samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Based on the data collected, and considering renewals in those cases where they are possible, the average term of office at the Eurosystem’s NCBs is 11.8 years. 11  ANNEX 5 - Code of Conduct for high-level European Central Bank Officials (2019/C89/03) The main points covered in the Code of Conduct for high-level European Central Bank (ECB) Officials are as follows: - Standards of ethical conduct: officials shall observe the highest standards of ethical conduct and integrity. They are expected to act honestly, independently, impartially, with discretion and without regard to self-interest. They shall be mindful of the importance of their duties and responsibilities, shall take into account the public character of their functions and shall conduct themselves in a way that inspires ethical conduct within the Eurosystem, the European System of Central Banks and the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and maintains and promotes public trust in the ECB. - Principle of independence: officials shall act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole, regardless of national or personal interest, and not seek or take instructions from EU institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. - Professional secrecy: officials shall not disclose any information covered by the obligation of professional secrecy obtained in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities that has not been made public or is not accessible to the public except deliberately as part of the communication strategy of the ECB.

Legal independence is represented in the institution’s own legal personality, which is different from that any other State or General Government agency may have. As a result of this personality, the Banco de España has the autonomy to assume contractual rights and obligations with third parties and to take decisions under its remit, which are legally binding for those concerned. Functional independence means that, under the principles of observance of the law and the general interest that govern its conduct, the Banco de España has the instruments needed to perform its function and the autonomy to decide on the internal resources and processes it deploys to fulfil the objectives assigned to it. This autonomy extends to its internal organisation (divisions, departments and posts, with their tasks and procedures). As an exception, a matter to which I shall return, there is currently the possibility of government review of some of its decisions in the supervisory sphere. Personal independence means that senior management, the Council members and employees of the Banco de España can do their work “independently” in the exercise of the functions entrusted to the institution. Here, independence means that in the decisions taken and in the attendant actions, members of the institution must be free from external interference and be guided exclusively by rigour and professional competence.
And I would also like to urge you to take a little time off to visit some places of interest, while you are in this beautiful country, Sri Lanka. Thank you. BIS Review 50/2004  1

Given the famous ‘long and variable lags’ in the transmission of monetary policy, an immediate policy response to the gas price shock could not have prevented some rise in headline inflation.9 In line with its remit, the MPC needed to act to steer inflation back to its 2% target on a sustainable basis, in a difficult environment where the adverse terms of trade impact of higher imported energy prices weighed on domestic real incomes and spending. In doing so, it was crucial that monetary policy was prepared to act to contain so-called second-round effects in price, wage and cost developments, which threaten to impart a self-sustaining momentum to inflation, even as the original impetus to higher inflation from rising gas prices dissipates. By its nature, that more persistent component of inflation would last to the horizons at which monetary policy does have an effect on price developments – it is thus any such persistence in inflation that the MPC (in its recent communication) has flagged as the driver of more ‘forceful’ policy actions. Bank of England  Page 7  This is where the impact of higher gas prices interacts with developments in the labour market. Even as economic activity in the UK has weakened as higher gas prices weighed on household spending power, the labour market has remained tight. The unemployment rate recently reached its lowest level since the mid-1970s. Recruitment difficulties in a tight labour market has supported stronger underlying wage growth.
The construction industry is showing a positive trend in the south-eastern region, primarily due to public building projects, while western Oppland is experiencing weaker activity. On the whole, enterprises providing services to the household sector are faring better than those oriented towards the business sector, primarily due to weak developments for customers in the construction industry, corporate customers that are in competition with foreign companies or dependent on customers in these categories. Employment is stable, but many enterprises, particularly in the public sector and the construction industry want to downsize in response to higher costs, lower budgets or as part of general, planned workforce cutbacks. Developments in Raufoss may have a considerable impact on the local community. Pay increases are expected to be considerably lower in 2003 than in 2002. Wage growth is highest in the public sector. There are wide regional variations in unemployment. At end-April, 3.2 per cent of the labour force in Hedmark and 2.9 per cent in Oppland had registered as unemployed. This is well below the national average of 3.9 per cent. The increase in unemployment on a national basis in 2002 primarily occurred in the service industries. In January, manufacturing took over the lead as the industry with the highest increase in unemployment. Manufacturing unemployment is now 3700 higher than a year ago. Agriculture and forestry account for a larger share of employment in Hedmark than in other counties. Because of the large tracts of forest in this county, forestry is a particularly important sector.

On average, it was 1.1% in this period, dropping 1.8 percentage points from the previous quarter. The rapid decline of annual inflation rates, which has started in the third quarter of the past year, is driven mainly by the slowdown of price rise in food items during this period, as well as the stability of prices of other consumer goods. Inflation performance has reflected the simultaneous action of supply and demand factors. On the supply side, slowdown of commodity prices in international markets and of inflation in our trade partners, combined with the stable exchange rate, have transmitted lower imported inflation rates to our economy. Likewise, contribution of administered prices has been lower. Inflation expectations have been anchored and production cost pressures contained. On the demand side, pressures remain low, conditioned by the continuation of the negative output gap. Reduction of factual inflation rates, shifting of the inflationary pressures balance to the down side and the increase of aggregate demand below its potential, under the conditions of a controlled fiscal policy, have created the space for further increase of the monetary stimulus to the economy during the first quarter of the year. The Bank of Albania has lowered the key interest rate twice, bringing it down to the historic low of 4.25%. Such a decision, besides being in line with maintaining price stability over the medium term, provides the appropriate conditions for boosting private demand at home.
Alongside Bercy this time, and French banks, I fully support the Commission and ECB’sii target of applying the output floor on a consolidated basis: we must not create new obstacles to Banking Union, and the reluctance of “host” countries has no other basis than a form of harmful protectionism. Regarding insurance, the Commission also published in September its proposed amendments to the Solvency II rules, which look set to lead soon to a final compromise text at Council level, under the French Presidency of the European Union. They have our full support, to facilitate long-term, sustainable investment (support for equity investment, integration of climate objectives), without increasing overall capital requirements for insurers. Further advances have also been made in anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) with the creation of a dedicated directorate within the ACPR, which will notably monitor the risks linked to crypto-assets. The ACPR is in part to thank for France’s excellent results in its evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), with the French AML/CFT system recently receiving the highest possible score for quality. In customer protection, the industry-wide agreement reached in February 2022 under the aegis of the Ministry of the Economy will ensure greater transparency in management fees for life insurance and retirement savings contracts, with insurers required to publish a fee schedule for each contract as of 1 July 2022. But we need to ensure savers are even better informed.

Ardian Fullani: Development of the interbank market in Albania and the Bank of Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Forum “Interbank Market Development and Improvement of Operational Policy at the Bank of Albania”, Tirana, 21 June 2010. *  *  *  Dear bank managers, Dear colleagues, We are gathered here today to discuss an essential issue concerning the performance of our financial market and the Albanian economy on the whole: interbank market development and strengthening. I do believe that the role and importance of the interbank market is clear to all attendees. It represents the first link of liquidity trading in economy and the most transparent price setting mechanism. By providing the appropriate instruments and partners for liquidity trading, the interbank market allows the refinancing of short and medium-term positions and facilitates the mitigation of your business’ liquidity risk. The banking system and the interbank market represent the exclusive setting monetary policy operates in. A developed, active and efficient interbank market enhances the efficiency of central bank’s monetary policy, transmitting its impulses into the economy best. Thus, the development of the interbank market smoothes the progress of financial intermediation and boosts lending to economy, hence improving the country’s economic and social welfare. The deepening and broadening of the financial market is one of the key structural reforms in economy. It should be ceaseless and it requires the commitment of domestic and external factors.
A gradual increase in the repo rate, where the policy is brought step by step onto a less expansionary path, in my opinion reduces the risk of a development that would lead to abrupt adjustments in house prices and household indebtedness later on. This also thus reduces the risk of an unfavourable development of the real economy 3 . In this context, I would, however, emphasise that the reference to household indebtedness and house prices is not, as some have understood it, an expression for our having introduced new targets alongside the inflation target. There are though, as I have just explained, reasons to take into account the impact of these factors on the real economy and inflation, even in a longer perspective, and under different designs of monetary policy. Uncertainty over the future repo rate path We thus always try to be as clear as possible about our view of future macroeconomic developments, including the monetary policy with which this development is normally associated. One question that therefore deserves a comment, before I finally go on to discuss current moentary policy, is how accurately is the future repo rate depicted by market expectations as expressed in implied forward rates? It is important to remember that our view of the development of the repo rate at the monetary policy meetings is based on the information available at the time of the decision. Our considerations may, of course, subsequently be changed due to new statistics becoming available or to the economy facing unforeseen shocks.

But if successfully executed, these objectives are mutually reinforcing and will lay the foundation for a more sustainable and vibrant First World economy. Moderation in growth Why is China growing more slowly? As China reaches a more mature stage of development, it is simply unrealistic to expect it to grow at the same rate as before. China is confronted with the reality of supply-side constraints that every economy eventually runs into. •  According to UN projections, China’s working-age population (aged 15–59), is projected to shrink by 0.6% each year over the next 15 years. Slower growth does not mean anaemic growth. China may no longer grow at 8–10%, but it is well positioned to grow by 6 to 6.5% for the next five years. With the right mix of structural reforms, there is substantial scope for China to achieve faster catch-up in productivity and income levels. •  China’s per capita GDP is modest by international standards and its labour productivity remains well below the frontier. •  The less developed regions in China still have scope to grow at rates that are higher than the national average, and this process of internal convergence is itself an important source of future productivity growth. The large size of the Chinese economy means that, at even more moderate rates of growth, the incremental demand from China will be quite substantial in absolute terms – and this is what matters for the global economy.
An important part of the IMF’s work with debt management in the poor countries is therefore to strive for the resources that are released in the country are invested long-term and in a way that benefits all the population. Research shows that IMF lending and programs are successful. In the years a program is implemented, and the countries save to finance their deficits, growth is normally decreased a bit. After a few years, the countries can however reap the fruits of a more stable economy, in terms of lower inflation and higher growth. Successful programs also have a positive effect on social policy in the countries. Expenditure on education and healthcare in the poorest program countires increased by four per cent per capita between 1985 and 1998, and these areas now account for a larger share of the government budgets. Countries with IMF programs have seen more children in schools, increased literacy and access to clean water, and lower child mortality. 5  BIS Review 78/2000  Swedish participation in the IMF Sweden is one of the creditor countries in the IMF. In the board we share a seat together with the seven other Nordic and Baltic countries. As well as other country groups, we have an office in Washington with representatives who work full time on pursuing our interests on the board. I worked at this office myself for over four years as Nordic-Baltic representative in the board.

Although we have seen marked improvements in the critical areas of capital, liquidity, and resolution, we have not yet fully addressed the root causes of many of the problems that have plagued the financial sector. I am thinking of not only the excessive risk-taking and leverage in the run-up to the crisis, but also the repeated scandals related to LIBOR, FX, money laundering, sales practices; unfortunately, the list goes on and on. Underlying these scandals is often an inadequate corporate culture, where accountability and ethical conduct have fallen by the 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  wayside. The good times we’re in can exacerbate these problems in three ways. First, there’s a risk of complacency setting in—an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mentality. Second, in a strong economy, the hard numbers that we tend to focus on when examining profits, losses, capital, and liquidity can look like everything’s coming up roses, even when an uncomfortable reality lies beneath. And, finally, culture is a long-run investment that takes many years to develop and requires constant reinforcement to preserve. If you let it erode, you can’t go to the market and obtain a new “culture” overnight. As I mentioned, establishing a more robust regulatory framework was absolutely necessary for a healthier, more resilient financial system. But, it is far from sufficient. The danger we face today is that people may conclude that the hardened defenses are enough, and other supervisory activities around culture, conduct, and governance are superfluous.
The interaction between the collateral framework and liquidity regulation is of great importance, especially for the Eurosystem.10 Let me illustrate this. A possible strategy for euro area banks to meet their LCR requirements is to increase their reliance on central bank funding using non-HQLA collateral. This is due to two features of the LCR calibration, which are of particular relevance for the ECB. First, the LCR and the Eurosystem’s monetary policy framework differ as regards the definition of qualifying assets. The stock of HQLA accepted in the LCR is narrower than the stock of assets which are eligible as collateral for the Eurosystem’s monetary policy credit operations. For example, asset backed securities (ABS) and uncovered bank bonds are accepted as Eurosystem collateral, but do not qualify generally as HQLA in the LCR. In addition, the LCR and the Eurosystem’s collateral framework differ as regards haircuts that are applied to specific categories of assets.11 Thus, there is no alignment between the definition and the risk assessment of liquid assets and the central bank’s collateral framework. This is justified by the different purposes of liquidity regulation and of the central bank’s collateral framework: the collateral framework protects the balance sheet of the central bank and, without prejudice to this objective, can support monetary policy transmission to the economy, which calls for a broader range of eligible assets, especially in such a diverse region as the euro area. This is also justified by the global nature of the LCR while central banks frameworks are all different.

The inadequacies of banks’ liquidity management became apparent when some markets for long-term debt securities (including ABS, ABS CDOs, etc.) experienced a sudden re-pricing, resulting from the fact that risks were not properly reflected in their prices. Banks faced  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  substantial liquidity outflows and shortages owing to their excessive exposure to these instruments and their excessive reliance on short-term and volatile secured market funding sources. In the US, this phenomenon mainly materialised as a “run on repo”;1 in the euro area, it resulted into drying up of foreign currency funding, severe strains in bank unsecured funding, and/or a reduced access to repo through clearing houses. In all cases, the central bank had to step in and to expand its liquidity provision to banks. What does this imply for liquidity regulation? Regulations should start from first principles, and we therefore have to identify the market failures or negative externalities that liquidity regulation aims at addressing. I consider that there are three main objectives for liquidity regulation: a) to reduce the impact of uncertainty on the bank risk profile, b) to build up liquidity buffers and c) to mitigate the systemic characteristics of a liquidity crisis. Maturity transformation gives rise to liquidity risk since, by definition, a bank engaging in maturity transformation cannot honour sudden and large withdrawal requests by depositors. They may face similar difficulties if interbank market lenders refuse to roll over their loans.
If Parliament had not passed the emergency legislation in October 2008, thereby ensuring that there was a functioning banking system and that domestic deposits were secure, if capital controls had not been introduced in November 2008, if we had not been so successful in repairing domestic balance sheets, if the economic recovery had been weaker and the rate of return on domestic assets had been lower, then the domestic assets of the old banks would have been worth much less, as would the offshore krónur. In this scenario, these positions might have exited Iceland long since, at just a small fraction of the value they had just before the resolution of the old banks. Instead, the domestic assets of the old banks amounted to 25% of GDP and the stock of offshore krónur was estimated at around 15% of GDP. It was clear that free exportation of these positions without mitigating action would have resulted in a new currency crisis, with potentially serious effects on financial stability. That was both economically and politically unacceptable. As a matter of fact, the population had been promised solutions to these problems entailing no negative effect on the exchange rate. The Icelandic authorities have publicised three versions of their capital account liberalisation strategy: the first in 2009, the second in 2011, and the current one in June 2015. It was under the second strategy that the stock of offshore krónur was reduced through a series of auctions.

Second, even if the authorities should, for some obscure reason, allow these krónur to go through the onshore market at this point, they would never command the current onshore rate. The position is simply too large, and that applies even if we look only at the current liquid part. It would simply push the market in front of it. Third, these numbers are within the range where offshore krónur have been trading in auctions and in the market. Fourth, the most important number is 190. This is found partly by looking at what will happen to our FX reserves if we buy the entire position at this rate. It will take us below the metrics that both we and the IMF think we should prudently meet when we start lifting capital controls on domestic residents. We are willing to stretch that far, however, in order to facilitate an amicable solution, as we are confident that we can rebuild reserves to the required level in the next few months. Second, why are the authorities not offering longer-term bonds as a part of the solution? That was the initial intention when work on auction design began. At that time, the idea was to have a multi-product auction offering foreign currency, long-term euro-denominated bonds, and long-term króna-denominated bonds. The deliberations revealed, however, that such a structure would have involved significant risks for Iceland. First, a multi-product auction carries more operational risk than a straightforward FX auction.