samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Instead, the post-crisis consensus emphasizes the use of monetary policy as a "preventive" tool for financial stability, that is, not to allow monetary policy to sow the seed of asset price bubbles. An important lesson from this crisis is that an over-extended period of low interest rates can distort risk perception, leading to excessive risk taking and costly financial imbalances. Beyond the reorientation of monetary policy, the post-crisis consensus advocates the use of macroprudential policy as the first line of defense against the buildups of financial imbalances. In comparison to interest rate measures, macroprudential policy can address sector-specific financial stability concerns more directly without excessive side effects on the overall economy. Macroprudential policy differs from traditional prudential regulation in that it adopts a systemwide or systemic perspective. The idea behind macroprudential policy is that while financial institutions may be individually safe, collectively they may be at risk due to herd behaviors and their interconnections. Here, the U.S. subprime crisis serves as a case in point. Regulators thought banks were safe because they had off-loaded their subprime credit risk exposures through securitization and unknowingly allowed the market to grow out of hand. From a system-wide perspective, the risk did not go anywhere as banks, in search for good yields during the low interest rate environment, invested in securitized assets issued by other banks. The situation was further exacerbated by the complex interconnections among U.S. financial institutions whereby the failure of one institution greatly increased the probability of failure of others.

We did it in March 2020, when it was still debated if it wasn't just a common cold that would go away in the summer. The alternative was to wait, monitor and analyse the situation for at least a few months before taking concrete action. From today's perspective, we can say that such waiting could have impacted very adversely banks, businesses and households alike. It was that anti-crisis package that allowed the introduction of a moratorium on loan repayments, which at its peak exceeded BGN 9 billion. Here is the place to emphasise that this was a private moratorium, an initiative by our commercial banks, as they better than anyone else understand that when their customers are not well, they are not well either. The Association played a key role in that process, which, among other things, is another testament to the excellent cooperation between the Association and the BNB. As with all our meetings, we prefer to look forward rather than backward. Unfortunately, what we see ahead are new challenges. On the one hand, these are the political and economic processes in the country. The intersections of their dynamics and development are basically three: prices, prices, and prices again. The outcome of the budget process that is currently underway will be indicative of the direction of these dynamics and development.
To so do would bring serious costs to the economy in the bad times without creating much benefit the rest of the time. So while we’re always looking for ways to make regulation as refined and efficient as possible, we are committed to robust standards of resilience in the financial system. Looking ahead, we’ll need a level of resilience in our system in future that’s at least as great as currently planned. 6  See ‘Stress testing the UK banking system: 2018 results’ in the November 2018 Financial Stability Report. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  And reflecting the size and importance of our financial sector relative to our economy, we’ll continue to need a level of resilience that exceeds what’s required by baseline international standards. Agility With the fault lines that caused the crisis largely dealt with, it might have been tempting to declare ‘mission accomplished’. But times change. The financial system changes shape. And new challenges emerge that it may need to one day face. Regulation has to adapt if it is to ensure the new system stays able to serve households and businesses in the face of these challenges. Continued stability needs regulatory agility. That’s why it makes little sense to base regulation of finance on a set of rules that’s difficult to change and evolve. There is no set of rules that will deliver the right outcome for the economy for all time.

And before we go live with this exercise in 2021, we’ll be consulting actively with risk specialists across the financial sector, climate scientists, other industry experts, and other informed stakeholder groups such as the Climate Financial Risks Forum. Participants in the test will need to show how they measure, monitor and manage the physical and transition risks to which their businesses are exposed. Our aim is to motivate companies to address data gaps and develop cutting-edge risk management so that the financial system can continue to serve households and businesses in the face of rising temperatures and reducing carbon emissions. Open-ended funds Regulatory agility is needed not just because the system will face new challenges in the future. It’s needed because the financial system itself is changing. It’s to be welcomed that the system has become more diverse. Non-banks – and I mean things that really aren’t banks, rather than the ‘shadow banks’ that proliferated before the crisis – have become more important. In this country, they’ve grown by almost 40%. That’s a net positive for the stability of the system and to its ability to channel savings into long-term investment. But that doesn’t mean the non-bank system is perfect at serving the economy in bad times and good. In particular, the structures in which long-term investments are held matters. Pretending such investments are liquid when they are not creates dangers.
6 Whatever the merits or demerits of its conjunctural points, the letter made no mention of an objective of low and stable inflation, or of the fiscal sustainability that is a precondition for monetary stability. Indeed, it is striking that, in this country, price stability was not energetically promoted by the mainstream academy. Rather, the case was made by what seems to have been a relatively small group of public intellectuals, 7 together with a few academics and officials. Drawing on the work of US macroeconomists, UK policymakers reached four broad conclusions that have endured: that macroeconomic policy should not assume that there was a long-term trade off between inflation and output; that microeconomic policy should be assigned the task of improving the supply side of the economy; that only monetary policy could achieve and maintain price stability; and that medium-term fiscal discipline was needed for any monetary regime to be credible. 8 Elements of that were controversial at the time. And views within the official sector on the acceptable rate of inflation covered a broad spectrum. By the early-mid 1980s, some were apparently prepared to settle for inflation of around 5%, or at least were concerned about the output costs of further disinflation. Others, notably Eddie George, argued that inflationary expectations could be stabilised effectively only if inflation were lowered below that. 9 Whilst affirming a commitment to reduce inflation further, 10 politicians did not resolve these debates by articulating a medium-term goal for inflation.

It is clear that further increases in the policy rate are required for inflation to return to the target. I will return to this later. But let me say now, that I am confident that the Riksbank will do what is needed to attain the inflation target. In contrast to the early 1990s, we now have a better mandate and a constitutional independence that enable us to take decisive action to attain the target. However, this must not lead us to underestimate the challenges we are facing. New vulnerabilities have been built up over the past 30 years: High indebtedness among households and businesses3, housing shortages, a divided labour market and a lack of investment in, for instance, defence, infrastructure, and climate transition. This means that the tightening will severely affect some households and businesses, while higher interest rates risk making necessary investments more difficult and costly. Diagram 1. The Riksbank’s policy rates since 1907 Per cent 100 80 60 40 20 0  -20 1900  1920  1940  1960  1980  2000  2020  Note. The Riksbank's policy rates consist of the discount rate, the marginal interest rate and the current policy rate (formerly known as the repo rate). Source: The Riksbank. Today, therefore, I would like to invite you to discuss the economic policy framework.
I hope that at this new stage, the economic recovery stage, banks will be full participants in the economic recovery process, expand lending, create new services, and, in fact, add new value for their customers by responding to the needs of the people and business. I wish you all every success. Thank you for your attention. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches

It will have potential profit and loss, tax and accounting implications on market participants. Migration of legacy contracts and adoption of new documentation involving hundreds of thousands of clients would be another complex exercise. All these 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  issues will cut across different segments of the financial market, from derivatives, to bonds, to loans and many others. The implications may also vary greatly across different jurisdictions given the different market structure and legal environment. Therefore, industry associations such as ISDA have an important role to play, in helping to address these wideranging issues with a global and industry-wide perspective. Global banks should take the lead 8. Likewise, international banks, which have operations across many jurisdictions, will be better placed to help shape the path for transition for the banking sector. As we all know, IBORs are used in nearly every aspect of their business – from trading, to risk management, to pricing and valuation. Preparing for the transition means they need to develop the necessary operational and system capability for their global operations, probably dealing with multiple alternative reference rates at the same time. I can see this is a very onerous and resource-intensive process. But then, given the quantity and diversity of financial contracts on their book, and their presence and market knowledge in various jurisdictions, these global banks should be best equipped to take the lead in devising a comprehensive transition plan.
Jacques Necker, who had been born in Geneva, was Minister of Finance under Louis XVI. After the French Revolution, Geneva began to evolve into an important wealth management centre. 1 In 1857, the first Swiss stock market was founded in Geneva, before those in Zurich and Basel. The Geneva stock market soon ranked fifth among European stock markets. Geneva remains one of the major world financial centres today, particularly when it comes to private wealth management. 2 The financial sector in Geneva is an engine for the regional economy. In 2014, around 120 banks were based in Geneva. The financial sector creates a significant part of cantonal value added and is a major employer. 3 A strong financial sector, such as that in Geneva, makes a substantial contribution to economic growth. It is therefore a crucial foundation, both for the regional economy and for the Swiss economy as a whole. A robust financial sector is also very important for the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The SNB interacts closely with the financial sector, and in particular with the banking sector. I will talk about this later. In my presentation, I will begin by explaining how the SNB and the financial sector are interlinked. Then I will discuss the importance of an independent monetary policy in providing stability as a long-term asset. However, in the short term, this long-term stability may generate costs. I will then explain the SNB’s current monetary policy and our reaction to international developments.

It enables us to create long-term stability. And this in turn is an asset for the whole economy and the financial sector in particular. 5  Cf. SNB annual Financial Stability Report, in which the SNB presents its yearly assessment of the Swiss banking sector’s stability: www.snb.ch/en/iabout/pub/oecpub/id/pub_oecpub_stabrep. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Due to Switzerland’s stability, domestic and foreign investors find it attractive to invest or have their wealth managed here. Of course, high-quality services provided by banks are an additional factor making Switzerland attractive for investors. Price stability is also an advantage. It makes the future more predictable and decreases the uncertainty of investments. Customers of Swiss banks are not investing exclusively in Swiss assets or Swiss francs. But part of the reason why they want to have their wealth managed here is because of the stable political, economic and monetary conditions. These stable conditions have supported the development of a strong and globally attractive financial sector. Swiss banks are global leaders in managing cross-border assets and wealth management. At the end of 2014, roughly half of the assets under management at banks in Switzerland were foreign customer assets. 6 The Swiss franc plays an important role in the international financial system. Measured by foreign exchange turnover, the Swiss franc was the sixth most important currency worldwide in 2013. 7 The banking sector is also an important part of the Swiss economy. The Swiss banking sector currently generates about 6% of GDP (cf. chart 3).
Having clarified this point, I can potentially see four main ways of increasing resolution capacity: The first would be to increase the amount of regulatory capital held by CCPs, and explicitly ring-fence a share of this capital as a means to recapitalise a new entity in a resolution scenario. In the EU, CCPs are required to hold sufficient own resources to cover operating costs over a six-month period – this requirement could be strengthened, not only in order to cover for a potential wind-down, but also to meet the funding costs of a new entity. For the reasons described above, I believe there would be important drawbacks in relying only on CCPs to increase their regulatory capital. CCPs should provide a proportional contribution to the resolution process, but should not bear all the costs. A second policy option could be to make use of initial margin haircutting as a means to fund the resolution process and establish a new CCP. While this would provide CCPs with significant resources, mutualised across the entire clearing membership, and could provide a base for re-launching a viable CCP with some degree of certainty over the sharing of losses, it would also imply a significant change in the way clearing members understand their liabilities towards the CCP – indeed, in certain jurisdictions, initial margin currently has to be bankruptcy-remote. It would be difficult to predict the potential pro-cyclical effects resulting from this tool, as well as the effects on incentives for members to take part in central clearing.

Ivan Iskrov: Association of Banks in Bulgaria – 20 years Congratulatory address by Mr Ivan Iskrov, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, to the Association of Banks in Bulgaria on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Association’s Foundation, Sofia, 3 April 2012. *  *  *  Mr. President, Ladies and gentlemen, Dear colleagues and friends, It is a great honour and a pleasure for me to be here today commemorating with you the 20th Anniversary of the guild of the banking profession – the Association of Banks in Bulgaria. This is a perfect opportunity to congratulate the Association for the long way it successfully traversed, and along which it established itself as one of the most reputed trade associations in the Republic of Bulgaria. All these years the Association consistently assisted its members in pursuing their banking business and protecting their interests, all the while standing as a stable and constructive partner of the central bank, as the banking regulatory authority, of other government authorities, and of the representatives of the business. Therefore, we the members of the BNB Governing Council are all pleased to attend this occasion as a proof of the respect cherished by the central bank’s management for your work and professional achievements! Behind the ABB’s history stands the individual road of achievements, but also of challenges, of each one of the Association’s members.
In common with many other countries, our problems also reflect the underlying need to rebalance our economy, requiring a reallocation of resources both within and between nations. It is not simply a question of boosting aggregate demand, but of helping to bring about a shift to a new equilibrium. That in turn implies the need for both large changes in relative prices, especially between tradable and non-tradable goods and services, and a shift in the relative levels of domestic demand at home and overseas. There are, therefore, limits on what any one country’s domestic monetary policies can achieve without the support of others. Despite these limits, circumstances have demanded that central banks take extraordinary measures. Such measures can risk moving into territory more normally associated with fiscal policy and, in doing so, put at risk their hard-won independence. There are, it seems to me, three threats to central bank independence. First, there is the risk of appearing to promise too much or allowing too much to be expected of us. With constraints on other policy instruments, central banks are seen as “the only game  5  Facilities introduced by the Bank of England have included the Discount Window Facility, the Special Liquidity Scheme, Extended Collateral Term Repos, Extended Collateral Long Term Repos, and the Funding for Lending Scheme. The ECB initiated its Long Term Repo Operations.

It would make much more sense to implement the best possible measures within a suitable time frame, in order to achieve a significant reduction in the risk to our country as early as possible. I consider that the best possible measures are those which take account of the specific characteristics and risks inherent in our banking structure and have a high impact without incurring too high a cost. The package now before Parliament fulfils these criteria. On the one hand, the proposed measures are rigorously based on tried-and-tested approaches and instruments11 which have been in existence in all developed countries for decades and whose effectiveness cannot be doubted. On the other hand, measures with great potential for unintended consequences have been decisively rejected by the committee of experts and the Federal Council, and not included in the package. Conclusion I am now drawing to the end of my remarks. The failure of a big bank would have enormous and incalculable negative implications for Switzerland – not least because a state bail-out would be unavoidable. This risk is no longer acceptable. That is why strenuous efforts have been made over the past eighteen months to find a solution to the “too big to fail” problem. The Federal Council has recently presented a carefully thought out, balanced package of measures for Parliament’s consideration. 11  6  Regulations on capital, liquidity and risk concentration. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Implementing these measures in full will make an effective contribution to significantly reducing the problem in Switzerland.
This is particularly important given the lack of well-developed road and rail networks of the region. Countries in the GMS are addressing this through various projects, the main one being the road corridors. The North-South Corridor which connects Yunnan in China, with Myanmar, Laos and Thailand has been completed. Also, the East-West Corridor which links Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar is near completion. This will make the whole region more closely interconnected, hence investments in any of the GMS country stand to benefit the rest. 11. The final point is on the demand side. The GMS will enjoy a larger consumer market base with distinct needs and increased purchasing power. The AEC is home to over 600 million people. In tandem with this is the significant rise of the middle class population. The Asian Development Bank estimates that the share of ASEAN’s middle class is expected to increase to 65% by 2030.3 Moreover, ASEAN continues to pursue closer integration into the global economy through various Free Trade Agreements. This includes China and India, both superpowers at the crossroads of the GMS. Therefore, the AEC will also be an important gateway, connecting the GMS to major markets of the Asia-Pacific region. 12. The bright future is ours for the making. The GMS economies are blessed with abundant resources and promising growth prospects. With the realization of the AEC, the region’s opportunities will be multiplied. Yet there remain important challenges. The bright future is ours only if we work to overcome the challenges together.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Knowing Nusantara – money that made the region Opening speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the launch of “Knowing Nusantara: Money That Made the Region”, Bank Negara Malaysia Museum and Art Gallery, Sasana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 26 August 2014. *  *  *  The Numismatic heritage of the Malay Archipelago is as rich as the region itself. There were few other regions that had such a level of trade that has existed in this part of Southeast Asia. Every type of seafarer had been here over the centuries, bringing with them a wide range of currencies. From Chinese copper cash to South American “pieces of eight”, Nusantara has been a magnet for money of all shapes, sizes and materials. When these are combined with the indigenous currency minted in the Archipelago, the legacy is immense. “Knowing Nusantara: Money that Made the Region” explores the coins and banknotes that have circulated in the Malay Archipelago, telling a story that goes back 2,000 years and that continues to evolve. By telling this story, the objective is to create a deeper understanding of the region. The history of the archipelago is largely about contact and the interconnectivity that existed in the region even during that period. Movement between islands and the mainland are mirrored by the encounters between the indigenous and foreign peoples.