samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) became operational in August 2000 as an autonomous body in order to strengthen the prudential regulations and to improve the quality of banking supervision. The Banks Act was amended to simplify and bring the supervision standards in line with the EU directives, international practices and the core principles stated by the BIS. However, the reform process was not continued in line with the pre-determined schedule and broke down during the 2000 and the 2001 crises. The process could only be restarted again after the 2001 crisis. Dear Guests, If I have to describe the crisis in the Turkish economy in 2000- 2001, I would prefer to describe it as the result of accumulated structural distortions in the economy. These distortions in the economy put pressure on the pegged exchange rate regime and, along with the credibility problem due to the bad track record of policies, resulted in first banking and then currency crises. In other words, the 2001 crisis started as a banking crisis, then it turned into both banking and currency crisis. Dear Guests, As I have mentioned several times in my speeches, in Chinese the word crisis also means opportunity. The Turkish economy nowadays is showing signs that, after all those hectic years, opportunity to stabilize it was finally seized. Policies and measures that were put into practice after the 2001 crisis were not limited to simply practices of crisis management in the short term.

The krona was put under strong pressure by investors who expected Sweden to devalue again soon and, in November 1992, the Riksbank was forced to give up its defence of the fixed exchange rate. New policy with emphasis on long-term anchors The consequences of the crisis emphasised, with all desired clarity, that the type of policy Sweden had pursued for a number of decades had reached the end of the road and needed to be fundamentally reshaped. Instead of defending a fixed exchange rate, the task of monetary policy from now on would be to keep inflation low and stable. For its part, fiscal policy would focus considerably more than previously on keeping public finances in good condition so as to maintain market confidence. Gradually, the new order was confirmed through changes in the fiscal and monetary policy frameworks. The price stability target, which, in practice, had been introduced in 1993 in the form of an inflation target, was written into law in 1999, at the same time as monetary policy decisions were delegated to an independent Executive Board. In fiscal policy, the budget process was changed so that it would be easier to gain control over expenditure developments, while public net lending would, on average, show a surplus. The purpose of the latter was, of course, largely to bring the rampant government debt under control and to restore confidence in public finances.
And a disorderly transition, where more severe policies are introduced later in the horizon to compensate, could result in both lower growth and higher inflation from rising energy and materials costs in the economy. In either case, the economic impacts from such transition scenarios over the medium term will likely be much lower than the growing challenges from physical risks. Under current climate policies, which are insufficient to reach net-zero emissions, analysis from the NGFS scenarios suggest that up to 13% of global GDP would be at risk by 2050, even before accounting for the potential consequences of severe weather events. Monetary policy These risks to the economic outlook make climate change and the transition to a net-zero economy also relevant factors for the conduct of monetary policy. The typical policy horizon for monetary policy is two to three years, and so many of the effects of climate change (particularly tipping points) will manifest beyond that timeframe. But the effects of climate change matter for monetary policy because structural shifts in the supply side of the economy can affect not only future point-in-time macroeconomic variables, but also the expected natural rate of interest (r*) and the natural rate of unemployment (u*). The physical and transition risks from climate change are relevant to these issues, although the economic modelling and research to estimate the relative size of these effects has only started to emerge in recent years.

