samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We anticipate a growth of  Meanwhile, core inflation continued its  5.5 – 6.0 per cent in 2017.  upward trend in 2016, reflecting the firming up of demand conditions in the  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  8  economy and the revisions made to the  eleven months of 2016, an increase of  tax structure in the latter part of the  14.7 per cent over the previous year. year. Core inflation, based on CCPI,  Workers’ remittances recorded a  increased to 6.3 per cent, year-on-year,  moderate growth of 3.1 per cent during  at end 2016 in comparison to 4.5 per  the first eleven months of 2016 and  cent at end 2015, while NCPI based core  amounted to around US dollars 6.6  inflation was 6.8 per cent, year-on-year,  billion. With these developments, there  in November 2016.  was a narrowing of the savings –  In response to preemptive monetary policy measures, monetary aggregates, which expanded at a high rate, decelerated, while growth of credit to the private sector showed some slowdown, mainly reflecting the impact of increased market interest rates. investment gap as reflected in the lower current account deficit during the first nine months of 2016. Foreign investment in the government securities market saw a net outflow, while longterm loans to the government recorded a net inflow.

the government on organic  In line with the international appetite to  agriculture, mainly due to the  promote green financing, the Central  multiple benefits that accrue from it,  Bank has also joined the Sustainable  the Central Bank expects to promote  Banking Network (SBN) of the  commercial scale organic agriculture  International Finance Corporation (IFC),  and dairy entrepreneurs through the  which is a knowledge and capacity  establishment of formal agribusiness societies and multi-stakeholder enterprises. building platform for financial regulators and banking associations of emerging markets on sustainable finance. As a   A Loan Scheme for Promoting Rooftop  member of the SBN, we would focus on  Solar Power Generation: A new loan  sustainable banking practices to help  scheme, funded by ADB, will be  banks to effectively manage  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  31  environmental and social risks in the  finance, with the support of IFC, we  projects they finance and support  intend to conduct a workshop for the  businesses that are greener, climate  senior staff of banking institutions in Sri  friendly and socially inclusive. As an  Lanka during the first quarter of 2017.  important step towards sustainable  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  32  6.
Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir: Economic outlook and business opportunities in Malaysia Opening remarks by Mr Mohd Razif bin Abd Kadir, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, for Malaysia Country Showcase at the IFSB Summit: "Economic Outlook and Business Opportunities in Malaysia", Dubai, 14 May 2007. *  *  *  I would like to welcome you to the Malaysia Country Showcase held in conjunction with the 4th Islamic Financial Services Board Summit. On behalf of the Malaysian delegation, I wish to thank you for your presence here on this important occasion as it gives us an opportunity to share the Malaysian business proposition and to nurture strong trade and investment ties in the region. We are fortunate to have with us distinguished panel of experts who will be engaging in an interactive discourse. Today's forum provides a platform for greater awareness of the economic climate and outlook as well as the business potentials and opportunities in Malaysia. A decade after the financial crisis, the Malaysian economy including the financial system is at its strongest position. Malaysia has greater economic flexibility to shift to new areas of growth and thus sustain the development momentum. Economic growth has been achieved with relative price stability, low unemployment and strong external balances. The level of savings remains high at 37 percent as a percentage to the GDP and the level of external reserves remains strong at USD91 billion.

Nor is devaluation necessary to help make us more competitive, even given the fact that many of our neighbours have seen currency devaluations of between 20 and 80 per cent. Currency devaluation is not the only means to achieve economic adjustment, and the argument that Hong Kong is losing out by maintaining the link makes little sense for such an externally oriented economy. Hong Kong is achieving its adjustment through other variables. Asset prices and the cost of production, particularly in the form of land and rentals, BIS Review 98/1998  -5-  have come down very sharply. Wages are easing. Manufacturers and service providers are increasingly able to lower their costs while at the same time seeking improvements in productivity. It is therefore quite misleading to claim, as many sceptics do, that without currency devaluation Hong Kong cannot be competitive. We have chosen an alternative route towards adjustment, and we consider ourselves fortunate that we have the capacity to make that choice. This capacity comes from the fundamental strengths that make it possible for us to run an effective currency board. These fundamentals can be reduced to four basic, and some what obvious, points. They are so obvious, in fact, that they are too often overlooked in the narrow discussions about the prospects for the link, and it is worth setting them out. First, our ample foreign currency reserves. These are the fruits of strict fiscal discipline, which has produced surpluses year after year, and of prudent investment.
Irma Rosenberg: Riksbank to introduce own path for the repo rate Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Danske Bank, Stockholm, 17 January 2007. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here and speak about monetary policy. The Riksbank is constantly working on improving the bases for monetary policy decisions and its communication. As part of this work, we on the Executive Board of the Riksbank decided yesterday that we will publish our own views on what is a suitable development of the repo rate in connection with the presentation of the inflation forecasts. 1 I intend to devote my speech today to explaining why we have made this decision and also to mention some other changes we are making in connection with this. However, I will not on this occasion discuss the current economic situation. The Riksbank is considered by many experts to be one of the most transparent central banks in the world. 2 We were amongst the first to introduce a numerical inflation target and to publish our inflation forecasts and the minutes from our monetary policy meetings. This is so that the general public will understand the reasons for our decisions and also to enable our monetary policy to be evaluated. It further enables accountability and gives legitimacy to an independent central bank like the Riksbank. Now we have decided to publish our own forecast for how we believe the repo rate will develop.

Another problem sometimes mentioned is that there may be difficulties in communication in the cases where the central bank has a different view from the market as to what constitutes a reasonable future development for the policy rate. 7 The forecasts for developments in the real economy and inflation that are published will under such circumstances not be the ones that the central bank believes to be the most likely and the value of the published forecast is therefore diminished. This is the same type of problem as with constant repo rate forecasts, although the problem is probably less on average over time. Most of these problems can be avoided if the central bank instead bases its inflation forecasts on its own forecast for the development of the policy rate. 8 However, the primary reason for publishing one’s own interest rate forecast is that it makes it easier for the central bank to steer expectations. With this assumption for the interest rate, the central bank can explain more clearly to the general public and the financial markets how it envisages future interest rate developments and how it reasons when making monetary policy decisions. The interest rate development that follows on from market expectations does not always give a good picture of all of the considerations a central bank must make when discussing what provides a reasonable development in interest rates.
Small depositors Given the prospect of mergers and rationalisations, it is natural that many bank customers are apprehensive and worried about how they will be affected. A merger will result in rationalisation of branch and ATM networks, which will inconvenience some customers. But overall, customers should have access to more branches and ATMs after the merger, even though not every existing branch and ATM can necessarily be retained. And because a larger merged bank can operate more efficiently and realise revenue synergies, it should be able to provide better service and greater choice to customers. Of course the bank will have to handle the implementation carefully and sensitively, giving customers adequate notice of changes and helping them to adjust. It is in the bank’s own interest to do this, and I am sure they will make every effort to do it well. Unfortunately this does not mean that as a result of a merger, every bank service will become cheaper or free. This is not possible, not because of mergers, but because of competition. Competition will force banks to watch their bottom lines more closely, and to make each service and product break even. It will become harder for banks to continue cross-subsidising services that they used to provide for free or below cost. That was a luxury that they could only afford in a protected and languid market where profits came easily, a state of affairs which was unsustainable in the long run.

Deposit insurance makes clear where depositors stand: depositors know exactly how much of their money will be protected if a bank fails. Government statements that it will not bail out depositors beyond the insured amounts become more credible. However, deposit insurance is not without its downside. If its coverage is too broad, or it insures too large a proportion of deposits, it can cause the same problems as a government guarantee. A poorly designed deposit insurance scheme may make the banking system less rather than more stable. These problems can be mitigated if the deposit insurance scheme only insures small deposits, or sets premiums in line with the relative riskiness of banks, or discriminates between banks and subsidiaries that are incorporated here from those that are not. These are complex issues that need careful study, which MAS has begun. Conclusion This liberalisation package will provide further impetus for upgrading and progress in the local banks and Singapore's financial sector development. We will review the progress made in another 2-3 years, before deciding on further moves. Consolidation and continued liberalisation are important in building strong banks. But they are not in themselves sufficient. Banks must press on to upgrade their capabilities. They must keep abreast of international best practices, new products, technological developments and new ways of doing things, while retaining the support and confidence of consumers. ABS can play a part to help the banks do this. The government will do its best to maintain a sound regulatory framework, conducive to competition and innovation.
All these facets and others covered by the strategic review may be relevant when delivering on our price stability mandate. Indeed, one of this review’s key aspects will be the definition of the ECB’s price stability target. The current inflation target, consisting of inflation rates of below, but close to, 2%, may be reformulated. First, it may be necessary to clarify the specific level of inflation targeted, to make it easier for economic agents to understand. Second, this target could also be made more symmetric, clarifying that the ECB’s response to undershooting would be as firm as its response to overshooting, and its determination to achieve symmetry in inflation outcomes around its target. Likewise, in the current environment of low inflation and interest rates close to their lower bound, the inflation target must take into account the need for a sufficiently high buffer, above zero, granting conventional interest rate policy more room for manoeuvre. 13  See, for example, Bernanke et al. (2019). 14  See Banco de España (2020b) for a description of this announcement and an assessment of its effects on the financial markets. 17  For all the above reasons, I believe it would be desirable to establish an inflation target of 2%, interpreted symmetrically, in the sense that I have just explained.

This would have three advantages: the numerical target would be clarified; the current target (which is below 2%) would be raised, thus providing more space for our interest rate policy; and the possible perception of asymmetry in the current formulation would be completely eliminated. Another key aspect will be which tools are to be included in the ECB’s monetary policy toolkit and how they are to interact within the new strategic framework. In this regard, it seems clear that, against the backdrop of low natural interest rates and greater constraints on the use of nominal interest rates as a stabiliser, asset purchase programmes and liquidity-providing operations have become part of central bankers’ normal “toolkit”. Moreover, the pandemic crisis has dramatically illustrated how the economic and financial impact of exogenous crises affecting the euro area as a whole can be asymmetric across jurisdictions. This suggests that we ought to have sufficiently flexible instruments available, so as to avoid the re-emergence of fragmentation dynamics that jeopardise the smooth transmission of monetary policy throughout the euro area. The current crisis has also highlighted that monetary policy cannot be the euro area’s sole stabilisation mechanism. Indeed, it is crucial that the euro area should have a permanent fiscal stabilisation mechanism to enable future crises to be addressed without the need for ad hoc political agreement. The European funds approved during this crisis may prove to be a sound embryo for this mechanism.
In particular, they need to have enough capital to be considered solvent even after sustaining significant losses, so that they can maintain the market access needed to recapitalize. They also need sufficient liquidity buffers so that they can respond to shocks without having to sell illiquid assets. The forced sale of illiquid assets can push asset valuations far below their fundamental value, which can increase insolvency risk. And, it is important that they not be overly reliant on short-term wholesale funding, which can evaporate during times of stress. Second, when we identify potential sources of instability that could amplify shocks, we need to make structural changes to the financial system to reduce or eliminate them. For example, the financial crisis made it clear that changes were needed in how tri-party repo transactions were unwound each day, net asset values were calculated for prime money market mutual funds, and OTC derivative obligations were cleared, settled, and risk-managed. Third, there should be a viable and predictable resolution regime. We need to be able to resolve a large, systemically important bank or securities firm in a way that limits contagion and stress on the rest of the financial system, while at the same time protecting the taxpayer against loss. Meanwhile, central counterparties (CCPs)—through which most standardized OTC derivatives must now be cleared—need to be open for business for the financial system to operate effectively.

He suggested the design of a body that “would exert direct responsibilities” in a number of domains, including “the rigorous surveillance of both fiscal policies and competitiveness policies with the capacity, in exceptional cases, to take decisions immediately applicable in a particular economy that puts the euro area financial stability in danger”.3 Where does Malta’s fiscal situation and more generally the broader Maltese economy, fit into all this? Malta’s fiscal deficit ratio followed a generally downward path during the last decade, though the decline was interrupted during two particular years – 2003 and 2008 – each explained by particular events. More recently, the budget deficit ratio has fallen each year since the high of 4.6% that was recorded in 2008. A large outlay was incurred during that year for the restructuring of a government-owned enterprise. This outlay however brought to an end the provision to the same enterprise of further government subsidies, which would otherwise have added to future deficits. The ratio eased to 3.7% and 3.6% in 2009 and 2010, while the latest government projections, as indicated in the Pre-Budget Document, refer to a deficit of 2.8% in 2011 and 2.2% in 2012. Since 2009 the deficit ratio for Malta has been below the euro area’s average, but it has to be pointed out that this average is heavily affected by the high deficit levels of the Member States facing difficulties (Chart 2).
We must not forget that copper, our main export, traded at nearly 4 dollars per pound for an extended period, and now it is closer to 3 dollars and may fall further in the long term. Moreover, during the last decade, coincidentally with higher prices and supply shortages, investments in mining have increased significantly around the world. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Chile was no exception. During the 1990s and early 2000s, mining investment averaged 2 to 3 points of the country’s GDP. Between 2006 and 2013, this figure rose to 5 points of GDP, peaking in 2012 at 6.5 percent of GDP. This phenomenon not only allowed the country to enlarge its mining capacity, but also created major productive linkages toward other sectors, including construction, trade, and manufacturing industries. The north of our country, especially cities such as Iquique, Antofagasta, and La Serena, has seen strong development and growth thanks to the positive impact of this phenomenon. However, this investment cycle, as has been noted on numerous occasions, has entered a matured stage, resulting in a decline in the number of projects under way. This is also true of other metal-exporting economies like Australia and Peru, although differing in intensity and timing, and is symptomatic of this phenomenon. However, the aforementioned maturation of the global cycle of copper investment is not the only reason behind the slowdown in mining investment.

In addition, the depreciation of our peso, although an important incentive for the export sector, in the short term has negatively affected the imported components of domestic expenditure. Along with this, it is worth noting the decline in economic expectations in recent months, which, on one hand, are a reflection of this scenario of slower growth, but on the other, may end up negatively affecting domestic demand. Expectations for investment and consumption have been falling for quite some time already, and more sharply in the most recent past. The Economic Perceptions Index (IPEC) and the Monthly Business Confidence Indicator (IMCE) have posted continuous declines this year. As of July, the two are below their neutral levels (figure 1). Besides, they show significant deterioration in some specific items, most notably those related with the convenience of buying durable goods, the perception about employment and the appropriate level of inventories. Meanwhile, the Business Perceptions Report published by the Bank in August revealed that firms perceive an increase in uncertainty, which has influenced both their own and their customers’ investment and spending decisions. Increased uncertainty naturally results in investment projects being pushed back (the “wait-and-see” option in specialized jargon), which could partly explain the reduction in investment. As I said, monetary policy has responded strongly and decisively to the worsening of our domestic scenario, generating significant monetary impulse. By mid-2013 we expressed the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  need to adopt a more expansionary monetary stance that would ensure that inflation would converge to the target.
If unchecked, it may only be a matter of time, before terror groups in other parts of the world also emulate these dastardly attacks. It is therefore, vital that all countries quickly assist Sri Lanka to eradicate this threat, as otherwise, it may only be a matter of time, before this too becomes a new tool in the armoury of terrorists. Today, combating terrorism cannot be considered the sole responsibility of single governments or of single sets of soldiers who fight at the front at the risk of their lives. We must all get involved in an international effort if we are to defeat this menace. In these efforts, financial institutions and all other corporate entities, especially, NGO’s must also actively help prevent the funding and the flow of goods and services to terrorist organizations. We must all be wise to the type of trade we are engaged in, and be mindful of the impact it can have in facilitating terrorist activity. It therefore becomes imperative that any loopholes in banking which can be identified as facilitating the financing of terrorism and strict adherence to regulations to prevent such financing, receive the immediate attention of the regulatory institutions. The aftermath of natural disasters also often provide happy hunting grounds for money launderers and terrorists. Sri Lanka’s experience post-tsunami is ample testimony to this reality. Organisations and individuals emerged from nowhere after the Tsunami, with absolutely no track record of humanitarian work, to descend on us in the guise of humanitarian relief.

The consequences of our inability to cope with these capital flows did not show up in the usual macroeconomic indicators such as growth, unemployment and inflation. Overall balance in each of the major economies was maintained. Rather, the massive flows of capital from the new entrants into western financial markets pushed down interest rates and encouraged risk-taking on an extraordinary scale. Banks expanded their balance sheets and new instruments were created to satisfy the search for yield. In the five years up to 2007, the balance sheets of the largest UK banks nearly trebled. The build up of risk came to threaten the stability of the entire financial system. Capital flows provided the fuel which the developed world’s inadequately designed and regulated financial system then ignited to produce a firestorm that engulfed us all. To prevent another crisis will require reform to both the regulation and structure of banking and the international monetary system. I have spoken about the former on earlier occasions. Tonight I want to focus on the question of how we can reduce the imbalances in the world economy. Although overall growth in both high and low saving countries was sustainable, the composition of that growth was not. And the composition of growth reflects the interaction between countries’ economic policy choices. No individual country faced strong incentives to alter its own choices, but the collective outcome was costly to everyone.