samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, the possibility of reduced access to external funds, plus the increase in global risk, put pressure on internal financial conditions, causing a significant increase in interest rates and lending standards. At the same time, when future earnings became more uncertain, households and firms significantly reduced their demand for new credit, as revealed by the Banking Credit Survey that the Central Bank conducts on a quarterly basis. Overall, the tightening of financial conditions was not so severe as to hinder banks’ access to external credit or their proper functioning domestically. This was possible also because of a set of measures adopted by the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance to ensure the proper functioning of the financial system. Nonetheless, due to the higher uncertainty, the sensation that the world economy might enter into a significant depression with huge losses of wealth triggered an unprecedented erosion of global confidence. Growth forecasts began adjusting at great speed. Undoubtedly this hit the behavior of households and firms hard around the world, which stopped their spending plans, or put them on hold indefinitely. Consumers’ and entrepreneurs’ expectations indicators showed a profound weakening in the last quarter of 2008 (Figure 8). A look at durable goods consumption indicators reveals the steep fall in sales levels (Figure 9). All this takes me back to the previous point in my presentation. The dramatic increase in uncertainty that began in September of last year altered people’s behavior substantially, leading to an abrupt and sudden paralysis of the demand for durable goods.

4 This idea permits us to explain why the decision to wait and see can be optimal and permits us to justify why demand, D, depends negatively on uncertainty, σ. The increase in uncertainty and the fall in demand What is critical about this analysis is that it can be very important from a quantitative point of view. The decision is not marginal. An increase in uncertainty does not result in “some” decrease in spending. An uncertainty shock that is common to all will lead every firm and every consumer to paralyze spending, causing a collapse in demand. The main point is that this fall can be so sharp that one can even have more than one possible equilibrium (Figure 3). This could be the case if households decide to increase their savings significantly, such that low-income families would rather not spend on durable goods. The same could be true if firms decide not to invest. Thus, households and firms would delay  3  For the case of irreversible investment, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide a very thorough analysis. A simple example is presented in De Gregorio (2007), chapter 4. 4  Implications like the ones described here can be inferred from the precautionary savings theory. In order to avoid the cost in lost utility of extreme negative events, the consumer chooses to keep some buffer-stock savings. If uncertainty aggravates, for example by increasing the dispersion of future earnings, then precautionary saving will probably increase, which is done by postponing consumption decisions.
Since then, Hong Kong has begun to play an active role in the activities of the BIS, including attending its regular meetings and participating in committees focusing on global financial issues, in particular, the Committee on Banking Supervision and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. In July 1998, the BIS established in Hong Kong its Asia Pacific office, which is also the Bank’s first overseas office. In addition, Hong Kong continued to attend the annual meetings of the Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as well as maintaining close technical co-operation with these bodies. Since the outbreak of the Asian financial turmoil, the issues of financial stability and new global financial architecture have become increasingly important. In addition to voicing our views on these topical issues under the name of “Hong Kong, China”, Hong Kong has also actively participated in the lending arrangements organised by international financial agencies. In 1998, we cochaired the G22 Working Group on Transparency and Accountability and actively promoted the disclosure standards in both public and private sectors. At present we have been invited to attend the BIS Committee on Global Financial System and its working group meetings. While the above underscore Hong Kong’s status as an international financial centre, it also demonstrates to the international financial community the successful implementation of the “one country, two systems” principle. Conclusion 21. Time flies. Nine years have passed since the Basic Law was promulgated.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Outlook for Thailand at a time of economic uncertainty Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thomson Reuters Forum, Bangkok, 21 February 2012. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to be the keynote speaker at this Thomson Reuters forum. This is a special opportunity for me to share my views on the “Outlook for Thailand at a Time of Economic Uncertainty.” At the outset, I would like to highlight that the Thai economic outlook for 2012 is likely to be strong in terms of projected GDP growth while pressure on inflation should be well- contained. Having said that, I know that all of you, especially those in financial markets, are well aware that in today’s fast-paced world we cannot be complacent. Positive outlooks, such as the one I just described, may change quickly. Today, my speech will focus on laying out the challenges, my assessment of the challenges, and our policy options going forward. First, let us turn to the challenges. Last year 2011 was a year of regaining poise and balance for monetary policy. One year ago, the global recovery had started to gain traction. Capital flows had begun to stabilize and became less uni-directional. The balance of risks had started to shift away from growth to inflation. As a result, the Bank of Thailand (BOT), and indeed, the majority of central banks in the region, normalized interest rates throughout most of the year.
While the crisis has provided a great opportunity to enhance our dialogue across supervisory boundaries, there are still impediments to realizing a more seamless and coordinated approach. Among the impediments are the challenges in information sharing, where there continue to be barriers to freely sharing information among supervisors. While some of these impediments are cultural – or trust-related – ones, there are still legal barriers to sharing information that need to be addressed. We need to address the legal impediments for supervisors on the ground to be able to share information in a more routine and natural way. We also need to continue to build the working relationships among the supervisory teams on the ground. Much of this kind of dialogue is underway, but more could be done to move ahead on this issue. In this vein, we need to work more collaboratively together, be candid about concerns we have, and agree on the range of work necessary across these largest firms. Steps in this direction, some of which we have already started implementing, include embarking on efforts like joint examinations or concurrent examinations, with similar scopes across legal entities/jurisdictions, to ensure a more holistic understanding of issues can be obtained.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Last year, I noted that I had had a similar conversation almost ten years ago with a nearly identical audience – in which I raised the question of whether the industry was going to finally tackle this issue and get it right. I find myself here again this year wondering the same thing. But, rather than just raising the question, I thought I’d offer a couple of areas where we – collectively – could be thinking about how to “get it right.” First, I do think this is an area that got short shrift during and following the crisis. Much of management’s attention was directed at the issues of the day, and decisions on where to invest resources were directed at the most pressing – and most obvious – areas. Thus, I think we are where we are: an area of compliance that didn’t get sufficient attention, didn’t keep up with evolving standards and now we find ourselves in a race to get it right. So, increased attention and investment is obviously needed. Many firms continue to make the mistake of treating AML compliance as a static exercise, while AML standards and best practices continue to evolve. Two critical areas where this mistake appears to keep being made are failures to update customer due diligence and transaction monitoring programs as the firms’ business model changes. Second, this is an area where the fragmentation in supervision is quite apparent.
At the same time, it should be remembered that many markets in Sweden still show clear signs of a lack of competition. This entails a considerable cost and in this field we appear to have more to learn from history. The significance of this is underlined by the fact that the various parts of the economy are interlinked, which often means that a strengthening of the weaker parts is more important for the whole than for the particular industry or sector. 3  The complementarity of the economy makes it particularly important to remedy our weak links and to listen with humility to the proposals of, for instance, the OECD and IMF. It is often easier to identify the problems if one can look at things with a little perspective. I believe that the Swedish economy has considerable unused potential for stronger growth if we concentrate on this, that is to say, on how to make our joint share of the cake grow. 3  The significance of complementarity in economic policy has been demonstrated by, for instance, Aziz and Wescott 1997 in “Policy Complementarities and the Washington Consensus”. 6  BIS Review 37/2003

