samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We call upon the Fund to ensure that its support is available to all members in an evenhanded manner without exceptions, and that emergency financing lives up to its name. We look forward to further refinements of the Fund’s lending toolkit, including the introduction of a pandemic support facility. As the global economy is bracing for a challenging post-crisis recovery, the Fund must stand ready to assist members through financial support and tailor-made as well as country specific policy advice and capacity development to ensure that the transition and the subsequent recovery proceed smoothly. This could only be achieved by a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF, with the quotas remaining the core source of financing. With this mind, we are looking forward to an accelerated timeframe for the review of the overall size of the IMF quotas. We would also support an initiative discussed at the Executive Board to make better use of existing SDRs for the benefit of poorer members, and repeat our call for a new general allocation of SDRs. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

The need for this involvement is heightened by the entry into force in 2018 of the new standard (IFRS 9) under which banks will switch from using the concept of incurred loss to that of expected loss in order to calculate the credit portfolio provision. This standard is undoubtedly an improvement on the current situation, since it enhances the measurement of the risks of loans and receivables. At the same time, it significantly increases the complexity of calculating provisions and, thus, increases the risk of heterogeneous application across banks, which is something the supervisor should be aiming to mitigate. The work under way in the Basel Committee on this matter is therefore very timely. My comments so far imply that there are in practice significant obstacles to satisfying the legitimate expectations that a rigorous and granular supervision will help moderate the intensity of the regulatory changes needed to promote financial stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The regulatory frameworks in force and different supervisory cultures, along with the difficulty of becoming more involved in accounting practices, often place considerable limits on the intensity of supervision attainable. This explains why the actions of the authorities to prevent financial crises largely rest on the definition of clear and demanding prudential standards to underpin the work of supervisors.
Most analyses indicate that the policy rate has very little impact on housing prices and thus also on household indebtedness.17 Using the repo rate would be justified if what we were seeing was a credit boom throughout the Swedish economy. But this is not what we are seeing. Household indebtedness is increasing at approximately the same rate as disposable incomes. The rate of growth in bank lending to companies typically varies with the business cycle, and at present this rate is low (see Figure 11). All in all, credit growth is relatively low in the Swedish economy. Figure 11. Lending to households and companies from monetary financial institutions Annual percentage change 20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  Total lending from monetary financial institutions Companies Households  -10 03  04  05  -10 06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Source: The Riksbank. Another problem with using monetary policy to influence household indebtedness is that this also has an impact on the exchange rate. All else being equal, higher interest rates lead to a stronger currency and, again all else being equal, a stronger currency leads to lower inflation and lower resource utilisation. There are thus clear costs associated with using monetary policy in this way. The alternative – and a better one – is to separate monetary policy from the policy that aims to promote financial stability.

Established beliefs in efficient markets, asset price dynamics, and more, have all been called into question. Amid the flux in the global financial and economic landscape, Singapore also has its own challenges. Resource constraints mean that we have to restructure the economy to depend less on the labour force and more on productivity increases for growth. During this period of transition, important adjustments in domestic resource costs and consumer prices are taking place, alongside the usual cyclical developments confronting the economy. Dealing with the confluence of factors affecting domestic prices has been particularly challenging, for us at the central bank and equally so for consumers and businesses. CPI-All Items inflation, for instance, has been elevated coming out of the recent financial crisis, averaging 4.1% since 2010, much higher than the historical norm of below 2%. MAS Core Inflation, which excludes changes in accommodation and private road transport costs, averaged a lower 2.0% over the same period. Consumer price pressures have picked up more recently. CPI-All Items Inflation reached almost 5% in Q1 this year and households may face higher price increases for specific expenditure items. MAS is monitoring these and other cost indicators closely. Allow me to take this opportunity to highlight some conceptual issues concerning price adjustments in the  1  Phillips, P, Shi, S and Jun, Y (2011), “Testing for Multiple Bubbles”, Working Paper No. 03–2011, Singapore Management University. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  economy and their implications for monetary policy.
Marzunisham Omar: Launch of the National Scam Awareness Campaign Speech by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of the National Scam Awareness Campaign, Kuala Lumpur, 30 October 2022. *** Assalamualaikum and good morning. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I would like to thank the Association of Banks in Malaysia, the Association of Islamic Banking and Financial Institutions Malaysia, and the Association of Development Financial Institutions of Malaysia for organising the national scam awareness campaign. The presence of Dato' Mohd Kamarudin bin Md Din, Director of the Commercial Crime Investigation Department, PDRM, Encik Kamal Baharin bin Omar, Deputy Director-General of the National Anti-Financial Crime Centre (NFCC), and Encik Harme Mohamed, Head of Network Security Division, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) this morning reflects our commitment and collaborative efforts to raise awareness on financial literacy and fight financial scams. This morning, there is also the Financial Literacy Month (FLM) Exhibition, which marks the end of this year's Financial Literacy Month. This year's FLM, themed "Financial Wellbeing: Go Digital Confidently", is all about educating and raising awareness on digital financial literacy and safe usage of digital financial services. The past month has seen many seminars, workshops and other activities being conducted all around the country. The FEN mobile coach also travelled to 61 locations across the country, reaching out to over 20,000 people in urban and rural communities.

