samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The reduction in the policy rate has been effectively transmitted into lower money market rates as well as lower commercial banks' retail rates. To date, 4 major Thai commercial banks have reduced their deposit rates and 3 of them have cut down their lending rates. The downward interest rate path should help improve sentiments and lower the cost of funds, which would support the recovery in domestic demand, particularly, investment. The outlook for the Thai economy within the next few years remains positive. The BoT's forecasts, having incorporated the aforementioned risks, show that the Thai economy should be growing by 4-5 percent in 2007 and by 4-5.5 percent in 2008. Such growth rates are respectable in light of these challenges. Regarding the challenge arising from the volatile global financial market and an appreciation of the baht, Thailand, with a relatively small and still shallow financial market like many emerging market economies, is vulnerable to the fast-moving international capital. Rapid movements of capital flows can have negative impacts on the export or import sectors, which could pass on the adverse effects to the real sector and financial sector and eventually jeopardizing economic stability. The rapid appreciation of the baht particularly in the last quarter of last year, which proved to be inconsistent with economic fundamentals and much out-of-line with the rest of the region, inevitably forced the Bank of Thailand to implement a reserve requirement on capital inflows to break the rapid one-way momentum and preserve overall stability after several capital account measures proved unsuccessful.

Under inflation targeting, the emphasis is given to maintaining core inflation within the target range and, at the same time, achieving a balanced growth path. We use the 1-day repurchase rate as a policy instrument to keep the quarterly average of core inflation within the target range of 0-3.5 percent. If inflationary pressure heightens and thereby increases the possibility of core inflation breaching the target, interest rate has to be raised. Bearing in mind that a time lag of 4-8 quarters before a change in the policy rate can be fully transmitted to the rest of the economy, policy consideration needs to be forward-looking. Upward inflationary pressure over the past few years, due to higher oil prices, has been tamed by monetary tightening. We raised the policy rate 13 times between August 2004 and June 2006, bringing the policy rate to 5.00 percent from 1.25 percent per annum. Hikes in the policy rate have brought the money market and commercial bank interest rates higher over the past 2 years. Our policy response proved timely, with inflation and its second round effects well contained. Recently, domestic demand, particularly in private consumption and investment, showed signs of a slowdown, while economic momentum from exports was expected to moderate, given the prospects of the global economy in 2007. Since inflationary pressures have subsided in line with easing energy prices, monetary policy could be eased in support of a further expansion of the economy.
Durmuş Yılmaz: Role and responsibilities of emerging economies in the global monetary system Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the conference on "Where Is Global Finance Heading? ", Istanbul, 2 October 2009. *  *  *  Dear Guests, I would like to welcome you all to Istanbul. It is a great pleasure for us to host this conference and such a distinguished group of central bankers, academics and experts. I hope this meeting, together with the upcoming events, will be helpful in shedding light on the future of the global financial system. It has been almost two years since the surfacing of global financial crisis of epic proportions and we are still dealing with its repercussions. One can easily identify a variety of reasons for its occurrence: Global macroeconomic imbalances certainly played a key role. Deficiencies in financial regulations and lack of coordination among monetary authorities and regulatory institutions played even a bigger role. Policy makers were quite complacent during the build up in asset bubbles. Accommodative monetary policies enabled access to cheap money. High leveraged transactions magnified the amount of liquidity created through financial system. Search for high yields led to excessive risk taking and use of complex instruments. Compensation scheme in the financial sector encouraged short-term bias. Above all, believed that with the use of complex financial instruments, one can wipe out the risk from balance sheets.

In Asia in particular, while new bond issuance fell more than 40% compared to 2021, syndicated lending saw modest growth. Quite remarkably, the green and sustainable segment grew by around 50% in 2022. 4. It's worth asking why we continued to see growth and innovation in Hong Kong during the challenging 2022: I believe it's because we benefit from some unique fundamental strengths, as well as some supportive policy measures. 5. So, what are these strengths? First, Hong Kong has a strong banking network. We are home to over three quarters of the world's top 100 banks. With a robust capital adequacy ratio of around 20%, a liquidity coverage ratio of over 160% and a low classified loan ratio of about 1.4%, our banks are always looking for new business. They give Hong Kong the liquidity and expertise needed to handle transactions of any size and complexity, and at highly competitive rates. 6. Our banking system operates within a vibrant financial ecosystem that offers plenty of opportunities for collaboration and cross-feritlisation. This is the most obvious with the bond market, which has a symbiotic relationship with the loan market in providing credit financing. Here again we are by far the number one in Asia. According to the International Capital Market Association, for six consecutive years to 2021, Hong Kong was the largest hub for arranging international bond issuance from Asia, capturing one-third of the market; we anticipate that Hong Kong will top the rankings again in 2022.
More recently, wide publicity has been given to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code which allows a debtor to continue its operations under a re-organization plan. Similarly, the Indian government initiative in the form of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act was passed with the objective of ensuring timely detection of sick and potentially sick industrial companies, to expedite the revival of potentially viable units and closure of nonviable units is noteworthy. We are informed that India is also re-examining the provisions of this law. The prevailing labour laws and parate execution powers make it difficult for financially troubled enterprises to restructure and continue business operations. The exercise of parate execution powers lead only to closure of enterprises, although the law provides for restructuring. The purchase of the mortgaged properties by the bank at the auction sale through the exercise of rights of parate execution has resulted in another undesirable phenomena, that is the accumulation of foreclosed assets on the balance sheets of banks. Undoubtedly, the closure of enterprises results in great cost to the economy by way of loss of output, loss of employment, defaults to creditors and low return to entrepreneurs. It is therefore, vital to have a sound procedure in place to assist ailing enterprises to overcome their problems, provided the enterprises are commercially viable and the problems are of a temporary nature.

Second, the Committee stands ready to make further asset purchases should the outlook warrant them. Just as with movements in Bank Rate in more normal times, a pause in monetary loosening does not necessarily mean that loosening has come to an end. It will all depend on how the outlook for inflation evolves. Looking further ahead, the Committee at some point will need to reduce the current exceptional degree of monetary stimulus. Some commentators have suggested that the MPC has been less forthcoming than other central banks in explaining its exit strategy. But to a large extent this reflects the fact that we have less to communicate. The Committee has two instruments through which it can withdraw the stimulus, raising Bank Rate and selling assets. Unlike some other central banks which need to create new instruments to drain excess reserves or alter the terms of existing facilities, the structure of the Bank’s operating framework means these two instruments can be used at any time, in any order. And the strategy guiding our policy decisions will be unchanged – monetary policy will continue to be determined by the outlook for inflation relative to target. The most difficult decision will be to decide the timing of the withdrawal, but that is always the case. The aftermath of the financial crisis posed many questions for the theory and practice of monetary policy.
Spain and Italy in the danger zone At the beginning of August concern increased that the problems would spread to other countries than Greece, Portugal and Ireland, who were already receiving support. Market participants focussed on the sovereign debt situation in Spain and Italy, which caused government bond yields to rise in these countries. Both countries have problems with their public finances, but in different ways. Italy has a very large national debt, but not such a large deficit in public finances, while Spain has a smaller national debt but larger public finances deficit. Both countries have suffered declining competitiveness over the past ten years. Recently, the lack of confidence has also begun to affect France. The banks managed the stress tests There is also concern that the sovereign debt problems will spread to the banking sector. On 15 July the European Banking Authority, EBA, reported the results of the stress tests of 91 European banks, which together account for 65 per cent of the EU’s banking sector. This showed that all the banks but 8 had sufficient resilience to manage a deterioration in the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  scenario for the period 2011–2012, but that a further 16 banks almost did not pass the tests. However, all four major Swedish banks passed the stress tests with flying colours. The results were received with some scepticism, as they were not considered to be sufficiently credible, but the markets nevertheless calmed down.

