samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If one also takes into account the depreciation of the domestic currency against $ as at end-November, the stock market of Thailand has fallen by 71% from its peak this year, Malaysia by 69.7%, Indonesia by 64%, Korea by 61% and BIS Review 116/1997  -2-  the Philippines by 61%. Even Singapore’s stock market suffered a 35.7% drop in $ terms, which is comparable to the 37.7% fall in the Hang Seng Index. Only Taiwan recorded a lower fall of 31%, whereas the Nikkei also lost 28%. I quoted these figures in order to illustrate the magnitude of the turmoil and its contagion effects on the asset markets in the region. Singapore, which is a strong economy and given a triple-A rating by the international rating agencies, adopts a managed floating rate regime, but such regime has not insulated its asset markets from the regional turmoil. In terms of interest rates, Singapore’s one month interbank rate rose by almost 5 times to 16% on 27 October from around 3.6% on 2 July. Singapore’s one month rate is now 6.25%, which is still significantly higher than the level in early July. In the case of Hong Kong, the one month rate rose also by around 5 times from 6% in early July to a high of 30% on 23 October. At present the one month rate in Hong Kong is around 7.5%.

With that background, I would like to comment on some of the criticism of Fed policy decisions. Some of the commentary surrounding the FOMC’s June decision to raise the federal funds rate 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  target by 25 basis points illustrates the current tension between “too low” inflation and “too buoyant” financial conditions. On one hand, some observers question the decision to reduce policy accommodation given that inflation has fallen somewhat further below our objective. I would respond to these concerns by noting that monetary policy is still accommodative and that financial conditions have eased. In addition, the long and variable lags between monetary policy adjustments and their impact on the economy imply that the FOMC may need to remove accommodation even when inflation is below its goal. In particular, if the unemployment rate were already below its longer-run natural rate, as may be the case currently, the impact on wage growth and price inflation would still likely take some time to become evident. This would be particularly true if inflation expectations were well-anchored at or slightly below our 2 percent objective, as is the case currently. On the other hand, some Fed watchers have argued that we are helping to create financial asset bubbles by not removing accommodation more quickly. My view is that asset valuations are not particularly troublesome given the economic environment in which we’ve been—that is, a long period of moderate growth, low inflation, low interest rates, and low recession risks.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Some perspectives on globalisation and its aftermath Welcoming remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 2017 IMF-BNM Summer Conference "Some Perspectives on Globalisation and its Aftermath", Kuala Lumpur, 25 July 2017. * * * Welcome to the 2017 IMF-BNM Summer Conference. I would like to thank the IMF for partnering with Bank Negara Malaysia to co-host this event for the first time in Southeast Asia. Our exchange of knowledge and experiences will be valuable for us to better understand the dynamic issues brought about by globalisation that is confronting our economies, financial systems and societies. I want to record my appreciation to all of you for being here today. Kofi Annan once said that arguing against globalisation is like arguing against the law of gravity. Globalisation has brought about unprecedented periods of peace, prosperity and progress for the world. We have made significant strides. In the last decade, we have lifted half a billion people out of abject poverty – it previously took us 25 years to do it, from 1980 to 2005. Businesses, investors and workers have benefited from expanded opportunities. Countries have rapidly transformed agricultural labourers into manufacturing workers, spurring growth and productivity. Consequently, economies worldwide have become more interdependent, integrated and intertwined. One of the biggest beneficiaries from globalisation is ASEAN, which celebrates its 50 th anniversary this year.

The banks have always passed the stress tests, most recently the one carried out on their balance sheets at year-end 2007. At that time, the equity ratio of Iceland’s largest banks ranged from 11.2% to 11.8%. The result of the stress test was that, even if various severe shocks inherent in the premises of the test were to occur simultaneously, the banks would still have an equity ratio ranging from 10.4% to 11.2%. Their liquidity position was ample at year-end, so there was no driving need to seek funding in the international credit market. But at some point in time, they will need to return to the capital markets. All of Iceland’s large commercial banks have an international credit rating. Though these credit ratings are comparable to those awarded to similar banks in other countries, there is an abiding suspicion in the market toward Icelandic banks. This is difficult to explain fully, and it results, for example, in CDS spreads that are higher than in foreign banks, although CDS spreads also differ among Icelandic banks. It is worth remembering that Kaupthing Bank’s CDS spreads rose when the bank announced its intent to acquire a Dutch bank last August. As the autumn progressed, the other banks’ CDS spreads increased also. That trend continued intermittently until now. When Kaupthing abandoned its plans to acquire the Dutch bank, the reason for the increase last August vanished. Spreads declined slightly thereafter, as a large uncertainty factor had been eliminated.
In the period since the krona’s recovery in 1995 to ‘96, however, the exchange rate has been comparatively stable, except during the widespread turbulence in connection with last autumn’s international financial crisis. But even with today’s relatively strong government finances and low inflation, a flexible exchange rate does seem to entail exchange rate fluctuations that are greater than many of us believed when the krona fell in the autumn of 1992. This is an experience we share with other countries that target inflation in a flexible exchange rate regime, for example the UK, Canada and Australia. Sweden’s participation in ERM2 The introduction of the euro has revived the question of Sweden’s adherence to the economic and monetary union. Political statements and a more positive opinion at times have led some observers to talk of the possibility of Sweden joining the euro area as early as from 1 January 2002, after a Social Democrat Congress next spring followed by a referendum later in the year. This in turn has led to talk of Sweden joining the new European exchange rate mechanism ERM2. The matter is being increasingly discussed in market letters and the media and that is why I want to consider some of its aspects with you this evening. BIS Review 48/1999  4  The Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) has already stated that membership of ERM2 can be regarded as a direct preparatory step before entry into the monetary union.

Growing financial problems during 1998, culminating after Russia’s 3  BIS Review 48/1999  suspension of debt payments and the near failure of an American hedge fund, increased the risk aversion of international investors and prompted a flight to more secure assets. This hit the krona even though the economic fundamentals in Sweden were mostly good. One reason why the general increase in risk premia weakened the krona was probably the persistently high level of external debt. Other countries with large foreign debts were similarly affected. In Sweden’s case, however, some part was also played by domestic factors; the krona tended to weaken, for example, at the time of the general election in September. When the financial market turbulence then subsided around the turn of last year, the krona strengthened once more. This suggested that low inflation and the rapid consolidation of government finances were again playing a relatively larger part in exchange rate movements. The stronger krona also had to do with political signals early this year of Sweden’s adherence to the monetary union. Market players believed that the euro conversion rate for the krona would be stronger than the current market rate and that reinforced the krona’s appreciation. During the discussion about the krona’s depreciation during 1998 there were two arguments that call for some comments. One argument was that the krona weakened relative to the German mark on account of structural problems in Sweden.
Page 1  Recent developments in the economy and markets − speech by Huw Pill Given at Institute of Directors NI Annual Dinner, Holywood, County Down  Page 2  Published on 29 September 2022  Speech Good evening everyone. It is a great pleasure to speak at tonight’s annual dinner of the Institute of Directors in Northern Ireland. I owe thanks to Gordon Milligan and his IoD colleagues for their kind invitation. I would also like to thank my colleagues Frances Hill and Gillian Anderson from the Bank of England’s Belfast Agency for putting together such a great agenda for my Northern Ireland visit. Many of you will know them as contacts of the Agency, feeding information about business developments and your own firms’ situation into the Bank’s decision making processes. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for all the time and effort you take to provide those insights. My colleagues on the MPC – as well as in other parts of the Bank – find this information invaluable in getting a timely read on the economy. At a time when we are faced with uncertainty on many dimensions, that timely read can strongly influence our thinking, our analysis and, ultimately, our policy decisions. The Bank’s Belfast Agency was set up in the late 1990s to ensure that developments in Northern Ireland were fully embodied in the Bank’s economic assessment.

It is important to remember that the interest rate forecast is a conditional forecast and not a promise. The interest rate path has been revised frequently, and sometimes fairly substantially – as during the financial crisis and in the wake of the oil price fall in 2014. Nor are market 2/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  expectations of future interest rates necessarily aligned with Norges Bank’s interest rate path. On the contrary, the two curves have often diverged to some extent, particularly at somewhat longer horizons. Norges Bank’s analyses nonetheless indicate that we are successful in steering market expectations in the desired direction (Brubakk et al (2017)), for example by publishing the interest rate path. The analyses also find that central bank and market revisions of interest rate paths in the periods between monetary policy meetings are strongly correlated. This suggests that market participants have a good understanding of the central bank’s response pattern and of how monetary policy will react to new information about economic developments. Need for alternative reference rates Chart: From key rate to money market rate … Market expectations of future interest rates are reflected in the Norwegian monetary market rate – three-month Nibor. This rate can be decomposed into the average expected key policy rate over the next three months and a risk premium, usually referred to as the money market premium. Over time, three-month Nibor has tracked the key policy rate.
We very much value the skills and diversity they bring to our efforts, so in a short recruitment pitch, when you ‘Think Science’, think too of central banking. After all, science starts with curiosity and asking the right questions. Science teaches people to conduct dedicated research and disciplined analysis. These skills and talents make a good supervisor, policymaker or senior leader, and they are the reason that the Bank increasingly recruits from beyond the field of economics. Not least because scientific advances in Artificial Intelligence and machine learning are reshaping our world, transforming the nature of both work and commerce. This revolution will impact all aspects of the Bank’s work, from the future of work, through its effects on employment, productivity and wages, to the future of finance, as the nature of customer service, trading and risk management transforms. These advances in science and technology are also transforming our focus today – money. They are making digital money more like its physical counterpart – instant, anonymous and direct. And scientific advances are modernising physical currency, cash, which still has a hugely important role in society. We use a host of technologies to protect our physical banknotes against counterfeiting. The switch to polymer has allowed us to introduce new security features, including see-through panels, coloured foils and detailed metallic images. Polymer also makes our banknotes stronger, with a lifespan two and a half times that of paper notes, and greener, because they will be recycled when they reach the end of their useful lives.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: The future of finance Speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at a "Teh Tarik Session", at the Harvard PETRONAS Alumni event "The future of finance", Kuala Lumpur, 8 September 2017. * * * Thank you for inviting me here today to share my thoughts on the future of finance. The future is always a topic weighing heavily on the psyche of our nation, as we reflect on our transformation over the last 60 years, and what the future will be 50 years from now. I would like to share my thoughts today in three parts: a. A brief reflection on finance and five themes that may affect its future; b. A look at four possible future scenarios that may develop based on these themes; and c. Finally, implications of these future scenarios on the Bank and policy development. Let me place a qualifier here, it is not an exhaustive survey of the future landscape. My remarks today are meant to stimulate our thinking and discussion. These are my personal reflections and insights. Finance across the years and five themes for the future At its most basic level, finance is an intermediary service that matches the funding, saving and investing needs of agents in an economy. It lubricates the economy to function smoothly and allocate scarce resources efficiently. But over the years finance has evolved. It is useful to understand the ideas behind why and how finance has changed in the past.
The oil price was approxi mately NOK 500 per barrel at the beginning of 2008 Q4 and has varied bet ween NOK 260 and NOK 350 per barrel in 2009 3) Negative return in NOK. Negative return measured in international currency in brackets 4) Fall in housing wealth fro m August 2007 to 2008 Q4 (no minal ter ms) Sources: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Folketrygdfondet and Norges Bank 5  6  BIS Review 53/2009  Return 1998 - 2008 Benchmark portfolio and actual portfolio. Indexed, 31 Dec1997=100 200 Benchmark portfolio Actual portfolio  175  150  125  100 98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09 6  Return on equities1998 - 2008 Benchmark portfolio and actual portfolio. Indexed, 31 Dec1997=100 Benchmark portfolio  200  Actual portfolio  175 150 125 100 75 98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09 7  BIS Review 53/2009  7  Return on fixed income instruments 1998 - 2008 Benchmark portfolio and actual portfolio. Indexed, 31 Dec1997=100 Benchmark portfolio  200  Actual portfolio  175 150 125 100 75 98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09 8  Credit ratings, fixed income portfolio1) Government Pension Fund - Global.

Add to this the persistence of the expansionary impulse from monetary policy, as can be seen by simple observation of the interest rates of consumer, commercial or mortgage loans, which are all at or very near their all-time lows. Moreover, different qualitative measures produced by the Bank, such as the Banking Credit Survey or the Business Perceptions Report, coincide in their favorable evaluation of the cost of credit, considering its low interest rate. Another way to measure the expansionary nature of monetary policy is to review how far or near the MPR is from its estimated neutral level, which we place between 4% and 4.5%. Therefore, a 2.5% MPR is clearly expansionary and, in our baseline scenario, we assume that we will come near the neutral level only by 2020. Furthermore, beyond the comparison with market rates or their neutral levels, Chile's monetary policy rate is among the lowest when compared to its Latin American peers or with other commodity-exporting countries with a similar macroeconomic framework (figure 3). The better prospects for 2018 growth also rely on the recovery of non-mining investment, including construction and other works, whose decline seems to be ending after one and a half years, which combines with a moderate growth in consumption (figure 4). All this is backed by improved consumer and business confidence indicators, which becomes all the more evident when referring to expectations about the future. These factors are not necessarily independent of each other, so it is difficult to quantify the importance of each one precisely.
The lawyers may get rich, but will you be in business? • Testing is not a problem -- our organization has good testing and acceptance procedures and we test all the time. Previous internal testing standards probably won’t do the job this time. • Obtaining adequate resources will not be an issue -- our organization has a great technical staff and we can always hire additional resources if it becomes necessary. Good luck. As a bank supervisor, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will do whatever it can to encourage banks to set up and adhere to programs that deal with Year 2000 problems. Our examiners will focus on how well individual banks are doing and will highlight for senior management and directors those instances when progress may be lagging. This oversight will include not only U.S. banks, but also the U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. However, the motivation and determination to cope with the Year 2000 problem must come from within banking organizations rather than from supervisory oversight. Getting the Year 2000 issue right is critical for every organization. Failure to get it right will affect the integrity of the payments system and the performance of the domestic, and maybe even the global, economy. The Federal Reserve is working hard to make certain that our systems will be ready and fully tested. And I am pleased by the high level of central bank coordination on this issue, as the recent release of the Basle Supervisors’ technical paper demonstrates.

Obtaining and retaining the staff resources capable of dealing with Year 2000 issues will be another increasingly difficult problem. There is a limited pool of skilled technical staff to make needed changes, and demands on this pool are growing as the time draws closer. In the short run, the ability to add to this pool significantly through training is limited. Qualified outside consultants already are heavily committed and will become even more scarce over time. Obtaining equipment on which to conduct tests also often requires significant lead time. All of this suggests that controlling the cost of Year 2000 projects will be a problem for many institutions as resource prices are bid up. Already, we have seen many institutions increase their Year 2000 budgets several times, and by significant amounts, as they develop their detailed plans. Security also is likely to be of increasing concern as we move forward. As time pressures mount, there is a risk that shortcuts will be taken. The checking of credentials for new staff or outside contractors or consultants may be rushed and less rigorous. Date-dependent security applications may be turned off to facilitate testing. In an industry like ours, with so much interconnectivity, any compromise of security simply cannot be tolerated. BIS Review 87/1997  -3-  Every financial institution needs its own comprehensive project plan to address the Year 2000 problem. In the United States, bank supervisors have suggested an approach that includes a number of phases.
Christine M Cumming: Early intervention and resolution Remarks by Ms Christine M Cumming, First Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on Early Intervention and Resolution, at the Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue, Brussels, 25 October 2010. *  *  *  Let me thank the organizers for the opportunity to speak today about the supervision and resolution of financial institutions in danger of failing. Let me begin by noting that the views I'll express in these remarks represent my own views and not those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. In any industry, it is important that unsuccessful firms fail. Business strategies fall short, franchises depreciate, management loses focus. Large or small, unsuccessful firms need to be cleared from the scene through merger, restructuring or liquidation. This is no less true for the financial industry than for any other. And for all firms, society has an interest in ensuring that the process of failure does not destroy more value than necessary. As an economist, I see much innovation in national insolvency practices over time as designed to reduce the cost of insolvency and increase the value preserved in the insolvency process. One of the vexing problems during the recent financial crisis was concern about the adequacy of means to resolve large financial firms and uncertainty about the externalities of placing a large financial firm into insolvency. The Lehman bankruptcy no doubt validated those apprehensions for many.

Those stylized facts were:   The value of the firm’s assets and its business lines tends to decline with time as the firm’s financial weakness becomes more apparent and market pricing of its assets takes on a “fire sale” character;    The funding capacity of the firm declines as its troubles become more evident, counterparties cut lines and limit maturities and the quality of counterparties declines; and    The value of the firm’s franchise decays as customers migrate to other providers. This three-part program of identifying all problems, replenishing capital and liquidity and recasting the business plan was designed around loan exposures, but continues to be relevant today. The challenges are to adapt such a program to the many financial institutions strongly oriented toward capital markets activities with the resulting volatile balance sheets and income streams and to apply the program timely. Time also plays an important role when a financial firm is subject to an insolvency process. Another stylized fact is that the market value of the assets and business lines often suffer a substantial markdown when a financial institution enters insolvency and may decay further thereafter. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the resolution authority for banks in the United States, routinely experienced losses in resolving banks in the 1980s, when it was required to wait until the bank's book value had reached zero. That led to the provision in FDICIA 1991 that a bank can be declared insolvent when its tangible equity falls below 2 percent of assets.