samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Likewise, scientists from the IPBES (which is the equivalent to biodiversity of what the IPCC is to climate change) or the WHO have also been warning us for years that we may enter an 2  Page 3 sur 12 “Era of pandemics” vi if we do not tackle the biodiversity crisis: there is only one planet, and “one Healthvii. The devastating experience we’ve gone through for the past few years with Covid 19 could repeat itself through new viruses if we do not urgently revert biodiversity loss. Thinking through the concept of planetary boundaries therefore enables us to better understand the interconnections between different ecological challenges. For instance, biodiversity loss can accelerate climate change, which can in turn further accelerate biodiversity loss. Likewise, acting on land use change (one of the planetary boundaries) will be critical to move back below the safety thresholds for other planetary boundaries such as climate change and biodiversity. In line with these findings, a recent joint workshop between the IPCC and the IPBESviii concluded that it will be impossible to tackle climate change and biodiversity in silos. The dramatic and unprecedented changes in many Earth subsystems caused by human activity have led many scientists to consider that we have entered a new geological epoch: the Anthropoceneix, literally the “age of humans”.

For instance: -  How could we design scenarios that account for what IPBES experts are telling us, for instance with regards to the different values of nature, the rights of indigenous people and the need to think comprehensively about economic, social and environmental inequalities? -  How much can the global economy grow while accounting for all planetary boundaries? And how to distribute this “remaining growth  8  Page 9 sur 12 potential” between rich and developing countries, as a fair transition is key? -  What could be the impacts of lower growth rates or potential no growth on global value chains, on employment, on different economic sectors that could win or lose from the transition? -  Which assumptions do we make about demographic trends? I actually greatly appreciated that in his review Professor Dasgupta mentioned demography. I am aware that this is a delicate issue but it has several ecological and macroeconomic implications and we should be able to assess them. -  How should we tackle climate change and biodiversity, taking into account the complexity of each of both issues but also their interaction? If you think that this is too political for central bankers, let me strongly oppose this view: what would be too political is to deny all the evidence gathered by natural and social scientists for the past decades. Just one year ago, before the war, it would have been unlikely to think about potential energy constraints linked with a hybrid war.
Why would the most efficient retail bankers not be able to export their  BIS Review 22/2004  1  concept, just as IKEA, McDonald’s, or American Express, to name a few other retail service companies, have done in their industries? However, there are economic obstacles related to the cost of entry into new markets. Major cross-border expansion must, with few exceptions, be made through mergers or acquisitions. The success of a cross-border deal depends on the ability to realise synergies. This takes a number of tough decisions regarding reductions in staff numbers and overlapping or inefficient systems and operations. If then to this entry cost are added extra hurdles in the form of regulations and politics it is easy to see that the difficulties related to cross-border expansion might seem insurmountable to a bank manager. On the margin, I think these extra hurdles or barriers might be more important than the inherent economics of banking. Generally, in countries where the costs of entering the national banking market are relatively low, the market share held by foreign banks tends to be higher. In the last decade, countries with less developed banking systems and few or no powerful incumbents have seen extensive entry by foreign banks. Witness the expansion by European and American banks into emerging markets, e.g. in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. In the EU, in contrast, national banking markets are generally well developed and incumbents are strong, making entry costs much higher.

Some participants will probably address some of these issues during the conference, which are of great interest for central bankers. I also provided you with some examples of possible options monetary and financial authorities may take to help improve the functioning of the financial cycles. There is a lot of merit in embarking upon an overall review of regulatory, accounting and tax rules and regulations, as well as of codes of good conduct and good practices, and finally of structural developments of markets themselves. I am convinced that this review, triggered not only by macro-financial considerations but also by dramatic micro observations, like ENRON, is likely to help identifying possible amendments and improvements that could, protect and enhance not only the integrity but also the behavioural and conceptual diversity which should make an essential characteristic of modern financial markets. I thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 28/2001
But, as it showed just recently in making a modest reduction in interest rates, the ECB is sensitive to changes in the balance of risks around those judgements. So, too, are we in the United Kingdom. In our case we have been fortunate, since being driven out of the ERM in 1992 and moving to a symmetrical inflation target, in enjoying a sustained period of relatively stable economic growth. In fact we've experienced the longest period of continuous quarter by quarter growth since quarterly records began, with average annual growth at around 3% over the whole period compared with our long term trend rate of 2¼-2½%. Employment has steadily increased, and unemployment has fallen to its lowest level for 25 years. Meanwhile the rate of inflation has been consistently relatively close either side of the Government's 2½% target – the lowest and most stable rate of inflation that most of us in this country can remember. Domestic demand growth in the UK has remained relatively robust into this year, but we too are affected by the US slowdown and by the associated weakening of equity prices. And we have had a new problem of our own in the form of Foot and Mouth Disease, the effects of which have gone a good deal wider than just the agricultural sector. These new developments were likely to have a dampening effect on overall demand pressure within the economy, both through their direct impact and through possible damaging effects on confidence.

