samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is, however, encouraging to see that these deficiencies are being addressed and that efforts are being made to render BIS Review 93/1999  2  the impact of economic decision-making on the euro area as a whole visible and transparent for the markets and the public at large. Moreover, the recognition that Europe’s performance depends to a large extent on its ability to take on the task of implementing real structural reforms appears to be gaining ground. There is no alternative to orienting the conduct and the presentation of economic policies to the new framework of EMU in order to explore its full potential. It remains to be seen whether these adjustments will have institutional implications, either motivated by functional necessity or in response to the demands from our partners and interlocutors. I should add that institutional changes will in any case be on the agenda of the EU in the coming years, not least in order to endow Europe with a capacity for decisive external action. This is a consequence not only of the momentous changes in the wider Europe, but also the projected expansion of the EU. The European Union has launched an enlargement process of unprecedented dimensions, with 12 countries from central, eastern and southern Europe currently involved in, or preparing, entry negotiations. The prospect of EU membership and the eventual participation in EMU has galvanised these countries into pursuing economic reforms, re-orienting their trade and embarking on a difficult and sometimes painful process of disinflation.

In this context, there should be no denying that the European Union too will have to reform its institutions and decision-making structures in order to cope with a larger number of Member States. By agreeing to convene an Intergovernmental Conference next year, the Member States have taken the first steps in this direction. So far the progress of negotiations is encouraging, and the applicant countries should be applauded for their great efforts towards meeting the economic and political entry criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. Beyond that, it appears that the very prospect of eventual participation in EMU has also helped to establish clear policy orientations. Naturally, the ECB takes a keen interest in developments in the future Member States and has established the relevant contacts. I should like to conclude that the ECB is well aware of the challenges ahead, and that we are still far from “business as usual” – despite the smooth and successful launch of the euro. With the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union, the EU has recorded an outstanding historical achievement, but the task of making EMU a success will be an ongoing one, and perhaps even more momentous challenges in the wider Europe are awaiting our response. Thank you very much. 3  BIS Review 93/1999
In addition, the country concerned is expected to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II, for which it must similarly fulfil certain economic criteria. Finally, the convergence criteria must be complied with, which should ensure that a candidate country wishing to join provides evidence of sufficient economic convergence with the euro area. In addition to sound public finances and a high degree of price stability, they must also provide evidence of relatively low long-term interest rates and stable exchange rates. The European Council decides whether a country is eligible to join in Monetary Union and calls upon the ECB and the European Commission to give an Opinion. Conclusion I shall now come to a close. The ECB has been responsible for monetary policy in the euro area for nine months now. So far, we believe that the ECB’s monetary policy, the new monetary policy strategy and the new range of instruments have passed their first test very well indeed. Many international observers share this view. The real art of monetary policy will continue to be maintaining price stability in the euro area in the foreseeable future. Faith in a currency cannot be achieved by way of national or international legislation. Rather, the ECB must try to inspire new faith in the euro on an almost daily basis in order to build up credibility over time. It would be wise to develop this credibility so that the ECB’s monetary policy is also sufficiently prepared for difficult phases in the future. BIS Review 99/1999  6

In simpler terms, consumer spending of Albanian households, private sector investments, public spending and external demand for Albanian goods and services do not manage to fully use the productive capacities of the economy. The low aggregate demand leads to low increase in employment, wages and production costs, and hence to low inflation rates. Also, it poses difficulties for many businesses and is translated into increase in nonperforming loans in the banking system. In this context, undoubtedly, promoting and stimulating the economy should be a priority of the macroeconomic policies. The Bank of Albania deems that besides the classic instruments of the economic stimulus, monetary and fiscal policies, attention should be paid to smoothing uncertainties in the economy. I will briefly address three of these elements. First, in our opinion, the fiscal policy has limited space for economic stimulus. The rapidly expanding public debt increases the vulnerability of the Albanian economy and may make the fiscal stimulus counterproductive. We deem that the fiscal policy should focus on monitoring the public debt in the medium and long term. The Bank of Albania sticks to the opinion that the public finance consolidation should anchor to an effective and transparent fiscal rule. This rule would increase the short-term flexibility of public finances and reduce the fiscal adjustment cost. Second, the overall economic and financial stability is a prerequisite for a rapid economic growth. The monetary policy has been and will remain oriented toward meeting our inflation target.
Controls might very well ensure the fulfillment of these criteria, but there are two problems here. First, it might happen that such controls are not effective, meaning they can easily be circumvented. Nearly two thirds of the increase in the liabilities of foreign-owned banks in Romania during 2005–2008 occurred after the reserve ratio was raised to 40 percent. Second, even assuming they cannot be evaded, controls need to be discriminatory 1, so as to allow, for instance, equity inflows and discourage debt flows. But controls come at a very high price. Capital flows were subject to controls in all countries until the end of the sixties. Moreover, controls were also in place for lending and deposit rates, the volume of private sector credit, as well as for the business scope of certain groups of intermediaries. The positive effect of these controls was enhanced stability of the financial system: no banking crisis broke out during 1945–1971 (Eichengreen and Bordo, 2003). But the negative consequences were not negligible. Banks innovated less, they limited lending to large and secure firms, and operated on a less efficient basis. Once controls provided protection against crises, central banks became less interested in financial stability and preserved minimum expertise in this respect (Goodhart, 2010). There is also the issue of anteriority. Recent research concluded that controls yielded better results in countries where controls had been in place beforehand. Should we therefore consider preventive controls? This would mean ignoring the fact that large capital inflows are temporary in nature.

Mugur Isărescu: Monetary policy during transition. How to manage paradigm shifts Presentation by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Annual Conference of the European Association for Banking and Financial History, organised by the European Association for Banking and Financial History and the National Bank of Romania, Bucharest, 7–9 June 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I started my career back in August ’71, the day after President Nixon announced the suspension of gold-convertibility of the US dollar and the introduction of a 10 percent surcharge on American imports, thus marking the dismantling of the Bretton Woods System. We all know what happened next: in an attempt to preserve a system of fixed exchange rates, the Smithsonian arrangement – which set a fluctuation band of +/–2.25 percent – was introduced in December 1971. It only lasted for six months, so that during 1972–73 fixed exchange rates were replaced by floating regimes in most economies around the world. Exception made the countries of the European Economic Community, which decided to implement a joint floating arrangement and introduced rather funny concepts such as the “snake in the tunnel”. Those were also years of intellectual controversy – I remember reading alternatively the Newsweek articles of Samuelson and Friedman, one preaching the virtues of Keynesian policies, while the other praised free markets and non-intervention. I witnessed the end of an era and the dawn of another.
I find relevant what Agustín Carstens, General Manager of the BIS, said in his lecture held at the London School of Economics in May 2019: “The textbook version of the inflation targeting framework, which prescribes pursuing inflation stability with floating exchange rates through adjustments of a short-term interest rate, is obviously too narrow for EME central banks. In particular, the financial channel of the exchange rate gives rise to difficult trade-offs for monetary policy, while at the same time complicating the conduct of monetary policy by weakening its transmission. EME central banks have risen to this challenge through their innovative use of additional policy instruments. They have turned to FX intervention to deal directly with the financial channel or insure against undesired exchange rate swings, and to other non-orthodox balance sheet policies as well as macroprudential tools to deal with specific imbalances or vulnerabilities in a targeted way.” Not only that I share his view, but I have to say that, in Romania, we started practicing what he speaks about now even before the outbreak of the global crisis. We resorted to forex interventions in order to mitigate the exchange rate volatility and we took prudential measures to contain excessive growth of credit (of forex lending in particular). The IMF mentioned the NBR as being among “the pioneers” of what was later referred to as “macroprudential instruments".

No matter how rapidly or how slowly the economy is growing, or how fast or slow the money is circulating, the aggregate amount of reserves will be exactly the same. So it should be clear that the quantity of central bank reserves held by the commercial banks is useless as an indicator of the effectiveness of Quantitative Easing. Now obviously we would prefer that the money circulates more rapidly and that this is done through increased bank lending and deposit taking. In other words, we would like to see a further expansion of credit and broad money. Since the banks collectively are now awash with reserves, they should not be prevented from making additional loans because of any liquidity concerns. Banks are, though, constrained by a lack of capital and are looking to reduce leverage rather than increase it. Fortunately, increased bank lending is not necessary for Quantitative Easing to work. Indeed, it was precisely because the Monetary Policy Committee expected the additional monetary injection not to stimulate bank lending directly at the current juncture, that the Asset Purchase Facility’s purchases were targeted at assets held primarily by the non-bank private sector 1 . So if the Asset Purchase Facility buys gilts from pension funds or asset managers, they will then have to look for another home for their money. As it is not very rewarding just to hold it on deposit, they are likely to look to put their money into other assets, including equities and corporate bonds.
At the national level, the PACTE Act proposes certain advances in life insurance, which is by far French households’ leading form of financial savings (EUR 1,700 billion at end-2018), in particular to promote the Euro-Growth Fund by making it simpler and more understandable for savers and to increase insurers’ investment in innovation financing. The French authorities are also very careful that the current review of the Solvency II Directive is favourable to the long-term investment of insurers in equities. At the European level [Slide 3], we need to build a real “Financing Union for Investment and Innovation” to better steer our resources – a savings surplus of EUR 345 billion in the euro area5 – towards equity and innovation. This Financing Union must bring together and amplify existing initiatives, the Capital Markets Union, the Banking Union and the Juncker Investment Plan. I would now like to answer my second question: is the diversification of sources of financing sufficient? From my point of view, the answer is no because diversification carries risks that need to be well managed. II. Diversifying sources of financing is a complex business whose success requires 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  managing all the traditional and new risks faced by intermediaries A. First, there are the risks linked to fast-growing private sector debt Corporate debt in France is growing much faster than in the rest of Europe [Slide 4]. We are now significantly above the euro area average.

Transition risks – which stem from the adjustment to a low-carbon economy – are longer term and therefore less visible. To better assess these risks, we need to both measure exposures and perform forward-looking stress tests. We also need to develop the considerable opportunities associated with the financing of the transition to a low-carbon economy [Slide 5] – this involves finding close to USD 90 trillion by 2030 – while preventing the risk of greenwashing. A major work programme for the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which was launched by the Banque de France in December 2017 and now counts close to 40 members and entities 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  about to join. Conclusion To conclude and summarise my speech, the diversification of sources of financing holds the promise of improving the financial system’s ability to support innovation and sustainable economic growth, as long as this diversification is encouraged and its risks are well managed. Given this promise, the slow pace of change, the modest progress towards a capital markets union, the complexity of the challenges of digitalisation and green finance should encourage us to continue to act with determination, patience and perseverance. On the way, we can seek support and comfort in this quote by the former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel: “Hope is not the conviction that something will turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out". Thank you for your attention.
However the impact on the economy remains positive, as outsourcing and off-shoring allow companies to increase their competitiveness and lift the sales – inter alia, due to the fact that foreign branches to a large degree serve the local markets – which, in turn, requires a higher employment level in head offices and a higher number of well-qualified people at home. 20 Moreover, the fear of off-shoring increases the investment of employees in human capital, which results in better performance and flexibility of the labour market. 21 Therefore, the ability to change and improve qualifications as well as to assess which sectors in Poland have the potential and which are on the decline due to their inability to face the global competition, is gaining on significance. We should also assess what impact globalization has on company strategies. If multi-sourcing strategies are to be more and more widely applied, the question arises how Polish enterprises should operate on that market. The question whether a long-term employment relationship in a large organisation is better than the one of self-organizing cooperating nets of small companies or even persons, which proved well in the manufacturing of motorbikes and textiles in China, and some software, still remains unanswered. Last but not least, we should consider how Polish companies and their employees should develop their most precious assets in the homo sapiens globalus society i.e. the intellectual capital. I am just making a remark of these extremely important topics. Conclusions The recently published report by Edward Bendyk, “Przyszłość pracy.

The issues reflect areas where the true costs of managing a large, complex, internationally active firm have not yet been fully internalized by the firms. Said differently, the cost of international financial activity has probably been too low, and as it rises, some readjustment of those activities will be necessary. The forces of change continue strong, as strong as they were in the peak years of innovation more than 25 years ago. Now, as then, financial institutions will need to adapt and transform themselves. This time, however, we have the sobering experiences of the financial crisis to guide us. We all have an interest in moving forward, given the pace of change in the world and in technology. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
These movements have been very beneficial for the economy and, when starting our asset purchases a year ago, I would have been more than willing to have settled for such an outcome. However, it is difficult to identify the incremental role of QE in driving these improvements. These other asset prices may respond less quickly to asset purchase announcements and so are less easily isolated using event studies. Moreover, these movements coincided with a global rally in financial markets, which further complicates the task of isolating UK-specific effects. However, it is important to see this global rally in the context of the similar policy strategies adopted by a number of the world’s most important central banks: official interest rates were cut to very low levels and central banks’ balance sheets in many parts of the world were greatly expanded. The fact that UK capital markets moved in line with global markets during this period does not suggest that domestic policy had little impact. Indeed, I have little doubt that our asset purchases contributed substantially to these movements, via the channels I have discussed. Through a portfolio rebalancing effect, as both retail and institutional investors switched out of gilts into alternative assets, such as corporate bonds and equities. Through improvements to market liquidity, aided by our purchases of commercial paper and corporate bonds. And through their impact on expectations, as asset purchases demonstrated our commitment to act, boosted confidence in the economic environment and so reduced the likelihood of further large falls in asset prices.

Speech  Embargo 5 September 2019, 6.00 pm  Currencies, money and digital tokens 30th anniversary of the WWZ and VBÖ, University of Basel  Thomas J. Jordan* Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Basel, 5 September 2019 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2019 (speech given in German)  *  The speaker would like to thank Oliver Sigrist for his support in preparing this speech. He also thanks Simone Auer, Nicolas Cuche-Curti, Matthias Gubler, Christoph Hirter, Carlos Lenz and Alexander Perruchoud, as well as SNB Language Services. Page 1/7  Ladies and gentlemen It is a great pleasure, and an honour, to be invited to speak to you today, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the University of Basel’s Faculty of Business and Economics (WWZ) and the Vereinigung Basler Ökonomen (VBÖ). I congratulate you wholeheartedly on reaching this milestone. There is a long-standing and close association between the Swiss National Bank (SNB), on the one hand, and the WWZ and the University of Basel on the other. Many SNB economists were trained here and some of our staff regularly give lectures at the WWZ. I would like to thank the University of Basel and the organisers for inviting me to this special event. I am sure that the ties between our institutions will continue to be close for many years to come. For central bankers, Basel is a special place.
It cannot be stressed too strongly that although the Riksbank’s sights are consistently on the target, inflation will always tend to hover around the bull’s-eye. Looking back, however, it will be seen that ever since the target was instituted, inflation has on average been very close to it. The intention is that this will continue to be the case in the future. More and more signs of a recovery So it is not the transitory price shocks that give the greatest cause for concern. Things are worse if we cannot rule out the possibility that part of an increase in inflation stems from strong activity earlier. Such effects usually show up after some time and tend to persist. During a strong upward phase, firms can begin to pass through rising business costs to consumers in the form of higher prices. Perhaps it is precisely this we have seen recently, at least to some extent. Support for such a conclusion may lie in that fact that, according to the latest statistics, the average wage level in Sweden is rising somewhat faster than is compatible with a 2 per cent inflation target. This may indicate that resource utilisation is in some sense more strained than we counted on earlier. If economic activity in Sweden were to rise only moderately, leading in time to a weakening of inflationary pressure, the risk of inflation would diminish.

And no doubt the world economy will also have a share in these benefits. 3  BIS Review 109/2000