samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For instance, for banks, it is important to allow for the fact that  2  BIS Review 101/2009  the size of an institution is already taken into account in the prudential ratios, since capital requirements are proportionate to exposures. It is also important to bear in mind that the diversification of business lines, which goes hand in hand with a certain size of institution, may be a factor of resilience that should not be discouraged. This is an important and delicate task that has been entrusted to the FSB. 2. Developing multilateral surveillance  I will now turn to collective surveillance. Let me start with the following simple observation: the crisis did not emerge from where we were expecting. Our warning systems, both at the national and regional levels, let us down. Above all, we did not have an overall, across-theboard view of the vulnerabilities. We omitted to take into account the interactions between global economic imbalances, international financial stability and national regulation and supervision. The crisis took us by surprise because it broke out at the heart of the system, i.e. in the US financial sector. Unlike other recent financial crises and in particular the Asian crisis at the end of the 1990s, contagion spread from the industrialised countries to the rest of the world. Surveillance instruments, in particular those of the IMF, were chiefly designed to detect a balance of payments crisis, whereas this crisis first affected the financial systems. We were prepared for a foreign exchange crisis, i.e.

This clearly reflects the IMF’s commitment to reforming its assistance and solidarity framework to help the most vulnerable countries. Similarly, the adequacy of the resources of multilateral development banks was reviewed and, for example, the capital of the Asian Development Bank was tripled. In order to enhance the legitimacy and efficiency of key players in the international financial architecture, the bolstering of resources must go hand in hand with a reform of their governance. As a European, I am perhaps not the best person to give my views on the governance of financial institutions, and of the IMF in particular because, for emerging countries to be given a fair representation, it is most often the representation of European countries that is called into question. You may therefore be tempted to interpret my suggestions negatively. I would, however, first like to say that the representation of European countries should not be contested: Europe is a diverse continent that encompasses small, new, and even emerging countries alongside large and established developed nations. Overall, it is somewhat under-represented in a community that is still made up of sovereign states.
That is because the rise of international free trade – and the stability that comes with it – has historically depended on the backing of a global hegemon. This was evident during the British Empire in the 19th century, as it was with American support in the wake of the Cold War. [3] However, major economies – led by the United States and China – are now increasingly using trade to limit the ambitions of geopolitical rivals. That could fragment world trade with potentially huge costs. The IMF estimates that severe trade fragmentation may cost global output roughly 7% in the long term – an amount similar to the annual output of Japan and Germany combined. [4] These geopolitical winds are reshaping the second feature of this new map: supply. We are seeing strategic considerations becoming increasingly important in where suppliers are located. The US Inflation Reduction Act, for example, is deliberately aimed at “reshoring” production and reducing the country’s reliance on strategic imports like batteries. [5] China is also seeking to reduce its own dependence on the rest of the world. And some surveys suggest that even firms in “non-strategic” sectors are increasingly likely to regionalise their supply chains. [6] This in turn is leading to the third key feature: the growing importance of security. With the security of supply for critical inputs no longer guaranteed, we are likely to see a new “scramble for resources”.

In less than half a year, we have raised the ECB interest rates by 250 basis points, the fastest increase in our history. And we have made it clear that ECB interest rates will still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that are sufficiently restrictive, and stay at those levels for as long as necessary. In other words, we will stay the course to ensure the timely return of inflation to our target. Conclusion Let me conclude. The transition from one year to the next is traditionally associated with quiet reflection, when we take stock of things that have come to pass. But as the poet Rainer Maria Rilke once wrote: a new year is “full of things that have never been”. As we head into 2023, a changing world brings with it new challenges, but also opportunities. And let there be no doubt: with more self-confidence, more assertiveness and the right policies in place fuelling green and digital growth, Europe can adapt and thrive. But some things never change: namely, the ECB’s commitment to price stability. We will play our part in Europe’s next chapter by bringing inflation back to our 2% target. Thank you. 1. See Lagarde, C. (2022), “A new global map: European resilience in a changing world”, keynote speech at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 22 April. 2. Lagarde, C. (2021), “Globalisation after the pandemic”, Per Jacobsson Lecture at the IMF Annual Meetings, 16 October. 3.
A major factor driving the slowdown is a dramatic decline in the growth rate of “total factor productivity,” or TFP, a measure of innovation and technological change.3 As Bob Gordon has taught us, U.S. productivity growth tends to cycle between periods of high growth in decades following fundamental breakthroughs in science and technology, and relatively fallow periods of steady, incremental improvements. All the evidence indicates that we are in one of the latter periods of “normal” productivity growth of 1 - 1.5 percent per year, and that things will likely stay that way until the next scientific or technological revolution.4  R-star Descends These global shifts in demographics and productivity have two important implications for the future of our economies and for monetary policy. First, slower population and productivity growth translate directly into slower trend economic growth. Second, these trends have contributed to dramatic declines in the longer-term normal or “neutral” real rate of interest, or r-star. Slower trend growth reduces the demand for investment, while longer life expectancy tends to increase household saving.5 This combination of lower demand for and higher supply of savings, along with other factors, has pushed down r-star. With open capital markets, these global changes in supply and demand affect r-star globally. The evidence of a sizable decline in r-star across economies is compelling.

The impact of the second minimum wage hike on inflation is expected to be limited, as most businesses manage to keep a lid on cost via increased production efficiency, encouraged in part by a highly competitive goods market. The BOT will however continue to closely monitor any inflationary impact of the wage increase. Policy challenges for 2013 While it may seem that the worst is behind us, one must continue to be vigilant of risks. It is crucial for policy to be forward-looking and proactive, quickly adjusting to changing environment and shifting challenges. As I have mentioned, the key immediate challenges is to preserve the right balance of policy mix, in order to ensure that each policy’s effectiveness is maximized and grounded on the basis of sustainable economic well-being, as well as safe and sound financial system. Toward these goals, the BOT has a number of functions to perform. Monetary policy and exchange rate policy The overriding objective of monetary policy continues to be the safeguarding of economic stability, which encompasses the dimensions of growth, inflation, and financial stability. This year, a key challenge will be in striking the right balance between providing sufficient support to growth while ensuring that financial stability is also preserved. In particular, a prolonged accommodative monetary policy may pose risks to financial stability if it  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  encourages excessive debt accumulation, or induces overinvestment in risky assets as investors search for higher yields.
Miller M., Weller P. Zhang L., Moral Hazard and the US Stock Market: Analyzing the Greenspan Put, Economic Journal 112, 2002. IMF, Asset Prices and Business Cycle, World Economic Outlook, Washington D.C., May 2000. IMF, Growth and Institutions, World Economic Outlook, Washington D.C., April 2003. Mishkin F, White E., US Stock Market Crashes and their aftermath: implications for monetary policy, NBER Working Paper, No. 8922, 2002. Posen A., It Takes More Than Bubble to Become Japan, [in] Asset Price and Monetary Policy (ed.) A. Richards, Reserve Bank of Australia 2003. Posen A., Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles, Institute of International Economics Working Paper WP 06-1, January 2006. Roubini N., Why Central Banks Should Burst Bubbles?, NYU Stearn School of Business mimeo, January 2006. BIS Review 134/2007  7

Today I would like to talk a bit about what went wrong, where we are today, some new initiatives that are underway, what lessons we should take from the crisis and some steps we need to take so this doesn’t happen again. It is well-recognized that one important catalyst for this financial crisis was the easy credit and loose underwriting practices that fueled the boom in the U.S. housing sector. The ability of virtually anyone to get a loan to buy a house pushed up home prices significantly faster than incomes. To keep the boom going, underwriting standards were progressively relaxed, but even with that support to demand, inevitably the boom proved unsustainable. As the boom reversed and housing prices began to fall, the bad underwriting practices and the mispricing of risk became readily apparent. When prices are rising no one needs to default, they always have the option of refinancing or selling the house at the now higher price. But when prices are dropping, there is no easy way out. The result has been a sharp rise in delinquencies and foreclosures as the bust has played out. The fact that these poorly underwritten loans were used in the construction of very complex collateralized debt obligations or CDOs, with risks that were not well understood and grossly mispriced – made a bad situation even worse.
Outstanding bank lending to corporates is rising at a faster pace in France than anywhere else in Europe: +4.5% year-on-year at end-November 2015, compared with +2.1% in the United Kingdom, +1% in Germany and an average of +0.9 % for the euro area as a whole. In fact, based on the responses given by business leaders to our surveys, it seems that applications for investment loans are generally accepted fairly readily, and the same seems to apply, more or less, to cash loans. Although difficult to measure, firms’ willingness to apply for loans appears to be strong. Surveys conducted by the ECB show similar results, and rank France on a par with Germany in terms of access to credit and willingness to apply for loans, well ahead of the other major countries in the euro area. Interest rates on loans are also lower in France than anywhere else in the euro area – by around 1 percentage point in the case of individual loans of up to EUR 250,000. With regard to today’s topic, however, there are a number of important distinctions that need to be made. Access to credit is markedly more difficult for VSEs than for other SMEs: –  fewer than 60% of applications for cash loans were accepted (i.e. granting of 75% or more of the requested amount) in the third quarter of 2015, compared with 74% for SMEs.

As you know, VSEs are usually defined legally as undertakings with fewer than 10 employees, annual turnover or a total balance sheet of under EUR 2 million, and which are not part of a group managed by a larger enterprise. France’s 2.1 million VSEs account for around 20% of private sector employment and close to 20% of total enterprise value added. If we include micro-enterprises, firms with very low turnover and which have a special tax and social security status, this segment comprises some 3 million business. This is a lot more than we tend to think. What’s more, companies in this segment are spread out across the entire country rather than being concentrated in just a few dynamic industrial centres. VSEs are also an important source of investment in France and one that is badly in need of stimulus: according to estimates, at least half of all VSEs chose not to invest in 2013  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  and 2014. Fostering the expansion of these firms is vital for economic growth and for jobs. But to do this, they need to want to invest, and to have sufficient financing to do so. *** What are the main approaches the Banque de France is taking to encourage the financing of VSEs? The Banque de France’s actions in this field are guided both by its knowledge of the statistics and its vision of the reality on the ground. On the whole, French firms do not appear to have any particular difficulty accessing credit.
See Panetta, F. (2022), “A digital euro that serves the needs of the public: striking the right balance”, introductory statement at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 30 March and ECB (2022), “Digital euro – Privacy options”, presentation to the Eurogroup, 4 April. 4. Panetta, F. (2022), op. cit. 5. Consumers are already increasingly turning to non-cash payments. Only 20% of the cash stock is now used for payments, down from 35% 15 years ago. See Zamora-Pérez, A. (2021), “The paradox of banknotes: understanding the demand for cash beyond transactional use”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 2, ECB, Frankfurt am Main. 6. We are accustomed to using private and public forms of money interchangeably. Euro banknotes and coins are legal tender in the euro area, and cash is the only form of public money to which everyone can have direct access. Confidence in private money – bank deposits, credit cards and e-payment solutions – rests on the ability to convert it, at par, into public money. This allows payment systems to run smoothly and commerce to flow. 7. Panetta, F. (2021), “Central bank digital currencies: a monetary anchor for digital innovation”, speech at the Elcano Royal Institute, Madrid, 5 November. 8. Panetta, F. (2021), “The present and future of money in the digital age”, lecture at Federcasse’s Lectiones cooperativae, Rome, 10 December. 9.

Last year, Singapore’s GDP growth was driven by two engines – the trade-related cluster and modern services cluster – with domestic industries flat. The trade-related cluster – manufacturing, wholesale trade, transport and storage – grew 4.3% and contributed 55% to overall GDP growth. The modern services cluster – financial, information and communications, and professional services – also grew 4.3% and contributed 40% to overall GDP growth. Growth in the domestic industries cluster – construction, retail and F&B, health and education services – was negligible, mostly weighed down by the slump in construction. This year, the trade-related cluster is decelerating, modern services is holding up, and the domestic industries cluster is gradually recovering. 4 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  The trade-related cluster will continue to face the full brunt of the maturing of the global tech cycle and growing trade tensions. The modern services cluster will be the main driver of growth this year, supported by healthy regional demand and increased investments in digitalisation as the domestic economy undergoes transformation. Domestic industries will make a modest, positive contribution to overall growth, as the construction sector turns around, and retail and F&B benefits from firm labour demand conditions and efforts to lift productivity. INFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY Inflation in Singapore remains subdued and within expectations. MAS Core Inflation this year is expected to come in near the mid-point of the forecast range of 1–2%. While there will be some domestic cost pressures from firm labour market conditions, underlying inflationary pressures should remain contained.
Microfinance institutions should, therefore, strive to keep the transaction costs at a minimum and eliminate the possibility of incurring deadweight losses. The on-time delivery of microfinance loans is also a very important requirement. Most of the microfinance projects are agriculture based businesses. Hence, there is a necessity for meeting crucial expenses on-time. For instance, if a farmer has to apply fertilizer to his field, he has to do it on the due date. For him to buy fertilizer, he needs money also on the due date. This requires the microfinance institutions to release their loans on the due dates. Any undue delay would be immensely costly. A final word should also be said about the subsidization of the interest rates under microfinance credit schemes. Such subsidized credit is demanded, not by the microfinance borrowers, but by urban based social workers and politicians. The problem with subsidized credit is that it flows not into the microfinance projects but elsewhere. What microfinance borrowers need is not cheap credit. They need credit on simple terms in time at zero transaction costs. When the credit is subsidized, it not only leads to wastage, but also goes into the hands of undeserving individuals. Most probably, middle class and lower middle class people would flock to appropriate such credit which they plan to use for other types of non-productive purposes. In this context, informal money lenders would definitely provide a role model for microfinance institutions.

The Bank now requires for the simplification of disclosures by financial service providers and for the strengthening of the role of independent advisory services in the financial institutions. Financial institutions are also required to 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  exercise a higher degree of diligence in ensuring that the respective products sold to consumers had to be commensurate with their financial capability and to steer financial consumers towards decisions that are in their interests, whereby choices are in the best interest of consumers. Approaches to financial education have also become more targeted in an effort to more effectively influence financial behaviour. This reflects the growing customisation of financial education programmes to target audience groups that are delivered at the right time and using the right channels. Programmes are increasingly being tailored to behavioural traits, demographics and stages in the financial lifecycle of individuals so as to appeal to the intrinsic motivations and incentives that would drive financial behaviour. The second development relates to the advances in technology that has had a profound impact on financial capability. While it presents new challenges for financial capability strategies, it also brings with it the potential to revolutionise how financial capability strategies can be designed and delivered, enabling policymakers and financial institutions to achieve what was previously not possible. Online classrooms and games, have for example, opened up new and engaging avenues for imparting important messages on financial management.
The decision to lend or not to lend will always be a difficult one, conducted with imperfect information and in the midst of a crisis. Ex post judgments on whether the central bank lent too much or too little must recognise this constraint. But the UK’s experience can I hope show one way to address the risks of lending “too much” through enhanced accountability whilst also still allowing central banks the “constrained discretion” to exercise expert judgment in the pursuit of financial stability. I look forward to our discussion of these issues today. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Page 1  The digital pound − speech by Jon Cunliffe Given at UK Finance  Page 2  Published on 07 February 2023  Jon Cunliffe says it is likely that a retail, general purpose digital central bank currency - a digital pound - will be needed by the end of this decade. He discusses why this is the case, what the model could look like and how the digital pound may sit within the digital payments landscape. Speech As some of you may have seen, the Bank of England and the Treasury have today published, as a Consultation Paper, the report of the Bank of England – HM Treasury Taskforce on the introduction in the UK of a central bank digital currency – a ‘digital pound’. So I am grateful for the opportunity today to set out some of the thinking behind the report and the next steps we propose. First, however, I should set out the headline conclusions of the Taskforce. Our assessment is that on current trends it is likely that a retail, general purpose digital central bank currency - a digital pound - will be needed in the UK. This would be a new, digital form of money, issued by the Bank of England for use by households and businesses for everyday payments. A digital pound would be a very substantial financial infrastructure project that would take several years to complete.