samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
• The effects on the exchange rate may vary according to international conditions - interest rates in other countries - required rates of return and risk premiums in financial markets  SG Gausdal 31.01.03  Norges Bank has one instrument: the interest rate. It is set to achieve the operational target for monetary policy - an inflation rate of 2½ per cent over time. An increase in the interest rate will normally contribute to reducing inflation by curbing demand for goods and services and by strengthening the krone against other currencies. An interest rate reduction has the opposite effect. Inflation targeting means that monetary policy contributes to smoothing fluctuations in the economy. This implies that the interest rate is increased in response to pressures in the economy and a risk of higher inflation, and that the interest rate is reduced when growth is sluggish and the outlook points to lower inflation. This objective is also expressed in the Regulation on Monetary Policy. The effect of the interest rate on inflation is uncertain and may vary over time. Its impact is partly dependent on the debt rate in the private and public sectors, the situation in the labour market and the impact of a change in the interest rate on the exchange rate. The effect of interest rate changes on the exchange rate may vary according to external conditions, such as foreign interest rates, required rates of return and risk premiums in international financial markets.

The choice made was  2  BIS Review 100/2006  imposed by the circumstances: lack of developed financial instruments and institutional financial structure; absence of the interest rate transmission mechanism, and high interdependence between the aggregate demand and money supply. In October 1995, NBRM made a shift towards monetary strategy of targeting the nominal exchange rate against the German Mark, and later against the Euro, with the Denar exchange rate stability being the intermediate monetary policy objective. Such a strategy, applied in a small and open economy such as ours, has proved to be very successful for maintaining the price stability until present day. All reforms in the monetary policy instruments since the independence have been directed towards introducing indirect, market-oriented instruments for enabling efficient monetary policy conduct. Therefore, in 1993 deposit and credit auctions were introduced, and at the end of 1994 CB bills auctions were introduced. The initial development and strengthening of the financial system of the Republic of Macedonia, especially of the government securities market, enabled us to include new instruments, following the example of the modern central banks. In April 2005, we promoted the overthe-counter market for government securities. In the same year, we launched the general repo agreement and we started with repo operations when concluding lombard credits. In March this year, together with the Ministry of Finance we introduced Treasury bills for monetary policy purposes. The transition of the monetary strategy and of the monetary instruments would not have been successful without adequate banking reforms.
The frustrating thing is that, with the best will in the world, there was not much that either we at the Bank or the UK Government could have done to ward off the pressures on UK manufacturing, which had their origins abroad. It's fairly obvious where we are talking about the global slowdown - with negative growth last year of about ½ % in Japan and very slow growth of just 1¼ % in the US and 1½% in the Eurozone. We can go to international meetings and encourage the respective authorities there to stimulate their economies, but there is nothing that we can do about it directly ourselves. It's perhaps less obvious that we cannot influence the exchange rate. Many people think that we could weaken sterling against the euro quite simply by cutting our interest rate relative to the interest rate in the eurozone. But it's not as simple as that. The US has reduced its interest rate far more aggressively than the ECB over the past year or so, but the dollar is actually stronger against the euro than it was to begin with; and the same is true, to a lesser degree, of ourselves, here in the UK, with sterling also stronger against the euro (though weaker against the dollar) than it was a year ago. So there was nothing much - as I say - that we could have done directly to affect these depressing effects coming from the global economy and the resulting weakness of external demand on the UK.

I feel strongly that we should leverage our competitive advantage as the key producer to ensure the success of our futures market. Our main producers should be able to play an active role in the determination of the world prices – that is; AFET prices should be used as the world’s benchmark. I believe we are well-placed to achieve that goal. Ladies and Gentlemen, Now it is time to channel our energy and effort into making AFET a successful futures market for agricultural products, especially in the international arena. The next key question then is “How”? This task is indeed a challenge and if we all agree on this part, I think the best approach is for us to focus on one product at a time. I propose that AFET conduct an in-depth study into each of the products currently listed on the exchange and evaluate their chances of success. AFET can then prioritise whether they should first concentrate on smoked rubber sheet, block rubber, tapioca starch or white rice. Commodity Trading normally involves reference prices based on a certain futures exchange. For instance, market participants prefer to use futures prices from the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange as a reference for white sugar while benchmark prices for rubber products are currently determined in the Tokyo Commodity Exchange and Singapore Commodity  BIS Review 14/2006  1  Exchange. It is worth noting that there are no well-established reference prices for white rice just yet.
•  Individuals purchasing property are constrained on their total debt service ratio. 36. MAS announced new unsecured credit rules two years ago. •  FIs will not be allowed to grant further unsecured credit to borrower whose aggregate unsecured debt exceeds borrowing limit for 3 consecutive months. •  This limit has been set at 24 times borrower’s monthly income, and will be lowered to 18 times from 1 Jun 2017 and 12 times from 1 Jun 2019. 37. Vast majority of Singaporeans manage their debt well. •  Less than 2% of unsecured credit users affected by industry-wide borrowing limit. •  Nonetheless, this is about 22,000 borrowers who need help to manage down their debt. There are measures to help unsecured borrowers pay down their debts 38. Banks have worked with Credit Counselling Singapore (CCS) to develop a new Repayment Assistance Scheme (RAS). •  Convenient one-stop solution for borrower to work out centralised repayment solution with creditors. •  Lower interest rate of 5% p.a. over repayment period of 8 years for debt in excess of 12 times a borrower’s monthly income. Second consumer initiative: facilitate retail access to simple, low cost investment products 39. Last year I spoke about how MAS was working to improve savings and investment options for retail consumers. Made progress on three fronts. •  introduced Savings Bonds for flexible risk-free returns  •  facilitated access to $ corporate bonds for stable, long-term returns  •  expanded ETF options for diversified equity returns  40.

•  Core inflation also expected to rise. Core Inflation should stay around current level before rising from Q4 15. MAS Core Inflation – which excludes accommodation costs and private road transport costs – remains positive. •  However, it eased to 0.8% in first five months from 1.9% last year. •  For 2015, core inflation is expected to be in lower half of 0.5–1.5% forecast range. 16. Core Inflation should rise gradually from Q4 onwards and reach close to its historical average in H2 2016. •  Impact of lower global oil prices will wear off going into 2016. •  Effect of budget measures to help households cope with costs of healthcare and education will also wear off  •  And some recovery in food prices. 17. More fundamentally for inflation, our labour market remains tight. •  While wage pressures and pass-through from wage cost to prices have both been modest this year, there is every possibility they could pick up in 2016. •  Resident unemployment rate is near 17-year low  •  Job vacancy rate at its highest level over same period  •  As long as economy grows close to its potential rate, wage pressures can build up quickly. Second reason why we cannot be said to be in deflation is that most items in CPI basket continue to experience price increases 18. Slightly more than half of CPI-All Items basket and three quarters of Core CPI are experiencing moderate price increases.
With regard to the length of the period of ERM II membership, in view of the varying degrees of convergence of the accession countries, limiting the duration of ERM II membership to the minimum permissible time to qualify for the adoption of the euro – that is, two years – may not be an optimal choice for all accession countries. Longer membership of ERM II may, in some cases, be helpful since it would allow accession countries to retain the exchange rate as an instrumental policy variable during the catching-up process. Indeed, this option has proven useful for most of the current euro area participants. Again, it is worthwhile to recall the examples of Greece, Portugal and Spain. In the case of Greece, the final revaluation of the drachma on 17 January 2000 took place at the request of Greece, with the agreement of the EU authorities, to support the country's efforts to preserve sustainable price stability and progress in real convergence without jeopardising the competitiveness of the economy. Portugal and Spain, which participated in the EMS/ERM for a longer period of time, also used the option of realigning the respective exchange rates of the escudo and the peseta at several points along the road towards entry into the euro area. Participation in ERM II should, therefore, not be seen as a mere “waiting room” prior to the adoption of the euro.

