samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Understanding the types of financial products and services available in terms of; – the types of providers, the services which are regularly or less frequently used, services which are paid for and for how much, and challenges in accessing the financial products and services. As Bank of Zambia, we believe that this study will also contribute to the documentation of information relating to financial inclusion. The information is important to aid in policy formulation by the government and potentially inform business strategy of financial service providers to reach out to the un-banked citizens. We encourage other stakeholders to contribute to this necessary body of knowledge in our financial sector. Financial inclusion for the majority of our people, especially women, is a corner stone of our financial sector development. The Honourable Minister of Finance in his 2014 National Budget address, set the stage by emphasising the need to accelerate broad based growth, diversification of the economy and the entrenchment of social justice so that all Zambians, rural or urban, male or female, young or old and including the differently abled, benefit from and contribute to national development. Ladies and Gentlemen, it has been reported at various fora that our women continue to face challenges in accessing financial products and services. These barriers range from cultural, legal, financial and sometimes religious discrimination among others. However, access to finance and financial services in general, has in the recent past been cited as a major challenge to the participation of women in economic development.

This emergency compromise has shifted the focus away from structural reforms, which guarantee rebalancing through the increase of income. Often, the perspective of economic policies does not extend beyond some quarters ahead, while a much longer time vision should be considered. The anchoring of the future should start from the present. The actual philosophy of stabilising policies is based on past experiences with the hope that the current crisis is similar to previous ones. This reasoning has urged the authorities to insist on recycling stabilising measures. The time, however, shows that the global economy has undergone radical changes. The current crisis is happening as the global economic map is being redesigned in terms of economic size, geographic distribution of savings, debt, and trade and current balances. Advanced economies have traded positions with the emerging ones across all these dimensions. Consequently, old recipes do not provide an exit given that axioms on which they are based have changed. The solution of current and future challenges requires a new philosophy of thinking based on the new global reality. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  This reality, globalisation, is no longer a choice, but a fact that should be taken into account when formulating long-term development strategies. Turning to a regional setting, I think that this philosophy should be embraced and supported without hesitation. In order to make it more productive, we should be more opened to each other and take regional cooperation to new and higher levels.
Ravi Menon: "Chongqing connectivity in digitalisation and sustainability" Keynote speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore-China (Chongqing) Financial Summit, 23 November 2021. * * * Mayor Tang, Minister Teo, colleagues from ASEAN, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. Welcome to the 4th Singapore-China (Chongqing) Connectivity Initiative (CCI) Financial Summit. I thank the Chongqing Municipal People’s Government for hosting this Summit. Financial connectivity between Singapore and the Western Region has strengthened. Crossborder financing volumes have grown substantively over the years. Since 2015, there has been a total of 192 financing deals between the Western Region and Singapore, amounting to over $ 17 billion. This year, despite the pandemic, cross-border financing amounted to $ 3 billion. Globally, we are seeing the two big trends of digitalisation and sustainability. It is thus appropriate that Chongqing and Singapore have identified trade digitalisation and green finance as two of the focus areas under the CCI Finance Pillar. First, digitalising the CCI-International Land Sea Trade Corridor (CCI-ILSTC).The CCIILSTC, first conceptualised in 2018, has proven to be a viable alternative for traders looking to transport goods between Western China and Southeast Asia. Despite the pandemic, trade flows along the CCI-ILSTC increased by almost 30% in 2020. We should now aim to turn the CCI-ILSTC into a main thoroughfare for regional trade. But to do this, we must address some of the challenges inherent in its multi-modal nature. The rail-to-sea modality requires greater coordination than single modal transportation.

Indeed, it was Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, by the mideighties, who eloquently said “good-bye financial repression, hello financial crash” (DiazAlejandro, 1985). Some recent research also points in the same direction, as reviewed in Dr. Reddy’s lecture – beyond a certain level, financial depth has marginal contributions to growth (Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012). In Chile we had a great financial crisis in the early eighties which led to an overhaul of financial regulation. The country followed the prudent route, allowing only activities that could be handled appropriately by financial intermediaries, but above all that could be understood  1  and monitored well by market participants and financial regulators. Since the country was emerging from a deep financial crisis, the macro view of the financial system and its regulation were a central part of the design. But this seems not to have been the case in advanced economies. The global financial crisis has revealed the perils of financial deepening. It has shown that advanced economies are not different. This is not new in emerging markets, but is something less common and more dramatic in advanced economies. Long ago we learned that when an economic downturn comes with a financial crisis the costs are extremely high. What went wrong? It is important to recall that the crisis had its origins in a noble cause: providing housing to low-income families.
Expressions like “stress-testing”, “black-swan”, “animal-spirits” and even “sovereign debt” have become the new buzzwords in the financial industry. Risk managers have been reminded of model risk; portfolio managers have discovered the true face of risks; market participants have started to think about the compound effects of risks, the dynamics of crises and the impact of systemic risks arising from macroeconomic shocks, contagion effects and “hidden imbalances”; academic and practitioners have further analysed market failures, particularly based on behavioural and institutional aspects; and a certain degree of scepticism has spread, leading to some people wondering whether there is a genuinely risk-free asset and what are the real benefits of diversification. It seems clear that the “risk reassessment” process in the wake of the financial and economic crisis has been rather extensive and, perhaps, even excessive. For instance, market reactions to recent rumours about the financial soundness of institutions and sovereigns have been in some cases “off-the-charts”. Likewise, markets that had traditionally enjoyed lively trading activity and relatively good liquidity conditions completely dried-out. The shift in attitude that we have experienced in recent years relates not only to the ability of market participants to take risks, but also to their willingness to take them. In general, the crisis has eroded the capital position of the financial industry, forcing some institutions to embark on a process of deleveraging and risk downsizing that, in absence of an orderly  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  mechanism, may bring global capital markets further down.

This process has dragged the real economy and the fiscal position of many countries, thereby contributing to the further deterioration of the global picture of risks. This sort of negative feedback from financial factors can be explained both from the fundamental side, as global risks did increase while the ability to absorb losses decreased, but also from a behavioural perspective, since confidence disappeared as the evolution of the crisis pushed us to unchartered territories and away from the comfort zone in which we thought we were living. As central bankers, but also as risk managers, we fear that in some cases we may have gone too far, and that what we see now cannot be explained only in terms of a better understanding of risks, but in many cases reflects a sharp increase in risk aversion that it is not always fully justified by the “learning process”. It seems obvious that we need to incorporate in our decision-making process and in the models we use to support it, the notion that markets are driven by behavioural factors. All in all, one can optimistically conclude that this time some important lessons have been learned and hope that by implementing the necessary reforms, confidence can be restored. In any case, a crucial question remains: has the crisis changed our minds in a permanent manner or are we just living in a “crisis” mode and the lessons learned will be forgotten shortly after once the crisis is over?
Indeed, it is crucial that payments of cash and delivery of securities be performed without undue obstacles throughout this very large financial area grouping so many market players keen on operating in deep and liquid capital markets. As regards this crucial issue of financial market integration, it is needless to insist on what has already been achieved during the last eighteen months. However, it is also important to keep in mind areas where some work remains to be done. •  The integration of interest rate markets within the euro zone is a first, key achievement that deserves to be underscored. The high level of integration that was accomplished can be observed not only at the short end of the market, in the inter-bank and money markets, but also at the long end. Market participants across the euro area now trade according to the same rules and practices, using the same indices (for example the Eonia and Euribor references on the swap market). When looking at the behavior of the market for government securities, it is striking to see how fast intermediaries, but also issuers, have adjusted to the new environment created by the introduction of a single currency. At the same time, the advent of the euro has been the catalyst for the development of a buoyant market for corporate securities. A market for high-yield bonds is already following.

We will then assess and benchmark the results against overseas peers to identify whether there are firstly, any business areas – such as Investech, Wealthtech, Insurtech and Greentech - where technology is underused, or secondly, any specific technology types, including artificial intelligence and blockchain solutions – that are not receiving sufficient attention. Based on the findings of this exercise, we will consider what support the HKMA can offer to help the banking sector reach the next level of fintech sophistication. If everything goes according to plan, you can expect to see the results in the first half of 2022. 18. In parallel, we will continue to provide guidance on fintech areas that may present opportunities or risk management challenges to the banking industry. This will help banks adopt novel technologies with more confidence and less apprehension that regulators may come knocking! As an example, as part of our two-year Regtech roadmap, we will soon be publishing a “Regtech Adoption Practice Guides” series to address how Regtech solutions can be applied to cloud computing, blockchain and anti-money laundering surveillance. 19. Despite this promise of support, we recognise that banks, especially smaller ones, may still have doubts about going “all in” with fintech given the heavy talent and resource investments required. However, we are confident that by offering support that is targeted, specific to local market circumstances, and where it is needed, banks of all sizes will soon grow to appreciate the case for “going” fintech.
I also hope that your participation in this workshop results useful, in terms of exchanging the know-how on various issues and in particular, on the ethics and econometrical techniques. It is with pleasure that I declare this workshop open and I invite you to deepen our knowledge! Thank you! 2  BIS Review 132/2007

And I will frame my contribution in terms of the use the MPC has made of what has come to be known as the “monetary policy toolbox”: the range of policy tools that MPC has used so far, what tools are available to us now, and which ones we might decide to use in the near future. The idea of a range of monetary policy tools is itself quite a new one. For many years monetary policy makers used one tool, the policy rate, to achieve their goal – in the UK case, that meant Bank Rate. And the Bank used a small, focused set of central balance sheet operations to keep money market rates, and so rates in the wider economy, close to that policy rate. Two developments changed all that: first, the secular decline, over several decades, in the trend real interest rate; and second, the global financial crisis and the great recession that followed it. 1 The trend real rate – big R*, in central bankers’ jargon - has fallen over the past few decades across advanced economies. Figure 1, taken from the August 2018 Inflation Report, sets out the MPC’s view of what explains that fall. Much of it can be explained by structural factors such as an ageing global population, which have raised the demand for savings. Other structural factors, including a decline in trend productivity growth, have reduced businesses’ demand for capital.
BIS Review 10/2007  13  In this example, we have been able to reconstruct (approximately) the reference path in Inflation Report 3/06 by minimising a loss function under commitment in a timeless perspective. To reconstruct the reference path, the weight on the output gap in the loss function, lambda, has been set at 0.3. We also had to place a weight on changes in the interest rate in the loss function. This weight, which penalises large changes in the interest rate, can be defended based on considerations regarding robustness and financial stability. What is the outcome if we depart from our established response pattern? 14  BIS Review 10/2007  The chart illustrates what might happen if the central bank reoptimises today, but promise never to do so again. In the model, this will result in a marked rise in interest rates today. But such an approach has been criticised in the literature. If the central bank departs from its response pattern today, it is easy to believe that it will do the same in the future. It may therefore be difficult to gain credibility for such a policy. Even if it may feel tempting, it is important to be aware of the costs associated with departing from an established response pattern. It will then be more demanding to influence private-sector expectations. Frequent reoptimisations will in practice undermine the benefit of commitment and lead to a discretionary policy. The benefit of commitment hinges on the credibility of the central bank’s actions and communication.

When an entire country’s financial system collapses, as was the case here, it can take a long time to make it fully operational once more. As a result, it could take some time, given the global financial crisis, for foreign credit markets to re-open, as turned out to be the case. In view of the fact that considerable refinancing of Treasury debt was scheduled for 2011 and 2012, there was clearly limited scope to use the Central Bank’s foreign reserves to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations without risking the Treasury’s ability to refinance or pay off the loans maturing in these years. For whatever reason, when it came down to it, the IMF was not prepared to extend loans to facilitate in the reconstruction of the Icelandic economy unless it could be guaranteed that funds provided would not be sucked down a whirlpool of capital fleeing the country. The capital controls provided the authorities with leeway to restructure the financial system, get a grip on Treasury finances, and deal with the problems of debt-ridden households and businesses. All of this is a prerequisite for regaining the trust  BIS Review 64/2010  1  of international credit markets in the Icelandic economy and in the ability of the Treasury to meet its obligations. Since the controls were tightened, they have contributed to greater exchange rate stability than has been seen for a long time, albeit at a lower level than is desirable. This stability has facilitated implementing economic policy.
This growth trajectory leans on three fundamental premises: First, the impulse we are receiving from abroad, although milder than we could have foreseen some years back, is not particularly low. Of course we would rather live in a world of higher copper prices and two-digit growth in China. But in hindsight, that was clearly 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  unsustainable in time. Nevertheless, the world growth figures we see today and project for the next two years, do not differ much from what we saw in 2015. The terms of trade should tend to stabilize towards 2017 and external financial conditions are good by historic patterns. Surely we face risks, but don’t we always. Second, from a macroeconomic standpoint, our economy is well balanced. The external accounts are in good order, our fiscal policy is sound, inflation expectations remain well anchored and, beyond the importance of mitigating the risks identified in the Financial Stability Report, local financial markets are well equipped to contribute to that recovery. The third premise is the return of confidence. On this point let me digress. It is not a good sign for a goal of 3.5 percent growth to seem so elusive. Just a couple of years ago we believed that growth between 4.5 and 5 percent was possible. After all, in the last thirty years, the Chilean economy grew by an average of 5.2 percent annually. Certainly many things have happened in the last thirty years that can explain this.

Thus, in an OECD comparison, Chile is in the lower part of this ratio’s distribution (figure 16). Although the current capital levels are sufficient to absorb a possible severe stress scenario, gaps have narrowed. While every bank’s CAR exceeds the 8-percent regulatory minimum in the stress scenario, the share of banks having a CAR above 10 percent in such a scenario has dropped in recent years, to less than half the system’s assets in the latest test (figure 17). Let me conclude with some final thoughts. Concluding thoughts In the past several months the macroeconomic scenario has brought no big surprises, but that does not mean that challenges have been absent. Inflation has dropped in line with expectations, but remains above the tolerance range. Our projections indicate that in a few more months it will return to that range to then decline towards the 3-percent target. If this is so, we will have ended quite a long period during which inflation was at or above 4 percent and monetary policy-making has been particularly complex, as we have had to deal with a significant depreciation of our currency and the ensuing rise in prices, aside from the economic slowdown. Still we have been able to keep inflation expectations over the projection horizon well anchored to the 3-percent target. In the short term, there are obvious inflationary risks, which could again push back this convergence.
That also requires managers' attention, in a setting in which there is a greater likelihood that the accommodative stance of monetary conditions will progressively be normalised and that the slowdown in house prices that appears to have begun will continue and even intensify. BIS Review 60/2006  9  The forceful increase in banking activity, and particularly in credit to the resident private sector, has not been accompanied to the same degree of intensity by the raising of funds through traditional liabilitiesside instruments such as deposits. In this respect, there was a stronger tendency in 2005 to seek additional financing on the financial markets through the issue of mortgage covered bonds and other securities, or through asset securitisation. Although this usually entails more costly financing than the raising of more traditional resources, it is no less true that Spain's incorporation into a stable zone, such as the euro area, has provided our institutions with access to efficient capital and interbank markets. Access to international markets, mainly in the euro area, has assigned to credit institutions a central role in the channelling of saving from the rest of the world to our economy, and, in the case of securitisation, it has helped transfer part of the risk to foreign investors. This may mean that the external financing conditions for credit institutions and for the Spanish economy may be more sensitive to the circumstances of capital markets and to developments on property markets in our country.

However, average labour costs have grown at relatively moderate rates as a result of the rise in employment in industries with comparatively lower wages, which are those where the influx of immigrants is proving greater. In this respect, the sizeable immigrant inflows are acting as a factor of wage flexibility in certain labour market segments. In any event, while this behaviour of wages may be considered moderate, compared with their historical, upward pattern, growth has remained higher than that of wages in other euro area countries. Moreover, these developments have taken place against a background of very low productivity gains, meaning that the cost growth differential with the euro area has remained wide. This differential is proving particularly harmful for manufacturing industry, which has continued under increasingly sharp pressure from foreign competition. It should be borne in mind that, in the euro area, the consequences of losses in competitiveness induced by continuing demand pressure may be difficult to reverse. This is because they require a direct adjustment of relative prices and costs based on the effective moderation and the sufficiently flexible behaviour of wages. In Spain's case, moreover, given the specialisation of the productive structure in industries where demand is more sensitive to relative prices and in which the pressure exerted by products from the emerging economies is very high, companies may find themselves having to make a sharper adjustment to make up for lost ground on international markets and on the domestic market.