samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The euro area economic outlook Ten years after the start of the global financial crisis, the euro area economy is performing well – and has been for some time. We have now seen 22 consecutive quarters of economic growth, while over 9 million jobs have been created and the unemployment rate has declined to 8.1%, its lowest level since November 2008. The Irish economy has seen a particularly strong expansion in recent years. Ireland is now growing at the fastest pace of any euro area country. Unemployment has been falling too, and now stands well below the euro area average. This is all the more impressive given the severe crisis Ireland went through and the legacies it is dealing with, including high private debt and arrears. Looking ahead, while some sector-specific data and selected survey results have been somewhat weaker than expected, the latest incoming information overall suggests that the broad-based expansion in the euro area, and in Ireland, is set to continue. Against this background, euro area inflation is expected to continue to converge towards the ECB’s objective of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. Getting to this point has required considerable monetary policy support. The euro area is looking back on several years of exceptionally low interest rates and unconventional monetary policy measures. The ECB’s key interest rates have been at unprecedented low levels since 2009. They have been supported by a series of unconventional measures, introduced in the face of a protracted recession and persistently low inflation.

He exclaimed: “People here in the rural communities are shocked and astonished to hear that the Norwegian people were within a hair’s breadth of losing their currency, after the enormous sacrifices they had made, and being given a new one instead with all the terrible disadvantages and problems that would inevitably have accompanied it …” 3 The cantor’s joy was to be short-lived. Norway joined the Scandinavian Monetary Union only a year later. The speciedaler was abandoned and the krone took over. The advantages of being able to use Norwegian money as legal tender in Denmark and Sweden trumped the symbolic value of the speciedaler. Looking back, Norway’s participation in a monetary union reflected a nation that had become self-assured and that viewed itself as its Scandinavian relatives’ equal. In the 1800s, Norway’s economy and monetary system underwent extensive changes. Increased trade and economic progress required a more advanced monetary system. A banking system developed, initially in the form of savings banks that extended credit based on their members’ deposits, followed by the emergence of commercial banks. By the end of the 1800s, Norges Bank’s role had changed: from being Norway’s only bank, it was now the bankers’ bank. 2  Henrik Wergeland (1834): Speech at Eidsvoll, “Til forfædrenes minde” [In memory of our ancestors], Samlede skrifter [Collected Works], Vol. 2: 1834–37. 3  Kolbjørn Skaare (1995): Norges mynthistorie [A numismatic history of Norway] (p. 171), Vol 1. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A new Norges Bank Act was adopted in 1892.
We recognize that timely and accurate information about our region, which is highly valuable to us, can also help to reduce uncertainty and inform the economic and financial decisions of regional residents, businesses, communities and governments. To that end, we make our various regional measures and analysis available to the public through our website and a variety of outreach activities. These activities include making presentations on topics of current concern to business and community organizations throughout the District. We welcome you here today to brief you on our views of the current state of activity and employment in the regional economy and to review the rich portfolio of resources that we make available to help monitor economic conditions across the region. 2  BIS Review 49/2010

If Brexit progresses smoothly, we expect that the current heightened uncertainties facing companies and households will fade gradually, business investment will rebound, the housing market to rally, and consumption to grow broadly in line with households’ real incomes. This would accelerate economic growth, strengthen domestic inflationary pressures, and require limited and gradual increases in interest rates in order to return inflation sustainably to the 2% target. It is unsurprising that the path of interest rates consistent with achieving the inflation target in this scenario differs from current market pricing of a lower expected path for Bank Rate given that the market places significant weights on both the probability of No Deal and on cuts in Bank Rate in that event. As the perceived probability of a No Deal has picked up, the levels of Bank Rate, sterling and other UK asset prices in our projections have therefore become increasingly inconsistent with the smooth Brexit assumption in the MPC’s projection. That doesn’t mean that the market is wrong or that the MPC is right about the likely outcome of the negotiations. It just highlights the extent to which the levels of interest rates, sterling and other asset prices might increase if a deal were reached. The MPC will explore how to best illustrate these sensitivities as we update our projections for the August Inflation Report. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  16  We will also make a detailed assessment of the potential implications of the global sea change currently underway.
There is a widespread – and in my view largely correct – view that the US housing crisis acted as the trigger for an overdue correction in financial markets, after a long period of plentiful liquidity during which risk premia of all sorts had become unduly compressed, asset prices had become detached from reality, financial innovation had run ahead of risk management, and unsound business models had led to a deterioration in credit monitoring and, in some areas, underlying credit quality. Many people – including the Bank of England – foresaw that some form of correction in financial markets was highly likely, even inevitable. But it was another matter altogether to predict the precise nature and timing of the present crisis. The extent of the reverberations across different markets was certainly not fully appreciated. But the “accident waiting to happen” description of the current situation, however plausible at a general level, lends itself to a wide range of predictions about the possible course of events from now on, from the relatively benign to the frankly apocalyptic. The interesting question is: where do we go from here? Might slowdowns in other housing markets have the same potential to impair loan books and dent overall growth as in the US? What is the likely impact of a further falls in global equity markets? What further scope for amplifying financial shocks lies buried in the highly leveraged and tightly interconnected world created by the heady pace of financial innovation over the past decade?

2/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  All the countries that experienced an acute crisis – Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – now have budgets with deficits below 3% of GDP and a positive primary balance in their current account, with the exception of Spain. Last year, Spain still had a primary deficit of 0.5%, but this year it is very likely that they will also make a surplus. In some cases, this adjustment in the primary balance was in the double-digits, which is huge. Our analysis, and the IMF’s, shows that the positive current accounts that all of these peripheral countries have built are the result of a structural adjustment. This is not about lower imports and weaker demand; it is about the improved performance of exports and structural adjustments. And that’s very important. Second, in terms of the banking sector, the capital level of banks everywhere has increased and the average common equity ratio of banks here is 14.3%. There is no bank below 11% in the euro area. That also represents a huge reduction of risk. Then, third, there is the BRRD [Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive], which rules that if there will be any collapse of banks, then no bailouts by the public sector can be engineered – at least before there is a private bail-in of 8% of the total assets of the bank. So that’s a big risk reduction for national government budgets and for taxpayers. Banks are also building up their bail-in-able securities.
Several central bankers have spoken about FinTech in the last couple of years, but I bring a little difference; my Central Bank is in an emerging country, where the usual challenges of controlling inflation and securing financial stability are intertwined with the distinct features of a developing financial sector. This makes the achievement of central bank goals a little more difficult and underscores their relationship to longer-term development objectives. So in this keynote I would like to discuss the difference that FinTech can make to the delivery of the responsibilities of a Central Bank of an emerging country. Note in this respect that since banking regulation in my country is in charge of a separate entity, I will focus mostly on the macro stability dimensions of financial markets. Just in case I issue some nonconventional opinions, let me also state that they do not necessarily represent the official view of the Central Bank of Chile or its Board. [SLIDE 1] In what follows, I will first provide a quick overview of the main features of central banking and its relationship with the financial sector as well as the way the latter works in a developing country, including its role in the transmission of monetary policy. Then I will identify which features of FinTech development can have a greater influence on central banking, financial stability and financial deepening.

Funding of pensions  The savings market in various countries 31.12.2000. As a share of GDP 2.5 Pension funds Securities funds Life insurance  2 1.5 1 0.5 0  um mark land ance many eland Italy lands rw ay tugal Spain eden rland lgi r Fr Ger Ir Fin Sw itze No Por Be Den the Sw Ne  UK  Source : OECD SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  The organisation of the pension system in Norway will also be of considerable importance to the local government sector as a big employer. The securities market will also be influenced by the pension system Norway will have in the future. Life insurance companies and pension funds are major operators in the Norwegian securities market. • Design of a new pension system: - "Pay-as-you-go" - Fund-based schemes: – Defined contribution – Defined benefit  • Who should bear the risk? SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  In Norway, the bulk of pensions are funded through the pay-as-you-go system. It is the taxation of current income that pays for the National Insurance Scheme’s current pension benefits. For the vast majority of western countries, estimates show that substantial tax increases will be needed to cope with the ageing of the population. The alternative to the pay-as-you-go system is to build up funds prior to the payment of pensions. These funds can consist of different assets such as stocks and bonds.
The New York Fed is the managing member of Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III, and, as set forth above, has control rights over the RMBS and CDOs that were acquired by these LLCs. BlackRock Financial Management Inc., an investment manager, has been retained to serve as the New York Fed’s agent in managing the RMBS and the CDOs. The management objective for both is maximization of long-term cash flows to pay the New York Fed’s Senior Loans to the LLCs (subject to certain fees, costs, and reserves that are senior to the Senior Loans), and refraining from investment actions that would disturb general financial market conditions. Distribution of all cash flows realized by the Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III occurs on a monthly basis. Cash proceeds from the assets may be invested solely in U.S. Treasury or agency securities that have a remaining maturity of one year or less, U.S. 2a-7 government money market  2  In April 2009, Treasury restructured this investment and provided an additional preferred stock facility of $ billion, of which only $ billion has been drawn. BIS Review 73/2010  5  funds, reverse repurchase agreements collateralized by U.S. Treasury and agency securities, and dollar denominated deposits. However, in the case of Maiden Lane III, a broader range of assets may be acquired as part of a portfolio liquidation of one or more CDOs held in the Maiden Lane III portfolio.

On the evening of September 16th, we advanced $ billion in credit to AIG through a fully collateralized lending, and announced the term sheet for what would become an $ billion revolving credit facility with AIG (Fed Facility). 1 Some have asked why the Federal Reserve did not see the threat that AIG posed to the financial system before September 16th. The short answer is that AIG had hundreds of regulators, none of which was the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve had no regulatory authority over the firm – no authority over its capital, no authority over its liquidity, and no oversight over its control functions. The Federal Reserve was not engaged in supervision of AIG. It did not have the legal authority to do so. These roles and responsibilities remained with state insurance regulators, and with the comprehensive consolidated supervisor, the Office of Thrift Supervision. Throughout the weekend of September 13th and 14th we were assured by those regulators that a private sector consortium of commercial banks had a solution to AIG’s liquidity problems, and we had no basis to question those assurances. But then Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection and the private sector consortium unequivocally stated that they were no longer prepared to lend to AIG. The AIG situation is both different and similar to that of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund that nearly collapsed in the fall of 1998.
Internally, the Federal Reserve has organized a supervisory program on cybersecurity that consists of subject matter experts from across the Federal Reserve System. Work is underway to enhance the analysis of IT examination data in conjunction with threat information to enhance risk-focused reviews during examinations. Through our discovery work with financial institutions, we have found that the state of cybersecurity readiness varies across firms. Supervisors are seeking to develop common principles to address cybersecurity issues and will work with other agencies to ensure that firms are dedicating resources and taking the appropriate actions to defend the operations that are critical to the financial services sector against cyber threats. This is particularly true for those risks that could be channeled through interconnected organizations and that could potentially have an impact on other firms and more broadly across the sector. •  Fintech The financial sector, like the broader U.S. economy and society, is becoming increasingly digital and there is considerable discussion of “fintech” – defined simply as the intersection between financial services and new technologies. A recent industry study, for example, reports that investment in fintech companies grew from $ billion in 2010 to $ billion in 2015.3 It is unclear, however, whether fintech will enhance or fundamentally disrupt the financial service and payments industries, or perhaps it is some combination of both. In any of these cases, however, supervisors will have a keen interest in monitoring the impact on the business models and risks of financial institutions and the way financial intermediation is done.

I said, “Tim, that’s a great job. I really like you, I’d love to work with you, but what do I do the 39 other hours of the week besides advise you?” And then a couple of weeks or months later, I can’t remember exactly how long it was, he called up again and said, “Well, how would you like to come to the New York Fed and run the Markets Group?” Markets Group at the time had about 230 employees. They executed monetary policy for the 14 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I wasn’t sure I was going to have any time to talk to Tim Geithner in that role. And so I said yes immediately. Dr. Olajide Oladipo: You have a question? Are you a student? Audience Member: Yes, I am. Dr. Olajide Oladipo: Thank you. Audience Member: I am a student. Thank you so much for taking the time and speaking to us. My question was, being from a younger generation, I’m definitely interested in investing, but what would be your biggest piece of advice. Especially for us, the younger generation, with a limited budget, what would you – how should we go about it? President Dudley: Well, I don’t think I’ve ever been asked for investing advice before now. It’s probably not appropriate for the Federal Reserve to give out investing advice. I think the first thing is you want to get knowledgeable.
Suhaimi Ali: Leading the change - empowering small businesses to tackle climate change Opening remarks by Mr Suhaimi Ali, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Greening Value Chain (GVC) Programme Rollout, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 2023. *** Assalamu'alaikum and a very good morning to distinguished guests. Let me begin by congratulating Kossan Rubber Industries Berhad and Pantas Sdn. Bhd. for the timely rollout of the Greening Value Chain programme. It is no doubt that climate change is accelerating. Dangerous weather events are becoming more frequent and extreme, and global CO2 emissions are starting to rise as economies pick up speed post-pandemic. As we gather here today, floods caused by heavy rainfall have been reported across several states in Malaysia. With the climate crisis upon us at such a pace, accelerating our actions in responding to climate risk becomes all the more urgent and necessary. Ladies and gentlemen, We are on the edge of a climate precipice, close to reaching a 1.5C tipping point, beyond which the damage to our environment would be irreversible. The increasing frequency of natural disasters also provides a grim teaser of what lies ahead if we do nothing. Recognising this urgency, more than 70 countries have set net zero Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions targets1, and more and more businesses are also making commitments to reach net zero GHG emissions by mid-century. Based on projections, climate inaction would cost the global economy USD 178 trillion over the next 50 years2.

Not all banks have done all of the work we would like them to do. Some are well under way, and some still need to do much more. Some observers are disappointed that a male candidate – Italy’s Andrea Enria – will take over as head of ECB Banking Supervision from Danièle Nouy next year, rather than Irishwoman Sharon Donnery. How did you feel about the news? I hope that our ratio of women in central banking, as well as in banking supervision, will increase. I’m convinced that diversity in management positions is an intelligent idea to pursue. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Effective monetary policy relies upon a rich and subtle understanding of the structure of the economy and how our policy decisions are transmitted to our final goals (the so-called “monetary transmission mechanism”). Equivalently, effective delivery of a financial stability mandate requires a rich and subtle understanding of the structure of the domestic and international financial system, and how developments in one part are transmitted to others. That means our range must continue to extend beyond banks to the capital markets and the financial infrastructure. The analogy does not stop there. In the monetary sphere, policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s urged reforms to make the real economy, especially labour markets, more flexible, as that would reduce the burden on monetary policy in smoothing cyclical fluctuations. The analogue in the financial stability sphere is that the authorities need to help to identify and, crucially, remedy faultlines in the financial system. Whereas for monetary policy we want real-economy flexibility, for financial stability we want financial system resilience. And just as the monetary policy transmission mechanism evolves, so the structure of the financial system changes. The explosion of Vehicular Finance and the development of credit trading are just two recent examples that affected the current crisis. We therefore need a very highquality, continuous assessment of emerging vulnerabilities in the system as a whole, and how it would behave under stress. 6  BIS Review 39/2009  Internationally the official community has not distinguished itself on that front over recent years. Just three examples; there are more, I fear.

But is also makes the case for policymakers developing macroprudential instruments that could be used to lean against future credit booms and for making our financial system more resilient. If we could manage that, it might be the most significant extension in the overall international macro policy framework in a generation. Price stability, financial stability and sustainable growth. They need each other. 14  For example, see Reinhart C M and K S Rogoff (2009), “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 2009, 99:2, 466–472 and Hoggarth G and V Saporta (2001) “Costs of banking instability: some empirical evidence”, Bank of England Financial Stability Review, Issue 10, June. 10  BIS Review 21/2010  Charts Chart 1: UK GDP and sectoral output(a)  Chart 2: World industrial production Contribution to annualised quarterly industrial production growth (pp)  15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15  High Income Countries Developing countries excl China China World Total  -20 -25 -30  2007Q1  2007Q3  2008Q1  2008Q3  2009Q1  2009Q3  (a) Chained-volume measures. GDP is at market prices. Indices of sectoral output are at basic prices. Source: World Bank  Chart 3: Business investment to GDP ratio(a)  Chart 4: Nominal GDP  (a) Chained-volume measures. Recessions are defined as two consecutive quarters of falling output (at constant market prices) estimated using the latest data. (a) At current market prices.