samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A good scenario would be what policymakers and analysts call a “soft landing”, where growth slows down sufficiently to reduce inflation but the economy avoids recession. Given how high inflation has climbed and the degree of monetary policy tightening that may be necessary to bring inflation down, the pathway to achieve such a scenario is quite narrow. A more likely variant of a good scenario is a mild, short-lived technical recession that tames inflation and sets the stage for a sustained recovery in growth. A bad scenario is a deeper recession in some of the major economies even as inflation is brought down: a so-called “hard landing”. Such a scenario could occur if monetary policy tightening precipitates sharp dislocations in financial markets. In many countries, financial vulnerabilities have increased due to a run-up in private sector debt during the last ten years of highly accommodative monetary policies. Overvalued assets and high debt could magnify any growth slowdown. An ugly scenario would be one where growth stagnates while inflation remains high – stagflation. This could happen if fresh supply shocks or disruptions further boost inflation while monetary policy tightening sharply reduces economic activity. Stagflations are rare but when they occur, they present difficult policy dilemmas for governments and central banks. Economic growth in Singapore is expected to moderate further in 2023 in tandem with the slowdown in our major trading partners. The extent of the growth moderation will depend in part on how the scenarios for the global economy will pan out.

responsible wage settlements that help to restore workers’ purchasing power without setting off a wage-price spiral. The ongoing expansion in labour supply should provide some relief to labour market tightness. The relaxation of our border restrictions and resumption of foreign worker inflows should help to moderate labour cost pressures. To prevent a further build-up in labour cost pressures, it is important that the inflow of non-resident workers continues unimpeded. The risk of a wage-price spiral is contained for now but bears watching. A concern in several advanced economies with some degree of wage indexation is that wages and prices start chasing each other and inflation gets worse and more entrenched. If real wages increase faster than real productivity, the increase in unit labour costs will lead to firms raising prices to protect their margins, setting off a second round of wage increases and a wage-price spiral. Automatic wage indexation is rare in Singapore and the pass-through from prices to wages has been historically weak. Nonetheless, the risk of a wage-price spiral cannot be discounted, especially in the context of a tight labour market and high inflation. To contain the risk of a wage-price spiral, it is important that real wage growth not exceed real productivity growth persistently and firms do not pass on in prices the full impact of wage cost increases. MANAGING DEBT AMID RISING INTEREST RATES  One of the key challenges posed by the combination of rising prices and rising interest rates is the burden imposed on debt servicing.
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14  0  Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research Global and Bank calculations. (a) Changes in assets under management may partly reflect changes in sample coverage. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 5 UK life insurance liabilities by type(a)  Chart 6 Change in equity allocation of US and French life insurers over time(a) 40  £ billion  Non-profit non-linked  1400  With-profit  1200  Unit-linked  91  94  97  00  03  06  09  12  6 4  800  10  2  600  0  200 88  30  8  20  1000  400  85  8Q cumulative change to equity allocation, percentage points  Smoothed annual growth, per cent  0  96  99  02  05  -10 -20 -30  08  11  0 -2  US (right-hand scale) France (right-hand scale) S&P 500 (left-hand scale)  -4 -6  (a) Technical reserves net of reinsurance  Source: National flow of funds  Source: S&P SynThesys (regulatory returns) and Bank calculations. (a) The 8Q cumulative change to equity allocation is calculated using an 8 quarter moving-sum. Reallocation into equities is calculated as the difference between the allocation in equities at time t and allocation into equities at time t-1, measured in percentage points.

From this point of view, I welcome the six very important recommendation issued in April directed to supervisors, central banks and the financial sector: i) integrating climate-related risks into financial stability monitoring and supervision; ii) integrating sustainability factors into own-portfolio management; iii) bridging the data gaps ; iv) building awareness and intellectual capacity and encouraging technical assistance and knowledge sharing ; achieving robust and intentionally consistent climate and environment related disclosure ; vi) supporting the development of a taxonomy of economic activities. In the longer-run, when there will be a global convergence about the necessity to issue global standards and regulatory requirements, global standard setter such as the BCBS and FSB would need to take the lead on addressing climate change-related risks.12 1 Main  findings : Climate change: which risks for banks and insurers? acpr.banquefrance.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/as_cover_note_en.pdf Analysis and synthesis no. 102: “French insurers facing climate change risks” April 2019 acpr.banquefrance.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/as_102_climate_change_insurers_en.pdf  2 Analysis and synthesis no. 101, “French banking groups facing climate change-related risks”, April  2019acpr.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/medias/documents/as_101_climate_risk_banks_en.pdf  2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
I want to emphasise this last point. Some commentary that I have seen has suggested that in addressing market disorder the MPC somehow broadened its objectives and used a monetary policy tool for financial stability purposes. I don’t see it like that at all. The MPC took action in pursuit of its objectives, because further market dysfunction triggered by the Covid shock would have led to even worse outcomes for GDP and inflation. Their action had the welcome side effect of supporting financial stability, but it was taken for monetary policy purposes. Indeed it is quite possible to imagine other circumstances where the MPC would Joyce, M, Tong, M and Woods, R (2011), “The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2011 Q3 20 In his 2016 speech “The spectre of monetarism”. 19  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10  not act to quell market disorder, if doing so would run counter to rather than in support of monetary stability. It’s for exactly this reason that the work I mentioned earlier, on whether central banks need new tools to deal directly with market dysfunction, is so important. QE and government financing One aspect of QE that has received particularly close attention has been its relationship to the Government’s finances. Specifically, some commentators have raised the question of whether, by buying government bonds at a time when the Government deficit is expanding, the Bank is somehow financing government spending.

Gent Sejko: Address - Assembly of the Republic of Albania Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, to the Assembly of the Republic of Albania presenting the Annual Report of the Bank of Albania for 2022, Tirana, 6 July 2023. *** Honourable Speaker, Honourable Members of Parliament, Allow me to start this communication by stating that the Bank of Albania adheres to an open and transparent communication with the Parliament of the Republic of Albania. This communication is important as it ensures the BoA's accountability and responsibility as well as the improvement of the process for compiling and implementing the economic policies through the establishment of a common vision on the challenges ahead and the best ways and instruments for addressing them. Dear ladies and gentlemen, A series of frequent, complex and unprecedented shocks have battered the Albania economy in recent years. After the 2019 earthquake and the pandemic in 2020 and 2021, we faced the economic and financial lingering consequences triggered by the Russia's invasion of Ukraine over 2022. This aggression caused a sharp surge in food, oil and energy prices across global markets, heightened uncertainty amid economic and financial agents, as well as an increase in the overall financing costs both in Albania and globally. The new economic and geopolitical reality tested the sustainability of the economic and financial equilibriums of Albania, posed serious challenges to the Albanian enterprises and households, and called for the fast and coordinated reactions from public authorities.
There is no doubt that this global crisis will affect Chile, and it will do so through various channels. Firstly, regarding the effects from abroad, it will cause a considerable drop in trade flows. This year, the world economy is projected to suffer a recession, combining drops in activity in the developed world with weak expansion in China. In this scenario, it is worth mentioning a contraction in the United States, where 2  preliminary labor market figures point to a major impact on the economy. In the Eurozone, the already low dynamism of its main economies (i.e. Germany, France, and Italy) and an already complex banking system situation, pose major challenges for stimulus policies. China will grow this year by 3%, its lowest since 1990, with important repercussions in the rest of the world, both because of its integration in the value chains and because of its weight in the trade of some countries, including Chile. The impact on trade is compounded by the negative impact on income as a result of falling commodity prices (Figure 4). Especially relevant for Chile is the drop in the copper price, which approached USD 2 per pound during March, and the forecast for this year is an average of USD 2.15 per pound. This negative effect will be largely offset by the lower oil price, which dropped to levels between USD 20 to 30 per barrel in March. Hence, the terms of trade deterioration should be less than 1% in 2020.

60  60  40  40  20  20  0  0 Will drop significantly  Will drop slightly  Will not change  Source: Business survey, Central Bank of Chile. 11  Will increase slightly  Figure 7 National unemployment rates and extended measures (2)  Total employment (1) (contribution to annual change, percentage points)  4  4  Self-employed  Salaried informal 3  Total employment  3 2  (percent)  20  10 Potential rate( 4)  18  2  Unemploy't rate (right axis)  16 1  1  0  0 Salaried formal  -1  -1  9  8  14  7  12  Labor pressure rate 6 (3)  Other -2  -2 10 18 Sep.  19 19  19 May  19 Sep.  20  5 14  15  16  17  18  19  20  (1) First quarter 2020 uses information up until the moving quarter ending in January. Salaried formal comprises dependent workers with access to social security, i.e. health-care and pension fund associated to their employment. Salaried informal are dependent workers with no simultaneous access to social security or is not guaranteed by the employer. Others correspond to employers, and non-remunerated family services or household help. (2) Considers information up to the moving quarter ending in February.
It is no longer really about protecting depositors, as the vast majority are wholly protected by the insurance scheme. From a micro perspective, it is essentially about minimising risks to, and losses at, the deposit insurer, the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Second, it also potentially alters the dynamics of the market place. It makes it easier for banks to pay up for deposits; the signal that a bank will take greater risk than otherwise, as it would have to, does not matter to the depositors. They are covered, and so simply enjoy the higher returns on their deposits. If the bank succeeds, the rewards are reaped by shareholders and management; if it fails, retail creditors get repaid in full. This doesn’t feel like a stable regime. And it is worth remembering that President Roosevelt seriously hesitated before introducing the equivalent FDIC scheme in the US in the 1930s for precisely that reason. One way of addressing these risks – and the approach eventually being tried in the US – would be to make such risk-taking banks pay a higher levy into the insurance scheme. Riskbased premia would help to offset the incentives otherwise created. And, of course, any such insurance scheme must be pre-funded; it is no good trying to collect levies from riskier banks after they have gone bust. That is why the Bank has advocated this course.

But many of these e-wallet solutions are currently caught under two separate pieces of regulation in Singapore. MAS will streamline the licensing of payments services under a single, activity-based modular framework. This means: holding just one licence to conduct different kinds of payment activities; meeting only those regulations pertinent to the specific payments activities they undertake, rather than the full gamut of payments regulations; adhering to common standards for consumer protection and cyber security. Guidelines to Promote Secure Cloud Computing There used to be a view within some quarters that “MAS does not like the cloud”. Lest there be any lingering doubt, let me reiterate: MAS has no objections to FIs using the cloud. Cloud computing provides economies of scale, enhances operational efficiencies, and delivers potential cost savings. In fact, a secure cloud infrastructure is an enabler for a variety of FinTech innovations, including banking-as-a-service (BaaS) platforms. To put its money where its mouth is, MAS set out earlier this year specific guidelines on the use of cloud services by FIs. FIs are free to adopt private clouds, public clouds, or a combination of these to create hybrid clouds. But some of the distinguishing features of clouds – such as multi-tenancy, data commingling, and processing in multiple locations – can potentially pose issues for data confidentiality and recoverability. And so we expect FIs to conduct the necessary due diligence and apply sound governance and risk management practices to address potential vulnerabilities.
Jacqueline Loh: Implementation of the FX Global Code Keynote speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 13th FX Week Asian Conference, Singapore, 23 August 2017. * * * Eva Szalay, Editor, FX Week, Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for inviting me to join you at the 13th FX Week Asia Conference. I am very happy to join you today. The foreign exchange or FX market – which all of you are participants in – is the largest and most liquid of financial markets globally. It has grown remarkably over the past few decades. Between 1995 and 2016, a 21-year period, global FX turnover rose from $ trillion to $ trillion per day, according to the BIS Triennial FX Survey, representing a compound annual growth rate of more than 7%1. Its importance extends beyond financial markets and participants, and is reflected in how it supports the real economy, forming the backbone of international trade, and cross-border investments. Looking back, while we have seen healthy growth in volumes, the same cannot be said of conduct. The misconduct that has come to light in recent years, has eroded trust in the FX market. Looking ahead, for the FX market to continue to grow in a sustainable manner to support economic growth, guiding behaviour in the FX market and anchoring strong culture within firms through good market practice will be key.

Their solutions, however, undermine the liberal market democratic system that has brought about prosperity. The appropriate solution to many of our problems consists of returning power from the state to the community. Communities should be able to develop policies to address their own needs. This makes them less receptive to populist solutions. Raghu’s view reminds me of the political system in Switzerland. Here, political decisions are taken at the lowest possible level of governance, closest to the people concerned. This decentralisation fosters citizens’ engagement in their communities. Today, Raghu will speak about an issue that is more narrow in scope, but which is of great importance to central banks, not least to the Swiss National Bank. His speech is about the spillovers of monetary policy beyond a country’s border. This topic has attracted a lot of attention in the past few years following QE and other unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by central banks. Who better to speak to us on this subject than Raghu with his profound knowledge of capital markets and his experience as the central bank governor of a country highly exposed to monetary policy decisions taken elsewhere? Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Raghuram Rajan with a big round of applause. Page 4/4
Woodford, Michael (2007), “The Case for Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall 2007. Woodford, Michael (2010a), “Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis”, working paper, Columbia University, www.columbia.edu/~mw2230. Woodford, Michael (2010b), “Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability,” in progress. 6  BIS Review 118/2010

Productivity gaps between regions and between large and small firms point to regulatory fragmentation which still needs to be addressed. To enhance productivity, measures to increase the scale of small firms in the SME sector, which tend to be smaller than in peer countries, need to be pursued. More attention needs to be placed on the education system and professional training to enhance human capital and reduce skills mismatches. Finally, greater investment in R&D and innovation by Spanish firms would enhance their competitiveness and contribute to generate more growth through higher value added. Only by raising productivity and correcting macroeconomic imbalances can the long-term growth potential of the Spanish economy rise. This is a condition to place Spain on a solid growth path, increase employment and raise wages to finally leave behind the financial crisis that erupted ten years ago. Let me conclude. The importance of increasing long-term growth potential is true for Spain as it is for the whole euro area. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  At the same time, I cannot emphasise enough that a robust euro area economy has to rely on sound economic governance. Solidifying the institutional architecture of EMU is essential at this juncture in order to foster cohesive economic performance without fragmentation or excessive imbalances. Reforms at the national and EU level are needed to uphold a stable financial system and a resilient monetary union.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 1 World growth (*) (anual change, percent) 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15  80  84  88  92  96  00  04  15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15  08  World at market exchange rate  Chile  (*) Gray area denotes forecast published in the December's Monetary Policy Report. For Chile, considers the midpoint of the projected growth range in 2011. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and IMF. Figure 2 Inflation indicators (annual change, percent) 12  12  9  9  6  6  3  3  0  0  -3  -3  06 CPI  07  08  CPIX  CPIX1  09  10  CPI excluding foodstuffs and energy  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3 Inflation by components (annual change, percent) 60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  -10  -10  -20  -20  -30  -30  -40  -40 05  06  Electricity  07 Fuels  08  09  Foodstuffs  10 CPI  CPIX1  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau.

Macroeconomic stability was preserved and performance of the Chilean economy was much better than in previous world recessions (figure 1). Also, the financial system endured the global financial crisis with no setbacks, no systemically important financial institutions experienced major stress, and macroeconomic policies set the stage for the healthy recovery we are witnessing now. The macroeconomic framework of the Chilean economy was very important in attaining these results. This framework rests on four pillars. First, monetary policy management is based on a flexible inflation-targeting regime, conducted by an autonomous central bank and supported by a floating exchange rate system. The inflation targeting scheme considers a 3% annual inflation target, with a two-year horizon to correct deviations and a ±1 percentage point tolerance range. 1 The floating exchange rate regime includes the possibility of intervening in the foreign exchange market under exceptional circumstances, which has happened four times since September 1999. Second, a fiscal policy that is accountable and predictable thanks to a structural balance rule. 2 The significant amount of savings accumulated during the run-up of copper prices was a crucial factor in bolstering the resilience of the Chilean economy and in providing a countercyclical fiscal boost. Third, a high degree of commercial and financial integration with the rest of the world.
In just a few years, many new electronic services and gadgets have become natural parts of our lives. This has also influenced how we execute payments. Payments via Internet banking, mobile banking and card payments over the Internet have become the norm. Paperbased instruments such as cheques and mail giros have become less important. Norway is a good example of the transition from a paper-based to an electronically-based payment system. Only twenty years ago, 90 per cent of payments from deposit accounts were made using paper-based instruments such as cheques and paper giros. Today, more than 95 per cent of such payments are made electronically, mostly via payment cards and Internet banking. The first results from Norges Bank’s cost survey were published today. The survey estimates the social costs of using and producing payment services in Norway to around 11 billion kroner, or just under half a per cent of GDP. This estimate covers payment activities by banks, subcontractors, the central bank, households and merchants. The estimate for Norway is quite low in an international context, although estimation methods may vary. How we organise our payment system has consequences beyond the system. Direct debiting and electronic invoicing will, for example, involve substantial savings for businesses. Thus the potential savings for banks and the rest of society of moving towards more efficient payment systems are considerable. Payment cards and Internet banking have not only replaced cheques and mail giros, they have also contributed to a reduction in the use of cash.

Estimates from our recent survey indicate a sharp drop in the use of cash over the last 15 years. Estimates of the exact level of cash use vary according to data sources and methodology. However, it is fair to say that cash is still an important means of payment. Notes and coins will also remain important as symbols of money. I believe that there have been two very important factors behind the rapid transition to electronic payment services in Norway. Banks have cooperated on standards and payments infrastructure while competing on the supply of services, and banks have charged for the use of payment services. Prices that reflect relative differences in production costs encourage users to choose the most cost-effective services. Research (by Humphrey, Kim and Vale) has shown that a  BIS Review 140/2008  1  relatively high price per transaction for paper-based payment services and a low price for electronic payment services have accelerated the trend towards an increasing share of electronic transactions. Without incentives for consumers or merchants to move to more efficient instruments, banks and other payment service providers will more likely be left trying to improve on old solutions. Payment systems are networks for the exchange of values between payers on the one hand and beneficiaries on the other. In two-sided markets like this, the benefit to existing users increases when new users join up.