samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chile)  2.8 -0.6 1.9 7.7 5.1 3.8 2.7  1.9 -0.4 1.1 8.1 6.3 4.3 3.3  1.5 -0.5 1.7 7.5 5.4 3.8 2.7  1.7 -0.4 1.8 7.6 4.1 3.8 2.6  LME copper price $ Brent oil price $  361 112  350 108  330 108  Terms of trade  -4.1  -0.4  -5.2  Dec.13 Report  2.5 2.6 2.6 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.3 8.2 7.4 7.4 6.4 5.8 5.3 4.7 3.9 4.0 3.7 2.9 2.9 (levels) 332 340 305 310 109 101 108 106 (annual change, percent) -3.9 -1.6 0.1 0.2  2.7 2.1 0.8 7.5 6.3 4.1 3.7  2.7 1.4 1.0 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.4  290 97  290 100  -1.2  -1.5  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, IMF, and respective statistics bureaus.

Figure 4  CPI inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  10  CPIEFE inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  10 10  10  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  -2  -2 -2  -2  -4  -4 -4  -4  07  09  11  13  15  07  Dec.2013 Report  09  11  13  15  Sep.2013 Report  (*) Gray area, as from the fourth quarter of 2013, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 MPR and expectations (percent) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  MPR  FBS second half Nov. 2013  EES November 2013  Forward rate, Dec.2013 Report  Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11
William C Dudley: Risks of wholesale funding Welcoming remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the workshop on the “Risks of Wholesale Funding”, New York City, 13 August 2014. *  *  *  Michael Fleming, Jamie McAndrews, Susan McLaughlin and Joseph Tracy contributed to preparing these remarks. It is a pleasure to welcome you to the New York Fed today to discuss the important issue of wholesale funding. As you all know, the financial system plays an essential role in modern economies, and liquidity is in turn critical to the functioning of the financial system. Because financial intermediation is critical to economic activity and intermediation is dependent on funding and liquidity, disruption to funding and liquidity can cause severe damage to the economy. The experience of recent years revealed serious flaws in the system. Risk was mispriced and there was a build-up of excesses before the crisis. Structural weaknesses in the financial system then amplified the effect of the sharp decline in U.S. house prices, and the result was a widespread financial crisis and a deep recession both here and abroad. The extensive use by financial firms of short-term wholesale funding was one critical factor in the crisis.

As with bank deposits prior to deposit insurance, this created an incentive for investors to be the first to get out whenever there was any uncertainty over the underlying value of the assets in the fund. By being first in line, they could exit while the fund could still repay at par, leaving others to bear any losses. The longer the investor waited, the greater the risk that the fund would be forced into the fire sale of assets to meet redemptions and end up breaking the buck. As the crisis unfolded, the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury and others took a series of actions to contain the spiral of funding runs and asset fire sales. First, the traditional lender of last resort function was strengthened through the introduction of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and foreign exchange swaps with foreign central banks. Then, as the crisis intensified, the lender of last resort liquidity provision was extended to directly backstop key wholesale funding markets and made available to certain nonbank firms. The Federal Reserve created a direct backstop to the tri-party repo system through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). When the Reserve Fund broke the buck after the failure of Lehman Brothers, precipitating a run on money market mutual funds, the Treasury guaranteed money market fund assets and the Fed introduced the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidation Facility (AMLF).
In the very turbulent and uncertain situation prevailing at that time, the main focus was on quickly making a diagnosis and implementing more or less acute measures – “intensive care” if you like. It was necessary to take rapid and forceful action to safeguard financial stability and to minimise the negative effects of the crisis on economic developments in general. For the Riksbank and many other central banks the "normal” tools have not been sufficient to achieve this. But we have adapted quickly, taken out a whole range of complementary tools from our workboxes, and even constructed some new ones! Now, one year later, the most acute phase of the financial crisis is now hopefully behind us. Although we have not yet climbed out of the trough that turned out to be the worst economic downturn since the war. But there are many indications that we have passed the turning point. In my speech today I intend to provide a brief status report of where we stand today and how we should to proceed. Are we about to land on our feet? How does the economic situation look today from a monetary policy perspective and what lies ahead of us? What is the outlook for the financial system? Have the “extraordinary” measures taken had an effect and how should they be phased out? Even after we have landed properly it will be necessary to keep our balance. But the road ahead may be difficult to negotiate.

On the other hand, one can use a measure of underlying inflation, the CPIF, which excludes the direct effects of the repo rate on mortgage rates. Measured in terms of the CPIF, we expect inflation to be much more stable and to be close to 2 per cent for most of the forecast period. Figure 5. Inflation measured in terms of the CPI and the CPIF, annual percentage change 5  5 CPI  4  4  CPIF  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  There is still considerable uncertainty surrounding future developments (Figure 3). It is possible that the improved situation in the financial markets will contribute to a faster recovery in the world economy than we are expecting in the main scenario of the Monetary Policy Report. On the other hand, the recovery may be slower than expected when the fiscal policy stimulation packages around the world are gradually phased out. There are many potential risks along the way. But our forecast is that if we hold the repo rate low up to autumn 2010 and then begin raising it, this together with other measures will contribute to a stable recovery and mean we attain the inflation target of 2 per cent.
To shed further light upon this we need to go through the causes for the development in the number of hours worked in recent years. The number of hours worked in the economy is determined partly by the number of persons working and partly by average working hours, i.e. how many hours each person works. One factor that has clearly pulled down the average working hours in recent years is the rise in sick leave. It is uncertain to what extent this is an effect of a transitory nature. Various studies have shown that the amount of short-term sick leave taken tends to increase when the situation on the labour market improves and unemployment declines. If sick leave is divided up according to length, it can be seen that the longterm sick leave has increased most over the past years. To the extent that this development is the result of incentive effects, the increase may be of a more structural nature, which means sick leave will not automatically decline when the economic situation deteriorates. In the general debate it has been implied that changes in various institutional factors accounted for this interpretation, e.g. that the rules for qualification for early retirement pension had become tighter and the remuneration level in sickness benefit had been raised. Another important factor here could be that the percentage of older people on the labour market has increased somewhat recently. Is an increase in sick leave the only explanation for the decline in average working hours? No, it is not.

The incentives to work have rather been reduced in the social insurance system in recent years. There are also discussions now of reducing working hours. The Riksbank has earlier spoken of a potential growth rate in the economy in the interval of 2-2.5 per cent. We have not considered it possible to be more precise than this. Of course, we are constantly examining our view in the light of new data and analyses. When we look ahead two years, there is no reason to change this view now; it is important that no one misunderstands me here. But if the current trends for the labour supply persist, it is likely that we will have to assume in the longer term a potential growth rate closer to 2 per cent than 2.5 per cent. Thank you! Fig. 1. Essential outline, actual and potential GDP GDP  Time  6  BIS Review 16/2003  Fig. 2. Estimated production gap according to three methods Per cent of potential GDP  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  -3  -3  -4  -4  UC PF HP  -5  -5  -6  -6  -7 1995  -7 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Fig. 3.
I will pick out a few of the highlights for discussion. First let me note that the “stress” so far has not involved any actual exit from accommodative policies in the advanced economies. The change in the outlook was initiated by speculation about the possibility that the FOMC might start to slightly reduce the rate at which it is adding stimulus! It would have been a more severe stress if policy rates had actually been changed. Many firms for whom maturity transformation is a major part of their business model will actually be better off if the short-term rates at which they fund themselves are relatively unchanged while longer-term rates rise. Have markets got it wrong? If so then in my view that was not obviously in the price reactions since May (although the extent of the fixed-income sell-off may turn out to have been overdone, especially for the UK) – rather it was the expectations that had become embedded prior to May which had become overly certain even if, at that time, it supported the intent of monetary policy in both the US and Europe. It is important to remember that monetary policy is about decision making under uncertainty. Considerable uncertainty. Policy makers get surprised by economic developments just like everyone else, and that news is often visible to the market before the authorities can even think about the right responses, let alone respond to them.

