samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The other point is that while reforms are occurring, they can adversely affect the pace of economic growth due to the dislocations caused. However, assuming that the Government has the fiscal strength, some of these dislocations can be mitigated through the use of fiscal policy. Therefore, in terms of the growth outlook, if countries seriously undertake structural reforms it may temporarily reduce growth, but would likely lead to much stronger longer-term growth. If such reforms are not undertaken, it would create a low and unstable growth path for the affected economies. The collateral consequence of this later outcome could be increased cross-border frictions. The fifth and final point I would like to mention has to do with income inequality. You cannot but have noticed that it has become a hot topic of discussion in the post-crisis period. The French economist Thomas Piketty, has become a superstar by writing a book on it. The reasons for this are obvious. Well-paid bankers caused the crisis and after the crisis most of them continue to have well-paid jobs. Many low and middle income workers lost their jobs, suffered sharp declines in their economic welfare, and many even lost their homes. Furthermore, the crisis has highlighted the large disparities in income in the AEs, and the fact that in the preceding period of prosperity, the benefits of growth have largely gone to a relatively small group in society. You can say that the crisis has let the genie out of the Gini-coefficient.

What have companies been using those cash piles for? Well, either they have been returning that cash in bucket-fulls to shareholders or using it to support their share prices through share buy-backs. It was reported in yesterday’s Financial Times that during the first three months of this year alone, the S&P 500 companies in the US spent a record $ billion to repurchase shares and pay cash dividends. While this may help to keep share prices high, they do not create new sources of growth. Meanwhile, capital spending by the S&P 500 companies has grown by an average of just 3.6 percent per year over the last five years. Ultimately, the quantity and quality of investment will determine the quality of growth now and well into the future. The second issue facing these economies is that despite the drop in unemployment, productivity growth has remained weak. The way we understand the recovery process, when demand picks up, companies will first try to meet it using its existing workers. Productivity increases. However, as demand continues to grow, the increase in productivity of existing workers will be insufficient and companies have to hire new workers to increase production. So employment increases. Therefore, an increase in productivity is accompanied by an increase in employment. We have not witnessed that phenomenon this time.
In the context of the UK’s highly developed and increasingly integrated financial services industry, in which distinctions between banks, building societies, investment intermediaries, insurance companies and so on have been becoming increasingly blurred, the argument for moving away from a fragmented supervisory and regulatory structure, in which banks were separately regulated, was compelling - and Howard and his team have done a tremendous job in bringing all the different strands of financial services regulation together under the FSA umbrella seamlessly and in a relatively short space of time. A potential downside from the Bank of England’s perspective was the possible loss of information from, or contact with, the banking sector which might reduce our capacity to exercise our responsibility for the stability of the financial system as a whole. Now of course it is early days to begin to assess the new arrangements from this perspective. It is true that we have not had any serious threats to financial stability in this country over the past three years, but I suppose that putting that down to the new structure would be a bit like the man who claimed that the absence of pink elephants in Hyde Park was the direct result of his clicking his fingers there on his regular morning walks. We really haven’t been tested.

And the City has continued to play a very active part in developing market activity in the new currency ever since. In many respects the City is already an integral part of the Eurozone. There were those who argued that the City would suffer if the UK failed to join from the outset. That clearly has not so far happened - quite the reverse. The argument now is that we will suffer if we don’t join reasonably soon. That’s not something you can actually prove either way. It’s not a general point about the City’s competitiveness. It’s euro-specific, with the implication that somehow or other obstacles will be put in our way. That possibility cannot be altogether excluded, but it would be illogical. Most of the people that I talk with recognise the positive contribution the City is making to the development of euro financial markets - it is in fact the most positive contribution that we can make from the outside. Of course it represents competition with other European financial centres, but at the macro-economic level such competition is a positive - not a zero - sum game from which borrowers and lenders and market intermediaries collectively all stand to gain. Certainly the City has benefited from the euro’s introduction, but not at the expense of other centres, rather alongside them.
Annual wage growth1) and unemployment rate2) Per cent  Annual wage growth  6  6  4  4  Unemployment  2  2  0  0 1993  1 99 4  1995  19 9 6  1 99 7  1998  19 9 9  2 0 00  2001  2 00 2  1) Average for all groups. Including costs associated with additional vacation days 2) Registered unemployed as a percentage of the labour force  Sources: TRCIS, the Directorate of Labour and Norges Bank SG Gausdal 31.01.03  At the same time, total employment rose sharply. The unemployment rate, measured by the LFS, fell from close to 6 per cent in 1991 to almost 3 per cent in 1999. Later in the 1990s, unemployment declined as long as wage growth in Norway was lower than wage growth among our trading partners. This came to a halt in 1998. The rise in salaries for white-collar workers accelerated and the social partners rejected a policy of wage moderation. Unemployment stopped falling.

When we look at future prospects, a good estimate for the output gap can therefore provide a better indication of the outlook for wage and price inflation. Both these simple measures are based on stylised assumptions concerning productivity growth and must therefore be used with caution. Wage gap1) and output gap Per cent 4  4  3  3  Output gap  2  2  1  1  Wage gap  0  0  -1  -1 -2  -2 1) Up to 2000: difference between rise in hourly labour costs in manufacturing in Norway and among trading partners. Thereafter growth in excess of 4.5 per cent. -3 -4 1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  -3 -4  2002  Sources: Statistics Norway, TRCIS/IMF and Norges Bank SG Gausdal 31.01.03  The high level of wage growth in 2002 implied a tight monetary policy. The interest rate differential against trading partners widened. The krone appreciated further. Relationships in the foreign exchange market are unstable, but there are a number of fundamental forces that influence the krone. High oil prices and the phasing in of petroleum revenues into the Norwegian economy are part of the explanation, but the predominant factor is probably the cyclical divergence between Norway and abroad. Krone exchange rate1) and 12-month interest rate differential against trading partners.
Boris Vujčić: Croatia's joining the euro area makes it an active participant in defining a common monetary policy Speech by Mr Boris Vujčić, Governor of the Croatian National Bank, at the conference "Croatia, the 20th Member of the Euro Area", Zagreb, 24 January 2023. *** Your Excellencies, esteemed guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my honour and pleasure to welcome you to the conference that marks an outstanding success of our country, our economy and our society as a whole, to which many of you have directly contributed: the introduction of the euro in Croatia. Allow me to extend my deepest gratitude to you for all your effort, hard work and dedication to this, in all respects, complex and demanding project. Commenced in 2017 with the Eurostrategy, a strategic document outlining significant and lasting economic benefits to be brought to the Croatian economy by the euro and, in contrast, relatively small and mostly one-off costs, the project involved a lot of stakeholders in Croatia and abroad. Exposed to a great many risks, it demanded that quite a few goals be achieved and challenges overcome in the process, which was done successfully and in the shortest possible period, notwithstanding all external shocks and requirements that had to be met along the way. Some of them are widely known, while only a narrow circle of those involved is familiar with the others. Still fresh in our memories are the COVID pandemic and the devastating earthquake that hit Zagreb in March 2020.

Foreign currency deposits are expected to have a considerable annual increase, of about 18.2 percent, or Lek 17.7 billion, by the end of 2004. Table 4. Money supply growth as to trimesters (in Lek billion) T1  T2  T3  T4  2004  Money supply  10.9  11.0  11.5  14.0  47.4  Money outside banks  1.7  3.1  3.2  6.9  14.9  Lek deposits  4.1  3.6  3.7  3.4  14.8  Foreign currency deposits  5.1  4.3  4.5  3.7  17.7  Generally, the M2 aggregate growth will follow the performance of the economy demand for monetary assets. This demand is expected to higher in the first trimester of the next year. BIS Review 8/2004  5  Table 5. M2 and monetary assets demand growth (in Lek billion).
With a view to managing such a crisis scenario, Credit Suisse as well as UBS have increased their gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity by issuing further bail-in instruments, which can be converted into equity in the event of impending insolvency. As we explained in our Financial Stability Report published in June, since the ‘too big to fail’ regulations came into force, 1 Final requirements refer to the requirements that will apply after expiry of all transitional provisions, and in particular to the qualitative requirements for going-concern capital. Page 1/3  Berne, 14 December 2017 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  Credit Suisse and UBS have also taken important organisational steps to improve their resolvability. Despite these positive developments, the two big banks still need to make further progress if they are to fully comply with the second-pillar requirements. This applies both to their gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity and their resolution planning. Full compliance with all of the ‘too big to fail’ requirements will further strengthen the big banks’ going and gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity as well as improve their resolvability in a crisis. Both of these sets of requirements must be addressed if Switzerland’s ‘too big to fail’ problem is to be solved. Domestically focused banks  I would now like to turn to the domestically focused banks. These institutions’ biggest risks continue to stem from the mortgage and real estate markets. I will make three points in this regard. First, imbalances on the mortgage and real estate markets persist.

Amidst this changing global landscape, Islamic finance must continue to evolve to address the emerging issues and new challenges and leverage on the emerging opportunities in this increasingly more globalised environment. With the theme “Islamic finance: Opportunities for tomorrow”, the Global Islamic Finance Forum 2010 follows from the massive global interest and the widening sea of opportunities in Islamic finance that has come from its growing internationalization and global expansion. The  2  BIS Review 140/2010  Forum aims to provide an opportunity for the global Islamic finance communities to share experiences and discuss key developments in Islamic finance and to explore the way forward for the international Islamic financial system. The Forum will feature plenary talks and multitrack sessions, which include the Regulator’s Forum, the International Shariah Forum and the Islamic Liquidity Management Workshop. On the side of this Forum, the inaugural IILM Board Meeting will be convened to pave the way for its operationalisation. Another important meeting taking place is the ISRA Council of Scholars Meeting which gathers eminent Shariah scholars from around the world. This gathering of minds will importantly contribute towards greater global understanding and harmonisation in the field of Shariah. A series of high-level meetings and several important signings of MoUs will also be taking place, highlighting increased international cooperation.
The senior management of the Central Bank protested vehemently against the separation, and I would like to quote from a letter on the topic, sent by the Board of Governors to the then Minister of Commerce in early 1998: “The Board of Governors is of the opinion that there are overwhelming arguments in favour of the Central Bank’s continued supervision of the activities of deposit institutions, other credit institutions, and securities market entities. The Board of Governors wishes to emphasise in particular that such supervision is a normal and appropriate part of the Central Bank’s activities. This supervisory role benefits just as much from its partnership with the Central Bank as various other Bank activities do from partnering with banking supervision.” If there is any single factor that foreign experts have identified as the main cause of the 2008 financial crisis, it is the fact that responsibility for and supervision of the financial system were spread across a large number of ministries and institutions, with the result that no single party had an all-encompassing overview, no single party was actually accountable, no single party had adequate power, and no single party had enough muscle to intervene. Actually, in other countries where financial supervision had previously been hived off from the central bank, the two functions were reunited after the 2008 crisis. The Ministry of Commerce was united with the Ministry of Finance for the same reason: to enhance the punching power of financial and economic administration.

Bruno Gehrig: Review of the Swiss economy: end-of-year media news conference Introductory remarks by Prof Dr Bruno Gehrig, President of the Swiss National Bank, at the End-of-year Media News Conference, Zurich, 7 December 2001. *  *  *  Financial markets characterised by economic slowdown Development on the financial markets during the current year was characterised by a surprisingly significant weakening of the economy affecting all the major economic regions around the world. The slowdown was most pronounced in the US, but Europe is experiencing a considerable setback in growth as well. Inflationary pressure, already weak, thus eased further. The central banks took advantage of the rapidly increasing flexibility and lowered their key rates, in some cases down to historical lows. Up until the middle of the year, the prevalent opinion in the financial markets was that - buoyed by the Fed's marked interest rate cuts - the US economy, along with the global economy, would stage a fairly swift recovery from the deterioration in the technology sector and the associated weak investment activity. For this reason, the second quarter was characterised by a recovery on most stock markets, increasing bond yields and a US dollar defying gravity. By mid-year it became clear that the cyclical decline was likely to be more serious and to last longer. This reversal of opinion led to investors gradually becoming more risk averse. Equities portfolios were regrouped and invested in the money market and in bonds.
And firms’ derivative exposures are now more robustly collaterised ex ante and in large part cleared through central counterparties to prevent the procyclical spiral of demands for collateral (margin calls) that spread stress throughout the system as confidence in creditworthiness declined. 90% of new OTC single-currency interest rate derivatives are now centrally cleared in the US. And an additional $ trillion of collateral is now held globally against all derivative trades. These reforms have been built around internationally agreed standards and other jurisdictions have taken similar steps. While we might not be able to predict the extent, nature and trigger of the next crisis, we have much greater assurance now that the financial system could weather very substantial corrections in credit and asset values without failing in the way it did 10 years ago. The FPC has also focussed on borrower, as well as lender, resilience. As we saw in the crisis, significant cohorts of over-leveraged borrowers cut consumption when hit by a shock which can deepen and prolong the loss of economic output and, in turn, add to the pressure on the stability of the financial system.22  20  Stress tests might also serve the useful function of reminding bankers, and policy-makers, that tail risks exist and can be very expensive.

Macroprudential measures February 2004: DSTI caps (30% for consumer loans and 35% for mortgage loans) and LTV cap (75%)  October 2006: extending the prudential measures to NBFIs  August 2005: Maximum total DSTI limit at 40%  August 2008: requirements regarding the DSTI caps should be set taking into account interest rate risk and FX risk  January 2007: Higher risk-weight (100%) for commercial real-estate March 2007: self-regulation regime (banks establish DSTI and LTV maximum levels in their internal norms)  December 2012: extending the measures to nonfinancial companies lending  October 2011: LTV caps (60% - 85%) and stress test parameters for DSTI caps  January 2016: - CCoB buffer of 0.625% -> gradual increases in equal steps until 2019 - O-SII buffer of 1% for systemically important banks - CCyB buffer of 0%  Source: NBR  12
The Federal Act on Currency and Payment Instruments stipulates that the money issued by the SNB is legal tender in Switzerland and that the Swiss franc, which is divided into 100 centimes, is the Swiss currency unit. 3 Central bank money and its unit of account thus form the anchor of our monetary system. The SNB’s money defines the value and characteristics of our currency and thus also provides the basis for bank money. Bank deposits are not legal tender, however. They are instead much more a private claim against a bank. On demand, these claims can be exchanged one-to-one for central bank money, i.e. banknotes in the case of non-banks. Economic agents are prepared to hold bank deposits instead of central bank money as long as they have confidence in the bank’s ability to pay and as long as the bank deposits offer them added value compared with central bank money. For instance, bank deposits facilitate the settlement of transactions – most of us would probably find it highly impracticable if wages and rent had to be settled in cash, for example. Bank deposits also offer protection against theft and are often a better means of preserving value than central bank money in that they normally generate a return. However, they do entail a certain degree of credit risk. In Switzerland, bank deposits account for more than 90% of the money held in Swiss francs by households and companies, with less than 10% being held in banknotes.

However, one important condition for a successful reduction in money supply is that the SNB must have unrestricted control over its balance sheet. And in particular, it must, if necessary, be able to sell foreign currency for Swiss francs, in the same way as it has been able to make foreign currency purchases in recent years. We therefore must also firmly reject any ideas aimed at channelling our assets into a sovereign wealth fund, even though we may be highly sympathetic to the matters in question, such as securing pension provision. 10  Summary and outlook In conclusion, allow me to stress once again how valuable it is to have a dialogue on the core issue of sound money. In my remarks, I referred to the crucial importance of the three mainstays of a robust paper money system: a central bank mandate focused on price stability, the independence of the central bank in setting monetary policy, and solid state finances. As we have seen, sound money is always subject to latent threats. It is essential that we remain on our guard if we are to identify these threats in good time and ward them off. What are the biggest threats to sound money at present? In my view, there are two developments in particular that we need to be watchful of. On the one hand, any move to make central banks an instrument of state financing would undermine the second mainstay, namely central bank independence.
Inflation in many countries is the highest seen in decades, and central banks in many trading partner countries have responded by raising their policy rates substantially over a short time. In Norway, inflation is markedly above our 2 percent target. Twelve-month consumer price inflation was 6.5 percent in August, far higher than we expected before summer. Prices for electricity and other energy products have risen to historically high levels. But prices for a range of other goods and services are also rising faster than normal. The consumer price index adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products - the CPI-ATE - was 4.7 percent  higher in August this year than one year earlier. Prices for both imported goods and domestically produced goods and services are rising at a fast pace. We project that inflation will remain higher for longer than envisaged in June. The tight labour market has contributed to pushing up wage growth. There are signs of higher electricity prices ahead than anticipated earlier, and we expect firms to pass on some of the cost increase to selling prices. We also believe it will take a little longer for imported goods inflation to come down to a more normal level. The Committee assesses that there is a need for a higher policy rate to bring inflation down towards the target. A higher policy rate will pull down demand for both labour and goods and services, which will have a dampening effect on price and wage inflation.

India’s ascent to a formidable global ICT power has been mainly driven by economic reforms, establishment of a free market democracy, perseverance of some unbeatable private entrepreneurs and above all, continuous human capital development in engineering and electronic fields. 10 The last development came from the high educational standards maintained by a web of reputed state owned Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and permission given to private sector to set up higher learning institutes. This is definitely an eye opener for Sri Lanka. Even in the midst of growing evidence from India and elsewhere that privately owned institutes of higher learning could make a significant contribution to the globalization of education and training, Sri Lanka still keeps education as a closelyguarded relic in the public sector. As a result, its capacity to meet the demand for higher education is woefully low with one place being offered to satisfy about 16 aspirants. This has led aspiring youth to seek higher education in other countries at a high personal investment cost. Since every investment should yield commensurate returns, it also has compelled them to seek employment elsewhere. Whatever the intention, the closely protected public university education system has become a waste of scarce public resources, since only a fraction of the total registered students is reported to be in 11 attendance in classes. Hence, to gain reputation as a global centre of learning, it is necessary that the Sri Lanka’s university education system should undergo a complete overhaul and reform.