samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The public sector employs more than one-third of the labour force in Norway. In Northern Norway, public sector employees account for close to 45 per cent of the labour force. The primary industries are important for the counties in Northern Norway, especially the utilisation of the abundant fish resources in the coastal areas. A large part of the fishing industry is export-oriented and is increasingly competing with low-cost countries. These industries will be vulnerable when the rise in domestic costs is high. There are wide regional variations in unemployment. At the end of July, the number of registered unemployed in Northern Norway came to 4.4 per cent of the labour force, which is slightly higher than the national average of 4.1 per cent. Even though the region has somewhat higher unemployment than the national average, the rise in unemployment in Northern Norway has been relatively low in the last year. Unemployment has only risen half as much in Northern Norway as in the rest of the country. The number of unemployed has risen least in the county of Finnmark in the last year. This is probably related to the industry structure which is characterised by a relatively high share of employees in the public service sector. As I have mentioned, a look at the current situation in this part of the country and similar reports from the other regions represent important information in the work on setting interest rates. The short-term nominal interest rate in Norway has now reached a historically very low level.

Deliver the right message at the right time. 18. Third, we will provide more avenues for people who are in difficulty or financial distress, to seek help. We must do everything we can to prevent people from getting into a worse situation, or getting into a debt spiral. CCS, with the help of ABS, runs a very useful debt management programme for those who cannot re-pay their borrowings from banks. We can do more, using our social workers and counsellors. 19. MoneySENSE, through the new institute that I talked about, the Institute of Financial Literacy, is now conducting a pilot training programme to help social workers and counsellors, to equip them with financial literacy knowledge so they can provide advice to low income households, or those who come and see them for help. It may have to do with cutting down on utility bills, or it may be about spending wisely in weekly marketing, without compromising on health and wellbeing. 20. MoneySENSE will continue working with the social service sector with the objective of training social workers and counsellors, so they can expand our outreach to Singaporeans. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conclusion 21. This is what we plan to do for the future. I think we have done good work for the first ten years, but there is a lot more work ahead to help Singaporeans.
In order to keep overall demand in the economy moving forward in the face of the slowdown overseas, which has depressed both financial sentiment and business investment in this country, as well as net external demand, we had no choice but to seek to buoy up the other elements of domestic demand. Without that we, too, would have seen negative growth in this country. In terms of monetary policy that in effect meant cutting interest rates - to 4% - their lowest level for 40 years - in order to sustain the growth of consumer spending. And we were subsequently helped by the Chancellor's decision to increase public spending. That's something which, as a central banker, I'm supposed to frown upon - and it clearly is important for the stability and efficiency of the economy that it is kept within bounds over the medium and longer term in line with the Chancellor's Golden Rule. But I must confess to you that it is something that I positively welcomed in the immediate situation with  BIS Review 3/2003  1  which we were confronted. Without it we would have been even more dependent upon consumer demand than we have been.

This is the fifth occasion in just the past eight years on which I've had the pleasure of giving this biennial report on the state of the UK economy to our Scottish stakeholders. On each previous occasion I have been able to report to you relatively steady growth of overall output, a continuing fall in unemployment and stable low inflation. But I've then gone on to discuss the risks and uncertainties ahead and to worry out loud as to whether or not we could keep it up. On each occasion I have concluded - usually somewhat tentatively - that we could. And indeed we have in the UK - as a whole, though I have to admit it was a close run thing last winter in the wake of the unexpectedly sharp economic slowdown that hit the whole of the industrial world from the beginning of 2001. Despite that global economic shock - which produced near-simultaneous recession in the world's three largest economies, the US, Japan and Germany - we in the UK - at the overall, aggregate, level have now enjoyed continuous quarter by quarter growth at an annual average rate of 2¾% throughout the past 10 years. That is far and away the longest period of consecutive quarterly growth since quarterly estimates began nearly 50 years ago - and the annual average growth rate has remained somewhat above most estimates - at least until recently - of the longer term trend rate of some 2¼% - 2½%.
UK 10-year real government bond yields have fallen 115 basis points; by contrast 10-year real government bond yields in the US are down by around 25 basis points only. 2  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  the outlook and therefore on the potential timing of any Bank Rate increase. But all expect that any changes would be limited in scope and gradual in pace. From my perspective, given the mixed signals on consumer spending and business investment, and given the still subdued domestic inflationary pressures, in particular anaemic wage growth, now is not yet the time to begin that adjustment. In the coming months, I would like to see the extent to which weaker consumption growth is offset by other components of demand, whether wages begin to firm, and more generally, how the economy reacts to the prospect of tighter financial conditions and the reality of Brexit negotiations. During the negotiating period the economy will be importantly influenced by the expectations of households, firms and financial markets about the nature of both the transition and the longer term economic relationships with the EU and other countries. Markets have already anticipated some of the adjustment. Depending on whether and when any transition arrangement can be agreed, firms on either side of the channel may soon need to activate contingency plans. Before long, we will all begin to find out the extent to which Brexit is a gentle stroll along a smooth path to a land of cake and consumption.

And that is part of what is occurring today, with Japan, Germany and China running excess surpluses relative to fundamentals; and the US and the UK running excess deficits (Chart 2). And although the euroarea excess surplus is relatively modest relative to its GDP, in absolute terms it is at least as important as 6  those of Japan or China (Chart 3). So while the distortions are few in number, those that exist are large in scale and systemic in importance. 4  Canadian deficits averaged 8% of GDP in the thirty years before World War I. ‘Canada in a multi-polar world’, speech by Mark Carney, 16 May 2011, available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2011/05/canada-in-a-multi-polar-world. 5 See Lisack, N., Sajedi, R. and Thwaites, G. ‘Demographic trends and the real interest rate’, Bank of England Staff Working Paper forthcoming. 6 Small economies hosting large financial centres like Singapore and Switzerland are special cases for which it is difficult to estimate ‘norms’. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Chart 2: Actual current account balances and IMF estimates of fundamental balances  Sources: IMF July 2016 External Sector Report, WEO April 2017 and Bank calculations. Notes: The data point for the 2016 current account for the UK has been adjusted; see notes to Chart 1 for more details. Chart 3: Excess current account balances  Sources: IMF July 2016 External Sector Report and WEO April 2017.
Mr. Kent examines the challenges facing the UK commercial property market as it moves towards the 21st century Speech by Mr. Pen Kent, an Executive Director of the Bank of England, to The Investment Property Forum Annual Lunch in London on 15/1/97. Introduction 1 The IPF has built up a significant and diverse membership in recent years and has deservedly become one of the most prominent and respected trade associations within your industry. I am delighted to have the opportunity to address you all this afternoon. 2 When Mark Burton suggested that I might look back at developments in the commercial property market during the eight years that I have been doing my present job, that appealed to me because I shall be retiring from the Bank next month. But I also like to look to the future and to identify coming issues and challenges. With that in mind, I will also pick out some of the factors relevant to the industry as it moves forward. The Past 3 My involvement with commercial property began in 1985, when plans for Canary Wharf were beginning to materialise. One of the questions put to the Bank by the developers was whether we would change our policy encouraging banks to have their offices close to the Bank. We recognised that our policy was distorting the market and we decided to make the change. I have followed the property story ever since.

The enthusiasm and momentum for them is apparent both from what the market tells us and from recent surveys. A clear message from our wide range of property contacts is that greater liquidity is essential if commercial property is to remain attractive as an asset class. There is equally a clear message that successful development of securitisation and derivatives will not on its own be the saviour of commercial property. But without it property will not turn in a performance which can stand comparison with competing assets. We need a mature, liquid cash market in property with a healthy derivative market to permit successful management of risk. These are essential characteristics of efficient markets which are necessary for efficient use of property by users as a factor of production. Without such a development there is a risk that the costs of doing business in the UK will be uncompetitively high. I do not know how, or indeed whether, the obstacles to the development of such markets can be easily found. But I regard these issues as nationally important. Conclusion 22 So, what is likely to happen in the next eight years? Let me sum up my vision. 23 The current strong commitment to keeping inflation in check will create conditions more conducive to rational long-term decisions. Commercial property is still to a large extent a longer-term asset and should benefit from this environment.
They wrote to the newspapers and gave TV interviews stating that the initial successes were flukes and were not sustainable. They warned that the economy would return to the vicious cycle once again. They continued to support their arguments with many high sounding theories and hair-splitting formulas, and Dr. Jayasundera and I were ridiculed, and often described as the villains responsible for the impending disaster. We were regularly featured in some unflattering, but nevertheless enjoyable cartoons as well! But, today, Mr. Chairman, those critics are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their criticism, in the face of the gradually emerging new equilibrium of the “virtuous cycle” that our new harmonized policy framework had been able to generate. Presently, even though a minority stubbornly refuse to see what is unfolding before their very own eyes, this new cycle has taken shape: Low inflation leading to real interest rates; real interest rates leading to enhanced savings; enhanced savings leading to a regular pipeline of investment; regular investment leading to lower debt levels; lower debt levels leading to sustained growth; and sustained growth once again leading to low inflation. What that tells us is that we have been able to break free from the previous vicious cycle, and have now placed the country on a more virtuous cycle! The challenge therefore would be to carefully nurture and guard this new equilibrium, knowing fully well that the disturbance in even one of those components could change that situation with adverse results.

While such action can be tremendously effective under certain conditions, its limitations should be frankly recognized. Thus, through its control of money the Central Bank can assist, but by no means ensure, the achievement of the above objects. A monetary system that is stable and at the same time responsive to the needs of a growing country is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of orderly economic development.” Sixth: Exter reports on the vital importance of harmonizing between the Government policies and the Central Bank policies. Here, Exter’s comments are unambiguous and far reaching. I quote: “There are, however, many important problems of monetary policy, especially those relating to fiscal policy, on which a central bank must necessarily work in close harmony with the government. On such problems, experience in many countries has shown that a central bank, with a degree of independence of the government proper, can make economic analyses and hold views which are more detached and objective than those of a government department. Many governments have learned to value and to use the sort of independent and objective advice on monetary and other aspects of economic policy which central banks have been able to give. On matters of vital interest to the state, however, it must be recognized that… it would be impossible for the Central Bank to adopt a policy or pursue a course of action contrary to the policy of the Government of the day.
Oct. Jan. 2006  2007  40  40  20  United States  20  United Kingdom 0  08  Source: Datastream and JP Morgan Chase & Co. (a) Equity and property indices rebased to Jan. 06 = 100. BIS Review 24/2008  60  Euro area Jan.  Apr. Jul. 2007  Oct.  Feb.  May. 08  0 -20  Aug. Source: Bloomberg. (a) 3-month LIBOR spreads over 3-month overnight index swap (OIS) rates. (b) Solid lines show 3 month historical data, with dotted lines derived from forwards. 5  Chart 5: Sub-prime mortgage losses  Chart 6: Monoline CDS prices(a)  $ billions 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Default losses to date (a)  Projected losses (cashflow method)  Projected Writedowns losses to date (market prices) (b)  Sources: Bloomberg, Banks' financial statements and Bank calculations. (a) Estimated default losses to date on subprime securities based on cumulative delinquency rates. (b) Net of hedging. •  •  Sources: Bank of England, Barclays Capital, Goldman Sachs, IMF and Moodys. (a) Average of bid and offer premia of five-year senior debt CDS contracts.

•  For a few weeks in October the market thought the worst was over but the publication of Q3 results renewed fears about the scale of bank losses which sparked a new squeeze in the money markets and a further sharp fall in bank share prices towards the end of the year. •  Co-ordinated action by central banks helped to ease the short-term funding pressures at the year end (Chart 4); and hopes rose that the acute phase was over as banks declared their losses and, where necessary, managed to attract new capital including from sovereign wealth funds. Where we are now But markets have remained difficult in the New Year. While LIBOR spreads have not returned to the levels of early December, money markets are sticky. Corporate bond and credit default swap rates have continued to climb, leveraged loan prices are dropping quickly, securitisation markets remain largely closed and the CDS and equity prices for banks continue to deteriorate. This continuing strain reflects three main factors. First, it reflects fears about the future path of the economy especially in the US and the scale of new losses that may bring – not just in housing, but also in other forms of lending. Second, however, there is continuing uncertainty about the scale and distribution of losses that have already occurred: •  To illustrate the uncertainty on overall scale, Chart 5 sets out different estimates of sub-prime losses based on different estimation methods.
The responsibility of the central bank for the payment system is therefore often expressed as a task to maintain financial stability. The repo rate is not an efficient instrument for counteracting problems in the payment system. If such problems threaten to arise, it is entirely different types of measures that need to be taken. The monetary policy stance takes into consideration the outlook for inflation and the real economy, but does not consider financial stability. So if the repo rate is not a good tool for financial stability, how can we protect ourselves against financial crises? In my experience, much can be achieved if the authorities and the financial participants together draw up effective preventive measures and plans for good crisis management. One clear and positive conclusion from the crises in the past twenty years is that good crisis management can save large amounts of money and reduce disruptions to society. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that bad crisis management aggravates crises, partly by spreading uncertainty among the general public and the financial market agents. This may sound abstract, but in practice entails creating good laws, regulations and supervision. Sometimes, acute banking problems may nevertheless arise and may mean it is necessary to close down a bank. When a bank needs to be closed, a difficult balance arises, between the owners' interests and the savers' interest, which are both safeguarded in law. One very current example of this dilemma in Sweden is the case of Custodia.

Previously, forecasts were instead based on the assumption that the repo rate would remain unchanged during the forecast period. What consequences does this change have? Monetary policy could previously be described with a simple policy rule. If the forecast for inflation was below two per cent, the repo rate would normally be cut, and it was above two per cent the interest rate would be raised. If the forecast was very close to two per cent the repo rate would remain unchanged. Of course, this rule could not capture all of the nuances in the monetary policy discussion, but it provided a rough explanation of the monetary policy decisions. Now we no longer use this simple policy rule. According to our new way of thinking, if the inflation forecast is close to two per cent, the repo rate should normally develop in line with market expectations. This could mean that the repo rate should be raised or lowered in a number of stages over the coming two-year period. The new way of thinking thus means that, unlike before, the monetary policy discussion is now based on an interest rate path that stretches across the entire forecast period. This method of working enables clearer communication regarding future policy. Although it cannot, of course, be regarded as a commitment from the Riksbank that the repo rate actually will follow a particular path. Each time we make a decision, we take a stance on the repo rate path, on the basis of the information available at the time.
By country, among the four largest euro area economies, the output loss was more pronounced in Spain (9.1%) than in Italy, France and Germany (down 4.5%, 4.1% and 4.2%, respectively). 1  Much uncertainty also persists regarding the intensity of the recovery in the fourth quarter of the year, in view of the recent course of the pandemic in Europe. The few short-term indicators available signal a slowdown in activity growth, which could be exacerbated – and even lead to contraction in at least some countries or sectors – by the widespread implementation of new measures to contain the health crisis. In the euro area, the PMI (the most leading indicator) for October fell by 0.5 percentage points (pp) to 50, standing at the boundary between expansion and recession. The pandemic is having a notably uneven impact, affecting primarily the services sector, whose PMI fell 1.1 pp to 46.9. Conversely, the manufacturing PMI rose 1.3 pp to 58.4. Similarly, the European Commission’s consumer confidence indicator also contracted. The latest ECB staff projections were published in late September; the baseline scenario indicates a drop in euro area GDP of 8% in 2020, followed by growth of 5% in 2021. However, the feasibility of these figures is in doubt, since one of the assumptions under this baseline scenario was that the epidemiological situation would not worsen in the near term. Developments since the projection cut-off date appear to contradict that assumption. The recent news regarding the availability of a vaccine early next year is obviously to be welcomed.

Given that in the long run the nominal interest rate is the real equilibrium interest rate plus expected inflation, a fall in the latter implies lower average nominal rates, causing them to collide with their lower bound more often. This entails less headroom to provide stimulus in recessions with low inflation, further lowering inflation expectations, and so it continues. In this setting of historically low natural rates, a loss of interest rate policy scope and deanchoring risk for inflation expectations, the main central banks have deemed it necessary to rethink their monetary policy strategy, i.e. how they structure their monetary policy targets and how they pursue them with the tools available. To date, within their strategic frameworks most central banks have followed variants of what is known as inflation targeting, whereby they target inflation running close to a precise numerical value — e.g. 2% — over the medium term. 5  See, for example, Brunnermeier and Koby (2018) for a discussion of the effect of interest rates on bank profitability and their ability to lend. 6 Arce et al. (2018) estimate that these negative rates do not necessarily tighten the credit supply of European — or, in particular, Spanish — banks. 8  Yet alternative monetary policy strategies exist whereby a central bank attempts to make up for past deviations of inflation from its target. These are the so-called make-up strategies.7 One of them is known as price-level targeting. In this case, the central bank announces a target price-level growth rate, e.g. 2%.