samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We proceed from the fact that the global economy will be bouncing back faster than we expected in February. This will be driven by a large-scale fiscal stimulus in advanced economies and the mass vaccination of people worldwide. The growth of the global economy will boost the demand for Russian exports. Taking into account this factor and the slower recovery of oil production under the OPEC+ agreements, we have raised our forecast for oil prices from 50 to 60 US dollars per barrel this year and to 55 US dollars per barrel next year. The forecast for 2023 remains unchanged at 50 US dollars per barrel. Accordingly, we have also increased the forecasts for exports and the trade surplus. As domestic demand has been expanding, we have revised the imports forecast upwards. The current account surplus will grow to 56 billion US dollars this year from 34 billion US dollars last year. Now, I would like to discuss in detail risks that are beyond our baseline forecast. Proinflationary risks are primarily associated with increased inflation expectations. As inflationary pressure is stronger and supply-side factors exert additional influence on price growth, inflation expectations may stay elevated for longer time. Consequently, the saving ratio may decline faster, with consumer activity rising above expectations. As always, there are risks related to the external sector, including changes in the geopolitical environment. We have always taken them into account.

In a situation where these risks materialise, an increase in volatility in financial markets may speed up inflation, which we factor in when making our decisions. There are also disinflationary risks, yet the probability of their materialisation is lower and they are mostly associated with the fact that demand growth may turn out to be below our expectations. This group of risks may also include a faster reopening of borders, as a result of which demand may shift from domestic consumption to foreign travels. The risk of new coronavirus strains or lower paces of vaccination persists, which, in contrast, may reduce people’s mobility and limit consumption growth, especially in the services sector. If the situation develops not in line with our baseline scenario, we will be responding so as to bring inflation back close to its 4% target over the forecast horizon. Winding up, I would like to comment on the future path of the key rate. Today, we have first published the ranges of the average Bank of Russia key rate for a calendar year over the forecast horizon. According to our baseline forecast, this year the average key rate will generally equal 4.8–5.4% p.a., 5.3–6.3% p.a. next year, and 5–6% p.a. in 2023, which is in line with the range of the long-term neutral key rate. By publishing the path of the key rate, we increase the transparency of our communication, which will ultimately improve the efficiency of monetary policy. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
More progress needs to be made in increasing resilience with regard to the leverage ratio. 25  Rather, higher-capitalised banks tend to grant more loans, not fewer (for example, cf. Cecchetti, 2014, and Gambacorta and Shin, 2016). The minor negative impact can be explained by the fact that, first, more equity capital does not necessarily lead to higher capital costs for banks (Modigliani-Miller offset) and, second, potential higher costs in a competitive banking sector are not passed on in full to borrowers (cf. Junge and Kugler, 2017, for Switzerland). Page 11/14  Moreover, the work that still needs to be done under the second pillar should not be underestimated. The resolution of a bank, especially a globally active big bank, is highly complex. It needs to be planned in a thorough and prudent manner. To ensure that a bank can be resolved in an emergency, further progress is needed in three areas in particular. First, resolution funding plans need to be drawn up, which FINMA, as the competent authority, is currently in the process of doing. These aim to ensure that a bank has sufficient liquidity to implement a resolution. Second, loss-absorbing capacity must be ensured at the level of each individual entity within the big banks. Previously, the focus was on loss-absorbing capacity at consolidated group level. Third, both big banks must further reduce the financial and operational dependencies within the group. In addition, the two banks need to finalise the required emergency plans for Swiss institutions with systemically important functions by end-2019.

24 However, economic costs from stricter capital requirements may arise in the form of higher borrowing rates, reduced lending and an associated weakening in economic  20 21 22 23  Cf. Swiss National Bank, (2016), p. 17, for an overview of the specific requirements. Cf. Swiss Federal Council (2015), p. 1932. Cf. Federal Department of Finance (FDF) (2016). For example, cf. the literature review in FDF (2017), section 3. 24  A number of empirical studies show that bank crises are generally associated with a sharp reduction in growth. For example, cf. Haldane (2017) and, for Switzerland, Junge and Kugler (2013). Page 10/14  growth. Empirical evidence shows that these negative effects are minor, particularly if the capital requirements are increased gradually as planned. 25 Cost-effectiveness also needs to be taken into consideration when deciding on specific regulatory measures. Switzerland made a conscious choice to adopt a lean approach to resolvability requirements. Consequently, the regulations do not directly impact on banks’ business models or organisational structures. Nor do they distinguish between desirable and undesirable banking activities or prohibit certain practices. Rather, the Swiss approach is based on incentives and subsidiarity. Banks ‘only’ have to demonstrate that they are ‘resolvable’ in the event of a crisis. Of course, the calibration of the capital requirements takes international competitiveness into account. The Federal Council’s 2015 evaluation report gives great weight to the comparison of the Swiss regulations with those of other countries.
We have been stimulating the economy with historically extreme levels of monetary policy for a long time and a variety of headwinds (including the problems in the euro area, a tightening of credit conditions, the drag on activity from fiscal consolidation, and a squeeze in household real incomes resulting from the fall in productivity and higher energy and commodity prices) have all contributed to limit the effect of that stimulus. What seems to have happened in 2013 is that at least some of those headwinds were perceived to have diminished, allowing the policy stimulus to come through and the resulting growth has generated the renewed consumer and business confidence which reinforces demand. We are very conscious that the headwinds have not gone away: much of Europe and some other parts of the world continue to struggle for sustained growth; fiscal consolidation in the UK (and elsewhere) is likely to continue for a while to come; and the financial sector still needs some rebuilding. Indeed, the official production and construction data released earlier this month were rather disappointing, reminding us that strong growth from here on is by no means guaranteed. But to varying degrees perhaps the very worst of the storms may be behind us. Just a tailing off in some of their negative impacts may have been sufficient to allow the economy to start growing again. Interest rates and forward guidance So why aren’t we moving to tighten policy straight away, why did we issue forward guidance around monetary policy?

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
For Sweden there is also membership of the European Union and possibly of EMU. ·  Analytical requirements are heightened in general. Matters are becoming increasingly complex. Another factor here is the new technologies with electronic payment systems, for example. ·  In our case there is also the crisis in the early 1990s and the lessons we have tried to learn from it. I shall now say something about the work we have done in recent years in three respects: Concentrating on cores activities; Strength and security; and Management with an executive board. BIS Review51/2001  1  Concentrating on core activities A good performance presupposes that we concentrate our resources to what is really important. The starting-point here is, of course, our main statutory functions, namely to maintain price stability and promote a safe and efficient payment system. For three hundred years the Riksbank has owned a paper mill and a note-printing works in Tumba and a mint in Eskilstuna. These are largely manufacturing operations. Through the Tumba works, in the past decade the Riksbank has been active in export markets and produced banknotes on behalf of a number of countries. Besides manufacturing notes and coins, we distribute them. Like McDonalds and the food chains, we send our products, wrapped in plastic though not deep-frozen, to everywhere in Sweden. In our case the security requirements are, of course, considerably higher. But is this really something we should be doing? At the Riksbank we decided it was not.

One example is the interest rate fluctuations, which have shown up in the own homes item in the CPI. During 1996-97 in particular, the CPI was relatively far below not just the targeted rate but also the lower tolerance limit. To a fairly large extent, this was because the Riksbank lowered the interest rate markedly with a view to ensuring that the target would be met a little later on. In the period 1993-98 the Riksbank tried to explain how effects of this kind would be handled. But not everyone considered the policy was sufficiently clear. The Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament), for  BIS Review 98/2000  2  example, assessed the Riksbank’s performance solely in terms of the CPI outcome even though there had been long periods when monetary policy had focused on other indicators that exclude transitory effects. In the best of all possible worlds one would prefer to use an indicator of inflation that excludes all those effects one wants to disregard. Unfortunately, there is no such indicator that suits every situation. For example, a tax increase may, under certain circumstances, need to be excluded as a transitory effect. In other cases, however, tax increases should be taken into account when formulating policy because they are a part of the inflation process. Against this background, in 1999 the Riksbank declared that in connection with every monetary policy decision, any grounds that existed for modifying the policy’s target variable would be clarified.
To generate these, consider a simplified version of (9) which abstracts from discount rates, company-specific risk premia and dividends: (11)  Following Wickens (1982), the rational expectation t+N periods ahead are formed on the basis of information available at time t. For each company j, these expectations differ from the realised values by a forecast error ( ) unpredictable at time t: (12)  Adding and subtracting the average forecast error across all companies (  ) gives:  (13)  Actual prices cannot be used in the estimation of (13) as these are not known at time t and . But consistent estimation of are correlated with the error term ( but which are independent of (13) is possible using a set of instruments correlated with the company-specific excess forecasting errors. In the estimation, lagged share prices, lagged dividends per share and lagged earnings per share are used as instruments for future dividends and equity prices. These are known at time t but are uncorrelated with the error term. Five lags of each variable (price, dividends, earnings) are used as instruments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  (c)  Generating estimates of short-termism  Given estimates of company beta and gearing, risk-free rates and the instrumented variables, equation (9) can be estimated to generate estimates of the short-termism parameter, x. This was achieved using non-linear least squares on a set of cross-sectional regressions for each of the years 1985 to 2004.24 Chart 4 shows point estimates of x for each of these years.

These are a key conduit for choice over time. An efficient capital market transfers savings today into investment tomorrow and growth the day after. In that way, it boosts welfare. Short-termism in capital markets could interrupt this transfer. If promised returns the day after tomorrow fail to induce saving today, there will be no investment tomorrow. If so, long-term growth and welfare would be the casualty. Yet, despite its potential importance for long-term growth, studies of short-termism in capital markets are relatively thin on the ground. There is a sharp disconnect between popular perception of rising myopia, driven by technology and neurology, and empirical evidence.4 This paper aims to provide some evidence on short-termism drawing on equity market experience. It is planned as follows. Section 2 reviews existing evidence on short-termism. Section 3 describes the theory underlying our test of short-termism and its adverse implications for investment choice. Section 4 presents the empirical results, drawing on cross-sectional and time-series data. Section 5 draws out the investment implications of the results and sets out a potential menu of policy options. 1  Haldane (2010). 2  Barton (2011). 3  Carr (2008). 4  A recent interim report on short-termism by a UK government department concludes thus: “Overall, respondents believe that short-termism exists in equity markets, but provided little evidence to demonstrate the scale of the consequences for companies and investors” (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2011)).
Yves Mersch: Opening remarks at the Academy of European Law Opening remarks by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Academy of European Law, Luxembourg, 29 June 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, For over 20 years the Academy of European Law (ERA) has provided a forum for law practitioners to debate European legal issues. And the need for such a forum remains strong today – maybe stronger than ever. Shakespeare’s character Tranio in Taming of the Shrew exhorts us to “do as adversaries do in law – strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends”. This is an appropriate sentiment for tonight’s event: the ERA is providing food and drink and has invited me to give you all something to argue about. This is a critical juncture for the European Union (EU). A number of states have re-imposed border controls to stop the inflow of refugees, anti-EU parties are gaining popularity in many member states and one of the largest members has just voted in a referendum to leave the Union. These factors provide a challenge to our institutions and legal frameworks at EU and at national level – a challenge that also legal professionals across Europe need to engage with. I believe there are many reasons why the vision of a united Europe is worth fighting for.

In order to function democracy requires that citizens can hold decision-making accountable at the level at which these are taken. But today we can only elect and sanction at the national level, while decision making is widely done at the European level. Therefore, we have to enhance the decision-making process at the European level through appropriate democratic control measures and more direct election and sanctioning features. The solutions to these issues are not simple, and reasonable people may well disagree on their form. This forum is an ideal place to debate what laws, rules and institutions we need to put in place to strengthen the integrity of the Union. I promised earlier that I would give you something to argue about tonight! I believe the vision of a united Europe is worth striving for. To make this vision come true, we also need to understand the forces behind the populist dissatisfaction with the Union, and not dismiss them. The referendum debate in the United Kingdom has been acrimonious. In striving to deliver a united Europe, we need to be united in ourselves and build a shared EU-wide identity that delivers the necessary democratic legitimacy to the institutions. Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
As foreseen in the central scenario of this MP Report, projected growth in the United States and Europe will be negatively affected by lower credit expansion and greater global uncertainty. This effect will be most visible in the second half of 2023 and early 2024. For these years, growth in those developed economies that are Chilean trading partners is expected to average 0.4%, which compares with the 0.7% forecast in December (figure 10). Emerging economies will face tighter financial conditions, which will also affect the external demand relevant to Chile. The better outlook for China after its reopening, together with the evolution of the copper and oil market balances, has been behind the improvement in our terms of trade, which are revised upwards from the last MP Report. This combines the better outlook for copper prices and lower projected prices for foods and fuels. For copper, our projected prices for this and the next two years are increased. We foresee an average price of 3.85 dollars per pound in 2023; 3.65 dollars per pound in 2024, and 3 and a half dollars per pound in 2025. Oil prices have been quite volatile due to the tensions in the financial markets in recent weeks and their possible implications for world growth. In addition, inventories have been accumulated and OPEC has recently announced production cuts. In the central scenario, the average Brent-WTI price is projected to gradually decline from 73 dollars per barrel in 2023 to 67 dollars in 2025.

Our per capita income was then at RM17,600 (2004) per annum compared to RM37,800 in 2016. And yet, our rating remains the 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  same at ‘A-‘. Rating agencies assess sovereign credit risks based on a long term outlook and at most times are reactionary to certain events. This may result in the credit ratings falling behind the curve and not incorporating the latest market developments. For example, Indonesia was only recently upgraded to investment grade by S&P, more than 5 years after Moody’s and Fitch’s gave a similar rating. Market-implied ratings may be a better gauge of a country’s latest credit profile and is already widely used by the market. In the past 3 years, based on bond market yields, Malaysia’s marketimplied rating has at times reached levels that indicate a better rating than that assigned by the rating agencies. Throughout the first half of this year alone, yields for the 10-year Malaysian government securities have swiftly recovered to 3.9% from a peak of 4.5% last November, post-US elections, reflecting higher confidence in the Malaysian bond market. We are currently the largest bond market in ASEAN in terms of percentage over GDP. The Malaysian bond market continues to be resilient and well-functioning. Non-resident holdings of Malaysian bonds have settled at a lower level of 26% compared to its peak of 34.7%.
We closely monitor industry structure and fund flows to detect whether the framework is having any unintended impact. For example, we watch banking data and money fund holdings to see if savings are shifting between the two, because if such a shift had to reverse as we wound down the ON RRP, those flows could potentially create costs to the firms concerned and also unnecessary problems for market functioning. We also keep track of prime money funds converting into government-only money funds, because if they do so on the mistaken impression that the Federal Reserve would provide a risk-free investment opportunity indefinitely and on a very large scale, they might later have to unwind that change when their error became apparent. Avoiding financial instability The third lens for evaluating the framework is the extent to which the framework avoids augmenting risks of financial instability. In particular, the framework shouldn’t create a risk that, in times of stress, money market lenders will rapidly disintermediate their usual counterparties and come to the Federal Reserve instead, such as through the ON RRP facility.27 Of course, flight-to-quality effects existed in financial markets long before we put the new framework into place – what I’m referring to is a situation where the framework facilitates those effects or makes them larger. We address the risk of sudden surges in take-up in a couple of ways. For example, we can employ vigilant market monitoring to detect any such shifts and allow the FOMC to formulate a response.

The first authorised in Bulgaria providers of the two new payment services started their activities in 2020. In conclusion, we can sum up that the trends in Europe are related to the development of a single European payments infrastructure based on common standards and instruments, aiming to ensure a pan-European scope and reach. Instant payments, which are in a process of introduction also in Bulgaria, open banking, and the increasing use of mobile technologies are topical issues both in the country and in the European Union, issues that we will continue to talk about. The payment services in Bulgaria are evolving in line with the dynamic processes in Europe, gathered around digitalisation, new technologies, and the ensured security of the payment process. 1 Contactless Payments on consumer off-the-shelf devices (COTS) and Software Based PIN Entry on COTS 2 Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) 3 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017 supplementing Directive (EU)  2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication (RTS on SCA and CSC) 4 www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/payment-services-and-electronic-money/eba-working-group-on-apis-  under-psd2 5 Opinion of the European Banking Authority on obstacles under Article 32(3) of the RTS on SCA and CSC 6 www.eba.europa.eu/single-rule-book-qa  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches