samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In 2006, in order to create a more conducive external sector environment for both local and foreign investors, the Exchange Control Department also initiated the following several measures: •  Facilitating non-resident investments in government securities  •  Introducing two new foreign currency accounts to expand incentives available for professionals who earn foreign exchange and for the suppliers of inputs to BOI companies who help to save foreign exchange. •  Authorized dealers have been permitted to open and operate Treasury Bond Investment External Rupee Accounts (TIERA) in commercial banks in Sri Lanka, in order to facilitate the fund transfers in purchasing treasury bonds by non-residents. 4. Challenges in meeting price and economic stability and financial system stability in 2007 and beyond  Sri Lanka, being a small open economy, continues to face external shocks arising from global political and economic developments, domestic disturbances and natural disasters. At the same time, while the emergence of South Asia as a new force in the world economy would provide new opportunities for Sri Lanka to achieve higher economic growth, the geopolitical uncertainties that would impact global economic stability would probably pose a threat to meeting external sector targets in 2007 and beyond, and therefore would need close monitoring. Two of the more significant challenges that would have to be faced in 2007 would be the impact of possible high and volatile international oil prices, as well as the security concerns in the country. The impact of high oil prices is manifold.

Based upon the aforementioned assumptions and trends, the Reserve money target for end 2007 has been computed by allowing the necessary increase from that as targeted at the end 2006 value to accommodate the expected GDP growth of 7.5 per cent, inflation of 8.5 per cent, and an extra 1.6 per cent to cover the change in velocity, a total of 17.6 per cent. The Broad money (M2b) target too, has been computed by applying the properties of the Quantity Equation, the inflation target and expected economic growth 3 . The Reserve money growth will be facilitated by two major developments, the change in the Net Foreign Assets and the change in the Net Domestic Assets of the Central Bank. The Net Foreign Assets of the Central Bank have been determined by the expected BOP surplus of US dollars 200 million. As already explained, the planned monetary programme requires the Reserve money growth to be maintained at 17.6 per cent from the targeted level of Reserve money as at the end of 2006. At the same time, the expected reserve build up of the Central Bank indicates an increase in Net Foreign Assets of the Central Bank by Rs. 21 billion while the Net Credit to the Government from the Central Bank will increase by Rs 11.5 billion, which includes provisional advances of Rs 12.5 billion, and a decline of Treasury bills by Rs. 1.0 billion. 3  A crucial factor in developing the monetary programme is the assumptions in velocity of money and money multiplier.
1 These new products are currently available in German and French; from autumn 2016, they will also be available in English and Italian. All this information may also be accessed via our main website, www.snb.ch. “Our National Bank” helps us to fulfil one of our statutory tasks – informing the public about our activities. The new platform replaces “The world of the National Bank”, which has provided the general public with information until now. We hope that this new resource will prove useful to you, too, in one way or another. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Fritz Zurbrügg, who will present this year’s Financial Stability Report. 1  4  The Our National Bank brochure can be accessed in the form of a pdf file at our.snb.ch or ordered through library@snb.ch. BIS central bankers’ speeches

Despite the general consensus that the obstacles to union in this region now are greater than they were for Europe 50 years ago, I have a feeling that Asia will not take quite so long. I am not offering to make a bet on this, mainly because I do not think that many of us in this room will be around long enough to see how many years it really does take. But one reason that makes me think that Asia will not take so long is that we have a successful model to look to, which brings me to the main question: "Can the euro be a benchmark for Asian monetary co-operation?". My answer to this question is a resounding "yes". The creation of the euro has shown that effective monetary union can be achieved in a voluntary and co-operative way by countries with different economic, political and cultural traditions. While, as I have suggested in the discussion about "special considerations", there may be different ways of achieving a similar goal in Asia, the euro provides a precedent, a point of reference, a large realm of experience and expertise, and - I would certainly agree - a benchmark for any enterprise in monetary co-operation that we might wish to embark on in this region. BIS Review 19/2005  3
The financial market liberalization made the monetary policy effectiveness increasingly dependent on market expectations for the interest rate policy, which additionally raised the need for developed central bank communication with the public to the degree of necessity. As an illustration of the central bank communication in the past, and what it is today, I would remind you that the world’s largest central bank – the FED, publicly announced the decision on interest rates for the first time in 1994. Today, it seems unreasonable 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  for a central bank not to announce its decision on the interest rate. The recent global economic crisis has once again affirmed the necessity of developed communication and transparency and has been an incentive for many central banks to ensure proactive approach in promoting their transparency. Today, as the ECB President, Mario Draghi, emphasized, “the central bank communication is actually a monetary policy tool in itself”. Besides the numerous monetary instrument innovations aimed to stabilize the financial markets and encourage the economy, central banks have begun to struggle to improve the quality and quantity of communication of their measures, including their future measures. Namely, the central banks not only tried to better explain the measures they took and the reasons for doing this, but also reported on the future measures (monetary policy set-up), which is an important novelty in the central banking operations. Why is all this necessary?

Anita Angelovska Bezoska: Journalists are one of the main transmitters of monetary policy messages Address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the Journalist Workshop - 2018, organized by the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 25 December 2018. * * * Distinguished media representatives,  Welcome to the fourth Journalist Workshop hosted by the NBRM. I am glad to see you in greater numbers this year, which is confirmation of your interest in the topics that will be the focus of today’s event. Allow me to take a brief look at several basic, yet important aspects of central bank communication: 1. Why is central bank transparency and communication important and needed? 2. How has central bank communication evolved over the years? What were the challenges in the period after the outbreak of the global crisis and how were they addressed globally? 3. Challenges in central bank communication in the Republic of Macedonia. A comparison between the current and the past transparency level and central bank communication shows an exceptional transformation in this segment. The need for strengthening central bank transparency was brought to the fore for the first time in the 1990s, implying enhanced communication with the public, including the media. This change is associated with the concept of central bank independence, or the independence of the monetary policy from fiscal policy.
The Board assesses the key rate at monetary policy meetings within these four months on the basis of the approved strategy. The Bank thus gives the market some indication of the upcoming monetary policy decisions. As from last November, we took this process one step further and published our own forecast for the interest rate three years ahead. This means that we have now in a sense “assumed ownership” of the interest rate in our projections. Chart 3 shows the interest rate forecasts in the previous Report, published a few weeks ago. BIS Review 26/2006  1  Forecasts for inflation, output, the interest rate and other variables are based on an assessment of the current situation and a perception of how the economy works. There is substantial uncertainty associated with future interest rates, as illustrated in the fan charts. 1 While we assumed the interest rate to be constant through the forecasting period in 2001 and 2002, our projections were based on market expectations in 2003 and up to November last year. On some occasions we stated that it was our view that the interest rate would move on a different path than that indicated by market expectations. For example, in June 2004 we stated that “the most appropriate alternative now seems to be that the interest rate should be kept unchanged for a longer period than indicated by market expectations”.

In a period of increasing cross-border labour flows, substantial technological advances, changes in competitive conditions and new trade patterns, we may, with our very open economy, have to accept a somewhat greater variability in inflation and deviations from the target, as we have witnessed over the past two to three years. Thank you for your attention! 4  BIS Review 26/2006
•  In any event, compliance processes should clearly spell out the roles of independent control personnel and provide for appropriate separation of duties. A key point to make is that,  2  BIS Review 76/2006  regardless of the compliance risk management framework employed, business line managers continue to "own" the compliance risk in their areas and should suffer real consequences in the event of compliance failures. This responsibility cannot fall just on the independent compliance functions. Emerging practices - such as when firms explicitly factor internal compliance metrics into management compensation or into the allocation of capital among business areas - will underscore compliance accountability even further. •  Rounding things out, management information systems should be in place to adequately monitor and assess compliance risks. For example, the sophistication of monitoring for money laundering is rapidly increasing. Institutions are using specialized software and MIS reports to detect patterns of transactions that warrant investigation, to identify accounts that are the subject of repeated suspicious activity reports, and to build better escalation protocols. A key take-away from this is that compliance professionals must be on top of technological advances that would allow them to do their jobs more effectively. Turning more specifically to the operations of foreign banks in the US - a question we are sometimes asked is whether there is, from our perspective, a best way to structure the relationship between the locally-based compliance functions and the rest of the organization.

However, as I have mentioned in the past when referring to public policies in general, the different social and economic transformations that we advocate and support have transitory costs and affect the public at large in different ways. The digitalisation phenomenon in banking is a good example of these adverse and uneven effects. Something that will deliver great benefits for society overall in the medium term may, nevertheless, entail costs and lead to frustration, inconvenience or even exclusion for certain population groups, as a result of the difficulty or inability to adapt to these changes. These are real problems, as the testimonies we have received from many members of the public in recent months show. Some of these individuals are here with us today and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for putting together this information and bringing it to the attention of the authorities. As I say, these problems are real and, as such, require real solutions. The Protocol that the banking sector is presenting here today must, of course, be part of the solution. It provides specific answers for individuals with fewer digital skills or difficulties in accessing these new channels and thus require more support and assistance in the digital transition. Naturally, we will have to analyse the practical implementation and sufficiency of the protocol in the coming months.
First, agents will need to build their capacity to analyse consumer needs and risk profiles, and be able to match them efficiently to suitable products or combinations of products that are appropriate to the consumer. In practical terms, this has significant implications for the information systems that agencies need to develop and maintain, the training, development and recruitment programs that they have in place, and the kind of information and support that they need to secure from insurers to enable them to properly advise consumers. The role of agents is especially important for an orderly transition to a more liberalized environment. A deeper understanding of risks developed by agents can help address information gaps in the earlier stages of transition and prevent premiums from over or undershooting their technical levels. This in turn will reduce future volatility in premiums which is important to build confidence in the ability of insurers to meet their promises as expected. Consumers should also be informed that in the first year of transition, they can continue to maintain the same motor insurance coverage at prevailing tariff-rates. This is to provide an opportunity for the public to familiarize themselves with new product options that will become available – a process that agents will play a key role in helping with. Second, agents need to be able to provide higher and more unique value in their services, and they need to be able to do this in a highly flexible way.

It will improve incentives for safe driving behaviours and better risk management practices by both risk owners and insurers. And it will address market distortions which have threatened access to motor insurance, particularly for higher risks. This is also a time when businesses and households are facing rising costs and more uncertain conditions which can adversely affect discretionary spending on insurance. At the same time, the exposures of households and businesses which insurance is designed to protect, have actually increased as evidenced by more frequent and severe incidents of natural and man-made disasters. All of these developments raise critical questions for insurance agents. One question that comes up time and again is: Will insurance agents continue to be relevant? If you are in this room today, then I assume you will agree with me that the answer is clearly ‘yes’. But I believe you are also here because there is a recognition that agents will have to evolve. Even if some of you were not completely convinced of this before, that reality surely can no longer be ignored or dismissed. So the more important question then is how agents can be a meaningful part of this change in order to advance the important benefits of insurance for the economy and the wider society? Today in Malaysia, the general insurance penetration level measured in terms of premiums as a share of GDP stands at less than 2% (1.68% as at end 2015).
In  particular, any situation should be avoided whereby for a prolonged period of time an NCB’s net equity is below the level of its statutory capital or is even negative” (ECB 2022, Section 2.2). 22 [30]  Figure 13. Central banks’ balance sheet totals Per cent of GDP  Note. GDP is calculated as the sum of the present quarter and the three previous quarters. For any quarter(s) that GDP has not yet been published, the most recently published GDP statistics are used. Sources: Eurostat, Japanese Cabinet Office, Statistics Sweden, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, U.K. Office for National Statistics, US Bureau of Economic analysis, respective central bank and the Riksbank. It is difficult to compare the accounts of different central banks because different accounting principles are applied in different countries. Many of the other central banks use accounting principles that mean that changes in value have a slower impact on reported earnings. The increase in interest rates this year will thus be reflected directly in the Riksbank’s annual accounts, but will be spread over many years for some other central banks. Moreover, some central banks, such as the Bank of England, have an agreement with their government that the effects on the results of asset purchases should be entered in the government budget, without affecting the performance of the central bank.43 Nordström and Vredin (2022) nevertheless attempt an overview of the effects on the results of the central banks’ monetary policy motivated holdings.

