samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To give an example, the original idea of applying the socalled country of origin principle should be reconsidered. This would mean that the regulation of the exporting country is applied. The benefits from such a change are straightforward: first, it becomes easier for a service provider that no longer has to deal with the regulations of 28 countries when exporting across the Union. Second, it would incentivise countries to put in place efficient and well-functioning legislation. In addition, the Single Market for services should be expanded to additional sectors: there is, for instance, no good economic reason for excluding health care. As I said earlier, reforms are also about improving economic governance. When the first European Semester was launched in January 2011, it marked a sea change in the economic governance of the euro area. With this new tool, Europe recognised that ex ante coordination of economic policies – and not only fiscal policies – at European level was necessary. Later in the same year, the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) strengthened the European Semester further. For the euro area, the corrective arm of the MIP even foresees sanctions in case of non-compliance. The European Semester and the MIP are powerful tools that no doubt have made the euro area stronger. Yet – five years later – we have to admit that the sun does not shine everywhere. The implementation record for country-specific recommendations (CSRs) was not very high from the start and has declined further recently.

Philipp Hildebrand: The Swiss National Bank’s ability to act in the crisis Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Executive MBA HSG, Universität St Gallen, St Gallen, 21 January 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The global financial system is in the midst of the biggest crisis of the postwar years. Above all, the crisis is the most complex of this period. Problems in the US sub-prime mortgage market led to the breakdown of both markets and general trust. In particular, the interbank market, the nerve centre of the financial markets, froze up for several months. Governments and central banks managed to prevent the financial system from collapsing. The interbank market has been revived and risk premia have come down from their former record levels. In the meantime, however, the financial crisis has worked its way through into the real economy, which is now moving into a sharp downturn. In order to fight the crisis, the central banks have lowered their key interest rates aggressively. The instrument of the Swiss National Bank (SNB), the repo rate, has practically reached zero. However, this certainly does not mean that the SNB is incapable of action. If needed, there are other options available. The National Bank can extend the terms of repo transactions or give consideration to the purchase of government and corporate bonds.
REMARKS ON THE CHILEAN ECONOMY Mario Marcel 1/ Governor, Central Bank of Chile April 2017  1. The last few months have brought mixed signals for the Chilean economy. Recent data suggest the global outlook appears more favorable, particularly for emerging economies. On the one hand, activity data and expectations in advanced economies have been more upbeat, marked by better than expected performance by the manufacturing sector and a more positive outlook following years of stagnation. As a result, deflationary risks have dissipated, as inflation is expected to return to more normal levels. The Federal Reserve (Fed) has continued to normalize monetary policy and monetary authorities in Europe and Japan appear to have set aside the possibility of additional stimulus measures. Markets have incorporated these changes in their expectations avoiding any serious disruptions. Along with better signs in advanced economies, activity in China has remained relatively stable, which contrasts with what had been observed one year ago. 2. In this context, there has been a generalized increase in willingness to take on risk in financial markets, increasing stock market indices, reducing sovereign risk premiums and increasing capital flows to emerging markets. Commodity prices have also benefitted. Copper, our main export product, has been trading at prices near its two year highs and prospects for the next few years have improved, which has had a material impact on the Chilean terms of trade.

In contrast, in the context of the absence of observable macroeconomic imbalances that hinder growth, a scenario in which the global outlook improves, combined with the end of the adjustment of mining-related investment, and a rebound in sentiment, may lead to a more dynamic recovery (figure 9). 17. In fact, several fundamentals of the Chilean economy have remained quite solid during this weaker part of the cycle. As you might know, Chile was one of the first few countries to introduce a structural fiscal policy, which has been applied consistently over more than 15 years. As part of this policy, the government has been able to save during good times and currently has two sovereign wealth funds, totaling almost 10% of GDP. Figure 9 Public sector balance (percent of GDP)  4  Latin America: 1995-2015 average (*)  2  1.1  0 -1.5  -2  -0.5  Chile  Peru  Brazil  Colombia  -6  Argentina  -3.4 -3.1  Mexico  -4  -0.9  Chile  4  9  2  6  6  0  3  3  -2 0  0  -4 -3  -3  -6 -6  -6 90  94  98  02  Effective  06  9  10  14 18(f)  Structural  (*) General Government Financial Balance. (f) For 2017 to 2019, forecasts obtained from the 2016 Public Finances Report. Sources: Moody’s and National Budget Department, Ministry of Finance of Chile. 18.
We would not charge negative interest if we did not regard this as being absolutely crucial for us in fulfilling our mandate. It is of great importance to us for the Swiss people to understand why our current monetary policy is appropriate in its full context, and what impact it has for Switzerland as a whole. Page 2/8  Protracted decline in global interest rates To explain to you why the negative interest rate is necessary, I need to take a broader perspective and look back at the past quarter of a century. The level of interest rates has fallen markedly worldwide over this period. Chart 1 shows that the nominal yields on 10-year government bonds in Switzerland, Germany and the US have been declining since the 1990s. There are various factors behind this downward movement. The first of these is the success central banks have had in their efforts to combat inflation. After the negative experiences with high inflation rates in the 1970s and 1980s, at the beginning of the 1990s many central banks started striving to achieve price stability. Inflation subsequently fell, and so too did the rates of interest on savings accounts and financial market yields. After all, if the money on a savings account retains its value thanks to inflation being lower, the interest no longer needs to compensate for any erosion in value. Lower inflation and the attendant decline in the level of nominal interest rates are essentially a positive development for households and companies alike.

Speech  Embargo 26 April 2019, 10.00 am  Monetary policy in the interests of the country as a whole 111th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Berne, 26 April 2019  © Swiss National Bank (speech given in German)  Page 1/8  Mr President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests A warm welcome to you all to our Annual General Meeting. Engaging with the general public across Switzerland is very important for us. It therefore gives me great pleasure to speak before you here today, and I hope I will have the opportunity to talk with as many of our shareholders as possible over refreshments afterwards. In my position as Chairman of the Swiss National Bank’s Governing Board, I receive a lot of correspondence from people throughout our country. In one such letter, the owner of a family business in northwestern Switzerland described how she had struggled for years to hold on to customers, only to have to now close down anyway as the strength of the franc has made competition from neighbouring countries simply too great. In another letter someone wrote that despite his having had to pay ever higher pension fund contributions over the past 15 years, there has been no increase in his projected retirement savings. In fact, they have even declined. He attributes this to what he refers to as ‘minus interest’.
The second main focus of the Allsopp review is the stark imbalance between the coverage, timeliness and quality of statistics on the services sector relative to those on manufacturing. Suppose you were interested in studying the economic behaviour of the UK textiles industry - which accounts for around one-third of one percent of UK output. The good news is there’s plenty of coverage in the national accounts, although you have some decisions to make. Are you interested in clothing, or carpets and rugs? And if clothing, are you interested in knitted and crocheted garments…or work wear…or outerwear?…or indeed underwear? Each of these has its own data set: the array of sub-categories is truly impressive. However, suppose instead that you were interested in the retail sector, and wanted to know, for example, how much the large supermarket chains have contributed to GDP in recent years, or what inroads they have made into the non-food market. No dice. Although the retail sector nowadays accounts for over 5% of UK output - so it is nearly 20 times the size of the textiles industry - more detailed data are not produced for the UK national accounts. The need for better service sector statistics goes well beyond any interest we might have in detail for its own sake. In the UK, early estimates of GDP rely heavily on measuring output. Since the service sector accounts for more than 70% of UK output, the quality of early GDP estimates is inextricably linked to the quality of service sector statistics.

Subsequently, we started an unprecedented – in terms of size and speed – process of interest rate cuts that was one of the largest in the world, bringing the MPR to developedeconomy levels. Between January and July of 2009, we cur 775 basis points off the MPR and also established a mechanism – the term-liquidity-facility, FLAP – to grant funds to the financial system at the same rate as the MPR for a six-month period (figure 7). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Time and again I wonder what else we could have done to cushion the international recession. In hindsight, it is difficult to think that macroeconomic policies could have averted the collapse in demand, considering its size and speed, and particularly because it was triggered by a severe deterioration in economic expectations. The normal lags of monetary and fiscal policies do not allow containing such a major drop in economic activity while it is happening. Nonetheless, expansionary measures were key to attenuate the fall and also boost the expansion that began in the second quarter of 2009 and continues to this day. The recession was severe, but short. The monetary stimulus was vital in getting out of the recession so quickly. Our economy was recovering strongly until it was smashed by an earthquake and tsunami in February 2010, with devastating consequences.
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES Annual address by Governor Øystein Olsen to the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank on Thursday, 18 February 2021  THURSDAY 18 FEBRUARY 2021  Economic perspectives 2021  NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  INTRODUCTION  Illustration: Theodor Kittelsen, Photo: National Museum / Ivarsøy, Dag Arne  One year ago, I stood here and delivered the annual address to 300 guests. This year is different. This evening there are no guests physically present at the central bank. The contrast with last year could hardly be greater. The same also goes for the theme running through this evening’s speech – the Covid-19 pandemic. Not a trace of it can be found in last year’s speech. Yet contagion was lurking right outside our borders. We sensed that something was brewing. Norges Bank was in the process of revising down its economic forecasts. The employees at our Shanghai office had been sent home, yet we did not foresee how far-reaching the outbreak in Wuhan would be. Two weeks after delivering last year’s speech the first case was recorded in Norway – soon thereafter, Norway went into lockdown. Since then, we have done what people do during serious epidemics – we engage in social distancing. We can still meet – in a way. Technological innovation has provided us with new possibilities. During the Black Death, wealthy farmers from the western fjords of Norway isolated themselves in Jostedal, a remote valley that reaches into the mountains. They had to find new ways to communicate.

Yet as long as the crisis is ongoing, an expansionary monetary policy will be needed to stimulate the economy. This reduces the risk that unemployment becomes entrenched at a high level. At the same time, persistently low interest rates entail a risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. In Norway, rapidly rising house prices and further household debt accumulation pose a particular risk. Once there are clear signs that economic conditions are normalising, we will again seek to normalise the use of instruments – as we did after the financial crisis in 2008 and after the oil price fall in 2014. 11  SUBSTANTIAL TRANSFERS FROM THE GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND GLOBAL  NORGES BANK  The monetary policy stance in the period ahead will be influenced by the timing and means of fiscal policy normalisation. Here the authorities face a difficult balancing act. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  On the one hand, the crisis is not yet over, and there is uncertainty regarding infection rates and the progress of vaccination. Against this background, the Storting (Norwegian parliament) has decided to extend the extraordinary support measures aimed at both individuals and businesses until September. At the same time, it is important that the support measures are scaled back as the situation becomes more normal. If these measures are extended too far into the future, we risk impeding necessary business restructuring. Workers may miss out on opportunities to seek new jobs, and unemployment may become entrenched at a higher level than prior to the crisis.
The Central Bank of Malta seeks to achieve these objectives through the operation of an exchange rate peg. The Bank’s ability to maintain the peg in an environment where capital flows freely across borders, however, depends crucially on financial market perceptions regarding the effectiveness and sustainability of macroeconomic policy, particularly fiscal policy. In this context, the present deficit scenario is not helpful and, if not corrected, could oblige the Bank to raise interest rates. The role of governments How and why have fiscal deficits become a problem? In the first decades after the Second World War, governments came to play a key role in promoting economic growth and social development. In today’s free-market economies, moreover, they provide indispensable support to the activities of the private sector and also play an important role in curbing its excesses. Another function of governments concerns economic stabilisation. They can intervene to stimulate aggregate demand in periods of recession and to restrain it at times when the economy is booming. Under appropriate demand and supply conditions, such intervention can contribute to a more favourable investment environment and, in turn, to growth. Perhaps the most important tool Governments use to pursue these objectives is public expenditure. Taxation and borrowing may be viewed as ways of financing such expenditure, but they also constitute important tools in their own right. Effectiveness of government intervention Government intervention in the economy has important implications not only for competitiveness and growth, but also for the promotion of the social dimension of development.

Michael C Bonello: Fiscal reform - an imperative for sustainable growth and development Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Institute of Financial Services Annual Dinner, St Julians, 11 November 2004. *  *  *  I should first of all like to thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to your annual dinner and for the opportunity to share my thoughts once again with such a distinguished audience. I must also congratulate you on your recent election as President of IFS - Malta and wish you and your Committee every success in your endeavours to ensure that the Institute’s educational programmes remain relevant in today’s complex financial services environment. As you rightly pointed out in your first message to your members, in a situation which is rapidly evolving, “we must be prepared to embrace change.” I have a similar message to convey tonight. Inspired by the words of George Washington that “There is no practice more dangerous than that of borrowing money”, mine is essentially an appeal to the country to leave behind its spendthrift ways and to learn to live within its means. I shall therefore make a case for fiscal reform. Now some might wonder why a central bank governor should be so concerned about the state of the country’s public finances. Put simply, the reason is that a persistent excessive deficit situation represents a potential threat both to price and financial stability, which are key objectives of most central banks today.
9 The recalibration of these operations decided at our last meeting will likely encourage early voluntary repayment of outstanding TLTRO III balances by increasing  8  Fo r instance, under the TLTRO III co nducted during the pandemic, the ECB tempo rarily lent to banks meeting the lending targets at rates as lo w as -1%. 9  The first TLTRO III o peration, which amounted to € billion, matured on 28 September 2022 (with early repayment between September 2021 and June 2022 o f € billion). In the fo urth TLTRO III operatio n in June 2020 the participating banks received a to tal o f € billion, an all-time reco rd in Euro system refinancing operations, which will mature in June 2023, altho ugh it can be repaid earlier. 5  the expected average cost of TLTRO III funds. Such early voluntary repayments of TLTRO III funds would reduce the Eurosystem balance sheet. In my view, it may be appropriate to wait until sufficient outstanding TLTRO III balances have been repaid before starting the bond portfolio run-off, for two reasons. First, the large TLTRO repayments expected in the first part of 2023 will give us an initial picture of any potential asymmetry and non-linearities in the effects of balance sheet reduction vis-à-vis those generated by balance sheet expansion, by when we will probably have too a clearer idea about whether we are in, or headed towards, a recession.

See also N. Sudo (2021), “Quantifying stock and flow effects o f QE”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 53(7), pp. 1719-1755. This study attributes ro ughly three-quarters o f the impact o f the PEPP programme in spring 2020 to the effect o f the anno uncement of the o verall purchase envelo pe, and just o ne-quarter o f its effects to the actual flo w o f purchases. 14  Fo r instance, acco rding to the SMA, the median respo ndent expects APP reinvestments to last until June 2023, with a steady reductio n in the APP po rtfo lio thereafter. 15  Under the TPI, the Euro system will be able to make seco ndary market purchases o f securities issued in jurisdictions experiencing a deterio ratio n in financing co nditions not warranted by co untry-specific fundamentals, subject to fulfilling established eligibility criteria. Fo r further details, see ECB press release, “The Transmissio n Protection Instrument”, 21 July 2022. 8  monetary policy is tightening while economies are facing an energy shock. In this context, fiscal policy should refrain from providing across -the-board fiscal support, as this would further raise inflation. 16 In turn, higher inflation would eventually force monetary policy to tighten further, with the resulting adverse implications for governments’ financing costs and for the economy more broadly. More generally, the optimal response, in my opinion, should be guided by four criteria. First, the aggregate euro area fiscal policy stance should also be normalised.
In that case, loyalty to a network of professional contacts was a powerful incentive to commit fraud. I am lucky to have had a very different experience at the New York Fed. I oversee a staff of legal, compliance, and law enforcement professionals who appreciate their paychecks but, in all candor, are not in it for the money—or, at least, not entirely in it for the money. What matters to them is the Federal Reserve’s public mission. A good way to encourage their best conduct is to acknowledge their contributions to that mission. But don’t take my word for it. A growing number of organizational experts and management consultants have concluded that job satisfaction and other intrinsic benefits matter as much if not more than extrinsic rewards, including pay. 7 This is not to say that incentive compensation is 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  weak tea. It is certainly a powerful motivator. My point is that, in your efforts to construct the most effective controls for your organization’s risks, consider both monetary and non-monetary incentives. Moral reasoning It is also important to promote moral reasoning. I know there’s a joke in there somewhere. After all, what is a lawyer doing talking about morality? And there is some tension in advocating moral judgment in a discussion about controls. Controls seek consistency and objectivity. Morality, by contrast, can be very personal or subjective. Controls often remove discretion. Moral reasoning is all about choice. But let’s be realistic.

And so it is my pleasure to welcome you to this ceremony today, formally to witness the appointment of Standard Chartered Bank as the Settlement Institution for the new euro clearing system. This system will enable a wide range of financial transactions in euro to be settled on a real-time basis here in Hong Kong. Not only should this be useful to those involved with trade and remittances in euro, but it should also facilitate financial institutions to manage international liquidity and investment portfolios in Hong Kong. The system will encompass not only the best, internationally agreed, principles of payment system design but also state-of-the-art technology. It will provide RTGS settlement for euro denominated fund transfers; a linkage with the US dollar payment system to provide real-time PvP settlement for EUR/USD transactions; and linkages with the CMU to provide DvP settlement for euro-denominated debt securities, in readiness for the potential development of that market. We expect to see all these features implemented by the second quarter of 2003. For the moment there will be no cheque clearing capability, but this is something which could be added later if there was sufficient demand. As in the case of the US dollar clearing, we have adopted a private sector solution, with a commercial bank as the Settlement Institution. This is not only consistent with the tradition in Hong Kong, but is also in line with international practice and with the recommendations of the Bank for International Settlements.