samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When prices for retail services, such as the use of cards or cash, are transparent and reflect the cost of production, they give incentives to efficient use of each instrument. Again, if actual costs of cash services were transparent to consumers and if the use of cash was priced according to the cost of providing cash services, the use of cards would probably increase substantially. I am sure that we will move in that direction, even though consumer acceptance of paying for the use of cash will increase only at a slow pace. Thank you.

It is expensive to use, however, and in one way or another we all as bank customers pay for the use of it. For reasons of security and efficiency in retail payments, a more widespread use of cards would be desirable. Forces driving the development of the card payment market The forces of supply and demand shape the evolution of the card payment market in much the same manner as they influence the evolution of any other market. Demand is influenced by factors such as acceptance, convenience and relative prices. It has sometimes been argued that demand for payment instruments is not price elastic - that relative prices 1 do not greatly influence users' preferences for different payment instruments. The Nordic experience does not support this view. The rapid expansion of card payments and other electronically initiated instruments in Norway clearly point in a different direction. Norwegian consumers' shift of preferences followed immediately after banks' change of pricing strategy, where (among other changes) a price was put on the use of cash (as a small fee on ATM withdrawals). In Sweden, as previously noted, the use of checks fell sharply when banks started to charge for their use, although the charge was fairly small. Of course, good substitutes must be readily available. But if alternative ways of payment are present, fees seem to matter and matter a lot.
For central banks and other economic forecasters, the challenge will be to attempt to make the best assessment possible of the manner in which potential output and growth may be impacted by both the crisis and the regulations resulting from it. For the authorities that are to design the regulations, the challenge will lie in finding an appropriate balance: on one hand, the regulations will need to be sufficient to reduce the risk of financial crises – which can cause potential output to fall. However, on the other hand, they should not be so comprehensive as to impede the financial sector unnecessarily, thus risking dampening potential growth. In other words, it is a matter of finding just the right level of regulation. Figure 5 Potential output with and without crises Potential output Without regulations, with crises With regulations, without crises  Time  Somewhat simplified, it could be said that this is a matter of making a choice between two development paths for potential output (Figure 5). In one, development is interrupted now and again by crises, during which potential output falls, but between these, growth is relatively strong. In the other, development is even, but growth may be slightly lower than is the case between crises in the first development path. It is not obvious which development provides the best welfare effects over the long term, but it is clear that general opinion at present is that we should attempt to reduce the risk of crises and abrupt halts.

We have done so more or less right from the very start, even if, when the inflation-targeting regime was new, there was particular reason to emphasise that low and stable inflation should be prioritised. However, in the present framework, the considerations that we actually make as regards both inflation and the real economy have become more apparent. However, a number of problems still remain. For example, it is not obvious which measure of the real economy monetary policy is to stabilise nor how best to calculate the trend to be stabilised around. Quite different estimates can be made, not only in terms of the present and the future, but also of past events (Figure 3). However, it remains clear that intellectual progress has been made and that developments have moved forwards. So far, relatively few central banks have gone so far as to publish forecasts of their policy rates, as the Riksbank does. But it is clear that the manner in which monetary policy is conducted has developed in most parts of the world and is presently more open and clear than was the case fifteen to twenty years ago.
Second, when trying to enforce new supervisory guidelines and rules on our local banks, one of the first questions they will ask is what is being done elsewhere. It is thus very helpful to be able to point to the relevant international standard in order to confer legitimacy on what we are trying to achieve. Of course, this presupposes that international standards are relevant to individual countries and territories. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has played a major role in setting standards which do have such relevance. In particular, the Basle capital adequacy ratio, which is still called the “Cooke ratio” in parts of Asia in deference to our chairman here today, has become the de facto capital standard in most supervisory systems around the world despite the fact that it was originally intended to apply only to internationally active banks. Despite this enormous achievement, however, it can be argued that the subsequent work of the Committee did become somewhat too narrowly focused on issues which are of principal interest to supervisors from G-10 countries. This is only natural since these are the people who comprise the Basle Committee but it perhaps left something of a vacuum in the setting and promulgation of standards with more global relevance. In particular, much of the work of the Basle Committee has been dominated in recent years by the formulation of its recommendations to extend the capital adequacy regime to cover the market risk arising from trading in derivatives and other financial instruments.

The creation of these indicators, their calculation and rating in the relevant markets would create the conditions for the real assessment of the competitive advantages that this district has to offer. The help that the local authorities can give in identifying the competitive advantages and the provision of local statistics are perhaps the best investment they can make for the regional and national development. Today, more than ever before, all the attention of global economy is oriented towards the markets, as the best estimators of the competitive advantages in the global economy. The developments in these markets are bringing about the reconfiguration of the economic powers at a global level. The new commercial and financial trends appear to be in favour of the utilization of natural resources and competitive advantages, through investments in emerging economies, to later import them in the form of final products, ready for consumption. These are advantages for the Albanian economy, which, with the major structural reforms taking place (privatizations, natural and human resources, creativity and the entrepreneurship spirit), enjoys all the opportunities and should play an active role in the regional market and beyond, in the global market. I am optimistic and I do believe in our economy and its potentials. Thanking you for your attention, I welcome any comments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Overall, they find that optimal capital levels for the US banking system can range from 13% to 25%. The Costs of Higher Capital Requirements  The costs of higher bank capital requirements arise from potentially tighter credit supply conditions. Banks may adjust to the need to fund themselves with more equity by tightening lending rates and restricting loan volumes. The LEI study assumed that each percentage point increase in the capital ratio would raise loan spreads by around 13 basis points. That translated into a fall in GDP of around 0.1% relative to trend.17  What have we learned about these costs since the LEI study? Cecchetti (2014) documents how banks have adjusted their balance sheets and credit provision since the introduction of Basel III. He finds that banks increased their capital ratios significantly, by over 4 percentage points on average, across his sample. Net interest margins and profitability fell. But with the exception of European banks, banks’ assets increased, their lending spreads narrowed, lending standards eased, and the ratio of bank credit-to-GDP went up. 14  This calculation is based on the marginal condition for optimal capital reported earlier. We parameterise the crisis probability and severity functions as follows: 𝛾 = exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑘)⁄(1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑘)); ∆= 𝜃0 + 𝜃1 𝑘. The model is calibrated to deliver an optimal capital ratio of around 18% when 𝜃1 = 0, i.e. the LEI case.

Regulators around the globe are very mindful of this trend and are willing to take calculated risks on innovative ventures, going beyond the banking system for solutions. There is thus, a more level-playing field and more business opportunities for non- traditional companies that are responsive and effective in meeting the financial services needs of consumers. For example, new robo-advisory businesses are now providing high quality investment advice at low cost, while payment technology companies are making cross-border payments cheaper, 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  quicker and more efficient. TransferWise, a cross-border payment company is now moving to offer ‘borderless’ bank accounts for businesses that operate across border. This is a challenge for many incumbents. The second observation is that data could be the ‘king-maker’ of finance. Companies that are able to control and leverage on data to deliver superior customer experience will possess the greatest advantage. Successful startups over the past decade such as AirBnb, Grab, Snapchat and Uber have all utilised technology and data to improve business models and customer interactions. For the financial sector, this could potentially mark a highly interesting shift of mantra in the future from “cash is king” to “data is king”. The arms race of the 21st century is really big data. Firms on Wall Street and the City of London are now employing data scientists en masse. They are the new breed of ‘bankers’. The bankers of the future.
Our response to recent failings should be as ambitious as those of our predecessors to the Great Fire: renewed prosperity built on private markets and public market infrastructure. Let our legacy be the earthly equivalent of Wren’s ethereal genius, real markets so that the City can do what it does best: transact and innovate for the good of the people of the United Kingdom and the world. Thank you. 5  See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/openforum.aspx. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Whether the academic and central banking community has its analysis of those channels correct is open to question, but the voluminous literature on the impact of QE on yields is testament to an absence of neglect, even if we are still working towards definitive answers on many fronts. Page 7  But the first two dangers remain relevant. In pursuing our inflation target at the Bank of England, our core modelling framework employs what is essentially a real framework to model the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This is founded in the canonical new Keynesian model: prices are set as a mark-up over marginal cost, with that mark-up varying cyclically. The main policy implication is straightforward: in order to stabilise inflation at target, keep aggregate demand in line with aggregate supply. This framework assumes longer-term inflation expectations are, and will remain, well-anchored. That is certainly the ambition of the MPC. Monetary policy actions are always aimed at ensuring so: following its June meeting, the MPC stated that monetary policy is acting to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations are anchored at the 2% target. But we cannot rely on our forecasts of inflation returning to target to reassure ourselves that inflation expectations are well-anchored, since such anchoring is one of the assumptions underlying those forecasts. That would be circular reasoning. Ensuring the institutional and analytical framework for monetary policy is robust to potential shifts in inflation expectations is key.
17  Inflation targeting is generally characterised by an announced inflation target; an inflation forecast, which facilitates forward looking monetary policy decision making; and a high degree of transparency and accountability. According to Lars Svensson, the Swedish economist who later served as Deputy Governor of the Riksbank, this policy framework encompasses a trinity of a mandate for price stability, independence, and accountability for the central bank, which enables anchoring of inflation expectations effectively. In practice, inflation targeting is flexible rather than strict. According to Svensson, flexible inflation targeting means that monetary policy aims at stabilising both inflation around the inflation target and the real economy, whereas strict inflation targeting aims at stabilising inflation only, with little regard to the stability of the real economy. A strict inflation targeter would be who Mervyn King, the former Governor of Bank of England, called an “inflation nutter”. Most of the central banks do not only aim at stabilising inflation around an inflation target, but also put an effort into stabilising real economic variables. This effort is described by the time 18  horizon in achieving the inflation target, which dampens the adverse impact of policies on the real economy. Therefore, an important feature of flexible inflation targeting is that the inflation rate will be on average at target, but perhaps not every month. A key advantage of inflation targeting is that it is easier for the general public to relate to.

Timothy F Geithner: Further investments to strengthen the financial system Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Economic Club of Washington, Washington, 9 February 2005. *  *  *  Good evening. I am honored to be here. It’s good to be back in Washington and to have a chance to talk with such a distinguished group. Much of our nation’s financial history and the history of our central bank is a story of contest for influence and over ideas between political leaders in Washington and the financial center of New York. I think it is important that ideas shuttle back and forth between our cities, and I am pleased to have a chance to share a few tonight. My overall argument this evening is this. We face a delicate balance between genuinely positive near-term economic conditions, and some fundamental challenges. If we are to increase the likelihood of continued strong growth in living standards, we should use this time of relative prosperity to address the imbalances that hang over our economy. Even with good policy choices, and with considerable luck, these imbalances will take time to unwind. During this time we face some risk of a more volatile and less benign overall financial environment. This makes it important that we continue to invest in making our financial system stronger and more resilient. Markets now reflect a fairly positive view about overall economic prospects.
And there is a sense of change in the air. We’ve seen an increase in interest rates recently driven by international political developments and an increase in inflation expectations. To the extent that they presage longer-term changes in economic policy, they could perhaps affect the natural rate of interest and perhaps even the longer-term trend rate. Conclusion  Things do change. As I said at the start, I left this University at what even a 1970s Arts graduate could see was a pretty bleak period in UK economic and political history. It was by no means clear that the UK could ever wean itself off inflation. Indeed, the economics profession at the time had by no means reached a consensus on whether there was a long-run tradeoff between inflation and employment. Nor was it at all clear that supply side, structural reforms could ever happen, given the political economy at the time. And it was only a year after the UK’s first referendum on membership of the EU – which had generated quite a stir in the Students’ Union – and there was a lot of uncertainty as to where it all would lead us. I would certainly not have imagined that 40 years on anyone, let alone I, would be talking about getting inflation up to target and the problems of low interest rates.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Migration to electronic payments Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Payment System Forum 2013 “Migration to electronic payments”, Kuala Lumpur, 9 December 2013. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to welcome all of you to the Payment System Forum 2013 organized by Bank Negara Malaysia in collaboration with the Association of Banks in Malaysia (ABM) and the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM). Overview of the payment system forum The objectives of the Payment System Forum are: •  Firstly, to build greater awareness amongst the business community on the wide range of electronic payment solutions available in the market; and  •  Secondly, to showcase experiences by businesses who have successfully migrated to, and are reaping the benefits of, electronic payments. Besides featuring presentations by banks and payment system professionals, and the sharing of experiences by businesses, I am pleased to announce that the Payment System Forum has also brought together 27 exhibitors. The exhibitors comprise representatives of banks, payment service providers and government agencies who will showcase their electronic payment solutions. Members of the business community are encouraged to visit the exhibition booths located outside of this Auditorium and sign-up to the latest offers. Enhancing Malaysia’s payment system infrastructure An efficient, reliable and secure payment system is critical to the stability of a country’s financial system, besides contributing to a country’s economic growth and competitive position.
The VA is another explicitly countercyclical element of Solvency II that aims to mitigate the effect of exaggerations of bond spreads. Chart 3 shows the UK VA plotted against UK corporate bond spreads. From the end of 2019, the VA more than tripled to its peak of 50 basis points in March, coinciding with a rapid rise in credit spreads. As you can see, though, the increase in the VA, while large relative to its historical level, isn’t as large as the increase in corporate bond spreads. As spreads have moderated in the last few weeks the VA has also declined, though it still remains elevated by historical standards. As a result, while the VA provided some cushion against the rise in spreads, a significant amount of the market stress would have been passed through to insurers’ balance sheets. The final Solvency II measure that I would mention is the ladder of intervention, a tool we have yet to deploy in this crisis. This allows an insurer that fails to meet its SCR some time to work with the regulator to find a solution to restore their compliance with the SCR. We therefore see this as an additional tool to promote the safety and soundness of UK insurers and to protect policyholders by avoiding a “cliff-edge” effect of a winding-up. Life beyond Solvency II: some lessons learned from Covid-19  We will learn from the EIOPA 2020 review post Solvency II implementation. We will also learn a lot from this crisis.

These are changes that we could make relatively quickly and with a high-degree of confidence, rather than a wholesale reinvention. Any longer term changes or ‘rationalisation’ of the reporting package will need proper consideration in close conjunction with industry. The Bank’s central Data Team will also consider data collection mechanisms – the ‘how’, as well as the ‘what’ when it comes to collecting data. The changes that we implemented in March to allow delays to various aspects of Solvency II and PRAowned reporting were designed to reduce some of the operational pressure on firms due to Covid-19. Firms have told us that these flexibilities have been helpful. Any further reduction in reporting requirements will need to balance efficiency for firms, whilst still enabling us to collect the data we need to effectively supervise the industry. These areas for reform have been raised by industry on numerous occasions. It should not come as a surprise however that there are fundamental principles of the regime that we would seek to maintain. As I’ve said before, the principles of Solvency II – a whole balance sheet, market consistent approach to regulatory solvency, focus on good governance and risk management – remain valid. Looking forward: emerging supervisory priorities  Beyond Solvency II, the Insurance Supervision Directorate has a number of supervisory priorities that we are pursuing through firm supervisory programmes and cross-firm reviews.
Inflation in the first quarter of 2007, as foreseen, remained within the uncertainty band set around the path consistent with the target, whereas the decline in inflation stagnated in the last quarter due to both considerable increases in food prices, arising from drought as well as global conjuncture, and adjustments in administered prices. Thus, it has become obvious that the year-end inflation would remain outside the uncertainty band. Though the Central Bank has targeted the CPI inflation, it has pursued an effective communication strategy by referring to core measures at times of price movements beyond its control and pursued an effective communication strategy. In line with the positive outlook of inflation trend in prices excluding energy, food and administered prices, a measured rate cut cycle has been initiated in September 2007. Accordingly, the overnight borrowing rate was decreased by 175 basis points in total until the end of 2007, from 17.50 percent to 15.75 percent. The Central Bank has made significant progress over the last two years in terms of communication policy, transparency and accountability. Despite the fact that inflation remained above the path consistent with the target due to a series of supply-side shocks over the past two years, the inflation expectations for the next 12 and 24 months indicate low levels such as 6.1 and 5.2 percent, which have not been experienced for many years in our economy. This shows that inflation targeting regime has highly succeeded in managing expectations.

Luis M Linde: The exit from the crisis and the firming of the recovery in the euro area and in Spain Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Círculo de Economía, Barcelona, 13 November 2013. *  *  *  Let me begin by conveying my sincere thanks to the Círculo de Economía and to its Chairman – who is unable to accompany us – for the invitation to join you today. It offers me the opportunity to share with you some thoughts on the major issue our economy faces: the exit from the crisis and the conditions under which a recovery may firm. More than five years back now, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy triggered the most serious international economic crisis since the Second World War. It has severely affected growth and employment in the advanced economies and, among these, the European countries. At certain junctures, most particularly in summer last year, monetary union and the very process of European integration were subjected to serious tensions. But the latest economic indicators point to an incipient pick-up in activity in the euro area, and most international agencies and private analysts forecast a firming of economic growth over the next two years. To assess the scope of this turnaround, we should recall what were the underlying weaknesses over this long phase of crisis and recession. In the euro area, the crisis has most acutely affected those countries whose economies evidenced greater dependency on external funding (i.e.