samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, I would like to mention that the ECB made recourse to these operations repeatedly in August 2007 and again in September this year to provide overnight liquidity in addition to the liquidity provided at its weekly main refinancing operations. In addition, as already mentioned, in the past two weeks, overnight fine tuning operations have been used regularly to re-absorb the excess liquidity provided to the euro money market. 2. The Eurosystem has very significantly increased the average maturity of its lending to euro area banks. The outstanding amount of refinancing provided via longer-term refinancing operations has increased by around € billion since 2007. The latest measure in this respect consists of a series of special term refinancing operations with a maturity of six weeks, which were launched in September 2008 and will be continued until at least beyond the end of the year. Consequently, and in order to keep the total amount of outstanding refinancing unchanged, the amount of liquidity provided via the one-week main refinancing operations has been reduced correspondingly. 3. On 8 October, due to intensified tensions in the financial market, the ECB took the absolutely exceptional decision to adopt a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment for all its weekly main refinancing operations as long as market conditions dictate. Third, in October 2008 the ECB reduced the corridor of the standing facilities around the interest rate on the main refinancing operations was reduced from 200 basis points to 100 basis points.

Public authorities have a clear role in this respect, and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a major player in this field at the global level. I fully endorse the work done by the Basel Committee to review banks’ risk management practices, as well as the Guidance on Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision, which was recently published and constitutes a benchmark for the practices of financial institutions. The European Central Bank, as the ultimate provider of liquidity in the euro area, has a particular interest in issues relating to liquidity risk management. Against this background, our work on liquidity stress testing and contingency funding plans has highlighted the importance of both banking supervisors and central banks having access to the results of liquidity stress tests carried out by banks so that they can better assess the potential  4  BIS Review 123/2008  systemic impact of a liquidity shock. The ECB supports the idea of organising common liquidity stress tests, for which participating banks would use their own stress tests based on a joint scenario. Furthermore, the contingency funding plans of large banks should be shared not only with banking supervisors but also with central banks, as also recommended by the FSF. Having said that, I would like to stress that financial institutions are ultimately responsible for ensuring that all relevant risks, including liquidity risk, are properly integrated into their overall risk management.
Second, even if the authorities should, for some obscure reason, allow these krónur to go through the onshore market at this point, they would never command the current onshore rate. The position is simply too large, and that applies even if we look only at the current liquid part. It would simply push the market in front of it. Third, these numbers are within the range where offshore krónur have been trading in auctions and in the market. Fourth, the most important number is 190. This is found partly by looking at what will happen to our FX reserves if we buy the entire position at this rate. It will take us below the metrics that both we and the IMF think we should prudently meet when we start lifting capital controls on domestic residents. We are willing to stretch that far, however, in order to facilitate an amicable solution, as we are confident that we can rebuild reserves to the required level in the next few months. Second, why are the authorities not offering longer-term bonds as a part of the solution? That was the initial intention when work on auction design began. At that time, the idea was to have a multi-product auction offering foreign currency, long-term euro-denominated bonds, and long-term króna-denominated bonds. The deliberations revealed, however, that such a structure would have involved significant risks for Iceland. First, a multi-product auction carries more operational risk than a straightforward FX auction.

At the end of May, monetary stimulus was strengthened by a further cut in the key interest rate. Available information on financial markets shows that this cut has been fully transmitted to the interbank and government securities markets. It was also reflected in lower financing costs of the banking system, creating, in turn, premises for the transmission of stimulus to the lending interest rates and further to the economy. The Bank of Albania calls on the banking system to comply with this important link of the transmission mechanism. Despite the easing of monetary conditions, the economy’s demand for financial assets remains weak. Monetary indicators for April show a slower annual growth of money supply, to 0.7%. Its performance reflects the weak borrowing demand from the public sector and the contraction of credit to the private sector. In April, credit to the private sector was 2.4% lower than in the previous year, continuing to shrink for all but a year. The poor credit performance reflects mainly the contraction of credit to businesses. The analysis of credit demand and supply factors shows that there are uncertainties on both sides, which are materialised in high risk premiums. As we have previously stated, the steady improvement of crediting will follow the improvement of economic activity in the country. *** At the end of discussions, the Supervisory Council concluded that the incoming available information does not alter our baseline projections. The economy will see a gradual growth during the year, with an improved pace over the second half.
Norwegian businesses are losing market shares partly because of the strong krone. The international division of labour is shifting, and in the face of major restructuring it is a disadvantage for Norwegian business and industry that costs are high. In 2003, both employment and investment fell, although investment picked up somewhat towards the end of the year. Efficiency-enhancing measures will probably continue to mark developments in the business sector this year. This will curb demand for labour and investment growth. Strong competition has resulted in substantial restructuring. In Norway and other countries, manufacturing production is being moved to countries with lower costs. Petroleum investment is also rising this year and investment growth may continue to be strong in 2005. Petroleum investment has traditionally had a considerable influence on cyclical developments in Norway. If investment in 2005 is as high as estimated in the most recent investment intentions survey for oil and gas operations, petroleum investment will make a strong positive contribution to the Norwegian economy. Oil price developments have mixed effects on the Norwegian economy. Persistently higher oil prices contribute to higher petroleum investment and increased activity in sectors affected by petroleum activities. A sharp rise in oil prices, however, has restrained global economic growth and affected demand for our other export products. Increased petroleum investment and exploration activity offshore are providing an impetus to the business sector in the North-West. This is reflected in an increase in incoming orders to the shipyards, following a long period of sluggish activity. The willingness to invest is rising.

One explanation for this, common to all these countries, appears to be keener competition, which has led to high productivity growth. In the first round, heightened competition affects companies’ profit margins. But enterprises respond by reducing their costs. This occurs in part in the individual business, but subcontractors also come under pressure to reduce their prices and enhance efficiency. Increased competition therefore triggers higher productivity growth in the economy. Low inflation may thus be matched by higher productivity. Economic developments External cyclical developments and events are of considerable importance to developments in the Norwegian economy. In autumn 2003, activity in the global economy picked up from a very low level. After rising sharply for several quarters, economic growth in the US slowed in the second quarter of 2004. Economic growth has picked up from a low level in the euro area. Growth has also gained momentum in Sweden and the UK. Strong growth in the US and China exerted upward pressure on commodity prices in 2003 and into 2004. A number of central banks have increased interest rates. Interest rate increases are expected in a number of countries. Oil prices have also risen considerably during the summer. High oil prices constitute a risk factor with regard to developments in the global economy. In Norway, output growth has picked up after a growth pause in 2003.
21 I have previously discussed the financial risks that occur on the Riksbank’s balance sheet when we have large bond holdings. 22 These risks in combination with the Riksbank’s weak earning capacity constitute an argument in favour of a smaller balance sheet in the long run. This is the best way of safeguarding the Riksbank’s future capacity to fund its own operations and conduct an independent monetary policy. 23  Reasonable for the Riksbank’s balance sheet to shrink in the long run The Riksbank’s balance sheet has grown rapidly in recent years, partly because we have purchased government bonds for monetary policy purposes, and partly because the foreign exchange reserve has been strengthened. In other countries, arguments have been put forward indicating that central banks should perhaps continue to hold large bond holdings even in the future when monetary policy has been normalised. In my opinion, these arguments are of limited relevance to Sweden and the Riksbank. On the other hand, there are arguments indicating that the Riksbank should mitigate its financial risk by winding down most of its bond holdings when monetary policy is normalized. My assessment is that the best way of winding down the bond holdings with as little market influence as possible is to hold the bonds in the portfolio until they mature. Over the next decade, the Riksbank’s bond holdings will then develop approximately as shown in Figure 6. The repo rate and the rate path will thus be the main monetary policy tools when monetary policy has been normalized.

As we noted in the December FOMC statement, we anticipate that we will continue reinvestment “until normalization of the federal funds rate is well underway.” I think this policy makes sense not only because the decision to end reinvestment will represent a further tightening of monetary policy, but also because it is difficult to assess ahead of time the impact of such a decision on financial market conditions given the lack of historical experience. I also believe that continuing reinvestment until the federal funds rate reaches a higher level makes sense. We want to ensure that we have the ability to respond to adverse shocks by easing monetary policy by lowering the policy rate. Having more “dry powder” in the form of higher short-term interest rates seems more desirable than less dry powder and a smaller balance sheet. Now the words “well underway” in the FOMC statement are vague – what does that mean in terms of the level of the federal funds rate? Reiterating the disclaimer that I am speaking for myself, my view is that we should not set a numerical tripwire for ending reinvestment. If the economy were growing very quickly and the risks of an early return to the zero lower bound for the federal funds rate were deemed to be low, then I could see ending reinvestment at a relatively low federal funds rate.
•  In Singapore, liberalisation spurred the consolidation of Singapore banks from seven banking groups to three, a process which may otherwise have taken much longer. •  Foreign bank participation in the domestic banking system must therefore be strong enough to encourage the strengthening of the local banks but not so strong as to overwhelm them. •  It is a judicious balance that each country must find for itself. Third, selective and stringent admission. Singapore has always had a very open policy towards foreign banks in wholesale and offshore banking activities. But when we selectively liberalised foreign bank access to retail banking, MAS considered three sets of factors: •  First, the banks’ prudential strength, credit ratings, and quality of risk management. We only admitted strong, well-run banks. •  Second, we took into account the relationship we had with the home regulator, as we needed to be able to work with them on consolidated supervision of these banks and trust them to regulate the head office in a sound manner. •  Third, we evaluated the banks’ long-term business plans and how they could contribute to the Singapore economy. Liberalisation is not an end in and of itself. It must ultimately lead to a stronger, safer, and more competitive financial system that serves the needs of the economy and country.

Before doing so, however, I shall offer a brief overview of the financial situation last year in Spain. Spanish banking system Inevitably, the Spanish financial system was affected during 2001, albeit unevenly, by the aforementioned shocks. The economic slowdown throughout the year translated into a lesser rate of banking activity than in previous years, resulting in growth in total assets of 7.3% in consolidated terms. Though below this, the growth rate of credit remained high, especially in respect of mortgage lending, which made for an increase in the level of debt and, in turn, saw credit markets gain weight relative to securities markets. The Spanish banking system was scarcely affected by the shocks discussed earlier, with the exception of the Argentine crisis, whose repercussions were more telling. Notwithstanding, our banks are weathering the storm caused by the Argentine crisis thanks to an appropriate and prudent provisioning policy. Although this has meant reduced earnings, these have still continued to outgrow those of most of the major international banks. The cyclical turnaround has also led to an increase in bad loans. Yet owing to the relatively strong growth of credit, this has not been reflected in default ratios, which have held at historical lows. The solvency of Spanish banking institutions was bolstered last year, breaking with the trend seen since 1997, although this improvement is mainly attributable to secondary capital.
It is therefore unsurprising that the use of the euro in Sweden is relatively modest so far. The main contribution of the finance markets to internationalisation is, as at the national level, to channel capital to where it will do the most good. The rapid globalisation of trade and manufacturing has also created a need for new financial solutions for companies and individuals. This applies in particular to the need to manage the risks arising in international trade and investments. Thanks to IT developments, it has been possible to develop well-adapted financial instruments for this purpose. At the same time, the integration of the financial markets and the technological developments have meant that financial crises can now spread between countries and regions much more quickly than before. This shows that these markets do not function perfectly. It is therefore important that government and authorities continue to co-operate to create regulations and institutions that minimise the risk of financial crises, without providing obstacles to healthy risk taking, which is necessary for good economic growth in the global economy. BIS Review 26/2001  5

Multiple supervisory agencies examine BSA/AML compliance, oftentimes at a single firm, which can result in mixed messages, delays, and overlapping and redundant work for you and for us. This is an area that warrants additional attention. Third, there are several other areas where the industry and supervisory community should consider working together, including issues like conflicting laws/regulations associated with an international footprint; subjectivity in some of the AML guidance that drives differences in approach by firms and by supervisors; and, the potential negative impact of AML compliance on the ongoing provision of vital banking services. And, finally, I still wonder whether communication has reached far enough into organizations to ensure that decisions made at both the top of the house and at the ground level don’t expose firms to ongoing AML/BSA risks. Weak BSA/AML compliance programs are often attributable to the failure by the boards of directors and senior management to actively and meaningfully promote AML compliance as a priority and take responsibility for it. AML needs to be managed on an enterprise-wide basis, while also addressing the unique aspects of every business line. 4. Culture  This last point brings me to my final thought – on culture.
Lucas Papademos: Presentation of the ECB’s Annual Report 2008 to the European Parliament Introductory statement by Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, to the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Strasbourg, 21 April 2009. *  *  *  Madam Chair, Honourable members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, It is a privilege for me to present to you the Annual Report of the European Central Bank (ECB) for 2008. This presentation is an essential element of the ECB’s democratic accountability and is therefore of the greatest value for us. In my introductory remarks, I will first briefly review the economic and monetary developments over the past year, present our current assessment of the macroeconomic outlook and explain our monetary policy decisions. I will then focus on a number of topical policy issues, in particular those pertaining to financial stability and supervision. But before doing so, I would like to highlight some important events that have taken place over the previous 12 months. Last year the ECB, and at the beginning of this year the euro, celebrated their tenth anniversaries. We can look back at the past ten years with pride, and we can justifiably say that the euro has been a success. We have delivered a stable and credible currency that enjoys the confidence of now 329 million fellow citizens in 16 EU countries.

In general, Czechs despise inflation, and the central bank needs to explain repeatedly why it uses the worldwide standard of a 2% inflation target instead of targeting literal stability of the CPI level, or 0% inflation. Already many decades before the era of independent monetary policy, in the early 1920s, Czechoslovakia pursued a strategy of deliberately strengthening the national currency. This policy resulted in deep deflation, in strong contrast to the hyperinflations seen at that time in neighboring countries (Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Poland; see Sargent, 1982). So, it comes as no surprise that the Czech National Bank is rarely applauded for cutting interest 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  rates, while hikes are often welcomed by a majority of the population. An important publicrelations test arose for the Bank in 2013, when interest rate cuts proved insufficient to return inflation to the target. Inspired partly by one distinguished member of today’s panel, the Czech National Bank adopted an exchange rate commitment to keep the currency from appreciating. The commitment was terminated a year ago. Since then, studies by the IMF and academics alike have pointed to large benefits of the policy in terms of reducing unemployment, lifting GDP growth, and preventing deflation. Within two years after the commitment’s enactment, the Czech Republic – at least in part thanks to the commitment – turned from a de facto sick man of Europe to one of the fastest-growing economies with the lowest unemployment rate in the entire EU.
Going forward, we will seek to better understand: how the scoring methodologies of these climate indices fare as indicators of actual company actions; how company actions in turn translate into climate risk reduction and financial market pricing; and how active managers calibrate their investment process when their performance is measured against a climate index instead of a conventional market capitalisation-weighted index. MAS has integrated ESG considerations into its evaluation process for choosing external fund managers. The aim is to improve ESG standards among our key external fund managers, and uplift standards in the broader asset management industry. MAS has in-depth discussions with our external fund managers on how they can encourage their portfolio companies to improve their ESG disclosures and make real progress in the climate transition. We are heartened that our external fund managers have ramped up their stewardship capabilities in recent years. Some external fund managers have established dedicated stewardship teams to drive voting and engagement efforts. Voting has increased by 25% and engagements by 63% over the last three years. 15/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Bolstering the climate resilience of MAS' investment portfolio is work-inprogress. The initiatives we have taken to-date have put us in a reasonably good position. But there is much more work ahead. With that, I will conclude my remarks and we can move to questions.

1 There are four types of qualifying local intermediaries: Selected Registered and  Exempt charities with a valid Fundraising for Foreign Charitable Purpose Permit; Charitable Institutions and Not-For Profit Organisations established by Financial Institutions in Singapore, as specified by MAS; Selected Grantmakers under the Ministry of Culture, Community & Youth's Grantmaker Scheme; and, Other selected entities, as approved by MAS. 16/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches