samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the EU, the regulatory framework for openness and for managing the financial stability risk around the single market in financial services was built very clearly on the principles of common rules – with force of law – commonly applied and on mutual recognition. It is worth dwelling a little on what lies behind these principles. First is the need for the so-called ‘level playing field’. To have an effective single market it is necessary to align regulation to ensure that it does not act to prevent cross-border activity or to distort competition. In this respect it is worth recalling that the Treaty talks of the “approximation” of laws and of “harmonisation”. Without common rules, commonly applied, national regulation can be used to block entry and to protect national players. And, equally, it can be used to give domestic players an advantage in their cross border activities. This is, of course, important in other areas of the single market. But it is particularly important in the single market for financial services because the risks of regulatory arbitrage are very  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  large and have consequences that go wider than the distortion of competition. We have seen in recent years how damaging those consequences can be in terms of financial stability. To be confident of maintaining financial stability in a single market with free movement of capital, each member state needs to be confident in the strength and in the application of prudential regulation in other member states.

It allowed supervisors to ensure that the collective results of the individual banks were consistent with a top-down assessment of revenue and credit losses generated from an adverse stress scenario for the macroeconomy. We are incorporating these types of broad, horizontal reviews more deeply into our supervision process. So, what else are we doing going forward? There are a large number of initiatives under way to make our financial system more robust to shocks and more resilient to the inevitable swings in activity and sentiment. These initiatives include several aimed at strengthening bank capital requirements. When these initiatives are fully implemented, they should prevent some of the practices we witnessed during the crisis – for example, a banking organization paying out dividends to demonstrate that it is strong when, in fact, by depleting capital, such an action is making it weaker. One important initiative in this regard is to better capture all the sources of risk in the capital assessment process. This, for example, includes the trading accounts of banks. Some institutions had clearly not set aside adequate levels of capital given the risks that were embedded in their trading positions. We are also exploring the potential for contingent capital. The goal is to bolster the amount of common equity available to absorb losses in adverse economic environments. This might be done by allowing the issuance of debt instruments that would automatically convert into common equity in stress environments, under certain pre-specified conditions.
Policy initiatives aimed at enhancing competition in market segments with low competition, such as services and energy, would allow pricing behaviour to adjust and thus contribute to lower inflation pressures. Furthermore, policies to increase trend productivity growth would contribute to smaller unit labour cost increases and ultimately also to higher employment. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS Review 57/2008  3

At the same time and not withstanding their role in increasingly integrated global value chains, growth in imports has been sluggish, meaning that net trade has provided support to GDP growth. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  Taking all of these together leads me to conclude that, although the resilience of growth in the wake of the referendum has been welcome, the broad channels through which we would have expected demand to adjust to a vote to leave the EU are now operating. As a result, GDP growth has slowed from average quarterly rates of 0.7% in 2014 and 2015 to 0.4% more recently. For those of you who, like me, have had to assess and categorise past UK slowdowns as either U- or V-shaped, I consider what we are witnessing as more of a saucer-shaped slowdown and pretty unusual for that (Slide 6). Given the long horizon over which the effects of Brexit could play out, we are likely to be on the flat part of the saucer for some time – as embodied in the MPC’s forecast for GDP growth which remains at 0.4% per quarter over the 3-year forecast horizon, conditional on households and companies basing their decisions on the expectation of a smooth adjustment to new trading arrangements. If realised, that will leave the economy about 2% smaller by 2020 than the May 2016 MPC forecast would have implied.
[9] Over time, this balance between public and private insurance will have to adjust in other parts of the non-bank sector too. The question is how best to achieve this. A risk is that we end up repeating the experience of recent years: providing public insurance when risks crystallise, with regulatory change coming only ex post in sectors where clear deficiencies do end up being revealed. But that would be very costly, both in terms of the potential over-provision of public insurance, and in terms of having to suffer periodic bursts of damaging disruption. And it makes determination of preferred overall insurance levels something of a random and history-dependent process. An alternative approach would be to map the vulnerabilities in non-banks more comprehensively, establishing a common baseline for the appropriate level of private insurance consistent with maintaining financial stability in normal times, and taking steps to achieve that baseline ahead of time. Aspects of this work were undertaken by the Financial Stability Board following the dash for cash,[10] and some reforms are now underway in various countries, including the UK. But the task is huge, and global in nature: the non-bank sector is highly diverse, and the work involves an unusually wide range of public bodies, both national and international, with varying remits.

Jean-Pierre Roth: The euro – a stabilising factor in the international currency system Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne, 21 September 2007. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The euro is undoubtedly a success story. It has contributed to stabilising the international currency system. In Europe, the former monetary disorder has been replaced by a new monetary order. The European payment system has become more transparent and price stability is guaranteed. Switzerland, too, is benefiting from European currency stability. The Swiss franc is taking advantage of a monetary environment that is considerably calmer than previously. The euro and the franc are coexisting very successfully. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to claim that all the effects of European currency integration have already worked their way through to the real economy. In spurring on competition and promoting transparency, the euro is having an integrating effect. However, there are still considerable obstacles standing in the way of this integration process. BIS Review 103/2007  1
A further possibility is to temporarily ease the State aid framework for the business sector and establish certain temporary limits on retail electricity prices. More broadly, the war has underlined the need to accelerate European integration so that the EU is an important player on the global stage, capable of deciding its own future and defending its values. A cornerstone of this integration is the creation of a common and permanent fiscal capacity in the euro area, which would facilitate the economic policy response to severe shocks. The design of this common fiscal capacity must be based precisely on the lessons learned from NGEU and the instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE), which were implemented to deal with the pandemic, and on any lessons we might draw now from our response to the war. The financial realm is a second area of economic integration. Pan-European bond issuances to fund NGEU, and any other potential issuances as part of the response to the invasion of Ukraine, are an important step towards creating a European safe asset. In addition, deeper capital market integration in the euro area would pave the way for greater risk-sharing in the face of asymmetric shocks. Lastly, a third necessary element to bolster the euro area’s institutional architecture is the completion of the banking union, establishing a European deposit insurance scheme and a common framework for resolving systemic crises.

On average, it will rise to 2.8% in 2022 as a whole, but then gradually slow over the rest of the projection horizon. Compared with the December projection exercise, the inflation forecast for 2022 is revised upwards significantly (by 3.8 pp), due, above all, to the recent energy component surprises. The balance of risks in this projection exercise is tilted to the downside in the case of economic activity and to the upside in that of inflation, amid extraordinary uncertainty as a result of the war in Ukraine and its geopolitical implications. In particular, economic activity and inflation will be very sensitive to energy and commodity market developments, to the hypothetical emergence of second-round effects on prices and wages and to the path of household consumption and saving. By way of example, later on I will describe in some detail the adverse repercussions for the Spanish economy of such second-round effects, underscoring the need to adopt an economic policy response that pre-empts these risks via an incomes agreement. The economic policy response The magnitude of the effects of the war will also ultimately hinge on the economic policy response, which has a crucial role to play. Allow me to offer a few thoughts on that response. European economic policies Like the pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine is a very adverse, exogenous shock common to the European Union (EU) as a whole, albeit with uneven effects across countries, sectors and firms.
It is unsurprising, then, that savings behaviour lies at the heart of the current debate among policymakers and academics on the causes of imbalances. This, too, need not be bad news. For example, differential savings may simply be mirroring fundamentals, reflecting differences in rates of time preference among consumers or differential rates of technological progress among companies. Equally, it is possible to conceive of explanations for differential saving which are less well-rooted in fundamentals, such as lax monetary policy in the West or mercantilist trade policy in the East. 2 These latter explanations take us closer to a bad cholesterol story for global imbalances. This is where much of the current debate on global imbalances is centred. Are they the result of surplus countries saving excessively – a “savings glut” explanation (Bernanke (2005))? Or is it instead the deficit countries saving too little – a “savings shortage” explanation (Taylor (2007)). Put differently, is the problem impatience in the West or excessive patience in the East? 2  This can lead to a global co-ordination (or adding-up) problem, as countries seek individually to each run a current account surplus, so depressing global demand (King (2010)). BIS Review 174/2010  3  Global imbalances – present To begin to answer those questions, consider recent saving behaviour in two archetypical surplus and deficit countries – China and the US. Chart 7 looks at the respective contributions of China and the US to global savings since 1980. In 1980, the US contributed around a quarter of global saving.

Bank Negara Malaysia has so far issued eight financial advisers licences which employ a total of 57 financial advisers’ representatives. I encourage you to follow their footsteps and embark on a new chapter in your professional careers, to make the most of the opportunities that you will have to create a lasting impact in promoting sound financial planning among Malaysians. I trust that the distinguished speakers will share their valuable insights and experiences to provide you better clarity on the opportunities as financial advisers. On that note ladies and gentlemen, I wish you a successful and productive seminar. We look forward to your contribution to the further growth and development of the financial services industry. Thank you. BIS Review 136/2008  3
(b) Sample includes Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, ING, JPMorgan, Lloyds Banking Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, State Street, UBS, UniCredit, and Wells Fargo. Chart 6: Overnight sterling repo rate (RONIA) and the introduction of leverage ratio requirements  (a)(b)(c)  Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., EVIA (formerly WMBA), and Bank calculations (a) The Repurchase Overnight Index Average rate (RONIA) is the weighted average rate of all secured sterling overnight cash transactions. Boxes indicate quarter-end dates. (b) The monthly average is the arithmetic mean of a firm’s total exposure measure on the last day of each month in the quarter. (c) The daily average is the sum of: (i) the arithmetic mean of a firm’s total exposure measure in relation to on-balance sheet assets on each day in the quarter; and (ii) the arithmetic mean of the firm’s total exposure measure excluding on-balance sheet assets on the last day of each month in the quarter. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  Chart 7: Risk weights on UK mortgages under the Standardised Approach (SA) and Internal Ratings-Based Approach (IRB)  (a)  Source: Benetton, Eckley, Garbarino, Kirwin, and Latsi, ‘Specialisation in mortgage risk under Basel II’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No.639.

New products, market practices, and especially technologies are going to emerge; some of these might create new risks that were unforeseen when the post-crisis reforms were developed. As unintended consequences come to light and new risks emerge regulators may need to make changes to regulation over time, what I am going to refer to as ‘dynamic adjustments’. Being open to making such adjustments does not mean undermining the objectives behind the post-crisis regulatory framework or changing the level of resilience in the banking system regulations are aiming for. On the contrary, it is by making dynamic adjustments that we can ensure the regulatory framework continues to deliver on the reforms’ objectives and ensures that the resilience that policy makers injected into the system post-crisis endures. To ensure this is the case we will need to follow a set of principles to guide us towards when it is appropriate to make dynamic adjustments. Principles for making dynamic adjustments  What might these principles look like? Here are my current thoughts. Principle 1: decisions about dynamic adjustments should be made with reference to the objectives of the original regulation and/or of regulators. For the Bank, prudential regulation is relevant to a number of our primary and secondary objectives: most obviously the PRA’s microprudential objectives and the FPC’s macroprudential objectives, but also the MPC’s monetary policy objectives given the role banks play in the monetary transmission mechanism. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Principle 2: decisions about dynamic adjustments should be evidence-led.
But major gaps remain. These are evidenced by enforcement actions which continue to appear with depressing frequency. These sanctions, while necessary, aren’t the solution, not least since the $ billion of fines levied on global banks translates into more than $ trillion of reduced lending capacity to the real economy. We need a better balance between individual and firm accountability. But who should be accountable? Against which standards? And with what consequences? In these regards, I welcome the Review’s recommendations that:  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  First, individuals must be held to account. Doing so requires new, common standards, cast in clear language; better training and qualifications for FICC personnel; and mechanisms to ensure that when individuals are fired, their history will be known to those who consider hiring them. Second, firms must take greater responsibility for the system by improving the quality, clarity and market-wide understanding of FICC trading practices. I welcome the industry’s leadership in drawing up plans for a new FICC Market Standards Board. The Board’s mandate will be to establish readily understandable standards, keep them up-to-date with market developments, and promote adherence to them. Crucially, the Board will be dynamic, and will monitor and address areas of uncertainty in specific trading practices. This is a major opportunity for the industry to establish common standards of market practice that are well understood, widely followed and, crucially, that keep pace with markets. If firms and their staff fail to take this opportunity, more restrictive regulation is inevitable.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Towards a more efficient payment system – electronic payments Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Mobile Digital Signature Symposium 2008 – "Towards a More Efficient Payment System: Electronic Payments", Cyberjaya, 3 June 2008. *  *  *  It is my honour and pleasure to be here today at this Mobile Digital Signature Symposium 2008 to deliver an address at this important forum. This forum takes place at a time when developments taking place in the global economy are resulting in fundamental changes to our lives. While the global economy has benefited from an extended period of high performance and strong growth, it now requires greater agility to adapt to the rapid changes that has occurred. A major emerging international phenomenon is the rising inflationary pressures. We are now living in an environment characterised by rising prices, with energy and commodity prices prevailing at record highs. Energy and commodity prices which have risen steeply have been driven by demand and supply factors and reinforced by market conditions. Clearly, the global factors that have influenced these international prices are beyond our control. Individually and collectively, we therefore need to adjust and adapt to these new conditions. Increasing efficiency and adopting new business processes needs to be explored to reduce costs.
These conversations will help me to represent all of my constituents in my work at the Fed as I consider how best to manage interest rates and make other monetary policy decisions. Northern New Jersey is important to me not just because it is a large and important part of the New York Fed’s District but also because it is my home. My wife and I have made our home in Cranford – her home town where she can be near her mother. While my colleagues and I are pleased to work with the business community – and I know that Jason Bram and Rae Rosen of the Fed have addressed this group in the past – we also have a number of initiatives specifically targeted to help low- and moderate-income groups, particularly here in Newark. For the past three years we have provided the Newark/Essex County Foreclosure Taskforce with data and analyses on the latest mortgage conditions and trends through a range of outlets including round tables, presentations and newsletters. This Taskforce was formed in response to the rise in foreclosures in Newark and surrounding towns in late 2007. The Taskforce is comprised of representatives of over 40 community development corporations, nonprofit housing counseling and legal service providers, government and community development officials and advocacy organizations working to address this serious issue. Over the past two years we have partnered with Bank on Newark.

In addition, a large number of residents, including myself, commute each day into the city. A smaller but still sizeable number of New Yorkers commute into this state. Now, how did the state fare during the downturn and how is the recovery proceeding? As I mentioned, the New York Fed produces indexes of economic activity to help monitor the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  performance of the region.1 Based on our index, the downturn in activity in New Jersey began about the same time as the Great Recession was beginning nationwide – that is, around December 2007. While activity in the state is no longer declining, and there has been a slight pickup this year in the level of activity, to date there is still no sign that a strong recovery has taken hold. Quite frankly, this modest recovery in New Jersey contrasts with the relatively sturdy recovery in activity in New York City over the past 18 months. Employment in our region also declined substantially during the Great Recession. Job losses in New Jersey totaled about 250,000 – on par with the roughly 6 percent loss nationwide. The pattern of job losses here in northern New Jersey was very similar. In New York City, job losses were also large but somewhat less severe, with employment in the city down a little over 4 percent. The jobs recovery in New Jersey to date has been sluggish.