Yet allow me to emphasise that, in parallel, central banks have strengthened transparency by providing the general public with extensive information about the rationale behind these monetary policy measures within our existing mandates. In particular, in the case of the Governing Council of the ECB, the accounts of our monetary policy meetings are published and the President and Vice-president hold a joint press conference with a Q&A session after each decision. In addition, members of the Governing Council routinely engage in public events and deliver speeches to explain our decisions and the rationale behind them. And, of course, the President of the ECB regularly participates in sessions with members of the European Parliament as do governors of national central banks in their corresponding parliaments. I deem it essential to persevere in this direction to reinforce the democratic accountability of the central bank. In communication with the public, central banks should carefully balance the need for clarity and the intrinsic complexity of monetary policy decisions. To strike the right balance it is worth noting that transparency does not mean providing certainties on intrinsically complex issues but clarity on the inevitable uncertainties and trade-offs that affect monetary policymaking. An added difficulty in the euro area is having to communicate to citizens from 19 different countries in which public opinion sometimes focuses more on national affairs than on European issues. On top of high transparency standards, we should explore additional tools that could contribute to reinforcing the legitimacy of an independent public institution.

The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL&from=EN  4/9  Regarding micro-prudential supervision, the importance of independence in this field, besides its relevance in monetary policy, is actually a worldwide recognised standard enshrined in the Basel “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”5. The Basel Core Principles are part of the “Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems”6 determined by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) that deserve priority implementation depending on countryspecific circumstances. Moreover, implementation of these principles is generally assessed through the IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP7). In the Euro area setting, the creation of the SSM in 2014 added this dimension of independence.8 However, building a system of banking supervision in the euro area in parallel with the monetary union posed challenges from the perspective of central bank independence. In particular, it could raise concerns of potential conflicts between the prudential supervision of European banks and the primary goal of price stability. This was foreseen in the institutional design of European supervision, assigning to the Supervisory Board – a new body within the European Central Bank – the planning and execution of the supervisory tasks. In consequence, separation between monetary policy and supervision was a key pillar for the conferral of supervisory tasks on the European Central Bank.