samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Equally, we are confident that full implementation of the Swiss ‘too big to fail’ regulations will reduce the false incentives that underlie the issue and create the necessary conditions for resolving the issue here in Switzerland. The state should no longer be obliged to use government funds to bail out a bank. Page 12/14  Bibliography Afonso, Gara, João A. C. Santos and James Traina (2014), Do ‘too-big-to-fail’ banks take on more risk?, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review, 20 (2), pp. 41–58. Alessandri, Piergiorgio and Andrew G. Haldane (2009), Banking on the State, speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Twelfth Annual International Banking Conference, Chicago, 25 September. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2016), Explanatory note on the revised minimum capital requirements for market risk. Bernanke, Ben (2006), Modern risk management and banking supervision, speech held at Stonier Graduate School of Banking, Washington, D.C., 12 June. Branson, Mark (2011), The case for more and higher quality capital, FINMA annual media conference, Berne, 22 March. Cecchetti, Stephen G. (2014), The jury is in, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Policy Insight No. 76. FDF (2016), Bericht des Eidgenössischen Finanzdepartements über die Anhörung zu Änderungen der Eigenmittelverordnung und der Bankenverordnung (Eigenmittelanforderungen Banken – Rekalibrierung TBTF und Kategorisierung). FDF (2017), Erläuternder Bericht zur Änderung der Eigenmittelverordnung (leverage ratio und Risikoverteilung) FINMA (2009), Financial market crisis and financial market supervision, report. Gambacorta, Leonardo and Hyun Song Shin (2016), Why bank capital matters for monetary policy, Bank for International Settlements, BIS Working Papers, 558.

The National Bank of Romania invites you to an anniversary concert performed by exceptional artists of the “George Enescu” Philharmonic Orchestra, conducted by the renowned conductor Horia Andreescu. We will also be delighted by the talent and virtuosity of a young pianist, Andrei Licareţ. All these artists will give us a great joy in this splendid hall of the Romanian Athenaeum with a programme comprising well-known musical compositions from the national and international repertoire, selected from the “Eastern flank” of the European Union: Enescu, Smetana, Chopin, Bela Bartok, Grigoraş Dinicu. I thank you once again and I invite to take the floor Mr Jean Claude Trichet, the President of the European Central Bank, a close friend of the National Bank of Romania. 2  BIS Review 114/2010
This is illustrated by the blue bars on Chart 4. For the full year 2020, our interventions totalled 110 billion Swiss francs (more than 15% of GDP). This, together with our policy rate at −0.75%, has allowed us to maintain an expansionary policy stance throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. The sharp increase in risk aversion also led to severe strains in offshore US dollar funding markets. Because of the substantial increase in demand for US dollars, non-US banks increased the premium that they were willing to pay in order to secure US dollar funding in the foreign exchange swap market. This led to a significant increase in the US dollar swap basis 1 and a corresponding deterioration in dollar funding conditions, as shown in Chart 5. So, to ease strains in global US dollar funding markets, the SNB participated in a series of coordinated central bank actions, enhancing the provision of US dollar liquidity through the swap line arrangements with the Federal Reserve System. These actions proved effective. The US dollar swap rate quickly reverted to pre-COVID-19 levels. Let me leave you here with a first observation. By promptly fending off the financial crisis as the COVID-19 pandemic was erupting on a global scale, central banks reaffirmed their role as effective crisis managers, both nationally and internationally. Their decisive policy actions alleviated market stress and helped to restore confidence.

But calming global financial markets – and in the case of Switzerland, countering the heavy wave of safe-haven flows into Swiss francs – has been only one facet of the SNB’s policy response. The unique nature of the COVID-19 pandemic has also caused an unprecedented shock to the real economy. To mitigate this shock, central banks – in cooperation with the fiscal authorities – have created new instruments. The SNB during the COVID-19 crisis: same role, new tools Given the nature of the crisis, an important part of the policy response was to address the strains on the corporate sector, particularly among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In Switzerland, 99 percent of all firms are SMEs and they employ some 67 percent of the labour force. The lockdown measures resulted in a sudden stop for many businesses. There was real concern that economically viable SMEs, in particular, could be 1  The US dollar swap basis is an indicator of US dollar funding costs in foreign exchange markets. A large negative basis reflects a scarcity of US dollar funding. Page 3/10  forced into bankruptcy through no fault of their own. To address the problem, the Swiss Federal Council adopted a range of important measures, including the COVID-19 loan programme for companies. To be effective, financial support had to be fast and well targeted.
Between 1996 and 1998 import prices fell by 20% relative to overall consumer prices – the biggest fall over any two year period since the early 1950s. That was  4  Some of these changes in the inflation dynamics date from 1992 when the inflation target was introduced, although the fall in inflation expectations occurred in 1997. 5  This is known in the academic literature as the ‘Taylor Curve’. See Taylor (1979). 6  I have defined the frontier for a given set of monetary policy arrangements – technically, for a given distribution of the inflation target. If the frontier is instead defined as corresponding to an optimal policy where the inflation target is believed with certainty then the movement from B to A is a move onto the frontier from a point outside it. BIS Review 43/2007  3  shortly followed by the Asian financial crisis and the Russian default and devaluation in 1998 which led to concerns about the stability of US and other financial markets. Later there was the world IT-led slowdown in late 2000 and 2001, and sharp falls in equity prices. The share of government final consumption in nominal GDP rose by 4 percentage points between 1998 and 2005 – the biggest continuous expansion since 1945 – and the share of taxes in total income rose. More recently, oil prices more than doubled and the labour force expanded by 1 ½% in 2006, a rate exceeded only once in the past 35 years.

Shortly after we joined the EU it was almost a shared view among the prevailing part of the elite in our country that the sooner we join the better and that the euro was the best club imaginable and a sure-fire recipe for success. The public never accepted this view. However, it was still very difficult to argue against it, like I and some others did ten years ago. The lesson learned is: no worries, the media and politicians can change their minds. If you believe in your case, do not change yours. They will change theirs. Ladies and gentlemen, I very much believe in reasonable European cooperation. But I also believe in reasonable competition among countries and their economic models. So I do not take it lightly when some integration projects divide us rather than unite us. I think that next time around we should be much more careful when some start selling us a project as indisputable and irrefutable. At that moment we should all be far more circumspect and far less credulous. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
In particular, what does the MPC’s so-called forward guidance, which we announced in the summer, mean for you – the businessmen and women driving this recovery? And that’s the plan for today: to consider three key questions about the economic recovery that we’re now finally enjoying – why now, will it last, and what next for policy? 1  Securities and Investment Review, September 1993. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Why now? First, why now? Why after several years of frustration and disappointment has the economy begun to grow? It’s hard to be certain: this time last year we were not predicting such a sharp turnaround in growth and there’s a danger of appearing to be wise after the event. But, at least with the benefit of hindsight, two developments in particular seem important in driving the turnaround: an easing in credit conditions; and a reduction in economic uncertainty. Let me say a few words about each, starting with credit conditions. Improved credit availability Although it’s still patchy and there’s further to go, we’ve observed a marked improvement in the ability of many companies and households to access credit over the past 18 months or so. Some of that stems from a lessening of tensions within the euro area, which has helped to ease pressures on banks both sides of the channel.

So although there are risks and there is further to go, particularly for SMEs, credit conditions for many companies and households have eased over the past 18 months and this has helped to stimulate activity, particular so within the housing market. Consider next the reduction in economic uncertainty which has probably played a greater role in turning the economy around this year. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Reduced economic uncertainty It seems clear that economic uncertainty has diminished over the past year or so. Think back, for example, to the middle of last year, when the euro area appeared once again to be teetering on the edge. Or even as recently to the beginning of this year, when all the talk at home was of the possibility of a triple dip. To some, appealing to “reduced uncertainty” as a driver of the economic recovery may sound rather vague and nebulous. A convenient ex post rationalisation perhaps for something we don’t really understand.
The financial system is safer, simpler, and fairer. The financial system is safer A central achievement has been the transformation of banking. A decade ago, banks were woefully undercapitalised (some were levered over 50 times), with complex business models that relied on the goodwill of markets and, ultimately, taxpayers. Large global banks are now considerably stronger. They can stand on their own. With capital requirements for the largest that are ten times higher, banks have raised more than $ trillion of capital. And they are disciplined by a new leverage ratio that guards against risks that seem low but prove not. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  Banks are also more robust because they have changed their funding models, not least due to new global liquidity standards. The financial system is simpler The system is simpler in part because, a decade on, banks are less complex and more focused. They lend more to households and businesses, and less to each other. Business strategies that relied on high leverage, risky trading activities and wholesale funding are disappearing, as intended. Trading assets have been cut in half, and interbank lending is down by twothirds. In parallel, the system is simpler because a series of measures are eliminating the fragile forms of shadow banking while reinforcing the best of resilient market-based finance. A decade ago, off-balance-sheet vehicles masked enormous leverage. Monoline insurers supported unsustainable debts, and banks became overly reliant on fragile short-term funding from money markets.

They contain Braille markings as well as tactile symbols to denote each denomination. In 2000, Bank Negara Malaysia presented 13,000 units of Ringgit cash test cards to the visually impaired which measured third series banknotes of all denominations. This year, the Bank will distribute 20,000 units of Ringgit cash test cards to the visually impaired. The Bank has made several improvements to the new cash test card design including to measure the fourth series banknotes and a coin channel to measure third series coins after obtaining feedback from the National Council for the Blind, the Malaysian Association for the Blind and Kementerian Pembangunan Wanita, Keluarga dan Masyarakat. In conjunction with this program, I would like to take this opportunity to launch the new cash test card. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
To conclude: 2014 will, as we all know, be an extremely intense year as far as international financial regulation and supervision are concerned. There will be no lack of work. My best wishes to all of you and good luck. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

We need a global effort and a whole-of-society approach within each country. Effective partnerships across the public, private, and people sectors will be key to mobilise the financing necessary for an effective and just transition. As a leading global financial centre in Asia, Singapore can play an important role in mobilising this capital, especially to support Asia's transition to net-zero. At the Singapore Pavilion, we have set out how we will do this through three key strategies: blended finance to mobilise private capital for the transition carbon markets to facilitate emissions abatement and inclusivity good-quality data to support credible disclosure and track progress First strategy - blended finance to synergise public and private capital for projects that are marginally bankable. Many green and transition projects in emerging markets pose risks that are not commensurate with their expected returns. We need catalytic capital to improve project bankability and crowd in private sector capital. Blended finance is also about combining financing with capacity building, technology transfer, and institutional support, to reduce risk and enhance bankability. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Blended finance is not new but scaling it requires a fresh approach. About a month ago, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) held the inaugural Transition Finance towards Net Zero Conference Conference. The conference saw more than 500 leaders and experts from across the world – from industry, academia, governments, and multilateral development banks - discuss the nuts-and-bolts of what it takes for blended finance to scale. What were their key take-aways?
In the course of a decade unemployment has been virtually halved, from 12 to just over 6 per cent. Of course one cannot be certain that other countries’ solutions apply to Swedish conditions in every respect. But it is important to note that GDP growth in the Netherlands has been fairly close to the EU average even though employment has developed very differently. So it is not higher demand in the past decade that lies behind the creation of so many new jobs in the Netherlands. Most of the evidence suggests that traditional demand management is not capable of lowering unemployment appreciably. Instead it is the workings of the labour market and wage formation that are key factors for the possibility of turning the path of unemployment. That is where the efforts must be made. Such efforts might make it possible to combine low inflation with a better development of employment. They could then contribute to increased confidence in economic policy as a whole. At times there seems to be a tendency for the problem of unemployment to generate some uncertainty about economic policy’s long-term commitment. Reforms in the fields of wage formation and the labour market can mitigate the potential conflicts between economic policy’s goals. That would improve the conditions for a continued fall in the level of interest rates relative to the rest of the world, even in a situation where Sweden stays outside the euro area for the time being. BIS Review 68/1997  -7-  4.

This restricts the future freedom of action in economic policy and means that there is a risk of fiscal policy in practice having a destabilising effect. This is particularly the case in that, with high revenue and spending ratios, the Swedish budget is sensitive to cyclical factors. Seen from this angle the Government’s target of a 2 per cent budget surplus over the economic cycle appears reasonable, though there is no academic foundation for a quantified level of ambition. There may be grounds for strategic tax cuts to improve the long-term growth potential. But in the light of the experience with government finance in recent decades a warning should be issued against tax cuts without parallel cuts in spending. Weak employment The labour market trends in recent years have been bleak. Although annual economic growth since 1993 has averaged 2.7 per cent, employment has not risen. This indicates that a considerable proportion of unemployment is structural in the sense that the level is liable to remain high even if activity continues to improve. The difficulty in generating new jobs is not confined to Sweden; it is a problem we have in common with much of Europe. But there are countries in Europe that have succeeded in turning the employment curve upwards since the mid 1980s. I am thinking in particular of the Netherlands, where employment, after a long period of stagnation, has been increased by 20 to 25 per cent since the mid 1980s.
Fabio Panetta: A digital euro for the digital era Introductory statement by Mr Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the ECON Committee of the European Parliament, Frankfurt am Main, 12 October 2020. * * * Madame Chair, honourable members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Thank you for inviting me to present the Eurosystem report on a digital euro.1 The quest to ensure that means of payment are fit for purpose has characterised economic history. In the provision of money by the sovereign, Europe can boast of a primacy dating back to ancient Greece2 and the Roman era.3 The search for sound money continued in the “dark” years of the High Middle Ages, despite the resumption of bartering; in the eighth century the monetary reform of Charlemagne spread out in many European countries.4 The evolution of money over the centuries and across different regions has reflected changes in economic life, in technology, and in societal beliefs and behaviours. When Marco Polo visited China in the 13th century, he was shocked to discover paper money, which we now know had already been used there for centuries. He called its creator a perfect “alchemist”.5 Today, digitalisation is spreading to all areas of our life, including the way we pay. So I do not expect anyone to find the idea of a digital currency as astonishing as Marco Polo found the idea of paper money.

Today, support for the single currency stands at record high levels.15 To be successful, a digital euro would also have to enjoy strong support from the public. It would be a digital symbol of progress and integration in Europe. And it would support the international role of the euro. Issuing a digital euro would be relevant for almost everything the ECB does. And it would affect our society as a whole. This is why we are seeking, through the public consultation we are launching today, an intense and open dialogue on our recent report with citizens and other stakeholders. Together with European institutions and authorities, in primis the European Parliament, we will 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  discuss the framework that would be necessary to introduce a digital euro. As co-legislators and representatives of European citizens, you will have a fundamental role to play in the process. I therefore very much look forward to our first exchange today. 1 ECB (2020), Report on a digital euro, Frankfurt am Main. 2 “Sometime in the first millennium BC, coinage was invented probably in Asia Minor, and it rapidly spread  throughout in the Mediterranean area….Wherever Greeks settled coinage followed. In the span of hardly a century the innovation had become established around the Aegean area, Sicily, southern Italy, southern France, Spain…. We know that by the end of the sixth century BC most of the city-states in the Greek world had their own coins…”.
I would like to add that it should also be possible to examine the areas of our work that are not directly concerned with monetary policy. Openness is something that permeates Swedish public administration and is one of the keystones of our principle of free public access to official documents. It means that the authorities’ activities should as far as possible be carried out in an open form. This also applies to the Riksbank, of course. But there are other types of more "informal” accountability that are facilitated by our openness, credibility and independent position. The information from the Riksbank also makes easier the often fairly lively debate on monetary policy conducted in the media. Through our independent position and our openness, we create very good conditions for a debate without any great risk that our credibility will be chipped away. The possibilities for accountability even in this more informal way are thus fairly large. The Riksbank’s responsibility as an authority also makes other demands on our actions. This applies, for instance, to the forms for how we make our interest rate decisions and how we communicate our monetary policy intentions – what is usually called “signalling” in central bank language. Our interest rate decisions must be taken in what I would like to call a "correct procedure” and it is important that our principal – ultimately the general public – has insight into the decision-making process.

BIS Review 62/2007  5  Changes for more efficient communication Ever since the inflation target was introduced, openness and clarity have been guiding principles for us. We have gradually implemented changes to become more transparent and more efficient in our communication. In February we presented for the first time our own forecast of the development of the policy rate over the coming years, something that our colleagues in Norway and New Zealand have also done. And as I mentioned earlier – a central bank can hardly be much more open and clear with regard to its monetary policy intentions. This increases the opportunities for evaluation and accountability. It has also become easier for us to explain our decisions and forecasts and to outline alternative scenarios for the interest rate. We are better able to live up to the requirements made in our interaction with the general public and the financial markets. There are also other examples of measures taken to increase our openness. Here I am thinking about the publication of minutes from the monetary policy meetings, our monetary policy reports, the many speeches held by Executive Board members every year and the hearings of the Governor by the Riksdag Committee on Finance. Clarity, not just openness – quality, not just quantity But efficient communication is not merely about quantity, it also concerns quality. Publishing a lot of information and doing so very often does not necessarily make the message clearer and the communication more efficient. It is not enough to merely be open.