17 This is despite oil price shocks having had on average much less impact on the economy, largely thanks to the  8/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  enhanced credibility central banks have gained over time. See, for example, Choi et al. (2017), “Oil Prices and Inflation Dynamics: Evidence from Advanced and Developing Economies”, IMF Working Paper No 17/196. 18 See, for example, Bielen et al. (2017), “The Future of Power Markets in a Low Marginal Cost World”, Resources  for the Future Working Paper 17–26; and Archer, C. and M. Z. Jacobson (2005), “Evaluation of global wind power”, Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 110, pp. 1-20. 19 See, for example, the Platform for Climate Adaptation and Risk Reduction on www.placard-network.eu. 20 Google, for example, managed to reduce its energy consumption by more than a third by optimising its cooling  system through artificial intelligence controlled systems. 21 On the positive side, however, the associated increase in the economy’s trend growth rate will help lift the  natural rate of interest, thereby increasing the policy space available for central banks to manage fluctuations in the business cycle. See also Cœuré, B. (2018), “Scars that never were? Potential output and slack after the crisis”, speech at the CEPII 40th Anniversary Conference, Paris, 12 April. 22 See the European Parliament resolution of 29 May 2018 on sustainable finance (2018/2007(INI)). 23 See Articles 11 and 127(1) TFEU and Article 3 TEU.

Also, climate-related shocks have uneven macroeconomic effects, with adverse consequences concentrated in countries with relatively hot climates, such as most low-income countries. See IMF (2017), “The Effects of Weather Shocks on Economic Activity: How Can Low-Income Countries Cope?”, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, October. 8 For price effects, see also Parker, M. (2018), “The impact of disasters on inflation”, Economics of Disasters and  Climate Change, Vol. 2(1), pp. 21–48. 9 See, for example, Gourio, F. (2015), “The effect of weather on first-quarter GDP”, Chicago Fed Letter, No 341. 10 Academic studies project that the risks of extreme heatwaves and floods will increase by around another 50%  this century. See Mann et al. (2018), “Projected changes in persistent extreme summer weather events: The role of quasi-resonant amplification”, Science Advances, Vol 4(10). And evidence of such an increase is already visible. According to the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council, the number of global floods and other hydrological events has quadrupled since 1980 and doubled since 2004. See European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (2018), “Extreme weather events in Europe – Preparing for climate change adaptation: an update on EASAC’s 2013 study”, March; and Stott, P. (2016), “How climate change affects extreme weather events”, Science, Vol 352(6293), pp. 1517–1518. 11 See, for example, Weitzman, M. (2011), “Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic Climate  Change”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 5 (2), pp. 275–292; and Weitzman, M. (2009), “Additive damages, fat-tailed climate dynamics, and uncertain discounting”, Economics — The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 3: 1–29.