Fortunately, so far, there is patent goodwill to reach an understanding between the European authorities responsible for the Single Resolution and Supervision Mechanisms, which will shortly take the form of a memorandum of understanding between the two that will contribute to attaining the required coordination. What has still to be done in Spain? The institutional framework of supervision in Spain has evolved so as to adapt to the new European and global regulatory framework, and to the establishment of the banking union. That said, the task is not yet complete. In respect of macroprudential policies, the Banco de España has, as a result of the new regulations on capital requirements, assumed the competencies over the potential activation of macroprudential instruments that involve actions related to credit institutions. Indeed, last December, the central bank adopted the first decisions in this respect entailing the identification of institutions considered systemic at the domestic level, the determining of the additional regulatory capital required of each of them and the setting of the countercyclical capital buffer envisaged under the regulations. Given the current cyclical position of the Spanish economy following the sharp contraction in GDP and credit levels since 2008, the buffer was initially set at a level equal to zero. However, Spain is still lacking a macroprudential committee or forum, on which government authorities and financial supervisors are represented, that can assess macrofinancial conditions from a broad perspective and that has the capacity to formulate recommendations on public policies that may affect financial stability.

The experience accrued during periods of crisis and the changes that have taken place in the financial industry have conditioned the authorities’ preferences over time. For instance, until the end of the last century, the prevalent worldwide model was one of allocation of supervisory responsibilities by sector (banking, insurance and securities  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  markets). This model typically included a supervisor – normally the central bank – which was charged with ensuring that credit institutions complied with the sectoral regulations on solvency and conduct; a second supervisor, with similar competencies for insurance companies; and a third supervisor, which oversaw the behaviour of securities market participants. This model responded well to an industry structure in which the various types of institutions primarily pursued their activity in a single sector – whether banking, insurance or securities markets – and to the absence of widespread concern over the existence of possible conflicts between the surveillance of institutions’ solvency soundness and the monitoring of their behaviour with customers and investors. In the mid-1990s, this sectoral model began to be replaced in many countries by a single supervisory authority model (following the paradigm of the reform implemented in the United Kingdom in 1997) in which the oversight of banks, markets and insurance companies, in terms of both solvency and conduct, was assigned to a single supervisory agency separate from the central bank.