samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To go beyond this first step, we need to build a regulatory framework adapted to the specificities of DeFi. In my view, when designing this framework we should not try to replicate existing financial regulations at all costs. On the contrary, it could be advantageous to draw inspiration from regulations in other sectors. For example, one could imagine setting rules on "products" even when their "producer" or "issuer" is not clearly identified. In addition, we have to recognise the technical specificities of decentralised finance and pay a particular attention to the three layers (blockchains, applications and access gates) that schematically constitute DeFi. First, we should evaluate the resilience of the blockchain infrastructure supporting DeFi. That leads to an open question: can public blockchains provide the right level of security, and if so, how? Second, we need to address the security of the applications, on which DeFi "services" are provided. A logical avenue for regulation would be to define the perimeter of protocols that are deemed "secure", i.e. whose computer code has been certified. Of course, this leads to many subsequent operational issues that deserve careful analysis. 2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Third, we should regulate access to DeFi, in order to protect users, and in particular individual customers. Intermediaries – or "access points", whatever their form – who provide access to DeFi should comply with rules of good conduct, and be subject to a duty of care and advice as well as KYC requirements, when necessary.

Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid: Keynote address - Islamic Financial Market Forum Keynote address by Mr Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Standard Chartered's Islamic Financial Market Forum, Kuala Lumpur, 14 March 2023. *** CEOs, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Assalamualaikum w.b.t and a very good morning. The Financial Sector Blueprint 2022–2026 sets out what BNM's development priorities are for the financial sector over the next five years. In its third iteration, Islamic finance remains a top priority. One of the thrusts, "Advancing value-based finance through Islamic finance leadership" is aimed at spurring growth that is progressive, sustainable and inclusive. This also intends to strengthen Malaysia's value proposition as an international gateway for Islamic finance which will be a reaffirmation of the "Malaysia as an Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC)" agenda. Since its inception in 2006, the MIFC agenda of "Internationalisation of Islamic finance" has offered a platform for Malaysia to position itself as a centre for the offering of Islamic financial products and services in international currencies to the global and domestic financial community. Many of our early initiatives and efforts were to build the foundations and to create the necessary critical mass for participating financial players, which would increase the scale of activity and financial services offered. Malaysia aimed to attract global players as well as to enhance the capacity and capabilities of the domestic financial institutions.
The first three relate to macroeconomic imbalances that could cause a further widening of the current account deficit, higher external debt and a depreciation of the króna. Vulnerability on these counts is no less than a year ago, and higher global interest rates and premia could have widespread repercussions. On the other hand, much of the uncertainty about the banks’ access to financing has been dispelled and they have built up ample liquid reserves. Under such conditions, the focus shifts to asset quality. The second table highlights factors that contribute to financial system resilience. The most noteworthy development is the banks’ stronger position in the form of ample liquidity and capital adequacy ratios which are very acceptable and historically high. On the whole, the Central Bank’s finding is that the financial system is broadly sound. It is equipped to withstand shocks to the economy and financial markets, to mediate credit and payments, and to redistribute risks appropriately. In other words, it is capable of performing its function in an orderly and efficient way. Iceland’s banking system meets the demands made of it and performs well on stress tests conducted by the Central Bank and FME. BIS Review 41/2007  3  Table 1 Main vulnerabilities Risk  Explanation  Exchange rate developments  Macroeconomic imbalances are pronounced. The current account deficit poses the risk of a depreciation of the króna. Shifts in carry trades and other exposures could catalyse a sudden turnaround. The FX market relies on three market makers and is still relatively thin.

We monitor all financial market data: equity prices, interest rates, capital flows. Corporate and sovereign debt markets are also important. What is going on there? We have seen a sharp increase in the risk premia that firms have to pay when raising debt on the markets. For high-risk firms in particular, these risk premia have shot up. Yields for countries such as Italy have also increased signficantly. We see a broad increase in risk premia. Another question that arises is whether the markets are still functioning. Is supply still matching demand? The central bank should intervene if liquidity dries up, that is if the markets suddenly seize up because of a lack of available liquid funds, or if the transmission of monetary policy is endangered, that is if our measures are not reaching the real economy. And that is exactly what we have been doing in greater measure since last Thursday. Our bond purchases have a stabilising effect on the market. US Treasuries have seen some severe temporary disruptions. There was a series of short intervals in which the trade in US Treasuries was disrupted. That’s a sign of considerable nervousness in the markets. Besides the markets, we are closely monitoring the situation of banks in Europe. We have taken measures to prevent banks from having to overly restrict their lending during the crisis. But the pressure on banks will intensify if economic conditions deteriorate. We are also closely watching investment funds. What is happening there?
Regarding the International Capital Standard, which aims to develop an international capital standard in order to be able to establish a comparable basis in terms of prudential requirements for all international groups, recent progress was made in Kuala Lumpur in November 2017 which should lead to, by the end of 2019, a version called “ICS 2.0” that will be used as a reference in international supervision Colleges, for a transitory period of five years. During this timeframe, each internationally active insurance group will have to ensure a compulsory and confidential five-year monitoring period based on the ICS, after which this standard is expected to become effective. Now, I will turn to IFRS17: it would be unreasonable to apply the new IFRS17 accounting framework right now. Given the obvious issue of timing, it is quite welcome that the IASB reopened the discussion and that the application of this standard has now been postponed by one year. This will primarily give us time to reach an agreement on identifying groups of loss-making contracts. We also want to bring the discussion on the 4  treatment of reinsurance contracts held to a satisfactory conclusion. At this point, there is too much room for interpretation in the standard, which could interfere with the comparability and consistent application across countries. In Europe, the current “hot topic” is the forthcoming Solvency 2 review. This review must include a full and objective assessment of the framework that has now been in place for three years.

We need to assess these systems against some benchmarks or international norms which would help to increase efficiency, safety and the integrity at national and regional level. In doing so, it may also be useful to look at the benchmarks set by the regional initiatives such as CEMLA, SADEC, CIS, API or other advanced payment systems. Third, the framework need not aim to introduce or formalize too extravagant payment mechanisms for the SAARC countries at this stage, but it should focus on the need to elevate the national payment systems of member countries to a level capable of facilitating present and future trade and investment flows and mitigating risks in cross border transactions. This task can be facilitated by setting up National Payment Councils (NPCs) in their own countries and complying with common standards, harmonization policies and international best practice. Fourth, the framework should broadly include the following: • •  • •  A time targeted vision acceptable to all members. A clear mission accompanied by a statement of the roles and commitment and responsibilities of all members. Policy objectives necessary to facilitate the present and future trade and investment flows within the region. Funding sources, budgetary allocations and an appropriate subscription formula. Guiding principles for mitigating risks and reaping benefits. 7. Road map and way forward  •  If SAARC central bank representatives consent to establish a SAARC regional payment initiative, it will be necessary to appoint an apex body which is capable of taking the reforms forward.
I would like to dwell now on another argument, which relates to the current crisis, but also has significant potential for development if identified and addressed in due time. In addition to the negative effects, the global crisis provides some opportunities which I believe time is ripe to identify promptly and get the most benefit from them. Let me state a fact from last year, which I think illustrates my observation better. There is an observation that the Arab Spring is one of the factors that led to the increase of the re-export industry in Albania. Not only wasn’t it hit by the crisis, but it also grew its activity further. One could rightly say that the Arab Spring comes only once in a lifetime. This is true but what I see as a comparative advantage of our economy in relation to the economies of many countries that traditionally make the active processing of the orderer’s materials (re-export industry) is the cheap labour force. Countries like China, Turkey, Vietnam etc, have raised the labour cost, while it has to be admitted that they have a high level of productivity. Hence, what we need to do is to qualify the labour force of these sectors in order to increase productivity. I think that the qualification of the labour force, the increase of human capital and the formulation of more stimulating policies to support these sectors represent a resource and potential we have to rely on to create competitive advantages.

