samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This leads to a voluntary allegiance of the countries of Europe, initiated by a number of great Europeans, amongst whom Carlo Ciampi, who - in my mind - has also shown that central bankers can become visionary politicians ; but then Carlo Ciampi was not an ordinary central banker, but already a visionary in his days as Governor of the Banca d’Italia. Carlo Ciampi and many others were convinced that Europe could only prosper in unity. For the first time in the history of Europe, nation states voluntarily decided to transfer part of their sovereignty to a ‘higher’ collective body, nowadays referred to as the European Union. In this respect, Rome is also a symbolic place for the Governing Council to meet, as the first Treaty, establishing the European Economic Community, was concluded here - 45 years ago - and hence bears its name. Finally, this meeting of the Governing Council takes place in a nation that belongs to the foundingcountries of the European Community, and which has always been among the staunchest supporters of the European integration process, as a road towards peace and prosperity. Admittedly, when the so-called Maastricht Treaty was concluded - in 1992 - the expectation was that only a small group of European countries would be in the position to adopt the euro. For some, this small group would not include Italy.

Looking back, the convergence process that was triggered, after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, was very impressive, in particular in Italy, eventually paving the way for this country to be among the first to adopt the euro. This convergence process has also contributed greatly to macro-economic stability and sound economic policies, both in this and in other European countries, a practice nowadays entrenched in the Treaty, in particular in the so-called Stability and Growth Pact. Where many did not have considered this to be possible, Italy has thus become a member of the stability-oriented family of European nations. Also in this respect, it is a pleasure for the Governing Council to meet here. We are living in a period in which history is made, almost every day. In two weeks time, ten countries will sign the so-called Accession Treaties, making it possible for these countries to become a member of the European Union, in the spring of next year. This enlargement of the European Union to the east  and south of our continent is another historical event, ending the rift that was created after the Second World War. The benefits of this enlargement, both in political as well as economic terms, are clear. However, this does not make it less of a challenge, also for the ECB and the national central banks.
What we learned from the crisis last fall is that markets that previously did not move together can suddenly do so, reversing trends that had been under way for several years. Moreover, we became aware that liquidity in even the most widely traded securities can be interrupted, primarily when many traders attempt to enter or exit positions at the same time. Thus, simultaneous stress testing across diverse fixed-income portfolios may help to identify high-risk market scenarios. Finally, I am convinced that there is a need for improved disclosure. In my view, the transparency derived from more open disclosure of risk management practices, risk profiles, and risk management performance cannot help but facilitate market discipline. Timely disclosure of such information would enable market participants to better assess how much risk market participants are taking, how well they manage it, and how much capital and liquidity they may need to survive adverse markets. BIS Review 8/1999  –5–  The desirability of improved disclosure is made clear in a report issued by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision in September on enhancing bank transparency. This report set out a framework for the disclosure of key risks and performance measures for banks. In my view, the availability of more detailed data on international exposures would enhance the ability of both supervisors and counterparties to assess the vulnerability of domestic banks and banking systems to financial shocks from abroad.

At the official level, international cooperation is intensifying through groups such as the Joint Year 2000 Council, chaired by my Federal Reserve colleague, Governor Ferguson. However, it is plausible that time will simply run out for some countries and some institutions. While I certainly don’t expect a financial system breakdown, the potential for some disruption to international trade and capital flows exists and that puts a premium on maximizing our efforts now. Finally, the practice of risk management must permeate all levels of your institutions, from the executive offices to the trading rooms. The senior management of most large financial institutions now have a variety of sophisticated measures and reports on their firms’ exposures, making it possible for them to track credit and market risks on a daily basis. But if the insights gleaned from these risk management tools are not incorporated into the operations of the front line, where both trading and credit decisions are made, they will be of little help when they are needed most. This is especially true for this audience because of the constant and rapid evolution of the fixedincome markets. Against the backdrop of the budget surplus in the United States, there are expectations for a continued reduction in the supply of U.S. Treasury securities. Borrowers in a variety of markets – including corporate, agency, and, to a lesser extent, emerging market and mortgage-backed securities – have taken this opportunity to meet investor demand with a greater volume of new issues and larger offering sizes.
Mark Carney: Redeeming an unforgiving world Remarks by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the 8th Annual Institute of International Finance G20 conference, Shanghai, 26 February 2016. *  *  *  The global economy risks becoming trapped in a low growth, low inflation, low interest rate equilibrium. For the past seven years, growth has serially disappointed – sometimes spectacularly, as in the depths of the global financial and euro crises; more often than not grindingly as past debts weigh on activity (Chart 1). This underperformance is principally the product of weaker potential supply growth in virtually all G20 economies. 1 It is a reminder that demand stimulus on its own can do little to counteract longer-term forces of demographic change and productivity growth. Chart 1 Serial growth disappointments Actual GDP growth 2011 Dotted lines = Emerging economies Solid lines = Advanced economies  2012  2013  2014  2015  Per cent 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  0  Source: IMF. That is not to suggest that such stimulus is without value or impact. Accommodative monetary policy can support activity while parts of the economy delever. Monetary stimulus can avoid hysteresis in the labour market. And monetary stimulus can buy time for structural adjustments which shift activity from public to private, external to domestic, and declining to rising sectors.

The policy rate is probably not the most effective weapon in this context, but it is more powerful than a pea-shooter. However, the shotgun and the mosquito comparison holds up fairly well. The policy rate is not a precision instrument, it affects the entire economy. This is why the strategy of “leaning against the wind” can have some negative effects in parts of the economy that the central bank does not wish to affect. If one wants to tackle an excessive growth in the property market, there may well be instruments with better precision than the policy rate. I will return to this in a moment. Not “sufficiently” serious consequences? A third counter-argument was, at least earlier, that the negative effects of a bubble bursting need not be so dramatic. Rather, they could be managed fairly easily, for instance through more expansionary monetary policy. But as I recall, this argument was primarily put forward when the IT bubble was the crisis most fresh in our memories. Since then a global crisis has had dramatic effects – much more serious and more widespread than I believe anyone had actually predicted. And this latter point is a nuance in the debate that I would like to highlight. It is not just difficult to estimate the probability of a bubble arising and when it will burst, as I described recently. It is also very difficult to assess how serious the consequences might be after a bubble has burst.
This is especially evident today in the environment of the anaemic growth and low inflation that require pursuing the expansionary stance of monetary policy, yet at a price of jeopardizing financial stability through the search for yield behaviour that might create new asset bubbles. To tame these risks, the tight stance of macroprudential policy is needed. Still, it remains to be seen how effective macroprudential policy can be in taming the risks that emanate from a long period of ultraloose monetary policy. The macroprudential ammunition at the disposal of central banks is another potential source of concern. The CRR/CRDIV has provided us with various tools: supply-side (such as capital and liquidity buffers) and demand-side instruments (such as LTV, LTI or DSTI ratios). However, one should be very careful not to err in calibration of those instrument, whether on the side that leaves insufficient coverage (effectively producing policy inaction) or on the side that creates too much of a burden (exceeding the net benefit of macroprudential policy in the medium term). Conclusion I hope this overview comes as a stimulus for further theoretical ad empirical research, regardless of the degree of agreement on the specific issues outlined in this speech. Therefore, I am looking forward to this conference. Hopefully, we will leave with answers to at least some of the questions raised and with a strengthened sense of obligation to continue with demanding work. Thank you. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Our economies and our societies have suffered heavily – indeed, on all available forecasts, this year will see the biggest declines in GDP recorded in peacetime – and we will have to endure a period of painful reconstruction for which sound knowledge and also good judgment will be essential. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
Unfinished business While important progress has been made in rehabilitating Asia’s financial systems, a great deal remains to be done to continue the strengthening of weakened financial and corporate sectors, and improve the region’s resistance to future problems. I am well aware that universal policy prescriptions are difficult to draw, given the wide range of experience and initial conditions. Indeed, individual countries in Asia have followed differing reform strategies, and the results of these efforts will help to inform the ongoing debate. Nonetheless, I am fond of citing a few of the cautionary lessons from recent international experience with financial sector reform: •  Restructuring and reform must adequately address both the current "stock" of problem assets, as well as the potential "flow" of new problems attributable to deficiencies in the broader financial system infrastructure. Lack of adequate action on either front can lead to a continuation of the substantial costs of weak banking sectors, sometimes well beyond the immediate crisis itself. •  Clean-up efforts must be sufficient to the task. Half-done measures that leave financial institutions with significant levels of impaired assets at best postpone the reckoning and potentially create incentives for excessive risk-taking. •  Fundamental improvements in bank corporate governance are critical. Just as risk management and internal control processes usually need to be thoroughly overhauled in weak institutions, more often than not, so too does management. •  Protracted forbearance to preserve the appearance of solvency is not a solution.

Boards of regulated subsidiaries need to be able to take decisions where required to meet their own legal and governance responsibilities or in the interests of the safety and soundness of the subsidiary. But, that does not mean they should operate outside the general governance and objectives of the group to which they belong. Independence in this context is carefully defined and limited. As you will all be aware, we have undertaken significant engagement with the boards of banks and building societies on governance. Through our supervisory work, we are seeing improvement but in our view there is more to do. Board effectiveness will therefore remain a key priority. To conclude, governance matters a lot, I can’t understate that. Effective boards are central to the success of firms and the financial sector, and central to the delivery of our objectives. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Norwegian interest rates are now somewhat higher than expected short-term interest rates in the long term. This reflects a relatively tight monetary stance and tight economic conditions. On the other hand, interest rates in the US and Germany are exceptionally low as a result of the downturn. Short-term rates have not been that low in the US for 40 years. The wide difference between the economic  2  BIS Review 65/2002  situation and short-term interest rates in Norway and abroad is one of the driving forces behind the appreciation of the krone. Forward rates ahead indicate that the market expects the interest rates differentials to diminish as the cyclical divergence narrows. The relationship between interest rates and exchange rates was not as strong during the period when equity prices rose sharply towards the end of the 1990s and to the first quarter of 2000. This was a period when the quest for equity gains was also important for exchange rate developments. Financial markets have since shifted their focus. Even if the krone is strong, expectations concerning the krone are not particularly strong. If kroner are bought forward for delivery a few years ahead, and the exchange rate is agreed today, it will be at an exchange rate that is on a par with the average exchange rate for the 1990s. The cyclical divergence that is reflected in the krone exchange rate is not entirely disassociated from our position as an oil economy.

The type of auction for the injection of liquidity changed to fixed-price auctions, the collateral base for repo agreements expanded, the use of the required reserve increased from 20 to 40 percent, and the spread between the Bank of Albania’s key interest rate and overnight loan dropped from 175 to 75 basis points. Third, through a special act, the Bank of Albania required higher capitalization of banking activity from the banking sector, adding to the guarantee of the banking sector’s financial soundness. Making a generalization, I deem that the measures adopted over this period are unusual, extraordinary and contrary to the “constitution” of modern central banks as regards the liquidity, money market and monetary policy transmission channels. However, we well  BIS Review 146/2009  1  understood the philosophy that “the purpose justifies the ways”. For the sake of financial stability, all the measures taken are justifiable and have proved effective. So far so good. However, I think that the current situation makes the central bank more vulnerable from the viewpoint of monetary policy independence and efficiency. Liquidity by all means, whatever the size, whatever the maturity, and whatever collateral for an indefinite period of time, would damage irremediably the monetary policy and the financial stability in a second round. Preserving balances is more complex, if we take into consideration even the other major vulnerability related to high degree of euroisation (high share of foreign currency component to money supply structure) and lack of convertibility of our national currencies.
6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  The PRA is a founding member of the Sustainable Insurance Forum, a network of around twenty insurance regulators from around the world who are sharing knowledge and best practice on how to consider climate risk in insurance supervision. The Bank, as many of you know, has also co-chaired since 2016 the G20 Green Finance Study Group on behalf of the United Kingdom, with our colleagues at People’s Bank of China. We continue to do so under Argentina’s Presidency, the group now being the G20’s Sustainable Finance Study Group. And most recently, the Bank has become a founding member of the Central Bank 7  and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System . Conclusion  We are part way through a transition in thinking where climate change is moving from being a social responsibility issue to being a core financial risk at the heart of how companies manage their business. It is these financial risks that create the link from climate change to the Bank of England’s mandate - given our core responsibilities to ensure the safety and soundness of banks and insurers and our responsibility to support a stable financial system. It’s clear to me that many different actors - companies, investors, financiers, climate scientists, governments, financial policy makers - have a part to play, given their mandates and specialisms, to support this transition in thinking.

This proved to be inadequate, and the baht continued with its appreciation. After a number of unsuccessful conventional measures, we resorted to the less conventional measure of imposing a reserve requirement on capital inflows in December 2006. The measure was designed to break the one-way momentum, to preserve overall economic stability, and to give the export sector time to adjust. To this end, it has succeeded. Other regional currencies continued to appreciate while the Thai baht had stabilized. The decision to impose the reserve requirement was a difficult one as it entailed a painful tradeoff between investor sentiment and export sector competitiveness as well as economic stability. In the end, cost-benefit analysis led us to choose the latter given the importance of export sector stability to the overall economy. Indeed, during the first three quarters of 2006, net exports accounted for 5.1 per cent out of 5.3 per cent GDP growth in total. Losing export sector stability will result in economic instability. As a small open economy, Thailand relies a great deal on international trade. Let me be clear that the reserve requirement was designed to preserve economic stability and to give time for the export sector, which includes many SME operations, to adjust. The reserve requirement was not designed to maintain a certain exchange-rate level. As such, the reserve requirement is not a permanent measure; it is temporary. In addition, the intended benefits of measures such as these will tend to decrease as people find ways to circumvent the regulation over time.
Mr. Davies looks at the tasks of the UK's new Securities and Investments Board and how it will affect the business community Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. Howard Davies, at the Futures and Options Association International Derivatives Week Conference in London on 4/6/97. Thank you for your invitation. And, particularly, thank you for not withdrawing it when you discovered that, rather than having on your platform a benign, soft-centred Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, you found yourself face to face with the all-seeing, all-regulating head of super-SIB. This may have come as a surprise to you - but nothing like as big a surprise as it was to me, I can assure you. And I have to say that, in spite of the way I have been presented in some of the newspapers, muscles rippling beneath a Superman T-shirt, I still feel rather more like Clark Kent in his thick specs, stumbling myopically around the office. I haven’t yet found a phonebox in which to get changed. I do not plan, this morning, to talk at length about my new responsibilities, partly for the very good reason that I have not had the time to prepare a coherent plan of campaign. But I might just say a word or two about the new SIB, and the way it will affect your business. I have been quite encouraged, so far, by the market reaction to the proposed new structure.

But, above all, it has been a key tool for ensuring the maintenance of affected employees’ income and for improving the prospects of recouping employment once the restrictions on activity imposed by the state of alert are lifted. The particular characteristics of this shock, which temporarily shut down many workplaces, and the incentives approved for the use of this instrument after the state of alert was declared have contributed to a much greater resort to ERTEs than in past crises. Hence, if we focus on the arrangements available for permanent employees, at end-April the number of workers affected by an ERTE totalled 3.4 million. Since then, this figure has fallen significantly. Moreover, on the information available, only a very small portion of wageearners who have emerged from this situation have gone into unemployment or become idle, whereas most of those affected have returned to their pre-crisis job. These developments are qualitatively consistent with the objective pursued; namely, that ERTEs would be a temporarily used tool while the transitory shutdown in activity lasted. In late June, coinciding with the end of lockdown-easing, 1.8 million workers continued to avail themselves of an ERTE. This figure is almost half the end-April peak and accounts for close to 10% of total wage-earners, confirming that one of the characteristics of this recovery is its incompleteness. From the standpoint of the labour market, what we have is also an uneven recovery. This is because the reduction in the number of workers on ERTEs has been very uneven across the productive sectors.