samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
After making the turn, they have reaped large payoffs. I will not comment on the negotiations that are currently taking place in Athens. They have to be concluded by a courageous, comprehensive and convincing multi-year programme. And I am confident as regards the results of these discussions between the Greek government, the European Commission, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund. Let me add a word about Germany and the current public debate here. I very much appreciated the invitation by Finance Minister Schäuble yesterday to speak with the floor leaders of all political parties represented in the Bundestag. I said yesterday in Berlin that I had found this meeting – in which Jürgen Stark and I could respond to all questions of our  4  BIS Review 59/2010  interlocutors – extremely important. My main message was that a fast parliamentary procedure was highly recommended in the present circumstances. What we need most at this time is a strong sense of direction. We need a sense of direction that can guide us on how we can emerge from these turbulent events and how we can return to the path of economic stability. In my view, this sense of direction can be provided in three steps: first, in the case of Greece, a strong and credible programme, negotiated between the Commission, the ECB, IMF and the Greek government. Second, the support I have mentioned that will avoid the materialisation of financial risks for the euro area as a whole.

Mr Heikensten discusses monetary policy aspects of Sweden’s position “inside EU, outside EMU”  Speech given by Mr Lars Heikensten, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a seminar arranged by Handelsbanken Markets, Stockholm, on 10 September 1999. *  *  *  First a word of thanks to those who arranged this seminar for inviting me to take part. The agenda covers many important issues that all deserve a thorough discussion. Sweden’s relationship with the European monetary union is one of them. Today I shall be considering four matters: the feasible timetable in the event of full participation in EMU; Sweden’s performance as regards the criteria for joining the euro area; considerations concerning the rate for the krona’s conversion to euro; and, finally, something about how economic policy should be formulated in the meanwhile in the event that we do join the monetary union. When could we join? The timetable in the event of our participation in the monetary union is set both by decisions in Sweden and by negotiations with the existing euro countries. As regards the domestic process, in December 1997 the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) decided that Sweden would wait and see, but that the door to future participation is not to be closed. Players in the financial markets, along with other observers, are now trying to work out whether this door will be opened wide and, if so, when that is likely to happen.
10 When I refer to repo rates, I mean those on repo backed by Treasury securities generally, rather than specific  Treasury issues – that is, “general collateral” repo.. See Copeland, Davis, LeSueur and Martin, “Mapping and Sizing the U.S. Repo Market,” June 25, 2012. 11 These new floating net asset value, liquidity fee and gating rules apply to municipal (tax-exempt) money market  funds as well. Municipal (tax-exempt) money markets are beyond the scope of my remarks. 12 Competition could have suffered, for example, if too few prime funds continued lending to banks, giving the  remaining funds some market power. Similarly, if the supply of funds in the secured market were to become overly large relative to banks’ balance sheet capacity, those banks willing to accept these funds could potentially obtain some market power. 13 Other money market investors have similar broad mandates and play a role in promoting relative value between  the secured and unsecured markets. However, some such investors, such as nonfinancial corporations and foreign official institutions, appear to have limited ability to dynamically reallocate funds among asset classes, perhaps because of limited information or investment mandate restrictions. Further research to explore mechanisms by which money market lenders substitute between secured and unsecured investments may prove helpful. 14 Chen, Cipriani, La Spada, Mulder and Shah. “Money Market Funds and the New SEC Regulation,” March 20,  2017. 15 For a broad perspective on how financial regulation changed after the crisis, see Tarullo, “Departing Remarks,”  April 4, 2017.

The launch of the Bank’s MobileLINK today is one of the efforts to facilitate the achievement of the objective to enhance our reach to a wider community. This custom-made coach is equipped with all the supporting facilities, and is another avenue for members of the public particularly from the non-urban areas to engage on matters relating to banking services which need to be addressed and on any other financial services that are offered by our financial institutions. This will allow members of the public including SMEs to receive rapid response and facilitation on financial matters. It will also enable the Bank to hear directly from the public on financial issues concerning our financial system. The journey for MobileLINK will begin today to cover about 50% of the identified the nonurban areas nationwide in the next 3 years. In the first phase, the MobileLINK’s journey will  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  start from Mersing, Johor and will continue to northern states and later back to the south to Jerantut, Pahang. This part of the journey will be completed in December 2012. The Bank looks forward to this new venture. It would also help to identify the specific financial needs of the local communities and the financial assistance and the advice for the different communities in our country. The terminals in the MobileLINK coach are connected to the Bank’s information technology systems such as Central Credit Reference Information System, Customer Redress Mechanism System and the Bank’s corporate website.
In practice this often means that we allow the time for bringing inflation up or down to the target to vary depending on the prospects for economic activity. According to our monetary policy strategy, our policy is normally aimed at attaining the inflation target within two years. The calculation we made in July indicated that it would probably have required a slightly higher interest rate path than that described in the Report to bring inflation down to 2 per cent in two years. This would have brought down growth even lower next year. Given that inflation was deviating so far from target and taking into account the uncertainty in the financial markets, it would have been better, in my opinion, to aim at bringing down inflation to around 2 per cent in three years. I do not believe that the decision in July can be regarded as any severe tightening of monetary policy. The interest rate is still relatively low. The nominal interest rate prior to the decision at the beginning of July was at a long-term average of 4.25 per cent. But the real interest rate was still lower than an historical average. In July the real interest rate was around 1.5 per cent, but it will rise during the forecast period to just over 2.5 per cent at most. The interest rate path we described in July entailed a change from a relatively neutral to a slightly contractionary monetary policy.

The Minister of Trade and Industry at the time, Erik Brofoss, advocated following UK actions to the full, and was supported in this view by Gunnar Jahn, the director of Norges Bank. They feared a substantial loss of competitiveness if Norway was the only one among its trading partners not to follow the sterling devaluation. When the magnitude of the UK devaluation became known, Gunnar Jahn was attending the annual meeting of the IMF in Washington. He had received provisional authorisation from the government to inform the IMF that Norway would follow a moderate British devaluation. The expectation was a sterling devaluation of around 20 per cent. However, Erik Brofoss had informed Jahn that he favoured following the UK move regardless of how much they devalued. At an IMF dinner on the evening of 16 September Jahn received a business card with the date “18 September”, the number “30.5” and the words “Tell Bramsnæs” written on it (Bramsnæs was the director of Danmarks Nationalbank, who was also  BIS Review 147/2010  3  demand pressures were elevated. The krone devaluation triggered high inflation. 14 This time, the rule “do what the UK does” contributed to a less favourable outcome. 15 4. Groups often make better decisions than individuals  So what steps can we take to ensure that important decisions are the best they can be, even if they have to be made under uncertainty? In his novel L, Erlend Loe discusses advantages and drawbacks of different decision systems.
At the same time, all desirable spending programmes must be prioritised within an overall budget framework. Fund structures or other forms of financing outside the ordinary budget are only a way of avoiding budget constraints. This would weaken the credibility of the fiscal rule, which in turn would affect interest rate setting. Again – policy rules and words must be followed up by action. In the words of former Norges Bank Governor Hermod Skånland: Once the authorities have charted a course, they should not embark a different path. 5  National Budget for 2003. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Lessons from the financial crisis – financial stability and supervision Chart 14: Household debt. As a percentage of GDP. 2000, 2005 and 2010 I have described how Norway differs from other European countries after the financial crisis. While many EU countries are in the economic doldrums and are facing high government debt, Norway has made use of its fiscal leeway and has fared well. However, there is one area in which Norway differs from other countries in a manner we perhaps do not like: Norwegian households are among the most heavily indebted in Europe. Rising debt and property prices are mutually reinforcing. Higher asset prices lead to higher collateral values for loans. Easier access to credit also leads to increased purchasing power when property is offered for sale. This increases risk in the financial system.

CDS spreads among  2  BIS Review 25/2008  Icelandic banks are much wider than among foreign banks with comparable credit ratings, and much wider than many – including respected financial analysis institutions abroad – consider appropriate and consistent with the banks’ financial strength and performance. 1 It is worth remembering that Iceland’s financial system has grown by leaps and bounds recently, and the operations of Icelandic commercial banks extend to a large number of foreign locations. Iceland’s three largest commercial banks now generate more than half of their income through their operations in other countries. Those operations are distributed over a wide geographical area. While they are most prominent in the Nordic region and the UK, they are also visible in Continental Europe and farther afield, though to a lesser extent. Through these operations, Iceland’s banks have fortified their foundations and distributed their risk. They are international banks with headquarters in Iceland, and they are much less dependent on economic developments in Iceland than they were previously. At the end of January, the banks published their annual accounts for the year 2007. These reflected both the success of the past several years and last year’s changes in the global capital markets. For the year as a whole, the banks demonstrated excellent performance. Profits were good, and core operations yielded strong returns. As can be expected, profits dropped in the fourth quarter, as was the case with banks all over the globe.
There will now be a  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  period of opportunity for the politicians of Europe to get on with making the changes that would really make a long-term difference, such as improving competitiveness in the countries of southern Europe. To summarise my assessment of markets at this point I would no longer say that they are healing. Rather, markets are scarring over – adapting and evolving to the new environment. No one is quite sure where the process will end, but the industry has a job to do, including investing large sums of money here and now. And in some fashion, reflecting the enhanced perceptions of risk, that will continue. Given what happened in financial markets, it is no surprise that there are policy initiatives on financial market regulation everywhere one chooses to look: Dodd-Frank in the US; EMIR, Solvency II and the Crisis Management Directive in the EU; the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) proposals in the UK; the new Basel 3 rules on capital and liquidity globally (CRD IV in Europe), and numerous initiatives under the auspices of the Financial Stability Board including defining the key attributes for effective resolution regimes. The full list of new rules is much, much longer of course. Despite the variety of authorities involved, I believe there is a common thread behind the policy reactions. Many of the changes have been prompted by perceived excesses in much of the financial sector.

To put it in another way, the framework in question is intended to establish a balance between flexibility and safety, gradually easing the burden on employment, increasing the firms’ and workers’ capacity to adopt to changes, increasing the quality of workers that are transferred from the agricultural sector, and developing active labor policies to meet labor market’s needs. In the last part of my presentation, I would like to briefly mention the current account deficit problem. As it is known, in line with the high growth rate, an upward trend is observed in the current account deficit. Today, the primary reason of the current account deficit is that investments grow faster than savings. In 2005, the current account deficit was recorded as USD billion 23.1 billion and the ratio of current account deficit to national income was 6.4 percent. In this ratio, the impact of energy prices, which is composed of the prices of crude oil, natural gas and coal, was 1.4 points and the impact of the rise in crude oil prices alone was 1.1 points. By April 2006, the current account deficit increased to USD 26.8 billion. However, the question is not the level itself but its sustainability. When global trends are analyzed, it is observed that countries, which have succeeded in increasing financial and economic integration and reinforced macroeconomic stability, are able to sustain higher current account deficits compared to the past.
Today, I would like to focus on this challenge by analysing the context in which the SNB manages its foreign exchange reserves. While a number of problems are shared by both the SNB and other large investors, there are certain features that are specific to a central bank; I will return to these in a moment. My presentation is structured as follows: First, I will outline the latest developments in the SNB’s foreign exchange reserves. Second, I will describe the principles underlying the management of these reserves. Third, I will comment on the current allocation of reserves, based on the results for the third quarter of 2012, which have just been published. I will conclude by setting out the main challenges facing the SNB in the management of its foreign exchange reserves. Substantial growth of foreign exchange reserves since the start of the crisis A first key observation is that the SNB’s balance sheet has grown significantly since the onset of the crisis (cf. slide 1). It is currently around four times its pre-crisis level, at nearly CHF 500 billion, with foreign exchange reserves amounting to nearly 70% of GDP. Such a sizeable expansion is by no means unique; other central banks have also seen their balance sheets grow considerably. However, the SNB stands out because of the very rapid expansion in its foreign exchange reserves (cf. slide 2). It is important to note that this growth results directly from the SNB’s monetary policy, and not from any investment choices.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Bank of France - how the commitment to fintechs is being implemented Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), at the ACPR-AMF Forum Fintech, Paris, 11 October 2021. * * * Dear Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you to the Banque de France this morning for this annual ACPRAMF Fintech Forum – and I would also like to welcome Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF. Mr. Minister, dear Cédric, you have once again given us the pleasure of being present for this second forum. The strong attendance of public officials testifies to our collective commitment to fintechs, which I am convinced are indispensable to the financial sector, as a driver of creativity, vitality and efficiency. Previously a garden in the making, the fintech ecosystem is now growing in leaps and bounds. This is especially the case since these start-ups have benefited from the acceleration of digitisation in finance resulting from the health crisis. Moreover, 2021 was a record year for fundraising in the sector: EUR 1.7 billion had been raised by the end of August 2021, which is already twice as much as for the whole of last year, and this year also saw the birth of the first French fintech “unicorns".
Source: ONS, IMF World Economic Outlook  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In the UK, the rate of growth which we have seen over the early stages of recovery has not been spectacular, but that is not unusual in the early period of a return to growth after a major economic downturn. It is also not surprising that there have been variations in growth across different sectors of the economy and that confidence still remains fragile in the business community and among consumers. It is normally only 2–3 years into the recovery phase of the economic cycle that perceptions of improving economic conditions begin to catch up with the reality of a return to growth. This strong correspondence between economic growth in the UK and elsewhere in the EU shown in Chart 1 should not be a great surprise. It reflects the close economic links which have grown up over the centuries and which have been reinforced by the development of the European Union and the Single European Market. But this close link between economic growth in the UK and elsewhere in Europe is an example of a much more general phenomenon. We now live in a highly integrated global economy. And economies which are very open to trade and investment – like the United Kingdom, and indeed Jersey – are strongly influenced by international economic trends. During my time on the MPC, the growth and inflation performance of the UK, and hence our monetary policy judgements, have been heavily driven by global developments.

Some of the gains of the past few years have dissipated, and our disposable income might fall by close to 10 per cent in 2009. In periods of substantial uncertainty, investors will seek to repatriate investments in foreign currency. The fragility of the Norwegian krone was illustrated when investors fled the currencies of small countries, and the krone weakened considerably. When speculators withdrew, daily fluctuations increased and hedging against exchange rate volatility became  BIS Review 37/2009  5  more expensive. The krone fell to a record-low level in December last year, but has appreciated since then. Consumer price inflation reached a peak in October of 2008, and has slowed markedly thereafter and was 2.5 per cent in February. Underlying inflation is still above the inflation target, and stood at approximately 3 per cent in February. Even though inflation has been falling, the rise in prices has been somewhat sharper than expected recently, particularly for imported consumer goods. The depreciation of the krone last autumn has probably fed through to prices more rapidly than usual. Nevertheless, looking forward inflation will abate. Norges Bank has over a number of years focused on anchoring inflation expectations around  6  BIS Review 37/2009  the target of close to 2.5 per cent over time and given weight to predictability, with a recognizable response pattern. The downturn has not affected long-term inflation expectations to any great extent.
Fifth, in competing for the same pool of international investors, countries in the region often attempt to raise their individual profile through offering tax break or other subsidies. This race to the bottom does not prove to be productive. Resolving any of these issues requires foresight, strong institutions, determined policy action, and regional coordination. Institutions and integration Our region is actively involved in the EU integration process. This objective is the lighthouse for our institutional reform efforts and has produced notable benefits. The EU integration is aiding authorities in the region to anchor their institutional reforms and policies. On the other hand, the EU institutions provide oversight and lend credibility to the process. Additionally, since individual countries are working towards common objectives, regional policy is better coordinated. However, I also believe countries in the region could do more to share their experiences and learn from each other. Albania offers a positive example in terms of economic and financial stability. Macedonia has done exceptionally well in terms of attracting high-value-added FDIs. Serbia is on the regional vanguard of financial market development. All of us should learn from our individual success stories; all of us should avoid mistakes we have individually made in the past. Our countries share more commonalities than differences: what works for one is more likely than not to work for others, and vice versa. Furthermore, I believe we should look at regional integration as a goal in itself, rather than as an instrument to EU integration.

In France, in December 2012, the Government approved a draft Law on the reform of the banking sector that, among other things, envisages the establishment of an equivalent authority, the “Conseil de la Stabilité Finacière” (CSF). At the Bank of Spain we are also currently looking at the way a Spanish Macroprudential Authority should be set up. Changes in bank regulation Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to turn now to the changes that have occurred in the regulatory field  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The crisis we are still going through was triggered, on the one hand, by the extraordinary loose monetary and financial conditions – and the expansion of credit – of the period between 2000 and 2007. On the other hand, inadequate rules – result of two decades of deregulation, and sometimes bad deregulation – compounded the problem and facilitated high leverage. The Basel capital ratios of the time were low or, in some cases, not applied. There was excessive reliance on internal bank models. The way VaR models were defined by Basel and applied by banks underestimated what we call tail risks, that is, risks associated to events with low probability of occurrence but extremely high cost. Therefore, there was a need for a regulatory response after the crisis. Since the main elements of this response are well known, I will limit myself to a few remarks. First, the response took a predictable pattern: the strengthening of capital requirements, both as regards levels and quality of capital.