samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Imagine the developments following the World War II, when central banks widely accepted their transition from private to public ownership and when they realised that it was not only necessary but also imperative to cooperate, regardless of physical barriers. Imagine, for example, the president of the Federal Reserve, who wasted three months to travel to Europe and two weeks to receive a letter from his homologues overseas. Actually, central banks have increased their efforts for a better and more fruitful cooperation. This is an undeniable truth. It has been a distinct feature of our work in recent years. Since my first public appearance as Governor of the Bank of Albania, I have pronounced my ambition for Bank of Albania’s legal and institutional transformation in line with the model of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). I am fully confident that the successful conclusion of the Twinning Project with the Banca d’Italia and Banque de France is another determinant step forward in the joint efforts to strengthen cooperation and elevate our work standards to European levels. Today, we see that, in a few months, a brilliant idea has turned into reality and the project has been crowned with success. The project objective was to improve our work practices in the field of banking supervision, statistics, payment systems, interbank market, coordination of EU integration process and financial literacy. More specifically, cooperation in banking supervision focused on implementing major reforms in areas such as consolidated supervision, approval of new regulations and staff training.

A proverb says: “No matter how long the journey is, one has to take the first step to start off.” This philosophy was made concrete through this twinning project, which along with the assistance in the afore-mentioned areas, was also the first step on the path of our institution to EU standards, as one of the priorities of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the Banca d’Italia and the Banque de France for the outstanding cooperation we have had during the project implementation. I commend the efforts of both honoured institutions and hope that the successful implementation of this project will provide us with an example to involve more in such initiatives in the future. Also, I want to extend my thanks to the Delegation of the European Union for its ongoing assistance and prudence throughout the project performance. I am deeply confident that these are only the first steps towards a close cooperation. I would like to conclude by bringing to your attention a statement of Mr. Shimon Peres, who, listening to his advisor, Agassi, who was speaking about developing alternative oil sources in the absence of oil, interrupted him by saying: Nice speech, but what are we going to do? In light of this, we should think about what to do in the future. I think that the political coverage of this approximation process is important, with which I mean Brussels’ probable acceptance of Albania’s application for membership in September.
However, obtaining capital in the international market is a laborious and long-term work that requires a systematic build-up of confidence. Every new lender must become acquainted with the borrower’s name and history and eventually request a limit in his board. This takes time and the process is not simplified by a common currency. With regard to building up the international investment base, the Swedish housing credit institutions have perhaps had slightly different approaches and priorities. Having a well-established network of contacts among the European investors is surely not a bad idea the day that the euro becomes our own currency. It is interesting to note the rapid increase in Swedish corporate bonds issued in euro during the autumn. The supply of government bonds has decreased which has led investors to look for other alternatives, but they have clearly become increasingly interested in assuming additional risk in exchange for some additional interest rate percentage points in the return. Eriksson, Volvo and now most recently Birka Energi are making company presentations at places in Europe where few investors have previously shown interest. And Birka can hardly be said to be a familiar name in the market outside Sweden. This development should also include opportunities for the housing loan institutions.

However, a not inconsiderable risk capital or guarantees from the owners have also been required. Capital adequacy in the Swedish companies is shown in figure 3. If – or rather when – the owners’ requirements for return on the capital contributed increase this can be problem. Mortgage banks capital ratio and tier 1 capital ratio 1998. Per cent Capital ratio  Tier 1 capital ratio  • Handelsbanken Hypotek  10,7  10,0  • Stadshypotek  13,1  12,7  • Spintab  16,0  11,1  • SBAB  10,6  6,9  • Nordbanken Hypotek  10,5  8,8  • S E B BoLån  8,4  4,3  During the financial crisis in Sweden, the balance sheets were for obvious reasons insufficient to enable the institutions to borrow at competitive prices in the international market. This uncertainty on asset values was all too great for a while. Since then, however, creditworthiness has been continually increased, which is reflected in a gradually improved international rating. The Swedish housing loan institutions have today around 13% of their borrowing abroad. Traditionally the Swedish insurance companies and pension boards have been large purchasers of housing institution bonds. A part of the international borrowing has taken place in Europe, in particular in London, while the major part has originated from investors in the USA and Japan. An interesting issue is whether the ability to borrow in euro will make the Central European investors more interested in Swedish risks than before? It remains to be seen.
But as with CCP margin, it is important that we remember the reasons for the regulatory reforms in this area. As I have noted, one of the key differences between this crisis and the financial crisis has been the ability of the core banks to absorb a very severe financial market shock. We should not put that at risk by weakening the regulation of banks. If we want to increase the overall resilience of the system we cannot simply lower resilience in one area in order to strengthen it in another. Rather we need to look at other ways to reduce surges in the demand for liquidity and improve the supply of liquidity under stress. See BIS (2017) ‘Repo market functioning’ https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs59.htm and BIS (209) ‘September stress in dollar repo markets: passing or structural?’ https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1912v.htm 14  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13  Conclusion  The issues outlined above are neither an exhaustive nor a definitive list. There are other lessons about the financial system under stress that we will inevitably learn as this crisis progresses. Not all of these will be in the financial market and non-bank sectors. We will, as I have said inevitably learn more about the performance under stress of the banking capital regime and the usability of banks’ capital buffers. But the list, I think illustrates two important points.

In respect of green and sustainable finance, the Government is also setting up a committee with industry experts in green technology, green finance and green standard certification to formulate an agenda for developing Hong Kong into an international green technology and finance centre; and expanding the scope of the Government Green Bond Programme to cover sustainable finance projects. We trust that these will make the Hong Kong platform and ecosystem even more attractive and conducive to market participants looking to seize the opportunities ahead. 17. I know I have covered quite a lot already, so let me close here. I wish today's Summit the very best success. And I look forward to working with the APLMA and all of you here to promote the further growth of our loan market in the future. 18. Thank you. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Without commenting on the specifics of any particular case, let me offer a view of what I see as fundamental tenets of a credible approach by the international community to situations where a sovereign finds it necessary to restructure its obligations to private creditors: The IMF should be willing to lend to a sovereign that is in default to its private creditors only when two conditions have been established: First, the country must commit to a credible medium-term adjustment program, one that offers the prospect of a successful restructuring and a reasonably early return to the capital markets. This has to be established up front for any restructuring effort to work. Commitment to a credible adjustment path that offers the reasonable prospect of a return to financial viability and growth is the necessary foundation for engagement by the creditors in a restructuring process. Without that, there is little basis for meaningful engagement. The science of economics does not provide a definitive answer to what that adjustment path must be, but it does offer the means to determine a reasonable band of outcomes between the inadequate and the excessive. This judgment must be made by the government. It can be informed by consultations with the creditors. Ultimately, though, it has to be endorsed by the Fund, if the Fund is to lend.

Concluding remarks By way of conclusion, there are a number of issues on which we need to evolve our thinking. I believe that the contributions to this conference have indeed succeeded in capturing the most important and relevant ones. 2  See, for example, Fischer, S. (1996), “Why Are Central Banks Pursuing Long-Run Price Stability”, in Achieving Price Stability, symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. A recent reference that has brought the problem to the fore once again is Faust, J. and D.W. Henderson (2004), “Is Inflation Targeting BestPractice Monetary Policy?”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 86(4), 117-143. BIS Review 45/2005  3  One of the most central from my point of view concerns, as I have indicated, the balance between inflation stability and output stability - both in terms of the most appropriate way to accommodate it in the practical policy and the best way to communicate it. Although there is hardly any doubt that “we are all flexible inflation targeters now”, how can we progress as regards concretising this flexibility in action and communication? Another interesting question is whether inflation targeting is better suited than other regimes when it comes to anchoring long-term inflation expectations. I have always thought so myself, but it is of course an issue that requires empirical investigation.
A core motivation, for the quick actions taken by central banks during this crisis, has been to restore an orderly functioning of money markets. High volatility, high risk premia, impaired interbank and funding markets hurt the normal transmission of monetary impulses. Starting in the summer of 2007, Central Banks were confronted with major and unprecedented tensions. Increasing uncertainty led to liquidity hoarding by financial institutions. Banks severely limited the maturity, the scale and the number of their counterparties, severely affecting the functioning of the interbank market. These interventions were adjusted to the specific structures of the financial system in which central banks operate. In the US, where financial intermediation is heavily dependent on securitized credit markets, this involved significant asset purchases by the Central Bank. By contrast, in the Euro area, where financial intermediation occurs mainly through the banking system, ECB actions were aimed at providing banks with sufficient liquidity through repo operations to secure the flow of credit to the economy. 6. In the Eurosystem, we have entered the crisis with a large set of tools. From the outset, our operational framework was based on a broad list of eligible counterparties and collateral. So, we could adjust rapidly to the shocks in money and credit markets even if the environment in which we had to operate has changed profoundly. 7.

A mere six quarters could therefore simply be too short a time horizon to allow for money to begin transmitting in any significant way its impact on inflation. The Fischer et al. paper will prove to be particularly valuable if it encourages further research to investigate the relevance and stability of its findings under different inflation regimes, in different economies and over longer time horizons. In this context, let me now briefly turn to the Swiss experience with money and monetary policy. 3. SNB experience using information from monetary aggregates  With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the SNB had to search for a new policy framework. 1 From 1974 until the end of the 1990s the SNB announced monetary targets; first for M1, and eventually for the monetary base. In 1978, the SNB abandoned its monetary target for a short period in favor of a nominal exchange rate target. 2 During the second half of the 1990s, the monetary base became instable. The SNB faced increasing difficulty using a money target for MO, let alone to communicate through them. Finally, the SNB decided to adopt an altogether new monetary framework in an effort to increase the clarity, transparency, and flexibility of the conduct of its monetary policy. The new concept, introduced in January 2000, is based on three elements: an explicit definition of price stability, an inflation forecast as the main indicator for policy decisions, and a range for the 3-month LIBOR as the operative target.
Before these problems are brought to light and dealt with, it will be hard to see any long-term solution for the European banking sector. A new framework – the way forward At the same time as the crisis has to be managed, those of us interested in financial markets must think ahead and build a more robust framework. The world doesn’t need a new 2008. Encouragingly enough, we have taken important steps towards creating structures that may prevent new problems. But there is still a lot of work to do. The crisis taught us lessons about risks in the financial sector Obviously, the experience of authorities around the world in the crisis will form the basis of a new and more secure financial framework. Academic research has also contributed valuable insights. It is obvious that risks in the financial sector were underestimated before the global financial crisis. One underestimation concerned the degree of correlation of risks in individual institutions. But it could also be argued that we, on the regulatory side, were a little naive regarding the risk of moral hazard in the governance of banks. To generalise slightly, it could be said that, before 2008, we felt quite safe when we saw that the risk in individual institutions looked manageable. Today, we know better. Even an individually well-diversified bank has assets that could be highly exposed to the same macroeconomic risk. In addition, as the banks largely act as each other’s counterparties, one bank’s problems can easily become another’s.

Through these functions, a meeting place is formed by the financial system (and particularly the banks) for the economic activities of households and companies. Perhaps it could be likened to a motorway junction for the economy. In the financial sector, the income and expenditure of households and companies meet like traffic flowing from all directions. A robust construction is needed to make this interaction proceed smoothly. When a lot of traffic is moving at high speed, the construction must also have a clear focus on safety. The higher the speed limit, the greater the safety margins must be. Financial crises have major macroeconomic costs Just like driving on a motorway, the financial system entails risks. On the roads, these risks do not just affect the driver’s own vehicle, but the entire flow of traffic. In the same way, the economic costs of a financial crisis are significant. Nobody could have missed this in recent years. We know that financial crises have permanent effects on growth. It is often not possible to recover from the major fall in GDP that is the consequence of a deep financial crisis in the period following such a crisis. Normally, we see a downwards shift in GDP level trend even if good times may then mean a return to the same rate of growth. The economic costs are significant. Of course, any estimate would vary depending on the crisis and assumptions, but a mainstream assessment would be just over 60 per cent of precrisis GDP.
Under the terms envisaged in the current Law on the Management, Supervision and Solvency of Credit Institutions, this cost will be borne by the banks, in accordance with the legally established keys and procedures. As to the total cost of the exercise for the ECB and the supervisory authorities as a whole, I am not yet in a position to provide it. But the cost is high. 4. Assessment of the exercise from an overall standpoint  First, I do believe that having conducted such an exercise in such a short period of time is an achievement in itself. Never to date has a stress test and an asset quality review been combined at the European level. It is a challenge of the first order, since banks from 19 countries with different supervisory models and different regulatory frameworks were involved. However, thanks to a sound methodology and with rigorous quality assurance processes set in place, both by the ECB and by national authorities, we were able to ensure that the results of the exercise met high standards and were reasonably comparable across banks from different countries. Moreover, the Comprehensive Assessment is, undoubtedly, a major step forward in terms of transparency, significantly increasing the amount, quality and consistency of the information available about the position of European banks. 5. Minimum levels of capital required.

However, today marks not an end, but a beginning. In just over a week the Single Supervisory Mechanism will become fully operational, and the immediate future poses challenges of the first order both for supervisors, involving the adaptation of our structures and functioning to the needs of the new European mechanism, and for banks. I would not like to conclude without thanking the whole team at the Banco de España, which has been working for months in collaboration with the European Central Bank, the banks and the audit firms to successfully see through this complex exercise. And, naturally, I would also like to extend my thanks to the teams at all of the banks which, for months, have devoted their best technical capabilities to this end. Thank you very much for your interest and for being here today. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Talent management, the new paradigm Opening remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the AIF (The Asian Institute of Finance) International Symposium 2011, Kuala Lumpur, 7 April 2011. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to speak at this inaugural AIF International Symposium 2011 on Talent Management, the New Paradigm. While I may not be here in person, I am most certainly here in my commitment to this Symposium on the enhancement of human capacity in the financial services industry. Importance of human capital development Significant new trends continue to reshape the financial services industry. In this recent two decades, the intensification of the globalisation process, the advancement in technology and the unprecedented consequences of the global financial and economic crisis have contributed to these changes. While the global economy is now on a recovery path, several challenges continue to remain. The focus of the crises affected countries have been on the immediate term challenges involving the resumption of the functioning of financial markets and the financial intermediation process while supporting the overall economic growth. As part of the response to the crisis, is the financial regulatory reform both at the national and international level. This has also been reinforced by a tightening of the supervisory oversight. These cumulative developments are also dramatically transforming the financial landscape of the international and national financial systems. The future has therefore become more complex, uncertain, unfamiliar and more ambiguous.

The promotion of more effective international cooperation on training and skills development to meet the changing demands of the industry, more comprehensive strategies on talent development and greater mobility that is consistent with the realities of the global economy will support such talent development. Despite these demands, under investment in learning remains in a significant proportion of financial institutions. This is largely due to the focus on keeping short term costs low. This has however resulted in drawing talent from the existing pool which has in turn resulted in rising costs of talent. Surveys suggest that the biggest skills and knowledge gaps faced by financial institutions are in knowledge of regulatory standards, communications, management skills and risk assessment and management. Professional and technical skills, particularly in the middle to senior levels, are still very much needed in many parts of Asia. These skills shortages will intensify as financial institutions expand their operations. Strategies for talent management and development must therefore change if financial institutions want to be competitive and well positioned to adjust and adapt to the changing conditions. The Asian Institute of Finance (AIF) was initiated by Bank Negara Malaysia and established jointly with the Securities Commission in [2009] to respond to the growing needs of the financial industry for high quality and efficient training opportunities that would develop indemand skills.