samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this connection, we underscore the importance of future realignment of quota shares on a periodic basis, beginning with the Fourteenth General Review of quotas, as is currently proposed in the package. We maintain that PPP GDP and compression factor should remain in the formula for it to credibly capture the dynamic contribution and relative economic size of countries in the world economy. We also support the future work program, in particular further refinements to the definitions of openness and variability to guide future realignment of quota shares. 12. The New Income Model is also a critical element of the Reform Package, without which the Fund cannot discharge its functions properly. We are pleased to note the broad  BIS Review 51/2008  3  consensus on the core elements of the proposed new income model for the Fund and are prepared to give our support to the emerging package. We would simply underline the importance of establishing the necessary governance arrangements that allow the Board and the Management to deal effectively with the risks that broadening the Fund’s investment mandate will undoubtedly bring. We are also pleased to support the limited sale of Fund gold to establish an endowment to generate income. In fact, we see this as a critical component of the new income model, without which it may be difficult for the Fund to close its budget deficit. We look forward to a prompt resolution on this issue, particularly from the major shareholder. Strategic directions 13.

Overall, as of January of this year, we are down nearly 10 million jobs from the pre-pandemic level, a greater shortfall than we saw even at the worst point of the aftermath of the Great Recession. Locally, we’ve experienced considerable strain, given that much of New York City’s economy hinges on the leisure and hospitality industry. Job losses have been dramatic: New York was hardest hit at the start of the pandemic, and almost a year later the data still show a city under stress. While national employment was 7 percent below pre-pandemic levels at the end of 2020, employment in New York City was 12 percent lower.1 I hope that as workers return to their offices and the weather turns warmer we will start to see people frequenting the small businesses that are the lifeblood of our city. Unfortunately, job losses have not been only highly concentrated in particular industries, but also more concentrated among certain demographic groups. The pandemic and the ensuing economic downturn have done disproportionate harm to women, communities of color, younger workers, and the lowest paid.2 The data are particularly sobering when we look at communities of color. Recent research by my colleagues at the New York Fed shows that more Black and Hispanic workers lost jobs compared to white workers, and Black workers have been more likely to drop out of the labor force entirely, making it more challenging to rejoin in the future.
I would like to highlight three main aspects of this work: First, the financial crisis revealed that banks held insufficient capital, excessive short-term market funding and inadequate liquidity buffers. The new Basel III framework sets out stricter requirements. Higher and better-quality capital will increase banks’ resilience to pronounced fluctuations in the economy without their having to tighten lending abruptly. The new rules aim to moderate growth in banking in periods of expansion. Second, the new framework includes macroprudential tools that can be applied as necessary. Banks may be subject to additional capital requirements if credit growth in the wider economy is excessive. The requirement is intended to ensure that banks build up an extra capital buffer when systemic risk increases. Loan-to-value ceilings on mortgage loans may also be imposed. Third, the authorities must acquire tools that enable banks to be wound up in an orderly manner. In this context, it is important that the structure of banking groups is transparent. Banks must also draw up plans for their own liquidation in the event of difficulties. Owners and creditors – not taxpayers – must bear the losses. The interest rate on banks’ funding will then reflect the risk they take rather than an implicit government guarantee. This will in itself have a preventive effect. In some areas, banking sector regulation in Norway has been stricter than in other countries. Over time, this has been a strength, not a weakness, for Norwegian banks.

Currently, Malaysia’s exports to India has amounted close to USD9 billion in 2011, equivalent to 4.1 percent of Malaysia’s total exports, while the outstanding direct investments from India is now close to half a billion USD. The financial sector has an important role to be a catalyst to facilitate growth in such trade and investment activities between India and Malaysia. The establishment of our relationship has already begun with the issuance of a full commercial banking license to an Indian bank to operate here in Malaysia in 2010. A licence has also been granted to an Indian fund manager. Rise of islamic finance in the new global economy Another development in several emerging economies in Asia and the Middle East is the rapid growth of Islamic finance. An important development in this decade has been the growing significance of the international dimension of Islamic finance and its increased role in mobilising and channeling funds to productive investment activities across borders. Expanding steadily at a double digit pace of growth, total Islamic financial assets currently is estimated to be more than $ trillion. With more than 600 Islamic financial institutions now operating in more than 75 countries, countries from Asia, Middle East and Africa are increasingly participating in cross-border financial markets. In financing trade and investment activities, Islamic finance has influenced a new global pattern of trade and financial flows. Islamic finance serves as an important channel for more efficient allocation of funds across borders and diversification of risks.
Since September 28th the krona has weakened almost 2 per cent in terms of the TCW-index, while since the depreciation began last May the exchange rate has fallen about 9 per cent. Just as on previous occasions, financial unrest has hit the Swedish krona as investors play safe and move to larger and more stable currencies. This time, however, the unrest seems to have less to do with uncertainty about the future for Sweden’s economic fundamentals. Instead it appears to involve general risk aversion among investors. Support for this interpretation is to be found in market letters (Swedish as well as foreign), et cetera, as well as in price setting of # and ##. That should point to an appreciation in the next phase, when the general unrest has subsided and investors concentrate once again on economic fundamentals. Judging from Prospera’s surveys for the Riksbank, for instance, it seems that market players are also allowing for this in their assessments. The recent market weakening of the Swedish krona is a reminder of both the advantages and the drawbacks of a flexible exchange rate. The weaker exchange rate can serve as a mechanism for adjustment when international activity is slowing down. This could be valuable if the crisis is profound. At the same time, the recent events illustrate that our vulnerability with a flexible exchange rate is considerable. The krona has fluctuated even though economic policy is basically focused on stability.

These are the Top Islamic Bank and Top Development Financial Institution awards to recognize these two categories of institutions for their contribution towards the overall business growth of CGC and the SME sector. These new categories illustrate our sincere acknowledgment of the financial institutions that have made significant contribution to SME development. We believe 2008 is an important year for CGC. Foremost is that it marks the 36th year of the Corporation's involvement in SME development. It is also the year which will see the implementation of the third phase of our three-year business transformation plan and the successful completion of the three-year strategy. The necessary preparatory work under the transformation plan has largely being completed and we hope to take the first step towards achieving financial sustainability. Another significant milestone in 2008 is the establishment of the SME Credit Bureau, a watershed event in CGC's evolution. The Bureau is a source of credible and reliable credit information that serves the needs of both the SMEs and the potential financiers. This reflects the natural progression for the CGC in its continuous efforts to enhance access to financing by SMEs. The establishment of a SME Credit Bureau, by CGC in strategic collaboration with Dun & Bradstreet, would no doubt complement the other initiatives of the Government and the financial sector in promoting growth and development of SMEs. We have seen how CCRIS, where real-time and comprehensive information on consumers' credit exposures and history is readily available.
Moreover, the delays in the restructuring or privatisation of state-owned companies paved the way for high levels of arrears. Acting as surrogate money, they undermined monetary policy restrictiveness and fuelled inflation. In addition, the disequilibria manifest at the level of the current account could be adjusted only by purposely resorting to the exchange rate, whose depreciation generated inflation as well. As a matter of fact, other countries which, during one transition stage or another, had slowed down the engines of economic restructuring were also faced with such issues, recording a more modest macroeconomic performance. Going back to the comparison with Poland, I deem it relevant that the output loss associated with the structural changes implied by the transition to a market economy was fully recovered in 1995 in Poland, whereas in Romania this occurred a hefty nine years later. Now, it is almost two decades since Romania – EU accession negotiations had been opened. Back then, in 2000, I served as prime-minister. In fact, I think I may say that my entire prime2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  ministership in 2000 was dedicated to laying the groundwork for Romania’s accession to the European Union. And it is worth noting that, if Romania managed to join the EU on 1 January 2007, all the inherent stumbles notwithstanding, the preparation process started in 2000 was essential. And it would have been dramatic if this start had been missed.

I confess that I then felt the need to go to the vault and feel with my own hands the gold bars – Romania’s last tangible reserve in those days (in December 1990, gold reserves stood at 68.7 tonnes, amounting to approximately USD 850 million) – for a boost of confidence that the rather complex economic situation might be successfully tackled. It is hard to believe that this really happened, especially now, when Romania’s international reserves amount to approximately 38 billion euros. I will now move on to less amusing memories of those times. The avatars of economic transition rendered difficult the mission of Romania’s central bank. Monetary policy, a fundamental task of the National Bank of Romania, was facing numerous difficulties and constraints, as the process of lowering inflation was often undermined by the need to pursue conflicting macroeconomic objectives or avert a full-blown banking system crisis. This was because Romania’s path towards a functional market economy was anything but smooth. Quite on the contrary, the process often shifted between step-ups and slowdowns, that is when it did not stall altogether. A major feature of the domestic economy’s reform was the priority given, at the onset of the process, to ensuring the country’s social and political stability. In this context, the preferred choice was a gradual strategy, with reforms spread over many years, so as not to spark major social tensions.
But sterling’s exchange rate has fallen – by around 4% since the MPC’s August meeting; and by about 15% since the beginning of 2007, so that, in sterling terms, the fall in oil prices has been less pronounced over the past month or so. On balance, those developments mostly comprise downside news, since the August Inflation Report, to the outlook for demand and for inflation. But the recent depreciation of the exchange rate has to be offset against that. And headline inflation has reached 4.4%. It will probably rise further. The Committee can and will ensure that this is a temporary state of affairs. But, for the moment, inflation expectations do continue to flash an amber light. Meanwhile, credit has remained tight, and underlying money growth has decelerated, implying that monetary conditions may be leaning against those incipient inflationary pressures. At the end of the last year – some months’ after the onset of the market turmoil – I set out some of the thinking that guided my interpretation of the monetary data and how it related to my policy decisions. 3 I stressed that “we must try to avoid a vicious circle in which tighter liquidity conditions, lower asset values, impaired capital resources, reduced credit supply, and slower aggregate demand feed back on each other”. A vicious circle between the world financial system and global economy has so far probably been kept at bay; global growth has slowed not collapsed.

4  BIS Review 112/2008  rate is a fully satisfactory summary statistic; other rates fall into line through arbitrage, with differences reflecting risk premia. More practically, it can typically be assumed that the rates charged on private sector loans are maintained at fairly stable spreads relative to the riskfree yield curve (ie given the expected path of the policy rate). And, related to that, it can also typically be assumed that the degree of credit rationing in the economy is broadly constant over time. Obviously, neither of those things is true at present. The most unusual, and stretched, circumstances lie within the global financial system itself. The premium on unsecured interbank lending has risen (Chart 1); and growth of such lending has slowed. This reflects a desire to hoard liquidity in a hazardous environment; and heightened aversion to taking on unsecured credit exposures for term maturities. Banks are, in consequence, deleveraging 7 their balance sheets. Broadly, they can do so in two ways – raise extra capital, or shrink (the pace of growth in) their balance sheets. Both have been underway. The balance sheet shrinkage is reducing the supply of credit to households and firms. But there is differentiation across the banking industry, according to size and strength. In that environment, spreads on corporate bonds are higher. Many corporate and household lending rates have been affected by the rise in Libor relative to risk-free rates. And retail rates – for both loans, and some deposits – have risen relative to the relevant risk-free rate.
23 In the Monetary Policy Report published in April 2020 (Riksbank 2020d, p. 9), we justified the purchases, among other things, as follows: ”The fact that credit conditions are tightened and interest rates on lending to households and companies are increasing in relation to interest rates on safe assets is of course natural when credit is assessed as more uncertain. But at the same time, tighter credit conditions and higher interest rates mean that the economic downturn will be deeper and more prolonged. The Riksbank's monetary policy aims to ensure that increased uncertainty and reduced risk appetite do not become a self-fulfilling prophesy. This helps avoid the downturn worsening and being prolonged unnecessarily.” 24 See, for example, the Riksbank (2020a). 13 [30]  to have contributed the housing market in particular developing strongly (see Figure 10). To summarise, the Riksbank's purchases during the pandemic functioned differently from those before the pandemic. This is not surprising. During spring 2020, the Riksbank entered as buyer into markets which, due to the high level of uncertainty, were functioning poorly when many wanted to sell and few wanted to buy. Moreover, the Riksbank began to buy bonds issued by private agents (mainly banks). The Riksbank thus took over risk from market participants. This is unlike the situation prior to the pandemic, when the Riksbank's purchases meant that one government asset (government bonds) was removed from the market but was replaced by another asset with a similar risk profile (reserves at the Riksbank). Figure 10.

But I will conclude by quoting a Frenchman, Clément Beaune, the new Minister for European Affairs, who I believe sums up the situation eloquently: "Celebration is necessary, but it is never enough and does not dispense with what has for six decades been the unique strength of the Franco-German relationship: a working relationship, organised at all levels of our political and administrative life, whose power stems from the fact that our two countries have indeed often divergent positions but know, at key moments, how to overcome them by involving others”. Involving others is what we did in July 2019 with the appointments to the Commission and the ECB, and even more so this year in the face of the crisis. Together we have served Europe and Europeans well. We can be sure of one thing: they will still need our common commitment, on many ambitions and for a long time to come. i Clément Beaune (2020), “L'Europe, par-delà le COVID-19”, Politique étrangère, autumn. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
In this regard, while the Gross Domestic Product increased by 6 percent on an annual basis in the last quarter of 2009, it decreased by 4.7 percent across the year (Figure 23). Seasonally adjusted data indicate continuance of the recovery process in national income as of the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 24). Data regarding the first quarter of 2010 indicate that the rebound in Domestic Demand is gradually becoming stable and broad-based. The influence of policy rate cuts besides the hikes in public expenditures are getting more pronounced and a relatively more robust activity in sectors sensitive to domestic demand is being witnessed. In this respect, the analysis of the recovery process in industrial production indicates that besides the sectors stimulated by fiscal incentives and their intermediate input suppliers as well as the nondurable goods sector and sectors with strong links to the construction sector have been on the rebound (Figure 25). There is no significant improvement in external demand. The global growth outlook continues to dampen economic activity, particularly in sectors that are relatively more sensitive to foreign demand. Following the recent crisis, manufacturing firms that mostly serve external markets have been operating at lower capacity than local market oriented firms (Figure 26). Thus, in line with our previous forecasts, domestic demand has remained more robust than foreign demand. Yet, aggregate demand uncertainty continues to be a major concern, as inventory buildups have remained limited.

The impact of soaring food and energy prices on catering and transport services became more significant in the first quarter of 2010 (Figure 12). Consequently, annual services inflation, which has been declining since the third quarter of 2008, increased by 1.9 percentage points in the first quarter of 2010. Seasonally adjusted data also indicate that price increases in the services group accelerated compared to the previous quarter (Figure 13). The low base of the previous year caused by the tax cuts in durable goods and the inventory destocking process have been major factors accounting for the increase in core inflation indicators (Figure 14). Reverberations of the rise in cost factors and the limited rebound in demand are also seen in the seasonally adjusted data (Figure 15). Parallel to these developments, medium-term inflation expectations, which started to increase in the last quarter of 2009, maintained this trend in the first quarter of 2010 (Figure 16). While expectations displayed an increase in all maturities, the difference between expectations and targets became wider (Figure 17). However, the increase in medium-term expectations remained relatively limited. 2. Monetary policy response  After commenting briefly on inflation developments, I would now like to cover the policies pursued by the Central Bank during the last quarter. Anticipating that inflation would decrease sharply following the last quarter of 2008, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) focused on alleviating the potentially harsh impact of the global financial crisis on the domestic economy.
Overall, although liquidity remains ample, it is unlikely at this stage that it will give rise to inflationary pressures, given the current economic environment and the expectation that some of the portfolio shifts will be reversed once the financial market uncertainty diminishes. This assessment is supported by the continuing moderate growth of loans to the private sector, particularly to non-financial corporations. As regards the information under the second pillar, recently published data and survey information indicate that economic growth in the euro area remained subdued around the turn of the year and that the overall sentiment in the economy remained lacklustre. While these indications suggest that growth dynamics will remain weak for the early part of this year, the most likely scenario remains that of a gradual increase of real GDP growth rates, starting in the second half of 2003. The current low levels of interest rates should contribute to this scenario materialising. In addition, while the appreciation of the euro over recent months is likely to contribute to a dampening of export growth to some extent, this should be counterbalanced by the assumed recovery in the world economy. In this respect, it should also be taken into account that the price competitiveness of euro area companies remains favourable in a medium-term perspective. At the same time, uncertainty regarding the economic outlook remains high, in particular due to the ongoing geopolitical tensions.

Further turbulence in the oil markets could have a negative impact on economic activity throughout the world and, therefore, on euro area employment as well. These  BIS Review 8/2003  1  concerns could weigh adversely on confidence. In addition, the accumulated macroeconomic imbalances outside the euro area have led to uncertainty surrounding the strength of the recovery in other major economies. By way of conclusion, there are still downside risks to the outlook for euro area economic activity. Turning to prices, HICP inflation has remained slightly above 2% in recent months. On the one hand, there was upward pressure from oil prices and from various increases in indirect taxes and administered prices. On the other hand, the strengthening of the euro, together with base effects, helped to limit year-on-year consumer price increases. Looking ahead, given the outlook for moderate economic growth, the gradual pass-through of the appreciation of the euro should contribute to a dampening of inflationary pressures. Overall, the most likely outcome remains that inflation will fall and eventually stabilise at a level below 2% in the course of 2003. However, the volatility in oil prices makes it very difficult to forecast prospects for inflation movements accurately, especially in the short term. Moderate wage developments are a major prerequisite in order for price stability to prevail in the medium term. This will also help to improve the prospects for economic growth and further employment creation. When looking back we see that wage growth followed an upward trend until recently, despite the economic slowdown.