samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Few times ago, I have been informed about a new EU initiative, which requires to set up, within a certain period of time, among others a unified payment system within the euro area, including payments with cards. Presently, small and medium businesses in the euro area have not the same payment opportunities as they have in their respective countries on a national scale. Such a case includes credit cards, which cannot be employed equally across the borders. For this purpose I would suggest that respective experts from the Association and Bank of Albania be as soon as possible informed about this project, making the relevant suggestions in this direction. I personally remain consistent in my position that in Albania we have to adopt the most advanced solutions in all the infrastructure projects that we are going to implement. I believe that we do not need to examine old-fashioned models, which, in addition to the initial cost, will continuously require other funds for maintenance and modification. Besides the developments in the field of payments I would welcome from you a broader commitment even in other directions. I think that the system must further expand its geographical coverage, aiming at including also areas, which, though having at first sight the appearance of being inactive, have large financial potentials in the form of threasurised savings outside the system. Also, the service level should be further improved.

The second element of the strategy is a comprehensive analysis of the risks to the outlook for price stability, according to two perspectives: economic analysis and monetary analysis. These two perspectives offer complementary analytical frameworks to support the Governing Council’s overall assessment of risks to price stability. The economic analysis aims at identifying those factors that have a bearing on risks at short- to medium-term horizons. It includes, inter alia, projections of key macroeconomic variables and an analysis of shocks hitting the euro area economy. In turn, the monetary analysis – which has been broadened and deepened over time – draws on a wide range of tools, techniques, models and frameworks, complemented by the use of informed judgment, in order to identify risks at longer horizons. After the evaluation of the strategy in 2003, the Governing Council of the ECB explained that the monetary analysis mainly serves as a means of cross-checking the short to medium-term indications coming from the economic analysis. When compared to the strategy of inflation targeting, the Eurosystem’s Monetary Policy Strategy shares the essentials: that is, the importance of price stability and the need for monetary policy to act pre-emptively and make comprehensive use of all available information. The strong belief that institutional independence must necessarily be supplemented by high standards of accountability and transparency is also shared by both camps. This is reflected in the growing weight that central banks, in industrial countries and beyond, place on the importance of communication.
The other option, described by Kohn as the “extra action” policy, provides for a deviation of current inflation from a level determined as stable, in return for an improvement of the perspectives of achieving price stability in the future. However, the extra action policy does not mean bursting speculative bubbles by central banks. It rather means “buying” additional insurance against possible negative shocks, which may happen in the future. In Kohn’s opinion, the extra action policy may be run very rarely and only where the three conditions are met: •  the central bank must be able to identify bubbles on the asset market in a timely manner and with high certainty as to the correctness of conclusions from the analysis,  •  the probability that a slight tightening of monetary policy will be able to stand against the speculative activity on a given asset market must be high,  •  the expected improvement of the future economic situation resulting from a smaller speculative bubble must be significant and higher than the costs incurred by the economy in the aftermath of running the additional action policy. In view of the available studies, it may be stated that it is extremely difficult to sufficiently fulfil the three abovementioned conditions. It may not be excluded, however, that in the future, the understanding of economic processes will improve as much as to enable running the additional action policy in justified cases.

That makes monitoring the economy closely, and setting policy to support it, more important than ever. At present, the largest clouds on the economic horizon in the UK come from: the effects of rising numbers of Covid cases across the UK and the accompanying policy measures taken to contain them; risks to business activity and jobs in the light of these public health developments; and the effects of moving to new trading arrangements with the EU at year-end. This unholy trinity of risks give good grounds for caution. Some degree of caution is desirable - in how we socialise, shop and work - to prevent the spread of this awful disease. But we need at the same time to prevent healthy caution morphing into fear and fatalism. Pessimism can be as contagious as the disease - and as damaging to our economic fortunes. Avoiding economic anxiety is crucial to support the on-going recovery. This has important implications for how businesses and policymakers act and communicate. The Fall and Rise of the UK Economy Let me start by running through the fortunes of the economy so far this year. The early months saw a collapse in UK economic activity unprecedented in its speed and scale – a fall in GDP of around a quarter in a matter of weeks. This recession was unique in its source as well as its speed and scale. An extreme shock to public health required extreme public health measures, restricting the flow of goods, services and people.
In conclusion, the exchange of views and experiences is an important step to develop a coherent overall sense of economic identity. With this note, I would like to thank Bilkent University once again and wish a successful conference. Thank you. 11  4  Speech by Issing, O. (2004). “EMU and Economic Governance”. BIS Review 35/2007

Norman Chan: Self-made life pension Remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Philanthropy for Better Cities Forum, Hong Kong, 20 September 2018. * * * Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen 1. One of the biggest challenges in many societies in recent decades is how to ensure that the elderly have sufficient income or financial means to maintain a decent retirement life. Many governments have introduced different forms of pay-as-you-go retirement support schemes, which unfortunately have now proved to be hard to sustain fiscally in the longer run if the population is ageing rapidly. 2. The Hong Kong population is also ageing. While we celebrate having the longest life expectancy in the world, with women reaching 87 and men 81, this also creates tremendous challenges for retirement protection. In the context of retirement protection, I can divide the population into three groups: high income people who have accumulated significant amount of savings and (i) wealth during their working life. They have the financial means to take good care of themselves during retirement and we need not worry about them; the underprivileged, working poor or lifelong poor. This group of people depends crucially on the social safety net provided by the Government as they don’t have the ability or financial means to look after themselves. In Hong Kong, the Government (ii) support mainly takes the form of Comprehensive Social Security Assistance, highly subsidized housing, health care and education.
SPEECH DATE:  9 November 2016  SPEAKER:  Martin Flodén  VENUE:  West Sweden Chamber of Commerce, Göteborg  SVER IG ES R IK SB AN K SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergst org 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn @ riks ban k.se www.riksb ank.s e  The Riksbank’s bond purchases affect government finances Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the Riksbank could make profits without taking any actual risks. The assets on our balance sheet mainly consisted of foreign debt securities while the main liability items were outstanding banknotes and coins and our equity. The assets generated a reliable return, although their value fluctuated with foreign exchange rates, while the liabilities were interest-free. The Riksbank could therefore easily fund the bank’s operations as well as distribute a surplus to the government. But the current picture of the Riksbank’s financial position and risks is entirely different, something that, in part, can be illustrated by how the balance sheet has grown and changed in nature (see Chart 1). One important change is that the decline in the use of cash and the low interest rates have impaired our earning capacity, something which my colleague Kerstin af Jochnick has previously highlighted. 1 Another important change is that the Riksbank has purchased large volumes of Swedish government bonds since the beginning of 2015. These purchases have increased the risks on our balance sheet and made our profits and dividends more sensitive to interest rate changes.

When the reallocation mechanism is working, the transfer of capital and labour from the less productive to the more productive pulls up the level of productivity in the economy and reduces the divergence between firms. The high degree of divergence between firms at present implies that this reallocation mechanism is working significantly less powerfully now than before the crisis. This can also be seen in the proportion of loss-making firms which stands at around 20% higher than its long-run average. 2 Company liquidations also remain low. So there is still more than a hint of ‘zombiness’ in the corporate sector. 2  4  Changes in 2002 to the HMRC’s preferred creditor status means that the proportion of loss-making firms might not return to its long-run average. BIS central bankers’ speeches  The damage to the banking system has certainly played a large part in this. A wellfunctioning banking system is a key part of the reallocation mechanism. It allocates capital efficiently to its most productive use and matches risk to reward. A badly damaged one, recovering slowly from a period on life support does not play that role well. And the exceptional stance of monetary policy that has been necessary to cushion the fall of the economy and to provide the platform for recovery may also be part of the story here by reducing the pressure on poorly-performing firms. As an aside, I want to make a brief comment in the context of the other part of my job: financial stability.
Specific examples are the action plan on critical raw materials - aimed at reducing the EU's external dependence in the sourcing of such goods -, the "RePowerEU" initiative - aimed at reducing the EU's energy dependence -, and plans to drive the digitalisation of European economies. A second set of measures aims to protect EU countries from possible abusive practices adopted by third economies - practices that may be related to strategic or political objectives. These measures include those aimed at monitoring foreign direct investment flows from third countries and other measures designed to limit coercive actions against European companies. A third class of measures aims to preserve the international level playing field by compensating for competitive disadvantages that EU companies might face due to less stringent environmental and state aid policies implemented by third countries. Examples are the regulation on foreign subsidies that distort the internal market and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). 5  Other countries have started to include geopolitical considerations in their economic policy decisions as well. Foremost among these is the recent move by the US to restrict exports of semiconductors and advanced chip-making manufacturing equipment to China, and the adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act, which provides tax credits to clean energy and electric car producers conditional on assembly and production in North America.

Dimitar Radev: The Bulgarian banking sector in 2020 – how have we coped and what is forthcoming Publication by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, in the Bulletin of the Association of Banks in Bulgaria, issue 64, December 2020. * * * Dear Colleagues, We are approaching the Banker’s Day in a year of unprecedented challenges: first, in relation to the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic; andsecond, with the completion of the strategic project of the entry of the Bulgarian Lev into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), simultaneously with the accession of our country to the European Banking Union, including to the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. From the banking sector’s perspective, there are two key questions: how we have coped to date, and what is forthcoming? Our goal, defined as early as the start of the crisis, was for the banking sector to generate solutions, rather than problems. As a result of our effort in the recent years, we were well positioned for the attainment of this goal. The banking sector ‘entered’ into the crisis with a Common Equity Tier 1 capital adequacy of over 19%, and with a liquidity coverage ratio of over 260%, i.e. times above the regulatory requirements. Regardless of the good starting position, we were aware that, because of the abrupt deterioration of the environment in which banks operated, there should be new measures for further strengthening of their capital and liquidity positions.
But the Committee updates its inflation forecast on a regular basis and so the forecast can be adjusted and revised as the Committee learns about the responsiveness of productivity to a pickup in demand. 7  Indeed, Ben drew attention to this relationship, and why it is not likely to hold in the current environment, in a speech last month (Broadbent 2013). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  policy to the level of unemployment makes that clear. Its levels not growth rates that matter. Likewise, those expecting to see the close synchronisation between UK and US policy rates that held during much of the Great Moderation to reassert itself as rates begin to normalise need to remind themselves about the differences in the extent of the recoveries in the two countries to date. The US economy has been growing for almost 4 years; the UK for barely 6 months. The level of US GDP is 5% above its pre-crisis level; UK GDP is 3% below. Its levels not growth rates that matter. I don’t know how quickly Bank Rate will begin to rise. That will depend critically on the extent to which productivity recovers as demand increases. But the MPC’s forward guidance makes clear that, after the worst recession in post-war history and the weakest recovery on record, this time is likely to be different. Its levels not growth rates that matter. Conclusion The financial crisis and its aftermath provided a tough examination of the UK’s inflation targeting regime.

Indeed, a noteworthy addition to the MPC’s remit when it was renewed by the Chancellor earlier this year was a request that “… the Committee should promote understanding of the trade-offs in setting monetary policy to meet a forward-looking inflation target while giving due considerations to output volatility.” The forward guidance announced by the Committee clarifies its view of the appropriate trade-off. The primacy of the inflation target makes clear that the long-run objective for monetary policy hasn’t changed, and the inflation forecast knockout provides information about the minimum speed at which the Committee judges it acceptable to bring inflation back to target. At the same time, the unemployment threshold provides guidance about what the MPC is trying to achieve in terms of real activity as the economy gradually normalises. Moreover, by making clear its view of the desired trade-off, the MPC helps to make our monetary policy more predictable. This enables financial markets, companies and families alike to make more informed decisions and so improve the effectiveness of policy. Let me summarise where we have got to so far. The inflation target served us well during the financial crisis. Straight A’s for preserving credibility and for anchoring inflation expectations. But the aftermath of the crisis has posed particular challenges of communication and accountability that, on its own, an inflation target is ill equipped to address. The MPC’s forward guidance is designed to help us to meet those challenges head on.
Importantly, the exercise required firms to understand how their real economy customers were both exposed to these risks and the actions they would take to manage them. This was one of the most challenging aspects of the work – as it revealed gaps in real economy firms' understanding of what climate transition means for them. A gap I will return to. The CBES also showed that costs were lowest, and opportunities greatest, with an early and well managed transition. That underlines that while governments set public climate policy, banks and insurers have a collective interest in managing climate-related financial risks in a way that supports that transition over time. Managing climate related financial risks Second, interactions with banks and insurers had revealed them to be in the early stages of developing their climate risk management capabilities. To address this, we set the world's first supervisory expectations for climate risks in 2019 – expectations that became part of the PRA's core supervisory processes last year. 2/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Our reviews and observations – including the CBES – have shown significant progress. However, a distance remains to the end-point and all firms need to invest to make further progress. We have given firms a huge amount of homework to do, as set out in our latest Dear CEOOpens in a new window letter and in direct supervisory feedback. I can assure you we will be marking that homework.

And for the Bank of England, it is to work within its objectives to ensure the financial system is resilient to the risks from climate change and supportive of the transition to net zero. With that in mind, today I wanted to reflect on a speech I delivered in 2020 on how to move beyond rhetoric to make climate action a reality. I had split our journey into three phases. Firstly, recognising and identifying the financial risks climate changes poses. Secondly, building capabilities to enable us to turn aspiration into action. And thirdly, making business decisions to advance the transition. With almost three years passed, I want now to evaluate our progress, identify the barriers we have encountered, and consider what else is needed if we are to progress. Back in 2020, I suggested that we had probably achieved the first phase of our journey to net zero. Conversations with leaders in the financial sector made it increasingly clear that climate change is central to the future of their businesses, not just the confines of Corporate Social Responsibility departments. I suggested we had entered the difficult second phase of turning aspiration into action, across the financial sector and the real economy. This phase involves a lot of hard work: the collection of data and the building of new tools that better enable climate considerations to be embedded in strategy and risk management.
John Galbraith, for instance, has carefully documented the role of debt and leverage in crises going back to the 17th century. 6 More recently, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets concluded in 1999 that, “The principal policy issue arising out of the events surrounding the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Management is how to constrain excessive leverage.” 7 3. Is there a need for better regulation? Assuming there is agreement that excessive leverage has been a major factor in past crises, what ought to be done about it? An obvious response is to limit leverage. But is it really that obvious? After all, some people would argue that regulation is at least partly to blame for past crises. Before I go any further, I want to clarify where I stand in the debate on regulation vs. free markets – my ideological baggage, so to speak. I believe that free markets are the best available mechanism to allocate resources and that they are ultimately the best way to promote welfare and economic growth. Fundamentally, I am therefore wary of elaborate efforts to interfere with the functioning of free, competitive markets. At the same time, it is obvious to me that, under certain conditions, free markets produce inefficient outcomes. If these market failures are apparent and important enough, they justify and indeed require interference in the market mechanism.

Is Germany imposing its conditions on the rest of Europe? The ECB has a range of tools to ensure price stability and the proper functioning of the market. It can remedy market disruptions. It has done so several times in recent years to avoid a “credit crunch” by greatly increasing its provision of liquidity to the banking system and by lengthening the maturity of refinancing operations. Still within our mandate, we are able to take quite significant non-standard measures and we have done this on several occasions. The mandate of the ECB is also to ensure the solidity of the euro. But the ECB cannot replace governments, nor spare them from making the necessary efforts to control their debt and restore the competitiveness of their economy. The credibility of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  governments cannot rest on the central bank. And yet, the former must demonstrate their determination to improve their fiscal position. But under Germany’s pressure, the ECB is not using all the instruments at its disposal. How is this justifiable when huge efforts are required of Spain and Italy? The ECB is being unfairly accused. No central bank in the world – neither the Fed nor the Bank of England – directly funds governments or purchases sovereign debt on the primary market to finance their deficits. However, it is possible on the secondary market. We have done so in the past. There are no differences of opinion between the French, the Germans and the European Commission.