samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Emphasis on communication has also been boosted by central bankers becoming increasingly aware that effective communication facilitates the transmission of monetary policy decisions to the economy, thereby making their jobs easier. Nonetheless, the Eurosystem’s strategy has some differences when compared with the inflation targeting strategies. Let me focus my comments in this respect on two particular issues: the relevant horizon for policy and the role of macroeconomic forecasts in policymaking and in communication. The relevant horizon for policy Inflation targeting is often described as a framework where monetary policy responds to deviations between a conditional inflation forecast at a specific time horizon, typically of around two years, and the inflation objective. From a welfare perspective, however, focus on an ex-ante fixed horizon is problematic for a number of reasons. In particular, economic theory suggests that the relevant horizon for monetary policy depends in a significant way on the size and nature of shocks affecting the economy, as well as on the prevailing circumstances (i.e. the initial state of the economy). Moreover, taken at face value, this approach neglects the implications of policy for price stability at longer horizons. BIS Review 132/2007  3  In connection with this last point, a number of researchers (and notably research at the BIS 5 ) have been arguing quite convincingly that that short-term inflation control is not enough to prevent the emergence of imbalances, which may lead later on to costly episodes of macroeconomic instability.

The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem in retrospect The ECB Governing Council had three main objectives in mind when it decided to announce a new monetary policy strategy for stage three of EMU in October 1998. First, the strategy should facilitate transparency and accountability, helping the public to understand and assess monetary policy decisions. Second, it also should promote credibility and confidence among euro area citizens that the Eurosystem would keep a clear focus on its constitutional assignment of maintaining price stability. And third, the monetary policy strategy was important for internal decision-making. It should constitute a conceptual framework for structuring information and provide guidance and consistent decision criteria to policymakers, who are constantly confronted with alternative paradigms, limited information and difficult views about the current state and prospects of the economy. Next year will be the 10th anniversary of the creation of the ECB and the announcement of the monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem. In retrospect, the monetary policy strategy – together with a strong institutional set-up- has provided the right foundations for an effective and successful monetary policy in the euro area. The Governing Council of the ECB has demonstrated that it is well-equipped to take prompt and swift action in order to secure price stability over the medium-term. At the same time, it has retained the appropriate degree of flexibility to respond to shocks and to take into account the unique uncertainties facing the euro area.
To conclude on this estimate of effectiveness, the IMF – regarded as an objective judge of the relevance of economic policies – was unequivocal in its assessment at the last G20 meeting in Shanghai at the end of February, saying, “The ECB’s asset purchase programme has supported the recovery by improving confidence and financial conditions [and] monetary policy should remain accommodative”. 3) What about the risks? I talked earlier about the risks of doing nothing: we need to take action in order to bring inflation back up towards 2%. That said, we also need to keep a close eye out for any possible negative side-effects of our monetary policy, notably for financial stability. We are actively monitoring the financial cycle, including in France where the task falls to the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière (High Council for Financial Stability), set up in 2013: I will be taking part in its 8th meeting at the Finance Ministry tomorrow. For the time being, there are no signs of any bubbles forming in the main financing markets: on the whole, developments in the equity markets appear in line with corporate profit forecasts, while evolutions in bond yields also seem consistent with the outlook for inflation and growth. Nor are there any signs of excessive credit growth in the financial system. Nevertheless, we remain vigilant over all aspects of the current macroeconomic and financial environment.

The group was also encouraged to work with vendors, notably the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), to implement solutions providing a framework for ongoing processing efficiency and data integrity. The result was the launch, in November 2006, of DTCC’s Trade Information Warehouse. In parallel, the Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems has been investigating developments in the OTC derivatives space more generally, updating work carried out in 1998 to map the landscape and identify risk issues. The Committee published a report in March 2007. The report recognises that the clearing and settlement infrastructure has been strengthened significantly in recent years, noting, in particular, the progress in automating and centralising key posttrade functions. But the report also highlights that there is more to be done. For instance, while processing backlogs in credit derivatives have been reduced substantially, they remain sizeable in other product lines. Recognising that the group convened by the FRBNY has been effective in resolving co-ordination problems, the report argues that momentum from the credit initiative should be carried across to other products. An initiative is already under way in this regard, with the FRBNY group having been expanded to 17 firms and a broader range of products. Firms are working towards targets for backlog reduction. Automation is a key element of this initiative, although it is recognised that there needs to be interoperability between core vendor services if the benefits are to be realised.
2 See Michael Barr et al., “Behaviorally Informed Regulation,” in Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy (E. Shafir,  ed.) 440–64 (2012). 3 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, “The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards,”  106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 57 (1992) (arguing that the choice of a rule or a standard depends on where the “legal directive . . . fall on the continuum of discretion”—that is, how much do we trust the decisionmaker?). 4 Ben Heineman, The Inside Counsel Revolution 7 (2016). 5 See generally Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social  Psychology (1991), 28 (“ocial pressures and other situational factors exert effects on behavior that are more potent than we generally realise . . . . [T]o understand the impact of a given social situation, we often need to attend to its subtle details.”). 6 Sue Jaffer, Nicholas Morris and David Vines, “Why Trustworthiness is Important,” in Capital Failure: Rebuilding  Trust in Financial Services (Morris and Vines, eds. ), 15–16 (2014) (“Trustworthiness requires conscious choices to be made rather than merely being the outcome of a reliable process.”). 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

At the same time, the rate of the ruble remains floating, and continues to be influenced by market factors. However the impact of operations conducted on the nominal exchange rate is very limited, as the volume of monthly currency purchases will not exceed the volume of additional monthly budget oil and gas revenue from the excess of the actual oil price levels that are budgeted. I would also like to point out that the short-term inflation risks associated with the Ministry of Finance starting to make foreign currency purchases, evaluated by the Bank of Russia in its decision-making processes at the start of the year, have not been realised. Clarity is extremely important for monetary policy, not only in relation to the budget, but also to changes in the tax system. Now both a tax manoeuvre and other taxation innovations are under discussion. And in our view during such discussions it is very important to take into consideration the possible impact on inflation and inflationary effects, and to make informed decisions on this basis. We hope that this will also be carried out by the Ministry of Finance and the government, in collaboration with the Central Bank. We also are in support of the project – long under discussion – for the issuing of OFZ securities to the population.
That reflects the strong dynamism of exports, driven in recent months by the improvement in Spanish competitiveness and the buoyancy of the euro area markets; but it is also indicative of the weakness of domestic expenditure, giving rise to the contractionary behaviour of imports. As a consequence of these developments, Spain will show a net lending position against the rest of the world of around 2% of GDP, an unprecedented and record figure in recent decades. Over the past months, inflation, proxied by the CPI, has been declining notably, essentially as a result of the tapering off of the effects of the VAT increase over more than a year back. Thus, in October, the CPI fell by 0.1%. Foreseeably, however, positive though moderate rates of change will resume in the coming months, therefore proving compatible with the necessary continuation of the ongoing improvement in competitiveness our economy requires. For 2014, a central scenario has been outlined in which the factors that have been affecting domestic demand progressively slacken. It is projected that the processes of adjustment in the economy, and most particularly the redressing of private-sector debt and the ongoing fiscal consolidation, will continue to influence the pace of recovery of demand and activity; but, at the same time, the reduction in uncertainty and the culmination of the restructuring of credit institutions, along with their improved results, will lay the foundations for improving financial conditions for the resident sectors.

M. Trichet presents the monetary policy guidelines of the Bank of France for 1997 BANK OF FRANCE, PRESS RELEASE, 17/12/96. 1. The ultimate goal of monetary policy is to ensure price stability, as required by legislation. The objective of the Monetary Policy Council is that the increase in prices, as measured by the consumer price index, should not exceed 2% in 1997, as in the medium term. 2. To meet this ultimate goal, the Banque de France uses two intermediate objectives, one of which is external and the other internal: -  The objective of a stable external value of the currency: as it has been for ten years, the stability of the franc will be maintained against the group of the most credible currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. -  An intermediate internal growth target for the money supply as assessed by the development of the narrow and broad monetary aggregates: in 1997, the money supply should be able to show a medium-term growth trend of 5%. This figure is consistent with price inflation of no more than 2% and non-inflationary real GDP growth of about 2.5%, which could be exceeded, in view of the potential for growth to catch up in the medium term. The Monetary Policy Council has decided to simultaneously monitor the main narrow and broad money aggregates in order to obtain a concise estimate of all monetary developments. 3. Total domestic debt is an important indicator.
MAS views seriously the responsibility of banks to safeguard the integrity and security of customer information held by the bank and its service providers. To enhance the protection of critical customer information, outsourcing arrangements involving certain customer information will be subject to a higher standard of care. •  Third, a greater focus on FIs’ outsourcing risk management framework. FIs were previously expected to pre-notify MAS of any material outsourcing arrangements, and MAS would impose prudential requirements on the FI, where necessary. With the growing prevalence and complexity of outsourcing arrangements, such a caseby-case approach has become less tenable. Instead, MAS will continue to assess and monitor the robustness of FIs’ outsourcing risk management frameworks while FIs will continue to be responsible for ensuring the safety of all of their outsourcing  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  arrangements. The revised Guidelines will no longer require FIs to pre-notify MAS of any outsourcing arrangements. 24. The Guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive. MAS recognises that the diverse range of outsourcing arrangements and rapid pace of progress in digital technology preclude a prescriptive approach to risk management practices for outsourcing or a one-size-fits-all set of rules. MAS will adopt a risk-based approach in implementing the guidelines. Conclusion 25. Let me conclude. 26. A tougher macrcoeconomic environment and growing complexity of operational and technology risks will place greater demand on banks’ risk management and compliance systems.

This implies that we will continue to exert downward pressure on the yield curve by keeping our stock of asset holdings at a high level for a prolonged period of time, and we could specify it in our communication. 2/ Perhaps the most unconventional policy tool is the use of negative interest rates. Negative interest rates have their limitations; I have already stressed them in the past.vii And at our Governing Council’s meeting in Tallinn last June, we clarified these limitations in our forward guidance stating that we do not intend to lower our deposit facility rate below its current level of -0.40%. But slightly negative interest rates have their virtues. First, by removing the zero lower bound constraint on expectations of future short-term interest rates, they contribute to easing financial conditions by lowering rates along the curve, with a positive impact on the demand for credit by firms. Second, the negative deposit facility rate (DFR) positively interacts with asset purchases. Indeed, the portfolio rebalancing effect of QE is reinforced by the negative DFR, as banks with excess liquidity holdings have a stronger incentive to put their reserves to work. And, so far, we have not seen significantly detrimental effects of negative rates on the profitability of banks, notably thanks to the favourable fact that the slope of the yield curve has remained positive. 3/ Our forward guidance provides further indications as to the future path of our monetary policy; and by steering expectations, it has an impact on the yield curve.
In the context of investment policy, climate risks are not fundamentally different from other financial risks – they too can trigger or amplify market fluctuations, which influence the attractiveness of certain assets. By opting for broad coverage of entire markets, the SNB takes into account the complexity of the many different risks. We regularly review changes in the risk landscape and factor them into our investment policy where necessary. Furthermore, as an investor the SNB has long had in place a clear set of exclusion criteria for companies that violate Switzerland’s fundamental norms and values. For instance, it does not invest in companies that systematically cause  1  Relevant documents are available on the SNB website: www.snb.ch/en/ifor/finmkt/fnmkt_benchm/id/finmkt_reformrates  Page 3/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  severe environmental damage. Given the monetary policy requirements of our mandate, we are convinced that the approach we have chosen is appropriate. Foundation of the BIS Innovation Hub  In October, the SNB announced that it was collaborating with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to establish the BIS Innovation Hub Centre in Switzerland. This Hub Centre, which is scheduled to commence operations at the beginning of 2020 alongside the Hub Centres in Hong Kong and Singapore, will initially focus on two projects. The first will examine the integration of central bank money into a distributed ledger technology infrastructure, with a view to facilitating the settlement of tokenised assets between financial institutions.

Hamad Al-Sayari: Recent economic and financial developments in Saudi Arabia Speech by His Excellency Hamad Al-Sayari, Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques on the occasion of presenting the 44th Annual Report of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Riyadh, 11 October 2008. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure for me to present to you the 44th Annual Report of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency which reviews the latest economic and financial developments in the Kingdom. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, During 2007, the national economy continued its strong growth for the fifth consecutive year, with real GDP increasing by 3.4 percent. The roles of the private and the government sectors in the development process were enhanced, recording growth rates of 5.8 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. The State budget witnessed remarkable improvement in 2007, resulting in a surplus for the fifth consecutive year amounting to 12.3 percent of GDP. The balance of payments registered a surplus for the ninth consecutive year which stood at 24.9 percent of GDP. The monetary and banking sector also contributed effectively to the economy by providing adequate liquidity to finance growing and accelerated activities. Financial institutions played a significant role in the growth of the economy by providing various modern financial services. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, With the establishment of the Supreme Economic Council (SEC) under your wise leadership, the Saudi economy has witnessed a dramatic transformation.
Nominal 3-month interest rate and inflation in Sweden and abroad 2(a ) Nominal interes t ra te  2(b) Inflation  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  Note. Fi gure 2(a), per cent. The nominal interest ra te refers to three-month treasury bills except i n the euro area, where it refers to EONIA. Figure 2(b), annual percentage change. Inflation refers to the CPIF for Sweden, the HICP for the euro area a nd the CPI for the remaining countries. Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Euribor, Eurostat, Ja panese Statistics Bureau, Macrobond, OECD, Offi ce for Na tional Statistics, Statistics Sweden and Statistics Ca nada  Global real interest rates have been falling for a long time Monetary policy in many countries has therefore been characterised by close -tozero policy rates ever since the onset of the financial crisis. All the major central banks, along with several small ones, have also large volumes of purchased  5 [23]  government bonds and taken other measures to push down interest rates even further.

We have a negative policy rate and have carried out extensive purchases of government bonds to hold longer-term interest rates down as well. Maintaining confidence in the inflation target is the main task of monetary policy. A challenge for monetary policy in recent years has been to push up the excessively sluggish inflation rate, which is one explanation for the expansionary policy. By doing so, we can correspond with the expectations of all the participants in the Swedish economy who base their calculations on the fact that we are aiming for a fixed target. The inflation target has been a cornerstone of the Swedish economy for twenty years, it is well known and established and helps to boost confidence in the Swedish economy. The Riksbank’s forecasts indicate that monetary policy will continue to be expansionary with low interest rates in the period ahead in order to stabilise inflation around the target. But this could also bring new challenges with it. Continued low interest rates could lead to the policy rate hitting its lower bound more often, thereby making it more difficult to stimulate the economy when economic activity weakens and inflation is below target. In such a case, it could be necessary to implement other measures, both from the Riksbank and from other policy areas. 1 For a discussion of the concepts of target range and tolerance band, see Sveriges Riksbank (2016).
We discuss in turn how each might potentially be affected by the degree of market power in product markets and higher mark-ups. (i)  Phillips curve  In the New Keynesian model, firms operate in imperfectly competitive product markets defined by monopolistic competition (Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)), with nominal rigidities (Calvo (1983)). As first described by Chamberlin (1933), and formalised by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), monopolistic competition is an environment in which a large number of firms each face a downward-sloping demand curve for their respective differentiated product. This typically takes the functional form:  11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  𝑌 𝑑 (𝑖) = (  𝑃𝑡 (𝑖) ) 𝑃𝑡  −𝜖  𝑌𝑡  (3)  𝑌 𝑑 (𝑖) is the demand for good 𝑖, whose price is 𝑃𝑡 (𝑖). 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 are the overall price level and aggregate demand at time 𝑡, respectively, while 𝜖 is the elasticity of substitution between the monopolistically competitive products. Individual firms are assumed to be small enough that a price change by one firm has a negligible effect on the demand faced by other firms. By implication, there is no strategic interaction between firms. Firms can set prices above marginal costs because of a finite elasticity of substitution between individual goods in consumer preferences, regardless of the fact that their share of the total market is small. There are clear limitations of this product market formulation when addressing issues of market power.

31  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  31  Table 2: Regressions of investment, R&D and productivity on UK-listed firms’ mark-ups Investment rate  Innovation rate  Log TFP  Log labour productivity  0.095*** (0.027)  0.023*** (0.009)  0.097*** (0.026)  -0.036 (0.045)  -0.041** (0.017)  -0.018** (0.008)  0.162*** (0.014)  0.041 (0.034)  -0.002 (0.006)  -0.000 (0.002)  -0.054*** (0.005)  -0.022** (0.013)  -0.011 (0.012)  -0.007** (0.003)  0.005 (0.006)  0.019 (0.013)  0.018 (0.012)  0.009*** (0.003)  -0.010** (0.004)  -0.018 (0.014)  Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  N  21874  7386  28371  21268  0.058  0.057  0.305  0.054  Log mark-up Log mark-up squared TFP distance Log mark-up * TFP distance (interaction term) Log mark-up squared * TFP distance (interaction term)  R  2  Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bank calculations. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 In regressions associated with columns 1 and 2, lagged Tobin’s Q and the lagged sales-to-assets ratio were included as controls. In regressions associated with columns 3 and 4, the terms involving TFP distance are lagged by one year. ‘Investment rate’ defined as capital expenditure as a proportion of the previous year’s net property, plant and equipment level (PPE).