samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Conclusion As a source as well as a destination for investments, Asia presents compelling prospects for the hedge fund industry. Singapore’s strategic location makes us well-placed to serve as a hub with strong physical connectivity, trade and financial linkages to the rest of Asia. Together with our strong commitment to growing a well-regulated fund management industry, this makes Singapore an ideal vantage point for asset managers to understand Asia and to manage pan-Asian investments. So it leaves me now to congratulate SALT on its inaugural Asian leg of the SALT Conference. I wish all of you a fruitful conference ahead. Thank you. 7  Preqin/Global ARC Study of Asian Institutional Hedge Fund Investments 2012  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

This is available from 1997 and projected backwards using aggregate M4 growth before then. Chart 2: Broad money growth slowed significantly after the financial crisis, inflation still close to 2%  Page 5  Sources: ONS, Bank of England and Bank calculations. None of this means that at the margin (holding everything else fixed) QE doesn’t add to broad money or ultimately to the level of prices. Nor does it imply that the quantity measures are never useful or important. It would be as wrong categorically to ignore monetary aggregates as it would to assume that they’re the only thing you need to consider. As far as the theory’s concerned, people can’t always borrow and lend freely. In the presence of these and other “financial frictions” the availability of liquid assets can matter for spending, independently of interest rates. Besides, interest rates themselves matter only relative to some “neutral” rate that cannot be observed directly. So, in practice, monetary policymakers should always pay attention to other – indeed any – indicators of incipient inflationary pressure. And although changes in banks’ deposits have often been driven by shifts in demand there are times when they look more supply-led. Arguably, the surge in broad money in 2020 looks like one such episode. Supported by the furlough scheme, and because their spending was held back by the lockdowns, households accumulated significant deposits during the pandemic (Chart 3). While not literally a “helicopter drop” this came quite close to an exogenous increase in the stock of household (and aggregate) money.
Firstly, due to the phenomenal rise in reserve holdings of central banks, in our region, and secondly, due to the intensive public scrutiny that reserve management has attracted as a result of the significant increase of foreign reserves in the national wealth of countries in our region. The drivers of this sharp rise in reserves are many. High commodity prices, increase of exports of natural resources, and increased remittances, have been among the main contributors to this situation. Consequently, many countries have been able to systematically accumulate large foreign exchange reserves over the past few years, and, in a way, reserve accumulation is now possible, not only for the wealthy industrialized countries, but for the so-called developing countries as well. 4. However, these reserve accumulation has not been without pain. In fact, developing countries, being those still requiring improvements in their domestic infrastructure and other systems, have found that the increasing of their foreign exchange reserves has resulted in a huge opportunity cost. This is particularly so because the funds collected in the form of foreign exchange have been generally applied to acquire low risk, low-return investments, mostly in fixed income securities in industrialized countries. This situation has indirectly led to such funds being used to fund the huge fiscal deficits of several Western countries, or the expansion plans of their large corporations, instead of being utilized for domestic infrastructure, which, on most occasions have been funded with high cost loans from those very same countries.

As a result, the economic growth of 2019 resulted in the level of 2.2%, down from the level of 4.1% recorded in the previous year. The shocks we suffered slowed down the growth rate, but did not divert the Albanian economy from the positive development trend. This performance was reflected in the reduction of the unemployment rate, in the increase of employment and wages, as well as in the reduction of the foreign debt and the public debt of the country. In parallel, the main indicators of the health of the banking sector remained at satisfactory levels. The average inflation of 2019 resulted in the level of 1.4%. The performance still below the inflation target, required the maintenance of the stimulative direction of monetary policy during 2019. For this reason, the Bank of Albania kept the key interest rate unchanged at 1.0%, oriented the market on maintaining the easing direction of monetary policy in medium-term horizon, as well as supplied banks with the necessary liquidity. In response to our monetary policy, financial conditions were stimulating to increase aggregate demand and appropriate for returning inflation to target. The monetary stimulus brought about the reduction of the credit price and stimulated the growth of lending. Under these circumstances, private sector lending experienced a relatively rapid growth and showed a better distribution. Also, the monetary stimulus reduced the cost of debt service for businesses and households, as well as created the premises for a more stable exchange rate.
A better arbiter of market power may be measures of market contestability, in particular the potential for barriers to entry to and exit from the market. Entry and exit rates from banking have, historically, tended to be very modest by comparison with the non-financial sector and other parts of the financial sector, such as hedge funds. For banks operating in many markets and offering a range of services, aggregate returns may offer a misleading guide to the degree of market contestability. Looking separately at the different activities financial firms undertake provides a potentially clearer indication of the drivers of performance and the structural factors determining them. In this respect, JP Morgan Chase provides an interesting case study. JP Morgan Chase is a large universal bank offering a full package of banking services to customers, retail and wholesale. Its published accounts also provide a fairly detailed decomposition of the returns to these different activities. Chart 36 looks at the returns on equity at JP Morgan Chase, broken down by business line and over time. These estimates are based on the firm’s economic capital model. So provided this model adequately captures risk, these estimates ought to risk-adjust returns across the different business lines, allocating greater amounts of capital to riskier activities. (a)  “Low risk/low return” business activities  Consider first some of the activities generally perceived to be low-risk/low return – asset management and treasury and securities services and retail financial services.

We’ve also taken two steps to improve our communication of the Fed’s monetary policy strategy and plans. First, we released a statement of our longer-run goals and strategies – essentially, a declaration of our monetary policy principles.7 That statement noted that we view a 2 percent inflation rate as most consistent with our mandates. It also emphasized that we will continue to balance our goals of maximum employment and price stability in making policy. Second, we now regularly report our views about the probable course of short-term interest rates over the next few years. Under current economic circumstances, most Fed policymakers judge that near-zero short-term interest rates will be appropriate well into 2014. In this way, our interest rate forecasts reinforce our public guidance. Releasing the views of policymakers in this fashion should further reduce public uncertainty about our plans. And that, in turn, improves the effectiveness of our policies. We at the Fed are broadening our commitment to openness and accountability. And we’re doing all we can to carry out the mission Congress gave us. The Fed’s powers are limited. Lower interest rates alone can’t fix all the economy’s problems. But monetary accommodation is indispensible. The economy would be in much worse shape if the Fed weren’t acting so energetically. Looking ahead, we may need to do more if the recovery falters or if inflation stays well below 2 percent. If the economy does need more stimulus, restarting our program of purchasing mortgage-backed securities would probably be the best course of action.
More generally, all over the world, the best private sector involvement is foreign direct investments, privatisation and going back as soon as possible to spontaneous market financing. FTD: Is the ECB sticking to the line that any solution for Greece that leads to a credit event, a selective default or a default must be avoided? Trichet: The Governing Council has not changed its position. Again we are in a domain where Governments are responsible. Our duty is to say clearly what we judge appropriate in order to avoid the risk of adverse developments in the euro area and in Europe. As you know there has been several times in the past when our advice was not followed, such as when we advised solemnly against watering down the letter and the spirit of the Stability and Growth  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Pact. If this advice had been followed, we may have avoided some of the problems we are facing today. FTD: How is the ECB helping to battle the crisis? Trichet: The most important thing for the Governing Council of the ECB is, for the future as it did in the past, to stick to its mandate and ensure price stability for the euro. The fact that the euro is a stable and credible currency is a prerequisite, a necessary condition for mastering this difficult situation. The ECB is an anchor of stability and confidence which is particularly fundamental at a time when everything else seems to be moving and shifting.

Each government must keep its own house in order. In addition, the European Commission and all governments are responsible for ensuring that the fiscal policy of all euro area countries is constantly surveyed and monitored in line with the Stability and Growth Pact. We always made publicly the point that governments must live up to their responsibility. FTD: Now that the markets are losing confidence in Italy and Spain, can Europe still manage this crisis? Trichet: Naturally the Europeans can manage the issue. It is not a question of technique. It is a question of will and determination. And the situation, at the level of the euro area as a whole, is more sound than in the equivalent advanced economies. For example at the end of the year the euro area will post around 4 ½ % of GDP public finance deficit when the US and Japan will post around 10 %. FTD: The ECB argues against private sector involvement in the second rescue package for Greece on the grounds that, in international terms, this is not usual in such cases. But even the International Monetary Fund is now in favour of involving private bondholders. Why is the ECB still resisting such a move? Trichet: If you read carefully what the IMF writes, you will see that it is much more prudent. In any case you know the position of the Governing Council on Greece, which I repeated in our last press conference.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: The international economic scene and analysis of the Spanish economy Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Senate Budget Committee, Madrid, 23 November 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Appearances by the Governor of the Banco de España before Upper and Lower House committees, as part of the discussion and approval of the State Budget, have traditionally been one of the main occasions for Parliament to deliberate on the analysis of the Spanish economy that forms the basis of the central bank's actions. As this is my first appearance as Governor before the Senate, allow me to reiterate, as I did in the Lower House, the importance that I attach to relations with the people’s representative bodies for the proper performance of the tasks entrusted to the Banco de España. Tasks which are of great importance in the light of macroeconomic and financial stability, and which justify the independence granted by European laws and treaties to the Banco de España. Indeed, this is one of the Bank’s main identifying features, but one whose corollary is full transparency and fluidly operating accountability. At issue here, therefore, is an institutional arrangement whose balance hinges significantly on relations between the Banco de España and Parliament. Before moving to the analysis of the Spanish economy, I should dedicate some time to the external environment, focusing on the euro area, which is where our monetary policy is designed and decided.

Yet despite this narrowing of the gap between the contributions of national and external demand to growth that I have referred to before, the expansion of the Spanish economy in 2006 has essentially been underpinned by the buoyancy of domestic spending. In particular, gross capital formation has retained considerable strength, while only private consumption and government consumption have slowed slightly in the year to date. The somewhat less dynamic behaviour of private consumption in the first three quarters of 2006 is a result of the interplay of numerous factors whose effects, in some cases, have tended to counter each other. The losses of purchasing power caused by the high inflation rates in the first half of the year have affected household disposable income and, therefore, they will have tended to reduce consumer  2  BIS Review 117/2006  spending. Further, the increase in borrowing costs following the successive rises in official interest rates by the ECB must have curtailed the spending capacity of some sectors of households. Conversely, intense job creation - running at a rate of over 3% - and the notable rise in household wealth are factors that should have sustained the growth of private consumption. Regarding household wealth, it should be pointed out that, although house prices have begun to show signs of slowing, there have continued to be very significant stock market rises in 2006, outpacing those in recent years, which were already considerable. As I mentioned earlier, gross capital formation has been very robust throughout 2006.
The RMB Clearing Agreement lays down the framework for RMB business in Hong Kong. I will not bore you with the details but just to highlight two important changes made in the Agreement. First, the restrictions on the types of institutions that can open RMB bank accounts were lifted. This effectively means that securities firms, asset management companies and insurance companies are now free to open RMB bank accounts. Second, the restrictions on RMB interbank transfers between personal accounts and corporate accounts were also removed. With these relaxations, the key hurdles that had previously limited the development of offshore RMB wealth management business have been eliminated. Market players have been responding to these relaxations quickly with the launch of a wide range of RMB investment products. These include RMB-denominated insurance policies and investment funds. Investor interest in these products has been phenomenal. In developing our offshore RMB business, let me stress that Hong Kong does not have a monopolistic power and we are also facing competition from other financial centers. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  However, Hong Kong does enjoy the first mover advantage over the others in a number of ways. Over the years, the HKMA has built up a very good working relationship with the Mainland authorities. We have accumulated a wealth of operational and regulatory experience in RMB business. We have also developed the most advanced financial infrastructure for RMB transactions with cross-border links with the Mainland.

Eddie Yue: Hong Kong as an international financial center – the China factor Introductory remarks by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the “Hong Kong: China’s Global Financial Centre” conference, New York, 1 March 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It’s my great pleasure to be here today. No doubt I fully agree with Ms Leung and Mr Wheatley as they have rightly set out the key strengths of Hong Kong in serving as a financial hub in Asia. But I would also like to go deeper into the matter and focus on one very important factor, which may explain why more and more asset managers have been looking to set up their regional operations in Hong Kong. And this is the China factor – a unique competitive advantage of Hong Kong that is difficult for other financial centers to replicate. The China factor is growing in prominence as China continues with its path of very impressive growth: over the past three decades, Mainland China’s GDP has registered an amazing 29-fold increase, from around $ billion to more than $ trillion in 2010, with an average annual growth rate of 10%. Today, Mainland China is already the second largest economy in the world and the single biggest contributor to the world’s economic expansion, creating nearly one-fifth of the world’s newly generated economic activities. As an international financial center of China, Hong Kong stands to benefit the most from the country’s phenomenal development.
Monetary policy and the Swiss franc  Switzerland conducts an independent monetary policy and has historically had a strong and important currency that plays a much bigger role in the international financial system than the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  size of the economy would imply. The attractiveness of our currency as a safe haven reflects the stability of the country and is, as such, an asset for our economy. However, since the start of the crisis back in summer 2007, this factor has also repeatedly been a source of pressure. The Swiss franc started appreciating in August 2007 (figure 2), with the onset of the US subprime crisis. The huge uncertainty generated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers one year later and the Great Recession which ensued put the Swiss franc under further upward pressure. The situation worsened in 2010 and 2011. The European sovereign debt crisis and the fears of a break-up of the monetary union sent jitters through financial markets. In addition, market participants were worried that the US Congress would not reach an agreement to avoid hitting the debt ceiling. To complicate matters still further, the global economic outlook turned noticeably gloomier. As a result, enormous safe-haven flows poured into the Swiss franc. From August 2007 until August 2011, the Swiss currency appreciated by about 40% in real effective terms. Yields on Swiss Confederation short-term debt turned negative and have remained negative ever since.

4.1  Innovative and diversified Swiss international trade  Looking at the structure of Switzerland’s international trade will allow me to dispel some wellestablished preconceptions about the Swiss economy. If I asked you to list some core Swiss economic sectors, you would probably mention banks, watches and chocolate. But Switzerland is much more than that. The Swiss economy is in fact highly diversified. For example, the share in total value added of the sector comprising financial, insurance and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  business services is smaller than the EU average (20.3% vs 26.2% in 2012, according to OECD figures). By contrast, the share of the manufacturing sector is significantly larger. Overall, the amount of goods and services that Switzerland sells abroad is equivalent to half of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Goods dominate export activity but, with a share of one-third, the contribution of services is by no means negligible. The export intensity is significantly above the OECD average. Switzerland is surpassed by the Benelux countries, however. Part of the gap with the Benelux reflects the extensive re-exports of imported goods generated by the activity of the world-class ports in Belgium and the Netherlands. Admittedly, access to the sea is not a key comparative advantage of Switzerland… In order to maintain competitiveness, the Swiss export sector has gone through profound structural changes during the last decades. First, there has been a shift in the composition of the export sector (figure 4).
It is a ‘hard’ floor because no participant in the interbank repo market is willing to lend reserves in the overnight segment at a rate below the rate that can be obtained by participating in our fine-tuning operations. However, we must not set this hard floor too high, as otherwise all banks would only trade with us. If we no longer had any interbank trades in the overnight repo market, SARON would be deprived of its calculation basis and quickly lose economic significance. How has the money market adapted to the new situation? We will close our speech with a discussion of how the money market has adjusted to the new situation with a positive policy rate and to our new way of implementing monetary policy. Page 7/10  The positive SNB policy rate took effect on Friday, 23 September, the first business day following the monetary policy assessment. On Slide 11, you can see that on 23 September, SARON – depicted by the red line – jumped all the way up to 0.38%. In other words, it moved to within just 12 basis points of the new policy rate, the blue line on the slide. Over subsequent days, SARON increased further and has remained close to our policy rate since then. In the first few days immediately after the rate hike, we conducted fine-tuning operations on a daily basis to set a hard floor on interest rates used in transactions in the overnight segment.

Mark Carney: Three truths for finance Remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the Harvard Club UK Southwark Cathedral dinner, London, 21 September 2015. *  *  *  I am grateful to Ben Nelson and Iain de Weymarn for their assistance in preparing these remarks. “All England is an American shrine, full of rich records of the makers of their nation.”1 None more so than glorious St Saviour’s – Southwark Cathedral – a few minutes south of the river from here. Its connection with Harvard makes it something of an American Mecca. For at St Saviour’s was baptised a Southwark butcher’s son who became benefactor to the university that would bear his name. John Harvard would doubtless be delighted with what has become of the 320 volumes and £ he bequeathed to posterity: a college founded for the avoidance of leaving “an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our present ministers shall lie in the dust”. From that bequest sprung one of the world’s leading universities. A community dedicated to its motto: Veritas – truth; the pursuit of truth in the sciences, humanities, even economics. Truth to create a better world. But recall Pilate’s question that has echoed down through the centuries from the pulpits of Southwark Cathedral to Memorial Church, “Truth? What is truth?” Indeed, upon arriving at Harvard, students and visitors are confronted with a curious truth, or rather, three untruths.