samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Hayo, B and Neuenkirch M (2018), “Central Banks’ Predictability: An Assessment by Financial Market Participants”, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 14(4), pp 163–185. Hubert, P and Labondance, F (2018), “The Effect of ECB Forward Guidance on the Term Structure of Interest Rates”, International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 14(5), pp 193–222. Kahnemann, D (2003), “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics”, Amercian Economic Review, Vol. 93(5), pp. 1449–1475. Kohn, D L, and Sack, B (2003), “Central Bank Talk: Does It Matter and Why?”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2003–55. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Lange, J, Sack B, and Whitesell, W (2003), “Anticipations of Monetary Policy in Financial Markets”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 35(6), pp. 889–909. Mishkin, F (2004), “Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far”, NBER Working Paper No. 10829. Moessner, R (2013), “Effects of Explicit FOMC Policy Rate Guidance on Interest Rate Expectations”, Economics Letters, Vol. 121(2), pp. 170–173. Morris, S and Shin, H S (2018), “Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices”, AEA Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 108, pp. 572–577. Samuelson, P (1994), Panel remarks, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference, Conference Series 38, Jeffrey C Fuhrer (ed) “Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers”. 1 Bernanke (2007) 2 Blinder et al. (2008) 3 Lange et al.

The end product is usually of laudable standards and serves as a good yardstick for domestic practices to be benchmarked against. Investor protection The third reason is that a common set of standards facilitates sound regulatory oversight that is based on consistent treatment of cross-border markets and activities. With regulators using the same standards in assessing systems, products and practices, market players that deal with foreign institutions or instruments can take comfort that those institutions and products are regulated based on similar high standards. Efficiency & cost savings And the fourth reason is that the establishment of a set of standards that is subscribed to internationally has the effect of aligning the regulatory practices in different jurisdictions. This allows international financial institutions operating in different markets with similar features and rules drawn up according to international standards, to benefit from lower compliance costs. Given a choice, from the business proposition point of view, few fund managers, issuers or financial advisers would wish to expend resources on compliance systems to keep track of different requirements and procedures in different markets. Much work is already underway to develop international standards on specific subjects. Within IOSCO, MAS is a participant of various of its working groups including the Internet Project Team and the Implementation Committee which, as its name suggests, has been tasked to implement the 30 IOSCO principles of securities regulation. Apart from IOSCO, a number of other fora has also proposed recommendations in their respective areas.
Christian Noyer: Macroprudential policies – implementation and interactions Introduction by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, before the Bank of France’s Financial Stability Review Panel (Panel RSF), New York, 14 April 2014. *  *  *  Dear Governors, Dear colleagues, Ladies and gentlemen, I am very proud, today, to launch the 2014 issue of the Banque de France’s Financial Stability Review on “Macroprudential policies: implementation and interactions”. Since 2002, our Review has brought together contributions from prominent academics, practitioners and policy-makers from all over the world on topical issues. This year, macroprudential policy has been one of the focuses of policy-thinking and policy-making and it is likely to be so for some time to come. I am sure that this issue of the Banque de France’s FSR will provide food for thought and action. I warmly thank all the experts who have contributed to this Review for their papers of exceptional quality and depth. I do not have time to mention all of them and only some authors are here with me today. These contributions are very diverse in their assessment and experiences of macroprudential policies. Policy recommendations and proposals are sometimes difficult to reconcile but this is what we want to achieve in our FSR. Naturally, we don’t necessarily share all the views expressed in all the articles, but we do believe in the exchange of ideas.

For this reason, as part of the 2015 preparations for the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA), it asked insurers to conduct an in-depth analysis of the impact of persistent low rate scenarios on their solvency, finances and ability to meet their commitments. In addition, this year EIOPA is conducting a Europe-wide stress test. For France, the scope of this exercise is particularly broad: the ACPR has extended it to cover 90% of the market, compared with the 75% specified by EIOPA. Unlike bank stress tests, insurance stress tests are not “fail or pass” and as a result will not lead to the application of additional capital requirements. The findings, to be published by mid-December, will make it possible to determine precisely how exposed the insurance market is to the risks linked to the low rate environment. The ORSA exercise and stress-tests will enable the ACPR to identify weaknesses, and we fully intend to discuss any counter measures to be put in place with the establishments concerned. Lastly, there is the proposal, under the draft Sapin law, to extend the powers of the French macroprudential authority, the HCSF, to the insurance sector. There is no point trying to turn this into a controversy; indeed doing so would only be counterproductive for the protection of policyholders. Let me say this  Page 5 sur 7  unequivocally: there is no threat to the savings of French investors, and no question of making changes to the terms of their policies.
Már Guðmundsson: The fault-lines in cross-border banking: lessons from the Icelandic case Keynote address by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Banking Law Symposium 2011, OECD, Paris, 4 October 2011. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking the OECD and other organisers and sponsors for inviting me to speak in this symposium. The title of your symposium is “Crisis management and the use of government guarantees”. This was a highly relevant issue when three cross-border banks in Iceland collapsed in early October 2008, and that is probably why I am here.1 In the panic that gripped global financial markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these banks – like so many internationally active banks around the world – were faced with a wholesale run on their foreign currency liabilities, and were therefore heading towards a default on them in the absence of lender of last resort assistance in foreign currency. However, given the size of the balance sheets involved (10 times GDP overall, with over twothirds in foreign currency), it was impossible for the Icelandic authorities to provide such assistance on their own. It would indeed have been catastrophic if they had made a full-scale attempt to do so. The background to these events was that the Icelandic banking system expanded very rapidly in just under five years. Its balance sheet grew from under 2 times GDP at the end of 2003 to almost 10 times GDP by mid-2008.

Be that as it may, with the solvency assumption in mind, the authorities had tried to build defences against potential foreign currency liquidity problems at the banks by negotiating swap lines and by tapping foreign capital markets, in both cases with limited success. The problem was surely exacerbated by the handling of a LOLR request from one of the banks in late September 2008. The announced solution was to nationalise the bank. This would have been a disaster if it had been carried out because it would have made the Government responsible for refinancing a bleeding foreign currency balance sheet, which it did not have the resources to do. FX reserves and swap lines amounted to only 35% of GDP, and at that point the Government itself was shut out of international capital markets. Nationalising the bank would have turned a bank foreign currency refining problem into a sovereign problem with the serious risk that the sovereign might have defaulted on such foreign currency payments. The decision was, however, never implemented because of the ensuing full-scale run on the foreign liabilities of the banks and the domino effects inside the Icelandic economy. But the time to consider the options was rapidly running out. Given the lack of international co-operation, the Icelandic authorities were forced at this point to consider radical solutions.
We can preempt such a rise in inflation by tightening monetary policy at a later time. 2  BIS Review 27/2003  Relaxed monetary policy Our interest rate cut of 50 basis points last March was the last possible downward interest rate adjustment. Our intention was to resolutely counter the appreciation of the Swiss franc vis-à-vis the euro in the current difficult economic environment. So far, it has been a successful step: the Swiss franc has depreciated markedly against the euro. Monetary conditions have again become considerably more relaxed. For the time being, we intend to continue to implement an expansionary monetary policy and to support the economic recovery in Switzerland. Swiss franc investments are to remain unattractive in the foreseeable future. Economic recovery is still uncertain. There is even recurring talk of a deflation risk in Switzerland. We consider this to be a minimal risk. In a few months, inflation may well be negative. An actual deflation spiral leading to a strong decline in the demand for goods and in output is, however, highly unlikely as long as the Swiss franc does not appreciate inordinately. We shall therefore continue to take decisive steps to combat a tightening of the monetary conditions brought about by any significant rise of the Swiss franc against the euro. You will certainly have taken note of the high growth rates of the money supply aggregates in the last few quarters. The money supply aggregates are currently growing at rates last seen at the end of the eighties.

On discussing this transaction, the bank authorities of the National Bank expressed their concern that it was now even more obvious that the National Bank’s profit transfer was reaching a level that cannot be maintained in the long term. The Governing Board shares the bank authorities’ concern that a later return to the “normal level”, which will only amount to approximately Sfr 1 billion, is likely to create considerable political difficulties. From today’s vantage point, it cannot be ruled out, moreover, that as a result of the additional distribution on the income-yielding free assets the National Bank’s provisions will be reduced more rapidly than had been assumed when the main agreement on the National Bank’s profit distribution was concluded in April 2002. At 2.9% a year, the income forecast on which this agreement was based is rather optimistic given the low yield level on the financial markets for some time to come. It may therefore well be that a downward adjustment will become necessary as early as 2007, when, in terms of the agreement, the level of distribution will be reconsidered. In any case, the National Bank does not consider an annual profit distribution of Sfr 3 billion from 2007 onward as by any means a certainty. We think it is important to draw attention to these risks well in time. We also explained them to the Head of the Federal Department of Finance and asked him to advise the responsible persons of the cantons of our misgivings.
Three quarters of the Bank’s assets is in the form of a loan to the Asset Purchase Facility backing £ of gilt holdings and £ of corporate bonds, while another £ has been lent to banks under the Term Funding Scheme (Chart 3).9 A further £ of liquidity has been extended under the so-called ‘Index Linked Term Repo’ facility, part of the Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF). Nearly all of that activity has been financed by an increase in central bank reserves (Chart 4). 8 9  Alongside meeting regulatory liquidity requirements, and deposit insurance. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/funding-for-lending-and-other-market-operations 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  Chart 3: Bank of England assets  Chart 4: Bank of England liabilities  Source: Bank of England Note to Charts 3-4: The Special Liquidity and Funding for Lending Schemes (SLS and FLS respectively) were funded through asset swaps rather than reserves, so were not on balance sheet. They are nevertheless shown for context. Although created to finance asset purchases and loans, this increase in reserves supply has also allowed us to (more than) meet a sharp pickup in the demand for reserves as a safe asset, underpinning financial stability.

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Cultivate a strong culture of innovation within to increase value-add and catalyse private investment Development institutions should be leading innovators in providing solutions to stimulate investment and entrepreneurship especially in uncharted sectors. In my view, a key part of their contribution to development has to be in evolving non-traditional approaches to encourage investments in targeted sectors, precisely because conventional approaches have not responded adequately. Indeed, they should be providing the richest environment for adaptive learning, creativity and innovation to effectively serve their mandates. Innovation is also being supported through a “test and learn” approach which allows for experimentation by financial institutions in close coordination with regulators. This approach promotes a deeper understanding of risks inherent in new solutions and products, and the appropriate ways to control them. The introduction of the regulatory sandbox in several countries, including Malaysia, to support regulatory flexibilities for the deployment of FinTech reflects such a “test and learn” approach. Development financial institutions should use technology to advance the cause of their mandate. To be innovative, development financial institutions must be able to attract and retain good leadership and talent. KfW in Germany and Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), two global development financial institutions, were recognised as being among the top 100 employers in their respective countries in 2017. Well-designed talent strategies, and an environment that nurtures experimentation and adaptive learning with appropriate oversight and controls are key. These require bold and visionary leadership.

Fadilj Bajrami: Continued cooperation with central banks of the Western Balkans Address by Mr Fadilj Bajrami, Vice Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, on the occasion of the first Programme Steering Committee Meeting of the ECB Regional Cooperation Programme with central banks in the Western Balkans, Tirana, 17 April 2014. *  *  *  Honorable Governor Fullani, Honorable Governor Hamza, Dear Mr. Sturm, Dear Mr. Rumbold, Representatives of central banks, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my honor and pleasure to be here with you in Tirana on the occasion of the first meeting of the Steering Committee for the joint cooperation project between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Eurosystem, and the central banks of the Western Balkans. As my colleagues have already noted, most of the activities of the project will be devoted to identifying the needs of the central banks of Albania and Kosovo in the process of their joining the European System of Central Banks, by strengthening their capacities and compliance with the standards of the central banking in the EU. Last year, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia successfully implemented such a project in cooperation with the ECB and the Eurosystem. The project implementation has clearly identified the changes that the NBRM should focus on during its preparations for accession to the European System of Central Banks.
Fourth, the significant reduction in the Treasury’s financing capacity in 2014 and 2015 is well reflected in the aggregate monetary survey, with the Treasury becoming a net borrower in 2015 vis-à-vis the banking system for the first time in many years. On the other hand, the decline in net external assets and the significant slowdown in the growth of credits to the economy more than offset the reversal of the Treasury’s net position. Overall, monetary expansion, as measured by M2 growth, was only 0.12 percent in 2015, the lowest rate ever, mainly reflecting the magnitude of the impact of the oil price decline. Excluding hydrocarbon sector deposits, the money supply increased by 2.8 percent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The credits to deposits ratio rose from 69.5 percent by end 2013 to 74.7 percent by end 2014 and 86.7 percent by end 2015, indicating a decline in the surplus of banks’ collected resources compared to extended credits. The evolution of credits, in particular medium and long term credits, in a situation of stable deposits, is the main factor explaining the decline in the public banks’ short term liquidity ratio. Deposits in the banking sector, which rose in 2013 (7.5 percent) and 2014 (17.5 percent), slightly declined in 2015 (-0.2 percent) as a result of the sharp contraction in the deposits of the hydrocarbon sector (-41 percent).

This has grown from around $ billion in December 2001 to over $ billion in December 2015 (according to IMF statistics). And this growth has been positive each year except for a decline during the last global financial crisis. In the same period, total portfolio investment assets held by investors from the Asia and Pacific region in these same European markets have grown from $ billion to over $ billion.3 Therefore, developments in each of our jurisdiction and region can have a significant spill-over impact on the other. Financial regulators form one important stakeholder group and platforms for dialogue and sharing such as in this forum will be helpful in promoting greater mutual understanding and cooperation. Importance of regulatory cooperation I am sure that everyone in this room will agree on the importance of regulatory exchanges and co-operation. Asia-Pacific jurisdictions including Singapore play host to many European financial institutions which are active and significant participants in our respective financial markets. Such crossborder and cross-region participation have benefitted both regions. For example, the recognition of LCH.Clearnet and the Singapore Exchange Derivatives Clearing by MAS and EU authorities, respectively, provide local market participants and European Financial Institutions a choice of where to clear their transactions. More importantly, the recognition will allow market participants to comply with their respective jurisdiction’s central clearing requirements when they are effected, thus avoiding duplicating or conflicting requirements.
As some banks may be too big to fail, as regulators we should also discuss the possibilities of creating debt instruments which automatically convert to equity when losses mount above certain trigger points. Building trust to enhance cross-border crisis management A financial crisis is costly to resolve. The potential costs are so large that only the nation state, through its power to tax, can shoulder the costs. This makes the state the only ultimate and credible guarantor of financial stability. Today, we have a mismatch between the geographical reach of the only party that can guarantee financial stability – the state – and the international financial system. The logical solutions to this geographical mismatch are either to shrink the financial system back to within national borders or to create an international institution with a right to tax or a system of burden-sharing, so that confidence in an ultimate guarantor can be established on an international level. The first solution would be too costly. Basically, it would imply rolling back decades of globalisation and financial integration. Consider, for example, the costs of dismantling a large cross-border bank. It would also mean a serious blow to the European single market. In a way, I find it puzzling that we are discussing the possibility of a single market for all kinds of goods and services except for the commodity most suited for free trade: money.

At the end of April, the daily turnover of RMB foreign exchange transactions in Hong Kong had reached $ billion equivalent, more than eight times greater than five years ago. The average daily turnover of Hong Kong’s RMB Real Time Gross Settlement system also exceeded RMB1 trillion recently. Going forward, we should see more products denominated in RMB. This is an area where market participants can play their part and why we also think seminars like this are important in bringing together ideas and looking at solutions. Building market infrastructure The HKMA has played a major role in promoting market development, with our strategy focusing on strengthening market infrastructure to support offshore RMB business. Indeed, liquidity is the linchpin in growing this offshore business and the HKMA has in place a RMB400 billion currency swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China which can be activated when market conditions warrant. In addition, we have made available an RMB liquidity facility to banks which is currently offering intraday repos of up to RMB10 billion, as well as overnight funds on T+0 basis and one-day and one-week funds settled on T+1 basis. We have also appointed seven banks as Primary Liquidity Providers (PLPs) and provided each with a bilateral repo facility of up to RMB2 billion. These facilities have helped banks to better manage their RMB liquidity and played a significant role in offshore market development. These facilities will be reviewed from time to time with the aim of providing better liquidity support to the offshore RMB market.