samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I truly believe that transformation can come from constructive and systematic engagement with your value chain. I therefore urge you to convene your opposite numbers in and around the real economy. Chapter Zero is a great network. Who knows, the source of your Scope 3 emissions may be sat in this room! Conclusion Let me conclude. We know the costs of transition to a net-zero economy are lowest with early and wellmanaged action. And we are making good progress in supporting that transition, arguably more than we might have expected given the shocks we have faced. But there is still much more to do. We have not yet reached the tipping point where we have built the capabilities and the transition finance infrastructure that will support the right strategic decisions in an unavoidably uncertain transition. We all have a role to play in driving progress. Governments globally have the key role in developing the policy paths and infrastructure that deliver the transition and draw us closer to this tipping point. Central banks and regulators can operate within their objectives to catalyse, complement and amplify those policies. And, business and finance can – indeed in order to manage their future risks will need to – make progress whilst policy is developing, ahead of clarity on sectoral paths and regulatory practice. Be assured that the difficult conversations that follow are a sign of success on our pathway to net zero, not a sign of failure. Waiting for certainty and perfect information creates an excuse to go slowly.

On the one hand, global trade may continue to grow more rapidly than expected, thereby supporting euro area exports. Moreover, strong business confidence could provide more support to domestic economic activity in the euro area than is currently expected. On the other hand, downside risks relate to the tensions in some segments of the financial markets and their potential spillover to the euro area real economy. Further downside risks relate to renewed increases in oil and other commodity prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. With regard to price developments, euro area annual HICP inflation was 2.4% in January 2011, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 2.2% in December. This further increase was broadly anticipated and largely reflects higher energy prices. Looking ahead to the next  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  few months, inflation rates could temporarily increase further and are likely to stay slightly above 2% for most of 2011, before moderating again around the turn of the year. Overall, we continue to see evidence of short-term upward pressure on overall inflation, mainly owing to energy and commodity prices. Such pressure is also discernible in the earlier stages of the production process. These developments have not so far affected our assessment that price developments will remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. At the same time, very close monitoring is warranted.
They cannot fully insulate the financial system from the effects of large macroeconomic shocks. And they will not by themselves preclude the possibility of failure in a major financial institution or a critical piece of market infrastructure. For these reasons, it is important that those of you who run financial institutions build in a sufficient cushion against adversity. Of course, the overall performance of the financial system and the degree of financial stability depends on more than just the skill of risk managers and supervisors. The unique strengths of the U.S. financial system in allocating capital to where long run returns are highest depend on the overall confidence investors have in the fairness and integrity of our financial markets. These strengths depend on our openness to competition and the opportunities and rewards to innovation that the regulatory environment provides. The stability of the financial system also depends significantly on the quality of macroeconomic policy, not only in terms of the credibility of monetary policy, but also in the degree of confidence investors have in U.S. fiscal management. The current deterioration in the U.S. fiscal position and the acute decline in the net national savings rate represent risks to the financial system and the economy as a whole. These risks are magnified by the size of the U.S. external imbalance and the unprecedented scale of financing requirements it reflects.

This apparent resilience, relative to past downturns and relative to the experience of other countries, is the result of a number of factors. Some of these factors stem from developments outside the financial system, like better macroeconomic policy and better microeconomic or supply-side fundamentals. And some stem from changes in the nature of financial intermediation, the structure of the financial system, and the capacity of financial institutions to manage risk. To start with the broader economic context, the strength and length of the expansion of the 1990s helped ensure that U.S. financial institutions entered the latest recession with strong capital positions. The fact that the recession was shallower and shorter than the average of the past helped limit the scale and scope of losses to financial institutions. The forcefulness of the monetary policy response and the large fiscal stimulus provided by the tax cuts and expenditure increases played a significant role in limiting the depth of the downturn and in helping to bring about the recovery. It is significant that the yield curve has been steeper and stayed steep longer in this latest recession than in the previous one. And, finally, the stronger microeconomic fundamentals of the U.S. economy - the shift to just-in-time inventory management, the speed of innovation in the U.S. economy, and other factors that seem to have reduced the amplitude of the business cycle and improved the flexibility and resilience of the U.S. economy in response to shocks - have also contributed to financial stability.
The first wave of speculative crypto-assets such as bitcoin – which are very volatile, with no real underlying economic basis and perhaps no real future – has been succeeded by a second generation of assets – stablecoins – based on the same promising blockchain technology, but now backed by mechanisms designed to stabilise their value. Thanks to network effects, these stablecoins could offer a concrete solution for cross-border payments which are still – undeniably – far too costly and slow. But – and this is the downside – these crypto-asset projects, which are global in reach, also generate considerable compliance, financial and political risks. I’m thinking notably of money-laundering and terrorism, for which they could provide new channels of financing, and of the more systemic risks to financial stability. II/ Our response: Step up the pace on payment solutions and consider the possibility of a 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  CBDC Of course, as central bankers and supervisors, there is no question of us standing by and letting this change happen unchecked. We have to remain fully committed to our dual objective – safeguarding confidence/supporting innovation – which is written into the very DNA of our institution. We are determined, first and foremost, to safeguard confidence – at the global level – through strong and coordinated action. Under France’s presidency, the G7 reacted swiftly and strongly last June: alongside Bruno Le Maire, we entrusted Benoît Cœuré with a mandate immediately after the announcement of the Libra project.

The current Direction de la surveillance des paiements et des infrastructures de marché (DSPM – Payments and Market Infrastructures Oversight Directorate) will become the Direction des infrastructures, de l’innovation et des paiements (DIIP – Infrastructure, Innovation and Payments Directorate), and its scope will be extended to cover all payment innovations, infrastructures and central bank digital currency. Additional skills will be recruited to strengthen its expertise, and, with the help of our Lab, the DIIP will work with industry innovators from the private sector: we want to start 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  running experiments rapidly and will launch a call for projects before the end of the first quarter of 2020. We are particularly keen to take part in experiments to integrate a “wholesale” CBDC into innovative procedures for exchanging and settling tokenised financial assets. Nathalie Aufauvre, Director General of Financial Stability and Operations, will coordinate the Banque de France’s acceleration process. Our actions will naturally contribute to the work of the Eurosystem, which should make looking into the possibility of an “e-euro” one of its next focuses: Christine Lagarde referred to it on Monday in front of the European Parliament. Beyond this, we intend to take part in the work of the “innovation hub” recently created by the BIS. On a substantive level, I would like to share with you some first thoughts – which are still open to discussion, of course – on three aspects: the objectives, externalities and possible modalities of a central bank digital currency.
Though there may be early wins, it will involve a carefully planned, detailed and sustained effort over a number of years and in a very wide range of areas. The benefits however could be very large indeed. 1  6  For a discussion of possible policy options, see “The case for a better functioning securitisation market in the European Union”, Discussion Paper, May 2014, Bank of England and European Central Bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches

If one also takes into account the depreciation of the domestic currency against $ as at end-November, the stock market of Thailand has fallen by 71% from its peak this year, Malaysia by 69.7%, Indonesia by 64%, Korea by 61% and BIS Review 116/1997  -2-  the Philippines by 61%. Even Singapore’s stock market suffered a 35.7% drop in $ terms, which is comparable to the 37.7% fall in the Hang Seng Index. Only Taiwan recorded a lower fall of 31%, whereas the Nikkei also lost 28%. I quoted these figures in order to illustrate the magnitude of the turmoil and its contagion effects on the asset markets in the region. Singapore, which is a strong economy and given a triple-A rating by the international rating agencies, adopts a managed floating rate regime, but such regime has not insulated its asset markets from the regional turmoil. In terms of interest rates, Singapore’s one month interbank rate rose by almost 5 times to 16% on 27 October from around 3.6% on 2 July. Singapore’s one month rate is now 6.25%, which is still significantly higher than the level in early July. In the case of Hong Kong, the one month rate rose also by around 5 times from 6% in early July to a high of 30% on 23 October. At present the one month rate in Hong Kong is around 7.5%.
Irma Rosenberg: The current situation and monetary policy Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Stockholm, 30 May 2008. *  *  *  The Riksbank is currently facing a rather difficult task. This, by the way, does not apply just to us but to the other central banks as well. The Riksbank’s task is to keep inflation low and stable and to help make sure that production and employment levels do not fluctuate too much. However, inflation is now high at the same time as economic activity is slowing down. Raising the policy rate in order to curb inflation would lead to a further decrease in economic activity. This is a dilemma that we and other central banks face. When the Executive Board met on 22 April to decide on monetary policy, we took into account, as usual, all the factors that may affect the development of the Swedish economy. Our decision then was to hold the repo rate unchanged. Today, I intend to tell you a little about our thinking at the time and to discuss the problems we now face in the current situation. In particular I will, in a little more detail, address the dramatic development in food and energy prices in recent years and how these affect inflation in Sweden. I will conclude by discussing the new information we have received since our latest meeting.