Victims of financial scams may call their bank's hotlines which are operating 24 hours a day, 7 days a week or NSRC's 997 hotline to lodge reports. I also wish to highlight that in trying to trace and intercept stolen funds, and to prevent further losses, time is of the essence. Therefore, victims must immediately call their banks or 997 as soon as they discover that they have been scammed. The NSRC will initiate an immediate response, but victims must make a police report to furnish more detailed information to allow the authorities to investigate the matter. The NSRC is an important element in our fight to combat scams. But, as they say, prevention is better than cure. In this regard, it is important that all of us take actions to protect ourselves from becoming victims of financial scams. Each and every one of us should remain vigilant and on guard to safeguard our banking information. In the Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand survey which BNM recently conducted, one third or 37 percent of respondents stated that they would be willing to share their bank account passwords or PIN numbers with their close friends! This statistic is indeed very troubling. We must take responsibility of our banking security credentials just like how we should take good care of our prized possessions. We also need to ensure that our computers and mobile devices are secure and running up-to-date software. Remember not to download files or applications such as Android Package Kit from unverified sources or links.
Growth dispersion is a natural phenomenon in any large economic area. Looking at the main trend, the degree of dispersion in real GDP growth rates across 12 euro area countries declined somewhat since 1999, reaching 1.5 percentage points in 2005, while for the largest countries it has remained close to 1 p.p. Let me recall that growth dispersion had been fluctuating around 2% since the 1970s. By comparison, the dispersion of real growth rates across the eight US statistical regions fluctuated around an average of 1.5 % between 1990 and 2002. This is not surprising since some stabilisation channels are at work in a currency area: in particular, a credible monetary policy should bring about a convergence of expected inflation towards the definition of price stability, leading progressively to the convergence of ex ante real rates across the area; moreover, lower inflation relative to other trading partners increases price competitiveness, which in turn counteracts the initial effect of higher real interest rates. 3. Appropriateness of the monetary policy stance  Has the monetary policy stance been appropriate? To try answering that delicate question, the literature of central bank watchers or observers has mainly focused on Taylor-type rules as a usual benchmark. Despite numerous caveats, such an approach can be very informative as it addresses several relevant issues such as: is the monetary policy decision process rule-based or rather discretionary? To what extent is the central bank too focused on price stability at the expense of, say, growth and employment?

It is hardly equitable to provide free health care and medicines to all irrespective of income levels. Means testing  BIS Review 59/2007  1  would, moreover, help to ensure that essential health and welfare services could be provided free of charge in the years to come to those who truly deserve them. The provision of stipends to all students in higher education is even more difficult to justify. For apart from equity considerations, stipends draw funds away from other uses, such as the provision of better library and laboratory facilities and the recruitment of more full-time teaching staff instead of part-timers. I acknowledge that it is not easy to implement means testing fairly because those who under-declare their income, and thus evade taxes, would qualify for benefits undeservedly. The answer, however, is not to rule out means testing in principle, but to wage a more effective campaign against tax evasion. I also recognize that a wider application of such testing might make only a relatively small contribution to the correction of the fiscal imbalance. But it would be highly symbolic in that it would send a powerful message about the need for change to a citizenry which firmly believes that public goods and services can be had for “free”. The truth is that there is no free lunch – somebody must pay for it! Let me give you two topical examples. First, take the Park and Ride scheme. The popular impression is that it is free. This, however, is not correct.
Another is that, in an environment where investors are chasing yield, collecting the premium income from writing options has become a prevalent way of sustaining returns in the hope that nothing too bad happens; and that if it does, today’s liquid capital markets will contain the volatility anyway. In other words, they base their explanation on what has been going in the financial system. Financial system uncertainties Big, perhaps fundamental, changes have been underway in banking and capital markets for a few years now, with implications for how we gauge money and credit conditions, and assess the resilience of the financial system as a whole. Discussions typically jump to the second, financial stability issue. But I want to look first at some monetary indicators in the light of these structural changes. Broad money growth As has recently attracted a good deal of attention, UK broad money is up around 15% on a year ago, and more than 25% since the beginning of 2005 – much more than elsewhere in the G7 (Chart 6). Of this increase, almost half – or around £ – is accounted for by the money holdings of so-called Other Financial Corporations13. Central bankers have to ask whether that represents a threat to inflation and stability or, rather, a shift in the demand for money that is a symptom of structural change in the financial system.

Indeed, under the Alternative Story, there could well be challenges for monetary policy, which in its modern mode operates essentially by using Bank Rate to regulate aggregate demand relative to aggregate supply, exploiting a short-run trade off between growth and inflation so long as inflation expectations are well anchored. If aggregate supply were to become endogenous in the way I have described, the short-run trade off might well be less pronounced for a while. That would make it harder to judge inflationary pressures from gauging the amount of slack in the economy; and harder for the Bank to achieve our 2% inflation target by broadly steering demand conditions. In that scenario, it would matter enormously that wage and price setters continued to act on the basis that CPI inflation would remain in line with the 2% target over the medium term. For me, both the Orthodox and Alternative Stories are plausible. In that sense, I think the outlook is ‘bimodal’ – in terms of there being two main stories. The Orthodox Story, to which I gave most weight in my November vote, required a small tightening. The implications of the Alternative Story for policy were less clear. I concluded that it was essential for the MPC to act in a way that was most likely to keep inflation expectations anchored.
Jarle Bergo: The role of interest rates and the outlook for the Norwegian economy Address by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank, at a seminar hosted by Swedbank Markets Oslo/First Securities, Gardermoen, 23 March 2006. The  charts can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 16 March, Inflation Report 1/06 and on previous speeches. *  *  *  The interest rate is a variable that affects most of us, whether we are investors or borrowers. And even if we don’t have debts or assets, the influence of the interest rate on the economy will affect us indirectly. In this presentation, I would like first to discuss briefly the various roles played by the interest rate in a theoretical framework and as an instrument in monetary policy. With this as background, I will go on to present Norges Bank’s view of the Norwegian economy and our monetary policy assessment, which was published in the Inflation Report on 16 March. The interest rate has several functions Interest rates are the terms at which money or goods today may be traded off for money or goods at a future date - the price we pay to bring consumption forward in time and the compensation we receive for postponing consumption.

Studies by organisations such as the OECD and the IMF point to a clearer connection between long-term growth and the structure of tax and benefit systems than any direct relationship between the tax burden and potential growth. However, this is an area to which Sweden by virtue of its high taxes must pay continued attention. Economic policy must be focused on finding ways to reduce the distortional effects of the tax system, not least as regards people’s willingness to work. High marginal taxes can reduce the motivation to work, thus hampering the economy’s potential growth. This applies particularly when the benefit systems are linked to income. At an individual level, this could mean that someone who is offered a job and at the same time must pay higher tax and receive lower benefits may come to the conclusion that it is more rewarding to remain outside the labour market. This dampens the labour supply and thereby also the economy’s long-term potential growth. Growth issues and particularly the labour supply now appear to be increasingly in the spotlight, which is positive provided that it also lays the foundation for further reform. Having said that, it is pleasing to note that several reforms have been introduced recently with a view to decreasing the distortional effects of the tax system, in particular among low-income groups. This applies perhaps primarily to the steps that have been taken to abolish individual social security contributions, thus reducing marginal taxes among low- and medium-income groups and raising thresholds for state income tax.
Be that as it may, with the solvency assumption in mind, the authorities had tried to build defences against potential foreign currency liquidity problems at the banks by negotiating swap lines and by tapping foreign capital markets, in both cases with limited success. The problem was surely exacerbated by the handling of a LOLR request from one of the banks in late September 2008. The announced solution was to nationalise the bank. This would have been a disaster if it had been carried out because it would have made the Government responsible for refinancing a bleeding foreign currency balance sheet, which it did not have the resources to do. FX reserves and swap lines amounted to only 35% of GDP, and at that point the Government itself was shut out of international capital markets. Nationalising the bank would have turned a bank foreign currency refining problem into a sovereign problem with the serious risk that the sovereign might have defaulted on such foreign currency payments. The decision was, however, never implemented because of the ensuing full-scale run on the foreign liabilities of the banks and the domino effects inside the Icelandic economy. But the time to consider the options was rapidly running out. Given the lack of international co-operation, the Icelandic authorities were forced at this point to consider radical solutions.

4  A number of recent cross-country studies have documented the substantial and long-lasting effect on output of past recessions caused by banking crises. That is illustrated in Chart 6. The dark blue line shows the mean fall in output relative to a continuation of the pre-crisis trend (calculated omitting the three years preceding the crisis) across 88 previous systemic banking crises in advanced and emerging market economies. The average decline in output, relative to a continuation of the pre-crisis trend, is around 10% and remarkably persistent, suggesting that ultimately aggregate supply follows aggregate demand down, even if it does not fall immediately. The UK experience (red line) has so far been fairly similar to that average past experience, although the most recent quarterly outturns have been somewhat  4  See, for instance, the IMF’s October 2009 World Economic Outlook and Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, This Time Is Different. 4  BIS Review 142/2010  stronger than one might have expected. Chart 6 also reveals, however, a very marked heterogeneity across episodes, with the blue swathe covering the central 50% of the distribution of outcomes and the grey swathe 90% of the distribution; a substantial permanent loss in output is by no means pre-ordained. There are a variety of ways that a banking crisis might impair an economy’s supply capacity. Reduced availability of credit and lower activity are both likely to depress investment, which has indeed fallen sharply.
Svein Gjedrem: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 22 May 2006. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The statement is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2005, Inflation Report 1/2006 and the Executive Board’s assessments published after the monetary policy meeting on 26 April. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee and also thank for this opportunity to report and answer questions on monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s Credit Report. The account is based on the Bank’s Annual Report, but is also updated based on the Executive Board’s assessments for the period to the preceding monetary policy meeting. Economic policy in Norway faces particular challenges. Low prices for imported goods and services, combined with high prices for export goods, have led to substantial terms-of-trade gains for Norway. The Norwegian economy has experienced a strong positive income shock. Such a pronounced improvement in the terms of trade has in fact not been observed since the First World War. Real national disposable income will increase by 25-30 per cent in the period 2003-2006.

Partly reflecting the improvement in the terms of trade, the nominal krone exchange rate has remained strong. Wage costs in Norway are now very high compared with other countries, measured in a common currency. The current situation is considerably different from that of the mid-1990s. At that time, performance in the manufacturing sector was strong partly owing to solid competitiveness. Today, the manufacturing sector is faring well in spite of a strong krone and a high cost level. The reason is the unusually buoyant markets for Norwegian goods. At the same time, the strong krone exchange rate has eased the impact of revenue gains. In periods, the effects on the krone may nevertheless be somewhat excessive, partly owing to the low level of inflation in Norway. Low interest rates, increased petroleum investment, strong global growth and the improvement in the terms of trade have contributed to solid growth in the Norwegian economy. Capacity utilisation has probably reached a higher-than-normal level, and the cyclical upturn is continuing. Enterprises are steadily increasing their debt to finance investments. So far, the cyclical expansion has been marked by strong production growth, with ample labour supply and unusually low inflation. 1  2  Adjusted for lower maximum day-care rates. BIS Review 44/2006  For a long time, employment growth measured by number employed was lower than in previous upturns, partly reflecting the fall in sickness absence as of summer 2004. In 2005, the number of person-hours worked increased relatively rapidly and productivity growth picked up.