samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Inflation, on the other hand, continues its downtrend in May, and although we see inflation numbers turning negative, the current uptick in commodities and asset prices, together with signs of greater stabilization in the real sector, help lessen the concern regarding deflation risk. Against this background, the Monetary Policy Committee in its meeting on May 20th held the view that monetary policy has been substantially eased and the current policy rate at 1.25 percent remains supportive of the economy. Two implications must be drawn from this decision. First, given the low policy rate and the ample availability of liquidity, more gains could be made by ensuring that, at the current policy rate, the benefits of past rate reductions are passed on more fully to consumers and the private sector through corresponding adjustments in the banking system’s interest rates. The second implication is that, while the  BIS Review 76/2009  1  emerging signs of stabilization are positive and are consistent with the developments on a worldwide basis, they must be treated with caution given that the current state of the global economy and financial markets are still far from normal. Hence, the MPC will continue to monitor closely the uncertainty surrounding both domestic and external economic conditions, and stand ready to implement appropriate monetary policy to support economic recovery in the period ahead. Turning now to the banking sector. The Thai banking sector was able to weather the impact of the global financial crisis with a relatively strong initial position.

I will not have time today to dwell on the details of the plan, let me just say that the plan is now complete and is currently being considered by the finance ministry, and is scheduled to come into effect this year. It is our hope that this continuing momentum of reform will help expand the competitiveness and the growth of the Thai financial sector and the economy in the years to come. I probably have used up my allotted time. Again, I want to thank Euromoney for the invitation. It has been a pleasure and thank you for your attention. BIS Review 76/2009  3
This can include credentials, jargon, control over journals and control over training the new experts. 20  But this boundary work can also  reduce their effectiveness, especially in a world where there are many alternative sources of views. A recent blog post by Bank of England staff compares the linguistic complexity of our publications to other sources of information and finds they require a level of reading comprehension which makes them accessible to only one in five people (Chart 2). 21  For example, at the Bank of England we have learned that talking about  “prices and jobs” is far more effective than economists’ jargon of inflation and employment. And in preparing this speech I was pleased to discover that linguistic analysis found it was at an “intermediate” level of linguistic complexity – equivalent to a political speech or a tabloid newspaper. 19  Papacharissi, Z. (2002) The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere, New media & society, 4(1), 9-27 Rifkin and Merton (1997), Negotiating Expert Status.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Policy implications of the financial crisis Speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Conference, “From Fragility to Stability”, University of Geneva, 18 November 2009. I would like to thank Jürg Blum and Rita Kobel for their valuable support in drafting this speech. I also want to thank Nicole Allenspach, Philipp Haene, and Signe Krogstrup for helpful comments and discussions. *  *  *  Introduction It is an honour to speak at the University of Geneva this evening. I want to thank Rajna Gibson for her kind invitation. A year ago, we were in the midst of a perfect financial storm. Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September, the imminent collapse of the global financial system became a distinct possibility. Since those dark days, the situation has manifestly improved. A bold and unprecedented global policy response has had its intended short-term effect. While important questions remain as to the sustainability of the global recovery, we are no longer staring into the abyss of financial and – potentially – economic chaos. The worst financial crisis for at least 70 years has not resulted in a new Great Depression. On the other side of the ledger, the tangible and intangible costs of this crisis are enormous.
To the extent that this situation continues, it is possible that domestic output and expenditure will fail to show the greater dynamism that is expected in the baseline scenario. Conversely, a scenario where expectations improve significantly would allow for a faster recovery of the economy, particularly in 2016. Regarding inflation, pressures are somewhat milder than expected in March, due to lower activity and the fact that, although with volatility, the peso has not continued to depreciate. However, in a context of persistently high inflation, with bounded margins, strong wage growth, higher fuel prices and external risk scenarios that can drive a significant further depreciation of the peso, inflationary risks remain important. As we are permanently aware of our legal mandate, this is one risk we analyze and monitor with special care. After evaluating these risks, the Board estimates that the risk balance is unbiased for both output and inflation. Summing up, inflation remains high, despite some decline in recent months. Domestic activity picked up in the first quarter, but the outlook for the second half of the year has moderated. As has been mentioned before, macroeconomic policies have played a countercyclical role. In particular, the stronger monetary impulse translated into a reduction of 200 basis points off the monetary policy rate, which helped to drive the long-term rates close to their historic lows.

Rodrigo Vergara: The Monetary Policy Report and the Financial Stability Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Finance Commission of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 3 June 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found on the Central Bank of Chile's website. The Monetary Policy Report of June 2015 and the Financial Stability Report of the first half of 2015 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Introduction Mr. President of the Finance Committee of the Senate, Senator Andrés Zaldívar, senators members of this Committee, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me to share the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile on recent macroeconomic and financial developments, their prospects and implications for monetary and financial policy making. This vision is contained in detail in the Monetary Policy Report of June 2015 and the Financial Stability Report of the first half of 2015. The macroeconomic scenario shows minor changes with respect to forecasts in March. Annual inflation declined between February and April, but it remains above 4%. Output and demand continue to grow at a moderate pace, and the first quarter was better than expected, but incoming data suggest that the remainder of the year will be somewhat less dynamic than previously estimated. In the global economy, the growth outlook showed no major changes either. The weaker US figures early in the year and the consolidation of better prospects in Europe are worth mentioning.
Since early 2010, due to anemic growth in external demand, current account balance has been deteriorating rapidly, whereas core inflation remains subdued and output gap persists. Recent surge in capital flows toward emerging markets, including Turkey, has the potential to exacerbate the divergence between the pace of recovery in the domestic and external demand. If this pattern of growth coexists with rapid credit expansion and deterioration in the current account balance, it may lead to financial stability concerns. These developments make it essential to effectively utilize policy instruments other than policy rates. Consequently, in today’s challenging financial environment, which is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, the Central Bank of Turkey underscored four basic principles upon which the monetary policies would be built to maintain financial stability. The first one is to discourage excessive leverage and keeping the debt ratios of banks and the corporate sector at modest levels. The second principle is extending the duration of borrowing for private and public sector, as well as household deposits. The third principle is strengthening the FX position of both the public and private sector, which is usually the Achilles’ heel for emerging economies with sizable current account deficit. The fourth principle is better management of foreign currency risk by the corporate sector through instruments like the Turkish Derivative Exchange. In November 2010, we have started quantitative tightening to deal with rapidly increasing macro imbalances driven by short term capital inflows and acceleration in credit growth.

Over the first quarter century, from 1960 through to the mid-1980s, average pairwise correlations between bond yields were around 0.1. Over the subsequent quarter-century, these correlations have risen steadily, averaging 0.7 over the latter part of the sample (Chart 7). Second, and more striking still, is the level reached by these correlation coefficients towards the end of the sample. Whether it is safe government assets or risky corporate bonds and equities, correlations typically lie in the range 0.7 to 0.9. Other things equal, a common global factor potentially accounts for perhaps 70–90% of the movements in advanced country asset prices. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  These correlation patterns are stronger, and even more striking, when we look at their evolution over time. As one example of that, Charts 10 and 11 plot “heatmaps” of the strength of a common factor in the variation of spot and forward rates respectively for government bonds at different maturities in the UK, US and Germany over the period since 1995. In general, they show the same pattern of high and rising correlations over time. But these correlations also show distinctive flare-ups, associated with spasms in global financial markets such as the global financial crisis and last year’s ‘taper tantrum’. By the end of the sample almost the whole of the yield curve, bar the very short end, is moving synchronously across countries. To a first approximation, global yield curves appear these days to be dancing to a common tune.
In such a scenario the Swedish economy could experience a more pronounced slow-down. Focus on the U.S. economy… During the 1990s the United States experienced its longest economic upswing ever without any serious signs of accelerating price inflation. A more productive economy, with strong competition and more efficient product and labour markets, accompanied by advances in computer and telecom technology, are said to have contributed to a higher rate of potential growth. Even so – or perhaps as a consequence of this – the euphoria led to growing imbalances. The rapidly rising stock markets in the late 1990s seem to have stemmed from unduly high expectations of future profits and incomes. Partly in view of the booming stock market, households stepped up their expenditure on consumption in excess of current income. Corporate investment expanded rapidly to meet the growing demand. High share prices stimulated the procurement of venture capital and generated a plentiful supply. The growth of demand in relation to the expansion of the U.S. economy's supply side was proceeding at a rate that was based on expectations that simply could not be fulfilled. American households pledged future incomes for current consumption to such an extent that their savings no longer sufficed to finance corporate investment. The saving deficit in the private sector grew, as could be seen from the rising deficits on the current account, and large amounts of capital had to be imported.

Urban Bäckström: Monetary policy in a small open technology-oriented economy outside the major currency blocs Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Conference on New Challenges for Credit Markets and Monetary Policy, hosted by Handelsbanken and held in Stockholm, 18 May 2001. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to this conference and to discuss the Swedish economy and monetary policy with such a distinguished group of people. Today I intend to begin by looking back at economic developments in recent years in Sweden. That should help to put the current discussion about the Swedish economy in perspective. After that I shall be saying something about the economy's recent cyclical path and how I assess the future in the light of the information that is presently available. Economic policy realignment in the early 1990s The direction of Sweden's economic performance during the 1990s contrasts sharply with the unstable, inflationary path we experienced in the 1970s and '80s. That stop-go policy contributed to the recession in the early '90s, which was the worst for over sixty years. The 1970s and '80s illustrate how a long period of high and variable inflation creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability. Slowly but surely, long-term conditions for production deteriorate. It was partly in the light of these experiences that Swedish economic policy was realigned in the early 1990s.
As you can all see, a lot has happened over the past ten years. For instance, we can observe that:   The foreign currency reserve is SEK 325 billion larger. This increase is mainly because we have borrowed the equivalent of SEK 200 billion in foreign currency through the Swedish National Debt Office to strengthen the foreign currency reserve. The Riksbank’s balance sheet 2004 and 2014 SEK billion  Source: The Riksbanken  2  The formal term in the balance sheet is “lending to credit institutions in Sweden related to monetary policy operations denominated in Swedish kronor”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3    We have once again acquired a securities portfolio in Swedish krona. The Riksbank previously had a portfolio of Swedish securities but then this was phased out more than ten years ago.   The stock of notes and coins has declined, partly due to card payments and electronic payments becoming more common. As a consequence of this, we now have monetary policy liabilities instead of a monetary policy claim. This means that we are now borrowing excess liquidity from the banking system instead of lending money to cover a liquidity deficit. I will return to this issue later on.

EU legislation prescribes that it is the highest decision-making body in the central bank that shall decide on the size of the bank’s equity. It is of course important that the decision is made after a preparatory process that is transparent and predictable, with a healthy balance between promoting on the one side the need of the Riksbank to have sufficient equity on each occasion and on the other side the interest of the Swedish government to minimise the Riksbank’s costs for tying up capital. To summarise, we can note that the Riksbank currently only has one source of funding that it determines itself, namely monetary policy liabilities. In other words, the Riksbank can always make payments by increasing liquidity in the banking system. But all other forms of funding are affected in one way or another by things beyond the bank’s control. At present, the repo rate is at zero and this means that the Riksbank does not have any interest expenditure for the monetary policy liabilities. But this is temporary, and as the repo rate is raised, the bank’s interest expenditure will increase. This will also mean that profits decline. The coming years – profits declining, no dividends I have now spent some time on describing the Riksbank’s balance sheet and discussing some of the challenges the bank is facing. But I have not yet said anything about the largest challenge for the bank in the short term. By this I mean the extremely low interest rates, both here in Sweden and abroad.
The financial services industry - globally and not just regionally within Europe or nationally - has been going through a prolonged and continuing period of unprecedented change. There are to my mind two main drivers of that change - first, the progressive shift - within the industrial world but increasingly also over the past decade or so in emerging markets and transition economies away from varying degrees of centralised economic administration towards an increasingly open, market-based approach; - and, secondly, the revolution in information and communications technology. The potential economic advantages of free market competition nationally, and its logical counterpart in free trade and the free movement of capital internationally are now pretty well taken for granted just about everywhere. While no-one would pretend it's a perfect guide, profitability is the best guide we have to allocating limited real and financial resources to wherever they can be most productively used. So it is - potentially - the most effective means we have of generating the wealth, and employment and rising living standards we all want to see. And liberalisation or deregulation - including liberalisation in the financial sector - needs to be seen in this context. Of course it cannot mean simply a free-for-all. Markets need to be fair as well as free if they are to function efficiently in practice - they need rules which minimise artificial or non-commercial distortions and the related resource misallocation that would otherwise arise.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Changes in the financial services industry Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the 16th European Finance Convention, London, 6 December 2002. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. May I begin by congratulating you, Claudio - and your colleagues - on organising such a remarkable 16th European Finance Convention here in London, spread over the past five days. I don't think I've ever seen such a distinguished and comprehensive list of speakers - ranging from politicians, central bankers and financial regulators and representatives of the international financial institutions, as well as representatives of private sectoral and specialist financial services trade associations and experts from commercial companies - all assembled on one program. I gather that the attendance has not been all that it might have been during the week. But perhaps that's not surprising: anyone with the stamina to attend even half of your proceedings is certainly a chronic insomniac. But those who have been here will have been rewarded by knowing everything there is to know about the recent development and current state of the financial services industry and how it might evolve. And they still have to listen to me! But don't despair - it's the last lap - and I'll try to keep it short! You have certainly had a great deal to discuss.
First, domestic demand, supported by the large and fast-growing middle income and young population in the region, will increasingly have a greater role in driving economic growth in Asia. This would contribute towards a greater balance between domestic and external sources of growth. Second, the diversification of external markets will accelerate, towards greater economic inter-linkages with emerging economies in other parts of the world. Part of this trend includes the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015 in which ASEAN will transform into a single market with free movement of goods and services. This will include the lifting of restrictions to the flow of capital in the region. And third, is the greater financial integration within Asia that will result in an increased part of the savings in Asia being reinvested in Asia. The new spending patterns as incomes rise in the region will drive the modernisation of the retail sector across the region. Financial services to the household sector will become increasingly important in this new environment. Reforms to pensions and retirement benefit systems will be key to providing a more comprehensive social safety net, thus reducing the need for high precautionary savings and encouraging consumption. In addition, the large trade sector in Asia and large capital investments required to move towards higher valueadded activity will also provide an expanding market for financial services. The more regionally integrated financial system will allow firms and investors increased options in the regional financial markets for financing and investment.

Despite all the European convergence and integration, financial systems in different EU member states still look and work very differently. Trying to administer them from a single centre according to a single set of rules might be like trying, say, to feed all the animals in a zoo with a single type of food. As an illustration: the recent ECFIN Retail Banking Survey says:   in Austria almost 100% of house purchasing loans feature variable interest rates, while in France the share is only about 10%.   countries differ substantially in the share of owner-occupied housing and therefore in the importance of the mortgage market;    they differ in how intensively they use electronic means of payment;    in the significance of building societies and credit unions;    in tax and other incentives that the government provides for certain types of financial transactions;    in the extent to which local banks trade in various non-plain vanilla products such as derivatives;    in the share of subsidiaries and branches of foreign financial institutions and, more generally, in ownership structure    in the loan-to-deposit ratio, which varies from roughly 70% in some countries to more than 200% in others;    in the degree of local market concentration;  etc. There are many more examples, some of them influenced by long-term developments, some by entrenched behavioural differences and habits.