samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Meeting these challenges has not been straightforward in recent years as the euro area economy was hit by several shocks: financial instability in the aftermath of the stock market  6  BIS Review 113/2007  collapse in 2000, exceptionally high economic and geopolitical uncertainty between 2001 and 2003, just to name a few. -  First of all, we have to identify and account for temporary “special factors” or “distortions” that may affect monetary developments and blur their information content. To some extent it is the aim of the methodology developed at the ECB which allows for periodic adjustments to measured monetary aggregates in order to account for portfolio shifts which impact the demand for money without any incidence on future inflation. This approach has met with great success in the period 2000-2004, allowing the Eurosystem to enter an easing cycle despite a rapid growth of M3. -  Second, and more permanently, it is necessary to disentangle, in monetary and credit evolutions, those which reflect structural and permanent changes from those which simply result from moves in the level of interest rates and the position in the economic cycle. -  Finally, we must be able to assess whether these developments result from money supply shocks, in which case they clearly entail some risks to price stability, or whether they are caused by money demand shocks that may raise the desired level of money balances without necessarily impacting aggregate demand.

Developments were marked by the financial crisis, which resulted in low wage agreements which were largely in line with the Riksbank’s forecasts. The crisis also meant that the commonest agreement period became two years instead of three years, as had been normal since 1995. The centrally-agreed wage increases were calculated to average 1.8 per cent per year in 2010 and 2011. However, the economic recovery was significantly stronger in 2010 than most people had expected. The growth in GDP was the highest in 40 years. The labour market also developed above expectations. Among other reasons, this was because the decline in employment was primarily concentrated on the manufacturing sector, which is less labour-intensive than many other sectors. Furthermore, the so-called crisis agreements in the manufacturing sector contributed towards dampening the decrease of employment. Due to the low agreed wage increases, the wage bargaining rounds in 2010 probably contributed to the strong development of the Swedish economy we experienced in 2010 and the start of 2011. According to our present assessment, the average increase of hourly wages in 2010 and 2011 has been 2.8 per cent per year, which is 0.5 percentage points per year more than we had estimated before the wage bargaining rounds. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  But at the same time, the wage bargaining rounds in 2010 entailed a couple of problems for future developments. One such problem was that the dates for the expiry of the various agreements became more spread out than before.
This concept refers to the level of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is consistent with stable inflation around the target and, therefore, it is adequate for measuring the activity gap associated with short-term inflationary pressures. Along with this, from time to time we also make estimates of trend growth, a concept that is related to the medium-term growth capacity of the economy. At long terms, potential and trend growth rate converge to the same number; however, they tend  2  to diverge in the short term due to transitory factors that alter productive capacity, such as temporary shocks to productivity and limitations to factor utilization. On this occasion, our potential growth estimate has been revised upwards, which is to be expected in a context of recovering investment, higher growth and still well-contained core inflation. For 2018, the potential growth of non-mining GDP stands at 3.1%, which compares with our 2.7% estimate a year ago. For 2019, the potential growth of non-mining GDP is 3.2% (2.9% a year ago). Trend growth remains within the 3% to 3.5% range estimated in 2017 and will be reviewed next year, once the updated demographic projections from the Census are released. With this, potential and trend growth should converge sooner than expected. Growth accumulated up to the second quarter of the year—even considering the higher potential growth—has narrowed the activity gap with respect to the forecast, and we estimate that it is near zero in absolute level (Figure 3).

William C Dudley: Welcoming remarks at the Community Bankers Conference Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Community Bankers Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 18 April 2018. * * * Thank you for joining us today for our 16th Annual Community Bankers Conference. This is my last opportunity to address this fine group of community bank leaders in my role as president of the New York Fed. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System.1 Since becoming head of the New York Fed in 2009, I have had the opportunity to watch the evolution of community banking up close. I observed the resilience of community banks at the height of the financial crisis and how your organizations managed during those turbulent times. I also have had the privilege of meeting with many of you during my regional visits, and I remain impressed with how small banks remain important pillars of economic support for their communities. The past decade has seen significant change for your industry. There has been significant consolidation among institutions and the remaining community banks are much healthier. Back in 2009, there were 191 community banks in the Second District with an aggregate of $ billion in total assets. In contrast, there are 135 community banks today.
In recognition of the importance of the financial sector towards national development, the Bank of Zambia has continued to address various weaknesses in the Zambian financial system, among them being the low financial intermediation and limited access to finance. The Bank of Zambia is encouraged to see banks in the country exploring new ways in which they can take banking services where they are needed the most and this is mainly to the unbanked. On its part, the Bank of Zambia has continued to implement measures to reduce the cost of borrowing. In the recent past, the Bank introduced the Policy Rate which is aimed at fostering transparency in the determination of lending rates. Under the new framework, all financial institutions are now required to realign the pricing of loans with reference to the Policy Rate. Furthermore, in January 2012, the Bank of Zambia introduced the new minimum capital requirements for commercial banks. The minimum primary capital was raised from K12 billion to K104 billion and K520 billion for locally and foreign owned banks, respectively. This measure is intended to make commercial banks more resilient to financial instability and provide banks with strong balance sheets that would meaningfully support economic activities in the country. I am pleased to note that Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited was one of the first banks to reduce their lending rates in line with the objective of the Bank of Zambia policy rate.

And three points on what it will mean. On the “how”, the first thing to say is that going forward, banks are being required to carry considerably more capital and liquidity. Second, as is now well known within the industry, the international authorities have agreed a blueprint for resolution regimes to manage the failure of so-called Systemically Important Financial Institutions in an orderly way. G20 Leaders have committed to legislate that regime into their domestic systems where necessary. All resolution regimes have the effect of distributing the losses of distressed financial firms – ie losses already or prospectively exceeding equity – across unsecured, uninsured creditors. That is the only place losses can go if taxpayers are to be spared. “Bailin” has focussed minds on this, but is in fact just one method, albeit a very important one, for ensuring that uninsured creditors take losses. Those “how” points are very familiar. A few comments, therefore, on possible implications – all of which, looking ahead, point towards the crucial importance of our capital markets. First, in a world of less leveraged banks, a business model of Originate and Warehouse – because that is what it became by the middle of the past decade – is unlikely to be viable. Maybe a genuine model of Originate and Distribute will emerge, with something like agencytype market making and trading. Second, holders of bank paper – especially bonds – will be living in a different world. They will have a big incentive to monitor the riskiness of banks.
Due to investment expenditures and exports as well as the rapidly increasing industrial production since the second quarter of 2020, the number of people employed rose by 2.7 million (1.3 million being in the services sector and more than 900,000 in the industrial sector) as of the first quarter of 2022. In addition, employment has increased by approximately 846,000 people since the beginning of the year. This increase in employment is significantly larger than that of peer countries. Considering the population and the sources of employment growth in these countries, our employment performance becomes even more remarkable. Employment in the manufacturing industry in particular, exhibits a notably strong performance. In the pandemic period, many countries have not managed to compensate for the losses in labor force participation. On the other hand, both the labor force participation and employment indicators in our country have exceeded their pre-pandemic levels, showing how brisk and robust the labor markets were in the normalization process. Distinguished Members of the Chamber of Industry, The Turkish economy is going through a process of structural transformation centered on increasing investments, employment, production and exports, the focus of which is you. Adjusted for cyclical effects, the Turkish economy had a current account surplus for three consecutive quarters for the first time since this analysis began in 2004.

As of end June 2008, credit portfolio of the banking system accounted for nearly 43% of total assets, increasing by 3.6 percentage points relative to end-year 2007. Consumer deposits remain the main funding source for the activity, accounting for 80% of total assets. Business funding through the credit lines from the parent banks increased to 9% of total assets in the first half of 2008. As of end June 2008, return on average assets was estimated at 1.3% while return on average equity equalled to 16.6%. Capitalization indicator of the financial sector, and in particular of the banking one, increased slightly. Capital adequacy rate of the banking sector showed a slight increase to 17.3% as of end the first half of 2008. Liquidity indicator continues to remain at higher levels compared to the other regional countries. Liquid assets of the banking sector share 47% of total assets, dropping by about 5.7 percentage points relative to end-year 2007. The spread of the U.S. economy crisis to the international financial markets and the uncertainty for the nature of its effects, the institutions’ map, the types of instruments and its extent, do theoretically increase the risk of its impact on the financial system at home. Basically, this crisis has not provided its impact on the banking activity in Albania.
Once the preserve of large and complex risks such as property catastrophe and mortality risks with a long history of well modelled losses, it is now considered for lines previously deemed uninsurable, such as cyber. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  ii. Second, the catastrophe ILS market is no longer dominated by wind exposure in the United States, and spreads over perils like earthquakes and floods in other regions such as Japan, Europe and recently Latin America. b. On ILS structures, the market is moving beyond ILS bonds and increasingly issuing collaterised reinsurance, sidecars, an d industry loss warranties. Asia is the next frontier for ILS growth 7 As ILS funds continue to seek diversification opportunities for their investment portfolios, Asia is poised to be the next frontier for ILS growth. At first glance, the economics of ILS in Asia appear to be challenging. Asia is still a developing market with low insurance penetration. Traditional reinsurance coverage is still competitive in the region. Apart from more mature markets such as Japan and Australia, a large part of Asia has yet to tap the capital markets for their growing insurance needs. 8 Yet, it is likely that ILS will achieve a breakthrough in the coming years, as the protection gap in Asia widens. Over the last 20 years, Asia has accounted for almost half of the world’s economic losses from natural disasters, amounting to more than $ billion. Economic losses in Asia Pacific is projected to exceed $ billion annually by 20302.

The purpose of the strategy is to improve the retail payments market, promoting the use of electronic payment instruments and broadening the financial inclusion of the population. The strategy will be implemented through the improvement of the legal and the regulatory frameworks, through improvements in infrastructure and financial education. Other activities In the field of statistics, the Bank of Albania continued its work for the methodological approximation of statistics with international standards and their alignment with the acquis communautaire. In cooperation with INSTAT and with expertise from the European Union, the Bank of Albania coordinated the work to develop indicators of macroeconomic imbalances for Albania. During 2018, the EUROSTAT carried out an evaluation mission of the Statistical System in Albania, which assessed that the statistics of the Bank of Albania are in line with the principles of the European statistics Code of Practice. As at the end of 2018, the international reserve reached EUR 3.4 billion, sufficient to cover 6.7 months of imports of goods and services and 156% of the short-term external debt. In order to 6/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  increase the flexibility of managing the needs for foreign currency liquidity, an agreement was finalised with the Bank for International Settlements for a foreign currency credit line. The agreement constitutes an important mechanism available to the Bank of Albania in the event of an emergency situation. Research continued to support the decision-making process for formulating and implementing Bank of Albania’s policies.
At the risk of going over ground which was already covered yesterday, let me start by briefly reviewing the changing pattern of global imbalances. In doing so, the main point I want to make is that this is quite a complex story, which is consistent with several different – but not mutually exclusive – interpretations. And, hard as it is to understand, the past may not be much help in predicting the future. The steady increase in the US current account deficit since the 1990s and its present unprecedented level – at over 6% GDP – has made it particularly tempting to look for home grown factors which can consistently explain this trend. But the pattern of US saving and investment underlying its current account deficit look very different in the pre and post 2000 periods. The former period was characterised by sustained fiscal consolidation, leading to fiscal surpluses, together with a fast growth in private investment in response to high expected productivity in the US; the latter by an emerging fiscal deficit, in response to tax cuts, and a fall off in business investment. Only the steady downward trend in the household saving ratio – now into negative territory – is common to both periods. This shift in the composition of the pattern of US savings and investment has coincided with a change in the composition of external financing flows into the US.

Rachel Lomax: Global financial imbalances Remarks by Ms Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the Chatham House conference on Global Financial Imbalances, London, 24 January 2006. *  *  *  One spin off from the debate about global imbalances has been renewed interest in the international monetary system. It is a benign aspect of a potentially acrimonious debate about whether the scale and persistence of global imbalances – and specifically the US current account deficit – was made in the USA or made in Asia – or conceivably Europe (and maybe even the Middle East). A better approach is to view global imbalances as the outcome of decentralised savings-investment decisions within an interdependent global system. And it’s worth emphasising straight away that substantial imbalances may be the natural product of a healthy global monetary and financial system: they do not necessarily represent a problem. But is the current pattern of large and persistent global imbalances healthy in this sense? Or does it reflect unsustainable behaviour on the part of policy makers, companies or private individuals around the world, rooted in unrealistic expectations, sub optimal economic policies or tensions between national policy objectives? Are global imbalances now on such a scale that their reduction inevitably poses a threat of some kind, whether to global activity, trade or financial stability? And does the current international monetary system embody sufficient incentives to deliver an orderly correction of imbalances?
Lately, price pressures from abroad have been subdued and the upturn in inflation has largely been domestically driven, primarily via price increases in the service sector. The combination of wage and price developments in domestic sectors and inflationary impulses from abroad will determine how monetary policy should be designed to influence domestic demand and the exchange rate in the desired direction, so that inflation ultimately stays around the target. To some extent, it will of course be less complicated for monetary policy if inflationary pressures both rise abroad and in domestic sectors and in ways we are used to – and the risks of imbalances may then also be mitigated. Complementary monetary policy measures may be the norm As I mentioned earlier, the environment of low real interest rates will probably last for quite some time to come, which means that the policy rates of central banks will on average be on a lower level. This may, in turn, limit the scope of central banks to tackle economic downturns by cutting policy rates. Say, for example, that the repo rate will on average be around 2.5 per cent, that is, at the lower bound in the Riksbank’s assessment of the long-term level. That does not provide much leeway down to zero. As we have shown, it is possible to lower the rate some way below zero but it is clear that there may be less scope for rate cuts than previously.

Financial regulations are necessary given the complexity of financial transactions that are taking place here in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. They are not liked by anybody but regulations should be viewed as brakes or traffic lights. Regulations by themselves are not meaningful, unless the financial community makes a concerted effort to observe what is good for the wider financial system. Regulators should be flexible to relax regulations, where possible, and allow markets to grow. For example, very recently, the government decided to allow foreigners to invest in Sri Lanka Treasury Bonds through TIERA accounts. That is a further relaxation of capital controls. If financial markets use this opportunity in an objective manner, we can expect further relaxations. Regulators and policy makers should find a middle way to understand the way innovative products work. My message to this august audience is that under the present regulatory regime, Sri Lanka’s financial system is resilient and it is capable of absorbing shocks from within or outside. We should be happy to note that like the Sri Lankan economy, the financial system has also displayed its resilience under trying circumstances in the recent past. We hope it will continue to be so in the future. From a regulatory point of view, we will continue to support markets and financial intermediaries to maintain the required robustness of the financial system. Thank y ou. BIS Review 6/2007  3
Financial System Risks in the UK – Issues and Challenges (John Gieve) (July 2006) www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2006/speech280.pdf . BIS Review 81/2007  1  To deliver these objectives effectively, the aim is also to use a rigorous and consistent analytical framework which integrates behavioural responses, interactions and feedback effects, to ensure that the system-wide implications are fully captured 5 So where is current practice against that ideal? A typical or traditional “macro” stress test has the stylised form set out in Chart A. The first stage is to put together a coherent stress scenario, typically using a macro-econometric model (which may include some assumed endogenous policy response). By mapping important propagation channels, an estimate of likely financial sector credit losses is produced; for example, by modelling the impact of the macro stress on corporate and household balance sheets and gauging the consequent impact on the probability of default and likely recovery rate on banks’ credit exposures. Market losses are estimated by judging the impact of the macro stress on different asset classes. Total bank losses are calculated by aggregating credit and market losses, perhaps including an additional allowance for the impact of the stress scenario on net interest income and on funding costs.

Combine this with the strength of some key sectors of our economy; the result is that Paris now stands as the first stock market capitalisation in Europe, ahead of London.2 And as the Bloomberg article points out, despite some political unrest earlier this year, Paris is true to its motto: fluctuat nec mergitur, it is rocked by the waves but does not sink. This motto also perfectly suits French institutions – we have a very strong Constitution – and the French economy, which has proved remarkably resilient. Our growth performed better than most expected in the first quarter, at 0.2%3. The likelihood of a recession in 2023 can now be excluded, and prospects have been revised upwards: this confirms our forecast for 2023 of 0.6%, thanks to stronger than anticipated external demand and a quicker than expected  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  slowdown in energy prices, before rebounding to 1.2% and 1.7% respectively in 2024 and 2025. Furthermore, despite the recent turmoil in the United States and in Switzerland, from which we can already draw out some first lessons,4 financial stability has been preserved in the EU. Our banks are robust, with substantial capital and liquidity buffers: they are all subject to stringent Basel requirements – and to single and strong supervision within the Banking Union, which makes a big difference with many US banks.