samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Smith, R.D (2006), “Responding to global infectious disease outbreaks: Lessons from SARS on the role of risk perception, communication and management”, Journal of Social Science and Medicine, 63, 3113-3123. Tilman, D (1999), “The ecological consequences of changes in biodiversity: A search for general principles”, Ecological Society of America, Vol. 80, No. 5: 1455-1474. Voute, A.D (1946), “Regulation of the density of the insect populations in virgin forests and cultivated woods”, Archives Neerlandaises de Zoologie, 7, 435-470. Watts, D (2002), “A simple model of global cascades on random networks”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 9: 5766-5771. Watts, D.J and Strogatz, S.H (1998), “Collective dynamics of 'small-world' networks”, Nature 393 (6684): 409–10. Wheelis, M (2002), “Biological warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa”, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 8, No.9. Worm, B, Barbier, E.B, Beaumont, N, Emmett Duffy, Folke C, Halpern, B.S, Jackson, J.B.C, Lotze, H.K, Micheli, F, Palumbi, S.R, Sala, E, Selkoe, K.A and Stachowicz, J.J (2006), “Impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services”, Science, Vol. 314: 787790.

One of the aims of the merger is to be better positioned to compete with global companies. New market entrants and lower entry barriers promote competition, but there are other mechanisms that could weaken competition in the longer term. One example is if one or a small number of multinationals become dominant payment service providers at the global level. The key words are digital platforms and network effects. Marketplaces such as stock exchanges and shopping centres have existed for a long time. But digital marketplaces, known as platforms, are far more scalable. Well-known examples of digital platforms are Google, Facebook and the classified ad portal Finn.no. These platforms achieve competitive advantage by gathering information about customers, eliminating time-consuming tasks and simplifying users’ everyday lives. Platforms have network effects. Competition can be impaired if platform companies exploit their market power. A large user base makes it profitable for other service providers to develop complementary services. Because of network effects, dominant platforms can achieve a nearmonopoly position. Operators that control parts of the payment infrastructure can shut out competitors. For instance, Apple Pay is the only option for contactless payments based on near-field communication (NFC), using Apple’s iPhones. A number of countries are considering whether this constitutes abuse of a dominant market position. In Norway, this would be a matter for the competition authorities. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Payment solutions should build on a common underlying infrastructure that enables payments to be carried out swiftly, safely and at low cost.
What this argument suggests is that economists should be cautious about drawing strong conclusions about the future path of productivity growth. The changes in technology are real and evident in many aspects of our home and business lives. But their implications for aggregate productivity growth are much more uncertain. The two uncertainties facing the UK economy at present, namely the imbalances both at home and overseas, suggest that the Monetary Policy Committee may be in for a slightly bumpier ride over the next four years than during its first four. So far, the Monetary Policy Committee has managed to achieve an overall balance in the economy despite the contrasting fortunes of the internationally exposed and more sheltered sectors of the economy. But if these large imbalances are to unwind, then the Committee is likely to face a difficult challenge in trying to maintain a balance between total demand and supply. Controlling inflation in future may prove more difficult than over the past four years, and the longer the imbalances persist the greater the risk that the subsequent adjustments to demand, output and inflation are larger than those experienced recently. Any rebalancing of the economy is likely to be associated with a fall in the real exchange rate. But the magnitude and timing of that are not only uncertain, but also difficult for the MPC to influence. As Sir Samuel Brittan wrote recently about expected changes in exchange rates: "These developments are most likely to happen when they are least expected and least welcome".

This included powers to resolve non-viable financial institutions and powers to direct specific institutions running systemic risks to take measures to reduce those risks. These powers are in addition to the Bank’s regulatory and supervisory powers over banks and insurers. Having such powers is useful in a crisis. But the ability to operationalise them can be a whole different matter that requires greater attention to forethought and scenario-planning. Fourth, authorities need to increase policy agility. Every crisis or financial stability issue is different, and each requires a different policy response. The pressure will be on authorities to be able to respond to an infinite variety of problems, which are very rarely understood clearly at the onset, and which often evolve rapidly. Going forward, long-standing policy frameworks are likely to come under increasing pressure, simply because they are not built to respond to the intensity and pace of change taking place in the financial system. I believe the solution lies not in building new frameworks, but in strengthening institutional foundations which allow for more nimble frameworks to emerge. Such foundations include clear decision authorities, credible analysis to support decision-making, effective policy feedback loops and strong monitoring and accountability frameworks. Equally important is the ability to react to unplanned events given the inherent difficulties in predicting market behaviour, especially further out in time. Managing financial stability will ultimately require authorities to walk a fine balance.
Strangely, in the euro area, growth and inflation are moving in opposite directions. As growth accelerates, inflation keeps going down. This “disconnect” in the Philips curve is puzzling. We must look, then, at the broader picture. Euro area economies have attracted strong capital inflows over the recent months, with two opposite effects on financial conditions: first, easing through lower long-term interest rates. And, second, an appreciation of the euro exchange rate. It’s not clear whether the overall effect is positive. While nominal conditions are more accommodating in euro area than in the US, real indicators point to a more restrictive stance. We may see a perverse feedback loop develop, with low inflation, increasing real rates, capital inflows and exchange rate appreciation mutually fuelling each other. The financial economy may be heading towards a bad equilibrium that would threaten the real economic recovery. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The situation called for an appropriate policy response and, as you know, the Governing Council has agreed last month on a strong package of four significant measures. First the refinancing and deposit rates have both been reduced – bringing the deposit rate into negative territory for the first time. Second, the ordinary regime of unlimited liquidity provision has been extended to the end of 2016. Third, the Eurosystem will conduct a new set of targeted longer-term refinancing operations.

Recent forecasts put German growth at more than 2%, Italy in positive territory, and the outlook for France has improved markedly. Growth of business activity in the euro area in April was the highest in the past three years. But the crisis has left an important legacy:   Money and financial markets remain excessively segmented. The monetary transmission mechanism is severely impaired and credit conditions are still very different across countries and sectors.   Deleveraging in the banking sector still acts as an impediment to recovery and growth. Bank credit remains flat in the euro area as a whole, and SMEs’ financing is a major concern, especially in stressed countries, where the percentage of financially constrained but viable borrowers is estimated at 25% vs 1% in “core” countries. We are very aware that balance sheet repair is a prerequisite for credit to resume and for monetary policy to be efficient. So, we are addressing the problem as a priority. 1. We are building a safer and more robust system of financial intermediation. A major step has been the creation of a banking union that, as you all know, will delink bank and sovereign risks and ensure a harmonised and tough financial supervision. It is easy to underestimate this achievement. The idea was adopted less than two years ago. The Single Supervisory Mechanism is now up and running. There is no example in contemporary European history when so much has been achieved in so little time. 2.
The accountancy profession is very much under the microscope at the moment, as part of the rash of Enronitis which fills the pages of the press. I want to touch on Enron at the end of my talk here tonight, since it raises a number of issues of relevance to us at the Bank in our broader financial stability role. Maintaining monetary stability I turn first though to the Bank's role of maintaining monetary stability. The current institutional arrangements were put in place in May 1997, when the Chancellor established the Monetary Policy Committee. The MPC's target is extremely clear, and - I hope - well known. We aim for 2½% inflation in retail prices (excluding mortgage payments) at all times. That target is set by the Government. And it is symmetric: that is to say, we worry as much about being below the target as we do about being above it. That makes sense because the problems of severe deflation are just as great as the problems of severe inflation. Since the inception of the MPC, RPIX inflation has been extremely stable by historical standards, and close to target. Some commentators have suggested we have had more than our fair share of luck in achieving this outcome. There may well be some truth in that. But I'm not sure that we should be too surprised. Market and survey evidence shows that people are now clear that the MPC will do what it takes to keep inflation on track.

Enron had extensive links with banks and other financial firms, mediated in part through the use of relatively new credit risk transfer instruments. Tracing these exposures through to their ultimate owners is not a particularly straightforward business - an issue that we at the Bank have been raising in a macro-prudential context for some time now, most recently in our December Financial Stability Review. But on current information, the residual exposures do not appear unmanageable. Indeed, the apparent dispersion of exposures may even turn out to demonstrate the effectiveness of these markets in spreading risk. BIS Review 18/2002  3  The Bank does not have any direct locus on the accounting and corporate governance issues raised by the case. But the way in which firms' financial performance is overseen and presented does have an important bearing on the disciplines applied by financial markets, which are an essential component of maintaining financial stability in the wider sense. Public confidence in financial statements and the role of auditors is critical. One set of issues relates to the appropriateness of accounting rules governing the treatment of special purpose vehicles and those relating to revenue recognition. This is a technical area, and one in which the rules applied in the US and the UK are relevantly different. No doubt the appropriate professional bodies will be looking at these questions. Another set of issues relates to rules and practice governing the appointment of auditors, and the extent and nature of non-audit work carried out by firms' auditors.
Unlike the 1980s, the build up of debt in recent years has been in an environment of low inflation and low interest rates. The interest ratio, that is, interest expenditure as a share of disposable incomes, is much lower now than it was then. Although the level of households' debt ratios is not necessarily worrying, it is nevertheless the case that a borrowing level rising by more than 10 per cent a year is not sustainable in the long term. In the long term it needs to come down and be more in line with nominal disposable incomes. The Riksbank is assuming that household borrowing will continue to increase, but at a slower rate than before. The fact that interest rates have been raised contributes to this, as does the fact that economic activity is entering a calmer phase. The interest ratio has recently begun to rise but is still at an historically low level. The expected  BIS Review 60/2008  1  slowdown in household borrowing will mean that the interest ratio also increases at a slower rate in future (see figure 3). The chances are good that household borrowing and house prices will have a soft landing. Although borrowing is still increasing at a rapid rate, there has nevertheless been some slackening and this is expected to continue. House prices fell slightly in the first quarter of this year compared with the final quarter of last year. However, on an annual basis the increase was just over seven per cent.

European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the press conference, held in Frankfurt, 7 March 2002. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I will now report on the outcome of today's meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB. First of all, we were pleased to see that the euro cash changeover went so smoothly – more smoothly in fact than we could have hoped. The European public very quickly became familiar with the new banknotes and coins, as is shown by the fact that national banknotes were largely withdrawn well before the final deadline of their ceasing to be legal tender. The Governing Council wishes to express its gratitude once more to all those who helped to make the euro cash changeover such a success. As usual, at today's meeting we examined recent monetary, financial and economic developments. The Governing Council concluded that the information which had become available in recent weeks confirmed that the current level of key ECB interest rates remains appropriate for the maintenance of price stability over the medium term. Against this background, the Governing Council decided to leave the key ECB interest rates unchanged.
Despite this contraction in number, the remaining firms have continued to grow and thrive, and now have assets totaling $ billion, which is an increase of about 30 percent. Community banks are much stronger financially today. In 2009, troubled assets were 26 percent of capital, primarily reflecting a large volume of construction lending. That ratio has declined significantly, to 8.5 percent today— demonstrating that community bank leaders have the capacity to take action, effectively work out troubled assets, and generate capital. These data tell a welcome story regarding your ability to successfully conduct business through the economic recovery. So, where does the industry go from here and what challenges lie ahead? That is the theme of today’s conference, and I expect a robust and enlightening series of discussions from both panelists and presenters. From my perspective, there are two challenges that I would highlight: ongoing advances in technology, and interest rate risk. First, major technological changes are compelling banks to embrace technology to better meet the needs of their customers. Today’s customer expects increased digital access, and a bank’s failure to advance technologically would be very damaging for its franchise value. But, the use of new technology comes with its own risks that require significant investment and attention— especially around cybersecurity. Second, in today’s low interest rate environment, we have observed that some community banks have taken on more interest rate risk by increasing the maturity of their assets and the average duration of their loan portfolios.

Nicolai Tangen took up the position of CEO on 1 September, and I would now like to give the floor to Nicolai. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
This underlines the importance of policy coordination at international level for effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and to reduce the magnitude of the transition costs. Obviously a world with differing sensibilities and environmental policies poses significant challenges. In particular, there is a risk of a significant “carbon leakage” towards countries that decide to adopt a more gradual transition path. Also, in the absence of sufficient coordination, there is a risk that unilateral measures may hamper trade and the functioning of the world economy, with the consequent loss of global welfare. In this respect, in the sphere of central banks and bank supervisors, I wish to highlight the coordination carried out by the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which the Banco de España joined in 2018. Meanwhile, the Basel Committee on Banking  4  This is precisely the essence of the proposed Carbon Dividend Act promoted by the Climate Leadership Council, which states that “a carbon tax offers the most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions at the scale and speed that is necessary”.

•  In 1996, the Bank of Zambia attempted to jumpstart secondary market trading in Government securities by restricting the primary issues of Government securities to commercial banks. It was expected that commercial banks would take up the role of market-making. This did not materialize with most commercial banks preferring to buy and hold the securities until maturity. Consequently, authorities were obliged to re-open the primary market to other non-bank investors. •  Further, since 1998, Government bonds have been listed for trading at the Lusaka Stock Exchange. The benefits have not been realised despite the fact that all banks are registered as brokers in this respect. I am sure the LUSE will provide you with more detail on this as you deliberate. •  More recently, the Government and the Bank of Zambia in 2006, with the support of DIFID and the World Bank undertook a study tour of selected emerging markets in Africa and Asia. The aim of this tour was to learn the actual workings of well functioning government securities markets. Technical information was collected and a report prepared. Once the recommendations in that report have been adopted, I expect that these will complement your own efforts to activate secondary market trading. I am aware that the successful development of a secondary market needs a reliable and efficient settlement infrastructure. This is important for it addresses the concern that is normally raised on the possibilities of settlement risk.
This “recovery” has been much weaker than previous cyclical upswings – and according to the recently published May Inflation Report projections, output is more likely than not to remain below its pre-crisis level for another year or so. There has recently been a lot of discussion about whether the UK has suffered a double-dip recession or not. But to focus on whether growth is a bit negative or a bit positive is to use the wrong reference point. Trend growth should be more like 0.6% a quarter and we have only had five quarters of growth at that rate or higher in the 21 quarters since the start of 2008. There had been no such weak period in the UK since quarterly GDP data were first published in 1955. Even compared with previous examples of financial crisis – whether at home or abroad – the UK economy has been puzzlingly weak for a long time. I want to take the opportunity today to offer a possible explanation that at least fits some of the data. Much of what follows has been used as a narrative in recent Inflation Reports. It is as if the different groups within our society – households, businesses, banks and the Government – have all decided that their future financial positions, on average, will be worse than they thought before the crisis. As economists, we would say “a reduction in estimated permanent income”. I will come back to reasons why, but, given that premise, we can explain much of what is happening.

ii) Impact Tolerances The second is the requirement for firms to set impact tolerances for their IBS. Here, we expect firms to assume that disruption to IBS will occur and then set clearly defined time-based metrics, and well defined thresholds, at which the disruption would threaten regulatory objectives. iii) Mapping and Testing The third area is, following the identification of IBS and setting impact tolerances, we expect firms to perform mapping and testing so they are able to demonstrate their ability to stay within their impact tolerances. Firms’ testing strategies should incorporate the risks and vulnerabilities they will face in severe but plausible scenarios and then demonstrate how they will remediate any disruption in a timely manner. The experience gained from this testing can then inform how firms monitor risks to their operational resilience and increase the maturity of their overall processes. Policy interactions For the recent March 2022 deadline, firms had to meet the first two of these elements, namely identifying the IBS and setting impact tolerances. Looking ahead to the next key deadline, which is in 2025, firms will have to prove that they are able to remain within the impact tolerances that they have set out, and this is where the assurance gained from high quality testing will be key. I would also like to highlight the interaction of these expectations with the PRA’s outsourcing and third party risk management policy2, which was published at the same time as the policy on Op Res.