samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If the central bank fails to do this, the market will certainly come up 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  with some alternatives for this purpose. In this connection, you are no doubt aware that the HKMA has just launched the Faster Payment System a few days ago. Once the system goes live on 30 September, people in Hong Kong will be able to enjoy almost instantaneous P2P payments, making use of either mobile phone number or email address, free of charge to the users. While the Distributed Ledger Technology used in crypto-assets creates many issues, the technology has shown great potential in many other applications. For example, the HKMA and the banks in Hong Kong will soon launch a digital trade (d) finance platform using DLT. We are also in the process of developing a DLT interface that can link the domestic trade finance platform with those of other trading partners, such as Singapore, on a bilateral basis. This new interface is expected to be launched sometime next year. Despite some improvements made in the past few years, cross-border payments, especially retail or small value, remain inefficient and costly. This is unsatisfactory as it is not conducive to financial inclusion in relation to remittances by SMEs or (e) individuals. In this connection, I am pleased to note that progress is being made recently, as some banks and non-bank e-wallet operators are now developing new cross-border payment channels, making use of DLT in some instances, that would result in faster and cheaper services for users.

European governments have begun to take steps towards fiscal consolidation, and must convince markets that these steps are credible. Unfortunately, the private sector is not ready to take over the slack in public demand. Private sector debt-to-GDP ratios exceed 250% in the G3 economies. In the United States, where the household debt-to-disposable income ratio reached an unprecedented 135% in 2008, deleveraging is already underway with the recovery in private consumption well below historical rebounds. While Eurozone households are less leveraged than US households, disposable income is likely to grow more slowly in the Eurozone and hence be a bigger drag on consumption. A third source of deleveraging is the banking system. Banks in the Eurozone have to strengthen their capital adequacy position to meet new regulatory requirements as well as buffer against potential losses on their sovereign debt holdings. With uncertain prospects for raising fresh capital in equity markets and facing funding shortages in wholesale markets, some of them are looking to scale back their risk-weighted assets. The resultant crunch in credit could further exacerbate the slowdown in the economy. With governments, households, and banks all having to deleverage at the same time, we are looking at a prolonged period of sub-par growth in the advanced economies. In many advanced countries, debt-to-GDP ratios are not expected to stabilise until 2015 to 2020. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Asia: neither decoupled nor derailed What does deleveraging in the G3 mean for Asia? Asia is not immune to developments in America or Europe.
In this regard, on 2 September we learned that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline that connects Russia and Germany had been shut down indefinitely, which might suggest that we are now closer to that scenario. However, it should be noted that the downside scenario includes other negative shocks that have yet to materialise. Moreover, the current prices of gas, electricity and other energy and non-energy commodities are lower than those included not only in the downside scenario, but even in September’s baseline scenario. We will also have to watch out for a potential de-anchoring of medium and long-term inflation expectations above the 2% level. Such de-anchoring would affect the price- and wage-related decisions that firms and households make in the present, causing even higher and more persistent inflation, thereby requiring still more forceful monetary policy measures. While we have yet to observe any signs that expectations are being de-anchored, there are some signals that need to be watched. The most recent surveys of professional forecasters put inflation in 2024 at, or just above, 2%. The data from inflation derivatives markets (adjusting for risk premia) suggest likewise. However, the most recent round of the ECB’s monthly Consumer Expectations Survey (CES), published earlier this month, puts the median inflation expectation three years ahead at 3%, up from just over 2% at the start of the year. We will be extremely vigilant of these indicators in the coming months.

Ravi Menon: Islamic finance – continued growth Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 5th World Islamic Banking Conference Asia Summit, Singapore, 3 June 2014. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. And to all our foreign guests, a warm welcome to Singapore. The sun is shining on Islamic finance. Let me highlight three promising global developments. First, Islamic finance continues to grow rapidly. The industry grew at double digits last year, as it has for the previous five years, despite global economic uncertainties and market volatility. Global Islamic financial assets are estimated to have reached $ trillion by the end of 2013, from $ trillion in 2012. Second, global regulatory standards and best practices are being established for Islamic finance. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), and the International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM) have been at the forefront of this effort, helping to narrow differences in market practices and regulatory treatment. Common standards are good for facilitating cross border transactions. They help to address risks that are idiosyncratic to Islamic finance, such as Shariah non-compliance risk. In so doing, these standards serve to bolster confidence in the safety and soundness of the Islamic finance industry. Third, more countries are catering for Islamic finance. In Asia, Indonesia has set out to significantly grow its Islamic banking sector and develop its Islamic capital markets.
In particular, the flow of new mortgages slowed considerably in the second half of 2022, falling 5.4% year-on-year in Q4, in line with the moderation in house purchases and prices. - The stock of lending to non-financial corporations and sole proprietors fell by 1.5%, with a more marked drop in the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic (6.9%). This despite new loans growing 15.2%, while the principal drawn on available credit lines rose by 23.3%. 4  - The average interest rate on loan portfolios increased during 2022, particularly in the last quarter of the year. However, the pass-through of the changes in reference rates (around 30%-40%) was lower than that implied by the historical sensitivity to the cycle. Credit quality  - In 2022 the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio4 fell by 0.8 pp to 3.5% at December, the lowest level since 2008, with cumulative declines since the start of the pandemic of 1.6 pp for the corporate sector and 1.4 pp for households. In the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic, the NPL ratio fell by a lesser degree (0.3 pp in 2022, to 5.6%). 4  The faster decline in NPLs in 2022 was driven both by smaller inflows and larger outflows. 5  - Stage 2 loans likewise declined, falling by 0.9 pp to 7.1%, as a result of both lower inflows and larger outflows to performing status. However, the stock of Stage 2 loans remains 24.5% higher than pre-pandemic levels.

Lastly, it must be borne in mind that the short and medium-term challenges posed by the recent period of extraordinary crises do not make tackling the banking sector’s structural challenges – such as those linked to the management of climate-related risks, digitalisation and growing competition from technology firms – any less urgent. Thank you. 10
Moreover, fair value accounting is consistent with the increasing use of mark-to-market techniques in risk management. Such techniques in part reflect a progressive but fundamental shift from the traditional banking approach of holding assets until maturity to today’s approach of managing on the basis of continually assessing the opportunity cost of maintaining the existing balance sheet. It is clearly beneficial to transparency if publicly-available accounting information as far as possible reflects the basis on which management actually run a business. However, there are a number of complications associated with the wider use of fair values. First, there is a question as to how one can obtain robust fair values for instruments which are not priced, even indirectly, in reasonably deep and liquid markets. Model-based valuation techniques may be used, but they may not be analogous to genuine market clearing prices. The issues here include determining the conceptual basis for valuation (“the model”), obtaining the necessary inputs, and avoiding slavish adherence to a model which may in some circumstances deliver misleading results. In other words how, and to what extent, can human judgement properly be used to modify the model? Second, there is the question of the economic relevance of unrealised gains and losses - particularly if they are not immediately realisable. For example, while information on changes in the fair value of bank loans conveys useful economic insights, it needs to be interpreted carefully.

BIS Review 71/2004  3  We perhaps need to look again at the process for considering, and reaching a conclusion about, the fundamental “design parameters” some of which I have touched on today. This is no small task, but if agreement could be reached on the fundamentals, these could be stated as clear principles in a preamble to any new standard, to guide the more detailed requirements. And it might enable the widely-held vision of a less detailed and prescriptive standard to be realised, to replace the hundreds of pages of complex rules. To address this, however, raises three questions: (i) On what is early consensus necessary? (ii) How should the transition be approached? And (iii) What does this mean in institutional terms? Early consensus Early agreement seems to me particularly important in three areas. The first is to review the conventional understanding on who the accounts are for, and clarify how the different interests of different stakeholders are to be met. The second is to agree where the standard should be placed along the spectrum between historic cost and fair value measurement. A particularly difficult conceptual question in this area is: precisely what economic meaning is there in so-called fair valuation of instruments in which (a) there is little or no secondary market, or (b) there is a market, but a clear intent to hold an instrument to maturity? Finally, the implications of any increase in measured volatility will need to be assessed.
Since its establishment more than six years ago, the French Monetary Policy Council has reiterated, notably in the Banque de France’s Annual Report, the three other main prerequisites for growth and durable job creation: a sound fiscal policy aimed at controlling public spending and reducing deficits lastingly; ambitious structural reforms in the areas of education and training, the labour market and welfare and, lastly; the continuation and strengthening of a policy aimed at containing unit production costs in the economy and improving corporate competitiveness. These guidelines are equally valid for the entire euro area economy as for the French economy. BIS Review 55/2000  2  With regard to the first two conditions, and without forgetting the major achievements in the fight against unemployment in recent years, the Banque de France is convinced that we could have even lower unemployment - as low as in the best-performing economies in Europe and the world - if the level of public spending (which can be likened to the overheads of our economies) was lower and if the labour market functioned in a way even more conducive to job creation. It should be recalled that our Monetary Policy Council recommends, as an essential first step, that our public spending be reduced to below 50% of GDP as quickly as possible (it came to 52.4% in 1999). Note also that the Stability and Growth Pact recommends that public finances be “close to balance or in surplus” in the current period. This is not yet the case in France.

