samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Accordingly, I strongly encourage all financial intermediaries to actively participate in the dialogue the Eurosystem has established, both at the European level through the Euro Retail Payments Board and at the national level. We just decided to set up a CBDC working group within our French payments committee (the CNPS). Concerns have emerged that the issuance of a CBDC would threaten the role of banking intermediaries in client relationships, while draining banks’ deposits through a massive conversion into risk-free CBDC accounts, especially in times of stress. These outcomes are not foregone conclusions, to say the least. The Eurosystem is currently looking at the possible scope and design of a digital euro. Let me just share my personal thoughts about the general framework that  Page 4 sur 7 should see light: in my opinion, similarly to the current intermediation model, as many functions as possible should be delegated to intermediaries.   Obviously, some functions should remain the exclusive privilege of the  Eurosystem because they are at the core of its mandate and cannot, by definition, be outsourced. This is the case specifically for the issuance of a potential digital euro.   The Eurosystem should entrust banks with the distribution of digital  euros to final users, while setting technical, functional and commercial rules like for example the branding, logo, and fee structure. We would thus build on their experience as intermediaries to offer means of payment to end users and develop value-added services.

The Eurosystem could also outsource parts of the settlement, such as recording or validation, to intermediaries.   Moreover, it is clear that some functions should remain under the sole  responsibility of intermediaries. In particular, I believe that the Eurosystem should not have the role of managing digital euro holdings: the Banque de France closed its last private customer accounts over 20 years ago, and does not intend to reopen any. Customer relationship management is best handled by financial intermediaries, as they have the experience in this field. They would also ensure compliance with the related regulatory requirements, including KYC and AML/CFT. Such a design would allow them to preserve the role of financial intermediaries in the retail payment system, and would ensure the high level of privacy required by the public.   Finally, regarding the possible risks of banks’ deposit conversions, we  must and will ensure that a digital euro remains a means of payment rather than a saving/investment asset. This could be achieved by capping the maximum amount of digital euro in circulation, at a low enough level. In a completely other field, regulated savings, ceilings for the Livret A have proven an efficient tool, without requiring the intervention of a Big Brother to check on them. Page 5 sur 7 II.
Should we conclude that we can live without pollinators and without food? That would be foolish and dangerous of course. We therefore need to understand how shocks in one sector can (and will, in the case of biodiversity loss) greatly affect the output of other sectors. And the current gas crisis in Europe is an example of the fact that we have not sufficiently thought about this. Hence, what we need to understand as central bankers is that the best risk mitigation strategy is to do everything in our power, early enough, to ensure that we remain within planetary boundaries. The Dasgupta Review indicates (in chapter 17, dedicated exclusively to the financial sector) that failing to do so will lead to systemic environmental risks known as “green swans”xxvi. Elsewhere in the Review, he also reminds us that the loss of nature (of natural capital) is only very partially substitutable with labor or manufactured capital. Beyond monetary valuations of ecosystem services what we truly need to understand is that as living creatures, we are “embedded in nature”, to quote Professor Dasgupta again. However, it is pretty clear that our socioeconomic system is currently disembedded from nature: it takes much more from it than what nature can provide us. In 1823, French economist Jean-Baptiste Say famously said that natural resources are infinite because if they were not, we would not be able to obtain freely. He deducted from this that the still emerging economic discipline did not need to be concerned with the value of natural resources.

Therefore, it is in the interest of all stakeholders to migrate quickly to the SEPA instruments. So what will make industry and/or customers stop using the old products and switch to SEPA? A SEPA migration end-date for credit transfers and for direct debits would make clear that migration cannot take forever. The European Commission in collaboration with the  6  4  ECB, SCT Indicators (see http://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/sepa/timeline/use/html/index.en.html). BIS Review 151/2009  Eurosystem is, therefore, investigating the possibility of a Regulation to facilitate the migration to SEPA. The Eurosystem considers a legally binding instrument necessary for a successful migration to SEPA and hence fully supports such regulation. I also see a lot of support for this way forward in the market. Therefore, we should continue our efforts in setting a realistic but ambitious end-date for migration to SCT and SDD to reap the full benefits of SEPA. Conclusion Let me conclude. SEPA is not just about making life easier for European citizens and companies by removing obstacles to cross-border payments. SEPA is also about removing barriers to the single market, making payments more efficient, introducing more competition to the payments industry and speeding up innovation. Hence, rapid SEPA migration would bring tremendous benefits to the European economy as a whole. The single market for goods and services – created with the Maastricht Treaty 16 years ago – now needs a single market for financial services.
William C Dudley: Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands after hurricanes Irma and Maria Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Press Briefing on Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands after Hurricanes Irma and Maria, New York City, 22 February 2018. * * * Good morning, and welcome to the New York Fed’s Regional Economic Press Briefing. Today, we will provide an update on the economies of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, with particular focus on the impacts of Hurricanes Irma and Maria. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System.1  Initial fallout from the storms Hurricanes Irma and Maria did immense damage to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, severely exacerbating what were already very difficult economic conditions. My heart goes out to our fellow citizens who have suffered so much and who face a long and difficult recovery ahead. Maria was the most devastating hurricane to hit Puerto Rico in nearly a century. Many lives were lost, homes and businesses suffered immense damage, and large parts of the Island’s infrastructure and agriculture were destroyed.

Moreover, Puerto Rico’s power outage was, by far, the most severe in U.S. history, in terms of total customer-hours lost, and it will still likely take many more months to fully restore electricity and other critical infrastructure to all of the Island’s residents. As a result, a sizable number of residents went to the U.S. mainland in the weeks following Maria, and it still is unclear how many will return once circumstances improve. Even before the storms hit, Puerto Rico was struggling with severe fiscal difficulties and a long period of poor economic performance. For over a decade, the Island has been experiencing a shrinking economy, contracting employment, low and declining labor force participation, and persistent out-migration of residents to the mainland. Furthermore, public debt reached a problematic level, and the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities—including the power and water authorities—lost their ability to borrow in the public markets. Defaults and ongoing debt restructuring efforts followed. In the U.S. Virgin Islands, the situation is similar in many ways. St. Thomas and St. John were ravaged by Irma, and St. Croix was devastated by Maria just two weeks later. Their economy, which is much more dependent on tourism than that of Puerto Rico, has also been contracting for the better part of a decade. However, the population of the U.S. Virgin Islands has not fallen nearly as sharply as Puerto Rico’s, and its economy had stabilized in the past two years following the closure of a major refinery in 2012.
It was as if the engagement was held in Bucharest and now, the official marriage is being celebrated here, in Tokyo. It was not an easy journey. The National Bank of Romania has shown its support and loyalty from the very beginning. Many of you, present here, played an essential role in making it happen: Minister Jan Kees de Jager, Governor Knot, Executive Directors Menno Snel and Ruud Treffers. I want to extend my thanks to them and to each and every one of you. Now we are a big family where trust is vital. I wish we have the opportunity to meet again in the future, look back on this day and be proud of our accomplishments. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

4 Patrick Bolton, Morgan Despress, Luiz Awazu Pereira da Silva, Frederic Samama, and Romain Svartzman, “The  Green Swan – Central Banking and Financial Stability in the Age of Climate Change,” Bank for International Settlements, 2020. 5 TCFD site and review of annual reports, integrated reports, non-financial reports, sustainability reports and  standalone climate-related disclosure reports of individual GSIBs. 6 In the international context, see Enhancing Banks’ and Insurers’ Approaches to Managing the Financial Risks  from Climate Change, Bank of England Supervisory Statement 3/19, April 15, 2019; ECB Banking Supervision: Risk Assessment for 2020, European Central Bank; and Bolton et al. (2020). 7 Kevin J. Stiroh, New York Fed, Emerging Issues for Risk Managers, Nov, 2019. 8 Governor Lael Brainard, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Why Climate Change Matters for Monetary Policy  and Financial Stability, Nov. 2019. 9 “Demystifying Climate Scenario Analysis for Financial Stakeholders,” Four Twenty Seven, 2019. “Climate risk  and response,” McKinsey Global Institute, 2020. “Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), the Synthesis Report (SYR),” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2015). 10 Fink, Larry, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, Letter to CEOs, 2020. 11 See The 2021 Biennial Exploratory Scenario on the Financial Risks from Climate Change, Bank of England  Discussion Paper, December 2019 for a discussion of relevant issues. 12 Carney (2015). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Yet this week the Governor’s open letter to the Chancellor to explain why inflation last month had deviated by more than a percentage point from the target was only the second written in over 10 years. And taking the past decade as a whole, this stability of inflation has not come at a cost to growth – quite the opposite in fact. Output growth has been high both relative to the rates  1  Indeed work done at the Bank suggests that in terms of inflation, it has been the most stable decade in many lifetimes – that is, since the Restoration at least (Benati (2006)). BIS Review 80/2008  1  achieved on average over the preceding 30 years and in comparison with our European neighbours. It also has been remarkably stable. 2 Of course that stability at the macro level disguises some big changes in the structure of the economy. Indeed it has provided a platform for change. The North East for example is now much more diverse than it was and less reliant on a few large industries. And, overall more people are employed in the region: the number employed in the North East has risen by more than 100,000 in the past ten years. And export growth remains relatively buoyant. In contrast to this picture of stability, the preceding 3 decades were scarred by painful recessions where unemployment rose sharply, and inflation fluctuated wildly.

