samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
London’s position has developed gradually and the statistics rarely separate the group of wholesale financial markets and supporting legal, accounting and other services that make London special from a broader group including retail banking and insurance and business services. But there is some evidence that all three factors are at work. The story seems clearest with the specific factors of production. The cost of commercial property in London, for example, has grown rapidly. According to Jones Lang Lasalle Research, in the City average capital values are over $ per sq.m, above both Paris and New York. And the costs in the West End, the main home of the new hedge fund industry, are almost twice as high. There is no doubt that the success of London’s financial centre is helping to fuel demand for office space from Canary Wharf to Mayfair. And of course it is not just commercial property in London that has been booming. House price inflation in London has outstripped the rest of the UK (Chart 1), and in Kensington and Chelsea average house prices have risen by almost 40% since the start of 2005, compared with 20% for Greater London as a whole. ECA International published a survey comparing average monthly rents for a 70-square metre unfurnished flat in the largest cities and showed London over € 2,100, compared with New York around € 1,750 and Paris below € 1,500.

Gent Sejko: Ninth and tenth review of the arrangement with the IMF concluded Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the joint press conference with the IMF mission and the Minister of Finance, Tirana, 24 January 2017. * * *  On the completion of the ninth and tenth review of the Arrangement with the IMF The beginning of 2017 coincides with the conclusion of Albania’s arrangement with the IMF. This Arrangement has guided our development policies over the past three years, and has been a roadmap for our structural reforms agenda in the long term. Against this backdrop, the last review of the Arrangement not only provides for a comprehensive assessment on the achievement of its objectives, but also helps in identifying challenges to the country’s development and contributes to discussions on the policies that need to be designed and implemented for supporting the development. Let me now outline the opinion of the Bank of Albania on this review. The Arrangement with the IMF was signed amid an external economic and financial environment surrounded by uncertainties, and in response to deepening internal development challenges. Economic growth was on the downtrend, public debt and nonperforming loans were set on the uptrend, and uncertainties in the Albanian economy and financial markets were relatively high.
This will be a key development in our thinking about Op Res (including third party risk management) as a whole. It will also inform the evolving cross-sectoral and international debate on the topic. 4. Conclusion As I outlined at the start of my remarks, firms are on a journey to achieve the level of operational resilience set out in the policy we published as final just over a year ago. A positive start has been made on this journey, and I want to thank you all again for the open and direct engagement we have enjoyed along the way. It will be important to build on this as firms tackle the next legs of the journey. In line with my remarks today, there are clear developments needed before the deadline for meeting the policy outcomes by end March 2025 at the latest. You can expect the PRA to continue to work with firms along the way both directly though firm specific supervisory dialogue but also through industry wide events like this. We will also be 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  continuing to evolve our own supervisory and policy approach to ensure it supports this industrywide effort. I would like to thank you for your time today and I look forward to ongoing engagement with you all, including through the discussion to come, as we collectively move this work forward. I would like to thank Helen Stone and Harry Grantham-Hill for their invaluable help in preparing these remarks.

And second, because prudential supervision was not sufficiently active in detecting and preventing this type of instrument. None of these elements has been present in the Spanish banking system, which explains why Spanish banks have no exposure to these vehicles. Spanish banks have obtained sufficient profits pursuing their traditional and typically retail activity, meaning they have had no great interest in developing either the structures or products that are at the root of the current problems. The Banco de España has been categorical regarding its requirement that these vehicles be consolidated for accounting and capital purposes. Today, following the application of International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005, this requirement to consolidate conduits and SIVs is now very clear. But even before the IFRSs came into force, Spanish banks had no incentive to develop these off-balance sheet vehicles, because the Banco de España always analysed the risks assumed by banks from a consolidated perspective. Fourth lesson: on the procyclicality of banking regulation The fourth lesson to be drawn from the turbulence is related to the debate that has reopened on international markets about the way in which financial regulation should address so-called procyclicality. In particular, concern has been raised about Basel II and international accounting standards. We should perhaps begin by acknowledging that financial market participants themselves behave in a procyclical way, as they tend at favourable times in the cycle to forget about the consequences of an excessive build-up in risks.
One explanation is that holding cash is associated with cost and inconvenience and there is therefore a willingness to accept a certain cost to avoid doing so. But an e-krona would change the prerequisites. In contrast to physical cash, the e-krona would not require agents to invest in ways of storing, transporting and insuring. This means that the lower bound for the policy rate would increase, probably to zero, that is, where it was previously assumed to be. In this sense, the e-krona could restrict monetary policy and make it less effective. The situation would be entirely different if the e-krona was to be interest-bearing. The zero bound would then no longer constitute a restriction as the yield of the ekrona itself could be negative. Furthermore, if physical cash were to be entirely phased out, the policy rate could instead be taken much further into negative territory than today. 26 Potentially, therefore, monetary policy would become more effective, even though it would probably be met by significant resistance from economic agents. This resistance is already substantial to what are currently more modest negative interest rate levels. But with an interest-bearing e-krona, we would also be in a completely different world. The interest rate on the e-krona, for example, would become a new regular monetary policy instrument. Potentially, therefore, it would involve a change on many different levels. However, with the current legislation, it is not clear whether it is even possible for the Riksbank to introduce an interest-bearing ekrona.

Re-establishing it may require a prolonged and costly process, which should also be taken into account. It is such fears that largely explain the policy conducted by the Riksbank in recent years. Does a policy that “leans against the wind” require there to be confidence in the inflation target? It is probably possible to construct theoretical and quantified examples in which the recession that is prevented or mitigated by “leaning against the wind” is sufficiently long and deep for it to be worth taking the cost of losing, and having to re-establish, confidence in the inflation target. But in practice, it is very difficult to imagine how a central bank, seeing that confidence in the inflation target is being eroded, could stick to a tighter policy and risk inflation expectations staying permanently low in order to perhaps prevent a financial crisis sometime in the future. I am not saying that this is a reason to never conduct a policy that “leans against the wind”. On the contrary, I am personally in favour of the idea as such, and can well imagine formally integrating such a policy into the monetary policy set-up, in the way it has been done in Norway. But one can argue a policy that “leans against the wind” is in practice a “fair-weather” policy – windy but sunny, in other words. Only as long as confidence in the inflation target is intact, there is scope to use monetary policy to counteract financial imbalances.
Diverse new sources of growth have now emerged across ASEAN, with the economies now moving beyond their traditional reliance on manufactured exports to expanding the production of resource-based products, and increasingly to the services sector and thus providing greater flexibility to respond to shifts in external demand. There has also been a rebalancing of the sources of growth between domestic and external demand. The role of private consumption has strengthened in the ASEAN economies. ASEAN now possesses a burgeoning consumer market that is valued at more than USD 330 billion. With high savings rate continuing to prevail, there is potential for this trend to be sustained. Consumption demand has also been supported by rising incomes, with GDP per capita having increased to over USD 1,500 compared to USD 1,157 in 2000. In the long-term, these trends are expected to be reinforced by the positive demographic structure in the ASEAN region. ASEAN’s population is not only large but also young with 55% at less than 30 years old and becoming increasingly urbanized. There is also greater involvement of the private sector in the economy following the period of adjustment post-crisis. Private investment which was initially slow to adjust has now shown prospects for a stronger recovery. The potential for greater investment is driven by the rising infrastructure requirements throughout the region that is estimated at USD 160 billion for the period 2006-2010. There has also been growing interest in resource-based industries.

This has not only enhanced the range of business opportunities for the financial institutions but also their potential to expand beyond domestic borders and building further on regional linkages. Increased Asian regional complementarities Post-crisis, ASEAN has further increased intra-regional trade and investment linkages within ASEAN and with the other major economies in the region. Intra-Asian trade now accounts for more than half of the total trade of the region. The emergence of China and India has created new export markets for ASEAN, thus diversifying the ASEAN export market from over-concentration in the traditional markets. ASEAN is among the few regions to have a significant and growing trade surplus with China, reaching about USD 20 billion in 2005. Meanwhile, the total trade between the ASEAN-5 and India has expanded by more than tenfold from only USD 2 billion in 1990 to USD 21 billion in 2005. 2  BIS Review 46/2007  In investment activities, Japanese investors have had an early presence in most of the ASEAN economies. This has generally reflected the diverse comparative advantage of ASEAN economies that range from labour cost advantages to natural resources and the increasingly more deregulated and liberalised regimes. Foreign investors have also leveraged their supply chain networks on the ASEAN platform to take advantage of this diverse comparative advantage. Even within ASEAN, there has been an increasing trend of outward direct investment especially by Malaysia and Singapore, being undertaken to leverage on regional growth opportunities.
For example, for the euro area, see Gambetti and Musso (2017), “The macro eco nomic impact o f the ECB’s expanded asset purchase pro gramme (APP)”, ECB Working Paper No 2075. Fo r the United States, see Weale and Wieladek (2016), “What are the macro eco no mic effects o f asset purchases?”, Journal of Monetary Economics (79): 81-93. And lastly, fo r the United Kingdo m, see Kapetanio s et al. (2012), “Assessing the eco no my-wide effects o f quantitative easing”, The Economic Journal, Vo l. 122, pp. 316-347. 7  Co stain, Nuño and Thomas (2022), “The term structure o f interest rates in a hetero geneo us mo netary union”, Working Paper No 2223, Banco de España. 4  over time and across asset classes -, it played an additional role to reduce fragmentation within the euro area and thus ensure a smooth transmission of the single monetary policy. Let me now turn to the TLTROs. In 2014 the ECB launched TLTROs. Unlike the (non-targeted) longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) that preceded them, these ECB loans were specifically targeted at encouraging euro area banks to expand their lending to households and firms. Provided they met certain lending targets, banks received TLTRO loans under very advantageous conditions. 8 In this respect, TLTROs are complementary to asset purchases. While asset purchases aim to reduce the funding costs of those agents (such as sovereign and large corporate issuers) that fund themselves through bonds, TLTROs are intended to increase households’ and (smaller) firms’ access to bank credit.

In this respect, given the high level of debt, an increase in interest rates may have a significant impact on interest expenditure, although this effect would take some time to become manifest, since the lengthy average term of maturity means that the pass-through of changes in interest rates to the cost of refinancing debt comes about gradually. This situation means we must continue to rationalise public spending and make it more efficient, prioritising those items that have a greater potential for improving productivity and long-term growth. During the crisis, spending on public investment has halved, standing significantly below the average level for the euro area, and most likely even below – though this is not an easy calculation to make – the level needed to cover the depreciation of the existing stock of public capital. Turning to revenues, consideration should be given to reviewing the composition of taxes which, once the desired level of public spending has been set, may enable the necessary takings to be raised in the most stable and efficient way possible. Compared with the European Union average, it is a fact that Spain stands out for the relatively low weight of its tax revenue as a proportion of GDP, this being attributable, in the comparison within the euro area, to the low relative weight of indirect taxation, particularly in the areas of environmental taxes and excise duties.
The future output sub-index of the global composite PMI recorded 67.1 in May, signalling strong expansion going forward. Asian businesses expect to share in the global recovery in the second half of the year. The corresponding reading for the Asia ex-Japan economies 4 stood at 60.3 in May, well above last year’s average of 53.2. The expected strengthening in momentum is due to two main factors: substantial policy stimulus in the US and brisk deployment of vaccines in the US and Europe. The strength of the rebound in the advanced economies should in turn provide a powerful tailwind for Asian economies, particularly those that are more actively engaged in global supply chains. Overall, the global economy is expected to expand by 5.8% 5 in 2021, after last year’s 3.0% contraction. 1/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  The global economy has probably already regained its pre-pandemic level of output. In fact, the global economy could potentially surprise on the upside. One, vaccination rates are rising in many advanced economies, allowing them to re-open earlier and more fully. Some of them may effectively suppress domestic transmission by the end of Q3 2021. Two, even if there are mobility restrictions on account of new outbreaks of the virus, businesses and households have become better at adapting to such restrictions. A review of the evidence by MAS 6 has found that economic activity has become less responsive to movement restrictions over time.

This is an area where active choices must be made. We look at the choice of external asset managers as an investment decision. Since 1998, we have invested through 319 different external active equity managers. To retain their mandates, they must show over time that they can identify profitable investments. They must also take responsible investment into account. The fund’s size and breadth enable us to follow up the external asset managers systematically over time. Internally, we employ portfolio managers who perform their own analyses and monitor the external asset managers’ portfolios. All aspects of the activities of these managers are evaluated to ensure that they meet our requirements and expectations. Chart: Net relative return. External asset managers We get back much more from external asset managers than we have paid for their services. In the period to 2019, cumulative excess return after costs associated with external mandates has 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  been NOK 48 billion. The results have exceeded expectations. At the same time, these investments spread the fund’s risk across more markets. External asset managers also help the fund to steer clear of problematic business models and companies and sectors with weak ownership structures. It would have been difficult to achieve without local knowledge. The Executive Board intends to raise the limit for the external management mandates to 5 percent of the fund next year. Conclusion The fund has become larger than anyone could have imagined only a few years ago.
A signalling channel may also have been at work as we had communicated our intention to follow a clear sequence in the process of policy normalisation: to end net asset purchases before raising interest rates. However, empirical evidence suggests that the effects of the signalling channel tend to materialise predominantly at shorter maturities, with limited impact at longer maturities. See Altavilla et al. (2015), “Asset purchase programmes and financial markets: lessons from the euro area”, Working Paper Series, No 1864, ECB, November. 21. Andrade et al. (2016, op. cit. ); and Krishnamurthy, A. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2011, op. cit.). 22. Albertazzi, U. et al. (2021), “Portfolio rebalancing and the transmission of large-scale asset purchase programs: Evidence from the Euro area”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 48, October; Altavilla et al., op. cit; and Andrade et al. (2016, op. cit.). 23. Portfolio rebalancing can also be thought of in the context of the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy, which suggests that a long period of very accommodative monetary policy causes investors to increase risk-taking. See Borio, C. and Zhu, H. (2012), “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: A missing link in the transmission mechanism?”, Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 8, No 4, pp. 236-251; and  Adrian, T. and Shin, H. S. (2010), “Liquidity and leverage,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 19, No 3, pp. 418–437. 24. Guimaraes, B. (2011), "Sovereign Default: Which Shocks Matter? ", Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol.

We hope to conclude this review by the end of the year. One important element in our discussion is the amount of central bank reserves required to effectively steer short-term interest rates in either a floor or a corridor system. This amount informs our decisionmaking as to when balance sheet normalisation might need to be halted. Structural and regulatory changes have made estimating the demand for reserves more challenging than before the global financial crisis. [5] However, our current estimates suggest that the amount of central bank reserves currently held by the banking sector exceeds, by a significant margin, the level necessary to steer short-term market rates close to our key policy rate even under a floor system. This implies that the current size of our balance sheet is larger than necessary to effectively implement our monetary policy stance. As such, maintaining a large bond portfolio absorbs valuable policy space that may be needed if policy rates were to become constrained again by the effective lower bound. Shrinking the balance sheet, to the extent possible, is therefore both prudent and efficient. Mitigating negative side effects of a large balance sheet The second reason for reducing the APP portfolio is related to the side effects of running a large balance sheet. It is well documented that bond purchases can cause asset price valuations in financial and real estate markets to diverge from their economic fundamentals, thus raising both financial stability risks and wealth inequality. [6] Maintaining too large a balance sheet may also have undesirable side effects.
John C Williams: If we fail to prepare, we prepare to fail Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, 6 June 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery Note: These remarks are based on those delivered at the 9th High-Level Conference on the International Monetary System on May 14, 2019. Introduction Thank you for that kind introduction and for the opportunity to speak again at the Council on Foreign Relations. I’m going to keep my remarks brief so that there’s plenty of time for Steve to grill me on interest rates, followed by some thoughtful questions from the audience. With the mention of interest rates, it’s time I remind everyone that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. John Maynard Keynes is credited with saying, “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” The economic era we’ve experienced for the last 11 years has been defined by the Great Recession. There’s the world before, and the world after, the subprime mortgage crisis, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and the ensuing financial crisis. The Road to Recovery Governments and central banks have spent the intervening years working to get their economies growing, create jobs, and put regulation in place to prevent another such catastrophe.

In OECD countries, population growth averaged over 1 percent back in the 1950s and 1960s, but it is now running at half a percent per year, and is expected to gradually fall before dipping into negative figures by 2070.1 Slowing birth rates mean fewer consumers and fewer workers. People planning on longer retirements will tend to save more. And while this is undoubtedly good news in many respects, an abundance in the supply of savings also has a big effect on the global economic picture. When it comes to productivity, there has also been a stark step-down in growth. Rapid changes in the kinds of technology we use in our daily lives—robotic vacuum cleaners, self-driving cars, and facial recognition technology in our phones—may make this seem counterintuitive or plain wrong.2 But the data are clear. In OECD economies, growth in labor productivity—the amount produced per worker hour—has averaged a little over 1 percent per year since 2005, about half the pace seen over the prior decade. Falling R-star So what does all this mean for the future? Two things: First, slower population and productivity growth translate directly into slower trend economic growth. Second, an abundance of savings, and a decline in demand for savings resulting from slower trend growth, together lead to lower interest rates. All of these factors combined have contributed to dramatic declines in the longer-term neutral rate of interest, or rstar. While a central bank like the Fed sets short-term interest rates, r-star is a result of longer-term economic factors.