samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They come close to the two ideal forms that I mentioned earlier: in some areas there will be centralisation and discretion; in others decentralisation and no discretion. From November this year banking supervision will be centralised in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Bank resolution will also be centralised in the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The latter is particularly important as the legal framework it will  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  implement – the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) – contains quite some discretionary exemptions, in particular from the new bail-in provisions. For deposit guarantee, there is no centralisation yet. But under the recently adopted directive national schemes will have to meet the same minimum standards for levels and funding, meaning that there is also little discretion. Implementation, therefore, will be key. Fiscal union Banking Union will certainly help reduce the impact of sovereign risk on the banking system. But still, there is little that can be done if sovereigns pursue manifestly unsound fiscal policies. Domestic banks remain heavily exposed to their sovereigns. And any regulatory initiatives to address this issue – e.g. large exposure limits or doing away with the risk-free treatment of sovereign debt – can only be introduced very gradually in order to avoid market turmoil, and most likely only in the context of other governance reforms. Thus, to be consistent, a single banking system and a single currency require a fiscal framework that guarantees budgetary solidity.

Second, what is causing some people to turn against the EU, in my view, is not a dislike of European governance per se; it is a lack of delivery on jobs and growth. If European policy-makers can find better ways to get the most out the European project, I strongly doubt the voters as a whole would be against that. 4. Conclusion  Let me conclude. What I have tried to underline today is that a well-functioning market depends on getting the rules, institutions and instruments that govern it right. And the source of the euro area’s difficulties, in my view, is that policy-makers failed to do so. For this reason, it would be wrong to conclude that Europe, or the euro, has failed. It was policy that failed. But importantly, policy can also be fixed. What we need now, therefore, is to finish what we started in 1999 and make the euro area work. We have done much to stabilise the euro area with Banking Union and other reforms; but now we need to find ways to make the euro area sustainably grow. Voters in Europe have overall given policy-makers a mandate to do this; we have a pro-European majority in Parliament. If we do not seize this mandate, however, they may not provide another one. 7  For more details see Rahman, Jesmin and Tianli Zhao. “The Role of Vertical Supply Chains in Boosting Growth”, in Jobs and Growth: Supporting the European Recovery, IMF, April 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
Thus, while in the United States there seem to be no gaps and incoming data on prices and wages show more clear inflationary pressures, in the rest the gap is still to be closed and inflation seems bounded (Figure 5). 2  This has widened the differences regarding the expected evolution of monetary policy across economic blocs, triggering movements in interest rates and an appreciation of the dollar globally (Figure 6). This divergence was importantly confirmed at the Federal Reserve meeting yesterday, where along with the approval of the second increase in the federal funds rate for the year, it signaled it would speed up the normalization process foreseen for the next two years. One striking element in the way the external scenario has behaved in recent months is the stronger reaction to news of different sign. Part of it was observed in February, due to higher than expected figures for wage growth in the United States. A similar phenomenon happened more recently relating to the configuration of the government in Italy. Although this is an important economy within the European Union, it had not been common for interest rates, exchange rates and risk premiums to react in such a degree to similar events. This makes us think that changes in the markets’ appetite for risk have made them more reactive to incoming news and the possibility of observing episodes of high volatility seems greater than in the past. In this context, financial conditions facing the emerging world have taken a downward turn.

Figure 10 Oil price (*)  Terms of trade  (dollars per barrel)  (annual change, percent)  80  80 12  70  70  60  50  10  8  8  17  Mar'18 MP Report6  Jun'18 MP Report  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  40 -4  -4  50  40  12  10  6  60  Dec'17 MP Report  18  13  (*) Simple average of the prices per barrel of Brent and WTI oil. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. 12  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  Figure 11 Inflation indicators (*) (annual change, percent)  7  7  6  6  5  5  Services  4  4  3  CPI  2 1  CPIEFE  0  3 2 1 0  -1  Bienes  -2 -3  -1 -2 -3  13  14  15  16  17  18  (*) As from January 2014 the new indexes with annual base 2013=100 are used, so they are not strictly comparable with earlier figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
To that end, several major reforms were implemented, including: Slide 5: Measures were taken •  a tax reform which lowered tax rates and expanded the tax base,  •  abolition of selective support schemes to companies and industries,  •  an agreement between unions and employers to improve cost competitiveness, and  •  the establishment of the Goverment Petroleum Fund, Norway’s sovereign wealth fund. Slide 6: Two golden decades A long upturn followed. Norway has not experienced a pronounced economic downturn since the crisis around 1990. The reforms introduced during the 1990s have resulted in a fairly flexible labour market, which has allowed labour supply to adjust to changing conditions. In addition, we have been helped by good fortune in the form of favourable terms of trade. The economy was quite robust when the financial crisis hit in 2008, in sharp contrast to our situation 25 years ago. The policy climate in Norway in the early 1990s may have some characteristics in common with what we see in parts of Europe today. While short-term challenges need to be tackled urgently, a time of crisis may also provide an opportunity to implement structural reforms. In the case of Norway, the commitment and the capacity to implement reform was a critical condition for renewed and sustainable growth. The Fund and fiscal policy The Act relating to the Government Petroleum Fund was passed in 1990.

Our average ownership in listed European companies is almost three times our average holdings in Asia or the Americas. Slide 12: Changing regional allocation (starting point) At the start of this year, more than half of the Fund was invested in Europe. As the Fund has grown, we have come to realise that a more even distribution between regions will better enable the Fund to take part in global value creation. Slide 13: Changing regional allocation (target) Recently, a new principle for the regional allocation of the Fund’s assets has been approved. A consequence of this principle is that the relative allocation to Europe is reduced. The Fund’s relative holdings in the Americas, Asia and emerging economies will increase accordingly. For the Fund as a whole, a more even allocation across regions will improve the overall long-term trade-off between risk and expected return. In accordance with the new allocation of the Fund’s assets, new purchases will primarily be made outside of Europe, until the adjustment process is completed. As the Fund receives inflows of fresh capital on month-by-month basis, we are able to undertake the adjustment through new purchases. This will ensure a gradual process, and will not entail a large sell-off on our part. Instead, the effect will be merely a temporary drop in our purchases of European assets. Under the new principle, the Fund will still be overweight in European assets, compared to a market neutral position.
Svein Gjedrem: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 1 December 2003. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The statement is partly based on the assessments presented in “Report on monetary policy in 2003 - the first eight months” and Norges Bank’s Inflation Report 3/2003. The Charts in pdf can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Storting for inviting Norges Bank to appear for the first time before this Committee to report and answer questions on monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s credit report. The mandate The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2½ per cent over time. The target is symmetrical - it is equally important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low, as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high. The inflation target provides an anchor for economic agents’ expectations concerning future inflation. It provides an important basis for choices concerning saving, investment, budgets and wages. Households, businesses, public entities, employees and employers can base decisions on the assumption that inflation in Norway will be 2½ per cent over time. We have a very open economy with free capital movements.

It may be useful to distinguish between three channels through which monetary policy operates: •  The demand channel  •  The exchange rate channel  •  The expectations channel  The effect on inflation of changes in interest rates occurs with a lag and may vary in intensity. In the time it takes for a change in interest rates to feed through, other factors will also have an impact resulting in changes in inflation and output. We cannot assume that the various relationships are entirely stable. As interest rates fall, household and municipal consumption and investment will tend to accelerate. This is because they have more money left over after servicing their debt and because borrowing is less expensive. Corporate finances are strengthened and investment may become more attractive. Higher demand leads to higher output and employment. Wage growth may pick up. Higher wage growth combined with higher profit margins will result in higher inflation. The effect of interest rate changes may be amplified because the interest rate also affects the krone exchange rate. When interest rates are lower, more people will borrow money and fewer will invest in NOK. Lower interest rates will thus normally lead to a depreciation of the krone. Imported goods will then become more expensive and inflation will accelerate. A weaker krone also boosts exports and improves profitability in Norwegian business and industry. The effect on the exchange rate of a change in interest rates will vary as themes and sentiments shift in the foreign exchange market.
Neither the new technological solutions nor the financial products developed based on them can sell themselves. And again I would use the payments services as an illustration. In the recent two years our joint efforts ensured the connectivity to TARGET 2, the national system for euro-denominated payments, and its interface with major analogical systems in the European Union. This provides much greater possibilities for payment intermediation at low  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  cost. At the same time, these possibilities are almost in no way reflected in the banks’ marketing and product strategies. Other similar situations can be identified. Endeavors are made to create a new product, but the efforts needed for developing the necessary infrastructure for its use and marketing, in spite of the efforts and investments made for the latter, may turn to be much greater, as is the case with mobile payments. I made this small aside comment with the intention to be useful, and not edifying. I am very well aware that the participants in this event are primarily managers and experts in the information and communications technologies. At the same time, it is a well-known fact that maintaining and developing the technological level of financial intermediation is owing to your efforts, but if you are to enjoy the results, you need the efforts of all your other colleagues, to which you are immediately connected. By way of conclusion I would like to underscore the progress I see achieved in the information and communications technologies, which is not trifling.

Dimiter Kostov: The world of finance is becoming more IT Address by Mr Dimiter Kostov, Deputy Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, Banking Department and Fiscal Services Department, before the participants in the 14th Financial IT Forum “The World of Finance is Becoming More IT”, Sofia, 19 April 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the Bulgarian National Bank, I have the honour to congratulate you with the opening of the 14th Financial IT Forum. This Forum has established itself as an annual opportunity to share experience and ideas, and to view the prospects opened to the financial sector by the information and communication technologies. These results are undoubtedly owing to the organizers of the event, but what is of no less importance is your interest to it. From the point of view of the business, times are still hard for financial intermediation. In the conditions of volatile international financial markets and an unstable economy, the Bulgarian banking system is coping well with the challenges and remains stable. The levels of capital adequacy and liquidity remain high. Irrespective of the increased impairment costs the banking system continues generating positive results. It is of no little importance, too, that in these conditions the banking system managed to preserve and even to slightly increase its loan portfolio. In the recent three years the economic activity in the country has contracted by about 3 percent, while the loan portfolio not only did not contract, but grew by about 8 percent.
But, above all, it has been a key tool for ensuring the maintenance of affected employees’ income and for improving the prospects of recouping employment once the restrictions on activity imposed by the state of alert are lifted. The particular characteristics of this shock, which temporarily shut down many workplaces, and the incentives approved for the use of this instrument after the state of alert was declared have contributed to a much greater resort to ERTEs than in past crises. Hence, if we focus on the arrangements available for permanent employees, at end-April the number of workers affected by an ERTE totalled 3.4 million. Since then, this figure has fallen significantly. Moreover, on the information available, only a very small portion of wageearners who have emerged from this situation have gone into unemployment or become idle, whereas most of those affected have returned to their pre-crisis job. These developments are qualitatively consistent with the objective pursued; namely, that ERTEs would be a temporarily used tool while the transitory shutdown in activity lasted. In late June, coinciding with the end of lockdown-easing, 1.8 million workers continued to avail themselves of an ERTE. This figure is almost half the end-April peak and accounts for close to 10% of total wage-earners, confirming that one of the characteristics of this recovery is its incompleteness. From the standpoint of the labour market, what we have is also an uneven recovery. This is because the reduction in the number of workers on ERTEs has been very uneven across the productive sectors.

And clear as authorities with each other to confront the obstacles and difficult questions around firm failure upfront and find answers to them. Resolution planning will be a constant from here for firms and authorities. CMGs held annually or semi-annually have been central to this effort. Incrementally, resolution plans for G-SIBs have come into focus in CMGs. The resulting plans have then been endorsed by senior policymakers from the authorities around the table in CMGs in the Resolvability Assessment Process (RAP). In RAPs for each firm, the plans have been reviewed, barriers  1  Financial Stability Board (2015) ‘Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution: Total Loss-absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet’. 2  Financial Stability Board (2014) ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  to resolvability identified and agreement reached on how, and on what timeframe, they will be removed. This way commitment has been secured from all the authorities in CMGs to the plan ex ante. But perhaps more importantly, there is a network of people who have worked through these questions together and have a degree of mutual trust and reliance that will enable us to get to a co-operative outcome cross-border in a way that has often failed us as authorities in the past. We will need to continue to ensure that these contacts are maintained and deepened. Ultimately they are what will make resolution work for international banks.
Victoria Cleland: Global action to enhance cross-border payments Speech (virtual) by Ms Victoria Cleland, Executive Director for Banking, Payments and Innovation of the Bank of England, at the Silk Road Cash & Payments conference, Almaty, 29 March 2023. *** Cross-border payments are crucial to the smooth functioning of the global economy, and their importance is growing in our ever more interconnected, global digital economy. The value of cross-border payments is forecast to increase from almost $ trillion in 2017 to over $ trillion by 20271. Yet cross-border payments are typically, though I want to stress not always, slower, more costly, less transparent, and harder to access than domestic payments. And this impacts not just big wholesale players but consumer and remittance payments too. There are instances of payments taking up to 10 days2 and costing more than 10%3 of the payment value, and all too often with timing and cost unknown upfront. The G20 made enhancing cross-border payments a priority in 2020 and developed a roadmapOpens in a new window for delivering improvements. Since then, organisations from around the world have come together and made significant strides to lay the foundations for enhancing cross-border payments.

This can best be achieved when the largest possible number of the community’s members are involved. 4  Individuals are at the same time citizens and economic subjects, thereby creating a crucial interdependency. Proper integration into a balanced economic environment is an important prerequisite for developing a sense of common purpose - in other words, identifying with society and thus also displaying a willingness to actively help shape its progress. This ultimately means that economic and social development can only progress in a sustainable and balanced way if an appropriate equilibrium can be maintained between them. 5. Even at a time when global economic and social developments are becoming more and more closely intertwined, being an integral part of a national community still plays an important role. It is still essential that these national communities should strive first and foremost to keep their own house in order - a house, though, which should not just be stable but open as well. 6. Ensuring the stability of the financial system is one of the core tasks of the supervisory authorities and of the central bank in its capacity as lender of last resort. However, the market players’ sense of individual responsibility is also of key importance. If a third party is to offer assistance in a system run on free market principles, this can and should be seen as nothing more nor less - than helping the others to help themselves. BIS Review 26/1998
Ardian Fullani: The fight against money laundering Luncheon speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at an Anti Money Laundering workshop, Tirana, 22 June 2005. *  *  *  Dear participants, The subject of today’s workshop is, as you well know, a matter of great concern worldwide. The way we fight money laundering (ML) and counter the financing of terrorism (FT), does not have an impact on us only, but also on our neighbours and any other country with which our citizens and companies perform trade and financial relations. In these last years, to this issue has been devoted considerable time and efforts by you, by Albanian authorities and by international organisations. Besides meeting each other again and exchanging opinions on general issues, I want to use this opportunity to share with you some thoughts about the importance of the existence of a culture against ML in the institutions we represent. I will refer in this case to banks, meaning non-bank financial institutions as well. Following that, any consideration about ML will be valid also for the FT, for which I am convinced that our awareness and that of the public, is complete. With the term “culture” on anti-money laundering (AML), I refer not only to the existence in the bank of structures responsible for AML and its related procedures.

Similarly European resolution authorities setting MREL in the EU will need to consider how to go from MREL in current liability structures to an MREL that ultimately meets the BRRD objectives. The RTS allows transitional MREL to be set until 2020. Work needs to be done to clean up existing liability structures to make them consistent with requirements. This is firm level work which will be addressed as part of the resolution planning process. Let me give you some examples of what I have in mind. •  My first is structured notes. Some respondents to the FSB consultation suggested the blanket exclusion of structured notes from TLAC should be relaxed. We are reflecting on that. But the current situation is that in many cases structured notes have been issued to meet the needs of often quite small pockets of investors. The result is that some firms have many thousands or even tens of thousands of notes outstanding each with different structures and embedded derivatives. Trying to value all these instruments and bail them in would be a barrier to making resolution work. And as such will need to be addressed as part of the resolution planning process for a particular firm. •  My second example is non-equity capital instruments issued out of operating companies. As I described earlier, SPE strategies are built around putting only the top company in a group into resolution and avoiding legal risk and the potential dislocation of systemic functions by keeping operating subsidiaries outside resolution.