samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The harsh laws of economics mean that those with smaller balances may suffer disproportionately from new fees and charges and receive less compensation in the form of higher interest. Competition will help to address this concern to some extent since banks have adopted different charging and interest rate policies. Customers should therefore be prepared to shop around for the best offer. Diversity of approach among banks should also help to mitigate the risk that an increasing proportion of the population will be excluded from the banking system by prohibitive costs. But this is something that both the Government and the banks will need to keep an eye on as the effects of deregulation work their way through. 2  BIS Review 71/2001  The Mandatory Provident Fund The Mandatory Provident Fund is another innovation that is bringing new challenges and opportunities for the banks and their related companies. The opportunities come from the chance to earn a stream of annuity-type revenue stretching out into the distant future. The assets under management in MPF funds are already building up faster than expected and amounted to about $ billion at the end of May. This includes assets transferred from ORSO schemes. The combination of regular contributions and long-term investment returns means that MPF assets may total several hundred billion dollars in ten years time. This will earn the MPF participants an annual all-in fee of around 1.75% of the assets, though this will have to be shared among the various service providers.

In the current liquid conditions, therefore, the large banks have been able to cut their standard savings rate. They are therefore seen by some analysts as the winners from deregulation since they now have another lever to adjust their net interest margin. The unanswered question is whether they will be able to get away without a significant erosion of deposits in savings and current accounts. A certain amount of switching of accounts has gone on. But there is not enough evidence at this stage to conclude whether deregulation has resulted in any significant redistribution of deposits among banks. So we cannot tell how interest elastic the demand for savings accounts may prove to be, particularly in today's somewhat artificial conditions of high liquidity. However, what can be said is that deregulation does offer the smaller banks an enhanced ability to compete for savings accounts and for those customers which the large banks may be less eager to retain. While the smaller banks may have to pay a higher rate for their savings deposits, they will still benefit if they can substitute such funds for even higher cost, and less stable, time deposits. Consumers will also benefit from deregulation through greater choice of savings products and, for those with larger balances at least, from higher interest rates. However, we have to face the fact that not all depositors will be better off in the deregulated world.
8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  EMBARGO: not for release before 19:30 on Wednesday 4 October 2017  Further ahead, we hope for a strong, co-operative relationship in which wholesale banks can continue to operate across the UK and EU27 in branches. The fact this happens today is not just thanks to the passport. It is because we have shared in the long road of post-crisis reform, developing and implementing the same high standards. And it is because we have embedded a sophisticated framework of supervisory co-operation, toward the same objectives of safety and soundness. With common interests and a concerted effort, there is every reason to think these will continue into the future. But we must plan, in a proportionate way, for alternative outcomes. Planning for the worst, hoping for the best. Conclusion  In my speech here a year ago, I said that the post-crisis reforms will be treated to revisionist history and the calls of counter-revolution. So it has proved, most obviously in the US. Some still argue that capital requirements are too high, and others that they are too low. Broadly I think we have landed in the right place and I take some comfort from being flanked on both sides of the argument. The next challenge will be striking the right balance of geofinance. How much is enough? Learning the lessons of the past decade, we are embracing geofinance in the domestication of retail banking.

3  See Chancellor of the Exchequer: A Plan for Jobs 2020 See speech by Jon Cunliffe (2020): Financial System Resilience: Lessons from a real stress 5 See letter from FSB Chair Randal Quarles to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors: July 2020 4  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  Since central banks acted, markets have opened up again, allowing companies to raise finance. Britain’s companies issued more than £ of new bonds since March. A second response was also needed. The seizure of corporate debt markets meant that larger companies that normally enjoy market access were suddenly faced with uncertainty about access to that finance when it was most needed. They turned, as a precaution, to banks to bolster their cash positions. What followed was not a run on the banks driven by fear about the banks, but a run to the banks driven by fear on the part of businesses about their own access to finance. In a complete contrast to what happened in the 2008 financial crisis, bank lending shot up. Net of repayments, banks lent £ in March – more than 30 times their normal monthly net lending flow as large companies drew on committed credit lines. That threatened to overwhelm the capacity banks have to lend to the wider population of businesses. The Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF), owned by the Treasury and operated by the Bank of England, was designed to alleviate that pressure.
Riksbank's asset holdings compared with the outstanding stock on the market SEK billion  Note. The figure shows the Riksbank’s holdings in government bonds, covered bonds, municipal bonds, treasury bills (SSVX) and corporate bonds issued in SEK, compared with the total outstanding stock for each type of security in the Swedish market of as at 31/12/2021. The holding as a share of the outstanding stock has been rounded to the nearest percentage point. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. 15 [19]  Diagram 4. Policy rates and expectations according to forward pricing Per cent  Note. Forward rates describe market-based expectations of the overnight rate, which do not always correspond to the policy rate. Broken lines represent forward rates 5 May 2022. For the euro area, the EONIA overnight rate was replaced by ESTR as the underlying rate in forward contracts on 1 January 2022. The figure therefore shows forward contracts with ESTR as underlying rate. Sources: Sveriges Riksbank. Diagram 5. Sequence of measures to make monetary policy less expansionary  Policy rate  Assets  Reinvestments 1 3 QE  2  QT sales  time  16 [19]  Diagram 6. Perspectives on the Riksbank’s balance sheet Per cent  Note. The Riksbank's balance sheet as a percentage of GDP and financial assets respectively in Sweden. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. Diagram 7. CPIF inflation in Sweden Annual percentage change  Note. Unbroken line refers to outcome, broken line represents the Riksbank’s forecast. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank.

1, available at Coronavirus pandemic:The Riksbank’s measures and financial developments during spring and summer 2020. Hansson, D. and J. Birging (2021), "The Riksbank's asset purchases during the coronavirus pandemic", Economic Commentaries No 12, Sveriges Riksbank, available at The Riksbank's asset purchases during the coronavirus pandemic. Hauser, Andrew (2021), “Bigger, broader, faster, stronger? How much should tomorrow’s central bank balance sheets do – and what should we leave to financial markets? Some principles for good parenting”, speech at the International Finance and Banking Society (IFABS) 2021 Oxford Conference on “The Financial System(s) of Tomorrow”, available at Bigger, broader, aunt, stronger? How much should tomorrow’s central bank balance sheets do - speech by Andrew Hauser | Bank of England. Ingves, S. (2020), “The monetary policy toolbox“, speech at the Swedish Economics Association, published on 10 June, available at Ingves: Central bank balance sheets increasingly important for monetary policy | Sveriges Riksbank. Jonung, L. (ed.) (2003), “På jakt efter ett nytt ankare. Från fast kronkurs till inflationsmål” (Hunting for a new anchor. From fixed exchange rate to inflation target), SNS förlag. Melander, O (2021), "Effects on financial markets of the Riksbank's government bond purchases 2015–2017", Economic Review No 1, Sveriges Riksbank, available on Effects on financial markets of the Riksbank's government bond purchases 2015–2017.
First, we need to ensure that our own institution is sufficiently diverse and inclusive. The clear finding from our recent review is that currently we are not making sufficient progress, or moving quickly enough. Of course it is likely to be true that the sorts of issues which emerged in our review are present in many other institutions, and that they are part of a wider set of challenges which are not entirely within our power to tackle. That does not mean that we should not make strenuous efforts to improve our performance in this area, both because greater diversity and inclusiveness will aid the quality of our work and because as a national institution which relies on trust and confidence it is appropriate for us broadly to reflect the public we serve. Put at its simplest, for me the experience of our review highlighted the many ways in which coming from a white, middle-class background – and arguably also being a man – can make it easier to navigate an institution with the sort of heritage the Bank naturally has. In general I don’t believe it is a single or small number of big issues which create that difference – it is mostly many, many smaller things repeated day in day out in people’s experience of working life. We should iron those differences out, which will take a focused effort over time because changing attitudes and rooting out biases is not an easy task.

This is an innovative proposition, and we are working in close collaboration with the payments industry and potential users on the policy, technical and operational design. Later this year we will provide an update on our August 2018 call for interest on this topic. This is an exciting time for payments internationally as well as domestically. We therefore have a strong engagement programme with other central banks and overseas authorities. We work with our peers to set, and role model, global best practice and to find ways to drive harmonisation. And we can learn from their  8  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/payment-and-settlement https://www.wearepay.uk/new-payments-architecture-programme/ https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/payments/rtgs-renewal-programme/iso-20022/iso-20022-consultation-paper.pdf 11 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/payments/rtgs-renewal-programme/iso-20022/iso-20022-consultation-response.pdf 9  10  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  experiences. This collaboration will be all the more important as we seek to address issues around cross-border payments. To deliver the intended outcomes for the RTGS Renewal Programme we will continue with our extensive industry engagement and outreach. And as the transition approaches we also need the payments industry to act: to start preparing for the changes needed to their own organisations and to harness the benefits for their own firms and customers. Listening, and responding, to a diverse range of views is important in enabling the Bank to advance its objectives to benefit the public. But to be able to react effectively we also need diverse technology and diverse and talented staff.
Such a tool would reduce the pressure on monetary policy as an instrument for managing risks on the Swedish housing market, something that I personally would very much welcome. This would allow influence to be exerted on the expansion of credit in the household sector and on housing prices, without simultaneously impeding credit granting in other sectors and possibly influencing the krona exchange rate in a direction that would impede exports. A ceiling on household borrowing Another way of counteracting systemic risks is to use loan ceilings as a macroprudential policy instrument. These can certainly be focused on all categories of borrower in society, but, in the countries in which they have so far been applied, they have been directed at households and their indebtedness. 12 These instruments have usually been formulated as a limit on the amount of the loan in relation to the household’s income or the value of the household’s assets that form the collateral for the loan. There is no internationally harmonised definition of these instruments, allowing them to be defined differently as regards loan amount, income and value of underlying collateral. In Sweden, Finansinspektionen issued a recommendation almost two years ago regarding a limit on how much borrowers may borrow, the so-called mortgage ceiling. According to this, household loans should not exceed 85 per cent of the property’s market value when the loan is granted. Lending above this threshold is still possible, but should be granted without residential collateral and therefore at higher interest rates.

In the same vein, our projections suggest that the Albanian economy will continue to grow in the medium-term horizon. Although the economic activity will suffer from the negative consequences of inflation, the economic growth of Albania is expected to remain in the positive territory. Economic growth will continue to benefit from the overall financial and economic stability in Albania, the sound balance sheets of enterprises and households, as well as the continuing support of the banking sector with credit and payment instruments. In this context, it should be emphasized that the banking sector appears sound, liquid, and well-capitalised. The continuing reforms undertaken in the past years have borne their fruits. The consolidation of the banking sector, the improvement of the lending environment, the multifaceted development of financial markets and payment systems, as well as the initiatives carried out that encourage the use of national currency, have brought about notable qualitative improvements in the stability and efficiency of the banking sector. The growth rate of credit to the private sector recorded a progressive improvement, peaking to 13.7% in August. Also, it shows a good coverage of the need of enterprises and households for long-term financing and liquid tools. The stable growth of credit and the increase in the quality of its portfolio, are crucial indicators which demonstrate the sector's support to the economic recovery of Albania.
I will turn to the question of three of the new expectations on central banks, that we at the ECB are currently discussing as part of the Strategic Review rightly initiated by Christine Lagarde. I. Inflation remains the principal edifice of the Central Bank's Construct I.A. The past: had inflation disappeared? When it comes to inflation, the last decade left economists and central bankers confronting a number of puzzles. The Great recession of 2008-09 exhibited a “missing deflation”, when the important contraction of output was not associated with a consequent fall of prices. The recent years, on the contrary, were characterised as a period of “missing inflation”. The vanishing level of inflation has been a pervasive and global phenomenon. It can be grasped with a simple comparison of the inflation rates in the first and the second decades of the 21st century. Page 2 sur 9  The inflation rate of the Euro area was 2.1% on average from 1999 − when the euro was created − to 2007 − when the financial crisis started. It dropped to 1.0% over the period 2013−19 following the double dip recession and until the current pandemic. At more than one percentage point, this is a substantial decline between the two periods. Headline inflation in the US experienced a similar decline, having dropped from 2.7% to 1.6% between the two periods. In the early 2000s, the euro area’s inflation rate was in line with the ECB’s price stability mandate, defined as a target of “below but close to 2%”.

What I suggest is a slight evolution in our analysis – the data mix – and in our implementation – the instrument mix. Page 8 sur 9 On the data mix, the Governing Council already has to ensure its decisions comply with the proportionality principle and so has to consider the side effects of its policy actions. However, it does pose a more difficult analytical challenge: financial stability, unlike price stability, is not easily summarised by one statistic (inflation in the case of price stability), so we need in any case to look at a range of indicators. To respond to this challenge I believe we should broaden the current monetary second pillar into a monetary and financial pillar. This second pillar would be responsible for deepening research into the origins of the financial cycle. More specifically, let me mention a few examples of variables that could be monitored under this new pillar: -  Indebtedness of firms and households;  -  Bank balance sheet information, which is useful for assessing the functioning of the bank lending channel (including in a forward-looking way);  -  Indicators of excess risk tolerance and excess credit, which provide information on the risk-taking channel;  -  Stock and house prices, which provide information on the asset price channel. On implementation and the “instrument mix”, we now have quite an arsenal of unconventional policy instruments. With multiple monetary policy instruments, we now have a set of combinations that can deliver the required stance with respect to inflation.
Last year trade growth lagged the growth of global activity, and current global export PMIs now signal a contraction in global trade (Chart 11). Chart 11: Trade growth has weakened notably 56  Diffusion Index, 50 = no change  Percentage change on a year ago  55 54 53  Global manufacturing PMI: New export orders (6 month lead, LHS)  7 6  CPB world trade volume (3 month MA, RHS)  5 4  52  3  51  2  50  1  49 48  0  47  -1  46 2011  -2 2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  Sources: CPB,Markit Economics and Bank calculations. Bank of England simulations suggest that the impact through direct trade channels of the narrow, bilateral tariffs already announced would tend to be small and would be largely confined to the countries directly involved. A larger increase in tariffs of 10 percentage points between the US and all of its trading partners could take 2½ per cent off US output and 1 per cent off global output through trade channels alone, although the impact on the UK is smaller reflecting a greater exchange-rate driven boost to net exports. If business confidence and financial conditions are also affected (as recent experience suggests they would be), these impacts could double (Table 2).

The burgeoning of the non-banking financial institutions which have now become full fledged, brought with it increasing competition to the banking sector and unique products some of which cannot be clearly defined or very often understood by only a few. It also allowed for the exploitation of arbitrage and has contributed to the erosion of the orthodox predictability of the financial services industry. Regulators have had to realign their mindset to regulate and supervise these non-traditional institutions. As the financial services landscape continues to evolve, it is imperative that regulators adapt an anticipatory and proactive demeanour to address the inevitable challenges. The current world financial crises and the continuing economic uncertainties have shown us how fragile and interconnected is the global financial system. Careful attention needs to be paid to what is taking place in the major financial centres because of the contagion effect. Additionally, careful attention needs to be given to the new standards being promulgated by rule setting bodies which have profound effects on the way financial institutions are required to operate. Today every supervisory action has to be risk skewed. We have long moved away from the traditional transaction-oriented approach to supervision and as we move further away, cooperation among the regulatory bodies will become even more important given the home/host relationship and the magnitude of the risk that is inherent in such relationships. I have noted that over the last thirty years, the CGBS has endeavoured to strengthen its supervisory and regulatory framework of the regional central banks and monetary authorities.
This is a very favorable development for the economy and monetary policy, which can safely “look through” transitory shocks. Anchoring Inflation Expectations at the Target This brings me to my second point of the importance of anchoring inflation expectations at the target level. As HMS correctly stress, policymakers cannot take for granted that inflation expectations will remain well anchored. They highlight the risk that very tight labor markets could eventually lead to a resurgence of inflation and unmoor expectations, as in the 1960s. I concur that we must remain vigilant regarding a sustained takeoff in inflation. We must be equally vigilant that inflation expectations do not get anchored at too low a level. So far during this expansion, core and overall PCE inflation has averaged about 1.5 percent, well below the Fed’s 2 percent target. Taking a longer perspective, over the past 25 years, core and overall inflation have both averaged 1.8 percent. This persistent undershoot of the Fed’s target risks undermining the 2 percent inflation anchor. In this regard, research by Ulrike Malmendier and Stefan Nagel is sobering.6 They find that inflation expectations are heavily influenced by the inflation experience in one’s own lifetime, which implies that decades of too low inflation can become embedded in expectations. Indeed, we have seen some worrying signs of a deterioration of measures of longer-run inflation expectations in recent years, as seen in Table 2.

Before I continue, I’ll give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. Has the Phillips Curve Changed, or Is it a Trick of the Data? Throughout the paper, HMS use a reduced-form Phillips curve regression as a basis for their analysis. For my remarks, I simplify the specification and assume the inflation rate depends on the unemployment gap (and variants thereof), four lags of inflation, and a constant (relative to HMS, I have dropped the import price and inflation expectations terms). 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Overall, the results for the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index inflation using this simplified specification are quite similar to those reported in HMS. The full-sample (1961-2017) estimated coefficients using the core PCE price inflation rate are reported in the first column of the upper part of Table 1. The second column reports results corresponding to the “spline” specification of HMS, where positive values of the unemployment gap are added to the equation to capture asymmetry in the response of inflation to labor market tightness versus slack. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 report the corresponding estimation results for the subsample of 1961-1987, and the final two columns report the results for the subsample 19882017. Like HMS, the latter sample shows far less intrinsic persistence in inflation and a severe flattening of the Phillips curve relative to the full-sample results.