The FOMC similarly committed to keep the US economy growing, with state-contingent forward guidance being issued in December 2012. The MPC had voted to increase its stock of asset purchases to £ billion in July 2012 and introduced the Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS). Taken together these factors were generating a growing “hunt for yield”, initially cautious and focussed on relatively simple, liquid financial instruments but gradually expanding, especially in terms of credit risk – for example “high yield” bonds were in particularly high demand, leading to historically compressed spreads. Since then, we have seen a game of two halves. If I move on to around April this year, the picture had changed substantively relative to the autumn. The previously perceived tail risks were fading from discussions. Europe was making progress on a number of structural reforms, including moving towards a banking union. A mini-crisis in Cyprus had been dealt with, without too many spillovers. Spreads over bunds for sovereign debt of the larger vulnerable euro-area economies had narrowed considerably. The US “fiscal cliff” at end-2012 had passed by with some relief (although concerns about the processes associated with the US fiscal deficit have now resurfaced). While fiscal consolidation might have slowed US growth somewhat, the process of adjustment around the turn of the year had been smoother than feared and the macroeconomic repercussions rather less. China had injected some renewed stimulus and Japan had introduced a far reaching new economic framework of quantitative and qualitative easing to improve the outlook there.
Ásgeir Jónsson: Address – 59th Annual Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland Address by Mr Ásgeir Jónsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the 59th Annual Meeting of the Central Bank of Iceland, Reykjavík, 25 March 2020. * * * On 19 October 1918, Iceland finally reached a sovereignty agreement with the Danish authorities. But that day, 19 October, was momentous for another reason as well. It was the day the second wave of the Spanish flu arrived in Iceland with the passenger ship Botnia. No hygienic measures or mitigating actions were taken at first. In fact, the Surgeon General considered it pointless. The disease spread like wildfire and peaked a mere three weeks after it had been borne to Iceland. However, the authorities prevented the spread of the Spanish flu to North and East Iceland by closing off transportation. At that time, half of the nation lived in the countryside, and it was therefore easier to maintain distances between people than it is today. Iceland recorded its first death from the Spanish flu on 2 November 1918. An estimated 63% of Reykjavík residents were infected, and around 500 Icelanders died, making for a mortality rate of 2.6%. The Spanish flu hit young people the hardest. It is clear that, against this backdrop, the celebration of Iceland’s sovereignty, when the Danish-Icelandic Act of Union entered into effect on 1 December 1918, was a bittersweet affair. But misfortune had more in store for Iceland.

2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Furthermore, we have lifted the 2% countercyclical capital buffer on financial institutions. The buffer has been reset to 0% and will remain there for at least the next two years. Lifting the countercyclical capital buffer requirement will make it easier for the banking system to support households and businesses by creating the scope for new lending in an amount ranging up to 350 b.kr., or 12.5% of the current loan portfolio, all else being equal. Moreover, it was decided this past Sunday, at an extraordinary meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, to begin direct purchases of Treasury bonds in the secondary market. This will both support fiscal policy and ensure that lower interest rates are transmitted out the entire yield curve, thereby lowering households’ and businesses’ financing costs, which is the Bank’s objective. Honoured guests: In Iceland’s campaign for independence, currency issues were never mentioned. It was automatically assumed that Iceland would continue to participate in the Nordic currency union as an independent member, as the Norwegians had done after separating from Sweden in 1905. Participation in Nordic currency cooperation was actually written into the agreement made when Iceland was granted sovereignty in 1918. This currency cooperation was based on the gold standard, as were most of the world’s currencies at that time. However, the Nordic currency union fell apart during the post-war years, and Icelanders were forced to rely on themselves as they endured the shocks that pummelled the country during its first years of sovereignty.
Furthermore, cooperative efforts in promoting the practice of information sharing and capacity building will help strengthen competency of regional central banks to safeguard against external shocks and disturbances. Although the practice of information dissemination among the regional peers is nothing new, there is still room for improvement to facilitate a more structured approach and timely delivery. Ladies and gentlemen, these are just some food for thought to precede the more detailed discussions and lively debate to follow. I certainly look forward to hearing the views of Mr. Caruana, who has been among those at the centre of the challenges facing us. His perspectives will be valuable for our further discussions and deliberations. And we will learn more from Mr. Glenn Stevens, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia; Mr. Kiyohiko Nishimura, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan; and Mr. Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of The Monetary Authority of Singapore, who will lead the discussions focusing on their respective country’s experiences. This will be in keeping with our tradition in learning from one another to further enhance SEANZA cooperation and promote greater stability in the region. In concluding my remarks, I would like to reiterate to you my warmest welcome, and may I also wish us all a successful and fruitful meeting, which would hopefully bring us on the right track towards weathering the storm in anticipation of sunnier days. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 120/2008

In addition, the war in Ukraine poses significant risks to food and energy prices, as well as to global economic growth. Uniquely American Going back to my analogy of factor analysis, there are idiosyncratic components to the pandemic. And I think it's important to note areas where we have had a uniquely American experience in the COVID-19 recovery. First, the amount of direct fiscal support in the United States was larger than what most other countries provided.1 This created a sizable cushion for many households, giving them the ability to maintain spending through the pandemic and as inflation started to rise. In addition, the U.S. labor market has recovered strongly since the recession trough, and labor shortages here have become more acute than in many other countries. Part of the reason for a shortage of labor is that the U.S. labor force participation rate is still about a percentage point below its level prior to the pandemic, in what has become known as the Great Resignation. A portion of this decline reflects longer-term trends related to the aging of the population. But some left the labor market because they needed to be home to care for young children or elderly relatives. Others didn't want to risk exposure to COVID at the workplace. And many simply chose early retirement. Despite the challenges presented by the Omicron wave early this year, the unemployment rate fell to 3.6 percent in March, bringing it in line with the very low levels seen before the pandemic.
11 This outcome would be undesirable for us, as we aim to steer secured short-term Swiss franc money market rates so that they remain close to the SNB policy rate. By reducing the stock of excess reserves, we also reduce the supply of reserves in the interbank money market. This lets us steer money market rates closer to our policy rate of 0.5%. That is precisely what the second element of our implementation approach accomplishes. To absorb excess reserves, we use open market operations. Specifically, we use term repos and SNB Bills, the latter being marketable debt claims on the SNB. 12 Term repos have a term of one week and are auctioned daily. SNB Bills, on the other hand, are auctioned on a weekly basis and with different terms from week to week. As Slide 8 shows, the effect of these operations is to replace the light-blue shaded rectangle with a light-green one. Our reserve-absorbing operations are offered with interest rates that are close to 0.5% on an overnight-equivalent basis. 13 This makes them particularly attractive to banks that hold excess reserves. By purchasing the instruments we offer, these banks can reduce the stock of excess reserves, which would otherwise be remunerated at 0%. It is important to emphasise that both interbank trading and the SNB’s reserve-absorbing operations are mechanisms for reducing the stock of excess reserves, possibly to the point where all excess reserves have been ‘soaked up’. How does the SNB’s approach determine money market rates?

Many emerging economies have successfully applied the lessons learned in past financial crises, capitalizing them as increased financial resilience and a reduced impact on growth than developed countries. One feature of world financial markets’ behavior of the past few months has been the increase in long-term interest rates on public instruments. These movements can be linked to an environment of reduced risks and expected increases in fiscal debt certificates, and to the fact that, for the first time in several months, there is incipient debate about the convenience of a not-so-expansionary monetary policy, given the medium-term inflationary risks. In the local financial markets, the interest rates on long-term Central Bank notes have also risen— albeit with swings—above the levels that prevailed at the time of our May Report. The steepening of the yield curve coincides with what has occurred in international markets, and may be signaling an increase in the markets’ appetite for risk. It may also be that they respond to more idiosyncratic factors, especially because of the big momentum showed by the local bonds market this year to date. The pass-through of MPR cuts to lending rates in recent months has been evident. While the latest data suggest that it may have moderated, transmission should continue, particularly as macroeconomic uncertainties phase out. The annual growth rate of credit volume has slowed, in a context where lending standards are still tight and there is less demand for credit due to a more cautious attitude among economic agents.
Alan Blinder has deftly set out 1 a spectrum of decision taking structures ranging from one individual, the Governor; through committees that are more or less collegial, with either a clear leader or a more collective approach; to committees, such as the Bank of England’s MPC, that are individualistic. Blinder and others identify advantages in a committee approach of some kind, essentially on the grounds, based on analysis or experiment, 2 that committees will generally make better decisions. That may leave out something rather important. Which is that in some countries a committee structure has been a pre-condition for achieving central bank independence in the first place. And that is a useful reminder of the political economy conditions in which monetary regimes are constituted and operate. Context matters, including possibly to some of the issues on your conference agenda. The UK’s post-war journey to monetary credibility illustrates that rather neatly. Environmental preconditions for independence: ideas and values For a long time, price stability simply was not the core objective of macroeconomic policy. A Bank of England piece in the late 1960s 3 described government’s twin goals as having been to improve trend growth and maintain high employment, to which was subsequently added balance of payments sustainability. When, in the mid-1970s, the UK suffered the indignity of having to borrow from the IMF, the Cabinet split over the Fund’s stability-oriented programme.

Dimitar Bogov: The Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Address by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the presentation of the Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia in the process of accession to the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem to the public, Skopje, 22 January 2013. *  *  *  Your Excellency Ambassador Orav, Honorable Director General of the International and European Relations at the ECB, Mr Moss, Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, media representatives, It is my great pleasure and honor to greet you today at the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia for the public presentation of the Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia in the process of accession to the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem. First, I would like to thank the EU for the financial assistance provided and to express my special gratitude to the EU Delegation in our country for the given support in obtaining the project. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the ECB for the efforts and readiness to carry out the project with the NBRM and to the national central banks of the Eurosystem involved in the project for their willingness to contribute to its implementation.