samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2/2003, Summer 2003. Tsatsaronis K., Systemic financial risk and macroprudential supervision, article presented at Bocconi University Centennial Conference on risk and stability of financial system: what roles for regulators, management and market discipline, 2003. 6  2  Rybiński K., Globalizacja w trzech odsłonach, Difin, Warszawa 2007. BIS Review 134/2007  market. The currently effective legislation may contribute both to aggravating the supplydemand imbalance which supports the divergence of stock prices from the fundamentally reasonable levels and also towards the growth in the scale and impetus of price adjustments, should a bubble burst. Open pension funds are one of the main sources of demand on the stock market. From their very beginning, they have recorded average monthly inflows of PLN 870 million, the value of equities in their portfolio have exceeded PLN 51.5 billion, whereas their share in free float has amounted to ca. 22%. The assets held by open pension funds are likely to continue their rising path. As estimated, their credit debit balance will stabilize to report a balanced position only in 2031 7 . In addition, the past quarters saw high demand of investment funds for equities. Meanwhile, despite a large number of debuts, the value of equities introduced to the Warsaw Stock Exchange is relatively low. By way of illustration, in 2004, the value of public offers amounted to PLN 13.2 billion (including PLN 7.9 billion of PKO BP's issue); in 2006 it was PLN 4.2 billion, whereas in the first nine months of 2007 it was PLN 6.4 billion.

I believe that joint actions must be undertaken in order to minimize the threats of asset bubbles resulting from effective regulations in the sector of open pension funds, to better diversify investment portfolios as well as to enhance the sector’s prospective levels of return. In order to achieve those goals, we have to commit ourselves to: •  increase the limit on foreign investment and gradually modify some terms and conditions of using them from the current level of 5% to 30% of assets,  •  allow open pension funds to take recourse to derivatives with a view to hedging their investment portfolios,  •  in a longer perspective, gradually raise the open pension funds’ limit on investment in equities from 40% to 60%. Pension funds should invest a large part of their portfolios in equities because the return on equities should exceed that of debt instruments over a long horizon. CalPERS, the world’s  7  Rozwój systemu finansowego w Polsce w latach 2002-2003, Narodowy Bank Polski, December 2004, p. 120. 8  Regulation of 13 September 2005 concerning the deposits of a pension fund, Polish Journal of Laws – Dz. U., No. 186/2005, item 1549). 9  Regulation of 20 December 2005 repealing the regulation concerning the deposits of a pension fund, (Dz. U. No. 260/2005, item 2180). BIS Review 134/2007  3  largest pension fund, invests 45% of assets in equities on the US market and 20% in equities quoted on foreign markets.
This is achieved through the intermediation process to facilitate trade, business and investment. This will facilitate the integration of the Islamic financial system as a viable component of the global financial system. It is the ability of the Islamic financial industry to build institutional capacity, intensify the collaborative efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the Islamic financial infrastructure, and the acceleration of its global integration that will provide the synergies and opportunities for the Islamic financial industry to evolve into an important component of the international financial system that can contribute to greater global financial stability and enhance the prospects for a more balanced global growth. BIS Review 3/2004  7

What is certainly true, as I’ve argued throughout this speech, is that such tradeoffs should not exist when the costs of emissions have been effectively internalised, and capital market structures have fully matured. That must be our ultimate goal. The choice of potential investment strategies is a live issue for the Bank of England too, as a market participant in our own right. Most of our asset holdings consist of UK government securities. But 2% of the Bank’s Asset Purchase Facility consists of sterling corporate bonds, acquired as part of the MPC’s quantitative easing programme. As we stated in our TCFD disclosure, the framework for the MPC’s asset purchases is determined by the Committee’s remit given to it by the Chancellor. But, subject to the Government indicating a willingness to update this remit, we will over the coming year be considering how to incorporate climate factors into decisions on the mix of financial assets, whilst still achieving our policy aims. We will have much to learn from the range of approaches already adopted in the private sector. Conclusions So where does this all leave us? One thing is clear: there is a lot to be positive about – capital markets are innovating, and rapidly, in response to the very real rise in demand from clients, businesses, investors and public authorities to take 20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  20  climate risk and return seriously. And that innovation is beginning to drive some hard-edged price discrimination based on climate risks.
Exchange rates are yet another financial price that should be stabilised to effectively contribute to the promotion of the growth of the real estate industry, particularly that a substantial amount of building materials, such as, steel are imported. An unpredictable behaviour of the exchange rate can make investment in real estate unattractive. However, following the introduction of the Broad-based Interbank Foreign Exchange System (IFES) in July 2003, the exchange rate of the Kwacha against major foreign currencies, particularly the US dollar, has been relatively stable. The Kwacha appreciated by 2.6% against the US dollar in 2004, after depreciating by 7.2% in 2003. Other factors contributing to the relative stability of the Kwacha include strong performance of the external sector, prudent fiscal management, and the broad weakness of the US dollar in the international market. From the behaviour of the exchange rate of the  2  BIS Review 46/2005  Kwacha against major currencies, it is clear that, supported by effective supervision, foreign exchange market participants are able to police themselves and instil discipline in the market. Ladies and Gentlemen Allow me, at this juncture, to turn to the other function of the Bank of Zambia – that of ensuring financial system stability. As you may be aware, financial system stability is very critical to the maintenance of macroeconomic stability. As a matter of fact, monetary policy would not be effective in pursuing the inflation objective if the financial system were not stable, for monetary policy actions are transmitted through financial institutions.

5  In addition to New Zealand and Norway, the central banks in Sweden, the Czech Republic and Israel currently publish interest rate forecasts. In addition, the Federal Reserve publishes the individual interest rate forecasts of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 6  Norway’s sovereign wealth fund (the “Government Pension Fund Global”) is managed by Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) and is invested in international capital markets. 7  For details on our institutional framework, see Qvigstad, J. with I. Fridriksson and N. Langbraaten (2013): “Monetary policy committees and communication,” Norges Bank Staff Memo 2/2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  [Chart:Timeline: The first years of Norges Bank forward guidance] In 2004, we started to publish our first quantitative guidance in the form of a “strategy interval” for the key policy rate four months ahead. In November the following year, we published for the first time our own interest rate forecast for the next three years. Prior to that, we had established and published criteria for an appropriate interest rate path. 8 Up until November 2005, the analyses and forecasts in our reports had been based on either a constant interest rate path or an interest rate path as implied by the forward market. At this point however, our conclusion was that it would be easier to interpret, evaluate and communicate our view of the economy when it was based on a path for the interest rate that we considered to be appropriate.
*** Returning to the present day, a little more than eight years after Europe’s leaders signed the Treaty of Maastricht and agreed on the necessary framework and timetable, we now have a functioning EMU with a single European currency. Nonetheless, I would not be surprised if, to some external observers, EMU might at first glance appear rather unusual and perhaps even somewhat confusing. This is no doubt a consequence of some of the specific features of EMU that I should take some time to explain. This also holds true of the European Union, which still does not fully correspond to the model of a union you may have in mind, namely the United States. Starting from basics, I should point out that some of these specific features relate to the fact that while the European Union is comprised of 15 Member States, only 11 of these have so far adopted the euro. We cannot therefore talk about the single monetary policy of the European Union, but rather, for this purpose, we must instead refer to the euro area, the euro zone or, as some people have chosen to call it, Euroland. A similar problem arises when we wish to refer to the authority responsible for the conduct of the euro area monetary policy. The Treaty establishing the European Community stipulates that this policy is to be conducted by an independent European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks of the 15 EU Member States.

Strong growth in the world and in China and India are driving a very good terms of trade scenario, together with good access to our products in world markets. Thanks to its openness and to its macroeconomic policy framework, Chile has reaped the benefits of this good scenario both in the sense of reaching average growth close to the trend and in accumulating resources that may permit to prevent a real appreciation while ensuring funding for public spending, should the terms of trade deteriorate. This policy framework permits to prevent episodes of unsustainable expansion and crises that came with terms of trade cycles in the past. BIS Review 87/2007  5
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: ASEAN – a dynamic region with diverse strengths Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the International Symposium “Ten Years After the Asian Currency Crisis: Future Challenges for the Asian Economies and Financial Markets”, hosted by the Center for Monetary Cooperation in Asia (CeMCoA), Bank of Japan, Tokyo, 22 January 2007. *  *  *  Ten years after the crisis, ASEAN stands out as a dynamic region with diverse strengths. With a growing population of over 550 million, ASEAN remains one of the fastest growing regions in the world (2005: 5.6%; world: 4.9%). The combined GDP of the ASEAN economies is expected to exceed USD 1 trillion in 2007. This growth has been extensive and includes all the developing economies in the group. The ASEAN economies have always been highly open economies, with total trade accounting for more than 130 percent of GDP and the value of trade flows now exceeding USD 1 trillion. In view of this high degree of openness, ASEAN has also always been vulnerable to external developments. The ASEAN economies have however demonstrated, time and again, their capacity to rebound from adverse shocks, and to do so within a short period of time. While the 1997 – 1998 crisis was devastating, most ASEAN economies were able to restore stability and resume growth just after a year. ASEAN has also continued to weather other both regional and international shocks that have since occurred.

Whereas it was once natural to put money into a normal savings account, this is no longer the case. Today, an increasingly large share of savings is being invested in various securities and the rapid expansion in the mutual fund market is an important part of this development. One only needs to look at the Swedish Mutual Fund Association's own report on mutual fund investment in Sweden to realise this. The statistics show that new mutual fund investment has increased gradually during the 1990s. In 1994 net investment in mutual funds totalled SEK 7.5 billion. Last year the corresponding figure was SEK 99.1 billion. This is an entirely natural development, as it has been possible to obtain a significantly higher yield from savings invested in various types of securities than from savings paid into a traditional savings account. Swedish investors have not only realised this, they have also understood how to use the financial market to spread their risk by investing money both in fixed income funds and in shares in different types of companies within different sectors and countries. Many people, including me, see this development as a positive thing; others are critical and express concern over what they call an insensitive fund capital, shovelling money around the world and quickly withdrawing from countries that show the slightest sign of problems. This criticism cannot be completely dismissed, but I do feel that it often does not fully take account of the importance of the financial sector for economic development.
Perhaps more tellingly, the increased competitiveness of our goods exports has succeeded in arresting the persistent decline in our share of world export markets seen over the past 15 years or so. In contrast, exports of services – at least as measured – have fallen. These declines are concentrated in exports of financial and business services, areas in which the UK has particular expertise. It would not be surprising in the current environment if this weakness partly reflects reduced global demand for these types of services. If that is the case, our prospects for net trade will depend in part on the extent to which demand for financial and business services revives as the recovery in world demand continues and the functioning of the financial system gradually returns to normal. Where does all this leave us? Judging the net impact of these opposing forces on the growth outlook is very difficult. The pattern of growth from quarter to quarter is quite likely to be choppy. But smoothing through this, my central view is that over the next few years the economy is likely to grow at rates around or a little above its historical average, supported by monetary policy and the lower level of sterling. This is similar to the outlook in the November Inflation Report. But to repeat the point I made earlier: the depth of the recession means that output and employment are likely to remain below what would feel like normal levels for many companies and families for some considerable time.

Another aspect that takaful agents must recognise is that takaful products embody universal value propositions that would appeal to all market segments, whether Muslim or not. One of the more distinct features of takaful is the distribution of surplus to takaful participants, reflecting the principles of solidarity, risk-sharing and mutuality among takaful participants. The outcome of this are not just socially meaningful products, but also commercially competitive ones. Take a motor takaful product as an example: In addition to the ‘No Claim Bonus’ feature that is common in conventional motor insurance, takaful participants could receive additional financial benefits when the takaful fund performs well through the sharing of surplus. Often, the advantages of the takaful products are not sufficiently highlighted, potentially hampering the competitiveness of takaful products The key is to continuously espouse the value propositions of takaful products. This is an aspect that agents could certainly help to address. The market potential for takaful products is so much larger than what is realised today. Let me offer you two key information. As at end-2016, insurance and takaful penetration in the B40 segment of working age stood at 30.3%, compared with the overall penetration rate of 46.8%. Second, the global Halal industry is worth USD2 trillion annually and Malaysia has a large and growing Halal industry. The question is to what extent the takaful industry fulfills the insurance needs of the Halal businesses.
Is this perhaps why there is less incentive to implement measures today? To mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, the most important measure is the work conducted in the political arena, together with the development of more environment-relatedly friendly technologies. At the same time, the authorities, private individuals and companies must address a new type of economic risk, climate risk. Climate risk includes physical climate risk and transition risk. Physical climate risk is associated with uncertainty about the economic consequences of higher temperatures and more extreme weather. There is a not insignificant probability of an outcome that is far more severe than the Paris Agreement is aiming for. Even if such an outcome does not materialise, and even if mitigation measures are able to limit the extent of the damage, the economic consequences could be considerable. Poor countries in the Global South will likely be hardest hit. Chart: Insurance payouts after natural disasters Norway is in a less vulnerable position, but we see that the weather is changing too. River and coastal flooding has increased and the damage caused is more severe, as reflected in insurance claims payouts. Over the past ten years, annual insurance payouts for climate-related flood and storm damage have been on average about five times higher than in the 1980s. Transition risk is associated with the economic consequences of the transition to a low-carbon economy.

The Norwegian banking sector and climate risks Norges Bank promotes stability in the Norwegian financial system. We have recently published our annual financial stability report. The report includes an analysis of adaptation to climate risk in the financial system. Economic losses resulting from changes in the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, new climate-friendly technology or new consumption patterns must primarily be borne by the individual firm and its owners. In the event of very substantial losses, the firm's lenders will also be affected. In Norway, these lenders are largely banks. Climate risks, and transition risk in particular, may thus be a source of credit risk for banks. Norwegian banks' exposures reflect the Norwegian economy and industry structure. I have already touched upon the substantial importance of the oil and gas industry to Norway’s economy. Lending to this industry is a possible source of transition risk for banks. Chart: Oil-related exposures, DNB Although Norwegian banks have reduced their exposure to the oil industry in recent years, this industry remains important for banks. However, banks’ losses may not be substantial unless a structural decline in oil-related industries results in substantial spillovers to the wider economy. This applies not least if there is a sharp fall in prices in the commercial and residential property markets, where banks’ lending exposures are highest. Banks can make a number of adjustments to reduce their own climate risk, primarily by correctly pricing the risk associated with their own exposures.
20.05.2019  The Need for Deepening Euro Area Integration City Week 2019: The International Financial Services Forum Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, Let me start by thanking Maurice Button and the Board of Patrons of City Week 2019 for their invitation to participate in City Week 2019. It is a pleasure to be here together with leading participants from the financial sector. 2019 marks the year in which we are celebrating the 20th anniversary of the launch of the euro. However, this celebration is taking place at quite a challenging point in time. The legacies of the crisis in terms of unemployment and debt, the rise of populism, the threat posed by protectionism and uncertainties stemming from Brexit all make for a complex situation. But to the surprise of many, this background has not reduced European citizens’ support for the European integration process. Quite the opposite I would say. Euro area citizens have declared the highest level of support for the euro ever recorded. The latest Eurobarometer survey shows that 74% of citizens across the euro area countries favour the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), with a single currency, the euro. The survey also reveals strong support for more coordination and economic reforms to improve the performance of national economies. These figures provide solid grounds for European governments and institutions to combine efforts aimed at making the euro area architecture more robust and resilient to shocks, and at increasing its ability to respond when shocks occur.

The banking sector still remains mainly national, and intertwined with the sovereign of its host jurisdiction. For bank depositors and national authorities, the current situation is such that the ultimate backstop for insuring deposits in a failed institution relies completely on a national government which has a limited say on the on-going supervision and resolution of the failed institution. This is so since decision-making processes on these responsibilities are now adopted by the European single mechanisms. 4/11  Notwithstanding cultural, legal or historical reasons, these inconsistencies and obstacles are broad-based, and stem from pure regulatory barriers, a lack of infrastructure or limited political resolve. The results are pervasive. Investment portfolios are not well diversified and investment opportunities are lost as these may not always be matched with savers’ funds. The financial system remains fragile and fragmented because of the doom-loop between sovereigns and banks. An important consequence of insufficient integration is the limited capacity of risk-sharing mechanisms in the Euro Area countries, compared with those of the United States. 5/11  As you know, risk-sharing is the ability of countries to diversify country-specific shocks among other member states through the cross-country savings and capital market channels (i.e. the private risk-sharing mechanisms), as well as through fiscal transfers (the public sector channel). With regard to the private channels, the degree of risk-sharing through capital markets is comparatively low in Europe.