samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are large sums of money arising from savings or other cash balances which must be (re-)invested somewhere. Returns from the safest sovereign assets have been driven to very low yields. And even some risky assets – like bank debt – are getting scarcer as a result of policy actions, directly or indirectly. Where are asset managers putting the money? BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Chart 4 Financial market volatility(a)(b) Interest rates (RHS) CDS premia (RHS) Equities (LHS) Foreign exchange (LHS)  Per cent  100  Basis points  300 250  80  200 60 150 40 100 20  50  0  0 07  08  09  10  11  12  Sources: Bloomberg, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, NYSE Euronext, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank calculations. (a) Three-month option-implied volatilities. (b) Average of FTSE 100, S&P 500 and Euro Stoxx 50 for equities. Average of three-month short sterling, euro-dollar and Euribor for interest rates. Average of five-year on-therun iTraxx Europe main and CDX North America investment-grade for CDS premia. Average of three month € $ $ Yen per $ and € for foreign exchange. There has been a renewed search for investible assets going on. Not the old, indiscriminate, invest-in-anything-with-a-high-return-and-ask-no-questions “search-for-yield”. It has so far been a much more calculated hunt. Not so much for return on capital but return of capital. Credit and liquidity risks are now being much more thoroughly appraised. In particular, investment firms have been avoiding the least liquid products.

Under this framework, banks and non-banks alike collaborate at the infrastructure level through a shared payment infrastructure, while individual players compete at the product level by developing innovative value-added features. This approach is envisioned to expand the network reach at a lower cost, while promoting competition in areas that advance financial inclusion, higher service levels and the delivery of a superior customer experience. There are clear synergies to be gained from such collaborative efforts. They enable technological infrastructure to be shared across the industry. This shifts the competitive focus towards improving the value created for customers and the economy at large, rather than a race towards building proprietary networks that ultimately leads to market fragmentation. However, the effect of this is also a sharp laser focus on bottlenecks within individual firms. By levelling the playing field, firms will face a greater urgency to address internal constraints that prevent them from capitalizing on opportunities for higher growth and productivity. This may well be the most important challenge for digital leaders. Elevating the quality of financial sector growth This brings me to the quality of financial sector growth. There are two perspectives to this. First, digitisation offers enormous potential for the financial sector to achieve what was not possible before, at least not without prohibitive costs. And second, the transition to a digital economy itself calls for a re-orientation of the financial sector to meet the new business demands for financial services.
Such trends can namely also depend on the fact that the real exchange rate, that is, the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative price levels between Sweden and other countries, is not necessarily constant. If price devel-  7 [21]  opments are approximately the same as abroad, the adjustment of the real exchange rate will occur via trends in the nominal exchange rate. Importantly though, trends in the real exchange rate are determined by structural factors, such as differences in productivity growth among countries. Challenges in communication This is how the debate has been framed. One observation is that the monetary policy conducted by the Riksbank has been the subject of lively discussion, despite its sole purpose having been to fulfil the remit the bank has from the Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag. Furthermore, in recent years the Riksbank has managed its remit well, from a purely objective perspective. I draw two conclusions from this. First, the debate seems to be about the remit itself, even if this is not always apparent. It seems people want the Riksbank to do something other than what it has been tasked to do. Second, maybe we at the Riksbank have not managed to communicate well enough why we have the remit we have, why we need to conduct the policy we have conducted and what the benefits are of having an inflation target of 2 per cent compared with other monetary policy objectives. The fact that the communication has faced challenges is in a way natural.

The reason is that it has proved difficult in practice to lower nominal wages. If inflation is low and nominal wages cannot be lowered, it becomes difficult to adjust real wages among different professions, companies and sectors. This can ultimately bring about both higher unemployment and poorer productivity growth in the economy. These problems can be mitigated if there is some inflation. Another advantage of a target of 2 per cent, which has been particularly apparent in recent years, is that a very low average rate of inflation would make it more difficult for monetary policy to counteract recessions. If inflation on average is very low in a world of low real interest rates, like today, the average nominal interest 8 [21]  rate will also be very low. The lower the interest rate is in normal conditions, the less scope there is to lower it before it reaches its lower bound. It will thus become more difficult to counteract future economic downturns with interest rate cuts. Thus, if you do not like negative interest rates, you should not advocate a lower inflation target, as that would involve the repo rate needing to be negative more often and for longer periods. There is a widespread international discussion on whether a target of 2 per cent, which most developed countries have now, really provides sufficient scope to conduct a monetary policy that is as expansionary as it sometimes needs to be.
It is also true that such developments will not only bring banking services closer to those who need them, but also improve competition among banks in Zambia while creating jobs for our people. However, there is need to complement physical branch expansion with product innovation programmes that will capture a lot more people in the remote areas of our country. In addition, the crucial role that banks play in financial intermediation cannot be overemphasised. The real challenge is for all financial sector players to play their honest part in enhancing savings mobilization and to effectively channel the public’s savings to support financing of economic activities in all parts of the country. Chairperson, it is pleasing to note that despite the recent challenges facing the global economies, Access Bank Zambia Limited remains committed to growth through its efforts to expand its branch network and through product innovation. Although the bank has been in existence for just under two years, it now has three branches which is a very welcome development. I am certain that this development will go a long way in enhancing access to finance. Furthermore, I am reliably informed that the bank is earmarked not only to expand its branch network to five this year but also bring to the financial sector some exciting and innovative products. An example of this is the Visa Debit-card which was launched today. It is the Bank of Zambia’s expectation that these efforts, accompanied by prudence in risk management, will contribute to the further deepening of our financial markets.

But beyond that it certainly means, too, that “outs”, or potential “pre-ins”, should not attempt to exploit any perceived -- and certainly short-term -- advantage from the additional policy freedoms they might have on the outside, but should, for example, persist in macro-economic, fiscal and monetary, discipline in parallel with the EMU countries. But it also means that the “in” countries, for their part, have an identical self-interest in maintaining an open and constructive relationship with the “outs”/“pre-ins”. Otherwise we would all be cutting off our nose to spite our face. I make this general point, Mr. Chairman, because this context seems to me to be relevant to any assessment of the economic prospect, of the economy as a whole or of any particular sector, within or without the euro-area. In the rest of my remarks I assume that, in or out, we will be operating within a constructive, co-operative, environment throughout the EU, for the powerful reason that that is in everyone’s interest. BIS Review 106/1997  -2Against that background let me turn to the prospects for the City. I will, in fact, concentrate on the case in which the UK does not participate in EMU in the first wave, because in the alternative case, the UK in scenario, while there may be uncertainty about the overall macro-economic implications, there is little reason to suppose that there would be any adverse implications for the City in particular.
I believe the time has come to redefine the concept of need and reschedule our social priorities because it is clear that we can no longer afford to provide such a wide range of services for free to all irrespective of income levels. Moreover, we must ensure that whatever programmes are implemented, these are done in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible. Which brings us to another important labour market issue that needs to be tackled, namely employment in the public sector, where the extent of human capital absorbed is excessive and where, consequently, productivity is on average lower than in other sectors. Apart from imposing a tax burden on the rest of the economy, this is effectively reducing the supply of potential skills to the private sector, thereby not only limiting its growth but also increasing the cost of its labour input. Turning next to the product markets, competitiveness can only be hurt if goods and services are not properly priced to reflect the demand for them and the use of resources in providing their supply. This may take place, for instance, through excessively high prices engendered by monopoly situations and cartel pricing. High inland freight costs, for instance, are contributing to erode the competitiveness of our exporters as well as to inflate domestic price levels. Another example is the provision of free goods and services by the State.

The external dimension of the economic imperative is further reinforced by domestic considerations. These arise mainly out of the small size of the economy and its lack of natural resources, which translate into a high degree of openness. Malta depends heavily on imports for its consumption and investment needs, and equally critically on exports to generate the foreign exchange required to service its import bill. Imports and exports each account for around 100% of GDP. Such dependence on international trade is clearly a source of vulnerability. Most business activities in Malta are thus inevitably exposed to the full force of international competition. Producers for the domestic market face import competition while export-oriented firms face an ever-tougher competitive environment as new countries enter the global market-place. In the export-oriented sector, there is a predominance of foreign direct investment that often provides the technical and marketing expertise which is a prerequisite for success. A loss of competitiveness would thus be doubly damaging. In the first instance, there would be a drop in domestic output in favour of imports and a contraction in export revenues. In the longer term, as Malta became a less profitable location, there would be a decline in new foreign investment and a consequently negative impact on growth prospects. Apart from these structural factors, the need for competitiveness is accentuated by the current phase of the economic cycle. For most of this year the world economy has been on the brink of a recession.
Crucially, the Committee has also initiated an annual stock take of the supply side of the economy. It now publishes its best collective judgments on the natural rate of unemployment, the output gap, as well as the expected growth in productivity, labour supply and potential output. To draw out these points consider three examples of forward guidance by the MPC. The first occurred five years ago when the economy began to recover from the worst downturn since the Great Depression. During previous periods of accelerating growth and firming business confidence, the MPC had always tightened policy significantly (as evidenced in the correlation between survey indicators and MPC votes seen in Chart 1). On the basis of this past behaviour, the MPC would have raised interest rates by 2 to 3 percentage points between August 2013 and the end of 2014. For anyone who might suggest the MPC should have followed that reaction function, note that, even on unchanged policy, CPI inflation in the summer of 2016 was running at only about ½% and core CPI inflation around 1¼%. 3  In other words, the amount of volatility in interest rates should match the amount of uncertainty surrounding the economy. There should ideally be no additional volatility, or risk premium, due to uncertainty about how policy would respond.

Chart 5: Guidance has reduced the correlation between economic uncertainty and interest rate volatility 10  Economic uncertainty and option-implied volatility of 3 month rates 1 year ahead 3m rate standard deviation 180 160  2000-August 2013  140 120 100 80 60 40 August 2013 EU referendum  20  EU referendum - latest  0 -2  -1  0 1 2 3 Economic uncertainty (deviations from average)  4  5  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., ICE, Bank calculations and Haddow et al, ibid. 10  The indicator of economic uncertainty is based on the principal component from seven measures of uncertainty: FTSE and sterling option-implied volatility, dispersion of company earnings forecasts and among forecasters’ growth projections, proportion of companies reporting that uncertainty is limiting investment, households’ unemployment expectations, and number of press articles citing ‘economic uncertainty’. See Haddow, A, Hare, C, Hooley, J and Shakir, T (2013) “Macroeconomic uncertainty: what is it, how can we measure it and why does it matter?”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2013 Q2. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  The MPC is now in the process of reviewing the possible range for the equilibrium real interest rate in the medium term. This analysis reflects the importance of global equilibrium rates for the UK, and the possibilities that the global equilibrium real rate may rise as the global recovery proceeds and that domestic cyclical factors such as the pace of public and private balance sheet repair may shift.
There have been comments that the Riksbank has been too silent and not prepared market agents and others for a raise. We must, of course, consider this criticism. A natural part of monetary policy is to consider whether there are things we could do better. This is the way we always try to work. There is one aspect of this of which it is important to be aware. This is that we quite simply cannot send clear signals as to how the interest rate will be set two to three weeks ahead of a monetary policy meeting. This would require us to be fairly certain about the majority opinion and that it will not change. The decision-making situation is often unclear to the very last. And, I would say that this was definitely the case this time. Now, I do believe that there is widespread understanding that we cannot in advance state how the interest rate will be set. It may be the case that as a result of the recent turmoil there has been more of a need than usual that the Riksbank comments on the course of events, without anticipating the interest rate decision. Assessing monetary policy Now let us look back and discuss the material for assessing monetary policy, which came about on the initiative of the Committee on Finance. It is for me quite special this time. This is the first occasion on which the material for assessing monetary policy actually covers decisions that I have been party to.

Perhaps splitting hairs on whether we should focus more on asset based or equity based financing pales in comparison to other issues, such as encouraging mutual recognition on diversity of thoughts and ideas in Islamic finance, enhance the inter linkages between Islamic financial centers, so that economies that have surplus funds could be channel to economies that are short of funding and that those excess funds could be invested in productive manner. Perhaps, we should be patient in developing Islamic finance, moving forward. Patience does have its own virtue. I remember the days when the financing for purchases of houses are purely based on murabahah concept, but now we have musyarakah mutanaqisah, a structure that is very close to equity-based type of financing structure. Conclusion Malaysia since 1983 has established a comprehensive Islamic financial system. We have suitable legal, tax, shariah, regulatory and supervisory framework institutions and the right talent to bring Islamic finance to the next level of development. If there is a gap – we are in a position to fix that gap. But the world as you know it has never remained static, the agility and the commitment to change would determine the ability of Malaysian Islamic financial system to remain competitive and relevant. On that note, I wish you all the best and I am confident this forum will make a tremendous contribution to the overall growth in Islamic finance. 6  BIS Review 49/2010
The increase in copper export receipts was on account of the rise in both the volume of copper exports by 2.1% to 30,076 metric tons in January 2004 from 29,449 metric tons in December 2003, and an increase in realised prices by 5.5% to 96 cents per pound in January 2004 from 91 cents per pound in December 2003. •  However, cobalt export receipts decreased following the decline in the sales volume by 42.9% to 131.8 metric tons in January from 230.9 metric tons in December 2003. Cobalt realised prices, on the other hand, increased by 46.6% to US $ per pound in January 2004 from US $ in December 2003. •  Non-metal export earnings increased by 1.6% to US $ million in January 2004 compared with US $ million realised in December 2003. The major non-traditional export items that contributed to the rise in export receipts in January 2004 were burley tobacco, cement, cotton lint and sugar. 2. Developments in the financial sector  Banking sector Overview of financial performance of the banking sector •  On the basis of capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings performance and liquidity, the overall financial condition and performance of the banking industry during the month of February was satisfactory. •  The industry’s net worth position increased by 3.2% to K639,660 million from K619,955 million in January. The sector also continued to be adequately capitalised. All banks met their minimum regulatory capital requirements in the month under review.

The armistice ending World War I took effect on 11 November 1918. This undeniably joyous event was followed by a deep economic recession. In autumn 1919 came the Great Crash, when the price of Iceland’s most important export product – salted herring – collapsed. As the winter advanced, Iceland became virtually unable to sell its fish. Foreign exchange revenues stopped flowing into the country. It was in late summer 1920, when the Prime Minister of Iceland was in Copenhagen intending to pay some outstanding debts, that Danish banks refused to accept the proffered mail order cheque issued by Íslandsbanki, which functioned at the time as Iceland’s central bank. Iceland had no foreign currency and had to ration goods the following winter. The economy took a nosedive – one that turned out blessedly short-lived. The years to follow brought major improvements, until the Great Depression in the 1930s. But that is yet another story. Honoured guests: American author and satirist Mark Twain is quoted as saying “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes” – just like a good Icelandic quatrain. Now, a century after achieving sovereignty, we Icelanders are facing many of the same challenges as in autumn 1918. But with one major difference: in 1918 the country was destitute and unprepared – with the authority of a sovereign but without social infrastructure such as a healthcare system. Today we are in a vastly different position.
In this regard, we should bear in mind that inflation in the last two years has been predominantly negative. On the other hand, with an ongoing unfavourable international environment and a strong Swiss franc, the situation for our economy remains challenging. Should it become necessary, we will therefore enforce the minimum exchange rate by buying foreign currency in unlimited quantities. And, if required, we will also take further measures. In addition, we are leaving the target range for the three-month Libor at 0.0–0.25%. The SNB bases its monetary policy decision on a conditional inflation forecast, which assumes an unchanged three-month Libor of 0.0% over the next three years. You will find the relevant chart in your media kit. Compared to September, our forecast has been adjusted downwards slightly. Reasons for this are the unexpectedly low rates of inflation for October and November, which serve as a lower departure point for the forecast, as well as the decline in inflation in the euro area and the slight fall in the oil price, which both help to dampen the inflation outlook. For 2013, we still anticipate inflation of –0.2%. For 2014 and 2015, the inflation forecast is down in each case by 0.1 percentage points and is now at 0.2% and 0.6% respectively. Consequently, no inflation risks can be identified for Switzerland in the foreseeable future. Global economic outlook The SNB’s inflation forecast is embedded in a global economic scenario. I would therefore like to begin with our assessment of the global economy.

Spikes on international financial markets therefore cannot be ruled out during the process of normalising monetary policy in the major currency areas. Swiss economic outlook I will now look at economic developments in Switzerland. The economy continued to develop favourably in the third quarter. Annualised real GDP was up by slightly more than 2%. Unlike the previous quarter, goods exports grew substantially. Domestic demand, however, lost some momentum. On the output side, manufacturing in particular recorded positive growth, having previously fallen for three successive quarters. Construction continues to be an important growth driver. Owing to this positive growth, utilisation of production capacity picked up. Nevertheless, it remained at a relatively low level in manufacturing. Employment increased slightly and the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate has not risen further since summer. Overall, the output gap remains negative. The indicators already available suggest that growth will weaken temporarily in the fourth quarter. Following the sharp increase in the third quarter, goods exports and industrial output, in particular, are likely to advance at a slower pace. In the coming year, with the gradual improvement in the global economy, GDP should once again grow more strongly. We continue to expect growth of 1.5–2.0% for 2013. For 2014, we expect a growth rate of around 2.0%. However, given the vulnerable economic situation abroad, downside risks still prevail for Switzerland. Monetary and financial conditions I will now turn to monetary and financial conditions.