samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a consequence, the purchases had only modest direct effects on financial conditions.4 Starting in 2006, when the initial wave of QE ended, the BoJ began to formalize its inflation goal in numerical terms. This was initially expressed as an “understanding of medium- to long-term price stability” based on individual policymakers’ views. The inflation objective went through several iterations before being defined in 2012 as a Committee “goal” of a positive range of 2 percent or lower, with a lower interim goal of 1 percent. Following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007–2008, Japan resumed QE, and gradually tightened the link between its policy actions and its objectives. By January 2012, the BoJ had committed to keep rates at the zero bound and to continue purchasing assets until the 1 percent goal was “in sight.” Several prominent Japanese experts have argued that there was a “start-stop” aspect to monetary policy during the 1990s and 2000s with reversals in policy beginning before deflationary expectations were eliminated.5 Fiscal policy also reversed abruptly on several occasions before economic recovery was firmly established. While Japan did enjoy a period of respectable real per capita growth in the mid-2000s, escape from deflation proved elusive. More than a decade after Japan’s bubble burst, the U.S. housing bubble burst. This exposed extensive vulnerabilities in our financial system and triggered a global financial crisis.6 Unlike Japan, we had the advantage of being able to learn from another nation’s recent experience.

The mobile app serves as a powerful tool to further promote transparency and competition in the money services business industry, by providing consumers with the information and facilities that will help them make smarter remittance choices. Kota Kinabalu will be an important testbed for these initiatives, serving as a model for envisioning an end-to-end digital remittance landscape in Malaysia. Given Sabah’s aspirations to develop a digital ecosystem, we could not have picked a better city or time to launch our next Greenback journey. As we look forward to the journey ahead, I cannot help but recall how far the MSB industry has come. In 2017, the MSB industry facilitated RM20 billion in worker remittances and a further RM400 million in business remittances. This represents a 43% and 300% increase respectively over values transacted in 2013 when significant reforms were introduced to strengthen standards and shore up trust and confidence in the industry. Today, an industry represented by progressive and credible principal MSB companies and a wide network of agents has not only improved access to services, but also raised the quality of service. With better knowledge, tools and resources, the industry has also worked hard to strengthen safeguards against its use for criminal and other illicit activities. The industry is already leading the way in the financial sector by certifying all compliance officers to equip them to be more effective in implementing AML/CFT measures.
Over the past ten years, revisions to services output have accounted for more than half of the average revision to GDP growth; and around four-fifths of the variance of GDP revisions can be attributed to revisions to service sector growth. Indeed, research by Bank staff has indicated that the private-sector business surveys may give a better guide to the ONS’s estimate of service sector output growth two years or more after the event than do the ONS’s own early estimates. (In contrast, the ONS’s early estimates of manufacturing output growth clearly outperform the business surveys as a guide to later estimates.) The ONS is well aware of this imbalance. In fact, it has been at the forefront of developing and improving measures of service sector output: within the OECD only the UK and Korea produce a monthly Index of Services production, the counterpart to the well-established monthly Index of Production for the industrial sector. The Allsopp Report should give further welcome impetus to this work. The third focus of the Allsopp Report is the capacity of the ONS to identify and respond to structural change in the economy. The make-up of UK economic activity is constantly changing. Fifty years ago, the manufacturing industry accounted for about one-third of UK output. The service sector made up less than one-half. Today, the corresponding shares are less than 16% for manufacturing, and over 70% for services. Responding to this sort of change is challenging.

The second main focus of the Allsopp review is the stark imbalance between the coverage, timeliness and quality of statistics on the services sector relative to those on manufacturing. Suppose you were interested in studying the economic behaviour of the UK textiles industry - which accounts for around one-third of one percent of UK output. The good news is there’s plenty of coverage in the national accounts, although you have some decisions to make. Are you interested in clothing, or carpets and rugs? And if clothing, are you interested in knitted and crocheted garments…or work wear…or outerwear?…or indeed underwear? Each of these has its own data set: the array of sub-categories is truly impressive. However, suppose instead that you were interested in the retail sector, and wanted to know, for example, how much the large supermarket chains have contributed to GDP in recent years, or what inroads they have made into the non-food market. No dice. Although the retail sector nowadays accounts for over 5% of UK output - so it is nearly 20 times the size of the textiles industry - more detailed data are not produced for the UK national accounts. The need for better service sector statistics goes well beyond any interest we might have in detail for its own sake. In the UK, early estimates of GDP rely heavily on measuring output. Since the service sector accounts for more than 70% of UK output, the quality of early GDP estimates is inextricably linked to the quality of service sector statistics.
(b) Role of Financial Integration 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The private sector’s role in enhancing shared prosperity in ASEAN must be facilitated by an enabling environment for efficient cross-border business transactions. This has been achieved through greater financial integration in ASEAN including deeper banking integration; smoother capital mobility; and efficient payment and settlement systems. ASEAN central banks have made significant strides towards this end, but by no means will we coast on by. We will continue to champion financial integration that benefits all. An Asian Development Bank study in 2013 has shown that banking integration mobilises savings towards more productive investment, thereby increasing productivity and accelerating growth. This study also showed that smoother capital mobility will facilitate more competitive and productive cross-border lending and borrowing, while promoting financial sector and capital market development. Lastly, an efficient cross-border payment and settlement systems promotes cost-effective transactions by reducing the cost of doing business. Hurdles faced by ASEAN Like it or not, the path to achieving the strategic objectives of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 2025 will be filled with hurdles. The pace of convergence within ASEAN would be shaped by members’ different levels of development. It is harder for countries with resource constraints to shoulder the high costs involved in undertaking structural and institutional changes, which are required for effective integration. In overcoming such hurdles, I stand proud in acknowledging that ASEAN adopts a gradual and phased-in approach that ensures a win-win situation for all.

1 Based on those he expressed a view, which I share, that while the recent experience may have made us a bit more confident about detecting bubbles, it has not resolved the problem of doing so in a timely manner, nor has it shown that small-to-modest policy actions will reliably and materially dampen speculation. An extra policy reaction to changes in asset prices thus still remains questionable. The second frontier to be mentioned tonight is related to the monetary policy implementation, current situation on the money market and financial stability of the banking sector. For years the monetary policy implementation was not an issue and central banks were able to tighten the short-term money market interest rates such as for instance 3M PRIBOR closely to the key policy rate. Unfortunately, this changed in August 2007 for the US interest rates when the 3M LIBOR for the US dollar denominated funds started to deviate significantly from the Federal Reserve target for funds. A year later following the second round of the financial crises that peaked during the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers also the Czech short-term money market rates started to elevate well above our policy rate, the two week repo rate. 1  Quoted from speech of Vice Chairman Donald L. Kohn: “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Revisited” at the Cato’s Institute 26th Annual Monetary Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., on November 19, 2008.
In doing so, the legal professionals are thus well positioned to detect or identify and prevent the conduct of illegal activities, which involve such financial transactions that the profession is mediating. The resultant impact of a lawyer’s inappropriate conduct when dealing with a client, if left unchecked, may pose reputational risks and loss of confidence, not only to the affected individual lawyer or the associated firm but the legal fraternity as a whole. It is on this note that I urge the lawyers to always conduct yourselves in a manner that upholds the public trust and confidence in the legal profession. It is our hope that lawyers will err on the side of caution in interpreting their compulsory reporting obligations under the AMLA. Based on the outcome of the National Risk Assessment in 2017 on DNFBP sectors, in particular, the legal sector has been assessed as Medium High and Medium level for net money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing (TF) risk, respectively. The rating is predominantly driven by the inherent higher risk services provided by lawyers which are vulnerable to abuses for ML related activities, for example, the use of client account, conveyancing and provision of nominee services, which are further aggravated by the marginal level of AML/CFT control measures generally implemented by the legal fraternity. Consequently, the recent two years have seen the intensification of our outreach to the legal fraternity, in particular and to DNFBP sectors, in general, with the mix of on-site examinations, awareness and engagement sessions, off-site data and information submission activities.

While we have observed positive and progressive improvements by the DNFBP sectors, overall AML/CFT compliance, however, remains relatively inadequate, mainly attributed to the lack of awareness and understanding of AML/CFT obligations and risks. Bank Negara Malaysia has, increasingly over the years, taken more stringent enforcement actions on reporting institutions for non-compliances with AML/CFT requirements. While the focus so far has been on financial institutions, Bank Negara Malaysia will continue to pursue enforcement actions against all reporting institutions, where warranted. In this regard, it is of utmost importance for the DNFBP sectors to understand the vulnerabilities of its sector to ML and TF risks that its products or services may be exploited by criminals to advance ML and TF related crimes, and be vigilant in protecting themselves from being abused or inadvertently facilitating ML or TF activities. In this manner, the DNFBPs in general and legal professionals in particular, are in a position to detect irregularities in the transactions and discharge their obligation in submission of suspicious transaction reports to Bank Negara Malaysia, in a timely manner. So, how can we mitigate the risk of inadvertently facilitating ML and TF activities?
The biggest risk to an orderly rebalancing of our economy comes from abroad. Efforts to restore world demand are impeded by the scale of the imbalances in trade, which are beginning to grow again. If the UK and other low-savings countries are to rebalance their economies, demand for their products must increase overseas. Lower domestic demand in the deficit countries must be accompanied by strong growth in domestic demand in the surplus countries if the world economy is not to slow. That will require a change in the strategy of those countries that have built their own policies around export-led growth. In searching for a solution, some ask who is to blame. But that misses the point. Before the crisis, all the main players were rationally pursuing their own perceived self-interest. Policymakers in countries like China wanted to develop via an export-led strategy, and policymakers in the low-saving countries took actions to maintain an adequate level of overall demand, consistent with steady, low inflation. But what seemed to make sense for each player individually did not make sense in aggregate, and we can see the consequences. A key lesson from the crisis is that we must find better ways of ensuring the right collective outcome. That challenge is clearly visible today. All countries accept that global rebalancing is necessary.

But the regeneration of urban communities, and the efforts of British Waterways, have reversed this decline. The number of miles is now increasing. Last year, 13 million people visited our canals and the number of boats is actually higher now than during the Industrial Revolution. Such examples are important because our economy faces the prospect of change again. After an unprecedented financial crisis and deep recession, the UK economy needs to rebalance. Tonight I want to talk about what those changes will entail and the role which the Bank of England can play in supporting them. The Bank of England’s key role has always been to ensure that the economy is supplied with the right quantity of money – neither too much nor too little. For fifty years, my predecessors struggled to prevent there being too much, so leading to inflation. I find myself in the opposite situation having to explain that there is too little money in the economy. But, in the wake of the financial crisis, and the sharp downturn that followed, the amount of money in the economy as a whole – broad money – is now barely growing at all. That is restraining activity and pushing down the outlook for inflation. So the Bank of England has taken extraordinary monetary policy measures – through our so-called “quantitative easing” programme of asset purchases – to ensure that the amount of money starts growing again in order to support a recovery and keep inflation on track to meet our target in the medium term.
In addition, the social partners have concluded agreements in different areas on various types of collective pension schemes, many of which are based on funds. It is no coincidence that pensions are in focus when this type of fund is built up. In some way or another, systems must be created so that people have financial resources for their whole life. And this means that the perspective is very long-term. Neither is it so strange that the Norwegian oil fund is actually called Statens pensjonsfond utland (The State’s pension fund abroad). A century of collective pension wealth in Sweden How much funded collective pension wealth has then been built up in Sweden? What share of the wealth in Sweden is in collective pension funds? Figure 1 answers these questions. Figure 1. Funded collective pension wealth as a share of total wealth in Sweden, 1920-2019, per cent. 30 25 20  15 10 5 0 1920  1930  1940  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  2020  Source: Swedish National Wealth Database, 1810-2019. See also Waldenström (2016) and (2017). Note: Total wealth is the sum of financial and real assets, with a deduction for financial liabilities, and funded collective pension wealth. 1 Ore and forest are natural resources that have been and still are of major importance in Sweden. But extensive  investment has been required to be able to benefit from these natural resources. Norwegian oil is a “windfall gain” in a completely different way.

Another necessary principle, as I have argued elsewhere, 10 implies that “there should be a clear organizational separation  10  Constâncio, V. (2012) “Towards a European Banking Union” Lecture held at the start of the academic year of the Duisenberg School of Finance, Amsterdam, 7 September 2012, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/ key/date/2012/html/sp120907.en.html. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  between monetary policy and supervision. This can be realized at all organisational layers, from the analytical and informational level to the decision-making level”. The Commission´s proposal includes the creation of a Supervisory Board in the ECB composed basically by the Heads of Supervision of the participant countries and that Board will be the vital component of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). This can also open the door to the participation of countries that are not members of the euro as they could have equal treatment in the Supervisory Board. But supervision is only one leg of a genuine financial union. It also requires an effective tool to deal with bank failures without triggering financial instability, without long squabbles about burden-sharing, and without dragging sovereigns into a deadly embrace with their domestic banks. In the view of the Four Presidents, this requires elevating resolution responsibilities to European level, and putting them in the hands of an independent European Resolution Authority (ERA). There are three main reasons for this. First, an ERA would ensure more effective decision-making when cross-border banks run into difficulties.
According to a number of estimates, including our own, SVB's short-term liquidity ratio (LCR), had it been applicable, would have been below the 100% requirement, which would have been an early  Page 5 of 9 warning signal – for memory’s sake, all liquid assets are booked at fair market value in this ratio. The priority is therefore not to keep reworking the Basel requirements - and thus delaying their implementation - but to implement them everywhere and quickly. In short, more Basel III now, rather than a hypothetical and delayed Basel IV. However, there are two i ssues to consider: the increased speed of deposit withdrawals - connected with digitalisation and social networks - raises new challenges. None of the ideas put forward on this subject are clear-cut, but none should be taboo. Moreover, the lack of liquidity and transparency in the singleissuer CDS market must no longer give rise to systemic risks: as a first step, we must ensure a better understanding of the transactions, the participants and the correlation risk with other financial instruments. Let me now turn to supervision. Why did Credit Suisse fail despite meeting the requirements of Basel III? The answer is clear: good regulation is necessary; but it is never enough. A Highway Code - regulations -, even the best one in the world, will only be effectively enforced if the traffic police - supervisors - are efficient. The risks generated by specific business models should normally have led to stricter requirements.

This means that heavy and prolonged interventions may be self-reinforcing over time, steadily increasing the necessary volume of intervention purchases required to maintain the krone exchange rate. The foremost example of such a game situation in Norway’s exchange rate policy history was Friday, 20 November 1992, when we made intervention purchases for NOK 37 billion from the time the market opened until the market closed. Norges Bank does not want to intervene in such a way that this type of game situation arises. However, the Bank will use interventions if the krone moves substantially out of line with what we consider to be reasonable based on fundamentals or in the event of exceptional short-term volatility. It may also be appropriate to reinforce a desired development in the exchange rate that has already been observed in the market. In such a situation, it is assumed that the risk of ending up in a game situation against exchange market players is marginal. However, we must take into account that the krone exchange rate cannot in the long run deviate substantially from the level implied by economic fundamentals. The instrument available to Norges Bank for influencing economic fundamentals is the interest rate. Over time, therefore, the interest rate is the most important instrument of monetary and BIS Review 10/1999  –8–  exchange rate policy. This is also recognised in the formulation of the guidelines for monetary policy. According to the National Budget for 1999, “Interest rates must be adjusted in order to avoid persistent and large-scale interventions”.
The current account surplus is comparable with our estimates of external debt payments in 2015. According to the data from transaction passports, the repayment value, including interest payments, is estimated at 120 billion US dollars this year. But, given the refinancing capacity of international markets, we estimate net external debt payments totaling 65 billion US dollars, that is twice as less as in last year. In effect, we have already passed the peak of external debt payments. Residents can make payments either buy drawing down the buffer of their accumulated foreign exchange liquid assets or from current revenues from foreign trade. The Bank of Russia foreign liquidity refinancing instruments will make it possible to fund both external debt payments and cumulative capital outflow estimated as 100–110 billion US dollars without considerable impact on the ruble exchange rate. I would like to note, that this year peak debt servicing payments are due in February and March, and payments already effected did not have any significant impact on the ruble exchange rate. Oil prices remain the main factor which can influence the ruble exchange rate dynamics. However, sustainable oil price reduction comparable to last year’s patterns does not seem feasible. The oil market will remain volatile, with oil prices changing in both directions. Oil price fluctuations are followed by fluctuations in the ruble exchange rate. However, one-way change in the ruble exchange rate has stopped. This means that the exchange rate impact on the inflation will gradually wear out.

Elvira Nabiullina: Recent Russian economic developments and Bank of Russia’s forecast Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in follow-up of Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 13 March 2015. *  *  *  Good afternoon! Today the Bank of Russia Board of Directors decided to reduce the key rate from 15.00% to 14% per annum. This decision takes into account the following main factors. First, the latest data on the economic situation show that the balance of risks remains shifted towards the weakening of the economy rather than acceleration of inflation. January data and February leading indicators, primarily business sentiment indices, indicate that the economic situation continues to deteriorate and this trend may persist until 2016 Q1. Seasonally adjusted unemployment fell to 5.0%. It should be taken into consideration that the Russian labour market traditionally adjusts, at least at the first stage, through wage rates and part-time employment, whose dynamics is indicative of lower demand for labour. At the same time, shrinkage of consumer demand will have a downward pressure on inflation. Second, monthly inflation slowed down considerably in February following the surge in late December-January. And weekly March data indicate that this process continues. The current high level of annual price growth is explained by the supply-side factors – decline in the ruble exchange rate and imposed trade restrictions. These are one-time factors, and in case there are no new considerable shocks their impact on monthly and quarterly inflation will decrease over the next months.