samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Rodrigo Vergara: Chile's September 2016 Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 7 September 2016. * * * The Monetary Policy Report of September 2016 can be found at www.bcentral.cl  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate, Mr. Ricardo Lagos-Weber, honorable senators, ladies, gentlemen, I thank you for inviting the Board of the Central Bank of Chile to present our Monetary Policy Report. As it does in September each year, this issue coincides with the Central Bank’s Report to the Senate, presenting our vision of the recent macroeconomic and financial developments in Chile and abroad, together with prospects and implications for monetary policy conduct. After more than two years above the tolerance range, last July the CPI’s annual inflation descended to 4%. The baseline scenario that I will be sharing with you in a minute assumes, as do private expectations, that it will continue to approach the 3% target in the coming months, to close the year at 3.5%. Why has it been so high for so long? We can blame it on the significant depreciation of our peso, driven by the much needed readjustment of an economy confronted with the end of the commodity price supercycle, the end of a very pronounced cycle of mining investment, and a domestic weakening associated with a decrease in the country’s capacity for long-term growth.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: “The Role of the Central Bank in Driving Thailand’s Sustainable Growth” Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, before the Thai Forum, New York, 8 October 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Thailand has undergone much change this year, and the usual visitors from abroad may have chosen, understandably, to watch developments from afar. It is thus my sincere pleasure to bring some of Thailand to your very doorstep. The country is now at an important junture. Political uncertainty has subsided and some promising government plans have taken place. Therefore there is no better time for domestic and international investors alike to capitalize on the new wave of growth. Thailand’s immediate challenge is to restore growth to its potential. For much of the past seven years, we have been experiencing sub-par growth rates. As the economy now wakes up from its third contraction since 2008, it is time to focus on Thailand’s avenues for restoring normal growth again. How can an economy rebound from a contraction back to growth? Part of the answer lies in the economy’s strong fundamentals, and the Bank of Thailand, as the central bank, plays a part in safeguarding them as attested by quick rebounds of the Thai economy after the Great Recession in 2008 and the Thai floods in 2011. In addition, as caretaker of the country’s banking system, the Bank of Thailand also fosters development of the financial system to bring about growth.
Thus, not every stage in the development of the crisis will be recapitulated, or every step and detail in its resolution. Nor have I tried to reflect every nuance in the public debate, in the reports from parliamentary commissions and in research papers on the subject3. The views I put forward are my own and have been deliberately sharpened to promote discussion. The most important characteristics of the resolution of the Norwegian crisis can be summarized as follows: •  The banks’ own collective guarantee funds handled the problems in the banking sector before the crisis became systemic. •  No blanket guarantee for the banks’ debts was provided by the government. •  No regulatory forebearance. •  No liquidity support to banks whose solvency was in doubt. •  A clear and transparent division of responsibility between the political authorities, the supervisory authority and the central bank was established early on. •  Government support was contingent on strict requirements being met, e.g. existing shareholders accepting a write-down to cover losses to the extent possible. •  No micro-management of the banks. •  Measures taken to prevent supported banks exploiting the situation vis-à-vis non-supported banks. •  No asset management companies or “bad banks”. I shall comment on each of these issues, but before doing this let me briefly mention the background for the crisis:  1  Source: Sandal (2004). 2  Source: Kane and Klingebiel (2002) and Norges Bank.

