samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is not just a case of making sure that those that buy bank debt that can be bailed in realise the risks of the instruments they have purchased. It also means making sure that creditors understand the resolution strategy of the institution to which they have lent money. Unprotected depositors in institutions that have no bail-in debt should be clear that in the event of trouble, they stand next in line after shareholders when it comes to absorbing losses. Conclusion As I’ve tried to show, the question of how to deal with failing banks and who pays is not new. But the answers have changed over time. We no longer think we should rely on a diet of bread and water, unlimited liability, Shakespearian recitals, ordinary depositors or the taxpayer to bear the burden of failed banks. Our success can never be absolute. We can’t expect to insulate fully all institutions from all external shocks, however large.14 We have, however, in my view, put in place the legal, financial and practical arrangements to resolve banks of all sizes. But it will only be true if we implement the new regime on resolution fully. Both regulators and industry have an incentive to do so. If, next time there is a crisis, authorities face the same unenviable choice as in the crisis, if taxpayer bailouts cannot be avoided, then the case for breaking up banks and making them much, much simpler will be very hard to resist.

The impact has been identified and quantified; the bailout of Continental Illinois in 1984 artificially reduced the funding costs of all other banks that were considered ‘too big to fail’ by  4  2  The ‘Lifeboat’ was a Control Committee of the Bank of England and the English and Scottish clearing banks, consisting of senior representatives of each under the chairmanship of the Deputy Governor of the Bank, which first met on 28th December 1973. BIS central bankers’ speeches  more than a quarter of a percentage point (32bps).5 And while fluctuating over time, these ‘implicit subsidies’ remained sizable throughout most of the 1990s and 2000s. And indeed, expectations of bailouts were generally right. Very few banks were allowed to go into insolvency in the global financial crisis. Lehman was very much the exception that proved the rule. The impact of Lehman’s failure revealed that things had not moved on since Continental Illinois; the official machinery in most jurisdictions was completely unable to handle the failure of a large – or in the UK case even a medium-sized – banks in a way that did not pose risks to the financial system. So in most cases banks were bailed out. The risks of contagion, loss of confidence in the system and disruption to the provision of banking to the economy were simply too great. But the costs had grown since the Continental Illinois episode of the 1980s.
Financial Institutions are required to conduct customer due diligence to deter and detect proceeds from serious foreign tax offences, even if they are not offences in Singapore. •  We will automatically extend Exchange of Information (EOI) assistance in accordance with OECD standard to all existing Avoidance of Double Tax Agreement (DTA) partners without the need for negotiation. •  We signed the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  What is less well-known is the rigorous supervisory regime in place to combat financial crime. MAS’ approach is preventive. •  We seek to identify control weaknesses early so that financial institutions can strengthen their processes and prevent attempts to launder money or finance terrorism. •  This is more effective than punishing financial institutions only after actual acts have been committed and detected. Our coverage is comprehensive. •  Over last three years, MAS conducted total of 108 Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) inspections covering banks, insurance companies, money changers, remittance agents, and licensed intermediaries. •  Financial institutions have enhanced AML/CFT controls over the years, and most have in place the necessary policies, procedures and controls to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Financial institutions with control deficiencies are firmly dealt with. •  •  Example: –  A bank which facilitated ship-closing transactions, did not conduct adequate due diligence on the final identity of buyers behind these transactions.

Digital finance: a regulatory challenge [Go toslide 5] I will now turn to digital finance and its regulatory and supervisory challenges. 2.1. Rapidly growing markets but increased risks This digital finance relies on new players, new assets and new infrastructures. Among these new players are big techs, which should not be reduced to the GAFAMs alone. These have made targeted and fragmented inroads into financial services. These incursions include the provision of cloud services to financial institutions, which are progressively migrating their IT systems and infrastructures to these new solutions in order to reduce costs, increase the flexibility and security of their infrastructures, and improve customer experience. Furthermore, big techs are setting up their own financial activities, in a fragmented and unregulated manner, in the form of technical services (e.g. Apple Pay digital wallet, Google Pay, etc. ), or in the form of financial products and services (savings products, loans, issuance or trading of cryptoassets, etc.) which are developed in-house or in collaboration with traditional players. For example, Apple offers a savings account in partnership with Goldman Sachs, while also offering its own fractional payment service. What are the risks associated with these inroads into financial services?
In a scenario where the world fails to transition to a low-carbon economy, the risk increases, including for the fund, because the consequences of large-scale climate change will be felt everywhere. As an investor in equities, bonds and real assets, we have investments in everything from real estate and infrastructure to forestry and food production. All of these investments could be hurt by changes in the environment such as heatwaves, floods or fires. We own a little of everything. For a large, long-term, global fund, there will be nowhere to hide. Climate risk is an important long-term risk that the fund needs to address. What does a long-term goal of net zero emissions mean for the fund? One key recommendation from the expert group is that Norges Bank’s responsible investment is given a long-term goal of working towards net zero emissions from the companies in which the fund is invested. Norges Bank supports this recommendation. Some might interpret this as a plan to divest from companies with high emissions. But that is not our intention, nor is it what the expert group is recommending. Instead of divesting, we aim to use active ownership to be a driver for change, pushing companies to make the transition to net zero emissions. To have that influence, we need to be on board as a shareholder. And we believe that our active ownership works. It works because we are large.

Norges Bank is among the top ten shareholders at around half of the companies we are invested in, and we have found that companies listen to what we have to 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  say. Responsible investment – a chain of tools Chart: Responsible investment – a chain of tools Responsible investment is the most important tool in our work on climate risk and climate-related investment opportunities. I will now look at some important parts of this work. We are already doing a great deal, but we now plan to do even more. This work can be divided into three target areas: markets, companies and the portfolio. This results in a complete chain of tools. I will not review this work in detail here, but focus on a few key aspects. Establishing standards The first, establishing standards, concerns standards for reporting and measuring companies’ climate risk. Good common standards are important. They help us as an investment manager to assess companies’ prospects, prioritise our ownership efforts and make sound investment decisions. And not just us. Better reporting will also make financial markets function better and channel capital better. International standards provide consistency across markets and set the bar for all companies. We, and other large investors, have an important part to play in the development of such standards. One particularly important initiative we have supported is the climate reporting framework from the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).
In order to minimize the ill effects of using a central bank’s profits for government expenditure, Exter has made special provisions in the Monetary Law regarding the application of profits of the Central Bank. Accordingly, out of the surpluses of the Central Bank, the first charges should be to build the reserves of the Bank to support the currency it issues. Any remaining balance should be utilized to retire the government’s borrowings from the Central Bank or paid into the government as a normal profit transfer. However, it has to be done collaboratively by the Minister of Finance and the Monetary Board, having taken into account the inflationary impact of each such measure. As such, the government does not have the first claim on the profits of the Central Bank, though it is owned by the government. The profit criteria that are applicable to other governmental institutions are, therefore, not applicable to the Central Bank. A general concern which has often been raised at numerous public fora has been the existence or the absence of the independence of the Central Bank. Many have found fault with Exter for making the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance a member of the Monetary Board. They have argued that this official member with his own self interest in funding the government expenditure programs would use the opportunity to dictate terms to the Monetary Board, thereby permitting the fiscal policy to override monetary policy.

But for the time being, and whatever the precise numbers, the overall prospect for the British economy over the next couple of years is for output growth picking up to around trend and inflation to around target. And it was against that background that we left interest rates unchanged at our MPC meeting last week. I gather that the EEF was "deeply disappointed" at that decision, having been hoping for a cut. And I really do understand why, seeing things from the perspective of the manufacturing sector in particular, you might take a somewhat more pessimistic view of the prospects than did the MPC. We are - as I have explained - well aware of the degree of uncertainty inherent in any forecast, and do not pretend we have a crystal ball. But I can assure you that if, as we move forward, it seems likely that the overall economy will be weaker than we currently expect, and inflation lower, then we are prepared to reduce interest rates further, just as we stand ready to raise them if the overall economy, and inflation, appear likely to be stronger than we currently anticipate. Mr President, the past year or so has been a difficult time for the world economy which has made life increasingly difficult for the internationally-exposed sectors of our own economy - including large parts of manufacturing. And things could remain difficult for a time. But it won't last for ever.
The role played by cash in payments from customers to companies is declining steadily, but the position of cash as a means of payment between private individuals is still strong. Unless cash is superseded in this area of usage, it will continue to play an important role in our payment system. I therefore believe that the major challenge to cash will come if a new payment service appears that could be used to make quick and safe payments between private individuals. There are interesting projects and products that may threaten cash in this respect. Sweden is well to the fore in this field and the Swedish banks are working on an interesting mobile phone-based service for person-to-person payments in real time.3 Square is another interesting product, as yet only available in the United States, that allows card payments to be made between private individuals by connecting a small card reader to a mobile phone.4 Whatever path technological development takes, it will probably mean that the use of cash continues to decline. We will have more payment services to choose between and competition will increase. How far the use of cash is pushed back will depend on what alternative payment services are established. The same barriers that protect cards against competing products will also protect cash to a certain extent. But, above all, cash is simple and easy to use as a means of payment, especially for small transactions. This is appreciated by the consumers and it has proven to be quite difficult to change consumer habits.

Countries are expected to anchor fiscal prudence in national rules, creating a much more “vertically integrated” concept of governance. All these measures were unthinkable four years ago. If we look at the conclusions of Euro Summit on 26 October – dismissed by some observers as insufficient – we see even more radical steps envisaged for the future. Euro area countries have committed to adopt balanced budget rules. They have agreed to base their budgets on independent growth forecasts. They have agreed to stick to the recommendations of the Commission when implementing the Stability and Growth Pact. Countries in the Excessive Deficit Procedure – which is currently 14 out of 17 euro area countries – will allow the Commission to examine draft national budgets and monitor budget execution. Although some of the recent governance reforms, like those that formed part of the so-called “Six-pack” proposed by the European Commission, fall short of the “quantum leap” that the ECB had long advocated for the euro area, they still represent significant progress relative to the situation prevailing before the crisis. The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility and future European Stability Mechanism could also not have been imagined in 2007. The euro area has institutionalised the provision of sovereign liquidity and agreed to a Treaty change to ensure its legality. As the new facilities have developed, they have acquired a range of tools.
To complete this list of policy challenges that are important to U.S. competitiveness, let me conclude with a few brief points on the broader imperatives of macroeconomic policy. The United States faces very substantial gaps between our fiscal resources and our expenditure commitments. The size of these gaps, these deficits, have been masked in recent years by a substantial, unanticipated and probably transitory surge in revenues, and by an unusually long period of unusually low long-term interest rates, in part the consequence of foreign official capital flows. But these gaps remain substantial and the U.S. fiscal position is unsustainable. Time does not help. We are going to have to begin to develop a political consensus on the mix of policy changes that can bring our commitment and resources more into balance, if we are to preserve confidence in our market and our long-term economic prospects. One of the most important roles for public policy is the maintenance of a stable macroeconomic framework that enables firms to make long-term investment decisions. In this sense, the fiscal policy choices ahead for this country will be critically important to the overall environment in which U.S. enterprises operate. The business community will play an important role in shaping the policy response to these longer-term economic challenges. These reforms will have a long fuse. The benefits will be shared broadly, rather than captured specifically by particular sectors of the economy.

Here is how Norman described the relationship between the Bank of England and the Government in the 1930s: AUDIO INSERT: “The Bank of England has always been constitutionally a private body... but what matters is not the position on paper but the position in practice. In monetary as in other matters the Government of the day must have the final word and this is fully recognised.” Today, the position on paper and the position in practice are the same. Our job is given to us by the Government and by Parliament. But for me, the story of the modern independent Bank of England began exactly fifteen years ago in early May 1997. It was a Bank Holiday Monday, immediately following the general election. After an early morning tennis match, I returned home to find a message from the Governor, Eddie George. He wanted to meet me in the Bank as soon as possible. An hour later we met in his office, alone in the imposing building known to most of you only by the facade shown on television. Eddie told me of his meeting that morning with the Chancellor, Gordon Brown, who had explained the proposal for Bank independence. It was something for which Eddie and I had worked for five years since Britain’s departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Now we had a chance to show what an independent central bank could do.
Is this method to the disadvantage of other countries? The method is to the advantage or disadvantage of other countries depending on whether a normal monetary policy expansion, an interest rate cut, is to the advantage or disadvantage of other countries. The effects of a small, open economy's monetary policy on other countries is normally limited, and the net effect depends on a number of circumstances. Monetary policy is normally conducted in each country without regard to such effects. The impact that a currency depreciation or a monetary expansion in a larger country has on the trade balance of other countries depends on both income and substitution effects. The former is positive due to the greater output and the greater demand for foreign imports, while the latter is negative due to changes in the real exchange rate and the terms of trade. Depending on the initial position, the positive income effect can be quite substantial. However, as the income and substitution effects normally have different signs it can be expected that the net effect is normally fairly small. This is supported by simulation studies. 14 Today, however, we have a situation in which the two largest economies in the world, the US and Japan, both have a zero interest rate. If the authorities in these countries want to stimulate the real economy by lowering the real interest rate further by creating higher inflation expectations, they clearly cannot do this by depreciating their currencies against each other at the same time.

François Villeroy de Galhau: New Year wishes 2023 New Year wishes to the Paris financial centre by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de resolution (ACPR), Paris, 5 January 2023. *** Allow me to extend my warmest wishes for 2023 on behalf of the Banque de France and the ACPR. I don't know if I dare wish you, or wish us, a year free of shocks after those of 2020, 2021 and 2022. This past year has been marked by a climate of uncertainty, exacerbated by Russia's war in Ukraine and the energy crisis. It has also seen increased financial market volatility, compounded by the turmoil in the cryptoasset universe. In this unstable environment, I would like to make two double wishes for 2023: 1) Less inflation and more stabilisation. Activity has, until now, proved more resilient than expected, which is good news; however, inflation must not become entrenched. It is the number one concern for French people, and defeating it is our number one mission. It fell in December to 6.7%, which is encouraging but still not enough. It should peak in the first half, before declining towards 4% by the end of this year. But our forecast, and our commitment, is that inflation should be brought down towards 2% by end-2024 to end-2025.
[20] A digital euro should enhance rather than constrain services and business options so that service providers can enrich their portfolio and develop new products and services around a digital euro to the benefit of their customers. In this light, we are stepping up our engagement with banks and other market stakeholders, including consumer representatives and retailers. We are listening carefully to their views. [21]  Conclusion Let me conclude. We are designing a digital euro that would make central bank money usable for digital payments, giving Europeans a digital means of payment that they can use throughout the euro area for their everyday payments and supporting Europe’s societal objectives. Having digital money issued by the central bank and available to everyone would provide an anchor of stability for the payments market, preserving the coexistence of public and private money that has served us well so far. By distributing digital euro, intermediaries will play a key role. We are working to address at an early stage any possible undesirable consequences that may result from the issuance of a digital euro for monetary policy, financial stability and the allocation of credit to the real economy. Your role as co-legislators will be key to ensuring that the necessary regulatory framework is in place for both public and private forms of money in the digital age. For my part, I will continue to report to you regularly as we progress to the next steps in our investigation phase. I now look forward to our discussion. 1.

Finally, further clarification should be made to differentiate ARTs referring to other crypto-assets from conventional financial instruments: an ART designed to maintain a stable value by referring to another crypto-asset, or a basket of crypto-assets, could be considered as a financial instrument (e.g. a crypto-asset tracking the value of another crypto-asset may be an exchange-traded fund (ETF)). Such an asset should be subject to the relevant EU legislation (such as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive or the Market Abuse Regulation). 12. It would also be beneficial if the new European anti-money laundering authority were to supervise the riskiest crypto-asset providers, as this would help considerably in harmonising supervision across all EU Member States. 13. For a full overview of the effects on the monetary and financial system stemming from the introduction of a digital euro, see Panetta, F. (2021), “The present and future of money in the digital age”, lecture at Federcasse’s Lectiones cooperativae, Rome, 10 December. See also Adalid, R, et al. (2022), “Central bank digital currency and bank intermediation”, Occasional Paper Series, No 293, ECB, May. The analyses presented in this paper look at different approaches for assessing the effects of a digital euro on euro area banks. 14. Overnight retail (household and non-financial corporation) deposits make up around 40% of euro area banks’ total liabilities. Retail deposits are the defining feature of commercial banks – the receiving of deposits and repayable funds is the first criterion of a credit institution in EU law.