samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moving on to developing financial technologies Technology has an increasingly large impact on the financial sector. Russia is progressing in line with global trends. In some cases, we are even ahead of some of these trends: for example, Russian banks already offer cutting-edge mobile applications. According to Ernst & Young, the Russian market is currently in third place globally in terms of financial technology development. It would be foolish to miss out on the technological revolution. We have work ongoing in three areas. The first two (where we are highly engaged, which is hopefully evident to you) involve supporting fintech and preventing cybercrime in the financial sphere. The third involves the so-called regtech i.e. new regulatory and supervisory approaches for us to elaborate in order to provide adequate risk management of financial institutions that are becoming increasingly like technology companies. What is the Bank of Russia doing to support financial technologies? We have repeatedly talked about our principles of regulation and supervision over fintech – first you need observation then regulation in proportion to risks. We engage in constant dialogue with 9 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  the market and created Fintech, an association for financial technology development. The next step for us to accomplish in the coming years is to create a national fintech infrastructure i.e. the necessary elements that will be beneficial to and in demand by all market players and will ensure that players of all sizes have convenient access to the market.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Enhancing the soundness of the banking sector The New Capital Accord Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Risk Management Seminar on the New Capital Accord (Basel II), Kuala Lumpur, 15 April 2004. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Risk Management seminar on Basel II organized for the directors and senior management of banking institutions. The objective of this seminar is to promote greater understanding of the impending changes to the international capital adequacy regulation. Given the importance of the subject and its implications on the banking industry, it is important for the industry to understand the intentions and the challenges arising from these changes so that the necessary action may be taken in a manner in which the benefits to be derived from it can be maximised. While there has been global acceptance of the broad principles of the new accord, differing implementation approaches are being adopted by different countries. I will take the opportunity to discuss the new Accord from our perspective and the approach that will be adopted for Malaysia. This seminar will provide you with the opportunity to engage in discussions on the issues concerning the new Accord. Philosophy and objective of capital regulation A well functioning and efficient banking sector is vital to the economic growth process. The banking institutions perform the important intermediation function of mobilizing funds to finance productive activities.
News conference  Berne, 14 December 2017 Andréa M. Maechler  Introductory remarks by Andréa M. Maechler  I will begin my remarks with a review of the situation on the financial markets, before going on to discuss the progress made in reference interest rate reform. Situation on the financial markets  Let me start with developments on the financial markets. The monetary policy pursued by the large central banks was once again the focus of attention for the financial markets in the second half of the year. Given moderate inflation growth, financial market participants are expecting only a very gradual normalisation of monetary policy across the world. Against this backdrop, government bond yields have remained persistently low. Muted expectations regarding a move away from expansionary monetary policy, coupled with favourable economic data and good corporate results, have contributed to largely positive risk sentiment on the financial markets. This has been reflected, for instance, in a stock market rally, lower yield spreads on corporate bonds and reduced demand for safe-haven assets such as the Swiss franc. In this positive market environment, volatility has remained low and volatility for the US equity and bond markets, calculated using option prices, has dropped to record lows (cf. chart 1). Despite positive economic data in Europe, European stock indices have risen only moderately. The Stoxx Europe 600 has climbed some 3% since mid-year. One reason for the modest stock market performance in Europe is the strengthening of the euro, which impaired corporate earnings growth somewhat.

The depreciation largely occurred over a few days at the end of July, but the downward trend – broad-based across the market and founded on good market quality – continued over the following months. Overall, the situation on the foreign exchange market remains fragile, however. Despite the positive market environment, the Swiss franc has not weakened any further in recent weeks. The risk of renewed Swiss franc appreciation remains, particularly if there is a return to risk aversion in the market. A look at the option markets shows that investors are still prepared to pay a higher premium to hedge against Swiss franc appreciation than against its depreciation (cf. chart 4). Progress made in reforming reference interest rates  Let me turn now to reference interest rate reform. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK announced in July of this year that it would not guarantee the continuation of Libor beyond 2021. The reason for this is that the volume of money market transactions underlying Libor – unsecured interbank loans – has been low for a number of years. The FCA will exercise its power to compel panel banks to take part in the Libor panel only until the end of 2021. After that, the possibility of Libor disappearing fairly quickly due to the withdrawal of panel banks can no longer be excluded. The period until the end of 2021 should now be used by market participants to ensure an orderly transition from Libor.
Debt-servicing costs of borrowers whose net monthly wage is lower than lei 500 rose by 32.2% of the said income, whereas those of borrowers with an income higher than lei 3,000 increased by less than 7% of their net monthly wage. Designing similar solutions for both borrowers with income lower than lei 700 and an average DTI ratio of 184% and borrowers with income higher than lei 7,000 and an average DTI ratio of 26% is not warranted. CHF-denominated loans are usually long-term loans, with an average residual maturity of 13.2 years. However, about 40% of CHF-denominated loans have a residual maturity shorter than five years and other 40% of them have a residual maturity longer than 15 years. In fact, the average value of CHF-denominated loans is significantly higher than that of leudenominated loans, but it also varies a lot depending on borrowers’ income level. Such disparities argue against applying a similar approach to borrowers’ debt-servicing difficulties: there are various individual specific situations, therefore one size does not fit all, which calls for the adoption of several differentiated solutions. CHF-denominated loans are concentrated among a handful of banks (three banks account for 77% of CHF borrowers and for 69% of the CHF-denominated loan volume; these banks jointly held 14% of total bank assets in November 2014). Moreover, the net currency position in CHF was not a source of speculation for banks, given its very low share in total own funds and its extremely low volatility when compared with other currencies.

Your Excellency, from this, it is clear that the current strengthening of the Kwacha has been caused mostly by changes in economic fundamentals. I recognise the concerns by some of our exporters of non-traditional commodities that they are losing external competitiveness. I wish to point out that not all has been lost as a result of the appreciation of the Kwacha. Some non-traditional exporters have benefited through, among other things, the reduction in the cost of capital goods and imported raw materials. In addition, may I mention the fact that the exchange rate alone does not determine external competitiveness of exports. Exporters should look at those areas in their production processes where they can attain efficiency gains and improve productivity. These efforts need to be complemented by Government through directing investment in infrastructure and structural reforms, including labour  BIS Review 72/2006  3  laws, so as to reduce the cost of doing business in Zambia. On its part, the Bank of Zambia will carry out its function of smoothing the movements in the exchange rate in a way that would not compromise the low inflation objective. At this point, Your Excellency, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to humbly say once again that I am deeply honoured to be invited to address you on this occasion. I thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 72/2006
At the same time, we have a very close co-operation with our colleagues on the other side of the Atlantic, which proved to be useful precisely in the times we are living. The international meetings, in particular the global economy meeting of central bank governors and the G20, provide regular forum for a thorough and open discussion between the participating  2  BIS Review 18/2009  Governors, particularly with Governor Zhou, who plays a very important role in these meetings. China Finance: To what extent do you see the need to reform the international monetary system and the global financial regulatory system in the light of lessons learned so far from the ongoing financial crisis? Trichet: The current crisis stands out because it affects the heart of the global financial system. Its root cause was a wide-spread underassessment of the quantity of risks and marked an undervaluation of the price of risks in the global financial system, especially in the most advanced economies. One of the reasons why this could happen was the widely held view that regulation should not stifle financial innovation and that markets knew best and could – for the most part – regulate themselves adequately. The turmoil has shown that this attitude was deeply misleading. When the turmoil set in, many financial institutions realised that their risk management systems were not as reliable and robust as they had believed them to be and, indeed, should have been.

