samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, the Central Bank targeting a variable such as FX rate, growth or current account deficit is out of the question. The Central Bank shares with the public the general framework of the current exchange rate policy and FX buying auctions in the press releases it has issued each year since the start of 2002. As also stated in these press releases; (i)  In the current floating exchange rate regime, exchange rates are determined by supply and demand conditions in the market and the Central Bank does not have any exchange rate target. (ii)  Since there is no exchange rate level to maintain in countries with floating exchange rate regimes, the level of foreign currency reserves is much less significant compared to countries with fixed or flexible exchange rate regimes. However, especially in emerging economies such as Turkey, a strong FX reserves position is significant in removing the unfavorable effects of potential internal and external shocks and boosting confidence in the country’s economy. In addition, taking into account the foreign debt payments of the Treasury and the need to gradually reduce the number of high-cost remittance accounts in the long-term, which are peculiar to Turkey and make up a significant part of the liabilities side of the Central Bank’s balance sheet, the Central Bank holds foreign exchange buying auctions to build up reserves at times where foreign exchange supply constantly increases compared to foreign exchange demand.

Under the assumptions regarding liquidity stated above, the Central Bank’s 2007 liquidity management strategy will be as follows: (i)  The Central Bank will continue to announce overnight borrowing and lending interest rates between 10:00-12:00 and 13:00-16:00 in the Interbank Money Market within the CBRT. In case of a liquidity shortage during the day, banks will be able to borrow at the Central Bank’s lending rate against collateral within their limits. In the event of a fall in interest rates due to increasing liquidity, banks will be able to lend New Turkish Lira to the Central Bank at the Central Bank’s borrowing rate. (ii)  The Central Bank will continue to provide the Late Liquidity Window Facility in the Interbank Money Market within the CBRT between 16:00-16:30 such that banks may borrow from or lend to the Central Bank against collateral without any limit. (iii)  In case of a temporary or permanent liquidity shortage, the Central Bank will continue to carry out liquidity management through one-week repo auctions. When there is liquidity shortage in the market, the Central Bank will announce the amount of repo auction for that day on Reuters’ CBTF page at 10.00. While determining the amounts of the auction, the Central Bank - as long as no extraordinary fluctuations are observed in the market - will endeavor to maintain the average auction interest rate; a.
And the City has continued to play a very active part in developing market activity in the new currency ever since. In many respects the City is already an integral part of the Eurozone. There were those who argued that the City would suffer if the UK failed to join from the outset. That clearly has not so far happened - quite the reverse. The argument now is that we will suffer if we don’t join reasonably soon. That’s not something you can actually prove either way. It’s not a general point about the City’s competitiveness. It’s euro-specific, with the implication that somehow or other obstacles will be put in our way. That possibility cannot be altogether excluded, but it would be illogical. Most of the people that I talk with recognise the positive contribution the City is making to the development of euro financial markets - it is in fact the most positive contribution that we can make from the outside. Of course it represents competition with other European financial centres, but at the macro-economic level such competition is a positive - not a zero - sum game from which borrowers and lenders and market intermediaries collectively all stand to gain. Certainly the City has benefited from the euro’s introduction, but not at the expense of other centres, rather alongside them.

We need a global effort and a whole-of-society approach within each country. Effective partnerships across the public, private, and people sectors will be key to mobilise the financing necessary for an effective and just transition. As a leading global financial centre in Asia, Singapore can play an important role in mobilising this capital, especially to support Asia's transition to net-zero. At the Singapore Pavilion, we have set out how we will do this through three key strategies: blended finance to mobilise private capital for the transition carbon markets to facilitate emissions abatement and inclusivity good-quality data to support credible disclosure and track progress First strategy - blended finance to synergise public and private capital for projects that are marginally bankable. Many green and transition projects in emerging markets pose risks that are not commensurate with their expected returns. We need catalytic capital to improve project bankability and crowd in private sector capital. Blended finance is also about combining financing with capacity building, technology transfer, and institutional support, to reduce risk and enhance bankability. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Blended finance is not new but scaling it requires a fresh approach. About a month ago, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) held the inaugural Transition Finance towards Net Zero Conference Conference. The conference saw more than 500 leaders and experts from across the world – from industry, academia, governments, and multilateral development banks - discuss the nuts-and-bolts of what it takes for blended finance to scale. What were their key take-aways?
We have made good forecasts for all variables, with the exception of productivity, one year ahead. This is reflected in the fact that we have made more accurate forecasts than the time series model and also in the fact that the correlations are relatively high between forecasts and outcomes. In addition, the bias is small for all variables one year ahead. We have a forecasting memory two years ahead for both employment and inflation. Although the correlations between forecasts and outcomes are weak one year ahead, they nevertheless show a clear relationship. On the other hand, the study implies poor forecasting memory for GDP and productivity two years ahead. The correlations between the forecasts and outcomes are also weak for these variables two years ahead. We have seen that the  6  BIS Review 138/2007  bias is larger for most variables two years ahead. GDP and inflation have been overestimated slightly during the period studied, and employment and productivity have been under-estimated. Our inflation forecasts, particularly those for CPIX, have good qualities such as high correlation with outcomes and long forecasting memories. It is worth pointing out that this is the variable that is most important for monetary policy. At the same time, the uncertainty band shows that probability that inflation will be within the Riksbank’s tolerance interval of 1-3 per cent two years ahead is only around 75 per cent, despite our forecast being that it will be two per cent.

Given increased inflation expectations and supply-side restrictions, these factors may have a longer-lasting effect on prices. The pass-through of last year’s ruble depreciation to prices still continues, although it is waning. Recently, prices could be affected not only by ruble exchange rate fluctuations in 2020 H2, 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  but also its weakening in spring, when enterprises were unable to revise their prices immediately due to a slump in demand. Eventually, the combination of the two episodes of the ruble depreciation may be a reason why inflation expectations will stay elevated for a longer period. Upward pressure on domestic prices persists due to the situation in global commodity markets, first and foremost in food markets. Food prices have risen because of reduced inventories and unfavourable weather conditions. Moreover, the growth of prices for cereals increases costs in meat product manufacturing and is not only a proinflationary factor in itself, but it may also entail secondary effects. It is worth noting that the new mechanism of export duties in grain markets will smooth out the influence of global price fluctuations on domestic prices. Finally, inflation is still affected by a group of factors associated with the epidemic situation. It includes staff shortages in a number of industries, increased costs incurred by companies to comply with sanitary and epidemiological rules, and persistent temporary delays in supplies due to disruptions in logistics chains. These are supply-side factors putting upward pressure on inflation.
The adjustments are between 10% and 25% in the number of offices, and between 12% and 18% in staff. Third, to reinforce the viability of the new institutions (resulting from the mergers of several savings banks) with the resources and the management capacity of the savings banks best placed to lead each of the concentration processes. Finally, to ensure in the medium term that the lower number of institutions and the diminished capacity will allow a reasonable level of profitability in step with the risks incurred for the remaining institutions. To round off the adjustment, the legislation governing savings banks was also amended in an attempt to make the management of these institutions more professional and, most notably, opening them up to market discipline and to the possibility of them raising capital (shares) to reinforce their solvency. In short, the central aim of the efforts made by the Bank of Spain since 2009 has been to restructure the balance sheets of banks, and of savings banks in particular. Spanish deposit institutions have made an enormous write-down drive to date, this effort often going unnoticed by certain observers of the Spanish banking system. Overall, provisions totalling € billion which is a 9% of GDP, more than the cost of numerous bank crises experienced by developed countries.

After the Second World War, there was a long period of trying to achieve price stability by means of various intermediate targets such as a fixed exchange rate and a target for growth in the money supply. The first explicit inflation target was introduced in New Zealand in 1990. Canada followed in 1991, the UK in 1992, and Sweden and Australia in 1993. Inflation targeting is now the norm in small and medium-sized open economies. Denmark is an important exception. Since the mid-1980s, Denmark has conducted a very disciplined fiscal and wage policy. Combined with ERM II membership, this has enabled Denmark to maintain a credible and successful fixed exchange rate regime. Pursuant to the Regulation on Monetary Policy laid down by the Government on 29 March 2001, the operational objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation. Norway’s mandate is as follows: “Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. [...]” The first paragraph of the mandate sets forth its intentions.
In 1978, Helmut Schmidt said that “the citizens of Europe just want solutions to concrete issues".2 Nonetheless, we need a political ambition if we are to act – call it a “vision", if you wish. We need this because we have to make progress – it’s now or never: thanks to the economic recovery, and thanks to President Macron’s initial proposals at the Sorbonne, and the European chapter of the German coalition agreement – it is obviously not my place to comment on the rest of the agreement – we are enjoying historically favourable conditions. If we don’t act in 2018 – first the French and Germans, and then all 19 member countries of the euro area – we will never make headway. 2. How to strengthen the euro area: three new ideas I will now turn to my three new ideas to strengthen the euro area. In order to make genuine progress in Europe, we must first start with the real needs for corporate investment, and the resources at our disposal. In terms of needs, the key to growth in the euro area today is, without doubt, innovation. Chancellor Merkel spoke about it in Davos three weeks ago, while companies in Bavaria are well placed to recognise its importance: over the past 50 years, Bavaria has radically transformed its economy by rising to the challenge of innovation.

We have been hosting a series of events that bring together experts on economic inequality and the needs of low- and moderate-income communities in our District. Today’s event on food insecurity is part of that larger effort. But we recognize it’s not enough to merely study the issue. The role of our Community Development team is to champion promising solutions by connecting people, programs, and proposals with funding. Up to 40 percent of food produced in the United States goes to waste 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  each year, so there is a huge opportunity to distribute that unused food to those who need it. You’ll be hearing more about that later today. But first, we’ll start off with a presentation from Professor Tashara Leak. She’ll frame the discussion by talking about how food insecurity affects the health of children—and how that, in turn, shapes their economic prospects as they grow older. Then, we’ll convene a panel of business and government leaders, along with impact investors, who will spotlight some of the innovative work being done to make healthy and affordable food more accessible. Thank you all for joining us. And with that, I’ll turn it over to Professor Leak. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Surveillance has been and will be intensified to detect vulnerabilities that may emerge in this period of uncertainty. As such, the financial institutions as well as the designated non-financial businesses and professions, or the DNFBPs, must be ready to respond to emerging risks and threats. These risks and threats include money laundering and terrorism financing that may undermine the efforts undertaken to maintain financial stability. For this purpose, it is apparent that the efforts to further strengthen the AML/CFT regime need to be intensified. Individual countries may benefit from robust AML/CFT regimes as enhanced financial sector integrity and stability facilitates their integration into the global financial system. They will also contribute to more transparent governance and effective fiscal administration. At the international level, there is renewed interest to review policies relating to banking secrecy and transparency, which are two of the factors identified to have contributed to the current financial meltdown. In this regard, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has initiated a study to assess the effectiveness of its policy tools in response to the current financial and economic crisis. The FATF is now identifying policy tools which may need further strengthening and evaluating whether new policy tools or responses may be needed to meet any new challenges. This is an opportunity for us to provide feedback to the FATF on its 40+9 Recommendations, including implementation challenges. Against this backdrop, the theme of this conference, “Strengthening Vigilance During Turbulent Times”, aptly describe what I believe should be considered by every institution during this challenging times.

The establishment of a national platform for processing card payments - would to provide a direct impact on reducing high costs and improving the current card processing practices, due to the extended cycles and involvement of more actors in the process. Such a platform would also support innovative services, such as mobile payments and e-wallet. The Bank of Albania is analysing the possibility to develop instant payment in our market as well. The implementation of such a project is deemed to have a direct impact on financial inclusion and on providing services at low cost. I invite you to actively participate in  discussions, in order to benefit as much as possible by the experience of other countries, and to analyse the possibilities presented by service providers that are invited to discuss on these topic in the afternoon session. Furthermore, regarding financial inclusion, the strategy pays special attention to the establishment of the concept of “basic” bank accounts with low costs, for the financial inclusion of all levels of population, irrespective of their economic situation. Last but not least, innovation in public services. The initiatives that digitalise and automate public services need coordination and access to various data electronic platforms, such as data of: citizens; addresses; and payments for these services. Any development should be accompanied with financial education of the population, as a precondition for success.
The case in favour of such an approach is that a known ‘reaction function’ allows market participants to organise their affairs and price risks in advance of episodes of dysfunction, avoiding over-optimism about the circumstances in which public support will not be forthcoming (incentivising appropriate self-insurance), and over-pessimism about when it would (allowing safe business to thrive). It may also provide confidence that the system is backstopped against operational or other idiosyncratic market-wide events, such as systemic IT outages. Similar arguments have been used to rationalise standing facilities for banks. Fourth, careful consideration would need to be given to who should have access to these tools, either directly or indirectly. Restricting such access to banks alone is unlikely to prove sufficient to stabilise core markets, given the increasing importance of the sorts of non-bank participants I discussed earlier. But access criteria would still be needed – to limit the financial risks to which public money is exposed; to ensure public insurance is not provided to firms who have not first taken steps to provide for their own resilience, or that of the wider system; and to ensure the sheer operational feasibility of any new tool.23 The quid pro quo between central bank access and meeting robust prudential standards is one of the key reasons why these discussions need to happen in parallel with those taking place at the Financial Stability Board. Fifth, and finally, the terms and conditions of such facilities will also need to be carefully calibrated to ensure those same risks are effectively managed.

From Lender of Last Resort to Market Maker of Last Resort via the dash for cash: why central banks need new tools for dealing with market dysfunction Speech given by Andrew Hauser, Executive Director, Markets  Reuters, London 7 January 2021  I am grateful to Tim Taylor for his assistance in writing this speech; and to Andrew Bailey, Imane Bakkar, Yuliya Baranova, Charlotte Barton, Alex Brazier, Jon Bridges, Alice Carr, Geoff Coppins, Ed Denbee, Johnny Elliot, Gerardo Ferrara, Bernat Gual-Ricard, Jon Hall, Sarah Hall, Nicholas Jackson, Joshua Jones, Anil Kashyap, Nick McLaren, Ankita Mehta, Matt Roberts-Sklar and Andrea Rosen for their comments and guidance. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction  Increasingly we look to financial markets, rather than banks, to care for our savings or provide credit. Millions save via pension, investment or exchange traded instruments. Companies and local authorities hold cash in money market funds. And firms, large and small, borrow from capital markets or non-bank lenders. Taken together, fully half of all financial assets are now held outside the banking system. These trends aren’t new – and to the extent that they bring broader access to cheaper, faster, and more diverse financial services, they’re good news. But they do pose novel challenges to financial stability. In particular, as its usage grows, market-based finance seems increasingly prone to liquidity shocks.
Today, however, I want to devote the limited time available to talking about electronic money within the internet itself, so I shall not be discussing card-based money any further. Many people speak of the arrival of the internet era as a revolution in business practice. From the particular viewpoint of making payments, I prefer to regard it as a step along an evolutionary path rather than as something revolutionary. Our distant forefathers were sceptical about the introduction of banknotes in place of metallic tokens and coins; and our more recent forefathers were worried as to the reliability of cheques as a substitute for cash when they first appeared. Even during the span of my own working life I can recall initial resistance by some to credit cards and debit cards on suspicions about the security of the arrangements, as well as opposition to autopay and direct debit schemes for fear of granting to a third party too general an authority to debit one’s bank account. But each of these innovations has, in the event, been assimilated and has taken its place in the range of accepted payment instruments. I would expect e-banking to follow suit, as just another step along the evolutionary path. But it is perhaps worth pausing to consider whether there is anything intrinsically different about e-banking which demands special attention from the central bank.

Another option would be to introduce a multiplier on model-based risk weights for specific positions, as already imposed by FINMA for some mortgage loans. Efforts are underway at FINMA, supported by the SNB, to analyse potential differences between the two approaches. In this context, the SNB recommends that the big banks increase transparency with regard to their risks. This includes, among other things, publishing their internal measures of total risk. Disclosing RWA according to the standardised approach in addition to model-based RWA would likewise lead to greater transparency with regard to risks. Greater transparency would help to make changes in model-based RWA easier to understand, and thereby increase the credibility of the model-based approach. Domestically focused banks: resilience and lending policies I would now like to turn to our assessment of domestically focused commercial banks. At present, the risks for these banks are primarily linked to the situation and momentum on mortgage and real estate markets. In an environment of historically low interest rates, there has been a build-up of imbalances on these markets. On the one hand, the ratio of mortgage loans to GDP has increased to very high levels in a historical comparison. On the other, growth in real estate prices has been persistently stronger than what can be explained by fundamental factors. Owing to these developments, measures were announced in June 2012 to reduce risks in the Swiss mortgage market. These measures include a revision of the self-regulation rules for mortgage lending and stricter capital requirements for mortgage loans.