samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  11  Chart 14 Financial conditions index (UK)  Chart 15 GDP fall during the crisis compared to tail risks flagged by high debt vulnerabilities and low bank capital resilience  Difference from average since 1995 (number of standard deviations)  6 5  Three-year cumulative GDP growth 2007Q41 in 20 forecast 2010Q4 (%) (as of 2007 Q4) 0  4 3 2 1  -1 -2 -3  0 -1  2019  2017  2015  2013  2011  2009  2007  2005  2003  2001  1999  1997  1995  -2  -4 -5  Household Credit  Corporate Credit  Current Account  Low Bank Capital  Other  Total  Actual Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Eikon by Refinitiv and Bank calculations. Notes: Financial conditions index (FCI) estimated using principal component analysis. The FCI summarises information from the following financial series: term spreads, interbank spreads, corporate spreads, sovereign spreads, long-term interest rates, equity price returns, equity return volatility and relative financial market capitalisation. An increase in the index indicates a tightening in conditions. Notes: Figure based on Aikman et al. (forthcoming). The chart compares the actual cumulative three-year fall in UK GDP during 2008-2010 to the 5th percentile of real GDP growth forecasted for the same period as of end-2007. This estimate is decomposed in the same way as described in the note to Chart 13 and additionally shows the estimated impact of low bank capital resilience.

Launched in Paris last December, the NGFS started out with eight trailblazing supervisors but has since grown to include 19 members and five observers, including the Sustainable Insurance Forum (SIF). We are working hard on two subjects where insurers are in the vanguard: disclosure of current climate risks and the projection of dynamic stress tests based on future risks. A report detailing the network’s first year of work and making recommendations will be presented at a conference in Paris on 17 April next year. ** I have called green finance “the new frontier for the 21st Century”. Today, you are talking about “pushing back the limits of insurability”. These images testify to your pioneering role and evoke your spirit of entrepreneurship and innovation. The risks facing the world in 2018 are unquestionably growing, and we need these qualities more than ever before. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Lars Heikensten: The krona, Sweden and EMU Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Öhman Fondkommission, Stockholm, 13 November 2002. *  *  *  During the past six the months the issue of Sweden's full participation in EMU has again come to the fore. It now looks as though a referendum on EMU participation will be held some time next year. This in turn has revived the discussion both about the economic policy that would be appropriate if Sweden adopts the euro and about what may happen in the meantime. In these contexts the Riksbank plays a central role, making it natural that we discuss as openly as possible the matters we shall have occasion to consider in the coming years. In that way we can hopefully contribute to a better understanding of the challenges that we and others involved in economic policy face. Today I intend to concentrate on three matters in particular. First I shall be saying something about the decision-making process in connection with the possibility of participation in ERM2. Then I shall talk about the matters that should be considered before deciding on an appropriate exchange rate at EMR2 entry. Finally I shall talk a bit about my view of economic policy in ERM2. Participation in ERM2 The next step now is for the party leaders to get together and consider a date for an EMU referendum. Their meeting is scheduled for November 29.

So higher relative growth is often associated with a higher price level and a stronger real exchange rate. The reverse provides an important partial explanation for the krona's long-term real depreciation: Sweden's growth trend in recent decades has been weaker than in our most important competitor countries (Diagram 1). BIS Review 65/2002  3  Diagram 1. Real exchange rate and relative GDP against the euro area Index 1992:Q4=100 130 Relative GDP  120  110  100  90 Real exchange rate  80 1970  1974  1978  1982  1986  1990  1994  1998  2002  Source: Sveriges Riksbank  Another important explanatory variable for the real exchange rate is terms of trade, which is also a relative price for groups of goods. Here, however, the categories of goods in the comparison is more limited than in the case of the real exchange rate. More specifically, terms of trade represent the price of imported goods expressed in terms of the price of goods that are exported. In Sweden's case, shifts in terms of trade often stem from changes abroad; in our small and open economy, changes in domestic supply and demand are of secondary importance for the long-term development of our terms of trade. A look at Sweden's terms of trade in recent decades reveals a number of episodes where major changes in terms of trade have led to sizeable movements in the real exchange rate.
Many believe that it is important in such a case to act forcefully so as to prevent a deep recession. However, the risk of such an approach is in overdoing it and thereby delaying a necessary adjustment of balance sheets and debt levels. New imbalances in other markets could then arise and the process begin again. When the situation turns next time, there is a greater risk of quickly reaching the zero-interest rate level. Conclusion In my opinion, the economic costs in the shape of sharp fluctuations in demand are likely on average to be higher if the central bank does not take account of asset prices and credit expansion in its decisions. One reason for this is the costs associated with reaching zero interest rates. However, the decisions must be based on an analysis that takes advantage of the knowledge that we nevertheless possess about the importance of asset prices and debt in the transmission mechanism. More in-depth knowledge of this area is necessary, however. Research must be intensified regarding credit cycles, risk behaviour and method development for identifying when rises in asset prices and credit expansion can be judged to increase the risk of a sharp fall in output. There may also be reason, based on the insights and techniques that we have today, to evaluate and develop the theories expounded by the monetary economists from the Austrian School, for example.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Presentation of the 2019 Annual Report of the ACPR Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), at the press conference, Paris, 28 May 2020. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to welcome you to this presentation of the 2019 Annual Report of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution (ACPR – Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority), in the company of Bernard Delas, Vice-Chairman of the ACPR, Dominique Laboureix, the new Secretary General of the ACPR, and Alain Ménéménis, the new President of the Sanctions Committee. The circumstances are unusual and unprecedented. Indeed, we shall be talking about a year that has ended, at a time when, since then, we have found ourselves engulfed in an unprecedented health and economic crisis. We shall come back to this. In 2019 and since the start of 2020, the women and men of the ACPR have continued to work tirelessly to safeguard financial stability. I would like to take this opportunity to thank them. This morning, I shall focus my comments on an issue that cannot be ignored and that is at the heart of our concerns, without forgetting the other challenges we face – the profitability and solvency of French and European banks and insurers. I.
Second, in assessing the current size of the reserves, it is important to bear in mind that the impact of general liberalisation of capital controls seems, fortunately, to come to the fore gradually, although this does not mean that it couldn't become significant going forward. Large reserves generate confidence during this process. Third, we should not project current conditions to the infinite future and therefore come up with a huge problem. The monetary stance changes over the course of the business cycle, as is normal, and the interest rate differential with abroad varies from one point in time to another. Furthermore, there are fluctuations in foreign currency flows and exchange rates, and the opportunity could arise later to sell off a portion of the reserves so as to mitigate these fluctuations and generate revenues to offset the current cost of the reserves. None of this changes the fact that we must always think in terms of reducing the cost of financing the reserves. Larger reserves provide for the possibility of placing a portion in riskier investments that could generate larger returns, as many central banks in a similar position have done in recent years.

Somewhat simplified, the income comes from two main sources: remuneration to the labour force in the form of wages and other benefits and remuneration to capital in the form of yield and profits. Both of these types of remuneration have increased over the past three years, and GDP has increased by a good three per cent on average in  4 See, for instance, OECD (2015) and Furceri et al. (2016). 6 [14]  real terms. 5 But the question is how the growing incomes have been distributed among households. Households differ with regard to the size of the income they receive from different sources. In general, labour income is in relative terms the most important source of income for households in the lower and middle parts of the income distribution, while capital income has the most significance for those at the top – particularly the very top – of the distribution. As monetary policy affects wages and capital income in different ways, the overall effect may differ from one household to the next. It is this channel from monetary policy via the composition of household income on which the debate has focused the most – rising asset prices should have benefitted households at the top of the income distribution to a relatively large degree and thus contributed to a greater income dispersion. Higher asset prices, lower yield and cheaper loans However, households do not only differ with regard to the composition of labour and capital income.
Office for Budget Responsibility (2021), “Debt maturity, quantitative easing and interest rate sensitivity”, article in Economic and Fiscal Outlook, March, available at Debt maturity, quantitative easing and interest rate sensitivity - Office for Budget Responsibility (obr.uk) Sellin, P. (2018), “The Riksbank’s operational frameworks for implementing monetary policy, 1885-2018”, Economic Review No. 2, available at The Riksbank’s operational frameworks for monetary policy, 1885-2018. 12 [19]  Skingsley, C. (2021), "Adapting to new conditions – monetary policy freedom with responsibility", Digital speech at SEB, published on 20 May, available at Skingsley: Adapting to new conditions - monetary policy freedom with responsibility | Sveriges Riksbank. SOU 2022:10, ”Coronakommissionens slutbetänkande” (final report of the Coronavirus Commission), published on 25 February, available on Slutbetänkande SOU 2022:10 (coronakommissionen.com). Sveriges Riksbank (2017), "The Riksbank's strategy for a gradual normalisation of monetary policy", article in the Monetary Policy Report, December, available at The Riksbank's strategy for a gradual normalisation of monetary policy. Sveriges Riksbank (2020), "How the Riksbank's measures have worked during the corona crisis", article in the Monetary Policy Report, September, available at How the Riksbank's measures have worked during the corona crisis. Sveriges Riksbank (2021), “Foreign central banks’ plans for a gradually less expansionary monetary policy”, article in the Monetary Policy Report, September, available at Foreign central banks’ plans for a gradually less expansionary monetary policy, article in the Monetary Policy Report September 2021 (riksbank.se). Sveriges Riksbank (2022), "The coronavirus crisis and the Riksbank's asset purchases", article in the Account of Monetary Policy 2021, available at Account of Monetary Policy 2021 (riksbank.se).

