samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For further information, see the following list of FAQs: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_ swapfaqs.htm. 19  See Michael Fleming (2012), “Federal Reserve Liquidity Facilities Gross $ Billion for us Taxpayers” Liberty Street Economics (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, November). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  system is constantly evolving and it requires constant monitoring and analysis since it is not a self-regulating system. The main message I hope to leave you with is while economic and finance education may need to be supplemented, the analytical rigor of such an education is indispensable for coming to grips with the complexity and ever changing structure of the global financial and economic system. Analytic rigor is not sufficient by itself, however, since it needs to be combined with practical experience of the actual workings of the financial system. The Center for Global Economy and Business gives you many opportunities to start to gain this practical experience. Thank you. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

It must be recognised that structural reforms, and specifically financial sector reform, is of crucial importance if this recovery is to be turned into sustainable economic growth. A bank with the mandate to promote development in Asia must surely have a role to play in all this and I look forward to greater involvement of the Bank, in whatever capacity, in maintaining the momentum of structural reforms in Asia. Mr President, the efficiency of financial markets in the region in performing the important function of financial intermediation has been found lacking. There has been notably little disagreement about the desirability of developing domestic and regional bond markets. But there has also been little progress. And there has been no lack of explanation of why this is the case. The often quoted impediments include the lack of clearing and settlement infrastructure, the absence of a broad institutional investor base, the lack of a benchmark yield curve, low liquidity, and so on. While these impediments are recognised and are being tackled earnestly by national authorities, there is one problem that has attracted relatively little attention so far. The problem relates to the generally low credit ratings of the Asian issuers, including the sovereigns, granted by the international rating agencies. 1  BIS Review 38/2000  I do not wish to provoke a debate on the objectivity and reliability of the ratings and the rating process of the international rating agencies.
Most, but not all, non-conventional measures have led central banks to use and expand their balance sheet in order to influence a broader set of financial parameters: long-term interest rates, credit spreads and credit volumes. In the euro area, the bulk of interventions have aimed at providing unlimited liquidity to the banking system, first through the “fixed rate full allotment” procedure adopted in 2008, then through a progressive extension of maturities, culminating in the two three-year LTROs decided on in December 2011. Other central banks, and more recently, the Eurosystem, have resorted to asset purchases, both private and public, sometimes on a large scale. So-called “forward guidance” on interest rates has been  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  used, especially in the United States, to influence interest rate expectations and bring down the yield curve. Most recently, additional innovations have been introduced in the United Kingdom and Japan, where central banks have taken actions to directly stimulate private credit to the economy. These actions have involved a mix of regulatory measures and targeted liquidity providing operations, such as the “funding for lending” scheme implemented in the United Kingdom. 2. It is important to note that none of these developments were imposed on central banks by governments. In all countries, non-conventional measures and the consecutive expansion of balance sheets were a deliberate and voluntary response to financial market developments that threatened their integrity, their functioning and overall economic stability. Nor were these measures planned in advance.

These interventions have largely succeeded in avoiding deflation and a cumulative fall in GDP during the most acute phases of the crisis. It remains true, however, that, contrary to past episodes which followed deep recessions, the current recovery appears sluggish, uncertain and fragile. The global growth environment remains affected by significant uncertainties. Today, I would like to reflect upon these developments and focus on the challenges facing central banks in the post-crisis environment. 1. Let me start with a few stylised facts The first, and most visible, is the spectacular expansion in central banks’ balance sheets. In all advanced economies, their size has been multiplied, over four years, by a factor of two to five. This is an unprecedented development. Beyond advanced countries, central banks in emerging economies have also, to a lesser extent, expanded their balance sheets, mainly, but not only, as a result of foreign exchange interventions. A second, and related, feature is the diversification of central banks’ interventions. Prior to the crisis, central banks would conduct monetary policy by determining the policy rate, and, in some countries, by imposing compulsory reserve requirements on banks. The crisis has led to the development and proliferation of so called “non-conventional measures”, with two objectives. First, to remedy financial market disruptions; and second, to provide further monetary accommodation once policy rates have been brought down to very low levels and hit the so-called “zero lower bound”.
As a representative of the French government, I negotiated the Maastricht Treaty with Horst Köhler, the current German President, who, like me, was then Undersecretary of the Treasury. Those were very important and inspiring negotiations, and we became friends. I am proud that the euro is as trustworthy as the Deutsche Mark used to be. The promise we made to our fellow citizens that the new currency would be as solid and credible as the best national currencies has been kept. FOCUS: What irritates you about Germany? Trichet: I deeply believe that the different European cultures complement each other. I was surprised at the beginning to see that any time a decision is taken in Germany, all the arguments against the decision are meticulously listed, even if that decision has already been agreed in principle. At first I was surprised, because in many other cultures, all the arguments that support your conclusion are given strongly preferential treatment. 4  BIS Review 7/2010  FOCUS: Is that wrong? Trichet: With time, I have seen that this German method is a good way of ruling out the possibility of serious mistakes. FOCUS: Has the fact that you have learnt German helped you? Trichet: It certainly has. At the ECB, we mostly talk in English. But in the corridors you’re just as likely to hear German, French, Italian or Spanish, and many other languages besides. Having some knowledge of the German language has enabled me to better understand the culture of the country.

Likewise, the iTraxx Sovereign Western Europe Index, consisting of 15 sovereign CDS across Europe, rose by approximately 70% in the same period. 2  This is an approximation of the real effective exchange rate, assuming constant weights and inflation differentials. 3  Annualised volatility computed over one calendar month on the basis of daily movements. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  rate on 6 September, EUR/CHF volatility has fallen below 10%, though it remains high from a historical perspective. The introduction of the minimum exchange rate also had an impact on some of the dynamic properties of the Swiss franc. As the red bar on the left side of chart 2 suggests, there was previously a positive correlation between the movements of the Swiss franc and those of risk indicators such as the VIX Index, i.e. investors tend to buy Swiss francs when perceived risk increases. In the same vein, the blue bar on the left of the chart shows that the correlation between the movements of the Swiss franc and those of risky assets, such as the equity shares on the MSCI World Index, has historically been negative. In other words, negative market developments have often been accompanied by a rising Swiss franc. Intriguingly, as the right side of chart 2 shows, the introduction of the minimum exchange rate appears to have had a significant impact on these correlations. The SNB’s implementation of monetary policy: liquidity measures On 3 August, the SNB started to implement liquidity measures against the massively overvalued Swiss franc.
What attracted me most at that time was the collection of journals he, as a college student, was having in different subjects: Free World from the US Embassy; Commonwealth Today from the British High Commission; Nawa Yugaya from the Lake House; Rasawahini from the Times Group etc. I had the habit of leafing through those magazines and enjoying the titles and photographs. He did not mind our bothering him. He, in fact, encouraged us to write to the respective Missions for complimentary copies. When I entered the Vidyodaya University (now, the University of Sri Jayawardenapura) to do my undergraduate studies in management in late 1960s, Professor Tilakaratna had just returned to the island having completed his doctorate at the prestigious Queen’s University in Canada. He took all our courses in economics: micro, macro, welfare economics, international finance, international trade, public finance, development economics etc. Hence, we could safely say that our whole undergraduate knowledge of economics was imparted to us by him. He had referred to all the latest text-books, meticulously prepared his notes and updated them continuously. I still recall that the students were eagerly waiting for his lectures. This was because of the comprehensiveness of the lectures and the unique method of delivery. He used to explain the technical terms again and again as and when they emerged in his lectures, until their meaning was permanently implanted in our minds. We were all benefited by his up to date treatment of the subject.

Timothy F Geithner: Perspectives on US monetary policy Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before Princeton University’s Center for Economic Policy Studies, Princeton, NJ, 1 April 2005. *  *  *  I am glad to be here at Princeton's Center for Economic Policy Studies to have this conversation with Alan Blinder and to address some of the key questions regarding monetary policy today. I am particularly pleased to be in front of such a distinguished audience, including colleagues from the Federal Reserve who will be talking about some of the same questions at tomorrow's meeting. I would like to start with a few propositions about the state of U.S. monetary policy and the Fed today. The achievements in inflation outcomes of the past decade or so - low inflation, less volatility in inflation, more moderate long term inflation expectations, and less volatility in those expectations, achievements that are impressive relative to past U.S. experience as well as to the gains of other mature central banks - suggest we are close to the frontier of monetary policy credibility. These gains came alongside a significant reduction in the volatility of U.S. output. And they are impressive in light of the speed and force with which the Fed acted in several instances of systemic financial distress.
Opposition to infrastructure reform by those firms that have in the past benefited from complexity and lack of transparency must be firmly overcome. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that central counterparties themselves can become single points of failure, with potentially devastating consequences. Central counterparties must therefore have sufficient financial resources to withstand the default of the largest participants. Operators and regulators should carefully evaluate the adequacy of the risk management models and financial resources of central counterparties. Only if central counterparties are financially sound can they play their critical role in preserving financial stability. Finally, as an ultimate resort, we cannot ignore the need to consider measures that address the size of banks, indirectly or directly. 13 Admittedly, there are some benefits from size. But the empirical evidence suggests that these benefits are rather limited. Economies of scale, whereby larger amounts can be produced at lower average cost, already appear to have been exhausted in the case of relatively small banks. 14 Obviously, banking systems made up of only small banks are not immune to crisis episodes. But let us not make the mistake of using another problem as an excuse to shy away from the severe moral hazard problem associated with the largest banks. It is also sometimes argued that interconnectedness matters more than size when it comes to systemic importance. It is evident that both size and interconnectedness matter. Recent empirical evidence, however, indicates that systemic importance increases more than proportionately with size.

John C Williams: The gold beneath our feet Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the GARP Global Risk Forum, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 7 November 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery When plans for the New York Fed’s headquarters here at 33 Liberty Street were developed in 1921, the building committee compiled 33 pages of requirements for potential architects.1 I can assure you that our appreciation for bureaucracy has endured the test of time! Joking aside, the focus of many of those requirements was specifications for the building’s gold vault. Beneath our feet lies a triple-tiered vault system with 122 separate compartments for storing gold bars. For those of you who are Harry Potter fans, it’s as close to Gringotts Bank as you’ll find anywhere in the world—although for security reasons I am not allowed to confirm or deny that we have a dragon down there. The whole building was constructed around the vault. Engineers had to excavate 117 feet down to the bedrock for a foundation that could support the weight of the construction. Why am going into so much depth about the gold? There is a reason! But before I explain, I should give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System.
12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  12  Consumers should have greater choice, better services and equal access to finance. Small and medium sized businesses should have access to new credit to grow. Banks themselves should be more productive and supervision more efficient. And the financial system should seize the opportunities and manage the risks associated with the UK’s transition to a carbon-neutral economy. The success of the new finance will be assured if we remember some old lessons, namely: -  That similar activities should be regulated consistently;  -  That markets don’t always clear, liquidity is state contingent and the riskiness of an asset depends in part on the entity that holds it;  -  That individual responsibility is essential for collective welfare;  -  That ending Too big to Fail is a moral and a financial imperative; and  -  That when it comes to financial stability, success is an orphan. Memories fade, complacency sets in and the virtues of prudence are soon forgotten. Most fundamentally, we must always remember that finance is not an end in itself. It is a servant of the real economy, of the households and entrepreneurs that make this country great. They are demanding a more sustainable, inclusive and prosperous future. The ultimate test of the New Finance is whether it helps deliver just that. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13

Ladies and gentlemen, Let's now shift gears from the institutional to the systemic. With the continuously evolving ML/TF landscape, banks are expected to play a more active role in protecting the wider integrity of the financial system – and ultimately the public funds they are entrusted with. This demands greater vigilance and awareness of trends of serious crimes in the country and emerging threats impacting the system. It also calls for effective responses in the form of more robust, agile controls to address these identified trends and threat in a timely manner. From the National Risk Assessment 2020 undertaken by members of the National Coordination Committee to counter money laundering and to assess and facilitate the understanding of ML/TF risk exposures, it was found that the top five high-risks crimes that pose substantial ML/TF threats to the country are corruption, fraud, smuggling, illicit drug trafficking and organised crimes. Corruption remains a systemic issue, and is particularly insidious, since it facilitates and sometimes enables others significant crimes such as fraud, drugs, human trafficking and environmental crimes. The assessment also indicated that the banking sector is exposed to high level of ML /TF risks. With banks as the nexus between all financial and non-financial sectors, the banking platform has become an ideal channel to be abused for criminal activities including corruption.
Importantly, the latest policy decisions remained fully in line with the ECB’s mandate and the principles I mentioned just now. Those who say that we were or still are “behind the curve” should consider all the decisions the ECB has taken since the financial crisis has intensified and broadened. In this respect, let us not forget that a central bank has only one instrument at hand, namely monetary policy. It cannot be held accountable for meeting more than one objective. Any such attempt would  2  BIS Review 139/2008  overburden monetary policy. For this reason, the Treaty provides for a clear and efficient allocation of policy responsibilities, with price stability being exclusively and primarily assigned to an independent ECB as its primary objective. Not surprisingly, our debates yesterday and today have triggered the question of how to safeguard EMU and build on its achievements at a time when the world’s financial landscape is changing dramatically. In fact, the current financial turmoil – the origins and implications of which we discussed in detail – is likely to dampen demand in the euro area and the rest of the world for quite some time. It may well turn out to be a litmus test for the functioning of EMU, both in economic and institutional terms. Having carefully listened to the presentations, I remain confident that monetary union will withstand the test of time. As illustrated during the conference, the euro has already brought real benefits to the 320 million people in the euro area.

These measures could be perceived as innovative: •  it has provided full allotment at a fixed interest rate in all its refinancing operations;  •  it has expanded the range of eligible collateral in this context; and,  •  in close cooperation with other central banks, it has taken measures to improve global funding conditions in various currencies. Allow me to add here, on a personal basis, a word of caution: we, as central bankers, have the obligation to remain prudent. First, not to set the wrong incentives for market participants. Second, central banks need to be aware of any operational and reputational risks associated with the adoption of new measures and less traditional instruments, notably for the balance sheet of the Eurosystem and, ultimately, for the credibility of the ECB’s monetary policy. Not to mention the potential impact on central bank independence. The reputation of the ECB is firmly based on the credibility of its commitment to price stability. This credibility must by no means be put at stake. Likewise, in its monetary policy decisions, the ECB has not shied away from taking some highly unusual but appropriate steps. Within the space of less than one month, on 8 October and 6 November, the ECB lowered its key rates by 100 basis points in total. These moves were remarkable and unique in the ECB’s ten-year history – in terms of magnitude, timing and rapidity.
Because the cost of abolishing institutions is high, the number of international groupings and institutions has proliferated in recent years. Many of them tread on each others toes. As a result, the IMF, World Bank and OECD, have all been bruised. Duplication of roles is wasteful of time, money and focus. Each institution should have one very clear remit, and focus on it. Of course, countries which play a role in one institution but not in another will have an incentive to build up the role of the former at the expense of the latter. So it is up to the member countries to limit the battle for turf. There are few examples where all these principles appear to have been followed. The World Trade Organisation has been an effective umpire of countries’ commitments about trade restrictions and comes close. But the example of the WTO highlights the importance, above all else, of clear commitments from nation states themselves. The failure of countries to conclude a multilateral trade round since the WTO was formed more than a decade ago is worrying. The Doha round has continued past its expected completion date and only a brave commentator would forecast eventual success. The fault does not lie with the WTO. Instead, it reflects the fact that national governments have not been willing to make the necessary commitments. BIS Review 126/2006  3  4. What do those principles mean for the IMF? With those principles in mind, I want to consider the challenge of reforming the IMF.

Joseph Yam: Competition and cooperation among global and regional financial centres Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Concurrent Panel Sessions of the Lujiazui Forum, Hong Kong, 9 May 2008. *  *  *  There are two points that I would like to make. First, given that many jurisdictions claim to be or wish to develop as international financial centres, we need to be clear about what actually defines an international financial centre. We in Hong Kong have given much thought to this, principally because Article 109 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region requires that "The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall provide an appropriate economic and legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre". We obviously do not wish to fail in this legal responsibility. I do not believe that being the nth largest foreign exchange trading centre or the presence of many of the largest international financial institutions are good definitions for an international financial centre. Indeed, with the advancement of information technology, there may be a tendency for the market place to migrate into cyber space. In my opinion, an international financial centre is a centre in which the function of financial intermediation, which is so important for supporting economic growth and development, takes place on an international dimension.