samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What I would like to say is that, in order to further facilitate Fintech development in Hong Kong, the HKMA has decided to launch two new initiatives today. Fintech Innovation Hub 14. First, I am pleased to announce that the HKMA will collaborate with the Applied Science and Technology Research Institute (ASTRI) to set up the “Fintech Innovation Hub”. It will be equipped with all necessary system and support resources to enable players of the banking and payment industry to conduct proof of concept trials of products and services through the use of new technologies, and do it safely – as this controlled environment is separated from their internal systems. Also, the Fintech Innovation Hub allows regulators to provide early inputs to the trial works before the actual implementation. While some of the largest banks have built their own laboratories, this new Fintech Innovation Hub will cater for the big and small institutions alike such that the industry as a whole would be able to adopt new technologies more speedily and in a more collaborative manner. 15. Among its potential uses, this Fintech Innovation Hub, as a neutral testing ground, will be ideal for two types of activities. First, industry players can test new Fintech solutions which involve the collaboration of multiple parties and are intended to be commonly adopted in the industry. A good example is biometric authentication.

We will provide guidance to central banks and supervisors on how they could potentially address these barriers. The NGFS is working on two blended finance deliverables by COP28. First, a handbook on blended finance. It will draw on key lessons from past case studies on blended finance projects and provide practical guidance on how such projects can be scaled up. Second, demonstrative blended finance projects. The aim is to spotlight projects that have incorporated mechanisms to promote the scaling of blended finance. We will also categorise the key pain points in some of these projects and draw lessons on how they could be addressed. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Transition planning Across the financial industry, the focus is gradually shifting from commitment to action. This means going beyond high-level net zero commitments to designing credible transition plans that will get us there by 2050. Drawing up a credible transition plan requires financial firms to do several things:  baseline their financed emissions; set interim targets based on appropriate science-based sectoral pathways; engage clients on their own corporate transition plans; and monitor portfolio and client progress over time. Transition plans need to be adaptive to changing circumstances while maintaining ambition. There is uncertainty over the path of various decarbonisation technologies as well as climate-related policies such as carbon taxes and emission standards. The assumptions used in transition plans would need to be continually monitored and adjusted as necessary.
The reason for the delay between the decision in January 1993 and the target coming into force was to give the inflationary impulse that arose when the krona was allowed to float in November 1992 time to wane. During summer 1994, inflation and inflation expectations began to rise. 7 Most analysts’ forecasts pointed to inflation overshooting the target by a broad margin, and various indicators showed that the long-term expected inflation rate, which had never been close to 2 per cent, was now above 4 per cent. The inflation-targeting policy was thus faced with its first real challenge and the Riksbank began to raise the repo rate. Despite this being an entirely logical measure in the prevailing situation, it was met with strong criticism from some parts of society. A number of members of the largely politically-appointed General Council of the Riksbank, which was then the body that made the monetary policy decisions, entered reservations against the decision. Some even considered that this interest-rate and monetary policy was leading Sweden into “economic suicide”. 8 The most important measure, they said, should be to achieve a 7 See Bäckström (2003) for a description of the situation at that time. 8 See LO (1994). It should be added that LO fairly soon afterwards came out in support of the inflation target and  has supported it ever since. 7 [20]  lower real interest rate.

In the long run, it is monetary policy that determine the rate of inflation in the economy and “rational” long-term inflation expectations should therefore still be in line with the central bank's target for price stability. If the public makes this presumption, the negative consequences of taking longer to attain the inflation target will be much less serious. 11 [20]  Concluding comments Let me round off. My purpose here has been to do two things. Firstly, I have tried to put the recent debate on monetary policy into perspective. I have discussed the criticism raised against our policy in general and against the negative repo rate in particular. As I hope I have made clear, there are some gaps in the criticism. I noted earlier that the main argument is often merely that monetary policy for various reasons is wrong. What I feel is often missing is a discussion of why the advantages of the inflation target should no longer apply and what the consequences would be if the Riksbank abandoned it. It is no new phenomenon that the debate fails to answer important questions. In the mid-1990s, when the inflation-targeting regime was relatively new, Lars E.O. Svensson, who was then scientific adviser to the Riksbank and later a member of the Executive Board, argued that the debate often lacked structure.
Much attention will also be required, in the fullness of time, to make sure that the financial systems through which financial intermediation takes place are robust so that the benefits of financial liberalization could be maximized and the associated risks could be minimized and prudently managed. 3. As a financial services centre which operates with a highly liberal regime, Hong Kong has important roles to play in all this. There is not enough time to go into details here on this occasion, so I shall just identify three general areas for your consideration. 4. The first area concerns financial intermediation within individual economies, in other words, the channelling of domestic savings into domestic investments. Here Hong Kong, at this stage at least, largely only plays an advisory role. The less liberalized financial systems in this region are very much dominated by domestic financial institutions, particularly in the banking market. Further, domestic politics and a desire to protect domestic financial institutions from undue competition are such that liberalization to admit foreign financial institutions to take part in domestic financial intermediation would only proceed at a pace dictated by these considerations. For example, it will, I think, take some time and patience for Hong Kong-based banks to gain a physical presence in the mainland of China, be allowed access to renminbi banking business and command a significant share of that business. 5.

Some economists think that a shift from a rigid exchange rate regime to a free float would result in lower interest rates to ease the interest rate pain. However, recent experience in Asia has shown that the market demands even higher interest rates than before under a floating rate regime due to the need for hedging, since there is a perception of higher credit risks and exchange rate risks. 17. I interpret the currency turmoil in the region not as exchange rate volatility, but as a painful but necessary adjustment in the real economy (manifested through the financial system and markets) to the new world of greater competition. In essence, we must all work harder to get greater productivity gains to meet the new challenge. No one can afford to be complacent in this global world. To the extent that the free market is demanding higher interest rates because there is a reverse flow of capital from Asia to the OECD markets, we will all have to bear the pain and adjust accordingly. 18. And not all interest rate pain is bad. Higher interest rates would increase savings in Hong Kong and bring inflation down further, thus increasing our competitiveness. To the extent that higher interest rates would reduce house prices, they would also make housing more affordable. 19. The currency board system with a fixed exchange rate is appropriate for a small and highly externally-oriented economy like Hong Kong. It further imposes a strict discipline on public finances. Hong Kong runs budget surpluses, not deficits.
13  With the addition of 25 expanded counterparties who were cleared to participate fully in RRP operations starting on March 16, 2015, the Desk’s 163 RRP counterparties comprise 141 expanded counterparties (105 money market funds, 12 government sponsored enterprises, and 24 banks) plus 22 primary dealers. A list of the Desk’s reverse repo counterparties is available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/ expanded_counterparties.html. 14  Consistent with the temporary nature of the ON RRP facility, the New York Fed does not expect to increase the total number of RRP counterparties further, unless the addition of new counterparties is deemed necessary to support the implementation of monetary policy. Thus, the number of expanded RRP counterparties is not expected to exceed 150. Additional firms that meet the eligibility criteria are allowed to submit applications, but will be added to the counterparty list only if the maximum number of expanded RRP counterparties has not been reached. On March 9, 2015, the Desk released a policy statement indicating that it could remove an entity from the RRP counterparty list for failing to meet prescribed eligibility and participation criteria. The statement is available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/opolicy/ operating_policy_150309.html. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A series of rate adjustments last November and December was particularly instructive in this examination. During the six-week test, the offering rate was temporarily lowered from 5 basis points to 3 basis points, then raised to 7 basis points and 10 basis points.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Preparedness to implement normalization Extensive testing of ON RRPs and other supplementary tools have provided policymakers with confidence that they will be able to maintain control over interest rates – that is, that rates will move up with increases in the IOER rate – during the normalization process. 12 An important determinant of the effectiveness of an ON RRP facility is whether a sufficiently wide set of nonbank counterparties has access to it. The New York Fed currently executes RRPs with 163 counterparties comprising many of the major cash lenders in secured and unsecured money markets – including money market funds that manage about 70 percent of the total U.S. money market fund assets under management and account for more than a quarter of total tri-party repo lending against government collateral. 13 This provides a high degree of confidence that we are transacting with an adequate set of counterparties to achieve our policy execution objectives. 14 Throughout the testing regime, the Desk has varied the settings and design of the reverse repo operations, with operational results informing subsequent changes. We’ve operated at different times of the day, increased the maximum bid limit per counterparty, and introduced an aggregate cap of $ billion and a single-price auction mechanism to allocate awards should the sum of submitted bids exceed the cap. We’ve also adjusted the offering rates and tested ON RRPs in conjunction with term RRPs at quarter-ends.
Second, does the monetary union have to constitute an optimal currency area at the outset of the project? As hinted at earlier, the description so far leaves out the political dimension which in the European case has been very important. The EEC, predecessor of the European Union, was established after  2  For a recent overview and summary of the field, see Rose and Stanley (2005). For another recent EMU application, see Baldwin, Skudelny and Taglioni (2005). 3  For the case of EMU, see for instance Böwer and Guillemineau (2006). 4  Excerpt from the poem "On the Move" from the collection "The Hearths". 2  BIS Review 73/2006  World War II primarily as a project for peace. Political integration was the objective, to be achieved in large measure with economic means. Against this backdrop, besides wanting to avoid war, one pragmatic political aspect of the decision on whether or not to join a monetary union is the possible gain of security and influence that comes with being a member. But if a number of countries choose to form a monetary union, how – from an economist’s point of view – should they prepare themselves? Before implementation of a monetary union A number of questions arise when having decided to form a monetary union.

06.06.2017  Appearance by the Governor before the Senate in relation to the Draft State Budget for 2017 Luis M. Linde Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, In my appearance, which forms part of this Chamber’s discussion and approval of the State budget for 2017, I shall begin by reviewing the current macroeconomic setting and outlook for the Spanish economy. I shall then analyse the main aspects of the State budget for this year, according to the draft Law approved by the Government on 31 March, and the Updated Stability Programme for the period 2017-2020, submitted by the Council of Ministers to the European Commission on 29 April. The external environment of the Spanish economy The current international economic setting is characterised by an increase in uncertainty, chiefly the outcome of the political changes in the past year in the United States and the United Kingdom. However, that does not appear to have exerted a significant influence, so far, on the real economy, or on the financial markets. Both have continued to perform favourably and, despite rising in the final months of 2016, interest rates are holding at stillmoderate levels at all terms. The main exception to this climate of relative stability has been oil prices, which have been highly volatile in recent months. Recent economic developments in the euro area show a firming in the recovery, which is progressively extending to more sectors and countries.
According to the estimates of GDP growth for the fourth quarter, the economic expansion extended into the final part of 2015, setting the rate of growth at 3.2% for the whole year. Spain thus recorded the strongest economic growth amongst the main economies in the euro area. Certainly, these developments were supported by some tailwinds, whose impact on growth rates is expected to decay over time. I refer here to the fall in oil prices, the depreciation of the euro and the easing in financing conditions. But, quite obviously, these factors were also present in other economies which posted significantly lower growth rates. This underlines the fact that elements of a more permanent nature lie behind the recent performance of the Spanish economy, these elements being linked to the correction of the previous imbalances and the reforms that have been undertaken. Concerning prices, the latest estimate for the harmonized price index in Spain was moderately negative in January (minus 0.4%), due to a decline in energy prices, and it is expected to remain in negative territory for the coming months. The indicator that excludes energy prices went up moderately in the course of last year, in line with the reduction in the degree of slack of the economy. In the euro area, overall prices showed an increase of 0.4% in January, that is, 0.8 pp above the rate recorded in Spain. Thus, the Spanish economy continues to gain competitiveness vis à vis the euro area.

But this is not the case at present, as banking activity levels are still low, and precisely this is the second source of pressure on the income statement. The third one is the significant volume of non-productive assets (NPLs and foreclosures) remaining on banks’ balance sheets although, as I mentioned earlier, the data shows a positive trend with a significant decline over the last two years. In a period of far-reaching changes in the banking sector, it is important for banks to improve their efficiency, so as to remain viable competitors. Banks could do this through various means, for example redesigning their networks, redefining their capacity and efficiency, enhancing their geographical diversification, and increasing specialization in certain market segments. From this perspective, a number of analysts and market participants expect a greater degree of consolidation in the Spanish banking sector. The start-up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the gradual disappearance of barriers against banking integration at the European level facilitate a new operational framework for banks, when defining their strategies through the Eurozone and the area covered by the Single Supervisory Mechanism. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusions: growth perspectives Now, to conclude: According to most analysts, public and private alike, the Spanish economy is expected to continue growing at sustained rates in the medium term. In particular, GDP might increase at a rate around 2.8% in 2016 according to the consensus. This figure is well above the estimated rate for the euro area average.
Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 24 April 2020. * * *  Today, the Board of Directors has decided to cut the key rate by 50 bp to 5.50% per annum. This implies that we have switched to accommodative monetary policy. Moreover, we hold open the prospect of further key rate reduction if the situation develops in line with the updated baseline forecast of the Bank of Russia. Our today’s decision is based on the profound revision of our view of economic development and inflation trends in the next three years. Since the last Board of Directors’ revision of the key rate, three events have happened which have defined our view of the situation. They are primarily associated with the spread of the coronavirus pandemic. Firstly, this is a drastic decline in the global economy. Secondly, there has been another round of a slump in oil prices, despite the new OPEC+ deal. Thirdly, the Government has introduced nation-wide restrictions. As a result, a large number of businesses have suspended their operations or switched to the remote work mode. A lot of citizens are currently in self-isolation. As to positive factors, I would focus on a slight stabilisation in global financial markets as compared to March, which was largely driven by measures being implemented by the central banks of reserve-currency countries.

It is therefore, imperative that all institutions provide the price of their loans in terms of the Annual Percentage Rate rather than a monthly percentage. In this way, transparency is enhanced and consumers would have a clear  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  picture of precisely how much they need to borrow relative to their income levels. This would result in responsible lending and a more competitive and transparent microfinance industry. It is in this regard that the initiative on transparent pricing for the microfinance sector in Zambia could not have come at a more opportune time. I am informed that the Transparent Pricing initiative will offer training on transparent pricing and collect and publish data on the prices of microloans offered in Zambia. This initiative will complement the Bank of Zambia’s effort of enhancing transparency through the quarterly publication of financial charges, fees and commissions for accounts and other general services and transactions applied by financial service providers. In addition, the workshop has come at a time when the Bank of Zambia is conducting a study on “How Microfinance Institutions Determine Lending Interest Rates in Zambia”. The deliberations from this workshop will be of great benefit to the Bank and will provide valuable insights into the factors affecting interest rates in Zambia. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, one of the reasons advanced by microfinance institutions to explain the high interest rates charged for their services in the past has been the high risk of default and lack of credit information on the borrowers.
That is why, for the Bank’s own Climate Biennial Exploratory Scenario exercise which we formally launch next month, we are putting emphasis on the qualitative questionnaire and an assessment of business model changes, rather than the traditional capital-adequacy metrics.9    Look at both physical and transition risks coherently as you undertake your analysis and as you determine your strategic response. Some combination of these risks will materialise. If you are assuming there is no price on carbon in your risk models, you’re implicitly assuming a high degree of warming. If you do believe some policy action is inevitable but don’t know what the shadow price of carbon is, don’t assume it is zero. That is equivalent to not knowing for sure how Bank rate will evolve but assuming it away when discounting over 30 years.   Given the sensitivity to core assumptions, there is considerable value in running credible, independent, standardised scenarios. That will make your results more easily comparable to others, even if you use in addition other scenarios and models that you find more relevant to your business.   Don’t be afraid to share lessons learned, disclose key assumptions and limitations in your analysis and where possible work together to improve understanding. Here it is worth highlighting the excellent work being done by the Climate Financial Risk Forum in the UK which brings together senior financial sector representatives to build capacity and share best practice in managing climate-related risks and opportunities.

And of course the future path of the climate risks themselves is subject to huge uncertainty. But given the urgency of our challenge, we cannot let uncertainties and complexities lead to inertia and inaction. Scenarios are generally comprised of three key components:   Transition models that set out how energy production and land-use can adjust to lower emissions and meet a given carbon budget or temperature target;    Physical models that set out projections for how living conditions and extreme weather would shift given a pathway for emissions; and    Economic models that quantify the potential impacts from both transition and physical risk on the economy. This is unfamiliar territory for most central banks, businesses and the financial sector. It is however territory we all need to get familiar with if we are to find the right climate path. Our desire to improve our understanding and capability to measure and monitor these risks inspired us to launch a project to co-design climate scenarios together with world leading climate scientists and 60 other central banks and supervisors that are part of the macrofinancial workstream of the Network for Greening the Financial System or NGFS.4  It has been a truly interdisciplinary effort. We have had to integrate a suite of models across each of the areas – physical, transition, economic, financial – to deliver insights [figure 3].