samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the one hand, deregulation and the opening of markets for products and factors and, on the other hand, the phenomenal progress in information and communications technology.3 On a macroeconomic level, the explanations lead to three possible conclusions. First, to the conclusion that the economy has lost some of its cyclical dynamic, a change which is explained by the increased transparency and more efficient steering of entrepreneurial processes as well as the fact that inventories have been cut or completely eliminated. Second, that there has been a permanent reduction in the natural rate of unemployment which results in an upward shift of the potential output curve and thus to significantly higher growth rates in the transition phase. Third, that there is a gain in long-term productivity growth, ie a steeper potential output curve in future. Academic economists usually react with scepticism to these basically supply-side hypotheses. In fact, they are assumptions which, plausible as they may be, have not been empirically tested. Monetary policymakers cannot simply ignore them because they relate to interconnections which are important for the formulation of policies. It would be just as foolish, however, to accept such theories uncritically and to include them in the decision-making process simply because they sound plausible. In any case, the assertions put forward under the label “new economy” create additional uncertainties. In this particular state of uncertainty, there is growing interest in an ongoing analysis and interpretation of indicators. In this way, one searches for early evidence for the pros and cons of these hypothetical changes.

There has also been some further deregulation. For instance, state monopolies have been abolished and freedom to establish new companies with regard to, for instance, transport, communications and energy has been introduced. Changed competitive conditions thus affect productivity growth, but they can also affect price developments more directly. Despite the fact that we gained much stiffer legislation on competition in 1993, developments in this field appear to be moving slowly. Swedish prices remain higher than in other countries in several areas without explanations for this in the form of differences in VAT rates and wage levels. Increased competition can contribute to price levels converging, but this assumes that the relative price changes will be accepted and it can entail, as in the 1990s when electricity and telecommunications were deregulated, such large price reductions in some sectors that our inflation rate will be lower than that of other countries. Special interests and consumer interests Limits to competition are a clear example of how special interests dominate over general consumer interests. There are many examples of this in various areas of the Swedish economy, and in particular the construction sector. This means that we allow inefficiency to remain, which reduces growth and the development of most people’s standard of living. One interesting and very recent example of how special interests have declined concerns pharmaceutical prices.
We anticipate a financial institution's policy to cover all necessary areas pertaining to IT activities including contingency plan, security, and out/in-sourcing. In addition, the policy should cover new product issuance such as internet banking and e-money. The process of formulating, implementing and maintaining of such policies should be considered. A continuous risk assessment and monitoring should also be part of an area of examination. Management support and oversight It is ultimately a responsibility of a financial institution's board and management to extend governance to IT and provide the leadership, organizational structures and processes to direct and control the enterprise. Management must monitor to ensure that IT resources are properly managed to promote business objectives. 4  BIS Review 35/2005  IT governance During the last few years, financial institutions have increasingly invested in technology infrastructure to improve their internal processes and servicing capabilities. Investment in technology infrastructure normally involves huge amount of funds and other resources. Technology also carries risks, which can adversely affect financial institutions if not properly managed. Financial institutions need to understand the strategic importance of IT, manage IT to effectively deliver value to business, and mitigate risks arisen from the use of IT. IT governance focuses on how financial institutions make the best use of their invested technologies. It is a high-level IT control framework related to the formulation of IT strategies, the management of IT processes to deliver value, the performance measurement, and the management of IT-related risks.

In the case of Thailand, BOT takes an active role in meeting regularly with financial institutions and IT companies to exchange views and experiences on the development of the businesses and IT environment. -  In the process of drafting policies, we often seek out the view from our fellow regulators to ensure that our policy are in line with market and international practices, as well as to help us anticipate problems that may arise in implementation. -  The final drafts of policies are sent out for comments from key stakeholders in and outside the Bank of Thailand, especially the industry, to ensure that the policies are practical and not posing any undue burden on financial institutions. -  We also make sure that revision of regulations and guidelines is conducted regularly to ensure that e-banking policies are keeping with demand from the financial community as well as with market innovation and international best practices. -  To maintain proactive supervision, the IT risk-based supervision is conducted continuously, updating each of bank's IT risk profile on a regular basis and performed overall assessment in certain areas. In case of getting a report of any incidents, we have to thoroughly analyze the impact on the financial institution system and consumer. And, to prevent recurrence of such incidents, we may urgently issue notification to financial institutions to provide preventive, detective and corrective control measures in self and customer protections.
It is possible that some households planned on the basis that this increased economic stability would persist indefinitely. If so, the events of the past two years would have come as a substantial shock. Households’ consumption has slowed sharply since the beginning of 2008. Indeed, consumption is estimated to have fallen for the past five consecutive quarters, the first time this has happened since records began in 1955. Relative to an average rate of increase, the level of consumer spending has fallen by around 7½% since the start of 2008, and the savings rate has increased sharply. There has already been a considerable adjustment in households’ spending. In the near-term, the prospects for consumption depend importantly on the performance of the labour market. Although there has been a substantial fall in employment over the past year or so, the size of this adjustment to date has, if anything, been less than we might have feared given the falls in output. This may partly reflect the greater degree of wage flexibility that has been apparent in this recession compared to that in either the 1980s or 1990s. 6 This greater flexibility has meant that more of the burden of firms’ adjustment to the recession has been spread over the workforce as a whole, rather than on those losing their jobs.

Whatever the approach chosen, the main challenge would be to take account of climate risks, either through economic estimates that we master – such as GDP observed under stress – or directly through climate variables – such as the rise in temperature – which would require  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  developing new methods and gathering new information. This, of course, would mean relying on expert judgment on these issues, in a context where financial institutions do not have enough experience to understand future risks. We will work on this with the ACPR and the public authorities concerned. *** Understanding and analysing climate risk is essential. The regulations currently being drawn up – the Act on energy transition and the work of the Financial Stability Board – on information disclosure are useful tools to ensure that the transition to a greener economy is active and therefore under control. These initiatives could also contribute to making market participants more aware of the need to use a discount rate that is more compatible with the transition to a greener economy. The Canfin-Grandjean report of June 2015 also includes many interesting avenues. However, we must at the same time remain modest. We, the public authorities, do not know everything. And we cannot substitute ourselves for private players, whether financial or nonfinancial.
The portfolio size and composition to which each central bank eventually normalizes will, of course, depend on what it eventually determines is appropriate to support implementation of monetary policy in the longer run. Indeed, the FOMC has indicated that in the longer run, it will hold no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively, and that it will hold primarily Treasury securities. The ECB has also used unconventional measures to provide accommodation, but unlike the Federal Reserve, BoJ, and BoE, this has primarily been through liquidity provided directly to the banking system via longer-term refinancing operations, rather than through asset purchases. This liquidity was provided at fixed terms of up to three years, thus allowing the size of the ECB’s balance sheet to normalize automatically as refinancing agreements mature. By contrast, the ECB’s upcoming purchases of asset-backed securities and covered bonds will present it with longer-term portfolio considerations. Finally, I should note that central banks – like other financial market participants – need to remain aware of changes in the financial market landscapes in which they operate. They may need to adapt their operations accordingly as they move away from asset purchases and back to money market instruments to implement monetary policy. For example, in addition to reflecting developments in its balance sheet since the financial crisis, the FOMC’s approach to normalizing policy also reflects changes in U.S. money market dynamics that have been influenced by various factors.

Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy, exchange rates and capital flows Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the 18th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 3 November 2017. * * * I would like to thank T. Kostka, A. Mehl, I. Van Robays and J. Gräb for their contributions to this speech. I remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. Central bank asset purchase programmes are often catalysts for significant cross-border capital flows. By compressing the (excess) return on domestic bonds, they encourage investors to rebalance their portfolios towards foreign, higher yielding assets.1 Such capital flows have reached historical dimensions in the case of the ECB’s asset purchase programme (APP), with both resident and non-resident investors moving out of euro-denominated securities and into bonds issued predominantly by the safest non-euro area sovereigns. I examined these flows in detail in a recent speech at the ECB’s Foreign Exchange Contact Group meeting.2 One intriguing observation I made in this speech was that there was no evidence of a causal link between such capital flows and exchange rate movements. Findings based on event studies instead suggest that, around the time of central bank asset purchase announcements, investors price the exchange rate mainly on the basis of the information these programmes provide to markets about the expected future path of short-term interest rates.
Potential output growth estimates for 2022, 2023 and 2024 in the European Commission’s Autumn 2022 European Economic Forecast also remain higher than the estimates in the Autumn 2019 and 2020 European Economic Forecasts. To put the size of the revisions to potential output in context, the European Commission estimates that potential output was 5% lower 5 years after the onset of the global financial crisis compared to the level it would have had if it had increased each year from 2008 to 2012 at the pre-crisis potential growth rate (that loss increased to more than 9% after 10 years). The European Commission’s Autumn 2022 European Economic Forecast estimates GDP to be 0.2% higher in 2024 than the level it would have had if it had increased each year from 2020 to 2024 at the 2019 potential growth rate, but 0.6 percentage points lower than the level implied by the Autumn 2019 European Economic Forecast. The potential output level in 2024 is therefore not estimated to be significantly different from the level that could be expected before the onset of the pandemic, with the sign of the change depending on the counterfactual used. This may reflect factors that have impacted potential growth in different directions: the pandemic and the recent shocks may have had a negative effect, while Next Generation EU investments and other policy measures in response to the pandemic may have had a positive effect, with the net effect being small. 15.

First, conducting monetary policy based on the view that potential is permanently lower – without clear evidence that this is the case – could prove self-fulfilling and costly. The evidence increasingly shows that destroying demand also affects supply. Research on recessions over the last fifty years has found that deep contractions – including those driven by monetary policy – lead to long-lasting effects on real GDP compared to the pre-contraction trend. [20] This suggests that current macroeconomic policies should be designed to avoid unnecessarily heightening the risk that the increasingly likely contraction in coming months becomes a severe and protracted one, which would scar the economy. This requires that energy and fiscal policies remain targeted and contribute to dampen inflationary pressures, helping to keep inflation expectations anchored while preserving productive capacity. But it also requires that monetary policy does not ignore the risks of overtightening. [21] If we were to compress demand in an excessive and persistent manner, we would face the risk of also pushing output permanently below trend, irrespective of whether the initial shocks were temporary or not (that is, even if a harsh policy reaction was unnecessary). And that could not be easily reversed by subsequent policy easing, not least because expansions do not rebuild supply nearly as much as contractions destroy it. [22] Second, even if we were to conclude that supply shocks will lower potential durably, we would still need to examine their effects on demand before deciding our policy stance.
  In addition, I would expect to see increased RMB trading in the forex market, which in turn should lead to the development of more sophisticated instruments. The second change to offshore RMB markets we can confidently expect is the further development and strengthening of links with the onshore RMB market. As a critical piece of infrastructure that supports the internationalisation of RMB, the offshore RMB market cannot operate in isolation. Given continued liberalisation of cross-border RMB transactions by the Mainland authorities, we will see more and wider channels for the flow of RMB between the onshore and offshore RMB markets. This will be critical for the sustainable development of the offshore RMB market and, thus, the future role of Hong Kong. Role of Hong Kong And this brings me now to my third point, the development of Hong Kong as the offshore RMB business centre. Let me start by saying that Hong Kong’s role is not an accident or a result of chance. It stems from our city’s historical and indispensable role facilitating the opening up of the Mainland economy. Since China’s liberalisation and reform began three decades ago, Hong Kong has served as the global gateway for trade and investment with the Mainland. Even to this day, Hong Kong still intermediates some 30% of the Mainland’s external trade and accounts for some 60% of cross-border direct investments in both directions.

Likewise, they suggest a much wider use and circulation of RMB in the international financial system. Renminbi internationalisation: From where to where? So let us now turn to this issue, and my second point – the expanding role of the RMB. The big question I’m often asked is how the wider use and eventual internationalisation of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  RMB is to unfold. This question is, of course, easier to ask than to answer. But I believe we can gain useful insights by taking some perspective on where we are now and how we arrived here. How it started? Given the pace of change, it is sobering to recall that it wasn’t until 2009 – not all that long ago – that the Mainland authorities started to allow Mainland corporations to use the RMB when trading with the rest of the world.   The first step was the launch of a pilot scheme in July 2009 allowing corporations in five Mainland cities to settle their trade with Hong Kong, Macau and ASEAN economies, in RMB. This pilot was subsequently expanded progressively. Today, all trade transactions between Mainland China and the rest of the world have the option to be settled in RMB.   Another major milestone was reached in 2011, when the Mainland authorities began to liberalise the use of RMB for inward and outward direct investments.
In this respect there are some notable differences in Sweden. External competition in markets for goods has also tended to grow in Sweden. Since the mid-1980s the traditionally high GDP share for imports has almost doubled. Domestic competition has also increased, for instance in markets that have recently been deregulated - electricity and telecommunications, of which the latter is particularly strategic for IT. Even so, price levels in Sweden are still high in many areas - higher than in most other EU countries as well as compared with the United States. Differences in taxation clearly play a part but so does a lack of competition. This in turn may have to do with the degree to which markets for goods are  BIS Review 18/2000  4  regulated. In the OECD index of product market regulation, Sweden is admittedly lower than many other EU countries but appreciably higher than the United States. A breakthrough for the new economy is also dependent on the situation in factor markets. The Swedish risk capital market has undergone major improvements and relative to GDP is now the third largest in Europe, after the United Kingdom and Ireland. And whereas in 1983 it was only a quarter of the relative size of the risk capital market in the United States, by 1998 it had already become half as large. A notable feature in recent years is the greatly increased input of foreign capital.

A closer look at the figures reveals that the improvement has been most marked in manufacturing and particularly rapid in industries where computers are used most intensively. The upward shift in US productivity growth was preceded by an investment boom that gave pride of place to investment in IT-related capital. Since the 1980s, American investment in computer capacity has doubled in nominal terms; in relation to the dramatic price fall for computer capacity, the level has risen by a factor of more than twelve. To what extent, then, has the improvement in productivity come from IT? What are the mechanisms? Computers have clearly helped to make production processes more efficient and automated, just as new techniques have led to the creation of many new goods and services, from compact discs to tele-medication. But in order to understand the broader implications for the workings of the economy, one should perhaps heed Alan Greenspan, head of the US Federal Reserve, and single out the word “information”. When information flows more efficiently, there will be a better matching of supply and demand both internally and between firms, as well as less tied-up capital for coping with contingencies. In that firms can use IT to enhance “just-in-time” routines, they can cut the levels of stocks and working capital. Better information also paves the way for smaller production units and less bureaucratic structures. All these processes are now being further reinforced by the rapidly growing flow of information on the Internet.
Andres Lipstok: The Estonian economy Speech by Mr Andres Lipstok, Governor of Bank of Estonia, at a lunch for the EU Deputies, organised by the Ambassador of the Czech Republic, Mr A Langer, Tallinn, 28 May 2009. *  *  *  Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen, I am genuinely pleased for the invitation of Ambassador Langer to join you here at the working lunch. First of all, I would like to provide a short overview of Estonia's current economic situation and the plans related to the adoption of the euro. Afterwards I would be glad to discuss these issues with you. The global crisis has had a strong impact on Estonia's small and open economy via trade channel. Collapse of world trade and decreasing demand in Estonia's main trading partners has decreased considerably also Estonia's exports. Although financial channel is also somewhat strained, we have not witnessed particularly excessive tightening of credit inside the banking groups that operate in Estonia. Estonian banking market is fully integrated into Scandinavian groups, which has provided stability. Estonia's banking sector has enough capital and liquidity to support restructuring in the real economy. The global turmoil is clearly not over yet, though there have been some signs of stabilisation over the past months. Estonia, too, is showing some signs of stabilisation and confidence indicators have also slightly improved. However, it has to be stressed that outlooks for this and next year are highly uncertain everywhere in the world.

CMH is expected to unlock a vast potential of opportunities for the Islamic financial industry. It can provide a wider range of new instruments not only for liquidity management and risk management purposes but players can derive additional linkages by utilising CMH to facilitate issuance of sukuk and in the creation of financing and deposit products. Besides having the potential of providing wider product selections, CMH could create a more transparent and streamlined commodity transaction practices based on the concept of murabahah or tawarruq. Leveraging on the experience of Bursa Malaysia in the area of exchange traded products, CMH is able to eliminate uncertainty in the transactions and could mitigate risks such as legal risk, market risk and counter-party risk. We are most grateful to the CPO suppliers for participating in this initiative. For CMH to be successful, it requires the cooperation of the players in the CPO market. With greater involvement of players in the commodity industries, CMH would be able to unlock the potential of your business operation by enabling the stocks to be exploited for this exchanged traded mechanism. The success of the CMH depends on the continuous support of the CPO suppliers. The CMH could also explore the possibility of sourcing CPO supplies from abroad. This innovative effort which has been endorsed by the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Securities Commission has the potential to appeal to a wider market audience in and outside of Malaysia.