samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Sweden we have had several deregulations, including those in the taxi industry, domestic air travel and dental care, which have not caused any substantial drop in prices. Other deregulations, including those in the electricity and telephone markets, have had larger moderating effects on prices than expected. The difficulties do not only involve evaluating the effects on inflation of each single deregulation or every new step in internationalisation. They also concern the more principal question of to what extent this type of effect on inflation should be accepted. Where should one draw the line between a relative price change, which leads to such inflationary effects that a monetary policy reaction is motivated, and a change which does not require any such reaction? Presumably, today's increased competition is only part of the whole picture of developments, in the same way that tax increases were during the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, not taking into account the fact that tax increases were part of the inflation process was a considerable policy mistake. In the same way one can ask whether the effects of deregulation and other effects of international competition should really be taken into account today. There are fundamental arguments against the idea of discounting considerable aggregates of goods that have been hit by price falls. What central banks should be trying to do is to stabilise general price levels and not to counteract changes in relative prices.

The second reason is that domestic markets and economic agents have been able to adapt to changing circumstances. In the labor market there has been substantial mobility between sectors and from salaried to self-employment, while nominal wages and working hours have adjusted gradually. The corporate sector has cut on costs, improved operational efficiency and refinanced its debt. Financing conditions have remained historically favorable and banks have adjusted loan-loss provisions without rationing credit. 21. The above indicates not only that the Chilean economy has become more resilient than in the past but also that it is well prepared to resume growth. In fact, there are no major macroeconomic constraints to grow beyond the current rates. On the one hand, financial conditions are highly favorable and corporations and financial institutions face no liquidity constraints. On the other, with a current account deficit of 1.6% of GDP, Chile has little pressure from external savings. Finally, public net debt is only slightly positive and there is very little risk of crowding out private investment.
For instance, robotisation, alongside the use of AI and ML-related tools, allows increased efficiencies and, when properly conceived, can further help increase financial inclusion, thus fostering growth and employment alike. However, as with any innovation we should not only welcome the potential benefits but also set against them the new and traditional risks that could emerge with these tools. I would like to structure my address today into three interrelated fields: first, the European experience in regulating crypto-assets; second, the Eurosystem experience in developing and providing a digital euro; and third, the promotion of innovation and the Spanish experience with a sandbox. The European experience in regulating cryptoassets Over the last two years or so, cryptoassets have certainly attracted growing attention in the public debate. Their steady, exponential growth was the initial trigger, followed more recently by an equally impressive rapid decline. Yet, despite recent events, cryptoassets and their underlying infrastructure, are another good example of the potential of new technologies to help overcome certain shortcomings in the existing financial ecosystem and, perhaps, even to create new business opportunities. Take the potential possibility to fractionalise real-world assets (especially non-tradable ones), through  1/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  tokenisation, which opens a wide door to, among other things, an expansion of the investor base and broadening the range of collateral that is available and acceptable, beyond traditional items.

In Norway, the banks dealt with the problem loans themselves, and there is good reason to try to achieve this, where possible: the originating banks themselves are the best placed to deal with the problem loans. However, this presupposes that the problem loans account for only a limited proportion of total lending, so that the banks are able to continue to operate normally. Sweden and Finland established a “bad bank” that took over the high-risk loans. But this was in most cases done only after the state had nationalised the banks and was thereby able to control the kinds of loans that were transferred to the “bad bank”. Third, banking crises do not need to be prolonged. In the Nordic economies the prompt and extensive writing down of problem loans and recapitalisation of the banks limited the economic downturn, which lasted only around a few years. This experience stands in contrast to that of Japan, where loan losses were recognised too slowly, with substantial and decade-long consequences for economic developments. All that said, however, the challenges facing banks today require a broader set of instruments than those used by the Nordic authorities 20 years ago, for two main reasons: First, the situation for banks is more complex. The authorities have to distinguish more clearly between insolvent banks and banks that are solvent but in need of more capital in order to increase lending. The lessons from the Nordic banking crisis can be drawn on for the insolvent banks.
First, in time for the Argentine G20 Summit, drawing on the work of the Big Four accounting firms, the Task Force will report on implementation experience, focusing on examples of good practice to foster wider adoption. Second, the Task Force is launching a Resource Hub to provide technical support, data, and collaborative partnerships – all aimed at helping companies implement the recommendations in as effective and efficient a manner as possible. As preparers, financials and investors 'learn by doing’, a virtuous cycle will be created where more and better information creates the imperatives for others to adopt the TCFD and for everyone to up their game on the quality of information they provide. This iterative process is a reason why there is likely cause for the Task Force to continue beyond the Argentine Summit in late 2018 and into the Japanese presidency. In particular, it will be important to get feedback from investors on which disclosures are truly decision useful so that this process is as efficient and effective as possible. Third, insurers and banks. Insurers have long been on the front line of the physical risks posed by climate change such as extreme weather events. Since the 1980s, the number of registered weather-related loss events has tripled. Inflationadjusted insurance losses have increased from an annual average of around $ in the  5  See ISS, (2018), United States Proxy Voting Guidelines, Benchmark Policy Recommendations, and Glass Lewis, (2018), Guidelines: An Overview of the Glass Lewis Approach to Proxy Advice.

When I first spoke about the financial stability risks from climate change, at Lloyd’s of London in 2015, I highlighted two paradoxes relating to transition risk in particular. 1  First, the future will be past. That is, climate change is a tragedy of the horizon which imposes a cost on future generations that the current one has no direct incentive to fix. The catastrophic impacts of climate change will be felt beyond the traditional horizons of most actors. Once climate change becomes a clear and present danger to financial stability it may already be too late to stabilise the atmosphere at two degrees. The second paradox is that success is failure. That is, too rapid a movement towards a low-carbon economy could materially damage financial stability. A wholesale reassessment of prospects, as climate-related risks are re-evaluated, could destabilise markets, spark a pro-cyclical crystallisation of losses and lead to a persistent tightening of financial conditions: a climate Minsky moment. The tragedy of the horizon can be resolved in an orderly, effective and productive manner, however, with early transitions in thinking and action. 1  See Carney (2015), “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability”, speech given at Lloyd’s of London, September 2015. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  A transition in thinking Since 2015, a transition in thinking has taken place.
Essentially we took the view that unbalanced growth was better than no growth at all - which was the only other option we had. This "two speed" economy has, I know, been reflected in the pattern of your own activity as FLA members, with consumer finance volumes growing strongly in recent years where business volumes have been relatively flat. In the past year alone new business written to consumers was nearly three times that written to business customers. Now clearly the imbalances can't go on increasingly indefinitely. The build-up of household debt and the related strong rise in house prices we saw last year in particular must begin to moderate at some point. So much of the recent debate has been about whether the eventual adjustment will occur gradually, within the context of continuing overall expansion, or more abruptly in which case the overall expansion could prove more difficult to sustain. On the macro-economic data it seems clear that the global economy in fact bottomed out around a year or so ago, and that we have since seen the beginnings of a recovery, notably in the US, on which so much of the rest of the world currently depends. And it is also clear that monetary policy generally and in some countries also fiscal policy - remains supportive.

3 The Black-white unemployment gap, which had reached historical lows in 2019, widened considerably during the spring and summer, undoing much of the progress of the past decade. While the gap has narrowed some since, closing this gap further will be an important part of a full recovery. Black-owned businesses have also suffered disproportionately.4 A report released by the New York Fed in August found that Black-owned businesses have been almost twice as likely to shutter during COVID-19 as white-owned firms.5 A key area of our focus is to better understand what contributes to economic inequities and to finding solutions.6 Through our economic research and outreach efforts, we are working to understand how racial disparities play out in the labor market, and what can be done to change these outcomes. Now I’ll turn to inflation, the other half of our dual mandate. Although we have seen swings in some prices from the effects of COVID, overall the inflation rate has been running below our 2 percent goal. With our economy and the global economy still far below full strength, I expect underlying inflationary pressures to remain subdued for some time. An encouraging sign is that measures of longer-run inflation expectations have retraced earlier declines as the economic outlook has brightened and are now at levels seen a few years ago. As the economy fully heals and reaches maximum employment over the next few years, I expect inflation will sustainably move to levels consistent with our 2 percent longer-run goal.
Allow me to reiterate and point out that over the years, we delightfully have noticed that the quality in the research work of participants has been on rise, turning the performed analyses and researches increasingly more professional. As in previous years, Albanian students from domestic or foreign universities have applied and presented their best research work. We are happy to notice that participation and interest from students and universities has been significantly edging up, showing appreciation, reliability and reputation of this competition. This year, we received 25 studies, whose common characteristic is the addressing of the reality in the last couple of years. They mainly scrutinise the economic, financial and social effects of the pandemic and the resistance of market and financial institutions to this shock. Thesis on the forward guidance of financial market, focusing on the digital currency effects; exploitation of large detailed databases for evaluating the behaviour of financial market segments which, which have been out of the research attention, are important to the country development; in addition to the study of other important issues to Albania, like fiscal policy, etc. The addressed themes and their findings are based on the application of contemporary research methodologies and make use of granular statistical information, which is both thoughtful and structured one. Above all, this information is employed rigorously pursuant to the academic standards and requirements to research and argue through theoretical and empirical hypothesis on the economic and financial phenomena and events.

But before that, let me say a few words about our monetary policy. Our monetary policy is doing its part, thanks to its persistence and patience, as Mario Draghi stressed this morning. Past questions about its effectiveness and our exit strategy seem to have receded – and rightly so. We confirmed last week our course of gradual normalisation, with the removal of the so-called “easing bias” on the APP. What we see now is a welcome alignment of the stars: against the economic background of a robust expansion with gradual progress on inflation, there is a broad convergence of market expectations with the views within our Governing Council. At present, there is very little debate among us. But this convergence doesn’t preclude vigilance. We’re closely watching the somewhat slow pace of inflation – I believe the Phillips curve is still at work, although with a time lag – and the global risks, starting with US trade policy and the evolution of the exchange rate. Let me now turn to the core of my message: the need to strengthen our Monetary Union by making concrete progress on Economic Union. There is currently a window of opportunity: the economic recovery is robust, and many euro area reform proposals point in the same direction, including the Commission roadmap of December 2017, President Macron’s speech at the Sorbonne last September and, more recently, the European chapter of the German coalition agreement. The outcome of the recent elections in Italy shows that we can’t waste any more time with theoretical debates.
Discussions are ongoing among central banks as to what the significance of low interest rates will be for monetary policy and how the scope for monetary policy to act in economic slowdowns can be increased. One conclusion is that complementary monetary policy measures of the type used by many central banks in recent years, such as the purchasing of various assets, may become more common in the future. Other feasible measures in the monetary policy toolbox are loans directly to companies via banks, and foreign exchange interventions. 11 [13]  The new environment also affects other policy areas Another possibility is other policy areas being used more actively to stimulate the economy in times of recession. In the international debate, it has, for example, been said that the limitations imposed on monetary policy by the low interestrate environment mean that fiscal policy may need to contribute to stabilisation policy to a greater extent than before. 13 I think, to start with, that it is important to point out that monetary policy has not be exhausted as a result of the policy rate being lowered as far as is practically possible. As I just mentioned, there are several tools in the monetary policy toolbox that can be used if need be, in order to stimulate the economy. That said, there are obviously feasible tools in other policy areas as well.

Lower interest rates on average than before To start with, it can be noted that we find ourselves in an environment where interest rates are much lower than before. “You’ve made your bed so you must lie in it”, someone may object – is it not central banks themselves that have created this environment? It is true that policy rates have been cut significantly to support economic activity and return to inflation targets. But the fact that this has caused policy rates to fall to extremely low levels is because central banks needed to adapt to a general downward trend in interest rates around the world, a trend that began a long time before the financial crisis in 2008. Declining trend in real interest rates on a global level Returns and interest expenditure adjusted for inflation are important to households and companies, as they make decisions on saving and investment. In other words, it is real interest rates that matter. By changing the nominal policy rate, the central bank can affect the real interest rate in the near term and thus demand in the economy. This is possible, as it takes time for companies to adapt their prices to the change in the policy rate and other interest rates in the economy. But once prices have been adjusted, the real interest rate is also reset. In the longer term, therefore, monetary policy has no major effect on real interest rates.
Second, and more importantly, a “basic” service will be defined which, for payment orders submitted in the correct format, should provide a guaranteed service level with attractive conditions in terms of price and execution time. The Eurosystem welcomes the idea of a basic service offer, but the progress report went one step further by inviting banks to set up a “standard” cross-border payment service with a common name, to be provided by most banks in the euro area. Such a standard service would contribute even more to greater price transparency and, consequently, enhanced competition. The progress report also recognises that the achievement of the objectives depends not only on banks but also on companies and customers, who should include adequate information in invoices and payment orders so as to facilitate straight-through processing. The Eurosystem is therefore urging the 5  BIS Review 109/2000  banking industry to launch an information campaign and expects specific proposals by the end of 2000. The organisation of such an information campaign would be greatly facilitated if a standard service with a common name existed. The Eurosystem will continue to closely monitor the progress made by the banking industry with regard to the outstanding issues, as well as developments in customer prices, in order to ensure that the preparations currently under way do ultimately translate into adequate services for European citizens. All options, including the operational involvement of the Eurosystem, will be retained, in case the situation has not improved significantly by 2002. BIS Review 109/2000  6

To follow, I will discuss the role of policy in and ensuring that growth is sustainable and not prone to relapses, especially ways to mitigate potential economic and financial imbalances. And finally, I will explain how the Bank of Thailand intends to find the right balance for policy to foster businesses and investment during the rise of Asia. Ladies and Gentlemen, Since the ancient Greek and Indian times, a golden age refers to a period of peace and unity, stability, and rising wealth, with an abundance of hope and opportunities. Evidence has pointed out that Asia has increasingly embraced these characteristics. In terms of peace and unity, we have witnessed increasing international cooperation to boost economic welfare and safeguard against risks in the region. For ASEAN, this has been reflected by the increase in free trade and investment agreements both bilaterally and under the ASEAN Economic Community. In a broader group, the ASEAN+3 countries have been working closely to set up and improve a committed mechanism for regional crisis prevention and management. As for economic stability, I think that the robust recovery, low level of public debt, together with sufficient foreign reserves have demonstrated that Asian regional economies have the satisfactory capacity to cope with future shocks. In terms of increasing wealth, it is clear that the share of emerging Asia in world GDP has been increasing markedly with a status as a global production hub of manufactured goods. This is projected to rise even further.
I just quoted the seminal opus of Karl Polany1 in 1944, but I should also mention another famous economist of the last century, Joseph Schumpeter. They diverged in their prescriptions, but they were both born in Europe (Austria-Hungary, to be more specific) and then lived and died in North America. We will need their vision to succeed in the Great transformations of our demanding 21st century. 1/ Climate change is accelerating. Natural catastrophes such as droughts, heat waves, storms, etc. cost USD 250 billion in 2021, a steep increase of 24% compared with 2020 – which was already well above the 10-year average2. We are hopefully all concerned about the delays in implementing the Paris agreement. The Banque de France has conducted simulations on the basis of macro-financial scenarios developed by the NGFS, the Network for Greening the Financial System: a late and disorderly transition would have far more adverse effects, ranging between 10% and 20% of world GDP by the end of the century (compared with up to 7% of GDP for an orderly transition). Beyond COP26, globally coordinated governmental forward-looking guidance is therefore necessary to anchor concrete and credible commitments, such as the one taken by the European Union in its Fit for 55 programme. And yes, policies to fight climate change should imperatively include an appropriate carbon price. Be assured that central banks will do everything they can do. The ECB monetary policy strategy review, concluded last summer under President Lagarde’s leadership, sets out an ambitious action plan leading up to 2024.

But central banks and, beyond, financial intermediaries cannot substitute for adequate – and sometimes difficult – public policies. The green transition does hold risks – including for inflation –, but it also offers economic and financial opportunities, as new technologies gradually reach scalability. The sooner we start, the more positive (or the less negative) the economic balance will be. 2/ Let me now turn to the second major transformation underway: the digital transformation. Here, Europe is still lagging behind the United States and China. It is of the utmost importance to remain at the technological frontier in order to reap the benefits of innovation in terms of productivity and growth, as the winner often takes all. Beyond the economic fallouts, it is also a matter of strategic autonomy.