samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Requirements were defined with regard to the maximum tolerable downtime before the resumption of normal operations. A distinction was made between critical and non-critical business processes, activities and participants. Business processes were deemed to be critical if their functioning is absolutely vital for the system-wide provision of liquidity. •  The central infrastructures (SNB, SIS, Telekurs), which are crucial for the critical business processes, must be able to resume critical business activities within two hours without losing any confirmed transactions. •  Critical system participants must be able to resume defined critical business activities within four hours. •  The other system participants must be able to resume operations within 24 hours. The results of the analysis show that adequate preparations have been made both for central infrastructures and the major system participants. Nevertheless, areas in which there is room for improvement were identified. For instance, existing precautionary measures should not only be  tailored to cater for the failure of physical components (such as buildings or hardware), but particularly to events that interfere with staff availability. The final report of the working group will be completed in the second half of 2005. It will not be limited to issuing specific recommendations, but also to showing how they can be implemented. Financial Stability Report 2005 (950 kb)

The UK economy has also been facing high and rising degrees of uncertainty about future trade, though the source has been different – Brexit. According to our Decision Maker Panel, the number of companies reporting Brexit as among their top three risks have risen from one-third in April 2018 to around 50% now. Most recently, the perceived risk of a “no deal” Brexit has risen, with betting odds placing a roughly 30% probability on that event, double the probability earlier this year. With no precedent, it is very difficult to gauge the economic impact of a “no-deal” Brexit. One simple way of doing so is simply to ask companies how they think it would affect them. This is something the Bank’s regional Agents have been doing since late-2018. Chart 30 shows companies’ expected responses for output, employment, investment and exports under “no deal/no transition” and “deal with transition” scenarios using the combined results of four surveys from December 2018 to April 2019.28 The expected responses to a “no deal” are negative, significantly so. Output is expected on average to fall by 3 ½%, employment by 3% and investment by 1 ¼%. By contrast, expected responses to a deal scenario are all positive. Looking at the different waves of the survey, the good news is the expected negative effects of “no deal” were somewhat smaller in the later waves compared to the first in December 2018. That likely reflects the significant increase in Brexit planning and preparation, by companies and the government, over that period.
We believe, rightly, that the banks entrusted with our life savings are prudent. When we transfer money, we don’t worry about whether the payment system will get the funds to where we want them to go. We also expect that the currency we hold will be stable – and that we will not wake up one day to find that our purchasing power has been eroded overnight. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  9. In Hong Kong, you and I expect all of this to run like clockwork. And it does. But it’s only when the smooth operation of our monetary and banking systems is put under test by severe external shocks that we will see a reflection of true resilience. 10. We all know the challenges Hong Kong has faced over the past year, including social events, COVID-19, and the China-US tensions. Despite all these challenges for our economy, Hong Kong’s financial system has remained remarkably stable. 11. The value of the Hong Kong dollar has stayed close to the strong side of its trading band for most of this year. There have been strong inflows to the local currency, partly because of substantial demand for Hong Kong equities, including some large IPOs, and partly because of the very strong market confidence in the Linked Exchange Rate System. 12. There have been talks about capital flowing out of Hong Kong, especially during the peak of the social events last year.

Eddie Yue: What quality means to Hong Kong as an international financial centre Opening keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Management Association 2020 Quality Award Presentation Ceremony, Hong Kong, 14 October 2020. * * * Helmuth, YK, ladies and gentlemen, honoured guests, 1. Good evening. It gives me great pleasure to deliver the keynote speech at tonight’s prestigious ceremony. 2. The Hong Kong Management Association and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority are like twin brothers. Not only that we share the same HKMA acronym, but we also share similar beliefs. We both have a deep commitment to management excellence, developing human capital and upholding the highest standards of quality. 3. Ten years ago, at this same event, my predecessor Norman Chan shared his thoughts on how the HKMA – the Monetary Authority, that is – can achieve quality in public service. He said that the community expected nothing short of the highest standards of quality from the HKMA. And he highlighted the importance of professionalism, passion and pride to our organisation. 4. I believe the last ten years have demonstrated the truth of these words. So, tonight, I’d like to build on what Norman said at that time by taking a broader perspective on what quality means to Hong Kong as an international financial centre. Quality in an international financial centre 5. We can all discern quality in products and services.
This in turn enables banks to differentiate good debtors from more risky ones, and charge them commensurate to their risk profiles. In view of bank oversight, the Bank of Thailand has reoriented its focus on supervisory framework away from solo-basis transaction-testing analysis, towards risk-based supervision on consolidated basis. To fulfill this objective, we have already issued guidelines on all key risk categories and undertaken internal reform and capacity building to meet the challenge posed by comprehensive risk-based supervision. An example in this area is the development of examiners’ manuals that are regularly revised to ensure consistently high standards of supervision. 4. Going forward  Ladies and gentlemen, in the next few years, Thailand anticipates both opportunities and threats in the retail banking sector for existing banks in the light of the implementation of the Financial Sector Master Plan. As regards the focus of regulators, more attention will be given to watchful monitoring of the use of credit cards, monitoring of non-bank credit institutions, and observance of governance by market participants. The changing landscape of financial system to be brought about by the Financial Sector Master Plan will create opportunities for present market participants that have the courage to explore the niche and capability to satisfy the specialized needs of this group of customers. They come in the form of a new type of bank license - retail bank and other incentives. The tier1 capital requirement of 250 million baht for retail banks will be conducive to their specialized lending to retail customers.

However, Japan has also become an important market for Norwegian products. From the considerable deficits of earlier years, trade in traditional goods with Japan has moved into near balance. Strong growth in Asia is probably one of the prominent factors contributing to high oil prices in spite of low growth in the OECD area in recent years. China accounted for close to 50 per cent of growth in world oil consumption in 2002 and 2003. Trade in Asia has stimulated Norwegian shipping. The Chinese economy could continue to expand at a brisk pace for a longer period, which would open a large market that can also be entered by Norwegian enterprises. Norwegian exports to China have increased, but are still limited. Over several years, enterprises in Central European countries have been a source of competition for Norwegian jobs. Integration is also opening new markets and providing new sources of income for Norwegian enterprises. At the same time, tender requirements and the freedom of establishment have increased the competition facing Norwegian industries that were previously sheltered. A steadily larger share of Norway’s consumer goods imports come from China and Central European countries. Growth in imports from China was provided with an additional impetus after China became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001. Imports from Eastern Europe have also continued to grow. There are many economic agents in Norway that are benefiting from globalisation. Consumers are enjoying lower prices for goods and services.
Euro adoption and Banking Union For a non-euro area country the issue of participating in the Banking Union is intrinsically linked to that of euro adoption. After the crisis broke out, all non-euro area EU countries in Central and Eastern Europe with floating exchange rate regimes, as well as Bulgaria, shifted to a wait-and-see approach as regards euro adoption, even though, in most of them, the Maastricht criteria were already fulfilled or within reach. This state of affairs may appear paradoxical, given that, shortly after these countries’ accession to the European Union, their euro adoption target dates were very ambitious, despite the scant progress at the time in fulfilling the Maastricht criteria – 2008 in Hungary, 2008/2009 in Poland, 2009/2010 in the Czech Republic, 2010 in Bulgaria and 2014 in Romania. None of these deadlines were met. Currently, virtually all new Member States outside the euro zone lack a euro adoption target date, which is indicative of a substantial shift in approaching the euro changeover as a whole rather than their inability or difficulty to comply with the reference values of nominal convergence. How did this change come about? This shift in approach occurred amid euro adoption benefits becoming less obvious, to which added the increasingly evident costs. This is also reflected by the Flash Eurobarometer, which indicates a significant decline in the number of those who believe that adopting the euro is beneficial for their country.

My speech will endeavour to outline the arguments that support the opt-in decision for Romania, but I believe that, despite the slightly different circumstances, the reasoning also holds true for other non-euro area countries – such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Bulgaria. General remarks Before dealing with the arguments underpinning our position regarding the Banking Union, let me give you a short account of Romania’s recent economic history that should enable all of you to better understand our particular circumstances. No doubt the crisis has taken its toll on Romania’s economy, given the large imbalances which had been steadily accumulating during the boom years. Whether the crisis has ended or not on the European level is still a matter of debate. What may be said for certain is that Romania undertook the necessary adjustments during the 2009–2012 period and the preconditions for sustainable growth are now in place. Indeed, the outcome of these adjustments may already be seen in the 2013 economic performance, which hopefully marks a turnaround in Romania’s economic development: •  rapid (judged by the current standards in the European Union) economic growth, namely 3.5 percent,  •  sizeable adjustment of the current account deficit, from the double-digit area (between 2006 and 2008) to 1.1 percent,  •  historically low inflation (1.55 percent at the end of the year),  •  fiscal deficit well below 3 percent.
Physical risks can damage property and other infrastructure6, disrupt business supply chains and food systems, influence productivity and health, and, more broadly, can lead to potentially wide displacement and even conflict. This can reduce asset values, result in lower profitability for companies, damage public finances, and increase the cost of settling underwriting losses for insurers. Transition risks, arising through changes in climate policy, technology and shifting consumer preferences could prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of carbon-intensive assets – leaving some ‘stranded’. In turn, this will give rise to credit risk for lenders and market risk for insurers and investors. Yet these physical and transition risks are not reflected in the market prices of most financial assets.7 Structural barriers such as the lack of climate disclosure, the lack of clear sector-level climate policies, firms not internalising the cost of emissions, and the short time horizon of some investors, all contribute to what Nick Stern has described as the greatest market failure the world has ever seen.8 A sharp shift towards a new equilibrium as a result of recognising the full extent of this market failure could create significant financial losses in a ‘climate Minsky moment’. Maintaining monetary and financial stability in light of these risks therefore demands a timely, coherent and coordinated policy response from the authorities.

The importance of the Bank’s role in this has been recognised through the Chancellor’s recent remit and recommendation letters to the Bank’s policy committees, which set out that the transition to a net-zero economy is now a part of the government’s economic strategy that the committees must have regard to.9 So what does this mean a central bank should do in practice? Financial system First, and foremost, it means building resiliency at a micro and macro level. We do this by ensuring the financial system proactively manages and pre-emptively mitigates the financial risks from climate change. That task falls squarely within the mandate of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Policy Committee (FPC). The PRA has set supervisory expectations for banks and insurers to ensure they adopt a strategic approach to climate change and develop capabilities to effectively identify, measure, manage, and where outside appetite, mitigate the financial risks from climate change. This is a necessary component of protecting the safety and soundness of PRA-regulated firms. The FPC, alongside the PRC, will launch next week a Climate change Biennial Exploratory Scenario exercise – the CBES – to assess the resiliency of individual banks, insurers and the wider financial system to different climate scenarios. This type of scenario modelling and analysis is critical to enabling real decisions on climate-related risks by financial firms and policymakers. Assessing resiliency against a range of scenarios enables us to prepare for what might happen in the absence of certainty about what will happen.
Christian Noyer: The euro area perspectives Keynote speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Paris Europlace International Financial Forum, Paris, 10 July 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to speak to such a distinguished audience and I thank Paris Europlace for the invitation. As Arnaud de Bresson just mentioned it, I take this opportunity to express, again, my strong support to the ongoing development of financial activities in off shore RMB out of Paris. In that regard, let me also commend the work undertaken by Paris Europlace to federate and coordinate the variety of initiatives that we have seen develop over the recent months. We are lucky, here in Paris, to benefit from the presence and the dynamism of the major Chinese banks, which are among the main international banks. This is an asset for Paris. Similarly, the main French banks are active on the Chinese markets, out of Hong Kong and out of mainland China. This is another major asset for Paris as a financial center. Both will benefit Chinese corporates in France, and French corporates in the Chinese markets. Both these assets will guarantee that liquidity in RMB does and will flow smoothly from China to Paris. Furthermore, Paris ambitions to serve as a hub for the development of yuan denominated business throughout the euro area.

Whereas then the exchange rate depreciated continually, amplifying the effect of external price increases, in the past few months the peso-dollar parity has shown large swings, and is now, as of the statistical closing of this Report, at around CLP480 per dollar. After the Bank’s announcement of the reserve accumulation program in early January, the peso depreciated from some CLP465 per dollar to nearly CLP500 per dollar. After that there was an appreciation trend that took it back to pre-intervention levels; however, the effects of this measure have combined with external developments, in particular the sustained weakness of the dollar at the global level and the copper price increasing to all-time highs in nominal terms (figure 15). Thus, since its peak of late 2008, the appreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar has not differed much from that of the currencies of commodity-exporting countries or other economies that have intervened or applied administrative measures in their forex markets (figure 16). The real exchange rate (RER) followed the trend of the multilateral parity, which has depreciated since December. Considering the level of the nominal exchange rate and parities prevailing at the statistical closing of this Report, in March the RER posted figures in line with its long-term fundamentals (figure 17). The baseline scenario of this Report uses as a working assumption that the RER will stay near its recent levels.
We also need to make supervisory colleges more effective, including: •  Constructing the colleges with the appropriate members reflecting the key jurisdictions based on the scale or criticality of activities;  •  Ensuring robust dialogue between supervisors and firms in college settings;  •  Providing direct and candid feedback to firms and supervisors following from the interactions; and  •  Agreeing on key messages to firms or areas of supervisory focus to ensure consistency across home and host supervisors. I don’t mean to suggest that coordination isn’t underway already – because there is – but there are many reasons to be hopeful that even more progress will be made in the near-term. •  There are efforts such as those of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG) to promote enhanced information sharing and collaboration among supervisors. •  I’m particularly excited about the recent opening of the BIS’s Data Hub – a move designed to provide a more efficient and practical mechanism for supervisors – and eventually central banks and other relevant bodies – to share information on global banks’ activities and exposures. 3. AML/BSA compliance  A third area I wanted to touch on is one that I raised last year – AML/BSA compliance.

I think it’s pretty safe to say – after one reads the newspaper on any given day – that we may be at a low point of confidence and trust between the public and the financial sector – with a series of high profile events over the past 18 months that raise issues of both basic compliance with laws and regulations and of governance and culture in firms and in the system more broadly. Culture can be a complex topic – and I know it’s one that firms are spending a lot of time thinking through and trying to figure out how to ensure a strong culture. As we are thinking about it, we’re asking ourselves a series of questions – and I thought I’d share a couple of these with you as food for thought on this topic. Culture starts at the top of the organization – “the tone at the top” •  Do the directors/CEO set the right tone for behavior at the organization? •  Is there effective challenge and debate at the board meetings/committee meetings? BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  •  Do personalities interfere/get too big within the company for effective risk management? •  What’s the dialogue like between supervisors and the firm? In a strong risk culture, incentives within the firm set the right expectations for behavior. •  How are audit and supervisory findings handled? •  Does the performance management system reward both good behavior and punish bad behaviors or lapses?
Additionally, we will cultivate further our staff’s ability to evaluate advanced risk measurement and management methodologies for operational risk, especially because so much of that work centers on advanced statistical analysis. Externally, the Committee anticipates providing more assistance, both formally and informally, to other supervisory agencies that are preparing for the added responsibilities we will all assume as the New Accord comes into force. Moreover, I am pleased to note that the Financial Stability Institute will continue its collaboration with the Basel Committee, especially in assisting supervisors globally in understanding and implementing all aspects of the revised Accord. The "FSI" anticipates that more than half of its 40 seminars and programs in 2003 will concentrate on components of the New Accord. In fact, shortly after the release of the Third Consultative Document next year, the FSI intends to offer three special seminars around the world to introduce other supervisors to the most important features of the new framework. 3. Working toward consistent implementation: Accord Implementation Group  The third area of activity will be to deepen the level of communication and cooperation among supervisors so that we implement the new rules more consistently across jurisdictions. A "level playing field" demands that international competition be driven by each bank’s strengths, rather than by each country’s rules. Within the Basel Committee itself, we’ve established the "Accord Implementation Group" as a forum for sharing information on ways to assess risk management processes under the New Accord.

As you are aware, the preferred inflation measure of the Fed, the PCE index, includes these expenditures.  Last but not least, our inflation objective while clarified should also be credible. I will come back to this with my fourth question about communication. 3. What about the second pillar of the ECB and is there a link with “secondary objectives”? For many, the history of the second pillar of monetary analysis of the ECB seems to be coming to an end. Born as the first pillar in 1999 and coming at the time from the strict following of monetary aggregates by the Bundesbank – and the Banque de France as well –, it became the second pillar after 2003, passing behind the economic analysis of the inflation outlook. And due to the fact that it has progressively fallen into disuse, many suggest we should now call time on it during our strategic review. Is it that sure? Isn’t there another alternative path, more adequate than letting it disappear? There are three possible reasons:  The second pillar allows a cross check on the analysis of inflation.  We could possibly introduce a focus on nominal aggregates, whereas the first pillar focuses by its nature on prices and volumes.  Finally, it would allow reference to some of the “secondary” objectives of the ECB, including financial stability.