samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Comparatively, however, we are ahead in the region as 51 per cent of about 89 million farm households in India have no access to formal or informal sources of credit while 73 per cent have no access to formal sources of credit. Although both in India and Sri Lanka, the shares of noninstitutional sources of credit have decreased compared to the 1970’s and 1980’s, there still remains a significant gap in accessing the formal financial sector by men and women in rural areas and the unemployed in the urban areas. Among many reasons for financial exclusion of women from the formal system, however, literacy barriers and language barriers are becoming less important factors. It is primarily the approach of banks and financial institutions and the strenuous processes and procedures adopted by them, which matters more in financial exclusion. The second important area of financial exclusion is the denial of access to efficient and safe payment systems. This area of activity is unknown to many and it has been taken for granted. Among the main payment instruments, cash is straightforward. However, the other payment instruments, such as cheques, bank drafts, electronic payments, card payments etc., can have delays in both clearing and settlement, which can cause problems to those who receive money through these payment modes. This is common to both men and women.

MFIs – SEEDS (SKS)  Male  % Received by Women  NA – refers to the non-availability of disaggregated data Source: Regional Development Dept., Central Bank of Sri Lanka  As shown in the table, the Small Farmers and Landless Credit Project (SFLCP), Poverty Alleviation Micro Finance Project (PAMP) and SANASA Thrift and Credit Societies have been successful in providing loan facilities at 93%, 76% and 70%, respectively, for women. Approximately 8,681 women have obtained financial and credit facilities under the SFLCP revolving funds loan scheme, while 39,388 women have benefited under PAMP as at the end of 2007. Again, due to lack of statistics and information, it is difficult to assess the ratio of loans granted exclusively for women by commercial banks. Among others, the Sarvodaya  6  BIS Review 40/2008  46.00  (SEEDS) has been in the forefront, reporting a total loan value of Rs 1.9 billion at the end of 2007, of which 67% has been for women borrowers. As shown in Table IV, exclusivity conditions are not necessarily applicable to Sri Lanka given the large-scale membership of women in the widespread banking arm of the Cooperative Societies, i.e. about 1,500 cooperative rural banks and 7,400 Sanasa Societies, both providing banking and financial services. In effect, in the micro finance delivery chain, Sri Lanka’s Cooperative Societies and Sanasa Societies appear to be very significant.
All documents are digitised and the process is digitalised end-to-end. NTP enables SMEs to share information quickly and securely with multiple parties connected within the platform. It also enables SMEs toapply for trade financing with multiple banks through a single application portal. Enhanced Access to Global Opportunities – Business sans Borders It’s not just cross-border trade that SMEs have to contend with. They have to look abroad for business opportunities, for suppliers and customers. 4 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  They have to manage procurement, logistics, and supply chains, also across borders. To address these pain points, MAS and the Infocomm Media Development Authority have together developed Business Sans Borders, or BSB for short. BSB is designed to connect different platforms globally to help SMEs seamlessly access a much larger ecosystem of buyers and sellers. It uses Artificial Intelligence (AI) to introduce to SMEs essential financing and business solutions from service providers across the BSB network. For example, a Singaporean SME seller of kueh lapis, a type of traditional cake, was able to use the pilot BSB platform to connect and trade seamlessly with SME buyers on platforms in India and the Philippines. BSB also intuitively matched the seller with a local FinTech firm which provided preshipment financing support for the trade. I am happy to announce that BSB has been operationalised by a private entity Proxtera and is starting its live beta during this Singapore FinTech Festival.

In particular, and in keeping with previous communications, the Governing Council acted – with a package of expansionary measures – in response to inflation rates, both realised and projected for the coming years, which have remained persistently below the ECB’s aim, in line with its commitment to symmetry in relation to this aim. In this context, symmetry means that the ECB undertakes to act with the same determination whether inflation is persistently above or below 2%.1 In particular, the Governing Council of the ECB took the decision to decrease the interest rate on the deposit facility by 10 basis points to -0.50% and reinforced its forward guidance on interest rates by indicating that they will remain at their present or lower levels until it is seen that the inflation outlook robustly converges to a level sufficiently close to, but below, 2%. Such convergence should also be consistently reflected in the observed behaviour of underlying inflation. The ECB also agreed to restart net purchases under its asset purchase programme (APP) at a monthly pace of € billion as from 1 November and without a defined time limit. In order to preserve favourable bank lending conditions, the modalities of the new series of quarterly targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO III) were also changed, eliminating the 10 bp spread established on the interest rates applied to them and extending their maturity from two to three years.
Jaime Caruana: Reform of the international standard for bank capital Notes for the testimony by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Parliament, Brussels, 18 January 2005. * 1. *  *  Introduction  I am honoured to appear before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs today to discuss the reform of the international standard for bank capital. In past years, members of the European Parliament have kindly welcomed Bill McDonough, the prior Chairman of the Basel Committee, as well as other Basel Committee representatives. I would like to thank you for giving me this opportunity to contribute to the debate and to support your important work in considering the proposed directive on capital adequacy requirements for banks and investment firms. These hearings are extremely valuable and represent a vital stage in the European legislative process, where the European Parliament has a crucial role. I will be speaking today in my capacity as Chair of the Basel Committee. But I hope you will allow me to digress on one or two occasions to supplement my remarks with my perspectives as Governor of the Banco de España. The Banco de España is a central bank and banking supervisory authority within the European Union; it will therefore be a direct subject of the legislation that is enacted on capital adequacy.

It will help to avoid redundant and unco-ordinated approval and validation work, thereby reducing the implementation burden on banks, and conserving supervisory resources. In this regard, the Committee’s Accord Implementation Group continues to encourage practical work among supervisors on applying Basel II effectively and efficiently to internationally active banking organisations. The AIG is currently working with supervisors of different areas of the world to conduct a number of “real case” studies to gain better insight into the practicalities of co-operation between home and host supervisors. In this context, if you will permit me, I would like to speak from my perspective as a European banking supervisor, and pick up on the statement I made at the beginning of my intervention. As I said, I believe that Europe is in a unique position to lead the way in the cross-border implementation of the  BIS Review 3/2005  3  new framework and to make faster and more tangible progress than is currently possible on a wider international basis. I think we need to seize this opportunity with both hands, because it will not just benefit us in the EU, contributing to the fulfilment of the Lisbon objectives, but, I believe, will also have a positive impact beyond our borders. We have two major advantages in this respect. Firstly, the division of supervisory responsibilities between our countries is embedded in our common single market legislation in the banking field, founded on harmonisation and mutual recognition.
The ECB pursues this objective in a consistent and forward-looking manner, ensuring the confidence of all policy-makers, both within and outside the euro area. Experience so far suggests that the ECB has been able to keep inflationary expectations at a low level. Although current HICP figures in the euro area are adversely affected by energy and food prices, the current outlook is compatible with the maintenance of price stability in the medium term. This view is supported by the analysis of bond yields. It is comforting to see that market participants expect medium-term price developments to remain in line with the ECB's definition of price stability. Currently available forecasts give rise to the expectation that inflation will again fall below 2% in 2002. Hence, we appear to be on the right track. However, we must not ignore existing risks to price stability. The Governing Council of the ECB therefore always stresses that it is vigilant and will take into account all new information that might affect the outlook for price stability in the medium term. Let me now conclude by recalling that, while the ECB cannot be held accountable for growth in the euro area, interest rates in the euro area have been relatively low, and cannot, by any means, be considered to be an obstacle to growth. Currently, although uncertainty remains high, the general expectation is that growth in the euro area will remain at, or slightly above, trend potential growth in the period ahead.

The Board reaffirms its commitment with the inflation target and will take every action necessary to ensure that it will return to 3 percent annually within the policy horizon. It also reiterates the need for all financial system participants to properly assess their borrowing and lending conditions. We, as the Central Bank, will continue to contribute with what is our duty – that is, safeguarding the stability of our currency and the normal functioning of internal and external payments – to Chile’s development and welfare. Thank you. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 1 Inflation indicators (*) (annual change, percent) 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 11  Jul. 12  Jul. 13  Jul. CPI  CPIEFE  14  (*) Starting in January 2014, calculations are based on the new indices with base year 2013=100, so they may not be strictly comparable with earlier figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
Emerging versus developed economies”, Norges Bank Working Paper 2012/11 http://www.norges-bank.no/no/om/publisert/publikasjoner/working-papers/2012/11/. 4  Frankel, Jeffrey A. (2011), “How Can Commodity Producers Make Fiscal and Monetary Policy Less Procyclical?” in Beyond the Curse: Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources, ed. by Rabah Arezki, Thorvaldur Gylfason and Amadou Sy, International Monetary Fund. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  All government revenues from the oil sector must be transferred to the fund. •  Government spending, on average over the cycle, must be limited to the expected real return on the fund – estimated at 4 percent. This is known as the fiscal rule. The aim is to spend only the return generated by the fund’s investments, not the capital itself. •  All of the fund’s capital is invested abroad. Chart: Projected size of the oil fund At the time the fund was established, Norway was in the midst of a deep recession, and many doubted that any petroleum revenues would ever be saved. However, after a few years, the government’s cash flow from the petroleum sector started to increase sharply. The savings plan has since remained intact and the fund has now reached a size of more than USD 700 billion, or 140 percent of GDP. Chart: Structural non-oil budget surplus As a result of the fiscal rule, economic policy is more robust: First, by decoupling spending from current petroleum revenues, the fiscal rule provides for a gradual and sustainable phasing-in of petroleum revenue spending.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Management of the fund Besides making monetary policy decisions, one of Norges Bank’s main tasks is to manage Norway’s oil fund. Chart: Governance structure The Ministry of Finance holds the political responsibility for the fund. The overall management principles and strategy are anchored in parliament and the Ministry reports to parliament at regular intervals. The management of the fund is fully delegated to the central bank – to Norges Bank. Our task as manager of the fund is strictly commercial: to maximise returns within the guidelines defined by the government. All investment decisions are made by Norges Bank Investment Management, a separate division within the central bank. Neither Norges Bank’s Executive Board nor the Ministry of Finance is involved in any individual investment decisions. This governance structure was set up to ensure that the fund was not used as an instrument of foreign policy. The purpose of the fund is to ensure that future generations receive their fair share of Norway’s petroleum wealth. To achieve this, the fund was designed to be invested for the long term. Size and a long investment horizon are the fund’s two key characteristics. Together, they form the backbone of the fund’s investment strategy: •  First, the fund’s long investment horizon implies substantial risk-taking capacity. We are able to act as a countercyclical investor. •  Second, the fund’s size makes it possible to take advantage of investment opportunities worldwide, in a number of asset classes.
The available evidence is consistent with the view that the changes in the core of supervised institutions, growth of the leveraged sector and rapid financial innovation have strengthened the efficiency and resiliency of the overall financial system. As I mentioned at the start, a broad range of recent financial shocks do not seem to have adversely impacted the real economy. The international financial crisis that began in 1997 did not spillover to the nonfinancial sector in the United States. The equity price collapse and deterioration in credit in 2000 did not cause significant damage to the core institutions in the U.S. market. The relatively limited damage caused by operations failures of the 9/11 attacks reflected the strength of the capital position of major intermediaries, as well as the policy actions by the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity to the markets. More recently, the series of smaller financial shocks experienced since 2001, including the corporate bond defaults after 2001, the corporate accounting scandals in 2002, credit downgrades in the U.S.  BIS Review 85/2006  3  automobile industry in 2005, the failure of Refco, the sharp declines in mid-2006 in equity, commodity and emerging markets debt prices caused little contagion to other markets and limited strain on financial institutions. Challenges The favorable balance between efficiency and resilience in the financial system we have observed recently does not of course guarantee we will achieve as favorable a balance in the future.

The recognition of a market failure does not mean, of course, that policymakers have the capacity to design solutions that can effectively mitigate those failures without raising others problems. The fundamental challenge for policy is how to achieve the appropriate balance between efficiency and financial resilience. With too much government intervention, innovation is constrained and the system is stifled. With too little, the probability of systemic crisis may rise to levels that are unacceptably high. We judge the appropriate balance not against the standard of whether it reduces to zero the probability of a major financial crisis, the failure of a large individual financial institution or a major reduction in asset prices. That is not an appropriate objective of policy. Some vulnerability to crisis is a necessary and unavoidable feature of a dynamic and efficient financial system where asset prices need to be able to adjust to changes in fundamentals. The consequences of trying to induce regulated financial institutions to self-insure against all conceivable potential risks would do substantial damage to the level and efficiency of economic activity and cause the same risks to migrate to other institutions. This leaves policymakers with a set of normative questions, the answers to which must be based on knowledge about how markets work, as well as a substantial degree of judgment about what policy actions are likely to be both appropriate and effective. What level of exposure to very low probability, extreme adverse events should we be comfortable living with?
And in the UK, the experience of the crisis created a swell of opinion that legislative updates to the Banking Act were necessary and, significantly, that banking supervision should be undertaken by the Bank on a statutory basis for the first time. This was not necessarily a welcome development for the Bank. George Blunden, head of Banking Supervision at the time, felt the key characteristics of the Bank’s approach – flexible, personal, progressive, participative – were highly desirable, and he was keen not to have these eschewed by the forthcoming legislation. The Bank prided itself on its flexible approach, its recognition of the role of the market and its consensual mode of supervision – and was determined not to lose this as its oversight of the banking sector inevitably took on a more formal tone. In large part, the Bank achieved its aim – the 1979 Banking Act was more evolutionary than revolutionary and written in such a way that “clear scope was preserved for the 20  continuance of the Bank of England’s particular supervisory style” . Indeed, “the legislation was designed to interfere as little as possible with what was regarded as good in what had come before and only to add to the 21  earlier arrangements new features where the previous system had been found wanting” .

The relationship between the Bank and banking sector was no longer one of equals, though the Bank’s approach did not alter course overnight. The Bank of England Act 1946 subsequently granted the Bank a range of powers, including the ability to issue directions to firms. A further legislative development – the Companies Act 1948 – conferred privileged status on some institutions (recognised banks or discount companies) which resulted in the Bank granting 7  exemptions to these institutions by virtue of their status as a bank . For the first time, we see evidence of some differentiation of treatment between banks and regular companies. 8  Meanwhile, the Accepting Houses Committee – a collection of merchant banks with accounts at the Bank – had by this point grown in stature as an association that represented banks of good standing with the implicit 9  backing of the central bank . During the 1950s, and in exchange for the extension of this privileged status, the banks accepted a measure of consultation in order to reassure the Bank that their name was still good. This often took the form of a monthly meeting with the Governor to discuss the firm’s balance sheet, and it was in this setting that the Bank formed an idea of the level of hidden reserves (or excess capital in modern parlance), something that would otherwise go undisclosed in the firm’s public accounts.
34, No. 1-2, pp. 219-251. Haldane, A and McMahon, M (forthcoming), ‘Central Bank Communications and the General Public’, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. Kynaston, D (2017), Till Time’s Last Sand: A History of the Bank of England 1694-2013, Bloomsbury Publishing. Tetlock, P and Gardner, D (2016), Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction, Broadway Books. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11

Governor’s Speech – Thailand Focus “Normalizing Policy to Ensure a Smooth Take-off” [clip] Dr. Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, Governor of the Bank of Thailand Grand Hyatt Erawan Bangkok, 24 August 2022  Focus on 3 questions: (1) What do we need for a smooth take-off? (2) How do we get there? (3) What is our rationale for monetary policy normalization? What should we really be worried about? Part 1: What do we need for a smooth take-off? Our policy objective has been and continues to be trying to ensure a smooth take-off. For Thailand, this objective is different from that in industrial economies because the stages of recovery are different. Therefore, the policy response is also different. What is needed to achieve a smooth take-off? We need to keep inflation under control and ensure that the financial system continues to function well. 1. Need to keep inflation under control. a. Inflation harms purchasing power of households and hurts businesses, which in turn can put a drag on consumption and overall economic activities. b. High and persistent inflation may become entrenched if households and businesses expect inflation to remain high for long periods. A shift towards a higher and less well-anchored inflation regime must be prevented because in such a regime, high inflation expectations generate broader cost passthrough that act to keep inflation persistently high in a self-fulfilling manner. In such situations, inflation can also become more sensitive to relative price shocks including large depreciation in exchange rate and wage adjustment. 2.