samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
MAS recognises that the insurance funds are different in nature from the equity of the company or the group because they belong to the policyholders and not the shareholders. Therefore in principle investments using the insurance fund should be treated separately from the investments of the company and the group. Nevertheless the insurance fund should also be used only for portfolio investments, and not for the purpose of controlling other companies in the group, especially nonfinancial companies, whether by itself or together with other investments by the group. Currently, some banking groups have used these insurance funds as the vehicle for owning and controlling their investee companies. For example, the bank itself may own only 5% of an investee company, but the insurance fund of the insurance company may own another 15%, giving a total stake of 20%. This is not satisfactory, because it presents the same problems of contagion, non-transparency and dilution of management focus as the bank itself investing directly in these companies. BIS Review 53/2000  6  MAS will study the appropriate investment limits of insurance funds for both bank-related and independent insurers. The limits set should protect the interests of policyholders through adequate diversification, and ensure that the investments do not amount to controlling stakes. These measures will be developed in consultation with the industry, and are expected to be finalised by the end of the year.

The costs for the banks' payment services should thus, all else being equal, be lower in Sweden than in countries that apply systems similar to the textbook one. We can therefore say that our system is more cost-effective than the textbook's system. Following the tragic events in the USA the other week, some central banks announced that they were prepared to supply liquidity to avoid a shortage of liquidity on the market. During periods of unease the demand for risk-free investments normally rises. This leads to investors demanding higher compensation for taking credit risks. It can also lead, as a consequence, to an increase in the interest rate on the interbank market. In extreme situations, access to liquidity can be valued so highly that banks and other market participants are not prepared to lend money at any price. As a result of the great uncertainty prevailing, the daily lending market in US dollars functioned very poorly during the days following the terrorist attack, daily rates rose and there were indications that some banks were experiencing difficulty in obtaining dollars at all. Given these developments, the Federal Reserve offered the US banks increased opportunities to borrow dollars from the central bank. However, the European banks were also affected, and therefore with the aim of maintaining the dollar market function, a number of central banks, including the Swedish Riksbank, offered a dollar facility to the market.
During 2006 the Bank of Albania started examining the prerequisites and implementation conditions over a mid-term period (year 2009), of a new monetary policy regime. In this context, analyses are carried out about the possibilities of improving the legal infrastructure for the creation of such conditions in compliance with international standards in this area. Also, the possibility of improving the organic law of the Bank of Albania has been considered, coinciding with the prediction of its alteration as a mid-term priority of the National Plan for the Implementation of the SAA. It is forecasted that these alterations will stipulate clearly the competences and procedures for the decision-making process of the Bank of Albania and the transparency of this process, which constitutes also a substantial precondition for the compilation and implementation of an effective monetary policy. In the framework of the legal reforms undertaken by the Ministry of Justice for the amendment and improvement of the Civil Procedure Code, the Bank of Albania has been  12  BIS Review 80/2007  fully committed to cooperating with the banking sector for the completion and accuracy of mandatory execution procedure of executive titles. The Bank of Albania proposals have aimed at improving the legal base on the application of procedures for the execution of acts that constitute executive titles. The main purpose is to cut the time for the execution of those acts, aiming to increase security in the lending activity, thus reducing the credit risk the banks are faced with.

At end of 2006, the Bank of Albania closely cooperated with the Ministry of Finance in compiling the draft-law “On Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing”. In accordance with the respective European Union directives and other international recommendations, the Bank of Albania, being the supervisory authority of the banking system, regards with priority the legal framework improvement for preventing the use of banking system for laundering money and wealth that derive from criminal activities. During this year, with the assistance of the World Bank, the drafting and completion of the regulatory framework for foreign reserve management was carried out successfully, reviewing the Bank of Albania’s policy on the management of such reserve, the management criteria and terms, as well as the decentralization of decision-making competences during this process. Internal audit In 2006, 44 audits and 3 verification procedures were carried out. The inspectors presented 269 findings and 197 recommendations out of these audits, which were carried out at the Bank of Albania and at its five district branches, the Printing House included. 11. Bank of Albania balance sheet  During 2006, the Bank of Albania assets further increased, totalling ALL 255.5 billion, about 14 percent higher than at end 2005. The constituent groups, both foreign currency and domestic assets, have reflected growth, while the first group occupies about 68 per cent of total assets, the same level as that of the previous year.
Unfortunately, it would seem that it hasn´t been till recently that this call for action has been taken seriously. In his keynote presentation Lord Stern will shed some light on whether we are still in time to avoid the worst impact. Thank you very much for accompanying us today. Still, we shouldn´t forget that the fight against climate change also has a human and social dimension. The transition to a low-carbon economy must also be “fair” or “just” for the economic sectors most affected. This is one of the objectives of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which commits to eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development worldwide by 2030, ensuring that no one is left behind. The Agenda integrates in a balanced manner the three dimensions (economic, social and environmental) of sustainable development through seventeen Sustainable Development Goals. Ms. Cristina Gallach, High Commissioner for the 2030 Agenda, will moderate the panel that will follow Lord Stern´s presentation, and will share with us the progress that is being made in this respect. Thank you very much, Cristina, for being here today. I am sure we are all looking forward to hearing Lord Stern’s speech. But first, let me say a few more words about the implications that the transition to a low-carbon economy has for the financial sector, and the kind of actions that Supervisors and Central banks are taking to address this global challenge.

https://eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/2854739/916f8c4b-7099-4abaac1f-882cfd4c3583/RAQ %20Booklet %20Spring %202019.pdf?retry=1 7 https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/green-finance_en 3/5  2030 targets agreed in Paris, including a 40 % cut in greenhouse gas emissions, we have to fill an investment gap estimated at 180 billion EUR per year. The effects of climate change and actions to mitigate them also pose risks for both insurance companies and banks. It is well known that the climate change-related risks may be divided into two categories: physical and transition risks. This requires banks to consider climate change-related risks and the transition to a low-carbon economy in their integrated risk management. One of our panelists, Mr. Sean Kidney, co-founder and CEO of Climate Bonds Initiative, will be able to give us an overview of the evolution and prospects of green financing instruments, in particular green bonds. Meanwhile, Ms. Danae Kyriakopoulou, OMFIF´s8 Chief Economist and Director of Research, will give us her insight into this adaptation by the financial sector to the challenges posed by climate change risks. Thank you for your participation in today´s panel. As regards international collaboration in the field of sustainable finance, I believe both the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development acted as a wake-up call for supervisors and central banks to join forces, setting in motion a whole agenda of policies intended to contribute to the objective of avoiding this increase above 2oC. In this short period of time, many initiatives, both from the official and private sectors, are being undertaken.
More public equity has been issued so far this year than at the same point in any year in the past decade. [See slide 5 of accompanying deck]  But that issuance has all been by listed companies. On our estimates, the vast majority of the possible equity needed will be for companies not listed on a stock exchange. And so the challenge is to give a wide range of businesses every opportunity to access growth capital. That’s capital willing to invest in assets – like unlisted equity – that can’t easily be traded and doesn’t deliver a quick or stable return. Unlocking more growth capital  Unlocking more growth capital is not a new challenge. Three years ago, the Treasury launched a review of what it called Patient Capital. Since then, many changes have been made. The Pensions Regulator has clarified its guidance to funds. New funds, including British Patient Capital (a subsidiary of the British Business Bank), were established. And the Financial Conduct Authority now permits retail investors greater access to funds invested in illiquid assets. There is more to do. And the need for more equity finance to minimise the scarring to the economy now creates a case for ambition. A range of authorities have a role to play. Lots of attention tends to be given to schemes and ideas involving public money and the taxation of equity relative to debt.

But the shares of assets allocated to growth capital assets like unlisted equity can be small. UK insurance companies and pension funds together allocate only around 3% of their assets to unlisted equity. The collective investment funds, in which they and others invest, allocate only 2%. [See slide 6 of accompanying deck]  There seem to be biases in the system. Even investors who should have the longest horizons seem to have a fetish for liquidity and an aversion to really illiquid growth capital assets. Getting to the bottom of this should be the focus of our efforts. Consider the £ trillion of assets in UK investment funds. The mass of these – just over 85% by assets – are open ended14, offering investors the opportunity to redeem their holding for cash each day by selling a slice of the funds’ assets. Because they offer this, these funds aren’t suited to investing in highly illiquid growth capital. The alternative closed end fund structures issue a fixed number of shares, which can be listed on a stock exchange. Because investors ‘redeem’ by selling their share to another in the secondary market (and typically at a discount), the assets held in the fund do not need to be traded. These funds are therefore more able to invest in truly illiquid growth capital. So it is no surprise that a bigger proportion of their assets is allocated to assets like unlisted equity [See slide 6 of accompanying deck]  But these funds are much smaller.
Changes to the target range for the policy instrument - the 3-month Libor - are commented by a press release. They are also discussed after each Quarterly Board Meeting, which are fixed in advance. At our biannual press conferences, we provide our assessment of the economic situation. At these occasions, we inform the public how we judge the risks facing the economy and present our inflation forecasts for the next three years. The forecast should guide the public in monitoring inflationary risks. Given all this, we have taken the extra step to publish the forecasting models that are used to generate our inflation forecasts. The meaning of faith in financial markets Trust is relevant not just for central banks but also for the entire business and financial community. Trustworthy business standards are one of the most important forms of social capital. Trust is paramount to the efficient operation of financial markets, which is a key ingredient of a well-functioning economy. This trust includes confidence in the people who run the companies, and in those who watch them. It also means that the information required to make sound investment decisions is disclosed fully and accurately. The disclosure moreover must be fair. There must be confidence that insiders are not trading on information unavailable to everyone. Only when all these components of trust are in place do we have healthy, efficient financial markets where everyone benefits. What is lost when accounting fraud and the abuse of management power occur?

However, the increased volatility in equity markets has also been pronounced because of peculiar events: the integrity of financial analysts’ recommendations and the increased spread of fraudulent accounting practices. It is the latter that has struck the financial markets particularly hard in recent months. U.S. firms, such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Xerox, have become household names not because of their services and products but for their alleged accounting abuses. Investors in these firms undertook investment decisions based on apparently false information. The fear is that only the top of the iceberg has been revealed and more unpleasant news is expected to fill the front pages of the daily newspapers. The fallout from the financial scandals has unearthed several dormant issues that twitch the nerves of financial markets. In turn, this has generated considerable discussion in the financial press, on the airwaves, and in the corridors of government buildings. While the issues are complex, the list of proposed solutions is long. This all suggests that consensus and reform will not be achieved overnight. Trust as an asset As in all walks of life, trust is a valuable attribute. Central banks, as well, value the importance of credibility and trust. Allow me a few minutes to explain why these qualities are important to the National Bank. At the same time, they can provide a good illustration as to why these same qualities are equally important for the private sector. Let me begin with what I mean by trust.
Besides these welfare-enhancing effects on the “domestic” economy of the euro area, the new setting also has far-reaching consequences for the world economy and the international community. Let me shed some light on the international ramifications of Monetary Union by highlighting three interrelated aspects. First, the use of the euro as an international currency in the global financial system; second, the growing role played by the Eurosystem in international policy cooperation; and, third, relevant aspects of the exchange rate of the euro. Before dealing with these points in turn, I should like to recall some key economic features of the euro area. Key economic features of the euro area Let me begin by putting the euro area into an international perspective. The euro area represents a large and relatively closed economy. Given its population of almost 300 million people and its significant weight in the global economy, the euro area is broadly comparable with the United States. As regards its size and structure, the most striking fact is that the euro area economy has a share of world output of around 16%. This is more than three times that of its largest national component (namely Germany, which accounts for 4.7%), significantly higher than that of Japan (which accounts for about 8%), while being lower than that of the United States (which stands at 21%).

