samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the same time, these periods of change are crucially important for economic development. In the centuries before the 1800s economic growth measured as GDP per capita averaged only 0.1 to 0.2 per cent a year. At that rate, doubling the standard of living took roughly 500 years. The change was obviously hardly noticeable to a single generation. In the first half of the 19th century, when agriculture was transformed in Sweden, GDP growth per capita averaged 0.4 per cent a year. Even at that rate, standards of living did not improve dramatically. From 1850 up to the present, however, per capital GDP has grown at an average annual rate of about 2 per cent, leading to a notable change in our living conditions. With that rate, the standard of living doubles every 35 years, which means that a marked improvement has been experienced by each generation. Concluding remarks The points I have tried to make in the light of the historical perspective can be summarised as follows: •  Despite falling prices for IT shares and the economic slowdown in the United States, the IT revolution has come to stay. In fact it has only just started. •  The development of the new information technology will continue in the coming decades and bring about considerable changes in many walks of life. This refers, of course, to new production processes, new products, new forms of consumption and new consumable goods and services. This may affect the location of production and thereby employment.

It has been used, for example, to explain and sometimes justify rapidly rising share prices for companies in the domain of information technology, known for short as IT companies. It has also featured, however, in the view that the economic laws under which we live have ceased to apply, leaving our economies in a state of bliss. Constantly accelerating productivity growth should lead to an unending boom, so that we central bank governors can sit back and stop worrying about the tensions that strong growth usually generates between supply and demand, with the risk of rising inflation. Reality, however, does not seem to have kept pace with these notions. Share prices for IT companies have fallen steeply. In the course of last year the average value of the Nasdaq exchange, perhaps the prime indicator of the aggregate value of international IT companies, was almost halved. IT shares have also fallen markedly on the Stockholm exchange as well as elsewhere. Moreover, a number of new companies in this sector have collapsed. Developments in the U.S. economy are a reminder that time-honoured relationships do still apply, even in a phase of rapid transformation with major technical innovations. An economy that is expanding rapidly will ultimately generate imbalances and rising prices. That was why the Federal Reserve had to tighten the monetary stance so that the high growth in the United States would be subdued. My attitude to talk about a ‘new economy’ or a ‘new economic era’ has been sceptical for a number of reasons.
I think that monetary policy can best be understood in terms of the yield curve. The Riksbank implements its monetary policy by determining the repo rate, the interest rate the banks face when depositing money in accounts with the Riksbank overnight, or when borrowing money overnight. Thus, the Riksbank determines the short end of the yield curve. But the market determines the long end. Everything in between is a combination of the Riksbank’s influence and market forces. The long end is affected by many factors, not merely expectations of the repo rate. It may, as recently, be a question of a flight to safety, which has pushed up, for instance, Greek interest rates and pushed down American, German and Swedish interest rates. The Swedish yield curve is currently much lower than is consistent with the Riksbank’s repo-rate path (see Figure 14). Moreover, the banks’ lending rates are affected by other factors than the repo rate, which has led to increased spreads between the repo rate and the banks’ lending rates. This means that what is known as the transmission mechanism – how the Riksbank’s repo rate affects economic developments – has probably changed. But it is difficult to say how it has changed. On the whole, we should develop the financial part of our macroeconomic models to give greater consideration to the financial markets.

But the lesson that if you want better options to deal with a failing financial institution they need to be put in place beforehand applies more widely than banks. 1 2  RLF would not be available to any firm subject to an insolvency or administration procedure. See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/money/eligiblecollateral.aspx 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  So we need also to think about whether resolution is necessary in other parts of the financial sector, particularly systemically important insurance companies and CCPs. These did not fail in the last crisis. But they may pose similar problems in a future episode of stress. Insurance companies are very different animals to banks. Insurer failure is more likely to be in much slower motion and solvent run-off may present a credible solution. However we need to think carefully about whether we can rely wholly on that and what, if any, systemic risks could arise from insolvency of a major insurance company. Given the relatively small amount of debt in insurance companies relative to policy liabilities, who should bear the losses in resolution? And what tools are needed to allocate them? The answers to these questions are not yet fully apparent, though in my view, the case is probably made for a resolution regime for insurers, if only as a precaution should it turn out that run-off is not enough. CCPs CCPs are also very different to banks.
This might arise because the pool of workers willing to enter the labour force at the existing wage rate has increased – for example, older workers prepared to work longer than they had planned or workers from overseas moving into the UK labour force. There is evidence of many of these trends intensifying over the past few years. For example, the unemployment rate among 18-to-24 year olds has fallen by almost 4 percentage points over the past year. The trend in labour force participation rate has picked up significantly among women and older cohorts over the same period. And net migration to the UK was estimated to be almost 300,000 in the year to September 2014, almost double the level two years earlier. 7  8  For example, Weale (2015). BIS central bankers’ speeches  There is evidence, in the UK and internationally, to support the Phillips curve having flattened over time. For example, cross-country evidence from the IMF suggests that the slope of the price Phillips curve has fallen, from around one in the 1970s to 0.1–0.2 today (Chart 16). That could reflect the effects of globalisation, enhancing competition in domestic labour and product markets.8 The implications of a flatter Phillips curve for future wage growth and inflation can be assessed by rerunning the projections from the MPC’s February Inflation Report. Specifically, assume a halving of the Phillips curve slope used in the model of Chart 15, from 1 to 0.5.9 That slope is still well above the levels in Chart 16.

Bottlenecks may arise in some sectors of the economy, and the sharp rise in property prices and borrowing may persist for a longer period. This could be a source of instability in demand, output and inflation in the somewhat longer run. This implies, in isolation, a higher interest rate. At the same time, the current rate of inflation is low, and there are prospects of low inflation for a period ahead. The objective of bringing inflation back to the target of 2½ per cent and anchoring inflation expectations imply a continued expansionary monetary policy. The monetary policy assessments presented by Norges Bank in March indicated that the interest rate will rise after a period and at a gradual pace. Economic developments since then have been broadly in line with expectations. International key rates are rising, albeit slowly and from a low level. Although a gradual rise in the interest rate seems to provide a good balance between the different objectives, the Executive Board concluded that it is too early to increase the interest rate at this monetary policy meeting. The Executive Board decided yesterday, 20 April, to leave the interest rate unchanged at 1.75 per cent. The Executive Board weighed the objective of bringing inflation back to target and stable inflation expectations against the risk that output growth may eventually be too high. BIS Review 27/2005  7
But structural factors are also playing a role: higher import volumes as a result of advanced globalisation have increased the importance of international prices relative to domestic prices, forcing domestic mark-ups to be less sensitive to the state of the domestic economy. This may imply that monetary policy has to react more aggressively to counteract shocks. So in combination, central banks may be facing a two-pronged challenge to their mandates: a situation where, due to the role of global inflation, more stimulus is needed than in the past to deliver their domestic mandates; and where, due to the falling equilibrium interest rates, their ability to deliver that stimulus is more constrained. That would certainly offer one explanation for why monetary policy has needed to stay accommodative for so long across advanced economies. This does not make monetary policy ineffective. As we have seen in the euro area, even with a low equilibrium rate central banks can still steer conditions in the wider economy by targeting directly the constellation of interest rates that matter for borrowers. But one nonetheless cannot deny that the fall in the equilibrium rate poses a challenge for central banks. This challenge for monetary policy has been recognised, with a number of innovative solutions proposed by academics. Let me mention two but also say upfront that I am not particularly convinced by any of them. One option that has been mooted is to allow nominal interest rates to go deeper into negative territory.

When it comes to monetary policy, we must restore balance to the economy and bring inflation down to 2 percent on a sustained basis. Earlier this month, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 4-1/2 to 4-3/4 percent, the eighth consecutive increase. The FOMC said it anticipates "ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time. In determining the extent of future increases in the target range, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments. "3 The Committee also said it will continue to reduce its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, according to the framework it announced last May.4  3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  One aspect of inflation that's important for achieving and sustaining price stability is the anchoring of inflation expectations.
See also, for instance, Amtenbrink, F. (1999), The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks, Hart Publishing; and De Haan, J., Amtenbrink, F., Eijffinger S.C.W. (1999), “Accountability of central banks: aspects and quantification”, PLS Quarterly Review, Vol. 52, No 209. [16]Issing, O. (1999), “The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or ‘Willem in Euroland’”, Journal of Common  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  Market Studies, Vol. 39(3): 503-19; Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2000), “The Institutional Glossary of the Eurosystem”, ZEI Working Paper, No B-16; and ECB (2002), “The accountability of the European Central Bank”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, November. [17]The Governing Council’s quantitative definition of price stability is as follows: "Price stability is defined as a year-onyear increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%." [18]Issing, O. (1999), “The Eurosystem: Transparent and Accountable or “Willem in Euroland””, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(3): 503-19; Padoa-Schioppa, T. (2000), “The Institutional Glossary of the Eurosystem”, ZEI working paper No. B-16, and; ECB (2002), “The accountability of the European Central Bank”, ECB Monthly Bulletin November 2002. [19]Padoa-Schioppa, T. “  An institutional glossary of the Eurosystem” presented at the conference on "The Constitution of the Eurosystem: the Views of the EP and the ECB", 8 March 2000.

[52]See Article 5 of the SSM Regulation. [53]Article 13h of the ECB’s Rules of Procedure. [54]On the reciprocity of macroprudential policy measures in the EU, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2016),  Financial Stability Review 2016, pp. 45-46. [55]See, for instance, de Larosière, J. (2009),  Report of the High Level Group on Financial Banking Supervision in the EU, p. 39. [56]Drehmann, M., Borio, C., and Tstasaronis, K. (2012), “Characterising the financial cycle: don’t lose sight of the medium term!”, BIS Working Papers, No 380, Bank for International Settlements; and Rünstler, G., and Vlekke, M. (2016), “Business, housing and credit cycles”, Working Paper Series, No 1915, ECB. [57]See Issing, O., “Monetary and financial stability – is there a trade-off?”, speech at Conference on “Monetary Stability and the Business Cycle”, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, 28-29 March 2003. [58]See ECB (2016), Macroprudential Bulletin, Issue 1/2016, ECB, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Chapter 1.  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]
Peter Pang: Pilot platform for cross-border investment and settlement of debt securities Remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary, at the Press Conference on Pilot Platform for Cross-border Investment and Settlement of Debt Securities – Hong Kong, Malaysia and Euroclear Bank, Hong Kong, 13 March 2012. *  *  *  Deputy Governor Muhammad Ibrahim, Mr Anso Thiré, ladies and gentlemen, Good afternoon. Let me welcome you all to this press conference to announce the launch of the strategic alliance of the cross-border bond investment and settlement platforms in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Euroclear Bank. The Pilot Platform to be launched on 30 March under this strategic alliance goes well beyond commercial cooperation amongst the partners. It will advance the important policy objectives of fostering bond market development and promoting financial stability at both global and regional levels. There are strong demand and supply side factors that focus global investors’ attention on bond markets in Asia. On the demand side, the European sovereign debt problems and successive downgrades of sovereign credit ratings of the advanced economies underscore the need for geographical diversification by global investors. Asia is the obvious choice as it stands out as the bright spot and engine for global growth. According to IMF’ s forecast, emerging Asia, with China as the core, will contribute about 57% of the world’ s GDP growth by 2016. Augmenting this favourable demand factor is the improved credit ratings of Asian sovereign issuers.

Moreover, we see a pick-up in consumption of durable goods as confidence increases, aided in part by the continued strong growth of farm income by 21.1 percent during the first quarter of 2008. As for the strength of the investment engine, private investment indicators have continued the uptrend while investor confidence has been boosted by the public investment plan over the next 5 years. During the first three months of this year, the Private Investment Index was up by 7.2 percent from the same quarter of 2007. Though we know that actual disbursement  BIS Review 63/2008  1  of government investment expenditure may not occur till the final quarter of this year, the strong government commitment has already led to stronger investor confidence. Additional expenditure for land acquisition for mega projects would also boost domestic demand to some degree. This should prompt the pent-up demand for private investment, which has been held back over the past several years, to begin to materialize. Turning to the external sector, the strong trading partners’ demand, seen in 2007, will unlikely reoccur in 2008. The world now expects the US economy to weaken substantially. Clearly, we will have to wait quite sometime for the clear upturn of the US economy after the US Fed’s sharp and substantial interest rate cuts to shore up the economy and confidence.
Yet the persistence of low inflation and the financial implications of normalisation call for a gradual approach. The experience of the “taper tantrum” episode in the US, in 2013, showed us that markets can rapidly shift their sentiment and prompt an abrupt adjustment of financial variables. Predictability and a clear communication strategy will be important in order to avoid adverse market reactions. It will also help mitigate spillover effects in third countries. In any case, emerging economies are now better prepared to manage this new context, given their enhanced resilience and stronger growth outlook. At the same time, we have to be vigilant regarding the signs of overvaluation of asset prices, the underpricing of risk and the exceptionally low levels of expected volatility.  Risk of overburdening monetary policy: It is important to stress that we should avoid overburdening monetary policy. Secular stagnation requires an overall policy strategy: in particular, both fiscal policy and structural reforms have an important role to play in supporting demand, and in raising productivity and potential growth. 2. Implementing new financial regulation   Safer scenario / implementation challenge. The new micro and macroprudential regulations and the strengthened supervisory framework provide a safer scenario for the financial sector. There are higher capital requirements for financial institutions and enhanced supervision, including new instruments for early identification of financial risks.

Financial markets experienced a sudden stop in the fall of 2008. The decline in global banking activity has been particularly pronounced in cross-border positions vis-à-vis advanced economies, which declined by 20% between 2008 and 2017, whereas cross-border lending to emerging market economies increased by 44% during the same period (primarily driven by very strong lending to China).  Global Financial Crisis. During the years of expansion of the so-called Great Moderation, from the mid-80s until the crisis, the global economy was progressively accumulating high levels of debt and leverage, assisted by easy financing conditions and the underpricing of risk. This led to increased vulnerability of the global economy and to the accumulation of bubbles, mainly in the financial and real estate sectors in advanced economies. What took us all by surprise was the intense depth and global nature of the crisis that exploded in 2008. In a context of high integration and complex interconnections between financial institutions, instability spread rapidly across markets and economies, leading to the most serious global financial crisis of the last 80 years. In the European Union, the crisis was exacerbated by a double-dip recession, which hindered our recovery period and revealed as well the weakness of the institutional framework of the euro area.  Technological change. In the 21st century we have seen an explosion of technological changes that are reshaping the global economy: internet, e-commerce, mobile phones, artificial intelligence and big data.
This was a clear break with the earlier arrangement where the management was closer to that of a conventional company with a managing director and a board that exercised control and took the overriding decisions. I should like to conclude with some remarks on the challenges this change involved. As regards monetary policy, it was not all that difficult. In the light of experience from the German, British and American central banks, for example, we had drawn up proposals for working procedures which we have largely adhered to. Our internal process is very open and the staff are deeply involved. The minutes of the Executive Board's monetary policy discussions are published, which dispels any sense of mystery. At the same time, a better foundation is hopefully provided for a discussion of monetary policy in society in general. The matter of internal control has been trickier. One alternative would be to treat the Executive Board as a board of directors; that, however, would have meant working with as many as 18 chief executives in the form of the heads of department. Another possibility would be to see ourselves as chief executives but that, too, has its pros and cons; few organisations have six chief executives, presumably for very good reasons. Perhaps the closest parallel is the board of a group with a number of subsidiaries. In practice we have adopted a variety of approaches.

For Sweden there is also membership of the European Union and possibly of EMU. ·  Analytical requirements are heightened in general. Matters are becoming increasingly complex. Another factor here is the new technologies with electronic payment systems, for example. ·  In our case there is also the crisis in the early 1990s and the lessons we have tried to learn from it. I shall now say something about the work we have done in recent years in three respects: Concentrating on cores activities; Strength and security; and Management with an executive board. BIS Review51/2001  1  Concentrating on core activities A good performance presupposes that we concentrate our resources to what is really important. The starting-point here is, of course, our main statutory functions, namely to maintain price stability and promote a safe and efficient payment system. For three hundred years the Riksbank has owned a paper mill and a note-printing works in Tumba and a mint in Eskilstuna. These are largely manufacturing operations. Through the Tumba works, in the past decade the Riksbank has been active in export markets and produced banknotes on behalf of a number of countries. Besides manufacturing notes and coins, we distribute them. Like McDonalds and the food chains, we send our products, wrapped in plastic though not deep-frozen, to everywhere in Sweden. In our case the security requirements are, of course, considerably higher. But is this really something we should be doing? At the Riksbank we decided it was not.