samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is also important to note that unwanted side effects can be minimized if different public authorities operate in a well-defined and respected framework. We have such a framework in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the Eurozone. It is based on fiscal discipline leading to debt reduction. If those disciplines are not respected or implemented with insufficient vigilance, then monetary policy through public sector debt securities purchases may be perceived as creating strong moral hazard, thereby weakening the necessary consensus and compromising its efficiency. When fiscal transfers take place between countries of the Eurozone, they are implemented through mutually agreed and conditional programs. There are permanent temptations to blur the distinction between those fiscal programs and the monetary and liquidity operations of the Central Bank. Those temptations should be resisted. This is the reason why the Eurosystem has been extremely rigorous in implementing its collateral rules in a transparent and neutral way. Let me conclude. Unconventional monetary policies are necessary but complex. They create more interference with markets than policies conducted in ordinary times. As a consequence, it becomes more difficult to avoid unintended spillovers of stabilization policies on the allocation and distribution of resources. This reality should not prevent Central Banks from acting decisively when there are risks for price stability. But such actions demand rigor and precision in their implementation. For Central Banks, their balance sheet has become the main tool of monetary policy for the foreseeable future. It has proven effective.

The establishment of the credit bureau is likely to increase credit business, lead to more competitive pricing of credit facilities and lower credit loan defaults and delinquency rates. To address the concerns over the treatment of credit data, MAS would follow two broad principles. 1  Refers to the submission of customer’s payment histories on their credit facilities. Positive data refers to timely payment (i.e. a good customer) and negative data refers to overdue payments. 2  BIS Review 7/2002  First, it is important that individuals have access to their own credit files and to have any inaccurate information corrected. Any dispute resolution process should be timely and effective, and should also be covered in the Consumer Banking Code that ABS is currently working on. Second, it is also important that individual privacy is respected and customer data are not misused for purposes other than what they were originally intended for. A good starting point is the principle of reciprocity on data usage, which all participating members to the bureau will need to adhere to. High standards of confidentiality is also expected of both the bureau operators and participating members. The ABS will continue to work with MAS to ensure that these principles are observed. The launch of the consumer credit bureau will mark the beginning of a new risk management process in Singapore. It will further bolster the integrity and transparency of Singapore’s financial sector.
Among the factors driving it are, first, the progressive normalisation of financial conditions brought about by the Eurosystem’s expansionary monetary policy and the reduction in the degree of financial fragmentation in the area. Favourable labour market developments are also playing a notable part in kick-starting domestic demand, by contributing to upholding household disposable income and to improving confidence. Among the domestic spending components, mention should be made of household consumption (underpinned by improved disposable income and by recourse to saving), the sustained increase in business investment (driven by brighter final demand prospects) and the culmination of the sharp adjustment of residential investment, where there are signs of stabilisation. For the first time in the last six years, close-to-zero or slightly positive rates can be observed in the aggregate real estate price indices. Lending figures remain in a contractionary phase, in parallel with private-sector deleveraging. But, on the data available, this process is proving compatible with a shift in credit flows towards companies with better output and export prospects and in a sounder financial position. Foreign trade flows have undergone quite sharp changes in 2014, brought on by the loss of momentum in our export markets (most particularly in specific emerging economies and in the EU) and the acceleration in imports as the recovery took root. As a result, the net contribution of the external sector to GDP has diminished and the pace of adjustment of the external imbalance has slowed.

Last year was exceptional, with euro area GDP growing by about 3% in real terms between the first quarter of 2017 and the first quarter of 2018, with the combination of strong growth in domestic demand and a rebound in international trade. This year, international trade dynamics seem weaker. It may be attributable to a delayed impact of the appreciation of the euro since the beginning of 2017. Temporary factors and supply-side tensions related to very high levels of capacity utilisation in some euro area countries also contributed to a moderation in economic growth in early 2018. In a nutshell, both demand and supply-side factors are at work, and our baseline scenario is surrounded by more uncertainty. So we must be prudent and carefully monitor economic developments. Why? 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The level of uncertainty has increased. Protectionism, for example, is having an effect on business sentiment, which might already be holding back investment. It is still too early to tell. In addition, Brexit will have financial implications for firms not only in the United Kingdom, but at this stage no one knows what the final Brexit conditions will be. Are these uncertainties the reason for your prudence in the way the asset purchase programme is being concluded? Our baseline scenario still holds, but we must monitor the risks. This is why we decided to express an anticipation about the evolution of our net asset purchases. By doing so we are keeping what we call optionality.
However, in the really long term, it is structural factors such as long-term growth, propensity to save and technological progress that are crucial for movements in interest rates rather than short-term fluctuations. Let us begin with a definition that can help us bring some structure to the discussion and to understand the challenges we are facing. The interest rate we normally see is nominal, and measures how much we pay in terms of money when we borrow or how much we receive when we save. But as prices usually rise over time, the value of our money also declines. To take this into account, one can look at the real interest rate, that is, the nominal interest rate minus the expected rate of inflation. The real interest rate measures how much we pay for our loans in real terms, that is, in terms of our purchasing power. In the very long turn, the real interest rate is determined by structural factors, such as savings and investment. And in a small, open economy like Sweden’s, these factors are primarily determined by international developments. Monetary policy, on the other hand, does not have any marked effect on the real interest rate in the long run. However, monetary policy does influence the rate of inflation and inflation expectations. If monetary policy is based on an inflation target that is perceived as credible, long-term inflation expectations will coincide with the inflation target.

During that period, she confronted many of society’s biggest challenges – for example introducing legislation to tackle domestic violence, to eradicate modern slavery and to counter terrorism. Never afraid of a challenge, she stepped into the breach to become Prime Minister following the referendum. The Prime Minister and her Government are committed to making the most of the opportunities that Brexit brings, and more fundamentally to working to build a stronger, fairer and more prosperous country for all. Please join me in welcoming the Prime Minister, Theresa May. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6
They highlight the role an impaired banking system may have played in contributing to the weakness in productivity. And to evidence that suggests that a failure to reallocate resources from less to more productive firms has had a pronounced effect on productivity growth. Such factors may persist even as demand recovers, suggesting that any rebound in productivity growth may be more muted.4 Both sets of arguments are very plausible. Indeed, it is likely that both played some role in the weakness of productivity. The challenge for the Committee is weighing up the relative importance of these different factors. And this judgement is central to the setting of policy. Too optimistic and we risk stoking up excessive demand that will feed through into higher inflation and a potential loss of credibility. Too pessimistic and our nation’s resources will remain underutilised for an even longer period, with potentially damaging effects on the longrun health of our economy. The design of the forward guidance – in particular the combination of the unemployment threshold and the knockouts – makes the setting of monetary policy more robust to this uncertainty, allowing the Committee to learn about the responsiveness of supply as the economy recovers, without needing to work out the precise cause of the productivity weakness up front.5 Let me explain.

And the results slip reads pretty well. In particular, the inflation target was instrumental in anchoring the credibility of policy, without which the MPC would not have been able to respond so aggressively. Without credibility, there can be no flexibility. And the MPC has used that flexibility to the full, providing extraordinary levels of stimulus to support growth and jobs. But the nature of the inflation targeting framework meant that it dropped a few marks in terms of helping the MPC to communicate the role monetary policy played in supporting the recovery. That risked undermining the democratic legitimacy of inflation targeting. Likewise, the inflation target on its own was less suited to explaining the MPC’s view of the appropriate trade-off between the speed with which inflation is returned to target and the support provided to the fledgling recovery. The forward guidance announced by the Committee retains the primacy of the inflation target while allowing the Committee to more effectively tackle these communication challenges. In so doing it enhances the transparency and accountability of monetary policy. The guidance also provides a robust framework in which the MPC can explore the scope for economic expansion and helps to provide greater clarity about the likely path of monetary policy as the economy recovers. The inflation target remains front and centre in the conduct of UK monetary policy. Price stability remains the primary objective of monetary policy.
Another variant of an asymmetrical disturbance is that asset prices – the property market and stock exchange – due to a too strong economic development are forced up for a short while. However, in situations such as this, the required tightening can usually be managed with the help of fiscal policy. Naturally, stabilisation policy via the budget has its limitations since it only works with delay and is dependent on many other long-term considerations. In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact, which Sweden is included in whether or not a member of the EMU, provides a limitation on increased government expenses. The most important “shock absorber” even if we do not join the EMU, but especially if we do, is that wages can adapt to changes in the competition situation, i.e. that there is a high degree of flexibility and pliability in wage formation. It would thus be possible to avoid an increase in unemployment during an adaptation period. Naturally, it can be more difficult, politically, to achieve this than to adapt an exchange rate. A single monetary policy therefore requires greater discipline from labour market parties since the connection between wage costs/inflation and monetary policy will be less obvious than is the case today. The krona The reasoning I have pursued so far has assumed that the exchange rate actually functions as a shock absorber: that the floating exchange rate adapts to competitiveness and the business climate, i.e.

Inflation expectations may be sensitive to a large but temporary shock that moved inflation outside the range within which it has remained for some years. With their belief in stability jolted, households’ inflation expectations might move by much more than was justified by the temporary nature of the shock. That would make it more difficult for the central bank to bring inflation back to target. The moral of this particular story is that it may be risky to infer from the observation that inflation expectations are stable that all is well. There will be times when large and persistent shocks occur, and it would be unwise to count on inflation expectations remaining stable when actual inflation starts to deviate substantially from its recent range. So those are the three lessons that I have learnt from Alan: (i) a recognition that economics is not a set of doctrines but a way of thinking; (ii) the importance of using qualitative and quantitative information from a range of sources; (iii) there are a small number of fundamental objectives that are crucial and which we can judge by the Greenspan yardstick of whether we have freed businesses and households from the burden of expending resources to deal with unnecessary policy volatility. Alan’s departure from the central banking scene will deprive us of a source of wisdom, inspiration and leadership. To be sure, Alan’s words, whether spoken or written, will surely still reach us from the sidelines.
L. Arrondel, M. Debbich and F. Savignac (2015), “Stockholding in France: the role of financial literacy and information", Applied Economic Letters, Vol. 22, Iss. 16, pp. 1315–1319. L. Arrondel, M. Debbich and F. Savignac (2015), “Does financial literacy influence financial decisions? ", Banque de France, Rue de la banque No 2. www.banque-france.fr/uploads/tx_bdfgrandesdates/RDB_02.pdf. 4 Pete Seeger in “Loose Talk", ed. by Linda Botts, 1980. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

What objectives should a central bank have? The most fundamental question to ask when one is on the point of reforming the monetary policy framework is, of course, what the objective of monetary policy should be. On a very general level the objective of monetary policy can be said to be to create an environment where the economy can develop in the best possible manner. However, this definition is too general to be of any great practical use, although it excludes some tasks that are sometimes imposed on central banks. To obtain a more operational definition, it is necessary to take the discussion one step further and ask the question of how monetary policy can contribute to favourable economic development. On a fundamental plane, one could say that the central bank’s main task should be to ensure that the payment system in the economy functions efficiently. This means in simple terms that payments and financial transactions can be made easily and smoothly and entail as little risk as possible. Many scholars also regard this as the main reason why central banks were originally founded. 1 An economy’s payment system can be regarded as a sort of infrastructure in roughly the same way as the country’s communications network or energy supply system. It also essentially fulfils the same purpose, i.e. to ensure that the flows essential to the economy – in this case the flow of money – functions properly.
6 "Federal banking agencies provide banks additional flexibility to support households and businesses," Joint press release (Mar. 17, 2020). 7 "Federal banking agencies encourage banks to use Federal Reserve discount window," Joint press release (Mar. 16, 2020). 8 12 U.S.C. § 343. 9 Information of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility ("PDCF") is available on the Board of Governors' public website and the New York Fed's public website. See also Antoine  Martin and Susan McLaughlin, "The Primary Dealer Credit Facility," Liberty Street Economics (May 19, 2020). 10 Information on the Commercial Paper Funding Facility ("CPFF") is available on the Board of Governors' public website and the New York Fed's public website. See also  Nina Boyarchenko, Richard Crump, and Anna Kovner, "The Commercial Paper Funding Facility," Liberty Street Economics (May 15, 2020). 11 Information on the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility ("MMLF") is available on the Board of Governors' public website. See also Marco Cipriani, Gabriele La  Spada, Reed Orchinik, and Aaron Plesset, "The Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility," Liberty Street Economics (May 8, 2020). 12 Information on the Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility ("PPPLF") is available on the Board of Governors' website. See also Haoyang Liu and Desi Volker, "The  Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility," Liberty Street Economics (May 20, 2020). 13 Information on the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility is available on the Board of Governors' public website.

This does not differ much from how the Federal Reserve has behaved historically – set the fed funds rate at a level consistent with the desired level of economic activity and inflation over time. So how does the IOER rate relate to the fed funds rate? The two rates are likely to track each other closely in most circumstances. 4 First, banks generally do not have any incentive to sell fed funds at rates below the IOER rate. Only nondepository institutions – such as the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) – that can buy and sell fed funds but are not able to hold excess reserves with the Fed, might have an incentive to sell fed funds at rates below the IOER rate. But even in this case, the fed funds rate would not likely fall far below the IOER rate. After all, if the fed funds rate were to fall significantly below the IOER rate, banks could purchase the fed funds and hold them as reserves with the Fed, earning the difference. The ability of banks to engage in arbitrage should limit the size of the deviations between the IOER rate and the fed funds rate. Thus, through the IOER rate, the Federal Reserve can effectively retain control of monetary policy. In addition to paying interest on excess reserves, the Federal Reserve also has the ability to drain the excess reserves from the banking system.
The growth and integration of financial and capital markets has been even more spectacular, especially over the past 20 years. Financial openness – defined as the ratio of external assets and liabilities to GDP - has risen seven-fold for both groups of countries. Second, the dramatic rise of new economic powers has been simultaneously adding to global productive capacity, and changing the balance of world trade and economic activity. The entry of China, India and Eastern Europe into the global market economy has effectively doubled the world’s supply of labour. The sheer scale and speed of economic development in China alone has been quite without precedent. After 25 years of double-digit growth, it is now the world’s fourth largest economy, having overtaken the UK this year. Its share of world trade has more than doubled over the past decade, making it the third largest trading country behind the US and Germany. Increasingly, a small group of industrialised countries will no longer dominate the world economy in the way they did 30 years ago. Measured at market exchange rates, the G7 still accounts for 60% of world output. But if current growth differentials persist, this share will fall to 40% within the next 20 years. And if output is measured using purchasing power parities – to give a higher, and arguably more accurate, weight to relatively cheap non-traded goods and services in emerging markets - the G7 world share has already fallen to that level. Emerging markets are already a major force in the world economy.

It would be pragmatic to build monetary co-operation and establish links, perhaps first at the bilateral level, between those who are ready and willing, and are operating compatible systems: for example, bilateral repurchase agreements of US Treasury securities to enhance each other’s liquidity of foreign reserves, or bilateral linkages of real time payment systems and clearing systems for securities to facilitate effective financial intermediation across the cooperating economies. These bilateral linkages would serve to set targets and standards for others in the region who are not quite ready. And when eventually the majority of the bilateral linkages have been established, we would then have a network, an Asian monetary network, of considerable strength, which would hopefully enable Asian monetary problems to be tackled effectively. It should also be a network that is capable of being linked up with monetary systems outside the region, with a view to building the global monetary framework. Issues for Asian Monetary Co-operation 48. Let me now turn to specific issues for Asian monetary co-operation. There are five areas. These are information exchange, resource provision, market infrastructure development, banking supervision and financial regulation, and policy consultations. 49. As the experience of EMEAP has shown, information exchange has been the easiest area of monetary co-operation. The use of the EMEAP Virtual Secretariat, using Internet technology, has greatly facilitated the exchange of information, helping the sharing of market intelligence, techniques and experience in all areas of central banking.