Gent Sejko: Bank of Albania’s engagement in financial education Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the opening ceremony of the Money Week 12-18 March 2018, Tirana, 12 March 2018. * * * Dear Mr Pedrazzi, Dear students, teachers and friends of the Global Week, Like in previous years, I have the pleasure to welcome you today to our central building, and thank you for your participation in the Money Week 2018. This is a special year as it marks a decade of Bank of Albania’s engagement in financial education, which meaningfully started with a Memorandum of Cooperation signed with the Ministry of Education. Over these years, financial education and financial inclusion have increasingly held a significant place in our work, in designing and implementing numerous educational projects. They are dedicated to different age groups, and consist of a variety of initiatives ranging from training and brochures to the high school elective module “Personal Finance in Your Hands”, the educational package for the elementary schools and the Albanian Money app. Moreover, the Museum of the Bank of Albania, our utmost effort in this regard, offers/provides a multifunctional space, where visitors may not only learn more about the monetary history in Albania and the central bank, but also deepen their financial literacy and expand their financial awareness. As a result of all these valuable experiences, we have been able to participate with dignity in the Money Week, which, in 2018, is celebrated in more than 135 countries.
Chart 6: Change in firm-level productivity dispersion since 2001 Services (indexed)  Manufacturing (indexed) Index, 0=2001  Denmark Finland France Italy Japan Norway New Zealand UK  2001  2003  2005  Index, 0=2001  0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2  2007  2009  2011  2013  0.7  Denmark Finland France Italy Japan Norway New Zealand UK  0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 2015  2001  2003  2005  Year  2007  2009  2011  2013  -0.2 2015  Year  Sources: OECD and Berlingieri, Blanchenay and Criscuolo (2017); ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. Notes: Chart show log difference between 90th and 10th percentiles indexed to zero in 2001. UK data only available from 2002, so UK base year = 2002. 30  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  30  Chart 7: UK, Germany and France firm-level productivity (data for 2013) Percentage of firms 12 Expected value of productivity in country  UK  10  Germany 8 France 6  4  2  0 -220 -200 -180 -160 -140 -120 -100 -80 -60 -40 -20  0  20  40  60  80  100 120 140 160 180 200  Productivity (difference from expected value as a percentage of peer group median)  Sources: McKinsey and Orbis (2013). Notes: Data kindly provided by McKinsey Global Institute.

In relation to GDP, bank financing of companies is around half that in Germany. The UK’s national development bank (the British Business Bank) has assets that are a small fraction of its German counterpart (KfW) (Table 7). There are plans to increase the capacity of the British Business Bank, but that would still leave it significantly smaller than KfW relative to GDP. In sum, the UK’s long tail problem is largely a diffusion rather than innovation problem. And this problem seems to have its roots in transfer barriers – barriers to transferring technology, know-how, people and financing – from the UK’s thriving hubs to its striving spokes. Stronger, longer spokes are needed to reach the long tail. The Bank of England and Monetary Policy  48 49  Bank of England (2016) discusses the measurement and financing of “productive investment” in the UK. Belsham and Rattan (2017). 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  Since its inception, the Bank of England’s role has been to secure stability in prices and the financial system. Historical experience illustrates these are essential ingredients for investment and innovation by companies and for rising productivity, pay and living standards in the economy. 50  By achieving its statutory objectives of  price and financial stability, the Bank of England provides one of the necessary foundations for productivity.
Whatever the precise portfolio investment limits for the insurance funds, MAS will take the governance and deployment of these insurance funds into consideration, when assessing whether the banking group has de facto control of an investee company, and thus whether an investment meets the portfolio investment criteria for the banking group. Time frame and potential impact The separation of the financial and non-financial activities will be a major change for the banking groups. There will be significant corporate restructuring and divestment of assets. We must do this in an orderly manner, over a reasonable period. There is no reason to force a fire sale, which would weaken the banks and diminish confidence, and would be against the interests of shareholders and depositors. Local banks will be given three years to complete the restructuring and comply with the new requirements. The three years will commence from the passage of the relevant legislation, which should take place by the end of the year. MAS will work with the banks on a phasing and schedule, so that the restructuring and divestments can take place in an orderly manner and be completed within the three-year deadline. Tax treatment for divestment The divestment of non-permitted assets will have significant tax implications. In order to avoid uncertainty as to how IRAS will treat these transactions, and to minimise the tax impact on the banks of changes which have been mandated by MAS, the Government has decided on a set of one-off administrative concessions to facilitate this exercise.

Therefore, in the present exercise MAS will allow the principal shareholders to continue owning indirect stakes in the banking groups through the non-financial entities that they control. MAS will review this arrangement later. Management To avoid conflicts of interest, the management of the financial entities should be separate from the management of its non-financial affiliates. There should be no sharing of executive directors and management staff, such as the chief financial officer and chief operating officer. On the board of directors of a regulated financial entity, a majority of the directors should not be holding directorships on the boards of the non-financial affiliates as well. Name-sharing Mixed conglomerates usually leverage on common brand building. Many of the non-financial affiliates of local banks share the name of their parent banks. Financial and non-financial entities alike have built up goodwill in the brand name over the years. But reputational and contagion risks can result from sharing of names and corporate badges between the bank and its non-bank affiliates. Where an unregulated entity sharing a name fails or falls into disrepute, the public may attribute its problems to the bank, causing a bank run. MAS will therefore disallow the sharing of names and logos between the financial and non-financial entities. We are considering amending the Banking Act, to prevent the use of names or acronyms by companies that may confuse the public, or give the impression that a company is related to or associated with any Singapore-incorporated bank.
"2 The Federal Open Market Committee lowered the target range for the federal funds rate to 0 to ¼ percent3 and increased purchases of Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities. The Board of Governors created new dollar liquidity arrangements with central banks, reflecting the global nature of the pandemic and its economic disruption.4 Together with other Federal banking agencies, the Board issued regulatory relief and guidance to banks encouraging them to meet the changing needs of customers,5 to use their capital and liquidity buffers to facilitate lending,6 and to access the discount window.7 Perhaps most prominently, the Fed has used its emergency powers in Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act to establish programs and facilities to keep the economy running.8 The Board of Governors created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility,9 the Commercial Paper Funding Facility,10 and the Money Market Liquidity Facility to provide relief for critical wholesale markets.11 Another facility supports lending to small businesses via the Small Business Administration's Paycheck Protection Program.12 Two commercial credit facilities provide liquidity for corporate bonds.13 The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility supports the markets for student loans, auto loans, and credit card loans.14 The Municipal Liquidity Facility helps state and local governments and agencies close revenue gaps.15 And facilities specifically targeting "Main Street"16 help sustain retail businesses and may expand to assist nonprofit institutions.17 For the last several months, implementing the Board of Governors' relief initiatives has been the priority of the New York Fed and our sister Reserve Banks.

And the Fed regulates and supervises financial institutions so that, each and together, they safely match savers and borrowers in the real economy. I sometimes think that theories or expectations of central banking depart from reality. This may be unavoidable. The best theories are simple. The reality of central banking is complicated. The Fed is a complex entity governed by numerous statutes that have changed many times in the last 100 years—and are still changing. The Federal Reserve is not just a concept. It is a creation of Congress. Its job is what Congress tells it to do—to adhere as closely as possible to the will of Congress. Of course, Congress's instructions sometimes leave room for interpretation and discretion. For example, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act allows the Board of Governors to provide credit during "unusual and exigent circumstances." What are those? And how do we know when circumstances cease to be unusual and exigent? Theories can help resolve these ambiguities and guide the judgment of policymakers. Other times, Congress is clear, but its instructions do not fit neatly into theories of central banking. In designing its Section 13(3) facilities, the Board of Governors coordinated its policy decisions with the Department of the Treasury. This was required by law.
I would like to draw your attention to the following issues: í  first, the euro area will have to face up a number of challenges to confirm its initial success;  í  second, the success of the euro will make a contribution towards encouraging a balanced international monetary situation. I believe that in the current overall economic situation, the success of the euro will help not only Europe but also the rest of the world which will benefit from European prosperity and growth as part of a healthy world economy. This would help facilitate the current accounts adjustments of the countries affected by the crisis. The success of the euro will be complete if a number of challenges are taken up A few years ago, it was necessary to convince a great deal of sceptic people that the euro was a viable project. Many of them pointed to its presumed contradictions and its alleged inconsistencies: for example, the impossibility of achieving an efficient policy mix without a political federation; the impossibility of avoiding some “asymmetric shocks”; the lack of sufficient flexibility of the economy and real mobility of the labour force in the European countries, etc. The result was that the euro would never exist! BIS Review 81/1999  4  These criticisms proved wrong as to the introduction of the euro. But they are useful to help answer the question of what are the conditions for ensuring that the euro is a complete success.

And the euro will also encourage “cross fertilisation” of best practices through stronger co ordination of member states policies in areas such as labour markets, education and training, job creation incentives, effective welfare safety nets, etc. In this sense, the euro – which is in itself a major structural reform- must, and will certainly, bring about other structural reforms. í  The fourth condition is that all economic leaders in Europe must be clearsighted with regard to the crucial matter of competitiveness. Pre-euro economic policy meant in particular monitoring trade balances, the balance of payments and the foreign exchange and interest rate markets. Economic leaders thus received constant and to a large extent real time feedback on key indicators affecting national economic performance and could react accordingly. These indicators remain on the euro-wide level: this is why the mutual surveillance of fiscal and economic policies provided for by the Treaty is so important. But they have disappeared at the national level with the advent of the euro, whilst the. rules of a market economy continue to apply to each economy participating in the euro zone. Jobs are created by consumers when they choose the goods and services they feel are the best value for money. Businessmen allocate these jobs to different possible locations in different countries according to the relative competitive advantages of these locations. Therefore the leaders of each national economy must monitor competitiveness through indicators such as unit production costs, tax and regulatory frameworks and so forth. This is even more important than before.
Will the long-term liquidity constraint, the NSFR, eventually be abandoned? We will work on it again as of next year. Should the Solvency II standards for insurers also be delayed? We have a particular problem concerning long-term business lines (i.e. life insurance, civil liability, construction). Designed before the crisis, this system of standards, which adjusts portfolio assets according to their market value, is not suited to a highly volatile environment like the one we have seen for the past five years. We need therefore to ask again the fundamental question: are the basic assumptions underlying Solvency II correct? And we need to seek to reduce volatility by getting closer to economic reality. Here again, we should not set rules too quickly the impact of which may be very great but has not been fully assessed in times of crisis. I think that it would be fruitful to try out several different technical solutions over a number of years before laying down the final rules. In any event, I recommend that French insurers continue with their preparations in order to be ready technically in 2014 as if the standards were going to enter into force as scheduled. Is the programme of job cuts that you have just announced for the Banque de France sufficient when compared with staff levels at other central banks? I find the accusations about the supposedly excessive staff levels at the Banque de France exasperating.

GDP fell about 5 per cent and unemployment rocketed from levels around 2–3 per cent to two-digit figures. After a series of heavy attacks, the Swedish krona was left to float in 1992. The fixed exchange rate regime was replaced by a return to price stability as the policy objective, now in the form of a 2 per cent inflation target. Since 1999, price stability is enshrined in law and the Riksbank is more independent in the pursuit of this goal. While low inflation is admittedly not an ultimate goal for economic policy in general, it is an important prerequisite for generating growth that is stable and high. History clearly demonstrates that a high and fluctuating rate of inflation is incompatible with a permanent improvement in standards of living. A commitment to price stability is therefore one of the foundation stones of any economic policy that aims for rising prosperity and high employment. BIS Review 81/2001  3  The years since the policy realignment have been successful. But this is not only because stabilisation policy is now being conducted differently, with a clear focus on price stability and a balanced budget. It is also a result of all the measures that were introduced around the turn of the 1980s to improve the workings of the economy. These included the deregulation of capital markets, “the tax reform of the century”, a realignment of housing policy and so on.
Norges Bank recommends that the maximum limit for the loan-to-value ratio be set at 85 percent as a regulatory requirement, but that banks are also permitted to extend a certain proportion of loans with a loan-to-value ratio higher than 85 percent. Such quotas for new loans that exceed the regulatory limit are commonly referred to as speed limits. Norges Bank recommends that the tightened requirements for principal repayments for loans with high loan-to-value ratios and for debt servicing be set out in the form of guidelines rather than in the form regulations. The prudent lending requirements strengthen the robustness of banks and households and should be regarded as a permanent structural measure. Let me conclude by turning back to the present situation and challenges for the Norwegian economy. Oil prices have nearly halved since last summer. So far, the effects on the mainland economy have been relatively small. Nevertheless, the Norwegian economy must now adapt to lower demand from the oil sector and lower oil revenues. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The shift to an oil-driven economy with a high wage capacity was a comfortable journey. The journey forward, where the oil service industry must downscale and other trade-exposed industries must grow, will be more challenging. The point of departure for coping with the period of restructuring we are now facing is favourable. We have economic policy leeway. Inflation expectations are firmly anchored and the krone exchange rate is functioning as a stabiliser.

Luis M Linde: Profile of Professor Nicholas Bloom – winner of the XII Germán Bernácer Prize Opening remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XII Germán Bernácer Prize Ceremony, Madrid, 24 September 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen It is a great pleasure for me to introduce this award ceremony for the 12th Germán Bernácer Prize. First of all, let me once again thank the organizers and sponsors of the Prize. They have established an excellent programme to support economic research in the fields of macroeconomics, monetary policy, and financial economics. This is the 10th time that the Bernácer Prize award ceremony has taken place at the Banco de España. The continued support and backing of this initiative of the Observatory of the European Central Bank by the Banco de España is justified by its conviction of the importance of macroeconomic research, insofar as it concerns the functions to be performed by the European System of Central Banks. By recognizing the relevance of a prize like this, which has been awarded, in every instance, on the basis of academic excellence, the Banco de España reaffirms its commitment to economic research. As many of you know, this Prize commemorates a distinguished Spanish macroeconomist who worked at the Banco de España, as director of its Research Department, during the 1930s. Despite the isolation of the Spanish economics profession at that time, Germán Bernácer obtained substantial international recognition for his research contributions.