samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They are more of a speculative investment instrument than a means of payment capable of retaining its value. The chart on the right-hand side of the slide illustrates this. Compared with exchange rates, commodities and equities, cryptocurrencies are subject to very high volatility, and investors must be aware of the financial risks they are taking on when buying them. Cryptocurrencies therefore do not meet the requirements of a currency. However, this does not mean we can simply dismiss them out of hand, for behind all of the hype there is an array of technological innovations. Particularly important among these is the distributed ledger technology, known as DLT for short and often also referred to as blockchain. In other words: it is important to make a clear distinction between cryptocurrencies as assets, and the underlying technology, which does indeed have potential. DLT could facilitate solutions in various areas of the economy that would enhance the safety  Page 2/8  and efficiency of digital information flows. A distributed ledger is essentially a decentralised and synchronised database that allows participants to read, write and save information. DLT makes it possible to unequivocally define ownership structures within a computer network, without the need for a central third party. These facets also give rise to interesting possibilities for the financial sector, and DLT is therefore regarded as one of the biggest innovations in the fintech area.

2  See for instance Már Guðmundsson and Thorsteinn Thorgeirsson, “The Fault Lines in Cross-Border Banking: Lessons from the Icelandic Case” SUERF Studies 05/2010, European Money and Finance Forum (2010); Már Guðmundsson, Keynote address at the Eighth High-Level Meeting for the Middle East & North Africa Region: Recent Policy Developments for Strengthening the Resilience of the Financial Sector, Abu Dhabi, 28 November 2012. www.cb.is; and Már Guðmundsson‘s speech at the IIEA conference in Dublin, Ireland, “Iceland‘s crisis and recovery: facts, comparisons, and the lessons learned”, 27 April 2015. www.cb.is. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Let me conclude by telling you what we are contemplating in Iceland in this regard, as this issue is very much on the agenda as we prepare to lift the comprehensive controls on capital outflows that were introduced at the peak of the crisis. We will work through all of the avenues that I have just mentioned, and many of the reforms have already been implemented. What I call IT-plus – or plus-plus – will replace IT of the precrisis type. A managed float has already taken the place of the free float. Foreign exchange intervention is thus used to reduce excess volatility in the FX market and lean against capital flow cycles. The financial stability framework has been strengthened, and macroprudential tools are being developed that should mitigate adverse interactions between capital flows, on the one hand, and domestic credit growth and asset prices, on the other. Foreign currency borrowing by unhedged domestic agents will be very much restricted.
We can look back at 18 consecutive quarters of economic growth; this is a robust, broad-based economic recovery. Now is the time to sort out the issue of non-performing loans. Banks need ambitious yet realistic plans to deal with their stocks of NPLs. And they need the right governance for these plans. Earlier this year, the ECB published its “Guidance to banks on non-performing loans”. Along these lines, and as part of our supervisory dialogue, we take a close look at the banks’ ability to manage their NPL stocks. We then scrutinise the plans devised by the banks to reduce those stocks. We will start providing our feedback later this month. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Banks have to carefully consider how they will react should any performing loans happen to become non-performing. So, with the future in mind, we have to ensure that the problem of NPLs does not recur. New NPLs should therefore be conservatively provisioned within a reasonable period of time. This would serve to strengthen the balance sheets of banks, enabling them to focus on their core business. That’s why we have drafted an addendum to our guidance on non-performing loans. It sets out how we expect banks to provision for future NPLs. The main goal is to have timely provisioning, which should prevent new NPLs from becoming a problem with systemic implications. But let me say that while our expectations are firm, there are no automatic actions attached to them.

Sabine Lautenschläger: Banking supervision – what next? Speech by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, at the Banking Supervision, Resolution and Risk Management Conference during the 20th Euro Finance Week, Frankfurt am Main, 14 November 2017. * * * “What next in banking supervision and resolution?” is the title of this panel discussion. Well, before we discuss what comes next, let us take a quick look at what has happened in recent years. Since 2014, we have built European banking supervision from scratch. We have hired people, devised methods and set up processes. There are certainly still things that need to be improved, but by and large the system runs smoothly. As that is the case, there will be less construction work to be done in the years ahead. But this doesn’t mean that we will sit idly by, quite the opposite. The banking sector is facing a whole range of challenges, as you well know, and we have our part to play. Let me mention a few points – and it’s not a comprehensive list. There is the banks’ search for profitability and their need to cut costs and adjust their business models. There is Brexit. There is digitalisation and there are cyber risks. There are the Basel III reforms, which need to be finalised and then implemented. And there are efforts to further strengthen proportionality.
For the first time, these exercises will be conducted in a fully integrated way – under the aegis of the SSM – with full accountability of the results. Completion should mark a turning point where there will be no more doubts about the sustainability of our banks and credit should resume at a normal pace. 3. In the longer run, a major policy challenge for the euro area is to “reinvent” a new and robust financial integration model. We need sound cross-border capital flows,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  because we do not want the Eurosystem to intermediate permanently between borrowers and lenders from different countries. Developing a safe securitisation process should be a priority, despite the major technical difficulties. II/ – Is Europe facing the prospect of a lost decade? Questions about long-term growth are not limited to Europe. What we hear about our continent reflects a more general concern: the possibility of “secular stagnation” in advanced economies. Larry has launched this crucial debate. I don’t know whether he was thinking specifically about Europe, but, of course, this question is very relevant for us. Secular stagnation rests on the assumption that the natural interest rate is negative. This may happen for two reasons: •  In the short run, we may have a downward shock on demand and an increase in savings resulting from the deleveraging process. I have just explained how we are currently addressing this issue.

•  In the longer run, ageing and slower innovation may push up saving rates and bring down the return on capital. Therefore, the ultimate response to the risk of secular stagnation is to improve the return on investment, thus pushing the natural interest rate back into positive territory. Again, this is not only a European problem. But we do have difficulties in this regard. Structural reforms are not easy. Many, however, are currently being implemented. Italy is abolishing its provinces, generating savings that will allow for a reduction in taxes and liberalising its labour market. France is on the same track and has reduced taxes on its labour costs as well as improving labour market flexibility. III/- short-term policy challenges and responses The main challenge, of course, is low and declining inflation, with inflation expectations in the euro area drifting downward at short to medium-term horizons. This prevents adjustments in relative prices, – an important mechanism to eliminate gaps in competitiveness – and increases the risk of outright deflation, should a negative shock occur in the future. Strangely, in the euro area, growth and inflation are moving in opposite directions. As growth accelerates, inflation keeps going down. This “disconnect” in the Philips curve is puzzling. We must look, then, at the broader picture. Euro area economies have attracted strong capital inflows over the recent months, with two opposite effects on financial conditions: first, easing through lower long-term interest rates. And, second, an appreciation of the euro exchange rate.
Quite simply, this is a matter of designing a set of rules and regulations that will counteract future economic crises at the same time as the socio-economic costs for these rules and regulations are limited. What will the new regulations cost? It is easy to get the impression that all of the new requirements I have reviewed will lead to drastically increased requirements regarding the banks’ capital. One common and highlyjustified question is therefore how the new regulations will affect the banks and their customers. In recent months, we have read in the headlines about how expensive the new rules will be, above all for private individuals with mortgages. According to the banks’ calculations, mortgage rates will go up by up to one percentage point. And yes, it is quite likely that the new regulations will force the banks to adjust their business models, which may lead to certain price increases. While it is too early to say exactly what these costs will amount to, the Riksbank judges that they will not be excessively high. Basel III is a gradual process that will begin to apply in 2013, but which will not have its full impact until 1 January 2019. Furthermore, the market is already placing high requirements on the banks’ capital, and we can note that the Swedish banks are coping well – they are well-capitalised in terms of both level and quality. So there should be no question of any extra costs for acquiring capital.

The fact that the banks are not equipped to manage this type of risk became evident when Lehman Brothers collapsed in the autumn of 2008 and the financial problems spread like wildfire between the market agents. A fourth and final example is that Basel II has in many cases overlooked the risks that have developed off the banks’ balance sheets, and this is something that many banks have taken advantage of. By selling their mortgages to special companies that they have set up themselves off their own balance sheets, the banks have been able to sell their own credit risks and thus reduce their capital requirements. The problem with this is that the banks have not been entirely separated from these special companies. During the crisis, the risks therefore moved directly back onto the banks’ balance sheets where there was no capital to cover the losses that arose. This problem was particularly evident in the United States. 3  The term macroprudential indicates that something – for example regulation, supervision or inspection – aims to limit the risk of serious disruptions to the financial system as a whole. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Inadequate standards for liquidity management Another important lesson from the crisis is that the regulations have paid far too little attention to the banks’ liquidity management. In the present Basel regulations, there are no binding regulations on how banks should manage their liquidity risks.
Carney, M, 2015, “Writing the path back to target”, Speech at the Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre, Sheffield, and available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ Documents/speeches/2015/speech808.pdf. Forbes, K, 2015, op-ed in Evening Standard, http://www.standard.co.uk/business/markets/ kristin-forbes-zero-inflation-is-here--but-theres-no-need-for-soulsearching-10133157.html. Gali, J and T Monacelli, 2005, Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 707–734. Hansen, L and K Singleton, 1982, Generalized instrumental variables estimation of nonlinear rational expectations models, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 5, pp. 1269-1286. Hills S., R. Thomas and N. Dimsdale, 2010, “The UK recession in context – what do three centuries of data tell us?”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2010 Q4. Eichengreen B, 1996, “Golden Fetters. The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939”, NBER Series on Long Term Factors in Economics Development, Oxford University Press. Miles D, 2015, “What can monetary policy do?” Speech given at University of Edinburgh Business School, Edinburgh and available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ Documents/speeches/2015/speech791.pdf. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13