We have always been in favour of a very close relationship between the central bank and the banking surveillance authorities. We said that long before any new problems, any new difficulties. We had a Governing Council position close to the start of the ECB, which we made public. We also strongly believe that better coordination for big cross-border institutions is absolutely necessary. Some avenues have already been suggested by Ecofin, the Council of Finance Ministers in the EU. The European Parliament has also carried out several works. The European Commission set up the De Larosiére group, a high level working group, to make recommendations. One of the European Parliament’s suggestions is that the ECB could play a particular role in this domain for the coordination of surveillance for cross-border institutions. In the US the Federal Reserve has a surveillance responsibility which concentrates very much on the big cross-border institutions. I see similar suggestions coming from the private sector and from the industry. As President of the ECB’s Governing Council I have no position of the Governing Council, but I am impressed by the mark of confidence in the ECB, demonstrated by the previous suggestions. In any case, the fragility, not only of global finance but of the international economy itself, is something that we should not accept as a normal feature of the globalized market economy. A new concept of strong resilience at a global level is of the essence.
Speeches  Published Date: 26 May 2023  "Everything, Everywhere, All at Once: Securing Monetary and Financial Stability in an Interconnected World" - Opening Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 10th Asian Monetary Policy Forum on 26 May 2023 Professor Bernard Yeung, National University of Singapore Business School, and President of the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) Professor Steven J Davis, University of Chicago, Hoover Institution, and EXCO Member of ABFER Distinguished speakers and guests, ladies and gentlemen GETTING IN ALL THE CRACKS OR TARGETING THE CRACKS? At the inaugural Asian Monetary Policy Forum in 2014, I spoke about the challenge of securing both price stability and financial stability. [1] Now, nearly ten years later, we know a lot more about this issue,yet there is still much we do not know. Let me take stock of where we are. To achieve both the objectives of price stability and financial stability, I described in 2014 three possible approaches for monetary policy. The first approach is to keep monetary policy focused on price stability and leave financial stability to microprudential regulation and supervision. Most advanced economies have stuck to this approach in the last ten years, with adjustments to countercyclical capital buffers as the sole macroprudential policy innovation. The second approach is to include financial stability in addition to price stability as an objective of monetary policy.

[12] Brunnermeier (2023), “Rethinking monetary policy in a changing world”, in IMF Finance and  Development, March. [13] Borio and Disyatat (2021), “Integrated policy frameworks: the constraints of policy horizons and  adjustment frequencies”, SUERF Policy note 246. [14] Shirakawa (2023), “Time for change”, in IMF Finance and Development, March.
Stablecoins and CBDC are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Depending on design choices, they could sit alongside each other, either as distinct payment options, or with elements of the stablecoin ecosystem, such as wallets, providing consumers with access to a CBDC. So there will likely be a role for the private and public sector working together in the future of payments. Brookings, July 2020, ‘Design Choices for Central Bank Digital Currency – Policy and technical considerations’. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Design-Choices-for-CBDC_Final-for-web.pdf 9 Bank of England, 12 March 2020, ‘Central Bank Digital Currency: opportunities, challenges and design’. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2020/central-bank-digital-currency-opportunities-challenges-and-design-discussion-paper 8  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  8  As well as not being exclusive, stablecoins and CBDC are not the only ways to meet changing demands and reducing frictions in payments. We need to continue to enhance existing infrastructure, including by renewal and harmonisation of RTGS systems. This work will continue in parallel with other developments. There are also initiatives like the UK’s New Payments Architecture, which offers a consolidated and open retail payment infrastructure. Public policy questions raised by digital currencies  The rise of stablecoins and the emerging proposition of CBDCs pose fundamental questions about the role and responsibilities of private firms and central banks in the world of payments.

Since early 2003, we cut several times the core interest rate bringing it at its minimum historical level, 5 percent. In taking any monetary policy decisions we had considered the further invigoration of economic activity, keeping always an eye on inflationary developments and financial stability as well. As I would like to often mention in the IMF premises, Albania is considered as a successful story. The Board of directors have recently declared that Albania is enough mature to sign a new three-year agreement by the end of this year. The new arrangement will be a more flexible one leading Albania to a better access in the international financial market. Of course, what I mentioned above was just a brief resumé regarding the current situation of the banking system and the overall economic performance. There is no doubt that Albania’s attractiveness has further enhanced, and partially this reflects also the increase of confidence in the Albanian banking system. Using the opportunity of this very prestigious forum, I would like to share my voice with that of the Albanian representatives present in this panel, expressing that my country is more open, more consolidated, ready to absorb more ambitious projects and, of course, global projects. I wish you successful and fruitful proceedings of this meeting. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 41/2005
On the other hand, Bank of Albania deems that this sustainability would be assisted by the application of a cautious fiscal policy, which should already factorize the long terms soundness of fiscal parameters in its decision-making process. BIS Review 50/2010  3

When the financial crisis hit, governments had to deal with a novel feature in their crisis management – cross-border banks. Cross-border banking brings potentially many benefits, such as a more competitive banking industry and the transfer of know-how. However, because the EU’s long-term objective of creating a single financial market – including an integrated banking system – has never been matched with a single legal and prudential framework, cross-border banks also pose severe problems for the regulatory and supervisory community. In my view, it would be misguided to conclude from the problems that we have seen during the financial crisis that cross-border banking should be prevented or limited. However, at the same time I do not believe it is very realistic to expect the creation of a single regulatory and supervisory authority at the EU level in the near future. Instead, I think we need to find new forms for cross-border cooperation between national authorities. As it may take some time to achieve effective cooperation at the EU level, I want to strike a blow for cooperation at the regional level. After all, cross-border banking is to a large extent taking place in a regional context. This may not completely prevent problems related to crossborder banking from arising, but I think it is the only reasonable middle way between maintaining financial integration and avoiding the unduly high costs associated with managing cross-border banks in a crisis. References Agénor P. 2001),”Benefits and Costs of International Financial Integration: Theory and Facts”, World Economy, Vol. 26, pp. 1089–1118.
The Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in 1992, made monetary policy a euro area competence but left economic and fiscal policies under the responsibility of national governments. The concept of economic union relied essentially on the single market, with few binding constraints on economic and fiscal policies. Over time, this turned out to be a significant institutional shortcoming. Moreover, the transfer of a core sovereign prerogative like monetary policy to the supranational level is a highly political act which entails important political commitments for the future. In particular, the participating countries must undertake to conduct fiscal and economic policies in a way that allows monetary union to work properly. This is a responsibility that the euro area countries share, a responsibility that governments have to fulfil vis-à-vis their peers and vis-à-vis their own citizens. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that the concept of EMU goes beyond economic and monetary integration. Let me add that the single market itself has a political dimension as the proper functioning of markets requires strong institutional underpinnings, such as enforcement of contracts, consumer protection and competition policy. It has mandated the creation of a federal executive (the European Commission), legislative (the European  1  In the late 1970s, European countries agreed on closer exchange rate cooperation by setting standard fluctuation bands of plus/minus 2.25% for their bilateral exchange rates.

Urban Bäckström: The inflation targeting approach  Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at the 28th Economic Conference of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Wien, on 15 June 2000. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to attend this conference and discuss challenges for monetary policy together with such a distinguished panel. In the last decade a growing number of countries have chosen to conduct monetary policy with an explicit target for inflation. One reason behind this choice has no doubt been these countries’ poor experience with a fixed, but adjustable, exchange rate regime. The first country to formally adopt a policy of targeting inflation was New Zealand, in 1990. Canada did the same in 1991, followed by the United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia. Since the early 1990s other countries have also introduced some variant of inflation targeting. It is interesting to note that before the 1990s the predominant view was that a floating exchange rate regime was not suitable for a small open economy. Today, I believe that experience among those countries that are targeting inflation has been exceptionally good. In fact, even some emerging market countries are now building the same kind of regime.
It is true that the past, global financial centres emerged in jurisdictions with huge trade surpluses: Amsterdam in the 16th century, London in the 19th century New York in the early 20th. But London’s re-emergence 60 years ago was long after the global economic dominance of the UK – and long before the single market in financial services developed in the EU. Openness, time zone, language, law, developed domestic financial markets and, crucially, the concentration of skills and expertise and talent, seem better explanations of the agglomerations of economic activity that are today’s global financial centres.3 The EU has the ambition to build a more integrated and more market based financial system – the Capital Markets Union. I certainly believe this is the right ambition; a greater role for risk capital and for market based rather than bank-based finance will help to diversify risk across borders, reduce costs to the real economy and avoid too great a reliance on the banking channel of credit intermediation. BIS (2019): UK’s share of global 2019 (April) turnover in OTC interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange UK’s FinTech adoption rate was 71% in 2019, global average is 64 3 Roberts, R. (2005). London as an international financial centre, 1980-2000: global powerhouse or Wimbledon EC2?. In: Cassis, Youssef and Bussière, Eric (eds.) London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 287-312. ISBN 9780199269495. Wójcik, D., Knight, E., & Pažitka, V. (2018). What turns cities into international financial centres?

But as the master of detective novels, Agatha Christie said: "The truth, however ugly, is always curious and beautiful to seekers after it". We will continue to investigate and learn. But this should not obscure the elephant in the room. One of the most important potential source of vulnerabilities nowadays remains non-bank financial intermediaries, which are not regulated appropriately. This is where the liquidity mismatch is the highest and this is why I strongly concur with Klaas' determined commitment to deliver on the FSB agenda there. I thank you for your attention. 1 Pablo Hernández de Cos, Banking starts with banks: initial reflections on recent  market stress episodes, Speech, 12 April 2023. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches