Sveriges Riksbank (2020a), “Financial Stability Report 2020:1”, Sveriges Riksbank Riksbank (2020b), “Monetary Policy Report November 2020”, Sveriges Riksbank Riksbank (2020c), ”Minutes of the monetary policy meeting in November 2020”, Sveriges Riksbank  27 [30]  Riksbank (2020d), “Monetary Policy Report April 2020”, Sveriges Riksbank Riksbank (2021) “Rapidly rising housing prices despite the coronavirus crisis”, article in Monetary Policy Report, April 2021, Sveriges Riksbank. Riksbank (2022), “Financial Stability Report 2022:2”, Sveriges Riksbank Stella, Peter and Åke Lönnberg (2008), “Issues in central bank finance and independence”, IMF Working Paper WP/08/37 Tobin, James (1958), ”Liquidity preference as behavior towards risk”, Review of Economic Studies 25(2), 65-86 Vayanos, Dimitri and Vila, Jean-Luc (2021), “A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates”, Econometrica 89(1), 77-112  28 [30]  Appendix Table A1 lists the monetary policy meetings during 2015-2022, where the Riksbank decided on asset purchases. The amounts mentioned refer to nominal purchase volumes. Up to June 2019, coupons received and repayments upon the maturity were reinvested by the holder in addition to the amounts mentioned here (see, however, decision in December 2017). The Riksbank's holdings declined in 2019 and 2022, as the purchases then were less than the holdings that matured. Table A1 Policy decision meeting  Decision  (Link to meeting documentation)  My voting, if different (Link to the minutes)  February 2015  Purchase government bonds for SEK 10 billion during February-March 2015. Maturity 1-5 years. March 2015  Purchase government bonds for a further SEK 30 billion during March-May 2015. Maturity 125 years.

Thomas Jordan: No end to the debt society without a culture of stability Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, held at an “NZZ Podium” event, Zurich, 28 February 2012. *  *  *  The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website. The most recent financial and economic crisis has resulted in an unprecedented rise in public debt. However, a chronic tendency towards deficits and higher indebtedness has already been observed in a number of countries for the past few decades. Excessive public debt has a negative impact on long-term economic growth, and deprives a country of its freedom of action during a crisis. Sound state finances are thus essential for ensuring an economy's competitiveness and maintaining its social security system, and hence also for social solidarity. Last but not least, excessive public debt also poses a serious threat to price stability and monetary policy independence. Yet how can state budgets be consolidated over the long term? There are limitations on how far fiscal policy powers can be delegated to independent groups of experts. Because fundamental decisions on taxation or expenditure – unlike monetary policy – are aimed at redistribution, they have to be taken at the political level. Even fiscal rules such as a deficit cap or debt ceiling can only achieve a lasting improvement of budgetary discipline if they are supported by a broad political consensus on the advantages of sound finances.