When the Riksbank alters the repo rate, there is an effect on total demand and ultimately also inflation through various channels within the economy. These channels are the cost of borrowing, incentives to save and wealth, as well as exchange rate fluctuations that affect imported inflation, exports, imports and capital flows. In addition, there is an effect on inflation expectations. It takes some time for an interest rate change to have an effect through these channels. The monetary policy decisions must therefore be based on an assessment of future inflation. Flexibility thanks to credibility Conducting monetary policy is not the same as flying a familiar, well-tuned aircraft. The repo rate is unfortunately a blunt instrument with regard to steering inflation, even a couple of years ahead. What monetary policy can do is to ensure an inflation rate that is over a number of years in line with the target and to contribute to reducing fluctuations in the real and financial economy. When the inflation target was announced in January 1993, the Riksbank formulated a tolerance interval around the target of ± 1 percentage point. The purpose of this was to explain that it is not within the power of monetary policy to exactly meet the target all of the time. In addition, the tolerance interval provides scope for temporary deviations from the target which may be justified by taking growth and employment into consideration.
Deposit accounts have increased from 19,738 deposit accounts per 10,000 adults in year 2000 to 29,311 deposit accounts per 10,000 adults this year. Similarly, there has been significant increase in loan accounts from 3,105 loan accounts per 10,000 adults to 8,600 loan accounts per 10,000 adults. More than 80% of our adult population have some form of deposit accounts. The ranking by World Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the Poor shows that Malaysia is in the 20th position globally, [Singapore is in the 16th position; Thailand: 33rd; Indonesia: 70th; and the Philippines: 71st]. While we have made considerable progress in improving financial inclusion agenda, the Bank is unrelenting in our aspiration to shape our financial system to be more inclusive and effective in supporting a balanced economic growth for our country. Our financial sector Blueprint that will chart the direction of development of our financial system in the next ten years places a high priority on the financial inclusion agenda. Among the areas of focus are the development of cost efficient delivery channels that will enhance the outreach of financial services, expand the range of products and services to meet the distinct financial needs of the underserved and strengthen the institutional arrangements to enhance the capacity of providers of such financial services. Equally, important will be the attention accorded to financial consumer education and protection in which the standards of consumer care are high and consumers have choices and are confident about making their financial decisions.

Among the services that will be available are advisory services on banking, insurance & takaful and SMEs financing related matters; retrieval of personal credit status through the Central Credit Reference Information System (CCRIS); and advisory on any other financial related matters under the purview of the Bank. The introduction of MobileLINK complements the series of consumer financial advisory initiatives that have been introduced by the Bank since 2005 with the establishment of BNMLINK at the Bank’s six offices; the Bank’s call center, BNMTELELINK; as well as BNMLINK mobile counter services in semi-urban areas to provide access of financial information and consumer redress mechanisms. The introduction of MobileLINK also provides a platform for enhancing financial literacy and financial capability of consumers to make well informed and responsible financial decisions and thus participate meaningfully and effectively in the financial system. Akhir kata, saya ingin merakamkan penghargaan kepada semua hadirin sekalian yang memberi sokongan kepada inisiatif “MobileLINK” ini. Kami berharap inisiatif ini akan dapat merealisasikan usaha Bank dalam mencapai rangkuman kewangan yang menyeluruh. Bagi mencapai objektif ini, kerjasama pihak yang hadir pada hari ini dengan Bank Negara Malaysia adalah dialu-alukan bagi memastikan usaha yang lebih bersepadu dan berkesan dapat digembleng bersama. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In May of 1995, the OTS approved the application of a new thrift, the Security First Network Bank (“SFNB”), that sought explicitly to provide the majority of its electronic banking services over the Internet.5 In May of 1996, the Board of Governors approved the application of SFNB’s parent, a bank holding company, for SFNB to acquire a data-processing firm specializing in data processing activities that would provide nationwide banking and financial services over the Internet.6 In December of 1996, the Board of Governors approved the application of a Minnesota bank holding company and two foreign banks to join a consortium of 15 North 4  Alan Greenspan, Banking in the Global Marketplace, address before the Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan (Nov. 18, 1996). 5  See OTS Order No. 95-88 (May 8, 1995). See Cardinal Bancshares, Inc., 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 674 (1996). In this Board Order, the Board stated that “The Board believes the provision of computer banking services by SFNB to its customers in accordance with the authority granted by the OTS, and as specifically described in this proposal, is consistent with Cardinal’s existing authority under the [Bank Holding Company Act] and Regulation Y to operate a savings association.” Id. at n.1.

Lim Hng Kiang: Increasing and broadening private sector participation in infrastructure development Opening remarks by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the World Bank-Singapore Infrastructure Finance Summit, Singapore, 29 May 2013. *  *  *  Ms Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Managing Director of the World Bank Group Mr Cesar Purisima, Secretary of Finance of the Philippines Mr Sergey Storchak, Deputy Finance Minister of Russia Mr Areepong Bhoocha-Oom, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance of Thailand Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen Introduction – infrastructure financing is crucial to maintain sustainable growth for countries A very good morning to all of you. It gives me great pleasure to join you at the opening of this year’s World Bank-Singapore Infrastructure Finance Summit. Let me extend a warm welcome to all our guests, and especially to our overseas guests. This is our fourth meeting, and we are meeting under more stabilised circumstances. Emerging market economies have experienced a strong rebound in capital inflows post global financial crisis. McKinsey estimates that some $ in foreign capital went to emerging markets in 2012. These flows are due in part to institutional investors’ hunt for yield in the shorter term, and in part also to the longer-term shift in liquidity from the advanced to the emerging world. The G30 Working Group on Long-term Finance has estimated that infrastructure spending must increase nearly 15% for countries to achieve even moderate levels of economic growth.
Most importantly of all, it confirmed that the Bank had sufficient lending capacity in place to meet an extremely severe liquidity shock,  11  See for instance: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech960.pdf. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  which allowed the Bank to make reassuring statements about its readiness to act. In the event no such shock occurred. But the Bank’s preparedness played a part in that. Just as we expect firms to be ready for the unexpected, we hold ourselves to the same standard. Indeed this exercise drove home an important broader point: for central banks to be effective watchmen (all the time) and firefighters (occasionally), we first need private sector risk managers to have drawn up (and shared with us) their own fire precaution and exit route plans. Without a good understanding of firms’ potential liquidity needs under stress, their alternative sources of liquidity and available collateral we cannot fully evaluate our own capacity to lend. This sort of liquidity planning under stress is I know an increasing focus for both banks and non-banks alike, and is something we would actively encourage. (iii)  Calibrating the Bank’s own capital  I mentioned at the start of my remarks that central bank capital is different to that of a commercial bank: central banks need to meet a ‘policy solvency’ rather than a ‘financial solvency’ test.

Of course, the financial crisis was due to many factors acting together. But one of the most important lessons was that one should beware of allowing debts to grow too much. This applies equally to households, companies and governments. This is neither a particularly surprising nor especially new lesson; over several hundred years, financial crises have often been preceded by periods when the attitude to credit granting and lending has been too carefree. But it seems as though this is a lesson that we must experience again and again – at least once a generation, and perhaps even more often. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  A rapid and substantial credit expansion can cause many different problems. If the expansion is characterised by an exaggerated optimism and an underestimation and underpricing of risk, large loan losses may arise in the banks when the sentiment changes. This can lead to banks failing and ultimately to a financial crisis. We experienced this in the 1990s, and Spain and Ireland are experiencing it now. Once the economy has entered a recession after a period of rapidly-increasing indebtedness and rising asset prices, the recovery from this level may be very slow. The reason is that the economy then often enters what is known as a balance sheet recession.1 Put briefly, what this means is that the economic agents need time to adjust their balance sheets if, for example, property prices have fallen. Their incomes will for some time to come be used for amortisation rather than consumption and investment.