samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Albeit for solving the growth puzzle a larger focus on structural policies and productivity growth is called, it is more than obvious that accommodative monetary stance of the ECB will persist in the forthcoming period, as a tool for growth support and for closing the gap between the current inflation and the medium term inflation target. Chart 1: ECB balance sheet and key interest rate (%) 6  ECB assets as % of GDP 40 35  ECB key rate  Deposit facility  Marginal lending facility  5 4  30  25 20 15  3 2 1  10 5  0  0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  -1 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  Source: ECB, WEO and Federal Reserve Economic Data  Having in mind the magnitude of the monetary accommodation and the fact that ECB tapering seems remote, this note investigates the effects the monetary accommodation produces on the countries in the Central and South-Eastern Europe3. All economies in the region are open economies with strong trade and financial linkages with the EU. Thus, there are a couple of channels through which the accommodative monetary policy of the ECB may be transmitted to the  Since 2009 ECB adopted a number of asset purchase measures aimed at stabilizing dysfunctional financial markets.

Distance of debt level 2020/21 to 60% Maastricht Criteria  3  Strong adjustment  No adjustment  4  -10  0  Gradual adjustment  2 1  20  30  40  ROM  LIT  HUN  LAT  CZR  POL  MKD  BIH  SLO  CRO  BUL  ALB  35  LAT  LITH  15 MK  PL  AL  25  RO  BIH  5 -5  SRB  HU CRO  0 -1  10  45  7  5  -20  BUG  8  6  -30  -15 -25  SLO -35  SRB  IMF DSA Debt change 2021/2020 - 2015  -2  -45  *Size: 0.5 - no adjustment; 1 - gradual; above 1 - strong. ** "-" is above "+" is below the benchmark. ***  To sum up, it appears that ECB policy accommodative actions affected the financial conditions in the region. Reduction of the main policy rate allowed a room for policy rate reduction in the region thus contributing to lower costs for borrowing of the private and public sector. Part of the injected liquidity through asset purchase programs seems to be allocated on the CESEE financial markets, enabling cross– border capital flows that underpinned the process of recovery of asset prices and reduction of the borrowing costs.
13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  13  Monetary policy’s record In sum, the macro-financial record of the “only game in town” is clear. It is not just that mass unemployment and debt deflation have been avoided. Since rates were cut to their (then) lowest possible levels and QE was launched, 2 ½ million jobs have been created, the proportion of people in work has moved to its highest level on record, nominal wages are up 17%, real GDP is up 15%, and the UK has consistently been one of the strongest economies in the G7. All major income groups have seen their income and wealth rise. Monetary policy has offset all of the headwinds to growth arising from private deleveraging, fiscal consolidation and subdued world growth (Chart 16). People haven’t been made poorer; rather across major income and wealth categories, they are better off, and at the margin, surprisingly, income inequality has fallen a bit. 1  Why, then, doesn’t it feel like the good old days? Because anxiety about the future has increased, because productivity hasn’t recovered, and, as a consequence of the latter, because real wages are below where they were a decade ago – something that no-one alive today has experienced before. The underlying reasons for the 16% shortfall of the UK’s productive capacity, relative to trend, are poorly understood. What is clear is that the influence of monetary policy on productivity is limited. It can only stabilise demand around the economy’s potential; it cannot increase it.

That’s in part because, to a large extent, the thrifty saver and the rich asset holder are often one and the same. Just 2% of households have deposit holdings in excess of £ few other financial assets, and xxix  don’t own a home. So the vast majority of savers who might have lost some interest income from lower  policy rates have stood to gain from increases in asset prices, particularly the recovery in house prices. Alternatively, have low interest rates meant the rich get richer at the expense of everyone else? Again, no. The data show that the poorest 20% of households have actually seen the largest proportional increases in their net wealth since 2006 (Chart 14), though a large part of this is due to a painful deleveraging (via lower mortgage debt). The data do not support the idea that the period of low rates has benefitted the wealthiest at the expense of the least wealthy. In actual fact, all wealth quintiles have experienced wealth increases. What about the distribution of income? Similar to wealth, and although labour income has been exceptionally weak, the total incomes of all groups have risen since 2006 (Chart 15). In fact, between 2006 and 2014, the bottom 20% saw the largest proportional gains, in spite of a devastating recession. Moreover, all groups have gained since 2009, when extraordinary monetary measures began to be implemented.
Another area in which there is significant participation of women is the services sector which has now become one of the most important sources of growth for the Malaysian economy projected to expand by 7.7% in 2008. Ninety percent of womenowned SMEs in Malaysia are in fact in the services sector. Some of these activities are also developing in the informal sector. As, the formal economy in Malaysia continues to prosper, there is significant scope to integrate the informal sectors of our economy with the formal sector. Deliberate actions to integrate the informal economy into the formal economy will give this segment of society increased opportunities. As part of the efforts to promote greater engagement of women in the modern economy and their increased participation in the formal economy, significant initiatives have been taken to raise the level of financial literacy among  2  BIS Review 37/2008  women. Greater empowerment can be achieved through the resulting greater financial independence. In many countries, the success of various national and international socio-economic reform programs have resulted in women becoming an increasing part of the formal economy. Through the concerted efforts of women's rights movements, economic policy intervention and gradual shifts in cultural norms, women today have more opportunities for education, careers and political representation. This has allowed for increased participation in the economy. Bringing women into the economic mainstream would contribute to the economic potential of the nation.

Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to the South Wales Chamber of Commerce, Cardiff, 23 October 2012. *  *  *  Of the many memorable moments in an eventful summer, recall that balmy night in late July when attention was diverted from the economy by the Opening Ceremony of the Olympic Games. The sound of Welsh children singing Cwm Rhondda on that beautiful beach in Rhossili filled the Olympic stadium. Inside the stadium, we saw not manna descending from heaven, but thousands of athletes and volunteers rising to their challenge. If the Olympics aimed to inspire a generation, the challenge for economic policymakers is to give that same generation the opportunities to make the best possible use of their talents in a vibrant economy. After a period of lopsided expansion, with growing trade deficits and debt levels, and a collapse of their banking systems, advanced economies across the world are facing a huge adjustment. Such is the scale of the global adjustment required that the generation we hope to inspire may live under its shadow for a long time to come. During the course of this year, the challenge has grown as the economic sky has darkened. The storm clouds coming from the Euro area have not yet lifted, and in other parts of the sky new clouds have drifted over. China, India and Brazil, the three largest emerging market economies, are all slowing.
Mohammed Laksaci: Investment financing in Algeria Speech by Dr Mohammed Laksaci, Governor of the Bank of Algeria, at the Japan-Arab Economic Forum, Tokyo, 7–8 December 2009. * 1. *  *  Recent economic and financial developments  The deep and synchronized recession in advanced economies, which resulted from the deepening financial crisis during 2008 and which rapidly spread to many emerging and developing countries, appears to recede. Indeed, the second and third quarters of 2009 recorded the first signs of stabilization and even some signs of improvement in the global financial situation. The massive public interventions in many countries have contributed to reducing systemic risks and uncertainties in the financial markets. However, signs of malfunctioning in the financial sector remain and commercial banks are still dependent on exceptional budgetary support and central banks, in the context of gradual recovery in some advanced countries. Ensuring sustainable growth anchored to financial stability remains a major challenge. The spill over of the impact of the global financial crisis and recession to emerging and developing countries is well established in the first half of 2009, especially in countries affected by sudden capital outflows in the context of high exposure of their banking sector to international financial markets. In response, recovery plans focussed on supporting domestic demand have been implemented in a number of emerging countries, particularly in Asia, thereby contributing to stimulating commodity export recovery in Latin America and the Middle-East.

Despite a situation of increasing  BIS Review 168/2009  1  investment rates, the ratio of total savings to GDP reached 57% in 2008 against 48% in 2004, leading to a context of excess saving rates of 13% to 24,7% over the period. These developments have allowed sizeable reserve accumulation, particularly from 2004 $ billion 43) to 2008 $ billion 143) as a cushion against possible external shocks, including shocks of a “sudden stop” nature. Anchored to regained macroeconomic stability, a large public investment program was launched in 2001 (2001–04) followed by a larger one in 2005 (2005–09). Implementation of the two public investment programs significantly stimulated gross fixed capital formation, with public investments representing 56.5% of total investment in 2008 up from 40.8% in 2004. Over the past five years, public investments (economic and social infrastructure, housing, agriculture and water, others) amounted to $ billion 80 (representing 51% of a total of $ billion 156). It should be noted that foreign companies, particularly from Asia, hold a significant position in terms of implementation of the public investment programs. In parallel, the national oil company (Sonatrach) implemented ambitious annual investment plans over the past 3 years, increasing the annual investment envelope from $ billion 4.8 in 2006 to $ billion 8.5 in 2008. For the past 5 years, the ratio of Sonatrach’s investment to total investment reached 17.6% (17.1% in 2008). For 2009, Sonatrach’s investment program amounts to $ billion 16.5.
But as we move to the next phase of post-crisis regulation, many commentators find it tempting to succumb to world-weary arguments. That any reform will be arbitraged That any insurance will promote risk taking That there is a trade-off between stability and growth  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  And that there will always be financial crises. We were right to reject such fatalism when we embarked on reform and we are right to reject it now. While all recognise that future crises cannot be ruled out, the steps taken in the past six years have certainly reduced the likely frequency and severity of such crises. Where banking systems have raised capital and restored trust in their creditworthiness, access to credit has returned. This central lesson from the US and the UK recoveries could not be clearer. Publicly provided insurance is being removed from the system as the Too Big to Fail problem is addressed and the public subsidy for globally systemic banks is eliminated. Market forces are being restored. The system is more transparent. It is clear who bears risk. And the scope for arbitraging new regulation has been reduced through a global approach to reform that has established common standards and encompassed shadow banking. In short, any serious look at the experience of post-crisis reform shows that reform and regulation support – not damage – long-term prosperity. As I said in Washington three years ago: in no other aspect of human endeavour do men and women not strive to learn and improve.

Solvency II review, internal models and the solvency capital requirements calculation Having mentioned the Solvency II review, I do not propose to try and cover the many topics that it encompasses. I do want to talk about one aspect which risks being overshadowed by the familiar headline topics of risk margin, regulatory reporting, and matching adjustment. That is, the overall approach to setting capital requirements, and the potential role of sector-wide stress testing in that. Under the existing implementation of Solvency II, there are many firms for which the standard formula is not appropriate, and internal models are the near-exclusive determinant of capital requirements for all or part of the business. And those models either have to be approved or, if not, rejected in their entirety, using a bottom up approach of assessing compliance with a large number of technical tests and standards. The philosophy is, in effect, that everything can be modelled, and that determining capital adequacy is essentially a technical exercise. This denies the reality: first that some risks are simply not conducive to modelling; and second that even for those that are, there will always be a chance that the model is wrong. It hinders supervisors in responding flexibly to risks not well captured by a specific model, or by modelling in general. And it has led to huge expenditure of effort by both firms and supervisors in the approval of models and model changes.
Moreover, the persistent contraction in the tourism sector and the gradual decline in the favorable effects of commodity prices are likely to cause some increase in the current account deficit in the short term (Chart 14). Esteemed Guests, As you all know, food, energy and import prices also play a great role in inflation forecasts. Therefore, before moving on to forecasts, I will briefly talk about our assumptions regarding these variables. We revised our assumptions for crude oil prices for the upcoming period upwards compared to 7 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  the July Inflation Report, while our assumptions for USD-denominated import prices saw some downward revision (Charts 15 and 16). As depicted on the slide, in terms of annual averages, we kept our oil price assumption constant at 44 USD for 2016, and increased it to 54 USD for 2017. On the food front, food inflation remained far below the level envisaged in the July Inflation Report due to unprocessed food inflation in the third quarter of 2016. Taking account of the current trend of unprocessed food inflation as well as the decrease in the demand for food stemming from the fall in tourism revenues, food inflation, which we assumed to be 8 percent by end-2016 in the July Inflation Report, was revised downwards to 6 percent.

The committee held its first meeting under the new setup and commenced work. The key agenda items of the Food 9 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  Committee include establishing an early warning system to facilitate close monitoring of supply and demand developments in food products and taking timely actions; enforcing foreign trade mechanisms when necessary also taking account of the sectoral balances; introducing arrangements to improve competition conditions in the wholesale and retail food market; taking logistic measures to diminish losses and developing efficient agricultural financing models. Actions taken by the Food Committee set an invaluable precedent for the joint effort of institutions to achieve long-lasting price stability in Turkey. However, I would also like to underline that food is only one of the structural factors that slow down the disinflation process. We will soon announce our work on other structural issues that cause persistence in inflation. Esteemed Guests, While concluding my remarks, I would like to thank all my colleagues who contributed to the Report, primarily those at the Research and Monetary Policy Department as well as the members of the Monetary Policy Committee. I also thank every one of you for your participation and patience. 10 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is a multi-faceted concept incorporating both higher product quality and lower costs than those of competitors. The erosion in competitiveness experienced since the start of this decade is partly explained by relatively higher prices and unit labour costs than in our trading partners. This process needs to be reversed. One way of addressing this challenge would be to ensure more competition in certain product markets. Another would be to replace the national wage indexation mechanism with a productivity-linked wage adjustment system at the enterprise level. Yet another would be to step up efforts to ease the bottlenecks that are constraining the country’s growth potential. The revamped EU2020 Agenda could be a useful guide in this respect since it focuses on a number of supply-side initiatives in areas where Malta has lagged behind in the past, such as employment rates, spending on R&D, education-related indicators and clean sources of energy. The achievement of such goals does not depend only on releasing substantial resources through a reordering of fiscal spending priorities. It also requires the adoption of micro-level  9  European Commission Forecasts. 10  Sustainable Report 2009, pp. 23, 125. 4  BIS Review 73/2010  policies that create incentives to encourage private initiative and risk taking, that make work pay and that help to change the still prevalent culture of dependence on the State. Conclusion To sum up, Malta has not been unduly affected by the global financial crisis and the subsequent recession, and the latest forecasts suggest that it is recovering, albeit modestly.

But this partly reflects the weight of past decisions and specific factors relating to the reintermediation, by banks, of previously securitised loans. •  All surveys point to a tightening of credit standards going forward. “Tightening” does not mean that credit will dry up, but rather that it will be more expensive and more selective. Banks are gradually passing on to their customers the increase in the cost of financing that they incur. •  We are closely monitoring this development that, at present, does not appear to be, in itself, a threat to growth. Indeed, the recent period had been characterised by an extremely high credit growth rate. As you know, the government has implemented measures to facilitate the financing of SMEs. To conclude, in the longer term, and in accordance with the guidelines laid down by European governments on 4 and 12 October 2008, I believe that it would be useful to revisit the foundations of our financial regulation. This should be done without haste, but no stone should be left unturned. We must be willing to address all the questions and challenges that this crisis has raised. These include the role of credit ratings agencies, the management of risk, market infrastructures, the scope of financial regulation and the question of remuneration. As regards the latter, we should not seek to over-regulate or punish, but rather to instil a sense of responsibility. Pay structures should not encourage short-termism or, as was the case, excessive risk taking. BIS Review 129/2008  3
In particular, because no new entity is required, it will not be necessary over a resolution weekend to authorise a new entity, or to change the contract documentation to which the firm is a party, and memberships of Financial Market Infrastructures can remain intact. But, whichever approach is pursued, the essential elements of the transaction are the same. These are set out in the KAs and are included in some detail in the BRRD: •  Entry into resolution: The trigger for entry into resolution is twofold 2: first, a firm must be failing, or likely to fail to meet its conditions for authorisation; second, it must be reasonably likely that no action is available to remedy this situation within a reasonable timeframe. This is intentionally forward looking; it is designed to allow recovery actions to be taken to remedy a breach, or likely breach, of threshold conditions, when the existing owners and management of the firm can take actions that might be successful in rectifying the breach. But, when recovery is not reasonably likely, resolution authorities have the option to put the firm into resolution and deploy their toolkit. And the BRRD goes beyond this – it includes the obligation that, when these two triggers are met, capital instruments are written down or converted to the extent necessary to meet resolution objectives, putting in statute the Basel Committee’s requirement that capital must be fully loss-absorbing when firms meet the point of non-viability.

Part of the resolution planning process with firms is discussion of the options available for reorganising critical functions in a resolution, whether they are to continue within the firm, to be transferred elsewhere in the market, or to be wound down. Authorities may require firms to make changes ex ante in the way they are organised or operate in order to be adequately resolvable. Structural reforms have been introduced in some jurisdictions to guarantee that options to separate critical functions in resolution exist. The creation of ring-fenced banks in the UK is one such example. So what does all this tell us? First and foremost it tells us that failing firms are not being resurrected in a bail-in. The reality of a G-SIB is that its activities cannot be shut down immediately and it will need to be adequately recapitalised to sustain its critical functions and stabilise the situation while a reorganisation or orderly wind-down takes place. In order to achieve this, firms must have a liability structure that allows them to absorb losses and to restore solvency to the point that a G-SIB can be reauthorised, and command market confidence and access to normal central bank facilities following the resolution. Loss absorbing capacity in resolution That is what GLAC and MREL are meant to help achieve. If G-SIBs do not have adequate loss-absorbing capacity when they fail, then the resolution authority may not be able to stabilise them without recourse to public funds.