samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We cannot achieve and maintain financial stability on our own. Above all, it requires recognition of the public interest in financial stability. Thirteen years ago, at the annual banquet for the Bankers and Merchants of the City, in June 1997, just over a month after the Election of that year, commenting on the new regulatory arrangements, the then Governor of the Bank, Eddie George, said that the direction of financial services regulation was driven in part “by a rising tide of public expectations in terms of both the prudential and the behavioural standards required of financial intermediaries”. Eddie George was undoubtedly correct that the public will and should expect more in terms of the standard of business of firms. But history now tells us – painfully – that on the way to higher standards there was a terrible lapse in which too many people in our industry forgot that preserving financial stability is the duty that we all owe to the public. The fact of the matter is that the public has every right to expect us to act in their interest. This means that we cannot have attitudes which put short-term gain first on the basis that the stability of the financial system can be tomorrow’s objective, for the next person. But in order to achieve this, we need to be very clear on the benefits of financial stability. One of the questions I get asked most frequently is how we will ensure that the lessons of the crisis stick.

Dimitar Bogov: Addressing structural rigidities in view of monetary policy transmission effectiveness Address by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the 4th Research Conference “Addressing structural rigidities in view of monetary policy transmission effectiveness”, Skopje, 23 April 2015. *  *  *  Dear Governors, Your Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear guests, It is my pleasure to welcome you all, on our fourth Research Conference, entitled Addressing Structural Rigidities in View of Monetary Policy Transmission Effectiveness. Just like the previous years, we hope that the topic of this conference is both interesting and challenging to provide an interactive framework for discussion and research-based policy advices for the central bankers. Structural rigidities, indeed, are related to a wide range of economic segments. Therefore, today we will try to tackle different economic issues, enlightening their importance for the monetary policy transmission effectiveness. Transition economies have undergone many structural changes in the ongoing reshaping of the economies, which to some extent have influenced the monetary policy decision making or monetary policy transmission channels. Globalization is yet another factor that tends to produce changes in the economic structure and at the same time, affects the markets functioning or economic agents’ behavior.
That requires striking a suitable balance between measures to minimise the probability of the bankruptcy of systemic institutions – by imposing supplementary capital buffers – and, in the case of more complex institutions, the design of contingency action plans which ensure orderly resolution if a state of non-viability is reached. This is, in essence, the content of the work undertaken recently by the Financial Stability Board. In any event, the essential ingredient of orderly bank resolution schemes is the specification of a bail-in arrangement establishing a clear order of priority for the claims of shareholders and the various types of creditors that can be activated before insolvency proceedings are commenced and before any State aid is made available. The credibility of this framework will favour the appropriate perception of the risk effectively entailed by each liability instrument and will minimise the bill to be borne by taxpayers to prevent the disorderly winding-up of banks. In the European arena, we have progressed greatly in the definition of a regulatory framework for the resolution of non-viable banks. There is already political agreement on a proposed Recovery and Resolution Directive which will establish a clear burden-sharing system for insolvent banks and thus minimise the possible cost of rescue for taxpayers. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  This Directive is also a first step in the creation of a single resolution mechanism to supplement the nascent single supervisory mechanism which will enable a real banking union to be set up in Europe.

Accordingly, our financial system will be significantly strengthened by the setting up of an effective banking union with all the important components, including the single resolution mechanism. Once again, it is clear that defence of the national interest requires unreserved support for initiatives that tend to deepen and speed up the process of European integration. Thank you very much for your attention. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1985 volume 100, number 4; and Walsh C.E.,1995,‘Optimal contracts for central bankers’, American Economic Review, volume 85, number 1. 8  BIS Review 46/2006  analyses of the economic outlook that, notwithstanding the absence of news, we have subsequently deliberately junked – and so abandoned as an input to our policy judgments – when it suited us in order to secure a ‘better’ path for output. For example, I have mentioned how in late 2003/early 2004, some MPC members explained that, if the economy continued to recover, we expected to vote for a gradual withdrawal of monetary accommodation. If the economy had been knocked off course, speaking for myself I would not have had any difficulty in referring back to my earlier statements and explaining how things had changed. It would have been the obvious thing to do. That would not have involved breaking a promise; and I do not think it would have been misunderstood. Perhaps more important than that, the model world in the stabilisation-bias story seems to be better than reality in one key respect, and therefore to miss something rather central to the policy maker’s job. In the face of a major cost (or supply) shock, the big question is whether, as well as a temporary upward impetus to inflation, there will be ‘second-round’ effects via wage earners trying to recover lost purchasing power.

Mr President, no company can sustainably grow if it does not provide mechanisms by which employees can influence their working lives. Labour is more than a commodity. Unlike non-living factors of production, such as, machinery and raw materials, the work of human beings raises questions about the impact of work and work relations. As you review your collective agreement frameworks, I wish to remind you that there are a lot of common interests and important interdependencies between employers and employees despite the apparent conflicting interests. For instance firms need workers and workers need jobs. Ladies and gentlemen, there can be no true bargaining without prudent and effective leadership on either side of the table. This kind of leadership is required for us to achieve our collective objectives. We are desirous of seeing a Union leadership, which is well-informed and constantly upgrading their leadership skills for the attainment of organisational goals and workers welfare. In conclusion, I wish to once again implore you to actively participate and take a keen interest in the deliberations of this Forum. It is my expectation that you will have an opportunity to carry out an appraisal of your individual and collective skills and how they impact upon the job market and workers welfare in the financial sector. With these remarks, Ladies and Gentleman, I declare this Forum officially open. I Thank You  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Incentives on the liability side of banks’ balance sheet Having discussed how a bank can operate on the asset side of its balance sheet to improve LCR compliance, I now turn to the liability side of its balance sheet. A bank that faces the possibility of a LCR shortfall has the incentive to (i) decrease its reliance on short-term unsecured funding, (ii) decrease the 30 days net cash outflow, and (iii) to replace it by longer-term funding or, if this is too difficult or too expensive, by secured funding. Since outflow rates are zero for secured funding obtained from the central bank, but higher for secured funding obtained from other sources, the bank is more likely to borrow from the central bank by pledging non-HQLA assets, either in tender operations or in the marginal lending facility.14 As a result, this lessens the need of banks to seek funds in the short-term interbank market to ensure that the LCR requirement is met.15 A reduction in the reliance on short-term unsecured funding is an intended consequence of the LCR. However, the implementation of the LCR might then lead to an overall decline in unsecured money market activity, which could be problematic for the euro area. Money markets play a central role for monetary policy transmission in the euro area. This is because the euro area financial system is largely bank-based, and interbank money market interest rates represent the marginal cost of funding bank loans.

Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Innovative risk management - GO BOLA! (Go Beyond, Go Original, Go agiLe, Go Ahead) Opening speech by Ms Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Malaysian Association of Risk and Insurance Management (MARIM) Conference 2018, Kuala Lumpur, 17 July 2018. * * * It is my great pleasure to be here today at the MARIM Conference 2018. With well-documented lessons on the links between corporate management and sport, and the 2018 FIFA World Cup final just behind us, the “GO-BOLA” theme must have been much too tempting to resist! As displayed on the football pitch, the quest to anticipate, defend and overcome continues to challenge risk and insurance management practitioners as we grapple with profound changes in the operating environment. The Allianz Risk Barometer for 2018 revealed that today’s risk management world is more fluid than it has ever been. The impact of many of the top risks identified is also more interlinked. Not surprisingly, business interruption and cyber incidents are the top threats for corporations of all sizes and sectors. Risk scenarios have also expanded – going beyond traditional risk exposures such as natural catastrophes and fires, to new risks associated with technological and social change. There is no question that risk and insurance managers today face significant uncertainty.
This is faster than we expected at the outset, perhaps because the auctions have acted to boost secondary market liquidity by more than we had allowed for. So far our approach to setting reserve spreads has also successfully driven the Bank’s holdings towards our ‘sector key’ (Chart 9), and I am confident it will continue to enable us to make our purchases in a neutral manner across economic sectors. So while our purchase pace will continue to depend on the nature of the offers we receive, and portfolio matching constraints are likely to become more binding as we near the purchase target, it seems probable that the Bank will be able to complete the purchase programme faster than we thought possible to begin with. Conclusion  In concluding, I hope my remarks have helped demonstrate that a detailed understanding of market structure is a core part of effective central banking. From the experience of 2016 I’d draw two specific lessons. First, so long as central banks design their operations carefully, drawing on study of the relevant market structures, they retain the capability to broaden the range of policy tools at their disposal. The early success of the corporate bond scheme – both in effectively purchasing the bonds and in terms of initial evidence about the transmission to wider economy of those purchases – underscores the continued scope for central banks to innovate when circumstances dictate that need.

In this regard, I  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  believe that our Flexible Inflation Targeting framework will continue to serve us well. This conclusion is based not solely on Thailand’s favorable experience with the framework, but also echoes the experiences of many other central banks around the world. Supplementing this framework with macroprudential measures should help to further strengthen our ability to deliver long-term economic and financial stability. While the current monetary framework gives priority to inflation, the BOT gives a balanced consideration to economic growth and financial stability as well. In the face of severe disruption to economic activity from the floods, elevated risks and uncertainties from the global economy, and moderating inflationary pressure, monetary policy has recently shifted toward addressing risks to economic growth. This is reflected in the two consecutive reductions in the policy rate in the last two meetings before yesterday. These actions have helped to shore up confidence and accelerate the return of economic activity to normal levels. At this juncture, upside risks to inflation have begun to increase. Externally, geopolitical problems in the Middle East have pushed global oil prices up strongly. Domestically, postflood pickup in public and private spending is adding to demand pressure. In addition, various government measures, including the reduction in the oil subsidy and a hike in the minimum wage, may also boost prices in the short term. As I understand, the minimum wage increase is one of the chief concerns for many of you here.
In the situation where some forecasts have been extremely pessimistic, one might expect markets to adjust correspondingly in an abrupt fashion. In the event, in the foreign exchange markets the dollar overall has remained rather steady; and the short-term interest rate futures curve implies that rates are expected to bottom out later this year and then begin to rise. Moreover, while the stock market has fallen back over the past year from what many felt were unrealistic levels, and has been volatile again in recent days, the downturn in the mainstream market has so far been relatively limited, with the greatest fall concentrated in more speculative stocks. Equity valuations are always uncertain at times of adjustment, and we could see some continued volatility in that area, but the overall picture is that the markets as a whole are "looking through" the present slowdown, on the basis that they see a reasonable prospect for a recovery in US growth after the present adjustment. A second area of uncertainty lies much closer to home, and happily its ramifications are almost wholly beneficent. This is the question of whether changes in the supply-side of the UK economy mean that we can hope to achieve higher rates of sustainable growth, consistently with our inflation target, than has been possible in the past. One essentially empirical argument that is sometimes made to suggest that we can achieve faster sustainable growth is that inflation has in fact run a little below our target for most of the past two years.

But in relation to prospects for the economy, that is even more than usually the case now, given the uncertainties we face. Looking ahead, we can in a sense see two rather different pictures, one superimposed on the other. One is the domestic economy, where demand remains reasonably well sustained and now, as I have indicated, better balanced than it was; employment remains high; and consumer and business confidence both seem reasonably upbeat. The other picture is the international environment, where the US slowdown is likely to have a dampening effect, but how quickly, and on what scale, and for how long, remains uncertain. Since the UK is not, except literally, an island, these two pictures do not mesh. But it is not easy to see how they will coalesce into a single image. The operation of monetary policy is often said to be more of an art than a precise science. But none of us can claim to be a Michelangelo. So let me take you briefly through three particular areas of uncertainty we face, in the hope that, when we get to the discussion session, you will be able to add definition and colour to my half-formed sketches. First, the slowdown in the US is an important area of uncertainty because, if the downside risk of a deeper or more prolonged slowdown materialises, we would face slower growth and lower inflation in the UK than we are projecting on our central projection.
Pillar 2 requires supervisors to carry out their obligations in a transparent and accountable manner, for example making publicly available the criteria they use in the review of banks’ internal capital assessments, and explaining to banks why any remedial actions are considered necessary. So we see transparency as an effective tool and reality check for ourselves too. The three pillars together can thus be seen as a series of checks and balances that seek to promote reasonable and realistic approaches to risk management and to capital management in banking organisations. The efforts that banks take to identify and assess their risks rigorously, and to evaluate and implement measures necessary to protect themselves effectively, represent not just good steps toward maintaining capital adequacy, but also important steps toward improved corporate governance on a broader scale. 3. Basel II will become an effective standard at the macro level  I believe that Basel II will likewise serve as an effective standard at the macro level, which is the second topic I’d like to address today. Supervisors and central bankers are increasingly interested in standards that will strengthen the stability of the banking system and of the financial system more broadly. Indeed, just across the street from us here at Grocers’ Hall, the Bank of England is an example of a central bank that is explicitly charged with promoting financial stability. Another example would be my own institution, Banco de España. In my mind, three factors will drive Basel II’s success as a public policy standard.

