samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, efforts have been taken to increase transparency, and develop and implement standards and codes to promote greater stability and enhance the robustness of financial systems to shocks. Efforts undertaken by international financial institutions include the IMF's Reports 1  The East Asian 9 economies are Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Korea, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong and China. BIS Review 48/2001  1  on Standards and Codes (ROSCs), and the IMF/World Bank's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Many developing countries, however, have expressed concerns over the tendency of these organisations to adopt a one-size-fits-all approach without taking into account the different circumstances and varying implementation capacity of the countries involved. In the banking industry, the Basle Capital Accord of 1988 was a landmark agreement which helped to increase the capital held by internationally active banks, and to create a more level playing field for banks under different jurisdictions. However, the rapid changes in banking and finance have led regulators to propose a New Basle Capital Accord which will establish a more risk sensitive and comprehensive capital framework, to benefit banks as well as improve safety and soundness of the financial system. The new Accord, however, poses challenges to Asian banks and regulators alike. The banks would have to develop more sophisticated risk management capability while the regulators would need to build up technical knowledge as well as supervisory resources to validate banks' risk management systems and determine if banks are sufficiently well capitalised on an on going basis.

Interbank markets, which a few months back had to deal with serious liquidity problems, have continued to normalize thanks to the liquidity provision measures adopted by the authorities and the gradual recovery of expectations. On the other hand, institutions have been able to raise capital according to needs; the US Treasury even authorized some of the bailed-out banks to repurchase the preemptive stocks they issued when receiving the governmental support under TARP. One key factor behind this set of elements pointing at stabilization is, without a doubt, the scale of the monetary and fiscal stimulus packages that have been implemented in large parts of the world, in both developed and emerging economies. This is a significant difference between this crisis and the Great Depression. Although it has been claimed that the financial debacle we have experienced recently is similar in magnitude to the one that originated the Great Depression, the lessons learned from it have allowed policies to act much faster, with more effective and pragmatic responses. In those days, fiscal authorities tried to keep their budgets balanced, even when the economic depression had settled in, in 1937, thereby deepening the contraction of aggregate demand. In the case of monetary policy, the premature reduction of the monetary stimulus in 1936 contributed decisively to the recession of 1937-38. The current monetary policy has played its role in providing liquidity and generating an expansionary stimulus.
These are often expressed simultaneously and are difficult to distinguish from one another, but I think there is a point in trying to keep the arguments separate. One sort of criticism is that a negative policy rate in itself is something unnatural and unhealthy. The other is that a negative policy rate is the wrong policy in the current economic situation. Let me discuss these arguments one at a time. Negative policy rate unnatural and unhealthy in itself? One can dispute whether a negative policy rate is unnatural and unhealthy, but it is certainly very unusual. This applies not only to policy rates but also to nominal interest rates in general. Prior to 2015 we had never had a negative nominal interest rate in Sweden. On the other hand, negative real interest rates, that is, nominal interest rates adjusted for inflation, have occurred now and then. The short-term real interest rate has been more or less constantly negative since 2009. If we look further back in time, negative real interest rates have not been so unusual either (see Figure 3). Of course one might think it rather unnatural to need to pay to lend money to someone, and to be paid for borrowing. But as it is usually our purchasing power that we are concerned with, it is not really clear, when one thinks about it, why it should be more unnatural to have a negative nominal interest rate than a negative real interest rate.

The criticism lived on for quite a long time, but it was probably quite essential to demonstrate at that time that the inflation target was taken seriously. This was until now the only time I can remember that the Riksbank was urged not to do its best to maintain confidence in the inflation target. The criticism then was largely due to the inflation-targeting policy being so new – as I said, the inflation target had not yet even come into force. It is less easy today, after twenty years of positive economic developments, in which the inflation target has been a cornerstone, to see why the Riksbank is being urged to lower its ambitions. Perhaps it is because developments have been so positive for so long that one feels the existence of a credible nominal anchor is no longer as important. If so, I am convinced that this is a mistake. Difficult to see reasonable alternatives to the policy conducted But what about developments in household debt and housing prices? Don't they give a reason for changing monetary policy? The Riksbank has previously used the repo rate to try to subdue the upturn in debt and housing prices. But this was on a fairly modest scale and – above all – during a period when confidence in the inflation target appeared firmly rooted. 9 In recent years, on the other hand, there have been signs that this confidence has begun to be undermined, which has changed conditions rather drastically.
As policy instruments are targeted to address systemic risk, assessing macroprudential measures in a consistent manner requires accounting for spillovers, including to the real economy, also taking account of their impact on various sectors as well as layers of interaction between those sectors. Conclusion Let me conclude. The ECB has been working hard on developing analytical tools for the effective implementation of macroprudential policy. The ECB’s new legal competences in macroprudential policy relate primarily to the power to top-up measures adopted by national authorities and the assessment of possible spillovers to other countries in connection with the reciprocity principle laid down in the legislation. In this vein, the ECB has been analysing the numerous macroprudential measures adopted by member states that, so far, we have decided not to aggravate. Concerning the governance framework, we have created an internal Macroprudential Coordination Group and established the Macroprudential Forum – integrating the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board – to discuss all matters related to financial stability and macroprudential policy. We are taking our new responsibilities very seriously. The robustness of our assessments is key and, for this reason, analytical and research work in the macroprudential policy area has been stimulated and has been fruitful, as evident in my  16  Gross, M. and J. Poblacion, (2015), “Assessing the efficacy of borrower-based macroprudential policy using an integrated micro-macro model for European households”, ECB Working Paper No. 1881.

Now the time has come—I would argue it came a while ago, but in any case it’s here now—the time has come for every firm with LIBOR exposure to actively grapple with the risks that are coming your way whether you like it or not. The way forward for the vast majority of LIBOR-based instruments is rapidly becoming clear. It’s easy and tempting to justify inaction by criticizing the available solutions as imperfect or as just too hard to do. But inaction at this point in the LIBOR transition is short-sighted and futile and only extends the uncertainty. We need decisive action by everyone in the market to avoid damage to individual firms and the financial system. 1 Raymond Check and Thomas Noone assisted in preparing these remarks. Mr. Held would like to thank his  other colleagues at the Federal Reserve who provided comments and corrections. 2 2019 Outlook: Trends in the Capital Markets 3 See for example the FSOC’s Annual Reports for 2013 and 2018. 4 See Introductory Remarks by Federal Reserve Board of Governors Vice Chairman for Supervision Randal K.  Quarles at the Alternative Reference Rates Committee Roundtable, July 19, 2018 5 Second Report of the Alternative Reference Rates Committee, March 2018 6 Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, 22 July 2014 7 Principles for Financial Benchmarks Final Report, July 2013 8 Information on the ARRC, including  its announcements and publications, can be found at  www.newyorkfed.org/arrc.
Although such a euro area stance is prevailing, the contribution of individual Member States to the aggregate outcome is suboptimal. Some of them need to take additional measures to ensure compliance with the fiscal rules, while others have scope to use available fiscal space. In addition, all euro area countries should strive for a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies by prioritising public investment and reducing the tax burden on labour. The current political and economic momentum in Europe also provides an opportunity to strengthen our Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Further integration needs to be achieved 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  above all by implementing what has been agreed and by completing the common projects we have started. This includes completing the banking union and building a capital markets union. A more complete EMU, with further steps towards a deeper financial, fiscal and economic union, will be the foundation for a stable, flourishing and resilient euro area economy. That is the best contribution which Europe can make to global economic growth and financial stability. By delivering on its mandate, the ECB will continue to play its part in this endeavour. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Anne Le Lorier: Regulating non-banks – ways forward and challenges ahead Speech by Ms Anne Le Lorier, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the ACPRBank of France Conference “Financial regulation-stability versus uniformity, a focus on nonbanks actors”, Paris, 28 September 2015. *  *  *  Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues and Friends, On behalf of the Banque de France and of the ACPR, I would first like to thank very much the speakers and the participants in today’s conference for the quality of their presentations. Indeed, they helped us to have insightful debates on the ongoing efforts made to prevent systemic crisis as much as possible, strengthen the global financial system and its resilience i.e. its capacity to withstand systemic shocks. As illustrated today, this is not an easy task and the global regulators are facing many challenges in shooting at a moving target: the financial system not only adapts, but also transforms itself and anticipates regulatory changes, sometimes constructively, sometimes less, thereby continuously modifying the sources, the channels and the shape of systemic risks. Regulation itself can be ill-designed, too narrowly focused or can generate unintended consequences.
During much of this period, banks internationally were engaged in a highly competitive ROE race. Therein lies part of the explanation for these high returns to labour and capital in banking. 4. Explaining aggregate returns in banking – excess returns and risk illusion How do we explain these high, but temporary, excess returns to finance which appear to have driven the growing contribution of the financial sector to aggregate economic activity? In this section we discuss potential balance sheet strategies which may have contributed to these rents. Essentially, high returns to finance may have been driven by banks assuming higher risk. Banks’ profits, like their contribution to GDP, may have been flattered by the mis-measurement of risk. The crisis has subsequently exposed the extent of this increased risk-taking by banks. In particular, three (often related) balance sheet strategies for boosting risks and returns to banking were dominant in the run-up to crisis:   increased leverage, on and off-balance sheet;    increased share of assets held at fair value; and    writing deep out-of-the-money options. What each of these strategies had in common was that they generated a rise in balance sheet risk, as well as return. As importantly, this increase in risk was to some extent hidden by the opacity of accounting disclosures or the complexity of the products involved. This resulted in a divergence between reported and risk-adjusted returns. In other words, while reported ROEs rose, risk-adjusted ROEs did not (Haldane (2009)).

Some of these trends in the value added and profits of the financial sector, and in particular their explosive growth recently, are also discernible in the market valuations of financial firms relative to non-financial firms. Total returns to holders of major banks’ equity in the UK, US and euro area rose a cumulative 150% between 2002 and 2007 (Chart 5). This comfortably exceeded the returns to the non-financial economy and even to some of the more riskseeking parts of the financial sector, such as hedge funds. To illustrate this rather starkly, consider a hedged bet placed back in 1900, which involved going long by £ in financial sector equities and short in non-financial equities by the same amount. Chart 6 shows cumulative returns to following this hedged strategy. From 1900 up until the end of the 1970s, this bet yielded pretty much nothing, with financial and non-financial returns rising and falling roughly in lockstep. But from then until 2007, cumulative returns to finance took off and exploded in a bubble-like fashion. Only latterly, with the onset of the crisis, has that bubble burst and returned to earth. (b)  Measuring GVA in the financial sector  To begin to understand these trends, it is important first to assess how financial sector valueadded is currently measured and the problems this poses when gauging the sector’s contribution to the broader economy. Most sectors charge explicitly for the products or services they provide and are charged explicitly for the inputs they purchase.
Two priority areas: That evolving regulatory approach is underpinning our approach to two pieces of policy I know are of keen interest to BSA building society members – Basel 3.1 and our Strong and Simple regime for smaller firms. 13 UK Deposit Takers Supervision: 2023 priorities (bankofengland.co.uk) 14 The regulatory foundations of international competitiveness and growth − speech by Vicky Saporta  | Bank of England  Bank of England  Page 7  Basel 3.1 In keeping with what I have set out, the PRA’s proposed approach to the Basel 3.1 standards15 maintains high levels of resilience and is aligned with international standards that we helped shape. The standards constitute a comprehensive package of measures that make significant changes to the way firms calculate risk-weighted assets for the purposes of calculating risk-based capital ratios. The proposed changes will make firms’ capital ratios more consistent and comparable. But we also need to make sure that the new rules work effectively, and in line with our objectives, both for banks and building societies. That is why we stressed in our recent Basel 3.1 CP that it was very much an open consultation and that we welcomed evidencebased analysis and feedback to help shape our final rules. Input from both the BSA and its members is core to that, and we are grateful for the feedback you have collectively and individually given.

The actions we expect firms to take will be based on those judgements; Secondly, it is forward looking – assessing firms not just against the current risk environment but, as I have just outlined, on how existing risks may evolve and new risks emerge; and Thirdly, it is focused on the key risks – and that is where we’ll primarily dedicate our focus and attention. Across those three principles we will continue to apply proportionality. This means the supervisory focus on your firm will reflect your size and complexity. Bank of England  Page 6  Although the key elements of our supervisory approach remain, we have made some enhancements, which we communicated to you in our January Priorities letter13. These include revising the way we categorise the ‘potential impact’ of firms and refining our schedule of ongoing core assurance work. We are communicating what this means to individual firms over the next year, through the supervisory communications we send. We also have some significant change taking place on the regulatory front. The Financial Services and Markets Bill, which is currently making its way through Parliament will – if passed into law – introduce a new secondary competitiveness and growth objective for the PRA. This would sit below our primary objective, to promote the safety and soundness of firms, and alongside our existing secondary objective to facilitate effective competition in the market for services provided by PRA-authorised firms.
In effect, MAS front-loaded policy adjustment in Jan so that further adjustment was not necessary in Apr 27. Shift in monetary policy stance in Jan was measured: continuing to keep $ band on gradual and modest appreciation path to ensure price stability over medium term. Important to keep a medium-term orientation with regard to setting monetary policy 28. If MAS reacted to every short-term fluctuation in output and prices, it would risk introducing even more volatility to markets and economy. This is because: •  4  External shocks that could hit small open economy like ours can be very frequent  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  There are considerable lags in monetary policy transmission. Off-cycle policy shift therefore highly atypical and only sparingly used. 29. Current policy stance remains appropriate for ensuring medium-term price stability  •  Economy estimated to be close to its potential for 2015. •  Labour market expected to remain at full employment  •  Core inflation, most relevant indicator for MAS’ monetary policy, expected to strengthen. Next monetary policy review is as scheduled in Oct. MAS’ financial performance 30. MAS’ P/L was almost in balance in FY2014/15, recording a small profit of $ billion. •  In FY2013/14, we recorded a profit of $ billion. •  Prior to that in FY2012/2013, recorded a loss of $ billion. 31. Why so volatile? Fluctuations in MAS’ profit figures from year to year is almost entirely due to currency translation effects, i.e.

Both CPI-All Items inflation and MAS Core Inflation forecasts for 2015 were sharply down in Jan this year, compared to Oct 2014 when we last reaffirmed our monetary policy stance •  Oil prices had fallen sharply – from $ in Oct 2014 to $ in Jan 2015 – and assessment was that prices were likely to stay low for at least a year. •  Against backdrop of modest economic growth in 2014 continuing into 2015, wage growth was weaker than anticipated and so was pass-through into prices. 24. Waiting to adjust policy in Apr would have put MAS considerably behind curve and led to excessive speculation about a policy move. •  We decided to adjust both inflation forecast and policy stance in a timely and consistent manner. 25. In Apr, MAS affirmed monetary policy stance. •  This decision surprised some market observers, who had anticipated a further easing of $ policy. We made no change to policy stance in Apr because there was no change to forecasts 26. There was no ground for another shift in policy. •  No reason to reduce slope of $ policy band further, given that core inflation was projected to pick up from Q4 onwards and economy remained close to potential. •  No reason to shift level of policy band, as we did not envisage deflation or recession. •  No reason to adjust width of policy band, which remained sufficient to accommodate volatility in foreign exchange markets.
Located within the NBRM Library, the Center provides access to over 400 publications of the World Bank, electronic access to the World Bank databases, as well as a specifically authorized direct access to the electronic World Bank library, with a possibility to browse over 6,000 copies of professional literature. What makes this Center additionally useful for the public is that, within the cooperation with NBRM, it simultaneously provides the external users with an access also to the National Bank publications, in the form of annual reports and working papers, and to the professional literature that the NBRM Library has at its disposal. The access to all publications, as well as to the World Bank statistical database is open for all interested users in the Republic of Macedonia, because of which this Center can bear the epithet of a rich trove of knowledge, which is waiting to be used. Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, We live in an era of extraordinary dynamic changes. An era, where the already learned things outdate in no time, or become insufficient, while the crisis once again showed that the enigmas are far more numerous than the axiomatic truths. That is the reason that the investments in learning should be ongoing. As a Central Bank, we make constant efforts for knowledge improvement and elevation of the scientific and research capacity, not only within the Bank, but wider, as well.

Pay gaps have not only been large but persistent, strikingly so among ethnic minorities, even once we make allowance for differences in skill and job attributes. This suggests, despite progress, much remains to be done. Third, even where we can “explain” pay gaps using various fundamental factors, this should not be taken to imply these gaps are necessarily justifiable. For example, consistent and large education and skills differences between cohorts could themselves be taken as evidence of a policy failure. So too might a preponderance of certain types in certain sectors or occupations. Fourth, consistent with that, our results suggest that existing pay biases can be amplified and exaggerated by the effects of age, the nature of the employment contract, educational qualifications and having children under the age of 2. On average, these too tend to further the pay disadvantage for women and ethnic minorities. In terms of policy implications, a number of important government initiatives are already underway, among central banks and more widely. The Bank of England began publishing its gender pay gaps in 2017 and has chosen voluntarily to publish its ethnicity pay gap too since 2018. In 2019, the median gender pay gap was 23% and the median ethnicity pay gap was just under 7%, reflecting lower representation of both groups at senior levels. Published pay gaps were a further useful prompt for action by the Bank. The Bank is committed to closing these pay gaps, including by setting stretching targets for representation, in general and at senior levels.