samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3 – CIPS survey activity balances Index of activity (above 50 indicates expansion) 65 Expansion 60 55 50 45 Manufacturing  40  Services 35 Contraction 30 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  Source: The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply  UK economic growth prospects Looking ahead to this year and next, current forecasts for economic growth are relatively subdued at present. The latest CBI forecast, for example, predicts growth of 1.8% this year and 2.3% next year and these figures are very close to the current Consensus Forecasts of growth for this year and next – 1.9% in 2011 and 2.1% in 2012. Most forecasters expect the manufacturing sector to continue to perform strongly, supported by strong growth across the world economy. Chart 4 – UK and world economic growth Annual percentage change in real GDP 6 4 2 0 -2 UK World (UK trade-weighted)  -4 -6  1989  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  Note: 2011 growth rate for the UK are consensus forecasts; those for the world are IMF forecasts.

We know that growth in December was heavily affected by the snowy weather but there are also concerns that the economy may have slowed for other reasons. We would have to wait until April for the next quarter’s GDP data, but even when this arrives it will be a very provisional estimate. So it makes sense to look at other data sources to gauge the pace of recovery – notably the employment figures and business survey information, which also have the benefit of being less subject to data revision. The employment data broadly support the view that the underlying momentum of growth has remained healthy despite the impact of December’s weather on activity levels. Unlike the early 1980s and the early 1990s, when unemployment continued to rise in the early phases of the recovery and the jobless rate rose to over 10%, we have seen a much earlier turnaround in employment in this recovery. Employment picked up in the first half of last year and has risen by nearly 300,000 since last winter.4 More recently, jobs growth has eased off with falling public sector employment offsetting increases in the private sector. But the official Labour Force Survey unemployment rate has remained at around 8% or just below since the recovery started in the second half of 2009. Indeed, the most recent figure we have for unemployment – the claimant count number for February – indicates the lowest jobless total on that measure for almost two years.
There's no use in complaining about "populism", which incidentally is a label that is too easily used, if we can't provide the "people" with the ability to ask the right questions and then evaluate the answers. France has therefore made a firm commitment to implement a strategy for financial education based on the principles set out by the OECD and endorsed by the G20 leaders. Work on the strategy began in 2013 and on 20 December of last year, the Minister of the Economy called the first meeting of the National Committee for Financial Education. This Committee brings together relevant administrations and institutions, consumer associations and finance sector professionals, and gives the political impetus at the very highest level. The Minister also reaffirmed the role entrusted to the Banque de France of conducting the national strategy. Before continuing with a presentation of our first collective achievements, I would like to focus on the role of the Banque de France. ***  1. The Banque de France, the conductor of the national strategy [slide 4] The Banque de France has concrete, everyday experience of our fellow citizens' needs in terms of information and explanations through its three core tasks of monetary strategy, financial stability and services to the economy. For example, as part of the over-indebtedness procedure managed by the Banque de France, each year we provide solutions to more than 200,000 households experiencing financial difficulties.

In order to ensure that the national strategy is rapidly implemented, we rely on the Operational Committee, which I chair, and which is responsible for management and coordination. Our roadmap for 2017 is clear: during the first half of the year, operational objectives will be defined and available resources will be identified; and during the second half, a robust and effective assessment methodology will be developed. We are already actively working on introducing specific mechanisms for people in financial difficulty and students. To help those experiencing financial difficulties, we are working closely with social service providers to produce practical educational materials covering seven concrete subjects: budgeting, relationships with banks, credit, bank payment incidents, banking inclusion, overindebtedness and complaints. From June 2017, these materials will be made available to social workers and associations so that they can be used with people in financial difficulty. By the end of the year, the Banque de France's teams have planned to hold nearly 900 meetings to present in detail these educational materials, as well as the "mes questions d'argent" portal, to 14,000 social service providers. For students, in December 2016 the Ministry of Education set up a group of experts in which the Banque de France and the French Institute for Public Financial Education actively participate.
In 2011, fiscal policy was oriented towards further consolidation of fiscal indicators in order to preserve the public debt thresholds. This approach established a mild fiscal stimulus in the economy, concentrated mainly in the first and fourth quarters of the year. Budget deficit was 3.5% of GDP, up by 0.5 percentage points, y-o-y. The budget deficit was determined by the slow increase in fiscal revenues and expenditures. Revenues increased by 1.8% y-o-y, due to decelerated economic activity. Their performance also determined the prudent approach in carrying out expenditures, which rose by 7% from the previous year. The budget deficit was financed by domestic borrowing with an increasing orientation towards longer maturities, thereby improving the public debt maturity structure and lowering the refinancing risk. The low public sector demand for financing was reflected in the decreased yields on government securities and also made more room for higher private sector financing. Adverse developments in external economy were also reflected in the balance of payments. The curbed economic growth in Albania’s trade partner countries was reflected in decelerated exports, which reduced their annual growth rate to 20.0%. On the other hand, high global market prices materialized into 12.4% increase in import expenditures, in 2011. These developments reversed the adjustment trend of the current account deficit pursued over the past two years. Current account deficit reached 12.1% of GDP, up by 12.5% from 2010. Net flows in capital and financial account increased by 5.6% and contributed to financing 80.4% of the current account.

Conform to institutional commitments, the Bank of Albania has regularly contributed to reporting according to respective chapters of the acquis communautaire, reflecting the progress achieved on the approximation of Albanian regulatory framework to EU legislation and attainment of European standards. With regard to Bank of Albania’s activity, the EC in its Progress Report of October for Albania, inter alia, commented positively that the monetary policy has successfully helped in keeping inflation stable and the banking sector remains well-capitalised and liquid. Implementation of the EU-funded Twinning Project of the Bank of Albania with the Bank of Italy in partnership with the Bank of France started in 2011. This project, which covers the major part of Bank of Albania’s activities, will help in enhancing institutional capacities, approximating the regulatory framework and work practices of the Bank of Albania to those of the EU and ECB, as well as promoting the development of financial market and instruments at home.   Promoting payment system  Fulfilling its legal responsibility for a smooth functioning of payment systems, in 2011, the Bank of Albania actively worked to strengthen the payment systems oversight, improve the technology infrastructure and develop new payment products in Albania. Both main payment systems, AIPS (for settling large-value payments) and AECH (for settling and clearing small-value payments) operated with full efficiency, reflecting the stability of the systems.
Even with the benefit of hindsight, these steps seem like sensible ones. In particular, there appear to have been three key objectives behind the evolution of international bank regulation over the period. •  First, to level the international playing field and prevent a race to the bottom in capital adequacy standards, in particular under Basel I. •  Second, to align regulatory capital with risk by improving the risk-sensitivity of capital standards, in particular under Basel II and III. •  And third, to reduce incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and create incentives to upgrade risk management, in particular under Basel II and III. All of these responses were understandable and, in concept, laudable. The question is whether, with the benefit of hindsight, they have been successful. Unfulfilled ambitions (a) Levelling the Playing Field The rationale for the original Basel Accord is that it would effectively defuse an international race to the bottom by setting a common, internationally-set capital standard. But the use of risk weights, in particular those based on internal models, in calculating banks’ capital ratios has provided an alternative avenue through which this race can be run. And empirical evidence suggests this race may have continued apace. Chart 1 plots the average risk weight applied to the assets of 17 major international banks over the period 1993 to 2011, together with a trend line. The trend is steeply and strikingly downward-sloped, falling on average by 2 percentage points each year.

The letter says: “The rise in the cost of living in the past three years has been larger than has been seen in many other countries that compete with us in foreign markets. When the cost of living rises, so wages should also rise and consequently so too production costs, with the result that our competitiveness declines. Do we not have to fear this?” Unfortunately we do not know what advice Nurkse gave to Jaakson, and within only a couple of years the question was no longer of any great relevance for Eesti Pank. During the second world war, Ragnar Nurkse focused in his work on inflation and exchange rates. The research that he published on these topics has led many writers to call Nurkse one of the main architects of the Bretton Woods system. After the war Nurkse taught for thirteen years in the prestigious Columbia University in New York. There he mainly focused on development economics, earning a great reputation as an international advisor on the subject. He died unexpectedly and still relatively young at only 51. The view of Ragnar Nurkse of the time notes his thorough knowledge of economic theory and practice, his original ideas, and his clear vision. He was the sort of man who is clearly needed in the world today. When Estonia regained its independence it chose the path of reform, with a unique combination of conservatism, innovation and a recognition of its own limitations. Estonia chose once again the road to Europe.
But we are not the main players in driving long-term productivity growth. We do not invent new technologies or processes. And the necessary supporting policies such as product and labour market reform, infrastructure, education, ensuring the economy is open to competition including from abroad – these are issues for governments and elected politicians. Looking at advanced economies, particularly with aging populations, we are all going to have to work a bit harder on productivity growth in the longer term if living standards are to continue to rise. But the growth rate of productivity does matter to central banks. It is a very important factor in determining the supply side of the economy; the capacity of the economy to grow without generating inflationary pressure. And in recent years, it has become more important to us as the really hard questions about the economy have been as much if not more about understanding post crisis changes in the level of supply as about the level of demand. We spend more time now discussing the supply side in the MPC – mentions of ‘supply’ and ‘productivity’ in the minutes of MPC meetings have doubled, relative to mentions of other terms, between 2006 and 2014.Productivity is also a key determinant of the growth in real incomes and so affects the demand side of the economy as well. Drivers of the economic recovery Over the past two years, UK economic growth has averaged 2.5%; stronger than most of our G7 partners and we are forecasting that to continue.

I want to talk a little about how we have been able to grow relatively strongly over the past couple of years despite very weak productivity growth; but why that is unlikely to be possible over the coming years. And why we expect productivity to improve – albeit moderately – in the future. And in doing so I will also talk about why the UK’s productivity performance has been so puzzlingly weak, not just in the depths of the crisis and recession but in the recovery and expansion that has been underway since the middle of 2013; and whether the boom and bust of the financial sector can help us to understand the UK’s recent productivity performance. The importance of productivity Productivity growth matters hugely. In the end it is the key determinant of rising living standards. For 18 centuries – from the year 1AD to 1800 when the industrial revolution started – living standards in the West were fairly stagnant. It is because of the step change in BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  productivity growth launched by the industrial revolution that living standards are now 20 times higher than they were then. 1 Increases in population and the labour force can make the national economy bigger. But in the end only productivity growth – producing more output relative to input – can consistently raise GDP per person. Central banks like the Bank of England foster monetary and financial stability, which support investment and productivity growth.
1  William C Dudley, 2011: “Securing the Recovery and Building for the Future.” Remarks at United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, November 17. 2  Based on the CoreLogic index. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Home construction collapsed with new single family starts falling from a peak rate of 1.75 million homes per year to a low of 360,000 in early 2009. After a very slight pick-up, they have been bumping along at about a 425,000 annual rate for over a year. Although the number of mortgages becoming delinquent is off its peak, it remains very elevated and increased in the third quarter of 2011.3 According to the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, at the end of that quarter there were roughly 1.5 million first lien mortgages 90 or more days past due, and 2 million first lien mortgages in some stage of foreclosure. Over time, without an improvement in housing and the labor market, more loans will become seriously delinquent. Moreover, absent more aggressive efforts to find economically efficient alternatives to foreclosure – loans already seriously delinquent and in foreclosure will become real estate owned by the lender, or REO. My staff estimate that the flow of properties into lender REO in 2012 and 2013 could be as high as 1.8 million per year, up from around 1.1 million in 2011 and around 600,000 in 2010. The overhang of properties in the foreclosure/REO pipeline continues to exert downward pressure on house prices and housing activity.

For mortgages that are part of securitizations, the legal obstacles to loan modification that preserve value are substantial. Meanwhile, mortgage servicers lack the systems, processes, governance, resources and incentives to deal effectively with a large volume of delinquent borrowers – who often suffer poor customer treatment at a time of personal distress.8 The result is inefficiently low levels of mortgage modification, too few “short sales”9 by mutual agreement between distressed borrowers and lenders, and too much reliance on the foreclosure process. This process also has many legal impediments and has become even more inefficient as the volume of loans in the pipeline increases. One consequence has been lengthening delays in completing foreclosures – including unavoidable foreclosures. These delays have increased the economic damage caused by foreclosure and reduced recovery rates. The damage caused by inefficient foreclosures is worth emphasizing. It is not just the direct loss of value in terms of deterioration of homes that are ultimately foreclosed. In addition, as I have personally witnessed in my outreach visits across the New York Fed’s District, foreclosures impose significant costs on families, surrounding neighborhoods and communities. Unmaintained homes facing foreclosure drag down the value of nearby homes. Also, property taxes on non-foreclosed homes often go up due to a declining tax base and this puts additional downward pressure on housing prices. Foreclosures also undercut housing demand. Households that go through foreclosure need to repair their credit records and to accumulate new downpayments.
As regards the challenge of moving to a more sustainable economy, the financial sector and the wider economy could be hurt by an inadequate or delayed response to the accelerated transition to a carbon-neutral economy. Allow me to illustrate my point with an example: the Banque de France conducted simulations based on macrofinancial scenarios prepared by the NGFS, which found that a delayed and disorderly transition would be far more damaging, costing up to 5.5% of French GDP by 2050. Given their lynchpin role in financing the economy, banks must continue to be resilient amid the twin transition. This is especially necessary in Europe where, unlike in the UK and US economies for example, bank loans are the main source of financing, accounting for approximately 70% of financing for euro area businesses, compared with around 40% in the United States. In saying this, I do not want to give the impression that banks are alone in providing financing to the economy. On the contrary, they need to harness the complementarities offered by market financing. The digital and green transition that lie ahead will require huge investment but also, and most importantly, innovation. On this front, the European Union (EU) lags Asia and the United States. Take the example of research and development (R&D) spending: in 2018, total public and private R&D expenditures in the EU were equivalent to 2.2% of GDP, compared with 4.5% for South Korea and 2.8% in the United States.

These two pieces of legislation will usefully supplement the Second Payment Services Directive adopted in 2015, which paved the way for the creation of payment institutions, i.e. regulated entities that do not have to be registered as credit institutions. As you are well aware, however, the challenges linked to better regulation of digital finance are not confined to Europe. Globally, several major initiatives are under way. Because of time constraints, I will mention only two. First, the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body that works to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, recently extended the scope of transfer transparency requirements, also known as the “travel rule”, to include virtual assets. Second, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is currently doing work on the question of setting prudential requirements for banks’ crypto-asset holdings. In a fast-changing world, there are a number of issues that regulatory authorities have yet to get to grips with. For example, we need to develop an adequate approach to regulate bigtech activity in finance. I would now like to talk about regulatory responses in the area of sustainable finance. The EU leads the field in this regard[SLIDE 6]. A major step forward was taken with the adoption on 18 June 2020 of the European Taxonomy Regulation, which seeks to promote sustainable investment through a common classification of economic activities (not of financing or businesses).
According to a research of the World Bank, in the years 2005 - 2025, the labour force participation rate in the developed countries of high income will fall by ca. 20 million, whereas that the developing countries will increase by almost a billion. At the same time, in view of the aging populations, especially in Europe, there will be a rapid growth in the number of elderly people, from 36 per 100 working people to 52 per 100 working people. These trends, coupled with a fivefold difference in average wages between the developed and the developing countries, will inevitably bring about an increase in the economic migration rate. What triggered the emergence of the global labour market?

Caleb M Fundanga: Advanced payment system oversight and management Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI) workshop on Advanced Payment System Oversight and Management, Lusaka, 12 July 2010. *       *  *  The Director – Financial Sector Management at MEFMI Representatives from MEFMI Secretariat Distinguished Resource Persons Dear participants Ladies and Gentlemen  It is my pleasure and honor to be here today to officiate at this important regional workshop on Advanced Payment System Oversight and Management organized by the Financial Sector Management Programme of the Macroeconomic and Financial Management Institute of Eastern and Southern Africa (MEFMI). Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to begin by expressing my gratitude to MEFMI, for having organized this workshop that has brought together officials from the regional central banks and ministries of finance and economic planning to address and brainstorm on important aspects concerning regulation and supervision of the payment systems. I warmly welcome you all to Zambia and in particular to the City of Lusaka. In particular, I would like to welcome and thank our distinguished resource persons, some of whom are here present and others still to join us during the week. We thank you for accepting invitations to join us for this workshop and hope that your participation will enrich the deliberations of this workshop as well as the knowledge of the participants.