samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Early last year, renminbi was estimated to represent 1% of the global foreign exchanges reserves, and the share will grow. Recently, we have also started to see interests in SDR bonds, with the inaugural issuance by the World Bank in China’s domestic bond market, followed by subsequent interests from commercial entities. Having this seminar thus at this juncture is indeed very timely. Uneven global growth with gravity shifting to Asia, particularly China For the past couple of years, the global economy had softened, with a marked slowdown observed throughout both the developed and emerging economies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently revised their global growth forecast to 3.1% for 2016, from 3.2% previously, reflecting softer-than-expected growth in advanced economies and the impact of Brexit. Global trade continued to be subdued, with the World Trade Organization (WTO) expecting only a 1.7% expansion in 2016, marking the slowest pace of global trade growth since the global financial crisis. While China is also contending with moderation in growth during its economic transition, it continued to become the largest contributor to global growth. The gravity centre of global growth has for now, shifted to emerging economies, particularly Asia. China’s slowdown is not all negative – as China’s economic transformation, through various efforts to restructure its economy and internationalise its markets, are important towards a more sustainable path of development. Furthermore, a 6.7% growth rate is an economic performance many would aspire to.

Part III: The side effects of improved incentives Will higher capital restrict bank lending? Let me now turn to the examination of some of the potential side-effects of the measures described in the preceding section. A legitimate first question is whether improving incentives in the way we have described could have undesired indirect effects such as modifying the banks’ lending behaviour. An argument often heard is that higher equity requirements would force banks to set aside, or hold in reserve, funds that could otherwise be used for lending. Here the main observation is that extremely risky gambles should now be avoided as a result of improved incentives. There has been excessive risk-taking in the past; there should be less of it under the new incentives. Beyond this intended effect, which concerns only the most risky activities, the form of financing used by an institution – in itself – should have no impact on the profit-maximising business model. That is, as far as activities and revenues are concerned, imposing extra capital does not change the perspective of the decision-maker beyond restoring the incentives for balanced risk-taking. The exception is the case of marginally profitable activities, and here only to the extent that the cost of financing is increased (more on this later). Provided that activities are profitable, and bearing in mind that in banking the targeted return on equity is not only highly positive but incomparably higher than in other sectors of the economy, the cost of financing should not be the main determinant of activity.
Chart 3 shows the share of HICP items experiencing price falls, year on year. In terms of expenditure weights, around 20% of the HICP items reported negative annual growth rates in May 2009. This share has increased recently but it remains not so distant from the average of the last decade. Excluding food and energy, the share was lower at 14%. The share of items with negative inflation is subject to significant volatility, partly owing to seasonal factors, such as sales in the shops at certain times of the year. This makes the measure more difficult to interpret. However, it is possible to take account of these factors by comparing the proportion of items with negative inflation rates in any given month with the historical average for the same month. As you can see from chart 4, the share of items with negative inflation rates (excluding energy and food) in the year to May was only a touch higher than the historical average, further confirming that there have been no widespread price cuts so far. Let me dwell on this point. Chart 5 shows the distribution of the annual rates of change in all the items included in the HICP basket, weighted by their expenditure share. This also suggests that price cuts are not generalised, but are concentrated on few items. In May this year the bulk of the distribution – around two- thirds – showed inflation rates above 1%, with some items (heat energy) recording an inflation rate above 10%.

