samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
While surveys do not suggest that access to finance is the private sector’s main concern, this is probably due to the fact that firms have been able to finance projects through their own funds. Over the last decade, companies shifted to intragroup loans and intercompany lending instead of bank loans as a main source of financing. One, of course, needs to distinguish between intragroup loans (parent to subsidiaries or subsidiaries to other subsidiaries) which we think make up the bulk of “intercompany” lending and other intercompany lending undertaken through factoring, trade credit and loan funds. Also bear in mind that the Financial Institutions Act related companies (within a group) do not need a licence to lend to each other. To give loans outside the group (intercompany) one does need a licence. While it is beneficial to see a diversification of firms’ financing sources, this change raises some issues. Let us start with something we discussed last year. We need to be careful that in the current low interest environment, investors’ search for yield does not stimulate excessive risk-taking. Therefore, we need to complement the rise in corporate bond issuance with a significant effort in improving investors’ education and compel corporates  Page 7 of 10  borrowing from the domestic capital market to provide more information to investors about their creditworthiness.

(Article 112) "The Exchange Fund of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be managed and controlled by the government of the Region, primarily for regulating the value of the Hong Kong dollar." (Article 113) "The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall follow the principle of keeping the expenditure within the limits of revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve a fiscal balance, avoid deficits and keep the budget commensurate with the growth rate of its gross domestic product." (Article 107) These stipulations confirm the continuance of the Hong Kong dollar as an independent currency; they confirm that the Exchange Fund is available to regulate the exchange rate; they rule out the use of exchange controls; and they provide some comfort that deficit fiscal financing should not attain a scale that would pose a serious threat to monetary stability. Choice of regime But within these parameters the exact monetary arrangements are not prescribed. We have chosen to operate a currency board with a fixed rate against the US dollar. I have recently written and spoken at  2  BIS Review 31/2002  2  some length on the rationale behind this choice and do not intend to repeat all of that today. But let me just reiterate one of my principal contentions – namely that monetary policy, which includes exchange rate policy, cannot determine an economy's competitiveness outside the relatively short term.
Throughout the 1990s, the objective of monetary policy was to stabilise the krone and thereby make a contribution to low inflation. The central government budget was to smooth fluctuations in output and employment. This became increasingly demanding as favourable economic developments and oil revenues generated government surpluses. Both the interest rate and the government budget had then, in periods, the effect of amplifying, not dampening, cyclical developments. This resulted in fluctuations in the krone exchange rate. 31 Norges Bank was forced to recognise that it could not fine tune the exchange rate from day to day or month to month. Nor would the Bank knowingly contribute to fuelling inflation or deflationary downturns. Interest rate policy was then instead geared to keeping inflation in line with euro area countries. As from 1999, the Bank’s policy was in practice oriented towards an inflation rate of around 2 per cent. 32 Keeping inflation low and stable is the best contribution monetary policy can make to economic stability and a stable krone exchange rate. A formal inflation target – with a target of 2.5 per cent – was introduced in Norway in March 2001. The new monetary policy framework was introduced at the same time as the government drew up new fiscal policy guidelines that provided for a gradual, albeit sustainable, phasing in of oil revenues into the Norwegian economy.

Traditional nine-to-five jobs are becoming less common, and people are increasingly employed in less traditional work arrangements. Measuring the creation and destruction of these new jobs is of utmost importance to gain a better assessment of the health of the labor market. We also need to understand how this evolution is affecting job security and earnings stability. While these jobs might provide workers with more flexibility, they might also come with increased income volatility and financial vulnerability. In today’s gathering, we will discuss the measurement challenges we face to better understand this growing segment of the labor market, and we will facilitate a dialogue aimed at developing a workforce aligned with the evolving nature of work. The Fed’s efforts to understand labor markets include analyzing the comprehensive data that exist now. But, in an ever-changing workplace, it is critical that we hear from external stakeholders to understand their views on these changes and to ensure we incorporate them in our assessments. This is an important part of our discussion. As technological changes persist, it is inevitable that the nature of our jobs will continue to evolve. We may not readily recall the days when there was little job flexibility and we did not have today’s technology to assist us in our work. While technological transformation allows for further growth in productivity and innovation, we must also think through how these changes affect the workforce overall. We must realign our workforce development strategies with these changes.
As Martin Wolf, a well known Financial Times journalist said “The financial services industry is famous for privatizing its gains and socializing its losses in that it expects the society at large to rescue them through public funds”. 1.4 The third component is Compliance, which relates to laws and regulations, internal policies and procedures. Literally, Compliance means obedience or dutifulness, but it has broad scope and various interpretations. Compliance generally covers matters such as observance, application of standards of market conduct and managing conflicts of interests. More recently, Compliance has expanded its scope to cover specific areas such as operations of money laundering and terrorist financing and even tax laws that are relevant to financial services. In brief, the Compliance function should protect the institution against unlawful behaviour and strengthen its ethical consciousness. A Board of Directors of any financial institution should approve and oversee the institution’s strategic objectives and set a compliance culture. Similarly, the Board should ensure that the financial institution has adequate policies and procedures that enable oversight activities to be carried out on all business lines. Given their fiduciary responsibilities, financial institutions, in particular, should comply with applicable laws and regulations in the jurisdiction in which they operate. 1.5 The word “Compliance” has also a connotation of regulatory and supervisory structures, which means that there is an external regulatory or supervisory body to ensure that financial institutions adhere to norms, guidelines and rules set by it.

5.1.2 If one financial institution experiences problems today, given the interrelated transactions, it could lead to a systemic issue which will result in the entire system suffering. Therefore, it is equally important to use peer pressure to get weak or prodigal institutions to comply with regulatory instructions and directives. So, it is everybody’s responsibility to ensure that outliers are brought on to the desired path. 5.1.3 Clearly, training and consulting remain very important, especially to change the mindset to a more committed one. All stakeholders need to understand why GRC should be  BIS Review 15/2008  5  implemented as a package and the benefits attached to it, from the point of view of the institution as well as its clients. 5.2  Leveraging on technology  5.2.1 Technology is a critical factor, which facilitates efficiency and effectiveness in the GRC processes. A real time risk, compliance and monitoring environment enables financial institutions to ensure that risks are being managed and disruptive events are being acted upon. Therefore, technology integration across the financial institution would enable institutions to gain more timely and reliable regulatory compliance, more efficient use of IT systems, and lower cost on development and maintenance of software applications. Many organizations that apply GRC best practices have understood that service-oriented architecture (SOA) is more appropriate, as it would promote GRC integration while securing the highest value that IT can offer.
Next Steps  I started this talk by noting that we may be in the midst of a leap forwards in payments. This is good news. Innovation – including the innovation some of you in this room are pushing forward as part of the New Payments Architecture project, and the work that the Bank of England is pursuing on RTGS renewal promises to deliver easier, faster, cheaper, and more stable payments. But to ensure that this period of innovation does not end in a leap backwards we need to be sure that regulation keeps pace. Regulation needs to facilitate innovation by avoiding picking winners or losers. Instead we should focus on delivering same risk, same regulation. The protections regulation delivers for your payments should not depend on whether you are paying by cash, card, interbank, or stablecoin. Fortunately, here in the UK we have an opportunity to ensure that regulation remains fit for purpose through this period of change. HM Treasury is currently leading a welcome review of the payments landscape. And there is related work underway in the cross-authority Cryptoassets Task Force that was launched by 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  HM Treasury in 2018, bringing together Bank, FCA and Treasury thinking. The Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee is supporting this work by providing insight into the financial stability implications of innovation in payments – in December, for the first time ever, its semi-annual Financial Stability Report included a chapter on payments.

In other words: if you’re used for payments you should be regulated to the same standard as other entities conducting payments activities. It doesn’t matter what technology you are using. Same risk, same regulation. Nothing new under the sun  The second challenge for regulators is that stablecoins differ from existing payments systems in one fundamental way: Regulation of existing payment chains largely focuses on the resilience of arrangements to transfer money – how money gets from point A to point B. However, the reliability of those chains also crucially depends on the stability of the money they transfer. Existing payment systems transfer money that has been created by other entities — central banks or commercial banks. Stablecoins propose to create the digital tokens or ‘coins’ they transfer. Existing payment systems effectively outsource this issue - they only transfer money that is subject to separate protections and regulations to help maintain stability and confidence. The value of central bank money, which gives holders a claim on the state, is protected by the Bank of England’s monetary stability mandate and inflation targeting regime, while the value of commercial bank money is protected by legal rights that ensure holders can redeem this money one-for-one in the currency they deposited. Robust prudential regulation and deposit insurance in turn ensure that commercial banks can make good on this in all but rare circumstances. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  These protections are important as they underpin confidence in the system.
Faster clearing, especially with a balance check at initiation and immediate posting or credit at the receiving end could reduce the amount of credit involved in managing commerce or a payments business, credit that arises today from returned checks, for example. Customers that are relying more on their balances and less on float or credit may borrow less but may need to be more liquid. The possibility that future payments might rely somewhat less on a firm’s economic capital and its liquidity could also contribute to efficiency. Along with enabling innovation, technology drives new risk. Reports of denial of service attacks and data breaches have raised data security concerns across the payments industry. Concern is growing about the potential to corporate and or other bank account takeovers. Any of these disruptions has the potential for undermining confidence in the payments system, particularly given that it is difficult for end-users to assess the security of payment services. Security and resiliency have always been paramount concerns across the payments system. The impact of a significant outage or fraud on the public’s confidence may adversely impact increasingly electronic or “digital” commerce. New ways of making payments and the entry of non-traditional payments system participants create change that presents new risks and challenges to assess. The sophistication of some recent frauds introduces the potential for material risk.

They have clearly demonstrated their will to take action when necessary. But governments are also intervening to bolster banks’ solvency and soundness. In this context and in order to ensure that national measures for dealing with the crisis are consistent, the international community is taking a collective stand. The G7 plan of action is a major step forward. It sets out clear principles to be applied by the whole international community – in particular the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee – with a view to giving structure to national actions. It expounds the following principles: •  taking decisive action to prevent the failure of financial institutions;  •  taking all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money markets;  •  ensuring that banks and other major financial intermediaries can raise capital as needed;  •  ensuring that national deposit insurance and guarantee programmes are robust;  •  ensuring accurate valuation and transparent disclosure of assets, as well as consistent implementation of high quality accounting standards. Thanks, in particular, to France’s leading role in discussions, Europe is organising itself.
And when the repo rate is comparatively far from a more neutral monetary stance, monetary policy can be adjusted in larger steps than when the rate is closer. Thus, there are various ways of making up for the fact that economic forecasts beyond the short term not infrequently miss the mark and still allow for the circumstance that it takes a comparatively long time for the full effect of monetary measures to materialise. Conclusion I should like to conclude by saying that while we all know that the Riksbank’s main concern is the future path of inflation in the Swedish economy, our deliberations about how to hold inflation at a BIS Review 13/2000  4  stable level around the 2% target can just as well be seen as the Riksbank’s endeavour, by means of the repo rate, to contribute to a continuation of the Swedish economy’s favourable trend. In many situations our statutory duty - the maintenance of price stability - is fully commensurate with the requirement that the Riksbank helps to make the development of production and employment in the Swedish economy as stable as possible. 5  BIS Review 13/2000

A salient feature of the Norwegian economy is the importance of oil revenues, which may fluctuate considerably from year to year. The Government Petroleum Fund was established to serve as a buffer against fluctuations in oil revenues. It dampens the impact of changes in oil prices on the Norwegian krone. In recent years, a number of countries have switched to a monetary policy regime based on a target of low inflation. With a passive fiscal policy, monetary policy then in practice assumes a greater role in the stabilisation of economic developments. In Norway, we have a different institutional structure and monetary policy objective. When the krone has been stable and inflation shows signs of rising, Norges Bank’s first reaction is to inform the political authorities that measures other than those available to the central bank are required. Norges Bank would do the same if the requirement of returning the krone to its initial range could no longer apply. In a country with an inflation target, the central bank would deal with this itself, without first consulting with the government authorities. However, as mentioned, Norges Bank cannot with open eyes inflate or deflate the economy. Norges Bank’s mandate must be viewed in the light of the emphasis placed by the government authorities on conducting a disciplined, but active fiscal policy. The mandate gives Norges Bank a basis for conducting a monetary policy that provides a nominal anchor for the Norwegian economy.
Now I know it hasn't felt like that for everyone - particularly for internationally exposed businesses and their employees and for the regions in which such businesses are more heavily concentrated including the West Midlands with its relatively high concentration of manufacturing businesses. I am well aware that many of them - perhaps many of you - have been having a rough time over the past few years. 2  BIS Review 53/2002  Although the UK economy as a whole managed to avoid recession, UK manufacturing output fell from a peak nearly two years ago by around 7% and employment in UK manufacturing fell by 225,000 people, or some 6%. To put that into perspective, manufacturing output fell from peak to trough over much the same period by over 16% in Japan, by 7½% in the US and by 6½% in Germany; and manufacturing employment fell by 7¼% in Japan, 9½% in the US and nearly 3% in Germany. So the pressures on manufacturing were not confined to, nor did they originate in this country. There are two main reasons for the pressures on the internationally-exposed sectors of our economy. The first is the weakness of much of the global economy as a result of the Asia crisis and its aftermath in the late 1990's, and then, more recently, as a result of the sharp, synchronised, slowdown in the major industrial countries - as reflected in the figures I've just given you.

The potential downside risk - and one can debate just how big a risk it is - is that the macro-economic stability  BIS Review 53/2002  3  framework - while based upon the same general philosophy as here in the UK - would in this case be directed to stability in the Eurozone as a whole. Monetary policy would be decided collectively by the ECB, and fiscal policy would be constrained by the European Stability and Growth Pact - so that the policy stance may not always necessarily be consistent with the particular macro-economic policy needs of individual member states. The essential purpose of the Chancellor's assessment of the famous five tests is of course to weigh the balance between these potential benefits and possible risks, and it will then be for the Government and ultimately the people of this country to decide. The outcome could have a bearing on the macro-economic context both for the UK as a whole and here in the West Midlands, but it is very difficult to predict what the effects might be. Whatever the outcome of the euro debate, you will be operating in a market economy within a stability-oriented macro-economic framework. The crucial point then is that the overall rate of growth that we can hope to sustain - which is the key to our future prosperity - will depend upon the vigour and flexibility of the supply-side of the economy.
In addition, it would be appropriate to consider the possibility of developing centralised and binding dispute settlement arrangements, such as those in place in other European countries, possibly with the participation of the industry, to correct the shortcomings of the present system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  6. Final thoughts  Let me finish by saying that in mid-2010, at the height of the financial crisis, Alexandre Lamfalussy, one of the architects of European monetary and financial integration, with whom I was fortunate enough to work with in the mid-1990s and who passed away just a few days ago, ended one of his last public speeches as follows: All the actors – central banks, governments, international organisations and, naturally, market participants – are navigating in waters uncharted by reliable historical experience. The complexity of the current situation is without precedent. But there is no way of “opting out” of this complex world. Wishing that we could go back to the professional and intellectual comfort of the pre-crisis years is a pipe dream. This does not make me a pessimist.3 I believe that when one looks back at the work done to overcome the problems that beset the Spanish financial sector, Lamfalussy’s words are fully applicable. Thanks to the efforts made by all the agents concerned the most serious shortcomings of the banking industry have been remedied, allowing it to resume, gradually, full exercise of its role in the economic system and which is vital for our prosperity as a nation.

In the case of the most vulnerable banks – which accounted for little more than 20% of the system – these developments ultimately threatened their viability, generating appreciable risks to continuing financial stability. As you all know, this situation could only be resolved through the contribution of significant public funds, most of which under the financial assistance programme and financed, therefore, with European funds. Thus, through the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector (FROB) the State has since 2009 contributed a total of € million in various forms of capital. The industry has also contributed to the recapitalisation of vulnerable banks by providing, through the Deposit Guarantee Fund (FGDEC), a total of € million, on top of the € million 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  provided to the FROB in 2009. Also to be added here is the value of the various guarantees granted on the different sale processes involving State stakes, discounting the consideration obtained thereon. All these calculations are detailed in the related information regularly published by the Banco de España.1 Clearly, then, the public effort for the recapitalisation of the system has been considerable.