An annuity is a very serious business: Part Two1 Speech given by David Rule, Executive Director of Insurance Supervision Westminster and City Bulk Annuities Conference 10 April 2019  1  Chapter 2, Sense and Sensibility, Jane Austen, 1811  A year ago, I spoke to this conference about the risks facing insurers active in the bulk purchase annuity market. In particular, I discussed the treatment of unrated, direct investments under the Solvency II Matching Adjustment, with a particular focus on equity release mortgages. A year later and the movement of defined benefit pension liabilities from employers to insurers has continued apace. Around £ billion of risk was transferred in 2018, if you include buy outs, buy ins and longevity swaps (Chart 1).2  Most commentators expect the market to continue to grow. On the  demand side, more employers might be in a position to afford a buy out if improvement in life expectancy stalls, interest rates rise and asset values increase (Chart 2). On the supply side, the possible emergence of superfunds could create an alternative to insurers. Meanwhile, the current level of transactions is still dwarfed by the scale of remaining defined benefit (DB) liabilities of some £ trillion, of which nearly £ trillion are closed to new members.3 Today I want to discuss more generally the risks associated with insurers taking on significant annuity obligations. I will then show how, in my view, the PRA’s implementation of Solvency II does a good job of addressing these risks.
The duty of the central bank in such a situation has been to keep the lid of the jar tightly so that the child is unable to take out cookies at its own pleasure. This is not a popular measure, but central banks throughout the world have been found to keep the cookie jar in tight control for the benefit of the society. Given the above economic costs, inflation is undoubtedly the public enemy number one. 4  BIS Review 55/2007

The euro is a currency firmly based on internal price stability and therefore has a clear potential for a stronger external value.” To sum up we have two main messages to global investors and savers: firstly, we pursue a policy which is designed towards price stability and currency solidity in a steady medium and long-term perspective; secondly, the euro has a significant potential for appreciation. In conclusion, let me stress the following: The international cooperation under the aegis, in particular, of the G7, has been very fruitful regarding key issues dealing with the strengthening of the international financial architecture. There is sometimes too much emphasis being put, in my view, on the different feelings or positions that appear here and there. What I think more important is the fact that the international community fully agrees on many key issues which are extensively mentioned in the Communiqué of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 20 February 1999. Other fora have significantly contributed to the very useful exchange of views on ways to reform the international financial system. The Financial Stability Forum is making progress on important issues: Highly Leveraged Institutions, short-term capital flows and offshore centres. Following the statement at the Summit of the Heads of Government of the G7, the Forum will be broadened. I am very happy that Hong Kong is invited to participate in the Forum’s next meeting. 7  BIS Review 81/1999
News conference  Berne, 25 March 2020 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and Gentlemen First, on behalf of the entire Swiss National Bank, I would like to express our sympathy to all those directly affected by coronavirus. Swiss society and our country’s economy face enormous challenges. The SNB is working closely with the Federal Council, the authorities and the business community to overcome this crisis. The measures adopted by the SNB complement those of the Confederation and are intended to cushion the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Monetary policy supplements the various fiscal measures taken by the public authorities. The Swiss National Bank has set up the SNB COVID-19 refinancing facility (CRF). This instrument is designed to strengthen the supply of credit to the Swiss economy by providing the banking system with additional liquidity. There is no upper limit on the amounts available under the CRF, and drawdowns can be made at any time. The CRF will be available from 26 March 2020. The CRF operates in conjunction with the federal government’s guarantees for corporate loans. The facility allows banks to obtain liquidity from the SNB, which is secured by these federally guaranteed loans. In taking this action, we are enabling banks to access the required liquidity that will allow them to expand their lending rapidly and on a large scale. The interest rate for these refinancing transactions corresponds to the SNB policy rate, currently −0.75%.

Once we have received and considered them, we will begin work on more detailed proposals which will be published for consultation in due course. Whilst I hesitate to claim that the finished strong and simple framework will resemble a great cathedral in its beauty – and I can certainly promise you it will not take centuries to complete – it is nevertheless a major building project which will create an important new part of the regulatory landscape. Help us now to lay its foundations and to shape our vision of what it will grow into. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10
Such institutional factors probably account for some  2  Partly because of the strength of this institutional demand (and their tendency to buy bonds then hold them to maturity), inflation-linked markets are significantly less liquid than their nominal counterparts. DMO data show that as a proportion of the market capitalisation of bonds outstanding, turnover in the IG market is about 1/6th that of the conventional gilt market. BIS Review 84/2007  5  part of the measured rise in forward inflation rates. Nonetheless the stability of inflation expectations will remain a key concern for the MPC. Sovereign Investors In a global context, another influential set of investors in financial markets over recent years have been holders of official foreign exchange reserves and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs). A by-product of large current account surpluses, the funds available for investment have ballooned over the past few years – foreign assets held by sovereigns globally currently stand at $ trillion, of which around $ ½ trillion is held as international reserves. This is around 5 times higher than the level seen in the early 1990s, and could well be an understatement. The growth in foreign assets has been particularly rapid in Asian countries (especially China) and oil and gas exporting economies, including Russia (Chart 12). It is difficult to be precise about the size of SWFs because they are not recorded explicitly in most official statistics. But recent estimates suggest that their foreign assets are in the range of $ –2 ½ trillion and they are rising rapidly.

Another variant of an asymmetrical disturbance is that asset prices – the property market and stock exchange – due to a too strong economic development are forced up for a short while. However, in situations such as this, the required tightening can usually be managed with the help of fiscal policy. Naturally, stabilisation policy via the budget has its limitations since it only works with delay and is dependent on many other long-term considerations. In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact, which Sweden is included in whether or not a member of the EMU, provides a limitation on increased government expenses. The most important “shock absorber” even if we do not join the EMU, but especially if we do, is that wages can adapt to changes in the competition situation, i.e. that there is a high degree of flexibility and pliability in wage formation. It would thus be possible to avoid an increase in unemployment during an adaptation period. Naturally, it can be more difficult, politically, to achieve this than to adapt an exchange rate. A single monetary policy therefore requires greater discipline from labour market parties since the connection between wage costs/inflation and monetary policy will be less obvious than is the case today. The krona The reasoning I have pursued so far has assumed that the exchange rate actually functions as a shock absorber: that the floating exchange rate adapts to competitiveness and the business climate, i.e.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Talent development in Islamic finance over the next decade Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launching of IBFIM’s Islamic Finance Qualification Framework & Progression Route (IFQFPR) “Talent development in Islamic finance over the next decade”, Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2011. *  *  *  In a highly dynamic, rapidly changing and challenging environment, talent development for the financial services industry has become an even more important agenda to ensure that its growth and development is supported by the necessary skills and capabilities. This is particularly important for Islamic finance given that it has become the most rapidly growing segment in our financial system. With the increased pace of the internationalisation of Islamic Finance, this growth momentum is also taking place in several other jurisdictions. This current global financial crisis which has highlighted the importance that the growth of the financial sector should correspond with the growth of the economy and for risk management and governance practices to be strengthened to ensure its stability and sustainability has also prompted increased interest in Islamic finance. These are the very principles and foundations inherent in Islamic finance. Talent as a thrust for industry advancement The development of the Malaysian Islamic financial system, has now evolved our Islamic finance industry into a progressive, comprehensive and competitive component of the overall financial sector.

In my view, transmission of monetary policy in this cycle is not weaker but slower, for three reasons: The starting point: the balance sheet of corporates as well as of households was very strong after the exceptional Covid support; Fixed rate mortgages have significantly increased in share, and are now predominant in many jurisdictions. It's nevertheless good news for financial stability; The higher proportion of services in the economy, which are less directly sensitive to interest rates. Non-housing services now represent 49% of Core HICP basket in the euro area, compared with 41% in 2001. In a recent speech,1 I suggested that the lag could be up to two years. Hence, "length" is still more important than "level", to quote the two dimensions mentioned by Christine Lagarde recently2. We stated in our last Monetary policy statement that "the key ECB interest rates will be brought to levels sufficiently restrictive to achieve a timely return of inflation to our 2% medium term target and will be kept at those levels as long as necessary". I think we are close to the former (levels), and should be now sufficiently patient on the latter (duration). In other words, as transmission is of the essence, so is the persistence of our monetary policy. 1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  1 Villeroy de Galhau, F., Monetary policy transmission: where do we stand?, speech, 22  May 2023 2 Lagarde, C., Breaking the persistence of inflation, speech, 27 June 2023  2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Chart 3: Wage growth compared to MPC forecasts  Chart 4: Unemployment compared to MPC forecasts  Outturn February 2014 IR forecast February 2015 IR forecast February 2016 IR forecast February 2017 IR forecast  6  10 9  4  8  3 7  2 1  6  2019  2018  2017  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  -1  2007  0  2006  Wage growth (& forecasts)  5  Outturn February 2014 IR forecast February 2015 IR forecast February 2016 IR forecast February 2017 IR forecast  5  Unemployment (& forecasts)  7  -2  2020  2019  2018  2017  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  -4 Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Notes: Whole economy AWE, total pay. 4  2006  -3  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Notes: Unemployment rate for 16+ population.

Krzysztof Rybiński: Poland and EURO Panel speech 1 by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Poland, at a debate organised by demosEUROPA – Centre for European Strategy and Ebert Foundation, Warsaw, 26 November 2007. *  *  *  In my speech 2 in June this year I outlined the key benefits and costs of adopting the euro. Let me briefly restate what they are: On the benefits side of adopting a common currency economists usually mention the following factors: lower transaction costs, lower interest rates, financial integration and trade creation. When speaking about costs economists usually cite two groups of factors: asymmetric shocks and arising micro- and macroeconomic imbalances. It is important to note that some costs will materialize if asymmetric shocks hit the enlarged eurozone. We do not know the likelihood of such shocks though, so it is impossible to calculate the expected value of costs related to these events. We know, however, that the probability of asymmetric shocks declines with rising similarity or progressing real convergence of the EU economies. Let me also stress that the magnitude of costs depends crucially on domestic policy – prudent banking sector supervision, labor market reforms and sound fiscal policies to name a few. Adoption of proper policies reduces future potential costs related to eurozone membership and, at the same time, enhances future benefits.