samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Separately, one of the two largest trade unions in Malta has been running an independent price monitoring exercise, to be followed soon by a name and shame campaign. This exercise involves the participation of mystery shoppers who monitor an extensive list of products and services. More recently, a special deposit scheme was launched to provide residents with a one-time opportunity to regularise their position in respect of cash and deposits not previously declared for income tax purposes. The objective is to mitigate the risk of inflationary pressures arising from the sudden conversion of these financial assets into real assets, which would reinforce the view that the euro creates inflation. If I had to draw any conclusions from Malta’s experience, I would first say that the prospect of euro adoption has served as an additional, and welcome, impetus to fiscal consolidation and to structural reform. As a result, the economy should not only be more prepared for take on the policy disciplines of EMU, but also be better equipped to deal with an increasingly challenging global economic environment. Second, while a successful integration in the euro area demands, apart from solid economic foundations, public acceptability of the single currency, opinion surveys in Malta seem to confirm that public perceptions do respond to a targeted information campaign. Such a campaign is in hand, but the adjustment process is slow and is occasionally fraught with perceptions that are seemingly in conflict with each other. Myths are not easily dispelled!

The Central Bank of Malta’s preparatory process for integration in the Eurosystem has undoubtedly benefited from its participation in ESCB committees and from the bilateral contacts established with many Eurosystem central banks, including the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, our partner in the Twinning Arrangement on communication strategy in which we participated with Cyprus. Some Eurosystem central banks, moreover, have responded favourably to requests for entering into cooperative arrangements with the Bank for the implementation of specific operations, such as in the field of reserve management. As for the public mood, price perceptions will probably remain a source of apprehension, at least in the immediate period ahead. Although 68% of Maltese respondents who participated in the latest Eurobarometer survey said that they are in favour of a relatively early euro adoption, some responses to the other questions suggest that the Maltese are not indifferent to what they hear about the possible negative effects of the single currency. The percentage of respondents who consider that the euro will be of personal or national benefit, 2 for example, is smaller than that of those who favour early adoption. And the main concern is not unlike that in the current euro area Member States. It is not about the ability of the ECB to deliver price stability over the medium-term. It is primarily about a temporary increase in price levels after the changeover, a fear which has been reinforced by what is reported in the Italian media.
8 However, much of the research indicates that globalisation has had relatively little significance for the reduction  in inflation in advanced economies. What has been more important are changes in monetary policy strategies, changes in wage formation systems (with, for example, a reduced degree of indexation) and, as a result, stabilisation of inflation expectations; see, for example, Attinasi and Balatti (2021). However, some studies suggest greater effects; see, for example, Auer and Fischer (2010). 9 [16]  Diagram 6. Global real interest rates have fallen Per cent  Note. Real interest rates refer to 10-year zero coupon rates for real (index-linked) bonds for Sweden and the United States and 10-year benchmark rates for real (index-linked) bonds for Germany and the United Kingdom. Sources: Bank of England, Bloomberg, Federal Reserve and the Riksbank. Driving forces behind this development that are often highlighted include demographic factors. A large global population of working age and increased prosperity have contributed to high global savings.9 These are conditions that monetary policy cannot influence, but must adapt to. As the real interest rate situation has fallen, central banks’ policy rates have subsequently had to be cut to increasingly lower levels for each economic cycle in order to have sufficient effect, especially when fiscal policy has at the same time been restrictive and sometimes tight.

Recently, a number of global shocks − the coronavirus pandemic, Russia's invasion of Ukraine1 and lock-downs in China − have contributed to pushing up inflation in Sweden and around the world, to levels we have not seen since the early 1990s. I think it is of the utmost importance that we defend the inflation target as anchor for price setting and wage formation in Sweden. Inflation is too high. It is painfully high for both households and companies.2 In addition to worrying about rising prices, households and companies are worried about higher interest rates. Will we go from 500 per cent to −0.5 per cent to –  *I would like to thank Mikael Apel for his work on this speech, Johan Almenberg, Emma Bylund, Charlotta Edler,  Petra Frid, Stefan Ingves, Jens Iversen, Ann-Leena Mikiver, Emelie Nilsson and Marianne Sterner for their valuable comments, Elizabeth Nilsson for translation into English and Daniel Höffker and Josefin Poellinger Östberg for data from the Riksbank's archives. I would also like to thank my upper-secondary school teachers at Platenskolan in Motala for their solid education and for always showing their pupils respect and trust. 1 See, for example, Ohlsson (2022) for a review of how war has affected inflation in the 20th century. 2 Inflation also has a varying impact on different types of households and companies; see Breman (2022) for a more detailed discussion. 1 [16]  well, what comes next?
Smart Banking is a platform that offers full interconnectivity amongst retail and corporate customers and allows more personalised financial services and transactions to be undertaken with great mobility, speed, ease and safety! At the same time, under our risk-based supervisory regime, the right balance will need to be struck between promoting financial innovations on the one hand and 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  according appropriate customer and investor protection on the other. In conclusion, it is not a question of whether the tech firms will disrupt the banks or the banks can resist the intrusion of tech firms. It is a question of whether we make the best out of banking and technology by marrying the two. The answer to this question is crystal clear to me. We must move into the new era of Smart Banking by embracing technology and safe banking. Indeed it is most encouraging to see many banks in Hong Kong are already taking the initiative to ride on the wave and making impressive progress in this direction. Ladies and gentlemen, I feel very excited by the prospects that lie ahead because Hong Kong, by virtue of its status as an IFC and technology hub in Asia, is uniquely well positioned to advance and excel. Thank you very much. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

The Governing Council fully supports all steps to avoid the occurrence of excessive deficits and all efforts to reduce the public debt and bring the fiscal stance into line with the stability programmes in individual member countries in order to ensure the credibility of the commitments made under the Stability and Growth Pact. In the same vein, we very much support the continued initiatives to foster structural reform. We welcome the focus placed on these issues in the context of the forthcoming Barcelona summit and we are looking forward to swift and determined delivery of essential structural reforms in the goods, services and labour markets to promote the euro area's growth potential. 2  BIS Review 9/2002
This could be part of a European Monetary Fund, provided that its scope of action is extended beyond the current European Stability Mechanism. -  A micro accelerator: i.e. a Financing Union for Investment and Innovation. The aim is to mobilise the EUR 350 billion savings surplus of the euro area, notably to shore up equity which is the key to an innovation economy, and also to foster synergies, thanks to an integrated steering mechanism, between the Juncker investment Plan, the Capital Markets Union and Banking Union. -  A fiscal accelerator, once we have increased trust between Member States and made headway towards greater economic convergence: the euro area budget could be used to  Page 6 sur 6 finance, for the benefit of all countries, certain “European common goods” such as digital technology, energy transition, security, and migration controls. -  An institutional accelerator: The fourth is not an accelerator in substance, but rather a “facilitator” for the first three. In terms of institutions, we would need first and foremost a euro area Finance Minister, President of the Eurogroup and member of the Commission, backed by a European Treasury; but also a euro area Parliament group, in order to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the institutions and decisions. But it only makes sense if we make progress on the substance: if not, it would be little more than mere window dressing. The latter two accelerators, fiscal and institutional, would require Treaty changes, unless they were to be very limited.

The Fund needs to make more of its presence at inter-governmental groups such as the G7 and the G20. And it needs to experiment with more flexible ways of exploring key policy issues with relevant groups of members, to add depth to the formal exchanges typical of large set-piece international gatherings. After a couple of years debate, the prospects for achieving meaningful reform now look promising, following the Fund’s Annual meetings in Singapore. The agenda for reforming surveillance includes a new focus on multilateral issues, including global financial issues and a new procedure for multilateral surveillance. The Managing Director has launched a first round of multilateral consultations on global imbalances. These are a potentially important innovation in the way the Fund interacts with key policymakers, but as they are still under way, I shall not comment further. Instead I want to focus on the other key area for reform, where there are some important outstanding issues. This is the work now in hand to clarify and update the operational guidance on surveillance, through a thorough review of the 1977 Decision and by designing a new annual remit for surveillance. This is aiming to provide a clear, up-to-date set of guiding principles, and a firmer operational foundation for surveillance. This matters because the Fund can only be effective in encouraging countries to fulfil their obligations if there is a clear and shared view of what those commitments are, and a coherent and transparent operational framework for assessing compliance.
First, by boosting incomes in retirement it will help support a large share of the population as it ages, reducing the burden that currently falls on the unfunded pay-as you-go system. Second, if individual contributions are linked more closely to individual payouts, this will encourage private saving, which, as we have seen, is necessary to close the saving/investment gap. Finally, if individuals perceive a closer link between their contributions and their retirement income, this should help curb the evasion of social security payments. There is little room for tax increases Fiscal consolidation, therefore, is desirable to help correct the economy’s external imbalance; to put public finances on a sound footing while coping with the costs of population ageing; and, above all, to maintain credibility and investor confidence, which are prerequisites for growing the economy. Now deficit reduction is typically achieved through a combination of increased revenue and expenditure cuts. As for the former, relying mainly on higher taxation cannot be an option at this juncture; besides, it generally distorts the efficient allocation of resources. Higher indirect taxation tends to push up the price level and, hence, harms competitiveness, while higher taxes on income depress economic growth. Neither, of course, is this a time for cutting taxes. An option which is at once fiscally beneficial and socially desirable is to close remaining tax loopholes and to engage in a more aggressive pursuit of tax evasion and benefit fraud. We need to cut spending, while rebalancing it The only real alternative, however, is to cut public spending.

Conclusion Mr. President, this evening I have argued that while the Maltese economy is headed in the right direction – a fact that has been recently confirmed by its 33rd place in the Human Development Index –, we must look beyond the current upturn to examine structural weaknesses that are preventing the economy from exploiting its full potential, and thus from closing the income gap with our European peers. I have therefore suggested that we need to raise labour force participation, improve the quality of the work force and increase the efficiency of public spending, particularly in education. We also need to invest more, to upgrade the capital stock. Here, monetary policy is playing an important role: interest rates are at historic lows and bank credit continues to flow. The Eurosystem’s commitment to deliver price stability in the medium term is also a key factor in sustaining investor confidence and supporting economic expansion. Market mechanisms, underpinned by appropriate legal frameworks, must be allowed to work better. In general, we need to open up domestic markets to an even greater degree of competition. In addition, fiscal tightening is necessary to correct current imbalances and begin to reverse the trend increase in public debt. This objective acquires added importance in the context of population ageing. Above all, durable consolidation requires a reappraisal of the role of the state and the tightening of fiscal rules. Finally, we need to further improve the economy’s resilience to external shocks.
In the moving year ending in the second quarter of 2022, the current account accumulated a deficit of 8.5% of GDP, a figure in which the savings-spending imbalance of the government played a preponderant role, due to the income-support measures adopted in 2021. Households also showed a significant imbalance, given the liquidation of savings involved in the withdrawal of pension funds to finance higher levels of private consumption (figure 7). Although the impact of these phenomena has been receding, this will only begin to show up in the current account in the second half of this year. On the external front, the sharp rise in inflation and the response of central banks has led to tighter financial conditions, which has reduced global growth prospects and increased the risk of a global recession happening in 2023. Inflation numbers not seen in several decades 3  have been reached in several economies. Given inflation’s higher persistence and expectations, most central banks have maintained and/or accelerated their interest rate hikes, where worth singling out are the unexpected magnitude of the hikes and the more restrictive message from the Fed. The worsening of financial conditions has begun to impact on the activity and expectations of different agents, in addition to the uncertainty surrounding the unfolding of the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe's gas supply disruptions, and the weakness of the Chinese real-estate sector and overall economy (figure 8). Commodity prices have fallen across the board, driven mainly by lower expected demand and an appreciated dollar.

15  Table 1 Domestic scenario  2021  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Private consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Nominal gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)  11.7 21.6 18.0 17.6 18.2 20.3 -1.5 31.3 -6.6 18.8 24.0  2022 (f) 2023 (f) Jun.22 MP Sep.22 MP Jun.22 MP Sep.22 MP Report Report Report Report  2024 (f) Jun.22 MP Sep.22 MP Report Report  (annual change, percent) 1.5-2.25 1.75-2.25 -1.0/0.0 -1.5 / -0.5 2.25-3.25 2.25-3.25 1.4 1.2 -3.4 -4.7 2.5 2.2 1.0 0.9 -3.4 -4.6 2.5 2.6 -4.8 -3.3 -2.2 -4.7 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.2 -3.7 -4.6 2.4 2.4 2.1 1.4 -4.1 -5.7 2.5 2.5 1.3 1.3 5.7 5.5 3.0 3.0 0.0 -1.4 -3.0 -5.5 2.3 1.2 -6.6 -6.3 -4.5 -3.6 -4.0 -3.3 18.4 18.9 20.0 20.0 20.1 19.9 23.3 23.5 22.8 22.2 22.4 22.2  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Sound economic fundamentals continue to provide support for favourable growth and collective efforts should be focused on raising the economy’s potential output in order to achieve price stability and sustainable growth in the long run. 2  BIS Review 119/2008  By old book, growth comes from utilization of the country’s resource endowment with available technology. However, with the advent of global economic and financial integration, growth is no longer constrained by endowment. In today’s world economy, outsourcing for inputs abundant in other countries and exchange of technology and skills allow for lower production costs and greater potential to grow. Potential output in this era is thus free from conventional hindrance. From the Bank of Thailand’s latest research, the Thai economy has a potential output growth rate of around 5.5 to 6.0 percent per year from 2008 to 2015. This is based on an assumption that investment can grow at the same rate as the economy, and therefore, the ratio of real gross investment to real GDP needs to increase from 22 percent today to 28 percent within the next 8 years. Prior to 1997, Thai economy grew satisfactorily on the back of high level of investment as well as increasing utilization of labor. During this period, sufficient capital formation allowed for an increase in labor productivity. However, in the post crisis era, potential output gradually declined as real investment did not fully resume its pre-crisis level, which was 31 percent of real GDP.

I believe that all of us at this gathering are not dissimilar in trying to do the right things today for a better tomorrow. Indeed, the pursuit to become a higher income economy is not a lone man or lone organization journey. This ambitious goal calls for coordination and synergy of all participants in the economy. And, with everyone’s support, including all of us here in this room, Thailand’s fortune should be as bright and promising as ever. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 119/2008  5
Second, the entire path will be considered when assessing whether there are grounds for changing the horizon. We have also begun providing projections for a three-year period in the Inflation Report. If extraordinary conditions prompt Norges Bank to apply a different time horizon than two years, the Bank will provide a clarification of this. However, confidence and credibility in the conduct of monetary policy are necessary before taking such additional considerations into account. The greater the confidence in the inflation target, the larger the scope for stabilising the real economy. A rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate may be appropriate in cases where there is a risk that inflation might deviate considerably from the target over a longer period, so that inflation expectations might be affected or where heightened turbulence in financial markets or a cost-push shock resulting from wage negotiations indicates that confidence in monetary policy is in jeopardy. In Norges Bank’s Inflation Report, we present our forecasts for both inflation and the output gap in the same chart. The reason for this is that we want to be as transparent as possible concerning the tradeoffs made in our conduct of monetary policy. Transparency enhances confidence in and the understanding of monetary policy. This has been well received internationally, cf. the following quote  8  See for example Smets, F. (2000): “What horizon for price stability”, ECB Working Paper nr. 24, July 2000 and Svensson, L. (1997), “Inflation forecast targeting: implementing and monitoring inflation targets”, European Economic Review, 41, 6, side 1111-1146.

Growth in mainland GDP was revised upwards by an average of 1 percentage point per year for the period 1995-1999. The largest revision was for 1999. As late as in May 2002, we believed that growth in 1999 had been 1.1 per cent. The revised figures now show that growth was in fact 2.7 per cent. It is obvious that such revisions can have a considerable impact on the actual output gap. Norges Bank is currently systematising different vintages of national accounts figures. We can then go back and evaluate monetary policy in “real time” to learn how we should respond to uncertain data. Frank Knight (1921) differentiates between “risk” and “uncertainty”.12 With risk, we know the probability distribution for the potential outcomes, but with pure uncertainty we do not. Thus, there is risk, but not  10  In the opening address at last year’s Jackson Hole conference, Alan Greenspan expressed the following: “Uncertainty is not just an important feature of monetary policy landscape; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape. As a consequence, the conduct of monetary policy in the US at its core involves crucial elements of risk management.”  11  Orphanides, A. “The Quest for Prosperity without Inflation”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(3), April 2003, 633-663. 12  Knight, Frank H. (1921) “Risk, Uncertainty and Profit”. 6  BIS Review 6/2004  uncertainty, associated with the fall of a die, according to Knight. Thus, for a decision-maker, risk is far more manageable than pure uncertainty.