samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These service providers, whether they are doctors, nurses, midwives, clinical officers, dentists, or pharmacists offer their clients increased choices. More choices in health provision allow people to find the best care for their own particular circumstance and needs. The expanded choices and reach provided by the private sector is a wonderful complement to the existing public health services. Furthermore, the recent decision by the Zambian Government to designate Health and Education as economic sectors will undoubtedly, assist all investors in the health and education sectors. This entails that investors in these sectors can now enjoy the various incentives previously available only to investments in the real sector. Chairperson, In order for the private health sector to truly flourish in Zambia, it is vital that the government provides an enabling environment that will ensure that private providers of health services can obtain the financing they need to expand and improve their medical practices. Most micro, small, and medium enterprise firms in Africa, including health businesses, only receive 5 percent of their financing through banks, while larger firms get 22 percent of their financing needs from banks. In Zambia, a recent survey on financial inclusiveness indicated that only about one third of the population is financially served by banks and non bank financial institutions. Barriers to access to credits identified included; high interest rates, caps on loans and excessive collateral requirements. BIS Review 73/2009  1  The importance of increasing access of banking services to a larger proportion of our population cannot be overemphasized.

The situation only got worse when the sovereign crisis – that started in Greece in late 2009 – progressively spread to other euro area countries with vulnerable fundamentals. As we have seen in our discussions today, the trigger of the crisis in the euro area shows, to a certain extent, similarities to those that affected Latin America in the past: a stop in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  foreign capitals inflows, which induced severe financial stress and real adjustment. But also differences, due to the fact that this reduction of capital flows took place in a highly integrated monetary union, with its own peculiar adjustment mechanisms, leading to the segmentation of the euro area capital markets. These peculiarities also contribute to explain the huge magnitude and depth of the crisis. The scale of the imbalances and adjustments surpasses those in Latin American past experience. Correspondingly, the challenges that individual countries and the area as a whole are facing are daunting. Indeed, the policy response to the crisis – both at the national level and at the level of the EU and the euro area authorities – has been substantial, particularly in the structural and institutional dimensions. The euro area authorities have realised that, in parallel to the management of the crisis, a reshuffling of the European governance and a strengthening of the institutional framework are necessary for the long term sustainability of EMU.
Thus, despite the significant improvement in the employment situation, the total number of hours worked in France each year hardly increased between 2000 and 2006. Higher costs and sluggish supply: overall, the French economy is still absorbing the effects of the reduction in the working week and the wage catch-ups which it has given rise to over the past ten years. And these effects have a delayed yet strong impact on the external performance of the French economy. Reforms In order to reinforce the growth dynamics beyond the current cycle, it seems necessary to considerably increase the quantity of labour. The European countries whose per capita income is expanding most rapidly have enlarged and activated their workforce via increases in participation and employment rates. This assessment is encouraging for France, which has, thanks to its demography, large growth reserves. If these could be “activated” by appropriate policies, France should, in a few years, be able to substantially raise per capita income and catch up with, or even overtake, the best European performers. This catching-up is feasible and the current economic recovery provides a particularly favourable context in which to implement ambitious reforms. It requires a radical change in habits and policies. In addition to reducing the social contributions weighing on overtime, it is also necessary to take measures to raise the participation rate. Some would be simple and not too costly: for example, allowing pensioners, without any restrictions, to draw a pension and a wage concurrently.

But we must be vigilant towards any significant increase in longer-term inflation expectations. If high inflation gains a foothold, it may prove more costly to bring it down again, as experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. When my predecessor stood here last year, Norges Bank embarked on a gradual normalisation of the policy rate (Chart 7). But when inflation accelerated over spring, it became clear that the policy rate was no longer appropriate for the economic situation in Norway. Over summer and autumn, we raised the policy rate faster and in larger steps than had been the norm. As mentioned, the main driver of the jump in inflation has been higher prices for energy and imported inputs. So why does it help to raise the policy rate in Norway, some might ask. We cannot influence energy and commodity prices. But by softening demand, we can help avoid price increases for those prices spilling over to other prices and wages, and ushering in a period of high inflation. Chart 7 The policy rate was raised rapidly Policy rate. Percent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2001  2004  2007  2010  2013  2016  2019  2022  Source: Norges Bank  Norges Bank  Economic perspectives 2023  9  Chart 8 Inflation does not come down on its own Consumer price index subcomponents. Four-quarter change.
Another puzzle, described by the Federal Reserve economist Kevin Lansing 4 , is the fact that the growing share of the US society is aging and will leave the period of their highest income level behind. In such a situation, the Americans should be paying off their housing loans and accumulate savings. However, they do exactly the opposite thing. If this behaviour pattern does not change soon, many Americans may find themselves in a situation where retirement shall mean a radical decrease in their standard of living. Of course, it is difficult to point out a single factor that leads to all those changes. Yet, there is no doubt that one of the most important factors changing the structure of the global economy is the rapid globalisation of financial markets, trade, manufacturing and - in recent years - of services and knowledge. Globalisation has many dimensions but today I would like to focus on just two aspects that are actually interrelated, i.e. global imbalances and globalisation of manufacturing, services and knowledge, which takes on the form of offshoring. At the same time, I shall omit many other globalisation-related themes, such as globalisation of financial markets or migration. As I have mentioned before, one of the manifestations of globalisation in recent years are global imbalances. In 2005, the US current account deficit exceeded 5% of the GDP, and many forecasts of investment banks point to its further increase in 2006 and 2007 5 . The USA has had a negative current account balance for two decades now.

Nor is this just a question of learning about parameter values. That would yield an optimal state-contingent procedure for updating the monetary policy rule. It is that we are unwilling to commit now never to learn from future experience. So we would not want to embed any rule deeply into our decision-making structure, such as giving it the force of law or making it part of the constitution. Instead, we delegate the power of decision to an institution that will implement policy period by period exercising “constrained discretion”. The status and purpose of such institutions can be embedded into the law or constitution, which may increase the cost of reversing the delegated powers, but the optimal policy path should be open to change in response to learning. Since  7  4  As reported by Gore Vidal (2003). BIS Review 5/2004  we cannot hope to describe ex ante what it is we expect to learn, and since new ideas are unlikely to be uniformly recognised and instantly accepted, it may be sensible to delegate both the immediate policy decision and the process of learning to the same institution.8 An interesting example of seeking flexibility to allow for learning occurred during the writing of the US constitution. One draft clause specified that Congress should be allowed to “… emit bills on the credit of the United States”. There was a debate on a proposition to strike out the clause.
Being smaller and relatively young, Islamic finance currently offers fewer product choices for consumers and less comprehensive risk management options for institutions. Cross-border investment flows are also constrained by differing interpretations of permissible transactions under  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Shariah principles. The isolated pools of Islamic liquidity in each market restrict opportunities for more efficient allocation of capital across consumers, industries, and jurisdictions. Islamic finance must become more integrated with the global financial system. The industry must expand beyond its traditional markets to include a wider range of financial institutions, investors and consumers. This means Islamic finance must strike roots in the key international financial centres of the world. These centres can contribute to Islamic finance in several ways. First, market liquidity. The broad and deep investor pools in international financial centres offer an opportunity to channel non-traditional sources of funds into Islamic finance. In Singapore, for instance, several local and foreign issuers have successfully tapped the capital markets using Islamic instruments. The demand comes from not just Singapore but a diverse group of international investors across Asia and Europe. Many of them are conventional investors, attracted by the credit quality and yields. Second, capabilities in global financial markets. Islamic finance should leverage on the capabilities and strengths offered by conventional financial markets in international centres, to augment the range of Shariah-compliant products. Take for example the market for Real Estate Investment Trusts, or REITs.

This course will provide first and foremost, an overview of the international standards relating to AML/CFT supervision matters, operational aspects of the supervision work by incorporating publicly available case studies in the training modules, technical aspects of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, supervision of banks, conduct of on-site and off-site bank supervision, and sharing of real bank cases on supervision on AML/CFT. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I do hope that aside from benefiting from the course, participants will make full use of these forums as a platform to network and exchange views on key AML/CFT supervisory issues, collaborate, compare practices and share relevant information. On that note, I would like to once again thank all of you here today for attending this workshop and for the speakers, Mr Stuart Yikona, Ms. Pramita Moni Sengupta, Mr. Mehmet Kerse, Ms. Desiree Ann Chereebin and Ms Leonora Emini who are willing to share your experiences for the collective benefits of everyone here attending the workshop. Our appreciation again to the Government of Canada for the support for this programme. I wish all of you a successful and productive workshop ahead and please take the time to explore Kuala Lumpur and its surroundings. Thank you and have a pleasant and enriching day ahead. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
At the same time, a high capital buffer reduces the incentives for shareholders to take excessive risks as they would be putting their ‘own money’ on the line. Liquid assets, in turn, ensure that a bank is capable of withstanding sudden, unexpected outflows of short-term liabilities without getting into acute payment difficulties. The bank-specific level of these requirements is today partly determined by the bank’s degree of systemic importance. In contrast to the pre-crisis era, the regulations now expressly take into account the risks to the financial system and the economy as a whole arising from the failure of a systemically important bank. In this way, the regulations also explicitly rein in incentives for excessive growth in the sector. However, even the new, stricter capital requirements cannot eliminate the risk of a systemically important bank getting into existential difficulties. First, the risks are difficult to assess and they also change over time. Second, the very nature of banks’ operations means that they will always be to some degree susceptible to crises. Absolute security can never be achieved if, at the same time, we want to safeguard the useful economic functions of banks. The second pillar of the TBTF regulations comes into play in the event that a systemically important bank gets into financial distress despite increased resilience. It is intended to ensure that the bank is resolvable. In other words: Even a systemically important bank should be able to exit the market in an orderly fashion.

From this position, what the BNB is focused on today are two groups of tasks: the legal framework and the technical preparations. We have been working on these two topics methodically and consistently. As regards the Law on the BNB, we have two key dates. By the end of December we had to put forward amendments, ensuing from the convergence reports issued in recent years. I am talking about only a few amendments, but very complicated from a legal point of view, including the judicial protection of Governing Council members other than the Governor. We drafted these amendments, consulted the European Central Bank about them in accordance with the established practice, and submitted them, through the Government, to the National Assembly which approved them in December by a Law amending and supplementing the Law on the BNB. The second key date is 31 March 2023. By then we will have to draw up an entirely new draft of the Law on the BNB, which will incorporate the latest amendments and will govern all other issues relating to the Bank's operation within the euro area. Significant progress has been made on this draft. The first draft will be ready by the end of this month. We are going to devote the whole month of March to finalising the draft. The approach that we have adopted is to place the work on this draft on the broadest possible institutional basis, with the involvement of the management and of all key directorates and units of the BNB.
Compliance efforts will be effective and sustainable only in organizations where Compliance emerges from an ongoing board-level engagement. Compliance management therefore is the execution of business processes designed to manage risks and to continuously benchmark against expected parameters/tolerance levels applicable for the entire industry. 1.6 Compliance is considered to be costly, time consuming and an onerous endeavor. But, many financial institutions understand the criticality and the importance of better GRC and they are willing to devise strategies for leveraging their GRC systems to derive value as well as increase their compliance performance. Behind all these imperatives is the commitment at all levels to manage GRC in an integrated manner and inculcate the culture across the financial services industry. 1.7 The three GRC imperatives are interrelated in financial business and implementing them in isolation or treating them as separate elements would not be fruitful. In the past, most organizations have traditionally viewed, and some still continue to treat, GRC as separate components. The emerging perception of GRC is that it is an integrated set of concepts and, when applied holistically within an organization, it can add significant value and provide competitive advantage. Further, the holistic approach would be more efficient, consistent and legally sound and the Boards of Directors, senior management and staff at all levels would be involved in the organization’s conduct of business. Most financial institutions have viewed GRC as discrete activities undertaken by different departments with no coordinated efforts.

5.1.2 If one financial institution experiences problems today, given the interrelated transactions, it could lead to a systemic issue which will result in the entire system suffering. Therefore, it is equally important to use peer pressure to get weak or prodigal institutions to comply with regulatory instructions and directives. So, it is everybody’s responsibility to ensure that outliers are brought on to the desired path. 5.1.3 Clearly, training and consulting remain very important, especially to change the mindset to a more committed one. All stakeholders need to understand why GRC should be  BIS Review 15/2008  5  implemented as a package and the benefits attached to it, from the point of view of the institution as well as its clients. 5.2  Leveraging on technology  5.2.1 Technology is a critical factor, which facilitates efficiency and effectiveness in the GRC processes. A real time risk, compliance and monitoring environment enables financial institutions to ensure that risks are being managed and disruptive events are being acted upon. Therefore, technology integration across the financial institution would enable institutions to gain more timely and reliable regulatory compliance, more efficient use of IT systems, and lower cost on development and maintenance of software applications. Many organizations that apply GRC best practices have understood that service-oriented architecture (SOA) is more appropriate, as it would promote GRC integration while securing the highest value that IT can offer.
Luis M Linde: Monetary policy in the advanced economies Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Nueva Economía Fórum, Madrid, 8 July 2014. *  *  *  Let me first thank the Nueva Economía Fórum for their kind invitation to participate in today’s event. I shall briefly be discussing the monetary policies currently being implemented by the main advanced economies. The similarities and differences between such policies are not always readily understandable and they add complexity to the current economic circumstances. After a brief overview of the role monetary policies are playing in managing the international crisis, I shall specifically refer to the cases of the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, and then focus in greater detail on the European Central Bank’s approach and on the measures it has recently adopted. The role of monetary policies in managing the international crisis Unlike in the Great Depression, and largely as a result of the lessons learned from it, the economic authorities responded swiftly, robustly and in a relatively coordinated fashion internationally when the crisis in the advanced economies broke. This response took the form of a raft of measures to support financial systems and the application of a series of expansionary demand-side policies. The measures set in train were aimed firstly at heading off a potential global liquidity crisis, which would have seen the functioning of financial systems and, therefore, of economies themselves collapse.

The latest programme – introduced and promoted by Prime Minister Abe – included among its three pillars an ambitious monetary expansion plan which, with official interest rates close to zero, is being implemented through growth of the monetary base. Although the latest data show an incipient return to positive rates of growth and inflation, evidently monetary policy in Japan is still far removed from the threshold marking not only a change of cycle, but also a move towards a less expansionary stance, in contrast to the cases of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. The monetary policy of the European Central Bank The specific characteristics of current euro area monetary circumstances stem from the complexity and depth of the crisis and the slow pace at which the euro area is emerging from 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the crisis in comparison with other areas. Following the negative data of 2012 and 2013, the projections published by the ECB last June indicate that the euro area will not recoup precrisis levels of GDP until the end of next year. However, the recovery in employment in the euro area as a whole will not be completed in 2015. Since end-2011 the inflation rate has moved on a declining trend. It stands at an all-time low and the available projections indicate that it will remain, for the foreseeable time horizon, far from the benchmark of 2% which, in the medium term, marks the price stability target governing the ECB’s actions.
Once a monetary policy framework has been in force for long enough, the benefits of it tend no longer to be so obvious. In addition, if developments have been favourable, as has been the case since inflation targeting was introduced, it is easy for demands and expectations to rise. It is also easy to place greater focus on the drawbacks, which exist in all frameworks. For example, it is not so difficult to communicate that high and variable inflation is bad, as was the case when inflation targeting was introduced in the early 1990s. But when memories of those problems have faded, it is not as easy to convey that an inflation target is also supposed to prevent inflation being too low, that is, the importance of there not only being common expectations in society as to how much prices and wages will rise, but also that these expectations are anchored far enough above zero. Although this argument – that the inflation target should be sufficiently high – is crucial, it is after all also relatively abstract. There are above all two relationships that I think make it important to maintain confidence in the inflation target of 2 per cent – which is what our policy in recent years has aimed to do – and which indicate that the target should not be lower. One is that the conditions for wage formation to effectively allocate resources in the economy can deteriorate when average inflation is too low.

This has resulted in more independent directors being appointed to the boards in most of the financial institutions. The environment confronting financial institutions will continue to be immensely challenging, particularly in the coming years as global financial conditions remain highly volatile and uncertain, and as regulatory reforms start to take effect. In this environment, a number of areas will become more important to reinforce the effectiveness of boards and sound governance. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  First, board-level engagements on risk issues will need to be strengthened further. This can only be achieved if boards have a sound understanding of the institution’s business model, and a strong grasp of the changing complexion of risks in which the institution is exposed. Committed resources should therefore be available to the board to support their understanding of material developments affecting the institution, and to hone their judgement on matters concerning risk strategy. This should include relevant and meaningful management of information flows and risk analysis to the board, the ability to retain talent including external expertise where required, the ability to attract individuals with relevant competencies and experience to serve on boards, and the budget for board development and education. Second, with the growing expansion of financial institutions in scale and complexity, there is a need to inject greater diversity into boards to enable the board collectively to deal with the broader range of issues across the institution’s activities. This needs to be embedded within the framework for board renewal and succession.