samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
ICE Term SONIA Reference Rates  ; Refinitiv Term SONIA  14. Standard on use of Term SONIA reference rates 15. Investor size, liquidity and prime money market fund stress 16. Re: Transition to the Secured Overnight Financing Rate – The Views of Nonfinancial Corporations  Descending safely: Life after Libor ‐ speech by Andrew Bailey | Bank of England  Page 6  Andrew Bailey Governor, Bank of England  Sign up for latest updates  Descending safely: Life after Libor ‐ speech by Andrew Bailey | Bank of England  Page 7

5  See IMF (2010), chapter 2, and references contained in it, for a discussion of balance sheet and asset co-movement approaches to determining systemic institutions. 6  Actually, the SBIF may deny authorization to any bank merger, acquisition of assets of a bank by another banking entity, or taking control of two o more existing banks by the same person or group, or to increase substantially the existing control if the acquiring bank that performs said merger, acquisition or the resulting group of banks reaches a significant market share. In order to deny authorization, the SBIF needs prior approval by the Central Bank Board, issued by the majority of all Board members. 6  BIS Review 124/2010  Figure 1 Net flows of investment funds to emerging economies (billions of dollars accumulated in twelve moving months, weekly data) Equity flows  Total flows  Emerging (1) Latin America Total equity  120  Asia ex-Japan Other emerging (2)  120  80  80  40  40  0  0  -40  -40  -80  Total  Total fixed income  Total equity  -80 06  07  08  09  10  06  07  08  09  10  (1) Global Emerging Markets (GEM). (2) Middle East, Emerging Europe and Africa. Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research. Figure 2 Monetary Policy Rates in the world (1) (percent)  Developed economies (2) Chile (4) Survey emerging ec. 35  Emerging economies (3) Survey developed ec.
The sake of efficiency, however, should not be a reason to allow large enterprises to take over businesses that produce products or provide services for domestic and local consumers, if it has a detrimental effect of destroying jobs and livelihoods of these people or the local customs and ways of life. The traditional mom-and-pop stores have no impact on our competitiveness at the international level; they do not need to rely on “know how” of the western model of trade to improve their efficiency, which is usually at the expense of tradition. We can now only hope that authorities will not allow the impact of globalization, brought about through hasty FTAs, to destroy the livelihoods of local people in small businesses, such as barbers, restaurants, truck drivers, and farming. The process of globalization, which began with the industrialized nations of the West, has had important influence on our values, as I have mentioned earlier. If our government is in favor of this creed of globalization without reservation, there will be no one to stop globalization from eventually overtaking our local businesses. More importantly, social values which give us a sense of satisfaction and happiness will be gradually eroded. It is up to the government, who is tasked with the management of the country, to selectively choose which technology to be brought in to improve efficiency, and only where necessary and appropriate. They should take heed not to allow new developments to overwhelm local traditions and livelihoods.

Although there is a great number of arrangements that ensure money transfers between financial intermediaries, in practice, financial transfers tend to be concentrated on a few of them. Thus, the largest volumes and values of payment orders are currently carried out in multilateral payment systems. On the basis of several surveys conducted by the Eurosystem since 1999, we consider that the market share of these systems is nearly 80 %, both in terms of volume and value. However, we should not minimise the role of correspondent banking, which holds the remaining 20 % of the market. Correspondent banking arrangements also show a high degree of concentration: out of all reporting banks to the Eurosystem’s survey, the ten largest banks account for about 80 % of the overall value of correspondent banking transactions. Moreover, correspondent activities of some banks are substantial and similar in size to those of some interbank funds transfer systems. The issue of the infrastructures diversity for payments in euro across the EU was raised prior to, and due to, the introduction of the euro. At that time, it was realised that diversity had drawbacks to the  BIS Review 49/2005  1  extent that it came together with a discrepancy of service level between national and cross border payments, at the expense of the latter. With respect to the objective of financial integration, it was clear that this situation could not be considered as an optimum. The issue was taken into account before the launch of the euro.
Spikes on international financial markets therefore cannot be ruled out during the process of normalising monetary policy in the major currency areas. Swiss economic outlook I will now look at economic developments in Switzerland. The economy continued to develop favourably in the third quarter. Annualised real GDP was up by slightly more than 2%. Unlike the previous quarter, goods exports grew substantially. Domestic demand, however, lost some momentum. On the output side, manufacturing in particular recorded positive growth, having previously fallen for three successive quarters. Construction continues to be an important growth driver. Owing to this positive growth, utilisation of production capacity picked up. Nevertheless, it remained at a relatively low level in manufacturing. Employment increased slightly and the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate has not risen further since summer. Overall, the output gap remains negative. The indicators already available suggest that growth will weaken temporarily in the fourth quarter. Following the sharp increase in the third quarter, goods exports and industrial output, in particular, are likely to advance at a slower pace. In the coming year, with the gradual improvement in the global economy, GDP should once again grow more strongly. We continue to expect growth of 1.5–2.0% for 2013. For 2014, we expect a growth rate of around 2.0%. However, given the vulnerable economic situation abroad, downside risks still prevail for Switzerland. Monetary and financial conditions I will now turn to monetary and financial conditions.

In this regard, we should bear in mind that inflation in the last two years has been predominantly negative. On the other hand, with an ongoing unfavourable international environment and a strong Swiss franc, the situation for our economy remains challenging. Should it become necessary, we will therefore enforce the minimum exchange rate by buying foreign currency in unlimited quantities. And, if required, we will also take further measures. In addition, we are leaving the target range for the three-month Libor at 0.0–0.25%. The SNB bases its monetary policy decision on a conditional inflation forecast, which assumes an unchanged three-month Libor of 0.0% over the next three years. You will find the relevant chart in your media kit. Compared to September, our forecast has been adjusted downwards slightly. Reasons for this are the unexpectedly low rates of inflation for October and November, which serve as a lower departure point for the forecast, as well as the decline in inflation in the euro area and the slight fall in the oil price, which both help to dampen the inflation outlook. For 2013, we still anticipate inflation of –0.2%. For 2014 and 2015, the inflation forecast is down in each case by 0.1 percentage points and is now at 0.2% and 0.6% respectively. Consequently, no inflation risks can be identified for Switzerland in the foreseeable future. Global economic outlook The SNB’s inflation forecast is embedded in a global economic scenario. I would therefore like to begin with our assessment of the global economy.
That is what we appear, increasingly, to find in financial market prices in practice, whether in volatility and correlation or in fat tails and persistence. This change in price dynamics will in turn influence market-making behaviour. Consider the problem facing an HFT market-maker. They face inventory risk from market fluctuations and information risk from adverse selection. Pricing these risks means forming a guess about the future path of prices. The greater the potential range of future prices, the larger the insurance premium they will demand. The future price range (maximum – minimum) for a price series at some future date T, R(T), can be written generically as: 20 (1) where κ is a constant and σT is the standard deviation of the process up to time T. H is our old friend the Hurst coefficient, dredged up from the Nile; it can be thought to summarise the degree of fat-tailedness and persistence in prices. When the holding period is short (say T=1), as with HFT, the future price range is the volatility of the series magnified by the Hurst coefficient. In other words, the fatter and more persistent the tails (H), the greater the market risk and the wider the bid-ask spread of the HFT. This has implications for the dynamics of bid-ask spreads, and hence liquidity, among HFT firms. During a market crash, the volatility of prices (σ) is likely to spike. From equation (1), fractality heightens the risk-sensitivity of HFT bid-ask spreads to such a volatility event.

