samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Consequently, one of the key response from the authorities was to develop the BASEL III Reforms Package that aims to strengthen global supervision of international banks and banking systems. While the global banking supervisors have been working hard to improve banking supervision, the financial crisis has mutated into a fiscal crisis in some markets in Europe, once again threatening the viability of some global banks and causing the risk of contagion to other financial institutions and markets. Consequently this drives home the lessons that strengthening banking supervision alone is not sufficient and that prudent fiscal and monetary policies are essential for a sound and resilient banking system. Before I talk about Basel III, I would like to revisit the evolution of the Basel II framework which was published by the Basel Committee in June 2004 with a tentative full implementation date of 1st January 2007. Consequently in 2007 a pertinent question was that why did Basel II fail to prevent the financial crisis. The response was that apart from its slow and uneven implementation in the advanced markets, Basel II was a flawed standard that had failed to address some of the major supervisory weaknesses. These included the lack of a common definition of quality of capital, no limits on leveraging, no common standards for liquidity and a failure to recognize the excessive market risks embedded in trading and derivative transactions that had risen very sharply among the major banks. Therefore, Basel II would have not done the job it was required to do.

The second area of improvement is on other Pillar 2 risks including interest rate, liquidity, FX, strategic, technology and reputation. All banks have developed methodologies to identify, quantify, manage and allocate capital to such risks. These were risks for which no capital was required earlier. A third area is stress testing where Saudi banks have made good progress. This allows them to know their risk tolerance and resilience in times of stress. Finally, the introduction of Pillar 3 has strengthened the disclosure of Saudi banks to high international standards. This brings me to an important natural question. What does Basel III mean for Saudi banking system? Well let me assure you that our preliminary analysis is that the transition to Basel III in the Basel agreed time frames should be smooth. Saudi banks already maintain a high level of core common equity capital. The average following the introduction of Basel III has been about 17%, of which around 85% is core common equity. Similarly Saudi Banks maintain a high level of liquidity which has averaged over 30% over the past two decades. SAMA already requires banks to keep conservation buffers above the minimum and has  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  introduced stringent stress testing requirements. Banks are making good progress in all areas. SAMA has already started the Basel III implementation process by publishing its plans, introducing relevant prudential returns and providing guidance to banks.
The pandemic is also likely to have lasting economic eﬀects beyond 2021, including postponed investments, the negative impact of sustained job losses on human capital, global supply chain reconfigurations that emphasise resilience over eﬀiciency, and high public and private debt levels. These eﬀects will further threaten potential growth in economies globally. 6. However, Asian economies are poised to overcome these challenges. Our growth model which comprises deep international integration, investment in human capital, and sound economic governance has helped us weather past crises and will continue to serve us well. The digitalisation of the regional economy also oﬀers immense opportunities. It is facilitating the growth of emerging industries such as e-commerce and expanding access to the vast East Asian market for non-traded goods. 7. In the medium term, Asia’s outlook is positive. In the next five years, the IMF projects 5.2% average annual growth for the region, compared to 3.2% for the rest of the world. By 2025, Asia’s share of global GDP is expected to reach 38%, up from 26% 20 years ago. [4] Financial Markets in Asia – Sharing the growth story 8. Asian financial markets have grown in tandem with the Asian economic growth trajectory.

And they can be further minimised if we can ensure that when the adjustment and loss occurs, other features of the financial system do not amplify and spread the stress. The great, post crisis, programme of reform of financial regulation, that is now well into its implementation had precisely this objective. Much stronger prudential rules require banks to have capital and liquidity to enable them to take losses and withstand liquidity stress in excess of the losses and stresses encountered in the financial crisis. 19  Bordalo, Gennaiolo and Shleifer (2018) 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Major UK banks now have capital ratios that are more than three times higher than before the financial crisis and their short-term wholesale funding has fallen from being more than 15% of total funding in 2007 to less than 5% today.
In total, approximately $ trillion of dollar-denominated securities and cash deposits are held by foreign official account holders at the New York Fed, representing about half of the world’s official U.S. dollar reserves and one-third of the world’s total official FX reserves. Reflecting the breadth of its foreign official customer base and dollar holdings, the Federal Reserve’s account platform is a centralized infrastructure through which dollar-denominated financial transactions between official institutions can occur under a single roof using the same clearing and settlement staff. This provides an important public benefit in terms of control of transactions, efficiency of execution, and confidentiality in two specific ways. First, this centralized account platform has played a critical role in the resolution of international debt crises throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, such as the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s. Second, the centralized platform sustains a high level of operational readiness for crossborder dollar operations in support of global financial stability. By allowing direct payments between or among account holders on a shared platform, or between the Federal Reserve and account holders, the speed and efficiency of often time-critical official payments is greatly shortened and simplified. Combined with the Federal Reserve’s ownership and operation of critical payment systems such as the Fedwire Funds Service and the Fedwire Securities Service, this centralized platform supports the Federal Reserve’s crisis response capabilities in a highly dollar-based international financial system.

This is especially true for liquidity tranches of reserve portfolios where safety and accessibility are critical for the execution of core central banking functions, including FX reserve management, FX intervention, time-sensitive official payments, macro-prudential policy, lender of last resort responsibilities, and other central bank operations that may require the use of foreign assets and currencies. As stewards of national wealth in their capacity as managers of official foreign reserves, central banks seek to minimize custodial risk in the safekeeping of their foreign reserves.13 By using a central bank custodian, the risk of loss stemming from insolvency, negligence, or unauthorized disclosure is either removed or significantly reduced. Central banks do not pose counterparty risk and reserve managers’ use of fellow central bank account services reduces the risk of disclosure of central banks’ trading strategies. Relatedly, the confidentiality of holdings and activities in central bank accounts supports the execution of sensitive operations that may require utmost discretion to avoid setting off market panics or privileging one set of market participants over another. Finally, central banks’ use of a fellow central bank’s account services allows them to settle in central bank money, with attendant benefits from the standpoint of smooth and reliable settlement.
James McAndrews: Mortgage contract design – implications for households, monetary policy, and financial stability Opening remarks by Mr James McAndrews, Executive Vice President and Director of Research of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the “Mortgage Contract Design: Implications for Households, Monetary Policy, and Financial Stability” Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 21 May 2015. *  *  *  The views expressed in this speech are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System. Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. Good morning, and welcome to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Today is the second and final day of our conference on mortgage contract design. We are hosting this conference, in association with the NYU Stern Center for Real Estate Finance Research, because we view mortgage design as an important policy issue, with implications for monetary policy, household finance and risk management, as well as for the structure and stability of the financial system. Mortgage debt is, by far, the largest household financial liability. According to New York Fed data 1, mortgages and home equity lines of credit make up 73 percent of U.S. household debt, amounting to $ trillion in liabilities outstanding.

1 This work covers issues such as collateral mobility and cross-border interoperability (i.e. collateral messages,  workflows, cut-off times, settlement cycles, etc.). 2 With regard to the conflict of law issue, the ECB welcomes the Commission’s “legislative initiative” to determine  with legal certainty which national law should apply to security ownership. The ECB will contribute to the forthcoming public consultation with a view to strengthening the legal environment for cross-border settlement services. With regard to the withholding tax procedures, the Eurosystem welcomes the Commission’s announcement that a Code of Conduct on withholding tax procedures will be published in 2017. The AMI SeCo predecessor – T2S Advisory Group – has contributed substantially to the work of the Commission in analysing the possible harmonisation on withholding tax procedures and stands ready to further contribute to this work, if required. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
7    Approve, at the proposal of the Executive Commission, the Banco de España’s Annual Report and, where appropriate, any other reports that it may be required to submit to Parliament, the Government or the Minister for Economy and Finance14.   Approve Monetary Circulars and Banco de España Circulars.   Submit to the Government the proposals for removal from office referred to in Article 25(4)(d) of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España.   Approve, at the proposal of the Executive Commission, the Internal Rules of the Banco de España.   Approve the Banco de España’s budget proposal, authorise the annual accounts for issue and approve the proposal for distribution of profit.   Approve the staff policy guidelines and ratify the appointment of Directors General.   Impose penalties the adoption of which falls within the powers of the Banco de España.   Approve penalty proposals to be submitted by the Banco de España to the Minister for Economy and Finance.   Settle appeals or claims against decisions of the Banco de España where it is within its powers to do so.   Adopt any other resolutions necessary to perform the functions entrusted to the Banco de España under the Law of Autonomy that are not the exclusive competence of the Executive Commission.   Designate, at the proposal of the Governor, the two Council members of the Executive Commission and the members of the Audit Committee.

6  ANNEX 2 - Functions of the governing bodies of the Banco de España In accordance with the provisions of Articles 17 to 23 of Law 13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco de España, and of its Internal Rules, the functions of the governing bodies of the Banco de España are, essentially, the following: 1 Powers of the Governor               Run the institution and preside over the Governing Council and the Executive Commission. Act as the Bank's legal representative to all effects and purposes, especially in the Courts of Justice. Authorise contracts and documents and perform all other activities necessary for the conduct of the functions conferred on the Banco de España. Represent the Banco de España at those institutions and international organisations in which its participation may be envisaged. Sit on the Governing Council and the General Council of the European Central Bank (ECB). Represent the Banco de España before the Spanish Parliament, acting as the channel for providing parliamentary access to Banco de España information that falls under the secrecy obligation, and attending the sessions of the parliamentary committees at which his/her presence is required under parliamentary regulations or national law Manage, at the highest level, all the services of the Banco de España, and sign any documents, such as minutes and circulars that he/she is required to formalise. Propose to the Government the appointment of the Deputy Governor.
8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 Multilateral nominal exchange rate (1) (index, 2005=100) 140  140  130  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80 00  01  02  03  U.S.  04  05  06  07  08  09  Commodity exporters (2)  10  11  Chile  (1) An increase indicates a depreciation of the local currency. (2) Simple average of Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Figure 6 Real exchange rate (index, Jan.00-Mar.11 average=100) 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60  Range (*)  Average  U.K.  U.S.  South Korea  Mexico  Eurozone  Peru  Japan  Norway  Poland  Malaysia  Israel  New Zealand  India  Turkey  Chile  China  Thailand  South Africa  Hungary  Philippines  Canada  Czech Rep.  Russia  Australia  Brazil  170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60  Spot  (*) The range shows maximum and minimum values posted by the local currency during indicated period. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on figures from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

Our projections have not changed: the Bank of Albania expects economic activity to improve progressively over the medium-term horizon. This performance will continue to be sustained by stimulating financial conditions and growth of private domestic demand. It will contribute to the improvement of economic and financial equilibriums in Albania and to the return of inflation to target within 2018. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The realisation of these objectives requires maintaining the actual mix of economic policies. The monetary policy will maintain the stimulating trend over the medium-term horizon, while the intensity of the monetary stimulus will not decrease for some quarters ahead. On the other hand, the fiscal policy should maintain its consolidating trend. The balance of risks related to expected developments remains on the down side. The expansion of economic activity continues to be decelerated by the unfavourable economic performance in the euro area, which is further complicated by the Brexit, as well as by the behaviour of economic and financial agents, who continue to show reluctance in undertaking long-term business projects. Against this backdrop, the Bank of Albania deems that economic policies and structural reforms should focus on: –  Maintaining and further strengthening the economic and financial stability. –  Accelerating structural reforms, especially with regard to: improving the legal setting and business climate; encouraging domestic and foreign investments, completing the infrastructure; enhancing productivity; and, improving the labour market. –  Expanding crediting, to support the country's medium-term development.
The Banks formed an “Open Market Investment Committee” to coordinate their activities, and the Committee soon began to make policy recommendations to increase or reduce the availability of reserves to member banks. The Banking Act of 1935 created the modern Federal Open Market Committee, and the Committee selected the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as its operating agent.9 The Federal Reserve Act specifies the types of transactions that Reserve Banks can undertake, but does not designate how they should be undertaken. Although other possibilities exist, such as public auctions and reverse auctions, for more than 80 years the Desk has conducted monetary policy operations with bank and nonbank dealers, primarily because they were the core market makers – that is, liquidity providers – for Treasury securities. In 1942, the Fed and the Treasury agreed to cap Treasury yields for the duration of the Second World War in order to facilitate funding the war effort. By the end of the war, open market transactions were conducted with a small group of “qualified” dealers. The FOMC set the terms and conditions of the counterparty relationship. In 1951, the Fed returned to using open market operations as a tool for maintaining control over the monetary base and restored the “recognized” dealer program that had been in place before the war.10  8  Kenneth Garbade, The Early Years of the Primary Dealer System (New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2015). 9  In fact, the FOMC directs a “Selected Reserve Bank” to conduct open market operations.

These dealers maintained the liquid secondary market for Treasuries and served as counterparties for open market operations. This state of affairs continued until 1970, when the Treasury introduced auction offerings of coupon-bearing debt. Auction participation, like market making, was a risky, capital-intensive activity, and dealers – especially primary dealers – began to play an increasingly important role in the primary market. Though the transition was gradual, this period represented the moment in history when the same set of counterparties began to participate in both open market operations and the primary issuance of Treasury securities. Recent changes More recently, the Federal Reserve’s approach to designing an effective counterparty framework has been informed by our experience of conducting asset purchases as well as other balance sheet actions and exercises necessary to implement policy in the post-crisis period. In these years, we have ventured beyond the primary dealers to conduct open market operations with a wider and more diverse range of market participants. The introduction of daily reverse repurchase agreement (RRP) test operations in September 2013 required several years of work by the Desk to establish relationships with an expanded set of counterparties beyond the primary dealers or entity types that are currently eligible to be primary dealers, and to develop an approach to evaluating the capabilities of these firms that is distinct from the process for assessing primary dealers.
After the crisis of 2008-2009 the Federal Reserve increased the monetary impulse beyond the usual limits set by the interest rate. It not only took it to zero percent, but it also added a quantitative boost through the purchase of bonds. In a normal environment, it probably would have been unnecessary to take the impulse to such extremes, and probably the economy would have taken less time to react. However, 11  the post-crisis damage was very large and only the persistence of the momentum has allowed the US economy to make a successful recovery after nine years. We see something similar in Europe, with the difference that they took longer to apply the stimulus, suffered a banking crisis in 2011 and, in addition, the very agreement procedures of the European Community make it more difficult to take extreme decisions. Finally, as I said, monetary policy must be credible, in order for the economic agents’ reactions to its impulses to be in line with the objective. If inflation expectations are aligned with the two-year-ahead target of 3%, agents’ decisions, market interest rates, and financial asset prices will harmonize with low, stable inflation. The need for persistence and credibility raises a warning about how inefficient an interest rate reduction may be if perceived as temporary by the market. This is very important, because in practice if agents consider that a rate cut will be very short lived, it will probably have no meaningful effect on the yield curve or on the decisions of households and businesses.

In practice what that would be likely to mean in our present situation is substantially lower interest rates: the intended effect would be to stimulate external demand, but it would inevitably also involve further stimulus to domestic demand. In effect, it implies that we should acquiesce in increasing overall demand pressure leading inevitably to faster inflation. That might conceivably even provide some relief to the suffering sectors in the short term. But increasing demand pressure, including labour market pressure, and accelerating inflation would - as we’ve repeatedly seen in the past - ultimately need to be brought back under control, involving a more abrupt tightening of policy. That frankly would not do the suffering sectors themselves much good at least for very long - and it would have a potentially serious destabilising effect on the economy as a whole. That is precisely what we are trying to avoid. 3  BIS Review 33/2000  The more hopeful news is that we have recently seen strong signs of recovery - of both economic activity and exchange rates - in a number of emerging markets and transition economies. And we are seeing a strengthening of domestic demand and of output in the Eurozone, which may help the euro to appreciate. To the extent that these trends persist, it will help to ease the exceptional pressures on the most internationally-exposed sectors, and contribute to a better balance within the UK economy.