samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Even so, a good many private investors have gone in for more risky strategies of this type. To my knowledge, there are unfortunately no studies that systematically illustrate more precisely how people in Sweden have managed their saving in shares. A research paper from the United States points out that the IT boom, combined with markedly lower transaction costs as a result of new 14 technology, induced many inexperienced people to invest in shares. Moreover, access to the internet leads to an increased number of share transactions, with poorer results. These less experienced players have tended to concentrate on the technology-oriented Nasdaq exchange. Whereas more professional and institutional investors account for 90 per cent of transactions on the New York 15 exchange, approximately half of Nasdaq dealing is by private individuals. American investors are also becoming younger; the proportion who are under 35 and make more than six transactions a year rose from 1.1 per cent in 1995 to 13.2 per cent in 1998. The same tendency applies to stockbrokers and financial consultants, more than half of whom began their careers in the 1990s. All this indicates that large numbers of inexperienced investors entered the market in the 1990s and that a high proportion of their brokers and consultants unfortunately have relatively little experience. On the other hand, many of the newcomers working in financial markets have had a thorough training that is often better and – perhaps more important – more up-to-date than many of their older colleagues’.

However, on both sides of the Rhine, we are in danger of forgetting that it is just as essential to be architects, through two major transformations to be achieved in the coming years: the ecological transition, even more necessary with the energy crisis and our need for independence vis-à-vis Russia; and the digital transformation, which is also key to strategic autonomy (or sovereignty). Real supply-side reforms and those to enhance our productive capacity - which are different from tax cuts - are rarely popular; they have taken too much of a back seat over the past two decades in both our countries: but they are essential for both lowering inflation and increasing growth in Europe. In addition to major adaptations of our production systems, they require very significant investments – of around 2.5% of GDP 2030 in France (EUR 70 billion in 2021 constant euro) for the climate transition, according to Jean Pisani-Ferry,3 to be financed essentially by the private sector. It is in this sense that Joachim Nagel and I have just published a joint appeal: a "political accelerator" is needed for the Capital Markets Union (CMU), so that the new action plan established in 2020 can at long last transform Europe into a genuine single financing market. Further integration would contribute to preserving our financial stability through different channels: geographical diversification of our funding sources to better absorb external economic shocks, and increased equity funding.
The fact that 50 states in the United States share a common currency -- and have done so for over 130 years -- provides the critical foundation for an integrated and efficient capital market that extends from Maine to California and on to Alaska and Hawaii. In this market, capital flows smoothly from high-saving to high-investment areas, as required by changing business conditions, without any thought of exchange rate risk. A common U.S. currency, it is important to note, has many advantages beyond simply reducing transaction costs. It also simplifies choices for households and corporate management, enhances the efficiency with which financial institutions and the payments system function, and promotes competition across the whole productive spectrum. While a common currency in Europe can be expected to lead to similar efficiency gains, the economies of the United States and Europe differ in several important dimensions, so that a common currency is likely to work in substantially different ways in the two regions. The ways in which Europe and the United States differ most have to do with the degree of integration of their labor markets and their fiscal systems. The United States enjoys a very mobile labor force -- across sectors and states -which allows job losses arising during sector-specific or state-specific recessions to be rapidly absorbed where jobs are growing faster. This contributes to aggregate unemployment being kept reasonably in check.

In Zambia, with the growing emphasis on trade within the regional economic groupings like SADC and COMESA, plastic money in the form of credit cards, is a very practical way of facilitating settlement of cross border transactions. Another benefit which may be associated, with the more extensive use of e-money is the potential increase in tax compliance among the retail and wholesale sectors. The use of credit cards generates accurate records of purchases which currently may not be captured by the Zambia Revenue Authority because business houses may declare false figures. With the use of a credit card there is no provision to cheat the taxman by refraining from issuing a receipt as the record of the transaction will speak for itself. Whilst on the subject of greater tax compliance, I would want to see some form of requirement for most businesses to use points of sale terminals and other non-cash forms of payment in our shopping malls and central business district businesses where we see a resistance from businesses to embrace this technology in favour of cash. But let me end my remarks this evening by pointing out a number of problems and challenges that might be associated with the use of credit cards. The biggest disadvantage of credit cards is that they encourage the holders to spend money they don’t have. If the credit card does not require that you pay off your balance each month, this balance will accumulate.
A further 10 firms have commenced exploratory engagement with our specialists with a view to a future application. But it is self-evident that, each time we make a requirement more proportionate for firms below a certain size threshold, we introduce one extra adjustment that firms need to make as they grow in size and exceed it. This brings the risk that on the mountain-path from newly authorised firm to ring-fenced bank, we create sheer rock-faces that can be a rather daunting barrier, and require investment in specialist climbing equipment if they are to be scaled. And more broadly, we recognise that there is always the risk that the costs to comply with a regime that is designed for all firms including the most complex can be disproportionate for those that are smaller and simpler. This means we need to do two things. First, we need to do what we can to smooth out those barriers to growth, in order to create a smoother path and not insurmountable rock faces along the way. For example, we have set out a new policy for a ‘graduated rate’ approach to setting capital requirements for credit unions with more than £ million in total assets.7 And second, we need to help firms get over those barriers.

All of that should mean that firms face a more balanced choice between incurring the costs of specialist climbing equipment to climb a particularly steep bit of the mountain and strolling up a somewhat gentler hill instead. The mountain guide The consultation we’ve launched today introduces a new Supervisory Statement to make it much clearer how our expectations change over time for banks as they grow from ‘new’ to ‘mature’. Whilst most of this reflects how we have supervised firms in practice over the past few years, we have brought it all together for the first time so that the mountain path ahead is clear to you all. I won’t set out the entire supervisory regime now. But I did want to draw your attention to three changes introduced by the CP, all relating to capital, and which are designed to deliver a clear path from being a new bank at base camp to being established and on the way to the summit.   First, we are proposing to update how we calculate the capital buffer requirement for new banks. To date this has been based on an unspecified wind down cost calculation. But interpretation by banks has (understandably) been inconsistent, so we are proposing to move to a clear and consistent policy of setting the buffer as six months of operating expenses. This should be enough to allow banks time to find alternative sources of capital or to change their business model if investor support is lost.
Second, the economic and financial context in which French banks are operating is also a source of risks. Indeed, lessons must be learned from the slowdown in the USA, amply illustrated by the housing downturn, which resulted in higher risk in the sub-prime segments of the retail banking market. It should also be acknowledged that financial markets could become more unsettled. If higher risk aversion were to encourage greater use of risk transfer products, this could drain liquidity from some markets and undermine the efficiency of banks' management. From a supervisory perspective, the problem is all the more acute since the growing reliance on credit risk transfer instruments tends to make it harder to assess the type and degree of risk that banks actually bear when, for example, they arrange complex transactions. Third, the regulatory environment for French banks is changing radically as a result of the Basel II accords. Banks that have adopted the advanced approaches to risk management must put models in place – usually as early as January 2008 – for the internal rating and assessment of credit risk, market risk and operational risk. On-site inspection teams from the Commission Bancaire are currently scrutinising these models. Their investigations show that, overall, large banking groups have taken the measure of this project early on, so as to be ready for the deadline of the 1st January 2008, even if some improvements need to be made in certain areas.

The exchange rate has been relatively stable after the adjustment that took place in the first half of last year, and the króna is currently somewhat stronger than historical measures would warrant, although it should be admitted that determinism is probably not the most suitable approach for assessing currency developments. One reason for uncertainty about the exchange rate is the large current account deficit, as well as the fact that it can easily be driven by factors over which we have no control, given how closely Iceland’s financial sector is now integrated with global financial markets. A central bank with a legislative and regulatory remit to target inflation is of course pleased with such inflation developments, but would prefer them to be built on a more solid foundation. Domestic demand growth has declined, but rather more slowly than the Bank had hoped. The current account deficit is large and will also contract more slowly than the Bank would have desired. Demand remains buoyant in the housing market and there are indications that the rate of credit growth may be on the increase again. For these and other reasons, the Bank will remain on the alert and not ease its monetary stance until even clearer signs emerge that a lasting change has been established. Equity prices have soared in Iceland in recent years.
All of us have contributed to and are familiar with what has been accomplished in 2010. I will therefore refrain from listing our past achievements but concentrate on the things that remain to be done. Let us therefore start to think about our New Year’s resolutions for 2011. New Year’s resolution number one: let’s define a SEPA migration end date There is a consensus that an end date is needed for the migration to the SEPA credit transfer (SCT) and SEPA direct debit (SDD). Throughout 2010 representatives from almost every stakeholder group have been calling for a defined end date. Just recently a study conducted by BearingPoint revealed that more than 80% of the banks surveyed consider a binding SEPA migration end date to be necessary. In fact, the majority are in favour of an EU regulation to set one. 1 Of course it is no secret that, despite this general agreement, the details of such a regulation have been widely debated since the summer. For this reason, I had welcomed the European Commission’s decision to organise a public hearing on the issue, which took place last Wednesday. We in the Eurosystem have been very explicit in our comments on this topic and we have been calling for a regulation setting a migration end date for SCT and SDD. Indeed, we have gone one step further and have announced preferred dates, i.e. the end of 2012 for credit transfers and the end of 2013 for direct debits.

Whilst risks to the outlook for global growth continue, with new events unfolding daily, Asia’s economic growth remains strong and transformation is expected to expand well into the future. This growth is set to drive increasing trade in goods and services, as well as the flow of capital between the region and the world. At the same time, Asia is also intensifying intra-regional financial and economic integration that would contribute towards accelerating the region’s growth prospects. Adding to these transformative trends is the march towards urbanisation which will continue to stimulate demand for infrastructure development. All these factors will have an important influence on the way in which the financial services industry responds to new growth opportunities in the region. To support Asia’s growth, financial markets in Asia must continue to grow in size and sophistication to intermediate capital towards productive investments. We can expect increasing demands being placed on Asian banks for services and expertise in trading, risk management, structured financing and loan syndication, infrastructural financing, and capital raising. Equally, recent efforts focusing on strengthening regional financial integration to facilitate the increasing intra-regional trade and investment, such as the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, will offer tremendous opportunities for banks with the right credential to establish their presence as regional players. On the retail side, there exists vast potential for growth – owing much to the demographic transformation in the region. Asia is now home to a growing middle income population, the number of which is projected to reach 3 billion by 2030.
As I said at the beginning, the annual variation of the Consumer Price Index excluding Food and Energy (CPIEFE)—our measure of core inflation that deletes the prices of food and energy from the CPI—has remained below 2%, with annual inflation still negative for goods and persistently around 3% for services. The CPI has approached 3%, mainly driven by the behavior of the more volatile prices (Figure 9). The peso depreciation has an effect on the revision of the short-term inflation outlook. By the end of this year, the annual variation of the CPIEFE is forecast to be at 2.7% (2.3% in June) and that of the CPI, at 3.1% (2.8% in June). Once both indicators converge to 3% during 2019, they will remain in the neighborhood until the end of the projection horizon (Figure 10). It is very likely that in September the annual CPI inflation rate will be temporarily above 3%, because of the low basis for comparison left by the unusual behavior of some foodstuffs in 2017. Regarding monetary policy, we think that the evolution of macroeconomic conditions makes it less necessary to maintain the current monetary stimulus. Therefore, our working assumption for the MPR is that it will begin to increase in the coming months and by 2020 it will stand near its neutral level—ie. between 4% and 4.5%. This assumption is not essentially different from the forecast a few months ago, as it implies gradual increases in the policy rate associated with the recovery of the domestic economy.

As you can imagine, the panel has been a great resource, accessible by staff at all Federal Reserve banks through a fast and easy-to-use interface. It has already been used in several 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Federal Reserve Board and Treasury reports, Federal Open Market Committee presentations, speeches, and congressional testimonies, and in about 100 research papers and policy analyses. It also has value for our community outreach, as we can profile specific geographical regions. Particularly impactful have been our releases of the Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, containing a comprehensive summary of households’ access to and use of credit. Several of our research findings have influenced policy debates. For example, an important question regarding recent household deleveraging has been to what extent the decline in aggregate household debt was attributable to delinquent debt charge-offs as opposed to active debt paydowns by consumers. Our research found that while charge-offs played an important role, a huge change in consumer behavior had taken place. While consumers extracted home equity and took on more debt during 2007, they reverted to actively paying down debt during 2009, creating a remarkable $ billion reversal in cash flow available for consumption in just two years. In our most recent report we are seeing signs suggesting that the deleveraging period has reached its end. The availability of borrower-level data has been key to our ability to analyze consumer behavior.
Links with the traditional financial sector The second contradiction arises from the crypto industry’s attempt to strengthen ties with actors in the financial system, including banks, big tech companies and the public sector. Major payment networks[27] and intermediaries[28] have enhanced their support services for crypto-assets. Numerous prominent tech companies, including Meta (formerly Facebook) and Twitter, have explored ways to incorporate crypto into their platforms. [29] By leveraging their large customer base and offering a mix of payments and other financial services, tech firms, especially big techs, could solidify the ties between crypto-assets and the financial system. The recent failures of Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank have highlighted the risks for banks associated with raising deposits from the crypto sector. The stability of these deposits is questionable given cryptos’ volatility. The discontinuation of the Silvergate Exchange Network and SigNet, which functioned as a quasi-payment system for the crypto investments of Silvergate Bank and Signature Bank clients, also shows how crypto-assets service providers depend on the traditional financial sector for settlement in fiat money. The crypto industry not only seeks to strengthen its ties with the traditional financial industry. It also seeks to gain access to the public safety net that strongly regulated financial entities benefit from. [30] Indeed, Circle, the issuer of the USD Coin (USDC) tried to gain access to the Federal Reserve's overnight reverse repurchasing facility in order to back its stablecoin.

