samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The demand for protection will grow, not just the need to insure against losses but also the demand from businesses who wish to strengthen their resilience and to recover more quickly from security breaches. 41. But the market needs development. It’s still in its infancy. We have to increase awareness of the importance of insurance in dealing with cyber risk. Again, however, the data needed for efficient underwriting of risk is weak. We need to strengthen collaboration between the industry, government and academia to build reliable databases and analytical tools to enable the efficient underwriting of cyber risk. •  We have set up the Cyber Risk Management Project in Singapore. It was launched recently, involving the Nanyang Technological University’s (NTU)’s Insurance Risk and Finance Research Centre (NTU-IRFRC), and supported by leading industry players and the Cyber Security Agency (CSA) in Singapore. Conclusion 42. It is, to conclude, a difficult and challenging environment for insurers globally. We have to live with a low interest rate environment for a long time to come, even as our societies are getting older. It’s a challenge for everyone in the retirement business, including insurers. We have to find ways to make savings for affordable for ordinary savers as they prepare for their retirement. 43. But we also have to meet new opportunities in the insurance industry.

In undertaking this challenge, banks and supervisors recognise that having adequate levels of capital is not enough to ensure success in banking - or even long-term survival. A bank’s long-term success is determined chiefly by the quality of its management and controls, which together make up its first line of defence. The New Basel Accord seeks to capture the relationship between the adequacy of capital and the quality of risk management by relying on three important and mutually reinforcing “pillars”. These consist of, first, the minimum capital requirements; second, supervisory review; and third, market discipline. The three pillars themselves reflect the trend among bank supervisors to embrace a balanced philosophy of regulation that provides incentives to banks to manage their risks appropriately. The first pillar, for example, seeks to align capital requirements more closely to the actual risks that banks face. But the minimum requirements provide economic incentives - in the form of lower capital charges - for those banks that develop better measures for their exposures to risk and better techniques for managing their risks. Banks with more traditional exposures and less complex operations will be better able to ensure that the their capital base is sufficient for the level of credit risk they face by aligning their capital requirements with external measures of their borrowers’ creditworthiness. The most sophisticated approaches to credit or operational risk will allow banks to rely increasingly on their own assessments of risk to determine how much capital to hold.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Riksbank’s calculations of potential GDP Resource utilisation can be measured in several different ways. Here, I will demonstrate how we, at the Riksbank, calculate measurements of resource utilisation based on GDP and potential GDP, as well as hours worked and potential hours worked. Potential GDP refers to the level of GDP that is consistent with a use of the available resources that is sustainable in the long term and that does not push up inflation. If GDP exceeds the potential level, then resource utilisation is high – and vice versa. We call the difference between actual and potential GDP the GDP gap.6 When resource utilisation is normal, GDP is equal to potential BNP, and the GDP gap is equal to zero. Consequently, potential GDP does not refer to the highest level GDP may reach over the short term. In Figure 1, the trend development of GDP is represented by a Hodrick-Prescott trend (HP trend). An HP trend is something between a linear trend and the actual development of GDP. The HP trend is a common and often fairly good measure of the underlying long-term development in GDP during normal cyclical fluctuations. But the HP trend is not good at estimating the underlying development of GDP at the end of a time series and it gives no guidance as to why output deviates from its trend level.

A projection of GDP from 2005 according to the earlier trend of three per cent per year would have given a GDP level about six per cent higher than actual GDP in 2011. Even if this is only a mathematical example and the potential growth, if there had been no financial crisis, is assumed to be significantly lower than three per cent per year, it still shows that the financial crisis put a dent in the long-term upwards development of potential GDP.13 The lowered rate of growth of potential GDP after the financial crisis corresponds with international experiences. In conjunction with financial crises, it is normal for GDP growth to be lower in the ten years following the crisis than in the ten years before the crisis.14 But the financial crisis primarily affected Sweden through reduced exports, not through problems in the banking sector. It is thus not self-evident that the rate of growth of potential GDP should necessarily be lower in Sweden. One explanation may be that the rate of growth of potential GDP does not only decrease in conjunction with financial crises, but also in conjunction with deep recessions. We have seen in earlier crises, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as well as in the early 1990s, that a deep recession can have this effect. On these occasions, GDP did not reach the pre-crisis trend level for the next ten years.15 Another explanation may be that Sweden, with its high international dependence, cannot isolate itself too much from developments abroad.
The reason is that a crisis in a bank can very quickly spread to the rest of the financial system, which can in turn have very costly consequences for the economy as a whole. I shall explain how this comes about. The banks’ traditional business model is to function as an intermediary between, on the one hand households and companies needing credit to buy homes or to get business projects started, and on the other hand households and companies wanting to hold money in accounts for transactions or savings. The banks thus help to transform savings into investment in the economy and contribute to more efficient mediation of payments. This is of course beneficial to the economy as a whole. At the same time, this business model entails significant risks. To put it simply, this is because the bank's assets consist of long-term loans that cannot be quickly and easily converted into cash, while the bank's funding is largely shortterm and volatile. Normally, this does not entail any problems, but if for some reason doubts were to arise with regard to the bank’s ability to pay, the funding could be withdrawn very quickly, and the bank could be forced to default on its payments. Problems in one bank can have serious domino effects As the banks are often interlinked with one another and often have similar types of exposure, problems in one bank can very quickly have serious domino effects in the rest of the financial system.

2  A banking crisis every thirty years With this historical retrospective, I would like to remind you that as long as there have been banks, there have also been financial crises. And when financial crises have arisen, the state has often had to rush to the rescue in one way or another. In Sweden alone, severe banking crises have occurred no less than nine times in the past 250 years. 3 This entails, on average, one crisis every thirty years. 1 Thank you to Johan Molin, who has helped me write this speech. Valuable comments were received from Mats  Anderson, Christina Nordh Berntsson, Sara Edholm, David Forsman, Mattias Hector, Martin W. Johansson, Gabriel Söderberg and Anders Vredin. 2 See Wetterberg (2009). 3 See, for example, Hagberg (2007). 1 [14]  This speech is about how Sweden can counteract and mitigate the effect of such crises, and not least the significance of having an appropriately-designed foreign currency reserve to succeed in this. Johan Palmstruch’s banknotes were an innovation in their day, but now, 350 years later, we in Sweden are heading towards a cashless society, primarily due to new financial technology in the payments field. What this and some other development trends may entail for society and for the Riksbank is the subject of my speech today. The banks’ business models entail risks What is so special about banks that the government sometimes intervenes to counteract banking crises? Nothing like this happens when, for instance, a manufacturing or construction company collapses.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with FOCUS Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, conducted on 20 February 2007 by Ms Alexandra Kusitzky, Mr Bernd Johann and Mr Thomas Zorn, published in FOCUS on 26 February 2007. *  *  *  Central bank presidents must take enormous care over what they say. Your US counterpart Ben Bernanke caused turmoil in the financial markets when he made remarks to a journalist at a party regarding Federal Reserve strategy. How do you guard against inadvertently divulging information? We central bankers know that we are watched very closely indeed and that any sign can be overinterpreted. But I do not think that we are very different in that respect from other people with important responsibilities in the public eye. But you could at least tell us what you expect the key ECB interest rate to be at the end of the year? I invite you to participate in my next press conference on Thursday, 8 March. As ECB President, if you so much as smile for slightly too long, that can give rise to speculation. With such intense scrutiny, is it at all possible to have a private life? My private life is unfortunately subject to tough constraints. Nevertheless, I try to make time for myself, even if I don't succeed all that often. European and international meetings are often held during weekends, of all times. But when I have a free Saturday or Sunday, I really enjoy it, believe me.

What do you get up to? I love art, as well as literature and opera. We are privileged in Europe, and there are some wonderful exhibitions here in Frankfurt. But you must surely miss the spectacular cultural opportunities that you had when you lived in Paris? Paris is of course wonderful, but I have to say that the Rhine-Main area really was a very pleasant discovery. Within 30-45 minutes of my house you have the opera houses and theatres of Frankfurt, Wiesbaden, Mainz and Darmstadt. Where else can you find so many in such a small area? If you already live in Germany, do you also read German literature? Yes, indeed. Heine, for example. You know, a good poem is like a gold coin that goes into circulation and doesn't lose its value. It's something that lasts forever. I also read Rilke, but I only read him in French. Your German's coming along well. I'm learning German. That's also important to me for my work. Germany has the largest population and the largest economy of all the EU Member States. If you understand the language, you gain a profound understanding of how the people think. Because of their language, the Germans are more direct than the French or the English. For instance, simply saying "no" in French or English is always somewhat more complicated! But the most recent French criticism of the ECB's stability policy has been distinctly direct.
Urban Bäckström: The business cycle and interest rate policy Speech by Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements,.at the Euroforum’s Conference, Örebro, 10 October 2001. *  *  *  First a word of thanks for the invitation to discuss matters to do with the business cycle and interest rate policy here with you in Örebro. We are living at present in turbulent times. Political events on the world stage have considerable economic and other repercussions in Sweden. Today I shall be saying something about my view of the business cycle’s current phase and also try in some measure to look into the future. Weaker activity in the rest of the world Global economic growth slackened appreciably in the first half of this year. The downward phase has lasted longer and become deeper than many observers had counted on at the beginning of the year. For the first time in over a decade we are experiencing a synchronous slowdown in all the leading economies. The terrorist attacks on 11 September have accentuated the risk of the downward phase being more pronounced and protracted. At the same time it should be underscored that the attacks can hardly be expected to disrupt the conditions for growth in the longer run, either in the industrialised countries or in what are commonly referred to as the emerging markets.

Sweden is one of the world’s best examples of the forces for growth that are generated by innovations, experimentation and creative processes. Companies like Ericsson, AGA, SKF, Atlas Copco and Electrolux are just a number of the instances of inventions that have contributed to our country’s long-term growth. The old Austrian school of economics, with its roots in the period before World War I, had an analytical focus on growth and the business cycle that is relevant for an understanding of the present situation. One insight is the crucial part innovations play for the path of long-term growth. This has been elucidated not least by Joseph Schumpeter and Erik Dahmén. However, the significance of innovations and technology for growth is not a straightforward matter. They often raise productivity and generate windfall profits. The new products that result from innovations give some firms a monopoly, while other firms that are relying on older technology are pushed to the wall. In such a process there is, of course, a large risk of making the wrong decisions. The Austrian school also regarded investment as the linchpin of the business cycle. In the event of a technological breakthrough, firms are liable to overestimate the size and duration of the resultant improvement in productivity. That is why an upward phase not infrequently culminates with excessive optimism and faulty investment. When profit expectations then fall back to more realistic levels, share prices fall and corporate investment takes time out until capital stocks have adjusted to a more reasonable view of long-term yields.
Thus our current assessment indicates an interest rate path where the interest rate is raised by about 1 percentage point this year, in line with expectations in the market. The two previous Inflation Reports underlined the risk that a low interest rate over a long period may result in strong pressures in the economy, with a risk of bottlenecks, accelerating cost inflation and debt accumulation. On the other hand, the Reports also pointed to the risk that continued trade shifts and increased competition in labour and product markets might result in lower price and wage inflation and weaker pressures in the economy. Through autumn, statistics did not favour either alternative, but now we see signs of both. This may increase the uncertainty surrounding the state of the Norwegian economy. Monetary policy must strike a balance between the various objectives. Strong growth in the Norwegian economy, a tighter labour market, a pronounced rise in equity prices and high credit growth must be weighed against unexpectedly low inflation. We have illustrated the uncertainty surrounding forecasts for the interest rate, inflation and the output gap with fan charts. The width of the fan charts is based on historical disturbances. However, there is no certainty that future disturbances will be of the same nature and scale. The wider the fan charts are, the more uncertain the projections. Uncertainty surrounding the interest rate reflects the monetary policy response to unexpected disturbances to inflation, output and the exchange rate.

This is particularly important for the common assumption that a mortgage must be arranged at the time of purchase, which means entering into a very longterm payment commitment with a credit institution. Something which, as the crisis brought painfully to light, may entail problems in the case of economic or labour market instability. Comparatively speaking, mortgage risk performed well during the previous financial crisis, despite the fact this is not always perceived as such. Defaults on house purchase mortgage loans at no point exceeded 6%. However, financing for real estate development and construction reached non-performance levels of over 36%. This demonstrates that individuals treat their monthly mortgage payments as something that is a priority, whereas the financing of these same houses before their completion and sale evidences much riskier characteristics. Yet despite this relatively good performance, the crisis showed that the mortgage market had certain shortcomings that needed correcting. Apart from the evident social and economic drama, in the final years of the crisis we experienced a bout of litigiousness and unprecedented legal uncertainty. Notably, much of this litigiousness was concentrated in the mortgage market. One paradigmatic instance of this conflict were the so-called floor clauses. According to end-August figures, more than 1.2 million complaints were lodged in this connection, with a cost for banks of almost € billion. 1  The economic and, no less importantly, reputational harm that cases such as the floor clauses have caused to the sector is evident.
Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2011) show in a study of crises in 14 countries during the period 1870-2008 that if the upswing phase is marked by a strong credit boom, the crisis tends to be deeper and the recovery slower. 8  Note that such a scenario would not necessarily lead to financial stability problems. See, for example, the stress tests published in the Riksbank's Financial Stability Reports. 9  Of course, the repo rate is not the only tool for managing this type of circumstance, which is discussed below. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  will occur with certainty if one conducts a specific policy; it entails weighing the risks and probabilities of various scenarios against one another. In this case, the risk of a really poor development further ahead must be balanced against short-term costs. One is forced, so to speak, to pay an "insurance premium" in that a slightly less expansionary monetary policy in the short term leads to slightly lower inflation and slightly higher unemployment. A particularly difficult situation arises if a weak development of the real economy means that the short-term costs of conducting a less expansionary policy appear to be large at the same time as the risks linked to credit granting and the housing market increase. To summarise: in principle, there is no doubt that the Riksbank according to its mandate may take into consideration risks linked to a rapid increase in household debt.

While a number of countries in the Working Group appear to agree that any project should, to the extent possible, follow the media neutral approach taken in the 1996 Model Law, thus far the focus has tended to be on the cross-border recognition of the use of digital signature technology. This may be indicative of the fact that several countries have enacted or have proposed digital signature legislation. Spain, Germany, Malaysia and Italy are among the foreign jurisdictions that have enacted digital signature legislation. Other countries such as Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom have developed guidelines on digital signatures. The Working Group has agreed on at least one important issue. Even though PKI technology can be used to encrypt messages, questions relating to the use of PKI and other cryptography for security purposes are outside of the scope of this UNCITRAL effort. Of course the United States continues to advocate the development of a voluntary market-driven key management infrastructure and of key recoverable encryption products. And while this position is not reflected in the OECD’s Guidelines for Cryptography Policy, I am sure that the Administration will continue to promote key recovery both domestically and abroad. In closing, I would like to echo the sentiment expressed in the Framework: “The success of electronic commerce will require an effective partnership between the private and public sectors, with the private sector taking the lead.” The creation of private fora such as this conference, which bring together Government representatives and industry, provides an exciting opportunity to further that partnership.
Even then, its political system sometimes struggles to take difficult decisions. The euro area, on the other hand, has existed for just 13 years. The strengthening of its institutions began only two years ago. Against that background, what has been achieved through the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility and European  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Stability Mechanism, the entry into force of the “Six-Pack” legislation and the agreement on the Fiscal Compact, is already very significant. On 29 June, the Euro Summit took a further series of steps to strengthen crisis management. They agreed that loans to Spain as part of its bank recapitalisation programme would not have a senior status, removing a key concern for investors about the programme and their continued purchases of Spanish government debt. They committed themselves to use the full range of EFSF and ESM instruments in a flexible and efficient manner. And most importantly, they decided that the ESM should have the ability to recapitalise banks directly, once a single supervisory mechanism is in place involving the ECB. These are all very significant developments. Let me elaborate. First, the possibility for direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM is crucial to break the vicious circle between banks and their sovereigns that is at the heart of the crisis. It would allow for banks to be stabilised without increasing the debt level of the sovereign, thereby avoiding further damage to sovereign debt markets and banks’ balance sheets.

Even if it were possible, going back to the ECU would present major disadvantages compared to today’s euro: until the euro was introduced, France did not actually participate in decisions on interest rate levels and had to follow German monetary policy; the franc was at the mercy of speculative attacks from the financial markets that drained our currency reserves as we saw in the 1992-1993 period. The euro was introduced to solve these problems. Today, the euro is alive and well. It is the currency of 340 million Europeans, is recognised worldwide and is trusted by the people of France. Almost 70% of French citizens are in favour of the euro because it protects their purchasing power, with prices that increase three times less rapidly than previously; because it makes borrowing easier, with interest rates that are 1.5% to 3% lower; and because it safeguards the value of their savings. Finally, I would like to add that the Eurosystem has not modified its sovereign debt purchase programme in relation to France’s presidential elections. The distribution of monthly purchases between the various countries is based on the ECB’s capital allocation principle. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches