samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That would provide gone-concern loss-absorbency for new improved resolution regimes to draw on. A still richer Accord might include instruments that aid recovery by converting into equity in the face of meaningful but not life-threatening losses. This approach moves away from seeing runnable short-term wholesale debt as a source of discipline on banks, to instead seeing longer-term bonds as providing a mass de manoeuvre for recapitalising distressed banks. Not all forms of leverage are the same. But no static regime can ever be enough. If they were, crises would not recur. That is why the new macroprudential authorities, such as the Bank of England’s FPC, will be able temporarily to adjust capital requirements when circumstances warrant. I have stressed that it is oversimplistic to think of macroprudential interventions to improve capital adequacy as always inevitably leading to higher funding costs and tighter credit conditions. It will depend upon the prevailing circumstances: whether the banks started out with solid balance sheets, what the market knows and thinks. The FPC will need to be transparent in order to build understanding of its actions. 15  I worry about the withering away of a market for bankers’ acceptances; claims by one company on another, but guaranteed by one or more banks, and historically eligible for discount at central banks. As I have said before, corporate treasurers, bankers and central banks could usefully work together on this.

One way of overcoming this is for the prudential regulator to make a firm raise the required equity capital once the deficit is identified. Another way might be for banks to issue so-called hightrigger contingent capital instruments (CoCos), ie bonds that convert into equity if a bank’s capital ratio falls below a prescribed but reasonably high level. In steady state, for a bank with a minimum equity ratio of 10%, that trigger might be, say, 8%: sufficiently below the required level for the insurance provided by these CoCos not to be prohibitively expensive, but sufficiently high that the bonds would convert to equity while the bank was still able to fund itself in the market.8 The second, and in some ways bigger, issue relates to the problem of a debt-overhang.9 Suppose, due to a marked deterioration in the macroeconomic environment, a bank’s equity base, even after the conversion of high-trigger CoCos, is revealed to be too thin to cover the risks in the business. Debt spreads rise and, in consequence, the value of bonds in issue falls. An injection of fresh equity would increase the value of the business, by reducing the probability of bankruptcy. But since bond-holders ultimately pay the bankruptcy costs, they and other creditors would be the main beneficiaries of recapitalisation: there would be a transfer of resources from equity holders to bond holders. Shareholders in a poorly capitalised firm have an incentive, therefore, to keep their hands in their pockets and gamble that the economy, and with it their bank, improves.
Their average annual per capita growth rates of 6-8% are historically unprecedented and greatly exceed those attained by the present advanced economies at their earlier stage of economic development by at least three folds. Similarly, ASEAN-5 experienced growth rates of more than doubled that of world average during the past two decades. Nevertheless, Asia's growth path is no different from those of the other economies. Asia too follows a similar industrialisation process of moving from traditional to  BIS Review 130/2009  1  modern activity, from the production of low value-added goods to incrementally higher valueadded products to eventually the services sector. What makes Asia different, however, is that this process has been considerably accelerated. The success of Asia has not been a result of one single factor, but instead, a confluence of factors that has promoted, facilitated and driven economic development. Given the immense diversity of the continent, it would not be possible to draw on exact and specific development strategies that have contributed to the rapid economic progress and transformation. Nevertheless, four general but salient features have been critical in the development strategies of most of the Asian economies. First, sustained economic growth has always been given a steadfast priority in the Asian economies. The governments in most South-East Asian and East Asian countries have focused on institution-building and promoting industrialisation. Institutions have been established to plan, drive and monitor the laying of necessary economic foundations, including enabling infrastructure, in the broader economy, while potential impediments have been addressed.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Global economic recovery - where to from here? Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, Mansion House, 26 June 2002. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, my Lords, Aldermen, Mr Recorder, Sheriffs, Ladies and Gentlemen. On this great annual occasion last year I spoke about the problems that confronted us in keeping the UK economy on course in the face of the cold winds blowing from abroad. I drew attention to the risk that in seeking to avoid being sucked down into the Charybdis of adverse external influences, by lowering interest rates in this country, we could find ourselves thrown onto the Scylla of excessive domestic exuberance. In the event, the cruel terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11th - had a damaging short term impact on economic conditions everywhere. We were drawn irresistibly towards Charybdis despite the resilience of domestic consumer demand, which we sought to sustain by steering towards Scylla, with further reductions in interest rates. The economy as a whole became becalmed over the winter. That of course, was disappointing after 37 successive quarters of relatively steady growth. But the economy as a whole still managed to grow in the year to the first quarter - by 1% on the present data which was somewhat faster than in a number of other G7 countries.
However, I think a sensible way to address signs of severe misalignments, beyond the leaning against the wind with monetary policy, is through sterilized intervention. But, in order for this to be effective and coherent with the inflation targeting framework, some conditions must be met: •  In the first place, it must be consistent with the inflation target, in order for the intervention not to jeopardize the credibility of monetary policy. •  Secondly, to safeguard monetary policy independence, once the intervention is announced, it must be implemented mechanically. All this shields the conduct of monetary policy, typically carried out in regular pre-established meetings, from the extraordinary decision of buying or not buying foreign currency. In particular, the sterilization of intervention decisions permits to preserve both the credibility and the independent management of monetary policy. •  Finally, and because of this sterilization requisite, the cost of intervention must be properly considered, because it entails a quasi-fiscal component that could be significant. The Chilean experience last year was in line with the aforesaid principles. It was done in a moment where there was clear evidence of misalignment with respect to the levels deemed consistent with long-term fundamentals. It was also totally consistent with the inflation objective, and started at a moment – April 2008 – in which there were rather benign inflation figures that revealed a smaller risk of unwanted inflationary propagation.

Our estimates of the potential output level have increased in pace with the emergence of new information. Our best guess is nevertheless that the output gap is now positive and widening. Low inflation combined with high growth in output and employment is therefore a challenge to monetary policy. 2  BIS Review 49/2006  Even though economic growth has been strong over the past 15 years, business cycles have fluctuated. A pronounced upturn in the years from 1993 to 1998 was followed by a period of more moderate growth and a mild recession in 2002 and into 2003. Since summer 2003, there has again been a clear upturn in the Norwegian economy. Wage developments reflect and influence business cycles. Strong employment growth in the 1990s resulted in a rise in labour costs, which in turn had a dampening impact on growth. Moderate wage growth in recent years has been accompanied by a strong cyclical upturn. So far, the upturn has been marked by strong growth in output, with an ample supply of labour and unusually low inflation. For a longer period employment showed a smaller rise than in previous cyclical upturns, partly reflecting the decline in sickness absence since summer 2004 and solid growth in productivity. Employment showed a turnaround last autumn and the number of persons employed is now increasing sharply. Unemployment is falling rapidly.
1970 – 2018 1) 250 250 Gas Oil  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0 1970  1978  1986  1994  2002  2010  0 2018  1) Preliminary figures for 2018. Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate  9  There is still global demand for oil and gas. If we reduce production on the Norwegian shelf earlier than planned, other suppliers are ready to take over. The climate impact of an earlier reduction would therefore be marginal, while the costs to Norway would be substantial. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  The oil industry has been an economic engine for Norway for close to 50 years. The revenues from this industry have improved the welfare of today’s citizens and the citizens of tomorrow. The spillover effects from the oil sector to the wider Norwegian economy are substantial. Throughout our country there are oil-related jobs to be found. More than 10 percent of all employed persons in Norway are either directly or indirectly working for the oil industry.3 Innovation and skills development in the industry have also benefitted other sectors. The oil industry has been through a demanding period of personnel cuts, cost savings and rationalisation. The restructuring in the industry that was already underway became even more pressing when oil prices collapsed in 2014. Today, oil companies are hiring again, and will likely continue to do so in the coming years.

2  INTRODUCTION  NORGES BANK  From a not too distant future, let’s return to the present day. We can already see the contours of the digital tools used by Kristoffer and his digital assistant. Technology is advancing at a rapid pace. Every day we rely on new technology as we tap our payment cards on the reader. We also have to adapt to new developments on many other fronts. A shift in production methods and consumption is underway in response to global warming. The world economy is marked by densely interwoven trade flows, but also by uncertainty about the path ahead. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IS CREAKING Throughout history, technological innovation and increased trade in goods and services have been important sources of growth and development. The two driving forces have functioned in tandem. Trade barriers have been reduced in recent decades. Faster transport and advanced communications systems have greatly facilitated access to ever bigger markets. Global value chains have emerged, and service providers can be located far from customers. With free-flowing capital, we can invest globally. Since the 1970s, world trade has grown rapidly (Chart 1). As a percentage of world GDP, international trade has almost doubled. Goods are still the dominant component, but trade in services has been on the rise. A host of new countries have also increased their share in world trade. Substantial technological and economic lags have been reduced. The world’s economic balance has shifted. Chart 1 World trade1) has grown markedly.
This is especially important as nearly two fifths of university graduate cite good work life balance as the main thing they look for in an employer. Third, the Bank encourages shared paternity leave and over the last year, 59 colleagues took up the offer, compared to 187 people on maternity leave. We have a generous pay package of six months at full pay and 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  three at statutory pay. Colleagues are given ten Keep In touch (KIT) days and are offered IT equipment to take home during maternity leave to enable them to maintain contact with the Bank and ease their eventual return to work. The Bank has been successful in retaining female talent, with the Bank’s maternity returner rate at almost 90% over the past few years. What gets measured gets managed: be transparent about progress Building an inclusive culture is impossible without transparency.10 In recent years, important strides have been made on transparency around the gender pay gap. Transparency delivers accountability and in making this information public, the sector must acknowledge the work it has to do to close the gap. In the financial sector, the average mean pay gap at banks and building societies is 35% and 31% in insurance companies. For the Bank, the mean gender pay gap is better than the industry average at 20%. The gap is driven by the difference between male and female representation at senior levels. This is not an excuse.

Available at: https://www.creditsuisse.com/corporate/en/media/news/articles/media-releases/2012/07/en/42035.html 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  The Bank of England values diversity for three reasons. First, it is the right thing to do; a public institution should reflect the people it serves. Second, diversity can build the trust required to deliver our remits, as people are more likely to trust people they recognise, reducing misperceptions that we are experts making esoteric decisions in ivory towers for the benefit of others.5 Third, diversity leads to better decision-making, more creative thinking and reduces the risks of groupthink and bias.6 This last point is critical. Almost all decisions in finance are taken under uncertainty, making it especially important that decision makers are exposed to a range of views, and engage in open debates with people whose perspectives challenge the prevailing wisdom. Articulating why diversity and inclusion are important has helped the Bank move the dial. When I joined the Bank, only 17% of senior managers were women, so we set an ambitious target to reach 35% by 2020. The Bank is on track to achieve this: today, 32% of senior management are female, considerably above the 14% industry average. Our pipeline of future leaders also looks healthy: 46% of colleagues below senior management are women. This didn’t just happen. Reaching this point has required a deliberate, concentrated effort throughout the organisation. The power of organisations like the WIBF is that they help such approaches permeate through the industry.
Chart 2: Central bank policy rates 2016 - 2007, change in pp  Policy Rates, end of period in % 20  ECB  2016  SRB  2011  2015  ROM  2010  2014  POL  2009  2013  MKD  2008  2012  HUN  2007  -1 -1.0  14  region average  16  ALB  18  0  -2  12 -3  10 8  -3.5  -4  6  -4.0  4  -4.5  -5 -5.0  2 -6  0 ALB  HUN  MKD  POL  ROM  SRB  -5.8  ECB  -6.0  -6.6  -7  12  Spread to the ECB rate in pp 10 8 6 4 2 0 ALB  CZR  HUN  MKD  POL  ROM  SRB  -2 average 2004-2007  average 2008-2012  average 2013-2016  Source: Central Banks’ internet pages. The eased monetary stance across of the central banks in the region led to loosening of the financial conditions for borrowing of the private sector. The scrutiny of the lending interest rate data reveals that the downward adjustment of the cost of credit is visible in all of the countries in the region.

180  International Liabilities  160 140 120  100 80 60 40  20 0 Region  CEE 2007-2005  2012-2008  SEE Baltics 2015-2013  Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics. Data from the balance of payments statistics used as an indicator for the capital inflows in the region point that overall capital flows have continued, but at a much slower pace compared to the pre-crisis period. The slowdown is visible in the most recent period, as well. Thus, during 2013-2015 the capital inflows for the region on average amounted to around 12 % of GDP, compared to a cumulative growth of 38 % of GDP in 2008-2012 and 67 % during 2007-2005. The largest slowdown is observed for the CEE group of countries, where capital inflows almost stalled. Chart 8: Components of capital inflows, cumulative change in p.p.
The easing of concerns over inflation has allowed the Central Bank of Turkey to focus on curbing the potential destruction of the crisis on the Turkish economy without conflicting with the primary goal of maintaining price stability. The majority of policy rate cuts to compensate the additional tightening in financial conditions was antedated. Subsequent data releases on inflation and economic activity have bolstered the credibility of the Central Bank. I would like to underline the gradual decline in interest rates on commercial loans as a positive development in this period. BIS Review 134/2009  1  The common denominator of the Central Bank’s policy preferences and the recent choices should also be emphasized. The primary objective of the Central Bank is to achieve and maintain price stability and this primary objective does not conflict with any other objective of the Bank. The policy stance we have recently adopted clearly reflects this. Although recent data releases indicate that the worst may be over, the recovery is expected to be protracted given credit market problems and rising unemployment rates. The tightness in financial conditions still persist to some extent, and uncertainties regarding the impact of the problems across financial markets on the real economy are ongoing, suggesting that downside risks still remain. Although downside risks are still more significant, recent signs of partial recovery in economic activity should not be discarded. Nonetheless, we are of the opinion that most of the recent increases in economic activity were attributable to the short-term effects of the global fiscal measures implemented.

In the few cases where counterparties have defaulted, for instance in the case of a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers, the Eurosystem was able to fully cover its exposure by seizing the posted collateral. At the same time, the collateral framework ensured that banks were able to obtain sufficient amounts of central bank liquidity throughout the crisis. This became most visible in the context of the two Very Long Term Refinancing Operations that the ECB conducted in 2011 and 2012. In these operations banks obtained collateralised central bank liquidity in the order of EUR 524 billion within only 10 weeks. This basic set-up of the collateral framework has remained the same since the beginning of monetary union; the three constituent parts of the Eurosystem collateral framework, i.e. (i) the counterparty framework, (ii) the basic eligibility criteria for underlying assets and (iii) the risk control measures, have remained largely unchanged. The Eurosystem maintains a broad counterparty framework and its eligibility criteria are still based on the same principles as at the beginning. This shows that the design of the Eurosystem collateral framework is in general very robust. However, some changes were necessary to guarantee a smooth implementation of monetary policy at times of financial market stress that led to a general reduction in access to market funding.
So how do our actions support economic activity? Buying assets and extending interest rate guidance puts downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, so they are lower than they would otherwise be for any given economic outlook. This supports the price of assets such as equities and homes. Buying mortgage-backed securities has the additional effect of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  narrowing the interest rate spread between these assets and Treasuries, which further reduces mortgage rates. Moreover, to the extent that our actions are seen as supporting the recovery and providing some insurance against adverse shocks, confidence in the mediumterm economic outlook should also increase, making businesses and households more willing to invest, hire and spend. If we are successful, long-term Treasury yields could actually rise as confidence in a sustainable recovery increases. At the same time, the expected returns on private assets should rise and risk premia decline. This matters because such shifts would provide support to the economic recovery. Now it is true that some of the channels through which monetary policy affects the economy may be partially impaired at the moment. For example, because of ongoing restrictions in the supply of mortgage credit to customers with less than perfect credit records, the impact of lower mortgage rates on housing is probably less powerful than normal. While this restraint should slowly ease as house prices stabilize, the difficulties of households with lower credit scores in obtaining mortgage credit warrants ongoing attention.

We therefore seek to minimize how far employment is from its long run normal level and inflation is from our longer-run goal of 2 percent on the PCE measure. Because monetary policy works with a time lag, we base policy not just on where the economy is today but where we expect it to be in the future. To do this, we make economic forecasts, based on data and insights from a broad range of economic models. We also take into account the balance of risks around our base case outlook. Looking ahead, in the absence of further monetary easing, I concluded that growth would remain too subdued over the next several years to make big inroads into the spare capacity that remains from the Great Recession. As a result, unemployment would remain unacceptably high, with economic risks skewed to the downside. Meanwhile, with substantial slack in labor markets and inflation expectations stable, inflation was likely to remain a bit below our 2 per cent longer-run objective. In this situation, I concluded that our policy framework means that further monetary policy easing was appropriate provided that the benefits of using the tools available outweighed the costs. In my judgment, this standard has been satisfied here. I am confident that the costs are manageable, based in part on the experience we have of using the tools these past four years and that the benefits substantially exceed the costs, recognizing, of course, that our actions are not so powerful that they will instantly transform the economic outlook.