samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These weaknesses make it necessary to design specific policies to address this objective and to adapt the institutional and regulatory framework so that the smooth functioning of the markets will drive the innovation and development of new activities that will focus the productive structure on sectors in which demand and value added are greater. As a result of the launch of the new Plan to achieve a dynamic economy and to foster productivity, certain measures were adopted to promote competitiveness (of a sectoral nature), which will unquestionably play a part in improving productivity. The Banco de España particularly welcomes those measures addressing the financial system. However, what is most important is that this Plan should clearly steer reform policy priorities in the right direction and maintain the momentum of reform. The commitments announced must be implemented ambitiously and complement other actions aimed at fostering improvements in human and technological capital and in the workings of markets and institutions. This is not the appropriate setting for a detailed and exhaustive review of the range of measures and reforms required by the Spanish economy. I have referred only to some of the most necessary ones, but this list would be incomplete if I did not mention steps to mitigate the potential effects of household indebtedness and of house price rises on the sustainability of growth.

Caleb M Fundanga: Improved financial services in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of The Barclays Bank Zambia Plc, Chilenje Branch, Chilenje, 9 January 2008. *  *  *  • Mr Fritz Seegers – Barclays Global Retail and Commercial Banking ChiefExecutive • Mr J J Sikazwe – Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chairman • Mr Ahmed Khan – Barclays GRCB Emerging Markets Chief Executive Officer • Mr Michael Miebach – Barclays Sub-Sahara Africa Managing Director • Mr Zafar Masud – incoming Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Mr Danie Nel – outgoing Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Invited Guests • Ladies and Gentlemen I am delighted to be the Guest of Honour at the official opening of the Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chilenje branch. My appreciation of this opening is because it reflects a fundamental change in strategy by Barclays Bank Zambia over the last few years. I recall that only a few years ago, Barclays Bank Zambia closed a number of its branches in several towns and locations. We were greatly concerned because it meant that even the few that were serviced by commercial banks would have greater problems in accessing financial services. Barclays Bank Zambia obviously had its reasons for taking such an action and we cannot fault them for attempting to curb their costs. However, it is now evident that there is a turnaround in the situation.
Closing remarks for the 13th edition of the Regional Seminar on Financial Stability Florin Georgescu, First Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Romania Bucharest, September 13, 2019 Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,   We have reached the end of the 13th edition of the Regional Seminar on Financial Stability and it is my pleasure to provide some closing remarks.  After two days of interesting presentations and intense debates, I will try to summarize some of the ideas presented here.  In this year’s edition of the Financial Stability Seminar, whose topics was “Inclusion and Financial Stability”, we have discussed about: o Financial inclusion and income inequality o Correlation between macroprudential policy and financial inclusion o Access to banking financing o Climate-related risks All these were discussed in the context of financial stability.  Some of the subjects, like macroprudential policy and its effects, were discussed in-depth these days, but also in the previous editions of the seminar. And that’s how it should be. This policy represents a key element in ensuring financial stability.  Macroprudential policy, according to ESRB recommendation, has ”the ultimate objective to contribute to the safeguard of the stability of the financial system as a whole, including by strengthening the resilience of the financial system and decreasing the build-up of systemic risks, thereby ensuring a sustainable contribution of the financial sector to economic growth”.

However, credit to low-income people does not come from banks, where they are not eligible. They resort to non-financial institutions instead, where looser credit standards come at the cost of higher interest rates.  Adequate economic policies will help increase the credit worthiness level of low-income citizens, which then can apply for sustainable loans.  Also, good economic policies means an increase in the quality and complexity of manufactured products within an inclusive economic growth. It means higher research and development expenditures that will determine an increase in the supply of medium and high tech goods.  The global economy is still in a favorable position, albeit decelerating, while the uncertainty is rising. New opportunities, but also new risks and new challenges emerge, such as Brexit, the trade and currency war, the cold war of technology, the debt crisis, money laundering, climate changes, higher inequality. All these aspects must be addressed as complementary to current policies.  Besides the discussions that took place here, related to the soundness of the financial sector and the need to have financial services widely accessible, I would like to underline two main points, in which I strongly believe. 2/4  The first one is that “There is no financial inclusion without social inclusion”  As we look at the development indicators, we can notice, on the one hand, that significant quantitative progress have been achieved in reducing the worldwide poverty across countries.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  17  Appendix Chart 1: GDP per capita since 1750 log GDP per head, 1990 International $  9  8 IT revolution  Industrial revolution  Mass industrialisation  10  7  6  1750  1800  1850  1900  1950  2000  5  Source: DeLong (1998). Chart 2: GDP per capita since 1000 BC GDP per head, 1990 International $  7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000  -1000  -750  -500  -250  0  250  500  750  1000  1250  1500  1750  2000  0  Source: DeLong (1998). 18  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3: Male heights from skeletons in Europe, 1–2000 AD Male height, centimetres  180  Skeletal remains, Europe Sweden  178  USA, native born  176 174 172 170 168 166 164 162  0  500  1000  1500  160 2000  Source: Clark (2009). Chart 4: Social development index Social development points, log linear scale  1000  100  10  -1000 -800 -600 -400 -200  1  200  400  600  800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000  Year Source: Morris (2010, 2011). Notes: This chart shows the average of “Western” and “Eastern” social development scores reported in Morris (2010, 2011). These scores include energy capture, organisation, war-making capacity and information technology.

These well-being measures suggest global living standards plateaued for the majority of the past 3000 years, before rocketing over the past 300. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, income was locked at close to subsistence levels. In line with Thomas Malthus’s predictions, they were sufficient to sustain the population, but no more. 16 For that reason, some have called this the Malthusian era. 17 If you think that’s sounds grim, the picture further back in history is, if anything, even less optimistic. Rather remarkably, estimates of global GDP have been constructed back to 1 million BC, the dawn of man. 18 Statistical agencies were thinly staffed back then, so these statistics need to be treated with an even greater than usual pinch of salt. Table 1 considers growth rates in per capita GDP and population over that longer sample. For much of the history of mankind, there was effectively no rise in either living standards or  13  Clark (2009). 14  For example, Clark (2009). 15  For example, Morris (2011). 16  Malthus (1798). 17  For example, Clark (2009). 18  DeLong (1998). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  population. It is possible the most gradual of advances in living standards began tens of thousands of years ago, around the time modern man (homo sapiens) emerged and Neanderthal man (homo Neanderthalensis) disappeared. So the short history (the Golden era) and the long history (the Malthusian era) of growth could not be more different. Secular innovation followed a lengthy period of secular stagnation.
There has already been progress with privatisation, especially in the hydrocarbon industry. There are plans to restructure and privatise over 500 state enterprises during the next five years, and to commercialise - or “autonomise” - Iran’s state-owned banking system. Trade and foreign investment are being encouraged by the extension of Iran’s free-trade zones. And new legislation is expected soon to simplify and clarify the Law for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment. These are all clearly positive steps. Iran is, of course, OPEC’s second largest producer and has the second largest reserves of gas in the world. It has benefited from the recent rise in oil prices and is playing a positive role in promoting the stability of the oil market. President Khatami recently noted that OPEC may need to raise output in proportion to the increase in global oil demand to stabilise prices. The government has taken positive steps to encourage foreign investment in the petroleum sector. For example, they have facilitated foreign participation in contracts to redevelop oil fields, and they have also signed an agreement with a consortium of nine leading international oil and gas companies to study Iran’s potential as an exporter of gas. The government is, moreover, actively seeking to cushion the economy from future fluctuations in the oil price.

I have been immensely interested in - and greatly encouraged by - what you have had to tell us. Perhaps I might add a few observations of my own - from my inevitably more distant perspective. For much of the past two or three years the external environment facing Iran was a difficult one. The slowdown in world economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis and the associated fall in oil prices - to an unsustainably low level - significantly weakened the financial positions of all major oil-exporting countries. Iran was no exception. The current account swung from a surplus of 2.2% of GDP in 1997/98 to a deficit of over 2%. And the fiscal position deteriorated to a deficit of 6.7% of GDP. But Iran’s response to worsening economic conditions was a positive one. The authorities began to formulate a medium-term reform strategy, which has now been articulated as the Third Five Year Development Plan. Since then, the combination of sound economic management at home, coupled with continued economic expansion in the industrial countries and rising oil prices, have improved Iran’s prospects considerably. The IMF forecast GDP growth of 3.4% in Iran in 2000/01. The external account has strengthened, with a surplus of 4.7% of GDP recorded in 1999/2000. And the budgetary position swung from deficit to a surplus of 1% of GDP in 1999/00. Foreign exchange reserves have risen by $ billion to $ billion since 1998/99.
Therefore, we urge the EPC and CAS members to swiftly agree on concrete proposals for a permanent governance structure with regard to security certification for cards and terminals. Last, but not least, I would like to stress that, from a European perspective, it is of strategic importance to adopt a more coordinated approach to global standard-setting bodies, such as the ISO and EMVCo. These requirements should lay the foundation for a competitive European cards market. However, I personally believe that the European cards market would also benefit from the power of choice. Therefore, a duopoly in the European cards market is not the outcome that I would prefer to see for the SEPA project, which brings me to New Year’s resolution number three. New Year’s resolution number three: let’s move forward with an additional European card scheme The Eurosystem has been calling for an additional European card scheme for four years. Therefore, we are closely monitoring the work of the three initiatives that have been launched. It is important to emphasise that we have not selected any “favourite” out of the three projects, but treat all three equally. All three face some of the same challenges: the  2  BIS Review 159/2010  main challenge is certainty as regards the potential business case. Some clarity has been provided with regard to the sensitive issue of multilateral interchange fees (MIF) thanks to the agreements reached by the EU Commission with VISA and MasterCard.

The potential for online payment solutions is great enough to offer scope both for secure card payments and for e-payments based on online banking. The ECB strongly supports the emergence of SEPA-wide online e-payment solutions, such as those that already exist at the national level, for example in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. In my view, European wide implementation of such innovative ideas is very much needed. Both increased security for “card-not-present” transactions and the introduction, throughout Europe, of e-payments based on online banking will provide more payment options for users. And such developments will also address a problem that greatly concerns central banks: safety. I firmly believe that for “online shopping” the payments industry needs to deliver a solution that permits customers to pay for their purchases in a safe way. This brings me directly to the last of my proposed New Year’s resolutions: New Year’s resolution number five: let’s not forget about security The security of retail payments is key to ensuring that consumers and businesses place their trust and confidence in SEPA. The risk-based approach applied by individual banks may not be sufficient to achieve the level of security that is required at the aggregate industry level. The reason for this is that commercial risk tolerance may differ from social risk tolerance. In the seventh SEPA progress report we dedicated a chapter to the topic of security. By sending a number of ambitious messages we have ensured that the necessary attention will be paid to this topic.
This is a complex issue, which MAS will study carefully, and discuss with the banks. Changes to existing rules can have major implications for the players, so MAS will take care to give them enough time in the implementation, to make the adjustments without disrupting the markets. BIS Review 30/2000  6  Insurance Insurance companies need to raise their standards of professionalism and proficiency. They must become more efficient and upgrade customer service. They must also become as competent as professional fund managers in managing their funds. I hope that the liberalisation of the industry will give them the competitive impetus to do so. Moving forward in a liberalised insurance market, MAS needs to promulgate a framework for capital adequacy that is risk-based and which enhances standards of corporate governance and market conduct. This will encourage innovation in the industry while at the same time guard the interests of policy holders. MAS will also work with the industry to raise disclosure standards to international best practice. We have formed a committee comprising leading industry representatives and MAS officials, to recommend changes to improve the efficiency, transparency and quality of distribution of insurance products. This will include the study of alternative distribution channels such as the internet, direct marketing and bancassurance. In developing the insurance industry, we aim to service emerging opportunities in the Asian market. We will also promote new insurance activities, such as specialised underwriting skills and Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) activities.

It has started to happen, particularly in the US, but there is a long way to go. As the IMF noted a fortnight ago, global banks accounting for 80% of the total assets of the largest institutions are still earning profits below their cost of capital. Prior to the crisis, global banks’ return on equity averaged 15%. In those years, global banks’ actual returns on the assets they held were pretty much flat in that period. Indeed, in the UK, banks in the years immediately before the crisis, return on assets actually fell. The high returns were not fuelled by a better return on the underlying assets banks were holding. In the UK, for example, banks’ assets grew from 20 times equity to more than 30 times equity. Put simply, banks maintained and increased shareholder returns by dangerously increasing leverage and thinning their capital cushions. Of course, shareholder returns collapsed when the crisis struck and risk across the system was re-priced. In the depths of the crisis, global banks’ earned negative returns for shareholders. UK banks’ return on equity plunged to –10%. Today, returns on underlying assets remain lower than they were before the crisis. In 2013, global banks’ average return on assets was 0.3%. For the largest UK banks, return on assets was just 0.01%. Return on equity in the UK, the shareholders’ return, was just 0.3%. Today’s low returns both on assets and on equity reflect a number of factors.
The intensive trade and financial links with the euro area are the main factors behind this choice. Of course, the adoption of a euro-based exchange rate arrangement is a unilateral decision, and does not involve any commitment from the Eurosystem. However, this growing use of the euro as a reference currency, and also the use of euro banknotes and coins outside the euro-area, may be seen as a sign of confidence in the stability-oriented macroeconomic policies of the euro area. The internationalisation of the euro might develop further, thanks to an established track record of the Eurosystem with reference to its primary objective of price stability and continuing integration of financial markets in the euro area. But the Eurosystem does not pursue the internationalisation of the euro as an independent policy goal: this implies that it neither fosters nor hinders this process. It does not mean that the international dimension is irrelevant for the Eurosystem. Of course, we take into account potential spillover effects on monetary policy. However, the impact of the internationalisation of the euro on monetary policy should not be over-stressed, as the Eurosystem’s monetary policy is sufficiently robust to take into account and accommodate its potential implications. At this point, one may ask what conditions are required to complete the success of the euro and EMU in the medium term. In my opinion, the metaphor of rugby is appropriate: by introducing banknotes and coins in euro, we have scored a try. Now, we must convert our gains.

Jean-Claude Trichet: The Euro and the monetary union Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, Governor of the Banque de France, at the Society of Business Economists Annual Dinner, London, 12 February 2002 *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and an honour to be with you today, in the occasion of the Annual Dinner of the Society of Business Economists, in front of such a distinguished audience. I am particularly pleased to express my views on the euro and its prospects following the successful launch st of the notes and coins on 1 January 2002. I am happy to have an opportunity to present my views on the successful set-up of the euro, on the economic and financial integration of Europe and on the challenges that the euro-zone has to cope with. The Euro: built on a successful set-up Set-up of the Eurosystem The single monetary policy is formulated and implemented within a sound institutional framework, the Eurosystem, comprising the European Central Bank and the twelve national central banks of the euro area. Three principles are shaping up the Eurosystem: independence, transparency and decentralisation. The independence of the European Central Bank and national central banks is enshrined in the Treaty. When exercising their powers and carrying out their tasks and duties, neither the central banks of the Eurosystem nor any member of its decision making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.
Joseph Yam: Current issues for monetary and financial stability in Hong Kong Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Management Association Annual Fellowship Dinner, Hong Kong, 27 November 2007. *  *  *  Introduction I feel especially honoured to have been asked to speak at this HKMA Fellowship Dinner, one particular reason being that the Hong Kong Management Association and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority share the same initials. I have, ever since the establishment of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in April 1993, felt some what indebted to the Hong Kong Management Association in its acquiescence to our use of that symbol of excellence, the HKMA, no doubt in the hope that we too would in time mature to deserve the respect that those initials command. About fifteen years on, I hope we have not disappointed you. This evening I would like to talk about the monetary and financial issues currently confronting Hong Kong. I have chosen to do so because what is going on around us on the monetary and financial fronts appears, to me at least, to be unusually complex, presenting risks to monetary and financial stability that are perhaps less well understood and possibly less benign than those that we have been experiencing since the economic recovery from the second quarter of 2003.

I should of course start by re-iterating the firm HKSARG policy of keeping our exchange rate to the US dollar within the range of 7.75 to 7.85 through the linked exchange rate system, characterised by currency board arrangements that require our monetary base, and any changes in it, to be 100% backed by US dollars. With the weakening US dollar and the strengthening renminbi; with the local inflation rate, excluding the temporary effects of tax relief, edging higher; with an “asset bubble” on the lips of many commentators; with the exchange rate hitting the strong side Convertibility Undertaking late last month, requiring our passive and un-sterilised foreign exchange intervention, injecting quite a lot of Hong Kong dollar liquidity into the inter-bank market; and with current US monetary policy possibly becoming inappropriate for Hong Kong; questions have understandably been raised on the appropriateness of the system. Let me provide answers to these questions. First, the appropriateness of the linked exchange rate system should be judged by its ability to deliver monetary and financial stability in Hong Kong through economic cycles, and should not be judged by the short-term cyclical conditions of the economy relative to that of the US economy. The linked exchange rate system has served Hong Kong extremely well since its establishment.