samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, cooperation of financial and business sectors is vital for lifting growth potential. The private sector needs to add more value to products and services by having long run commitment and investing in both physical and human capital, for example, high technology machinery, employee training as well as research and development. In order to support this, the public sector and Bank of Thailand can improve accessibility to sources of funds, especially for SMEs, and lower the costs of long-term investment. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Bank of Thailand pursues economic growth as part of its commitment to sustainable well-being. Economic growth, as discussed today, is maximized by keeping growth close to potential as well as lifting growth potential itself. The central bank can contribute to growth potential by stabilizing the overall economy. The Bank of Thailand has looked after growth, price, and financial stability during the downturn, leaving the economy on a more confident track to recovery. As for raising growth potential, cooperation of all sectors is needed, while the central bank provides a favorable financial environment which is prerequisite. In the football game of the economy, the Central Bank acts as Center Back. In order to safeguard stability during the recent circumstances, we have played a proactive role due to high economic uncertainty. Now that political and economic clarity is higher, the central bank will play a supportive role.

However, policy-making becomes significantly more challenging at times of market stress, when historical regularities cannot be entirely relied upon, while increased volatility blurs the information content of market variables and other indicators. In periods of stress, analytical tools that under normal conditions provide valuable inputs into the information set available for policy decisions may at least to some extent lose their utility. And although comparisons with previous episodes of turmoil may add historical perspective and provide benchmarks for policy actions, spells of financial tensions often resemble each other only to a limited extent. Indeed, when thinking about the dynamics of financial turmoils and crises, one is tempted to recall the Ana Karenina’s opening that “All happy families resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Indeed, the current turmoil has been “unhappy” in its own way. From its origin in the relatively small sub-prime segment of the US market for mortgage loans to its somewhat unusual dynamics of transmission (for instance, the fact that the current turmoil initially manifested itself in the difficulty for banks, mainly European, to obtain short-term liquidity in the US dollar market), a number of factors have set this episode of turmoil apart from previous experiences. Thus, during the current turmoil we have been less able to rely on standard analytical tools and conventional information sets, particularly in the area of liquidity management. To illustrate this point, let me briefly recall how our liquidity policy normally works.
6  See Tucker (2010), Remarks at an FSB conference entitled “Financial Crisis and G20 Financial Regulatory Reform: An Overview”: “part of deferred compensation should be in the form of a debt contract, so that the managers and workers in large firms eventually become creditors of the firm and so they themselves have the same risks as other debt holders”. See also Liikanen (2012), “High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector”. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Competition policy may matter too. Some countries – notably Australia and Canada – are sometimes characterised as shielding their main domestic commercial banks from competition, 7 in order to dilute the temptations of international wholesale banking. The UK should try, instead, to combine openness with stability. That requires a profitable banking sector: we should not forget that, as the Bank used to say, the first buffer against losses is profits. Other countries – perhaps most obviously the US – ban acquisitions of banks that would result in control of more than 10% of the country’s insured deposits. The approach there is to limit the accumulation of market power. Questions of industry structure, as well as firm structure, might be relevant to the UK. The operations making up Lloyds Banking Group and the Royal Bank of Scotland accounted for about 40% of the stock of lending to UK businesses in 2007. It was a disaster for domestic credit conditions when they failed.

