samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In conclusion, despite the upward global economic challenges at various indicators, especially the forecasts for growth of the global economy to slow, and the factors that still affect the performance of many global economies, the recent data of the Arab banking sector for 2021 revealed positive results in terms of capitals, liquidity and profitability inducing to adopt a countercyclical policy by rebuilding capital and liquidity margins for the sector units to face any future challenges. Ladies and Gentlemen, Once again, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to your Excellencies, and hope that the outcomes of this meeting help achieve the desired goals in supporting financial and monetary stability and plans of development and prosperity for our countries. Thank you  18/9/2022  Page 4 of 4

All else equal – for a given setting of monetary policy – it was also disinflationary. Qualitatively, at least, the same thing is going on right now. Public sector debt has risen significantly, across the developed world, in response to the pandemic. But, as was the case after the financial crisis, this has not been caused by any material rise in governments’ spending on goods and services, or their direct demand for underlying economic resources. It’s because tax receipts have fallen sharply and, more materially, because governments have compensated people for the impact of mandated lockdowns. Private and aggregate demand have fallen, below the economy’s supply capacity – despite these huge transfer programmes, rates of unemployment and wider measures of spare capacity are rising. And it’s in response to these disinflationary pressures that independent central banks everywhere, including in the UK, have eased monetary policy. Anyhow, having set out at some length the points I want to make, I hope I can be reasonably concise in the body of this talk. I’ll cover first the cyclicality of interest rates under inflation targeting. Via some very simple simulations I’ll then look briefly at the impact of inflation on the public finances, focusing in particular on the effect of paying interest on central bank reserves. After an equally brief canter through some of the relevant bits of UK history there’s a short concluding section.
It is also now ranked 5 th as the world FX currency in trading value and 6th as a payments currency in value. Given the steady internationalisation of the currency, the renminbi is expected to be on a gradual path to become a fully convertible currency, along with the emergence and expansion of major Chinese cities such as Shanghai, as formidable truly global financial centres. The ongoing accessibility to the domestic financial markets, if further accelerated, will set forth a virtuous 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  cycle of development that will facilitate greater use of the currency. Thus, should the internationalisation of the renminbi continue as expected, it will further cement its role as the influential currency for trade and investment, and some say, a path towards becoming one of the more significant global reserve currencies. What are the implications for Asia? Using an analogy is apt in describing the implications for Asia. Japan, a country experiencing approximately 1,500 earthquakes a year, is finding innovative ways to support its structures. Instead of using steel and concrete, traditional materials to strengthen its structure, a Japanese textile firm is experimenting with carbon fibre rope-curtains, which are tough and pliant to earthquake-proof a building. This will allow the building to realign itself when it is quivering during an earthquake. This company, Kengo Kuma and Associates, realising the potential risks from stress, also planted anchors around the structure to prevent the ground from rising up when the carbon-fibre curtain is activated.

Our contacts with investors and financial institutions in the Gulf region have also reinforced our belief in promoting the development of Islamic finance in Hong Kong. This has in fact been articulated as a key policy initiative set out by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region in his 2007 Policy Address. In other words, it is now official Government policy to develop Islamic finance in Hong Kong and our commitment to this is beyond doubt. Being a major international financial centre in Asia, Hong Kong should seek to become an important player in the booming Islamic finance arena by providing a platform for Middle East  BIS Review 59/2008  1  investors to access investment opportunities in the Asia Pacific region. Hong Kong can also leverage on its experience, innovation and market diversification to serve as a capital-raising centre for Middle Eastern issuers to tap the funds made available by the high savings rate in Mainland China. Some people have expressed scepticism about how Hong Kong could play a role in these segments of the market. But market players in Hong Kong have answered this scepticism by quickly introducing our first Shariah-compliant product. In late 2007, we witnessed the first Islamic fund introduced by a local bank in Hong Kong. The fund is an index-tracking fund which tracks the performance of the Dow Jones Islamic Market China/Hong Kong Titans Index.
The ACPR’s pilot exercise and CCFD’s report Despite the Covid-19 crisis, the pilot exercise on stress tests which I announced here one year ago was launched in July and its results will be published next April. Top French institutions (both banks and insurers) are currently running it. This exercise is the first of its kind worldwide. Its goals are twofold: 1/ better assess the exposure of banks and insurers to climate risks (both physical and transition risks) in a forward-looking/dynamic manner. 2/ Assist the industry to better factor in climate change risks, improve models and assessment methodologies, and identify data gaps. Beyond that, we hope we are designing a methodology for climate stress tests that can be fine tuned over time and which other central banks and supervisors will be able to follow. The Authority also published a guide last May referencing the best practises regarding the governance of climate change risks for banks. On another note, the ACPR’s CCFD (our new Commission Consultative Climat et Finance Durable [Climate and Sustainable Finance Committee]) has been monitoring the public commitments of financial institutions to exit carbon-intensive industries. The ACPR-AMF preliminary joint report published this morning stresses the progress made by the French financial sector, but also the need for harmonisation. 1.2.

If people came to believe  6  BIS Review 91/2010  that inflation was not going to be brought back to the 2% target, then Bank Rate would have to change by a potentially much larger amount in order to ensure that inflation is, in fact, returned to target. The recent high rate of CPI inflation can be largely attributed to a number of temporary factors, combined with weak downwards pressure on inflation from the subdued level of demand. Nevertheless, given the expected degree of spare capacity in the economy over the next few years, and that the temporary factors should wear off, the most likely outcome is that inflation falls back to below target over the next couple of years as shown in the May Inflation Report (Chart 12). On that basis it was sensible not to try and offset the recent rise in inflation by tightening policy. But let me be clear about the risks. Our central expectations could be wrong. Certainly the inflation data have tended to consistently surprise on the upside, month-by-month. What if spare capacity continues to exert much less restraint on inflation than anticipated? Or perhaps current data estimates have significantly underestimated demand and output growth? Or the exchange rate effect is bigger than incorporated in the projections? We could also be wrong in the other direction: downside pressures on UK output growth (Chart 13) could yet lead to an even bigger fall in inflation than the central case.
The conclusion is that however good the decisionmaking material is, it can never be comprehensive or unequivocally interpreted. I have mentioned previously that developments in the financial sector and the effects on the real economy cannot be easily captured. I have also, in connection with the discussion on household borrowing, mentioned how we can assess effects in the longer term. Since we cannot make meaningful forecasts for an unlimited period of time, we must restrict the forecast horizon. But this is not set in stone in the sense that it should prevent us from considering problems that may arise in a few years’ time. Moreover, there are risk scenarios that are difficult to capture in terms of forecasts. Even if your ambition is to base the monetary policy decision on what are termed unbiased forecasts, in which upside and downside risks are balanced, you should be aware of the  10  For a description of how decision-making data for monetary policy decisions are prepared, see the speech “The monetary policy decision-making process” by Irma Rosenberg held on 13 June 2008. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  difficulties involved. In practice, however, such forecasts have difficulties in capturing everything perfectly. In practice, you may wish to guard against some outcomes that you consider to be particularly harmful and that should therefore be avoided at all costs.

It reduces the risk that we will be forced to make more drastic increases in the future. The repo rate path also means that households can gradually adjust to higher interest rates and it is reasonable that their borrowing will slow down. This should in turn reduce the risk of having to make painful corrections of financial imbalances further ahead. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  It is difficult to identify monetary policy expectations The fact that monetary policy expectations, as reflected in forward rates in the slightly longer term, are lower than the Riksbank’s repo rate path has been discussed a great deal outside the Riksbank, but also within the Executive Board. During the drafting of the latest repo-rate decision and at the monetary policy meeting, we discussed pricing on the market and the problems it entails for drawing far-reaching conclusions about monetary policy expectations for Sweden and abroad. Put simply, a market rate can be seen as the sum of expectations of the future interest rate plus a risk premium. 1 It is easiest to understand the role of market expectations if you take the so-called expectations hypothesis as your starting point; this says that a long interest rate is equal to the expected average short interest rate level during the period of maturity. The Riksbank can therefore by means of its monetary policy decisions, and in particular by publishing its repo-rate forecasts, influence market expectations and thus the interest rates offered to households and companies.
Review of monetary policy Winding up, I would like to remind you that the Bank of Russia has announced its plans to review its monetary policy over the period since the switch to the inflation targeting regime. Within this review, the Bank of Russia will analyse the actual results achieved, the changes in the economic environment over this period, and long-term trends that might impact the implementation of monetary policy in the future. The results of this work and the findings relevant for the parameters and practice of the Bank of Russia’s policy will be presented by the middle of next year and will be taken into consideration in the course of the elaboration of the Guidelines for 2023. Conclusion Recently, Russia’s economy has demonstrated multiple times its ability to adjust to the changing environment. Regardless of how the situation unfolds, we will do our best to create necessary conditions to further develop the country’s economy and enhance its resilience. Monetary policy aimed at ensuring price stability and enabling a countercyclical response to changes in the economy is an essential condition for sustainable and well-balanced economic growth. Thank you for attention. I am ready to answer your questions. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Moreover, there is a second reason for stressing the difference between the three types of response, which is that both the measures seeking to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis, and those seeking to increase the future resilience of the financial system are usually of little use in resolving the problems that affect economies and financial systems in the short term, that is to say now. The authorities naturally wish to “sell” the decisions they are adopting. But nobody should think that the immediate application of the measures aimed at preventing future crises or mitigating their intensity will suffice to resolve our short-term problems. If we analyse the matters addressed on the FSB or European Commission’s agendas, we will see that, until relatively recently, most progress has been centred on preventing the repetition of a crisis such as the current one, which has affected the entire financial system. And in the case of a fresh crisis arising, the aim has been for the financial system – for banks and for the authorities – to have resolution mechanisms that mitigate its adverse effects. With sole regard to the management of future crises, although major efforts have been made to move towards more effective crisis-resolution arrangements, most of the prescriptions admittedly require time to be effectively set in place, meaning that they cannot be used to manage the current crisis. Returning to the management of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, much progress has clearly been made in the reform of European governance.
Another example is the recent agreement between the National Statistics Institute, the Tax Revenue Service, the Social Security and the Banco de España, as holders of a significant amount of administrative information and of granular data collected for statistical purposes, for the joint design of a collaborative data system to which researchers will have access, provided that the information to be used is for scientific purposes in the public interest. The purpose of this agreement is also to promote the future inclusion of other institutions that hold administrative records or other granular databases of research interest. It is our obligation as the participating authorities to put this agreement swiftly into practice, and to establish what might be an unprecedented landmark in information availability for economic research and evaluation purposes in Spain. The need to improve the economic and financial education of the population Quality data, technical ability, and analytical rigour and independence would thus seem to be the necessary ingredients for setting in place an assessment culture leading to the evidence-based formulation of public policies. In my view, this recipe will be like one for bread without yeast. A third key ingredient is needed: an appropriate economic and financial education for the public at large. With citizens able to critically internalise in their individual economic and financial decisions both the fundamental results of these independent evaluations and the various benefits and costs associated with different courses of action, it would be easier to set an assessment culture in place.

5 E. Fuentes Quintana (1948), “Efectos económicos de la política fiscal: comentario a las tesis suecas”, Anales  de Economía, vol. 8, no. 32 (October-December), pp. 487–497. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
Public sector borrowing and domestic financial market The draft-budget 2017 envisages domestic borrowing amounting to ALL 19.8 billion. The liquidity situation in the domestic financial market and the low interest rates provide the premises for accommodating the aimed borrowing level. However, the Ministry of Finance and the Government of Albania should give due attention to the even distribution of borrowing and budget expenditures, in order to reduce domestic markets’ volatility. Also, the Ministry of Finance should constantly monitor the absorption of borrowing in domestic financial markets, in order to enable the constant re-calibration of debt instruments with market requirements. *** Concluding, the Bank of Albania would like to present some suggestions, which – in our opinion – would contribute to the process of drafting and implementing the Budget in the future. 4. Suggestions and recommendations 4.1 Forecasting, Uncertainty and Risk Management The forecast on the revenue of the budget – like any other economic forecast – is surrounded by uncertainties and risks. The proper acknowledgment and understanding of this fact necessitates measures to identify and quantify them, and paves the way to effectively manage the possible consequences. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In line with our previous suggestions, Bank of Albania deems that the drafting and implementation process of Budget would benefit from the establishment of alternative budget scenarios, which would be implemented in the event of large deviations from the forecast.

