samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Increased public discontent being actively exploited by populists is mainly linked to the nondynamic development of the global economy over this decade. The reasons are different: ageing of the population and the reduction of the economically active population; low growth rates in countries used to be the powerful drivers of growth in previous years, such as China; the lack of new breakthrough technologies; accumulation of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  various structural imbalances; the on-going reduction of debt burden accumulated before the 2008 crisis (so-called deleveraging) and so on. The problem is that low growth rates affect the poor more adversely than the rich. Income disparity in the world has soared since the mid-1980s. The latest OECD report emphasises this fact. The Gini coefficient in OECD countries grew by almost 10% to 32. According to World Bank estimates, in 2000–2012 the Gini coefficient in Russia increased from 37 to 41.5. It would not be an exaggeration to say that a vicious circle is being shaped: low rates of economic growth strengthen centrifugal and disintegration forces and provoke events like Brexit, which downgrade the outlook for world economic growth even stronger. A growing demand for ‘easy’ economic decisions has also been observed in Russia. For example, giving promises that the printing of 1–2-3 trillion rubles and their issue as cheap loans will ensure sustained acceleration in economic growth rates without serious inflation implications. This is even based on pseudo-scientific foundation.

Regional banks would also be prohibited from making cross-border transactions; neither would they be able to open branches / structural subdivisions outside the region wherein the bank is registered and outside its adjoining regions. We deem it appropriate to discuss with the bank community the possibility to considerably streamline regulation for such banks so they are exempt from compliance with technically complicated international standards. Importantly, this suggestion is not about softening the regulation for regional banks – it is about its simplification. Concerning the other banks (save for systemically important) which we call banks of federal importance, the plan is to increase the minimum required capital to 1 billion rubles, with international standards to be rolled out subsequently. By the way, from the slide here you can see that minimum capital requirements in our EurAsEC partner countries are higher than in Russia. And even once the billion-rule is implemented, in three countries they will still be above this one billion. The introduction of proportionate regulation comes with a transition period of up to two years, in which time banks would be able to decide how they see their future; a similar transition period will certainly be required to implement the increased minimum capital requirement. We propose to discuss details at the congress. Now with regard to consolidated supervision. The current supervision and inspection extend to more than individual credit institutions and cover banking groups.
Many have been established and are staffed by people who acquired their skills and earned their capital at the more established investment banks and fund management firms of the City. Being at the heart of world markets helped them spot the opportunities and assess the competition. Once they struck out on their own, they could draw on a network of former colleagues and contacts for staff, information and expertise. Future prospects of the City of London So what are the prospects of the City of London? One of the clear lessons from history is that any position can be lost. It is always possible to throw away an advantage by ill judged decisions. Any widespread operational disruption or fear about security could also be very damaging, which is one reason why we and the other tripartite authorities are spending so much time on improving crisis response and management. But in the absence of disaster the structural factors I have discussed seem likely to favour further concentration of financial business in the City. First, the entry of China and India international market has been associated with a massive expansion of international trade and finance in relation to overall world GDP. That seems likely to continue and has been a major factor in the growth of London in the past. Fifteen years ago people worried that developments in information technology would undermine centres like the City of London.

The mandatory savings scheme was intended to inculcate in the beneficiaries the value of thrift as an integral part of making any sustainable livelihood 18 . This is because without learning how to save, an individual is unable to learn how to spend wisely. Accordingly, each member of the group was required to save per week a minimum of Rs. 5 19 in a group savings account which later served as an insurance against unexpected future eventualities such as family illnesses or crop or business failures. Group members were encouraged to meet in rotation in one of the member houses at least once a week so as to ensure group cohesiveness and facilitate member education programme. At these meetings, they were encouraged, guided by the change agent, to discuss among themselves freely why they were poor, what skills they were lacking for gainful enterprise, the working of the free market system and how they could benefit by being integrated to the market system. These meetings also gave them vital training on how they could conduct meetings democratically and listen to each other without being offended or having to embarrass others when a disagreeable opinion is made. Groups were chaired by a member who was also selected by rotation and records of group meetings were kept by a member who functioned as its secretary.
It is not that I intend to question the concept of risk-weighted requirements in any way. Rather, it is my wish to possibly strengthen these requirements by introducing supporting measures. For example, compared with risk-weighted requirements, volume limits or the debt-equity ratio have the advantage that such key figures are basically very transparent and are not based on complex models. Moreover, they calculate the only element that is relevant in a crisis, and that is the size of the buffer that a bank needs to absorb losses. Third, it is a striking fact that, to date, hedge funds have not been a focus of the current crisis. To a considerable extent, this is attributable to a much improved management of counterparty risk in recent years. It is my view that banks should strengthen their risk management as regards their own refinancing decisions and risk allocation and not just with respect to external customers such as hedge funds. The kind of internal subsidising of refinancing costs for individual business areas observed in some cases creates false incentives. In future, the refinancing costs that a bank charges its internal risk centres should constitute an integral element of its risk management approach. To sum up, I would like to state that it is certainly true that the current situation in the credit markets is very serious. At the same time, I want to stress that, fundamentally, the earnings capacity of our international banks is high, thanks to their diversified business model, and this increases their resilience.

Technologies under reviewed include biometrics for electronic know-your-customers, machine learning for alternative credit scoring models, and blockchain applications for cross-border payments, supply chain financing, and document authentication. Another way in which productivity is being enhanced is through improving regional financial connectivity. Recent efforts by banks in the region to partner and adopt the Thai QR code standard and blockchain applications for cross-border payments are examples of how financial innovations can help improve regional financial connectivity and facilitate smoother cross-border financial services. Let me now turn to building immunity, which is a significant imperative for the future VUCA world. With the vast amount of data and modern analytical tools available, resilience can be significantly improved. For example, banks can use transactional data to better forecast customers’ credit demand and credit risks. Regulatory agencies can analyze financial connectedness through network analysis to detect risk events and safeguard financial stability. The Bank of Thailand has employed a number of big data analytics to detect early signals of imbalances in the economy and respond pre-emptively should risks arise. Additionally, in this increasingly digital environment, cyber resilience and cyber security must be a top priority and all of us must be prepared to prevent and respond effectively to cyber threats. Adoption of modern technologies like biometrics and blockchains can help safeguard financial information and reduce the number and magnitude of fraudulent activities.
Motivating all banks to improve their management of risk, and thereby strengthen the stability of the banking system, is one of the principal objectives that the Basel Committee set out for itself in undertaking a major revision of the international standards for regulatory capital. The three years since have been a tremendous journey for all of us as we seek fundamental reform of the capital adequacy framework. Meeting here in Cape Town, it seems fitting to portray our work to date as an unfinished journey. This historic port has traditionally served as a way station and respite for weary seafarers who had weathered many storms, but had not yet reached their destination. So today we’ll have a chance to rest near the Cape of Good Hope, to reflect on how far we’ve come, and to chart the rest of our way to the successful implementation of the New Accord. I’d like to share with you the latest news on where the New Accord stands and offer some insight into what you can expect to see in the future. I’ll begin with my views on the milestones that we’ve achieved. Then, I’d like to bring you up to date on how we are resolving outstanding issues. It’s wise to conclude any speech with thoughts about the future, so I’ll close with some remarks on what we’ll need to do to finish our journey – from the perspectives of the Committee and of other supervisors, including of those who may have adopted the 1988 Accord more recently.

They are regular companies, which lend to firms and households, financed by issuing bonds and short-term commercial paper (CP) rather than by taking deposits. It can be tempting for them to extract a term premium by increasing their maturity mismatch. Some did so during the boom years. In the US and UK during the crisis, alongside the CP market more generally, they were given access by central banks to what in effect were discount-window type liquidity-insurance facilities. It is not obvious to me that they should be regulated as commercial banks, as they do not provide monetary/payments services. But it is clear that this part of the credit system became fragile due to leverage and maturity mismatches. It relied on the CP market remaining open; and thus on money funds maintaining demand for corporate and finance-company CP; and, if that demand dried up, they relied on banks being able and willing to honour the committed lines that underpinned those CP programmes. But for too long and in too many countries, regulation did not adequately capture the associated credit and liquidity risk. The result was a shadow financing (or credit) system that was effectively dependent in adverse circumstances on the banking system, but without the banks being ready and able to support it through systematic stress. 4  There were warnings years ago; for example in Edwards F (1996), “The New Finance: Regulation and Financial Stability”, American Enterprise Institute.
Of note, payments abroad for insurance and reinsurance services, largely by corporates, grew significantly by 45% since 2010 to reach RM10.2 billion in 2017. As our needs increase, it is imperative that efforts be intensified to optimise onshore insurance capacity. Risk and insurance managers play an important role in supporting broader efforts to develop domestic insurance capacity. More can and must be done to improve the quality of risk information and work collectively with brokers and onshore insurers – both Malaysian and foreign – to develop costefficient and innovative solutions that are tailored to business needs. This will go a long way to build domestic capacity while contributing to a stronger domestic economy. In closing, I am reminded of the famous Italian poet, Pietro Metastasio, who said this of risks: “Every noble acquisition is attended with its risks; he who fears to encounter the one must not expect to obtain the other”. I cannot think of a better reason for advancing innovative approaches to risk management that will provide the confidence and economic freedom for businesses to grow and evolve. On that note, let me once again thank MARIM for the opportunity to share some thoughts with you today and I wish you a productive conference ahead. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches

We believe that the industry is ready to build and expand its capacity in this area. While we are moving to being more risk-based, there is still a lot more to be done. This includes educating everyone in the industry that “risk-based” does not mean “total risk aversion”. While it is crucial to protect our financial system from being abused, it is also necessary for financial institutions to serve their roles and purposes in the economy and for the society. Accordingly, the new 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  regulatory framework demands reporting institutions to take greater ownership of their individual AML/CFT frameworks. Reporting institutions must strengthen their internal governance and controls to preserve financial integrity, not because Bank Negara tells them so, but because it is the right thing to do. This demands a high level of maturity by the industry. For individual institutions which have established a mature control environment, there will be greater latitude to design control frameworks in a way that is more operationally flexible. On the other hand, for individual institutions who are not quite there yet, the new framework raises the compliance bar, calling for them to strengthen awareness, governance and processes to ensure they have the capabilities to preserve integrity of the financial system. On this point, I wish to applaud the Financial Services Professional Board (FSPB) on its recent publication of standards on whistleblowing and on managing conflicts of interest.
The global economic crisis, which deeply affected all countries of the region, was accompanied by slowed exports, reduced remittances and other foreign currency inflows, increased uncertainty and slowed credit growth. Although 2010 is expected to be accompanied by a gradual improvement in the world economic environment, many of the factors that negatively affected the Albanian economy will continue to be present even during this year. The stimulating fiscal and monetary policy helped supporting the economic activity during 2009. However, fiscal trajectories and the need for long-term stability suggest that the Albanian economy can not rely for a long time on fiscal stimulus. Against this background, in 2010 a more conservative fiscal policy is necessary and is welcomed by the Bank of Albania. In a medium- and long-term horizon, we are of the opinion that fiscal sustainability should be ensured through a clear and prudent fiscal rule. Under new circumstances, the economic growth should be based more on boosting the private sector of the economy and bank credit plays a key role in this regard. The good financial health of our banking system and the progressive improvement of liquidity conditions and risk premiums in domestic and foreign financial markets are encouraging developments. The easing of monetary conditions and the liquidity injections by the Bank of Albania have supported and will further support this process.

However, the reactivation of credit activity remains a challenging goal, which would require encouragement of the final demand and generation of business plans valid for bank financing, reduction of real and perceived risk in the economy, review of development strategies and commercial banks’ lending policies, as well as reduction of cost and non-cost elements in lending. All these factors are envisaged to gradually improve throughout the year; however, they will remain far from the pre-crisis levels. Bank of Albania’s monetary policy will continue to be prudent, chiefly oriented towards achievement of inflation target. The recent upward inflation trend might have been motivated by temporary-action and limited-intensity supply factors. The Bank of Albania has envisaged  BIS Review 28/2010  1  that the exceeding of 4 percent inflation rate will be for a short period of time and will not be followed by steady inflationary pressures. Our projections show that consumer price inflation will fall gradually towards the 3 percent targeted rate during 2010. However, we remain committed to taking all appropriate steps to ensure this performance and meet our legal mandate for price stability in the economy. 2  BIS Review 28/2010
Recent economic research – both analytical and empirical – is seeking to further explore how the economy’s performance is influenced by institutions and values; and, more generally, how the economy’s functioning may change if we relax some of the simplifying assumptions about (1) the behaviour of a seemingly “valueless”, perfectly rational homo oeconomicus; and (2) the functioning of markets that are “perfect and complete”, characterised by full information, rational expectations and largely unaffected by cultural and social values. In my presentation, I will address some of these issues by examining how and to what extent institutions and values may be affecting the performance of the European economy. To this end, I will first sketch out a simple conceptual framework indicating how economic performance, the functioning of markets, institutions and human values relate to each other. Second, I will show how the growth performance of the European economy – compared to that of the United States – can be accounted for by differences in the trend growth rates of productivity, labour utilisation and population; and then I will discuss – on the basis of the empirical evidence available – the role of economic institutions, social preferences, values and attitudes in explaining, at least partly, these differences. A key issue of practical and policy relevance is whether European economic performance can, in fact, be improved without giving up values or preferences that are considered to be quintessentially European.

This is particularly important as the Riksbank has such a high degree of independence. This independence means that it is important to be able to evaluate how we are carrying out our duties. To make it possible to evaluate us, we must be open and clear in everything we do. But it is perhaps not as self-evident that the responsibility of public authority makes a number of other demands on our actions. This applies, for instance, to the forms for how we make our interest rate decisions and how we communicate our monetary policy intentions. The latter is usually called “signalling” in central bank language. I shall return to this. Transparency – being open and clear It was long common for central banks to be secretive and a little mysterious. One example, which today may sound fairly strange, is that the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, did not begin publishing the interest rate changes it had decided until 1994 1 . However, over the past fifteen years, central banks have in general become increasingly open and clear with regard to their actions and intentions. This applies both in inflation-targeting countries like Sweden and in countries that have not quantified a target, like the United States. Democratic reasons for transparency… There are several reasons for the increased openness and clarity, or transparency, as it is usually called. The most important one is probably that the central banks have become more independent in relation to the political system.
It thus appears that the euro area has yet to harness fully the benefits arising from economic integration and the introduction of the single currency. The emergence of difficulties in furthering European economic integration has recently been discerned. Cases in point are the problems affecting the fiscal discipline framework, the delays in meeting the targets of the Lisbon Agenda and the obstacles still blocking, in certain industries, the development of the single European market. At the March 2005 European Council, the authorities attempted to correct the lack of ambition behind the structural reforms and the scant consistency of budgetary policies with the disciplinary rules set by adjusting some of the policy co-ordination mechanisms. However, only clear resolve on the part of the authorities to fulfil their commitments would dispel the scepticism some of these proposals evoke. In the fiscal policy realm, the European Council approved a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. Among other changes, provisions were made to pay greater attention to the particular situation of each country when evaluating its budgetary position and to make the application of the corrective measures  BIS Review 45/2005  3  envisaged in the Treaty more flexible. As a result of these changes, the economic rationality of certain components of the Pact has perhaps been enhanced, though its complexity and the margin available for discretion in its application have also undoubtedly increased.

These new possibilities mean that institutions have had to become much more sophisticated risk managers because of the singular features of these financial products and intermediaries, particularly their complexity and opacity. If we factor in the natural doubts as to the sustainability of this scenario (not so much as to whether it will continue but as to how benign it will be), it becomes evident that the satisfactory behaviour of the markets and financial intermediaries should not be allowed to lead to complacency, but should be used to strengthen the soundness of institutions as a precaution against possible changes in the favourable central scenarios. Spanish deposit institutions have not been unaffected by these developments. In fact, to the favourable factors listed above should be added, in the case of Spain, a highly favourable  BIS Review 45/2005  9  macroeconomic scenario and a growth differential with the core European countries in both output and employment. This, along with the good starting position of our institutions in terms of efficiency and competitiveness, enabled the soundness and international leadership of our financial system to be strengthened. Our institutions have thus been able to meet the demand for more and increasingly complex banking products and services, and at the same time improve their profitability. Naturally, however, the above comments on the international scenario and the need for markets and institutions to maintain their operational soundness apply likewise to Spanish institutions.