In this case, a third and independent party, such as the IMF or OECD, regularly monitors and assesses the economic policies of its members. The ECB participates in the surveillance process for policies falling within its competence (e.g. monetary policy, payment systems oversight). This means that, whenever monetary policy is under surveillance, the ECB is solely responsible for its interaction with the IMF and OECD. Standards and codes recently adopted by the IMF and other relevant international institutions are a way of defining best policy practices and enhancing transparency in the field of monetary and financial policy. In this respect, the ECB’s involvement in regular surveillance further strengthens its accountability through being transparent. Third, in the area of macroeconomic policies, consultation and surveillance are the only forms of international cooperation that are relevant to the Eurosystem. Any form of ex ante policy coordination of monetary with other macroeconomic policies would neither be advisable for the Eurosystem nor be compatible with the ECB’s mandate and independence. Apart from the well-known recognition and decision lags in policy-making, attempts to coordinate ex ante would not only blur the specific responsibilities of individual policy-makers, but also reduce their accountability. In determining its monetary policy stance, the ECB should and does take into account all relevant information. It cannot let its policy solely be determined by the current and future course of other policies. This could easily compromise the maintenance of price stability.
But first of all, let me briefly outline what exactly have been the challenges in recent decades that have required us to rethink the way we conduct policy. Globalization has been a long and drawn out process. Countries have jumped at the opportunity to reap the benefits of globalization, with advanced countries leading the pack. Jumps in technology in recent decades, particularly in information and communications, have ensured that services – particularly financial services – have become truly borderless for advanced and developing countries alike, in a much shorter period of time. 2. Challenges to traditional monetary policy under globalization  We are all familiar with the benefits of globalization, with the past few decades seeing cheap exports from emerging markets fueling global trade and growth, albeit with some hiccups along the way. China’s accession to the WTO and the subsequent flux of Chinese exports to the rest of the world, as well as oil exports from the Middle-East, helped to create an environment of prolonged low global prices and low global inflation. We are all familiar with this episode and have given it a few names: the great moderation, the Goldilocks’ economy – not too warm and not too cold, and stable disequilibrium. This is an episode in our history where variability of growth in real output has declined along with the variability in inflation. Along the way, imbalances in the global economy began to build up.

The spike in oil and commodity prices last year, which initially appeared as a supply shock at the individual country level, in fact represented economic overheating at the global scale, and domestic monetary policy tightening may not have been the most effective way to deal with this situation in the global context. In addition, at the present juncture, the unprecedented and contagious slowdown in each country’s economies as a result of global linkages means that monetary policy now needs to respond to the monetary policy stance in other countries. This has added an extra international dimension to policy making, in addition to previous considerations such as the impact via capital flows and trading partners’ economies. 4. Testing the limits of monetary policy under globalization  But what exactly are these changes that globalization has brought about to traditional monetary policy? And in particular, how have these changes affected central banks? The first aspect has been the challenge to the basis of our traditional monetary policy decision-making process. Traditional conduct of monetary policy would rely on the accuracy of our forecasts of the economy, of inflation dynamics, and of our understanding of how the economy works. With globalization, making accurate economic forecasts become more difficult. The recent economic cycle has demonstrated that shocks to the economy and the price level have been both rapid and frequent. This is most clearly demonstrated by the volatility in  2  BIS Review 33/2009  inflation in the past year.
Furthermore, China currently has either very low inflation or deflation, which normally points to devaluation pressure rather than revaluation pressure (a need for real depreciation). Finally, China and other the Asian economies that are trying to prop up the value of their currencies are the main purchasers of US Treasury bonds. So, in a situation where the US government finances are deteriorating, the Chinese exchange rate regime is actually helping to depress US long yields and indirectly bolstering the US recovery. My conclusion is that China in the short term should retain its fixed exchange rate until such time as its financial system has undergone more substantial reform, which is something that nevertheless must be done in the coming years. In the long term, however, a floating exchange rate appears unavoidable for a country that is on the way to becoming one of the world’s leading economies. It is only in the much longer term, when China is highly integrated with the world economy, that fixed exchange-rate cooperation can become a possibility once again. This conclusion brings me back to the main line of my argument: Europe can gradually be enlarged to become a relatively big currency area that includes all the countries, from Ireland in the west to Estonia in the east, where the long-term microeconomic gains outweigh the recurring but temporary macroeconomic costs.

If there are such gains to be made from a common currency in a reunified Europe, would it not be possible that such gains may also be attained on a global level? Should we continue on a path towards more global monetary cooperation? There are many arguments both for and against such an arrangement. In recent years we have seen substantial exchange rate fluctuations between some of the world’s large economic blocs. These have largely been related to developments in the US dollar. The dollar’s weakening against the euro has recently gained impetus once again; in two years, the euro/dollar exchange rate has gone from a low of 84 cents to 1.18 dollars in recent weeks - a rise of just over 40 per cent. Discussions of the implications of an overvalued dollar for the US current account deficit have quickly turned into concern over the effects of the rapid fall in the dollar on euro area growth. Should there be a quicker correction in the US current account deficit due to diminishing interest among international investors in US assets, the dollar could weaken further. A fast and dramatic depreciation of the dollar could derail Europe’s fragile recovery.