samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A workshop held by the Committee on the Global Financial System earlier this year in Hong Kong also noted this difficulty. Appropriate calibration of macroprudential tools is difficult because of the lack of data and information about how the transmission process works―that is, what impact the tool will have on the targeted sector. Even assessing the impact ex post  1  Tobias Adrian, Meg McConnell and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  is challenging because it is difficult to predict how the macroeconomy and financial system would have evolved if the macroprudential tool had not been in place. Second, in the U.S., even if such a framework existed, there would still be a problem in terms of timely implementation. The U.S. regulatory structure is fragmented, so that in most cases, no single regulator is able to implement macroprudential tools in a comprehensive manner. As a result, imposing macroprudential tools in the United States would almost certainly leave significant gaps in coverage. Such coverage gaps would likely lead to distortions within the financial sector, as the tool would have differential impacts across financial intermediaries inside versus outside a particular regulatory boundary. Also, activity would migrate toward those areas outside the scope of the macroprudential tools that had been implemented. It is important to note the regulatory mandates of the numerous federal and state regulatory authorities differ considerably. Some simply may not view financial stability as an important part of their mandate.

How will the governance work in coordinating across these three realms? In the meantime, while we work to sort all this out, we should take considerable solace from the fact that we have made the financial system more resilient to shocks. We may not be able to anticipate the next area of excess. But with higher capital and liquidity requirements and the use of stress tests to assess emerging vulnerabilities, I think we are much better placed than we have been in the past. Thank you for your kind attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Few knew who was exposed to losses, and banks, funds and financial establishments started to question counterparties’ financial situation, and held on to their money. This resulted in a surge in banks’ premia on short-term interbank rates. Moreover, banks had to bring back on their books loans from companies they had established, which further reduced their capacity and willingness to provide new loans. Several large foreign banks have received capital infusions from sovereign-wealth funds in the Middle East and Asia to bolster their financial strength. What began as isolated losses in a small segment of the US home mortgage market led to a confidence crisis, which spread to money and credit markets in many countries in autumn 2007. In the US, there is a risk that the losses will increase in other segments of the property market and on ordinary consumer and business credit. Many of the new financial instruments which were forged to diversify risk have proved to be non-viable. It is now difficult for many companies to raise new capital or procure long-term funding. There are also signs that prices and activity in property markets have reversed and are falling in many European countries. Around the turn of the year, doubts were raised as to the financial strength of some US banks. The new year was ushered in amid fears of a setback in the US and a sharp decline in global equity prices.

And, while pausing to enjoy the view, it has also found it possible to look beyond through the mist to the taller peaks gleaming in the distance. WTO and Hong Kong 3. The most prominent of these peaks – at least among those visible to us now – is the prospective accession by China to the WTO. It is still not clear when exactly this event will take place, although the latest predictions seem to put it at some time during the second quarter of next year. Nor is it entirely clear how extensive an impact the event will have on China, on the world, on the region, or on Hong Kong – or how fast or slow the impact will be to take effect. 4. Some initial assessments about the impact on Hong Kong of China’s WTO accession were, in fact, quite negative. A few were even alarmist. The trend of analysis now seems to be more positive. It is, however, qualified by a recognition of the challenges that Hong Kong faces, and of the standards we need to maintain, and improve on, if we are to make the most of our uniquely advantageous position. The Chamber’s own detailed analysis of the implications (which has provided a solid basis for the discussion at this summit) is, in my view, an excellent example of what we need to help us understand this historical turning point in world trade relations: a rational, balanced, informed approach to a complex issue.
Even when the exchange rate is freely floating, and therefore theoretically free of any precise exchange rate target, when sentiment is one-sided, which is often the case in financial markets, exchange rate overshooting can be quite common. 18. Largely against the background of financial crises in the 1990s, in which the choice of exchange rate regime has been a prominent issue, there has been a clear trend in thinking on what constitutes an effective and credible choice. This choice boils down to two options, in what is now commonly referred to as the two corner solutions: either an exchange rate target that is perceived to be impregnable or a regime that does not involve any exchange rate target, as in a free float. Neither solution is, admittedly, immune to crisis, particularly in the case of open and liquid markets. And the precondition has to be that any exchange rate regime, if it is to be credible, is built upon sensible economic policies, strong institutions and robust market infrastructures. BIS Review 114/2000  4  19. Clearly, no exchange rate regime can be perfect, and no simple regime can suit all. The present trend is towards floating regimes, though these seem to work best for the larger economies, whose foreign exchange markets are big enough to absorb voluminous capital flows, and for the smaller economies where controls and restrictions are practised.

Fritz Zurbrügg: Presentation of the Swiss National Bank’s Financial Stability Report Introductory remarks by Mr Fritz Zurbrügg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the media news conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 16 June 2016. *  *  *  In my remarks, I will start by looking at the key points addressed in the Financial Stability Report, which was published today. I will then finish with a review of the launch of the new banknote series, which commenced in April. Big banks: Capital situation further improved – SNB welcomes regulatory reforms Let me begin with the situation of the Swiss big banks. Over the past year, they each improved their capital situation further, as regards both risk-weighted capital ratios and leverage ratios. Both big banks are already almost fully compliant with the requirements of the current Swiss ‘too big to fail’ regulations (TBTF1), which will apply in full from the beginning of 2019. The Swiss National Bank acknowledges the progress made in this area. These regulations were revised over the course of the last year. The revised regulations (TBTF2) envisage a significant increase in requirements on the loss-absorbing capacity of the big banks and will come into effect in a little over two weeks from now. With a phase-in period until end-2019, the requirements will be gradually increased to the definitive level. Both big banks are already fully compliant with the revised requirements that come into effect on 1 July.
Dimitar Bogov: The Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Address by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the presentation of the Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia in the process of accession to the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem to the public, Skopje, 22 January 2013. *  *  *  Your Excellency Ambassador Orav, Honorable Director General of the International and European Relations at the ECB, Mr Moss, Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, media representatives, It is my great pleasure and honor to greet you today at the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia for the public presentation of the Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia in the process of accession to the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem. First, I would like to thank the EU for the financial assistance provided and to express my special gratitude to the EU Delegation in our country for the given support in obtaining the project. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the ECB for the efforts and readiness to carry out the project with the NBRM and to the national central banks of the Eurosystem involved in the project for their willingness to contribute to its implementation.

The securitization markets have shrunk since the financial crisis and the Federal Reserve has further reduced the amount of available securities by snapping up trillions of dollars in bonds in recent years.” Let me repeat that last clause: The Federal Reserve has further reduced the amount of available securities by snapping up trillions of dollars in bonds in recent years. To be precise, $ trillion of Treasuries and asset-backed securities were purchased under QE3, on top of the $ trillion purchased under the previous rounds of quantitative easing. To be sure, we have instituted programs to counter this problem: We have developed sophisticated operations whereby we sell assets in our portfolio and promise to buy them back at a later period. This is known as our overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility, and its net effect is to shift longer-term securities out of our portfolio and into the hands of market operators. This has expanded the traditional reach of our New York desk, where the aggregate portfolios of the 12 Federal Reserve banks are traded under directives given it by the FOMC. Thus the Fed's reach – some would say intrusion – into trading markets has been expanded. Now, let's bring together these observations with the thought I asked you to hold earlier. It strikes me that given current circumstances, it would do no harm to start slowly trimming our holdings by letting them roll off as they mature.
Both of these programs provide important insights into the role of the central bank as a provider of liquidity, leading to a few observations and to a few questions that I believe warrant further exploration in considering future policy actions. 1 Liquidity swaps with foreign central banks The second half of 2009 and the early part of 2010 were marked by substantial improvements in financial markets, ranging from short-term funding to longer term risk assets. There was good reason for those improvements: Efforts by the government to stabilize markets and support financial institutions were successful, and a virtuous circle appeared to be under way in which increasing optimism about the economic outlook and improving conditions in financial markets fed upon one another. The gains in asset prices were dramatic, with broad equity indexes reversing most of the declines experienced in late2008 and early 2009 and with some measures of short-term funding spreads returning to pre-crisis levels. However, more recent developments have demonstrated that conditions in financial markets can change abruptly. These developments have been widely discussed at this point, and I will not go through them in detail, except to highlight the two broad themes in play. First, investors have become concerned about the fiscal positions of some European countries, leading them to re-price sovereign risk for those countries and to question whether austerity measures and other supporting efforts will prove sufficient to restore market confidence.

The swaps were priced at rates that were well below those available in the market at that time, causing usage of the swap lines to rise dramatically to a peak of nearly $ billion in December 2008. In the current circumstances, although the swaps have been priced in the same manner as during the crisis, this pricing is less advantageous relative to the funding rates available in the market, limiting the usage of the swap lines at this time. The swaps were essentially put in place in a preemptive manner, under the view that their presence would provide a backstop for dollar funding markets and help to bolster market confidence. Reflections on the TALF I am now going to switch gears and discuss the TALF, which is a liquidity program of a very different nature. Later this month, we will be holding our final subscription for the TALF. However, because no deals have been presented for review for the final subscription, we know that the extension of new credit under the TALF has effectively come to an end. Although the structure of the TALF differed considerably from the other liquidity programs initiated by the Federal Reserve, its basic role was similar in many ways to the traditional  2  BIS Review 80/2010  central bank function of providing liquidity to the financial system and encouraging the flow of credit. In this case, however, the program was geared toward providing support for marketbased credit intermediation, as opposed to the traditional banking sector.
This is an area that should always be a top priority for us all. But I stress it today in the context of the risks and potential rewards I outlined earlier. Simply put, the stakes for each of us – for our institutions, the industry and indeed for Hong Kong – are higher now than ever before. We should therefore invest in talent and professional development accordingly. To make this concrete, the HKMA and the SFC – with, I’m pleased to note, the warm support of the private banking industry and professional bodies – have set up a taskforce to work out an enhanced competency framework for private banking practitioners. Our initial thinking is that the framework should emphasise vocational training and practical application, as well as ethics. Under this framework, private banking practitioners could take different examinations provided by, say, the HKIB and the Hong Kong Securities Institute, and ultimately acquire a professional qualification. To ensure continuous development, practitioners would also take additional regular training. Under the same proposed new framework, the HKMA intends there to be more emphasis in future on practitioner competency, continuous professional training and adherence to common set of professional ethical standards. Getting this right will be an important piece in the puzzle towards building a world-beating sector here in Hong Kong. Getting it right means raising competence and professional standards and, consequently, raising levels of trust and custom. To achieve that will take a full, team effort.

So I very much welcome your input to developing these ideas further and flesh out the framework over the coming months. Closing remarks At the outset of my remarks, I highlighted the banner headline indicating that we are “Heading into a New Era”. Having journeyed this far, is this statement a fair one? Given the opportunities I’ve outlined, I think the answer really should be “yes”. But if I’m cautious, I would have to say, “Yes, if”: if we can rise to the challenges touched on earlier; if we can capitalise on the great strengths and advantages of Hong Kong; if we can invest in our people and our institutions to match the scale of the opportunities. If we can do that, I believe we can truly make this a transformative moment in the development of the banking landscape in Hong Kong. The prize for your institutions, your clients and for Hong Kong is great. I look forward to continue working with you so, together, we attain it. Thank you. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Overall, then, while the theoretical and empirical evidence suggests it is possible higher market power and mark-ups may have come at some cost in lower investment and innovation, the evidence is not overwhelming and certainly would not imply that the aggregate effect is large. A second relationship explored recently is between market power and the labour share. 15  Autor et al (2017)  find a negative empirical relationship using measures of market concentration among US companies. And Díez et al (2018) and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) identify a weakly negative relationship between 15  The relationship between labour, capital and profit shares is discussed in Barkai (2017). 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  mark-ups and the labour share. If we run regressions similar to those in Díez et al for UK-listed companies (Table 3), we also find a negative relationship between mark-ups and the labour share. 16  The analysis presented here, and much of the recent literature, is based around estimates that suggest a secular rise in firm-level mark-ups. Some caution is advisable when drawing conclusions from these results. First, some macro-economic evidence points to falling, rather than rising, company mark-ups/margins (for example, Chen, Imbs and Scott (2009, 2004)). Second, some mismeasurement may be at play in the estimation of mark-ups (for example, Traina (2018)). These uncertainties in the measurement of mark-ups should be borne in mind in interpreting what follows.

The development of money markets and progress in financial innovation, the rapid growth of lending and dollarization of the economy, and the increasing role of real estate in the investment opportunities caused the functioning of the Albanian economy to become even more complex. They were supplemented with unstable velocity of money circulation hence toning down the short and medium-term link between monetary aggregates and inflation. This change materializes the modernization of monetary policy decision-making based on a more complete information analysis that aims at managing the market operators’ expectations. 2  BIS Review 97/2010  One of the directions the Bank of Albania’s work has been focusing on during the past year, as we have transparently stated in our Monetary Policy Document, was the assessment of the suitability of operational targets and the adoption of more advanced forms. The quantitative targeting of the Bank of Albania’s balance sheet, in the form of a ceiling on the net domestic assets and a floor on the net international reserves, has for quite a long time acted as a guide to our interventions in the interbank market. In spite of that, the abovementioned developments suggest that there is plenty of room for improvement in this philosophy and practice. Targeting the interbank market interest rates seems a practical option that finds ample theoretical support and whose application has proved successful in a number of advanced economies.
In connection with this, a number of provisions of a compulsory nature were introduced to prevent the possibility of the state being placed in a blackmail situation. For instance, an act was introduced that meant in principle that the Swedish Bank Support Authority could make decisions in the bank through a state compulsory purchase of the shares if the bank’s capital adequacy fell below two per cent. But these temporary provisions, like the general bank guarantee, ceased to apply in 1996. The Bank Support Authority was transformed into the Deposit Guarantee Board, which was given the task of managing the deposit guarantee and investor protection. Since then it is in principle only the general regulations for competition and liquidation and the system for the deposit guarantee that are available for managing institutions with problems. Unfortunately it is not particularly appropriate – if even possible – to apply the general competition regulations to banks. The regulations on competition and liquidity are primarily to protect the interests of the creditors. They are not particularly well-adapted to take into account society’s interest in maintaining the stability of the financial system. The primary task of a receiver in a bankruptcy is to safeguard the interests of the creditors. He or she has neither the authority nor can be expected to have the skills required to take the measures needed to safeguard the stability of the financial system. Problems which threaten stability require immediate action. Bankruptcies usually take years to resolve.

William C Dudley: Address to the New College Class of 2010 Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the New College of Florida 44th Annual Commencement, Sarasota, Florida, 21 May 2010. *  *  *  Congratulations, graduates. And congratulations, even more so, parents and all of you who supported these graduates along the way! Thank you to the graduates and members of the faculty and administration for selecting me as New College of Florida’s 44th commencement speaker. I am very grateful for the opportunity to speak here today in such a beautiful setting. It’s nice to be back. Earlier today, I had the pleasure of meeting a few of you – in a smaller setting – to hear about your plans for after graduation; or should I say, tomorrow. I am very impressed with the high caliber of graduates in your class. I also had a tour of the campus today, which I must say has changed a lot in the past 30 years. One thing that hasn’t changed, however, is the Palm Court – or as you all so affectionately call it, the “center of the universe.” I have very fond memories of my time at New College, aside from those great Palm Court parties. I received a terrific education and made some life-long friends. I hope the same has been true about your New College experience.