samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When these transitory influences drop out of the year-over-year numbers this spring, the inflation rate is likely to move higher. Importantly, even as inflation undershot the FOMC’s objective over the past year, inflation expectations have been broadly stable. I would be much more concerned if low inflation outcomes were contributing to a decline in inflation expectations. That would make it more difficult to push inflation back toward our 2 percent objective and would increase the risk of getting stuck at the effective lower bound for interest rates following the next economic downturn, which inevitably will come. Even if inflation were to remain somewhat below 2 percent over the near future, that might not be a serious problem, if the economy were to continue to perform well in other respects. To me, it would imply that the unemployment rate associated with “maximum employment” is lower than current estimates and that we could let the labor market tighten a bit further. This would be a positive outcome because the productive capacity of the U.S. economy would be enhanced and more people would be able to find jobs, develop their job skills, and build their human capital. In short, 2018 looks like it will be a good year for the economy. I anticipate that the Federal Reserve will make further progress in achieving its dual mandate objectives of maximum sustainable employment and price stability. If circumstances evolve close to what I have outlined today, I will continue to advocate for gradually removing monetary policy accommodation.

In certain cases, their carbon footprint is as large as the one of 15.5 million petrol cars in a year.26 Sixth, since crypto assets can also be used for unlawful activities, including money laundering, financial integrity concerns follow. Such risks could be larger on account of the fact that transactions are performed through non-standard payment systems and their heightened degree of anonymity. Seventh, crypto-assets’ value could also become swiftly eroded on account of the limitations and problems associated with cyber risks associated to the technologies underpinning their operations, i.e. blockchains. This could occur due to a wide range of possible causes, such as their technical configuration placing constraints on the scale of operations, which would prevent growing public demand from being met. While progress is 23  Investment in or proprietary trading of crypto-assets or the purchase of structured products in which they are an underlying asset would appear to be the most common means by which they are incorporated onto banks’ balance sheets. 24  In certain cases (e.g. El Salvador), this state of affairs is deliberate. 25  See “Cryptoassets as National Currency? A Step Too Far”. T. Adrian and R. Weeks-Brown (2021), IMF blog, 26 July. 26  See “Hearing on Cleaning Up Cryptocurrency: The Energy Impacts of Blockchains”. US House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce (2022). 7  being made in this field, these developments are still far from being mature enough.
Third, and instead, what matters more – not just for inflation itself but the cost of government debt as well – is the prevailing regime for monetary policy. The two can clearly interact: the monetary regime was abandoned in those wars partly because of the pressures from higher spending, and it was that de-linking from gold that allowed prices to rise in the first place. Equally, it was precisely because of the visibility and prominence of that measure, and the belief that it was likely to be temporary, that both the subsequent inflation and the rise in the cost of new government borrowing were contained to the degree they were. Conclusion Aggressive monetary easing by central banks, occurring as it has alongside very large government deficits, has raised fears in some quarters about “monetary finance”. These are misplaced. Certainly there’s nothing about the coincidence of the two in time that, in and of itself, constitutes monetary finance. If the rise in government debt is caused by a weak economy, something that would otherwise depress inflation, easing policy is exactly what an independent, inflation-targeting monetary authority should be doing. Theory tells you that, to stabilise inflation, policy needs to lean against swings in demand and UK history bears that out. It’s true that, if only for a while, easier money policy reduces the real cost of borrowing, for public and private sectors alike. That’s how it’s meant to work. The reduction in the cost of borrowing for the private sector stimulates demand and inflation.

