samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a result, funding costs for households and businesses in the major economies have risen as banks continue to tighten credit standards, which is not positive for growth. On account of this, global growth prospects seem to have further weakened, while the decline in oil price have helped ease concerns about global inflation. Future direction of the oil price, however, is still very much uncertain. The global economy and conditions in the global financial markets, therefore, have become more challenging, and they are likely to have important implications for emerging markets through the usual trade and financial channels. This is, therefore, an important area that we need to pay close attention to in the next few months. Under the current global setting, a decline in oil price will be positive for emerging markets like Thailand, and as a group, the growth prospect of emerging markets should remain satisfactory given their abilities to support domestic demand. But questions remain about individual economies on how resilient they would be in the face of such shocks, including the banking sector. In the Thai case, our assessment is that the Thai banking sector is strong enough to weather the current turmoil. This conclusion is supported by the following five important reasons. First and foremost is the low direct exposure that the Thai banking sector has to sub-prime credit and CDO. CDO exposure of Thai banks at the second quarter of last year was less than 0.3 percent of total asset.

Bandid Nijathaworn: How strong are Thai banks to weather the turmoil? Keynote address by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Fitch Thailand’s 2008 Annual Conference, 10 September 2008. *  *  *  Thank you, Chairman. First, let me thank Fitch Thailand for the invitation to address this year’s conference as a keynote speaker. Our topic this morning is “How strong are Thai banks to weather the turmoil?” My answer is short and simple: Thai banks are strong enough to weather the current global turmoil. The sector is also well positioned to support the economy. This is the message I gave six weeks ago when we had a press briefing at the Bank of Thailand. Although conditions in the global economy and financial markets have changed somewhat since then, it is the same message of resiliency and strength that I want to echo to you this morning. I agree with the two previous speakers that global financial market conditions and growth prospects have further weakened especially in the past two months. In financial markets, we continue to see falling share price indices and increased spreads in a large number of US dollar products, including high-quality US corporate bonds, money market spreads, and bank credit default swaps. Doubts about additional losses by banks in major economies also persist and this has made it more difficult for banks to raise capital.
The Committee views Pillar 3 as a further refinement of accounting standards requirements as they should apply to banks in the light of the specific risks they face. Some of the requirements may furthermore be tied to a bank’s eligibility for adopting an advanced approach to credit or operational risk or for recognising the benefits of particular instruments and transactions in mitigating risks. We based our decisions on the information that should be disclosed on the following principles: that market participants require an understanding of how the capital requirements apply to the consolidated banking organisation; that they should know what risks banks face, to what degree, and how they assess those risks; and that they should have details on what capital they hold. More generally, by emphasising principles in the disclosure rules - that banks should have a formal disclosure policy approved by the board, that internal measurement tools must be credible, that they must adequately capture risk, and that they must be used by banks in the daily management of their operations and not just for regulatory capital purposes - transparency may actually result in more consistency in the application of advanced approaches than detailed quantitative criteria. Issues That Arose in Consultation: The process for transcribing these principles into rules for the New Accord has involved extensive discussion among supervisors, representatives of the accounting profession, and financial institutions.

It is this fundamental difference that I intend to talk about today. On a general level one can say that the difference concerns the view of the risks linked to financial imbalances and to what extent monetary policy should be used to counteract such risks. It is primarily the latter that has come to be a recurring theme in the discussions on Swedish monetary policy. Here in Sweden, monetary policy has deliberately not accelerated more, despite the low inflation and low resource utilisation, with reference to the claim that a more expansionary monetary policy increases the risks linked to high household indebtedness. One justification for this deliberation is that the financial crisis has shown how high costs can be if these risks are allowed to increase and that it is therefore worth deviating from the inflation target and allowing a somewhat poorer development of the real economy to avoid indebtedness soaring too high and creating problems further ahead. I can very well understand the wish to prevent new crises and I am not categorically against conducting monetary in this way; leaning against the wind as it is usually called. But if one weighs the advantages of conducting this policy against the disadvantages, I reach the conclusion that there is no justification for it in Sweden today. As I see it, the advantages are small. We do not have a general credit boom in the Swedish economy that needs dampening.
These cases often reflected misaligned incentives and insufficient attention paid to remediation actions and staff training. 9 Even back in 2009, MAS issued our Fair Dealing Guidelines. These require financial institutions and their representatives to recommend products and services that are suitable for their target customer segments. The Guidelines include supporting customers with clear, timely and relevant information to make informed investment decisions. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  10 MAS expects boards and management of financial institutions to stand behind these commitments. We have recently proposed guidelines to strengthen the accountability of senior managers in charge of key functions within a firm. Under these enhanced guidelines, boards must clearly designate the officers who are responsible and those who are accountable for the conduct and business operations in their organisations. The measures will include having a clear governance and oversight framework. 11 To avoid a situation where individuals with a pattern of misconduct and transgressions simply move from one financial institution to another, or what is referred to in regulatory circles as “rolling bad apples”, MAS will further require that financial institutions conduct reference checks with the previous employers of their representatives. Carrying out reference checks is already a long-standing industry practice. MAS’ proposal will harden this requirement. 12 MAS will also step up our monitoring of financial advisory practices in the industry. One example is our mystery-shopping exercises where we send researchers to “live test” the sales and advisory processes in sampled financial institutions.

Ladies and gentlemen, In Romania, the initial economic impact of the pandemic was strong, compounding the existing imbalances and the depreciation pressures on the domestic currency and entailing higher liquidity needs. Consequently, the immediate objective of our central bank was to maintain banking system stability and liquidity, for the proper functioning of public finances and the real 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  economy; at the same time, the dosage of measures sought to avoid an excessive and unnecessary depreciation of the leu. Over a broader horizon, our aim was to preserve confidence that economic and financial equilibria are kept under control. In this vein and in full compliance with its mandate and statutory independence, the NBR promptly adopted a package of proportionate and effective measures to support the Romanian economy. Given the exceptional nature of the pandemic, the NBR cooperated more closely with the Government of Romania, particularly with the Ministry of Finance, to avoid any conflict between monetary, macroprudential and fiscal measures.
More often than not, handling the politics is the most difficult part. You can be 100 per cent right technically and you can spend all day explaining all the fine details, relating them to the policy objective and the public interest. But if you are not skillful enough in the handling of the politics of the issue, particularly an issue in whose success the confidence of the people plays a crucial part, all your efforts might be wasted. A totally different perception than that intended could well result, undermining the chance of success of what you are trying to achieve. 8. Let me focus specifically on the management of the political process concerning monetary issues. I must say that this task is, for the HKMA, becoming increasingly difficult and time-consuming. Monetary issues are unfortunately very technical and elusive, but they affect everybody. Money is dear to the heart of everyone. We work hard to earn it. And we use it everyday, which can often be, thank goodness, the more pleasant aspect of it. So, quite naturally to us, the price and the value of money are things that we should be concerned about. Here, already to a layperson or to the average politician, we are being esoteric. What is the price of money? What is the value of money? And what are the differences between the two? Why should we be concerned about them? These are very legitimate questions. And they are in fact not easy questions to answer or easy concepts to put across. 9.

He must take a view on whether this would introduce an avenue for political interference in the work of the HKMA, in particular in monetary management. He must also take a view on whether this would undermine the effectiveness of the relationship between the Administration, in particular himself, and the HKMA. 28. Insofar as getting things done at the technical level is concerned, for example in achieving the broad policy objectives of monetary and banking stability, and the development of the financial infrastructure, the existing relationship between the Administration and the HKMA has worked well. The Hong Kong dollar exchange rate has remained very stable and the banking system robust, and Hong Kong now has one of the most sophisticated financial infrastructures in the world. BIS Review 87/1998  -7-  29. It is of course up to the Administration to consider whether, for political reasons, the unusual arrangements for the appointment of the Monetary Authority and the framework defining his accountability should be looked at. But it should be remembered that those unusual arrangements had the agreement of the Legislative Council as recently as late 1992 when it approved the required amendments to the Exchange Fund Ordinance. Admittedly, the details of the amendments then reflected expediency dictated by political considerations at the time. But the arrangements have worked well for Hong Kong. 30.
In recognition of continuing stresses in financial markets, the Bank announced in January 2009 that, for an additional fee of 25 basis points, it would temporarily permit drawings from the Discount Window with a maximum term of 364 days. 12  Because covered bonds and master trust RMBS are based on revolving pools of mortgages, an exception was made to accommodate them, but with a strictly declining limit over the three year life of the Scheme. 13  But it did require Treasury agreement for the Debt Management Office to create and lend the additional Treasury bills, and for the Treasury to underwrite the Scheme should there be any losses. BIS Review 126/2010  5  Access to the Discount Window is only permitted for firms that are considered by the Bank to be solvent and viable. Nevertheless, large scale borrowing from the central bank can generate credit risk concerns in the minds of market counterparties. To avoid this “stigma”, the Bank releases information on the use of the Facility averaged over counterparties and over a three-month period, released with a further quarter’s lag. Following a market consultation, the Bank has recently announced that, as of early next year, it will extend the range of collateral it is willing to take in the Discount Window to include diverse portfolios of “raw” loans. 14 This extension has a number of advantages. Securitising loans into asset backed securities – such RMBS – is expensive and only available to firms large enough to have a securitisation programme.

6  BIS Review 126/2010  Second, the Bank’s permanent operations are intended to offer liquidity support for the banking system, not for the market in any one particular type of security. Intervening in a partial way could create unfortunate market distortions. If there is a genuine market for a private sector security, it should be able to support itself in the medium-term without special forms of liquidity support from the authorities. Third, the asset purchase programme, although focussed on buying gilts, was intended to support the liquidity of all private sector securities by forcing would-be gilt holders to purchase more risky assets (rather than by direct central bank purchases of those assets). There is plenty of evidence to suggest that was indeed the outcome and most private sector markets have recovered to some degree. The covered bond market has also been supported by the introduction of FSA regulations, to provide additional comfort for investors. 16 A second topical issue is bank funding more generally. It is often asserted that the Special Liquidity Scheme provides a funding source for banks and that, given continuing pressures on them to raise funds to support lending, we should extend the lifetime of the Scheme. The first point to note is that the Scheme facilitates funding but does not provide it directly. Rather, as I have outlined today, the SLS provides a collateral upgrade and the private sector remains the ultimate source of funding as the Treasury Bills lent under the Scheme are turned into cash in the market.
Notes: Scenario 1 assumes that half of firms with interest cover ratios of less than 1 exit the market. In scenario 2, only the lowproductivity half of firms with interest cover ratios of less than 1 exit the market. Chart 25: The estimated relationship between leverage and labour productivity  Source: Bahaj, Foulis, Gal and Pinter (2016). Notes: The figure plots the results from local regressions. The red line shows the results from local weighted scatter smoothing (LOWESS), the blue line shows the results from a third degree kernel weighted local polynomial smoothing where the gray area depicts the associated 95% bootstrapped confidence bands. Labour productivity is defined as the log of gross value-added per number of employees. During the local regression estimations, we trim the data by deleting the top and bottom 1% of estimated productivity and leverage values in order to mitigate problems of outliers. 35  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  35  Chart 26: Distribution of average pay across companies  Source: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. Notes: Series show wage deciles/percentiles. Chart 27: Distribution of firm level labour productivity, wages and profits in 2014  Sources: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations.

But, from a long run perspective, its performance is highly significant. Internationally, many changes are taking place in the FMI arena and it is vital that our FMI – often referred to as the “plumbing of our financial markets” – continues to serve Switzerland’s best interests in the future. My goal this evening is to raise awareness of the FMI’s importance and of the need to develop a strategy to ensure that it remains an asset for us in the future. Part I: Financial market infrastructure Overall, the key elements of the Swiss FMI function well. In the recent crisis, the resilience of our infrastructure has been remarkable. But, increased competition, international regulatory changes, growing trade volumes and, on occasion, heightened volatility imply that it will have to evolve in order to remain effective. I will hence highlight three aspects of our FMI tonight: its relevance, its strengths and the challenges it faces. The importance of a safe and efficient financial market infrastructure The summer of 2011 will take its place in history as a period of considerable market uncertainty and volatility. On three occasions we saw daily moves of the Swiss franc against the Euro which were among the most extreme experienced since the inception of the euro in 1999. The most significant one day move of 3.2% occurred on 9 August.
The yield on 10-year German government bonds continued to decline from mid-year under the influence of the ECB’s bond purchases. A moderate decline in yields was also observed in Switzerland. For example, the latest reading shows the yield on 10-year Confederation bonds just below the mid-year values, at around –0.6% (cf. chart 2). On the foreign exchange markets, the persistent downtrend of the US dollar has been the dominant theme in recent months. On a trade-weighted basis, the dollar has depreciated by over 7% since the end of June. Against the backdrop of predominantly positive risk sentiment, the dollar was less in demand as a safe-haven currency. The rise in inflation expectations in the US is also likely to have contributed to the depreciation of the dollar. The euro, by contrast, has appreciated by almost 3% on a trade-weighted basis since mid-year. It strengthened in particular following the announcement of the EU recovery fund, which market participants interpreted as a sign of stronger fiscal cohesion within the euro area. Trading in the pound sterling has been volatile over recent months in light of the ongoing Brexit negotiations; the currency has appreciated over 2% on a trade-weighted basis since mid-year. The Swiss franc trended mainly sideways on a trade-weighted basis during the summer months, before coming under renewed appreciation pressure in the autumn due to the second coronavirus wave and heightened uncertainty ahead of the US elections.

The Swiss franc only weakened again recently with the prospect of a COVID-19 vaccine and hopes of a faster recovery of the global economy. On a trade-weighted basis, the Swiss franc is almost 1.5% stronger in nominal terms than at the end of June (cf. chart 3). It thus remains highly valued. As reported in our interim results, we carried out foreign exchange market interventions totalling CHF 90 billion in the first half of this year. On a trade-weighted basis, the Swiss franc has strengthened some 5% in real terms since the beginning of 2020. Had we not intervened, the franc would have appreciated significantly more, and this would have placed an additional burden on our economy in an already exceptionally challenging environment. Page 2/5  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Final sprint in transition to SARON  Let me now say a few words about the changeover from Swiss franc Libor to SARON. The end of Swiss franc Libor is fast approaching. In November, the Libor administrator launched a consultation procedure on the discontinuation of Swiss franc Libor as per end-2021. Market participants in Switzerland may therefore only have around 12 months to complete the necessary work for a smooth transition to SARON. Only the heavily used tenors of US Libor are expected to be granted an extension until mid-2023. However, this will not affect the Swiss franc Libor I have been focusing on in my remarks.
The conditions which existed when it was introduced in 2011 had fundamentally changed. On 15 January 2015, the SNB therefore decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate and to impose an interest rate of –0.75% on sight deposits held by banks at the SNB. With this negative interest rate, the interest rate differential to the euro area was at least partially restored. At the same time, the SNB announced that it would continue to intervene on the foreign exchange market if necessary. By implementing both of these measures, the SNB’s aim was and remains to reduce the upward pressure on the Swiss franc. Immediately after the minimum exchange rate was discontinued, the Swiss franc appreciated abruptly against the euro before weakening again somewhat. The Swiss franc saw the same appreciation that the US dollar and the pound sterling had already experienced. Due to Switzerland’s close trade links with the euro area, this appreciation presented the Swiss economy with major challenges. The euro area’s neighbours reacted to the ECB’s monetary policy measures in varying ways. Denmark lowered its deposit rate to –0.75% in January 2015 and intervened in the foreign exchange market.9 Sweden introduced a negative interest rate in February 2015, although the relevant deposit rate currently stands at –0.60%. The Riksbank also began its own quantitative easing programme and announced that it would intervene on the foreign exchange market if necessary. The Czech National Bank reacted with more foreign exchange market interventions, but decided not to implement negative interest.

Indeed, in many countries, it is envisaged to make the central bank the “systemic supervisor” or, at least, a central pillar in the macro-supervisory architecture. 3. A key question, however, is how this new financial stability function would interact with monetary policy. In theory, things are simple. Central banks would have several tools available for different objectives. One set of tools (interest rates, international  2  BIS Review 147/2009  reserves) would, as now, be used to fulfil the price stability mandate. On the other hand, macro-prudential tools would support and foster financial stability. In such an ideal “Tinberghen” world, each instrument would be precisely assigned to a single objective. Things may be more complex in the real world because these instruments are not independent. For instance, changes in capital requirements will affect credit growth and the transmission channel of monetary policy. Conversely, as I said, levels of or movements in monetary policy rates may increase or decrease the level of risk inside the financial system, hence its vulnerability to shocks. Finally, there may be circumstances in which the objectives of price and financial stability may not be fully compatible. 4. When instruments overlap and the objectives possibly conflict with each other, the potential for confusion is real and significant. To avoid any damage to central banks' credibility and ability to fulfil their mandate, it is essential that a clear and transparent framework should be in place.