy launched, to have acted more aggressively from the outset, with an injection of public funds in the form of capital and the segregation of impaired assets into purpose-built companies, such as that which was finally created, namely Sareb. With respect to the first scenario, and irrespective of political considerations, letting ailing banks go bankrupt was not a reasonable option in economic terms. The winding up of banks would have meant the paralysis of banking services and losses for depositors in the institutions concerned of that portion not covered by the DGS (a portion that could be very high), accentuating the risk of contagion to other institutions. This type of strategy would have had a devastating impact on confidence and the stability of the financial system, on the real economy and on employment, and it would very likely have meant a higher cost for taxpayers insofar as the DGS would almost certainly not have been able to meet the coverage of deposits without further public aid.

We have therefore worked with the Government on two measures to enhance the resilience of the SGS market. MAS will be empowered to either adjust the issuance size or vary its subscription amount to stabilise an auction. This will mitigate the risk of disorderly trading in specific securities or further volatility in the secondary market. In the event of extreme market conditions or disruption, MAS will be empowered to cancel an auction. In ensuring stability and resilience of the financial sector, a key anchor is a central bank backed by a strong balance sheet. We have increased our total capital and reserves to $ billion, representing close to 11% of MAS’ total assets of $ billion. This will position us well to navigate through a potentially volatile financial market environment, and allow us to implement a broader range of measures to stabilize the Singapore financial system should the need ever arise. While local institutions withstood the crisis and remained sound, a large number of local investors were adversely affected when the credit-linked structured notes they bought defaulted or were redeemed early. Although the defaults were triggered by an unprecedented financial crisis, it has been a painful experience for affected investors. MAS has responded by taking prompt measures to require affected financial institutions to review complaints rigorously. MAS’ approach was for financial institutions to review complaints on a case-by-case basis. Settlement offers are made by the financial institutions taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of each transaction.