samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
An efficient statistical apparatus provides the basis for financial transparency, thus contributing to disseminating best practices in terms of governance. Besides, institutional quality also strongly influences the composition of inflows into emerging economies. This is a key determinant of FDI flows, which tend to increase the benefits of financial integration. The need for sound economic policies and strategies should not either be neglected. In a globalised world where countries compete to attract foreign capital, sound fiscal and monetary policies influence not only the amount but the composition of inflows. Sound domestic policies strengthen the resilience of the economy to external shocks and thus maximise the growth benefits of capital account liberalisation. Recent crises remind us how macroeconomic imbalances may be exacerbated by financial fragilities and trigger capital account problems affecting economic growth. For instance, experience shows that excessive fiscal deficits are more dangerous with open capital markets. Actually, market discipline is not always at play or sufficient if there is excessive appetite for risk and not enough discrimination. Therefore, internal rules as well as Government commitments may be needed as illustrated by the socalled European Stability and Growth Pact. In the same way, structural policies aiming at improving the efficiency of the labour and good markets shall accompany financial liberalisation. They are indeed needed to enhance the capacity of the real economy to attract and allocate capital as well as to reduce vulnerabilities and absorb potential shocks.

The relationship between the incumbents and insurgents has been sometimes competitive but often collaborative – and both have been good for the ecosystem. We adopted a multi-pronged strategy to build what is now regarded by many as one of the most vibrant FinTech ecosystems in the world. First, a conducive regulatory approach that facilitates innovation while managing risks: simplifying rules; selectively easing licensing criteria; providing guidance on new areas like cloud computing, robo-advisers, and digital tokens; adopting activity-based regulation right-sized to the risks posed, as in our Payment 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Services Act; and allowing experimentation through regulatory sandboxes. Second, the digital infrastructure necessary for the adoption and proliferation of new technologies: a 24/7, real-time electronic payment system; a national digital identity and trusted data architecture that allows seamless online authentication and financial transactions; digital platforms to connect businesses, financial institutions, and FinTech firms: matching buyers and sellers through, for example, Business sans Borders; and matching problem statements and solutions through, for example, the API Exchange (or APIX); cross-border data and digital connectivity agreements and frameworks; and Project Ubin - a blockchain based prototype platform for cross-border payment and settlement in different currencies on the same network – faster and cheaper than conventional cross-border payment channels.
The institutional arrangements that seem most relevant to monetary policy credibility and competence involve the degree of independence afforded the central bank, the design of the mandate or objectives given the central bank, the regime or instruments adopted by the central bank to pursue that mandate, the structure of the decision making process, and the degree of communications and transparency. I want to talk about this broad complement of the institutional foundations of a credible central bank, and I’ll do so in part by talking about the history of the central bank of the United States. For reasons that are simple and compelling, independence is a critical part of the foundation for a credible central bank. Independence comes in many forms, and some of the most important dimensions of independence are hard to discern from the legal underpinnings or the formal structure of the institution. Central banks with many of the formal or legal attributes of independence can make bad policy choices. Central banks without formal independence can make good policy choices and achieve sustained improvements in macroeconomic outcomes. What does independence mean and how do we know it when we see it? Why is it important and how does it affect the quality of monetary policy choices and outcomes? In its most basic sense, independence is the freedom to pursue a defined monetary policy objective without consideration of political or private interests, and without fear of subordination to other economic policy objectives.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Enhancing the professionalism of Malaysia’s Islamic financial services industry Speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of the Chartered Institute of Islamic Finance Professionals (CIIF), Kuala Lumpur, 6 November 2015. *  *  *  Today’s official launch of the Chartered Institute of Islamic Finance Professionals (CIIF) marks a momentous occasion that reflects our collective effort to enhance the professionalism of the Islamic financial services industry. We are embarking on a long journey to create a new landscape of talent development, one which is permeated with a strong culture of professionalism, integrity and ethics. Greater professionalism among Islamic finance practitioners will instil greater confidence and capability to the Islamic finance industry to better serve public interest. The recent global financial crisis has brought to the fore the importance of trust, confidence and integrity in the financial services sector. The banking industry is subjected to continuous scrutiny on their values, professionalism and work ethics. This has prompted a host of initiatives both domestically and globally, aimed to strengthen the industry, given the significant role financial institutions have to the broader interest of society and the overall economy. Maintaining public confidence is critical. It is therefore in the industry’s interest to always place public trust above everything else, and only if we are able to do this, we shall enjoy the confidence that ensures the long-term growth of the industry.
The general public’s expectations of inflation two years ahead are below 2%, which suggests that the inflation targeting policy has achieved credibility – a matter that is crucial for monetary policy’s ability to produce good results. The foundation for monetary policy credibility has been strengthened in that the new legislation in force from the beginning of this year has created a more independent central bank. Maintaining price stability is now the Riksbank’s statutory function. The Riksbank has defined its target as being to keep annual inflation, expressed as the change in the consumer price index (CPI), at 2%. The ambition to keep inflation low stems from the insights about inflation’s harmful effects on the economy – that higher growth and employment cannot be generated in the longer run by means of higher inflation. It is other matters, such as how the economy functions, achievements in technology and the educational system, that determine those factors. The best way for monetary policy to contribute to high growth and employment is therefore to improve the long-term growth potential via low inflation. To achieve its objective, the Riksbank uses its instrumental rate, the repo rate. If the Riksbank’s monetary stance is unduly expansionary, that is, if the repo rate is too low to ensure macroeconomic balance, in time the economy will be liable to overheat. Demand then grows more rapidly than production capacity and this generates inflationary pressures.

That is certainly true in the sense that we are able to raise the interest rate and ensure that inflation comes into line with our target. But the picture as presented is too rosy. If wage formation were to fail or budget policy became excessively expansionary, the restoration of a balanced economy would be costly: growth would be depressed and employment would presumably fall when interest rates are raised, accompanied perhaps by an appreciation of the krona. In this sense, access to a national monetary policy is not a patent remedy. At the same time, it is clear that we – as a member of the monetary union – would lose the option of guaranteeing low inflation even by having recourse to this costly cure. For example, if the labour market organisations were to make unduly high wage settlements or if fiscal policy were to get out of hand, the Riksbank would no longer be in a position to secure low inflation. To me, however, it is by no means clear that the natural conclusion today is to begin arguing that Sweden ought not to aim for euro area participation as soon as there is political support. Compared with a couple of years ago, the economic situation is now more stable in almost every respect. It is not only that the economy has adjusted in various ways to lower inflation; government finances have also improved and during the past year employment has risen rapidly.
Luis M Linde: United Kingdom and Spain – assessing current issues Intervention by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the dinner opening the 25th Tertulias Hispano-Británicas, Madrid, 26 October 2012. *  *  *  Almost a quarter of a century back, following the visit by her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II to Madrid in 1988, a group of Spanish and British diplomats, politicians, academics and civil servants had an excellent idea. They took advantage of the Gibraltar dispute not to further cool relations between Spain and the United Kingdom, or to squabble some more, but rather to seek to be closer friends and try and understand one another better. Today marks the 25th edition of the Tertulias. Let me welcome all those taking part, firstly and especially our British friends, who honour us with their presence. A few days ago, perusing James Boswell’s legendary book on the life of Samuel Johnson, one of European culture’s literary giants, I came across several paragraphs in which Boswell relates Dr Johnson’s interest in Spain. He was convinced that Spain was a greatly unknown country in England and in Europe, and he suspected it could teach much to those taking the trouble to travel there. Samuel Johnson made this statement around the mid-1760s. Today, Spain is no doubt much better known in the United Kingdom than in Johnson’s time, as it is also the case for the United Kingdom being better known in Spain.

of PopulaBanking PopulaBanking Outlets tion per tion Density Branch (All ('00,000) Banks) *  Province  Banking Population Density per Branch  1  Colombo  415  24.56  16.90  5,918.07  2  Gampaha  174  21.40  8.13  12,298.85  3  Kalutara  89  11.11  8.01  12,483.15  4  Matale  38  4.77  7.97  12,552.63  5  Kandy  96  13.80  6.96  14,375.00  6  Nuwara Eliya  46  7.42  6.20  16,130.43  7  Galle  78  10.52  7.41  13,487.18  8  Matara  70  8.13  8.61  11,614.29  9  Hambantota  50  5.52  9.06  11,040.00  10  Jaffna  40  5.99  6.68  14,975.00  11  Killinochchi  4  1.46  2.74  36,500.00  12  Mullativu  4  1.47  2.72  36,750.00  13  Mannar  5  1.01  4.95  20,200.00  14  Vavuniya  8  1.66  4.82  20,750.00  15  Ampara  42  6.15  6.83  14,642.86  16  Batticaloa  20  5.23  3.82  26,150.00  17  Trincomalee  18  3.55  5.07  19,722.22  18  Kurunegala  101  15.24  6.63  15,089.11  19  Puttalam  53  7.52  7.05  14,188.68  20  Anuradhapura  66  8.01  8.24  12,136.36  21  Polonnaruwa  34  3.95  8.61  11,617.65  22  Badulla  71  8.50  8.35  11,971.83  23  Monaragala  35  4.25  8.24  12,142.86  24  Kegalle  68  8.02  8.48  7.42 13,485.71  25  Ratnapura  72  10.86  6.63  11,794.12 Sabaragamuw a 15,083.33  1,697  200.10  8.48  11,791.40  8.48 11,791.40  Total * Branches only  BIS Review 40/2008  Western  11.88  8,417.40  Central  6.93 14,438.89  Southern  8.19 12,207.07  Northern  5.26 19,000.00  Eastern  5.36 18,662.50  North Western  6.77 14,779.22  North Central  8.36 11,960.00  Uva  8.31 12,028.30  Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka  3  Table I shows that as at the end of 2007, there were 678 banking outlets in the Western Province out of a total branch network of 1,697 in the whole country.
For Basel II, it runs to 333 pages plus another 76 pages for Basel 2.5. As for Basel III, insofar as it covers capital (and not liquidity), it is 562 pages (including as it does Basel II and 2.5 on the capital side). In the USA, the Dodd-Frank Act runs to over 800 pages with probably in excess of 10,000 pages of subsidiary rules expected  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  eventually. Haven’t we hit the limit here of what might be considered optimal or indeed sensible? Should we rethink whether adding complexity to the regulatory system is the only effective way of reducing the risks of complexity in the financial system? Is there any room to inject an element of a more principle based, common sense, approach in bank regulation and supervision? I know that the main proponents of “Less is More”, such as Andy Haldane, are not here today, but I hope there will be some discussion of this important issue of complexity at the Forum tomorrow. Need to avoid a race to the bottom? 12. Apart from reflecting on risk management and the increasing complexity of regulation, I would also like to invite you to join me in rethinking what the banking industry is really about. To me, banking is all about trust and confidence. Our citizens entrust their hard-earned savings to banks and, as a society, we allow banks to use depositors’ money to fund productive enterprises and other investments.

These possibilities are why the Bank has already taken a number of steps to encourage FinTech’s development. 4  For a summary of the new regulatory arrangements see “Changes to the Bank of England”, Murphy, E. and Senior, S, Quarterly Bulletin Article (Q1 2013). 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  The PRA and the FCA have changed their authorisation processes to support new business models. The New Bank Start-Up Unit, created in 2016, works closely with firms seeking to become banks. Already, four new ‘mobile’ banks have been authorised. 5  The Bank also established a FinTech Accelerator last year. Since then, we have worked with a number of firms on proofs of concept ranging from strengthening our cyber security to using AI for regulatory data, and improving our understanding of distributed ledgers. Today we are opening our 4th round of applications to the Accelerator. We are looking to work on new proofs of concept on maintaining privacy in a distributed ledger and applying a range of big data tools to support the Bank’s analysis. 6  More broadly, the Bank is working to ensure that this time the right hard and soft infrastructure are in place to allow innovation to thrive while keeping the system safe. Let me expand briefly with three examples. The Right Soft Infrastructure First, with respect to soft infrastructure, the Bank is assessing how FinTech could change risks and opportunities along the financial services value chain.
In that context, we have been lucky enough to be able to let the use of these policies to decant and wait for evidence to accumulate on the effectiveness of 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  various tools so we can conduct an educated analysis on how to progress in the implementation of this type of policies in our country. Although one can still question conceptually the need to have a macroprudential framework in place from a cost-benefit perspective, I think it is important to recognize that the macroprudential agenda has gained ground in the international debate, and is increasingly a part of the framework of stabilization policies that are inherent to a modern, financially integrated economy. Accordingly, there are reasons of substance and form that suggest that in the coming years we will need to take determined action and progress in the implementation of a macroprudential policy framework in Chile. It is worth noting, however, that although we have monitored from a distance the widespread recent use of new tools with macroprudential purposes, both the conduct of economic policy in our country and its financial regulation and supervision already contain several macroprudential aspects. To begin with, the Central Bank of Chile is constitutionally mandated to safeguard the stability of domestic and external payments. As there is a clear link between the payment system and the financial system, this mandate has been interpreted as extending to the stability of the financial system.

Even though we do not consider it particularly attractive (since we have an open capital account) or efficient – and those are the reasons why we have not used it in the last 15 years – its use cannot be ruled out under exceptional circumstances. Our powers as a financial regulator also include other dimensions that some countries have used as part of their prudential toolkit. For instance, the CBC determines the level of reserves to be kept by banks that take deposits from the public during an operating cycle (reserve requirement) and the interest yield of such resources. Several jurisdictions (e.g. China and Peru) have controlled credit growth and currency composition by imposing differentiated reserve requirements. Moreover, the CBC has the authority to regulate the relations that should exist between assets and liabilities of commercial banks, which have led to our standards of liquidity and market risks. In a nutshell, our current regulatory and legal framework, as well as the actions of financial regulators and supervisors, including the Central Bank of Chile and the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions, contains elements that are consistent with a financial stability and macroprudential approach, and grants powers that may be used with these purposes if deemed necessary. 5. Final thoughts  The recent financial crisis was a reminder, especially for the developed world, of how costly a financial crisis can be and how important it is to minimize their probability of occurrence and costs, by explicitly safeguarding financial stability.
One thing that we have learned from this episode of financial turmoil is that, no matter how well maintained the domestic financial environment may be, problems remain in our increasingly liberalised international financial system that cannot be resolved by individual jurisdictions alone. There is a need for regional and international co-operation. Hong Kong has not, of course, been alone in this view. There is now international consensus that something needs to be done, if not on what exactly should be done, in reforming the international financial architecture. Financial Crisis: Local, Regional or International The financial crisis is basically an international one, and I think it is now generally accepted as such. But, when the financial crisis erupted nearly two years ago in Thailand, and even when it was already spreading rapidly throughout the region, the explanations put forward by the experts then were largely local ones: macro-economic imbalances in the crisis-hit countries, cronyism, poor regulation, policy errors, and so on. Consistent with these explanations, the assumption was that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the multilateral development banks would fix it country by country, as they had done before in other localised crises elsewhere in the world. We therefore saw a series of policy adjustment programmes and financing packages targeting specific economies. These international financial institutions deserve much credit - far more than they have received - for mobilising, sometimes in a matter of days, financing packages totalling $ billion.

But this process can take too long. There is always the risk that when the dust has settled the initiative and enthusiasm, dare I say, on the part of those less affected by the crisis, may be stifled. There is also the risk that the plight of those who have been seriously affected by the crisis is not given the attention it deserves, simply because they do not have an adequately representative voice on the issues at hand at these international forums. There is no lack of ideas, but they need to be translated into actions sooner rather than later. Let me take this opportunity to outline three broad approaches mooted at different forums and supported by us. The first approach involves enhancing the transparency of markets. Timely and reliable information relevant to decision making by market participants as well as by the regulatory authorities is crucial to the effective functioning of a market. It is thus important that there should be an adequate public disclosure framework to provide information that is necessary for counter-parties, creditors and investors to assess risks properly. Not only should increased transparency be promoted in markets trading products in an established exchange. It is also perhaps time to consider whether some suitable form of transparency requirements should be imposed in OTC markets. This is not an easy task, but I believe that with earnest international co-operation, we can achieve meaningful results.
In exchange for receiving valuable operating benefits, a bank’s implicit codes of conduct-that is, its culture-must reflect the public dimension of the services that banks provide. Third, the reform of bank culture should aim to restore trust.7 The bedrock of the financial system is trust and the word credit derives from the Latin notion of believing or trusting. We saw seven years ago that the public’s trust is critical in a crisis. The repair of the financial system would not have been possible without public support. If another crisis were to happen tomorrow, would there be that support? A lack of trust-or, more accurately, low trustworthiness-also imposes day-to-day costs.8 For starters, there are fines. Then there are the legal costs in investigating allegations and defending lawsuits. Internal monitoring also becomes more expensive as rules become more extensive. Some might say that the proliferation of rules since the Financial Crisis is inversely proportional to a decline in the industry’s perceived trustworthiness. The choice between rules and standards depends on the trustworthiness of the regulated. A more flexible, standardsbased legal regime requires a degree of trustworthiness that, in recent years, banks have not demonstrated. Those are the measurable costs of low trustworthiness. There may be other, longer-term costs that are more difficult to price. Let me raise just two. If employees perceive a firm as  6  E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual Report, January 1983.

They have undertaken reforms in the areas most important for competitiveness, growth and the sustainability of public finances such as labour markets, products markets, social security, pension systems, etc. These reforms are a prerequisite for dynamic and sustainable growth in the future and they must be vigorously pursued. In addition to this very clear determination at the different national levels to reduce deficits and introduce the necessary reforms, Europe has equipped itself with a new disciplinary framework. The Heads of State signed a new fiscal compact over a year ago that fixes very strict rules and gives very extensive powers to the European Commission to assess the compliance of Member States. This new compact goes hand in hand with the introduction of rules for monitoring macroeconomic imbalances. It is important to understand what these institutional advances represent: in effect, they represent a new Treaty creating very strong commitments for the States via rules that are far better calibrated and far more binding than those in place when European monetary union began. 3. Monetary Union is to be enhanced with a banking union  As well as being a year that saw a considerable strengthening of fiscal and macroeconomic discipline in Europe, 2012 also saw significant progress towards a banking union. Why has a banking union suddenly become such an indispensable and urgent project? Simply because we are now certain that many of the problems we have experienced could have been avoided with a banking union.