samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, a wide consensus among academics and policymakers has emerged over recent decades on the damaging effects of high inflation levels and variability on economic growth and, hence, on social welfare. Indeed, the history of monetary policy in the last 20 years or so is a very successful one. Price stability, as it is usually defined, is currently a tangible reality in most developed countries. Also, many less-developed countries previously prone to endemic high inflation have managed to reduce and stabilise it at reasonable levels, with noticeable effects on economic prosperity. I believe that the achievements of the last few years in terms of price stability are largely permanent. In the main, they respond to non-conjunctural factors such as a more refined conceptual understanding  BIS Review 34/2005  3  of issues like the temporal and uncertain nature of the trade-off between output and inflation, to institutional reforms -such as central bank independence- and, probably, to greater social awareness of the benefits to be had from sustained low inflation. Although low and stable inflation is a clear prerequisite for macroeconomic stability, this does not per se eliminate the potential risks of disturbances that can adversely affect economic performance. This is the case of negative demand shocks which can generate deflationary processes.

And for both the IMF and the World Bank, a critical question today is legitimacy. And the way emerging market economies are playing a more important role in the global economy – not only they are representing a larger share of world output as compared to before, but also represent at this point a solution for the crisis – it is imperative that these countries have a proportional weight in the governance structure of the two Bretton Woods institutions. Another fundamental development these days is the increasing role played by the G20, for the very same reason of the growing participation of emerging markets economies in global output. It is clear today that the G7 alone or even the G10 are not able to address all relevant issues that affect the world economy, which are better dealt by a larger group as the G20. Evidently there is always a trade-off, the larger the group, the more difficult its effectiveness. But that is a challenge that we have to face. The first meeting of heads of states of the G20 was an essential step towards making the G20 a more effective decision-making forum. The next topic is a global supervisory authority. The G20 suggested the creation of a college of supervisors, following a Financial Stability Forum recommendation. President Köhler raised here the idea of having the IMF playing this role.
Although Sweden in this regard would have liked to go a step further towards full deregulation of the financial marketplaces, it must nevertheless be seen as a step towards freer securities trading in the EU. In addition to developments at the EU level, national reforms are also under way in several countries. In Germany the efficiency of the banking system is being improved considerably now that the state guarantees are being abolished. Similar measures should also be taken promptly in the other major euro area countries, so that they can also capitalise on the advantages of a deregulated financial market. But these are tough reforms that require that special interest groups do not exercise their influence. When there are politicians on the boards of some of Europe’s banks, there is reason to suspect that decisions are sometimes made on grounds that are not entirely related to business. As long as this uncertainty remains, it will contribute to the euro area’s financial markets often being a secondhand choice for international investors. Furthermore, there is still much to be done in terms of competition. The majority of countries in the euro area are burdened with overcrowded bank markets that have many inefficient local branches. However, the existence of some 2,400 banks in Germany should not be taken as a sign of stiff competition, but rather the opposite. Overcrowding is at least as ominous an indication that the operations are not been run in a business-like manner.

In our view, financial literacy has become a necessity, taking into consideration not only the level of economic, banking and technological development, but also the importance and significance of information in today’s global setting. * * *  Honourable Chair, Honourable Members of the Committee, In conclusion, I would like to highlight that, over 2016, the Bank of Albania has showed initiative and devotion in addressing the challenges we have faced. The positive results of our work show that we are on the right direction. Nevertheless, I think that for successful institutions there is always something more to do. They are guided by the medium and long-term objectives; they invest to enhance the professional standards and increase their capacities though the preparation, strengthening of independence, accountability, transparency and good governance. This credo of ours will be a guide for our action plans in the future. Thank you for your attention! 1 This Memorandum was signed by the Bank of Albania, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Development,  Tourism, Trade and Entrepreneurship and the Albanian Association of Banks. 8/8  BIS central bankers' speeches
For CCPs the task of assessing an insolvency counterfactual is likely to be harder still – particularly if it must rely upon a forecast of how the rest of the waterfall would have unfolded, the behaviour of the CCP’s participants and the movements of the markets in the days that would have followed if resolution had not taken place. A liquidation counterfactual must also confront the argument that the CCP would have protected itself from insolvency through full tear-up. Given these valuation challenges, I suspect there will need to be careful further consideration given to the formulation and practical application of the NCWO safeguard; we must end up with a safeguard that is sufficiently certain and capable of estimation in advance that both creditors and resolution authorities are able to make sensible decisions before, during and after resolution. With that, let me conclude by summing up some key points: •  CCP resolution is both a necessary and inevitable part of the overall post-crisis reform agenda to end Too Big to Fail. As private, profit-making enterprises CCPs must be allowed to fail, but, given their systemic importance, many will need to be allowed to do so in a manner that maintains the continuity of their critical functions. •  Having a credible resolution regime for Clearing Members is a big step forward in helping to reduce the risk of clearing member default and from that the risk of CCP failure.

Loss absorbing capacity for CCP resolution Let me start by discussing the loss-absorbing capacity needed for CCP resolution. The use of a bail-in tool on a bank unlocks the loss absorbing capacity of the non-equity part of its balance sheet, the part that would otherwise only bear loss in insolvency or in a voluntary restructuring. Applying this concept of going and gone concern resources to CCPs is a less straightforward task. Unlike a bank, a CCP’s own loss absorbing resources sit both on its balance sheet as margin and default fund and off it in the form of contingent claims on its members. Consistent with the PFMIs, these arrangements are intended to be comprehensive at least insofar as they cover losses that could arise from clearing member default. That begs a question as to what additional loss absorbency the resolution of a CCP can currently unlock that recovery cannot unlock already. The question of loss absorbency is one that the FSB is looking at. Do we need additional resources in the waterfall beyond existing funded and unfunded resources? If additional resources are required, should the initial margin held by a CCP be made available if it would have suffered losses in insolvency? Or should CCPs hold other resolution resources instead? BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I will not prejudge that debate here. However, I do think there is value in clarifying what is meant by the expression “TLAC for CCPs”. Total loss absorbing capacity is not simply shorthand for subordinated debt.
Many of these standards are implemented through the exchanges’ own business rules to ensure fair and orderly trading. 9. This brings me to the subject of SGX as a self-regulatory organisation or SRO. Singapore’s capital markets operate under a dual-level regulatory framework. The MAS is the statutory regulator, and we have the broad mandate of overseeing the proper functioning of financial markets, including exchanges like the Singapore Exchange (SGX) and newer entrants such as ICE Futures Singapore (ICE Futures) and EUREX. The MAS, as you all know, is an integrated financial supervisor and our Capital Markets Group performs the equivalent regulatory functions as other standalone securities regulators including the SEC in the US, the SFC in Hong Kong or ASIC in Australia; our regulatory powers encompass policy making, supervision and enforcement. 10. The exchanges, with their frontline interface with industry players, traders and investors, perform complementary and important roles in ensuring fair, orderly and transparent markets. The exchanges are accountable to MAS on how they exercise these regulatory responsibilities. 11. Questions have been raised, and quite understandably so, on whether a listed for-profit exchange can discharge its role as a regulator. 12. In Singapore, this issue has been reviewed periodically since the demutualisation and merger of the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) and Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) in 1999, to form SGX. It is important to be mindful of what the SRO function entails. 13. Let me elaborate. The SRO function goes beyond listings, which has been the main area of focus.

The best place to start is the objectives given by Parliament to the PRA, namely the safety and soundness of firms that we supervise, the protection of insurance policyholders and our secondary objective in respect of competition, best described as requiring us to act in respect of the implications for competition of our own actions and inactions but only to the extent that we are not undermining our primary objectives. At the heart of what we do in the PRA is risk assessment. Understanding how firms take and manage risk, the controls they have and the quality of risk management, is at the heart of the job of a prudential supervisor. That’s what we do every day, and the standards of this work have been raised extensively since the crisis, which was very necessary. I never tire of saying that the PRA is a judgement-based supervisor, by which I mean the application of judgement against a framework of rules and regulation. As Mark Carney said recently in the context of the European Union, from which the largest part of our framework of rules and regulations comes: - “Ensuring the Bank of England has the instruments necessary to achieve its financial stability objective will depend on the EU continuing to have regulations of the highest standards, which strike the appropriate balance between harmonisation and flexibility, and which accommodate necessary national responsibilities, including for supervision”. Narrow rules-based approaches to regulation create inflexibility and can be easy to arbitrage.
However, we must emphasize that the Republic of Macedonia is finally back on the right track: back to the main mega-trends of the most developed part of human civilization, to the building and practicing of a functional market economy; to the competition on the open international market; to the dominance of the individualism as opposed to the general and omnipresent collectivization; to the painstaking establishment of institutions responsible to the people; to the difficult road of providing the rule of law. And have we learned the lessons? •  that we should stay away from the revolutionary methods which suddenly stop it all and start building it all over;  BIS Review 100/2006  3  •  that there is no efficient system in which ownership and rights deriving from it are not known;  •  that there is no efficient system which denies the differences in the capabilities, dividing the social wealth on the basis of their harsh negation;  •  that there is no sustainable economic growth by continuously spending more than we earn;  •  that there is no strong economy without developed institutions and judicial system. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Central Bank completely distinguishes between the principles of the previous and of today's system in creation. Therefore, today it is a successful and modern institution, with a satisfactory trend of development of its institutional capacity.

