samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Essentially, the Principles seek to control money laundering by cutting across the multiplicity of jurisdictional issues and addressing the serious reputation damage they were suffering in the media because of money laundering. Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me now to discuss our local initiatives/responses to money laundering. Admittedly, there has been little activity in the areas of prevention of money laundering in Zambia, until quite recently. This exposed the country to the activities of money launderers because they always seek to operate in countries where there are lax controls. However, the major initiatives in the fight against money laundering, locally, have included: •  Enactment of the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act. The Government of Zambia responded to the increase in drug trafficking and money laundering by passing the Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act in 2001. The Act provides for the disclosure of information by supervisory authorities and of regulated institutions if suspected of money laundering activities. The Act also provides for the forfeiture of property belonging to persons connected to money laundering offences as well as for the prosecution of persons connected to or charged with money laundering offences. The Money Laundering Act places certain obligations on the Bank of Zambia as the supervisory authority. One of these is the issuance of regulations to commercial banks as and when necessary in order to prevent money laundering. •  Regulatory responses.

Caleb M Fundanga: The role of the banking sector in combating money laundering A paper presented by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at a seminar organised by the C and N Centre for Advanced International Studies, Lusaka, Zambia, 23 January 2003. *  *  *  Mr Chairman Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen Allow me first of all to thank you for inviting me to address you on this topic of great importance to the development of our financial system in Zambia – “the role of the banking sector in combating money laundering”. I have every reason to believe that your training in the last couple of days has provided an opportunity for you to share with the resource persons valuable insights on the subjects you have covered. Mr Chairman, the scourge of money laundering is not new to mankind. Despite money laundering being topical in policy discussions nowadays and on the minds of supervisors and regulators like the Bank of Zambia, the scourge itself has a long history and could be as old as the history of organised trade. Nonetheless, in spite of the fundamentals of the crime remaining, largely, the same as in the olden days, recent advances in technology and globalisation have offered and will continue to offer more sophisticated means to convert ill-gotten proceeds into legally acceptable financial assets. In recent times, money laundering has grown into real big business.
2  BIS Review 67/2007  The steady rise in the prices of high-risk investments, the low risk premiums and low volatilities might possibly even have an influence on the external value of the Swiss franc. Let me comment on this statement in a little more detail. In international currency portfolios, the Swiss franc has always been a safe haven currency. In the past, this was reflected in the fact that the Swiss franc rose against other investments when the situation was uncertain. Thus, the Swiss franc took on a kind of insurance function and many investors held Swiss franc investments to protect themselves against political and economic crises. Just as the Swiss franc is particularly attractive as a safe haven in stormy conditions, there is little interest in the Swiss franc when the weather is calm. Due to the very low level of risk awareness and risk aversion at present, the demand generated for hedging and thus for Swiss francs is weak. However, in the past, phases of calm weather in foreign exchange markets were repeatedly interspersed with stormy periods. Therefore, financial market participants and other market players with exchange rate exposures should remain aware of the exchange rate risks they are incurring. BIS Review 67/2007  3  4  BIS Review 67/2007

Finally, the procyclical leverage of financial intermediaries is tied to systemic risk, suggesting that the leverage of financial intermediaries is a key factor behind economy-wide financial crises. Once again, a potential “macroprudential” regulator – one that is attempting to reduce the risk of a financial crisis but also attempting to stabilize the macroeconomy – would face a risk-return tradeoff: Allowing a buildup in financial intermediary leverage as the economy grows can assist in achieving macroeconomic objectives such as full employment, but risks a more severe downturn if such leverage growth becomes excessive. Making those judgments is inherently difficult. The benefit of being a money issuer Society demands money for many purposes. Money provides a good way for people to store value safely, and it can be used as a means of exchange. These are classic and enduring features of money. For the purpose of this talk, by “money” I mean a broad definition of money – what some would call “money-like” assets that can provide the monetary functions of storing value and serving as a medium of exchange. Those include both short-term government debt and short-term borrowing by financial intermediaries, especially borrowing that is designed to be extremely safe, such as repurchase agreements, or repos. A repo is a fairly modern instrument that I’ll describe in a bit more detail, as repos played an important role in the buildup of intermediary leverage and the issuance of private-sector money-like instruments during the lead-up to the crisis of 2007–09.
These projects are: •  a review of the standardised (credit and operational risk) approaches to capital adequacy, which need to be re-examined in light of calls for greater simplicity and comparability in the regulatory framework as well as the desire to reduce the reliance on credit rating agencies if possible; and  •  an examination of the need for a capital framework for interest rate risk in the banking book, particularly given the desire to limit arbitrage opportunities between the trading and banking books. These last two projects are still at an embryonic stage, so I cannot say too much about what they might entail at this point in time, but they will be the last pieces in what has essentially been a complete overhaul of the regulatory framework since the financial crisis. Monitoring and reinforcing implementation of Basel regulatory standards As I have already said, the establishment of the implementation monitoring programme has been a high priority for the Committee; it is critical to the successful delivery of the benefits of the agreed reforms. Starting from scratch at the beginning of 2012, a comprehensive assessment framework has been developed that is growing in its acceptance and credibility, and I am pleased to report that the Committee now has dedicated capacity in the area of implementation work. The implementation framework is being continuously strengthened through a lessonslearned process.

Our goal is to take a more holistic view on the implementation process by focusing not only on the existence of a regulatory framework but also on its functioning. The implementation process is also envisaged to be closely linked to the ongoing policy development process, creating a positive feedback loop that can help strengthen the regulatory regime. There is no doubt that this new monitoring and assessment initiative has already had a positive impact. As a result of the regular monitoring of how countries are tracking against agreed deadlines, as well as the forthcoming country assessments, member jurisdictions regularly approach the Committee about specific aspects of the Basel framework, actively seeking to ensure that their local adoption of the Basel rules would not be inadvertently out of line with the spirit of the agreement. Jurisdictions have also brought forward the release of their rules to ensure that their progress was captured in the periodic updates that the Committee has provided to the G20 and made public. The self-assessment responses undertaken for the assessment process are also benefiting the implementation process. In addition, the assessments of drivers that lead to variation of banking and trading book riskweighted assets are continuing and are to likely lead to both more consistent implementation of existing rules, and the development of policy options to address identified areas of weakness.
The micro-economic evidence discussed earlier suggests these effects are difficult to detect and, to the extent they do exist, might be relatively modest in the contribution they have made to slowing aggregate investment and productivity growth. And if higher markups have, in fact, been the counterpart to a rise of ‘superstar’ firms, benefiting from network economies, that would, in principle, raise productivity growth and r*. A second structural parameter in the IS curve is the interest elasticity of aggregate demand, 𝜎. In the simplest baseline model, this is determined by (the inverse of) the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In more general settings, with credit constraints, it may depend additionally on the balance sheet characteristics either of borrowers or lenders or both (for example, Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993)). A rise in market power could, in principle at least, affect the balance sheets of borrowers and/or lenders in ways which could influence 𝜎. For borrowers, a rise in market power might raise equilibrium profit rates and market valuations. It may thus reduce companies’ collateral constraints and their reliance on external sources of finance (for example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)). For lenders, a rise in market concentration could in principle reduce the speed of pass-through of policy rates to retail deposit and lending rates (Gerali et al (2010)). Each of  24  Equation (9) is specific to the Galí model presented here, but equation (10) is a more general feature of macro-economic models, where r* is a function of the household discount rate and productivity growth.

One Norwegian krone was worth 0.40323 grams of fine gold. In the latter part of the 1800s, Norway benefited from free trade and free capital movements and became a relatively prosperous country. The standard of living in Norway did not lag behind that of Sweden. The currency union was maintained after the political union with Sweden was dissolved. The agreement lost its practical significance after the gold standard was suspended in 1914. The agreement was not formally terminated until 1972. From an economic viewpoint, the dissolution of the union in 1905 was a painless process. Economic developments were favourable up to World War I. International real interest rates have fallen The interest rate level is lower today than in 1905. In fact, Norges Bank has not allowed the key rate to be this low since the Bank was established in 1816. This partly reflects international conditions. In many countries interest rates were reduced considerably when the economic situation took a turn for the worse early in 2000. Interest rates adjusted for inflation, i.e. real interest rates, are now also low. Low real interest rates may be ascribed to several factors: Inflation has been low for such a long period that savers require a low premium as a hedge against unexpected inflation in the future. In order to prevent an appreciation against the dollar, many Asian central banks have been buying US government bonds, thereby pushing down yields.
At the same time, the SSM will develop its own more detailed supervision manual, which lays down the supervisory approach to be taken by the SSM including on off-site and on-site reviews, risk assessments and model validations. The ECB and the EBA are cooperating closely to ensure that these two projects are fully consistent. Here again, the existence of the SSM will greatly facilitate the work of the EBA, as all SSM members will naturally converge in their supervisory practices. Third, the conduct of stress tests. The Council Regulation requests the SSM to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the banks that the ECB will supervise directly. This will have two main building blocks. First, a balance sheet assessment, which is a point-in-time evaluation of the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Second, a forward-looking assessment of individual banks’ capital positions and provisioning levels in the form of a stress test. This stress test, and future stress tests undertaken as part of the SSM’s regular supervisory functions, will be conducted in close cooperation with the EBA, in particular regarding the design and timing of the exercises. European Systemic Risk Board As regards interactions with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the activities of the SSM will have a clear systemic dimension and so cooperation between the SSM and ESRB will be essential.

Memoranda of Understanding regulating these interactions will be prepared in the coming months. Conclusion To conclude, it is unavoidable that the existence of the SSM will alter the functioning of the ESFS. This is, after all, the most significant development in financial supervision in the history of the European Union. However, I am confident that the changes brought by the SSM will strengthen the ESFS, and will overall enhance the quality and consistency of supervisory and regulatory practices across Europe. The more Member States that are involved in Banking Union, the greater these positive effects will be. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Ensuring adequate provision of a means of payment that is credit-risk free and fully and efficiently available and accessible to any potential user group is extremely important. To date, cash has been the only asset that enjoys legal tender status and has played this role. Yet, the way cash is fathomed and embraced nowadays is heavily influenced by the increasing digitalisation of society, and by technological change more generally. For example, the behaviour, preferences and expectations of users are changing rapidly, as their experience with digital technologies grows. Novel payment alternatives, provided  1  either by private players (both traditional and non-traditional ones) or by public authorities in various jurisdictions, may also surface and/or expand, presenting greater appeal than traditional banknotes and coins. Moreover, new features of existing payment instruments or services, such as programmability, are now becoming possible thanks to emerging technologies. Therefore, besides ensuring the availability of cash, we also need to consider new ways of improving the efficiency of retail payments by leveraging digital technology more extensively. All of this could signal the need to broaden the approach and explore new opportunities, aiming to better address modern society’s unmet demands. In this process, the notion of a universally accessible CBDC stands out, that is, a new type of central bank digital liability that could be made widely available.

In our discussion to come, I believe we could study two types of aggregates:  Page 7 sur 10   Financial aggregates, from the perspective of financial stability, and potentially looking more closely at the assets of financial institutions including non-banks (such as their provision of credit in the broadest sense) rather than at their liabilities only (including money, as in the past).  Other economic aggregates, starting with nominal GDP, which has the virtue of combining real growth and prices – two variables that statisticians sometimes have difficulties separating in our measures. But also employment and income distribution, which respond to the demands of the Treaties as well as to the expectations of the public. Allow me some remarks on the substance of these “secondary” objectives. To achieve financial stability, in an ideal world, we would have a box of macroprudential tools that could maintain financial stability whatever the monetary policy stance. However, in practice our set of macroprudential tools is comparatively limited. We need a monetary policy strategy that reflects this reality. We should go beyond the old debate of “separation principle” versus “ leaning against the wind”. I advocate a median way, which we could call “coordinated” or “integrated”.viii We have now a range of unconventional monetary instruments and our objective should be to pick the right combination that delivers the necessary accommodative monetary stance while minimizing of adverse side-effects on financial stability.
Broad money  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  M3 growth came close to its historic average during the fourth quarter of the year, marking 11.9% and mainly in time deposits in the banking system. Although banks did not tighten their lending terms and conditions – on the contrary, during the second half of the year there were signs of easing – demand for bank lending by the private sector was low. This remains low due to the existence of negative output gap by businesses and the growing consumer tendency to save under a perceived added insecurity for the future and a more cautious behaviour towards actual consumption. Reduction of risk premia in financial markets, maintaining positive economic growth, employment and salaries, as well as a clearer short-term perspective of the economy are expected to contribute to an increased demand for bank loans in the coming period. The banking system meets the prerequisites, in terms of liquidity, capitalisation and more favourable financing conditions to response to this demand. Our outlook for the future supports keeping a positive progress of the economy for 2011. Growing demand is expected to be subject to the comparatively better progress of the domestic demand during this year. Private consumption and investments are expected to rise further, while, after the slowdown in 2010, the fiscal sector is expected to contribute positively to the economic growth. In spite of this, the growing demand is considered to be below the potential of our economy even for 2011.

Rapid expansion of exports and moderate increase of imports led to improved trade and current account deficits, contributing to foreign currency demand and supply balancing and increased exchange rate stability. Monetary and fiscal policies have conveyed a careful macroeconomic stimulus. Withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus during the second half of the year, led to a more stimulating monetary policy, by reducing the key interest rate in July and a fuller introduction of it into the financial markets during the following period. Financial markets were characterised by an improvement of liquidity indicators and a decline in interest rates in almost all financial instruments. Furthermore, a prudent fiscal policy rendered budget deficit and public debt in line with 2010 forecasts. These developments are expected to be brought forward, in broad terms, in 2011 as well. Economic growth is expected to remain comparable to levels of 2010. However, it is expected to be driven by domestic demand to a large extent. The banking system is in a much better position compared with two previous years in terms of supporting the increase of domestic consumption and investment with funds. Moreover, inflation pressures are forecasted to be under control, budget deficit and public debt are expected to be further consolidated, and external position of the economy is expected to be more stable. Respecting this picture has important implications, which I will address later in more details, for policymakers and economic agents. Latest developments in global economy are characterised by continued economic growth in most developed countries and emerging economies.
MAS also set up a $ billion US Dollar Facility that is available to all banks, on the back of the swap arrangement with the US Federal Reserve. This Facility has helped to stabilise US Dollar funding conditions in Singapore, and enabled US Dollar lending to businesses in Singapore and in the region. About $ billion has been provided through this Facility. FINANCIAL STABILITY  The COVID-19 shock has also increased the risks to global financial stability. The world entered the current crisis with one strong card and one weak card. The strong card is the banking sector. Globally, banks are generally in good shape, with healthy capital and liquidity buffers. The weak card is the corporate sector. In many parts of the world, corporate debt levels were already high pre-COVID, and will increase further through the course of this crisis. With tight cash flows, over-leveraged entities could face financial distress, leading in turn to ratings downgrades and corporate defaults. Mounting corporate defaults will strain banks’ profitability and capital positions. The strong card could become progressively weaker. If this happens, banks will be less able to sustain credit to the real economy. Worse still, if funding conditions also tighten and confidence is shaken, some banks could run into trouble, possibly triggering a financial crisis. MAS is determined that the financial system in Singapore remains robust and resilient. Our banks have built up strong capital and liquidity buffers, and are well-placed to weather these risks even as they continue to extend credit.

Our research shows that the gains from structural change can be considerable although adjustment costs, in terms of the reallocation of labor and capital, will also be significant. Now we arrive at the third and final question. Given the euro crisis and Thailand’s prospects for growth, what should monetary policy do? The dilemma here is how to bridge short-term stabilization with long-term goals of structural change. The challenge for policy is to maintain an overall framework where the trend of increasing economic integration can continue while containing crises. Given our baseline scenario of a prolonged recovery without a liquidity seizure we lean towards long-term goals – for example, maintaining capital flow liberalization, financial sector liberalization and market-led exchange rates – but with a readiness for monetary stimulus should a clear need arise. Let me discuss the policy tools at our disposal and how they fit into our overall policy objectives. On the interest rate, the policy rate has been on hold at 3.00 percent since January this year. At the moment we view it as supportive of growth amid global risks and consistent with our inflation target. However, I must stress that the interest rate is poised to go either way depending on developments in the advanced economies, in particular the euro area and the impact on the overall Thai economy. We recently saw how the impact of the euro crisis is spreading to Asia in the form of a broad-based slow-down in Thai exports.