samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is now clear to everyone that low inflation must be good for people because price growth does not accelerate, food prices do not grow. However, perhaps not everybody has realised the benefits of sustainably low inflation for businesses, because we are yet to assure them that inflation will indeed remain low and stable, and companies may rely on this assurance in making plans and raising investment. I hope we will be able to achieve this in the forthcoming years. As for the development of the financial and banking sector, I would like to complete the so-called resolution policy and invest more in favourable conditions for banking and finance at large, in order to improve financial inclusion and expand the availability of financial services to customers so that they have more trust in the financial system. The confidence in the banking system is already relatively high, but I would like to support and strengthen it. A separate task is the development of the non-bank financial sector. We have quite a small share of pension funds and insurance companies, though they are a source of long money necessary to economic development. These are the key objectives in this field. QUESTION from Reuters: 11 / 14  BIS central bankers' speeches  The seasonal nature of the balance of payments makes analysts expect purchases of foreign currency conducted by the Ministry of Finance to have larger impact on the ruble exchange rate in April. Do you support this view? And a question about methodology.

3  The Riksbank’s long-run target fulfilment is discussed by Andersson, Björn, Stefan Palmqvist and Pär Österholm (2012), “The Riksbank’s attainment of its inflation target over a longer period of time”, Economic Commentary no. 4, 2012, Sveriges Riksbank. 4  See, for instance, Heikensten, Lars, (1999), “The Riksbank’s inflation target – clarifications and evaluation”, Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Review, 1999:1, pp. 5–17. 5  The reason why the inflation target did not begin to apply from January 1993 was that it was realised that the large depreciation in connection with letting the krona float would result in a one-off increase in the price of imported products and thus a relatively large, but temporary, increase in the inflation rate. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Favourable developments have held inflation back Of course, it is also important to analyse why inflation has undershot the target, even after these direct effects of interest rate changes have been excluded. My view is that growth in the economy has often been surprisingly high during the periods when inflation has been unexpectedly low. The combination of low inflation and high growth indicates that the economy was affected by positive changes on the supply side. The Riksbank and other forecasters have, for instance, often been surprised by the high productivity growth in the Swedish economy. As I see it, it is thus largely unforeseen, but beneficial developments that have kept inflation down.
Svein Gjedrem: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 14 May 2009. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The statement is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2008, Monetary Policy Report 1/2009 and the Executive Board’s assessments in the period to the monetary policy meeting on 6 May. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee for this opportunity to report on monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s Credit Report. My statement is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report, but is also updated based on the Executive Board’s assessments in the period to the previous monetary policy meeting and new information received to date. I also refer to this year’s report from Norges Bank Watch, a group of experts that evaluates Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy. Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards maintaining low and stable inflation. The operational target is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. The inflation target is an anchor for inflation expectations in the foreign exchange market, for the social partners in connection with wage settlements and for those setting prices for goods and services.

Last year, the joint meeting between the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Institutions Policy Committee was first held with the purpose of sharing ideas from different perspectives. It set a stage for both committees to regularly monitor and exchange views on any systemic risk that might occur from the interconnectedness of economic and financial sectors and to form policy response, should further measures be necessary. For this year, the Bank of Thailand will continue to make sure that overall economic conditions stay safe and sound. Yet, balancing among different policy objectives to reach the ultimate goal of macroeconomic stability is even more challenging this year, given the possible risk on financial stability while the global environment is still surrounded with uncertainties. In closing, I would like to outline the key challenges faced by the Bank of Thailand this year: First, on monetary policy. Since the main goal of conducting monetary policy is to ensure sustainable economic growth, the MPC’s decision-making has always based on the risk to economic growth, inflation, as well as financial stability. This year, the challenge would be striking the right balance between economic growth and financial stability as inflationary pressure is well contained in the short run. Given buoyant domestic spending, keeping the policy interest rate too low for too long could give incentive to private sectors to borrow more. Furthermore, low interest rate will encourage depositors to switch to invest in riskier asset which could lead to the problem of asset price bubble in the future.
A key channel is obviously through the interest rates faced by households and businesses when they want to borrow, for example to buy houses or to invest. Fixed-rate mortgages have become increasingly popular in recent years and now  represent 95 per cent of the flow of new lending and 80 per cent of the stock. Two-year fixedrate products are particularly popular and their cost to the lenders who provide them is derived from two-year interest rate swaps. A year ago the two-year swap rate was 0.5%, a month ago it was 4%, after the 22 September MPC meeting it was close to 4.5% and at yesterday’s market close it was around 5.4% having peaked at nearly 6% in the intervening fortnight. (Chart 6). Chart 6: UK 2-year swap rate  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculators  The Bank’s latest figures for quoted mortgage rates in September were published this morning. Because these are averages for the month they lag somewhat market measures, but the increases are still marked. Quoted mortgages rates on two-year fixed rate mortgages increased by around 50bps between August and September and were up by nearly 300bps compared to last September and have been rising further into the start of October. Recently lenders have also withdrawn a large number of mortgage products from the market because of the turbulent market conditions.

Ex ante assessments, based on the introduction of compulsory impact studies in 2009, have remained under used as a management tool, "too often appearing as a self-serving justification for the laws they accompany". iii Ex-post assessments have also been developed in France either by public bodies or academic research, but contribute more to methodological debates than to any real objectification conducive to action. Dwindling academic research Meanwhile, what can we say about academic and economic research in this area? In the 1980s and 1990s, this was mainly influenced by the New Public Management (NPM) school of thought, which adopted management methods from the private sector, with a focus on incentives for public servants and more variable pay. The Virginia School’s Public Choice theory (Downs, Buchanan, Tullock) even proposed to turn the concept of public action on its head: individualistic officials and policies could pursue private interests rather than spontaneously acting in the general interest. I personally remember the shock that I and the whole generation of civil servants around me experienced when Jean-Jacques Laffont questioned the principle of the "benevolent state" in a presentation he made to the Economic Advisory Council (CAE) in 1999. Fortunately, Jean Tirole has since clarified and qualified the analysis in "Économie du bien commun, iv where he called for the creation of "real public service bosses", and for them to be afforded "considerable managerial freedom accompanied by strict ex-post evaluation". NPM gave rise to performance incentives based on indicators and assessments.
Other things being equal, bank balance sheets – and so broad money – would expand, but it might be hard to judge the extent of any inflationary impulse coming through a “shock” to the supply of broad money over and above that stemming from a relaxation in credit constraints and higher asset prices. Also, although a “counterparts” approach to the monetary aggregates would incline one to think that shocks to the supply of credit would flow into broad money, changes in the “technology” of banking and financial intermediation might in some conditions make the connection tenuous. After all, the intermediation of credit occurs via capital markets and not just across bank balance sheets. That could matter, for example, if an increase in the supply of credit happened to occur at much the same time as an increase in incentives or the means for banks to securitise – ie sell – the loans they originate. In the limiting case, a big positive shock to the supply of credit could coincide with shrinking bank balance sheets and so negative broad money growth. That is, of course, not at all what we have 33 seen recently. But the thought experiment underlines two things. First, we need to attend carefully to the underlying drivers. As part of that effort, the Bank has recently launched a new Credit Conditions Survey, which should enrich our grasp of what is going on.

For example, in Germany, the institution that became the highly independent Bundesbank was established as part of the country’s reconstruction after WWII and so before its new democracy was embedded. It had “goal independence”. And in the US, while there is hesitation over giving the Federal Reserve an inflation target, as great weight is placed by Congress on the “dual mandate”, there is not concern about the scope or mechanics of the FOMC’s accountability to Congress. Every member of the executive arm of the government is unelected except the President. The central bank is no outlier. 18 But in the UK it really was a novelty – in a way, a constitutional departure, foreshadowed perhaps only by the judiciary 19 – to give such a politically sensitive lever to a body of unelected technicians. The institutional obstacles to Bank of England “independence” therefore needed institutional solutions. Responsibility for bank regulation was transferred from the Bank in 1997. The pathway to resolution of the “democratic deficit” problem had potentially been opened up in the 1980s by the St John Stevas reforms of Parliamentary Committees which led, over time, to a Treasury Committee with a high reputation and standing, supported by access to expert advice. In the 1997 reforms, the sphere of politics was carefully delineated. The goal of price stability is set by Parliament in legislation; and, within that framework, the Chancellor of the day sets the Bank its target for inflation.
So this situation hardly constitutes a macroeconomic problem at present. In actual fact, one of the aims of the low interest rates has been exactly to create conditions for households to reduce their saving and maintain their consumption in the weaker economic climate. In spite of this, there is reason for the Riksbank to monitor developments carefully. There is also good reason for individual households to reflect on their debt situation. Interest rates are unusually low at present and will most probably change in the future. On the whole, there is no reason to make any marked adjustment to the overall outlook for demand in the Swedish economy in the coming years compared with in December or February. Most factors still indicate that growth in household consumption will continue to be stable around 2.5 per cent in the  2  BIS Review 16/2004  years ahead. The contribution to growth from exports will probably be somewhat higher than previously expected, but a large part of the effect on demand will be offset by the fact that this could also be the case for imports. Local government consumption appears to be somewhat weaker than we thought in December. Investment is a source of uncertainty and could probably pick up somewhat later than forecast. On the whole, therefore, GDP growth may be roughly as we expected in the December Inflation Report and when we took our decision in February, reaching around 2.5 per cent per year in the years ahead.

However, there was a marked change over the course of 2003; between the first and second halves of the year growth rose from 1.4 to 1.8 per cent. The situation at present is that the upswing in industry has progressed somewhat. Export demand has gathered pace, and firms are fairly optimistic about the future. It also appears that capacity utilisation in industry is continuing to rise. Exports were unexpectedly strong during the final two quarters last year, and business tendency data point to continued optimism in the period ahead. Households’ expectations regarding both their own finances and the Swedish economy have also begun to rise again after having fallen somewhat at the end of last year. Retail sales figures indicate a continuation of robust consumption. Low interest rates, rising equity prices and low inflation will boost consumption in the period ahead as well. While on the subject of household consumption allow me to say something about the recent discussion on household indebtedness. Debt as a proportion of households’ disposable income continued to grow last year, and the debt ratio is now approaching the levels seen during the sharp expansion in credit at the end of the 1980s. At the same time, low interest rates mean that households’ interest costs as a percentage of income is at a historically low level. The latter means that it is not a great problem today for the household sector to bear its debt even if this debt of course limits households’ scope for consumption in the near future.
So allow me to briefly pause here and explain clearly my own intentions with regard to the next halfhour. The theme of my speech here today is how the Riksbank’s independent position, together with a high degree of transparency and efficient communication, contributes to long-term target fulfilment and credibility for monetary policy. Key words in this context are evaluation and accountability. It is these different pieces of the puzzle that I now wish to discuss in more detail. The Riksbank’s position – from bank crisis in the 17th century to independent central bank The fact that we are in this room today is actually rather appropriate. I can tell you an interesting fact here – that the Riksbank and the Riksdag had a fairly intimate relationship, in geographical terms, for over 70 years, from the early 20th century up until 1976. The Riksbank was then located in the building across the street, where the Riksdag now has its assembly hall. Riksbank officials thus sat almost side by side with the people’s elected representatives. Now I do not believe one should draw any far-reaching conclusions on the degree of independence for monetary policy on the basis of geographical location – other factors decide this. But for those who have any doubts, I can point out that the Riksbank is now at a more “suitable” walking distance from the Riksdag, a few blocks away. BIS Review 62/2007  1  The Riksbank is formally an authority under the Riksdag.

The 2022 Corruption Perception Index published by Transparency International report showed that Malaysia is ranked 61, compared to 51 in 2019. While Malaysia has placed priority on addressing corruption and strengthening governance and integrity in recent times, for example through the National Anti-Corruption plan, it is imperative for all stakeholders to actively play their role in this very important endeavour. Ladies and gentlemen, Integrity holds an even more foundational place within Islamic finance. Upholding high standards of ethical behaviour and personal integrity at all times are not simply actions that guarantee good governance or financial stability. In our shared faith, they are virtuous ends within themselves. Many verses of the Quran and hadiths emphasise the importance of integrity. One such example is in Sahih Al-Bukhari 7138, where the Nabi Muhammad s.a.w. said: "Surely! Every one of you is a guardian and is accountable for his charges". In today's speech, I would like to touch upon two aspects of banking where the integrity of an institution truly comes to the fore. One, corporate governance and workplace culture. Every individual is responsible for their actions, but what parameters has the institution put in place to make it easier to do the right thing? 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Two, the institutional role in preserving national integrity through effective and strict measures against money laundering and terrorism financing – more commonly referred to as ML/TF risks. Firstly, governance and culture.
“Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the Euro area periphery and core.” Economic Papers 506, European Commission. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  been urging a faster pace of structural reforms for many years now and I wish more governments would listen. But monetary policy and domestic structural reforms should not be the only game in town. We need a better overall policy mix. Against a background of accommodative monetary policy and faster economic reform, we need looser and better targeted fiscal policy at a European level. For example, more could be done to increase investment in public infrastructure, education and apprenticeship in Southern Europe. Fiscal expenditure could be shifted towards retraining programmes or other measures to help shift resources between sectors. One way of thinking about our current predicament is that the natural short-term real rate of interest is too low, due to insufficient ex ante investment relative to savings. The ECB has been providing substantial monetary accommodation using unconventional tools to try to push down the effective nominal rate. A better way in the long-term would be to raise the natural real rate of interest through stronger economic growth and investment. Conclusion As for many other economic policies and concepts, the Great Recession led us to reconsider the role of central banks with regard to medium and long-term growth. Beyond their normaltime contribution to long-term growth as price stability guardians, central banks in deep depression have to act against the hysteresis effects of the crisis and the damages from financial sector disruptions.

This has not only created, regardless of existing differences at the state level, a common legal environment, but also led to harmonised or similar policies in most other areas and not least fostered the development of a common ground of behaviour in economic life. By contrast, the history of the 11 Member States of the euro area was different. Notwithstanding my earlier reference to the integration process over the last decades and the EU institutional set-up for the coordination of economic policies, Europe is still a more heterogeneous area than the United States. The Treaty establishing the European Community does not state how price stability is to be maintained. In other words, it does not define what is called a monetary policy strategy. Therefore, the Eurosystem has designed its own stability-oriented strategy. Apart from the quantitative definition of price stability, it consists of two pillars. The first pillar is a prominent role for a broad monetary aggregate, M3. This is based on the view that inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon. A reference value of 4½% for annual M3 growth has been defined. Deviations of actual monetary growth from the reference value will not be corrected mechanically, but will always be analysed with regard to the signals they provide with regard to future price developments. The reason for being cautious is that the introduction of the euro may have changed the behaviour of economic subjects, also their demand for money.
The important point, however, is that in the euro area today structural reforms are not about creating minor efficiencies or marginal gains. They are about unleashing an untapped potential for substantially higher output, employment and welfare. And in the current environment, this would play a crucial role in ensuring that the ongoing cyclical recovery becomes a stronger, structural recovery. Structural reform in a fragile demand environment This discussion on the importance of structural reforms leads in principle to only one conclusion: the earlier they take place, the better. However, while most of us might agree with this statement in normal times, the fact that interest rates have reached the effective lower bound, coupled with the still fragile cyclical situation, makes the situation less straightforward. In particular, the question has been raised as to whether implementing structural reforms when the economy is still weak would be counterproductive, in the sense that it would make it harder to achieve our mandate by further reducing short-term demand. One argument that has been put forward in this context is that, if reforms lead to a credible increase in aggregate supply, they will exert downward pressure on inflation expectations. And if nominal interest rates cannot fall because monetary policy is at the lower bound, real interest rates will then rise, creating contractionary short-term effects. 12 A parallel argument in favour of postponing structural reforms relates to their short-term effects on employment.

And this is why, as I have said many times, I believe there is a strong case for governance of structural reforms to be exercised jointly at the euro area level: to help each country to achieve the necessary level of resilience; and to ensure that they maintain that resilience permanently. 4 Since structural reforms in any euro area country are a legitimate interest of the whole union, there needs to be stronger ownership of reforms not just at the national level, but at the European level as well. Several countries have however made significant progress with structural reforms during the crisis, and we can already see how this has altered the relationship between inflation and unemployment. Various estimates of the euro area Phillips curve show that, while the slope has varied over time, it has steepened in recent years. In particular, there is evidence that inflation has become increasingly responsive to cyclical conditions in countries that have reformed their product and labour markets, such as Spain 5 and Italy 6. Raising potential growth Besides this issue of resilience, as the central bank of the euro area we also have another, equally direct interest in structural reforms. This is related to their effect on growth – or more specifically, the challenges posed by a period of low potential growth. International institutions currently estimate potential growth to be below 1% in the euro area, compared with above 2% in the US (Chart 3).