To conclude, the ECB is committed to its primary objective of maintaining price stability, which has been defined as a rate of increase of the general price level of less than 2% but close to 2% over the medium term. This requires a constant monitoring of all inflationary risks, both upward and downward, on the basis of a series of indicators and analytical instruments. Ultimately, the firm anchoring of inflation expectations remains the best way to check the appropriateness of monetary policy in an uncertain environment. Thank you very much for your attention. 8  BIS Review 81/2009  BIS Review 81/2009  9  10  BIS Review 81/2009  BIS Review 81/2009  11  12  BIS Review 81/2009  BIS Review 81/2009  13  14  BIS Review 81/2009  BIS Review 81/2009  15  16  BIS Review 81/2009
Aaronson, Daniel, and Andrew Jordan, 2014, “Understanding the relationship between real wage growth and labor market conditions(pdf),” Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 327, October. Aaronson, Daniel, and Daniel G. Sullivan, 2001, “Growth in worker quality(pdf),” Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Vol. 25, Fourth Quarter, pp. 53–74. Acemoglu, Daron, and David H. Autor, 2011, “Skills, tasks and technologies: Implications for employment and earnings,” in Handbook of Labor Economics, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card (eds. ), Vol. 4B, Amsterdam: Elsevier / North-Holland, pp. 1043–1171. 15  8  Lockhart (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  Autor, David H., 2011, “The unsustainable rise of the disability rolls in the United States: Causes, consequences, and policy options,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 17697, December. Burkhauser, Richard V., and Mary C. Daly, 2011, The Declining Work and Welfare of People with Disabilities: What Went Wrong and a Strategy for Change, Washington, DC: AEI Press. Charles, Kerwin Kofi, Erik Hurst and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2013, “Manufacturing decline, housing booms, and non-employment,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 18949, April. Daly, Mary C., and Bart Hobijn, 2014, “Downward nominal wage rigidities bend the Phillips curve(external-pdf),” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, working paper, No. 2013–08, January. Dice Hiring Indicators, 2014, “Average job vacancy duration is 25 working days (externalpdf),” release, Chicago, August. Gordon, Robert J., 2013, “The Phillips curve is alive and well: Inflation and the NAIRU during the slow recovery,” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 19390, August.

Charles Bean: Business surveys and monetary policy Speech by Mr Charles Bean, Deputy Governor (Monetary Policy) of the Bank of England, at the CBI Industrial Trends Survey 50th Anniversary Reception, Centre Point, London, 24 July 2008. *  *  *  Good evening! It is a great pleasure to be asked to say a few words to mark the 50th birthday of the CBI’s Industrial Trends survey. The birthday boy and I have, in fact, been acquainted with each other for over thirty years – from when I started my professional career in 1975 as a forecaster in the Treasury. In those days, the quarterly Industrial Trends survey was really the only game in town as far as business surveys go. Since then, the field has become more crowded, but the Industrial Trends survey remains a key source of information about business developments. To celebrate the survey’s birthday, I thought that I might say a few words tonight about the part played by business surveys, and intelligence about business conditions more generally, in our setting of Bank Rate each month. Because our interest rate decisions affect UK economic activity and inflation with a rather long, and sometimes rather variable, lag, there is nothing much that we can do to affect the current and near-term rate of inflation. That is already largely baked into the cake. Instead we have to focus on inflation prospects in the medium term – that is, two years or so ahead.
Today, low-inflation policies seem to enjoy high credibility in most countries, which is indicated in part by the fact that the rise in the oil price at least so far has had small effects on inflation expectations. The risk of an oil price rise spreading to wages and other prices in the economy is therefore also likely to be low. Furthermore, in the case of Sweden it should be added that inflation is rising from a low level and that agreements in the labour market have been settled for 2005 and 2006, further reducing the risk of contagion effects via the jobs market. To sum up: the fact that the increase in the oil price is partly a demand-driven phenomenon, that the dependency on oil has decreased and that inflation-targeting regimes enjoy high credibility suggests that the higher oil price should mainly be reflected in a temporary, limited rise in inflation and that the effects on the real economy should be fairly small. If this is correct, the general economic and inflationary developments are more significant for monetary policy than developments in the oil price. This brings me to a discussion of the broad outlook for the Swedish economy in the years ahead. Economic activity in Sweden Despite the Riksbank’s relatively optimistic outlook for the Swedish economy compared with other forecasters, we have gradually revised up our forecasts in the past year.

