We can certainly expect that data quality and analytical frameworks will continue to improve over time. But our understanding of future crisis dynamics will never be perfect. Far from it. This means that we must be prepared to change course when required and acknowledge errors in judgment sooner rather than later, even if it means re-evaluating wellreasoned positions. This brings me to my second point on agility. Financial crises are inflection points of a cycle which materialise in the least predictable manner. This demands a high degree of agility of policymakers and the financial system to adapt to the new operating reality. Such agility is derived from crisis management frameworks that are well-anchored in clearly defined strategic outcomes and accountability structures, but also flexible enough to respond to a range of conditions. And critically, it requires investing in resources with deep experience and knowledge. Going back to the 1996 Everest expedition, Hall and his team had made every reasonable effort to incorporate comprehensive risk management and contingency planning into the preclimb plan. As things turned south, it became clear that the team was unable to respond quickly to the dynamic situation. Outdated and inefficient radio systems led to a communication breakdown of vital information. Physiological, psychological and technical readiness of some of the climbers was also in question. Their inability to respond fluidly to changing conditions created an overdependence on key resource persons. Combined with lack of experience to deal with a series of new challenges, leaders were incapacitated and team dynamics disintegrated quickly.

Last, but certainly not least, is the element of trust. In the panic and chaos during crisis situations, feeble coordination and communication arrangements will falter easily. This can  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  occur even with well-established frameworks and dynamic resource persons at hand. Communication failures during Robert Hall’s expedition were not caused by the lack of infrastructure or defined channels for information dissemination. It stemmed from a more fundamental issue. Those involved in the final climb were complete strangers until several weeks before. Unfamiliarity among team members generated communication barriers, distrust and uncertainties. This did not engender efforts to create a robust co-dependency and coordination structure to collectively weather extremities faced on Mount Everest. Strong policy frameworks and institutional arrangements only make interagency coordination and communication feasible. But it is entrenched mutual trust, fostered during stable times, that makes them credible in challenging times. Trust ensures that collaboration arrangements, secured in good times, remain firm and functional in the face of crises. Trust nurtures confidence and enables reliance on the competence of others. Without trust and symbiotic crisis networks within and across agencies, a crisis framework offers little more than false comfort during crises. The Bank’s own experience in the management of crises, as well as global reforms that are taking place in this area, continue to be useful in guiding us as we navigate this increasingly demanding policy domain. We have continued to make important progress.