samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Norway is recovering sooner than most countries, and Norges Bank was among the first central banks to raise its key policy rate. It did so twice in late 2009, up to 1.75%. As a global investor and an open market economy, my country shares the interests of most market participants, large and small. We have a common interest in a market-based international order, supporting a level playing field and sound economic governance. Like many other countries, we have benefitted greatly from economic and financial globalisation. It has delivered prosperity and growth without precedent. In the midst of the crisis, these gains must not be forgotten. The multilateralism of Bretton Woods At the end of the Second World War, 45 countries agreed to establish a new international financial and economic order with the Bretton Woods Institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, at its center. In his inaugural speech to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau noted the following: “We know that economic conflict must develop when nations endeavor separately to deal with economic ills which are international in scope. To deal with the problems of international exchange and of international investment is beyond the capacity of any one country, or of any two or three countries. These are multilateral problems, to be solved only by multilateral cooperation. They are fixed and permanent problems, not merely transitional considerations of the postwar reconstruction.

They are problems not limited in importance to foreign exchange traders and bankers but are vital factors in the flow of raw materials and finished goods, in the maintenance of high levels of production and consumption, in the establishment of a satisfactory standard of living for all the people of all the countries on this earth.” 3 These wisely spoken words are as relevant today as in 1944. When the IMF and the World Bank were established, it marked the beginning of a period of international economic and financial cooperation which over time embraced virtually all the countries of the world. The Bretton Woods Institutions have served their membership well. When needed, their policies have adapted promptly and timely to changes in the world economy and the global financial system. The IMF, with its crucial competence, has been a key forum for policy collaboration. Its surveillance and lending activities are unique. I strongly believe that global  3  Cited inter alia in Harold James: International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, The International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 1996. 2  BIS Review 22/2010  governance is best served by a statutory-based international economic order, with effective and legitimate multilateral institutions where all countries are represented. In the recent decade, the rapid expansion of many large emerging economies has greatly altered the global economic landscape. Most dramatic is the re-entry of China as a major economic power.
I particularly like this story because my very first job after university, here in London, involved sitting in Barings and trying to work out quite how much money Nick Leeson had lost. What then prompted such a critical article, almost exactly 100 years before I found myself involved in the clear-up after the Leeson episode? Barings, at this point, was responsible for about one quarter of the considerable funds flowing into Argentina – a very attractive investment at the time – and a man by the name of Revelstoke was pivotal to its success. He managed to secure the flotation of the Buenos Aires Water Supply and Drainage Company and, “with his propensity for double-or-quits, decided against the increasingly 3  common custom of having the issue fully underwritten” . The flotation flopped in 1888 and, to make matters worse, a combination of financial maladministration and political turmoil in Argentina left Barings over-exposed, with capital locked down in its various South American holdings. This, coupled with the policy of the Russian government of steadily withdrawing its large-scale deposits from the house, left Barings in a precarious position by 1890. Rumours began to circulate that the firm might not have any surplus left after payment of its liabilities.

Yiu-kwan Choi: Basel II implementation in Asia Introductory remarks by Mr Yiu-kwan Choi, Deputy Chief Executive (Banking) of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the BCBS/FSI/EMEAP: Basel II Implementation in Asia, Hong Kong, 17 October 2007. *  *  *  Dear colleagues, Good morning. On behalf of the HKMA, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to you all here today to take part in this outreach event organized jointly by the Basel Committee, the FSI and EMEAP, focusing on the IRB validation aspect of the Basel II framework. The event coincides with one of the regular meetings of the Validation Subgroup of the Basel Committee’s Accord Implementation Group, which was held here over the last two days. The Validation Subgroup, or the AIGV as it is commonly called, is one of three subgroups under the AIG that share information and discuss specific issues related to Basel II implementation. The AIGV specifically explores issues related to the validation of systems used to generate the ratings and parameters that serve as inputs into the internal ratingsbased approach to credit risk. The AIGV has done some excellent work, using the regular AIGV meetings as an information dissemination platform for members of this Subgroup to explore various IRB validationrelated issues. The AIGV has also published several high quality supervisory guidance papers covering topics on validation of low-default portfolios, use of vendor products, use test and control expectations for validation under the Basel II IRB framework.
Managing risk in a soft market Speaking to firms about their approach to the market, they often talk about prioritising margins over growth, focusing on more profitable lines of business – for example, where they have established strong market positions or a particular niche, and making more active use of reinsurance. These all seem sensible approaches for an individual firm but, in aggregate, the risk must end up with someone. One indicator of the competitive pressure on insurers to source new business in the wholesale markets is that brokerage commissions have been increasing as a share of gross written premiums despite the common desire to lower costs in line with lower premium rates. Looking forward, the key challenge for insurers is how they preserve or even grow their activities while avoiding the “Winner’s Curse” of under-pricing in order to get the business. The PRA is a not a price-regulator. But we are concerned to see that firms are adequately managing their exposures – that they can identify and quantify the risks being covered, manage and control overall exposures, and estimate likely claims costs under different loss scenarios. Against this background, I make no apology for repeating the points made earlier this year by my colleague Chris Moulder, our Director of General Insurance, in a Dear CEO letter and subsequent speech.

None are perfect but all are independent of the internal model, and therefore can help provide us with a different view on the evolution of risk exposures and a safeguard against model drift. All risk measures have their limitations. So we plan to use a range of measures alongside other supervisory review process initiatives, such as the analysis of internal model outputs. Conclusion In conclusion, given today’s audience, I want to stress the critical professional role of actuaries in current soft market conditions, where there may be a greater tension between on the one hand underwriting discipline and appropriate reserving and on the other hand business growth and current-year profits. Actuaries are responsible for providing assurance on reserves and opinions on both the underwriting and reinsurance strategies of firms, implying strong engagement with the risk function, as well as independence and objectivity in their assessments. Events like today’s, where actuaries come together to share knowledge, with the aim of raising professional standards, are particularly important and welcome. Chart 1  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
On the other hand, one can use a measure of underlying inflation, the CPIF, which excludes the direct effects of the repo rate on mortgage rates. Measured in terms of the CPIF, we expect inflation to be much more stable and to be close to 2 per cent for most of the forecast period. Figure 5. Inflation measured in terms of the CPI and the CPIF, annual percentage change 5  5 CPI  4  4  CPIF  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  There is still considerable uncertainty surrounding future developments (Figure 3). It is possible that the improved situation in the financial markets will contribute to a faster recovery in the world economy than we are expecting in the main scenario of the Monetary Policy Report. On the other hand, the recovery may be slower than expected when the fiscal policy stimulation packages around the world are gradually phased out. There are many potential risks along the way. But our forecast is that if we hold the repo rate low up to autumn 2010 and then begin raising it, this together with other measures will contribute to a stable recovery and mean we attain the inflation target of 2 per cent.

Svein Gjedrem: History of economics in Norway Schweigaard lecture by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway) at the University of Oslo, Oslo, 23 August 2010. *  *  *  Dear students and other attendees Allow me to start by thanking you for the invitation to give the Schweigaard lecture for new students and others at the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo. Rather than reminisce about my days as a student, I will talk about the subject you will be studying and the economy which you will be using your knowledge to understand. The world has just witnessed the most severe economic crisis since the 1930s. Many countries that were affected by the crisis appear to be recovering. Continued turbulence in international financial markets is nevertheless fuelling uncertainty about developments ahead. The prospects for Europe are particularly uncertain. Many countries are struggling with high public debt and low confidence. A number of countries are forced to make substantial cuts in welfare spending and raise taxes. The financial crisis started with problems in the US subprime mortgage market. There were few, if any, observers who foresaw that problems in a small segment of the US housing market could result in such dramatic consequences for economic developments throughout the world. Economists, politicians and most people have in its wake asked how this could happen. It may be that the desire to understand has led to a rising number of young people who want to study economics.
Thank you for your attention and for the interest you show in the National Bank and its activities. 4  BIS Review 25/2004

I would like to make a clear pledge: the Basel III agreement is intended to apply everywhere in a consistent manner, including of course in the United States. Those anywhere who would recommend not transposing Basel 3 would give in to the temptation to forget, ten years after the Great Financial Crisis; they would take the responsibility of increasing financial stability risks, at a time when these risks are already significant. That said, rest assured that we will insist on a fair and reasonable implementation in Europe, taking into account the specificities of the European banking sector in order to avoid undue impact on capital requirements. II. The French economy is resilient, with growth expected at 1.3% this year Despite this darker context, the French economy is resilient, with growth expected at 1.3% this year, three times higher than the German one. This expansion is being sustained by a robust internal demand. Real household income per capita is accelerating sharply (increasing by around 2% in 2019) at its fastest pace since 2007, due to the fiscal stimulus and to a larger extent to the strength of labour income – 1 million jobs have been created over the past four years. Many important reforms have already been adopted. Of course, much remains to be done to tackle structural unemployment, which is still too high. III. Beyond Brexit, building a new European financial architecture Brexit is and remains bad news for everybody but above all for the British economy.
In the case of insured deposits, that means Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) suffering losses, as they would in Purchase & Assumption-style resolutions of an operating bank. But, due to less destruction of value, those losses under bailin would be smaller (and never greater) than the losses the DGS would have suffered in a liquidation. Insured deposits themselves do not get haircut under any resolution techniques; the losses of the DGS get picked up by the rest of the industry standing behind it. Bailin is no different from other resolution tools in that respect. The point I have been labouring about all creditors being exposed to loss needs to be distinguished from the quite separate issue of whether the authorities should mandate a specified amount of bonded debt to act as required layer of gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity (GCLAC). That may be issued from a holding company, or it might be subordinated debt issued by an operating company. through such requirements, the authorities would in effect be determining part of the creditor hierarchy – the order in which creditor classes take losses – in order to reduce spillovers into the wider financial system when a distressed financial group is resolved. The G20 Leaders’ Summit have asked the FSB to develop such a regime over the coming year. (4)  Some impediments to smooth cross-border resolution need to be removed  I said earlier that the resolution process will become smoother over time. A range of impediments have been identified.6 Some of them require steps by policymakers.

All creditors can face having to absorb losses. What matters is the creditor hierarchy  Notwithstanding the clarity in the Financial Stability Board’s international standard on resolution,4 and in the US and draft EU legislative regimes, it is still common for commentators and industry participants to refer to “bailin bonds”.5 As I have said before, “bailin” is a verb not a noun. It is a power, not a special kind of bond. Like other resolution tools, it can be applied to any kind of debt obligation. What is true is that if bonds are issued from a holding company and the resolution is topdown (SPE), then those bonds will absorb losses before any creditors of the operating  2  See Financial Stability Board (2013), “Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies” and Tucker (2013), “Resolution and the future of finance”. 3  See Tucker (2013), “The reform of international banking: some remaining challenges”. 4  See Financial Stability Board (2011), “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”. 5  Most recently in Chapter 3, “Changes in bank funding patterns and financial stability risks”, of the IMF’s October GFSR, which misleadingly refers throughout to “bail-in debt”. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  subsidiaries; holdco creditors are structurally subordinated to opco creditors. But if the losses are vast enough, then the haircuts imposed by the resolution authority can in principle permeate to any level of the creditor stack.
B S B aims to link multiple platforms domestically and internationally, connecting buyers, suppliers, marketplaces, and service providers across economies If successful, the BSB experiment will demonstrate that the key to supply chain resilience is not to isolate and retreat behind borders, but to strengthen connectivity across borders even more. Resilient Industry The second dimension is a resilient industry – one that can continue to function in the face of disruptions and movement restrictions. Digitalisation is one of the ways in which an industry can build resilience. We have seen, amid the COVID-19 lockdowns, how firms which have gone digital earlier have managed to ensure business continuity, with the transition to working remotely and serving customers online. To ensure resilience, digitalisation needs to be end-to-end. If every part of a process is digitalised except one step which requires an in-person interaction, or a wet ink signature, or a payment in physical cash, then the “digital chain” is broken and resilience compromised. In financial services, this is what we have been aiming for: to be digital to the core. 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Digital trade finance solutions are trying to achieve seamlessness, to help facilitate trade flows. At the Singapore FinTech Festival last year, a trade finance application portal was launched as a value-added service on Singapore’s Networked Trade Platform, which allowed traders and businesses to seamlessly apply for financing from nine banks.

Moreover, while these feedback loops were important in setting into motion self-reinforcing losses and deleveraging, it was also the interactions amongst them, through joint exposure to common risk drivers and network linkages, that contributed to the multiplication of losses. Let me now turn to the second part of my talk which I will focus on the policy approach to deal with procyclicality. 2  BIS Review 160/2009  A good starting point to discuss policy is to recognize that business cycles are a normal feature of market economies and their existence – especially the interaction of the three cycles – can not be eliminated. The best we can do is to recognize the cycles and find ways to manage them in a way that markets continue to function without risking systemic instability. Reflecting this, it is clear that the objective of policy is to reduce the amplification of the cycles and their interactions by limiting the build-up of excesses. A common wisdom at this time is that policy should aim to limit the build-up of excess in the good time and ensure that the system has adequate capacity or buffers to manage the downturn in the bad time. But because the build-up of financial excess tends to be a result of many factors, some of which are not related to financial institutions, therefore, a broader approach to policy is needed so that many measures, both macro and micro, are used to help solve the problem.
Furthermore, our analysis6 shows that there are only limited spillovers from the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve to euro area inflation and output. This suggests that ECB monetary policy actions are, by and large, able to shield the euro area economy from spillovers from US monetary policy. But undoubtedly, there is evidence that US monetary policy is a driver of a “global financial cycle”.7 In step with such a financial cycle the risks to euro area financial stability can change as well. Current financial stability concerns in the euro area As you know, our characterisation of the main risks to euro area financial stability has remained broadly unchanged over the recent years. We see four main risks: The most prominent risk stems from the possibility of a disorderly increase of global risk premia. The second risk is related to renewed debt sustainability concerns, for sovereign debt in particular. The third risk is that banks’ intermediation capacity may be hampered by their continued low profitability. Finally, we are of the opinion that possible liquidity strains in the investment fund sector constitute a growing risk. All four risks are intertwined and would have, if they were to materialise, the potential to be mutually reinforcing. In 2018, a growing economy and improved banking sector resilience were important positive factors supporting financial stability. Now, however, the assessment is affected by a weakening economic growth outlook for the euro area.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: The future of finance Speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at a "Teh Tarik Session", at the Harvard PETRONAS Alumni event "The future of finance", Kuala Lumpur, 8 September 2017. * * * Thank you for inviting me here today to share my thoughts on the future of finance. The future is always a topic weighing heavily on the psyche of our nation, as we reflect on our transformation over the last 60 years, and what the future will be 50 years from now. I would like to share my thoughts today in three parts: a. A brief reflection on finance and five themes that may affect its future; b. A look at four possible future scenarios that may develop based on these themes; and c. Finally, implications of these future scenarios on the Bank and policy development. Let me place a qualifier here, it is not an exhaustive survey of the future landscape. My remarks today are meant to stimulate our thinking and discussion. These are my personal reflections and insights. Finance across the years and five themes for the future At its most basic level, finance is an intermediary service that matches the funding, saving and investing needs of agents in an economy. It lubricates the economy to function smoothly and allocate scarce resources efficiently. But over the years finance has evolved. It is useful to understand the ideas behind why and how finance has changed in the past.
Cecilia Skingsley: Reasonable expectations of monetary policy Speech by Ms Cecilia Skingsley, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Danske Bank, Stockholm, 19 September 2013. *  *  *  This is not the first time I will present my view of monetary policy in Sweden. I have done so in many different contexts during my 20 years as a professional economist, for instance as a columnist for “Dagens Industri” or, most recently, as Chief Economist at Swedbank. Now, however, I am here as one of the new members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank. It is of course quite a different thing to be one of the six people responsible for the monetary policy decisions than to be an external analyst. It is of course also the case that the experience I have gained marks my monetary policy stance and colours my view of what it is reasonable to expect of monetary policy in practice. Today I intend to talk about my thinking at the two latest monetary policy meetings and about my thinking on monetary policy in principle. Monetary policy through my eyes It is now two weeks or so since I took part in my second monetary policy meeting as a member of the Executive Board.

A strategy is evaluated using a financial risk calculation that is based on how much an asset portfolio can increase in value in relation to the risk that it will fall in value. This approach can also be applied to the world of central banking, although instead of being about an asset portfolio it is then about monitoring risks relating to the development of the economy and to the central bank’s target variables, for example inflation.4 As in the case of an asset manager, the time horizon on which the strategy is based is important. Translated to the current situation in the Swedish economy, this risk-reward approach could be expressed by saying that better target attainment in the short term must be weighed against increased risks in the longer term. In other words, using a more expansionary policy to boost a part of the economy that is already relatively strong, that is the households, to counteract weak demand in the export sector – which in the main is due to factors beyond the reach of Swedish monetary policy – risks leading to imbalances in the long term in my opinion. Of course it is true that a more expansionary monetary policy could weaken the exchange rate, which would benefit the export sector, but in the monetary policy trade-off I cannot ignore the risks associated with the high level of household debt.