samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Islamic banking industry now accounts for 16.7% of total assets in the industry. Similar trends can be observed in the growth of deposits that have reached RM180.4 billion, an increase of 27.7% during this period while, total financing has also increased by 24.5% to RM143.4 billion. This growth has also accompanied by an increase in the number of full-fledged Islamic banking branches. From January to September this year, 93 new branches were opened thereby enhancing the outreach of Islamic financial products and services. BIS Review 146/2008  1  Another area that has seen significant growth is in the Sukuk market. The Malaysian sukuk market has expanded significantly with an average annual growth rate of 22 per cent since 2001. Despite the current market conditions that have affected the volume of new bonds and Sukuk issuance, the Islamic capital market has continued to structure innovative Islamic financial instruments. By the first half of 2008, the composition of the more innovative Sukuk Musharakah had increased to 84% as compared to 58% of the total sukuk issuance in 2007. In addition, several new Islamic financial products have been introduced including residential mortgage backed securities, Commodity Murabahah deposit products, commodity based financing, credit card based on ujrah , as well as, structured products based on Musharakah, Mudarabah and Ijarah. Malaysia has acquired a unique market space for driving Shariah-based innovation by combining the depth of knowledge with the drive for innovation.

The success of the SNB cannot be measured in terms of our annual results but by whether we fulfil our mandate, which is to ensure price stability while taking account of the development of the economy. In order to fulfil this task, the minimum exchange rate remains necessary for the foreseeable future. And so we return to the starting point of my presentation. I will repeat what I said before, that only the minimum exchange rate can prevent an undesired tightening of monetary conditions, should the upward pressure on the Swiss franc increase once again. Should it become necessary, we will therefore enforce the minimum exchange rate by buying foreign currency in unlimited quantities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches
13 As noted in the Minutes of the February 2021 MPC meeting. 14 The Bank set out some initial thinking on this in a March 2020 Discussion Paper, and together with six other central banks and the Bank for International Settlements published a report in October 2020 identifying the foundational principles necessary for any publicly available CBDCs to help central banks meet their public policy objectives. 10 11 12  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  6    Central banks including the Bank of England are considering what contribution they can make, consistent with their remits, to encourage an earlier and more orderly transition to a carbon-neutral economy. QE as a monetary policy tool I will say more about QE and climate change as part of the potential “future normal” towards the end of my lecture but for now I want to focus on QE in the context of the here and now. The fact that QE only came into use in the UK in March 2009 means that in practice its history, at least in the UK, is a short one. As Figure 2 illustrates, it has been used essentially five times in twelve years. QE1, 2 and 3 came in response to the financial crisis and the euro area crisis that followed; QE4 followed the Brexit referendum; and QE5, which is still ongoing, formed part of the policy response to the Covid crisis last March.

The MPC has set out forward guidance that it does not intend to tighten monetary policy at least until there is clear evidence of significant progress being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% inflation target sustainably. As time passes and the economy recovers the forward guidance will become more salient, providing reassurance that there is a high bar to any future tightening. Figure 9: February 2021 Monetary Policy Report GDP projection, based on market interest rate expectations £ bn, 2018 prices 640 Projection  620 600  580 ONS data  560 540 520 500 480 460  440 420 2016  2017  2018  2019  2020  2021  2022  2023  400 2024  Source: February 2021 Monetary Policy Report. Conclusion  In conclusion, my view as I have set out in this third Peter Sinclair Town Hall lecture, is that QE is a policy tool that has worked: it has proved its worth in the policy response to the Global Financial Crisis and more recently in the response to the ongoing Covid crisis. Over the past twelve years, QE has meant an expanded role for the central bank balance sheet as a key feature of what Peter termed “the new normal” for monetary policy. Of course, public scrutiny and debate about the role of QE is also valid – it is a relatively new tool about which we still have much to learn.
For example, only about 20 percent of the respondents to the July NABE business conditions survey indicated their firms face shortages of skilled labor. 11 And if skills mismatch was a large ongoing problem, we’d expect to see wages rising much faster for those with the skills in excess demand. Here, there is evidence of larger wage increases in some occupations, but the degree of wage-growth dispersion does not appear to be unusual. Wages Indeed, wage growth in general continues to be very modest–at a bit over 2 percent per year. That is a long way from the 3 to 4 percent benchmark implied by productivity growth and our inflation objective. Indeed, over the past three years, the unemployment rate has fallen by a percentage point per year; yet real wage growth has barely budged. It’s hard for me to imagine a full labor market recovery without genuine improvement in compensation growth. But am I wrong? Has the wage Phillips curve completely broken down? Some claim the answer is no – you just have to look at the right measure of unemployment.

Over the past 20 years, long-run inflation expectations in Japan have averaged a little over 1 percent. Yet during that period, the only time inflation was palpably above zero – let alone not in outright deflation – was when consumption taxes increased or oil prices spiked. So inflation expectations may remain stable while inflation itself lags for a prolonged period. 17 Conclusion As I think about the process of normalizing policy, I conclude that today’s risk-management calculus says we should err on the side of patience in removing highly accommodative policy. We need to solidify our confidence that our ultimate exit from the ZLB will occur smoothly – and in a way that sustains our escape from it. A corollary to this is we should not shy away from policy prescriptions that generate forecasts of inflation that moderately overshoot our 2 percent target for a limited time. Such a policy strategy more properly balances expected costs and benefits. And it would leave me with much more confidence that inflation will not stall out below target once we start raising rates. I agree with Atlanta Fed President Lockhart in thinking that we ought to be “whites of their eyes” inflation fighters. 18 The last thing we want to do is regress back into the ZLB. Indeed, such a relapse would be a sign there was something else going on that was preventing the economy from being as vibrant as we thought possible. 17  Consensus Economics, Inc. (1994–2014). 18  Lockhart (2014).
More importantly, in recent years, China has become a net exporter of direct investment into Malaysia, contributing to significant source of capital for development in various sectors such as infrastructure construction, power plant and steel manufacturing. Outstanding direct investments from China and Hong Kong SAR had grown significantly, almost reaching USD11.1 billion in first half of 2016, as compared to USD6.5 billion three years ago (end-2013). China’s recent One Belt One Road initiative has also added more excitement and opportunities for countries like Malaysia, which is strategically located along the maritime Silk Road. Joint initiatives had been developed to upgrade several ports in Malaysia, with significant investments in the development to come from China. The high-speed rail development between Malaysia and Singapore paired with China’s initiative to develop the network within Southeast Asia and Central Asia will further enhance the connectivity within the region. In fact, today’s headlines carried more developments on the East Coast Rail project with again, strong participation of China in the financing and construction of the project. As you know, our Prime Minister is leading a delegation to China discussing areas of bilateral cooperation, regional and international issues, as well as investment. Malaysia is also a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Recently, the Parliament passed the AIIB Bill 2016, granting approval for Malaysia, a founding member, to contribute capital for the institution. Beyond trade and investment, China- Malaysia bilateral relation expands further with people to people connection, through culture, tourism and education.

When a home falls greatly in price, the household becomes unable to move without realising major losses. Individual households can then find themselves in particularly dire straits. A couple of days ago, Finansinspektionen presented a report on housing loans in Sweden.2 Encouragingly, this report showed that the mortgage ceiling introduced in 2010 may have dampened indebtedness and risk. At the same time, it can be noted, for example, that over half of new loans approved have no amortisation requirements whatsoever. Of the remaining loans, almost half must be amortised over a period of 50 years or longer. A large percentage of the loans being issued at present will remain for a long time. To a certain extent, these entail risks that the banks will also have to manage in several decades’ time. The higher capital adequacy demanded by the Ministry of Finance, Finansinspektionen and the Riksbank for the major Swedish banks should be seen in light of this. The banks need to lend a little more of their own money and slightly less of other people’s. This would mean that they would be able to bear losses more easily and would reduce the risk of future costs for all of us, as citizens. The European Commission is concerned about developments in Sweden The European Commission is also concerned about the high debts accumulating among Swedish households.
The conclusions I have drawn from developments during the 1970s and 1980s are that the economic policy conducted together with the functioning of the economy during this period could not lay a foundation for macroeconomic stability and good economic growth. Price and wage formation that got out of hand in the 1970s, a series of devaluations that created considerable pressure in the economy during the 1980s, deregulation of the credit market that triggered a large credit boom, which could not be counteracted by monetary policy as this was detailed to defend the krona’s fixed exchange rate, and a fiscal policy that could not withstand inflationary pressures. All in all, this led to repeated crises and finally to economic collapse. This leads me in to the next three episodes. The reform of wage formation Before I get into the changeover in exchange rate and monetary policy at the beginning of the 1990s, I want to mention two episodes that have contributed to making the changeover in exchange rate and monetary policy successful with regard to bringing down inflation to a level comparable with other countries. These are the reform in wage formation and the budget consolidation in the 1990s. At the end of the 1980s it had become increasingly evident that Swedish wage formation did not function in a manner compatible with macroeconomic balance.

Under one important prerequisite: the private sector should play its part in the effort, and we should unlock cross border capital flows for the transition; this is the strongest argument in favour of a Green Capital Markets Union, which I advocated with my German colleague Joachim Nagel x). Except in 2022 and the exceptional energy shock, the euro area had a structural excess of savings to investment of 2% of GDP. Hence, provided we have the right economic incentives, Europe can finance its ambitious climate transition; this final and fundamental conviction is a good piece of news. * **  Good news is also important in what could seem like an ocean of alarming information on climate change. Our natural tendency to shut our ears when faced with pessimistic announcements was best captured by Homer with Cassandra. She repeatedly tried to warn that Troy would fall should they let Ulysses’ Trojan horse get into the city. I don’t claim to be Homer or even Cassandra. I tried this morning to sum up in a fair way what we know and don’t know yet about the macroeconomics of climate change, but above all what we can and must do as soon as possible – we are already in “money time”. I thank you for your attention.
Furthermore, the risk to financial stability would be less, in part because domestic parties’ currency-related risk would be lower and because it would be possible limit the size and growth of the banking system. To summarise, the possible reforms are as follows: •  Fiscal policy must support monetary policy more effectively. Well-formulated fiscal rules could help in this context. •  Improved financial stability policy where prudential rules and other instruments are applied in order to reduce risk in the financial system as a whole and address the procyclical interactions between it and the real economy (so-called macroprudential policy). •  Intervention in the foreign exchange market with the aim of leaning against excessive capital inflows and mitigating the negative impact of capital outflows on financial system stability. Such intervention would also be applied to smooth out excessive exchange rate volatility. •  Prudential rules after capital account liberalisation: -  Rules on domestic banks’ foreign liquidity and foreign exchange balance aimed at reducing foreign exchange risk and foreign-denominated liquidity risk in domestic financial institutions, as well as making it more difficult for them to provide foreign-denominated loans to domestic borrowers without income in the borrowed currencies. -  Restrictions on deposit accumulation in foreign branches of domestic financial institutions. -  A ban or other restrictions on foreign-denominated lending to borrowers without foreign-denominated income. -  A temporary tax or reserve requirements to temper excessive capital inflows.

It is not only through low policy rates Norway’s economy is influenced by monetary policy abroad. In a number of areas, we import the effects other central banks are seeking to achieve through quantitative easing. Chart: Yields on 10-year government bonds One example is the government bond market. For investors seeking safe investments, Norwegian government bonds have been one of several alternatives. Norwegian 10-year government bond yields are now quoted at around 1½ percent. Other investors have turned to the Norwegian equity market. Equity prices on Oslo Børs have tracked the rise in equity prices abroad. Even when oil prices – and oil equities – began to fall, the rest of Oslo Børs continued to rise. The commercial property market is another example of foreign capital finding its way to Norway in search of higher returns. The required rate of return on attractive office premises has fallen in pace with long-term yields, and prices have risen considerably. At the same time, rental prices in a number of locations are showing a downward trend. Large foreign capital inflows have probably contributed to the fall in the required rate of return. Like their counterparts in other countries, Norwegian bond-issuing enterprises and banks have over time been able to obtain cheaper funding. Lower risk premiums on covered bonds, for example, have reduced banks’ residential mortgage funding costs.
That being the case, it is worth considering the “second wave” of diversity initiatives that might augment the first. An obvious place to start here would be the other dimensions of diversity – cognitive and experiential. The evidence suggests these confer societal benefits every bit as great as identity. Indeed, diversity of thought and experience go the very heart of decision-making diversity. Moreover, because these dimensions are less well-recognised and harder to measure, unconscious biases around them may be harder to detect and correct. That underscores the importance of purposive action to move the diversity dial in these directions. (a)  Cognitive diversity  Cognitive diversity is far from easy to define and measure. It is stored between our ears in an organ which, despite recent neuro-scientific advances, remains largely a black (or grey) box. A second reason is that it is clearly multi-faceted, including diversity of perspectives, interpretations, heuristics and predictive models. 62 It comprises not just technical problemsolving, in an IQ sense, but also social and interpersonal problem-solving, in the EQ sense. Together, these comprise an individual’s cognitive toolbox. Recognising even that this toolbox exists, and what might lie inside, is a useful first step. Work by sociologists, psychologists and neuro-scientists has, over recent decades, shone a light on these wide-ranging cognitive competencies, their implications for behaviour and their source. Yet this evidence is only now beginning to percolate into the workplace, much less into wider society. Let me give an example.

The proportion of BAME employees is around 17%, greater than the proportion for the UK as a whole. Representation at senior management remains much lower at 5%, but is increasing. 56  Walton and Spencer (2009). 57  Page (2010). 58  Davies (2015)  59  Resolution Foundation (2015)  60  Although around half of that reflects the fact that there is a greater proportion of women working part time than men. 61  European Women on Boards (2016)  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Like many other organisations, the Bank has sought to support diversity through a range of diversity networks covering, among other things, gender, ethnicity, LGBT, mental health, disability, caring and some of the main religions. One of my responsibilities is as Executive Sponsor of the Bank’s Ethnic Minority Network. This Network has put in place some valuable new initiatives to support greater ethnic diversity across the Bank over recent years, including reciprocal mentoring schemes and an Afro-Caribbean Scholarship Programme which funds students through university. The Bank has also recently signed up to UPstanding – an initiative to showcase BAME professionals working in the US, UK and Ireland. Plainly, there is further to go along these identity-based dimensions of diversity, in the Bank and more broadly. But there is wind in society’s sails, as well as in the Bank’s, on these dimensions of diversity, which gives good grounds for optimism about the future.
This will enable us to make possible further adjustments, for example regarding the liquidity rules that will apply as of 2015. The question of systemic risk is still outstanding and we will deal with it in 2011. Le Figaro – Are you in favour of more stringent requirements for larger banks, considered to be systemic? Christian Noyer – This should be an option rather than automatic. Who would have thought that Northern Rock or Bear Stearns could be regarded as systemic? I think that, in the context of each country, a wide variety of instruments is necessary to allow supervisors to ensure that banks increase their loss-absorbing capacity. In particular, the experience of national supervisors should be taken into account. In France, for example, we adjusted, as permitted by Basel II, the ratios required of each institution based on its risk profile. The experiment was conclusive. The amounts that each bank had to raise from the State during the crisis proved consistent with the requirements that we had determined. Other countries that have not had this experience are likely to implement automatic rules. Le Figaro – In the United States, some believe that European banks, and in particular French institutions, are undercapitalised relative to the size of their balance sheets... Christian Noyer – The idea that US banks all comply with Basel III and that efforts are only required in Europe is false. Those who believe this are victims of an accounting and prudential optical illusion.

Although that means that a given amount of growth translates into bigger employment gains, it certainly is not an unmitigated good development. Also, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the economy still faces significant headwinds and there are some meaningful downside risks. In the headwinds department, I would include the  1  This recurring pattern has led some economists to question whether the depth and duration of the Great Recession has distorted the usual patterns of seasonal adjustment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  run-up in gasoline prices mentioned earlier because that will sap purchasing power, the continued impediments to a strong recovery of the housing sector, and fiscal drag at the federal and state and local levels. In terms of downside risks, these include the risk that growth abroad disappoints and the risk of further disruptions to the supply of oil and higher oil prices. On the inflation front, the overall rate of increase of consumer prices, as measured by the 12-month change of the consumer price index slowed to 2.9 percent in February from a recent peak of 3.9 percent last September. Despite the recent rise of gasoline prices mentioned above that may interrupt this pattern, we expect this moderation in the growth rate of consumer prices to resume later this year.