samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We do not conduct large-scale investigations that we document and leave behind us; we describe our own experiences and allow our colleagues to consider whether these experiences may be of any use in their own work. We in Sweden and at the Riksbank have achieved quite a lot that has turned out well over the years, but we have also done a lot that we feel with hindsight could have been done better. For instance, we are proud of how we came through the bank crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, but not of how we got into it. This is the type of experience that no textbooks or courses can convey in the same way as people who were there when it actually happened. Our colleagues are usually interested in everything, but particularly in learning from others’ mistakes. We also consider it important that the Riksbank’s employees learn from the cooperation – that is one of the ideas behind a “Staff Exchange Programme”. Encountering activities that are similar to your own workplace’s, but are conducted under different external conditions always gives reason for consideration and reflection. Our programmes are therefore of great professional interest to our employees and most of them return from their trips with new and often unexpected experiences. Our cooperation with Sida has been excellent, although we sometimes hear that we have not spent as much money as expected. A few experts and their trips do not cost very much. The cooperation with the embassies is also very important.

These loans have been provided at longer maturities than normal and with a broader spectrum of collateral. In Europe and other parts of the world, central banks and supervisory authorities have faced many new problems over the last 12 months, not least with regard to banks that have operations in several countries. The experience gained is now the subject of intensive discussion. I am convinced that in the future we will see major changes regarding the supervision and regulation of the banks and other financial operations. But I will gladly speak about this on another occasion. Concluding remarks Over the last 12 months we have experienced a financial crisis that is exceptional in many respects in the sense that it has hit more players, markets and types of asset than any previous crisis. Since the beginning of the summer, the real economy has begun to show signs of stabilisation, although from very low levels. In Asia, and not least in China and India, growth has begun to pick up again and this is having a noticeable effect at those companies that export to these countries. World trade is beginning to stabilise and the fall in GDP has slowed down. The reports of the banks and companies for the second quarter have also been less negative than expected, which has given rise to somewhat greater optimism about the future. There are also signs that the financial markets are working more effectively.
The perceived costs associated with new regulatory requirements on capital and liquidity ratios may further incentivize such behavior, particularly by foreign institutions. Borrowers’ responses appear to contribute to the period-end dynamics I described earlier, including declines in money market volumes, increased volatility in money market rates, and elevated participation in the RRP operations as cash investors face temporarily reduced investment options from private counterparties. Importantly, the increase in RRP take-up can be understood as a consequence, rather than a cause, of private market balance sheet reductions on quarterend dates. There have also been changes to the business models of many money market participants. Following the financial crisis, many financial institutions have sought to adjust their balance sheets to enhance their liquidity positions and reduce reliance on short-term wholesale funding. Cash lender business models have also adapted, with changes to some lenders’ willingness to take credit risk. For example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not been active lenders in the fed funds market since 2011. 21  Although the currently elevated level of reserves creates unique temporary dynamics, the introduction of IOER, (which would have been implemented regardless of monetary policy responses to the financial crisis) represents a permanent change in the Federal Reserve’s operating framework. 22  Drawing on public filings of market participants, we estimate that this figure captures approximately 80 percent of all overnight fed funds transactions. 23  For foreign banks—the predominant borrowers of fed funds—the Basel III leverage ratios are largely calculated on a period-end basis.

(2007)  BIS Review 156/2009  5  Figure 2 Growth volatility in Chile, 1911-2010 (*)  (Standard deviation of the growth rate)  18% 15% 12%  15.0% 11.5% 12.0%  9%  7.5%  7.3% 5.1%  6%  2.9%  3% 0%  6.9% 3.6%  2.2%  1911- 1921- 1931- 1941- 1951- 1961- 1971- 1981- 1991- 20011920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010  (*) 2009-2010 based on the IPoM of September 2009. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 3 Percentage drop in the MPR between September 2008 and September 2009 and Central Bank independence  % drop in MPR (09.2008 09.2009)  1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0  0.2  0.4 0.6 0.8 CBC independent index (Arnone et al. , 2007)  1.0  Sources: Arnone et al. (2007) and Bloomberg. 6  BIS Review 156/2009  References Arnone, M., B.J. Laurens, J.F. Segalotto, and M. Sommer (2007), “Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons from Global Trends,” Working Paper 07/88, International Monetary Fund. Barro, R. (1995), “Inflation and Economic Growth,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 35, pp. 166–176. Céspedes, L.F. and C. Soto (2007), “Credibility and Inflation Targeting in Chile,” in F. Mishkin and K. Schmidt-Hebbel, eds., Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, Vol. XI, Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policy series, Central Bank of Chile. De Gregorio, J.
The lunch was excellent, and the ambience was fostered by a holographic show of pictures from the trip that Global stores on a photo server accessible via the Internet. They were watching the pictures on a display fixed in the restaurant. Global is a regular here, so his bank will take care of the bill. On his way home, Global buys flowers paying e-money by accepting the receipt in his communicator. As the weather is stunning, he takes a walk home. Passing by a sweet shop, he gives in to temptation and indulges in a big portion of ice-cream. He pays by his communicator, which includes a RFID payment card. (It is worth pointing out that the communicator is one of the most useful gadgets, as it plays many roles, e.g. that of electronic signature, ID card, driving license, passport, global tax ID, social security ID, season ticket in domestic and international transport, to name just a few. It is biometrically protected. This means that in order to activate it, Global touches a scanner which needs only a fraction of a second to read his papillary ridges). Afternoon At home, Global finds his son in front of the computer. He is preparing to go to Warsaw to take part in a workshop. Moving and communicating is easy, so Global has more time to spend with his son than his parents had for him. Even during his business trips, he can have eye contact with his child.

Krzysztof Rybiński: A day in the life of Homo Sapiens Globalus Address by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at the 11th Teleinformatics Forum, Legionowo, 21 September 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Today, I would like to present a vision of the citizen of the world in the year 2026. Homo sapiens globalus will be found almost everywhere on the globe, and his traits will be identified by his ability to capture the benefits brought by the global financial market, global labour market, and global knowledge market. He will work, obtain information, establish and foster his professional relations as well as arrange his leisure activities primarily with the aid of the Internet. Homo sapiens globalus has mastered the fine art of capturing the benefits of the (continuously improved) functions available on the Internet. He is able to absorb frequent changes, and he turns them to his advantage. This makes him increasingly effective, knowledgeable, and capable of pursuing activities he finds interesting. Let us now consider a typical example of homo sapiens globalus, namely John Global. I would like to introduce him to you, but in order to do so, I have to take you on a short journey. This will be time and space travel. Just imagine that by the time I will have finished the previous sentence, twenty years have passed. This means that we are now in the year 2026.
A key lesson of the crisis is that inflation forecasts at (say) the two-year horizon are not a sufficient statistic for monetary policy, and that a thorough and broad-based analysis of underlying trends in monetary and credit aggregates may help in identifying longer-term risks to price stability. The second lesson of the crisis that I will stress today is that, contrary to the widespread view of the years leading up to the crisis, the zero lower bound of interest rates is not an issue of purely historical interest, and is rather relevant for contemporary policy-making. I. General principles of monetary policy not altered by the crisis  The financial crisis has not invalidated the general principles underlying the design of monetary policy strategies during the previous two decades. First and foremost among them is the absence of a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment, also known as the “natural rate hypothesis”.1 Underlying the natural rate hypothesis is the key concept of monetary neutrality: in the long run, the Phillips curve is perfectly vertical, which is another way of expressing Robert Lucas’s famous dictum that “You can’t buy a permanent economic high just by printing money”. A second key principle of monetary policy, which remains as valid today as before August 2007, pertains to the benefits of keeping inflation low and stable, due to the corrosive impact of inflation on economic activity.

