samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To this end, a number of initiatives are currently in progress to help ensure the continued efficiency of the payment and settlement system in the United States. Let me be a bit more specific about some of the planned improvements to the infrastructure of the financial system that we expect to be implemented in a very short time. The first is the CLS Bank project, the Continuous Linked Settlement Bank, which has been under discussion since 1995. The owners of the CLS Bank are in the process of building the Bank’s systems and getting supervisory approval to begin operations in the fall of next year. The purpose of the CLS Bank is to create a privately owned and operated facility for payment-versuspayment settlement of foreign exchange transactions. Today, many foreign exchange transactions carry principal risk - that is, the risk that only one of the two legs of the transaction will be executed. This risk exists because of differences in the operating hours of large-value payment systems around the globe. However, when transactions are settled through the CLS Bank, the two legs of the transaction will be executed simultaneously with finality, thereby eliminating principal risk from the transaction. A second initiative under way to improve the payment and settlement infrastructure has to do with CHIPS, the Clearing House Interbank Payments System. The New York Clearing House, which operates CHIPS, is planning to introduce fundamental changes to its processes for large-value interbank payments that will bring about intraday finality.

Furthermore, some of the very largest commercial banks earn a substantial portion of their net revenues from the various payment and credit services they offer to the securities industry. In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission jointly regulate and oversee the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation through which privately issued bonds and equities are settled in the United States. Third, as fiscal agent, the Federal Reserve provides a variety of payment-related services on behalf of the United States Treasury and other government agencies. These services include the processing of government payments as well as the creation, safekeeping, and transfer of book-entry records detailing ownership of the public debt. As an extension of these fiscal agent duties, the Federal Reserve also seeks to promote the efficient operation of the government securities market. BIS Review 93/2000  2  Fourth, the Federal Reserve oversees private clearing and settlement systems and provides payment services, principally Fedwire. These services are central to overall financial stability because disruptions in payment systems have the clear potential to impair the functioning of the financial sector and the real economy. Moreover, a major financial or operational problem at a key institution in a securities settlement system can also spill over to the payment systems that it uses and thereby have systemic repercussions. Finally, to enhance the general welfare of the US economy, the Federal Reserve promotes the efficient functioning of the payment system and helps to supply payment services.
16  Goodhart (2013) argues that so-called countercyclical measures will need to be introduced at a time when they are likely to be opposed by many politicians, most borrowers and lenders, and many, probably most, commentators in the Press. He also doubts that the measures will be implemented with sufficient vigour and aggression to have any mitigating effect, as they would be operating against the prevailing trend of the financial market. 17  This objection of course applies to all policy areas trying to counteract financial risks, including a monetary policy that leans against the wind. But while this objection is often made against monetary policy, it has so far only been discussed to a minor extent with regard to macroprudential policy. 18  Stein (2013). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Little acceptance for this view in the Swedish debate To summarise: in my view, macroprudential policy should be the first line of defence against financial imbalances.19 But it is possible, and even quite probable, that in some situations it may need support from monetary policy. And there is thus, at least as I understand it, good reason to extend the strategy for monetary policy and allow greater consideration to be given to financial imbalances than was the case prior to the financial crisis. One of the main arguments against this view in the Swedish debate is that monetary policy in practice has little effect on the risks linked to financial imbalances.

See, for instance, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I think that the division into these three main views provides a good reflection of the current debate. But there are of course no sharp dividing lines between them, rather the dividing lines are relatively fluid. And where one finds oneself on the scale ultimately depends on which argument or arguments one allocates the greatest significance. It will probably come as no surprise to those of you who follow the monetary policy debate in Sweden that I myself have great sympathy for the principle that monetary policy needs to support macroprudential policy. I would therefore place myself fairly close to the second view in Smets’ description. So what has led me to this view? Allow me to begin by giving my interpretation of what a monetary policy that leans against the wind entails. What does it mean that monetary policy leans against the wind? There are different ways of illustrating how and why financial imbalances and risks should be included in the monetary policy deliberations. Essentially it is a question of avoiding scenarios where the imbalances will lead to very negative effects on GDP, unemployment and inflation. So in principle it is a question, as usual in monetary policy, of stabilising inflation and the real economy.
It therefore follows that our actions in pursuit of price stability do not undermine our commitment to incorporate climate change considerations, within our mandate. Similarly, this same commitment does not undermine our commitment to price stability. Nor does it in any way restrict our ability to deliver price stability, even in the challenging circumstances we are currently facing. Not only have we started policy rate normalisation with an unprecedented 125 basis point increase in our rates over the last two Governing Council meetings, we have also released details of how we aim to decarbonise our corporate bond holdings on a path aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement. As of next Monday, we will start tilting our corporate bond purchases towards issuers with a better climate performance. This is a milestone in the implementation of our climate action plan which will reduce our exposure to climaterelated financial risks and support the green transition of the European economy in line with the EU's climate neutrality objectives. The climate action plan that we unveiled in the summer of last year is not an aim in itself. The ECB is committed to regularly reviewing all the measures it has introduced.

And we will insist that banks' risk  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  management practices are fully aligned with all our expectations by the end of 2024 at the latest. It is clear that central banks and supervisors are not primarily responsible for addressing the ongoing climate and environmental crises. They are climate and environment policy-takers, whereas governments and legislators – including the European Parliament – are climate and environment policymakers. The European Union and its co-legislators are clearly committed to the Paris Agreement. The EU is taking concrete steps to implement legislation that puts this commitment into practice. Central banks and supervisors cannot ignore this in the pursuit of their mandate. Similarly, on the path to meeting the Paris Agreement goals, we cannot ignore scenarios which include a greater manifestation of physical risks from climate change and environmental degradation. And we will not ignore all this. To the contrary. We acknowledge that we cannot deliver on our mandate if we assume a status quo in which the world will not transition as the baseline scenario for the future. And by rejecting that status quo as the baseline, we are becoming a force that contributes to the transition. And we will continue to be just that: a force that contributes to the transition. Within our mandate. And in the pursuit of our mandate. Thank you very much for your attention. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Financial innovation, defined as the emergence of new financial instruments and services, and of new forms of organisation in more sophisticated and complete financial markets, has many well-known positive effects: •  by creating more complete markets, it improves resource allocation, thereby supporting longer-term growth prospects 1 ;  •  financial innovation even appears to reduce growth volatility, as has been shown in the case of the US 2 and confirmed on a sample of 25 countries 3 . As regards firms, this seems to result from a more flexible financial structure. With respect to households, this appears to stem from relaxed collateral constraints on borrowing 4 allowing households to better smooth consumption in the face of temporary changes in their income 5 . Moreover, deregulation and innovation on the housing finance markets enable households to purchase houses whose values are consistent with their long-term income prospects, as shown e.g. in the case of the US using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Financial innovation does not follow a regular pattern, as some periods are more active than others especially those of financial liberalisation and increased use of IT in financial related activities.

Panetta, F. (2021), ““Hic sunt leones” – open research questions on the international dimension of central bank digital currencies”, speech at the ECB-CEBRA conference on international aspects of digital currencies and fintech, Frankfurt am Main, 19 October. 10. Panetta, F. (2022), “For a few cryptos more: the Wild West of crypto finance”, speech at Columbia University, New York, 25 April. See also Hermans, L. et al. (2022), “Decrypting financial stability risks in crypto-asset markets”, Financial Stability Review, ECB, May. 11. In particular, it would be important for stablecoins with an algorithm-based stabilisation mechanism to be treated as crypto-assets other than e-money tokens (EMTs) and asset-referenced tokens (ARTs), and they should not be used for payment purposes. Given that some algorithmic stablecoins have failed in the past (including the recent collapse of TerraUSD), algorithm-based stabilisation mechanisms without a reserve have proven to be conceptually flawed and have performed no better than bitcoin in terms of stability. This means that algorithmic stablecoins without an issuer and a  reserve should be treated in the same way as crypto-assets other than EMTs and ARTs. Moreover, as crypto-assets are not of sufficient quality to back up the value and maintain the stability of ARTs/EMTs, the reserve assets of ARTs/EMTs should not include any crypto-assets – ARTs, EMTs or crypto-assets other than ARTs/EMTs.
Moreover, the relationship between home and host authorities may be affected differently depending on which function of authority, for example, supervision, emergency liquidity assistance or deposit guarantees, that is being employed. An interesting development is, however, that the distinction between subsidiaries and branches is becoming more and more blurred. Banks increasingly concentrate different functions, such as funding, liquidity management, risk management and credit decisionmaking to specific centres of competence in order to reap the benefits of specialisation and economies of scale. With the financial integration in the EU, this specialisation also occurs cross-border. As a consequence, foreign subsidiaries (and branches) become less self-contained. It can no longer be taken for granted that even a large subsidiary will be able to continue its business, if the parent bank defaults – at least not in the short run. And I believe that the idea that a subsidiary could be successfully ring-fenced in its host country is merely history today, as accounts could easily be transferred from one country to another at the push of a button. Even if many of the examples I will use today formally will have bearing mostly on cross-border banks with a branch structure, economically and practically, they can often just as well apply to cross-border banks with a subsidiary structure. Challenges ahead Although increasing cross-border integration of the financial industry is essentially a positive – and even necessary – development to enhance the economic potential for the EU area, it also means new challenges for the authorities involved.

Or, if emergency liquidity assistance was provided at some point during the course of the crisis (on the erroneous assumption that the bank was basically solvent), a loan loss may be incurred on the national central bank that acted as a lender of last resort. And, of course, when giving liquidity support to a bank with cross-border operations in many countries, you can never be entirely sure in what jurisdiction your money ends up. In the case of a branch structure, it may end up in any country in which the bank operates, and ring-fencing a subsidiary may prove equally difficult in practice. Furthermore, in some situations it may be socially optimal to spend public money in order to reconstruct a failed bank. If the reconstruction is successful, the money spent may eventually be recovered by the public. But it could take a considerable amount of time before this happens, and a precondition is that you are not betting on the wrong horse. The taxpayers in one country may not be so keen to take on such risks in another country. In addition to fiscal costs, there may of course be substantial indirect social costs in the form of a dipping GDP that may occur when the financial system is suffering efficiency losses or is being temporarily disabled as a result of a financial crisis. These indirect costs are basically a function of the systemic relevance of the financial institution(s) in question.
But even these could spread more widely through global supply chains and dampen any uptick in demand-driven trade flows. They could even backfire on the US given how integrated production networks are across countries. In short, the growth spill-over from the US to the rest of the world will depend on the balance between fiscal stimulus on the one hand, and financial tightening and trade restrictions on the other. The current consensus is that the former will outweigh the latter. We will have to see. Conclusion On balance, chances are that global growth will be slightly higher this year compared to the last. Hope and confidence are important factors and recent improvements in business and consumer sentiments may well translate into higher investment and consumption. A shift in the macro policy mix in the US, away from excessive reliance on monetary policy towards a bigger role for fiscal support, is to be welcomed. A well-designed fiscal policy can provide some modest stimulus in the short-term but more importantly help to augment the productive capacity of the economy in the long term. A successful outcome could encourage other advanced economies to seek a better balance between monetary and fiscal policies. 6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Some caution though is warranted. There remains considerable uncertainty as to the actual policy changes in store. They may not pan out as expected. There are serious downside risks on immigration and trade policies.

Ravi Menon: Global economic outlook - renewed optimism, higher uncertainty Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the UBS' Wealth Insights Conference, Singapore, 16 January 2017. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. The global economy in 2016 – resilient but uninspiring 2016 was an eventful year for the global economy. If you recall, we began the year with anxiety over China’s financial markets but breathed easier over the course of the year as China steadied its economy and avoided the hard landing feared by many. We saw economic momentum in the US slip, and then pick up towards the end of the year, which also saw the second rate hike by the Fed in 10 years and an unexpected presidential election outcome. The EU economy was stirred but not shaken by the shock of the Brexit vote in June, with accommodative monetary policy providing support while domestic demand gradually improved. Japan saw further innovations in monetary easing – with negative interest rates and yield curve control – with some but not decisive improvement in growth outcomes. In the ASEAN economies, growth was respectable but below potential, as a pick-up in private consumption was offset by weaker investment and exports. Overall, I would say the global economy in 2016 was resilient but uninspiring. Economic growth was sustained in the face of shocks but remains sub-par.
Although substantial losses have been taken up in the financial institutions’ balance sheets, and they have been allocated new capital to a large degree, we have not yet seen the end of the financial crisis. Different measures of risk premiums are still at a high level compared with the period prior to last summer. One can illustrate the problems in different ways, for instance by means of the so-called basis spreads, which demonstrate the difference between interest rates between the banks and the expected policy rate set by the central bank. This measure reflects pricing of the risk faced by the banks when lending to other banks. The basis spreads increased significantly in August last year. Sweden has also been affected by the global financial crisis, but to a lesser extent than many other countries. The basis spreads have, for instance, increased more in the United States and the euro area than in Sweden. But it is at the same time important to remember that the crisis has increased the Swedish banks’ vulnerability to shocks. Although the basis spreads have declined somewhat in the euro area and in Sweden since last spring, they have not returned to the earlier levels yet and one cannot exclude the possibility of new problems arising that will push risk premiums even higher. Weaker growth in the USA Economic developments in the United States continued to deteriorate during the first half of the year. This was largely connected to problems in the financial markets.

The Financial Services Academy, established today, jointly by the SEC and the IBSL is a great move in that direction, and I hope that the FSA would grow to be a leading institution in financial education not only in Sri Lanka but also in the region. 2  BIS Review 24/2007
But, if you look closely, you’d see that excess reserves actually  1  An extended effort to evaluate potential long-run monetary policy implementation frameworks was announced in the July 2015 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes. This effort was previously discussed at the dinner address for the Bank of England-Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference on Money Markets and Monetary Policy Implementation. 2  Congress had agreed to give the Federal Reserve the authority to pay interest on reserves in 2006, but this authority was to take effect on 2011. The effective date of the authority was moved forward to October 1, 2008, with the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. 3  The FOMC published its Policy Normalization Principles and Plans on September 16, 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  started expanding earlier and control of the federal funds rate deteriorated. 4 So what happened? In reviewing the events of the second half of 2007 and most of 2008, it is clear that the Federal Reserve faced a tension between the need to provide liquidity to ease money market strains and the need to keep control of the interest rate target within its earlier framework. Demand for dollar liquidity increased in many money markets and some of that demand came from banks headquartered outside of the United States. A by-product of the Federal Reserve’s efforts to provide liquidity to the financial system is that the supply of reserves, which can only be held by banks, increased.

This includes requiring listed companies to make timely disclosures on 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  material transactions and have in place adequate internal controls and governance structures. The MAS supervises the SGX in the discharge of its regulatory function. SGX’s RegCo Board also has oversight of the exchange’s regulatory responsibilities. This MAS-SGX regulatory model, where the statutory and market regulator each have their distinct role but also share the responsibility to ensure sound functioning of the capital markets, is not unique to Singapore. Similar approaches are adopted in many financial centres, including in the United States, Australia and Hong Kong. So each time a corporate failing of one form or another happens, both the MAS and the SGX would review and investigate the matter. The specific regulatory response would obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Often, a kneejerk tightening of rules may not be in the best interest of the market. Tighter across-the-board regulations can impose additional costs on all listed companies, and these costs must be weighed against the benefits. It may not be appropriate to prescribe the same standard on all companies, as they can differ in size or business complexity. The MAS has therefore been deliberate in calibrating our rules. For example, there are more stringent CG standards for banks, compared to for other listed companies; and rightly so due to banks’ potential systemic impact. This is also why in the latest review of the Code, the Council took a pragmatic approach.