samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, in the year to date, the 12-month EURIBOR has increased by around 290 bp, while the 10-year OIS rate, which acts as the euro area long-term risk-free interest rate, has risen by almost 250 bp. The cost of corporate debt issuance has also risen significantly, in line with risk-free interest rates. The increase in market interest rates has also started to pass-through to the average rates applied on new loans to households and firms. In the coming months, this passthrough is expected to continue. The rise in market interest rates is also gradually increasing the average cost of outstanding debt for both households and firms. The speed of this process depends on the maturity of the instrument (short vs long-term) and the type of contract (fixed vs floating rates). For the euro area as a whole, the share of short-term and floating-rate loans in the stock of loans is much higher for firms than for households. This means that outstanding debt is repriced faster for firms than for households. Besides the tightening in financing conditions in terms of cost, the credit standards for new loans to the nonfinancial private sector also tightened across the board during the first half of 2022, according to the July Bank Lending Survey (BLS).6 This is attributable to banks’ heightened risk perception and lower risk tolerance. In July banks expected a further contraction in credit supply for the third quarter. So what can we expect for the financial system in 2023?

Then, let us take action with Leonardo da Vinci: "Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Being willing is not enough; we must do". Doing not for the bitter pleasure of austerity,  Page 9 of 9 but to ensure the sustainability of our social model, and the efficiency of our public services and our economy. Thank you for your attention. i  See the MIX scenario , Table 46: Commission staff working document, Impact assessment, Accompanying the document, Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions, Stepping up Europe’s 2030 climate ambition, Investing in a climate-neutral future for the benefit of our people, September 2020. ii Cour des Comptes, "Report on the position and outlook of public finances" (Rapport sur la situation et les perspectives des finances publiques, 22 June 2021), or the Public Annual Report, 16 February 2022. iii F. Villeroy de Galhau, The Eurosystem and its monetary policy: from an “impossible dilemma” to a possible roadmap for normalisation, speech, 6 May 2022. iv According to Eurostat, spending on pensions and “economic affairs” reached 15.7% and 6.8% of GDP respectively in France in 2020, compared with 13.4% and 5.9% of GDP for the euro area as a whole (12.3% and 4.6% in Germany). v F. Villeroy de Galhau, Making the post-Covid era a success for the French and European economy Pour l’économie française et européenne, réussir l’après-Covid, speech, 18 January 2022.
Third, putting our money where our mouth is: MAS committed $ million under the Financial Sector Technology & Innovation or FSTI Scheme: to attract financial institutions to set up their innovation labs in Singapore; to catalyse innovative solutions by financial institutions or FinTech firms; and to fund industry-wide infrastructure for inter-operability and seamless services. Five years have passed, and we have made good progress towards our vision of a Smart Financial Centre. Singapore is consistently ranked among the top three or five FinTech hubs in the world. We now host 40 innovation labs set up by global banks and insurers, compared to hardly any five years ago. These labs have embarked on close to 500 innovation projects. Two examples, just to give a flavour: DBS’ AI chatbot “JIM” that reviews resumes, collects applicants’ responses to pre-screening questions, and conducts psychometric profiling of candidates; and BNP Paribas’s digital advisory platform “BeAdvised” that provides recommendations to wealth management clients customised to their portfolio preferences. The innovation labs we have funded, have created 180 high value jobs. Approximately 60% of these jobs are held by Singaporeans. More than that, there is valuable learning and capability transfer, helping to build our local talent pool and pipeline for future leadership roles. Beyond the innovation labs, financial institutions have been employing many more people across a wide range of tech areas such as cloud computing, data science, blockchain/DLT, customer journey design, digital marketing and cybersecurity as they 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  undergo digital transformation.

We will introduce a new AIDA-Lite track to support financial institutions adopting existing AI solutions in the market. We will require all AIDA applicants to work with the Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF) to actively look out for at-risk workers impacted by AI adoption, and to develop a training plan to keep them employable. To sum up, the enhanced FSTI 2.0 renews and anchors MAS’ resolve to support the financial industry in its journey … a journey of continued innovation and experimentation; deepening our local talent pool in new technologies; and 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  better serving our societies – here in Singapore and across the world. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Furthermore, I see a 3 percent inflation threshold as a safeguard against inflation running too high for too long and thus unhinging longer-run inflation expectations. It also is a safeguard against the kinds of policy errors we made in the 1970s. If potential output is indeed lower and the natural rate of unemployment higher than I currently think, then resource pressures would emerge and actual inflation and the outlook for inflation over the medium term would rise faster than expected. If this outlook for inflation hit 3 percent before the unemployment rate falls to 7 percent, then we would begin to tighten policy. I understand that some may find such a policy proposal to be hard to understand, or even risky. But these are not ordinary times – we are in the aftermath of a financial crisis with massive output gaps, with stubborn debt overhangs and high degrees of household and business caution that are weighing on economic activity. As Ken Rogoff wrote in a recent piece in the Financial Times, “Any inflation above 2 percent may seem anathema to those who still remember the anti-inflation wars of the 1970s and 1980s, but a once-in-75-year crisis calls for outside-the-box measures”.9 The Fed has done a good deal of thinking out of the box over the past four years. I think it is time to do some more. 9  Rogoff (2011)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  References Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011, Minutes of the FOMC Meeting, January 25–26.

As I just said, I subscribe to a 2 percent target for inflation over the long run. However, given how badly we are doing on our employment mandate, we need to be willing to take a risk on inflation going modestly higher in the short run if that is a consequence of polices aimed at lowering unemployment. With regard to the inflation marker, we have already experienced unduly low inflation of 1 percent; so against an objective of 2 percent, 3 percent inflation would be an equivalent policy loss to what we have already experienced. On the unemployment marker, a decline to 7 percent would be quite helpful. However, weighed against a conservative estimate for the natural rate of unemployment of 6 percent, it still represents a substantial policy loss. Indeed, weighed against a less conservative long-run estimate of the natural rate, it is a larger policy loss than that from 3 percent inflation. Accordingly, these triggers remain quite conservatively tilted in favor of disciplined inflation performance over enhanced growth and employment, and it would not be unreasonable to consider an even lower unemployment threshold before starting policy tightening. I would also highlight that while I believe that optimal policy would be consistent with inflation running above our 2 percent target for some time, this policy does not abandon the 2 percent target for long-run inflation. Indeed, I would support combining this policy with a formal statement of 2 percent as our longer-run inflation target in conjunction with reaffirming our commitment to flexible inflation-targeting.
The commercial banks distribute the cash among the people and companies of Estonia, in the same way that it is done around the world. Eesti Pank is not aware of any country anywhere where the central bank is responsible for operating the cash network serving people and companies directly. It would require massive investment and fixed costs for Eesti Pank and the outcome would most likely be unwieldy and unclear for the public in their use of money. The commercial banks are much better able to do this and do it more efficiently. However, Eesti Pank is responsible for managing cash circulation, and we consider it important to engage in looking for ways of making sure services can be accessed across Estonia. Access to banking services is a problem globally, this is not an issue that is unique to Estonia. A parliamentary commission in Australia looked into the matter ten years ago, and similar questions have been discussed in Canada and Sweden and other countries. The trend is for the number of bank branch offices and cash machines to be cut, and this is happening everywhere in the world in response to advances in technology, trends in demography and changes in consumer preferences. To some degree this is a natural evolution against which it would be pointless to stand. Equally it creates problems of access to banking services, and such problems need to be resolved.

