samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The bank therefore contributes to ensuring that the mediation of capital in the economy functions efficiently; it is sufficient that borrowers can convince the bank of their creditworthiness, they do not need to convince each individual saver. Similarly, savers do not have to assess the creditworthiness of every borrower; it is enough to be satisfied of the bank's solvency. The banks can also supply payment services for households and companies by using the existing financial infrastructure, such as accounts and various routines for transferring funds between financial institutions. As these functions are central to an efficient economy, it is evident that major problems can arise if financial stability is upset. This is aptly illustrated by, for instance, the crises in South East Asia at the  BIS Review 52/2006  3  end of the 1990s and by the bank crisis that Sweden and other countries suffered at the beginning of that same decade. While the target of maintaining price stability is relatively straightforward and intuitive, it is more difficult to specify the task of promoting financial stability. This task has also been formulated in slightly different ways in different central banks’ regulations. For instance, the Bank of England’s charter says that it is ”responsible for the overall stability of the financial system as a whole”, while the corresponding task in the regulations for Sweden’s Riksbank has been expressed in a more indirect manner: ”to promote the efficiency and safety of the payment system”.

I assume that this is one explanation why, for instance, it took Sweden until 1999 before there was sufficient political support to grant the Riksbank increased formal independence and to confirm by law the price stability objective, despite the fact that these reforms had been proposed when the inflation target was introduced in 1993. However, the concern among politicians over making central banks independent is quite unwarranted. The independence does not, of course, mean that the central bank is free to conduct any monetary policy they wish; it only means that it should be able to use the means at its disposal to meet the objectives set by the political system without outside intervention. This is usually expressed as the central bank being instrument independent but not goal independent. The delegation of powers should be regarded as a means for politicians to ensure that the long-term aim of the monetary policy that they endeavour to achieve – but have difficulty guaranteeing – can become a reality. Furthermore, a natural consequence of the independence is that the central bank shall be accountable for its actions and that monetary policy shall be conducted in a transparent manner. 7 It is interesting to note that, despite fairly substantial initial doubts, people have afterwards been very satisfied with the reforms implemented. Monetary policy therefore appears to have essentially delivered what was hoped for and I am not aware of any country where making the central bank more independent has been regretted. Conclusion Let me round off.
Table 2 Estimates of potential growth and activity gaps for non-mining GDP (1) Potential (2)  Non-mining GDP (2) Sep.18 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021  Jun.19 1.6 1.9 4.1 3.2  Gap (2) (3)  Statistical models (4) Sep.18 2.0 1.6 3.9 3.0 3.7 3.6  Sep.'18 average  Jun.19 2.2 2.5 3.1 3.2  2.4 2.5 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4  -0.5 -1.1 -0.1 -0.1  MEP (5) Sep.18 -0.5 -1.1 -0.1 -0.3  Jun.19 -0.3 -1.2 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1  (1) For each column, the figures after the dotted line show the forecast contained in the respective Monetary Policy Report. (2) Non-mining GDP at seasonally-adjusted factor cost. (3) Average for the year (4) Log-difference between actual and potential GDP expressed as percentage. (4) Statistical models uses aerage potential levels with trivariate filter and multivariate filter. MEP model gap. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Page 12 of 18  Figure 6 Activity gap (percent)  4  4  2  2 Dec.'18 MP Report  0  0  Jun.

An additional dimension of the monetary policy decision of last Friday is to clearly separate the implications for the MPR of recalibrating the monetary impulse in the face of the current configuration of structural parameters and economic variables, of the responses that might be necessary in the face of the evolution of macroeconomic conditions. As I have stressed in this presentation, the world economy is experiencing a delicate moment, where a declining phase of the cycle is combined with high policy uncertainty in the world's leading economies and where financial markets rely heavily—perhaps too much—on the will of the central banks to react to episodes of volatility. Although the world economy continues to grow, we note with concern the escalation and expansion of trade conflicts, a stagnation of international trade, deteriorating expectations and frequent episodes of market volatility. In these circumstances, as we have pointed out before, the Chilean economy, despite its commercial and financial openness, has powerful buffers, given by the exchange rate, the depth of the domestic financial market and the anchoring of expectations. However, it also has room for robust policy responses, particularly of monetary policy. Having solved the past imbalances of the MPR helps us identify future phenomena and apply the proper responses. On other occasions we have said that the Central Bank of Chile is prepared to face new challenges. Recent decisions include an additional element in this statement: the evidence that we have the capacity to identify important changes and react with the necessary speed.
This will add a fresh boost to the growth of the global Islamic Finance industry, complementing the domestically driven growth of Islamic finance markets in Asia and the Middle East. First, both the Middle East and Asia will continue to post robust growth relative to other parts of the world. This gives incentive for economic and financial players to participate more actively in each others’ economies. The GCC economies have held up well despite weak global growth, suffering limited impact from slowdowns elsewhere in the world. IMF estimates that growth in the GCC countries will moderate slightly but remain robust at 4.0% in 2013 and 2014.4 Growth will be largely driven by increased domestic demand, and further spending on infrastructure to address present shortfalls and facilitate economic expansion. IMF has projected Asia to grow by 5.7% in 2013, and 6.0% the following year, exceeding the outlook for the global economy.5 Growth in Asia over the medium term will be supported by continued urbanisation, favourable demographics and increased intra-Asian trade and investment. Second, multilateral Islamic finance agencies are making steady headway in addressing issues that contribute to some fragmentation of the Islamic finance industry. Work by the IFSB in setting international standards and best practices for the industry is providing greater uniformity of regulatory environment for Islamic financial players globally. The International Islamic Financial Markets (IIFM) is collaborating with ISDA and industry players to develop standardisation of Islamic financial products, documentation and related processes that will facilitate cross-border Islamic hedging, risk management and money market activities.

Zdeněk Tůma: Education as investment in human capital Speech by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, for the graduation ceremony, The New Anglo-American College, Prague, 20 June 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues, It is my pleasure to be here today and to share with you some thoughts that concern the role of education as an investment in human capital in the long-term development of our economy and society in general. Today it’s commonplace for politicians to swear by concepts like investment in education, knowledge-based economy or the effect of education on long-term economic growth. They are also quick to add something about the necessity to pay for university education, at least those on the right wing of the political spectrum. Don’t worry, we haven’t met today to assess individual political ideas, and we all know that sometimes it’s a long road from what politicians say to what they do. However, the fact that you are sitting here today indicates that viewing education as an investment has its place in today’s society regardless of political preferences. I would like to use this opportunity to point out that although the concept of investment in education may be somewhat misused and can have unfortunate overtones for somebody, it has a rigorous theoretical foundation and is of high empirical relevance.
These will include analysing the interplay of different regulatory and supervisory systems and also different legal and institutional arrangements, for instance when dealing with problems in cross-border financial institutions. There will also be assessments of the implications of one country’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities on some financial institutions and financial infrastructures which are active in that country but which have their main activities in another country – maybe even outside the region. The analysis will be compounded by the fact that the national governments and authorities may select policies and approaches which are not compatible simply because their national interests differ. For regional FSAPs in European Union and EEA countries the work becomes somewhat easier since there exists a common minimum framework of legislation. But there may also be complications such as in the Nordic-Baltic FSAP due to the mixture of currency arrangements – one country is already using the euro, some are outside and still others in a transitional mode. Notwithstanding the difficulties of conducting regional financial stability assessments I sincerely believe that they imply a major positive and even necessary shift. In today’s world, where financial sectors are often closely knit across the borders, it makes little sense to analyse financial stability on a standalone domestic basis pretending that external events do not matter or can be reduced to simple parameters in the stress-testing models. How could FSAP-like assessments provide additional value in a European context? In order to answer this we first must define what the “European context” is.

In the long run, the persistence of structural reforms remains a priority for stimulating the economic growth rates. The Bank of Albania has constantly called for the restructuring of the Albanian economy and the need for a new economic growth model. It should be an export-oriented growth model and it should create a more favourable environment for promoting foreign direct investment  BIS Review 175/2010  1  at home. Increasing economic growth potential is, among others, a necessity against a background of steady employment growth and lower unemployment figures. The Bank of Albania has been consistent and transparent about the targeted macroeconomic policy approach. We have requested and welcomed the re-orientation of fiscal policy towards bringing the budget deficit down and keeping the public debt level in check. The successful borrowing via the issuance of Eurobond is a positive signal for the Albanian economy and it will help finance public sector’s activity with foreign currency in the short-run. On the other hand, the quotation of the Albanian sovereign debt in the international markets will require greater commitment in order to maintain appropriate parameters of fiscal sustainability. Pursuing these principles in 2011 budget and in the medium-term public finance framework would be the first right step in this regard. Keeping inflation under control will continue to guide our monetary policy judgment and decision-making on interest rates and the liquidity conditions in economy.
These criteria – combined with an important role for the central bank, which I have argued in favour of today – are also largely reflected in a recommendation from the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). The European macroprudential supervisory body ESRB was created in response to the financial crisis and began operating in 2011.12 The purpose is to contribute to preventing or reducing systemic risks in the EU. The primary instrument for doing this is the ability to issue warnings or recommendations if significant risks are identified. The ESRB  11  See, for instance, the Executive Board’s consultation response to the report Evaluation of the Riksbank’s monetary policy and work on financial stability 2005–2010 (2010/11:RFR5), published on 30 November 2011. In addition to the four criteria, it is also emphasises there that the Riksbank should play a central role in macroprudential policy, which I have argued in favour of today. 12  It is headed by ECB Chairman Mario Draghi and consists mainly of the central banks and financial supervisory authorities within the EU, with the first-mentioned having the right to vote. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  does not have any binding instruments of its own at its disposal; instead it assumes that the EU member states themselves will establish systems for this. Thus, an important part of the discussion on how macroprudential policy should be organised is the ESRB’s recommendation to the EU member states’ governments in this field, which was published in January 2012.

The Bank has been very intensively engaged in much of this work - with the Treasury in the G7, the G10, the new G20 and the IMF, with both the Treasury and the FSA in the new Financial Stability Forum; with the FSA also in the Basel Committee; and with our central bank counterparts in both the BIS and the ECB. All of this, too, points to the critical importance of coordination and cooperation, nationally between the Treasury, the Bank and the FSA, but also to an ever increasing degree with our various interested counterparts abroad. And in this context, given the international importance of the City, we, together with the FSA, have a particular role to play in engaging the private sector financial community in the consultation process: we have a common interest in the outcome. All of these developments, Chairman, pose major challenges both for market participants and for the authorities. But, for the markets at least, with major challenges come major opportunities. Our job is to help the markets take advantage of those opportunities by providing a stable and orderly financial environment within which markets can function more effectively. It is very much in the interests of the City that we should succeed. We - like you - have plenty to do. BIS Review 49/2000  4
Norman T L Chan: Hong Kong as a risk management hub Welcoming remarks and keynote speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Treasury Markets Summit 2019, Hong Kong, 16 September 2019. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, 1. About 15 years ago, a senior banker suggested to me that, in order to further promote Hong Kong’s position as an international financial centre (IFC), we should turn Hong Kong into a “risk management hub” in Asia. However, he did not elaborate further at the time on exactly what he meant and how this could be achieved. To be honest, it was not clear to me then what this risk management hub idea was all about. 2. Now looking back, I realise that, even without us consciously pursuing the idea as a policy objective, Hong Kong has already made major accomplishment as the “risk management hub” in Asia. Let me explain. Prerequisites for a Risk Management Hub 3. Clearly an important pre-condition for a risk management hub is to have money or capital flowing through Hong Kong. In this context, it is important to distinguish genuine financial flows from those that are not. Many of you may recall that, in the 1990s and prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, many Japanese (regional) banks used Hong Kong to conduct the socalled euro yen businesses, through which the banks would book in Hong Kong their yen loans to borrowers in Japan, presumably to benefit from more favorable tax treatment.

This is in the light of an important contemporary directive of European Union, which we are working to introduce in our banking legislation. Last, but not least, we will continue our efforts during 2016 for the further institutional perfection the Bank of Albania, aiming a fast approximation to the model of ESCB central banks. The new organisational structure and the three-year development strategy of the Bank of Albania will guide a set of decisions of the Bank of Albania's Supervisory Council to improve legal and sub-legal acts. The daily activity of the Bank of Albania's departments, the mobilisation and motivation of human resources, efficient management of funds for the financing of the activity, the strengthening of the internal audit and risk management in the activity of the Bank of Albania will be the main priorities in our work during 2016. Thank You! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
And when, in the choice between two repo-rate paths, the majority of the members of the Executive Board choose a path that provides poorer target attainment for both inflation and resource utilisation, this may undeniably give the impression that monetary policy has more targets than inflation and resource utilisation. 1 If, in addition, repo-rate increases are justified with reference to factors such as high growth, house prices, household indebtedness, the low level of interest rates, possible financial imbalances in the future and so on, there is a risk that this impression will be strengthened. If so, monetary policy will become unclear. 1  At the monetary policy meeting in June 2010, the repo rate was increased despite the fact that the CPIF forecast was below 2 per cent and the forecasts for all the measures of resource utilisation were below a normal level. An unchanged repo rate would have entailed a CPIF forecast closer to the target and forecasts for resource utilisation closer to a normal level. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Third, I would like to explain in more detail why I entered a reservation at the latest monetary policy meeting and how I arrived at a significantly lower repo-rate path than the path in the main scenario. The Riksbank conducts flexible inflation targeting – but what does this mean in practice?

What I am objecting to here is not that the forecasts are adjusted with assessments that take into account factors that affect the forecasts but are not captured in the usual models. On the contrary, I have always advocated such an approach and have even discussed how this can be done more systematically in a number of research papers. 7 I think that it is quite correct to take into account house prices, indebtedness, imbalances and so on to the extent that they affect the forecasts for inflation and the real economy. All information that affects the forecasts is relevant. The problem arises when one allows these factors to undermine target attainment for inflation and resource utilisation. In practice, this gives them the status of separate targets for monetary policy. This makes monetary policy unclear and hard to understand. Moreover, as I see it, the Sveriges Riksbank Act and its preparatory works do not provide scope for any other targets for monetary policy than inflation and resource utilisation. 8 I believe that it is important that the Riksbank’s decisions and communication in the future do not give the impression that monetary policy is focused on anything other than inflation and resource utilisation. In their 2006 evaluation of Swedish monetary policy in the period 1995–2005, Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006) also say that the Riksbank’s statements on housing prices led many people to perceive the Riksbank’s message as confusing, which made things unclear and undermined confidence in monetary policy.
The new statistics support this scenario, although the picture is not clear-cut. For instance, the National Accounts for Q3 indicate an increase in growth compared with earlier quarters, in line with the forecast in the Inflation Report. Other indicators of a recovery are the purchasing managers index and the National Institute of Economic Research's business tendency surveys, as well as the fact that retail trade continues to show good growth. Counteracting this is the fact that manufacturing output was weak during October and November and the number of new orders declined. In addition, new estimates for public finances indicate that public consumption this year may be somewhat weaker than  4  BIS Review 9/2004  was assumed in December. This is mainly connected with the financial situation in local government. The local government sector as a whole shows a deficit, which must be redressed over the coming years. Although the dollar has weakened against the Swedish krona, in terms of the TCW index the krona has not appreciated as much. This is mainly because the krona, contrary to many expectations, has weakened against the euro. The most recent National Accounts figures and foreign trade statistics also indicate that we have so far been slightly too pessimistic with regard to Swedish exports. The most evident cause for concern is the labour market, which has developed more weakly than expected, particularly towards the end of 2003.

Some analysts have pointed to the possibility that the recent productivity increase could be at least partly due to IT capital now making an efficiency impact on production even outside the sectors producing IT capital, where it has enabled rationalisation of labour and a reduction of the investment requirement. This theory thus explains the combination of rapid productivity growth, weak employment growth and a slow increase in investment, which has recently characterised both the US and Swedish economies. So what - apart from the actual developments in productivity, employment and investment - indicates that this is the explanation? One piece of the puzzle that supports this theory is that the improvements in productivity can scarcely be explained merely by business cycle effects. This becomes clear if we study productivity growth in the corresponding phase of the business cycle during earlier periods (Figure 5). The measure of economic activity we have chosen is, however, more or less arbitrary and does not entirely correspond to the assessment of resource utilisation in the Riksbank's Inflation Report. Nevertheless, this does not appear to affect the general conclusion that productivity growth is unusually rapid at present, bearing in mind economic activity and could thus be a sign of a sustained change. BIS Review 9/2004  7  5.