samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  In 1975, David R. Merrill, a law student, instigated legal proceedings against the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) in the US, charging that the FOMC violated the Freedom of Information Act by deferring public disclosure of its interest rate decision by 90 days. The case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Reserve could continue its practice if it could provide an adequate explanation showing that immediate disclosure would significantly harm the Government's monetary functions or commercial interests. The Supreme Court left the assessment of this explanation to the district court. The district court concluded that it lacked the expertise necessary to substitute its judgment for that of the FOMC and the Federal Reserve did not begin to release its monetary policy decisions on the same day until 1994. See Marvin Goodfriend (1986): “Monetary mystique: secrecy and central banking”, in Journal of Monetary Economics, 17, no. 1, pp. 63-92. 3  The bill also enabled Catholics to serve in the British army. British military forces were involved in conflicts in many countries at the time and needed more manpower. See A. Andréadès (1966): History of the Bank of England 1640-1903, 4th edition, Frank Cass & co. Ltd.  BIS Review 140/2009  1  In Norway, monetary policy was probably also perceived by many as something mysterious and remote.

12 In my lecture here last year, 13 I noted that it can be demanding for the political authorities to ensure price stability because low interest rates are often more popular than high interest rates. An appropriate interest rate may therefore be demanding to  8  See NOU (Official Norwegian Report) 1973:36 Om prisproblemene (On price problems). 9  For an account of economic policy in Norway in the twentieth century, see Tore Jørgen Hanisch, Espen Søilen and Gunhild J. Ecklund (1999): Norsk økonomisk politikk i det 20. århundre. Verdivalg i en åpen økonomi (Economic policy in Norway in the 20th century. Ethics in an open economy), Høyskoleforlaget. 10  See i.e., chapter 5 in the Norwegian Act on Securities Trading. 11  In Norway, the concept is also associated with Jahn Teigen’s contribution “Glasnost” in the national final of the Eurovision Song Contest 1988. 12  During the financial crisis last winter the Government wrote: “Monetary policy is the first line of defence in countering a setback in the economy”. See Report No. 37 (2008-09) to the Storting (Norwegian parliament) “Om endringer i statsbudsjettet 2009 med tiltak for arbeid (On changes in the 2009 Budget and labour measures), Ministry of Finance, p. 6. 13  The lecture entitled “On keeping promises”, remarks by Endre Stavang and Henrik Syse and Francis Sejersted’s summary of the debate have been published in Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift 1/2009. BIS Review 140/2009  3  set in government corridors.
Peter Praet: The financial cycle and real convergence in the euro area Speech by Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of the US and World Economies, Washington DC, 10 April 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen1 Thank you for inviting me to address this conference. The latest data confirm that the euro area on aggregate is proceeding slowly along the path of economic recovery. Yet, a key issue that faces policymakers today, and that will continue to face them for several years to come, is how to deal with persistent divergence between national economies. Some euro area countries are experiencing steady growth, while in others growth remains anaemic. Some have unemployment rates under 5%, while in others unemployment exceeds 25%. In the euro area, which is a monetary union but not a formal political union, there are risks if such divergences remain unaddressed. Without fiscal equalisation mechanisms, real economic convergence is important to gradually reduce cross-country income gaps, and this in turn ensures the economic and social cohesion of the single currency. This issue of real convergence is what I would like to focus on in my remarks today – in particular, why the first decade of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) failed to produce real convergence, and how the euro area can produce a sustainable convergence process going forward. My main argument is as follows.

