samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Outstanding contributions to the development of Islamic finance in Malaysia Welcoming remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Royal Award for Islamic Finance Gala Dinner and Award Presentation, Kuala Lumpur, 14 November 2016. * * * Bismillahhirahmanirrahim. Mengadap Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di-Pertuan Agong Almu’tasimu Billahi Muhibbuddin Tuanku Alhaj Abdul Halim Mu’adzam Shah ibni Almarhum Sultan Badlishah, Seri Paduka Baginda Raja Permaisuri Agong Tuanku Hajah Haminah. Ampun Tuanku beribu-ribu Ampun, sembah patik mohon diampun. Patik serta seluruh dif-dif jemputan pada malam ini dengan penuh hormat dan takzimnya merafak sembah menjunjung kasih atas limpah perkenan Seri Paduka Baginda Tuanku berdua berangkat bercemar duli ke Majlis Makan Malam Anugerah Diraja Kewangan Islam Tahun 2016. Ampun Tuanku. Seterusnya patik ingin memohon perkenan Seri Paduka Baginda Tuanku untuk menyampaikan ucapan kepada para hadirin dalam Bahasa Inggeris. KeBawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia Paduka Seri Sultan Nazrin Muizzuddin Shah Ibni Almarhum Sultan Azlan Muhibbuddin Shah Al-Maghfur-lah, Sultan of Perak Darul Ridzuan, and Duli Yang Maha Mulia Raja Permaisuri Perak Tuanku Zara Salim. Your Royal Highnesses, Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies & Gentlemen. It is my pleasure to welcome the distinguished audience to the Gala Dinner for the Royal Award for Islamic Finance (RAIF) tonight, which is held to honor an individual for outstanding contributions to the growth and development of Islamic finance.

My fourth bit of advice is to continue to build your human capital. That means seeking out jobs and opportunities that give you new experiences and skills. Keep up with your mentors and continue to cultivate relationships and build your network. Education isn’t just about college course work, it should be a lifelong experience. If your employer asks you do something new – don’t shy away from it. Instead, think of it as a wonderful deal: Your employer is going to pay you to deepen your skills and knowledge base. You will be paid to become more valuable. For me, the ability to build my human capital has happened – in spades – several times. The first occurred here at New College and at Berkeley for graduate school. Here I learned to really read critically and how to write – the one literature course that I mentioned earlier notwithstanding. The second was the opportunity early on in my career to become involved in macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis. Up to that point, I had been a regulatory economist. I had only taken one course in macroeconomics in graduate school and it was the only course on which I received a “B” grade – I had not revealed any great affinity for that subject. At first, the work was stressful. When people asked me questions, I wasn’t sure whether I was supposed to know the answers or not. At first, I felt quite ignorant, but eventually that passed.
And according to Svensson (2013c), 60,000 more people are now unemployed than if the repo rate had not been raised since 2010. It hardly needs to be pointed out that such calculations are very uncertain. I have previously criticised Svensson (2013b) for focusing on a specific measure of inflation expectations. If one instead uses a different, more accurate, measure of expectations, almost all of the unemployment effect Svensson has calculated disappears (Flodén, 2012). And Söderström and Vredin (2013) point to problems with interpreting causal relationships behind Svensson’s estimated Phillips curve. The claim that unemployment would have been lower if a more expansionary monetary policy had been conducted since 2010 appears more plausible, however. But one can find objections to this conclusion. First, the reasoning presumes that a more expansionary monetary policy would not have caused the crisis scenario that a majority of Executive Board members have expressed as a risk that justifies a higher repo rate (see the article in Monetary Policy Report February 2014). Second, higher unemployment now can be counterbalanced by lower unemployment in the future, as monetary policy can become more expansionary in the future when inflation and inflation expectations today are low. The question is thus whether the low inflation affects the average level of unemployment or merely the volatility of unemployment over the business cycle. 13  Examples are the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank (ECB).

Caleb M Fundanga: The importance of cross border information exchange for Zambia Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the launch of the Alumniportal Deutschland, Lusaka, 25 November 2008. *  *  *  • Her Excellency the Ambassador of the Germany Embassy in Zambia • Management and staff from the Germany Embassy in Zambia • Fellow alumni • Members of the press • Distinguished invited guests • Ladies and gentlemen Guten Abend meine Damen und Herren. I am truly honoured to officiate at this important Launch of the Alumniportal Deutschland. I am informed that Africa has a rare honour of being the first continent to implement the Alumniportal Deutschland. I am certain that our implementation process will define the failure or success of the whole project. We thus have a huge challenge to ensure that we achieve success and provide a benchmark for others to emulate. However, looking at the many beaming faces present in this room, I have no doubt that we will provide more than just a benchmark for others to follow. I am glad to note that we are all optimistic on the success of this project in Zambia in particular and Africa in general. We have a duty to represent our continent and give it the honour that it so deserves. Your Excellency, the Launch of the Alumniportal could not have come at more opportune time when cross border information exchange has become cardinal in every aspects of life especially trade.
As a result, in less than ten years since the launch of the euro, the number of large value payment systems in euro operating in the EU will have been dramatically reduced: this number is to drop from 21 ( i.e the 16 components of TARGET1 plus 5 privately-owned systems) down to 2 (TARGET2 and EURO 1). To sum up, we should shortly be on the same footing as the United States in terms of the integration of large-value payment infrastructures. On the retail side, the situation is quite different. Indeed, there are today in the EU, 15 multilateral clearing and settlement systems in euro, almost the same number than 10 years ago, and there is no clear sign for the time being that this number is going to fall significantly in the short to medium run. The market is therefore characterized by this multiplicity of national multilateral retail payment systems, coexisting with various other payment arrangements such as bilateral schemes, international card schemes or banking “clubs”. It is fair to say that significant steps towards integration have nevertheless been made since the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins. In 2002, the European banking community launched the SEPA project, with the final objective that by 2010 “all payments are treated as domestic as far as speed, security, convenience and cost are concerned”.

The new European DLT pilot regime, which will come into force in March this year, will allow us to continue our experiments within the boundaries of a simplified regulatory framework. At the same time, the Banque de France is contributing to the reflection on the possibility of a retail CBDC: this is currently what Eurosystem central banks have embarked on, under the ECB aegis, with the ongoing investigation phase for a digital euro. The evolution of the payment landscape leads us to reflect on the ways in which citizens can have access to central bank money, also in the digital world. Let me conclude in saying that tokenization can be a blessing or a curse for the functioning of the financial system. It is my belief that we can collectively make the best of it if we ensure its expansion within a framework of confidence in which good regulation has an important role to play. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
The TARGET system processes today around EUR 1500 billion per day, 50% more than the average in 1999 and an estimated three times the amount that all the large-value payment 11 systems in the 12 euro area countries processed together in 1990. –  Thirdly, a large currency area means deeper and more liquid financial markets. This allows market participants to diversify their risks on a wider basis; moreover, as currency risk is eliminated, they can focus on the analysis of credit risk. A large currency area also provides more scope for specialised institutions to develop. All in all, market efficiency and liquidity 12 help to cushion external shocks. 2.3  Taking into account these benefits, one could question why financial stability issues are still important in the euro area. In my view financial stability issues need to be re-visited today against the backdrop of the farreaching changes observed on the financial markets in the last decade, and taking into account the succession of market instability episodes. Just to name a few, the Asian crisis, the Russian/LTCM crisis in 1998, the “Tech-bubble” as of 2000. These episodes were characterised by situations of liquidity stress, market volatility, and the late discovery of risks that had spread widely through complex hedging and financial innovation devices. In this respect the complex relationship between volatility, financial innovation and financial stability deserves attention. Clearly, volatility levels primarily reflects the degree of uncertainty of market participants.

A lot of our exports are in sectors which have a large carbon footprint and will be susceptible to policy measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism currently being put in place by the European Union (EU), as part of the EU green deal. So, what role can sustainable banking play in taking Thailand from where it is today to where it needs to be in terms of reducing its vulnerability to climate change? Banks in Thailand can play an important role in getting us to where we need to go. Banks play the predominant role in channeling credit to the private sector. Over 90 percent of private credit comes from the banking sector. So, banks will need to increasingly incorporate sustainability considerations into their lending decisions and increasingly need to improve disclosure on climate-related information. They will also need to improve their risk assessment tools. For all these to work, there needs to be a very clear tone from the top from these institutions. There has been progress to date. The Thai banking sector, including the Thai Bankers’ Association and the Association of International Banks in Thailand, have developed and adopted Sustainable Banking Guidelines in 2019. We have seen concrete steps taken by Thai Banks to incorporate sustainability into their business strategy. We have seen them setting up clear governance structure on sustainability issues such as dedicated sustainability committees, developing risk assessment tools, and disclosing ESG-related information.
Having observed the behaviour of the economy in the period since the crisis, the Committee was aware of the possibility that these effects could, in combination, mean a period of weaker growth but higher inflation and thus create a trade-off for monetary policy to balance. The Committee made its first full assessment of these effects in August. Over the three-year forecast period, uncertainty was expected to weigh on demand, investment spending by firms in particular, and a period of resource reallocation as the UK’s trading relationships were re-configured was expected to weigh on supply. At the same time, the sharp fall in the sterling exchange rate following the vote to leave would imply higher imported inflation, meaning upward pressure on inflation. The MPC responded to this outlook by reducing Chart 8: No stimulus in August would have been consistent with a weight of zero on stabilising the output gap at the 2-year forecast horizon 4  Bank Rate by 25 basis points, announcing £ billion of asset purchases, and by launching a Term Funding Scheme to ensure banks passed through lower interest rates to end borrowers. A majority of  Inflation (%)  the MPC also indicated that, if the economy evolved 3.5  in line with its forecast, they were prepared to take further action. 3  Suppose the MPC had not responded in this timely,  November August , with stimulus  coherent, and comprehensive way.

Because monetary policy can also influence demand it can lean against such shocks. If successful, it can stabilise inflation. In this case, no output-inflation trade-off arises. This is the so-called “divine coincidence”. 10  In Figure 2, negative demand shocks would create a tendency for inflation and the output gap to move into the south-west quadrant. Similarly, for positive demand shocks, inflation and output gap would move to the north-east. Because in these cases, there is no trade-off between stabilising inflation and the output gap, it is relatively straightforward for monetary policy to keep inflation and the output gap close to the origin. Chart 1: For much of the great moderation period, data were consistent with predominance of demand shocks… Great moderation  3.5  In practice, data in these quadrants reflect lags in the transmission of monetary policy and other uncertainties: it takes time for monetary policy to  Inflation (%)  affect output, and for output in turn to affect inflation. But if monetary policy has been effective, these  3  deviations would not be expected to be either large or 2.5 Output gap (%)  persistent. This state of affairs characterised much of the “Great Moderation” in the United Kingdom, from  2  -1  0  1  1993 to 2007 (Chart 1), which was effectively a 11  1.5  1  period of demand management. Things are different when shocks drive inflation up or down independently of demand.
37  Aside from these effects, the estimates available show that potential growth in the Spanish economy is low in comparison with other developed countries. An economy's potential growth, on which the level of welfare in the long term hinges, is the result of the accumulation of the capital and labour factors of production, and the degree of efficiency with which they are combined. The low levels of potential growth in our economy are attributable to both poor total factor productivity and a higher level of structural unemployment. In its recent annual reports,13 the Banco de España has highlighted some avenues of economic policy which, if pursued, could improve the dynamics of these variables in Spain. These initiatives relate to the level of sectoral competition and to the productive structure, tax and regulatory incentives, human capital, R&D and technology, and labour market regulation, inter alia. Here I would like to highlight two areas of action: improving human capital and fostering efficient R&D expenditure, as both could be particularly affected by the situation brought about by COVID-19. As regards human capital, the confinement imposed as a result of the crisis has led to students at different levels of educational attainment ceasing to attend classes in person. This could have significant effects on their academic performance, particularly in lowincome households, where there is a lower possibility of replacing physical access to education.

One can therefore say that there are considerable welfare losses connected with weak competition. How does competition function in Sweden? Competitive conditions have improved during the 1990s and the relative price level has fallen, as can be seen from diagram 2. The factors behind the improved competition situation are increased internationalisation, deregulation, technological developments, EU membership and the more stringent competition laws introduced in 1993. The fall in relative price levels in 1993 is largely due to a weakening of the exchange rate in connection with the floating of the krona in November 1992, when  4  Preliminary statistics from Eurostat for the year 2000. 5  The Swedish Competition Authority, (2000), “Why are Swedish prices so high?”, The Swedish Competition Authority's report series no. 2. BIS Review 25/2002  3  Sweden became a relatively inexpensive country in terms of euro. Sweden has also had a lower inflation rate than other EU countries, which has contributed to keeping down the relative price level. Diagram 2: The difference between the price level in Sweden and the EU average 1991-2000. Percentage points 60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0 1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  Source: Eurostat.
Inflation increased to a level that was tangibly higher than the inflation target, resource utilisation was higher than normal and there was a rapid expansion of credit. Despite this, the repo rate was lower than normal for most of the period leading up to the crisis. A more rapid increase of the repo rate would have been better. We did not foresee the financial crisis, but once it hit the Swedish economy with full force in September 2008 the Riksbank acted quickly and forcefully. This mainly concerned measures to preserve financial stability. However, the expansionary monetary policy conducted by the Riksbank also played an important role in reducing the severity of the downturn that followed in the wake of the financial crisis. Looking forward, I think that the repo rate should be raised at every meeting this year, considering the economic development we envisaged at the last monetary policy meeting. If inflation becomes higher than we had expected, it may be necessary to raise the repo rate to a normal level of around 4 per cent as soon as next year. The average for the repo rate over the last 10 years cannot be taken as a starting point for what the average repo rate should be in the longer term. However, at the same time, I am, of course, prepared to reassess my view of the direction of monetary policy if the external conditions should change significantly, as they did in September 2008. There are those who think that monetary policy is too tight.

Imagine the developments following the World War II, when central banks widely accepted their transition from private to public ownership and when they realised that it was not only necessary but also imperative to cooperate, regardless of physical barriers. Imagine, for example, the president of the Federal Reserve, who wasted three months to travel to Europe and two weeks to receive a letter from his homologues overseas. Actually, central banks have increased their efforts for a better and more fruitful cooperation. This is an undeniable truth. It has been a distinct feature of our work in recent years. Since my first public appearance as Governor of the Bank of Albania, I have pronounced my ambition for Bank of Albania’s legal and institutional transformation in line with the model of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). I am fully confident that the successful conclusion of the Twinning Project with the Banca d’Italia and Banque de France is another determinant step forward in the joint efforts to strengthen cooperation and elevate our work standards to European levels. Today, we see that, in a few months, a brilliant idea has turned into reality and the project has been crowned with success. The project objective was to improve our work practices in the field of banking supervision, statistics, payment systems, interbank market, coordination of EU integration process and financial literacy. More specifically, cooperation in banking supervision focused on implementing major reforms in areas such as consolidated supervision, approval of new regulations and staff training.
An encouraging aspect of subsequent developments, however, is that the banks have begun to extend the maturities of their foreign borrowing, so that the gap between their short-term and long-term liabilities has narrowed in recent weeks. This is crucial, because it may be imprudent to place excessive faith in the availability of shortterm funding. In its letter, the Central Bank echoed cautionary remarks from the agencies that award credit ratings to the Republic of Iceland and other Icelandic borrowers in foreign markets. Ratings agencies have stated that their chief concern and the main constraint on upgrading Icelandic ratings - or even a potential reason for downgrading them - is the high external debt position of the economy. Since the Treasury has been retiring its foreign debt over the past few years, the ratings agencies’ comments are addressed elsewhere, in particular to the banks. Cautionary remarks based on such arguments should of course be heeded by all the banks in Iceland that have been borrowing abroad recently. It is in everyone’s interest to safeguard Iceland’s credit ratings and, where possible, strengthen them. Payment and settlement systems At the Central Bank’s annual meetings in recent years I have outlined the work it has undertaken in development of payment and settlement systems. Two types of payment system are in operation in Iceland, both of them settlement systems, i.e. the Central Bank’s real-time gross settlement system and the netting system operated by Fjölgreiðslumiðlun hf. Settlements of securities transactions are processed by the former system.

The interest rate differential reflects high demand growth and high wage growth. There is a clear relationship between wage growth, interest rate expectations and the krone exchange rate. The appreciation of the krone dampens inflation, and at the same time weakens profitability, employment and the capacity to cover labour costs in the internationally exposed sector. The krone can move in both directions. It will not appreciate indefinitely. Sustained lower wage growth will be accompanied by a narrower interest rate differential and it may reverse movements in the exchange rate. A declining level of wage growth would provide a strong impetus to the internationally exposed sector. The interest rate could be reduced. This would lead to a depreciation of the krone, with a further improvement in earnings and employment. Over the last thirty years, manufacturing has been scaled back in waves. There was substantial downscaling in the years from 1977 to 1984 and 1987 to 1992 in particular. In the years leading up to the periods of contraction, profitability deteriorated in the manufacturing sector. It can take time before such a deterioration translates into lower output and employment. But when the turnaround does occur, it tends to be swift and hard-hitting. It now appears that a new period of downscaling is under way. Several factors point to this: First, productivity growth is higher in manufacturing than in other industries. This has resulted in a trend decline in the numbers employed in manufacturing in Norway, as it has in other OECD countries.