samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Jean-Claude Trichet: Conclusions of the G20 in Seoul – Interview in Le Progrès Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, in Le Progrès, France, conducted by Mr Vincent Rocken and published on 13 November 2010. *  *  *  Are you satisfied with the conclusions of the G20 in Seoul? Let me first of all say how delighted I am to be here in Lyon, breathing my native air and soaking up the beauty of the city and its way of life. With regard to the G20, I took note of the communiqué stating that risks remain for the global economy and that there is a need for extreme vigilance. I share this view entirely with the Heads of State and Government. Four further conclusions are particularly important to my mind. First, a commitment to pursue macroeconomic policies aimed at ensuring sustainable growth, including rigorous fiscal measures in countries where these are necessary. Second, the need to implement ambitious structural reforms to foster growth and employment. Third, the approval of the banking supervision reforms prepared by the Basel Committee. And fourth, a commitment to enhance the flexibility of the exchange rates of certain currencies which are not sufficiently flexible. When France takes over the presidency of the G20 for a year, what guidelines and actions should it focus on at the financial level? The global governance of the G20 is a long-term undertaking.

Potential risks include blunting the creative destruction of the crisis by allowing unproductive, zombie firms to remain in business and permitting the inflation of asset bubbles. Some have also raised concerns that low interest rates have reduced incentives for governments to carry out difficult fiscal and structural reforms. These topics are complex and deserve a greater depth of comment than I have time to cover today. Given the audience here tonight, I wanted to focus on two particular potential consequences of our unconventional measures: the impact on the distribution of wealth and income, and the impact on bank profitability. To an extent, monetary policy always works through a redistribution of activity. Lowering interest rates encourages households to bring forward to today some consumption planned for the future. Some have argued that negative rates have the perverse effect of forcing savers, such as those with a fixed savings target for retirement, to save more. But such an argument is not borne out by the data. Since the introduction of the negative rate on our deposit facility, saving rates across the euro area have remained broadly stable, or have fallen. The only major country to have some rise is Germany. However, the profile of the German saving rate also reflects the ongoing recovery in the residential investment sector. But before I analyse more deeply the distributional impact of monetary policy action by the ECB, let me first consider the distributional impact of monetary policy inaction. These effects are clear.
The third point regarding the changing process of the Turkish economy I would like to share with you is the increase in confidence, which is actually an outcome of the issues that I have just mentioned. To clarify this point, public confidence in the economic policies in implementation and favorable expectations of the results of these policies have improved and are continuing to improve. The most concrete indicator of this confidence is that the inflation target is becoming a more credible nominal anchor for most of the economic agents. In other words, it is more commonly used as a reference. The existence of a strong nominal anchor in an economy, which can be used as a reference, helps to shape other economic variables. Accordingly, volatility both in economic fundamentals and in other variables gradually decreases. As I have already emphasized at the beginning of my speech, this point is of great importance with respect to resolving the pricing difficulty arising from excessive volatility. Moreover, today we are happy to see that economic units are now able to foresee longer terms and they are now able to carry out longer-term transactions. These developments are drastic steps for determining benchmark interest rates for pricing derivatives operations. Thanks to the macroeconomic stability and structural transformation process, we have now reached the point where we can make risk management in a sound and healthy environment. The Turkish Derivatives Exchange is the most important pillar and complementary element of this process.

In the case of social bonds, for example, the European Platform on Sustainable Finance has been working on a proposal for a social taxonomy, but this area evolves very quickly and more dimensions need to be included, such as diversity, equity and inclusion. In addition, the focus of sustainable finance is widening from climate to include nature and the environment because climate change and biodiversity loss are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. 7  Central banks are starting to analyse the consequences of the loss of biodiversity for the financial system. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) has set up a task force on biodiversity loss and nature-related risks. We need to research and learn more about the transmission channels from nature loss to the economy and the financial system, as we are already doing in relation to climate change.7 Thus, we have a further challenge here, and probably next year there will be a session at this conference focusing on biodiversity. In the meantime, to conclude, we can see that the issuance of green bonds is recovering in 2023. However, other bonds in the sustainable finance family are seeing less interest from investors. The challenges are several: i) the lack of common definitions, ii) the voluntary aspect of the European green bond standard, and iii) the lack of verification of sustainabilitylinked bonds. In addition, a higher degree of transparency and a global disclosure standard would contribute to the development of sustainable bond markets and a reduction in greenwashing. 7  See NGFS (2022).
Karl Marx’s (1867) work also centred on this relationship, but he stressed the reverse causation: the effect of the economy’s structure and markets on society’s values and culture. In recent years, and after a prolonged period of neglect, the role of values or culture as an underlying determinant of market efficiency and overall economic performance has been emphasised and explored by, among others, Banfield (1958), Aghion and Howitt (1998, 2005), Eggertson (2005), Blanchard (2000, 2003, 2004), Layard (2003), Bruni and Porta (2005), Sapir (2004, 2005) and Edmund Phelps (1973, 2003, 2006), winner of the Nobel Prize in economics last year. III. Economic growth in Europe and the United States: the contribution of productivity, labour utilisation and population  Let me now address these issues by examining the growth performance of the European economy. I will use as a benchmark for comparison and assessment the US economy, which is comparable in size and degree of development to Europe’s and which has experienced high growth rates, especially since the mid-1990s. Economic growth in Europe over the past decade and a half, and especially since the mid-1990s, has been below our expectations and unsatisfactory in comparison with the United States. The average growth rate for the euro area in the period 1990-2005, was 2.0%, noticeably below the average growth of 2.3% recorded in the 1980s (1980-1989). Moreover, the gap in real GDP growth between the United States and the euro area widened over the period 1980-2005, as shown in Chart 1.

Lucas Papademos: Economic performance, institutions, and human values Speech by Mr Lucas Papademos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the Second International Symposium on Universal Values: “Science, Technology and Human Values”, The Academy of Athens, Athens, 2 May 2007. * I. *  *  Introduction  This conference focuses on a fundamental and broad topic of relevance to all fields of science and public policy: the importance of human values. The role of human values in shaping developments in different fields of science, in assessing the implications of scientific advances and in adopting appropriate policies is steadily becoming more widely recognised and better understood. This observation is also true for economic science and public policy. Over the past half-century, economic science – both theoretical analysis and empirical research – underwent a profound transformation with the progressive and extensive adoption of mathematical analysis, statistical methodology and use of computing technology. The “dismal science” has become more of a true science. However, the vast majority of the significant advances in economic theory and empirical analysis has placed little emphasis on the role of values as well as institutions in influencing the behaviour of economic agents, the overall functioning of the economy and the orientation or conduct of economic policy. This fact may seem rather odd since in previous years the importance of institutions and underlying values was at the centre of economic and political thought.
Paul Fisher: Current issues in monetary policy Speech by Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director for Markets of the Bank of England, at the University of Bristol – London Alumni Event, Bristol, 26 February 2013. *  *  *  Thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you this evening. The University of Bristol is a very fine institution in a very fine city and I have extremely fond memories of my time there from 1977 to 1980 as a student in Economics with Statistics. In music at that time we had the latter stages of punk rock, and Bristol was also very good for folk music; in football I remember watching Bristol City playing Tottenham at Ashton Gate in what was then the true First Division; and in the economy there was continuing economic and social unrest (the Winter of Discontent) with inflation and unemployment stubbornly high. I recall a flatmate conducting a survey of students’ inflation expectations in 1978 when RPI inflation had just fallen below 8% for the first time since 1972. Unemployment was thought to be high at the time, as a result of the first oil crisis but was to take a further upwards lurch in the early 80s and I remember how lucky I was to get a research job at Warwick University when I left Bristol – having spent the summer of 1980 painting rusty trolleys in a factory, which was itself knocked down to create housing later in the 80s.

6  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Documents/pdf/chancellorletter120321.pdf  7  See for example “Recent Developments in the Sterling Monetary Framework” http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2011/speech487.pdf  BIS central bankers’ speeches  available  at:  3  money can surely be relied on to prevent deflation, but even if it provides a temporary boost to real activity it can’t guarantee sustaining a particular real growth rate. Third, the split into prices and real output and the overall outturn for the economy, depend on what else is happening at the same time: monetary policy is just one of the various forces at work shaping the pressures on output and inflation. We don’t conduct monetary policy in a scientific laboratory where everything else can be held constant. QE is often described as being a great experiment. In fact, the theory of monetary policy in the economic textbooks that I was brought up with at Bristol, and later, all considered the supply of money to be the central bank’s primary policy instrument. The use of interest rates to set monetary policy appeared to be viewed by many academic authors as something of a slightly unfortunate and uninteresting practicality8. I want to be clear about one very important point: for monetary policy to stimulate the economy, the Bank of England has to cut interest rates and/or increase the supply of money. That gives firms and households an incentive to spend rather than to save.
What then are the risks - the possible arguments against our joining the euro? Essentially the potential downside can be summed up as the risk that the single monetary policy - the “one-size-fits-all” short term interest rate within the Eurozone, which is the inevitable consequence of a single currency - will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic monetary policy needs of all the participating countries. Countries may have divergent cyclical positions. They may face divergent fiscal positions, which would affect their appropriate fiscal/monetary policy mix in different directions - though this should be contained by the Growth and Stability Pact. Or their domestic policy needs may diverge as a result of economic shocks of some sort - a classic, but unique, example was German re-unification, but the more recent global economic disturbance was perhaps another example. The risks of divergent monetary policy needs within a monetary union are certainly real. They were recognised in the Maastricht Treaty, which established the famous “convergence criteria” precisely in order to try to limit the risks before the euro-project went ahead. They are essentially similar to the risks of sectoral or regional divergence within a national currency area - which we in the UK certainly know something about - it is in fact a major monetary policy headache for us at the present time. But in the case of the Eurozone the risks are of divergent monetary policy needs between the different member countries - they apply at the national level.

This policy of “prepare and decide” has subsequently been confirmed by the publication of a National Changeover Plan, which sets out the key steps that would be involved in the transition following a positive decision on UK entry. This remains the Government’s policy. In the meantime, we continue to pursue macro-economic - both fiscal and monetary - stability and supply-side flexibility alongside our European partners, in our own national economic interest, which will also help to bring about closer convergence between our economies. Over the past seven years or so we have in the UK achieved the longest period of sustained low inflation we’ve known for a generation. Retail price inflation - on the Government’s target measure has averaged 2.6% since the beginning of 1993 and is currently running at 2.2%, or only 1% on the European harmonised index of consumer prices. But alongside low inflation we’ve had the lowest nominal interest rates that most of us can remember. Short-term rates have averaged some 6¼% since the MPC’s first decision in June 1997 compared with some 9.25% over the preceding decade. And 10 year government bond yields have fallen, with inflationary expectations, to around 5¼%, which apart from a brief period last year is the lowest they’ve been for nearly 40 years. Much more fundamentally we’ve enjoyed the longest period of uninterrupted, quarter by quarter, economic growth since records began some 45 years ago - with annual growth since Q3 1992 averaging 2.8% - between ¼ and ½% above most estimates of our underlying trend rate.
17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Chart 3: UK Phillips curve Wage inflation (%)  40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0  0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14 -5  Unemployment rate (%) 1971-1997  1998-2012  2013-2017  Fitted 1971-1997  Fitted 1998-2014  Fitted 2013-2017  Sources: ONS and Bank of England calculations. Notes: Wage inflation refers to annual whole economy total pay growth. Chart 4: US Phillips curve  Wage inflation (%) 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  Unemployment rate (%) 1971-1982  1983-2011  2012-2017Q1  Fitted 1971-1982  Fitted 1983-2011  Fitted 2012-2017Q1  Sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18  Chart 5: UK trade union membership Per cent of employment 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1892  1902  1912  1922  1932  1942  1952  1962  1972  1981  1991  2002  2012  Sources: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) and Bank of England calculations.

In 2013, almost one-fifth of global foreign exchange transactions took place in Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and Australia. While these centres have not yet reached the UK level, they are now almost on a par with the US. Singapore last year supplanted Japan as the world’s third-largest foreign exchange trading centre (righthand side of slide 3).3 Against this backdrop, these markets have understandably gained in significance for the SNB, too, which explains why we decided to open a branch office with eight staff in Singapore in mid-2013. This office is primarily significant from the point of view of investment policy, and to date our expectations on this score have been met in full. Our presence on the ground in Singapore enables us to manage our Asia-Pacific portfolio much more effectively. The importance of being able to operate on the Asian bond and stock markets during local trading hours, for instance, has been confirmed. Our office there also allows us to manage a host of on-site relationships, which deepens our understanding of Asian financial markets – and economies in general. Moreover, having a local presence makes it easier for us to monitor and enforce the minimum exchange rate round the clock, thereby contributing to the implementation of monetary policy. The growing importance of Asia is also reflected in our foreign exchange reserves. As I mentioned earlier, given the enormous increase in our foreign exchange reserves, the  1  World Federation of Exchanges. www.world-exchanges.org, Statistics/Annual Query Tool. 2  Asian Development Bank. 2006 and 2014.
Unscrupulous owners and managers might therefore have an opportunity to take excessive risks or misuse policyholder funds: for example, by using them to finance their other business ventures. They might also seek to mask the true financial position of an insurer using opaque models, optimistic assumptions and impenetrable mumbo jumbo. The misalignment of incentives might be particularly extreme when an insurer is close to insolvency, with owners and managers tempted to take more risk in a ‘gamble for resurrection’. In my view, these risks are common to any profit-seeking financial institution in the business of investment in order to pay annuities. That is why, for example, our response to the recent Department of Work and Pensions consultation on superfunds said: “The risks faced by DB consolidators are similar to those managed by insurance companies providing annuities. And insurance companies may want to enter the defined benefit consolidation market. There may be unintended consequences if the two types of business are regulated differently.”4 4  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/publication/pra-response-to-dwp-consultation-paper-definedbenefit-pension-scheme-consolidation  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  Overall, I think the PRA’s implementation of the Solvency II regime addresses these risks well. I would emphasise in particular the following features of the regime: 1. It strongly encourages UK insurers to invest in assets with fixed cashflows that closely match those of their annuity liabilities. This limits exposure to market risk. 2.

The initiatives can also fit in with the broader agenda of ASEAN integration, to leverage on regional resources and promote regional economic integration simultaneously. Closing remarks Let me close my remark by thanking all of you once again for your invaluable contributions to the Thai economy. The Bank of Thailand will continue our work of ensuring a stable financial and economic environment, so that businesses can continue to thrive and individuals can enjoy better standards of living on a sustainable basis. I hope that Thailand will continue to be a destination of choice for your investment, and a country of shared opportunity and prosperity for us all. Thank you  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The public sector must be ready to steer and lead the nation onto a new, uncharted path with confidence, certainty and conviction. This is a heavy responsibility. What we do today will have ramifications on the future of our children and our children’s children. We must rethink the way we formulate policies, the way we deliver on our mandates and the way we think about public policy. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Today, I would like to speak about three possible characteristics that will be necessary for the public sector to navigate the challenges of the future. These are: Integrity, Agility and Validity of Measurement. Integrity: The courage to take the road less travelled As public servants, our duty is to serve and protect the public interest. Our legitimacy is strengthened by their confidence. Discharging this responsibility will become more challenging as we move forward: Priorities and needs will continue to expand faster than our resources. In these times, moral courage, integrity and transparency will be more important than ever. We must be brave enough to pursue the right course of action, doing the right thing, unpopular as they may be in the short-term. We must also be accountable for our decisions. This requires that we engage and communicate with the public as never before, explaining clearly the rationale of our policies. It is also important that we foster a culture and environment that prioritises these values at the level of the individual.

Rather, as with the other issues I have discussed, I view this development as limiting the upside risk to that forecast. Despite the limiting factors discussed above, the pace of growth envisioned in the consensus forecast implies that overall labor market conditions will continue to improve. But there is a great deal of uncertainty about the resulting path of the unemployment rate, with some forecasters expecting a fairly steep decline to around 5 percent by the end of 2015, while others anticipate a much more gradual decline. In addition to how strong output grows, the ultimate path of the unemployment rate will also depend on the behavior of productivity growth and the labor force participation rate. The labor force participation rate has declined a great deal since 2007, the previous cyclical peak, due to a combination of demographic factors and protracted cyclical weakness in labor demand. The behavior of the participation rate and its likely future path is an issue we continue to monitor and study intently. While I still believe that the participation rate could move back up again as the demand for labor strengthens, I am less confident about this than earlier as the downward trend in participation rates has persisted even as the labor market has improved. What I can say with greater certainty is that there still is a significant underutilization of labor market resources. I come to this conclusion after assessing many labor market indicators, not just the level of the unemployment rate.