For example, housing prices rose rapidly in many other countries, and also in countries where central banks did not purchase mortgage  14 [30]  bonds (see Figure 10).25 A more important explanation for the price increase was probably that demand for housing increased during the pandemic, when many began planning for a future where they could work from home to a greater extent.26  Asset purchases should have been concluded earlier However, whatever measures were behind this development, I believe that we could have responded to this information in autumn 2020. I am thinking in particular of our monetary policy meeting in November 2020, when we decided to extend and prolong the asset purchase programme. The main elements of the change were that the framework for the total purchases of assets under the programme was extended from SEK 500 billion to SEK 700 billion and that purchases would continue until the end of 2021 instead of the end of the first half of 2021. At this time, it was still very uncertain how the pandemic would develop and how it would in turn affect the economy. Although the economy had begun to recover after the closures during the start of the pandemic, the spread of infection had gained new momentum in the run-up to the monetary policy meeting and uncertainty in the financial markets increased again.
Thorsten Beck, Tao Chen, Chen Lin and Frank M. Song (2016), “Financial innovation: the Bright and the Dark Sides”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 72, pp. 28– 51. 3 See, notably, Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, Thorsten Beck, “Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and  cause”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 46, Issue 1, August 2000, pp. 31–77 and Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, Finance and the sources of growth, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 58, Issues 1-2, 2000, Pages 261–300. 4 Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The aftermath of financial crises”, American Economic Review 99,  No. 2, 2009, pp. 466–472. Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor (2012), “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008”, American Economic Review, 102 (2): pp. 1029– 1061. Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef (2013), “An International Look at Growth of Modern Finance”, Journal of economic perspectives, 27, pp. 73–96. Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi (2015), “Why does financial sector growth crowd out real economic growth”, BIS working papers, 490. 5 Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring, “Disaster myopia in international banking", Essays in International  Finance, No. 164, 1986. 6 See notably Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes and Ugo Panizza, “Too Much Finance? ", Journal of Economic  Growth 20, 2015, p. 105–148. 7 Private non-financial sector debt as share of GDP, Q1 2017. Sources: Eurostat data, Federal Reserve, Banque  de France calculations. 8 Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, “Systemic banking crises database", IMF Economic Review, Vol.61, No.

And judging from their persistent low profitability and price-to-book ratios, developing sustainable business models remains a major challenge for many banks. One important element of this is misconduct, where the peak of the crisis for banks has arisen more slowly than the prudential crunch in 2008. It casts a very long shadow – most importantly, on the lives and livelihoods affected by unacceptable behaviour, but as a secondary effect on banks’ ability to generate sustainable returns and build capital internally. For example, in their 2015 results UK banks disclosed a further £ billion of provisions relating to past misconduct, which reduced their pre-tax profits by around one half. But this is only part of the picture – even leaving aside misconduct, many banks have simply not yet adapted to the new prudential constraints or the lower-rate environment. This is now a first-order issue for us as the PRA and FPC. A recent paper by Natasha Sarin and Larry Summers provides a useful reminder that on many market metrics the banking system still looks fragile, which they argue may be largely due to 6  weakened business franchises . While we have done a huge amount to repair the financial system in recent years, as supervisors we would be unwise to ignore these signals – we need to complete the implementation and give firms a proper chance to adapt to the new world. That’s what our forward-looking, judgement-based approach now requires.