samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Minister of Finance was decisive, and after a single “one-on-one” discussion with me, he gave the approval for the Central Bank to proceed with implementation of the intervention plan. The rest is history. The newly appointed directors and the managing agents, with the Central Bank in the background, were able to stabilize the bank within a short period of about 2 weeks. Thereafter, within a few months, the bank was able to infuse new capital and thereby qualify to exit from the close monitoring system of the Central Bank, in less than a year. This episode will be an important lesson for those who wish to study the way Governments and Central Banks should cooperate to bring stability, in the face of any instability in the banking sector. It also confirmed the validity of an important annotation in Exter’s Report. Let me quote once again from the first Chapter of his Report: “Many of its (Central Bank’s) powers may go unused for long periods, because they are designed for particular situations, some of which may never arise. Others are intended for use only in crises or to forestall a crisis, but prudence dictates that they be included now, so that they will be at hand in case of need. …”.

Mr. Chairman, having said that, we will now discuss some case studies that would throw some light about the degree of harmonization that took place between the policies of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance, in order to deliver some of the vital results to our country and economy, over the past 7 years. Case Study 1: Opening out Sri Lanka Treasury Bills and Bonds to foreign investors Mr. Chairman, the first case study that I would like to cite is the November 2006 move to open out Sri Lanka Treasury bills and bonds to foreign investors. By late 2006, in Sri Lanka, a massive infrastructure development programme had been launched, and the critical humanitarian operation had begun. These twin programmes had demanded a regular, steady and massive flow of funds, and it was becoming increasingly clear that we would not be able to secure the new fund requirements only via local taxes and local borrowing. If such a quantum of funds were to be sourced from within, an enormous pressure would have been exerted upon the entire economy. In fact, such an attempt would have pushed interest rates to unacceptable levels, and may have even dragged the economy towards negative territory, and placed the entire monetary system at considerable risk. Such fears may have perhaps been one of the reasons that prompted successive governments of the past, to avoid large scale infrastructure development programmes or attempt to launch a full scale counter action programme against terrorism.
Third condition: determination in transmitting to the market the idea of a single and consolidated project, of a concentration arrangement equivalent to a merger, of an entity prepared to harness in practice all the synergies and all the management improvements made possible by an IPS structure. To do this a proactive strategy should be adopted, geared to securing the economies of scale characteristic of a merger and to reducing overheads, including unit wage costs, which is imperative in the current economic circumstances. Any sign of wavering should be avoided, since this would be seen as an excuse to question the group’s cohesiveness, which is an unacceptable risk at present. I stated in the introduction that any new product has to be prepared to overcome a fourth and final trial and evaluation step: it must prove its capacity for future development. This is a particularly pertinent demand for the financial system, since what is involved is a nimble and dynamic sector. IPSs are a structure that must prove to be of use in providing lasting banking services. But it is also true that legislation, specifically Royal Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010, has opened up new means for savings banks to pursue their activity, offering a range of possibilities. In particular, it is provided for that savings banks participating in an IPS can convert in the future, de facto or de jure, into savings banks with “indirect activity”, or into foundations, which focus on attending to and developing their welfare fund assets.

Consequently, a major communication drive is needed to explain the changes agreed, the assets and liabilities of the new financial statements (which are still pro-forma) and the pending concentration programme. This is because suspicions arise in the markets from time to time that these changes, rather than amounting to wholesale reform of the organisations concerned, are merely window-dressing. And this task of educating people must be performed before the wholesale markets re-open in about three weeks’ time. When that happens, the new treasury teams resulting from the concentration and merger of savings banks will have to use that detailed information as the basis for their demands for financial resources from euro area creditors. Without fluid communication, matters will be very complicated indeed. It is now that the true extent of the value added by good management comes into its own. You must take decisions, at times disagreeable ones, to protect profit margins, to reduce operating costs and overheads, to promote business activity, to control risks and liquidity, and to complete the integration of operations. In short, you will have to convince the euro financial markets to commit money to your projects, in the form of loans and capital, and all this must be done very rapidly and in an adverse environment.
Today, we are well into our ninth consecutive year our thirty-third consecutive quarter of relatively steady growth (despite having to absorb the global emerging markets financial shock of a couple of years ago) at an annual average rate of 2.8%; the number of people in employment has risen to an all-time high; the rate of unemployment, on a claimant count basis, has fallen to 3.6%, which is the lowest rate for 25 years for the UK as a whole and the lowest rate for 20 years in every individual region of the UK; and retail price inflation on the target RPIX measure has now averaged 2.7% over the past eight years, and on the standardised HICP measure is currently the lowest rate in Europe. And if you ask me today the same question - can we keep up that performance, my answer is still a cautious yes - on the same three conditions - low and stable inflation, fiscal prudence and supply-side flexibility. Now I am very well aware that some of you - perhaps many of you - thinking of your own businesses may conclude that I’m living on a different planet.

We could, in principle, go further than we have, and deliberately aim off in our monetary policy, in order to try to relieve the immediate pressure on the euro-exposed sectors. But that would necessarily involve taking more risk with our inflation target and with continuing stability in the economy as a whole. That is not consistent with our mandate. And it is not something that most business people I speak to - even from the suffering sectors - would want us to do. 3  BIS Review 98/2000
Additional capital is for example required to cushion the inventory risks of underlying assets and equity positions that are embedded in partnership contracts, therefore bringing the capital requirements closer to the true economic risks in portfolio of the financial institutions. To manage depositors' expectations and sustaining market confidence, Islamic banks are also permitted to set aside a portion of income derived from assets funded under Mudarabah contracts, in the form of profit equalisation reserves (PER), as a mechanism to address the impact of pro-cyclicality of their returns. This is reinforced by a combination of stronger governance and enhanced transparency to address the trust-based relationships which is a fundamental hallmark of Islamic finance. With increased globalisation and greater integration of Islamic finance with the international financial system, the higher will be the risk of the contagion effects from other markets and jurisdictions. In addition, Islamic finance will also be affected by the second round effects arising from slower economic growth and the reduction in global liquidity. An essential infrastructure in this environment is a well functioning liquidity management infrastructure to enhance the capacity of Islamic financial institutions to effectively manage their liquidity positions. Of importance, is the wide availability of Shariah-based Islamic financial market instruments to facilitate liquidity management. Such facilities for adjusting portfolio balances in a Shariah compliant manner ensure that the liquidity risks can be effectively managed.

In the process of dollarization, in which the central bank will have to buy back the local currency, a large portion of the current stock of international reserves is needed. Although the need for international reserves to support the exchange rate is eliminated, it is still crucial that the central bank retains an adequate level of reserves to help support economic shocks, as well as to finance its operations. 7. Dollarization will eliminate seigniorage earnings, which is the income of the central bank from issuing the local currency minus the cost of printing banknotes and coins. This could lead the reduced income to the government. 2  BIS Review 164/2009  4. View on dollarization  Particularly the reduction in banking costs and the perspective of low interest rates could make dollarization appear very attractive. However, it seems to me that in a stable economic environment with strong fundamentals, a reliable macroeconomic policy, and a credible central bank, the advantages of dollarization are marginal. The more so when there is a good track record of maintaining a fixed and stable exchange rate with the US dollar. The goal of maintaining a fixed exchange rate is to be able to benefit from the trade advantages of being anchored to the currency of the country with which there exist strong economical ties, while maintaining some degree of independence in terms of monetary policy. Furthermore, it cannot be denied that there is a political and social aspect to this.
But this does not seem to be an excessively long period, given that we were affected by the worst financial turmoil in the recent history of the region. I am aware, however, that there has been some controversy over the performance of the Hong Kong economy, compared with that of other Asian economies, in coping with the Asian financial crisis. There seems to be the impression that Hong Kong has been the slowest to recover. This may be true according to one measure or another, and we should obviously look critically into the reasons, if indeed there are structural defects that may have inhibited our recovery. Economic cycles come and go, and there is no way that Hong Kong, as an open and externally oriented economy, can be immunised from external shocks of the dimension that we have seen. But we need to make sure that we come out of the crisis stronger rather than weaker. Structural defects, if any, need to be corrected decisively, to the extent that this is within the powers of Government to do so. But we also need to keep our heads cool and be objective in this self-assessment. The loud and heartfelt complaints of a community in pain, legitimate though they may be, can sometimes drown out the arguments in support of policies that are in the long-term interests of Hong Kong.

This means a greater regulatory burden for all and greater inconvenience to market participants, and possibly implications for the legal and institutional arrangements for regulation. Fourth, this approach may involve tighter rules for the markets. The critics may again say that this will further erode market freedom. But should we be so dogmatic? In any case, it is all a matter of degree. In the end, it is the public interest that counts. Is there, for example, anything wrong in restrictions against the holding of large dominating positions in any particular market, or against the taking of market moving activities? The purpose of a market is price discovery. There is no objection for buying low and selling high, and I would wish anybody who is attempting that the best of luck. But there is no legitimate reason for anybody to be operating in a market in a manner that has the sole aim of moving the price in order to make a profit. Tighter rules aside, it is interesting, and indeed slightly worrying, to note that stronger forms of restrictions and controls have been gaining currency among some monetary authorities or regulators in the past two years. These range from restrictions on domestic credit to some forms of exchange controls. This response is quite understandable and may be a reflection of the failure of the international financial architecture to accommodate the needs of small markets. But it is also regrettable, given the enormous benefit that international capital has brought to the region.
Caleb M Fundanga: Winning with leasing Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the “Winning with Leasing” seminar, Lusaka, 21-23 February 2007. *  *  *  • Mr Chairman • Chief Executives and representatives of Banks and Leasing Companies • Representatives of businesses organizations; • Distinguished ladies and gentlemen Let me first express my sincere gratitude for being invited to officiate at this important regional Leasing Seminar. It is my hope that this interaction will give us a better understanding and appreciation of the important contributions that the Leasing sector has made and continues to make to the economic growth of this country. As the title of the seminar “Winning with Leasing” suggests, it is only by winning in all our efforts that we will provide meaningful contributions to the development of this country. Mr Chairman, before I talk about your role in the growth of the economy, allow me to first give a brief account of the macroeconomic developments in Zambia in the recent past. I know that many of you have been following the economic developments in the country. The economy has performed relatively well in recent years, with positive real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and inflation as well as interest rates coming down. During the period 2001-2005, growth in real GDP averaged around 5% per annum. More recently, in 2006, it is estimated that the economy grew by close to 6%, marking the eighth consecutive year of positive real growth in output.

In the same vein, our projections suggest that the Albanian economy will continue to grow in the medium-term horizon. Although the economic activity will suffer from the negative consequences of inflation, the economic growth of Albania is expected to remain in the positive territory. Economic growth will continue to benefit from the overall financial and economic stability in Albania, the sound balance sheets of enterprises and households, as well as the continuing support of the banking sector with credit and payment instruments. In this context, it should be emphasized that the banking sector appears sound, liquid, and well-capitalised. The continuing reforms undertaken in the past years have borne their fruits. The consolidation of the banking sector, the improvement of the lending environment, the multifaceted development of financial markets and payment systems, as well as the initiatives carried out that encourage the use of national currency, have brought about notable qualitative improvements in the stability and efficiency of the banking sector. The growth rate of credit to the private sector recorded a progressive improvement, peaking to 13.7% in August. Also, it shows a good coverage of the need of enterprises and households for long-term financing and liquid tools. The stable growth of credit and the increase in the quality of its portfolio, are crucial indicators which demonstrate the sector's support to the economic recovery of Albania.
If we do this, I believe that we will acquire a financial regulatory framework that can efficiently prevent unnecessary risks and imbalances from building up, both nationally and globally. But we must act now while we have the chance. The lessons from this crisis must not be forgotten. 12  BIS Review 25/2010

But it has clearly had an impact on the way their are conducted: the Eurosystem is by nature a teamwork, with built-in co-ordination mechanisms ensuring that appropriate answers are given to specific situations should they occur. The management of the 9/11 crisis offered, if need be, a good illustration of the responsiveness of the structure. Let me now turn briefly to the two specific issues that I mentioned previously. 2.2 As the integration of our Capital markets deepens, it is of utmost importance, from a financial stability viewpoint, to rely on an efficient financial and banking supervision framework. Let me offer a few remarks on this question: The success of the “Lamfalussy” process for financial markets has prompted EU authorities and Member States, through the Economic and Financial Committee and the ECOFIN, to propose its extension, inter alia, to the field of banking regulation and supervision. As a matter of principle, such an approach is welcomed, should it translate into a more flexible regulatory process and a more consistent implementation of EU regulation in Member States, and foster the convergence of supervisory practices. However, in this exercise, we must keep in mind the specificity of banking supervision and build on the accumulated experience of the relevant authorities: first, in this area, co-ordination structures have been already set up that work effectively as underlined for instance in the Brouwer reports. Second, in this area particularly, co-ordination between supervisors and Central Banks is key.
Simon Potter: Reducing the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet - the benefits of moving gradually and predictably Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the National Association of Securities Professionals, New York City, 16 November 2017. * * * Good afternoon and thank you for the kind introduction. I would also like to add my warm welcome to the New York Fed. We very much value the National Association of Securities Professionals' (NASP) efforts to promote professional excellence and encourage economic empowerment for people of color and women on Wall Street, and for our community, and are pleased to host this year’s kickoff to the NASP's 21st Annual Symposium.This year’s symposium is organized around the timely theme of “Keeping Pace when Market Dynamics Shift”. In that vein, I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you some important changes that are in train with respect to the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, and how these may impact financial markets. As always, the views I will express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System.1 Before I discuss the Fed’s balance sheet I would like to briefly review some pilot programs we conducted over the last few years and their impact on our counterparty policy.

Marzunisham Omar: Launch of the National Scam Awareness Campaign Speech by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of the National Scam Awareness Campaign, Kuala Lumpur, 30 October 2022. *** Assalamualaikum and good morning. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I would like to thank the Association of Banks in Malaysia, the Association of Islamic Banking and Financial Institutions Malaysia, and the Association of Development Financial Institutions of Malaysia for organising the national scam awareness campaign. The presence of Dato' Mohd Kamarudin bin Md Din, Director of the Commercial Crime Investigation Department, PDRM, Encik Kamal Baharin bin Omar, Deputy Director-General of the National Anti-Financial Crime Centre (NFCC), and Encik Harme Mohamed, Head of Network Security Division, Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) this morning reflects our commitment and collaborative efforts to raise awareness on financial literacy and fight financial scams. This morning, there is also the Financial Literacy Month (FLM) Exhibition, which marks the end of this year's Financial Literacy Month. This year's FLM, themed "Financial Wellbeing: Go Digital Confidently", is all about educating and raising awareness on digital financial literacy and safe usage of digital financial services. The past month has seen many seminars, workshops and other activities being conducted all around the country. The FEN mobile coach also travelled to 61 locations across the country, reaching out to over 20,000 people in urban and rural communities.
In other words, the Riksbank is said to have “tricked” the social partners into setting wages too high in relation to the inflation that was later realised. 6  Several people have claimed that undershooting the inflation target has led to unnecessarily high unemployment. Assarsson, Bengt (2011), “Riksbanken måste ta sitt arbete på större allvar” (the Riksbank must take its work more seriously), debate article in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter, 2 May, 2011, is one example. Svensson, Lars E.O. (2012), “The Possible Unemployment Cost of Average Inflation below a Credible Target”, unpublished article, (http://people.su.se/~leosven/papers/Phillips.pdf), tries to quantify the number of people unnecessarily unemployed using an estimated Phillips curve. His calculation method implies that the reasons for CPI inflation undershooting the target are of no importance for the effects on unemployment. It also means that average CPIF inflation is unimportant in this context. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, it is far from clear what inflation expectations are used as a base for wage setting. In the long run, say five years, expectations are well anchored around the inflation target of two per cent. But in the shorter run, expectations vary more and follow actual inflation more closely. It may be that wage setting is based on the expectations in the somewhat shorter run. Expectations can be measured in different ways that give slightly different results.

One concrete proposal that is put forward is that monetary policy should support a target for an employment rate of 80 per cent.8 The level of central banks’ inflation targets has begun to be discussed internationally as a result of the recent crisis.9 One argument is that if the targets were set slightly higher, it would make it easier to stimulate economies in deep recession, as it would reduce the risk of the policy rate reaching the zero lower bound. This is a relevant argument. Moreover, it is probably not the case that an inflation rate of, say, 3 per cent would be more problematic to live with than an average inflation of 2 per cent. It is only at considerably higher figures that inflation is harmful. Difficult to change an established inflation target However, it is one thing to set an inflation target for the first time, and a quite different thing to raise an existing target. If we go back twenty years in time, to when the policy of inflation targeting was introduced, the target could in principle have been set at 3 instead of 2 per cent. It is possible that it would have been a little more difficult to make the target credible, partly because it should have been higher than actual inflation at the time – which was fairly exactly 2 per cent, and partly because the few central banks that had begun targeting inflation at that time had chosen targets on or close to 2 per cent.