samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The extraction of oil at great sea depths would require the development of new technologies. This entailed the building up of expertise in our own country, which would secure a full order book for many years ahead – and not only off our own shore. The activities on the Norwegian continental shelf would also provide a boost to other industries in Norway. Chart: A new market for the shipbuilding industry And the timing was perfect: economic stagnation and competition from Asian countries had brought the Norwegian shipping industry to the brink of a crisis. With the discovery of oil, an adaptable shipbuilding industry and the oil companies were soon on good terms. Building up a new industry and spending the revenues generated also brought a new set of challenges, and in 1974 these challenges were the subject of a government white paper, Report no. 25 to the Storting, entitled “The role of the petroleum industry in Norwegian society”. To provide room for the oil sector and higher consumption of goods and services, other industries had to give way. The mechanisms described in the white paper are familiar: “A transfer of production and jobs between firms and industries can occur via increased domestic cost pressures.” So, the nation was prepared for restructuring and for the costs this would involve. But the white paper also made it clear that, in order to reap the benefits of economic growth, restructuring would be necessary. We now know, more than 40 years later, that structural changes were indeed made.

The industry structure of our economy has changed. A growing number of firms, and not only in the engineering industry, have targeted the oil industry. Labour shedding in some sectors has freed up labour for other uses. Chart: High wages in the oil industry  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Oil companies have had the capacity and the willingness to pay. Tax rules have favoured investment spending and earnings have been solid. Oil company employees have been wage winners here in Norway. A state-of-the-art oil service industry has emerged. New products and technological solutions have been developed. For many firms, the contracts on the Norwegian continental shelf have been a springboard to new export markets. Chart: Growth in oil investment High oil prices and a profitable petroleum production industry have led to record-high oil investment in recent years. The level of investment in 2014 was equivalent to that of all the domestic non-oil industries combined. The positive spillovers to the oil service industry and other firms have been substantial. Employment has remained high and unemployment low, even when the financial crisis hit in 2008. A large share of the business sector and the labour market is now linked to the oil industry. A relatively small number of jobs are directly involved in oil and gas production. But if account is taken of all the suppliers to the petroleum sector, about 1 in 9 jobs in Norway, a total of about 300 000, were linked to the oil industry in 20141.
Enabling Digital Financial Advice and Insurance The digital offering of financial advice and insurance is becoming more popular, catering to the needs of a growing segment of technology-savvy, self-directed consumers. MAS’ regulatory framework for financial advice is technology-agnostic. But we need to update it to make it easier for consumers to benefit from the lower cost and greater choice that digital advice and insurance can potentially provide. While at the same time ensuring adequate safeguards for these consumers. Automated, algorithm-based digital advice on financial or investment services by robo-advisers has taken off in the United States and will soon reach our shores. MAS will soon set out proposals on the governance, supervision, and management of algorithms for robo-advisers to ensure integrity and robustness in the delivery of financial advice. 3/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  We will consult the industry before finalising the guidance. In insurance, MAS already allows insurers to offer online without advice simple term life and direct purchase policies with broadly standardised features. MAS will now allow insurers to offer the full suite of life insurance products online without advice. MAS will be issuing guidance on the safeguards to be put in place for online distribution of life insurance products. Regulatory Sandbox to Test Innovative Ideas In June this year, MAS launched a regulatory sandbox for financial institutions as well as new FinTech players to test their innovations.

The process is costly and laborious, and hugely duplicative. The pain is pervasive because KYC and identity authentication are involved in so many financial services, from opening a bank account to making a payment to making an insurance claim. We need an infrastructure solution to this problem. Singapore is in the process of creating a national KYC utility. Now, obviously this involves several layers of identity verification depending on the purpose of the transaction, the extent of information involved, and the degree of rigour required. 6/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  The basic building block is the MyInfo service, jointly developed by the Ministry of Finance and GovTech, the lead agency for digital and data strategy in Singapore. MyInfo is a personal data platform, containing government-verified personal details, e.g. the national ID number, residential address, and so on. MyInfo enables residents to provide their personal data just once to the government, and retrieve their personal details for all subsequent online transactions with the government. MAS is partnering MOF and GovTech to embark on a pilot that will expand the MyInfo service to the financial industry for more efficient KYC using trusted government collected personal data. No more tedious form-filling and providing hardcopy documents for manual verification by the FI. No more data entry errors. Higher productivity for the FI and greater convenience for customers. The government will run a MyInfo pilot with two banks in Q1 2017, before scaling it up to other FIs progressively.
In any event, the final calibration of the minimum ratio should be completed in 2017, with a view to its definitive inclusion in the solvency rules in 2018. This calibration will define the interrelatedness of the ratio to the other solvency measures and, specifically, the conditions under which it will act as a binding constraint. We are still, therefore, at the analysis and calibration phase. Next year, banks will be required to publish the ratio as a transparency measure, which will be conducive to the final design of the new regulatory requirement attaining a sufficient degree of consistency and homogeneity. Evidently, the introduction of new prudential control measures entails an additional effort for banks, at a time when the sluggishness of economic activity is exerting significant pressure on their margins. Undoubtedly, however, adopting these measures while observing a prudent implementation calendar will have an appreciably positive effect on the industry’s soundness and resilience and, consequently, on the economy as a whole. Banking union That said, as experience categorically shows, the harmonisation of solvency rules is not a sufficient guarantee to ensure homogenous control of the financial position of banks located in different jurisdictions. As important as having similar rules is the application of a common supervisory approach. And the homogeneity of the prudential control exerted over financial institutions is particularly important in economic areas that share an integrated banking market and a common currency. Hence the importance for Europe of setting up a single supervisory mechanism.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  This mechanism, as the first piece of the banking union project, is essential for contributing to doing away fully with the financial fragmentation that threatened the continuity of the euro and to deactivating the vicious feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, which caused so much harm to economies such as Spain in terms of greater funding costs, difficulty of access to credit and, in sum, lower employment and growth. The single supervisory mechanism As you are aware, the start-up of the single supervisory mechanism, the first pillar of the banking union, is at a very advanced stage following the entry into force, just a few days back, of the Community Regulation creating it. Currently, intense preparatory work is under way, and I can assure you this poses a significant organisational challenge. A key element is to establish an appropriate governance structure combining the leadership of the ECB in the supervisory function with the involvement of the national authorities, all the while ensuring that the assumption of prudential functions by the ECB does not clash with its monetary policy responsibilities. Supervisory powers will mainly be channelled through the Supervisory Board, whose chairperson and vice-chairperson, along with the representatives of the national authorities, have already been appointed. The Board will convene for the first time this very week.
Because the increasing inflow of foreign money was accompanied by a continuous demand for credits on the part of enterprises (financed partially also from foreign resources), this situation called for the sterilisation of excess funds, taking into account the goals of monetary policy. Paradoxically, due to the government’s sound fiscal policy, we were confronted with an insufficient amount of government securities, and therefore the CNB had to issue its own bills and sold them to commercial banks to weaken the impact on the volume of money stock. A certain turnaround has occurred since the end of 1995. Contrary to previous years, the foreign sector helped to weaken money supply growth due to an increasing balance of trade deficit and the slower growth of foreign capital inflows into the country. Exchange rate policy The above-mentioned development of the composition of the monetary aggregates has influenced attitudes vis-à-vis exchange rate policy. At the beginning of the transformation we were faced with the difficult choice of setting an appropriate exchange rate. On the eve of the programme of price and trade liberalisation the government took the decision to use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor because in a small, open economy the domestic price level is heavily affected by the exchange rate. Having taken into account various considerations in December 1990, we fixed the new exchange rate at 28 Czechoslovak crowns per US dollar, which then was about the middle ground between the parallel black market rate and the calculated cost of earning one dollar of foreign exchange.

In 1995 and 1996, however, the growth of real wages, which - if aggregated over all sectors - was faster than the increase in productivity, became one of the potential inflationary dangers. The nominal anchor of the fixed exchange rate played an important role in the relatively good Czech results in fighting inflation. Instead of repeated smaller devaluations as in Poland or Hungary, the Czech Republic used a combination of a large initial devaluation and a subsequently fixed nominal exchange rate. In 1990 - before the start of the full transformation programme - the currency was devalued by more than 50%. That subsequently enabled us to keep the nominal exchange rate stable for five years. After the introduction of a wider 7.5% fluctuation band in 1996, the exchange rate is within the band. Transformation involved so much fundamental change that its start inevitably led to an initial fall of output and GDP. However, part of the former higher output level was simply feeding the enormous waste which went on throughout the command economy. In 1993, GDP stagnated partly due to the split-up of Czechoslovakia. Economic growth was resumed in the Czech Republic in 1994 and continued in 1995 and 1996 as a fast growth period. Unemployment has been kept low during the whole transformation period, thanks mainly to the rapid emergence of new private firms, and a large shift of labour into the previously underdeveloped service sector.
We need in particular to ensure that financial groups maintain information on the assets and liabilities of their legal entities; it is legal entities that  4  BIS Review 39/2009  go into resolution not business divisions. Lehmans shouts that out loud and clear. We need to ensure that banks, however grand they are, keep information that would facilitate rapid payout from deposit-protection schemes. We need banks to have contingency funding plans that are shared with regulators and central banks. We need, more ambitiously, to address Too Big To Fail. And we need to do just massively better at working together internationally. However much we do, I fear that the inescapable conclusion will be that we cannot rule out that very rarely the banking system will end up needing to be supported by some ultimate source of capital. If that is right, then society needs principles and policies for what might be called “Capital of Last Resort”, to sit alongside the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) principles developed by and for central banks since the 19th century. Parts of the academic community have started to think about and advocate capital-insurance from the private sector, but over the long term we need to decide whether or not to have a policy for public sector capital insurance. At a high level, this faces exactly the challenges of central bank liquidity insurance. Its terms must not incentivise imprudent behaviour; and they must be time consistent.

To create greater international awareness on these new initiatives, financial ambassadors are being appointed to meet with potential players and investors and road shows will be conducted as part of the promotional plan. In addition, the MIFC Executive Committee is formulating the supporting immigration policies with the Immigration Department where long-term employment pass, multiple entry permits, dependent pass and professional visit pass would be offered to expatriates identified as professionals and experts in Islamic finance. To attract specialist and high level expertise, a Permanent Resident status may also be offered based on the recommendation of the relevant financial regulators. A mechanism is also being put in place to ensure the efficient processing of these measures. This is aimed at addressing the acute current shortage of such talent and expertise in the global financial system. While the education infrastructure has already been put in place to address this shortage, Malaysia also needs to be competitive in attracting and retaining the talent. The Executive Committee will therefore look into customised incentives to attract best talents to Malaysia in addition to the entry of international legal firms that are able to provide services for the international currency business in Islamic finance. Role to be played by financial institutions One of the key success factors for a vibrant financial hub is having the critical mass of reputable and diversified range of financial institutions. With extensive incentives and measures in place, it is a priority for those already based in Malaysia to be encouraged to be the players in the MIFC.
SPEECH DATE:  15 October 2019  SPEAKER:  Governor of the Riksbank Stefan Ingves  VENUE:  Money Macro and Finance Research Group, London  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  Swedish monetary policy experiences after the global financial crisis: What lessons are there for other countries?∗ Thank you for inviting me. It is both inspiring and a privilege to be given the opportunity to speak in more academic contexts, such as this one. Although it was a long time since I was conducting academic research myself, I try to keep updated on what is happening, not only because it is part of the job, but also for my own interest. Now, about ten years on from the global financial crisis, I feel that we are in an unusually interesting phase. Worldwide economic events like the financial crisis, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s and stagflation in the 1970s, often have a profound effect on both macroeconomic thinking and practical policy. It is possible that something similar will also happen this time, but what a new macroeconomic paradigm will look like and what the policy implications will be is still unclear. 1 For my part, the crisis that affected Sweden and a few other countries in the early 1990s is etched on my mind, not least because, back then, I headed the so-called Bank Support Committee, which managed problems in the Swedish banking sector.

(2017)) and Gourio, Kashyap and Sim (2018) and Caballero and Simsek (2019) find reasons for monetary policy to do so. 9 Adrian and Liang (2018) also find that more research is required to clarify the role monetary policy should have when it comes to counteracting the build-up of financial imbalances. 10 See, for instance, Yellen (2014), Brainard (2017) and Quarles (2019). 11 https://www.norges-bank.no/en/topics/Monetary-policy/Mandate-monetary-policy/ 12 See, for instance, Ingves (2012) and Jansson (2013). For a rebuttal of the criticism that the Riksbank “leaned against the wind” very substantially and was the main reason why the Riksbank increased the interest rate in 2010-2011 in the first place, see, for instance, Jansson (2014). 13 Ingves (2007). See also Nyberg (2005), and Heikensten (2008). Heikensten (2008), writes: “With house prices increasing drastically, risks for the real economy have been perceived to be bigger. On a few occasions in 200405 the Riksbank did for that reason not follow a strict inflation-targeting rule. We “leaned against the wind”, in 8  4 [21]  So what happened and why did we stop “leaning against the wind”? A few years after the financial crisis, it was clear that inflation had not risen in the way the Riksbank had anticipated, but instead was surprisingly low. During the first half of 2013, for example, the average of Swedish forecasters expected inflation to reach around 1.5 per cent in 2014. The outcome was almost one percentage point lower, that is, one and a half percentage points below the target.
The extent to which these conflicting imperatives can be reconciled in a sustainable manner remains unclear. A focal point of the reforms has been to protect retail banking from the vagaries of investment banking that often has involved higher risk-taking activities. In the United States,  1  As at December 2009. BIS Quarterly Review Statistical Annex, June 2010, Table 19. 2  The Banker publication. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the Volcker Rule prohibits banks from carrying out certain types of investment banking activities if they wished to continue to rely on deposit funding. In a similar vein, in the United Kingdom, the adoption of the recommendations by the Independent Commission on Banking mandates banking groups to establish a separate subsidiary for their retail activities, and it prohibits the subsidiary from undertaking other businesses and risks. Solutions to these challenges are far from straightforward. While these and other reforms by the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board are expected to have far reaching implications for the landscape of the financial system as we know it today, they have yet to provide answers to many of the key questions that policymakers and the financial industry need to address in the pursuit of effective functioning and sound financial systems as we progress forward into the future. Since the global financial crisis, significant attention has been directed at evolving an effective macro-prudential policy framework, which can serve to rein in excesses and strengthen the nexus between finance and the real economy.

On the other hand, the financial sector acts as an intermediary between monetary policy decisions and the overall economy. It contributes to an efficient economic system and to the prosperity of our country. The SNB thus needs a competitive and stable banking system to fulfil its mandate. The long-term goals of the SNB and the banking sector usually go hand-in-hand. Monetary stability and a strong financial sector are in our common interest. They represent long-term assets for the whole economy and for Switzerland as a country. Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Charts Chart 1  Source: SNB  Chart 2  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3  Chart 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Chart 5  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Uncertainty over the total effects of technological developments means that we must show greater sensitivity when formulating monetary policy. Let me call it being more “reactive” than would otherwise have been the case. By reactive, I mean that we must constantly reconsider our earlier assessments in the light of developments in the economy and the way the various parts actually react. I maintain that this has in many ways been a characteristic of our Inflation Reports over the past year. These reflect clearly how the view of potential growth and the connection between inflation and growth have changed as a result of the Riksbank’s analyses and models taking account of structural changes in their assessments. The repo rate could not have remained at its current level if price levels had not been affected by deregulation on several markets and the fact that we can see a positive development in productivity. Then there are of course a number of other important factors that must be taken into account, labour supply, wage formation, international price developments and, in particular, confidence in the monetary policy. However, developments in productivity will continue to play a central role in the assessments. The Riksbank monitors the various signs of the “new economy” and takes them very seriously. BIS Review 89/2000  8

Hurricanes don’t care about your organizational chart, and cyber attackers would actually like a copy of it to use it against you. Since threats aren’t siloed, our defenses can’t be siloed either. One of the insights of enterprise risk management is that good outcomes rely on integration across organizational boundaries and types of risk. That’s why it’s not just risk management, its enterprise risk management.3 We can use approaches from enterprise risk management to create bridges across silos. To start, enterprise risk management focuses on an organization’s objectives and the critical processes that support them. Critical processes span organizational units in a connected chain of activities, starting with inputs delivered by suppliers, to value-added transformations within the organization, to the final delivery to customers. So, to strengthen resilience, we identify the risks to process outcomes and then design processes and controls to address those risks. Since silos weaken resilience, you may want to look in your organization at some of the hotspots where enterprise-wide coordination is essential. I’d start with incident response. Are you ready for complex threats that require teamwork across organizational units? Another challenging area is external dependency management. Do you have a coordinated and coherent approach to understand and manage vendor exposures across the full spectrum of risks, including information security, data privacy, compliance, business continuity, and credit? Risk silos are as problematic as business-line silos.4 While the specialization of risk disciplines has benefits, common negative side effects are insufficient communication and coordination, followed by information gaps and ineffective decision making.