Ida Wolden Bache: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing of the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament) in connection with the Storting's deliberations on the Financial Market Report, 9 May 2023. ***  Accompanying charts of the speech Thank you for this opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy. When I was here in April last year, Norges Bank had started a gradual normalisation of the policy rate following the coronavirus pandemic. Chart 1: In March 2022, a gradual rise in the policy rate was envisaged The Norwegian economy had recovered after the sharp downturn during the pandemic. High energy prices and a sharp rise in international goods prices had driven up consumer price inflation to a level markedly above the inflation target. Economic activity was strong, and job vacancies were high. Norges Bank expected rising wage growth and higher imported goods inflation to push up inflation through the year, and overall price inflation was projected to be 3.4 percent in 2022. The policy rate was projected to rise towards 2 percent over spring 2023. Chart 2: The policy rate has been raised more than projected a year ago These forecasts were less than accurate. The policy rate has been raised faster and more than projected in March 2022.
Table 2 Parities with respect to the U.S. dollar (1) (index 2005=100) Currency Australian dollar Brazilian real Canadian dollar Chilean peso Colombian peso Czeck koruna Euro Hungarian forint Indonesian rupiah Israeli shekel Japanese yen Korean won Mexican peso New Zealand dollar Norwegian krone Peruvian peso Polish zloty Russian ruble  15-Sep-08 Maximum 96.5 67.8 88.7 94.7 88.5 74.7 94.5 93.3 101.9 81.5 101.8 107.3 95.7 108.2 94.4 90.6 77.9 91.9  129.4 93.9 107.8 121.4 111.5 103.9 108.1 138.5 136.2 97.5 104.5 151.3 138.6 144.9 118.0 99.2 128.7 131.0  Depreciation Minimum (2) percentage 34.1 38.4 21.5 28.2 26.0 39.1 14.4 48.4 33.7 19.6 2.7 41.0 44.9 33.8 25.1 9.6 65.1 42.6  Appreciation (3) percentage  83.0 63.5 84.8 87.6 78.0 75.2 89.0 96.6 100.6 84.5 84.1 111.1 112.5 93.9 90.4 86.9 89.5 103.3  -35.8 -32.4 -21.3 -27.8 -30.1 -27.6 -17.7 -30.2 -26.2 -13.3 -19.6 -26.6 -18.8 -35.2 -23.4 -12.4 -30.4 -21.1  (1) From 15 September 2008 to the statistical closing of the Monetary Policy Report. (2) Difference between the currency's highest exchange rate over US dollars and the rate at 15 September 2008. (3) Difference between the currency's highest and minimum exchange rate in US dollars. Source: Bloomberg.

First, the likelihood of a bank failure as a result of problems in Singapore is small as our banking system is sound and closely supervised, even though it is possible that problems elsewhere will affect a bank’s operations in Singapore. Second, even if a bank were to fail here, it should still have substantial assets to meet its liabilities to depositors. Under the law non-bank depositors enjoy priority in being paid, ahead of other unsecured creditors. This makes it more likely that the failed institution will have sufficient assets to pay out to depositors. Hence, for the guarantee to be called, two things have to happen: a bank has to fail, and at the same time its assets must be worth so little that there is not even enough to repay its depositors. Even then the draw on the guarantee should only be for the shortfall, which should be a fraction of the deposits outstanding. Hence we have calculated that the $ billion backing is an amount that will be ample to meet any eventuality except the most remote. $ billion does not in any way reflect an estimate of the likely draw over the two years of the guarantee. On the contrary, we expect the actual draw to be small or if we are fortunate even zero. Instead, the $ billion reflects the Government’s confidence in the banking system, and its intention to give all depositors that same confidence.
4  Barro and McCleary (2003). 2  BIS Review 114/2010  argued that pre-dominantly Protestant countries in Europe grew faster than Catholic countries as a result of differences in patience and work ethic. 5 This has echoes with recent literature emphasising the role of “Asian values”, such as thrift and patience, as a driver of growth in the region. 6 Patience is also likely to have been a key factor in the evolution of financial systems. At root, banks and capital markets are simply a means of matching saving to investment. They are about realising the benefits of patience and thus growth. There is strong evidence for such effects. Financial deepening is known to be an important determinant of long-run growth. 7 Why? Efficient financial intermediation increases the returns to patience, thereby encouraging thrift and promoting growth. The impatience “gene” For every virtue there is a vice, for every ego an alter ego. So it is with patience. In Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, he also spoke of a “two self” model. People had both a patient and impatient component. This double-self principle was developed by psychologists and philosophers, such as Freud and Berlin, during the 1950s and 1960s. Latterly the work of behavioural economists, such as Thaler and Shefrin, has formulated the two selves as the patient “planner” and impatient “doer”. 8 Using brain imaging, this model has recently been given neurological support.

While patient behaviour is associated with activity in the pre-frontal cortex, impatient behaviour is associated with a distinct part of the brain – the limbic (or midbrain dopamine) system. 9 Humans have distinct patience and impatience “genes”. When making difficult inter-temporal decisions, we are quite literally in two minds. Impatience is no stranger to economics. It was discussed by Neo-Classical economists, such as Marshall, Fisher and Pigou writing over a century ago. Pigou memorably described the tendency of humans to discount excessively future outcomes as a “defective telescopic faculty”. Today, research has gone one step further: discounting is not just myopic but inconsistent through time. This has been given a somewhat less memorable, if mathematically more accurate, moniker by economists – “hyberbolic discounting”. 10 Hyperbolic discounting describes how people’s preferences alter as distant outcomes become closer to the present. Concretely, imagine a person who prefers $ in ten years’ time to $ in nine years’ time. With hyperbolic preferences, this same person would also favour $ in one year’s time to $ in two year’s time. They exhibit inconsistencies in decision-making across time, or so-called preference reversals. The implications of such behaviour are potentially far-reaching. The patient planner becomes a spontaneous doer when outcomes are within reach. The cautious saver becomes a reckless spender when nest eggs are close to hatching. The long-term investor becomes a short-term speculator if assets can be cashed. As temptation beckons, the devil on one shoulder whispers more seductively than the angel on the other.
Øystein Olsen: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 15 May 2017. * * * Accompanying slides Thank you for the opportunity to report on the conduct of monetary policy. My introduction here today is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2016 and our monetary policy assessments up to the monetary policy meeting earlier this month. Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards keeping inflation low and stable. The operational target is consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 percent over time. Monetary policy is at the same time flexible in that our interest rate setting also takes developments in output and employment into consideration. The key policy rate was lowered to 0.5 percent in March 2016 and has since been kept unchanged. The key policy rate is low because interest rates abroad are low, while capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy is below a normal level and the forces driving inflation are moderate. Low growth and the risk of deflation in the global economy have brought down interest rates among Norway’s trading partners to a very low level. Chart: Global and trading partner GDP Growth in the global economy has gradually slowed in recent years and was in 2016 at its lowest since the financial crisis. The slowdown reflects more moderate growth in China and stagnation in some other important emerging economies.

Chart: Relative labour costs Improved cost-competitiveness is an important factor in enabling new exports to emerge as the production of oil and gas dwindles. Tourism in Norway has risen markedly in recent years, and exports of traditional manufactured finished products have shown an appreciable increase. However, the increase is not sufficient to compensate for a decrease in exports from other sectors of the mainland economy. Total mainland exports were lower last year than in 2014. The most important reason for this is the marked decrease in oil service industry exports in the wake of the fall in oil prices. But even excluding this part of the export industry, growth in mainland exports since 2014 has been lower than growth in trading partner imports. Chart: Mainland exports Weak export growth partly reflects supply-side constraints in some sectors. Production stoppages at several large companies led to a decrease in industrial commodity exports last year, while salmon lice infestations contributed to a decline in seafood exports. Other service sector segments in addition to the oil service industry also appear to have been adversely affected by the downturn in the global petroleum industry. A weaker krone is also an advantage for Norwegian firms competing in the domestic market. Competitiveness in the oil service industry has improved considerably, particularly after the substantial cost-cutting measures introduced by companies in this industry in recent years. We have recently seen that a larger share of contracts on the Norwegian continental shelf is being awarded to Norwegian companies.
Yet as long as the crisis is ongoing, an expansionary monetary policy will be needed to stimulate the economy. This reduces the risk that unemployment becomes entrenched at a high level. At the same time, persistently low interest rates entail a risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. In Norway, rapidly rising house prices and further household debt accumulation pose a particular risk. Once there are clear signs that economic conditions are normalising, we will again seek to normalise the use of instruments – as we did after the financial crisis in 2008 and after the oil price fall in 2014. 11  SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFERS FROM THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL  NORGES BANK  The monetary policy stance in the period ahead will be influenced by the timing and means of fiscal policy normalisation. Here the authorities face a difficult balancing act. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  On the one hand, the crisis is not yet over, and there is uncertainty regarding infection rates and the progress of vaccination. Against this background, the Storting (Norwegian parliament) has decided to extend the extraordinary support measures aimed at both individuals and businesses until September. At the same time, it is important that the support measures are scaled back as the situation becomes more normal. If these measures are extended too far into the future, we risk impeding necessary business restructuring. Workers may miss out on opportunities to seek new jobs, and unemployment may become entrenched at a higher level than prior to the crisis.

A key next step will be for the U.S. and other major jurisdictions to put in place regulations and supervisory measures that will require non-bank counterparties of GSIBs to trade with the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  GSIBs on terms equivalent to those found in the ISDA resolution stay protocol. This further step is needed in order to limit the potential for arbitrage within the market and to promote greater stability in the event of a necessary resolution. As we move this work forward, we should acknowledge and take stock of the significant advances achieved over the past few years, while at the same time remain focused on our responsibility to address the challenges that remain. Thank you for your kind attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3