samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In any event, the recovery was still influenced by the course of the pandemic, partly as a result of the emergence of new variants of the virus. Another novel feature of economic performance in 2021 was the strong global surge in inflation. This was especially severe in both energy and non-energy commodities, after many years in which their price increases had remained at persistently low levels. The intensity and persistence of the inflation surge – fuelled by both demand and supply factors – systematically surprised on the upside. Notable among the demand factors are the relatively strong recovery in activity following the collapse in 2020 and the changing consumption patterns as a consequence of the pandemic and the measures adopted to contain it. Among the supply factors, global production and supply chain disruptions, as a consequence of the disruptions in the production of certain intermediate goods and in some modes of international goods transport, stand out. Both these aspects – a recovery influenced by the course of the pandemic and continuous upside inflation surprises – continued to determine the pace of the global economy at the start of 2022. Accordingly, before the invasion, analyst consensus forecasts broadly coincided in expecting a first quarter in which economic activity would decelerate somewhat as a consequence of the negative, but relatively limited, impact of the Omicron variant.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: 10th year anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 10th Anniversary Dinner, Kuala Lumpur, 16 May 2013. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to welcome Your Excellencies and distinguished guests to this IFSB 10th Anniversary Dinner, organised in conjunction with the 10th IFSB Summit. Tonight is a landmark celebration of the 10th year anniversary of the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), as we commemorate a decade of milestones and achievements of the IFSB and pay tribute to its members and industry stakeholders that have provided undivided support to the Board. Bank Negara Malaysia is indeed honoured to have the opportunity to host this 10th IFSB Summit, which is exactly ten years since we hosted the IFSB inauguration in November 2002. We are also very pleased to welcome back the Founding Members and many of the industry leaders that witnessed the inauguration of the IFSB. We are very honoured to have your presence at this Anniversary Dinner. It was in the year 2000 that the discussion began on the merits of establishing a dedicated organisation to develop a separate and distinct regulatory framework for the global Islamic finance industry.
In some, the financial authorities might decide the scale of the haircuts/conversions; perhaps in other countries, it might be thought that a senior judge should decide on the basis of an application by the financial authorities. It is also worth saying that maintaining an LCFI in business through such means would neither preclude nor of itself require regulatory action against management or, once the crisis had passed, to wind-down parts or all of the business over time. Nor would a regime of the broad kind I have sketched exclude restructuring banking groups into functional subsidiaries, with different resolution tools applied to, say, deposittaking/payments; custody and global cash management; the business of illiquid lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and households; trading/derivatives business or wholesale banking more generally. That would not be inconsistent with reducing the number of legal entities in LCFI groups, perhaps by an order of magnitude. The current FSBsponsored work to develop “recovery and resolution plans” for the top 25 or so LCFIs is designed to identify where those kind of steps are warranted. Resolution could, therefore, take its place alongside structure and regulation as one of the key elements of a reform package to strengthen the global financial system. A super-special resolution regime along those lines would, on the face of it, go quite a long way towards reintroducing market discipline – by putting uninsured creditors at risk even in systemic situations. I am not innocent enough in the ways of the market to think that it wouldn’t affect behaviour.

Bluntly, the challenge is how to sustain the provision of financial services during a crisis without the state bailing out uninsured creditors. BIS Review 33/2010  1  Handling LCFI complex derivative/trading portfolios Some types of business activity, particularly complex trading, do not lend themselves at all well to the standard resolution tools I summarised just now. Not least, unwinding a derivatives book is especially complicated; it typically requires dynamic hedging to preserve value, and that would be very hard indeed in a liquidation. Counterparties flee. Funding flees. The Lehman and AIG experiences demonstrate this. So, in a different context, does the time it took Berkshire Hathaway to wind down the complex derivatives portfolio of its Gen Re subsidiary; years, not months. What can be done? One route, suggested by those examples, would be for the authorities to finance the wind down of complex trading positions, in what would be in effect an analogue to US-style debtor-in-possession financing. The authorities would be preferred creditors. That kind of approach could be used either briefly, in order to bridge to an insolvency procedure, which would amount to putting a framework around the kind of operation the NYFed mounted for a week or so to contain disruption from the failure of Lehman’s US broker-dealer. Or, alternatively, it could in principle be used over a prolonged period, to finance the run off of a whole book.
“Since the medium-term equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the composition of unemployment, it will change over time…That medium-term equilibrium unemployment rate is a different concept from the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate: the latter is the rate to which unemployment will trend towards in the long run once all of the short and medium-term effects have dissipated. That long-run equilibrium rate will reflect the institutional features of the labour market, such as the degree of labour market flexibility, and the extent to which potential employees are aligned with vacancies in terms of skills, location and occupation. Over time, the medium-term equilibrium unemployment rate should converge towards the long-run rate. Current estimates of the long-run equilibrium rate are significantly below estimates of the medium-term equilibrium rate.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  This suggests that, even though unemployment is falling faster than expected, the recovery has some way to run before it would be appropriate to consider moving away from the emergency setting of monetary policy. It is widely recognised that our 7% threshold is not a trigger for raising Bank Rate. Last August, the MPC said that when the 7% unemployment threshold was reached, there should be no assumption of an immediate, automatic change to its policy stance. It would assess the prevailing economic conditions, including wider measures of slack and inflationary pressures, before deciding the appropriate stance for monetary policy.

These banks are on course to meet these new requirements five years before the deadline, having raised more than half a trillion dollars of new equity. In the UK alone they have raised £ To ensure that this is sufficient, the Bank of England will begin annual concurrent stress tests of major institutions this year. The Bank is also working with international peers to tackle worryingly large differences in bank risk models through tighter supervision, more standardised approaches and better disclosure. To make markets safer, funding and derivatives markets are being overhauled. Recognising that this will transform the use and importance of collateral, the Bank is reforming our market operations. We are also working to develop market-based sources of finance so that the real economy can be less reliant on banks. To make the system fairer, the days when banks privatised gains but socialised losses must end. The Bank is at the forefront of international efforts to agree common standards to create classes of debt holders that can be bailed in to recapitalise failing institutions. By complementing this so-called gone concern loss absorbing capacity with cross border agreements, plans on resolution, and new derivative contracts with automatic stays, we can create the situation where the incentives of shareholders, management, bondholders, and citizens are aligned. Firms that take excessive risks will bear the full consequences of the market; consumers, businesses and taxpayers who rely on critical banking services will not. It is not the Bank of England’s role to champion the City.
However, they pay less than intermediate and advanced tech roles and have not appealed to Singaporeans as much. The recent increase in minimum qualifying salary to $ for entry-level employment pass holders in the financial sector means that it would be harder for financial institutions to hire cheaper foreigners for these roles. We hope more locals will take up these job roles, even if they are less paid, which also provide a pathway to the intermediate tech jobs, which are in demand. Beyond the technology function, there is healthy demand for jobs across diﬀerent business lines, including consumer banking, corporate banking, private banking and wealth management. These jobs are in three broad categories:  business roles, for example, relationship managers, product advisory, and portfolio management; control roles, for example, customer due diligence, compliance, and risk management; and https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/gearing-up-for-new-and-evolving-jobs-in-financial-services  9/18  04/12/2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authorit…  transformation roles, for example, digital transformation, innovation and process excellence. In our survey, we also asked financial institutions about the profile of candidates that they hope to hire. We found that for over 60% of the jobs, financial institutions are looking for experienced hires or specialists to fill these roles. I can understand that for many roles, there is indeed a business need to hire people with direct experience and deep expertise.

Following the monetary policy meeting at the end of June, new inflation figures have been published for June and July. These show that the CPI and the CPIF rose by 1.1 and 1.7 per cent respectively in July, compared with the same month last year. Inflation is so far in line with the assessments in the Monetary Policy Report: in July underlying inflation was only 0.1 of a percentage point lower than the forecast in our Report. Long-term inflation expectations It is important to the Riksbank that long-term inflation expectations in society are anchored securely around the inflation target of 2 per cent. This makes our work easier. If most people expect inflation to be 2 per cent, this affects price-setting and wage-formation, so that we can more easily attain the inflation target in the long term (even if short-term fluctuations cause inflation to deviate from the target level). This is the reason why we carefully follow inflation expectations. According to a survey from Prospera, inflation expectations for the coming five-year period were on average 2.2 per cent in June. This figure represents an average for all respondents. (Figure: Inflation and inflation expectations). Recovery in the Swedish economy To summarise, the new information presented during the summer supports the Riksbank’s view that the Swedish economy is continuing to recover. GDP growth has so far this year been slightly higher than we had expected, and the labour market has shown slightly stronger development. Inflation has largely been in line with our forecasts.
In this light, the recent increase in borrowing among younger individuals is consistent with an improvement in labor market prospects and some loosening of credit standards, although the increase in borrowing by younger age cohorts is modest and remains below their pre-crisis level. The high level of student debt may create the risk of a drag on future consumption growth. In fact, while highly skilled young workers have traditionally provided a vital influx of new, affluent consumers to U.S. housing and auto markets, the unprecedented growth in student debt and the persistently high student loan delinquency rates are likely to dampen the influence of this group in today’s marketplace and may represent a structural or longlasting change in household credit markets. To summarize, I have reviewed the many positive signals we should take from the fact that in 2013 we observed the first year-over-year increase in borrowing by U.S. households since 2008. The willingness of U.S. households to increase their debt levels in aggregate likely reflects the restorative influences of significant turnarounds in house prices and stock market values since their lows in 2009–10, somewhat better employment outcomes, and much stronger household balance sheets as a result of write-offs and pay-downs of earlier indebtedness. In addition, a gradual loosening of credit availability is likely to have accommodated the increased demand for credit, although mortgage lending continues to be subject to high credit standards.

3  See Atif Mian and Amir Sufi (2011), ‘‘House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S. Household Leverage Crisis,’’ American Economic Review 101, 2132–56, and (2011), ‘‘What Explains High Unemployment? The Aggregate Demand Channel,’’ University of Chicago, unpublished paper. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  reversal reduced the aggregate wealth of homeowners and, in the worst case, left many “underwater,” meaning that the amount of mortgage debt secured by their home exceeded its current value. This outcome is reflected in the dramatic decline in owners’ equity in household real estate, seen in Chart 3 (Result was a Huge Decline in Owners’ Equity in HH RE). It is interesting to note that while home prices rose during the boom, homeowner’s equity share remained constant. Thus, prior to the end of 2006, on average for each 1 percent increase in home prices, homeowners increased their mortgage debt by 1 percent (through higher balances on first mortgages, cash-out refinances, second mortgages, and home equity lines of credit). When house values began to fall, so did corporate equity values, which depressed household wealth further Chart 4 (Stock Market Wealth also Fell Sharply), limiting households’ options for reducing their debt burdens or sustaining their prior levels of consumption. Consequently, and in line with the logic of the research I discussed earlier, U.S. households decreased the cash flow available for consumption by paying down debt during the recession and early recovery.
In fact, during the turmoil precautionary buffers have increased very significantly, and there is on an aggregate level a large amount of over-collateralisation in collateral pools held with the Eurosystem. Hence, only a part of the ABSs deposited as collateral with us are effectively refinanced in our temporary operations. Nevertheless it is fair to say that the ability to use ABSs as collateral with the Eurosystem helps counterparties to hedge the refinancing risk of those assets. One phenomenon which shows to what extent the primary and secondary markets for ABSs have become dislocated since the outbreak of the turmoil is the fact that many ABS transactions were not placed in the public market but taken onto the balance sheet of the originator and/or privately placed. Indeed, as shown in Chart 5, issuance of publicly placed securitised products in Europe declined substantially in August last year and has since September hovered around a very low level per month. At the same time, deals that have been privately placed or retained by the originator have been consistently higher than public issuance since August, reaching a peak of around € billion in December 2007. The Eurosystem’s collateral rules may partly explain why at least euro denominated securitisation issuance has not come to a halt notwithstanding the withdrawal of third party investors.

This proposal is an important step to encourage a strong corporate and market focus on how Islamic financial institutions are generating value, not just for shareholders, but for the communities which they are a part of. On-going collaboration and active engagement with the industry are currently being undertaken under this initiative to ensure proactive behaviours and sustained momentum towards the creation of a sustainable development. Another precondition for long term sustainable value creations is the availability of top-notch talent to drive and execute innovative business strategies that will realise the full potential of Islamic finance. Based on market assessments, a greater pool of quality professionals are required to sustain the growth of global Islamic finance that is estimated to surpass $ trillion total assets size by 2020. The challenge in meeting this demand however goes beyond the numbers. The next phase of growth and development of Islamic finance calls for a deep talent pool that not only has a strong foundation in the application of Islamic finance principles, but also the much broader set of competencies required to use those applications effectively to provide and implement solutions to real world problems. And such talent must be developed not only within Islamic financial institutions, but also the professional ancillary service providers that are part of the Islamic finance ecosystem. In Malaysia, there are close to 40 professional ancillary services entities under the MIFC Community which play an important role in the development of Islamic finance.
The repo-rate path chosen by the majority does not meet the well-known necessary but not sufficient condition for a well-balanced monetary policy formulated by the Deputy Governor of the Norwegian central bank Jan Qvigstad (2005). Applied to inflation and unemployment, this condition means that the inflation gap (the difference between inflation and the inflation target) and the unemployment gap should have the same sign. As the inflation gap is negative and the unemployment gap is positive for the majority’s repo-rate path for most of the forecast interval, this condition is not met. With a lower repo-rate path, on the other hand, the gap for both would be reduced and target attainment for both inflation and unemployment would thus increase. The fact that monetary policy is not well-balanced for the majority’s repo-rate path is clearly demonstrated if one uses mean square gaps to measure target attainment as in Figures 7 and 8. Figure 7 shows the forecasts for the CPIF and unemployment that are compatible with the main scenario’s repo-rate path and the higher and lower repo-rate paths published in Chapter 2 of the Monetary Policy Report in February. Panel b shows that the repo-rate path of the main scenario does not meet the Qvigstad condition. Neither is it effective, as a lower repo-rate path stabilises both inflation and unemployment better. Figure 8 shows the main scenario’s repo-rate path and the lower path that Karolina Ekholm and I advocated at the meeting.

Such challenges have all been the preoccupation of your majesty, and you have been constantly urging the authorities concerned to overcome them. The most prominent of those challenges are the following: First: employment of the Saudi youth, which constitutes one of the major challenges facing the national economy. In spite of the good achievements made in the preceding period, estimates indicate that unemployment among Saudis amounted to about 9.6 percent in 2009. Given the rate of population growth and structure, it is important to continue intensifying current efforts to increase investment to develop the human capital with the active participation of the private and public sectors. Efforts should be intensified for Saudizing the jobs in the private sector, and obstacles hindering this process should be considered and eliminated. The percentage of Saudization fit for the nature of each activity and sector needs to be determined, and work should be made to activate the procedures and regulations that respect productivity and safeguard the rights of workers and employers alike. Second: good utilization of economic resources of our country, most notably oil and gas that represent the most important elements of the economic development of the Kingdom. Figures indicate that the rates of domestic consumption of the Kingdom’s oil and gas are growing at high rates, recording an average growth of 5.9 percent during the past five years. This is a high growth rate compared to the population growth and the size of GDP, which calls for investigating the reasons for such an increase and rationalizing it.
First, it led to bank supervision becoming the responsibility of an increasing number of central banks. Second, the focus on systemic stability led to the emergence of macroprudential supervision as an explicit concept and task for which naturally central banks have become responsible. In Bulgaria the monetary regime can be viewed as a rather traditional one, the primary objective of the BNB being to maintain price stability through ensuring the stability of the national currency. For more than 20 years now, our regime has been based on the operation of the currency board. The BNB also conducts micro- and macroprudential policies. As a matter of fact, well before the recent global crisis we designed and applied countercyclical macroprudential measures, even though the term ‘macroprudential’ was still not being used. Many other countries in the region, subject to massive capital inflows at the time, did the same. Therefore, the BNB’s tasks and responsibilities, as we see them today, are an outcome of decades of evolution. And this reflects, and is consistent with, the long-term developments of central banks’ mandates globally. It can be argued from a historical perspective that changes in these mandates follow common evolutionary paths which are often shaped by crises, such as the global one in 2007/2008. The financial stability focus That led to reassessing the importance of financial stability as a policy objective of central banks. Before the 2007/2008 global crisis, central banks focused on price stability as their primary objective.

One important step led to a common methodology for the supervisory review and evaluation process, the core of supervisory activities and the basis for the capital level the SSM expects a bank to hold according to its individual risk profile. Starting with 19 different supervisory practices and information levels, it was pivotal to set a basis of quantitative as well as qualitative information about individual banks and the differences in national banking systems. We can now reap the fruit from  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  having a single European supervisor by moving our capacity for benchmarking to a European level. But it was not only a busy year, it was a very special year, too. Everything we decided, we decided for first time. Everything we did set a precedent. Thus, everything had to be discussed in the Supervisory Board of the SSM, consisting of the representatives of the 26 national supervisory authorities as well as of 6 ECB representatives. We formulated supervisory policies in all major areas, for example large exposure limits, the fitness and properness of board members, conditions for changes in qualifying holdings, prerequisites for capital reductions and issuances, model approvals, capital and liquidity waivers, IPS etc. We also discussed and agreed on concepts and processes for supervisory planning, onsite inspections, risk analysis, reporting of banks. Integrating 19 national supervisory cultures and traditions with a wide range of administrative practices demanded and still demands organisational and methodological rigour.