samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some pursue strategies geared to obtaining high revenue, which counter relatively high costs. Others focus on low costs that are compatible with relatively low revenue. And others strike a balance between average revenue-generating capacity and medium or low-level costs. These differences in strategies are reflected in different action plans: some are geared to growth in loans or fees; others to streamlining costs through various means, although two appear to be prominent, namely digitalisation and externalisation. Conclusions To conclude, I believe we all share the view that the challenges the financial sector faces in Spain are far-reaching. The social environment, supervision and regulation appear not to be helping, since they increase pressure on banks. However, experience shows that, sadly, it is almost always under pressure that reforms are undertaken. Compared with their European competitors, Spanish banks have significant comparative strengths to address the changes. These include higher profitability and efficiency, and a lower potential impact from the implementation of Basel III. We should harness these advantages and attempt to correct those areas in which we are less competitive. Irrespective of improving profitability, efficiency and solvency levels, the key long-term challenge involves transforming the business model. And as I have said, technology is central to this challenge. The future will be for those who are most prepared. In this respect, I believe that any challenge can be viewed from two different and, in fact, opposite standpoints: as a threat or as an opportunity. The difference between both views lies in the attitude adopted and the willingness deployed.

Mergers – or, I should rather say, their absence in light of the recent past – are always prominent in press headlines. In this respect, let me reiterate that mergers may be a means for securing gains in efficiency and profitability, but they are very complex operations and the attendant business plans must be appropriately assessed. 10/15  We have seen a 30% reduction in the number of institutions there were in 2009. More recently we have seen how, in the absence of a context of acute crisis, many of the corporate operations announced do not reach fruition. Meantime, in some of the operations that are finalised, integration problems continue to be seen for years. Our task in a setting such as the present one is to ensure that any merger process should lead to the creation of a new, more solvent institution, with a sound business model, enabling structural costs to be cut and, in short, value to be generated. We must of course assess these same aspects with a view to potential cross-border mergers in Europe. The absence of such mergers may be seen as a sign that the Banking Union is not working as it should. True, several elements of the Banking Union are still not in place, including most notably the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). It is likewise true that the regulations affecting the sector are still too heterogeneous across the different Member States.
First, I will touch on the increasingly complex policy making environment given the openness of our economies. Second, I will posit three issues that we need to grapple with in considering the optimal policy mix towards achieving monetary and financial stability. Our mandates are to preserve monetary and financial stability, which are critical conditions for sustainable growth. In the pursuit of these mandates, a key consideration is the openness of our economies. While the integration of our economies with the global economy and international financial markets has yielded substantial benefits, it has also made our economies more susceptible to external shocks and spillover effects from global developments. Let me briefly touch on some of these external factors: First, global growth momentum is slowing. A key issue is how deep and prolonged the slowdown will be. A key risk is the ongoing trade tension and its impact on global trade, investment and sentiments. For many of our countries that depend heavily on international trade, the impact is already being felt in the slowdown of our exports and growth. Second, major central banks have indicated intentions, or a few have taken steps, to relax their monetary policy to support growth in an environment of low inflation. While this has helped to loosen the global financial conditions, the question is should emerging economies be prepared for another round of surge in capital inflows? This brings me to my third point.

Facing this new reality, the policy reaction function of central banks from the emerging market economies could, to quote BIS General Manager Carstens, be described as a multi-instrument reaction function responding to multiple-indicator variables, including the exchange rate. Given these increasingly complex and interconnected challenges and the risks of policy tradeoffs, what should guide policymakers going forward? Allow me to pose three questions on this. Question 1: The assignment problem First, the assignment problem – how do we assign policy tools to policy targets appropriately? The Tinbergen principle suggests that policymakers trying to achieve multiple economic targets need to have at least one policy tool for each policy target. Robert Mundell went one step further and suggested that each policy instrument should be assigned to the policy target on which it has the greatest relative effect. This may sound good in theory, but we know it is much more complex in reality given the multifaceted and often interconnected risks confronting us. For ASEAN policymakers, how can we assign the tools available to us to our expanding objectives/mandates in the most optimal way? How do we avoid overburdening any single policy tool? If multiple tools are needed, how do we sequence them? Is there a case to be made for an optimal order of policy based on prioritising of objectives? Or is a pre-agreed sequenced policy order too restrictive? Question 2: Rules versus discretion Second, is the old question of rules versus discretion.
High-quality research boosts the central bank's credibility and improves the quality of its policies. The remit of this activity is the presentation and discussions of the current research projects conducted at the Bank of Albania over this year, along with the researches performed in other central banks, prestigious international and Albanian universities, as well as in financial institutions. It is an excellent opportunity to get feedback and new insights from colleagues in homologue institutions working on the same topics and dealing with similar challenges to ours. I am pretty sure that this workshop will be worthwhile to better understand the origin and complexity of challenges we are facing, and design the right policies to address them accordingly. Over these years, the workshop did change and grew in many different ways, in turn so did the challenges and opportunities faced by us. This event takes place at a particularly difficult time: while we are still facing the complexities of the gradual phasing out of the policies implemented during the pandemic, new risks have dramatically taken center stage. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Despite the limited direct exposure of Albania to Russia or Ukraine, the macroeconomic scenario changed almost overnight following the Russia's war in Ukraine. Albania is now facing the challenges arising from the surge in international prices of energy, tighter global financial conditions, which are likely to persist and the economic slowdown in Europe.

Finally, I would like to close my remarks by thanking our speakers, discussants, the chairpersons, as well as the Bank of Albania's staff for dedicating your time and efforts to this important activity. I kindly invite you to actively participate in and conduct a very lively and fruitful debate. I truly believe that the productive discussions which will certainly take place during these two-day workshop, will contribute to strengthening further cooperation among researchers, and between the institutions. Thank you! 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
I do not intend to say much more about the unfolding situation other than that we are naturally following developments very carefully and, as always, are prepared to act to safeguard financial stability, should such action be necessary. Allow me, therefore, to return to the more general discussion I had originally intended to hold. However, before proceeding further, I would like to point out that the thoughts I present here are my own. My colleagues on the Executive Board do not necessarily analyse matters in completely the same manner as I do. I would also like to emphasise that my ambition is to illustrate different ideas in an intuitive manner, without attempting to propose any cut-anddried solutions. BIS Review 68/2010  1  Monetary policy has developed Let me start by looking back on how monetary policy has developed in Sweden and other countries over the last fifteen to twenty years. As I have already mentioned, we were one of the first central banks to introduce inflation targeting. When we started in 1993, our only forerunners were the central banks of New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom. Today, inflation targeting is applied in approximately twenty-five countries. 1 Furthermore, many other central banks have adopted essential elements of inflation targeting, such as setting price stability as the overriding goal, basing the policy on forward assessments and publishing regular reports to provide relatively comprehensive explanations of the reasoning used.

Nonetheless, I believe there are good conditions for development work within this area to result in equally healthy returns as the efforts expended upon developing monetary policy over the last fifteen to twenty years. The application of time-varying regulations also raises the issue of what would be an appropriate form of institutional organisation. Different countries have chosen different solutions as regards the allocation of responsibility. One common feature is for the central bank frequently to have a certain responsibility for financial stability via its role as lender of last resort. In certain countries, the central bank also has responsibility for supervision and the application of regulations. Meanwhile, in other countries, such as Sweden, responsibility for regulatory and supervisory matters is placed with a separate supervisory authority. This means that, in Sweden, it is the Riksbank that controls the policy rate and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Finansinspektionen, that controls regulations. For some time, a discussion has taken place on the international level regarding the role central banks should play in matters of supervision and the application of rules. Ideas regarding the application of more time-varying regulations are adding fresh fuel to this debate. Utilising the expression for the rule of action above in the equation for the lending rate allows different institutional arrangements to be illustrated. In the previous equation for the lending rate, the regulations were described as a time-varying variable.
Inflation can be expected to be somewhat higher than this forecast for some time to come due to the higher energy prices, although, it is a matter, as I see it, of changes in a rather short time perspective. However, as we have earlier pointed out, there is also reason to assume gradually increasing inflationary pressures as the economic upswing leads to a rise in capacity utilisation both in Sweden and abroad. The basic assessment of inflation developments over the next few years still stands, given the new information received since the Inflation Report. My overall conclusion is that the new information received since the Inflation Report in February mainly confirms the picture then outlined of economic activity in Sweden, while it indicates a slightly stronger development abroad. Inflation prospects in the next few years also appear to have held up rather well on the whole. In February, when we chose to raise the repo rate, our conclusion was that the interest rate should perhaps be increased at a somewhat slower rate than was anticipated according to the interest rate path on which the forecasts in the Inflation Report were based. Personally, I do not see any reason in the current situation to change that assessment, although international developments now look slightly better than we had anticipated in February. This is something I will discuss with my colleagues when we meet next week.

To date, they have focussed on items such as groceries and clothing. Although early days, the potential benefits in terms of increased sample sizes and granularity seem to be considerable. For example, the ONS have so far collected 7,000 price quotes per day for a group of 27  grocery items, which is larger than the current monthly collection for those items in the CPI. For GDP measurement, new sources and methods are also gaining ground. One recent study used satellite imaging to measure the amount of non-natural light emitted from different regions of the world. This has 28  been found to have a statistically significant relationship with economic activity. This approach could  potentially help in tracking activity in regions that are geographically remote, where statistical surveying techniques are poor or where mismeasurement problems are acute. A more down-to-earth example, used by the UK’s ONS and other statistical agencies, is so-called administrative data. This includes data collected by government agencies as part of their activities – for example, on tax revenue and benefit payments. In the UK, some of these data have recently become available for wider use through the government’s Open Data initiative, albeit subject to important checks. 23  Coyle (2014). Fouquet and Broadberry (2015). 25 Cavallo and Rigobon (2016). 26 Cœuré (2017). 27 See https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/researchindicesusingwebscrapedpricedata/august2017update 28 Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2011).
To understand the urgency of the need for fundamental reform of the educational system, it is sufficient to note that, among the OECD countries, Spain comes last in tests of mathematical reasoning and second last in reading comprehension. And, in the short term the educational system needs to be strengthened in order to ensure that pupils acquire the necessary qualifications, even in the absence of physical classes. As for technological capital, the weight of public investment in research and development activity in GDP is 26% lower in Spain than on average in the EU, a gap that widens to 54% in the case of private spending, which indicates just how far behind we are in this area. To correct this shortfall would require improving the incentives for investment in R+D+I, including strengthening the support mechanisms for innovation, improving the evaluation of research-based further education and boosting the most appropriate financing levers in this area, which are different from the usual ones, given the particularities of investment with a greater innovative potential. Moreover, it is necessary to stress the existence of complementarities between human and technological capital, which would warrant taking an overall approach when promoting them.9 Given their considerable effectiveness in raising the economy’s potential growth, it would be desirable for projects with both a high technological content and a focus on human capital development to be given priority among the uses for the European recovery fund, despite the long maturity period before they bear fruit.

Households’ gross disposable income fell by 8.8% year-on-year in the first half of 2020. In parallel, lending to households has fallen off in recent months as a result of the decline in new lending business. The reduction has been more marked in the consumer credit segment, while new financing for house purchases fell less sharply. Overall, although the moratoria on loans, which affect 7% of the outstanding balance of lending to households, have checked the decline in lending to this sector by reducing the volume of loan  5  repayments, its year-on-year growth rate dipped to -0.8%, compared with the 0.3% increase in February. This has entailed an increase in the financial pressure borne by households. Thus, for the household sector as a whole, the debt-to-gross disposable income (GDI) ratio rose by almost 4 pp in the first half of the year to 95%. Once again, the intensity of this increase in debt will foreseeably ease to some extent with the GDI data for Q3. The increase in household saving not earmarked for debt service (a consequence of the heavy decline in consumption) appears to have been channelled to bank deposits, which posted a year-onyear increase of 7.1% in July. However, updated information on the distribution of this saving within the household sector is not available, making it difficult to assess to what extent this development is softening the greater degree of financial pressure for certain groups of households.
I would like to thank Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Ben Broadbent, Victoria Cleland, Andrew Hauser and Tom Mutton for their comments. 1. To function money relies on a shared understanding that the relevant instrument can be used to calibrate, exchange, store and settle claims. For further discussion on this point see recent speeches ‘It’s Time to Talk about Money’ (2020) and ‘Do We Need Public Money (2021)’. 2. The Bank of England also issues reserves to financial institutions. This is a form of wholesale money that allows regulated firms to hold claims on the Bank of England. 3. Only the Bank of England issues banknotes in England and Wales, but six banks in Scotland and Northern Ireland also issue banknotes, backed largely by assets at the Bank of England. See Scottish and Northern Ireland banknotes | Bank of England and the Scottish and Northern Irish Banknotes Regulations (2009) for further details. 4. The Payments of Wages Act 1960, as amended by the Truck Act. 5. Some examples of programmable functionality might include: instantaneous currency exchanges with reduced settlement risk; more efficient real estate purchases whereby all parties’ transactions are executed simultaneously by a smart contract; or an automated payment made by a vehicle at a toll booth. 6. Financial Services and Markets Bill (2023) . In December 2022, the Bank of England published a consultation closing on 10 February, setting how it intends to use these new powers. ,  7. See for example Haldane, A.: ‘Seizing the Opportunities from Digital Finance’ (2020). 8.

We are seeking industry and public views on the key design choices that determine the model. The Consultation Paper is accompanied by a Technical Working Paper which sets out our current thinking on the relevant technology and seeks feedback on the approaches we propose to consider. There is not time today to go through the model in detail, but I will briefly set out some of the most important details of what we propose. Page 7  We envisage the digital pound as a partnership with the private sector. The Bank would provide the digital pound and the central infrastructure, including the ‘core ledger’. Private sector firms – which could be banks or approved non-bank firms – would provide the interface between the Bank’s central infrastructure and users by offering wallets and payment services. These private companies would be able to integrate the digital pound, as the settlement asset, into the services they would offer to wallet holders. The wallets would be operated on a ‘pass-through’ basis. That is to say, they would not constitute a claim on the wallet provider in the way that a bank account is a claim on a bank. Nor would they represent a custody arrangement. Rather, the wallets would hold all of the customer related information and ‘pass-through’ the customers instructions to the Bank’s infrastructure. All of the digital pounds would be held on the Bank of England’s central ledger. Privacy has been a major theme of the Taskforce’s engagement with industry and the public.
I emphasise that this is not a call for harmonisation of regulation or a blind assertion of the need for a completely level playing field, but simply a call to re-examine the rationale for differences in regulation. We may find that some differences are justified. For example, if we conclude that failures of insurance companies impose fewer systemic costs than bank failures, we might certainly choose to set our minimum insolvency tolerance at a different level. Much of the detail of risk measurement and regulation must necessarily differ, for example because of the very different time horizons involved in life insurance compared with either banking or securities business or non-life insurance. But there is a body of common risks faced by banks and insurers on both their assets and liabilities – namely credit, market, and operational risks – as well as a body of distinct risks (such as mortality risk for life insurance companies and on the banking side liquidity risk); and to my mind this means that any very fundamental divergences in the basic frameworks do need careful consideration: for example, whether the trend toward risk based measures in banking needs to be mirrored in the non-life insurance regulation in Europe. This is clearly not a small task but I would welcome it being scheduled for the future on the international agenda.

Defining the objective is possible only in the broadest sense, measuring how close we are  BIS Review 43/2001  1  to it is even more difficult; there is certainly no agreed single indicator or set of indicators which tell us when we have achieved financial stability or when we risk failing to achieve it. Importance of financial stability In part this is because we still lack evidence. This comment may strike some of you, perhaps those from Scandinavia or Japan, as ironic; you may feel that the body of evidence we have is already disagreeably large. However, whilst banking crises are not exactly rare, they are episodic rather than regular and they tend to exhibit a number of idiosyncratic characteristics. This is in some sense reassuring – at least banks and the authorities do not keep making exactly the same mistakes – but at the same time it makes predicting crises very difficult. The causality is complex and difficult to grasp. In some cases, fragility at individual banks can turn into system-wide fragility and in turn into systemwide crisis. In others, a macro-prudential shock or policy error can impact on individual institutions, revealing underlying systemic weakness and triggering a crisis. However, the papers to be presented at this conference each address, in various ways, one or more of these issue s – about definitions, objectives, and policy mechanisms – and I am confident that at the end we will have achieved our aim of a real advance in our understanding.