samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Back then employment could be generated through the reduction in wage costs that a devaluation entailed and thanks to the improvement in competitiveness that immediately came about in companies. But this formula is no longer viable, and thankfully so, because the benefits for Spain of being part of the euro far outweigh those of retaining the peseta in the long run. But if we accept this constraint now upon us, we must be consistent and accept that this time we can no longer, as we did on several occasions in the past, adjust our competitiveness and, therefore, increase our growth rate without changing our singular institutional framework. And in this forum I should mention the responsibility that large and small firms alike must embrace. With all due diligence they should adopt the organisational reforms and adapt their working procedures so as to enable them to use as soon as possible all the changes introduced into our legal and institutional framework aimed at making hiring easier. Let me move on now to the problems I mentioned at the start of my address. These concern the markets’ doubts, reflected in the higher cost that the Kingdom of Spain has been paying for a year to raise funding. Blaming this on greedy or evil markets would be a waste of time, and might distract us from the fact that these costs can only be reduced if we adopt the domestic measures and reforms needed as soon as possible.

The Icelandic banking sector experienced a dramatic expansion in just a few years, funded by cheap foreign financing, which allowed it to boost its assets from 100 to almost 900 percent of GDP between 2004 and end-2007. This expansion made the Icelandic banking system one of the largest in the world in relation to GDP. As global conditions deteriorated in early 2008, banks’ CDS spreads rose to unprecedented levels. In response, banks slowed lending growth, enhanced liquidity buffers, reduced costs, and started a process of downsizing non-core operations and laying off staff. But their ability to deleverage was limited by the global risk aversion. A recent FSAP update and Article IV Consultation conducted in June 2008 pointed to several risks that were mounting throughout 2008: (i) liquidity and funding risks, associated with the banks’ reliance on market funding and their large funding needs over the short run; (ii) credit and market risks, resulting from foreign currency, equity exposures, and high indebtedness of domestic borrowers, as well as collateralized lending, connected lending, and large exposures; (iii) operational risks, associated with the banks’ rapid expansion in recent years; and (iv) quality of capital risks, related to complex ownership structures. In this light, the Staff Report concluded that “if risks were to materialize in full, Iceland could face severe financial strains.” Despite the authorities’ attempts to prepare for contingencies earlier in the year, the crisis brought down the three main banks within a week.
The other option, described by Kohn as the “extra action policy”, allows for a deviation of current inflation from a level determined as stable in return for improvement of the perspectives of achieving price stability in the future. However, the extra action policy does not mean piercing the speculative bubbles by central banks, and means rather “taking out” of additional insurance against possible negative shocks, which may happen in the future. In Kohn’s opinion, the extra action policy may be run very rarely and only where the three conditions are met: •  the central bank must be able to identify asset bubbles in a timely manner and high certainty as to the correctness of analysis conclusions;  •  there must be a high probability that a slight tightening of the monetary policy will be able to stand against the speculative activity on a given assets market;  •  the expected improvement of the future economic situation resulting from a smaller speculative bubble must be significant and higher than the costs incurred by the economy in the aftermath of running the extra action policy. To recapitulate this train of thought, Kohn was very sceptical whether the three above-mentioned conditions can be sufficiently met; however, he did not preclude that in the future, the understanding of economic processes will improve as much as to enable running the extra action policy where reasonable.

Krzysztof Rybiński: Globalisation and its implications for monetary policy Speech by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at a series of seminars by the Centre for European Regional and Local Studies and the UNESCO Chair, Warsaw University, Warsaw, 6 April 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Globalisation is a term used frequently in the economic debate nowadays, and it would be difficult to find an area of economic research that is “globalisation-free”. However, its meaning is so broad, that when globalisation is referred to in a discussion, various people understand various things. For this very reason, a discussion on globalisation and the monetary policy should commence with an attempt to define the term. One of the definitions of globalisation is provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 1 , where it is construed as “the growing interdependence (integration) of national economies, in particular as a result of the growing international trade and financial flows”. Moreover, an element of globalisation that is worth mentioning is the fast flow of information and knowledge, which is the driving force behind globalisation processes. One should keep in mind that globalisation is not a completely new phenomenon 2 . In view of the existence of political barriers to international trade, the flow of capital and goods was equally as possible one hundred years ago as it is today.
However, as the economy bounces back, such a large-scale programme is now mostly pushing up housing prices, and this rise is not covered by the subsidised interest rate. Nor does it improve the affordability of housing for people, while the main goal is to increase the affordability of housing for people. We needed a shift to more targeted programmes addressing social issues, rather than focused on boosting construction in general. This is exactly why the parameters of the subsidised programme were changed, as was announced by President Putin. The next measure is reducing people’s and companies’ costs for covering their daily financial needs. In other words, this is not only loan restructuring and new loans which largely offset plummeting incomes, but also lower costs in the financial sector. We introduced a free limit of 100,000 rubles for P2P money transfers in the Faster Payments 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  System and obliged all banks to provide convenient access to the FPS in their applications. In addition, we limited acquiring fees to reduce companies’ costs related to cashless payments. This was a temporary measure, but it helped companies save 1.5% of their non-cash flows. Accommodative monetary policy and, accordingly, lower deposit rates made people opt for more profitable instruments in the stock market. Russia recorded a surge in the number of retail investors. As of the current moment, almost 13 million people have entered the stock market. They are mostly newcomers in the stock market, and we need to protect their rights.

Entering the EU, for the NBRM would automatically mean participation in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In this manner, we are getting much closer to Europe in the field of central banking. The staff of the central bank becomes part of many committees, subcommittees and working groups of the ESCB, which is crucial ingredient for strengthening the institutional capacity for policy making. And this is vital for the future steps, as the EU membership, for small and open economy, with high level of euroization and fixed exchange rates would inevitable imply need for very serious preparations for the Euro adoption. It requires passing the so-called test period, staying in the ERM 2 mechanism for at least two years and delivering stable currency, inflation and long term interest rates comparable with those in the EU, and disciplined and prudent public finance. All of these are Euro convergence criteria that at the end boil down to having safe and sound economy and disciplined monetary and fiscal policy, as a precondition for smooth monetary integration. Hence, entering the EU not only will facilitate trade and finance, and make movement of people much easier, but it will also open the doors to gradually move towards a single currency. The benefits of adopting the Euro are well known, in particular for a country that already has the exchange rate as a target, which means smoother transition. The single currency eliminates the currency risk and transaction costs, and thus facilities trade of good and services.
That would appear to confirm the scant flexibility of these economies and their limited responsiveness to changing conditions on world markets. Recent growth patterns have also led to widening divergence between the growth rates of the three main developed areas, as the high rate of expansion of the US economy increased and that of Europe and Japan declined or rose less than expected. This bore unfavourably on the global disequilibria, as manifest in the widening US current-account deficit, the counterpoint to which was the rising surplus in Japan, China and other Asian economies, as well as in the oil-exporting countries, while the slight surplus in the euro area increased very moderately. The prolonged deterioration of the US external balance - linked to a very expansionary fiscal policy that has compounded the effects of scant private-sector saving in recent years - engendered expectations of a depreciation of the dollar on international foreign exchange markets, which materialised only partially and asymmetrically. Consequently, while the dollar depreciated significantly against the euro until late 2004, it held very stable against the Asian currencies with which most of the US external imbalance has been built up. The effective depreciation of the dollar was thus only 5% in 2004.

While the impact of some of the factors underpinning household spending may moderate in the coming quarters, most of the factors operating in the recent past will continue to boost domestic demand and, in particular, productive investment. Likewise, insofar as European markets recover and the effects of the euro appreciation in 2004 ease and are absorbed, the contractionary influence of external demand might be checked. Under this scenario, the outlook for the economy in the short run points to a prolongation of the expansionary phase, with sustained GDP growth rates similar to those observed in 2004. These forecasts are subject, however, to some risk. This poses significant challenges for economic policy, especially when it comes to promoting the sustainability of economic dynamism over a longer  BIS Review 45/2005  5  term, under the constraints stemming from euro area membership. There are certain external risks whose potential influence on Spain is significant, but which economic policy action can do little to counter. This is the case with the dangers arising from the weakness of the euro area, from higher oil prices and from the appreciation of the euro. What economic policy can do here is in line with what policymakers can do to counter domestic risks, these undoubtedly being the most relevant ones for policy design. Accordingly, I shall focus on analysing the nature of the latter and their possible repercussions.
On the contrary, they need to contribute to the design of the measures to make them robust and effective across countries. Similar holds for regulatory objectives, as what is considered a priority for regulators in advanced countries, like the G20 countries, might not be considered as urgent in emerging market countries. In this regard, I welcome and strongly support the effort of the Basel Consultative Group (BSG) as a forum for deepening the engagement of the BCBS with non-member authorities, international institutions, and regional groups of banking supervisors on the regulatory reform and banking supervisory issues. I see cooperation between the BCBS and the BCG as a key component helping to design robust regulation and supervision, taking into account financial sector aspects in both advanced and emerging markets and developing countries. As a member of the BCG, the CNB has actively participated in the work of the group. We contributed to the work agenda evaluating major intended and unintended consequences of Basel III implementation for emerging and smaller economies in the past. We also hosted a workshop on this topic in 2013. As I see your workshop agenda, I appreciate that you are going to discuss the timely issue of sovereign exposures in emerging markets. The reasons for the high share of government bonds in commercial bank assets in emerging markets are clear and straightforward. Financial markets in these countries are still under development and shallow, which is limiting their ability to diversify assets.

On the contrary, government debt is a vital ingredient of modern monetary policy. A liquid market for government bonds is a prerequisite for a modern and efficient financial market. Functioning financial markets, in turn, are necessary for an efficient monetary policy: a liquid market for governments bonds enhances the efficiency of the monetary transmission mechanism. Yields on government bonds and indicators derived from these yields are an important source of information for the monetary policy decision making process. Finally, in implementing government policy, government bonds serve as collateral. Sound government finances are a prerequisite for the long-term success of monetary policy and for maintaining price stability. However, healthy government finances do not necessarily imply zero government debt. For the functioning of financial markets and an efficient monetary policy, a liquid market for government bonds is a considerable advantage. BIS Review 94/2007  1
The minutes from each of the quarterly AIPPF meetings are publically available and the AIPPF will produce a final report upon its conclusion later this year. As we, and industry, learn more from this soft support around AI, it may be that harder forms of public infrastructure will be needed, provided either by the Bank, another authority or as a collaboration between different authorities. Those decisions will be taken at the appropriate time. If that means that the Bank’s direct involvement in these areas passes over to another institution, then that’s fine: we will have played our role at the right time. PRA regulation on outsourcing and third-party risk management  A further business model-related change we need to think carefully about as digital finance becomes more prevalent is the relationships between financial firms and the technology companies that deliver their business services. That is particularly the case where those services are critically important to firms’ operational resilience or where they are involved in processing of confidential or sensitive firm data. 13  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/minutes/2020/artificial-intelligence-public-private-forum-minutes 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Reflecting this the PRA has updated its regulation on outsourcing and third-party risk management to complement and strengthen its new policy framework on operational resilience. 14 And we plan to analyse further whether we need even stronger tools to manage the risk that critical third parties, including potentially cloud and other major technology providers, may pose to the Bank’s and PRA’s objectives.

2 The Covid crisis has seen a further acceleration in the pace of digitalisation. Online sales have surged – coupled with a decline in the use of cash and less reliance on cards – and use of digital banking has increased. The Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee has been focusing on the macroeconomic impacts of the changes the pandemic has caused to what we buy, what we make and how we work, as I outlined in a speech I gave last November. 3 It’s a complex picture, and it’s still far too early to say what the long term economic effects of these developments will be. But what certainly has changed for good are our expectations of what services all of us should be able to access from our homes; which will see more work done such as my speech to you today .Digital finance, in all its forms, will be crucial to the recovery and to the post-Covid form of the economy. Into this changed landscape Ron Kalifa published his Independent Fintech Strategic Review earlier this year.4 The Bank welcomes this report, which provides a timely opportunity for us to reflect on our role and how Ron’s recommendations fit with our work to support safe innovation. So how do we see our role in the fintech landscape? At its most basic, I would say that private-sector innovation relies on public-sector foundations.
For instance, many countries (the UK, the Scandinavian countries, many Asian countries, such as China, South Korea, Singapore, and India) have realized that the future economic success will strongly depend on the ability of a country to provide innovative solutions and offer products and services of high value added. Thus, their system of education is being adjusted to those needs. For example in 2003, the number of American patents obtained by companies from the five largest developing countries was 3,900, against 166,000 and 59,000 patents obtained by Japanese and German companies, respectively. In 2002, Polish companies filed 123 patent applications and were granted 11 patents. According to the present forecasts, starting from 2010 the annual number of graduates from engineering, technical, mathematical and related faculties in China will reach ca. 800,000, and in India – about 600,000, 2 which will jointly exceed the number of graduates from American colleges by twelve-fold. As early as now, IT companies, pharmaceutical and many other industries are launching or extending their research centres in Asia, not only with the aim of optimising their research costs, but also to gain access to the fast-growing army of highly qualified experts. Hence, a snowballing increase in the number of patents registered by companies from the developing countries, mostly in Asia, may be expected in the forthcoming years. It has been observed in many countries that the public sector itself must become a source of innovation as well as must actively support e.g.

1  But it has not always been the case that we do not talk much about money itself. There have been times, times when the machinery of money itself has failed or when it has changed, that there has been debate, often long and bitter, about what money is and how it should work. th  The creation of the Bank of England itself, which caused much controversy, in the late 17 century, can be seen as ingenious marriage between the King’s fiscal needs and the economy’s need for a larger and a state authorised money supply using the new technology of ‘notes’ or claims drawn on banks. 2  The same period also saw a protracted debate about the debased state of the English coinage and how to fix the value of money, a debate involving John Locke among others and leading to a painful set of statutory and technological reforms carried out by Isaac Newton no less. The development of modern economies has been punctuated by debates about the nature and technology of money. 1  Milton Friedman made use of Mill’s characterisation of money as a machine when describing ‘what monetary policy can do’ in his seminal address to the American Economic Association in 1967. 2 In 17th century England, goldsmiths would take custody of their customers’ gold and issue a paper note in receipt.
The extent to which banks and other enterprises use the system will probably depend on the price. All the national central banks in the EU area can join Target, whether or not their country is in the euro area. But there is a considerable risk of countries outside the euro area being in a worse position, for instance due to restrictions on intra-day borrowing in euro to counter fluctuations in the payment flows. We have vigorously opposed this threat of discrimination but the issue, along with others, has been deferred and will now be decided by the countries that join the euro area from the start. 3. Legal framework A clear legal framework for the euro is essential. Economic values, for instance in contracts, bank accounts and pension agreements, must be guaranteed during the changeover period from 1999 to 2002, when the euro and national currencies will exist side by side. The so-  BIS Review 14/1997  -6-  called continuity of contracts is regulated in one of the euro statutes but amendments to national laws will also be needed. Another legal issue concerns the national central banks. As regards the Riksbank, the Maastricht Treaty calls for a more independent statutory status. This means, for instance, that the status of the Governor must be clarified; grounds for his or her dismissal will have to be explicit, e.g. serious misconduct, etc. Neither will the Riksbank be able to accept directives, except of a statutory nature, from others, e.g. the Government.

Although this would reduce unemployment, it would lead to a permanent reduction in labour supply and growth potential. So is there any evidence of this in the euro area? The overall picture suggests not: the euro area has not been affected by strong adverse participation effects, as was seen for example in the United States – where the unemployment rate would have been significantly higher during the crisis had it not been for workers dropping out of the labour force. You can see this on the left-hand side of slide 2. For the euro area, this is not a statistical artefact due to pension reforms or other possibly distorting measures: participation is growing virtually within all age groups.4 Workers have on the whole remained attached to the labour market and, today, headcount employment has virtually regained its pre-crisis level. This is shown on the right-hand side. The same is true of the euro area employment rate, which expresses headcount employment as a share of the population aged 15 to 74. This in itself provides strong evidence against participation-related hysteresis in the euro area. But even though labour force participation has held up relatively well in the euro area, the second issue we need to look at is the composition of the unemployed.