Data on new orders suggest that output is likely to fall sharply in the first quarter of 2009 as well as in Q4 of last year; further declines in output, if not at the same pace, are likely beyond then. The widening margin of spare capacity will act as a significant drag on costs and prices. Coupled with the deflationary impact of falling commodity prices and the cut in VAT, CPI inflation will continue falling over the year and may go well below the target rate of 2% despite the impact of sterling’s depreciation on import prices. With its inclusion of mortgage interest and other housing costs, the change in the RPI is expected to turn negative. The downturn itself has set powerful contractionary forces to work. Over-indebted households and companies will be pulling back on spending to try and pay down those debts. Although the recent falls in commodity prices will help to mitigate some of the downward pressure on household income, rising unemployment is not only constraining the spending of those losing or not finding jobs but is likely to boost precautionary saving across the household sector. And falling property prices are reducing activity in the housing market and the construction sector. With credit hard to come by, companies will find it difficult to fund new investment projects and few companies would be likely to invest large sums of money even if they could raise the funds. Commercial property prices are still falling rapidly.
It is often acknowledged that European construction has been forged through the overcoming of recurrent episodes of crisis, from which the project has always emerged strengthened. Let us hope this is true this time and that the European authorities’ decisions will rise to the challenge. The Spanish economy was particularly affected by the sovereign debt crisis when the Greek and Irish economies had to resort to adjustment programmes. Conversely, when the same happened with Portugal in April this year, the impact was less, despite our closer economic, trade and financial ties with this country. This was due to the set of measures that had been  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  adopted previously to speed the approval of some reforms and thus tackle confidence problems. In any event, the Spanish economy remains under the scrutiny of the markets, which continue to demand an unjustifiably high level of sovereign risk premia. In past weeks we have witnessed the effect caused by the recent discussions in Europe on the potential participation of the private sector in the bail-out of the Greek economy, while doubts resurfaced over the seriousness of Spain’s commitment to pushing through outstanding reforms. The spread of the sovereign debt crisis to Spain was ultimately due to the presence in our country of certain factors of vulnerability as a result of the imbalances that had built up during the previous upturn.

It would also be conducive to the stability and integrity of the financial system. I would emphasise the word “international” as there is no reason to develop regional standards different from those that have already been developed by international financial institutions and professional bodies, together with supervisory agencies. 17. The fourth element concerns the strengthening of co-operative efforts in financial system development. As I have already noted, in Asia we have been making good progress in our efforts to develop the domestic and regional debt markets through various regional forums and involving the international financial institutions. In the context of developing Asian Bond Fund 2, for example, we have achieved a few firsts, including the introduction of the first exchange-traded bond index fund in Asia, arranging for two Asian markets to allow exchange-traded funds for the first time, and opening up the renminbi inter-bank bond market for the first time to foreign investors. 18. The final, and probably most difficult, step towards creating an integrated Asian financial market involves the relaxation of statutory restrictions on cross-border capital flows. It is likely to be the most difficult, in part because it depends on the ability of the financial system in individual jurisdictions to cope with the ensuing risks. 19. This last point brings me to the next issue I wish to touch upon in my remarks, namely, the need for a strong and efficient regulatory framework that is adapted to the integration of the domestic financial system with that of other jurisdictions. 20.
One of his great themes was that the Bank of England should acknowledge its role in stemming panics, and set out its principles for doing so: “The Bank has never laid down any clear or sound policy on the subject.” 8 Over the past fifteen years or so, including during the current crisis, the Bank of England has taken steps to make the Bank’s principles clearer. 9 Most recently, we have also addressed  6  For example, see Brunnermeier M K and Pedersen L H (2008), “Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity”, The Society for Financial Studies, Oxford University Press. 7  Bank supervision has its origins not in consumer protection but in preserving stability (and protecting the central bank against risks incurred through its open market operations and discount window lending). This was evident in the remarks, just over twenty years ago, of George Blunden, the Bank’s then Deputy Governor and, a decade earlier, the founding Chairman of the Basel Committee: “Supervisory standards are set not only with an eye to what is required to protect depositors with individual institutions, looked at in the narrow context of their own operations, but also with an eye to protecting them from problems which could be created by wider, systemic, developments. A bank may consider a course of action it wishes to take to be acceptable – as it may well be in a limited context. But the same course might, if widely copied by other banks, have unfortunate effects on the banking system as a whole.

We are fortunate in having been able to grab him for a couple of hours today while he is briefly passing through Hong Kong. It is my pleasure to welcome him and to join with you all in the launch of this seminar, which will, I hope, be the first of many organised by the MPC over the coming months and years. 8. Finally, let me record my gratitude and congratulations to all the Committee members of the MPC for the excellent work they have put into the reconstruction of the Committee, and my thanks to everyone here for supporting this event today. 2  BIS Review 3/2001
If developments move in line with our projections, the key interest rate may be reduced to 1 per cent in the latter half of this year. However, the projections are uncertain. An economic turnaround may occur faster than expected. The low interest rate level may lead to a situation where saving in Norway does not pick up as expected or that the krone depreciates markedly. In that case, the key rate may be set higher than projected at this time. On the other hand, there is a risk that the downturn in Norway will be more pronounced and longer, or that krone appreciates markedly. In that case, a stronger use of instruments may be appropriate. The downturn abroad and the unusual conditions in the credit market will mark the Norwegian economy for a period ahead. Mainland GDP is projected to decline by 1 per cent between 2008 ad 2009. Unemployment has increased since autumn 2008, but is still low. Unemployment is projected to continue to rise to the end of the year and into next year. Pay increases are moderate as a result of weaker corporate profitability, rising unemployment and lower inflation. Wage growth will show a considerable decline between 2008 and 2009. BIS Review 60/2009  3  Households have a dimmer view of the future than earlier, but the pessimism is no longer intensifying. This influences private consumption. Housing investment has also declined over a period, but house prices now seem to have stabilised, and perhaps started to rise again.

As far as the NBR is concerned, enhancing the governance has been a steady concern over the course of time, the ultimate goal being the alignment with the best practices, often with IMF support. Let me just point out that the NBR shifted from an internal auditors’ Commission to the auditing of financial statements by external auditors as early as 2001, while the following year saw the establishment of the Audit Committee as a substructure of the NBR Board (at a time when not even the ECB had such a committee in place!). In addition to the Audit Committee, the NBR’s internal control system includes several control layers. In fact, there are three lines of defence against any factors that might jeopardise the fulfilment of the NBR objectives. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  First of all, the National Bank of Romania takes a functional approach to risk management, meaning that each organisational unit has primary responsibility for identifying, assessing and managing the risks associated with its own activities and operations. The risk management process is an integral part of the NBR’s internal control system and represents the bank’s first line of defence. Each organisational unit implements operational control procedures within its area of responsibility, in accordance with the levels of risk tolerance set in advance by the executive management.
Much of Asian savings, in particular official sector savings and private sector savings that have been institutionalized, are still invested in assets of OECD countries, although the trend has been a gradually falling one. I cannot speak for other economies, but insofar as Hong Kong is concerned, in excess of 95% of our $ billion of foreign reserves are invested outside Asia. Specifically, in the management of our foreign reserves, we work against a preferred neutral position of about 75% in US dollar assets, mostly in US Treasury securities. I understand also that more than 80% of total Asian foreign exchange reserves amounting to $ billion are invested largely in North America and Europe. At the same time, there has been much foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment from OECD countries in Asia. It can be argued therefore that Asia is financing much of the budget deficits of developed economies, particularly the United States, but has to try hard to attract money back into the region through foreign investments. And the volatility of foreign portfolio investments has been a major cause of disruptions to the monetary and financial systems of the Asian economies. Some have even gone as far as to say that the Asian economies are providing the funding to hedge funds in non-Asian centres to play havoc with their currencies and financial markets. 35. This comment is perhaps a little unkind, given the important role that is being played by the international financial community in the globalized financial environment.

In terms of financial sector development, they range from sophisticated international financial centres with deep financial markets and robust financial infrastructures to those which have just begun building their financial systems. 42. Reflecting such diversity, there are also dramatic differences in policies, in terms of the objectives pursued and the approaches to achieving those objectives. Focusing specifically on monetary policy, although there seems to be a clear consensus on the desirability of maintaining currency stability, there is great diversity on the degree of clarity with which this is defined. For some, currency stability is what the government thinks is politically expedient at the time. For others, currency stability is defined in the clearest of terms. Associated with this, there is also great diversity in the degree of independence of the monetary authorities and the degree of discretion available to them arising from the different monetary or exchange rate regimes practised. Nothing can be more polar than, for example, the currency board version of a fixed exchange regime in Hong Kong and BIS Review 91/1997  -9-  the totally free float of New Zealand. Given differences in the economic and financial structure on the one hand, and differences in policy objectives and approaches on the other, the monetary transmission mechanism of Asian economies and their monetary reactions to internal and external shocks are also quite different. 43. How then should Asian economies pursue Asian monetary co-operation?