samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So far six such reports have been drawn up and submitted to the Coordination Council for Preparation of the Republic of Bulgaria for Euro Area Membership, headed by the Finance Minister and me. Each of the BNB Deputy Governors is in charge of the relevant area of activity within the BNB's mandate. Contact groups have been formed, with individually named members of the BNB and of the European Central Bank working on specific matters. The absence of a regular government and a clear political commitment to the euro area accession process are a serious obstacle to its progress. This is the reason why we are missing, one by one, important indicative time-frames. This time last year Croatia was well ahead on its way to the euro area. I will give you only one example. On 10 September 2021 the European Commission and the euro area Member States signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Croatia on the production of national euro coins. This Memorandum sets out the actions required for a future euro area Member State to begin producing euro coins. The signing of the Memorandum makes it possible to detail the schedule for the future euro coins of the country, allowing that country to start selecting its euro coin national side designs and to carry out the technical preparations for minting and producing a test series of national euro coins. The Memorandum is a precondition for that country to receive the technical specifications documentation needed for production of national euro coins.

During the previous discussions I had the opportunity to point out that these questions had been raised at least twenty years before, and they have been answered repeatedly, even in the last months and weeks. For example, just a few months ago the Economic and Social Council to the National Assembly approved an analysis about the implications of Bulgaria's euro area accession for the economic development, inflation and incomes in the country. This analysis was conducted at the request of the Speaker of the National Assembly and was brought to the attention of the members of Parliament. Let me highlight that by law the Economic and Social Council is a consultative body expressing the will of civil society organisations regarding the economic and social development, with its members representing trade unions, employers, industry organisations, organisations of pensioners, the socially weak and the disabled, women's organisations, as well as distinguished independent scientists who are specialists on the issues of the economic and social policy. The conclusion made by the Economic and Social Council, which represents such a wide variety of civil society organisations, is that the benefits from Bulgaria's euro area membership far outweigh the risks and costs. 1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Quite recently, a collective monograph 'Challenges facing the Bulgarian economy on its way to euro area membership' was published by Sofia University to mark the 120th anniversary of the Department of Economics within the Faculty of Economics of Sofia University – the oldest department of economics in Bulgaria.
Over the past few months, the implied path for interest rates in the UK and globally has shifted down. In the UK, forward interest rates at the end of 2017 have shifted down by 80bp since the middle of the year, to stand below 1.7%. One interpretation of that move is the market is now assigning a somewhat higher probability to the lower peak. 7  An important reason why the Taylor rule points to tighter policy over this period is that the United Kingdom was hit by a series of large relative price shocks – increases in import prices (stemming from both the depreciation of sterling and rises in commodity and world export prices), increases in energy price, and changes to the rate of VAT – that raised CPI inflation. It is not obvious that tightening monetary policy in line with the prescription from the Taylor rule in order to offset these shocks would have been desirable. 8  By contrast, if the effect on supply capacity was only temporary, lowering the measured output gap, that could imply the need for tighter policy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Whether this is the optimal – or indeed even the most likely – path for interest rates is a different issue. For example, if there is genuine uncertainty about the path of the economy, the optimal policy response may be to avoid the worst outcomes – in other words, to set policy to avoid the lower peak.

According to the August Inflation Report forecasts, they will continue to ease in the period ahead. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  Asset prices have risen significantly, boosting economy-wide wealth. Since 2009, UK equity prices have risen by over 50%, UK ten-year government bond prices by around 15% and UK house prices by around 20%.1  •  Perhaps most striking of all, employment in the UK has risen by almost 1.8 million since its trough and by around 750,000 in the past year alone. The unemployment rate has fallen from a peak of 8.4% to 6%. According to the August Inflation Report forecasts, it is expected to fall further in the period ahead, to close to 5%. Economists since Arthur Okun have often combined macro-economic measures into a single index.2 It speaks volumes for economists’ psychological state that they tend to call these “misery indices”. Although something of a dog’s breakfast, misery indices provide a simple summary statistic of macro-economic health. I have constructed an index of unemployment, inflation and GDP growth in the UK. The higher GDP growth, and the lower unemployment and inflation, the higher is the index and the healthier is assumed to be the economy. The choice of these measures, and their weighting, is rather arbitrary.3 To buck Thomas Carlyle’s image of the economist as dismal scientist, let’s call this an “ecstasy index”. Chart 1 plots the ecstasy index for the UK since 1970.
So it is not entirely correct, as some say, that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon, but in practice and in theory inflation is always and everywhere both a monetary and a fiscal policy phenomenon.36 An example of fiscal dominance from last year was when the new UK Prime Minister, Liz Truss, planned to cut taxes and increase public spending and these plans  33 See Capie, Fischer, Goodhart and Schnadt (1994). Central bank mandates were also discussed at a 2016 confer-  ence organised by the Riksbank, see Lindé and Vredin (2016) for a summary. 34 A theory explaining the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy is presented in a new book by John Cochrane, see Cochrane (2023). 35 See Leeper and Leith (2016). 36 Milton Friedman coined the term "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon", see Friedman (1963). However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that Friedman was unaware of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy, but that he assumed in his analysis that fiscal policy did not counteract monetary policy. 19 [30]  were revealed.37 This led to a collapse in the government bond market. The reason was as follows. The value of government bonds is determined by the cash flows generated by the primary budget surplus, i.e. the difference between government income and expenditure excluding interest. If the surplus decreases, the bonds become less attractive and the demand for them decreases.

Billi, R. and A. Vredin (2014), “Monetary policy and financial stability – a simple story,” Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2014:2. Bernanke, B. (2013), “The economic outlook”, Testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2023), “Review of the Federal Reserve‘s Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank”, 28 April 2023. Borio, C. and P. Lowe (2002), “Financial and monetary stability: Exploring the nexus”, BIS Working Paper No. 114. 25 [30]  Brandao-Marques, L., G. Gelos, M. Narita and E. Nier (2020), “Leaning against the wind: A cost-benefit analysis for an integrated policy framework”, IMF Working Paper, WP/20/123. Brunnermeier, M. (2023), “Rethinking monetary policy in a changing world”, Finance & Development, March 2023. Capie, F., S. Fischer, C. Goodhart, and N. Schnadt (eds) (1994), “The future of central banking: the tercentenary symposium of the Bank of England”, Cambridge University Press. Cochrane, J. (2023), “The fiscal theory of the price level”, Princeton University Press. Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig (1983), “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91. Eichengreen, B., et al. (2011), Rethinking Central Banking, Report, Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, Brookings institution, Washington, DC. European Commission (2023), “Reform of bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework”, 18 April 2023. FDIC (2023), “FDIC’S supervision of Signature Bank”, 28 April 2023. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2022), “The Shifting Tides of Global Trade”, Annual Report 2022.
This inevitably led to a very grim situation in the banking sector, where many of the newly established banks collapsed under the burden of bad debts. The state-owned banks had to have their capital replenished by the government. Balance sheet cleaning was also one of the preconditions for banks’ successful privatization in the late 90’s. BS Profitability 1  5  0,8  4  0,6  3  0,4  2  0,2  1  0  0  -0,2  -1  -0,4  Gross profit/ assets in % Net interest margin in %  -2 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  12  Nowadays, the existing banks are well capitalized, the level of bad loans is relatively low and adequate provisions and reserves are made. Despite the decreasing net interest margin, the profitability has improved, especially thanks to an increasing portion of banks’ income coming from fees and commissions. Improved Indicators of Financial Health Health 40 35 30  %  25  Capital Adequacy Classified Credit (weighted) Quick Assets/Total A. 20 15 10 5 0 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  1H 2003  11  6  BIS Review 53/2003  Profitability Return on Equity 40 30 20 10 0 -10  Banks- ROE Insurance Comp.

And, during the period between March 2008 (when J.P. Morgan Chase and Bear Stearns agreed to merge) and June 2008 (when the merger closed), counterparties of Bear Stearns continued to do business with it because of the J.P. Morgan Chase guarantee. On the other hand, where a third party provides the guarantee, the acquirer enjoys all the benefits if the target’s condition improves and none of the burdens if the target’s condition declines. It is the third party who is on the hook, and in this case that third party would have been the taxpayer. Similarly, from the perspective of the merger target, an unlimited guarantee by the Government could provide the merger target with the means to try to stay independent – its shareholders might vote the merger down with an unlimited Government guarantee. Some observers ask why if we were not able to backstop Lehman, we were able to provide substantial credit to AIG immediately afterwards. The answer is that in the case of AIG, there was sufficient collateral to support the commitment to lend. Unlike the naked guarantee needed to facilitate the merger of Barclays and Lehman, our committed credit to AIG on September 16, 2008, was fully secured by good collateral, namely, AIG’s sound retail insurance businesses. In fact, before any money was disbursed to AIG on September 16, AIG delivered share certificates to the New York Fed that we continue to hold as collateral in our vaults. These shares fully secured every penny we lent to AIG on September 16, 2008.
The improvement in terms of trade has benefited both wage-earners and enterprises. Low import prices have resulted in a slow rise in consumer prices and a solid increase in wage-earners’ real wages. High export prices have contributed to holding down the rise in real wages. Combined with high productivity growth, this has resulted in high corporate earnings and solid growth in employment. Equally important is the ample supply of foreign labour in Norway. There was a particularly sharp increase in inward labour migration after EU enlargement in 2004. Over the past two years, these labour inflows have accounted for over 30 per cent of growth in the labour force in Norway. At the same time, this has enabled Norwegian companies to be bolder in accepting new assignments and making investments, in the knowledge that they can procure labour not only from the Nordic countries but throughout Europe. Norwegian firms also have greater scope for relocating production to other countries if labour costs become too high. This has resulted in intensified competition in the labour market and has probably had a dampening effect on wage demands. Increased globalisation may have resulted in permanent changes in the Norwegian labour market. The integration of additional countries in the global economy – in particular India and China – and changes in the social structure in these countries has led to a doubling of the global labour force. Norwegian enterprises have access to this labour supply through trade, capital flows and outsourcing of jobs and capital.

Between the low risk-return bank deposits and the high risk-return equity market, there should be a risk-return profile that fits that of debt instruments. The trick is how this latent demand, involuntarily trapped at the two ends of the spectrum, can be brought out and satisfied. Investor education and the creation of a retail network to market debt will help. But the costs of the latter can be quite substantial and possibly prohibitive, particularly in a low interest environment, if the retail banking system cannot be relied upon to support this wholeheartedly (which I am glad to add is not the case in Hong Kong). Furthermore, when government debt is used by the banking system as assets for acquiring liquidity support, the demand from the banks may easily crowd out the retail demand. Nevertheless, the institutionalisation of savings, if this could be organised, through for example the introduction of professionally managed provident fund schemes, should be quite effective in harnessing this demand. This would, at the same time, enable the retail demand to be transformed into a level of sophistication that, with the appropriate supply response, will greatly enhance the efficiency and robustness of the debt market as a channel of financial intermediation. The seventh point I wish to make concerns the supply side. For an economy with a continuing need to finance budget deficits there is of course a natural supply of debt instruments, unless, like Hong Kong, it has surpluses to spend. But the story does not end there.
Pongpen Ruengvirayudh: The current economic situation and recent monetary policy developments Opening remarks by Ms Pongpen Ruengvirayudh, Deputy Governor for Monetary Stability of the Bank of Thailand, at the Joint Foreign Chamber of Commerce in Thailand (JFCCT), Bangkok, 21 May 2014. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. It is my pleasure to be back here at the Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce (JFCCT). First of all, I would like to thank JFCCT for inviting me and would also like to thank all the members of JFCCT for your continuing contribution to the economic development here in Thailand. Economic outlook 2. A great deal has changed both domestically and externally since I was here last year. With respect to domestic economy, the prolonged political stalemate has weighed considerably on confidence, exacerbating the already fragile economy. Externally, the announcement of the US Fed to scale down its Quantitative Easing program since May 2013 has led to turmoil in financial markets across emerging economies. Today, I therefore would like to take this opportunity to share briefly with you my thoughts on the country’s economic outlook, the medium-term challenges we face and monetary policy of the Bank of Thailand. 3. When it comes to current economic assessment, the slowdown of the Thai economy over the last year, in combination with uncertainty over the ongoing political conflict, is a growing concern for many. The NESDB two days ago announced that GDP growth in 1Q14 contracted by 0.6% (YOY), compared to same period last year.

Signs of moderation were witnessed in various economic activities, such as consumption and investment, as well as in government spending, despite signs of a rise in some exports. As the political deadlock lingers, tourism has begun to feel the impact. In the last MPC meeting of April 23rd, the committee projected that the Thai economy in will grow less in 2014 than the previously assessed at 2.7 percent. This will be mainly due to the weaker-than-expected economic momentum in the first quarter of the year and the political impasse posing downside risks to domestic demand and tourism. However, the economy is expected to resume its normal growth in 2015. 4. Notwithstanding the short-term headwinds, there are also causes for optimism. Global economic activity has been firming up. Growth has gathered momentum in the US, the Euro area and Japan. Recent government’s attempts in China to reform the financial sector should support sustained growth in the longer term, although with some impacts on short-term growth. In emerging economies, the turbulence in financial markets has somewhat receded following these economies’ attempts to address vulnerabilities and also in Thailand, the financial market has stabilized. Volatilities in foreign exchange market have been contained. The IMF, in their April report, projected that the global economy will grow at 3.6 per cent this year, which is an improvement from 3.0 percent growth last year. This more favorable external environment should benefit export-reliant countries such as Thailand. Medium-term challenges 5.
And its calibration is subject to uncertainty which, combined with its size and the quantity and importance of the services that it underpins – retirement income and long-term investments – mean that we have to maintain a very high confidence that its calibration is suitably prudent. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The increasing role played by illiquid assets – whilst wholly consistent with the advantage that insurers have as investors in this space – is a growing source of uncertainty and makes it essential that the calibration be set at a level appropriate to the assets that firms actually hold. I am sympathetic to calls to look again at breadth of eligibility and process improvements for the MA to remove barriers to investment – in infrastructure for example. But we should be cautious about calls for the MA to be made any more generous, both for prudential reasons and because the very existence and current level of the MA may already crowd out investment by insurers in anything that is not eligible. Another important area is the role of internal models in the regime. My colleague Charlotte Gerken has spoken recently about our concerns over excessive reliance on internal models and some potential responses to it.

This is the central role assigned to the Euro Retail Payments Board. Later on this morning, Yves Mersch will give us further insights into the work of the ERPB. Allow me now to conclude briefly by expressing again my gratitude to all the speakers, panellists and participants who are present today to share their thoughts on a wide variety of subjects of topical interest. I wish you extremely fruitful discussions throughout the whole day. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Similarly, we hope that this MAS office can also cater to the needs of the larger Chinese financial community by enhancing understanding and contacts with Singapore and the regional markets, as thereby contribute in our own small way to the continued development of China’s financial sector. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Concluding Remarks 18 On behalf of all my colleagues in MAS, I would like to express our strongest appreciation to the People’s Bank of China for their approval and support for MAS’ representative office in Beijing. 19 We look forward to taking full advantage of this milestone collaboration to deepen our financial and economic cooperation and take our bilateral relations to new heights. 20  Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

In other words, with the rise of new FinTech players, activities that are considered banking services need not be provided by traditional banks alone. Technology or e-commerce giants like Alibaba and Tencent have moved into the financial services space, as they seek to strengthen their customer-centric propositions and services. Business disruptions need not be led only by the large firms. Smaller nimble start-ups have also sought to un-bundle the banking value chain by focusing on niche areas such as financial advisory services and consumer finance. There are two underlying factors: (a) One, is the arrival of the smartphones that launched a new era of mobile apps. Banking has moved from physical branches, to the desks, and now to the palm. Recently, I read a report that British psychologists found that young adults use their smartphones roughly one-third of their total waking hours. Simply put, all of us can now do banking anytime, anywhere. And many segments of our populations are increasingly comfortable going digital, be it for banking, or to purchase goods and services. (b) Second, the accessibility afforded by technology has led banks to shift away from a production-consumption model. Traditional banking models are based on making available the range of the services that a customer need. Today, competition centres on the customer experience. One of our local Singapore banks has a tag line on making banking joyful. The notion of delighting a customer opens up a whole field of competitive ideas as to how to generate that positive experience.