samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The pace of  2  BIS Review 76/2001  demand growth in the US needed to slow down - as of course it has, dramatically, to the point where growth in the US in recent quarters has pretty well come to a halt. The big questions now are whether we are at the low point, and what might we expect in terms of the strength of a recovery. And the reality is that no-one can be confident that they know the answers. What we do know so far is that there has been a sharp downwards inventory correction and a contraction of investment notably in ICT which was so buoyant before, with associated declines in equity prices and in US imports. Consumption growth, supported by a strong housing market has so far held up rather better than might have been expected. Looking forward, on the positive side, one could point to the strong monetary policy response to the slowdown, and to the recent tax rebate, which have yet to have their full effect. There were some suggestions in recent capital goods orders figures that the rate of decline in investment spending may now slow. And the rate of inventory liquidation had stabilised pointing to a turn at some point so long as consumption continued to be reasonably well sustained. Consensus opinion, or so it seemed to me, had become modestly optimistic. At least that was the prospect until Tuesday and the appalling terrorist attacks in New York and Washington.

All these developments will help soften the impact of the crisis on employment, reallocate surplus labour towards more productive sectors and raise our economy’s potential growth rate. And there are more reforms recommended by analysts: the re-directing of support policies to the unemployed, so greater importance is given to active policies such as training, improvements to the intermediation capacity of public employment services, etc. In addition to the reform of labour institutions, there are other areas where action should not be delayed, even though the effects will be over a longer term. This is the case primarily of education, which is pivotal for ensuring a continuous increase in human capital and for reinforcing one of the main sources of improving productivity. And, of course, there is a long list of reforms outstanding to increase competition in many industries, such as services, energy, rail freight transport, etc., to which I have repeatedly referred. Lastly, the soundness of the financial system is essential for ensuring the financial flows needed to restore economic dynamism. The Spanish financial system has weathered very well the direct and indirect effects of the international financial crisis thanks to a series of widely known factors that I shall not repeat here.
As an anniversary usually brings up both a tally of what was done in the past, and wishes for the future, I will try to have some measure of both in my congratulatory address to you. Practicing our profession involves our capability to serve society and help the Bulgarian economy. Because, as we are all very well aware, banks have high responsibilities in a market economy – the ongoing technological innovation, developing and offering new products and services, as well as the predictability and stability of banks are a mandatory prerequisite for economic prosperity. From my first day as a BNB Governor to this very day, I have never stopped reiterating and instilling the idea that this responsibility requires the individual efforts of each one of us to be governed by a long-term goal – let’s call it a sense of mission – which goes beyond the specific financial or market considerations of the current day. It is exactly a jubilee like today’s that reminds us of the historic horizons behind the daily statistics, balance sheets or income statements, which ultimately mark the road of new and democratic Bulgaria. Speaking of history, exactly the current crisis stirs the need to examine the past. It is often said about this crisis that it has been the biggest one globally in the recent decades.

Banks and other financial institutions drastically reduced their exposure to the risks that they had imprudently accumulated during the phase of financial euphoria. Financial intermediation and loans to companies were curtailed in the wake of a forceful process of “deleveraging”. This was the point when important spillovers of the financial crisis set in. We saw the almost immediate spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. The credit squeeze and loss of confidence started to take a toll on the real economy, and a negative feedback loop developed between the financial sector and the real economy, and has since become a major feature of economic and financial developments. Almost simultaneously, the crisis that originated in the advanced economies spilled over to the emerging market economies. Since the fourth quarter of 2008, virtually all economies – both those of the industrialised countries and the emerging markets – have faced synchronised business cycles. Since half a year, we are facing a highly synchronised global economic downturn. The ECB’s response to the financial crisis Turning to the ECB’s response to the crisis, let me first insist that none of my remarks should be interpreted in terms of the future course of monetary policy. I stick rigorously to what I have said during my last press conference. We are indeed in the one-week “purdah period” before the next meeting of the Governing Council. Since the start of the financial turmoil, central banks around the globe face unprecedented challenges.
Certainly, as far as loss absorbing resources are concerned I do not believe that it is likely to be justified to require CCPs to hold an extra shot, in the form of bail in debt – to enable them to replenish their own resources. If, following the default of more than two major wholesale financial market institutions in stressed market conditions, the margin held by the CCP, the default fund, and further cash calls on the membership have been insufficient to meet the losses, we will have gone considerably further into the tail of systemic stress events than we have experienced before or that we require banks to withstand. In those circumstances, a reload of the CCP’s resources by bailing in debt is unlikely to resolve the problems. On the other side of the ledger, holding bail in debt would be of no other use to a CCP but could put up materially the cost of clearing. All else equal, this would be passed onto the users of clearing, reducing incentives to use the risk reduction that clearing offers. Resolution, however, is about more than access to extra loss absorbing resources. Its objective is to ensure that when systemic financial institutions get into trouble, financial services critical to the real economy are maintained. The latter stages of a CCP’s recovery plan that terminate, in the tearing up of contracts, would probably be “orderly” only in the sense that it would be a prescribed sequence of pre-agreed actions.

