samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I would argue that this inflation-safeguard threshold needs to be well above our current 2 percent inflation objective. This is consistent with the theoretical work showing that extraction from a liquidity trap requires the central bank, if necessary, to allow inflation to run higher than its target over the medium term. My preferred inflation threshold is a forecast of 3 percent over the medium term. For a central bank like the Federal Reserve that has a statutory dual mandate, this seems like a risk that we should be willing to accept. We would suffer some net policy loss if the gains in employment did not occur. But we certainly have experienced inflation rates near 3 percent in the recent past and have weathered them well. Such an experience would not be anything close to the debilitating higher inflation rates we saw in the 1970s or 1980s. And 3 percent isn’t high enough to unhinge long-run inflation expectations. Indeed, I think our new framework commitment to a 2 percent long-run inflation goal would help anchor inflation expectations if we undertook this policy strategy. Let me also emphasize that under this policy proposal, inflation reaching 3 percent is only a risk – and not a certainty. Indeed, simulations of standard models suggest that inflation is likely to remain below 3 percent even under a policy of extended monetary accommodation.

I want to thank you all for your support, trust and commitment, which has enabled us to reach this first step towards an integrated, more efficient, and harmonised post-trade market in Europe. In particular, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the national communities, namely the national central banks, the securities depositories and their clients, for their involvement and cooperation. Moreover, I would like to thank the 4CB (composed of Banque de France, Deutsche Bundesbank, Banca d’Italia and Banco de España) for developing and now also running the T2S platform. Let me also acknowledge the hard work and dedication of the people at the ECB who coordinated the implementation of the project. In particular, I thank Jean-Michel Godeffroy, who steered the T2S ship through sometimes stormy waters for many years, and Marc Bayle, who brought the ship to a safe harbour on 22 June 2015. And a special thanks to Ms Tumpel-Gugerell, who was the ECB board member in charge during the project’s inception. A popular saying is that “Two heads are better than one”. From the very beginning T2S has managed to unite the efforts of both the private and the public sector. T2S was not initiated by the market, but owing to its post-trade harmonisation agenda it has evolved into a marketdriven initiative which is supported by the public sector. In many ways it has been a unique project. First of all, no one was forced to join the T2S Community.
Now the time has come—I would argue it came a while ago, but in any case it’s here now—the time has come for every firm with LIBOR exposure to actively grapple with the risks that are coming your way whether you like it or not. The way forward for the vast majority of LIBOR-based instruments is rapidly becoming clear. It’s easy and tempting to justify inaction by criticizing the available solutions as imperfect or as just too hard to do. But inaction at this point in the LIBOR transition is short-sighted and futile and only extends the uncertainty. We need decisive action by everyone in the market to avoid damage to individual firms and the financial system. 1 Raymond Check and Thomas Noone assisted in preparing these remarks. Mr. Held would like to thank his  other colleagues at the Federal Reserve who provided comments and corrections. 2 2019 Outlook: Trends in the Capital Markets 3 See for example the FSOC’s Annual Reports for 2013 and 2018. 4 See Introductory Remarks by Federal Reserve Board of Governors Vice Chairman for Supervision Randal K.  Quarles at the Alternative Reference Rates Committee Roundtable, July 19, 2018 5 Second Report of the Alternative Reference Rates Committee, March 2018 6 Reforming Major Interest Rate Benchmarks, 22 July 2014 7 Principles for Financial Benchmarks Final Report, July 2013 8 Information on the ARRC, including  its announcements and publications, can be found at  www.newyorkfed.org/arrc.

The European Commission's proposal (CRR3/CRD6) to finalise the implementation of these rules is a decisive and very balanced step forward. This balance must be preserved in the discussions that are underway in the Council and Parliament, and which will continue under the Czech Presidency. In this respect, I would like to mention two major challenges that you are familiar with. First, we continue to call for the implementation of an output floor at the highest level of consolidation within the European Union, which is the only level consistent with the spirit of the Banking Union, which is now almost complete. Second, we need targeted adjustments on critical and strategic exposures for the financing of the EU economy, but they must remain temporary in order to correspond to the spirit of the agreements. 3  In the current context, in addition to completing micro-prudential regulation, it is also desirable to maintain a comprehensive and consistent macro-prudential safety net to enable banks to absorb new shocks while continuing to provide essential services to the real economy. This takes several forms, ranging from countercyclical capital buffers, which the French macroprudential authority reset at 0.5% with a 12-month implementation deadline at its March meeting, to borrower-based measures.
We are accountable also to Parliament, which will entail members of the Monetary Policy Committee giving evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, most probably on the basis of our quarterly Inflation Report, as well as the Bank’s Annual Report being debated in the full House. And we are accountable to the public through the framework of transparency. 8. Put together, these elements provide for greater transparency and accountability of the monetary policy process than in any other country in the world. None of this, of course, guarantees success. But I believe that this new, and carefully-constructed, framework provides the best prospect we have had for years of delivering price stability as a steady foundation for the sustained growth of output and employment that the UK is capable of achieving. This framework for monetary stability, combined with the parallel commitment the government has demonstrated to fiscal responsibility and to promoting a flexible and competitive supply-side structure for the economy, provides a basis for the UK economy to continue to grow on a sustainable basis in the years ahead. Preparations for EMU 9. These changes in the monetary framework have been a major focus of interest of the UK financial markets over the past summer. But in parallel there has also been close focus on the continuing progress being made within the European Union towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 10. The UK government’s statement on EMU last month provided a clear account of UK policy in relation to the monetary union.

Consistently with this view, we believe that it is essential that payments be able to flow freely throughout the TARGET system. 25. Why do we devote this effort for preparing for the euro? The reason is very straightforward. London’s pre-eminent position as an international financial centre rests on the fact that it provides broad and liquid markets for the full range of internationally-traded currencies and for the vast array of different instruments and facilities denominated in them. The euro will undoubtedly become a major internationally-traded currency, and it is therefore certain that it will be traded extensively in the London markets. The euro thus represents an opportunity, rather than a threat, for the London markets, and it is important that the London markets prepare in good time the systems and infrastructure needed to take advantage of this opportunity. London as a financial centre after EMU 26. The reason why we are convinced that the euro represents a major opportunity for the London markets relates essentially to the strengths that the London markets have displayed over the years:  •  London is a global financial centre rather than just a European centre, with much of its business generated around the world, not just within Europe. BIS Review 110/1997  -5-  •  London has always thrived on financial innovation, and has a strong track record of capitalising on new opportunities. •  The euro may very well bring greater financial activity to the main Continental financial markets.
More relevant to today’s conference, following the FSB’s recent Plenary meeting in Tokyo we announced that in the next few weeks we will issue a consultative paper on resolution planning and, in particular, on resolution strategies. The paper, drawn up by a subcommittee led by Christine Cumming of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, will cover three areas. The first is Recovery Triggers and Stress Scenarios used in recovery planning. Firms need to ensure that triggers are not linked mechanically to metrics that lag behind their true financial condition – a problem with some previous earlyintervention frameworks. Recovery actions must start sufficiently early. But care must be taken to avoid markets overacting to the fact of such actions being taken. That is not easy. Second, the consultative paper will outline a possible framework for national authorities to use when identifying the critical functions and support services of firms that need to be sustained in distressed conditions. What matters here is focusing on those services that are vital to the economy. The third, and most important, area of consultation is about the development of Resolution Strategies and Operational Resolution Plans. This guidance aims to capture the main issues that authorities should address.

But some general policies are also emerging. Here in the UK, the government is requiring the domestic retail banking business of the largest banking groups to be ring-fenced. And for the EU, Erkki Liikanen has produced an important report on  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the structure of banks which would involve essentially ring-fencing the trading business. Both of these approaches, which are similar in many respects, work with the grain of the FSB’s approach to resolution. Single-point of entry resolution: bail-in of the debt of the top company The central principle running through this whole endeavour is that after equity is exhausted, losses should fall next on uninsured debt holders, in the order they would take losses in a standard bankruptcy or liquidation process. Although all resolution strategies have that effect, it is the particular focus of what has come to be called “bail-in”. I should perhaps say that bail-in isn’t about identifying a special type of bond that can be written down or converted. “Bail-in” is a verb not a noun. It’s about giving the authorities the tools, the powers, to effect a restructuring of the capital and liabilities of a bank that isn’t toxic all the way through; as such it will be recognisable to specialists as broadly akin to the US Chapter 11 system for business reconstructions, but speeded up for the exigencies of banking. Bail-in is not unique in putting losses on bondholders. All resolution tools do that.
Global imbalances – where to from here Looking forward, the unwinding of global imbalances requires some combination of a slowdown in the growth of domestic demand in deficit countries and an increase in domestic demand in surplus countries. If the slowdown is not to dominate, we need to see a shift in relative prices to rebalance demand – that is a gradual real exchange rate depreciation of deficit countries against surplus ones. The rise of SWFs may play a part in this dynamic. Their emergence is a sign that surplus countries may be less willing in future to accept such low yielding assets. That should put pressure on exchange rates to adjust and contribute to a reduction in global imbalances. So while SWFs may be a product of global imbalances, they may also play a part in the adjustment. There are signs that in the United States, at least, imbalances are beginning to adjust. The US current account deficit now looks past its peak and the marked fall in the dollar – about 25% in real traded-weighted terms – since its peak in early 2002 should help in the adjustment. However, the decline in US relative demand is coming about mainly through slower domestic demand growth at home rather than faster demand growth abroad while the dollar has fallen less against currencies with the largest current account surpluses (Chart 7).

The problems we encountered in communicating monetary policy, which arose in conjunction with the substantial rate cuts during the second half of the 1990s, were also a significant reason for the Riksbank's decision in 1999 to publish a clarification of the formulation of policy and the application of the inflation target.1 Among other things the clarification specified the situations in which there may be reason to deviate from the simple rule of aiming policy at meeting the target of 2 per cent CPI inflation one to two years ahead. My discussion today is based on exactly the same line of reasoning as in that clarification. The second example is taken from spring 2001. Higher food and energy prices due to foot and mouth disease and mad cow disease, as well as supply shocks in energy production, caused a sharp rise in CPI inflation. The price increases were judged to be temporary, and the Riksbank decided therefore not to raise the repo rate. As the prices rises were estimated to disappear from CPI inflation relatively quickly, there was no need in this case to depart from the Bank's simple rule of monetary policy. However there was a need in our external communication to illustrate clearly the assessment that it was mainly transitory price increases that had caused CPI inflation to be so high above target.
In this framework, the membership would give both an opportunity and an obligation for local firms to improve their businesses at the micro level through increasing their productivity, enhancing their management and technical skills together with the quality of labour force and switching to products with high value added. In short, as the Turkish economy moves along the membership process and converges to the EU economy, we would see a high and satisfactory level of sustainable growth, advance further in economic stability and therefore in the enhancement of the welfare of the society. Ladies and Gentlemen, As you all know, we have started negotiations only a few weeks ago. It is obvious that the EU enlargement with Turkey will be very different from the previous enlargements in the sense that Turkey is not similar to the other countries in its dynamics including economic, demographic and political ones. However, a closer look at the enlargement periods of the new members reveals the fact that these periods are associated with both debates and concerns. But, when we look at the results, we see a win-win situation for both the EU and the new member states. And I believe that Turkey s membership will be another win-win situation as well. All in all, I believe that Turkey s membership will create a synergy in which both the EU and Turkey could enjoy a mutually advantageous conjunction of their different characteristics. However, one has to remember that during this process, both Turkey and the EU have their own responsibilities.

In trade in value-added terms (“TiVA”), more than one-third of the exports from the five economies of Northeast Asia and the eight economies of Southeast Asia 1 ends up in the region itself – this is nearly twice their exports to the US. ASEAN in particular is becoming a major economic force in Asia. It is a $ trillion market with over 630 million people. Based on current growth rates, ASEAN is expected to become the fourth largest market by 2030, behind the EU, China, and the US. ASEAN has emerged as a key global manufacturing region, with extensive supply chains linking the individual economies and to China. ASEAN is the world’s fifth largest manufacturing economy in value-added terms. So, in the face of rising trade protectionism, it is important for Asian economies to strengthen trade, investment and infrastructure networks to sustain long term growth. Indeed, the best response to trade restrictions is to further liberalise trade among willing economies. And this is exactly what Asia is doing. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”) is a good example. It brings together the ten ASEAN economies and China, India, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. It signals the region’s commitment to freetrade. Negotiations are ongoing, but when successfully concluded, the RCEP will create the world’s largest trading bloc, covering one-third of global GDP. And by the end of next month, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP-11”) will enter into force.
In Russia, a federal state with a very large geographical area, the Central Bank has sixty territorial branches and nineteen regional banks - apparently rather modest numbers for a country with some 150 million people spread across ten time zones. But in addition the CBR in 1994 ran 1,356 cash and settlement centres, 13 banking schools, and 30 “other organisations”. To run this empire the bank employed over 52,000 staff, having created over 7,000 additional posts in the previous two years to conduct its various new functions. Central bank staffing and costs All this shows that, even though all European central banks face similar pressures, the solutions remain quite diverse. That is reflected in relative costs. Comparable data are hard to come by, but the Bank of Russia appears to have more staff per head of population than any other. The People’s Bank of China is larger, employing some 150,000 people (but only 1,000 in head office where policy is centralised), but considering the PBoC’s continuing role as banker to the state-owned enterprises that looks small in relation to a population of 1.2 billion. Other very large central banks are the Reserve Bank of India with 32,000 staff and the US Federal Reserve System with 25,000. One would expect the number of staff employed by a central bank to depend not just on the population of the country (and in this there should be some economies of scale) but also on the range of tasks it has and how efficiently it conducts them.

In the March 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  23 statements, the FOMC also announced it would start to purchase agency commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) to smooth market functioning in that market that helps to finance multi-family housing. For more on the deterioration of CMBS market functioning, the Fed purchases and their impact on the CMBS market during this period, see Woojung Park, Julia Gouny, and Haoyang Liu, Federal Reserve Agency CMBS Purchases, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, July 16, 2020. 9 FSB Sets Out Action to Maintain Financial Stability during COVID, July 15, 2020. 10 John C. Williams, Rising to the Challenge: Central Banking, Financial Markets, and the Pandemic, Remarks at  the 16th Meeting of the Financial Research Advisory Committee for the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research (via videoconference) (July 16, 2020). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
If we are hit by a critical crisis in one or more of the major financial institutions today, the regulatory and supervisory framework is not sufficient. Second, we need to move forward and find a modified framework before problems arise. My experience is that if a crisis hits an unprepared authority, the choice of solution will suffer. Third, we should move ahead gradually, since there are obvious political difficulties and it is uncertain what the first-best solution would look like. In a political world, it is difficult to achieve first-best directly. Instead we have to move stepwise and ensure that we have our compass firmly in our hands to ensure a move in the right direction. To solve some of the problems of coordination of information and assessments, I propose the establishment a new pan-European body, a European Organization for Financial Supervision (EOFS). The idea is to create a separate agency to follow the major cross-border banking groups in Europe. The EOFS should only focus on the presently about 40 truly cross-border banking groups and not deal with the about eight thousand European banks with a predominately national character. The EOFS should have three tasks: It should gather information about the banking groups and their activities in different countries. Importantly, it should also create unified risk-assessments of each cross-border banking group. Finally, it should also oversee the activities and risks of these banking groups. To achieve these tasks, there is a need for a separate agency, staffed with a sufficient number of competent employees.

In addition, the home country will get an explicit EU-mandate to take the interest of the other relevant countries into account in its assessments and decisions but it is not clear how this will work in practice. There is also an accountability problem with this solution. National authorities are both appointed by and accountable to the national governments and in extension to the national electorate. It may be difficult for a host country to hold the authorities in a home country responsible for a specific decision, even if its main effect is in the host country. A fourth possibility is the pan-European solution where both the mandate and responsibility for supervision are transferred from the national level to the EU-level. This would imply the creation of a European FSA, as well as granting the ECB a role as Lender of Last Resort for cross-border banks. This solution raises a number of difficult political considerations. It basically means handing over a part of the sovereignty to the EU-level. Also, at present the EU has no supra-national taxing power, so some other formula on burden sharing would have to be found. Presumably the political obstacles for this solution are large. At least in the short run, this fourth solution is not realistic. Another approach With this background, I draw three conclusions. First, the present situation with a growth of crossborder banks – with some clear examples in the European region – combined with national responsibility for supervision and financial stability is not satisfactory.