samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The weakening of the krone came to a halt in winter 2004. Again we started seeing signs of a stronger krone. At the same time, inflation remained low. We therefore placed emphasis on interest rate developments in other countries, and in May 2004 Norges Bank thus stated: “The inflation outlook in Norway implies that Norway should not be the frontrunner when other countries increase interest rates.”3 At the monetary policy meetings between September 2004 and February 2005, after key rates had been raised in several other counties, the formulation was changed to the following:”that we should lag behind other countries in adjusting interest rates to a more normal level.”4  3  See Norges Bank press release of 26 May 2004. 4  See press releases following the monetary policy meetings in the period between 22 September and 2 February 2005. BIS Review 38/2005  3  In February, we no longer used this formulation. The background for this is that central banks in other countries such as the US, Canada, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Switzerland had raised their key rates. Our closest neighbouring countries – Sweden and the euro-area countries – and Japan have left their key rates unchanged. On average, the key rates among our trading partners have increased by 0.3 percentage point during this business cycle.

Through it, among other things, we not only influence on the economic agents’ expectations and behavior, but ensure our transparency, as well, which is especially important because the central bank is an independent institution, and independence goes hand in hand with accountability. After all, transparency and accountability are the fundamental principles underlying our operations – they guarantee the preservation of the confidence and integrity of the National Bank. Moreover, the public confidence in us and in our capacity to deliver macroeconomic and financial stability is a sine qua non to our success. The communication of central banks is a dynamic category. Several decades ago, globally, central banks were closed institutions whose communication was extremely complex – clear and close only to certain groups that knew central banking well. As FED’s former Chairman Alan, Greenspan’s once said: “If I’ve made myself too clear, you must have misunderstood me”. But today, we, the central banks, operate in a world of openness and clarity and tend to be understandable in our public speaking. Particularly significant changes in communication have been evident in the last ten years since the beginning of the global economic and financial crisis. And not just through greater openness in communication, but also in the way central banks present themselves in their releases. This is not surprising, since we all, during the crisis, faced with high uncertainty, mistrust, and we started using instruments outside the conventional set of instruments. With regard to these changes, I would particularly emphasize the ECB’s example.
This annual expansionary fiscal impact poses a challenge to stabilisation policy in general and monetary policy in particular. Underlying real expenditure growth has exceeded mainland GDP for the last 4 years. Nominal growth in 2002 is 7 per cent. (The deflator, mainly wages, is 4½ per cent). Measured as a share of GDP, public expenditure is growing rapidly. In 2002 alone, this share will increase by some 2½ percentage points. According to the Revised National Budget, an increase in expenditure of 7 per cent this year will lead to an estimated growth in public sector consumption of only 1½ per cent. The rest will be spent on government transfers and wage growth. This is consistent with close adherence to the new fiscal guidelines. The new guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy were introduced simultaneously, and are not independent of each other. Fiscal policy is geared towards the phasing in of oil revenues; monetary policy has been given a more explicit responsibility for macroeconomic stabilisation. Monetary policy is to be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The inflation target is set at 2½ per cent. Monetary policy affects the economy with considerable and variable lags. The key rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment of the inflation outlook two years ahead. If it appears that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased.

The existence of abundant natural resources can be a mixed blessing. Experience elsewhere suggests that the sudden occurrence of major income flows tends to undermine future production potential. In the long term, it is difficult to ensure an efficient distribution of wealth between and within generations without triggering rent-seeking behaviour among households and firms. In the short term, the volatility in income flows and in terms of trade poses a challenge for monetary and fiscal policy. The mixed blessing of national wealth is not a new problem. Vigilant observers were already aware of this in the 17th century. In modern economic language, the Moroccan ambassador to Spain pointed to the problem of deteriorating competitiveness 300 years ago (see Chart 2). The main long-term challenge to economic policy is how the returns on petroleum wealth can be phased into the economy without a deterioration of our future growth potential. Even with our substantial petroleum reserves, human capital is by far our most important resource. It accounts for over 80 per cent of Norway’s national wealth (present value of future labour). Income from oil and gas is transferred to financial assets through the government budget. These transfers are large in terms of GDP, but still minor compared with our human capital. Oil and gas reserves account for about 7 percent of national wealth today, whereas in 2030 these reserves will be reduced to only 1-2 per cent. To meet these challenges, the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund was established on 22 June 1990.
For the day when this event will not only be our dream, but also our reality, the National Bank will continue to promote the fulfillment of its goals and tasks in accordance with European standards and best practices, which is of exceptional importance for the future the process of admission of the country into the membership of the European Union. Therefore, I assure you that we, the management and the employees of the National Bank, will be committed to this Project, we will openly and constructively cooperate during the implementation of all project activities, and use this opportunity provided by the European Union for further strengthening the capacity and credibility of our institution. At the end of my speech, let me wish the successful work of the project leaders and all the experts participating in the Project. I believe that after eight months we will be able to summarize a successfully completed Project, and in the period after that, after we have implemented the recommendations, we will write one of the many historical pages about the contribution of our institutions to the European integration processes of our country. Thank you! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Many micro enterprises fail within the first few years of operation, if the producers do not pay heed to this vital requirement. The distancing of the project management from the selection of business line is a well thought out process, because it forces the beneficiaries to make business decisions and take responsibility for same. To build their capacity to make these decisions, training was provided as to how they should conduct simple and quick market surveys and how they could satisfy the quality requirements expected by their customers. After the beneficiaries have selected their business projects, they are referred to the relevant regional development bank for funding support. In view of the speciality and complexity of the loan objectives, micro loans are granted to beneficiaries on the strength of a mutual guarantee or an interse guarantee. If any member of a group defaults the loan, other members of the group are called upon to repay the loan. This ensures credit discipline and compels the members of the group to be constantly alert and vigilant on how a member of a group is using the funds lent to him, because if he defaults, the other members have to bear the burden of repaying the loan of the defaulting member. The peer pressure exercised by members on each other is a better loan management and monitoring system than what the mainstream bankers usually do through their branch network and local staff.
Norges Bank, like other central banks in Europe, provided dollar liquidity to banks in periods. Banks’ access to funding at all but the shortest horizons has been very limited during the crisis. A key problem was that banks were heavily reliant on international market funding. When that source of funding seized up the Norwegian authorities had to intervene. Several instruments have been deployed. Loans have been offered at longer maturities than earlier, in some cases up to 2 and 3 years. The arrangement where banks and bank-owned mortgage companies can swap covered bonds (OMF) for government securities was introduced to facilitate banks’ access to medium-term and long-term funding, but also to ease money market conditions so that money market premiums could be reduced. In the mid-1980s Norwegian banks also relied heavily on foreign funding. In spring 1986 – following a sharp fall in oil prices – confidence in the Norwegian economy weakened and liquidity flowed out of the country, as was the case last autumn. Norges Bank had to purchase NOK and sell foreign exchange to maintain a fixed krone exchange rate. The krone liquidity that flowed into the foreign exchange market flowed back into Norges Bank as loans to the banks to avoid a liquidity crisis and a surge in money market rates. Bank lending continued to grow in 1986 and 1987, and in retrospect it might almost seem as though the central bank through its lending operations had played an active part in financing the credit boom.

Pessoa (2016) finds similar results for the UK in the years following China’s accession to the WTO. Further, even if people are re-employed relatively quickly after an industry shrinks, there’s no guarantee they’ll get the same wage. Economics certainly doesn’t say rising import penetration means permanently fewer jobs, but it does suggest that, if you suddenly open up trade with a country with a plentiful supply of 7  unskilled labour, that can reduce the wages of less-skilled people at home . The Pessoa (2016) study finds that, among the bottom 10% of earners in the UK, those in industries more exposed to trade with China saw a drop of around 4% in their total earnings (relative to others) over the following few years. This is partly the  6 7  Autor et al (2013). Stolper and Samuelson (1941) 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  result of slightly longer periods of non-employment. It’s also because they got less well paid in their new 8  jobs . More generally, the growth in trade with developing economies has been suggested as one possible explanation of the widening dispersion of wage and income inequality in the United States (the red line in Chart 10).
7  Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), September to October 2017 9  Chart 10: The most important problems that the SMEs are currently facing with (Average 2015-2017, % of the total number of surveyed companies) 30% 25%  30%  EU-28 24%  2017  23%  2016  2015  20%  20% 15%  13%  10%  12%  CESEE region 24%  25%  14%  13%  11%  7%  2015  12%  8%  10%  8%  2016  17%  15%  12%  2017  5%  5%  0%  0% finding competition access to customers finance  costs of availability regulation production of skilled or labour staff or experienced managers  finding competition access to customers finance  other  costs of availability regulation production of skilled or labour staff or experienced managers  other  Source: Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), EC and ECB. Despite the fact that according to the Survey, access to finance itself is not the major impediment for the SMEs, it is still an important caveat. And going under the surface and dissecting the sources of financing, one can note important structural features. First, bankrelated products remained the most relevant source of financing for SMEs compared with market-based instruments. The SMEs from the European Union and from the region do not differ much in terms of the main sources of financing.

The Commission made no specific recommendations for how the challenges related to supervision and regulation of critical ICT service providers and data centres should be followed up. In its consultation response, Norges Bank wrote that the following points deserve particular attention: The significance and management of concentration risk because many critical functions 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  rely on a small number of ICT service providers and data centres. The supervisory frameworks for ICT service providers and data centres that are important for key public functions, including the payment system. Whether the contingency arrangements of key ICT service providers and data centres are sufficient. ICT service providers, FMI owners and financial institutions need to address cyber risks. Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank have recently taken the initiative to engage in a dialogue with the industry on whether to introduce a framework for testing cybersecurity in the banking and payment system in Norway. This framework, called TIBER-EU, has been developed by the European Central Bank (ECB). A number of Norway’s neighbours, including Denmark and Sweden, have introduced or are about to introduce the ECB testing framework, ie TIBER-DK and TIBER-SE, respectively. Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank are planning to invite the industry to a dialogue on this testing framework. It can also be used to bolster security linked to key ICT service providers in the banking and payment system.
In order to mitigate the high credit risk noted in the banking sector, it is important for banks to address the risk posed by information asymmetries through a credit information sharing mechanism. To this end, the Bank of Zambia through NB Circular 3/2008 of December, 2008 made it mandatory for banks and other financial service providers in Zambia to go through the Credit Reference Bureau before a loan is provided. Consequently any loans approved without passing through the Credit Reference Bureau will attract Regulatory Action. BIS Review 152/2009  1  I must also mention here that in striving to increase credit, banks must always comply with the rules and regulations as stipulated in the Banking & Financial Services Act and other subsidiary regulations to ensure the safety of customers’ deposits. Furthermore, much more credit needs to be directed to sustainable productive sectors like Agriculture, Manufacturing and Tourism in order to drive the economy forward and not lending for consumption only. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is pleasing to note that despite the recent challenges facing the banking sector, Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited’s commitment to growth and re-investment is unwavering. The bank continues to be adequately capitalised with its total assets accounting for 12.1% of the banking sector’s total assets. Its deposit base remained strong at 12.9% of the total industry deposits while total loans accounted for 13.8% of the sector’s total loans as at end-October 2009. The bank has a network of 12 branches including this Mulungushi branch and about 47 automated teller machines.

However, some are still dragging their feet and are yet to adjust their rates. While we commend the banks that have responded positively, we call upon those who have not done so to act in a positive and prompt manner in order to make credit more affordable to the majority of our people. This in turn will lead to the growth of the productive sector and in particular Agriculture and the SME sectors, which are the engine for economic growth of our country. Finally, let me extend my gratitude to the Board of Directors and the Managing Director of Stanbic Bank for inviting me to be with you on this auspicious occasion of the opening of this branch. It now gives me great pleasure and honour to declare Mulungushi Branch of Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited officially open and I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 152/2009
The Repo rate in practice and the rule of action 10,5  9,5  8,5  Percent  7,5  6,5  5,5  4,5  3,5  2,5 1992  1993  1993  1994  1994  1994  1995  1995  1996  1996  1996  1997  1997  1997  1997  1998  1998  1998  1998  Time  Source: Jansson and Vredin, The Riksbank (2000)  3  BIS Review 107/2000  While I accordingly consider that a rule of this kind is of considerable value, I must underscore that we never intended to implement it mechanically. What matters is that we secure our objective in the longer run, really for ever. We chose to focus on the period from twelve to twenty-four months ahead for a number of reasons. One reason for not having a shorter target horizon is the time lag that applies before an interest rate adjustment normally affects the economy and inflation. But effects do arise in the shorter run, for instance via the exchange rate. We pay less heed to developments more than two years ahead partly because forecasting the longer term is normally difficult. Still, although monetary policy is guided mainly by prospects one to two years ahead, there are normally grounds for paying some attention to forecasts both for the coming year and for the period beyond the two-year horizon. Neither is it reasonable in practice to focus solely on inflation.

The chart also shows the price of imports and an indicator of underlying domestic inflation, UNDINHX. As you will see, we believed inflation would move up gradually in the wake of rising activity. This would be countered by low, even falling, import prices in connection with a stronger exchange rate, lower oil prices and generally strong global competition. Even our inflation forecast was evidently on the high side, at least to date. It is perhaps even more noteworthy that underlying domestic inflation has turned out to be appreciably lower. This is something that observers of the Swedish economy cannot ignore, particularly as the past decade has provided so many surprises of this sort, though not as dramatic. The main point to consider is, of course, how permanent the changes are likely to be. To what extent should we abandon earlier relationships and commit ourselves to a continuation of the relationships that have applied in recent years? 1  BIS Review 107/2000  Why has inflation been low? The first thing to note is that this development has not been confined to Sweden. Inflation in many other countries has also been unexpectedly low. There, too, the reasons for this are not entirely clear. Some pieces of the puzzle have been identified but not enough to make up a clear picture. As decision-makers, however, we cannot simply shrug our shoulders and say we don’t know.
In my opinion, which is based on experience from other financial crises, it will take a very long time for it to return to that historical average. In this context, it is worth mentioning that after the Asian crisis, real exchange rates rose from their lowest point, but for many years afterward they were between 15% and 30% below their levels seven years pre-crisis, depending on the country. The equilibrium real exchange rate is now lower than before, and in the medium term it will remain lower than it will eventually be. The Central Bank is of the opinion that the real exchange rate is below equilibrium, but it is uncertain just how much. How the equilibrium real exchange rate will rise in coming years is uncertain as well. BIS Review 130/2010  5  While this complicates monetary policy, dealing with uncertainties is nothing new for monetary policy-makers. Furthermore, Iceland needs to substitute its borrowed reserves for non-borrowed reserves in the next few years. To that end, we have begun modest foreign exchange purchases in the market. These total 14 million euros, including special purchases in late August, before the regular purchasing programme began. So far, these transactions have not weakened the króna, and it could be argued that the long-term effects could just as well be in the other direction.

Indeed, the initial group of six countries that started this process has now expanded to become a group of 27 countries, with another one, Croatia, joining next year. Others are currently negotiating to become members. Proposals for deeper monetary integration date back to the Werner Report of 1970 and gained political momentum in the second half of the 1980s. At that time, Member States were taking steps towards establishing a single market. This included also the liberalisation of capital movements. As a consequence, Europe became captive to what Robert Mundell and other economists have called the “impossible trinity” – in other words, the impossibility of simultaneously achieving the three goals of financial liberalisation, exchange rate stability, and national monetary policy. One of the three goals had to be abandoned. The choice as to which one became increasingly clear after the failed attempt to secure exchange rate stability through the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 1 Given that a single market, including capital account liberalisation, had been a stated goal since the Treaty of Rome, and given that exchange rate stability was needed to reap the full benefits of the single market, Member States agreed to renounce monetary sovereignty. Moreover, sharing a currency makes sense for countries with close trade ties. This is especially true for the euro area countries which, since the start of EMU, have conducted almost half of their overall trade among themselves.