samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
...and a high level of household saving gives scope for growth But Swedish households have also acted in a way that has increased resilience during the economic downturn. Unlike in many other countries, savings in Sweden have shown a rising trend over the past decade (Figure 3). 6  BIS Review 149/2010  During the crisis, saving increased both in Sweden and in most other countries. This is largely due to what is known as precautionary saving as a result of increased uncertainty. In many countries this uncertainty concerns the large deficits in public finances and what consequences these may have for household incomes in the future. As this uncertainty can be expected to remain over the coming years, private consumption will probably be held back. But we do not have this situation in Sweden. Although one can note that consumer confidence has strengthened in many areas in recent years, it is primarily in Sweden that it has reached historically high levels (Figure 4). The combination of sound public finances and high household savings means there is scope to reduce saving over the coming years. Together with relatively large increases in disposable incomes, this means that private consumption is likely to increase at a good pace. Sweden is one of few countries in the OECD area where the labour market has clearly begun a recovery. Moreover, the upturn in employment is on a broad front. The manufacturing industry has once again begun recruiting and is expected to continue to do so over the coming period.

But there are a number of circumstances that almost certainly contributed, although there is still debate on their relative significance. Poorly adjusted regulations and insufficient oversight One fact that definitely did play a role is that the regulations and supervision did not function satisfactorily. One of the problems was that there was too much focus on the situation of individual agents and too little focus on the financial system as a whole – too much micro and too little macro, if you like. Moreover, the supervision lacked the necessary international oversight as it was largely conducted on a domestic basis by each individual country. There were also loopholes in the regulations that, for instance, meant that some institutions and markets were not covered and could expand without the authorities having any real oversight. Things were not made easier by the fact that there was also great ingenuity in the financial markets that resulted in new financial instruments, where no one properly understood the risks. So all in all, one can say that the deficiencies in regulation and supervision meant that the brakes did not catch when events got out of control and the risks became too great. A North Atlantic property bubble… One of the main reasons behind the financial crisis is sometimes said to be that a property bubble arose in the United States, which then burst and spread extensively. This is largely true, although a simplification.
It will in particular change the relationships between the members of the financial community and between this community and the non-financial world  II. Regarding Big Data, central banks will have to switch from an observer status to a user or player position, which implies significant changes in performing part of their activities  III. Big Data raise regulatory issues that cannot be solved within a national context but require a global reflection from public authorities. I. Big data will have significant economic effects. Entry costs for carrying out financial  transactions have already been reduced and will be lowered further in the future. Customer knowledge, in particular regarding the conditions applied by financial institutions, will be enhanced and more generally information asymmetries between clients and providers of financial services will narrow. Big Data can be a powerful card to play by GAFAs or other native non-financial firms to develop new activities. The financial industry has therefore to adapt rapidly to face the data revolution and compete with the new entrants, while protecting privacy against increasing cyber risks in particular. All in all, competition will increase, which is beneficial to the economy. The flip side can be enhanced risks for financial stability, implying a new form of vigilance for central bankers in particular. I will elaborate a bit more on this later on. II. Terabytes of data are available and more will be coming soon. Central banks will  collect more and more granular data. This is a clear opportunity for better forecasting and even nowcasting.

Caleb M Fundanga: Improved financial services in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of The Barclays Bank Zambia Plc, Chilenje Branch, Chilenje, 9 January 2008. *  *  *  • Mr Fritz Seegers – Barclays Global Retail and Commercial Banking ChiefExecutive • Mr J J Sikazwe – Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chairman • Mr Ahmed Khan – Barclays GRCB Emerging Markets Chief Executive Officer • Mr Michael Miebach – Barclays Sub-Sahara Africa Managing Director • Mr Zafar Masud – incoming Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Mr Danie Nel – outgoing Barclays Bank Zambia Managing Director • Invited Guests • Ladies and Gentlemen I am delighted to be the Guest of Honour at the official opening of the Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chilenje branch. My appreciation of this opening is because it reflects a fundamental change in strategy by Barclays Bank Zambia over the last few years. I recall that only a few years ago, Barclays Bank Zambia closed a number of its branches in several towns and locations. We were greatly concerned because it meant that even the few that were serviced by commercial banks would have greater problems in accessing financial services. Barclays Bank Zambia obviously had its reasons for taking such an action and we cannot fault them for attempting to curb their costs. However, it is now evident that there is a turnaround in the situation.
11 Other institutions include legal tender status (meaning that you cannot be sued for non-payment of debts if you offer sterling to meet them) and the insurance of deposits of up to £ at banks and building societies backed by the Government. 12 This will feature JMW Turner. For further information see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/polymer-20-pound-note 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  -  The Monetary Policy Committee which conducts monetary policy independently to achieve price stability defined by the 2% inflation target;  -  The Prudential Regulation Committee which is charged with ensuring the safety and soundness of the banks and building societies that hold your money;  -  The Financial Policy Committee with its wide powers to maintain the resilience of the financial system as a whole; and  -  The Bank’s powers and facilities that provide a wide range of liquidity to banks and other financial institutions in order to promote the continuous functioning of the financial system during shocks. The Bank has been given clear remits by Parliament for these responsibilities and has operational independence to use its powers to achieve them. We are accountable to Parliament and the people for our performance. The combination of this robust institutional framework and the fact that only sterling is legal tender in the UK sets a very high bar for competing forms of money to dislodge sterling. But at present, more than a thousand virtual or “crypto” currencies are trying to do just that.