However, the decision-making system in the United States is constructed in a way that makes it difficult to take the necessary type of decision. Moreover, my impression is that the problems with the public finance deficit are underestimated in the United States to the extent that they believe growth will resolve much of the problems. On the other hand, they have now decided on certain budget-strengthening measures and the United States usually succeeds in managing difficult problems in the end. The sovereign debt problems in the euro area are actually smaller than the US problems. The deficit in public finances in the euro area is calculated by the IMF to correspond to around 4 per cent of GDP this year. All in all, there is thus less need of budget strengthening measures in the euro area than in the United States and the tightening effects need not be so great. But the deficit is unevenly distributed and some countries have very large deficits and/or national debts. The problem is that even in Europe it appears to be difficult to reach decisions on credible long-term programmes for consolidating public finances. Instead, many countries have been forced by the markets to decide on further budget strengthening during the summer to increase confidence. However, even if the sovereign debt problems in the United States and the euro area are essentially the same, the market turbulence may lead to the situation deteriorating.
The Bank has an open mind about the eventual development of a CBDC and an active research programme dedicated to it. That said, given current technological shortcomings in distributed ledger technologies and the risks with offering central bank accounts for all, a true, widely available reliable CBDC does not appear to be a near-term prospect. 28  See Fergusson, N., (2017), ‘The Square and the Tower: Networks, Hierarchies and the Struggle for Global Power’. 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Moreover whether it is desirable depends on the answers to a series of big policy questions. While these are largely for another speech, I will note that a general purpose CBDC could mean a much greater role for central banks in the financial system. Central banks may find themselves disintermediating commercial banks in normal times and running the risk of destabilising flights to quality in times of stress. 29  There are also broader societal questions (that others would need to answer) such as how society balances privacy rights with the extent to which the information in a CBDC could be used to fight terrorism and economic crime. A CBDC shouldn’t be a solution in search of a problem or an effort of central bankers to be down with the kids. Especially because there are more immediate ways to give you what you want.

And the Governing Council underlined at its recent meeting that, should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, it is unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate. Thus, many of the necessary conditions to restart credit growth are now in place. Yet, I think it would be short-sighted to claim that these alone will be sufficient. Coming out of a major financial crisis, it was always clear that repairing the bank lending channel would be a longer process, and the measures I have just described would only be the first steps in that process. One of the most important issues now in the repair process is how banks adapt to the challenging business environment that has been bequeathed by the crisis. The banking sector in transition The euro area banking sector remains in transition. At present banks generally have low revenues and profitability arising from several factors, including legacy factors such as loan losses during the crisis; cyclical factors such as the weak macroeconomy; and in some cases regulatory factors such as the costs of adapting to new legislation. This is reflected in historically low returns on equity: the median return on equity for euro area significant banking groups is currently 5%. It is unlikely, and indeed undesirable, that we will see a return to the high returns on equity we saw before the crisis, which were distorted in particular by excessive leverage and maturity mismatch.
Sources: UK line – Bloomberg Finance L.P, TradeWeb and Bank calculations, US and German lines – Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. the effect of changes in public-sector debt. When the UK government borrows money it’s tapping a global market for savings, not just a domestic one. And from the perspective of a relatively small, single borrower – certainly one who’s still judged to be creditworthy – a greater demand for credit needn’t have any impact on what is essentially a global price. This doesn’t mean a country’s fiscal position never matters at all. Just as for an individual household or company, a government’s creditworthiness can affect the risk premium it’s charged for new borrowing. If there’s a concern that high levels of debt might result in some sort of default – whether directly or in the form of a sudden burst of inflation – you’d expect to see that reflected in some sort of extra margin on its bond yields10. But that’s a long way from saying that any variation in public-sector debt will have a measurable impact on its price. It’s further still from the claim that such an effect should be the dominant (let alone the only) influence on yields. Clearly, that’s not what the data tell you. Before closing this section I should make one other point. I’m taking it as given here that monetary policy does actually have some effect on demand and inflation (all else equal), through all the channels we know about.

Svein Gjedrem: Ethics and the Government Pension Fund – global Dinner speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference “Investing for the future”, Oslo, 16 January 2008. *  *  *  Minister, ladies and gentlemen, We are gathered here for a conference – and a dinner – centred on ethics. At this venue, it is obvious that no one will be cheated, and each will get his or her due. Clearly, no one should need to leave this place hungry, or unfairly treated. For that we are truly grateful. Norges Bank is proud, and fortunate, to be the manager of the global part of the Government Pension Fund. And we are proud that Norway has been one of the frontrunners in promoting the idea of ethical investment. Although the debate has broadened over the past few years, some criteria for the management of the Fund have been in place since the beginning: We must have leaders and employees who do their job in a morally impeccable way. We must also make sure that environmental sustainability and social issues are factored in, since they are crucial to future returns, and to the Fund’s legitimacy. And there should indeed be barriers against certain acts and investments, no matter how profitable, basically because ethical behaviour is a goal in itself. In addition to our job of managing the investments, we have been given the task of being active and engaged owners of our global stock portfolio.
3  A more detailed analysis is provided in the article “Financial imbalances in the monetary policy assessment” in the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Report published in July 2013. 4  See, for instance, IMF “World Economic Outlook”, April 2012, A. R. Mian, K. Rao and A. Sufi (2011), “Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and the Economic Slump”, Chicago Booth Working paper, November 2011 and K. Dynan, (2012) “Is a Household Debt Overhang Holding Back Consumption?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, spring edition. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  imbalances that can affect confidence in the country, the currency and the banking system. I consider the assessment we made in July to entail on the whole a good balance between these difficult questions. Macroprudential policy needs to be implemented without delay... At the same time, I consider it important to emphasise that the repo rate is a blunt instrument. Other policy areas have more effective tools for influencing household debt. One such policy area is macroprudential policy, which entails limiting the risks in the financial system as a whole. If there were more effective tools available for managing and preventing financial imbalances, monetary policy would not need to take such risks into account to the same extent. At present, several countries and international organisations are working on producing and implementing a new framework for financial stability, where macroprudential policy will be in focus and the central bank will be given an important role. However, the design is slightly different in different countries.

Mixed signals from the rest of the world... New US statistics indicate continued strength in the US economy. Preliminary figures show that GDP increased in the second quarter by 1.7 per cent, calculated as an annual rate, compared with the first quarter of this year, which is in line with the assessment we made in July. At the same time as the new outcomes were published, the statistics authority released revised GDP figures for previous periods. These show that GDP growth has been slightly higher since 2007, and that the fall in GDP during the financial crisis was thus not as large as indicated by earlier statistics. In the United Kingdom, GDP was slightly better than expected during the second quarter. The indicators for July also point to a gradual recovery in the British economy. However, in Japan, which showed positive signals at the start of the year, newly-received statistics over the summer have not been as clear. GDP growth slowed down during the second quarter and the recovery in both the household and corporate sectors appears to have been dampened slightly further at the start of the third quarter. At the same time, data shows that emerging markets are slowing down somewhat. In China, preliminary figures for the second quarter show that GDP increased by 7.5 per cent as an annual percentage change, which was a slowdown compared with the previous quarter. Indicators for the other BRIC countries, that is, Brazil, Russia and India, show some slowdown.
I have pointed out the advantages of free movement of capital, but also the instability that has followed in the footsteps of deregulation and the crises that have occurred since the early 1990s. The free movement of capital makes great demands on the countries' economic policy. If it turns out that the crises increase in number and become more profound, the demands for a return to regulation will strengthen. There are already demands for this, which are put forward in various international forums. History shows that periods of liberalisation have been followed by periods  BIS Review 9/2002  5  of regulation. It is possible that the regulatory frameworks on which the international organisations are currently working will stabilise the foreign exchange markets, but it is also possible that some form of "Tobin tax" will win political support. The story isn't finished yet. 6  BIS Review 9/2002

At the same time, these periods of change are crucially important for economic development. In the centuries before the 1800s economic growth measured as GDP per capita averaged only 0.1 to 0.2 per cent a year. At that rate, doubling the standard of living took roughly 500 years. The change was obviously hardly noticeable to a single generation. In the first half of the 19th century, when agriculture was transformed in Sweden, GDP growth per capita averaged 0.4 per cent a year. Even at that rate, standards of living did not improve dramatically. From 1850 up to the present, however, per capital GDP has grown at an average annual rate of about 2 per cent, leading to a notable change in our living conditions. With that rate, the standard of living doubles every 35 years, which means that a marked improvement has been experienced by each generation. Concluding remarks The points I have tried to make in the light of the historical perspective can be summarised as follows: •  Despite falling prices for IT shares and the economic slowdown in the United States, the IT revolution has come to stay. In fact it has only just started. •  The development of the new information technology will continue in the coming decades and bring about considerable changes in many walks of life. This refers, of course, to new production processes, new products, new forms of consumption and new consumable goods and services. This may affect the location of production and thereby employment.