samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This may be a particular concern among those who argue that the current low policy rate environment has fueled an unsustainable rise in asset prices beyond their fundamental values. However, this is not clearly the case on a broad basis. Obviously, risky asset prices have undergone a historic rise from their trough in early 2009. But this rise began from an extreme starting point, one in which asset prices were being depressed by the baseline forecast of a deep recession, by the prospect of further downside risks to the economy, and by very elevated risk premiums. As the economy stabilized, asset prices benefitted from both the improving economic outlook and a significant renormalization of risk premiums – a pattern that was a desired outcome from the stance of monetary policy. Moreover, we do not see definitive signs that risk premiums have broadly become too low at this point. To be sure, a number of significant risks remain in the economic outlook, and those translate into financial market risks. Eventually, though, we expect to reach a period of sustained, above-trend growth to absorb the substantial slack in place, which is an environment that should be quite supportive of risky asset prices. Policy tightening will presumably occur as that happens, limiting the downside risk to markets associated with policy actions. Conclusion In conclusion, the exit from the various liquidity facilities that the Federal Reserve implemented has been very successful, as the up-front design of those facilities reduced the need to actively manage the end of those programs.

Moreover, although nominal interest rates may be at very low levels, if inflation continues falling, real interest rates will trend upwards, contributing to reducing consumption and investment. Secondly, in economies posting a high level of public or private debt, or both, very high or rising real interest rates may exacerbate the difficulties of bringing about a reduction in household, corporate and public-sector debt, the reason being that the stock of debt, though it holds constant in nominal terms, will rise in real terms. The macro adjustment of a highly indebted economy in an environment of very low inflation or, indeed, deflation, thus becomes difficult and complex. And, thirdly, in relation to financial stability, the events we have seen in recent years indicate that asset price bubbles and the misallocation of financial resources may coexist alongside low inflation. If the situation of low inflation extends over time and draws close to deflation, we will arrive at very low or even negative interest rates, and that will entail additional risks for institutional investors, for the allocation of resources and for the sound functioning of the financial system. This was what we experienced in the euro area in the second half of last year. What role can monetary policy play in such a scenario? In September 2014, the ECB decided to expand the tools available to monetary policy by adding a private asset purchase programme followed, in January this year, by public-sector and public debt purchases.
To offset the impact of a shock on RPIX inflation in less than a year or so might imply undesirable volatility in output. BIS Review 63/1999  4  Hence the MPC has been given “constrained discretion” concerning the horizon over which it tries to bring inflation back to the target level. The appropriate horizon depends, in general, on the type and persistence of the shock. There is no simple rule to determine the appropriate horizon. It depends on the nature of the shocks. That is why the MPC spends so much time trying to unravel recent economic history. On average, since shocks may take several months to have their full effect, a horizon of about two years is a reasonable one over which to bring inflation back to its target. But if shocks are sufficiently large – in either direction – then it may be sensible to aim to bring inflation back to the target level over a somewhat different horizon. In such circumstances, the MPC would make that clear both in the minutes of its meetings and in the Inflation Report, and, if required, in an open letter to the Chancellor. Common objectives versus individual accountability During its first two years, the MPC has had to develop a modus vivendi to manage the potential tension between operating as a team with a common objective, on the one hand, and the requirement for individual accountability of its members, on the other.

In the US the application of new technology, especially information technology, is often held responsible for this improved performance. Such explanations should, in principle, apply to most industrialised countries, at least to some degree. But, whatever similarities there are in the recent economic performance of the US and UK, productivity growth is not one of them. Indeed, since 1990, UK productivity growth has been exactly in line with the thirty-year average. So it would be premature at this stage to suppose that there has been a permanent shift in productivity behaviour in the UK, although further study of the recent differences in productivity growth across countries and how they might relate to differences in the way information technology has affected working practices is important. 7  BIS Review 63/1999  If not productivity, what other changes might help to explain the recent benign behaviour of inflation? A more plausible explanation for the lower-than-expected growth rates of earnings, and hence prices, is, in my view, a fall in inflation expectations. If that is the case, then part of the improved performance of the last two or three years can be attributed to a combination of the “credibility windfall” resulting from the new monetary policy framework and the benign impact on inflation of the higher exchange rate and lower commodity and import prices. In order to assess whether economic relationships have changed, it is vital that the MPC have access to timely and accurate information. Official statistics comprise the bulk of information available to the MPC.
Koh Yong Guan: Review of Singapore’s economy and financial sector Opening remarks by Mr Koh Yong Guan, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the press conference releasing the MAS’s Annual Report, Singapore, 21 July 2004. *  *  *  Introduction Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Let me first give you a quick overview of current economic conditions. I  Supporting non-inflationary economic growth  As you know, the Singapore economy experienced a difficult first half last year. Global economic conditions had improved markedly since then, providing support for a rebound in the domestic economy. We have since recorded four consecutive quarters of solid growth. The latest economic data released by MTI showed that GDP in second quarter this year grew a robust 9.1% on a seasonally adjusted annual rate basis. Looking ahead, the prospects for the external economy remain bright. Notwithstanding the risks from rising interest rates, higher oil prices and a sharper than expected slowdown in China, the upturn in the global economy is likely to be sustained through the rest of this year and will support the continued expansion in the domestic economy. Barring any major shocks, Singapore is on track to achieve GDP growth of 5.5% to 7.5% this year. Following an extended period of very low domestic inflation, signs of inflationary pressures have emerged in recent months. The forecast for CPI inflation in 2004 was hence revised upwards to the 1.5-2.0% range.

