samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this regard, banking institutions have given their commitment to facilitate and advise customers on safe practices in migrating away from cheques to adopt electronic payments. Bank Negara Malaysia and the banking industry will continue the efforts to assist businesses and the general public to ensure a smooth transition in adopting online banking and IBG. This includes the increase of transaction limit for IBG and online banking from RM5,000 to RM10,000 to facilitate high valued payments. With the increase in the limit, 90% of the total  1  2  Affin Bank, AmBank, Bank Islam, Bank Rakyat, CIMB Bank, Hong Leong Bank, Maybank & Public Bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  number of cheques which is 184 million from 204 million cheques in 2012, or 135 million of 150 million cheques issued in January to September 2013, can be made via online banking. In addition, most of the banks have shortened the crediting time for IBG transactions, in which the beneficiaries will receive their funds faster within the same day. Other initiatives include several major banks will be offering IBG services via ATM and banks have provided access to Internet banking through the deployment of Self-Service Internet Kiosk at all bank branches to facilitate those who do not have access to Internet banking to make payment electronically.

Our discussion this morning will provide information for participants to obtain guidance and have a closer look on the benefits of online banking services and IBG. In line with the development in technology and innovation, making payments electronically through online banking can reduce the cost of doing business by reducing or using resources previously used to handle cash and cheques, enabling businesses to optimize their business performance and profitability. This can be achieved through increased use of electronic payments where the cost of manual processing, including the postage fee or the cost to deposit cheques in the Cheque Deposit Machine (CDM) or at the counter of bank branch, can be saved. My point is, you can save on your petrol expenses, parking fees or even avoid being issued a ticket for illegal parking and most importantly, you will be able to save time that could be utilised to increase your business productivity. This is because online banking allows you to enjoy the convenience of banking at anytime and anywhere without the hassle of having to queue at the bank counter or hiring employees to perform daily banking activities. Among other benefits of online banking and IBG is that, it offers faster movement of funds compared to payment using cheques. For example, the transfer of funds through IBG performed before noon allows a person to receive the funds within the same day compared to cheques that will take a couple of days to three days.
Specifically, staff estimate that the APP and the PEPP had jointly compressed the ten-year GDP-weighted risk premia of the four largest euro area countries by around 180 basis points by the end of 2020. Revisions in market expectations about the evolution of the size of our balance sheet over the coming years are estimated to have reversed around 40 basis points of this peak impact since September 2021. Conclusion All this suggests, and with this I would like to conclude, that portfolio rebalancing effects are relevant market drivers, both when central banks intend to expand their balance sheet and when they plan to reduce it. Prospects of QT are therefore likely to have complemented the tightening from changes in our key policy rates before balance sheet run-off actually began, thereby contributing to a timely return of inflation to our 2% target. Over time, balance sheet run-off will reduce our market footprint, improve market liquidity and lower the Eurosystem’s exposure to credit and duration risk, recovering valuable policy space. By how much we will ultimately reduce our bond holdings will mainly depend on the demand for central bank reserves, stemming both from autonomous factors and from the banking sector, as well as the operational framework that we intend to implement in the medium run. Thank you. Annexes 2 March 2023 Quantitative tightening: rationale and market impact    ENGLISH  1. See, for example, Andrade, P. et al.

This annual inflation outturn was largely attributed to the decline in annual food inflation to 2.8% from 3.8% recorded in June 2010, as annual non-food inflation rose to 12.5% from 11.8% during the same period. Food inflation Quarterly food inflation rose to –0.1% in September 2010 from the –1.7% recorded in the previous quarter, but was 1.0 percentage point below the 0.9% recorded during the third quarter of 2009. This was due to higher prices of rice, various beef products, pork chops, mutton, fresh kapenta, dried kapenta, carrots, green beans, groundnuts and cassava tubers during the quarter under review. This was attributed to the impact of the upward adjustment of transport charges in July 2010 on the commodity market. Annual food inflation fell on account of price reductions on cereals, various vegetables, groundnuts, tubers, beef products (fillet steak, rump steak), mutton and dried kapenta, due to improved seasonal supply factors. Non-food inflation Quarterly non-food inflation slowed down to 3.2% from the 3.7% observed in June 2010, but was 0.7 percentage points above the 2.5% recorded in the third quarter of 2009. This was mainly attributed to lower quarterly inflation for the following sub-groups: Furniture and household goods of 4.5% [7.5%], Medical care 1.6% [2.7%], Transport and communications 0.9% [5.1%], Recreation and Education –0.1% [1.3%], and other goods and services 1.7% [2.8%]. However, on an annual basis, non-food inflation increased to 12.5% from the 11.8% registered in June 2010.
Mr Heikensten discusses the new currency and the Swedish economy Speech by the First Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr Lars Heikensten, before the Swedish Shareholders’Association in Sölvesborg, Bromölla, on 23/1/99. On New Year’s Day, ten currencies in Europe were replaced by a single, common currency. The changeover went well, no doubt exceeding some expectations. The elaborate systems that were used in earnest for the first time to transmit cross-border payments functioned properly, with no serious technical hitches. This made it possible to establish a uniform instrumental rate for monetary policy throughout the euro area. The new currency also had a favourable reception in financial markets, accompanied by falling interest rates. EMU has thus got off to a successful start. But the challenges posed by monetary union and any risks connected with the project are mainly of a different nature. They are economic and political, affecting the participants as well as non-euro countries. With eleven countries subscribing to a single monetary policy, the conditions for economic policy in Europe have changed. So have the terms for Sweden and economic policy here. These matters have not yet been discussed at all fully in Sweden. Under these circumstances, I shall be opening our debate today by touching briefly on four issues: the new challenges posed by the euro to economic policy in Europe; the consequences for Sweden; the path of the krona’s exchange rate; and current monetary policy. Challenges to EU economic policies The euro’s successful launch was underpinned by intensive preparations.

Mervyn King: Monetary policy developments Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, London, 16 June 2010. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Mr Chancellor, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, May I join the Lord Mayor in welcoming you, Chancellor, to your first Mansion House Dinner? You have set a rapid pace in your first month in office, not least in your announcements this evening. In previous years I have sometimes set this gathering a quiz question. Tonight I want to reverse the process by providing the answer and asking you for the question. The answer is 23, and later I shall ask you – to what question is 23 the answer? Over the past year, there has been no slackening in the pace of economic and political upheaval. The financial crisis that began in 2007 is not yet over. Much of the recent market volatility reflects concerns about the ability of governments to service their own debt and provide assistance where necessary to weakened banking systems, especially in the euro area. Such risks have the potential to derail recovery and we cannot ignore them. At home we face the challenge of ensuring recovery while rebalancing the economy, reducing the fiscal deficit, and reshaping the structure and regulation of our banking system. In playing its part to meet this challenge, the Bank of England has two priorities.
28.10.2020  A trail-blazer at the pinnacle of the Spanish financial system “Diversity and Enterprise” conference, Federación Asturiana de Empresarios Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Good morning, I feel very honoured to have been invited here today by the Business Equality Committee of the Federación Asturiana de Empresarios (FADE), one of Spain's first employers' associations to approve a plan establishing equality as a strategic priority in its corporate and human resources policies. Initiatives that bolster and give visibility to female leadership, such as those implemented by FADE with the support of the Committee, are key to ensuring diversity. Gender balance must be a priority at all organisations, both public and private. Rest assured that we at the Banco de España embrace this commitment, and I think it is fair to say that we have made significant headway in recent years. In fact, early this year the Gender Balance Index 2020, produced by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), ranked the Banco de España first for gender equality among the world’s central banks (scoring 91.67 out of 100). In 2019 we achieved near-parity between men and women in our workforce, and in the last three years we have increased the participation of women in management positions. With eight members, female representation on the Governing Council has reached 50%.

Page 7 sur 8  The impacts of the climate transition could last throughout the decarbonisation of our economy. If we looked through it, we would overburden fiscal policy in cushioning these shocks. 3. Market alignment >>> signalling through Central Banks’ operations - Third, appropriate market incentives are necessary. This is where carbon pricing is needed, as I mentioned earlier, to align firms’ behaviour and private financing, but also (and maybe primarily) a fair pricing of climate risk on financial markets. This is where central bank operations and their greening have a key role to play, giving the right market signals and inducing changes. With Christine Lagarde, we at the ECB are already implementing a greening of our corporate sector purchase programme, as well as adapting our collateral framework. 4. Funding green investments >>> solvable through blended finance - Last but not least, if these conditions are met, the question as to how to finance investments is solvable. Different estimates have been computed, and their amounts may look impressive especially when presented in gross and absolute terms, for instance around EUR 500 billion per year in the EU until 2050. viii. However, when you consider net and relative financing needs, which represent between 2% and 3% of current GDP be it for the EU or France ix  Page 8 sur 8 according to the reports quoted, this turns out to be manageable.
That can mean a “second engine” for growth from abroad. But it can also mean a dragging anchor when things go awry across borders. 5  See for example Grossman, G and Helpman, E (1991), Innovation and growth in the global economy, MIT Press. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3. Role of the EU in UK dynamism and stability  How has the EU affected the UK’s dynamism and stability? Let me begin with the first. 3.1  Role of EU in UK dynamism  In some respects the UK is the leading beneficiary of the famous “Four Freedoms” first set out in the 1957 Treaty of Rome.6 These are the free movement of goods and services, capital and labour, enhanced over time through a range of measures to reduce impediments across the EU. So although the UK’s dynamism is the product of many factors including deep human capital, well-developed physical infrastructure, a competitive fiscal regime and the rule of law; the EU has arguably bolstered it by establishing the world’s largest single market with free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. The UK has further benefited from these dynamics by retaining relatively flexible labour and product markets. In product markets, home and foreign firms receive close to equal treatment; the administrative burden on start-ups is second lowest in the G7; incumbent firms receive the lowest regulatory protection in the G7; and product market regulation is light (Charts 5–8).

It is therefore important to take very seriously the discussion going on within the trade union movement regarding larger than expected price increases. The weak exchange rate, with the potential economic stimulus it represents via exports, is more complicated. In the past, a marked improvement in costs for Swedish exports relative to the main competitor countries has tended to lead to an increased export market share. At the same time, there is no denying that the international economic slowdown is particularly evident in markets of importance for Sweden’s economy. As long as those markets remain weak, a larger market share for Swedish firms will not yield a notable increase in volume. Another matter here is that in the IT and telecom sectors, on which the Swedish economy became increasingly dependent in the 1990s, the problems are not dependent on the krona’s exchange rate; here it is more global factors that are decisive. However, it can also be noted that the order inflow to manufacturing is now falling less markedly than earlier this year. There are certain signs of a levelling out, usually an early indication of a possible upturn in the coming quarters. Analysts’ expectations of this year’s profits for listed companies have clearly worsened during the autumn but this has been accompanied by a substantial upward revision of next year’s profits. So the overall appraisal of the krona’s exchange rate and its stimulatory effect is not entirely self-evident. Finally there is the question of economic policy’s aggregate impact on demand.
Inflation is still being restrained by the fall in prices for imported consumer goods, increased competition in a number of markets and the current period of lower nominal pay increases. The trend in prices for consumer goods over the past two or three years is a result of favourable developments in the Norwegian and global economies. Low inflation is being accompanied by real income growth and a rise in production. It cannot be ruled out that small open economies are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices. Deviations from the inflation target in Norway are broadly in line with Sweden and New Zealand, but are larger than for example in the UK and Canada. Developments in recent years have also been influenced by the fairly large favourable disturbances to which the Norwegian economy has been exposed. Developments in Norway’s terms of trade provide an illustration of this here. As consumers, we enjoy the benefits of falling prices for many imported goods. As a nation, we benefit from a fall in prices for the goods we import in relation to prices for the goods we export. Norway’s terms of trade are improving. The impact of the rise in oil and gas prices is particularly strong – and the domestic economy is shielded to a certain extent through the oil fund mechanism – but there have also been terms-of-trade gains in the mainland economy. The situation in Norway differs from that of our Nordic neighbours.

As a Thammasat Economics alumnus, it is an honor and a great pleasure to be ‘home’ addressing the distinguished guests and participants of this prominent conference. Thank you. BIS Review 62/2002  5
The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox prompted an adjustment of the efficient market hypothesis. In the modified version, financial  9  See for example the Bank of England’s dividend discount model, where the risk premium is calculated as a residual, as used in Quarterly Bulletin Q3 2010. 10  Report no 24 to the Storting (2006–2007): On the management of the Government Pension Fund in 2006. The Ministry’s estimate is based on a risk premium of 2 per cent for equities. 11  William F. Sharpe (1991): “The arithmetic of active management”, Financial Analysts Journal, 47, pp. 7–9. 12  Sanford Grossman and Joseph Stiglitz (1980): ”On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets”, American Economic Review, 70, pp. 393–408. BIS Review 145/2010  5  markets reach near-efficiency most of the time, but active management is necessary to eliminate mispricing and increase market efficiency 13 . When panic seized the markets in autumn 2008, prices simultaneously fell for many types of securities that had previously shown a low degree of correlation. It came as a surprise that there was a strong positive correlation between for example Japanese inflation-linked government bonds, bonds issued by international institutions such as the European Investment Bank, covered bonds issued by European banks and US mortgage-backed bonds. An investor such as the Fund can survive a liquidity squeeze for a period. We were prepared to maintain positions in fixed-income securities to maturity and the vast majority of borrowers appear to be honouring their debt obligations.

Other countries were later incorporated into the benchmark portfolio. In 2007, small companies were included in the benchmark portfolio. Today, the Fund has equity holdings in 8,000 companies in almost 50 different countries. The bond portfolio was expanded from 10 to 18 countries in 1998. Since 2002, the Fund has gradually moved into the corporate bond market and mortgage-backed securities. Chart: Fund returns In 1998, analyses indicated that returns would be higher than achieved to date. It should be noted that the Fund is nevertheless considerably larger than expected 10–12 years ago. High oil and gas prices have resulted in substantial transfers to the Fund. Sizeable returns on oil in the ground have more than offset low returns on securities. Since equity investment started in 1998, the annual average real return on the Fund has been a good 3 per cent after expenses 8 . This figure is partly a reflection of the financial crisis. The Fund’s short history includes a lost decade in the stock market, with two periods of sharp decline. During financial crises of the type we have recently experienced, the government as investor has no place to hide. Even though it is less visible, the return on government real investments in Norway is also lower during economic downturns. The estimated size of Norway’s offshore oil wealth naturally varies widely with oil and gas prices and frequent changes in petroleum reserve estimates.
And to ensure that they can do so in an orderly manner, a European resolution mechanism has been devised. It defines the tools and the institutional setup. It forms the second pillar of the banking union alongside European banking supervision. But again, resolving a bank is just the very last resort. Thus, the new framework becomes applicable long before a bank fails. It requires banks, for instance, to draw up recovery plans. In these plans, the banks set out how they would overcome severe crises using their own resources. Now, recovery plans are drawn up when the going is good. When times are tough, the new framework offers some more tools, including early intervention measures. Supervisors can use them if they see that a bank is about to get into trouble. The idea is to be intrusive and to make the bank officially aware of the supervisor’s serious concerns. This helps to get the bank back on track. Early intervention measures can be an important tool to prevent bank failures. In practice, however, it is challenging to use them, for two reasons. First, because they overlap with some of our standard tools. To give you just one example, asking a bank for a capital plan can be either a standard supervisory tool or an early intervention measure. This overlap is a challenge as it often prevents us from applying early intervention tools. We are bound to use the least intrusive tool, which is always the standard one.

Do the banks have enough capital to absorb any losses in either scenario? And the crucial question that follows is, of course: what if they don’t? Well, let’s take a brief look at the upcoming stress test. This year, the European Banking Authority, EBA for short, will conduct a stress test involving the largest banks in the EU. This test includes 37 banks from the euro area which are directly supervised by the ECB. To obtain a fuller picture, we will, in parallel, stress-test most of the remaining large banks in the euro area, using the same scenarios and methods as the EBA. In respect of capital shortfalls, the stress test is not a pass-or-fail exercise. The banks do not have to meet certain thresholds. Instead, we supervisors will decide on a case-by-case basis whether banks have a capital shortfall, taking into account their individual risk profiles and their individual capital needs. 7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  At the end of the day, stress tests may deal with hypothetical scenarios, but their results can have very real consequences for the banks. They inform the work of supervisors, and they inform market expectations when the results are published, as they will be in the case of the EBA’s stress test. They are also a moment of truth for the banks. More generally, stress tests help supervisors and banks to spot and remove weak points in banks’ resilience early on. If this is not done, problems can quickly mount up.