samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It may convey information about our reaction function. But such a commitment is not easy to design. If too general, it will not add anything to our existing – and over-riding – commitment to do whatever it takes to hit the inflation target. If too precise, it will not capture the myriad of factors that affect the outlook for inflation. The array of judgements underlying the Committee’s policy decisions are not easily summarised by reference to one or two economic variables. The Committee’s preferred approach is to describe its assessment of the outlook for output and inflation, and allow the public and markets to make their own assessment of the likely future path of interest rates. In the most recent Inflation Report published in May, the  2  BIS Review 86/2009  Committee judged it was more likely than not that CPI inflation would be below the 2% inflation target in two or three years time if interest rates followed a path implied by market yields and the stock of purchased assets increased to £ Market participants subsequently revised down their view about the pace at which Bank Rate was likely to rise. 2. Strengthening the policy framework  I remain firmly convinced that an inflation targeting framework should continue to be central to the design of macroeconomic policy in the UK. The benefits of low and stable inflation are clear and well understood.

Paul Fisher: Financial markets, monetary policy and credit supply Speech by Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director for Markets of the Bank of England, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, to Richmond University, London, 2 October 2013. *  *  *  Thank you for having me back at Richmond University. In this lecture today, I aim to review the behaviour and development of financial markets over the past year, including the period of heightened volatility since May and the introduction by the Monetary Policy Committee of explicit forward-looking monetary policy guidance in August. I will also assess the working and impact of the Funding for Lending Scheme over its first year of operation. Developments in financial markets When I spoke to you a year ago, financial markets were still scarred by the crisis years and there remained a number of significant downside tail risks to the global economy. Contacts were citing: the risks of a breakup of the euro-area; the possibility of a “fiscal cliff” in the US; a slowing in China, alongside already weak growth in the advanced economies; and tensions in the Middle East – especially around the Straits of Hormuz. But those tail risks were seen to be offset in large part by the commitment of central banks to respond. The ECB had announced its Outright Monetary Transactions programme and had been interpreted as publicly committing to do whatever it takes to keep the euro-area together.
Charles L Evans: Managing monetary policy risks Speech by Mr Charles L Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, at the Lake Forest-Lake Bluff Rotary Club Regular Meeting, Lake Forest, Illinois, 11 January 2012. *  *  *  Introduction Thank you for that kind introduction. This seems to be the time of year when both businesses and individuals focus on planning for the year ahead, and I’m delighted to be here this morning to share my perspective on the current economy. In doing so, I will discuss my views on the progress of the recovery and on the likely course of monetary policy. Those of you who follow monetary policy developments may be aware that I was the lone dissenter at the last two Fed policy meetings. So it should come as no surprise when I say that the views that I am presenting today are my own and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or my other colleagues in the Federal Reserve System. Lately, it has become extremely important for Federal Reserve policymakers to get out from behind our desks and into the communities we serve. Doing this gives me the opportunity to explain how I think about the economy, but it’s also important for me to learn from your questions and comments. I really do value the opportunity to interact with business people within our Fed District, which comprises most of the Midwest and stretches from Detroit to Des Moines and on down to Indianapolis.

In normal times, real interest rates – that is, nominal interest rates adjusted for expected inflation – rise and fall to bring desired savings into line with investment and to keep productive resources near full employment. This market dynamic is thwarted in the case of a liquidity trap. That is, when desired savings increase a great deal, nominal interest rates may fall to zero and then can go no lower. Real  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  interest rates become “trapped” and may not be able to become negative enough to equilibrate savings and investment. That is where we seem to be now – short-term, risk-free nominal interest rates are close to zero and actual real rates are modestly negative, but they are still not low enough to return economic activity to its potential. A liquidity trap presents a clear and present danger of a prolonged period of economic weakness – today that means a risk of repeating the experience of the U.S. in the 1930s or that of Japan over the past 20 years. But we need not resign ourselves to such an outcome. Because of the dire implications of liquidity traps, economists have studied them over the years in rigorous analytical models. Importantly, variants of these models have successfully explained past business cycle developments in the U.S. These studies conclude that economic performance can be vastly improved by employing monetary policies that commit to keeping short-term rates low for a prolonged period.
Growth was robust across both traditional and alternative assets on the back of higher valuations and continued inflows to Asian markets. We continued to anchor the operations of global asset managers in Singapore. Example: AIA set up its first group-wide regional investment hub here. Efforts to grow the private financing market are also showing signs of promise. Alternative AUM grew by an average 16.9% p.a. over 2016 and 2017, led by venture capital and private equity. There are currently about 220 VC and PE managers located in Singapore with the majority of PE managers focused on growth and buyout strategies. Around 85% of their investments are across Singapore and the region, targeting higher growth sectors such as consumer and retail, healthcare and IT. We are also doing well in wealth management, with private banking AUM expanding an average of 6.6% p.a. over 2016 and 2017. A growing number of Asia’s wealthiest families have set up Family Offices in Singapore to access investment opportunities in Asia. Singapore’s growth as a wealth management hub rests on its reputation as a clean and trusted jurisdiction. Singapore’s activation of a broad network of Automatic Exchange of Information, or AEOI, relationships, reaffirmed its commitment to international standards of transparency and tax cooperation. Singapore is emerging as a leading Asian bond market, with corporate debt issuance volumes rising by 22% p.a. over the last two years. MAS’ Asian Bond Grant scheme has supported Asian companies to raise international capital in Singapore.

It can take various forms, including a carbon tax, in which case part of the resulting public receipts should be invested in low carbon alternatives, and another part redistributed to households in order to mitigate its social effects. A price on carbon should be supplemented with other climate regulations and subsidies to help develop alternatives sufficiently early. The second and opposite temptation is that of “ostrich policies”, which consist of burying our head in the sand to avoid seeing or hearing what is going on. This is not an option either. We are directly concerned, in two different ways [slide 2]. Page 2 sur 8  First as supervisors, insofar as climate-related risks are clearly among the long term risks to which financial institutions are exposed: monitoring these risks is not a “nice to have”, or part of a CSR policy, but a “must have”. Second, we are concerned as central banks in charge of price stability. Just to clarify, we shouldn’t waste too much time here in the legal and political debate on centralbank mandates. Central banks’ core mandate worldwide is price stability, and climate change already affects the level of prices and activity – think of severe drought in Argentina which cost 3% of GDP i, of floods in Pakistan with losses and damages equivalent to 8% of GDP ii, or of the recent rise of food prices everywhere –: hence we have to deal with the effects of climate change on the economy.
Eddie Yue: Join us and be part of the change Keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at Hong Kong Fintech Week 2019, Hong Kong, 6 November 2019. * * * 1. Good morning everyone, a very warm welcome to the Hong Kong Fintech Week. For those of you visiting from outside Hong Kong – a special welcome to our city. 2. This is the fourth year we are hosting Fintech Week. I guess many of you were at previous ones. If you came to the first in 2016, you might have noticed how this event has evolved in just a few years. 3. Back then, the HKMA had just set up the Fintech Facilitation Office, or FFO. We hosted the first Hong Kong Fintech Week – basically as an “experiment” – at the relaxing PMQ heritage site in Central. We weren’t sure at that time whether people like you would be interested in coming along! Frankly, there wasn’t much talk about Fintech in Hong Kong at that time. Certain people in the industry did tell us, to our faces, that the HKMA was a big hindrance to Fintech development because our regulatory approach was too conservative! 4. But that’s fine! We always value your feedback. 5. That Fintech Week three years ago turned out to be a great first step. It genuinely started a dynamic and constructive dialogue between everyone involved in Fintech development in our region.

The Government has launched a variety of technology initiatives. It set up a $ billion dedicated Innovation and Technology Venture Fund. It injected $ billion into the Research Endowment Fund of the Research Grants Council. And it is funding the Hong Kong Shenzhen Innovation and Technology Park, which will enable Hong Kong to tap the supply chain capabilities and talent pool across the border. 33. The administration has boosted incentives for the Fintech industry by increasing the tax deduction for R&D expenditure. And government support has also helped seven local universities launch Fintech undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. 34. In particular, I would like to mention that in collaboration with the HKMA, the Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks will set up a new Fin+Tech platform to organise accelerator programmes and hackathons. There will also be a new Innovation Hub at the governmentfunded InnoCentre, where the HKMA will host its latest proof-of-concept studies. These two initiatives will provide open platforms for different stakeholders to collaborate on Fintech development. Bracing for New Trends 35. I hope I have outlined what all of us in different sectors in Hong Kong have achieved in developing Fintech in Hong Kong, under the joint effort as “Hong Kong Inc.”. I would like to wrap it up with you some thoughts about three macro trends that I believe will influence the future of Fintech. 36. First, financial services will increasingly integrate with social platforms and other lifestyle channels.
This possible weakening in the link between wage rises and price rises could be attributable to more structural factors, which are also being discussed in the United States: we shall pay close attention to how data on this issue evolve. 3 - Relentless efforts towards a stronger Europe Monetary policy cannot be the only game in town. I understand and share German concerns on this... and that is why we need to push relentlessly for a strengthening of our Economic Union. Allow me to mention a great Luxembourger, Pierre Werner. At the end of the 1960s, he dared to suggest in his report that the monetary area needed a common budget, that its decisions should be endowed with democratic legitimacy or that unions should be given an active role. In this respect, the advances made by the Eurogroup in December 2018 constitute limited progress that needs to be extended. With regard to the Banking Union, its success will be predicated on the establishment of a solid and effective resolution mechanism, more than on the deposit insurance scheme. We need to pave the way for the backstop to be implemented as soon as possible. Moreover, in the interests of financial stability, we should consider extending the maturities on the credit lines and reach a definitive agreement on how to make emergency decisions. Unfortunately, there was almost no progress at all on the Capital Markets Union in the 4 December agreement.

This expanded role reminds us that the monitoring responsibility of a Central Bank is crucial. Our dedication to stability and our forward looking approach in a globalised financial world is a challenging task. Long lasting cooperation among Central Banks and stimulating conferences like this one largely contribute to this achievement. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 113/2010
It seems natural to believe that greater losses would occur if there were repeated mistakes in economic projections of a one-sided nature. An example would be repeated extreme optimism or extreme pessimism in the face of reasonable evidence to the contrary. Such bouts could be due to mistakes about cyclical factors or a misunderstanding of the changing structure of the economy. At the policymaking level, a continuing pattern of not taking appropriate policy actions in the face of a changing economic outlook or structure would presumably lead to poor outcomes against medium-term goals. Now, caution in policymaking can be a virtue. But at some point, when the weight of the evidence is large, continued delays in action could erode credibility. In general, although a policymaker’s credibility account is credited and debited on a regular basis, the most substantial credibility losses come in two varieties: 1) really large and systematic deviations of outcomes from ex ante chosen policy objectives; and 2) a substantial misunderstanding of policy objectives. Monetary economists often point to the poor economic experiences of the 1970s and 1930s as times when the Federal Reserve’s credibility account was debited substantially because of both of these factors. I believe the current liquidity trap environment following the 2008 financial crisis is similarly challenging today’s policymakers. So far, I believe we have done the right thing.

