samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The prices of other goods and services, on the other hand, have been posting quite modest growth rates. Therefore, the inflation expectations of entrepreneurs and consumers have remained close to the historical average. If the price hike of commodities stops, the increase in the euro area’s prices could remain below 2% already next year. However, looking at the data from another angle, we can find proof to arguments which insist that the current euro-area interest rate level is not suitable for guaranteeing the low inflation rate that corresponds to the price stability goal. Although the general public focuses on the debt crisis of certain European countries, the developments of the economy itself have, on the whole, exceeded expectations. Economic growth has remained above average and the utilisation of production capacity no longer resembles a crisis situation. Though unemployment is still high, it is decreasing and the indicators of the industrial and service sectors are posting quite high results from the historical perspective. If we add here the fact that global price rise pressures have been annoyingly enduring and do not show any signs of abatement, the risk of a persistently higher inflation rate in the euro area has increased. Therefore, at the press conference after the most recent meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank it was pointed out that, to withstand this threat, the Eurosystem might increase the price of money in the markets earlier than expected, maybe already in April.

For instance, in one year the inflation rate of Slovenia and Austria may differ greatly due to changes in taxes or differences in the economic cycle, but the longterm price expectations of people still remain quite similar in these countries. This is logical. In the monetary union, it is natural that there occur differences in the inflation rate across regions, but these cannot last very long. Otherwise, the competitiveness of the country with the faster inflation rate will suffer: in the best case, the country’s economic growth will slow down gradually, but in the worst case the country will have to adjust through a difficult crisis similar to the situation in Greece. One way or another – eventually, this entails a decrease in demand and price growth will be forced back to its “correct” level. For us, not much has changed after joining the monetary union. Inflation in Estonia was affected by euro-area price stability already under the fixed exchange rate system. Though for a short while, Estonia’s inflation greatly exceeded that of Europe, long-term and excessive deviations were corrected by the economy. Otherwise, it would have started pressuring the credibility of the fixed exchange rate. While in the previous monetary system, more fretful analysts might have speculated that the economy would be adjusted through devaluation – the weakening of the currency’s value – which would have allowed inflation to remain higher, luckily this is not an option in the monetary union.
The EU Member States’ constitutions, on the other hand, tend more towards the principle of proportional representation, which some consider to be in favour of universal programs designed to benefit various groups and thus higher government spending. 25 It is common knowledge that, in an effort to avoid the pitfalls of unsustainable budget policies, the Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact lay down the conditions necessary for safeguarding budget discipline within a monetary union. The Pact’s underlying philosophy in the budget field is that countries must structurally pursue breakeven budgets or a budget surplus, in order to then allow automatic stabilisers to function without any restriction. This institutional setup, comprising constraints of an almost constitutional nature in the field of budget policy, is different from that in the United States where tax regulations are in some ways more flexible, although they have been much altered in recent decades. It has been repeatedly proposed to introduce a break-even budget rule in the United States, but it has not happened yet. Another example of the importance assigned to discretionality over regulations in the United States can be seen in the fact that, while the overall debt is nominally subject to a ceiling approved by Congress, that ceiling is in fact regularly modified, thus in actual fact it is not binding at all. For example, the deficit targets established in the 1985 Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman Act) were abundantly breached and later relaxed.

In light of this, the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) introduced restrictions to the discretionary component of expenditure and ground rules designed to restrict spending to real revenue; on the basis of those rules, any new discretionary spending (apart from the legislation on social security and revenue) was to have a neutral impact on the budget. Thanks to this method, a positive budget balance was achieved and maintained for a certain amount of time under the Clinton administration. Yet the deficit’s disappearance proved short-lived; negative balances were repeatedly recorded in the wake of the taxation and spending policies adopted by President Bush’s administration. 3.4.2  The economic structure  Moving on to the deep-seated differences in economic structure, a crucial difference between the United States and the euro area lies in the far smaller size of the US government sector. 24  Alesina, A. and E. L. Glaeser (2005), A World of Differences. Fighting Poverty in the United States and in Europe. Published by Editori Laterza, Bari. 25  Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2000), “Comparative Politics and Public Finance” , Journal of Political Economy, No 108, pp. 1121-1161; Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (2003), The Economic Effects of Constitutions, Munich Lectures in Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge. BIS Review 135/2008  9  It follows that the automatic stabilisers, in particular, operate in somewhat different contexts in the two economic areas. This could partly explain why countries with larger governments generally show less product variability.
6 Do you know why the losses were so small? Because banks were well capitalised and bank equity cushioned depositors – and the economy more broadly – against losses in the event of a bank failure. According to a study, the average capital-asset ratio fell from a high of 60% in 1880 to a low of 20% at the turn of the century. Then, after the crash of 1929, it rose to about 30% in the 1930s and 1940s. 7 It is now much lower, as you know. Making sure that banks are well-capitalised is the foremost life jacket of our system. Lifesupport in the form of liquidity assistance cannot act as a surrogate for appropriate management practices inside the banking system. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which will be hosted by the ECB, will assume a novel role in crisis prevention at the level of the 27 economies of the European Union as a whole. The ESRB will have the aim of identifying emerging systemic risk, and, if necessary, publishing early warnings as well as making recommendations to the competent authorities. The ECB is also fully involved in G20 reform efforts. International cooperation is absolutely vital given the interconnectivity between financial markets. A return to pre-crisis business practices would be fatal. Financial market participants need to restore trust. But this alone will not be sufficient. We absolutely require intelligent regulation that will prevent self-destruction.

Growth is also uneven, with the short-term prospects more favourable for the group of the advanced economies, and paler for the emerging and developing world. The risks in the latter group, which accounts for almost 60% of the global GDP and has contributed with more than 80% of the global growth since 2008, seem to be large and strong enough to constrain the growth of the world as a whole. It is not only the relatively slow global recovery that is worrisome. The fact that downside risks to the baseline growth scenario are prevalent, accentuates the uncertainty and fragility of the growth outlook. What are the main risks that should be pinpointed? First, there is the economic transformation and rebalancing in China, which is moving away from the previous model of export- and investment-led growth based on manufacturing towards a larger reliance on private consumption and services. Second, we are observing a large fall in oil and commodity prices, often reflecting concerns over the subdued global demand. Third, there is the gradual normalisation of Fed policy rates as opposed to the continued quantitative easing in most other advanced economies and the divergent monetary policy in emerging and developing economies. From a medium-to-long term perspective, all these trends could have a positive effect. Still, they also have short-term consequences, which pose significant downward risks for the global economy.
We have not had any problems with excessive inflation since then, until perhaps now. The problem has usually been the reverse, that is, that inflation has been lower than the target. Some conclusions from the history of inflation So what conclusions can be drawn from this review of Swedish inflation history since 1900? One conclusion, which was also in some way the starting point, is that inflation tends to rise in connection with war, and that this also applies in countries like Sweden, which has been fortunate not to be directly involved in any war during this period. 20 Drechsler et al. (2020) provides an alternative explanation for ‘The Great Inflation’ in the United States, which  is based on the failure of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. A special law, Regulation Q, imposed a ceiling on the banks' deposit rate. When the Fed raised the interest rate to slow down inflation, this ceiling meant that the interest rate changes made no difference for most people. When Regulation Q was lifted at the end of the 1970s, monetary policy once again had an impact and inflation fell. 21 The Economic Commission (1993). 9 [14]  Another conclusion is that the first three inflation peaks in the 1900s were so short-lived that expectations of higher inflation in the longer term were never built into price- and wage formation.

My third observation is that those who said that the Asian crisis was the death knell of Asia as an economic force - and there were many of them - seem to have been wrong. There has been remarkable resilience, even in the worst-hit economies, and a will to reform and restructure that has helped put a number of economies back on their feet even during a time of global economic downturn. Progress has not been evenly spread throughout the region, and there are still causes for anxiety. But, as the world economy shows signs of recovery, the prospects for the region, if not dazzling, look somewhat brighter. It is now my great pleasure to introduce our speaker and discussant. From the late eighties until very recently, Stan Fischer has been very much at the centre of world economic and financial crisis - and its solutions - first at the World Bank and then as First Deputy Managing Director and subsequently Senior Adviser at the IMF. He has played a practical role - often a crucial one - in addressing, preventing and resolving crises, and he has written extensively on the subject. Asia, no less than other regions of the world, has benefited from his expertise, and we are very honoured to have him here to talk about the lessons that can be learned from the recent crisis. Steve Grenville served for 20 years with the Reserve Bank of Australia, and was Deputy Governor of that Bank from 1996 to 2001.
On the policy front, central banks should continue to conduct monetary and supervisory policies that create incentives for the financial sector to thrive so as to enable them provide better services. Ladies and Gentlemen, with these few remarks I would like to conclude here and wish you success in the rest of your deliberations for this conference. I thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 149/2010

In concrete terms: •  the management structure of the Bank of Albania was completed;  •  the Audit Committee, composed of three Supervisory Council members, started its activity;  •  the Inspector General resumed reporting to the Supervisory Council;  •  the Medium-term Development Strategy and Medium-term Budget for 2016–18 were approved;  •  the new organisational structure was approved;  •  the head offices renovation and construction works were completed;  •  and the Museum of the Bank of Albania was launched. These highlights contributed to strengthening good governance, accountability and subsequently enhancing public confidence in the Bank of Albania. The monetary policy intensified the simulating stance during 2015. The Bank of Albania lowered the key rate twice, continued to inject the necessary liquidity in the financial markets and clearly communicated the future monetary policy stance. Our monetary policy was successful in easing the financing conditions in the economy and helped in the return of the Albanian economy to a positive development track. In particular, interest rates on new lek loans and servicing costs of existing credits fell. Lek credit increased, offsetting the continuous fall of the credit portfolio in foreign currency. Also, the share of lek credit in the total credit portfolio has been increasing, from around 28% in 2008 to 43% in 2015. These actions have played a vital role in accelerating the economic growth during the last two years. During 2015, the banking system continued to expand its activity.
The desk’s role in implementing monetary policy Before discussing overnight, fixed-rate reverse repos, I think it would be helpful to lay out some context for how we think about monetary policy implementation. As you well know, the Federal Reserve Act charges the FOMC with formulating monetary policy to achieve what we call the “dual mandate” – stable prices and maximum employment. In normal times, the Committee would do this principally by changing the level of its target for the overnight fed funds rate, in order to influence the pricing of money and credit. Movements in this rate are passed on to other short-term interest rates that influence borrowing costs for households and businesses and financial conditions more broadly. Since December 2008, of course, the FOMC has held its target fed funds rate in a narrow range just above zero. Since then, in order to support a stronger economic recovery and help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its mandate, the FOMC has provided additional monetary policy accommodation using a number of unconventional tools. These tools include alterations in the size and composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and forward guidance on the target federal funds rate. Any change in the size and composition of the System Open Market Account (SOMA) decided upon by the FOMC is implemented by the Desk. This distinction between monetary policy formulation and monetary policy implementation is important.

Such tools would allow participants to fine-tune the amount they want every day in response to changes in supply-and-demand conditions in the market and their cash management needs. In either the fixed-rate or fixed-quantity case, tools offering the ability to transact directly with either bank or non-bank counterparties would enhance the Desk’s operational capacity and strengthen the transmission of monetary policy in the face of some of the rates wedges currently seen in markets. I should note that the operations described above are all temporary liability management tools that don’t reduce the size of the Fed’s balance sheet; they shift one liability item – reserve balances – into another – a reverse repo with the New York Fed, for example.11 In recent years, the Federal Reserve has developed and tested several tools, including term and overnight reverse repos with an expanded set of counterparties and the Term Deposit Facility, or TDF, available to nearly all depository institutions, that together with IOER represent most of this broad toolkit.12 IOER and the TDF represent unsecured overnight and term tools, respectively, in which only depository institutions are eligible. I’ve already discussed IOER. The TDF is a program through which Federal Reserve Banks offer interest-bearing term deposits to eligible banks through an auction subscription that could be either fixed in quantity or fixed in rate with full allotment. An increase in term deposits outstanding temporarily reduces reserve balances because funds to pay for them are immobilized away from reserve accounts of participating institutions for the life of the term deposit.
The MPC, therefore, decided to maintain the policy interest rate at 1.25 percent per year  2  BIS Review 164/2009  during the most recent meeting. At the same time, the BOT is expecting that the Thai economy will return to a positive growth of 3.3–5.3 percent in 2010. Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe we have a consensus that the worst of the global economic crisis is already behind us. At this juncture, policymakers and businesses are starting to look beyond the crisis and gauging what lies ahead. At the Bank of Thailand, we envisage the following three challenges for the post-crisis era. First, the outlook for Thai export market will not be as good as the pre-crisis period. This is because the global financial crisis is likely to reduce both the purchasing power and the potential growth of Thailand’s major trading partners, especially the industrialized economies. Moreover, as the unemployment rates continue to increase in the G3 countries, protectionist sentiment may be intensified in an attempt to protect jobs at home. It is a common knowledge that, since the 1997 financial crisis, Thailand has relied on exports as our primary engine of growth. This dependency is expected to continue for quite some time as our domestic demand is not large enough to substitute the purchasing power from abroad. Therefore, exporters need to be more adaptive, while policymakers need to ensure supportive policies.

BIS Review 65/2010  1  After the foundations for a potential turnaround became discernible, the policy debate turned to the appropriate exit strategies from these expansionary policies. In the case of monetary policy, the central banks of the main developed countries have already announced – and begun to implement in some cases – plans to withdraw their unconventional liquidity-support measures. In the case of fiscal policy the challenge is successfully to apply fiscal consolidation. That will require a significant effort if public finances are to be set on a sustainable path. However, it is also time to shift our focus from the short to the medium and long run and start to address the structural problems of our economies. There are several arguments justifying this need for a shift in policy perspective. First, the historical evidence suggests that output may remain well below pre-crisis trends in the medium run. The associated losses in capital, employment and total factor productivity during the crisis could be long-lasting, leaving an enduring imprint on productive capacity. And medium-term output dynamics may also be affected. In particular, investment has fallen dramatically in the crisis, resulting in a slowdown in the rate of accumulation of productive capital. This, when combined with higher rates of capital obsolescence, is lowering potential growth in the short to medium run. In addition, these adverse effects could persist in the long run if there is a permanent step-up in the cost of capital due to changes in attitudes towards risk among investors.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the krone exchange rate Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Annual Meeting of ACI Norge - The Financial Markets Association, Oslo, 26 August 2004. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 11 August, Inflation Report 2/04 and on previous speeches. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  In most countries, price stability, or low and stable inflation, is the objective of monetary policy. The historical experience of Norway and other countries shows that high and variable inflation results in considerable fluctuations in output and employment. In addition, a fall in the level of prices could easily accompany a period of decline. The first explicit inflation target was introduced in New Zealand in 1990. Canada followed in 1991, the UK in 1992, and Sweden and Australia in 1993. Norway introduced inflation targeting in the spring of 2001. Approximately 20 countries currently use inflation targeting in their monetary policy. In this context, I would like to mention that the central bank of Sweden was able to draw on its own experience from the 1930s when it sought to motivate and firmly establish inflation targeting during the 1990s. Admittedly, Sweden did not have an inflation target but a price target for monetary policy in the period 1931-1937.

Trichet: What we must achieve first, are sound and rigorously implemented adjustment programmes fully in line with the commitment of Governments to take all measures needed  BIS Review 67/2010  1  to meet their fiscal targets this year and the years ahead in line with excessive deficit procedures and to accelerate fiscal consolidation and ensure the sustainability of their public finances. HB: Do you see any risks for European taxpayers? Trichet: Our message from the very outset has been that risks for European taxpayers will not materialise if all governments concerned are faithful to all their commitments. They must keep to the rules and commitments. They must behave themselves properly and alert their peers, the other Governments, to also behave properly. Mutual surveillance is essential. HB: Do you now start the same what the central banks in the United States and the United Kingdom have already been doing for a while? Trichet: That is not comparable. What the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have done was “quantitative easing”. They were injecting liquidity into the markets and that with the explicit goal of augmenting the overall liquidity. As I said already what we are doing through the Securities Market Programme is not quantitative easing. HB: Is the ECB violating the spirit of the Treaty of Maastricht? Trichet: No, not at all. We cannot imagine doing anything that would violate the Treaty – not even for a moment. What we are doing is of course in conformity with the Treaty’s letter.