samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me also talk about what we did from the Bank of Thailand side to cushion the impact of Page 1 of 8  the crisis. When the crisis hit, the top priority for us back then and still going forward, was to ensure that the financial and the banking sector functioned as close to normal as possible. We did not want to see that the banking sector acts as a shock amplifier instead of a shock absorber because when the economy got hit and contracted, we would see a contraction in credit. Instead of extending loans, the banks would tend to call back their loans, and it would trigger a downward spiral along the lines of what we saw during the 2008 global financial crisis or the 1997 Asian financial crisis for Thailand. Our priority was to ensure that the banks still functioned in extending credit to the economy. I would say we were reasonably successful in keeping credit growing as the overall credit grew at about 5 to 6 percent last year. The figure is higher than what we saw in other countries in the region, even though Thailand as an economy got hit harder by Covid-19 than other countries in the region. I think this is a testament to the policy response and to our friends in the banking sector that try to ensure that the credit mechanism function, as well as one could reasonably expect.

But if you buy the argument that ASEAN is a good place to be, then Thailand is not a bad place to be to take advantage of the opportunities in ASEAN. Even though we are neither the largest economy nor the fastest growing economy, in many ways, Thailand is the most connected economy in ASEAN, not from a financial standpoint but from a real standpoint. Let me share some thoughts on why Thailand is a very connected economy. What kinds of things do we think of if we think about the well-connected economy? It has to have strong trade and investment linkages, good logistics, a good production hub, and a high degree of labor access. If we look at each of those dimensions, Thailand is still an interesting place to be. In terms of trade, if we look at the share of intra-ASEAN exports, the top of the list is Singapore. However, it is not entirely their export because roughly 40 percent of Singapore exports are transshipment from other places, so let us exclude Singapore. Next on the list is Malaysia accounting for about 20 percent of intra-ASEAN exports, but a large share of Malaysian exports goes to Singapore. Thailand is next on the list at 18 percent. But if you ask which economy in ASEAN is the most closely linked in terms of trade with other countries, and more broadly, in terms of diversity of products it exported and coverage of the countries it traded with, it turns out to be Thailand.
Regrettably, fiscal developments have worsened recently in a few accession countries, reflecting ongoing restructuring programmes and higher expenditures related to the adoption of EU standards, but also the lack of a realistic medium-term fiscal strategy. In addition, structural deficits have become rather large and public debt ratios have started to increase, limiting the room for manoeuvre of automatic stabilisers. Overall, the need for further fiscal consolidation seems overwhelming, as fiscal slippages could put under pressure and even endanger the macroeconomic stabilisation achieved thus far. Finally, let me turn briefly to the third component of, or perhaps better complement to, stability-oriented policies in accession countries that I will be addressing today: the implementation of further structural reforms. Stability-oriented policies can best be supported by structural reforms, as they enhance the flexibility of the economy to adjust to necessary changes and cope with potential shocks. Moreover, structural reforms are also key determinants of the medium-term growth potential. In the case of the accession countries, structural reforms are even more important because they are necessary to complete the full adjustment of the accession countries' economies toward well-functioning market economies, including the setting-up of appropriate institutions and the adoption of international best practices in a number of areas. Completing this agenda is a challenge for the accession countries, particularly because of the sheer magnitude of pending reforms. Moreover, structural changes may complicate the conduct of monetary policy, as structural reforms may cause structural breaks that complicate the pursuit of credible disinflationary policies.

Willem F Duisenberg: Perspectives on EU enlargement Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate from IMADEC University, Vienna, 14 October 2002. *  *  *  Dear Klaus, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great privilege for me to be awarded an honorary doctorate today by such a distinguished institution, IMADEC University, in Austria. It is also a great pleasure to hear the kind words of my colleague and friend, Governor Klaus Liebscher. When listening to Klaus Liebscher, who has indeed studied my curriculum vitae in great depth, Shakespeare's words came to my mind and I thought for a moment he had come to bury me, although he has actually come to praise me. I am afraid that this is the fate of anybody whose retirement comes within sight. Nothing but good should be said of the dead, they say. Considering that I am still alive, it is even more gratifying to hear nothing but good things about myself; perhaps with the exception of my addiction to tobacco - an addiction that Klaus and I happen to share. There is one thing I should like to emphasise in the laudation. As Klaus Liebscher has just said, my career has benefited from a “Summe von Zufälligkeiten” that I have been lucky enough to encounter throughout my professional life.
In order to distinguish between the parts of this story that provide lessons that are applicable to the rest of the world and those that do not, we need to get some of the facts straight, because to this day there are still several misconceptions floating around about what was done in Iceland during the crisis. The collapse of Iceland’s three cross-border banks in early October 2008 was the most noticeable event in the unfolding of the financial crisis. The combined balance sheet of these banks was 10 times Iceland’s GDP (see Figure 1), and their combined bankruptcy, measured in terms of balance sheets, ranks second in size in the international history of corporate failures, only after Lehman Brothers. And this happened in a country that ranks among the smallest in the world! We are still dealing with the complications that this entails, as can be seen in our overblown and unbalanced IIP and the controls on capital outflows. Figure 1  Source: Central Bank of Iceland. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Before the collapse, the banking system had expanded very rapidly, growing in just five years from a combined balance sheet of less than 2 times GDP at the end of 2003 (see Figure 1). Most of this expansion was cross-border, and a significant part of it was actually off-border, having very little to do with Iceland, as both financing and investment took place abroad. Around two-thirds of the balance sheet of the three cross-border banks was denominated in foreign currency.

But there is one other area – as investors in bank capital instruments. I am therefore sure you understand that the authorities, internationally, cannot avoid reviewing what should count in the medium term as regulatory capital for banks. It won’t do for banks to be able to leverage up on subordinated debt (or other forms of hybrid capital) if, just when it matters, the holders do not suffer because the authorities cannot let the banks concerned be liquidated without bringing system collapse down on us all. We either need a system where banks of any type can quietly fail and hybrid capital is actually useful in protecting the deposit insurer; or, more realistically, we shall need a much narrower definition of capital. Only equity can absorb losses and sustain a going concern. Finding a way through that in the current crisis remains a challenge. One helpful step might be for the investment industry to seek out opportunities to convert subordinated debt into equity; or, at a discount, into senior unsecured debt, as has occurred in a few instances already. It would probably entail a haircut, but I wouldn’t air it unless I thought it could be in your collective and medium-term interests as investors in our economy and the system of credit that supports and lubricates it. The new Special Resolution Regime for banks may create healthy incentives in that broad direction. In concluding, can I thank you again for inviting me to join you today.
If a small rise in short-term rates were to lead to an abrupt increase in term premia and bond yields, resulting in a significant tightening in financial market conditions, then the Federal Reserve would likely move more slowly – all else equal. As an example, consider the experience of the 1994–95 tightening cycle. Bond yields rose sharply and the Federal Reserve tightened less than what was ultimately priced in by market participants. Conversely, if term premia and bond yields were to remain low and the economic outlook suggested that financial conditions needed to be tighter and a rise in short-term rates did not generate this outcome, then the FOMC would likely need to raise short-term rates further than anticipated. The 2004–07 tightening cycle might be a good example of this. The FOMC ultimately pushed the federal funds rate up to a peak of 5.25 percent, in part, because the earlier rise in short-term rates was generally ineffective in tightening financial market conditions sufficiently over this period. 5 This means that there is uncertainty about the trajectory of short-term rates from two distinct sources: (1) the economic outlook and what setting of financial conditions this implies is appropriate, and (2) what setting of short rates is consistent with the financial market conditions that the FOMC is seeking to generate. This also suggests that market participants should be cautious in interpreting the Summary of Economic Projection “dot plots” that show the FOMC participants’ modal outlooks for the short-term rate trajectory.

Moreover, because it takes time for  2  For example, see Alan Blinder, “The Mystery of Declining Productivity Growth,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  technological advances to be adopted broadly throughout the economy, it seems unlikely that the productivity gains from recent innovations have yet been fully realized. Because I am uncertain about the near-term trends of GDP growth and productivity growth, I am also uncertain about whether we will see further progress in the labor market over the remainder of the year. There are many possible outcomes to consider. For example, if real GDP growth were to pick up more than productivity growth, then employment growth would likely remain sufficiently firm to lead to further tightening of the U.S. labor market. But, if the reverse occurs, then payroll gains could slow even as GDP growth strengthens. In contrast to my uncertainties about growth and the labor market, I am becoming more confident that inflation will return to our 2 percent objective over the medium term, as long as the labor market continues to improve – an important caveat. The reasons here are straightforward. First, a number of factors that threaten to keep inflation below our 2 percent objective appear to be transitory. In this camp, I put the sharp decline in oil and gasoline prices that began in mid-2014, and the weakness we have seen in nonpetroleum import prices due to the strength in the dollar.
The launch of the Bank’s MobileLINK today is one of the efforts to facilitate the achievement of the objective to enhance our reach to a wider community. This custom-made coach is equipped with all the supporting facilities, and is another avenue for members of the public particularly from the non-urban areas to engage on matters relating to banking services which need to be addressed and on any other financial services that are offered by our financial institutions. This will allow members of the public including SMEs to receive rapid response and facilitation on financial matters. It will also enable the Bank to hear directly from the public on financial issues concerning our financial system. The journey for MobileLINK will begin today to cover about 50% of the identified the nonurban areas nationwide in the next 3 years. In the first phase, the MobileLINK’s journey will  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  start from Mersing, Johor and will continue to northern states and later back to the south to Jerantut, Pahang. This part of the journey will be completed in December 2012. The Bank looks forward to this new venture. It would also help to identify the specific financial needs of the local communities and the financial assistance and the advice for the different communities in our country. The terminals in the MobileLINK coach are connected to the Bank’s information technology systems such as Central Credit Reference Information System, Customer Redress Mechanism System and the Bank’s corporate website.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Financial inclusion – enhancing access to banking services in Malaysia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of Bank Negara Malaysia’s MobileLINK, Kuala Lumpur, 9 December 2011. *  *  *  Coach’ Bergerak Laman Informasi Nasihat dan Khidmat Bank Negara Malaysia ini, iaitu “MobileLINK” adalah untuk memperluaskan rangkuman kewangan kepada masyarakat luar bandar. Saya amat berbesar hati untuk mengalu-alukan kehadiran Tuan-tuan dan Puanpuan ke Majlis Pelancaran Rasmi “MobileLINK”. Financial inclusion has now become an important global agenda to ensure sustainable economic growth. It has become one of the main pillars of the global development agenda in which importance is given to outreach so that the economic growth and development that is achieved will be inclusive. Financial inclusion is an integral part of this process. Financial inclusion aims to ensure that all segments of the economy, regardless of income levels, economic activity or regions have access to financial services. The Bank’s efforts towards promoting financial inclusion is focused in enhancing access to basic banking services; and to financing; and undertaking financial education, and to build greater and awareness on financial matters and management. We have seen significant progress on several fronts as more and more of the members of the population enter into the financial and economic mainstream and as those that are already participating in the financial system are able to do so in a more effective manner.
10. Many success stories have been showcased in today’s event. The Roundtable with Tech Giants session offered valuable insights into how to use Cloud and Artificial Intelligence to aid Regtech adoption. In the Pulse of Regtech and Masterclass sessions, our guest speakers shared real-life stories on practical drivers for Regtech adoption and factors in successful solution implementation. 11. We heard how organisations have successfully implemented Regtech solutions in a number of areas within their risk management and regulatory compliance functions. These areas included credit risk management, stress testing, sales practice and suitability, employee conduct and monitoring, regulatory reporting, and regulatory compliance obligations. It is therefore very clear that the use of Regtech goes far beyond anti-money laundering and financial crime compliance, although that area of use cases is certainly a very good place to start any Regtech adoption journey! 12. If you are like me, you would have noted down many practical tips offered by our speakers today. Let me share four key takeaways that I noted for overcoming the challenges connected with Regtech adoption: First, buy-in is crucial. A range of stakeholders from across financial institutions need to buy in to Regtech and collaborate fully in adopting it. We have heard how a supportive leadership can shape an organisation’s culture, and in turn drive Regtech-led transformations. Middle management and operational staff need to support this as well. Second, data is king. This point has been made repeatedly today.

2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Finally, collaboration among different parts of the ecosystem is crucial. My colleague Raymond Chan has highlighted the importance of collaboration in the ‘Path Forward’ session. Regtech solution providers and professional services providers, such as technology firms and advisory firms, have a wealth of knowledge and experience supporting Regtech implementations. As Ms Jessica Tan noted, these technology companies can help to bridge the gaps that banks may have in technical capability, people and skills. We also heard today that some banks have successfully implemented Regtech using external vendor technology for some of their solutions. Leveraging such expertise in turn frees up banks to focus on their core value propositions and competitive edge. How to Grow and Nurture Regtech in Hong Kong 13. Some of the Regtech adoption challenges are technical ones. But one very common barrier is mindset. We have heard multiple speakers who are leaders in their respective organisations say today that investment in Regtech is growing, and it will grow even faster in the future. How can we ensure that the mindset for growth is in place throughout the Regtech ecosystem? 14. One way with which we promote Regtech adoption in Hong Kong is by providing an environment conducive to the development of Regtech solutions. This includes attracting top talent to the city. The Global Regtech Challenge was one such initiative. Earlier, we had the Regtech Challenge finalists presenting their amazing solutions for transforming risk management and regulatory compliance processes.
Every year we compile an account of monetary policy for the Committee, which in turn then provides its comments in a report or a statement on monetary policy, not just to “grade” us, but to provide feedback in advance of the next report with regard to questions that require further illumination (see Figure 2). Hearings in the Committee are also a part of their scrutiny of the Riksbank. Moreover, larger external evaluations are made around once every five years. 14 With regard to the analysis of monetary policy, the Riksbank chose to begin publishing its own forecasts for the repo rate in 2007. I think that the experiences of all of these measures have been good. 15 International rankings of central bank transparency usually place the Riksbank near the top. 16  12 See, for example, Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). 13 See Bergström (2001). So far three of these have been made: by Francesco Giavazzi and Frederic Mishkin with regard to the period 1995-2005, by Charles Goodhart and Jean-Charles Rochet regarding the period 2005-2010 and by Marvin Goodfriend and Mervyn King regarding the period 2010-2015. A new evaluation by Karnit Flug and Patrick Honohan regarding the period 2015-2020 has recently begun. 15 See Sveriges Riksbank (2017a). 16 See Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). 14  5 [20]  The framework functioned as intended In many ways, the inflation-targeting regime has functioned as intended.

The Riksdag was being asked to authorise the Government in principle unconditional drawing rights from the state budget to consolidate the banking sector. If this measure did not succeed in calming interest rates, we would ultimately need to make use of a loan programme from the IMF. Finally, the situation in Sweden became untenable, and the fixed exchange rate had to be abandoned on 19 November 1992. The nominal anchor had completely collapsed. However, inspired by New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, the Riksbank considered adopting an inflation target as a new anchor. 3 No sooner said than done: As of 1993, we have a floating exchange rate and an inflation target of 2 per cent, which still applies today. 4 The results of academic research indicated that the conditions for attaining low inflation increased if one delegated monetary policy to an independent central bank. This reduced the so-called time inconsistency problem in monetary policy, where the long-term objective of low inflation is not compatible with the shortterm motives for high inflation. 5 Empirical studies showed that countries with more independent central banks had lower inflation, without a deterioration in the real economy. 6 I think that an independent central bank is not merely useful in addressing overly high inflation. Independence is also important to avoid inflation being too low, as it facilitates a more long-term focus in decision-making. 7But I will return to this shortly. In the new act of 1999, the Riksbank was given greater independence from the political system.
Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 23 July 2021. * * * Good afternoon, We have made the decision to raise the key rate by 100 basis points to 6.50% per annum. Our today’s decision is based on the updated macroeconomic forecast that was significantly revised. The growth of the Russian economy sped up in the second quarter, and inflationary pressure turned out to be higher and more persistent than forecast. Some sectors are already demonstrating signs of overheating. Inflation expectations also continued to go up. Given the observed trends, we have revised our inflation forecast upwards by one point. This year, it will equal 5.7–6.2%. The important step in our policy, which we have made today, is needed to bring inflation back to the target. We expect inflation to slow down to 4.0–4.5% next year and stay close to 4% further on. Nonetheless, our policy will not contain the steady rates of economic growth. I would now dwell on the factors behind our today’s decision. I will start out with inflation. As of 19 July, inflation was 6.5% in annualised terms. This is considerably above the target and is close to five-year peaks. High growth rates are driven by both temporary and steady factors. According to our estimates, steady factors dominate at the moment.

As you know, on 4 November the first pillar of the Banking Union project, namely the Single Supervisory Mechanism, came into being. The Single Supervisory Mechanism aims to harmonise banking supervision in the euro area so as, among other things, to sever the negative link between confidence in banks and doubts over the sustainability of public finances. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Intense work was needed to implement the new supervisory system. Milestones included the completion of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation in October 2013; the approval of another regulation assigning responsibilities to the European Central Bank and national authorities; and the drafting of a supervisory manual setting out the best supervisory practices of each country and implementing common procedures for all members of the system. One of the main objectives of the new institutional design is to ensure that the ECB’s supervisory functions do not clash with its monetary policy responsibilities. To this end, a new Supervisory Board was set up in the ECB to plan and conduct banking supervision. This Board will be responsible for making proposals on supervision to the Governing Council, which continues to be the highest decision-making body of the ECB in both monetary policy and supervision. The start-up of the SSM constitutes an unprecedented transformation of the responsibilities of the participating national supervisory authorities, which naturally include the Banco de España. The Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation distinguishes two groups of banks.