36. The “travel rule”, already used in traditional finance, will in the future cover transfers of crypto-assets. Information on the source of the asset and its beneficiary will have to “travel” with the transaction and be stored on both sides of the transfer. The law also covers transactions above € from ”self-hosted wallets” (a crypto-asset wallet address of a private user) when they interact with hosted wallets managed by crypto-asset service providers. See Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the  Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (Text with EEA relevance), Official Journal L 150, 9 June 2023, p. 1– 39. 37. Crypto lending is a centralised or decentralised finance service that allows investors to lend out their crypto holdings to borrowers. Decentralised crypto lending platforms use smart contracts to automate loan payouts and yields, and users can deposit collateral to receive a loan if they meet the appropriate requirements automatically (see Duggan, W. (2023), “Crypto Lending: Earn Money From Your Crypto Holdings”, Forbes, 30 January). A non-custodial wallet, or self-custody wallet, entails the crypto owner being fully responsible for managing their own cryptos. The users have full control of their crypto holdings, manage their own private key and handle transactions themselves (see “Custodial vs Non-Custodial Wallets”, crypto.com, 17 February 2023). 38.
Since asset prices are typically far more volatile than real economic variables and general price levels, substantial changes in interest rates could be required to check financial imbalances, and this could have serious side-effects on the goal of maintaining price stability. BIS Review 121/2010  3  As you can see, there are many questions that have not yet been clarified. The problems I have mentioned make it clear that central banks would rapidly reach their limits if they were simply to add a further goal alongside price stability without new instruments to deal with it. The more objectives an instrument is expected to achieve, the greater the risk of wrong decisions and conflicting objectives. However, as I have already said, these problems do not mean that financial stability should be ignored completely in monetary policy decisions. Asset prices and other variables such as credit growth must be included as indicators when assessing the situation and the outlook for inflation. They are already included in the practical implementation of today’s monetary policy strategy. Yet care must be taken when interpreting such “instability variables” because they provide only limited information about future economic trends. To sum up, monetary policy can make an important contribution to financial stability. However, the set of monetary policy instruments is unsuitable for excluding all imbalances in all circumstances. Accordingly, instruments that have a direct effect are needed to counter the emergence of (global) financial instabilities.

Therefore, in order to develop reliable indicators for systemic risk, to analyse the  4  BIS Review 121/2010  interaction and feedback between macroprudential and monetary policy instruments, and to carefully evaluate the effective measures, we need clear mandates, enough time and additional expertise. So what is the role of central banks in establishing such a macroprudential framework? Generally speaking, the traditional tasks of central banks are closely linked to various aspects of systemic stability. A stable financial system is very important for the effective implementation of monetary policy. But also in active crisis management, central banks bear a major responsibility, as the recent financial crisis clearly demonstrated. The contribution of central banks is therefore of great relevance in the analysis and regulation of systemic risk. In particular, central banks will have a key role to play in macroprudential supervision and regulation for the following reasons: Developing and structuring macroprudential measures requires reliable analytical and forecasting skills – for instance, with regard to the overall economy or specific market segments, such as real estate. Central banks have extensive and soundly based knowledge of these fields. Moreover – as I have already pointed out – macroprudential policy interacts closely with monetary policy. This implies that the information advantage of central banks could be important in shaping macroprudential measures. Central banks will therefore almost certainly have to play a major role in implementing such instruments.