samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The requirements were largely set out in the Public Administration Act of 1967 and the Freedom of Information Act of 1970. Today, transparency and disclosure requirements also apply to Norwegian enterprises, particularly to listed companies. 10 The legislation is to ensure that all shareholders receive adequate, correct and timely information from the company. Companies must be open and assure equal treatment of all owners. Well-functioning equity markets rely on confidence that everyone has access to the same information about the company. Transparency is natural in a democracy Transparency is natural in a democracy and is important to ensure accountability among decision-makers. The Danish Nobel laureate in physics Niels Bohr supposedly once stated that “The best weapon of a dictatorship is secrecy, but the best weapon of a democracy should be the weapon of openness”. Yesterday was the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. This event has become a symbol of the fall of the iron curtain. We recall from those times the Russian word glasnost, which means openness. Mikhail Gorbachev sought to modernise the Soviet Union and used glasnost as a means of reducing corruption and abuse of power. In western democracies, the term glasnost took on a broader meaning, and was associated with détente between East and West in the 1980s. 11 As mentioned, the shift towards a more decentralised economy both in Norway and abroad reflected the failure of centralised planning. Monetary policy is an important component of the economic policy framework.

The G20 communiqué backed the calls for a broader international cooperation in several fronts, but let me remind you that the international community of central bankers and financial regulators have already developed strong cooperation ties. Institutions as the BIS with its regular meetings or governors and of senior central bank officials and experts or forums like the Basel Committees and the Financial Stability Forum have been providing for years the necessary dialogue, exchange of ideas and information between us. I understand that other forums of economic authorities can replicate our own model of cooperation. Regarding the IMF, the discussion currently concentrates around its role and legitimacy. Its role should focus on three main topics. The first is surveillance. It is very important that the IMF becomes a key and integral part of the financial early warning system. The IMF is vital not only in terms of forecasting, which is already regularly performed and published, but also  BIS Review 147/2008  1  in terms of surveillance of each country’s policies and specific warning indicators, aimed at detecting its growing unbalances. One of the points that, in my personal opinion, have complicated efforts to deal with the current financial crisis is that the whole focus of the IMF during decades was to prevent crises in emerging markets. There is a different picture now, and is paramount that the surveillance done by the IMF focus on every relevant economy and really works as an early warning system. The second topic, evidently, is international cooperation.
The bank lending survey confirms the improvements in broader credit conditions since the introduction of the APP. As a result, credit to the private sector in the euro area has shown signs of recovery and registered a positive growth since May 2015, the first time in 36 months, as shown in Chart 7. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 7 – M3 and main counterparts  On the inflation front, however, results continue to disappoint on the downside. The harmonised index of consumer prices in the euro area is just 0.1% in October 2015, following a period of negative or close-to-zero inflation. On the other hand, the latest inflation rate for Malta, at 1.6%, is within reach of the ECB’s below but close to 2% target; it attests to the buoyancy of the economy. It also indicates that the APP has had positive effects on Malta’s economy. The main transmission channel has worked through the exchange rate. The depreciation of the euro against other major currencies has kept inflation in Malta closer to the ECB target and it also boosted competitiveness on the exports side. Countries with high openness to trade with non-euro area countries have been more sensitive to the depreciation of the euro. In Malta exports of goods towards non-euro area countries represent around 72% of total goods exports and around 87% in the case of service exports. The wealth effect is another transmission channel of the APP that has been evident in Malta.

The persistence of uncertainties in particular relating to geopolitical factors and the threat of protectionism is weighing on economic sentiment. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  At the same time, supportive financing conditions, favourable labour market dynamics and rising wage growth continue to underpin the euro area expansion and gradually rising inflation pressures. This supports our confidence in the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Significant monetary policy stimulus remains essential to support the further build-up of domestic price pressures and headline inflation developments over the medium term. This will be provided by our forward guidance on the key ECB interest rates, reinforced by the reinvestments of the sizeable stock of acquired assets. In any event, the Governing Council stands ready to adjust all of its instruments, as appropriate, to ensure that inflation continues to move towards the Governing Council’s inflation aim in a sustained manner. The euro’s external dimension The benefits of the euro have not been limited to the European internal dimension. Standing together within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) allowed us to retain sovereignty that would otherwise be lost by individual countries in a highly integrated world economy. As already envisaged at the time of its creation, the euro symbolises the unity of a European continent that is better able to exert global influence.
This is why part of our vision for 2020 is to support the development of pan-European instant payment services, so that customers can send and receive payments at the same speed with which they can send and receive e-mails. The Euro Retail Payments Board is a multi-stakeholder body which helps foster the development of an integrated, innovative and competitive market for retail payments in euro. This summer it mandated the payments industry to design a scheme for instant payment services by November 2015. The Eurosystem could also consider a possible service expansion in this context, at least on the settlement layer, in order to meet the needs of potential future instant payment providers. TARGET, T2S and SEPA have been important milestones on our journey towards European integration. The Eurosystem’s Vision 2020 will set out the next steps. The actions we take over the coming years will complement the European Commission’s project to establish a Capital Markets Union in Europe – a project which the ECB and the Eurosystem fully support. In fact, T2S and its harmonisation agenda have already laid the groundwork for such a union. With the action plan published at the end of September, the European Commission has transformed its vision into concrete steps. I am confident that through our joint efforts and complementary initiatives we can deepen financial integration and complete the Single Market in Europe in a lasting way. I have briefly outlined a few components of the Eurosystem’s Vision 2020.

But the reason why so many of us now have a smartphone in our pockets is because the innovation did not end there – someone had the idea to combine these tools into a single device. The Eurosystem’s vision for 2020 is not so different. Over the coming years, we will seek to draw on the synergies between TARGET2 and T2S. One idea is to consolidate some components of the technical infrastructure and maybe even form a single platform. This will allow TARGET2 to benefit from some of the state-of-the-art features of T2S, such as the implementation of ISO 20022 standards. Migration to ISO 20022 in TARGET2 was originally planned for November 2017, but upon the banks’ request, we have postponed implementation and will work together with the market, under the umbrella of our Vision 2020, to find the most appropriate method and timing for migration. The enhancements we envisage for Europe’s financial market infrastructure will benefit users from a technical perspective in that they will have access to all available services via a single gateway. Moreover, these enhancements will provide an opportunity to further increase the resilience of the system. As regards the business benefits for users, we will seek to enhance the services currently provided by TARGET2, for example by further optimising liquidity-saving mechanisms. In addition, it could be possible to add statistical tools to support banks with their regulatory reporting.
Firstly, that the analysis of potential changes in setting that can affect business solvency is an essential part of risk assessment and management in the financial system, irrespective of whether this change in setting is caused by technological, customer behaviour-related, regulatory or environmental factors. Secondly, we should not lose sight of the fact that the environmental transition has indeed been planned and announced. I have already pointed out that the European Commission’s goal is to achieve a fully decarbonised economy by 2050. This is a reasonably long term, but achieving this goal will necessarily entail regulatory and structural changes in the economy, which will particularly affect specific sectors of activity. So we cannot say that this transition has come as a surprise or that we were not warned. In addition, we should not forget that transition risk may also materialise as a result of changes in people’s behaviour, which in practice may foreshadow future regulatory changes. One clear conclusion would be that when it comes to assessing transition risk, we should not focus on our past but should look to the future. Indeed, if we analyse the information available in the Banco de España’s Central Credit Register, we can see that after the  5/9  outbreak of the crisis, credit exposures financing polluting activities had lower default rates than other exposures.

Accordingly, we should conduct this process carefully and gradually if we wish to minimise any undesirable economic and social consequences. The goal is to achieve what has been dubbed “a fair transition”, affording due attention and support to those groups and geographical areas most severely affected by this process. Naturally, we should stress that the change of production model will also entail opportunities for economic agents. In any event, we should consider how banks may contribute to bringing about a decarbonised economy; ultimately, when we think about climate change we see particularly pollutant activities, from which banking is naturally missing. I shall try to explain today why, despite being a “low emissions” sector, banks have a major role to play as facilitators of change. If I manage to do this I hope that I will also, at the same time, dispel another doubt that many of you will have entertained: what is the Deputy Governor of the Banco de España doing opening a forum on the decarbonisation of the economy? 3/9  Combating climate change internationally As you know, combating climate change has been a recurrent goal of international institutions, at least since the United Nations Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Traditionally, the companies dependent on oil products have been those most affected by the environmental regulations resulting from these international agreements. Conversely, we should admit that the financial sector’s involvement in this battle has been rather limited. When referring to the financial sector I include both credit institutions and central banks and supervisors.
One specific concern that some have expressed about Basel II’s applicability in emerging markets is that banks with more basic risk management systems will rely on external credit ratings issued by rating agencies under Basel II’s standardised approach to credit risk. In some emerging markets, there may still be few, if any, rated companies. The Committee has been mindful of this concern. If supervisors are uncomfortable with the use of external ratings in their countries, they may opt to weight all corporate claims at 100%, while sovereigns and banks can be risk weighted according to the risk scores of export credit agencies. This eliminates the dependence on ratings issued by external credit agencies. Indeed, our discussions with colleagues and counterparts from countries outside the Committee, including India, as I mentioned, have been instrumental in addressing other concerns in the capital framework. Thanks to our consultations, we have endeavoured to address several other broad issues in the new framework, including the document’s apparent complexity and the consistency of its application internationally, which I will set out now. Complexity One inevitable by-product of designing a comprehensive three-pillar framework with a range of options for different circumstances is increased complexity. The members of the Basel Committee certainly recognise that it is far easier to enforce a simple rule than a complicated one.

That dialogue creates great implicit incentives for management to undertake careful evaluations of the bank’s capital needs. Finally, the third pillar, market discipline, recognises the power of marketplace participants to motivate prudent risk management. By enhancing transparency in banks’ financial reporting, the third pillar provides counterparties, investors, and other participants with greater insight into a bank’s risk profile; that increases their ability to distinguish and reward banks that are well managed, while penalising those that are not. One might say that Basel II seeks an “efficient frontier” of policy objectives through the three pillars. Each pillar provides something that the other two cannot. Each is essential to achieving our overall objective of financial stability - an objective that would benefit all countries in all stages of development. Of course, some of the advanced approaches offered in Basel II are intended for large and/or sophisticated banking organisations; this has sometimes led bankers and supervisors in particular regions of the world to ask me whether Basel II is relevant to their situations. So I’d like to turn now to address some of the questions that I have heard frequently from bankers and supervisors especially in emerging market countries. Issues in emerging market countries Is Basel II appropriate for emerging market countries generally? Let me address the question that I just mentioned, namely whether Basel II is relevant to the banking system of an emerging market country. Let me begin by emphasising that I cannot answer the question of when or how any country should adopt Basel II.
In light of this, the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) introduced restrictions to the discretionary component of expenditure and ground rules designed to restrict spending to real revenue; on the basis of those rules, any new discretionary spending (apart from the legislation on social security and revenue) was to have a neutral impact on the budget. Thanks to this method, a positive budget balance was achieved and maintained for a certain amount of time under the Clinton administration. Yet the deficit’s disappearance proved short-lived; negative balances were repeatedly recorded in the wake of the taxation and spending policies adopted by President Bush’s administration. 3.4.2  The economic structure  Moving on to the deep-seated differences in economic structure, a crucial difference between the United States and the euro area lies in the far smaller size of the US government sector. 24  Alesina, A. and E. L. Glaeser (2005), A World of Differences. Fighting Poverty in the United States and in Europe. Published by Editori Laterza, Bari. 25  Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000), “Comparative Politics and Public Finance” , Journal of Political Economy, No 108, pp. 1121-1161; Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Munich Lectures in Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge. BIS Review 135/2008  9  It follows that the automatic stabilisers, in particular, operate in somewhat different contexts in the two economic areas. This could partly explain why countries with larger governments generally show less product variability.

For example, government bond yields are more or less equal, which given the lower level of short-term rates in the US implies a steeper slope of the term structure and higher expected short term rates in the future. Interest rates on long-term corporate bonds were between 4.9% and 8.2% in October, depending on the risk profile, while they were between 5.7% and 9.6% in the US. As far as household credit is concerned, short-term mortgage lending rates were indeed lower in the US in September (5.1% against 5.8%), but long-term rates (which are prevailing in the US) were higher than in the euro area (5.8% against 5.4%). 30 To sum up, financing conditions to non-financial firms and households remain slightly more favourable in the euro area, and they will continue to be so after yesterday’s decision to reduce ECB policy rates. 29  Afonso, A. (2001), Government Indebtedness and European Consumers’ Behaviour, Working Paper del dipartimento di economia dell’ISEG No 12/2001/DE/CISEP. 30  Note that the data are not fully comparable since the lending rates refer to primari mortgages in the US, and to all mortgages in the euro area. BIS Review 135/2008  11  In conclusion, the euro area and the US economies are different and their management requires monetary and fiscal policies that cannot be the same. They are more gradual and less activist in Europe.
Every economic unit needs the services of a booming insurance sector, through your brokerage, for them to contribute more to economic growth and development. In this regard, I wish to urge you to continue facilitating and promoting investments in the insurance sector. Mr Chairman, allow me to point out that, in order for you to contribute positively to the development of the insurance sector in the country, it is imperative that you carry out your work in an honest manner, maintaining the highest degree of integrity, only then can your firms become credible enough to attract business from the public and private firms operating in Zambia. One of the most important attributes of a credible insurance broker is the ability to remit funds to insurance companies on time. As intermediaries between clients and insurance companies, you are entrusted with a heavy responsibility of looking after other people’s funds. Clients pay premiums due to insurance companies through insurance brokers. To enhance credibility of your institutions and contribute to the growth of the insurance industry, I would like to urge you to ensure that you remit your clients funds to insurance companies on time and as agreed. Delays in remitting funds may tempt you to put such funds to other uses which may lead to default and erosion of the integrity upon which your intermediary role is based. Mr Chairman, Zambia has come a long way to attain the current macroeconomic stability and economic growth.

Moreover, its effects will be reinforced by tighter financial conditions and possible negative spill-overs to growth in the UK’s major trading partners. In sum, the material slowing in growth that the MPC had identified as a risk associated with the referendum now looks likely to be our central forecast. Using reports from our nationwide network of agents, private survey evidence, and hard data, in the coming weeks we will estimate the extent of the deceleration as we formulate our August projections. 3. Policies in an uncertain world  When uncertainty is high, policymakers should have three objectives. First, conduct a sober, objective assessment of the outlook and the risks to it. Second, develop and communicate a plan to reduce those risks and to seize new opportunities. And third, do no harm, by  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  minimising any possible confusion about the commitment to core macroeconomic policy frameworks themselves. In Tim Geithner’s famous dictum, “plan beats no plan.” And in my experience, a plan that is clearly articulated and transparently executed is best of all. A plan for the UK’s current challenges would include a comprehensive strategy for engaging with the EU and the rest of the world – including clarifying the UK’s future trading arrangements, calibrating its openness to migration, ensuring the continuity of capital flows, and confirming the appropriate regulatory framework for the UK financial system. The impact of concrete progress towards these objectives would be amplified by an overarching, positive and animating narrative for growth in a post-Brexit world.
14  World Bank (2013), Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises. 15  Foster, N., Poschl, J., Rincon-Aznar, A., Stehrer, R., Vecchi, M. and Venturini, F. (2013), “Reducing productivity and efficiency gaps: The role of knowledge assets, absorptive capacity and institutions”, in European Competitiveness Report, DG Enterprise and Industry, European Commission. 16  See for example Gomez-Salvador, R., A. Musso, M. Stocker and J. Turunen (2006), “Labour productivity developments in the euro area”, ECB Occasional Paper No. 53, October 2006. 17  Bourlés, R., Cette G., Lopez J., Mairesse, J. and Nicoletti, G. (2012), “Do product market regulations in upstream sectors curb productivity growth? Panel data evidence for OECD countries”, Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(5). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  to have access to adequate initial and vocational training – something which on the whole US firms seem to have been able to do better than European ones.18 As part of this process, reallocation of resources is both unavoidable – as firms need to restructure – and essential – to concentrate resources where they are most productive. There are however important differences in the extent to which capital and labour flow to innovative firms. For example, researchers at the OECD have found that a 10% increase in the patent stock is associated with an increase in the typical firm’s capital stock of about 3% in Sweden and the United States; 1.5% in the United Kingdom and Germany; and a 0.5% in Italy and Spain.

This seems to be feeding, with about a two years delay from the start of reforms, into a gradual recovery in employment. But these achievements are not yet showing any signs of feeding into productivity growth. Total factor productivity has actually fallen by 0.8% in the euro area since 2008, whereas in the US it has grown by almost 7% in the same period. Higher competitiveness may well contribute to raising productivity, but we know that cheap labour alone will not produce innovative firms. Thus, I see a need today to rebalance our focus: to focus less on achieving internal devaluation, and more on raising productivity. And this entails a broader set of reforms than countries have adopted thus far. Creating a productivity-enhancing environment For advanced countries in today’s globalised economy, productivity is increasingly linked to investment in knowledge-based capital and moving closer to the technological frontier, especially in high value-added sectors such as the digital economy. While this is ultimately about the effort and ideas of individuals, not governments, public policy plays a crucial role in creating the right environment.