samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To banks, we urge you to embrace fintech, and join the CDI platform. To data providers, we invite you to contribute meaningful data, such as logistics data and procurement data between buyers and suppliers, to enrich the types of data available. To SME owners, we encourage you to contact your bank and understand more about CDI. Together, we can take Hong Kong’s data ecosystem to new heights, and ultimately contribute to bridging the global trade financing gap. 15. The benefits of a more digitally integrated trade finance system are plentiful, that much is certain; and the HKMA strives to help bring about an enhanced system in collaboration with different stakeholders. We look forward to working with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Fung Group in this regard so that the needs of the underserved segments can be better catered for. 16. Before I close, I’d like to take this opportunity to offer you a glimpse of the HKMA’s vision of digitalising cross-border trade. For those of you who have been following our CBDC developments closely, you will know that we are working on a project called mBridge. We have already developed a trial CBDC platform, and it has proven ability to speed up crossborder payments from multiple days to near real-time. 17. We are now exploring the feasibility of connecting eTradeConnect, CDI, and mBridge to strengthen the synergy between the three and further digitalise the cross-border trade process.

4. Similar platforms have proliferated around the world, but the trade finance gulf continues to widen. According to the Asian Development Bank, about 10% of global trade suffer from the trade financing gap.1 To put this into perspective, the value of the gap amounted to USD $ trillion in 2020, marking a 15% increase from just two years before. SMEs, in particular, accounted for an alarming 40% of rejected trade finance requests. These figures illustrated that global efforts are nowhere near enough, and we should all rethink why the gap is continuing to widen, and how to make our efforts as effective as possible. 5. A recent report published with the support of Fung Business Intelligence suggested a possible reason: the various digital trade finance platforms mostly work independently and do not synergise with each other, resulting in what we call digital islands. It is as if we are all putting our heads down and concentrating on developing our own platforms, forgetting that it is equally important for the platforms to communicate and work with each other. As suggested in the report, interoperation between the platforms could help to further modernise the global trade finance ecosystem and close the gap. 6. The Commercial Data Interchange, also known as CDI, which the HKMA is building, is precisely designed with enhancing interoperability in mind. By way of introduction, CDI aims to enhance the sharing of commercial data. Currently, every time a bank wants to connect to a data provider, it has to set up a new, separate connection.
The recent outlook of export orders for domestic and foreign markets exhibiting a more balanced pattern suggests that policy measures have started to become effective. Distinguished Guests, 48. I would like to remind you that we continued to implement floating exchange rate regime along with inflation targeting regime in 2010. In line with its general strategy to maintain a strong foreign exchange position, the CBRT designs foreign exchange buying auctions at times when supply is higher than the demand for foreign currency, and also assuring to affect the free market conditions at the minimum level. Accordingly, the daily amount to be purchased in foreign exchange auctions was increased in August on the back of a stable increase in capital inflows to Turkey as well as to other emerging economies. With a view to strengthen foreign exchange reserves, the CBRT modified its method of foreign exchange buying auctions effective as of October 4, 2010 in order to benefit more effectively  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  from capital inflows and to enhance resilience against volatility in these capital flows. In this regard, the CBRT may raise the amount to be bought at regular foreign exchange auctions in order to accelerate foreign exchange purchases if liquidity conditions ease on global financial market developments and capital inflows remain strong. In case the CBRT decides to accelerate foreign exchange purchases, the additional amount that may be purchased will be announced on the first working day of the week. 49.

Therefore, we predict the upward trend in the current account deficit to persist in the short run also taking into account the low base effect from last year. Yet, we also envisage that the dampening effects of our recent policy measures on loans and imports will materialize as of the second quarter of the year. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Distinguished Guests, 26. Domestic credit volume, which surged in 2010, accelerated further in the final quarter of the year. As the effects of the crisis waned, the number of sectors utilizing loans increased rapidly and maturities were extended. An analysis of the rise in real sector loans by sub-categories reveals that this rise was supported by the rally in both consumer and business loans. Meanwhile, loan utilization by small and medium-sized enterprises, which were those hit most severely by the crisis, increased as well. 27. I would like to underline that the vigorous loan utilization was underpinned by measures taken by the CBRT in the aftermath of the crisis with a view to maintain the functionality of the credit markets, as well as by the consequent rapid recovery in economic activity and the favorable economic outlook. Furthermore, ample global liquidity owing to the monetary easing implemented by major central banks and the favorable economic outlook providing low and foreseeable interest rates were also instrumental in stimulating loan utilization.
They needed every dollar they could get back from their European counterparts. So the European dollar problem bounced back to the United States. In this situation, the US central bank (the Federal Reserve) decided to supply the European Central Bank (the ECB) and a number of other European central banks, including the Riksbank, with dollar loans. While this had already been carried out on a smaller scale since 2007, it escalated steeply in conjunction with the Lehman collapse. This lending was conducted via what are known as currency swaps, in which (put simply) the Federal Reserve lent dollars against collateral in euros or other local currency. In this way, the ECB, the Riksbank and other central banks could provide their domestic banks with loans, not only in their own currency, but also in dollars. The flow of dollars from the private market was thus  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  replaced by a flow of dollars from the Federal Reserve (see Figure 1). This saved a number of European banks which otherwise would have gotten into trouble, but what was probably more important from a US point of view was that it also saved a number of US banks. Figure 1. Federal Reserve’s lending to other central banks USD Billions 600  500  400  300  200  100  0  Sources: Federal Reserve and the Riksbank  The way that this drama played out in Sweden can clearly be followed by examining the Riksbank’s lending activities (Figure 2).

As intermediaries in exchanges, stablecoins are far less effective than a settlement asset with legal tender status, insofar as (i) they are not entirely stable since their price stability depends on the value of a basket of assets, and (ii) they offer no guarantee of a refund in the event of fraud. The fact that they have no intrinsic value and that they offer no guarantee that they may be converted at par upon demand with commercial bank money or central bank money means that they cannot be used to create reliable stores of value. In addition, as pointed out in the G7 report on stablecoins issued last year, stablecoin schemes are significantly exposed to risks of various nature, including legal, financial, operational and compliance risk concerning money laundering and terrorist financing, competition law, consumer and investor protection. The risks identified must be seriously addressed if stablecoins are not to become the « weak links » undermining the safety of our payment systems. This is all the more important as some of these risks would be amplified and new risks might arise if stablecoins are adopted at a global level. Stablecoins of potentially large size and reach – so-called global stablecoins – may indeed pose additional challenges of system-wide importance both domestically and internationally, for the transmission of monetary policy, as well as for financial stability. They could also have implications for the international monetary system more generally, including currency substitution, and could therefore pose challenges to monetary sovereignty.
But it illustrates vividly that the interpretation of ex post outcomes depends critically on understanding the ex ante process which generated those outturns. Another example shows that it is not just lay people who find statistical inference difficult. Experts of all kinds do too. The advent of DNA profiling in the 1980s led to the use of match probabilities in criminal cases. The jury is told that the probability of finding a match between the sample taken from the scene of the crime and the DNA of the defendant is, for example, only 1 in 500,000. That is sometimes taken as evidence that the probability of the defendant being innocent is also only 1 in 500,000. Such an inference is incorrect. In a city such as London where there might be about 5 million people who could have committed the crime, around ten people would have DNA that matched the relevant sample. Hence, in the absence of any other evidence, the probability that the defendant is guilty, far from being overwhelming, is only one in 10. Of course, in practice other evidence is usually available. But this incorrect statistical reasoning has swayed enough cases to be given its own name - the prosecutor’s fallacy.11 The cases of Sally Clark and Angela Cannings, both convicted and imprisoned for the alleged murder of their own children, show the desperate consequences of the false use of statistics to create a presumption of guilt to resolve the cause of apparently inexplicable events.

But sharing across all generations, including the unborn, requires collective or public insurance through variations in the national debt.22 Consider an annuity provider who faces the risk that an increase in the average longevity of its pool of annuitants will lead to a shortfall in its funds. The annuity provider would clearly like to hedge this risk in some way. One way of doing that would be for it to have assets on its balance sheet that pay out more if the average longevity of its annuitants increases. Financial markets are currently developing ‘longevity bonds’ along these lines.23 The interest rate on longevity bonds is linked to some measure of unexpected changes in average life expectancy. In the case of the recently announced European Investment Bank-BNP Paribas bond, the payout each year for the next 25 years will be a fixed sum multiplied by the proportion of people in England and Wales who were 65 in 2003 that are still living in that particular year. So if five years from now 90% of the cohort are still alive, the payment in that year will be 90% of the fixed sum. The cash flows to a buyer of this bond will decline over time, but decline less rapidly if people live longer. The demand for such a hedge against longevity risk we might expect to come from pension funds and other providers of annuities.
Impact of implementing the IFRS 9 by banks in Romania (June 2017)  Figure 16. Profitability of the banking sector: ROA, 2016 1.5  percent  1.0 EU median  0.5  0.0  percentage points  percent  50  0  40  -1  30  -2  20  -3  10  -4  0  -5  -10  -6  -20  -7  -30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Total  -0.5  1  change in total capital ratio GR IT CY PT DE ES FR NL AT PL IE MT SK SI LT RO CZ HU BG  -1.0  Source: ECB, consolidated banking data  change in impairment loss (expected loss; rhs) Source: NBR and credit institutions that are Romanian legal entities 13  Figure 18. Map of risks Map of risks to financial stability in Romania Deterioration in investor sentiment in emerging economies Tensions surrounding macroeconomic equilibria Higher household indebtedness through both banks and NBFIs Weak payment discipline in the economy, vulnerabilities in firms' balance sheets Faster increase in property prices severe systemic risk high systemic risk moderate systemic risk low systemic risk Note: The colour shows risk intensity. Arrows indicate the outlook for risk in the period ahead. 14  Figure 19. 5-year government bond yields 3.5  Figure 20.

It was deemed necessary to be emphasised as a distinct risk that is on the rise on account of three reasons which make it more dangerous today than previously: (i) the reduction in the vulnerabilities in banks’ balance sheets (through the clean-up of the non-performing loan portfolio) does not translate into a corresponding decrease in the vulnerabilities in firms’ balance sheets, which reveals the persistence of structural issues economy-wide; (ii) the vulnerabilities in firms’ balance sheets have persisted even in an environment of above-potential economic growth; and (iii) after the conclusion of the arrangement with the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, part of the reforms carried out during the period covered by the agreement with regard to strengthening payment discipline in the economy (cutting arrears, in particular) were reversed. 7  In fact, the reversal of structural reforms seems to have started shortly after the completion of the arrangement with the IMF and the EU, being manifest in the case of at least two of the highlighted risks: the tensions surrounding macroeconomic equilibria (as a result of giving up fiscal consolidation) and the weakening payment discipline in the economy. A risk of lower magnitude, yet related to the increase in household indebtedness, refers to property prices. The faster increase in property prices further poses a risk to the banking sector, as credit institutions’ exposures to the real estate market are substantial.
This agreement thereby affects some 20% of the labour force and includes rules that reduce the risk of periods without agreements and rules that reduce the risk of conflicts breaking out. In the state sector, adaptation of pay bargaining has been facilitated by the frame budget process, which entails that wage development in the export industry shall set the level for state wage costs. With the intention of facilitating wage formation compatible with economic balance, the Government introduced a bill in December last year that included proposals to create a new agency, the Mediation Institute. The bill includes measures that aim to reduce the risk of conflict breaking out and are to come into effect if contractual solutions are not reached in some other way. In conclusion The state of the Swedish economy is better than for a very long time. Inflation expectations have stabilised around the target and economic policy is focused on continued consolidation of public finances. The prerequisites for the Riksbank to conduct monetary policy so that it contributes to stabilising growth around its long-term path are thereby improved. 5  BIS Review 20/2000  However, this does not mean that challenges are lacking with regard to striking the right balances in monetary policy. I have discussed some of these. One is the assessment of productivity growth and the potential growth in the next few years. There are still no signs that we will see a productivity growth such as in the USA.

Gross fixed investment as a per cent of GDP 30  30  25  25  Gross fixed investment  20  20  15  15  Grossfixed investment, excl residential 10  10  5  5  Källa: SCB 0  0 1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  Savings, Investments (net) and Current account as a per cent of National Disposable Income 1950-96 20  15  10  5  0  -5 1950 D :\ex\d-sv\data\datany  55  1960  65  Nettosparande  (Net savings)  1970  75  N ettoinvesteringar  (Net investment)  1980  BIS Review 20/2000  6  1990  (Current account)  Source: National accounts. Note: From 1986 reinvested capital gains is included. Source: Lennart Berg  85  Bytesbalans  95  Labour productivity growth 5 SWEDEN 4,5 4 3,5  USA USA  3 2,5 SWEDEN  2 USA  1,5  SWEDEN  1 0,5 0 60-74  75-94  7  95-99  BIS Review 20/2000
With this auspicious start, I trust this conference may become a regular forum of dialogue between researchers and policy-makers: central banks and financial supervisory authorities have many things to learn from the research carried out in academia, away from the frequent policy-making urgencies that drive the daily workload in our institutions. Financial stability and macroprudential policy The last crisis generated a good deal of issues to be dealt with by authorities with a role in financial stability. The experience gained over recent years has shown the importance of safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole. We now understand that this ambitious task requires the use of sophisticated analytical tools to identify vulnerabilities at an early stage and anticipate how potential shocks can propagate across the financial system. To this end, both micro and macroeconomic methodologies can offer valid insights, and this is why the conference programme intends to offer a mix of both approaches. One of the most relevant and obvious legacies from the crisis is the introduction of a fullyfledged macroprudential policy framework. As we all know, macroprudential policy has, essentially, a twofold objective. On the one hand, it seeks to prevent or mitigate the emergence of systemic risks over the expansionary phase of the credit cycle, as well as to strengthen the resilience of financial institutions against these risks.

This is typically carried out through countercyclical instruments, such as capital buffers, which should be accumulated over expansionary periods and, eventually, be released in downward phases in order to smooth total credit over the cycle. Second, macroprudential policy is concerned with the structural features of the financial system. This is a notion that has to do with the impact on systemic risk arising from the size, 3/5  complexity and interconnections of certain financial institutions. It is essential that financial institutions duly internalise the impact of their decisions on the whole system, which is generally greater for larger, more complex, more interconnected and less substitutable financial institutions. Capital buffers specifically tailored to the most systemic banks have been introduced in recent years in many countries, within the framework of the G20, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision initiatives, precisely to address this issue. Another interesting tool for financial stability, of potential macroprudential use, are the stress test exercises. Notwithstanding their current limitations, stress tests represent a major effort by supervisory authorities to assess the impact of different adverse scenarios on the financial system, to convey its state of resilience to the public and to inform the necessary follow-up actions. Summing up, the macroprudential policy toolkit has significantly expanded in recent years. This is a change in the right direction because, beyond conferring new powers to central banks and supervisory authorities, it requires the adoption of a system-wide perspective in policy-making.
Just as in the mature economies, there is room for emerging market economies to boost potential growth through structural reforms, such as measures to improve the investment regime for infrastructure, improve public services and the business climate, and overhaul tax systems. Having said all that, it is completely understandable that there is uneasiness in much of the emerging world with what is going on in the developed economies. Over the years, the emerging markets have learned about financial stability the hard way, from their own crises and those of their neighbors. They have had too much experience with the aftermath of excessively loose fiscal and monetary policy, and political gridlock. Those experiences have engendered a cautious approach to fiscal and monetary management and financial sector oversight that has served countries well during the volatility of recent years. It has also made them understandably uncomfortable with the risks they perceive in the developed economies. The fact of the matter is that the potential spillovers do pose risks for everyone, developed and emerging. The large and volatile capital flows encouraged by accommodative financial conditions in the developed economies, and the attendant pressures they put on credit markets, asset prices,  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and currency values do add to the challenges countries face in containing external vulnerabilities. And the failure to address underlying vulnerabilities in the developed economies does expose the EMs to the risk of sudden reversals in capital flows.

And while the ECB’s (European Central Bank) framework is less focused on quantitative targets, there is little doubt that the ECB’s willingness to expand its balance sheet through lending and through the OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions program) has been a key support to stability. This activism has some observers asking – with some justification in my view – whether central banks are trying to do too much. Concerns are being raised as to whether price stability and financial stability are being put at risk, and about potential spillovers into currency markets. Monetary policy is, after all, a blunt instrument. It supports investment and consumption in the real side of the economy by stimulating financial activity, by lowering borrowing costs and boosting financial wealth. But, as we have learned the hard way, easy monetary and credit conditions are also the stuff out of which credit excesses and bubbles can form So the question many central banks face is whether the benefits of further easing are worth the potential costs: in essence, will we get enough risk-taking on the real side of the economy, before we get too much on the financial side? Of course, this is not a static calculation. Sound structural policy can improve the odds that monetary stimulus feeds through to the real economy. After all, firms’ decisions to invest, hire more workers and expand their operations depend not just on the cost and availability of funds, but also on the opportunities and the uncertainties in the business environment.