samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Institutions deemed as having higher risk are subject to more frequent onsite inspections. Let me cite some outcomes from our inspections. Institutions that have failed to meet our requirements have been warned or reprimanded in writing. A few have been required to appoint external consultants to conduct a thorough review of their AML/CFT frameworks; others have been asked to increase the resources devoted to this function. In a couple of cases, where the frameworks and procedures were adequate but ineffective management oversight resulted in inadequate implementation, we have asked the senior management to be replaced. In all cases, MAS informs the institution’s parent supervisor of our findings and concerns. Our supervisory approach aims to be preventive in nature. This means that sanctions can be taken against financial institutions for weak AML/CFT controls, even if no predicate offence has occurred. Having reviewed our regulations and our supervisory and enforcement actions, the FATF assessors concluded, “Singapore’s AML/CFT sanctions regime is effective, proportionate, and dissuasive”. In a nutshell, while a lot has been done, our institutions can always do better. MAS is reviewing whether we need to increase our supervisory intensity and is considering if we should make public, sanctions against persistently or egregiously errant institutions. Strengthened cross-border co-operation The third prong of our efforts is international co-operation.

The most recent published data show that nearly half a trillion pounds of collateral have been delivered to the Bank in this way. The existence of a wide range of facilities, coupled with the presumption of access, has helped reduce concerns about the Bank lending “too little”. But at the same time, it has also strengthened safeguards against lending “too much”. Counterparties can see clearly that the Bank’s facilities are priced to incentivise the use of private markets in normal trading conditions. And the detailed pre-positioning process, underpinned by published collateral eligibility criteria,  2  See the Sterling Monetary Framework “Red Book”, at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/ sterlingoperations/redbook.aspx. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  provides assurance against the possibility that the Bank is taking sub-standard or overpriced collateral. The third lesson from the UK is that richer tools for LOLR require strong governance and accountability mechanisms, to reassure society that the central bank will operate according to clearly established procedures, and will report on its activities ex post. Assurance that the Bank will not lend “too much” under its published facilities (backed by its own resources) is provided through a combination of ex ante safeguards and ex post transparency. The ex ante safeguards include: the new liquidity, capital and resolution regimes; the link between access to facilities and the threshold conditions for supervisory authorisation; the requirement to pre-position collateral; and the pricing schedule.
That said, there are some nascent signs that the economy may be doing better. For example, based on the first estimate, which is subject to revision, real GDP increased at a 2.8 percent annual rate in the third quarter of 2013, above the trend of the past four years. And the most recent payroll employment report showed a pickup in the monthly pace of job gains. The 3-month moving average rose back above a 200,000 pace after slowing to about 150,000 as of July of this year. I hope that this marks a turning point for the economy. But before we rush to this conclusion, a few more cautionary comments are appropriate. With respect to GDP growth, it turns out that inventory investment contributed ¾ of a percentage point to that overall growth rate. Thus, because this impetus from inventories will  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  likely reverse this quarter, the real GDP growth rate is likely to slow to around a 2 percent annual rate or a bit less in the fourth quarter. With respect to payroll employment, we have seen such bursts in payroll growth before over the past few years and have been disappointed when the pickups proved temporary and did not lead to a rise in the overall growth rate. But, I have to admit that I am getting more hopeful.

However, the notion that the economy will grow more swiftly remains a forecast rather than a reality at this point. As is always the case, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding this forecast. Moreover, there is always the possibility of some unforeseen shock. Thus, we will continue to monitor U.S. and global economic conditions very carefully and will adjust our views on the likely path for growth, inflation and the unemployment rate accordingly. Regional economic conditions Let me turn now to the regional economy. A year has passed since Superstorm Sandy devastated the tri-state region. And even today, many of the hardest-hit places are still struggling to recover and rebuild from the storm. In fact, reminders of the storm’s damage remain visible in neighborhoods across Brooklyn, Queens and Staten Island, as well as along the coasts of Long Island and New Jersey. On a more encouraging note, however, the broader regional economy has proven to be remarkably resilient. After a brief dip following the storm, the regional economy quickly rebounded and has continued to add jobs at a reasonably good pace. Moreover, the region’s housing markets have continued to show steady improvement throughout the year. To help monitor the performance of the regional economy more generally, the New York Fed produces economic activity indexes for New York State, New York City and New Jersey. Based on these measures, New York City’s economy has continued to grow strongly throughout the year, and both New York State and New Jersey have seen some pickup in growth in recent months.
Turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (M3) continues to expand at a robust pace, with an annual rate of growth of 4.7% in February 2017, after 4.8% in January. As in previous months, annual growth in M3 was mainly supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 expanding at an annual rate of 8.4% in February 2017, unchanged from the previous month. The recovery in loan growth to the private sector observed since the beginning of 2014 is proceeding. The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations declined to 2.0% in February 2017, from 2.3% in the previous month, while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained broadly stable at 2.3% in February. At the same time, the euro area bank lending survey for the first quarter of 2017 indicates that net loan demand has increased and bank lending conditions have further eased across all loan categories. The pass-through of the monetary policy measures put in place since June 2014 continues to significantly support borrowing conditions for firms and households and credit flows across the euro area. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with the signals coming from the monetary analysis confirmed the need for a continued very substantial degree of monetary accommodation to secure a sustained return of inflation rates towards levels that are below, but close to, 2% without undue delay.

Incoming data since our meeting in early March confirm that the cyclical recovery of the euro area economy is becoming increasingly solid and that downside risks have further diminished. At the same time, underlying inflation pressures continue to remain subdued and have yet to show a convincing upward trend. Moreover, the ongoing volatility in headline inflation underlines the need to look through transient developments in HICP inflation, which have no implication for the medium-term outlook for price stability. A very substantial degree of monetary accommodation is still needed for underlying inflation pressures to build up and support headline inflation in the medium term. If the outlook becomes less favourable, or if financial conditions become inconsistent with further progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation, we stand ready to increase our asset purchase programme in terms of size and/or duration. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Euro area real GDP increased by 0.5%, quarter on quarter, in the fourth quarter of 2016, following a growth rate of 0.4% in the third quarter. Incoming data, notably survey results, bolster our confidence that the ongoing economic expansion will continue to firm and broaden. The passthrough of our monetary policy measures is supporting domestic demand and facilitates the ongoing deleveraging process. The recovery in investment continues to benefit from very favourable financing conditions and improvements in corporate profitability. Employment gains, which are also benefiting from past labour market reforms, are supporting real disposable income and private consumption.
20 It would be premature to draw too close an analogy with climate risks, and it is true that court cases have, so far, largely been unsuccessful. Cases like Arch Coal and Peabody Energy – where it is alleged that the directors of corporate pension schemes failed in their fiduciary duties by not considering financial risks driven at least in part by climate change 21 – illustrate the potential for long-tail risks to be significant, uncertain and non-linear. And “Loss and Damage” from climate change – and what to do about it – is now formally on the agenda of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, with some talking openly about the case for compensation. 22 These risks will only increase as the science and evidence of climate change hardens. Physical risks from climate change will also become increasingly relevant to the asset side of insurer’s balance sheets. 23 While the ability to re-price or withdraw cover mitigates some risk to an insurer, as climate change progresses, insurers need to be wary of cognitive dissonance within their organisations whereby prudent decisions by underwriters lead to falls in the value of properties held by the firm’s asset managers. This highlights the transition risk from climate change. Transition risks The UK insurance sector manages almost £ in assets to match liabilities that often span decades.

The far-sighted amongst you are anticipating broader global impacts on property, migration and political stability, as well as food and water security. 8 So why isn’t more being done to address it? A classic problem in environmental economics is the tragedy of the commons. The solution to it lies in property rights and supply management. 2  For instance, the IPCC has stated “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia”. See IPCC - Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014). 3  See www.metoffice.gov.uk/news/releases/archive/2015/Record-UK-temps-2014. 4  See IPCC (2014). 5  See IPCC (2014) which notes that the effects of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, together with other anthropogenic drivers are “extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of observed [global] warming since the mid-20th Century”. 6  See, for example, Otto et al (2015). 7  See Munich Re, NatCatSERVICE (2015). 8  The report “Risky Business – the economic risks of climate change in the United States” (2014) suggests that in the USA $ worth of coastal property could be below sea level by 2100. Research by Lloyd’s identifies climate change as an important supply-side issue for food security. See www.lloyds.com/~/media/lloyds/reports/emerging%20risk%20reports/food%20report.pdf. This is consistent with the views expressed by Lloyd’s market participants surveyed by the PRA for its report to Defra.
This will not last and the fiscal authorities need to factor this in when considering what needs to be done to put the federal budget deficit and the nation’s debt burden on a sustainable path. Second, I will argue that fiscal consolidation should take into consideration the offsetting adjustments needed to keep the economy on an even keel. While fiscal consolidation is a necessary condition for a healthy economy over time, it is not a sufficient condition. Fiscal adjustments require offsetting changes in private-sector spending and saving behavior, and in the trade sector. Prudent economic policies and international coordination can help ensure that such adjustments take place in ways that support economic activity (and, by extension also support government revenue). As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and opinions and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. As we all are aware, the federal budget deficit is very high and the federal debt burden has climbed sharply as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 1). Despite this, the net interest burden on the outstanding debt remains low as a share of GDP (Figure 2). This is due, of course, to the unusually low level of short- and long-term interest rates. These unusually low interest rates are the result of monetary policy actions taken by the FOMC.

Philipp Hildebrand: (The) productivity (imperative) Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at Avenir suisse, Zurich, 24 September 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Just a few years ago, the weak growth of the Swiss economy was a dominant topic in public debate. For four years now, the economy has been advancing strongly. Is this merely a cyclical boom? Or has structural change taken place, affecting both productivity and the associated potential growth path? This would have far-reaching implications, not least for monetary policy. A number of factors indicate that structural change is indeed occurring and that this could ultimately result in an increase in the underlying productivity trend. However, time lags and cyclical distortions make it difficult to identify such changes. BIS Review 104/2007  1
But they entail several risks, and they could lead to significant concentration effects among a few dominant private networks: these would in practice “re-intermediate”, but without the trust and regulation associated with the architecture of the monetary and financial edifice that we – public and private players – have built together over a period of decades. In the face of this major challenge, we need to both innovate and regulate. For some, the conjunction between the two should be an “or”, considering them mutually exclusive: innovation in the form of a central bank digital currency would be an alternative, indeed the only alternative, to the unchecked development of decentralised finance. For me, the conjunction is “and”: the two pillars clearly work together to foster sustainable innovation; this is why the EU should at once (i) adopt the MiCA regulation on crypto assets in the first half of this year, (ii) prepare for a Central Bank Digital Currency, a e-euro, by 2026. But the worst conjunction would be “neither, nor”: revolutions always happen quickly, and we are at risk of neither innovating nor regulating in time. In that case we would have failed in our historical mission and jeopardised centuries of work building up confidence in our money. Page 8 sur 9 2/ Let me now turn to the second major transformation underway, the ecological transition, which is an absolute necessity at the global level even if Europe here lies ahead. Climate change is accelerating.

For instance, the mission observed that in Mpongwe, in the 2011 farming season, the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) paid out a total of K52 billion (Kr 52 million) to small-scale maize farmers while an additional K7 billion (Kr 7 million) was paid to commercial farmers. Coupled with this, total sales from maize alone exceeded about K80 billion (K80 million) if total sales to agents other than the FRA was included. It was further observed that the district produces more maize than the other nine districts on the Copperbelt put together. In addition, it was noted that the payments made to the farmers were growing steadily as evidenced by the increase from K19 billion (Kr19 million) in 2010 to K58 billion (Kr 58 million) in 2011 while members of the Farmers Union had accessed about K2.4 billion (Kr2.4 million) in loans from banks outside the district for the 2010/2011 farming season alone. Furthermore, the Mission reported that 2,700 residents of Mpongwe, comprising Government/Civil Service employees and registered farmers use the financial services located either in Kitwe, Ndola or Luanshya. It must be noted that this number did not include other persons in the productive sector such as private businesses. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report further observed that a total monthly wage bill of about K2.8 billion (Kr2.8 million) was paid out to the residents of Mpongwe in 2011. These funds did not include grants and other sources of funding utilized by various Government organs and private individual and businesses.
To build a common analysis of balance sheet positions and a shared understanding of the implications of that analysis for the world economy, a trusted, independent and expert secretariat is needed to facilitate those discussions. Only if countries are willing to share confidences with each other - discuss their "policy reaction functions" - will international meetings justify their cost. Those three tasks do not exhaust the responsibilities of an international financial institution. From time to time, there may well be financial crises when it would be appropriate for the international community to provide temporary financial assistance to mitigate the costs of sharp adjustment in trade flows and output. But such a role should not be the principal focus of international monetary co-operation, and, as I have pointed out, it has not been the role for the IMF vis-a-vis any developed economy for many years. Moreover, nor is it likely to be true of many important emerging market economies in the future. As I argued in my K.B. Lall Lecture in 2001, following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s it was likely that countries might choose to build up large foreign exchange reserves in order to be able to act as a “do it yourself” lender of last resort in US dollars. It is now clear that this is exactly what many Asian countries have done. Nevertheless, it is sensible to provide the Fund with the capability to act when necessary. How should the IMF be reformed?

They had the vision to put in place international institutions that might help prevent the disintegration of the open trading system that they saw as necessary to a revival of economic prosperity. We have not had to go through a time of economic disaster. We have had the opportunity to experience an extraordinary flowering of the international trading system, and the entry into that of the world’s two largest populations. The expansion of trade, the rise in the number of qualified people entering the world’s labour force, and the growing realisation that we can all benefit from trade has raised living standards and provided us with opportunities to reduce poverty around the world. That should make it easier, not more difficult, to design international institutions to sustain those developments. We will have only ourselves to blame if we fail to live up to that challenge and simply allow the IMF to evolve through a series of ever more bland communiqués and meaningless statements. Today, I have tried to challenge the thinking behind the slow progress in reforming the IMF. But that should not be interpreted as any criticism of the extraordinarily talented and committed people who work for the Fund. On the contrary, the responsibility for reform lies fairly and squarely with the shareholders – the member countries. Nor are the issues an arcane exercise in international finance. As Governor Deshmukh said in his speech in Savannah, agreements on the international monetary system and on trade go hand in hand.
Pension funds – reacting with moderation and flexibility Ladies and gentlemen, the pension funds have not been idle in the last few years with regard to the challenges mentioned. As pension fund managers, you have shown moderation and great flexibility in initiating various measures to bring your pension funds’ income and expenditure into equilibrium over the long term as well. On the investment side, the exposure to fixed-income instruments has been reduced – given the persistently low interest rates – in favour of equities and real estate (cf. chart 4). Furthermore, the pension funds have again become more active abroad, and are keeping their liquid assets to a minimum. Indeed, liquidity as a share of total investment assets is currently at a historic low (cf. chart 5). You have also had to take action on the benefits side in order to balance income and expenditure over the longer term. These cuts are painful and have been directly reflected in people’s insurance certificates. One example is the sharp reduction in the conversion rate for non-mandatory cover. 8 Moreover, the technical interest rate 9 has been lowered by 40% in the last ten years. This took account of the probability that income from the ‘third contributor’ would also be greatly limited in future.

At present a higher level of economic growth is thus required to change the level of unemployment compared to the average historical relationship since 1980. The time lag between GDP and unemployment also appears to have increased during the 2000s. Thus, it now takes longer before the full impact of a change in growth has an effect on unemployment in Sweden. What is different this time? Part of the explanation for unemployment not having risen as much as one might have expected given the historical relationship could be that not all of the economy has suffered. The main fall in employment has been in the manufacturing industry, while the services sector, which is more labour intensive, has fared better. Last year exports fell by a good 13 per cent, while retail sales, for instance, only slowed down slightly. This is probably because the Swedish export industry was hard hit by the large fall in world trade, while the large economic policy stimulation helped hold up consumption. Industrial production fell by around 25 per cent between the peak in November 2007 and the trough in May 2009. However, the fall in the production of services was just over 10 per cent between the peak in December 2007 and the trough in June 2009. In recent months production in both sectors has stabilised. This has also had an effect on employment, which fell much more in the manufacturing industry than in the services sector.