samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Mugur Isărescu: Convergence towards euro enlargement Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Conference "The Danube Triangle", Bucharest, 25 October 2018. * * * Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, Allow me to welcome you to the National Bank of Romania. It is the seventh time that the National Bank of Romania hosts an ELEC Conference. It started in 2011 with “Renewable energy and transport infrastructure in the Black Sea Region”, a year later we talked about “Eastern Europe and the EMU: finding the optimal path for introducing the euro“. In 2013 there was the 3rd edition of the Danube Financing Dialogue. The following year the dialogue focused on “Agriculture and environmental protection in Central and Eastern Europe and their contribution to growth and employment“. In 2016 we discussed on “How the EU can generate a virtuous circle in the Black Sea Region – the case of food and energy security” and last year we debated on “the challenges for Eastern Europe in the present turmoil in the EU and EMU – persevering in the reforms and investing for the future”. As one could notice, the topics previously discussed during all ELEC Conferences have most certainly cast a new light on possible ways to handle the challenges ahead of us. The European League for Economic Cooperation has stood out, ever since its foundation in 1946, as an independent network of business people who put their knowledge and influence together to extend European integration.

Ardian Fullani: Recent economic developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Joint Press Conference of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 9 March 2010. *  *  *  Honourable Mr. Minister of Finance, Honourable Mr. Bell, Honourable participants, During the last two weeks we have had an intensive dialogue with the IMF Mission, which visited Tirana in the framework of periodic consultations in terms of the observance of Article IV. During these discussions there is appraised the good performance of the Albanian economy during the past year and there is also emphasized the need for pursuing prudent economic policies, designed and implemented in the context of strengthening the macroeconomic and financial stability. Also, special attention has been paid to the need for ongoing structural reform that will support our long-term economic growth. The Albanian economy has recorded a positive economic growth during the past year and has successfully tackled the direct and indirect shudders of the global economic crisis. Moreover, the Albanian economy has passed the test, by maintaining the domestic economic and financial balances, which serve as a prerequisite for a sustainable and long-term growth. Thus, inflation rate fluctuated around 2 to 3 percent during 2009; the country’s external balances have shown correction signs, while the Albanian banking system remains robust and well-capitalized. However, the economic growth rate slowed down significantly during 2009.
Finally, I will take up the three issues I have just mentioned and explain the reasons for my views on these issues. For the sake of clarity, let me also add that the opinions I will be expressing in this speech are my own. They are not necessarily shared by my colleagues in the Executive Board of the Riksbank. The years prior to the financial crisis When I first arrived at the Riksbank, I did not suspect that we were about to experience one of the worst international financial crises of our times. I had been through two previous crises. The first of these was the deep recession at the end of the 1970s and start of the 1980s, when, through a series of devaluations, Sweden attempted to restore the competitiveness it had lost due to the severe price and wage inflation of the 1970s. The second was the crisis we experienced at the start of the 1990s. This was a fairly typical financial crisis, starting with the deregulation of the credit market and leading to a banking crisis, a deep recession and large public finance deficits. The Riksbank had built up its analytical capacity Its experiences in the Swedish banking crisis at the start of the 1990s had led the Riksbank to build up its analytical capacity before my time at the bank started. In 1997, the Riksbank started to publish a Financial Stability Report twice per year.

The crisis also showed how important it is that the two departments handling financial stability and monetary policy work closely together. The prevention and management of systemic risks requires both macroeconomic competence and knowledge of the financial system. Stress tests will continue to form a central part of our work. In the autumn of 2010, we carried out tests of the Swedish banks’ liquidity for the first time. These showed that the Swedish banks were exposed to greater liquidity risks than the European banks against which we compared them. The greatest problem for the Swedish banks during the financial crisis was not loan losses, of course, but a shortage of liquidity. The crisis has also shown that the Riksbank’s fundamental task as lender of last resort can no longer be limited to lending in kronor. Consequently, stress tests of liquidity need to be developed so that they also show what may happen if the banks are unable to obtain funding in foreign currency. We also need to think through how the Riksbank could achieve greater impact for its analyses and assessments. So far, we have primarily relied on what we usually call moral suasion, which is to say making an impact through careful analyses and strong arguments. But, despite the risks concerning developments in the Baltic that we drew attention to before the crisis, too little was done to prevent the Swedish banks’ rapid credit expansion in these countries.
As such, it is important for the industry to be aware of the trade-offs that come with adoption of these technologies. In pushing the boundaries of innovation, the industry needs to understand the risks that they pose. One example is the rise of mobile banking, e-payments and virtual assets. In Malaysia, mobile banking transactions have multiplied greatly, from around 500 million transactions in 2016 to almost 1.3 trillion transactions in August this year. The ubiquity of mobile internet and increasing dependency on our smartphones is expected to increase the importance of this medium. This technology fosters financial inclusion and offers potential for greater customer engagement. One such potential is in meeting and strengthening know-your-customer requirements. By leveraging on technology, financial institutions will be able to conduct e-KYC with greater efficiency while making the customer experience more seamless. One such solution is being tested in the Bank’s FinTech sandbox. Another area of growth comes from virtual assets. Between the end of 2016 to date, market capitalisation of virtual assets have grown by an extraordinary rate of over 1000% from around USD 20 billion to around USD 200 billion. While the technologies behind virtual assets may present great potential to revolutionise the way we conduct finance, the risks associated with virtual assets is an area that deserves much scrutiny. Features that may allow anonymous or pseudonymous transactions and easier crossborder transfers of values carry money laundering and terrorism financing risks that need to be addressed.

Our transition into the flexible regime with China allowed for us to achieve it without being destabilised by the financial markets. Bank Negara Malaysia also became one of the first Asian Central Bank to be accorded the QFII status in 2009 as we took steps to diversify our reserves into Chinese and other Asian denominated papers. While China in the current environment is being confronted with challenges as it addresses its areas of vulnerabilities and as it takes steps to rebalance and reform its economy and financial system, it is these very actions that will provide the ground for a more sustainable China that will in turn become a source of stability for the region and for the global economy. Looking ahead, there is much to be done by all of us. I have said that the business of Central Banking is an unfinished business. In view of the highly dynamic environment, there will always be new challenges on the horizon. For Asia, it is the future challenges that we now need to be concerned with. And it is what we do now that will prepare the ground for us for the future. There has been too much focus on the present. In Asia, while we have successfully prepared ourselves for the current environment, we now need to prepare ourselves for the future.
Investor protection or market integrity: As most of these crypto-assets are traded in unregulated platforms, usually via the internet, there are significant gaps in data collection and investor protection. Crypto-asset markets are therefore prone to (c) market manipulation, such as spoofing or flooding the market with fake orders to trick others into buying or selling. Moreover, the security or integrity of some of the trading platforms is also in doubt given the number of cyber incidents that have led to significant losses of the investors. 7. Having said all the above, I wish to conclude by making the following points: Crypto-assets are not money or currencies. So people wishing to invest or speculate (a) in crypto-assets should do so without harbouring the unrealistic expectation that they would one day become money or currencies that can be used as a means of exchange. Central banks must take extra care in making sure that the issuance of fiat (b) currencies is managed prudently in order not to diminish the purchasing power of the currencies or people’s confidence in them. Overseers of payment systems must take proactive steps to ensure that large value as well as small value retail payment systems, making use of commercial bank or central bank balances, are efficient, convenient and at low cost to the users. This is increasingly important as the public now expects and demands a faster and cheaper means of electronic payment or digital cash, as some would call it, for their day to (c) day transactions.

Basically the FSB considers that while crypto-assets do not pose a material risk to global financial stability at this time, given the relatively small size of this market, vigilant monitoring is (a) necessary in view of the speed of developments and data gaps. The FSB has developed a framework, in collaboration with the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures, to monitor the financial stability implications of the developments in crypto asset markets. Noting that crypto assets raise a host of other issues that I will explain shortly, the FSB also considers that further international coordination is warranted. Illicit activities risk: As many of these crypto-assets are so designed that anonymous email accounts can be used for trading and transfers without a central clearing agent, they effectively bypass the existing regime in combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and other illicit activities. The ease with which crypto-assets can be transferred across national borders has made it even more attractive to criminals in (b) laundering their proceeds and income. For the banks and other regulated financial institutions, it is proving difficult, if not impossible, for them to comply with the statutory or supervisory requirements in respect of know-your-customer (KYC) or ascertaining the source of funds. This was why the HKMA issued a circular in 2014 to banks in Hong Kong advising them to be mindful of the need to comply with all relevant KYC and anti-money laundering (AML) requirements in their dealings with crypto-assets.
This situation may have considerable implications for the long-term economic growth rates in the regional countries, which still are in need for foreign financial funds to support their  BIS Review 118/2009  3  convergence process. Therefore, I believe that the crisis has called for another lesson: the need to draft and implement joint regional programmes and structural reforms to absorb projects and financing lines, which will in turn expand and deepen our joint Balkan market. It is true that after each crisis, macroeconomics as a science has made steps forward. Each crisis represents an event with specific characteristics, dissimilar or partly dissimilar from the previous crises. Each crisis brings in new information, regardless of the intensity, geographic extension or duration. Each crisis fills in a piece of the hard puzzle of free-market economy functioning, helping to a better understanding of the whole. I hope to provide a consensual conclusion if I say that we, the administrators, had the fortune to govern in a time of crisis and that we have a motive to feel privileged – and why not proud – to have coped with the challenge, being witnesses and active players in that regard. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 118/2009

On the foreign exchange market, the Swiss franc came under increased upward pressure for a brief period after the Brexit vote. This pressure abated again, not least due to the Swiss National Bank’s willingness to intervene on the market. While the pound sterling continued to lose value over the summer months, other key currencies, including the Swiss franc, moved sideways within a narrow range (cf. chart 3). Heightened uncertainty in the run-up to the US presidential election was once again reflected in growing demand for safe-haven currencies on the foreign exchange market, leading to slightly higher Swiss franc exchange rates. Following the US election, the US dollar appreciated on a broad basis. The strengthening of the currency occurred against the backdrop of the rise in US interest rates mentioned earlier. The dollar gained approximately 3% in trade-weighted terms after the election. The recent developments in the US also had an impact on other currency areas. Currencies in emerging economies in particular came under pressure and, as a group, weakened by around 4% against the US dollar. On a trade-weighted basis, the Swiss franc has changed little from its end-June level. Nevertheless, Swiss franc exchange rates moved in different directions. While appreciating more sharply against the yen than against the euro and pound sterling, the Swiss franc weakened against the US dollar and currencies of commodity-exporting countries. Overall, the Swiss franc is still significantly overvalued. The market environment remains challenging and fraught with global economic and political risks.
Source: MPF, NBR, NBR calculations  23  Figure 32. Distribution of companies with equity below the regulatory threshold in 2016 by year of establishment 25,000  no. of firms  20,000  15,000  10,000  5,000  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  1993  1992  1991  1990  0  Source: NTRO, MPF, NBR 24  Figure 34. Share of overdue payments* generated by undercapitalised companies  Figure 33. Breakdown of overdue payments* across the economy by company ownership 80  lei bn.

For example, whether – (a) the bank is locally incorporated with majority Singaporean/PR Board representation, and what types of businesses are conducted by the locally incorporated entity; (b) Singapore is one of the major markets for the bank group, constituting a substantial part of group profits and assets; (c) major business lines and key decision makers are headquartered in Singapore; and (d) the bank serves a comprehensive spectrum of the local community in Singapore. A bank that demonstrates these and other characteristics can be considered significantly rooted. (iii) MAS will consider awarding new QFBs only under FTAs where there are substantial benefits to Singapore. New QFBs that are granted under future FTA offers will have to first locally incorporate before they may establish up to 25 places of business. This evolution of our QFB scheme, and it is an evolution, should ensure that our local banks continue to have majority share of domestic deposits, while banks awarded QFB privileges can build a deeper presence. Given the size and maturity of Singapore’s domestic retail banking market, we have to calibrate our moves to ensure that greater foreign bank participation does not result in a fragmented and inefficient market, but instead leads to a more robust and competitive system. Banks with a meaningful market share will be in a better position to reap the benefits of scale from a more extensive network, to respond to customers’ changing needs and at reasonable cost, and to be better rooted in Singapore to contribute to our financial stability and growth.
A number of important measures have been taken to ensure that this ambitious goal is met. The constitution has been amended to allow for international arbitration between the Turkish State and foreign investors. A streamlining of the regulations governing operations in the energy and telecommunications sectors is expected to attract privatization, and Parliament is even now considering the necessary enabling legislation, which will be enacted very soon. These actions in the fiscal, privatization and structural reform areas are a part of the front-loading mentioned above, and the authorities have already taken most of the measures. Now let me turn to the program’s nominal strategies, most of which are the responsibility of the Central Bank. In an economy like Turkey’s, where inflation has a long history, expectations and inertia play important roles in the inflationary dynamics. This represents a major problem for the program, which needs to be addressed thoroughly. Since exchange rates have high public visibility, there was a broad consensus in Turkey that using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor would be an effective tool for interrupting the public’s inflationary expectations based on the past. In addition, the openness of the Turkish economy to capital movements makes the commitment to an exchange rate anchor particularly effective in affecting nominal interest rates. Accordingly, the exchange rate regime has been designed to provide clear signals as a basis for price and interest rate expectations, while avoiding the medium-term drawbacks experienced in the medium term by some of the other countries pursuing exchange rate based stabilization.

BIS Review 9/2000  2  Here is how exchange rate policy will be conducted during the program period. We are already announcing to the public the daily value of an exchange rate basket consisting of $ 1 and Euro 0.77 for the coming 12 months. The monthly depreciation rate of the basket adds up to a 12-month depreciation rate of 20%, in line with the WPI target for the period. At the end of each quarter, we will pre-announce a depreciation rate for the quarter beginning nine months later, and leaving the pre-announced rates for the intermediate quarters unchanged. This means that at the end of every three-month period, the rate of increase in the exchange rate basket for the next 12 months will be publicly known. The system will function in this manner for the first 18 months of the program. Then, starting in July 2001, a gradually widening symmetrical band will be introduced for the pre-announce exchange basket. From this point on, the total width of the band will be 7.5% by end-2001, 15% by end-June 2002, and 22.5% by end-December 2002. It will be noted that while we are making strong commitment to a pre-announced exchange rate path, we are simultaneously announcing our exit strategy, which should allay concerns about the difficulty of making a smooth exit from such systems. Of course, there are also some risks created by pre-announcing the path of the exchange rate.
One specific concern that some have expressed about Basel II’s applicability in emerging markets is that banks with more basic risk management systems will rely on external credit ratings issued by rating agencies under Basel II’s standardised approach to credit risk. In some emerging markets, there may still be few, if any, rated companies. The Committee has been mindful of this concern. If supervisors are uncomfortable with the use of external ratings in their countries, they may opt to weight all corporate claims at 100%, while sovereigns and banks can be risk weighted according to the risk scores of export credit agencies. This eliminates the dependence on ratings issued by external credit agencies. Indeed, our discussions with colleagues and counterparts from countries outside the Committee, including India, as I mentioned, have been instrumental in addressing other concerns in the capital framework. Thanks to our consultations, we have endeavoured to address several other broad issues in the new framework, including the document’s apparent complexity and the consistency of its application internationally, which I will set out now. Complexity One inevitable by-product of designing a comprehensive three-pillar framework with a range of options for different circumstances is increased complexity. The members of the Basel Committee certainly recognise that it is far easier to enforce a simple rule than a complicated one.

Governance structure and management model Now, let me turn to the Fund management model. The governance structure is based on a clear division of responsibilities between the political authorities and the operational management. •  The Ministry of Finance is the owner of the Fund. The Ministry defines the mandate and monitors and evaluates performance. •  The management of the Fund is delegated to Norges Bank. The Bank’s task is to implement the investment strategy and exercise ownership rights. Norges Bank also provides professional advice to the Ministry on investment strategies. The Fund’s investment strategy is to maximise financial return with moderate risk. The longterm strategic allocation is defined in terms of a benchmark portfolio, which consists of equities and fixed income instruments. Equities account for 60 per cent of the Fund's strategic benchmark portfolio. The size of the Fund implies that it currently owns about 1 per cent of listed European equities and ½ per cent of listed equities on a global basis. Fixed income instruments account for 40 per cent. 2  BIS Review 81/2008  Furthermore, the Ministry has recently decided that the Fund should prepare the ground for investing in real estate at 5 per cent of the strategic benchmark portfolio. In time, this will reduce the fixed income share to 35 per cent. Norges Bank has built an organisation with emphasis on investment returns and based on three fundamental principles: Accountability, transparency and professional standards.