samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  BIS Review 130/2010  models, 3 principal component methods 4 or models where one estimates a flexible-price output gap. 5 Resource utilisation can also be measured by the employment rate, unemployment and other measures. I will return to a number of these measures later. What has happened to GDP in connection with the crisis? During the years prior to the financial crisis, productivity growth in Sweden was rapid. At earlier conferences here in Saltsjöbaden, I have pointed to possible causes of the rapid growth in productivity. 6 Examples of structural causes are deregulation of product markets, increased competition through globalisation, increased use of information technology or – the theme of this year’s conference – a rising level of education and a changed work structure. However, productivity also varies over the business cycle. In June 2007 – before the financial crisis began – our assessment was that productivity growth would be lower in the coming years. But we did not foresee that productivity would fall as heavily as it did. In June 2007, we were assuming that productivity would increase by a total of around 5 per cent during the years 2008 and 2009. Instead, it fell by around 5 per cent. The main reason for this fall was an exceptionally steep decline in demand. GDP fell by a total of 5.5 per cent during the years 2008 and 2009, instead of increasing by an almost equivalent percentage, as predicted.

There is no simple link between one measure of resource utilisation and one measure of inflation. Resource utilisation can instead be measured in several ways, each of which has its strengths and weaknesses. Inflation can also be measured in a number of ways and we regularly utilise a large number of measures  13  For a more detailed discussion see Adolfson, M. and Söderström, U. (2003) “How is the economy affected by the inflation target?” Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 1/2003. 14  The HICP is the EU-harmonised consumer price index and largely corresponds to the CPIF, but is not affected by weighting changes at the end of each year. BIS Review 130/2010  7  of underlying inflation. In this multi-faceted world, we make the best assessments we can of the direction of monetary policy. At the latest monetary policy meeting on 1 September, we decided to raise the repo rate by 0.25 percentage points to 0.75 per cent, and our assessment was that the repo rate will gradually be increased to more normal levels as resource utilisation increases. The repo rate will nevertheless be abnormally low for some time to come in order to support the recovery in the economy. I supported the forecast for the repo rate made in the latest Monetary Policy Update – a forecast that I believe is well in line with the picture of a stable economic upturn in Sweden. (Figure 14. Repo rate).
The financial crisis has made the link between the Riksbank's two areas of activity – conducting monetary policy and safeguarding financial stability – very clear. The fact that financial stability is a necessary condition for monetary policy to function efficiently is fairly self-evident, but it is not perhaps something one thinks about as long as everything is functioning normally. But now that the financial markets are no longer functioning efficiently, this link becomes more important. As a result of the uncertainty and distrust prevailing between the banks and other financial institutions, the interest rates paid by the general public are higher than normal, seen in relation to the repo rate. Access to credit is also declining. The economic situation is therefore tightening more than the current level of the repo rate would normally allow. The crisis may also, if it is not counteracted, have significantly negative effects on inflation and growth. It affects the banks’ loan losses to some extent, which in turn has significance for financial stability. We need measures regarding both financial stability and monetary policy to resolve the confidence crisis causing a gridlock in the credit markets and to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis on the Swedish economy. The most recent measure taken was the interest rate cut of 1.75 percentage points to 2 per cent last week, when we also brought forward the meeting we would have held on 17 December.

For example, in Chile, if it were determined that housing prices are distorted and lenders are not correctly internalizing this distortion, then the Superintendent of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) has the authority to increase provisions and capital requirements on housing loans. Addressing the risks that arise from expanding cross border debt requires, at the very least, that existing prudential regulation ensure that funding liquidity risk is dealt with adequately by financial intermediaries. Often, however, this may simply lead to a transfer of this risk to the non-financial sector. Hence, there remains a role for a foreign currency liquidity buffer made up of international reserves. Vulnerabilities regarding currency risk that often come hand in hand with increased foreign debt, merit special attention. In the past we have seen many crises originating from the accumulation of unhedged foreign currency debt in banks and non-financial corporations. This was one of the main amplifiers of the Chilean banking crisis of the early 1980s – where firms in the domestic sector built up substantial amounts of dollar-denominated debt during a period of fixed exchange rates and capital account opening. It was also an important factor in the Mexican crisis of 1995, in the Asian crisis, and more recently in financial problems in some Eastern European countries. On the other hand, low currency mismatches allowed the central banks of many EMEs to lower interest rates aggressively as a response to falling demand during the crisis. In the past there was fear of exchange rate depreciation because of currency mismatches.
Heng Swee Keat: New strategies for new economic realities Remarks by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 16th Annual World Islamic Banking Conference, Bahrain, 7 December 2009. *  *  *  H.E. Governor Rasheed M. Al Maraj, Central Bank of Bahrain, H.E. Aset O. Issekeshev, Minister of Industry and Trade, Republic of Kazakhstan, Your Excellencies Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen 1. Good morning. I am honoured to speak at this plenary session of the 16th World Islamic Banking Conference. Global crisis and recovery 2. The theme of “New Strategies for New Economic Realities” is timely. Last year, the financial crisis that enveloped the world was unprecedented in scale, complexity and speed of transmission. Major financial institutions have failed and others continue to face significant challenges ahead. 3. The outlook seems better now than a year ago. Equity markets have rallied and credit spreads narrowed. Many Asian and GCC economies have recovered more quickly and strongly than expected with China and India leading the way. ASEAN-5 and GCC countries are expected to post small positive growth in 2009. Going into 2010, growth in ASEAN-5 and GCC is estimated to rebound sharply to 4% and 5.2% respectively. 4. However, sentiments remain volatile and investors react sharply to bad news, as recent events have shown. The global de-leveraging of financial institutions is still on-going.

It will be a more diverse and vibrant landscape in the future. BIS Review 163/2009  1  8. However, growth is not to be taken for granted. Many challenges remain. Let me suggest three areas where policy makers and financial practitioners in the Middle East and Asia can work together to contribute to growth and development. 9. First, at the recently-concluded APEC meetings in Singapore, it was recognised that sustainable global growth will require structural reforms and a new growth paradigm. We can no longer rely on export-led growth in developing countries and high consumption in the developed world driven by excessive leverage and asset appreciation. Big economies like China and India have greater scope to restructure their economies and raise domestic demand. Smaller economies such as Singapore and Bahrain have to re-orientate themselves and respond nimbly to new opportunities in global markets. 10. In both the GCC and Asian regions, the funding needs to support growth and development are large. For instance, the Asian Development Bank has projected that Asia requires $ trillion of new infrastructure over the next decade. Such investments are important for economic growth, as well as for raising the quality of life by providing better access to education, health care and sanitation. Hence, as part of the structural reforms, governments need to put in place investment frameworks that promote and mitigate the risk of such long term investments. 11. Second, proper financing structure for such investment is crucial. Today, there is strong risk appetite for emerging market assets.
Assimilating the long-term view that price stability requires is harder for the political power, which may have incentives to prioritise shorter-term considerations tied to the electoral cycle. The grounds for the independence of central banks are thus general interest considerations. Firstly there is the belief that such independence benefits society far more than if the powers were to be directly assumed by the political authority. And further is that fact that the legitimacy resulting from this independence is conferred by a decision of the State’s highest political institutions (parliaments). Independence must of course go hand in hand with guarantees as to the professional competency and personal integrity of the members of the independent body, especially of its 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  senior officers, and controls over, and accountability for, their actions. Control and accountability are also crucial to adequate institutional quality. Yet aside from independent central banks being an example of effective institutional design when it comes to incorporating long-term considerations into our democratic societies, I wish to use my address to outline three complementary matters. These are, in my view, essential to encouraging the public authorities to include these long-term considerations in economic policy decision-making, and how independent institutions such as the Banco de España can make a decisive contribution. An assessment culture to launch us forward The first of these three matters stems from the incorporation of an ongoing and thorough publicpolicy assessment culture.

Pablo Hernández de Cos: Long-term considerations in economic policy. The role of evidenced-based policies Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the acceptance of the 2021 Gran Cruz al Mérito en el Servicio de la Economía awarded to the Bank of Spain by the Consejo General de Economistas, Madrid, 19 October 2021. * * * I would like to begin by thanking the Consejo General de Economistas (Spanish General Council of Economists), its Chair, Valentín Pich, and, above all, the members of the panel for awarding the Banco de España the Gran Cruz al Mérito en el Servicio de la Economía(Grand Cross of Merit in Service to the Economy). This honour is an acknowledgement of all of us who work at the Banco de España; of the constant dedication and drive to always provide Spanish society with the utmost value, but especially during these uncertain times after the unprecedented economic impact stemming from the pandemic. With no complacency whatsoever, and mindful of the work ahead, this award shows us that we are on the right track towards achieving our goal of being an outstanding and dynamic central bank committed to society. This commitment is underpinned by a set of fundamental values that pervade the Banco de España’s culture and are reflected in our Strategic Plan: independence, transparency, public service, integrity and excellence.
I have, since those events, heard two views that, as a central banker responsible for financial stability, give me considerable concern. The first is that there was ‘nothing really to see here’. After a brief period of disruption, understandable given the nature of the shock, markets returned to normal and indeed were able to support the economy through the pandemic. Implicit in that view, of course, is that absent central bank intervention markets would have returned to order and stability. I simply do not believe that is the case. One cannot of course know for certain what would have happened if central banks had stood aside. But by the time central banks were forced to step in, market flows had become almost entirely one way. In a period of huge uncertainty, once the flight to safety had become a dash for cash, there was no-one other than central banks able and willing to step in to catch the falling knife. Absent the massive intervention I described above, core markets would have continued to seize up and the liquidity crunch would have become worse. Indeed, though concerned with bank rather than market liquidity, the experience of the Great Financial Crisis was certainly that once powerful and adverse liquidity dynamics set in, they do not go away by themselves. The second view that gives me some concern is that in a severe shock, in a tail event, it is the role of central banks to underpin market liquidity.

Intermediaries reported being relatively unaffected by the increase in margin calls in March 2020. Even for those intermediaries that experienced the largest increases in margin outflows relative to liquidity resources, the proportion of their liquidity resources this represented remained relatively small, amidst unprecedented central bank interventions to support liquidity. The picture on clients is more varied and the data less reliable. But there was evidence that some clients faced liquidity needs materially greater than anticipated. And turning high quality assets into cash to meet margin requirements was a problem for some participants. Drawing on the findings in the report, CPMI, IOSCO and the BCBS have consulted on six potential areas for further work. I will group these under three heading: procyclicality; transparency; and preparedness. First, we need to ensure that the necessary pro-cyclicality of margin does not add unnecessarily to a systemic stress. On variation margin, this means tackling the issue on predictability and preparedness identified but also considering ways toward more efficient collection and distribution of variation margin around the system. On initial margin, it means looking at the trade-off between levels of margin in business as usual. This is why we have proposed an in-depth evaluation of the responsiveness of centrally cleared initial margin models to market stresses, with a focus on impacts and implications for CCP resources and the wider financial system.
For example, clothing and footwear, audiovisual equipment, furniture and white goods have shown very strong price declines. Low prices for imported consumer goods, combined with high prices for our commodity exports, have resulted in a strong improvement in Norway’s terms of trade. Since 2002, the terms of trade have  4  BIS Review 28/2007  improved by about 40 per cent. A similar situation has not been seen since World War I, when earnings in the shipping industry and other export industries were exceptionally high for a period. The supply of foreign labour has increased markedly after EU enlargement in 2004. Over the past two years, these labour inflows have accounted for more than 30 per cent of growth in our labour force. Norwegian companies have also been able to be considerably bolder in undertaking new assignments and investments knowing that they can procure labour throughout Europe. In addition to increased labour inflows from Poland, Lithuania and other central European countries, we have long benefited from inflows of labour from Sweden. Many workers are on temporary assignment and their consumption is primarily concentrated in their home country. The Norwegian economy has seen a net capacity increase. Inward labour migration delayed the fall in unemployment in this expansion. It has also reduced bottlenecks in the economy and curbed the impact of the fall in unemployment on wage growth. Labour inflows have also had a dampening effect on wage growth, probably because the wage level of foreign workers is somewhat lower than for Norwegian labour.

Svein Gjedrem: The economic outlook in Norway Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to invited foreign embassy representatives, Norges Bank, Oslo, 22 March 2007. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 15 March, Monetary Policy Report 1/07 and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all, I would like to welcome you to Norges Bank. This event gives me an opportunity to discuss developments in the Norwegian economy and to present Norges Bank’s view of the economic outlook for Norway. It also gives us an occasion to discuss other issues of mutual interest in an informal setting. The Norwegian economy has been affected by several positive supply-side shocks over the last decade. I am thinking in terms of the effects from increased global trade and freer flow of labour across national borders. I want to discuss how these shocks have had an impact on economic growth and inflation. These shocks have also affected prices in the Norwegian housing market, and they have had a strong impact on the income from the petroleum sector and thereby the transfer of funds to the Norwegian petroleum fund.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Talent management, the new paradigm Opening remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the AIF (The Asian Institute of Finance) International Symposium 2011, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2011. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to speak at this inaugural AIF International Symposium 2011 on Talent Management, the New Paradigm. While I may not be here in person, I am most certainly here in my commitment to this Symposium on the enhancement of human capacity in the financial services industry. Importance of human capital development Significant new trends continue to reshape the financial services industry. In this recent two decades, the intensification of the globalisation process, the advancement in technology and the unprecedented consequences of the global financial and economic crisis have contributed to these changes. While the global economy is now on a recovery path, several challenges continue to remain. The focus of the crises affected countries have been on the immediate term challenges involving the resumption of the functioning of financial markets and the financial intermediation process while supporting the overall economic growth. As part of the response to the crisis, is the financial regulatory reform both at the national and international level. This has also been reinforced by a tightening of the supervisory oversight. These cumulative developments are also dramatically transforming the financial landscape of the international and national financial systems. The future has therefore become more complex, uncertain, unfamiliar and more ambiguous.

Ladies and gentlemen, Weaknesses in risk governance have been one of the major cause for the recent global financial crisis. Until now, risk governance remains a work in progress as evident from the recent money laundering control failures experienced by some big financial institutions in developed economies. The theme for this year’s conference, the “Risk, Governance & SelfRegulation: Within and Beyond”, is not only timely but also an ongoing self-reflection for all of us. The organisers have also impressed upon me that this year theme is a continuation of 2012 theme of “Compliance, Challenges and Effectiveness: The next level”. After the efforts in putting in place the appropriate risk management framework, it is time for us to ask ourselves the following questions: Have we done enough on risk and governance? And can we do it better? Sound risk management is fundamental to preserve the integrity of the financial system and there has been increased attention given to this area. In my remarks today, I intend to focus on the following key points and highlight initiatives undertaken by Bank Negara Malaysia to strategically support financial sectors’ governance and self-regulation in preventing the risks related to financial crime. Firstly, the risks and its importance in setting the context: Secondly, the governance and risk culture; and thirdly, self-regulation. Risks and its importance in setting the context In principle, money laundering and terrorism financing risks are no different than other type of risks facing businesses.
ways to delink reserves creation from monetary policies and exchange rate management appear promising and, although very complicated, should be encouraged. These are extremely difficult issues. But I want to pay tribute to the leadership taken by Korea on this question during its G20 Presidency. Conclusion To conclude, I would like to outline what I see as the main lessons central banks should draw from the crisis. First, financial crises are a pervasive feature of modern capitalism. While the exact timing of a crisis is hard to predict, situations of financial fragility, when some sectors have increased their debt and leverage in parallel to asset prices, reduce the resilience of financial systems to asset price reversals. Second, timely and determined interventions of central banks can quench the thirst of financial markets for liquidity and limit the spill over of liquidity squeezes to the real economy. Central banks have demonstrated that their international cooperation could be relied upon even under extreme stress in financial markets that have become integrated at the global level. Third, central banks should both prepare to manage future financial crises and design their policies in order to minimise the risks of future financial crises. For the least, central banks should avoid that their policies stimulate potential excessive risk taking, which although benign in good times, increase the scale of insolvency in the event of an asset price reversal. This is the best way to limit the risks to price stability over the longer run. Thank you for your attention.

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