samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
National demand is estimated to hold on a mildly slowing path, and there will be further improvements in the contribution of net external demand. This profile would be in line with the macroeconomic scenario on the basis of which the State budget for 2007 has been prepared, although the starting point is somewhat higher growth rates in 2006. As to inflation, although the growth of the CPI in 2007 on average will be far below that of the current year if cheaper oil takes root, it is clear that there will only be significant headway in inflation rate convergence with the euro area if this reduction in energy prices feeds through permanently to agents' expectations. We are therefore faced with a picture of sustained growth and some gradual correction to certain imbalances in the Spanish economy. Yet this scenario is not free from risks in the medium term. On the international front I have already mentioned risks relative to the outlook for the world economy and the uncertainty over the intensity of the European recovery. Furthermore, oil prices are subject to the influence of numerous economic and geopolitical factors, any changes in which may prompt a reversal of the fall seen in recent months. Within Spain, both the persistent inflation differential with the euro area and the high indebtedness of Spanish households harbour uncertainties that economic policy should contribute to dispel. The maintenance of price increases higher than those in the euro area over a lengthy period is a cause for concern.

This has led our export shares in international markets to stabilise somewhat, following the losses recorded in the two previous years. However, no substantial changes to the gradual deterioration in the pricecompetitiveness indicators seen in recent years are discernible yet. Combined with the buoyancy of final demand, this has meant that purchases abroad have retained strong momentum, whereby import penetration has continued to increase. Despite the better export performance and the slowdown in expenditure, the external deficit has continued to increase both in nominal terms and as a percentage of GDP during the first half of 2006, albeit at lower rates than in the two previous years. The rise in the external deficit reflects, first, the impact of some temporary or one-off factors such as more expensive energy and the cyclical discrepancy between our economy and that of the euro area. We may also include here the import intensity of investment in capital goods, although this component may have a more permanent underpinning. Foreseeably, the recent course of energy prices and the recovery in the euro area will contribute to alleviating the tendency towards deterioration. However, we must not lose sight of losses in competitiveness. Reversing these losses may prove much more complex since that will ultimately depend on the economy’s efficiency and flexibility. The labour market has continued to be governed by the patterns of previous years, with strong job creation that has provided for the incorporation of a growing number of workers into the market and a reduction in the unemployment rate.
Of late, however, academics have started to recognise how critical leadership, politics, good governance and institutions are to growth. I believe that to trigger off and sustain economic growth, three necessary conditions are required: •  First, vision and ideas;  •  Second, sense of reality; and  •  Third, good implementation  As the first and second factors are related, I will discuss them together. Vision and ideas and sense of reality First, vision and ideas. By this, I mean that leaders must offer a political and economic vision to excite the imagination of their people. They must offer hope and programmes to rally the people to sacrifice, struggle and work together to achieve a better future. Second, by sense of reality, I mean leaders must have their feet firmly planted on the ground even as their imagination of growth and prosperity soars. In pursuing growth, sound basic economic principles such as prudent fiscal policies, monetary discipline, and high savings must be practised. Many countries' experiences have reinforced the importance of a stable macroeconomic environment and the benefits of a market-based system. Policies on growth must be applied to local contexts in a practical way, taking into account an economy's resources and constraints. In addition, countries must be open to new ideas and be prepared to change. They must not be trapped in old paradigms but must constantly adapt to the everchanging world. Let me illustrate this with Singapore's example. After independence, we implemented policies that promoted macroeconomic stability.

Yugoslavia, Mexico and Egypt had the advantage of being close to the critical export markets in the developed world. Honduras and Tanzania had precious metal deposits, as did several of the other Latin American and African countries. Singapore had nothing, was over-populated and had high unemployment. Many economists of the day predicted that countries in Latin America and Africa would outgrow over-populated, resource-scarce Asia. The outcome, however, was totally different. Living standards have barely risen in Honduras in the last 40 years, and have declined in Tanzania. Tito's Yugoslavia no longer exists. East Pakistan fought a war with West Pakistan and separated to become Bangladesh. Civil war and internal disorder tore up countries like Liberia, Ethiopia and Uganda. Singapore which was written off by pundits as being not viable without the Malaysian hinterland not only survived but thrived. Its GDP per capita increased more than six-fold, better than any of the other 15 countries represented in my class. Why have the growth experiences of individual countries been so disparate? Some of you might have watched the movie, "The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly", released, coincidentally, exactly 40 years ago. Set during the American Civil War, it was about three bandits who each held one clue to a hidden trove of gold coins. They did not trust each other, and wanted all the money for themselves. In the end, the "Good" bandit who put all the three clues together won.
How do we solve the Triffin dilemma and what role will Europe play in the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN)? A more international  Page 6 sur 7 euro will provide increased options to store global liquidity, but the goal will obviously not be to turn the euro into a dominant currency. On the contrary, we would aim for reliance on multiple currencies to offer stability to the International Financial System through diversification of risks. Regarding the global safety net, the euro area generated a quantum jump for the regional layer of the GFSN in creating the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). In addition, the euro area countries were instrumental for the strengthening of the IMF resources and the SDR allocation and rechannelling. The weight of the euro in the SDR basket should increase in the future in proportion of the increase of its international use. Finally, the Eurosystem is already providing international liquidity through existing swap lines and repo facilities with other central banks, and stands ready to do more if and when warranted. 2. Invoicing international trade With the EU ranking as the world largest trading block, the euro has ample margin to improve as an international trade invoicing currencyvi. The choice of invoice currency is a complex and largely private phenomenonvii, partly driven by the structure of global value chains, which are being reshuffled.

Under one important prerequisite: the private sector should play its part in the effort, and we should unlock cross border capital flows for the transition; this is the strongest argument in favour of a Green Capital Markets Union, which I advocated with my German colleague Joachim Nagel x). Except in 2022 and the exceptional energy shock, the euro area had a structural excess of savings to investment of 2% of GDP. Hence, provided we have the right economic incentives, Europe can finance its ambitious climate transition; this final and fundamental conviction is a good piece of news. * **  Good news is also important in what could seem like an ocean of alarming information on climate change. Our natural tendency to shut our ears when faced with pessimistic announcements was best captured by Homer with Cassandra. She repeatedly tried to warn that Troy would fall should they let Ulysses’ Trojan horse get into the city. I don’t claim to be Homer or even Cassandra. I tried this morning to sum up in a fair way what we know and don’t know yet about the macroeconomics of climate change, but above all what we can and must do as soon as possible – we are already in “money time”. I thank you for your attention.
Most recently, the IMF, in its World Economic Outlook assessment of October 2008, forecasted that “The world economy is entering a major downturn in the face of the most dangerous financial shock in mature financial markets since the 1930s. Global growth is projected to slow substantially in 2008, and a modest recovery would only begin later in 2009. […] The immediate policy challenge is to stabilize financial conditions, while nursing economies through a period of slow activity and keeping inflation under control.” Nevertheless, there is also a positive development. Central banks and regulators around the world are now taking coordinated and concrete actions. Comprehensive measures aimed at restoring confidence in the banking systems include provision of liquidity, new capital injection, guarantee of interbank loans, blanket deposit guarantee, and government purchase of troubled assets. As for Thailand, despite the magnitude of the turmoil in the global financial market and the decline in local stock market, the immediate impact of the turmoil on Thailand’s banking system thus far has been limited. This is because the direct first-round impact linked to investment exposure of the Thai banking system is small. The indirect second-round impact via the downside risks to economic growth and financial market volatility, however, will be a challenge and will require vigilance on macroeconomic policy, as well as prudential measures, to ensure continued economic growth and financial stability. Let me cite some of the factors which have helped to keep the direct negative impacts limited. First, Thai banks have low direct exposure to problem assets.

