samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The key policy rate was reduced substantially in order to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis on the Norwegian economy. This contributed to a pickup in economic growth. There are prospects that inflation over some time will remain fairly close to the inflation target. The downturn in Norway proved to be mild and unemployment has not moved up to a high level. Developments in Europe are also amplifying the uncertainty concerning the outlook for the Norwegian economy. Thank you for your attention. 12  BIS Review 69/2010

Although wholesale funding plays an important role in market discipline, it is particularly sensitive to changes in perceptions about the risk of issuers and to the assets’ liquidity in the secondary market. In addition, the events of recent years show that negative developments in foreign or local financial conglomerates may adversely affect the cost of funds in the wholesale market for the banks belonging to these groups. Accordingly, it is important that banks maintain a diversified funding base in terms of counterparties and maturities. Also, banks should use in their liquidity management stress tests and contingency plans that appropriately reflect their risks, business strategies, financial condition and financing ability under different scenarios. In addition, it is important that banks properly internalize the economic and reputational risks of their exposure to related entities, for which a proper corporate governance framework is crucial. In this context, I would like to bring to your attention four regulatory elements. First, the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF) perfected its regulatory framework on corporate governance in banks. Second, based on the possible contagion effects in financial conglomerates the SBIF enhanced the regulations restricting transactions with related debtors, increasing their supervision tools in this area.
We consider that independance as defined above contributes to the clarity and the credibility of the single monetary policy. Transparency and accountability: elected authorities, key economic players, as well as all European citizens must be fully informed on the conduct of the single monetary policy. At the European level, the ECB maintains a permanent dialogue with the European Council and the European Parliament, as do national central banks with national institutions. The ECB is the only central bank in the world to enforce the concept of regular, frequent, real-time communication in the domain of monetary policy. Indeed, once a month, immediately after the meeting of the Governing Council, the President of the ECB holds a press conference. The independence of a central bank and its democratic accountability are two sides of the same coin. In this respect, both public speeches and testimonies by the President of the European Central Bank and by the Governors of national central banks, to the attention of institutions as well as public opinion, are crucial. An important part of our collective duty consists of tirelessly explaining the rationale that underpins the Governing Council’s decisions. Lastly, decentralisation: as the subsidiarity principle underlies the whole European construction, decentralisation is a major principle of the architecture of the Eurosystem. The Eurosystem is a team whose members work in close co-operation, and the team spirit is really strong and fruitful. Monetary policy decisions are taken, at the centre, by the Governing Council, and are implemented by the national central banks in a closely co-ordinated way.

First, in our country the women employment rate declined by 1.2 percentage points, while the men employment rate fell less than 1 percentage point, thus further widening the already wide gender gap of 18 percentage points, much higher than in the European Union. That data show that only 38% of the women work, which is significantly lower than the employment rate of men (56%). When we look at the unemployment rate, we see similar developments. Initially unemployment rate increased more for women than for men. Then, as a result of policy support measures, the unemployment rate gradually went back to the pre-crisis level in 2019. However, the adjustment in the unemployment rate is largely related to the increased exit of females from the labor force, illustrated with the fall of their labor force 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  participation rate. Of course, this is not the case just in our country. It is a global phenomenon. It is a case in the whole Western Balkan region. For example, participation rate in the region on average declined by 1.5 percentage points to 51%, which is the lowest level since 2016, with a higher drop again for women than for men. Thus the female participation in the Western Balkan region fell to 41%, which means that only 41% of the working age women are part of the labor force in comparison to the 63% of men, although with large variations, from 52% of women participating in Albania, to 22% of women participating in Kosovo.
While the costs of the global financial crisis are still being counted, it seems likely they will be the largest since at least the Great Depression. Two approaches are typically used to gauge these costs of crisis: the cumulative loss of output relative to its trend and the cumulative fiscal costs of supporting the financial system.1 Let’s take these in turn. Chart 1 looks at the path of output relative to a simple measure of its pre-crisis trend in the US, UK, France and Germany after the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. In either case, it is debatable whether estimated “pre-crisis trends” were sustainable, as they may have been artificially inflated by credit booms. Nonetheless, it is clear that the output losses from both crises, relative to pre-crisis trends, have been extremely large and long-lasting. In the US, the level of output is currently around 13% below a continuation of its pre-crisis trend. Ten years into the Great Depression, output was around 28% below its pre-crisis trend. Even if not quite on the scale of the 1930s, the global financial crisis has imposed a huge opportunity cost on US citizens. In the UK, the losses since the Great Recession, currently at around 16% of pre-crisis GDP, are larger than in the US and indeed larger than those that followed the Great Depression.

Out of this intellectual vacuum, a new framework for regulation has been born – macroprudential regulation. This explicitly recognises the links that might tie together individual nodes in the financial system. These might arise from correlated asset exposures, the type of which has historically emerged during the upswings and downswings of the credit cycle (Aikman et al (2015)). Or they might emerge from financial exposures, on- or off-balance sheet, between intermediaries operating in the global financial web (Haldane and May (2011), Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May (2012)). Over the past decade, a lot has been written in the area of macroprudential policy (Galati and Moessner (2013), Aikman et al (2013), Freixas et al (2015)). A sizeable number of countries are now undertaking macroprudential policy in some shape or form. Table 5 in the Annex provides a rough summary of current international macroprudential practices (for a more comprehensive overview, see Cerutti et al (2017)). By any historical metric, however, macroprudential policy remains a fledgling framework. Understandably, many of its key facets remain contentious. And the macroprudential policies put in place internationally so far are more notable for their differences than their similarities. This is providing a diverse body of case law. We discuss two key aspects of this framework: its appropriate objectives; and the choice of instruments. Objectives of Macroprudential Policy  The Bank of England entered the debate on the potential role of macroprudential policy in a discussion paper published in 2009 (Bank of England (2009)).
A financial meltdown was averted, economic activity was supported and protectionism was contained. The chart shows the decline in world trade during the Great Depression compared to the much quicker decline in the recent crisis. 4  BIS Review 113/2010  Historical perspective II The decline in world trade during the crises of 1929–1933 and 2008–2010  But in the 1930’s, it took 3–4 years before world trade stopped falling, and the pickup in trade was slow. This time, a fairly quick rebound of trade has taken place. Some two years after the crisis started, world trade was more or less back to the pre-crisis level. IMF lending June 30, 2010  Early on, the IMF advocated forceful and coordinated measures that the G20 followed up with broad international efforts to stabilize the global economy. Without such prompt and comprehensive action, the consequences of the crisis would have been far greater. BIS Review 113/2010  5  It is in the interest of all that the large and systemically important countries discuss issues of common interest. Their successful collaboration benefits not only themselves, but also the rest of the world. G20, IMF and small countries  Among the G20 initiatives were the efforts to strengthen confidence in international financial institutions, the IMF in particular, to permit these institutions to play an effective role in tackling the crisis. Large financial resources were raised by IMF members, many outside the G20. Indeed, the G20 has used the IMF as an instrument of its policy implementation.

In this regard, banking institutions have given their commitment to facilitate and advise customers on safe practices in migrating away from cheques to adopt electronic payments. Bank Negara Malaysia and the banking industry will continue the efforts to assist businesses and the general public to ensure a smooth transition in adopting online banking and IBG. This includes the increase of transaction limit for IBG and online banking from RM5,000 to RM10,000 to facilitate high valued payments. With the increase in the limit, 90% of the total  1  2  Affin Bank, AmBank, Bank Islam, Bank Rakyat, CIMB Bank, Hong Leong Bank, Maybank & Public Bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  number of cheques which is 184 million from 204 million cheques in 2012, or 135 million of 150 million cheques issued in January to September 2013, can be made via online banking. In addition, most of the banks have shortened the crediting time for IBG transactions, in which the beneficiaries will receive their funds faster within the same day. Other initiatives include several major banks will be offering IBG services via ATM and banks have provided access to Internet banking through the deployment of Self-Service Internet Kiosk at all bank branches to facilitate those who do not have access to Internet banking to make payment electronically.
The ratio of consolidated budget deficit to gross national product turned into surplus of 0.4 percent in the second quarter of 2006. And the ratio of public sector net debt stock to gross national product decreased from 90.5 percent in 2001 to 52.8 percent in the first quarter of 2006. In fact, public sector net debt stock is on a downward path converging towards the Maastricht criterion. And maturities are becoming longer. More importantly, the issue of public debt sustainability is no longer at the top of the agenda, implying decreasing pressure in financial markets. I want to stress here again that the continuation of tight fiscal policies and high primary surplus is quite important in terms of both the price stability objective and the financial stability issue. Dear participants, The last concept in central banking that I want to mention today is the role of expectations management in emerging market economies. 3  Moreno, R. (2002). “Fiscal Issues and Central Banking in Emerging Economies: An Overview”. Meeting held at the BIS in December 2002. 4  Eichengreen, B., Haussmann, R. (1999). “Exchange Rates and Financial Fragility”. NBER Working Paper 7418. 4  BIS Review 88/2006  As economic literature tells us, and you very well know, the management of expectations is of great importance for every central banker.

I believe this is one of the major structural reforms in the Turkish economy, especially in terms of its effects on inflation. Of course, independence is not a concept that can be achieved via the implementation of law alone. It is a concept that policy practices have a great influence upon. Dear participants, Having mentioned the two milestones in the notion of central banking, I’d now like to continue with the challenges of central banking in emerging economies combined with the Turkish experience in terms of monetary policy implementations. Although objective functions are similar in financially liberalized and well-functioning market economies, the transmission of monetary policy actions on economies certainly differs between industrialized countries and emerging market economies. Accordingly, there is a wide range of views among economists on how monetary policy decisions influence economies. If we add the uncertainties faced by the internal dynamics of emerging market economies to the picture, the impact of decisions taken by central banks might differ from one country to another both in terms of the nature and the time and even from one period of time to another for the same country. First, it is important to note that in the design and implementation of monetary policy, the understanding of structural changes is essential since the impacts of monetary policy decisions in a given economy depend on its structural changes and macroeconomic environment 2 . On the other hand, it is clear that emerging economies like Turkey are subject to structural changes more frequently than any other developed economy.
Depending on the circumstances, the SNB would have to accept credit risks onto its balance sheet and, in return, would have a more direct influence on lending. Such centralisation is not desirable. The smooth functioning of the economy would be hampered by political interference, false incentives and a lack of competition in banking. Second, sovereign money limits liquidity and maturity transformation as banks would no longer be able to create deposits through lending. Sovereign money thus restricts the supply of liquidity and credit to households and companies. The financing of investment in equipment and housing would likely become more expensive. Those sectors which have no access to the capital market and rely on bank loans to raise funds – notably, small and medium-sized companies as well as households – would be the most affected. Third, it would be naive to hold out too much hope on the financial stability front. Investors and borrowers will always make misjudgements. A switch to sovereign money would thus not prevent harmful excesses in lending or in the valuation of stocks, bonds or real estate. Also, while the sovereign money initiative targets traditional commercial banks, let us not forget the Page 8/12  role played by ‘shadow banks’ in the global financial crisis of 2008/2009. More importantly, when governments and central banks were rescuing systemically important financial institutions, they had not only the protection of sight deposits and thus payment transactions in mind, but also borrower-lender relationships.

As a result, interest rates in emerging market economies are expected to be raised faster than the industrialized countries. These interest rate and growth differentials against the backdrop of ample global liquidity are breeding the carry-trade behaviour with the USD as the funding currency this time. This leads us to our third challenge, which is how to prevent the surge in capital inflows from creating unwarranted instabilities such as excessive volatility in the currency market and asset price bubbles. In response to this challenge, we are beginning to see some countries such as Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and China tightening their prudential standards to cool down speculative pressure in the real estate sector. In addition, Brazil has recently imposed measure to slow down the inflows of fund into its stock market. In the case of Thailand, net capital flows have turned positive in July and continued to remain so, causing the Thai baht to strengthen as the current account is also in surplus. Nevertheless, the Thai baht has been moving in line with other regional currencies and the Bank of Thailand remains vigilant in ensuring this continues to be the case. In order to make capital flows more balanced, we are in the process of furthering the liberalization of capital outflows. This would also increase the flexibility of our businesses in financial management.
It is also important to understand financial reporting formats and the auditing standards specified by the external auditors and ensure that there are no conflicting instructions issued by the regulator or the external auditor. This task can also be facilitated through continuous dialogue between the relevant parties and in forums like this, where such issues can be raised and resolved. BIS Review 64/2007  1  Neither the regulator nor the external auditor can ensure that the companies are acting in a transparent and an accountable manner. The boards of directors and the senior management should be accountable to relevant stakeholders. This is why it is necessary to adopt corporate governance practices both at the board level and throughout the operations of the institution. There is an increasing trend of making some of the corporate governance practices mandatory either through rules and regulations issued by the regulator or by separate mandatory codes. From 2009 onwards, all finance and leasing companies will have to observe mandatory governance principles. Therefore, contribution by the boards of directors and the senior management of finance and leasing companies is extremely important as it will facilitate the roles of both regulator and auditor. The role of an auditor under the new Companies Act Given the fiduciary responsibility of finance and leasing companies, it is important to differentiate normal company audits from financial institution audits.

The GFC has also taught us that even the largest banks in the world are not immune to failure in risk control and management and, when they failed, there would be devastating effects on systemic stability and on the society at large. 4. Fellow INEDs, while you may have come from a rather diverse background, I believe most of you know each other quite well already. This is because all of you have worked for decades in your respective fields, crossing the paths of a wide spectrum of industries, and have achieved proud accomplishments in different shapes and forms. It is your unique experience and expertise, your reputation and your willingness to serve the banking sector that have brought you together as INEDs today at this Conference. 5. As INEDs, you play a crucial and irreplaceable role in the governance of the banks in Hong Kong, serving not only the shareholders but also the public at large, given the special and important role of banks in the society. I think you will agree with me that in the interest of good governance, a board of directors has to provide the needed steer, guidance and checks and balance to the bank. Clearly this can only be achieved if the INEDs can function effectively and efficiently. Without functioning INEDs, the board is just another gathering of the senior bank management. We may as well abolish the board of directors as it would serve no real or useful purposes. 6.
Debt convertible into equity on the downside would also be helpful in that it would be a dampening mechanism – equity capital would be automatically replenished, but only when this was needed. Transparency There were many areas where a lack of transparency contributed to a loss of confidence, which intensified the crisis. One particular area was the case of over-the-counter securities such as ABS, CMBS, RMBS and CDOs and their associated derivatives. There was a lack of transparency in a number of different dimensions. A.  Valuation. CDOs and other securitized obligations were complex and difficult to value. This reduced liquidity, pushed down prices and created increased uncertainty about the solvency of institutions holding these assets. B. Prices. The lack of pricing information led to a loss of confidence about accounting marks. Sometimes identical securities were valued differently at different financial institutions. C.  Concentration of risk. Because there was no detailed reporting of exposures, market participants did not know much about the concentration of risk. This led to a reluctance to engage with counterparties, which, in turn, pushed up spreads and reduced liquidity further. The SCAP exercise was an example where increased transparency helped to generate a better outcome. We disclosed our stress test methodology and the results for each of the nineteen largest bank holding companies. This transparency increased confidence and made it easier for the banks to raise more capital.

But this suggests that it might be better for central bankers to examine the efficacy of other instruments in their toolbox, rather than simply ignoring the development of asset bubbles. 3. If existing tools are judged inadequate, then central banks should work on developing additional policy instruments. Let’s take the housing bubble as an example. Housing prices rose far faster than income. As a result, underwriting standards deteriorated. If regulators had forced mortgage originators to tighten up their standards or had forced the originators and securities issuers to keep “skin in the game”, I think the housing bubble might not have been so big. I think that this crisis has demonstrated that the cost of waiting to clean up asset bubbles after they burst can be very high. That suggests we should explore how to respond earlier. Harkening back to my earlier themes, I think we can respond in a number of ways: •  First, we can do a better job understanding interconnectedness. This means changing how we oversee and supervise financial intermediaries. •  Second, we can change the system so that it is more self-dampening. •  Third, we can improve incentives. •  Fourth, we can increase transparency. •  Fifth, we can develop additional policy instruments. For example, we might give a systemic risk regulator the authority to establish overall leverage limits or collateral and collateral haircut requirements across the system.