samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Lift-off was quickly aborted as the economy came back to earth with a bump. In trying to spring the interest rate trap, countries found themselves being caught by it. Why did this happen? One plausible explanation is the asymmetric behavioural response of the economy during periods of insecurity. Dread risk means that good news – such as oil windfalls – is banked. But it also means that bad news – 9/11, the Great Depression – induces a hunkering down. It risks shattering that half-empty glass. A rate tightening, however modest, however pre-meditated, is an example of bad news. Its psychological impact on still-cautious consumers and businesses may be greater, perhaps much greater, than responses in the past. Or that, at least, is what historical experience, including monetary policy experience, suggests is possible. Another way of illustrating this point is to imagine you were concerned with the low path of the yield curve and the limited monetary policy space this implied. And let’s say you were able to lift the yield curve to a level which, for the sake of illustration, equalised the probabilities of recession striking and interest rates being at a level at which they could be cut sufficiently to cushion a recession. With monetary policy space to play with, this might seem like a preferred interest rate trajectory. But it comes at a cost, potentially a heavy one. The act of raising the yield curve would itself increase the probability of recession.

The increase in the number of licences and authorisations issued by the ACPR illustrates this success: more than half of the 62 electronic money institutions and payment institutions currently in operation were licensed after 2018; the number of agents registered with the ACPR has risen by more than 40% in one year, with almost 3,300 decisions to register agents in 2021. 3- However, the framework established for open banking has its limitations. First, in terms of the openness of the market: the new service providers remain dependent on 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  traditional institutions, in particular for the opening of a segregated account, which raises questions given the difficulties that many Fintechs encounter in practice in accessing accounts. I n technical terms too. While the use of APIs makes account access more secure, these interfaces must also ensure that new entrants are able to provide their services at a level of quality that is consistent with their business model, as I will discuss later. B- As part of our supervisory duties, I can draw two lessons from these observations for the development of open finance regulations: one concerns the statuses that are necessary for the opening of the market, and the other concerns the technical means to ensure proper security. 1- While the creation of new statuses would appear to promote the emergence of new business models, we must nevertheless seek to limit unnecessary sources of complexity and, more fundamentally, the risks of regulatory arbitrage. Here are two examples to illustrate my point.
I first made reference to the New Silk Road at the 2nd World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF) on "Unleashing the Potential of Emerging Markets" in Islamabad, Pakistan in November 2006. It is my pleasure today to share some thoughts on the potential role of Islamic finance in strengthening the New Silk Road. My remarks will focus on four areas that is the emergence of the New Silk Road; how the linkages on the New Silk Road have built on the comparative advantages of Asia and the Middle East; how Islamic finance is able to foster the linkages along the New Silk Road; and finally, how we can extend the New Silk Road to the rest of the world to advance global economic stability and prosperity. The emergence of a New Silk Road Today, signs that a New Silk Road is flourishing are abundant. The economic and financial linkages between Asia and the Middle East are growing. While the world trade has on the average expanded by 10% over the period 2001-2005, Asia's trade with the Middle East has increased on the average by 24%. More than half of the exports from the Gulf states 1 goes to Asia and more than one-fifth of its imports are from Asia. The Gulf is the major supplier of fuel to Asia, while Asia in turn supplies manufactured goods and food to the Gulf. Recent trends in investment activities have been equally significant.

But others argue that it could accelerate further, as technology costs continue to fall, helping market users seek out more obscure venues where they might have an edge.5 Whatever happens, for today’s market participants, fragmentation is a fact. And that means – just like Lola – they can experience a markedly broad range of outcomes. That has important implications for all three of the characteristics – informational efficiency, resilience and fairness – I talked about a moment ago. Central banks are watching those issues closely.6 But today I want to focus on the effectiveness of the FX market in delivering the services needed by its users – using three storylines of my own. Our first fictional FX market user has never had it so good. With the resources and knowledge to connect to dozens of competing platforms and liquidity providers, analyse rich data sets in real time to work out the best way to deal, and using an array of algorithms (perhaps even arranged in an ‘algorithm wheel’) to execute at speed with minimal price impact, she gets an exceptional service from FX markets. I say ‘she’ quite deliberately here too – because, as I discussed back in June in a different speech,7 technological innovation means embracing diversity – of people, ideas, and working practices – is no longer a choice, it’s a business necessity.
A practical way forward So how can we make more progress? I have spoken about drawing up a shared framework or set of principles but I am only too aware how easily that could become a drafting exercise in which difficult issues are evaded rather than dealt with. Clearly initiatives such as this workshop are a useful way to bring relevant policymakers together – and I am encouraged by the shared commitment to make progress that you have shown by being here today. My suggestion is that probably the best way of making further progress on a genuine and useful common approach is to work together on practical examples; to consider some of the operational problems that we would face if particular sorts of crises arose. And thus establish a shared fact base and understanding of what we might expect from each other in a crisis, and how we should go about handling it. This idea of informal groups of relevant authorities is not new. In a sense, it is borrowed from the supervisory world, where colleges of regulators have existed for some time, with the aim of devising ways of pooling knowledge and developing common approaches – to supervise firms efficiently and to reduce the supervisory burden for them. The groups to discuss crisis management issues would need to bring together supervisors and central banks.

John Gieve: Practical issues in preparing for cross-border financial crises Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the Financial Stability Forum Workshop: Planning and Communication for Financial Crises and Business Continuity Incidents, London, 13 November 2006. *  *  *  Introduction My subject this evening is the challenge that globalisation poses for handling and resolving financial crises. If that seems a typically gloomy subject for a meeting of central banks, regulators and finance ministries, I would like to start by emphasising two points. First, I do not believe that globalisation is a source of instability; indeed in financial as in other markets, the opening up of international competition has been a huge force for good; by spreading and diversifying risk, it has in many ways made financial markets more efficient and stable. However, the fact is that governments, regulators and central banks remain largely national and our machinery for cooperation has not kept pace with the internationalisation of markets. Second, I have not chosen the subject because I believe a crisis is imminent. Indeed, in the UK and elsewhere economic and financial conditions currently are mostly benign and are forecast to remain so. Of course concerns about global imbalances and the search for yield in financial markets remain but our central projections like those of the IMF and most other international forecasters show the ‘Great Stability’ of the last 10 years continuing at least in the near term.
The Central Bank and Territories Conference organised by Bordeaux Sciences Économiques & the Banque de France 27 April 2023 The Banque de France over the years: Serving the regions and its inhabitants Speech by First Deputy Governor Denis Beau  Dean of the Faculty, Denis, Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you very much for inviting me to open this conference – “The Central Bank and Territories” – here at the University of Bordeaux. We are gathered for a very special occasion, as we are celebrating the 175th anniversary of the Banque de France's branch in Bordeaux. It was indeed on 27 April 1848, during the “Spring of Nations” described so eloquently by Franco-Hungarian historian François Fejtő, that the principle of setting up a base for the Bank in Bordeaux was agreed upon.1 Five days later, on 2 May, the branch opened its doors to the public, in the building that formerly housed the Banque de Bordeaux on rue Esprit des Lois.2 It stands there still, a testament to the longevity of its mandates and the continued presence of its employees in the service of France’s regions and inhabitants. Branches were opened at the same moment in eight other French cities,3 so expanding the 15-branch network already in operation.

We aim to offer young people a useful decision-making framework, ensuring that they have access to reliable, unbiased economic and financial information. We also provide services for local decision makers, notably by providing research analysing cyclical and structural conditions in the regional economies. **** Let me now turn to the current economic situation and explain how monetary policy helps to improve it.10 The fact is, it is not enough to merely set up a framework within which households and economic agents can operate and regions can grow. Serving the economy and society also means guaranteeing monetary stability. Today, inflation is having a severe and unequal impact on many French people, generating costs that they are unable to pay, which is why the Eurosystem’s primary goal is to bring inflation down towards 2%. 10  For a more in-depth presentation of the causes and symptoms of inflation and how it can and will be tamed, see the Letter from the Governor of the Banque de France to the President of the Republic published on 24/04/23. 5  Since resurfacing in 2021, inflation has accelerated at a pace not seen since the 1980s. In March, as measured by the European harmonised index, annual inflation stood at 6.7% in France and 6.9% in the euro area. The initial causes of the inflationary resurgence are well known.
Put simply, a balance sheet produced under US GAAP is twice as small as its equivalent using international standards. And capital appears twice as high. This creates confusion. Le Figaro – Will the United States implement Basel III? Christian Noyer – We’ll be monitoring developments very closely. I have no doubts about the commitment of the US administration and the Fed. 2  BIS Review 152/2010

And it seems somewhat inconsistent with the rise in equity and other asset prices, the fall in credit risk premia, and the relatively low levels of uncertainty about the future reflected in measures of expected future volatility in many different types of financial instruments. One feature of present conditions that is not captured by these explanations and that is likely to be playing a significant role in contributing to the combination of these large imbalances and relatively low forward interest rates is the pattern of exchange rate and monetary policy arrangements in the global economy today. Even with the broad shift globally to more flexible exchange rates, a substantial part of the world economy now run monetary policy regimes targeted at limiting the variability in their exchange rate against the dollar, or a basket in which the dollar plays a substantial role. Sustaining that objective in the past several years has required a large accumulation of dollar assets. The scale of this activity has been particularly dramatic in parts of Asia. The significant rise in the earnings of the energy exporters, many of whom also run exchange rate regimes that seek to shadow the dollar, has also generated a substantial rise in investments in U.S. assets. A large share of the capital flows to the United States that have financed our current account imbalance come from these official sources. These flows add to other sources of private demand for U.S. assets.
Thus, reducing excessive spending and managing to bring inflation down to the 3% target is a priority if we want our economy to be able to adequately withstand the effects of a major disruption of the world economy. Adequately mitigating the adverse effects of an external shock also needs a deep local capital market. Therefore, it is essential that we recover the buffers that permitted us in the past to mitigate shocks coming from abroad. Macroeconomic stability is one of them. A deep capital market is another, but was weakened in recent years by the withdrawal of pension funds. We must ensure that this buffer is not further debilitated. Dear senators, The Chilean economy is living complex times. Inflation has been high for a long period, excess spending has not been corrected, and uncertainty has grown in the external scenario. Bringing down inflation is an indispensable condition for the economy to see sustainable improvement and be able to cope in the best possible way with the impact of shocks hitting us from abroad. Total inflation will gradually diminish in the coming quarters so, according to our projections, it can return to single-digit numbers sometime in the second quarter. This does not mean, however, that the problem of inflation has been resolved, nor does it mean that convergence is guaranteed. Our goal is that inflation meets the 3 percent target in two years. Higher inflation is costly to everybody.

These weeks have also seen declines in stock markets and reductions in the prices of some commodities (figure 9). The degree of uncertainty regarding the evolution of the global financial situation is significant. The authorities of the countries involved quickly adopted decisions to contain the impact of these episodes. Of particular note are the coordinated actions taken by central banks to safeguard the provision of liquidity in the markets. Private banks have also made efforts, 4  particularly in the United States. However, there is still anxiety among market agents and volatility remains high. The Chilean banking system is subject to robust regulation and supervision, which prevent situations such as those that triggered the current episode of uncertainty in international banks. The dominant banking business model in Chile is a traditional one. It is focused on granting credit on a more diversified basis of financing and adequate management of maturity mismatches. The regulatory framework has been updated and considers Basel III capital and liquidity standards for all banks. All of them are subject to continuous risk management, capital adequacy, liquidity and transparency supervision processes. In addition, both the Central Bank and the Commission for the Financial Market, CMF, permanently monitor the banks' capacity to withstand adverse events through stress tests. In any case, the shift in the external scenario will have an impact on the local economy.
Should you prefer local owners or should you allow foreign owners freely, being open to the possibility that the foreign banks become dominant in your system? Being a free-marketeer I strongly advocate the latter. Your prime aim should be to have a banking system which provides the best services to the society, whether locally owned or foreign owned. Like many other countries your banks could also benefit from the influence of the foreign banks if they have more advanced systems or methods. On the other hand, I would also warn against being too lenient toward foreign applicants to set up or buy into existing local banks – I have seen many countries being too trusting toward foreign owners. These should be submitted to the same scrutiny as local applicants. The scrutiny should include a test of the origin of the money used to found (or buy) the bank. Obviously only known owners should be accepted and thus no beneficial owners who are hidden behind the veils of companies established on some offshore jurisdiction. And when speaking about foreign owners: When banks operating in your country have foreign parents you must ensure that the home supervisor practices consolidated supervision which includes the entities in your country. If this is not the case, it is in your best interest to deny the application for a license. Who should be allowed to own banks in addition to individual persons and financial institutions; should non-financial institutions be allowed and should there be holding companies?

Your Excellency Allow me also to state one issue that is of particular importance to, especially, developing countries, like ours. It has been established that effective national capacity-building requires adoption of international best practices. But for a developing country to benefit from this process effectively it would require citizens who are not only technically competent, but also fluent in writing, reading and speaking major international languages, among which French is key. For this reason, most professionals from Anglophone countries, Zambia inclusive, have failed to secure jobs in international organisations, mainly on account of their inability to communicate in a major international language other than English, such as French, which most often is a requirement for securing employment in international organisations. In this connection, we are happy to sign this MoU, whose principal objectives are to: (a)  establish a framework in which the French embassy can facilitate capacity building in the French language among the Bank of Zambia employees;  (b)  promote multi-cultural awareness and appreciation of a diversity of languages necessary for bank staff to transact effectively and efficiently in social and professional fora where the knowledge of French would be beneficial; and  (c)  enhance opportunities for bilateral and/or multilateral co-operation between the Bank and relevant French-speaking authorities and clients.
You have clearly argued in favour of indicating who voted for what and why. Now it seems that these will be more like summary accounts indicating the primary arguments. My opinion has not changed. I do indeed believe that demands are higher today in terms of transparency. The ECB was once right at the forefront in this regard, when it introduced its monthly press conferences. Now, though, we are lagging way behind when you see what other central banks are doing. That’s why I believe that publishing accounts that summarise the general course of the discussion would be helpful. I personally would also be in favour of indicating how people voted. That would require all members of the Governing Council to explain how their own arguments and their own voting behaviour were in line with the ECB’s European mandate. What about the argument that individual central bankers would then be put under pressure? I think the concerns that the pressure would become too great have been exaggerated. Someone who takes on a job like that must be capable of withstanding pressure. Nobody will be put in prison for voting for an interest rate rise in the euro area. People shouldn’t be that sensitive in this regard. I was in favour of OMTs because they were – and still are – the right response for Europe, despite the fact that many in Germany are opposed to them. The OMT programme has made a significant contribution to the easing of the euro crisis.

We will then know what the capital shortfalls are and whether they can be covered. Moreover, the state of the banking sector is a serious problem for the country, but not the only one. Slovenia has inefficient state enterprises, attempts to introduce pension reform have failed twice and it is running a larger budget deficit than EU regulations allow. Many people are also concerned about the heavyweights France and Italy. Some observers fear that both countries are completely incapable of introducing reforms. How frustrated are you and your ECB colleagues that the large countries are not making better use of the time that the ECB, too, is “buying” for them to introduce reforms. Let me say one thing first: we all have a strong interest in an economically strong France. The entire construction of the euro area can only function with a strong France. The latest pension reforms are a step in the right direction but do not go far enough. I also see problems regarding the intended funding through higher taxes and contributions, rather than through specific spending cuts. Besides, the plans also contradict the EU Commission’s country-specific recommendations. The bottom line is that France will need to do more to enhance its competitiveness. The government will need to speed up the pace of reforms. And Italy? Much was achieved through fiscal policy efforts under the former prime minister Mario Monti. It is now important to ensure that these successful achievements are not eroded.
Albania 10  Bulgaria  BiH  15  5  10  10  6.1 2.4  3.0  0  4.9  5  2.7 0.1  0  -5  5  5  0.0  15  10  10  -2.4  5  3.6  -0.7  -10 2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  Romania  2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  Serbia  15  3.9  3.4  -5  -10 2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  5  0 -0.4  -5  -10  Poland  N.Macedonia 15  2.3  10 4.3  0  -5  2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  15  10 4.3  0  -10 2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  Montenegro 25  3.3  Hungary  15  10  6.0  -5  -10 2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  Czechia  15  0  -5  -10  Croatia  15  15  Slovenia  15  15  20 15 10 5 0  5.1  3.6  0.2  -5 -10  3.4  5  1.6  2.6  5  10 4.1  2.9  4.1  10  6.6  4.6  5  10  6.2  5  2.0  5  0  0  0  -5  -5  -5  -0.4  0  0  -5  -5  -15 -20  -10  -10 2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  4.3  3.4  0.4  -10 2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  -10 2001- 2009- 20142008 2013 2018  Source: Eurostat and NBRNM calculations.

Chart 1 Tariffs and Global Value Chain Participation2  (Value added weighted average over countries and sectors percent) 50  6 5.5  45  5 4.5  40  4  35  3.5 3  30  2.5  Average GVC participation  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  2000  1999  1998  1997  1996  2  1995  25  Average tariffs (right scale)  Source: Source: IMF, WEO April 2019  Global external imbalances have been at the forefront in the macro - discussions and risk assessments. One of the first steps when scrutinizing external positions and imbalances is the current account position. Current account imbalances can be healthy or a sign of  2 Chart extracted from the IMF WEO, April 2019. 2  macroeconomic and financial stress. In many cases, current account imbalances can be entirely appropriate, even necessary. For instance in converging economies, with vast investment opportunities, they benefit from foreign funding, and can afford to accumulate debts (by running current account deficits), provided they can repay them out of future income. Sometimes, however, external imbalances can point to macroeconomic and financial stress. Economies that accumulate external liabilities on too large scale may become vulnerable to sudden stops in capital flows that force abrupt cuts in spending–making financial crises more likely.