But financial institutions and policymakers could – and should – have been more alert to the vulnerabilities that were building during the years leading up to the crisis and therefore to the possibility of a major shock to the financial sector and to the economy more generally. It is somewhat analogous to seismologists trying to predict earthquakes along a fault line. It is impossible to predict the day and magnitude of a shock with any precision, but it may be possible to say something about the likelihood of an earthquake occurring within a given period from seismic measurements and indicators of latent stress. Now it might seem natural to measure the severity of a recession by the magnitude of the fall in output. Indeed, a recession is sometimes characterised in the media as being two or more consecutive quarters of falling output, with the end of the recession being marked by a return to expansion. But that is not a very useful definition, as the mere resumption of growth will still leave some plants idle and some workers unemployed. From an economic perspective, it should be the margin of unused resources in the economy – the difference between actual and potential output – that we care about. And it is also the margin of unused resources that determines how much the economy can grow during the recovery before it puts significant 3 upward pressure on inflation , the control of which is the MPC’s primary objective.
Moreover, it is necessary to use uniform accounting and auditing standards to ensure safety and stability of Islamic banking. It is also encouraged that Islamic financial institutions merge to increase their capital and have more liquidity to finance their investments. Finally, Islamic financial institutions need to steer efforts towards good corporate governance, good risk management, transparency, and financial disclosure. I hope that the Islamic banking industry will achieve further prosperity and success in the future. Thanks again to the Central Bank of Syria for hosting this conference and for the interest in Islamic banking, and I think it is timely and wise to choose this topic for the conference. I wish all success for this conference and the participants and I thank you all for your kind attention. Wassalmu Alikum Warahmatu Allah Wabarakatuhu. BIS Review 53/2010  3

M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Outlook for 2002 and the road ahead Speech by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, to the Foreign Banks Association, Bangkok, 6 March 2002. *  *  *  Mr Weerasinghe, distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me begin by thanking the Foreign Banks Association for hosting this enjoyable event and for inviting me to speak. I am honored to be here and would like to extend once again my congratulations to Mr. Weerasinghe on his presidency of the FBA. The formal meeting we had in late January offered an opportunity for me to exchange many useful views and ideas with you. I consider that fruitful and I also appreciate the opportunity given to me this evening. I hope my talk tonight will enhance communication and our mutual understanding even further. I wish to use my time tonight to share with you our view on the current state of the Thai economy as well as what we see now as the outlook for 2002. It is my intention to discuss with you our assessment of the nature of the incipient recovery process that is now taking place, and to identify the risks and challenges we may face in the near future. Ladies and gentlemen, permit me to go straight to the crux of the matter. We enter the year 2002 with more confidence. The Thai economy had most assuredly bottomed out last year.
As the manager of the Exchange Fund, the HKMA has ensured that ESG principles are now an integral part of our investment criteria, investment process and asset allocation decisions. 42. And, once again, Hong Kong’s status as China’s offshore financial centre gives us an edge in sustainable finance. No financial centre is better positioned than Hong Kong to channel global investment into China’s ambitious plans to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. Opportunity – Technology 43. When it comes to technology, Hong Kong is already at the forefront of the global fintech scene. The HKMA’s Smart Banking initiatives have helped drive the digital transformation of banking services, bringing competition and promoting financial inclusion that directly benefit 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  customers. This is just the start of a long journey. The adoption of AI and data analytics in banking operations, the use of Regulatory Technology – or Regtech – in compliance and the need for enhanced cybersecurity are high on our agenda. 44. Looking ahead, apart from the technology itself, it’s clear that data will be central to the future of banking innovation. That’s why we’re building next-generation financial infrastructure. Last November, we announced plans for a pilot to build a Commercial Data Interchange. The project will enable corporates to share with banks their digital footprint kept by their business partners on a common platform.

Caleb M Fundanga: Develpments between the Bank of Zambia and the Lusaka Stock Exchange Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the LUSE/BESA/BOZ workshop for secondary trading of government bonds, Lusaka, 3 March 2008. *  *  *  The Chairperson, Resource Persons, Workshop Participants, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honoured for the invitation extended to me this morning to officially open this important workshop on secondary market trading for Government securities. To begin with, I wish to commend the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LUSE), the organizers, on the timeliness of this workshop. I have little doubt most of you will agree with me that this discussion on the secondary market is long overdue and therefore could not have come at a better time. Dialogue among key stakeholders is invaluable to the success of market development efforts. This is particularly so because this allows each participant to share and learn from their diverse experiences in this area. I must say that this workshop addresses a subject in which I personally take keen interest. This is because I have, over the recent past, participated in a number of meetings with key investors in our securities market. At these meetings, issues surrounding the development of the secondary market have always been at the centre of our deliberations. I am glad that we have now began to address those very issues.
What advice would you give to euro area governments on how to deal with the economic impact of this pandemic? We need to be aware that this will lead to a significant drop in business revenues and the public sector will need to fill this gap. The main factor in terms of ensuring the economy starts to recover when the health situation improves is to try to “vaccinate”, as best we can, the business ecosystem of each country. What we need to do is try to keep the business system alive, as much as possible, and to come through this period. That is what my advice would be. Keeping this ecosystem going is also important in terms of safeguarding jobs and reducing the social impact. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Mr Bergström elucidates the economic situation in Sweden  Speech by Mr Villy Bergström, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the HSB Finance Day, HSB Bank, held in Stockholm on 18 November 1999. *  *  *  The prospects for the Swedish economy look better than for a very long time. We might have to go back several decades to find a period with such favourable conditions as those we are now experiencing. It is estimated that the Swedish economy will grow by as much as 3.6% this year, and the Riksbank forecasts that growth will be slightly higher next year. Despite the marked fall in production at the beginning of the 1990s, around 13% more is being produced now than at the end of the 1980s when overheating was worst. Part of the income from production has been used to pay off our foreign debt, which grew during the 1980s in a way that was unsustainable in the long term. This has been reflected in Sweden’s financial balance with other countries, i.e. the current account balance, which has been in surplus for a number of years and is expected to total SEK40 billion this year. After a number of years of large deficits, central government finances are now in surplus for the second year running. From having had the second worst central government budget balance in the whole EU at the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden’s public finances are now among the strongest in the union.
Nonetheless, potential emergencies arising from contamination from euro area partners would create additional difficulties and huge effective costs for the economies of the region. Therefore, we call for the establishment of appropriate mechanisms and instruments for liquidity provision by the European Union to peripheral euro area countries. I believe that the financial integration makes this common defence more urgent, through the right understanding of the common fate of our trade partner economies. I take the opportunity, given the presence of many central bank officials from the region, to call for an en bloc coordinated position in this regard. The experience of the latest crisis showed that the countries which had more space to react, in the form of healthier fiscal balances or the financial system, and in the form of more reliable public institutions, were able to cope better with the consequences of the crisis. This lesson should not be neglected. Among other things, it implies timely measures and, through counter-cyclical policies, establishment of the necessary space to buffer potential shocks. Likewise, it implies ongoing efforts by macro and micro-prudential policies to minimise financial misbalances across all the sectors of the economy and the financial market. These policies, which are often known as “leaning against the wind”, have been and will continue to be part in the logics behind the actions of the Bank of Albania. Concluding, I would like to assure you that the Bank of Albania will make maximum efforts to continue its success story into the third decade of its life.

Debt convertible into equity on the downside would also be helpful in that it would be a dampening mechanism – equity capital would be automatically replenished, but only when this was needed. Transparency There were many areas where a lack of transparency contributed to a loss of confidence, which intensified the crisis. One particular area was the case of over-the-counter securities such as ABS, CMBS, RMBS and CDOs and their associated derivatives. There was a lack of transparency in a number of different dimensions. A.  Valuation. CDOs and other securitized obligations were complex and difficult to value. This reduced liquidity, pushed down prices and created increased uncertainty about the solvency of institutions holding these assets. B. Prices. The lack of pricing information led to a loss of confidence about accounting marks. Sometimes identical securities were valued differently at different financial institutions. C.  Concentration of risk. Because there was no detailed reporting of exposures, market participants did not know much about the concentration of risk. This led to a reluctance to engage with counterparties, which, in turn, pushed up spreads and reduced liquidity further. The SCAP exercise was an example where increased transparency helped to generate a better outcome. We disclosed our stress test methodology and the results for each of the nineteen largest bank holding companies. This transparency increased confidence and made it easier for the banks to raise more capital.
As for the financial tensions that have shaken the Spanish economy in recent weeks, holding resolutely on a course towards fiscal consolidation is a pre-requisite for dispelling the mistrust stifling the economy. Therefore, the potential short-term costs will be amply offset once it becomes apparent that the efforts made are yielding results. The State and Social Security budgets for 2012 are pivotal to this strategy. Fortunately, while they have not yet been approved, many of the measures they envisage have already been implemented, thereby preventing precious time from being lost in adjusting the fiscal imbalance. In this respect, it should be stressed that cutting the budget deficit requires an unprecedented structural effort. The measures that have to be adopted must reduce debt in an environment in which the interest burden will be growing and where the double-dip in economic activity will affect tax revenue and some cyclical expenditure. In light of these conditioning factors, the consolidation strategy must obviously use all the instruments available, on both the expenditure and revenue sides. As regards revenue, various measures have been adopted affecting, above all, the direct taxes households and firms pay. A reduced rate has also been introduced to bring undeclared assets out into the open. Here, although the macroeconomic forecast for 2012 may be realistic, there are risks of slippage in projected revenue.

There is now a wide body of evidence, drawn from a wide variety of settings, on the benefits of combining the insights from expert and non-expert sources when making sense of a complex world, when forecasting an uncertain future. 3  Harvesting insights from a non-expert audience appears, in these uncertain settings, to be especially valuable by providing diverse perspectives and different insights. If we turn from understanding to trust, the picture has many similarities. Trust lies at the heart of the social contract between institutions and societies, between policymakers and citizens. But the very nature of trust appears to have changed rather fundamentally over the recent past. Societies and individuals have 4  undergone what Rachel Botsman in her recent book calls a “trust shift”. Where once trust was institutionalised and anonymised, today it is socialised and personalised. This shift in the gears of trust has had consequences. Public institutions of all stripes have been one of the 5  casualties, with measured trust having fallen steadily over the recent past. Most central banks have not escaped these shifting sands, in particular since the global financial crisis. For them and us, the age of innocence, or at least the era of taking public trust as given, may be over. That matters. Credibility and trust are the secret sauce of central banking. They are what enable them to shape expectations in ways which stabilise the economy and financial system. An economy or financial system without trust, history tells us, ceases to be a system.
Even so, the real level of interest rates is expected to remain low and should act as a stimulus to the Swedish economy, above all in the somewhat longer run. The domestic economy In our December Inflation Report, the GDP growth rate was assumed to be between 2.5 and 3 per cent in 1998, between 2 and 2.5 per cent in 1999 and around 2.5 per cent in 2000. The available statistics suggest that our forecast for 1998 is probably correct. For 1999 and 2000, however, we consider that the December forecasts are somewhat too optimistic. One of the items we believe may be weaker is foreign trade. With the poorer outlook for the international economy, net exports could be lower in the years ahead. Industrial activity may then also continue to slacken. The expectations of Swedish firms are low, above all in manufacturing, and this could have a downward effect on investment. On the other hand, the statistics show that private consumption is still strong, with a 1998 third-quarter increase that exceeded expectations. House prices and the number of new cars registered are continuing to rise and retail turnover is also moving upwards. Other signs are increased lending to households and the growth of the money supply. Households are optimistic about their own economic situation, one reason being the growth of real disposable  BIS Review 18/1999  4  wage income; a marked increase in 1999 is implied by the low level of inflation and the tax cuts.

Much of the available capacity has now been put to use. We now estimate that capacity utilisation was approximately ½ per cent above normal at end-2005. Despite strong economic growth, inflation is still low. As the recovery became more broadly based, inflation gradually began to edge higher. In the second half of 2005, the 12-month rise in consumer prices adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) varied between 1 and 1½ per cent, before surprising on the downside in December and January. In February, inflation edged up again. Monthly variations in the CPI-ATE have been fairly pronounced recently. There is little prospect that inflation will increase substantially in the near term. If we adjust for the effect of reduced maximum day-care rates, the year-on-year rise in the CPI-ATE is projected to be 1¼ per cent in the second quarter of 2006. Inflation will be dampened by continued low external price impulses and the appreciation of the krone through 2004 and 2005. After a period, the unwinding of the sharp rise in petrol prices through 2005 will probably lead to some decline in the year-on-year rise in the CPI. Growth among our trading partners is still solid, and appears on the whole to be somewhat stronger than assumed a few months ago. High commodity prices have contributed to somewhat higher  BIS Review 22/2006  3  inflation, but so far underlying inflation has not been pushed up.