samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is potentially more we can do to provide a mobilisation framework to allow these new entrants to build their businesses under a more proportionate set of regulatory requirements, and this is something we are considering as part For further information on PRA expectations in this area, please see ‘Supervisory Statement 2/18: International insurers: the Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to branch authorisation and supervision’ 5  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  of the review of Solvency II – allowing greater space for small scale start-up insurers to innovate and bring new products to the market whilst ensuring that policyholders remain properly protected. Barriers to entry are not limited to authorisation of new insurers. For the London Market in particular, there is a need to react quickly to changes in rates to function effectively as a dynamic market. We should continue to consider measures that could maintain and further enhance the London Market’s pre-eminent position, including our approach to both traditional capital investment and Insurance Linked Securities (ILS). The ability to access capital and obtain regulatory permissions can be particularly critical during market turning events: to recover capital positions, to stabilise the market, and to respond to new opportunities.

Companies comment to us that the time and resources needed to win new business and secure contracts has increased sharply in the face of weak demand.7 I’m sure that these mechanisms and many more like them are at work today. But are they sufficiently strong for us to be confident that the likely relationship between growth and inflation would be unusually favourable were demand to increase strongly? Why should these mechanisms be so much more pronounced now than in previous recessions? Wouldn’t most of them have seemed equally important in the past? I find it hard to believe that these types of effects are the entire – or even the main – explanation for the weakness in productivity. What is unusual about this downturn is that it has been associated with a severe and prolonged financial crisis. Several of our banks are still not in a position to lend normally. Many firms have had to economise on working capital as the cost has increased and the availability reduced. The ability of many SMEs to raise finance to fund new investments or business expansion has been constrained. The efficiency with which banks have been able (or willing) to reallocate funds from outdated businesses and sectors towards new and dynamic companies has been stunted.
•  As of 1 May 2004, ALL new member states will have to treat their monetary and exchange rate policy as an area of common interest for all member states. Price stability is the main aim of Estonia’s monetary policy already now, and it MUST remain so also according to the principles of the European Union. But as far as the choice of strategies for managing the monetary and exchange rate policy is concerned, this will still be decided by each member state individually. •  Therefore ALL the countries joining the European Union together with Estonia face another important merger in the near future - accession to the Economic and Monetary Union (prior to that the countries are EMU members with limited rights). Only after completing this change can we be sure that our state is capable of fully utilising the possibilities that the merger with a powerful economic area offers. Estonia hopes to be among the very first member states to do that. •  At some forums outside Estonia we have been asked why we are rushing to the euro zone. Actually, the question should be formulated the other way round - why are some countries incapable of taking this next step in the near future? Estonia has pursued conservative economic policy and achieved success. Thus it is inappropriate to imply that we should wait for others for whom our pace of movement is too fast.

Mr McDonough comments on Capital Markets, Securities and Government Sponsored Enterprises Statement by the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr William J. McDonough, before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1999. Good morning Chairmen Leach and Baker and members of the Subcommittee. When I appeared before the full Committee in October, I spoke about the near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management and the events leading up to the private-sector recapitalization of its fund, Long-Term Capital Portfolio. At that time, I promised you that we would take a hard look at the issues growing out of that experience, particularly as they affect our responsibilities as bank supervisors. I am pleased to appear before you today to report on the lessons we have learned and the actions we have taken to reduce the possibility that such an episode could repeat itself in the future. As I indicated last fall, three issues require particular attention by banks and their supervisors in the wake of LTCM. These are, first, the adequacy of banks’ credit analysis processes; second, the effectiveness of exposure measurement; and third, the role of stress testing of counterparty exposure. In my remarks today I will detail the substantial progress that has been made, both domestically and internationally, to address each of these supervisory concerns.
Bear in mind then that Sweden is an industrialised country. Many of the member states of the IMF are poor and have even in calm periods unemployment of around 30%, a very strained government budget and limited opportunities to obtain foreign finance. Financial stability is even more important in these countries. Activities to prevent crises A large part of the IMF’s activity centres around preventing crises arising. Globalisation has meant that this work has become increasingly important. Few people want to trade with a country that is insecure, and even fewer to lend money there. Since the flow of information is increasing and capital can swiftly be moved between countries, economic crises can arise more quickly in the event of indications of problems in a country. They can also become deeper and spread to regions farther away than previously. The value of a stable, long-term economic policy has therefore been reinforced. Briefly, the IMF’s preventive work involves spreading knowledge, giving advice and creating norms. Spreading knowledge means that the IMF continually monitors trends in the world economy, conducts research and spreads knowledge to national governments and the general public. Knowledge about where the economic risks are has a stabilising effect on markets and also allows countries to tackle their problems. The IMF continuously surveys economic trends in each member country and also gives regular advice on economic policy on issues concerning, for instance, exchange rates, inflation and the financial market. Most countries receive a visit from the IMF every year.

To alleviate the problems here, the Swedish National Debt Office, in consultation with the Riksbank, decided two weeks ago to increase the supply of treasury bills through a number of additional auctions and at the same time buy, by reverse repo as it is called, the corresponding amount of mortgage bonds. These measures mean in total that the Swedish National Debt Office will probably have invested around SEK 150 billion in covered mortgage bonds by the end of November. However, there is also a flexibility to adjust the issue volumes on the basis of market developments. It is worth noting that the Swedish market for mortgage bonds has been open during the whole period of financial turbulence, although it has functioned less efficiently than before. Just over a week ago the Riksbank also increased the possibility for credit for the participants in the RIX payment system. The purpose of this is to facilitate the banks’ payments to one another during the day, where necessary. To oil the wheels a little, one might say. RIX participants can now to a greater extent use their own covered bonds, or those issued by an institution with close links, as collateral in the system. The collateral for a covered bond is directly tied to a particular portfolio of mortgage loans with high collateral. This means that  4  BIS Review 119/2008  the credit granter is protected, even if the institution issuing the bond were to collapse.
The equity prices of banks tumbled, falling 86% on average for the major UK banks between February 2007 and March this year (Chart 4). In money terms, that is a loss of market capitalisation of around £ equivalent to 20% of annual UK GDP. Underlying these price falls was a generalised loss of trust between banks and investors in banks, such as sovereign wealth funds and mutual funds. What explained this wholesale loss of trust? In the run-up to the crisis, banks’ business models were increasingly predicated on making loans for onward sale. Loans became tradable securities and long-term relationships gave way to short-term transactions. The perils of this practice were well understood by Michael Marks, founder of Marks and Spencer and of course one of the region’s greatest-ever entrepreneurs: “You either make things or you sell them. Don’t try both”. Banks tried both, making loans with an eye to subsequently selling them. This had unintended, but in fact entirely predictable, consequences. Without skin in the game, banks’ due diligence became slipshod. The quality of tradable loans fell as their quantity rose. Investors in these securities were not as canny as the landlady of the Esk Inn: they purchased them in size even though “they knew nought about them”. By the time the penny had dropped for these investors, the pounds had not taken care of themselves.

Global losses on these securitised assets are now believed to lie anywhere up to £ trillion.6 As losses accumulated, trust in these securities was undermined and with it trust in the banks issuing them. As credit was cut, trust in the viability of some non-financial companies was questioned. Corporate distress began to rise internationally during the course of 2008. And as corporate distress rose, in particular after the failure of Lehman Brothers, distrust between companies mounted. The stream of trade credit extended between firms dried to a trickle at the end 2008 and in the first part of 2009. At that time, a survey by the Bank’s regional agents  6  For example, Bank of England Financial Stability Report, June 2009. BIS Review 108/2009  3  reported that around a quarter of contacts had had to turn down potentially profitable orders as a result of tighter trade credit. This progressive hardening of the credit arteries also had dramatic effects between countries. Cross-border flows of credit have reversed dramatically in the past year. “Home bias” by investors – a lack of trust in foreign investments – has returned with a vengeance. Cross-border lending by international banks grew by 20% per year between 2003 and 2007. In 2008, it fell 5% (Chart 5). This has had adverse effects on UK companies, around a third of whose borrowing comes from foreign lenders.
Countries with cost-advantages, driven by technology and innovation, have been able to attain  6  The Consumer Finances and Socio-economic Survey Report 2003/04 – Part I, Central Bank of Sri Lanka p. 66  7  World Development Report, 2006, Table 3, pp 296-7  BIS Review 4/2007  5  specialization in sub-components of given final industrial products which are assembled in global factories. As reported by the World Bank 8 , the Ford Escort Motor Car which is finally assembled in the UK or Germany, had main components manufactured in 15 different countries. In the modern production processes, it has been observed that product development relating to personal computers takes place in USA. The components for them are manufactured in Taiwan. The final assembly takes place in Malaysia. The marketing is undertaken in Singapore. The inquiries relating to the products are handled by call centers in India. It, therefore, behooves developing countries like Sri Lanka to be a part of this ‘global factory process’ in order to raise their industrial production capacity and wealth. But the prime pre-requisite for that is the existence of a vibrant and dynamic services sector equipped with a free flow of information and capacity to impart knowledge on time. In other words, the modern industry cannot survive or sustain without services. Hence, any attempt at developing industry in isolation would drain it of a vital requirement for growth and sustenance, viz., competitive advantage.

According to the World Bank data 5 , between 1960 and 2004, the share of the services sector in some selected countries was as follows:  The share of the services sector Percent of GDP 1960  1980  1995  2004  UK  53  54  66  72  Australia  51  58  70  71  France  52  62  71  73  Japan  42  54  60  68  USA  58  64  72  75  Singapore  78  61  64  65  Hong Kong  62  67  83  88  China  20  21  31  35  India  30  36  41  52  Sri Lanka  48  43  52  58  The statistics show that the current level of services in Sri Lanka is more or less equivalent to the status which the services enjoyed in developed countries in 1960s. While Sri Lanka is far ahead of the two giant growth machines in the region, viz., China and India, it would not be too long for these two countries to overtake it, given their current services promoting policies. It is also observed that the services sector has been growing in importance in all the countries during the past five decades or so. Some countries have now attained the optimal level of services above 70 percent.
Third, given the lingering monetary accommodation, policy space has narrowed, thus constraining the room for reaction if severe shocks occur. In this note, we will make an effort to transpose these challenges to the countries of the CESEE region and asses how relevant these global matters are for them. Policy rates in advanced economies, in the US and the euro area in particular have remained low. The monetary policy normalisation was rolled-back in the US, with the new cycle of lowering the policy rate being opened. In the euro area, the accommodative stance of the ECB was strengthened, by further cutting the interest rates and relaunching the QE programme. These moves enabled for the already easy financing conditions to remain in place, and further easing to be expected as well. This environment in the global context has been conducive for behaviour of yield searching, thus potentially encouraging excessive risk-taking and building up of financial vulnerabilities. Conditioned on the specifics of the region/country, financial vulnerabilities are assessed to be located in different sectors across different countries. According to the financial vulnerability map of the IMF published in the Global Financial Stability Report, October 2019 it seems that the risks stemming for sovereigns are still visible across the board. Similar inference can be made by observing assessed vulnerabilities in nonbank financial sector and nonfinancial corporates, while the picture on households and banks is rather mixed. 2  Chart 1: Financial vulnerabilities – heat map across sectors and group of countries  Source: Global financial stability report, IMF 2019.

This in turn could lead to lower inflation and economic activity. The central bank’s response is to lower the policy rate. Chart: Financial stress does not arise As a starting point for our model exercise, let us first assume that neither the central bank nor other economic agents recognise that financial stress could arise. The blue lines in the panel show the path for the policy rate, the output gap, inflation and the financial imbalances in this case. Capacity utilisation increases and inflation returns to target. However, the low interest rate level leads to an increase in the financial imbalances. Let us return to the extended model, and assume that the central bank recognises that financial stress could arise further out and takes into account the possible impact of financial imbalances on inflation and output. This scenario is represented by the red lines. The policy rate is still reduced, but to a lesser extent. In this scenario, it takes longer for inflation to move up to target. The policy stance also results in a somewhat weaker increase in activity. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  At the same time, the slightly higher policy rate contributes to mitigating the build-up of financial imbalances. So far, we have assumed that financial stress has not occurred. Hence, we have not reaped the benefits of the “leaning against the wind” strategy. Now, let us see what occurs if financial stress does arise further out.
Moreover, our current account surplus essentially means that we are exporting capital on a large scale; in somewhat more extreme terms, you could say that the jobs being created by our growth are largely ending up outside Sweden's borders. So the low employment growth does not appear primarily to be a result of weak demand. Instead, the explanation must be sought among longer-term structural factors. This is reflected in particular by the fact that the employment rate, in spite of historically high economic growth, has not completely recovered since its sharp fall in connection with the crisis in the early 1990s. Moreover, the fact that open unemployment did not drop more during the economic upswing in the 1990s suggests that the labour market is not functioning satisfactorily. One example of rigidities in the labour market is that unemployment has remained around 8 per cent in the construction sector,  6  BIS Review 84/2005  even though it is one of the few sectors where activity has risen and labour shortages have begun to appear. Another sign that the unemployment problems are structural in nature is the large differences across regions and occupational categories. In spite of a single monetary policy for the whole of the Swedish economy, unemployment figures in some regions are twice as high as in others, while the proportion of people receiving benefit from their unemployment fund is twice as high in some occupational categories as in others.

Nominal and real wage growth, 1995-2004 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 BUSINESS SECTOR Blue-collar workers  4.7  5.4  4.7  3.4  2.6  3.3  3.8  3.6  3.1  2.6  White-collar workers  3.5  6.4  4.2  4.7  3.7  4.1  4.5  4.1  3.3  3.2  Blue-collar and white-collar workers  3.3  6.0  4.5  3.7  3.4  3.7  4.4  4.1  3.5  3.3  CPI  2.5  0.5  0.7  -0.3  0.5  0.9  2.4  2.2  1.9  0.4  Blue-collar workers  2.2  4.9  4.1  3.7  2.1  2.4  1.4  1.4  1.2  2.3  White-collar workers  1.0  5.8  3.5  5.0  3.3  3.2  2.0  1.9  1.4  2.8  0.9  5.4  3.9  4.0  2.9  2.8  1.9  1.9  1.5  2.9  WHOLE ECONOMY  REAL WAGE GROWTH  BUSINESS SECTOR  WHOLE ECONOMY Blue-collar and white-collar workers  Sources: National Mediation Office, Statistics Sweden and Sveriges Riksbank. Structural unemployment Developments in the labour market have been weak despite several years’ firm economic growth, historically low interest rates and strong public finances. So far, the growing economy has not managed to create enough jobs.
Caleb M Fundanga: The role of professionals in economic development Remarks by Mr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Annual National Development Conference of the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research, Lusaka, 28 November 2009. *  *  *  Hon Minister of Finance and National Planning, Dr Situmbeko Musokotwane The Permanent Secretary Budget and Economic affairs, Mr Emmanuel Ngulube ZIPAR Executive Director – Mwilola Imakando Distinguished Guests, Members of the Press Ladies and gentlemen, It is indeed a pleasure for me to be invited to this very important gathering to give a Scope of the Conference. The central theme of my address today is the role that professionals are expected to play in economic development in general and in the provision of public goods and services in particular. You will agree with me that the levels of professionalism in our country has somewhat declined in the recent past. Nowadays, it is not rare to hear of corrupt practices and unethical conduct in the both the public and private sectors. This has no doubt compromised professionalism. Ladies and Gentlemen, as you are aware, professionalism entails possessing specialist knowledge and following a standard of conduct based on ethics that govern the use of this knowledge when providing a service to the public. Professionals provide essential and valuable services to any society. It is for this reason that the public depend on them more and more as economies advance.

Question: Until now we did not speak of Kosovo, we have war here at our doors, was this war - the possible impact on economy or the psychological impact on Europe - part of your decision or part of your concerns? Duisenberg: No, it was not. It neither induced nor deterred us from taking the decisions we have taken today. Of course, we are fully aware of the dramatic turmoil that is taking place in Europe, and it does not leave us untouched, by no means, but we have also noted with gratitude that all this turmoil has so far not had any impact at all on the financial markets or exchange rates. 5  BIS Review 39 /1999
In taking this action, the Bank has sought to prevent the emergence of a self-sustaining vicious spiral of collateral calls, forced sales and disappearing liquidity from emerging in a core segment of the financial markets. Restoring market functioning helps reduce any risks from contagion to credit conditions for UK households and businesses. Such actions preserve the effective transmission of monetary policy. But crucially they are not monetary policy actions in themselves. Were monetary policy to be re-oriented towards serving financial stability ends, not only would it be less effective in addressing dysfunction than more temporary and targeted interventions in specific dis-orderly market segments, but it would also be distracted from its central task of maintaining price stability and returning inflation to the 2% target. At the time of writing, this distinction between monetary policy actions and actions taken by the Bank to support financial stability has been recognised and priced by market participants. 4/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In the face of a substantial re-pricing of financial assets a few weeks ago, markets originally anticipated that Bank Rate – the active instrument of monetary policy in the eyes of the MPC – might be changed at an ad hoc meeting outside the regular schedule of MPC decisions.

I also want to thank Andy Haldane, our communications staff at the Bank, and our colleagues tasked with making the logistics work – all the way to Edinburgh. Last but certainly not least, let me thank those of you who spent the day with us at Guildhall, those who followed online, and those who participated in our sessions in Birmingham and Edinburgh, Cambridge and Manchester and our many school sessions. Apart from coming up with the words “Open Forum”, I’ve added little to this memorable day, but I have taken away a great deal! Let me spend a couple of minutes on a few of these takeaways. They are far from comprehensive, and only a starter, because part of the point is that we all need to go back and reflect on what we learned and what we’d like to prioritise. The first thing that struck me was the almost universal reaffirmation of the importance of markets. Whether it was the vox-pops in the streets of Leeds or Belfast, the feedback from our event in Birmingham, the interventions here in Guildhall, there was a clear recognition of how important these markets are not just to the economy, and not just in an abstract sense, but to people’s everyday lives. At the same time, the level of trust in institutions and market mechanisms is quite low.