The expected performance of the economy and its interaction with the monetary and fiscal policies The Albanian economy has shown signs of recovery over the past two years. This performance reflects the recovery of private consumption and investments, whereas the external environment has been and remains unfavourable. The expansion of the private sector activity was supported by our accommodative monetary policy and was favoured by the consolidating fiscal policy implemented during this period. This policy mix has brought financing costs down for the private sector and has improved the liquidity situation in the economy. The 2017 budget takes into account forecasts for the real economic growth at 3.8% and an increase in the nominal value of the gross domestic product to 6.3%. As detailed in the draftbudget and in the accompanying explanatory notes, such economic growth will be supported by the continuation of the combination of the monetary stimulus with the fiscal consolidation policy. However, the intensity of the fiscal consolidation in 2017 is foreseen to be somewhat lower than in 2016. The Bank of Albania deems that the expected economic developments and the sustaining 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  policies constitute an acceptable and consistent starting point for drafting the budget for 2017. Economic activity at home is expected to mark an improved growth over the next two years. The monetary stimulus will support boosting domestic demand, keeping financing costs down for private consumption and investments.
Put differently, our work is motivated by protecting banks from climate change, and not by changing the climate itself, where other measures outside the toolkit of regulators and supervisors are needed. Although, of course, achieving our goal will in turn contribute towards meeting broader objectives related to climate change, such as the COP 21 Paris Agreement. And the mechanism is well known, as banks adequately manage, mitigate and disclose climate related-financial risks as part of their day-to-day business operations, we should expect a natural evolution in the composition of their balance sheets that, in turn, will reflect our path towards a low-carbon world. 1/6  In other words, if we succeed in incorporating these risks into the decisions of the financial sector, this will translate into a change in relative prices of financial instruments. And, in turn, that will help to internalise those consequences originating from both transition and physical risks. And this will be a powerful and much-needed complement to the use of the fiscal and environmental instruments that are needed to fight against climate change. Within this approach, it´s very important to recognise that there are several crucial limitations in our current capacity to measure these risks. In particular, there are few sufficiently deep and harmonised databases to analyse and understand transition and physical risks. Data granularity is particularly important given the high heterogeneity of the potential impacts. And we lack as well sufficient historical depth.

The only result to be achieved will be higher inflation than desired – that is to say that, on average, the inflation target will be exceeded. Consequently, for monetary policy, the highest level of resource utilisation that is sustainable over the longer term is the normal level. Other economic policies than monetary policy, such as labour market policy and structural policies improving the workings of the economy and the degree of competition, are needed to raise production and employment above the level that today is normal for these variables. Consequently, if the inflation target is given priority, a higher than normal level of resource utilisation cannot be sought in monetary policy. Some people may believe that priority to the inflation target may entail ignoring the real economy entirely and only caring about stabilising inflation. This is an altogether too narrow approach and characterises a so-called “inflation nutter”, to use Mervyn King’s striking expression. It is called strict inflation targeting in the terminology I proposed.1 Giving priority to the inflation target does not, therefore, mean that monetary policy should not stabilise resource utilisation, but, instead, that it should stabilise resource utilisation around a normal level, rather than a higher one. The same concept can be expressed with different words. When it comes to the average level of inflation and resource utilisation, there is only one numerical target, namely the inflation target. There is no independent numerical target for resource utilisation.