samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Fourth, the significant reduction in the Treasury’s financing capacity in 2014 and 2015 is well reflected in the aggregate monetary survey, with the Treasury becoming a net borrower in 2015 vis-à-vis the banking system for the first time in many years. On the other hand, the decline in net external assets and the significant slowdown in the growth of credits to the economy more than offset the reversal of the Treasury’s net position. Overall, monetary expansion, as measured by M2 growth, was only 0.12 percent in 2015, the lowest rate ever, mainly reflecting the magnitude of the impact of the oil price decline. Excluding hydrocarbon sector deposits, the money supply increased by 2.8 percent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The credits to deposits ratio rose from 69.5 percent by end 2013 to 74.7 percent by end 2014 and 86.7 percent by end 2015, indicating a decline in the surplus of banks’ collected resources compared to extended credits. The evolution of credits, in particular medium and long term credits, in a situation of stable deposits, is the main factor explaining the decline in the public banks’ short term liquidity ratio. Deposits in the banking sector, which rose in 2013 (7.5 percent) and 2014 (17.5 percent), slightly declined in 2015 (-0.2 percent) as a result of the sharp contraction in the deposits of the hydrocarbon sector (-41 percent).

Transition to a new investment financing pattern  In the context of structural excess savings over investment, which characterised the period 2000-2013, the structure of investment financing in Algeria during 2008-2014 showed a very high level of self-financing (84 percent), particularly with regard to the Government’s and the national oil company’s investments. Investment in the economy (excluding the hydrocarbon sector) has also been, to a large extent, self-financed (59.7 percent over 2008-2014), while the financial savings of private firms and households have significantly increased. In particular, the years 2010 and 2011 recorded a  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  substantial increase in self-financing (71.4 percent and 24.1 percent respectively), which contributed to the significant recovery of investments in the non-hydrocarbon sectors. In the meantime, the relative share of medium and long term domestic bank credit in the financing of investments in the productive non-hydrocarbon sectors increased substantially between 2012 and 2014, up from 38.4 percent to 45.2 percent. Reflecting dynamic medium and long term bank financing, credit to the economy recorded strong growth in 2013 (20.3 percent) and 2014 (26.1 percent), following already high growth in 2012 (15.1 percent). Improved credit conditions, together with Government support measures with regard to credit to SMEs, which improved their access to bank credit as of 2010, have contributed to the sustained expansion of overall credits to the private sector, which recorded an average annual growth rate of 19.4 percent over the period 2001–2014.
Given these considerations, the Bank chose instead to set minimum reserve spreads privately for each bond in the auction, drawing on a range of sources of information. One factor is the balance of our portfolio relative to the market as a whole, where the MPC was very clear that purchases should be representative of outstanding issuance. The Bank therefore publishes every month a ‘sector key’, showing the target share of purchases for each sector alongside our current holdings. 8  Since the August 2016 decision, cover in these operations has averaged 3.1, with the second operation in August 2016, which received offers slightly below the target level of purchases, standing out as an anomaly. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  By adjusting our reserve spreads over time to reflect progress against that sector key, we can make ourselves relatively more willing to buy in sectors where we are underweight, tilting purchases towards those sectors. Collectively these choices were designed to encourage participation and competition in the auction, ensure that the Bank does not over-pay for bonds but delivers appropriate value for money, and accommodate the likely variable intensity of participation through time. Impact so far So if that was the theory, what have the results been? Most obviously, and even before purchases began, there was a clear and immediate impact on market pricing from the announcement of the August package. Yields on gilts eligible for purchase in the APF fell by 14-18 basis points on the day (Chart 4).

3 See article 127 of the TFEU: “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the  general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union”. These objectives include “the sustainable development of Europe“ and “a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment”. 4 Princess Mononoke film (1997). 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
The same debate may have led others to discover the exact size of the payments they can expect to receive as pensioners. As income levels rise, many will want to set aside more of their income for consumption later in life. In addition, today’s working population expects to live longer than previous generations, but also to be more active and in better shape than they were. Many people will therefore want to have more capital at their disposal as pensioners than public pension schemes can provide. Another reason to save is to have something put by to meet emergencies. In Norway, the tradition used to be to hide away some extra “daler” in savings in the bottom of a trunk. These emergencies are also to a greater extent now covered by public schemes such as unemployment benefit and disability pensions. At the same time, private schemes are becoming more common. Let us now look at how households save. Households save either in the form of fixed investment, mainly their own homes, or in the form of financial investments. This chart shows how households distribute their total wealth. The value of housing wealth is very uncertain. By our estimates, households’ total housing wealth was around NOK 2000 billion at the end of 2004. Housing wealth accounted for a little more than half of total gross household wealth at this time. The picture was about the same in the mid-1990s.

In the past couple of years, growth has also slowed in Latin America and Asia. The number of unemployed in the EU has reached around 22 million. This is equivalent to the combined populations of Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Instead of being gainfully employed, workers are idle and their skills are eroding. Unemployment is a waste of resources and a tragedy for the individual. A generation of young people are suffering the consequences, particularly in southern Europe. Government debt is still high in European countries, and in many of them debt burdens have risen further. Government budgets are still showing sizeable deficits. Several countries have also experienced economic decline and deflation. Overcapacity is high in China, particularly in heavy industry. Some manufacturing segments in other parts of the world are also facing excess production capacity, and profitability is low. Overcapacity and lower prices for manufactured goods are adding to global deflationary pressures. Around half of China’s steelworks are operating at a loss, and debt is rising. 3 China lacks efficient bankruptcy procedures, and as enterprises in heavy industry are mostly stateowned, the industry can be run at a loss. This makes it difficult to effect change. The US has imposed a penalty tariff on Chinese steel imports, and steel works in Europe are closing down. If he was to comment on China’s current situation, Hayek would have stated the following: Debt in the steel industry and other heavy industry must be restructured. Industrial enterprises that are running at a loss should be closed down.
Figure 4  Oil and copper prices (dollars per barrel; dollars per pound)  150  5  120  4  90  Food prices (2) (index, 2009=100) 200  200  180  180  160  160  3  140  140  120  120  60  2  100  100  30  1  80  80  60  60  0  0  40  40  06  07  08  Oil  09  10  Copper (1)  06 07 08 Edible oils Meats Cereals  09  10 Sugar Dairy  (1) At the London Metal Exchange. (2) Based on FAO figures that consider average trading prices in main markets. Source: Bloomberg. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Table 1 World growth and commodities (annual change, percent) Average  Average  2009  2010  2011  2012  90-99  00-07  (e)  (f)  (f)  (f)  World GDP at PPP World GDP at mkt exchange rate Trading partners  2.9 2.4 3.1  4.2 3.2 3.6  -0.6 -2,0 -0.2  4.9 3.7 5.1  3.8 2.9 3.6  4.5 3.7 4.2  United States Eurozone Japan China Asia excl. China, India, and Japan Latin America (excl.

Lawrence Williams: An evolving financial services landscape in the Caribbean Welcome remarks by Mr Lawrence Williams, Governor of the Bank of Guyana, at the 30th Annual Conference of the Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors, hosted by the Bank of Guyana, Georgetown, 24 May 2012. *  *  *  Chairman, Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors, Mr. Ramnarine Lal Hon. Minister of Finance, Dr. Ashni Singh, M.P. Hon. Minister within the Ministry of Finance, Bishop Juan Edghill, M.P. Deputy Governor Bank of Guyana, Dr. Gobind Ganga Banking Manager, Mr. Leslie Glen Conference Delegates Special Invitees Members of the Media It is indeed an honour for the Bank of Guyana to host the 30th annual conference of the Caribbean Group of Banking Supervisors under the theme “Regional supervisory imperatives in an evolving financial services landscape”. I wish to welcome all of the visiting delegates to our shores. I acknowledge the presence of the delegates from thirteen of the sixteen CGBS membership. Though our region is small, we are geographically dispersed and travelling to some territories can be a bit of a challenge. I am therefore pleased at the representation and sincerely hope that your stay will be pleasant and memorable.
Let me stress two elements in this direction: • We are data driven, we are not forecasts driven. And recent data show that even if we are obviously still far from the inflation target, our monetary policy is at work, and is working : inflation has peaked in the euro area, core inflation has declined for the second consecutive month, and there are several other signs that underlying price pressures are softening. According to yesterday’s inflation forecast, which is a rather cautious one, inflation should be at 3 % in the euro area by the end of this year, and at 2% by 2025: we are confident that we will deliver on our inflation target in the next two years. • We have already shown our determination on interest rates through this overall 400 basis point increase. We obviously covered most of the  Page 2 sur 6 ground, and we are clearly in restrictive territory on all maturities: the key issue now is the transmission of our past monetary decisions, which is proceeding forcefully to financial conditions but could take up to two years for its full economic effects. Hence, the duration matters more than the level; persistence matters more than the peak. II. Forces pushing for greater diversification in the IMS Despite the end of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, the US dollar still plays a dominant role in the international monetary system (IMS).

more than the World Bank - and even, in some cases, as a lender of last resort, v outside the framework of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and any collective rules. However, the renminbi's share is likely to  Page 3 sur 6 remain small, even in the medium term: its internationalisation will be structurally held back by its very limited convertibility. vi More broadly, the BRICS – in particular President Lula's Brazil - are expressing their wish to de-dollarise their economies, or even to create a common currency. Utopia? European countries, while having shared foundations, know better than anyone how long it would take to give birth to a single currency. Nonetheless, these political premises call for vigilance, because they would lead to fragmentation rather than monetary diversification, but also because they resonate with other, more economic arguments. Other, shorter-term forces are at work. The supply of safe global dollardenominated assets depends on the United States’ fiscal capacity, while demand for these assets is set to grow. Yet, the recurring US debt ceiling crisis - this year was particularly acute - may erode international investors' confidence in dollar-denominated assets, making Triffin's dilemma more topical than ever. In addition, the fight against inflation in the United States has led the Fed to rapidly raise its rates since 2022, which has potentially difficult consequences for the financial stability of the many countries that are de facto dependent on the US dollar.
It plunged many economies into recession, considerably weakened public finances in many countries and, generally, entailed considerable losses in well-being. Fortunately, and this is a positive message worth emphasising, the authorities’ response was generally correct. In a relatively short time, sweeping regulatory changes – which you will be able to review in detail in this conference – were ushered in. Moreover, the euro area has managed, at unprecedented speed, to launch an institutional reform, namely the banking union, whose scope cannot be overstated and which entails the strengthening of the Monetary Union. In Spain, I believe the work done in reforming our financial system has had very satisfactory results. International agencies, in particular the IMF and the European Commission, have repeatedly testified to these results. So too have the markets, where there have been significant increases in the valuation of instruments issued by Spanish banks. And, most recently, there was further acknowledgement in the comprehensive assessment of the European banking sector by the ECB and the European Banking Authority. Given the importance of this exercise, as a prior step to the start-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), allow me to refer to the results disclosed yesterday, before discussing the most significant measures taken in Spain to strengthen the financial system and highlighting some of the challenges to be faced in the near future.

However, it would seem fair to say that the exercise has validated the collective efforts made to overcome the huge impact that the international and European financial crisis and the harsh macroeconomic  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  conditions – linked in part to the collapse of the real estate sector – has had on our banking system. What has changed, then, since 2012, when Spain signed up to the financial assistance programme? Naturally, much of the soundness gained by our financial system reflects the general improvement in economic conditions over the past two years, stemming from the stabilisation of international markets, the institutional changes and the monetary policy measures taken at the European level, along with the reforms to our economy’s productive sector. At the same time, however, I believe that the reforms in the financial sector have managed to significantly mitigate, if not eliminate, some of our banking system’s negative particularities, which made it especially vulnerable to the macroeconomic and financial shocks witnessed since the start of the crisis. In my view there were four such vulnerabilities. 1. Firstly, the lack of sufficient capital at that time and, generally, of loss-absorption capacity in a significant part of the banking sector. Correcting this shortcoming was, as you will recall, the main objective of the financial assistance programme.
As it turned out, the three largest commercial banks reported record profits in 2006 and ended the year with their strongest capital adequacy ratios since the Basel Accord went into effect, as well as building up very strong liquidity. In the autumn the banks announced that they had completed refinancing of all their loans maturing that year and virtually all their 2007 maturities, thereby dispelling doubts about their ability to refinance outstanding debt. The liquidity risk that loomed in the first half of 2006 was a thing of the past. In their refinancing arrangements the banks rested the EMTN market that had been their main source of capital and successfully tapped others, mainly in the US but also in Australia and Japan. Some have now successfully returned to the EMTN market. The first signs of a change in foreign investor sentiment towards the Icelandic banks appeared in higher CDS spreads for their bonds in secondary markets, which had been in the range of 0.1 to 0.15%. They began to inch up late in 2005, rose sharply in the first half of 2006 and peaked around  2  BIS Review 60/2007  mid-year close to 0.8%. At that time, this trend was very much at odds with CDS spreads on issues by comparable banks in other countries. Towards the end of last year spreads began to decrease again and have narrowed steadily to only marginally higher than before the market turned uneasy at the end of 2005, at near 0.2% to 0.25%.

The Icelandic economy has witnessed huge changes in recent years following the deregulation of cross-border capital movements in the 1990s and market liberalisation. In the 1990s, the Central Bank of Iceland adhered to a fixed exchange-rate regime with tolerance limits, which was supposed to provide an anchor for the core policy of keeping inflation under control. The arrangement was successful then and for much of that decade inflation in Iceland was close to or below the OECD average. Over time it became increasingly clear that a fixed exchange rate was incompatible with full deregulation of capital movements. Bearing this in mind and because a floating exchange rate would arguably suit the Icelandic economy better, the tolerance limits were extended in phases from 2.25% at the beginning of the 1990s to 9% early in 2000. In the course of the 1990s, an episode of overheating began. It originated in a massive increase in foreign investment in the aluminium sector but gradually became driven by private consumption. Inflationary pressures amplified and the current account deficit widened sharply to 10% of GDP in 2000. Market expectations shifted and the Icelandic currency, the króna, began to depreciate. Over the year and a half from spring 2000, the króna depreciated by one-third. The Central Bank raised its policy rate, although its hands were partly tied by the fixed exchange rate regime. It also repeatedly intervened in FX market trading to defend the króna, significantly eroding its net foreign reserves.
Based on the information currently available, the level of the liquidity in the market in 2007 (i)  The increase in base money,  (ii)  Coupon and principal redemption by the Treasury to the Central Bank,  (iii)  Treasury’s foreign exchange debt payments financed by its domestic currency borrowing  will have a lowering effect, while (i)  The Central Bank’s net foreign exchange purchases,  (ii)  Interest payments to be made by the Central Bank for reserve requirements and for excess liquidity absorbing transactions,  (iii)  The decline in Treasury cash accounts with the Central Bank will have an increasing effect on liquidity. Based on the assumption that the foreign exchange payments of the Treasury would exceed the foreign exchange inflow, and by taking the Central Bank FX buying auction program into consideration, the excess liquidity in the market is expected to continue within reasonable limits in 2007, even though temporary liquidity shortages may occur. However, as in previous years, it is not possible to make a precise forecast regarding the net foreign exchange payments of the Treasury, the amount of the Central Bank’s foreign currency purchases and the balance of Treasury cash accounts with the Central Bank. Depending on the variations of these variables, the market liquidity may change significantly.

Accordingly, the maximum daily amount to be purchased in the auctions has been set at USD 45 million, with USD 15 million for auction amount, and USD 30 million for optional selling amount (200 % of the total amount sold). As of 12 December 2006, the total amount of foreign currency purchased via auctions and interventions is USD 9.4 billion, while the total amount sold is USD 3.1 billion for the whole of 2006. The total amounts of foreign currency purchased and sold by the Central Bank are shown year by year in the table below:  Table 2: The Central Bank’s net foreign exchange purchases and sales (2002-2006; million USD) FX Buying Auctions  FX Selling Auctions  FX Buying Interventions  FX Selling Interventions  Total Net FX Buying  2002  795  -  16  12  799  2003  5.652  -  4.229  -  9.881  2004  4.104  -  1.283  9  5.378  2005  7.442  -  14.565  -  22.007  2006*  3.961  1.000  5.441  2.105  6.297  Total  21.954  1.000  25.534  2.126  44.362  Year  * As of 12 December 2006  BIS Review 1/2007  7  Unless extraordinary differences are observed in foreign exchange liquidity conditions, FX buying auctions will continue in 2007 in the framework of the aforementioned program.
At the same time, the growing imbalances in the world economy became and continue to be a source of instability, in addition to spurring protectionist tendencies. It is perhaps time to honor some fundamental principles, such as the one noted in an IMF Pamphlet from 1992: “The philosophy of the Articles of Agreement is based on the superiority of free trade as the organizing principle of international economic interaction.” 4 Lessons from the crisis The joint, massive, and unprecedented policy responses that were put in place as the crisis unfolded surely deserve due credit. As Mr. Subramanian here at the Peterson Institute noted in the Financial Times in late December 2009: 5 “What is striking about the influence of economics is that similar policy responses in the fiscal and monetary areas, and non-responses in relation to competitive devaluations and protectionism, were crafted across the globe. They were evident in emerging-market economies and developing countries as much as in the industrial world; in red-blooded capitalist countries as well as in communist China and still-dirigiste India. If ever there was a Great Consensus, this was it.” A key lesson from the crisis is the need for multilateral cooperation and collective action. It relates to the framework for polices on prevention, resolution, reform and implementation. It also relates to the institutional set-up.

11 In an article in the Financial Times late last year, Anders Åslund, a Senior Fellow at your Institute, argued in a refreshingly blunt manner for a change in the G20. 12 The ongoing efforts to change global governance should not be limited to the IMF alone. In saying this, I repeat that I fully recognise the important role played by the G20 in the time of crisis. However, while the G20 continues to exist and even expands into policy areas as varied as food security, energy and climate change, its legitimacy and democratic foundations must be reinforced. This can be achieved by, for example, representation and participation on a rotating basis. Everyone does not have to be present all the time. The constituency model of the IMF and the World Bank could be adopted, providing for the participation of other countries, even if only indirectly. In that vein, the G20 might be expanded by, say, four members in conjunction with the adoption of a structure which embraces the rest of the world. On the matters of economics and finance, I view the G20 as a complement, not an alternative, to the IMF. An appropriate solution would be the recognition of the IMF and the IMFC as the statutory-based principal forum. G20 collaboration on these matters would be recast in the IMFC or in an enhanced version in the Council if the membership decides to activate the provisions on its establishment. The IMFC is an institution of the IMF and thus has a statutory basis.