This is an important area which will provide all those of us involved in financial sector oversight with major challenges for years to come. Increasingly active players are the hedge funds, employing alternative investment techniques and attracting a multitude of investors searching for higher yields. They often operate globally on the strength of the derivatised and securitised world. There has been a dramatic growth in hedge funds: data suggest that the past eight years alone have seen the value of assets rise by nearly 450%. Many of them are unregulated in a prudential sense, and are typically characterised by large proprietary positions, sometimes with an emphasis on unconventional assets and arbitrage positions. The complex and diverse operations of hedge funds can help to arbitrage away pricing mistakes, and to integrate financial markets. But they also raise new questions for financial stability oversight. The areas we need to look at are quite wide. There is of course the opacity aspect - what are the underlying concentrations hedge funds hold? But there are also other questions. How leveraged are they? Do lenders to them understand the risks that they are taking? And what is the potential impact of confidence and liquidity if they don’t? And what would happen if the new investors in hedge funds became disillusioned by their performance. Would it trigger an exodus and cause markets to go “one way”?
Similar to what we have observed at the euro area level, the economic expansion in the Netherlands has also strengthened. GDP grew at 2.2% in 2016, driven by strong domestic demand on account of improving business and consumer confidence and positive wealth and real-income effects. In addition, unemployment has steadily decreased, registering at 5.1% in March 2017, and the Netherlands has more jobs than before the crisis. Supported by low interest rates and a strengthening recovery, the Dutch government ran a 2.9 billion euro surplus last year, its first surplus since 2008. And, as an export-oriented country, the Netherlands is currently benefiting from the recovery in other euro area countries, especially as growth in global trade remains tepid. The side effects of our policies I am aware that these very accommodative financing conditions have raised various concerns, also in this House. Monetary policy measures always have side effects. So far, the potential negative side effects have been limited. We are monitoring these various effects carefully, taking into account our price stability mandate. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  To ascertain the overall impact of our measures on citizens, it is important to differentiate between the various ways in which they affect economic actors, such as households, pension funds and banks. Let me start with households. An accommodative monetary policy means households accrue fewer nominal returns on their savings. However, an accommodative policy supports the economic recovery, which in turn bolsters employment, income, returns on investment and tax revenues.

Finally, let me also address the risks of overheating in some parts of the financial markets. We do not currently see compelling evidence of overstretched asset valuations at the euro area level, but we do see that real estate dynamics or high household debt levels in some countries signal the risk of increasing imbalances. Such risks also exist in the Netherlands: they relate to the continued very high level of household indebtedness and the low level of mortgage collateralisation. For this reason, we share the concerns expressed in the warning issued by the European Systemic Risk Board in November 2016 and recognise that there is a case for mitigating measures. That being said, monetary policy is not the appropriate tool for addressing local and sectoral financial risks. Rather, targeted macroprudential policies, which can be tailored to local and sectoral conditions, are the right answer.1  The way forward Against the backdrop of a recovery that is becoming increasingly solid, the benefits of our policy clearly outweigh potential side effects. Also due to the pass-through of our monetary policy, there is now more and more evidence that economic growth is firming and broadening. Incoming data confirm that the cyclical recovery of the euro area economy is becoming increasingly solid and that downside risks have further diminished. Nevertheless, it is too early to declare success. Underlying inflation pressures continue to remain subdued and have yet to show a convincing upward trend.
Such initiatives will have to weigh the objective of improved disclosure of pertinent information versus convenience and effectiveness considerations. 31 We are also working to improve the Product Highlights Sheet, or PHS. As background, MAS requires issuers to set out clearly in their offering documents information pertaining to their business, operating environment, financial position and prospects, key risks as well as salient terms of the instruments offered. A full prospectus can run into hundreds of pages. We know many retail investors are likely to find it hard to digest all the information in a prospectus, especially since some of these are written in a technical and legalistic manner. 32 MAS has therefore required issuers to furnish a PHS, which is a summary of the key information presented in a clear and concise manner. It started well. But over the years, we noticed a creep where the form and content of the PHSes put out by issuers have become increasingly technical and legalistic. This picture is a sample PHS that we typically see today. Despite our efforts to encourage issuers to simplify the language and use more visual aids, we have found that most PHSes are still very cluttered and difficult to read. We are reviewing how to improve the way useful information is presented in the PHS. What you see is a prototype of an improved PHS that we are considering. We have incorporated consumer-friendly message design, clear and simple language and the use of effective diagrams and infographics.

