samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Strengthening the partnership between Shanghai and Singapore will bring broader benefits to our economies, and together with other financial centres such as Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Sydney, create a more vibrant financial ecosystem across Asia. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

The second key challenge is on the external front as the global environment remains uncertain. The lingering euro debt crisis and fragile US recovery continue to weigh on global growth. Policymakers are still grappling with deep-rooted long-term problems, and policy response has been met with mixed success. The recent improvement in market sentiments is a welcomed relief and some tail-risk events may have been averted. Nonetheless, a full recovery is not yet in sight, which adds to uncertainty. Given this backdrop, it is important that the Bank of Thailand remains alert, and retains sufficient policy space to act if and when necessary. The third key challenge is that of a recent surge of capital inflows, whose causes are both domestic and global in their origin. On the one hand, the relatively robust growth momentum in Thailand has been a “pull” factor, attracting portfolio inflows from those seeking to benefit from better economic prospects. At the same time, the low interest rate environment and subdued growth in major economies have helped “push” investors to search for higher risk-adjusted returns elsewhere, particularly in emerging economies including Thailand. The exchange rates of these recipient economies have appreciated as a result, leading to concerns in some quarters about the prospect of growth momentum. In Thailand, some have called on the MPC to lower the policy interest rate to ease the pressure on the baht. A few have gone further to question the suitability of inflation targeting regime for Thailand.
In such a scenario, the net result in the short term will not necessary be falling inflation - it could just as well be rising inflation. This is one of the risks in this context. Another risk that has not been discussed much yet refers to a longer-term perspective. Changes create both winners and losers. Lower purchase prices for a business owner or for us consumers may involve a lost profit margin for other companies. An increase in productivity may involve redundancies and that companies which are unable to keep up with developments are wiped out. The structural transformation thus contains not only possibilities, but also social maladjustment that must be dealt with by the labour market, the capital markets, the education system, etc. What does this mean for monetary policy? I intend to discuss four areas that have figured in debates on monetary policy and the ‘new and old’ economy: the effects on interest rates, the effects on purchasing power, the economic relations and the Riksbank’s intellectual framework. It would not have been possible for interest rates to lie at the current levels if price stability had not lowered the risk premium that lenders require for the uncertainty factor. In addition, the reduction in public borrowing and declining indebtedness has led to real interest rates being pulled down. But would this still apply if we had a higher growth in productivity in the future? One effect of higher growth and increasing investment could be rising real interest rates.

We have moved away from an economy marked by detailed regulations, devaluation cycles and national perspectives, to an economy with well-developed credit markets, deregulation and greater international openness. The total of all these changes should contribute, with some time lag, to what has now happened, that is, that growth and productivity are developing more strongly. My point is thus that we should not overestimate the significance of information technology on what has happened so far in the Swedish economy. The fact that things are now going well is probably more due to stability policies, structural reforms and international influences and less due to new technology. There are some people who claim that the vigorous Swedish IT sectors is a sign that no further structural reforms are needed in Sweden. Things are fine as they are. This is a rather dubious conclusion. The Swedish IT miracle is largely the result of three deregulation processes in Sweden. The deregulation of the domestic credit market, the abolition of foreign exchange controls and the deregulation of the telecom sector. This opened the way for the growth of the Swedish IT sector. Risk capital flowed in to new companies from Sweden and abroad. This is not a new economy - it happens every time that strictly regulated markets are opened up to competition. To be fair, however, it should be mentioned that there is a two-way relation between the new technology and the deregulation processes.
And LIFFE do not need me to argue their case for them. I see from the programme that they are sponsoring the coffee and the tea at this conference. As a regulator it will of course be quite impossible for me to accept such lavish and unreasonable hospitality, but the rest of you are welcome to do so. For the moment, LIFFE has a dominant position in short-term interest rate futures and is the leading contender to capitalise on that position, whether or not the UK elects to join EMU in the first wave. It has already amended its contract specifications and from March 1999 onwards these contracts will settle against the three-month interest rate for euros, a move which has been widely welcomed in the industry. The new euro bond market is likely to support a range of futures contracts, as I have said, and it is not impossible that more than one identical contract will continue to exist post-EMU, due to arbitrage opportunities, as happens now between the LIFFE’s and the DTB’s Bund contract. That will be an interesting competitive arena to watch. As far as OTC derivatives are concerned, there is little reason why London should lose its pre-eminent position as a result of EMU. OTC markets by definition have no centralised trading platform and their location will depend on, for example, the regulatory environment, the availability of staff of sufficient quality and in sufficient numbers and the other success factors I described earlier.

At some point, this passive loss of duration will begin to exert increasing upward pressures on the term premia. Over time, this gradual process will tend to steepen the yield curve, with our forward guidance on policy rates keeping the front end of the curve well-anchored. Our enhanced rate forward guidance is a two-pronged statement. There is the date-based element that interest rates are expected to remain at their present levels “at least through the summer of 2019”. In addition, there is a state-contingent element that rates will remain unchanged “in any case for as long as necessary to ensure the continued sustained convergence of inflation to levels that are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term”. The date-based element ensures that our stimulus is not weakened by premature expectations of a rate hike. The state-contingent element, in turn, ensures that the stance will continue to evolve gradually and in a data-dependent manner. The anchoring effect of our enhanced rate guidance was highly visible in June, when the Governing Council announced that we anticipated a gradual winding-down of our net asset purchases. Our enhanced forward guidance helped reduce the uncertainty around future shortterm rates (Chart 7 and Chart 8). Rate expectations aligned immediately to the Governing Council’s rate guidance; no financial market volatility ensued.
However, it is an unrealised accounting loss, and it would reverse if the exchange rate should move in the opposite direction. No assets have been lost. The foreign currency value of the reserves is unchanged, and the purchasing power in terms of what the reserves would be used for is intact. Other aspects of the matter are of greater concern: the negative interest rate differential resulting from investing the reserves at historically low foreign interest rates and the interest expense on the Central Bank’s króna-denominated liabilities, which bear much higher interest. Extrapolations to 2025 indicate that, other things being equal, the Central Bank will record losses of 18 b.kr. per year from 2018 onwards, and the Bank’s equity will be negative thereafter. This in and of itself is not Armageddon, and many central banks have functioned quite successfully with negative equity. Nevertheless, it is better for a number of reasons if the Central Bank has an acceptable capital position. Extrapolations carried out by the Bank show that with various measures and appropriate distribution of the cost of the reserves among the parties that benefit from them, the gap can be closed. Among the measures is the possibility of increasing returns on the reserves by splitting them up into two or more tranches based on term and yield. The question has arisen whether the foreign exchange reserves are too large, or in other words, whether the costs outweigh the benefits.

The Bank’s Financial Market Infrastructure report will be issued early in June, and much is happening in that arena with the renewal of payment systems and the impact of technological developments on banks and payment intermediation. Honoured guests: The legacies of the financial crisis have now by and large been dealt with. We are now embarking on a new period of capital account openness. This entails both opportunities and risks. We must seize the opportunities, analyse the risks, and take appropriate action. To the best of its ability, the Central Bank will contribute to this process where appropriate. In closing, I would like to thank the Supervisory Board and the Monetary Policy Committee for their work over the past year, and I wish to thank the Central Bank’s many colleagues and collaborators for their cooperation – not least the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, and the Financial Supervisory Authority. I would also like to thank the financial institutions with which the Bank interacts for their cooperation. Furthermore, I would like to thank the Parliament of Iceland, particularly the Economics and Commerce Committee, for their collaboration. And last but certainly not least, I want to thank the staff of the Central Bank for a job well done over the past year. 8
I think the gradual and predictable approach the FOMC has adopted has been successful so far, but we will learn more as we proceed and as other central banks reach those milestones as well. 1 My discussion here focuses on the Federal Reserve’s actions to adjust the stance and conduct of monetary  policy in pursuit of its statutory mandate of full employment and price stability. However, the Fed’s response to the crisis also included numerous temporary programs and facilities aimed at supporting the liquidity of financial institutions and fostering improved conditions in key financial markets. 2 The Fed’s outright purchases of securities did not raise any credit risk exposure. 3 The FOMC also undertook a program to extend the maturity profile of its Treasury holdings. This Maturity  Extension Program (MEP) did not affect the portfolio’s overall size, yet still increased the portfolio’s duration risk —an important characteristic of all asset purchase programs. A common metric for communicating about the dollar value of duration risk held in the portfolio is in terms of ten-year Treasury equivalents. 4 9 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  4 Even before asset purchases were launched, the reserve-adding effects of the Fed’s crisis-related lending  programs highlighted shortcomings of its pre-crisis monetary policy implementation framework.

These principles on corporate governance are largely part of those adopted in 1999 and subsequently revised by the OECD in 2004. They include equal rights and a level-playing field for shareholders, the role of stakeholders, disclosure and transparency, and board accountability. Corporate governance has direct implications on the behaviour of the organisation towards its employees, shareholders, customers, partners, banks included. Poor governance reduces the potential and, worse though, can lead to financial distress and even fraud, while well-governed companies will usually be more competitive than their rivals and will be able to bring in investors who will invest their money in the companies’ future growth. I will also add that no matter how relevant formal rules are to the proper functioning of an economy, it is essential to trust in business partners’ word given and their honesty. Whenever this is missing, not only dealings in goods and services, but also financial transactions are hit hard. Given that integrity, confidence and reputation weigh heavily on the economy, everyone pins his hopes on the business sector. Future wealth depends now more than ever on how this issue is dealt with. This is why we can assert that, in extenso, good corporate governance underpins the integrity and efficiency of financial markets. Moreover, for the banking field, in light of recent developments, I truly believe that increased ethics is to be welcomed. Thus, good practices in corporate governance are an essential ingredient of wealth and sustainable growth.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Economic activity and monetary policy in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 12 December 2003. *  *  *  The National Bank has decided to leave the target range for the three-month Libor rate unchanged at 0.0%-0.75%. For the time being, the three-month Libor is to be kept around 0.25%. In the past two years, we reacted to the decline in economic activity and the upward trend of the Swiss franc by considerably relaxing our monetary policy. Now the signs of an economic recovery in Switzerland are intensifying. The upswing is not yet assured, though. At the same time, the inflation potential is small. For this reason, we are adhering to our expansionary monetary policy and are keeping down the attractiveness of Swiss franc investments. We estimate that the economy will grow by slightly over 1.5% in 2004, while a moderate decline in economic activity is expected for the current year. If monetary policy remains unchanged, average annual inflation is likely to amount to 0.4% in the coming year, to 1.0% in 2005 and to 2.3% in 2006. We are of the opinion that price stability can be maintained by tightening monetary policy at a later point in time. In the following, I shall first focus on economic activity in Switzerland and our new inflation forecast. This will be followed by a discussion of monetary policy.

There is still a risk that the economic upswing in our country may be short-lived. A delay in the global economic recovery in the next few quarters, an unfavourable development in the financial markets or growing geopolitical tensions could jeopardise the economic pickup in Switzerland. Overall, however, the cyclical risks today are significantly more balanced than even a few months ago. It can thus not be ruled out that the recovery will set in faster than we expect. Inflation forecast I shall now turn to the latest development in inflation and our new inflation forecast. Annual inflation (inflation rate compared with previous year) measured by the national consumer price index has shown extremely stable development for some time. In August, it rose by 0.2 percentage points to 0.5%, where it remained until November. This stability is attributable to the evenly spread price increases for domestic goods. Inflation on imported goods has been distinctly more volatile in the wake of fluctuating oil prices. The core inflation rate calculated by the National Bank currently amounts to 0.6%. BIS Review 58/2003  1  The graph shows our inflation forecast of September 2003 (the dash-dotted green curve in the graph) as well as the new forecast of December 2003 (dashed red curve). The assumptions on which the new forecast rests differ in various respects from those in September. For one thing, growth in the United States will be markedly higher in the current year than anticipated three months ago.
How Monetary Policy Affects Your GDP Speech given by  Andrew G Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England  Finch Lecture, University of Melbourne 10 April 2018  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Phil Bunn, Shiv Chowla, Fergus Cumming, Alice Pugh and Chris Yeates for their help in preparing the text. I would like to thank James Benford, Tom Belsham, Ben Broadbent, David Halpern, Michael Hallsworth, Clare Macallan and Michael Saunders for their comments. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  I am honoured to be here at the University of Melbourne to deliver this year’s Finch Lecture. Colin David Finch built his brilliant academic and professional career on nurturing international co-operation on economic and financial matters: in his studies here at the University of Melbourne and at the London School of Economics; in his long and distinguished time at the International Monetary Fund; and, in later life, at the Institute for International Economics in Washington DC. Citizens of the UK owe Finch a particular debt of gratitude. He led the IMF rescue mission to the UK in 1976. That, in many respects, marked the turning point in the UK’s economic fortunes. It heralded the start of a long period of liberalisation and integration of markets in goods, services, people and money. The world economy broadly mirrored those trends towards increased international liberalisation and integration.

Greater awareness of these public goods might help, at least a little, in closing the public perception gap. A more promising approach is “personalised framing”. This links a policy intervention to the specific circumstances of an individual or set of individuals. For example, experimental trials suggest people are more likely to pay taxes or donate to charity if they are told about the local or personal impact of doing so. 43  Personalising a message in this way increases the changes of it being heard, understood and acted on. What would be the monetary policy equivalent? Imagine a personal monetary policy scorecard, similar in spirit to a personal tax scorecard, tailored to an individual’s characteristics – assets and liabilities, housing 39  For example, Ford (2016). The Behavioural Insights Team are specialists in this area, see Halpern (2015) for a discussion of their methodologies. 41 For example, Hallsworth et al (2014). 42 Barnes et al (forthcoming) and Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute (2015). 43 Agerström et al (2016), Service et al (2014). 40  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  tenure, age, employment status etc. This would identify the channels and the amounts by which a significant change in monetary policy affected people’s finances (income, wealth) and wider well-being (employment and financial security). Now stop imagining. Figure 1 shows such a scorecard for the contribution of monetary policy since the crisis for the average UK household. In the upper part, it quantifies the annual impact on the average household’s finances.
Banks’ balance sheets became overstretched. Off-balance sheet vehicles without any equity proliferated. Monoline insurers  BIS Review 143/2008  1  guaranteed volumes of structured products way beyond what their equity position could bear. As you know, leverage works both ways. It amplifies gains as well as losses. Amplified gains took the form of the US property boom. Amplified losses are with us now. The whole deleveraging process still underway has meant, since its start, that financial institutions unable to raise capital had to suffer very considerable depreciations on some products, which in some instance wiped out their net worth, bringing them to failure. Against this background, what about French banks? Of course, they are not immune to the crisis. Direct or indirect exposures to toxic assets implied that they too had to record writedowns; sometimes substantial ones. The liquidity shortage is also hurting and the prolonged market disruptions have raised their refinancing costs. That said, our banks are sound and robust. Indeed bearing in mind the following. First, French banks exhibit high solvency ratios. Indeed well above minimum prudential requirements and above ratios of many competitors. Second, overall, they remain profitable. It is so not least because they benefit from regular sources of income. They are universal banks; and as such much less susceptible to funding market conditions. Sound and revolving sources of profits are a vital asset at the current juncture. Fourth, French banks can “manoeuvre” and play an active role in the ongoing restructuring of the international financial sector.

The general principle is straightforward: it consists in ensuring that supervision manages to limit risks for the stability not only of a particular institution, but also of the entire financial system. Its implementation, however, is complex. For the moment, we are only at a preliminary stage, contemplating which tools a macro-prudential policy could be based on, and how these tools could be used. As regards supervision, this crisis has shown three things. First, it has highlighted the merits of having the banking supervisor close to the central bank. The point is not to claim there is an optimal supervisory structure that fits any country’s circumstances. Rather, it is to note that a system such as the one we have in France has proved very useful in allowing for an in-depth knowledge of the banking sector and the various financial institutions. It also allowed for very swift and timely exchanges of information, and, as a result, allowed us at the central bank to quickly pass sensitive judgments, not least on the usefulness of injecting liquidity. Second, the crisis also revealed that, as far as supervisory infrastructure is concerned, simple, robust and pragmatic plans have shown their efficiency. Thirdly, the crisis stressed the need for supervisory structures to adapt to their environment. This is very true for Europe. I guess it is also true for other countries and regions.