samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Moderate leveraging of firms and households together with strong balance sheets of banks allow private sector to withstand economic shocks. Unemployment rate is low and stable, leaving households with enough purchasing power to start spending again when the economy rebounds. Greatly adding to the strength of domestic purchasing power is the export sector. Global recovery has become firmer as recent economic indicators such as Global Purchasing Managers’ Index, or PMI, reflect the more resilient recovery in advanced economies. Nearer to this region, the decelerating Chinese economy is not a major cause for concern since it is more about economic restructuring than unexpected slump in domestic demand. The overall impact for Thailand is that exports are still expected to be our main engine of growth this year. The risk to watch out for concerning exports, again stems from the monetary policy changes of advanced economies. These policy changes could cause economic slowdown in ASEAN and China and further affect Thai exports to these countries; however, this type of risk is still remote. Other fundamentals include our location and workforce advantages. Thailand is located in the center of ASEAN and has well-developed logistics, and acts as a hub for trade with CLMV, presenting an opportunity to access fast growing markets. As for the workforce, our semi-skilled labor fills an important niche in the world market. Looking at strong fundamentals just mentioned, we can see that Thailand’s turnaround is no false hope.

Indeed, the return to net inflow of foreign investment since the beginning of April, indicates the return of foreign interest in Thailand. However Thailand’s structural improvement needs a long way to go. Furthermore, economic fundamentals can be eroded if political uncertainty and global risks intensify. The prolonged political impasse will further reduce confidence, financial positions, and government spending. The labor force is already beginning to feel the stress, as recent surveys show the number of overtime hours worked has begun to shrink. Now I have presented to you the future conditions, from sound fundamentals to possible risks. With these conditions in mind, I believe that maintaining status quo while waiting for the political situation to resolve is not the appropriate way out because sound fundamentals alone cannot lead to growth. Thailand should use the current lull in activity as an opportunity to reposition for future growth. Indeed the private sector is already in transition, but still has a way to go. Further investment will both jolt some energy back into the economy and build an even stronger foundation for long term growth. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Supportive roles of the Bank of Thailand and financial institutions An economy in transition needs support from all sectors of the economy. The real sector, financial institutions, and the Bank of Thailand have their own important roles which I would like to elaborate. Thailand’s economy should transition from efficiency to innovation to build competitive advantages. Up to now, we have increased productivity by reallocating labor and capital.
I have just explained how we are currently addressing this issue ;    In the longer run, ageing and slower innovation may push up saving rates and bring down the return on capital. Therefore, the ultimate response to the risk of secular stagnation is to improve the return on investment, thus pushing the natural interest rate back into positive territory. Again, this is not only a European problem. But we do have difficulties in this regard. Structural reforms are not easy. Many, however, are currently being implemented. France, although at too slow a pace, is reducing taxes on labour and has somewhat improved labour market flexibility. Adjustments efforts conducted by several countries, especially in Southern Europe, are starting to pay off. Competitiveness gaps between Northern and Southern Member States have been reduced, notably through real wages decreases in countries like Spain or Portugal, which are exporting more and more. This builds the way for a healthy growth in peripheral countries, which are experiencing a trade surplus of 2% of their GDP on average, and a moderate public deficit, taken down to 3%. III. Short-term policy challenges and responses  The main challenge, of course, is low and declining inflation, with inflation expectations in the euro area drifting downward at short to medium-term horizons. This prevents adjustments in relative prices, – an important mechanism to eliminate gaps in competitiveness – and increases the risk of outright deflation, should a negative shock occur in the future.

The significance of the complete and voluntary transfer of a core competency of the modern state, namely monetary policy, from the Member States to a truly European and independent institution such as the European Central Bank, can hardly be overestimated. While the years of technical preparation certainly required great efforts on the part of all involved, it is the longer-term impact of EMU which holds the prospect of the most momentous change. The first few months of the existence of the euro have set the scene for a positive outlook. Even though external developments such as the depreciation of the euro against the dollar have attracted rather pessimistic headlines, there are, in fact, several reasons for some satisfaction. The changeover to the single currency ran smoothly, largely thanks to the diligent preparation of all involved. The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem have assumed their new responsibilities, and the monetary policy instruments and decision-making procedures are functioning well. A unified euro area financial market is developing as operators re-orient their activities beyond the borders of their previous domestic markets. However, it is altogether natural that not all facets of the complex EMU project are as yet complete. Setting up the technical and operational framework for EMU – even if it is proving to function to full satisfaction – is not sufficient. Economic and Monetary Union cannot simply be reduced to the mechanics of a functioning single monetary policy – however important this may be.
We have seen shocks to credit markets in the last two summers which were swiftly reversed. Could recent events be the beginning of a more lasting change? There are some good reasons for doubting it. First the underlying economic and corporate fundamentals remain encouraging. Not only is world growth running at over 5% but it seems better balanced with the recovery of Germany and Japan and slightly lower growth in the US (although one of the explanations for the rise in longer term risk free rates has been a more optimistic view on US growth prospects). In the corporate sector overall gearing is not unusual, pension deficits have diminished, and profitability is high. Defaults in the prime housing market in the US have not shown dramatic increases. Losses on mortgage lending in the UK are still very low and there seems no prospect of a significant rise in unemployment that led to sharp rises in repossessions and defaults in the past. Equity markets remain strong at multiples of earnings which are little above average. Again, within financial markets, liquidity remains high overall (Chart 4). Against that background, there is a risk of becoming alarmed by good news. In our last Financial Stability Report we identified the low risk premia in credit markets as the principal vulnerability in financial markets because of the risk it carried of a swift and disorderly return to more normal levels.

My argument is that the uncertainties today are a return to normality after two years of exceptional predictability in monetary policy both in the UK and elsewhere. A particular area of uncertainty at present is in the credit markets. The dangers of combining a traditional credit cycle with the new derivatives markets have emerged in the US sub prime sector. The US housing market is in its downswing and there are some signs that the same is true in the UK of unsecured credit and commercial property. The position of the bigger UK sectors is less clear cut. The shift in pension fund priorities and the growth of sovereign wealth funds are further clouding the picture. It is our job on the MPC to work through these issues and reach a judgement on them. Our target is to reduce inflation to 2% and keep it there. I can assure you that we will do whatever is needed to achieve that.
The strong increases in prices in the Swedish stock market indicate that there are expectations among those who handle risk capital that profits will increase sharply particularly in Swedish IT-related companies. In order for such a development to be realised, it is reasonable to assume that investment must increase on a broad front. A risk with a strong increase in share prices before any visible signs of potential growth accelerating is if consumption is strongly stimulated by households who own shares increasing their wealth. An increase in demand that is not corresponded to by an increase in potential growth increases inflationary pressure that the Riksbank must counteract by increasing interest rates. However, increased interest rates also subdue increased investment, which is unfortunate, as it would brake the growth of capacity. It has been difficult during earlier periods of large increases in share prices to prove that Swedish households have really increased their consumption as a result of increased wealth. During recent years, however, the proportion of households owning shares has increased. When property prices increased sharply at the end of the 1980s, many households raised loans on their homes and used the money for consumption. A low housing production combined with growth that is strongly concentrated to the big city areas has contributed to housing prices again rapidly increasing in recent years. This development can also stimulate consumption with the risks that I have just mentioned.

This could eventually increase the flexibility of wage formation and increase productivity. This development is particularly in evidence in the expanding services sector. According to the National Institute of Economic Research, the proportion of time-limited employment has increased from 10 to approximately 16% of the total number of employees between 1990 and 1998. This development may have been reinforced by the difficult situation in the labour market during these years but many believe that the trend will continue. New methods of compensation are also spreading. Bonus wages, profit sharing and a 13th monthly wage are examples of components in wage formation that increase flexibility in the labour market. Increased cost consciousness due to stiffer competition can be a factor driving on this development. Although short-term employment in various forms may reduce the inflationary pressure and make the labour market more flexible, this does not mean that this development is always positive for wage-earners and households. Uncertainty about future income makes long-term planning more difficult such as having children and buying a house. In order to reduce the risk of various groups in the labour market competing against one another to drive up pay increases in a way that in the end creates a poorer outcome for all, various changes in the forms of wage formation have been carried out and are planned. The most important is the so-called Industry Agreement between some 20 organisations in the labour market.
Notes: Excess is calculated as the difference between the actual current account balance in 2016 and the mid-point of the range of IMF estimates of the fundamental balances, shown in Chart 2. The data for the 2016 current account for the UK has been adjusted; see notes to Chart 1 for more details. Such global imbalances matter for at least three reasons. First, from the Lawson boom to the Tequila and Global Financial Crises, a common lesson is that large 7  current account deficits are one of the most trenchant early warning signs of financial instability. This is  7  Blanchard, O. and Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. (2011), ‘(Why) Should Current Account Balances Be Reduced?’, IMF Staff Discussion Note, No. 11/03. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  8  especially true when deficits are accompanied by rapidly growing domestic credit. It is dangerous to rely entirely on the discipline of the domestic financial system. In each case, the eventual large private losses weighed on public balance sheets and growth for years. 9  Second, when imbalances reflect unfair competitive advantage – either through managed trade or managed exchange rates – they can lead to protectionist backlashes that leave everyone worse off. And third, in the current environment of synchronised weakness and limited policy space, it is not hard to imagine this low inflation / low wage / low growth trap being sealed as it was in the 1930s.

The passage of this Act is a win-win for small businesses as well as banks. The Bank of Thailand regulations on loan classification, provisioning requirement, and valuation guidelines have been issued to help banks adopt this new collateral regime. 4/5  BIS Central Banker's Speeches  Ultimately however, we would like to see Thailand moving from collateral-based lending towards cash-flow-based lending especially for small businesses with few or no eligible collaterals but otherwise viable prospects. In order to do so, we need to have sufficient data for credit risk enhancement and monitoring. In light of this objective, we are developing an industry-wide SME database from pooled bank data for banks to use for their planning and risk management. In addition, we are working with relevant parties to amend the Credit Bureau Act to expand its membership to players like Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lenders. These efforts would get along well with the government policy to expand the roles and coverage of Thai Credit Guarantee Corporation (TCG) to provide credit access for SMEs lacking collateral security. Ladies and Gentlemen. If we look beyond our domestic market, increasing regional integration brings numerous exciting business opportunities. Thailand’s strategic location at the heart of Mainland ASEAN along with close economic relations with our neighbors make us a natural candidate to become a regional connector of trade and financial services. We have offered many fronts to enhance such connectivity.
Eva Srejber: How do we create stability in financial markets? Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a public hearing in the Riksdag: “Economic policy in a global economy - is the Tobin tax an obstacle or an opportunity?”, Stockholm, 3 April 2001. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here. This is a subject that I am often asked to discuss in various parts of the country. There is considerable interest in the challenges facing economic policy in an increasingly internationalised world. The credit market is central to a country's economy. Financial institutes are needed to mediate payments for households and companies, such as wage and invoice payments. In addition, the institutes mediate capital from savers to borrowers. This can comprise companies making investments or households buying their own home. All in all, a well functioning financial sector is a necessary condition for a country to achieve prosperity. However, mediating payments and lending money also involves taking risks. The international foreign exchange market in turn links together the national credit and payment markets, so that payments in one currency can be exchanged for payments in another currency. This enables trade, investment and foreign aid between countries. International capital flows enable savings in countries with a capital surplus, after exchange on the foreign exchange market, to finance investments in countries with a capital deficit.

And even if it were possible, I do not consider the Tobin tax to be a good method of reducing speculation and excessive risk taking on the financial markets. On the contrary, there could be an increase in risk taking when the possibilities for insuring oneself against financial fluctuations become too expensive and the banks' opportunities for distributing risks are reduced. Instead, I see the international work already being carried out into producing norms for various areas as a better means of promoting stability and reducing risks. To summarise, the credit and foreign exchange markets play an important role in society by mediating payments and savings, both nationally and internationally. The best way to prevent excessive risk taking is not to tax transactions, but to ensure that more countries pursue fiscal and monetary policy aimed towards stability, with a suitable exchange rate regime, and follow the international regulations and norms that promote stability. These norms must be continuously adapted to developments on the financial markets and in the rest of the economy, in order to limit the risks in the financial sector. BIS Review 27/2001  3
We know from experience that the inflation outlook can change rapidly. During the late spring and summer of last year we were concerned over inflation being too high, even though this was mainly due to rising oil and food prices. Rising unit labour costs were also taken into consideration. Fears that high inflation expectations would become entrenched also formed part of the picture. We then raised the interest rate despite beginning to see signs of weaker economic activity in the future. The assessment was that this was necessary to attain the inflation target a couple of years ahead. When developments turned out differently, we had to quickly change our course. We are of course always prepared for situations like that. We are ready to act as quickly and as forcefully as is necessary, both to attain the inflation target and to carry out our financial stability responsibilities. Unconventional measures There have been many discussions on what the Riksbank could be expected to do if developments turn out weaker than we are now assuming. And our toolbox is not empty because the repo rate is so close to its lower limit. Put simply, the way the repo rate tool works is that the banks either borrow or buy Riksbank Certificates with a maturity of one week from the Riksbank at the price of the repo rate. In addition, there are what is known as daily fine-tuning operations between the Riksbank and the banks at an interest rate very close to the repo rate.

It also includes having in place the nominating and remuneration committee to ensure the right persons for the job are appointed and that the reward or penalty are commensurate with the accountability and performance. Indeed the prophet refers to this in the words, "whoever employs a person out of favouritism and there is someone who is better than that person, he has committed breach of trust with God, His prophet and all Muslims". The risk management committee needs to review the risks peculiar to Islamic finance and consider the means by which they should be managed. Expertise needs to be developed to address the audit for the Shariah risk. The audit committee therefore needs to examine not only the risks associated with banking operations, but also complementing the Shariah Committee in ensuring full compliance with the Shariah principles. The role of the Shariah committee may also be expanded beyond product approval, in particular to strengthen the governance of the Islamic financial institutions by ensuring for each new product, proper disclosure is made and the rights of the customers and the responsibilities of the Islamic banking institutions are clearly provided. Fourthly, the role of the regulator in strengthening the standards and best practices in inculcating good governance. The government and regulator has an important role in putting in place an enabling environment that supports the development of a strong governance structure and that provides for enforcement. In Malaysia, corporate governance reform is a priority agenda.
Allow me to recapitulate the consequences in a few words: various banks, stock brokerage firms and securities houses lost part or even all of their staff, their business premises, their backup facilities and their lines of communication. The markets remained closed on the following day, the equity markets even until the end of the week. From a systemic point of view, of even greater consequence than the closing of the equity market was the fact that the two markets for US government paper and for commercial paper, the main vehicles for short-term liquidity equalisation between market participants, had ceased to operate. Payment and settlement systems started to break down. Securities and credit balances totalling billions were thus blocked at some banks while lacking at others. Even though the terror attacks were concentrated on New York and Washington, in the beginning they not only paralysed Wall Street but they also threatened to undermine significant parts of the international financial system. It is much too soon, and this is not the proper place, to make an assessment of the profound human, social and political implications of the terror attacks. The resilience of the banks and the financial markets must be emphasised, however. A week after the attacks, business was almost back to usual again. In most cases, the banks and securities houses affected managed to solve their problems, some of which were immense. Neither a stock market crash nor a breakdown of parts of the financial system set in either in the United States or anywhere else.

Thomas Jordan: International money market disruptions, central bank reactions and lessons learnt Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 13 December 2007. *  *  *  As early as the first half of 2007, turbulence could be observed now and then on international financial markets. However, each event was isolated and short-lived. In the second half of 2007, there was a fundamental change in the situation. The sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US had a substantial impact on international financial markets, the extent of which had never been anticipated. I will cover three areas in my following remarks. First, I will discuss the upheaval on the international money markets. Then I will talk about the reaction of central banks, in particular that of the Swiss National Bank. Finally, I will outline some of the lessons learnt from this crisis to date. Serious disruptions on international money markets At the beginning of August, the US sub-prime mortgage crisis spread like a shock wave into the money markets of the most important currencies. In doing so, it hit the vital nerve of the international financial system. Well functioning money markets are essential in ensuring that financial market participants can adjust their liquidity positions. Ultimately, they are crucial for banks' solvency and long-term commercial viability.