samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Gent Sejko: Ninth and tenth review of the arrangement with the IMF concluded Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the joint press conference with the IMF mission and the Minister of Finance, Tirana, 24 January 2017. * * *  On the completion of the ninth and tenth review of the Arrangement with the IMF The beginning of 2017 coincides with the conclusion of Albania’s arrangement with the IMF. This Arrangement has guided our development policies over the past three years, and has been a roadmap for our structural reforms agenda in the long term. Against this backdrop, the last review of the Arrangement not only provides for a comprehensive assessment on the achievement of its objectives, but also helps in identifying challenges to the country’s development and contributes to discussions on the policies that need to be designed and implemented for supporting the development. Let me now outline the opinion of the Bank of Albania on this review. The Arrangement with the IMF was signed amid an external economic and financial environment surrounded by uncertainties, and in response to deepening internal development challenges. Economic growth was on the downtrend, public debt and nonperforming loans were set on the uptrend, and uncertainties in the Albanian economy and financial markets were relatively high.

With the support provided through expertise and funds, the agreed programme with the IMF has aimed at drawing up an appropriate monetary and fiscal policy mix, correcting fiscal imbalances, improving the balance sheets of economic agents, and implementing an ambitious structural reforms programme, to support the long-term development of Albania. The Bank of Albania assesses that the Arrangement has achieved its major objectives: correcting structural imbalances and setting the country on a steadier path to longterm development. Economic growth has been improving in the recent years, driven – among others – by the combination of the monetary stimulus and fiscal consolidation, reduction of risk premiums in the economy and improvement of the balance sheets in the real sector of the economy. From a longer-term perspective, the structural reforms and the improved business climate should open the way for faster, more balanced and stable growth. In addition, excluding the effects of supply-side shocks, inflation has trended upward recently. The improvement of economic activity, implementation of a prudent monetary policy and a better anchoring of inflation expectations render us confident for the stable return of inflation to our 3% target. Lastly, Albania has made notable progress with regard to strengthening other economic and financial equilibriums. Safety nets in the financial system have been strengthened. The institutional framework that shapes the coordination, design and implementation of measures for safeguarding financial stability has been improved. The legal framework that disciplines contract enforcement has been improved.
Chiarotti, Mathur, and Rajan (forthcoming), ‘Assessing Basel III: Impact of automatic distribution restrictions on regulatory capital and bank lending’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper. The authors apply a difference-in-difference approach to aggregate bank balance sheet data and granular loan-level data on syndicated lending to corporates. The latter allows the authors to control for important unobservable features in the aggregate data such as changes in credit demand and in borrowers’ risk. 12. To ensure that banks which have different concerns about MDAs nevertheless have similar probabilities of triggering the restrictions, the analysis considers also the banks’ capital surpluses to regulatory buffers. 13. During the Covid-19 pandemic, several jurisdictions including ECB/SSM Fed and BoE recommended banks to restrict or suspend dividends and share buybacks, but not AT1 coupons (see Svoronos and Vrbaski (2020) (2021)  and BCBC  ). 14. During the pandemic AT1 coupons were excluded from the scope of the blanket distributions restrictions that many jurisdictions imposed, so unlike for dividends banks’ ability to pay AT1 coupons was still linked to automatic distribution restrictions thresholds. 15. A somewhat extreme version of broad-based capital conservation – reflecting the unusual and extreme level of economic and market uncertainty at the time - was implemented during Covid-19 when PRA recommended the major UK deposit takers to cancel dividend payments, share buybacks and cash bonuses. 16.

Recent bank instability episodes outside the EU are a further reminder that we need to remain vigilant. The resilience of the financial system is essential. Only a resilient financial sector will be able to support the real economy during times of stress,14 and all financial authorities and institutions across the EU must contribute to this end. In this regard, regulatory actions and policies towards banks and NBFI intermediaries must aim to preserve shock absorption capacity in the form of capital and liquidity buffers. 14  See also Macroprudential policy in Europe: building resilience in a challenging environment, Welcome remarks by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB and Chair of the European Systemic Risk Board, at the sixth annual conference of the ESRB, December 2022.
With attention focused on money markets, the spotlight also fell upon central banks who implement their monetary policy in money markets by influencing the level of interest, via the supply of liquidity. Moreover, the central banks are the only market participants who are in a position to create the liquidity used in the interbank payment systems. The kind of upheaval observed in the international money markets over the past few months has never been witnessed in living history. Rumours and reports of substantial sub-prime positions at banks led to a sudden loss of confidence in international financial institutions. Moreover, these banks are, to some extent, uncertain about their own future liquidity situation. Consequently, banks subsequently began hoarding liquidity and became extremely cautious when granting credit to each another. The market for unsecured interbank loans over longer terms collapsed and at times the market for foreign exchange swaps dried up. Since then, banks have been unable to obtain unsecured funds for terms of more than a few days or weeks – or have been able to do so only by paying substantial interest premiums. There were three factors that exacerbated the money market disruptions. First, bank securities holdings that had supposedly been first class and liquid proved to be illiquid, thereby failing to serve as a source of supplementary liquidity. Second, other participants in the financial markets also faltered in their supply of liquidity to the banks. Their confidence in banks suffered because money market investments that had been considered safe suddenly turned out to be risky.

