samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In four meetings we raised the MPR by 200 basis points, to 8.25%. The purpose was to limit the propagation effects, via reducing the demand through a more restrictive monetary policy. Just as we then stated, although a deceleration of global growth was expected, we did not see that it would have the necessary force to contain inflation and therefore monetary policy had to be tightened. As a matter of fact, our Report of September 2008, before the economic plunge and when Consensus Forecasts estimated 2.6% growth for the world this year, we announced that the MPR would probably be raised above 9%. But the world changed again, and very strongly. What at first seemed just as a deceleration of global activity, resulted being the first drop in world growth in over sixty years (figure 4). This led to a change in policies with no precedent in Chile’s monetary history. The drop in world demand would result in a larger slowdown in domestic demand than the one we intended to cause via monetary policy. In this new setting, the obvious reaction was to change the sign of monetary policy. The first important signal was revising our projections – in November 2008 – and announcing that the increases that had been forecast in September would not occur. Such an announcement had an immediate impact on financial conditions. This way, the CBC initiated the most aggressive interest rate cut ever implemented in Chile, and one of the sharpest in the world (figure 5).

Experience from other countries, where the policy realignment had already been made in the early 1980s, indicates that the creation of confidence in a low inflation regime takes time and a lot of hard work. But it also shows that after a while, such a process does yield its reward in the form of low interest rates, a stable currency and ultimately a favourable economic development. The price stability target Following the move to a flexible exchange rate, monetary policy in Sweden is directed at a quantified inflation target. In this it resembles the situation for monetary policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, where inflation targets are also used. In Sweden the target is formulated as being to limit the increase in the consumer price index to 2 per cent. This target is to be assessed, not in terms of isolated twelve-month change figures but in a somewhat longer, annual, perspective. As monetary policy obviously cannot control price developments exactly, the target is accompanied by a tolerance interval of ±1 percentage point. This tolerance interval also serves to absorb temporary deviations from trend inflation. Such deviations may arise, for instance, from political decisions to alter indirect taxes and subsidies, changes in interest rates as well as from international price shocks. For March 1997 the consumer price index showed a twelve-month fall of 0.4 per cent. However, this figure was to a large extent influenced by last year’s sharp repo rate cuts.
Let me elaborate a bit more on these three themes: the need for an encompassing and integrated set of data, the achievements of, and outlook for, euro area statistics and the ECB’s framework for analysing this information. Monetary policy and the need for an encompassing and integrated set of data If we lived in the world of macroeconomic textbooks, a few simple models with a limited set of variables would be a sufficient basis for monetary policy-making and the statistical requirements could be kept to a minimum. As we all know, the real world is much more complex and, therefore, information needs are much more elaborated. In such a world, a rich and integrated set of data is needed because macroeconomic models, synthetic indicators and unconnected statistical indicators are often too rough a guide to the current and likely future development of the economy. As mentioned before, central banks have to take decisions under conditions of constant uncertainty. The economy is never at rest. A multitude of disturbances of diverse nature affect the economy all the time: financial shocks, demand shocks, supply shocks etc., and these cannot easily be distinguished in real time, let alone foreseen. In their attempts to identify disturbances and track how they spread through the economy, central banks are assisted by models. But too often, existing models are not sufficiently sophisticated instruments to identify shocks. For one thing, their focus may be too narrow, in a way that makes them  BIS Review 67/2004  1  unduly selective.

Among other things, there was considerable uncertainty surrounding trade tensions between the US and China and the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Despite somewhat lower growth, unemployment continued to edge down in many countries. US unemployment is now the lowest in 50 years. Consumer price 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  inflation among trading partners picked up in 2018, mainly owing to higher energy prices. Underlying inflation was fairly stable among our main trading partners. Chart: International interest rates Official policy rates in the US, UK and Sweden were raised in 2018. The US federal funds rate has been raised in several steps in recent years, and the target range is now 2.25 to 2.5 percent. Nevertheless, the global interest rate level remains low, and market expectations indicate a low level in the years ahead. In the euro area, there are prospects that the ECB deposit facility rate will be negative for some time to come. Chart: Oil prices and the krone exchange rate The tailwind from the rebound in oil prices has provided a considerable boost to the Norwegian economy in recent years. Oil prices have more than doubled since the low in early 2016. In 2018, oil prices were highly volatile in periods, primarily reflecting supply-side conditions. Towards the end of 2018, uncertainty about global economic prospects had a dampening impact on oil prices. After rising to above USD 85 per barrel through autumn, oil prices fell to below USD 55 per barrel at year-end. Prices have edged up again since then.
I repeat, this agreement was and remains the best possible one for France and for Europe. I recall that the removal of internal models was a key element in the negotiations. We fought hard to gain the lasting recognition of these models while committing ourselves to further improving their comparability. The application of Basel III will not require a dedicated capital increase for any French bank. The implementation of this agreement will not have a negative impact on the financing of our economy. This concern traditionally voiced by the banking industry has always proved unfounded: on the contrary, credit growth in France remains very robust at 7% per year. But we are fully aware, as is Bercy, of the negotiations that remain to be conducted. And France will fight for a transposition that is both fair and reasonable. Fair because there would be no question of transposing it in Europe if the United States did not apply the agreement. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Reasonable in terms of managing capital requirements under Basel III. Firstly, I believe it is necessary to apply the output floor at the consolidated level of the banking groups. The Basel requirements will also have to be intelligently integrated with the capital buffers that are already applied in Europe under Pillar 2 2020 will also be the year of the Solvency II review. We had expressed our reservations about the document circulated for consultation by EIOPA.

I also call on banks to better monitor their pricing practices: margins must be sufficient to cover the costs and risks associated with housing loans. These points will be particularly closely monitored by the ACPR in 2020, and they are – I stress – of common interest to both you and us – in terms of financial stability. Lastly, to meet the challenge of profitability, French banks and insurers must be able to – at last! – operate in a genuine single financial market conducive to cross-border consolidation. And yet, the Banking Union is still half-finished: progress on resolution – second pillar – is at least as important as that on the deposit guarantee scheme – third pillar. Moreover, in the run-up to the arduous discussions on the future relationship with the United Kingdom, Europe must – more than ever before – assert its financial sovereignty. This requires the Capital Markets Union. I 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  would like to express my support for the priorities put forward in the “Next CMU” report and for the High-Level Forum (HLF) launched by the new Commission. If 2020 proves to be not only the year of Brexit, but also the year of a Savings and Sustainable Investment Union, Europe will have turned the problem into an opportunity.
This contribution was materialised through: Implementing an accommodative monetary policy stance, which supported economic growth, increase in employment and wages, and rise in inflation; Prudential supervision and proactive approach to banking regulation, contributing to the improvement of banking sector indicators; Enhancing the banking system security, by establishing specialised structures to administer the necessary interventions and restructuring in banks facing solvency difficulties; Promoting the development and efficient functioning of the payment system; Promoting financial education; Further fostering the institutional capacities of the central bank, through constant investment in enhancing professional skills, independence, accountability and transparency, as well as through cooperation and exchanging information and opinions with Albanian and international partners. Our activity in 2017 was guided by the Medium-term Development Strategy 2016–2018. In addition, the Bank of Albania has paid particular attention to the implementation of the recommendations left by this Committee in the Resolution “On the assessment of the activity of the Bank of Albania for 2016”. Let me first present an overview of the activity of the Supervisory Council, the highest decisionmaking body of the Bank of Albania. 1. Activity of the Supervisory Council and strengthening institutional governance The Supervisory Council has conducted its activity in line with the provisions of the organic law and the procedures established in the internal regulation on its organisation and functioning. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  In 2017, the Supervisory Council held 15 meetings and took 82 decisions. In addition, it approved 29 regulations and 1 guideline for general application.

Following their pre-university programmes, Imran aspires to be a Mechanical Engineer, Hajar is keen to read Chemistry while both Ying Xin and Nur Shazlin aspire to be Doctors. I am confident that all of you will do your best and will contribute for the future of the nation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In addition to the Kijang Emas Scholarship award, every year the Bank also awards scholarships to 50 high achieving SPM students for them to pursue their undergraduate studies abroad with the objective of them being part of the Bank’s future talent pool. The Bank has put in place a structured, holistic and collaborative Scholar’s Development Programme to support all of our scholars throughout their studies. The programme aims to develop high-quality and well-rounded scholars with leadership qualities as the next generation of young talent who will be the leaders of tomorrow for the Bank and our nation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The Governing Council supports the actions taken by the European Commission in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact and the subsequent outcome of the ECOFIN Council meeting last month. It is now necessary to remain vigilant in order to ensure strict adherence to the medium-term plans and rigorous implementation of the procedures of the Stability and Growth Pact. In order to further improve the fundamentals of the euro area and to put the expected recovery on a broad and sustainable basis, euro area countries must strengthen their efforts to implement comprehensive structural reforms. Over the past few years progress has been made with regard to enhancing the flexibility of euro area product and capital markets. Euro area countries have also made some headway in terms of improving the way their labour markets operate. These reforms, together with moderate wage developments, have contributed to the strong employment growth and the considerable reduction in unemployment witnessed in many euro area countries in the last cyclical upswing. However, it is worth noting that despite the continued high unemployment in the euro area, firms continue to report difficulties in terms of recruiting suitably qualified workers. This suggests that further improvements in the functioning of euro area labour markets and their ability to match labour supply and demand are needed. Evidence gathered in a recent Eurosystem analysis, which will be published shortly, supports this view. In this context I would also like to stress that structural reforms in different markets should not be seen in isolation.

Starting with the analysis under the first pillar of our monetary policy strategy, the three-month average of the annual growth rates of M3 stood at 8.0% in the period from November 2001 to January 2002, compared with 7.8% in the period from October to December 2001. The high level of the annual growth rates of M3 is very much related to portfolio shifts to liquid positions, most of which occurred in the autumn of 2001 in an economic and financial environment characterised by high uncertainty. While many investors still seemed to be "parking" some of their assets in M3 in early 2002, some moderation in the short-term dynamics of M3 could be observed around the turn of the year. The Governing Council continues to hold the view that the information from the first pillar thus far does not indicate risks to price stability, as the portfolio reallocations which drove M3 growth in 2001 should remain temporary. In addition, the slowdown in the rate of growth of loans to the private sector has been continuing over the past few months. However, we will need to analyse monetary developments closely in the coming months. As regards the second pillar, there are further signs that the trough in economic activity may have been reached at the end of last year. Coincident and forward-looking indicators increasingly point to improvements in economic conditions. A similar picture is reflected in financial market expectations, especially those embedded in bond yields.
ATM connectivity has also been established between Thailand and Myanmar and between Thailand and Laos to facilitate cross-border money transfer. Like other areas of regional connectivity, there is a need to upgrade financial connectedness to support closer economic relations among the GMS. For today, let me highlight three key areas that Thailand will pursue in this endeavor. The first one is to strengthen cross-border banking networks. With regard to the banking sector, the Bank of Thailand aims to further liberalize banking activities by broadening cross-border banking networks. We encourage Thai commercial banks to further expand their regional presence to support businesses operating in the GMS. In addition, we fully support foreign banks to use Thailand as a springboard to expand their businesses into the subregion. Recently, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi acquired a microfinance bank in Cambodia, using Bank of Ayudhya as such a springboard; and in 2014, CIMBThai bank set up its first branch in Vientiane. Moreover, the Bank of Thailand has been relaxing regulations to further accommodate investors in the GMS. We will allow them to take loans from Thai banks for direct investment in the GMS without a cap. We also lifted the cap on outflows of transporting baht in cash to GMS countries from half a million to two million baht per trip. In this connection, we have now started to see the results of the increased flexibility, which helps multinational corporations to establish Treasury Centers and International Headquarters in Thailand.

