samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Last year, the Shenzhen Municipal People's Government issued offshore RMB municipal government bonds in Hong Kong for the first time, testifying to our strength as a platform for issuing RMB bonds, including green bonds, enriching the product range of the local dim sum market and paving the way for other municipal or provincial governments to follow. We will actively promote Hong Kong’s bond market to markets that are looking to strengthen their ties with China, and attract sovereigns and other issuers from these regions to arrange and issue bonds in Hong Kong. The third way we can expand our offshore RMB market is by enhancing our own financial infrastructure. At the core of this effort is the HKMA’s programme to develop the Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) into a major international central securities depository (ICSD) in Asia, to better support the connectivity between the Mainland and international  financial markets in cross-border clearing, settlement and custodian operations.

The Bank more than welcomes a more competitive payment landscape. We desire new entrees. We are not in the business of protecting the incumbents. We also do not pick winners and losers. The market will decide those who will prosper. Existing players were given this notice long time ago. Banks especially, will have to reinvent themselves or risk being disrupted. What matters most, from the public policy perspective, is that Malaysian businesses and consumers will benefit from a more vibrant, competitive and efficient ecosystem. We should expect 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  enhanced competition to spur innovation in the products and services that are being offered. Globally, we have seen collaborative strategies emerging as a response to the changing market dynamics. From Scandinavia to Asia, banks in some countries are increasingly competing on a united front. This includes industry partnerships with the payment system operator and fintech firms. In these markets, collaboration on common mobile applications seeks to enable banks to develop more innovative use cases by leveraging on pooled R&D resources, and facilitate mass adoption through common awareness and promotion campaigns. Collaborative efforts enable greater economies of scale through the pooling of resources. Establishing a common platform among banks defrays the cost of testing out new technologies and new ways of doing business. This can go a long way in fostering a culture of experimentation. Collaborative strategies will enhance the probability of success. This is the essence of the merger between MEPS and MyClear. Maintaining the status quo is simply not an option.
We do know that as of now many people expect working from home to remain more common after the Covid pandemic is over. Half of new remote workers say they would like to continue to work from home all or most of the time even when lifting restrictions permits a return to normal working patterns (Felstead and Reuschke, 2020). Employers in some sectors also expect the proportion of staff that regularly work from home to more than double (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 2020 and DMP, 2021)1, and many contacts of the Bank’s Agents expect a hybrid model of two to three days a week spent in the workplace to become the “new normal” for office workers. What is the evidence so far for the impact of Covid on productivity and investment? Here we can turn to the information that comes from the regular surveys of the Bank’s Decision Maker Panel (DMP) (Bloom et al., 2020). Labour productivity in the UK tends to be pro-cyclical. This does not appear to be the case in the Covid shock. So far during the pandemic labour productivity per hour appears to have risen, but with a tendency to reduce over time (Chart 2). There is, however, a lot more going on under the surface. There The February 2021 Decision Maker Panel survey asked businesses for the first time about what proportion of their employees’ time was spent working remotely, both pre- and during Covid, as well as their long-term expectations.

Employment, total hours worked and unemployment all tend to be highly persistent, so a rise in unemployment means – based on history – that it will be higher a year from now. That said, the UK labour market has adjusted relatively quickly to large shocks in the past (Broadbent, 2012). In normal times, around 9% of workers change jobs every year, but the tendency to persistence provides evidence from the past of the effects of a mismatch between the skills of job seekers and those required by hiring firms. As I noted earlier, some of the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic employ more young and low-skilled workers, who may find it hard to move between sectors (Haldane, 2020). That difficulty will be amplified if the jobs involve different tasks. Bank staff have analysed the task content of different jobs to quantify the extent of task reallocation required in various scenarios. In a relatively extreme scenario where the pattern of consumer spending is unchanged from 2020 Q3, staff estimate that the extent of the task reallocation over coming years would be higher than in the recent past, but much less than occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. That was a period of 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  significant structural change during which the share of employees working in the manufacturing sector fell from 26% to 16%. There are two important points I would emphasise here.
Central clearing: reaping the benefits, controlling the risks. Banque de France Financial Stability Review No. 21, April 2017 - The impact of financial reforms 97. Cole, S., Kanz, M., & Klapper, L. (2015). Incentivizing calculated risk‐taking: evidence from an experiment with commercial bank loan officers. The Journal of Finance, 70(2), 537-575. Cont, R., & Schaanning, E. (2017). Fire sales, indirect contagion and systemic stress testing. Norges Bank Working Paper. Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., Strahan, P. E., & Tehranian, H. (2011). Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), 297-312. Crockett, A. (1996). The theory and practice of financial stability. De Economist, 144(4), 531-568. Crowe, C., Dell’Ariccia, G., Igan, D., & Rabanal, P. (2013). How to deal with real estate booms: Lessons from country experiences. Journal of Financial Stability, 9(3), 300-319. Cunliffe, J. (2017). Ten years on: Lessons from Northern Rock. Speech at the Single Resolution Board Annual Conference, Brussels. Dagher, J., Dell’Ariccia, G., Laeven, L., Ratnovski, L., & Tong, H. (2016). Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital. Staff discussion Note 16/04, International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC. Dal Bó, E. (2006). Regulatory capture: a review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2), 203-225. Demekas, M. D. G. (2015). Designing effective macroprudential stress tests: progress so far and the way forward (No. 15-146). International Monetary Fund. DeMiguel, V., Garlappi, L., & Uppal, R. (2007). Optimal versus naive diversification: How inefficient is the 1/N portfolio strategy? The Review of Financial Studies, 22(5), 1915-1953. Demirguc-Kunt, A., Detragiache E. & Merrouche O. (2010).

