samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So yes to the innovation brought by digital assets and DeFi - which is, let me repeat, very welcome in Paris - but not at the cost of less regulation, which would - as we have seen elsewhere - work against the interests of the players themselves. II. Digitalisation of currency and payments: illustration of innovation partnership approach This brings me to the more forward-looking recipe, which provides a second insight into the dynamic interdependence between regulation and innovation, and between the public and private sector. Private innovation is both crucial and irreplaceable but central banks also have creative DNA, and many innovations  Page 4 of 6 are deployed within a partnership framework. Money is a perfect illustration. For centuries, the coexistence of central bank and commercial bank money has structured the retail payment landscape. We can all physically pay with central bank money, using cash, or with commercial bank money, using non-cash payment instruments such as cards. However, the rapid digitalisation of payments is leading to a rethink: as we become fully digital societies, should central bank currency be the only thing to remain in paper format? I imagine that two centuries ago, certain people had major doubts about issuing banknotes - a major innovation at the time - alongside gold and silver coins. Essentially, the e-euro should be a digital banknote – in other words "Cash +". First, it should have the same properties as cash. In particular, it will guarantee respect for privacy,iii with offline functionality guaranteeing the utmost confidentiality.

2023 Paris Finance Forum – Paris, 5 July 2023 Regulation and innovation: the yin and yang of the financial sector  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 of 6 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a real pleasure to be taking part in the Paris Finance Forum and I wish to warmly thank Augustin de Romanet for his invitation, and Europlace for their work. Europlace has contributed to the growing interest in the Paris financial centre in the wake of Brexit. As I have the privilege of speaking this lunchtime, I shall begin with dessert. According to an excellent Bloomberg article,i "If any city can make claim to being the European Union’s new pre-eminent hub, it’s Paris". Paris is the only financial centre to offer a broad range of financial activities – from global asset management to insurance and banking and market activities – and it has benefited from the relocation of all segments of the financial industry. Paris has now overtaken London as Europe's largest financial centre in terms of stock market capitalisation. With the presence of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), there is also a 'regulatory hub' – to which I should add the ACPR, generally recognised as an exacting but extremely competent supervisor. The Paris financial centre is therefore a good illustration of harmonious coexistence between regulation and innovation. In my view, these are the yin and yang of the financial sector.
For this to materialise as early as possible, it is of the utmost importance to maintain discipline and a medium-term perspective in macroeconomic policymaking, pursuing a stability-oriented and sustainable approach. This is the best way to preserve and enhance confidence. The significant measures being implemented by governments to deal with the financial turmoil should help to ensure trust in the financial system and to ease constraints on credit supply to companies and households. With regard to price developments, annual HICP inflation has declined substantially since the middle of 2008, when it peaked at 4.0%. HICP inflation was 1.6% in December, after 2.1% in November. As we have emphasised on previous occasions, the significant decline in headline inflation in the second half of 2008 reflects mainly the sharp falls in global commodity prices over the past few months. Looking forward, lower commodity prices and weakening demand confirm that inflationary pressures in the euro area are diminishing. Owing mainly to base effects stemming from the past behaviour of energy prices, headline annual inflation rates are projected to decline further in the coming months, possibly reaching very low levels at mid-year. However, also owing to base effects stemming from past energy price developments, inflation rates are expected to increase again in the second half of the year. Hence it is likely that HICP inflation rates will fluctuate sharply during 2009. Such short-term volatility is, however, not relevant from a monetary policy perspective.

Looking forward, we continue to expect inflation rates in the euro area to be in line with price stability over the policy-relevant medium-term horizon, thereby supporting the purchasing power of incomes and savings. After today’s decision we consider risks to price stability over the medium term to be broadly balanced. This takes into account the latest economic data releases and survey information, which add clear further evidence to the assessment that the euro area is experiencing a significant slowdown, largely related to the effects of the intensification and broadening of the financial turmoil. Both global demand and euro area demand are likely to be dampened for a protracted period. Monetary expansion is moderating further, supporting the assessment that inflationary pressures and risks are diminishing. All in all, the level of uncertainty remains exceptionally high. The Governing Council will continue to keep inflation expectations firmly anchored in line with its medium-term objective of inflation rates below, but close to, 2%. This supports sustainable growth and employment and contributes to financial stability. Accordingly, we will continue to monitor very closely all developments over the period ahead. Allow me to explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Since September 2008 the financial market turmoil has intensified and broadened. Tensions have increasingly spilled over from the financial sector into the real economy. As a result, economic activity throughout the world, including in the euro area, has weakened further.
Islamic banking in particular, which is a form of financial intermediation that is directly linked to trade and investment flows, has significant potential to facilitate this process. Islamic finance requires all financial transactions to be supported by an underlying economic activity. There is now a renewed focus in the global community on generating real economic activity, generating jobs and generating overall financial stability. Following the developments that have led to the current global financial crisis, there is a greater recognition for the need to reduce the decoupling of the expansion of financial transactions and the growth of the real economy. This is in fact a fundamental requirement in Islamic finance thereby resulting in a close link between financial and real flows. BIS Review 26/2009  1  In Malaysia, the Islamic banking sector continues to progress, recording double digit growth over the recent 8 years with an average annual growth rate of 20% in terms of assets. As at the end of 2008, Islamic banking has increased its share of assets in the banking sector to 17.4%. The assets share of the takaful industry grew at 23% per annum in the recent five years, with family and general takaful capturing 11% and 7% respectively, of the overall insurance sector. The MIFC initiative has focused on promoting Malaysia as an international Islamic financial hub, in particular in sukuk origination, foreign currency business, takaful, research and talent development.

The demand for skills in Islamic finance throughout this region and other international financial centres has generated further growth in Islamic finance. In this regard, Malaysia has also embarked on several initiatives towards creating a supply of qualified human capital both in Shariah and Islamic finance. The International Centre of Education in Islamic Finance  2  BIS Review 26/2009  (INCEIF) is established to be a premier university in Islamic finance, to offer postgraduate qualifications in Islamic finance as well as the Chartered Islamic Finance Professional (CIFP) qualification. CIFP is the world's first Islamic professional qualification and it is accredited as a Masters degree level equivalent. Recently, INCEIF produced its first batch of 32 CIFP graduates from nine countries, of which three are from Indonesia. INCEIF has also entered into strategic partnership with Universiti Airlangga in Surabaya and Universiti Indonesia in Jakarta where the CIFP programmes are now being taught. Through these strategic alliances, the efforts would be directed to jointly produce high-calibre talent that have the combination of knowledge in Shariah and finance. It is our hope that PT. Bank Muamalat Indonesia would consider Malaysia as a platform for securing foreign currency business ventures in the region and contribute to the development of Islamic finance in Malaysia.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 1: UK and Scottish onshore GDP per capita UK Scotland  Percentage changes on a year earlier 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6  1964  1972  1980  1988  1996  2004  -8 2012  Source: Bank calculations; Scottish Government GDP statistical bulletin (2010Q1 and 2013Q3); ONS UK real GVA ex oil and gas extraction (KLS2 & UIZY); ONS mid-year population estimates; General Register Office Scotland; OECD. Chart 2: Unit wage costs in the UK and Scotland UK Scotland  Indices: 2000 = 100  150 140 130 120 110 100 90  1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012  80  Sources: Bank calculations; ONS Gross weekly earnings by region (EARN05); ONS real GDP (ABMI); Scottish Government GDP statistical bulletin 2013Q3; Labour Force Survey. Gross weekly earnings seasonally adjusted in-house. Notes: Unit wage costs calculated as gross weekly earnings divided by real output per worker for the UK and Scotland. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3: Unit labour costs in the Euro area Indices: 2000Q1 = 100  Euro area Belgium Germany Estonia Ireland Spain France Italy Cyprus Latvia Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Austria Portugal Slovenia Slovakia Finland Greece  240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100  2000Q1  2003Q1  2006Q1  2009Q1  2012Q1  (a)  80  Sources: DataStream, Eurostat and Bank Calculations. Notes: Greek data seasonally adjusted by Bank of England.

William C Dudley: The challenges ahead Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Center for the New Economy 2010 Economic Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico, 19 February 2010. *  *  *  Thank you very much and good morning. Although this is my first visit to Puerto Rico in my current role, I have been here a number of times, going way back to a childhood visit with my parents. It’s a beautiful and special place, but I must admit that coming in February has some special advantages. I welcome this opportunity to talk with business leaders, workers and educators. My goals are to hear what issues are on the minds of people here and to let you know what the Federal Reserve has been doing to help improve the economy. So I’m very grateful to the Center for the New Economy (CNE) for giving me the opportunity to speak to – and learn from – you. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. I want to start by talking about the implications of the close economic ties between the mainland and Puerto Rico. Since the economies of the mainland and the Commonwealth are very tightly linked, what happens on the mainland has important consequences for Puerto Rico, as well.
1 There are lessons to be learnt from past crises as we build stronger central counterparties. The Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and IOSCO are working on this. But we need to go further than that. We need to think – and we are thinking carefully – about how to put more of the OTC market either on to exchanges or through trading platforms with greater transparency. In this particular area the United States is acting ahead of Europe. That doesn’t matter. It is not a race and there is co-operation going on through IOSCO, with central bank support, that should reach fruition over the next few months in a report to the FSB. Large exposures Central counterparties are one way to mitigate the interconnectedness. Another, complementary route would be regimes that are more attentive to the network of large exposures that exists between our banks and dealers etc. The EU has been taking a step forward internationally in applying large exposure restrictions to interbank exposures for the first time. This is a big step; one that is welcome to the Bank of England. The question I would like to pose is whether, globally, we should go even further in respect of large exposures amongst the largest institutions in the world. One of the greatest worries under stress is the size of the exposures amongst the biggest and most complex firms. BCBS are contemplating it.

Given the stronger focus of financial regulators on conduct and culture, such professional codes will matter greatly going forward as an important complement to regulatory standards. The FSPB is well placed to lead and support initiatives to establish standards of conduct for the financial industry. Its standards not only serve as useful frameworks for financial institutions and professional bodies to develop specific guidance for their own employees and members; they also serve to embody the industry’s collective commitment to socially responsible values and 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  ethics. For example, I noted with interest that the Professional Code being launched today commits to dealing with counterparties, including suppliers and agents that “subscribe to sound ethical principles”. Matters such as the environmental footprint or human rights record of third party providers are not typical obligations currently found in regulatory standards, yet, these are matters of great importance. They are a reflection of the values of the industry, and they matter to many conscientious consumers in this age of increasingly accessible information. Given the central role of financial services in any economy, these are issues likely to move from the periphery to increasingly important business considerations. At the global level, we are already seeing greater attention given to sustainable and responsible finance. In many cases, it will require the industry to draw on experience beyond the traditional core competencies of most financial services providers.
Our understanding of the transmission channels behind this synchronized increase is still limited.5 These recent events have elicited mixed feelings in the international community. On the one hand, there is the view that the longer the global liquidity persists, the more likely that vulnerabilities will build up in capital‐receiving countries. In this view, a gradual normalization of international liquidity conditions would be a welcome event for those countries where fundamentals are still strong. Furthermore, to the extent that the normalization comes with better prospects for advanced economies, the somewhat tighter access to international borrowing would be accompanied by an increase in external demand. On the other hand, there is the view that a fast reversal of expansionary monetary policies in advanced countries would yield a sudden and important tightening of financial conditions and a surge in financial volatility. Recent years have taught us all too well that a situation like this may have unforeseen consequences. All in all, the final impact of the tapering of QE policies on the rest of the world will depend on when it takes place, how it is done, and what countries do in the meantime. Let me first address the issue of when it will take place. After some speculation earlier this year that tapering would start in September, subsequent developments indicated that the recovery of the US labor market had been more sluggish than initially expected.

But even if we believe these factors to be important some key questions remain open. For instance, why did this time emerging markets recover relatively quickly from the global shock, while advanced economies stagnated? Was it due to better policies, or to the new relevance of China for their external demand, or to another factor? We need to know more of the ultimate causes of this two‐ speed recovery, and more research on this front would be helpful. 1  IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, May 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Despite the likely role of pull factors, the fact that these phenomena coincided with the timing of the monetary expansion in advanced countries suggests there is a link between them. In fact, many believe that this “push factor” played a major role, and recent research lends some support to this view.2 This afternoon we will be discussing one avenue through which low interest rates in advanced countries may channel capital toward emerging markets: carry trade flows, whose relevance will be addressed in a presentation by Craig Burnside. The likely role of push factors is not a total surprise, since the recovery of advanced economies in the context of a deleveraging process requires a rebalancing of global demand toward emerging economies. This rebalancing needs the right price signals and quantity responses. Two presentations this morning by Philippe Bacchetta and Gian Maria Milesi‐ Ferretti will touch on the topic of global rebalancing and external adjustment to the crisis.
Figure 4 Growth forecasts (*) (real annual change, percent)  2018  2019 4.5  3.25  3.5  4.0  3.5  4.25 4.25 4.25  4.0 4.0  3.5 3.0 3.25  2.5  2.5  3.25 3.25 3.25  2.5  2.25  Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. 17  18  Mar. Jun. Sep. Dec. Mar. Jun. Sep. 17  18  (*) The ranges show the range growth forecast in each MP Report. Red diamonds corresponde to Economic Expectations Survey at the respective statistical cutoff date. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 15  Figure 5 Evolution of investment and consumption forecasts in Monetary Policy Reports (annual change, percent)  Total investment  Total consumption  3.0  3.0 3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5 2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0 2.0  2.0  2017  2017  September  September  2018  June  3.5  March  3.5 3.5  December  3.5  September  4.0  June  4.0 4.0  March  4.0  June  4.5  March  4.5 4.5  December  4.5  September  5.0  June  5.0 5.0  March  5.0  2018  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

For banks subject to minimum reserve requirements, the exemption threshold is calculated as 20 times the minimum reserve requirement, based on a reference period. For sight deposit account holders not subject to any minimum reserve requirements, the exemption threshold has been set at a minimum of CHF 10 million. By applying negative interest universally to all account holders, we are adhering to the principle of equal treatment. It therefore makes sense that banks with above-average sight deposits in proportion to their minimum reserves pay higher interest than other banks. In this respect, negative interest is no different to traditional monetary policy measures. Although the conditions are always the same for all participants, the precise impact may differ for individual banks or market participants and depends on their balance sheet situation. The full effect of negative interest is felt on the money and capital markets even in the case of high exemption thresholds. At present, at approximately CHF 170 billion, some 40% of SNB sight deposits are subject to negative interest. Nevertheless, transmission of the negative interest rate is working well, with interest rates on this market aligning themselves directly with the negative interest rate of –0.75%. This is because interest rate determination is based on the marginal interest rate, in other words the rate for holding one additional unit of sight deposits. Movements in SNB sight deposits Chart 2 shows sight deposits of domestic banks (dark blue area) which, together with other sight deposits (light blue area), comprise total sight deposits at the SNB.
The excessive reliance in Asia on short-term financing from overseas lenders through weakly regulated banking systems, and all the turbulence that this has entailed, is a reflection of the lack of deep and diversified debt markets in the region. The essence of the problem is the failure of our financial systems to keep pace with the strong underlying growth in other sectors of the Asian economies: the industrial and trade sectors surge ahead, while the financial sector lags behind. Too large a share of Asia’s financial resources has consequently been recycled through overseas markets, with the inevitable loss of information flows, and a tendency towards the kind BIS Review 2/1999  –9–  of market volatility that has caused us such problems. We need to establish local debt markets that bring both borrowers and lenders into more direct and long-term relationships, and which leaves both sides less exposed in terms of currency and maturity mismatches. Ironically, the underdeveloped state of our debt markets is attributable in part to the traditional absence of large budget deficits in most of the region, which has limited the development of government bond markets. Debt market development needs some official help, since individual issuers are not in a position on their own to create deep and liquid markets. The APEC initiative on bond markets - in which Hong Kong plays a leading role, will provide some impetus.

This is a long-term possibility, but it would have the advantage of reflecting the strong trade linkages in the region. It would also create bigger and more liquid markets that are less susceptible to manipulation. It would also help address problems of intermediating financial resources within Asia. At present, Asia’s central banks invest massive amounts in foreign securities, particularly U.S. dollar assets, only to see volatile funds flow back to the region from overseas markets. By investing reserves directly in Asian financial assets, this type of costly and unstable recycling through developed markets could be reduced. There are, of course, many obstacles in the way of creating an Asian Currency Unit. The various economies of the region operate under widely differing economic regimes, and are at different stages of development. An institution would be necessary to administer the system, and the politics involved would doubtless be very complex. But I believe that now is a useful time to raise this topic for discussion, at least at an intellectual level: successful implementation in the longer term would go a long way towards addressing the currency instability we have seen in the region over the last year and a half. After all, it has taken the more homogeneous Europe fifty years to bring the euro into existence. A further long-term solution lies in the development of stable and transparent debt markets in the region.