samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
8  12  14  16  18(f) 20(f)  Figure 5 Total, trend, and potential GDP (1) (annual change, percent)  6  6 Total GDP (2)  5 4  4  Trend GDP  3  5  3  Potential GDP  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  (1) For more details on trend and potential GDP, see "Trend growth: Medium-term Forecasts and Analysis of its Fundamentals", published in Spanish together with the September 2017 Monetary Policy Report. (2) Total GDP uses actual data up to 2017 and for subsequent dates the forecasts contained in the March 2018 Report. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 6  Parities with respect to the US dollar (index, 2017-2018=100)  110  110  106  106  Latin America  Chile  102  102  98  98 Commodity exporters  94  94  90 1717  90 17 Mar. 17 May  17 Jul. 17 Sep.  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. 9  17 Nov.  18 18  Mar.18  Figure 7  Nominal exchange rate (*) (pesos per dollar)  680 660  680 JAN-MAR 2018 Avg. DXY=90.2 670 Avg. copper=316 2018 growth (EES)=3.3 660  650  650  640  640  630  630  670  620  620  JAN-JUN 2017 Avg.

The individual responsibility to have in place a sound long-term retirement income strategy, that integrates private savings, contributions to the Employees Provident Fund and supplementary private pension and annuity plans, has therefore become important. Ladies and Gentlemen, This is not the first time that Bank Negara Malaysia has issued such bonds. The second and third series of the Malaysia Savings Bonds, which were issued in November 1999 and February 2002 respectively, had the same underlying objective. Each time, the features of the bonds have been enhanced. The Merdeka Savings Bond is for retirees who are 55 years old and above, and who do not have a full-time job. Armed Forces personnel who opted for mandatory retirement below the age of 55 are also eligible to purchase the bonds. The Merdeka Savings Bond, which will be based on the Islamic principle of Bai' Al-Inah, has several new features. Firstly, the bond will be issued on a regular basis over the next two years. Following the first issuance on 4 February 2004, there will be three other issuances on 1st April, 1st July, and 1st October in 2004. This will be followed by similar quarterly issuances in 2005. It is hoped that this regular issuance would provide interested investors, who may have their savings locked in other assets with the flexibility in the future to purchase the Merdeka Savings Bond. A total issuance of RM 2.25 billion has been planned for 2004 and 2005, with the first issuance amounting to RM 500 million.
On the asset side, the Central Bank's claims on deposit money banks and other financial institutions increased by 59 m.kr., and its foreign assets by 101 b.kr. The growth in foreign assets was largely the result of the Treasury's euro loan, but partly due to the impact of the depreciation of the króna on the nominal amount of the reserves denominated in domestic currency. At the end of the year, the Central Bank's equity amounted to 48.2 b.kr., an increase of almost 12 b.kr. from the end of the year before. In the budget for 2007, the Treasury was authorised to strengthen the Central Bank's capital position. The Treasury borrowed € billion in international capital markets in 2006 for the sole purpose of boosting the Central Bank’s foreign reserves. All the proceeds from the loan were deposited in a foreign currency account in the Central Bank. The Treasury earns interest on the deposit at a rate matching that of the foreign loan. Here I have briefly summarised the highlights of the Central Bank’s accounts. The financial statements for the year are published in their entirety in the annual report with notes, and the Bank’s results and changes in its balance sheet during the year are also described in more detail there than I have entered into here. In June 2006, Jón Sigurðsson stepped down as Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland when he was appointed Minister of Industry and Commerce in the government of Iceland.

