samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Mortgage bonds that were difficult to sell could be converted into a liquid asset, which meant that the measure simultaneously helped the situation on the mortgage bond market. About the same time, the Riksbank also made it easier for banks to borrow from the Bank by accepting additional types of securities as loan collateral. Covered mortgage bonds issued by an institution with close links to the counterparty could now be used as collateral to a greater extent than in the past. This measure is also helping the situation for mortgage bonds. … a shortage of dollars the second The next problem to address was a general shortage of financing opportunities in US dollars. Since the Swedish banks are not counterparties to the US Federal Reserve (Fed), they cannot be sure of benefitting from the Fed's liquidity injections. In late September, mutual currency arrangements with the Fed were established by the Riksbank and several other central banks. With these swap facilities the Riksbank can borrow US dollars against Swedish kronor. The Riksbank then offered its counterparties large loans denominated in US dollars. The loans are granted against collateral at an interest rate determined by auction, though no lower than a minimum rate related to the expected policy rate in the United States. General measures to promote liquidity Since the beginning of October the Riksbank has been implementing measures to support SEK liquidity, aimed at securing bank funding, facilitating the supply of credit and improving the functioning of the financial markets.

I usually look at these five economic variables when trying to gain an impression of a country’s overall macroeconomic development and I will return to them often during my speech. During the 1970s a number of events occurred that had serious consequences for the Swedish economy. Oil prices rose substantially in 1973, which led to much higher inflation than could be considered justified by the actual oil price. Internationally, this became the start of a long period of low growth. In Sweden the government invested in economic stimulation to bridge over the coming economic recession. The central wage agreements signed for 1975-76 were therefore at a very high level, which together with wage drift and increased employer contributions meant that the wage costs per hour  BIS Review 21/2006  1  rose by a total of 38 per cent. Sweden’s competitiveness thus deteriorated substantially. Our labour costs per unit produced in industry in relation to the corresponding costs in other countries rose by around 25 per cent between 1974 and 1977. At that time, Sweden had an exchange rate regime with a fixed exchange rate. After World War Two, almost all western countries’ currencies were pegged to the United States dollar, which in turn had a fixed price against gold. The system came into force in 1944 and was called the Bretton Woods System.
This was especially true in the United States, where the task of containing inflation was still pending and history teaches us that the process has never been easy. In fact, in the last few weeks, some of the risks that we identified in the face of a process of interest rate hikes in the developed world have materialized. Doubts about the financial situation of some banks in the United States have opened up a major channel of uncertainty. 8  So far, its impacts have been contained. In fact, the central scenario of this Report considers that there will be effects on growth in the developed world and this will have repercussions on our economy. But these are impacts of a much smaller magnitude compared to episodes such as the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Now the effects are associated with lower confidence and, therefore, with a contraction of credit levels and tighter financial conditions, a consequence of the search for safe assets worldwide. Since the most recent focus of uncertainty originated in the banking sectors of other economies, it is important to review what is happening in our country. The first thing to reiterate is that the Chilean banking system is subject to adequate regulation and supervision, which makes situations such as those that triggered the current uncertainties in international banking very unlikely to occur. This does not mean that the Chilean economy, including the banking system, is immune to a further deterioration of the external scenario.

A review of the national accounts shows that the level of consumption over the last three years was ultimately much higher than we had thought: almost $ billion more. Moreover, the speed of the economy's adjustment has been slower than expected. In the projection scenario that I will now share with you, the improved performance in early 2023 leads to an upward revision of this year's GDP growth projection. However, the economy will continue adjusting in the coming quarters. Therefore, for 2024 our projection is corrected downward. With this, the cumulative growth between 2023 and 2024 does not differ much from what was forecast in the December Report. Total inflation will continue to decline in the coming quarters. According to our projections, it will return to single digits during the second quarter. However, I want to be emphatic in pointing out that this does not mean the inflationary problem has been solved, much less inflationary convergence is assured. Our goal is to bring inflation down to 3% in two years. Higher inflation is very costly for everyone. The global economic outlook has turned more difficult since early March. For the Chilean economy, this will imply facing lower external demand and tighter global financial conditions. Overall, the current scenario is associated with a higher degree of uncertainty than usual. On the one hand, there is the risk of a sharper deterioration of the external scenario, with more profound implications for Chile.
May they share these approaches and concerns. Their confidence in the lasting benefits of globalization will be fully justified as a new world, born from the opening of economies, the unification of markets, and the universal availability of information and knowledge, has an immense potential for high-quality growth. May they also validate their own message of confidence by a clear demonstration of their sense of universal responsibility and solidarity. BIS Review 43/1998

Estimates from our recent survey indicate a sharp drop in the use of cash over the last 15 years. Estimates of the exact level of cash use vary according to data sources and methodology. However, it is fair to say that cash is still an important means of payment. Notes and coins will also remain important as symbols of money. I believe that there have been two very important factors behind the rapid transition to electronic payment services in Norway. Banks have cooperated on standards and payments infrastructure while competing on the supply of services, and banks have charged for the use of payment services. Prices that reflect relative differences in production costs encourage users to choose the most cost-effective services. Research (by Humphrey, Kim and Vale) has shown that a  BIS Review 140/2008  1  relatively high price per transaction for paper-based payment services and a low price for electronic payment services have accelerated the trend towards an increasing share of electronic transactions. Without incentives for consumers or merchants to move to more efficient instruments, banks and other payment service providers will more likely be left trying to improve on old solutions. Payment systems are networks for the exchange of values between payers on the one hand and beneficiaries on the other. In two-sided markets like this, the benefit to existing users increases when new users join up.
To be sure, such willingness has not been entirely voluntary. Neither has the pace with which openness is being pursued. For relatively small domestic markets, there is understandably a lack of attraction for the large and sophisticated international financial intermediaries. And so there may be special privileges or incentives offered, at the risk of creating structural distortions in the financial system, as enticement for the esteemed presence of the household names of international finance. More important, individual jurisdictions have been, whether of their own free will or under pressure, pursuing financial openness, not just in respect of the financial system, but also in respect of the international mobility of capital. This they do so, in some cases, perhaps prematurely, by reference to their ability to manage the associated risks to monetary and financial stability on a continuous basis, in keeping with the demands arising from the changing scene, and changing risks, of international finance. As a result, the path towards financial openness has not been a smooth one, and diversions, although of a defensive nature, have been rather frequent lately. This is an aspect to which I shall return later. Let me turn first to how financial openness has been manifested in the dynamics of financial intermediation in Asia: this is the fourth characteristic of Asian finance that I wish to talk about. High public-sector and private-sector savings, less developed financial systems and financial openness have affected financial intermediation in two ways.

While the recent joint staff report on the events of October 15 certainly revealed that much has changed, it is also important to recognize that both private and official sector efforts to ensure a healthy and efficient Treasury market have been ongoing for some time. 3 One obvious example is the Treasury Market Practices Group, or the TMPG. Set up in February 2007, the  1  What I have to say today represents my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. 2  See Regulation and Liquidity Provision, remarks at the SIFMA Liquidity Forum, September 30, 2015. 3  Joint Staff Report: The U.S. Treasury Market On October 15, 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  TMPG is a group of market professionals committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the Treasury market. 4 A core purpose of the TMPG is to develop and update a set of best practices related to trading, settlement and risk management, thereby establishing a set of behavioral norms to which market participants are expected to adhere. Most recently, the TMPG updated its best practice guidance to address automated trading, and published a companion white paper on the subject.
In my view, this notion is nothing more than a financial analyst’s fantasy. In fact, over the last six months, we have seen constant confirmation of the anti-inflationary stance of monetary policy with, for example, the FED actually establishing a quantitative definition of price stability for the first time (in fact, identical to the one used by the Eurosystem). Sixth remark. Our immediate priority is therefore to construct or reconstruct the mechanisms and structures of a sound and efficient financial intermediation framework. That is why, at the euro area level, the financial union project is fundamental. At the global level, the FSB’s role is crucial in developing a robust technical, regulatory and prudential architecture, adapted to the interconnection of our economies. Seventh and last remark: fiscal policy and debt management. Here, I would say that we are all guilty of a certain degree of ambiguity, both at the market level and at the political level: •  on the one hand we want public debt markets that are broad, deep and liquid, because they form the base on which our entire financial system is built. In particular, government bonds are the safest and the most liquid assets. They act as reserves of value for a large number of investors, starting with the central banks themselves which hold them as foreign currency reserves or as monetary policy collateral. •  And on the other hand we want solvent States, i.e.

This will offset the impetus to consumption and investment provided by the near-zero interest rates. 7. Some academics believe that the effectiveness of the quantitative easing policy in the US is also undermined by the fact that the US property market has not yet bottomed out and US households need to continue to de-leverage. Many policy measures introduced in the US recently aim to reduce the pain of households in a falling property market and slow down the process of foreclosures. Even though property prices have already fallen significantly, more than 50% in some places according to anecdotal reports, potential buyers still prefer to wait as they fear that prices may fall further once the huge stock of foreclosed properties are put back to the market or when interest rates return to more normal levels. In other words, while measures to slow the downward adjustment of the property market are well-intentioned and have their political merits, they could prolong the time needed for the market to reach a new equilibrium or find the so-called clearing price. In my view, this may delay a true recovery of the property market and create a negative drag on the repair of US  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  households’ balance sheets, making the recovery of consumer confidence farther and farther away. 8. Finally I would like to share with you a few policy lessons learnt from the latest crisis:  (a)  Households, companies and governments alike must avoid excessive leverage or borrowing.
An incentive for further structural reforms a/ The Euro is, per se, also a strong catalyst for structural reforms in all non-financial domains in Europe : a single currency facilitates the full comparison of prices, taxes and earnings. I think that the euro could encourage "cross-fertilisation" of best practice through stronger co-ordination of Member States' structural policies in areas such as labour markets, education and training, job creation incentives, effective welfare safety nets, etc. It is the reason why the European Council, meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, explicitly mentioned structural policies among the items selected for reinforced co-ordination. The Lisbon European Council made a further contribution to the necessary medium-term strategy for structural reform in the Union. The emphasis put on deepening the single market, the setting of indicators allowing comparisons of best practices among the Member States, the fact that the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines will examine the structural issues closely : all these developments are going in the right direction. BIS Review 11/2001  5  All European countries must resolutely carry on the structural reforms they have already initiated. It must be acknowledged that a lot has already been done, in particular with implementation of the single market. However, continental Europe is still experiencing levels of unemployment that are too high, despite the fact that the jobless rate has been declining significantly in most of its economies for three years.