Writ large, the objective of recovery and resolution are the same for systemically important banks as they are for CCPs – to ensure the maintenance of critical economic services during stress. But the similarity pretty much stops there. The main challenge with a bank that has exhausted too much of its prefunded loss absorbing resources – ie its capital - is to be able to bail in resources and to reduce its liabilities. By contrast, if pre-funded resources at a CCP are insufficient to absorb losses, the CCPs is able to bail in more resources from its members to absorb losses. If that is insufficient, unlike banks, it is able to reduce its liabilities – ultimately to zero. All of this would happen outside insolvency. And it would be “orderly”, in the sense that it would be a prescribed sequence of action that has been pre-agreed between the members of the clearing house and within contractual arrangements between clearing members and their clients. Given the scale of the loss absorbing resources held by and available to CCPs and the fact that their rulebooks provide ultimately for their wind down outside insolvency, some have argued that while resolution is relevant for banks, it is simply not a relevant concept for CCPs. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  I see some force in this argument.
BIS Review 103/2009  9  Figure 15: Yield Curves* (Percent)  16  Yield  14  12  1 Apr 2009 16 July 2009  10  8 0.5  1  1.5  2 2.5 Term (Year)  3  3.5  4  * Estimated by using the compound returns on the bonds in the ISE Bonds and Bills Market, based on the Extended Nelson-Siegel (ENS) method. Source: CBRT. 3. Inflation and monetary policy outlook  Distinguished Guests, Having summarized inflation and monetary policy developments in the second quarter of 2009, in this part of my speech, I would like to share with you the evaluation of the inflation outlook and monetary policy of the Central Bank of Turkey in the upcoming period. In addition, I will also outline the Central Bank’s inflation forecasts presented in the Inflation Report, which is to be posted on our website shortly. Firstly, I will briefly touch on the economic framework underlying these forecasts. In spite of widespread views that the recovery in the global economy will be slow and gradual, perceptions that the worst of the crisis is over led to optimism in global financial markets in the second quarter of the year and an increase in risk appetite. Parallel to the recovery in global risk perceptions, the risk premia of emerging markets fell rapidly and reached almost pre-crisis levels (Figure 16). As was the case throughout the crisis, the risk premium of Turkey followed a relatively lower path compared to other emerging markets.

Should global conditions and consequently domestic economic activity further deteriorate, the CBRT would consider another cycle of rate cuts, and then maintain policy rates at low single digits for an extended period of time. Another possible scenario is a surge in capital inflows to emerging markets owing to the relative improvement in creditworthiness of these countries. In this context, receding risk premia and appreciating currencies would present downside risks regarding inflation prospects. These circumstances could also trigger acceleration in rate cuts, or another easing cycle, which could then bring policy rates which hover around low single digits for a prolonged period of time. Increasing budget deficits worldwide continue to pose risks on inflation expectations and thus on global interest rates in the long term. The medium-term forecasts presented above envisage that the slow recovery in global economic activity and rising saving rates will keep global interest rates at low levels for an extended period. However, the lack of a clear exit strategy from global fiscal stimulus packages creates upside risks regarding global inflation rates and therefore longer-term global interest rates. Counter-cyclical fiscal policies to curb the contractionary effect of the crisis on economic activity, which have also been introduced in Turkey in line with global trends, have accelerated the rise in budget deficit. The relatively low level of public sector indebtedness in Turkey compared to other countries implies that we have a broad fiscal space.
At the same time, it will probably be easier for enterprises to pass on cost increases to prices in pace with the rise in demand and capacity utilisation. Capacity utilisation is now projected to be somewhat higher than its normal level. Mainland GDP is still growing strongly in 2006. Capacity utilisation in the economy is expected to rise over the next two years. Even though a gradual increase in the interest rate will result in somewhat weaker growth impulses after a period, monetary policy will still be expansionary. A further interest rate increase will  BIS Review 41/2006  5  stabilise growth in output and employment. Capacity utilisation may in time be brought down somewhat and stabilise. This will curb the rise in inflation, so that it stabilises close to target. Developments in inflation and capacity utilisation seem to provide a reasonable balance between the various objectives of monetary policy. The interest rate is sufficiently low for inflation to approach the target of 2.5 per cent while avoiding a capacity utilisation level that is too high. Projections are uncertain. We have illustrated this uncertainty in the projections for the interest rate, the krone exchange rate, inflation and capacity utilisation using fan charts. The width of the fan is based on historical disturbances. However, there is no certainty that future disturbances will be of the same character or scale. The wider the fans, the more uncertain the forecasts are.

Simon Potter: New York Fed - strengthening relations with African central banks Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the Assembly of Governors of the Association of African Central Banks, South African Reserve Bank, Pretoria, 16 August 2017. * * * Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice-Chairman, and honorable governors and heads of delegation, I appreciate this opportunity for me and my colleagues from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to speak before the Assembly of Governors of the Association of African Central Banks (AACB). Since its establishment in 1963, the AACB has played a vital role in fostering cooperation among central banks in Africa, and between central banks inside and outside of Africa. Through my participation in the Symposium yesterday, I got a sense of the challenges and purpose that drives your agenda in this diverse and dynamic region. The AACB is an important forum for exchanging views within the region and with international partners on these shared challenges and opportunities. My colleagues and I have joined your meetings to seek enhanced dialogue with each of your institutions to strengthen our relationships and channels of communication. We view this engagement as an initial step in our long-term commitment to strengthen our ties with African central banks, and we are pleased to have already met bilaterally with many of you.
MAS launched a $ million support package in April 2020, to sustain and strengthen capabilities in the financial services and FinTech sectors. The package has two main components: enhanced subsidies for training and manpower costs; and strengthening digitalisation for operational resilience. Top of our agenda is skills. We cannot let up on training and upskilling because of COVID-19. On the contrary, the pandemic has underscored the importance of upskilling, and created the opportunity to do so. Working closely with the financial industry, MAS is taking a comprehensive approach to the skills agenda. Take-up of the various schemes since April has been strong. To help the existing workforce to upskill, MAS has enhanced to 90% the subsidies for training courses certified by the Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF). Close to 11,000 trainees have availed themselves of these training courses since April. To enable fresh graduates to gain meaningful job experience, MAS has enhanced salary support for structured talent development programmes offered by the financial institutions. Financial institutions have committed to hiring approximately 740 Singaporeans under these programmes over the next three years. MAS is also working with the financial industry and Workforce Singapore (W SG) to create traineeship opportunities under the various SGUnited programmes to build the skills necessary for future high growth areas in the financial sector. As of mid-June, 31 financial institutions have offered more than 1,000 vacancies for trainees. To support mid career workers prepare for new roles, MAS has been working closely with IBF and Workforce Singapore.

Jean-Pierre Roth: What to expect from monetary policy? Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies (ICMB), Geneva, 25 November 2003. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  A number of current issues, such as the weakness of the economy and the new National Bank Law, raise the question as to what we can expect from monetary policy. With regard to the stability of consumer prices, the answer is relatively simple. The goal of price stability is at the very top of the Swiss National Bank’s priority list. Since both inflation and deflation are monetary phenomena over the long term, the SNB can and will guarantee price stability in future too. Expectations of monetary policy are considerably lower when it comes to regulating economic activity. Economic activity in Switzerland is strongly dependent on growth abroad. Inflation does not bring about long-term economic growth. Stable prices, however, are the best precondition for sustained growth. A goal of price stability automatically ensures a degree of stability in the economy. Because of uncertainty and time lags, however, fine-tuning the economy is an impossible task. Speculative bubbles in the real estate and equity markets have been an increasing source of macroeconomic instability during the past two decades.
The sharp price increase in international markets and its rapid pass-through to domestic consumer prices in early 2011, led to key interest rate rise by 0.25 percentage points in March. Such a move aimed at anchoring inflationary expectations and preventing second-round effects on inflation, against the setting of projections for further international price increases. Over the second half of the year, upon moderation of inflationary pressures and inflation’s falling back within the target, as well as upon the shifting of expected inflationary pressures balance downward, the monetary policy became strongly stimulating. The Bank of Albania carried out two consecutive key interest rate cuts, taking the key interest rate in the economy to the lowest historical level (to 4.75%). The stimulating policy through the key interest rate was accompanied by continuous liquidity injections into the financial market. Overall, the monetary policy pursued in 2011 and the sluggish demand for public sector financing helped in controlling the risk premia, leading to lower financing costs and increased financial intermediation in the national currency. The latter was also helped by a change to the required reserve instrument, by means of which the foreign required reserve remuneration was abrogated. It aimed to discourage foreign-currency intermediation and improve the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The issue of financial euroization in Albania will continue to be on the focus of the Bank of Albania’s monetary policy in the future. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  ***  3.

With this in mind, the CPSS will continue to closely monitor progress over the next year for any signs of slippage. BIS Review 60/1997  -5-  The search by individual banks for efficient ways to reduce their foreign exchange settlement risk has brought about important progress at the industry-group level as well. The Allsopp report noted the efforts of FXNET, S.W.I.F.T, ECHO, Multinet, and the Group of 20 banks to offer various types of risk-reducing services, and these ongoing efforts are very encouraging. Some banks are also exploring the elimination of settlement risk altogether by shifting the market to trades that simply settle the gain or loss associated with exchange rate movements -- called “contracts for difference” -- instead of requiring delivery of the underlying currencies. We are well aware that many market participants are currently debating what constitutes the most efficient multi-currency netting and settlement services. While there will be potential winners and losers, I believe that the market as a whole should ultimately benefit from this rigorous competition. At the same time, settlement risk reduction should not be used to justify the concentration of market power. The G-10 central bank governors have long been on record in favor of fair and open access to services that permit participation by a broad range of institutions, consistent with the prudent management of risk.
European Central Bank: Press conference – introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Luxembourg, 2 July 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, the Vice-President and I are very pleased to welcome you to our press conference here in Luxembourg. I would like to thank Governor Mersch for his kind hospitality and to express our special gratitude to his staff for the excellent organisation of the meeting of the Governing Council. We will now report on the outcome of today’s meeting of the Governing Council, which was also attended by the President of the Eurogroup, Prime Minister Juncker, and Commissioner Almunia. On the basis of its regular economic and monetary analyses, the Governing Council decided to leave the key ECB interest rates unchanged. The current rates remain appropriate taking into account all the information and analyses that have become available since our meeting on 4 June 2009. The fall of annual inflation rates into negative territory in June is in line with previous expectations and reflects mainly temporary effects. After a return to positive inflation rates, we expect price developments to remain dampened over the policy-relevant horizon. Recent data releases and survey information provide further indications that economic activity over the remainder of this year is likely to remain weak but should decline less strongly than was the case in the first quarter of 2009.

All business decisions have risks and there must be mitigating strategies in place to manage adverse occurrences. Hearing your input and perspectives on these issues is an important part of the process for us, and I am fortunate to have the opportunity to meet with many community bankers in the Second District. Some of the most common themes I hear include: an appreciation for the recent regulatory reforms implemented such as the streamlining of the Call Report; the extension of the examination cycle to 18-month for firms under $ billion in total asset-size; and the current discussions around capital simplification. The comment period on capital simplification will close on April 9th, and I hope you all shared input to influence that important policy decision. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  One area where we receive mixed feedback from bankers is the issue of off-site examinations. Some bankers love that idea, while others have stated they like the face-to-face interaction as it reduces the risk of miscommunication, misinterpretations or ambiguities. Still others prefer a hybrid approach with certain portions of examination work conducted on-site and others off-site. All felt critical meetings should be conducted in person. Today’s technology makes all of these options possible, and we will continue to exercise judgment and thoughtful communication with bankers to determine the best option. At the end of the day, our shared goal is a fair and accurate assessment for your institution, and we will continue to work together to accomplish this.