(2021) estimates that $ of the $ of economic damage caused by Hurricane Sandy (New York, 2012) was attributable to climate change driven rises in sea-levels 7 See Chapter 6 of IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2020Opens in a new window 8 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate ChangeOpens in a new window (2006) 9 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  9 See Government announcement of climate considerations being embedded across UK principal financial  regulatorsOpens in a new window 10 Dietrich, Müller, and Schoenle (2021) – ‘The Expectations Channel of Climate Change: Implications for Monetary  Policy’ 11 Monetary policy in the intangible economy - speech by Jonathan Haskel, University of Nottingham, February  2020 12 See ‘It’s not easy being green – but that shouldn’t stop us: how central banks can use their monetary policy  portfolios to support orderly transition to net zero’ speech by Andrew Hauser and Options for greening the Bank of England’s Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme discussion paper  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
We generally recommend that banks take a particularly judicious approach to paying dividends as there is continued uncertainty linked to the pandemic and capital may be required in the future to absorb losses. Therefore, before paying dividends, it is vital to assess future capital needs based on conservative estimates. Now about the funding situation. It has also levelled out. In general, over the first seven months of 2020, the funds of legal entities increased by almost 3% (by 2.9%). Concurrently, there was a significant inflow (+27%) of funds of state organisations. Household contributions during this period demonstrated divergent dynamics. At the start of the pandemic, especially in March, there was an outflow of funds (people formed cash reserves at the outset of the lockdown period). However, as early as June—July, the situation had stabilised. On the one hand, this is due to the peak of the epidemic passing and the gradual recovery of people’s income, and, on the other hand, the substantial support provided by the Government’s welfare payments. The active growth of funds in escrow accounts (more than 330 billion rubles since the beginning of the year) lent additional support, and this is noticeable, to deposits, thanks to the development of project financing for housing construction. Therefore, this year deposits have already increased by 514 billion rubles 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  in the banking system, or 1.6%. The overall level of liquidity in the system remains high.

But at the same time, the model of ecosystem creation that currently dominates can lead to the monopolisation of the market, and in the end (like any monopoly, no matter how effectively it started out), it can lead to stagnation in the technology market in the long term, and a slowdown in the introduction of innovations, which threatens consumer interests. And, of course, straight away there is a collateral risk that we have to learn to manage: that large amounts of sensitive data (payment, medical and other data) from all spheres of our citizens’ lives are gathered by one system. That is why we as the Central Bank would like to see healthy competition between a number of players. The conditions of access to emerging ecosystems should be completely open, nondiscriminatory to all suppliers, and consumers should be able to choose the most appropriate products and services for them. Meanwhile, “external” ecosystem participants will also have to comply with certain rules and ecosystem requirements — both in line with rules pertaining to sales and high requirements for cyber resilience. Regulating emerging ecosystems is, of course, a very difficult task. But we need this regulation to avoid the risks I mentioned and to develop the benefits that ecosystems offer, which includes safeguarding the potential for small players to develop. Therefore, we propose working with the market to develop approaches to ecosystem regulation. We have established a working group at the Bank of Russia and will soon publish the first consultation paper on this topic.
More advanced includes: printing and recording, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, computing, electrical, machinery, motors and equipment. Less advanced includes: textiles, products of wood, paper, rubber, basic metals, non-metals, other materials and other manufactured goods. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Over the past two decades, Inflation Targeting central banks have established good track records of keeping inflation from being too high. It has brought tangible benefits to the UK, particularly lowering the volatility of both inflation and of income growth.2 But now those central banks, including the Bank of England, are being tested by inflation that is too low. Inflation has fallen globally (Chart 1) and is below target in 16 of 18 Inflation-Targeting major economies (Chart 2). 11 of those countries have inflation rates below 1%.3 Today I will discuss the consequences for the UK of persistently low global inflation, why it matters, and what the Bank of England can do about it so that businesses and households in Sheffield and beyond can focus on what really matters to them. The bottom line is that there is a risk that the combination of persistently low global inflation and the strength of sterling could weigh on prices here for some time. But despite these headwinds, a solid UK expansion, underpinned by strong domestic demand growth, leaves us on track to return inflation to target within the next two years. To deliver that outcome, a gently rising path for Bank Rate is likely to be required over the next few years. 1.

Yves Mersch: Legal aspects of the European Central Bank’s response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic – an exclusive but narrow competence Keynote speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the European Central Bank, at the ESCB Legal Conference, Frankfurt am Main, 2 November 2020. * * *  Exploring the legal framework governing the ECB’s actions – scope and general legal principles When exploring the scope of our actions we are cognisant that the ECB has exclusive but narrow competence to define the European Union monetary policy for the purpose of maintaining price stability. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has consistently held that the ECB enjoys broad discretion in defining monetary policy within its mandate to pursue the objective of price stability. Discretion without limits increases the risk of arbitrariness. Therefore the Court has insisted on being able to control this discretion on the basis of the criteria that some refer to as the self-imposed constraints. Furthermore, we are bound to respect certain established legal principles. Our measures must be proportionate to the ECB’s legitimate objectives. They must not undermine the spirit of the “no bailout clause” and must also comply with the prohibition of monetary financing, which is its monetary policy counterpart. Last of all, the principle of an open market economy in which resources are allocated efficiently must also be respected. These are the constitutional red lines for our actions.
With Gladwell’s 10,000 hours under their belt, this person would be as well-informed on the impact of AI on unemployment as anyone on the planet – a true expert, perhaps even a phenomenon. This is the single person or, if you like, Oracle (in the Ancient Greek sense of the word) solution to this decision problem. But is it the optimal one? There are reasons for doubt. Evidence clearly suggests that, in a complex decision environment, drawing on non-expert opinion can provide added insight. It offers diversity of perspective, whose benefits are amplified if those diverse perspectives are discussed and debated to arrive at collective conclusions. This is Surowiecki’s “wisdom of crowds” at work. So let’s go to the other end of the spectrum and draw instead on the insights of a big crowd – say, 1 million people, roughly the adult population of Estonia. This would then, in effect, be an Estonian referendum on AI and unemployment. Clearly, we would now be drawing on a vast array of expert and non-expert opinion. But that would come at the expense of less time for deliberation. Given our time quota, each person would now have only around 30 seconds to give an answer. Facing a tight time constraint and a very complex question, most people would struggle. I certainly would. The best a non-expert could probably do is to provide an instinctive, “fast thinking” response. Or, perhaps more likely still, they might jump aboard a collective, but potentially poorly-informed, bandwagon by copying what others say.

Standard economic theory dictates that, in such circumstances, exogenous changes in money demand should indeed be accommodated. In a seminal article going back to 1970 1 , William Poole showed that, when there is uncertainty about money demand, the optimal response is to stabilize the interest rate, thus letting money supply adjust. Since short-term interest rates are, for all Central Banks, the main policy tool, an increase in interbank rates over and above the official rate would indeed be tantamount to a shift in monetary policy. In contrast, liquidity provision by Central Banks has ensured that the overall policy stance has remained unchanged. A clear distinction has been – and will be – maintained between temporary liquidity provision, on the one hand, and medium term oriented monetary policy, on the other. Should liquidity be provided at a penalty rate, as some have argued, to avoid moral hazard? The answer is clearly positive if and when liquidity assistance is targeted at specific institutions. But there is no reason, for Central Banks, to significantly depart from prevailing policy rates if their main objective is to respond to an exogenous and general increase in demand for central bank balances. In the future, monetary policy may have to be adjusted, not for the purpose of easing financial tensions, but according to its own objective and in view of the state of the economy.
8/9  As this is my last appearance before the Senate as Governor of the Banco de España, and to conclude, I should like to express my gratitude for the consideration that has always been extended to the Bank and to me in this chamber, and for the quality of the interventions and questions raised on which I have had to comment. I have always thought, and have said so on different occasions, that the lower and upper houses are the “natural fora” in which an institution such as the Banco de España should preferentially express itself, cooperating and contributing, as best it can, to parliamentary functions. Thank you for your attention. 9/9

Competition has been relatively tough, with decreasing margins on ordinary financial services and other foreign banks that have gradually tried to gain entry. It is likely that the banking system’s fast development has contributed to the continuous growth in the entire Baltic region during the current decade. Investment flows can also help strengthen the complementariness between industrial structures in different parts of Europe. Outsourcing of labour-intensive stages to low-wage countries has recently taken the blame for the weak jobs growth in the United States. In reality the data indicate something else: that the integration with the fast-growing countries in Latin America and the Pacific Rim have been a crucial factor for the United States’ capacity to raise its productivity and prosperity increasingly faster during the 1990s and the 2000s. One study carried out by independent researchers at the institutes NBER in the United States, CEPR in Europe and the IMF show that outsourcing to low-wage countries even strengthens employment growth in the long term. The consultancy firm McKinsey has estimated that each dollar invested in outsourcing to India gives the United States an economic gain of USD 1.12-1.14 and a gain of USD 0.33 in India. In this regard the enlargement affords a similar opportunity for the EU and Europe. There are innumerable examples of how investment in companies in the new member states results in sophisticated cooperation with Western firms.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and aspects of economic developments Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Central Bank of Norway, Ålesund, 12 October 2005. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The speech is based on the assessments presented at the Central Bank of Norway’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 21 September, Inflation Report 2/05 and on previous speeches. The  Charts in pdf format can be found on the Central Bank of Norway’s website. *  *  *  Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards low and stable inflation. This is also the most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments in the long term. Low and stable inflation provides the economy with a nominal anchor. This contributes to predictability for those taking decisions about saving and investment today, although the result depends on how the economy develops in the future. In addition, we will seek to prevent unduly wide fluctuations in output and employment in the short and medium term. In the long term, output in an economy is determined by the supply of labour, capital and technology. Monetary policy influences the economy with long and variable lags. This means we must look ahead when setting interest rates.

We had to expect that this increase would lead to a deterioration in the competitive position of Norwegian manufacturing, either through higher wages or through an appreciation of the krone exchange rate, and with Norway’s relatively higher wage growth, competitiveness has been weakened by approximately 15 per cent since the mid-1990s. The krone exchange rate has been influenced by high oil and gas prices and prices for other Norwegian export goods. Monetary policy has also influenced the path for Norway’s relative costs, but the nominal value of the krone is about the same as ten years ago. Strong growth in public expenditure and expectations of moderately higher growth in the use of petroleum revenues now seem to have been factored into the cost level. Even at the beginning of the oil age in Norway in the early 1970s, the relationship between the use of petroleum revenues and changes in industry structure was raised as an issue. Manufacturing industry was scaled back in waves in the course of this period. The last wave occurred around the turn of the millennium, but a substantial decline also occurred in the periods 1977 to 1984 and 1987 to 1992. Prior to these periods, the manufacturing sector’s competitiveness deteriorated. Today, about 55, 000 fewer persons are employed in manufacturing than was the case in 1998. The share of our imports that can be covered by current petroleum revenues and some of the Petroleum Fund will gradually diminish. Competitiveness must therefore be improved.
Second, as the SNB has repeatedly emphasised, given the cyclical risks in the Swiss mortgage and real estate markets, a temporary adjustment of banking system-wide capital requirements may have to be considered. To this end, on 1 June the Swiss Federal Council announced that a macroprudential instrument will be made available to the Swiss authorities from 1 July, in the form of a countercyclical capital buffer. Introduction of a macroprudential instrument To conclude, I would like to briefly describe how the countercyclical capital buffer will work. This instrument will enable the authorities to adjust capital requirements in the banking system, depending on potential excesses in the Swiss credit market. It is a preventive instrument that can be activated if necessary, to a level deemed appropriate. It can also be targeted to a specific segment of the credit market. Once the imbalances have been corrected, the countercyclical capital buffer will be deactivated, either immediately or gradually. In activating the countercyclical capital buffer, the aim of the authorities is twofold: First, it should increase the resilience of the banking sector, thereby helping to protect against the consequences of a correction of excessive credit growth. Second, it should help to lean against the build-up of such excesses. The Federal Council decides on the activation, deactivation and level of the countercyclical capital buffer, upon the proposal of the SNB. The SNB consults FINMA before submitting its  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  proposal.

Confirmation of our struggles to promote data dissemination is our adherence to the highest statistics dissemination standard of the International Monetary Fund – SDSS Plus early this year that made us one of the nineteen countries in the world whose statistics are harmonized with this highest statistical standard. Dear guests, Many of the post-crisis statistics initiatives are completed both globally and in our country, or are underway. It is clear though that the environment is dynamic and requires constant changes in the data architecture of central banks. As Mario Draghi once pointed out, “the well-established ESCB statistics will continue to provide the “big picture” of economic developments. But we should also offer a magnifying glass1” to help us look at the details regularly and precisely. “Looking at the details enriches our understanding of economic phenomena and at the same time increases our flexibility to respond to unexpected policy needs”. I am sure that we, the statistical bodies, will always be ready to respond to the new challenges. Compiling and disseminating statistics in accordance with the latest European standards is and I believe will always be our strategic commitment. Today, the message from the father of statistics, Karl Pearson that "Statistics is the grammar of science” is more than clear. From today’s perspective, I would add “it is also a grammar of the language in which policy- and decision-makers need to speak and understand each other". Thank you for your attention.