samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And should we change the goal of monetary policy to include a wider range of objectives that include maintaining the stability of the banking sector? 2  BIS Review 100/2010  Why were banks so fragile? On the eve of the crisis we had come to be in a situation where the capital of UK banks, relative to their assets, was around half the level that was typical fifty years earlier and probably around one third the level that was usual one hundred years ago (Chart 2). In the US the decline in bank capital over the past one hundred years is quite probably even larger. Chart 2  Chart 3  Capital levels relative to total holdings for UK banks  Liquidity ratio of the UK banking sector  Per cent 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001  Sources: United Kingdom: Sheppard, D (1971), The growth and role of UK financial institutions 1880–1962, Methuen, London; Billings, M and Capie, F (2007), “Capital in British banking”, 1920–1970, Business History, Vol 49(2), pages 139–162; BBA, published accounts and Bank calculations. (a) US data show equity as a percentage of assets (ratio of aggregate dollar value of bank book equity to aggregate dollar value of bank book assets). (b) UK data on the capital ratio show equity and reserves over total assets on a time-varying sample of banks, representing the majority of the UK banking system, in terms of assets.

There is also firm evidence that the inflation targeting regime has earned credibility in the markets and the community. The monetary regime will be further tested in the period ahead, which will among other things be characterised by an exceptional level of foreign direct investment in the aluminium industry and associated publicly owned and debt financed power plants. Our experience is a strong indication that inflation targeting is a policy which can be pursued in a very small and open economy as in a large economy with very deep financial markets. This policy is resource-demanding and imposes by necessity a very strong discipline on the respective central bank. In our view the increased focus on financial stability in the Central Bank Act of 2001 was natural and well within the accepted framework of central bank activities. The Bank was responsible for banking supervision until the end of 1998 when that function was merged with the Insurance Supervisory Authority in a new and unified Financial Supervisory Authority, with which the Central Bank cooperates quite closely on financial stability issues. While the Central Bank had responsibility for banking supervision, its attention was necessarily focused on individual institutions and overseeing that their operations complied with existing laws and regulations. Before banking supervision was transferred elsewhere, the Central Bank had also begun to focus its attention on broader financial stability issues along the lines that many other central banks were doing at that time.
In all, our view is that the improved economic fundamentals and the more flexible policy regime should place the economy in a better position to weather the current turmoil without too much impact on growth and economic stability. And with growth continuing, the performance of the banking sector will also benefit. My last point is that the ability of the Thai banking sector to weather the turmoil is also confirmed by our recent stress-testing exercise which covers credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk, linked to a macroeconomic impact scenario. The result indicates that the Thai banking system is quite resilient. Thai banks can withstand sharp economic slowdown and unfavorable market volatility quite well. This is a result of strong profitability and capital accumulation, as well as prudent credit and investment policies over the years. And for our part, given the increased uncertainty in the external environment, the Bank of Thailand will continue to monitor our banking sector and financial markets closely, and to move forward in our regulatory reform to enhance the risk management and the efficiency of the banking system. In the near-term, what we have in the pipeline is a full implementation of Basel II by 2010, which includes the introduction of Pillar I by the end of this year, implementation of Pillar III by the middle of next year, and the introduction of Pillar II by 2010.

Loan growth in July increased to 11.8 percent while deposits including bill of exchange grew by 1.9 percent. Liquidity in the system remains adequate, with loan/deposit ratio excluding interbank transactions at 90.1 percent in July. On asset quality, gross NPL ratio edged downward to 6.4 percent in June. These numbers show that the performance of the Thai banking sector is quite robust, and is well positioned to support the economy. Fourth, a more difficult picture to assess is the impact of the turmoil on the economy and how this would translate into the impact on the banking sector. So far, notwithstanding the less helpful global environment, the Thai economy has performed relatively well, with growth averaging 5.7 percent in the first half of this year. But going forward, market participants expect the economy to become more affected by the slowing global economy. Our own forecast also sees growth to be less buoyant in the second half of the year, reflecting a more adverse impact on exports. But overall, the momentum of growth should not be too adversely affected given the support that growth could gain from domestic demand which is being supported by high farm income, continued credit availability, and supportive fiscal policy. Moreover, lower oil prices and monetary policy that focuses on inflation should provide a stable price environment conducive to domestic demand and to export competitiveness. Also, continued current account surpluses, lower external indebtedness, and high domestic savings have made the economy’s financial conditions more stable, by reducing its dependency on capital flows.
In this context, I should also highlight that ERM II membership should not be seen as a mere "waiting room" prior to the adoption of the euro, but rather as a meaningful and flexible framework for the achievement of further real and nominal convergence with the euro area. Compliance with the Treaty in the field of central bank independence and other legislation of concern to the ECB The ECB is not formally associated with the negotiations on accession, and we have no intention to compete with the European Commission and the other entities involved in this process. On the other hand, the timely implementation of the acquis communautaire within the ECB's field of competence is of crucial interest to the ECB for a number of reasons. One reason relates to the new status of the central banks of accession countries from the date of EU accession. At that point in time, these central banks will become members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Moreover, commercial banks of accession countries will also be affected by accession, and we need to know that they operate in a sound and stable legal environment. For instance, the rules of the internal market and the "single financial passport" will allow credit institutions established in an accession country to obtain indirect access to Eurosystem facilities – such as monetary policy operations and payment systems – through branches located in the euro area.

Against this background, the central banks of accession countries should simultaneously be concerned about the need to further advance disinflation and to catch-up with real income and price levels in the euro area. The strict respect of the Maastricht inflation criterion should be seen as a medium-term objective and not as an immediate goal, if progress towards the achievement of this criterion would jeopardise the catching-up process. Nevertheless, the ultimate fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria over the medium term should provide monetary policy with the appropriate  2  BIS Review 84/2001  framework for gradually lowering inflation rates, thereby contributing to macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth. Together with the maintenance of inflation differentials with the euro area, catching-up in terms of real per capita income and price levels may also imply an appreciation of the real exchange rate. In this fashion, exchange rate policy should support the convergence process without any constraint to real sustainable growth. Again, neither the Eurosystem nor the ECOFIN Council can recommend a single exchange rate policy as the appropriate one to be pursued along the road towards the adoption of the euro. It is clear, however, that some accession countries will have to modify their exchange rate strategies to make them compatible with ERM II requirements. This applies mainly to the existing free floats (e.g. Poland) and pegs against anchors other than the euro (e.g. Latvia and Lithuania); in these cases, it will be crucial to identify the optimal timing of the revision of the different regimes.
How do banks in Hong Kong measure up in terms of environmental issues? As an international financial centre, Hong Kong provides a base for a number of multinational banks that have developed detailed environmental policies and procedures. In the case of local and regional banks, I would say that environmental issues are less highly articulated. This is why I welcome this conference and the involvement in it of the Hong Kong Association of Banks. It is not my purpose in this speech to anticipate the more detailed advice that subsequent speakers are going to offer. But I would like to offer a few general recommendations that banks should take into account in dealing with environmental issues. First, banks should keep themselves informed about international and regional initiatives on the environment, particularly those that directly concern financial institutions. In this connection, I would draw the attention of those institutions that are not already aware of it to the work of the United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”). This is the main UN institution that deals with environmental questions. As part of its work, it has established a Financial Institutions Initiative on the Environment which is a partnership between UNEP and leading banking and insurance companies to promote sustainable development and environmentally sound business practices. The basic role of the Initiative is to promote the integration of environmental considerations into all aspects of the financial sector’s operations and services.

Denis Beau: Digital finance, market disruption, and financial stability Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Bank of France Toulouse School of Economics joint conference, Paris, 12 November 2018. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you all today, for the tenth edition of the Banque de France and Toulouse School of Economics joint conference. This year, we have decided to shed light on how digital-based financial innovations are affecting the robustness and efficiency of the financial system. It is a good time to talk about digital finance and market disruption for at least two reasons: - 2018 is both the 10th anniversary of the Lehman bankruptcy and that of Nakamoto’s paper underlying Bitcoin. - those events have unleashed regulatory and market developments and innovations that should contribute to both strengthen and change the role and structure of financial intermediation. As a result, we see a complex set of interactions, involving competition and cooperation, which are developing between “old” and “new” players and which are likely to coexist in the intermediation space going forward. “What does that mean in terms of financial stability?” and “how does this coexistence affect central banking?” are two questions open for discussion at today’s conference. But for the time being, let me quickly follow two leads. I. Promises of digital finance: redefining financial intermediation? First point: The digitalization of finance is prospering on the ground of cutting-edge technologies.
Such reversals, abrupt or not, are bound to happen once better growth prospects in the advanced economies are confirmed. The upshot is that we are living in a world where disruptive tail events can be more of a frequent occurrence than was the case in the past. And third, while the forces underlying the current cycle of capital flows are global, policy response in emerging economies remains domestic-centric. This, I think, is an important point to note in the current capital flows episode. Also, because financial markets are more integrated, policy response in one country can have significant unintended consequences on other economies. In other words, we are living in a world where events and policies in a country can result in large spillover effects on other economies. BIS Review 141/2010  1  So, this is the new economic and financial context in which the flows are taking place and the policy responses are being shaped. Managing this will be a challenge, and effective policy response will require an integrated approach that combines flexible monetary and exchange regime, fiscal policy, capital account liberalization, and the use of macroprudential measures, in a coherent policy framework. Moreover, the policy response will need to be supported by structural reforms and policies to enhance the depth, the resilience, and the strength of the domestic financial system, as well as policies to promote a greater degree of product and labour market flexibility.

(1997), “Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets”, European Economic Review 41, pp. 1111–1146 introduced this type of loss function to analyse so-called flexible inflation targeting. However, the behavioural assumption that the loss function (or very similar variations of it) implies, has a long tradition in analyses of monetary policy (for example, Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott (1977), “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans”, Journal of Political Economy 85, 473–491.) 15  One can also calculate the mean value of these deviations, what is known as the mean squared gap. The mean squared gap for inflation and resource utilisation can then be drawn in as points in a figure; see, for instance, the article “A method for assessing different monetary policy alternatives” in the Material for assessing monetary policy 2011, Sveriges Riksbank. 16  See, for example, Apel, Mikael, Per Jansson and Lars Heikensten (2007), “The role of academics in monetary policy: a study of Swedish inflation targeting”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2007:1, pp. 21–58. 17  The document “Monetary policy in Sweden 2010”, Sveriges Riksbank, summarises the Riksbank’s monetary policy strategy. It is stated there (p. 5) that monetary policy “in addition to stabilising inflation around the inflation target, also strives to stabilise output and employment around long-term sustainable paths”. However, this does not mean that policy needs to be pegged to specific numerical estimates of these paths; see the continued discussion in this speech.
William C Dudley: Regional economy and housing update Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing, New York City, 19 October 2010. *  *  *  Good morning and welcome once again to the New York Fed’s Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing. As always, I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with the journalists covering our region – and through you, to the people in our District. This morning I will focus on regional economic conditions, with particular attention to the housing sector in the nation and especially the Second Federal Reserve District, which covers New York, northern New Jersey, Fairfield County, Connecticut; Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. My colleagues will follow my remarks and provide more detail. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. National economic conditions To provide context, let me start with a few comments about national economic conditions. As I discussed in a recent speech, the long and deep recession that ended in June 2009 has been followed by a very tepid recovery. Since June 2009, economic activity has grown – but only slowly from levels far below the productive capacity of the economy. In recent months, the momentum of the recovery has slowed.

Ladies and Gentlemen It is a continuing concern of all key stakeholders that provision of financial services in rural areas continues to be significantly lower than in urban areas. This has constrained the rural populace from access to savings products. This largely on account of poor infrastructure coupled with low literacy levels. As of June 2020, 39 out of the 116 districts in the country, did not have either bank branches or agents. It is from this backdrop that the Bank of Zambia, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning and the Ministry of Health, commenced an initiative to help accelerate rural financial inclusion in Districts by promoting the use of health facilities as general access  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  points for financial services. The General Access Point Inspection Report was presented during the dissemination workshop on 13 September 2022 and is available for detailed information. Ladies and Gentlemen The implementation of the National Strategy on Financial Education requires the united responsibility of the financial sector. This has been demonstrated by the Pensions and Insurance Authority, the Insurers Association of Zambia as well as Securities and Exchange Commission and the Capital Markets Association of Zambia who successfully launched the Insurance Week under the theme "Insurance-Solutions for a better tomorrow" and World Investor Week under the theme "Learn more about Investor resilience and sustainable finance" earlier this month. I am confident that the key messages disseminated during these events will contribute to raising the levels of financial literacy in the country.
Also in the fact that external conditions forecast to 2015, while less auspicious than expected in September, point to an improvement from this year. And last but not least, in the strength of our economy and our institutions. The significant monetary impulse that has already been added, the increased fiscal impulse and the effect of the peso depreciation on the performance of tradable sectors will lend support to economic activity. The depreciation of our currency has favored the exporting sectors and the regions where some of these sectors are based. It is worth noting that, as can be inferred from our Business Perceptions Report, certain regions of our country, especially to the south, which have endured difficult moments in the past few years, now largely outperform their peers up north. However, as I already mentioned, inflation remains high and above projections, a sign that for the time being monetary policy actions have reached its limit. Although we are convinced that inflation will return to near 3 percent over the course of 2015, we cannot rule out that this convergence is slower than expected. This is important, because in the end, we must not forget that higher inflation hits hardest those most vulnerable sectors of the population, as they have fewer tools to deal with it. In this sense, absent significant changes in the scenario we estimate to be the most likely, we do not see that, in the short run, we should increase the monetary impulse, which is already strong enough.

After assessing these risks, which originate both domestically and abroad, the Board estimates that the risk balance is unbiased for inflation and downward biased for output. Inflation is high now, but it is expected to approach 3 percent over the course of 2015. Domestic output and demand continue to show significant weakness and growth prospects for 2015 have been revised downwards, despite that both monetary and fiscal impulses are significant, and the external impulse will be slightly larger than what we saw this year. The Board led the policy rate to 3 percent and stated that future changes to it would depend on the evolution of internal and external macroeconomic conditions, and their implications on the inflation outlook. At the same time, it reaffirmed its commitment to conduct monetary policy with flexibility so that projected inflation stands at 3 percent over the policy horizon. The Financial Stability Report (IEF) Our Financial Stability Report (IEF) discloses, twice a year (in June and December), those recent macroeconomic and financial developments that might influence the financial stability of the Chilean economy. Let me now briefly describe some of the main subjects covered in this last issue. The same scenarios for external risk I just described are analyzed in the IEF. From the standpoint of financial stability, we conclude that as the process of monetary policy normalization in the United States advances, financial volatility episodes may follow. The expansionary policies have helped to shape the current environment of low risk premiums and low volatility.
Market capitalisation of domestic bond markets more than doubled over the past nine years - from an average of 20% of combined GDP in 1995 to 47% in 2003. During the same period, the combined share of bond markets in total financing grew from 11% to 19%. Bond markets are, therefore, a growth industry. Quite apart from the considerable initiatives by the private sector, bond market development has been a particular target of initiatives by governments and multilateral agencies. There are good reasons for this. My intention in this short address is to set out briefly these reasons - to put the case for an Asian bond market - and then to examine some of the work that is in progress in this field, particularly from the point of view of the central banks. The need for an Asian bond market The underdeveloped state of the Asian bond market - compared with the bond markets in the industrialised economies - has been well documented in recent years. Despite the impressive growth of the size of the Asian bond market that I have just mentioned, it still lags behind the developed economies in terms of breadth and depth. For example, the market capitalisation of the domestic bond market in the US, the UK and Japan is equivalent to over 150% of the GDP compared with just 47% in ex-Japan Asia. Activity in the secondary market is also relatively low.

Joseph Yam: The case for an Asian Bond Market Opening address by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asia-Pacific Bond Market Congress: A New Maturity, Hong Kong, 8-9 July 2004. *  *  *  I am honoured to be invited to give the opening address at this congress. The strong attendance at this event, and the quality of the sessions lined up, are, I think, an indication of the growing recognition of the importance of bond market development in this region. I am delighted that Hong Kong has been chosen for the venue. The congress is well timed, since only yesterday the Hong Kong SAR Government launched its $ billion bond issue. I extend a warm welcome to those of you who are visiting Hong Kong: I hope you will be able to stay on for a few days and enjoy the city over the weekend. The title of the congress “A New Maturity”, apart from the mild and allowable pun, makes a useful comment on the state of the bond market in Asia. Whether “maturity” is quite the right word is a matter of debate, and I note that the title of the panel discussion later this morning adds a question mark to the word. However we might describe it, there is no doubt about the progress that has been made in the growth of domestic bond markets in the region over the past few years.