samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Figure 3 Real exchange rate (*) (index, 1986=100) 120 110 100 90 80 70 88  90  92  94  96  98  1991-2010 average  00  02  04  06  08  1996-2010 average  10 RER  (*) Preliminary for August 2011. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4  Change in Central Bank of Chile's international reserves (percentage of GDP) 8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4 91  93  95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  11 (*)  (*) The reserves include the purchase of $ billion announced in January 2011. To forecast GDP, growth and inflation projections in the September Report are used. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 Central Bank of Chile balance sheet (billions of pesos, percent) 3.000  30  2.000  20  1.000  10  0  0  -1.000  -10  -2.000  -20  -3.000  -30 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Net result  NER variation (*)  (*) Corresponds to y-o-y exchange rate variation at December of each year. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

In this regard the authorities launched a consultation process with the stakeholders involved, to amend Banking Rule 9 which involves measures addressing credit risks arising from the assessment of the quality of asset portfolios of credit institutions. In a nutshell, the proposal aims to establish a concrete plan with those banks with NPLs higher than 6% to reduce such NPLs below that level over a period of 5 years, where failure to adhere to this plan will require the institution to shore up its resilience through the accumulation of an additional capital reserve. Meanwhile, on a European level, the European authorities are pushing for the establishment of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), which is a necessary ingredient to complete the architecture of the Banking Union project. This is because a common deposit insurance fund inspires the same level of confidence to depositors throughout the entire Banking Union, creating a consistent and common framework for supervision, resolution and depositor protection. Moreover, this joint safety net within the Banking Union is expected to prevent the creation of competitive distortions, thus facilitating cross-border banking and hence strengthen financial integration. However, in this regard, there is still some way to go for agreement among all Member States, as risk reduction measures, particularly through asset quality reviews of the less significant institutions and addressing the banking-sovereign debt loop, need to be also implemented. Malta is committed to taking the EDIS file forward during its presidency.
Zdeněk Tůma: The interrelationship between monetary policy, price stability and financial stability Speech by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the European banking and financial forum 2005, Prague, 22 March 2005. *  *  *  Mr. President, Excellencies, Governors, distinguished guests, It is an honour to be opening the central bankers' forum. As the main part of the conference program concerns the financial sector challenges and opportunities in the “New Europe”, the central bankers' panel has to necessarily reflect the close, particularly topical, issue of the financial stability and its relationship to a reasonable monetary policy conduct. While my colleagues will discuss mainly the particular issues of financial stability, I, having the privilege to be the chairman of the panel, would like to frame the discussion using a more general and historical context. Bearing this perspective in mind, I would like to point to the interrelation between the ultimate goal of monetary policy, the price stability, and the financial stability. First of all, let me start with the definition of financial stability, simply assuming that price stability does not need any further explanation. To be as brief as possible, financial stability can be defined as the soundness of the financial system, that is, its resilience against various shocks.

It is for this reason that – in our opinion – the responsibility for the countercyclical capital buffer for domestic lending must lie with the SNB. The National Bank must be able to decide when the buffer is activated and how high it should be. It goes without saying that it would do so within legally defined limits. The same should also apply to the activation of loan-to-value ratios and affordability criteria for mortgage loans. All of these instruments are closely linked to monetary policy. Within the context of the implementation of the TBTF regulations, the systemically important banks will have to be determined. This is because the more rigorous capital and liquidity requirements are only intended for these banks. And because emergency liquidity assistance is also reserved for systemically important banks, the decision as to the systemic importance of a bank has a direct impact on the SNB in its function as lender of last resort. These decision-making powers, too, must therefore be placed in the National Bank’s hands. This proposed solution should give the SNB the formal responsibilities it needs in order to fulfil its mandate in the area of financial stability in a preventative manner. In many countries, a transfer of banking supervision to the central bank is currently the subject of intensive discussion. In contrast, the National Bank is by no means calling into question the separation of banking supervision and central bank activities with the solution presented here. This separation has worked for Switzerland.
This was accompanied by further declines in both the share of people working part-time that would like full-time work, as well as the share of people not part of the labor force. Consistent with a tighter labor market, the share of the working-age population that is employed has risen gradually, and the labor force participation rate has stabilized. While the weakness in some indicators has led me to make small reductions in my forecast, my overall outlook has not changed substantially. In making this determination, a central question is how to reconcile these cross-currents. One has to also factor in that the real GDP growth rate in the fourth quarter was only 1.0 percent and the four-quarter change was 1.9 percent – low even by the subdued standards of this expansion. It is important, though, to recognize that a number of transitory factors held down growth in the fourth quarter – most notably lower utility spending due to warm weather and a decline in the rate of inventory investment. As these transitory factors depressing the pace of economic growth dissipate, the core strengths for the economy should reassert themselves. I anticipate that consumption and housing activity will expand at a moderate pace. Continued job and wage gains, as well as low energy prices, should support real disposable income growth and consumer spending. Retail sales in January provide evidence of this support. The housing market should remain on a solid trajectory, supported by rising employment and low mortgage rates.

Mugur Isrescu: nvestments in challenging times - how can Romanian firms thrive in the new context? Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isrescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the conference "Investments in challenging times: How can Romanian firms thrive in the new context? ", Bucharest, 16 March 2023. *** Vice-President Pavlova, Chief Economist Revoltella, Distinguished audience, Ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to this year's conference organized by the European Investment Bank in partnership with the National Bank of Romania, titled "Investments in challenging times: How can Romanian firms thrive in the new context?". I am glad that we are able to meet again at the National Bank of Romania, after 2 years in which we had to host this event exclusively on-line. Please allow me to extend a warm welcome to the EIB representatives that are joining us: Vice-President Pavlova, Chief Economist Revoltella and Ms. Tasan Zanin, Head of the EIB office in Bucharest, and to all our colleagues and guests that are with us today, in person or online. I commend EIB's continuous involvement and support in engaging with stakeholders in Romania through these valuable series of events. There is already a tradition, today's conference being the sixth we have co-organized and hosted. Romania and the European Investment Bank share a long and fruitful partnership that has resulted in projects in important sectors of our economy. I am certain we will be able to continue to build on this important partnership, tackling variable challenges and opportunities.
Moreover, the volume of placed assets during the first five months of 2010 outpaced the combined placed volumes in 2008 and 2009. These tentative positive signals are confirmed by the European ABS Investor Confidence Index by JP Morgan, which has remained in positive territory for the last nine months. Our own Bank Lending Survey indicates that for the first quarter of 2010, banks generally reported that their access to wholesale funding became easier. 1 In addition, after a broadly neutral evaluation of true-sale securitisation access for corporate and housing loans in the fourth quarter of 2009, banks assessed the situation as significantly more positive, in particular for the securitisation of housing loans. It should be noted, however, that this survey was conducted before the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis. While all these indications may suggest that demand for ABSs is re-emerging, we still need confirmation from the data over the next months. Moreover, the latter developments represent an improvement but are still far from normal market conditions, or even from suggesting that we may be moving towards such conditions. IV. How do we bring back investors’ confidence? Taking the stock of the latest information, one should recognise that euro area securitisation markets remain dysfunctional, mainly for demand-side related reasons. And, of course, the malfunctioning of the market has implications also for the supply-side.

  On the demand side, the investor base has been and remains severely eroded and many earlier active investors, such as SIVs and money market funds, are not expected to return to the market anytime soon. Europe in particular suffers from a lack of a significant real-money investor base that could step in.   On the supply side, concomitantly, the profit generating potential of securitisation remains insufficient, since spreads for various ABS still exceed the break-even levels from the issuer’s perspective. At the current levels of spreads, securitisation does not make economic sense for originators in most cases. At the same time, it would appear that current yields, with some exceptions, are not attractive to compensate for the perceived risks in the view of many investors. Therefore, although there are some signs of improvement, the current situation in structured finance continues to impose market funding constraints on banks and to hamper banks in  1  See “The Euro Area Bank Lending Survey”, April 2010, ECB. BIS Review 84/2010  3  providing credit to the economy. In this sense, securitisation is still certainly unable to fulfil the objectives that I highlighted at the beginning of my speech. Going forward, the key question is therefore: how do we bring back investors to the securitisation markets? This is tantamount to asking: how can investor confidence in securitisation be restored?
The fundamental challenge is that, alongside its great benefits, every technological revolution mercilessly destroys jobs and livelihoods – and therefore identities – well before the new ones emerge. 24  Carney, M (2016) 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Moreover, recently, we have seen the power of networks to divide as well as to connect. Social media can reinforce our tendency towards confirmation bias as we search out the information consistent with our priors and disregard that which is not. 25  How to lead in such a world? First, define your purpose and stick to it obsessively. And remember that purpose, including of business, must be grounded in the objectives of clients, society and humanity. As John Kay has observed, “Profit is no more the purpose of business than breathing is the purpose of living.”  26  Second, in a world of division, fusion will bring breakthroughs. Select your teams wisely and recognise that while diversity is a reality, inclusion is a choice. Take it. Third, while you should always marshal your facts, you must engage people’s intuitions and win their trust in order to convince them. Do this through empathy – the antidote to righteousness. 27  Be open to dialogue and  remember Henry Ford’s advice that, “the secret of success is to see things from another person’s point of view.”  28  Finally, do not confuse your leadership role with yourself or become addicted to the status and privileges of power.

And you will notice that I emphasise “working together”, because while we all clearly have a common interest in that objective, we all - commercial bankers, banking supervisors, central banks and governments - have distinct responsibilities and distinct contributions to make towards bringing it about. And we will not succeed unless we all play our respective parts. From the programme for your convention I see that most of your working sessions have been concerned with the steps that commercial banks can take to protect themselves against risk in a rapidly changing financial environment and the role of banking supervisors. I should like to start from the other end, as it were, and talk about the role of the authorities more broadly. I suppose that the most frequent cause of financial instability is macro-economic shocks of one kind or another. Certainly major disturbances can originate within the financial system itself - and that of course in turn can generate macro-economic instability. But my observation is that the causality more often than not runs the other way. From our own experience in the UK, the exaggerated economic boom and bust cycles of the past - at least I hope they are in the past - and fed in some instances by abrupt financial deregulation - have led to a sharp expansion of bank lending in the upswings, the value of which became impaired, amidst a great deal of social as well as economic distress, in the downturns.
Combined with new financial instruments that were intended to spread risk – but that did not prove to be viable – the US housing crisis has spread to many parts of the world and whose outcome is still unknown. Seven or eight years ago, we experienced a similar situation, although not as severe, when the dotcom bubble burst. Many also recall the crises in the emerging market economies in Asia, Central Europe and South America ten years ago and the downturn in the Japanese economy in the 1990s. Nor will we forget the banking crises in the Scandinavian countries in the early 1990s. However, financial crises are nothing new. We also find parallels to today's crisis if we go back to the Great Depression in the 1930s. If we go much further back in history, to the 1600s, the same phenomenon occurred with speculation in the tulip trade. In Holland, they discovered at an early stage that a virus could give tulips stripes and beautiful colour. A forward market for bulbs developed in the 1630s. In 1636 market prices rose sharply and in a short time that winter bulb prices increased 25-fold. This did not last. The market collapsed in February 1637 and prices fell to 5 per cent of earlier levels in the course of few days. Auction lists a hundred years after the crisis show prices from one per cent to 0.005 per cent of the level before the collapse.

William C Dudley: Panel remarks at the Bank for International Settlements' Annual General Meeting Panel remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bank for International Settlements' Annual General Meeting, Basel, 25 June 2017. * * * John Clark, Gerard Dages, Linda Goldberg, Eric LeSueur, Jonathan McCarthy, and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. Let me start by thanking Jens Weidmann and the Bank for International Settlements for the opportunity to respond and comment on Professor Hélène Rey’s thoughtful remarks and on the issue of international spillovers associated with U.S. monetary policy. As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System.1 As is characteristic of her work, what Hélène has to say is well-argued and provocative. It is also very relevant to the conduct of monetary policy and the functioning of the international monetary system. I mostly agree with the major points she makes. First, I wholeheartedly agree with her on the hazards of financial booms. Rapid increases in credit and capital flows, asset prices, and leverage can lead to potentially severe corrections that can impose great stress on financial systems. As we have seen repeatedly, this stress can impair the ability of the financial system to perform well in intermediating credit between savers and borrowers, and in helping households and businesses manage their financial risks.
I am pretty confident that our research output will be improved and enhanced in the future. Challenges for macroeconomic research Today and tomorrow you will be talking essentially about macroeconomics. Looking forward, macro policies, monetary, fiscal, and macroprudential policies, are facing a number of challenges that require deep theoretical and empirical analysis. Perhaps, first of all, we need to understand the causes and consequences of the current levels of low inflation in most developed economies, despite the fact that most major central banks have introduced unprecedented monetary measures to support activity and growth. Several explanations, ranging from a “debt supercycle” to a secular stagnation have been proposed. If natural rates at very low or even negative levels are here to stay, central bankers will have to rethink our standard toolbox and to decide which policy measures put in place during the last decade should be maintained. In this respect, I think that the first paper of the conference, which analyzes the effects of negative nominal interest rates, will offer new insights on this important topic. Secondly, we need to improve our understanding of the links between monetary policy, macroprudential policy and financial stability. The financial crisis underlined how an impaired financial system could cause severe economic damage and disrupt the transmission of monetary policy. Moreover, following the financial crisis, many central banks have provided with new macroprudential tools that remain largely untested.

However, one of its significant features is that the uncertainty surrounding the “true” value of complex financial instruments has undermined the confidence of global markets, increased uncertainty about counterparty risk and led to contagion across asset classes, financial markets and economic regions. The crisis has highlighted the fact that the valuation of financial instruments is not only a question of accounting. It raises issues about risk measurement and management by financial institutions, prudential issues via the definition of capital requirements and, more widely, financial stability issues. However, valuation is also without any doubt an accounting issue. It is therefore hardly surprising that the debate about the application of accounting standards to financial instruments is a highly topical one. I think it interesting to note that the crisis has occurred in a financial system that has seen two far-reaching developments. I am referring first of all to the rapid growth in securitisation and products whose valuation is complex. I will not dwell on this aspect as it is not the subject of today’s meeting. The aspect I would like to focus on is the transition to the “fair value” accounting of financial instruments. The rationale behind this accounting development is understandable and can be summarised as follows. The aim is to enable investors and financial system participants, which include supervisors, to have a better understanding of the risk profile of financial institutions in order to better assess their position.
Denis Beau: Financial inclusion in the digital age - how to make a difference? Panel opening talk by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Singapore Fintech Festival 2019, Singapore, 13 November 2019. * * * Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to be here with you today to introduce this session on financial inclusion and I would like to thank the MAS for offering me the opportunity to contribute to this conference. Inclusion is an essential topic for the financial sector, and more broadly for society as a whole. It’s essential because it’s about making sure everyone can have access to financial services. Because without this access, there is no or only limited ways for people to take part in the formal economy, to build up capital, to buy goods and services, to develop an entrepreneurial project. It is essential because it’s not just about more growth for the financial sector or  even for the economy as a whole, it’s also about reducing inequalities and making sure that more fragile populations,households and businesses, are not left out of economic development. Of course, Fintechs have a huge role to play in financial inclusion. They can provide new solutions, but they also raise new challenges, with new players entering the financial world and new ways of looking at customer relationships.

This is why French law imposes on banks to provide a specific offer for these clients, comprising minimal services with reduced fees of 3 euros per month. To follow up on the implementation of this provision, an Observatory for Banking Inclusion was created in France. Chaired by the Governor of Banque de France, it brings together public authorities, NGOs and banks and has proved to be a very helpful forum. A second example is the “Mediator of Credit” function. Led by an official of Banque de France, it is aimed at small businesses and it relies on the operational support of the local branches of Banque de France. Its objective is to help entrepreneurs who have been refused a loan by providing mediation with their banks and creditors to overcome these financing difficulties. 20.000 successful mediations have taken place since the creation of that function in 2008. This mediation function does not just provide financing: it also reduce the risk of bankruptcy for the companies which benefit from it. Another contribution of Banque de France to improving acces for fragile populations takes the form of support to assisted microcredit activities. Banque de France is a strong supporter of these activities through funding of a credit guarantee fund (5 million euros in 2018) and the development of a local networks of correspondents. To help preventing inequalities of treatment, Banque de France is involved in preventing and addressing household over-indebtedness issues.