samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Do we as economists and policymakers truly understand all the synergies, complementarities and marginal effects of different reforms? Probably not to the extent that we would like. Are we on the same boat when it comes to their positive gains and externalities? I would dare say yes. We also have to keep in mind the political economy dimension of the process. We need to ensure broad support for the reform agenda especially since there might be some short-term costs of certain reforms. In that sense, lacklustre support for market economy and democracy as well as low faith in justice systems in CEE countries compared to long establishes democracies might complicate matters further. This is where policy transparency and communication plays an important role. Clearly, not everything we do will always get full support from the broad public, particularly in the case of structural reforms with long-term gains and short-term costs, but sometimes boldness is rewarded beyond our expectations. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s latest economic and financial developments Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision-Making of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 27 November 2012. *  *  *  Today, on 27 November 2012, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council reviewed and approved the monthly Monetary Policy Report. Based on the latest monetary and economic developments in Albania, and following the discussions on their future outlook, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 4.00%. The Supervisory Council deems that the current monetary conditions are adequate to meet Bank of Albania’s inflation target in the medium term. These conditions ensure the necessary monetary stimulus to support the domestic demand. Let me now proceed with an overview of the economic developments and key issues discussed at today’s meeting. *** Annual inflation fell for the second consecutive month, down to 2.4% in October. Its performance was driven by food price developments, which account for almost 70% of the inflation rate. Prices of other consumer basket items moved in different directions, retaining their contribution at the same levels as in the previous months. From the macroeconomic viewpoint, inflation rate continued to be determined by temporary externally-generated supply factors and structural changes in the domestic market. The slow performance of economic activity is associated with low increase in producer costs and low pressures on inflation.
Evolution of New York Fed’s Effort In the ten years that followed the financial crisis, we have continued to see a stream of misconduct scandals and cultural failures, and a corresponding increase in significant litigation and enforcement activity, with costs estimated at an aggregate of $ billion worldwide.3 At the New York Fed, our work in advocating culture and behavior reform in the financial sector 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  started in late 2013 when our former President, Bill Dudley, delivered a speech on the “too-big-tofail” problem.

International efforts range from the creation of specialized units of behavioral risk experts to risk culture assessment frameworks to supervisory guidance that directs supervised institutions to develop and promote a sound corporate culture. I view this variation in approach as a feature and not a bug of the official sector focus on culture reform. There is rarely a single solution to a complex problem with many interdependencies and deep uncertainty. Rather, the official sector must experiment and innovate; probe and adapt; and try new approaches to foster a healthy culture that promotes appropriate conduct. One common thread of the recent innovations, however, is that supervisors can provide a horizontal perspective on culture reform that reflects broad social goals in a way that the private sector cannot. To be clear, it is not the supervisors’ job to dictate the internal culture of a firm, but when there are market failures such as externalities or information asymmetries, then there is a role for the official sector to push firms to do more to address these issues and mitigate misconduct risk. We should be cautious, however, about our ability to influence precisely and predictably. Public health studies, for example, document “policy resistance” where interventions are defeated by the system’s response to an intervention.8 As an example, a rules-based regime that focuses on reducing conduct risk by prescriptive regulatory fiat runs the risks of creating a “check-the-box culture” where everything not explicitly banned is considered acceptable behavior.
Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Recent developments in the Spanish economy Testimony of Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, to the Parliamentary Budget Committee, Madrid, 7 October 2008. *  *  *  Budgetary discussions this year are taking place at a time when the Spanish economy is deep in a process of adjustment proving much more pronounced than initially expected. The international backdrop is marked by the weakening of the US economy, sharp rises in oil and commodities prices and, above all, the scale and persistence of the turmoil on international financial markets. Given the latest events in the United States and Europe, it is no exaggeration to say that we are faced with a global financial crisis without precedent in recent times which will require an overhaul of the principles that have governed the regulation of international finances in recent decades. The world economy is in exceptional circumstances, with a general loss of economic dynamism, surging inflationary pressures and serious financial instability problems. These are exacerbating and accentuating the adjustment of the Spanish economy which the exhaustion of the cycle had already set in train, following a long period of expansion. Moreover, this is the first occasion on which the Spanish economy has faced such a process since joining the Economic and Monetary Union, which provides undoubted buttresses but also poses considerable challenges. The economic policy debate behind the preparation and approval of the Budget is thus of crucial importance.

The far-reaching changes in the Spanish economy in recent decades have equipped it with the wherewithal to overcome this difficult stage and to subsequently resume a path of sustained growth, allowing convergence to continue. But if these factors are to operate, the authorities and all agents must face up to the current circumstances and make the required efforts, and economic policies must prevent any slippage and enable the factors conducive to the resumption of sustained growth to come into play. Naturally, I shall focus today on the diagnosis of the situation of the Spanish economy and on its economic policy implications. But these would both be incomplete without some, albeit brief, reference to the deterioration of the international setting and to the economic outlook in the euro area which, as you know, will determine monetary policy developments. Last year, the growth of the world economy reached 5%. The forecasts available for this year, however, place the figure below 4%, with scarcely any scope for the start of a recovery in 2009. Moreover, any recovery will be moderate, slow and subject to a degree of uncertainty fuelled, among other developments, by a rise in major inflationary pressures in most economies. In my view, there are three basic factors behind this deterioration of the global economic situation. The first is the adverse behaviour of the US economy, weighted down by the continuing decline in its real estate sector, which is depressing household and investor confidence.
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Perspectives for young people from the full membership of the country in NATO and EU - impacts on monetary policy, business and the capital market Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the debate forum, organized by the Institute for Business and Management &quot;Heidelberg&quot;, Skopje, 18 October 2018. * * * Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me express my gratitude and appreciation for inviting me today, to be part of the eminent speakers at this debate forum, organized by the Institute for Business and Management HEIDELBERG Skopje. The matter that this event addresses is an important dimension of the prospects of our society, economy and the overall wellbeing. “Every cloud has its silver lining”, and joining a large, diverse and prosperous community, such as the European Union, should be our “silver lining” when facing difficulties in paving the way for stronger and faster economic and social convergence. The European Union has been an important institutional, economic and political anchor for the region ever since the beginning of the transition. The accession process provides important tools that enhance the overall reform processes in the country, making it well prepared and better founded when the moment for full–fledged membership comes. My role today is to shed some light on what the EU entrance might imply for the monetary policy in general and for us as monetary policy makers, in particular.

One angle of this issue is how the membership might impact the overall economy, and hence what challenges as policy makers we could face. The second angle is more specific, as the economic integration is the stepping – stone towards the monetary integration, and the adoption of the Euro as a single currency. Observing the first angle, one should probably try to draw conclusions from the experience of other peer economies that already went, through this process. Entering the EU, for these countries provided confidence anchor and significant reduction of their risk premiums. It enabled strong influx of capital, which underpinned their real and financial convergence. In some of these countries, the finance flows went to productive and tradable segments, making the economies more resilient to shocks and less vulnerable. But, in some of them the allocation of capital was less conducive to sustainable growth, it created excessive imbalances, high leverage and less room for policy makers. The occurrence of the global crisis was a “natural halt” and painful correction of this unsustainable economic matrices. At this juncture, with the global crisis behind us and all the lessons learned, I think as policy makers we are more knowledgeable to reap the benefits of the EU entrance more wisely, and to better deal with the challenges ahead. At this point I must say, that Macedonian economy is already well integrated both in terms of trade and finance with the EU.
The Federal Reserve has also continued to test its Term Deposit Facility, which provides a term investment option for credentialed depository institutions. Recently, TDF tests varied the rates and maximum awards and introduced an early withdrawal feature that provides favorable treatment of term deposits under the U.S. liquidity coverage ratio. 20  The December 2014 and March 2015 quarter-ends, respectively, had a total of $ billion and $ billion in awarded bids outstanding between term and overnight operations combined. These amounts are close to the $ billion in bids that were submitted in the ON RRP operation at the September 2014 quarter-end, only $ billion of which were filled. On non-quarter-end days, take-up has averaged less than $ billion. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In recent years, money market trading dynamics have changed, reflecting the effects of Fed monetary policy as well as other factors. The expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and the introduction of payment of interest on reserves have significantly altered the motivation for many fed funds trades. 21 With an abundant supply of reserves available, banks’ need to borrow funds to meet their reserve requirements or to clear financial transactions has been dramatically reduced. Meanwhile, entities that have surplus cash but are not able to earn IOER, such as Federal Home Loan Banks, lend funds at sub-IOER levels to banks that borrow them for the purposes of depositing them at the Fed to earn IOER.

In some jurisdictions, national supervisors will conduct additional field tests to determine whether the new rules deliver the levels of capital we expect. Similarly, in all jurisdictions, there will be a period of time during which banks will calculate their capital requirements in parallel under the 1988 Accord and under Basel II. National field tests and the period of “parallel running” of the new framework will serve as some of the final reality checks for Basel II prior to its implementation. We recognise that these tests and reviews will demand resources and substantial efforts from both banks and supervisors. Yet I must emphasise that neither banks nor supervisors will be able to evaluate the calibration of the new framework - and hence its effectiveness - if banks do not participate fully and seriously in the national field tests or in the periods of parallel running. I urge you to devote your best efforts and resources to these undertakings. Only you can provide the data that all of us will need to ensure that Basel II functions as we intend. b)  Monitor ongoing advances and clarify and provide guidance for selected rules  A second area where supervisors are active is in monitoring ongoing advances in risk management while clarifying and providing supplemental guidance for some of the rules. Like the development of the framework itself, this work will require a great deal of communication and co-operation between banks and supervisors.
I have also argued that monetary policy was crucial in preventing the dual shock of the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis from having even more negative consequences for the euro area as a whole. The ECB’s extremely accommodative monetary policy stance sustained the ongoing economic recovery, while heading off the threat of deflation. I would like to stress, however, it is much harder to sustain economic activity and attain the price stability objective when interest rates reach the zero lower bound. Although the ECB has made ample and imaginative use of non-standard monetary policy measures, inflation in the euro area has not yet risen in a sustained way towards the inflation target. I would like to conclude with a few words about the Maltese economy. Malta weathered the global financial crisis and the euro area sovereign debt crisis well. Malta has been outpacing other members of the euro area since 2012. We are the fastest-growing economy in the euro area, registering extremely rapid growth rates over the past three years. In part, this was because we avoided the problems that dragged down some euro area member states: the banking system remained liquid and well-capitalised throughout, while fiscal discipline ensured that public debt never rose to unsustainable levels. Malta also benefited, of course, from the accommodative monetary policy stance that I have just described.

Crucially, Malta enjoyed the gains from a range of structural reforms that increased labour force participation, 7  raised efficiency in key economic sectors and led to the diversification of activity into new niche areas, particularly in services. Monetary policy on its own cannot deliver the full range of desirable economic outcomes. When it is accompanied by complementary and consistent fiscal policy actions, as well as by well-designed structural reforms, then monetary policy can deliver on its primary objective of price stability, while maintaining economic activity and employment close to their potential levels. 8
That year the output slack closed and a positive output gap opened up, and sustained growth without economic overheating called for increased labour importation. In recent years, Icelanders income has risen above its pre-crisis peak, owing both to GDP growth and to the improvement in terms of trade. Real wages were 24% higher in 2018 than in 2007, and real per capita income was 12% higher. According to international statistics, Iceland ranked 11th in the OECD in terms of per capita income in 2007. We dropped to 19th place in 2010, but by 2017 we were up to sixth place. I always expected that the economy would recover, but I dared not dream that we would get to where we are today. As I mentioned in my speech at the 2010 Annual Meeting, I was also worried that the endemic imbalances in the Icelandic economy would surface again once the economic recovery was further advanced. This could manifest itself in economic instability, an unsustainable external position, and above-target inflation. Fortunately, that did not happen. We have experienced a long, sustained period of growth. Certainly, a positive output gap could have ended in overheating and instability. But we managed to avoid this with imported labour and prudent economic policies, particularly monetary policy. Now the output gap is narrowing quickly, but without yet giving way to an economic contraction. In the future, considerable effort will probably be spent on seeking explanations for this success.

Certainly there are a number of questions and challenges regarding future developments in the banking system and the regulatory framework for it, as has emerged in the recent White Paper on a Future Vision for the Financial System, but further discussion of that topic must await another opportunity. Early this month, Parliament passed legislation lifting restrictions on the remaining stock of offshore krónur, which amounted by that time to 84 b.kr., or just under 3% of GDP. This represented the final step in lifting capital controls on non-residents’ króna-denominated assets. The assets fell into two categories: so-called offshore krónur, on the one hand, and króna-denominated assets held by the failed banks’ estates, on the other. These assets combined amounted to 65% of GDP at the peak. We reduced that percentage to the current level through various measures taken in 2010-2017 — without disturbing the balance of payments or financial stability, without tapping the Bank’s reserves to an inordinate degree, and without significant legal repercussions. This success has been noticed, including internationally. Alongside the final liberalisation of offshore krónur, the special reserve requirement on capital inflows into the bond market and high-yielding deposits was lowered to 0%. This synchronised effort has delivered positive results. The 5  exchange rate of the króna has not been under pressure due to offshore króna outflows, and the Central Bank has not yet needed to use significant reserve assets in order to fulfil its pledge not to allow those outflows to weaken the currency.
We have a more flexible economy, which is evident in the speed with which enterprises adjust and the relative ease with which labor and capital move to their most productive uses. 2  BIS Review 2/2005  Our financial system provides a strong combination of bank-centered financial groups that are capable of withstanding larger shocks than was possible in the past, a more diverse mix of other financial intermediaries, and deeper and more liquid capital markets than exist in the other major financial centers. Together these factors seem to have produced a more stable and resilient financial system, one that is better able to withstand stress. These are important strengths for the United States, and they are formidable even in comparison with the scale of the broader challenges ahead for the world economy. What are the most important actions policy makers can take to mitigate the risks and challenges on the horizon? Here’s a list of actions the U.S. can take on its own or initiate in cooperation with others. First, with respect to monetary policy. We need to preserve confidence that policy will move toward a positive real fed funds rate at a pace sufficient to keep inflation expectations stable at a low level. How far policy moves and the pace at which it moves will depend on how the outlook evolves.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Big techs in finance - a bildungsroman that is far from over Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the highlevel BIS conference "Big techs in finance – implications for public policy", Basel, 9 February 2023. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to introduce the second day of this BIS high-level conference on big techs in finance. While it is a pity to do so from a distance, perhaps that is fitting for a conference on the changes in our working lives brought by digital innovation. Very early on, big techs saw finance as a natural complement – and booster – to their core businesses, launching a technological revolution that might bring many benefits to consumers, across different fields such as payments and stablecoin issuance. Big techs have met with success on some of these roads, and less so on others. Interestingly, some of these developments do not exactly match what we could have expected even four years ago. We can therefore consider big techs' entry into finance as a bildungsroman – a sort of coming of age story – with promising early years and somewhat disappointing learning years partly behind usi. Building on this already significant experience, the maturity years may be ahead of us – but that will only be possible under consistent conditionsii. I. Big techs and finance: a bildungsroman unfolding under our eyes A.