samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Meanwhile, considering that the problems in the global economy have not been completely eliminated despite recent improvements, I would like to remind you that as we have already pointed out, policy rates may need to be kept at current levels for a while and may need to follow a low course for an extended period. In the first quarter of 2010, central banks mostly implemented exit strategies from expansionary monetary policies and therefore the global monetary policy outlook became partially tighter. In the said quarter, a limited number of central banks tightened their monetary policy stance by increasing policy rates, while most of them kept their rates unchanged at low levels. In the meantime, these central banks started to terminate the expansionary monetary policy implementations, which are conducted with the use of unconventional policy tools. Accordingly, while drawing attention to the risks regarding pricing behaviors and taking account of the normalization in both money and credit markets; we decided to gradually withdraw some of the measures taken in the foreign exchange and Turkish lira markets during the crisis. Owing to the importance that we attach to transparency and predictability, I would like to remind you that we informed the public about the general framework of our exit strategy in our Press Release of 14 April 2010, before putting the strategy into practice. 3. Inflation and monetary policy outlook  Now, I would like to share with you the monetary and financial conditions, as well as the economic outlook underlying our forecasts.

In this respect, the CBT has delivered sizeable cuts in policy rates, while providing liquidity support to facilitate the smooth operation of credit markets. Accordingly, policy rates were cut by 1025 basis points between November 2008 and November 2009. Considering the favorable developments in credit markets and the moderate recovery in economic activity, the Monetary Policy Committee (the Committee) has kept policy rates constant since December 2009 (Table 1). Following the policy rate cuts implemented by the CBT since November 2008, market rates have plummeted to historic lows since the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 18). The stable course of market rates had implications on medium-term real rates in this period (Figure 19). Lower policy rates and stabilizing liquidity measures continued to be effective on money and credit markets during the first quarter of 2010. In this context, while consumer loan rates remained at historic lows, commercial loan rates continued to decline in the first quarter as  well (Figure 20). With the easing of financial conditions, the expansionary impact of CBT’s monetary policy has become more pronounced in this period. As I have just mentioned, the pronounced elevation in inflation since the last quarter of 2009 had adverse effects on inflation expectations. Therefore, taking account of the adverse effects of the high inflation levels on expectations, albeit temporary, the Central Bank signaled the transition to a more cautious stance as of March.
In such a situation, it is a case of using all the means at your disposal to ensure that you stay on the road and do not fall into the ditch. What the road looks like 50 meters further ahead is highly uncertain and, in effect, less important. Once you are back relatively safely on the road your speed will be very low and you will be able to look ahead and try to return to more normal driving. In the upturn: patterns had been broken, parallels with previous crises Thanks to resolute action on the part of central banks and other authorities the crisis entered a less acute phase. However, the financial markets were still not functioning effectively and support measures were still needed. But, a total collapse had been avoided and it was possible to see signs of a normalisation on some financial markets. Nevertheless, the situation was highly uncertain. It was also difficult to assess the real economy. Did the major falls in GDP in Sweden and abroad mean that potential GDP had declined? In many countries the households had experienced substantial falls in house prices. To what extent would the need of the households to strengthen their balance sheets mean that consumption would decline and that the ability of monetary policy to stimulate the economy would be weakened?5 It was clear that the economic patterns that prevailed before the financial crisis had largely been broken.

My point here is that if somewhere at the back of your head you have a preconceived idea of how a crisis should develop then it is easy to miss signals that may indicate that the course of the crisis is moving in a different direction. 5  If the households need to consolidate their balance sheets then an expansionary monetary policy may be less effective as the households will be less inclined to take new loans. Such a situation is sometimes called a balance sheet recession. Lars Nyberg discussed balance sheet recessions in more detail in the speech “After the crisis – new thoughts on monetary policy” which was published on 6 December 2010. 6  See Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff, (2008), “Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison”. NBER Working Paper No. 13761. 7  There are studies that indicate that the recovery after a financial crisis is slower if the crisis was preceded by low growth, see Cecchetti S., M. Kohler and C. Upper (2009),”Financial Crises and Economic Activity” NBER Working Paper 15379. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Some personal reflections on forecasting The things I have said about forecasts so far are fairly general observations that I believe my colleagues on the Executive Board would essentially agree with, even though they would probably express themselves differently. In this concluding part of the speech I would therefore like to take up some aspects of forecasting that are perhaps more personal.
Mario Draghi: Inauguration of the new ECB premises Speech by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the inauguration of the new ECB premises, Frankfurt am Main, 18 March 2015. *  *  *  Deputy Minister President Mr. Al-Wazir, Lord Mayor Mr. Feldmann, Former President of the ECB, dear Jean-Claude Trichet, Fellow and former members of the Governing Council, Former Lord Mayor, Mrs. Roth, Honorary citizen, Mr. von Metzler, Head of the Jewish Community, Mr Korn, Heir of the Grossmarkthalle architects, Mr. Elsaesser, and Mr. Prix, the famous architect of our new house Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to welcome you all today to the inauguration of the new European Central Bank headquarters. Creating our new home is a project as old as the ECB itself. It began in 1998 with the search for a suitable site. In 2001 we found that site here at the Grossmarkthalle. A year later, an international competition was launched for the best architectural design, which was eventually won by Wolf Prix and his team. And in May 2010 the foundation stone was laid and the main construction works started. Many people, some of them here today, have worked tirelessly over this period to make this project a reality. I would like to thank everybody involved for such tremendous work. The euro, our single currency, has become the most tangible symbol of European integration – a piece of Europe accessible and valuable to each and every one of us.

It reflects what they have in common, now and in the future.” Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Investors’ disagreement and uncertainty about the overall stance of monetary policy will reflect their views on the future evolution of both the federal funds rate and the SOMA  5  See, for example, Question 8 in the January 2013 Survey of Primary Dealers. 6  The measures of forecast uncertainty and disagreement discussed here are based on Rich and Tracy (2006) and Wallis (2004, 2005). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  portfolio. One way to get a sense of the overall level of policy uncertainty is to convert the SOMA portfolio into “fed funds equivalents”.7 With this translation, it is possible to estimate the hypothetical level of the federal funds rate that would provide a similar amount of monetary policy accommodation as both the actual level of the federal funds rate and the size of the SOMA portfolio. Figure 2 shows the disagreement and uncertainty around this measure of policy uncertainty 12 months in the future. Disagreement about current policy is quite low relative to the past few years, which likely reflects the effect of forward guidance on expectations about the federal funds rate and the relatively low disagreement about the size of the portfolio that I mentioned earlier. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is relatively high and larger than the amount of disagreement. Since there is very little uncertainty about the level of the federal funds rate one year from now, most of this effect comes from uncertainty about the size of the portfolio.

The structure of the current purchase program reflects the Committee’s expressed intention to provide policy accommodation as necessary to improve the outlook for the labor market and allows the FOMC’s policy response to adjust over time in response to incoming information. The flexibility to adjust purchases is useful given our relatively limited experience  1  The FOMC also directed the Desk to reinstate its previous policy of rolling over maturing Treasury holdings into new issues. See the Desk’s Frequently Asked Questions for more information. In practice, the amount of maturing proceeds will be quite small over the next several years, since nearly all securities maturing within the next three years were sold or redeemed as part of the MEP. 2  The current par value of the portfolio excludes about $ billion of agency MBS trades scheduled to settle in the future. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  with the balance sheet as a monetary policy tool and the uncertainty about the policy’s effects. Of course, previous asset programs have also been conditioned on the FOMC’s assessment of the economy and its evolving views on the efficacy and costs of purchases. For example, the September 2011 FOMC announcement, in which the Committee introduced the MEP, noted that “the Committee will regularly review the size and composition of its securities holdings and is prepared to adjust those holdings as appropriate”.
When the Bank was founded in 1968, Malta formed part of the sterling area, reflecting its past as a British colony and its strong ties with the United Kingdom. When the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1972, the Maltese monetary authorities decided to break the exclusive link with the pound sterling and to peg the lira to a trade-weighted basket of currencies. During the 1980s the composition of the basket was revised on several occasions until, in 1989, the number of component currencies was reduced to three, the ECU - which had replaced several European currencies - the pound sterling and the US dollar. In 2002, the weight of the euro was raised to 70%, while those of the dollar and the pound were set at 20% and 10%, respectively. Following Malta’s accession to the European Union, in May 2004, the authorities resolved to move swiftly to adopt the euro. A year later, the Maltese lira entered Exchange Rate Mechanism Mark II (ERM II) with a unilateral commitment by the Maltese authorities to maintain its value unchanged at the central parity rate. This central parity rate then became the conversion rate between the Maltese lira and the euro when Malta adopted the single currency at the beginning of 2008. In effect, Malta has moved from a currency union with the pound sterling to membership of the euro area, with a period characterised by a basically fixed exchange rate in between.

The diverging competitiveness is a consequence of various factors and policies as well as of market adjustment mechanisms, which in some cases reflect rigidities in labour markets and the low degree of integration and competition in certain product markets, particularly for services. The persistence of these developments suggests that adjustment mechanisms are functioning slowly and that self-equilibrating forces are not sufficiently strong. The extent and the cumulative effects of differences in competitiveness between some euro area countries raise concerns about their impact on growth. In addition, other factors – some exogenous, such as competitive pressures resulting from globalisation, and some internal, influencing consumer sentiment – affect economic activity and tend to compound the adverse effects of the erosion of competitiveness in some countries or partly offset the benefits from the increased competitiveness attained in other countries. A better understanding of the factors and processes that determine economic fluctuations, inflation persistence and competitiveness developments across the euro area countries will contribute to the diagnosis of the present situation and the assessment of future trends. Two papers in this workshop provide insights and useful results to this end. The extent of synchronisation of economic activity in Europe is examined in the paper by Domenico Giannone and Lucrezia Reichlin, which evaluates long-run tendencies and cyclical fluctuations. Different growth trends may be due to different patterns of specialisation, which can be desirable within the monetary union provided that countries can share risk through capital market integration.
For this to be the case, however, an individual who is convicted of illegal activities, or who violates a firm’s code of conduct would need to face the risk of being permanently denied employment in the financial industry. Rather than paying for the performance bond upfront, the bond is posted in terms of the privilege to continue to work in the industry. There are several steps that can be taken to implement this concept. The first step is to make it more difficult for employees in finance who cross ethical boundaries to be able to move from one firm to another in order to escape the consequences. Currently, lenders who are considering making a loan to a borrower can look up the borrower’s credit score which reflects the borrower’s performance on past loans. In a similar manner, it would be helpful if financial firms, prior to making a hiring decision, could look up a candidate’s “ethics and compliance score” that reflects the individual’s past performance at other financial firms. Along these lines, one approach would be to create a central registry that tracks the hiring and firing of traders and other financial professionals across the industry. There would be many details to sort out regarding how to do this in a manner that was both transparent and consistent with due process. The database could be maintained by the official sector – specifically, by financial institution supervisors – based on information provided by supervised financial institutions.

Rodrigo Vergara: Macroeconomic and financial stability – challenges for monetary policy Opening remarks by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the XVI Annual Conference on “Central banking, analysis and economic policies” of the Central Bank of Chile, Santiago de Chile, 15 November 2012. *  *  *  I thank Sofia Bauducco, Gonzalo Castex, Maria Consuelo Edwards, Luis Oscar Herrera, Kevin Cowan, and Claudio Raddatz for helpful comments. Good morning. Welcome to the Central Bank of Chile’s sixteenth annual conference on Central Banking, Analysis and Economic Policies. This year’s version is about “Macroeconomic and Financial Stability: Challenges for monetary policy.” We are expecting two exciting days of learning and discussion on topics at the forefront of academic and policy research on macroeconomic and financial stability. The interaction between academics and policy makers fostered by this conference provides an important opportunity to learn from each other and share views and experiences that will help us improve our policy decisions and hopefully go home with new ideas for research. Today and tomorrow we will reflect on the role of central banks in preventing and reacting to financial exuberance and financial crises. The discussion will focus on two important policy questions: first, did the conduct of conventional monetary policy before the crisis contribute to shaping it? And second, how should monetary policy react to a crisis? In particular, we will discuss the efficacy of conventional monetary and macro-prudential policy action in ameliorating the effects of financial crises.
The Riksbank's losses do not reflect the overall result The Riksbank's task is not to generate profits. Our mandate is to maintain permanently low and stable inflation and also to contribute to a balanced development of production and employment. The bond purchases made prior to the pandemic were part of the expansionary monetary policy that would safeguard the credibility of the inflation target. In addition, during the pandemic, the intention was to support the real economy by ensuring that credit provision continued to function. An evaluation of our asset purchases cannot therefore be based solely on the financial gains or losses that have arisen on the Riksbank's balance sheet. One needs to examine, among other things, how government finances were affected. 32 Until the end of last year, the government bonds we purchased in phase 1 had increased in value. Unrealised  value increases of SEK 9 billion were therefore recorded in revaluation accounts, see Table 4. 33 These calculations are based on the cash flows that have so far been generated for each bond purchased, combined with a market valuation at current prices of the bonds that have not yet matured. The calculation can therefore be seen as the final result of the purchases, assuming that the remaining holding is sold today. 18 [30]  Two examples of questions that need to be answered are: Did the government's borrowing costs fall? Did growth and employment in the economy rise, so that state tax revenues increased?

For example, 70 per cent of respondents in the Riksbank's financial market survey believe that the securities purchases have contributed negatively or very negatively to the functioning of the market. However, the costs of such negative side effects are hardly comparable to the value of avoiding a prolonged recession. The losses in the first purchasing phase are offset by gains for the state Nevertheless, I would like to try to evaluate the narrower and more direct effects of our purchases of government bonds, purchases which were largely decided prior to the pandemic. In Flodén (2016) I tried to make such an evaluation of the initial purchases.34 My calculations then indicated that the purchases of government bonds in phase 1 led to the government's costs for new borrowing via treasury bills and government bonds falling by approximately SEK 7 billion in 20152017. The reason was that the rate on these securities was pushed down about 0.3 percentage points below the policy rate. 34 Kjellberg and Åhl (2022) present this type of update, based on market prices in April 2022. Their calculations  indicate that the overall effects on government finances will be positive, despite the losses on the Riksbank's balance sheet. In a similar assessment, the Reserve Bank of Australia notes that while their purchases during the pandemic are now leading to substantial financial losses and probably a negative capital for the Bank, the total value of purchases is nevertheless higher than the costs (Bullock, 2022).
Ladies and Gentlemen, in August 2011, the Swiss franc was massively overvalued, according to any yardstick. In addition, in practically the same period, the international economic environment had become noticeably gloomier. This situation presented an acute risk to our economy, as well as carrying the threat of a deflationary trend. Consequently, the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  SNB reacted fast and announced an unscheduled interest rate reduction on 3 August. In addition, from this moment onwards, it increased the supply of Swiss franc liquidity by a hitherto unprecedented amount, in several steps, with the aim of weakening the Swiss currency. Overall, the liquidity measures achieved the expected results. They brought about significantly lower interest rates in the Swiss franc money market – interest rates that were, at times, even negative. This tended to weaken the attractiveness of Swiss franc investments. Thus the upward trend of the Swiss franc against the euro was checked for the time being. However, the exchange rate remained very volatile, due to the persistence of negative reports from abroad, and at the end of August the Swiss franc appreciated again. In this market environment, which was extremely uncertain and nervous because of the European debt crisis, the liquidity measures were ultimately insufficient to halt the appreciation of the Swiss franc. In recognition of this fact, the SNB decided to introduce a measure which was exceptional in every respect. On 6 September, the SNB set a minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro.

But everything is relative and I believe it’s not difficult to spot black holes, mistaken notions and errors of understanding on both sides. While these Tertulias are usually an opportunity to overcome some of these problems, they most importantly allow us to understand our respective stances on current, important or pressing issues. And we also enjoy ourselves. Because, unlike other meetings, the Tertulias are, from my experience, a rather entertaining event. I still have fond memories of the meetings I attended and the discussions we had in the now distant 1990s in Santiago de Compostela, in Seville, in Santander and also in Oxford and in Edinburgh. The Tertulias were instituted at what was a key time in recent European history: the disappearance of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the start of the European Monetary Union project. Next came the great economic expansion at the onset of the 21st century, the international financial crisis and the serious economic problems that have affected all of us, Spain and the United Kingdom included. The European Union and the Monetary Union are today at a difficult crossroads. They face a problem which, when the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated, we knew might arise: that the Monetary Union without fiscal integration would be an edifice with weak foundations. And although attempts were made to head off the risk with public deficit and debt rules, it was known that these were merely shoring up the building and that they could not resolve its fundamental weakness.