samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So transposed to Swedish conditions, around SEK 2 000 billion is at stake. This happens to be in the same order of magnitude as the balance sheet total of three of the four major Swedish banking groups. And, of course, this kind of shock to the national economy would not spare the country’s citizens in their role as taxpayers. Financial crises impact severely on the public treasury. A recently-presented British investigation – the so-called Vickers report – shows how the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  financial crisis, since 2007, has increased the United Kingdom’s public net debt by about 100 per cent of GDP. Basel III is strengthening the system’s airbags… The crisis of recent years has made us painfully aware of the financial system’s vulnerability and its importance for the real economy. The need for bigger and better airbags is obvious. These lessons lie behind the global Basel III agreement. The most important areas of Basel III deal with the quantitative requirements for capital and liquidity being placed on the banks. …with a substantial amount of equity… The Basel Committee’s analysis has concluded that the banks need substantial resilience. The crisis has shown the risk of considerable losses. So capital requirements are being increased in Basel III, above all for Common Equity Tier 1.1 The minimum requirement for the banks’ equity is being set at 4.5 per cent of riskweighted assets – more than double the requirement under Basel II.

This is to ensure an inflation rate in line with the target and a balanced development in the real economy. But at the same time I considered that the changes in the economic picture were not so great that the interest rate needed to be raised immediately. Let me explain why. In February we believed that growth would continue to be good, although it was expected to be slightly lower than last year. We estimated that cost pressures would rise during the forecast period as employment was expected to increase and wages were expected to rise faster. Higher cost pressures could also lead to inflation rising, but we estimated that the favourable supply conditions would contribute to a relatively modest rate of increase. At the same time, we pointed out that the assessment of wage developments was uncertain. For instance, the rapid upturn in employment and the increased labour shortage implied more rapid wage increases, while the increase in labour supply and continued price pressures from abroad indicated slower wage growth. The assessment in the main scenario was that the repo rate should be raised at a fairly slow pace. We also presented a number of alternative scenarios and the consequences they would have for monetary policy. In one such scenario we investigated the consequences of more rapid wage increases than calculated.
Singapore is developing two significant initiatives to facilitate the take-off of Asian infrastructure financing. First, an infrastructure debt distribution facility to help crowd-in institutional investors. •  We are working with industry partners to securitise a pool of brownfield regional project finance loans from banks into a collaterialised loan obligation that institutional investors, including insurance companies and pension funds, can invest in. Second, creation of investment benchmarks to make infrastructure an investable asset class. •  This will allow investors to compare the returns of privately-held infrastructure debt and equity against other asset classes. http://www.imas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Speeches-and-Monetary-Policy-Statem... 21-07-18  Connecting Global Markets Supporting Asias Growth  Page 7 of 7  Let me conclude. The Asian growth story will dominate the investment agenda in the next decade. Capital and investment will continue to flow into Asia. As an international financial centre, Singapore’s role is to connect global investors to Asia, and to bring Asian opportunities to global investors. And that is why Nomura has gathered you here. I wish you a stimulating forum, fruitful investments, and an enjoyable stay. Thank you. Last Modified on 05/06/2018  Copyright © 2018 Monetary Authority of Singapore  http://www.imas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Speeches-and-Monetary-Policy-Statem... 21-07-18

The opportunity, primarily for banks and other financial institutions, is to find ways to leverage Zambians in the diaspora to use remittance services that will both be profitable for the banks and will also provide them and their families with greater financial access. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 2/2010
It is to use Singapore as a launch-pad to do business in Southeast Asia. In recent years, Chinese corporates and financial institutions have been rapidly growing their operations and investments in Southeast Asia. Singapore offers an effective gateway for their expansion into the region. •  There are some 6,500 Chinese companies in Singapore. •  Many of them, such as Lenovo, have set up regional finance and treasury centres here to take advantage of Singapore’s banking and capital markets to finance their regional expansion. •  The seven Chinese banks in Singapore are also expanding their presence here to provide funding support for the activities of Chinese and regional corporates. Singapore-based financial institutions have extensive networks in the individual ASEAN countries and, have proven to be trusted partners for Chinese entities venturing abroad. •  A recent example is China Minsheng Investment Corporation, one of the largest private investment firms in China, which set up an office in Singapore with the mandate to invest in companies in South-east Asia and North America. One of its first projects is the construction of an industrial park in Indonesia. •  Other Chinese companies, such as Baosteel, New Hope and Huaneng, have invested in Vietnam and the region through their Singapore subsidiaries, with financing support from local banks like DBS. China-Singapore financial connectivity: the next chapter The next chapter in China-Singapore financial partnership will go beyond co-operation on RMB business and the use of Singapore as an Asian gateway.

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Address by Governor Øystein Olsen to the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank and invited guests on Thursday 14 February 2019  Analyses and charts are based on information up to and including 12 February 2019. THURSDAY 14 FEBRUARY 2019  Economic perspectives 2019  NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  Good morning, Kristoffer! It is now 6:00 am on Friday, 15 February 2030. The temperature is 7 degrees and it’s raining. You have been through four sleep cycles and can get up without violating the terms and conditions of your health insurance. The health module recommends cereal with oat milk for breakfast. I have bought oat milk, which was delivered at 4:00 am. News of relevance to you: The new government quarter opens today – your space is finally ready. Your investments in Green Equities have risen by 20 percent, on news of the major trade and environmental technology agreement concluded between the United States and China. The trading platform Nett sustained a hacker attack last night. Customer data were stolen, and customers are leaving the platform. I managed to withdraw 8 000 of the 67 000 kroner you had uploaded to the platform before all accounts were frozen. The rest of your money may be lost. In yesterday’s Annual Address, the Governor of Norges Bank announced that the next generation of central bank digital currency will be managed by artificial intelligence for a trial period. Have a nice day.
The euro recovered, on a trade-weighted basis, after having fallen to an eightyear low in July. It appreciated against the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the pound sterling and – to a lesser extent – the Swiss franc. In the US, the Federal Reserve embarked on a third round of asset purchases, intervening in the market to buy agency mortgage-backed securities. Equity markets initially registered distinct gains. The S&P 500 stock market index, for example, climbed 10% between mid-June and mid-September. This was followed, however, by a consolidation phase from October onwards, which reflected the high levels of uncertainty persisting in the market environment. This uncertainty is largely connected to the emergency policy measures in Greece and Spain, the deterioration in the global economic outlook, and the looming ‘fiscal cliff’ in the US. Government bonds perceived as safe benefited from this, with yields persisting at extremely low levels. Against this backdrop, it is notable that the volatility of risky investments has continued to decline. The VIX index, which measures implied volatility on the US stock market, and which is based on option prices, is virtually back down to the level last seen prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. A very similar picture emerges from implied volatilities on the foreign currency and bond markets. The low volatilities are due to comparatively low demand for options to hedge price movements.

This suggests that market participants’ misgivings about prevailing uncertainties have dissipated somewhat, which is likely not least of all a consequence of monetary policy measures by major central banks. In addition, some investors appear to expect that central banks will continue to pursue expansionary monetary policies for the foreseeable future, with low interest rates and an ample supply of liquidity. In Switzerland, interest rates remain at a very low level. The yield on ten-year Swiss Confederation bonds declined to a new low at the beginning of December, at 0.39%. No other government has ever recorded nominal ten-year financing costs at such a low level. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Money market rates also continue to be very low. Interest rates on the repo market are predominantly negative. At 1 basis point, the three-month Libor lies only just above zero. Based on Libor futures contracts, the interest rate expectations of market participants are that the low rate environment will continue for the foreseeable future. Management of foreign currency investments Our foreign currency purchases in early summer to enforce the minimum exchange rate have resulted in high inflows to the SNB’s foreign currency holdings. These holdings have increased by CHF 167 billion since the beginning of the year to CHF 425 billion at the end of November. This is a direct consequence of our monetary policy. In the event that foreign currency purchases are necessary to implement the minimum exchange rate, our foreign currency reserves increase, and the balance sheet expands.
It is thus also in the interest of the central banks to do what they can in various ways to avoid a situation where the economy goes into recession because of a burst bubble. The costs of the most recent financial crisis have been so high that it is difficult to claim that there would not have been any potential gains in preventing the financial bubble from arising. I mentioned at the beginning of my speech that the most recent financial turbulence is the greatest since the Depression and that the downturn in the world economy is the largest since the Second World War. Unemployment in the United States, for instance, has risen from around 4 per cent to more than 10 per cent in just over two years. The percentage of US households experiencing payment problems is the largest ever noted and millions of households have been forced – and probably further millions of households will be forced – to hand over their home to the lender for compulsory sale. In Sweden unemployment has risen much less during the same period, but it is now at just over 8 per cent, the highest level noted for more than 10 years. A further argument in favour of central banks preventing excesses in asset prices is the risk of what is known as moral hazard.

It was the uncertainty over the value of the assets that led to many institutions facing problems when their assets declined in value at the same time as they suffered funding problems. Some institutions were then forced to sell of some of their assets which further pushed down the value of the assets and led to new funding problems. There was a belief that the extensive trade in financial instruments meant that the risks were spread and that the system thus became more stable. In actual fact, the risks appear to have finally landed in the bank sector. The financial system was thus in practice more vulnerable than most people – including the financial supervisory authorities – believed. 3 Expansionary monetary policy in the United States The expansionary monetary policy in the United States during the period 2002–2004 has also been held up as a possible contributory factor to the overheating in the US housing market and the ensuing financial turbulence. 4 Some analysts feel that very low, short-term interest rates contributed to the overheating. However, it should be emphasised that inflation in the United States was low during this period and there were fears that the US economy would experience what is known as a liquidity trap, which could have had very serious consequences for developments in the real economy. Here it was the experiences from Japan during the 1990s and 2000s that caused alarm.
For example, it is the most active corporate issuer in Hong Kong dollar debt market in 2020, issuing $ billion corporate debts under a multi-currency medium-term note programme. 18. In terms of securitisation, the HKMC has issued a total of $ billion mortgage-backed securities since 1999, and has helped develop the local secondary mortgage market through purchasing mortgage loans from banks, and packaging the loans into mortgage-backed securities for investors with standardisation of product structure and documentation. 19. The HKMC also launched an Infrastructure Financing and Securitisation business in 2019. It is now in the process of warehousing global infrastructure loans from banks with a view to packaging and securitising them at an appropriate time in future. The initiative is welcomed by market players such as multilateral development institutions, commercial banks and insurance agencies. It is demonstrated by the fact that the HKMC has successively signed cooperation framework agreements with International Finance Corporation, Sinosure and MUFG. We expect that more will be forthcoming. 20. Within a short 2 years timeframe, the HKMC has managed to make great progress in acquiring and warehousing many infrastructure loan assets, across various sectors and geographies. The business momentum is strong, leading to further opportunities for the Corporation to continue accumulating a well-diversified portfolio and the necessary track record in managing this asset class, which are two essential requirements for future securitisation. 21. With respect to securitisation of infrastructure loan assets, it is not without its challenges.

2  Examples include the contribution of the private sector to: the development of revised ISDA protocols as part of efforts to tackle Too Big To Fail; improvements in disclosure under the aegis of the Enhanced Disclosure Taskforce; consultation over TLAC proposals; the establishment of the Banking Standards Council; and ongoing work to develop the appropriate near-risk free reference rate for sterling markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  It is frustrating for us all that such major progress risks being overshadowed by misconduct problems. The fair and effective markets review We must break the back of these issues, and the Fair and Effective Markets Review shows the way forward. With its publication today, all the main building blocks are now in place for the real markets we need. I want to pay tribute to my colleagues Charles Roxburgh, Minouche Shafik and Martin Wheatley, who so ably led the Review. And to salute Elizabeth Corley, who so expertly chaired the Review’s independent Market Practitioner panel, canvassing and coalescing views from across the industry. The importance and complexity of their task is illustrated by the multiple root causes of the misconduct in FICC markets.
[6] Understanding the underlying structural trends that drive this balance requires a structural model. Recent research by staff at the Bank has developed a model of the world economy that brings together several key structural factors that could account for the decline in Global R*. [7] These are productivity growth, population growth, longevity, the relative price of capital, and government debt. The structural model generates a path for Global R*, as well as a decomposition of the contribution of each of these factors. Some key results of this exercise are laid out in Table 1. This includes both the baseline model simulation, and a range of alternatives that vary some key underlying parameters and assumptions. It focuses on the period since 1985, given the attention it has received in much of the existing literature. The sample ends in 2015 due to the process used to extract the underlying trends in the structural factors and the timeliness of some of the data required for the simulation. [8] Given the focus on slow-moving structural drivers, omission of the most recent data is unlikely to have a material effect on the estimate of the trend real rate. And I will come on to consider the more recent period and the potential impact of the Covid pandemic later in the speech.

In the Minutes of that meeting, the MPC emphasised that it will take the actions necessary to return inflation to the 2% target sustainably in the medium term, in line with its remit. The scale, pace and timing of any further increases in Bank Rate will reflect the Committee’s assessment of the economic outlook and inflationary pressures. The Committee will be particularly alert to indications of more persistent inflationary pressures, and will if necessary act forcefully in response. Bringing inflation back down to the 2% target sustainably is our job, no ifs or buts. Tonight I will step back from the current situation and consider some of the longer-term forces affecting our economy, and shaping the economic landscape in which monetary policy is conducted. Assessing the policy landscape Monetary policymakers are typically focused on cyclical movements in the economy, since monetary policy is often thought to have its most powerful effect on inflation 18-24 months ahead. As cyclical shocks hit the economy, monetary policymakers must analyse incoming data to identify the underlying causes and form a view on their implications for the outlook for GDP and inflation. Page 3  Adjusting policy in response to the cyclical shocks in the foreground of the macroeconomic picture is therefore a core part of our role.
This is an encouraging result: it suggests that policymakers could partially influence the highexpectation right-tail of the inflation expectations distribution through public information campaigns in the spirit of our information treatments. Why heterogeneity for consumers, and why are expectations high? An important and well-known distinctive feature of survey inflation expectations of individual consumers and firms – when compared with that of professional forecasters – is the much larger dispersion across individuals’ beliefs about future inflation and the greater rightskewedness, or long right-tail, of this distribution. A number of different explanations have been proposed for the larger heterogeneity in beliefs, the larger proportion of extreme high responses, and the subsequent higher mean inflation forecast among consumers, summarized in Slide 11. First, in our research, we have found a tendency among a subset of respondents to think about specific prices, and especially those most salient to them, in coming up with a forecast. These often tend to be prices of goods that changed the most or are most volatile, such as food and gas prices. As a result, respondents who think about specific prices tend to report higher inflation expectations. Respondents who instead think more about a broader overall measure of inflation tend to report lower forecasts. Several alternative explanations that have been proposed in the recent literature for the large heterogeneity in beliefs focus on differences in information sets or in expectation-formation processes.

We use weights based on the American Community Survey to construct summary statistics for our public releases. The survey consists of a core monthly module on expectations about macroeconomic and household-level variables and an additional quarterly module that allows us to address special topics. Our core module contains questions about survey respondents’ expectations for inflation, wage growth, home prices, various commodities, household income and spending, taxes, government debt, credit access, and job search. So far, quarterly modules have included questions on housing and employment, work history, job search, retirement, financial literacy, consumption and savings behavior, student loans, and various field experiments. These quarterly modules are developed by Federal Reserve staff in collaboration with academic consultants and the Nielsen team. First, however, new questions are evaluated using cognitive interviews, and every new module is pilot-tested before being put into the field. The Bank began publishing the results of the Survey in January 2014, after having fielded the Survey since December 2012. We introduced it through a series of posts on our Liberty Street Economics blog; eventually, after a suitable embargo period, we plan to release to the public all the micro data from the Survey. Approach to and benefits of eliciting probabilistic beliefs As I mentioned earlier, an important innovation of our Survey is that, in addition to asking the respondent for a point forecast, it uses probabilistic questions to elicit a respondent’s density forecast.