The time needed to complete an investigation varies according to the complexity of each case. In complex cases, issues often cut across the domain of several agencies. Take for instance, a case of alleged corporate irregularities. These could range from issues of mis-selling to inadequate or false disclosures, or improper application of accounting rules, or there may also be breaches of fiduciary duties. A single case could span potential breaches of different regulations and laws, such as financial advisory regulations, securities law, company law, listing rules, accounting rules, and the Penal Code. Often, our investigators have to retrieve and review a lot of data. Where a case has a cross-border dimension, the relevant agencies will also have to seek the assistance and support from our foreign counterparts. Our investigations must be thorough and rigorous to be fair to all parties concerned. 26 MAS will strengthen our co-ordination with ACRA and CAD in the surveillance of our capital markets and in investigations. We have set up a joint forum between MAS and ACRA to review accounting-related and disclosure issues. As mentioned earlier, MAS’ enforcement team already has a joint investigation arrangement with CAD where our investigators collaborate closely. Our agencies will, in addition, work closely with SGX RegCo as they are the frontline marketplace regulator. 27 Industry groups also have a role as advocates of good governance and practices. SIAS, ABS and the Singapore Institute of Directors (SID) are good examples.
Peter Praet: Long-run saving and monetary policy Speech by Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Parliamentary evening on "Challenges for long term savings products in the context of the zerointerest rate policy", Brussels, 14 November 2016. * * * Accompanying slides The European Central Bank (ECB) has carried out a number of unconventional monetary policy measures since the crisis to bring about a return of inflation to our objective. These measures include targeted long-term repos, negative deposit facility rates since 2014 and large-scale asset purchases. We have received criticism of these unconventional policies from some quarters surrounding their potential negative consequences. In the light of that criticism, I wanted to answer three crucial questions tonight relating to our unconventional measures: Why have we implemented them? Have they been successful in their aims? And, finally, have they had unduly large negative side effects on the distribution of wealth and income? The determination of long-run interest rates First of all, I would like to spend a few moments discussing the determination of interest rates and what has happened to long-run interest rates over the past three decades. These two things have significant bearing on the rest of my remarks. Put most simply, saving is the decision to forgo consumption today, in return for higher consumption in the future. Since people are by nature impatient, they require compensation for delaying consumption, compensation usually in the form of interest payments.

Its basic functioning is as follows: if a given State suffers unwarranted tensions on its debt, we could decide to intervene as far as is necessary, provided that State commits to an agreed recovery programme. Undoubtedly, the announcement of the creation of the OMTs had a very strong impact: banks and firms regained access to capital markets; the spreads between the yields on Spanish and German 10-year bonds fell from more than 6pp in July 2012 to just under 3pp in May 2013, while the premium on Italian 10-year bond halved. This new monetary policy instrument has therefore fostered a considerable improvement in financial conditions in the euro area and represents a solid shield against further speculative attacks. The ECB’s Governing Council has stressed that monetary policy will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. In the period ahead, we will monitor very closely all incoming information on economic and monetary developments and stand ready to act if necessary. ********* The euro area is getting stronger: it is undergoing major reforms, building new institutions and setting up powerful crisis management instruments. These major and in many respects historical advances will lay the foundations for the future of our monetary union. The effects on financial markets are already very visible: tensions have abated and signs of defragmentation are starting to appear (TARGET balances for instance have declined by almost 300 billion euros or 25% from their peak).