We also allow for the wage Philips Curve to be non-stationary: it moves over time, and it is absolutely normal to do so. Reference wage values, social preferences, jobs’ characteristics, skill endowments and even Central Banks’ targets, they all change over time – hence, the impact of wage gaps on inflation cannot be the same in different time periods. The preliminary finding of our model is that inflation does not increase close to or above its target level until the wage gap is closed. For Philips Curve to work, the loss of welfare from a negative wage gap has to be fully compensated first – as a stock measure, not as a flow. The policy recommendation from here is that countries which closed their wage gap should be much more prudent in further wage increases – because they will be seen in inflation much faster and larger than in the recent past. And for countries which have not closed their wage gap the implication is 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  that inflation will remain subdued until this happens. I fully agree with the IMF’s recommendation that central banks in NMS with their own currencies should be alert to the inflation risks of higher wage growth, while bearing in mind that raising policy rates could trigger capital inflows and exchange rate appreciation – which could further deepen current account imbalances. While the real monetary policy stance may differ between euroarea and emerging Europe, there is broad heterogeneity even among emerging Europe.
At the recent Brookings-Yale conference looking back 10 years after the crisis, both former Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke and Vice Chair Kohn expressed the view that too much weight was given to the predictions of the Fed's workhorse model FRB/US.6 Some of you might observe that model uncertainty is a well-developed field, and certainly staff of the Federal Reserve Board and the Reserve Banks all appreciate the importance of using a diverse set of models with different transmission mechanisms, estimation approaches, and solution methods. Further, the Great Recession has generated considerable interest in approaches that allow for nonlinear reactions and fat tails, as Marco Del Negro will explore this afternoon. While I am incredibly sympathetic to the idea that more sophisticated modeling can improve judgment and decision-making—especially as I spent much of my career working on such technical issues—this approach has limits. If one had to summarize the message of the Superforecasting book in one line, it would be the well-known quip, "Forecasting is hard, especially about the future. "7 To illustrate some of the learnings from the book, I invite you to consider a standard problem: What is the probability the U.S. economy will be in a recession over some period of time? This is similar to the focus on binary outcomes in the IARPA tournaments. One simple, wisdom-of-the-crowd-based approach to this question would be to poll you all right now given a specific time frame. Rather than disturb your lunch, we can instead consider using the wisdom of the market.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Risk management and Pillar II implementation Opening address by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the FSI-SEANZA Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Supervisory Review Process (Pillar II) of Basel II, Bangkok, 21-24 April 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Speakers; and colleagues from SEANZA central banks and regulatory authorities, Let me begin by extending a warm welcome to all of you to Bangkok, and on behalf of SEANZA members, I would like to express our appreciation to all the speakers, as well as the FSI, for their contributions to make this FSI-SEANZA Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the Supervisory Review Process possible. This is all the more so as this seminar had to be rescheduled from last year, and in this regard, let me express our commitment that the Bank of Thailand stands ready to facilitate you and ensure that your experience here will be a fruitful and enjoyable one. Ladies and gentlemen, The current global financial crisis underscores the need to strengthen risk management and risk-based supervision, so that we can deal more effectively with the increased complexity arising from both financial product innovation and increased interconnectedness between financial institutions. As for the current crisis, while many causes have been identified, what has become very clear is that financial institutions, capitals were not adequate given their risks, and this had allowed over-leveraging by financial institutions as well as by their customers, leading to over-indebtedness and asset price bubbles.
Both regimes may be prone to fluctuations in interest rates in response to shocks, but with inflation targeting, which requires a flexible exchange rate even if managed to a degree, the central bank has a measure of discretion in the magnitude and timing of its response, whereas, with a fixed rate, defensive reactions must be more immediate and may hence be potentially sharper. Hong Kong context Recent criticisms of Hong Kong's currency board have focused mainly on two aspects - the implications for the competitiveness of Hong Kong vis-a-vis other economies and the problems of living with falling price levels. The remainder of this paper is directed mostly at these issues. Competitiveness Changes in competitiveness are typically measured by comparing movements in some appropriate measure of costs or prices at home and abroad, and adjusting for shifts in exchange rates. The  BIS Review 17/2002  1  1  measure of competitiveness thus produced is commonly referred to as the real exchange rate. A 2 stronger real rate means higher relative prices and therefore implies weaker competitiveness. I detect two common misconceptions about the real exchange rate. Influencing the real rate The first is the belief that the real rate is amenable to control by the central bank or government and that the chosen regime for the nominal exchange rate is therefore an important determinant of the real rate. Let me explain what I believe to be some flaws in this view.

Tony Latter: Why blame the peg? Speech by Mr Tony Latter, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at a luncheon of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, 12 March 2002. *  *  *  Introduction When things aren't going too well, it's natural to look for scapegoats. In the case of the Hong Kong economy, the pegged exchange rate certainly gets its fair share of that treatment. What is the basis for complaints about the peg, and how far are they justified? Before examining some of the complaints, however, let us review the monetary policy background. Monetary policy It is widely accepted that the duty of monetary policy - and that embraces exchange rate policy - is to provide that monetary environment which is most conducive to long-term growth and prosperity of the economy. This is seen to imply a desire for stable monetary conditions, but there is scope for judgement as to how this stability should be defined. The majority of regimes focus on internal purchasing power and thus aim for low and stable domestic inflation. Thus, the practice of inflation targeting has now become quite widespread and well understood. This requires an active monetary policy, necessarily impacting on domestic interest rates and money market liquidity; and, at least in the strictest form of targeting, it inevitably involves some exchange rate flexibility, even if not an entirely free float.