samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
capable of both encouraging innovation, protecting adequately customers and maintaining the stability of our financial system. The upheavals experienced by the crypto ecosystem and the confidence crisis that has developed from the fallout clearly show from our financial stability authority stand point that the implementation of such confidence prone regulatory framework is urgently needed. Europe has led the way in this field, defining a new regulatory framework, known as MICA (Markets in Crypto Assets regulation). It is important that its implementation takes place as swiftly as possible, within a broader, international effort, building on the high-level recommendations developed by the FSB. 2/ Beyond supporting the development and adoption of a confidence prone regulatory framework we can also, as a central bank, play a positive operational role in revisiting the central bank money services we provide with the objective of adapting them to the digital age and the possible associated development of tokenised finance. This is the reason why in 2020, the Banque de France launched a large-scale experimentation program on wholesale CBDC with a number of market participants. This program has allowed us to understand better how DLTs work and the benefits that are likely to emerge for financial markets. Our main motivation is to extend the existing trust in our settlement infrastructure and assets to transactions carried out on DLTs. Their settlement in central bank money appears essential to guarantee the players in these markets against the counterparty risks inherent with other, private tokenised settlement assets.

But let me note first that, those collapses did have significant negative spillover effects within the crypto ecosystem, and second that, in attempting to replicate some of the functions performed by the mainstream financial system, the crypto ecosystem inherits and may amplify the vulnerabilities of that system. For instance, tokenisation increases operational risks, especially cyber risks. It is currently the number one operational risk to financial players, and it has the ability to jeopardise the stability of the entire financial system. The tokenisation of finance creates in particular new points of vulnerability: let me mention bridges between blockchains, or oracles that feed data to blockchains. In addition, the governance issues of public DLT infrastructures, which contribute greatly to the risk of hacking, are still far from being resolved. II/ Impact on our role and activities In response to these transformations, we see our role as twofold: as a financial stability authority to help bring tokenised finance within a regulatory framework which allows its benefits to be reaped but also its risks appropriately mastered to safeguard financial stability and therefore confidence. But we see ourselves as being part of the innovative ecosystem with the objective to act as a facilitator and catalyst, in our operational role of central bank services provider. 1/ Contributing to a confidence prone regulatory framework Fundamentally, what does not change in the financial sector is the need for confidence .
The third important area of work for the TMA will be to develop and promulgate codes and standards that are widely accepted by market participants, and in line with best international practices, to help the treasury markets function smoothly. The TMA will continue the work of the TMF in reviewing and developing codes and standards for the industry in the light of the development in the  BIS Review 4/2006  1  local, Mainland and overseas markets. One example of work in this area is documentation in Chinese, which will be essential as Hong Kong explores new business opportunities on the Mainland. 7. Lastly, for Hong Kong to aspire to be the preferred hub for treasury market businesses in the region, we need to market ourselves well. The TMA will therefore have to pay attention to publicity and communication, not just in Hong Kong but also in the region. It will be very important for the TMA in the years ahead to raise its profile, and strengthen and broaden the ties previously established by the TMF with counterparts in the major market centres around the world. 8. Establishment of the TMA allows a wide range of institutions and practitioners in the foreign exchange, money markets, debt, derivatives and other treasury markets to pool their efforts towards a common aim. While the TMA is newly established, I am glad to note that the financial institutions and money brokers have already joined as institutional members. The majority of the ACIHK members have also joined as individual members.

Joseph Yam: Establishment of the Treasury Markets Association Welcoming remarks by Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the inaugural ceremony of the Treasury Market Association, Hong Kong, 23 January 2006. *  *  *  Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. First of all, let me, as President of the Council of the Treasury Markets Association, welcome you all to this inauguration ceremony to celebrate the establishment of the Treasury Markets Association. The establishment of the TMA has the strong support of market participants. I am glad to learn that the Association has already successfully registered about 2,000 market practitioners and over 50 institutions as members. This strong membership provides a solid base for the Association to take forward its strategy and plans. 2. To maintain the status of Hong Kong as an international financial centre, a requirement specified in Article 109 of the Basic Law, I believe that it is important for us to have, among other things, treasury markets that are active, professional and efficient, and that operate in accordance with international standards. The volume of financial business in Hong Kong is enormous.
Further, our financial sector had no exposure to toxic assets, which led to the credit crunch in most developed  BIS Review 86/2009  1  markets. However, the current global financial crisis, with the subsequent global economic recession, has adversely affected Zambia, like most global economies, mainly through: reduced revenue earnings from mineral resources; job losses, particularly in the extractive industry; lower foreign capital inflow (both foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct investment (FDI)); rising domestic inflation driven by pass-through effects of the depreciation in the exchange rate of the Kwacha against major currencies; and declining number of foreign tourists. Revenue earnings from mineral resources As you may know, Your Excellencies, Zambia, like many African countries, relies heavily on commodity exports. This has made the country more vulnerable to the global downturn. The global financial crisis and the plummeting commodity prices on the international market have negatively affected Government revenue. The global economic recession has resulted in a reduction in world demand for copper, which in turn, has led to the precipitous fall in copper prices. Copper prices at the London Metal Exchange (LME) fell from highs of $ per tonne in July 2008 to as low as US $ per tonne in December, 2008. The dramatic decline in the price of copper has entailed reduced earnings from copper exports by mining companies and subsequently reduced earnings for the Government from mineral royalties and corporate taxes from this source as well as falling income taxes from employees in the mining and related sectors.

BIS Review 86/2009  5  For its part, the Bank of Zambia continues to closely monitor global developments and always stands ready to intervene in the local financial market with a view to prevent any systemic risks that may have negative effects on macroeconomic gains achieved thus far. Once again, Your Excellencies let me thank you most sincerely for this opportunity to discuss the challenges Zambia is facing in view of the current global economic crisis. I thank you. 6  BIS Review 86/2009
Timothy F Geithner: Hedge funds and their implications for the financial system Keynote address by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the National Conference on the Securities Industry, New York City, 17 November 2004. *  *  *  I want to use this opportunity to share some perspectives on hedge funds and the policy implications of their evolving role in the financial system. The term hedge fund is used to describe a diverse group of financial institutions, which together play an increasingly important role in our financial system. The rapid growth in their numbers and their assets under management suggests they provide, or are perceived to provide, significant economic value to investors that is not available in other investment vehicles. If hedge funds demonstrate continued value as investment vehicles, then given the relatively small share of the world’s savings they account for today, we could see meaningful further increases both in the aggregate size of the hedge fund sector and in the relative significance of their role in financial markets. In the conventional wisdom, hedge funds are conspicuous more for their perceived risks to the financial system than for the positive contribution they make to how financial markets function. In fact, however, they provide a variety of very positive contributions to our financial system. Hedge funds play a valuable arbitrage role in reducing or eliminating mispricing in financial markets.

Urban Bäckström: The Swedish economy Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, to the Swedish Shareholders’ Association, Stockholm, 27 November 2001. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to this evening’s meeting. I intend to talk about the Swedish economy and monetary policy. The past year has been marked by a successive weakening of economic activity in Sweden as well as abroad. Forecasters all over the world have made sizeable downward revisions to the prospects for growth both this year and next. Consider the picture of the economic future that Consensus Economics compiles once a month from the predictions of 200 professional observers. At the beginning of this year the combined assessment was that in 2001 and 2002, GDP growth in the United States and Sweden would amount to between 2.6 and 3.5 per cent. It was foreseen that the slowdown would be comparatively moderate and be followed by a quick recovery. Today, growth in the United States is judged to be just a modest 1 per cent or so this year and even weaker in 2002. In Sweden, GDP is now expected to rise 1.4 this year and 1.7 per cent next year. In other words, it now looks as though the slowdown will be both deeper and more protracted than many observers counted on less than a year ago.
Caruana Jaime, “The great financial crisis: lessons for the design of Central banks” (2010), (Speech given at Colloquium in honour of L.Papademos, ECB, Frankfurt). 5. Carosio Giovanni, (2010), “Financial Stability and Macro-Prudential Supervision: Challenges for Central Banks” (OeNB – 38th Economic Conference). 6. Geraats M. Petra (2010), “Price and Financial Stability: Dual or Duelling Mandates?” (Paper for the 38th Economics Conference of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank). 7. Greenspan Alan (2010), “The Crisis” (Second Draft paper). 8. Hannoun Herve (2010), “Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework”, (speech prepared for 45th SEACEN Governors Conference, Siem Reap province, Cambodia). 9. Haldane G. Andrew (2010), “The $ billion question” Bank of England. BIS Review 90/2010  9  10. Krugman R. Paul, The Return of Depression Economics and Crisis of 2008. 11. Miles David (2009), Bank of England, “The Future Financial Landscape”. 12. “Macroprudential instruments and frameworks: a stocktaking of issues and experiences” (CGFS Papers, No 38, 2010). 13. Orphanides Athanasios (2010), “Monetary Policy Lessons from the Crisis” (Paper for the 38th Economics Conference of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank). 14. Tarullo K. Daniel (2010), “Financial Regulatory Reform” (remarks given at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, New York). 15. White William (2009), “Modern Macroeconomics is on the Wrong Track”, (Finance and Development, December 2009). 10  BIS Review 90/2010

Moreover, the small size of the domestic labour market and the extent of migration in and out of the country in past years suggest that in the event of an external shock specific to Malta, the labour market is sufficiently flexible to adapt. On a number of counts, in fact, labour market indicators are already comparable to those of the euro area. The resemblance is not complete, but further progress in this regard is to be expected as public sector employment is downsized further and as the structural reform programme continues to unfold. A similar conclusion emerges from a comparison with the euro area of the structure of the domestic financial sector and indicators of real convergence; the degree of similarity is already significant, although there remains scope for some catching up with respect to income and price levels. As far as fiscal policy is concerned, this has rarely been used for fine tuning purposes in Malta. If anything, the disciplinary mechanisms of EMU should serve to reverse the current trend of negative balances, allowing fiscal policy to respond to the needs of the economy and leaving monetary policy to focus more on price stability. As for the exchange rate, by pegging the Maltese lira to a basket of currencies, which is recognized as being the preferred regime for a small, open economy, the monetary authorities have long since given up the exchange rate as a tool of adjustment.
Since the housing component reflects an important share of the cost of living for households, it is natural to include it. Also, the CPI including mortgage costs is a more stable gauge of inflation than if they are excluded. House prices are a leading indicator as well. A sharp rise signals private consumption growth later on, enabling the Bank to respond more quickly to demand pressures. Finally, if the housing component were removed from the index now, inflation would probably measure higher than otherwise in the period ahead, assuming that house prices increase by less than the general price level, as has been forecast for some time. Thus it is difficult to envisage the gains from removing the housing component now. A more obvious measure would be to make it easier for the Central Bank to impact mortgage interest rates, as I discussed earlier. A cap on the policy interest rate differential with abroad would merely cause problems. Simply consider what would have happened had Iceland not been allowed to set its policy rate more than two percentage points higher than the ECB in recent times – which is the differential proposed by the Confederation of Employers. It is almost certain that Iceland  4  BIS Review 111/2007  would be struggling with very high inflation and all the disruption this would entail. Precluding such consequences would have called for a draconian fiscal stance and constraints on wage rises.

This is reflected in a stronger króna than otherwise, which other things being equal delays the adjustment of the current account deficit. Nonetheless, it is impossible to demonstrate that monetary policy is impotent. Anecdotal evidence about households and businesses being squeezed by high interest rates confirms that the opposite is true. Monetary policy does work, and will eventually impact demand and thereby the current account deficit. Inflation soared in the recent term to peak at 8½% just after mid-2006, as I mentioned before. The Central Bank made a particularly sharp response to the deteriorating inflation outlook last year with a large hike in the policy rate on the back of sizeable earlier increases. There is no question that the tight monetary stance entailed by these measures reversed the development and drove inflation down, as subsequent data have shown. In its Monetary Bulletin published in July this year, the Central Bank forecast that inflation would be close to target in 2008 and it would be attained in full in 2009. Of course events are unfolding in this way as a result of the tight monetary stance and it is absurd to claim otherwise. It can even be argued that the Bank should be criticised instead for not raising rates enough and quickly  BIS Review 111/2007  3  enough. I am referring here to the shortcomings I mentioned in the transmission of policy rate hikes and insufficient restraint in other areas of the economy. A tighter Central Bank monetary stance makes borrowing more expensive.
Lucas Papademos: Assessment of identified risks to the euro area financial system and the capacity to absorb disturbances Opening remarks by Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice President of the European Central Bank, at the press briefing on the occasion of the publication of the June 2010 ECB Financial Stability Review, Frankfurt am Main, 31 May 2010. * I. *  *  Introduction  My colleagues and I would like to welcome you to today’s press briefing on the occasion of the publication of the June 2010 edition of the ECB Financial Stability Review. 1 The primary objective of the Review is to identify the main sources of risk to the stability of the euro area financial system and provide a comprehensive assessment of the capacity of the financial system to absorb adverse disturbances. The Review integrates the interdepartmental work of the ECB with that of the Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) of the ESCB. It contains 16 boxes and five special feature articles that address topical financial stability issues in a more focused and analytical manner. As in the past, we have prepared a summary note that contains some key messages of our analysis and assessment. In my presentation, I will highlight the seven main risks and vulnerabilities identified and assessed in the FSR (slide 3) and the associated financial stability challenges. Four of these risks stem from outside the euro area financial system, while the other three originate from within the financial sector. II.

Because the Federal Reserve is such a critical player in the market, it is important that it not create unnecessary uncertainty. That is, the Federal Reserve has a responsibility to be as transparent as possible in the conduct of its monetary policy. Since February 1994, there have been direct and immediate announcements following FOMC meetings of the Committee’s policy decisions, which, in my view, have helped remove uncertainty. In addition, in implementing monetary policy through its trading role, the Open Market Desk has made numerous changes in recent years to add clarity and transparency to its day-to-day market interventions. The thrust of these changes has been to reduce uncertainty and enhance the price discovery process in the Treasury market. As to the Federal Reserve’s responsibility for ensuring that banks support the trading process by making sound credit decisions, let’s not forget that, despite the increase in market players, banks in the United States, as elsewhere, continue to play an extremely important role in the financial markets. Not only do banks often underwrite bond issues and structure hedging instruments for BIS Review 108/1998  –4–  these bonds, but they also provide much of the financing that allows market makers to take positions. Dealers in the U.S. bond markets finance themselves through repurchase agreements with bank counterparties. In many cases, banks are also the source of backup liquidity. It is in these ways that bank credit supports the price discovery process.
Malaysia 's own experience in managing the financial crisis in our part of the world over 1997-1998 was that a decisive and comprehensive response at an early stage of the crisis not only produced an early recovery but it also reduced the cost of the crisis on the financial system and the economy. The crisis was a defining moment for Bank Negara Malaysia . The Bank's efforts to sustain stability did not end when the Asian financial crisis abated, and when economic recovery was firmly in place. The key lesson was that foundations for resilience are built during the good times. Once stability was restored, the Bank therefore embarked on a comprehensive restructuring and reform of the financial sector. This included the aggressive development of the domestic financial markets and the strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory oversight. This has been reinforced by a higher level of regional cooperation and collaboration. Therefore, it is not what we are currently doing to cope with this international financial crisis but the efforts that have been undertaken over several years that have ensured the resilience of our financial system during these most challenging of times. Over the course of these recent months, we have witnessed the introduction of massive fiscal stimulus packages, sweeping proposals for regulatory reforms and various unorthodox policy measures being introduced to stabilise and restore market confidence in the financial system. Whilst these measures were necessary and have contributed towards some stabilisation in global financial markets, more importantly is the long-term sustainability of this trend.

10  Over the three year period 2008–2010, HBoS incurred losses of £ This amounted to around 5% of its 2008 risk weighted assets £ on a Basel III basis). In the same period, RBS incurred losses on trading activities and impairments on all assets totalling £ or 5% risk weighted assets £ on Basel III basis). These banks failed because they entered the crisis with very low capital strength. On a Basel III basis, RBS is estimated to have had a CET1 ratio of just 1.97% at end 2007. HBoS had 4.1%. See FSA (2011) and Bank of England/FCA (2015). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  That’s why, although they are well meaning, mandatory restrictions on distributions of dividends, coupons and pay when capital buffers are used can have a perverse effect. They create incentives to avoid dipping into capital buffers by taking actions that have broader economic effects. 11 Our baseline standards mean the biggest banks will be subject to a baseline capital buffer of nearly 5% of risk weighted assets, sitting on top of an 8.5% hard floor for tier 1 capital (see table 1). 12 A buffer of 5% goes beyond agreed international standards. Basel III sets a minimum buffer of 2.5% for all banks (the conservation buffer) and supplements it only for banks of global importance. We are intending to go further for big banks of domestic importance, just as the United States is going further on capital buffers for its largest banks.