samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the afternoon we will feature Sujit Kapadia and Prasanna Gai with an analysis of financial contagion using a network model. In addition, there will be two panels that will review financial risk management with two important nuances: its incidence in emerging economies on one hand, and on systemically significant financial institutions, on the other. The economists invited to these panels include Michael Bordo, Paul McCulley, Martín Redrado, José Darío Uribe, Martin Wolf and Roberto Zahler. Finally, Charles Calomiris will share with us his vision on the current crisis and the implications of the works presented in this conference. Two intense days that hold in store enormous technical content that, without any doubt, will make a fundamental contribution to our future view of macroeconomic and financial phenomena. I want to finish by thanking Rodrigo Alfaro, Dale Gray and Jorge Selaive for their work in putting together this conference. Also Mauricio Calani, Mónica Correa and Soledad Gallardo, and our Institutional Affairs Management for their help in organizing this event. I also want to thank the many authors and discussants of the papers for their dedication to preparing their valuable presentations. To all of you, dear participants, I wish you two days of fruitful discussion. Thank you. BIS Review 134/2008  3

Research done here at the New York Fed documents this for the nation and New York.1 The preponderance of transformational “new job” creation may have reflected the fact that the recessions of 1990–91 and 2001 were relatively shallow. In addition, employers may be more likely to use recessions as an opportunity to make their operations more efficient. For example, employers are less likely to use temporary layoffs when they reduce staff during downturns and more likely to use temporary service agencies or outsource part of their operations when they need to expand. So far, the current recession does not follow the pattern of the last two downturns. In New York and New Jersey as well as the nation, job creation during the recovery has been fairly evenly balanced between new jobs and old jobs – instead of heavily weighted toward new jobs as in the past two recessions. If this pattern holds, the recovery process could have a higher share of unemployed workers returning to jobs similar to those they left during the downturn. That could be promising for the adjustment process when the recovery gathers strength. There is some variation within the region, though, and the areas with a higher preponderance of new jobs are undergoing more rapid transformations that could position them well for growth going forward. As a result, these areas could face a particularly strong need to retrain and educate their workers.
Pablo Hernández de Cos: Remittance flows and their effects on Latin American macroeconomic and financial stability during the COVID-19 crisis Introductory remarks by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to the virtual seminar on “Remittance flows and their effects on Latin American macroeconomic and financial stability during the COVID-19 crisis”, organized by the Fondo Latinoamericano de Reservas (FLAR) and the Bank of Spain, webinar, 27 July 2021. * * * Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me first thank FLAR (the Latin American Reserve Fund) and its president, José Darío Uribe, for the opportunity of jointly organising this webinar with the Banco de España. It will be the first of many and marks the start of close collaboration between both institutions, formalised in a memorandum of understanding in December 2020. The close economic and financial ties between Latin America and Spain are widely known. The interest of the Banco de España in the region has grown, as you know, owing to the internationalisation of Spanish banks since the early 1990s, largely directed towards Latin America. In this process, the region has taken on great significance for the Spanish banking system. Indeed, Spanish banks’ exposures to Latin America account, on pre-pandemic data, for almost one-fifth of the system’s total exposures, and for almost 30% of exposures outside Spain.

The global economic recovery might also be delayed reaching the region, increasing the likelihood that the crisis may cause more persistent economic effects. Despite this difficult situation, remittances have proven pandemic-proof1 and have behaved countercyclically in most of the region’s countries, assuming a more important role as a source of external financing. This subject is crucial to Spain, since it is the second-ranked issuer country of remittances to Latin America. Some of the topics we will address today (such as the growing importance of digital money remittances, the role of fiscal stimulus measures in the resilience of remittances and the function of the informal economy) are key to understanding the behaviour of the flow of remittances in this crisis. Undoubtedly, today’s event will allow us to better understand these developments and – I hope – 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  to draw some useful conclusions on how to tackle them from the central bank standpoint. Thank you for your attention. Remittances barely fell by 1.6% in 2020, compared with their 4.8% decline during the 2008 financial crisis. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
But in any case, trust will not be rebuilt if we start by unravelling the existing rules. Second, we have seen during the crisis that, without monetary policy instruments at the national level, fiscal policies can become overwhelmed if country-specific shocks are very large and not well catered for by the shock-absorbing capacity of the economy and the financial sector. Action can and should be taken to reduce the probability and size of such large shocks. The banking union, with its Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism and the new bail-in rules, goes a long way in this direction, provided that all these elements are implemented in a resolute and consistent way. But we cannot responsibly assume that the euro area will from now on be immune to crises. The Five Presidents’ Report therefore calls for the creation of a shock-absorption capacity at the euro area level to complement the automatic stabilisers of Member States. And last but not least, there is ample scope for euro area countries to better absorb shocks internally, by having suitably resilient economies. Additionally, we need to improve and strengthen labour mobility and risk-sharing via financial markets. This is another reason why completing the banking union, and why complementing it with a capital markets union with substantial cross-border equity links, is so important. And this also reminds us of the importance of preserving labour mobility from the temptation of raising new fences.

In these circumstances, had we allowed the exchange rate to adjust to market pressures within the 15 per cent band, the currency would have appreciated. 5. You seem to be playing down the efficacy of the fiscal deficit and of exchange rate adjustment as a means of jump starting the economy. What would you suggest instead? As I have already pointed out, the domestic factors which are contributing to the economy’s anaemic growth record are largely microeconomic in nature. I have also explained why deficit financing and changes in the nominal exchange rate cannot correct these weaknesses, still less produce sustainable growth. Policy orientation must eschew short-term palliatives. Like our competitors we must learn to come to terms with globalization. Reflecting on one simple fact should help in understanding what this means: the hourly cost of labour of an electronics operative in Malta is around $ compared with $ in Singapore and $ in China. Neither more government spending nor a devaluation can narrow that gap. Against this background, maintaining external competitiveness in the long run depends on continued moderation in wage growth, faster increases in labour productivity and sustainable budget positions. I make no claim to originality in proposing this prescription; it is shared by the EU Commission, the ECB and the IMF. I shall first address the last objective. Given that taxation levels are already high, fiscal consolidation should be achieved by cutting recurrent spending.
Emerging Asia includes China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.) 2 4 EY, ASEAN FinTech Census, 2018 3 2 Statista, Digital Payments Highlights, CAGR 2018 – 2022, 19 June 2018 4 3 EY and DBS, The Rise of Fintech in China, 2016 5 5 World Bank, Global Findex database, globalfindex.worldbank.org, 2017 6 6 Oliver Wyman, Winner-takes-all in battle for e-wallet supremacy, 2018 7 7 ResearchAndMarkets.com, Global and China Mobile Payment Industry Report, 2018 8 8 BIS.org, Statistics on payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPMI countries, 2016 9 9 Global Data, Payment Card Analytics 10 10 DHL, The 21st Century Spice Trade, 2017 11 11 e-conomy SEA: Unlocking the $ Billion digital opportunity in Southeast Asia, 2016. 12 12 BIS, Central Bank Digital Currencies, 2018  6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

I would also like to stress that the application of the Bank’s policy instruments and powers is in the hands of three committees comprising internal and external members. Each of the committees has clearly defined objectives, as well as policy instruments to achieve them. They take independent decisions that they must account for publicly. This arrangement ensures both transparency and distribution of power. In 2021, the Central Bank took the step of capping loan-to-value ratios on residential mortgages at 80%. It also capped debt service-to-income ratios at 35%. We are now seeing signs that these measures have begun to make an impact. By wielding its policy instruments, the Central Bank can dampen demand for real estate, prevent speculative activity, and keep households from taking excessive risk. But there is also a shortage of residential property in the capital area, and real disposable incomes have risen steeply. This will naturally contribute to house price inflation. Iceland has plenty of land at its disposal, and if we use it sensibly, we will not need to wait too long for the market to rebalance. Honoured guests: Last May, the Central Bank of Iceland was the first Western central bank to raise interest rates after the steep rate cuts early in the pandemic. The Bank’s policy interest rate is now 2.75%, where it was pre-COVID, and has therefore risen by 2 percentage points in the past twelve months.
And for dessert, I will examine how this is informing our approach to the implementation of the Solvency II reforms, which includes additional supervisory measures, and the importance we are placing on senior management responsibility. Market developments - Accelerated growth From historic lows of 0.1% in December 2021, the UK Bank rate rose to 4.25% in March 2023. While it could hardly be described as plain sailing for pension schemes or their sponsors, the rise in interest rates has generally reduced the value of their liabilities and boosted funding ratios (see chart 1). This has greatly improved the affordability of buy-outs for many pension schemes. At the same time, trustees of pension schemes are reported to be increasingly viewing buy-outs as a long-term target[4]. Increased affordability and a decreased appetite to retain this risk have led to a growing appetite for schemes to transact in one go, rather than perform staged buy-ins spread over several years[5]. So called ‘jumbo’ schemes may also present exciting opportunities for the insurers. This all points to a material increase in pension schemes’ demand for BPA in 2023. But I’d note that this is an acceleration of the existing demand for BPA in a large but finite market in run-off (see chart 2 and 3). This heightened demand from pension schemes might lead you to think that there is enough new business for all insurers to get their fill, leading to competitive pressures easing up.

Against the backdrop of fear and uncertainty, banks have tightened their lending and consumers have become more cautious in their spending. This will act as a drag on the euroarea economy going forward. A key constraint for both the US and euro-area, as well as many other advanced economies, is the limited policy space available to authorities. In these countries, monetary policy and fiscal stimulus have been pushed to their limits. Limited capacity to respond to new shocks thus represents a real risk for these economies, and for the global economy, that we must be weary of. In this setting, and given the deep-seated nature of the problems being faced, meaningful remedies rest just as much on political factors as on economic ones. How governments respond and how their electorates receive these responses will be an important source of uncertainty. In contrast, the rising economies in Asia offer a more positive outlook. Despite the slowdown in exports of many Asian countries, reflecting the softer global economic backdrop, domestic demand remains robust. More fundamentally, the continued rise of China and the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) will generate enormous economic opportunities for the region. As will be discussed later, the key challenge for Thailand will be how to optimally position ourselves to reap the full benefits of this trend. This brings me to the internal challenges.
Mr. George reviews the role and structure of the New Lady of Threadneedle Street Text of the Vital Topic Lecture given by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E.A.J. George, at the Manchester Business School on 24/2/98. At some point in the next few months the Bank of England will receive a new Charter. The occasion will lack the ceremonial that accompanied the grant of our first Charter in 1694, when the Governors and Directors gathered in a solicitor’s office in Lincoln’s Inn Fields and swore oaths of allegiance to the King and of fidelity to the Company of the Bank of England. The Charter itself will be a typescript bound with red ribbon - quite unlike the massive illuminated manuscript of the original Charter displayed in our Museum: indeed we may even have to dispense with the red ribbon if the Treasury carry out their threat to send the document to us by e-mail. But as a milestone in the Bank’s long history, this new Charter is almost as significant as the first: and taken together with the new Bank of England Bill currently before Parliament, it foreshadows a rebirth of the Bank - the New Lady of Threadneedle Street. Just four days after taking office last May the Government announced its intention of giving the Bank immediate operational independence in relation to the conduct of monetary policy. A fortnight later the Government announced a radical reform of the entire structure of financial services regulation in this country.

However, the quantity of money in the form of deposits and banknotes and coins that the general public decides to keep as a liquidity buffer in readiness for coming transactions is also affected by the stability of the value of other assets and how rapidly they can be transformed into means of payment. Having funds in a current account at a bank or keeping banknotes in a mattress does not produce a return. It is therefore better, of course, to, for instance, purchase interest-bearing treasury bills which can be rapidly converted into transaction funds when wishing to make a payment. The ability to borrow money quickly also affects the willingness to keep a liquidity buffer in the form of banknotes, coins and liquid bank deposits. Efficient second-hand markets and access to overdraft facilities have, for instance, affected the needs of the public to keep a liquidity buffer. The public's need for transaction funds for purchase of shares has probably also increased and it is likely that it varies with developments in the stock market. Many factors have thus contributed to changes in the 1 rate of circulation of money and it has therefore become more difficult to predict. To sum up, the role of money for the level of prices in the economy has not fundamentally changed. What has happened is that the trend in the financial markets has meant that it has become more difficult for the central banks to use the quantity of money as an intermediate target for an ultimate price stability objective.
William C Dudley: Welcoming remarks at the Community Bankers Conference Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Community Bankers Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 18 April 2018. * * * Thank you for joining us today for our 16th Annual Community Bankers Conference. This is my last opportunity to address this fine group of community bank leaders in my role as president of the New York Fed. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System.1 Since becoming head of the New York Fed in 2009, I have had the opportunity to watch the evolution of community banking up close. I observed the resilience of community banks at the height of the financial crisis and how your organizations managed during those turbulent times. I also have had the privilege of meeting with many of you during my regional visits, and I remain impressed with how small banks remain important pillars of economic support for their communities. The past decade has seen significant change for your industry. There has been significant consolidation among institutions and the remaining community banks are much healthier. Back in 2009, there were 191 community banks in the Second District with an aggregate of $ billion in total assets. In contrast, there are 135 community banks today.

As the U.S. economy continues to grow and expand—as I expect it will—your personalized customer service, commitment to relationship banking, and adaptability to technological advances will serve you and your communities well. I will miss many aspects of my role at the New York Fed, particularly the opportunities I’ve had to interact with the community bankers in our district. Please enjoy today’s conference, and thank you for coming. 1 Sumeet Batra, Richard Ciccotelli, and Jacqueline Fenton assisted in preparing these remarks. 2 See William C. Dudley, The Importance of Incentives in Ensuring a Resilient and Robust Financial System,  March 26, 2018. 3 Keeton, William & Kahn, George A. & Schroeder, Linda & Weiner, Stuart E., 2003. “The role of community banks  in the U.S. economy,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 15–43. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
These asset purchases, together with the measures taken since June 2014, have proved very effective by activating a broad range of channels to support growth and inflation in the euro area. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  First, they have contributed to a tangible, broad-based easing of market funding conditions, transmitting the stimulus to the euro area economy at large. 1 Second, through improving borrowing conditions for firms and households in the euro area, these measures have also promoted a recovery in lending that went back to positive growth in the second half of 2014, supporting expenditure on investment and consumption. 2 Without these measures, the euro area would have been in outright deflation last year and prices would have fallen at an even faster rate this year. Growth would have been significantly lower. 3 Towards the end of 2015, significant risks to the inflation outlook started to materialise. Headline inflation entered negative territory in September (–0.1%), slightly recovered in December (0.2%) and January 2016 (0.3%) before turning negative again in February (–0.2%). This was partly due to a substantial decline in crude oil prices by 48% in euro terms from May 2015 to January 2016. The decline in oil prices reflected continued oversupply, weakening oil demand and the OPEC countries not cutting production targets. In particular, around half of the decline in headline inflation from January to February reflects that the already negative annual energy inflation turned even more negative.

Today, I will first discuss the monetary policy measures that the ECB has taken to fulfil its mandate and what impact these have had on the real economy. I will then explain how steps to complete banking union and a capital markets union would not only support a strengthened EMU (along with fiscal and economic union, as well as democratic accountability) but also contribute to enhancing financial stability. As European developments need to be put into a wider perspective, I will also say a few words on ongoing discussions in international fora regarding global developments and international financial regulation. Monetary policy and its impact on the real economy 2015 was characterised by a modest economic recovery. However, inflation dynamics were weak and continued to deteriorate throughout the course of the year. Thus, after adopting our credit easing measures in the middle of 2014, we took further decisive action in 2015 to pursue our price stability mandate. Let me remind you that, in January last year, inflation in the euro area had moved into negative territory, the outlook on inflation had worsened significantly and market-based inflation expectations stood at historic lows. In this situation, we judged that our monetary policy measures had to be stepped up in view of our price stability mandate. Therefore, as of March 2015 we expanded our asset purchase programme (limited until then to covered bonds) to public sector securities.