We are therefore pleased that we have evidently been able to meet the expectations of the banknote users – the Swiss population: - The new designs have been almost universally well received and have also been lauded by banknote experts internationally. - The new notes are technologically state-of-the-art and are also easy to handle, robust and distinctive. - All the logistical processes, including the modification of ATMS to accommodate the new notes, also ran largely smoothly. The substantial media and public interest and the feedback on social media have also been gratifying. When it comes to rapidly informing the public about the security features and the design of the new banknotes, the media naturally play a pivotal role. Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the SNB, thank you for all the work you do. We broke new ground with respect to informing the public as well, introducing ‘Swiss Banknotes’ – an augmented reality app with which users can explore the new series. We are Page 3/4  Berne, 3 September 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference on new banknotes  convinced that this innovation has helped to make the design and security features of the banknotes more accessible, especially to younger generations. So what happens to the eighth-series notes now? The old banknotes remain legal tender until further notice and can thus continue to be used for making payments. The SNB plans to announce the recall date for the eighth-series notes in the course of 2020.
In addition, the single currency creates a further dimension in the opportunities for bringing about a truly integrated financial market in the countries that have adopted the euro, in that it is more efficient to build up systems that can be used on a larger market than within smaller, individual currency areas. In order to benefit fully from this dimension, it is necessary to strengthen the incentives for making the infrastructure more efficient, in order to conduct cross-border trading in financial services, e.g. with regard to payments, clearing and settlement between operators in different countries. Less detailed government rules and regulations for financial services The political system, which has power over the rules and regulations for the financial sector, thus has important tasks with regard to ensuring that effective competition can be maintained and to reducing uncertainty regarding financial transactions. A number of initiatives are also being taken to strengthen financial integration. This involves the delicate task of prioritising between removing obstacles to cross-border operations and ensuring a fundamental consumer protection that does not have a discriminating effect. Ten years after the white paper on the single market was to be realised, there are new action plans within the EU with the aim of removing the remaining obstacles to borderless trading in financial services.

It may also be difficult to predict financial market reactions to very low and negative real interest rates. As early as 1967, US economist William Brainard discussed how central banks should respond to economic shocks when there is uncertainty about the impact of the policy rate on the economy. He concluded that the policy rate should be used with greater caution when uncertainty about its effect increases (Brainard (1967)). This involves a trade-off that can be illustrated graphically. Chart: Monetary policy and uncertainty This chart describes a situation where the policy rate is used to counteract the effect of a negative shock to the real economy. Two different interest rate paths are shown. The uncertainty is illustrated using bands around the expected paths for the policy rate, inflation and the output gap. In the scenario denoted by the blue line, the central bank does not take the uncertainty associated with the interest rate into consideration. In contrast, the yellow line represents a scenario based on a more cautious monetary policy response to the perceived uncertainty involved. The expected real economic costs of a more cautious response – as measured by the output gap – are somewhat higher, and inflation moves further from the target. In that respect, this is a less appropriate path for the policy rate. But there is also a benefit: uncertainty about the future path is substantially reduced. As you can see in the chart, the uncertainty bands around inflation and output have narrowed.
The conference is remembered, among other things, for the statement made by the UK diplomat who left the proceedings stating: “The future treaty you are discussing has no chance of being agreed; if it was agreed, it would have no chance of being ratified; and if it was ratified, it would have no chance of being applied.” This remark seems to encapsulate Britain’s political ambivalence towards Europe and has permeated the country’s attitude to the EU ever since. 1  See the European Commission’s EMU@10 report. BIS Review 20/2009  3  The second episode is more recent and more personal: I was a young sherpa in the Italian delegation to the European Council in Rome on 27-28 October 1990 which called for intergovernmental conferences on Political Union and on Economic and Monetary Union. The Council decided on the start of the second phase of EMU, 1 January 1994, and the creation of an institution in charge of developing “the instruments and procedures needed for the future conduct of monetary policy”. It was also decisive for one of the Heads of Government who, by insisting on having a dissenting voice, inserted in a footnote to the commonly agreed Conclusions, was unable to convince back home that such a footnote was in the country’s best interest. Lady Thatcher had in fact fully understood what the founding fathers had known for years, i.e.

Øystein Olsen: A decade of forward guidance in Norway Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a seminar, held at Columbia University, New York City, 8 April 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech or on the Norges Bank’s website. Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. Thank you for inviting me to Columbia University. Economists in Norges Bank have been greatly inspired by researchers from this institution, and we have had the pleasure of hosting scholars from Columbia at a number of conferences in Norges Bank. Some of our economists have also been here as visiting scholars. It is therefore a particular pleasure for me to be here today. “Forward guidance” as an element of monetary policy has attracted attention in the aftermath of the international financial crisis. With key policy rates in some countries constrained at a lower bound, statements about central banks’ future actions have been used to affect interest rate expectations. Norges Bank has published explicit numerical interest rate forecasts as a regular part of our monetary policy communication for ten years. The interest rate forecast is our preferred way of guiding economic agents’ interest rate expectations. As such, our version of forward guidance has been reasonably successful. The topic of my talk is our framework for forward guidance and the experience gained over a decade of practising our approach.
Finally, a rich literature uses experiments to assess bias in hiring, promotion and bargaining between groups (Neumark (2018)). In this paper, we use the first two approaches – regression-based techniques and decompositions – to analyse gender and ethnicity pay gaps in the UK. In the next section, we describe the dataset, summarise key trends in the UK labour market over the past 25 years and discuss unconditional pay gaps by gender and ethnicity. In the following section, we provide an explanation of these pay gaps using factordecomposition and regression-based methods. Section 5 summarises our key findings and policy recommendations. Section 3: Trends in the UK Labour Market This paper uses quarterly returns from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1994 Q1 to 2019 Q1. This gives us a sample of 1,154,759 observations of employed individuals, reduced to 563,353 observations when incorporating pay variables, as there are fewer observations for respondents on pay.6 There are two  6 Throughout our analysis we only use wave 1 respondents in order to ensure that we are not counting multiple responses from the same individual. In addition to this, we only include workers aged 25 and over in order to remove noise from the data. Most workers under 25 are earning in the minimum wage range which is subject to regulation, and may also particularly represent part-time employment.

Assume, again for simplicity, that males also have higher levels of educational attainment than females. This means that, for compositional reasons, we would also expect males to earn more than females. , is  and  The gap between male and female wages, (2) where  and  are vectors of explanatory variables evaluated at their means for males and  females, respectively. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition allows us to split up the overall gap into the part that is attributable to (i) differences in x's (the so-called “accounted for” component capturing compositional differences) and (ii) differences in the β's (the “unaccounted for” component reflecting the greater impact of a given factor on males versus females). In other words, the wage gap between the two groups can be expressed as: ∆  (3) where  ∆  and ∆  ∆  In this way, we can split the gender pay gap into a part that can be accounted for by females having different characteristics (x's) than males, and a part resulting from females being treated differentially to males given those characteristics (β's). This expression can be further rewritten as (4), which compares the regressions coefficients to their hypothetical value in a world of no labour market discrimination. ∗  ∆  (4)  where  ∆  ∗  and  ∗  22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  We use an extensive list of factors or characteristics, x, to help explain pay gaps.