samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We do this, but – I also realise – we could do better: we have to steadily adapt our communication channels and satisfy the increased demand for clear and timely information in the unconventional times we are passing through. It is also clear to us that any additional task entrusted to the ECB (such as banking supervision, currently under discussion) must be matched by additional reporting and accountability channels. Looking ahead: completing the architecture of EMU Let me conclude. The euro deserves trust – and trust in the euro as a currency depends on trust in the euro as a project. The ECB, with the legitimacy provided by the fulfilment of its mandate, will do everything within this mandate to ensure price stability in the euro area and therefore trust in the euro as a currency. But trust in the euro as a project relies on a more complex framework and structures. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In a recent article, 6 the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas and his co-authors argue that a rallying cry of the American War of Independence – “No taxation without representation” – has a new and unexpected resonance in today’s Europe. Once we create scope in the euro area for policies that result in redistributive effects across national boundaries – they write – European legislators who represent the people must be able to decide and vote on these policies. I tend to sympathise with this view.

Islamic finance, ingrained with the values of socio-economic justice and the spirit of cooperation, has the potential to provide an answer to this quest. Already, it is gaining much traction around the globe. “For Malaysia to remain a central part of this solution”, we must build on our experience and continue to promoting legal certainty for Islamic finance – especially in importing and applying Shariah requirements to the Malaysian law. I certainly believe we can. I wish you all the best in your interesting discussions on dispute resolution today, and also in the days to come. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
G  The desire for certainty and control which seems to underlie such proposals is understandable, as it appears to offer the promise of using less public money, and seemingly entails less risk that creditors will be bailed out for poor credit decisions. But the control and manageability that might result may be more seeming than real. G  For one, a perceived disposition to preemptively lock the door seems likely to send investors heading for the exits all that much sooner. As a result, many avoidable crises soon may become inevitable. And the problem of contagion, whereby difficulties in one case spread to many, would seem likely to worsen. G  Moreover, a perceived weakening of the international community’s commitment to voluntary, market-oriented approaches and its support for honoring contractual commitments would likely create deep distrust, making it harder to encourage cooperation between debtors and creditors in ultimately resolving the crisis. G  An overly quick recourse to payment suspensions also risks discouraging precisely the types of flows that we should wish to encourage, that is, longer maturities with better risk-sharing characteristics, such as long-term bonds and equities. In a crisis, the hottest money leaves first - - by definition. It seems counterproductive to seek to penalize those who stay. G  Finally, I would suggest that preemptive attempts to "freeze markets" also undermine market discipline of, and ownership by, the local authorities.

§  Progress in these areas, even if only incremental, will have important implications for what is possible and necessary in the future. For example, having stronger bank and corporate balance sheets, with lower leverage, expands the scope for using interest rates and asset price adjustments as stabilizing devices. Better liquidity management at both the micro and macro levels - - longer maturities, and greater reserve coverage and back-up financing - - will create margins to ride out financial shocks. And more  5  effective insolvency regimes would make decentralized workouts more feasible, particularly in cases where systemic stress is better contained. •  The approach to crisis management and resolution also needs to be creative. In part, this can be accomplished by relying as much as possible on the efforts of debtors and private creditors to work things out on their own. The perception in some circles that private creditors are not interested in resolving payment problems expeditiously is mistaken, and stands at odds with recent experience. If nothing else, investors are interested in restoring liquidity to debt instruments in order to move on to new opportunities. There is also scope for exploring creative market-based ways to lever in private participation and stretch the impact of public sector funds. G  •  The various experiences since the late 80s with buybacks, partial guarantees, and debt exchanges provide some hints for how targeted deployment of public moneys can spur tendencies in a direction consistent with public policy goals.
The Federal Council, parliament and the SNB have all come out in opposition, but the final decision rests with Swiss electorate, who will vote in a referendum on the matter later this year. As an alternative to the concept of sovereign money, some academics have launched the idea of making digital central bank money accessible to all. This means that sight deposit accounts with the SNB would no longer remain the sole preserve of banks and a few other financial market participants. The aim of this proposal is thus to broaden the public’s access to central 1  Accounts of the current situation published by the Bank of England and the Deutsche Bundesbank found considerable resonance in the media and the economic blogosphere. Cf. M. McLeay, A. Radia and R. Thomas (2014), Money Creation in the Modern Economy, Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, Q1, pp. 14–27; Deutsche Bundesbank (2017), Die Rolle von Banken, Nichtbanken und Zentralbank im Geldschöpfungsprozess, Monatsbericht, April, pp. 15–36. Page 2/12  bank money, without prohibiting banks from creating deposits through lending. However, as I will show, this too leaves a number of questions unanswered. We therefore take a critical stance on this proposal. Let me now turn to the basics of money creation in our present-day financial system. Money creation in today’s financial system Types of money  When speaking about money, we need to distinguish between various types of money.

Those who are subject to this pain should have a good understanding of the virtues of this painful adjustment and be prepared to take the bitter medicine for a permanent cure of the ailment. This casts a new responsibility on the banks, because monetary policy is implemented by the central bank through banks. In terms of this new responsibility, the banks should appreciate the intention of the central bank with a positive note. If the central bank raises interest rates and curtails credit levels, the banks should do much more than what the central bank has directed. It has to extend, both by deed and word, its full cooperation and commitment to attaining the monetary policy targets, because at the end, they are the main beneficiaries of having an inflation free world. A similar responsibility is cast on the private sector as well. The Central Bank, like a good physician, has to flush out all the causes of inflation from the system. When doing so, it has to adopt painful and unpopular measures. But such measures are taken for the interest and the long term well-being of the economy. If the economy is allowed to be hit by inflation continuously, it is the private sector which would suffer most. It would be reduced from a long term planner to an at the moment event manager. It would be pestered with numerous requests for wage increases by the employees. Its profits would fall in real terms.
In a critical review of the US purchases during the pandemic, Levin, Lu and Nelson (2022) believe that the programme was too large and extended, and they assess that the financial losses that are now incurred are not matched by other gains. 19 [30]  This effect on interest rates seems to be relevant even today (see Figure 2). The Swedish National Debt Office's new borrowing in government bonds amounts to approximately SEK 600 billion since 2015. If the rate on these bonds has become 0.3 percentage points lower and the average maturity of the bonds is seven years, the cost of borrowing has decreased by SEK 13 billion. In addition, the Swedish National Debt Office has on average had a debt of approximately SEK 80 billion in Treasury bills. With a 0.3 percentage point lower interest rate on this debt over eight years, a further SEK 2 billion is added in reduced interest expenditure.35 An updated calculation thus indicates that purchases of government bonds may have reduced government borrowing costs by approximately SEK 15 billion in 2015-2022. The financial loss of approximately SEK 5 billion caused by the purchases of government bonds in phase 1 therefore seems more than well balanced by the reduction in the costs of government borrowing. In my earlier discussion, I thought it unlikely that the Riksbank's acquisition of assets prior to the pandemic would significantly stimulate economic activity. On the other hand, the purchases made it possible to strengthen confidence in the inflation target.

Their compilation shows, as expected, that the value of central banks' holdings has also decreased rapidly and often more in relation to the size of the economy than here in Sweden. However, as I just mentioned, the Riksbank's capacity to bear risk and handle losses is weaker because its seigniorage is so small.44 Some central banks will be able to continue to finance their operations even if they are now making very large losses. Of course, the Riksbank's financial position is not improved by other central banks also making losses. However, it shows that our losses are part of international development. There may also be reason for central banks – especially those governed by the EU Treaty – to create a consensus on how long-term earnings capacity and financial independence are to be managed. 43  See Bank of England (2022a and 2022b). 44 Central banks' losses should therefore be related to their interest-free capital. 23 [30]  Asset purchases and current monetary policy In conclusion, I would like to address two questions where some see a link between our asset holdings and current monetary policy: Is the rapid increase in inflation this year due to the Riksbank's asset purchases having been too large and lasted too long? And should the Riksbank not actively sell assets when monetary policy is now being tightened to bring inflation down? I think the answer is 'No!' to both of these questions.
2  BIS Review 55/2007  Who should take the blame for inflation? It is ironical that practically everyone in the society should take blame for a continuously high inflation in an economy. This is because everyone, even in a very little measure, would have contributed to facilitate inflation to raise its ugly head. It happens when people of a country believe that they can have a higher standard of living without working harder or producing more. Inflation in the long run is directly related to the amount of money which people would have for buying goods and services. When that quantity of money is in far excess of the quantity of goods and services, the general price level has to move up in order to facilitate the required volume of transactions. Hence, the magic solution for keeping inflation in check has been the production of money exactly in line with the production of goods and services in the economy. Any violation of this golden rule, for whatever the justifiable reason, would pave the way for the long run inflation to peep into the system. In this context, the Central Bank has an inalienable responsibility to take all the measures necessary to curb long term inflation. The role of the Central Bank The Central Bank takes monetary policy measures to keep the total volume of money in line with the total production and the volume of transactions in the economy.

As a working assumption we assume that the MPR will follow a trajectory similar to the one implied by financial asset prices during the ten days prior to this statistical closing of this Report. Thus, we assure that monetary policy will have responded swiftly to the changes in economic conditions and will remain expansionary through the whole projection horizon (figure 12). As always, the conduct of monetary policy and any possible adjustments to the MPR will be contingent on the effects of incoming information on the projected inflation dynamic. On the external front, there are some sources of uncertainty that may have significant effects but by their nature are very hard to quantify. For example, political and economic uncertainty surrounding European elections, worries about Brexit implementation and possible shifts towards protectionism in several developed economies. Other risks that have long lingered in the external scenario have varied in intensity. The US economy has evolved favorably, averting the risk of a new recession. The much awaited fiscal impulse could help to sustain somewhat higher growth in the years to come. However, it is also a source of risk, as its implementation may have problems or inflationary effects that might trigger a faster withdrawal of the monetary impulse, creating disruptions in financial markets. China continues to be a source of concern, especially its leverage, although its authorities have successfully weathered its gradual slowdown without causing disruptions, and this has been welcomed by markets.
The new Basel package is an attempt to use simple measures to put bounds on the consequences of flaws in more complex measures, which were themselves designed to avoid the perverse incentives to hold only very risky assets created by the previous generation of simple measures. More will need to be done in the years ahead to simplify and underpin the Basel regime. Market discipline can help, but only if there is much more transparency around the drivers of risk weights – both why they change over time and why they differ, for similar exposures, across institutions. The market needs to be able to understand what is published. Microprudential supervision under the new UK Twin Peaks system But the new UK regime will not rely on getting the regulations exactly right. That would be a fool’s paradise. Effective supervision is absolutely vital. Whether we like it or not, firms will be able to find their way around any set of rules – complex or simple – if they are determined to do so. This is not good. But the UK’s new Twin Peaks structure will help. In the first place, the reforms will finally give London a dedicated securities regulator a quarter century after the Big Bang that made it so necessary. The Financial Conduct Authority’s approach to enforcement will need to preserve – and, where necessary, restore – honesty in a market community for which side-stepping rules and principles has become too close to being part and parcel of commercial life.

Putting it bluntly, that would make it less easy to get rich quick irrespective of the quality of business transacted or the compliance culture in their part of the firm. This points to revisiting the terms and scope of the existing codes on remuneration of the G20 Financial Stability Board, the European Union and, in the United Kingdom, the Financial Services Authority. Industry structure and system resilience Incentives will also be influenced by measures that constrain the structure of banking. The UK’s plans to ring-fence banks’ more basic retail banking business will do more than help to make complex banks resolvable. The domestic-intermediation part of banks’ activities will effectively be separate from the entrepôt, wholesale business centred in the City of London. This will make it somewhat easier to see what is going on – where profits are coming from; how much capital is allocated to domestic intermediation, etc. It will also help establish different cultures in different lines of business. Within domestic commercial banking, we need somehow to unwind some of what I think of as the industrialisation of retail and business banking that occurred during the years of plenty. Branch and regional banking came too close to being seen as an exercise in sales and marketing. The role of local branch managers in making loans has been diluted over recent decades, replaced by credit-scoring techniques operated from the centre. Banking is about credit judgments. Boards need to think about how to re-inject that into the role of banks’ front line managers.
The banks of the countries participating in the SSM have been divided into two groups of significant and less significant institutions. The ECB will exert “direct supervision” over the former; as regards the latter, it merely assumes “indirect supervision” functions, as the national authorities will in fact continue to be responsible for their effective supervision. A list of 120 significant banking groups has been drawn up, accounting for approximately 85% of euro area bank assets. 15 of these are Spanish groups, representing around 90% of the assets of our country’s deposit institutions. It should be borne in mind that when we talk about 120 groups, we are referring to consolidated groups; that is to say, the number of individual banks is far higher. In total there are 1,244 individual institutions, which is essentially explained by the importance of cooperative banks in certain euro area countries, in particular France, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. To directly supervise the significant banks, the ECB has created two directorate generals, which shall perform the continuous monitoring of the 120 groups. DG I will supervise the 30 biggest banks in terms of balance sheet and activities, while DG II will cover the remaining 90 significant banks. However, the supervision of specific aspects or matters, what is known as on-site inspection, will be carried out by different teams. The ECB has thus adopted a different model to that place at the Banco de España to date: functionally separating the continuous monitoring of banks and inspection visits.

One of the SSM’s four directors general and two of its seven deputy directors general are from the Banco de España, while by the end of this year almost 100 Spanish experts will have joined the SSM as junior analysts or managers, almost all of them from the Banco de España. Of the 102 management posts corresponding to the SSM’s top six management levels (which include directors general, deputy directors general, directors, heads of division, deputy heads of division and head of section), 19 are from the Banco de España, making it the national supervisory authority that has supplied the most managers. Naturally, as a result, we have had to fill the gaps left by the staff who have moved to the ECB. On our estimates, the target staffing level in the Directorate General Banking Supervision in order to meet the needs of the new supervisory model is approximately 440, which is virtually the same as before the launch of the SSM. The Banco de España has already set in motion the selection and hiring processes to fill these vacancies. To conclude, I would like to sum up my address in three points. First, the creation of the Banking Union is, without doubt, the most ambitious European project undertaken since the launch of Economic and Monetary Union. It is the first step in a new phase of economic integration, establishing a more robust institutional and regulatory framework that will help restore confidence in banks, safeguard financial stability and lay the foundations for more stable economic growth.
The staff, past and present should be proud of the useful contribution, you have made towards the steady progress the Bank has made in its quest to attain its mission of “achieving and maintaining price and financial system stability for balanced macroeconomic development”. Ladies and Gentlemen, this progress, has however, not been with any challenges. Among the challenges was, the Global Economic and Financial Crisis during 2008/2009, which adversely affected most economies. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that we reposition ourselves to mitigate these types of challenges should they threaten to recur in the future. Colleagues, this 50th anniversary celebration therefore presents us with an opportunity to reflect on the achievements and challenges of the Bank since its inception. You will recall from my “Town Hall Speech” to members of staff in January 2014 that going forward we need to work harder and build on the successes we have scored in the past, by focusing on enhancing productivity and accountability under what I termed “The New Bank We Need”. In repositioning ourselves, I would like to remind you of some of the tenets we need as the New Bank which include the following: 1. Productivity and accountability;  2. Strong team work operating under set values and ethics;  3. Open and effective communication among staff; and  4. Meeting targets and providing workable solutions.

In the same vein, allow me, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, to wish the Government, and people of the Republic of Zambia a happy 50th birth year which we will be celebrating on 24th October 2014, and one which has been attained under a tranquil environment and economic progress. Fellow Staff and Invited Guests, I would most likely be in breach of all moral standing if I did not, at this stage, emphasize the Bank of Zambia’s deep commitment to the welfare and well-being of our employees. I implore all of us to aim at leaving a legacy of professionalism and excellence in all that we do. I further encourage all the sportsmen and women participating in today’s events not to despair should they not emerge victorious for one reason or another. Rather, I strongly urge you all to walk away after the games feeling immensely proud that you have been an integral part of a truly momentous and historic occasion. Remember, one can only turn 50 years of age once! Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to further extend my sincere gratitude to the commercial banks that have sent their representatives to come and attend this event. The support we have received to date has been unflinching throughout the years. We shall continue to work together in order to ensure that the levels of service delivery to our customers is raised and maintained at high standards. Distinguished Guests, this really, is not an occasion for long-winded speeches.