“The budget should be balanced, the treasury should be refilled, public debt should be reduced, the arrogance of officialdom should be tempered and controlled … lest we become bankrupt. People must again learn to work, instead of living on public assistance.”  BIS Review 60/2009  7
And by investing overseas, domestic residents are able to pool risks of various kinds with residents of other countries. To date, international diversification of portfolios has been remarkably limited. In particular, equity portfolios of investors in the industrialised world are heavily biased towards domestic equities. In part, this reflects the difficulty of obtaining adequate information about the legal, accounting and other aspects of the infrastructure of economies overseas. But the failure to exploit the full benefits of an open capital market reflects also the instabilities resulting from the volatility of short-term capital flows. The volatility of capital flows has affected not only Asia but also Latin America, and almost all emerging markets have suffered directly or indirectly as spreads on their debt have risen to levels that in some cases have come close to cutting them off from the international capital market altogether. Indeed, Eisuke Sakakibara, formerly of MOF in Japan, has insisted that the past five years have been a “crisis of global capitalism”.2 Over that period, financial crises have been too frequent to be acceptable. The so-called “Washington consensus” that sound macroeconomic and financial policies should embrace the free movement of capital has come under fire. Both Mexico and Korea, regarded as models of development to such an extent that they were admitted to the OECD, experienced damaging crises shortly after their elevation to the premier league of advanced economies. Contrast their fate with that of India. Capital controls insulated India to a large extent from the recent crisis.

The essence of the middle way is to find practical steps forward to enable emerging markets to better manage the liquidity positions of their external liabilities, and to reduce their dependence on debt finance. Crises will still occur. But the aim is to reduce their frequency and severity. To that end there is one further policy which is fundamental to the success of the middle way – transparency. 5. Transparency  Transparency is one of the most popular words in economic policy today. And for good reason. Much has been said about transparency, and, interestingly, much has been done. Why is transparency so important? In itself, transparency will neither prevent nor resolve financial crises. But transparency can help reduce the frequency of crises – by alerting not only markets but also policymakers to problems on the horizon – and their severity – by minimising the surprises about the scale of any liquidity problems. In Korea, the foreign currency exposure of its banking system was not known until after the crisis had hit. And in Thailand, the true state of the foreign exchange reserves was unknown even to its own finance ministry,  7  BIS Review 95/1999  let alone financial markets. So transparency can be seen as a “second best” policy when purist solutions to financial crises are unavailable. It is in the context of the middle way that transparency comes into its own.
Carney M., 2017, ‘A fine balance’, Speech given at Mansion House and available here http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech983.pdf Fajgelbaum, P.D. and A.K. Khandelwal, 2016, ‘Measuring the Unequal Gains from Trade’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 131. Harrison A., McLaren J. and M. McMillan, 2011, ‘Recent perspectives on trade and Inequality’, Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 3, pages 261-289. Haskel J. and M. Slaughter, 2003, ‘Have falling tariffs and transportation costs raised US wage inequality?”, Review of International Economics, Vol. 11, Issue 4, September, pp. 630-650. Jacks D., Meissner C., and D. Novy, 2011, Trade booms, trade busts, and trade costs’, NBER Working Paper No. 15267. Keller C., Wieladek T., Gun D. and S. Kochugovindan, 2017, ‘The future of globalisation’, Barclays research. Krugman P., 1995, ‘Growing world trade: causes and consequences’, BPEA no. 1, pages 327-377. Krugman P., 1996, ‘Ricardo’s difficult idea’, paper presented at the Manchester conference in free trade and is available here Krugman P., 2008, ‘Trade and Wages, Reconsidered’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1. Pessoa J. P., 2016, ‘International Competition and Labor Market Adjustment’, CEP Discussion Papers dp1411, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. Samuelson P., 2004, ‘Where Ricardo and Mill rebut and confirm arguments of mainstream economists supporting globalisation’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 18, No. 3, pages 135-146. Stone S. F. and H Cavazos Cepeda, 2012, ‘Wage Implications of Trade Liberalisation: Evidence for Effective Policy Formation’, Policy Priorities for international trade and jobs, OECD. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14

First, we will put together programmes which will not only develop depth in core competencies but also breadth across related functional capabilities. A successful career in finance today requires versatility across different areas, be it to offer comprehensive solutions to customers or manage risks holistically across multiple business lines. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, we will build expertise and capabilities to serve and operate not just in Singapore but in a pan-Asian financial market. With the surge of opportunities in Asia, those with the knowledge and skills to operate across regional markets will be in high demand. These are capabilities that we must consciously seek to build amongst our professionals. IBF does not operate in a vacuum but in the larger context of what it takes to develop and grow the financial sector – to create meaningful jobs for Singaporeans, support the needs of the economy, and serve the larger region. It is now my pleasure to welcome our Guest-of-Honour, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, to talk to us about this larger context. It is especially appropriate that DPM Tharman is doing this as he is himself an IBF Pioneer who, as IBF Chairman some 14 years ago, transformed IBF to set competency standards for the industry. DPM Tharman, please. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The same could be said about cloud computing technologies, which enable the information systems of all kinds of businesses to be adapted flexibly to their changing needs, converting a large part of their fixed costs into variable costs. This technology may notably reduce the costs for banks of their information systems, which, precisely due to the use of new technologies, are growing rapidly, although there are security risks that must be controlled. Another example are mobile payment services. These may seem new, but ultimately the transaction usually ends with an interbank transfer or a simple credit or debit card payment. Spanish banks have been pioneers in the euro area in the incorporation of this technology 4/7  through the Bizum platform, an interbank initiative for immediate payments, allowing payment to be made from one account to another in a matter of seconds. The list of technological developments available to credit institutions is longer. To mention some more, I would also point out the new methods to validate identity by means of voice or image, which make it possible to identify and register new customers remotely, bypassing the traditional branch network; or the provision of automated advisory services, known as “robo advice”, which enable advice to be provided in areas where just recently it was impossible to imagine that automated solutions could be developed. 2. Second, the development of new services will require regulation in accordance with the risks they introduce into the system, both in terms of customer protection and the stability of the financial system.

The exemption thresholds take account of the very high level of liquidity in the banking system, which is due to the SNB’s past interventions on the foreign exchange market. The exemptions are calculated to ensure that they remain virtually unchanged over time. This means that the interest burden increases as soon as the SNB feeds more liquidity into the system – in particular in the event of further foreign exchange interventions. Consequently, the SNB’s readiness to remain active in the foreign exchange market and the negative interest rate are two mutually reinforcing measures. By imposing negative interest on sight deposits that exceed a given exemption threshold, we set incentives for the entire financial system to give preference to investments in foreign currencies over those in Swiss francs, thereby limiting new inflows into the Swiss currency. Since the exceptional demand for Swiss francs is not only foreign but also domestic, there is no economic argument for differentiating by origin of investor. What is more, we have reduced to a minimum the number of exceptions from the obligation to pay negative interest. Impact of negative interest Six months after the announcement of negative interest, we can see that the measure is having the desired effect on the money and capital markets. The money market is working well, even with negative interest. Money market interest rates have reacted rapidly, and the three-month Libor has settled in the middle of the range we targeted.
Page 6/10  indicated, the two distinct interest rates applied to reserves provide incentives for banks to trade their reserves. A money market rate that is compatible with the incentives of both borrowers and lenders must lie between these two interest rates. As shown on this slide, the demand curve is thus capped in the upper left segment by the upper remuneration rate and it is bounded in the lower right segment by the lower remuneration rate. Accordingly, SARON will lie in the corridor between 0% and 0.5%. With the transition to a positive policy rate, we no longer want SARON to be in the lower or middle part of the corridor. We want it to be close to the upper bound of the corridor, at 0.5%. This is because, in introducing our new approach to implementing monetary policy, we placed our policy rate at the upper bound of the corridor instead of keeping it at the lower bound as we had done in the negative policy rate environment. If the SNB were not to absorb reserves, the stock of excess reserves would still be sizeable. Because of the large supply of reserves in the interbank money market, SARON would be close to the lower bound of the corridor at around 0%, as shown on the slide.

| Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  SARON adjusted quickly to positive value of SNB policy rate and it has remained close to, while slightly below, 0.5% since then  11  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Rapid growth of SNB OMOs has absorbed a large amount of reserves  12  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Most SNB Bills issued to date have shortest term  13  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Interbank activity has remained solid since the rate hike  14  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Pass-through of policy rate move to other money market rates mostly complete, with implied rates from FX swaps lagging behind  15  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Thank you for your attention! © Swiss National Bank