samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In that sense we may be a victim of our own success on the exchange rate front, although I would not wish to place too much weight on this point - it may be a viable alternative only for a minority. However, if funding needs can be properly satisfied via alternative routes, we ought perhaps to rest content. Our role at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority is to help ensure that the infrastructure will allow the market to develop if borrowers and lenders wish it to, rather than to force the pace artificially. I believe, however, that there may be a stronger underlying interest in debt instruments among prospective borrowers and lenders than is currently visible on the surface. The move to list Exchange Fund notes on the Stock Exchange and the advent of the Mandatory Provident Fund are examples of potential significant new sources of demand for debt instruments. It is a challenge for all of us to identify and exploit these and any other pockets of latent interest. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority is in regular dialogue with the Hong Kong Capital Markets Association and we maintain an open mind, and an even more open ear, to ideas which people like you may have about the development of our markets. I should mention that we have regular contact also with the authorities of other centres in the region in order that we can gain from each other’s experience in such matters.

5 After four years of low or negative growth, the economy expanded by more than 3% in each year since 2005. At 6.5% the unemployment rate is at its lowest level in eight years, and the annual rate of change in productivity has returned to more acceptable levels after years of negative or marginal growth. Reflecting this general improvement, macroeconomic imbalances have also declined. The fiscal deficit contracted from almost 8% of GDP in 1999 to an estimated 1.6% in 2007 and the public debt/GDP ratio has gone down to 63% from a peak of 73% in 2004. The other Maastricht criteria, of course, were all met in good time and in a sustainable manner. Meanwhile, the current account deficit dropped from the 6 - 8% range in the first years after EU accession to around 3% in 2007, and is expected to drop further as the fiscal consolidation programme continues to unfold. At the same time, the private sector appears to have adjusted well to the changing composition of domestic and external demand. Not only has there been a shift away from public sector employment to private services - the share of the public sector in employment shed five percentage points to 30%since 2000 - but there has also been a move away from low value manufacturing activities to skills based services.
Timothy F Geithner: Global economic and financial integration – some implications for central banking Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Columbia Business School Center on Japanese Economy and Business' 20th Anniversary Conference, Columbia University, New York City, 26 October 2006. *  *  *  Thank you. This is a time of remarkable evolution in the world economy. The share of the world’s population exposed to the opportunities and pressures of economic and financial integration is higher now than ever before. While we almost certainly do not fully understand the precise implications of this process for long-run global growth and welfare, we know that the gains to global growth and welfare have the potential to be large and pervasive. To acknowledge this potential is to acknowledge the merits of investing substantial intellectual capital into strengthening our understanding of the policy challenges and implications of global economic and financial integration. Compared to even a decade ago, world financial and product markets are significantly more integrated. Trade is a substantially larger and rising share of GDP, and the share of goods and services that constitute the “tradable” sector is increasing. Cross-border flows of real and financial capital have also increased dramatically - a reflection of the recent notable reduction in the degree of home bias in capital markets.

CBRT Interest Rates (Percent) Non-CBRT Average O/N Funding Rate in BIST CBRT Average Funding Rate 1 Week Repo Rate Late Liquidity Window  14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6  02.17  01.17  12.16  11.16  10.16  09.16  08.16  07.16  06.16  05.16  04.16  03.16  02.16  01.16  5  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. I would like to underline that the recent policy we have been implementing is not equivalent to the previous discretionary monetary policy under a flexible corridor framework where the policy stance shifted at daily and weekly frequencies. This is a clear and stable policy tightening which will be preserved until we see a considerable improvement in medium term inflation dynamics. The significant tightening in the monetary policy stance can also be observed directly by looking at the yield curves. The left side figure shown below compares the most recent yield curve with the one materialized in early January, right before the CBRT response (Figure 13). It is clear that the short-end has shifted up and the longer-end has fallen, which is a typical response after a credible monetary tightening. As another indicator of the monetary tightening in time dimension, the 9  right side figure below shows the evolution of the slope of the yield curve at the cross currency swap market, which also clearly reveals a flattening in the yield curve (Figure 14). Figure 13. Figure 14.
At the same time, the financing of this process required huge flows of funds which, given the insufficiency of domestic saving, had to be met by turning to foreign saving, channelled to Spanish households and firms by credit institutions. Behind this whole process lay a real estate sector growing at an excessive pace in terms of both houses built and house prices. The excessive surge in construction was unquestionably fuelled by low interest rates and the practically unlimited supply of financing provided by foreign saving. The sound fiscal performance by the Spanish economy before the crisis, between 2005 and 2007, masked the actual situation of public finances which were distorted by extraordinary revenue of a strictly temporary nature, linked to the exuberant real estate sector. These abundant inflows discouraged the adoption of the necessary public expenditure rationalisation and control measures needed in both central and regional government. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In short, the path followed by the Spanish economy in those years brought about substantial macroeconomic imbalances which crystallised in, among other things, a large external deficit and a sudden sharp rise in total external debt, both of which reached highs in 2007–2008. Finally and inevitably a far-reaching adjustment took place, unfortunately amid the turmoil of the international financial crisis.

21  Moreover, average real household income has risen by almost 15% since the turn of the millennium. This can also produce a rise in demand for more and/or better quality housing, with an associated increase in the demand for mortgage loans. Page 11/16  However, momentum on the mortgage and real estate markets has been considerably stronger in recent years than can be explained by such fundamental developments. The ratio between the volume of outstanding mortgage loans and nominal gross domestic product (GDP) since 2000 has risen from 110% to some 145% (cf. slide 21). Lending has thus grown significantly faster than income in recent years. At the same time, we can observe increasing risk appetite among banks in their lending business. This is because banks’ income from interest rate differential business is suffering due to the low interest rates. By taking higher risks – in particular in mortgage lending – banks are able to counter this decline in income in the short term. Yet, this exacerbates their susceptibility to negative developments on the real estate and mortgage markets or to an unexpected sharp interest rate rise. Given the potentially far-reaching negative effects of a debt crisis as outlined in the second part of this speech, it is clear why the SNB has been carefully monitoring these developments for some time and pointing out the associated risks. Should central banks use interest rates to curb excesses on the credit market? But what should central banks do to counter excesses on the credit market?
Under this approach, the supervisory and regulatory agencies would maintain most data collection and analysis, with some enhanced authority along the lines I have suggested. Coordination would be committed to the council, which could also have authority to establish information collection  BIS Review 16/2010  19  requirements beyond those conducted by its member agencies when necessary to monitor systemic risk. This approach might achieve the benefits of the current arrangement and the proposed independent agency, while avoiding their drawbacks. The council would be directed to seek to resolve conflicts among the agencies in a way that would preserve nimbleness, and it could recommend that an agency develop new types of data, but it would leave the details of data collection and analysis to the agencies that are closest to the relevant firms and markets. And while this council of financial supervisors could act independently if needed to collect information necessary to monitor the potential buildup of systemic risk, it would benefit directly from the knowledge and experience of the financial supervisors and regulators represented on the council. The council could also have access to the data collected by all its agencies and, depending on the staffing decisions, could either coordinate or conduct systemic risk analyses. Conclusion Let me close by thanking you once again for your attention to the important topic of ensuring the availability of the information necessary to monitor emergent systemic risks and establish effective macro-prudential supervisory oversight. As you know, these tasks will not be easy.

So much of the funding now in the Irish property market is not coming from mortgages. You give the example of global institutional investors. What is driving the overall pricing of housing, also rental accommodation and so on, is not the mortgage situation in Ireland. Those global factors will be there no matter what happens to these mortgage rates in Ireland. It’s a very important issue for the individual in terms of coping with the mortgage they face. But in terms of saying this will somehow contribute to a repricing of the value of property, I don’t think that’s how it will work. We’ve just had an election. We probably won’t have a government for some time. What economic advice would you give to any incoming government? Every six weeks when we make our monetary policy statement, the last part of our statement essentially gives the list of our advice. One thing is that we do think the European economy will be better off the more governments do to improve the functioning of the economy. There is a long list of recommendations, called the country-specific recommendations that the European Commission offers to the member countries. Ireland has a long list in terms of improving infrastructure, productivity, etc. There are many dimensions to it, but I think everyone can identify 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  the same list. We also say that those countries with a strong enough fiscal position can do more to raise the level of economic activity in the euro area.
This time mismatch between the costs and benefits of reform is a prime reason why they are hard to sell. And where the costs and benefits accrue to different segments of the economy, the difficulty of instilling reforms is exacerbated since it is hard to create satisfactory compensation schemes while those who lose out tend to be concentrated and thus more effective in organizing opposition to the reform. Next, even if the obstacles to selling the reforms have been overcome, one of the most important issue that follows is the proper pace and sequencing of structural reform. In the context of financial sector reforms, for example, the underlying challenge is the proper mitigation of the additional risks that are injected into the financial system as markets develop and become more sophisticated. These risks consist of both financial risks borne by market participants as well as macroeconomic risks that may be associated with greater financial market volatility. Hence, the consensus on the importance of structural reform efforts does not carry over with the same strength to the issue of the appropriate pace and sequencing of policy changes. And finally, in the context of emerging market, the main stumbling block for structural reforms is the high degree of political fragmentation. The need to accommodate many, and sometimes conflicting, interests not only slows the reform process but often leads to compromised solutions that fail to address the original underlying goal of the reform.

Austin Mwape: Improving financial transactions in Zambia Speech by Dr Austin Mwape, Deputy Governor-Operations of the Bank of Zambia, at the Official Launch of “Airtel Money”, Lusaka, 14 September 2011. *  *  *  The Managing Director of Airtel – Mr Fayaz King The Former First Lady, Mrs. Maureen Mwanawasa Management and Staff of Airtel Chief Executive Officers and Representatives of various institutions present Distinguished invited guests Members of the press Ladies and Gentlemen Let me begin by thanking the management of Airtel for inviting me to this occasion, which marks the official launch of “Airtel Money” and may I also thank the Managing Director of Airtel, Mr. Fayaz King, for inviting me to speak at this important occasion. As has already been stated, Airtel Money will provide an electronic wallet that will enable customers to make different types of commercial transactions conveniently, quickly and safely. Customers will be able to make person to person payments, make purchases and pay various utility bills using this product. Airtel Money will certainly contribute to improving the way in which we transact and will also provide an efficient tool that will give Airtel customers the ability to carry out financial transactions from the comfort of their own homes. As you may be aware, the Bank of Zambia in consultation with key stakeholders has put in place an enabling environment to promote the development of modern payment systems in Zambia.
The second reason why recovery is likely to be slow after a banking crisis, highlighted by those such as Richard Koo (2003), is that the excess debt and investments built up in the preceding period of over-optimism need to be worked off. And that process of balance sheet repair – by households, businesses and financial institutions – typically takes time and involves a period of subdued demand unless the spending of other, less indebted, agents rises to compensate. Unlike some other countries which saw substantial rises in house prices during the years preceding the crisis, the United Kingdom did not see a major boom in residential construction (Broadbent, 2012). As a result, the overhang of unsold properties needing to be worked off was much smaller here than in, say, the United States or Spain. Even so, households that had taken out relatively large mortgages might have been more inclined to cut back their spending when conditions deteriorated in 2008–9 as the financial crisis worsened. Some support for this hypothesis is provided in Chart 4, which exploits microeconomic data from the Living Costs and Food Survey to examine consumption patterns by income quartile, split by the indebtedness of households. It is striking that the sharpest falls in consumption were seen amongst high income, highly indebted households, though there may be other explanations for this too. The most important process of balance sheet repair is, though, taking place within the financial sector itself.

Chart 2: Capital and leverage ratios of major global banks(a) Chart 2a: Risk-based capital ratios, end-2006 Per cent  Chart 2b: Leverage ratios, end-2006(b) Per cent  16 Surviving banks Failed banks  14  16 Surviving banks  14  Failed banks  12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  Sources: Capital IQ, SNL, published accounts, Laeven and Valencia (2010) and Bank calculations. (a) The classification of bank distress is based on Laeven & Valencia (2010), updated to reflect failure or government intervention since August 2009. (b) Total assets have been adjusted on a best-efforts basis to achieve comparability between institutions reporting under US GAAP and IFRS. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Chart 3: Output losses relative to trend after financial crises(a) Per cent 20 Interquartile range-past episodes Total range - past episodes  10  Mean 0  -10  -20  -30 0  1  2  3  4 5 Years from start of crisis  6  7  8  Sources: IMF and OECD. (a) The episodes examined are taken from IMF (2009).
Over the past decade, the government has continuously worked to improve the country’s education and health care systems. There have been extensions in terms of years of compulsory education and more financial supports to increase access to higher education. Subsidized health care for the poor has been provided with extending coverage over the years. Although the public spending (as percentage of GDP) on education and health care in Thailand is comparable to its neighboring countries, the quality remains relatively low. This is evident in the cross-country comparisons of the ratio of those attending secondary schools as well as the relatively low life span, especially compared with Japan which has the longest life span4. Hence, in moving towards a higher labor-skilled economy, Thailand needs to further improve access as well as quality of education and health care to enhance the quality of our human capital. Distinguished Audience, Apart from strengthening infrastructure investment and human capital investment, the exchange rate also plays an important role in influencing Thailand’s productivity in the long-run insofar as it affects efficient resource allocation in the economy. Given the recent development of the global economy, many of you will agree that Thai baht is unlikely to go back to the level seen in the pre-2006 era. This structural change has two implications; first, uncompetitive export sectors will be the most challenged. Second, the strong baht is an opportunity for Thailand to increase productivity through higher imported-capital investments.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Growth, sustainability and inclusiveness – Thailand’s key success factors Dinner talk by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC), Bangkok, 23 March 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me begin by extending my deepest condolence to the Japanese business community in Thailand on the immense losses caused by the unprecedented earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Despite the tragic incidents, I am confident that the strength and determination of Japanese people, together with supports from all around the world, will enable Japan to recover swiftly. For today, I would like to thank the Japanese Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to share with the distinguished audience my assessment of the Thai economy. I also look forward to hearing your views and concerns regarding the economic prospects. Needless to say that Japan and Thailand have a long history of close economic relationship, with Japan being the top foreign investor in Thailand. As such, Thailand has become a production hub for several Japanese industries, including vehicles, electronics and electrical appliances. I therefore hope that our discussion today will help align understanding and further strengthen the partnership between our two economies. For my presentation this evening, I would like to offer my assessment of the economy based on what I see as the three most important attributes that determine the economic progress for Thailand – the “key success factors”, if you will. First is that growth must be sustainable.
Despite the heterogeneity of these assets, valuation uncertainty still represents a potentially material source of concentration risk. The second area of model risk relates to rating uncertainty, as private assets are not publicly rated. Around 40% of the credit risky assets in insurers’ MA portfolios are only internally rated as at YE2020 [see Chart 5]. For annuity writers, the MA is a material regulatory benefit that allows future investment profits to be booked upfront, thereby increasing capital resources. The MA further reduces capital requirements which are calculated under stressed conditions. Under the current rules, the asset’s rating is the only measure of risk used to determine the MA, for a given currency, sector, and term. There is, therefore, an implicit reliance on the rating in capturing all of the retained risks of any asset – another form of concentration risk. Whilst Supervisory Statement SS3/17[13] sets out our supervisory expectations in the use of internal credit assessments for illiquid unrated assets for MA purposes, ratings are by no means the only credit risk indicator in our view. This is an area where we view the MA reform as an opportunity to improve the risk sensitivity of the regime. How best to do that is something we are continuing to review in the light of feedback received to DP2/22. In terms of concentration to specific illiquid asset classes, earlier this year[14] I raised the question of whether firms’ investment choices might be excessively influenced by the regulatory construct, by seeking the most MA-efficient assets.

For me today, it means that all current EU member states will contribute as much as they can to these improvements with their own ideas, knowledge and experience. The new ESCB members are prepared to contribute their share. They have gained a wealth of experience from a decade of economic transformation, a decade during which they used a wide variety of monetary policy strategies, from inflation targeting to currency boards, in order to deliver low inflation. Let me mention just a couple of lessons that were learnt: •  how to make decisions and produce good-quality economic forecasts when faced with large uncertainty (eg. about available data)  •  how to bring the economy back to low inflation after a series of supply-side shocks and how efficient communication is crucial in such circumstances  •  and that maintaining low inflation is much easier providing fiscal discipline and policy co-ordination can contribute to the task. These issues will surely be familiar to others. The knowledge gained during the transformation period will enrich the policy debates of the ESCB´s councils and working groups. This is how monetary integration will happen on a day-to-day basis both in countries that already use the euro and in those that will introduce it in the future. 2  BIS Review 70/2004