samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The main priority at the current juncture is for all stakeholders to make every possible effort to achieve the full and  4  BIS Review 86/2008  timely implementation of SEPA in order to ensure that a critical mass of retail payments will be made on the basis of SEPA instruments by end 2010. As ECOFIN concluded in January this year, public authorities have an important catalytic function in driving the migration process to SEPA forward, namely by supporting and explaining SEPA in their communication with their national constituencies. In addition to this political task, they also have an operational role to play in becoming early users of SEPA products and services. As initiators and receivers of high volumes of payment transactions, public authorities – such as national and local administrations, tax authorities, social security agencies and pension funds – are key stakeholders which can make SEPA a success. We have noted that there is still a lack of information and awareness about SEPA among the public at large. Greater effort should be made to communicate the benefits of SEPA to corporate enterprises and private customers at European and national levels. While we expect that the critical mass of retail payments will have moved to SEPA payments by the end of 2010 on a voluntary basis, an official end-date for the migration period may need to be set, by which time the use of national credit transfers and direct debits should have been phased out.

Third, OMTs will focus on the shorter part of the yield curve, and in particular on sovereign bonds with a maturity of between one and three years. This underscores the monetary policy nature of such outright transactions, the principle of which was foreseen in the ECB Statute. And it buttresses the OMTs’ aim to address reversibility premia which, as I argued above, have tended to manifest themselves at the short end of the term structure, while addressing the fact that credit risk embedded in longer-term yields should reflect the credibility of countries’ economic and financial adjustment programmes. Fourth, there are no ex ante quantitative limits on the size of OMTs. This makes clear that the ECB is committed to do whatever it takes, within its mandate, to preserve the solidity and irreversibility of the currency. Fifth, the ECB accepts the same (pari passu) treatment as private or other creditors with respect to bonds purchased in the context of OMTs. Finally, the liquidity created through OMTs will be fully sterilised. This reflects the role of OMTs in counteracting destructive self-fulfilling equilibria rather than altering the aggregate liquidity stance. The main features of the framework for OMTs outlined here address by design also three concerns or questions sometimes voiced in relation to outright purchases of government bonds by a central bank. The first concern can be summed up in two questions: are OMTs a form of monetary financing of governments and will inflation be unleashed? The answer to both questions is: No. In fact, quite the opposite.
exporters  -15  -9,9  -2,4  0  -0,9  U.K.  10  25 20  16,8  GDP growh in 2011-2015: 6.7%  U.S.  15  Eurozone  20  22,1  (*) Regional aggregates reflect simple averages. Sources: BIS and IMF. 7  Figure 3 Terms of trade (index, 2000=100) 200  200  180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  80  85  90  95  00  05  10(f)  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4 Net international investment position (percentage of GDP) (1) 100  100  75  75  50  50  25  25  0  0  -25  -25  -50  -50  -75  -75  -100  -100 97  01  05  Institutional Banks Companies and households (1) GDP at constant exchange rate (index, September 2010 =100). (2) Net international investment position. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

12  08  09 Assets  10 Net  -12.000
Although the size of the market may seem modest by global standards, the sukuk market has been registering an average annual growth of 40 percent. The growth of the Islamic bond market in particular, in the current environment also reflects its cost effectiveness. An increasing number of multilateral agencies, Government agencies and the corporate sector including multinational corporations have relied on the sukuk market as a source for raising financing. In Malaysia, Shell MDS Sdn. Bhd. issued the world’s first ringgit-denominated corporate sukuk in 1990, amounting to RM125 million. The issuance of a RM3.5 billion programme sukuk by TESCO Stores in 2007 witnessed the first sukuk issuance by a British owned MNC, while Toyota Capital Services, a Japanese MNC, issued a RM1 billion programme in 2008. There has also been a growing trend for multi-currency sukuk issuances in Asia, with the latest landmark issuance of the world’s first renminbi sukuk issuance in 2011 being issued in the Malaysian market. These multi-currency issuances have attracted international investors to participate in this market. As an asset class, there are now a wide range of structures, size and different maturities. Recent examples in Malaysia include the PLUS Berhad’s issuance of a record size of RM30.6 billion or equivalent to USD9.7 billion programme, with maturities ranging from 5 to 27 years. This also facilitates the potential for diversification of portfolios. The Islamic capital market has also been an avenue for businesses to raise equity financing globally.

And, households appear quite far along in the deleveraging process by a number of important measures. For example, the ratio of household debt service relative to income is back to levels last seen in the early 1990s. For these reasons, I expect that growth will gradually strengthen over the next few years. Nevertheless, significant downside risks remain, especially those related to the challenges in Europe and how the potential “fiscal cliff” in the United States will be resolved after the fall elections. Even if these risks do not materialize, I anticipate only slow progress toward full employment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  On the inflation side, in recent years our forecasts have been noticeably more accurate than on the growth side, and we have succeeded in delivering inflation very close to our 2 percent price stability objective. Through March, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures deflator, overall consumer prices have risen 2.1 percent over the past 12 months, and prices excluding food and energy have risen 2.0 percent. But price trends have been a bit stickier than one might have anticipated given the large amount of slack in the economy. To some degree, this likely reflects the anchoring exerted by stable inflation expectations. But some of the price pressures can be attributed to other, more temporary, factors:   Higher oil and gasoline prices and their pass-through into the costs of other goods and services.   Upward pressure on imputed homeowners rents due to increased demand for rental housing.
And with the natural trade links and the people-to-people relations, there is a role for Thai banks in the payments and remittance services. These areas may not be commercially viable for global banks if the scale of the transaction is deemed too small. But for Thailand, such basic services can help support the robust growth of cross border trade and investments which are important for rural development and income distribution. •  With the fundamental trend where Thai businesses start to diversify investment and production base to neighboring GMS countries, it is natural for Thai financial institutions to follow their clients. Thai banks therefore have an important role in partnering Thai and GMS corporates. Areas such as project evaluation, business-set up, cross-border financial transaction are areas where the local know how matter and where Thai banks can meaningfully contribute. Through the vertical integration of these corporate finance services, Thai financial institutions naturally become an intermediary between Thai business and our GMS counterpart. As clients organize themselves around a regional supply chain, Thai banks become a natural partner to bring GMS business and investment to Thailand. Thai banks and their GMS correspondent banks or joint venture partners have a niche market advantage. They have close business links, geographical advantage, and access to funding in local currencies which are the natural means of payment for intraregional trade.

Though not taking a driving seat, a financial system that is safe and sound has an important role to support growth and sustainable development. When it comes to finance, three issues come to my mind. First, what should be the strategy for meeting the financing needs of the Subregion. Second, what role should the Thai financial system play as an intermediary and as a member of the GMS. Third, what are the regulatory and institutional challenges to ensure financial stability and sustainable development. On the first issue of financing, we generally observe that trade and direct investment flows are largely influenced by proximity and endowment. Finance, on the other hand, knows no boundary. Given the broad-based financing needs of the GMS which range from large scale project finance to commercial banking for SME, there is a role for all types of institutions: local, regional and global. (1)  For local financial institutions, their knowledge and understanding should give them a comparative advantage to support the traditional sectors that are the mainstay of the region, namely the agricultural sector, household and small entrepreneurs. In this way, they have a predominant role in promoting financial inclusion. Non-bank institutions or innovative financial services such as microfinance, mobile and e-banking and remittance services help promote financial access for households and enterprises. (2)  For larger corporate or infrastructural projects that local or regional banks might not have the financial capacity or know how, there is a role for global institutions to lead finance or underwrite.
The second issue is how independence should a Central Bank be? I believe that a Central Bank should be independent within the government because it is the Minister of Finance who has to be accountable to the parliament on issues relating to macro economic, fiscal, monetary and financial system matters. I agree absolutely with Governor Paul Acquah that monetary and fiscal policies must be harmonized in order to achieve macro stability, meaning that a Minister of Finance and a Governor of a Central Bank must work hand in hand to achieve a proper policy mix of fiscal and monetary policies so that sustainable growth can be achieved. BIS Review 53/2002  3  Ladies and gentlemen, I feel that I have taken enough of your time already. Therefore, I would like to conclude that a Central Bank can be considered as having its independence when it can perform its duty of achieving and maintaining price stability without any political or governmental interference, and with honesty and integrity while working hand in hand with the Ministry of Finance to achieve a balanced fiscal and monetary policies mix that lead to macro stability and sustainable growth. Inflation targeting approach is an effective mean to achieve Central Bank independence because it encompasses 4 very important ingredients: operational independence, responsibility, transparency and accountability. Other means can be just as effective if they have these 4 required ingredients.

Dr. Puey believed that the government must have faith in the central bank in providing benefits for the country as a whole. The Governor and senior management should have enough courage to voice their critical, even dissenting opinion when such an action is necessary. His view was that the Governor and his senior management cannot be saints, but must carry out their work adhering to the principles of honesty and integrity. Neither can they act indifferently, because when it is necessary to reprimand the government, they must do so. Dr. Puey was determined to protect its officials from political interference. He issued regulations prohibiting Bank of Thailand officials to stand for political office or write articles on politics, which are still in force today. I totally agree with what Dr. Puey had thus said and practiced without fail. However, since Governor Puey left the office at his own will to concentrate on another job which he loved dearly, that is, rector of Thammasart University, we have had nine governors over a period of almost 30 years. Out of this nine, only two retired from the office, the other seven were either fired or pressured to leave the post by the Government for some reason or another and in most cases the causes of removal had nothing to do with their performance in conducting monetary policy. BIS Review 53/2002  1  How could this have happened?
We determine the price – the interest rate – of banks’ payments among themselves, we supply the central payment system. And if something goes wrong with RIX, Sweden’s financial lifeblood, it is the Riksbank’s task to manage the situation Monetary policy and financial stability are two sides of the same coin – financial stability affects how monetary policy is spread to the rest of the economy and price stability contributes to a stable financial system. Both monetary policy and various tasks to promote financial stability are part of a central bank’s core operations and I believe that it is in reality not possible to differentiate between these tasks. All this is interconnected since, as I said earlier, the central bank is where the money is. It is also at the central bank where the amount of money can be increased or reduced. Allow me in conclusion to illustrate the importance of preventing financial crises. Over the past 150 years, economic activity, measured in terms of GDP, has not fallen so often but when it has, it has often been in conjunction with a financial crisis. Six out of nine cases of substantial downturns in GDP have occurred in connection with a financial crisis. Of the rest, two coincided with the two world wars. The fact that we were spared financial crises between 1945 and 1990 depends to a high degree on the strict regulation that prevailed on the financial markets, although this regulation led to other types of problem.

The Riksbank’s banknote and coin operations are centralised to an ultra-modern office north of Stockholm. And the Riksbank’s role continues to change. An inquiry has proposed that the Riksbank should be given an overarching responsibility for monitoring and analysing cash management. 1 The Riksbank is prepared to take on this responsibility as it falls quite naturally within our remit as a central bank. The inquiry has also proposed that cash processing companies, such as Loomis and Nokas, should come under the supervision of the Riksbank. It is important for someone to exercise supervision over these operations and companies. I am doubtful whether the Riksbank is the authority best suited for this task, although that is of course a matter for the Riksdag to decide. Should the Riksbank issue electronic money? But developments have not just been a matter of reorganising the more operational side of cash management. Technical developments, globalisation and innovations on the financial markets also challenge the perception that it is necessary for the central bank to have a monopoly on issuing cash to ensure a safe and efficient payment system. Banknotes and  1  2  See SOU 2014:61. BIS central bankers’ speeches  coins have long since faced competition from other means of payment, especially different types of accounts with their related payment services offered by banks and other financial institutions. Today, payments are made electronically to a large extent; both households and companies, for example, pay invoices and transfer money online or by mobile phone.
Only then can they provide holistic advice and comprehensive recommendations on what to buy, and – more importantly – what not to buy. But we understand the concerns that some representatives have raised. MAS is prepared to adjust its requirements subject to the companies putting in place proper controls to ensure that only simple products are sold by the selected FA representatives who do not take the new examinations. Entry requirements for FA representatives Next, as part of FAIR, MAS will review the minimum level of qualifications that we expect of our FA representatives, to ensure they stay relevant to the needs and expectations of consumers. The current entry requirement for FA representatives is four GCE “O” level passes. It is clearly not in keeping with Singapore’s rising educational levels, the increasing complexity of products, and higher expectations from a more literate and sophisticated public.   One out of two Singaporeans has above GCE “O” level qualifications, compared to one out of three, ten years ago.   One out of four Singaporeans has a degree; this is double the proportion ten years ago. Our current requirements do not stack up well against major jurisdictions. They have been raising the quality and professionalism of their financial advisers.   In the UK, the minimum requirement for representatives serving retail customers will be raised by end 2012 to tertiary level qualification, defined as at least a Diploma.   In Australia, the current educational entry level is a Diploma-equivalent.

