samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And they include restoring the functionality of the banking sector, so that it supports rather than hinders the domestic economy as it emerges from the crisis. 8  OECD Economic Surveys: Germany 2012 (February 2012). 9  Lusine Lusinyan and Dirk Muir, “Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of Structural Reforms: The Case of Italy”, IMF Working Paper, January 2013. 10  Ramon Gomez-Salvador, Alberto Musso, Marc Stocker and Jarkko Turunen, “Labour Productivity Developments in the Euro Area”, ECB Occasional Paper, No. 53, October 2006. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Conclusion Let me conclude. The challenges the euro area is facing today to raise its growth potential are not new. Since the 1990s we have known that supply conditions in the euro area needed to be reformed. This was the aim of the failed Lisbon Agenda. And indeed, it was the context for a famous quote about the apparent inconsistency between reform and re-election. What is new today, however, is the urgency for action. We are facing the risk of a structural set back in growth. We can therefore no longer afford to delay, nor should we over-burden monetary policy. Structural reforms are a must. For this reason, the apparent contradiction between reforms and re-election may now be moot, simply because citizens want growth, and without reforms it will not materialise. There is no country in the euro area that has delayed reforms and achieved economic outcomes with which their citizens are content.

Convergence Programs of the new Member States should include ambitious Medium Term Objectives to ensure that not only the Maastricht criteria are met, but most importantly, the emergence of excessive deficit situations is avoided and the risks of taking recourse to exchange rate adjustments after joining the ERM2 (and, eventually, the euro area) are minimized. The well functioning single market for all goods and services, including infrastructure networks, as well as pursuing the National Reform Programmes in the context of the reinforced Lisbon agenda is the other pillar for the success of the euro area and for the new Member States in particular. Estonia has been a de facto member of the euro area since the inception of its independent currency in 1992. Fixing the local currency to D-mark, and later to the euro meant that the monetary policy decisions were not made in Estonia. Estonia's currency board regime implies prudent fiscal stance that has been largely adhered to since 1992, resulting in our general government having accumulated a relatively large net asset position of around 10 percent of GDP. A solid budgetary position and early deregulation of product and capital markets implies that Estonia has been well placed to absorb both positive and negative shocks during the last 15 years. Deregulation and reform in preparation of the EU membership has allowed us to fully integrate our economic and financial systems with the Single Market. However, that kind of approach requires, in today's conjuncture, forward-looking structural reforms in almost all EU member states, e.g.
However, the facility’s value in terms of monetary policy implementation wouldn’t necessarily be determined by the amount of usage. If the facility increases bargaining power for market participants, it could conceivably provide an effective floor for short-term rates, giving the Desk tighter control of money market conditions even with usage of the facility that’s low on average. At its September 2013 meeting, the FOMC unanimously approved a resolution that allowed the Desk to start an operational test of fixed-rate, overnight reverse repos.17 The exercise, which began on September 23 and is authorized to run until January 29, 2014, entails the conduct of a daily overnight, fixed-rate reverse repo auction in order to assess operational readiness to carry out such transactions. It therefore allows the Desk, its wide range of counterparties, and the tri-party clearing banks to utilize and fine-tune their procedures for end-to-end processing of trades, from posting of the rate to running operations, moving cash and collateral, unwinding the trade, and integrating information with accounting systems. Like other technical exercises, this one isn’t intended to materially affect the current level of shortterm interest rates. Accordingly, for the purposes of the exercise, each counterparty’s participation is capped.

Debate on the difference of behavior between the Eurosystem and the Fed. •  Less aggressive interest rate cuts in the euro area than in the US after 2001 and prolonged period of stable policy rates between 2003 and 2005 raised the question: is the Eurosystem “too passive”? •  Activism and gradualism refer to the number and magnitude of changes in the policy rate over a given period. •  Research recently conducted on the basis of an estimated model for the euro area and the US over the last two decades has yielded three findings: 2 -  the monetary policy strategies pursued by the Eurosystem and the Fed do exhibit some differences;  -  the degree of interest rate smoothing, taken as an indicator of monetary policy gradualism, is quite similar in the euro area and the US;  -  the differences in patterns can be ascribed to differences in size and nature of shocks. Most of the differences are due to demand shocks, which were larger in the United States. 1  A. Blinder (1998)  2  Motto and Rostagno (2005) and Sahuc and Smets (2006)  2  BIS Review 63/2006  Monetary policy and asset prices. •  Caution is also an answer to the following question: should monetary policy systematically react to perceived asset prices misalignments?
Ravi Menon: Building talent in the financial sector Opening address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Institute of Banking & Finance Annual Conference, Singapore, 22 June 2011. *  *  *  Ms Kate Sweetman, fellow Council Members of the IBF, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. The financial crisis has triggered a fundamental shift in the global financial landscape. There has been much discussion globally on levelling up regulatory standards to meet the risks of an increasingly complex and inter-connected financial services sector. But there has been less discussion on the competencies that need to be levelled up in financial services – competencies in risk management, corporate governance, and financial supervision. Only if competency standards are raised, will the ongoing financial regulatory efforts bear fruit. Since its inception, the Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF) has been playing a critical role in raising the standards of the financial sector in Singapore. Today, this has become more relevant than ever. Let me give an update of IBF’s efforts. In 2005, IBF launched the Financial Industry Competency Standards (or “FICS”). This is a set of competency standards developed by the industry, for the industry. It provides a practice-oriented approach and a clear roadmap for people working in the financial sector to attain the competencies they need to do their jobs. FICS has taken off quite well. As at end-2010, some 360 training/assessment programmes have been accredited under the FICS framework.

A new Client Advisor Competency Standards (CACS) assessment for the Private Banking industry is also slated to be introduced in September this year. These two examinations will allow Relationship Managers – those dealing with either corporate clients or high net-worth individuals – to be independently tested on their product knowledge. We also want to raise the competency levels of professionals dealing with the broader retail investor base. IBF will roll out in the third quarter of this year, new Modules under the MASregulated Capital Markets and Financial Advisory Services (CMFAS) Examination. These  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  new modules aim at raising the minimum competency standards for CMFAS representatives who wish to sell “structured products”. Despite these efforts, talent remains scarce in the industry. Bankers I speak to express concern about the sufficiency of skilled talent to sustain the growth of the financial industry. PwC’s 2011 Global CEO Survey conducted among 1,200 business leaders world-wide revealed that talent issues are topmost of CEO concerns. Every good CEO knows that it is not just business strategies, processes and technologies which drive new revenue streams. It is people with strong competencies and professional integrity, dedicated to serving the customer, who make the critical difference. Financial institutions must put in place policies and practices to ensure that their staff are well trained before they are allowed to deal with clients. Singapore’s financial sector headcount is expected to grow by 5 to 6 per cent this year.
And third, have structural changes in the world economy, such as the globalisation of capital, production and labour, made the job of central banks easier? I will deal with all three questions today, but particularly with the effects of globalisation. I will focus mainly on labour market aspects, taking the immigration we have seen in Spain in recent years as an example of the positive effects that globalisation can have on inflation. What is behind the recent success of central banks’ in combating inflation? Recent studies have given the credit for reducing the high inflation of the '70s and early '80s to the central banks’ better knowledge of the economy. In my view, these studies have got it right. We have to admit that, at least in some countries, monetary policy didn’t do all it could in the '70s to contain the oil shock-induced inflation of that time. Perhaps at that time, central banks lacked understanding of how supply shocks affect the output gap, as well as of the role of inflation expectations, and how these relate to monetary policy actions. But I don’t think that insufficient knowledge of the economy was the only factor explaining the rise in inflation during those years. Indeed, political will – or rather a lack of political will – could have been even more important. Germany is a good counter-example here, as a recent paper by Stephen Cechetti and others shows.

To give you another idea of what immigration has meant for the Spanish economy, let me tell you that foreign residents accounted for nearly the entire growth of the working age population between 2001 and 2006. What is more, as immigrants have a higher propensity to work, they have also helped to increase the aggregate employment rate through a composition effect. If we simply combine these two direct effects, immigration accounts for almost one-third of Spain’s notable GDP per capita growth since the turn of the century. This figure would be even larger if we took other indirect effects into account. For instance, immigrants’ readiness to take jobs caring for children and the elderly has pushed up the participation rate and the productivity of native female workers. Let me add, that despite Spain’s inflation differential with the euro zone, which is now standing at around half a percentage point over the euro area average, immigration has helped ease the inflationary pressure that results from buoyant domestic demand. How does immigration affect inflation? In two ways. First, an increasing labour force raises growth potential, which helps reduce the feed-through of strong demand pressures to inflation. Usually, any boost to output is followed by a rise in real wages and, thus, marginal costs, which translate into higher inflation. But this feed-through need not take place if rising labour demand is met with rising labour supply from abroad, as we have seen in Spain in the last few years.
Since 2015, we have formally adopted “the inflation targeting regime”. This regime provides the adequate incentives, discipline and flexibility to the maximisation of the longterm social welfare. In parallel with the evolution of the monetary policy, the Bank of Albania, in years, has built on a modern and effective regulatory banking framework, in line with the best international practices. From time we have implemented the regulatory standards incorporated in Basel I, II and III. Then, we have helped the establishment of the Albanian Deposit Insurance Agency (ADISA) and the resolution framework. These two elements are crucial for the stability of the financial system. In addition, we have been working in collaboration with other public authorities, on the development of the complete supervisory and regulatory architecture. I would like to mention in this regard the establishment of the Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) and the Financial Stability Advisory Group (FSAG). In the light of such a historical background of development and evolution, the Bank of Albania has shown itself an institution able to be adapted and change to keep up with the times. In parallel, the gradual, well-thought and to some extent, conservative evolution has always been important to the Bank of Albanian aimed at adopting the best international experiences resistant to the time. I think these two development features provide the appropriate guarantees that we will know to face the challenges of the “New normal”.

3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  *** Dear participants, I avail the opportunity for addressing to this Conference and highlighting the importance of sharing knowledge and experiences among us on such an important theme. I would like to conclude my speech by thanking you again for the invitation! 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
The first half of the nineties experienced a major transformation in the design of large-value payment systems with the widespread introduction of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems. In a second step, further advances in information technologies have made possible new designs like the so called “hybrid systems”, i.e. systems that settle in real-time but, at the same time, minimise liquidity needs thanks to highly sophisticated optimisation mechanisms. In short, advances in information technology allowed large-value payment systems to settle faster, with a lower amount of liquidity and at a lower cost. On the retail payments side, technological progress should also allow safety and efficiency gains beyond those which have resulted, for instance, from the implementation of cheque truncation or those that are expected from introduction of the EMV (Europay Mastercard Visa) technology for card payments. Innovation has definitely an important role to play in order to keep the SEPA project futureoriented and promote the use of new delivery channels for retail payments like the internet and mobile devices, or new types of services like electronic invoicing. However, this flow of innovations come together with the entry in the payments market of new actors which do not always offer the same level of security as the traditional suppliers of those services, namely credit institutions. There is obviously a trade-off between, on the one hand, encouraging innovation by facilitating access to the payments market and, on the other hand, ensuring the safety of payments provided by setting prudential requirements on their suppliers.

Conclusion In summary, I would like to say that, even if there are factors suggesting that the significance of the exchange rate should not be exaggerated, it is my opinion that it should be considered in monetary policy decisions. Recently, the development of the exchange rate has been an important reason for the reservations I have entered against monetary policy decisions. The Swedish economy grew very strongly during 2010, but this should be seen in the light of the very steep fall that started in 2008 and continued in 2009. My assessment is that there are still relatively many unutilised resources in the Swedish economy and that both resource utilisation and inflationary pressures will continue to be lower than normal over large parts of the Riksbank’s forecast period. Contributing to this is the fact that the krona has (nominally) strengthened by about 10 per cent over the last year, which is more than was previously expected. As a stronger krona dampens both inflationary pressures and resource utilisation, I believe that a lower repo rate path than that decided upon would lead to better target fulfilment. References Campa, J. M. and Goldberg, L. S. (2005), “Exchange Rate Pass-through into Import Prices”, Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 679–690. Chinn, M. D. and Meredith, G. (2004), “Monetary Policy and Long-Horizon Uncovered Interest Parity”, IMF Staff Papers 51, 409–430. Ekholm, K. (2010), “Monetary policy and the exchange rate”, speech at HQ Bank, Stockholm 12 January 2010.
It also enables the emergence of large bilateral asymmetries in the measurement of the same variables, as observed, for example, between the euro area and the United States, but also within the European Union (Chart 3). [5]  Chart 3 Bilateral euro area-US current account (EUR billions; 2020)  Sources: ECB and US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note: Positive balance indicates a surplus for the euro area. Turning to the financial side of globalisation, indicators of international financial trade increased from the early 1990s until the global financial crisis and have subsequently stabilised since then in proportion to global output (Chart 4). As shown in my work with Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, the expansion in external assets was concentrated in positions vis-à-vis international financial centres, which in turn are linked to the corporate structures of MNEs. [6]  Chart 4 Evolution of external assets (percentages of world GDP)  Sources: External Wealth of Nations database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti) and ECB staff calculations. Notes: Aggregates for advanced economies, financial centres and emerging and developing countries are defined as in Lane, P. R. and Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2018), “The External Wealth of Nations Revisited: International Financial Integration in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis”, IMF Economic Review, Vol. 66, No 1, International Monetary Fund, pp. 189-222. Gross foreign direct investment (FDI) transactions of euro area countries with financial centres have been so large that these have driven aggregate euro area developments.

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As we know, demand and growth have been high there for many years without inflation accelerating. Demand has been stimulated by high share prices and the private sector’s financial balance has decreased markedly. The strong credit expansion that preceded the bank crises in Sweden at the beginning of the 1990s took place at the same time as a strong increase in private consumption and investments, which led to an increasing deficit in the balance of trade, considerable overheating and high inflation in the Swedish economy. It is reasonable to assume that a large expansion in credit would create inflationary pressure now as well that would motivate restrictions in monetary policy. In this way, the credit expansion should be dampened and the risk for problems in the bank system reduced. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that situations will arise with strong credit expansion, for instance based on increasing asset prices without an increase in inflation being anticipated. Strong international competition combined with low, stable inflation expectations could possibly mean that inflation would not accelerate despite increased use of resources. It is also possible to conceive of situations with a credit expansion driven by high turnover on the asset markets. It is thus far from self-evident that a monetary policy based on stable prices would automatically be a guarantee against financial crises. These are questions to which there are no certain answers although they are discussed and investigated internationally as well as in Sweden.

In addition, the Act states that the Riksbank, without prejudice to the objective of price stability, shall support general economic policy with a view to achieving sustainable growth and high employment. Furthermore, when the new Act was passed, responsibility for general issues relating to foreign exchange policy was transferred from the Riksbank to the Government It is thus the Government that is to decide on the krona’s relationship to other currencies. This means, for instance, that it is the Government that shall decide whether and when Sweden shall apply for participation in the European exchange rate mechanism, ERM2. However, the Riksbank is responsible for setting the exchange rate at which the linkage shall be made in this case and the width of the band in which the krona shall be allowed to vary. In practice, it is reasonable to assume that this takes place in consultation with the Government, not least because Sweden cannot decide on this unilaterally. Control is exercised in various ways to ensure that monetary policy is conducted in accordance with the law and the intentions of the democratically appointed government authorities. What is involved therefore is not at all complete independence. The Government authorities naturally exercise control of how the Riksbank performs its work. We on the Executive Board of the Bank have also responded to the consequences of this independence by the way in which we have organised the monetary policy decision-making process.