To promote regional connectivity on a sustained basis, it is vital that we strive to strengthen all these key aspects by joining forces of both the government and the private sector. Let me now address each of them one by one. The first and most fundamental is the physical infrastructure connectivity, for instance, through transportation channels, power lines and digital channels. The work to connect physical infrastructure will always be a work in progress. The past two decades have seen the fruits of various projects to close “missing links” in road, rail, waterway, and energy networks in the GMS. 19 permanent border crossing points have been established to connect Thailand with Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. Energy connection within the subregion has been strengthened. Thailand, for example, bought 314 million USD worth of electricity from Laos each year, increasing about 8 times over the past ten years. A frequency of flights within the GMS, especially by low-cost airlines, has also risen markedly. Nevertheless, we still need to do a lot more to be better connected with each other. Many roads remain not fully operationalized or underutilized. Road transportation in the GMS is not seamless as it should be. In some routes, large trucks carrying containers still have to offload their goods to smaller vehicles to navigate the roads. Also, cross-border procedures remain obstacles to easy access of goods and people. Apart from building new infrastructure, it is therefore equally important to ensure that the existing ones are fully utilized to their potentials.
The need to review the assumptions on which the Central Bank Act was based when it entered into force in 2001 has also been mentioned. Let us recall that at the end of 2000, the Prime Minister assigned a committee representing the four largest political parties in parliament with the task of drafting new Central Bank legislation. A complete draft bill was delivered in March 2001, backed by the entire committee. This was passed as law virtually unamended with the unanimous support of all 56 members of parliament who were present for its final reading. The Act represented a major reform. It granted the Bank increased independence, simplified its objectives and made greater demands for transparency and professionalism. A review of the assumptions behind this legislation or amendments to it will obviously not reduce the current macroeconomic imbalances. Other action is needed. The issue is actually very straightforward. Iceland’s economy has been overheating for a long time. This is the result of massive domestic investments, radical changes in the domestic financial sector when the banks began providing mortgage loans in competition with the HFF, and exceptionally large increases in household disposable income stemming from increases in pay and tax reductions. All this happened under external conditions in which interest rates were at a historical low. The consequence was buoyant domestic demand, private consumption and investment, which have been reflected in inflation and a large current account deficit.

Investment advice by persons not carrying on a business: a growing number of online discussion fora, chat-rooms and bulletin boards allow persons to post their opinions concerning securities. An entity providing a platform for public discussion of securities would not attract licensing.11 Neither would a participant, as long as he is not deemed to be “carrying on a business” of providing advice. In the context of dealing, we will treat two common practices as passive conduits. First, websites providing hypertext links to, or advertisements for, licensed dealers. But websites should not advertise for, or link users, to unlicensed dealers, including overseas dealers not licensed by MAS. Second, licensing is not necessary for providing prospectuses and application forms passively on websites, or via email upon the request of investors. These merely improve on the efficiency of paper distribution.12 Websites must not go beyond being passive conduits. MAS will consider portals or websites providing facilities for accepting or relaying orders to dealers as licensable. This is because such a facility carries the risk of failure to transmit trade orders in a timely and accurate fashion, potentially to the detriment of investors. Overseas websites specifically targeting Singapore residents Our final principle deals with overseas websites. MAS will apply the same licensing principles to overseas websites which specifically target Singapore residents, as it does to local websites. This is to ensure that foreign and local internet players are treated on the same regulatory basis.
De Crescenzio, A., Golin, M., and Ott, A.C. (2015), “Currency-based Measures Targeting Banks - Balancing National Regulation of Risk and Financial Openness,” OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2015/03, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrp0z9lp1zr-en. Eichengreen, B., R. Hausmann, and U. Panizza (2002), “Original Sin: The Pain, The Mystery, and the Road to Redemption,” paper presented to a conference at the Inter-American Development Bank (November 2002). Hausmann, R., and U. Panizza (2003), “On the Determinants of Original Sin: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of International Money and Finance 22(7): 957-990. Pasricha, G.K., M. Falagiarda, M. Bijsterbosch, J. Aizenman (2018), “Domestic and Multilateral Effects of Capital Controls in Emerging Markets,” Journal of International Economics 115: 48-58. Pasricha, G.K. (2017), “Policy Rules for Capital Controls,” BIS Working Papers 670. Page 12 of 12

Therefore, they are subject to many risks that are similar to those confronted by conventional banks. In addition, Shari'a compliant banking has its own risks. In principle, there is a range of various activities through which Islamic banks can work in different ways that enable them to provide funds. These activities are adapted to meet the principles governing Islamic banking business, the most important of which is the principle of risk sharing. Therefore, there is an urgent need to identify, measure, manage, monitor and control such potential risks and mitigate them within the capacity and capital adequacy of the relevant bank. The most important challenges confronting Islamic banks are risks arising from financing formulas and Shari'a compliant banking, especially investment risks, method of applying "Basel II" proposals, capital market and financial derivatives risks. In addition, Islamic banks may bear a wide range of risks that differ, in nature, from those borne by commercial banks. In this connection, it is necessary to emphasize that the role entrusted to the supervisory authorities is to pursue a comprehensive control method based on risk assessment process and not to make any discrimination in a way that may suggest that Shari'a compliant banks are being rated differently or confronting larger risks.