It is also possible that the increase in debt is partly an adjustment  4  BIS Review 51/2004  to an economy with - compared with before - better functioning financial markets, low inflation and expectations of relatively low interest rates in the future. Most indications also suggest that the majority of households would be able to service their debt even if interest rates were to rise sharply. Nor does it appear likely that banks and mortgage institutions would risk incurring losses that would appreciably affect their capital bases. This wasn’t the case either during the financial crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. While the banks’ losses during the crisis were largely propertyrelated, they did not stem from lending against collateral in housing but from loans secured by commercial properties. And prices of commercial properties have this time not at all shown the same development as prices of residential property. On the contrary, they have fallen during the economic decline and have still not recovered. What remains then are the effects on the economy in general. In this respect it is perhaps first a question of whether the build-up in debt and developments in house prices should prove unsustainable, that the prices therefore should fall and that this on the whole should result in a decline in the real economy in general. The risk of this happening is of course related to your view of residential property prices.
This could in turn fuel asset prices, thereby increasing the risk to financial stability which could undermine the process of economic recovery. Indeed, some countries in the Asian region are already facing these issues and have introduced measures to reduce the risks associated with capital inflows. For Malaysia, however, it should be noted that the financial industry, the private sector and the country have the capacity to manage these challenges, given the stronger overall financial conditions in the country, low levels of corporate leverage, a sound banking system and a strong external balance of payments position. Beyond the immediate priority of establishing economic recovery and preserving macroeconomic stability, it is also acknowledged that the Malaysian economy currently stands at a pivotal juncture. In order to secure continued medium and long-term growth and development, the structure of the economy has to undergo several important changes – changes that would better position Malaysia in meeting the new challenges and reaping the opportunities that the future Asian and global landscape brings. Foremost, the events of the past two years have brought to the forefront the importance of having a more balanced and diverse model of development. Malaysia’s openness and integration with global trade and investment flows is an important source of our economic strength, and must remain so going forward. However, given the more dispersed growth prospects of the global economy in the future, it is important that the export structure of Malaysia evolves to be more diverse too.

The ASEAN Finance Ministers have agreed in 2003 on the Roadmap on Monetary and Financial Integration of ASEAN in the areas of capital market development, capital account liberalisation, financial services liberalisation and ASEAN currency cooperation. In 2007, the ASEAN Central Banks established a task force, chaired by Malaysia, to chart the milestones and timeliness for ASEAN financial integration. To complement the AEC Blueprint, leaders in early 2009 have agreed to an Implementation Plan to promote the development of an integrated capital market within ASEAN. These initiatives along with other regional efforts will effectively transform ASEAN into a single integrated market, and thus strategically position ASEAN as an important economic zone with a role to play in contributing towards global stability and growth. With the broad diversity within Asia, the pace of development will not be equal for all economies. The general agreement is that growth within Asia will be led by China, India and Korea. In a large part, the shape of Asia’s future will be dictated by the dynamic engagement of these prominent growth drivers with other Asian economies and the rest of the world. The prospects for ASEAN to thrive would depend crucially on its ability to engage with these growth drivers and seize on the opportunities that they offer. However, ASEAN must also recognise that at the same time, the level of competition will further intensify within Asia.
M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Upon acceptance of the award for Central Banker of the Year - Asia 2006 Statement by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Banker Magazine Luncheon Seminar, Bangkok, 1 February 2006. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Back in June 2001, when I landed at the job of Governor of the Bank of Thailand, I was fairly confident that I would be able to do well in the area of bank supervision, given the considerable exposure I’ve had as a commercial banker. I also had some ideas on how to move forward the resolution of NPL and return banks to profitability. But I was a banker and not an economist by profession. My expertise in business administration made me a bit uneasy on matters concerning monetary policy, as I felt that I did not have enough macroeconomic background to master the monetary policy issues. However, I was really fortunate to have a highly competent Monetary Policy Committee as well as BOT staff to support me in this area. Indeed the depth of knowledge and the quality of analysis provided by BOT staff are materials which I can always rely on. All I have to do during the past 4½ years is to pay close attention to their presentation, data analysis and proposals.

As the country with the largest circulation of banknotes and coin in the bimetal system, France played a key role in this complex system at the international level. Things are rarely as simple as they seem. The 19th century is often depicted as a time when the international system was based on a single metal currency. However, this was not the case. Until 1873, it worked with a complex bimetal system, based on gold and silver. Let me turn now to today’s financial and monetary world. I will first present the Banque de France view on gold and follow with comments on the euro after 18 months of its existence. I. Gold  A. The Banque de France’s view on gold is based on three main pillars:  •  We are in favour of gold holding  •  We are against gold selling  •  We have a very prudent and conservative approach to gold lending  1. Gold holding  The Banque de France is a major gold holder (with more than 3,000 tons). The creation of the single currency has in no way modified our policy and motivations for holding gold, which remains in our view an important reserve asset. Let us review the reasons why central banks want to hold gold. What is the rationale for holding gold, a non-interest bearing asset, given that there is no more official role for gold since the collapse of the gold exchange standard?
Theoretical models often assume the existence of a central bank reaction function. A well-known reaction function can be a powerful tool in stabilizing output and inflation because yield curves can adjust in anticipation of future policy in line with the evolving outlook for the economy. To return to my football theme, Mervyn King referred to this as the Maradona theory of interest rates. But credible reaction functions don’t fall from the sky and need to be earned by communicating and acting consistently through time. We are and will remain predictable for our stakeholders. Through its forward guidance, the Governing Council has also indicated its intention to move gradually and in accordance with the data. Faced with uncertainty about the strength of the transmission mechanism, we should be guided by pragmatism - the level of inflation relative to the medium-term objective and gradualism. The final C is for clarity. Central bankers should try to spell out what they will and won’t do as much as possible. On the first part, we were clear in Riga; on the second part, let me stress that we cannot fully compensate for the uncertainty created by other policy-makers; nor can we fully offset their effects. We have shown in the past few years that monetary policy is flexible, and we have been willing to use every instrument within our mandate to respond to too low inflation.

But once public debt reaches levels at which its sustainability comes into question, for some financial investors at least, there is the risk of self-fulfilling crisis. This uncertainty can weigh heavily on investment and growth. III. Monetary policy response to policy-induced uncertainty  How should central banks respond to this policy-induced uncertainty? I would like to return to the three C’s I mentioned earlier: credibility, consistency and clarity. Page 5 sur 5 To protect our credibility, we need to stick to our mandate of price stability. And in this regard I would say that we are more certain about the path of inflation than we are for growth. A protectionist shock would be undoubtedly bad for growth but the effect on inflation is more ambiguous, at least in the short run. A persistently high oil price would as well be negative for growth but contribute to inflation. Sticking to our mandate also means no fiscal dominance. The relationship between monetary and fiscal policy ultimately depends on who determines the price level. The risk with fiscal dominant regimes is that inflation rises in line with public debt because people expect it to be eventually monetized by the central bank. Modern central banking is unambiguous on this point – we cannot have fiscal dominance and the path of inflation is set by the central bank. Not only are central banks forbidden from monetary financing, the timing of monetary policy decisions is not determined by the fiscal problems of member states. The second C is consistency.
I would only like to mention, as an example of fruitful co-operation, that the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), set up last year as a follow-up to the Lamfalussy report, recently embarked with the European System of Central Banks on considering standards to be applied to the European securities settlement and clearing systems. In the field of financial regulation and supervision, the Council of Economic and Finance ministers (ECOFIN) had mandated, last May, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) to make proposals concerning the structures for financial regulation supervision and stability at the European level. The framework currently under consideration has the objective of extending the arrangements that are already in place for securities regulation to the other financial sectors, based on existing interinstitutional agreements. Of course, the sectoral specificities are recognized, and especially those of the banking sector, through the appropriate participation of all national central banks in the arrangements concerning the banking supervision. Indeed, one of the statutory tasks of the Eurosystem is to contribute to the smooth conduct of prudential supervision policies and the stability of the financial system. I am therefore convinced that the involvement of central banks in this issue is absolutely crucial. Economic reform is an ongoing process in Europe, in view of the considerable efforts that still have to be made in order to promote sustainable growth and enduring job creation. At the same time, the European Union has to face another important challenge in the near future : the enlargement process. 2.

And I do not believe we will ever achieve a cashless economy completely spontaneously). And this is something we should take into account in the future, as it will further complicate balancing the vertices of the banking triangle, or the banking trilemma I mentioned earlier. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches