samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In a hyper-connected, capital-light world, the future may increasingly belong to small and medium-sized firms, with platforms (such as taskrabbit, Amazon, Etsy, Shopify, and SamaHub) giving them direct stakes in local and global markets. The financial implications of these developments are only beginning to be realised, but they are likely to be immense. In anticipation, the Bank is already creating the new hard and soft infrastructure that the new finance will require. For example, the Bank of England is in the midst of an ambitious rebuild of the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system – the backbone of every payment in the UK. There are three ways the Bank’s new RTGS will provide a platform for private innovation. Each will make it easier for people to plug in and pay, even across borders. First, RTGS is being re-built so that new private payment systems, including those using distributed ledger, can simply plug into our system. Our new, hard infrastructure will be future-proofed to your imaginations, opening up a range of potential innovations in wholesale markets, and corporate banking and retail services. We have just opened up direct access to RTGS to a new generation of non-bank payment service providers (PSPs). No longer will access to central bank money be the exclusive preserve of banks. Several non-bank PSPs, focused on retail and corporate services, are applying currently. The electronic money flowing through their systems will become more like its physical relative. Electronic payments are becoming instantaneous by using QR codes or mobile phone numbers.

Pay distributions between whites and ethnic minorities show fewer differences. Chart 5: Distribution of hourly pay by gender and ethnicity  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Chart 6 plots the mean hourly pay by decile for different ethnicity and gender groups. In 1997, white males earned more than all other groups, on average, across the entire distribution. The same is broadly true in 2018, except that ethnic minority males now earn more in the top decile. Females continue to earn less than males right across the distribution. The difference between white females and ethnic minority females is relatively small across the distribution. Chart 6: Mean hourly pay by decile for ethnicity and gender interaction groups  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. (c)  Unconditional gender and ethnicity pay gaps  Unconditional gender and ethnicity pay gaps are calculated as the difference between median male (white) gross hourly earnings and median female (non-white) earnings, divided by median male (white) earnings.8 As with published pay gaps for companies, these measures make no attempt, at this stage, to control for factors driving or explaining these gaps; they are unconditional pay gaps. The unconditional gender pay gap is large over the sample, averaging just over 22% (Chart 7). This gap has shrunk over the past 25 years, from around 30% in the mid-1990s to around 20% in 2018.
The existing size of the sterling T-bill and gilt repo markets may, however, limit the extent to which this solution would be achievable in sufficient scale to meet the needs of sterling investors, at least in the near term. And this would of course also have significant implications for the funding of banks. Second, at the other extreme, the liquidity mismatch could be removed by making funds nondaily dealing – i.e. not cash on demand. This would require a term notice period. Such a fund would be somewhat like a term deposit with no break clause. This would fundamentally change the potential uses for which MMFs could be held, and so would also have repercussions for the demand for other instruments, such as bank deposits, the implications of which would require further consideration. Third, there may be a middle option whereby a combination of measures are used to reduce the risks to a sufficiently low level. We have a menu of options to choose from. For instance, a limit could be introduced on the percentage of assets a money market fund could hold in nongovernment instruments, to reduce the holding of less liquid assets. This could be combined with making sure funds are structured as variable net asset value, albeit with this asset mix the variability of the value in the fund should be lessened. And we would need to ensure the absence of regulatory cliff-edges, so that funds could be more confident to release their cash buffers in times of stress to meet withdrawals.

In total, sterling money market funds saw outflows of around £ or 10% of their total assets, in the eight days between 12th and 20th March last year. At first, the outflows were met by running down their holdings of cash, but as the outflows increased, they sought to liquidate some 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  of their bank assets – CDs and CP. But they found that the market for those assets – which typically comes primarily from dealers buying back their own paper – was closed. The dash for cash meant that the tide was flowing fast against them. As the regulatory system currently works, if MMFs’ liquid asset ratios fall towards prescribed thresholds, and they are unable to top up their liquid assets (cash) through sales, they are able to ‘gate’ or impose fees on investors, in other words decline to provide immediate liquidity. As with banks, the broader danger of this situation – which is a threat to financial stability – is that such a problem in one fund could trigger contagion to other funds, through fear that they might have the same problem, and thus lead to a highly destabilising run on money market funds. These thresholds can, therefore, also affect the behaviour of fund managers, making liquidity buffers not usable in times of stress, for fear this would fuel investors’ desire to run.
Speaking in April 2002, a year after the collapse of the high-technology boom and looking ahead to the next upturn in the economic cycle, I observed that when the tide eventually rose, it would not necessarily raise all boats. Countries which benefited most would likely be those who made the greatest effort to adapt to evolving market conditions. The tide has risen, even higher than expected. Global GDP is likely to increase by up to 5% this year, its strongest pace for a generation. This growth is being largely led by robust consumer spending in the United States and booming corporate investment in China, but Japan is also growing fast and even the euro area is showing signs of recovery, while emerging economies as a group are enjoying their fastest growth for at least twenty-five years. In sharp contrast, the Maltese economy is again this year likely to post one of the slowest growth rates in the EU. Returning the economy to a sustainable growth path closer to its potential rate must, therefore, be a priority objective. How should it be pursued? In today’s highly competitive global economy, there are no quick fixes or painless options that will produce greater economic efficiency, enhanced welfare and higher living standards. We must simply work harder and longer, and give more value for money. The temptation to postpone decisive action must be resisted. We should be encouraged by the knowledge that other countries have succeeded in overcoming similar, even tougher challenges.

In other words, the average annual increase in expenditures during the next three years must not exceed Lm5 million, which is just one-tenth of the present growth rate. This implies that measures must be put in place now that would by 2007 reduce expenditures by Lm150 million. Required expenditure and taxation reforms The attainment of this objective clearly requires extensive reforms. In this context, I would like to propose some policy orientations which would help to reduce the deficit to the planned level. For this purpose, it is useful to look at government expenditure from two perspectives. The first is in terms of what it is buying. The second focuses on what such expenditure is achieving. The first of these approaches helps to identify the potential for savings. This year over 20% of total spending, some Lm200 million, will go towards wages and salaries and another 10% will go to public sector bodies, again largely to finance human resource costs. In short, the public sector wage and salary bill absorbs close to one-third of total budgetary expenditures. Against this background it is imperative that the current negotiations for the renewal of collective agreements in the civil service and in the public sector recognize the need to cut spending. It is important that any wage increases be matched by measurable productivity improvements. It is equally necessary to make better use of the human resources available by strengthening both the management culture and work practices.
This will increase the confidence in the financial system as a "conditio sine qua non" for the functioning of the financial markets. In the case of Macedonia, which follows and will appropriately adjust to the changes in the world financial system, the crisis emphasized the existing weaknesses of the macroeconomic reality: the high import dependence of the economy, high export concentration, vulnerability of the sources of financing of the balance of payments deficit and currency risk, which can be easily transformed into a credit risk as a threat to the financial stability. Therefore, in a short run, we have to maintain the appropriate level of foreign reserves, as a precondition for maintaining the confidence in the stability of the domestic currency. In a medium run, more serious structural adjustments are needed, which will lead to narrowing of the trade deficit, primarily through increased export, which will enable higher growth rates of the economy and  6  BIS Review 127/2009  containing of the significance of the vulnerable sources of financing of the current account deficit. As a conclusion, Macedonia has succeeded in maintaining the confidence in the financial system, i.e. in the banking system. That was possible due to the prudential macroeconomic policies and sound supervision of banks. However, the struggle for maintaining the confidence is a constant effort. Risk management is never a completed process. We should always have in mind that the costs for regaining the lost confidence are always and everywhere incomparably higher than the investment in its maintaining.

On one hand, it implies that the speed of the disinflation process may need to take the "catching-up" component into account and that the monetary policy objectives in accession countries might need to be different from those applied to high-income countries or to the euro area for some time. On the other hand, it also means that other macroeconomic and microeconomic factors (including a relatively loose policy-mix, wage inertia, stubborn inflation expectations) as well as transition-related factors (price liberalisation, privatisation) continue to play a key role in explaining inflation outcomes in many accession countries and that, therefore, the persistence of inflation differentials with the euro area cannot be attributed to the Balassa-Samuelson effect alone. Also with regard to real convergence, the challenges are significant. Income levels in accession countries are far below the levels of the euro area, and discrepancies of this magnitude have never been observed in previous EU enlargements. Moreover, the process of catching-up in terms of real incomes will be very slow, likely to take many years, if not decades. Hence, even if different income levels are compatible with Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), it is desirable that the real convergence of accession countries towards the euro area increases further, particularly as real convergence will foster economic integration with the euro area and minimise the risks and effects of asymmetric shocks in an enlarged euro area.
Under Basel  BIS Review 81/2005  1  II, standardized approach, it is possible that sovereign debt is assigned a risk weight between 0% to 150%, most likely 100% since it falls under unrated category. This means that banking system in Albania may have to increase capital allocation to comply with the minimum level of the capital adequacy ratio. An important intention of Basel II is to strengthen market discipline by developing a set of information disclosure requirements. In our countries there is plenty of room for improvement in this respect to allow market participants to assess key information on risk exposure, risk assessment process, and hence capital adequacy. This is important since it increases public pressure on banks to have a better performance in assessing and monitoring risk. However, in short run information disclosure might also have some adverse implication, say in Albania. Let me explain myself better on this issue. Public is usually more sensitive to bad news than positive developments. In countries like Albania, reactions between good or bad news are even more asymmetric than in mature market economies. Public in Albania is particularly over-reactive toward grim news on banking sector or on a certain bank while tend to ignore what falls in the positive side. This could be due to both historical factors, e.g. the crisis of financial system in 1997, and culture factors e.g. low level of bank business understanding, e.g. the overreaction of public to the introduction of the Deposit Insurance Law in 2002.

8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3  CPI inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  CPIX inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  10  10  10  10  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  -2  -2  -2  -2  -4  -4  -4  -4  07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14  07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Report Jun.2012  Report Mar.2012 (*) Gray area, as from second quarter of 2012, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). Figure 4  Non-performing banking consumer loans index (percentage of consumer loans)  Commercial stores' delinquency (*) (percentage of total portfolio)  1.2  15  15  1.0  14  14  13  13  12  12  11  11  10  10  0.8 0.6 0.4 01  03  05  07  09  11  Dec.10 Dec.11 Mar.12  2001-2012 average (*) Considers over 30-day delay, using a simple average of the six largest commercial chains. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF and SVS data.
Such a sale could prove to be doubly problematic. Due to the limited size and relatively low liquidity of the market, the SNB would scarcely be in a position to shorten its balance sheet quickly and efficiently without influencing prices. Its market neutrality would no longer be guaranteed. Moreover, such a sale could well expose the SNB to substantial political pressure. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, to conclude: Climate risks are an important issue for our country’s population and economy. However, the objectives and solutions associated with transitioning to a low-carbon economy must be the fruit of a political dialogue and agenda. These questions are not part of the SNB’s remit. Let’s not forget that the SNB has a clear mandate: to ensure price stability. By fulfilling this mandate, it is making a crucial contribution to balanced economic development and a stable financial system – and it is doing so against an international backdrop freighted with uncertainty. Broadening this mandate to pursue other objectives, such as promoting a green economy, would pave the way for conflicts of interest and politicise monetary policy. This would affect the very essence of the SNB’s independence and thus its ability to make decisions that are occasionally difficult but absolutely necessary in order to fulfil its mandate and support Switzerland’s economy. The SNB takes environmental issues that fall within its mandate very seriously.

The monetary policy response to climate change will depend on the nature of the shocks, their intensity and their expected duration. 8 According to our assessment, the overall threat posed by climate risks that are capable of affecting Switzerland’s economic and financial stability appears to be moderate at present. Nevertheless, these risks and the assessment of associated exposure could change, which is why the SNB remains vigilant. This is all the more important as our country is not an island – Switzerland’s economy and financial system are closely interconnected with the rest of the world. The SNB participates in dialogue at both national and international level. The SNB and FINMA regularly discuss climate risks of relevance to the Swiss financial sector. In addition to this, in April 2019, the two institutions joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). This network, which currently has 46 members, was set up to promote the sharing of best practice in handling climate issues and support the development of climate risk management in the financial sector. It also aims to enhance the role of the financial system in enabling the transition to a low-carbon economy. The NGFS’s work is carried out in three dedicated workstreams. 8  •  The first, in which FINMA participates, looks into the implications of climate risks for the microprudential supervision of the financial system, and banks in particular.
Firms have developed a wide range of more-or-less polite methods for providing us with feedback on the letters we write to them. But letter writing is an art rather than a science, and evaluating objectively how clear we are does not lend itself easily to traditional forms of quantitative methods. Advances in ML,  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  however, are helping. We recently analysed the letters we write to firms on the key risks they face and our supervisory strategy. We quantified a number of qualitative features of these letters, for example, how blunt we are in our messaging, how personal we are in terms of to whom we address the letter, and the overall sentiment expressed by the letter. We then used an ML model called random forests to detect whether, for example, the PRA writes to firms differently than the prior regulator, the FSA. (We do. )10 On the back of that project, we have built an app that now enables supervisors to analyse their written communications. Supervisors can use the app to analyse any of their draft documents before they are sent to firms. IV. CONCLUSION  Advanced analytics, machine learning and AI seem to be everywhere now – from image and voice recognition software to driverless cars and health care.

Setting regulatory standards and collecting data is only the start of the supervisory process. Working out what the data mean is a second stage. Recent research has demonstrated how machines can now outperform doctors in the diagnosis of certain forms of skin cancer: machines can be taught to recognise cell clusters more accurately than the human eye can. This does not, however, imply there is no role for doctors in the treatment of cancers; quite the opposite. By using technology to perform certain roles, doctors can free up time to focus on cancer treatment and patient care7. This is an example of what is sometimes referred to as human-centred automation “… which considers where humans can often do tasks or make better judgements than machines, and designs automation around these strengths”8. In a similar way, by introducing ML to perform complex tasks, we ought to be able to free up and focus supervisors’ time where it is most needed. Take the case of credit unions. Of the 570 or so U.K. domiciled credit institutions, about 450 are credit unions. These are very small and simple providers of credit facilities that between them account for 0.07% of the assets of the UK deposit taking sector. Because none of these lenders is sufficiently significant to the stability of the financial system as a whole, we supervise these entities in a proportionate manner.
Monetary policy requirements also have highest priority when it comes to managing the foreign currency reserves. This is reflected, on the one hand, in the conditions on which we base our investment decisions, namely security, liquidity and performance. On the other hand, the primacy of monetary policy is also evident in the way we implement our investment policy. We proceed here with great caution to avoid causing distortions in the markets. We take account of the security and liquidity requirements for foreign currency investments by ensuring that a substantial part of our portfolio comprises high-quality government bonds. At the end of September, 83% of foreign currency holdings were invested in foreign government bonds or held as sight deposits at other central banks and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). A further 5% were held in other investments, mainly corporate bonds. Approximately 96% of our fixed-income securities are rated AAA or AA. Around 12% of the foreign currency investments are in – exclusively foreign – equities. The SNB thereby holds equities to a value of about CHF 50 billion. I would like to emphasise that all of our equity investments are managed passively. We first decide in which markets we want to invest, and then replicate appropriate share indices. The primacy of monetary policy clearly differentiates the SNB from most other investors. In contrast to these, the exchange rate risk on our foreign currency investments cannot be hedged.

This is critical to ensure the benefits of regional integration are experienced by all in the region. Conclusion While the future for ASEAN looks promising, ASEAN businesses, including SMEs, need to consider and explore an ASEAN strategy and to view ASEAN as an increasingly integrated market. Having such regional or international perspectives may prove to be a game changer for SMEs, paving a path towards sustained growth, increased job creation, and higher innovation capacity. A crucial element in the ASEAN economic agenda is the development of the SME sector which will contribute to stronger and more equitable growth in the region. The next frontier for SMEs is to emerge as regional players that are not constrained by the domestic consumer base. SMEs possess the potential to participate in global production networks by riding on ASEAN’s intrinsic strengths and prospects, multiple SME-focused policy initiatives as well as the continued wave of regional financial integration. This will allow for the transition for SMEs to benefit immensely from the ongoing regional economic and financial integration and thus contribute towards a balanced and sustainable growth of our region. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches