samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, insofar as climate risks affect the macroeconomy, the inflation outlook or the transmission of our monetary policy, then such risks are bound to affect the conduct of monetary policy. One fairly direct channel is the following. Policies aimed at promoting the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy – such as carbon taxes – are likely to affect the volatility of headline inflation, which includes energy prices. Most inflation-targeting central banks, including the ECB, target headline inflation, because it is more representative of the citizens' consumer basket than " other notions of inflation. The ECB’s medium-term orientation of our price stability objective provides us with some leeway to see through transitory energydriven increases in headline inflation. However, persistent upward pressure on, or substantial volatility in, headline inflation stemming from sustained climate policies could  2  lead us to rethink how we formulate our policies in pursuit of price stability over the mediumterm horizon. More indirectly, but not less importantly, climate change and the remedial actions needed to tackle it could affect central banks' ability to achieve price stability through their impact on the so-called natural interest rate3, which is an important benchmark for inflationtargeting central banks when setting our interest rates. Natural interest rates in advanced economies, including the euro area, have declined in recent decades, reflecting structural shifts in the balance between aggregate saving and investment.

In this context, and as part of our main responsibility to guarantee the stability of the financial system, we - regulatory and supervisory authorities - must ensure that the materialisation of climate risks does not endanger financial stability. Therefore, we must make sure that financial firms address these risks. In particular, we should contribute to identifying climate-risk drivers and their transmission channels, to the adequate measurement of the economic and financial impact of the different risks, and to the definition and development of the potential mitigation and riskreduction measures. If we succeed in incorporating these risks into the decisions of the financial sector, this will translate into a change in the relative prices of financial instruments. And, in turn, that will help to internalise those consequences originating from both transition and physical risks that affect directly providers and users of funds. This will be a powerful and much-needed complement to the use of the fiscal and environmental instruments that are needed to fight against climate change. In practical terms, climate risk can probably be captured in the traditional financial risk categories (credit, market, liquidity or reputational risks). However, several crucial limitations and challenges are coming to light when trying to measure these risks. In particular, there are few sufficiently deep and harmonised databases to analyse and understand the potential effects of physical and transition risks. Data granularity is particularly important given the high heterogeneity of the potential impacts.
We must ensure that this never happens again. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  But that should not discourage us from harnessing and redirecting such creative forces to address today’s most urgent global challenges, and in the process, restore trust and confidence in the financial industry. New paradigms in policymaking This brings me to the role of policy. In recent years, global standard setters including the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Insurance Association of Insurance Supervisors and the Financial Action Task Force, have heeded the call to promote a better balance between the objectives of financial stability, financial integrity and financial inclusion. This has resulted in important strides taken to encourage a more proportionate regulation. Despite this, a recent report by the Financial Stability Board disclosed that as of 2017, the derisking phenomenon continued at the global level, affecting remittance service providers and many poor countries that rely on remittances from abroad. Clarifying regulatory standards is an important step, but clearly this alone is not enough. So where to from here? First, taking a cue from Albert Einstein who famously said that we cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them, there is a need for policymakers to create safe harbours for experimentation. A number of regulators have introduced regulatory sandboxes that have helped create a virtuous cycle of innovation and sensible regulation, while isolating risks.

In Malaysia, solutions tested in the Bank’s regulatory sandbox enabled the Bank to design regulatory safeguards that would allow the implementation of end-to-end electronic know-yourcustomer processes for the provision of remittance services. By dispensing with the need to conduct physical face-to-face verifications, this is expected to significantly expand access to remittance services for customers working and living in remote parts of Malaysia, while effectively addressing money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Bank Negara Malaysia also successfully collaborated with the World Bank and the money services business industry in Malaysia to pilot and adopt solutions that have expanded the reach and reduced the costs of formal remittances. Second, policy life cycles will need to be managed more proactively, to allow for policies to be renewed when conditions change. While much is often said about policy stability, policies that fail to keep pace with conditions that are changing far more rapidly than we have experienced before, can be counterproductive at best, and at worst, create greater risks for the system. The SDGs are undeniably one of the most comprehensive attempts to capture the most important global challenges that we face. Solutions to these challenges will invariably create new issues for policy makers to consider. This in turn will lead to shorter policy life cycles, and a need for faster policy responses to emerging issues. Third, we need better remittance data. It is encouraging that efforts are being taken to ensure the availability of official global data sources on remittance flows.
In the future, the Bank might, for example, increase haircuts during “peacetime” if liquidity in the secondary market from a particular type of collateral became impaired; or if the Bank concluded that, as the upswing of a credit cycle developed, risk was plausibly becoming underpriced and so was not properly reflected in the valuations of instruments it was accepting as collateral. Whether or not that would be enough of itself quell a cycle is obviously uncertain; but it would help to protect us against risk and would give a signal. In short, haircut policy matters. Pricing But the Bank does not believe that haircuts can be relied upon on their own to produce the appropriate incentives for banks’ liquidity management. Price matters too. Bagehot said that the rate should be “high”. But since he wrote in the context of the Gold Standard and of domestic financial crises that were typically accompanied by external (or capital account) crises, his notion of a “high rate” was bound up with the central bank tightening monetary conditions to stem the outflows (of gold). But it is clear enough that, although he did not in fact talk of “penalty” rates, the relevant measure for him was the rate charged by the central bank relative to that prevailing in the market in normal conditions, ie before a crisis breaks. The Bank has adopted, and promulgated, a fee structure for its liquidity-insurance facilities that increases as banks’ borrowing increases and/or is made against riskier, less liquid collateral.

We will give particular priority to the highest-emitting companies and companies that have not published climate plans or have inadequate climate reporting. We will also step up our ownership activities aimed at the financial sector, which is exposed indirectly to climate risk through loans and investments. We tailor our dialogue to the sector and the situation. Steel and cement are good examples. These companies currently have high emissions, but their products will still be needed in the lowcarbon economy. Much of our dialogue on transition plans is therefore about the technological advances and investments needed. We also raise the need for industry standards and the issue of lobbying, which is a major challenge. Chart: Companies’ climate reporting is improving We are seeing signs that our efforts are paying off. For example, when we analysed the reporting of 1,500 companies, we found that those we have actively engaged with have made more progress in their reporting on climate strategy than the other companies. Of course, we cannot claim all the credit for this progress. But progress it is. In future, we will provide more information on our dialogue with companies – what we talk about and the changes we see. Drawing attention to it is a tool in itself. Reporting and voting Our dialogue with companies will not have the desired result in every case. We can then hold boards to account for their decisions through our voting.
They would probably result in further reinforcement of fluctuations, as activity - and thus liquidity - on the markets would decline. As representative of a central bank, I would also like to point out that nor do I believe that monetary policy alone can counteract exaggerated movements on the financial markets. On the other hand, a clear monetary policy, aimed at price stability, is necessary in the work on maintaining financial stability. It facilitates economic decision-making in society. However, part of the solution must lie in breaking the pattern that causes players to behave in exactly the same way as one another. Increased transparency with regard to countries' and companies' economic status is an important step in the right direction here. Developments in technology have demolished many of the barriers that previously hampered the spread of this type of information. However, this requires that authorities and companies make use of the opportunity and actually release important information. We at the Riksbank, like many other Swedish authorities, have for quite some time now made use of the advantages of the Internet in this context. All important information is published on our website, which is easily accessible to most people. This applies regardless of whether one is an analyst at a major bank or whether one is a private person. Information technology has thus created a powerful instrument, which can be used to counteract the 'follow the leader' behaviour.

In the June Inflation Report, Norges Bank assumes that money market rates among our trading partners will gradually increase over the next three years. The path for domestic and external interest rates does not imply considerable changes in the krone exchange rate. Growth in disposable income has been high in recent years. Lower interest expenses as a result of the decrease in interest rates and relatively high real wage growth have resulted in an increase in household purchasing power. The rise in house prices may also have fuelled growth in private consumption. With high growth in employment and falling unemployment, consumption growth is expected to be high again this year. Since the publication of the June Inflation Report, electricity prices have increased to a further extent than expected. Forward prices for next winter have also increased. Higher electricity prices may in isolation reduce household purchasing power somewhat. On the other hand, growth in household income is high and there are market expectations of a fall in electricity prices later next year. A continued rise in house prices may contribute to holding up consumption growth. House prices increased further this summer, and the twelve-month rise moved up to 15.8 per cent in July. Residential construction is still high. In 2005, the number of housing starts was the highest since the beginning of the 1980s. As the interest rate level gradually normalises, household interest expenses will increase. Combined with projected lower employment growth and higher inflation, this might reduce growth in household purchasing power in the years ahead.
One argument that has been put forward for trying to slow down an increase in housing prices is that future falls in housing prices would have negative effects on future inflation and the real economy. However, Claussen, Jonsson and Lagerwall show that the macroeconomic effects of a 20 per cent fall in housing prices would be relatively limited and possible to counteract by adopting a more expansionary monetary policy. This is shown in more detail in the minutes of the monetary policy meeting held in June 2010, when I presented simulations of how expansionary monetary policy can stabilise CPIF inflation and GDP growth following such a fall in housing prices (Sveriges Riksbank 2010). According to Finansinspektionen’s (the Swedish financial supervisory authority) report on the Swedish mortgage market (Finansinspektionen 2012), Swedish mortgages do not constitute any threat to financial stability at present. Mortgage borrowers have a good debt-servicing ability and pass stringent stress tests, credit assessments are thorough, the loan-to-value ratio for new mortgages is declining and the loan-to-value ceiling appears to be effective. If the growth in mortgages or the loan-to-value ratio were to develop in a problematic way further ahead, it is possible to lower the mortgage cap. This is a better means of influencing growth in mortgages and loan-to-value ratios than using the policy rate.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  A higher average unemployment rate by 0.8 percentage points over 15 years is of course a very large cost to the real economy of undershooting the inflation target. At present, a higher unemployment rate of 0.8 percentage points corresponds to around 40,000 jobs. In comparison, it can be mentioned that the government’s own calculations show that the four stages in the earned income tax credit and the changes in unemployment insurance reduce unemployment in the long run by 0.6 and 0.7 percentage points respectively. 17 The respective reforms are thus expected to have a slightly smaller effect on unemployment than the calculated real-economic cost of inflation on average undershooting the target over the past 15 years. Implications for future monetary policy Why average inflation in Sweden has undershot the target over the past 15 years is a separate and important question that requires thorough examination. I do not intend to discuss this here. But a clear conclusion for future monetary policy is that it is important that the Riksbank ensures that average inflation is actually close to 2 per cent over a longer period of time and that it does not fall as low as during the past 15 years. This means that the inflation target must be regarded as symmetrical and that it should constitute a central point for the fluctuations in inflation. One should thus not be more afraid of overshooting the target during a limited period than undershooting it.
Another important feature to note is the decentralisation of knowledge: With a touch of their screen, consumers are now able to access an almost infinite repository of information about the products that they want; including comparisons and peer reviews. The days of the insurer or agent knowing best have passed, and it is important to recognise how this tilts the bargaining power in favour of the consumer. From this, there are fundamental questions that need to be asked of the agency force: Are the current incentives of the industry aligned with the best interests of consumers? Should insurance companies still be thought of as the main principals that agents serve, or should consumers be seen as an equal principal in that relationship? How can the remuneration and more generally, culture, change from one focused on volume of sales to one where agents are recognised for more customer-centric, and a consultative role? These are some of the questions that I hope this convention will touch on, and perhaps for me to share some thoughts. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  There are many concerns over the potential upheaval of the status quo arising from the digitalisation of services. But I can share with you that we firmly believe that the agency force will continue to have a role to play in the general insurance sector even as it evolves into the Digital Economy.

I once again congratulate you and your parents, for it is only through their guidance and care that you shall continue to succeed. I wish you well in your studies and hope to see the day when all of you will graduate with flying colors. Lastly, let me commend the President of this Foundation, for the noble work that you undertaking. I hope others will emulate your commitment towards developing the youths so that they can contribute to the welfare of our country. Mr. President, I salute and urge you to keep up with the good work that you are doing. To the sponsors and the Board of Directors,  2  BIS Review 160/2008  may the good Lord continue blessing your deeds and may he give more to those who had a hand in helping the cause. Let me finish by saying that I can not wait to see these beaming young faces to lead our future generations into a better Zambia and a better life for all. I thank you. BIS Review 160/2008  3
In the period ahead, the policy mix we implemented under the Liraization Strategy will continue to foster financial stability through healthy credit growth, and potential output through the financing cost channel, and will contribute positively to the supply-demand balance. As a result, an improvement in pricing behavior and inflation expectations and a permanent fall in inflation will be ensured. Esteemed Guests, In this part of my speech, I would like to talk about our monetary policy practices in 2022. In 2022, to reshape price stability within a sustainable context, we conducted a comprehensive policy framework review process that prioritizes the Turkish lira in all policy instruments. Accordingly, we implemented the Liraization Strategy, which we developed with a holistic approach. With the Liraization Strategy, we tried to eliminate the sensitivity of inflation and pricing behavior to the exchange rate in the short term. In the medium term, we aimed to strengthen the current account balance by supporting production and exports. With the macroprudential tools and FX-protected deposit products we have introduced to this end, we began the liraization process of the banking sector on both the asset and liability side. We adopted a targeted loan approach in terms of creating financial conditions that will ensure permanent improvement in the current account balance by increasing production and exports in our country. While implementing the Liraization Strategy, we updated our macroprudential policy set according to our targeted loan approach to contain the risks to financial stability and price stability along with interest rate cuts.

ahap Kavcolu: Recent economic and financial developments in Turkey Speech by Mr ahap Kavcolu, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the 91st Ordinary Meeting of the General Assembly, Ankara, 28 March 2023. *** Esteemed Shareholders, Distinguished Guests, Before I start my speech, I would like to wish Allah Almighty's mercy on our citizens who lost their lives in the devastating earthquakes in February, I extend my condolences to their grieving families, and I wish a speedy recovery to those who are still being treated. I would like to commemorate again Prof. Yusuf Tuna, our esteemed professor and member of the Monetary Policy Committee, who passed away last year. Before moving on to the agenda items to be discussed at the General Assembly, I would like to share with you our assessments regarding the macroeconomic outlook and our monetary policy implementations. In the last part of my speech, I will summarize our activities in 2022. Distinguished Participants, In 2022, while the negative effects of the pandemic had not yet been fully eliminated, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war that took place in Türkiye's immediate region, supply constraints appeared again and particularly energy prices and global commodity and food prices rose rapidly. In addition to the geopolitical uncertainties that emerged due to the war, the supply-demand imbalances that persisted in the aftermath of the pandemic caused inflation to increase rapidly on a global scale, reaching historically high levels.
Why not persevere with the minimum exchange rate, instead of exposing the Swiss economy to the downsides of negative interest rates and the challenge of a stronger currency? With this question in mind, let me turn straight to a second fiction regarding Swiss monetary policy, namely, that an unlimited lengthening of the SNB balance sheet would be riskless. This fiction flies against common sense and is mostly prevalent in academic circles. I will try and clarify some misunderstandings with respect to central bank balance sheets by stressing three important facts that apply both generally and to the current Swiss monetary policy situation in particular. First, a central bank balance sheet is never a target per se, but rather, its size and composition simply mirror monetary policy decisions. Second, massive balance sheet expansions carry financial and economic risks. 3 This is clearly the case when the policies underlying the balance sheet expansion comprise outright purchases of foreign exchange. This puts foreign exchange risk on the central bank’s balance sheet. Third, policy measures involving a significant balance sheet expansion should be taken only as long as the benefits in terms of the broader policy objective clearly justify the risks and cover the costs associated with the balance sheet expansion. It is important to note that the costs and benefits of a given policy measure may change over time, and must therefore be reassessed repeatedly.

At the same time, unemployment in the euro area remains high, and the necessary balance sheet adjustments in the public and the private sector will continue to weigh on economic activity. This assessment is also reflected in the December 2013 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual real GDP declining by 0.4% in 2013 before increasing by 1.1% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015. Compared with the September 2013 ECB staff macroeconomic projections, the projection for real GDP growth for 2013 has remained unchanged and it has been revised upwards by 0.1 percentage point for 2014. The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area are assessed to be on the downside. Developments in global money and financial market conditions and related uncertainties may have the potential to negatively affect economic conditions. Other downside risks include higher commodity prices, weaker than expected domestic demand and export growth, and slow or insufficient implementation of structural reforms in euro area countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, euro area annual HICP inflation increased in November 2013 to 0.9%, from 0.7% in October. The increase was broadly as expected and reflected, in particular, an upward base effect in energy prices and higher services price inflation. On the basis of prevailing futures prices for energy, annual inflation rates are expected to remain at around current levels in the coming months. Over the medium term, underlying price pressures in the euro area are expected to remain subdued.