samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We can quantify the losses in terms of days of lost output. Given the regional GDP of $ trillion, a rough calculation yields a loss of $ billion for each full-day equivalent of lost output in the region. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  A considerable part of this lost activity will be offset over time or be replaced by a temporary shift of activity from hard-hit areas to less-affected places. But, in a services-based economy, much activity cannot be shifted in time: restaurants, for instance, can’t serve six meals a day to make up for lost business. The fact that many people who would have dined in lower Manhattan in the weeks following Sandy are instead patronizing restaurants near their homes or near temporary work sites represents an offset for the regional economy as a whole. But that’s little consolation for the original restaurant, which may in turn need to lay off some of its people or could even possibly go out of business. And, of course, this applies even more dramatically to businesses in hard-hit places along the regional shoreline. Against this, reconstruction began soon after the storm was over and has likely intensified since then. The repair and replacement of damaged or destroyed infrastructure, homes, and businesses is likely to continue for some time. Programs will need to be well designed in order to achieve maximum beneficial impact.

It continually has to earn it. For this reason, in the run-up to the introduction of the euro, the Bank of England is playing a key role in preparing London’s global marketplace for this major new opportunity, alongside market practitioners themselves: We are ensuring that the necessary financial infrastructure in London is in place so that anyone who wishes to do so can trade and settle in euro in London from the first day of EMU. We are also helping to ensure that City firms whatever their nationality - are properly prepared so that they and their customers can make full use of the infrastructure. We are providing information to the London market so that firms - whatever their nationality - are as well informed as possible about the technical side of the preparations for the euro. This is the significance of our broadly quarterly series of publications on ‘Practical Issues’, which now has a circulation of around 40,000, of which 5,000 go directly overseas. We also aim to promote agreement between central banks and market practitioners across Europe on practical issues in areas where the market requires a degree of co-ordination. In conclusion, I want to emphasise three points. First, the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 will create a major currency for financing, with significant depth and liquidity. Second, London will be ready for the introduction of the euro. Anybody who wishes to do so will be able to trade and settle in euro in London from the first day of EMU.
Stock of loans, by currency percent 100 90 80 70  54.2  57.8  60.3  63.3  63.7  62.7  61.2  56.5  49.7  42.9  37.1  34.4  57.1  62.9  65.6  2016  2017  Jul. 2018  60 50 40 30  20  45.8  42.2  39.7  36.7  36.3  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  37.3  38.8  43.5  2012  2013  2014  50.3  10 0  Share of local currency loans Source: NBR  2015  Share of foreign currency loans  Source: NBR  Foreign liabilities Domestic deposits  Jul-18  Jan-18  Jul-17  Jan-17  Jul-16  Jan-16  Jul-15  Jan-15  Jul-14  Jan-14  Jul-13  Jan-13  Jul-12  Jan-12  Jul-11  Jan-11  Jul-10  Jan-10  Jul-09  Jan-09  Jul-08  Jan-08  Jul-07  Jan-07  Millions  Figure 9. Structure of banks’ funding  RON bln. 350  300  250  200  150  100  50  0  Figure 10.

My assessment is based on a longer time perspective and it may differ from a year on year approach. Romania is one of the few success stories of converging within the European Union, even during and after the crisis. GDP per capita at PPS increased from 50.6% of EU average in 2008 to 62.5% in 2017. The real GDP was higher by 17.5% in 2017 as against 2008; and the real potential GDP was 23% higher in 2017 as against 2008 (Figure 1). By the end of 2018, these figures will further grow by approximately 4 percentage points, according to IMF and EC forecasts. 2  IMF/EU programs from 2009 to 2015 were successful in many ways, contributing to a sharp adjustment in the budget deficit, exit from the Excessive Deficit Procedure in 2013 and reaching the MTO in the period 2013-2015. Structural reforms also advanced during the programs, one indicator of these being the large reduction in public government and state enterprises’ arrears. Exports of goods and services doubled in the last ten years, from 38.3 billion euro in 2008 to 77.9 billion euro in 2017, while imports increased by only 42.7% over the same period. CPI-based Real effective exchange rate (REER) is also lower than in 2008 (Figure 2). Consequently, the negative contribution of net exports to GDP has diminished, and the current account deficit witnessed a major adjustment of about 10% of GDP.
The big lesson from the 1970s was that weakness in real incomes and price movements, which drive a wedge between consumer prices and output prices, lead to pressure for increases in pay to “catch up” on the lost income: or as it is sometimes called “real wage resistance”. The end result is more inflationary pressure for a given amount of unemployment. Put differently, to keep a lid on inflation, unemployment has to be higher following periods of pressure on real incomes. The current reduction in real incomes has been as big as we’ve seen for nearly a century. Real wages are still almost 9% below their pre-crisis peak. That is a fall of around 20% relative to the pre-crisis trend. Following a year of strong growth and a very rapid fall in unemployment, this would suggest workers would now demand some catch up in pay. However, there appears to be little evidence of real wage resistance – the sharpness of the recession and the years of austerity that have followed it, appear to have caused a shift in the psychology of UK workers. There appears, for the present at least, to be an acceptance that pre-crisis pay levels are no longer achievable. Real wages have proved to be remarkably flexible and, as a consequence, unemployment has been able to drop quickly without inflationary pressure on pay emerging. To complete the picture, the fall in unemployment has included a high number of long-term unemployed, who probably drag less on pay.

More information can be found in Regulation D.  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  short-term rates like GC repo have tended to be more variable and have, more than in the past, fluctuated with sometimes unpredictable spreads to federal funds. These periodic episodes of weaker linkages suggest that although the IOER rate effectively influences the marginal unsecured funding rate for eligible depository institutions, it may not be representative of, and may currently lie above, the marginal cost of funds more broadly across money markets, for example, secured financing costs faced by repo market participants. This weakening of the relationship between short-term interest rates represents a reduction in the precision with which the Desk is able to control them over the very short term. It’s difficult to know, though, whether the shift in dynamics across money markets we’re seeing is permanent or temporary. While some of the changes could be indicative of an increasing desire by market participants to focus on collateralized rather than uncollateralized markets, it could also reflect more transitory factors related to an elevated level of reserves that leaves banks with no need to borrow funds given the abundance of deposits. Of course, it’s also difficult to know with certainty how money market rate relationships will respond when the FOMC eventually begins to remove policy accommodation in an environment with a high volume of reserve balances.
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT IN THE DRAFT BUDGET PUBLIC DEBT  120 100 80  CHART 11 BREAKDOWN OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEBT  % of GDP  60  2017  2018  2019  Debt as a % of PIB  98.3  96.9  95.4  Debt change (as GDP pp)  -0.7  -1.4  -1.5  Balance  3.1  2.7  1.3  GDP nominal rate of change  -4.2  -3.6  -3.7  Flow-stock adjustment  0.5  -0.6  0.9  Due to:  40 20 0 75  78  81  84  PUBLIC DEBT  87  90  93  96  99  02  05  08  11  14  17  2019 STATE BUDGET FORECAST  SOURCES: Banco de España and 2019 State Budget. subject to a set of rules restricting fiscal policy which, in Spain’s case, would mean that: first, the structural government deficit would have to be reduced each year by 0.5 pp of GDP, under normal conditions, until the medium-term objective (MTO) of structural balance were achieved; second, the annual growth of general government spending would have to be less than or equal to the economy’s potential medium-term growth; and, finally, the government debt-to-GDP ratio would have to be reduced each year by one twentieth of the difference between its level and the target of 60%.

However, it cannot be ruled out that the increase in political and trade uncertainty may ultimately constrain the growth of business investment plans. This is especially the case in certain economies, such as Italy, where some signs of a tightening in financial conditions are already discernible, in a setting in which Italian public debt yields have, since spring last year, held at relatively high levels. The lower rate of growth in the euro area has contributed to delaying the prospect of a pick-up in the core component of euro area inflation somewhat. And compounding this has been the effect of the recent decline in oil prices on overall inflation. In these circumstances, the ECB’s monetary policy maintains a markedly expansionary stance, BANCO DE ESPAÑA  2	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  FORECASTS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY: OVERVIEW  TABLE 2  Annual rate of change (%)  December 2018 projections 2017  2018  2019  GDP  3.0  2.5  2.2  Employment  2.9  2.5  1.6  HICP (inﬂation)  2.0  1.8  1.6  SOURCES: INE and Banco de España. Projections cut-off date: 28 November 2018.  aiming to prompt the convergence of inflation, in the medium term, towards rates of increase in prices that are below but close to 2%.
Amid these increased uncertainties, there has been heightened volatility in the international financial markets, arising in part from increased sovereign credit risks and, more recently, the sharp movements in the major currencies in the foreign exchange markets. In contrast, the recovery in the emerging market economies, in particular Asia, remains robust, with the potential for relatively strong growth to be sustained. While most Governments in Asia had an important role in stimulating the economic recovery, private sector activity has been revived and is now having a greater role in driving the economy. Also, with rising intra-regional trade, external demand from the region is providing additional support to growth. Amid this favourable growth prospects, the region however is also confronted by a number of challenges. As highly open economies, the weaker global environment will, and indeed, has already resulted in a moderation in external demand. In addition, the divergence in growth prospects between the advanced and emerging economies, has precipitated surges of capital inflows, in particular, to Asia. This could in turn lead to the risk in the build-up of destabilising imbalances in our economies. Asia today, is however, in a better position to address these rising concerns. First, domestic demand has steadily increased in importance since the beginning of this decade and is contributing towards a more balanced growth. Second, is the diversification of Asia’s export markets towards increased intra-regional trade which now accounts for more than 50% of the total trade in Asia.

In February this year the interest rate was raised by a further quarter of a percentage point to 3.25 per cent. At the most recent monetary policy meeting on 3 May we decided to keep the repo rate unchanged. At the same time, our assessment was that the repo rate will need to be raised gradually, which we had also assumed earlier. Now we believe that it will need to be raised more than was anticipated in February. This is necessary so that inflation will develop in line with the target. The main reason why we need to revise our forecast upwards is the outcome of this year’s wage bargaining rounds. The central wage agreements have been slightly higher than we had earlier had reason to believe, given that unemployment is still quite high in Sweden. Some forecasters have believed in a higher interest rate path than we have predicted. However, this does not appear to be because their forecasts for wages or fiscal policy have differed substantially from those made by the Riksbank. I would also like to point out that so far there are no dramatic differences in our picture of current economic developments today compared with February. We will return to this in the Monetary Policy Report to be presented in June with a more detailed account of how we view the situation.
In the past, banking was regarded as a reputable profession and bankers were highly trusted and respected both by their customers and by members of the public more generally. This was not surprising as basically customers entrusted their life savings to their bankers and the preservation and safety of their hard-earned money was in the hands of those bankers. Although nowadays customers still place their life savings with banks, bankers no longer enjoy the same high degree of trust and respect from society, especially after the Global Financial Crisis. What has changed so dramatically to bring the reputation of bankers so low? 1  FT.com – March 12, 2009 “Welch condemns share price focus”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Change in modality and governance structure of banking 6. Well, the modality and governance structure of banking have changed a great deal over the last century. More importantly, these changes have created an incentive system that leads to a misalignment and disconnect between the interests of the owners of banks (i.e. the shareholders), bank management and customers. 7. Not so very long ago, banking was a business conducted by individuals, families and (more latterly) private partnerships, where the owners and managers of banks had ample “skin in the game”. They stood to lose not only their investments in the banks but also their entire family wealth or, in some more extreme cases, even their liberty, should their actions, or the actions of their partners, result in the failure of their bank.

There is always scope for new opinions in debates on current affairs. The debate in recent weeks partly reflects the fact that people are still absorbing the major changes that were made to the monetary policy framework this year. A wide range of cooperation has taken place between the Central Bank and the University of Iceland in recent years. The Central Bank has supported research projects in its areas of activity, and published the findings in its journals. As the importance of monetary policy becomes increasingly recognised in economic policy implementation, it is vital for the University’s Faculty of Economics and Business Administration to give a high profile to monetary economics, both theoretical and practical. Monetary policy is transmitted through numerous markets and it is vital for people engaged on both the analytical and business sides to have a firm grounding in this field. Similarly, it is important for the dialogue on monetary policy to be conducted as far as possible on a firm professional basis. The Central Bank is eager to cooperate more closely with the faculty and other bodies on strengthening university level teaching in monetary economics and central banking. Ladies and Gentlemen: In this talk I have described the changes made in Iceland’s monetary policy implementation and new attitudes to monetary policy in much of the world. The main task of most central banks is to promote price stability, because it is recognised that by doing so they make the best contribution to economic growth and prosperity.
Various indicators suggest that yields have fallen further from a low level, and that prices have risen once again. Moreover, there are isolated signs that risk appetite among the domestically focused banks has, if anything, increased again over the last six months. For example, affordability risk and direct interest rate risk at domestically focused banks have risen once more. The SNB will continue to monitor developments on the mortgage and real estate markets closely. Accordingly, it will regularly reassess the need for an adjustment of the countercyclical capital buffer. Announcement of issue date I would like to round up my speech with a few remarks on the new banknote series. On 14 August 2015, the SNB announced that it would begin issuing the new Swiss banknote series in April 2016. The first denomination to be released will be the 50-franc note. Today, we can announce the exact issue date. The new 50-franc note will be presented to the public for the first time at a news conference on 6 April 2016, and will first be issued on Tuesday, 12 April 2016. The new notes will be put into circulation continuously from that date onwards. A largescale information campaign will inform the general public about the new note and on ways to check its authenticity. The remaining banknotes in the series will be issued subsequently at half-yearly or yearly intervals. The SNB will announce each new issue date well in advance. The current eighth banknote series will continue to be legal tender until further notice.

The employees of Norges Bank Investment Management can be proud of their expertise and their efforts on behalf of the fund, the Bank and the country. I am certain that they will do their utmost to succeed even better in the years to come. Thank you for your attention. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
This initiative reflects our commitment towards financial integration in the ASEAN region and the global financial system through closer linkage with other central securities depositories, namely Euroclear and the Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. It is expected that other central securities depository will participate in this initiative to heighten this cross-border linkage. MyClear is thus set to be one of the key multilateral settlement platforms that will facilitate sukuk trading transactions. The implementation of this initiative which is scheduled to be completed in the second half of 2011 offers cost-effective access for foreign investors to invest in Malaysian securities deposited with MyClear. At the same time, it will enable Malaysian investors to invest in foreign securities deposited with international and regional central securities depositories institutions. Moving forward, MyClear will continue to expand its horizon to other regions across the world. Another infrastructure development that is taking shape in the international Islamic financial system is the establishment of the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM). Launched in October 2010, the IILM has begun its operations in Kuala Lumpur on the 1st of February. Its main task is to issue short-term multi-currency liquidity instruments to facilitate the cross-border liquidity management between financial centres and at the same time enhance the financial inter-linkages. The IILM is scheduled to roll out the issuance of liquidity instruments later this year. This will allow for more efficient management of financial flows across borders and thus contribute towards the efficient internationalisation of Islamic finance.

It is important that these matters are discussed, particularly as one cannot expect the economy to transform itself automatically. We have made good progress in recent years by establishing macroeconomic stability, with sound government finances and stable prices. Efficient wage formation and a financial system that functions properly are other important pieces. The fact that I have concentrated on these two factors this evening should obviously not be taken to imply that they are all that is needed to complete the puzzle. BIS Review 129/1999  4
Over the past year and a half as a whole, so including that initial drop, headline and core CPI have both risen at an average (annualised) rate of 1½-1¾%, a little weaker than pre-pandemic rates. We know too that quite a bit of the drop in output has been matched, on the supply side, by the significant numbers on the furlough scheme. The CJRS has successfully protected millions of jobs. But, because those on furlough aren’t available for others, it’s had the effect of matching part of the decline in labour demand with a decline in labour supply. During the second quarter of this year it’s likely that an average of over 2½ million people were furloughed – more than 7% of the workforce. Some of those employees were actually working, at least on a part-time basis, and furloughed jobs tend to be less well paid than the average. But, taking account of these things, the scheme was still holding back effective supply in the economy by an estimated 2%-3% in Q2 (Chart 1). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  Finally, we also know that the share of the population either in or actively looking for work – the so-called participation rate – has also fallen (the red line in Chart 2 is the year-on-year change). This too will have reduced the supply of labour.

He was, after all, the chief minister for over a decade of the Gujarat, the most probusiness state in India. And almost every U.S. business leader I know has heard of Ratan Tata’s experience when he looked to Gujarat for an alternative to the frustration of his attempt to build a new car factory in West Bengal. As I understand it, Mr. Tata went to see Minister Modi, had a handshake deal in 30 minutes, and in 14 months the new factory was up and running. That almost makes Texas look like California by comparison! BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  So Mr. Ambassador, we are all watching for this first prime minister born since Independence to work his probusiness, nonbureaucratic, can-do spirit upon the whole of India. It is in America’s interest for India to thrive. We wish Prime Minister Modi, the government you represent with such distinction, and the Indian nation the very best of luck. The Texas Jagannatha Tonight, you and I are surrounded by the smart, probusiness people of Indian heritage who have chosen to invest and operate within the most probusiness state in the United States. I am going to throw up a few slides to quickly summarize the environment in which they operate. Texas is a job-creating juggernaut. I pick that word deliberately, knowing it derives from the Hindi Jagannatha and is, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, a title of Krishna.
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I would like to conclude here that, to join the AEC in 2015 both central bank and financial institutions need to have proactive strategies to deal with the changing economic and social environments. The central bank will play an important role in supporting private sectors and ensuring the stability and efficiency of financial system and infrastructures. Concurrently, the financial institutions need to rethink and redesign their business processes and strategies in order to stay at the forefront of highly competitive environment as well as to reap the full benefit of the integrated economic community. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches