samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Growth is projected to stabilise in the second half of the year, and to remain stable in 2024 and 2025, underpinned by a recovery in real disposable income thanks to the anticipated easing of inflation, rising wages and resilient employment. Conversely, the tightening of monetary policy will exert increasing downside pressure on economic activity. All told, GDP is projected to grow by 0.9% in 2023 and by 1.5% in 2024, with both figures revised down by 0.1 percentage points (pp) compared with the March projections. The GDP growth forecast for 2025 is unchanged at 1.6%. Inflation declined further in May (to 6.1%), with a zero contribution from the energy component. Meanwhile, food and services prices have barely dropped from their recent alltime highs. Underlying inflation stood at 5.3% in May and has shown greater downward stickiness than expected a few months ago. The Eurosystem projections point to a gradual reduction in inflation as a result of base effects, the expected gradual moderation of energy and food prices and their progressive pass-through to underlying inflation. These factors should offset the mounting pressure from wages. Profit margins, which grew in recent quarters, are expected to moderate over the projection horizon. Overall, inflation is forecast to stand at 5.4% in 2023, to subsequently ease to 3% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025. These inflation projections are similar to the March ones.

We should take an open-minded approach to the findings of these exercises, which generally allow us to fine-tune the regulations so that they can be adapted on an ongoing basis in response to changing circumstances. Nor should we forget that in several jurisdictions the last leg of the regulatory reform – Basel III – is yet to be transposed into law. This regulation must be transposed completely and consistently so as to remedy the outstanding shortcomings, in particular in the definition of banks’ risk-weighted assets. Lastly, the short and medium-term challenges posed by the recent period of extraordinary crises do not detract from the pressing need to tackle the banking sector’s structural challenges, such as those linked to climate-related risk management, digitalisation and growing competition from tech firms. 8
Each month about 1,300 household heads participate in our survey. This is a nationally representative sample. Respondents remain on the panel for up to 12 months, with a constant fraction entering and rotating out each month. This allows us to monitor the expectations of the same respondents over time, which provides important benefits. First, it gives us greater confidence that month-tomonth changes in our headline numbers reflect true changes in beliefs, and not just changes in the sample composition. Second, observing repeated responses by the same individuals allows us to examine how expectations are formed and revised over time. Third, by following the same people over time, we are able to study how expectations are related to contemporaneous and future economic decisions and outcomes for these respondents. Today the SCE team will provide further background about the survey, discuss newly released findings for October and recent trends in some of its main indicators. The team will then present findings from two special components of the SCE: one that covers households’ credit experiences and expectations, and one that deals with labor market behavior and expectations. Before I pass this on to my colleagues, I would like to comment briefly on these two special surveys. New findings on Credit Access The SCE Credit Access Survey supplements the information collected in the Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, also known as SLOOS. The SLOOS is a primary source of information on credit standards and credit demand as perceived and reported by banks.

William C Dudley: Opening remarks at the Economic Press Briefing on the Survey of Consumer Expectations Opening remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Press Briefing on the Survey of Consumer Expectations, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 18 November 2016. * * * Good morning, and welcome to the New York Fed’s Economic Press Briefing. I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today about our Survey of Consumer Expectations. This is an important source of information that we use in our analysis of current and future economic conditions to help inform our monetary policy decisions. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System.1 In pursuing its monetary policy objectives, the Federal Reserve relies on a large number of data sources that provide information about recent developments and the current state of the economy. Most of these data sources are backward looking. That is, they provide data about past decisions and outcomes. In contrast, we know relatively little about the forward-looking subjective expectations and intentions of economic agents, which are a key determinant of current and future outcomes. This information, though, is essential for formulating policy and evaluating its effectiveness. The macroeconomic outcomes we observe reflect preferences and constraints, as well as beliefs of individual consumers and firms.
Reflecting diversity, choosing inclusion Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  Court Room, Bank of England 9 February 2017  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth, Anne Wetherilt and Iain de Weymarn for their assistance in preparing these remarks, and to Richard Galletly, Cat Hines and Daniel Nixon for background research. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  And there were never, in the world, two opinions alike, no more than two hairs, or two grains; their most universal quality is diversity. (Michel de Montaigne, Essais, Book II, Chapter 37)  Introduction  The Bank of England recognises that to pursue its mission it must reflect the diversity of the people it serves. That has not always been the case. Historically, there were times when this institution was run by the City for the City. Our first female Court member, Frances Heaton was only appointed in 1993, while our first Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) member, Lord Morris, followed five years later. Ten years ago our th  graduate intake was drawn from just 11 universities. And I am the 120 in a very long line of male Governors of the Bank. Frequent charges levelled at this central bank – like many of our peers – include being mono-culture, secretive and ridden with groupthink. Those charges began to lose their force in the face of significant efforts by my predecessors.

Unfortunately, there continues to be limited diversity in both US and UK economics  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  xx  departments, which to some degree, constrains whom we can hire . Both the education sector and the Bank need to do more to broaden access. xxi  One new initiative that enables the Bank to hire graduates from a broader set of disciplines and train them as economists and technical specialists is our new Central Bank Qualification. Similarly, our African-Caribbean scholarship aims to attract those hitherto underrepresented in central banking. Launched in 2015, the scholarship has given three students per year £ toward living and study costs, offered summer internships and provided career mentors. To recruit experienced hires, we have committed to ensure that wherever possible, we will create diverse shortlists for jobs and interview people with diverse panels in order to mitigate affinity effects and unconscious biases. This is starting to pay off. Of the 700 experienced professionals we hired last year, almost half were women and a quarter came from a BAME background, up from two-fifths and one fifth respectively since our strategic plan was launched. In recent years, we have recruited new PhD students not just from economics, but from physics, computer science, linguistics, psychology, anthropology and economic history. We recognise that career paths can be varied, so for people who want to return to work or to retrain, we are offering more opportunities to learn.
Public occupational pension schemes seem to enjoy slightly stronger constitutional protection than national insurance pensions, but the Supreme Court has  14  ROBEK – register of all municipal and county authorities subject to approval pursuant to Section 60 of the Local Government Act. 15  See discussion in Appendix 5 to the Report of the Pension Commission (NOU 2004:1). 8  BIS Review 123/2010  repeatedly stressed the authorities’ need for freedom of action when it comes to making changes to pension schemes. The Norwegian national insurance scheme is a pay-as-you-go system. This means that a given year’s pension payments from the scheme are covered by government budget revenues that year. When the national insurance scheme was introduced in 1967, a fund was established to provide for an expected reduction in private saving. However, pensions were still included in the central government budget at an early stage and financed by current tax revenues. Transfers to the National Insurance Fund were soon discontinued. Nevertheless, confidence in the pension system has actually remained intact, reflected in a low level of household saving, primarily through home investment. Perhaps there is some element of miscalculation here. A fall in value may occur if many homeowners free up housing capital to cushion old age. (See Chart: Government Pension Fund Global.) It was only when transfers to the Petroleum Fund were introduced in 1996 that funds were accumulated that could also be used to cover future pension payments.

Svein Gjedrem: Business cycles, crises and public finances – will governments be able to honour their debts? Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, 24 September 2010. The text below may differ from the actual presentation. This speech does not contain assessments of the economic situation or current interest rate setting. * 1. *  *  Imbalances and financial crisis  The financial crisis had its origins in an abundant supply of credit, market participants who took steadily higher risk and a lack of oversight on the part of banks, companies and authorities. The global economy entered a severe downturn. The acute crisis in financial markets has been succeeded by substantial labour market and fiscal imbalances in countries around us. Severe shortcomings in the management of public finances in several advanced economies have also been revealed. How public finances are managed in these countries will also be important to Norway. In the period from 1993 to 2008, global output expanded by more than 60 per cent, or an annual rate of just under 4 per cent. At the same time, inflation remained low. This period in the Norwegian economy could be described as two golden decades. But imbalances were building up in Europe and North America. With strong income growth and easy access to loans, the number and size of homes purchased by households grew. House prices surged in many countries.
If you’re interested in risk in the financial system it isn’t enough simply to look at levels of debt and compare them with those in other countries or long-distant periods of time. For the most part those variations seem to be explained by differences in sustainable levels of debt, not differences in riskiness. Another possible lesson involves the speed of any policy response. The Bank’s Financial Policy Committee, which is responsible for monitoring and stabilising risk in the financial system as a whole, has many tools at its disposal. One of the main instruments is the so-called “Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer” (CCyB). This is an extra margin the FPC can add to banks’ capital requirements when risks are rising. The aim is to ensure that, in the event of a downturn and losses on their books, banks don’t make it worse by actively cutting back on lending. 13  See Chart 18 in Broadbent (2012). 17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  However, it takes time to implement changes in the CCyB (we have to give banks advance notice). So if it’s true that swings in credit supply develop relatively rapidly, it may be necessary to supplement the CCyB with other safeguards. I would put the 2014 housing measures, which placed limits on high-LTI lending, into this category.

Option-adjusted spread on index of high-yield bonds issued in the US and spread to maturity on index of leveraged loans issued in the US measured relative to the spot Treasury curve. 9  Graham and Leary (2011), Harris and Raviv (1991). Atkinson (1967), Bernanke et al. (1996), Greenwood and Hanson (2013). 11 The characteristic feature of cov-lite loans is not that they have fewer covenants, but that the requirements bind less often, and in particular only in response to particular events (such as additional financing). More traditional, “cov-heavy” contracts require firms to meet such requirements continually (Becker and Ivashina (2016)). 10  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  If you think there are parallels here with the subprime mortgage boom in the U.S., ahead of the last crisis, then you’d be right. Those too were grouped together and sold to investors as packages of loans, diluting the ability and incentive to monitor individual risks; they grew extremely rapidly, particularly in the last year or two of the boom – and, as it happens, they accounted at the peak for a similar share of their underlying market (13% of total U.S mortgage debt). We should recognise that, in aggregate, corporate leverage in the UK has fallen since the crisis (Chart 17, which includes bonds as well as bank loans).12 As with mortgages, interest payments on those debts remain well below average and, if bond markets are anything to go by, will remain so for quite a while yet.
Barbro Wickman-Parak: Economic analysis requires a cool head – my view of developments in Sweden and abroad Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a meeting, Luleå, 15 May 2012. *  *  *  I would like to thank Magnus Wiberg at the Monetary Policy Department of the Riksbank for help with writing this speech. When we at the Riksbank decided on the repo rate almost exactly one month ago, I was one of the majority who wanted to hold the repo rate unchanged at 1.5 per cent and to keep the repo-rate path set at the February meeting. With regard to developments abroad, I pointed out that there was every reason to express caution with regard to international economic activity in the coming period. I also pointed out that we should continue to expect fairly sudden and dramatic changes on the financial markets. At the time of the April meeting we had seen the financial unease accelerate after a period of stabilisation at the beginning of the year. The focus was on concerns regarding Spain. Now the outcome of the elections in Greece has sent even larger shockwaves through the global financial markets, and this leads to other debt-ridden countries, such as Spain, being hit by greater unease. Let me say right now that neither I nor anyone else can know with any degree of certainty what this will entail.

The risks I spoke of earlier are ones that monetary policy normally faces and has to relate to. Forecasts change over time and monetary policy has to be adjusted accordingly. We would have a completely different situation, however, if the euro crisis were to worsen dramatically, and there was substantial turmoil on the financial markets and economic activity suddenly dived. In these situations monetary policy needs to adjust to a crisis situation, and we are prepared for this. As a central bank, we need to be prepared to deal with many unexpected events. And we must make an assessment in our forecasts of the probability of these events occurring. A central assumption in our forecasts is that the financial market turbulence will gradually decline and that confidence will gradually improve in the corporate and household sectors. This does not mean that we believe that the road ahead will be straight and narrow. We have to assume that confidence in the countries’ ability to resolve their problems will vary over time, and during the process different countries will come under focus. When we summarise the measures taken since the worst phase of the crisis last autumn, the European Central Bank’s two three-year loans to European banks were one measure that provided immediate relief. An acute liquidity crisis was avoided and the loans have also prevented a tighter credit crunch than would otherwise have been the case. However, they do not solve the long-term problems faced by many euro area countries, which was not really their aim, either.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Table 1 International baseline scenario assumptions 2014  2015 (e) Dec.15 Report  2016 (f) Dec.15 Report  Mar.16 Report  2017 (f) Dec.15 Report  Mar.16 Report  Mar.16 Report  Terms of trade Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP World GDP at market exchange rates Developed ec's GDP at PPP Emerging markets' GDP at PPP External prices (in $  -1.8 3.4 3.4 2.7 1.7 4.8 -0.9  -4.2 3.0 3.1 2.5 1.9 4.0 -9.3  -4.5 2.9 3.1 2.4 1.9 4.0 -9.7  -3.8 3.2 3.4 2.8 2.1 4.4 -2.8  -4.2 2.9 3.1 2.4 1.8 4.0 -5.8  1.7 3.3 3.5 2.9 2.2 4.6 1.5  0.7 3.1 3.3 2.7 1.9 4.5 1.0  LME copper price $ WTI oil price $ Brent oil price $ Gasoline parity price $ Libor $ (nominal, 90 days)  311 93 99 731 0.2  249 49 53 466 0.3  249 49 52 467 0.3  220 43 45 373 1.0  220 40 41 398 0.7  230 49 52 384 1.6  230 45 46 420 1.5  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

The Central Bank lacks the capacity to alter the economy’s potential growth or shield it from the shocks that affect it, but it can contribute to smooth the cyclical adjustment. This is what we have been doing, always with our eyes firmly focused on our constitutional mandate to safeguard price stability, which is one of our greatest contributions to our country’s development. Our policy framework, especially exchange rate flexibility, has played a key role in this process. Suffice it to compare it with some past episodes where the exchange rate adjustment was not allowed or was tried to avoid, to later realize the important role that a fluctuating currency plays in this. But, as is always the case, every adjustment process of any significance has short-term costs to pay. In this case, inflation has been above the target range for longer than we expected. As we have stated many times before, Chile has a sound macroeconomic policy framework that allows us to adequately address the changes occurring in the economic environment. In recent years, the adjustment has been made and there are no significant macroeconomic imbalances yet to be corrected. The best contribution we can make as the Central Bank is to simply fulfill our mandate of price stability. Rest assured that we will do everything necessary to make it happen. Thank you.
I will now turn to possible developments in particular markets. First the market for euro area bonds. In aggregate, the euro area government bond market is of a broadly similar size to the US Treasuries market. So it is one of the largest securities markets in the world. It is of course not yet as fully integrated as the Treasuries market. Substantial further progress in that direction probably depends on how quickly the various initiatives to link together Europe-wide trading and settlement systems come to fruition. And there are, and will remain, credit differences between particular issuers. But I would nevertheless expect the market to become increasingly integrated and, with other bond markets, more sophisticated over time. This ‘cash’ market is of course important in its own right; and London based market participants will remain very big players in it. But as far as the development of UK financial services business is concerned, the other interest rate markets which spin off the government bond market may be the ones where we see the most rapid growth, and the greatest scope for innovation. Good examples would be the markets for repo, swaps, and other interest rate derivatives. I think that in terms of new market opportunities, one of the most important areas in the evolving euro-denominated markets could be that for corporate bonds.

For that purpose, they will still want low cost trading and settlement mechanisms that minimise their exposure to counterparty risk and the impact on their balance sheets. So there are perhaps some tensions between the various forces at work here. To take another example, economies of scale in trading, clearing and settlement suggest that to minimise costs firms should encourage consolidation and integration of these activities within a market. Yet the major firms have, understandably, been very reluctant to allow the dominance of a single supplier. For example, EBS (Electronic Broking System) was set up by the major banks to offer an alternative system for foreign exchange trading. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me finish by saying that it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the future structure of the financial services industry. If it was, strategic decision making would be easier than it seems to be. But financial service businesses based in the UK start from a strong position, and are well placed to thrive in an environment that will evolve at an increasing pace, become even more competitive, and place an even greater premium on innovation. The Bank of England will monitor and analyse the developments very carefully – both because we want UK financial services to thrive, and because in the pursuit of our financial stability responsibilities we need to be able to spot potential problems as quickly as possible. BIS Review 43/1999  6
•  Do regulatory policies – either the microprudential or macroprudential variety – have an impact on market liquidity or short-term interest rates? The BIS recently convened a working group to assess the impact of microprudential policy on the efficacy of monetary policy. The report concluded that it was difficult to draw firm conclusions. But there were some interesting observations. •  The lending activity of less well-capitalised, higher risk-taking or less liquid banks appears more responsive to a tightening of monetary policy. •  This would seem to suggest that more stringent regulations tend to weaken the transmission of monetary impulses. •  And the transmission of policy rate changes to other interest rates and asset prices may be altered if debt markets become less liquid as a result of regulatory changes. Conclusion Let me conclude by drawing together the main points. •  Microprudential policies are critically important for financial stability and we must get them right. •  But the ability of microprudential policies to achieve financial stability may be dampened by credit cycles that have their roots in broader macro forces. •  Monetary policy matters for financial stability because it affects the credit cycle. To what extent monetary policy should therefore take account of financial stability remains an unresolved matter. •  Macroprudential policy potentially offers a way out by targeting the macro sources of financial instability, leaving monetary policy to focus on price stability. •  But macroprudential policy is neither a panacea nor without cost or distortion.

Attaining that promise of greater financial stability is a challenge that is worthy of all of our talent, of our time, and of our hard work. With that, I would like to thank you for welcoming me to your conference. I offer my best wishes for fruitful and thought-provoking discussions. BIS Review 34/2004  5