samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Beyond current uncertainties, significant risks remain in the global economy and financial system that could derail growth. In Emerging Asia, there are upside risks to inflation. If central banks are forced to tighten monetary policy more, growth could be jeopardized. In the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  US, there are concerns about fiscal sustainability. If these lead to volatility in the financial markets against the backdrop of a still-weak labour market, then GDP could decelerate sharper than expected. But the chief global risk is the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in peripheral Europe. If there is contagion and banks in core Europe are affected, there could be a severe credit squeeze and pullback in economic activity. MAS is closely monitoring the developments in Europe. Let me now go on to recent developments on the inflation front. Headline inflation is now expected to be 4–5%, but forecast for core inflation is unchanged. I mentioned two months ago in a speech that headline CPI inflation had probably peaked. This remains technically correct but less clearly so in substance. Inflation has indeed eased from 5.5% in January to 4.5% in April and May. But inflation is expected to creep back up to slightly above 5% for the next couple of months before slowly trending down towards the end of the year. Therefore, for 2011 as a whole, we are revising CPI inflation forecast to 4–5%, from the current 3–4%. This upward revision and renewed volatility reflect two factors. First, accommodation costs.

European firms were lagging behind US firms in terms of foreign direct investment and they are now catching up. European firms have entered a “globalisation process” whereby they aim to reach a global size through acquisitions. BIS Review 61/2000  6  Conclusion Allow me to conclude. The euro area has adopted a sound macroeconomic policy and has embarked upon a fairly comprehensive programme of structural reforms. These reforms will still take time to be fully completed. But they are well underway and have already boosted economic growth, job creation and corporate restructuring. This move has been triggered by the creation of a monetary union and a vast unified financial market. I am impressed by what has been achieved during the past years and the National Central Banks as well as the ECB are strongly encouraging governments and businesses to foster structural reforms in the future. The euro exchange rate is clearly misaligned relative to euro area fundamentals (robust domestic growth, steady implementation of the single market, abundant domestic savings, healthy external accounts). This is the reason why we consider that the euro has a strong potential for appreciation. The Eurosystem, which is the guardian of the euro on behalf of the people of Europe, knows that our fellow citizens want the single currency to be at least as solid as their previous national currencies. In France, to give but one example, 96% of the population want the euro to be at least as solid as the franc.
But in fact I think this appearance is deceptive, for three reasons: - first, investments in money market mutuals are not, as I understand it, in principle capital certain (though in practice they may be supported by the fund’s sponsor); nor are they covered by deposit insurance (though this may not always be understood by the investor); - secondly, as I mentioned earlier, money-market mutuals are not themselves at the heart of the payments mechanism, but in effect piggy-back on the banks which are; - and, thirdly, money market mutuals do not undertake maturity transformation by making illiquid loans; like all collective investment schemes they put their investors’ funds into marketable instruments in accordance with the rules of the fund. Whereas money-market mutuals have something of the character of banks on the liabilities side of their balance sheets, but not on the assets side, the converse is true of non-bank finance companies. They do make illiquid loans, much as banks do. But they typically fund themselves in capital markets or from the banking system, and do not offer capital-certain, immediately available, liabilities to the public at large which are in any way comparable to bank deposits. Nor do they typically offer payments services. But what about the free-standing securities houses - and in particular those of American and Japanese parentage that have, up to now, been separated from commercial banking activity by the Glass-Steagall Act and by Article 65?

But it all serves the same ultimate purpose, of providing public infrastructure for private innovation, consistent with our mission to promote the good of the people of the UK. 19  https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/payments-landscape-review-call-for-evidence https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/950206/HM_Treasury_Cryptoasset _and_Stablecoin_consultation.pdf 21 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2020/august-2020.pdf 22 https://committees.parliament.uk/work/834/future-of-financial-services/ 20  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7
Andrew Bailey: Bank capital – debating again Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Deputy Governor of Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority at the Bank of England, at Barclays’ 2016 Financial Conference, London, 9 March 2016. *  *  *  Bank capital has been in the news again recently, or at least parts of the news – there are some other things going on. There are probably two reasons for this “news”: first, because we have entered another phase of highly uncertain conditions in financial markets, which has had a strong impact on the market value of banks; and second, as authorities we are pushing on with implementing the post-crisis reforms to capital standards, and in doing so we have reached a point where some of the important building blocks are now being put into place. Today, I am going to reflect on and draw some conclusions for what I would call the bigger picture, namely what sort of banking system are we seeking to create, what are we not doing, and why not. I will draw on the detail, and there is no shortage of that, but this is not a talk about the detail of bank capital, you can find that in plenty of other places. Another objective is to tackle some urban myths of today.

The remaining challenge then is whether the authorities will have the nerve to follow through and carry out a resolution. This is the charge that comes from opponents, namely that it will be “bottled”. I don’t see this as likely to be an issue, because if resolution is a credible route to take, as it will be, why would the authorities want to put the cost somewhere else? 3  John Kay “Should we have ‘Narrow Banking’?” The Future of Finance, LSE Report, 2010  4  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig: “The Bankers New Clothes: What’s wrong with Banking and what to do about it”. P271  5  Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig: “The Bankers New Clothes: What’s wrong with Banking and what to do about it”. P74–78  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Now for supervision and whether it too can function effectively. Make no mistake, in many countries supervision failed badly in the run-up to the crisis. Prudential supervision of banks is all about understanding the risks firms take, the effectiveness of the controls in risk management, using the framework of rules and regulations to create the right incentives to control risks appropriately, and where necessary intervening directly to require actions to be taken that would otherwise lead the firm to a potentially unsafe or unusual position.
The problems Europe is facing – terrorism, security, the refugee crisis, but also growth and employment – are problems that we have to overcome together, and if each government turns inwards to focus on national interests and preparing for elections, there will be no more capacity for acting as one. And at the same time, Donald Trump is setting an example, a bad example, and the United States will become inward-looking as well. Geopolitical risk – the risk of a change in the international balance of power – is another risk 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Europe will have to face next year. Benoît Cœuré, should the whole of Europe be worried about a banking crisis? Because among the uncertainties, and even though we were told that the banks were sound, we’re hearing that Deutsche Bank has problems, that Portuguese and Italian banks are struggling, and that certain banks have to be recapitalised. What do you say to that? I don’t believe there will be a banking crisis, but I do think that European banks have profitability problems and that there are too many banks in Europe, so reforms are needed. In other words, some banks have to go. Yes, but that’s an issue for the banks themselves. Solutions must come, first and foremost, from the private sector – banks are commercial enterprises and public money won’t resolve the issue. So banks will disappear, but not in France. Just to reassure us, how are the banks doing?

It peaked at 13%, which is very high, at the height of the crisis and now it’s at 9.8%, so it’s below 10%. The euro area has created 4 million jobs in four years, that’s not bad. Yes, this morning we have to say “Thank you, ECB”. The Banque de France has just said this morning that it is lowering its growth forecast for France to 1.3% for 2016 and 2017, and then to 1.4% in 2018 because of the worsening international environment. Is the Banque de France more pessimistic than the ECB? Because you are saying that the growth situation isn’t bad in France. No, we agree with the Banque de France – growth will be weaker in France than in the rest of the euro area, unfortunately. 1.3%, 1.4%? Yes, 1.3% in France, 1.7% in the euro area, so France is lagging behind in terms of growth. And what does France have to do to recover or catch up with the other countries? When you read the programmes of the candidates for the presidency, whether on the right or the left, do you ever say to yourself that this one or that one would enable France to catch up? The ECB doesn’t get involved in politics...  Of course. So don’t expect me to express a preference for one of the candidates. However.
Since the risk weights given to such unsecured advances exceed even 100 percent, it is necessary for the Central Bank to plan for a higher level of reserves than the minimum 15 percent. The Central Bank management, having taken this prudential requirement into account, has decided, as a part of the Bank’s modernization program, to raise the reserve level up to 100 percent of the domestic assets of the Bank. This is being continued by the Bank since 2003 and the reserve level today stands closer to 100 percent. However, it would be prudential to revisit even this percentage today in terms of its adequacy in view of the level of ever rising unsecured provisional advances and Exter’s warning that the profits earned by inflating the economy should not be distributed. The build up of reserves by the Central Bank to be equal to its domestic assets has another monetary dimension. On the liability side of Bank’s Balance Sheet, it has liabilities on account of currency issue and demand deposits maintained by commercial banks. These liabilities are known as monetary liabilities, since they constitute the reserve money of the system. All other liabilities, including the capital and reserves, are, therefore, called nonmonetary liabilities. When reserves are built-up to be equal to the Bank’s domestic liabilities, its monetary liabilities would vary exactly in accordance with the movement of the Bank’s net foreign assets.

Hence, the first choice which Exter had to make was whether to retain the currency board system or go for a central banking system. In a way, he did not have much choice in this regard, because his mandate was “to report on the organization and the functions of a Reserve Bank for Ceylon….” If he preferred a currency board, he should not have accepted the assignment. However, like a true professional, he compared and contrasted the two systems before he made his recommendation in favor of a central bank. The report demonstrates that his recommendation was out of conviction rather than the performance of a mere duty. His choice of a central bank for Ceylon in preference to the continuation of even a reformed currency board system was made on the basis of strong economic arguments. BIS Review 92/2007  1  1. The higher credit needs of a growing economy: Currency boards which are restrained by the need for maintaining a 100 % foreign reserve backing for the currency cannot supply enough liquidity to meet trade and other requirements unless the country continues to experience a huge balance of payments surplus year after year. Exter argued that it was not only impossible, but also undesirable to have such a surplus. Impossible because a country cannot continue to maintain a competitive edge over its competitors. Undesirable because freezing foreign reserves does not help the country to attain higher growth or welfare. 2.
It is rare for one model to be superior for all possible purposes: forecasting, policy making, conditional forecasts, testing hypotheses or investigating the effects of a previous policy change, for example. Different users will have different tastes, beliefs and needs and will prefer certain types of models.” I understand a number of central banks, including the Bank of England, have followed this path. I am sure that you will hear more of this later from the expert from the BOE himself. Such an approach is of course hugely taxing on resources and here in Asia, we could perhaps look upon it as a desirable goal to strive for. Finally, I also encourage a pragmatic approach. Here, I am referring to the practice of supplementing model output with sectoral analyses, survey data, market trends as well as value judgements. Modellers need to be aware of the limitations of their models. The complexities of the economy cannot be fully captured by a macroeconometric model, no matter how comprehensive its specifications. In particular, macro models cannot quantify variables such as panic, greed or the herd psychology of investors. As a result, even the predictions of the most sophisticated model have been thrown off by unexpected developments in the environment. This was clearly evidenced during the turmoil in international financial markets in August 1998, when the LTCM crisis unfolded. Conclusion The new Monetary Model of Singapore incorporates many of the new features and innovations in macro modelling.

Otherwise, the macro models will have little or no value for the policymakers who must make hard decisions based on the policy implications of the models. Models today have in fact evolved to be quite different from those in the 1970s. Then, macro models placed much emphasis on demand-driven outcomes for the economy. That was because governments believed in the power of discretionary monetary and fiscal policies to promote high growth and low inflation. However, the repeated failure of such macro models to identify critical turning points in the 1970s and 1980s caused many economists to question the old assumptions behind the models. It then became clear that supply-side factors and the role of expectations also needed to be worked in. Thus, today many macro models build in these factors. One example is how most models now work in the impact of the economy’s potential output on inflation outcomes. In the US, modellers are faced with growing evidence of an emergent “New Economy”. The hypothesis is that high rates of growth can be sustained without triggering off inflationary pressures, even at the point of full employment. I understand that staff from the Federal Reserve constantly update their estimates of key model parameters, such as the NAIRU2 as well as trend productivity to reflect the features of this New Economy. These updated estimates have been used to help shape the Fed’s forecasts of growth and inflation, thereby ensuring that the policymaking process is an informed one.
Bank of Zambia and government participation in foreign exchange market •  As discussed during the meeting in Ndola and consistent with the code of conduct for the broad based interbank system, we would like to reiterate the fact that Bank of Zambia is a participant in the market like all other players. As such the Bank’s participation should not be seen as extraordinary but as part of the process. Equally, Government participation should be treated in a similar manner. •  In addition, a number of issues were raised in the workshop regarding the operations of the foreign exchange market and a report has been circulated to that effect. In this regard, the Bank of Zambia will soon write to the Bankers Association of Zambia (BAZ) outlining those issues that require action by all concerned parties. Use of EDP funds •  It has come to our attention that some intermediaries of the EDP funds are not utilizing the funds according to the agreed rules. In some instances, the intermediaries are not on-lending the funds to their clients. Such practices if allowed to continue will defeat the purpose of the efforts aimed at creating a sustainable source of wholesale medium- to long-term funds in our market. We wish to urge all of you to adhere to the established rules, failure to which those institutions engaged in unacceptable practices may not be able to secure such funding in the future thereby denying their clients critical project funding.

Indeed, such is further complicated by the fact that this invisible crime operates on the fringe of society, acting as a bridge between the underworld and the rest. Hence, we need a collaborative approach to work together to overcome such challenges that could damage the image and reputation of Samoa’s financial system, as well as the good standing of NPOs in the country. I now have the pleasure of officially opening this Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Activities Workshop. BIS Review 85/2009  5
Banks, meanwhile, show low and stable exchange rate mismatches, and have managed to extend the tenor of their external debt. At the same time, our reported stress tests show that the banks’ level of capital allows them to absorb a risk episode like the one just described. On the other hand, the main financial prices have generally proceeded in line with short-term fundamentals. For the stock exchange, the IEF reports results showing some degree of optimism in stock prices with respect to fundamentals. It is necessary to point out that, in the case of Chile, the risks of financial instability from potential price corrections in the stock exchange are low, because the level of debt associated to higher stock prices is small. However, it is important not to become too indulgent because of the resilience of the financial system. Credit users and financial intermediaries must internalize the risks I have just mentioned in their consumption, investment and financing decisions. On its part, the Central Bank permanently monitors these variables and, through instances such as the Capital Market Committee and the Board of Superintendents, coordinates with other institutions to watch over the health of the national financial system within the framework of its legal authorities. In this context, the Central Bank will not hesitate to perform – or request the relevant institutions – regulatory amendments whenever it detects risks threatening the financial system. To finish, let me share with you some thoughts.

Figure 2  Monetary policy interest rates (1)  U.S. Multilateral nominal exchange rate (2)  (percent)  (index, March 1973=100)  4,5  4,5  160  160  3,5  3,5  140  140  2,5  2,5  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  4,0  4,0 3,0  3,0 2,0  2,0  1,0  1,0  1,5  1,5  0,5  0,5  0,0  0,0  08 U.S.A.  09  10 Japan  11  73 78 83 88 93 98 03 08  Eurozone  (1) Gray area shows forward curve. Dotted line shows forecasts in September's IPoM. (2) Increase denotes a depreciation of the dollar against main trading partners. Last figure corresponds to November. Sources: Bloomberg and U.S. Federal Reserve. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3 Net investment flows towards emerging economies (*) (billions of dollars, accumulated in 12 months) 140  140  105  105  70  70  35  35  0  0  -35  -35  -70  -70  Stocks  Bonds  Total  (*) From investment funds investing in emerging economies. Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research.
Looking at it in another way, a Thai compromise to let people have second and third chances and to minimise individual’s suffering has been undertaken, in that the old owners have for the meanwhile been still kept running the plant, and they could perhaps renegotiate again what was not agreed upon during the interval. I have a large part in making the two sides come to terms. Once the terms were agreed, I wish that they could have been followed but it does seem that businessmen when in real trouble have to take big chances. That the court has given TPI a chance to rethink even if it is only over a couple of months is, I think, a very characteristic decision and we have to see whether it was worthwhile. I do not want to express my views on the outcome, but that one takes a little bit of time to try and solve what is important to everybody seems sensible. Ladies and Gentlemen, to end my statement let me expand on the essential nature of the TPI case to a larger sphere. There is still a conflict of philosophy basic to the management of Thailand. Does one  BIS Review 29/2000  4  help the poor or does one help the rich?

There are now no more “Banking” or “Note Issuing” departments as first so clearly expounded in Bagehot’s “Lombard Street” written in 1873. It is sad when one has to move away from what has become an institution of central banking, but we have to move with the time, as so many central banks have had to do in the past decade. Work on reorganising the management side is now fully complete and we are working on reorganising the departments and its work system which will take about another two years. We have of course over the last two years been developing control over the money market. Developing the debt market and improving our supervision examination capabilities. We can truly say that we have very good information in the form of database daily on the money markets in the country and have developed the instrument to fairly effectively control offshore activities. In terms of the debt market, we have developed a government bond market and a yield curve, and our next move is in the area of the private sector debt instruments which we have formally formulated into project, using A T Kearney’s methodology to execute our plan. In the area of examination and supervision, we have now finalised a system where we train and with the assistance of outside authorities certify our supervisors to be of high and uniform-standard apart from changing the method of supervision from individual-based to one of approval-by-peer-groups comprising a supervision and examination committee inside the central bank.