samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Ida Wolden Bache: The policy rate has been raised to bring down inflation Introductory statement by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the press conference following Norway's announcement of the policy rate, Oslo, 4 May 2023. ***  Accompanying charts to the speech Chart 1: Policy rate raised by 0.25 percentage point Norges Bank's Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee decided to raise the policy rate by 0.25 percentage point to 3.25 percent. Norges Bank's task is to keep inflation low and stable. The operational target is inflation of close to 2 percent over time. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability. Chart 2: Inflation is too high Inflation is now markedly above the target. In March, consumer prices were 6.5 percent higher than one year earlier. High energy prices are a key driver of inflation, but other goods and services prices have also risen rapidly. Price stability is crucial for maintaining a well-functioning economy. The policy rate is being set with the aim of bringing inflation back to the target of 2 percent. At the same time, we want to avoid a slowdown in economic growth beyond what is necessary to tackle inflation. We have not yet seen the full effects of our past rate hikes. Our March forecasts indicated a policy rate increase to around 3.5 percent this summer.

Mr. Erçel reviews central bank operations in 1996 and discusses the philosophy of central banks Remarks by the Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Gazi Erçel, on the occasion of the 65th Shareholders’ Ordinary General Meeting in Ankara on 15/4/97. I expressed my views concerning the main functions of a central bank in my speech to last year’s General Assembly. Today I would like to summarize the past year’s operations and share with you my thoughts on the philosophy of central banking. You will find detailed assessments of economic developments in Turkey and abroad in the Bank’s Annual Report for 1996, which has already been distributed to you. Instead of repeating these details, I will describe the implications of the events of 1996 for the operations of the Central Bank. The most important circumstance affecting the economy last year was the long-lasting period of political uncertainty. After the general elections, it took the first six months of the year to put together a coalition government. Political instability, Turkey’s entry into the Customs Union, and lack of the political determination needed to fight inflation created uncertainty in the financial markets. The Central Bank responded by aiming its monetary policies at achieving and protecting stability in the financial markets instead of aiming them at decreasing the rate of inflation. While withholding announcement of its targets for the second half of 1996, the Central Bank implemented a monetary program in keeping with its inner discipline.
Vittorio Corbo: Monetary policy under inflation targeting in Chile and around the world Speech by Mr Vittorio Corbo, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the ninth annual conference of the Central Bank of Chile, “Monetary policy under inflation targeting”, Santiago, 20 October 2005. *  *  *  Dear First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Dear Central Bank Governors, Dear Central Bank officials, professors and economists visiting from abroad, Dear friends, I am very pleased to welcome you to this Ninth Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, which has become a traditional event in the discussion of central banking policies and for the economic development of our countries. This Annual Conference focuses on the subject “Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting,” the monetary system that is gradually being adopted in countries around the world. I am not surprised at the great participation of central bankers from inflation targeting economies in this Conference. Thank you so much for coming down. This year, our annual conference coincides with the eightieth anniversary of the creation of the Central Bank of Chile. The occasion calls for a brief retrospective account of our Bank, which will help to better understand its path to the present monetary policy framework in Chile. Next I will review some of the challenges facing monetary policy in Chile today, which motivate several of the topics that will be discussed during this conference, which I will also list shortly later on.

The price of fresh salmon remains at the same level as in the last half of the 1990s. Exports of fish and fish products increased by 3.9 per cent from the second quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2001. Due to international developments, the uncertainties and the downside risks are now greater for many export industries. The krone has appreciated recently measured against our trading partners (trade-weighted exchange rate index). This partly reflects more than 20 per cent appreciation against the Swedish krone since spring 2000. Measured by the trade-weighted exchange rate index, the krone is now about 2 per cent weaker than in 1990 and on a par with the level in 1994-95. So far this year, the volume of traditional merchandise exports have increased more than in the same period last year, but growth is levelling off. The exposure of Norwegian exports in the ICT sector, where the international downturn has been most severe, is limited. Norway’s manufacturing output has declined somewhat this year, but less than in other countries. On the other hand, Norwegian manufacturing industry did not experience the upswing in 1999 and 2000. The business sentiment indicator does not suggest a severe decline. The order situation is still satisfactory in many industries. This does not necessarily mean that the turnaround will not occur in Norway as well. A sharp fall in share prices, tighter borrowing terms and an imbalance in international credit markets may quickly affect investment, prices, profitability and expectations.
The context of the Russian war in Ukraine challenges us to reinvent the dialogue with political authorities, for at least three reasons: because geopolitics are today a major determinant of the economy; because the energy markets, their regulation and pricing are key for inflation; and lastly because fiscal choices regarding subsidies to households or even to firms are far from neutral for monetary authorities. Another challenge, and a much more tough one, is that the populist ideology creates an atmosphere of general mistrust of institutions – and still more of independent ones. In the name of popular sovereignty, we would return to a power of elected sovereign that would be absolute – and not relative anymore. At worst, this would call into question our democracy and its necessary checks and balances. At the very least, it is imperative for us to be efficient in our mandate, and to increase our accountability. 2. Efficiency of our mandate Price stability, which is a prerequisite for long-term growth, is the primary objective of most central banks. Broader mandates nevertheless apply to some, notably the Federal Reserve with its dual objective on employment and inflation. Other central banks have expressed sensitivity to inequalities, or to other issues, and have therefore contemplated a broadening of their mandate. Some observers questioned this alleged “mission creep”, and wondered whether central banks have lost sight of their primary responsibility.

-  The cyclical component pertains to the way we can combine agility and  predictability in a very uncertain environment. We should be careful not to return to secrecy, or to unnecessarily add to financial and economic volatility. Otherwise, as research at the Banque de France shows, economic agents may begin to question our ability and commitment to fulfil our objectives, which could translate into dis-anchored long-term inflation expectationsiv. I suggest in my recent Jackson Hole speech some principles for this “new predictability”v. Not having a forward guidance does not mean, cannot mean, not having a narrative and a monetary strategy. -  The structural component is that our communication must not only resist  the risk of “political dominance” or “market dominance” that would run counter to our independence, but two additional risks that appear more specific to the current period. The first risk is the dictatorship of short-termism, imposed on us by the recent series of crises. Of course, we have to deal with them, but we must not become a prisoner of emergencies. We must continue to focus on the longer-term, in keeping with our role of advanced sentinels: central banks rely on their close monitoring of all financial and economic indicators, and also on their anticipation of how they may evolve in the future. The second risk is that of corporatist fragmentation. It is the other disease of the century. Of course, we are not responsible for it, and we are not corporatists.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 7 Change in the Central Bank of Chile's international reserves (percentage of GDP) 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  -3  -3 91  93  95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  (*) Reserves consider purchase of $ billion announced in January this year. For GDP, growth and inflation forecasts contained in March 2011's Monetary Policy Report are used. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 8 Copper price and multilateral dollar (1) $ index, January 2006=100) 5  130  4  120  3  110  2  100  1  90  06  07 Copper price  08  09  10  11  Current and one year ahead copper price forecast (3)  Multilateral USD (2) (1) Gray bars depict forex intervention period. (2) Dollar against currency basket of the U.S.'s main trading partners. An increase shows an appreciation of the dollar. (3) In Monetary Policy Reports of May 2008 and March 2011, respectively. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg and U.S. Federal Reserve.

These vulnerabilities increase the sensitivity of the economy and of financial and real estate markets to adverse shocks. I would now like to outline the position of the two globally active banks, Credit Suisse and UBS. I will then present our assessment of the situation at the domestically focused banks. Page 1/3  Berne, 16 June 2022 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  Globally active banks The two globally active banks developed differently in terms of profitability. UBS’s profitability increased and was high by historical comparison. At Credit Suisse, however, profitability was negative. This is on the one hand due to extraordinary items, such as large provisions for litigation, and on the other to relatively low operating performance during the period under review. The differing profitability is also reflected in market indicators such as CDS premia and stock prices. After the Archegos losses, the market drew a stronger distinction between the two banks and it continues to have a more positive assessment of UBS than Credit Suisse. With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the market’s assessment of the globally active Swiss banks and their international peers deteriorated overall. By contrast, the capital position of both banks has improved further since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report. In the case of UBS, this improvement is attributable to a capital build-up due to retained earnings; in the case of Credit Suisse, it is attributable to a reduction in exposure and a capital increase.
The question is whether this tightening of the laws will be sufficient; the incentives for following the competition laws are still fairly weak. It is individuals (company managers, directors, owners) who prepare and make the decisions on limiting competition in contravention of the law, but the current legislation is fairly weak with regard to personal responsibility. In the USA, on the other hand, legislation is more stringent - the responsible decision-makers can be personally sentenced to high fines or to imprisonment. Perhaps we need to have the same principle in Sweden. The government has also said that if the proposed tightening of the competition laws does not prove sufficient, it may consider designating these matters a criminal offence. The existence of what is known as non-tariff trade barriers creates difficulties for import competition, which could otherwise have subdued prices. One example is the building materials market, where special national regulations and voluntary product standards make import competition difficult. Sometimes the endeavour to satisfy information and protection interests can lead to trade barriers that hamper competition. The requirement that chemical products such as washing powder and cleaning fluids (which are more than 90 per cent more expensive in Sweden than the EU average) must be 8  The Swedish Competition Authority, (2001), "Why are construction goods more expensive in Skåne and food cheaper in Western Sweden? ", Swedish Competition Authority's report series, no. 1. 9  The Swedish Competition Authority, (2001), "Can local authorities push down food prices? ", Swedish Competition Authority's report series no. 4.

The part of household consumption that takes place in Swedish markets exposed to competition has 6 increased during the 1990s – from 25 per cent in 1991 to 32 per cent in 1999. However, this level is still below the EU, where 46 per cent of consumption is in markets exposed to competition. A number of different markets have been opened up to competition over the past ten years and Sweden is in many aspects a model for other countries to follow. Examples of markets that have been exposed to competition are the electricity market, post and telecommunications, the capital and foreign exchange market and a large part of the transport sector. The main areas where competitive pressure in Sweden is tangibly lower than in the EU and prices are higher are the food and housing sectors (and the construction sector). Swedish food prices are just over 20 per cent higher than in the rest of the EU, 7 while housing is around 35 per cent more expensive. These areas of expenditure together comprise more than ¼ of the CPI basket and are also responsible for a large part of low income earners' total expenditure. The absence of competition in the greater part of the public sector, which constitutes approximately 30 per cent of the Swedish economy, entails both a risk of lower efficiency and that a significant part of the economy is not offered alternatives in the form of new business ventures with the growth and th flexibility that small companies can offer.
Within a few years, the former Soviet empire, China and other Asian economies, with their combined workforce of over a billion people, entered the world trading system as market economies. Their focus on export-led growth allowed consumers in the West to enjoy rising living standards as the prices of traded goods fell. But the trade surpluses in emerging economies implied an outflow of capital. Relatively poor countries were lending money to richer western ones – the reverse of the traditional model of development. In the process, countries like China built up huge holdings of foreign assets – running into trillions of dollars – matched by equally huge debts in the deficit countries. Such massive imbalances were never likely to be sustainable, and so it proved. If the first fundamental cause of the crisis was the scale of imbalances in the world economy, the second was the inability of our banking system to absorb such large inflows of capital  BIS Review 117/2010  1  without taking excessive risk. In the five years leading up to the crisis, the balance sheets of the West’s largest banks doubled – mainly because banks lent more to other firms within the financial sector than to the wider economy. And the proportion of capital held by banks shrank so that their leverage – the ratio of total liabilities to equity capital – rose to unprecedented levels. Immediately prior to the crisis, the leverage ratios of some UK banks approached 50.

Even so, around a million more people in Britain are out of work than before the crisis. Many, especially the young unemployed, have had their futures blighted. So we cannot just carry on as we are. Unless we reform our economy – rebalance demand, restructure banking, and restore the sustainability of our public finances – we shall not only jeopardise recovery, but also fail the next generation. To my mind, a market economy and its disciplines offer the best way of raising living standards. But a market economy cannot survive on incentives alone. It must align those incentives to the common good. It must command support among the vast majority who do not receive the large rewards that accrue to the successful and the lucky. And it must show a sense of fairness if its efficiency is to yield fruit. There was nothing fair about the financial crisis. It was caused not by problems in the real economy; it came out of the financial sector. But it was the real economy that suffered and the banks that were bailed out. Your members, and indeed the businesses which employ them, are entitled to be angry. But however legitimate, anger will not produce change unless its energy is harnessed to a cool analysis of what happened and why. So I want to discuss the fundamental causes of the crisis before turning to current policy. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 changed both politics and economics.
In reading these stories, I could not help but think, if these individual acts could result in such outstanding outcomes, surely we can achieve a lot more given our resources, capabilities and outreach? With this, I would like to speak on COVID-19 and climate change, Collective responsibility, Commitment, and Collaboration. That’s 4 Cs. But before that, let me begin by thanking the organiser Climate Governance Malaysia, for inviting me to speak today and for successfully organising this event. COVID-19 & Climate Change My first C is “COVID-19 and climate change”. The fight against the COVID-19 pandemic brings into sharp focus the balance between safeguarding public health and the economy. Parallels have been drawn between this very current policy challenge and our struggle to manage climate risks. There are both differences and similarities. COVID-19 represents a singular common enemy, while climate risks are more multi-faceted. It could also be argued that the time dimension also differs, with COVID-19 being more immediate whilst climate challenges often come and go with climatic events. Given the latter, oftentimes our intensity to tackle climate change also ebbs and flows. But despite all this, the single biggest common point is the devastation that both COVID-19 and climate change bring to our lives and livelihood. Hence, there is a silver lining to this current health crisis. The pandemic was once a distant issue or someone else’s problem. Now, everyone from Australia to Zimbabwe is experiencing its full brunt. It is therefore an opportune time to reflect, reset and reprioritise.

We need strong commitment to combat climate change and take immediate actions to take charge of future economic growth. For corporations and businesses, over and above concerns on regulation and legal risks, is the need to commit to invest in doing the right thing for “people, profit and planet”. Corporations and businesses that align their policy and advocacy agenda to climate action have an important role in averting a path towards climate catastrophe. As we forge the path towards a climate conscious future, and for the whole system to change at the needed pace and scale, policy makers need to step up as well. For emerging economies such as Malaysia, there is a careful policy balance between transitioning to a low-carbon economy while addressing needs of society and businesses. This is meant to minimise unintended consequences of channelling financing towards non-green and non-sustainable practices and to minimise transition risk. As the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia is cognisant of this in crafting our strategies to respond to climate risk. Our commitment stems from the direct relevance that climate change has to our mandates in preserving monetary stability and financial stability. Approximately 11.7% of Malaysian financial institutions assets are potentially exposed to climate change. Our aim is to ensure that financial institutions are adequately measuring, mitigating and building buffers against climate risk. Our target is for climate risk to be featured more visibly in the risk management practices of financial institutions by 2022.
For example, outstanding foreign exchange swaps have declined from a peak of $ billion last December to about $ billion currently, and outstanding commercial paper held by the CPFF has fallen from a peak of about $ billion last fall to around $ billion currently. Despite the recent dip in the size of the balance sheet, the size of the purchase programs underway makes it likely that balance-sheet growth will resume as assets acquired in conjunction with these programs overwhelm any further declines in the funds advanced via the shorter-term liquidity facilities. The size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet seems likely to grow to roughly $ trillion, somewhat above the peak reached last December. 1  However, it was anticipated that the attractiveness of the Fed’s facilities would decline as market conditions improved. In fact, it was a key element of the exit strategy that was deliberately built into the design of most of the facilities. BIS Review 94/2009  3  It is no coincidence that the growth of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet since last fall has been accompanied by a sharp rise in the amount of excess reserves. When the Federal Reserve extends a loan or purchases a security, this automatically adds reserves to the banking system unless the Fed undertakes an offsetting reserve draining operation.

Has the publication of regular forecasts, which are seen to bear a close relationship to the decision taking process, helped to make the policy decisions themselves more predictable? The test is whether markets are less likely to be surprised by interest rate changes, given full knowledge of all the relevant economic news. We ran some simple statistical tests on two measures of ‘market surprises’. One is based on the Reuters poll of economists. The surprise measure is the difference between the actual repo rate change and the mean expected repo rate change. The other surprise measure is a bit further out along the yield curve: changes in the implied three-month forward LIBOR rate.11 Both measures suggest that interest rate surprises have become significantly smaller in the post-2001 period than previously (Table 2 Panel C), consistent with improved policy predictability. But, intriguingly, there is also some tentative evidence that surprises in Inflation Report months tend to be relatively large.12 What are we to make of that? 11  More precisely, this is an implied 3-month Libor forward rate at a constant horizon of 3-months, where the constant horizon is calculated by linear interpolation of adjacent futures contracts. The results are largely invariant to using six or twelve month horizons. 12  This could, of course, be entirely driven by the expectation that there would be no move in non-Inflation Report months: in the extreme, if the distribution of surprises in those months is degenerate (i.e.