samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, fintech initiatives to integrate social finance tools, such as waqf, sadakah and zakat, to offer more affordable financial and protection solutions, will be instrumental to serve those who are currently financially underserved or excluded. The integration of social finance into Islamic financial services encourages wealth distribution among society to achieve greater balance between wealth creation and wealth sharing. Ultimately, fintech in Malaysia should be harnessed to offer inclusive, sustainable and relevant financial products and services to serve the needs of all. The responsibility to manage the attendant risks This however means that we need to be cognisant of the potential risks associated with technology. This will be especially important as fintech and bigtech firms become more prominent in the financial system. Such firms could pose system-wide vulnerabilities that can amplify shocks to the financial system and cause financial and economic instability. Increasing reliance and concentration on third party service providers, including those located offshore, to support critical functions, could also increase operational vulnerabilities in more unpredictable ways The demands of society for speed, convenience and cost efficiency are at a point where substantial tensions already exist between pressures on financial institutions to accelerate the adoption of technology, and our capacity to manage those risks effectively. These tensions will only increase going forward. Managing these tensions at an optimal level will be critical.

We were fortunate that the need turned out to not be that great: $ billion of capital needed prior to capital actions already implemented and revenue generated during the first quarter of 2010; $ billion of capital needed after these first quarter actions.   We decided to apply the stress scenario on a consistent basis across all 19 banks. This entailed economists and bank supervisors working together to do analysis on both a top-down and bottom-up basis. This allowed us to generate aggregate estimates that made sense on an economywide basis. If we had just used the initial estimates supplied by the banks – we would have had a Lake Wobegon outcome – the banks would all have said that they were above average.   We specified the capital need in terms of dollars rather than in terms of a capital ratio. In other words, we did not allow banks the option of shrinking their risk-weighted assets in order to push up their capital ratios. We didn’t want banks to shrink to minimize the amount of capital needed because such behavior might have damaged the macroeconomy. I think this was an important macroprudential element of the SCAP.   Disclosure. This was hotly debated. There was no precedent for the disclosure of supervisory information. However, senior policymakers – including myself – thought disclosure was essential for the SCAP to be credible and we resolved to disclose extensive information. Disclosure allowed private-sector analysts to kick the tires and this was important.
In the UK, we have seen some signs, from the Bank’s Market Participants survey10 and the Decision Maker Panel survey of businesses, of expectations becoming more skewed to the right over 2022 relative to previous years, with a larger share of respondents expecting higher inflation in the medium term. There is a range of views among members of the MPC as to whether developments in inflation expectations and the potential for them to become de-anchored add to the other risks around the inflation outlook11. My concerns about the emergence and embedding of an inflationary mentality has been one of the factors contributing to my minority votes for a faster pace of tightening, first in February and again in September this year. 9  See The Burst of High Inflation 2021-22: How and Why Did we Get Here, Reis June 2022 and Losing the Inflation Anchor, Reis Oct 2021 10 See Market Participants Survey results – November 2022 | Bank of England 11 Inflation expectations, inflation persistence, and monetary policy strategy – speech by Catherine L. Mann | Bank of England  Bank of England  Page 10  Market reactions to UK monetary and fiscal policy  Global financial markets have been increasingly volatile over the last year, in particular as markets have responded to increased evidence of persistence in inflation and central banks’ policy actions and communications in reacting to it.

By restoring low inflation, consistent with its remit, the MPC can best contribute to securing stability and certainty, the foundations for sustainable growth. With thanks to Rupal Patel for her assistance in preparing these remarks, and to my fellow MPC members and numerous Bank colleagues, including Callum Ashworth, John Barrdear, Kieran Dent, Izzy Dought, Swasti Gupta, Zish Jooma, Zaar Khan, Simon Kirby, Nades Raviraj, Kate Reinold, Andrea Rosen, Harry Rigg, Saugata Sen, Fergal Shortall for their many helpful contributions.
A further question is whether there is a need to supplement existing rules and codes with more specific market-wide guidance or rules on acceptable market practice on a global basis for global markets. The regulatory perimeter is being extended in Europe, and codes covering foreign exchange markets are being updated. Market participants have nevertheless identified a range of market practices to the Review where they believe further guidance would be helpful. Put another way, is there more that we need to do to embed acceptable behaviours into participants’ rapid reaction “System 1” responses to situations of conflict? How can codes of conduct be given real ‘teeth’, whilst also remaining consistent with the many different national regulatory regimes and voluntary codes already in place? How can it be customised to the individual conditions in specific markets? How can it be couched in language that traders can immediately understand? And could it be owned by the industry – or does it ultimately need to be embedded in regulation, if necessary through an extension of the regulatory perimeter? 5. Responsibility, governance and incentives  The penultimate category in the table looks at how firms can ensure that standards, once set, are adhered to – through appropriate internal responsibility, governance and incentive mechanisms. It is clear that, in the run-up to the crisis, some firms active in FICC markets had allowed the culture on their trading floors to get out of control, combining weak controls with incentives focused heavily on short-term revenue performance.

W A Wijewardena: John Exter – central banker for all times Article by Mr W A Wijewardena, Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Sri Lanka, on the first anniversary of the death of Mr John Exter (Founder Governor of the Central Bank of Ceylon/Sri Lanka), issued to Sri Lankan newspapers, 28 February 2007. *  *  *  The first death anniversary of John Exter, Founder Governor of the Central Bank, falls on 28th of February. He died in 2006 after living a very productive life for 95 long years. John Exter can be regarded as one of the history makers in modern Sri Lanka. He lent his wisdom, intellect and experience, without any reservation, for the establishment of the Central Bank of Ceylon, the name of the Bank at that time. The Bank was established in 1950 on the basis of the recommendations made by him as a one man committee, the report of which is now known as the Exter Report. He made history once again by becoming the governor of that maiden bank at the young age of 39, an age normally considered as too low for that prestigious and demanding position. His task was to establish the bank, staff it and lead it in the first few formative years, so that it could eventually be taken over by a Sri Lankan management. His history making did not end there.
The second factor is the strong decrease of the price of oil after 2014 that lowered the inflation rate both directly, through the energy component of consumption prices, and indirectly. It is estimated that these two factors have led to a 1 pp decrease in the annual inflation rate. Unconventional monetary policy was successful in mitigating these disinflationary effects. Absent this  Page 6 sur 9 policy, in-house and ECB computations show that annual inflation would have been around 0.3pp lower between 2014 and 2019 (on average per year). After the onset of the pandemic, our monetary policy measures have also stabilized and then reversed the fall in inflation expectations. According to estimates from the ECB, all the measures taken since the beginning of the pandemic should contribute cumulatively around 1pp to the annual inflation rate over 2020-2022iv. Inflation expectations have picked up and long-term market based inflation expectations are currently above their pre-Covid levels (marketbased inflation expectations 5y/5y are close to 1.6% today). B. Beyond Covid, the ECB has a powerful “quartet of tools” to keep its monetary policy as accommodative for as long as necessary. Euro area HICP inflation increased to 1.6% in April 2021, from -0.3% in December 2020, while core inflation remained subdued at 0.7% in April and 0.2% at the end of last year. However, this rebound is primarily due to transitory factors and base effects, which are expected to fade out of annual inflation rates early next year.

The diagnosis is the same in the short-term derivatives market, whose integration, standardisation and depth have increased. This is reflected, for instance, in the scale of daily transactions and the huge expansion of the euro interest-rate swap market. These structural changes in the euro area money market have generated significant moves by market participants, who have concentrated within the euro area their euro cash management activity and have benefited from better liquidity on the secondary market. Of course, such integration has to be brought to fruition in the other segments of the money market, i.e. the repo market and the short-term securities market. Further integration will enhance the efficiency of the euro area financial markets and will be beneficial to borrowers and investors alike. –  With regard to the capital markets, progress towards integration has been significant, both on the euro-denominated bond market and the equity market. The gross issuance of long-term debt securities denominated in euro amounted to 791 billion euro in 1999, against the equivalent of 902 billion euro for debt securities denominated in US dollars. The pace of euro-denominated issues remained brisk in the first three quarters of 2000 at 498 billion euros. According to the Bank for International Settlements, euro-area private sector borrowers have issued about three quarters of their debt in euros since 1 January 1999, compared with an average of 50% in the predecessor currencies since during the 1990s.
•  This means that a fund manager authorised to manage a fund in one country can market the same fund in the other ASEAN countries. These are significant steps towards achieving an integrated ASEAN capital market. But they are not enough. In fact, it is like a bridge three-quarters completed. It marks good progress but is not quite useful until it is end-to-end. And end-to-end integration is what we need to fully realise the benefits of our efforts on the capital market front. ASEAN needs to continue enhancing linkages across its markets. •  We should build on the ASEAN Trading Link among Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore by further broadening and deepening post-trade linkages. •  Establishing clearing, settlement, and custody links will make the ASEAN Trading Link a full-fledged end-to-end platform across the three ASEAN markets. And with the progressive participation of the other ASEAN exchanges, we would have created a truly integrated ASEAN capital market – one that will: •  enhance trading volumes;  •  lower the cost of corporate fund raising;  •  provide investors with more choice and ease of access; and  •  enhance liquidity and stability in the market. Conclusion To achieve its potential, ASEAN must integrate further. Economic integration is a win-win proposition. By exploiting economies of scale and strategic complementarities, every country in ASEAN stands to gain.

We are not at this stage yet; however we are working hard in this direction. I should now like to say a few words about our immediate priority tasks. First, we are making sure the measures resulting from the asset quality review are strictly applied with a focus on the capital buffer replenishment plans as prescribed for some of the banks. Second, we are finalising the plan to further enhance the work of the banking supervision. That is a continuation of the plan we have been implementing for the last almost two years now and whose fulfilment has produced good results. The new accents are: internal regulations, 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  information systems, and increase of resources, including appointment of the additional number of people as provided for in the original plan, which, unfortunately, takes more time than we expected. Third, we adopted a combination of measures to make the already developed system for recovery and resolution of banks fully functioning. In this area we have prioritised two sets of measures: the approval of resolution plans for the systemically important domestic banks (something that we have already done for the subsidiaries of EU banks); and the joint work with the Ministry of Finance of possibilities for the BNB to provide liquidity support.
As Hong Kong has to import almost all the raw materials and equipment, devaluation of the currency does not mean that the export prices would necessarily be lowered by the same extent of the devaluation. As you know better than I do, although price is always important, competitiveness does not depend on price alone, whether or not you are talking about manufactured goods or services. Competitiveness depends on a host of factors, including better cost control, innovation, entrepreneurship, marketing and constant striving to achieve productivity gains. In this context, I cannot help tell an old, but true, story involving a conversation with an American friend 6 or 7 years ago, when the $ was depreciating and the DM and the Yen surging to new highs. He was complaining that many countries, including the Southeast Asian economies, were manipulating their exchange rates to gain trade competitiveness. As a result, American goods were having a hard time selling overseas because they were too expensive. I told him that, while it may or may not be true that some countries were deliberately keeping their exchange rates low, the apparent difficulty experienced by US manufacturers to penetrate the Asian markets was not caused by pricing alone. For example, how could the Americans expect to sell their refrigerators to Hong Kong households if most of the refrigerators they tried to sell were almost as big as the kitchen of an average flat here in Hong Kong?

This equilibrium rate has gone down – while in tandem the global economy has had to weather several major shocks, from the Global Financial crisis to the pandemic. Now, low inflation rates are being seen as just as much of a cause for concern and as a result, the target has now been set to 2% – over the medium-term – and the red flags are not only rates above that, but also rates below it. This decision was aimed at the possibility that the persistent low-inflation environment was being exacerbated by ambiguity about the level of the inflation aim and a perception of the aim being asymmetric. This decision was taken after an extensive assessment of the ECB’s unconventional monetary instruments, which looked at which ones were effective in raising output, employment and inflation – as well as how they affected each other. The new symmetric target is straightfoward, clear and unambiguous. This means that it will provide a more solid anchor for longer-term inflation expectations. In practice, it will require especially forceful or persistent monetary policy action in a way to avoid negative deviations from becoming entrenched. There was also discussion during the review with regards to the primary mandate and its context within the Treaty’s requirement to support the general economic and social policies of the European Union. The changes made to the monetary policy strategy will look at both aspects of this spectrum. Of course, the strategy review made other important changes.
The general wisdom was that the inevitable direction of the Hong Kong dollar under a freer exchange rate would be to depreciate. The result would be an end to deflation, a boost to economic growth, a reduction in unemployment, and the elimination of the budget deficit. In fact, all of our problems would be cured - and rapidly - by this single panacea. BIS Review 44/2003  1  If only things could be so simple! But, of course, they are not. I have spoken and written at length on other occasions about the huge risks to financial and social stability that we would expose ourselves to in following such a course. Financial markets have a habit of overshooting and precipitating financial crises that are very costly to the community. And it seems, from recent events, that the very premise on which this panacea of exchange rate depreciation is based may be seriously flawed. For the market exchange rate of the Hong Kong dollar has strengthened over the past two or three weeks to the extent that it has been necessary for the HKMA to inject liquidity into the system in order to dampen excessive volatility. The market has, all of a sudden, chosen to ignore the continuing problems of deflation, unemployment and budget deficit, and the possible implications of these for the exchange rate. The clear message from the market now is that, were the Hong Kong dollar to be allowed to float, its exchange rate would rise rather than fall.

Like the 70% guideline, the Link is maintained over the longer term for the greater economic well-being of our community, even though it might seem tempting from time to time to try to use monetary policy for short-term tactical gains. In fact, although the spotlight tends, quite understandably, to be on newsworthy issues - bank rescues, intervention in the stock market, the latest Exchange Fund results, the "alarming" strengthening of the Hong Kong dollar - much of the work of any central bank has to be focused on the longer term, on the implementation of sustainable, consistent, dependable policies on a horizon that lies well beyond the daily concerns of most of us. For this reason the general consensus is that a central banking institution must be somewhat set apart from the daily workings of government and politics. The HKMA, as Hong Kong's central banking institution, has, throughout the 10 years of its existence so far, always had a special position as an organisation that is a part of the Government and yet operates at some distance from the Government proper. This relationship between the HKMA and the Government has recently been set out in a series of documents produced in response to suggestions from within Hong Kong and recommendations by the IMF that the roles of various senior officials involved in monetary and financial affairs should be set out more clearly.
In line with this, today I would like to share how we at the Bank of England are looking to the future to ensure our systemically important payment systems are robust and resilient, their underlying infrastructure is best in class, and our regulatory toolkit remains fit for purpose and future-proof. NPSO: A mandate to be greater than the sum of its parts Payment systems, by their very nature, bring together participants that would otherwise transact bilaterally. Crucially, by doing so, they promote increased efficiency and resiliency that is enjoyed by all. They manage  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  risks, eliminate intermediate arrangements and related costs at the back-end of the payments value chain, and provide functionality that enables innovation to proliferate at the front-end. As described in our Annual 1  Report this year , financial market infrastructure, including payment systems, exist to reduce the risks and costs involved when participants make payments. And this leads me to the NPSO and its creation. The PSF, established by the Payment Systems Regulator (PSR) in March 2015, proposed the consolidation of the UK retail interbank payment system operators: Bacs 2  and Faster Payments, as well as the Cheque and Credit Clearing Company . The Bank was engaged closely with the work of the Forum and was supportive of this change as we could see the potential for the consolidated scheme to be greater than the sum of its constituent parts.

Whenever I speak with colleagues from other countries, I stress that only national authorities can decide when to adopt Basel II. Members of the Basel Committee believe that it is beneficial to move in the direction of Basel II, but no country should adopt Basel II if it feels that it is not yet ready. If a country does decide to adopt Basel II, the timing should be determined by its own circumstances, not the timetable for Basel Committee members. I hope you will pardon my pronunciation, but I am told that there is a Turkish proverb that says “hamama giren terler,” or “he who enters a Turkish bath sweats.” If I understand correctly, the point of this proverb is that you should understand the consequences of your actions. If the result is to be very positive, some work and thus some sweat is required. I don’t know whether adopting Basel II is similar to entering a Turkish bath, but I do know that it is important to understand that this is a high-quality and demanding standard. Unlike the 1988 Accord, which was relatively simple to adopt, Basel II is more complex and demands more of banks and supervisors. Therefore, we don’t expect Basel II to be adopted as widely and quickly as the 1988 Accord, at least at the outset. However, we do believe it is appropriate for all economies, and we expect and hope that the number of countries that adopt the new framework will grow over time.