In conclusion, let me stress the important role played by central banks in preserving monetary and financial stability in an increasingly globalised world. •  The recent years have shown the benefits of monetary stability in terms of growth in a globalised world. It is of course closely linked to central banks’ independence, which is no longer a matter of debate. •  Financial authorities are nevertheless faced with a new challenge, which is to strengthen financial stability, in a context of amplified financial cycles, in conjunction with monetary stability. I would like to stress what I feel is the highly complementary nature of price stability and financial stability objectives: price stability is the bedrock on which financial stability is built. •  Central banks have a undoubtedly special responsibility due to their position at the heart of financial systems: –  they contribute directly to supplying liquidity to the economy,  –  their close and constant contact with credit institutions gives them a thorough understanding of banking systems,  –  they are responsible for ensuring that payment systems operate smoothly,  –  and they contribute to banking supervision. I thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 41/2001
At the same time, one should remember that we are still in the same economic playing field, with the same regulations and the same referee, constantly striving to make economic progress to achieve the best possible welfare – a process that actually has no end. Similar experiences Economic developments in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s are very reminiscent of developments in Finland. Like Finland, Sweden underwent an overheating at the end of the 1980s, which was mainly due to an excessively high domestic demand, partly due to insufficiently tight fiscal policy, a rapid credit boom and rising asset prices in the wake of the successive deregulations - all within the framework of a fixed exchange rate regime that set limits as to how far the steering interest rate could be used to govern the level of domestic activity. The fact that Sweden and Finland did not have much to counter with when the currency crisis really got its claws into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, should be regarded in the light of the imbalances built up within their economies over several years. It was an uneven battle, although Sweden changed its fiscal policy and the Riksbank did all it could to defend the currency, raising its steering interest rate to 500 per cent. However, Sweden was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate as an anchor to achieve price stability in November 1992. Finland had replaced its fixed exchange rate regime earlier in the autumn.

It is also for this reason that we have tolerated a 'deviation interval' since 1995. While inflation has been low, growth in both Sweden and Finland during the inflation targeting period has been good from a historical perspective, and unemployment has fallen gradually from the high levels during the crisis years. There has been a successful consolidation of public finances in both countries and a fall in the central government debt measured as a percentage of GDP. Additionally, fiscal policy in Sweden has become more predictable with the introduction of a rolling nominal ceiling for public expenditure. Moreover, a number of measures have been taken to improve the functioning of the Swedish economy. These include deregulation and changes in the tax and social insurance systems. This has meant that the conditions for a favourable development have improved and confidence in the Swedish economy has increased. At the end of 1996; however, Finland chose a different direction for its exchange rate policy by taking part in the ERM as a preparation for full participation in the EMU from its start in 1999, while Sweden decided in 1997 that it would 'wait and see'. 2  BIS Review 9/2002  However, an unforeseen obstacle over the past decade has been the large fluctuations in the exchange rate.
The new statistics support this scenario, although the picture is not clear-cut. For instance, the National Accounts for Q3 indicate an increase in growth compared with earlier quarters, in line with the forecast in the Inflation Report. Other indicators of a recovery are the purchasing managers index and the National Institute of Economic Research's business tendency surveys, as well as the fact that retail trade continues to show good growth. Counteracting this is the fact that manufacturing output was weak during October and November and the number of new orders declined. In addition, new estimates for public finances indicate that public consumption this year may be somewhat weaker than  4  BIS Review 9/2004  was assumed in December. This is mainly connected with the financial situation in local government. The local government sector as a whole shows a deficit, which must be redressed over the coming years. Although the dollar has weakened against the Swedish krona, in terms of the TCW index the krona has not appreciated as much. This is mainly because the krona, contrary to many expectations, has weakened against the euro. The most recent National Accounts figures and foreign trade statistics also indicate that we have so far been slightly too pessimistic with regard to Swedish exports. The most evident cause for concern is the labour market, which has developed more weakly than expected, particularly towards the end of 2003.

Several safeguards are in place to minimise potential distortive effects on market functioning and price formation (such as the issuer limit and the issue share limit of 33%). There has been a prominent financial stability dimension in all unconventional measures taken, but the existing institutional framework ensures that monetary policy is the last line of defence with respect to preserving financial stability. The establishment of the European banking union, in particular the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), has taken monetary policy one step further away from financial stability issues. Progress has been made to ensure that regulatory capture and forbearance are minimised and that shareholders bear responsibility and face the consequences of failure. But we are not there yet. These mechanisms need to be complemented by a common system of deposit protection, which would further bolster financial stability by reducing the risk of bank runs in crisis times. Conclusion To conclude, unconventional policies have been complicated to implement and to communicate. But they have been effective in enhancing our ability to deliver on our mandate in a medium-term perspective. Our measures have been designed to complement each other and have proved adaptable to and effective against the series of shocks which have buffeted the euro area economy. The complex nature of unconventional measures has repercussions for the transparency and accountability dimension of central bank independence. But they were a sine qua non for our mandate to be respected.
6/14  In respect of monetary policy, the various ECB measures have allowed financial conditions to be eased considerably, and have acted as a mainstay for the economic recovery in the area, contributing to countering the deflationary trends looming over the region some years back. For the Spanish economy, it is estimated that from 2014 to 2018 the ECB’s measures boosted real GDP by 2.3% and the CPI by 1.4% (see Chart 11). These effects are of a fairly similar magnitude to those estimated for the euro area as a whole (2.3% and 1.7%, respectively). The fiscal policy stance shifted from expansionary in 2015 and 2016 to neutral in 2017, but it will once again be expansionary in 2018 once the various measures included in the State Budget for this year materialise. Over recent years, the reduction in the deficit has been due to the economy’s cyclical improvement and to the fall-off in interest expenditure, while the structural deficit has held at still-high levels, according to the European Commission’s latest estimates. That said, the role of the foregoing factors should, in future, tend progressively to taper off. This has been the case already for oil prices, the course of which has reversed since mid2017, and, to a lesser extent, of external markets, following the recent slowdown. But it is particularly relevant for demand-side (monetary and fiscal) policies. Specifically, it is to be expected that monetary policy will progressively play a less pivotal role.

In particular, for the moment it is unclear – as, I must say, it is bound to be at this stage – whether the financial system can generate the expansion of credit that will most likely be necessary to support recovery. The reopening of high-grade bond markets has definitely been encouraging. But in most countries, including the UK, bank lending remains subdued. It is hard to disentangle how much of that is down to weak demand, and how much to tighter supply conditions from the banks. I would just say this. I truly believe that it is in the interests of the banks themselves to ensure that businesses get the working-capital finance they need. While one can imagine, I suppose, individual banks being tempted to sit it out in order to deleverage their balance sheets in an environment that is obviously tougher for them, there cannot sensibly be free riders. If all banks were to adopt such a strategy, recovery might end up being anaemic at best, which would feed back into the banking system itself – increasing defaults and depleting banks’ capital. Not lending would be a counterproductive business and financial strategy. I’m reasonably confident that senior bankers can be persuaded to see that themselves, if indeed they don’t already. But it will, in my view, take until the autumn at least to gauge whether tolerable progress is being made on this front. Without it, confidence could ebb away. But with it, recovery will have a fair chance of becoming rooted.