samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 11 Average forward inflation compensation based on swap rates  Inflation expectations EES and FOS (*) (percent)  (moving weekly average, percent)  7  7  7  7  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  06  07  08  FOS one year ahead EES at Dec.11 EEE a dos años  09  10  11  06  FOS two years ahead EES one year ahead  07  08  3 in 2  09  10  5 in 5  1  11  1 in 1  (*) The FOS considers the survey of the first half of the month. Only for March, the second half is also considered. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Table 3  Impact on GDP and inflation of a $ increase in the oil price (*) (percentage points) FMI  OCDE  PIB United States Eurozone Japan Emerging Asia -exc.

Twice in the past 40 years we have succumbed to the temptation of living above our means. The first time was in the late 1970s, when the Norwegian state borrowed substantial amounts abroad. Our current account deficit in 1977, at 15 per cent of GDP, set an OECD record and we were probably on the brink of having to ask for an IMF program. We were investing heavily in the welfare state and in North Sea projects at the same time, and these investments could not be fully financed on the basis of economic growth. The second time was during the years of economic crisis before and around 1990, when levels of domestic spending, private and public, far exceeded our economic limits. It was not until 30 years after oil had been discovered off our shores that Norway was in a position to put some money aside. We are nonetheless frequently reminded that petroleum production has reached a plateau and will begin to decline in a few years’ time. Our welfare system, including old-age pensions, is basically financed by current income. It is not fundbased, as pensions are in a number of other countries. Even though it is likely that the Pension Fund will grow considerably in the years ahead, estimates show that the capital in the Fund will only cover some 60 per cent of public pension expenditure in the future. It cannot therefore be argued that the government’s savings are large relative to its obligations.
The pre-crisis decade was generally one of steady growth and inflation close to the target, and thus few signs of overheating in the real economy. Domestic demand nevertheless consistently outstripped the supply of output, generating a small but persistent current account deficit, averaging around 2% of GDP. MPC members noted on several occasions that this would have to be corrected at some stage, and would most probably need to be accompanied by a lower sterling real effective exchange rate. 1 Such a rebalancing process appeared to have been set in train by the deterioration in the outlook and the rise in uncertainty associated with the financial crisis. Household spending collapsed, as the saving ratio rose from around 1-2% to around 7%, with much of the rise accounted for by the behaviour of highly indebted households (Chart 1); businesses' capital spending also fell sharply, though that is something we would like to have seen more of, rather than less. At the same time, sterling fell by a quarter. That should have given us a head start in crowding in net exports to replace the lost domestic demand. The performance of net exports has, however, been distinctly underwhelming, adding just 1½ percentage points to total growth since the start of the recession. That is not simply a reflection of the weakness in our export markets, as the weakness at home has depressed imports correspondingly. Once one controls for the changes in activity at home and abroad, net exports still look weak.

(a) Saving ratios calculated using the average consumption and disposable income levels for each group of households. Numbers in parentheses show their share of total income in 2007. Shares do not sum to 100 due to rounding. (b) High-debt mortgagors are defined as having outstanding mortgage debt of more than twice their annual disposable income. All other mortgagors are low debt. Chart 2: Ratio of UK exports to UK-weighted rest of G7 imports(a) Indices: 2003 Q1 = 100 140 Goods  130  Services  120 110 100 90 80 70  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006  2009  2012  Sources: Eurostat, Japan Cabinet Office, ONS, Statistics Canada, Thomson Reuters Datastream, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bank calculations. (a) Chained-volume measures of UK goods (services) exports divided by real imports of goods (services) in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States, weighted using UK 2011 goods (services) export shares from the 2012 Pink Book. UK goods exports data have been adjusted for MTIC fraud by an amount equal to the ONS goods import adjustment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Chart 3: Net international investment positions (% of GDP) Percentage point changes since 2000 Germany France Greece  Ireland Italy  60  Spain Portugal  40 20 0 -20 -40 -60 -80  -100 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  Source: Eurostat.
Refinements in the structure and content of the GLDP are expected to be introduced in the subsequent sessions and will include, among other things, new areas such as geopolitical and economic trends, corporate entrepreneurship and innovation, diversity and inclusiveness, culture and corporate social responsibility. The US part of the Summer program will also be changed. The change will bring participants closer to distinguished faculty from such renowned institutions as Stanford, UC Berkeley and UCLA. 2  BIS Review 11/2006  Let me now conclude my remarks. Leadership is all about a vision for the future, setting the strategic direction for the organization and having the ability to translate the vision into results. This involves having the ability to promote the shared vision and energizing the organization to produce the results. As I have earlier mentioned to one of the groups of the GLDP program "The quest for leadership excellence is a journey and not a destination." When we talk about enhancing leadership capability, we are talking about leaders who are continuous learners, who strive for cutting edge excellence, leaders who have strong convictions and beliefs and yet having humility and recognizing the need to reinvent themselves and in doing so become dynamic leaders pushing the frontiers of excellence and having the courage to take on the new challenges. Thank you. BIS Review 11/2006  3

Benoît Cœuré: Interview with Politico Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, and Politico, conducted by Mr Pierre Briançon on 23 March 2016, and published on 30 March 2016. *  *  *  The last Governing Council meeting on 10 March seemed to be marked by some ambiguity on negative interest rates. On the one hand, the message was that rates wouldn’t get much lower. On the other, there was the signal that there could be exceptions… The question we are always trying to address is how to design our policy so that it is effective in the situation we face at a given moment. The package announced on 10 March was very potent, both in intensity and in sheer volume. Negative interest rates are not our main instrument, they just support our overall policy. And looking ahead, we’re not short of instruments – our choice is quite large. We will be able to deal with adverse situations if necessary. You indicated that the ECB wasn’t deaf to the banking sector’s concerns about the impact of negative rates on banks’ profitability. Banks’ profitability has improved when you look at the global overall impact of our monetary policy, that is, stronger credit demand and lower risk in the economy. And, as a matter of fact, the interest margin of banks has gone up, not down. Of course, the impact is different depending on banks’ business models and on how negative the rates are.
Specifically, when there is an inflow of funds involving the HKMA passively buying US dollars sold to it by the banks and providing the Hong Kong dollars, the clearing balance of the banking system will rise. This is the result of the HKMA, in the settlement of the deals, crediting the clearing accounts of the banks selling the US dollars to it with the Hong Kong dollars required for settlement. 4. Conversely, when there is an outflow of funds involving the HKMA passively selling US dollars and buying Hong Kong dollars from the banks, the clearing balance of the banking system will fall. This is the result of the HKMA, in the settlement of the deals, debiting the clearing accounts of the banks the Hong Kong dollars required for settlement. 5. The HKMA adheres strictly to this discipline which in effect involves the clearing balance of the banking system varying with the amount of US dollars sold to or bought from the HKMA at the initiative of the banks. BIS Review 19/1998  - 13 Exceptional Circumstances 6. There are, nevertheless, exceptional circumstances in which the HKMA may vary the clearing balance of the banking system directly without the corresponding change in its US dollar holdings.

The slowdown is also considered healthy, given a degree of irrational exuberance seen in asset markets in the past couple of years. Indeed, inflation this year will slow down further to 5% from 5.8% in 1997, with the unemployment rate staying low and the current account remaining broadly in balance. Thus the Hong Kong economy will not be too much affected by the devaluation of the exchange rates of our competitors. This is understandable for a highly service-oriented economy which Hong Kong now is 8. One Country, Two Currencies 11. Perhaps I should digress a little here and address a related issue which has been the subject of some attention, with considerable apprehension amongst observers. This concerns whether the currency of the Mainland of China, the RMB, would be forced into devaluation by the Asian financial turmoil and if so what would be the implications for the Hong Kong dollar’s link to the US dollar. The Chinese 7 As an illustration, residential mortgage loans, which account for roughly 25% of total domestic loans extended by the  banking sector, have been of very high quality, helped by the prudent lending policy of the banks, including for example a maximum loan to valuation ratio of 70%. As at the end of September 1997, the actual average of this ratio was only 52%. The delinquency ratio, measured by loans overdue for more than 90 days as a percentage of total outstanding loans, stood at only 0.1% as at end-September 1997.
The Riksbank’s assessment is that if the macroeconomic situation should worsen, it will lead to problems for individual households in meeting their payment obligations, but will hardly comprise a serious risk for banks in general and therefore not threaten financial stability either. In this context it is important to mention that the household sector normally accounts for a small percentage of loan losses, even during the banking crises. There is thus no reason in the current situation for the Riksbank to resort to special measures to intervene against the build-up of debt currently occurring in the household sector. When discussing the banks’ loan losses, I have alluded to the risk that households and companies will not be able to pay their loans. Loan losses can also arise when the banks cannot meet the obligations among themselves. These risks are usually called counterparty and settlement risks. This type of risk  BIS Review 50/2000  4  arises in the banks’ trading and taking positions in the financial markets. As the major Swedish banks have extensive commitments to one another and also to foreign banks, problems in one bank can rapidly spread to the others and cause problems throughout the entire financial system. Such a problem need not be due to a bank being insolvent; it may be based on, for example, a failing computer system or similar. The Riksbank has on several occasions pointed out that these individual exposures are a growing problem from the point of view of stability.

Corporate lending in relation to GDP has remained relatively constant over the last four years, and is currently far below the levels which prevailed at the end of the 1980s. The financial statements presented by companies are also currently strong, which suggests good solvency. In this context, I would also like to point out that those companies within the “new economy” that are currently very much in the news and which show weak profitability finance themselves primarily via the risk capital market and not via bank loans. This means that a possible downturn in this part of the corporate sector should only have limited direct effects on the banks. In terms of household lending, the situation is rather different. Lending to households has risen relatively strongly over the last two years and currently amounts to over 40% of GDP. It is therefore approaching the levels we saw at the end of the 1980s. However, it should be stressed that households’ interest expenses are currently lower due to the low interest rates. This rise in lending is also reflected in the household debt ratio, i.e. debts in relation to disposable income, which has risen and which now amounts to 104%. Households are borrowing to an increasing extent, at the same time as their economic situation has improved as a result of rising disposable incomes and falling unemployment.
Andrew G Haldane: Risk off Paper by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, 18 August 2011. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Aashish Pattani, Ben Broadbent, Srishti Chhabra, David Gregory, Priya Kothari, James McBride, Lewis Webber and Nicola Worrow for comments and contributions. Four years on from the start of the Great Recession, the world economy is cloaked in uncertainty. The story so far is well understood. Over-extension of private sector balance sheets – in particular among banks – sowed the seeds of the crisis. Those private sector risks have since been socialised, either directly through support for the financial sector or indirectly through lower aggregate output in the economy at large. That socialisation has caused balance sheet risk to migrate from the private to the public sectors. Today, these public sector balance sheets strains are most visible in Europe where a number of countries remain under the sovereign searchlight. But outside Europe, two of the world’s three largest economies – the United States and Japan – have been the subject of ratings action. And sovereign CDS spreads among advanced countries are at their highest-ever levels. Four years on from the start of the Great Depression, the world economy was also cloaked in uncertainty.

During the crisis, such market-based measures of leverage did a much better job of identifying problem banks than conventional risk-weighted capital ratios.1 So measured, the world’s largest 20 banks are at present around 36 times levered. That is a loan-to-value mortgage of around 97%. The household sector, too, has been repairing its balance sheet. On average across the US, UK and euro-area, households are running a financial surplus of around 2.5% of GDP (Chart 11). As recently as 2006, they were running a financial deficit of 1% of GDP. Since 2007, around £ has been repaid each year by UK households. Deleveraging is underway. Yet this aggregate picture masks some important distributional differences. There remains a sizable tail of over-indebted households vulnerable to a worsening of financial conditions. In the UK, the proportion of households in negative equity is 1 in 14. In the US, it is 1 in 4. With house prices falling in both countries, that fraction may rise further. The tail of “vulnerable” households (those with limited or no equity in their property and reporting problems servicing their debt) is high and rising. So defined, vulnerable households in the UK account for 15% of household secured debt and 35% of unsecured debt (Chart 12). These shares have risen over the past three years, by around 5 and 10 percentage points respectively, despite interest rates being at rock-bottom. The picture in the corporate sector is, in some respects, not dissimilar.
In a similar vein, some forms of “good” deflation could be accepted as conducive to stronger growth. To me, this approach is very misleading. I will indulge here in a little bit of history. As you know, at the inception of the euro, the definition of price stability was set as “lower than 2%”. That definition was quickly perceived by markets and economists as meaning we took a benign view of low inflation or, even, stood ready to accept deflation. As a result, the Governing Council felt the need, in 2003, to change the wording and specify the definition of price stability as “lower but close to 2%”. Third, the validity of the 2% target is widely acknowledged. That definition of close to 2% has today been broadly adopted in major advanced economies, including in the US and Japan. This is no coincidence. There is a robust rationale for aiming at 2% or close to 2% and, therefore, not tolerating persistent lower inflation. First, since the work of the Boskin Commission, which, I believe, is also valid for the euro area, we know that available measures tend to overestimate this rate. So it is legitimate to consider that, technically, an inflation rate of 1% may, in reality, be zero. Then, if the central bank aims at 1%, any negative shock would plunge the economy into deflation. To absorb such a shock, some margin – in the order of an additional 1% – is necessary. This simple reasoning provides a very strong basis for the current definition.

We know there are effective fintech solutions to this which leverage off the credit of the payer. In such circumstances, and more broadly where fintech moves further into more traditional banking areas such as peer to peer and other lending, the Bank recognises that we need to think about and take forward a proportionate, activity-based regulatory response. Let me turn to the second gap in relation to a lack of client focus: an engagement gap, if I can put it that way. This manifests itself in a number of ways, as noted during the many insightful interventions during our panel sessions. Perhaps Julia Black put it best when she described the dangers of groups of professionals talking just amongst themselves. This has been part of the issue with financial reform – a sense that reform was a pre-packaged process built on discussions between regulators, banks, and investors, with sympathetic academics adding in their words of support. Part of the reason for our broader discussions today is to ensure we move out of this state of affairs. And of course, once we bring in other perspectives, it changes our own perspective and underscores just how hermetically sealed the industry in its broad sense can be. Let me say a couple of words on this. It should be recognized that the industry has made tremendous strides to address a number of issues.
It must be right in the longer term that lenders should get back to fundamentals of creditworthiness and apply conventional lending standards; indeed this is one of the themes of this speech. Implicit parental guarantees have enabled companies such as GITIC to borrow more than they should have done and the lending has not been sensibly used. However, the adjustment process cannot happen overnight. The transparency is not there in many Chinese companies; and even if it was there, it would not in many cases support the present levels of borrowing if the companies were looked at on a stand-alone basis. The banks will therefore need to be patient and allow borrowers sufficient time to manage their debts down to more sustainable levels. The banks will also need to cooperate in assisting distressed Mainland BIS Review 53/1999  4  companies to work out their problems over time and to restructure their debts. The other side of the coin is that the companies and their shareholders must be prepared to be open and transparent with their creditors. Dealing with the financial problems of companies in general has become a major preoccupation of banks in Hong Kong and elsewhere in the region. There is still not much new lending going on - in Hong Kong domestic lending has fallen for ten months in a row. The main priority for many banks is therefore to limit the damage from loans already on the balance sheet.

In corporate and labour market circles it is becoming commonplace to consider what the value or social impact of a specific activity is, and to attempt to evaluate the economic and labour consequences of regulatory changes. One good example of regulatory impact is the Ecological Transition Bill that is currently pending parliamentary approval. The aim, as you know, is to switch our economy towards an environmentally more sustainable model. This aim is very broadly shared in our society, but its achievement will have large-scale implications for our productive model that may also entail undesirable social consequences. The Banco de España is working with the Ministry of Ecological Transition to assess the economic and employment implications of the law. I can assure you that measuring these consequences is not proving easy, but also that their measurement is crucial. Why is this? Measuring the consequences is essential in order for there to be genuine transparency. There has to be information; without measurements there is only noise. 2  In the absence of information, we cannot make comparisons between alternative investments, or between consumption, economic activity or funding options. Without data, we are in the hands of image campaigns and good intentions. Responsible investment has an ambitious goal: no less than to transform the economic, environmental and social reality, or at least to contribute to this transformation. So how can this ambitious goal be achieved? The answer is simple: through the behaviour of economic agents, be they households, firms or investors.