samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Joseph Yam: Competition and cooperation among global and regional financial centres Congratulatory remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the ACI Asia – The Financial Markets Association, Hong Kong, 11 July 2008. *  *  *  Mr Wiebogen, Mr Tan, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is with great pleasure that I join you this evening to mark the inauguration of ACI Asia – The Financial Markets Association. On behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, I would like first to offer my congratulations to all those who have worked hard over the last couple of months on the establishment of ACI Asia. Special congratulations are also appropriate to Mr Wiebogen and Mr Tan for the foresight and leadership they have demonstrated in this initiative. Financial markets in the developed economies have been experiencing considerable stress. At the risk of oversimplifying it, the current financial turmoil can be attributed to financial innovation creating distortions in the financial system, including the compensation schemes for the innovative lot, to such an extent as to lead to a serious erosion of credit standards. It is at a time like this that everybody should be reminded of the importance of professionalism in finance, at all stages of financial intermediation.

Natural to raise the repo rate 2010–2011 Purchasing Managers’ Index in the manufacturing sector  Lending to households and companies  An index over 50 indicates growth  Annual percentage change  GDP  Inflation  Quarterly change in per cent calculated as an annual rate, Seasonally-adjusted data. Annual percentage change  6  CPIF excluding energy CPIF CPI  4  6 4  2  2  0  0  -2  06  08  10  12  14  -2  Note. Forecasts from April 2011. Sources: Institute for Supply Management (ISM), Swedbank, Statistics Sweden and Sveriges Riksbank  18 [20]  Figure 3. Troubling situation at turn of year 2014-2015 Inflation  Annual percentage change  Inflation expectations Annual percentage change  Note. Measured using the CPIF (left) and the CPI (right). Sources: Statistics Sweden and TNS Sifo Prospera  Figure 4. 2015–2017 – inflation rises towards target again Inflation  Annual percentage change  Inflation expectations Annual percentage change  Note. Measured using the CPIF (left) and the CPI (right). Sources: Statistics Sweden and TNS Sifo Prospera  19 [20]  Figure 5. The development of services prices indicates that the Phillips curve works Annual percentage change  Note. Broken lines represent mean values since 2000. Source: Statistics Sweden  Figure 6.
In view of the extent and risks of the current crisis, fiscal policy will need to consider and prepare the deployment of additional stabilisation measures alongside the automatic stabilisers. In addition to the increased focus on economic policy, business practitioners within the Swiss economy are also challenged. In the case of banks, it is essential that credit shortages for companies and private households be avoided. Moreover, interbank business needs to be strengthened in order to smooth out liquidity imbalances. Companies must enhance their innovativeness and use opportunities for opening up new markets. The Swiss economy has many structural strengths and this prompts confidence that Switzerland will overcome the crisis. BIS Review 5/2009  1

European countries, by contrast, had a full range of workable  BIS Review 53/1999  2  options and chose the euro only after a long and thorough process of analysis, deliberation and preparation. If adopting a fixed rate was going to succeed anywhere, Hong Kong was certainly a prime candidate, because of the proven flexibility of the economy - not least the labour market, in terms of both inter-sectoral mobility and wage-cost flexibility. What has been surprising to many outside observers about the road to the euro is that, while it has all along been acknowledged that greater internal flexibility within the member economies would be required as a substitute for adjustment of relative price levels via the exchange rate, progress in that direction has been extremely slow. Indeed, in the period since the euro proposal first acquired real momentum it is probably true to say that some of the internal adjustment mechanisms in participant countries have become more rigid rather than less so. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to hear of worries about possible tensions in policy-making which the persisting disparities of economic performance across Euroland may cause. I have even read - but from sources which are probably more gossip than anything else - of the possibility of Maastricht budget deficit criteria in parts of Euroland being breached in order to sustain or stimulate growth. Of course, you may argue that this - budgetary relaxation - is precisely what we are doing in Hong Kong.
According to Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank, settlement of instant payments in SEK may be made available on the TIPS platform. If so, this would mean that at least some Swedish real-time payments will not be cleared through P27, which could affect the profitability of the project. Norges Bank is aware that the industry is also assessing other possible Norwegian solutions for better real-time payments in Norway. In its letter sent in October to Finance Norway and the P27 banks in Norway, Norges Bank called upon the banks to continue this work. The objective must 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  be to make the necessary adjustments to the Norwegian infrastructure as quickly as possible to give both businesses and private individuals in Norway access to modern real-time payments on a 24/7/365 basis. The technological set-up should be adapted to customers’ needs, particularly businesses, while also eliminating interbank settlement risk. As far as possible, the set-up should also be suitable for use in future solutions, such as P27, including a system for control of reserve cover at Norges Bank. Reusing a technological set-up will keep total costs down. Establishing a satisfactory Norwegian solution for instant payments will also decouple P27 work from any deadlines for the system in Norway, which in time may increase the chances of success for the P27 initiative. A common infrastructure for all payments has given Norway an important competitive advantage, provided economies of scale and facilitated interaction across the banking sector.

(1999), “  Do efficient financial markets mitigate financial crises?”, speech before the 1999 Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia, 19 October. [4] The net asset value spread refers to the difference between the price at which exchange-traded fund shares trade and the net asset value of the underlying portfolio held by the fund per share. This may also suggest that exchange-traded fund prices provided more upto-date information, thereby supporting price discovery. See Financial Stability Board (2020),  Holistic Review of the March Market Turmoil, 17 November. [5] Duffie, D. (2020), “  Still the World’s Safe Haven? Redesigning the U.S. Treasury Market after the COVID-19 Crisis”, Hutchins Center Working Papers, No 62, June. [6] It is even conceivable that the market turmoil could have been worse without the more stringent regulatory requirements on dealers, which helped to ensure their resilience during the spring. [7] At the same time, higher cash holdings were associated with substantially weaker performance in 2018-19 compared with previous years, potentially reflecting the high costs of holding cash in a low interest rate environment. [8] Schrimpf, A. et al. (2020), “  Leverage and margin spirals in fixed income markets during the Covid-19 crisis”, BIS Bulletin, No 2, Bank for International Settlements, 2 April. [9] Vivar, L.M. et al. (2020), “  Burned by leverage? Flows and fragility in bond mutual funds”, Working Paper Series, No 2413, ECB, May. [10] Vassallo, D. et al.
These inflationary impulses will be influenced by developments in international commodity and consumer prices and by the exchange rate. The inflation target provides the framework for monetary policy. Norges Bank’s Executive Board makes decisions about changes in the interest rate. The members of the Executive Board are collectively responsible for the Bank’s decisions. The Executive Board meets every three weeks. At every second meeting, the Executive Board discusses monetary policy in depth. Decisions regarding changes in the interest rate will normally be made at these monetary policy meetings. Three times a year, Norges Bank prepares inflation reports in which it presents its projections for inflation and economic developments in the years ahead. The Executive Board discusses the economic outlook at a separate meeting three weeks before the Inflation Report is presented. On the basis of preliminary projections for the report, the Executive Board assesses the outlook for inflation two years ahead and the uncertainty surrounding these projections. The following day, the Executive Board summarises its discussions and assesses the consequences for monetary policy for the next four months. This assessment constitutes an important internal reference when the Executive Board later makes a decision regarding the interest rate. It will also provide the basis for our external communication through speeches and the media. BIS Review 8/2002  1  The risk of a deep recession in the world economy appears to have diminished. There is still, however, considerable uncertainty surrounding both the timing and the strength of the recovery.

This FCI Survey 2021 was conducted immediately after the reopening of our economy in Q4 2021, and helped reveal the mixed effect of the pandemic on the financial capability of Malaysians. On one hand, the challenges presented by COVID-19 pressured Malaysians to be more careful about their finances. At the same time, many struggled to take appropriate steps to gain control of their situation. The findings from the FCI Survey 2021 provide valuable input to sharpen the implementation of the National Strategies for Financial Literacy 2019-2023. The survey's insights can also inform the Financial Education Network (FEN) in initiating measurement and evaluation mechanisms to roll out more effective and tailored programmes to inspire sustained behavioural change. I understand that 20 research papers have been shortlisted by the Scientific Committee for the Symposium, and I look forward to insightful presentations on this theme. In rebuilding financial resilience, it will be important to have a well-textured understanding of issues such as how the pandemic has affected the economic livelihood of Malaysians, trends in digitalisation and digital financial literacy, as well as short-term attitudes toward finance among Malaysians. It is therefore my hope that the Symposium today will be a platform for us to exchange experiences to identify critical questions, knowledge gaps and new ideas, as well as develop a shared understanding of measures to advance financial literacy among  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Malaysians.
We are watching again very carefully, and I can assure you that as prudential regulator we want to see sensible outcomes that balance the objectives of all parties and ensure that we maintain a stable financial system that can support the activity of today’s customers. Nobody wants to see a world where ex-post enforcement weakens the capacity to support economic activity, and that means we must return as soon as possible to a world where the emphasis is on strong risk management, governance and forward-looking supervision. This review of risks covers much of our work programme for the year. Two other points I would note. First, we are reviewing the Sourcebook which since the beginning of April has been called a Supervisory Statement. The Sourcebook was first introduced in 2010 as a response to the crisis. We will consult on changes later this year and have already had two very useful pre-consultation meetings with the BSA and a number of societies. Let me assure you that this review is not the beginning of a major agenda to change how we supervise societies. Rather, a lot has happened since 2010, and we think a stocktake is in order. Second, recovery and resolution is an important focus of activity following the enactment of the EU Directive (the BRRD). Our objective is to ensure that orderly resolution is possible should it be needed, and thus to support our general approach that we are not a regulator that adopts a policy of no failures.

To the extent that issuers and investors are unwilling to participate in TALF because of fears that their involvement might lead to unforeseen complications at a later date, this would lead to the unattractive outcome of underutilization and the achievement of only a portion of the potential benefits. Of course it is of critical importance in this facility and in all the programs instituted in response to this crisis that the interests of the taxpayer be protected, and the safeguards and restrictions on the use of TARP funds are designed to achieve this. However, I think it is fair to say that TALF got off to a relatively slow start because investors were worried that the use of TARP funds in TALF could restrict their ability to conduct their business activities more broadly, perhaps in unanticipated ways and potentially retroactively. Put simply, to the extent that the use of TARP monies creates stigma, this may limit the effectiveness of TALF and other programs that use TARP funds. Although we think these fears among market  4  BIS Review 69/2009  participants that use TALF are misplaced, such anxieties have had an impact on the program. Another challenge faced by the TALF is to increase the participation of real money investors (such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies), many of whom are not permitted to use leverage.
All these elements may contribute to a strengthening of the decelerating trend in world trade and activity which is already under way. In Spain, this deceleration has already caused some deterioration in the economy’s current-account deficit. The compatibility of strong domestic demand with an ongoing external surplus has unquestionably been one of the most positive features of the current upturn, compared with previous ones. However, some of the factors which favoured the strong performance of the external balance have tended to lose steam recently, as is the case of the higher energy bill during much of 2018 due to oil price rises and the weaker tourism flows from the rest of the world. In the future, persistence of the recently observed moderation in activity on a global scale, particularly in the euro area, or a hypothetical increase in the cost of funding Spanish external debt will pose risks for the performance of the external balance. At the same time, the need to reduce the still-high external debt makes it essential for the Spanish economy to keep running external surpluses in a sustained manner. 1.4  Macroeconomic projections of the Draft Budget  The Draft Budget is based on macroeconomic projections of real GDP growth in Spain of 2.2% in 2019, down 0.4 pp from the 2.6% projected by the government for 2018, while the increase in nominal GDP is estimated at around 3.8%.

Consequently, the monetary policy significance of temporary variations in the CPI in the near future should not be exaggerated. However, if long-term inflation expectations and wage formation risk being tangibly affected, we should consider taking measures. How should the exchange rate be taken into account? The Riksbank has no target for the exchange rate, but, in a small, open economy such as Sweden’s, the exchange rate is an important determinant for both inflation and resource utilisation. However, the analysis of exchange rates is an admittedly difficult area. I will explain some of the difficulties involved in this analysis, as well as how they have affected my view of the manner in which the exchange rate should be handled in the monetary policy analysis. The exchange rate’s empirical relationship with interest rate differentials in relation to other countries Let me first clarify my earlier claim that a greater interest rate differential in relation to other countries than that forecast in the Riksbank’s main scenario may lead to a greater appreciation of the krona than that forecast by the Riksbank. The theoretical basis for this is formed by a condition known as uncovered interest rate parity. This is a theoretically fundamental concept and is used frequently. Uncovered interest rate parity says that the interest rate differential between two countries corresponds to the anticipated change in the exchange rate during the period in question.
Q: Would you be in favour of the binding agreements proposed by Angela Merkel? A: Binding agreements are one way of achieving this. However, in my view, it is better to stay within the Community framework. It should be a multilateral discussion and not a bilateral one between the Commission and each Member State. There should be shared sovereignty as far as structural reforms are concerned, because there is a common interest. Q: The stress tests are nearing completion. Can we expect many failures and are there likely to be any surprises? A: We are checking the results, which will be available in the second half of October, so I cannot make any comments on them at present. Q: Will the tests be credible after what happened with Portugal’s Banco Espirito Santo (BES)? It collapsed despite the fact that the ECB and the rest of the Troika had been supervising Lisbon for the past three years. A: In the BES case, it appears that information was being kept from the supervisor, which was the Banco de Portugal and not the ECB. The ECB, the European Commission and the IMF were in Lisbon to analyse financial stability and macroeconomic outcomes. The ECB had neither the instruments nor the mandate to supervise banks, as this was the role of the national supervisor.

The euro area faces risks to its economic growth on such a scale that it’s necessary to use all available tools to support the economy. And that means using the instruments on the demand side and the supply side. On the demand side, you have monetary policy. And what the ECB has announced shows that we are committed to taking steps and that we have instruments we are ready to use. You have also fiscal policy, in those countries that have space to expand it. But what matters  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  most are the structural reforms, because without them no supply or demand measure will have an effect. Q: Is that message aimed at France and Italy? A: We are not asking anything from anyone in particular. There is nothing of a give and take here. The ECB is independent and does not enter into this kind of bargaining. We do what we think we have to do and we expect others to do their job. We are just highlighting the conditions for it to be effective. For example, in our view, the countries that want flexibility in applying the Stability Pact should announce reforms beforehand, because flexibility is useless if it isn’t backed by reforms. Fiscal policy should be used to support aggregate demand – but within the framework of the Stability Pact, and that’s an important “but”. The Pact creates confidence.
BIS Review 70/2006  1  Globalisation and UK manufacturing Looking wider than the UK, one of the most striking changes of the last few years has been the integration of China, India and countries from the former Soviet Union into world markets and the sharper competition that is bringing first into goods markets and, increasingly, into services also. The EEF report, ‘Where now for manufacturing?’, published at the end of 2004, highlighted the ‘huge increase in the importance of lower-cost countries as competitors’. Just under half of companies surveyed by the EEF saw China as the biggest competitive threat to their activities and nearly 60% identified China as a major competitive threat over the next five years. That was sharply up on the equivalent figure of 18% in 2001, illustrating that the change was occurring faster than companies then foresaw. One of the consequences of the globalisation of production is that a reduced proportion of output in the developed economies is in manufacturing. This is true of the UK, where manufacturing accounts for less than 15% of GDP, but also of France, Spain, the Netherlands and US (Chart 2). 4 Some have felt the blunt end of this competition from Asia. But the emergence of China and others has also created opportunities. It has encouraged UK manufacturers to specialise in those products for which they have a comparative advantage over their competitors, prompting a change in structure and focus of the UK manufacturing sector.

Part of the reason for that has been that the oil price increases have been offset by lower price increases elsewhere. Most recently CPI inflation peaked at 2.5% during 2005 and has recently returned to that level (Chart 5). Given the relatively small immediate impact of higher oil and gas prices on CPI inflation, it is less surprising that this has not had major knock on effects. Indeed it is not clear how far it is possible to predict the movement of prices overall by adding up the movements of different components. You might expect overall inflation to be made up of a “core” of domestically produced and consumed goods and services which would be relatively stable and responsive to policy at home and a more unpredictable and uncontrollable component arising from oil and other world markets. But that doesn’t seem to match our recent experience. The CPI in total seems to have been more stable than the CPI adjusted to exclude the impact of energy and import prices. The rise in these external components of our inflation rate has been offset by lower price increases of domestically produced goods and services. Services inflation, for example, has weakened from 4.6 per cent in August to 3.4 per cent in June. This might be because UK price setters have chosen to take a hit to their margins or squeeze other costs rather than pass on higher oil and other import prices to their consumers.