samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
More specifically, the Euro area quarterly economic growth reached 4.8 percent in the first half of 2022. However, the biggest impact from war developments is expected to be shown in the data of the fourth quarter of 2022 and the first half of 2023. This outlook is reflected in the latest ECB projections for economic growth, which have been revised down markedly for the remainder of the current year and for 2023. At the September 2022 ECB forecast round the euro area real GDP growth is expected to reach 3.1% for 2022, 0.9% for 2023 and 1.9% for 2024. The euro area economy is now expected to grow by less than projected, with the possibility of a recession taking place in 2023 being more likely. Inflation started rising in 2021, due to demand and supply imbalances following the reopening of economies after covid-related restrictions were lifted and due to supply chain bottlenecks. But there was another unpredictable and bigger inflation shock from the Russian war in Ukraine that catapulted energy prices. Harmonized inflation in the euro-area rose to a high of 10 percent in September, up from 9.1 percent in August, indicating a continuing rising trend. Based on the September Eurosystem staff Broad  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Macroeconomic Projection Exercise, both headline and core inflation are expected to be higher in 2022, at 8.1 per cent and 3.9 per cent, respectively.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As an EU institution that has played a central role throughout the crisis, the ECB has become a focal point for those frustrated with this situation. This may not be a fair charge – our action has been aimed precisely at cushioning the shocks suffered by the economy. But as the central bank of the whole euro area, we must listen very carefully to what all our citizens are saying. There are some, like many of the protestors outside today, who believe the problem is that Europe is doing too little. They want a more integrated Europe with more financial solidarity between nations. And there are others, like the populist parties we see emerging across Europe, who believe that Europe is doing too much. Their answer is to renationalise our economies and reclaim economic sovereignty. I understand what motivates these views, why people want to see a change. Yet in truth neither offers a real solution to the situation we face today. Solidarity is central to European integration and it is right that countries have supported each other during the crisis. But the euro area is not a political union of the sort where some countries permanently pay for others. It has always been understood that countries have to be able to stand on their own two feet – that each is responsible for its own policies.
But another important aspect to ensure the independence of these institutions is to prevent governments or interest groups affecting such independence. In the specific case of the Banco de España, the respect of the authorities for its independence and reputation is crucial for maintaining confidence in our banking system at home and abroad, and for overcoming the major challenges we currently face. Naturally, this respect for the independence of regulatory and supervisory agencies should unavoidably be accompanied by an obligation on their part to account for the performance of their functions before Parliament. Such accountability to the representatives of the nation should not only be an obligation for these agencies but also their right, since the transparency provided by Parliament is a mainstay for safeguarding the independence of the institution from possible interference by authorities and interest groups. Allow me to thank those here, the Deputy Governor, the Governing Council members and the Directors General, and all the Bank’s staff for their collaboration these past six years. I deeply recognise the competence and dedication with which they discharge their important responsibilities. But I should like to conclude expressing my particular appreciation of those who have participated in the supervisory function of the Banco de España these past years.

Following the approval of the RDL, the banks and the authorities focused on ensuring compliance with this legislation, and on pursuing bank integration processes and on implementing the business model changes arising from the amended regulations governing savings banks. Under the provisions of the RDL, 13 banks had to increase their capital by more than € billion, meaning that in the second stress test conducted by the European Banking Authority, further capital increases were not needed. However, as the crisis worsened and spread in summer 2011, the Community authorities demanded a temporary increase in the capital requirements of large banks and the creation of a temporary extraordinary buffer associated with potential sovereign debt portfolio losses. These new requirements were applied to the five largest Spanish banks, for which additional capital needs of somewhat over € billion were calculated. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As a result of all these developments, there was significant progress in the clean-up and restructuring of the Spanish banking system. From the onset of the crisis to the beginning of this year, provisions of around 13% of GDP were set aside, banks shored up their solvency by significantly increasing their capital, most savings banks converted into banks and around 30 institutions disappeared, with their management passing in most cases to other sounder and more efficient banks.
8  Figure 9 Public sector balance (percent of GDP)  4  Latin America: 1995-2015 average (*)  2  1.1  0 -2 -4  -1.5  -0.9  Chile  4  9  9  2  6  6  0  3  3  -2 0  0  -4 -3  -3  -0.5  -3.4 -3.1  -6 -6  Chile  Peru  Argentina  Mexico  Brazil  Colombia  -6  -6 90  94  98  02  Effective  06  10  14 18(f)  Structural  (*) General Government Financial Balance. (f) For 2017 to 2019, forecasts obtained from the 2016 Public Finances Report. Sources: Moody’s and National Budget Department, Ministry of Finance of Chile. 22. This is one of the factors that explain the CB estimates of growth at 2.25%-3.25% in 2018. Other factors include improving external conditions, the expansionary monetary policy and the gradual disappearance of idiosyncratic factors that have dragged down economic activity in recent years. According to the CB growth should resume gradually from the second quarter of 2017 to gain speed and start reducing the output gap, currently at 1 ½ per cent, in the second half of the year (Figure 10). 9  23. The above compares to a potential growth between 2.5% and 3%, according to the latest Central Bank estimates. This is indeed significantly lower than trend growth rates close to 5% in the mid-2000s.

10-15  16  17  18  90  90 13  14  15  16  17  18  (*) For comparison effects with the new 2013 Benchmark Compilation, the ToT of previous Reports are adjusted to 100 for 2013. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 4. On the domestic front, inflation has been consistent with what was expected in December. The annual variation of the CPI fell to 2.7% in March, a significant drop compared to the 4.5% figure of a year ago. The behavior of the nominal exchange rate, which has appreciated relative to its level one year ago, has been a fundamental driver of these dynamics. The appreciation has had a greater impact in the decline of the goods component of the CPIEFE index (our core inflation measure). In fact, the goods component of core inflation dropped from nearly 5% at the beginning of 2016 to 0.3% in March. The services component has been stickier, and has dropped from the same levels the first few month of last year to 3.3% in March. Approximately ¾ of the prices included in this component are managed or indexed prices, which enhances their inertia and, as such, makes them less sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations (Figure 2).
For instance, the Riksbank’s analysis of the financial sector became more structured and systematised, and from 1997 we began to present our analysis in the form of Financial Stability Reports. This financial stability work was, however, far from fully-developed when a new financial crisis broke out just over six years ago, this time on a global scale. For instance, we still lacked a system for crisis management. We also failed to prevent a too rapid credit boom in the Baltic region, at the same time as Swedish banks proved to have liquidity problems when the dollar market froze. As the new crisis was deeper and affected a much larger number of countries than the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, it also acted as a stronger and more worldwide signal that major efforts were needed to avoid financial imbalances causing problems in the economy as  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  a whole. The most concrete expression of this opinion was the emergence of the policy area that came to be known as macroprudential policy, which aims to take the overall view of the financial system as a whole that was lacking prior to the crisis. In this context, it is worth pointing out that in Sweden the boundary between macroprudential policy and supervision of individual banks, microprudential policy, is not particularly distinct because of the market structure we have, with four dominant major banks.

If the stability of one of these banks is threatened, it also entails a threat to the stability of the financial system as a whole. To this extent, one can say that we in Sweden have actually been dealing with macroprudential analysis for quite a long time. But this does not mean that there has been a ready-developed, fully-functioning framework for macroprudential policy. On the contrary, it is only fairly recently that the allocation of responsibility for macroprudential policy was made clear, and the framework that includes the Financial Stability Council, which had its second meeting a couple of days ago, was established. “Learning by doing” in macroprudential policy – as when inflation targeting was introduced The situation with regard to macroprudential policy today is in many ways like the situation when the inflation-targeting policy was introduced just over twenty years ago – a new type of policy is to be launched without really knowing how successful it will be. When we introduced the inflation-targeting policy in Sweden in 1993, there was not much guidance. Some countries, such as New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, had introduced such a policy before us, but they in turn had not really had time to gain much experience. It was quite simply difficult to know how to conduct the new policy, where the interest rate should be used to steer inflation towards a quantified target – and to know how well it would succeed.
And our White Paper MAP breaks down this process into five key areas — Under “M”, the white paper lays out new developments in Regtech, and explores their importance to Hong Kong’s banking industry Under “A”, the white paper assesses prevailing practice, and attempts to define and evaluate existing barriers to Regtech adoption As for “P”, there are three elements involved. The first element is about laying out a common practice framework for implementing Regtech in Hong Kong; the second element involves making practical recommendations for initiatives that can contribute towards the wider adoption of Regtech; and the third element is about delivering a practical roadmap of the HKMA’s plans for promoting Regtech adoption. 20. The White Paper is actually based on findings from a survey of banks and Regtech providers, interviews with industry stakeholders, benchmarking against other jurisdictions, and an analysis of Hong Kong’s Regtech progress so far. Some of you may have offered your valuable contributions to it. So, taking this opportunity, I thank those of you who have done so for your generous help and support. 21. The White Paper will be available for public download through our official website later today. Here, let me give you a quick snapshot of some of its key contents. 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Regtech adoption barriers 22. First and foremost, about Regtech adoption barriers. 23. We note that Regtech adoption in Hong Kong has made significant progress in recent years.

This one is perhaps more straightforward: a lack of suitable talent will be a major obstacle to Regtech adoption. As a start, no doubt a combination of upskilling and sourcing new hires is the key to developing talents with the right combination of local regulatory knowledge, technical skills and business acumen. To take that one step further, if Hong Kong can evolve into a hub for global Regtech talent, we will be uniquely positioned to build and export Regtech solutions to the rest of the world. 46. The White Paper suggests developing a Regtech skills framework. This framework will cover suitable modules and competency standards. And we would seek to identify the skills required for different roles and which would help speed up Regtech adoption, and then we would help train and develop both new entrants and existing practitioners. 47. Finally, on “Momentum Matters”. All our hard work will not bear fruits if the momentum for changes cannot be sustained. It is therefore crucial to keep the industry engaged in the years ahead. One suggestion is that we introduce a benchmark for our progress in increasing Regtech adoption. This benchmark will provide us with a holistic framework that will enable us to visualise the success of our Regtech initiatives. 48. That is a quick snapshot of the key recommendations in the White Paper. In fact, we are already putting some of those recommendations into action. 49. For example, a flagship event is already planned for the first half of 2021.
I have considerable uncertainty about this estimate. Regional economic conditions Now let’s turn to the New Jersey economy. One feature of the state’s economy is its industrial diversity. A sizeable number of jobs in the state are in the healthcare, professional and business services, wholesale and retail trade, and leisure and hospitality categories. When we look at the northern part of the state, we see a greater concentration of jobs in finance, particularly in Hudson County. Also prominent are goods distribution jobs related to the ports, rail lines, trucking and warehousing. Other large sectors include pharmaceuticals manufacturing and research and development, as well as private education. Looking at recent trends in northern New Jersey, the recovery in the economy in general – and in employment in particular – is lagging the nation and is not going as well as we would like. The Garden State’s economy lost a quarter of a million jobs during the recession, and employment didn’t begin to recover until 2011, and even then it was slow getting started. However, the latest annual employment revisions – released just a few weeks ago – show job gains in 2013 and 2014 were a bit stronger than previously reported. Nevertheless, four years into the recovery, employment has recovered less than two-thirds of the job losses from the recession. This contrasts notably with both New York State and the U.S. as a whole, where employment has far surpassed its earlier peaks.

Based on the poll results, we have developed an ongoing series of clinics for small businesses to help them take the next step to access capital and identify new sources of funding. We also get important input from our Small Business and Agricultural Advisory Council, whose members help us understand key economic and financial issues affecting regional businesses and communities. This year we tapped two New Jersey business leaders to join the Advisory Council: Adenah Bayoh, co-founder of Kapwood, LLC, and Ranjini Poddar, founder of Artech Information Systems, LLC. Let me now review recent developments in the national and regional economy, and at the end of my talk, I will be happy to answer questions you may have about the economic outlook. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).1 National economic conditions After growing at just a 2 percent annual rate from 2010 through 2012, real GDP expanded more quickly in 2013 and 2014, rising at a 2.7 percent annual rate. This was sufficient to push the unemployment rate down by more than two percentage points over this period. This  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  firming in growth reflected several important developments that, in my view, are likely to continue through 2015. The data we follow suggest that the household deleveraging process has largely run its course and the imbalances in the housing market have been mostly worked off.
The answer is not entirely clear, but much indicates that the Riksbank will find it more difficult to carry out its task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system in the future if we don't raise our level of ambition regarding the services now offered to RIX participants. I see two main reasons for this. First, settlement in central bank money is the safest means of settling payments. Private settlement platforms can, with the aid of the central bank, imitate part of the security offered by settlement in central bank money. In Sweden, this is done by the institutions that are participants in BiR allocating money in a special client funds account in RIX that acts as collateral for the payments settled in BiR. This hybrid system has enabled instant payments in Sweden without the Riksbank’s payment system having to be rebuilt from scratch. As long as the volumes are relatively small, this type of system is fully adequate, but financial stability will become increasingly dependent on the reliability of these hybrid systems if the volumes increase substantially. Sooner or later one therefore reaches a point where it is difficult to see the value of a hybrid system that tries to copy the safety offered by central bank money if the central bank could just as well offer this settlement itself. The Riksbank would in addition be able to offer participants better and more cost-efficient liquidity management than is possible in a private system. Second, the payment system is one of the economy's critical infrastructures.

For the big banks, in particular, it is crucial that a sufficient capital base be laid down as soon as possible, so that losses can be fully absorbed. The SNB welcomes the fact that, in 2010, both big banks already took important first steps in this regard, and we would like to encourage them to keep up the pace of their capital expansion. The capitalisation of most domestically focused banks is good by historical standards. However, a combination of high interest rate risk exposure and strong mortgage lending growth has been reported by a number of banks. In order for these banks to bear the risks in the medium term, it is important to ensure that their capital base is strong enough. I would now like to take a closer look at the situation of the two big banks, before turning my attention to the situation of the domestically focused banks. Situation of big banks Compared to 2009, the two Swiss big banks saw a marked improvement in their profitability and capital situation last year. In 2010, these institutions reported combined net profits of around CHF 13 billion, as opposed to roughly CHF 4 billion in 2009. This positive development was driven by UBS, whose situation improved further over the course of last year. In addition, both UBS and Credit Suisse continued to increase their regulatory capital ratios (ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets), which were already very high by international standards. Moreover, their financial strength ratings also improved.
On 11 February the Bank announced that, with effect from 1 July 2011, it will accept in its narrow collateral basket sovereign debt securities denominated in Sterling, Euro, US and Canadian Dollars and issued by the UK, the US, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Canada. That is a wider range of currencies than many of its international counterparts. For example, the ECB, Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan only accept securities denominated in domestic currency. The Bank of England takes a broader range of currencies, to make sure that the narrow collateral set is large and deep enough for our monetary policy operations not to cause frictions in the sovereign collateral markets. The risk is offset by additional haircuts for foreign currency. The choices of which currencies and issuers were to be allowed in the narrow collateral set were decided principally on grounds of liquidity, not credit. A number of AAA issuers are assigned to the wider collateral set principally because their debt stock in issue is too small and/or too tightly held such that bid-offer spreads are relatively wide and/or more volatile in the secondary market. Chart 3 shows a simple analysis of some of these factors. Those changes were not a response to short-term conditions in some sovereign debt markets. Rather, they form an important part of the transition to the Bank’s long-term collateral policy, which was initiated following the October 2008 consultative paper on the Bank’s market operations. The changes have expanded the universe of collateral eligible in the Bank’s operations.

And all the narrow collateral previously eligible will remain permissible under the new regime as either narrow or wider collateral. 6  Of course any drawdown is predicated on the counterparty being expected to remain solvent. 7  This is in line with new FSB principles aimed at reducing the extent to which ratings are “hard-wired” into financial contracts. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 3 Metrics of sovereign credit risk, market liquidity and size(a) US France Germany Netherlands Canada UK Italy Spain Belgium Austria Australia Sweden Denmark Finland Norway  5 yr CDS premia  300 250 200 150 100 50 0 -1  0 -50  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  10yr bond bid-offer spread (bps)  (a) The size of the bubbles is representative of the total amount of sovereign debt outstanding (in sterling terms). Ireland and Portugal are not shown, as their respective bubbles lie significantly to the north-east of the other countries identified in the Chart. Bubbles for Cyprus, Japan, Luxemburg, New Zealand, Slovenia and Switzerland are also not shown for clarity (although they are accepted as wider collateral). Data as at 11 April. Valuation The Bank’s valuation of collateral plays a key role in protecting the Bank against loss in the event of a counterparty default. Where available, the Bank uses market prices to value a security.