samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is because, if so approved by the general meetings convened for next week, the extent of pooling will reach 100%. This solidarity arrangement contributes to providing firm foundations for a common project and giving it substance, since objectives are unified, more efficient management arrangements are set in place and the markets and all intervening agents can more readily perceive the project’s cohesiveness and viability. From the standpoint of banking regulation, by using this design IPSs become consolidatable groups of credit institutions dominated by a central body. Actually, however, they are more than a group; they are de facto mergers (“cold mergers” as they have been called) since, for economic – not legal – purposes, each participant has forgone the individuality proper to a separate legal person. Full mutual liability between the parties to the agreement has been achieved, going beyond what the law governing corporate groups provides for in Spain. Hence, in practice, the participating savings banks become, from a merely economic and managerial standpoint, what are veritable retail banking “regional heads” of the IPS regarding their operational capacity and the way in which they contribute solvency, liquidity and results to the group; yet, from the legal standpoint, they retain their personality and their sovereignty in the agreed distribution of welfare fund assets. I also pointed out how, like any new product, IPSs must pass muster in respect of the third and most important step of the evaluation process, namely the “use test”, i.e. proof of their adaptation to reality.

Mergers and IPSs are thus two alternatives available to savings banks to concentrate their business and restructure. The two options differ in terms of their legal form, but they coincide fully in their objectives and should be equivalent in terms of their results. Let us turn to the second step of the evaluation process. The guiding principle of the design and legal construction of IPSs has been the search for a concentration mechanism analogous to mergers in terms of practical results. In this connection, the IPS has been structured on three basic pillars. The first entails the relinquishing by all participants to the central body of the IPS of the capacity to determine and implement business strategies and internal risk control and management tools, in such a way that this central body becomes the nerve centre of the IPS. The second pillar comprises the mutual liquidity and solvency pacts between the participating savings banks and the pooling of results, to extents that should exceed 40%. And the third pillar is a commitment to stability of the agreements, which must run for a minimum term of 10 years, and which cannot be broken without the Banco de España first analysing the viability of the various institutions resulting from the fragmentation process. It should be stressed that, in all cases, the agreements so far reached go further than these minimum legal requirements, in the extent of pooling of solvency, liquidity and results.
The Riksbank has therefore on three different occasions (in July, September and October)  BIS Review 160/2009  5  offered loans of up to SEK 100 billion with a maturity of almost one year and at a fixed interest rate, to contribute to bringing down the interest rates households and companies have to pay. On the first two occasions the loan amount was fully subscribed, but on the most recent occasion the amount borrowed was SEK 95 billion. By setting interest rates on Riksbank Certificates and fine-tuning – and as we will come to shortly – setting interest rates on the Riksbank's loans to the banks, the Riksbank has been able to steer the short-term rate throughout the crisis. To summarise, monetary policy has been aimed at keeping inflation close to the target and at the same time dampening the fall in economic activity during the financial crisis. The repo rate has been quickly cut to an extremely low level. The steering of the short-term rates has functioned well throughout the crisis. The normal aim of only steering the shortest interest rate has been supplemented with lending to the banks at longer maturities to be able to also influence interest rates further out on the curve. This means that monetary policy approaches questions regarding financial stability, which I will now discuss. Financial stability Financial stability is the Riksbank’s other main task. Put simply, it is a question of ensuring that the financial system is stable and that the payment system functions.

It is merely moved between the banks’ different deposit accounts with the Riksbank. The Riksbank’s lending in kronor to the banks has thus been entirely funded through deposits from the banks (Figure 8). Figure 8 The Riksbank’s deposits and lending in kronor SEK billion 400  400  300  300  200  200  100  100  lending  0  0 -100  -100  funding  -200  -200 -300 -400 Jul-08  Loans in SEK Fine-tuning Riksbank Certificates  -300 -400  Oct-08  Jan-09  Apr-09  Jul-09  Oct-09  Source: The Riksbank. The interest rates on the banks’ borrowing from the Riksbank, like the previously-discussed interest rates on the Riksbank Certificates and fine-tuning transactions, are related to the repo rate. The banks pay an interest rate that corresponds to the repo rate with a certain premium. The banks thus pay a higher interest rate for their borrowing from the Riksbank than they receive in interest on their deposits with the Riksbank. At the most recent auction of loans in SEK, for instance, the interest rate was 0.40 per cent for both fixed-interest rate loans and variable-interest rate loans. As mentioned earlier, the banks currently receive interest of 0.25 per cent on Riksbank Certificates and for fine-tuning overnight deposits they receive 0.15 per cent. In this way the Riksbank steers market rates by setting the interest rates for the Riksbank’s deposits and lending.
This would hardly be advisable, however, given the huge uncertainty that characterises the current economic environment and also the uncertainty that surrounds the impact of our policy actions on the economy in this context. The sources of this uncertainty are multiple. We face uncertainty regarding the nature of current shocks, that is, to what extent they reflect supply or demand factors, which as explained before determines how swift the policy reaction should be. We are also uncertain about their persistence, which is a critical determinant of the inflation outlook. We face uncertainty about how our actions eventually affect inflation along the monetary policy transmission channel: we do not know for certain how sensitive overall financing conditions (including bank lending conditions) are to our policy decisions, how sensitive aggregate demand is to financing conditions, and how responsive inflation is to economic activity –that is, the slope of the so-called “Phillips curve”. For all these reasons, it is very difficult to ascertain how much tighter, relative to a “neutral” path, our policy should be in the next few quarters in order to return medium-term inflation back to 2%. 10  For an in-depth explanation of the rationale behind our 75 bp rate increase in September 2022, see Hernández de Cos (2022), “Inflation and economic growth in the euro area: monetary policy and the role of other economic policies”, speech at Joly Andalucía Forum. Banco de España.

2  See Chapter 3 of the 2021 Annual Report of Bank of Spain, 2022, and Cardoso, M., C. Ferreira, J. Leiva, G. Nuño, A. Ortiz, T. Rodrigo, and S. Vazquez, “The Heterogeneous Impact of Inflation on Households' Balance Sheets", Banco de España Working Paper, forthcoming, 2022. 3 Further information can be found in Borrallo, F., L. Cuadro-Sáez and J. J. Pérez, “Rising food commodity prices and their pass-through to euro area consumer prices”, Banco de España, Analytical Articles, 2022. 1  In the current context, however, this central scenario is surrounded by significant uncertainty. Let me describe where I see the main sources of uncertainty, in particular in relation to future inflation dynamics. First, the potential emergence of second-round effects. Second-round effects occur when an increase in inflation is transmitted to wage increases and the latter, in turn, are transmitted to prices –as firms attempt to preserve or even increase their profit margins–, potentially leading to a price-wage spiral. This has not been the case so far in the euro area and, according to the latest ECB projections, significant price-wage spirals are not expected over the forecast horizon.4 Growth in unit labour costs is expected to significantly contribute to domestic inflation in 2023, but less so in 2024 owing to both the moderation in wage growth and the pick-up in productivity growth. Nevertheless, high and persistent inflation increases the risk of second-round effects materialising via higher wages and profit margins.
In any event, the still-high spare capacity in the economy presages a gradual recovery in inflation over the next two years. The factors underpinning the recovery The path of recovery of growth and employment has essentially been underpinned by the restoring of macroeconomic and financial equilibria, which were severely eroded in the crisis. Progress has been visible in the correction of the external imbalance, the deleveraging of households and firms, the redressing of fiscal balances towards levels more compatible with the sustainability of public finances and the restructuring and consolidation of the banking sector. Unemployment, too, is showing clear signs of a correction. The reforms undertaken within Spain, along with the headway in economic and monetary union and the application of the highly expansionary monetary policy by the ECB, have proven key to restoring confidence and providing for the progressive absorption of the imbalances. By way of illustration, the proportion of Spanish public debt held by nonresidents has risen from 30% in 2012 to 44% at present, an increase indicative of the improved confidence in our economy, but also of its dependence on the perception abroad of the soundness and continuity of our recovery. Despite what has been achieved in growth, employment and restoring equilibria, we are far from having overcome all the factors of vulnerability. Doubts over the continuity of the macroeconomic, fiscal and financial rebalancing drive might curtail and lead to backtracking from these achievements. We must not forget that the legacy of the crisis is still burdensome.

This agreement has reaffirmed the commitment to monetary union, patent both in the supportive efforts of its members and in the observance of the common stability rules governing the functioning of the Monetary Union. The negotiations for the Third Bailout Programme for Greece unfolded as scheduled, and there is every indication the Programme will be launched immediately and that the day after tomorrow, on 20 August, the Greek authorities will be able to meet their ECB payments, thereby avoiding a default with dire consequences. This third bailout is, perhaps, the most complex and demanding of those so far agreed between Greece and the European authorities and the IMF. This is so, among other things, because it will include measures to reinforce the Greek banking system, which has been greatly affected by events in recent months. Evidently, it is in the interest of all euro area members that the new Programme should be properly adhered to, and follow schedule, so that assessments of its implementation before year-end may be positive and provide for its full effectiveness and continuity. Needless to say, the fulfilment of this third programme will boost the growth of the Greek economy – the central and fundamental objective of this third assistance programme – and will strengthen the euro area and its stability as a whole. Recent developments on the international economic front are positive in terms of growth.
If money such as Bitcoin or Diem become dominant in Norway, we will move closer to a new 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  financial system. Let me first point out that a complete eradication of the Norwegian krone requires that the government also uses a different currency for paying salaries and benefits and accepts it as payment for taxes. In the long term, one should be careful to rule out anything completely, but as it stands today, this does not appear very likely. Yet we can imagine an intermediate solution where the government continues to use the krone, while the private sector prefers one or more cryptocurrencies. For this to take place on a large scale, an infrastructure is needed so that the money can be used at more locations than today. Chart: How much does a cup of coffee cost? With many competing currencies in circulation, we will lose the Norwegian krone as a common measurement unit for what goods and services cost. A simple question about how much a cup of coffee costs may have a complicated answer. Prices must be stated in several currencies, and customers and merchants must agree on which currency should be used in the transaction. Wide exchange rate fluctuations can make this particularly demanding. Even with one cryptocurrency in the private sector, those with income in cryptocurrency who pay taxes in Norwegian kroner will incur an exchange rate risk.

Persistent price increases that have broadened and crept into long-term inflation expectations have led to a more aggressive Federal Reserve’s response and an upward re-pricing of the terminal Federal Funds rate. Recent labour market indicators continue to signal significant tightness. At the same time, economic activity surprise indices, such as those produced by Citibank, have been showing downward forecast misses on the goods side. While it is possible that some of the misses reflect a rotation from durable goods to services as the economy re-opens, the market interpretation has been more tentative. A combination of growth and inflation fears have seen some correction in equity markets, higher bond yields, wider credit spreads, a stronger dollar, and a further tightening in financial conditions. Several factors need to fall in place for a “soft landing”. These can be grouped into determinants of the Aggregate Supply (AS), Philips Curve (PC), and Investment-Saving (IS) schedules. AS Schedule Supply-side factors have featured prominently in the inflation run-up. There are nascent signs of an easing in supply frictions which, if sustained, can take some of the burden of restoring price stability away from demand, and incur a smaller trade-off between inflation and growth. A pick-up in productivity growth, and some rise in the Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) would also relieve cost pressures. However, productivity gains of the mid-nineties that allowed the Federal Reserve to hike by 300bps with minimal output loss were exceptional and are unlikely to be replicated.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The importance of financial literacy among women in Asia Special address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the CitigroupINSEAD Women’s Financial Education Summit 2004, Hong Kong, 2 November 2004. *  *  *  Introduction Asia represents the fastest growing region in the global economy. Of significance, is that more than half the population in Asia are women. The participation of women in the economy would therefore not only enhance their own economic well being but would also contribute towards raising further the economic potential of Asia. Women are already engaged in both the informal and formal sectors and are increasingly emerging as a more important force in the economy. The effective participation, however, needs to be an informed participation. Financial literacy among women becomes an important part of this process, regardless of the income constituency to which they belong. There needs to be a better understanding of their financial rights and responsibilities, and their opportunities for income generation and the associated risks and costs involved. This is particularly important for Asia, where rapid economic and financial transformation is occurring. Financial literacy among women is thus a vital part of this process, not only to promote greater engagement of women in the current economic environment, but also to prepare them for the future. It is my great honour and pleasure to be here today to speak on the importance of financial literacy among women in Asia.

2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Conclusion As risk professionals, it’s important to be forward-looking and to continually ask ourselves: are all risks being captured, measured, and monitored? What is missing? Are we focused on the right areas? So, here is another question: When we look back at this conference five years from now, what will we view as a major blind spot? I expect there will be issues that we will be surprised we missed, and part of the purpose of discussions like this is to lower the likelihood and impact of those inevitable blind spots. Thanks for your attention, and I’m looking forward to hearing the discussion throughout the day. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
But the consensus does not imply uniformity, and when making comparisons between regimes, it’s also important to control for the importance of the sector to the economy, the reliance consumers place on it, and the ability of firms to fail in an orderly way which causes the least damage to policyholders. Provided that the foundation of adequate policyholder protection remains in place, we believe there will be scope for making changes which meet the other objectives of the review. To make tailored change to the regime which better meet the needs of the UK market and the broader economy. Quantitative Impact Study In modern construction, modellers can render the proposed new building in 3D according to the architect’s plans. Even before the building work has begun, it is possible to have a sense of what the design looks like in practice and judge whether it will deliver on the original vision. In policymaking we also aspire to get a projection of the end result, but unfortunately we currently lack the required rendering software, so instead we have to rely on Impact Study exercises. These exercises are vital in giving us the detailed, accurate measurements we need. For this reason we, in agreement with HM Treasury, are planning a Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) for the Solvency II review. We intend to gather the data that will allow us to project the impact of a number of different possible designs; this will give confidence before the proposals are finalised that the ultimate designs will really work.

Households and companies may feel growing uncertainty both about developments in public revenues and expenditure, and about the formulation of monetary policy. This can be costly for the economy if it leads to a failure to carry out investments and to unnecessarily cautious decisions about the allocation of resources. To sum up, then, it becomes more costly to pursue an excessively expansive fiscal policy when monetary policy is guided by an explicit inflation target. A good policy mix makes for better conditions A better policy mix arises if the orientation of fiscal policy does not make for higher inflation risk premiums. It can avoid this if the orientation of fiscal policy appears to be sustainable in the long run. The surplus-target in the public finances is a good example of this. One means by which the confidence felt by the general public in economic policy can be monitored consists of inflation expectations, which should not diverge substantially from the Riksbank’s inflation target. When expectations of inflation diverge from this target in the longer term - whether upwards or downwards - it implies that monetary policy should be adjusted so as to steer expectations back towards the target. In this connection it is important to observe that a central bank whose inflation target commands high credibility often has more scope for acting than one that has little credibility. Assume, for example, that an economy where the credibility of the inflation target is high experiences a positive disturbance to the business cycle, leading to higher demand.
Even when individual banks look adequately capitalised taken in isolation, the aggregate position may be more vulnerable taking into account common exposures to credit, market or liquidity risk, and cross-system exposures. Capital requirements for individual firms may, therefore, need to depend on how liquidity mismatched and how leveraged the system as a whole is. Even so, just as with liquidity, there will be rare episodes, which we must strive to make very rare, where there is a capital deficiency in individually significant banks, or even in the system as a whole. And, again analogously, we therefore need ex ante policies for catering with that. There are two elements to such policies. First, we need regimes for resolving distressed banks in an orderly way, outside of the insolvency regime applying to ordinary companies. The UK has taken a useful step forward in introducing a Special Resolution Regime for banks. We will need to keep its provisions under active review. Large and Complex Financial Institutions present a special challenge. Nearly a decade ago, a joint G10/Financial Stability Group, on which I served, articulated the imponderable scale of the challenge of winding up such a group. The conclusion was that it lay beyond the current capability of the authorities internationally; but that, nevertheless, we should work together – providing factbooks on firms and exchanging information – to put ourselves in the best possible position. None of that was done, and the FSF and G20 are, thankfully, now again underlining how vitally important it is.

We need in particular to ensure that financial groups maintain information on the assets and liabilities of their legal entities; it is legal entities that  4  BIS Review 39/2009  go into resolution not business divisions. Lehmans shouts that out loud and clear. We need to ensure that banks, however grand they are, keep information that would facilitate rapid payout from deposit-protection schemes. We need banks to have contingency funding plans that are shared with regulators and central banks. We need, more ambitiously, to address Too Big To Fail. And we need to do just massively better at working together internationally. However much we do, I fear that the inescapable conclusion will be that we cannot rule out that very rarely the banking system will end up needing to be supported by some ultimate source of capital. If that is right, then society needs principles and policies for what might be called “Capital of Last Resort”, to sit alongside the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) principles developed by and for central banks since the 19th century. Parts of the academic community have started to think about and advocate capital-insurance from the private sector, but over the long term we need to decide whether or not to have a policy for public sector capital insurance. At a high level, this faces exactly the challenges of central bank liquidity insurance. Its terms must not incentivise imprudent behaviour; and they must be time consistent.