These uninformed traders face a fundamental uncertainty: they may not be able to observe the market price at which their trades will be executed. This is driving through the rear-view mirror, stock-picking based on yesterday’s prices. Co-location speeds up the clock. But it has also had the effect of turning it back. Location matters once more. The race to zero has become a physical, as well as a virtual, one. Distance matters more than ever. The dinosaur has been resurrected, this time in high definition. In some ways, it is the ultimate contradiction. In sum, through this century changes in the structure of trading, and in the behaviour of traders, have gone hand in hand. Liberalisation and innovation have delivered fragmentation of structure and transformation of speed. Both structure and speed have experienced a highvelocity revolution. So what impact has this race to zero had on market dynamics? 3. From microstructure to macrostructure  This is difficult detective work. But there are theoretical clues and empirical fingerprints. The theoretical clues come from a literature that flourished after the stock market crash of 1987 – the so-called market microstructure literature. 5 This departs from the notion of frictionless trading and information-efficient prices. In its place it introduces frictions in the price-setting process, which arise from characteristics of market participants (such as their trading speed) and of the trading infrastructure (such as its degree of fragmentation). 4  “Latency” refers to the time it takes from sending an order to it being executed.
There are several ways of achieving this both through strong public finances and a flexible economy. The Riksbank will certainly be asked to comment on the economic aspects again, particularly with regard to the commission appointed by the Swedish government to investigate the stabilisation policy consequences of EMU membership and that will soon present its conclusions. However, the final consideration of all aspects should be made at the political level. A central bank should therefore, in my opinion, avoid any statements that could be interpreted as campaigning. The discussion of the timetable The timetable for a potential Swedish EMU membership will be decided in the political process. The Government Bill "Sweden and the Economic and Monetary Union" from 1997 states that if the government should decide at a later date that Sweden should participate in the monetary union, the question would be put to the Swedish population for consideration. The signals from, for instance our Prime Minister Göran Persson, indicate that a referendum could be held next year. Other political leaders appear to be thinking along the same lines. If the result were to be a "yes", Sweden would present an application to the EU Commission and the ECB for an examination of whether we fulfil the legal and economic convergence criteria for inflation rate, long-term interest rates, exchange rate stability as well as the budget level and the public sector debt.

It will lay down minimum standards for banks to hold some resiliently liquid assets and about the funding of illiquid assets. To date, much more prominent has been the work on capital. Although there has been some dilution of the proposals from a few months ago, real substantive progress is being made in reforming the minimum standards and in introducing various buffers, taking into account credit cycle conditions and the circumstances of SIFIs. The key element of the overall package is that “capital” will mean capital. The world of hybrid instruments – pretending to be so-called capital instruments but which in fact cannot truly absorb losses in a going concern – should become more or less a thing of the past. The Bank of England would like it to be completely consigned to the past. Only equity can absorb losses. For that reason, in calculating regulatory capital, deductions from capital should really be from equity. As part of the emerging compromise, there will be some derogations from that, but the derogations should be transparent. Markets should learn to evaluate bank’s capital adequacy on the basis of what is made transparent about the makeup of that capital. The other really key change will come in stages – partly in the package this autumn and partly during next year and beyond – which is reducing the pernicious regulatory arbitrage that has existed between “banking book” capital requirements and “trading book” capital requirements.
In the early phase a significant part of this income came from liquidity programs. More recently, the main contributor has been net interest on the expanded SOMA portfolio. At this juncture, SOMA continues to generate abnormally high net income. As policy eventually normalizes and the cost of financing assets via interest on excess reserves goes up, the net interest margin on the SOMA assets will return to more normal levels. However, the net interest margin is unlikely to turn negative because roughly $ billion of assets are – and have been for many years – funded by notes and coins in circulation, on which the Fed does not pay interest.

A sustained rise in medium-term inflation expectations would represent a threat to our price stability mandate and would not be tolerated. Turning first to the economic outlook, the situation looks considerably brighter than six months ago. On the activity side, a wide range of indicators show a broadening and strengthening of demand and production. For example, on the demand side, real personal consumption expenditures rose at a 4.1 percent annual rate during the fourth quarter. This compares with only a 2.2 percent annual rate during the first three quarters of 2010 (Chart 1). Orders and production are following suit. For example, the Institute of Supply Management index of new orders for manufacturers climbed to 67.8 in January, the highest level since January of 2004 (Chart 2). The revival in activity, in turn, has been accompanied by improving consumer and business confidence. For example, the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index rose to 77.5 in February, up from 68.9 six months earlier (Chart 3). Indeed, the 2.8 percent annualized growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) in the fourth quarter may understate the economy’s forward momentum. That is because real GDP growth in the quarter was held back by a sharp slowing in the pace of inventory accumulation. The revival in demand, production and confidence strongly suggests that we may be much closer to establishing a virtuous circle in which rising demand generates more rapid income and employment growth, which in turn bolsters confidence and leads to further increases in spending.
Increasing product market competition, particularly in the services sectors, would also facilitate the restructuring of the economy and encourage innovation. Such measures are crucial for enhancing productivity growth, which is one of the main drivers of long-term growth. All these structural reforms should be supported by the necessary improvements in the structure of the banking sector. Sound balance sheets, effective risk management and transparent, robust business models remain key to strengthening banks’ resilience to shocks and to ensuring adequate access to finance, thereby laying the foundations for sustainable growth and financial stability. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

2  BIS Review 89/2007  Such volatility, which sometimes manifest themselves in “sudden stop”, is linked to a variety of factors including the pro-cyclical nature of the flows. For example, the pro-cyclical nature with respect to sovereign bond ratings. On the other hand, information asymmetries in emerging market may also make the flows more susceptible to contagion effect, resulting in large swings in capital flows unrelated to changes in fundamentals. Macroeconomic conditions in industrial countries is another candidate that can make emerging market more susceptible to a wide array of global shocks. Domestic political shock in the form of policy uncertainty can also be more pronounced in emerging markets, as evidenced by more frequent regime switches i.e, from fixed to floating exchange rates, as well as reversals in policies. Such shocks can exacerbate capital flow volatility and manifest themselves in terms of greater macroeconomic volatility. The second key difference between emerging markets and developed economies is the structural features of the economic system which influences how various shocks are propagated through the economic system. While there are many key differences in this regard, two features are especially important in the context of monetary and financial stability. The first is financial development. And the second is institutional framework of monetary and financial supervision policies. Financial development is an important process for channeling resources to their most productive uses. For example, a strong banking sector with highly disciplined risk management can help mitigate the risk of financial imbalance. This feature can be lacking in emerging markets.
In public relations, Eesti Pank has repeatedly emphasised that central banks are being forced to take on a role that does not suit them. Functions that are alien to the Eurosystem are best left to the European Stability Mechanism. There are two advantages to such a solution. Firstly, establishing conditions for the award of financial support allows guiding the recipient country’s economic policy in the desired direction. As we all know, monetary policy measures cannot be used for eliminating the causes of the sovereign debt crisis. Secondly, this will tighten the control of the member states’ governments and parliaments over crisis measures and ensure a better overview of the costs of the crisis measures. [TO SUM UP] 1. The right decisions can only be made when we understand the economy. It does not serve our interests to monitor just our own activities – we also need to monitor the development plans and objectives of other euro area countries (and not only Greece or Portugal). The European Economic and Monetary Union already has all the good characteristics for the achievement of which the union was established to begin with. We now need to enhance the union’s efficiency, potency and security in the service of our best interests. Honourable President of the Riigikogu, honourable members of the Riigikogu. I would like to finish the speech by expressing my gratitude for the seven years of cooperation. Thank you for taking notice and account of the messages of Eesti Pank!

Materialization of such a scenario could lead to temporarily lower policy rates than envisaged in the baseline scenario and the use of macroprudential instruments in the direction of tightening in order to cut the pace of credit growth in tandem with the temporary rate cuts. The second scenario illustrated in the chart was shared with the public in our Inflation Report of October 2010. Both recent economic developments in Europe and decisions taken  BIS Review 174/2010  3  by central banks of developed countries increase global economic uncertainty significantly. Should the measures taken at a global level cause long-term and high-rated increases in food and commodity prices, and should such increases lead to a deterioration in the price setting behavior, which in turn, hampers achieving the medium-term inflation targets, an earlier-than envisaged tightening in the baseline scenario would be considered. In this case, as domestic credit expansion would weaken, the use of macroprudential instruments might not be needed in the direction of tightening. If measures taken in developed countries remain inadequate, the third scenario illustrated in the lower left-hand part of the chart might be considered. In that case, as indicated in the latest Inflation Report, should the global economy face a longer-than-anticipated period of anemic growth, the monetary tightening envisaged to start in the final quarter of 2011 under the baseline scenario might be postponed. Moreover, an outcome, whereby global economic problems intensify and contribute to a contraction of domestic economic activity, may trigger a second round of easing.