samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 126/2010  3  This process of lending on one side of the Bank’s balance sheet and borrowing on the other – both in large scale – effectively dis-intermediated the malfunctioning sterling inter-bank market, ensuring that central bank money got to all those counterparties which needed it. In addition to the greater size and longer maturity of lending, the Bank also widened the pool of collateral eligible in the three-month lending operations to accept high-quality private sector securities. 9 These included AAA RMBS and covered bonds, neither of which had previously been taken as collateral by the Bank in OMOs. 10 This provided further support to the banking system, at a time when both primary and secondary markets for these private sector securities had closed. The temporary expansion of long-term repos during the crisis raised a number of important policy questions for the Bank. Firstly, it was very difficult to decide exactly how large the operations should be. This had to be assessed by reading market conditions. Secondly, the Bank also had to set an appropriate price to charge for lending against wider collateral, to mitigate adverse selection and the moral hazard risk. A minimum 50 basis point spread was applied. Thirdly, since the increase in the Bank’s liabilities (commercial bank reserves) was being funded at Bank Rate, and the assets were earning rates linked to 3-month market rates, there was a significant interest-rate mis-match.

Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Ensuring stability and integrity of the world’s financial system over the next few years Keynote address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 27th International Symposium on Economic Crime, Jesus College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, 5 September 2009. *  *  *  Chairman, Professor Barry Rider, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen; I am delighted to be here this afternoon at the historic University of Cambridge to deliver one of the closing addresses at your 27th International Symposium on Economic Crime. Thank you very much for your invitation, which I am honoured to accept. I am also happy that this year, 2009, marks the 800th Anniversary of this great institution. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the University of Cambridge on reaching this amazing milestone, and extend my best wishes for the centuries ahead. Mr. Chairman, at your invitation, I would, today, discuss the ways and means of ensuring the stability and integrity of the world’s financial systems in the future. As in the case of all serious and complex reviews, our starting point should necessarily be to critically examine the basic and underlying reasons for this crisis.
Comparison of October 2012 and January 2013 Inflation Report Forecasts Inflation Forecasts  Source: TurkStat, CBRT. Output Gap Forecasts  Source: CBRT. The same slide presents the revision in the output gap forecasts. We revised the output gap upwards for the first quarter of 2013 due to recent acceleration in capital inflows and credit growth. However, we assumed that the policy measures would drive the output gap and credit path closer to the October forecast in the second half of the year. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  We can summarize the main message of the forecast regarding the monetary policy as follows: a cautious monetary policy stance should be maintained to keep inflation close to the target at the end of 2013. It is important that the CBRT does not disregard excessive volatility in credit and exchange rates, for macro financial risks to be contained. It should be kept in mind that keeping credit growth at healthy and reasonable levels will support both price stability and financial stability. In fact, notwithstanding the recent faster-than-expected growth in credit, we envisaged that credit growth would hover around 15 percent. I would like to once more underline that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, assumptions regarding the monetary policy outlook underlying our inflation forecasts should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBRT.

Philipp Hildebrand: Swiss monetary policy and financial markets Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Autumn forecast of the Swiss Institute for Business Cycle Research, Zurich, 5 October 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Transparency and communication enhance the impact and the precision of monetary policy. Monetary policy functions through expectations. This means that it is first and foremost expectation management. Central banks strive for transparency regarding their methods and approaches. All in all, the current economic and, in particular, the structural uncertainties are resulting in a greater range of possible economic scenarios and thus also in an increase in the range of expectations regarding our future monetary policy. In other words, being transparent does not automatically mean being predictable. Therefore, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) considers it particularly important to communicate its monetary policy concept to the markets and the public. This allows them to arrive at similar conclusions to those reached by the SNB. BIS Review 92/2006  1
The agenda for this conference – covering topics such as cyber security, artificial intelligence and digital currencies - gives an insight into the scale and pace of innovative thinking currently taking place in the payments industry. Innovation is at the heart of the topic I will be focusing on today – cross-border payments. I will cover why greater innovation is needed in cross-border payments and outline the G20 initiative to develop a roadmap for action. I will then seek to bring it to life by outlining some of the key developments already underway at the Bank of England to support the international agenda in this area. Cross-border payments lag behind  Over the last decade or so, there has been a strong focus on further enhancing domestic payments with a significant increase in instant payments and great innovation at the customer-facing end. Just consider our ability to pay for goods and services not just with cards and phones but also with watches and smart speakers. There is also a move to enhance the core underlying infrastructure. In the UK, the Bank of England is renewing its Real Time Gross Settlement Service and Pay.UK is developing a New Payments Architecture for retail payments. Many other countries are undergoing similar transformations, including the US with FedNow and Australia’s New Payments Platform. Traditionally, however, there has been less focus on cross-border payments even though they are so significant in both value and volume.

Recession or instability at home is often quickly exported. Equally important, growth and stability abroad makes all our jobs easier. This means that there are externalities in the work we do, so that more effective fulfillment of our domestic mandates helps to bring us to a better place collectively. Ensuring global growth and stability is and will remain our joint and common endeavor. This is what Terry Checki has worked for over his distinguished career. We have been very fortunate for his service and must carry the mantle forward. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Sarah Dahlgren: Five years since the crisis – where are we now? Remarks by Ms Sarah Dahlgren, Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Institute of International Bankers’ Seminar on “Risk management and regulatory/examinations compliance issues”, New York City, 8 October 2013. *  *  *  Thank you Sally. It’s great to be here again this year to open up the IIB’s annual seminar on Risk Management and Regulatory/Examinations Compliance Issues. I appreciate the opportunity to address this group and to continue the dialogue that we’ve been having over the past several years. Given that we are celebrating the five-year mark of what was probably the worst part of the financial crisis, I thought I’d take this opportunity to take a step back and reflect a bit on how far we’ve come since the crisis in addressing some of the most pressing issues. Then I’d like to share with you some of my thoughts on areas that still need to be addressed and where I think more concerted effort is needed. As always, my remarks reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. It’s hard to believe that it has already been five years – and I’m not sure whether it feels longer or shorter than that!

A payments strategy for the 21st century  Remarks made by Andrew Hauser, Executive Director, Banking, Payments and Financial Resilience  Payment Strategy Forum “Launch of the Final Strategy”, London 29 November 2016  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today at the launch of the PSF’s Payments Strategy st  for the 21 century. I want to start by emphasising that this is not the Bank of England’s strategy – or the UK authorities’ as a whole. And that in fact is its great merit: because it has been drawn up by a genuine partnership of those who actually provide and use retail payments services, with the interests of those users uppermost in their minds. But that doesn’t mean the Bank has been ‘hands off’, or lukewarm over the direction of travel. Quite the reverse. We have a deep interest in, and responsibility for, maintaining the stability of sterling payments. First, through our statutory responsibility for the supervision of the major payments schemes. Second, by ensuring that all material payments either settle in, or are backed by, central bank money – the safest form of settlement asset. And, third, through our role as member of some schemes as a bank in our own right. It is sometimes said that a focus on stability impedes innovation. But there is no reason why that has to be true.
4  BIS Review 42/2003  As we consider the long-term view, we should not lose sight of the fact that we are just at the beginning. The New Accord represents another important milestone in the adoption of more advanced risk measurement and management practices. But to remain robust and relevant to the demands of twenty-first century banking, our capital regulations must keep pace with changes in the market environment and with the state of the art in risk management. On that note, I would like to emphasise the importance of research and debate in promoting the safety and soundness of the financial system. The Basel Committee owes a debt of gratitude to the studies and efforts undertaken by economists, risk management professionals, and researchers in both the public and private sectors as we have sought ways to refine the proposals. We know that your work has helped to inform ours. The future evolution of the Accord will be dependent on input and contribution from the industry, and I look forward to continuing our healthy and fruitful exchange of views. In closing my remarks today, I would like to stress again the Committee’s commitment to having a balanced Accord of the highest quality. Although we are encouraged by the general support for the proposals shown through the CP3 process, we recognise that there are some high-level issues still to be addressed and we are working hard to find the best ways to resolve them.

I know that many members of the IIF have accepted that choice as prudent for now, but you have also cautioned us that this decision is incompatible with the existing treatment of market risk and the emerging practices in operational risk management. We know that some banks are making commendable progress in thinking about ways to estimate the value of diversification. Nonetheless, we remain concerned about the degree of confidence one might have in those estimates, given the relative lack of data available on which to base them. Furthermore, we are concerned that it would be difficult for third parties to validate any estimates at this time. Finally, we are not convinced about the consistency of application of these diversification effects. For example we are not certain that any leading bank today consistently adjusts the value of all of its assets based on each asset’s contribution to diversification. Portfolio theory suggests that an obvious next step to further enhance the risk-sensitivity of the capital framework would be to incorporate calculations of diversification benefits into the framework. In the coming years, and we can start very soon, we look forward to working with banks, with banking associations such as the IIF, and with academics and researchers to find ways to move Basel in the direction of full credit risk models, and to harness other improvements in risk measurement and management practices.
Barbro Wickman-Parak: The economy and the labour market Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB), Stockholm, 29 April 2010. *  *  *  Sweden’s GDP fell by almost five per cent in 2009, compared with the previous year. We need to go back as far as the 1940s to find an individual year with a correspondingly large fall in growth. The large demand shock that followed in the wake of the financial crisis had an unavoidable and drastic impact on production and employment. It has been possible to alleviate these effects, but not to prevent them, despite forceful monetary policy measures and expansionary fiscal policy. Normally, changes in employment and unemployment occur two quarters after changes in production. This time, however, it appears as though the upturn in employment has already begun and unemployment has stopped rising, which is surprisingly early given the large fall in GDP. But unemployment is still high, and we are expecting a slow recovery in employment in the coming period. During the past three months unemployment has been around 9 per cent as a share of the labour force. Today I intend to talk about developments in the labour market in Sweden. I will begin by describing how employment usually varies over the business cycle and then discuss what is different this time. I shall conclude by discussing how we Executive Board members viewed developments in the labour market at our monetary policy meeting last week.

Christian Noyer: Central bankers’ dilemmas under uncertainty Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at a seminar in Buenos Aires, 5 June 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, •  Thank you for inviting me to this seminar. It is a great pleasure to address such a challenging theme, namely “Central Bankers’ dilemmas under uncertainty”. •  In the first part of my address, I will recall the nature of uncertainty and its importance for the central banker; in the second part, I will sum up proposals for addressing uncertainty. I  The nature of uncertainty  Uncertainty arises in many forms. It is crucial to central bankers in general (I/1) and maybe even more to the Eurosystem (I/2). 1)  The importance of uncertainty for the central banker  The relevance of risks and uncertainty for economic analysis was suggested in 1921, by Frank Knight (Risk, Uncertainty and Profit). “Risk” refers to situations where the decision-maker can assign probabilities to the randomness that he is faced with; “uncertainty” to situations where this randomness cannot be expressed in terms of probabilities. Uncertainty is crucial to central bankers: according to Alan Greenspan, “Uncertainty is not just an important feature of monetary policy; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape”. Thus, I will focus on monetary policy, although the topic is also relevant for financial stability, which is another important issue for central banks.
Easier access to financial services benefits us all, but there is a risk that it may also create more opportunities for criminals - if it’s convenient for us to move money in real time using our smart phones, it would also be convenient for money launderers as well. And there is no shortage of smart people looking for ways to exploit such new developments. 18. But technology, especially the fast-growing field of data analytics, has the potential to offer more effective and efficient ways to undertake our AML work. In particular, recent developments in artificial intelligence and data analytics, while still at an early stage, appear promising. For example, AI is already being used to – apologies for the jargon – “triage” alerts generated by monitoring systems to make subsequent case investigations by oldfashioned human beings more focused and efficient. And data analytics is being used to identify what normal behaviour looks like for particular segments or types of customer, thereby making it easier to spot behaviour that departs from the norm and which may therefore need to be scrutinised further. This has the potential to make monitoring less “expost” and allow potential problems to be spotted in real time to a greater extent. And I would once again stress the word “efficient” here: the HKMA is a banking regulator and we have an interest in seeing the banking sector’s cost-to-income ratios kept down, while without compromising effective controls. 19.

This reflects the fundamental reforms these EMEs have put in place over the past 15 years, as well as the hard lessons they learned from past periods of market stress. Among the positives are: •  The absence of the pegged exchange rate regimes that often were undermined violently in the past during periods of stress;  •  Improved debt service ratios and generally moderate external debt levels;  •  Larger foreign exchange reserve liquidity cushions;  •  Clearer and more coherent monetary policy frameworks, supporting what are now generally low to moderate inflation rates;  •  Generally improved fiscal discipline; and  •  Better capitalized banking systems, supported by strengthened regulatory and supervisory frameworks. Of course, progress has not been uniform across EMEs, and more work remains to further strengthen institutional structures in some countries. In particular, vulnerabilities remain in several important EMEs. Still, the fundamental improvements I’ve cited leave many EMEs better positioned than in the past to weather those times in the cycle when the external environment turns from welcoming to wary. The impact that changes in Fed policy can have beyond our borders has led to calls for us to do more to internalize those impacts, or even further, to internationally coordinate policymaking. As I’ve already noted, Fed policies have significant effects internationally, given the central place of U.S. markets in the global financial system and the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency.
Concerted efforts are underway focusing on the further development of the Islamic financial markets, the financial infrastructure, the investment in research and development to support innovation, and enhancing further the legal, regulatory and supervisory framework. An important part of the developments will be to facilitate a more inclusive arrangement that would allow for greater interface and inter-linkages across jurisdictions, in particular from emerging economies. As part of this process, building and strengthening linkages between financial systems will contribute to this process. Indeed, participation with the European financial systems will form an important linkage between the East and the West. In our pursuit and commitment to strengthening the resilience of Islamic financial industry and to enhance these linkages would not only have the potential to contribute towards global financial stability but also to the prospects for global growth. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 141/2009

Sabine Lautenschläger: The euro – idea and reality Speech by Ms Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, at the Europa Forum Luzern, Luzern, 2 May 2016. *  *  *  President of the Confederation Schneider-Amman, President of the Government Wyss, Mayor Studer, Excellencies and parliamentary representatives, Ladies and gentlemen, 800 years ago, here in the Swiss Alps, a structure was built that was vital in bringing people together in Europe: the Devil’s Bridge over the river Reuss. It was because of this bridge that the Gotthard pass become one of Europe’s main routes, “the people’s road”. Lucerne is located on this road and is thus an early witness of European integration. Today, in the 21st century, Europe is interconnected by much more than a pass. Europe has become a political and economic community. A tangible symbol of this community is our single currency, the euro. The euro – do the idea and the reality clash? The idea of the euro was, and is, to support Europe’s internal market, and thus provide for economic growth and prosperity. But the name of the currency says it all: the euro should be more. The euro aims to be a single currency for a united Europe. It should deepen Europe’s cultural and political unity, dismantle borders and strengthen our feeling of togetherness. So much for the idea.
Investors found it difficult to conduct their own risk assessments and largely relied on the classifications of credit-rating agencies. When the losses on sub-prime loans became unexpectedly large, genuine uncertainty arose about the value of the structured products and where losses associated with them would occur. Banks and other financial institutions became cautious about lending money to one another. They began to hoard liquidity to meet their own obligations and to avoid losses on loans to counterparties about whose status they felt uncertain in the wake of the general crisis. The cost for bank borrowing on the interbank market rose, causing other market interest rates to climb. The financial turmoil spread to Europe and resulted in a general aversion to invest in mortgage securities. Banks and mortgage institutions found it increasingly difficult to obtain funds on the securities markets. Escalating crisis after Lehman Brothers collapsed When the Lehman Brothers investment bank filed for bankruptcy protection, a full-scale confidence crisis erupted. A major financial player was left to its fate and there was rapidly growing concern that other institutions would follow suit. Credit flows dried up almost completely and investors essentially dared to invest only in government bonds. Companies had already experienced a tightening of credit terms; opportunities for loan financing now essentially disappeared. In this phase of the crisis, around mid September this year, the effects on the Swedish financial system became clear.

Even if the Riksbank's assessment is that the most acute phase of the crisis may subside over the next few months, it will probably take time before conditions return to normal. Confidence must be restored on several levels and that takes time. 6  BIS Review 140/2008