samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are, certainly, things that we can do to reduce the risks - to try to prevent the first climber falling off the rock face, or to avoid kicking the rock that starts the avalanche. A key condition, obviously, is maintaining macro-economic, monetary, stability. That goes without saying. It gives everyone on the mountainside much the best chance of coming down unscathed! We can also turn the new information technology to our advantage, using it to make the linkages between the climbers safer - by reducing the risks in payments and settlements systems. A good deal of our attention on the financial stability side of the Bank is focused in this direction. And we can satisfy ourselves - through micro-prudential supervision and regulation of individual financial businesses - that the climbers are properly trained and equipped, and fully conscious of the risks. This now, of course, becomes the responsibility of the FSA. Intervention But however much we try to prevent accidents, we need to be prepared for them to happen. The Bank’s concern then becomes to ensure that they do not spread to other parts of the financial system. This may involve providing liquidity on penal terms, outside the central bank’s normal money market operations, against high quality assets to a particular institution, that does not want to appear in the market because it is under a cloud. Or it may mean standing between an intermediary and the market place, to facilitate payments or settlements which might not otherwise be completed, which could then cause gridlock.

And the key to that is that both the Bank and the FSA should have a clear understanding of their respective responsibilities, and that they should continuously work very closely together to ensure that they keep sufficiently out of each others hair without letting things disappear between the cracks! Our ongoing relationship was formalised during the summer in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed between the Bank, FSA and the Treasury. This defines very carefully our respective responsibilities and provides for both the Bank and the FSA to exchange information freely and to consult where our interests interact or overlap. It helpfully establishes a high-level Treasury-Bank-FSA Standing Committee, which will provide a forum in which a common position can be developed in relation to emerging problems. And, as a further means of ensuring that we are aware of each other’s concerns, the Chairman of the FSA will become a member of Court, while the Deputy Governor responsible for Financial Stability will serve on the FSA Board. In the end the success of these arrangements will depend upon the working relationships between our respective staff at all levels, and it is helpful in this context that our own supervisory staff are moving to the FSA which will help to ensure that we establish the right working relationships from the beginning. But we will need to work at these relationships continuously to ensure that they are embedded into the future.
BIS Review 31/2003  1  Against this background of closely interacting national economies, mention should be made of the high dependence of the rest of the world on the US economy, which proved greater than expected, despite the fact that the results in the United States were not particularly buoyant. Such dependence is a cause for concern since the United States is, at the same time, the main source of growth for the rest of the world and the main raiser of savings on the international capital market, a situation that is hardly sustainable over the medium and long term. Moreover, the saving/investment mismatch in the United States has been heightened recently by the clearly expansionary bias of monetary and, above all, fiscal policy. In these circumstances, a swift correction of the US external deficit, while undoubtedly desirable in the medium and long run, might affect numerous other economies most adversely in the short term through causing a contraction in the external demand of these economies at a time at which their growth is rather low. A lesson to be drawn from this complex situation is that when international economic disequilibria increase and swell out of all proportion, there is a risk that their correction will be at the least timely moment and with significant costs in terms of growth and well-being. Last year the main economies adapted very differently to the above-mentioned shocks.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Macro-economic policy and monetary stability Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Euromoney Bond Investors' Congress, London, 19 February 2002. *  *  *  Thank you Padraic for that kind introduction and for honouring me with the Euromoney Lifetime Achievement Award. It's nice to be prompted to recall some of the good times - and some of the not so good times in the course of my career at the Bank of England which I think of not so much in terms of achievement but of lifelong learning. We've come a long way since 1962 - both nationally and internationally - from different starting points certainly, and moving in fits and starts, at varying speeds and to varying degrees, in a process of continuing, indeed accelerating, change. But standing back and trying to look through the confusion of short-term events, I would pick out three broad trends for comment this morning. The first relates to macro-economic policy, where the earlier emphasis was very much on short-term demand management designed to manage the perceived trade-off between growth and employment, on the one hand, and inflation and a manageable balance of payments position, on the other.
If we are to perform, we need to build in ourselves, the ability and the courage to meet with obstructions and move forward, in the face of challenges. Otherwise, our performance would not be realized. Fourth, Thithi Dhathu. That is, stay firm in the intended path. Even in the midst of opposition or challenges, we have to develop the ability to be focused and move with a clear vision and determination. We should not be distracted. We should not dilute the impact of our performance. 2  BIS Review 10/2008  Fifth, is the Thawara Dhathu. That is, the action should convey a strong stable message of commitment and dedication. Such a strong signal is often infectious and when the leader shows such firm commitment, performance often improves. Sixth, Upakkama Dhathu. That is, being wise to cleverly steer the path and induce others to also support the performance of the particular action. That is not easy, but it is vital. Inducing all within the team to move towards a single goal is the best assurance of success. We are today living and working in an unforgiving world. In this unforgiving world, the business sector in which we operate is intolerant of failure. Failure or even suggestion of failure invokes harsh penalties and abrupt ends to promising careers. We show how many important heads rolled after the “sub-prime” issue hit the market. However high and mighty a person may be, failure or non-performance or sub-performance is not forgiven. All past victories are erased with a single failure.

Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Management Accountants – focusing on the repositioning of the profession Special address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Global Summit, organised by The Institute of Cost and Works Accountants of India on “Repositioning the Management Accountant”, New Delhi, 12 January 2008. *  *  *  The theme of the Conference suggests that the Management Accountants of today are de facto doing something different to the traditional role of the Management Accountant. The new de facto role seems to be more of that of a strategist and a performance management specialist, rather than a historical “information supplying” or even a “decision facilitating” role of an accountant. If one were to drill down, we may perhaps note that the education and training of those who have become strategists and performance management specialists may not have necessarily been intended that way. But yet, it happened. How did this happen? •  Perhaps the training, although intended to create management accountants, was appropriate to create a strategist. •  Perhaps the training, coupled with business developments and public expectations, shaped management accountants to become strategists or the deliverers of outputs rather than contributors of inputs only. •  Perhaps the ability of the management accountant, as a result of his core disciplines, enabled him to respond effectively to unfolding developments and then deliver new outputs, and such abilities were recognized by the business community in the course of time.
The Bank of Sierra Leone has also recognised the need to bring the legal framework for regulating the banking sector consistent with international best practice. Hence, in consultations with our International partners, (ADB, IMF, World Bank, etc), the Bank of Sierra Leone is undertaking a comprehensive review of the Banking Act 2000, and the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2005 in order to align them with international best practices and to address some of the weaknesses which have been identified while implementing them. We anticipate that once these legislations have been amended, the legal framework will provide a conducive environment for a more robust banking sector. Going forward, the Bank of Sierra Leone plans to draft operating guidelines for other specialised institutions, including Merchant and Agricultural banks, in order to broaden the financial landscape in the economy. Traditional Commercial banks, on the other hand, should endeavour to increase product innovation and diversification. The real challenge for all of us is how to enhance savings mobilisation and effectively channel such savings to their most productive use. Madam Chair, Distinguished Guests, let me conclude my remarks with a serious appeal to the entire banking industry for the better packaging of banking products for our clients. This, I believe will enhance our service delivery, which in turn, will enable us offer more affordable banking services. Providing affordable banking services has the potential of drawing a larger number of Sierra Leoneans to the formal financial system, resulting in an expanded banking clientele.

By our estimates so far, ProCredit has already made some mark in the domestic Banking Industry and is poised to do more. As at end January, 2008, the bank’s credit portfolio amounted to about Le8.0 billion; this was disbursed to 1,440 customers. Deposit base during the same period stood at about Le3.0 billion, with an impressive record of 5,600 deposit  BIS Review 33/2008  1  accounts. What is important here is that many of these customers are first-time account holders who might have found it difficult to open accounts with the traditional commercial banks. Loan recovery has also recorded a formidable and impressive rate. We therefore commend the management and staff for this ground-breaking performance. Microfinance activities now include products such as micro credit, micro insurance, mobile banking, etc, which are designed to increase the product portfolio and provide customers with a variety of products that are easily accessible. We believe that with the increased efforts to further institutionalise microfinance activities in the country, we will soon see a wider variety of microfinance products for small scale producers. Madam Chair, I believe this is a befitting occasion to discuss what we, at the Bank of Sierra Leone, are doing to foster an efficient, sound and stable financial sector, including microfinance. The Bank of Sierra Leone, in collaboration with MITAF, is drafting guidelines for the regulation and supervision of deposit-taking Microfinance Institutions. Development in this area is far advanced.
Over the ensuing months, members of the Committee and several of its working groups engaged in intensive work with industry participants—many of whose institutions are represented here today—to develop practical and prudent solutions in these areas. In addition, I am pleased to note that we worked very closely with our colleagues in the International Organization of Securities Commissions in the areas of trading book and double-default. In July this year, the Committee issued guidance in both areas. With the publication of these documents on trading book/double-default and downturn LGDs, the Committee has concluded the policy development stage of Basel II. The industry has voiced the opinion that, while it could be possible to continue refining the Framework, it is more important that there be a pause to allow banks to implement the Framework. I very much support this view. Our priority now should be to achieve high-quality implementation. A good example of how we, industry and regulators can collaborate, without the need to add additional rules, is what we did in the case of low-default portfolios. Several types of portfolios may have low numbers of defaults or a bank may not have sufficient loss experience of its own (e.g. portfolios of exposures to sovereigns, banks, insurance companies or highly rated corporates). The industry was concerned that the lack of sufficient statistical data in some portfolios and the resulting difficulty in backtesting risk parameters would result in LDPs being excluded from IRB treatment. We have published a newsletter clarifying our view.

Jaime Caruana: Basel II progress Remarks by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Institute of International Bankers Breakfast Dialogue with Government Officials, Washington DC, 26 September 2005. *  *  *  Thank you very much. It is an honour to be here once again for a productive dialogue with members of the Institute of International Bankers, and it is equally an honour to be on a panel with such distinguished colleagues from the United States and the United Kingdom. I will keep my remarks as brief as possible so that we can have plenty of time for your questions and comments. It will probably come as no surprise that I will focus my remarks this morning on the same topic that I discussed with you last year: the new framework for capital adequacy, or Basel II. As you are probably aware, the Basel Committee published the Basel II Framework in June last year. At that time, the Committee indicated that while the Framework was mostly complete, several important technical matters still needed further work. Specifically, the Committee determined that more work was necessary with regard to (1) elements of the trading book and the treatment of so-called double-default effects for hedged transactions; and (2) the estimation of loss given default during periods of economic downturn.
(2013), When credit bites back, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, supplement to vol. 45/2. Jorda, Ò. et al. (2016), Macrofinancial history and the new business cycle facts, NBER Working Paper, 22743, October. Keynes, John M. (1936), The general theory of employment, interest and money, Macmillan. Kindleberger, C.P. and R.Z. Aliber (2005), Manias, panics, and crashes: a history of financial crises, 5th edition, Basingstoke: John Wiley & Sons. Koo, R.C. (2011), The world in balance sheet recession: causes, cure and politics, Realworld Economics Review, 58. Levine, R. (2005), Finance and growth: theory and evidence, Handbook of Economic Growth, 1A, Elsevier, pp. 865–934. Page 15/16  Minsky, H.P. (1992), The financial instability hypothesis, The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, Working Paper, 74, May. Modigliani, F. and R.H. Brumberg (1954), Utility analysis and the consumption function: an interpretation of cross-section data, In: Kurihara, K.K. (ed. ), Post-Keynesian Economics, Rutgers University Press, pp. 388–436. Reinhart, C.M. and V.R. Reinhart (2010), After the fall, presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s on Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 26–28 August. Reinhart, C.M. and K.S. Rogoff (2009), The aftermath of financial crises, The American Economic Review, 99/2, Papers and Proceedings, pp. 466–472. SFBC (1998), Annual Report 1997. Shiller, R.J. (2000), Irrational exuberance, Princeton University Press. Smets, F. (2014), Financial stability and monetary policy: how closely interlinked?, International Journal of Central Banking, 10/2, pp. 263–300. Svensson, L.E.O.

Janet L Yellen: Views on the economy and implications for monetary policy Speech by Ms Janet L Yellen, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, at the Portland Community Leaders’ Luncheon, Portland, Oregon, 29 July 2005. *  *  *  Thank you for that very kind introduction. It’s a pleasure to be here with you in this beautiful “City of Roses.” As a monetary policymaker, my main concern is the national economy, and that will be the chief focus of my remarks today. But as President of the San Francisco Fed, I also pay close attention to developments here in the Twelfth District, which, in many respects, mirror those of the nation. Looking at the big picture elements—growth, employment, and inflation—I’d say things are in reasonably good shape. Over the past two years, the nation’s output growth has been pretty steady, averaging just over four percent; this is solidly above trend, which, by most estimates, is around three and a quarter to three and a half percent. This growth has been amply in evidence here in the Pacific Northwest. While unemployment rates in Oregon and Washington remain above the nation’s rate, your region has largely recovered from the severe hit you took during the 2001 recession and its aftermath. As a result of sustained growth at the national level, slack in labor and product markets has trended down.
Christine Lagarde: IMFC Statement Speech by Ms Christine Lagarde, President of the European Central Bank, at the forty-fourth meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC), IMF Annual Meetings, 14 October 2021. * * * Global economic activity has continued to recover since our previous meeting in April this year, thanks to further progress in vaccination campaigns and supportive economic policies. However, the pace of the recovery remains uneven across sectors and countries, and the spread of the more contagious Delta variant of the coronavirus (COVID-19), coupled with supply bottlenecks, is casting a shadow over the near-term growth prospects for the global economy. The main challenge for policymakers continues to be steering the economy safely out of the crisis. It remains crucial that policy support is not withdrawn prematurely. On the fiscal side, support measures should be increasingly targeted. And on the monetary side, clear communication by major central banks is essential, also in view of the recent inflation developments. The policy mix should be accompanied by well-tailored structural reforms to enhance long-term growth and minimise scarring effects from the pandemic, along with action to accelerate the green and digital transitions. Euro area developments and outlook The rebound phase of the euro area economy is increasingly advanced, despite supply bottlenecks and continuing uncertainty about the pandemic.

However, expectations according to forward rates were much lower than the Riksbank’s repo rate path in the longer run. The total deviation between the repo rate path and forward rates can also be seen on the far right in Figure 3. Figure 5 The repo rate path and market expectations in April 2010 Per cent  Note. Market expectations are based on forward rates. “Before” are the closing rates on the day before the repo rate path was published. “After” are the closing rates on the day it was published. Prospera’s survey covers money market participants. Sources: Reuters EcoWin, TNS SIFO Prospera and the Riksbank. The real repo rate path How expansionary is the monetary policy that follows on from the Riksbank’s repo rate path? One way to gain an idea of this is to look at the development of the real interest rate. The real interest rate is the most important for the development of the real economy, as it is the interest rate on which consumption and investment decisions are based. It is defined as the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation. The Riksbank also publishes forecasts for the real repo rate in its Monetary Policy Reports. 8  BIS Review 85/2010  Figure 6 shows the Riksbank’s forecast from the April Monetary Policy Update together with different measures of market participants’ expected real repo rate. 8 Let us begin by looking at the Riksbank’s forecast for the real repo rate.
However, at the beginning of the 1970s, the exchange rate cooperation collapsed because of the tensions that had built up due to high, variable inflation in and between the participant countries and that had largely originated from the growing US budget deficit. Efforts at the time to establish a new credible anchor for inflation failed. The following two decades were marked instead by high inflation and low growth in many economies. BIS Review 40/2004  1  From the end of the 1970s the pendulum started to swing back slowly, and an increasing number of economists again highlighted the importance of price stability for economic stability and long-term growth. Attempts to fine-tune the economy via economic policy to stabilise growth had resulted in burgeoning central government debt in many countries, partly because of the inability of politicians to tighten policy sufficiently during booms. The economic debate at the beginning of the 1980s centred therefore on the need for regulations and fixed limits to avoid this. In Sweden, a last big devaluation in 1982 would first enhance the competitiveness that had been eroded for many years as a result of high inflation. However, it was intended that once the devaluation had got the competitive sector on its feet, the fixed exchange rate would thereafter serve as an anchor for an inflation rate in line with other countries. The demands that this imposed on fiscal policy proved politically impossible to live up to, however.

Basel III also envisages the implementation of a long-term liquidity ratio so that banks maintain stable funding profiles, tailored to their assets and activities. In that way, banks’ dependence on short-term funding markets is structurally reduced, since that proved to be a very disruptive weakness in the 2008 financial crisis. The design of this ratio is at a relatively early stage, as the preliminary proposal published in 2010 is being revised. It is expected that, early next year, a consultative document will be available, and that the regulations will have been finalised before 2015, with this entailing a simplification of the original rule. Further, it will be necessary to agree on certain aspects of relevance for Spanish banks, such as, in relation to liquidity requirements, the treatment of high-quality mortgages or matters pertaining to asset encumbrance. This ratio is expected to come into force in 2018, although in the case of the EU, the Commission will have to submit a legislative proposal before 2016. I shall now move on to certain elements relating to the review of capital requirements. This is part of a broader project: to attempt to ensure that the benefits of risk-adjusted regulations, such as Basel III, are not achieved at the cost of introducing excessively complex regulations which, in addition to other problems, yield results that cannot be compared from one bank to another. The Banco de España is in favour of simplifying the current regulations, striking a balance between simplicity, comparability and risk-sensitivity.