samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indeed, in a perfect world we might wish to see workers moving from higher-productivity to lower-productivity firms to enable good practices and processes to be effectively diffused from the upper to the lower tail. 39  The US job-to-job flow data are more comprehensive than those in the UK at picking up job moves within a given quarter. This methodological difference means that estimated US churn rates will be stronger than those in the UK, but this can only explain part of the gap between the UK and US job-to-job transition rates. 40 We combine the ASHE and BSD data for this analysis. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  Table 4 shows a matrix of transition probabilities for workers between four quantiles of the probability distribution for companies. 41  All of these probabilities are conditional on a worker moving in the first place  and so sum horizontally to one. Two points stand out. First, there is a high degree of stickiness in job moves. Workers tend to move between jobs in the same productivity quartile. In the upper and lower quartiles, around 40% of jobs moves are within-quartile. The second point is that there is rather limited evidence of technological diffusion being supported by jobs flows from firms in the frontier to the long tail. The probability of a worker for a company in the upper quartile moving to one in the lowest quartile is around 20%.

On balance, my outlook is that growth in the rest of the world will be roughly the same in 2014 as it is this year, so that the contribution of trade to growth will likely remain quite small. Putting all these factors together, I still conclude that there is a basis for a pickup in growth as fiscal restraint lessens, but the impulse is not likely to be a particularly powerful one without some unanticipated impetus to growth that solves the chicken-egg problems, especially in the near term. On the inflation side of the ledger, inflation remains below the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent longer-run objective for the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator. The year-overyear change in the total PCE deflator was 1.4 percent in July. This has created some concern that inflation is “too low,” raising real interest rates and making monetary policy less accommodative. I acknowledge this concern, but I believe it will abate as inflation moves gradually back up towards a 2 percent annualized rate over the next few years. A number of considerations inform my view. First, a decomposition of core inflation reveals that the most recent slowing in inflation has been largely confined to core goods, whereas the rate of increase of core services has been relatively steady. Such was not the case in 2010 – the previous instance of a significant slowing of inflation. This suggests that the fall in inflation partly reflects idiosyncratic factors that are not likely to be sustained.
By placing its initiatives within the framework of the Eurosystem’s discussions on an “e-euro", the Banque de France will continue and enhance its investment and expertise in the area of innovation in payment infrastructures and means of payment. To this end, it has recently created an Infrastructures, Innovation and Payments Directorate. This Directorate will enhance its resources in this area and will, I hope, participate in the work carried out within the BIS Innovation Hub. On an operational level, this  commitment will soon lead the Bank, in close cooperation with market professionals, to conduct experiments with a view to integrating a CBDC into the procedures for exchanging tokenised assets. In this respect, a call for projects will be launched at the end of March 2020. Conclusion It is indisputable that the digitisation of the economy has been a source of progress in the field of payments and other areas, as it has diversified and streamlined the services offered to the consumer. However, despite this positive assessment, we must not overlook the growing interdependence of economies, and the sovereignty risks that this greater intermediation is likely to pose in a context of trade tensions. At the Banque de France and the ACPR, we are ready to assist the market in the transformations necessary to preserve and develop a robust and resilient European ecosystem, capable of ensuring the continued sovereignty of our monetary and financial system.

This is particularly true of international payment schemes in the area of card payments (Visa, Mastercard), through which nearly two-thirds of card payments made in the European Union, especially cross-border transactions, are routed. Eighteen countries depend entirely on international schemes for the processing of their domestic transactions. Mobile payments, whose share is increasing, depend largely on mobile operating system developers such as Apple or Samsung. In addition, private systems entering in the instant payment sector are multiplying – Paypal, Lydia, and also Alipay, which will soon be launched in France, for example – at the risk of undermining bank interoperability and competition. Restrictions on the use of certain proprietary technical solutions such as NFC sensors, or payment card acceptance software for example, may also constitute an obstacle to free competition. Hence, the importance, in this context, of including collective interest projects in the European strategy for retail payments, which has reiterated the need for the EU to ensure the independence of its range of payment solutions. A key example of this is the project conducted by a group of banks to propose a solution, known as the European Payment Initiative (EPI). This is why the Banque de France and the Eurosystem as a whole are encouraging and supporting this market initiative, which would represent a further major milestone in the creation of an integrated European payment area since the creation of the SEPA area. B- Central banks may also contribute as providers of settlement services in central bank money, particularly with regard to financial intermediaries.
The basis for the Riksbank’s assessment included the prospect of a continued strengthening of economic activity, now with increased support from domestic demand. GDP growth was put at about 3 per cent in 1998 and over 3 per cent in 1999. Inflation expectations were considered to be largely in line with the inflation target. Compared with the September report, the Riksbank’s assessment in December represented a minor upward adjustment (by some tenths of a percentage point) of inflation in 1999, mainly in view of higher wage costs and lower productivity. Of greater practical importance for monetary policy was the forward shift of the time perspective by one quarter, which meant that the inflation forecast now included a period when capacity utilisation and BIS Review 5/1998  -6-  inflationary pressure were calculated to be somewhat higher. The picture of the real economic future had not changed appreciably during the autumn. The December report also presented two alternative scenarios that were judged to be equally probable. One envisaged stronger inflationary pressure due to higher wage increases and weaker productivity growth. The other involved stronger effects than expected from the Asian crisis and consequently a smaller increase in inflation. It has been claimed in the public debate that the Riksbank played down the Asian crisis. That is not so. Certain effects were allowed for in the main scenario for the December report. But above all, the risk of the crisis becoming more profound was highlighted in a risk scenario as an important factor for monetary policy to consider.

Public expenditures, as you can see on the slide, restricted the fall in domestic demand with a contribution of approximately 1.2 points to growth (Figure 23). Figure 22: Contribution to Growth from Figure 23: Contribution to Growth Production Expenditures (Percentage Points)  from  -4 -5 -6  -5.0  Source: TURKSTAT. BIS Review 103/2009  -5.6  -6.6 -8.3  -7.1 Net Exports  -1.9  -3  Change in Stocks  -1.1  -2  0.6  Public Investment  -0.1  0.5  Public Consumption  -1  7.0  Private Investment  0  8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10  Private Consumption  Net Vergi  Services  Construction  Industry  Agriculture  (Percentage Points)  Source: TURKSTAT. 13  Uncertainties in demand conditions driven by the global turmoil lead firms to adopt a cautious approach regarding production activities. In this context, the low capacity utilization rates and the weak course of propensity to invest continue to limit employment conditions. In the first quarter of 2009, with the accelerating slowdown in economic activity, the negative course of the labor market intensified in comparison with the previous quarter, and the increase in unemployment rates continued, also due to the increase in labor force participation rates (Figure 24).
In 2001, the Norwegian parliament approved new fiscal policy guidelines stipulating that the annual transfer from the Fund to the fiscal budget – that is annual spending of oil money – should correspond to the expected real return on the Fund. The expected real return is estimated at 4 per cent. The point of reference for the spending rule is a normal cyclical situation. In the event of particularly high capacity utilisation, spending should be lower than 4 per cent, whereas in a cyclical downturn, somewhat higher spending may be appropriate. The intention is for this wealth to be transferred to future generations, and that each generation should only spend the returns. The rule gives weight to long-term considerations when addressing current economic policy challenges. The rule also helps stabilise exchange rate expectations. The fiscal rule has the advantage of having intuitive appeal, and it is easy to check whether it is being followed over the business cycle. In line with the rule, the transfer from the Fund was higher than the expected real return of 4 per cent in the cyclical downturn in 2003 and the following two years. Since 2006, however, the transfer has been lower. It should also be noted that the target for the rule is the cyclically adjusted transfer, shown by the solid line in Chart 6. Automatic stabilisers are allowed to work, thereby reducing actual transfers during upturns and increasing them during downturns, as illustrated by the broken line in Chart 6.

On the regulatory side, the Fed has taken a number of steps to encourage banks to use their balance sheet to support borrowers. For community banks, for example, the federal banking agencies are implementing the part of the CARES Act to lower the community bank leverage ratio.3 4 In terms of liquidity provision, the Fed has actively encouraged banks to use the discount window to help meet the demand for credit from household and businesses.5 To make this more attractive, the Fed has lowered the borrowing rate, extended the term of these loans, and actively signaled support for discount window use. The Fed also implemented the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF).6 This facility is designed to support the effectiveness of the Paycheck Protection Program, created by the CARES Act and implemented by the Small Business Administration (SBA), by extending credit to financial institutions that make PPP loans. Supplying financial institutions with additional liquidity will help increase their capacity to make PPP loans. In term of eligibility for participation in the PPPLF, the Federal Reserve is working to expand eligibility to PPP lenders that are not depository institutions in the near future.7 Consumer Protection https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/sti200424  1/2  Panel Remarks: The Fed and Main Street during the Coronavirus Pandemic - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  The Fed has emphasized the importance of consumer protection during this period.
Those are the words of Sir Philip, the architect of that policy and someone who commanded and still commands a lot of respect. Indeed as Monetary Authority chief, I have no responsibility over that policy. It rests on the broad shoulders of Sir Donald Tsang who is carrying it bravely. Let us all make a little effort to give him the support that he needs, spiritual or otherwise, by trying to gain a better appreciation of what the policy of positive non-interventionism really means. BIS Review 67/1998  -4Whilst on the subject of intervention, may I reiterate that our intervention in the stock and futures market to deter currency manipulation does not imply any weakening of our resolve to adhere to the linked exchange rate system. This resolve has never been stronger. Indeed, as I have mentioned elsewhere, there simply is no better alternative for Hong Kong. The experience of many of our neighbouring economies in the past year or so underlines why. As the financial storm in this region spreads to almost everywhere now, and with increased intensity, the discipline of currency board arrangements of our linked exchange rate system is our best safeguard for our long-term prosperity and stability. BIS Review 67/1998

Not to act, however, would be to squander the lessons of the past decade and mortgage our futures. It is simply not an acceptable option. We face today probably the best macroeconomic environment in decades to put our economies on a sound economic and financial footing to meet the surprises we will inevitably face in the new century. The opportunities provided by rapid technological change are available to all in the global marketplace. The flexibility and adaptability we build into our respective economies today will ultimately determine the success we are able to achieve for the generations that follow us. The challenge could not be more important. 7  BIS Review 29/2000
Even disastrously, the under-employment in agriculture in Sri Lanka is not only the highest but also on the increase. According to the Consumer Finances and Socio-economic Survey of the Central Bank, the underemployment in the agriculture sector in 1996/97 stood at 31 per cent of the employed and it rose to 36 per cent by 2003/04. In contrast, the underemployment in the services  2  BIS Review 116/2008  sector fell from 20 per cent to 18 per cent between the two reference periods and that in the industry remained unchanged at 20 per cent. This has to be seen as both a weakness and an opportunity. We know that food prices have recorded an unprecedented increase in recent times. Hence, there are immense opportunities arising from increased prices and resultant increase in production. At the same time, food security has to be ensured in order to avoid adverse consequences of increased food prices and also undue declines in stocks. Given these limitations, the obvious strategy is to increase productivity. Accordingly, attempts need to be made to concentrate on land, water, agricultural methods, seeds, harvesting, credit to agriculture, transport, harvesting storage, stable prices, value addition etc. to raise productivity in agriculture. If the growth is constrained by limited expansion in agriculture, can’t we focus more on the industry sector? Of course, we can. Unlike the agriculture, which is constrained with limited land availability, industry does not have capacity or demand limitations.

Although we always stress the importance of improving productivity in agriculture and industry sectors, a similar significance should be assigned to the services sector as well. Despite the growing weight in services in economies, productivity growth in services has been slow in many countries and the share of the working-age population employed in services remains low in many countries. If we wish to strengthen economic growth and improve the foundations for the future performance of our economy, the services sector will need to do better. But strengthening growth performance is not the only challenge that we are facing. We are also confronted with the growing globalization of services and with rapid technological change posing the huge challenge of keeping the momentum in the services sector. Addressing such challenges and strengthening the potential of services to foster employment would be definitely through increased productivity and innovation. Certainly a productive services sector would deliver more benefits in a highly competitive environment. Sri Lanka’s telecommunication sector is a good example. In which areas have we been below par? Although Sri Lanka has a huge potential in services such as education, health and tourism, we haven’t done enough. So, also, has it been in the case of ports, financial services, including banking. We have not been able to reduce prices and charges through increased productivity. We may need to open domestic services markets to create new job opportunities and foster innovation and productivity.
Mario Draghi: ECB press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 5 December 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you to our press conference. I will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the Commission Vice-President, Mr Rehn. Based on our regular economic and monetary analyses, we decided to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. Incoming information and analysis have confirmed our assessment and monetary policy decisions of last month. Underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. In keeping with this picture, monetary and credit dynamics remain subdued. At the same time, inflation expectations for the euro area over the medium to long term continue to be firmly anchored in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. Such a constellation suggests that we may experience a prolonged period of low inflation, to be followed by a gradual upward movement towards inflation rates below, but close to, 2% later on. Our monetary policy stance will remain accommodative for as long as necessary, and will thereby continue to assist the gradual economic recovery in the euro area.

In this context, the Governing Council confirmed its forward guidance that it continues to expect the key ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time. This expectation continues to be based on an overall subdued outlook for inflation extending into the medium term, given the broad-based weakness of the economy and subdued monetary dynamics. With regard to money market conditions and their potential impact on our monetary policy stance, we are monitoring developments closely and are ready to consider all available instruments. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Following a rise of 0.3% in the second quarter of 2013, real GDP in the euro area increased by 0.1%, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter. Developments in survey-based confidence indicators up to November are consistent with a positive growth rate also in the fourth quarter of the year. Looking ahead to 2014 and 2015, output is expected to recover at a slow pace, in particular owing to some improvement in domestic demand supported by the accommodative monetary policy stance. Euro area economic activity should, in addition, benefit from a gradual strengthening of demand for exports. Furthermore, the overall improvements in financial markets seen since last year appear to be working their way through to the real economy, as should the progress made in fiscal consolidation. In addition, real incomes have benefited recently from lower energy price inflation.
But it does not mean that manufacturing output as a whole will contract in an absolute sense; on the contrary, past experience suggests that it will continue to increase, though the composition of output and techniques of production will continue to evolve. In that sense I very much share the view, of course, of the 49% of those surveyed by the ICA/IOD who disagree that manufacturing industry is in irreversible decline. It is entirely consistent with that view, of course, that other sectors, particularly the services sectors, will grow more rapidly and continue to increase their share of total output. The precise form of the macro-economic stability framework may well continue to evolve, and it would in particular be affected in some degree by the decision on whether or not we join the euro. Were we to do so, the nominal exchange rate certainty with our European partners, representing roughly half our international trade, would - depending partly on an appropriate entry rate, whatever that might be be of considerable longer-term benefit to many of the internationally-exposed businesses, in whatever sectors, that have suffered from the volatility, and particularly the weakness, of the euro in the past few years. And the greater transparency of prices and costs vis à vis other Eurozone members would enhance competition and the effective functioning of the single European market. There would also be benefits from the integration of our financial markets with those of the Eurozone.

Now I know it hasn't felt like that for everyone - particularly for internationally exposed businesses and their employees and for the regions in which such businesses are more heavily concentrated including the West Midlands with its relatively high concentration of manufacturing businesses. I am well aware that many of them - perhaps many of you - have been having a rough time over the past few years. 2  BIS Review 53/2002  Although the UK economy as a whole managed to avoid recession, UK manufacturing output fell from a peak nearly two years ago by around 7% and employment in UK manufacturing fell by 225,000 people, or some 6%. To put that into perspective, manufacturing output fell from peak to trough over much the same period by over 16% in Japan, by 7½% in the US and by 6½% in Germany; and manufacturing employment fell by 7¼% in Japan, 9½% in the US and nearly 3% in Germany. So the pressures on manufacturing were not confined to, nor did they originate in this country. There are two main reasons for the pressures on the internationally-exposed sectors of our economy. The first is the weakness of much of the global economy as a result of the Asia crisis and its aftermath in the late 1990's, and then, more recently, as a result of the sharp, synchronised, slowdown in the major industrial countries - as reflected in the figures I've just given you.