From a general point of view, volatility is a kind of genetic signature of the price setting mechanism in a competitive market. Prices hover around the equilibrium through successive adjustments. When market participants express widely different views on this equilibrium price, or when the volume of transaction shrinks, volatility usually increases. In this respect, there is a close correlation between the occurrence of crises –such as the revealed insolvency of an emerging country, supply shocks on commodity prices, bursting of equity bubbles– and excessive volatility. Volatility is not an indicator of market inefficiency. However, excessively high volatility has adverse effects on the behaviour of market participants and the real economy. From a corporate management point of view, volatility on capital markets lowers the predictability of the cost of capital. When reviewing investment  10  Source : Report on financial structures – ECB - 2002  11  estimation in « Central banks and financial stability – exploring an intermediate land » – Second ECB central banking conference - 2002  12  BRI – Economic aspects of regional currency areas and the use of foreign currencies – 2002 – document non publié. BIS Review 71/2002  5  opportunities, managers may want to avoid relying too heavily on external finance because of the uncertainties surrounding the cost, or even the sheer availability, of financing. This may lead companies to postpone or downsize investment projects.
I shall not elaborate here on this change in style, but let me stress its historical nature, since it entailed the recognition of a far different world from that when the Bretton Woods institutions were designed at the end of the Second World War. But the change in substance has not been any less. The philosophy behind international regulation until then had been based on the idea that private financial institutions knew better than anybody what they had to do, and we could therefore count on self-regulation. Meantime, in many countries, hands-off supervision was the prevailing philosophy: the less the public sector laid its hands on financial activity, the better. The crisis and the initiative of the G20 leaders have called this philosophy into question. An example of this is the radical change in direction of the work of the Basel Committee. Although the so-called Basel II reform had some very positive aspects, such as the greater sensitivity to risk of regulatory requirements and the consequent stimulus for banks to set in place better risk management systems, the Committee’s work was naturally infused by the self-regulation approach then prevailing. However, since late 2008, financial regulation has taken a radically different road.

EMU - an important part in EU cooperation When asked about the likelihood of EMU being actually established on time, some observers declare that “the EMU process has reached a point of no return”. I neither can nor want to be so categorical. But that EMU will be realised on time in accordance with the Treaty does seem highly probable. The political determination is strong, as has been demonstrated time and again when conflicting views threaten the process. I am glad the debate has now started in Sweden and that it is concentrating to a greater extent on the consequences for Sweden of joining the monetary union or remaining outside, rather than on whether the EMU project as such is good or bad. What I still lack in the debate is an appraisal of EMU in a broader policy perspective. The purpose of the economic and monetary union is the same as for the European Union: closer European cooperation on such areas as integration, growth, employment and prosperity. The European Union is often discussed in Sweden in terms of a Brussels bureaucracy that deals with the length of cucumbers or the curve of bananas. That is of course both incorrect and unfortunate. The Union should be seen as an arena or, if you like, a playing field. For some years now Sweden has been a player, which involves learning the rules and taking initiatives for the development of Europe in concert with other countries.
Around half of the European SMEs and from the region agree that the most relevant source for financing are the bank related products (credit line, bank overdraft, bank loans) and leasing or hire purchase. Also, companies from the region and the European Union use grants or subsidized bank loans and retained earnings (one third of the companies) as source for financing. On the other hand, market-based instruments, such as equity and debt securities, and factoring are less considered potential source of financing. Chart 11: Relevance of different sources of financing Relevance of the sources of financing for SMEs (average of 2015-2017)  60%  54%  51%  50%  Relevance of the sources of financing for SMEs (average of 2015 -2017)  49%  47% 46%  42% 40% 30%  27%  30%  18%  35%  32% 31%  17%  16% 14% 25%  13%  12% 10%  10%  20%  11%  8%  10%  6% 0% Retained Grants or Credit line, bank Bank loan earnings or sale subsidised bank overdraft or (excluding of assets loan credit cards subsidised bank (Internal funds) overdraft loans, overdrafts and credit lines) EU-28  Trade credit  Leasing or hirepurchase  4%  3%  2%  2% 0% Debt securities  Region  Equity capital  EU-28  Factoring  Region  Source: Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), EC and ECB.

Andrew Bailey: Modern challenges for the modern central bank perspectives from the Bank of England Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at the LSE German Symposium, virtual event, 5 February 2020. * * * It is a great pleasure to participate in the LSE German Symposium, and congratulations to the organisers for such an interesting programme. I want to take the opportunity today to step back a little and offer some thoughts on the context and framework of monetary policy. It is fast approaching twenty five years since the UK decisively changed its monetary policy framework and embraced the idea of an independent central bank with a mandate to maintain price stability in the form of an inflation target. Now, 25 years may not seem long in the broad sweep of history, but the history of UK monetary regimes points to a quarter of a century representing a relatively long-established one. Long may it last, because it has been successful, and it has delivered the much desired price stability. But the context in which policy is made does not stand still. The first decade of the MPC was with hindsight very benign – the impact of demand shocks to the economy was small, and supply shocks were typically in a favourable direction. The next decade and more has been quite different, with much larger shocks – a mix of both demand shocks and more adverse supply shocks.
That reduces the likelihood of a shock affecting one part of the currency union, and hence reduces the need for the exchange rate to adjust. Kenen (1969) argued that more diversified economies were better candidates to join currency unions because industry-specific shocks were less likely to have macroeconomic effects, reducing the need for exchange rate adjustment. 8  See Carney (2013). 9  Moreover unit labour costs in Scotland and the UK as a whole have moved closely together (chart 2), whereas large relative movements in the Eurozone imply divergences in competitiveness (chart 3). 10  The five tests focused on the degree of convergence between the UK and the rest of Europe, the degree of flexibility to adjust without moves in the exchange rate, and on whether joining would promote investment, financial services, and growth, stability and employment (HM Treasury 2003). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the benefits of a shared currency but can also mitigate the cost of losing exchange rate flexibility.11 Mundell originally argued that currency areas should coincide with regions which had high internal factor mobility.12 The idea was that by moving from areas where demand has fallen to those where it has risen, workers help moderate changes in wages and unemployment.13 There are clear practical impediments to labour mobility within the euro area including language and culture.

High electricity prices may lead to a pick-up in CPI inflation through 2006. However, the rate of increase in energy prices is still expected to slow as from spring next year. A fall in energy prices may curb CPI inflation as from 2007. The rise in prices for non-energy goods has been moderate in recent years. Price impulses from imported consumer goods have been particularly weak. Their contribution to inflation has been negative virtually every year since the mid-1990s, partly reflecting increased trade, a shift in imports  2  BIS Review 92/2006  towards low-cost countries and a substantial improvement in distribution efficiency in Norway. Price impulses from imported consumer goods are expected to continue to exert downward pressure on inflation in the period ahead, albeit to a lesser extent than in previous years. The rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services pushed up CPI inflation until this year, but since the beginning of the year this measure of inflation has edged down again. The 12-month rise in prices for goods and services produced in Norway, excluding energy, was 1.1 per cent in August, 0.2 per cent lower than in July. This is the lowest domestic inflation rate witnessed since autumn 2004. The reduction in day-care rates in January this year has pushed down domestic inflation by an estimated 0.3 per cent over the past year. The rise in prices has been lower than expected for both goods and services.
Thanks to significant lending volumes and strong price formation on domestic loans, the mortgage institutions have also been able to compete successfully on the international bond market. Borrowing against the entire balance sheet as security requires significant risk capital or some form of guarantees from the owners. All mortgage institutions, with the exception of SEB Bolån which does not does undertake borrowing transactions in foreign currency, have a capital cover considerably above the statutory minimum of 8% (Figure 9). Swedish mortgage institutions´capital ratios, 1999. NB-Hypotek SBAB SEB Bolån Spintab Stadshypotek  Total 10 9,4 8,8 13,5 12,6  Tier 1 8,8 6,5 4,8 10,0 12,6  Source: Mortgage institutions´ annual reports. The Swedish mortgage institutions are currently estimated to borrow around 20% of their capital from abroad. The major part of this is borrowed from investors in the USA and Japan. Borrowing in the euro area accounts for approximately 20% of borrowing abroad. It is difficult to see that the option of borrowing in euro would increase central European investors’ interest in Swedish housing bonds. As long as Sweden is not a member of EMU and as long as Swedish borrowers want to borrow in Swedish kronor, the foreign exchange risk will remain. Increasing competition on the mortgage market will entail a greater need for new forms of financing that are more economical with the institution’s risk capital. Two financing forms being used increasingly by foreign mortgage institutions are gilt-edged bonds and securitisation.

15%  2% 29%  1%  Denmark Germany Spain  7%  France  1%  Austria Sweden Norway 45% Source: The European Mortgage Federation  BIS Review 99/2000  2  The European market for housing bonds is currently dominated by three countries - Germany, Denmark and Sweden. Together, these countries account for around 89% of this market (Figure 4). Switzerland  0,7  Germany  Spain  Italy  Belgium  Netherlands  France  30 23,84 25 20 15 11,44 10 6,8 5 1,54 0,9 0,65 0,03 0 UK  Billion $  ABS/MBS securitisation transactions by country, 1997. Source: OECD  Competition for customers Although mortgages are a relatively straightforward and standardised financial product that should be well suited to sell abroad, international mortgage sales have been limited to date. One probable reason is that the mortgage market mainly targets private clients, which are hard to reach without using a local distribution network. In this respect, the Internet should be able to lead to greater transparency and competition, both by the credit issuers themselves supplying information and credit services over the Internet and by Internet-based brokerage sites finding the cheapest mortgages for borrowers. While Internet-based mortgage services are still a relatively new phenomenon, they are likely to increase competition on the mortgage market.
It left the punch bowl on the table and said “let’s party” ... Trichet: As regards the punch bowl, you are quoting William McChesney Martin, a previous Chairman of the Federal Reserve! Again, let me say that we are united in purpose. As regards the ECB, the very solid anchoring of inflation expectations is a major asset in all circumstances. FOCUS: However, you do sometimes make comments about the US Federal Reserve. When its Chairman, Ben Bernanke, was chosen as Time magazine’s Person of the Year, you commended him, saying that he had done extraordinary things under extraordinary circumstances. Were they also the right things? Trichet: When the financial crisis intensified in 2008, the ECB and the Federal Reserve cooperated closely, together with other central banks, including through swap agreements. We ourselves supplied US dollars on this side of the Atlantic as part of this very close cooperation. 2  BIS Review 7/2010  FOCUS: How important is it, in such dramatic situations, that the ECB is able to act independently of politics? Trichet: This is crucial. The European Central Bank is totally independent. This is guaranteed for us by an international treaty. It is essential for the confidence of our fellow citizens, economic agents and market participants. And “confidence” is the key word at the moment. FOCUS: Do you consider this independence to be a great advantage? The Chairman of the Federal Reserve was appointed by the President – and the Senate is currently deciding whether Ben Bernanke can have a second term in office.

Assuming a difference in the expected levels of inflation between the euro area and Switzerland of 1 percentage point, the Swiss real interest rate advantage thus accounts for about 60 basis points. A second finding is that euro area and Swiss interest rates basically move in tandem, as one would expect considering we face the same economic conditions. The high correlation of interest rates does, however, not imply causality. Rather, our monetary policies are similar because our economies are highly integrated. The third and final result is that the SNB tends to adjust policy before the ECB does. It is possible that shocks impact faster on our small open economy than on the euro area, making an earlier reaction of Swiss policy desirable. I also think, and I will return to this in a minute, that the SNB's small size helps us agree faster on interest rate adjustments. Conclusions What do I conclude from our experience since the introduction of the euro? To start with, I disagree with the notion that small open economies on the edge of a large monetary zone are bound to do worse on their own and had best join the union. On the contrary, it would be easy to demonstrate that living on the edge of the euro area is far preferable to being surrounded by an array of small European currencies facing crisis periodically, as was the case before 1999. Remember the instability of the European monetary scene in the 1990s and the volatility of hard currencies.