First, the Eurosystem is developing a securities holdings statistics database. “Securities holdings represent a field where exposures are often concentrated, and a lack of sufficiently comprehensive, consistent and granular information has been identified” (Draghi 2012). Second, more detailed balance sheets information of all financial intermediaries have been developed. Third, a matrix of integrated sector accounts has been devised and is published on a quarterly basis. Fourth, quarterly information on cross-border holdings of financial assets and liabilities by euro area residents is compiled, allowing for monitoring of cross-border exposures. The second lesson of the crisis was that data production should be multipurpose. The granularity of the data means in fact better use of the micro-foundations of the macro statistics. Albeit the need for more granular data primarily came as a result of the requirements of the macro-prudential oversight, their weight for the monetary policy is very large as well. As monetary policy-makers we want to act proactively and this requires identification of the risks in advance, which very often requires “going beyond the aggregates”. Hence, both for monetary policy purposes and financial stability purposes, variety of granular data and indicators are needed, which allows for data “outliers” and “tail risks” to be noticed. It is more natural than to seek for harmonized data collection systems, serving both mandates of central banks, monetary policy and financial stability. Of course this requires extraordinary coordination among the compilers of the data. It is easier when the central bank serves as a supervisor at the same time.

It intensified in August the same year, with the bankruptcies of the British bank, Northern Rock, and troubled banks in Denmark and Germany. On 15 September 2008, the crisis took a new and dramatic turn when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy. The next day, money markets seized up. Confidence between banks had been compromised. Liquidity dried up, interest rates rose sharply and equity prices fell. Exchange rate volatility – the daily fluctuations in the exchange rate – showed a marked rise. Bond markets in turn shut down. In the days and weeks that followed, banks tightened credit standards on new loans to households and enterprises. At that time, global economic growth was already slowing, but the situation deteriorated significantly throughout the last few months of 2008. The turnaround hit hard, with synchronised effects on virtually all financial and goods and services markets, not only in the US but also in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Oceania. For a long period there were hopes that growth in China and other emerging market economies would hold up. But they are also severely affected by the crisis. During the year, we saw a bank, credit and liquidity crisis in the financial system which gradually came to encompass a crisis in the real economy. The contraction in the world economy has resulted in a substantial decline in traditional exports, and global trade has fallen markedly since autumn last year. The global downturn also led to a marked fall in prices for oil and other commodities through autumn 2008.