samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As the FOMC concluded in its most recent statement: “The Committee anticipates, based on its current assessment, that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time following the end of its asset purchase program this month.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  But this sentence should not be viewed as an iron-clad commitment unaffected by economic and financial developments. The statement goes on to say: “However, if incoming information indicates faster progress toward the Committee’s employment and inflation objectives than the Committee now expects, then increases in the target range for the federal funds rate are likely to occur sooner than currently anticipated. Conversely, if progress proves slower than expected, then increases in the target range are likely to occur later than currently anticipated.” In other words, the FOMC’s monetary policy actions and the timing of lift-off will depend on how the economic outlook evolves, particularly with respect to the labor market and inflation. In considering the appropriate timing of lift-off, there are three important reasons to be patient. First, the Committee is still undershooting both its employment and inflation objectives. Unemployment is too high and inflation is too low. Thus, monetary policy needs to be very accommodative in order to close these gaps relative to the Committee’s objectives.

* At the end of the summer 2020, when we began ‐ at our modest deputy level – to launch this conference, we were convinced that the message of the Green Swan was worth spreading, but we were far from sure that it would attract such a prestigious set of speakers. This was before the new momentum we are experiencing thanks to the political shift in the United States, following the ambitious Italian G20 and UK G7 presidencies. Now, only a few months later, the context is quite different. Governments are more aware than ever before, that they need to act, to anticipate; there is more appetite for multilateral cooperation. The private sector is making many commitments to net‐zero emissions. However, a number of questions arise that we cannot answer easily. Three of them seem particularly important: 3  International Energy Agency – IEA (2021). Net Zero by 2050. A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector. Accessible at: https://www.iea.org/reports/net‐zero‐by‐2050  2  Should we focus on climate change or broaden the scope? How can we make sure that public policies are consistent? How to thrive within limits? Allow me to develop these points. * I. BEYOND CLIMATE? The Charter of the NGFS,4 adopted in December 2017, states that the network aims, in particular, to “contribute to the development of environment and climate risk management”. It is key to consider how ecological crises are in fact multiple and interconnected.
And Singapore’s CapitaLand and the Middle Eastern-owned Arcapital Bank have recently set up a property fund aimed at investing in Japanese real estate, with a target asset size of $ 300 million. 2  BIS Review 47/2005  Second, similarly for the banking sector. I expect to see more Middle East banks and financial institutions set up in Singapore and Asia going forward, and a counter-flow into the Middle East over time. Some Middle East banks are already planning to scale up their presence in Singapore to service Middle Eastern entities interested to operate in Asia, as well as to help Asian corporates to operate in the Middle East. There are similar plans by Singapore-based financial institutions to step up their profile in the Middle East as they seek to tap into Middle Eastern financial flows. Such plans may give added impetus as Singapore concludes FTAs with more Middle Eastern countries, including those which are currently ongoing with Qatar and Kuwait. Third, Islamic finance is an area that shows considerable promise globally. We know the size of the market - around $ 200 to $ 300 billion globally, and growing at about 15% per annum. Efforts are being made in Asian markets, to grow Islamic financial services. For example, Malaysia has been awarding Islamic banking licences to foreign players and encouraging the subsidiarisation of Islamic banking windows. It aims to have 20% of total banking assets to be Islamic by 2010. Singapore, as an international financial centre, is also keen to offer Islamic financial services.

Likewise savings in the Middle East have been rising over the past decade and are expected to average about 32% of GDP in coming years. (In 2004, the current account surpluses as percentage of GDP for Asia and the Middle East were about 6% and 14% respectively.) With Asian official foreign currency reserves exceeding $ 2 trillion, and Middle East oil revenues topping $ 180 billion in 2004 alone, the management of surplus savings and reserves in both regions will offer large business opportunities. It will also offer scope for sharing of experience between government investment agencies and central banks in both regions. Besides official savings, there is also a growing number of wealthy individuals in the two regions. Asia alone now has an estimated 2.3 million high net worth individuals (HNWI; people with at least $ 1 million in financial assets), not far behind the US with 2.7 million and Europe with 2.6 million. Asian HNWIs control an estimated $ 7.2 trillion in financial assets. The size of this group in Asia is growing at 7% per year, second only to the Middle Eastern HNWI, now 300,000 which is growing at 9% per year. Traditionally, Asian and Middle Eastern investors have looked to the developed, Western markets to meet their investment needs. But increasingly, they are looking to diversifying their assets globally. It is a interesting new story, that is only beginning to unfold in Asian markets. This is not just a post-9/11 story.
The elevated level of uncertainty reinforces the importance of a data-dependent approach to our policy rate decisions, which will be determined by our assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation, and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The key ECB interest rates remain our primary tool for setting the monetary policy stance. 2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The reduction of the asset purchase programme (APP) portfolio – the second topic for today's hearing – is part of our monetary policy normalisation. As of the beginning of this month, the APP portfolio has been declining at a measured and predictable pace of € billion per month on average and will continue to do so until the end of June 2023. The subsequent pace will be determined over time and the Governing Council will regularly reassess the pace to ensure it remains consistent with the overall monetary policy strategy and stance, to preserve market functioning and to maintain firm control over short-term money market conditions. Conclusion Let me now conclude. With war in Europe and high inflation requiring immediate action, policymakers may be inclined to divert their attention from long-term challenges – but we must all strive to keep up our efforts to address the existential crisis of climate change.

For us at the ECB, this means continuing to make progress on our climate roadmap.2 This week we will publish the first climate-related financial disclosures of the Eurosystem's corporate sector assets held for monetary policy purposes, and of the ECB's own funds and the staff pension fund. We will be joined in the coming weeks by all Eurosystem central banks, which will disclose climate information on their own eurodenominated non-monetary policy portfolios. Besides helping us be more transparent about our climate impact, these disclosures help us track our progress towards supporting, within our mandate, a decarbonisation path in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement and EU climate neutrality objectives. They will show, for example, that our corporate sector portfolio is becoming less carbon intensive, partly thanks to our efforts to tilt purchases towards issuers with a better climate performance. Over time – as more and better-quality data become available – we will improve the level of detail and expand reporting to include other portfolios and asset classes. Better and harmonised climate disclosures for all asset classes would help not only the ECB, but also the entire financial sector, to better account for climate-related risks.3 Thank you for your attention, I now look forward to your questions. 1 Gil-Robles, J.M. (1999), "Speech to the European Council", 3 June. 2 ECB (2021), "ECB presents action plan to include climate change considerations in its  monetary policy strategy", 8 July. 3 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecb.ESA_ECB_joint_statement~c1f96d353b. en.pdf. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Developments in debt in the 1990s may partly be interpreted as a delayed adaptation to the deregulation of the housing and credit markets in the 1980s after many households experienced financial difficulties following the relaxation. Household assets and debt and housing wealth have risen at a markedly faster pace than disposable income, and housing wealth has grown more than net debt from 1994 up to the present. The Norwegian economy has experienced both upturns and downturns since 1994, and activity is now approximately on a par with the level prevailing in 1994. These changes must therefore be regarded as structural changes. We have limited scope for restraining structural changes that occur when households increase their debt over several years to invest in housing and other property and assets. An interest rate that would  BIS Review 16/2004  5  effectively restrain these structural adjustments would also have an adverse impact on output and employment. The interest rate can be used to reduce credit demand. At present - with low interest rates abroad and a close link between domestic interest rates and the krone - a tighter monetary policy will restrain credit demand primarily because job security would be reduced. Household credit demand is closely linked to developments in the housing market. Home-owners who have seen the value of their dwellings rise have the possibility of taking up new mortgage-secured loans. They free up a portion of their home equity value to finance consumption and other investments.

Over this twoday period, we have lined up a panel of distinguished speakers, including the Honourable Prime Minister of Malaysia himself as well as Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia. The invited speakers are from various prestigious institutions, domestic and international with unique expertise and experiences. You can be rest assured that the speakers we are bringing to you are renowned in their own field and their views are well sought after by global investors and the financial fraternity. The major highlight of this conference is the keynote address by the Honourable Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi, the Prime Minister of Malaysia who is also the Finance Minister. His address will offer invaluable insights into Malaysia's policy and strategies to sustain its strong growth performance. The next significant highlight of this conference is a speech by Tan Sri Dato' Seri Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz, the Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, who will touch on investment opportunities in Malaysia in an evolving global environment. This speech is timely given so much interest shown by both domestic and international investors in the Malaysian economy. Both the Prime Minister and Governor will offer invaluable insights into strategic orientation of important policies that will chart the Malaysian economy going forward. Therefore, these are the main events not to be missed. Of course you should not miss other speakers too! They will touch on various topics according to their areas of expertise.
I would like to record Bank Negara Malaysia’s appreciation to this bold initiative by LIAM together with academia and the Ministry of Education through the #IDareYouChallenge to educate and increase awareness among the younger generation on the importance of long-term financial planning and insurance. It is an unconventional collaboration between industry and academia, which allows the industry to benefit from new ideas and perspectives, build brand awareness among these university students and indirectly connect to a future talent pipeline. Likewise, universities and the student population benefit by having more of their students exposed to the industry and being prepared for their post-academic career. But my dare is also for the industry should go further in the age of digital disruption, to be at the forefront of innovation and to be an employer of choice for today’s graduates. A survey conducted among students and graduates of Malaysia’s 100 leading graduate employers, only had two insurance companies on the list, compared to a total of 18 banking institutions in Malaysia. Whether this is borne out of reality or lack of outreach, there is a need to promote and to brand the industry with a culture of innovation and a more visible consumer presence including via digital means, from which it will naturally grow into an exciting and engaging place for new generations to build a career in. To the competing teams today, all the very best to all of you. In my mind all of you are winners.

In so doing, the organization must ensure that it can also reward itself with a fair return so that the fruits of its labours can be fairly shared by every party concerned. Thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 24/2006
We are starting with a public debt of 115.7% of GDP at the end of 2020, which is almost twice as high as 20 years ago:  Under a no-policy-change assumption, with potential growth of around 1.1% and a rate of public spending growth in real terms of around 1.1%, which is close to the trend over the last ten years, we will only succeed in stabilising our public debt at this high level over the next decade; this would be a dangerous strategy given the risk of a new exogenous economic crisis or an interest rate shock. But we can write a more positive script to avoid this trend-based scenario. It involves a combination of three ingredients: time - only start to reduce our debt ratio once we are economically out of the Covid crisis, hence after 2022, and adopt a tenyear strategy; growth – which will generate revenue but not miracles; and more controlled and efficient public spending:  Zero growth – i.e. stabilisation – of total public expenditure in real terms at constant taxation rate would reduce the debt to around 100% of GDP in 2032. Real expenditure growth of 0.5% per year would reduce the debt to around 110% of GDP.

Yes, a big step forward has been made thanks to Next Generation EU, financed by a shared debt instrument. Before thinking of possibly increasing its size, we should accelerate its implementation: speed, even more than weight, is what is currently lacking in Europe. But our real leap forward will come when the existence of a permanent common fiscal capacity, – although less limited in amount, although different from a standing budget because not systematically activated, – allows genuine countercyclical action to be taken. Conversely – and not contradictorily –, adequate fiscal discipline is key to cope with economic reversals. Look at Germany, which fixed the roof while the sun was shining, and made appropriate use of its financial leeway during the crisis. There will be a debate, to be concluded most likely next year after the German and French elections, on the Stability and Growth Pact, following three years of warranted suspension between 2020 and 2022. We should avoid a fruitless confrontation between “illusionists” – who plead for debt cancellation, which is completely out of the question – and “traditionalists” – who want to keep the same old rules as if nothing had changed, including on the level of interest rates. We do still need rules, but revised and simplified ones. Indeed, the current low interest rate environment (with r<g) does not mean that public debt sustainability issues have become irrelevant: it only implies that governments have more time to ensure debt sustainability.
At the same time, the culture and  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  practices of investment banking infiltrated retail banking – a sales culture which culminated in harmful cross-selling and unlawful mis-selling. If they are successful, these structural reform efforts will reverse this pattern. They will seek a separation, not just legally, financially and operationally, but culturally too between the very distinctive sub-cultures of transactional investment banking and relationship retail banking. That cultural separation ought to be the acid test of the success of these structural reform proposals. There are those who doubt whether a ring-fence is sufficient to achieve that cultural separation in banking – can two separate sub-cultures really operate underneath a single roof? Time will tell. If it is not possible, then full separation would be the logical next step. Alternatively, banks themselves might of course voluntarily choose to divest and separate, as some are already doing. Second, capital. Much greater levels of protection are being put in place for banks generally and for big banks in particular. New regulatory standards will mean that shareholders’ funds will be 7 times higher than before the crisis. For the world’s biggest banks, they will be 10 times higher. And for the first-time ever, banks will have to hold sufficient liquid assets to pay out depositors in a timely fashion. Regulation of this type might sound rather arid and technical. Welcome to my world. But it is also important.

What monetary policy can do is to maintain stability without unnecessary fluctuations in output and employment. Overall employment is also influenced by wage formation. If wages increase at an unsustainable pace, employment will decline and unemployment will gradually increase. Monetary policy cannot prevent an increase in unemployment that is due to a wage-driven cost shock. When there is confidence that monetary policy will contribute to low and stable inflation over time, it can contribute in the short term - under certain conditions - to smoothing fluctuations in output and demand. In the short term, there is a trade-off between the objectives of inflation stability on the one hand, and output and employment stability on the other. An aggressive monetary policy will rapidly bring inflation to the target. This will cause wide fluctuations in the real economy. The interest rate can also be changed more gradually, which will have less impact on the real economy but cause more pronounced fluctuations in inflation. By influencing inflation over time, we can ensure that an overly aggressive monetary policy does not in itself cause unnecessary disturbances to the economy. The impact of monetary policy occurs with considerable and variable lags. Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effects of an interest rate change will occur within two years. Two years is thus a reasonable time horizon for achieving the inflation target.
As a consequence, the MPC began to remove some of the policy stimulus, raising Bank Rate from ¼% to ½% in November 2017 and then to ¾% in August 2018 where it has remained since. 20  This comprised: a 25 basis point reduction in Bank Rate to 0.25%; a Term Funding Scheme to reinforce the pass-through of that cut to the borrowing rates faced by households and companies; £ billion of gilt purchases; and £ billion of corporate bond purchases. 21 The FPC cut the counter-cyclical capital buffer rate to zero, increasing credit availability by up to £ billion; emphasised that banks’ liquidity reserves are usable; and amended the leverage ratio framework for UK banks by excluding central bank reserves. The PRA Board used regulatory flexibilities to smooth insurers’ transition to new regulatory standards in a very low interest rate environment. 22 This estimate is based on the approach to construct a “synthetic” measure of UK GDP described in ‘The Economic Outlook: Fading global tailwinds, intensifying Brexit headwinds’, speech given by Gertjan Vlieghe at the Resolution Foundation, 14 February 2019. 23 Figures are for whole economy average wages excluding bonuses (“regular pay”).

Chart 9: Divine coincidence continued in the euro area post-crisis but not the UK a) UK Great moderation  6 Inflation (%)  Financial crisis and after 4  Inflationary, with trade-off  Inflationary, no trade-off  2 -6  -5  -4  -3  -2  -1  0  1  2 3 4 Excess demand (%)  0 Disinflationary, no trade-off  Disinflationary, with trade-off -2  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. 15  See, for example, evidence from the Bank’s Decision Maker Panel, a survey of over 8,000 companies. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  14  b) Euro area Great moderation Financial crisis and after  4.5  Inflation (%)  4 3.5 3 2.5  8  2 -4  -3  -2  -1  1.5 1  0  1  2  3  4  Excess demand (%)  0.5 0 -0.5 -1 Sources: Eurostat, IMF and Bank calculations. Notes: The measure of inflation is the four-quarter change in the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP). The output gap is the IMF’s estimate from the October 2016 WEO at an annual frequency, interpolated to create a quarterly series.