samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Central Bank has been active in promoting the development of the financial system and financial markets in Iceland and we have sought to adopt the methods of monetary management that have been developed in other advanced industrial countries. In 1998, we modified the instruments and operating procedures of the Central Bank along the lines that had been developed for the future European Central Bank. The Central Bank of Iceland levies a reserve requirement on credit institutions, operates an overnight facility and offers a deposit facility. The main operating instrument of the Bank is the repo rate. Auctions of 14 day repo contracts are conducted once a week. By adjusting our instruments and methods, we created a similar operating environment for Icelandic banks as those that prevail for banks in the Economic and Monetary Union of Europe. I should add that we are in the process of adapting our payments and settlement systems to the norms of our neighbouring countries. This includes, among other things, the establishment of an RTGS system for large-value payments. I mentioned that the main target of the Central Bank is the maintenance of low inflation. That is a long-term target. Our intermediate target is a fixed exchange rate. A more appropriate description of our exchange rate policy is to refer to it as a fixed but adjustable peg. Since 1995 we have operated with a fluctuation band around the central rate of plus/minus 6%.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Open world - Switzerland open to the world Summary of a speech by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Economic Forum, Thun, 7 May 2004. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Globalisation - the worldwide exchange of production factors, goods, technologies and ideas - is a process that has evolved in different ways and degrees ever since humankind can remember. Technological progress is the actual driving force behind globalisation. It thus becomes possible to reduce costs through increasing specialisation and the best use of comparative advantages. The process of globalisation, however, is restricted to some extent by national and international legal frameworks. Despite overall positive and widespread net effects, globalisation is, however, frequently not accepted due to adjustment costs arising for certain global players. With its successful export sector and its comparatively attractive local conditions, particularly the excellent infrastructure and the flexible labour market, Switzerland has the potential to benefit from the continuing globalisation in future as well. A necessary condition for this, however, is a rise in productivity and, as a result, enhanced competitiveness of the domestic sector. With international competitive pressure intensifying, insulating itself or merely adhering to the status quo are no options for Switzerland in the long term. This would lead to considerable losses in social security and growth and threaten the long-term survival of the country’s social institutions.
No, it applies of course to all parts of our activities – everything from our way of making forecasts to how the organisation looks and how we can improve the opportunities to assess how well we are doing. And an important part of this is discussions like the one we are having today. Thank you! 1. Driving forces behind increased openness and clarity   Monetary policy works better  Efficiency reasons  Independence requires openness  Democratic reasons  8  BIS Review 132/2007  2. Increased credibility 5  5 Inflation expectations CPI  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2 1994  -2 1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  Sources: Prospera Research AB and Statistics  3. Changes in our communication 2007 February  M ay  September  BIS Review 132/2007  • Forecast for the repo rate • M onetary Policy Report  • Press conference after each monetary policy meeting • No signalling in normal cases • Names in the minutes of the monetary policy meetings  • Repo rate forecast at each monetary policy meeting • 6 times a year  9  4. Other changes…   Time lag between the Monetary  Policy Report and the hearing  UND1X has become CPIX  5. Swedish economy is strong GDP growth. Annual percentage change.

In this way it functions as an extra incentive for us to become even more efficient within the walls of the Riksbank. Changes in our way of communicating So what are the changes that these driving forces have resulted in over the past year (slide 3)? There are primarily two changes involved. One is that we have followed the example of the central banks in New Zealand and Norway and now publish our own forecast for the future interest rate. The other is that representatives of the Riksbank no longer signal in advance, through speeches and press releases, how they consider the interest rate should be set at the next meeting. There has perhaps been less focus on a couple of other changes, but these are also important components in the whole that makes the strategy for our communication. Since the summer we now publish in the minutes the names of Executive Board members as they express their opinions in the discussion at the monetary policy meeting. We now hold press conferences in connection with all of the now 6 monetary policy meetings a year. From this December we will publish an interest rate forecast in connection with each of these meetings. Previously the interest rate path has only been published in connection with the Monetary Policy Reports issued three times a year. We have already discussed the interest rate path here in the Committee on Finance, but not the question of signalling.
For example, the volume of international air traffic, which is highly sensitive to world growth trends, was 6.4% up on a year ago in January 2010. 3 Despite the gloomy headlines surrounding the release of the latest UK trade figures last week, the UK economy is benefiting from this revival in world trade and activity. The latest trade data show that since the second quarter of last year, the volume of UK goods exports, excluding oil and erratics, have risen 8.5%. 4 This is equivalent to an annual growth rate of 15% – around three times the trend rate of UK export growth since the early 1990s. 5 But imports have bounced back too, which is why the trade deficit is not shrinking at present. In the short-term that should not be a source of concern – rising imports at this stage of the cycle are usually a sign of a recovery in demand and a turnaround in the stock cycle. But over time, we should see rising exports helping to close the UK’s trade deficit. The very positive responses on export orders and confidence shown by a range of recent business surveys suggest that there is a significant further boost to our international trade performance on the way – supported by the competitiveness benefits of sterling’s depreciation since mid-2007. This bounceback in the world economy is much stronger than we might have expected a year ago. 6 So what has been driving it? And how resilient might it prove to be?

IT is also a necessary condition for the methods used to calculate financial risks in portfolios of securities or credits. The new Basel Committee rules on capital adequacy in banks, to take an example, are entirely dependent on such calculations. Network effects in the payment system The banking sector in Sweden is, as we know, strongly concentrated. This can raise questions in certain contexts as to how well competition functions. However, the concentration has also enabled, as I pointed out earlier, a more rapid exploitation of network effects and economies of scale connected with IT developments. Let me go into this in more depth, hopefully without becoming too abstract. The development of payment services is governed, just as on other markets, by supply and demand. Supply is affected by costs and technology, while demand is affected by factors such as price, acceptance, comfort and accessibility. Advantages of scale within the production of payment services arise as these services are often connected with high fixed costs and relatively low flexible costs. Building up a new computer system is expensive, but every transaction that passes through the system costs less. The economies of scale effects provide incentive for various types of co-operation and joint solutions, where producers join forces to utilise the economies of scale and spread costs over greater volumes. There are also advantages of scale on the demand side, the in the form of positive network effects. Positive network effects mean quite simply that a particular system becomes more usable the more people who use it.
But an intense dialogue has now started on structural issues at extraordinary Council meetings, such the coming meeting in Stockholm, as well as in more regular processes such as the Luxembourg process for better employment policies and the Cardiff process for more efficient product markets. The EMU to date It must then be asked, of course, how well this framework is working now that EMU is a reality. It is certainly too early to draw definite conclusions about these matters but I can offer some observations. The first point worth noting is that we are now reaping the benefits of the convergence process and of the consensus on stabilisation policy that has, in fact, been established. Europe is now experiencing an  3  BIS Review 102/2000  economic upswing in which macroeconomic conditions are more stable and inflation expectations lower than for many decades. Since the move to EMU, there have been no clear signs of asymmetric shocks that might hit a particular country or group of countries, although the Asian crisis and the subsequent unrest did affect the member states somewhat differently. And we do not know what would have happened during the tempestuous autumn of 1998 if Stage Three had not been well on the way. Perhaps exchange rate developments in Europe would have been considerably more dramatic and disruptive. It will be recalled that the Swedish currency’s deviation from a reasonable long-term level was considerably greater than that of, for example, the Finnish markka.

I am going to talk about Texas tonight, this being my annual report on the status of the Texas economy. I will walk you through a series of slides that illustrate the strength of the Texas economy, a series of economic records we have set this year, and to provide a balanced view, some of the growing pains that we are encountering. But first, I want to make a comment on monetary policy. Thinking outside the box It strikes me as timely for the Fed to consider implementing one of the possible options under the “normalization principles” the FOMC articulated in September: allowing our security holdings to run off as the bonds in our massive portfolio mature. 1 Before you jump out of your skin at this “radical” thought, let me ask you to consider the following. The 10-year Treasury note has rallied in price and declined in yield to 2.29 percent. German 10-year bunds, the equivalent market-anchoring European security, are trading to yield 0.74 percent; the Japanese 10-year yields 0.42 percent. The spread between the U.S. and the German sovereign yields is slightly narrower than it was at the end of third quarter 2014, but it remains historically large and attractive for investors. 2 Hold that thought.
Thank you and I wish you a fruitful two days ahead. 1 Refers to Financial and Insurance activities, excluding holding companies (expressed in nominal terms). 2 This accounts for 4.5% of total employment in Singapore. 3 Refers to Financial and Insurance activities, excluding holding companies 4 Refers to Financial and Insurance activities, including holding companies 5 MTI, Economic Survey of Singapore 2Q2020, 11 August 2020 6 MOM, Labour Market Statistics, 29 July 2020 (Seasonally-adjusted basis) 7 MOM, 2019 Labour Market Statistics, 12 March 2020  6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

Luis M Linde: The challenges of the Spanish economy Opening remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XXIII Meeting of the Financial Sector, organised by ABC, Deloitte and Sociedad de Tasación, Madrid, 19 April 2016. *  *  *  Introduction Let me begin by thanking Deloitte, Sociedad de Tasación and ABC for their kind invitation to deliver the closing address of this first session of the XXIII Financial Sector Meeting, devoted to analysing the challenge of profitability in an environment which is most definitely uncertain. I would like to address the situation of the Spanish economy and its main challenges. The recovery of the Spanish economy over the past three years has been one of the highlights of recent developments in the euro area. To explain it, we must consider both structural or more durable factors, and temporary ones, some of which have been given by the international context. The structural factors relate to the still-incomplete correction of the main imbalances built up during the last cyclical upturn and during the crisis, but also to the improved financial landscape. The job creation observed since 2013 has been a significant prop for demand and, by sustaining household disposable income, for the improvement in confidence. In the course of 2015 there was further progress in the ongoing deleveraging of households and firms, and Spain posted an external surplus or net lending, based largely on the gains in competitiveness achieved since the onset of the crisis.
In the long run, when inflation is on target and resource utilisation is at its long-term sustainable level, the Taylor rule can be described as follows, 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅� = 𝒓𝒓∗ + 2,  where 𝑅𝑅� refers to the long-term level of the policy rate and 2 is as before the central bank's inflation target. The long-term policy rate is thus equal to 𝒓𝒓∗ plus the inflation target. If the inflation target is constant, the long-term policy rate, in practice the average policy rate, is determined by 𝒓𝒓∗ . For instance, if 𝒓𝒓∗ declines it means that the policy rate’s long-term (average) level declines at the same pace. We have seen a trend decline in international 𝒓𝒓∗ over a longer period of time, which is an important factor behind the low interest rates in Sweden. I will return to this later. Resource utilisation's long-term sustainable level also plays an important role for monetary policy, but in a slightly different way. The long-term level of the policy rate is namely not affected by 𝒚𝒚∗ , on the other hand, the variations around the long-term level of the policy rate are affected. A simple example can explain why this is the case. Let us assume that resource utilisation is equal to 𝒚𝒚∗ initially and that 𝒚𝒚∗ then rises to a higher level. Resource utilisation is then lower than its long-term level, that is, resource utilisation can be said to be lower than “normal” and we have “an economic downturn”.

If the uncertainty applies to the long-term inflation expectations or to the lower bound of the policy rate, one should act more aggressively. There is thus an on the one hand case where one should act less aggressively and an on the other hand case when one should act more aggressively. In other words, when it comes to monetary policy it can be an advantage to be a two-handed economist. Conclusion and summary Let me conclude by summarising my main messages today. Firstly, long-term trends play an important role in monetary policy. There are above all two trends that are of special significance; the long-term real interest rate and the long-term sustainable level of resource utilisation. The long-term real interest rate abroad has shown a falling trend for a long time and this is one reason why interest rates in Sweden and many other countries are unusually low. Secondly, the period following the financial crisis was special in Sweden in several ways, but also so in other parts of the world. Both inflation and wage increases have been lower than expected, at the same time as resource utilisation has on average been largely normal and the central banks’ policy rates have been low. Commonly recurring explanations for the low and slow development in prices and wages are globalisation and digitalisation.
Likewise, we cannot be specific today about the design of the “final” post-crisis operational framework. Before  8  BIS Review 51/2010  deciding on this, we will need to consider thoroughly the lessons to be learnt from the crisis. However, the operational framework that prevailed prior to the turmoil seems to provide a good benchmark. It served us well prior to the crisis, and could be adapted quickly as circumstances worsened. Concluding remarks Let me conclude. There is no doubt that the crisis will leave us a heritage of severe macroeconomic imbalances. Dealing with them will represent one of the most daunting challenges for policymakers in modern history. Against this backdrop, let me emphasise that the Governing Council will continue to deliver on its mandate, which is to maintain price stability over the medium term. All our decisions regarding an exit from supportive measures need to be seen within this context. As regards fiscal policies, it is essential to prevent public finances from running out of control. Clearly, this will require a very ambitious fiscal consolidation effort. In particular, as regards the consolidation strategy, and given that the tax burden is already high in many countries, the fiscal adjustment will have to be primarily expenditure-based. Finally, let me stress that any call to reduce the real value of public debt through higher inflation will be firmly opposed by the ECB. A low and stable level of inflation is a prerequisite for confidence, stability and sustainable growth. Thank you.

Jürgen Stark: Taking stock – where do we stand in the crisis? Speech by Mr Jürgen Stark, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the BMW (Bayerische Motoren Werke) Stiftung Herbert Quandt, Washington DC, 15 April 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Introduction: macroeconomic developments and outlook In autumn 2008, the world economy entered the worst financial crisis and the deepest recession since the Great Depression. Both monetary and fiscal policies responded vigorously to this exceptional situation and contributed to the emergence of a recovery in the course of 2009. Hence, after falling last year, global activity is expected to grow by around 4% this year, while global trade is expected to grow by almost 6% (IMF January WEO update). Strong growth in emerging market economies in Asia is a major driving force behind these figures, while growth in many advanced economies is forecast to be weak. Questions can be raised as to whether such an uneven pattern of the recovery will prove sustainable. In the euro area, recent information indicates that the recovery has continued to expand in the first few months of this year. Looking forward, euro area growth is expected to remain moderate, owing to ongoing balance sheet adjustments in the private sector, weak prospects for the labour market and low capacity utilisation. Available growth forecasts for 2010 put it at, on average, around 1%.
But this suggests that it might be better for central bankers to examine the efficacy of other instruments in their toolbox, rather than simply ignoring the development of asset bubbles. 3. If existing tools are judged inadequate, then central banks should work on developing additional policy instruments. Let’s take the housing bubble as an example. Housing prices rose far faster than income. As a result, underwriting standards deteriorated. If regulators had forced mortgage originators to tighten up their standards or had forced the originators and securities issuers to keep “skin in the game”, I think the housing bubble might not have been so big. I think that this crisis has demonstrated that the cost of waiting to clean up asset bubbles after they burst can be very high. That suggests we should explore how to respond earlier. Harkening back to my earlier themes, I think we can respond in a number of ways: •  First, we can do a better job understanding interconnectedness. This means changing how we oversee and supervise financial intermediaries. •  Second, we can change the system so that it is more self-dampening. •  Third, we can improve incentives. •  Fourth, we can increase transparency. •  Fifth, we can develop additional policy instruments. For example, we might give a systemic risk regulator the authority to establish overall leverage limits or collateral and collateral haircut requirements across the system.

21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21
Capital inflows helped fuel emerging market growth, contributing even more to the uneven global recovery. Looking a bit further ahead, as the recovery solidifies in the advanced economies and inflation risk rises in emerging markets, diminishing growth differentials will diminish, spurring volatility in capital flows. Choppy waters may be ahead. So I’ve given you my view of the current global environment of fluid, if not excess, liquidity. So if excess liquidity is not the main issue, what is? On top of the list we have oil prices, Japan crisis and geopolitical risk in the Middle East and how these risks interact with global fluid liquidity. Which naturally leads me to the next question – what are the global growth scenarios in such a context? BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In our central scenario or most likely scenario, we see continued global growth. The US and Euro area shows signs of a firmer recovery, amid monetary and fiscal stimuli. Latest data show strong consumption and production. But structural obstacles do remain; for example, unemployment and real estate market issues in the US and sovereign debt problems in the Euro area. The growth prospects of Asian economies remain robust, underpinned by strong fundamentals. However, inflation risk is rising, and fast. On the tragic Japan crisis, our current view is that its impact on the global economy should prove temporary. History suggests that Japan will quickly rebuild and recover. And the main engines of global growth still remain.

The current surge in oil and commodity prices also poses a challenge to global growth, though, we expect the supply shock to have a limited impact due to several reasons: first, increased oil resiliency, second, real oil prices are still lower than its peak in 2008 and third, many emerging markets administer prices to cushion the blow. There is a downside risk that this environment of global liquidity amid uneven recovery and geopolitical risk in the Middle East may threaten global growth and stability. This scenario has a low probability of happening. Nevertheless, we should be mindful of it. In this scenario, oil prices will surge upward again and remain high due to strong demand from emerging markets, partly fueled by global liquidity, and supply constraints arising from adverse weather and widespread and protracted unrest in the Middle East. Global recession may result; or worse, global stagflation. The outcome depends on how US and Euro policy makers will respond. US and European monetary policymakers are therefore between a rock and a hard place of balancing structural risks to growth and new risks to inflation. If US or Euro recovery is still fragile, policymakers may choose to keep interest rates low, prompting stagflation further down the road. The US and Euro policymakers are therefore in a race against time. Their economic stimulus packages must revitalize the economy before the negative side-effects return home to derail the recovery. In such a world, what can the Bank of Thailand do?