Most of all, they must – by word and deed – make clear to their staff that meeting revenue targets must never be at the expense of treating their customers with fairness and honesty. Enhance transparency of products A key aspect of fair dealing is to make insurance and investment products more transparent. MAS has enhanced safeguards for consumers who buy investment and insurance products that are complex. For example, for consumers investing into unit trusts via their investment-linked life insurance policies, we now require insurers to provide a Product Highlights Sheet or “PHS” on the underlying funds. The PHS should be written in plain language, in a “Question & Answer” format prescribed by the MAS. It describes the profile of customers the fund is suitable for, what the fund invests in, and what the risk areas are that could cause a customer to incur a loss. We also require FA representatives to conduct a Customer Knowledge Assessment to assess whether a customer has the relevant knowledge or experience to understand the risks of products which are more complex or have innovative features which customers might not understand. FAIR – the next steps MAS recognises that FAIR will have a significant impact on the industry and on the public. We will take a consultative approach and engage all stakeholders. A review panel will be formed, with representation from industry associations, the investment community, academia, media and consumer bodies, to review and propose recommendations on the five areas I have outlined.
Cloud computing and the use of third party services also have the potential to undermine firewalls. Putting a balance to the needs of various parties would be a challenging task. As information technology grows, so do the capabilities of cyber criminals. These criminals have a wide range of tools to execute cyber attacks, many of which are easily obtainable and relatively inexpensive to procure. For example, cyber criminals can now control networks of compromised computers through “botnets” that enable anonymity. This access can be bought or rented online. In the hands of criminal or organisations that are determined to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  disrupt national stability, botnets could be used to steal sensitive data or disrupt access to critical national infrastructure. Industry players, security firms and financial supervisors may easily find themselves in a cat and mouse game, where the ability to attack constantly outpaces the ability to defend. These challenges demand a stronger and forceful response by all parties. Recent global regulatory reforms, such as the Basel III capital adequacy and liquidity rules, have tended to focus on financial risks. There has been much less focus on technology and cyber security risks despite the real systemic threats that they pose. So far, no financial institutions in this region have encountered an attack, severe enough to disrupt its critical services or cause material losses, but we cannot leave this to chance.

Modern financial systems also operate and depend heavily on these same networks and infrastructure. We can expect the management of cyber security risk to be even more relevant and challenging in the financial sector. Financial institutions operate critical payment and settlement systems and maintain sensitive customer information. This makes the financial system an attractive target for cyber security attacks. The adoption of more sophisticated and digital technology for key systems such as trading platforms, data warehouses and internet banking introduces new sources of cyber security issues which could be more systemic. For example, a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on banks in the United States in 2013 caused serious disruptions in access to online services. While causing no major losses, the increasing sophistication of the cyber attack raises concerns over critical functions of the financial system. This offers a glimpse of the potential harm confronting us in the years ahead. No doubt, technological advancements are a force for good. They are crucial to the efficient operations of the financial system, such as through greater automation of processes, better risk management and the wider offering of products served through online platforms. This in turn benefits business and retail customers. However, the increasingly widespread adoption of advanced technology also exposes financial institutions to new cyber security risks that need to be better understood. For example, increased accessibility to a financial institution’s systems by employees and customers through the use of smartphones and tablets serve as entry points for cyber crime.