samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The key assumptions of the baseline scenario are as follows: (1) a gradual improvement of the pandemic situation worldwide owing to the progress of the vaccination, the development of the herd immunity, and the absence of new, more dangerous coronavirus strains; (2) the continuing recovery of the global economy; (3) debottlenecking the supply chain; (4) phasing-out of stimulus measures in major economies beginning from 2021 H2 and timely normalisation of their monetary policies to prevent persistently rising inflationary pressure. After the accelerated recovery, the Russian economy will slow down to its potential growth rate in 2022. Taking into consideration the structural measures implemented by the Government to boost the potential growth pace, it will probably edge up to 2–3% a year over the forecast horizon. Annual inflation will go down gradually from 2021 H2 as a result of the weakening impact of temporary factors and the effect of the earlier monetary policy decisions made by the Bank of Russia. Given the actual price growth rate in 2021 H1, we expect that inflation will reach 5.7– 6.2% as of the end of the year. Next year, inflation will slow down to 4.0–4.5% and will stay close to the Bank of Russia’s 4% target further on. The key rate will average 6–7% p.a. next year and then return to its long-term neutral range estimated by the Bank of Russia at 5–6% p.a. Alternative scenarios Nevertheless, there is still significant uncertainty about how the situation might be unfolding 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  in the future.

We believe it essential for financial market participants, businesses, and households to understand how our policy responds to changes in the economy and how we ensure price stability. To this end, beginning from April 2021, the Bank of Russia publishes the projected path of the key rate as one of the indicators of its medium-term forecast. We have also systematised and released the materials about the model-based approaches we apply to build our forecasts. People’s confidence in the monetary policy pursued is critical to anchor inflation expectations, reduce the inflation risk premium, and maintain interest rates at a moderate level. The Monetary Policy Guidelines we present annually promote this confidence. Economic situation in 2020–2021 For the second consecutive year, the global economy has been developing in the conditions of the coronavirus pandemic. The main problem a year ago was plummeting aggregate demand, whereas the major challenge since the beginning of this year has been increasingly higher inflationary pressure. Russia is no exception. After the downturn of last year, our economy has swiftly recovered. The rebound was faster than many expected. Russia’s GDP returned to its pre-crisis level as early as 2021 Q2, despite the remaining oil production cuts under the OPEC+ deal. This rise was driven by, among other things, fiscal support measures and accommodative monetary policy.
In my view, in markets where banks are dominating the financial sector and where the integration with securities and insurance markets are less pronounced, keeping the supervision separate and within the central bank makes good sense. Having said this, I acknowledge that the present tendencies are for banks to merge with other financial institutions, and for financial instruments to look increasingly alike whether they are created in banks or in other institutions. These tendencies would indicate a corresponding need for supervision of different financial sectors to cooperate closer and closer and, perhaps, finally to merge. The trend is clearly seen in Europe, reinforced by the common currency, but is gradually developing also in other countries. As mentioned above, this is the way we have organised supervision in Sweden. But I do not see a need to consolidate the supervisory authorities in a specific country until the structure of its financial markets so requires. As an intermediate step, cooperation agreements between the supervisory authorities should be encouraged. A strong rationale for locating bank supervision in a central bank is that bank stability is of crucial importance for the conduct of monetary policy. In addition, a central bank has the powers to provide liquidity - under normal as well as exceptional circumstances - to banks, for instance as a lender of last resort. To do this, it is obvious that the central bank must have full knowledge about the financial situation of a bank. However, there are also good arguments for keeping supervision separate from the central bank.

Sustained employment gains, which are also benefiting from past structural reforms, and still relatively low oil prices provide additional support for households’ real disposable income and thus for private consumption. In addition, the fiscal stance in the euro area is expected to be mildly expansionary in 2016 and to turn broadly neutral in 2017 and 2018. At the same time, headwinds to the economic recovery in the euro area include the outcome of the UK referendum and other geopolitical uncertainties, subdued growth prospects in emerging markets, the necessary balance sheet adjustments in a number of sectors and a  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms. Against this background, the risks to the euro area growth outlook remain tilted to the downside. According to Eurostat, euro area annual HICP inflation in June 2016 was 0.1%, up from 0.1% in May, mainly reflecting higher energy and services price inflation. Looking ahead, on the basis of current futures prices for oil, inflation rates are likely to remain very low in the next few months before starting to pick up later in 2016, in large part owing to base effects in the annual rate of change of energy prices. Supported by our monetary policy measures and the expected economic recovery, inflation rates should increase further in 2017 and 2018. Turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (M3) continued to increase at a robust pace in May 2016, with its annual rate of growth standing at 4.9%, after 4.6% in April.
If bank supervision works well in your country, let it be as is and strengthen the other sector supervisors instead. Operational independence should be implemented and at the same time rules for accountability and transparency. This is more important than the structure of the supervisory authorities. If you see good reasons in your country for changing the supervisory structure, you should follow a transparent process and be clear of the consequences. For obvious reasons, you must avoid making organisational changes when the financial sector is weak. Nor should you change during major developments in the financial sector, such as the introduction of the bank capital framework Basel II and the new accounting standard IAS 39. The structural change must be accompanied by measures to strengthen the capacity of the new authority. Otherwise the change is merely cosmetic. In many countries there is a political pressure to change the supervisory structure to show expediency, in particular when there has been a financial crisis and irrespective of the supervisory agencies’ roles and behaviour before and during the crisis. As a result banking supervision may in such cases be moved out of the central bank or, at other times, into it. Also the unification of the supervisory authorities is sometimes seen as a political issue. In my experience, there is not much to gain from a political point of view. On the contrary, the politicians might be blamed for future failures of supervision.

However, some countries have gone the opposite way by moving securities and insurance supervision under the umbrella of the NCB. They have benefited from the independence and resources of the NCB. On the other hand, these sectors require partly different staff skills and methods and they include issues which are normally outside the mandate of a central bank such as investigations of market conduct and law enforcement actions against individual firms or persons. Failures in securities and insurance companies may affect overall confidence in the NCB, although these institutions are in most cases of limited interest to the NCB from the point of view of financial system stability. Such failures might even lead to what Professor Goodhart calls “a creep of the Central Bank safety net” 4 implying that exceptional liquidity assistance might be used for non-systematically important institutions. My conclusion is therefore that you should only bring securities and insurance supervision into the NCB if this is needed because they can not fulfil their tasks outside the NCB for some reason such as lack of independence or human resources. After having discussed whether supervision should be inside or outside the Ministries and the NCB, I now turn to the issue of unified supervision. These are some often-heard arguments for the consolidation of supervisory authorities: Consolidating supervision in one authority Information sharing and coordination will be facilitated if the different sector supervisors are located in the same authority. In my experience this is mostly true, both for practical and legal reasons.
The euro area is over the worst phase of the recession, but if ambitious supply-side policies are not pursued, recovery will prove particularly slow. All that has been said on the need to revitalise potential growth through structural reforms and to prevent a fiscal crisis through credible fiscal consolidation programmes is a particularly pressing concern for the euro area. The emergence of the fateful “financial crisis-real crisis-fiscal crisis” sequence in one of the Member States, namely Greece, is a particularly serious and important development. Its effects have spread not only to other countries but also to the euro area as a whole, thus turning it into a new epicentre of global financial instability. This episode has highlighted the weakness of the economic governance arrangements for the euro, and is forcing some of its working mechanisms to be reconsidered, with a view to setting sounder foundations in place. Events triggered by the Greek fiscal crisis have ultimately exacerbated significantly the complex framework in which the Spanish economy operates. Allow me to depart from the traditional structure of this address to tackle the important issues raised by the Greek crisis in terms of the consequences for the Spanish economy in this exceptional situation, which poses a welter of challenges to Spain’s medium- and long-term growth possibilities. The shockwave of the Greek fiscal crisis hit the Spanish economy when we were facing the consequences of the deterioration in the labour market and in public finances and the need to complete the banking restructuring process under way.

It has done this by adjusting its schedule for withdrawing the extraordinary crisis-combating measures put in place, so as to attune it to developing financial market tensions. It thus re-established its six-month liquidity-providing operations, resumed its fixed-rate full-allotment tender system for three-month tenders and recommenced dollar-denominated liquidityproviding operations. Furthermore, the ECB started up a public and private asset purchase programme with a view to remedying the dysfunctions in certain financial market segments which were endangering the normal operation of the monetary policy transmission mechanism that is essential to ensure price stability. Along with these actions on the common European front, the other essential component of the response to the emergency situation is the reaction of national governments to ensure the sustainability of their finances and to undertake the reforms needed to restore vigorous and stable growth of both output and employment. In this regard, the sequence and content of the fiscal consolidation packages adopted by the Spanish government have naturally been influenced by recent developments. The Spanish government took a first step towards fiscal consolidation when it defined the State budget for 2010 and, later, when it presented the Updated Stability Programme in January this year, following the recommendations of the ECOFIN.
Less than a month ago the FAA – Finance Accreditation Agency, an entity responsible for reviewing the quality of the learning programs that serve the industry was launched. This agency complements the initiatives by the International Centre For Leadership In Finance (ICLIF) to produce capable and competence leaders. Taken together, these efforts reflect our motivation in ensuring comprehensive talent development solutions for financial sector professionals throughout their career progression from entry-level up to leadership positions. Equal emphasis is also given in the area of Islamic finance. Talent development has been identified as a key thrust to support industry growth and development, both domestically and globally. The role of several talent development institutions dedicated to serving the industry has been instrumental in contributing towards achieving this goal – the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) which is as a global university offering academic and professional qualifications in Islamic finance, the International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) which is a centre for applied research in Shariah and Islamic finance, as well as IBFIM or the Islamic Finance and Banking Institute Malaysia – an industry-owned training entity for Islamic finance professionals. Despite being relatively new in existence, these institutions have now become increasingly recognised as leading providers of expertise in Islamic finance, providing the Islamic finance global community a reference centre for knowledge and talent development. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I am most inspired by the optimism set by theme of this year’s conference – “Waves of change, Oceans of opportunities”.

Dimitar Bogov: Addressing structural rigidities in view of monetary policy transmission effectiveness Address by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the 4th Research Conference “Addressing structural rigidities in view of monetary policy transmission effectiveness”, Skopje, 23 April 2015. *  *  *  Dear Governors, Your Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear guests, It is my pleasure to welcome you all, on our fourth Research Conference, entitled Addressing Structural Rigidities in View of Monetary Policy Transmission Effectiveness. Just like the previous years, we hope that the topic of this conference is both interesting and challenging to provide an interactive framework for discussion and research-based policy advices for the central bankers. Structural rigidities, indeed, are related to a wide range of economic segments. Therefore, today we will try to tackle different economic issues, enlightening their importance for the monetary policy transmission effectiveness. Transition economies have undergone many structural changes in the ongoing reshaping of the economies, which to some extent have influenced the monetary policy decision making or monetary policy transmission channels. Globalization is yet another factor that tends to produce changes in the economic structure and at the same time, affects the markets functioning or economic agents’ behavior.
I hope that I have so far convinced you that living with capital inflows is not easy and will require efforts from the public as well as private sector. Indeed, to successfully live with capital flows is a delicate task, as the title of this speech suggests. On my part, what I want to assure you is that we at the Bank of Thailand are aware of the interrelated issues and always take them into account when making a policy. Tough choices, however, will always have to be made. We will try our best to balance between different stakeholders’ needs. For you, as investors, we take to the point that you value policy transparency, and we aim to provide you as such, in addition to macro-stability which is our overriding mandate. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Once the system is up and running, supervisory coordination in terms of exchange of information, say  BIS Review 102/2001  1  on risk model validation, will also be crucial. For this reason, seminars such as this also serve to build useful networks. Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me turn now towards the second topic at hand, the issues surrounding new technological development, that is, E-Banking. Indeed the key driver of the financial landscape in the past decade has been technology. Innovations, both in finance and IT, have changed the boundaries of financial institutions' businesses, spurred vertical as well as horizontal integration in financial industry and related industries, increasing the numbers of mergers and acquisitions, and in turn, revolutionized the regulatory boundary conceptually and geographically. In short, the definition of what is a financial institution is being challenged. Advancements in technology have ramifications for real applications in many Thai businesses, and the banking industry is no exception. Changes in consumer lifestyle are amongst major factors pushing financial institutions to implement technology-based services that will deliver traditional transactions in a more timely and convenient manner. Such a trend is evidenced by the fact that many Thai banks have invested a significant amount of resources modifying their technology systems to support new on-line services and to enhance efficiency and cost-effectiveness of their operations.
For instance, capital requirements do not prohibit risky exposures, but they make them expensive to the bank. Before moving somewhat deeper into the questions of supervision, there are some things to say about risk management. BIS Review 66/2000  2  Risk management Risk management systems are at the core of modern banks. Banks must have consistent systems for identifying, monitoring, controlling and managing risks. These systems must be endorsed and understood not only by credit officers, but also by the board and the management. In a deregulated banking sector, the division of control and responsibilities in a bank is of particular importance. Owners must take an active interest in the bank by setting broad strategic guidelines and policies for risk management and internal controls. Bank boards must have access to timely and adequate information and act on it when necessary. There must be a division of labour making it clear to all members of management and staff what specific responsibilities they have. From the Swedish banking crisis I would single out a few types of risk. Credit risk in general, linked to the issue of collateral, was - as should be expected - the main problem. It was our experience that banks coming from the sheltered world of strict regulation did not have good and consistent systems for credit evaluation and documentation. Today, banks must have credit policies, stating what kind of credits they wish to grant.

The discovery of resources on the shores of the Continent should be carefully handled so that the funds that are realised as much as possible are used in the development of the African continent. Exploitation of the natural resources by foreign investors should ideally involve value addition on the continent. This is one way through which Africa would benefit from its rich resource base. 4  BIS Review 126/2009  Conclusion The challenges of mobilizing domestic resources for the medium-to-long term development require higher levels of domestic resource mobilization. Africa needs a paradigm shift in terms of sources of development finance. This is because the resources that it has domestically in terms of official international reserves and pension funds can be used to finance infrastructural development and investments in other productive sectors of the economy. Capital markets can also be a source of finance for private and public sector investment projects. Africa needs to maintain the sound macroeconomic policies which led to the positive growth that the continent has witnessed in the last decade, and continue with policy reforms aimed at reducing the cost of doing business. This is the best way to ensure that domestic resources as well as foreign resources have a positive and long lasting impact on the African continent’s economic growth and poverty reduction outcomes. BIS Review 126/2009  5
Their findings were quickly put to use, and the enthusiasm among local farmers, fishermen and seamen sent a clear signal about the importance of good weather forecasts. The Norwegian economy – a mild winter The fields of economics and meteorology have a number of common features. Two key issues in economics involve understanding how the economy functions and forecasting its future path. Great strides have been made in the area of weather forecasting in recent decades. Accurate weather forecasts span increasingly longer periods, but they are not always on the mark. It is no less difficult to make accurate economic forecasts. Human behaviour does not follow the laws of physics. Few predicted the 2008 financial crisis, and the oil price collapse in autumn 2014 came as a surprise to many. We have now lived with lower oil prices for a few years. The most pessimistic scenarios have not materialised so far. But the fall in oil prices has put a damper on economic activity in Norway, not least in the western and southwestern areas of the country where the oil service industry has predominated in recent decades. Countrywide the downturn has not been as pronounced as the contraction triggered by the financial crisis. Excluding that sharp, albeit short, contraction, the period of weak growth we are now experiencing has not been seen since around 1990. Mainland output per capita has stagnated over the past two years, and the level of real wages is lower than in 2014.

While there are still widespread skepticism and even resentment to the label of financial derivatives or financial engineering, I think it is important for us to be able to differentiate between those structured finance products that are linked to and supportive of the real economy from those that have no useful links to the real economy. Clearly ordinary mortgage-backed securities with proper underwriting standards, not the kind of sub-prime mortgages in the US, are one of this kind of useful financial derivatives. Infrastructure loan backed securities can be another kind of useful structured finance because, if properly organised, they can bring about a win-win outcome for the investors, the recipient countries, the intermediaries and the capital markets. As I said earlier, infrastructure investments are one of the most difficult kind of asset class and to create a structured finance for these investments is not going to be an easy or short process, but as the Chinese saying “千里之行，始於足下” goes, no matter how long the journey is going to take, one has to make a start somehow. So here we are, the HKMC is going to take the first step in pursuing the securitisation of infrastructure loans in order to facilitate a more efficient flow of capital into infrastructure investments. 9. I note that in the afternoon there will be a session focusing on the prospects of structured finance in infrastructure investments. This is highly relevant and timely and I look forward to hearing the perspectives and insights from the experts on this subject.