samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, a limit will be enforced on the amount of assets issued by entities with a high carbon footprint that can be pledged as collateral when borrowing from the Eurosystem. The assessment of financial risks for private actors will see an active involvement of the Eurosystem. To ensure that the economy remains resilient during the transition to net zero, the Eurosystem is stress-testing euro area banks for climate-related events. Banks’ level of preparedness will be evaluated and, were deficiencies to emerge, recommendations will be issued to strengthen banks’ climate frameworks. The results of the ECB’s 2022 Climate Stress Tests (CST) showed that banks have started to integrate climate risk into their stress-testing frameworks, although most institutions are still at a very early stage when it comes to factoring climate risk factors into their credit risk models. (SSM Climate stress test report). When it comes to the Maltese economy, the Central Bank of Malta has made a first attempt at quantifying the exposure of the domestic financial system to sectors of economic activity that may be affected by transition to clean sources of energy. In a nutshell, as of June 2021 just over 23% of the domestic banking sector’s lending was directed towards sectors identified to be high carbon dioxide (CO2) intensive (such as energy, construction and transportation and storage), while an additional 27.7% was issued towards mid CO2 intensive 5  sectors (mostly services).

I could have quoted one of our famous French bildungsroman, such as Sentimental Education by Flaubert, but I will give primacy to the German master Goethe, who created the genre with his Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship: "One ought, every day at least, to hear a little song, read a good poem, see a fine picture, and, if it were possible, to speak a few reasonable words." I have endeavoured to follow this last piece of advice with this speech. Thank you for your attention, and have a good conference! i See the FIS Worldine Global Payments Report 2022 as regards Europe and Asia, and  the FSI Insights on Big tech interdepency – a key policy blindspot (July 2022) as regards India ii Big techs' "DNA feedback loop": data, network effects, activities iii Digital payments make gains but cash remains, Bank for International Settlements, 30  January 2023 iv FIS Worldine Global Payments Report 2022 v Villeroy de Galhau, F., Anchors and catalysts: central banks' dual role in innovation,  speech, 27 September 2022  4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  vi Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), A policy triangle for big techs in finance  , 23 October 2021 vii Big tech in financial services: regulatory approaches and architecture, International  Monetary Fund, 24 January 2022; and Big techs in finance: regulatory approaches and policy options, Bank for International Settlements, 16 March 2021 viii TARGET Instant Payment Settlement  5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Jean-Pierre Danthine: A macroprudential progress report Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Society for Financial Econometrics (SoFiE), Lugano, 11 October 2013. *  *  *  I would like to thank Till Ebner, Fabian Gunzinger and Patrick Saner for their very valuable support in drafting this speech. Introduction Five years ago, the failure of Lehman Brothers sent shockwaves through the global financial system. The failure of a relatively small but highly interconnected institution pushed the entire financial system and, eventually, the global economy to the brink of collapse. This painfully highlighted the fact that policymakers had underestimated systemic risk. Five years later, thanks to substantial efforts, we have a better – but admittedly still incomplete – understanding of what systemic risk is and what we should do about it. In general terms, systemic risk arises because an optimising financial institution does not fully account for the cost that its behaviour imposes on other financial institutions. Thus, in essence, the origin of systemic risk is a negative externality imposed by individual financial firms on the system. For analytical and regulatory purposes, it is useful to differentiate between structural and cyclical systemic risk. Structural systemic risk stems from institutions that are so large or so interconnected that their failure would threaten the stability of the entire system. These are the institutions that are “too big to fail” (TBTF) or “too interconnected to fail”.

The absence of extended periods of high unemployment in the face of significant adverse developments suggests that labour markets have been able to adjust. Indeed, unemployment in Malta has been less volatile than in the euro area. The exchange rate peg has also been a valuable nominal anchor, restraining price increases. In fact, inflation has averaged just 2.4% in the past five years (1.3% in 2003), indicating a considerable measure of nominal convergence with our major trading partners, and with the euro area in particular. Taken together, these features of the Maltese economy suggest that the likelihood of experiencing an asymmetric shock is small; and they lead us to believe that the exchange rate peg provides a suitable framework for joining ERM II and that the country should be able to adopt the euro sooner rather than later. We are also aware, however, that the peg will have to be maintained during the lira’s passage through what is essentially uncharted territory. Professor Eichengreen’s words of admonition to last November’s East-West Conference here in Vienna readily come to mind, “… prescribing bands for the new EU members for an extended period is the worst form of macroeconomic malpractice. Bands are fragile and difficult to manage. Their fragility is clear from Europe’s own experience in 1992.” In order to ensure a smooth transition towards, and through ERM II, therefore, it will be necessary to convince the markets that ERM II is indeed a natural culmination of the lira’s currency basket regime.
One reason for the appreciation of the US dollar against the Swiss franc and most other currencies is the substantial increase in long-term interest rates in the US, particularly following the presidential election. Long-term yields on Swiss Confederation bonds have also risen, but yield increases have been less pronounced here than in the US. The interest rate differential with the US has thus widened. Short-term rates in Switzerland are virtually unchanged, with the yield curve steepening as a result. Inflation expectations in Switzerland remain stable. Most households, companies and financial analysts anticipate that inflation will be slightly positive in the short to medium term. This view is substantiated in the surveys conducted by the SNB’s delegates for regional economic relations. Despite weak inflation in recent years, long-term inflation expectations have changed very little and remain firmly anchored in the range which we equate with price stability. Monetary policy outlook  Ladies and gentlemen, let me summarise my key points. Even in times of turbulence such as those witnessed in the last six months, our monetary policy has proved its worth. The negative interest rate has partially restored the traditional interest rate differential with other currencies and has thus made Swiss franc investments less attractive. During periods of high volatility, our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market has a stabilising effect on the exchange rate.

20 It would be premature to draw too close an analogy with climate risks, and it is true that court cases have, so far, largely been unsuccessful. Cases like Arch Coal and Peabody Energy – where it is alleged that the directors of corporate pension schemes failed in their fiduciary duties by not considering financial risks driven at least in part by climate change 21 – illustrate the potential for long-tail risks to be significant, uncertain and non-linear. And “Loss and Damage” from climate change – and what to do about it – is now formally on the agenda of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, with some talking openly about the case for compensation. 22 These risks will only increase as the science and evidence of climate change hardens. Physical risks from climate change will also become increasingly relevant to the asset side of insurer’s balance sheets. 23 While the ability to re-price or withdraw cover mitigates some risk to an insurer, as climate change progresses, insurers need to be wary of cognitive dissonance within their organisations whereby prudent decisions by underwriters lead to falls in the value of properties held by the firm’s asset managers. This highlights the transition risk from climate change. Transition risks The UK insurance sector manages almost £ in assets to match liabilities that often span decades.
18 18  1.2 17  17 Jul. 18 18  (f) Forecast. Source: Bloomberg. Figure 6 MPR expected by the market  Interest rate differential between the US and Germany and multilateral dollar  (at December of each year, percent)  (basis points; index)  3  3  330  June MP Report 2 Fed fund  2 March MP Report  95  2 years  310  94  290  93  270 1  1  Libor  250  0  0  -1  -1 12  14  91  230  10 years  210  Euribor 10  92 DXY (right axis)  16  18  20  190 01.18 18  Source: Bloomberg. 10  90 89 88  03.18 Mar. 05.18 May  Figure 7 Nominal exchange rate and multilateral measures (1)  Parities against the US dollar (1) (2)  (index, 2017-2018=100)  (index, 2017-2018=100)  110  110 120  120  105  105 110  Latam currencies 110 (3)  MER-5 100  100 100  100  MER 95  95  90  90  80  Commodity currencies (4)  Chile  90  TCN 90 17  17 Jul. 18  80 17  17 Jul. 18 18  (1) Dashed vertical line shows statistical cutoff date of March 2018 Monetary Policy Report. (2) Uses April 2018 WEO weights. An increase denotes a depreciation of the currency with respect to US dollar.

We continue to estimate that the economic recovery is grounded on a favorable external scenario, a clearly expansionary monetary policy, the completion of the adjustment of mining and housing investment and the absence of important macroeconomic imbalances. As a working assumption, we assume that in 2018 the economy will receive a fiscal impulse consistent with the current budget, including the adjustments announced by the Administration. Going forward, we assume that expenditure will follow the path of gradual fiscal consolidation defined in the fiscal policy decree just issued by the authority. With these figures, on average our economy will grow above potential in the period 2018-2020, closing the activity gap during the policy horizon, as we projected in the March Report. Also, our estimate for the economy’s potential growth continues to lie between 2.5% and 3% and it will gradually approach trend growth—between 3% and 3.5%—to the extent that the rate of investment recovers, short-term constraints disappear, and resources are reallocated to more productive activities. Come September, as has been the case for some years, we will reassess these estimates. The projected evolution of activity considers an external impulse slightly lower than that estimated in March, due to less favorable financial conditions and lower terms of trade associated to the oil price hike. Activity and inflation data of recent months have consolidated the differences between the cyclical position of the United States and the other developed economies.
Because excessive market volatility is not supportive of businesses, monetary policy will have to be watchful of financial developments abroad and to take account of the impacts that the global slowdown might have on external stability. Under the managed float, Thailand’s monetary policy is operating under an inflation-targeting framework. As the economy slows, the current domestic inflation rates remain low. Going forward, our analysis shows that inflation will not pose a policy concern in the immediate future. 2  BIS Review 70/2001  But with considerable uncertainty in the economic situations abroad, I believe monetary policy will need to take heed of both internal and external stability. This balance of emphasis will provide Thailand with some flexibility in dealing with the pressure that could stem from the external front. In essence, I see the need for monetary policy in the period ahead to be vigilant and give due safeguards to both internal and external stability. One question often asked is, “Does the continued emphasis on stability mean that monetary policy is abandoning growth?” The current policy preference for now is clear – stability ahead of growth. And to qualify this, I would like to make three points. First, an important pre-condition for growth on a sustained basis is a stable macroeconomic environment. To this end, the best contribution that monetary policy can make to promote growth is to ensure continuity of macroeconomic and financial stability. I remarked earlier that macroeconomic and financial stability are the gains we have made in the last few years.

Thus, the establishment of the Agricultural Futures Exchange of Thailand (AFET) by the Ministry of Commerce was a major step in the right direction. The futures market aims to provide an efficient and effective mechanism for the management of price risks. By buying or selling futures contracts - contracts that establish a price level now for items to be delivered later - individuals and businesses have access to insurance against future adverse price changes. Futures market is a continuous auction market whereby prices should reflect the latest information about supply and demand conditions. This price discovery mechanism allows producers to be better informed when making their production plans. Even for small producers who may not actively participate in the futures market, the transparency and the availability of the futures prices in the public domain should enable them to negotiate and obtain fair prices for their produce. Since AFET opened for trading in May 2004, the daily average turnover for a rubber sheet in the AFET rose almost 8-fold in 2 years to 400 contracts. This increase may look impressive, but if we look across to the futures exchanges in the neighboring countries, we find that the Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM) registers daily turnover for rubber sheets at 20,000 contracts while the Singapore Commodity Exchange (SICOM) sees around 8,000 contracts being traded daily. Given our prominence as the world’s leading producer, it came as a surprise to me that Thailand remains a mere price-taker in the world’s agricultural produce markets.
However, we see that a series of problems that may be largely attributed to the pandemic period have caused a rise particularly in producer prices in developed and developing countries, as is the case in Turkey. Therefore, central banks are closely monitoring the implications of high inflation for expectations and international markets in the current normalization period. One of the key drivers of the increase in inflation was rising commodity prices. We witnessed sharp increases in both energy and non-energy commodity prices due to the recovering global demand. Parallel to the rise in commodity prices, supply constraints caused by the failure of production to match the rapidly increasing demand also play a role in the rise  6  in prices. Increasing international transportation costs and lengthened delivery times also drive producer prices up. We see that post-pandemic problems such as container shortages create a supply-demand mismatch, exerting upward pressure on prices. The fact that exchange rates and commodity prices, which used to explain producer inflation developments in Turkey to a large extent, have fallen short of explaining producer inflation in the recent period points to additional supply-side factors. Recent surveys of the European region reveal that supply constraints are among the leading factors that restrain manufacturing, and their impact has increased significantly. These developments show us that pandemic-related conditions or their impacts have not disappeared yet. Central banks continue to emphasize these factors in their recent evaluations of inflation.

I think that a comparative analysis of some key macroeconomic variables may help us better evaluate Turkey’s current performance. Considered alongside OECD countries and China, Turkey has become one of the two economies that recorded positive growth in 2020. Data on the first half of 2021 showed that growth remained positive. The positive performance of vaccination in Europe has been reflecting on our economy through the tourism and external demand channels. In this context, net exports also continue to contribute positively to growth. High-frequency data also signal a recovery in the labor market on the back of the reopening. While employment in the services sector was on a slower recovery track amid pandemic restrictions, the losses of the pandemic period have been fully compensated for with the recent surge in services employment. Besides, on the back of strong exports, industrial employment has been following a more positive course compared to other subcategories in the recent period. All in all, we see that non-farm employment started to recover first with the help of the industrial sector, and reached pre-pandemic levels in early 2021 despite the limited contribution from the services sector. Finally, we can say that the labor market has largely overcome the effects of the pandemic on the back of the services sector and tourism. Distinguished guests, During the post-pandemic recovery, economic activity started to normalize at a global level.
Gower put forward the pros and cons of much supervision continuing to be undertaken by the DTI (in practice, largely self-regulating) or the establishment of a self-standing commission. His recommendation at the time was that the DTI continue in its role, allowing the firms to self-regulate, until such a time that ‘it is apparent that a substantial volume of day-to-day Governmental regulation and supervision will have to be undertaken… [at which point] a self-standing Commission answerable to the Secretary of State should be 38  established and the Governmental role undertaken by it’ . The debate about the most appropriate institutional setup for the supervision of financial services in the UK continued to rage on. Fast-forward to 1997 and the responsibility for insurance supervision was being passed to the newly-created Financial Services Authority (FSA). Around the same time, the Government announced that it would transfer full operational responsibility for monetary policy to the Bank of England, ably supported by my colleague Sir Jon Cunliffe in his former mandarin incarnation, and – as part of that change – the supervisory function for the banking sector was transferred to the FSA. In a statement to the House of Commons on 20 May 1997, Gordon Brown noted the “strong case for bringing 39  the regulation of banking, securities and insurance together under one roof” , noting that firms by this point managed their businesses on a group-wide basis and that the new regulatory structure would reflect the increasingly integrated financial markets of the day.

Meanwhile, the Bank had established a Board of Banking Supervision ‘to advise the Governor on supervisory matters and oversee the implementation of the (reformed) Banking Act’  28  and the supervisory  24  Hall, Maximilian, J.B. Handbook of Banking Regultation and Supervision, Hertfordshire, Woodhead Faulkner, 1993, p.75 Ibid, p.95 26 Kynaston, p.79 27 Hall, p.77 28 Ibid, p.23 25  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  function was further expanded. And this brings me back to the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995, following which a report into the existing supervisory arrangements was commissioned from the (now also-collapsed) Arthur Andersen, which in 1996 set out recommendations to overhaul the Bank’s supervisory approach. What you can see in all this is that supervision is not a static game, and has to move with the times. But there are also some constants. In particular, although we have moved a very long way from the supervisory practices (and hairstyles, other than the resurgence of beards amongst male supervisors) of the 1970s, we have maintained the view of our predecessors that supervision cannot be a narrow, tick-box, compliance exercise, and that judgement plays a key role. Building society supervision  The merchant and trading banks of the City of London were no doubt significant in the world of wholesale international finance. But there was another group – the building societies – that served a critical function in servicing the UK economy, particularly retail customers.
2  Even though systemic risks are not an issue in the card market, other risks may be highly relevant. Operational risks in particular are important since operational disturbances may give rise to substantial costs for society as a whole. The market for card payments is characterised by the presence of strong network effects in combination with economies of scale. To exploit these effects players that otherwise compete with each other have to cooperate. This cooperation is manifested in common standards and a common infrastructure. It is an important cooperation, which has the potential of providing inexpensive and convenient payments services to the public in a way that would otherwise be impossible. There is, however, another side of the coin. High market concentration may reduce the competitive pressure and thus the functioning of the market. Market power may be abused. The effect from concentration on incentives to invest in research and development is ambiguous. High concentration may also make it difficult to establish new payment instruments and systems. It is not obvious that the market by itself can strike the right balance between cooperation and competition. Turning to the pricing of card products, the Riksbank, in dialogue with the banks, has launched a research project related to retail payments. The aim is to investigate how well the price structure for retail payment services reflects the underlying production costs for these services.

Philipp M Hildebrand: Open world - Switzerland open to the world Summary of a speech by Dr Philipp M Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Economic Forum, Thun, 7 May 2004. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Globalisation - the worldwide exchange of production factors, goods, technologies and ideas - is a process that has evolved in different ways and degrees ever since humankind can remember. Technological progress is the actual driving force behind globalisation. It thus becomes possible to reduce costs through increasing specialisation and the best use of comparative advantages. The process of globalisation, however, is restricted to some extent by national and international legal frameworks. Despite overall positive and widespread net effects, globalisation is, however, frequently not accepted due to adjustment costs arising for certain global players. With its successful export sector and its comparatively attractive local conditions, particularly the excellent infrastructure and the flexible labour market, Switzerland has the potential to benefit from the continuing globalisation in future as well. A necessary condition for this, however, is a rise in productivity and, as a result, enhanced competitiveness of the domestic sector. With international competitive pressure intensifying, insulating itself or merely adhering to the status quo are no options for Switzerland in the long term. This would lead to considerable losses in social security and growth and threaten the long-term survival of the country’s social institutions.