samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The private sector will drive the transition to a low carbon economy and contribute to countries meeting the commitments made in the 2015 Paris Agreement. Reducing emissions will require significant investments in new technologies and infrastructures. 7  See PRA (2018), ‘Transition in thinking: The impact of climate change on the UK banking sector,’ September 2018. See PRA (2018), ‘Enhancing banks’ and insurers’ approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change,’ Consultation Paper 23/18, October 2018. 8  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  A4S’ Financing our Future report highlights the need for everyone in the investment chain to act: from individuals managing their savings, to financial intermediaries investing in the real economy, to regulators and policymakers creating the frameworks for action, to real economy firms investing in new processes, products and services. TCFD Doing so requires the right information. That’s why in 2015, in response to a call from G20 leaders, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) established the private sector Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) under the leadership of Michael Bloomberg.

Conclusion As I mentioned initially, I have in this speech referred to some of the new information received and compared it with the forecasts made in connection with the February Monetary Policy Report. It is important to point out that a lot of important new statistics will be received prior to the next monetary policy meeting in April, and it is not until then that an overall assessment can be made of the monetary policy consequences. When I look at what has happened since out monetary policy meeting on 12 February I think that events so far support the general outline given in the Monetary Policy Report. Neither does the difference between my own assessment and the main scenario apply to developments in so short a term as a month or two. My slightly more pessimistic view applies to what the consequences might be of the turmoil in the financial markets. It is a question of the risk of a weaker development abroad and the consequences this may have on developments in the real economy and inflation in the Swedish economy. My assessment in February was that, given the considerable prevailing uncertainty, we should wait before raising the repo rate. At the same time, it is important to emphasise that all we Executive Board members, regardless of our stance at the most recent meeting, look seriously upon both the risk of aggravated financial turmoil and weaker development abroad as well as the risk of inflation in Sweden becoming entrenched at a high level.
We can only imagine what would be the situation if we still had fifteen different currencies, with so many bilateral exchange rates potentially as volatile as other asset prices currently are. That single thought experiment is enough to show how much Europe benefits from having a single, truly global, currency. Two days ago, we took two very important decisions. First, in an unprecedented move concerted with all major central banks, we decreased our policy rate by 50 basis points. Then, in a separate deliberation, we further adjusted our liquidity provision framework. I will spare you the technicalities. Suffice it to say that, as a result, banks will have regular access, against collateral, to unlimited amount of liquidity at the policy rate i.e. 3.75%; this, at least until the end of January 2009. Let me briefly comment on those two decisions. First, on liquidity provision. Since the crisis broke out, central banks have tried and restore an orderly functioning of money markets. Even when modalities are different, there has been a convergence in objectives and frameworks. Central Banks have stepped up their supply of funds at longer maturities. Some have broadened the range of collateral accepted in their secured lending operations. They expanded the scope of eligible counterparties so as to ensure a wider dissemination of funds. Importantly, major central banks conducted coordinated actions to provide longer-term funds to address dollar funding needs of non-US banks, thereby ensuring an adequate distribution of liquidity across borders.

In addition, long term inflation expectations, as measured by the "5 years in 5 years" break even (or swap) inflation rate, has dropped significantly under 2%, perhaps reflecting the credibility created by our past actions. To be sure, we must remain vigilant as regards wage developments and the still possible second round effects from past price surges. But, overall, I would asses that our new monetary stance is in line with what is necessary, in current conditions, to fulfill our mandate. Let me now elaborate on two other set of policies, which, although not directly linked to the currency, contribute to underpin the strength and stability of the euro area. The crisis has given a new impetus to discussions on the proper architecture of financial supervision. In Europe, with market integration moving at a quick pace, supervisory structures will have to adapt. I am a strong supporter of the Lamfalussy process and believe that current efforts to improve and develop it deserve all our attention. But I would also argue that the process must be conducted with pragmatism and a constant look at reality rather than by reference are some theoretical scheme and vision, and I would like to take this opportunity to mention two lessons that I draw personally from events of the last 12 months. First, there are clear advantages in having banking supervision close to (or at least not too far away from) the Central Bank.
A third source of vulnerability is the large degree of connectivity and interdependency of the financial sector. Y2K and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted this type of vulnerability. One key lesson learnt was that vulnerability extends beyond these systems since they crucially rely on utilities such as electricity and telecommunications or on service providers like S.W.I.F.T. Let me sum up again. There are three major sources of a financial system’s vulnerability: economic concentration, geographic clustering, and connectivity and interdependency. The latter are an obvious characteristic of financial networks. Networks contribute to increased efficiency and facilitate risk management. At the same time they also can act as channels as well as origins of systemic crisis. From vulnerability to resilience Hand in hand with a new awareness of the vulnerability of the financial system, those responsible for its safety and stability in private firms, in financial market infrastructures as well as in the regulatory agencies have recently been taking a new hard look at the financial system’s capacity for resilience. In retrospect the Y2K problem was a first mild but nevertheless rather valuable test. The Y2K test was mild in the sense that everybody had enough time to prepare for it. What helped in Y2K was the clear deadline. All the contingency and communication networks could be set up before the event. Many of us gathered here today knew exactly where we had to be on December 31, 1999, what we had to do and whom we had to call if there were problems.

As much as public bodies are willing to step in as coordinators before and during times of crisis and eventually as lenders of last resort, they also want to see private sector entities being involved and actively participating in shaping resilience and resolving crises. The responsibility for financial stability is a shared responsibility. I am fully aware that none of us can precisely estimate today the economic consequences of what we all yet have to do in order to increase the resilience of financial systems. Since this resilience is bound to be tested again harshly sooner or later, there is no alternative to rapid, serious, adequate and if necessary costly preparations by all of us. Let me end by expressing my gratitude. I enjoyed contributing to the exchange of information, evaluations and views. This is the essence of the SIBOS conference. I am particularly grateful since I know that all of us in this room as well as those financial sector professionals who were unable to attend this conference, those of the private sector as well as those from the public sector, willingly share the noble responsibility for the efficiency and stability of today’s and tomorrow’s financial systems. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 55/2002  5
ESIGELEC - Rouen 25 May 2023 Digital transformations and financial system turbulence: What lessons for regulators and supervisors? Speech by Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor Introduction [Go to slide 2] Dear Professors, dear students. I am very pleased to have the opportunity of sharing with you some of the lessons that we at the Banque de France and the ACPR, under our financial stability mandate, have learned from the recent turbulence that has affected the international financial system. This turbulence, which has impacted both traditional financial players in the wake of the SVB bankruptcy and players in the "new digital finance" ecosystem in the wake of the FTX bankruptcy, results from the realisation of risks, whose impact has been amplified or whose spread throughout the financial system has been sped up, by digital innovations that are transforming at high speed, or even shaking up, the way in which finance works. While the effect of this turbulence on the financial system as a whole and the real economy seems to be contained for the time being, the impact of digital innovations raises questions as to the regulation and supervision practices of both traditional finance and the emerging digital finance. I propose presenting these questions to you one after the other, together with the answers that I believe to be appropriate. 1  1. Traditional finance put to the test by the digital world: what lessons can be learned from recent bank failures?

In the United States, these rules were not applicable to SVB, as certain exemptions, introduced in 2019 under the proportionality principle, apply to banks that are considered to be less important, this concept being understood in a broad sense since it includes banks with a balance sheet total of up to USD 250 billion. - The post mortem analyses carried out and published by the FED suggest that, had SVB been subject to these rules, it would not have complied with the short-term liquidity ratio as defined by the Basel Committee. Moreover, SVB's heavy reliance on tech companies' deposits should have alerted its supervisor if the additional monitoring tools required by international standards had been put in place. The same FED analyses estimate that SVB's interest rate risk sensitivity was around 35% before the crisis, well above the 15% alert threshold set out in the international rules and supposed to trigger supervisory action. - Monitoring compliance with regulations calls for strict, intrusive and reactive supervision, which, according to the FED, was not the case. Let me reassure you on one point: the European situation is radically different. The Basel Committee's rules are applied in Europe in their entirety and to all banks. By the way, I would like to add that Europe is in the process of finalising the transposition into European law of the latest reinforcements of the Basel III agreements, ahead of the other major jurisdictions.
There was, it must be said, a greater determination at least to pool expertise and discuss possible solutions in various international forums. But the political motivation for further reform gradually weakened during the period of strong global growth for most of the last decade. The present financial crisis has much in common with the Asian financial crisis in that it has involved massive failures in financial intermediation, a rapid transmission of problems, and a strong element of surprise. However, the present crisis is global, not regional, and it centres on the world’s most advanced economies. At its climax, in September 2008, the crisis raised the real possibility of a collapse of the world financial system. The reputations of many leading institutions and individuals have been damaged or destroyed. Large sectors of major financial systems have been effectively nationalised. Disillusion has spread, and fundamental questions have been raised about the future of free markets, as people count the cost of the excesses of the past few years. Inevitably, central banks and regulators have been among those that have faced criticism: for not seeing – or not heeding – the danger signals; for having allowed financial innovation to get out of hand, to the benefit of intermediaries but to the detriment of the public; and for not responding quickly enough when the crisis began to emerge. Although there are many lessons to learn, not all of these criticisms are fair.

As Governor Zeti has persuasively argued, Islamic finance encourages business activities that generate legitimate profits, and rests on principles of fairness, shared risk and ethical practices.1 There is, I think, much for us all to reflect on in this when considering how badly things have gone wrong recently in what might be called "traditional" finance. No institution with such a long history can have escaped controversy, and BNM has had its fair share. What is interesting, however, is that perhaps the most controversial action by the Malaysian authorities in recent years – the response to the 1997-8 Asian financial crisis – has now come to be understood as appropriate and effective. At the centre of this response was the imposition of capital controls to contain speculative capital flows, stabilise the ringgit, and give the economy a breathing space. This was widely criticised internationally as a retrograde step. Yet it was a limited and temporary measure, which, along with other policies succeeded in stabilising the system and providing the conditions for economic recovery. The role of Bank Negara in promoting international understanding of this measure was crucial to its effectiveness. It is not, of course, my purpose to recommend capital controls as a general solution to financial crisis. The lesson here is that unorthodox measures can be effective, provided that they are well thought out and properly implemented.
Before explaining how we designed and executed the consolidation process, I thought I should share with the distinguished audience, the basis and the background to this process, which was designed to re-organise the structure in the financial system within the existing legal framework, while taking into consideration some global experiences. In this regard, I will talk on four areas: the role of the Central Bank; evolution of our financial system; global experience in consolidation; and the transition of the burden of financial crises from shareholder to tax payer. Basis 1: Central Bank’s role in financial sector consolidation I would like to begin by explaining the role of the Central Bank in this process. As you all know, securing financial system stability is one of the core objectives of the Central Bank. In terms of Section 5 of the Monetary Law Act, the Central Bank is empowered to ensure financial system stability in the country. The importance of maintaining a sound banking system was also emphasised in the “Report on the Establishment of a Central Bank for Ceylon” by the Central Bank’s founding Governor, John Exter. There he said, I quote, “Banking is an economic activity which affects the public welfare to an unusual degree, it touches in one way or the other almost every phase of the country’s economic life. Sound banking is essential to a healthy and vigorous economic development”.

14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Phase III (from 1 August to 31 December 2014) Action 1: Revisiting and modifying the regulatory framework As we move onto a new platform of maintaining financial system stability with a set of relatively larger financial institutions under the transformation process of the domestic economy as well as the global economy, we feel that existing Directions, and Rules and Regulations that were used to assess the compliance of the banking and non-banking institutions too need to be revisited and modified in accordance with the financial sector consolidation programme. Accordingly, two internal committees have been officiated by the Departments of Supervision of Banks and Non-bank Financial Institutions to study the existing regulatory framework and propose changes in line with international best practices. The recommendations of these committees are expected to be submitted to the management of the Central Bank by end 2014. Action 2: Reviewing consolidation plans and meetings with the Boards of Directors In September 2014, the third round of meetings were held between the Consolidation Unit and the Boards of Directors of a few selected NBFIs to have a closer dialogue about their progress on the merger and acquisition plans. At these meetings, the Unit discussed in detail about the issues hindering their action in progressing with the consolidation programme, and provided them with necessary guidance for resolving the prevailing issues with a view to facilitating the expeditious implementation of their merger plans.
Turning to structural policies, measures that reduce adjustment costs and promote moderate unit labour cost growth are of the utmost importance in the current economic circumstances. While this is crucial in all euro area countries, it is particularly pressing in those that have experienced a significant loss of cost and price competitiveness over recent years and where unemployment has already started to rise. Moreover, fostering productivity  BIS Review 105/2008  3  through enhanced investment in innovation and education enlarges the scope for increases in real incomes in the longer run. We are now at your disposal for questions. 4  BIS Review 105/2008

A more granular disclosure of data could allow the construction of more meaningful sets of indicators and prevent misleading comparisons across institutions. On the analysis of capital adequacy, uncertainly about the computation of risk-weighted assets is shifting the focus to indicators calculated on the basis of total assets or tangible assets, balance-sheet equity and leverage ratios. Clearly, in the medium-term, a higher quality of data for financial stability surveillance and assessment may also be achieved through a better disclosure policy on the part of financial institutions. Benefits would come also from timely and harmonised reporting. 5. What is missing: remaining data gaps and other challenges confronting macro-prudential analysis  While data gaps can never be closed in full – also because they are a moving target – attempts to reduce these gaps are vital. With respect to macro-level data, efforts to improve the effective coverage of the so-called shadow banking sector – i.e. of credit intermediation, liquidity and maturity transformation activities that take place outside the regulated banking system – need to be continued. Important components of the shadow banking system include certain money market funds, structured investment vehicles, off-balance-sheet vehicles (reliant on banks’ credit lines) and securities lenders. Although some progress has been made, data gaps remain that render the proper monitoring and assessment of systemic risks arising from securities financing transactions (notable via repurchase agreements and securities lending) unfeasible. Challenges also arise from the activities of the shadow banking system that go beyond a specific group of entities or types of business.
CEMFI is the outcome of the ambition of the leadership of the Banco de España in the late 1980s, who saw the possibility of innovating in the organization of a graduate programme comparable to the best programmes in Europe. It was Luis Ángel Rojo, at that time the Banco de España's Director General of Research, who invited Rafael Repullo to lead this venture. Precisely as a token of appreciation for his decisive contributions in the early days of CEMFI, the prize for the best Master student bears his name. The Banco de España is very proud of its ongoing support and collaboration with such a special institution providing first-class graduate education and research, contributing a host of public goods to the Spanish economy and generating valuable ideas for public policymaking. An excellent example of this collaboration is the co-organisation of the biennial Financial Stability Conference that concluded this morning at the Banco de España. Demonstrating an outstanding academic level and policy relevance, it has enjoyed the presence of a large number of distinguished visitors, including the Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Jerome Powell. Building on this example, I am pleased to announce a new collaboration between the Banco de España, CEMFI, and the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, an annual conference on the Spanish economy, the first edition of which is due to take place next week in Santander.

The successful introduction of a broad range of pan European and sector-based indexes, and the subsequent launch of derivatives and new investment vehicles such as Exchange Traded Funds (or “trackers”) based on these new indices, highlights this change in investors’ approach. Empirical evidence suggests indeed that sector-related factors are playing an increasing role in price dynamics. As integration enlarges the range of potential investors, it also fosters the development of private equity and the financing of young and innovative firms, a trend that is obviously welcomed. 1.4 Behind the scene, supporting the evolutions that I just touched upon, market infrastructures have undergone radical changes. As an example, as regards trading infrastructures, the creation and expansion of EURONEXT is a striking illustration of the on-going consolidation process: the EURONEXT group now links the French, Belgian, Dutch and Portuguese stock markets, and has concluded co-operation agreements with several other European markets. The group also significantly increased its presence on interest rates derivatives markets. This ongoing movement of consolidation affects securities clearing, settlement and depository infrastructures, as providers aim to propose an integrated transaction service covering the entire securities processing cycle. In the field of post-market infrastructures, CLEARNET is pursuing its pan-European expansion by completing its operational integration throughout the EURONEXT area. The clearing house also reached an agreement with its Italian counterpart, enabling it to offer central counterparty services for transactions executed on the Italian government securities market.