samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is why we continue to invest a large amount of our time engaging with our counterparts in Europe as well as with the European Supervisory Authorities, the ESAs. We liaise closely with EIOPA, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. Julian Adams sits on the EIOPA Board of Supervisors and Management Board and this gives us an opportunity to participate at a European level. A few weeks ago, EIOPA reported on the critical issue of the long-term guarantees assessment and closed its consultation on proposals for preparatory guidelines. We now have acceptance that the classic matching adjustment is a prudent measure, which is hugely important for the UK life insurance industry. We know that many of you still have concerns around the restrictions built into the classic matching adjustment, particularly around the assets that can be used and the effect of possible downgrades in portfolios which are held for the long-term. We will continue to push for a prudent solution that will meet the needs of UK insurers and allows for the continued provision of annuities to policyholders. In doing so, we recognise that some restrictions are needed for the classic matching adjustment to be an effective and prudent measure. The importance of the EIOPA recommendations and their acceptance by the European Commission should not be underestimated. We have come a long way from the suggestion last year that a matching adjustment would not be part of the directive at all.

But the monetary policy of the Banque de France was backed by the people. Historically, what matters is that all future euro area countries, including France and Germany, cooperated very closely from the very outset to ensure convergence. Today, people throughout Europe are convinced of the importance of price stability. And they are also aware of the fact that being addicted to inflation is like being addicted to a drug that over time has extremely negative effects: stagnation and the destruction of jobs. FOCUS: Nevertheless, many experts are expecting prices to rise significantly again in the near future ... Trichet: We have made it very clear that we always take the decisions necessary to guarantee price stability over the medium term: an inflation rate below, but close to, 2%. Observers and market participants are fully aware of this. It is precisely because of the challenges posed by price stability that we stand ready for action at all times. I call that “credible alertness”. FOCUS: At the moment, the markets are addicted to cheap money – to low interest rates. Politicians, bankers and stock market traders have already become too used to this situation, and as a result the risk of inflation is on the rise. How do you intend to change this? Trichet: You can be sure that the European Central Bank will continue, as before, to maintain price stability. Keeping inflation expectations solidly anchored – in line with our definition of price stability – protects us against the materialisation of both inflationary and deflationary risks.
They attempt to harmonize legislation and the regulatory tools which become imperatives, worldwide, against financial crime and terrorist financing. At the same time, let us not forget that terrorists too, learn from each other. Sometimes the learning and co-operation may be direct. At other times, it could be indirect. Perhaps they too, have workshops like what we are having today. On 31st January 1996, Tamil terrorist suicide cadres drove a 500 kg. explosive laden commercial truck into the Central Bank of Sri Lanka building. About 5 ½ years later, on 11th September 2001, Al Quaeda terrorist suicide cadres piloted 2 jet fuel laden commercial air crafts into the WTC Twin Towers in New York. The scale and the means employed may have been different, in the two instances. But the method was similar. So, let us remember that terrorists and terrorist financiers will also surely learn from each other and wreck havoc in our respective societies, and they too, must be, obviously trying their best to be ahead of us. Regulators need, therefore, to be constantly abreast of these methods, if not be ahead of them. We need to equip ourselves for this purpose by enhancing our capacity and processes to effectively meet the challenges of terrorism and terrorism financing. I am happy to say that Sri Lanka has made considerable headway in this regard.

The analysis and projections in this Report contribute to the understanding of how the Central Bank exercises its responsibilities, as well as the opportunities and challenges that we face together. We remain at your disposal to deepen this discussion. Thank you. ***  7  Figure 1 Quarterly GDP change (1) (2)  Imacec (1) (3)  (contribution, percentage points)  (quarterly change, percent)  2.0  2.0  2.4  1.5  1.5  1.8  2.4  Imacec  Other  1.8  non-mining GDP  1.0  1.0 EGA  0.5 0.0  Fishery  -0.5 2017Q1  2017Q3  1.2  1.2  No minero  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.5 -0.6  -0.6  2018Q1  15  16  17  18  (1) Seasonally-adjusted series. (2) Other includes trade, manufacturing, financial and entreprenurial services, construction, agriculture, transport&communications, housing services, personal services, public administration, VAT and import duties. (3) Moving quarters. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Challenges and dilemmas for central banks and financial regulators  Slide 16  ▪  FinTech is not necessarily a threat to a central bank  ▪  Smets (2016) | FinTech offers good opportunities to central banks coming from the cost reduction implied by the DLT  ▪  The ability to align FinTech developments with central bank objectives depends on the regulations issued by central banks and financial authorities  Developments vs stability and trust o Inclusiveness vs risk of uninformed decisions o Decentralization, choice and competition vs. operational efficiency, economies of scale and client knowledge o Personal credit assessment and privacy  Challenges and dilemmas for central banks and financial regulators [SLIDE 16] FinTech is not necessarily a threat to a central bank, no matter how striking the contrast between its sobriety and the exuberance of FinTech developers. The Governor of the National Bank of Belgium Jan Smets,4 has argued that FinTech offers good opportunities to central banks coming from the cost reduction implied by the “distributed ledgers” technology; in his opinion, the greatest revolution of FinTech. The ability to align FinTech developments with the objectives of inflation control and financial stability depends to a large extent on the regulations issued by central banks and financial  4  Smets, J. (2016), “FinTech and Central Banks,” speech delivered at the Conference “FinTech and the Future of Retail Banking,” Brussels, 9 December, 2016. 13  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  authorities themselves.

Banking services coverage: international comparison 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0  Adult population with debit or credit card (percent) 90  Debit  Adult population with savings in financial institutions (percent)  Credit  80 Saving accounts (% of pop > 15 yo)  70 Cards (% of pop > 15 yo)  Accounts in financial institutions (% of pop > 15 yo)  Adult population with any type of account in a financial institution (percent)  60 50 40 30 20 10 0  OECD High Middle Low  LAC  OECD High  Low  Slide 7  50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 LAC  OECD High  Low  All figures at the end of 2014. Source: SBIF (2016), “Financial Inclusion Report in Chile 2016”. [SLIDE 7] In middle and low-income countries, the proportion of population holding any type of account in a supervised financial institution under supervision amount to 37% and 20%, respectively. These figures are far below the 92% and 90% of OECD countries and high-income countries. The use of bank-intermediated debit and credit cards and savings in financial institutions follows a similar pattern. [SLIDE 8] Insurance services contribute to deepen the financial system due to their long-run investment perspective. Both life and non-life insurance is far less extended in emerging markets compared to high-income OECD countries.
However, in over two decades’ time, the ratio will deteriorate significantly to 2:1, which means that there will only be 2 persons in the age group of 15–64 supporting one elderly person. The Government has already made it clear that, while we are having budget surpluses, structural budget deficits will occur within a decade mainly due to changing demographic structure. 20. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have just made a long speech and now I would like to leave you with several key takeaways. First, it is very easy for governments to fall into the trap of going down the path of fiscal unsustainability as a result of the collective irresponsibility syndrome as well as population aging. Second, it is very, very hard and immensely painful to try to get out of a government debt crisis. Third, more likely than not, it is the next generation and the next and the next that will have to shoulder the costs and to suffer the pains for excessive spending and stock piling of debts by the current generation. If we don’t want to mortgage the future of our children and grandchildren, try not to leave with them a pile of debts as in the case of many developed countries. How can we do this : we must take great care in not demanding or condoning policies that would undermine the long-established fiscal prudence and discipline of our Government.

Structural reforms were also needed to correct earlier structural mistakes and restore our economic vitality. Whether the measures that have been taken up to the present are sufficient is a debatable issue; but the point I want to make is that a change of direction and some political action had already been initiated in the 1980s. The work has continued since then and been undertaken by governments of diverse political hues and personalities. In other words, something happened to Swedish economic policy in a wide sense in the late 1980s. When the immediate crisis had been managed in the early 1990s it was clear that the weak government finances would have to be tackled. Moreover, the independent status of our central bank has been formally confirmed, accompanied by a clear mandate. The floating exchange rate regime and the explicit target for price stability have worked well. Several segments of the Swedish economy have been deregulated, though less has been done in this way in the labour market than in markets for goods and services. But the labour market organisations have been working on their own account to improve the system for wage formation. As a result of all this, the Swedish economy is doing better than we have seen for a long time. The economic upswing has now continued for more than six years, during which annual GDP growth has averaged around 3%. And notwithstanding the strong growth of demand, inflation has been lower than one would expect from earlier relationships.
Those responsible for other policy areas are urged now even more to take the necessary steps to improve longer-term growth prospects for the euro area through strictly and decisively adhering to the aims of the Stability and Growth Pact and through convincing structural reforms in the economy. I should now like to inform you about some of the other matters considered today. The Governing Council examined the outcome of a test run of the production of euro banknotes. This so-called zero production run involved the printing works of the participating countries. The main purposes of this test were, first, to check the compliance of the test banknotes against the technical specifications and, second, to prove that all printing works are in a position to produce the euro banknotes to the same high quality standards. The result of this test was positive, as only some minor technical specifications need to be modified slightly. The printing works will now start their final preparations for the commencement of the mass production of the euro banknotes. The Governing Council also decided to establish an Analysis Centre for Counterfeit Euro Banknotes. As is already indicated by its name, the main purpose of this Analysis Centre will be to technically analyse and classify new types of printed counterfeits, and to store the related technical data in a database. The Analysis Centre will be located at the ECB in Frankfurt. We are now at your disposal should you have any questions.

Underlying this stable rate of price increases have been offsetting developments at the level of services and goods prices. In February, services price increases moderated further slightly, mainly owing to downward adjustments in prices 1  BIS Review 39/1999  in the telecommunication area. At the same time, goods prices contributed slightly more to overall HICP increases than before, due both to price developments for unprocessed food and a deceleration in the fall in energy prices. It may be worth noting that goods prices may continue to move upwards temporarily, in particular as oil prices increased strongly from mid-February onwards. Such movements reflect the higher volatility of price changes of some categories of goods, in particular imported oil and other commodities. The interest rate decision has been taken in a forward-looking perspective, focusing on the mediumterm trends in inflation and the compatibility of these trends with the Eurosystem’s definition of price stability. In the view of the Governing Council, monetary growth is - at the current juncture - not a risk for future price stability. The decision taken today keeps monetary policy on a longer-term stability-oriented course and, by doing so, contributes to creating an economic environment in which the considerable growth potential of the euro area could be exploited.
The Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III assets continue to generate substantial proceeds, which are distributed monthly to pay down the New York Fed’s Senior Loans to the respective Maiden Lane LLCs. While the New York Fed may direct its investment manager to sell Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III assets into the market at any time, as a practical matter, the value maximizing strategy has been largely to hold the assets to maturity while collecting interest income, and principal repayments. Currently, the hold-to-maturity expected proceeds of each LLC’s portfolio are greater than the LLC’s debt to the New York Fed. As of May 20, 2010, the balance on the New York Fed’s Senior Loan to Maiden Lane II was $ billion (inclusive of accrued interest), while the total asset value was $ billion. The balance on the New York Fed’s Senior Loan to Maiden Lane III was $ billion (inclusive of accrued interest), while the total asset value was $ billion. In sum, the LLCs have repaid approximately $ billion of the loans made to them by the Federal Reserve. Based on the current performance of both portfolios, as well as our analysis of forecasts provided by our investment advisor, it is anticipated that the proceeds from both portfolios will exceed the principal and interest due on the New York Fed’s Senior Loans to both Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III. We expect to recover our principal and interest on the loans to the LLCs, and on the Fed Facility.

So far, 21 APG Typologies Workshops have been held since the APG’s formation in 1997, where the last Workshop was held in 2018, jointly with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) in Russia. These Workshops have contributed to a better comprehension of prevalent money laundering and terrorism financing (ML/TF) threats in the region, by allowing members to understand latest trends, identify key red flags as well as sharing of information on possible counter-measures to respond to the threats. This has assisted members to take the hard decisions to prioritise, apply resources and put in place systems to effectively tackle financial crimes. With so much benefits, the APG is committed to continue holding the Annual Typologies Workshop so that members could keep abreast with the latest ML/TF trends and typologies. As you can see in the agenda, this year’s Workshop aims to discuss two key areas that were approved by the membership earlier. These two topics namely, Digital ID/e-KYC and Financing and Facilitation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, are timely given the current development in our region. Allow me to touch briefly on these two topics. Digital ID/e-KYC The rapid technology advancement in the last decade has led to significant innovations in the financial sector. Then came the COVID-19 pandemic, which has accelerated the need for financial institutions around the world to shift their operations onto the digitalised platforms. Digital ID/e-KYC is one such innovation and the authorities have responded accordingly.
José De Gregorio: Capital flows and the interaction between macroprudential policy and monetary policy Keynote speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Central Bank of Chile Annual Conference on “Capital Mobility and Monetary Policy”, Santiago, 17 November 2011. *  *  *  I am very grateful for comments and suggestions from Rodrigo Cifuentes, Kevin Cowan, Luis Oscar Herrera, Alejandro Jara, Ernesto Pastén and Claudio Raddatz. Welcome to the 15th annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, this time focusing on “Capital Mobility and Monetary Policy”. In this address, I will discuss the challenges of dealing with macroeconomic and financial instability in the context of inflation targeting in emerging economies and analyze the special case of capital inflows as a source of such macroeconomic and financial instability. The monetary policy framework based on inflation targeting and exchange rate flexibility has been successful in providing price stability and the conduction of countercyclical monetary policy over the last decades. Perhaps precisely because of this success, the “separability view”, that takes price stability and financial stability as independent goals, was the preferred policy framework before the global crisis in those countries that explicitly pursue financial stability as a policy goal.1 Nevertheless, the recent crisis and financial turmoil resulted in increasing awareness of the linkages (spillovers) between macro and financial stability, both at the national and the international level.

This calls for a revision of this view.2 In my remarks today, I would like to start by discussing some general issues regarding the linkages between price and financial stability and the linkages between monetary and macroprudential policy. In the second part of this talk, I will refer to the context of international capital flows and policy responses in a small open economy with inflation targeting, and the relation that monetary policy has to have with macroprudential policies in that context. Interactions between Monetary and Financial Policies Most central banks care not only about price stability, but also about financial stability. The goal for price stability is usually the main mandate of central banks, and is widely understood as maintaining low and stable inflation, which also reduces the deviations of output from its potential. However, the central bank’s mandate for preserving financial stability is less explicitly defined; probably in part because there is less agreement on what is financial stability and what should be considered an indicator of it. Broadly understood, it encompasses a stable and fundamental-driven credit and asset price growth, as well as the absence of large mismatches in the financial sector. It is not the purpose of my talk to narrow the definition of financial stability, so I will use the term in a broad sense. There is also the key distinction between micro and macro financial stability, and in most of what follows I will be focusing on the systemic aspects of financial stability, unless noticed otherwise.
Estimations showed that Romania’s deficit financing for 2009 could have ranged between EUR 7.5 billion and EUR 16 billion, dependent upon foreign investors’ sentiment and their willingness to roll over the credit lines extended to banks and private companies. This gloomy sentiment was reflected in the weakening of the leu during October 2008 – February 2009. In this context, the authorities have decided to implement policies aimed at ensuring minimum cuts in Romania’s foreign financing. As early as December 2008, the economic programme was envisaged to focus on narrowing the external deficit of both public and private sectors, containing the impact of recession, averting a currency crisis as well as on easing inflationary pressures. Attaining these objectives required the design of adjustment measures meant to bring the economy onto a sustainable path with minimal losses, including in terms of employment. Given the sudden stop of the massive capital inflow episode, the leu’s exchange rate developments posed serious challenges. While in the past foreign currency inflows generated the overappreciation of the leu well above the level indicated by exchange rate fundamentals, the reduction in external financing and the degree of uncertainty tended to result in the unwarranted depreciation of the leu. The challenges were all the more so great that, despite the heavy foreign currency purchases performed during 2005–2007, the NBR only managed to contain the unsustainable appreciation of the leu, instead of completely avoiding it.

Consequently, during 2005–2008 the NBR did not refrain from making discreet forex market interventions by purchasing considerable amounts of foreign currency so as to preclude the fast overappreciation of the leu, which was likely to cause a dangerous erosion of the Romanian economy’s external competitiveness and to lead to a fall in inflation, yet in an unsustainable manner. At this juncture, I should bring to the fore other arguments in favour of a managed float policy for the Romanian currency. The major reason underlying the NBR’s purchases of foreign  10  BIS Review 5/2010  currency consisted in the fact that the leu strengthened in both nominal and real terms, concurrently with an extremely loose wage policy in 2006 and especially in 2007. During those years, pay rises overtook productivity gains, thus reducing the previously accumulated competitiveness gains and contributing definitely to the worsening of the balance of payments current account. Another argument I would like to point out is of a precautionary nature. As it has been noticed in practice, the end of cycles of synchronous large capital inflows coincide with somewhat abrupt depreciation episodes, which can be avoided provided sufficient reserves are available. The pro-cyclical conduct of fiscal policy that added to the vulnerabilities associated with the widening of the current account deficit during 2004–2008 also underpinned the NBR’s purchases of foreign currency. In principle, fiscal policy may either cushion or magnify the undesired effects of large capital inflows.