samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Both are necessary, though both differ in terms of focus, instruments and the way risk is evaluated. Micro-supervision seeks to improve the safety and soundness of financial institutions, while macro-supervision focuses on the health of the financial system as a whole. Since 2014 the Banco de España has indeed been identifying and monitoring vulnerabilities in the financial system, and it also has the possibility of introducing countercyclical capital buffers. Along these same lines, we have recently been given the possibility of using tools other than the mere activation of capital buffers. These tools are more specific, enabling us to take action focusing on the credit segment where imbalances may be concentrated. Changes in banks, governance and business models, and changes in society In any event, as supervisors we cannot ensure the sustainability of banking business in the long run. Actually, the keys to such sustainability have always been in the hands of banks themselves. I should like to talk about some of these in-house keys. Specifically, I shall refer to governance and those aspects that should have a bearing on banking business models, some of which in direct response to changes in society. Bank governance As many of you are aware, governance is an aspect I often bring up in my speeches. I consider it to receive little attention, despite the fact that, in my view, it is a necessary though not sufficient condition for the proper functioning of banks. Governance is not something totally quantifiable or directly measurable.

01.07.2019  “Banks and society. Looking to the future” Círculo Financiero de la Sociedad Económica Barcelonesa de amigos del país Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good evening. I would like to thank Fundación La Caixa for their kind invitation to me to take the rostrum today at the Círculo Financiero. It is firstly an opportunity to address an eminently distinguished audience. But it also allows me to visit Barcelona again, a city I know very well from my time as a bank supervisor and to which it is always a pleasure to return. You know better than me that Círculo Financiero has, throughout its long history, always offered a forum for open and frank debate on current topics. It has sought to tackle, from a constructive and European-oriented approach, the problems and difficulties we face as a society. Admittedly, the challenges before us at present are most significant ones. But it is no less true that Spain, throughout the history of this institution, has experienced and overcome even more turbulent times. Each of these convulsive periods was seen by our society as a crisis. Crisis and change The word “crisis” is from the Greek. Despite the adverse emotional reaction we all feel on hearing the word, the Greek term does not necessarily have a negative connotation. The root of “crisis” means “choice”, “dispute” or “decision”. Originally, then, the word “crisis” necessarily implied a change. But, above all, it reflected the need to act resolutely and decidedly in the face of such a change.
Through their asset purchase programmes, central banks in the UK, US, Japan and the euro-area have purchased government assets totalling around $ trillion since the start of 2010. But they have clearly not been alone. Most global banks have increased their holdings of safe government assets and central bank reserve balances. Among US banks, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets increased from 11% in 2009 to 15% in 2014, while among UK banks it rose from 20% to 23%. 4 That has been in part for precautionary purposes and in part in anticipation of new regulatory requirements. Among companies in the UK, US and Europe, there has been a significant increase in their liquid asset holdings, of around $ trillion since 2008, mostly for precautionary purposes. And among institutional investors, there has been a further portfolio switch into bonds since the crisis. Since 2009, the size of US bond funds has more than doubled, rising from $ trillion to $ trillion. As after the Great Depression and the Asian financial crisis, this precautionary behaviour has not been confined to the government bond market. It has affected spending behaviour among households and companies too. And, as previously, the consequences for the wider economy have not been benign. In 2008, households and companies were running a combined financial deficit (income less spending) of 2.4% of GDP in the US and 1.5% of GDP in the UK, while in the euro-area they were running a small surplus of 2.4% of GDP (Chart 10).

Moreover, even these estimates may overstate the future path of interest rates implied by financial markets. Market interest rates are probability-weighted averages of different possible interest rate paths – they are a mean. Model estimates of the modal – or most likely – path for interest rates are lower still (Chart 3). Estimates of the modal path of interest rates are drawn from estimated models, so are no more than illustrative. Nonetheless, the modal interest rate three years ahead in the US is  1  Expected lift-off here refers to a 25 basis point increase. 2  The path of forward interest rates will also be affected by term premia. See Shafik (2015). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  only 1.1%. In the UK it is 0.8%, little changed from current levels. According to these estimates, the glue holding interest rates to the floor looks stronger still. There is an old English aphorism, due to Walter Bagehot in the 19th century: “John Bull can stand many things, but he cannot stand 2%”. Prior to 2009, the Bank of England had been careful to avoid the wrath of Mr Bull: Bank rate had never been below 2% in its then-315 year history. For the past six years the MPC has been testing the patience of Mr Bull, with the 2% threshold consistently breached. If financial markets are to be believed, Mr Bull, Mrs Bull, and their children are set to have their patience tested further: UK rates are not expected to reach 2% until 2019.
This was due, on the one hand, to measures taken by the ECB, and on the other, to the fact that, in the US, the ‘fiscal cliff’ was averted. As recent weeks have shown, conditions on the financial markets can change again swiftly. In Japan, there has been a sharp correction on the stock market and the yen has again gained somewhat in value. Meanwhile, in the euro area, there is a discrepancy between the generally favourable trend on the financial markets and the disappointing economic data. Finally, in the US, a certain degree of uncertainty about the future monetary policy direction of the Federal Reserve (Fed) has gained ground. Overall, the market  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  environment continues to be dominated by high levels of uncertainty, thereby remaining susceptible to sudden shifts in mood. Management of currency reserves The easing of tensions on the financial markets also affected the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) currency reserves. These are mainly composed of foreign currency investments and gold. At the end of May, the SNB held foreign currency investments of just over CHF 440 billion (cf. chart 1). Due to our liquidity and security requirements, a large portion of our foreign exchange holdings are in government bonds and deposits with other central banks. This portion amounted to 78% at the end of the first quarter of 2013. To further diversify investment risk and increase investment in real assets, we raised our proportion of equities from 12% to 15% in the first quarter.

Chart 4: BCC survey activity indicators Balance reporting increased sales/deliveries 60 Services  Manufacturing 40 20 0 -20 -40 -60  Mar-07  Sep-07  Mar-08  Sep-08  Mar-09  Sep-09  Mar-10  Note: Sales/deliveries relate to domestic market Source: British Chambers of Commerce (BCC)  BIS Review 99/2010  5  The CBI’s most recent surveys show a similar picture, with manufacturing industry bouncing back strongly alongside a muted recovery in the services sector (see Chart 5). According to the CBI, retail sales growth appears to have been weak in the last couple of months – though this may reflect some temporary uncertainties relating to the change of government and the Budget, which could have affected consumer confidence and spending patterns. Chart 5: CBI survey activity indicators Balance reporting/expecting increased sales/output 40 Manufacturers output expectations  30  Retail sales  20 10 0 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60  2007  2007  2008  2008  2009  2009  2010  Note: Retail sales – percentage balance reporting annual increase (3 month average); Manufacturing output – percentage balance expecting rise in the next 3 months. Source: CBI Monthly Trends Enquiry and Distributive Trades Survey  I would not want to play down the uncertainties which remain in relation to the growth outlook here in the UK. Access to credit is still being adversely affected by the problems in the banking system.
2021 PARIS EUROPLACE – STUDIO GABRIEL, PARIS ROADS FOR THE FUTURE: CENTRAL BANK DIGITAL CURRENCY (CBDC) AND INNOVATIVE PAYMENTS  Closing address by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to be with you today streamed live from Studio Gabriel. I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Paris Europlace for having maintained through the crisis this fruitful dialogue with all stakeholders. Before turning to my main point today, I want to stress the resilience of our French financial institutions, which have played a decisive role in helping our economy weather the crisis. It was popular a year ago to predict a financial apocalypse, and certain Europeans, prone to self-flagellation, are still doing so today, whereas the Americans are more self-confident. The reality speaks for itself: French banks’ CET1 was higher at the end of the first quarter of 2021 (15%) than it was before the crisis; their profitability, however still insufficient, has improved sharply in this Q1; in general, French banks are in no way underprovisioned. France and Europe are not facing a “tsunami of bankruptcies”, and should, on the contrary, see a strong recovery: cumulative growth of more than 10% over 2021 and 2022. So we need to remain vigilant, but let’s stop scaring ourselves. This roughly reassuring situation is in no way a call for complacency and status quo. The Covid-19 crisis is acting as an accelerator for the major structural challenges banks and insurers are facing.

1 / Why: incorporating digital innovations is an imperative I shall sum up some very strong trends as a “triangle of risks”:  First, on retail payments, over the last 18 months, cash has accelerated its decline while the share of dematerialised payments has increased twice as fast as before the crisis, from 51 % in 2019 to 70 % in the first half of 2021. There is also a strong shift towards the tokenisation of financial assets. This dual trend could lead to the marginalisation of the use of central bank money, be it in the form of banknotes or in settlement systems. We, as a central bank shall never abandon cash; but this commitment cannot be our sole response to technological change. Second, the emergence of BigTechs and new settlement assets  (crypto-assets  and  stablecoins)  could threaten  our  monetary  sovereignty and our mandate to safeguard financial stability. Third and final factor, the progress made by extra-European CBDCs and notably by the digital  yuan, already accessible in the major Chinese cities. The risk is clearly that Europe will lose momentum not just in its drive to strengthen the international role of the euro, but even in preserving it. The challenge here is also a geopolitical concern. 2/ How: reasserting the anchoring role of central bank money thanks to a holistic approach Faced with these challenges, we want to be proactive and move forward in partnership with commercial banks.
The latest numbers for wage growth, in 2020 and  2020  1 0 3  2021, have been adjusted for the various distortions affecting the official data, and are below the headline figure. But this year’s number is still  4  5  6 7 8 Unemployment, per cent  Regular-pay average weekly earnings (AWE) in the private sector. The chart uses a Bank staff estimate of underlying AWE that strips out Covid-related compositional effects. Sources: ONS, Bank of England, and Bank calculations. noticeably higher than would normally be the case at the current rate of unemployment. (And arguably, if you think that some of those on furlough have actually been looking for other jobs while on the scheme, and therefore helping to depress wage growth to some degree, perhaps a better estimate would have both the red dots somewhat to the right, making the latest figure for wage growth look that much stronger, compared with the pre-pandemic relationship8.) However long it lasts, and whatever the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment, there looks to have been rise in the shorter-term equilibrium (the so-called “NAIRU”). Conclusion This is an extremely challenging period for monetary policy. Despite relatively weak growth over the past two years as a whole, domestically and globally, inflation has risen very significantly. In this country it was over 4% in October.

Look at these two graphs. One shows the share of the US financial sector in GDP going back to 1860. The other shows relative skill-corrected wages in the financial sector and an index of deregulation (where down is more regulation). We can see that there is a peak in all of these measures around the time of the 1929 crisis, followed by a secular decline. Regulation reaches a peak and relative wages bottom out in the 1960s and 70s. Then there is a long climb until just before the current crisis. If this was all we had to go on, it would be difficult to escape a certain prediction of what happens next! The big question is what it might mean for growth and prosperity. So it is important that we strike the right balance, as it is so aptly put in the programme for this event. Thank you very much. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Ivan Iskrov: Global and regional challenges to the economy and the financial system. Do we have working solutions? Opening address by Mr Ivan Iskrov, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, before the International Scientific Forum “Global and Regional Challenges to the Economy and the Financial System: Do We Have Working Solutions?” organised by the VUZF University, Sofia, 10 May 2012. *  *  *  Dear Mr. Rector, Dear Participants and guests of the conference, Ladies and gentlemen, It is an honour and a pleasure for me to take part in the opening of this International Scientific Forum organized by the VUZF University. I would like to thank its Rector, Prof. Vazov for inviting me, and through him to congratulate the University on the occasion of its remarkable 10th Anniversary. The academia are famous for their conservatism but here, only a decade after its foundation, your University established itself as one of the leading universities in Bulgaria in the area of finance and insurance. An example of the high European standards to which the VUZF University aspires, are the joint bachelor’s and master’s degree programmes with the University of Sheffield. In addition, the Extended “Erasmus” University Charter awarded by the European Commission provides opportunities to VUZF University students to train and have internships at EU universities and companies. It was announced lately that in the recent five years 55 thousand people have graduated economy in Bulgaria.

The funds necessary to repay the balance of the Fed Facility will ultimately come from the cash proceeds of the AIA and ALICO transactions, cash AIG generates as it monetizes the non-cash sales proceeds of the AIA and ALICO transactions, the divestiture of certain non-core assets, and profit derived from AIG’s core operating businesses. That said, our goal was never to make money – it was to avoid the systemic consequences that would have resulted from an AIG default and bankruptcy and to foster financial stability. IV. Conclusion  In all that the Federal Reserve has done, we have been motivated by two goals: to foster financial stability and to protect the U.S. taxpayer. Had we not acted to prevent an AIG failure, the financial crisis would have been substantially worse and even greater economic damage and suffering would have occurred. The decision to lend to AIG was a difficult one because addressing the systemic issues required us to provide liquidity to a non-banking company we did not supervise whose management had made poor business decisions. Still, our understanding of the consequences of an AIG failure left us no real choice. Thank you again for giving us the opportunity to appear before you today. We look forward to answering your questions. 6  BIS Review 73/2010
We also have to be alert to the risk of model drift: that detailed changes initiated by firms, that may each be reasonable in themselves, will have a bias towards reducing rather than increasing capital. Supervisors need to be able to interrogate the overall outcome of accumulated changes, not just the technical merits of individual changes. And it is equally important to remember that insurer resilience depends not just on capital, but also on the accuracy of technical provisions for liabilities, which are themselves inevitably determined by models. At times this has led to time-consuming discussion about the fine details relating to firms’ models: a bit too fox-like, when what is needed is a more hedgehog-like response – a frank dialogue about resilience to big real world risks and shocks. A dialogue that would allow us to respond flexibly to the emergence of new risks and shocks, and to balance modelling with judgment in satisfying ourselves – both regulators and Boards – over capital adequacy. We recognise that modelling is at the heart of the management of insurance liabilities, and of assets too thanks to the interconnectedness of the two sides of the balance sheet. But uncertainty places limits on the reach of quantitative modelling. We should look at a more flexible approach where models sit alongside other 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  6  inputs to capital requirements.

The fox and the hedgehog: preparing in a world of high risk and high uncertainty Speech given by Charlotte Gerken, Executive Director, Insurance Supervision InsuranceERM Risk and Capital EMEA Virtual Conference 3 December 2020  I would like to thank Alan Sheppard, Zachary Morris-Dyer, Gareth Truran, Anthony Brown, Robin Swain, Manuel Sales, Olga Filipenko and Sarah O’Sullivan for their assistance preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Good morning. Thank you to Insurance ERM for inviting me to speak at your conference. When I told a colleague I had been asked to give a talk on responses to risk, he told me: “the fox knows many things; the hedgehog knows one important thing.” I was curious to learn more: this idea came from a fragment of text by an Ancient Greek poet Archilochus of Paros; it inspired Isaiah Berlin’s 1953 essay on Tolstoy’s view of history; and has been used in Jim Collins’s book From Good to Great. What it boils down to is a way of thinking, one that guides how you prepare for and respond to risk: the fox looking at every eventuality; the hedgehog’s one big idea being to curl into a ball and wait for the peril to pass. I’m left with the image of the fox hopping about and getting ever more frustrated as it schemes how to get at the hedgehog.
Durmuş Yılmaz: Turkey beyond 2008 Speech by Mr Durmus Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Annual Investment Conference "Turkey beyond 2008", organised by the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) and The Turkish-American Business Council (TAIK), New York, 17 March 2008. *  *  *  Dear Guests, As you all may know, the Turkish economy used to experience boom-and-bust cycles throughout the 1990s. The economic crisis in 2001 was the low point of this period, when the economy contracted more than 5 percent. Since then, Turkey has put in place a very intense and ambitious structural reform agenda, coupled with sound monetary and fiscal policies, to establish macroeconomic and financial stability and to improve the business environment. Central Bank independence that was granted by Law in 2001 was one of the milestones of this agenda. The introduction of free-floating exchange rate regime in 2001 and inflationtargeting regime in 2002 were other key steps. The Central Bank of Turkey has also experienced a comprehensive institutional change towards a better communication policy and clearly defined accountability measures. We have experienced a significant disinflation process since 2001. The consumer price index came down from 68.5% in 2001 to 8.4% in 2007. I should call your attention to the fact that the list of countries that lowered inflation in 2007 was quite short, thanks to global inflationary pressures in food and other commodities.

The ratio of total credits to total deposits, which is a proxy for the intermediation function of the banking sector, has increased almost twofolds since 2001 and reached to 80% as of 2007. The strong growth performance of the Turkish economy may be considered as the fruit of these structural reforms, fiscal discipline, and cautious monetary policies of the last 6 years. Turkey has grown for 23 consecutive quarters since 2002 and has been one of the fastest growing countries in the world during this period. The real GDP has grown almost 50% on a cumulative basis in that period, bringing the average annual growth rate to 7%. This strong growth performance was private sector driven and supported by continuous productivity gains. Along with high economic growth, openness of Turkish economy has also increased substantially. Exports, which stood at only USD 31 billion as of 2001, increased by more than two-folds and reached to USD 107 billion in 2007. Dear Guests, There are four distinguishing characteristics of Turkey that set her apart from other emerging market countries. First, unlike other countries in the Central and Eastern Europe region, Turkey has a young population, which is a demographic gift that could accelerate economic growth. Of course, having great potential does not guarantee success. Currently, the Turkish economy is utilizing less than half of its workforce.