samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We cannot justify having a banking system that depends on the use of public money to douse the fire when the crisis comes. And we also cannot allow conditions to exist where risks are taken on the basis that this backstop exists. “Too big” or “Too important to fail” are shorthand for institutions that exist in their chosen form as a result of underwriting with public money. I don’t believe that there is anything controversial about a statement that no industry can take on a form which is a consequence of such a massive potential, and of course recently actual, call on public money. The big issue is therefore what to do to correct the situation. There are three elements to the debate: regulation, structure and resolution. We can re-design and re-build the fire prevention systems in the existing landscape. This is the regulation element. At the heart of this is action on capital requirements, including a role for contingent capital and larger liquidity buffers. But we may also conclude that we want to prevent fires by having a different landscape of buildings – a town planning solution in which the structure of the industry is re-drawn. And in the past, cities were rebuilt with that objective in mind. This is the structure element. But, whichever combination of these courses we choose to take, we cannot guarantee that there will be no fires in the future, and we would be extremely foolish if we made that promise.

Second, because stress tests tend to take the form of point forecasts, they assume that we can predict the form of the next crisis, and typically they will place too much weight on the recent past to predict what will happen next. And third, they don’t tell us what we should do about the stress. So stress tests are useful but nowhere near sufficient. RRPs are a big step beyond that and one that should complement stress tests. The objective of a recovery plan should be to set out how a bank may react to a whole range of stresses and the steps that it could plausibly take to head off the impact of these stresses in order to avoid formal resolution actions in the event of failure. Recovery plans should encompass contingency funding plans and the use of contingent capital instruments as well as the sale of assets and/or business lines. They should not assume the use of extraordinary public support. A key element of the recovery plan is that it should make management more aware of the risks run in their businesses while they can still manage out of a stressed situation, thus reducing the likelihood of failure. This calls for a sharper use of risk management tools and systems. To be blunt, I have seen too many banks in the past two years where the systems simply did not support that sort of management under stress.
Inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations remains of the essence. Monetary policy will do all that is needed to maintain price stability in the euro area over the medium term. This is the necessary and central contribution that monetary policy makes to fostering sustainable economic growth, job creation and financial stability. All the nonstandard measures taken during the period of acute financial market tensions, referred to as “enhanced credit support” and the Securities Markets Programme, are fully consistent with our mandate and, by construction, temporary in nature. We remain firmly committed to price stability over the medium to longer term. The monetary policy stance and the overall provision of liquidity will be adjusted as appropriate. Accordingly, the Governing Council will continue to monitor all developments over the period ahead very closely. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. After a period of sharp decline, euro area economic activity has been expanding since mid2009. Euro area real GDP increased, on a quarterly basis, by 0.2% in the first quarter of 2010. The available economic data and survey-based indicators suggest a strengthening in economic activity in the second quarter of 2010 and the available data for the third quarter are better than expected.

The firming in economic activity, in short, is due both to natural healing and past and present policy support. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In this regard, it important to emphasize that we did expect growth to strengthen. We provided additional monetary policy stimulus via the asset purchase program in order to help ensure the recovery did regain momentum. A stronger recovery with more rapid progress toward our dual mandate objectives is what we have been seeking. This is welcome and not a reason to reverse course. We also have to be careful not to be overly optimistic about the growth outlook. The coast is not completely clear – the healing process in the aftermath of the crisis takes time and there are still several areas of vulnerability and weakness. In particular, housing activity remains unusually weak and home prices have begun to soften again in many parts of the country (Chart 15 and Chart 16). State and local government finances remain under stress, and this is likely to lead to further fiscal consolidation and job losses in this sector that will offset at least a part of the federal fiscal stimulus (Chart 17). And we cannot rule out the possibility of further shocks from abroad, whether in the form of stress in sovereign debt markets or geopolitical events. Higher oil prices act as a tax on disposable income, and the situation in the Middle East remains uncertain and dynamic.
If world economic activity had remained strong, it would have been reasonable to count on the Riksbank continuing to raise the repo rate. BIS Review 26/2001  1  A look at the threats we perceived in December as being liable to push inflation up above our forecast, shows that they have become less troublesome. At the same time, the clouds that were gathering over the U.S. economy have thickened and darkened. To date this year the Federal Reserve has cut its interest rate a total of 1.5 percentage points. The first cut, announced in January in between the regular monetary policy meetings, surprised the market by its magnitude as well as its timing. Another cut came at the end of January and a third last week, on 20 March. There has been a spate of negative news about the global economy in general and certain companies in particular and international stock markets have remained turbulent. US economy difficult to assess The focus at present is on the U.S. economy. Its future path is highly important for economic developments in Sweden. In order to arrive at a clear picture of the situation, we need to judge the effects of alternative outcomes. During the 1990s the United States experienced its longest economic upswing ever without any serious signs of accelerating price and wage increases. A more efficient economy, with strong competition and functional product and labour markets, accompanied by advances in computer and telecom technology, are said to have contributed to a higher rate of potential growth.

Urban Bäckström: The current situation for Swedish monetary policy Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, before the Swedish Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 27 March 2001. *  *  *  First a word of thanks to the Committee for the invitation to have a stimulating discussion about the current situation for monetary policy. An open discussion of these matters is important for people’s perception of the Riksbank’s legitimacy. I cannot think of a more suitable forum than you as representatives of our principal, the Riksdag. Risk of a slowdown after a series of years with strong economic growth We can look back on a series of years with strong economic growth in Sweden, accompanied by low inflation. As far as can be judged at present, one explanation for this combination is that the Swedish economy is functioning more efficiently. To some extent, however, it has also been a cyclical phenomenon. After the economic crisis that ravaged Sweden in the early 1990s, there were plenty of unutilised resources to draw on and therefore less risk of rising production hitting the ceiling at an early stage. Sooner or later, however, demand growth that is excessively rapid and persistent will generate imbalances in the economy and that normally pushes the rate of price and wage increases up. Such a course of events is liable to result in a recession, with falling output and rising unemployment.
We are therefore pleased that we have evidently been able to meet the expectations of the banknote users – the Swiss population: - The new designs have been almost universally well received and have also been lauded by banknote experts internationally. - The new notes are technologically state-of-the-art and are also easy to handle, robust and distinctive. - All the logistical processes, including the modification of ATMS to accommodate the new notes, also ran largely smoothly. The substantial media and public interest and the feedback on social media have also been gratifying. When it comes to rapidly informing the public about the security features and the design of the new banknotes, the media naturally play a pivotal role. Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the SNB, thank you for all the work you do. We broke new ground with respect to informing the public as well, introducing ‘Swiss Banknotes’ – an augmented reality app with which users can explore the new series. We are Page 3/4  Berne, 3 September 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference on new banknotes  convinced that this innovation has helped to make the design and security features of the banknotes more accessible, especially to younger generations. So what happens to the eighth-series notes now? The old banknotes remain legal tender until further notice and can thus continue to be used for making payments. The SNB plans to announce the recall date for the eighth-series notes in the course of 2020.

News conference on new banknotes  Berne, 3 September 2019 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and gentlemen I too welcome you warmly to this presentation of the new 100-franc note. The issuance of this final note brings the ninth banknote series – an important and complex project – to a close. Over the next few minutes I’d like to look back at some of our experiences, review the results and, finally, make a few observations about the future of cash. Work on the new banknote series began over 14 years ago. On 2 February 2005, the SNB published a press release announcing that it was preparing a new series inspired by the overarching theme ‘Switzerland open to the world’. In November 2005, the results of the design competition were presented to the public, and at the beginning of 2007, the SNB tasked Manuela Pfrunder with carrying out the graphic design work. This decision marked the beginning of a 10-year adventure. The development of the new banknotes was shaped by stringent quality standards on both the design and production fronts. Throughout the process, dialogue and exchange were required between all the involved parties to ensure that these standards were met. Thanks to this team effort, the ninth series – culminating in the last denomination, the 100-franc note – is now complete.
Since the supply of Exchange Fund debt, even at about $ billion, is limited, and there is a lack of other Government debt, the range of collateral against which lender of last resort support would be provided must necessarily be wider than in some other economies. There are three basic instruments that the HKMA would use to provide support: purchase of the institution’s placements with other banks; repos of eligible Hong Kong dollar securities; and a credit facility against the security of the institution’s residential mortgage portfolio. The details are set out in the policy statement and its annexes, and I do not intend to go into them here, but I do wish to highlight three points. First, given that the purpose of liquidity support is to provide a temporary breathing space to allow the institution to sort its problems out, any support provided through repos or through a credit facility would be provided for an initial term of no more than 30 days, although there would be a provision for it to be rolled over for a further 30 days. Secondly, the interest rate charged on lender of last resort support would be pitched at a level sufficient to maintain incentives for good management but not at a level so high as to defeat the purpose of the facility, which is to prevent illiquidity from precipitating insolvency.

When I BIS Review 77/1999  6  addressed this subject in 1994 I pointed out that the establishment of the HKMA, and the placing of both monetary and banking supervision functions under one roof, had given a much more precise institutional focus to the lender of last resort function, and that the amendments to the Exchange Fund Ordinance in 1992 had further helped to clarify the scope of that function. I should like to reiterate that point this evening, more especially in the context of the world-wide debate about the merits of a super-regulator system, under which supervisory functions would be institutionally separate from central bank functions. Quite apart from the question, which still remains to be answered, of whether monolithic super-regulators really provide the efficient, economic, streamlined system they set out to achieve, there are, in my view, strong arguments, in the interests of efficient crisis management, for having the banking regulator as close as possible to the lender of last resort.
The accuracy of the forecasts depends on what variable one looks at, but for inflation, for instance, the more sophisticated forecasts show a better forecasting performance up to two years ahead. The Riksbank makes forecasts for GDP, inflation and the repo rate among other things, but sometimes there are also other aspects that need to be weighed into the balance in one way or another when monetary policy decisions are made. A current example is developments in the Swedish housing market, which have been discussed in connection with monetary policy recently. House prices have continued to rise during the economic downturn and growth in household credits has remained at a high level. Some say that this creates risks for the real economy further ahead, with households burdened by high interest costs and possible downward adjustments in house prices when mortgage rates return to more normal levels. Should the risk of such a development further ahead affect the monetary policy decision made now? If so, how and to what extent? It is important to try to quantify those risks – both upside and downside risks – in one way or another, and as far as possible, that are considered important with regard to future developments. 3 It will then be easier during the actual decision to take a systematic stance to the uncertainty that always prevails regarding future developments. I shall return later to how this uncertainty can be dealt with in the forecasting and decision-making processes. How are forecasts made at the Riksbank?

Public confidence is however, not one that is created and expected to remain constant without making conscious efforts to enhance it. Public confidence must be created, nurtured and continuously enhanced by all the players in the financial sector working together through a range of approaches and strategies. This mandate requires a holistic and a collaborative effort of the authorities, financial service providers, private sector, educators and related associations that are here today. I am delighted to note that MYFex2007 is one such effort. In the short 26 months it has been in existence, PIDM has gone beyond its statutory duty to create public awareness about deposit insurance and promoting public confidence in the resilience of the Malaysian financial system. They have embarked on a noteworthy initiative to contribute to financial system stability by organising a comprehensive financial awareness exhibition that seeks to create informed consumers with a view to contribute to financial system stability. I am pleased to see various Government agencies, the market players and related associations and professional bodies participating in this important financial awareness initiative. The vision for an effective, efficient and resilient financial sector requires the unified efforts of all the stakeholders in the financial system. The financial players, the regulators, the Government and the consumers all have a meaningful role in achieving this vision. With this let me conclude my remarks. 2  BIS Review 129/2007
As the regulator, we believe that share ownership in banks needs to be broadbased to strengthen corporate governance and to avoid ownership concentration, dominance in the boards, conflict of interest and risks associated with related party transactions. Therefore, the existing requirements on share ownership will be reviewed and certain additional measures will be brought in. In addition, fit and proper assessment criteria for appointment of Directors, CEOs and Key Management Personnel of banks will be strengthened further to appoint the most suitable and qualified individuals to the top positions in banks. Only persons with proven track records of good conduct and financial integrity would be considered for such appointments. Moreover, a broad-based policy on employment of expatriate staff considering the needs for external expert contribution will be introduced. Considering the significant developments in the banking environment and the professional accounting/auditing landscape, the minimum criteria for appointment of external auditors has already been reviewed and the panel of Qualified Auditors will be amended accordingly. With a view to further strengthening the market conduct and practices of treasury operations of licensed banks, the Central Bank intends to establish a new regulatory framework to ensure that treasury operations of licensed banks are carried out prudently and in line with the international best practices. The Central Bank will also formulate a crisis preparedness plan for the banking  25  industry, to minimise the adverse impact on troubled banks and mitigate spillovers. A consultation paper will be issued to banks in this regard.

Lastly, it is true that, even if a reform is approved which assimilates our labour institutions to those in the more developed countries, this does not ensure the immediate resolution of our problems of growth, public finances or banking system health. More measures have to be adopted and, among them, as I have said, budgetary consolidation is key. But let there be no mistake: while labour reform is not a sufficient condition, it is nevertheless an absolutely necessary and essential one without which the other measures or reforms adopted will have a much diminished effect on the competitiveness of our economy. Thank you. BIS Review 27/2010  7
As long as the basic willingness to share fiscal sovereignty is lacking, we could and should then agree that sovereignty will be relinquished if a Member State does not comply with the jointly agreed objectives, such as the deficit and debt limits. At the same time, it’s necessary to strengthen national ownership and private risk-sharing. From an economic perspective, it would seem obvious: if a state gets into financial difficulty, why shouldn’t the state’s creditors bear the losses? In reality however, this is not so easy to implement. Bear in mind how long it took to arrange that for the resolution of banks their creditors will also be liable in the future. Where does the problem lie? It lies in the possible contagion effects and in concerns about financial stability. The creditors of countries are in many cases the domestic banks. A state bankruptcy with a bail-in could therefore trigger a financial crisis. 2  Masuch, K.; Moshammer, E.; Pierluigi, Beatrice (2016), Institutions and Growth in Europe. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS Working Document No. 421). 3  “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”, presented by J.-C. Juncker, in close cooperation with D. Tusk, J. Dijsselbloem, M. Draghi and M. Schulz, 22 June 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  This problem is intensified by the fact that the regulation creates incentives for banks to hold government bonds.

8 To support such efforts in Shanghai, Singapore financial institutions can partner the Shanghai authorities and financial institutions to spearhead policy innovation supporting the liberalization agenda. For example, DBS participated in underwriting the pilot issuance of free trade zone (FTZ) bonds by the Shanghai Municipal Government last year, demonstrating how the complementarity of overseas networks that foreign banks provide can contribute to the internationalization of China’s capital markets. 9 Second, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will remain a priority trans-national initiative in China. During the National People’s Congress meetings last month, President Xi suggested that the Shanghai FTZ could be a bridgehead for the BRI, to help domestic companies channel investment overseas and set up a legal framework in line with international trade and investment rules. As a hub for trade and investment flows in Southeast Asia, Singapore would be a natural partner to Shanghai in realizing this vision to promote trade and investment flows between China and the ASEAN region. 1 0 Third, technology will continue to present benefits and opportunities to the financial sector. As leading FinTech centres, there is great scope for Shanghai and Singapore to harness technology together in a purposeful way, while ensuring appropriate and responsive regulatory frameworks to safeguard against possible new risks. Anchoring Stability, Leveraging Opportunities 11 Shanghai and Singapore can look forward to further strengthening collaboration and deepening mutual understanding in these as well as other areas.