Interest income grew by 162% over the year and interest expense by 178%. In total, interest income increased by 15.6 b.kr. and interest expense by 13.7 b.kr. to leave net interest income of 1.9 b.kr. Operating expenses, i.e. salary and payroll expenses and other operating expenses, were 1.5 b.kr., depreciation 90 m.kr. and a supplementary contribution to the Bank Employees’ Pension Fund 386 m.kr., in accordance with an agreement between the Fund and its member organisations. By law, the transfer to the Treasury is calculated as one-third of net profit, i.e. 16 m.kr. Profit after transfer to the Treasury but excluding exchange rate gain therefore amounted to 32 m.kr. In 2006, the Central Bank's balance sheet total increased by 159 b.kr. to almost 322 b.kr. at the end of the year. The main explanation is that total Treasury deposits in the Central Bank rose by 135 b.kr. over 2006 to 211 b.kr. at the end of the year. The balance on Government current accounts increased by 47 b.kr. and the deposit in the foreign currency account amounted to 94 b.kr. at the end of the year. Most of the foreign currency deposit is accounted for by the € billion loan taken by the Treasury towards the end of the year to boost the Central Bank's foreign reserves. Notes and coin in circulation grew by 10% to 14.5 b.kr. and the Central Bank's liabilities towards deposit money banks by just over 10 b.kr.
Margins on new lending have been slashed without generating much in the way of demand, and the effects of this on the overall net interest margin were evident in 2  2  "The Urge to Merge - a Global Phenomenon": UBS Warburg, March 2001  BIS Review 49/2001  the first quarter of this year. This in turn contributed to a moderate decline in the aggregate profits of the local banks' Hong Kong operations compared with the same period of last year. In this environment, where organic growth is hard to come by, it is not surprising that the local banks should be asking themselves if they should merge or acquire or be acquired. Coupled with this are global or regional developments that impinge on Hong Kong. When foreign banks merge in their home countries the combined entity may have operations in Hong Kong that are now surplus to requirements and that they want to sell. This may attract willing buyers from banks which want to get into the Hong Kong market or expand their existing presence here. Some foreign banks are in any case keen to acquire a presence in Hong Kong because they want to escape the confines of their domestic market, and see attractive business opportunities in Hong Kong, both in its own right and as a gateway to China. The latter may also be a reason for local banks to get bigger in order to meet the size criterion for entry or expansion into the Mainland market.

Whatever the motivation, a series of transactions have recently taken place that show that the pace of consolidation is picking up in Hong Kong. Last year, for example, we saw the acquisition by Standard Chartered of the credit card and retail banking business of Chase Manhattan and the purchase by Bank of East Asia of First Pacific Bank. This year, Development Bank of Singapore is in the process of acquiring Dao Heng Bank with the intention of eventually combining it with its existing locally incorporated subsidiary. Two of the Mainland banks, Bank of China and ICBC, are also consolidating their Hong Kong operations. The Bank of China move is particularly significant since it will create the second largest banking group incorporated in Hong Kong. What we have not so far seen in Hong Kong is merger among indigenous banks that are more or less of equal footing. This is perhaps not surprising. Such mergers are generally more difficult to arrange than straightforward acquisitions of a smaller bank by a larger bank. In the latter case, the acquirer is in a position to decide what it wants to do as regards management and staff changes, harmonisation of systems and the introduction of new products. With a true merger, these matters have to be settled by consensus, which may not be easy. Who for example is going to be the chairman or chief executive? It is probably better to avoid the Japanese solution of sharing each of these responsibilities among more than one individual.
It is clear that a transformation strategy endeavor for any nation, industry or organization, cannot be achieved without the right quality of human capital. This is particularly the case for banking as a knowledge dominated industry. Capacity building programs to mould and generate the right skills, mindsets and values consistent with changing market dynamics will be the key success factors. It is therefore imperative for learning institutions around the region to continue to review and update their respective syllabus, contents and learning methodologies and ensure that education remain relevant and effective in meeting the talent needs in the region. On this note, I commend the commitment of the Institute of Bankers Malaysia (IBBM) to transform from; a provider of courses to a facilitator of professional education, from a consumer to a producer of intellectual capital, and from a national to a regional, or perhaps as a global service provider. We are now looking at a new landscape for our banking education infrastructure and plan to announce soon on the developments and delivery of a broad range of industry programmes that will embrace professional standards that are more applied and reflective of the times. It might include multi-disciplinary research that covers areas such as thought leadership, publications and flagship conferences. We aspire the transformation of IBBM into a forwardlooking, world-class provider in the development of professionals for the dynamic financial sector. The transformation of IBBM represents part of an overall capacity building and infrastructural development efforts to raise the standards on education in financial services.

The theme very aptly sums up the business conditions we face today. Rapid change is the new normal in today’s dynamic world. The rise and interconnectivity of Asia as well as its demographic changes, the impact of regulatory changes and new technologies are all combining to transform the financial landscape of the region. Survival and success in today’s challenging environment will depend on being able to exploit new growth opportunities that come with change. But this journey will not happen without determined action to lay the foundation for future success of the industry. In closing, I wish you an insightful and productive deliberation and trust that your discussion will be useful and will leave you with additional insights to tackle the challenges that you face. To our overseas guests, I hope you will leave KL with pleasant memories of your brief stay here. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Such changes impact both sides of the insurers’ balance sheet, via the increase in physical risks and transition risks to a low carbon economy, and more work is obviously needed to address them properly. For instance, no common methodology has been developed yet to properly assess the impact of the foreseen increase in the frequency of natural catastrophes. Regarding the exposure to transition risks to a lower carbon economy, the exposures of the French insurers to such a risk have been assessed. At the end of 2017, EUR 250 billion, or around 10% of the total portfolio of the French insurers, was invested in sectors defined as sensitive to transition risk, which can be seen as a significant exposure. This figure is only a ballpark figure, though, as definitions of and methodologies to measure the carbon footprint of assets portfolios are still under construction. These examples show that there is still not sufficient recognition of the need to act rapidly in order to reach the objectives of the Paris agreement in terms of climate change. Regulators’ actions have to give the right incentives for players to act more quickly. In this respect, the Banque de France and the ACPR have set up and are actively coordinating the network of central banks and supervisors for Greening the Financial system (NGFS). Let me conclude by saying that mutual insurers are of course exposed to all the challenges I have mentioned. I trust that they are willing and well equipped to live up to them.

The  tightening  of monetary policy in response to improved economic conditions may impact the growth of major advanced economies. The US Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have progressively raised interest rates; meanwhile, the European Central Bank has started phasing out its bond-buying programme (QE). The impact of monetary policy normalisation on financial markets should be closely monitored. The overall market sentiment is optimistic, but signs of possible repricing in financial markets are emerging. Market volatility has increased since the beginning of the year and price corrections were observed, most significantly in equity markets. Valuations remain stretched in equity, bond and certain real estate markets creating a high risk of asset repricing. Recent tensions in emerging markets, especially Turkey and Argentina, initiated some flight to safety mainly towards US investments. In the near future, the threat to global trade created by protectionist tensions, and growing political uncertainties, also in Europe following the developments in Italy and a significant probability of a hard Brexit may weigh negatively on the global environment. In addition, the European insurance sector has been facing an unprecedented and challenging low interest rate environment for the past four years. The downward trend in bond yields had a direct impact on the return on investments, especially for life insurers 2  who hold a substantial portion of their investments in bond securities.
It should be underlined that fiscal discipline of the past several years, by reducing the longterm risk premium, has been the key force allowing the achievement of robust output growth during a remarkable disinflation period. In that sense, I believe it is useful to emphasize once more that maintaining the prudent fiscal policy during an episode of worsening risk appetite is even more critical for preserving the resilience of the economy. Our medium term projections are based on the assumption that government expenditure targets will be met in 2008. Moreover, we assume that any extra need to readjust the primary budget balance will be implemented primarily through expenditure cuts rather than hikes in indirect taxes. Therefore the medium-term outlook that I mentioned above does not envisage major shocks arising from administered price adjustments, except the hikes in electricity and natural gas in January 2008. It should be kept in mind that any deviation from this assumption may alter the inflation and monetary outlook. The recent increase in end-user energy prices may continue to exert some temporary upward pressure on headline inflation in the coming months. However, these adjustments will also support lower inflation in the medium term as they contribute to a prudent fiscal stance and facilitate an expansion of the domestic energy production. Hence the central bank’s policy will not to react to these price adjustments, except to contain second-round effects.

Only by attracting the right talent, can the industry prosper. In attracting talent, you have to compete with other sectors. That means paying a package that is as good as others. Skill sets including technical, analytical and creative thinking doesn’t come cheap. You have to pay for quality. The industry need to devise a scheme that commensurate with the talent they expected. Anything less, would not position the industry well or competitive. For existing talents, continuous professional and skills enhancement programmes organised by professional bodies like MII, would help the insurance and takaful industry in meeting the industrys’ needs. Conclusion Let me conclude my remarks. As we advance forward into the future, the economic and financial landscape would evolve and it would evolve very rapidly. Our duty as industry leaders is to build on the existing foundation that got us here. But moving the industry to next level would require strategic change. It would require fundamental rethinking to stay ahead of the curve and to meet the difficult challenges. The highest of priority needs to be given to raising performance standards, improving customer experience and retention, as well as  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  attract new and fresh talent. But all this can only be achieved if we embark on a collective effort. Only effective effort would ensure an industry that is vibrant and resilient. Thank you, and enjoy the rest of the evening. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
There is a final twist in this story of the dark side of integration and information. Fat tails and short minds can combine in uncomfortable ways. Myopia generates under-insurance against future risks, especially tail risks which seem remote. Yet, courtesy of integration, these tail risks may be on the rise. In other words, systemic risks may be rising at precisely the time societal insurance against these risks is most needed. Why institutions matter If so, then policymakers face a dilemma – catastrophe risk rising, but catastrophe cover falling. In these circumstances, the public good of system stability, locally and globally, socially and economically, may be at risk. How should policymakers respond? One response would be to turn the tide, reversing the paths of integration and information. Since the crisis, there have been some signs of just that. Chart 2 shows one measure of global capital market integration over the past century – the correlation between national saving and investment rates in a set of countries. A value of one signals financial autarky – countries fully reliant on domestic saving to finance investment. A value of zero signals perfect financial integration – countries financing local investment globally. For much of the 20th century, global financial integration, so measured, was very low. In the early 1980s, after decades of post-war financial liberalisation, this was seen as a “puzzle” (Feldstein and Horioka (1980)). Yet at precisely that point, the puzzle began to unravel. Correlations between national saving and investment began falling.

Given past events, my feeling is, although I have no firm facts to base it on, that the low productivity outcome for 2007 will be revised upwards somewhat as the statistical base improves. But this will not alter the picture of 2007 as a year of very weak productivity growth. We will not know the definite outcome for a couple of years yet. In the Monetary Policy Update published in December last year we could observe that productivity growth had been weaker than we estimated in our October Report (see Figure  12  Sveriges Riksbank (2007). 13  Öller (2007). BIS Review 12/2008  5  3). We therefore revised down our forecast slightly in the short term. In 2008 we envisaged a gradual recover in productivity. After that, our assessment was that productivity growth would develop roughly in line with the trend rate of increase. Several factors indicate that the long-term rate of increase in productivity will remain relatively high, although it will not be as high as during the years at the beginning of the 2000s. Globalisation is one such factor, and will probably continue to be a driving force behind productivity for a long time to come. Integration within the EU is deepening. The countries in eastern and central Europe who have moved away from planned economies have many years of rapid development ahead of them before they catch up with western Europe.
3/6  Against this background, household and business confidence has reached levels at an alltime high since the creation of the monetary union, suggesting that growth will be maintained in the coming quarters. Most analysts have revised their GDP growth forecasts upwards, placing them for this year at around 2.3%. The economic expansion has not yet or hardly been reflected in prices. Core inflation – which excludes the most volatile components – has remained anchored at around 1% for several years now. Behind this lies the moderation that wage growth continues to show across the board, despite the fact that in some economies unemployment levels are low in historical terms. Highly diverse factors contribute to explaining the phenomenon of wage moderation. Of note, in my view, is the role played by the low productivity growth in the European economies and the greater importance that may have been accorded to indexing to past inflation when negotiating wages in the context of persistently very low inflation rates in recent years. The significance of part-time employment in the current recovery and the inflow of immigrants are also factors that may have checked wage growth in some economies. The fact that wage restraint is not a development exclusive to the euro area suggests that factors of a more global nature may also be playing some part.

However, we are still far from attaining the employment levels prior to 2008. The second notable feature is that our recovery, which has been intense and prolonged, is proving compatible with the correction of the imbalances that emerged in the years running up to the crisis; in particular, it is proving compatible with the maintenance of a substantially positive external balance. 4/6  In 2017 we posted a current account balance of around 2% of GDP, a figure not far removed from that observed in the four preceding years. Admittedly, transitory or temporary factors – such as low oil prices and low interest rates, for instance – have exerted an influence on this surplus; but largely it is due to gains in external competitiveness and also to the reduction in the economy’s financing costs, a development in which the Eurosystem’s monetary policy has played a crucial role, as have the structural reforms made since 2011. Outlook On the latest Banco de España projections, which we published last December, the current upturn may be prolonged over the coming years with significant growth in activity and employment, albeit at lower rates than those observed in the last three years. This moderation in the increase in activity would be firstly attributable to the lesser momentum of demand-side policies. Specifically, we expect the impulse derived from fiscal and monetary policy to be lower, as well as lower growth of private consumption compared with that in recent years.