Yet, with hindsight we know that there was no underlying convergence in labour productivity. In particular, strong capital accumulation in catching-up economies did not translate into faster total factor productivity (TFP) growth. TFP actually diverged between higher and lower income countries in this period. In fact, there was a positive correlation between the initial level of GDP per capita and average TFP growth rates: the highest TFP growth rates were found in Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland. A special case here is Italy, where initial GDP per capita was high but TFP converged downwards the catching-up economies. This seems to be because falling real interest rates eased fiscal constraints and reduced the incentive of governments to focus on structural policies. In other words, the apparent economic convergence in the pre-crisis period was largely illusory. There was a cyclical convergence in GDP levels, but it was not structurally anchored. This poses two questions that can help inform policy choices in the euro area today: first, why did capital flows not lead to productivity convergence? And second, why did more observers not see through the illusion of convergence prior to the crisis? Why did real convergence not happen? Starting with the question of why TFP in particular did not converge, an important explanation seems to be that – contrary to the assumptions of the neo-classical growth model – foreign capital flowing into catching-up economies was allocated to sectors where the marginal product of capital was low and falling.
BIS Review 76/2010  1  The amounts involved are indeed sizeable, but it appears that the markets are unclear about the way in which they might be mobilised… In my view, the concrete implementation of the mechanism is taking place properly, and the most remarkable aspect is the speed with which parliamentary decisions have been taken in the countries in question. If, for some reason, Greece does not honour its commitments, might there be a need for a “plan B”? That is not part of our working assumption. Greece must and will honour its commitments. The European Commission, together with the ECB on the one hand and the IMF on the other, is following developments in the recovery programme very closely. Should we anticipate a debt restructuring programme? No, but allow me to make a general comment: the euro area has an average annual deficit – as a percentage of gross domestic product – of around 6.5% and 7%, which is substantially lower than that of the United States, Japan or the United Kingdom, where it is around 10% or higher of their gross domestic product. Sometimes, one imagines a sort of Anglo-Saxon plot against the euro. What do you think of this? No, one should be wary of any conspiracy theories. I simply believe that some international investors struggle to understand Europe and its decision-making mechanisms.

Since 2000, and especially in recent months, the picture has changed. The mines have opted for another strategy and have cut back on price hedging. This strategy change can be partly attributed to more positive expectations regarding the gold price. As a result of the central bank agreement on gold sales, producers no longer fear large-scale sales by the central banks. Moreover, it seems that producers have recently become more upbeat in their assessment of private investment demand. It is interesting, in this respect, that gold producers' hedging activity tends to accelerate market trends. When they expect price decreases, prices do in fact decrease faster as a result of hedging, and when they expect price rises, prices do rise faster owing to the decrease in hedging. Such strategy changes, which are always due to changed market expectations, have to be reckoned with in future as well. •  Reviving private investment demand in the industrialised countries has also contributed to giving the gold price a boost. This phenomenon has been particularly pronounced in Japan, but Europe and the United States have also seen gold demand booming. Economic imponderables, concern over the financial health of some companies, heightened political tension in different parts of the world, the terror attacks of September 2001 and concomitantly subdued stock markets have caused investors to increase their holdings of the  BIS Review 39/2002  1  yellow metal. It seems as if gold is, for the time being, once again assuming its role of a safe haven investment.
The most important factor behind this development is rising wages, but lower compensation ceilings in the unemployment insurance and income tax credits have also had an effect. Another trend on the labour market is that fewer and fewer employees are members of trade unions. Since the early 2000s the percentage of trade union members has declined by around 15 per cent. Part of the downturn reflects the fact that people born abroad more often refrain from joining a trade union and these  8 For a description of how matching efficiency is estimated, see Jonsson and Theobald (2019). 5 [24]  people are also overrepresented in the private services sector, where the percentage of trade union members has fallen the most. 9 There has also been a trend increase in the number of people with fixed-term employment contracts, see Figure 2b. These people often have a weaker foothold in the labour market and probably also a weaker negotiating position. The reduction in trade union membership and increase in fixed-term employment contracts may be indications that employees’ negotiating power has declined. If that is the case, it could have implications for both wage developments and inflation. Figure 2.

Bayoumi, Tamim and Habermeier, Karl (2014), The Evolution of Monetary Policy: More Art and Less Science. Post on the IMF’s blog iMFdirect, available at blog-imfdirect.imf.org. Bernanke, Ben S. (2011), The Effects of the Great Recession on Central Bank Doctrine and Practice. Speech at the 56th Economic Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 18 October 2011. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Bernanke, Ben S. and Gertler, Mark (1999), Monetary Policy and Asset Volatility. In Economic Symposium Conference Proceedings: New Challenges for Monetary Policy. Kansas City Federal Reserve Bank. Bernanke, Ben S. and Gertler, Mark (2001), Should Central Banks Respond To Movements in Asset Prices? American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 91, pp. 253–257. BIS (2013), VI. Monetary policy at the crossroads, 83rd Annual Report, 1 April 2012–31 March 2013. Bank for International Settlements. Blanchard, Olivier (2000), Bubbles, Liquidity Traps, and Monetary Policy. In Mikitani and Posen (eds) Japan’s Financial Crisis and its Parallels to the US Experience, Special Report 13. Institute for International Economics. Blanchard, Olivier, Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni and Mauro, Paolo (2013), Rethinking Macro Policy II: Getting Granular. IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/03. the IMF. Borio, Claudio (2011a), Implementing a Macroprudential Framework: Blending Boldness and Realism. Capitalism and Society 6 (1). Borio, Claudio (2011b), Central-banking post-crisis: What compass for uncharted waters? BIS Working Papers No 353. Bank for International Settlements. Borio, Claudio and White, William (2003), Whither Monetary and Financial Stability? The Implications of Evolving Policy Regimes. In Economic Symposium Conference Proceedings: Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy.
First prize The first prize was awarded to PEGI MYSHQERRI, a student at the Goethe University, Germany, for the study on the Master's theme: The effects of ECB Asset Purchases on European Corporate Bond Markets)". In her work, Pegi has assessed the impact and channels of the European Central Bank's quantitative easing policies on the interest rate of corporate bonds. The author has also analysed the behaviour of firms toward these programs of the European Central Bank, and whether they have affected or not in the issuance of an acceptable (adequate) debt. More specifically, Pegi has employed the econometrics methods to assess that both programs - the purchasing program in the corporation sector (CSPP) as well as the emergency purchasing program during the pandemic (PEPP) - have had an effect on the interest rate of corporate bonds, but the scale of the impact of each program has been different. Furthermore, results show that quantitative easing programs have had a considerable role in mitigating the lending conditions to corporation in the Euro area, affecting thus the increase of both the number and volume of corporate bonds issued. First, I would like to commend the winner of the first prize for choosing this theme; a rather interesting and relevant theme for banks in advanced economies, but which has been gaining traction in emerging countries.

We gladly assess that the topics presented fulfil the standards of a true scientific research, correctly addressing the hypothesis, and their validation is based on the application of contemporary research methodologies, while employing the statistical data in a correct and structured manner. As a result, reaching conclusions and the implications to decision-makers are analysed based on a diligent investigation work on various economic and financial events. After analysing the topics presented, the Assessment Commission has reached a unanimous decision on the winners of the first three prizes of "Governor's Award for the Best Diploma Thesis, 2022". Before awarding the prizes, I would like to congratulate and commend all the participants in competition for their interest, ideas, methods and conclusions, which were based on correct methodologies. The submitted materials are of a high level and the Assessment Commission was hard-pressed when selecting the winners. However, the three topics that will be presented stand out from the rest because of their importance and coherence, as well as for having fully employed the methodology, and diligently having applied and described the assessment methods, and the interesting findings. I encourage the winners and all the contestants in the competition to preserve and nurture the same passion and commitment further in their professional careers as shown in the submitted research works. Let's go ahead and present this turn winners.
The IMF has a key role to play in helping members with sovereign debt issues and in making the debt resolution process more predictable and efficient. In this vein, we support the joint efforts of the IMF and the World Bank to strengthen the Common Framework for debt treatment in a coordinated and timely manner, and in total concert with all creditors. We are all committed to a greener world and attach great importance to transformational reforms required to address climate change-related challenges for the benefit of generations that follow. No country and no region is immune to climate change. It is as much an existential threat to our constituency and to the MENA region as it is to other constituencies and regions. In our region, we have experienced historical floods at the same time as historical droughts. We have to recognize, and collectively address, the existing highly inequitable burden sharing, where countries with negligible carbon footprints bear the weight of negative externalities associated with climate distress created over the years by large emitters. Our countries are  3  committed to their pledges made under the Paris Agreement with the recognition that there could be country specific strategies towards the same greener targets and objectives. Finally, we reiterate our call for a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at the center of the global financial safety net. We call on the IMF to ensure the timely completion of the 16th General Review of Quotas by December 2023.

As before, we call for a revised quota formula that protects the share of poorest members, and for an increase in the IMF’s quota resources to lessen its dependence on borrowed resources and to reinforce its lending capacity. We remain concerned about the projected sharp decline in the IMF’s lending capacity which, unless reversed, could imperil the IMF’s effectiveness and credibility. 4
The one thing that one can say about the Thailand of old is that we really did underestimate the problems we were in and the structural changes needed to put us back to the forefront of international competition. Let me recall that two years ago, we were going through a negative growth of 10.7%, and inflation of 8.1%. The short-term three months fixed deposit rate at that time was 8.25%, and the minimum lending rate was 15.8%, having peaked at over 20% earlier in the year. The only good news at that time seems to have been the large current account surplus of around 10 billion dollars, which would help stabilize the baht dollar exchange rate as well as repay our huge debts, which had reached an unbearable level now known to be $ 105 billion or over 100% of GDP at the particular point of time that I was making the statement to this august body in 1998. At that time, I indicated that in my mind, our problem was structural, and that to solve and put Thailand back on the growth path, we must make structural changes, rather than just pumping money back in. Now, I am even more convinced that I was right and we have indeed pursued that path of restructuring and rediscovering ourselves. Let me elaborate a little. Prominent but unnoticed by many Thailand-watchers was our being invited and joining as shareholders of the BIS, properly known as the Bank for International Settlements.

Peter Praet: It is urgent to agree on an ambitious timetable for completing the Banking Union Contribution of Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, for the magazine of the Eurofi conference in Malta (5-7 April 2017), 4 April 2017. * * * In less than half a decade, the EU moved from decentralized banking supervision and resolution to the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, based on the Single Rulebook. This is part of an overarching effort to create a sound institutional framework for financial integration in Europe. There still are a number of legal, institutional and political problems to overcome before a European bank can operate in the Banking Union as it operates in its domestic market. Several dimensions need to be taken into account in institutional design. First, private risksharing. The financial system is a private risk sharing device, but we have learned the lessons from the financial crisis in terms of budgetary costs, when excessive risk-taking by the private sector was eventually borne by the public sector. Not to revert to the old world of implicit government guarantees for risky behaviour of financial institutions entails making banks equally liable across countries for the amount of risk they want to take into their respective balance sheet. The general principle of the new European rules such as the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive is to absorb bank losses by bailing-in shareholders and uninsured creditors.
In the medium term, the most important challenge for the Thai economy is how to cope with a slowdown in the world economy and a volatile global financial market. Thailand, like many emerging market economies with a small and shallow financial market, is particularly vulnerable to fast-moving international capital. Such rapid movements of capital flows can cause exchange rate to be vastly out of line with the underlying economic fundamentals and have negative impacts on the export or the import sectors depending on the direction of exchange rate movement. In our case, the recent surge in capital inflows has caused a one-way appreciation of the baht relative to regional currencies to the point that it may have become detrimental to both competitiveness and the ability to adjust of the real sector. Sustaining the growth momentum in such an adverse external environment is not an easy task. The key is to ensure that the baht does not move further ahead of other regional currencies. But this alone will not be enough. We also need help from domestic demand which has been somewhat soft due to a number of domestic and external factors during the past year. Whether we shall see a turnaround in domestic demand will depend on a number of factors. Some of these are fortunately on our side. First of all, oil prices, which hit the economy very hard this past couple years, appear to have settled down around 55 USD.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: Financial development – can we have too much of a good thing? Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the International conference on “Financial development, stability and growth”, jointly organised by the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) and the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 25 October 2012. *  *  *  I would like to thank Claudia Strub and Till Ebner for their valuable support in drafting this speech. Introduction Typically, the term “development” has a positive connotation. A state of higher development is perceived to be superior to a state of low development. The same is true for the term “financial development”, which we associate with improved financial products, processes and institutions. Financial development leads to an improved allocation of capital, empowering entrepreneurs and facilitating risk bearing and consumption smoothing. All in all, financial development increases welfare and potentially promotes growth. As Schumpeter saw it, “Bankers are the gatekeepers of capitalist economic development. Their strategic function is to screen potential innovators and advance the necessary purchasing power to the most promising.”1 And, indeed, the pre-crisis economic literature on financial development was strongly influenced by King and Levine’s empirical study2 suggesting that “Schumpeter may be right”. Using data on 80 countries over the 1960–89 period, the authors concluded that the cross-county evidence was consistent with the view that the financial system promotes growth.