samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It resulted in additional strengthening of the currency component in the banks' balance sheets. On June 30, 2009, the share of the liabilities with currency component in the total liabilities of the banking system equaled 54.7% and in comparison  4  BIS Review 127/2009  with December 31, 2008, registered an increase of 5.7 percentage points, while the assets with currency component participated with 56.5% in the banks' total assets, which is an increase of 4.2 percentage points compared to the end of 2008. Second, the reduced volume of banks' activities, followed by higher significance of the credit risk in the risks spectrum the banks face with, reflected also on their profitability. The profit the banks realized during the six months of the year, in the amount of Denar 646 million, is lower almost by four times compared to that registered in the same period of the preceding year. Third, despite the intensified carefulness of the banks in the banking activities conduct, in the first half of 2009 the trend of deterioration of the indicators for their credit portfolio quality continued. On June 30,2009, the credit exposure with higher risk degree (classified in the risk categories "C", "D" and "E") participated with 7.6% in the total credit exposure of the banks. These movements in the banks' credit portfolio primarily reflect the hampered working conditions of the domestic credit users as a result of the economic crisis.

The banks solvency (shown through the capital adequacy ratio, which equaled 16.4% on June 30,2009) is evidently beyond the prescribed minimal level of 8%, which provides enough capacity to absorb the possible negative shocks from further increase in the risks in their operating. However, the banks in the Republic of Macedonia face with several challenges. The consequences of the global economic crisis, which was felt in the Republic of Macedonia through the real sector, had negative influence also on the banking system. First, the reduced economic activity and the enhanced psychological pressures arising from the uncertainty regarding the duration and the consequences of the international economic crisis, reflected on the banks' balance sheets. In the first half of 2009, the banks' total assets reduced by 0.9%, with the annual growth rate reducing to only 3%. The decrease in the assets was reflection of the deposit core contraction, which went down by 2.4% in the same period, because of which the annual rate of change obtained negative value and on June 30, 2009 it equaled 0.1%. Only the banks' credit activity continued to expand, although with very slower dynamics relative to the preceding years. In the first quarter of 2009, the credit growth equaled only 1.7%, while the annual growth rate on June 30, 2009 reduced to 14.4%. Parallel to the lower volume of activities, also the currency propensity of the banks' depositors was changed. They were apparent through their enhanced interest for saving in currency component.
13  Ryan, R., O’Toole, C. and McCann, F. (2014), “Does bank market power affect SME financing constraints?”, Journal of Banking and Finance. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  other words, it creates the conditions for diversity and competition within the sector so that an optimal market structure can evolve. Conclusion Let me conclude. Repairing bank lending channel after a major financial crisis is inevitably a long and difficult process. Monetary policy has an important role to play, but the agenda is also broader: it involves supply and demand factors, and multiple aspects of national and European policy. The steps we have taken so far to strengthen the banking sector are necessary conditions for a stronger recovery in credit, and I am confident that we will see increasingly positive effects. But as banks transition to a new business environment, ensuring that they continue to have microeconomic incentives that coincide with our desired macroeconomic objectives is essential, as is developing a banking landscape that is sufficiently efficient and diversified to sustain credit supply. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

On the other, the fiscal and monetary policy measures implemented could support the recovery more strongly than anticipated. Swiss economic outlook  Through to late summer, the Swiss economy also recovered markedly and more strongly than originally expected from the first wave of the pandemic. Following a record increase, GDP Page 2/4  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Thomas Jordan  News conference  was still 2% below the pre-crisis level in the third quarter, having been more than 8% below in the second quarter. However, in October coronavirus also spread rapidly again in Switzerland. This has resulted in a renewed deterioration in the economic outlook, at least in the short term. The containment measures implemented thus far are restricting economic activity less than was the case in the spring. However, certain industries are severely affected again, above all hospitality and entertainment. Sentiment is also subdued in other industries. Economic momentum is thus likely to be weak in Q4 2020 and Q1 2021. We expect that GDP will shrink by around 3% this year. At our monetary policy assessment in September, we had anticipated an even stronger decline. The revision is due to the fact that the decrease in GDP resulting from the first wave of the pandemic was not as substantial as originally expected. Developments going forward largely depend on how successfully the spread of the virus can be contained in Switzerland and abroad. Our assumption is that there will not be a significant easing in the containment measures in Switzerland until the spring.
It became clear that the crisis severely aggravated the ongoing economic downturn, which together with falling commodity prices had a considerable dampening effect on inflationary pressures. Both we and others assessed that a rapid and substantial interest rate cut was necessary to alleviate the effects of the crisis. On 8 October the Riksbank and several other central banks, including the Bank of England, the ECB and the Federal Reserve, decided to cut our policy rates in a joint action. This action has later been followed by several interest rate cuts by central banks around the world. Last week, for instance, the ECB cut its policy rate by half a percentage point and the Bank of England cut its rate by 1.5 percentage points. The most recent interest rate decision Just over two weeks’ later, at the monetary policy meeting held on 22 October, the Executive Board of the Riksbank decided to cut the repo rate by a further 0.5 percentage points to 3.75 per cent. In our forecast for the future repo rate we are also expecting that it will be necessary to cut the rate by a further 0.5 percentage points within six months. The purpose is to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis on production and employment, and at the  BIS Review 138/2008  5  same time to attain the inflation target of 2 per cent.

It also becomes easier to work on prevention and in various ways to counteract a serious crisis from arising. The developments include methods regarding what are known as stress tests, which analyse what happens to the banks during various sequences of events and crisis scenarios. Such models are of course important tools when it comes to crisis exercises and to adapting our preparedness for managing real crisis situations efficiently. Challenges along the way A lot has changed, both compared with when I first began at the Riksbank and over the past six years. We have better conditions for managing various challenges so that we can attain our inflation target and safeguard financial stability in the best possible manner. It is also largely a case of learning by doing. I would therefore like to take up some of the challenges  BIS Review 155/2008  3  that we and other central banks have had to deal with in recent years. These are challenges we have learnt from when we were forced to deal with them. They are also challenges that in one way or another will stimulate future developments. Rising commodity prices,… In May of this year I held a speech on the upward pressure on international commodity prices that had been exerted for some time. This applied to both traditional commodities, such as oil and metals, and to foodstuffs, such as grain. The boom in commodity prices had pushed up inflation both here and abroad, and inflation was clearly overshooting our target.
As I mentioned earlier, this has a restraining effect on the economy, not least in that investments fall. Developments on stock markets around the world have fluctuated considerably and on the whole there has been a substantial fall. In many countries property prices are also falling, but in Sweden the decline has on the whole been fairly limited so far. However, all in all this development has led to a decline in wealth for many Swedish households, which is expected to dampen consumption. Various surveys indicate that households and companies have a more pessimistic view of the future now. The financial crisis has contributed to a deterioration in the prospects for global economic activity and to dampening international demand. The price of many commodities, such as oil and food, has fallen. This gives lower inflationary pressures. When international demand is lower, the Swedish economy is also affected via exports. We are assuming that exports will slow down next year, but recover during 2010. It is also clear that the uncertainty in the economy has increased in general. This affects households’ and companies’ financial decisions regarding the future. The uncertainty can also have contributed to the recent substantial weakening in the Swedish krona against most other currencies. It is not unusual that the value of currencies of small and very exportdependent economies, like Sweden’s, falls in times of market turbulence. This was the case, for instance, after the Asia crisis and the acts of terrorism on 11 September 2001.

Although a weaker exchange rate contributes to boosting exports, the effects are limited if international demand is low. At the same time, a weak krona provides higher imported inflation. We are expecting the exchange rate to strengthen in the slightly longer term, but to remain weak until the most acute stage of the crisis is over. To summarise in brief, we are assuming that the financial crisis will in various ways make the wheels of the economy turn much more slowly. Growth is expected to slow down both in Sweden and abroad. Our forecast is that the increase in GDP in Sweden, Europe and the United States will remain around zero next year, but recover in 2010 and 2011. The labour market, resource utilisation and inflation In that the financial crisis aggravates the ongoing economic downturn, we are assuming that the labour market will show weaker development and that inflation will be lower than we forecast at the beginning of September. Resource utilisation in the economy is still at a  6  BIS Review 138/2008  slightly higher level than normal. However, we are assuming that it will fall rapidly and be somewhat lower than normal over the coming years. Inflation is still high at the beginning of the forecast period. But during next year we are expecting it to fall rapidly. Opinion polls also indicate that inflation is expected to be lower in the future. Our assessment is that inflation will be below two per cent in 2009.
That is why we are currently engaged in reviewing our anti-money laundering guideline. In doing so, we are making particular reference to two main sources. The first is the paper on Customer Due Diligence for Banks issued by the Basel Committee in October 2001. The other is the consultation paper released by the FATF in May of this year on its review of the FATF Forty Recommendations that set the international standards on anti-money laundering. I would strongly recommend that all AIs familiarise themselves with both documents. Comments on the FATF Consultation Paper are due by the end of this month. The process of revising the FATF Recommendations will probably not be completed until some time next year. Final revisions to our own guideline will probably have to wait until then. In the meantime, however, we are reluctant simply to leave our existing guideline unchanged. There may be a number of areas where it is possible for it to be updated to reflect the current international consensus and to draw together pieces of guidance on particular issues that have appeared in circulars over the last few years. We are considering the best way to do this. One option is to issue a supplement to the existing guideline, pending the final revisions. Whatever we do will, as always, be the subject of consultation with the industry. In some places the revised standards may have to be tighter and permit fewer exceptions than at present.

I believe that these fears and concerns are unfounded and that Thailand will persevere. Our outlook for the Thai economy in the medium term is positive. Our forecasts show the Thai economy growing by 4-5 percent in 2007 and by 4-5.5 percent in 2008. These are respectable growth estimates for Thailand in light of the challenges and our focus on growth with stability. In the rest of my talk, I will address in detail the challenges and prospects for the Thai economy going forward. This brings me to the first of my three key points. The first key point is that the Thai economy is no stranger to difficult challenges. And we have always persevered in each instance. In 1997, we had the Asian crisis and undertook painful reforms; in 2001, the global economic downturn adversely impacted the Thai economy; and in the past two years, we had the Tsunami, SARS, the avian flu, southern unrest, political uncertainty, and the recent oil shock. The recent oil shock in particular proved to be a difficult test for the Bank of Thailand. High oil prices have two adverse effects: pressure on prices and a drag on economic growth. Tightening interest rates is the Bank of Thailand's primary defense against inflation. However, high interest rates would burden firms and households already trying to cope with high oil prices. Domestic demand would be adversely affected. There was no clear or easy choice to make.
Healthcare, education, and public infrastructure construction will be the better performing segments. The retail sector is likely to remain weak for the rest of the year, weighed down by sluggish consumer and business sentiments. The forecast of GDP growth in 2016 is 1.0–3.0%. The Ministry of Trade and Industry and MAS are reviewing this range. Inflation Inflation, which has been low for long, is on a modest ascent. Core inflation, which excludes accommodation costs and private road transport costs, is expected to rise gradually over the course of this year. Core Inflation bottomed-out in the fourth quarter last year and picked up to 0.6% in Jan-May 2016. The drag from oil-related items will continue to diminish. The disinflationary effects of some budgetary and other one-off measures will dissipate. The pace of increase in inflation will be restrained, however, by benign external price pressures, reduced tightness in the labour market, and a more muted pass-through of business costs to consumer prices. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  For 2016, core inflation will likely average around 1.0% and trend towards its historical average of close to 2.0% over the course of 2017. Likewise, headline inflation is expected to climb out of negative territory and move towards 1.0% next year. CPI-All Items inflation fell to −0.9% in the first five months of this year, as a result of declines in housing rentals and car prices.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Brief remarks on managing financial instability and shocks in a globalising world Introductory remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Tun Ismail ali Chair Public Lecture, Kuala Lumpur, 6 February 2004. *  *  *  We are indeed honoured and privileged to have Dr. Yilmaz Akyüz, holder of the Tun Ismail Ali Chair in Monetary and Financial Economics at the University of Malaya, to speak to us today on “Managing Financial Instability and Shocks in a Globalizing World”. The Chair on Monetary and Financial Economics at the University of Malaya was established by Bank Negara Malaysia in recognition of the contributions of the late Tun Ismail bin Mohamed Ali, the first Malaysian Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia. It is our hope that this Chair would contribute to enhancing expertise and knowledge in the area of monetary and financial economics. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me make a few brief remarks on the topic of today’s lecture, based on our experience in managing the Malaysian economy. Uncertainty and instability are the defining feature of the international financial system today, as borders have become more porous, financial markets more integrated and as financial flows have surpassed trade flows as the dominant determinant of the international financial environment. Emerging market economies have become more vulnerable to international shocks which can have a significant adverse impact on the economy. Malaysia has approached this more challenging environment by increasing our own resilience and tolerance level to these shocks.
As shown in (Figure 4), about $ trillion of assets had migrated from prime to government funds by late 2016. This resulted in a major reallocation of the investments held by the money market fund industry, shown in (Figure 5). This reallocation had far-reaching effects on the structure of money markets, as described in a recent blog by some of my New York Fed colleagues. 14 For example, banks that were relying on the funding by prime funds had to find other institutions that would be willing to lend to them. Government funds, which received large inflows, had to place the additional funds they had received, for example into Treasury or agency securities or into repo. Such a large change in funding flows could have created significant movements in money market interest rates. The good news is that the ON RRP facility served as a shock absorber for overnight rates. As shown in (Figure 6), money market funds, particularly government funds, increased their use of ON RRP during the transition. Because of the availability of ON RRP, government funds knew they would be able to temporarily place some of the new funding they received at the ON RRP facility while they were looking for new investment opportunities, and prime funds knew they would have access to a very secure and liquid overnight investment as they increased their liquidity to meet an uncertain level of redemptions.

The initial measures announced so far by the United States and then China only cover about 1% of global imports and should have limited direct effects on inflation and activity. But they have logically triggered retaliation by other countries or regions and the risk of an escalating and global trade war is no longer unthinkable. The classical analysis of the macroeconomic impact of higher trade tariffs treats it as a negative supply shock involving a trade-off between lower output and higher prices, at least in the short run. Studies that use this rather mechanical approach tend to find significant but still relatively limited effects. The IMF, for example, has examined the fairly severe scenario of a global rise in tariffs that causes a 10% increase in import prices but conclude that this would only lead to a 15% fall in global trade and a drop of around 2% in world GDP after 3 years. Page 4 sur 5 This type of analysis, in my view, seriously underestimates the possible effects because it ignores the shock to confidence through two channels. Firstly, uncertainty can increase risk aversion in financial markets and reduce the supply of credit. Second, a loss of business confidence can deter investment. Both uncertainty channels would tend to depress demand. What’s more, they can be front-loaded and occur before any trade restrictions come into effect. Indeed the damage can be done even if no additional trade restrictions are actually imposed. A good example of outcomes before the facts is Brexit.
Food inflation increased mainly on account of price increases on cereals, selected vegetable, beef products, and fish due to seasonal supply factors. However, non-food inflation slowed down on account of the Kwacha exchange rate appreciation against the US dollar during the period under review. Money supply and domestic credit 6. Preliminary estimates indicate that broad money (M3), comprehensively defined to include foreign currency deposits, increased by 2.5% (September 2010, rose by 7.9%) to K18,477.0 billion in December 2010 from K18,018.4 billion in September 2010. This growth in M3 was below the quarterly projection of 3.2%. 7. The outturn in M3 was largely due to an increase in Net Domestic Assets (NDA) by 10.3% reflecting increased lending to Government. However, Net Foreign Assets (NFA) declined by 7.9% mainly on account of a 1.3% decrease in gross international reserves to US $ million as at end-December 2010, coupled with 1.2% appreciation of the Kwacha against the United States dollar. 8. On an annual basis, M3 growth increased to 30.8% in December 2010 from 32.8% in September 2010. This outturn was due to the rise in NFA by 40.1% (September 2010, fell by 6.9%) primarily on account of an increase in gross international reserves. The NDA rose by a lower margin of 25.6% compared with the rise of 94.6% recorded in September 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  9.

The volume of ATM transactions also increased by 5.1% to 6,654,992 (third quarter 2010: 6,333,073). Similarly, the value increased by 17.1% to K3,397.3 billion (third quarter 2010: K2,897.6 billion). 50. The total volume of cheques returned unpaid on account of insufficiently funded accounts increased by 5.4% to 4,428 (third quarter 2010: 4,202) cheques while the value decreased by 8% to K36.2 billion (third quarter 2010: K35.3 billion). The Bank would like to urge members of the public to always ensure that they fund their accounts sufficiently whenever they issue cheques. This will ensure that they do not face criminal charges under the National Payment Systems Act for bouncing cheques dishonestly or with intent to defraud. Economic programme 51. A follow-up International Monetary Fund (IMF) Mission visited the country from 28th October to 3rd November 2010 to conclude discussions for the 5th Review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. The mission had fruitful discussions with the Zambian authorities and reached agreement on a set of macroeconomic policies and structural measures for the remainder of 2010 and 2011. 52. The IMF Executive Board meeting was held on 10th December 2010 and completed the fifth review of Zambia’s economic programme. This resulted in the immediate disbursement of an amount equivalent to SDR 18.395 million (about US $ million), bringing total disbursements under the ECF arrangement to SDR 201.7 million (about US $ million). 53. The IMF mission commended the authorities for Zambia’s economic prospects that have continued to improve as well as for having sound macroeconomic policies.