samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
39  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  39  Annex  Chart 1: Level of real GDP in the Great Recession and Great Depression US  UK Index, Year 0 = 100  Index, Year 0 = 100  140  140  130  130  120 110  120  100  110  90 80  100  70 60 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  90 0  1  2  Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929) Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Germany  France Index, Year 0 = 100  0  1  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929)  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929) Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Index, Year 0 = 100  150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60  140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70  0  1  2  60 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Years from start of crisis Great Depression (Year 0 = 1929) Great Recession (Year 0 = 2007) Continuation of pre-crisis trend (1998-07)  Sources: ONS, Bank of England ‘Millennium of Data’ (2017), IMF WEO, Maddison Historical GDP Data and Bank calculations.

The motivations of the business community to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility are numerous. •  Firstly, investment by the business community in the promotion of social goods such as education and health can have a direct impact on the productivity of the community and profitability of the private sector. This contributes to the physical and mental health of the company’s employees, hence enhances social and human capital. •  Secondly, the sensitivity of a firm to the concerns of a society can contribute positively to its reputation and the acceptability of its products. •  Thirdly, beyond improving the customer-company relationship, Corporate Social Responsibility can foster harmonious relationships between various stakeholders in a society. BIS Review 28/2006  1  •  Lastly, it is acknowledged that a stable environment is generally good for business. Ladies and Gentlemen, institutions such as the Bank of Zambia is no exception in this respect. The core function of the Bank of Zambia is “to formulate and implement monetary and supervisory policies that ensure price and financial stability.” The overall objective of this is to contribute to the attainment of a stable macroeconomic environment i.e. low and stable prices, low and positive interest rates, stable exchange rate, stable financial system as well as fiscal prudence so that the private sector can flourish. Many of you will agree with me that since 2002, Zambia’s macroeconomic indicators have generally been improving.
Karolina Ekholm: Do global imbalances pose a risk to the Swedish economy? Speech by Ms Karolina Ekholm, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Stockholm, 13 June 2011. *  *  *  The views expressed in this speech are my own and are not necessarily shared by the other members of the Riksbank’s Executive Board or the staff of the Riksbank. I would like to thank Hanna Armelius for all her help in writing this speech. Financial crises often come as a surprise. After the event, however, it may be a simple matter to look back and see all the flashing warning lights that should have signalled that things were about to go seriously wrong. I do not think many people realised how vulnerable the global financial system really was before the latest crisis, and consequently this crisis came as a surprise too. However, there were people who did see warning lights flashing. The problem was that they appeared to be flashing for a different type of crisis than the one that eventually arrived. What we expected to arrive was an international crisis triggered by a collapse in the real value of the dollar. 1 The warning lights began flashing due to the major global imbalances arising from the fact that that some countries, above all the United States, had substantial and persistent current account deficits while others, for example China, had substantial and persistent current account surpluses.

Apart from the fact that this would reduce the risk of a new international crisis, it would mean that a larger part of global demand would come from those countries that currently have a surplus, for example China, and a smaller part from the United States. It is difficult to know, however, what impact this would have on the demand for Swedish export goods. To the extent that Chinese households and companies demand different types of goods than households and companies in the United States, this largely depends on whether Swedish companies are flexible enough to adapt their production to meet changes in the pattern of demand. The Asian countries that have surpluses are a long way from Sweden and geo-graphical distance is a factor that has a clear negative link to the propensity of countries to trade with each other. 26 However, there are countries with substantial surpluses that are close to Sweden, for example Germany. It is therefore not obvious what the overall impact would be on the demand for Swedish exports if there was a general reduction in current account surpluses and deficits. It is also conceivable that the United States would import more investment goods if its current account deficit decreased, as this would probably entail an expansion of the export-oriented industrial sector at the expense of the more domestically-oriented service sector. This in turn would entail an increased demand for the type of industrial goods that Sweden exports quite a lot of.
Today over half of the Swedish population have downloaded the fast payments app (Swish) on their smart phone and it has become a prominent feature in the retail payment landscape, providing a substitute for cash in person to person (P2P) payments. Cards and cash are the most common payment methods among consumers  Source: Sveriges riksbank. These two examples shows that a central bank may need to be both “hands off” and “hands on” depending on the situation to foster innovation. The trick is to find the right degree of intervention at the right time. And to perform that trick there are no short cuts. A thorough analysis of costs and benefits is needed. 3 [4]  Another lesson is that in the wake of such fundamental changes, like the one currently transforming the Swedish retail payments market, new questions keep arising. With change, there will be winners and losers. In this case the winners are the Swedes who have adapted to electronic payment means. Losers are the ones who want, or for some reason need, to keep on using cash and who increasingly find themselves in a world where access to cash, and acceptance of cash, are on the decline. This creates a new challenge for society. This change needs to be managed. For a central banker, the transformation of the retail payments market also implies a more fundamental question. If cash basically disappears, then the general public will lose access to central bank money – they will only have access to commercial bank money.

Moreover, in the ten years that have passed since the introduction of the new regime, average inflation has been very close to our target. At the same time, growth has been higher than in previous decades. Prospective inflation has also been remarkably stable for the past 6-7 years despite periods of rather large transitory fluctuations in actual inflation. The stable inflation expectations have been particularly important for wage negotiations, which have been able to proceed against a completely different, more secure background than during the 1970s and 1980s. When we conduct monetary policy, we do so on the basis of forecasts of inflation for primarily the coming 1-2 years. The reason we work with this time perspective is that the effects of our actions are exerted mainly during this horizon. When our forecasts indicate that inflation in the relevant time horizon will be above target, there is normally reason to raise the repo rate, and vice versa. Particularly when it comes to debate situations such as that we have been involved in recently, it feels secure to gain a foothold in the clear framework that we have developed for our work in the past ten years. Although we do not mechanically set the repo rate in relation to our inflation forecasts, everyone that is interested in our work methods knows that our forecasts play a decisive role for our actions. Permit me now therefore to move on and say something about my current views on inflation perspectives before I comment on monetary policy.
On the contrary, they should assert their ascendancy over it through strict financial management. 2. Finance should not dominate the economy, it should serve it. i)  Reasserting the importance of regulation and supervision:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  The period from the 1990s to the start of the 2000s is sometimes called “The Great Moderation” because inflation remained stable at moderate levels and growth appeared solid and sustainable. In reality, however, the period saw frequent buildups of financial excesses. These excesses led to the crisis, and they were firmly rooted in the dogma of self-regulation – a dogma which was itself fostered by the belief that financial markets were somehow sacred and inherently “efficient”, capable of setting “real” prices. •  The crisis completely discredited this theory. From the first sparks of turmoil, the lack of transparency in certain segments of the market – notably CDOs – significantly exacerbated the loss of confidence. Financial institutions had insufficient capital cushions to absorb the shocks, leading to bankruptcies and forcing the government to bail them out, a process that was extremely costly for public finances, but also very damaging to financial sector accountability, as at times it meant bank losses were “socialised” whereas previously their profits had been “privatised”. This is the problem of moral hazard, a subject which will no doubt come up over the course of this session.

The conditions for opening up that access are rapidly being created in the wake of the Second Review of the IMF programme, as is witnessed by the development of the credit default swap spread of the Icelandic sovereign and the fact that the rating outlook has improved. But what about the pension funds? They were hit very badly, of course, as their equity stakes in the fallen banks became worthless overnight, the value of bank bonds collapsed, and asset prices of all kinds tumbled. The result was that the real rate of return on the funds was negative to the tune of 22% in 2008, and their assets as a share of GDP fell from 134% in 2007 to 119% last year. But let us remember that part of this is a correction. The asset values of the boom and the associated rates of return on pension funds, as well as banks, had a significant element of froth. To some extent, they were never real. 4  BIS Review 63/2010  We always knew that this kind of shock was the major risk facing fully funded pension systems. But the system is still here. It took a hit, but it withstood the shock. So my basic belief in the strengths of the Icelandic pension system and similar systems around the world is still intact. But that is provided that we learn the lessons of the financial crisis and make it a once-in-a-lifetime event. We need to learn the lessons on incentives and risk management.
China is the factory of the world, while India is the back office of the world. The rise of these economies is in fact putting pressure on Europe and Mexico, which we worried about as competitors ten years ago. ASEAN must once again band together to maximise our strengths. Our fundamentals are strong, and can be further exploited. First, ASEAN has a large market, with a population of 560 million and a combined GDP of $ billion, which is comparable to China?s coastal region. Second, we have an abundant supply of skilled labour ? young, eager to learn, and with a good attitude towards work. Third, ASEAN has a good track record in welcoming trade and foreign investments. We have always  BIS Review 20/2004  1  been outward-looking, and our belief in free and open trade is reflected in the multitude of FTAs that we are currently pursuing. The new ASEAN members have not progressed as far as the original ASEAN members in economic development and liberalisation, but they too are moving, and their rich human and natural resources and lower costs are key advantages that will fuel their economies. We must also remember that although the competition seems formidable, international competition is not a zero-sum game. ASEAN can benefit tremendously from the rise of our large neighbours by trading with them, investing in them, and attracting investments and tourists from them. But it means working smart, co-operating with China and India, and complementing their activities. It also means further integrating our economies.

Forging ahead Bilaterally, individual ASEAN countries are already increasing their economic links with China and India. But we should complement these individual efforts with combined ones, either several ASEAN countries which are ready proceeding first, or the whole of ASEAN working together as a group. We are negotiating an FTA with China, and targeting to conclude the goods chapter by middle of this year. By 2010, we should have an FTA between China and the original six ASEAN countries. By 2015, all ten ASEAN members will be included. India is also negotiating to establish an FTA with ASEAN by 2011. Japan, which has been a key investor in ASEAN, has also proposed a Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which both sides are now working on. The US, too, has announced the Enterprise ASEAN Initiative, under which it will pursue various agreements with ASEAN countries, taking into account their respective progress in economic liberalization. So we are strengthening our linkages with all our key trading partners. Last October, the Leaders committed to an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020. This is an ambitious vision which will see the creation a single market for goods, services, capital and talent in ASEAN. But 2020 is a long time from now, and we must make progress long before this deadline. Beyond trade in goods, ASEAN needs to step up its integration in other areas. For example, much work remains to be done in forging common investment rules, and in liberalising and integrating the services sectors.
The committee is chaired by the Chief Executive of the HKMA and comprises members coming from multiple functions including monetary management, banking supervision, research and macro surveillance. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  6. Some commentators have criticised the HKMA’s macroprudential measures as being ineffective because they have not been able to arrest the rising trend of property prices. This is a misunderstanding of the objective of the HKMA’s macroprudential measures. The objective of the HKMA’s measures is not to tame property prices. Instead, they are aimed at strengthening the risk management of banks and thus safeguarding long-term banking stability. In this regard, it is worth noting that the average LTV ratio of new residential mortgage loans has been consistently lower than 60% while the average debt servicing ratio of new mortgages has been consistently lower than 40%, suggesting that the banking system has built in buffer to safeguard its resilience. 7. Competition dynamics: Mortgage products in Hong Kong are homogeneous, in the sense that from the mortgagor’s perspective it makes little difference which bank is offering the mortgage facility. There is therefore a strong tendency for banks to compete for market share by lowering their underwriting standards. With the macroprudential measures in place, however, banks can compete for mortgage business only in terms of pricing (e.g. mortgage rate). Against a backdrop of rising property prices and a consistently low delinquency rate of mortgage loans, many banks tried to outcompete their peers by pushing down the mortgage rate to record low levels.

First, the spending decisions of the older age cohorts are less likely to be easily stimulated by monetary policy. That is because such age groups tend to spend less of their incomes on consumer durables and housing. Second, as the population ages and the number of retirees climbs, the costs associated with Social Security, government pensions, and healthcare retirement benefits increase. This creates budgetary pressure and leads to a choice of raising revenue to fund these costs, cutting other government programs, or cutting benefits. Now if this all had been fully anticipated by retirees and near-retirees, then this would already be factored into their spending and saving decisions. But, I doubt that this has been the case. I suspect that many have been surprised by the swift change in economic circumstances as the housing boom went bust. I doubt that many fully anticipated the budget crunch and the prospect that their future retiree and healthcare benefits would likely be curbed or their taxes would have to rise in the future. When households begin to anticipate this, they reduce their assessment of their sustainable living standards. This downward reassessment then feeds back to current spending and saving decisions. A fourth reason why the recovery has been slower than expected may be that we overestimated the capacity for fiscal policy to continue to provide support to growth until a vigorous recovery was achieved.
On the methodological side, it is quite obvious that imposing caps in ratings based on the sovereign is equivalent to constraining the results of whatever quantitative models rating agencies use. This is arbitrary and reduces the information conveyed by the ratings while leading to severe pricing distortions in assets across countries. Investors in capped securities will require a premium over similar but higher-rated securities while other investors are limited by regulation in their incentives to buy poorly rated securities. Additionally, it should be mentioned that ABS originated in countries under stress have performed considerably well even during the crisis. Indeed, ABS default rates have remained low in these countries and at levels comparable to non‐stressed jurisdictions (including the US). Thus, unless clients and regulators have (also) access to ratings without the cap, there should be minimal regulatory reliance on the ratings. In any case, additional transparency on loans, the existence of reliable credit registers or credit score systems should be mentioned as instruments to help market participants understanding better the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  European ABS risk profile. Additionally, such information could even support entrants into the business of assessing credit risk, which currently lacks competition. Whereas the policy conclusions are often hard to come about, one thing seems clear: Europe must avoid ending up with zombie banks as well as with zombie firms. Zombie banks and zombie firms have never been a characterization of a well-functioning financial system and economy.

If the problem is supply we know for sure one thing: fewer firms will have access to credit, some will be in trouble and will fail due to this fact; after many of these firms fail one can naturally state that there is no demand for credit. That is why it is so important to take care of supply problems. In doing so, policy mistakes should be avoided. It would be a mistake to simply state that a major policy target is to restart funding. That would be relatively easy to achieve, by the way: by funding expensive projects with public funds, independently of their quality. It would also be a mistake to try to boost artificially any specific financial instrument. Instead, the route towards a better financial system is one characterized by a level playing field for all types of finance, with specific choices left to borrowers and savers. The tax system should also not discriminate, i.e., it should treat symmetrically equity and debt, so that firms decide on the funding source regardless of the tax advantage of one over the other. Creating this level playing field will most likely lead to a more balanced and diversified financial system, i.e., with more options for savers and borrowers. This competitive environment is key to maintaining financial markets in constant improvement, characterized by innovation that responds to the insufficiencies of the existing instruments. Ideally, restrictions to the development of any type of finance should always be clearly justified on efficiency grounds.
Like the SSM, the SRM is based on a common regulatory framework (the BRRD Directive and the SRM regulation), and is structured around a Single Resolution Board and joint resolution teams. Although the SSM and the SRM have both been successful in managing the first bank liquidations or resolutions (i.e. those concerning the Veneto banks and Banco Popular), the second pillar still has to be finalised. Achieving this goal is essential, both to prevent the contagion of banking crises and to ensure the continuity of critical banking functions. In this regard, France has worked hard for the creation of a common backstop, the main features of which were decided just a few months ago. Three issues still need to be addressed however: the duration of the credit lines provided by the backstop; the creation of a rapid decision-making process in the event of an emergency; and the provision of liquidity to banks in resolution. Once these matters have been resolved, we can hope, and at the Banque de France it is our firm belief, that a pragmatic compromise can be found on the third pillar – the deposit guarantee scheme. c. … and building a Capital Markets Union to create a true Financing Union Evidently, financial integration is not just about achieving banking union. Ensuring the balanced and sustainable financing of the economy also implies deeper integration of capital markets, which fosters greater geographical diversification in savings and meets corporate firms’ financing needs – notably equity financing.

Another way to promote creativity is to create a facilitative environment for public private partnerships provides the best prospects to drive innovative strategies. With advances in technology, the scope and potential for such partnerships have increased exponentially. We see this in partnerships between mobile network providers and financial institutions in sharing data which can increase financial inclusion among borrowers that do not have a prior credit history. Partnerships that leverage on e-marketplaces and social media platforms also have enormous potential to increase the reach and development impact through the deployment of innovative strategies. Enhance corporate governance For many institutions, the ability to significantly increase their impact is closely tied to issues of corporate governance. Narrowly defined financing targets and links between business and Government have led to suboptimal resource allocations, increased moral hazard, and market 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  distortions. These can pose a drag on the economy and the overall development agenda. Broader confidence can also take a hit on suspicion of undue preference in extending financing, making it more difficult to mobilise resources for development. The critical appraisal and monitoring functions are largely shaped by the strength of its corporate governance. These require competent and professional boards to be installed, clear rules of engagement with their stakeholders, and stronger performance management standards that are aligned with development outcomes.