It will then return gradually to 3% by the second half of 2013, to stay in the neighborhood until the end of the projection horizon, this time the third quarter of 2014. The CPIEFE will converge to 3% later than foreseen in June (figure vi). This trajectory assumes that wages will be adjusted according to productivity and the inflation target. A methodological assumption is that the RER will remain around its recent figures during the forecast horizon. Finally, the baseline scenario uses as a working assumption that the MPR will remain stable over the short term. The baseline scenario reflects the developments that the Board believes to be the most likely to occur with the information at hand at the statistical closing of the Report. However, there are risk scenarios that, if materialized, might change – significantly, in some cases – the macroeconomic outlook and, therefore, the course of monetary policy. On this occasion, after evaluating the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance for output and inflation is unbiased. Abroad, the risks described during the past several quarters have not changed significantly. The situation of the Eurozone is complex. The materialization of the announcements will not be easy and the passing of time will bring more problems to the economies of peripheral Europe, so a severe aggravation of the financial crisis in the Eurozone or even more extreme scenarios with systemic implications cannot be ruled out.
There have been some unsavoury practices in this space: “flash loans” being used to manipulate prices in the market; bots being used to front-run retail trades. With decentralised governance, who do you approach to recover lost accounts or reverse accidental transfers of money? Existing regulatory frameworks will need to be adapted if DeFi becomes a reality. Regulations crafted to manage risks in a world of intermediaries are ill-suited where intermediaries are replaced by smart contracts. Enforcement is more challenging when control or governance is dispersed across the blockchain. MAS will follow Web 3.0 and DeFi developments closely, deepen our understanding, and seek to harness the benefits while managing the risks. We will work with both the financial industry and the broader ecosystem to find the right balance. It will be a learning journey. Regulatory Sandbox Plus And what better way to learn than by experimenting? We will facilitate experiments for blockchain and DeFi innovation through regulatory sandboxes. Five years ago, MAS launched the FinTech Regulatory Sandbox, to support live experimentation of technology innovations. Two years ago, we enhanced it with Sandbox Express, so that businesses can begin market testing of low risk activities in a pre-defined environment faster. MAS will enhance its regulatory sandbox with Sandbox Plus.We will broaden participation to early adopters of technology, in addition to first movers. We will provide financial grants to first movers of innovation, to support their technology, human capital, and market development.

Investors in these tokens are at risk of suffering significant losses. But MAS is also of the view thatblockchains and crypto tokens can bring many potential benefits. The blockchain is suited for applications where it is important to know the history of ownership and transfer of value but there is no trusted central party or reliance on a central party is too costly. A potentially strong use case of crypto tokens is to facilitate cheaper and faster cross-border payments and trade finance. But to be regarded as money, crypto tokens need to be more stable in value and have credible backing. Hence, the emergence of stablecoins. Stablecoins Stablecoins seek to combine the credibility of fiat currencies with the advantages of the blockchain. The more prevalent stablecoins are pegged to the US Dollar, promise to redeem at par, and claim to be backed by reserves. Will Juno accept stablecoins as money? An encouraging sign is that stablecoins are beginning to find acceptance outside of the crypto ecosystem. Some technology firms have integrated popular stablecoins into their payment services. Visa and Mastercard both allow transactions to be settled using USD Coin. Or are stablecoins more akin to the Chimaera, a monstrous fire-breathing hybrid creature in Greek mythology? Stablecoin issuers look like banks when they take money and offer to return it on demand, but if they do not intermediate credit, would bank regulation be appropriate for them?
Traditional housing loan finance – a good alternative The Swedish mortgage institutions have traditionally been financed with collateral in their entire balance sheet. There is thus no direct link between a particular loan and the collateral belonging to it on the one hand and certain issued bond loans on the other. In many countries, mortgage companies are obliged to collect a number of housing loans and then issue bond loans in the market with these as collateral. There are different techniques for this to which I will return later. The Swedish model thus has advantages to the extent that borrowing can take place without a fixed link to lending. In this way, large loans can be placed in the market, which will make it easier to maintain regular trade and good liquidity in the loans. This has occurred with the so-called benchmark bonds. However, housing loan institutions, among other things due to considerable loan volumes and a good price formation for domestic loans have also been able to successfully compete in the international bond market. BIS Review 113/1999  2  If one is to borrow on the balance sheet, it must naturally be in such a state as to be accepted by the lenders. The Swedish institutions have managed this by strict operating rules, which place limits on what the institutions may engage in and allow lenders to ensure that the institutions get involved in what they have said they are going to do and nothing else.

The requirements for diversification of assets would introduce stringent restrictions on the ability of the insurance companies to hold housing bonds. Representatives of the industry claimed that considerable volumes of housing bonds would be sold by the insurance companies for this reason and that this would affect the market and increase costs for borrowers sharply. The gilt-edged bonds could at least partly solve the problem since, according to the EC directive, they would not be affected so much by the rules for single-party commitment. Others were doubtful about introducing special rules for insurance companies to give them an incentive to have a larger proportion of housing bonds in their portfolios than they would normally choose. There are no good arguments for letting insurance policyholders subsidise either housing loan institutions or their customers. Now the new investment rules were introduced for the insurance companies without this leading to any of the terrible consequences that had been predicted. The housing loan institutions began to borrow abroad to an increasing extent, which was a good idea from many respects. Hopefully, then the desire to create space for a larger proportion of housing bonds in the Swedish insurance companies’ portfolios will then no longer serve as a motivation for the gilt-edged bonds. As long as the insurance companies had their undertakings in kronor, some concentration of investments was explicable.
Aligning Incentives with Good Conduct  It is now widely recognized that in the lead up to the crisis, bonuses were too closely linked to short-term revenues, with little weight placed on the longer term risks to the firm. These pay structures incentivized excessive individual risk-taking and left shareholders and ultimately tax payers to absorb huge losses and incur misconduct fines when risks crystalized. Moreover, contract theory tells us that high powered incentives work best when outcomes are easily measurable (such as sales targets). But more senior roles involve managing many unquantifiable but very important outcomes – such as reputation and risk culture. In the United Kingdom, we have taken the following actions to incentivise individuals to consider the longer-term health of the firm:   Remuneration rules require a substantial portion of bonus rewards to be deferred for up to 7 years for senior managers. This allows for malus (the reduction or cancellation of unpaid bonus awards) and clawback (a contractual agreement whereby the staff member agrees to return paid bonus awards to the firm where risks have subsequently crystallised or instances of individual misconduct have been uncovered). 10  There is evidence that malus is being increasingly used by firms – malus  adjustments within major UK banks has more than trebled from c. £ in 2010 to c. £ in 2014.

It is therefore more  2  Source: Record of the November 2016 Financial Policy Committee Meetings published 6 December 2016 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/records/fpc/pdf/2016/record1612.pdf 3 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/publications/ss/2016/ss1816.aspx 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  difficult for insurers to assess credit and other risks. Investing in and managing these assets also requires different skills. For example, when bonds are downgraded, an insurer may expect to be able to sell them. But when a direct investment begins to go wrong, the insurer will probably only be able to sell at a fire-sale price. It needs the capability to renegotiate and restructure the debt. One particular area of growth has been equity release mortgage lending. Life insurers take on almost all of the flow of new equity release mortgages in the UK. This now stands at around £ billion or 1.4% of non-linked assets. We published a discussion paper on Equity Release Mortgages last year. A typical such mortgage is a loan to an older borrower that does not require regular interest payments. Instead interest accrues over time and is repaid, together with the principal, from the proceeds of the sale of the house when the loan becomes due. That is usually when the borrower either dies or goes into long-term care. Borrowers have a ‘no negative equity guarantee’. It protects them from being required to pay back any more than the value of their property. In economic terms, the insurer has sold the borrower a put option on the house.
The Supervisory Board’s decisions are finally submitted, by means of a non-objection procedure, to the Governing Council of the ECB, which is ultimately responsible for their adoption. As regards actions relating to less significant institutions, which the Banco de España supervises directly, the procedures and reports have been progressively aligned with ECB practices, a process that will continue going forward. Finally, and in the same direction of improving our institutional governance, my intention is to continue to foster the collegiate functioning of our governing bodies, and to strengthen the functioning of our committees. There I shall finish and now I remain at the disposal of the House for any questions or clarifications. 13  ANNEX 1 The Banco de España’s participation in the Eurosystem  1 Participation in the European System of Central Banks  1.1 The Eurosystem The Eurosystem is the monetary authority of the euro area and is made up of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of the Member States whose currency is the euro, one of which is the Banco de España.1 The primary objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price stability in accordance with Article 127(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). According to this article, the Eurosystem shall also support the general economic policies in the Union. To pursue the fundamental objective of price stability, the Eurosystem has the basic function of defining and implementing the monetary policy.

2 years Directors-General and Associate DirectorsGeneral 6 months (extendable to 12) Senior officers of the Central Government  Spanish Central Government  Law 3/2015 of 30 March regulating the holding of senior offices in the Central Government  Officers in a regulatory or supervisory body (including the National Securities Market Commission (CNMV), the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC) and the Nuclear Safety Board CSN) Members of the Governing Council (Gov C), the Supervisory Board (SB), the Executive Board (ExB), the Steering Committee, the Mediation Panel  2 years  2 years  Private banks that have been subject to their supervision or regulation  1 year (extendable to 2 in the case of direct involvement in supervision)  Significant or less significant credit institutions  6 months  1 year Members of the ExB and the Gov C ECB  Code of Conduct for high-level ECB officials (2019/C 89/03) Gov C and SB alternates  6 months 6 months (extendable to 12 in the case of direct involvement in supervision) 3 months  6 months Gov C alternates 3 months  EC  Code of Conduct for the Members of the European Commission (2018/C 65/06)  Professional activities related to credit institutions, specialised lending institutions and securities markets Private banks affected by decisions in which they have participated with their vote In the case of Governing Council members, the prohibition extends to any private entity subject to regulation or supervision by the Banco de España, including Spanish banks within the remit of the SSM Relative prohibition: banks directly related to the duties of the office held (i.e.
In this, the parties involved need to be adaptable and responsive in offering pragmatic solutions that will deliver on the common goals, while respecting the respective priorities of various stakeholders. The second base of an effective partnership is complementarity. ASEAN’s diversity does not only manifest in terms of potential economic development, it also extends to the region’s varied cultures, languages, and religions. ASEAN therefore presents a unique opportunity to tap into this diversity as a unique strength and to harness the complementarities. By working collectively, ASEAN partners can build significant collaborative advantage to exploit new opportunities and achieve shared goals. This will involve removing constraints and taking bold, even experimental, steps to push new frontiers that may not have been considered possible before. The third base of a successful partnership is trust. And with trust, must come accountability. One can observe the fallout from the lack of trust in the financial markets during and after the global financial crisis, when many markets froze and fraudulent actions by financial institutions shattered the public’s confidence. Trust is pivotal in any collaborative relationship. The value of trust at the individual, institutional, national, and global levels cannot be overstated. Building trust, particularly among very diverse stakeholders, is of course not easy. Therefore, partnerships will benefit from a clear commitment to stated goals that are in turn supported by accountability structures that will sustain and reinforce that commitment. Finally, a key aspect in delivering partnership aspirations is governance.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Mobilising ASEAN - building the future through partnership Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Wharton Global Forum Kuala Lumpur 2016 “Mobilising ASEAN: Building the Future Through Partnership”, Sasana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 11 March 2016. *  *  *  It is my very great pleasure to welcome you to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia for the Wharton Global Forum 2016. Over the years, the Wharton community has very much recognised the potential of the ASEAN region as a growing force in the global economy. Indeed, in the recent five years, Malaysia is the third country in ASEAN to host this Global Forum (Bangkok in 2015 and Jakarta in 2012) and while central bankers have been a recurring feature at the Wharton Forum, I do however believe that this is possibly the first time a Central Bank is the venue and host to the Wharton Global Forum. We are really delighted to have this opportunity to be the host for this year’s Wharton Forum. I am particularly pleased to welcome you to Sasana Kijang, our Central Bank’s centre of excellence for learning and international cooperation. Indeed, the word ‘Sasana’ is a Sanskrit word that means a meeting place. The building Sasana Kijang which opened its doors in 2011 was envisioned to be a global meeting place for learning, international knowledge exchange, collaboration and cooperation.