samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, we cannot work a monetary miracle, either legally or, above all, from a “fiduciary” perspective: any suspicion of fiscal dominance would lead to monetary mistrust, to a loss of confidence in the value of money, as observed in the past and, more recently, in certain emerging market economies. Let us be clear on this: the sharp rise in public debt is clearly the buffer mechanism that the 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  economy needs in the current circumstances. But it will have to be paid back in the long term and this will mean adopting a more effective management of public spending in the medium term. The central bank’s actions are conditioned by its price stability target and not by the fiscal needs of its individual member countries. To call this into question would be to jeopardise public confidence in the currency, which is one of the essential assets for guaranteeing economic prosperity. Likewise, undermining the independence of the central bank would be to diminish its power and its agility, which are precisely the strengths that protect our economy during a crisis. This is why I am placing so much emphasis on these two anchors. It is not through a somewhat rigid sense of conservatism, as suggested by a slightly lazy cliché. In the current low-inflation environment, our mandate in no way prevents us from innovating, acting, supporting the economy rapidly and powerfully. Indeed, it even creates the conditions for legitimate and efficient action.

The NEU-CP market in Paris is by far the most active in the euro area, with outstandings of EUR 72 billion in mid-May, and the Banque de France’s most recent involvement since the end of March has been very effective and widely acknowledged by industry professionals. With its new Main Street Lending Program, the Fed recently went a step further by giving itself the possibility to fund the purchases of bank loans to businesses, via a special-purpose vehicle created with a US Treasury Department guarantee. We are not at that stage yet – the euro area has a different institutional framework – but we should not necessarily exclude it in the future if it proves to be a lever needed to maintain the financing of the economy by lightening bank balance sheets. What’s more, the French proposal for a “recovery fund” envisages its partial use for this very purpose. The Covid crisis has once again called upon the Eurosystem’s reactivity and creativity to fulfil its mandate in total independence. To conclude with the words of Jean Monnet, “I have always believed that Europe would be built through crises, and that it would be the sum of their solutions”. Without, of course, wishing for it, this is the situation we find ourselves in. And rest assured, the ECB has risen to this challenge. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
It would be pragmatic to build monetary co-operation and establish links, perhaps first at the bilateral level, between those who are ready and willing, and are operating compatible systems: for example, bilateral repurchase agreements of US Treasury securities to enhance each other’s liquidity of foreign reserves, or bilateral linkages of real time payment systems and clearing systems for securities to facilitate effective financial intermediation across the cooperating economies. These bilateral linkages would serve to set targets and standards for others in the region who are not quite ready. And when eventually the majority of the bilateral linkages have been established, we would then have a network, an Asian monetary network, of considerable strength, which would hopefully enable Asian monetary problems to be tackled effectively. It should also be a network that is capable of being linked up with monetary systems outside the region, with a view to building the global monetary framework. Issues for Asian Monetary Co-operation 48. Let me now turn to specific issues for Asian monetary co-operation. There are five areas. These are information exchange, resource provision, market infrastructure development, banking supervision and financial regulation, and policy consultations. 49. As the experience of EMEAP has shown, information exchange has been the easiest area of monetary co-operation. The use of the EMEAP Virtual Secretariat, using Internet technology, has greatly facilitated the exchange of information, helping the sharing of market intelligence, techniques and experience in all areas of central banking.

Developing the methodology to assess effectiveness  I mentioned earlier one of the promising new tools to assess the effectiveness of ethics and compliance programs, and that is the PEI, the Program Effectiveness Index. The excellent report by the Ethics Resource Center, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines For Organizations at Twenty Years, has drawn attention to standards for assessing program effectiveness. The report states: “Altogether, the lack of assessment standards and guidance on how the quality of a compliance/ethics program should influence the outcome of a matter create the impression, validated by the [Ethics Resource Center] and Conference Board studies...that too many judgments are being made inside a black box.”2 While we seem to be on the cusp of a number of promising indicators, like the PEI, the truth is that we are not there yet. We simply do not have a tool that will give us an accurate and reliable measure of program effectiveness. Instead, we have a situation where enforcers (including those agencies with civil enforcement authority, such as the banking agencies) tend to be result oriented. When we see that a particular organization has experienced a major compliance failure, we tend to view the failure as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the  2  Ethics Resource Center, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations at Twenty Years at 51 (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  ethics and compliance program.
Growth momentum from the private sector has picked up more firmly, making it possible for the Government to begin moving toward fiscal consolidation to ensure medium-term fiscal sustainability. According to current estimates, effective tax collection together with the economic expansion could allow the Government to achieve a balanced budget a couple of years earlier than planned. It is therefore clear that the thrust of growth has now been shifted from the fiscal sector to private hands, with export also contributing in a very significant manner. This is a much welcome development, as sustainable growth cannot rest forever on the shoulder of the government who makes up only about 15 percent of the country’s GDP. Ladies and gentlemen, The key drivers of the current recovery, as you know, have been the strong performance of export and private consumption. Export of goods broke its highest record in May this year at 6.5 billion US dollars and has since remained at the monthly average of 6.4 billion US dollars, with the average monthly export growth of around 12 percent year-on-year. BIS Review 46/2003  1  To many, this is a pleasant surprise given the export performance of other regional countries of late. It owes partly to the diversification of Thai export, both in terms of product type and market destination. In particular, our export is not concentrated in just one or two commodities but rather well balanced between agricultural, agro-industrial, and manufactured goods.

Outstanding export performance, strong domestic fundamentals, and continued GDP growth will unavoidably attract foreign capital into the country and, as in the recent months, exert upward pressure on the currency. While the economy now enjoys a more flexible adjustment mechanism compared with the past, a huge influx of foreign capital relative to the size of domestic financial and capital markets can nevertheless cause substantial market volatility and, if persists, can even lead to the emergence of asset price bubbles. 4  BIS Review 46/2003  Regarding the upward pressure on the baht, the Bank of Thailand has been monitoring the currency movements closely and has introduced a number of measures to ensure that the adjustment is orderly, in particularly that the exchange rate volatility is kept at a manageable level for the corporate sector. Let me emphasize here that the Bank of Thailand regards the current appreciation of the baht as a natural occurrence for an economy on the recovery and is not concerned with a trend movement that is in line with improved economic fundamentals. However, with realization that Thailand has always been more open on the inward than the outward direction, we have taken this opportunity to liberalize the outflow side of the capital account to make things a bit more balanced. With this intention, institutional investors have been permitted to invest in overseas securities, and the establishment of mutual funds to invest on behalf of local individuals in Asian Bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities has also been encouraged.
Looking out for the policyholder Speech given by Sam Woods, Deputy Governor, Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer, Prudential Regulation Authority  Association of British Insurers Annual Conference 2018, London 27 February 2018  I am grateful to Rebecca Pu for her assistance in preparing this speech and to other colleagues for comments and contributions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  I will begin this speech with a bold claim: insurance regulation is fun! This is just as well, because it is half of what we do at the PRA. Parliament very wisely decided to put prudential regulation of banks and insurers together in one institution following the financial crisis. I think this works very well, because there are many synergies. Both sectors provide critical services to the real economy, bringing customers’ money directly onto their balance sheets. And I would argue, for instance, that the basic qualities which make a good chairperson aren’t materially different between banking and insurance. But there are also very big differences. An annuity writer is nothing like a building society. London Market underwriters I have sat next to do a very, very different thing to what goes on in banks. The eighty actuaries we employ as part of our insurance division speak a different language from our risk specialists sat on the floor above them at 20 Moorgate. Much of the time, this insurance activity goes on underneath the radar, relative to banking.

But in recent months, the spotlight of the Treasury Select Committee (TSC) has swung onto this area, and we have all been enjoying the debate! Many hours have been spent highlighting the biblical scale of the reporting requirements, the wickedness of the risk margin calculations, the mystical nature of the Ultimate Forward Rate…I could extend this list tenfold. Then we have had a rather more pointed exchange about whether we at the PRA have been over-zealous in our implementation of Solvency II, perhaps damaging competition, or making life too difficult for insurance companies, or denying the nation of vital new infrastructure by being too cautious about insurers’ investment strategies, or all three! All of these are important topics, and in the course of the debate I am as guilty of focusing on them as anyone else. Indeed, I will double-down by talking about some of them again today. So for those of us inside the insurance beltway, this is a very useful and timely debate and I think it is a great thing that the TSC has taken an interest. Can we make our implementation of Solvency II work better? In my opinion, despite some inevitable differences of view, there is in fact a strong degree of agreement between us, the TSC and the industry about the answer to that question. Where is the policyholder? However, in all the blizzard of insurance and regulatory jargon, I think something has been missing from our discussions. Where is the policyholder?
For my part, there seems to be no reason at present for any appreciable change in the assessment I made in October, namely that a repo rate increase will probably be needed in the future in order to safeguard the continuation of a favourable and stable development, with low inflation and rising output. 7  BIS Review 98/2000

With the achievement of relative macroeconomic stability in the recent years as evidenced by a significant reduction in the inflation rate to 8.5 percent as at June 2006, it is the expectation of the Bank of Zambia that all prudent lending institutions would make downward adjustments to their lending interest rates. Some commercial banks have taken the lead by reducing their base lending rates and we expect microfinance institutions will follow suit so that many more people can have access to affordable financial services. Mr Chairperson, Distinguished Guests, let me take this opportunity to inform you that following the coming into force of the Credit Reference Services (Licensing) Guidelines and the Credit Data (Privacy) Code on 30 January 2006, a credit reference bureau has since been issued with an operating licence to provide services to the Zambian market. Although the bureau will initially provide services to the banking sector, it will subsequently extend its services to other credit providers, such as, microfinance institutions. This will help in reducing credit risk through the availability of a widely accessible database on the loan repayment profile of borrowers. This should also provide another incentive for lowering of interest rates. BIS Review 72/2006  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, one way of addressing concerns of limited capital and dependence on donor support to the industry is by promoting linkage banking where microfinance institutions not only maintain accounts with commercial banks but also access funds from their respective commercial banks for on lending.
We have an internationally agreed definition of the leverage ratio and we are implementing a leverage related capital requirement in the UK. But an international standard on such a requirement has not yet been agreed ahead of planned implementation in 2018. And there is still major construction work underway on the denominator of the risk based capital adequacy requirement – the Basel Committee work to update the standardised approach for those firms that do not use internal models and to review the role of internal models in the framework. This work is important; in order to have confidence in the risk based capital regime, one has to have confidence in the denominator of the ratio as well as in the numerator. My expectation, however, is that this will not lead to a major change in the aggregate level of global bank capital requirements, as some have claimed. If we are to trust the use of internal models in the approach we need to be sure that models are only used where there is adequate data to support them. And although we will I hope have an internationally-agreed leverage, non-risk based, requirement alongside the risk-based one, we will need more constraints on modelling assumptions and inputs in order to reduce variability of capital outputs between banks to an acceptable degree. I imagine this work will lead to a redistribution of capital within  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  the system and to changes in requirements for some institutions.

Management of specific, more common or day-to-day operational risks is not a new practice; it has always been important for banks to prevent fraud, maintain the integrity of internal controls and reduce errors in data transaction processing, ensuring the availability of information technology infrastructure and their back up systems when needed. More often than not, operational risks are taken as given and very little attention has been paid to it. Operational risk is intrinsic to financial institutions and it should be an important component of their firm-wide risk management systems. However, operational risk is harder to quantify and model than market and credit risks. Operational risk differs from other banking risks. It is a risk that is not willfully incurred in return for an expected reward but is implicit in the ordinary course of banking business and has the potential to affect the risk management process. However, ignorance of operational risks or failure to properly manage such risk can result in a misstatement of an institution's risk profile and expose the institution to significant losses. Such institutions can become a regulatory burden. These and a few other factors have led the Basel Committee to recommend a separate capital for operational risk. 3. Definition of operational risk has evolved rapidly over the past few years. First, it was commonly defined as every type of unquantifiable risk faced by a bank, which has been refined considerably to include modern day risks.
a)  Credit Risk  Financial crises have traditionally arisen where the solvency of one or more institutions either crumbles, or is perceived to be in danger of doing so, in a way that threatens the financial system. So we need to focus on credit concentrations, credit aspects of prudential standards, credit pricing and terms etc. We need data and intelligence to do that. Understanding credit conditions and vulnerabilities is quite well developed territory. But new threats have arisen, particularly from sophisticated credit transfer instruments. This is a tricky and opaque arena. It is hard to know where concentrations of credit risk actually reside and even where credit risk ends and market risk begins. In addition there is the increasing range of participants who are also taking on credit risk. Of course in addition to this we can – and do – think about credit risk standards like Basel II. We focus on the systemic aspects of prudential design since in the UK FSA focuses on supervisory issues. b)  Market and Liquidity Risk  As the global capital market has expanded on the back of securitisation and derivatives increasing vulnerabilities arise. Change has been so rapid and development so fast that it has been hard for any of us to keep up. Given the multitude of new instruments and new markets that have appeared and the resulting increase in risk, this is a significant area of work for us.

In particular, there is unease that the current approach to crisis management that has evolved out of the experiences in Mexico and Asia, notwithstanding its successes in some cases, entails solutions that: •  are potentially too costly, given the repeated reliance on large-scale financial support packages,  •  introduce adverse incentives, or moral hazard, and  •  are in themselves a source of uncertainty, and potentially of instability. 4  BIS Review 35/2001  But the alternatives look even more unpalatable in their implications. Notwithstanding considerable efforts at the public and private level to search for a better way, no magic bullet or formula has been found. Nor is one likely to be available. Experience and a reading of the historical record suggest that the seductive allure of grand solutions must be resisted. Cases differ greatly with respect to what is possible and desirable in terms of their implications for the interests of the public and private sectors. Moreover, if history is any guide, new developments in markets and practices quickly will render obsolete those measures that might seem well attuned to today’s circumstances. Then what is the right path? The solution is neither a single piece of financial engineering nor a compact between the official lenders and private creditors. Rather, it is a process incorporating a number of elements. Essentially, I would suggest that our current case-by-case approach to crisis management needs to evolve in ways that are market-based and adaptive, yet strategic, creative, and principled. Allow me to explain.
We believe that the search for excess return has had a strong disciplinary effect on the organisation with a view to controlling both market and operational risk, and to ensure that all inside and outside suppliers do exactly what they are paid to do. 7. We have tried to build an organisation where the focus is on investment returns. In order to keep that focus we have tried to implement three basic principles: •  Accountability for decisions is clearly defined  •  There is transparency, nothing can be hidden away  •  The professional standards required for employees are very high  8. For investment decisions these principles mean that every decision is made by one individual and that the remuneration paid to him or her depends on the profitability of the decisions. We have defined a large number of independent profit centers, each with a clearly defined mandate. A compliance function checks that no one operates outside the mandate. For external managers we apply the same principle: Hiring an external manager is an investment decision, and someone inside NBIM is held responsible for it. 9. The salary system is different from the rest of the central bank. The main objectives are to focus attention on performance, and to give distinct signals to people who do not perform according to expectations. Salaries have two components, a basic salary and a performance-based component.

Svein Gjedrem: Wealth management in a public setting Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to panel discussion on “Problems of Plenty? Challenges and Opportunities from the Accumulation of Large Exchange Reserves and Windfall Revenue”, arranged as part of the seminar program of the 2006 Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, Singapore, 18 September 2006. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  1. Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the challenges that arise when managing financial wealth in a public sector environment. Norges Bank now has eight to ten years of experience of this task, and I shall try to describe in brief the strategies adopted by Norges Bank, and what we believe we have learned. 2. We have a large amount of money under management. Our foreign reserves are probably larger than needed for financial stability and monetary policy operations. But the most important fund is the Government Pension Fund, formerly the Petroleum Fund. We have been responsible for managing that Fund since its inception in 1996, and it has been a major task for us since 1998. 3. The value of the petroleum resources in the North Sea is currently estimated at about USD 700 billion. The government receives the bulk of the revenues generated from petroleum extraction as sales revenues and taxes. The government channels these revenues into the Pension Fund as financial assets.