Table 4: Target hit rate, calibration of individual and combined regulatory tools and resulting false alarm rate  Target Hit Rate (%)  LR Calibration  RWCR  NSFR  False Alarm Rate for  Calibration  Calibration  Combined Regulation (%)  70  3.82  5.52  0.63  29.3  75  3.80  5.52  0.72  36.6  80  4.15  5.52  0.63  39.0  85  3.71  5.52  0.83  51.2  90  4.07  5.53  0.83  53.7  24  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  24  At a target hit rate of 70%, a portfolio of regulatory measures does little better than the leverage ratio on its own in signalling bank stress. At targeted hit rates of over 80%, however, that picture changes. The ROC curve for the regulatory portfolio lies to the left of all those corresponding to individual metrics. In other words, it is possible to achieve lower false alarm rates, for the same hit rate, when multiple regulatory metrics are used. The calibration of each metric in the portfolio is also less stringent than the calibration for each metric individually. These results hold when comparing any pair of regulatory metrics with individual metrics – a higher hit rate per false alarm rate, with less stringent calibrations. It also holds even more strongly in the wider 96-bank sample when the LTD ratio is considered instead of the NSFR (Chart 19).
But it also means we have a long way yet to go in reducing debts and returning to sustainable growth. 5. We are also seeing important shifts in the structure of global finance, besides the gradual contraction in global liquidity. It is too early to say where we will be five years from now, but some of the broad brush-strokes in this new landscape of global finance are already with us and likely to stay: •  The return on equity in global banking has fallen, and will not return to pre-crisis levels, given stricter capital and liquidity rules. •  Deposits have become more important as a source of bank funding. •  Banks in certain major jurisdictions have retreated from global markets, and worryingly, and may stay in retreat for some time. •  The securitised debt markets should recover, but with less leverage underpinning them, and hopefully greater risk transparency. •  In the derivative markets, there will be greater standardisation of products, and much greater reliance on common market infrastructure – for trading, clearing and reporting of trades. High volume, low-margin platforms will likely gain in competitiveness. •  Wealth management will remain a growth industry, especially in Asia, where the pool of wealth is growing most rapidly and the need for diversification remains great. •  And outside of intermediated finance, companies will seek new ways of raising funds, including through private placements. 6. Will this mean a safer financial world? Maybe.

Secondly, at the regional level, we have to inject greater momentum into improving crossborder market access and harmonising rules and standards. Key themes in the development of Asia’s financial markets 13. Let me now touch on three themes that will influence the development of Asia’s financial markets in the decade ahead: i.  Firstly, the changes in the OTC derivatives markets as a result of global reforms;  ii. Secondly, the harnessing of technology to transform Asia’s financial infrastructure; and  iii. Thirdly, the increasing international role of the RMB. 1  For example, South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. 2  Namely the US, Japan, France, peripheral Europe. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I. Structural shifts in the OTC derivatives markets as a result of global reforms  14. First, the structural shift in the global OTC derivatives markets. Most of you will be familiar with the changes that are coming into place, in steps, as a result of global reforms – more standardised products, and more robust market infrastructure: central counterparties for clearing, trade repositories for reporting, swap execution facilities for trading where appropriate. The global reform process is now shifting from rulemaking to implementation. 15. We are already seeing the shift in Asia’s OTC derivative markets. The new market infrastructures are expected to provide greater transparency and allow risks to be managed more effectively among market participants. Market practices will be redefined, with the need to report and clear selected OTC derivative trades within more than one jurisdictions. 16.
You may remember that in the quarters that followed the invasion of Ukraine, growth prospects were regularly revised downwards, as our European economy suffered in particular from high energy prices, fear of a shortage in energy sources, and hence general uncertainty - and even worries about how we would get through the winter. Europe reacted swiftly, diversifying its sources of energy supply, and global market prices decreased sharply, especially from the fourth quarter of 2022. In the end, the euro area economy expanded by 3.6% in 2022, still higher than in the US, despite a slowdown in the second half. The likelihood of a recession in 2023 is now very remote, and growth prospects have even been revised upwards, to 1.0% in 20231 (up by 0.5 percentage point compared with December forecasts), before rebounding to 1.6% in 2024 and 2025. Faced with a historic geopolitical and economic shock, Europe has shown remarkable resilience, and greater unity. Euro area inflation further accelerated after the invasion of Ukraine, but the outlook for 2023 and beyond has also recently improved – although with mixed news. On the one hand, the earlier-than-expected easing in energy prices has led to a decrease in headline inflation since October 2022, from 10.6% to 6.9% in March2 – though this level is obviously still far too high. We also expect tensions on food prices, which have soared since 2022, to start fading from the third quarter of 2023, in the wake of the recent sharp decrease on international markets.

You  can already refer to our report published in November 2021 for the key findings from our first nine experiments. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
However, without a well-designed infrastructure of useful and timely data and improved analytical tools – which would be expected to continue to evolve over time – these tasks will only be more difficult. We look forward to continued discussion of these issues and to a development of a shared agenda for improving our information sources. I would be happy to answer any questions you might have. This BIS Review is available on the BIS website at www.bis.org. 20  BIS Review 16/2010

Barbro Wickman-Parak: The Riksbank and the property market Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Fastighetsdagen 2008, Stockholm, 14 May 2008. *  *  *  Subprime loans in the United States were the origins of the deep-seated tensions in the international financial markets, which have not yet relinquished their grip after almost a year. The problems in the subprime market are an important reason behind the collapse in housing construction and the falling house prices, which have made a profound impression on the real economy in the United States. In some other countries, too, the earlier sharp rises in property prices have slowed down and been replaced by falling prices. Here in Sweden we have so far been spared these events. How does the Riksbank view future developments in the property market and what stance does the Bank's monetary policy take in relation to asset prices? Today I will address these questions. I will also briefly comment on the recent developments in the financial markets. Several countries have experienced rapidly rising house prices, for instance the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as Denmark, Ireland and Spain. Recently there has been a slowdown in the rate of increase and in some of these countries house prices are now falling. In the United States house prices have fallen by around 10 per cent since the peak in 2006 (see figure 1). In Sweden, too, house prices have risen rapidly, even more so than in the United States.
4 This is what I mean when I say that we need more advanced methods than studying pairwise plots, in order to try to come to grips with what the correlation actual looks like. In this context, it can be interesting to mention that a few fresh contributions to the debate originate from the School of Business here at Örebro University, where Sune Karlsson and Pär Österholm have estimated Phillips curves for the US and Sweden respectively in terms of inflation and unemployment. For Sweden during the period 1995–2017, the Phillips curve has, perhaps not so surprisingly, been found not to have been stable over time. It is also found that the Phillips curve,  3  See, for example, Kinnwall and Rune (2018). 4 See for example Blanchard (2016), Cunliffe (2017) and Murphy (2018). 8 [16]  specified in this way, has not become flatter in recent years. The Phillips curve has also been found to have been unstable for the US. It appears to have been flatter in 2005–2013 but thereafter to have had a clearer negative slope. It should be understood that economic research helps to improve our knowledge in that findings from many different quarters are thrashed out and hopefully eventually all point in a particular direction. Findings have so far varied a great deal. Off and on, the Phillips curve has been said to be dead, still alive but flatter than before or about the same as usual.

The activities and practices at large, complex financial organizations are simply too intricate and evolve too quickly to be fully described ex ante in regulation. Banking supervision works in concert with regulation as the more flexible element of banking policy. Supervisory policy and standards can, and do, evolve over time to reflect the evolution in practice in the banking industry and in financial markets. Overall, supervisors are guided by the mandate to identify any practices or conditions at supervised firms that are a threat to the safety and soundness of those firms – and, of course, to ensure that the firms take all necessary steps to promptly remediate any such conditions. Critically, the definition of what constitutes “safe and sound” is not hard-coded into regulation, but is guided by the information and analysis done by supervisors and other Federal Reserve staff, such as economists, attorneys and market analysts. Supervisory expectations and standards are expressed through public guidance such as Supervision and Regulation Letters (SR Letters), publicly-posted examination manuals and other guidance. On a day-to-day basis, banking supervisors collect information on financial institutions through examinations and analysis. Examiners look at key aspects of a supervised firm’s businesses and risk management functions. They use this information to assess the adequacy of the firm’s systems and processes for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling risks at the firm and in the financial sector more generally. That said, the ultimate responsibility for risk identification and risk management remains with the supervised institution.
Either the banking system needs to run with inefficiently large positive cycleneutral CCyBs or we need to make the buffer placed just below the CCyB in the capital stack – that is, the Capital Conservation Buffer (CCoB) – releasable. Therefore the flexibility to release the CCoB would supplement shortfalls in the CCyB if the shock occurs at a time when the CCyB has not been sufficiently built up, without forcing jurisdictions to run with inefficiently high levels of CCyB that might be rarely necessary. This would also reflect jurisdictions’ preferences revealed during the pandemic for a larger portion of releasable buffers. In response to the Covid-19 shock, multiple jurisdictions – some of them after having released the CCyB – took additional actions to release more capital, such as lowering systemic buffers or some elements of Pillar 2 requirements. [9] Releasing a great portion of capital buffers naturally means that firms are allowed to get closer to minimum requirements. But if firms perceive that buffers are not usable in an economic downturn and that they need to stay well above minima they will do so by cutting lending or fire selling assets. Those behaviours typically lead to an amplification of losses that firms need to absorb during the stress and, therefore, will ultimately hurt the banking system itself. With appropriate controls, making the CCoB releasable will enhance also the resilience of the banking system.

Usually you would expect faster growth to be accompanied by stronger employment growth, and vice versa (Chart 1) – an empirical fact so robust that 1  economists know it as Okun’s Law. Since the financial crisis, however, this law has, if not broken down, at least started working rather differently than before. Unemployment has fallen far more, and employment growth has been far stronger, than might have been expected given the subdued pace of GDP growth (Chart 2). Chart 1: GDP and employment growth 12  Per cent  Four quarter employment growth Four quarter GDP growth  10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 1972  1  1977  1982  1987  1992  1997  2002  2007  2012  2017  Okun, Arthur M. "Potential GNP, its measurement and significance". Cowles Foundation, Yale University, 1962 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  Chart 2: Okun’s Law and the financial crisis 4  Change in unemployment  1971-2010 2011-2018  3 2 1 0 -6  -4  -2  0  2  4  6  8  10  -1 -2 -3 -4 Arithmetically this is accounted for by a fall in the rate of labour productivity growth. Having grown steadily for a number of decades, the level of productivity fell sharply following the financial crisis. That was in line with 2  historical experience.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Regional economic conditions Starting with the area’s economy, one of the greatest challenges in the City over the past year has been the massive disruption and destruction caused by Superstorm Sandy. While areas of the New York City metropolitan region were hard hit by the storm, the devastation was particularly severe along the waterfronts of Queens – and in particular in Far Rockaway. We saw and heard about the devastation of the storm first-hand from many of those affected, through a series of support clinics that we held in the storm’s immediate aftermath, as well as from many of our own employees who lived in some of the hardest hit areas. The good news is that a little more than one-year later there has been a significant rebound in employment and economic activity across the five boroughs. New York City has continued to see pretty solid job creation through this past summer, and, in stark contrast with past economic expansions, this is happening without any direct contribution from the securities industry – or, more colloquially, Wall Street. So far this year, the city’s job gains have been broad-based, led by strong growth in industries such as education and health, advertising, computer services, leisure and hospitality, wholesale and retail trade, and, especially, construction.

Concluding remarks In closing, I would like to return to our decision of 15 January. Discontinuing the minimum exchange rate and reducing interest rates further are monetary policy measures for which there are no better alternatives. As I outlined previously, since the introduction of the minimum exchange rate in September 2011, the international currency relationships have changed fundamentally. In view of this development, a minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro was no longer sustainable. Over the long term, adhering to the minimum exchange rate would have jeopardised the SNB’s ability to conduct monetary policy and fulfil its mandate in future. This would have saddled the Swiss economy with longer-term costs that would have been out of all proportion to the benefits of continuing to enforce the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. With the international low interest rate environment, monetary policy faces big challenges. Overall, the Swiss franc is significantly overvalued. Negative interest helps to make investments in Swiss francs less attractive and thereby correct this overvaluation over time. The SNB will continue to take account of the exchange rate situation, and its impact on inflation and economic developments, in formulating its monetary policy. It will therefore remain active in the foreign exchange market, as necessary, in order to influence monetary conditions. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches