samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In its role as the regulator, the Bank of Albania’s vision is to contribute to the future, aiming to establish a highly adequate environment for boosting financial innovations and modernising the financial structure. Our regulatory regime aims at fostering innovation, being a positive catalyser and not a barrier. We aim at being avant-garde for a modern financial infrastructure. But experience shows that technology always is a step ahead and rapidly spreading. Technology has no limits and we, as regulators, should adopt rules and laws that these technologies be used by the consumers, individuals or businesses. At the same time, we should be aware of the risks that accompany these new technologies. Finding a perfect balance between the promotion of new ideas and the regulatory prudence constitutes one of the major challenges in this regard. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Bank of Albania has designed a payments regulatory framework, which paved the way for the development and modernisation. This framework provides all banks or other suppliers of financial services with the possibility to access the payment system in an equal and transparent way, thus contributing to the development of a competitive payment industry, without any asymmetry. Bank of Albania welcomes the contribution of innovation and technology in financial services as a support for achieving its strategic objectives for financial inclusion and reduction of cash use in the economy. These objectives serve crucially to both the transmission of the monetary policy and the safeguarding of financial stability.

Elisabeta Gjoni: Innovation in the banking sector Speech by Ms Elisabeta Gjoni, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the conference on “Innovation in the banking sector”, Tirana, 14 May 2015. *  *  *  Good morning and welcome at the Bank of Albania to discuss about innovation in the banking sector. The Ministry of Innovation and the Bank of Albania, under the auspices of the Minister for Innovation and Public Administration, Ms Milena Harito, and the Governor of the Bank of Albania, Mr Gent Sejko, in collaboration with the Albanian Association of Banks, organise this activity jointly in a common approach to work together and discuss ideas among the main stakeholders of innovation in financial services. Honourable Minister Harito, Honourable Chairman of the Albanian Association of Banks, Your excellencies ambassadors, representatives of banks and businesses, and of the Albanian private sector, dear colleagues, I take this opportunity to thank you, on behalf of the Bank of Albania for your commitment and collaboration for this activity. We are living in a new phase of banking that is frequently qualified as a silent revolution in the way we do things, and the way we live, which poses challenges to any developing or influencing stakeholder. People use technology for the new ways of communication it offers: to create social groups, purchase online and why not, to use banking and financial services.
The view that much of this growth reflects structural changes of this sort is supported in my view by the way the spread between deposit and loan rates of interest has vanished in the last few years (Chart 13). Of course that might be the product of competition between banks to lend more and attract more deposits; it also seems plausible that much of this lending is more about balance sheet restructuring than making a profit. However deposits associated with special purpose vehicles and intra-group only account for part of the growth. Even if we strip out all OFC deposits the growth rate of money has still been strong compared with the growth rate of money spending (Chart 14). In my final section I want to discuss what we should make of this. The significance of the money supply In the Treasury in the 1980s I was a close observer of the attempts to find a monetary aggregate as an intermediate target to guide policy. We were looking for both a predictable relationship between the policy instrument, interest rates, and the measure of money and a predictable relationship between that and our final objective, inflation. I remember the frustrations when both links proved unreliable. I am in no doubt that we are better off focussing directly on our final target, inflation. However I was struck, returning eighteen months ago to the economic debate, how the place of money in our debates had changed. Our model, like most others, is “new Keynesian”.

2 The rapid growth of hedge funds in the West End is the latest example of the innovation that this cluster of financial skills has produced. You know something must be happening when the Mayor of New York commissions a review of the threat London poses to New York’s position. London’s recent growth certainly has a cyclical element but it also reflects two more structural changes – the removal of barriers to international capital movements and the advances in information technology. These have led to a growing role for international capital markets compared to national banking and to a growing concentration of those markets in a few hubs among which London and New York are dominant. And this finance revolution is still underway. It is far more advanced in the US than in Europe and in Europe than in Asia. In the absence of disasters therefore London, as the preeminent centre outside the US, can look forward to a long period of fast growth and expect its share of the UK economy to increase. This evening I want to discuss the implications of that trend for the UK economy and for economic policy. On the first, is London a goose laying golden eggs for the rest of the country or is it more of a cuckoo in the nest? On the second, how does the growth of London and financial markets generally impact on the Bank’s core functions of setting monetary policy and maintaining financial stability.
As a former commercial banker, I know that competent, capable leaders at the enterprise level, supported by a well-trained staff and a robust system of risk management processes and controls, make up the first line of defense against financial instability within an economy. As a supervisor, I believe that there should be sufficient market and supervisory incentives to encourage banks toward responsible behavior. •  The supervisor’s second duty is to assist in the resolution of problems when they do occur, so that banks can continue to serve as intermediaries of credit, the lifeline of an economy, to businesses and consumers. This represents the duty of action. From the experience of the savings and loans crisis in the United States, to more recent regional financial emergencies elsewhere, we’ve seen that when disaster looms, prompt and decisive supervisory action is imperative to containing the damage that severely troubled financial institutions can wreak on the economy. In those extreme circumstances, supervisors must restore confidence  BIS Review 35/2001  1  quickly so that consumers and businesses do not lose access to credit necessary for the economy to grow. How the delicate balance of responsibilities of bank management and supervisors is accomplished, particularly in a period of stress, is crucial to the outcome of country’s economic performance.

Such discipline is not possible without meaningful public disclosure of a bank’s financial condition. I think we would all agree that there is no greater enemy to a stable financial marketplace than a lack of confidence, and surely nothing undermines confidence more than a lack of reliable information. Discipline by the market is not always pleasant – a lesson many companies have re-learned recently. Yet better quality information, or what we often call transparency, can boost the confidence of depositors, investors, and creditors, and it can contribute to stability by encouraging banks to adopt a more proactive approach to managing their risks. In this regard, just last month the Basel Committee published the results of a two-year study on public disclosure practices of internationally active banks as a guide to the industry and accounting standards setters on areas where disclosure can be improved. BIS Review 35/2001  3  While many countries have made great progress over recent years to improve the quality and level of disclosure, disclosure practices have not kept up with the changes in how banks manage their businesses and in how they measure and mitigate their risks. To improve this situation, I believe that the notions of what is public versus proprietary information must change. It is critical to approach the question of disclosure as users of financial statements. Shareholders, creditors, and counterparties cannot understand the risks of their own exposures to a bank until they first understand that bank’s appetite for risk and its approach to, and methodologies for, managing risk.
This condition is currently difficult to comply with, since banks are still in the process of setting up their MREL and, for some, it will not be easy to attain these thresholds as their access to the capital markets is limited, or there may be an adverse impact on their income statement. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  To date, the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the European resolution authority, has not taken a final, firm decision on the MREL, but everything suggests it will be demanding. At the Banco de España we advocate that the requirements should take into account the resolution strategy and should be prudent and adapted to banks’ economic and financial reality. In any event, cooperatives should build the concept of resolution into their planning and management, and continue working on the formation of voluntary and private mutual support mechanisms. Conclusion In sum, let me say that all the banking supervisors and regulators participating in this process are mindful of how important it is to finalise the Basel III review as soon as possible and of the significance of providing banks and market participants with certainty. I would not wish to conclude without reiterating the importance of a healthy and efficient cooperative sector, as it faces today’s challenges: the pressure exerted by the low interest rate environment on results, as is the case for other banks; the new regulatory demands; enhanced governance; the management and commercialisation of resources; and deeper association initiatives. Thank you for your attention.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
But the price-stability oriented policies of the Great Moderation proved to be instrumental in delivering not just low and stable inflation but also steady growth for a sustained period. The maintenance of price stability may be insufficient on its own to guarantee continued overall macroeconomic stability, but it surely has to remain the central objective of monetary policy in the long run, even if other considerations may intrude in the short run. Any other objective risks de-anchoring price expectations and inducing unnecessary extra volatility into the economy. Flexible inflation targets (explicit or implicit), which allow the monetary authority some constrained discretion in accommodating temporary price-level shocks, therefore remain a suitable organising framework for the conduct of monetary policy. We remain sceptical of the net benefits of moving to a higher inflation target in normal times so as to provide monetary policy with more room for manoeuvre. And a move to price-level targeting looks likely to offer only modest gains – particularly when there are also costs to changing the framework – though further analysis may shed additional light on this particular issue (Section 4). 6. Monetary policy and credit/asset-price booms. The twin beliefs that financial markets are efficient and that financial innovation is necessarily welfare-enhancing have been dealt a serious blow by the crisis. We have seen that financial markets are riddled with any number of incentive distortions and market failures. Alongside that, the crisis has also raised serious question marks about a policy of benign neglect towards credit/asset-price booms.

Central Bank Assets (LHS) and Liabilities (RHS) United Kingdom  BIS Review 111/2010  37  Chart 6 Deviation of Price Level from Deterministic Target Path  38  BIS Review 111/2010  Chart 7a Simulation of a “Leaning Against The Wind” Policy 2003–6: US Policy rate  Real credit growth (ann %) 15  10 8  10  6 5 4 0  2 0  -5  -2 -10 -4 -6 2001  2004  2007  2010  2001  Real house price growth (ann %)  2004  2007  -15 2010  GDP growth (ann %) 5  10  4 3  5  2 1  0  0 -1  -5  -2 -3  -10  -4 -15 2001  2004  BIS Review 111/2010  2007  2010  2001  2004  2007  -5 2010  39  Chart 7b Simulation of a “Leaning Against The Wind” Policy 2003–6: UK  Policy rate  Real credit growth (ann %) 14  10  12  8  10 6  8 6  4  4 2  2 0  0  -2 -2  2001  2004  2007  -4 2010  -4 2001  Real house price growth (ann %)  2001  2004  40  2007  2004  2007  -6 2010  GDP growth (ann %) 30  6  20  4  10  2  0  0  -10  -2  -20  -4  -30  -6  -40 2010  2001  2004  2007  BIS Review 111/2010  -8 2010  Chart 8  BIS Review 111/2010  41  Chart 9  42  BIS Review 111/2010  Bibliography Adrian, Tobias, and Hyun S. Shin (2008).
Interest rates moved upwards before the Swiss National Bank adapted its operational target or its repo rate because financial markets trusted that we would increase interest rates. Given our objectives and our previous track record, it was credible that we would hike interest rates in the given economic environment. Central bank transparency can only improve monetary policy effectiveness if it increases the predictability of future monetary measures. I would like to emphasise that predictability relies not just on information and the communication of intentions, but also on whether the public trusts a central bank to realise these intentions. Central bankers can thus only benefit from transparency if their statements about future monetary policy are credible. Ultimately, we know that our words must be matched by our actions. 2  BIS Review 55/2006  4. Transparency and press coverage of monetary policy  Ladies and gentlemen, central bank transparency yields economic benefits because it enhances monetary policy effectiveness and reduces uncertainties. Moreover, in a de-mocratic state, transparency is essential if independent central banks are to be held accountable by the public. I am therefore convinced that central banks around the world will continue to pursue a policy of openness for a long time to come. This leads me to an important question for all of us here: how will transparency about monetary policy affect future relations between the press and central banks. Does central bank transparency mean that future monetary policy will be boring, and that press coverage of central bank interventions will become obsolete?

One concern has been that in some countries, various forms of regulatory arbitrage have diluted the level of capital relative to the true risks being run by banks Last week, the Basel Committee, chaired by Bill McDonough, President of the New York Fed, unveiled its 'Second Consultative Package' which sets out the details of a new Accord. The intention is that this should be agreed by around the turn of the year, in order to allow implementation by 2004. We warmly welcome the new proposals and have played a major part in their negotiation alongside the UK Financial Services Authority and other G10 central banks and regulators. We particularly support the proposed use of banks internal ratings to calculate capital. Banks should know more about the riskiness of their individual borrowers than, for example, external rating agencies or supervisors and the new Accord will provide them with the proper incentive to do so. The new Accord also recognises that in today's complex banking markets, a focus on capital adequacy alone is not enough. This has to be reinforced by a rigorous review of banks' internal risk management processes, and also by greater transparency and market discipline. Together, these  BIS Review 4/2001  3  three mechanisms - which are intended to be mutually reinforcing - are known as the three 'Pillars' of the New Accord.
these parameters will be equal for national and cross-border payments). The following assumptions have been made to achieve the objective: -  a coherent and technically neutral (i.e. independent of any specific type of devices) legal framework should be provided for all payment services within the European Union (excluding cash handling and cheques); this framework should allow for the implementation of various solutions,  -  uniform technological and business standards should be provided for suppliers of payment services,  -  self-regulating mechanisms in business relations between participants of payments should be provided; simultaneously, intervention of legislative authorities should be kept at minimum. European authorities play an important role in the implementation of SEPA. The European Commission and the European Parliament are the main initiators and promoters of the idea of SEPA. They stimulate works on the project by issuing specific regulations and directives. 3  P O Gourinchas, H Rey, “From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist: US External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege”, UC Berkeley Working Paper, August 2005. 2  BIS Review 97/2006  The European Central Bank is also an active participant of the SEPA project. However, it acts only as an observer in the EPC. Central banks of individual Member States do not directly participate in the EPC works on SEPA. Their involvement is important in groups organised under the aegis of the ECB, especially as regards the works within the Eurosystem.

SEPA-related works in Poland are coordinated by the Polish Banking Association, which results from the approved model for SEPA implementation through self-regulation of the financial sector. The banking community holds consultations on payment systems with the NBP through the Payment System Council which is a consultative and advisory body of the Management Board of the NBP and follows developments on individual projects. The cooperation within the Council has led to the identification of main challenges, including currently: the specification of the pace of works performed in Poland as regards the implementation of approved SEPA standards and mechanisms, effective exchange of information between the interested parties, including those from outside the banking community, such as for instance clients of banks. The major directions of activities have also been prepared. Their aim is to prepare the Polish community for SEPA-related activities. The role of the PBA as the coordinator of SEPA works in Poland might change in the future if the approach based on the self-regulation model is discontinued in Europe and if the EU and ECB authorities apply a different model for SEPA adjustments (e.g. through issuing regulations for the banking sector) that could assume a greater role of the government and the central bank. We do not assume that this will be the case because the efficiently working self-regulation model might bring  BIS Review 97/2006  3  better solutions than a model enforced through regulations.
Chart 22: Firm level productivity distributions  a) Region  b) Industry  32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  32  c) Export status  d) Foreign ownership  e) Innovation  f)  Size  g) Leverage  Source: ONS, ONS Research Database, BvD and Bank calculations. Notes: These charts plot the kernel density distribution of labour productivity (real GVA per employee) across Great Britain. Chart (e) uses unweighted firm data. Chart (g) shows data BvD rather than VML firm-level data and is not directly comparable to the other charts. 33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  Chart 23 – Firm exports and productivity  Source: BvD and Bahaj, Foulis, Gal and Pinter (2016). Notes: Results from a Pooled Regression (slope=0.34; t-value=12.2), data for 2013. Table 3 – Median productivity growth by firm size*  Number of employees 6-10 11-20 21-50 >50  2.8 2.5 1.8 1.2  Source: BvD Notes: Data for 1998 -2013; Three-year cumulative growth. Chart 24: Monetary policy counterfactual experiment based on company accounts data a) Interest Cover Ratio  b) Leverage Density  0.15  Before intervention 0.10  After intervention  0.05  ICR = 1 0.00 -5 0 Interest cover ratio  5  10  15  34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  c) Productivity – scenario 1  d) Productivity – scenario 2  Source: BvD and Bank calculations.

David Carse: The current state of banking reform in Hong Kong  Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the luncheon of the Hong Kong Foreign Bank Representatives Association, held at the Hong Kong Club, on 5 September 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to have the opportunity to address this lunch gathering of the Hong Kong Foreign Bank Representatives Association. As an international financial centre, it is the essence of Hong Kong that it should be a host to foreign banks. And as the banking regulator in Hong Kong, it is important that the HKMA should keep in close touch with foreign banks through events such as today’s lunch. This gives us a chance to explain aspects of our policies and how we see the current state of banking in Hong Kong. It also gives you the opportunity to provide feedback to the HKMA on any issues of current concern to you. Hopefully, I will not have to address too many hostile questions. The 1998 Banking Sector Consultancy Study I have chose to speak to you today on the subject of “The current state of banking reform in Hong Kong”. This seems a good time to undertake this stocktaking. It is over a year since we embarked on the reform programme that we devised in response to the Banking Sector Consultancy Study undertaken by KPMG and Barents in 1998.