So we must always ask if we have seen anything that would move us away from our current viewpoints  2  2  See Evans (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  and forecasting methodologies – and if things have changed significantly, we must ask if achievable paths for our policy goals or the channels through which monetary policy works have been altered in any substantive way. These considerations would include questions about whether we are facing structural economic change that lowers the economy’s potential output, substantial financial impediments holding back demand along the lines stressed by Reinhart and Rogoff, global financial stress, and the like. A good portion of these concerns are related to appropriate risk-management considerations. Fourth, policymakers must make a decision regarding the stance and course of monetary policy. They must ask if their forecasts are consistent with their medium- and long-term policy objectives, and if not, what then is the best response for monetary policy to influence the trajectory of the economy and inflation in order to meet the FOMC’s objectives? That is a very quick summary of the necessary steps for effective monetary policymaking. Where does credibility come into play in all of this? Since no policymaking process can be perfect, some errors will naturally arise. At the forecasting stage, no one has a perfect crystal ball. Forecast errors will be made, and these errors could have an impact on credibility.
But this market has grown very weakly and in real terms is smaller today than it was at the start of the 1990s. It is not that the market for company financing has shrunk, but it seems to have scaled back its connections to the major banks. That is partly because large Swedish companies can turn to foreign banks or directly to the capital market for funding. Also, it is probably partly because Swedish banks in the wake of the banking crisis have made a conscious decision to reduce their share of risky lending. However, it does not seem as if the Swedish banks have fully managed to compensate for this lower lending through increased advisory services or other ”intermediary services”. In essence, Swedish banks have strong positions in a number of areas but these markets are either mature or else the banks’ shares are shrinking. If we were to assume that the trend oracle will be right, I envisage two possible ways forward for the major Swedish banks, both of which represent extremes. The first strategy would be based on the banks’ proven proficiency in terms of organisation and distribution, and to refine this strength and also become better at peripheral advisory services. Fewer resources would be invested in product development and risk-taking – products can easily be copied and risks sold on to other, hungrier investors.

Peter Pang: Policies adopted by authorities in different jurisdictions with respect to international reserves Welcoming remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the International Monetary Fund Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)/Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research (HKIMR) Workshop, Hong Kong, 24 March 2011. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to welcome all of you to this event co-hosted by the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research (HKIMR) and the Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF. The HKIMR, as some of you already know, is a subsidiary of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. Its objectives are to promote research on longer-term and wider policy issues of relevance to the monetary and financial development of Hong Kong and the Asia region; and to foster cooperation and cross-fertilisation of research efforts between academics, international financial institutions and the HKMA research activities. For this reason we are particularly pleased to co-sponsor this workshop which deals with the important topic of policies adopted by authorities in different jurisdictions with respect to international reserves and with the advice the IMF gives in this regard in its consultations with policy authorities. The accumulation of international reserves has become one of the issues at the center of debates about the functioning of the current international monetary system as well as about reforms of this system.
A New Horizon  Speech given by Mark Carney, Governor Bank of England  European Commission Conference: A global approach to sustainable finance 21 March 2019  I am grateful to Jennifer Nemeth for her assistance in drafting these remarks and to Ryan Barrett, Sarah Breeden, Emma Dalhuijsen, Edd Denbee, Chris Faint, Ronan Hodge and Sini Matikainen for their input. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  A New Horizon? A few years ago, I spoke of the Tragedy of the Horizon – how the catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most banks, investors and financial policymakers, imposing costs on future generations that the current one has no direct incentives to fix.1 Once climate change becomes a clear and present danger to financial stability it could already be too late to stabilise the atmosphere at two degrees. The paradox is that risks will ultimately be minimised if the transition to a low-carbon economy begins early and follows a predictable path. But for markets to anticipate and smooth the transition to a 2-degree world, they need the right information, proper risk management, and coherent, credible public policy frameworks. Today, catalysed by the COP21 Paris Agreement, and national policies such as the UK Government’s Clean Growth Strategy, some of these elements are coming into place, creating a potential path to break the Tragedy of the Horizon. But the task is large, the window of opportunity is short, and the stakes are existential.

Such claims could arise well into the future, as the science and evidence of climate change hardens, though some are already taking action against companies on the grounds of failure to disclose the risks posed to their business models by climate change. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4    Dependency on short-term actions given that the size of future impacts will, at least in part, be determined by the actions taken today; and    Uncertain time horizon which may stretch beyond traditional business planning cycles. The nature of these risks means that the biggest challenge in climate risk management is in assessing the resilience of firms’ strategies to transition risks. Part of the genius of the private sector-led TCFD is its recognition that disclosure needs to go beyond the static to the strategic. Markets need information to assess which companies can seize the opportunities in a low carbon economy and which are strategically resilient to the physical and transition risks associated with climate change. The Bank of England has also become increasingly active in such assessments, consistent with our financial stability and prudential mandates. As the supervisor of the world’s fourth largest insurance industry, we know that general insurers and reinsurers are on the front line of managing the physical risks from climate change.