samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A structural change with rising productivity growth may be due to, for instance, a shift in technology. An interesting example is provided by the United States, where the relative price fall in connection with developments in computers and telecommunications in recent decades can serve as an illustration. During the process of adjusting to the new, higher growth path there are at least two, contrary effects that are relevant for monetary policy. One effect is an increase in demand. The impact of this on 2  For an interesting review of aspects of the adjustment process, see Meyer, L.H. (2000), "The Economic Outlook and the Challenges Facing Monetary Policy," Remarks at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. The Federal Reserve Board, October 19. BIS Review 30/2001  3  inflation will depend on how the increment to demand relates to the higher potential supply of goods and services. The other effect is a direct damper on inflation. It is often only the latter effect that is highlighted in the public debate. I should like to consider the two effects in turn. Demand rises in the form of higher investment and increased private consumption. The upswing for investment stems from expectations of a higher return on capital. Share prices rise, which facilitates capital procurement. The capital stock is adjusted towards a new level that is expected to match the new and higher rate of potential growth. Private consumption is stimulated via the wealth effects of higher share prices and expectations of higher future household income.

They basically have to do with the principles that monetary policy decision-makers have to choose between when productivity growth accelerates. One possibility, given that the economy is in equilibrium, is to let output growth exceed the potential rate for a time. This leads to a temporary fall in unemployment but the direct dampening effect is so strong that inflation can be held in the vicinity of the target. This alternative presumably requires an instrumental rate that is kept at a comparatively low level. The other possibility, given that the economy is benefiting from the rising productivity growth, is to let output growth match the new, higher potential rate. Unemployment is then unchanged and the direct dampening effect is left to work through so that inflation falls below the target without this having any consequences for monetary policy. The two alternatives thus amount to choosing a temporarily lower level of either unemployment or inflation, or a combination of the two, during the actual process of adjustment. Taken literally, the Riksbank’s rule of action tells us that a temporarily lower level of unemployment is not the "correct" choice. Monetary policy should instead be sufficiently stimulatory to keep inflation close to the target. In other words, the central bank should let the economy grow faster than the potential rate and pave the way for a temporary fall in unemployment. In this context, however, an unduly rigid interpretation of monetary policy’s rule of action can be risky. Let me explain why.
5  4  Ten years ago, former MPC member Kate Barker estimated that construction of around 260,000 homes a year would be necessary to contain real house price growth at 1 per cent per annum (Barker, 2004). Far fewer have in fact been built in the years since – just 110,000 in 2013. Because housing demand tends to rise more than oneBIS central bankers’ speeches  To be clear, the Bank does not target asset price inflation in general or house prices in particular. It is indebtedness that concerns us. This is partly because over-extended borrowers could threaten the resilience of the core of the financial system since credit to households represents the lion’s share of UK banks’ domestic lending. It is also because rapid growth in or high levels of mortgage debt can affect the stability of the economy as a whole. An economic expansion is more precarious if there are a large proportion of heavily indebted households. History shows that the British people do everything they can to pay their mortgages. That means cutting back deeply on other expenditures when the unexpected happens, potentially slowing the economy sharply. That’s why recessions that follow rapid credit growth tend to be deeper and longer lasting. It is for these reasons that the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee (FPC) is mandated to address systemic risks arising from unsustainable levels of debt, leverage or credit growth.

Institutions are admittedly not accustomed to drawing attention to their forecasts if they do not come completely true. But what are the explanations? It has transpired now that GDP grew last year by more than was forecast, and new national accounts data also show that the figure for 2004 was hugely underestimated. GDP growth then was 8.2%, the highest figure in Iceland since 1987, which was effectively a tax-free year [when Iceland moved onto a PAYE tax system]. Last year was eventful on the economic front. Private consumption grew at its fastest rate since 1987 and gross fixed capital formation faster than any year since 1971. Import growth has not been as brisk in any year since 1953 and the current account deficit broke previous records – although it should be added that as a result of income from soaring foreign asset holdings, Iceland’s net external position only deteriorated slightly. Real wages were at a peak, unemployment at a minimum and direct foreign inward investment ran at a massive level. This inflated picture must be seen in the light of the very robust economic growth in the previous year, 2004, and strong growth in 2003 as well. Besides these large movements, a structural change in the domestic credit market made much more capital available to mortgage borrowers. Higher disposable income and net wealth also contributed to making this a unique period in Icelandic economic history.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As a result of these holistic efforts, green technology financing is beginning to gain traction amongst financial institutions. To date, the GTFS has supported RM805.5 million in financing to 65 companies, operating in a broad range of green technology sub-sectors which encompasses energy, buildings, transportation and water and waste management, reflecting a year-on-year growth rate of 130% in terms of total financing and 171% in terms of companies assisted. While still small in aggregate terms, the value accumulated by participating financial institutions in terms of greater familiarity with green technology applications, and their potential and success factors for commercialisation is an important ingredient in positioning financial institutions to further expand financing into this new and increasingly important area of growth. Therefore, the financial industry needs to do more. Opportunities moving forward Moving forward, the finance industry’s ability to leverage on the opportunities in green technology financing will determine the pace of growth in the green technology sector in Malaysia. The SME Masterplan 2012–2020 has identified potential areas such as solar power and energy efficiency products as well as other related services such as design and consulting of green solutions that could facilitate SMEs to move up the value chain. This is expected to contribute towards achieving the targets set under the SME Masterplan, where SMEs contribute 41% of GDP, 62% of total employment and 25% of total exports by 2020.

Urban Bäckström: In the wake of financial turmoil Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at the Conference on WorldCom and Enron - aftermath in the US and lessons for Sweden, held in Stockholm, 5 September 2002. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to discuss this interesting topic. The circumstances connected with WorldCom and Enron unquestionably raise some burning questions to do with the roles of the owners, the boards and the auditors, as well as with construction of the rule system. There is a risk, however, that a drive for quick solutions will result in hasty conclusions. Experience shows, in my opinion, that when dealing with complex problems, there is often much to be said for reflection and closer consideration. In many cases it is not until some time has passed, enabling us to gain a better understanding of what happened, that we are in a position to take the steps that are truly important and crucial. My starting point here is that the events to do with WorldCom and Enron are a part of a broader context. In the first place they are, of course, directly connected with the recent years’ stock-market bubble. But at a deeper level I believe they stem from two major processes and that, as so often happens when things go quickly, our current institutions - in a wide sense - have not quite kept up with the course of events.
Chart 6:  Chart 5: Long run government bond yields  (a)  Long run gold prices(a)  Per cent  US dollars per troy ounce (1980 prices)  16  800  14  700  12  600  10  500  8  400  6  300  4  200  2  100  US UK  0  0 1800  1840  1880  1920  1960  2000  Source: Global Financial Data. (a) US yields are on 10 year bonds. UK yields are on consolidated stock up to 1957; 10 year bonds after 1957. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1950 1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  Sources: Bloomberg, Global Financial Data and Bank calculations. (a) Deflated using US CPI. CPI for July and August 2011 is projected. 9  Chart 7:  Chart 8:  VIX Index(a)  Market liquidity Per cent 90  Index (a) 1.5  80  1.0  70  0.5 0.0  60  -0.5  50 -1.0  40  -2.0  20  -2.5  10  -3.0  0 2007  2008  2009  2010  -1.5  30  2011  Source: Global Financial Data. (a) S&P 500 implied volatility (daily closing prices).

The UK has recently put in place an explicit macro-prudential regime. In July of last year, the UK government announced a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) to execute macro-prudential policy.7 The FPC is housed in the Bank of England and met for the first time in June this year. The FPC’s objective is to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system against risks including “unsustainable levels of leverage, debt or credit growth”. Therein lies a key FPC challenge. There is evidence of unsustainably high levels of leverage in some sectors. But elsewhere, there is evidence of credit growth being unsustainably low. Some companies remain over-leveraged. Yet others are suffering a credit shortage, with bank lending to companies continuing to contract over the past 12 months. 5  For example, Graham and Narasimhan (2004), Malmendier and Nagel (2011). 6  For example, Cogley and Sargent (2008), Barro (2006). 7  HM Treasury (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In framing macro-prudential policy today, both these factors need to be weighed: on the one hand, enhancements to the risk-bearing capacity of the financial system to repair balance sheets; on the other, encouragement for the risk-taking capacity of the system to boost credit supply. These factors can sometimes point in subtly different directions. The first might point to higher buffers to boost banks’ risk-bearing capacity, while the second might point to lower buffers to boost their risk-taking capacity.
Firstly, inflation has been low and stable. Measured in terms of the CPIF, it has been at 1.8 per cent since 1995, and volatility has been low. Inflation has been so low and stable that the inflation target has sometimes been questioned. However, the question leads to some circular reasoning and rather reflects the fact that the inflation target has worked well. One purpose of the target is precisely that inflation should be so low and stable that changes in it need not be taken into consideration when planning to consume or invest. However, when inflation has been so low for a long time that households and businesses do not have to think about it, it is easy to see this as a natural condition that has arisen ‘by itself’ rather than as a result of a consistent policy. Diagram 2. Historical CPIF Annual percentage change  Note. Inflation outcomes for the period before 2005 are calculated in accordance with the method used in real time during this period. The red broken line shows the average for the period 1981-1992 (7.4%) and 1995-July 2022 (1.8%). Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. Secondly, real wages have developed positively. From the mid-1970s and about twenty years onwards, wages remained virtually still in real terms, that is, in terms of purchasing power. Although nominal wage increases were high, they were eaten up when inflation rose correspondingly. After 1995, however, we had a clear trend increase in real wages.

However, it is important to remember that it was a series of international events, combined with weak domestic economic policy frameworks, that made the crisis deep and prolonged. Let me briefly give some background.5 The German reunification, which created a local German boom and inflation that caused the Bundesbank to raise its policy rate, had a particularly strong international impact. This attracted large amounts of capital to Germany as investors in other countries sought the high return on the German capital market. This in turn led to an increase in tensions within the European exchange rate mechanism, the ERM. Other ERM countries were forced to raise their policy rates to maintain the exchange rate parities, despite the fact that this worsened the already weak economic activity there. In Sweden we had not created systems that could withstand the pressure this entailed for the Swedish economy. In the mid-1980s, Sweden had begun to phase out the outdated and inefficient regulation system for credit markets. Deregulation was perceived at that time more as a technical measure that was structurally necessary, but the effects on the macroeconomy came to be much greater than most policymakers back then had anticipated. Neither lenders nor borrowers were used to managing the risks in a deregulated environment and lending grew too strongly. The fact that currency regulation was still in place meant that Swedish investors were largely dependent on the domestic asset markets, where prices were soaring.
While inflation is rising and growth prospects are improving internationally, global interest rates may have passed their lowest point. Expected money market rates indicate that short-term interest rates among our trading partners will rise in the years ahead. However, interest rates will probably remain low, compared with pre-crisis levels, for an extended period of time. If developments abroad take an unexpected turn, the Norwegian economy will be affected. The challenges may become more severe than they seem at present. However, we believe the economic policy setup, with substantial fiscal policy leeway, a flexible labour market and our monetary policy framework, will enable us to face these challenges. And not to forget – a normalisation of monetary policy is most notably an indication of a normalisation of economic developments in the countries surrounding us. This is most welcome. Thank you for your attention. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Financial development has been important not only for firms but also for the country as a whole. A deeper and far-reaching financial system contributes to building financial and economic inclusion, and financial stability against external shocks. In this respect, the Chilean financial system shows better performance than other Latin American and Emerging economies, in dimensions like market capitalization, number of branches per inhabitant, use of derivatives, and participation in domestic credit to the private sector, to name a few. Nonetheless, increased development and complexity of financial markets also means that risks may be higher, and that a stronger and more sophisticated regulatory framework is required. Page 10 of 20  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  The Chilean financial crisis of the early eighties led not only to a radical bank regulation revision, but also to learning valuable lessons for the future. A deeper and properly regulated financial system contributes to financial stability, inclusion and increased welfare. Even though significant progress has been made in this regard, there are still challenges ahead that must be faced to further strengthen our financial system. Let me now address some of these regulatory challenges the CBC has been working on. Page 11 of 20  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  In order to have a deeper FX market and enhance resilience of the financial sector a number of measures are being taken by the Central Bank of Chile (CBC).
This year, Barclays pipped us to the post but in the spirit of sharing knowledge, we look forward to learning about the initiatives that have worked for them. The Bank is also focusing on mid-career recruitment and last year almost half of our experienced hires were female. To attract diverse candidates we review all job adverts to ensure they use only gender-neutral language to avoid alienating or discouraging prospective applicants. During the selection process, CVs are anonymised of all personal data, fostering a more objective assessment of a candidate’s skills. At the interview stage, we ensure that panels are diverse in order to mitigate affinity effects and unconscious biases. To make these initiatives a success, all our managers are required to undertake unconscious bias training before recruiting. Of course, not all talent develops on a linear career path; some people choose to take career breaks and may require support to return to the workplace. Recognising this pool of untapped talent, the Bank successfully piloted a Career Returners programme last year. The Bank offered a six-month placement to 16 people, with coaching and training support and fifteen women went on to take up permanent positions. Bolstered by this success, we are rolling out the programme across the institution. Recruitment is only the first step. As Jayne-Anne Gadhia observed in her review of gender diversity in finance, a layer of “permafrost” sets in at middle management, where women get either stuck or leave the sector.

As I hope I have demonstrated, the Bank is making strides to close this gap in a fair and sustainable manner that empowers all colleagues at the Bank. Nonetheless, the disclosure helps everyone to track progress and hold the Bank to account. To that end, HR publishes diversity metrics by division every quarter. The internal committee of Governors as well as the Court of Directors (the equivalent of our Board) regularly review and discuss the Bank-wide and divisional figures to identify areas for improvement. In 2018 we were also one of the first organisations to conduct and publish a special Cognitive Diversity Survey to gain a better understanding of how our colleagues feel about working at the Bank. The survey measured seven inclusivity metrics including interpersonal interactions, flexible working, communication with leaders as well as recruitment and promotion, and results are cut across twelve different aspects of diversity. Our results indicate colleagues are generally positive about inclusiveness at the Bank on every metric measured by the survey. 80% of colleagues in our annual employee survey reported that the Bank takes diversity seriously, seven percentage points higher than the UK average. And 87% of Bank colleagues say they are treated with respect as an individual, six percentage points higher than the UK average. These survey results and the progress against our targets are encouraging, but there is always more to do. And diversity is, of course, about more than gender, including ethnicity, age, disability, sexual orientation and socio-economic background.
Overall, 193 employees are currently in this situation. Banco de España employees account for 5.6% of total Eurosystem staff. Having regard to the proportion accounted for by our employees in total Eurosystem staff (5.6%) and our weight in the capital of the ECB (11.8%), the Banco de España ranks first among the euro area central banks, i.e. the ratio of one figure to the other is the lowest in the entire Eurosystem; and the same applies if the comparison is made not with the share in ECB capital but with the size of the euro area central banks’ balance sheets. Moving from staff to personnel costs, the latter totalled € million in 2013, representing 0.06% of our total balance sheet, compared with 0.14% in the case of the European Central Bank, which is the same percentage as that for the entire Eurosystem. The Banco de España also ranks first for this ratio (i.e. the lowest proportion) among the euro area central banks. If we compare operating expenses, i.e. including personnel costs, administrative expenses, depreciation of tangible fixed assets and banknote production, in relation to the balance sheet total, the proportion for the Banco de España in 2013 was 0.12%, which is also the lowest among the group of the six national central banks with the biggest balance sheets in the Eurosystem. In short, on the basis of these data the Banco de España can be said to score highly, comparatively speaking, from the standpoint of the efficient use of its resources.

Luis M Linde: Functions of the Bank of Spain in the new European context Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Parliamentary Committee on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, Madrid, 25 November 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Allow me first to thank the Committee for Economic Affairs for calling me to report on the organisation and functions of the Banco de España following the start-up on 4 November of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The launch of the SSM naturally marks a deep-seated change in banking supervision procedures and in the distribution of the attendant responsibilities in the euro area countries. After discussing the main characteristics of the SSM, I shall turn to how the Banco de España is affected in terms of its competences, workload, relationship to the European Central Bank, staffing needs and relations with other participating supervisory authorities. But first I should like to summarise some key figures relating to Banco de España staff and operating expenses compared with other Eurosystem central banks that are participating in the new European supervisory arrangements. The Banco de España within the framework of the Eurosystem As at 1 January 2014, total Banco de España staff numbered 2,652, 4.3% down on 2008. 84% of its employees work in Madrid, and 16% in the regional branches (of which there are 15 at present). A significant portion of the staff work outside the Bank, on secondment or on special or obligatory leave (i.e. not voluntary leave).