samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Most recently, we still see a sizeable contribution from FDI and long term borrowing by banks and non-financial corporates, whereas portfolio inflows have been relatively weak. The share of long term debt in total debt has been increasing steadily. The banks and firms are able to roll their debt comfortably, and the roll-over ratios are still above 100%. Figure 8. Financing of Current Account Deficit (12 Month Cumulative, Billion USD) 100 80 60 40 20 0 -20 FDI and Long Term  Portfolio and Short Term  CAD 11.16  02.16  05.15  08.14  11.13  02.13  05.12  08.11  11.10  02.10  05.09  08.08  11.07  02.07  -40  *Long term inflows are sum of banking and real sectors’ long term net credit and bonds issued by banks and the Treasury. Short term capital movements are sum of banking and real sectors' short term net credit and deposits in banks. Source: CBRT. 5  Dear Participants, Now, let me turn to inflation developments. In the past few months, we have observed a marked increase in the CPI inflation, while the core inflation indicators have shown a milder upward movement (Figure 9). The main driver of inflation in the most recent data was unprocessed food prices, most of which can largely be attributed to adverse weather conditions. Tax hikes and the exchange rate passthrough have also had a visible impact on inflation in recent months.

7 Dovern, J. and G. Kenny (2017), “The long-term distribution of expected inflation in the euro area: what has  changed since the great recession?”, ECB Working Paper No. 1999. 8 See Kozlowski, J., L. Veldkamp and V. Venkateswaran (2015), “The Tail that Wags the Economy: Beliefs and  Persistent Stagnation”, NBER Working Paper No. 21719. The authors argue that if people base their beliefs on past realisations, then extreme, albeit transitory, events can generate persistent changes in our cognitive framework. 9 See e.g. Gerba, E. and D. Żochowski (2017), “Knightian uncertainty and credit cycles”, ECB Working Paper No  2068. 10 See e.g. Benigno, G. and L. Fornaro (2017), “Stagnation traps”, ECB Working Paper No 2038. 11 See Rossi, B., T. Sekhposyany and M. Souprez (2017), “Understanding the Sources of Macroeconomic  6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Uncertainty”, Barcelona GSE Working Paper No 920. 12 See e.g. ECB (2017), Financial Stability Review, May and November. 13 See e.g. Draghi, M. (2017), “Accompanying the economic recovery”, speech at the ECB Forum on Central  Banking, Sintra, 27 June. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
But it is testimony to the strong credentials that Carney brought to these jobs: •  a solid academic grounding – with a PhD in Economics from Oxford University;  •  extensive experience in the private sector – having spent more than a decade at Goldman Sachs;  •  a background in public policy – working on a variety of economic issues at the Canadian Department of Finance; and  •  most important, a commitment to serve the larger good of society. •  Carney’s topic today is The Future of Financial Reform. He is uniquely well placed to talk about this, having lived and breathed financial reforms in the aftermath of the Crisis, especially as the Chairman of the Financial Stability Board. •  Under Carney’s leadership, the FSB has worked intensely to correct the fault lines that led to the Global Financial Crisis. •  The FSB, in partnership with various standard setting bodies, has presided over perhaps one of the boldest and most far-reaching set of regulatory reforms in recent memory. •  We look forward to hearing from Carney the progress and implications of that work, the new risks emerging on the financial horizon, and the forward agenda of the FSB. I have had the pleasure and privilege of working with Mark at many international meetings over the last three-and-a-half years, at the BIS, the FSB, and the IMF. There are many smart central bankers on the international circuit. There are also many sharp financial regulators.

In practice this means that non-financial companies may obtain funds by issuing and selling certificates to the banks, which in turn use them as collateral for loans from the Riksbank. This credit facility is also available through an auction, where the minimum rate is the current repo rate plus a premium. Since it is mainly large companies that issue certificates, it is they that will benefit directly from the advantages of these facilities. But since banks can increase their liquidity by using the certificates to borrow from the Riksbank, there is less risk of them cutting back on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises that are directly dependent on bank financing. The way ahead? When the dust after the crisis has settled, we face a major task. We must carefully analyse the crisis and determine the areas in which supervision, regulations, etc. need to be  4  BIS Review 140/2008  tightened up and in which areas the problems are best solved by players from the finance industry. Crises create space and acceptance for necessary reforms. At the same time, extreme situations such as this always generate demands for extreme measures. Careful deliberation is therefore important before implementing new regulations. It is all too easy to go too far and implement regulations that are too far-reaching and extensive. Such regulations could control and conserve market structures for a long time to come or involve major costs that reduce efficiency. This crisis will need follow-up care.
This is equivalent to 16% of the GDP of these economies, or nearly $ per citizen.2 But, this is only a lower bound of the cost of the crisis. If we also include the impact on GDP and the loss of production relative to its pre-crisis trend, the costs rise. This has been showed by several studies, including the one just mentioned by IMF economists, which estimates that banking crises that occurred between 1970 and 2000 are resulting in output losses of more than 20% on average if we look at all countries, and more than 30% of GDP in advanced economies.3 These results are in line with the BIS finding that the median discounted cumulative loss of output over the course of a crisis in the same period was about 19% of pre-crisis GDP.4 Now, the question of exactly how much regulation leads to the optimal outcome in terms of long-term growth is, of course, debatable. But let me underline that ambitious attempts have been made by the BIS, but also the OECD and others, to assess the net effect of recent regulatory reform measures, and the results generally point in one direction: that the net effect of reforms is positive. In addition, let me also underline that the Basel Committee has not been blind and deaf to the worries expressed by the industry about excessive regulation. Many adjustments have been made, not least when it comes to the new liquidity regulation.

The issue here is not only the financial effort involved, but also the difficulty, from a political perspective, to explain to the public the need for a financial contribution to mechanisms benefiting wealthier countries for the time being. A case in point is the fall of the Radičová cabinet in Slovakia in 2011. Euro adoption – a conclusion In my view, euro adoption is in the best interest of EU Member States in the long run – given the high degree of business cycle correlation and market integration –, but several essential preconditions, added to the nominal criteria, need to be cumulatively fulfilled in order to make the most of these benefits. I have been on this job long enough to remember a time when the dominant view was that fulfilling nominal convergence criteria was enough for successful euro area membership. The paradigm appears to have shifted. First, the emphasis falls now on the sustainability of nominal criteria fulfilment. Second, achievement of a relatively high degree of income per capita convergence, prior to joining the euro area, is considered increasingly important, since too much catching-up in terms of real convergence poses the risk of more intricate economic cycle management in the absence of independent monetary policy. Third, another essential prerequisite is that the new institutional framework of the euro area has to prove its efficacy in preventing and addressing the imbalances menacing economic activity.
When banks' access to liquidity dried up on every market, this hit all banks, including those that are financially strong, like the Swedish banks. Many central banks around the world had been taking measures for some time to strengthen liquidity in banking systems but the Riksbank had not needed to act. The interbank market and other short-term markets had worked, though interest rates had climbed sharply. When  BIS Review 140/2008  1  the crisis had a more tangible impact on Sweden, the Riksbank also implemented a series of interventions. Meanwhile, central banks in the rest of the world continued with their interventions and governments approved crisis packages to guarantee financial stability. Against the backdrop of this summary of events in the financial sector over the past year, today I will speak about the effects of this financial crisis on the Riksbank's work of maintaining a safe and effective payments system. But first I would like to briefly describe how we carry out this work under normal circumstances. I will also conclude with a comment on the crisis’ effects on monetary policy. Work with financial stability under normal circumstances The task of maintaining a safe and effective payments system includes the role of the Riksbank as the banks' bank. This task includes maintaining the RIX payment system for payments in Swedish kronor. Participants in the system may borrow during the day and overnight to cover temporary deficits. The task also includes continuous oversight of the financial system.

We are in a situation in which there is hardly any conflict between inflation and real economic considerations in monetary policy. Our decision to lower the interest rate is guided by normal monetary policy considerations – in other words, "business as usual". BIS Review 140/2008  5  When we lowered the interest rate we also noted that the effect of the lower rate would probably be smaller than usual. This is because the confidence crisis in the financial system has led to high risk premiums whereby short-term market interest rates were disconnected from their normal relationship to the repo rate, as I described earlier. The reduction we implemented on 8 October did not lead to an immediate drop in interbank rates. Consequently the mortgage institutions' borrowing costs did not drop either, neither did interest rates for loans to end customers. This clearly illustrates how the impact of monetary policy is dependent on financial stability. Some closing thoughts The Riksbank has worked on two levels during the current crisis. Interest rates were cut to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis on the real economy. In addition, measures have been taken on an ongoing basis to improve the functioning of the financial markets and to support financial stability. The interest rate decisions have been based on essentially the same type of considerations as those on which monetary policy is usually based.
SPEECH  Measure Twice, Cut Once May 11, 2021 John C. Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer  Remarks at SOFR Symposium: The Final Year (Part II) (delivered via videoconference) As prepared for delivery It's a great pleasure once again to be sharing a platform with Andrew Bailey as we discuss the transition away from the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). While it's no surprise that our work often brings us together, Andrew and I have joined forces on this issue to such a great extent because the LIBOR transition is essential to the integrity of the global financial system. Given its ramifications for institutions, markets, and economies around the world, strong cooperation at the international level is of critical importance. As the saying goes, time flies, and it's hard to believe that we've reached 2021. It's been more than a decade since LIBOR has been exposed as a flawed and unreliable reference rate. And, with only 235 days until January 1, 2022, I am pleased to say that the endgame for LIBOR is clearly in sight.1 This transition has been a monumental feat. The enormous amount of progress was made possible by a significant and coordinated effort across the globe, as well as in the United States.

First, it sets out the evidence base on the benefits and costs of the current shareholder-centric model of companies. Second, it makes some tentative suggestions for reform which might tackle some of these costs. There are possible remedies on the table. Part of the solution to the shareholder shorttermism problem may come from mobilising and catalysing what is at present a dispersed, and too often disinterested, long-term investor base. The falling share of institutional investors in equity ownership, together with the rise of passive investment strategies, has exacerbated the trend towards “ownerless corporations”. This is a particular problem in the UK, given its relative lack of block shareholding. 55 Under the auspices of the Investment Association, an Investor Forum has been set up following the recommendations of John Kay’s review. 56 And, internationally, an initiative by asset managers called “Focussing Capital on the Long Term” is seeking some of the same objectives. 57 Ultimately, however, it is simply too soon to say whether any of these initiatives will mobilise and catalyse long-term investors sufficiently to exercise leverage over company management in ways which support long-term value creation. A second, complementary strand would be to seek to reinforce and broaden the “purpose” of companies, to better reflect their broader societal role – their role in serving stakeholders plural (employees, customers, clients) as well as shareholders. Some companies have been able to do so voluntarily by defining clearly their societal purpose and sticking with it.
It could be argued, too, that this is more likely an underestimation than an overestimation, as there is systemic positive bias in household inflation expectations and the breakeven inflation rate in the market entails risk premiums. The effect that the real rate has on domestic demand and inflation depends on what the equilibrium real rate is considered to be at any given time; that is, the real rate that neither stimulates nor dampens the economy. The equilibrium real rate has probably fallen in Iceland, as it has in most economies in the wake of the financial crisis, but exactly where it lies is highly uncertain. One of the Monetary Policy Committee’s tasks is to attempt to assess it. It is normal that Central Bank interest rate should rise above equilibrium when a positive output gap develops and inflation is above target, but neither is the case at present. That being so, it was appropriate to contain the rise in the real rate by lowering the Bank’s nominal interest rates. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Some will surely ask: Shouldn’t the Bank have lowered interest rates earlier? Hasn’t the monetary stance simply been too tight in the recent past? I don’t think this is the right time to dissect these questions, not least because many things look different in the rear-view mirror. As is said in Njáls saga, “Everything is ambiguous in retrospect.” That said, I think there are solid arguments in favour of a negative response to both questions.

There is uncertainty about the exchange rate, in connection with the settlement of the failed banks’ estates and the liberalisation of the capital controls. There is little I can say about that at this point, but the aim of the work the authorities are doing at present is to minimise that risk. It can be done, but it is a risky process, and one that could be derailed at many points along the way if great care is not taken – and perhaps even if great care is taken. And now I will turn to monetary policy. Yesterday the Monetary Policy Committee decided to lower Central Bank interest rates by 0.25 percentage points, in view of recent developments and the near-term outlook for inflation and the decline in inflation expectations, which I mentioned a moment ago. If the Bank’s interest rates had remained unchanged, its real rate would have been higher than is warranted by where we are in the economic cycle and by the near-term outlook, particularly in view of the fact that it could rise still further in coming months. Estimating the Central Bank’s real rate is not always a simple matter, as different measures of inflation and inflation expectations give differing results. According to an estimate based on the average of various measures of inflation and inflation expectations, the Bank’s real rate was about 2½% before the recent reduction, and it had risen by approximately a percentage point in the previous year, which is a large change in terms of real rates.
How to: MACROPRU. 5 principles for macroprudential policy Speech given by Alex Brazier, Executive Director for Financial Stability Strategy and Risk Member of the Financial Policy Committee  London School of Economics, Financial Regulation Seminar Monday 13 February 2017  I am grateful to David Aikman, Jonathan Bridges, Matthieu Chavaz, Angus Foulis, Rønnaug Johansen, Vasileios Madouros, Joseph Noss, Rachana Shanbhogue, Robert Sturrock and Jagdish Tripathy for their help in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is an honour to be here at this LSE London Financial Regulation Seminar. My theme this evening is macroprudential policy – the business of ensuring, through regulation, that the financial system can serve the real economy, in good times and bad. Macroprudential policy regimes are the child of the financial crisis; the institutional memory of the mistakes and behaviour that led to the crisis and that had such severe cost. And the LSE has been the scene of many important contributions to assessing what went wrong and to the building of the post-crisis regime, including from central bank governors, past and present. So I stand tonight on the shoulders of giants. But I want to simultaneously keep my feet firmly on the ground – on the practice of macroprudential policy. It’s now part of the framework of economic policy in the UK. Like monetary policy, it has a statutory policy committee to set it – the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England.

Bank Rate has been reduced by 4½ percentage points in the past six months. And this month the Bank began a series of asset purchases aimed at boosting the supply of money in the economy directly. In due course, this will act to expand money spending. In its entire 300 year history, the Bank of England has never acted so swiftly or extensively in response to an economic downturn. The second aspect of the required policy response is effective stabilisation of the banking system. The experience of those countries that have most successfully resolved banking problems, such as Sweden in the early 1990s, suggests that that will require uncertainty about the values of some of the more opaque assets on bank balance sheets to be dispelled. It will take many months to audit forensically the true state of those balance sheets and for some of the underlying macroeconomic uncertainty to dissipate. In the meantime governments have to stabilise the banking system by reassuring creditors in order to prevent the risk of either retail or wholesale runs of the kind we saw in the Panic of 2008. They have to subscribe sufficient equity capital – plain ordinary equity – in order to underpin the capital position of banks in the event of future losses.
The economic theory clearly refers to the fact that the financial system is a relevant factor for economic growth, and the new message, clearly sent by the recent crisis, as the president of the Bundesbank, Weidmann, once said in one of his recent addresses,1 is that there is a need of “well designed regulatory reform”. Otherwise, a financial system which is developed and widely globalized today could become an obstacle for the economic growth. Thus, even though the crisis is still present in our everyday life, the financial institutions have already been facing new banking standards, and the national regulators seek to incorporate them in the national regulation. The debt crisis in the euro area resulted in establishment of new fiscal framework of the European Union and emphasized the need of fiscal consolidation. Fiscal imbalances are not sustainable on a long run, which is a postulate that also applies to the countries of the region, particularly countries where fiscal consolidation is crucial for maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium. Besides the experiences above, during the crisis we also gained many other experiences related to the market sensitivity, the promptness of market response to the changes arising from the development of crisis, and the slow reversible process of regain of confidence among market participants. Lessons and experiences learnt from the crisis should help us face future challenges more successfully. 1  Jens Weidmann, president of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Keynote speech at the Frankfurt Finance Summit, Frankfurt, March 2012.

In periods of high or rapidly rising unemployment, the use of petroleum revenue can be increased, and, inversely, fiscal retrenchment is needed during periods of high economic activity and resource scarcity. 2 It now appears that capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy may return to a normal level in one and a half to two years – and with a somewhat lower unemployment rate than today. A different path can be met with an interest rate response. Our understanding of the fiscal rule is that the government budget for 2012 or at the latest for 2013 should aim at bringing down petroleum revenue spending to 4 per cent of the capital in the Pension Fund. The scale of petroleum revenue spending – growth in public expenditure – is important for developments in competitiveness, also referred to as the real krone exchange rate, in the long term. But, in the short term, the krone exchange rate can vary widely, and it depreciated in autumn 2008 when capital sought safe havens. This helped Norwegian manufacturing in the first phase of the downturn. Since then, the krone has appreciated considerably. In 2009 and 2010, government petroleum revenue spending shows a substantial increase and foreign investment via the Pension Fund a decrease. This leads to higher commercial demand for the Norwegian krone which directly contributes to its appreciation.