samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Although households will manage well on average, I believe there is still reason to question whether individual households are not borrowing more than is reasonable in the long term and thereby increasing their sensitivity to unforeseen events. At the Riksbank we have expressed concern, in various contexts, that households have excessive confidence that interest rates will remain low for a long period of time. The average period for fixing interest rates has fallen to 12 months, despite the fact that long-term interest rates have been at lower rates than ever. It is easy to be seduced by a low  4  BIS Review 37/2005  monthly cost and forget that even minor increases in interest rates will lead to a proportionately large increase in loan costs. If, for instance, the interest rate rises from 3 to 4 per cent, it means that the monthly cost will increase by one third. There is reason for the Riksbank to closely monitor developments in household borrowing. However, this is a question of concern over developments in individual households and over the effects on house prices rather than a question of stability within the banks and the financial system. What will be the future direction for monetary policy, given the current situation? The inflation target, the simple policy rule and the clarification of the principles behind monetary policy together provide a clear intellectual framework, which has guided our actions in recent years. In my opinion, this intellectual framework provides a sufficient degree of flexibility for monetary policy.

The policy rule shall not be applied mechanically under all circumstances. This is particularly important given that the economic reality appears to be taking on increasing complexity and becoming more difficult to define. The Inflation Report published in mid-March contained the assessment that economic growth in Sweden and abroad would remain high over the coming years. Our forecast for Sweden was a growth rate of around 3 per cent a year, which is higher than we consider to be sustainable in the long term. The new information received since then has been mixed. The oil price has been unexpectedly high, although recently it has fallen slightly. Moreover, industrial activity appears to have weakened slightly, both in Sweden and abroad. We therefore came to the conclusion in April that growth in Sweden would be somewhat weaker than was anticipated in the March Inflation Report. Since then, we have seen statistics showing that growth in Germany was slightly stronger than expected during Q1, and that the downturn noted in the United States in March appears to have been temporary. We had anticipated lower growth in Sweden’s net exports, but exports of goods appear to be increasing even less than was forecast. However, good growth in real incomes and low interest rates will contribute to favourable growth in household consumption. The labour market remains relatively weak, and our forecast is based on employment strengthening during 2005.
Cross-border tie-ups like the Deutsche Bank-Bankers' Trust merger have been relatively few. Even in Europe, with economic integration far advanced, hurdles to cross-border consolidation are high. In Asia, the process of consolidation has barely begun even within the same country, much less internationally. The public, regulators and governments are generally wary of encroachment by foreign banks on their domestic turf. Some of their reservations may be protectionist and nationalist. But countries do have genuine concerns, ranging from financial stability to issues of macroeconomic management and customer protection. These will have to be addressed if the banks are to be allowed to pursue mergers and consolidation in accordance with economic logic. In Singapore, we have responded to the international consolidation not by trying to shut out foreign players, nor by a totally laissez faire approach, but by a phased liberalisation of our banking sector. We have opened it to greater foreign competition, while simultaneously pushing the local banks to strengthen and upgrade themselves. The stronger local banks have concluded that they need to develop into significant regional players, in order to diversify their earnings and exploit new growth opportunities. A few have taken the first steps in this direction. Not all their ventures have been successful. But mistakes are the price of experience, and the banks must learn from them, rather than abandon the effort to grow abroad. We have also encouraged the local banks to consolidate among themselves. The domestic market is too small to sustain five local banks of adequate size to compete regionally.

Nevertheless, the Thai banking system will be able to handle these challenges given a strong capital base as a result of continued profitability in the past ten years, a good risk management system, and strong risk-based supervision. Therefore, Thailand’s key fundamentals remain resilient in the face of these challenges. Most importantly, human resources and know-how remain intact. History shows that no matter how severe the natural disaster, roads can always be rebuilt and buildings restored in a relatively brief span of time should the human spirit remain, as it does in Thailand. The growth rates I have mentioned for 2012 and 2013 are consistent with the medium-term trend, as strong fundamentals mean that Thailand’s long-term growth trajectory remains intact despite the flood and volatile external environment. An important reason for this is  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  that Thailand is well positioned geographically to reap the benefits of growth in Asia. The rise of China and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) provide enormous growth opportunities from economic integration. For sure, there will be more competition. But our research shows that trade gains will be substantial, from both inside and outside the region. However, there is a catch. To reap these gains, the Thai economy will have to undergo structural adjustment, that is, the flow of labor and capital from sunset to sunrise sectors. The exact form of adjustment is uncertain, as it depends on global developments.
The 2012 MoU sets out a panoply of safeguards against the repetition of such an incident, including a requirement for timely notification from the Bank to HM Treasury of any risk to public funds, and analysis of the systemic impact of alternative policy options. The MoU makes it clear that the Chancellor has sole responsibility for the use of public funds, approves all ELA (including the terms on which it is provided), and may if necessary direct the Bank to extend ELA – though this is a backstop power, whose use is not expected to be considered in the majority of crisis situations. Where it is judged necessary to keep ELA covert for a period in order to minimise the risks to financial stability, key Parliamentary Chairs will be briefed orally by senior officials on any government indemnity attached to such lending – and full disclosure to Parliament would be made at the earliest subsequent opportunity once the risk of damage to the public interest had passed. 6 Covert operations, particularly those involving a fiscal component, are often cited as the most troubling forms of LOLR by those concerned that central banks have a bias to lend “too much”. In the United Kingdom, the disclosure of large covert loans to HBOS and RBS in late 2009 (more than a year after the loans were advanced) triggered a public debate about the  3  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/smf/annualreport15.pdf. 4  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/mous/statutory/moufincrisis.pdf. 5  “The view from No.11” by Nigel Lawson, pages 402-6. 6  See page 22 of http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtreasy/181/181.pdf.

The first authorised in Bulgaria providers of the two new payment services started their activities in 2020. In conclusion, we can sum up that the trends in Europe are related to the development of a single European payments infrastructure based on common standards and instruments, aiming to ensure a pan-European scope and reach. Instant payments, which are in a process of introduction also in Bulgaria, open banking, and the increasing use of mobile technologies are topical issues both in the country and in the European Union, issues that we will continue to talk about. The payment services in Bulgaria are evolving in line with the dynamic processes in Europe, gathered around digitalisation, new technologies, and the ensured security of the payment process. 1 Contactless Payments on consumer off-the-shelf devices (COTS) and Software Based PIN Entry on COTS 2 Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) 3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive (EU)  2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (RTS on SCA and CSC) 4 www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/payment-services-and-electronic-money/eba-working-group-on-apis-  under-psd2 5 Opinion of the European Banking Authority on obstacles under Article 32(3) of the RTS on SCA and CSC 6 www.eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Searching for answers Even if we can provide some general answers to the question of what has characterised central banking activities, we must continue to search for answers to what central banks are and what makes them useful. Norges Bank will celebrate its two hundred year anniversary in 2016. We plan to write three books: The History of Norges Bank will be written by historians, and The Monetary History of Norway will be written by economists. The third book from the project will offer an international, historical perspective on central banking, and has been given the working title What is a useful central bank? Norway will only be mentioned in this book if our experiences contribute to the international understanding of the question at hand. This last question was also the topic of the Governor’s speech yesterday and the theme of today’s symposium. He pointed out that a useful central bank must have a clear mandate with relevant objectives and instruments. The central bank must also seek to reach these objectives in a manner that ensures confidence. Arranging this symposium on a theme that interests the Governor is our way of honouring him after having served his two periods. Today we begin with a historical perspective on central banking. Professor Bordo will offer some long-term perspectives, while professor Toniolo will discuss some experiences from central banks’ challenges in the interwar period. Later, Governor Aziz will address current challenges for central banks in emerging market economies.

The financial bubble contained all the classical elements, such as a surging credit growth and house price inflation. Norges Bank had to carry out several rescue operations to save banks that were in trouble. 1899 was probably the first year the Bank functioned as “lender of last resort”. If you take a walk around the neighbourhood, you will see the physical aftermath of this bubble. You will find buildings from the 1890s and from the 1920s onward, but virtually nothing built in the intervening period. The past years we have again been in troubled waters. In September 2008 the turbulence in financial markets developed into a full-blown global crisis. Money markets seized up. Confidence between banks vanished. Liquidity dried up, interest rates rose sharply and equity prices fell. The long-term lending market dried up. International developments were also felt in Norway. Up until then we could almost take a well-functioning money market for granted in this country. But in the autumn of 2008 the money market stopped functioning and medium-term funding for banks was problematic. Just as in 1816, Norges Bank acted as “market maker of last resort”. And so, the history of my own central bank, expanding the window from 25 years to 200 years, does not provide an unambiguous answer to the question of what defines a central bank. But even if we look at central banks in other countries, there are no clear answers. The way the financial crisis was handled varied across countries.
What determines the interest rate at which the government can borrow, however, is the path for the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  amount of government debt held by the private sector, rather than the total amount of gilts in issue. That is true when the Bank purchases gilts and will be true later when the Bank comes to sell the gilts. Not only is combining monetary and fiscal policies unnecessary, it is also dangerous. Either the government controls the process – which is “bad” money creation – or the Bank controls it and enters the forbidden territory of fiscal policy. It is peculiar, to say the least, that some of the same people who believe that the Governor of the Bank is too powerful also believe that he should stand on the steps of Threadneedle Street distributing £ notes – a policy which you will appreciate is rather hard to reverse. For the same reason, the Bank could not countenance any suggestion that we cancel our holdings of gilts. The Bank must have the ability to reverse its policy – to sell gilts and withdraw money from the economy – when that becomes necessary. Otherwise, we run the risk of losing control over monetary conditions. Giving money either to the government or to households directly, or indeed cancelling our holding of gilts, means that the Bank of England has no assets to sell when the time comes to tighten monetary policy.

Page 21 of 27  Dec  Figure 15 Investments committed for next five years (CBC) (4)  Capital goods imports and IPSA (1)(2)  (billions of dollars)  (thousands of dollars of 2013; million of dollars of 2013) 14  Real IPSA (t+7)  Capital goods imports and IPSA (1)(2)  1,700  50 45  12  1,500  10  1,300  40 35 30  8  1,100  6  900  4  700  2  500  25 20 15 10  08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21  5  0 18  II  III  IV  19  II  III  IV  20  II  III  IV  21  (1) Quarterly moving averages. (2) Series deflated by the capital goods import price index, with base year 2013=100. Spliced with the base year 2008=100 series using annual changes. For second quarter, data for the first quarter of that year are repeated. (3) Excludes other transport vehicles. (4) Four-quarter moving average. For each version of the CBC survey, includes 5-year forecasts, considering the current year. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, and Capital Goods Corporation (CBC).
But if there is great uncertainty about the fundamental value of an asset or there is a suspicion that the seller may have chosen to sell it because they know it is a lemon, then prices are likely to have to fall a long way before buyers step forward. That is particularly so if potential buyers are concerned about their own access to funding and therefore wish to remain in safe and liquid assets. But given the use of mark-to-market accounting to value trading books, the falls in asset prices then worsens the balance sheets of other institutions. That in turn reduces their capital ratios, aggravating their problems in raising funds and generating a further round of asset sales. Further amplifying mechanisms arise as a consequence of leveraged positions. The net worth of a leveraged investor deteriorates much faster than his gross worth when asset prices fall, as all of the loss is scored against capital. Thus even to hold leverage constant requires substantial asset sales, further depressing asset prices. For instance, an investor with $ million of assets financed by $ million of capital and $ million of debt who experiences a $ million loss in asset value would have to sell $ million of assets and redeem an equivalent amount of the debt to restore his original leverage ratio. Brunnermeier (2009) refers to this as a “loss spiral”.

For example, Sweden shows no signs of the strong growth of investment that has been seen in the USA in the last four to six years. Further, there are no indications that the productivity of labour has increased very much, which appears to have been an important element of the strong growth in America. In the opinion of the Executive Board of the Riksbank, as stated in the Inflation Report (1999:3), the trade-off between inflation and growth has improved to some extent, even if there is considerable uncertainty about how much. In conclusion, the Swedish economy appears to have undergone only some of the structural changes that the American economy has implemented. It remains to be seen whether the “new economy” can have any further impact in Sweden. 5  BIS Review 132/1999
57 As I had explained on previous occasions, MAS’ overall profit position is strongly influenced by currency translation effects – these are the effects of converting value of our reserves in foreign currency to Singapore Dollars (SGD). •  A weaker SGD means a positive translation effect, i.e. investment gains on our foreign assets are amplified when reported in SGD. •  Conversely, a stronger SGD means a negative translation effect, i.e. investment gains are smaller or even negative when measured in SGD. But these translation effects have no bearing on the international purchasing power of MAS’ reserves. 58 Therefore, it is important to look at the underlying investment gains holding the SGD exchange rate constant to strip out currency translation effects. When we do this, for FY2013/14, MAS posted foreign investment gains of $ billion, comparable to investment gains of $ billion for FY 2012/13. 59 For this financial year, we recorded positive translation effects as SGD weakened against the USD, EURO and GBP. In the last financial year, we had negative translation effects because the SGD appreciated against these three currencies as well as the JPY. 60 To help make sense of MAS’ underlying investment performance, we have provided a write-up on page 27 of annual report, showing the overall profit position, currency translation effects, and investment gains. 61 As shown in the chart on page 27, MAS’ investment gains have been relatively stable.

These are in substance collective investments for which rules on public offerings and disclosure should apply. 39 One reason why consumers venture into unconventional and often risky products is that simple, lower cost products not easily available. MAS working to address this. 40 Following FAIR recommendation, MAS will introduce a direct channel through which consumers can purchase insurance products that focus on meeting their protection needs. Such products will be cheaper as consumers do not need to pay for distribution costs. The features of these products will also be largely standardised, making them easier to understand and compare across products. 41 By early next year, consumers who do not require financial advice will be able to purchase term and whole life insurance products, directly from insurers. MAS will be announcing details on this by the end of the month. 42 MAS is also working to facilitate better access to fixed income products. We are seeing growing retail investor interest in fixed income products, e.g. plain vanilla corporate bonds. While the risk-return profiles of such fixed income products are easier to understand they are not readily available to retail investors. 43 MAS reviewing how retail access to fixed income products can be improved. We are looking at how disclosure requirements can be streamlined for issuers satisfying certain criteria such as issuances of a certain size or with a track record. The idea is to make it easier for issuers to offer bonds to retail investors while maintaining sufficient safeguards.
The savings in fees and charges matters: •  If we can take one percentage point out of the fees and charges that ordinary savers pay in many market-based pension schemes, that one percentage point makes a large difference in retirement savings. Taken over a lifetime of work, that one percentage point will mean at least a 25% improvement in retirement savings. •  In a whole range of countries, the experience has been that it has been difficult for people to manage their own funds. They don’t make the right investment decisions. We have to think hard about the reforms that pool and collectivise savings, to reduce the costs for ordinary savers. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  28. A third challenge has to do with reforming healthcare systems. The advances in healthcare have been remarkable and that’s largely why people are able to live for much longer than we used to. We are living healthier lives. But by and large, in a whole range of countries, we have extremely inefficient healthcare systems. Too much treatment takes place in hospitals rather than in primary care or in the community. And it is also a system where subsidies have been dispensed on an untargeted basis in many countries. The system is not sustainable and is going to take up a lot of resources in the future: both private and public resources that could otherwise be used to strengthen retirement adequacy and incomes.

It is indispensable that households with minimum income to access and benefit the basic banking products, such as current accounts. The Bank of Albania, through legal and institutional changes has provided the possibility that households benefit these basic financial products at a low or no cost at all. As a result, cheaper and swifter alternatives, which compete with the existing financial products, will be available. At the same time, companies that will enter into these new markets will have better possibilities of profit. Education is the sole costs to know and benefit from these products. In this regard, the Bank of Albania remains the main actor for the spread and implementation of the national financial education and inclusion strategies. In this framework, the Bank of Albania is working with national and international important partners, the World Bank and EBRD. Their long experience shows that the correction and reduction of social and economic disparities is a difficult commitment, which takes time. Nevertheless, enhancing financial literacy, by spreading knowledges such are: budget drafting; its effective management; knowing risks and avoiding wrong investments; may affect the mitigation of wounds that these turbulences brings into the life of poor people, and of course to everyone; to the whole society and population and the financial situation that the moment brings about. Turning back to the launching of the Global Money Week 2022, I am glad to see the ever increasing interest of youths, their teachers and professors in our educational activities.