The significance of these achievements can be demonstrated by the resilience shown by the accession countries to the Asian and Russian crises in 1997-1998 and, more recently, to the adverse developments in Argentina and other emerging market economies. However, a number of important challenges remain. The years to come will be crucial to ensure that the current significant momentum of the accession process is maintained, and that the remaining difficulties are dealt with effectively in order to permit the smooth integration of accession countries into the EU and, later on, into the euro area. The forthcoming enlargement of the EU will, no doubt, increase the diversity and complexity within the Union in an unprecedented way. In economic terms, the discrepancies in real per capita income and price levels between the accession countries and the euro area are of a magnitude that has never been observed in previous enlargement rounds. In this regard, however, it should be borne in mind that the combined GDP of all the accession countries accounts for only around 5% of that of the EU. The enlargement also confronts European policy-makers with enormous challenges in political and institutional terms. The sheer increase in the number of Member States that the current enlargement represents renders the functioning of decision-making bodies more difficult. As we all know, substantial institutional reforms are needed to ensure that the EU can continue to function effectively after enlargement.
Having said that, the ECB would welcome an increase of the already substantial contribution of the euro area to global economic growth. However, this should be achieved in a lasting way, by increasing the growth potential of the euro area. The growth potential of an economy, however, is determined by technological and structural factors. Raising its growth potential is an important challenge that the euro area faces, achievement of which would spread its benefits throughout the world. While some reforms have already taken place, additional efforts are needed. Ongoing comprehensive structural reforms of the labour and product markets remain essential in order to improve the functioning of markets in the euro area. Responsibility for these reforms lies with the governments, and with the key national economic agents on the side of labour and industry. It is crucial to increase investment incentives through structural policy measures such as deregulation and privatisation. Fiscal policy should continue along the path of diminishing adverse incentives provided by tax, benefit and pension systems, while reforms on the expenditure side of the budget are also needed for progress along the way towards the medium-term objective of attaining budgetary positions "close to balance or in surplus". To sum up, although monetary policy cannot lift the euro area's growth potential, the benefits of price stability for growth are evident, as stable prices provide the proper environment for structural reforms to work.

The World Bank’s investment arm, the IFC, will be setting up in Singapore its first Asset Management Company office outside Washington DC, to co-invest in regional infrastructure projects. •  Last year, Temasek Holdings partnered Singapore-based banks to establish Clifford Capital, which aims to plug financing gaps faced by Singapore-based companies involved in long-tenor, cross-border infrastructure projects. •  MAS is exploring with industry players how capital market solutions can encourage investor interest through project bonds, infrastructure debt funds, and project loan securitisation. Pan-Asian focus A third pillar of Singapore’s value proposition as a financial centre is its pan-Asian focus. With strong links to all the key Asian economies, Singapore is a natural gateway for international firms looking to access Asia, and for Asian businesses to access the world. There are three new areas of opportunity that play to Singapore’s pan-Asian focus: ASEAN connectivity, OTC derivatives infrastructure, and offshore RMB business. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  ASEAN connectivity First, ASEAN connectivity. Singapore, in partnership with our ASEAN neighbours, is actively pursuing greater harmonisation and integration across the region’s financial markets. •  We are trying to harmonise rules and regulations and develop integrated trading, clearing and settlement infrastructure. •  For example, ASEAN regulators are currently working on a framework to facilitate cross-border offerings of collective investment schemes. This initiative aims to promote greater flow of capital across the region and enhance investor choice.
What this entails is the need for leaders to cultivate a transformative mindset that puts positive impact first in every aspect of the financial institution, including strategy development and operations. One area that is prime for disruption is data. Shared data infrastructure can help minimise reporting costs, especially in sectors where data is scarce – a dilemma that constantly plagues SDG financiers. Having better access to data means we can develop better metrics to track things that matter, eliminating the threat of impact washing. Towards this end, the Bank is working with industry players to explore enabling digital infrastructure for open data and to enhance impact-based disclosures. Thirdly, Islamic financial institutions should nurture the mindset of partnership. Having a supportive ecosystem as well as a wide network of trusted partners is key to bolster the effectiveness of value delivery. The iTEKAD programme is a good example. It is a blended financing programme which we piloted with the Islamic financial institutions since 2020 that fuses social finance funds with microfinancing and structured education and training provided by a group of implementation partners such as the State Islamic Religious Councils, government agencies, and NGOs, to empower low-income micro entrepreneurs. Over the next few years, the Bank intends to upscale the outreach and impact of iTEKAD as we mainstream social finance within the Malaysian financial system. I see merit to even scale this model at a global level to address financial inclusion matters at a larger scale, facilitated by complementary technologies.

Going forward, IBF will continue to take a proactive role in promoting best practices and thought leadership in talent management strategies. On thought leadership, I am delighted to warmly welcome our keynote presentation speaker Professor Ronald Collard for this year’s Annual Conference. Professor Collard will speak on the topic of “Talent Strategies for Sustained Profitable Growth”. I believe you will learn much from Professor Collard’s extensive experience and expertise in the area of talent strategies. I also wish to thank the panelists, David, Richard, Robert and Mark for their participation, and look forward to a lively discussion later. 2  BIS Review 81/2008  As IBF management is quite confident that Professor Collard and our panel of speakers will whet your appetite for more learning, I am pleased to announce that we will be holding the Beacon Series for HR Professionals in October and the Distinguished Speaker Series for business leaders in November. The year ahead will be exciting. Many of you have contributed to IBF in various ways. I wish to thank my fellow Council members, the FICS Steering Committee, the FICS Working Group members, and FICPs for your contribution to promoting the FICS framework.
Given this, it is quite natural that the interest rate forecast as indicator of the future repo rate has been devaluated somewhat.13 One idea that I am personally positive to, is to publish not merely an interest rate forecast, but to supplement it with a promise to condition the policy on certain developments in the economy.14 The conditioning that currently appears most relevant is to make clear that the policy rate will be held at zero until inflation has reached a certain level. Usually, central banks begin raising the interest rate before inflation has reached the target – start putting the brakes on in advance, so to speak. But the current situation is different. One problem for the Riksbank and many other central banks over the past decade has been that inflation has tended to undershoot the target. If this were to continue to apply, there is a risk that inflation expectations in the economy would fall, even long-term ones. As I have already described, this could make it more difficult to stimulate the economy using the policy rate. This could, in turn, mean that recessions become deeper, inflation and inflation expectations fall further, and so on in a negative spiral. There is therefore good reason to safeguard the symmetry of the inflation target. Not raising the repo rate before inflation has reached the target is a way of not putting the brakes on in advance.

Do they need to adapt to the new situation and, if so, how? One important question is, as I see it: “How can we ensure that monetary policy continues to have scope to counteract recessions and increased unemployment?” Keeping inflation low and stable certainly has a value in itself. But I have also argued here that maintaining the inflation target is very important for being able to use the interest rate as a monetary policy tool in the future. Thus, the fact that the Riksbank’s forecasts do not quite attain 2 per cent should not be regarded as an indication that we have abandoned the target and intend to focus on something else in future. It merely shows that it will take longer time to attain the target than we usually assume. The policy will in accordance with this remain expansionary, with the tools at our disposal today. But in the situation that has arisen, it is also fairly obvious that fiscal policy needs to play a larger stabilising role than has been the case in recent decades. One idea that I would like to at least air here is that fiscal policy may not merely provide support for monetary policy with regard to counteracting recessions, but also explicitly contribute to maintaining confidence in the inflation target. The inflation target is, after all, not merely the Riksbank’s target but a societal target with a political majority behind it.
We need the skills of both sides: the agility, innovations, customer relations of commercial banks; and the trust and stability guaranteed by Central banks. Yes, digital commercial bank money already exists, and is usually regarded as safe as central bank money; it will remain very significant in payment amounts, and you may possibly develop tokenised deposits. But the trust commercial bank money inspires is not only due to each bank’s private signature; it’s anchored by its full equivalence and permanent convertibility, 1:1, to the public money issued by the  Page 5 of 6 Central bank. Loosing this public anchor – in a world of digital payments without CBDC – would sooner or later mean undermining this private trust; think of the 19th century in the United States, before the Fed, where there were regularly confidence crises. To make it crystal-clear, a digital euro will not lead to disintermediation. It will be distributed through banks: we central banks have absolutely no intention to open private accounts. In response to some other worries, there will be no financial stability risks, due to possible significant outflows from commercial bank money to central bank money: a holding limit will apply to digital euro accounts, and it will ensure that the digital euro serves as a payment means, more than as a store of value. So commercial banks can and should get on board with full confidence. We are, in this 21st century as in the two previous ones, complementary and not competitors on money and payments.

i  Global Official Institutions Conference, 22 June 2023 Building together a future-proof banking and payment sector in Europe  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 of 6 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to be with you for this Global Official Institutions Conference organised by BNPP, and I extend my warmest thanks to Jean Lemierre, Chairman of BNPP’s board of directors, for his invitation to give this speech. Facing the obvious turbulence and challenges of the last 18 months, we come here from different perspectives. Let me focus nevertheless on some common features: I will take the European view, and not only the French one. And I will focus on two delicate interactions between public authorities and private sector financial institutions: -  the first one is about the recent past: why did the euro area escape the banking turmoil born in the US and in Switzerland, and can we be safe enough? (I)  -  the second one is about the next future: why should Central banks stand ready to issue a digital currency? (II)  I. Banking turmoil: three blessings and a funeral I spoke after SVB’s failure of ‘Three blessings and a funeral’. Let me start with the funeral, at least the one that we can welcome, but which, unfortunately, is not final. It should be the condemnation and the funeral of mismanagement.