samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The breadth and engagement of the membership gives its standards credibility and creates peer pressure within the industry to promote adherence. 8  Canute, King of Denmark, England and Norway, 995-1035, reputedly set his throne by the sea shore and commanded the incoming tide to halt and not wet his feet and robes. Yet "continuing to rise as usual [the tide] dashed over his feet and legs without respect to his royal person. Then the king leapt backwards, saying: 'Let all men know how empty and worthless is the power of kings, for there is none worthy of the name, but He whom heaven, earth, and sea obey by eternal laws.' 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  Second, peer pressure within firms should reinforce standards and, more generally, the commitment to real markets. Most banks have codes of ethics or business principles. These are necessary but not sufficient not least because it isn’t reasonable to expect every trader to absorb their meaning or to translate them readily into live situations. But it is reasonable to expect them to use FMSB guidance to help recognise the differences between a real market and a rigged one. And it is essential that business cultures encourage everyone to call out market abuse when it occurs. Third, buyside pressure for proper behaviour is made easier by clear, practical standards.

Exports are growing, and stock markets are up. As a regional grouping, we have continued to integrate our economies while individually pursuing restructuring. ASEAN is now back on its feet, up and running again. The necessity of deeper integration The need to broaden and deepen economic co-operation is a necessity recognised by ASEAN more than ten years ago. In 1992, ASEAN started the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) to boost intra-ASEAN trade and establish the region as a common area for manufacturing operations. At that time, the catalyst for greater integration was globalisation. Competition was getting tougher. Europe was consolidating and integrating itself to form the Single European Market. In North America, the US, Canada and Mexico were preparing to form the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA). NAFTA provided US manufacturers an attractive, low cost manufacturing base in Mexico. Mexico too expected to benefit from new investments from the US, which would create jobs and bring growth and prosperity to the country. Both the Single European Market and NAFTA strengthened the competitiveness of the continents, and threatened to divert investments away from Asia. Determined not to lose out, ASEAN responded with AFTA. In retrospect, AFTA is perhaps the most important decision on economic cooperation that ASEAN members have taken together. Today, the world is even more globalised than compared to 1992. Competition is once again at our door step. This time however, the competition comes not from Europe or Mexico, but from much closer to home. China and India are growing very rapidly.
At the same time, we had been charged with stabilising the financial sector, committing ourselves to take over a large portfolio of illiquid UBS assets. In addition, we concluded euro versus Swiss franc swap arrangements with the European Central Bank and the central banks of Poland and Hungary, to ease refinancing of banks that had granted mortgage loans in Swiss francs in these two countries. These swaps made it possible to counteract the rise in the Libor generated by an additional demand for Swiss francs outside our normal field of operation. The third stage began in March 2009. By then, price stability was threatened, not by the temporary inflationary escalation of 2008, but quite the opposite – the risk of a fall in prices over the coming three years. Since, by that time, our room for manoeuvre in the area of interest rates was limited, we decided to turn to unconventional instruments in order to bring about a further relaxation in monetary conditions. How has the economic and financial situation developed since our assessment in March? Global economic outlook Global economic activity declined more sharply than expected in the first quarter of 2009, especially in Europe and Japan. However, recent financial and macroeconomic indicators have shown a few encouraging signs. Stock exchange indices have started to edge up. Oil prices, which had been falling since July 2008, have been rising again since March. Risk premia in the money and capital markets have declined.

4  BIS Review 77/2009  Observed inflation June 2009 2006 Q1  Inflation  2007 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2008 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2009 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  2006  2007  2008  1.1  0.7  2.5  Q4  1.23 1.33 1.22 0.46 0.09 0.52 0.63 1.68 2.50 2.70 3.00 1.60 0.00  Inflation forecast of March 2009 with Libor at 0.25% and of June 2009 with Libor at 0.25% 2009 Q1  Forecast March 2009, Libor at 0.25% Forecast June 2009, Libor at 0.25%  BIS Review 77/2009  2010 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2011 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2012 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  0.10 -0.86 -0.98 -0.43 0.09 0.19 0.13 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.25  -0.74 -0.83 -0.28 0.55 0.50 0.40 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.31 0.46 0.65  Q2  Q3  2009  2010  2011  -0.5  0.1  0.1  -0.5  0.4  0.3  Q4  5
7/15  Implementation of Basel III  I have previously referred to the need for banks to plan their future capital requirements, whether as a result of their business projections or of regulatory changes. In this connection, the importance of strengthening, as far as possible, current capital levels should be interpreted against the background of the challenge – a further challenge – entailed by the entry into force of the final stage of Basel III. Last week the EBA published an update of the estimated impact that the implementation of the outstanding elements of Basel III will have on European Union (EU) banks. According to this estimate, risk-weighted assets (RWAs) will increase in the EU as a whole by 24.4%, meaning additional capital totalling € billion in order to respond to new needs. Naturally, we should qualify these figures. Let us not forget that they reflect estimates made under conservative assumptions that banks will not adjust their portfolios to lessen the attendant impact. The EBA itself indicates that needs would fall to € billion if banks decided to retain all their profits during the transitory period. The reforms will not affect all banks equally. Large banks, in particular those that use internal models (IRB), will be most affected, with the impact being restricted to an 11.3% increase in RWAs for medium-sized banks and of only 5.5% for the smallest banks. The main impact will stem from the application of the regulatory floor for those risk-weighted assets calculated using the internal ratings-based approach.

As we have witnessed in some cases in the recent past, the holding of these securities by individuals entails problems in a context of crisis, turning them even into an obstacle for the institution’s “resolvability”. And that is exactly the opposite of what the rule originally sought. The Banco de España is determined to prevent this type of past situation from recurring. We should not make the same mistakes again. For these reasons, the challenge of covering these issues is greater for smaller-sized banks, which have a scant presence on the markets and are more geared to the retail segment. I think it is important that banks, in particular those with less access to the markets, should take advantage of those windows in which investors’ appetite for this type of asset increases, so as to bring forward as far as possible the issuance calendar. One final aspect I wish to mention is the cost of these issues and of liabilities in general. The latest Banco de España Financial Stability Report offers the findings of a study on European banks which conclude that the higher the level of the CET1 capital ratio, the lower debt issuance costs are. 9/15  This effect increases as debt instruments become more akin to capital instruments. As can be seen in the chart, if the CET1 ratio increases by 1 pp, a 0.3% reduction may be expected in the cost of issuing instruments eligible as Tier 1.
This is a valuable approach which should be extended to all facets of MAS’ dealings with industry. Industry feedback will help us refine our policy and avoid mistakes and unintended consequences. Our contacts with industry need not be confined to Singapore. More often than not, business decisions that affect Singapore are made in the head offices. Where possible, we should extend our presence and reach by linking up with institutions and organisations worldwide. Deepen talent pool Third, we need to deepen the talent pool in the financial sector. The vibrancy of Singapore’s financial centre is dependent on this. Without the trained talent, it will be very hard to persuade financial institutions to site new activities in Singapore. MAS must continue its efforts to build up and upgrade this talent pool. While MAS is already co-funding financial skills training, we also need to extend our efforts into improving the quality and quantity of financial training and research conducted in Singapore. One possibility is to set up specialised financial service institutes in Singapore to teach both the art and science of finance, for example in wealth management. At the same time, the local talent pool must also be supplemented by infusions of fresh blood from abroad. Singapore must continue with its open door policy to attract talented professionals to work here. Another means of deepening the overall talent pool is through greater circulation of talent between the public and private sectors. MAS has actively hired from industry in order to build up its expertise.

Unlike the trading of bonds and derivatives, the trading of stocks is mostly confined to their home markets. But since there are only a limited number of large Singapore companies who have not yet been listed, Singapore will have to try harder to bring in foreign listings, particularly from India and China. One approach may be for SGX to leverage off Singapore agencies with presence in these countries, like EDB and IE Singapore. 1  DBS, OCBC, OUB, UOB, Keppel Bank and Tat Lee Bank. We excluded POSBank as it was technically not a bank. 2  The Banker, Jul 2002. 4  BIS Review 62/2002  Strategic and proactive approach to development In developing the financial sector, we sought to target key activities that would help to make us a world-class financial centre. Our pro-active approach has yielded results, both in expanding specific activities, and more generally in sensitising MAS to the needs of the industry. Debt market While the equity market has found it hard to grow, we have made some progress with our debt market, albeit starting from a very low base. The relaxation of the $ non-internationalisation restrictions 3 helped. We have issued more SGS to increase market liquidity and create a benchmark yield curve . 4 The corporate bond market has also seen significant growth . Issuers include supra-nationals such as the International Finance Corporation and the African Development Bank, well-regarded corporates such as GE Capital, and this year Freddie Mac.
Evidence from Eleven Countries over Twenty-Five Years”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 96(1), pp. 60-77 2  2/6  costs for certain groups of workers. Third, cybersecurity threats pose another challenge, given the vast amount of valuable information created and stored in the digital economy. Digitalisation may potentially lead to significant changes in the structure of most sectors of the economy. Among them, the possible impact on the financial sector is especially relevant for the Banco de España given our role as banking prudential and conduct supervisor and central bank. In particular, new technologies may imply efficiency gains and may also facilitate the entry of new companies offering financial services. For customers this may entail benefits in terms of cost savings and financial inclusion. For the incumbent banks technological change involves both challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, the entry of new competitors such as Fintech or Bigtech companies may threaten the market shares of incumbents. But on the other hand, innovation may lead in the long run to efficiency gains in the provision of financial services for incumbent banks, although in the short term it probably implies an increase in costs necessary to adapt to the new technologies. Given our limited understanding of the impact of digitalisation on the economy, the use of surveys to firms can be a useful tool to enhance our knowledge of specific aspects of digitalisation such as adoption rates, barriers and impact on firm performance.

10 Table 1 shows a few practical, down-to-earth calculations: a typical housing purchase in Sweden and Stockholm in 2004 and 2017 respectively. 11 We see that prices have increased significantly during the period, as has the size of the mortgages, while interest payments have not. This is due to the low mortgage rates. The figures can hence be deceptive. As we see, a 1-percentage point higher mortgage rate would have increased borrowing costs by significantly more in 2017 than in 2004. For a typical household in Sweden, a 1-percentage point higher interest rate in 2004 would have led to an increase in interest expenditure per month of less than SEK 500. This can be compared to 2017, when the same typical household would have seen its interest payments increase by over SEK 1,100. For the equivalent typical household in Greater Stockholm, a 1percentage point higher interest rate in 2004 would have increased their interest expenditure by just over SEK 900 per month, while a similar rate hike in 2017 would have pushed up interest expenses by more than SEK 2,300 per month. From a monetary policy perspective, one thing we need to do is to assess what the increased interest-rate sensitivity of households means for the effects of the repo rate on their consumption. For a more detailed description, see P. Gustafsson, M. Hesselman, and B. Lagerwall (2017), “How are household cashflows and consumption affected by higher interest rates?”, Staff Memo, Sveriges Riksbank. 10 See “Household indebtedness and interest-rate sensitivity”, article in Financial Stability Report 2017:2.
Lee Hsien Loong: Financial sector - liberalisation and growth Address by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Association of Banks in Singapore’s 31st Annual Dinner, Singapore, 17 June 2004. *  *  *  In 1997, MAS launched a comprehensive review of Singapore’s financial sector. The Asian crisis unfolded soon after, but we decided to press on. Over the next few years, we fundamentally changed our regulatory approach, from one-size-fits-all prescriptive regulation towards a more risk-focussed supervisory approach. We liberalised the industry, allowing freer competition, more play of market forces, and greater risk taking by institutions. We actively promoted activities in which we had competitive advantages. Our efforts are bearing fruit. In the last seven years, the financial industry has changed dramatically. Tonight, let me review the state of the industry, and discuss some key challenges and opportunities going forward. Overview of changes in the financial sector Singapore’s financial sector held up well against the full impact of the Asian Financial Crisis, and more recently the SARS outbreak. Despite the turbulent environment, it has steadily grown and matured. Our financial system is robust, and our legal, supervisory and institutional framework is sound, as the IMF’s recent Financial System Stability Assessment of Singapore affirmed. Today, 700 local and foreign financial institutions are in Singapore. They offer a comprehensive range of world-class financial services and with 5% of our workforce, contribute 12% of Singapore’s GDP.

25 (1973–74) to the Storting: “Petroleumsvirksomhetens plass i det norske samfunn” [The role of petroleum activity in Norwegian society]. 2  The Paradox of Plenty. Oil Booms and Petro-States by Terry Lynn Karl (1997) provides a good overview of oil nations’ problems. BIS Review 78/2010  1  From time to time, I meet representatives of the diplomatic corps in Norway. They seldom fail to mention the high cost level in Norway and their bewilderment over aspects of our way of life. A 17th century Moroccan ambassador was even more critical in his account of the wealthiest nation at that time: “…the Spanish nation today possesses the greatest wealth and the largest income of all Christians. But the love of luxury and the comforts of civilization have overcome them, and you will rarely find one of this nation who engages in trade or travels abroad for commerce as do the other Christian nations […]. Similarly, the handicrafts practiced by the lower classes and common people are despised by this nation, which regards itself as superior to other Christian nations. Most of those who practice these crafts in Spain are Frenchmen [who] flock to Spain to look for work … [and] in a short time make great fortunes.” See chart “Petroleum production” at the end of the speech. The oil age in Norway has now spanned about 40 years and there are prospects that it will continue for some time ahead.
With the perspective that the passage of time accords, history will acknowledge JeanClaude’s leadership and his ability to maintain the appropriate degree of flexibility needed to respond to the crisis. These qualities were key to ensuring that the ECB and the Eurosystem were up to the task, contributing decisively, through the discharge of the responsibilities legally entrusted to each, to maintaining financial stability across the euro area. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

With such caracteristics of climate-related risks, climate « stress test » as well as climate « scenario analysis », can prove to be very useful tools for financial institutions and their supervisors, to examine and understand the effects of different pathways for climate  change, as well as the effects of different pathways for climate policy, technology and consumer and investor preferences. It can prove also useful to reflect on and examine the impact of management decisions. It is with those mainly qualitative objectives in mind that, at the ACPR and the Banque de France, we have conducted with the French insurance and banking industry our first scenario analysis, which was completed and published a few weeks ago. I must say that those qualitative objectives have been well met, from our perspective. In particular, the exercise has clearly incentivised the participants to reflect on and develop appropriate tools and methodological frameworks to incorporate climate-related risks as a  mainstream risk to be governed and managed on a day to day basis accordingly, in line with our supervisory expectations. Given the difficulties to assess the exposure to and the impact of climate-related risk we have not assigned to this exercise quantitative objectives, beyond providing participants and us with a first bottom up assessment of their exposure, based on common assumptions, assessment which appears to be moderate by 2050.
The monetary policy we have needed to conduct to attain the inflation target and to provide sufficient support for the recovery has entailed historically-low interest rates and support to lending through fixed-rate loans to the banks. In Sweden house prices have risen substantially over several years. During the crisis, for instance, while house prices fell during a period of time, data from Statistics Sweden indicate that they have been rising again since the end of 2009 (Figure 3). Figure 3 House prices Annual percentage change  Source: Statistics Sweden  4  BIS Review 25/2010  There are many indications that the rise in house prices in Sweden as a whole is due to fundamental factors, such as the fact that demand has increased more than the number of new housing. But there may be risks. The Riksbank, like many other central banks, must achieve the balance I just described – evaluate possible risks of an imbalance in the housing market in relation to what we believe will happen in the economy as a whole. We have done this when making decisions on interest rates right now and in our forecast of future monetary policy. In a way, this is nothing new. We always follow developments in the housing market very closely. At the same time, we see a need to develop the analysis of house prices and credit growth – not least with regard to the question of how the links between the housing market and the Riksbank’s tasks and objectives look.

Our policy response was conditioned by the concerns of financial stability, assuming that interest rate cuts would speed up deposit withdrawals from the banking system. Bank of Albania took bold and decisive steps to control these problems and restore the credibility in banking system. As the effects of the fiscal stimulus began to phase out and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  confidence was restored in the banking system, we reduced our policy rate to its historic low in order to provide further stimulus for the economy. More importantly, our supervision of the banking system has been enhanced by establishing a thoroughly new Department of Financial Stability and by bringing financial stability issues in the decision-making process of monetary policy. As a result, the set of tools available to the Bank of Albania has extended to include several macro-prudential measures, which aim to address simultaneously both economic growth and financial stability concerns. I believe that similar steps have been taken by most central banks around the world. Willingly or not, the objective of financial stability is now seen as the central duty of our institutions. It does not matter whether the legal mandate of the central bank is amended to include this new objective or not. What matters is that financial stability is a prerequisite to overall macroeconomic stability and monetary stability.