samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Denis Beau: The Euro area sovereign debt markets in the crisis role and impact on financial stability perspectives Speech by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the Risk Live 2021, 7 June 2021. * * * The demand and supply environment in which European sovereign debt markets operate has changed over the last years and is still changing: 1. Firstly, liquidity in the financial system has increased, both in terms of excess reserves held by commercial banks and deposits held by the non-financial sector, notably corporates, whose considerable increase in gross debt has so far largely been offset by a similar rise of liquid assets on aggregate; 2. Secondly, central banks have strengthened their presence in the secondary sovereign debt market. This is a common and global feature. The Eurosystem for instance, has reinforced its accommodative policy stance notably by stepping up its asset purchases of public sector securities under the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) while continuing those under the asset purchase programme (APP). This implies that a large proportion of the stock of some governments’ debt -for the major currencies- is currently held by central banks; 3. A third obvious factor lies in the significant increase in sovereign debt issuances since last year, as European countries implemented substantial fiscal measures to cushion the economic impact of the Covid crisis and foster a subsequent recovery. All in all, euro area governments issued close to EUR 1 trillion in net debt in 2020.

The euro area repo market has also been largely unscathed by the pandemic, remaining a fully functional market even at the peak of the crisis. According to data from the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), the total value of the outstanding repo contracts has barely changed from December 2019 to December 2020 at EUR 8,300 billion (including both repo and reverse repo transactions). This is an all-time high with a repo market size up by more than 40% in 10 years. However, the euro area repo market can be affected by collateral scarcity and seasonality, especially at the end of the year, considering also the important share of Hold-to-maturity investors. In this regard, Eurosystem has made available government bond holdings for securities lending since April 2015. The Eurosystem securities lending programme has been successfull in helping to normalize market rates and in acting as a backstop facility for market participants. For instance, in April 2021, EUR 71.5 billion of public sector bonds were lent out on average with a breakdown of EUR 59.5 billion against securities and EUR 12.0 billion against cash collateral. Another key feature, which has helped to support the liquidity of the euro area repo market, is the dominant share, two-third, of repo market trading cleared via central clearing counterparties (CCP), despite the absence of any mandatory clearing on these instruments.
Eva Srejber: Globalisation and the IMF  Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at The Social-Domocratic Student Club, Stockholm, on 19 September 2000. *  *  *  Thank you for the opportunity of coming here to Stockholm University and meeting you from the different social-democratic student clubs in Stockholm and others among you who have seen posters here at the University. In a week’s time, the International Monetary Fund, IMF, will have its annual meetings with the World Bank in Prague. We will probably see demonstrations at these meetings - in the same way as we saw at the World Trade Organisation’s meeting last winter and at the IMF and World Bank meetings in Washington in April. In a short time, the IMF has increasingly become the subject of debate, not least since it is closely associated with the controversial and often hard-to-interpret economic trend called “globalisation”. The Riksbank has a reason for taking part in this debate. Most of you will be aware that one of our tasks is to maintain stable prices. The other main task of the Riksbank is to promote financial stability and an efficient payment system and to issue banknotes and coins. As part of this task, we participate in various international organisations which work for financial stability, among other things we are the contact authority for the IMF in Sweden.

All societies, whether open or closed, must find ways of ensuring that people are not excluded when technological progress makes old industries unprofitable. All societies also have a responsibility for production and consumption not having too great an impact on the environment since the welfare and health of future generations will otherwise be imperilled. We must be clear that development and collaboration are good. Almost everyone, including many of the poor in the world, has experienced great improvements in the past decades. In many respects, it is exactly the increased contacts and trade between countries that has contributed to it being possible to solve the problems that I have just mentioned. Growth in the industrialised countries has led to us being able to afford to conserve our environment, which most poor countries cannot afford to do. To reverse the trend - to attempt to isolate countries from one another - is not the way forward. Globalisation makes new demands I will now make some remarks on challanges specifically related to globalisation. Like all other development, globalisation is not without problems. These were clearly expressed in the severe economic crises that we have seen in recent years - in Mexico in 1994-95, in South-East Asia in 1997-98, in Russia in 1998 and in Brazil in 1999. These crises illustrate that increased trade and financial flows makes new demands public policy. Firstly, requirements increase on the national institutional settings - on laws, authorities and practices.
The amounts at stake vary, but as an illustration, the last Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, published last October, estimates that until 2050, the energy-related mitigation investments to limit warming to 1.5°C amount to USD 900 billion per year whereas climate-aligned bonds issued in 2018 reached USD 149 billion. Green financing requires an innovation-friendly framework: green loans, green securitisation, green covered bonds, green derivatives, green crowdfunding platforms and green private equity should all be promoted, keeping in sight our heading, which is preserving financial stability. The work of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance of the European Commission on green bond labels and sustainable benchmarks should be well understood as a game changer by the financial system: green finance should definitely mature, upgrade its professional standards and be “greenwashing proof”. Green finance has actually the ability to be a powerful transformational force but there will be no transition to a low-carbon future without further engagement from corporates, from large companies to SMEs. Financial institutions can provide a trickle-down effect, thanks to comprehensive CO2 disclosures or divestment strategies. But the real economy must embrace the transition on its own. Once again, appropriate public policies, like a credible carbon price, will set the proper incentives. d. Further developing the climate agenda in an inclusive manner Climate change will trigger strong distributive effects: agriculture in Sweden might benefit from an increase in global mean surface temperature while 145 million  people in China are threatened by sea rise in a +4°C scenario.

It is of the utmost importance that the entire euro area and Europe as a whole maintain and consolidate their cost competitiveness position. Since the introduction of the single currency, it is more important than ever that we closely monitor the production cost indicator, as it determines to a large extent the competitiveness of goods and services produced in our economy and, therefore, the current level of employment. It also acts as a “leading indicator” of future employment because it gives a measure of the attractiveness of an inward investment compared with investment outside the euro area or outside Europe. Embarking in bold structural reforms: In this context, we also need to pursue and step up bold structural reforms, aimed at increasing the flexibility of the economy as a whole and fostering the progress of science and technologies. This is crucial if we wish to enhance the potential growth of European economies and to continue to promote sustainable growth and enduring job creation. The European Council meeting held in Luxembourg in 1997 explicitly mentioned structural policies among the items selected for reinforced co-ordination. The Lisbon and Stockholm European Councils, held in 2000 and 2001, further enhanced the medium term strategy necessary for structural reforms in the Union. This strategy aims at raising the potential growth and strengthening the competitiveness of the EU economies.
And we have already seen some revision to the GDP data through this recession and recovery – for example the rise in 2009 fourth quarter GDP growth has been revised up from a provisional estimate of 0.1% to 0.5% in the space of just twelve months. For all these reasons, I believe we need to be particularly wary of basing monetary policy at present on fine judgements about the current and future growth of the economy. The MPC’s remit is clearly couched in terms of keeping consumer price inflation on target and we have a responsibility to take action when we see the sort of significant upside deviations we have experienced, not just recently, but over a number of years now. Most of the evidence suggests that recovery is underway and it is likely to continue, even though the pace of growth is somewhat uncertain. There are upside risks to the growth outlook as well as downside concerns. The world economy is growing strongly and this is a major factor underlying current inflationary pressures from global energy and commodity prices. And a stronger response of wage growth to current high headline inflation could support stronger growth of consumption than most forecasters currently expect. We have entered a period of UK monetary policy-making when the judgements made by the MPC are much less straightforward than they appeared to be before the financial crisis.

We may not see the effects of these reforms right away but we must continue pressing on with the reform effort and not let reform fatigue get in our way. Productivity also depends on the availability and quality of public goods. With a strong fiscal position, the Thai government this fiscal year has opted to pursue much needed infrastructure projects. Key infrastructure investment projects include the expansion of the mass transit network in Bangkok, water resource management, and an integrated logistics system. These public investments will ease bottlenecks and allow firms to focus on improving their efficiency and productivity. The importance of productivity cannot be overstated. But with integrated world financial markets, exporting firms must also learn to cope with exchange rate risk. We encourage exporters to hedge against foreign exchange rate risk, to bill their exports in foreign currencies other than the US dollar, and to use imports as a natural hedge. Your Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,  2  BIS Review 20/2007  The risk of global imbalances has been with us and will remain with us for some time to come. Each country has to do its own part in managing the risk. For us, we will forge ahead with our economic and political reforms. But major economies must also do their best to mitigate global imbalances since this is a global problem. We must solve it together. International policy dialogues such as the Fundinitiated Multilateral Consultation would need to be strengthened.
The UK has nothing to fear from the creation of a single euro area supervisor. What would have changed if the European supervision system had have been in place, for example for the Crédit immobilier de France (CIF)? Technically, not a lot. Instead of the French Autorité de contrôle prudentiel, the ECB would have asked the CIF to increase its capital. But make no mistake, banking supervision is not a catch-all insurance. In the case of the CIF, we were aware of its fragility stemming from its increasing refinancing difficulties and we knew that there were longer-term liquidity risks. The CIF is a textbook case where a downgrade by ratings agency expedited the disclosure of funding problems. Would you say that Moody’s was responsible for this situation? No, the primary responsibility lies with its management, which was unable to find a merger solution when it was possible and we had asked it to do so. Did you lack coercive power in this case? Yes, definitely. We have very great powers when an institution does not comply with regulations, but we do not have powers that enable us to prevent a crisis. As things stand, we can appoint temporary administrators if need be or revoke an authorisation, but we do not have powers of resolution allowing us to impose the restructuring of a banking group or transfers of assets. We worked on a draft regulation before the European project started to be discussed, but we underestimated the length of time needed to arrive at a European proposal.

The Board is constituted in a similar way to the other committees in that it is chaired by the Governor and has both internal executive members and externally appointed independent members. On the basis of current announcements it will have a total of 5 internal members 3, and 6 independent members 4 including the CEO of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). It meets approximately twice a month for formal meetings. In summary, the Board is responsible for meeting the PRA’s statutory objectives, including taking all the major supervisory decisions for the 1700 or so firms and groups it authorizes; formulates regulatory policy to meet those objectives; and has a range of strategic and management responsibilities including delegating some matters, principally to the CEO of the PRA or to formal PRA committees. Matters reserved to the Board and its delegations can be found in documentation on the Bank’s website via a link in this text. 5 In what follows I shall treat the PRA Board and the PRA as one policy making body, referring to one or the other as best fits the context. Before moving on, it is worth completing the picture by noting that the PRA works alongside the FCA, creating what is known as a “twin peaks” regulatory structure in the UK. The FCA is a separate institution and not part of the Bank of England.
Although the electronic platform being launched today will not be able to meet all of these, I still hope that it will prove to be the starting point for something new and contribute to an eagerly-awaited renaissance for Swedish fixed income trading. Good luck! BIS Review 37/2001  3

Tarisa Watanagase: Risk-focused supervision and risk assessment Opening address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Seminar on Risk-Focused Supervision and Risk Assessment, Bangkok, 6 September 2004. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies und Gentlemen, lt is a pleasure for me to be here at the opening of the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative on Risk-Focused Supervision und Risk Assessment. In making this opening address, I would like to personally extend a warm welcome to all the participants and to express my appreciation to the Federal Reserve experts who have kindly agreed to share with us their knowledge und experience on risk-based supervision. This regional seminar is held at an opportune time, about two months after the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the Basel II capital framework. As you all are undoubtedly aware of, Basel II aims to strengthen financial stability by encouraging sound risk management practices at banking organizations. The tools uscd are a more risk-sensitive capital regime (Pillar 1); the application of risk-based supervision (Pillar 2); und improved public disclosures to enhance market discipline (Pillar 3). Of the three pillars, one of the most formidable challenges for emerging market supervisors will be to properly implement the Pillar II risk-based supervisory framework. Since risk-based supervision is the main topic of this seminar, it may be useful to provide a few thoughts on some of the broader regulatory und supervisory implications associated with implementing this framework.
8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  For the UK the picture is broadly similar. Fast indicators suggest the trough in activity was reached in the middle of April, with a steady recovery thereafter. Chart 8 plots payments-based fast indicators for the UK mapped into four convenient categories of consumer spending. By late-June, these spending components had recovered at least a third, and in some cases all, of their prior fall. They have risen both sooner and materially faster than in the May MPR scenario. Chart 8: Fast indicators for the UK % change from Jan-Feb level  60 40  Staples  20 0 -20  Aggregate  -40 Delayable  -60  Work-related  Social  -80 -100  Mar-20  Apr-20  May-20  Jun-20  Sources: Bank of England and Bank calculations. Notes: Based on the CHAPS payments that a sample of around 90 UK companies receive from their merchant acquirers on a daily basis. These payments reflect the sales that companies make through debit and credit card purchases, which are summed to estimate rolling seven-day revenues. Definitions of the different consumption groups are discussed in the May MPR. Among the negatively-affected components of spending – social, work-related and delayable – the fastest recovery has been in delayable expenditure such as DIY and household goods.11 There has also been a sharp up-tick in the car and housing markets, albeit from stagnant levels.

Emerging market economies now make up a much larger share of global trade, the global economy, and global growth. As an illustration, emerging market economies have accounted for 70 percent of global economic growth since the crisis—double their share from two decades ago.3 This growth has provided much-needed support to world economic activity, as advanced economies have recovered slowly from the crisis. Rising economic integration is also evident when we examine the trade relationship between Brazil and the United States. Bilateral trade flows in goods have risen from $ billion in 1994 to nearly $ billion in 2016. The United States is Brazil’s second-largest export market, and an important destination for manufactured goods. In 2016, the stock of U.S. direct investment in Brazil was $ billion, up from $ billion in 1994.4 Recent initiatives announced by the Brazilian authorities—including a large and transparent infrastructure concession program and greater foreign participation in the oil and gas and aviation industries—underscore the potential for further increases in foreign direct investment. The Benefits of Open Trade Increased trade, through its longer-term impact on productivity, has been a key contributor to global growth and prosperity since the Second World War. Openness to trade brings many benefits to the supply side of the economy, including: larger markets, greater specialization opportunities, and the increased ability to exploit economies of scale and scope; faster transmission of technology and innovation; and greater competitive pressure on domestic firms to increase their productivity.
Are we done? Have we finished the journey? No, we're not at destination. Do we still have ground to cover? Yes, we have ground to cover. I can even go further than that: I can tell you that, barring a material change to our baseline, it is very likely the case that we will continue to increase rates in July, which probably doesn't come as a big surprise to you, but that's what I'm telling you. And this is so because we are determined to reach our target in a timely manner, and to continue to apply the principles that we have applied today: data dependency, the three elements of the reaction function, and moving meeting by meeting. Obviously, we are better informed at each projection meeting which happens, as you know, in June, in September and later. To your second question: I don't know what difference to make between a pause and a skip. I have not studied enough the press conference of my friend and colleague, Mr  4/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Powell. But as far as the ECB is concerned, I said what I said: we have hiked interest rates. Unless there was a material change to our baseline, we will continue to hike at our next meeting. So, we are not thinking about pausing, as you can tell. I have two questions.

We also see wages continuing to increase in the future. Now, you really asked me specifically the question of whether corporations and labour – and I'm using that term in a generic, comprehensive way – will find the terms under which they don't contribute to fuelling even more inflation that would call on us to take harder monetary policy measures. This is the assumption that we make. I think economically it is justifiable, it is rational, but of course humans are humans. It's going to be for the parties around the table to actually determine what they do going forward in terms of allocating profits and organising these social relationships. What they can be certain of in their discussion is that the European Central Bank will take all  8/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  necessary measures to return inflation to 2%. That, they can count on, and we are confident that we will get there so I hope it helps in their deliberation going forward. The persistency of inflation, as I said, has a lot to do with this unit labour cost that I have mentioned earlier on. This is really the strong – I don't want to use sticky component, because it is going to be persistent, and we know it. Numbers will continue to be high in the months to come, by the way, because we believe that services are going to continue to grow strongly. Labour-intensive services will. Contact-intensive services will continue to grow strongly.