But financial markets may not have been truly tested for the ability to absorb price moves or flows that persist for a prolonged period, or for a wider spillover between markets. As such, the “So what?” is that market participants need to take note of the recent periods of volatility and illiquidity and remain aware of the possibility of these events occurring more frequently, and the potential for them to have more persistent effects. As the Bank’s December Financial Stability Report concluded, “Adjustments will be more disruptive if investors’ pricing of liquidity risk does not fully reflect structural changes in market liquidity.” In conclusion, financial market conditions have changed quite noticeably over the past year or so. In part this is conjunctural: the macroeconomic outlook has changed and perhaps become less certain. Central banks have reacted, and in some cases pushed the innovation envelope further. Unsurprisingly these developments have been associated with more volatile financial markets. Given that policy-makers have previously been concerned that persistently tranquil financial markets could encourage excessive risk-taking, this development is not necessarily an unwelcome development. But recent months have also seen a number of short episodes of sharply-higher volatility which coincided with periods of much impaired market liquidity. There are good reasons to believe that the severity of these events was accentuated by structural change in the FICC markets. There must be a risk that future shocks could have more persistent and more widespread impacts across financial markets than has been the case in the recent past.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Review of the Swiss economy: end-of-year media news conference Introductory remarks by Dr Jean-Pierre Roth, Vice-President of the Swiss National Bank, at the End-of-year Media News Conference, Zurich, 7 December 2001 *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank has decided to lower the target range for the three-month Libor rate by 0.5 percentage points to 1.25%-2.25%. For the time being, the three-month Libor is to be kept in the middle of the target range. Recently, the National Bank has adjusted its monetary policy twice already. On 17 and 24 September 2001, we lowered the target range for the three-month Libor rate by 0.5 percentage points each. At the time, we acted in response to the decrease in inflationary pressures and the undesirable development of the Swiss franc exchange rate. The economic outlook has since continued to deteriorate around the globe. In Switzerland, there are no signs that price stability might be jeopardised in the medium term. Due to this development, we are now in a position to reduce rates again. Accordingly, since the beginning of 2001, we have lowered the target band for the three-month Libor by a total of 1.75 percentage points, thus easing monetary policy considerably. Assuming that the three-month Libor rate will remain stable at 1.75%, inflation is expected to hover between 0.9% and 1.5% in the next three years. The National Bank projects real gross domestic product to increase by 1.5% in 2001. For 2002 we anticipate a growth rate of around 1%.

Depending on the development of the political situation, the global economy may thus recover at a faster or slower pace than we anticipated, and the exchange rates might be subject to major fluctuations. In this case, the National Bank would have to review its monetary policy. In the short run, the price of oil will also have a considerable influence on inflation. If it continues to erode, measured inflation might fall below zero for a few months. Should this situation arise, it is important to bear in mind that it cannot be equated with sustained - and thus economically dangerous - deflation. On the contrary, a low oil price level would create a positive supply shock and, under the current circumstances, would impact favourably on production. Inflation would be dampened temporarily. We also keep a close watch on the development of the money supply M3 in order to assess the medium-term inflationary risks. Following a phase of low, or even negative, growth rates, M3 is now expanding at a somewhat faster pace. So far, however, there has been no excess supply of liquidity in the economy, and the money stock M3, therefore, does not point towards inflationary risks at present. Finally, I would like to make some closing remarks about the imminent introduction of euro notes and coins. For about three years now, the euro has existed as deposit money. It has led to fixed exchange rates and a uniform interest rate level in the euro area countries.
Let me also remind you of the political troubles that are observed in some countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The factors I have noted are factors that have added to the uncertainty for the outlook for inflation and growth worldwide and in the euro area. Let me also point out the following. Once again, we are observing an increase in food and energy and other commodity prices. This is adding to the risk of upward pressures of inflation. At the same time, it is a dampener on growth. These are real factors that I believe have raised the uncertainty for the outlook both for inflation and for growth. Q. How do you see the inflation and growth outlook? We constantly monitor developments in the outlook for growth and inflation. Our mandate is to maintain price stability over the medium term. We always try to balance the upside and downside risks of deviating from our mandate, so with new developments we always revaluate the situation. The developments since the March projection staff exercise give me reason to believe that the near-term pressures on inflation are elevated. In the near-term, the risks are to the upside. That said, we continue to observe that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. I do not think we have evidence of inflation pressures persisting beyond the near term. Over the longer term I see price stability being maintained in line with our mandate.

In the span of a decade, social media has become a bona fide global marketplace, marketing tool, recruitment platform and social scene. All this points to the double-edged nature of globalisation: While it may have brought people closer together, it also introduces the challenge of promoting greater appreciation of cultural, ideological and sociopolitical diversity. Conclusion Globalisation, once envisioned to be a beacon of unity, has fueled increasing polarisation in recent years. Let’s remind ourselves that in this globalised world, it is important for the contented to appreciate the struggles of the discontented. And, for the discontented to not lose sight of the potential that globalisation holds. And for all of us, to remember – that 75 years after Bretton Woods – the creation of a safe, fair and mutually beneficial global system is still not an easy pursuit. It is, nonetheless, a necessary one. Once again, I would like to welcome everyone to Sasana Kijang. The World Bank, a product of 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Bretton Woods, along with the IMF and WTO, has brought to Malaysia an amazing gathering of thought leaders and experts on globalisation from all over the world. The next two days will indeed be a fine example of globalisation in action. Let me end with a passage from John Maynard Keynes which I think is appropriate for the occasion. “Yet the new economic modes toward which we are blundering are, in essence of their nature, experiments.
9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  Equally important, utilising ML and AI to analyse the data could free up supervisors’ time to add the greatest value where humans excel over machines: judgement. That is why the Bank is today launching a Review to explore a transformation of the hosting and use of regulatory data over the next decade. This review will be conducted in close consultation with banks, insurers and financial market infrastructures. We are also embarking on proofs of concepts, in collaboration with firms and the tech sector, to test how we can automatically extract regulatory firm data. And we will identify and implement near term improvements in how we use data, including greater use of AI and ML to interpret the information. Support the transition to a carbon-neutral economy My final example of how the new finance can serve the new economy is the most fundamental. Indeed, it is existential. This year, the threats from climate change spurred demonstrations across the country and prompted Parliament to declare a ‘climate emergency’. In response, last week, the Prime Minister announced legislation that would make the UK the first G7 country to commit to net zero emissions by 2050. The changes required to achieve this are enormous. Carbon emissions will have to decline by 45% from 2010 levels over the next decade.26 This will require a massive reallocation of capital creating unprecedented risks and opportunities.

For more information, see the Bank of England’s response to the Future of Finance Review available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/future-finance. 13 In recent years we have expanded access to our balance sheet to central counterparties and broker-dealers to recognise the important role played by these firms in the provision of critical financial services to the real economy. In providing these critical functions, both broker-dealers and CCPs are exposed to liquidity risk. As the supplier of the economy’s most liquid asset, central bank money, the Bank is able to be a ‘back-stop’ provider of liquidity, and can therefore provide liquidity insurance to the financial system, promoting financial stability. 14 Oliver Wyman: Fintech 2.0 Paper: rebooting financial services (June 2015) and McKinsey: Global Payments report (2016). 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  retailers. As designed, Libra may substantially improve financial inclusion and dramatically lower the costs of domestic and cross border payments.15 The Bank of England approaches Libra with an open mind but not an open door. Unlike social media for which standards and regulations are being debated well after they have been adopted by billions of users, the terms of engagement for innovations such as Libra must be adopted in advance of any launch Libra, if it achieves its ambitions, would be systemically important. As such it would have to meet the highest standards of prudential regulation and consumer protection. It must address issues ranging from anti-money laundering to data protection to operational resilience.