samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
That is probably not happenstance. It may jeopardise internal cohesion and besides making monetary policy decisions, we have to work together in running an organisation. Then there is the risk that a policy of openness inhibits the internal discussion. (That is the background to the published minutes not reporting exactly what each member said at the meeting.) A third problem and the one that has attracted most attention has to do with our external communication. Before commenting more on the third point, it is perhaps advisable to point out that these problems had already been recognised when the new system was launched. That I mention them here should not be taken to mean that they have caused concern since then. More personification The changes from the beginning of this year were prepared at the Riksbank last autumn. After contacts with the Bundesbank, the Bank of England and others, a structure was drafted for the communication of monetary policy. Eight to ten monetary policy meetings a year would be held at set times. Press notices and inflation reports in connection with these meetings would form the corpus of our joint communications. Divergent opinions would not be revealed before the minutes have been published some time after each meeting. 3  BIS Review 111/1999  This arrangement does impose some restrictions on the outspokenness of Board members.

To date, however, the levels reached by asset prices in Sweden are hardly a risk for economic development and stability in the way that some observers perceive to be the case in the United States. All in all, the rate and breadth of the economic upswing in Sweden suggest that unutilised resources will be activated for production relatively quickly. Various indicators of resource utilisation suggest that certain capacity shortages may arise at the end of the forecast period. Unemployment falls to 4.6% next year and to 4% the year after, which means that we count on a higher rate of wage increases than before. In the coming years wages are now expected to rise 4–4.5%. With the rapid increase in employment, moreover, registered productivity growth will be lower, particularly as most of the upswing is occurring in the services sector, where productivity is relatively lower. The forecast for this year has therefore been revised downwards and for the coming years the Riksbank counts on labour productivity rising in annual terms by just over 1.5%. (Figure 3). Against this background it has to be said that inflation expectations look good. There has naturally been some increase in the shorter run in the light of stronger economic statistics but the level remains low. Expectations for the medium and longer run are anchored around 2%. (Figure 4). The combination of all these factors led to the conclusion in the Inflation Report that in the forecast period inflationary pressure will be somewhat stronger.
The significant improvements in the institutional frameworks of EMEs are being offset by the deepening fundamental asymmetry in the international monetary financial system, the continued shrinking of the GFSN, and the rapid rise of market-based finance. Now there can be innocent bystanders: but there should be no disinterested observers. We are all responsible for addressing the fault lines in the global financial system and its safety net. The IIF with its diverse and global membership can make a major contribution. In doing so we will reduce the volatility of capital flows, increase the sustainability of cross-border investment, and meet the great challenges of our age. 31  Since 1980 a maximum of 30% of EMs have concurrently been in an IMF programme, and since 1970 a maximum of 38% of EMs have experienced a crisis concurrently. 32 This is based on projections of emerging market economies’ external balance sheets – see footnote 21. 33 To date three countries, Colombia, Mexico, and Poland, have used the IMFs Flexible Credit Line. While none of the three countries have so far drawn down on these lines, the FCL has provided a valuable backstop for these countries and helped boost market confidence during the period of heightened risks. 22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  Annex: Capital flows-at-risk The Bank’s capital flows-at-risk (KF@R) framework is based on the use of quantile regression methodology.

These flows are particularly flighty (Chart 13), reflecting the fact that more than $ trillion of global assets are held in investment funds that promise daily liquidity to investors despite investing in potentially illiquid underlying assets, such as EME debt.17 We have recently seen analogous situations in the UK within some niche managers and smaller markets, such as open-ended property funds investing in commercial real estate.18 The complications would be much greater if a major asset class like EME debt were to freeze up. This structural mismatch means that these funds can behave particularly pro-cyclically. Bank of England work finds that redemptions by EME bond funds (those with larger structural mismatches) in response to price falls are five times those for EME equity funds (those with less structural mismatch). In turn, EME equity funds are twice as responsive as AE equity funds. While the shift to market-based finance has increased global capital flows to EMEs, it also amplifies spikes in Capital Flows-at-Risk. Moreover, market-based finance flows are particularly sensitive to push shocks, especially in extreme scenarios (Chart 13). The recent global growth in assets under management has not yet been fully tested in an extreme scenario, such as a global downturn. Chart 13: The sensitivity of Capital Flow-at-Risk to push factors, by source of capital flow  FDI  Banking  Market-based finance  of which: investment funds 0 -1 -2 -3 -4  Median  5th percentile  -5 Capital Flows-at-Risk as a % of GDP  Sources: IMF, EPFR, Bank calculations.
The social model that we share in the Eurozone combines a high level of public service, relatively low levels of inequality – much lower than in the United States – and a good intensity of social dialogue. Call it “social market economy” if you want, without prejudice to the intense and legitimate debate within the UK today. Page 2 sur 5  In France, growth has started to pick up, reaching 0.6% and 0.5% in the second and third quarters of 2017 respectively. However, despite strong job creation, the unemployment rate is still high, at 9.4% in the third quarter of 2017. Therefore, stepping up reforms is now a priority in France too, with a focus on two main areas: sustainably consolidating our public finances, and aiming to achieve a structural economic transformation, with a major simplification effort in the labour market, and large-scale investment in education, vocational training and apprenticeships. The new government, under Mr. Macron’s Presidency, has made decisive steps in that direction. I stress this as an independent central banker. As regards public finances, France still has one of the highest public spending levels among OECD countries, at 56% of GDP in 2016. The French government is committed to reducing this ratio by 3 GDP points within the next 5 years. Besides, measures have been taken to keep public deficits below the threshold of 3% of GDP. For the first time in 10 years, the government deficit should be below this threshold in 2017 (2.9%).

This means that any reforms to the MA will be a key determinant of success against all three of the government’s objectives for the Solvency II Review. My colleague Charlotte Gerken discussed in April how we use the MA as part of our supervisory approach, and I won’t rehearse the points that she made today4. As a regulator, we have long believed in the core concept behind the MA. We firmly supported its inclusion in Solvency II, and we brought in a similar mechanism in our previous Individual Capital Adequacy Standards (‘ICAS’) regime. There has been a lot of feedback about broadening of the asset eligibility criteria for the MA, and about simplification of the application process. We have heard this feedback, and are confident that the review can achieve improvements in these areas. If we get these changes right, the path can be smoothed for insurers to invest for the long term in a way which supports innovation and growth and is sustainable. Of course as I said earlier, unless there is adequate policyholder protection, any such changes will not meet these objectives. So through the QIS we will be gathering data around how the MA could be calculated, so that we can be sure that the reformed MA provides adequate protection given the wide range of assets annuity writers hold. Changes on eligibility and process don’t so easily lend themselves to a QIS, but they can be designed to ensure that the MA meets the government’s other objectives for the review.
The bond proceeds are channelled to support healthcare and pharmaceutical development, for the benefit of lower income households and small businesses. The World Bank’s pandemic bond facility has been triggered, and will provide $ million in emergency financing to 64 of the world’s poorest countries to support their recovery.3 5. Today, I will focus on opportunities in green and sustainable finance, and impact investing. Pushing forward with green finance for a sustainable world 6. The pandemic provides a prime opportunity for countries to “build back better”. It is important now, more than ever, that countries not only rebuild their economies and preserve jobs, but also in the process, intentionally build a more sustainable new economy. There have been growing calls for governments to prioritise or accelerate green infrastructure development as part of recovery plans. Infrastructure development is critical to driving economic growth and improving social outcomes, while climate change remains a significant threat to mankind. It is important that a right balance between growth and sustainability be achieved. Public-private partnerships will be key to achieving this. Last week, Infrastructure Asia in Singapore partnered the World Bank Group and Singapore Management University to build capabilities of regional government officials, and raise awarenss of solutions to support sustainable and resilient infrastructure development, such as clean energy projects.4 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  7. Singapore is committed to support the pivot towards a clean and sustainable future.

Timely implementation of consistent and coordinated policies in a coherent manner is also essential to ensure the realisation of the expected outcome of such policies. In this context, this Road Map intends to set the basis for strong policies and credible frameworks to achieve macroeconomic stability with the support of the government and private sector stakeholders. The outline of the Road Map 2019 is as follows: Section 2: The Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy and policies for 2019 and beyond Section 3: The Central Bank’s policies related to the financial sector performance and stability in 2019 and beyond Section 4: Policies Related to Ancillary and Agency Functions Now, let me elaborate further on these aspects. 11  2. Monetary Policy Strategy and Policies for 2019 and Beyond The Central Bank conducts monetary policy in an increasingly forward looking manner with the aim of maintaining inflation at low and stable levels in the medium term thereby supporting the economy to reach its potential. In 2018, the Central Bank conducted its monetary policy in a challenging environment with rapidly evolving adverse global conditions as well as several upside and downside risks on the domestic front. New developments in the global economy in the wake of rate hikes in the United States and the economic normalisation in most advanced economies have demanded monetary authorities around the world to adjust their monetary policies accordingly.
The NBP projection released in April - which assumes unchanged interest rates at 4 percent - points to economic growth within the range of 4.5 to 5.5 percent in the years 2006-2008 and inflation gradually returning to 2.5 percent target sometime in 2008. The statement issued after the April Monetary Policy meeting stated, and I quote 14 : “The Council maintains its assessment that with large probability inflation will in 2006 Q2 and maybe Q3 remain below the inflation target mainly due to short-term factors. If the developments in the economy were consistent with the April NBP inflation projection, then the current level of the reference rate of the central bank would support a gradual return of inflation to the target over the projection horizon and would also be conducive to keeping economic growth at a pace, which is consistent with the potential output growth, determined by the structural features of the Polish economy. The fact that inflation and core inflation has stayed below the previous forecasts for a relatively long period may be an indication that the impact of the factors which may slow down the returning of inflation to the target in relation to that accounted for in the projection is stronger than previously assumed.

Eva Srejber: Internationalisation and financial integration Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to The Bankers' Club, Gothenburg, 29 March 2001. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come to Gothenburg and speak about internationalisation and the ongoing process of integration in the financial markets. I intend to begin by putting developments on the financial markets in a historical perspective and then to deal with the forces behind current developments. I shall then focus more specifically on Europe and the role played by the euro and, finally, I shall briefly discuss the important work pursued by international organisations in strengthening the financial system and thus reducing the risk of crises arising. Globalisation from a historical perspective Over the past few decades we have seen how the global economy has been internationalised on a large scale and how deregulation and technological achievements, particularly within the IT field, have created new conditions for growth. During the same period, global purchasing power has more than doubled. And it is not only the western world that has benefited from the opportunities offered by internationalisation; many poor countries have managed to climb a few steps up the global income ladder. The Asian 'tiger' economies are good examples of this. A look back in time shows that this development is not unique.
In other words, it has become more important to inspect systems, defined in a wide sense, than to scrutinise particular commitments or market risks. Some supervision, moreover, can be carried out with the market’s assistance. By this I mean that authorities can prescribe as well as encourage a more open presentation of the institutions’ risks and profitability in different operations. Such a transparency accentuates the banks’ demands on each other as well as what customers require of their banks. These developments do, of course, call for new forms of competence and resources for the authorities. The transition from an administrative organisation to one that inspects sophisticated risk management systems in a wide sense is something of a cultural revolution. That is what central banks and financial supervisors around the world are working on intensively at present. Some have come a good way, others have more to do. Basic minimum standards for solvency and risk management, more active supervision with a stronger focus on risk, and increased transparency are also the foundations of proposals that have been presented both by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and by the Swedish Committee on Bank Legislation. In this context I want to draw attention in particular to the international work that the Director General of the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Claes Norgren, is doing as chairman of the Basel Committee’s Capital Task Force, as a part of the cooperation in the Bank for International Settlements, and in the Banking Advisory Committee of the European Commission.

Claes Norgren will be talking later on about the proposals for new rules. I should like to acknowledge that the task of achieving such a far-reaching reform of the international capital adequacy standards is by no means easy. Quite apart from the exceptional technical complexity of the substantive issues, it is not always evident how the political and cultural differences that nevertheless exist can be reconciled. BIS Review 9/2000  4  I know that Claes Norgren’s international efforts have been most valuable and appreciated around the world. Permit me to conclude by congratulating the Director General of Sweden’s supervisory body on his successful work. 5  BIS Review 9/2000
Dropping these, in column (7), adds to the models adjusted explanatory power, which is taken as the “preferred” model.26 Table A1: Simple Wage Phillips Curves using private sector regular pay, qoq annl. (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  Lagged wage  -0.0518  -0.134  -0.211*  -0.211*  -0.122  -0.232*  growth  (-0.40)  (-1.05)  (-1.69)  (-1.67)  (-0.95)  (-1.87)  1.254***  1.060***  1.062***  0.795***  1.135***  (-5.48)  (-5.31)  (-5.22)  (-4.18)  (-5.79)  Lagged CPI  0.458**  0.729***  0.737**  0.791***  0.719***  inflation  -2.17  -3.83  -2.67  -3.28  -4.54  Recruitment  0.421***  0.422***  0.259**  0.281  0.275  difficulties  -2.97  -2.86  -2.12  -1.54  -1.53  -0.0172  0.647***  -0.15  (-0.05)  -2.8  (-0.45)  Unemployment 0.921*** (-5.08)  Infl. expectations  (7)  1.116***  Productivity  0.257*  growth  -1.96  -2  N (adjusted)  61  61  61  61  61  61  61  0.374  0.415  0.489  0.479  0.426  0.508  0.516  Notes: Equation also includes a constant (not shown). t statistics in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively based on robust standard errors.

The MPC’s current policy horizon of around two years reflects our judgment of how best to balance these persistent forces while implying a slightly tighter stance of monetary policy, all else equal. Since monetary policy operates with a lag, it must be forward looking.8 As a result, monetary policy will continue to depend on economic prospects not the calendar. The UK’s prospects must be assessed in the light of an unusually uncertain supply side of the economy.9 The financial crisis upended the certainties of the pre-crisis years when productivity progressed predictably and labour supply expanded at a steady pace. Productivity growth fell markedly after the crash and, though recently picking up, now seems  7  Indeed, Lord King’s letter to the Chancellor noted that this would also have entailed risking an undershoot of inflation in the medium term once temporary factors had abated. 8  Estimates of the effects of monetary policy rely on plausible ways of identifying monetary policy shocks. There is a large literature on this, which seeks to quantify the “long and variable lags” suggested by Friedman. Examples include Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Uhlig (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2007). Estimates for the UK include those in Burgess et al (2013) and Cloyne and Hurtgen (2014). Such estimates typically refer to unanticipated changes in interest rates.
Indeed, by urging governments to aim at a fiscal position "close to balance or in surplus" in the medium term, the pact enables them to let fiscal deficits increase during recessions without exceeding the 3% reference value. In short, it allows them to create a fiscal buffer during normal economic periods that can be drawn on to counter economic divergences or asymmetric shocks. To summarise that overall issue, the “Optimal Currency Area” theory has frequently been called upon by economists who criticized EMU and expressed concerns about giving up the exchange-rate policy instrument as a response to asymmetric shocks—in particular to asymmetric shocks within a monetary union. I would like to point out, first, that one of the most remarkable effect of the European integration has been the increasing symmetry of shocks. Second, Professor Mundell himself, in support of EMU, made an interesting clarification at the beginning of 1998: in the event of a shift in demand from one member country to another, creating unemployment in the first and inflationary pressure in the second, flexible exchange rates would not be able to solve the problem. I quote: “If the argument for devaluation were valid, it could be applied to every state or sub-region in any country, with a proliferation of new currencies, so they could be devalued!”. In the same vein, other economists suggest that dealing with divergences and asymmetries should not prove much more difficult within the euro area, at least in its major countries, than within a long-established monetary union such as the US.

An incentive for further structural reforms a/ The Euro is, per se, also a strong catalyst for structural reforms in all non-financial domains in Europe : a single currency facilitates the full comparison of prices, taxes and earnings. I think that the euro could encourage "cross-fertilisation" of best practice through stronger co-ordination of Member States' structural policies in areas such as labour markets, education and training, job creation incentives, effective welfare safety nets, etc. It is the reason why the European Council, meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, explicitly mentioned structural policies among the items selected for reinforced co-ordination. The Lisbon European Council made a further contribution to the necessary medium-term strategy for structural reform in the Union. The emphasis put on deepening the single market, the setting of indicators allowing comparisons of best practices among the Member States, the fact that the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines will examine the structural issues closely : all these developments are going in the right direction. BIS Review 11/2001  5  All European countries must resolutely carry on the structural reforms they have already initiated. It must be acknowledged that a lot has already been done, in particular with implementation of the single market. However, continental Europe is still experiencing levels of unemployment that are too high, despite the fact that the jobless rate has been declining significantly in most of its economies for three years.