Article 130 prohibits the ECB and the members of its decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties. In addition, under Article 130, Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle, and not to seek to influence the members of the ECB’s decision-making bodies in the performance of their tasks. [11] This is a very strong concept of independence from the perspective of its content (double prohibition), its legislative source (Treaty level, meaning that it is very difficult to modify), and the judicial protection granted in the event of violation (individual governors have locus standi against their Member States). The concept of central bank independence has four features institutional, instrument, personal and financial independence. [12] In view of the broadened scope of the tasks performed by http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  central banks, they have to be viewed through a functional lens in order to be in line with the rationale of the Treaty provisions on independence. Institutional independence refers to the prohibition of the influence of third parties on the structure, functioning, decision-making, and exercise of powers of the central bank. Institutional independence implies that the central bank has a “broad discretion”[13] when making policy decisions.

As a consequence, institutional independence should be subject to a functional analysis of the need for those new tasks to benefit  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  from the same broad independence framework. If central bank independence is to be modelled in a functional manner, then its pendant – the central bank’s accountability and disclosure requirements – also need to reflect this modelling. Accountability and transparency The principles of accountability and transparency are essential for independent central banks. Accountability is a political duty and sine qua non for the democratic legitimacy of an independent central bank that is answerable for the exercise of its decision-making powers. [18] Accountability refers to the ex post explanation and justification of autonomous decision-making. [19] Transparency is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of a central bank’s policies by communicating them in real time, or even in advance, thus facilitating the public’s understanding of the central bank’s objectives, behaviour and decisions. [20] The channels through which the ECB is held accountable for the performance of its monetary policy function are laid down at constitutional level, i.e. in the Treaty. The Treaty was concluded by the national governments and ratified by the national parliaments of the EU Member States, and in some cases endorsed by popular referenda, in accordance with national constitutional requirements. This gives the ECB, as an independent institution accountable to the EU institutions as well as to the public at large, a profound degree of democratic legitimacy.