samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That is the largest recorded quarterly fall in output since 1958. In the wake of the financial dislocation of Autumn 2008, there was a collapse of confidence and elevated uncertainty which had a profound effect on consumer demand and investment intentions. There was also an intensification of the “Credit Crunch” which had been in train since the start of the crisis in mid-2007. A range of policies had been introduced in the United Kingdom to prevent an economic meltdown. That included action to re-capitalise some of the banks; guarantee some of their funding; expand liquidity assistance and to set appropriately accommodative fiscal and monetary policies. Governments around the world took very similar steps. Asset purchases were one part of the policy response. At its peak, the Bank of England bought nearly £ of commercial paper and corporate bonds (Chart 2). This is sometimes compared with the eventual total of £ gilts purchased, prompting the question why the Bank didn’t buy more private sector assets? This question reflects a – perhaps natural – misunderstanding of the different purposes of these interventions. The gilt purchases were intended as a monetary policy operation to inject a substantial amount of money into the economy. The consequences of that policy have been addressed in Bank publications (Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, June 2009 for example), speeches and elsewhere. There has been much less discussion about the private sector asset purchases.

Back then, press interviews were rare and scripted to within an inch of their life. In the past year, Bank officials gave around 65 speeches and over 200 press interviews. In Montagu Norman’s day, the combined total was one. The days of “keeping the Bank out of the press and the press out of the Bank”14 are well and truly gone. Earlier this year, the Governor gave the Bank’s first live peacetime radio address to the nation for 73 years. The Bank Tweets, fortunately with rather less vigour than your average Premiership footballer. Soon we will have, for the first time in history, published minutes of the Bank’s Court of Directors. The Governor has appeared before the Treasury Committee on no less than 47 occasions since he took office. In 2011, a word search of “Mervyn King” in the press revealed more hits than “Kylie Minogue”. To my knowledge, this is the first time a sitting Bank of England Governor has toppled the Aussie pop princess in the media opinion polls. Given its new responsibilities, the Bank cannot fail to remain in the public’s eye in the period ahead. Transparency and accountability will remain the watchwords – and rightly so. Conclusion When pressed by the Macmillan Committee in 1930 to explain the Bank’s actions, Montagu Norman replied: “Reasons, Mr Chairman? I don’t have reasons, I have instincts”.15 I suspect such an answer would work less well with today’s Treasury Committee, to say nothing of today’s media. All public policymakers have an obligation to explain.
The Riksbank discusses a number of possible measures in its latest Financial Stability Report. Firstly, the Riksbank tries to influence developments by communicating our views on what is happening publicly and in the form of a dialogue with the banks. The Financial Stability Report plays a central role in this context. The Riksbank can in certain situations provide a more comprehensive picture of the risks than the individual market players, as the latter attaches greater importance to evaluating developments in their own portfolios. If the Riksbank believes that an unhealthy build-up of risk is occurring and our assessment has not had the intended influence on the individual market players, there are other measures that the Riksbank can take. In extreme cases, quantitative regulations may be introduced, such as raised required capital adequacy ratios or a reserve requirement. Nor can an increase in the repo rate be ruled out if financial stability is threatened. However, these are more far-reaching measures and would only be used if the build-up of risk was assessed to constitute an acute problem. The assessment of the situation made by the Riksbank and other authorities will always be marred by a large measure of uncertainty, as it is extremely difficult to evaluate how serious the build-up of risk actually is. If drastic measures are to be taken, the assessment must be based on a strong foundation. The development we can see today is, as I mentioned earlier, far from requiring any intervention.

Households have traditionally borrowed mostly for housing, and the current increase in this type of lending is perhaps not so surprising in view of the fact that housing prices in metropolitan areas have risen relatively significantly. What is more remarkable is that lending for other purposes is increasing at a higher rate. It is difficult to see from the statistics exactly how the borrowed money is used, but lending both from banks and finance companies is now growing at a faster rate than lending from mortgage institutions. This has given rise to apprehensions that households are borrowing for consumption or in order to invest in shares, which could lead to rapid increased risks. In order to gain a better understanding of whether or not this is the case, the Financial Supervisory Authority has recently commenced an examination of the banks’ lending to the household sector. 1  Excluding repos. BIS Review 50/2000  2  There are several reasons why property prices play a central role in any discussion of financial stability. In addition to the fact, as I mentioned earlier, that the credit demand among households is largely governed by the demand for and price level of property, property can also be used as collateral for loans. Another reason for monitoring the property sector is that a large part of the banks’ lending is to property companies. These companies also accounted for a large part of the loan losses during the banking crisis in the early 1990s.
For me the main headlines from the results publication are: The stylised scenarios used in this exercise are illustrations of possible paths for climate policy and global warming, not forecasts. The projections made by banks and insurers are uncertain, but suggest that overall costs will be lowest with early, well-managed action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and so limit climate change. UK banks’ and insurers’ projections suggest that they are likely to be able to bear the costs of transition that fall on them. In part, that is because a significant portion of these costs may ultimately be passed on to their customers. In the No Additional Action scenario, households and businesses vulnerable to physical risks would be particularly hard hit, as general insurers would pass on the cost of higher claims into premiums, or otherwise refuse to renew insurance for some customers. Governments set public climate policy, which will be a key determinant of the speed and shape of changes in the global economy. Banks and insurers have a collective interest in managing climate-related financial risks in a way that supports that transition over time. They will need to improve their management of these risks in order to be able to do so. Within this, I wanted to pick out a few particularly interesting lessons. The first key lesson from this exercise is that over time climate risks will become a persistent drag on banks’ and insurers’ profitability – particularly if they don’t manage them effectively.

And so I see a number of challenges which underline the need for further work: To the extent that climate change makes the distribution of future shocks nastier, that could imply higher capital requirements, all else equal. So a key judgement will be: are current capital levels sufficiently high to guard against unexpected shocks during the transition? Even if capital levels are appropriate in aggregate, that does not mean that the capital is held in the right places. As we have seen, some of these risks are highly concentrated in particular  Page 8  sectors. A second key judgement will therefore be: does the framework of capital requirements capture climate risk at a sufficiently granular level? We also need to ensure firms have the right incentives to continue to improve their capabilities, and meet our expectations. The CBES results show that while progress has been made, there is still much to do. From the point of view of capital, this suggests a third key judgement: are we satisfied that firms are building the capabilities they need – and if not, do we need to introduce more incentives? Most fundamentally, the CBES results are a snapshot – based on current data and modelling capabilities, and focused on a specific set of scenarios and risks. I have highlighted the significant uncertainty as well as the gaps that underlie these results.
In recent years, the MPC has increasingly focused on structural changes in the economy, including by instituting regular reviews and publishing our assessment of the most important variables, such as the equilibrium unemployment rate. Over this period, as unemployment has fallen towards its estimated equilibrium rate and companies have found it harder to recruit and retain staff, pay growth has picked up. Across the economy as a whole, growth in average wages excluding bonuses has risen from around 1¾% a year during 2010-15 to around 2½% in 2016, and wage growth is expected to have picked up a little further to around 2¾% around the middle of this year. The most recent outturns support that judgement, with whole economy total pay increasing by 2.9% in the three months to July and private sector regular pay up 3% over the same period, and domestically generated inflation at rates consistent with the 2% inflation target. 39  Cavallo, A (2018), ‘More Amazon Effects: Online Competition and Pricing Behaviors’, paper prepared for the 2018 Jackson Hole Symposium. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  This brings me to a larger point. Although current rates of pay growth in the UK are below pre-crisis averages, this largely reflects continued weakness in productivity growth. While that weakness may reflect the early consequences of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, other factors seem more likely to be at play.

The annual growth rate of credit to the private sector climbed further in December 2021, albeit visibly more slowly, reaching 14.8 percent from 14.6 percent in November, solely due to the component in local currency. Leu-denominated loans saw their annual dynamics accelerate further in 2021, to 19.6 percent in December from 19.0 percent in November, also backed by government programs, with their share in total thus widening to 72.4 percent. Nowadays, as many other EU member states, Romania is preoccupied by the geopolitical and energy situation and their considerable impact on inflation. Inflationary shocks on the energy components of the consumption basket hit repeatedly throughout second half of 2021. These were partly offset by a government support scheme, in effect from November 2021. Nevertheless, the energy component still accounted for more than half of the overall annual inflation rate by the end of 2021. It is a fact now that approximately 85 percent of the CPI has root in the energy price surge. Therefore, the inflation expectations on the 1-year horizon have risen sharply, reflecting current developments. The positioning of the 2-year ahead expectations close to the target variation band suggests that the anchoring mechanism is still in place. However, specific measure to address energy situation is a need. Uncertainties continue to stem from the evolution of the pandemic as well, given the current wave, triggered by the more contagious Omicron variant of the coronavirus although the variant seems to be less virulent.
We are seeing signs that international banks are delving into the digital asset custody services space, with offerings such as structured products and trading in crypto derivative markets. Through distributed ledger technology, blockchain platforms enable banks to offer payments capabilities for settlement through tokenised assets. Crypto assets are rapidly growing, offering decentralised finance. As recent turmoil in digital asset markets have illustrated, the waters between where we are now and a digitalised world are particularly choppy. Established banks must not let commercial pressure to adopt new technologies or enter digital asset markets get in the way of first ensuring that they can properly understand and manage the associated risks. I would place particular emphasis on our operational resilience expectations and how banks should use these to inform technology investment decisions. As regulators we are considering the impact of technological developments on the sector and the future of finance, both for new entrants and existing entities. Our operational resilience expectations help in this regard. But we also want to see firms working together on market disciplines towards operational resilience in the financial sector. A good example is critical thirdparty providers, a subject on which HMT published a policy statement. [3] In the new world, relationships with critical third-party suppliers are becoming as important as the relationships with large financial counterparties that international banks had established over many years. That is a sign of the rising prominence of operational vs. financial matters in that new world – less of an afterthought.

Dear CEO letter 'International banks active in the UK: 2022 priorities' 3. Critical third parties to the finance sector: policy statement 4. Climate capital − speech by Sam Woods | Bank of England 5. Climate-related financial risk management and the role of capital requirements 6. Enhancing banks' and insurers approaches to managing the financial risks from climate change
These have now been delivered to help ensure that the Bank is prepared for emerging and future technologies, participants, and relationships across the payments value chain. Firstly, our regulatory perimeter has recently been expanded to allow us to supervise critical service providers to recognised payment systems and we have started supervision of our first service provider, VocaLink, who provides critical services to the Bacs, Faster Payments and LINK systems. It is important to be clear here that this change does not, in any way, replace the role of the scheme operators in managing their risks. Indeed we do not expect scheme operators to change how they work as a result. Instead, we see this supervision as a complementary corner stone supporting financial stability. We published our supervisory approach to service providers in February, setting out how we will use 5  international principles that are specifically tailored for this type of firm. Secondly, we worked with HM Treasury to further widen our regulatory perimeter to include non-interbank payment systems through the Digital Economy Act 2017. We are now in a position where a non-bank payment system, for example a ‘FinTech’ payment system whose users are not banks, can be brought under the Bank’s supervision, should one become systemically important to the UK financial system. 6  On both of these changes, the Bank has worked extensively with the other UK authorities to make sure our regime is future-proof and well-equipped to keep pace with and respond quickly to a payments landscape that continues to change shape.

The economy remains tied to the extraordinary and unpredictable nature of the pandemic. But with continued progress on the economic recovery and a reversal of some of the pandemic’s unusual dynamics, I anticipate that we will soon reach a time when business will be more like usual. I look forward to the Q&A portion of today’s program, and very much look forward to seeing many 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  of you when we are able to be together again. 1 See Hobijn, Bart, and Ayşegül Şahin (2021), “Maximum Employment and the Participation Cycle,” paper  presented at the 2021 Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, August 27. 2 Olivier Armantier, Fatima Boumahdi, Leo Goldman, Gizem Koşar, Jessica Lu, Giorgio Topa, and Wilbert van der  Klaauw, “Have Consumers’ Long-Run Inflation Expectations Become Un-Anchored?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, September 24, 2021. 3  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement, December 16, 2020. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Asia will grow, and the demand for quality in finance will grow. As global financial institutions restructure, and as technology transforms jobs in the next decade and beyond, we must ensure we are well prepared with the skills, depth of expertise and innovative capabilities to stay relevant and competitive. We have to continue to build globally competitive teams in Singapore, by proactively developing our Singaporean core while remaining open to foreign professionals with needed specialised experience and skill-sets. Skills that make the financial sector of tomorrow In short, we can excel in finance and build rewarding careers for Singaporeans. We move ahead from a solid base: a well-reputed financial centre with extensive links to the world, and a competent and skilled workforce. As we look to the future, we must develop capabilities in five areas, which I will touch on briefly in turn: (I)  Deep Functional Expertise;  (II)  Cross-Functional Capability;  (III)  Regional Knowledge and Experience;  (IV)  Technological Skills and Adaptability; and  (V)  Leadership  (I)  Deep functional expertise  First, we need to deepen functional expertise, across all areas of finance – in banking, capital markets and insurance. We are seeing a greater demand for specialised skills, for example in structured trade finance, reinsurance and specialty insurance. Financial institutions need strong expertise in risk management and compliance. In wealth management, there is demand for more sophisticated investment strategies that better hedge risks, and for being able to execute these strategies efficiently.

Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF) – celebrating 40 years of excellence Speech by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Institute of Banking and Finance 40th Anniversary Dinner, Singapore, 10 June 2014. *  *  *  Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of MAS and Chairman of IBF, Former Chairmen of the IBF, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure I speak for everyone in saying what a pleasure it is for us to be here as IBF celebrates its 40 years – 40 years of building skills and capabilities for what has become a leading international financial centre, and financial activities that support consumers and businesses with a broad range of their needs. I congratulate IBF for its achievements. Credit must go to IBF’s pioneers for your leadership and foresight, and the many individuals and financial institutions who have brought us to where we are today. Singapore’s development as a financial centre Major anniversaries are a good occasion for reflection. Singapore did not start out as a financial centre. In the early years of the nation’s development, the finance industry mainly comprised a group of foreign bank branches and small local banks. They serviced the foreign merchant houses and local merchants involved in trade across the Causeway, and provided working capital to various domestic businesses. However, the corporate sector relied largely on internal finance. There was also very little consumer finance. Skills in finance did not need to be more than basic.
The items with negative  3  Throughout this speech, when I mention euro area inflation, I will always refer to the measure provided by Eurostat’s HICP, unless I specify otherwise. 4  See also Bini Smaghi, L. (2008), “Careful with (the “d”) words!”, The European Colloquia Series, Venice, 25 November 2008. 2  BIS Review 81/2009  inflation rates are those such as clothes or electronic devices, which undergo constant quality improvements. A few items, mainly related to oil, recorded very strong price cuts. To check whether price cuts are generalised beyond food and energy, we could look at measures that exclude such items. These – the so-called measures of exclusion-based underlying inflation – can be constructed in several ways. I won’t go into the technical details here. Let’s just take the lowest and the highest at any point in time and construct a range. This range is shown as the shaded area of Chart 6, together with the headline inflation rate. The range has come down from the peak and is at or below 1.8%. Although this level is below the ECB definition of price stability, it is not exceptionally low and is actually higher than in 1998/1999, when underlying measures fell around 1%. International organisations, private forecasters and indeed the ECB expect this spell of negative inflation to be reversed, as suggested by inflation forecasts for 2009 and 2010. This can be seen, for example, from slide 7.

Let me discuss these scenarios in turn. The Phillips curve provides a useful framework for assessing the impact of growing economic slack and inflation expectations on price developments. In its most basic form, this theory posits that the inflation rate depends positively on the expected rate of inflation and negatively on the degree of slack in the economy, as measured, for example, by the difference between the supply potential of the economy and aggregate output, in other words the output gap. With euro area GDP falling at an annual rate of 4.8% in the first quarter of 2009 and unemployment rising to 9.2% in April, there is little doubt that spare capacity is high. This should exert downward pressure on prices. But how strong is this downward pressure, and can it determine deflationary risks for the euro area? Precise estimates of the Phillips curve for the euro area are subject to controversy. They vary depending on the specification, the precise measures of the output gap and expectations used, and the time frame considered. However, the general indication from the existing studies is that, on average, relatively large and persistent changes in the output gap are needed to affect euro area inflation. 5 In comparative terms, these changes are much larger than, for example, in the US and the UK. A simple plot (slide 9) of the evolution of various measures of the output gap against that of inflation for the euro area confirms that  5  See, for example, Musso, Stracca and van Dijkx (2007).