samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Domestic financial institutions must be ready and becomes an active player in the ASEAN economic integration process. On this issue BNM has started investing our international reserves in the regional financial markets, and increasingly a large portion of our reserve management business was being done with Malaysian financial institutions. With this mandate, we hope that Malaysian banks can play a greater role and expand their business by improving regional expertise and reach. Central to this is capacity building as more regional business opportunities will be accessible once we have the capability to offer cross border financial products and services. In this regard, for strategic positioning and to ensure long-term competitiveness, Malaysian banks operating across borders, should position themselves to be the first port of call for foreign investors who are considering to do business in this region. In line with the objective of supporting regional integration, Bank Negara Malaysia has recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Bank of Thailand to promote the use of Malaysian ringgit and Thai baht by the private sector to settle crossborder trades and direct investment. The cooperation is motivated by the strong trade relationship between the two countries. We expect Malaysia-Thailand trade links to reach RM100 billion in 2015. While the US dollar is still the dominant trade settlement currency, the THB and MYR are second and third most used currency by Malaysians and Thais – indicating potential for greater acceptance to settle trade in domestic currencies.

259-264. Goodhart, C and Pradhan, M (2020), ‘The Great Demographic Reversal: ageing societies, waning inequalities and an inflation revival’, published by Palgrave Macmillan; 1st ed. 2020. Haldane, A (2018) ‘Pay power’, Speech given at ACAS Future of Work Conference, available here. Johnson, R (2018) ‘Measuring global value chains’ American Review of Economics, 10:207-36. Malmendier, U, and Nagel, S (2011), “Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect RiskTaking?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2011, vol. 126(1), pp. 373-416. O’Connor, M and Portes, J (2021) ‘Estimating the UK population during the pandemic’, available here. Orphanides, A and Williams, J (2007) ‘Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge’, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, Issue 5. Tenreyro, S (2020) ‘Monetary policy during pandemics: inflation before, during and after Covid-19’, Speech available here. Von Hayek, FA (1972) ‘A tiger by the tail: the Keynesian legacy of inflation’ published jointly by the Institute of Economic Affairs and the von Mises Institute. 24  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  24
What is clear, however, is that the combination of low and stable inflation and continuously falling unemployment must come to an end at some point, and may already have done so. Starting, as we do now, with little if any spare capacity, it is unlikely that we can expect unemployment to fall indefinitely. From time to time shocks will hit our economy, as we have seen with oil prices and world trade, and so  2  BIS Review 61/2004  there will be fluctuations in growth and unemployment, as well as in inflation. Unemployment can be maintained at lower rates than in the past, even though there will inevitably be times when it will rise because no monetary policy can hope to prevent all fluctuations of demand, output, and hence employment. The nice decade we might expect to be followed by the not-so-bad decade.1 Moving from a nice to a not-so-bad decade would still represent a significant improvement in our economic fortunes compared with the period of high inflation. We must be conscious of the dangers of hubris. After all, starting from the Garden of Eden there can be only a fall from grace. ENDS  1  For those looking for a suitable acronym let me suggest that the degree of stability to which we can reasonably aspire, in comparison with the nice decade, will be not of the same order but also desirable, or not-so-bad. BIS Review 61/2004  3

This illustrates the first question, which is how to solve time inconsistency in fiscal policy. It is easier to follow the prescriptions of Keynes in bad times than in good times. This asymmetry may lead to an increase in budget deficits and sovereign debt over time, also referred to as the fiscal bias. As a result, many countries (PIIGS, UK,) have to tighten policy in a period when the real economy would certainly benefit from further stimulus. The crisis caused fiscal balances to deteriorate by 8–10 percentage points. There is an immense difference between encountering a shock of this magnitude from a positive fiscal balance of 4 per cent and encountering it from a negative fiscal balance of 4 per cent. From a negative balance of 4 per cent, fiscal balances end up at a 12 per cent deficit! Then it is imperative to tighten policy. A similar time inconsistency problem, the inflation bias, has been a much debated issue in monetary policy. The solution has been central bank independence. So the question is, is there something to be learnt from monetary policy? Ragnar Frisch  The fiscal bias is not a new phenomenon. And a number of possible solutions have been tried. As far back as in the early 1930s, the Norwegian economist and Nobel Prize winner Ragnar Frisch had the following suggestion: “It might be an idea to establish a cyclical council to make such decisions, a council that could operate with an independent status similar to that of the Supreme Court.
Over the years, re-insurance has come under the spotlight as a possible cause of intra-system connectivity and risk, but I have not yet seen a convincing demonstration of a major systemic issue for pure reinsurance of idiosyncratic, diversifiable, non-financial risks such as fire, weather, earthquake or liability. It is of course likely that within the insurance industry there are firms which because of some combination of complexity of risk and size pose more risks to the financial system, and as such our supervision should be proportional. Let me develop this theme drawing on, I should say, valuable input from my colleagues Paul Sharma and Julian Adams. The resolution challenge for non-life insurance involves ensuring short-term continuity of risk cover. But life insurers make long-term promises to their policyholders which can only be matched imperfectly with available financial instruments (securities and derivatives). This creates a vulnerability to shocks from financial markets such as the impact of the large fall in equity markets in 2002 to 2003. Life insurers do not close down by going into so-called solvent run-off in the same way as non-life insurers, and bear in mind that the term solvent run-off is the expression of a probability of an outcome. A non-life insurer when it enters run-off typically ceases to collect new premiums. The risk in run-off here – and there is a risk that needs examination – is that near-term claims are paid out to the detriment of unidentified far-term claims, thereby creating an inequality through a form of time subordination.

As for the customs system, Thailand has continued to improve the customs system over the past five year as attested by the improvement in indicators of trade across borders, which is a category in Ease of Doing Business assessment, done by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Export-related requirements in terms of number of documents or period of procedure have been reduced or shortened over time. These improvements and further works will certainly help promote efficiency in international trades. With regards to the issue of human resources, I see that the reliance on migrant labour to fill the current labour shortage is not a long-term viable solution for Thailand. In fact, the economy, with joint efforts of private and public sectors, needs to raise labour productivity by upgrading production technology that uses higher skilled labour. Finally, let me close by stressing that the three success factors: growth, sustainability and inclusiveness are necessary and complementary to achieving long-term economic progress for Thailand. For the central bank’s part, many of the issues discussed this evening are beyond the functional scope of the Bank of Thailand. Our main role is to ensure sustainable growth by maintaining macroeconomic stability through appropriate monetary policy and financial regulations. For this, I can assure you that we are fully committed to our role and responsibility.
The first is that growth in the immediate aftermath of the referendum has been stronger than the Bank, and other major forecasters, had expected. For example, growth in the third quarter of 2016 is currently estimated to be 0.5%. This compares with 0.1% growth in the third quarter expected at the time of the Bank’s August Inflation Report. This is welcome news. The main source of this upside news to activity has been the buoyancy of consumers. They appear to have kept calm and carried on spending on the high street, in the car showrooms and in the estate agents. The Bank’s latest survey of UK households explains why. It suggests UK households’ perceptions of income and job prospects have, at least so far, been largely unaffected by Brexit. That is true too in surveys of consumer sentiment which remain around historical average levels. 19  Vlieghe (2016). 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  11  Spending by companies shows a more mixed picture. For example, according to the Bank’s new company 20  Decision Maker Panel , just over half of all firms anticipate no material impact of Brexit on their investment plans over the coming year. That leaves just under a half of all firms expecting some impact on investment, consistent with surveys of gently falling investment intentions by the CBI, BCC and the Bank’s Agents. The second piece of significant news since August has been around the exchange rate.

A re-assessment of its implication on price stability indicated this appreciation was not compatible with our price stability target over the medium term. Under these premises, the Bank of Albania was forced to act. We lowered the policy rate to a new historical minimum of 1 percent. We clearly communicated the Bank of Albania did not assess this appreciation to be in line with fundamentals, anymore. Lastly, we announced the initiation of an FX purchase program in the domestic market. This program was aimed at controlling the pace of appreciation, removing the excessive short term FX supply and reversing expectations and one-sided bets in the market. In regard to this last one, I would like to emphasize the main features of it: First, it was undertaken as measure of last resort, when the space for further conventional policy rate cuts was limited. Therefore, any additional monetary policy stimulus would need to make use of unconventional instruments. Second, it was clearly communicated to the market to be of both an exceptional and a temporary nature. Therefore, it does not represent a shift from our commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime, and should not be represented as such. As a result, these measures proved to be efficient and now the exchange rate movements are going back to normality. Thank You! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Of course the foreign exchange costs in the eurozone were limited right from the start of the EMU in 1999, but they will now disappear completely. For the economy as a whole, however, this exchange of cash has involved a relatively small cost, which is nevertheless symbolically important. A somewhat larger cost has arisen from the handling charges the companies have been forced to bear to hedge against undesirable fluctuations in exchange rates. This cost disappeared as early as 1999 within the eurozone, but it is not particularly large in relation to our GDP – perhaps a few tenths of a percentage point. A single currency will promote competition within the EU and benefit the consumers, who will experience lower prices and thereby have more money in their pockets. When everyone uses the same unit of currency, it is easier to compare prices between countries. It will also be an advantage for the national economy as a whole, since competition facilitates the work on holding down inflation. Some differences in prices are unavoidable and arise from transport and information costs, but not all of the differences can be attributed to these costs. Despite the fact that we now have a common market with free trade for goods and services throughout the entire EU, there are still large differences in prices between different countries within the union.

In less developed countries, food is a very significant component of overall purchases by consumers. In a developed country such as the United States, food is a much smaller share of overall purchases. Thus the impact of a food-supply shock on the overall inflation rate and on other important economic variables such as wages and total imports can vary widely by country. Given the different impacts of supply shocks, it is not surprising that monetary policy is likely to react differently to a supply shock such as food, depending on the unique characteristics of the particular country. Figure 17 shows that in the United States, the importance of food as a component of inflation measures has been declining over time. And, despite improvements in energy conservation that have lowered the per capita consumption of oil, higher energy prices have contributed to recent increases in the importance of energy in the consumer price index. The fact that food and energy prices have been quite volatile recently, but remain a relatively small part of the entire basket of goods, helps to explain why core inflation rates have not been particularly responsive to food and energy shocks. Concluding observations In conclusion, I recognize that recent supply shocks have caused pressures on many household budgets, and have led some analysts and observers to become concerned about potential long-term inflationary impacts.
I have raised the questions of competitive conditions and price formation today mainly so as to help initiate a debate on these matters. For monetary policy it is self-evidently the case that increased competition, by keeping costs and prices down, can lead to better inflation prospects. This in turn can improve the conditions for monetary policy. In recent years there have been indications of tendencies in this direction, in Sweden as well as globally. At the same time, it is difficult to tell just how much of the reduction of inflation can be attributed specifically to changes in competition and price formation. Neither is it clear for how long such a process can continue and whether the same potential exists for keeping prices down over a series of years. These are matters to which we intend to return. 3. Some monetary policy issues Sweden has had good experience, as I demonstrated earlier, of efforts to establish credibility by means of a direct inflation target. Inflation is currently low and the level is expected to remain low in the coming years. The conditions for continuing with monetary policy’s focus on stability are being further improved by the far-reaching delegation of monetary policy that is involved in the Riksbank’s enhanced status from the turn of this year. Against this background, I should like to comment on some of monetary policy’s topical issues. The exchange rate The part played by the krona’s exchange rate is a matter for debate that surfaces from time to time.

Moreover, some of the transitory effects entail a risk of higher inflation, if anything, during 1999; tax cuts and lower interest rates leave households with more money to spend and the same applies to cheaper oil. But underlying inflation also shows signs of being weaker than expected even though economic activity seems to be relatively strong and in line with the paths we have counted on for some time, with a further increase driven by domestic demand and supported by strong activity in Europe. The better picture of prices comes from a variety of factors. The rate of wage increases is likely to be somewhat more advantageous than we counted on earlier, even though we have consistently been cautiously optimistic in this respect. Of greater importance is productivity, where good growth in recent years has helped to brighten prospects. Somewhat lower import prices together with a slightly stronger exchange rate also contribute. Work on our next Inflation Report is nearing completion. There are several indications that in the two years horizon that is relevant for monetary policy, CPI inflation may be somewhat below our target. The picture of underlying inflation is much the same. Neither are these positive inflation prospects modified by the various risks that lie ahead. In a perspective that extends to the middle of 2000 the element of uncertainty is obviously high; if anything, however, the main risk seems to be that international activity will be marginally weaker and inflation accordingly somewhat lower. This is a pleasant situation to be in.
Asia Bond Monitor. Includes bonds issued by governments, regional authorities, supranational organisations and corporations. 3  BIS. 2013. Triennial Central Bank Survey, Foreign Exchange Turnover in April 2013: Preliminary global results. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  broadest possible diversification of our investments is extremely important. Consequently, we have increased our exposure in this region over the last few years, in particular to Japan, Australia, Singapore and Korea. Since 2010, the share of Asian currencies in our foreign exchange reserves has almost doubled, from just under 6% to almost 12%. Prior to the financial crisis, the SNB had less than CHF 5 billion invested in Asian assets – and these investments were denominated exclusively in yen. Since 2010, we have been investing in the Australian and Singapore dollars, and since 2012, in the Korean won as well. At the end of 2013, we had over CHF 50 billion invested in Asia, and of this, CHF 15 billion was invested in these three new currencies (left-hand side of slide 4).4 Today, 3.5% of the SNB’s total foreign exchange reserves are allocated to these currencies (right-hand side of slide 4). We see further potential in Asia as we move forward and it will not surprise you to hear that we see China playing an increasingly important role here. Investment quota for Chinese government bonds Why does China interest us?

While the gold initiative’s third demand – that all of the SNB’s gold holdings should be stored in Switzerland – may be unproblematic in monetary policy terms, this too runs counter to the notion of security. Gold is stored in multiple locations for reasons of risk diversification, in other words to improve security. The lion’s share of the SNB’s gold reserves (approximately 70%) is already stored in Switzerland and an appropriate regional diversification serves to enhance the SNB’s market access. Concluding remarks Please allow me to make a few closing remarks. Managing Switzerland’s substantial foreign exchange reserves in the country’s best interest remains our key investment policy challenge. New markets are playing an important role here. I have discussed the growing significance of Asia and explained the process by which we plan to be able to invest a small fraction of our foreign exchange reserves in China in the near future. Thanks to our branch office in Singapore, we are optimally positioned to monitor developments and manage our investments in the Asia-Pacific region efficiently. Within the scope of its mandate, the SNB needs a certain amount of latitude in order to continue fulfilling its monetary and investment policy objectives, especially given that the Swiss monetary policy landscape is set to remain challenging in the foreseeable future. A BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  “yes” vote for the gold initiative would severely restrict our scope for action. It would therefore make it considerably more difficult for the SNB to conduct successful monetary policy operations in future.
It therefore gives me great pleasure today to launch the Consumer Education Programme for the insurance and takaful industries. This represents an important step in the ongoing evolution of the development of our financial system. Indeed, this also represents a part of the overall efforts to promote market integrity and consumer protection over the whole spectrum of banking, insurance and takaful activities in the market. For consumers to fully realise the benefits of increased opportunities available in this continuously changing financial environment, consumers need to be in a position to actively manage their financial assets while at the same time safeguard their financial future. The public response to the launch of the Consumer Education Programme for the banking sector early this year has been most encouraging. To date, more than two million visitors have accessed the Bank Negara Malaysia’s “Banking Info” website and more than 360,000 booklets have found their way into the hands of consumers. The launch of the Consumer Education Programme for the insurance and takaful industries today will be part of this on-going effort to enhance the ability of consumers to understand and draw meaningful comparisons of alternative financial products and make betterinformed decisions in financial planning. In formulating a consumer education strategy, the distinct features of the insurance industry have been taken into consideration to meet the information needs of insurance consumers. Insurance contracts are essentially formed on the basis of disclosures made by prospective policyholders about the risks to be insured.

Only for more complex organizations, a more extensive technological infrastructure is needed. Let’s come to the answer to the question then. To have a well established, in other words, efficient risk management system, first we need to develop the risk culture within our organizations meaning that we need to make sure that at all levels every person understands the risks the institution is exposed to. It is the responsibility of top management to provide that kind of information by having a clear approach to risk, its appetite for risk and assigning responsibility for assuming and controlling risks. Therefore, the first step in risk management process is to identify the risks the institution is exposed to and to quantify those risks. Effective risk management requires that a consistent methodology be developed for analyzing risk. Important steps in risk management analysis are as follows: •  identifying the key financial flows;  •  determining the appropriate time horizon;  •  setting a benchmark;  •  defining the institution’s return objectives and views toward risk. As you all know, most progress has been made in the measurement of market risk and much work is now being done in many places to construct models for a better management of credit risk. Difficulties with credit risk measurement lies in the lack of statistics about individual default probabilities. Even if these default probabilities can be estimated reasonably accurately, it is still rather difficult to combine them into portfolio assessments.