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At the current stage of development, however, we need to shift from purely qualitative judgements to quantitative analyses of what has caused the real exchange rate appreciation trends in many accession countries. For example, the majority of empirical studies of the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect have concluded that this hypotheses explains only 1-2 percentage points (or even less) a year of the observed real appreciation in Central European countries. This necessitates searching for other influential factors and forecasting their development for the future. The implications of the real appreciation process are probably different for those countries with hard pegs against the euro compared with countries that have floating exchange rates. In the case of currency boards, the only channel of real appreciation is an inflation differential. As the Maastricht inflation criterion is relatively strict, even a relatively modest pace of real appreciation might lead to complications. It will be certainly interesting to hear today if these countries really perceive this challenge as serious and what alternative policies - such as fiscal policies and/or income policies they can use to overcome the problem successfully. For countries with more flexible exchange rates, the Maastricht exchange rate criterion is less binding, and a modest nominal appreciation trend can be accommodated within its fluctuation bands. It will be interesting to hear whether we all share this view. Another question is whether we see any implications of the real appreciation process for designing the details of our ERM2 membership, such as its duration or the chosen central parity.