samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, the actual reality emphasizes that small and medium size enterprises play an important role in the economic activity in both the developed and developing countries, through their absorptive capacity in employing the workforce of the different levels of training and education. A study by the Riyadh Economic Forum on “the Saudi Business Sector and Meeting the Economic Challenges” showed that the average number of workers in the Saudi private sector stood at 8.4 workers per one single institution, and, consequently, 90 percent of the institutions in the Kingdom is considered within the scope of small and medium size enterprises. Small and medium size enterprises are considered the best efficient and effective tool for accelerating economic and social development, especially in remote areas with the least opportunities for development. They also provide a fertile field for training workers and developing their skills. To this end, governments have paid great attention to such enterprises and established the basic regulatory framework needed for their growth and development, particularly after having proved their ability to reduce pressure on the government sector in providing job opportunities and training. Governments also helped big enterprises in the marketing process and in providing raw materials and primary commodities at the different production phases. It is noted that most regional and international aid donating agencies and organizations have a growing tendency to provide financial resources and technical assistance aimed at assisting such small and medium size enterprises to depend upon themselves and play their anticipated role in the economy.

SMEs’ contribution to the U.S.A’s GDP is more than 50 percent. The insignificant contribution of SMEs to the Kingdom’s GDP may be due to the Oil and Governmental sector which represent the major impetus of economic activity. Dear Brothers and Sisters, SMEs are facing clear challenges in gaining the necessary funding for meeting their expansion needs due to various reasons including poor management, and lack of adequate guarantees and, subsequently, the difficulty of obtaining the necessary funding. In order to overcome this problem in the Kingdom, the Ministry of Finance, in collaboration with Saudi banks, established a guarantee program (Kafalah) for financing SMEs. The program, with a capital of Rls 200 million, is managed by Saudi Industrial Development Fund to cover a proportion of the risk of the financing entity in case of the failure of the guaranteed activity in repaying the finance or part thereof. The program also aims at encouraging banks to finance SMEs that have the constituents for success, but at the same time, they cannot present the necessary guarantees or accounting records to prove their eligibility for funding. The program has recorded good performance since its inception in 2006 until 1-Oct-2010, as the number of guarantees approved by the Ministry of Finance during that period reached 1,668 with a total value of Rls 644 million, while loans granted by banks under the umbrella of the program amounted to Rls 1.6 billion, benefiting about 1,113 SMEs.
We have moved away from an economy marked by detailed regulations, devaluation cycles and national perspectives, to an economy with well-developed credit markets, deregulation and greater international openness. The total of all these changes should contribute, with some time lag, to what has now happened, that is, that growth and productivity are developing more strongly. My point is thus that we should not overestimate the significance of information technology on what has happened so far in the Swedish economy. The fact that things are now going well is probably more due to stability policies, structural reforms and international influences and less due to new technology. There are some people who claim that the vigorous Swedish IT sectors is a sign that no further structural reforms are needed in Sweden. Things are fine as they are. This is a rather dubious conclusion. The Swedish IT miracle is largely the result of three deregulation processes in Sweden. The deregulation of the domestic credit market, the abolition of foreign exchange controls and the deregulation of the telecom sector. This opened the way for the growth of the Swedish IT sector. Risk capital flowed in to new companies from Sweden and abroad. This is not a new economy - it happens every time that strictly regulated markets are opened up to competition. To be fair, however, it should be mentioned that there is a two-way relation between the new technology and the deregulation processes.

For if risk is spread more broadly, shocks should be absorbed with less trauma. Moreover, the system as a whole may be less vulnerable to distortions introduced by the moral hazard associated with the access that banks have to the safety net. A second issue we need to consider stems from the complexity of the new credit instruments, the challenges they present in terms of valuation and risk measurement and their short history of experience in times of stress. Even the most sophisticated participants in the markets for these instruments find the risk management challenges associated with these instruments daunting. This raises the prospect of unanticipated losses. Default rates are harder to predict where there has been a substantial change in the financial attributes of borrowers. The prices of instruments may not respond as expected to a given change in losses or in the value of the assets underlying these instruments. Hedging strategies may prove to be less effective than expected. Similarly rated instruments can behave very differently in stress events. The response of prices and volatility to the downgrades in the automobile sector in the spring of 2005 and the recent experience in subprime mortgages and related asset-backed securities and credit derivatives illustrate different types of surprises faced by the participants in these markets. They are a reminder of the dimensions of uncertainty that exist about the shape of the distribution of potential returns. This is particularly true of what we might call the adverse tail, or the negative extreme.
This has also put upward pressure on interbank rates. Some central banks have thus experienced problems in keeping the overnight rate, the shortest interbank rate, at the target levels. These events have led to several central banks taking different types of measures. To carry out their task of stabilising the overnight rate, the ECB and the Bank of England for instance, have been more active than normal in supplying and withdrawing liquidity through their open market operations. To reduce the pressure on the slightly longer interbank rates and to contribute to efficient markets for different durations, several central banks have also taken measures to increase the supply of loans with longer durations. In this context it is important to clarify that it has not always been a question of a net supply of liquidity. When liquidity is added in the slightly longer term, the ECB for instance has often restored the corresponding amount at shorter durations to avoid the overnight rate deviating too far from the policy rate. A further measure has been to accept more securities than before as collateral for its lending. The Bank of England has also cut its policy rate, but this was also linked to signs of weaker economic activity. 6  BIS Review 51/2008  What has happened in Sweden? In Sweden the interbank market has on the whole functioned smoothly. The financial turmoil has not expressed itself in an increased demand for investment in the Riksbank overnight or in an increased reluctance to lend on the interbank market.

The overnight rate has remained stable around the repo rate. However, as in many other countries, Swedish interbank rates have risen. On the interbank market for loans from tomorrow until the day after, the interest rate has been higher than normal, and movements have been more volatile. But higher and more volatile interbank rates do not automatically mean that the banks will experience problems. Swedish banks have had good opportunities to obtain financing during the entire financial crisis, solvency is good and loan losses are currently small. The fact that we have not seen any major problems in Sweden is of course linked to the fact that Swedish banks have not been exposed to any great extent to the US subprime market. Nor has there been any “distrust” of Swedish banks. Ultimately, it is a question of a broad view that Swedish banks do not have problems. The fact that the overnight rate has been stable around the repo rate may also be linked to the way in which our monetary policy steering system is constructed. An increased demand for deposits with the Riksbank would have been visible in that banks with surpluses would have put their money in their deposit accounts. The return on this is 75 basis points lower than the repo rate, and thus poorer than the overnight market. It would thus be expensive from day one. This differs from systems with an average minimum reserve requirement.
This was partly the result of the deterioration of external conditions in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973. This gave rise to an international recession. At that time, we had a fixed exchange rate in principle. Having left the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate cooperation in 1971, Sweden joined the so-called currency snake in 1973. This entailed a fixed exchange rate against the D-mark in particular. The idea was that wages and prices would then increase in line with their equivalents in Germany and that the fixed exchange rate would act as a “nominal anchor”. This strategy did not work. From the mid-1970s until the early 1990s, inflation was significantly higher than in Germany (see Figure 1). Wages also increased faster than among our competitors and the competitiveness of the Swedish economy was weakened. Price clauses in wage agreements meant that wages were adjusted upwards at the prevailing rate of inflation, while wage clauses in the agreements meant that wages were adjusted upwards as a consequence of other, as yet unknown agreements. In this way, a price/wage spiral developed, in which expectations of high inflation were built in to the wage agreements. At the same time, in practice, not much was left in wage earners’ wallets of these high wage increases, as they had been “eaten up” by the high rate of inflation. From the mid-1970s, real wages developed poorly (see Figure 2). Sweden attempted to mitigate this impaired competitiveness through a series of devaluations. These devaluations meant that competitiveness could temporarily be strengthened.

This consists of three parts: an expenditure ceiling entailing that the Riksbank annually sets up an upper limit for nominal government expenditure for the next three years, a surplus target requiring public finances to have a surplus of one per cent of GDP over an economic cycle1 and a stipulation that municipal and county council budgets may not have deficits. This framework has worked well. Unlike many other countries, Sweden was able to enter the most recent financial crisis with a large public finance surplus. Secondly, the monetary policy regime has been changed. Instead of a fixed exchange rate, we now have a floating exchange rate and an inflation target. After the fixed exchange rate was abandoned in November 1992, the Riksbank decided in January 1993 on a new “nominal anchor” in the form of an inflation target of 2 per cent, to apply from 1995. The new monetary policy regime has worked significantly better than the old one with the fixed exchange rate. Inflation has decreased considerably since the 1970s and 1980s (see Figure 3). In addition, this has not been at the cost of lower average GDP growth than previously. On the contrary, since the mid-1990s, GDP growth has been higher than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Thirdly, and perhaps not as widely-known, wage formation has improved since the mid1990s. The changes had already started by the early 1990s.
The proposed Act will also institutionalise many of the practices that have been introduced in this recent decade which are deemed as critical in ensuring that the Central Bank has the necessary authority and state of readiness to face future challenges. In concert with these, the new Act will further reinforce the existing governance framework with adequate mechanisms to ensure sufficient checks and balances are in place. The governance framework will further facilitate and enhance high quality decision-making in the Bank, institutionalising both existing and new procedures and processes to enhance accountability, professionalism and transparency. The strengthening of governance and accountability will form the prerequisite for the Bank to maintain our public legitimacy and autonomy, as well as to ensure the integrity of the Bank as a public institution in serving the nation's interests. BIS Review 12/2009  5  Conclusion Bank Negara Malaysia's experience during these fifty years in preserving monetary and financial stability and in supporting the sustainability of economic development has seen many challenges. Throughout this journey, we remained focused on what needs to be achieved and the vision of where we want to be. Key to our effectiveness is the internal capacity of the Bank. At the heart of this are the people in the Bank. While the operating environment has changed significantly and the policy focus has evolved, the values that the Bank represents, of integrity, respect for diversity, professionalism and expertise, have been enduring and reinforced over time.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Fifty years of central banking – stability and sustainability Address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Ceremony for the 50th Anniversary of Bank Negara Malaysia: "50 Years of Central Banking – Stability and Sustainability", Kuala Lumpur, 8 February 2009. *  *  *  Bank Negara Malaysia opened its doors as a Central Bank on January 26, 1959, just over a year after Malaysia gained independence in August 1957, reflecting the importance that was being accorded by our founding fathers to the institution of Central Banking. At the very outset, the Central Bank was entrusted to provide leadership in performing the traditional Central Bank mandate of promoting monetary and financial stability. Equally important was the mandate to develop the domestic financial system – a financial system that would facilitate economic growth and development. It is my very great honour to welcome distinguished guests that have come from different parts of the world to join us on this special occasion to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Bank Negara Malaysia. We also wish to express our appreciation to the Prime Minister of Malaysia for his presence as the guest of honour at this occasion. Introduction Allow me to share our experience during these fifty years and our aspirations moving forward. These five decades have been highly challenging but rewarding with many fulfilling outcomes and there were also lessons learned.
Accordingly, the contribution of net exports to growth increased notably, and the current account balance posted a noteworthy improvement in the second half of the year (Chart 4). Chart 4. Current Account Balance (Seasonally Adjusted, Billion USD)  * Estimate for December. Source: TurkStat, CBRT. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Despite the attainment of favorable outcomes regarding macro financial risks, soaring inflation in the last quarter required a revision of the monetary policy stance. The ongoing deterioration in the global risk appetite as of August led to an excessive depreciation in the Turkish lira posing risks on the inflation outlook. In addition, sizeable price adjustments in administered products in October led the short-term inflation to increase above forecasts. In order to not to allow inflation expectations to deteriorate, the CBRT delivered an important tightening in monetary policy since October. Accordingly, the interest rate corridor was widened upwards and the amount of the Turkish lira funding through one-week repo auctions was adjusted and the average funding cost was raised significantly (Chart 5). Chart 5. CBRT Policies CBRT Policy Rates and Overnight Repo Rates  Source: CBRT. CBRT Funding and Average Interest Rate  Source: CBRT. The Monetary Policy Committee believes that the tight monetary policy stance should be maintained for a while to ensure that the inflation outlook is consistent with the medium term targets. Moreover, due to the ongoing uncertainties regarding the global economy, we are of the opinion that maintaining a flexible monetary policy will be appropriate.

Let’s be clear on this: French and European savers aren’t going to become Americanised in their savings behaviour or appetite for risk. These transatlantic differences have historical, cultural and sociological roots. And it’s not our role to go into them here, even less try to change them. However, the French debate would be made much easier if we distinguished clearly between the two main objectives underlying savers’ aversion to risk: security and liquidity. With regard to security, or capital protection, this is something that is important for savers. Genuine risk-taking, with all the potential gains it entails, will only ever be for a minority of investors. In the case of liquidity, however, increased life expectancy, lower pension replacement rates and the greater health risks associated with living longer are all pushing French savers to adopt longer and longer investment horizons. We need to be able to offer them suitable savings products: ones that are less liquid, with or without a long-term capital guarantee, and that allow savers to benefit from the higher returns offered by equities over the long term. A crucial point is to avoid any tax distortions that might mean these products are penalised more than liquid and risk-free investments. This level playing field in terms of taxation should also apply to the companies that are financed: in other words we need to avoid making debt financing more attractive than equity financing.
That made no sense. The only possibility of a speedy pay-out of deposit insurance in order to contain contagion was for the authorities in the host countries to pay it and leave the issue of settlement with Iceland for a later date. And this was what they did. From the beginning, there were legal arguments about the merits of such claims. In spite of that legal uncertainty, the Icelandic Government took part in several good-faith attempts to reach a negotiated solution. However, it proved impossible to get ratification through the Icelandic political process, in two cases involving referenda. In retrospect, it is clear that the main reason for this was the Icelandic people’s unwillingness to shoulder financial liabilities that had not been clearly signed by those mandated to do so on behalf of the nation or  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  proven in a court of law to be sovereign obligations. Instead, these were seen as the debts of reckless private bankers. Now the EFTA court has ruled that it was indeed not a sovereign liability. In any case, the recovery from the estate of Landsbanki will cover 100% of all deposits in foreign branches. Without the priority given to deposits in the Emergency Act of October 2008, the recovery to be paid to these depositors would be much lower. This case provides important lessons about the design of deposit insurance within the EU and the clarity of wording, or lack thereof, in EU directives.

The average level of such quantities is determined by other factors, such as demography, competition and tax policies, research and development and education and training. There are therefore good reasons why monetary policy should focus on inflation and have an inflation target. Flexible inflation targeting policy A strict interpretation of the possibilities of monetary policy can easily be perceived as being that central banks can only affect inflation. However, although monetary policy can not affect the average level of real factors, this does not mean that it is ineffectual in stabilising  BIS Review 111/2009  1  fluctuations in these factors. I mean by this that monetary policy can contribute to the stabilisation of resource utilisation at a normal level. In practice, central banks with an inflation target conduct what is called flexible inflation targeting. This flexibility means that – alongside the long-term inflation target – the central banks also strive to ensure that fluctuations in both inflation and the real economy are kept at a reasonable level. Striking the right balance between these factors is what the Riksbank calls a well-balanced monetary policy. The flexibility of inflation targeting becomes particularly important in situations where a conflict arises between the objective of reaching the inflation target and the objective of stabilising the real economy. In some situations, the inflation target calls for a certain type of monetary policy while resource utilisation calls for another. One example of this is the situation that prevailed during most of 2008, the year before I joined the Executive Board.