samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The fact that we have revised down the international growth forecast also means that we expect a slightly less strained resource utilisation in the global economy. The slightly slower recovery for the global economy will also have repercussions for developments in Sweden. Growth this year is now expected to be lower than last year and almost one half of a percentage point lower than we had reason to assume in December - 1.7 per cent instead of 2.1 per cent. Consequently, we are also anticipating there will be slightly more unutilised resources in the Swedish economy in the coming years than we had previously assumed. Our forecast of resource utilisation in Sweden has also been affected by the revisions Statistics Sweden recently made to the National Accounts. These indicate that productivity growth in the economy was higher than estimated during the greater part of the 1990s. This in turn indicates that the economy's long-term potential growth rate may be slightly higher. To summarise, I can conclude that the pictures of economic activity in Sweden and in the rest of the world are similar to the extent that there appear to be some unutilised resources and that growth will not exceed its long-term potential over the coming years. Developments are currently being restrained by the unease over Iraq. There is also still great uncertainty regarding the size of the adaptations that remain after the earlier rises in share prices and other asset prices.

Today I intend to begin by describing the current monetary policy situation and then looking back at developments in recent years. The latter discussion shows, not surprisingly, that it is not always so easy in practice to determine what is appropriate monetary policy, despite a clear target with apparently simple principles behind it. Current monetary policy Higher energy prices behind rising inflation Inflation is at present above the target level. Over the past twelve months UND1X inflation has risen by 3.3 per cent. Does this mean that monetary policy has been too expansionary, or that the interest rate should be raised now? No, it does not. At least we do not believe so. The fact that inflation has risen recently is due to large price rises on a few components of UND1X, primarily electricity and oil. Excluding energy prices, UND1X inflation has risen by 1.9 per cent over the past year, i.e. very close to the inflation target. It is well known and accepted that monetary policy does not have any great immediate effect on inflation, which is one reason why the interest rate is set in relation to changes in the forecast inflation rate rather than the actual rate. Attempts to constantly keep inflation close to the target level could  BIS Review 15/2003  1  lead to large fluctuations in interest rates, with negative consequences for the economy as a whole. This applies in particular when the economy suffers supply shocks, which at the same time lead to higher prices and lower production.
Erdem Başçi: The importance of commodity price movements Opening remarks by Mr Erdem Başçi, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Conference on “Policy responses to commodity price movements”, Istanbul, 6 April 2012. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Welcome to the conference on the “Policy Responses to Commodity Price Movements” jointly organized by the International Monetary Fund, the IMF Economic Review and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. As I will deliver another speech in the panel session on the second day of the conference, I will attempt to keep this inaugural speech as brief as possible. As you will recall, we hosted a conference on commodity price volatility in Istanbul last September within the context of G-20 program. These two conferences on similar topics in such a short time are clear indicators of how important the commodity price movements are for the global economy. Why are commodity prices so important? When we think of what is covered by “commodities” more closely, we also come up with how we should approach this issue. Usually, the term “commodity prices” represent energy prices (mainly the crude oil), food prices and the prices of some main industrial inputs. Energy prices are very closely monitored by economic units and policy makers, for it denotes the cost of one of the most significant inputs for the entire economy. Energy is one of the primary cost factors for firms. It is also a considerable item for households’ heating and transportation expenditures.

Another important issue to be discussed is how the effects of commodity prices on inflation, economic activity and exchange rates differ with respect to different monetary policy regimes. Another important issue is the interaction among different economic policies vis-a-vis the commodity price fluctuations. Distinguished guests, Studies included in the program will substantially contribute to the understanding of the commodity price dynamics and the policy responses against the macroeconomic effects of these dynamics. In this context, I would like to thank the organization committee for their efforts for this conference program which gathers very interesting and enlightening studies. I also believe that the conference will provide a platform which will be highly beneficial for the exchange of views among participants. Thank you very much in advance to all participants for their contribution. Now, I would like to give the floor to Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, professor of economics at California University-Berkeley and the chief editor of the IMF Economic Review journal to open the first session. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It was introduced during a period of crisis to back up external debt repayments. Am I right in thinking that the Central Bank will abrogate this instrument in 2018 or will you keep it in some other form with different conditions? And another question, if I may. Does the Central Bank intend to introduce special instruments to provide liquidity to banks which experience difficulties after information attacks? There have already been cases when regional banks faced challenges, due not to financial difficulties but to information attacks. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: As for the FX refinancing instrument, I think it would be appropriate to evaluate it when it expires. We believe that it has proven to be an effective instrument which has allowed our enterprises and banks to adjust more easily to the surge in external debt repayments. We set the limit at $ billion, with a maximum allocation of $ billion. For now debt only slightly exceeds $ billion. As we initially planned and stated, we will curtail its use by the end of 2017. We will progressively reduce the limits and we do not foresee any problems arising for the banking sector in repaying these funds by the end of the year. We are not going to completely abrogate it and remove it from our toolkit. It will be a suspended 12 / 14  BIS central bankers' speeches  instrument. We do not see any need to apply it again in the near future, but we will keep it in our toolkit.

Yes, we met on the sidelines of the G20 meeting for finance ministers and central bankers. In our talks we discussed, among other things, prospects for yuan-denominated OFZ to be issued on the Russian market. We not support for this idea in principle, with details to be discussed subsequently. Lenta.ru’s QUESTION: There are concerns in business circles and in the expert community that the ruble is too volatile. What is the Bank of Russia’s view on this matter? What could lead to the Central Bank giving up the floating exchange rate? ELVIRA NABIULLINA: In the foreseeable future, I do not anticipate any factors which would force us to abandon a floating exchange rate regime. I am convinced that the negative repercussions cited by enterprises in the real sector of the economy, namely, volatility, are outweighed by the benefits of this policy. Thus we are saved from any drastic corrections in the exchange rate, which would then hurt the economy overall, including social expenditures, etc. Allow me to stress this point again. We are confident that the arrival of the floating rate regime has in many ways helped the economy adjust to external shocks more quickly than it did in 2008–2009. This is also suggested by the depth of recession. It was the floating regime arrangement that enabled the real sector of the economy, together with the financial sector, to adjust to a drastically different environment. This really is an inbuilt stabiliser, and we see that it does work.
Chart: Change in market value since January 1998 So far, our nation has earned a solid return on its financial assets. The cumulative return on the GPFG since its inception amounts to over NOK 2 600 billion, equivalent to about a third of total GPFG capital at the end of 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Chart: Lower yields Over a third of the GPFG is invested in bonds. Real yields on high-grade government bonds provide a basis for the rate of return that can be expected ahead. In recent years, those yields have been close to zero. Low bond yields reflect global economic conditions: Governments, businesses and households are seeking to save more, while demand for safe investments has increased. Central banks’ substantial asset purchases are pushing in the same direction. However, low yields may also reflect modest expectations of economic growth further ahead. There is no return without risk. The GPFG features a very long investment horizon and a sizeable capacity to bear short-term risk. This is why the chosen allocation to equities is relatively high. It is also the reason why the GPFG has moved into real estate. The authorities have asked Norges Bank to assess whether the allocation to real assets should be increased. Any increase in the allocation to real assets will probably be at the expense of bonds. Chart: Spending of petroleum revenues almost level with revenues Petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget has increased since the turn of the millennium.

A growing number of these jobs are related to exports of oil extraction equipment. The oil and gas industry has played a decisive role in the strong growth of the Norwegian economy over the past 40 years. The past 15 years stand out in particular. But this dependence on oil has also made the Norwegian economy vulnerable to changes in oil prices or a decline in petroleum revenues. Chart: High wage growth (not incl. the krone depreciation over the past two years) High domestic labour costs have also increased the Norwegian economy’s vulnerability. The cost level in the Norwegian business sector has increased sharply in comparison with our trading partners. A rise is followed by a fall, and oil prices have fallen by more than half since last summer. As activity and earnings from the petroleum sector decline, oil service companies must seek entry into other markets. With a high domestic cost level, that task may prove demanding. Chart: Fall in petroleum investment A decline in activity on the Norwegian continental shelf has long been anticipated. The fall in oil prices has accelerated and amplified an announced decline in activity. Norwegian exports to other oil-producing nations are also in decline. This does not mean that the oil age is now nearing an end. Nearly half of known oil and gas reserves on the Norwegian continental shelf have not yet been extracted2. Large new discoveries have been made over the past few years and the Norwegian oil service industry is still receiving new orders.
That’s why the FPC has acted to limit the share of high loan-to-income mortgages UK banks can originate, the PRA has tightened standards on consumer credit and the Bank is monitoring closely the growth in leveraged lending. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  The second reason for caution is the possibility of a more material slowdown in China. China is the one major economy in which all major financial imbalances have materially worsened. It may be the exception that proves the rule that financial imbalances cause recessions. While China’s economic miracle over the past three decades has been extraordinary, its post-crisis performance has relied increasingly on one of the largest and longest running credit booms ever, with an associated explosion of shadow banking. Total Social Financing has increased from 120% to 223% of GDP since 2008. In parallel, the non-bank financial sector has increased from around 20% of GDP to over 70% today, with developments echoing those in the pre-crisis US including off-balance sheet vehicles with large maturity mismatches, sharp increases in repo financing, and large contingent liabilities of both borrowers and banks. Chinese authorities have begun taking measures to manage these risks. Growth in Total Social Financing is now in line with that of nominal GDP (Chart 10). The shadow banking sector is being restructured. But there is a tension between reducing the risks from high debt and supporting the economy.

60% of leveraged loans are now covenant-light and most deals have substantial “add backs” of EBITDA.20 These are developments analogous to the “No Doc / No Income” heyday of US subprime. To add to the sense of déjà vu, growth in leveraged loans has been increasingly driven by securitisation. Chart 8: New leveraged loans to US companies have become riskier  Average  Median  Riskiest 25%  Total debt to EBITDA 7  6  5  4 Post-crisis avg  2017  2018  Source: LCD, an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence. Notes: The chart includes leveraged loans issued to US corporate borrowers. Total debt to EBITDA is measured postissuance and is not adjusted for EBITDA add-backs, which have increased in size and prevalence in recent years. There are some important differences between leveraged lending today and subprime a decade ago. Nonbanks are playing much smaller roles in origination, and ‘skin-in-the-game’ rules had, until recently, aligned  19 In the US, gross corporate debt as a share of annual earnings was 266% in Q3 2018, compared to 262% at the end of 2007. On the same measure UK corporate debt to earnings was 312% in Q3 2018 compared to 336% at the end of the 2007, but excluding the leverage of UK companies in the CRE sector it is above pre-crisis levels (301% in Q3 2018 vs 278% at end-2007). See the Bank of England’s November 2018 Financial Stability Report for more details.
Our assessment is that unemployment will reach approximately 6.5 per cent at the end of the forecast period (see Figure 19). A lasting  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  reduction in the level of unemployment also demands that wage formation is effective so that costs in the business sector do not increase too rapidly. …and inflation can approach the target A new round of collective bargaining has now begun and the wage demands presented so far are higher than those presented in 2010. The Riksbank’s assessment is that wages will rise by almost 3.5 per cent per year in the years ahead. This is compatible with the inflation target. The assumption behind our forecast is that wage formation will work as well as it has over the last 15 years. Responsibility for this lies with the social partners. The krona is an important factor for inflation in Sweden as it determines how prices abroad are “translated” into import prices in Sweden. Historically the krona has weakened in periods of financial unease as investors often move their money from small currencies like the krona to the dollar and the euro. However, the krona has weakened only moderately this time, despite the financial unease (see Figure 20). We expect the krona to gradually strengthen as the financial unease subsides. The combination of falling commodity prices internationally and a stronger krona means that inflationary pressures from abroad will be rather low in the period ahead.

Different inflation measures 4  4 CPI  UND1X xe  UND1X  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  Jan 95 jan-95  Jan 96 jan-96  Jan 97 jan-97  Jan 98 jan-98  Jan 99 jan-00 Jan 00 jan-01 Jan 01 jan-02 Jan 02 jan-03 Jan 03jan-04 Jan 04 Jan 05 jan-99 jan-05  Note. 12-month changes in per cent. Inflation measures computed according to Statistics Sweden’s new method. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  6  BIS Review 25/2005  1b. Different inflation measures 4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 KPI CPI  -1  -1  UND1X UND1X UND1X exkl. energi UND1X excluding energy  -2 95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  -2  04  Note. 12-month changes in per cent. Inflation measures computed according to Statistics Sweden’s old method. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 25/2005  7  2. Inflation: goods and services 5  (excl.
The HKMA, in partnership with HKAB, will be monitoring developments, and I note that the Legislative Council Panel will also be revisiting this issue in six months time. Let me conclude with one point, which I hope has become clear through the discussion of this issue. The outcome of this discussion may come as a disappointment to those who say that the HKMA has an evil plan for taking over the world by grabbing powers and responsibilities whenever it can. The fact is that, although we are not technically a "statutory" body, what we can and cannot do in pursuit of our policies is strictly controlled by legislation, which is a matter ultimately for the Legislative Council to decide. I have, I hope, shown that this legislation, as it now stands, does not permit us to do many of the things that many complainants would expect or wish us to do. In setting out the various alternative approaches to complaint handling as objectively as we can, we have, I hope, made it clear that the HKMA does not seek, or even welcome, an expansion of its powers to satisfy these expectations. On the contrary, at a time of continuing challenge and shrinking resources, we think it sensible to concentrate our energies on our core responsibilities. We therefore welcome the present consensus on this issue and, together with HKAB and other parties, shall do our best to ensure that it works. BIS Review 39/2002  5

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Looking back, looking forwards: achievements and future direction of Economic and Monetary Union The conventional and unconventional measures the ECB has taken over the past decade have been successful in addressing the deflationary risks, restoring the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism and providing vital support to the euro area economy. But the ECB does not operate in a vacuum and other economic policies matter too. Allow me to recall my first appearance before this Committee in 2011. At that time, half of my introductory remarks were about the functioning of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the need for other European policymakers to act. So I will conclude my final statement to you by highlighting some lessons that have emerged from these eight years, which I hope can help in addressing the challenges ahead. When comparing the crisis response of the euro area with that of other advanced economies, it is evident that the latter were able to achieve a better macroeconomic policy mix at the time, thanks to more decisive actions in both the fiscal and financial domains. The Governing Council has reiterated that we are determined to ensure that inflation moves towards our aim in a sustained manner, and that we continue to stand ready to adjust all of our instruments. At the same time, a better policy mix, including fiscal policy, structural reforms and prudential measures, can help achieve this objective faster and with fewer side effects.

The elimination of Central Bank credit to the public sector will go far to create the confidence needed to launch the crucial struggle with inflation. Central banks are responsible for keeping prices stable as well as for ensuring that the financial system runs smoothly. A stabilized financial system and stable prices are essential conditions for steady economic growth in the medium term because only a stable financial system can provide the necessary link between savings and investments. Price stability is needed to reduce uncertainties for investors and encourage investments. In the long run, stabilizing prices is likely to increase both living standards and productivity. For this reason, the price stability that is the main goal of central banks is valid and urgent not only in the short run, but also in the long run. And once countries like ours have achieved price stability after long effort, they must continue the effort to maintain it. For central banks, price stability is a permanent goal. Inflation inflicts several burdens on a society: · Overall, it introduces uncertainty into economic decisions and profit seeking. · It reduces the discipline of price and market systems. · It has negative effects on the cost of capital. · It directs resources to unproductive activities. In periods of high inflation, investments in real estate and financial investments become more desirable. · Growth declines as inflation rises. In countries with high inflation, it has been observed that most resources are directed to the financial system.