Chart 3b uses slightly different measures for the same things – the average policy vote on the MPC and a survey measure of growth6 – but the conclusion is the same. Policy is tightened when growth is strong and loosened when it’s weak. It’s no surprise to find that the government balance is similarly cyclical (3c) – or, therefore, that it’s also well correlated with the behaviour of monetary policy. Furthermore, the responsiveness of policy rates to economic growth seems to be necessary to stabilise inflation. Certainly inflation has been very stable under inflation targeting (more stable, in fact, than in any 25-year period in the 800-year history of the estimated UK series). And you have to go back all the way to 6 A weighted average of the composite PMI and (to cover the distribution sector) the headline balance from the CBI distributive trades survey. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  the pre-WWI classical gold standard, the last time the UK had something akin to a “target” for domestic prices7, to find a period when short-term interest rates were reasonably well correlated with economic growth – or in which inflation was well controlled (Chart 4). Chart 3a: Monetary policy and economic activity correlated under inflation targeting  Chart 3b: Also apparent using MPC votes and survey measure of growth  Sources: De Rezende and Ristiniemi (2020), ONS and Bank calculations. 6-month averages, combined IHS Markit/CIPS and CBI distributive trades lagged one month.
If liquidating the bank has the potential to disrupt the financial system and therefore the public interest test is positive, the bank will be resolved at the European level instead. The SRB has various tools at its disposal for this and they are laid out in the relevant legislation. All these tools ensure that a bank can fail in an orderly manner without disrupting the financial system. And this is the overarching goal. Who foots the bill? Ladies and gentlemen, I have talked about the decision to declare that a bank is failing or likely to fail. And I have talked about what happens after such a decision is taken. The next thing I will talk about is money. Bank failures are costly. So who foots the bill? “Not the taxpayers” is the first and most important answer I can give you. After all, the main objective of the new framework is to spare taxpayers. Instead, it should be the owners and creditors who bear the losses. I have already explained the reasoning behind this. But how does it work in practice? The first thing to mention is that banks now have to hold more equity than they did before the crisis. This means that each bank has a larger buffer to absorb losses. And these losses are borne by those who provided the equity, the shareholders. So, higher equity means that the owners of a bank bear a larger share of any losses incurred. At the same time, failure becomes less likely.

But I draw upon my own experience in the corporate world and upon the insights offered by Goodhart to suggest that you simply take all this forward guidance and forecasting a year or more out with a big grain of salt, bearing in mind that the policy statements and forecasts issued by the FOMC are tactical judgments of the moment, made within a broader strategic context. 6  “Longer-term Central Bank Forecasts Are Step Backwards,” by Charles Goodhart, Financial Times, Feb. 2, 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The most important announcement Which leads me to what I consider the third and most important announcement we made last week: the statement of our longer-range goals and strategy. For the first time, the entire 17-member committee stated that, given inflation over the longer term is primarily determined by monetary policy, we are able to specify that an inflation rate of 2 percent, as measured by the index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent with our mandate.
Famously Alan Greenspan asked “But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions..?” There are two good reasons for care. First policy has to be appropriate for the whole economy; the interest rates which would be needed to have a significant effect, say, on the growth of house prices in recent years might have been far too high for other industries. Secondly central bankers have been cautious to put much weight on their own assessments of when an increase in asset prices is becoming unsustainable. If they get the judgement wrong, they risk slowing growth needlessly and bring inflation persistently below target. Even if central bankers put more weight in future on their judgements of excesses in financial markets, it seems highly desirable also to make the regulatory system more counter-cyclical. BIS Review 94/2008  3  A number of proposals have recently been put forward, which would have the effect of directly increasing a bank's capital requirements during an economic upturn and allow room for capital requirements to fall in a downturn. For instance Professors Goodhart and Persaud have put forward a scheme linking a bank's capital to the growth in its assets. Another possibility is to learn from the Spanish system of requiring banks to set aside general provisions against their loan book in good times which can be a cushion against losses in the downturn.

These include the low precipitation that affected hydroelectric power, various diseases that affected livestock and the fact that Sweden and southern Europe suffered poor harvests. We are in agreement with other forecasters and analysts that the inflation rate will fall as the effects of the transitory price rises abate and inflation approaches 2 per cent in early summer. In the longer term perspective, however, the picture looks slightly different and developments indicate an inflation rate above the target of 2 per cent. The assessment contained in the main scenario of the most recent Inflation Report has CPI inflation at 2.2 per cent one year ahead and 2.4 per cent two years ahead. The corresponding forecast for underlying inflation, UND1X, is an increase of 2.2 per cent at both one and two years ahead. It is the latter measure that is the most central to monetary policy. However, each inflation assessment also takes into account the risk spectrum. The risk spectrum mainly concerns domestic inflationary pressure. If resource utilisation comes under greater strain than the Riksbank has estimated in its main scenario, or if the potential growth rate has been overestimated, there is a risk that inflation will be higher than expected in future. Taking into account the risk spectrum, underlying inflation comes out at 2.3 per cent both one year and two years ahead. Although the inflation rate is expected to fall over the coming months, the forecasts indicate that it will exceed the inflation target one to two years ahead.
Rather than constructive ambiguity, we need credible clarity that when a bank gets into trouble, the losses will be made to fall on shareholders and creditors and not the taxpayer. And if the bank provides critical services to the economy, that these can continue while the bank is resolved in an orderly way. The Purple Book  It is in order to achieve such credible clarity, that next week the Bank will publish an update of its approach to resolution. This document – known by the colour of its cover as the Purple Book - was first published in October 2014. Its purpose is to set out very clearly the options that the Bank has to deal with a failure of a bank and the way in which we would use our powers. Explaining how resolution is designed to work in practice and what is needed to remove barriers to resolvability are necessary steps to ensure that resolution regimes are credible. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  The Purple Book illustrates the scale of progress that has been made in the UK towards putting in place a credible and effective way of dealing with bank failures. I would pick out three crucial areas of reform:  First, there is now a comprehensive statutory framework to deal with failing banks, for which the Bank of England is formally responsible. We have statutory powers to match this responsibility and there are a wide range of options available to us.

In order to prepare for the meeting with John Global, I suggest that we take a closer look at his daily routine. Let us take a sunny day of September 2026. Time: 5 a.m. Place: somewhere in the city of Poznan. John Global is still asleep, but the world is already getting ready to wake him up. The news aggregator is ready to provide him with a set of most recent news in line with his interests. As John Global tends to look through newspapers before 07:00 CET when he is in Poznan, and before 16:00 CET when he is in Hong Kong, the aggregator is already preparing a ‘special edition’. And Global always begins his day with looking through online newspapers and drinking well-brewed coffee. Coffee is one of his indulgences, a look back to recall past events, as coffee has been his morning ritual for more than 20 years. As far as other things are concerned, our Global tries to be more flexible and not to fall into any habits. It's 6:30 a.m. John Global wakes up. He enjoys the view from the window – the forest and lake. It is indeed different from the one he saw two days ago in Hong Kong – skyscrapers and smog blotting out the sun. He left Warsaw for Poznan 20 years ago, in 2006, when he realized that administrative issues are too timeconsuming and generate negative emotions.
And all policymakers have an obligation to learn from past crises and past mistakes. That is the only way credibility can be built: not the avoidance of crises and mistakes, which is impossible, but the recognition by the public that, when they do happen, the crises are contained and the mistakes are honest ones. The Bank of England is embarking on the latest chapter in its 318-year history. We cannot avoid a crisis but, as with Barings in 1890, we can endeavour to prevent it becoming a drama. We will certainly be doing our best to prevent it becoming a tragedy like that of the past few years. If nothing else, this new chapter will have learnt from, and will build on, the lessons of history. Thank you. References Ahamed, L (2009) “Lords of Finance”, William Heinemann Ltd. Bagehot, W (1873), “Lombard Street: A description of the Money Market”, Reprinted 1962. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois. Bank of England Archive E4/2. File on employment of women 1910–1919. Bank of England, (2012), The Framework for the Bank of England’s operations in the Sterling Money Markets available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/ money/publications/redbookjune2012.pdf  14  Capie (2010) p50. 15  Boyle op cit p327.

Andrew G Haldane: The Bank and the banks Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, at Queen’s University, Belfast, 18 October 2012. *  *  *  The views expressed within are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Bethany Blowers, Forrest Capie, John Keyworth, Victoria Kinahan, Emma Murphy, Varun Paul, Richard Roberts, and the staff of the Bank’s archives for their comments and contributions. In the light of the financial crisis, there is much to explain. Doing so is not just important for reasons of accountability to the public. Explaining and understanding errors of the past is absolutely essential if policymakers are to learn lessons for the future. To misquote someone none of you have ever heard of, those who forget the errors of the past are doomed to repeat them. During the course of its 318-year history, the Bank of England has had plenty of crisis experience. And encouragingly, on my reading of history, there is evidence of it having learnt from this experience. In response, radical reform of the Bank’s policymaking framework has been commonplace. There are few better examples than the radical reform of the Bank’s transparency and accountability practices over the past twenty-five years. Those reforms are continuing to the present day. A wholly new framework for financial stability policy is being put in place in the UK, perhaps the most radical in the Bank’s history.
Allow me to tackle several important aspects that will be included in our discussion in the days ahead of us. First, the conference will be opened by promoting the Red Book of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems of the Republic of Macedonia, which was issued at the end of last year, in cooperation with the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This publication is important for the Republic of Macedonia because it further improves the understanding, at both national and international level, of the functioning of the payment and securities settlement systems. At the same time, this project promoted the process of harmonization of the payment statistics of the National Bank with the payment statistics of the European Central Bank, which is an ongoing process that includes other banks, and is expected to facilitate complete methodological unification and readiness to disseminate information in accordance with the requirements of the statistical system of the European Central Bank. Allow me on this occasion to welcome Mr. Emanuel Freire, who will promote the Red Book of the Republic of Macedonia and present the activities of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems. Second, this conference will focus on the integrative processes in the field of payments within the European Union. We are all aware that the financial integration in Europe is important for both the increase of competition and the support of economic growth.

It is really a great honor to have representatives from the central banks of the EU member states as well as from the candidate countries attending this conference, especially having in mind that on the last day of the conference some of them will have presentations and share their experiences in the domain of payment systems. Ladies and gentlemen, Now, allow me to declare the seventh conference on payment and securities settlement systems open! I would like to wish the chairman Mr. Michiel van Doeveren and his colleagues a successful conference. I hope the weather will be fine and you will enjoy the beauties of Lake Ohrid, and in the afternoon and in the evening, you will have the opportunity to visit the city of Ohrid, which is one of the best preserved material and spiritual legacies witnessing the millennial existence of our culture and historical heritage. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Therefore, in the second part of my intervention, I would like to explore in more detail some of the most important recent trends and developments in risk management theory and practices, and also the impact that these developments can have both on individual firms and on the economy as a whole. I will cover three trends in particular: firm-wide assessment of risk, risk aggregation and risk transfer. This will lead me to the third part of my intervention: the challenge of devising a supervisory response which harnesses these developments for the benefit of financial stability. As I will argue, it is critical to ensure that our supervisory and regulatory structures are compatible with the best practices in risk management today. But I believe that our structures must go beyond that and actually encourage firms to continue to improve their measures of risk exposures and their approaches to mitigating them in the future. This forward-looking approach forms the basis of Basel II. In the final part of my intervention, I will explore some of the implications of Basel II that received some attention in recent times: namely, the potential impact of the new framework, both on capital flows and on global competition. My purpose today is not to describe Basel II in detail, but rather to highlight the dynamic processes that it stimulates.

Jaime Caruana: Announcement of Basel II Opening remarks of Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the press conference announcing the publication of Basel II, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, 26 June 2004. *  *  *  I would like to thank President Trichet for his kind words, which I will certainly share with my colleagues. On behalf of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, I am honoured to join him in announcing the publication of the revised framework for bank capital adequacy, a document that we have officially entitled, the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework.” I will not go into details about the document in my opening remarks, although of course I will be delighted to answer questions afterwards. What I would like to say is that the new framework represents a significant step towards achieving a more comprehensive and risk sensitive supervisory approach. It also represents an unparalleled opportunity for banks to improve their capital strategies and risk management systems. And finally, it provides supervisors with an opportunity to improve their ability to identify banking risks and to enhance the dialogue with the industry and among banking supervisors. This new approach can be expected to play a significant role in reinforcing the soundness of individual banks and thereby enhancing financial stability. Our objective is also to ensure a consistent application across jurisdictions.
Josef Bonnici: An alternative model for banking in Malta – a case for setting up a cooperative bank in Maltese economic realities Address by Professor Josef Bonnici, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Seminar on “Cooperative banking”, Valletta 27 September 2012. *  *  *  Honourable Ministers, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. As the previous speakers have shown, cooperative banks, though not often in the news, in these times perhaps thankfully, have a considerable presence in most countries, particularly, but not only, in European countries. Indeed, data for 2010 show that in Europe cooperative banks hold a market share of over 20% of deposits and a similar market share for loans. Their presence is particularly marked in France, where the three cooperative banking groups (Credit Agricole, BPCE and Credit Mutuel) account for some 50% of the market share for loans and 60% of that for deposits. There is also a significant presence in Italy, where they enjoy a market share of 34% of deposits and 30% for loans; in Germany, where they have a market share of 19% for deposits and 16% for loans; in the Netherlands, with a market share of 43% of deposits and 30% for loans; and in Finland, with a market share of 34% for deposits and 32% for loans. They include, apart from the well-known French banks already mentioned, such respected names as Rabobank in Holland and the Raiffeissen banks in Germany.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3