samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But EMU also means the harmonisation of goods and services markets as well as financial markets. In these areas, the integration process is well on track. EMU fosters economic and financial integration Financial Europe under construction: the reorganisation of capital markets In 1999, as soon as the euro was launched, one of the expected advantages was the prospect of deeper, larger and more integrated capital markets contributing to reducing the cost of capital for businesses and giving European savers a greater range of saving options. These expectations have become realities in both the money market and longer-term capital markets. On the euro money market, the unsecured deposit interbank market is highly integrated. EONIA and EURIBOR have provided the market with uniform benchmarks that are fully accepted by all market participants. This is reflected, for instance, in the huge development of the euro interest-rate swap market. These changes have prompted market participants to concentrate their euro cash management activity in order to take advantage of the higher liquidity levels on the secondary market. On the euro bond market, the integration process has registered three main developments: -  a rapid internationalisation: The introduction of the euro has fostered euro-denominated private bond market, by enlarging the potential pool of investors, notably international investors. During the period 1990-98, the legacy currencies accounted for 10% of all corporate bonds issued by euro area borrowers and only 2% of those issued by companies outside the area; these ratios have risen to 75% and 20% since 1999 [Galati and Tsatsaronis, 2001].

Let us try to remain serious, lucid, serene and balanced in our analysis, in our judgements, in our decisions. Let us all beware of the herd instinct which is always a very bad counsellor. Let us beware of fashion. As regards the present situation, we must remain prudent and cautious, but we have some signs indicating a bottoming out in the US and in Europe, including in my own country. And I see absolutely no reason why the European economy pick up would not be as early as in the US, taking account of the strong European fundamentals. §  Third, confidence is of the essence in the present situation. Confidence in our currency, confidence in its capacity to be a good store of value, confidence in its medium and long-term solidity, confidence in the capacity of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem as a whole to deliver price stability. This confidence – which is warranted by the central bank – is a very precious asset for the Europeans. It is a very important ingredient for fostering growth through consumer confidence and therefore consumer demand which is presently the main driving force behind the European economy. I thank you for your attention. 9
As of 2016, in all resolution cases, the BRRD will require a bail-in of shareholders and creditors equal to at least 8% of total liabilities of a given bank, including own funds. Only after the 8% threshold of bail-in is attained can money from the resolution fund be used and for a maximum amount of 5% of total liabilities (including own funds) of the concerned bank. Public money for recapitalisation, either national or European, can thus only be considered at the very end of the process after the other two sources of remedial action have been used. Furthermore, the “government financial stabilisation tools” that the Directive introduces is an instrument of last resort after having assessed and exploited the other resolution tools to the maximum extent possible. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The amount of 8% is very substantial compared to the losses banks faced in the recent crisis. To give you an idea, between 2008 and 2010 only one bank had losses exceeding the 8% threshold, and the average for all other banks was slightly less than 3%. Thus, under the BRRD, the injection of public money into banks, either from national governments or from direct European recapitalisation, will happen only in quite rare occasions. Bail-in of shareholders and creditors plus the use of the Resolution Fund should in most conceivable cases be enough to cover the losses incurred by a failing bank.

The plenary session will encompass all members of the SRB, which – on top of the ones just mentioned – will include  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  one member appointed by each participating Member State, representing the national resolution authorities.9 The fact that the ECB will be an observer in the Board, with no voting rights, is supported by the ECB. This accurately reflects the need to have the supervisor involved in resolution matters, while maintaining the necessary separation of institutional responsibilities between the supervisory and resolution function in the Banking Union. The decision-making within the Board is designed to enable taking resolution action in the interest of stability within the euro area and of the Union as a whole. In particular, decisions in the executive session should be made by consensus. If the executive session is not able to reach a joint agreement by consensus, the Chair and the permanent members will take a decision by a simple majority. By reaching a decision either by consensus or by a majority, efficient a European decision-making should be ensured.10 Decision-making in resolution It is important that the decision-making process in the SRM allow for timely and efficient decision-making, if necessary, within a very short time such as a weekend. It is therefore welcomed that the decision-making process in the SRM is capable of this, in spite of the fact that it may involve both the Commission and the European Council. Let me describe this process as simply as I can.
Denis Beau: What role should banks play in the twin digital and climate revolution? Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the conference at the Jean Monnet University, Saint-Etienne, 15 April 2022. * * * Accompanying slides can be found on the Bank of France website. [SLIDE 1] Students, faculty, ladies and gentlemen, We now have sufficient distance to say that, if the health crisis unleashed by Covid-19 was not compounded by a financial crisis, this was in part because our prudential framework has made banks considerably more resilient. The new framework, coupled with the exceptional support measures introduced by governments and the European Central Bank (ECB), enabled banks to continue financing businesses during the health crisis. Today, it is enabling them to cope with the economic and financial impacts linked to the war in Ukraine. That being said, for this new architecture to be consolidated, the Basel III Accord still needs to be fully implemented in a manner that is fair, reasonable and definitive. Yet this strengthened abilities to withstand shocks cyclical crises must not blind us to more structural vulnerabilities, which the health crisis has helped to amplify, I am thinking in particular of digitalisation and the transition to a sustainable economy.

An inflation target for monetary policy was introduced, with an operational target for annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. The fiscal policy rule was also introduced. According to this rule, the cyclically adjusted non-oil government budget deficit shall correspond to the long-term real return on the Government Pension Fund – Global. The division of responsibility in economic policy has since been the following: •  Monetary policy steers inflation in the medium and long term and can also contribute to smoothing swings in output and employment. •  The central government budget – growth in public spending – affects the real krone exchange rate and the size of the internationally exposed business sector in the long term. At the same time, developments in government expenditure and revenues must ensure a reasonable distribution across generations. •  Wage formation, the structure of the economy and incentives determine how well and how efficiently we utilise labour and other real economic resources. It is the government that defines the inflation target. Norges Bank sets the interest rate with the aim of reaching the inflation target. The Bank must account for its decisions. It does so through an annual report on the conduct of monetary policy. The report is submitted to the Ministry of Finance to be presented to the King and communicated to the Storting. The government’s assessment is presented in the annual credit reports.
If one can identify the excesses, why couldn’t the market correct them itself? This could be a question of what economists call market failure. Market participants act in a way that is rational from the point of view of each individual participant, but taken together the outcome is bad for all. As long as investors continue to earn money, the demand for credit can continue to grow, even if the signs of a bubble are strong. On such occasions, intervention by public authorities may lead to a better outcome not just for the economy as a whole, but also for the individual market participants. If one looks at Swedish monetary policy over the past decade, one can actually claim that it has been characterised by some “leaning against the wind”. The published minutes of the monetary policy meetings in Sweden in 2003 and 2004 indicate that rising house prices, high growth in credit and an increased burden of debt among households were put forward by several Executive Board members as arguments in favour of conducting a less expansionary monetary policy. The message is even clearer during the period March 2005 until the end of September 2007, when the Riksbank gave consideration to house prices and growth in lending in its monetary policy decisions. However, the decisions to take into account house prices and credit growth were not made on the basis of the Riksbank including asset prices as a further target variable for monetary policy.

It might perhaps have been possible to avoid the house price bubble if tighter monetary policy had been conducted at the beginning of the 2000s, but the price in terms of deflation and low growth could have been unreasonably high. Given the situation at the time the decision was made, the chosen policy appears well-motivated. Should central banks try to prevent financial bubbles from arising? Despite the fact that central banks perhaps cannot be blamed for the crisis arising, I think there is reason – given what has happened recently and the research carried out in recent years – to further consider what role they can and should play with regard to these issues. One often tries to distinguish between pure monetary policy, which is conducted with the policy rate as the primary instrument, and measures that are first and foremost aimed at promoting financial stability. However, this crisis has shown that it can sometimes be difficult to make this distinction. Without the measures to reduce the turbulence on the financial markets, the low interest rate policy conducted to counteract the recession would hardly have had any great impact. At the same time, it may be important to make this distinction as monetary policy is something for which the central bank has sole responsibility, while promoting financial stability is a task shared with other public authorities. There is currently important work being done on designing better methods for promoting financial stability, both nationally and internationally.
The world economic slowdown, with the attendant rise in credit risks, the deepening problems in Argentina spreading to its banking system, and the events of 11 September, creating temporary liquidity strains in New York and elsewhere, have all posed serious risks to the stability of the international financial system. So far, the response has been encouraging. The capital position of many of the larger financial players is stronger than in previous cycles. There seems to be a more sophisticated approach to differentiating between sovereign risks in the emerging markets. And the hugely impressive efforts of staff, together with the largely successful operation of contingency plans, and the flexibility of the US monetary authorities, saw us through the worst of the aftermath to last autumn's attacks without a serious crisis emerging. The latest topic of discussion in financial circles is, of course, the implications of the collapse of Enron. The case raises a host of issues for firms and policy makers. Some of these relate to accounting standards; some relate to the way in which the auditing profession organises itself; and some relate to corporate governance issues more generally. There are also some issues about the scope and operation of the financial regulation net. There have also been questions raised about the implications of the collapse for health of the financial system as a whole, which is very much of interest to the Bank, given our responsibility for systemic risk. From the current perspective, these implications appear limited, however.

Agents attend the monthly briefing in Threadneedle Street ahead of each policy meeting, so information from their contacts is fed directly into the heart of the policy process. I know I speak for all of my colleagues on the MPC when I say that we really do find this a crucial barometer of current events, so I hope you will feel that a short while with our Agents once or twice a year is time well spent! Financial stability and Enron I now turn to my final subject tonight - that of the Bank's role in ensuring financial stability. Responsibility for the day-to-day supervision of banks passed from the Bank of England to the Financial Services Authority in 1997. But as the central bank we still have a key role in overseeing the stability of the system as a whole. In this guise we meet on a monthly basis with HM Treasury and the FSA in the so-called tripartite Standing Committee, to review the risks facing the UK financial system and take stock of any actions which may be required to address them. Keeping close to the FSA is particularly important. To this end, I sit on the FSA Board, and Howard Davies is a member of the Bank's Court. Of course, as I have no need to remind you here, with the border of the euro area just a few miles down the road, we cannot look at the UK system in isolation from the wider international financial markets.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Towards a multi-polar currency and reserve system Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the High-Level Conference on the International Monetary System, Zurich, 10 May 2011. *  *  *  Governor Hildebrand, Managing Director Strauss-Kahn, Distinguished Speakers, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. I would like to thank the co-hosts, the Swiss National Bank and the International Monetary Fund, for inviting me to speak at this high-level conference. So far in this session, we have listened to a number of insightful presentations by well-known speakers. To avoid repeating what has been said, I will try to frame my talk from the perspective of a small emerging market economy. My focus will be on the three problematic issues facing emerging market economies and the current international monetary system, and how we may think of what needs to be done to put our international monetary system on a more sustainable path. 2. Let me start with the first issue. As of now, excess global liquidity generated under the current international monetary system is complicating the conduct of macroeconomic policy in many emerging market economies. Although the expansion of the global economy has strengthened in the past few quarters, economic cycles and thus monetary policy stance among various regions greatly differ. This has been widely regarded as a key push factor for international capital flows into emerging markets.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Islamic finance Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the official launch of Affin Islamic Bank Berhad, Kuala Lumpur, 6 June 2006. *  *  *  Islamic finance has become one of the most dynamic growth areas in international finance. While Islamic finance has become an increasingly important form of financial intermediation in several countries, more recently, we have seen the international dimension gain significance. The Malaysian Islamic financial system is now well positioned to become internationally integrated with the international Islamic financial system. The progress and development of the Islamic financial services sector in Malaysia is evidenced by: •  the rapid expansion in new and innovative Islamic financial products and services;  •  the enhanced competitive environment in which Islamic finance has developed;  •  the progressive development of the prudential, regulatory and supervisory framework for Islamic financial institutions;  •  the active issuance of both corporate and sovereign Islamic financial instruments;  •  the progressive liberalisation for foreign participation; and  •  the strengthened financial and non-financial institutional infrastructure, including the development of the domestic money and capital markets, and the establishment of institutions to promote human resource development in Islamic finance to ensure the pool of talent that is necessary to sustain the long term growth of the industry.
This might imply that the case for an equally rapid reversal of the policy easing as disinflationary risks abate is understated. However, expectations of such a rapid reversal may themselves undermine some of the stimulative effect of the easing: expectations of a steady-handed approach to policy decisions may help stabilise the economy close to the lower bound (or even avoid its incidence altogether, as in Pill (2010)). 26 Within the framework discussed in earlier sections of this speech, it may be seen as consistent with the MINIMAX characterisation of robust monetary policy that I outlined. 27 See King (1999), p. 7. 20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  20

It would naturally require commitment of substantial capital and human resources from both the banks and the regulators. We should all work together, therefore, to achieve these goals. This should not only be the objective of the Central Bank as we are all guardians of financial stability – I trust this conference will provide an adequate forum for open discussion. Thank you. 2/2
3  See, inter alia: C. Borio and H. Zhu (2008), “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?” BIS working paper no. 268; G. Jiménez, S.R.G. Ongena, J-L. Peydro and J. Saurina Salas (2010), “Credit supply: Identifying balance sheet channels with loan applications and granted loans”, CEPR discussion paper no. 7655; Y. Altumbas, L. Gambacorta and D. Marques (2010), “Does monetary policy affect bank risk-taking?” ECB working paper no. 1166; and A. Maddaloni and J-L. Peydró (2009), “Bank risk-taking, securitisation, supervision and low interest rates: Evidence from lending standards”, ECB working paper, forthcoming. BIS Review 45/2010  1  Upside threats to price stability were certainly emerging prior to the crisis, on the back of surging commodity prices and strong global growth. Let’s not forget, for example, that US headline inflation increased from 2.3% on average in 2003 to 3.2% in 2006 and 3.8% in 2008 (See figure 1). Core inflation increased from 1.5% in 2003 to 2.5% in 2006 and 2.3% in 2008 (See figure 2). Euro area annual inflation reached 3.3% on average in 2008. 4 To contain these upside risks to price stability, a case can be made that interest rates should have been higher than was the case before the crisis. Figure 1 Overall inflation  Figure 2 Overall inflation excluding food and energy  Source: ECB, BLS and OECD. Note: Average annual inflation rates. 4  2  On the basis of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP).

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This is done by growth strongly accelerating (see slide 1A). However, when the technological revolution has subsided, the boost in growth will also subside. However, it is not self-evident that there is some form of “natural” growth rate to return to. Over a long-term perspective the growth rate has both varied and accelerated. I therefore intend to take up the other possible angle of approach sometimes mentioned, that IT could raise growth permanently. This could only be achieved by the technological innovations also creating the right conditions for a more rapid development in technology in the future (see slide 1B). One example of this type of development is what is known as Moore’s Law. It is now 25 years ago that Gordon Moore, the founder of Intel, predicted that the capacity of a microprocessor would double every 18 months. So far he has been proved right and many believe that Moore’s forecast may hold true far into the 2010s. However, despite the fact that certain technological indicators, such as the number of patents granted, indicate an increasingly rapid development in the USA and Sweden, it is difficult to believe in a perpetual technological acceleration. From a central bank perspective, we can probably keep our distance to this debate by reminding everyone that our monetary policy goal horizon is one to two years. It suffices to imagine that the adaptation periods between the first and second dotted-line curve (in slide 1A) will take perhaps five to 10 years.

There is even an element of “new economy” in the deregulation of the telecommunications and electricity markets. Firstly, it would not have been so easy to implement the deregulation without the aid of the new technology. Secondly, the deregulation might not have had the same impact without, for instance, the information provided on the internet, which helped consumers in making a choice. 7  BIS Review 89/2000  All in all, I can allow myself to make a qualified guess on some areas, without knowing for certain: 1. Productivity, total factor productivity, has risen considerably in Sweden during the latter half of the 1990s. The emergence of information technology has probably been significant in this. 2. The effects will continue to be felt for a number of years, probably beyond the monetary policy horizon, for which reason the Riksbank will continue to monitor the IT phenomenon in future. 3. Deregulation and increased competition play a special role in Sweden, particularly as they have run parallel to IT developments. At the same time, there is reason to point out that the “new economy” does not constitute a guarantee for a stable and positive development in asset prices, either in the USA or Sweden. On the contrary, history shows that rapid technological changes often lead to speculative bubbles.