samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If price and cost inflation is on a par with the level aimed at by the ECB, one of the fundamental preconditions for exchange rate stability has been satisfied. The exchange rate may nevertheless be  10  BIS Review 7/2001  regarded as "too strong" or "too weak" in relation to the initial range. This may be because conditions in the real economy imply a real appreciation or real depreciation of the krone. The reason for these exchange rate changes may be a deterioration or improvement in the cost competitiveness of the Norwegian business sector. For example, a greater use of petroleum revenues in the government budget may mean that the internationally exposed sector has to be scaled back in order to create room for higher domestic consumption. The equilibrium level for the krone exchange rate may therefore change. In this situation, Norges Bank should have carefully evaluated the reasons for exchange rate movements. If there is reason to believe that the exchange rate will remain strong or weak for a prolonged period, Norges Bank will have to decide whether to notify the government authorities that measures other than those available to the central bank may be necessary. We can imagine situations in which the interest rate had to be kept at a high level, leading to a deflationary recession, in order to allow the krone exchange rate to remain close to its initial range for a period. However, this situation would hardly be stable.

The enhanced intermediation during this decade has benefitted access to financing, particularly for small and medium enterprises, has also improved, both in volume and efficiency. By leveraging on the distribution networks of commercial banks, enhanced product and risk management capabilities, access to financing by this sector has increased at an annual rate of almost 20% since 2005. The financial infrastructure in Malaysia has also been significantly strengthened. Malaysia has an effective financial safety net that includes a comprehensive deposit insurance system and institutional arrangements that provide avenues for advisory, redress and rehabilitation. Innovations in payment systems and instruments as well as infrastructure for the issuance, trading and settlement of debt securities and the access improved market information has contributed to greater efficiency and has also enhanced the overall price discovery process. To support our liberalisation measures our payment infrastructure has also been enhanced to support cross-border trade settlements in local currency and cross-border liquidity support arrangements for financial institutions. Today, Malaysia also has a deep and vibrant bond market which is the largest in South East Asia, and a comprehensive Islamic financial system that is recognised as among the most advanced in the world. The bond market comprising of the conventional and sukuk market has trebled in size, providing businesses with alternative access to financing solutions including in multicurrency to meet a diverse range of risk and maturity preferences.
Mr. Yam speaks on defending Hong Kong’s monetary stability Speech by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr. Joseph Yam, JP, at the TDC Networking Luncheon in Singapore on 14/10/98. … As I am sure you have noticed, Hong Kong, and specifically the involvement of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) in the stock and futures markets in August, has been the subject of some controversy recently. This is understandable, for Hong Kong has always been in favour of leaving markets alone, as much as possible. Indeed, Hong Kong has for many years been named as one of the freest, if not the freest, markets in the world. For the authorities in Hong Kong to go into the stock and futures markets to buy shares and stock futures contracts in such a big way naturally came as a surprise to every one, apart from the few of us who had the unenviable task of taking the very difficult decisions. Clearly the responsibility of public office includes taking difficult decisions in the overall public interest, and one must take them with courage and execute them with commitment. Furthermore, one must also try one’s best to explain the rationale behind them, and be transparent in, and accountable for, the actions taken. Difficult and controversial decisions can be easily misunderstood, even by the most learned man on earth. So we need to present the arguments patiently and clearly. This has not been easy.

Rumors abounded and the shorting of the Hong Kong dollar ahead of the weekend had become a weekly affair. In the first half of August, Hong Kong’s GDP growth for the first quarter was revised down to - 2.8%. Wall Street was down sharply. The yen fell to over 147 against the US dollar. On the approach of the long weekend in the middle of August, rumors of a devaluation of the RMB and/or the abandoning of the Hong Kong dollar’s link with the US dollar intensified, risking the creation of panic and a breakdown of confidence in the currency. Fact number five: there had been much selling pressure on the Hong Kong dollar in the first half of August. In accordance with the discipline of the currency board arrangements, the HKMA would have had to sell foreign reserves and buy Hong Kong dollars passively. This would have created a serious shortage in the Hong Kong dollar monetary base, thus sending interbank interest rates sharply higher and the stock market sharply lower. Given, however, the need to fund the budget deficit for this financial year, the opportunity was taken to switch some of our accumulated fiscal reserves held in foreign currencies back into Hong Kong dollars, leaving the monetary base and therefore interbank interest rates largely unchanged. The amount of Hong Kong dollars absorbed in this manner was large, exceeding the $ billion accumulated by the hedge funds.
It is rare to find another institution with such an experience. Preservation of global financial stability proved to be an issue of utmost importance to both the growth and the fight against poverty. Basel II has been definitively transforming into Basel III. There is a lot of work to be done to promote the micro-prudent and the macro-prudent frameworks. World Bank’s contribution through its participation in FSB and other international bodies and its cooperation with countries which use its financial and technical assistance is indispensable. I will finish my address with quoting the leaders of the Group of Twenty from the meeting in London, 2009: “We start from the belief that prosperity is indivisible; that growth to be sustained, has to be shared; and that our global plan for recovery must have at its heart the needs and jobs of hard-working families, not just in developed countries but in emerging markets and the poorest countries of the world, too; and must reflect the interest not just of today’s population, but of future generations, too.” Thank you for your attention and I wish you a fruitful discussion and a pleasant stay in Skopje. BIS Review 32/2010  3

David Clementi: A bank for all regions: promoting monetary and financial stability in the United Kingdom Speech by Mr David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Ulster Society of Chartered Accountants, Belfast, 14 March 2002. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much indeed for your kind invitation to be here with you tonight. Despite its name, the Bank of England is the central bank of the United Kingdom, and as such it is essential for us to get out and about in the country at large, explaining our actions, and listening hard to the views of businesses and the wider public about the way we are doing our job. In the past year, members of the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee have made some 50 visits across the UK. On this trip, apart from attending this dinner, I have held a meeting with the regional council of the CBI, discussed trading conditions with local business people, and explained our mission to some of the Northern Irish press. I want to cover three main themes in my comments tonight. First, I want briefly to explain the Bank's general approach to monetary policy. Second, I want to give you my current assessment of the outlook for the economy. And, third, I want to explain the Bank's other key role - that of maintaining stability in our financial system.
There are still expectations of an increase in international interest rates, but market participants have lowered their growth and interest rate expectations as a result of high oil prices. Growth in the Norwegian economy picked up during the second half of 2003. The low interest rate has contributed to strong growth in private consumption and housing investment. Activity has picked up in service industries and the construction sector. High petroleum investment, the global economic recovery and a weaker krone through 2003 have improved conditions for manufacturing. Profitability is improving for mainland enterprises. There are signs of renewed growth in investment in a number of industries. Imports have expanded markedly. Potential growth in the Norwegian economy is estimated to increase somewhat more than normal this year as a result of increased competition and rationalisation in many sectors. This will contribute to fairly high growth in the Norwegian economy without the emergence of constraints on the supply of labour or productive capital. The high rate of growth in output nevertheless implies that the output gap will approach zero towards the end of 2004. The output gap is a measure of the difference between the actual level of output and potential output. Developments in the output gap provide a basis for assessing cyclical developments and can thus shed light on domestic price and cost pressures in the economy. It is difficult to know how high capacity utilisation is at any given time.

This implies that Norges Bank maintains the key interest rate at the current level in the period to summer 2005, with a gradual increase thereafter. It is the Executive Board’s assessment that the projections seem to provide a reasonable balance between the objective of increasing inflation and at the same time avoiding excessive growth in output and employment. The projections imply a sight deposit rate in the interval 1¼ - 2¼ per cent in mid-March 2005. Uncertainty as to the effects of previous monetary policy easing and the unusually low interest rate level imply, on the one hand, that we should exercise caution with regard to further interest rate reductions. On the other hand, the prospect of continued low inflation for a period ahead implies that wide deviations from projected economic developments would be required before interest rates should be increased. The prospect of continued low inflation in Norway also implies that we should lag behind other countries in setting interest rates at a more normal level. At its monetary policy meeting on 3 November, the Executive Board decided to leave the sight deposit rate unchanged at 1.75 per cent. At this meeting, the Executive Board did not see any clear alternatives to leaving the interest rate unchanged. In reaching its decision, the Executive Board has weighed the objective of bringing inflation back to target against the risk that output growth may eventually be too high. BIS Review 66/2004  5
Within this framework, restructuring public banks, strengthening private banks, solving the problems of the troubled banks taken over by “Savings and Deposit Insurance Fund” and strengthening the regulation and supervision of the banking sector were among the priorities of the program. And, for improving the asset quality of the system, a debt restructuring process was put into practice, named as the “Istanbul Approach". The sector increased its capital and decreased foreign exchange open positions to a great extent. Hence, right after the 2001 crisis, the authorities intervened into the system in order to prevent a total collapse of the system. This operation had cost around 21.7 billions in New Turkish Lira – more than 12 billion Euros at current rates- or in other words, 12.1 percent of GNP. Firstly, the Treasury and the Central Bank have injected liquidity to public banks. Secondly, the Central Bank started foreign exchange sale auctions on a daily basis to provide foreign exchange liquidity in exchange for some of the excess domestic liquidity to the system so that they could close their open positions in foreign exchange. The Central Bank also used open market operations to withdraw the remaining still excessive liquidity from the system to prevent hyperinflation. Thirdly, to provide more room to the banking sector for liquidity management, measures were taken regarding the reserve requirements of the banking sector. The Central Bank started paying interest to banks’ required reserves.

Rather than simply resetting the quantitative standards, we sought to develop a new forward-looking approach that would be more sensitive to the actual risks that banks take on, one that would ensure a level playing field for banks that compete globally, one that would be better able to evolve with, and indeed encourage, future improvements in the measurement and management of risk, and one that would be well-anchored on a solid corporate governance structure and a sound risk culture. If you allow me, I will draw one more parallel between monetary stability and financial stability. I would say that Basel II incorporates some of the key basic principles that are also built in modern approaches to monetary policy and which have successfully resolved the debate between rules and discretion: a flexible and forward-looking approach, anticipatory rather than reactive behaviour to risk, and the need to take into account market views. The new capital framework is much more comprehensive than the 1988 Accord for many reasons: it applies to a wider scope of entities within banking groups; it offers a menu of different alternatives to fit different circumstances; it encompasses additional risks, in particular operational risk; it widens the recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques; it sets out a thorough framework for securitisation transactions; and, most importantly, it is based on three mutually reinforcing pillars. The first pillar aligns the minimum capital requirements more closely to banks’ actual underlying risks.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Thailand’s economic outlook in 2011 Opening remarks b Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, for the JSCCIB seminar titled “Thailand’s investment environment – looking forward”, Bangkok, 21 July 2011. *  *  *  Mr. Chartsiri Sophonpanich, Chairman of the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking (JSCCIB), Mr. Dusit Nontanakorn, Chairman of the Board of Trade of Thailand, Mr. Payungsak Chartsutipol, Chairman of the Federation of Thai Industries, Mr. Nandor G. von der Luehe, Chairman of the Joint Foreign Chambers of Commerce in Thailand (JFCCT), Distinguished Speakers and Guests, It is my honor and a pleasure to be here today, to give our distinguished audience an opening remark for this seminar, organized by the JSCCIB in cooperation with the JFCCT1. The theme, “Thailand’s Investment Environment: Looking Forward” is most timely and is of everyone’s interest. I am sure that the discussion and exchange of views and ideas presented throughout the day will be fruitful and beneficial to both public and private sector alike. Before entering into a full-fledged panel discussion, I would like to give you, as an overture, an overview of Thailand’s economic outlook in 2011, focusing on two parts. The first part will convey that 2011 is the year of normalization in several aspects, and the second part is to look beyond this ongoing normalization process and lays the basis for many challenges ahead.

The purpose of the strategy is to improve the retail payments market, promoting the use of electronic payment instruments and broadening the financial inclusion of the population. The strategy will be implemented through the improvement of the legal and the regulatory frameworks, through improvements in infrastructure and financial education. Other activities In the field of statistics, the Bank of Albania continued its work for the methodological approximation of statistics with international standards and their alignment with the acquis communautaire. In cooperation with INSTAT and with expertise from the European Union, the Bank of Albania coordinated the work to develop indicators of macroeconomic imbalances for Albania. During 2018, the EUROSTAT carried out an evaluation mission of the Statistical System in Albania, which assessed that the statistics of the Bank of Albania are in line with the principles of the European statistics Code of Practice. As at the end of 2018, the international reserve reached EUR 3.4 billion, sufficient to cover 6.7 months of imports of goods and services and 156% of the short-term external debt. In order to 6/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  increase the flexibility of managing the needs for foreign currency liquidity, an agreement was finalised with the Bank for International Settlements for a foreign currency credit line. The agreement constitutes an important mechanism available to the Bank of Albania in the event of an emergency situation. Research continued to support the decision-making process for formulating and implementing Bank of Albania’s policies.
All the revenue is channelled to the Government Pension Fund Global. The fund’s capital is invested abroad. The annual transfers from the fund to the fiscal budget are guided by the fiscal rule, which stipulates that on average over the cycle spending must be limited to the expected real return on the fund – currently estimated at 3 percent. The general view in Norway is that the management of our natural resource wealth has been a success. The OECD and the IMF have commended the framework. Still, there is an ongoing debate on whether current spending is too high. Some argue that the planned consumption profile takes too little account of future obligations, in particular pension liabilities. Others claim that the estimates of the expected real return on the fund’s capital are too optimistic. Bergsten and Gagnon (2017)1 and Gagnon (2018)2 present a different view. They point to high current account surpluses over a number of years and argue that Norway instead spends too little. Hence my presentation’s title – does Norway save too much? I will proceed by giving a few general perspectives on global current account imbalances. I will then turn to the question of how much oil producers should save – and the reasons for high saving in Norway. Graph: Outline 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  WHY A SURPLUS OR DEFICIT? The international capital market allows countries to decouple the size of savings from investments.

The accumulated wealth in the fund is approaching three times mainland GDP, enabling a lasting annual income contribution to future welfare of 6-8 percent of mainland GDP in the coming decades. The present guidelines allow temporary income flows to be transformed into permanent gains, benefiting all future generations. They are simple and robust. They take account of the effects on the rest of the economy and on the economic policy debate. Norway’s experience serves as an example of why temporary shocks in general, and more specifically discoveries of natural resources, justify deviations from a balanced current account. Deficits used to finance investments that generated high returns have served us well. I guess there is no such thing in the real world as an “optimal spending rule”. In the Norwegian case, there were definitely lessons to be learned during the first two-three decades of resource development. Still, over the years, and in particular with the present fiscal rule, I think we have struck a reasonable balance. Thank you for your attention. 1 Bergsten, C.F. and Gagnon, J. (2017): Currency Conflict and Trade Policy. A New Strategy for the United States,  Peterson Institute for International Economics 2 Gagnon, J. (2018): Can a Country Save Too Much? The Case of Norway, Policy Brief 18–7, Peterson Institute for  International Economics 3 Corden and Neary (1982): Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy. The Economic  Journal (92), pp. 825–848. 4 This is measured as the sum of labour costs, intermediate consumption and fixed capital investment.
Spain and Italy in the danger zone At the beginning of August concern increased that the problems would spread to other countries than Greece, Portugal and Ireland, who were already receiving support. Market participants focussed on the sovereign debt situation in Spain and Italy, which caused government bond yields to rise in these countries. Both countries have problems with their public finances, but in different ways. Italy has a very large national debt, but not such a large deficit in public finances, while Spain has a smaller national debt but larger public finances deficit. Both countries have suffered declining competitiveness over the past ten years. Recently, the lack of confidence has also begun to affect France. The banks managed the stress tests There is also concern that the sovereign debt problems will spread to the banking sector. On 15 July the European Banking Authority, EBA, reported the results of the stress tests of 91 European banks, which together account for 65 per cent of the EU’s banking sector. This showed that all the banks but 8 had sufficient resilience to manage a deterioration in the  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  scenario for the period 2011–2012, but that a further 16 banks almost did not pass the tests. However, all four major Swedish banks passed the stress tests with flying colours. The results were received with some scepticism, as they were not considered to be sufficiently credible, but the markets nevertheless calmed down.

Also, we cannot exclude the possibility that we will have to intervene substantially again. From the beginning we made it clear that enforcement of the minimum exchange rate was associated with risks. We are endeavouring to reduce the balance sheet risks through suitable diversification of our foreign currency investment. However, the exchange rate risk on the foreign exchange reserves is based on monetary policy considerations and the SNB is therefore obliged to bear it. My colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will talk about the management of the foreign exchange reserves in his remarks. Through its monetary policy, the SNB serves as a buffer for the Swiss economy and cushions the effect of severe shocks. Because it has a long-term focus, it is in a position to carry substantial risks. This means we can react flexibly in exceptional situations in order to fulfil our mandate, which is to ensure price stability while taking due account of economic developments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3