samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The repercussions of this event rippled through the crypto ecosystem, causing cascading liquidations[25] that underscored the interconnectedness and opacity of crypto markets. Ultimately, it showcased how swiftly confidence in the industry could deteriorate. Similarities to the FTX case can be seen in the recent civil charges brought by the US Securities and Exchange Commission against the biggest remaining crypto exchange: Binance. These civil charges allege that Binance’s CEO and Binance entities were involved in an extensive web of deception, conflicts of interest, lack of disclosure and calculated evasion of the law. [26] Should these allegations be proven, this would be yet another example of the fundamental shortcomings of the crypto ecosystem. The recent crypto failures also show that risk, in itself, is technology-neutral. In financial services, it does not matter if a business ledger is kept on paper as it was for hundreds of years, in a centralised system as we have now or on a blockchain as in the crypto asset ecosystem. In the end, whether a firm remains in business or fails depends on how it manages credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk and leverage. Crypto enthusiasts would do well to remember that new technology does not make financial risk disappear. The financial risk either remains or transforms into a different type. It is like pressing a balloon on one side: it will change in shape until it pops on the other side. And if the balloon is full of hot air, it may rise for a while but will burst in the end.

36. The “travel rule”, already used in traditional finance, will in the future cover transfers of crypto-assets. Information on the source of the asset and its beneficiary will have to “travel” with the transaction and be stored on both sides of the transfer. The law also covers transactions above € from ”self-hosted wallets” (a crypto-asset wallet address of a private user) when they interact with hosted wallets managed by crypto-asset service providers. See Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (Text with EEA relevance), Official Journal L 150, 9 June 2023, p. 1– 39. 37. Crypto lending is a centralised or decentralised finance service that allows investors to lend out their crypto holdings to borrowers. Decentralised crypto lending platforms use smart contracts to automate loan payouts and yields, and users can deposit collateral to receive a loan if they meet the appropriate requirements automatically (see Duggan, W. (2023), “Crypto Lending: Earn Money From Your Crypto Holdings”, Forbes, 30 January). A non-custodial wallet, or self-custody wallet, entails the crypto owner being fully responsible for managing their own cryptos. The users have full control of their crypto holdings, manage their own private key and handle transactions themselves (see “Custodial vs Non-Custodial Wallets”, crypto.com, 17 February 2023). 38.
There is evidence of increasing wages in some occupations, but wage growth in general continues to be very modest at about 2–1/4 percent per year. That is a long way from the 3 to 4 percent benchmark implied by productivity growth and our inflation objective. Indeed, over the past three years, the unemployment rate has fallen by a percentage point per year; yet real wage growth has barely budged. It’s hard for me to imagine a full labor market recovery without genuine improvement in compensation growth. But am I wrong? Has the wage Phillips curve completely broken down? Some claim the answer is no – you just have to look at the right measure of unemployment. Alan Krueger, Judd Cramer and David Cho, among others, have shown that the relationship between real wages and the short-term unemployment rate during this cycle has been in line with historical norms, whereas the historical spike in long-term unemployment exerted minimal pressure on real wage growth. 10 Of course, the short-term unemployment rate is now close to its pre-recession level. So their model implies nominal wage growth should be returning to something close to the fundamentals implied by productivity growth and inflation. My staff’s research comes to a somewhat different conclusion. Using models similar to those Michael Kiley presented here this morning, 11 they find that pools of potential workers other than the short-term unemployed, notably the medium-term unemployed and the involuntary part-time work force, substantially influence wage growth at the state or metropolitan statistical area level.

But the decision about when to begin to  13  See, for example, Hansen and Sargent (2008). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  raise rates shouldn’t be made prematurely. Rather, the decision for policy liftoff has to be made for the right reasons – that is, it should be dictated by economic conditions. I have said many times that I agree with Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota: Policy at all times must be goal-oriented. 14 Our experiences since the crisis began and current economic conditions are highly unusual. The FOMC should not simply set its policy instruments by mechanically aligning them with historical norms if those norms are not relevant harbingers for the attainment of both of our dual mandate goals. Rather, our policy instruments should be set to achieve our ultimate goals as efficaciously as possible given current and prospective economic conditions, all the while with an eye on managing against important risks to the outlook. What does that mean now? I believe that the biggest risk we face today is prematurely engineering restrictive monetary conditions. In this scenario, the FOMC could misjudge the presence and magnitude of economic impediments and misread the recent progress we have made as evidence of sounder economic trends. If we were to presume prematurely that the U.S. economy has returned to a more “business as usual” position and reduce monetary accommodation too soon, we could find ourselves in the very uncomfortable position of falling back into the ZLB environment.
Alternatively, OPEC can take a more active position and push up prices even further by capping production. Only a few years ago, a long-term price of around USD 20-25 (in real value) per barrel was the normal estimate. Analyses such as that presented by the IMF suggest that the long-term oil price level may be considerably higher than this. Let us return to the Norwegian economy, and the possibilities and challenges facing Norway. The projections in Inflation Report 1/05, published on 16 March, are based on a gradual increase in the interest rate. This is in line with financial and foreign exchange market expectations. It is assumed that the exchange rate will shadow movements in the forward exchange rate. This implies that the krone will remain fairly stable around the current level in the years ahead. Mainly as a result of persistently high oil prices and expectations that oil prices will remain high, investment in the petroleum sector may reach record levels this year. The investment intentions survey for the petroleum sector points to very high growth. The level is expected to remain high throughout the projection period. Activity in the petroleum sector will have spillover effects on the mainland economy, initially on the engineering industry and the construction sector. The scale of petroleum investment and its spillover effects are highly uncertain. The last time petroleum investment showed a sharp increase, in 1997/1998, growth was substantially stronger than had been assumed. An upturn occurred in the Norwegian economy as a whole at the same time.

The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. The inflation target provides an anchor for economic agents’ choices concerning saving, investment, budgets and wages. Households, businesses, public entities, employees and employers can base decisions on the assumption that inflation in Norway will be 2.5 per cent over time. High oil prices have a different impact in Norway than in oil-importing countries. When oil prices increase, the value of Norway’s national wealth rises. The idea behind the Petroleum Fund is that the cash flow from an increase in oil prices should accrue to the Fund and be invested abroad and should not be included directly in the government budget. As a result, the increase in the cash flow will not affect the domestic economy. Likewise, a fall in oil prices will not have an immediate impact on the domestic economy, but result in a lower accumulation of foreign assets. Even though the Petroleum Fund and the fiscal rule shield the Norwegian economy to a certain extent from fluctuations in the oil market, the Norwegian economy will still be affected by developments in oil prices. If changes in oil prices influence growth in the global economy, this will in turn impact Norwegian exports of traditional goods and services. Petroleum investment on the Norwegian continental shelf is another important channel. Fluctuating oil prices contribute to substantial variations in petroleum investment. This has spillover effects on the mainland economy.
Both the second-quarter Spanish Labour Force Survey figures and the Quarterly National Accounts estimates released at the end of August reflect high employment growth rates in the first half of the year (3% yearon-year; around half a million new jobs). The most recent data on Social Security registrations,  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  i.e. those for July and August, show a certain moderation in the rate of job creation in this period, albeit still in a positive vein. Labour costs continued to moderate in the first half of the year, reflecting the greater flexibility with which firms can adjust their labour conditions to the macroeconomic environment. If the trend prevailing in the past year and a half continues, the rise in employment may put the unemployment rate at around 20% in 2016 Q4. In the realm of inflation, the recent energy price falls have interrupted the course of recovery of the CPI. After posting positive year-on-year rates in June and July, for the first time in nearly a year, the overall price index slipped back (by –0.4%) in August. It is important, however, to emphasise the temporary nature of this new bout of disinflation, linked to the recent oil price fall in the international markets. In fact, the rate of change of the CPI excluding energy increased by 0.9% in August, growing slightly faster than in July, while the indicator which excludes unprocessed food as well, so-called “core inflation”, grew by 0.7%.

We have a more flexible economy, which is evident in the speed with which enterprises adjust and the relative ease with which labor and capital move to their most productive uses. 2  BIS Review 2/2005  Our financial system provides a strong combination of bank-centered financial groups that are capable of withstanding larger shocks than was possible in the past, a more diverse mix of other financial intermediaries, and deeper and more liquid capital markets than exist in the other major financial centers. Together these factors seem to have produced a more stable and resilient financial system, one that is better able to withstand stress. These are important strengths for the United States, and they are formidable even in comparison with the scale of the broader challenges ahead for the world economy. What are the most important actions policy makers can take to mitigate the risks and challenges on the horizon? Here’s a list of actions the U.S. can take on its own or initiate in cooperation with others. First, with respect to monetary policy. We need to preserve confidence that policy will move toward a positive real fed funds rate at a pace sufficient to keep inflation expectations stable at a low level. How far policy moves and the pace at which it moves will depend on how the outlook evolves.
Ladies and Gentlemen, the implementation of SEPA is a huge challenge for the Polish banking system, for companies that make up the Polish payment infrastructure and for many large clients of banks, including clients from the public finance sector. Such a huge challenge requires the creation of the vision of SEPA, the vision that will unite activities of all stakeholders of this process – from banks, through its clients up to infrastructural and telecom companies. The vision should treat the interests of the clients of the Polish and European payment infrastructure as a priority. All stakeholders should remember that only those companies will be successful in the global economy of the 21st century that deliver value to their clients. Companies that use cyclical market trends to gain benefits at the expense of their clients are doomed to fail. I would like to call on all those who develop the vision of SEPA Poland to analyse the functioning of payment systems in the most advanced parts of the world and to benefit from the experience of such countries as Singapore, as expressed in the vision entitled 4 “Intelligent Nation 2015” . Let us use the SEPA Poland process to create a payment system for the 21st century. Let us inspire others, including public administration, to act and implement eadministration and e-economy so that Poland and Europe can be successful in the global economy of the 21st century. Thank you very much for your attention. 4  4  See www.iN2015.sg  BIS Review 97/2006

Instead, this caused a significant current account deficit widening. Therefore, in order to preserve the GDP growth trend, economic policies should focus on its sustainability. In the quest for supporting potential growth and increasing the resilience of the economy, there is no substitute for a coherent mix of macroeconomic policies and structural reforms. A durable economic growth is extremely important also from the perspective of euro adoption, as it would lead to progress in convergence, which will put us on the right track for achieving the goal of joining the Eurozone. In order to stay on course, economic growth and convergence must advance in line with economic fundamentals. Otherwise, the gains, as spectacular as they might be, could be jeopardised by abrupt setbacks. At the end of the day, forcing convergence or postponing convergence is equally harmful. I had the honour to be one of the vice-presidents of the National Committee for Substantiation of the National Euro Changeover Plan, founded last year, which prepared a set of documents that emphasise the need for a substantial degree of convergence before entering the euro area. In fact, it is the Maastricht Treaty that explicitly stipulates the need for “a high degree of sustainable convergence”. Yet, this requirement seems to have been overlooked sometimes. Let me point out that by convergence I refer to all four types of convergence that must be taken into account: nominal, real, institutional and structural. Nominal convergence is easily quantifiable, as the specific criteria are clearly defined in the Maastricht Treaty.
They create new jobs at a faster pace than larger companies do. Their significance can furthermore be measured in the sizeable contributions they make to nearly all countries’ gross national products. Your workshop today reminds us that, if we are to promote growth by strengthening the banking sector, the Basel Committee must act in a manner that benefits banks and their ultimate customers as well. We must recognise that fair and reasonable access to credit matters, not just because credit helps small businesses to grow, but more importantly because small businesses help the economy to grow. So we have taken seriously the need to ensure SMEs of continued favourable access to credit under the New Basel Accord. This afternoon I would like to share with you some of my and the Committee’s views on why the New Accord is necessary. I shall then illustrate how the proposals will bear positively on small business lending. I’ll conclude with an update on the status of our work, after which I look forward to a discussion on issues you may wish to raise. The goals of the New Basel Accord Let me begin with some thoughts on why we need a new capital accord. From the supervisor’s perspective, capital is the last line of defence in a bank. When risk management is not enough, when provisions are exhausted, capital is a bank’s last hope. But when capital fails, the bank itself fails. The age-old question has been determining how much capital is enough.

In this regard, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord was a milestone. For the first time, supervisors in the major banking markets agreed on a definition of capital and a minimum requirement. While we all recognise that these rules are not sophisticated, they are easy to apply, a fact proven by their ultimate adoption in over 100 countries. More importantly, they reversed a downward trend in internationally active banks’ capitalisation, thereby strengthening the soundness and stability of the international banking system and enhancing competitive equality among internationally active banks. However, in the years since 1988, the drawbacks of a simple approach to capital regulation have become more apparent. Advances in technology and telecommunications, innovation in banking products and services, and the increasing globalisation of financial markets have changed the way banks measure and manage risk. Today, the 1988 Accord no longer provides these banks - and their supervisors - with reliable measures of the actual risks they face. BIS Review 32/2003  1  In response, the Committee decided in the late 1990’s to refine the measures for assessing and managing risk. Rather than treating all loans to corporate borrowers the same way, for example, the New Accord will permit banks with less complex exposures to rely partly on external credit ratings when determining their capital requirements under the “standardised” approach to credit risk. In turn, more advanced banks will rely in part on their own internal assessments of a borrower’s credit risk under the “internal ratings-based” approach.
The first is that there are still strong demand headwinds pushing the natural rate down. These include fiscal tightening, weakness in the global economy, restoration of credit spreads to more sustainable levels and elevated risk aversion which remains as a hangover from the crisis. The second explanation is that as well as headwinds to demand, the trend real rate itself has fallen and that the natural rate is now varying around a lower trend rate. The analysis around the time of the crisis,  7  Williams, J. H. (1931): “The Monetary Doctrines of J. M. Keynes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 45(4), 547–587. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7  including that just described, tended to ascribe the low level of the natural rate to the size of the demand headwinds. Since then, we have learned to be more aware of the structural decline in the trend real rate. This would suggest that some of the low level of the natural rate is due not so much to demand headwinds pushing the rate away from the trend real rate but from the drop in the trend real rate itself. The stance of monetary policy relative to the natural rate remains the same of course. But in this view of the world, we can perhaps expect the natural rate to stay lower even as the headwinds abate.

$ q]Y&  4 8  83%8-3%78-#433734#3434%8384 373488! 847"834 4% $ 8 83%8-3%78-3834'7438%374%#%(8% %3"8# ##8"73%8"8%4 +45,467.7373#%7 3 "--=*. 388417434738%%848738%7 774  999847-83(8%-+,+)-,5-,?-9'%8 3%' (%833#87478#34 999#4 "--84%3#348#( 83     ). *,,.55.l78l
All these 5/8  BIS Central Banker's Speeches  proceedings are also meticulously minuted, with the intention that the Bank will one day release the minutes for transparency purposes, and for the benefit of the research community. Even after the formal institutionalisation of our conduct of monetary policy, continuous efforts were made in the years after to further strengthen our policy decision-making framework in face of the ever-challenging policy environment. For instance, the establishment of the Joint Policy Committee in 2010, which combines members from both the MPC and the Financial Stability Committee, was done in recognition of the need to have effective coordination of monetary and financial stability policies given their increasing interdependence. The year 2015 also marked another significant milestone for the Bank. We appointed for the first time two external members to our MPC, a progress that reflected the ongoing maturity and inclusiveness of the MPC as a decision-making committee. The inclusion of the external members has brought about additional diversity of views, and their relevant experiences have further enhanced the collective expertise of the MPC. It is important for us to outline the philosophy that underpins our policymaking. The first is pragmatism – the need to do the right thing without necessarily being dogmatic and rigid in approaches. Our monetary policy framework is not on inflation targeting, but one with primacy placed on the price stability mandate while giving due regards to developments in the economy. This was amply illustrated in the way that we managed the challenges in 2007 and 2008.

Indeed it has been argued that rising income inequality is a direct and unavoidable consequence of the advent of technological revolution and the expanding process of globalisation. Thus, in this new economy, one of the pressing challenges may come down to reconciling the benefactors of technology and globalisation with those who are excluded, with the intention of keeping inequality at bay. This brings me to the second paradox. Despite all the technological advancements that we have experienced in recent years, labour productivity has not risen in tandem. The world is now at the cusp of path-breaking and fundamental technological changes – in the area of artificial intelligence, bio-technology, advanced analytics or ‘Big Data’, and fintech, just to name a few. But at the same time, labour productivity has been anaemic in major economies since the global financial crisis, which in the US, is currently experiencing the longest run of declining worker productivity since the 1970s3. Tangible slowdown in productivity is also prevalent in many emerging economies since the global financial crisis. This is a disconcerting trend, as productivity growth is the bedrock of sustained improvements in standards of living and income. To borrow Paul Krugman’s quote, “productivity isn’t everything, but in the long-run it’s almost everything”. It’s a real challenge, to truly understand why this is happening.