We expect to implement the risk-based capital frameworks for life and general insurance companies in the third quarter of 2004. BIS Review 43/2004  1  III  Enhancing market discipline  On enhancing market discipline, we began inspection for compliance with the Financial Advisers Act (FAA) last year. We noted a number of best practices during these inspections and have published them in a paper. To alert investors here, we intend to publish a list of unlicensed entities based outside Singapore who are suspected of conducting activities regulated under the Securities and Futures Act and/or FAA. Details will be released by the end of the week. To help consumers become more self-reliant in their financial affairs, MAS has worked with other public sector agencies to launch MoneySENSE, a national financial education programme, in October 2003. In the next few months, MoneySENSE will conduct a national financial literacy survey to benchmark the current level of financial literacy among Singaporeans. We are also facilitating the development of an integrated dispute resolution scheme for the financial sector. IV  Developing the financial sector  On the developmental front, the wealth management industry grew considerably, both in institutional asset management and private banking. Financial institutions enjoyed fresh inflows of funds as well as substantial appreciation in the value of their assets under management. The alternative asset management industry also saw good growth, with the entry of hedge fund managers.
Chile’s economic outlook for 2014 Nevertheless, the changes we have seen in the world macroeconomic scenario have had an impact that exceeded our forecasts of some months ago. Our new projections for 2014 will be released in our upcoming March Monetary Policy Report, but it should come as no surprise that our growth outlook for this year has been corrected downward from December. Private forecasts have already internalized this change. What are the factors behind this? First and foremost, there has been a slowdown in domestic investment, caused by both the abatement of global mining investment cycle and other specific developments. The slowdown in consumption has been more gradual, in line with fundamentals that, although they ceased to improve, are still good. As I said, investment is the one component of expenditure that has endured the biggest adjustments in the past few quarters. One explanation is the deceleration of emerging economies, China mostly, and the impact it has had on commodity prices, particularly metals. The price of our main export – copper – is around $ dollars per pound, compared with a little over $ a year ago and nearly $ in early 2012. In addition, the outlook for future prices has also been revised downward, triggering a postponement of mining investments whose effects spread to other economic sectors. At any rate, what is happening in Chile has been mirrored in other metal exporters, but maybe with a different timing.

As a matter of fact, the pass-through effect of exchange rate movements on prices has been weakening worldwide, in environments where price stability has been ensured thanks to highly reliable monetary policies, attributable to the facts that pricing in domestic currency is widespread, and owing to low and stable inflation, losses of value in the domestic currency are perceived as temporary and firms resort to price adjustments less frequently. At this point I would like to clarify one issue on the exchange rate policy of the Central Bank. The Central Bank has no policy towards keeping the Turkish lira overvalued. As always mentioned from the beginning of the implementation of the floating exchange rate regime, exchange rates are determined under the supply and demand conditions in the market. In case of excessive volatility in both directions, the Central Bank intervenes or if there is an excess foreign exchange supply Central Bank holds FX buying auctions to increase foreign exchange reserves. So we should keep in mind that in the current design of the monetary policy, with the floating exchange rate regime, level of foreign exchange rates is determined according to the developments in economy, exogenous shocks, expectations and volatility in risk premium as a result of all these. Dear participants, I would like to briefly mention what the economy of our country can gain if the main goal, which is price stability, is accomplished after the disinflation process.
BIS Review 47/2001  5  There is substantial uncertainty associated with developments in Japan. Industrial output and exports have declined. The financial sector is struggling in the face of large losses and poor performance, and the general price level is falling. In the euro area the picture is mixed. Growth is solid in countries like France, Finland and Ireland. Germany has a large internationally exposed industrial sector, which is feeling the effects of the 1 slowdown in growth in the US and Asia. In a survey , growth forecasts for Germany have been revised downwards this year from 3 per cent a few months ago to a good 2 per cent. Economic growth prospects for Sweden and the UK are also weaker than a few months ago. However, the easing of monetary and fiscal policy in many countries should contribute to a pick-up in growth and reduce the risk of a pronounced international downturn. The Norwegian economy will be particularly hard hit by an international downturn if this translates into a sharp fall in oil prices and other commodity prices that are important for Norwegian exports. This would lead to lower export revenues and slower growth. Employment would also be affected. An international downturn would also lead to lower prices for imported goods and services and thereby reduce domestic inflation. If other Nordic countries are negatively affected, this will have an impact on the supply of labour in Norway since the Nordic labour market has become increasingly integrated.

The direct effects of these factors on inflation are exhausted after a year. Hence these factors do not have any implications for the interest rate, which is normally set with a view to maintaining inflation at 2½ per cent two years ahead. However, it is still interesting to adjust monthly inflation figures for temporary effects to determine whether developments are broadly in line with our projections. This is why Norges Bank presents figures for consumer price inflation where the effects of some temporary factors are excluded. However, the automatic adjustment of inflation figures for direct effects of one-off factors can also be associated with pitfalls. Higher indirect taxes and electricity prices can be a source of accelerating inflation via spillover effects on other prices and wages. BIS Review 47/2001  3  The mandate for monetary policy with an inflation target provides a sound basis for assessing Norges Bank's interest rate setting. Inflation at one point in time, adjusted for certain temporary effects, provides a measure of whether interest rate setting was appropriate. Market participants and others can assess the quality in the inflation reports and analyses published by the Bank, and whether our analyses are consistent with our interest rate setting. The uncertainty associated with economic developments and inflation, as observed since the mid-1990s, may indicate that we normally reach the inflation target within an interval of +/- 1 percentage point. The Government has assigned a task to Norges Bank. Norges Bank uses its professional judgement in a delimited area.
Among the services that will be available are advisory services on banking, insurance & takaful and SMEs financing related matters; retrieval of personal credit status through the Central Credit Reference Information System (CCRIS); and advisory on any other financial related matters under the purview of the Bank. The introduction of MobileLINK complements the series of consumer financial advisory initiatives that have been introduced by the Bank since 2005 with the establishment of BNMLINK at the Bank’s six offices; the Bank’s call center, BNMTELELINK; as well as BNMLINK mobile counter services in semi-urban areas to provide access of financial information and consumer redress mechanisms. The introduction of MobileLINK also provides a platform for enhancing financial literacy and financial capability of consumers to make well informed and responsible financial decisions and thus participate meaningfully and effectively in the financial system. Akhir kata, saya ingin merakamkan penghargaan kepada semua hadirin sekalian yang memberi sokongan kepada inisiatif “MobileLINK” ini. Kami berharap inisiatif ini akan dapat merealisasikan usaha Bank dalam mencapai rangkuman kewangan yang menyeluruh. Bagi mencapai objektif ini, kerjasama pihak yang hadir pada hari ini dengan Bank Negara Malaysia adalah dialu-alukan bagi memastikan usaha yang lebih bersepadu dan berkesan dapat digembleng bersama. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

At the same time, it is of course desirable that the measures targeted at household indebtedness and the housing market do not in themselves lead to an economic downturn or unnecessarily obstruct monetary policy. The primary aims of policy in this area must be to ensure that the build-up of household debt slows down, that the households gradually become more resilient to shocks of various kinds and that the housing and mortgage markets become more effective. This is thus a question of a long-term adjustment process that must take place in suitablylarge steps. The amortisation proposal – a step in the right direction I see last week’s amortisation proposal as one such suitably-large step in the right direction. As only new mortgages will be covered, increased amortisation will be phased in over a long period of time. In combination with many new mortgage borrowers already amortising, and because the proposal entails only a moderate increase in amortisation rates, this means that the macroeconomic consequences will probably be small during the first few years. According to the Riksbank’s estimate, the amortisation proposal will have reduced the household debt ratio by 0.6 percentage points after five years compared with a base scenario. This means that the proposal will increase amortisation payments by less than 0.1 per cent of GDP per year during the period.5 The amortisation proposal thus appears to be well balanced at the moment, but work on the long-term adjustment process must continue. There are many factors to take into account when considering further measures.
See also Northern Rock’s 2008 Annual Report and accounts P25/6. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  large. Introducing a break clause allowing either counterparty to terminate the contract effectively shortens the maturity of the swap, since the bank (or the company, in case it is owed money and the bank’s credit appears more shaky) can demand payment at that time. In reality, most corporates do not expect such a break clause ever to be exercised. The concern would be that, if the corporate expects the bank to ignore the break clause regardless of the circumstances, exercising the clause would be a surprise for which the firm may not have put appropriate contingencies in place – perhaps even making default more likely. Or that the market may start to interpret the enforcement of “break clauses” as a sign of weakness on the bank’s part. In other words, such behaviour could be seen as so antagonizing to customers that a bank would only do it if it is absolutely desperate. Yet if the bank cannot in fact enforce the break clause, its credit pricing and risk management has been faulty. Another example, comprising elements of the break clause and the SIV problem, is the behaviour of managers of money market funds when faced with the prospect of “breaking the buck”. A money market fund calculates its net asset value (NAV) on a daily basis. The NAV is its price per share, which reflects the total value of the fund’s investment holdings.

Monetary policy and asset bubbles In my opinion, this crisis should lead to a critical reevaluation of the view that central banks cannot identify or prevent asset bubbles, they can only clean up after asset bubbles burst. As I wrote in 2006, this orthodoxy can be summarized by three propositions: 1. Asset bubbles are hard to identify. 2. Monetary policy is not well-suited to respond to bubbles. 3. Thus, the cost/benefit tradeoff of “leaning against the wind” against asset bubbles is unfavorable. From these propositions, the two important policy implications directly follow: 1. The central bank should only take asset bubbles into consideration in the conduct of monetary policy to the extent that these asset bubbles affect the growth/inflation outlook. 2. The monetary authorities should be there to “clean-up” after bubbles burst, both to prevent systemic problems and undesired downward pressure on economic activity and/or inflation. Relative to this, I would argue that:  BIS Review 83/2009  3  1. Asset bubbles may not be that hard to identify – especially large ones. For example, the housing bubble in the United States had been identified by many by 2005, and the compressed nature of risk spreads and the increased leverage in the financial system was very well known going into 2007. 2. If one means by monetary policy the instrument of short-term interest rates, then I agree that monetary policy is not well-suited to deal with asset bubbles.
We are also encouraged by the leadership shown by the Lord Mayor Alderman Alan Yarrow who is also President of TheCityUK’s Advisory Committee during his visit to Malaysia in May 2015 to discuss ways to further strengthen the collaboration between our countries with Islamic finance as the intermediary, in particular in the areas of trade and investment. Malaysia-UK relationship The UK-Malaysia’s relationship stretched back many centuries. Our strong and close linkages in social, economic and finance span over a period of 200 years that have delivered great economic benefits and opportunities to both countries. In Islamic finance, our collaborative partnership formally began with the MoU between Bank Negara Malaysia and the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) in 2009. The collaboration paves the way for both countries to strengthen international linkages in talent and expertise, cross border business and infrastructure support. Islamic finance: prospects & opportunities Islamic finance has increased its significant in the international financial landscape. As at third quarter of 2014, global banking asset has reached almost USD2 trillion whilst Islamic fund assets and takaful contributions amounted to USD76 billion and USD21 billion, respectively 1. As at end June 2015, total sukuk or Islamic bond outstanding stood at USD313 billion with Malaysia making up 55% or USD172 billion of total market share 2. 1  Source: IFSB 3Q2014. 2  Source: Bloomberg, Zawya. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The increased participation of non-Muslim jurisdictions also reflects the positive acceptance of Islamic finance among the global community.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We are committed to jointly resolving any outstanding issues, if any, for the purpose of advancing Islamic finance activities in both countries. We hope significant deals could be initiated following today’s event to facilitate cross-border flow of funds between both countries and regions, with the Malaysian delegation ready to share their experiences and expertise in this area. For example, Malaysian players can partner with the UK players to structure a syndicated Islamic financing facility or joint lead-arrange a sukuk issuance for any of the identified UK regeneration projects. Both London and Kuala Lumpur can succeed and prosper as leading global financial centres in Islamic finance. We are open to challenges and new ideas and look forward to working together with TheCityUK through a strengthened partnership to achieve these objectives in the years to come. A UK-Malaysia Working Group may provide that strategic platform to holding continuous dialogues for this purpose. With this, I wish the Forum an engaging and fruitful discussion. Thank you  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3