samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The changes in our assumptions have led us to revise our inflation forecasts for end-2011 upwards by around 35 basis points. Since the launch of inflation targeting in 2006, the CBRT has been announcing its mediumterm inflation forecasts and providing a qualitative perspective regarding the outlook for policy rates. As I have mentioned earlier in my speech, the current economic climate prompted the CBRT to consider financial stability along with price stability, which in turn required the diversification of policy tools. Accordingly, we adopted a policy mix made up of required reserve ratios and liquidity management facilities, besides policy rates. Given the significant level of uncertainties concerning the global economic outlook in the upcoming  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  period, we believe that there should be flexibility regarding the direction and course of each instrument within the policy mix. Therefore, this Report will provide forecasts for the net effect of the policy combination, and will not outline any specific path regarding its sub-items. Now, I would like to present our inflation and output gap forecasts produced within the framework outlined so far. Assuming that the policy mix is suited to deliver an additional limited monetary tightening during the rest of 2011, inflation is expected to be, with 70 percent probability, between 4.5 and 7.3 percent with a mid-point of 5.9 percent at end-2011, and between 3.3 and 6.9 percent with a mid-point of 5.1 percent by the end of 2012.

Rodrigo Vergara: Chile’s latest Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 4 September 2013. *  *  *  The Monetary Policy Report of September 2013 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Accompanying figures and tables can be found at the end of the speech. Mister President of the Senate, Senator Jorge Pizarro, honorable senators, ladies, gentlemen, Thank you for inviting the Board of the Central Bank of Chile to present our Monetary Policy Report. Each September, this presentation coincides with the annual report of the Central Bank to the Senate, where we share our vision on the recent macroeconomic and financial developments in Chile and the world, together with the economic-financial outlook and its implications on monetary policy. When I presented our Monetary Policy Report to the Senate’s Finance Committee in early July, I said that the world economy had begun to move towards a more normal configuration, with a more balanced growth outlook between developed and emerging countries, and where the terms of trade and financial conditions would not be as favorable to Chile as they had been for some years.
As I noted earlier this week, the biggest component of the journey to net-zero is the delivery of clear sector-level climate policy pathways by governments. Central banks cannot and should not try to fill any gaps in that space through their micro and macro-prudential actions - for example, we are not here to deliver carbon pricing. However, we should use these tools to fulfil our role over important areas such as those I am raising today. The final area I want to explore is the importance of central banks practicing what we preach by seeking to achieve best practice through our own operations. We hold ourselves to the same high standards that we expect of the firms we regulate. Consequently, we need to ensure that, wherever possible, our own financial operations, such as financial asset portfolios we hold, and our own physical operations, such as emissions from our buildings and printing banknotes, conform to best practice in the measurement, management and mitigation of climate risks. In line with this, I can confirm today that the Bank is committing to reduce emissions from our physical operations so they will be consistent with net-zero by 2050 at the latest. In the spirit of transparency, last year we published a TCFD aligned climate-related financial disclosure.8 The most challenging aspect of this report was the inclusion of analysis of the emissions associated with a monetary policy portfolio, a first for a central bank.

First, there is increasingly persuasive evidence that emissions, and so climate risks, are systematically underpriced in financial markets. This means that continuing to replicate the structure of the sterling corporate bond market, without taking explicit account of the climate impact of bond issuers, is no longer in fact a truly ‘market neutral’ approach. And second, the remit of the MPC was updated in March this year to clarify that, subject to achieving price stability, the Committee should support the transition to net-zero as part of the government’s economic strategy.11  The CBPS will remain a monetary policy tool, with its overall target stock of assets set by the MPC in order to achieve its primary inflation objective. However, from Q4 this year we intend to modify our approach to the composition of assets we buy, in order to take account of climate considerations. Our approach will be guided by three principles. First, we will look to incentivise companies to take decisive actions which contribute to an orderly transition of the overall UK economy to net-zero. Second, given the relatively small scale of the CBPS in the context of capital markets, we will seek to influence the thinking of other, larger investors, as well as learning from them. Thirdly, our requirements of firms will become more demanding over time, including as improvements in data and metrics allows us more precisely to monitor climate behaviour, and further to sharpen the incentives we set.
Bank capital is inherently somewhat procyclical. In an economic downturn, banks will increase provisions and tighten loan standards. In some  BIS Review 83/2001  3  circumstances, this could reduce the supply of credit, intensifying the decline in activity. But the introduction of a regime in which regulatory capital is linked to ratings could amplify that effect to the extent that those ratings themselves deteriorate rapidly in a downturn. There are various ways round these problems of procyclicality, but they will need to be resolved before the new Accord can be finalised. I have talked a lot about the structure of public regulation. But it is also important to remember the powerful role that effective market discipline can play in maintaining financial stability. Both the new Accord, and a number of other, broader international initiatives, put substantial emphasis on improving the disclosure of information by financial firms. Disclosure of an appropriate kind should help the market distinguish clearly between well-managed and adequately capitalised banks on the one hand, and their less sound counterparts on the other. This should act as a spur to the weaker firms to improve their performance. Disclosure should also help to reduce uncertainties, which may mitigate the tendency of financial markets to lurch into periodic self-fulfilling crises. It is certainly arguable that greater, and earlier, disclosure of the exposures of Long-Term Capital Management, for example, could have avoided the problems seen in world financial markets following its collapse in the autumn of 1998.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Building on the past, investing in the future Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at Invest Malaysia Kuala Lumpur 2017 "Building on the Past, Investing in the Future", Kuala Lumpur, 25 July 2017. * * * Thank you for the opportunity to speak here today at Invest Malaysia Kuala Lumpur. It gives me a chance to share a few words on the Malaysian economy and financial markets. Malaysia as a nation has forged strong ties with investors over a century. In fact, Malaysia’s relationship with foreign investors is older than the inception of the country. For example, HSBC, Shell and Nestlé have been in Malaysia for more than a hundred years. This year marks the tenth year since the Global Financial Crisis, which should more appropriately be called the Trans-Atlantic Financial Crisis since it did not directly impact Asia at the time. Closer to home, around 10 years ago, we created the Northern Corridor Economic Region. Today, the Northern Corridor is a success story, with the highest number of approvals for manufacturing investments. Let me share 10 facts on Malaysia to showcase our ever-thriving symbiotic relationship with investors. Three key things on the Malaysian economy: i. Malaysia’s openness to foreign investment and trade, ii. The country’s bright growth prospects; and iii. Our drive and agility for change to always remain relevant and competitive  Malaysia has always been open, friendly and fair to foreign investors.
This cluster comprises the manufacturing, transport & storage, and wholesale services sectors. These activities comprise some 43% of the economy and, on average, contributed slightly over two-thirds of sequential GDP growth in Q4 2016 and Q1 2017. Electronics manufacturing firms expect business conditions to remain favourable in the next six months, albeit slightly slower than in H1 2017. MAS expects higher growth in this cluster to flow-through more broadly to the rest of the 2 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  economy and gain momentum over time. The modern services cluster recorded mixed outcomes over the last two quarters but is poised for higher growth in the second half of this year. This cluster, comprising financial, business, and ICT services, accounts for about 30% of GDP. Financial services saw a strong outturn in Q4 last year but a sequential pullback in Q1 this year, reflecting heightened political and geopolitical uncertainties globally which dampened investor sentiments. The performance of modern services is likely to improve as the global economy recovers and the upturn in the trade-related cluster raises business confidence and investments. The pickup in regional growth and trade should help anchor growth in lending and trade financing activities. Demand for ICT services will be boosted by government initiatives, as well as general IT deepening that is occurring in Singapore and the regional economies. The domestic-oriented cluster has had lacklustre growth and some segments are expected to remain weak.

The ability to endure, to persevere, to be resilient in the face of such extreme odds is about having a great sense of purpose of what needs to be achieved and the motivation of why it needs to be achieved. The sheer responsibility and the awareness of the accountability that comes with it is the very driver of such perseverance. It is also the fear of failure and knowing the far-reaching and damaging consequences. This is reinforced with the values and the discipline to stay the course to do what is right and to do what is in the interest of the people. The discipline is also important so that the Central Bank is consistent in its behaviour in managing the challenging conditions or in its aspirations to push the frontiers and create great value for the country. During such times, having great clarity in the vision and on the objective of what is to be achieved becomes paramount. This has to be the starting point if it is to draw on the energies of the entire organisation. Articulating it with great clarity throughout the organisation allows the collective alignment to the goals. This also avoids being diverted by distractions when we are confronted with destabilising times. It is also imperative when we are ambitious with bringing about change and transformation. Knowing clearly the outcomes and the benefits it brings increases the potential of bringing diverse groups within a country and across countries to building the consensus on achieving a common goal.
There is also the currency depreciation that could reduce the acquisition of imported capital goods imports. The behavior of inventories also poses a risk on the dynamics of investment. Already by the end of 2018 there had been an inventory buildup that at the time was believed would turn into investment, but that did not happen and, on the contrary, in the first quarter accumulated further. This, in a context in which, according to the IMCE, the percentage of respondents in wholesale trade who judge their inventories as unwanted has risen, and in which the interviewees for the Business Perceptions Report in companies that trade in machinery and equipment report sales below expectations, particularly in the northernmost regions. Consumption, meanwhile, has behaved as expected and the baseline scenario estimates that, after growing 3.1% in 2019, will grow an average of 3.5% in the next two years. Accordingly, the projection for this expenditure  Page 5 of 18  component remains virtually unchanged from the March Report estimates. The higher growth rates foreseen for 2020 and 2021 are consistent with the economy speeding up growth. The labor market has given more positive signals regarding employment, as can be seen from in the INE figures, the administrative records and the information obtained for the Business Perceptions Report. Imports of consumer goods have remained high (with the exception of automobiles) and the expectations of the trade sector remain optimistic, as indicated by the IMCE.

With several factors both internal and external having materialized over the last several weeks, one can already see that 2014 will be yet another challenging year for the Thai economy. However, with cooperation from all sides, I hope we shall be able to weather the upcoming storms with a common vision and readiness, and that a clear blue sky is beckoning in the distance. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In a situation of stress, individual banks hoard rather than lend liquidity. The system then co-ordinates itself on a low liquidity equilibrium. Liquidity then has negative spillovers, imposing negative externalities; illiquidity is a public bad. And with asset prices and liquidity falling and haircuts rising, the credit multiplier becomes self-reinforcing downwards. Given these pro-cyclicalities, there have been recent proposals by both policymakers and academics to regulate collateral requirements.1 This is one possible arm of so-called macroprudential policy. Within the UK, haircuts on secured financing or OTC derivative transactions have been identified as one possible tool for executing macroprudential policy.2 The UK’s new interim Financial Policy Committee, housed in the Bank of England, will provide advice to government on possible macroprudential tools over the next year or so. The debate on haircuts as a policy tool is live internationally too. In a recent speech in Atlanta, US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner proposed the introduction of international minimum standards for margins on derivatives transactions.3 This would be akin to the international minimum standards for capital adequacy introduced through the Basel agreements. Since 1934, the US authorities have had regulatory powers to impose minimum margin requirements on lending against equity and some other assets – so-called Regulation T. But these policies have not been used actively, with minimum margins unchanged since 1974. To date, analysis of the macroprudential role of haircuts has been largely descriptive.

This calls for a seachange improvement in risk management practices among the clearing houses, as more financial transactions come to be centrally cleared to meet G20 commitments. Otherwise the too-important-to-fail problem simply re-emerges in a different guise.   Liquidity policy: One implication of the model is the importance of banks maintaining buffers of the highest-quality liquid assets. These have a doubly beneficial effect. First, they reduce banks’ need to hoard liquidity in situations of stress. Second, high-quality assets reduce the amplitude of the haircut cycle in the first place, as Table 1 demonstrates. The first reduces the impact of a liquidity event, the second its probability. The upshot is a fall in the chances of a systemic liquidity crisis. The new Basel III liquidity regulation uses a strict definition of what counts as liquid assets. The model underlines the importance of sticking to that definition. The model suggests that financial system robustness would be further enhanced by  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  targeting liquidity requirements on the most connected banks in the system, as this would lean against the destabilising effects of system-wide concentration. Hot heads make for bad decisions, frozen ears for uncomfortable ones. Financial markets have felt the effects of this change in the weather more dramatically than most. Suitably designed, macroprudential policy can help moderate those swings in temperature, thereby improving the health of the financial system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
We are focused, given our prudential remit as laid out in our statutory objectives, on the most material risks within firms, spending most time on those that pose the greatest risk to the stability of the UK financial system and the protection of policyholders. In the period since 2008, we have been steadily implementing the post-crisis reforms, both in banking and insurance. This has been a busy time but it is clear to me that this period is now drawing to a close, with the major remaining implementation tasks now narrowed to ring-fencing and bail-in debt. Instead of designing and implementing reforms, the job of supervisors becomes one of guarding them and holding the line. We are living through a vital moment in supervision and today I’d like to talk about three live challenges in turn: Brexit, an uptick in risk appetite and regulatory arbitrage. Brexit  A year ago, the UK voted to leave the EU. Although the negotiation is still in its early stages, changes to the trading relationship between the UK and the EU may require firms to alter their operations and the services they provide. Now that the Government has triggered Article 50, we expect firms with cross-border activities between the UK and the rest of the EU to undertake appropriate contingency planning for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. I want to make clear that whilst the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will change many things, it does not change the PRA’s statutory objectives.

Turning to fiscal policies, the latest available information suggests that the pace of fiscal consolidation in many euro area countries remains unsatisfactory. It is of particular concern that targets for correcting excessive deficits are at risk in some cases. Moreover, countries that have recently breached the 3% deficit limit are being granted relatively long periods to correct the situation in what constitutes a very generous application of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact. Against this background, it is important to recall that the best contribution that fiscal policies can make to stability, growth and cohesion in the euro area is to effectively tackle existing fiscal imbalances as part of a determined and well-designed economic reform programme. In this context, a rigorous implementation of the new rules is needed. This would reinforce the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact, boost expectations of sound fiscal policies and thereby help to increase confidence in economic growth prospects. As regards structural reforms, the European Commission has recently presented the “Community Lisbon Programme”, which contains a list of measures at the EU level to relaunch the Lisbon strategy. The ECB fully backs this initiative, in particular the measures to further open EU markets and to simplify the regulatory framework within which business operates. Progress at both the Community and the Member State level is crucial to addressing the economic challenges facing the EU.
Beyond the COP26 held in Glasgow a few months ago, globally coordinated governmental policies are therefore necessary to anchor concrete and credible commitments, such as the one taken by the European Union in its Fit for 55 programme. And yes, policies to fight climate change should imperatively include an appropriate carbon price. Rest assured that central banks will do everything they can do. The ECB monetary policy strategy review, concluded last summer under President Lagarde’s leadership, sets out an ambitious action plan leading up to 2024. But central banks and financial intermediaries cannot solve everything, and substitute for adequate – and sometimes difficult – public policies. The ecological transition holds risks, including on inflation as the gradual switch to greener energies may entail higher and more volatile prices, at least in the intermediate phase. Central banks are closely monitoring this debate about a possible “greenflation”. So far, the evidence points to a non-negligible but limited direct contribution of climate policy in the recent increase in inflation. For example, the ongoing rise in CO2 prices in the European ETS market, which we are already taking into account in our inflation projections, has a modest positive impact on inflation. And the implementation of a carbon tax in Germany in 2021 has had a discernible impact in 2021: combined with other measures to tackle climate change, the overall impact on German consumer prices was estimated at 0.4 percentage point in 2021.

But they entail several risks, and they could lead to significant concentration effects among a few dominant private networks: these would in practice “re-intermediate”, but without the trust and regulation associated with the architecture of the monetary and financial edifice that we – public and private players – have built together over a period of decades. In the face of this major challenge, we need to both innovate and regulate. For some, the conjunction between the two should be an “or”, considering them mutually exclusive: innovation in the form of a central bank digital currency would be an alternative, indeed the only alternative, to the unchecked development of decentralised finance. For me, the conjunction is “and”: the two pillars clearly work together to foster sustainable innovation; this is why the EU should at once (i) adopt the MiCA regulation on crypto assets in the first half of this year, (ii) prepare for a Central Bank Digital Currency, a e-euro, by 2026. But the worst conjunction would be “neither, nor”: revolutions always happen quickly, and we are at risk of neither innovating nor regulating in time. In that case we would have failed in our historical mission and jeopardised centuries of work building up confidence in our money. Page 8 sur 9 2/ Let me now turn to the second major transformation underway, the ecological transition, which is an absolute necessity at the global level even if Europe here lies ahead. Climate change is accelerating.