On an optimistic view, if consumption continues to hold up, and assuming that the recent underlying productivity gains can be maintained, investment spending will recover as the spread of ICT through the economy resumes, and the downward stock adjustment will come to an end. On this view we can look forward to a pick up in US activity as we move, say, into next year. But the pessimist is inclined to point to the weakness of private sector saving, which could induce more cautious consumer behaviour especially if unemployment continues to rise; he points to a possible overhang of past investment excesses; and he points to the US external deficit which will at some point need to be corrected. These adjustments might take place gradually over time, in which case the US might face a more protracted period of relatively slow growth; or, if you are really pessimistic, the adjustments might be more abrupt implying a possible period of negative growth and global financial instability. The recent somewhat erratic recovery of US stock markets from their earlier gloom suggests that they are beginning to side with the optimists; some of the survey evidence of consumer and business confidence on the other hand still supports a rather more pessimistic view. For what it is worth, and given the strong policy response in the US, I am modestly optimistic, but I recognise the downside risks.
In addition, in the most recent period, corporate indebtedness has decreased after being driven by loans related to foreign direct investment. Likewise, currency mismatches have continued to decline. Among households, in Chile, consumer debt is made up of close to 75% of term bank loans, 18% credit cards and 7% credit lines. Virtually all consumer loans bear a fixed interest rate, with an average maturity of between 4 and 5 years. In turn, mortgage loans account for most of the increase in household debt in the last six years. As is well known, mortgages are issued almost entirely at fixed rates (adjusted for inflation), long maturities, and a prudent housing loan-to-value ratio. Together, these elements reduce the potential impact of an increase in interest rates on the financial burden of households. Regarding the government sector, the mitigation of interest rate risk depends also on the behavior of the economy’s investor base. This makes the way in which the demand for and supply of bonds behave in stressful times particularly relevant. The importance of the participation of pension funds and mutual funds in sovereign bond holdings and the fact that in the face of external shocks, the less risky funds—and with a greater share of sovereign bonds—become more attractive, also offers a cushion to the effects international interest rate shocks. Even so, this is an especially important moment to strengthen potentially vulnerable flanks in emerging economies. As I have said before, it is important to restore the slack that has helped sustain Chile's macroeconomic policy framework.

Apart from the measures taken by the Riksbank, crisis measures taken by the Ministry of Finance and the National Debt Office of course affect costs (spreads) on the credit market. Fiscal policy stimulation measures also affect the costs of credit risk and thus the price of credit. We should also remember that supervisory and regulatory measures that establish different forms of constraint, for example capital adequacy requirements for the banks, can indirectly affect the price of credit. A question that we are wrestling with just now is how serious the credit crunch is and whether there is a risk that it will hit the non-financial sector so hard that it will have major repercussions on the real economy over and above the credit crunch that normally follows a recession that undermines the creditworthiness of companies and households. On the one hand the supply of credit declines when the banks want to shrink their balance sheets. Many companies in the Riksbank’s company survey state, for instance, that they are finding it difficult to borrow at longer maturities. On the other hand, the demand for credit should also  BIS Review 41/2009  13  decline as a consequence of weak economic activity. What can be done about this and what is the role of the central banks in easing the credit crunch? The Riksbank's view is that it is the financial system that as far as possible should be strengthened in order to ease the credit crunch.
2)  Banking law  Many amendments to the law on the financial system have been made over these years. These amendments resulted from the need of adopting the European Directives in this area and the Basel core principles for an effective banking supervision. This process was successfully finalized upon the approval of Law No. 9662 “On Banks in the Republic of Albania” by the Parliament. Compared with the previous law, the new law is more complete and more accurate in some parts of it. It has integrated some new concepts which are in full compliance with the European Directive 83/349 and other important directives. It stipulates changes in the licensing of activities by level of capital, in consolidated supervision, etc. In addition, “risk management”, which previously was provided for in specific regulations, has been now summarized in a specific chapter of this law. 3)  Foreign direct investments and the Albanian financial system  Foreign direct investments have been assessed as very important for developing countries, since they have a positive impact on the macroeconomic, technological and institutional performance of recipient countries. The wide experience over the last decades indicates that the presence of the financial FDIs improves the soundness of the domestic financial system, through a better management of portfolio risk and a more efficient allocation of credit funds. In addition, the technological innovations deriving from the FDI inflows affect the enhancement of the banking system competition and efficiency, through the increase in the variety of products and services provided.

Eddie Yue: Developing local-currency bond markets in Asia Statement by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Head of the Delegation of Hong Kong, at the 45th Asian Development Bank Annual Meeting, Manila, 4 May 2012. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Government of the Philippines for hosting the 45th Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). I would also like to congratulate ADB on the successful conclusion of the Tenth Replenishment of the Asian Development Fund (ADF XI), which would provide critical resources to ADB to further its work in poverty reduction in Asia. The global economy has shown signs of improvement in 2012 following a marked slowdown amid the intensification of the euro zone debt crisis in the latter part of last year. Nevertheless, significant downside risks remain, with the euro zone debt crisis yet to be fully resolved and rising oil prices adding further uncertainty to the recovery outlook. Asia has remained resilient so far, in large part attributable to the reforms taken by regional economies over the years to strengthen economic fundamentals, improve fiscal discipline and enhance the resilience of their financial systems since the Asia financial crisis. Nevertheless, the region is not immune from the lingering fragility in the global environment. To date, the deleveraging by European banks has not caused significant short-term credit tightening in Asia, with banks in the region and elsewhere having stepped in to fill the gap left by European banks.
In these three countries labour market institutions are currently assessed to be more flexible than in Luxembourg, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands. This should help achieve a balance of employment protection that gives both stability – encouraging workers to invest in firm-specific skills – and mobility – allowing for reallocation between productive and non-productive sectors.1 These same countries have also introduced several measures to help connect wage levels more closely with actual productivity developments. The link between collective bargaining and economic conditions has been strengthened by the possibility for more firm-level agreements. In Greece, wage floors have been significantly reduced to boost youth employment creation; in Portugal, they have been frozen and overtime pay considerably reduced. Wage indexation has become less prominent in Spain and in Cyprus it has been abolished. In all these countries the labour market reforms have started to have an impact on private sector wages. Private sector compensation per employee has fallen significantly in Greece since 2011, correcting what was an unsustainable increase prior to crisis, and it has also started to adjust in Spain, Portugal and Cyprus in 2012–13. I fully recognise the difficulties this process creates, yet this has to be set against the need for wages to adjust to reduce unemployment and restore external competitiveness. We are expecting that that these positive effects will dominate going forward and help employment to begin recovering in the near future.

In parallel, all programme countries have strengthened their active labour market policies, including by fostering traineeship programmes and dual-apprenticeship systems, also with the support of EU funds. This is important, as having an adequate social safety net and job search and retraining programmes can reduce unemployment duration and so lower the long-term costs of an adjustment phase. There is also a fairness dimension: we should not forget that some citizens paid high entry costs to enter previously closed professions, for example by purchasing expensive licences, and may now need help transitioning to new employment. Product market reforms have generally aimed at improving competition in network industries – energy, telecommunication, transport – and highly regulated professions, as well as reducing administrative (licencing) burdens to wholesale and retail trade and provisions of services. Such reforms have tended to face greater implementation obstacles than labour market measures, partly owing to the micro or sector-specific dimension of the reform needs. 1  Blanchard, O., F. Jaumotte, and P. Loungani (2013), “Labor Market Policies and IMF Advice in Advanced Economies During the Great Recession”, IMF Research Department. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  This has required policymakers to confront more concentrated opposition from vested interests within the sector that is subject to reform. However, among programme countries, Portugal has some impressive achievements to show in terms improving product market functioning and economic framework conditions.
They conclude that setting macro-prudential policy on the basis of these indicators might have procyclical effects: it would facilitate the build-up of systemic imbalances during booms, and their amplification during busts. Crockett (2000) had the foresight to argue that “The received wisdom is that risk increases in recessions and falls in booms. In contrast, it may be more helpful to think of risk as increasing during upswings, as financial imbalances build up, and materialising in recessions.” 13 The FPC’s statutory mandate includes a responsibility to identify risks; see Financial Services Act (2012). 14 Jordà et al (2013) use data for 14 advanced countries between 1870 and 2008 and find that more credit-intensive booms are typically followed by slower recoveries and deeper recessions. This is true both for recessions that follow financial crises and those that do not. 15 Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), present a new Keynesian model in which aggregate demand is depressed when indebted agents are forced into a rapid deleveraging. If this deleveraging is large enough it can push interest rates to the zero lower bound. Korinek and Simsek (2016) show that this can result in an aggregate demand externality which can be corrected through pre-emptive macroprudential policy. 16 Dynan (2012) uses household-level data for the US and finds that between 2007 and 2009 declines in spending were larger for highly leveraged homeowners. 17 Campbell et al (2011) find that foreclosed houses have an average sale price discount of 27%, using 20 years of data for Massachusetts.

However, recent empirical estimates for the UK suggest the effect is qualitatively present with the increase in banks’ overall funding costs due to higher capital requirements lower than in the absence of the theorem by 45% (Miles et al 2013) and 53% (Brooke et al 2015). 11 For example, the now defunct authority regulating the US Government-sponsored mortgage agencies stress tested them to only an 11% fall in house prices – a more severe shock than any nationwide house price decline to be found from 1945 onward. The peak-totrough fall of 11% was calibrated based on house price data for the West South Central Census Region between 1984 and 1993. Frame et al (2015) show that an alternative scenario based on realised post-2006 data would have revealed that Fannie and Freddie’s capitalisation was much weaker than what the original stress tests suggested. It wasn’t only regulators who made the mistake of relying on the recent past only. During a week when Goldman Sach’s Global Equity Opportunities fund lost 30%, Goldman’s chief financial officer famously stated: “We were seeing things that were 25-standard deviation moves, several days in a row.” His focus was too narrow. While the moves in 2007 were substantial, they were not unprecedented. Even within the last thirty years, equity prices had experienced larger single day falls than they did during 2007. 12 Danielsson et al (2016) show that systemic risk indicators constructed with market data were low and falling before the stress events in 1997 and 2008, and shot up during the events.
The Treasury can take note of this proposal, but can also ignore it, publishing a response. If the Treasury takes the advice, then the Office for Budget Responsibility (equivalent to the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council) will assess whether the measure is compatible with a sustainable fiscal policy. The idea is thus that discretionary fiscal policy measures shall replace the monetary policy stimulation that is not brought about because of the lower bound. Some argue that this would be a more effective and economically more reliable  19 Soon after the turn of the millennium, a committee investigated how stabilisation policy should be conducted in the event of Sweden introducing the euro (Swedish Government Official Reports, 2002). The committee considered that under normal economic fluctuations it would be enough to allow the automatic stabilisers to work and that discretionary fiscal policy would only be used in the case of unusually large disruptions. The reason the committee reached this conclusion was because of this type of problem. 20 See Yates (2017). 10 [24]  mechanism than trying to achieve the same effect through, for instance, the purchase of financial assets. 21 It is an open question whether a similar solution might function in Sweden. One condition that one should bear in mind, as the British proposal emphasises, is that the use of discretionary fiscal policy always entails a balancing act. Sweden's currently strong public finances provide protection against shocks.

One possibility the Riksbank and other central banks have made use of to make their monetary policy more expansionary when the policy rate is at or close to the lower bound is to buy government bonds on the secondary market. This affects market rates and other financial prices through various channels. 15 What one normally talks about are the signalling channel – which works through the purchases signalling that monetary policy will be expansionary and the repo rate will remain at the lower bound a long time, the portfolio balance channel – which means that the purchases will have contagion effects on prices of other assets and the premium channel – that works through purchases reducing the supply of bonds, which pushes up bond prices so that interest rates fall. As this is a new monetary policy tool, it has given rise to extensive academic research that attempts to estimate its effects. The most common conclusion is that the policy has functioned more or less as expected and complemented the policy rate cuts in a useful way. 16 One problem for Sweden is that it will become more difficult to use government bond purchases as a tool in the next economic downturn as the Riksbank already owns a large share of the outstanding stock of government bonds, just over 40 per cent. These are not then available for trading on the market, which contributes to making the market less liquid and means it takes longer to make transactions.