samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We should thus rekindle trust in our economic and fiscal framework, by making it more effective in ensuring sound policy making at national level. These actions can also be further supported at the European level by the recent decisions to launch an instrument for convergence and competitiveness for the euro area. To tackle future cyclical crises, the two layers of protection against shocks – the diversification of risk through the private financial system on the one hand, and public countercyclical support through fiscal instruments at the national and European levels on the other – need to interact in a complete and efficient manner. Achieving these reforms is not idealistic, nor utopian if we work together. And at the Euro Summit in December, leaders renewed their political commitment to strengthen EMU. If we want to realise in full the benefits of the euro, we need to capitalise on this commitment and translate it into concrete policy actions. Conclusion Mr Chairman, Honourable members of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I have used the word “together” several times today. As this is the last time that we will be together in this legislative term, let me add a few words to you personally. I would like to thank you all for the role that this Committee has played over the past years. In my first hearing here, I remember saying that was my first exercise in democratic accountability with the European Parliament and how grateful I was for it.

That is only to be expected when the krona has fluctuated markedly, besides being clearly under-valued on the whole in recent years. Differences in inflation and growth could previously explain most things In a longer perspective there are explanations for a large part of the krona’s depreciation. In the past three decades the nominal exchange rate has weakened about 90 per cent. More than half of this deterioration can be attributed to the higher inflation in Sweden compared with the rest of the world in the 1970s and ’80s. Mostly of the remaining part of the real deprecation can be explained in terms of relative GDP growth and worsening terms of trade in the same period. But neither of these two factors is relevant to the period since 1992 with a flexible exchange rate: inflation, growth and terms of trade have been at least on a par with the rest of the world. Various flows may have played a part in the short run. Looking back, it is evident that export growth and rapidly rising Swedish share prices may have contributed to the high exchange rate with the euro twelve to eighteen months ago. During the past year the opposite has applied. Another factor has been large investments in foreign shares when earlier barriers to risk diversion were removed from the pension system. In September there was also general financial unrest. However, variables such as these have proved to be of little value for forecasting.
After all, collectively these enhancements to our current regime may not solve another important problem evident within some large financial institutions – the apparent lack of respect for law,  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  regulation and the public trust. There is evidence of deep-seated cultural and ethical failures at many large financial institutions. Whether this is due to size and complexity, bad incentives or some other issues is difficult to judge, but it is another critical problem that needs to be addressed. Tough enforcement and high penalties will certainly help focus management’s attention on this issue. But I am also hopeful that ending too big to fail and shifting the emphasis to longer-term sustainability will encourage the needed cultural shift necessary to restore public trust in the industry. One alternative strategy for dealing with too big to fail is to reduce the size of large banks by imposing size limits. While I understand the motivation, it is important to recognize that imposing size limitations might not be a very efficient means of making the financial system more stable. First, it could sacrifice some socially beneficial economies of scale and scope, especially to the global clients of large financial institutions, depending on how the size limits were implemented. Second, the resulting benefits in terms of reducing systemic risk might be quite small.

For example, the fact that chief executive officer compensation and prestige are related to size may be just as important. On the other, this still is a problem because it works to distort the structure of the financial system and makes – by encouraging the proliferation of large, complex firms – the too big to fail problem worse. I conclude that while the funding advantage issue is very relevant to the debate on too big to fail, it may not be the most important issue. To me, the unacceptable risk posed to financial stability from the failure of large, systemic firms is at least as important. Solving too big to fail As I see it, there are two broad ways of solving the too big to fail problem. The first is to create a more robust financial system so that the failure of a large, systemically important financial firm does not threaten to take down the rest of the financial system. In this case, the authorities can let the troubled firm fail. Because failure is now credible, this should also eliminate the funding advantage from being perceived as too big to fail. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The second is to take steps to prevent the failure of such large, complex firms in the first place. This also reduces any funding advantage for firms perceived as being too big to fail, but without some of the negative financial stability consequences associated with failure.
While they were able to cope with the impact of SARS without major disruption, a certain amount of improvisation had to take place, and lessons were learned that should be incorporated into business continuity plans for the future. But the main point is that the banks did meet the immediate test posed by SARS, and for that management and staff deserve our congratulations. The banks have now been able to wind down their emergency arrangements, but the effects of SARS on their financial performance in 2003 will linger for a bit longer, albeit the impact is now much more muted than at the height of the outbreak. Despite the underlying economic difficulties, the banks actually managed to turn in quite a good performance in the first quarter of the year. Profits of the retail banks in aggregate rose compared with the same period of 2002, helped by increased fee income, higher treasury profits, reduced operating costs and a lower bad debt charge. Towards the end of the quarter, and going into April, SARS began to have an impact of increasing intensity. The demand for bank loans, which was already not very buoyant, slumped even further; credit card spending plummeted as consumers cut back on shopping and entertainment and tourists disappeared; and branch traffic dried up, hampering the efforts of the banks to market their products.

In this respect, it is important to emphasise that monetary policy considerations always take precedence over those regarding the SNB’s balance sheet risks. It is therefore worth repeating that there is a very high level of uncertainty in the international environment. An appreciation of the Swiss franc would again expose the Swiss economy to considerable risks and, once more, endanger both price stability and economic situation. Given this state of affairs, the SNB will continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with utmost determination and, should the economic outlook and the threat of deflation require, is prepared to take further measures at any time. Concluding remarks In closing, I would like to summarise my message. The unconventional measures the SNB and several other central banks continue to implement are tailored responses to exceptional circumstances. Their impact should nevertheless not be overestimated, and the associated risks must be recognised. Central banks are the guardians of price stability. Taking the broad economic situation into consideration, they can promote conditions that are conducive to growth. But central banks are not almighty. Monetary policy does not create wealth in and of itself, only financial and economic actors can harness the very best of their innovative, technological and creative talents to generate value and promote sustainable growth. References Gurria, Angel, OECD Secretary-General. 2012. “Policy priorities for a stronger, cleaner and fairer Swiss economy.” Remarks delivered at the launch of the 2012 OECD Economic Survey of Switzerland. 24 January 2012. International Monetary Fund. 2012.
07.07.2022  1st Banco de España Conference on the Spanish Economy – welcome address Banco de España Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning and welcome to the First Banco de España Conference on the Spanish Economy. Let me announce in advance that our intention is for this conference to take place on an annual basis and for it to be our flagship conference in relation to the Spanish economy. Let me first elaborate on the motivation behind the organisation of this conference and I will then focus briefly on the topics that have been chosen for discussion this year. The main aim of this conference is to bring together leading scholars and policymakers to discuss frontier research on the challenges facing our economy and the policy options to address them. The rationale for doing this is our understanding of the importance of the interaction between economic policy and applied research as a crucial tool to support the design and development of economic policies, as well as the evaluation of their effects. Indeed, high-quality research is an indispensable tool for advising on and adopting sound policymaking decisions. This is generally well understood in the central banking community, where research produced by central banks plays an important role in policymaking and the interaction with the academic community is usually very strong. At the Banco de España this is indeed the case, including first by promoting research within the institution. This is something we have tried to further enhance during the last years.

First, Spain faces the challenge of reducing the unemployment rate and the temporary employment ratio, which have been persistently high in recent decades. In particular, the unemployment rate of the Spanish economy was, on average, 15.9% over the 2000-2019 period, as against 9.3% in the euro area. Also the share of temporary employment was 28.3% over the same period in Spain, but only 15.4% in the euro area. Young people (those under the age of 24) have been particularly affected by this instability, with their rate of unemployment (32.5%) and their share of temporary employment (69.5%) standing well above the euro area average in 2019 (15.6% and 52.4%, respectively). Reducing this high employment instability is key, especially for young workers, given its adverse economic effects in many spheres. For example, employment instability affects the 3  accumulation of workers’ human capital and can thus have very persistent effects on their working lives. Furthermore, it also increases uncertainty over the future income path of the affected workers. This not only has consequences for spending decisions, but also for emotional well-being, the formation of new households and the birth rate. In this context, one of the main objectives of the labour market reform enacted in 2022 in Spain is precisely to combat the high proportion of temporary employment. And indeed, since the approval of this legislation, permanent hiring has quickened significantly and temporary hires have slowed, with permanent contracts increased most among permanent seasonal workers and permanent part-time workers.
There was too much financial globalisation, and this led to volatility and systemic risk and it has eroded fiscal resources because multinationals have become footloose. To a certain extent, financial openness cancelled out the benefits of trade openness. We need to come up with a new international order that can overcome these problems. But returning to a system based on domestic priorities alone will clearly not work. Don’t you think that central banks have been charged with too many roles and responsibilities? Yes, I do. People expect too much from central banks, considering what we can do and the mandate they have given us in the first place. If you give a central bank too many objectives, you transform it from an apolitical entity with a narrow mandate into a political institution. We have a duty to deliver on our mandate, that is price stability. But giving us too many objectives would make us political, which we certainly don’t want to be. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Indeed, in our current system, bank deposits are essentially an existing “digital currency” that we all use. What some central bankers have in mind, however, is a more substantive change. But it seems to me that the need for this change is often expressed quite vaguely. What problems of the current monetary system, and especially what challenges to monetary policy, should central bank digital currencies address? And how should these digital currencies be designed if they are to be useful in practice? These are other topics of my talk today. The big problem of the current monetary policy framework is the effective lower bound on interest rates. The underlying neutral rate of interest has probably started to rise recently, but it will hardly reach the levels we were used to in the 1980s and 1990s anytime soon. In other words, during the next recession all major central banks will hit the effective lower bound again. How could a digital currency help? One thing a digital currency can enable is the possibility of deeply negative interest rates. I am not a fan of negative rates at all, but of course one can imagine a scenario in which some central banks replace cash with a digital currency.
We are able to control the interest rates in the money market via various policy instruments through an efficient liquidity management and affect the money market rates in the favored direction and to the required extent. Accordingly, I would like to underline that in addition to the average funding cost, Interbank Repo Market rates shown in the chart should be closely monitored for a better assessment of the monetary policy stance. We will gradually raise this predictability of the monetary policy in the period ahead and ensure that interest rates in the Interbank Money Market to hover around 6.75 percent except the days on which the EPS is implemented. To enhance predictability in the funding strategy, we will limit the stock amount of the weekly funding we provide through the quantity auction method at 4.5 percent, not to exceed TL 10 billion until the year-end. Moreover, issues regarding the implementation procedures besides the funding amount to be made under this method as of 2014 will be elaborated on in the Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy for 2014 to be published in December 2014. Under this outlook with a gradual increase in predictability, I would like to remind you that our monetary policy will remain cautious until the inflation outlook becomes consistent with the medium-term projections. In the third quarter, interest rates were down from the previous reporting period across all maturities, with a larger decrease in the shorter end, while the yield curve trended upwards (Chart 5).

Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Opening remarks - World Bank's Sustainable ExchangE Development Series (SEEDS) Opening remarks by Ms Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the World Bank's Sustainable ExchangE Development Series (SEEDS), 25 October 2021. * * * Good morning. It is a privilege and pleasure to be a part of this year’s edition of the World Bank’s webinar series on sustainable finance. We are grateful to the World Bank for organising this programme. Learning from our peers continues to be one of the most important and practical ways in which we can help each other effect meaningful change to ensure that finance truly serves our communities. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have now been with us for almost two years. While ambitions to pursue sustainable finance goals started well before the pandemic, the pandemic will surely be remembered as a defining period in shaping the path taken to a more sustainable future. The pandemic has extracted an enormous toll not only on global health, but also on poverty levels and inequality. More vulnerable groups, including those who earn lower incomes, have lower levels of education, or are holding less secure jobs, have borne a disproportionate brunt of the fallout from the pandemic. While policy measures are helping to mitigate these effects in the short term, the longer lasting impact on society and future economic prospects are likely to be far more significant. This could amplify pre-existing inequalities, particularly in emerging economies.
8  BIS Review 80/2007  During 2006 commercial banks employed the overnight deposit facility for investing their free liquidities with the Bank of Albania, on average at ALL 1.6 billion a day or ALL 0.82 billion more than in 2005. Overnight credit has been employed only in seven cases, despite the lack of liquidity over the third quarter of the year. For the fourth consecutive year, the final lending facility of the Bank of Albania, i.e., the Lombard loan was not employed at all. The required reserve instrument was used constantly even during 2006, for withdrawing the banking system liquidity. The monthly pace of ALL required reserve rise during 2006 was on average higher than in 2005, 0.92 percent versus 0.76 percent, reflecting the rise in the respective categories included in the required reserve account. 8. Foreign reserve management  During 2006 the gross foreign reserve, estimated and reported in USD, has been increased by USD 368.06 million, recording the value of USD 1,793.12 million as at end of December. Out of this growth, about USD 205 million is accumulated from Bank of Albania’s interventions in foreign currency. They were intended at meeting the quantitative target for these assets and mitigating the volatility over the peak periods of foreign currency supply. While the exchange rate effect has been positive, at USD 106 million, the rest of the growth has been contributed by receipts from foreign disbursements. 9. Banking system performance  The banking system continued its stable development during 2006.

PRESENTATION OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE ANNUAL REPORT BEFORE THE  HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC*  Rosanna Costa Governor Central Bank of Chile 7 September 2022  *The September 2022 Monetary Policy Report can be found in full at http://www.bcentral.cl. Introduction Mr. President of the Honorable Senate, senator Álvaro Elizalde, honorable senators, on behalf of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile, I thank you for your invitation to present this year’s Annual Report in accordance with the Bank’s Constitutional Organic Law. In compliance with this mandate, in what follows I will share with you our view of recent macroeconomic and financial developments in the Chilean and international economies, as well as their outlook and implications for monetary policy conduct, as contained in our September 2022 Monetary Policy Report. As is customary at this time of the year, the Report features a more detailed review of the Bank's balance sheet, an account of the main decisions adopted by the Board in 2022 to date, and information on the management of international reserves. Just three days ago, Chilean voters rejected the proposal for a new Political Constitution drafted by the Constitutional Convention. It has been a long and intense process of deeply reflecting on Chile and how each one of us can contribute to its development and the wellbeing of its people.
Meanwhile, it is clear that all models – no matter how good they are – need interpretation from the perspective of the events that the moment poses and in the view of the dominant phenomena of time. Dear participants, COVID-19, coupled with the issues it has caused and the restrictions taken to contain it, continues to dominate both our economic and social life and activity. It has also certainly become an important part of the analysis and research work of the central bank. This is not a surprise. I think that the shock triggered by the pandemic and the related effects will continue to be part of the research agenda for a long time, even after the pandemic is over. However, recent developments show that the research agenda of the central banks have been enriched by the study of other risks, such as those related to climate change and environmental protection, demographic risks, digitalisation and digital currency. These have been identified as big and long-term challenges to both the global economy and the authorities of every country. The Bank of Albania has started to work on to establish the infrastructure for modelling and analysing these phenomena. It is crucial to not think of these topics only for the purpose of testing assumptions or academic discussions, but rather to consider them in the concrete framework of policy making and decision taking. I am confident these topics will become important themes for discussion themes in our Research Workshop in the future.

The annual organisation of this workshop has served to share experiences with the participating central banks and have enriched research work, becoming in turn an integral contributor to policy formulation. These workshops have made a valuable contribution for confirming and interpreting research results, which enable the compilation, calibration and implementation of policy measures for tackling the pandemic and similar shocks. Your findings, comments and discussions assist our authors to improve their studies, and in turn contribute to the formulation and decision making of policy at the central bank. Evidence, analysis and forecasts based on the research work that you will present in these two days will provide accurate and valuable information for orienting and coordinating decision making in the future. 20 research projects will be presented and discussed this year, which in in spite of covering a broad gamut/range of topics, are directly related to the activity and interests of the central bank. We have discussed almost the same topics a year ago however, you could rightly say: “What a difference, compared to last year?” In 2020, discussions were focused on the modern monetary policy, and the role of the central bank’s balance sheet as a permanent instrument of monetary policy that can and should be broadly used to bolster aggregate demand. The current monetary policy debate is concerned with the size and duration of the recent jump in inflation. The latest inflationary developments have divided academics and central bankers into two camps with diametrically opposed positions.