samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(Chart 12: Norges Bank’s key policy rate) In order to prevent inflation from becoming too low and to dampen the impact of weaker developments abroad on the Norwegian economy, the key policy rate was reduced to 1.75 percent in December 2011. With high money market premiums and elevated credit premiums, low key rates are not passing through fully to banks’ lending rates. The difference between various lending rates is unusually wide at present. Many households pay a mortgage interest rate of around 4 percent, and rates on corporate loans are between 5 and 6 percent. Monetary policy is the first line of defence in demand management. Norges Bank still has room for manoeuvre in interest rate setting – in both directions. The question nonetheless remains of whether it is desirable to use monetary policy to accelerate the pace of inflation when the countries around us are in a recession. Even if the krone depreciates somewhat, relatively high cost growth in Norway that could quicken the pace of inflation might lead to a further deterioration in competitiveness. This cannot be the way to go. Moreover, low interest rates over a prolonged period tend to amplify an upward spiral in house prices and lending. Imbalances that build up in credit and property markets  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  can have severe ripple effects further ahead, with a substantial impact on output and employment. Many Americans and Europeans have recently experienced this, as Norwegians did 20 years ago.

Besides, many people benefit from low interest rates as they are also homebuyers, taxpayers, entrepreneurs and workers whose companies are benefiting. BILD: In Germany the adverse effects are predominant. Making provision for retirement is becoming increasingly difficult… Draghi: Remember, what counts is what you earn on savings in real terms, i.e. interest minus inflation. This is higher today than it was on average in the 1990s. At that time you might have had a higher interest rate on your Sparbuch (savings account), but we often had an inflation rate that was higher still. So the interest looked good at first, but the real return was in fact much lower. Moreover, people can influence how much they get on their savings even in times of low interest rates. They don’t just have to keep the money in savings accounts but can invest in other ways. The Bundesbank has recently shown that the average return on all German household assets is close to 2%. BILD: So, are the German savers themselves to blame? Draghi: No. But there are alternatives when investing savings. In the United States savers had to face seven years of zero interest rates. The financial system – banks and insurers – nevertheless still worked. Money was invested in a variety of ways which in the end enabled a decent return. BILD: Of all people, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who has supported you for years, is now among your strongest critics, saying your policies are damaging savers and thereby strengthening populist parties.
Memoranda of Understanding regulating these interactions will be prepared in the coming months. Conclusion To conclude, it is unavoidable that the existence of the SSM will alter the functioning of the ESFS. This is, after all, the most significant development in financial supervision in the history of the European Union. However, I am confident that the changes brought by the SSM will strengthen the ESFS, and will overall enhance the quality and consistency of supervisory and regulatory practices across Europe. The more Member States that are involved in Banking Union, the greater these positive effects will be. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

As the leading green and sustainable finance hub in Asia and the dominant gateway to China, Hong Kong plays a crucial role in supporting China's climate transition by channelling international capital to green projects. Last year, out of the approximately $ billion green and sustainable bond issuances in Hong Kong, Mainland entities accounted for over 80% of the issuances. Since 2021, we have supported the green, sustainable, and blue bond issuances from the governments of the Shenzhen municipality and Hainan province in Hong Kong. This has created a strong demonstrative effect for both public and private sectors in the Mainland to leverage Hong Kong's green bond platform and enriched the range of RMB financial products available in the Hong Kong market. Hong Kong is already Asia's largest sustainable financing centre, with one-third market share. To facilitate further growth in sustainable investment between China and the rest of the world, we have spearheaded several initiatives. First, we are the first Asian jurisdiction mandating climate-related disclosure across the financial sector by 2025, and the first market working to operationalise the Common Ground Taxonomy jointly developed by China and the EU. This allows international issuers and investors to report and communicate sustainability impacts and meet regulatory and investor needs across global markets. Secondly, we have been collaborating with relevant Mainland authorities to promote Hong Kong's green financing platform.
We used depleted borrowed foreign  reserves to do that. In doing so, we lost a large amount of foreign reserves and then eventually there was an inevitable sharp Page 3 of 17  depreciation in due course. This doesn’t make any sense, so we are trying to follow a more flexible exchange rate policy, which will, we hope, enable us to have a competitive and stable exchange rate. If we get fiscal policy and monetary policy right, then the pressure on the exchange rate is reduced. So that’s crucial. You have to take all three macro-economic instruments together. If you are able to implement the other two macro policies well, then there won’t be pressure on the exchange rate and it will be possible to have a competitive and relatively stable exchange rate, which is what we want to try to get to. So that’s the micro side. In addition, the Government is also very much in the forefront in terms of improving the investment climate, investment promotion, trade facilitation and trade policy. So, hopefully we are moving in the right direction in terms of macroeconomic stabilization and the framework is being put in place to improve the investment climate, as well as the trading environment. Let me now turn to the matters in hand today and focus on the export sector. I must thank my colleagues in the Economic  Research Department of the Central Bank who helped me to put these remarks together.

Inflation rates have been falling in most countries and they have registered appreciable expansion in economic activities with GDP growth rates averaging at about 5% in 2007. In addition, most countries have become more democratic in political circles, giving more say to the public on the running of governments and their institutions. Distinguished Participants, allow me now to turn to the subject we are gathered here for, that is, “Central Bank Governance”. Good corporate governance is generally acknowledged as  BIS Review 26/2008  1  important in economic management. In this regard, Central bank governance is arguably defined by a number of key-concepts or pillars, which together should form the basis of an effective legal framework governing a central bank and on which central bank governance should rest, that is, operational independence, democratic accountability and transparency. Despite its common usage, it is not always very clear what central bank transparency amounts to. Generally, two definitions of transparency can be distinguished in the policyoriented literature. Firstly, central bank transparency is referred to as the activities of the central bank in providing information. Thus, in this case, transparency has been defined as the degree to which information on policy actions is available. However, a somewhat broader approach to transparency includes the public’s understanding of the decisions taken by the monetary authorities and the reasoning behind it.
Although the current account position underscores the need for the recovery to shift over time towards investment and export growth, it would be unreasonable to expect that to have happened already. Recoveries are seldom led by investment and strong demand from the UK’s major trading partners, including the euro zone, appears some way off. Ultimately, a sustained recovery in the UK will require a more robust and balanced global recovery. In summary, the UK has been in a situation where the equilibrium real rate of interest has been negative, but with monetary policy gaining traction, there is early evidence that the liquidity trap will be escaped over time. That is not to suggest the warnings are without merit, that interest rates can return to normal soon, that the risks to financial stability arising from the emergency stance of monetary policy are not real, or that escape would bring the freedom to grow at historic rates. It is in this last respect that the second story for a “secular stagnation”, persistently weak supply, is most relevant. 2. Supply pessimism  In many advanced economies, despite persistently disappointing output growth, unemployment rates have remained surprisingly low. Based on a simple Okun relationship, the current UK unemployment rate would be expected to be closer to 14% and the US rate to be around 10%. In fact, they are 7.6% and 7.0% respectively (Chart 4). 2  A point emphasised by Mervyn King, for example here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/ Documents/speeches/2012/speech613.pdf.

On 5 November, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) announced its decision to lower the Bank’s interest rates by 0.25 percentage points. This was done in view of the rise in the Bank’s real rate caused by the past few months’ decline in inflation and inflation expectations, which has been more pronounced than previously anticipated. The rise in the real rate was greater than is warranted by the business cycle position and the near-term outlook. In other respects, for the rationale behind the decision, I refer you to the MPC statement and the speech I gave at the Iceland Chamber of Commerce’s monetary policy meeting the following day. Naturally, we are also ready and willing to answer your questions about both this decision and the interest rate outlook. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Finally, I would like to mention that the MPC has been examining its monetary policy instruments in the recent term and, although certain changes have been made, this review is still underway. According to the statement from its March meeting, the aim of this review is primarily to ensure that monetary policy instruments are optimally suited to the achievement of monetary policy objectives, given that it is also desirable that monetary policy implementation be as effective, comprehensible, and economical as possible in terms of the Central Bank’s balance sheet. We are ready and willing to answer any questions that you have on this topic. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
during the current year and 19 b.kr. next year, over and above the amounts assumed when the Central Bank’s latest macro economic forecast was published last month. On the basis of these new assumptions, preliminary studies suggest that economic growth could easily end up in the range 2-2½% this year and well over 3% next year. The annual growth rate is as much as 1% above what was previously forecast. The employment outlook has also improved considerably. Given that the negative output gap was never very wide, and that seasonally adjusted unemployment measured 3.2% in February and has changed little since September, it is clear that inflationary pressures are likely to develop much sooner than was previously thought. Inflation this year is likely to be close to the Central Bank’s 2½% target, but other things being equal it could rise next year. While it is foreseeable that these major construction projects could coincide to some extent in 2004 and 2005, most of the weight will be felt in 2005 and 2006. Thus economic policy implementation will face a greater challenge than was thought when only the Reydarfjördur aluminium smelter and related hydropower development were foreseen. The new outlook calls for economic policy responses on both the monetary and fiscal side. While the scale of the response will be determined by exchange rate developments, it is clear that preventing overheating and inflation will be a major challenge in the period ahead.

Accordingly, the Central Bank is obliged to aim towards an annual rate of inflation which, measured in terms of the increase in the Consumer Price Index over a twelve-month period, should generally be as close as possible to 2½%. Inflation targeting was introduced in a climate where the economy was severely overheating. For this reason an adjustment period was set for the Central Bank, whereby it should aim to attain the inflation target by no later than the end of 2003. We have reason to celebrate the fact that inflation had already reached the set target by November 2002. In 1996 a period of robust economic growth began in Iceland which did not come to an end until 2002. GDP growth in 2001 is estimated at 2.9%, which is more than in most industrialised countries that year. This growth phase ended with severe overheating of the economy. Among the forms this took was a current account deficit in excess of 10% of GDP in 2000 and twelve-month inflation which peaked in the beginning of 2002 at 9.4%. In 2002, a sharp turnaround took place in the Icelandic economy, under the strong influence of the Central Bank’s tight monetary stance. A small surplus was shown on the trade account and better external balance put the exchange rate of the króna on a surer footing. The króna appreciated substantially during the year after sharp depreciation in 2001, when it most likely dropped considerably below the equilibrium exchange rate.
Mugur Isărescu: Romania, the EU and the euro area Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the "The Future of the Euro Area and its Enlargement" Conference, Bucharest, 17 October 2017. * * * Professor Sapir, Ladies and gentlemen, The National Bank of Romania’s Board and I are honored to extend a warm welcome to all of our distinguished guests attending the conference this morning. Allow me to wholeheartedly welcome our speaker, Professor André Sapir. It has become quite a tradition here, at the National Bank of Romania to invite well-renowned lecturers to address the audience on important topics of the day. This morning, we are privileged to listen to Prof. Sapir’s lecture on The Future of the Euro Area and its Enlargement. Please, allow me to briefly introduce to you Prof. André Sapir. He is a well-known name among European economists. He is an active member and Senior Fellow of Bruegel Institute in Brussels. Prof. Sapir has a rich academic career and important contributions in the field and study of economics. I wish to express my appreciation for his diligent work dedicated to the strengthening of the conceptual underpinnings of the European Union and the Euro Area’s economic and financial systems. For those of you who are not familiar with Bruegel Institute in Brussels let me pinpoint a few facts. Bruegel was set up in 2005 and has emerged as an important independent and non-doctrinal European think tank focused on economics.

I have mentioned his work outside the academic work to emphasize his extended experience and wholesome view on Europe and the Euro Area. And now, a few considerations about the Euro Area and Romania in the European context: The European financial environment has faced the need for thorough reforms. The financial crisis and the difficulties within the Euro zone have led to rethinking the assumptions behind the Euro zone governance and the links between the European Union’s euro and non-euro member countries. The National Bank of Romania maintains a deep interest in reforms of the EU governance that enhance its strength and resilience, in regional cohesion, nominal and real economic convergence, for the larger objective of Euro currency adoption and Euro Area accession. Euro area accession represents a strategic target for Romania, which needs a healthy economy in order to join it on favorable terms. However, we are facing great challenges with respect to the functioning of the Euro Area and the European Union in general. The euro area is an evolving target, one that changes and transforms overtime and, therefore, we are all asking ourselves what the Euro Area’s future will look like and what we are heading to. Romania can and should play a role in the ongoing debate on the future of the EU and even of the euro area. In this context, I am grateful to André for the opportunity to facilitate this exchange of ideas.
Moreover, the more it lasts, the more it is impossible to change since both group become mutually dependant through the stock of claims and debts they have reciprocally accumulated. Any significant break, for instance, in the allocation of reserves by surplus countries, would both trigger major exchange and interest rate volatility in deficit countries and lead to significant valuation losses in surplus countries. This “financial balance of terror” is supposed to keep the system in place for a long period of time. Implicit behind this doctrine, however, is the assumption that the creditor country can live with the risk of losses on its reserves and accept that possibility as a price to pay for the success of its growth strategy.   A more recent explanation is provided by the “asset shortage” theory (Caballero, 2006), which helps and explains why asymmetries in financial developments generate both payment imbalances and asset bubbles. According to the theory, the world has a shortage of liquid and riskless assets. Moreover, the supply of those  2  BIS Review 120/2010  assets is asymmetrically distributed between regions, with the US providing a large chunk of the total. Hence, there is a structural excess demand for dollar denominated securities, which sustains permanent capital inflows in the US.

The takaful industry continues to exhibit good financial results each year, as reflected in the three-fold increase in total assets to RM6.5 billion in June 2006, as compared to RM1.9 billion five years ago. More significantly, average doubledigit growth rate of 18.9% for net contributions of combined family and general takaful in the past three years, demonstrated the high potential of the industry. Whilst sustaining the current pace of development, there still exists high growth prospect for the takaful sector, in view of the large untapped potential, with the market penetration rate recorded at merely 6.1% in June 2006. Ladies and gentlemen, Bank Negara Malaysia has laid down a number of initiatives to further enhance the competitiveness and growth momentum in the development of the takaful industry. These initiatives emphasised on enhancing operational efficiency, strengthening corporate governance and risk management as well as improving the market practices and consumer awareness. All players need to capitalize on these initiatives for the takaful industry to achieve sustainable success and unleash the potential gains of the Islamic finance in Malaysia and abroad. Allow me to share some significant developments that may shape the future direction of the takaful industry moving forward. Firstly, as the prudential framework evolves towards a predominantly principle-based and riskbased regulatory approach, there will be a greater emphasis on risk management, corporate governance and transparency so as to maintain investor confidence and public trust.
Yet there is hardly any other alternative for a central bank than to respond by raising interest rates and in such a way demonstrate its intention to counter inflationary tendencies. At the same time there is reason to try to influence developments in other ways by clarifying the nature of the problems, so that financial policy is turned in the right direction. Figure 4  T h e Swe d ish Exch an ge Rate ve r su s U SD an d D EM 5,0  8,0 7,8  S E K /U S D r i g h t ax i s  4,8  7,6 7,4  4,6  7,2 7,0  4,4  6,8  S E K /D E M l eft ax i s  4,2  6,6 6,4 6,2  4,0 j un un--96  j u l -96  s ep-96  n ov -96  j an -97  mar -97  6,0 maj -97  S ou rce : T he R iksba n k Another, often complementary, reason for fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate may be unrest or disturbances in the international currency and capital markets. If such disturbances can be deemed to be pure market phenomena and thus of short duration, they should make hardly any difference to the bank’s behaviour. However, this is not the most common case.

Price stability, as everyone realizes, may be defined in many ways, with somewhat different consequences for the execution of monetary policy. When the index for measuring inflation is chosen, a number of different considerations have to be taken into account. The index has to be reasonably broad and give a picture of price developments in the economy as a whole. It is an advantage if it is also well established and regularly published with a short time lag. In addition, it is desirable that the index is seldom revised. All these factors bear out the suitability of the consumer price index (CPI) . Thus, the Riksbank’s inflation target has been expressed in terms of a change in the official consumer price index. BIS Review 56/1997  -8-  Figure 5  CPI an d U n d e r lyin g In flatio n Pe r ce n tage 12-m o n th ch an ge 6 .0  6 .0  CP I  5 .0  5 .0  Un derl y i n g do m es tic in fl ati o n  4 .0 3 .0  4 .0 3 .0  2 .0  2 .0  1 .0  1 .0 0 .0  0 .0 92  93  94  95  96  97 -1 .0  -1 .0  Sources: S tatistics S weden and the R iksbank One problem with the CPI is that it is affected by temporary influences on inflation.