Naturally, the Bank uses data supplied by other agencies as well. It also acquires information through other channels, such as both informal and formal meetings. For this reason it is simply wrong to claim that the Bank's resistance to easing its monetary stance is based on outdated information. BIS Review 27/2001  3  The Central Bank has declared that it will maintain tight money until unequivocal signs of a cooling in the economy begin to appear. Such indications have been emerging recently. For example, total business turnover has decreased. Retail turnover has contracted sharply and there has also been a decrease on the wholesale side. Turnover in manufacturing appears to be stable. However, turnover is still rising rapidly in the construction industry and at a considerable rate in the service sector as well. Although credit growth is still quite substantial, it has slowed down. In the Central Bank's opinion, the economy has now passed the most difficult phase of overheating and the time is ripe to ease the monetary stance somewhat, among other things to avoid a hard landing. The Board of Governors therefore decided today to reduce the rate of interest on its repurchase agreements with credit institutions by 0.5 percentage points. This change has been made in light of next year's lower inflation scenario alongside the slowdown in economic activity. Inflation prospects are within the reference limits stated in the joint declaration on inflation target issued today by the Government and Central Bank.
But based on the rapid pace of developments since we published our May forecasts and the shift in the balance of risks I can envisage those conditions for considering tightening being met somewhat sooner than I had previously expected. That reflects my current assessment that on balance I put more weight on my inflationary than my disinflationary scenario. But there should no presumption that the recent strength in demand and inflation will be sustained, and while I do currently put less weight on my disinflationary scenario, it is too early to rule it out. Along with the rest of the MPC I will continue to watch the data and newsflow closely. As and when conditions for considering tightening are met there is also the question of how we might tighten policy. The monetary policy toolbox has come a long way since the days when it contained a single tool, the  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  13  Bank Rate.6 As the terrain has got more complicated to navigate, the tools have become broader in range and more complex, including Bank Rate, forward guidance and asset purchases. Indeed as things stand we have an asset purchase programme in progress which is not due to complete until the end of the year.

Macedonia will have to save more What are your expectations for the Macedonian economy in 2013, which is expected to be perhaps more difficult and more turbulent than this year? What, according to you, will be the biggest economic challenges and problems next year? It will be another year full of uncertainty for the world and especially for the European economy. Thus, the export demand for Macedonian products is unlikely to improve. So, we cannot expect that to boost economic growth. However, our expectation for the economic growth in Macedonia is to be much better than this year, driven by diversification of the production into new export-oriented facilities that started to work this year, or will start to work in the next year, as well as infrastructural facilities for which funding has already been secured from foreign sources. Both politicians and economists globally are of a divided opinion in terms of the economic policy that should be conducted in order to emerge from the crisis. Some advocate austerity, others encourage spending to stimulate growth. Which policy you prefer and think is right for Macedonia? According to me, those are “false” discussions. If a country has a room for increased spending, certainly now is the time to stimulate the economy. But unfortunately, there are not many such countries worldwide. Developed economies were spending more than they could afford for years, and now they do not have any room for fiscal stimulus left.