The total foreign investment of Thai banks amounts to only around 1.2 percent of their total asset, and a small part of this is the investment by Thai banks on CDOs. Banks that have CDO investments have mostly sold them off, and all have made full provision and recognized losses in line with IAS 39. Secondly, Thai banks rely predominantly on local deposits for funding, as opposed to the international wholesale market. This helps make the domestic financial conditions more stable and not affected by the global credit crunch. Liquidity conditions in the Thai system have remained more or less stable, though liquidity tightened marginally due to acceleration in credit growth. The ratio of loan to deposits,  BIS Review 133/2008  3  including bills of exchange, has been stable at around 90 percent, indicating no shortfall in liquidity. Thirdly, the fundamentals of the Thai banking system have strengthened markedly, with robust capital and improved risk management. Banks have had solid profit since 2001, with gross NPL ratio to total loans declining to 6.4 percent and the NPL ratio net of provisioning declining to 3.4 percent as of the end of the second quarter of this year. NPLs are fully provisioned for in accordance with IAS 39. In August, the BIS capital ratio of the banking system increased to 15.5 percent due to higher profit and capital increase.
But we are very much aware that both policies may interact. As mentioned before, financial instability may undermine monetary policy’s ability to maintain price stability, both directly by its negative impact on credit provision, growth and inflation and indirectly by impairing the monetary transmission process. Conversely, a protracted low interest rate environment necessary to maintain overall price stability may create incentives to search for yield and lead to local bubbles in a heterogeneous monetary union. In both cases, macro-prudential policy can be used to address financial stability concerns and facilitate our monetary policy conduct. In the first case, where the financial stability concerns are of a systemic nature affecting the whole euro area, those policies will have to be coordinated. In the second case, national macro-prudential authorities may take actions to reduce the risk of local financial imbalances. In such a case, macro-prudential measures may exert cross-country spillovers that matter for monetary policy. For example, raising capital requirements in one jurisdiction may dampen lending in the whole euro area, while a tightening of loan-to-value ratios may simply shift lending between respective jurisdictions, leaving the euro area aggregate unchanged. A monetary authority may therefore have a legitimate interest in which macro-prudential measure is used. Many of these questions are yet to be fully explored and we have to acknowledge that the macro-prudential policy framework is still in its infancy. We are in a learning process.

We are committed to a dialogue, and that includes a dialogue with the people of Scotland. I cannot claim that we shall always do what some of you would like us to. But I can promise that we shall explain and we shall listen. And we shall remember those words of Rabbie Burns, O wad some Pow’r the giftie gie us To see oursels as others see us! It wad frae mony a blunder free us, And foolish notion. Some of you may still feel that the MPC’s decision to raise interest rates was a “foolish notion”. But I can assure you that our mission to explain will continue, and that we shall take the case for stability to every part of the country in order “to see oursels as others see us”. 5  BIS Review 111/1999
“The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14631. White, William R. (2006). “Is Price Stability Enough?”, Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 205. White, William R. (2009). “Should Monetary Policy ‘Lean or Clean’?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Globalisation and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 34. Williams, John C. (2009). “Heeding Daedalus: Optimal Inflation and the Zero Lower Bound”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1–50. Woodford, Michael (2003). Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. Woodford, Michael (2010). “Financial Intermediation and Macroeconomic Analysis”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(4), 21–44.

At a 2017 conference, hosted by the New York Fed, representatives from across the industry came together to discuss how boards of directors assess their firms’ cultures, hold management accountable, the benefits of data and benchmarking, and finally, the role of performance management and incentives.4 Since then, several firms have started to use big data to perform network analysis to understand how culture is transmitted through an organization. Others have further honed their ability to gather qualitative data and interpret it in new ways. There is a greater recognition that there are no simple and straightforward metrics to tell them where they stand vis-à-vis cultural capital.5 Rather, these firms are regularly experimenting with new ways to identify patterns within complex systems that are continuously evolving. A number of firms have recognized that the data they gather must be contextualized. Cultural capital is not a single statistic; one part of a firm could have generous stores of it, while another department or geography requires more focused investment and attention. From the accumulation perspective, building cultural capital means investing in the way the organization approaches everything it does, including defining its purpose, setting its business strategy and risk appetite, training, communications, decision-making, prioritization, compensation practices, and how employees are incented to interact with colleagues, clients, and customers. A critical part of sustained investment is that business leaders and boards of directors see it as their responsibility to set the tone from the top.
I consider that a clear but, at the same time, flexible framework for macroprudential supervision will create the best conditions to counteract future financial crises. But this is not to say that this would be enough to ensure that no financial crisis ever occurs again. The crises of tomorrow will probably have completely different causes to the crises of yesterday, making them difficult to protect ourselves against. However, the scale of the costs of a financial crisis justify making every effort to protect ourselves. As regards the question of where responsibility for macroprudential policy ought to lie, it is clear that this area is closely linked to both the Riksbank’s and Finansinspektionen’s activities. The Riksbank has been analysing the stability of the financial system for fifteen years and also currently provides recommendations for safeguarding it in its Financial Stability Reports. Finansinspektionen also works for the stability of the financial system but with a focus on individual institutions. The competence and experience of both authorities will have to be utilised if macroprudential policy is to be effective in Sweden. While awaiting a more long-term solution for Swedish macroprudential supervision, the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen have set up a temporary council for cooperation. In addition to consulting and exchanging information on assessments of risks and possible countermeasures, one task of the council is to discuss the development of instruments and methods within macroprudential supervision. The joint communication of our assessments in connection with this council for cooperation is a benefit in itself.

The level of the countercyclical capital buffers will be determined  6  This refers to Core Tier 1 capital in relation to risk-weighted assets. 7  FSB (2011), “Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions”, 4 November 2011. 8  See, for example, Financial Stability Report 2012:1, Sveriges Riksbank. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  by the relevant authorities on the basis of quantitative and qualitative assessments. Among other data, the quantitative assessment will take into account the so-called credit gap, which is how far credit growth deviates from an estimated trend. But this is a fairly rough measure of the degree of risk in the system, and other measures and assessments may also be fairly important. The aim of the countercyclical capital buffers is primarily to strengthen the banks and the resilience of the financial system. One effect of introducing the buffers will be to moderate the fluctuations of the credit cycle. In an upturn, substantial credit expansion will activate the buffers, which means that the banks will gradually have to hold more capital. This will restrict lending and thus reduce the risk of exaggerated credit growth and rising asset prices. In a situation in which lending is being tightened, the banks’ capital will be freed up as the buffer requirement is reduced. The banks will therefore not need to reduce their lending to the same extent, which would otherwise reinforce the downturn.
Just as when we travel on a journey, we need not only reliable vehicles, but also skilled drivers and passengers that are cautious explorers, and enforceable driving laws to ensure that we arrive at our next destination safely. The fact that the Thai banking system has been able to withstand many incidents in the past years, including the great flood, the subprime crisis, and the economic slowdown, testifies to the fact that we have been on the right path on sustainability. But again, complacency must be avoided. In this context, our banking system needs experienced bankers with good governance, excellent risk management practices and banking regulations to ensure safety and soundness, as well as financially literate customers. In my opinion, banks, as the first touchpoint to the customers, play a central role in promoting financial literacy and usage of new channels such as digital banking. More convenience does not mean a compromise on security and reliability of financial services, critical for customer’s confidence in the usage of digital channels. As QABs are increasingly interlinked with more cross-border transactions, it also calls for closer cooperation on the part of home and host supervisors in line with the global regulatory reforms to ensure stability of the financial system, similar to enforceable international driving laws. Last but not least, human resources are another key aspect that needs to be continually improved as without sufficient talent pool, the above milestones may not be achieved.

Taking into account inflation expectations, the pricing behavior and the course of other factors affecting inflation, we will maintain our tight monetary policy stance as long as deemed necessary. Chart 3. Chart 4. (2-Week Moving Average, Billion TL)  (Percent)  CBRT Funding*  *Marginal funding is O/N funding quoted at the upper limit of the corridor. Source: CBRT. CBRT Rates and BIST Interbank O/N Repo Rates  Source: BIST, CBRT. The yield curve, which was nearly flat in the last quarter of 2015 as in the entire year, assumed a positive slope in January 2016 (Chart 5). This was mainly due to long-term rates that rose amid the uncertainty surrounding global markets, geopolitical risks and heightened inflation expectations, which also affected the spread between 5-year market rates and the BIST overnight interbank rates. After remaining negative across the fourth quarter of 2015, the spread turned slightly positive in the first weeks of January as a result of rising 5-year market rates (Chart 6). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5. Chart 6. Yield Curve Between October 28, 2015- January 22, 2016 (Percent)  (Percent, 5-Day MA)  Source: Bloomberg,  Maturity (Year)  Money Market Rates  Source: Bloomberg, BIST. Regarding our Turkish lira liquidity policy, there has been some decline in banks’ FX swap deals with the market for short-term funds owing partly to changes we made to the guidelines for the use of FX deposits as collateral following the announcement of our road map.