Underlying inflation, which measures the rise in prices, excluding products with highly-variable prices (notably energy and fresh produce) and also public utility charges, after stripping out the impact of tax measures, rose at a slower twelve-month rate of 0.7%. France was thus the best performer of the euro area in this field, along with Germany, with twelve-month HICP growth of 1.7% in December 1999. Since the start of 1999, the Eurosystem - comprising the European Central Bank (ECB) and the eleven national central banks of the countries having adopted the euro as their currency - has been responsible for defining and implementing monetary policy. In accordance with the Maastricht Treaty, the primary objective of the single monetary policy is price stability. This is defined as a year-on-year increase in the HICP for the euro area of below 2%. The definition of this medium-term objective is the same as that adopted by the Monetary Policy Council for French monetary policy when the Banque de France was granted independent status a little more than six years ago. 1  BIS Review 55/2000  In order to achieve its main goal of price stability, the Governing Council of the ECB decided, as you know, to refer to two groups of indicators, or “pillars”, for European monetary policy: –  the first pillar is a prominent role for money, reflected by the choice of a quantitative reference value for growth in M3, the broad monetary aggregate for the euro area. This reference value has been set at 4.5%.
Figure 1 Monetary policy and housing prices Monetary policy  Housing prices  (percentage)  (nominal index, first quarter 2001=100)  15  15  250  250  12  12  200  200  9  9  150  150  6  6  100  100  3  3  50  50  0  0  0 90  93  96  U.S. Chile (*)  99  02  05  Canada  08  01  02  04  05  Australia Chile Canada  07  08  0  U.S. Spain  (*) Starting August 2001, the MPR is set in nominal terms. Previously, it was set in inflation-indexed terms. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bank of Canada, Bloomberg and U.S. Federal Reserve. 10  BIS Review 113/2009  Figure 2  Nominal exchange rate  (CLP/ USD) 700  700  650  650  600  600  550  550  500  500  450  450  400  400  Jan.08  Apr.08  Jul.08  Oct.08  Jan.09  Apr.09  Jul.09  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Furthermore, in some cases housing prices did go up high, with clear indications that there was a bubble. However, their financial systems made it through and remained stable and,  1  A flexible inflation targeting regime balances the cost of output fluctuations with those of inflation instability, and the result should be a decline in both, output and inflation volatility. For an exposition of this framework and how it relates to the definition of the inflation target parameters see De Gregorio (2009a). BIS Review 113/2009  1  despite the current difficulties, have avoided acute financial crises. This is the case of, for example, Australia and Spain. Naturally, when facing disproportionate increases in housing prices, both the increase in credit and the boom in construction are symptoms that the downturn will be severe. Still, this need not result in a systemic financial meltdown. In any case, monetary policy can and does help in the creation of bubbles, although not so much by the level of the interest rate but by the monetary policy strategy with which financial turmoil is dealt with. In the United States, the strategy of turning a blind eye to the period of soaring asset prices and then, when the bubble burst, reducing aggressively interest rates used to be the Fed’s strategy (the “mop-up strategy” according to Blinder and Reis, 2005). This approach was first used on the “Black Monday” of October 1987, then with the breakdown of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) and later with the bursting of the high-tech bubble.
Although responsibility for supervision of the bank has passed to the FSA, the Bank retains an interest in the design of the regulatory structure and the impact that this has on the stability of the system as a whole. The Bank is represented on the Basel Supervisors Committee and has been closely involved in discussions on the new Basel Accord and the capital requirements to be applied to banks. Clearly ensuring that individual banks are adequately capitalised has a direct bearing on the ability of the system as a whole to withstand shocks. However it is only really in a crisis or an economic downturn that it is possible to tell what the full story is. As one of my colleagues colourfully puts it, it is only when the tide rolls out that you find out who is not wearing swimming trunks! The final area I would like to mention is the Bank’s role in reviewing financing for business in the UK. This is more focused on efficiency and competitiveness than financial stability but, over several years, the Bank has built up a leading role in looking at financing conditions for small firms and high-technology companies. More recently the Bank has also become involved in the government’s initiatives under the Social Exclusion unit to look at financial exclusion and the provision of banking services to deprived areas. On occasion, the Bank also takes a role in corporate restructuring, holding the ring between large debtors and their bank lenders.

The first session will address the challenges of digitization and how we can measure its impact on the economy. We will review how the international statistical community has had to adapt to new sources of information to develop indicators that account for the impact of this new age. Also, during the first session, we will analyze the implications of digitalization and the use of electronic invoicing data in Chile to support the activities of central banks, mainly in the fields of monetary policy, economic analysis and financial stability. Finally, we will learn about the estimation of the contribution of the digital economy to the GDP of the US. The second session will address how the globalization of production has imposed demands for greater generation of statistics that provide information on interdependence between countries. We will learn about the experience of Mexico and the US in the development of new national accounts statistics. Page 3 of 4  Central Bank of Chile October 2019  In the third session, we will see how digitalization provides us with an opportunity to integrate databases of different sources and sizes, becoming a valuable tool for the design and development of economic and financial indicators. Finally, in the last panel, we will try to find answers to questions like: What is the role of the digital economy in the decline of productivity estimates? How are we capturing the contribution of digital platforms in the labor market? And how would current statistics and macroeconomic measurements be affected? among others.
Purchase surprise in the 28 Sep-14 Oct 2022 financial stability (FS) intervention is assumed to be £ the mean of a uniform distribution of purchase expectations based on the announced £ ceiling. In liquid markets the MD line looks to be less steep. As I said earlier, the fact that central banks now pay interest on reserves will surely have tilted it in that direction. At least in normal times there’s arguably less difference, as far as the private sector’s concerned, between a deposit in the central bank and (say) a short-term public debt instrument such as a Treasury bill. If repo markets are working smoothly financial institutions can use even longer-term government debt to raise cash. This increases the degree of substitutability between the two sides of the QE transaction and has the effect of flattening the MD curve. Conversely, bouts of illiquidity are characterised by a lower degree of substitutability – relative to government debt, the distinctive liquidity value of central bank reserves becomes more pronounced – and, as well as moving to the right, the MD line steepens (Chart 11). Page 20  Chart 11: Money demand schedule is steeper when markets are less liquid  The MPC has often pointed out that QE seems to have had differing effects, according to economic and financial circumstances (they’re “state-contingent”[12]).

And why, at least across these two periods, does neither measure of money growth seem to have much to do with inflation? What follows is not remotely a full and comprehensive answer to these questions. Nor are the points made here remotely novel. Over the years, reams have been written about all of them, including in some very good articles by Bank economists. But they’re certainly relevant in interpreting these data and therefore worth touching on. One I mentioned in the introduction: commercial banks can create and withdraw deposits – principally in the act of extending or reducing the quantity of their lending – independently of their reserve holdings at the central bank. Suppose you borrow £ from a bank. What the bank actually does, in granting the loan, is to put an extra £ into your deposit account. This is newly created (broad) money, matched, on the asset side of its balance sheet, by the debt you now owe the bank. This process doesn’t require any matching increase in reserves[9]. It has its limits, not least because banks are obliged to fund a proportion of their lending with equity (rather than deposits). They can’t (and don’t) expand or reduce the quantity of money  Page 17  indefinitely. And monetary policy, via its effects on the wider economic environment, will also influence these decisions.
For Norwegian banks, which have a large proportion of  6  The Act relating to debt settlement (Act 99/1992), which came into force in 1993, shall provide individuals with serious debt problems with a possibility to regain control of their finances. The Act was amended in 2003. A new proposal to amend the act is now being circulated for comment. 7  NOU 1973:3 Taxation of dwellings (headed by Tor Sekse) and NOU 2003:9 Tax Commission (headed by Arne Skauge). 8  The IFRS, or a simplified application of the IFRS, applies to banks belonging to a listed company. Under the regulation, financial instruments are to be stated at fair value, in practice at market value. See Act no. 56 of 17 July 1998: Act relating to annual accounts, etc., (Accounting Act), Chapter 2. BIS Review 110/2008  5  housings loans in their loan portfolios, Basel II entails a substantial reduction in capital requirements after a transitional period. This is because highly secured housing loans have a low risk profile. Bank equity ratios have fallen in recent years. At the same time, Tier 1 capital, which is a risk-weighted measure of financial strength, has been stable. This reflects a sharp increase in bank lending secured by mortgages on residential property in this period. The Basel II framework offers limited experience so far. It presupposes that risk assessments consider the prevailing macroeconomic environment. There is still a risk that banks give excessive weight to recent years’ experiences in their assessments and models.

See  Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2022), 'Energy efficiency: what you need to knowOpens in a new window' 5 See CFRF (2022), 'Climate Financial Risk Forum Guide 2022: Scenario Analysis in  Financial FirmsOpens in a new window', NGFS (2023), 'Scenarios PortalOpens in a new window', Bank of England (2021), 'Guidance for participants of the 201 Biennial Exploratory Scenario: Financial risks from climate changeOpens in a new window'  7/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches