samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These linguistic barriers apply everywhere and to everyone. But they seem to be especially troublesome among the economic and financial tribe, which stand out relative to others in their insularity. 8  Central bankers are not immune to these primordial tendencies. They, too, sometimes use the tribal language of technocracy. And this too can sometimes serve as a barrier to understanding and a blockage to trust. My “stylised fact” (itself a piece of technical jargon) is that around 95% of all the words central banks utter are inaccessible to around 95% of the population. (Imagine speaking 4 ½ million words and more than 4 ¼ million of them falling on deaf ears?) If you conduct a semantic analysis of central bank text, you will 9  find that I have erred on the side of generosity with these fractions. When someone says to me “spoken like a true central-banker”, they come to bury Andy not praise him. But things are changing. The Bank is making a big effort to simplify and demystify its words and to challenge its ideas and thinking. The Bank’s staff blog, Bank Underground, is one example of such challenge. Last year, it recorded its millionth hit. Recently, the Bank has begun issuing its publications in a “layered” format, to cater for different audiences: a one-sentence, one-graphic version for the time-poor; a 60-page chart-tastic technical text for the masochist. As best we can tell, this has opened up the Bank’s views to a far-wider audience.

Behind the veil lies the ultimate owner – citizens, whether as workers, customers, shareholders, stakeholders or voters. Institutions are executive gatekeepers of these citizen democracies. Ultimately, it is citizens to whom policymakers, economic and otherwise, are accountable. Those of us in the policy game need never to lose sight of that. Despite those ownership rights, it is nonetheless the RSA’s contention that citizens are not at present engaged in the economy, and in economic policy, as fully as would be desirable. They make the case for moving to a deliberative democracy, one in which citizens have a greater say on matters economic and financial. This is a big contention. Nonetheless it is one that I – as a citizen and as someone who works for one of those institutional veils, the Bank of England – fully accept. More than that, the Bank is making strides towards increasing citizen engagement in the economy and understanding of economic policy. In what follows, let me first say a word about the aims and objectives of a programme of citizen engagement, the like of which the RSA are proposing – the “ends”. I will then turn to the “means” – what practically could be done, and indeed is being done, to improve citizen engagement with the economy and economic policy. For reasons of familiarity, I will focus on Bank of England initiatives as one example of such public engagement, although the RSA’s recommendations cover a range of other policymaking functions.
As the banking industry goes through a radical transition, banks will need to widen their talent pools and attract  Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  - 13 -  a broader range of skills, in line with their shifting business models and changing customers’ preferences. Staff at banks of the future will no longer be limited to mostly finance professionals. Instead, the role of data scientists, visual designers, digital marketing and media experts, software developers and customer experience professionals will become more significant. Banks might even need to recruit psychologists, philosophy majors and other professionals with diversified skills that can bring in new perspectives. These people will be very different from traditional bank recruits, with different expectations for their roles, work environments and contributions. And banks will be in direct competition with technology firms, leading corporates and start-ups to hire them. Banks will need to overhaul their entire process around acquiring, managing, deploying and retaining talent. Like technology companies, they will need to invest in their talent pools to leverage their expertise and creativity. They will also need to transform their corporate culture into one which promotes agility, collaboration and responsible risk-taking when it comes to delivery of solutions. The banking industry needs to succeed on all of these battle fronts: customer loyalty, value, efficiency, resilience and talent. Failure to win on any front could have dire consequences, regardless of a bank’s size or market share.

A fourth reason why the DBU-ACU divide is of less relevance today has to do with the significant changes in MAS’ own banking regulations, aimed at reducing systemic risks. •  All banks will be required to meet enhanced liquidity requirements that apply to the entirety of their operations by January 2016. •  Banks which are designated as domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) in Singapore will be subject to additional supervisory measures over both their domestic and offshore businesses.1  •  In addition, where a foreign bank branch has significant retail presence in Singapore, it will also be required to locally incorporate its retail operations. The subsidiary will be subject to the same suite of regulation as the local banks, and the same supervisory regime aimed at minimising risks to local depositors. 23. Together, the enhanced global and domestic regulatory standards mean that the DBUACU divide is no longer useful. If we continue with the divide, it would merely impose undue administrative burden on banks, without materially enhancing prudential soundness or systemic stability. 24. Hence, MAS will be removing the DBU-ACU divide in its banking regulations. The details will be released in an MAS consultation paper by August. There is no rush. We will implement the changes in close consultation with the banking community, and phase them in over time. 25. This is a significant rationalisation in our banking regulation landscape.
In reality, this is precisely where the moral hazard issue associated with the implicit guarantee of the “too big to fail” (TBTF) status becomes relevant. By definition, a TBTF financial institution can expect to be rescued from bankruptcy. As a consequence, the banks’ bondholders know they will not bear the cost of excessive risk-taking and therefore they need not  4  5  Though determining the precise level of socially optimal risk-taking is difficult to gauge for the economy as a whole, excessive risk-taking by an individual institution is easier to detect. In Switzerland, a FINMA circular on remuneration schemes lays down rules for the remuneration of employees of financial institutions. Cf., FINMA Circular 10/1, “Minimum standards for remuneration schemes of financial institutions”, October 2009. 6  Executive compensation schemes which could represent an additional mechanism for improving managerial compensation include schemes that align managerial compensation with the long-term objectives of the firm. Skills are better assessed in relative terms and on a risk-adjusted basis. Therefore, a compensation scheme that rewards better-than-average corporate results and refers to risk-adjusted performance measures may reduce risk-taking and reward more skills. For a more complete discussion, cf. “The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System”, Princeton University Press, May 2010.

And also worthy of note is our work, together with the Ministry of Finance, on the initiative for the pension savings formation model through Individual pension capital. By our estimate, the work on this project is now quite advanced. We have undertaken a few rounds of both departmental and expert discussions. I very much hope that these changes will be accepted, as they will provide citizens with better quality of life, and generate a long-term source of funding for the economy, which is vital for investment development. And the last thing I wanted to mention, which I believe to be particularly important – when working on scenarios, on forecasts, on the budget – is our interaction with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development in preparing a firmly grounded medium-term macroeconomic forecast. Because this forecast provides direction not only for the budget, but also for businesses in our economy and economic subjects, and I hope that this work will also help to ensure consistency of views on macroeconomics and economic policy, because this is also very important. In the last two years we really have been consistently working together, and in our opinion this work has indeed paid off. And to wrap up I would like to extend my thanks once again to all the 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  staff of the Ministry of Finance for the constructive cooperation that we have developed, for your high professionalism, and for your responsible and involved attitude to work.
In the first part of the text, the general framework of monetary policy will be presented, and in the second part exchange rate policy and liquidity management issues will be considered. Inflation targets Inflation targets will continue to be defined as the end-year rate of inflation calculated by the annual percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the upcoming period. In the press release regarding the monetary and exchange rate policy for 2006, the target horizon was set as three years and this time frame will be preserved for 2007. Taking into account the structural transformation of the economy, the transition from chronic high inflation to low inflation, and the process of convergence to the developed countries, a target of around 4 percent is considered appropriate for the medium-term. Therefore, inflation targets for 2007 and 2008, which were previously announced as 4 percent, are maintained and the inflation target for 2009, which was scheduled to be announced at the end of this year, has also been determined as 4 percent. As the structural transformation and convergence process is completed in time, it will be possible to target lower inflation rates. BIS Review 1/2007  1  Uncertainty band In Article 42 of the CBRT Law it is stipulated that “The Bank shall submit information to the Government in writing and inform the public disclosing the reasons for the incapability to achieve the determined targets in due time published or the occurrence of the possibility of not achieving and the measures to be taken thereof”.

We also recognized that the central bank's credibility is crucial in assuring the public on the smooth operation of our economy. The Bank of Thailand decided to adopt inflation targeting as the framework for our monetary policy. Inflation targeting is not simply setting an inflation target. It is instead an approach that emphasizes (a) a forward looking economic forecasts using the most reliable economic models, (b) transparency in communicating to the public the reasoning for policy stance, and (c) accountability to ensure that promises of price stability are upheld. BIS Review 81/2001  1  We have chosen to target core inflation, a measure which excludes volatile components, namely raw food and energy prices. Our target range has been set between 0 to 3.5 percent until 2002. When I stepped in as a Governor in June, bearing in mind that our current account surplus was decreasing (due to a reduction of external demand) and international reserves may be affected, a review of the monetary policy was made. It was however agreed that inflation targeting framework should remain for price stability is still very important to prevent the economy from another crisis. However additional attention was emphasized on certain elements. International reserves which seem to be treated as exogenous factor under the framework have been brought into consideration, with the belief that healthy reserves are needed to maintain investor's confidence amidst the current slowdown of world economy.
Reduced precipitation is causing aridification in parts of North America, with the Corn Belt shifting northward. Floods and droughts of increasing frequency and intensity could cause not just disruptions in food supply but potentially also a permanent reduction in agricultural yields, with worrying implications for food price inflation. The era of cheap money, cheap labour, and cheap energy is most likely over. This is unhelpful for global inflation but not necessarily bad from a broader perspective. There has been too much borrowing, too much inequality, and too much carbon emission globally. With inflation likely to be higher than before, global interest rates are not going back to the zero lower bound. Borrowing costs that are more reflective of time horizons and risk premiums will perhaps help to reduce debt and leverage in the system. With declining labour force growth in many parts of the world, we can no longer rely on cheap labour to power our economy and society. But hopefully it will help to lift wages at the lower end of the spectrum and reduce inequality. With the cost of energy likely to go up as the world progressively switches to cleaner energy, it will help reduce carbon emissions, cap global warming, and avoid catastrophic climate change. HOW WILL GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS IMPACT THE GLOBAL ECONOMY? Geopolitical tensions are likely to lead to greater decoupling in the global economy.

It is inevitable that economic growth needs to slow down to bring aggregate demand and supply back into balance. The risk of the major advanced economies entering a recession in 2023 is high. The latest Consensus Forecasts has US and Eurozone GDP growth for 2023 coming in at 0.5% or less. Two recent polls by Bloomberg place the probability of recession in the US and the Eurozone in the next 12 months at 50% and 80% respectively. The Asia-Pacific economies are at lower risk of a recession but they will see a spill-over from the broader global slowdown. Exports from the region are already declining. The key question is: how deep and prolonged will the downturn be? That will depend on how high and persistent inflation is. For if inflation turns out to be stubborn, central banks will have to tighten monetary policy more and for longer than currently anticipated by markets. The good scenario is a short and shallow downturn, maybe even a technical recession – a “soft landing”. What are the signs of hope? First, output gaps in the major economies are relatively modest and bringing aggregate demand and supply into balance may not require much more policy tightening. Second, the recent moderation in global food and energy prices will help to ease overall inflationary pressures and help to prevent inflation expectations from rising. In fact, long-term inflation expectations appear to be well anchored.
Therefore, a more appropriate solution would be for them to be able to transfer the ownership of their assets in exchange for debt repayment with the option to repurchase those assets back at a later date. As such, this scheme will remove debt burdens that would incur otherwise if they still have to hold onto the assets and loans. These examples provide some concrete illustrations of how we, at the Bank of Thailand, have tried to respond flexibly and pragmatically to the changing circumstances of the COVID-19 crisis. Part 3: Future Plans Let me now turn to the third part of my remarks today, which is what is next? One thing that we would like to do is a move from short-term and blanket measures such as a debt moratorium to longer-term and more targeted solutions such as debt restructuring. Moratoria are good responses to something that is short, severe and broad. However, as we have seen in discussing the economic outlook, this crisis is likely to be long. The recovery is likely to be very uneven, thereby requiring a longer-term and more targeted approach. Hence, we would like to encourage a move from a solution of having debt moratoria in response to waves of infections that are causing a lockdown to more lasting solutions such as debt restructuring. On this light, we have recently announced a series of initiatives and regulatory incentives to encourage banks to undertake debt restructuring, which is important as a lasting solution to the problems that we are facing.

The share of the population that have received two doses of vaccines in Thailand currently stands at about seven percent, which lags behind other countries in the region including Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Therefore, given that Thailand has been hit severely by the third wave of the outbreak with subsequent lockdown and the likelihood in achieving a larger share of vaccinated population that will take some time, this indicates that the recovery is likely to be slow going forward. Second, Thailand’s economic recovery is likely to be highly uneven or so-called “K-shaped recovery”. Our export sectors have recovered back to where they were prior to the crisis and are producing and exporting at levels higher than the pre-crisis levels. However, other sectors, notably the services and tourism-related sectors, have been recovering more slowly. In particular, hotels and restaurants are lagging significantly and experience a great Page 1 of 9  degree of hardship. The reason why this has hit the economy particularly hard is that tourism, aside from accounting a large share of GDP, also accounts an even larger share of employment. Tourism, both directly and indirectly, accounts around 20 percent of total employment in Thailand. Hence, employment and income were severely hit as a result of COVID-19, which will be another factor that will characterize both the slower and the uneven nature of the recovery going forward. While we have been hit hard, the economy has proven to be resilient.
This was considered a natural consequence of the Riksbank being an authority under the Riksdag (the Swedish parliament). It was therefore considered unnecessary to specify any further objective than price stability in the law text. It would moreover be difficult to combine such objectives with the EU regulations and also inappropriate given that monetary policy cannot govern long-term developments in production and employment. Monetary policy affects the economy with a certain time lag. This means that the Riksbank cannot control inflation in the very short term and that monetary policy decisions must be based on forecasts of future inflation. Monetary policy is normally aimed at achieving the inflation target within two years to avoid the deviations from target from being too large and too protracted. The two-year horizon can be regarded as a restriction the Riksbank has taken upon itself to give credibility to the inflation target. At the same time, it provides an opportunity to show consideration for the real economy. If, for instance, there is a shock that leads to inflation being pushed upwards despite weak demand, a very rapid return to the inflation target could lead to a more severe slowdown in the already weak demand, than would be the case if the recovery was allowed to occur at a slower pace. If inflation is instead held back despite good growth in demand, attempts to quickly return it to target through very expansionary monetary policy could lead to the economy overheating.

Judging from the surveys we make of inflation expectations, monetary policy in this respect has a very high level of credibility. •  The Riksbank also has the task of safeguarding financial stability. We see no problems with regard to financial stability at present. The fact that we emphasise developments in house prices and indebtedness does not concern financial stability. It is because we are concerned over how future inflation and growth might be affected by a possible sudden correction in house prices. Finally, I would like to stress that the monetary policy framework has functioned well. This is indicated in particular by the fact that inflation expectations are firmly anchored around two per cent. There are no signs in the financial markets that monetary policy is regarded as unclear. However, this does not mean we can rest on our laurels. We have one of the most open and transparent central banks in the world and we wish this to continue. The Riksbank’s forecasts assume, as I mentioned earlier, that the repo rate will develop in line with market expectations. I have raised the question of possibly going one stage further and instead reporting the Riksbank’s own forecast of interest rate developments, as they do in, for instance, Norway and New Zealand. Personally, I see it as quite natural that we should make forecasts of repo rate developments in the same way that we forecast a number of other variables.
See for example Campbell, J, Pflueger, C and Viceira, L (2015), “Monetary policy drivers of bond and equity risks”, mimeo. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  19  xxii  See Carney, M. (2013), “The Spirit of the Season”, Speech to The Economic Club of New York, December; and Vlieghe, G (2016), “Debt, Demographics and the Distribution of Income: New challenges for monetary policy”, Speech at the London School of Economics, January. xxiii High inflation also tends to be volatile, which distorts price signals and reduces investment by raising the cost of capital. That, in turn, could harm real income growth. xxiv This is why average earnings tend to move counter-cyclicality as changes in the composition of employment boost average wages in the initial stages of a downturn and reduce them as the downturn subsides. See also Broadbent, B (2015), “Compositional shifts in the labour market”, speech given at ‘Understanding the Great Recession: from micro to macro’ Conference, Bank of England. xxv For a discussion in the UK context, see Hills, J., Cunliffe, J., Gambaro, L., and Obolenskaya, P. (2013), “Winners and Losers in the Crisis: The Changing Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK 2007-2010”, Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, LSE. xxvi Oreopoulos, P., von Wachter, T. and Heisz, A., (2012) “The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1): 1-29. xxvii See Blanchard, O. and Summers, L. (1986), "Hysteresis and European Unemployment", in Fischer, S. (ed.

th  Chart 6: Real wage growth slowest since mid-19 Century 10-year moving average, per cent 4  3  2  1  0 Forecast -1 1850  1865  1880  1895  1910  1925  1940  1955  1970  1985  2000  2015  Source: Thomas, R. and Dimsdale, N. (2016) "Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.3", Bank of England, based on average weekly wages and the CPI; and November Inflation Report. Such high income inequalities are dwarfed by staggering wealth inequalities. The proportion of the wealth v  held by the richest 1% of Americans increased from 25% in 1990 to 40% in 2012. Globally, the share of wealth held by the richest 1% in the world rose from one-third in 2000 to one-half in 2010.  vi  The picture in the UK is complex but in general suggests relatively stable but high levels of overall inequality, with sharper disparities emerging in recent times for the top 1%. When combined with low growth of incomes and entrenched intergenerational inequity, it is no wonder that many question their prospects. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  For example, a common measure of the distribution of income, the Gini coefficient, shows that inequality rose sharply during the 1980s and has more or less plateaued ever since (Chart 7). That suggests a large structural shift during the Thatcher era, followed by a more modest series of adjustments thereafter.