samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
13. The demand for digital services is becoming stronger. This is why financial institutions continue to invest in digitalisation even with the current strong head-winds. More than 400 financial institutions and FinTech firms have applied for the Digital Acceleration Grant launched in April 2020, to strengthen their operational resilience, improve process efficiency, manage risks better and serve customers better. Our efforts to grow the tech pipeline has yielded good results. However, demand continues to outstrip the local talent supply and FIs have responded to the tech talent crunch by tripling the number of traineeship positions available in the second run of the attach-and-train Technology in Finance Immersion Programme mentioned earlier. We will expand the scope of financial sector training support beyond finance and future-enabled skills, to include deep technology areas. We hope that FIs and FinTech firms will avail themselves of this support, which will take immediate effect. 14. Individuals also have a part to play to make this work. I encourage finance professionals to continue to build and upgrade your skills, deepen your knowledge and broaden your abilities, so as to seize these new opportunities created. And we will support you along every step in your career development journey, by extending the enhanced course fee subsidies and training allowance for self-initiated learning, and provide career advisory and job matching services where required, which is also available at the career fair today.

These efforts have helped to avoid retrenchment of staff who might otherwise be displaced, and contributed to the steady decline in retrenchments in the financial sector, from the peak of 2,300 in 2016 to 1,300 in 2019.7 However, given the accelerated pace of digitalisation, we need to do more, and at scale. We are now experimenting an Artificial Intelligence (AI) platform with 13 FI partners to automate the process of identifying adjacencies in jobs and skills, so that more workers can benefit from reskilling and pivot into suitable roles. We hope to share more about the platform early next year. Creating Opportunities Our second priority is to expand opportunities for those aspiring to enter or reenter the financial sector workforce. 9. The National Jobs Council has been set up to mobilise tripartite partners’ resources to create opportunities amidst the weak labour hiring conditions. I am pleased to note that the financial sector is one of the top contributing sectors to 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  the jobs and traineeships programmes, offering a wide range of opportunities, including in technology and innovation, retail and corporate banking. Close to 60 FIs have offered about 1,300 SGUnited Traineeship positions for fresh and recent graduates in this challenging job market. As of end July 2020, 50 FIs have committed to hiring 900 Singaporeans over the next 3 years to be groomed for future leadership and specialist roles under structured talent development programmes supported by MAS.
Ranee Jayamaha: Promoting credit culture and expediting the process of debt recovery Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at a workshop on proposed law on restructuring of sick industries and other legal issues at the Centre for Banking Studies, Rajagiriya, 1 February 2005. *  *  *  Honourable Mr K C Kamalasabayson, Attorney General, Mr Sumant Batra the Guest Speaker from India, distinguish guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am happy to be associated with this Workshop aimed at deliberating on vital issues relating to the proposed law on Restructuring of Sick Industries, and other legal and financial system issues on debt recovery by financial institutions. As you are aware, the two core objectives of the Central Bank are: to secure economic and price stability and financial system stability with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of productive resources of the Country. Debt recovery is one of the core elements of financial system stability and it depends on the performance of economic sectors, the industrial sector being one of the important areas. This is why the Central Bank has been interested in promoting credit culture and expediting the process of debt recovery. In recognition of this, in the year 1990, the Central Bank was associated in the enactment of a package of fourteen Debt Recovery Related laws.

More recently, wide publicity has been given to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code which allows a debtor to continue its operations under a re-organization plan. Similarly, the Indian government initiative in the form of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act was passed with the objective of ensuring timely detection of sick and potentially sick industrial companies, to expedite the revival of potentially viable units and closure of nonviable units is noteworthy. We are informed that India is also re-examining the provisions of this law. The prevailing labour laws and parate execution powers make it difficult for financially troubled enterprises to restructure and continue business operations. The exercise of parate execution powers lead only to closure of enterprises, although the law provides for restructuring. The purchase of the mortgaged properties by the bank at the auction sale through the exercise of rights of parate execution has resulted in another undesirable phenomena, that is the accumulation of foreclosed assets on the balance sheets of banks. Undoubtedly, the closure of enterprises results in great cost to the economy by way of loss of output, loss of employment, defaults to creditors and low return to entrepreneurs. It is therefore, vital to have a sound procedure in place to assist ailing enterprises to overcome their problems, provided the enterprises are commercially viable and the problems are of a temporary nature.
Close to 60 percent of the capital in the Government Pension Fund Global – Norway’s sovereign wealth fund – is invested in global equity markets. In times of good growth in the global economy and when optimism is on the rise, the return on the Fund increases. Conversely, turbulence and low risk willingness in the market have a negative effect on the Fund’s assets. This is a risk we have to live with to achieve solid returns over time. Because of the Fund’s long-term horizon, short-term risk tolerance is high. We can exploit this by engaging in countercyclical investment. The Fund’s size also allows us to reduce risk by spreading our investments across many countries. Norway has become a global financial investor. Through the Fund’s investments, Norway increasingly takes part in value added generated in other countries. Over the past hundred years, growing global trade and cross-border flows of capital and labour have been important factors driving economic progress. At times, the principles of free trade and capital movements have been set out of play. Walls have been raised between countries in the form of trade barriers and restrictions on capital flows. This has not been successful. Countries that have attempted to shield their economies from the rest of the world have fallen back into stagnation. Growing signs of increased protectionism are again causing concern. If this tendency intensifies, international trade and prosperity will be undermined. With its open economy, Norway would be severely affected.

We have invested in a profitable oil industry and found a balance between spending petroleum revenues domestically and saving petroleum revenues. On the other hand, it seems that both the public and private sectors are having difficulties finding profitable mainland investment projects. Taking a longer view, this is a source of concern. Should petroleum revenues shrink, our economy needs more pillars to stand on. Otherwise, we as well would have to embark on a path of adjustment towards renewed growth. Perhaps Norway is not so much an economy apart after all. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13
There was no data available for 3930. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  And sometimes it works. A while back I received a letter from a mother following a visit to a school near Hull. She told of the new determination in her son to achieve what I had. The words she etched and underlined on the paper “these visits can change lives” is motivation enough to get out from the confines of the Bank’s four walls. To build diversity, the Bank will continue its work with local schools to attract young people hitherto underrepresented in central banking. A decade ago the Bank only offered work experience to children of friends and family. Last year we offered 75 work experience placements to children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The Bank also supports several school mentoring programmes that aim to raise aspirations of students from lower socio economic backgrounds. 10  We also offer on the job training  through our Central Bank Qualification and award scholarships to young African Caribbean students. Our Early Careers Recruitment Team is engaging with schools across the UK through a series of presentations and careers conventions to demystify work at the Bank and to open up the recruitment process more generally. Over 90% of these sessions are held at state schools, reaching 1000 students last year alone. We now recruit at 40 universities across the country (four times as many as a decade ago).

The growing importance of Islamic finance Indeed, Islamic Finance has grown most significantly in the last decade, posting double- digit rates since 2007, at close to 20%, compared with growth of 4% in the “conventional” financial sector. It has now reached a volume of $ 2 trillion, which is a very significant figure that represents around 1% of total global bank assets. The surge of Islamic Finance is apparent both in Islamic countries and also, in European markets, with the establishment of Islamic banks and the development of the Sukuk market for private and official issuers under some European jurisdictions. The prospects for Islamic finance are also positive, given the extensive scope for the financial inclusion of a population in a number of countries, with very low rates of bank access and usage. The regulatory challenge of Islamic finance The further development of Islamic finance will nonetheless depend on implementing the necessary financial reforms to ensure its integration into the wider financial system. Here, I think that the challenges are twofold: FIRST, in Islamic jurisdictions the challenge is to continue developing the architecture of Islamic finance in areas such as payment systems and supervisory and resolution regimes. In particular, it would seem vital to advance towards the standardisation of Islamic finance regulation, breaking the existing jurisdictional heterogeneity, in order to take advantage of a wider international market. The SECOND challenge refers to the integration of Islamic finance into the wider financial system.
HKMA as Lender of Last Resort It might be worth pointing out first that some clarification of this issue was, in fact, provided in a luncheon speech I gave to the American Chamber of Commerce as long ago as October 1994. The speech was subsequently published in our Quarterly Bulletin of November 1994 under the somewhat bland title “Stability of the Banking System in Hong Kong”. It is not a good practice to quote from one’s own speeches, particularly those that are nearly five years old, but I could not resist plucking out two sentences from about half way through that speech, in which I state that: “there is an official lender of last resort in Hong Kong and that this is the HKMA. Some persons, even within the banking community in Hong Kong, still seem to be not quite clear about this.” A long explanation of the concept and functions of the lender of last resort as applied to Hong Kong followed this remark. Despite the explanation, it seems that there remains some confusion about the policy. The Report on the Consultancy Study finds that “there is still a substantial level of uncertainty” about this issue and “a large number of participants in the sector who are either unaware that there is actually a lender of last resort or are unclear as to the conditions under which the HKMA would provide this assistance”.

Mr Yam elaborates on the role of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority as the lender of last resort Speech by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr Joseph Yam, JP, at the Half-yearly Dinner of the Hong Kong Association of Banks in Hong Kong on 29 June 1999. The HKAB and HKMA Partnership I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak to the Hong Kong Association of Banks (HKAB) at its half-yearly dinner again. The last opportunity for doing so was in December 1992 when, ahead of the formation of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), I spoke as the Chief Executive (Designate) of the HKMA. It has been almost seven years, and although it is rare for the HKAB to invite the same speaker a second time, I must confess that I was privately beginning to wonder. Then your current Chairman picked up the phone with this very timely invitation that I gladly accepted. This is perhaps yet another good indication of the close partnership and understanding built up over the years between HKAB and HKMA. Together we have been through a lot and have achieved a lot. Our work together has embraced the continuous process of monetary reform; the strengthening of our supervisory framework; the building of a sophisticated financial infrastructure, notably the establishment of CMU and the introduction of RTGS; the preparation for the handover; and the handling of the Asian financial turmoil or, to give it perhaps a more appropriate term, the crisis of globalisation.
); (b) maintain financial and price stability; after having policy-engineered their V-shape recoveries, controlled their inflationary consequences and managed destabilizing large capital inflows; (c) calibrate their responses to this transition period of exiting from unconventional monetary policies, using their uneven policy room for maneuver and their preparedness; and (d) make the best possible use of the foreseeable changes in relative prices including their own asset prices; these changes are either occurring or in the making, in the light of the expected shifts in global monetary conditions in the coming months. I will focus my remarks tonight on three issues: (1)  how we prepared ourselves with policies put in place in Brazil and other EMEs over the last few years to sail through a period of intense capital inflows and to be well positioned for the exit from unconventional monetary policies;  (2)  notwithstanding that preparation, what has been the impact and the response to the start of the normalization of monetary conditions; and  (3)  what are the few analytical and policy lessons learned in the last few years with regards to the inflation-targeting framework for monetary policy in the context of the post-crisis challenges. The policy response to large and volatile capital inflows Let me begin by revisiting the rationale of the policies that many emerging markets put in place during the most expansionary phase of advanced economy monetary policies.

Let me now turn to the third and last topic of my remarks, that is … Inflation targeting in the post-crisis global economy As a growing and abundant new literature – together with new practices – is now showing, the 2008 crisis and its aftermath have called into question the balance and interaction between two components of macroeconomic stability: financial and price stability. They are both necessary, but taken individually, they are not sufficient to ensure overall macro stability that fosters sustainable growth. Therefore, the debate raises the issue of what new contours could take an inflation targeting framework for monetary policy that could also address financial stability when complemented by possibly the new macroprudential toolkit. Central banks and financial regulators both failed to counteract the buildup of systemic risk in the financial system. Therefore, this failure has brought the inflation targeting regime under scrutiny since it has been the monetary regime of choice in many central banks including in emerging markets. The first lesson of the crisis was a greater appreciation of the importance of financial stability as a component of macroeconomic stability. There are many directions in the ongoing debate3. One direction is to consider a division of labor along the lines of a separation principle: monetary policy using an IT framework would address price stability; and macroprudential policy would be used to mitigate financial systemic risk. Another direction is to ask whether monetary policy should explicitly incorporate a financial stability objective, and be more proactive in response to perceived risks to financial stability.
Sources: TNS Sifo Prospera and Statistics Sweden  For the Riksbank, this development led us during the spring of 2015 to reduce the Swedish policy rate, the repo rate, to negative levels and to start purchasing government bonds. One purpose of the bond purchases was to push down interest rates on longer maturities. 4 My assessment is that this monetary policy has, on the whole, been successful. The bond purchases seem to have pushed down interest rates more or less in the way we expected. 5 And the monetary policy also seems to have had the intended effect on inflation and inflation expectations. The downward trend has been reversed and both are now on significantly higher levels than at the end of 2014 (see Chart 2). At the same time, the Swedish economy has developed positively, with high growth and falling unemployment. … but the effects on the Riksbank’s finances must nevertheless be taken into account The purpose of the Riksbank’s bond purchases is thus to support the inflation target’s role as nominal anchor for price-setting and wage formation, and thereby to contribute to a positive development in the Swedish economy. How the Riksbank’s financial position is affected is therefore of subordinate, but not negligible, importance. I see at least two reasons to monitor how the Riksbank’s finances develop. First, the Riksbank’s finances are part of public finances. The size of the Riksbank’s profits and losses affect the dividends we can deliver to the government.

3 At the same time, the problems of falling inflation and inflation expectations also became increasingly apparent in the euro area. This led to the European Central Bank signalling the need for even more expansionary monetary policy in the period ahead, with low interest rates for even longer, supplemented by extensive asset purchases. The increasingly expansionary monetary policy in the euro area also led to monetary policy reactions from several smaller countries on the outside. 3 The significance of the inflation target for the economy is explained in detail in Sveriges Riksbank (2015a) and  Flodén (2015). 2 [12]  Chart 2. Inflation and inflation expectations have picked up 3  3  2  2  1  1  2.3  2.3  2.2  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.0  2.0  1.9  1.9 Inflation expectations  0  0  CPIF excluding energy  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.7  CPIF  -1  -1 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  1.6  1.6 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  Note. Annual percentage change and per cent. The CPIF is the CPI with a fixed mortgage rate. Inflation expectations 5 years ahead according to money market participants. The broken line indicates the time of the monetary policy decision in February 2015.
In particular, the current recession differs from past episodes in that its origin is not economic, so the fall in activity is not caused by problems in specific sectors or markets, but rather by the interruption of the normal functioning of businesses and activities to combat the spread of Covid-19. This implies that the economic measures adopted should seek to ensure that companies and individuals survive this period of confinement, avoiding more permanent damage. The key to mitigating the effects of the pandemic is to get credit flowing to businesses and allow them to cushion the major drops in their cash flows. Several measures have been implemented with this in mind, with some elements in common. First, central banks, along with lowering their benchmark rate to its lowest possible, have established special bank financing programs, conditional on their increased lending. Some examples are the programs of the Bank of England (Term Funding Scheme with additional incentives for SMEs, TFSME), the European Central Bank (Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations, TLTRO), and the Central Bank of Chile (FCIC). Second, governments have committed resources that serve as guarantees for loans, which in the Chilean case are the FOGAPE 1 guarantees (Table 1). In Chile, the sum of both programs is equivalent to just over 15% of GDP, comparable to the resources that have been committed in Brazil, but far above what has been done in other Latin American countries, such as Peru, Colombia, and Mexico.

However, the closing of the capacity gaps that widened in this period and the convergence of inflation to the target will only be completed by 2022. Moreover, this scenario is still surrounded by high levels of uncertainty and significant risks. Let me now turn to the details of the macroeconomic scenario. II.1. Macroeconomic scenario The behavior of the pandemic continues to be the driving factor in the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario. Several months after it first appeared, the Covid-19 has affected all the countries of the world over the course of this year, but its current dynamic is varied. While some countries have seen a more favorable evolution, others have had outbreaks or increases in infections that have yet to be brought under control. In some countries with good sanitary responses to the pandemic, it has been possible to avoid reinstating tougher restrictions in the face  1  of new epidemic outbreaks. The Latin American region overall currently accounts for the largest number of new infections, but they differ from one country to another in terms of their trajectories (Figure 1). In Chile, health indicators have improved, and the authorities have implemented a plan for gradual deconfinement nationwide. Thus, the percentage of the national population subject to quarantine has dropped from its peak of 54% in July to 40% this week. Particularly marked have been the changes in the Metropolitan Region, where the percentage of the population in quarantine has fallen from 98% in July to 46% today.