samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At home, the recent evolution of demand and prospects for consumption and  5  investment continue to indicate that the economy will narrow its capacity gaps further over the coming quarters. About the magnitude of these gaps, however, the mix between lower headline inflation and strong nonmining GDP imply that they will exceed previous projections, which, as has been noted, is consistent with the expansion of the labor force coming from massive immigration, among other factors. In order to tone down uncertainties about the values of this and other structural parameters used in the calibration of monetary policy, the Board has decided to update these estimates in the Monetary Policy Report next June. V.1. Activity  In our baseline scenario, we expect the Chilean economy to grow between 3% and 4% in 2019. This range runs somewhat below our December forecast (3.25% to 4.25%), due to a poor-than-expected mining performance which, as I just mentioned, is clearly noticeable in the figures early this year. For 2020, we foresee that the economy will grow between 3% and 4%, a little above our December forecast. Finally, in this Report we present the first growth projection for the year 2021, that is, within a 2.75% to 3.75% range. About expenditure, we still estimate that investment will be its most dynamic component, with annual growth over 6% in 2019. By 2020 and 2021, it should decline to around 4%. Consumption will continue to grow at rates consistent with GDP.

17  I refer here to the concept of “limited access social orders”, see North, D., J. Wallis and B. Weingast (2009). Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambridge University Press. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  At European level, we need to provide a framework that supports and incentivises the introduction of such national policies. This is the role of economic union in the euro area, the “E” of EMU. I would stress, however, that economic union does not mean defining a single economic model across all countries. On the contrary, its purpose is to create the conditions for each country to identify and develop its comparative advantage. Paradoxically, it is only by encouraging difference – comparative advantage – that the euro area can achieve convergence – that is, a more even distribution of economic outcomes. Avoiding re-nationalisation and protectionism Let me finally address the third lesson learnt from East Asia. Europe needs to avoid protectionist temptations and calls for re-nationalisation. Protectionism and beggar-thyneighbour policies would lead to further losses of welfare at both European and global level. Fortunately, there has been no significant surge in barriers to global trade in recent years – unlike during the Great Depression – thanks to global and regional policy coordination. These efforts remain important. Barriers to trade in goods and services cannot be raised within Europe thanks to our Single Market and competition rules which are enshrined in European laws, but the Single Market can be further enhanced.
For example, the Central Bank holdings of Treasury bills have declined drastically this year from more than Rs 300 billion at end 2016 to around Rs 30 billion by now, as the new system ensures full market subscription through the auction system without creating adverse volatility in interest rates. The proposed Liability Management Act allows the Treasury to create a buffer fund to meet the expenditure in the following year, eliminating the necessity for the Central Bank to provide advances to the Treasury at the beginning of each year as per the current provisions of the MLA. These two measures would, in future, insulate monetary policy from fiscal dominance. These reforms are expected to create a win-win situation for both the Central Bank and the Treasury, as they would facilitate the Treasury to raise the required funds at the least possible cost from a more sophisticated government securities market at competitive rates, while helping the Central Bank to achieve its primary objective of maintaining price stability. Looking towards the Future: Flexible Inflation Targeting as the New Monetary Policy Framework In the “Road Map: Monetary and Financial Sector Policies for 2017 and Beyond” presented in January 2017, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka reiterated its intention to move to flexible inflation targeting in the medium-term as its new monetary policy 21  framework.

On the assumption that the three-month Libor rate will remain stable at 0.75% during the next three years, inflation should average 0.7% in 2003, move up to 0.9% in 2004 and reach 1.6% in 2005. Forecast inflation will remain below 1% until the end of 2004 except in the fourth quarter of 2002. In the course of 2005, however, a marked acceleration will set in, with forecast inflation reaching the 2% mark in the fourth quarter of 2005. The new forecast is consistently below that of June 2002. It reflects the delay in the economic upswing. In the new forecast, inflation will rise more markedly at the end of the forecasting horizon due to an even more expansionary monetary policy since June. Expansionary monetary policy to be continued At our last media conference, I pointed out that the National Bank must be prepared to react quickly to changes in the economic situation. When the delay in economic recovery became discernible in summer, we acted immediately by again lowering interest rates. Since then, nothing of basic significance has changed in our assessment of the situation. We shall adhere to our expansionary monetary policy in the foreseeable future. We will thus contribute to the economic rebound and continue to keep Swiss franc investments unattractive. The low interest rate level and the relatively strong growth of monetary aggregates currently do not represent a threat to price stability. Once a sustained economic recovery becomes discernible, we shall have to review our monetary policy and adjust it to the new circumstances.
Tomaskovic-Devey, D, Thomas, M and Johnson, K (2005), 'Race and the Accumulation of Human Capital across the Career: A Theoretical Model and Fixed Effects Application', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 111, No. 1, pp. 58-89. Wagner, I (2018), ‘Certified Equality: The Icelandic Equal Pay Standard’, Institute for Social Research Weichselbaumer, D and Winter-Ebmer, R (2005), 'A Meta-Analysis of the International Gender Wage Gap', Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 479-511. 40  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  40

I am confident CIFF would embed a culture that places unequivocal commitment to professionalism and ethics that would raise the prestige of the Islamic finance industry and its practitioners. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Caleb M Fundanga: Improving financial inclusion in Zambia Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Celpay Mobile Banking Conference, Lusaka, 16-17 September 2009. *  *  *  The Chairman of the Board, Celpay Zambia, Dr Jacob Mwanza; The Chief executive Officer, Celpay International, Mr L. Muchenje; Chief Executive Officers and Representatives of Banks and Financial Institutions present; Distinguished Invited Guests and Resource Persons; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen I wish to express my gratitude to Celpay Zambia Limited and in particular to Dr Jacob Mwanza, the Chairman of the Board, for inviting me to speak at this important conference. I am informed that the conference aims to pave the way for the future of mobile banking in the quest to improve financial inclusion in our country. Mr Chairman, the need to promote wider access to financial services through innovative products by financial institutions and other market players cannot be overemphasized. Financial services are a critical tool to ensure that entrepreneurs step onto the economic growth ladder and create a brighter future by tapping their own creativity in income generating activities. The provision of financial services to the majority of our people especially the small and micro entrepreneurs who are financially excluded is a key element in alleviating poverty in the country. Improved access to financial services enables availability of funds for investment in income generating activities that ensure that the public lay a foundation for better standards of living.

Mobile banking will lead to increased outreach, increased efficiency and productivity as well as increased returns for businesses. Let me once again assure you, Mr. Chairman that, the Bank of Zambia is committed to providing an enabling environment through appropriate regulation for banks and financial businesses that wish to promote financial inclusion. We appreciate the Mobile Banking initiative by Celpay Zambia Limited and look forward to greater investment in financial inclusion in our beloved country. I thank you. BIS Review 111/2009  3
The second is that when the Fed ultimately raises the rate it pays on excess reserves, it will be providing a subsidy to the banks. IOER is not a subsidy to the banks.14 In attracting deposits or other liabilities, competition among banks15 will ensure that higher interest payments to banks on their reserves will be passed through to bank liability holders. I look forward to the day when the economy is strong enough for us to raise the interest rate on excess reserves. When that happens, deposit rates will also rise. That will be important because ultra-low rates have been a burden for many seniors and others heavily reliant on this kind of income. When we raise the IOER, it will be my mother and my mother-in-law and others like them, not bankers, who will mainly benefit. The third concern is the notion that the Federal Reserve will be slow to tighten monetary policy because this will reduce the amount of our remittances to the Treasury. This does not add up. The Fed is a central bank, not an asset management company – our commitment is to our dual mandate economic objectives – not maximizing net income or remittances. 14  When the Fed creates reserve balances, banks are forced to either add deposits or other liabilities to match the increase in their assets, or reduce other assets, by selling off securities, for example. In either of these responses, banks experience a cost of managing their reserves.

A critical front in this battle is the leveraging of technology and data. Banks need to use available data to improve their predictive analysis, not just for operational efficiency and planning, but also for insights into customer behavior and preferences. What is particularly surprising to me is that banks, though custodians of vast quantities of customer and transactions data, are not utilizing it effectively. Banks will need to change the way they segment customers, not by their income levels or types of accounts, but potentially by their life cycle, growth potential, and behavior patterns. Data analysis can provide a bank with actionable insights into multiple factors that impact its business, allowing it to improve its strategic and operational decision-making. Moreover, banks will need to overhaul their operations, accelerate end-to-end digitization, modernize their technology infrastructure, and transition towards digital channels. McKinsey estimates that banks worldwide could save more than $ billion a year in direct costs by shifting traditional customers to digital platforms, reducing the service cost by 80 to 90%. By winning the battle for efficiency, banks will not only be able to better engage with customers and achieve higher satisfaction rates, but also curtail operational cost. Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  - 12 -  iv. Battle for Resilience Winning the battles for customer loyalty, value and efficiency will help banks to grow and remain relevant. But that growth should not compromise banks’ soundness or sustainability. This bring us to the fourth battle: the battle for resilience.
Recognising the risk of self-fulfilling cycles, the ECB reacted quickly and forcefully by launching the pandemic emergency purchase programme. The message we sent was clear: there are no limits to our commitment to the euro. And that message holds true today. Equally important was the response by governments. The decision to launch Next Generation EU (NGEU) was a clear demonstration of European unity that broke with the past in many ways. Its size of € billion; its structure, which benefits most those worst hit by the pandemic; and its funding via European common debt – all represented a watershed. As a result, I believe that the intrinsic fragility of the euro area has now declined. Europe has proven that it will come together and take decisive action when needed. This is what the euro crisis taught us about how crises must be managed: they require the commitment of all policymakers for the benefit of all Europeans. The importance of policy alignment The euro crisis in turn led to a third, more slow-moving crisis. Europe slipped into a period of what I termed at the time “lowflation”: a persistent low-growth, low-inflation environment. This gave rise to the third lesson I want to underline: the importance of a balanced policy mix. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  When inflation is low and interest rates fall towards zero, the optimal policy mix changes. Monetary policy becomes more effective in lifting demand when fiscal policy reinforces it. In the mid-2010s, however, the euro area saw the opposite happen.

Three factors of uncertainty come into the picture: -  first, there is by essence a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the assessment of misalignments, related to their equilibrium prices and the channels of transmission to the real economy;  -  second, central banks have to keep in mind the balance of risks facing the economy: a monetary policy action that would reduce the risk of a large loss in the future might be very costly for the economy in the short run;  -  third, the effects of monetary policy decisions on asset prices are very uncertain. •  The announcement of a systematic reaction could therefore lead to moral hazard and undermine the central bank’s anti-inflationist credibility, which is its most precious asset. Moreover, the single interest rate policy cannot be geared simultaneously towards two potentially conflicting objectives. c.  Be aggressive or experiment  There may be two cases where gradualism is not the systematic guideline. •  Worst-case outcomes may best be prevented by following policy rules that are rather aggressive in responding to inflation deviations from target. •  A more aggressive policy rule may generate more information, which would improve the learning of the central bank and thereby future policy performance. But the learning process might be costly since it could generate increased volatility. 2. Some approaches to address uncertainty  a. Rely on monetary policy rules  •  Simple monetary policy rules (like the Taylor rule) may perform well in many different models.
Increased public spending may push up the cost of labour and stem the flow of labour to other exposed industries. When the economy turns down, with a pronounced rise in unemployment, fiscal policy can help support economic activity. But the Norwegian economy is still far from being in a crisis situation. Unemployment remains low. The international economic picture is mixed Six years have now passed since the global economy was severely hit by the financial crisis. The Norwegian economy quickly rebounded, supported by robust public finances and strong growth in the petroleum sector. Other advanced economies have experienced a more difficult time (see Chart 9). Excessive debt, in both the private and public sector, has led to weak activity and high unemployment in many of those countries. Global growth can be expected to pick up gradually over the coming years. The fall in oil prices is a positive factor for the world economy. But the picture is mixed. In the US, the recovery is on a firm footing. An expansionary monetary policy appears to be having the intended effect and both consumption and investment have turned up again. Unemployment has come down. The federal budget deficit has been substantially reduced partly thanks to higher economic activity. Developments in the UK and Sweden, two of Norway’s major export markets, have also been positive, although inflation remains a challenge. The situation in the euro area appears to be more problematic. A large portion of the workforce is idle alongside production equipment. Inflation is worryingly low.

But should oil prices concurrently fall, that path may narrow. Moreover, labour costs in Norway have reached high levels. The cost level in the business sector has increased sharply in relation to our trading partners (see Chart 5). With lower activity and earnings from the petroleum sector, oil service companies must seek inroads into other markets, which may be demanding with a high cost level. Substantial oil revenues and spillovers from the oil sector have driven up house prices and household debt. Debt has risen markedly faster than income. The debt burden on both younger and older households has increased, but the burden on younger households is heaviest (see Chart 6). Today’s households of age 30 have an average debt equivalent to three times their disposable income. Ten years ago, the burden on households of the same age was substantially lower. Households have borrowed heavily to buy primary and secondary homes, possibly on the expectation of continued high income growth. The price of an average dwelling has almost doubled over the past ten years, with the sharpest rise in cities located near oil industry areas. High debt levels give rise to vulnerabilities. The risk of default on residential mortgages, with large direct losses for banks, is nonetheless small. We have a solid social safety net, which provides an assurance in the event of income shortfalls. But in the case of a downturn that leads to higher unemployment, the high debt levels will prove uncomfortable for many households.
In this respect, and in what, in my view, should be the third main defining principle of Spanish fiscal policy in the coming years, public resources should be geared towards those uses or initiatives that have the most capacity to increase future economic growth. Apart from certain support measures that may be necessary in the short term, it is vital that economic policy in general, and budgetary policy in particular, are geared towards achieving the structural transformation of the Spanish economy, to correct some of the shortcomings that have accompanied us in recent decades and to ensure that we are not left behind in the profound changes that are taking place worldwide, including in terms of the level of globalisation, digitalisation and ecological transformation of our economy. Lastly, it is advisable that budgetary policy, rather than promoting initiatives that involve acquiring future payment commitments that will drive up our structural deficit, instead encourages temporary increases in the deficit, concentrated on items that can boost our growth potential in the medium term. I will refer repeatedly to these basic principles later. 2 Draft State and Social Security Budget for 2021 In this section I wish to offer my assessment of the main revenue and expenditure measures included in the Draft Budget, of the general budgetary policy stance envisaged for 2021, and of expected developments in Spanish government debt.

The third aspect of our financial reform is market discipline. ·  We recognise that sound corporate governance, both in banks and their borrowers, will provide discipline from within, while public disclosure will allow market force to discipline the financial institutions from the outside. ·  We will launch a new Directors’ Handbook for the financial community, which will further encourage understanding and motivation behind good governance, and we will also endeavour to improve the transparency of appointment and compensation. Ladies and gentlemen,  BIS Review 70/2001  5  The last challenge I want to share with you is the strengthening of the Bank of Thailand to meet future challenges. The crisis of 1997 brought to light weakness in Thailand’s financial management. The Bank of Thailand like most central banks in the region, have had to go through sea of changes in the wake of the crisis, and undergo intensive reform of its operation and organization. Three areas of change in particular that stands out as our major achievements are internal reorganization, strengthening the framework for monetary policy under inflation targeting, and enhancing communication and transparency of operation. At the onset of the crisis, the Bank of Thailand underwent major restructuring in the organization structure, data management and work process. These were aimed to ensure the good foundation in our decision-making process particularly with monetary policy implementation and financial institution supervision.
As well as extensive changes to risk-weighted capital requirements, the Basel Committee has published standards for a leverage ratio requirement, liquidity requirements and large exposures limits. 1  This is a count of publications by the Basel Committee of the publication type ‘Standards’. Where a standard was published in the period and subsequently superseded by another standard within the same period both standards are counted. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  In the United Kingdom, we have also developed a range of domestic reforms reflecting the importance of the banking system as a share of our economy. 2  These reforms range from the development and implementation of a new institutional framework for macroprudential policy to deal with threats to financial stability, to the design of microprudential remuneration rules that better align risk-taking incentives with variable pay, to the Senior Managers and Certification Regime aimed at improving individual accountability at PRA-authorised institutions. We have also undertaken structural reform to protect retail payments and lending to households and businesses from shocks to other parts of banking groups specialising in serving wholesale customers. We are well on track to deliver structural reform in January 2019, including higher capital buffers for ring-fenced banks. Yesterday, the PRA issued for consultation proposals to implement leverage ratio requirements and buffers for ring-fenced banks whose groups are required already to meet leverage ratio 3  requirements on a consolidated basis, and to reflect these higher leverage buffers in group capital.

The typical level of client initial margin for OTC derivatives held by a large clearing member is over $  34  If clients representing  half of the initial margin port, and the others are closed out and lose their entire initial margin, the loss to these clients collectively would exceed $ (Clearly we cannot know what the actual losses would be in any particular event, but we do know that the sums at risk are substantial). The financial stability benefits would have to be set against any possible costs. The risk-weighted capital ratio rather than the leverage ratio is the dominant constraint for many large clearing members. This means that for these firms a change in the leverage ratio to allow initial margin to offset exposure is unlikely to change their resilience at all. But even were a large clearing member to be constrained by the leverage ratio, the effect on capital – and hence on resilience – is small. For instance, for a typical large clearing member, the effect is to change the probability of default estimated by a model that has been used previously by Bank staff to inform discussions about the calibration of capital requirements  35  by between 0 and 8 bps. This takes the probability of default of  this typical clearing member from 1.2% to 1.28% at worst. This illustrates how different pieces of analysis and evidence could be brought together to assess objectively the case for making a dynamic adjustment to an aspect of banking regulation.