samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And the costs of taking this route would be unacceptable. References Bernanke, Ben S., Vincent R. Reinhart and Brian P. Sack, 2004, “Monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound: An empirical assessment(external),” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 1–78, available by subscription. Eggertsson, Gauti B., and Michael Woodford, 2003, “The zero bound on interest rates and optimal monetary policy(external-pdf),” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 34, No. s1, pp. 139–211. Federal Open Market Committee, 2005, Meeting transcript(external-pdf), February 1–2. Krugman, Paul R., 1998, “It’s baaack: Japan’s slump and the return of the liquidity trap,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 137–206. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997, “Optimal inflation targets, ‘conservative’ central banks and linear inflation targets,” American Economic Review, Vol. 87, No. 1, March, pp. 98–114. Taylor, John B., 1979, “Estimation and control of a macroeconomic model with rational expectations,” Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 5, September, pp. 1267–1286. Woodford, Michael, 2003, Interest and Prices: Foundations of Monetary Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Werning, Ivan, 2011, “Managing a liquidity trap: Monetary and fiscal policy (external),” National Bureau of Economic Research, working paper, No. 17344, August. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

While some of the innovations were still aimed at depository institutions, most of the facilities introduced were intended to address liquidity pressures at sets of firms in various financial markets, including primary dealers, money market mutual funds, commercial paper issuers and holders of asset-backed securities. In the end, these facilities effectively backstopped many of the different components of the shadow banking system. The efforts to ensure that the system had adequate liquidity also involved other government programs, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) debt guarantee and  4  BIS Review 40/2010  the U.S. Treasury Department’s money market guarantee. Those programs in effect broadened the insurance provided by the FDIC on bank deposits to other liabilities in the banking and shadow-banking systems. The combination of the liquidity and guarantee programs was instrumental in stabilizing the financial system. It is also worth noting that the demand for dollar funding proved to be global in nature, as financial institutions around the world faced an elevated need for dollar funding in response to market stress. This need was met by the liquidity swap lines that the Federal Reserve set up with fourteen central banks around the world. These swap lines provided dollar funding to foreign central banks so that they could inject dollar funding into their own markets, in order to address the funding demands of institutions operating during their market hours.
If they have considerable confidence, there is little risk that inflation expectations will be affected if inflation should deviate temporarily from the target level. At present, I cannot see that real economy considerations could lead to the Riksbank wishing to deviate from the normal rule of thumb for monetary policy, given the current level of household indebtedness. My own assessment is that there does not appear to be any conflict between price stability and stability in the financial and real economy. The current situation Before I summarise what I have said tonight, I would like to briefly comment on my current perceptions of future inflation. Our assessment in the spring was that economic activity both in Sweden and abroad would continue to strengthen this year and over the coming two years. Inflation in Sweden was expected to be relatively stable over the coming year and then to increase gradually as resource utilisation rose in Sweden and abroad. The conclusion was that inflation would be in line with the target level two years ahead, and we therefore chose to leave the repo rate unchanged. At our meeting in August, there appeared to be reason to expect slightly more rapid growth in Sweden and abroad, which then gave reason to assume a higher figure for resource utilisation and inflation. However, we still anticipated that inflation would be in line with the target two years ahead. The conclusion drawn by the Riksbank in August with regard to future inflation still largely stands, in my opinion.

This involves households making plans for the future and building up expectations of future economic developments, and also there being no systematic errors in these expectations. It is not unlikely that households’ rationalism is in some cases overestimated in the formal models. If this is the case, the conclusions regarding the effects of, for instance, repo rate rises that are calculated using these models may be incorrect. One such example would be if households did not include in their calculations the fact that interest rates rise when economic activity strengthens and that indebtedness and house prices therefore were being pushed beyond sustainable levels. Something that can give rise to special problems in the forecast context is that changes in indebtedness and property prices have a tendency to reinforce one another over the economic cycle. Low interest rates make it cheaper to finance house purchases, which means that house prices rise. As the value of the collateral for households’ loans mainly consists of houses or tenant-owned apartments, the price increase in itself contributes to making it possible to borrow more money. Sooner or later, interest rates will rise and the question is what happens then. If indebtedness and house price trends during the upturn phase have been based on over-optimism and unrealistic expectations among lenders and borrowers, house prices may fall sharply and households may experience difficulty in meeting their interest payments. Demand in the economy can then fall substantially.
Frankly it is not clear to me that this is a risk which it would be in the interests of either the UK or the Eurozone to take in today’s conditions. For the time being our best bet, it seems to me, is for both the Eurozone and the UK to continue to pursue macro-economic - both fiscal and monetary - stability in parallel, and to hope that the euro recovers, as I continue to expect that it will. That strikes me as a more reliable path to the sustainable convergence which the British Government has set as the essential economic criterion on which its decision to move ahead to a referendum on UK entry to the euro will be based. 3  BIS Review 92/2000

The size of the fund and how it is funded is left open to discussion. That’s why it depends on what the European governments decide. Why did the ECB decide to launch a new programme, the PEPP, just a few days after announcing that it was strengthening the previous programme. Was your initial assessment of the situation too optimistic? Within three or four days we saw a rapid deterioration in the situation. Containment measures were taken in several countries, and we realised that the impact on the economy could be enormous, with repercussions on the financial markets. It was a swift reaction on our part. It helped to calm the financial markets and it was well understood. Interest rates are falling in several countries, in particular in Italy. Is this something that the ECB is concerned about? We are concerned about a combination of problems: a deep recession, a huge impact on public finances and an increase in funding needs. This causes tension in the financial markets and, in particular, the government bond market. We are going to remain vigilant. As we have said on several occasions in the recent past, we are not going to allow any fragmentation of the bond market and we will act accordingly. We have a new instrument – the PEPP – and we can use it flexibly in terms of timing and the assets we purchase. That’s why I hope we can deal with this situation.
Your work will be vital to making these new standards a reality and thereby to establishing a stronger, more consistent standard of resilience across the EU. But amidst our work to embed new regulatory standards, it must not be forgotten that the responsibility for running insurers rests with their Boards and senior managers. This leads to the second right idea we are putting into practice: the people running insurance companies should be more clearly held accountable for their actions. It is now clear that in some parts of the financial sector, the link between seniority and accountability had become blurred or even severed. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recognised this when they recommended a new regime for the seniormost managers in banks, ensuring their accountability. The principles underlying that regime are more widely relevant. Those individuals that run financial institutions should act with integrity, honesty and skill regardless of whether they work for global investment banks, regional building societies or in the general insurance sector. Solvency II recognises this imperative. It requires both firms and regulators to monitor the fitness and propriety of staff with key responsibilities in the insurance sector. As a consequence, the Bank of England is now working with other regulators to develop a regime for the key people in your industry. That doesn’t mean we are about to extend the banking regime indiscriminately. For one thing, unlike in banking, there will be no statutory provision for applying a “reverse burden of proof” in the insurance sector.

The tax and transfer fee incentives pertaining to purchase of real estate expired at the end of 2003 has helped encourage consumers to take up mortgage, adding extra boost to its growth. BIS Review 22/2004  1  As for the credit card segment, in addition to the factors cited above, some relaxed subscription conditions during the economic slump and early stage of recovery have contributed to high growth of credits in this segment. Findings from studies on the financial services in the banking sector Now, allow me to move on to the assessment of the services provided by the banking sector - what our customers have to say about their needs - what our customers really want. The assessments are based on the studies and surveys commissioned by the Bank of Thailand as part of the formulation of the Financial Sector Master Plan. In order to move forward, we need to have a clear grasp of what is needed and missing in the financial sector, and we found that the following issues are key: •  financial service availability;  •  consumers’ preference of channel of service distribution;  •  expectations on financial services; and  •  factors driving them away from using bank financial services. Quantitative and qualitative gaps in both credit to personal sector and small enterprise sector Quantitative gap: individual customer group Allow me to elaborate a little further on these findings. Financing facility is the most dissatisfied aspect in terms of financial services provided by financial institutions.
Therefore, this cycle cannot be expected to disappear or to be completely stabilized by monetary policy, which is in turn not advisable. Macroeconomic policies should only aspire to smooth out any fluctuations. Monetary policy, committed to price stability, can stabilize both inflation and the business cycle. Halfway into last year, it was believed that a more restrictive monetary policy would contribute to reduce inflationary pressures in an international scenario showing less growth, but not a crisis. This was based upon the belief that, although the shock which had given rise to the increase in inflation was external, favoring a deceleration of internal demand would mitigate its propagation to other prices, which had already happened with the inflation records of part of the second and third quarter of 2008. However, a massive international crisis came on top of the natural evolution of the domestic cycle under a more restrictive monetary policy. This crisis, as we can see it today, is bearing a greater impact on output than we expected and than the one needed to bring inflation to target; and this has resulted in a change of sign of monetary policy aimed at mitigating the negative external impulse. 4  BIS Review 41/2009  (ii)  Real and financial impact of the international crisis  The global economic crisis has two kinds of domestic impacts. The first one is financial. Risk premiums rise and capital flows fall.

Meanwhile, in the words of the Socrates, the Greek philosopher, “all wars are fought for money”. We heard some good examples that illustrate this relation in last year’s conference. We heard from Prof. Picard about King Monunius, who is known thanks to the respective coin. He had it minted for the sole purpose of raising a strong army, convinced that his might rested with the army. From Prof. Egro, we learned that Mahmut Pashë Bushatlliu and Ali Pashë Tepelena tried to introduce their coins and banknotes, independently from the Ottoman Empire, not for financial purposes but as a token of rebellion or an attempt to break away from the Empire. Later on, in WW1, we see the banknotes of the Republic of Korça, which are a rare phenomenon not only in terms of numismatics, but also a materialisation of the early issues as a result of the war, after the formation of the Albanian state. During WW2, the Albanian currency underwent radical changes. On its obverse and reverse we no longer see King Zog. Instead, Victor Emanuel III is featured and the most significant change is that the Albanian franc was officially pegged to the fate of the Italian lira. We will have the opportunity to hear, during the day, other interesting and important examples in the monetary and economic history of Albania.
In fact, many of those with economics Ph.D.s elsewhere in the Bank started their careers at the Bank in the Research Group. They moved to other areas of the Bank as their interests evolved and they became less focused on research and more focused on policy development. This movement of economists throughout the organization has helped build a deep reservoir of human capital within the Bank and has fostered close collaboration between Research and other areas of the Bank. Our model with respect to attracting economists into our Research Group is to hire people with strong research skills, with the highest academic credentials and who already have or are likely to develop a policy orientation related to the Bank’s work. We give our economists plenty of time and opportunity to conduct independent research, and expect them to publish their research in the major academic journals and to engage with the economics profession outside the Bank. As they progress in research capability, we require economists to apply the skills and techniques they use in research to policy issues. We expect that, as their academic careers develop, there will be a natural convergence between their research interests and the Bank’s policy agenda. This usually happens as a matter of course because the Bank has a rich agenda of policy issues to work on and the economists at the Bank often have unique access to data and information that would not be available elsewhere.

All of the Federal Reserve Banks have their areas of specialization. In my opinion, the New York Fed has at least four that are worthy of mention today because these affect the work of the New York Fed’s economists. First, we are the operational arm of the Federal Reserve, responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. This means we have a unique set of relationships with the securities dealer community and with respect to monitoring financial markets. It also means that we work very closely with the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in implementing monetary policy. Second, we have a unique endowment and responsibility by virtue of our location. New York City is a global financial center, and finance is a very important aspect of the Second District’s economy. Most of the largest global financial institutions have a major presence here. With delegated authority from the Board of Governors, we are responsible for the supervision of most of the major financial institutions headquartered in our district, as well as numerous foreign banking organizations that do business here. Third, we are the fiscal agent for the Treasury and conduct the Treasury debt auctions on their behalf. Additionally, we are responsible for Fedwire, which along with Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), is one of the two large-dollar, real-time payment systems in the U.S. Fourth, we have a unique set of international duties. We provide banking services to foreign central banks, including investment of reserves and administration of foreign exchange swap lines.
Herein lies the tale of the recent long-term policy and strategy statement issued by the FOMC at the conclusion of its meetings last week. The recent pronouncements of the FOMC Many of you may have read that the FOMC did three things after its two-day meeting Tuesday and Wednesday a week ago. First, the committee issued the usual policy statement, stating that it “currently anticipates that economic conditions … are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.”5 There are presently 17 participants in FOMC meetings: the 12 Federal Reserve Bank presidents and the five current governors. Ten out of the 17 people get to vote in any given year, with the governors and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York always having a vote. I voted last year, and you may recall that together with Mr. [Charles] Plosser of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and Mr. [Narayana] Kocherlakota of the Minneapolis Fed, I resisted the notion of a need for a statement indicating that monetary accommodation be tied to a specific date, be it in mid-2013, late 2014 or any other. Instead, I feel that the key should be to calibrate monetary policy according to the state or condition of the economy.

  Longer-term work to assess what monetary policy framework is most consistent with the goals of monetary policy and financial stability. New York Fed economists have made many contributions to the theory and measurement in New Keynesian models, focusing on monetary policy at the zero lower bound, and incorporating financial frictions into more standard macro models. 2  Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Microeconomic and regional policy New York Fed economists also have important opportunities supporting microeconomic and regional policy. These include the survey of consumer expectations, which will launch this month, and the consumer credit panel, which, using raw data supplied by Equifax, allows us to develop insights into consumer indebtedness at the micro-level. These panels give us and the public unique insights into household beliefs and behavior. One example is the work highlighting the growing aggregate student loan debt balance and repayment burden. An important responsibility for each of the Reserve Banks is coverage of economic development in its region. A significant aspect of this work at the New York Fed involves our regional press briefings, business surveys, and white papers. One notable example has been the New York Fed economists’ work in developing a white paper that highlighted some key choices that Puerto Rican policymakers might make to eliminate structural constraints that have impinged on the Island’s economic performance. I’m very pleased by the contributions of our economists in the Bank, whether they sit in the Research Group or elsewhere in the Bank.
However, if inflationary pressures persist, they are more likely to spill over into wage negotiations and profit margins, thereby generating second-round and indirect effects on inflation. In this respect, during 2021 H2, the percentage of collective bargaining agreements signed in Spain with wage increases above 3% rose significantly. Also, in early 2022, a greater prevalence of indexation clauses – which update minimum wage rates if past inflation exceeds a certain level – was observed in sectoral collective agreements. In a similar vein, several surveys suggest that in the coming months business owners could pass on to their customers a portion of the higher prices that they have already borne on many of their inputs in recent quarters. These recent developments will require close monitoring in the coming quarters. Furthermore, these second-round effects would be more likely were the medium and longterm inflation expectations to become de-anchored. Since mid-2021, market and opinion indicators for long-term inflation expectations have risen, leaving behind the low levels of the past two years and reaching rates close to, but slightly above, the 2% target. In the United States, the professional forecasters surveyed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia have recently revised upwards their future inflation expectations more substantially and expect inflation to stand at around 3% on average in five years’ time. In addition, some relatively structural issues have been cited more recently that could have an impact on future price dynamics.

There are also wide-ranging international implications, not least in today’s highly globalized institutions, markets and capital flows. Weaknesses and vulnerabilities in one country may affect other countries and financial systems. The benefits of having a globalized financial system are indisputable as long as it is well structured and managed, but the contagion risks of a weak or badly managed system are large. To create a stable and efficient international system we need good domestic systems but also strong international institutions and good cooperation. I know that the authorities in India during recent years have taken major steps in modernising your finance sector and I wish you good luck in your future endeavours. I am confident that they will prove to be very worthwhile. BIS Review 111/2006  9