samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Albanian economy will continue to have spare capacities in the capital and labour markets, avoiding potential wage – inflation spirals and producing contained inflation pressures in the medium run. In addition, imported inflation is expected to decline and administered prices effects are expected to be eliminated in the medium run. In the presence of anchored inflation expectations by economic agents, the Bank of Albania deems that consumer price inflation will gradually settle close to its target of 3% in the period ahead. *** Drawing on the information above, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania deemed that inflationary pressures remain, in the short run, high. However, they are controlled and in the medium run they are expected to follow a downward trajectory. In the absence of unexpected shocks, inflation is expected to be within the target band of the Bank of Albania throughout the monetary policy time horizon. Inflationary expectations of economic agents continue to be within the inflation target range, which is essential under the conditions of the simultaneous presence of the negative output gap and high foreign prices. The Bank of Albania is fully committed for anchored inflationary expectations in compliance with its inflation target and stands ready to accomplish its mandate, by preventing materialisation of constant pressures on inflation. We deem that the monetary conditions are appropriate to stimulate economic growth, without generating additional inflationary pressures. Given the fragile equilibriums of the Albanian economy, this philosophy will continue to lead our activity in the period ahead.

However, since four of the national central banks which form part of the ESCB continue to conduct their own autonomous monetary policies, one cannot accurately refer to the ESCB as the authority responsible for conducting monetary policy in the euro area. We must instead use the term “Eurosystem”, which comprises the ECB and the 11 national central banks of those countries which have adopted the euro, and which has been adopted as a “user friendly” expression to denote the form in which the ESCB performs its tasks and responsibilities. The Eurosystem is set up, like the Federal Reserve System, in a distinctively decentralised manner. At the same time, however, the Eurosystem disposes of marked centralised structures, since the definition and implementation of the single monetary policy are carried out under the exclusive responsibility of BIS Review 4/2000  2  the decision-making bodies of the ECB. These are, first of all, the Governing Council, which defines the single monetary policy for the euro area and takes all other decisions of fundamental importance to the Eurosystem. The Members of the Governing Council are the Governors of the 11 national central banks and the six members of the Executive Board of the ECB. Basically, all decisions are taken by simple majority, whereby each member has one vote. The other important decision-making body is the Executive Board of the ECB, which is basically responsible for the implementation of monetary policy in accordance with the decisions taken by the Governing Council.
It is encouraging that we see the active participation of academic researchers, journalists, analysts and even whistle-blowers, 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  who are prepared to comment on and query corporate actions or decisions. In some sense, this demonstrates a growing maturity in our capital markets. 28 At the same time, SGX RegCo has introduced some affirmative initiatives. For instance, RegCo implemented the Fast Track programme that allows listed issuers with good history of compliance and corporate governance standards to enjoy faster processing times for corporate submissions. Making disclosures more accessible and understandable 29 Let me turn to the final section of my remarks on disclosure. Ultimately, the best form of investor protection is to empower investors by raising the level of financial literacy. 30 Clear and meaningful disclosures to the retail investor is a necessity here. MAS is working on a number of measures to make disclosures easier to understand and more accessible. For example, we are working with the local banks to consider how to improve the delivery of important information to investors for investment applications through ATMs for non-complex products. An important thing to bear in mind is that relatively simple products do not mean these have low market or credit risks. One idea is for easier access to product disclosure documents via a QR code; another could be clear summary highlights of key product class risk attributes in the ATM screen page.

Inflation expectations may be sensitive to a large but temporary shock that moved inflation outside the range within which it has remained for some years. With their belief in stability jolted, households’ inflation expectations might move by much more than was justified by the temporary nature of the shock. That would make it more difficult for the central bank to bring inflation back to target. The moral of this particular story is that it may be risky to infer from the observation that inflation expectations are stable that all is well. There will be times when large and persistent shocks occur, and it would be unwise to count on inflation expectations remaining stable when actual inflation starts to deviate substantially from its recent range. So those are the three lessons that I have learnt from Alan: (i) a recognition that economics is not a set of doctrines but a way of thinking; (ii) the importance of using qualitative and quantitative information from a range of sources; (iii) there are a small number of fundamental objectives that are crucial and which we can judge by the Greenspan yardstick of whether we have freed businesses and households from the burden of expending resources to deal with unnecessary policy volatility. Alan’s departure from the central banking scene will deprive us of a source of wisdom, inspiration and leadership. To be sure, Alan’s words, whether spoken or written, will surely still reach us from the sidelines.
There may be a conflict between the role as supervisor and the role of being a lender of last resort. If a bank would fail, being supervised by the central bank, the central bank may feel more inclined to provide liquidity support than is economically defendable. Bankers may know this and the case for moral hazard may therefore be stronger than with a separate supervisor. Rules for public administration of troubled banks outside the central bank may give some help in this respect. There may also be a conflict of interest relating to monetary policy. If a bank fails while being supervised by the central bank, this may affect the central bank’s reputation and credibility. In my view, these are important arguments, because credibility of the central bank is basic not only to systemic stability but also to the conduct of monetary policy. What is the role of the central bank in relation to financial stability when there is an independent supervisory authority? There are still remaining the increasingly important questions concerning the macroeconomic “oversight” or macro prudential supervision of the financial system. As a matter of fact, these questions often tend to be neglected when the ordinary supervision remains within the central bank, because they are in many ways different in character from the day to day supervision. To effectuate its responsibilities of conducting monetary policy and ensuring a stable payment system, a central bank must monitor the risks in the financial sector.

They may also, under a compromise text, render partly redundant and ineffective the responsibilities of supervisors of home and host countries, as well as those of micro-prudential and macro-prudential supervisors. In this context, I believe that the creation of a banking union is to be supported. It would be a major development for banking supervision in Europe, which would bring numerous benefits and would enable us to efficiently address the current difficulties. Such a development would most likely have very positive consequences in that it would be a step towards greater European harmonisation. Naturally, the benefits of such a reform would be more far-reaching but such questions go beyond the scope of today’s conference. Questions regarding the impact and stakes of Basel III will already give ample food for thought in the rich debates and discussions this morning. I wish you all a fruitful conference. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The portfolios for which the expected loss will be higher than current impairment loss are those of loans granted to the retail segment and regional governments. Heterogeneity is higher for banks at individual level, but is not likely to affect their stability considering the substantial surplus in solvency indicators (Figure 17). Starting with this issue of the Report, the NBR Board has decided to contain the number of presented risks to five at most, for two reasons: the opportunity to focus the analysis and draw attention to the most important messages, and the harmonisation with international good practice of central banks that publish financial stability reports, the ECB in particular. A full comparison with the risk map in the previous reports is therefore unfeasible. 3  No severe systemic risk has been identified, but a combination of the identified risks may induce a severe risk, amid unfavourable market conditions. The main risks to financial stability are set out in the table below. Map of risks to financial stability in Romania Deterioration in investor sentiment in emerging economies Tensions surrounding macroeconomic equilibria Higher household indebtedness through both banks and NBFIs Weak payment discipline in the economy, vulnerabilities in firms' balance sheets Faster increase in property prices severe systemic risk high systemic risk moderate systemic risk low systemic risk Note: The colour shows risk intensity. Arrows indicate the outlook for risk in the period ahead.

This mix between an expansionary budgetary and fiscal policy during a period of abovepotential economic growth and the worsening global market sentiment towards emerging economies in general can enhance volatility and affect financial stability via several channels: the interest rate, the exchange rate, the inflation rate. The advance in household indebtedness can cause these risks to pass through from the macroeconomic level to the microeconomic level for debtors. Last years’ environment 5  marked by low interest rates and sustained increase in new loans favours the build-up of possible vulnerabilities concerning the sustainability of the level of indebtedness through both banks and NBFIs (Figure 26), especially for lower-income debtors. The fact that the great majority of the stock and flow of housing loans and corporate loans are variable-rate loans (Figure 27) is an aggravating factor for financial stability in the context of the start of a new interest rate hike cycle – for external reasons, domestic reasons or for a combination of reasons. The fact that the advance in household indebtedness occurs concurrently with the high economic growth rates indicates the problems of economic growth: it is unbalanced and it leads to deeper inequality between social groups. Debt service-to-income ratio for debtors earning minimum to average wage economy-wide stands higher than that for debtors earning double the average wage, notably among borrowers with housing loans (Figure 28).
We want to define and chart a course toward our desired culture, so that individual decisions reflect the interests of the organization and the intent of the rules.6 To me, there are four central aspects of culture that support effective risk management: learning, listening, helping, and speaking up.7 In a learning culture, we think about and plan for what might happen. And, we learn from experience, what went well and what didn't, so we can improve for next time. In a listening culture, we seek advice, appreciate a fresh perspective, and are open to new ideas and feedback so we can improve. In a helping culture, we work together across the organization, building on each By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. other's strengths, and helping when we have an opportunity. And, in a speaking up culture, we let our colleagues know when we see a problem or after something goes wrong so that we can get started fixing it. Risk management is a creative, social process. It is a way of thinking, doing, and interacting. To bring it to life, we need to work together across the organization, staying continuously curious about the changing risk landscape and possible futures.

It also takes into account Malaysia’s aspirations to become a high valueadded, high income economy. Within the global economic landscape, emerging economies will assume a more significant role. While emerging economies will continue to be affected by global developments, most are able to demonstrate resilience and are expected to remain on a growth trajectory. By 2030, emerging economies are projected to account for 60% of total world output, from the current 40%. At the same time, the economies and financial markets in the global economy and international financial system have become more interconnected as a result of greater crossborder trade and financial flows. The continued development and deepening of our financial markets and increased financial liberalisation in emerging economies will reinforce this trend towards greater interconnectivity. More recently, the financial sector has been the target of a renewed focus and priority by the international community. Wide ranging financial reform measures have been introduced in the aftermath of the global financial crisis to address the weaknesses that have surfaced during the crisis. Several changes are also transforming the domestic environment. New domestic sources of growth, the greater role of the private sector in the economy, demographic changes, rising incomes and a growing middle class, and the accelerated pace of urbanisation cumulatively will significantly change the demands on the financial sector.
Comparing the current assessment with that presented in the December 2006 FSR, the main scenario for euro area financial stability remains broadly favourable:  BIS Review 69/2007  5  •  The current macroeconomic environment is benign and global and euro area economic activity it is expected to remain robust;  •  In February and March 2007, the resilience of the financial system was tested by the third significant burst of market volatility in two years, which it comfortably weathered;  •  Euro area credit quality, overall, remains high and should be underpinned by a favourable economic outlook;  •  Pockets of vulnerability in the euro area household and corporate sectors have most likely increased, but, on average, financial positions remain sound;  •  The profitability of euro area financial institutions further improved and solvency is comfortable relative to regulatory requirements.

In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to Japanese businesses for their contribution to the progress of the Thai economy over the years. Here's hoping that we continue to build and strengthen the foundation of this great relationship. Again, I am deeply grateful for this opportunity, and thank you for your kind attention. BIS Review 27/2007  3
From peak to trough, employment declined by roughly 3 percent in Queens, far less than the roughly 7 percent plunge nationally and the 4.5 percent loss in New York City as a whole. Although borough-specific economic data are not quite as current as city-wide data, we at the New York Fed see clear indications that employment in Queens stopped declining in the first half of 2010. We hope that upcoming reports will show a sustained upturn. With prospects for the national economy improving in early 2011, the outlook for Queens’ diverse and vibrant economy – and New York City’s as a whole – seems to be brightening as well. Conclusion To sum up, the national economy experienced a pick-up in activity during the last quarter of 2010 that shows signs of continuing in 2011. Although the city’s economy saw some loss of momentum, I would not be overly discouraged. After all, soft patches are not uncommon during economic recoveries. Both nationally and regionally, unemployment remains stubbornly high, but many indicators suggest that conditions are in place for stronger growth in the coming months. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

•  All the major mobile wallets – Apple Pay, Android Pay, Samsung Pay – are available in Singapore. •  They can be used at any merchant that accepts contactless Visa, MasterCard, or American Express payments. Our banks have been active in payments innovation, with several home grown mobile payments apps. •  DBS has PayLah! and Standard Chartered has Dash. •  These pioneering apps allow users to easily pay friends and businesses that use the same app. •  And the newer apps can do even more. –  OCBC’s Pay Anyone allows customers to send money to friends in Singapore, using only their mobile number, Facebook ID, or email address. –  UOB has created UOB Mighty, an all-in-one mobile banking app and wallet similar to Android Pay. But the rest of the world has not been standing still. China, for instance, has been a hotbed for payments innovation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  WeChat integrates social media and payments to let users make seamless peer-topeer payments, shop online, and even pay at physical merchants. •  These solutions have made themselves an indispensable part of their users’ daily lives. So, while there has been quite a bit of payments innovation in Singapore, our payments experience needs to be as good as the best we see globally. Our vision is to make Singapore an electronic payments society.
The subject easily gives rise to heated debate: on the one hand, there are the "conservatives" – not to mention the climate sceptics – who are concerned only about central banks' action against inflation, and denounce the risks of "politicisation" and “mission creep". And on the other hand, there are the activists who are calling for a change of mandate, with a focus on the fight against climate change and the conversion of instruments – including the American movement for a "Green QE". In my opinion, the truth is simpler and stronger. The Eurosystem's consideration for climate change is neither an abuse of its mission, nor a mere militant conviction or a fad; it is an imperative that we must pursue in the very name of our current mandate and to ensure the smooth implementation of monetary policy. 1.1 In the very name of our mandate Without even having to mention our "secondary iii" objectives, which include environmental protection, climate change is linked to the core of the Eurosystem’s monetary mandate: price stability. Shocks related to climate change are potentially difficult to manage for central banks because of their stagflationary nature, as they may result in both upward pressure on prices and a slowdown in activity. Transitional policies – which bring about taxation changes, such as a carbon tax, or regulatory changes – can affect prices, notably energy prices, generate inflationary pressures and weigh on activity, as is already the case in the automotive sector.

This is primarily due to the lack of comprehensive and standardised information that is needed for all economic agents to factor in climate risk. I will come back to this need for standardisation later. But more fundamentally, the difficulties in pricing climate risk are due to the very characteristics of these risks, and in particular to what we call "green swans", which generate radical uncertainty and whose consequences can be systemic. vii In this respect, market neutrality – which guides the execution of our market operations – should not put a brake on carbon neutrality. viii Market operations are conducted in a neutral manner as long as they comply with the central banks’ risk control rules. And yet, climate risk is precisely a financial risk that is currently insufficiently measured by markets. ix Another difficulty is often put forward, but it can be overcome: the fact that climate risk is long-term, while many of our risk measures are short- to medium-term. Page 4 sur 8 This is a real technical challenge: the "probability of default" is usually one year; our economic forecasts cover a two to three-year horizon. We must therefore work to "lengthen" our measures, but the fact that a "tragedy of the horizon x" exists is not a call for a status quo. On the contrary! Climate change calls for early and resolute action as the benefits of corrective measures will essentially only be felt in the longer term. II. How should the central bank intervene? How can this be concretely achieved?
It would seem that the least that we as prudential supervisor can do is ask the pertinent questions and challenge banks to look beyond governance in the stricter, more standard sense. I have tried to identify the kind of questions we might ask. I am very much looking forward to hearing your views in the ensuing discussion, which I hope and trust will be lively and stimulating. I promise we will reflect seriously on any suggestions that you might have. Thank you. 1. Kirkpatrick, G. (2009), “Corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis”, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2009/1(1), pp. 61-87; Saghi-Zedek, N. and Tarazi, A., (2015), “Excess control rights, financial crisis and bank profitability and risk”, Journal of Banking & Finance, No 55, pp. 361-79. 2. See SSM supervisory statement on governance and risk appetite, ECB, June 2016. 3. Joint ESMA and EBA Guidelines on the assessment of the suitability of members of the management body and key function holders under Directive 2013/36/EU and Directive 2014/65/EU (2021). 4.

The Eurosystem cyber strategy for financial market infrastructures Following the increase in both the frequency and severity of cyberattacks over the last few years, legislators, regulators and standard setters have issued legislation and guidance on cyber security at national and international level and at cross-sectoral as well as sector-specific level. Let me briefly mention three initiatives. First, in 2016, the EC adopted the Directive on security of network and information systems (the NIS Directive). Its aim is to bring the cybersecurity capabilities of operators of essential services to the same level of development in all the EU Member States and to ensure an efficient exchange of information and good cooperation on the topic throughout the EU. Second, at international level, the G7 countries have drawn up a set of fundamental elements of cybersecurity for the financial sector, as well as three further recommendations on the effectiveness of cybersecurity assessments, third-party risks, and coordination with other critical sectors. Third, with a key focus on financial stability, the CPMI-IOSCO published a principles-based “Guidance on cyber resilience for financial market infrastructures” in June 2016. Supplementing the “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures”, it provides additional detail related to the preparations and measures that financial market infrastructures should undertake to enhance their cyber resilience. In recognition of the escalating cyber threats, the legislative and regulatory guidance and the required paradigm shift, the Eurosystem’s overseers have launched a strategy for cyber resilience in relation to financial market infrastructures.