samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another factor in favour of focusing on productivity is that the types of reforms that will deliver productivity growth are likely to have less negative effects when monetary policy is at the lower  9  See Cœuré, B. (2014), “Structural reforms: learning the right lessons from the crisis”, keynote speech at the Economic conference, Latvijas Banka, Riga, 17 October. 10  See https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1522.pdf. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  bound. That is because they act more on fixed costs than marginal costs, and hence have less impact on prices and real rates. For example, measures such as judicial reform or opening up closed professions are likely to primarily boost investment – and hence productivity – with little disinflationary effect. For all these reasons, and as I have said on several occasions11, seeing rebalancing as all about cutting costs – which is what policymakers often think of as “competitiveness” – is misguided. Productivity growth is central to competitiveness and to growing out of debt. This is confirmed by the IMF exercise I just mentioned: the benefits of wage moderation diminish as more countries engage in it, whereas if all countries engage in structural reforms to raise productivity the benefits are large and uniform. Among the structural reforms that reduce fixed costs, one that is likely to have the strongest impact in the current environment is improving insolvency regimes. This would help tackle the debt overhang for viable firms by reducing the costs of debt workout.

In my view, the task could be easier achieved if the focus of EWE is narrowed down to the really important systemic issues i.e, the issues that have high-global impact but are beyond the capabilities of market and individual economies to monitor and make assessment. For example, instead of trying to spot vulnerabilities in all the possible key risk, in all markets, and in all economies, EWE should narrow its focus instead on the systemically-important issues, especially the known-unknowns. This include the robustness of the key global financial markets and infrastructure, risk relating to the systemically-important large economies and the operations of the internationally-important financial institutions. Such focus will make the whole EWE process more valuable and complements well with the surveillance that are done elsewhere at the country or regional level. With regards to the nature of future crises, a few realities have emerged from the current global financial turmoil. First, it is clear from recent experience that nobody is above crisis. Crisis can happen in any economy regardless of whether it is large or small, developed or emerging, with or without a sophisticated financial system, and regardless of whether the country adopts a fixed or flexible exchange rate system. And once happens, the impact is large because of the  BIS Review 19/2010  1  globalized nature of markets that drives the spillover or contagion. For emerging markets, this means the risk of future crises are wide-ranging and can be both externally and internally induced.
Indeed, apart from the defining characteristic that the internals have full-time executive responsibilities at the Bank, the main distinction to date is that internal members tend to serve for longer; an average of around five and three quarter years, compared with just over three years for the external members. 24  22  Walsh, C. E., 1995, “Optimal contracts for central bankers”, American Economic Review, volume 85, number 1, sets out how a contract between government and the monetary authority can give the latter the incentive to pursue society’s macroeconomic goals in a time-consistent manner. Rogoff’s “conservative central banker” relies on the central bank being more averse to inflation than society as a whole. 23  See Gerlach-Kristen, P., 2003, “Insiders and outsiders at the Bank of England”, Central Banking, volume 24, number 1. 24  To date, the time on the Committee served by externals has ranged from a minimum of 1.4 years to a maximum of 8.9 years. For internals, the corresponding range is from 2.25 years to 11 years. These ranges are calculated by including the  BIS Review 66/2007  5  That seems to me to be consonant with the political economy considerations behind the design of the Committee. The internal members provide a bedrock of accumulated policy expertise and commitment. The externals, coming from outside the Bank and turning over more frequently, keep the debate and the process fresh.

Two observations might be made about the case the Bank was making. First, there is a conviction that the long-term health of the real economy is affected by the monetary regime. In the jargon, money neutrality but not “superneutrality” which, put broadly, holds that monetary regimes are irrelevant to the long-run performance of the real economy. 12 The way I think about this is that low and stable inflation can bring two (related) benefits to the real economy. Relative price signals will be clearer, aiding the efficient allocation of resources. And greater macroeconomic stability will reduce risk, reflected in lower risk premia and so in a lower effective cost of capital for firms and households, as well as possibly in longer investment horizons. Second, some of the arguments might have seemed to shade into a “moral” case for price stability, which has recently been excoriated by Willem Buiter 13 on the grounds that it has typically come packaged with central bankers presenting themselves as akin to spiritual leaders who are above needing to explain their actions to the public. Well, I don’t think we had much truck with central banking as religion, and from the early 1990s the Bank could reasonably claim to have been in the vanguard of transparency. But there did run through our corridors a sense of outrage that homes, livelihoods and businesses could be destroyed by quite unnecessary lurches from boom to bust; and that the economy’s progress was being arrested by the lack of sustained and credible nominal stability.
Fostering Employment, Productivity and Innovation”, Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, 2005, pp. 7. 25  N. G. Mankiw, P. Swagel, “The Politics and Economics of Offshore Outsourcing”, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Working Paper, November 2005. 26  A. T. Kearney’s 2004, „Offshore Location Attractiveness Index, Making Offshore Decisions”, Three categories of indicators were assessed: the financial structure with the weight of 40% (labour costs, infrastructure costs, tax and regulatory costs), employee skills and access to labour force — weight of 30% (accumulate business experience, easiness of employing workers, knowledge of foreign languages and education, social indicators, e.g. unemployment rate), business environment — weight of 30% (business conditions in the country, infrastructure, cultural adaptability, intellectual property protection). 27  “The Future of Outsourcing, How it’s transforming whole industries and changing the way we work,” BusinessWeek, January 30, 2006. 6  BIS Review 19/2006  Alan Blinder 28 goes even further and openly speaks about the third industrial revolution. He presents a vision of medical services which may performed on a remote basis (an example of radiological examinations in India) as well as rendering many educational services via electronic ways of communication. Formerly, the natural resources of an economy were of prior importance; nowadays, the perspectives of an economy depend to a greater degree on the human factor. This factor is decisive, especially in new branches of the economy, related to the services sector.

See Mundell, R. (2002), “The Birth of Coinage”, Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series, No 0102–08, Columbia University, New York, February. 3 In ancient Rome, the first form of sovereign money (called “Asse di Bronzo”) was introduced by the King Servius  Tullius in the sixth century BC. See Forzoni, A. (2003), “Le origini della moneta a Roma: la scelta del bronzo e il valore fiduciario dell’asse”, in Milano, L. and Parise, N. (eds. ), “Il regolamento degli scambi nell’antichità”, Laterza, Bari. The “Asse di Bronzo” was a coin made in bronze weighing one “libbra” (one pound). See De Bonis, R. and Vangelisti, M., (2019), “Moneta. Dai buoi di Omero ai Bitcoin”, Il Mulino, Bologna. 4 See Cipolla, C.M. (2001), “Le avventure della lira”, Il Mulino, Bologna. 5 Marco Polo, Il Milione, capitolo 95. 6 Public consultation on a digital euro. 7 Harari Y.N. (2014), “Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind”, Vintage Books, London, page 201. 8 Privacy-enhancing techniques and auditability are discussed in the fourth phase of Project Stella, see ECB and  Bank of Japan (2020), “Balancing confidentiality and auditability in a distributed ledger environment”, Project Stella, February. Similarly, anonymity vouchers are discussed in ECB (2019), “ Exploring anonymity in central bank digital currencies”, In Focus, No 4, December. 9 Anderton, R., Jarvis, V., Labhard, V., Morgan, J., Petroulakis, F. and Vivian, L. (2020), “ Virtually everywhere:  digitalisation and the euro area and EU economies”, Occasional Paper Series, No 244, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, June.
6 Alogoskoufis and Langfield (2018), “Regulating the doom loop”, ESBR Working Paper, No 74. 5/8  One of the best ways of increasing the degree of diversification of banks’ holdings of sovereign debt, without relying on complex regulations with possible unintended effects, is through the creation of a pan-European safe asset. But as I will now argue, the relevance of a euro-denominated safe asset for strengthening our monetary union is not just linked to breaking the doom loop between sovereigns and banks, increasing diversification and strengthening the international role of the euro. It is also of paramount importance for the Capital Markets Union project. EU regulation has done a significant job in harmonising investment and savings products across the European Union. Nevertheless, the completion of the Capital Markets Union is hardly possible without a common benchmark for investors and firms at the euro area level. Under the current framework, even highly diversified multinationals are linked to the sovereign of the host country. For example, the credit default swaps (CDS) of the most important Spanish non-financial multinationals (firms with revenues from all over the world) show a more than 90% correlation with the CDS of the Spanish government. Again, the benchmark for any firm is not a pan-European benchmark (or the Bund), but the national one. A single, risk-free asset would likely become a common benchmark, allowing the prices of equities and bonds across the euro area to reflect fundamental risk more clearly.

In the meantime, we don’t think firms should have to wait before we provide more accessible rules. That’s why have already launched a new Policy Index. [18] It is an online resource that divides policies into sectors and topic areas. For each topic area, a dedicated webpage lists relevant policy material and provides quick access links, allowing firms to find applicable policies more easily. Conclusion I’m going to conclude by reminding you that while these are our ideas about how the PRA should make policy, we really want to hear your views. That is why we have published our discussion paper on our approach to policy making. I encourage you to submit responses. If Parliament approves the changes that make up the FRF, we will consult on proposals for how we make policy. Responses to this discussion paper will help us shape those proposals. I would like to thank Austen Saunders for helping me write this speech. I would also like to thank Andrew Bailey, Charlotte Gerken, Hannah Schraer, Gareth Truran and Sam Woods for their helpful comments. Any errors are my own. 1. PRA Discussion Paper 4/22 ‘The Prudential Regulation Authority’s future approach to policy’, September 2022 2. ‘Our responses to coronavirus (Covid): regulatory measures for PRA firms’  Page 8 3. PRA Dear CEO Letter ‘Existing or planned exposure to cryptoassets’, March 2020 4. PRA Discussion Paper 3/22 ‘Operational resilience: Critical third parties to the UK financial sector’, July 2022 5.
If any of these risks comes true, it is quite possible that the reaction of the exchange rate will push inflation up in the short term, although its medium-term effects are less obvious, considering that activity will probably suffer too. At home, inflation has remained high for quite some time, which could affect the velocity of its convergence, because of both its effects through indexation and the formation of expectations. All in a context where margins are still bounded and capacity gaps are small. Meanwhile, the drop in the oil price and the reduced external inflation might take some steam off inflationary pressures. Into the medium term, there are risks that could result in activity performing worse than assumed in our baseline scenario, widening capacity gaps and easing inflationary pressures. On one hand, although the labor market has remained resilient, a significant adjustment that may slow down wage growth, increase unemployment and affect expenditure cannot be ruled out. Confidence may not recover as expected, driving the economy to grow less. In any case, we do not rule out either that the economy could grow more than forecast, if confidence indicators recover more rapidly. This could also occur if the drop in fuel prices has a greater impact on our national income. After assessing these risks, we estimate that the balance of risks is unbiased for inflation and downward biased for output. Now let me turn to our Financial Stability Report (IEF).

Meanwhile, it is of key importance, not just for the financial centre but for Switzerland as a whole, that an acceptable solution be found for the taxation of foreign bank deposits. BIS Review 68/2010  1
This guidance will be finalised by the G20 meeting this July, with further work on the potential requirements for additional resources in resolution, in 2018. Supervisors, too, will need to keep pace with the growing importance of financial market infrastructure given its importance to both domestic and international financial stability. The Bank of England is the supervisor for financial market infrastructure firms incorporated in the UK – including those that provide truly global infrastructure. The Bank supervises eleven FMIs including some of the largest CCPs in the world (LCH and ICE Clear Europe respectively, by initial margin). As the world’s leading international financial centre, over a quarter of global clearing takes place in the UK. 18  We take this supervisory responsibility very seriously – as we do the need for our supervision to keep pace with the growing systemic importance of this infrastructure. Given London’s role as an international financial centre our aim is to be at the leading edge of supervision of key infrastructure. Over the past few years we have been reinforcing our capacity and capability precisely to that end. And we will continue to do so. Our annual report to Parliament will be published today. It sets out how we have discharged our supervisory responsibilities for FMIs over the past year – both through our core assurance programme and our forward-looking assessment of risks – in order to promote and enhance UK financial stability. It also sets out our priorities for the current year and beyond.

Figure 4 GDP  Non-natural resources GDP  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  8  8  8  Construction  6  6  6  Wholesale and retail trade  4  4  4  2  2  2  0  0  0  4  Rest  2  Personal services  8 6  Total 0  Manufacturing  -2 -2  -2 -4 14  15  Natural Resources 16  -2  Business services -4 -4  -4  14  15  16  Source: Central Bank of Chile. 3  7. On the expenditure side, domestic demand—excluding changes in inventories—also tended to decelerate throughout last year. Weakness was most evident in investment in construction and other works, which contracted by 4.9% in annual terms during the fourth quarter (average growth of 0.5% between the first and third quarters). 8. Private consumption, in line with its behavior in previous years, provided support to the economy, growing by more than 2% annually throughout 2016, on the basis of wage growth and a low unemployment. However, it should be noted that while consumption of nondurables and services has remained relatively stable, durable goods have recovered, partly due to the appreciation of the peso during the last year and the necessary replenishment of inventories following several years of weak growth and even contraction. Something similar is observed with gross fixed capital formation in machinery and equipment.
–  I have already mentioned the substantially reinforced fiscal and macroeconomic discipline framework: it needs to be recognised that this is a very important step given the transfers of sovereignty that it represents – we are moving towards a stronger economic union;  –  The European Stability Mechanism, whose implementation has been bolstered by the go-ahead given by Germany’s constitutional court and which held its first Board meeting, has a firepower of EUR 500 billion of new money to directly buy government bonds, provide collateral or lend funds. It will also be able to directly lend money to banks in difficulty without increasing the debt of their home countries as soon as the single supervisory mechanism will be in place. It is a powerful crisis resolution tool that Europe has equipped itself with; added to already disbursed bilateral and EFSF loans and to the existing EU facility, the total firepower will near 1000 billion of USD. –  The work on the establishment of the banking union is moving forward rapidly too. The Commission’s report that was submitted a few weeks ago sets out a clear framework: all banks in the euro area will quickly become subject to a single supervisory mechanism under the authority of the ECB. Day-to-day supervision will be performed by the national supervisors, in accordance with the principle of decentralisation that has already proved its effectiveness in the implementation of the single monetary policy within the Eurosystem.

The scandal at the energy company Enron and the recently disclosed fraudulent accounting practices at several US companies have eroded confidence in securities markets and the financial system. One role of securities markets is to ensure that the risk linked to various investments is reflected in borrowing costs and expected returns, which are adjusted continuously through market price mechanisms. For price mechanisms to function effectively, it is essential that there is confidence in the information and results published. The US authorities have already taken measures to prevent further accounting and audit scandals. Several initiatives are also expected to be taken internationally. Smoothly functioning securities markets make an important contribution to a stable and efficient financial system. Without securities markets’ contribution to risk diversification, it is highly unlikely that the financial system could have coped as well as it did with the shocks of recent years. Norway has a well developed financial system. Financial institutions such as banks, mortgage companies and insurance companies channel assets and debt between economic agents. In the securities market, capital is channelled directly from lender to borrower through the use of standardised debt and equity instruments in the primary market. Securities can also be traded in the secondary market. Substantial volumes of debt and equity instruments are traded daily among operators. The debt market consists of bonds and short-term debt instruments, while the equity market is essentially made up of stocks.
Mindful of the importance of consumer protection, the Bank of Thailand already issued a regulation requiring financial institutions to disclose information, especially on effective interest rate and fee charged, financial position and operating results, so that customers can make well-informed decisions. Additionally, financial institutions will be required to have in place clear procedures for handling customer complaints. On a system-wide scale, the authorities will introduce a deposit insurance scheme in place of the existing blanket guarantee to ensure protection of retail consumers. BIS Review 22/2004  3  3. Supervisory concerns and challenges  I have already touched on regulators’ concerns that directly affect consumer benefits. Now allow me to go through the concerns and challenges of retail banking from a wider perspective. First, we are concerned for those considering jumping onto the booming retail credit bandwagon without having sufficient skills and resources to capitalize on the key drivers of this market segment. Second, the risks inherent in credit extension, which have to be adequately monitored and managed. Third, the one that directly concerns us, regulators, - how to achieve a balanced objective of financial institution stability and fostering development, competition and level playing field. Drivers of retail banking business The gaps of financial services provided by financial institutions in Thailand reflect untapped opportunities in the retail sector awaiting those having the capability to fill in these gaps. The opportunities are open to banks with the right business models for the identified niche markets.

Due to consumption-orientated feature of this type of credit, this group of customers might develop a habit of living beyond their means, causing their debts compounding faster than income. Therefore, we will be on a careful watch of this segment of retail banking. Currently, the Bank of Thailand, in consultation with the industry, is in the process of issuing additional measures to ensure the integrity and soundness of personal credit sector. BIS Review 22/2004  5  Another area that alerts our attention is intense competition among non-bank credit institutions for credit card advances. Outside the purview of the current supervisory scope of the Bank of Thailand, they are part and parcel of the retail credit market. Their relaxed lending practices may attract irresponsible borrowing by undisciplined consumers who may bring themselves and their family to financial distress. It is in the interest of consumers that these credit institutions are prudently managed and sufficiently supervised - the role that will be better served by the Bank of Thailand empowered by the new Financial Institutions Businesses Act currently in legislative process. It is my belief that good corporate governance is key to safe and strong financial system because prudent and capable bank management that adheres to its professionalism overseen by independent and financial literate Board of Directors will be responsible to not only its shareholders but also depositors and consumers in all aspects of its business, including retail banking.