samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I have already said, we now have robust banks and, in Europe, the soon-to-be completed asset quality review, conducted under the aegis of the ECB, will help to guarantee this. However, this does not mean weaknesses have disappeared. They are still there, only in other parts of the system. At the moment, for example, credit activities are mainly concentrated in the hands of large asset managers who together manage portfolios of several tens of trillions of dollars. These managers are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and therefore more efficient, but at the same time they are getting bigger and bigger. They are judged on their short-term performances, often leading them to follow identical strategies, which in turn results in massive movements in the market. Some – though not all – transform short-term savings into structured products, a practice which, as the crisis has shown, can prove very dangerous. 4/ – Fourth paradox: our monetary policies are extremely accommodative, but inflation remains low and, in some cases, is even declining. Throughout the developed world, central  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  banks have slashed their policy rates close to the zero lower bound. Their balance sheets have ballooned under the impact of asset purchases and liquidity injections. But in all these countries, inflation rates are at levels considered too low with respect to the price stability target – in some cases dangerously so. In the euro area, inflation has been falling steadily for six months.

Or, put differently, curbing the credit cycle appears to be an important ingredient of broadly-based macro-economic stability. In principle, monetary policy could be used to curb the credit cycle. In practice, the differing duration and synchronicity of the credit and business cycles means this is unlikely to work well. Pre-crisis experience illustrates well just that point. At the same time as the wider economy was operating in cruise control, credit markets were in overdrive. Hitting these two birds – one flying high, the other low – with one (monetary policy) stone would have defied even the most astute marksman [King, 2013]. What is needed, in these instances, is a second instrument. In the language of Tinbergen [Tinbergen, 1952], two cycles and two objectives call for two instruments. This is where macro-prudential policy comes in. One of the aims of macro-prudential policy is to act counter-cyclically on the credit cycle, constraining credit booms and cushioning busts  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  [Aikman et al, 2014]. In this role, macro-prudential policy is complementing monetary policy in its role of stabilising the macro-economy. Macro-economic policy then becomes, in effect, two-handed or ambidextrous. Since the crisis, this two-handed approach to policy has been taken up actively by a number of countries internationally [IMF, 2013]. For example, counter-cyclical prudential policy is now baked into new international regulatory rules. The so-called Basel III reforms introduced for the first time a “Counter-cyclical Capital Buffer” (CCB) to be adjusted to counteract the credit cycle [BCBS, 2010].
Even worse, growth in the euro area has now all but come to a halt, and the currency union is faced with increasing unemployment. 2  Crowe et al (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  How to deal with systemic risk: The case for macroprudential regulation Let me proceed straight to the key problem at hand: the issue of systemic risk in financial markets. In general terms, systemic risk arises because an optimising financial institution does not fully account for the cost that its behaviour imposes on other financial institutions. That is, at heart, systemic risk originates in a negative externality imposed by individual financial firms on the system. The underlying sources of systemic risk can be either structural or cyclical. The structural dimension of systemic risk is linked to spillovers associated with three key properties of modern banking: high leverage, limited liability and interconnectedness. On its own, high leverage implies a higher risk of insolvency. Combined with limited liability, high leverage often leads to excessive risk-taking. This is because, with limited liability, the diverse set of stakeholders (managers, owners, creditors) benefits from the upside of risk-taking but does not fully bear the cost when these risks materialise. As a consequence, there are strong incentives to leverage the balance sheet beyond the level which would be chosen if the individual stakeholders were fully exposed to the associated increase in the risk of default.

Being utilised little as resources for the economic and social development of the country, remittances may have led to individual, family or local dependency. During the first stage of transition in Albania policies for optimising the administration and utilisation of workers’ remittances for developing purposes have been completely lacking. A few sporadic measures have aimed at driving workers’ remittances into official channels and improving savings and investments incentives of emigrants in the country but have been by and large inadequate. More recently, the Albanian government has taken a more attentive approach toward remittances and their potential contributions in financing the growth and development of the country. With the assistance of the European Union by means of CARDS program, and the support of the International Organization of Migration (IOM), this year the Albanian government has compiled two important documents regarding migration and remittances issues, called: National Strategy of Migration and Action Plan. The main objectives are: (i) the review of remittances flows and (ii) the identification of political constraints and institutional and regulative framework that influence these inflows, in order to: •  increase the volume of remittances;  •  help shifting them into formal channels; and  •  enhance their use in support of country’s economic growth. Bank of Albania role in achieving these objectives consists primarily in maintaining the macroeconomic and financial stability, which constitute important preconditions for the success of any policy related to workers’ remittances.
To conclude my talk today, I would like to reaffirm that our fundamentals are strong and that we in Thailand will do our best to regain full potential to achieve sustainable economic development. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Let’s think about challenges of the bear during winter. Even while hibernating, the bear cannot stay perfectly still. It needs to move and keep its muscles warm to prepare for spring. Thailand’s current economic condition is like a winter, we stakeholders are the bear that is hibernating, and like the bear, we must prepare for the coming spring. If we keep playing our roles in managing the economic transition, we will all reap the benefits of the turnaround. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

This is not a widespread issue: the average NPL ratio is 5.4% in the European Union as of September 2016, and in many countries, including France and Germany, it is below 4%. But it is a challenge which seriously affects specific banks in certain countries, mainly Italy and Portugal. So this challenge is manageable, but it needs to be actually managed: the quicker the better. Recent initiatives by Italian authorities are a step in the right direction, with the active involvement of European supervisory authorities. Third factor: the digital transformation. It is true that digitalisation is disrupting traditional customer relationship models. But it also creates opportunities: for instance, more diverse and accessible financial services, more complete customer satisfaction, greater valorisation of data. Yet, in order to succeed in the digital transition, financial companies need first to place innovation at the heart of their strategic management; and second to examine ways of transforming their business models, mainly in Retail. Obviously these are difficult choices that need to be made by the companies themselves. The strategic way forward is not up to regulators, and will not be uniform. That said, let me share some thoughts with you. On the income side, the response could be twofold: diversifying the range of services – both proprietary and via partnerships – that are offered to customers; and adjusting existing pricing policies, with fewer flat-rate prices and more pricing by use.
The Banking Ordinance is a complex statute of some 200 pages and it has been much amended since its original enactment in the 1960s. The mandate of the HKMA is, however, set out very plainly in section 7(1) of the Ordinance, which states that:  BIS Review 39/2002  1  "The principal function of the Monetary Authority under this Ordinance shall be to promote the general stability and effective working of the banking system." We pursue this mandate through licensing criteria and ongoing supervision of banks. We complement this supervisory work with a variety of initiatives under the banking reform and other programmes, the ultimate intention of which is to promote general stability and effective working of the system. For example: •  First, the deposit insurance scheme, now at the detailed planning stage, will promote the general stability of the system by protecting individual depositors up to a certain limit. •  Secondly, the Commercial Credit Reference Agency, which is expected to be launched as a voluntary, market-based scheme in the not-too-distant future, will promote the effective working of the system - and the larger economy - by helping banks channel lending to creditworthy small enterprises. •  Thirdly, public consultation by the Privacy Commission will soon commence on broad proposals for the sharing of positive consumer credit data - a facility which, when and if it is introduced, will help in addressing an issue of concern to banking stability: the dramatic rise in consumer defaults and personal bankruptcies.

Less positively, a more difficult economic environment contributes to friction between banks and their customers, for example in the greater incidence of default on debt on the one hand and in the greater tendency among banks, in times of tighter margins, to go after that debt. Whether in good times or bad, a certain volume of complaints is a healthy phenomenon because it encourages improvements in service where complaints are upheld, and improvements in transparency where misunderstandings occur. On a subject so important as the way in which banks handle people's money, there will always be complaints, and we need to continue to develop our machinery for dealing with them. Let me deal quickly with the options identified by the HKMA in its survey last year which, if I read it correctly, the debate within the industry and the community is ruling out. The first option of these is the establishment of a separate banking ombudsman along the lines of the practice in some other jurisdictions. This is, in some senses, a Rolls Royce solution in that it would provide a separate agency, to process and resolve complaints, with powers to arbitrate in complaints and award compensation. It would, however, be a costly solution, and it would take a considerable time to implement. Under such a system, the process of handling complaints would probably also be quite resource-intensive, and it is by no means clear that it would be able to address the full range of complaints being made.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the economic situation Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, 2 September 2003. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The speech is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 13 August and on previous speeches. The Charts in pdf can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. The inflation target provides economic agents with an anchor for their decisions concerning saving, investment, budgets and wages. The inflation target is a vehicle for monetary policy’s contribution to stabilising output and employment. This intention is also expressed in the Regulation on Monetary Policy. High demand for goods and services and labour shortages normally point to higher inflation. When interest rates are increased, demand falls and inflation is kept at bay. When demand is low and unemployment rises, inflation will tend to slow. Interest rates will then be reduced. Norges Bank sets the interest rate so that future inflation will be equal to the inflation target of 2½ per cent. The interest rate has been reduced since December last year in response to the change in the inflation outlook.

But it also meant that financial institutions were able to sell loans or take them off the balance sheet, which weakened lenders’ incentives to conduct prudent screening and constant monitoring of credit  BIS Review 66/2009  1  risk. So underwriting standards and lending oversight declined, and contributed to the excessive credit growth in the second half of the 1990s. In sum, the observer would have concluded that the factors that fuelled the credit and asset price boom of the past decade also created the conditions for a bust. In mid-2007 we started to see the backlash. The start of the financial turmoil was sudden but not unexpected. The financial system as it worked over the past decade – with its flawed incentives and its overly complex products and with global imbalances as its macroeconomic backdrop – was no longer sustainable. The asset cycle turned, the weaknesses were exposed and investors suddenly lost confidence. After years of exceptional risk appetite and high profits, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction, as markets became extremely sensitive to financial risk. In September last year, the crisis escalated sharply. In particular, a major financial player collapsed, which was directly involved in about 30 large payment and settlement systems worldwide and had a balance sheet of USD 600 billion. Its failure turned a large-scale crisis of confidence into a global financial panic. Financial intermediaries restored liquidity buffers, tried to economise on capital and to scale down their balance sheets. They sold assets and tightened lending conditions.
Thomas Jordan: The Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy after the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 107th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 24 April 2015. *  *  *  Mr President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests, dear School Students Since 15 January, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) has once again been coming to terms with a whole new set of challenges. On that day, the Governing Board decided to discontinue the minimum exchange rate because the international environment for the SNB’s monetary policy had changed dramatically. The end of the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 against the euro has far-reaching implications for our economy. It is therefore understandable that our decision triggered strong reactions. Yet had we continued to maintain the minimum exchange rate for a certain period, the consequences for our country would have been much more severe. In my talk today, I would like to explain to you in detail our reasons for discontinuing the minimum exchange rate. The SNB attaches great importance to clarifying its monetary policy decisions. This is, on the one hand, an important part of our statutory duty of accountability to parliament. On the other, it is a prime concern of ours that the general public and, in particular, you, our shareholders, should understand our monetary policy.

I will begin by talking about the prominent issues related to the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate. This will be followed by our present assessment of the Swiss economy and price developments and an explanation of our current monetary policy. Alongside our willingness to intervene on the foreign exchange market as necessary, negative interest on SNB sight deposits plays an important role in monetary policy. I would therefore like to look at this subject in greater detail today. Rationale for discontinuing the minimum exchange rate Let us begin with the reasons for discontinuing the minimum exchange rate. In the course of 2014, there were growing signs that a US exit from a highly expansionary monetary policy was drawing closer. In the euro area, by contrast, there was increasing evidence that monetary policy would be eased further. Against this backdrop, the euro depreciated considerably against the US dollar. These diverging monetary policy stances in the major currency areas affected the Swiss franc in two different ways. Like the euro, the Swiss franc weakened against the US dollar. Against the euro, however, it gradually approached the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20. At that time, the weakening of the euro had not yet cast doubt on the sustainability of the minimum exchange rate. Consequently, at the monetary policy decision in mid-December, we made the decision to leave monetary policy unchanged. Shortly after our monetary policy decision, the economic crisis in Russia escalated.
However, it is difficult at present, when the geopolitical landscape is very uncertain and constantly changing, to say what the significance of reshoring will be for central banks’ monetary policy and for the world economy more generally. Similarities with the 1970s But let us focus on the current situation. Inflation is now higher than at any point during the whole period we have had an inflation target. In that sense, it can be said that this is the first time that inflation targeting is put to the test in earnest ‘on the upside‘.6 In Sweden, inflation today is about the same as in the 1970s and 1980s, when average annual inflation was above 8 per cent (Figure 4). This is not the only similarity to that period. The high inflation at that time was triggered by similar factors to the high rate of inflation today. During the 1970s energy prices increased as a result of geopolitical unease and production disruptions in the Middle East, in a similar way as energy and commodity prices have now been pushed up in the wake of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. An important explanation for the lastingly high inflation during the 1970s and 1980s was the expectations that economic agents had of future inflation. If households and companies expect inflation to be high going forward, this will affect the  5 There is research that suggests that due to demographic factors, the global real interest rate will actually fall  further in the future; see Auclert et al.

SPEECH DATE:  9 December 2022  SPEAKER:  Deputy Governor Per Jansson  VENUE:  Swedbank  Monetary policy when inflation is too high – prerequisites and challenges* “There are decades when nothing happens; and there are weeks when decades happen.” The words are said to be Vladimir Lenin's, but it is disputed whether that really is the case. Nevertheless, the quotation is very well suited to what I intend to talk about today. Once a year, I usually make a longer speech, which is also published on the Riksbank’s website. The most recent was in December 2021.1 My speech then was about the division of roles in macroeconomic policy, and my main message was that in the future fiscal policy needs to be more active than has been the case in recent decades.2 I emphasised in my speech that the inflation target needs to be symmetrical, that is, it is as important to counteract too low inflation as it is to counteract too high inflation. But at that time, too high inflation was not regarded as a particularly pressing threat, nor was it something I specifically mentioned in the speech. The situation has changed rapidly To recall how the situation looked at the end of January this year, one can look up the inflation forecasts of Swedish forecasters at that time. As energy prices had begun to rise, all forecasters believed that inflation in 2022 would be higher than the target of 2 per cent.
21st ASEAN Banking Conference Governor’s Speech 28th November 2016, Anantara Siam Bangkok Hotel “TRANSFORMING FINANCIAL SERVICES TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE GROWING ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC)” Chairman of the ASEAN Bankers’ Association Chairman of the Thai Bankers' Association Deputy Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia Chairpersons, CEOs, and Top Executives of ASEAN Banks, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Sawasdee Krub A very good morning to you all. It is a great pleasure for me to be here today to share with you my thoughts on the upcoming challenges for the ASEAN banking industry. Before I begin, I would like to thank the Thai Bankers’ Association for the invitation to this annual gathering of ASEAN bankers. Let me also extend a warm welcome to the executives of ASEAN banks who have travelled here for this special event. From my calculation, in aggregate, you all manage assets of around 120 percent of total ASEAN GDP. Ladies and gentlemen, We are going together through profound changes in the global economic environment. The economic condition called the “new mediocre” together with the transformation towards digitization have been key driving forces for a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment or the VUCA world in short. Against this backdrop, we as commercial bankers and regulators have to move together to ensure growth, prosperity, and sustainability for our region. Let me elaborate on the key issues we are facing. The “new mediocre” is a state of multiple “lows” – low-growth, low-investment, low-trade volume, low-interest rate, low commodity prices, and low-inflation.

Prior to the introduction of the euro, the internal market came under pressure from exchange rate crises: national currencies sometimes fluctuated sharply in value. After the launch of the euro, the euro area enjoyed a number of calm years but, unfortunately, the member countries did not make use of this time to carry out the necessary reforms at national and European level nor, in particular, to put efficient crisis management arrangements in place. And the countries that experienced serious difficulties three or four years ago, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, are nonetheless beginning to recover, thanks in part to ECB policy. We also see that Germany, the strongest economy in Europe, is not experiencing any major disadvantage from that same ECB policy. Admittedly, it’s a continuous search for a policy that is as favourable as possible for everyone. What does one do with Greece, say, which has fundamental problems with its competitiveness? The Greek crisis would not have become so large if the European institutions had not been so weak and if more decisive action had been taken, with better crisis management. Are you surrounded by enough people who dare to contradict you? Do you speak to people who dare to question ECB policy? Oh yes, definitely. I listen to people who say that the ECB should take a different approach. I respect those opinions. We ourselves naturally reflect on whether our policy is correct.