samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In particular, the efficient and effective coordination between the statistical departments of the ECB and of the national central banks within the ECB’s Statistics Committee has been very conducive to the development of the comprehensive set of euro area statistics that is disseminated by the ECB. Equally, the cooperation between Eurostat and the ECB’s Directorate General Statistics is very intensive and fruitful, and is based on the allocation of tasks laid down in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in March 2003. Secondly, I would like to stress the importance of close cooperation with users, which should guarantee that the statistics are “fit for purpose”. At the same time, with the right institutional arrangements in place, responsiveness to user needs in the design and accessibility of statistics should not undermine the independence of statistics and statisticians, which is an essential factor. A third important “success factor” in the design of statistical systems is a strong legal basis. Article 5 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB states that “in order to undertake the tasks of the ESCB, the ECB ... shall contribute to the harmonisation, where necessary, of the rules and practices governing the collection, compilation and distribution of statistics within its fields of competence”. As a consequence, the ECB developed a legal framework for the collection of statistics and for ensuring compliance with these legal acts. Legal instruments are necessary to achieve satisfactory standards and equal treatment across Member States.

It would also strongly support the European framework to be further enhanced with full capacity to check without restrictions facts and figures including through missions on the spot. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 67/2004  7
17  Barton, D (2017) p.10 Warsh, K (2009) 19 As Tim Geithner, NY Fed Chair and later Secretary of the Treasury said “In an emergency you [the leader] need to lean against the forces of panic, restore confidence and reduce uncertainty.” Geithner, T (2014) 20 Alternatively, Tim Geithner summarised the issue as follows: “Herein lies the paradox. In a brutal financial crisis like ours, actions that seem reasonable – letting banks fail, forcing their creditors to absorb losses, balancing government budgets, avoiding moral hazard – only make the crisis worse. And the actions necessary to ease the crisis seem inexplicable and unfair”. Geithner, T (2014) 21 Bernanke, B (2015) p.261 - 262 18  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  As a leader you also need to be humble about success and honest about failure. Humility and honesty are essential to authenticity, which to paraphrase Groucho Marx, is very hard to fake. Being authentic means doing what you say, and people knowing who you are – including what you believe in, what drives you, as well as your strengths and, importantly, your weaknesses. Authenticity is intimately connected with trust. People may not agree with all of your decisions, but they deserve to know why you made them. And your decisions will be easier to follow if people know what you stand for. 22  When a leader admits their weaknesses, they recognise that they are on a path of continuous learning and self-improvement.

And it is the Open Letter system which both allows that more sensible approach to be explained by the MPC and allows the Chancellor publicly to endorse it.” Constrained discretion also provides much needed room for learning. Monetary policy remains more art than science, and its practice is riven with uncertainties and risks. As the present Governor put it in a lecture delivered in 1997 5 : ‘Inflation targets are a practical response to the fact that knowledge increases over time.’ So a framework of constrained discretion combines much needed scope to implement policy flexibly, in the light of both circumstances and experience, with the credibility benefits of committing policymakers to secure a pre-determined outcome for inflation. That, in essence, was the key difference from the failed experiments of the past. 4  The development of the MPC  The MPC got off to a good start. It inherited an inflation rate that had been low for the past 5 years. And the financial markets welcomed it by reducing the risk premia on UK assets. No one had very clear expectations about how it would behave or how it might think. While it inherited some technical features of the previous regime, the new Committee had quite a lot of scope to define its own operating procedures and intellectual framework. If not a blank sheet of paper, it was a book with many pages still to fill. As time has gone by, whole volumes have been filled. The Committee’s procedures and thinking have matured.
This is why there is an inflation target and why fiscal policy endeavours to have measurable surplus targets in public finances. It is thus important to have a measurable, quantitative target fulfilment not just for inflation but also for resource utilisation, and then in the form of unemployment. Monetary policy should not focus on financial stability as there are better instruments With regard to the view that monetary policy should also aim to limit growth in mortgage lending and more generally to maintain financial stability, I would like to state the following: The policy rate is a blunt, indirect and inappropriate means of influencing financial stability in Sweden and it has a direct effect on inflation and unemployment. As I said in the beginning, the objective of price stability and highest sustainable employment should not be neglected out of consideration for financial stability, except in extreme circumstances and then only for a limited time. This only includes such situations where there are clear indications of threats to financial stability and where there are no means to manage these threats without neglecting the objective of price stability and the highest sustainable employment. At the same time, there should be confidence that this type of temporary neglect will in the longer run lead to a better development of inflation and unemployment. This last condition is important.

But care is needed, not least because these models tend to be least robust in precisely the circumstances of most interest - ie those rather rare cases in which losses are very large, hidden away in the lowest parts of the bottom tail of the probability distributions. The evidence suggests that such events are not well captured by the normal distributions typically used in standard risk models. Markets tend to behave in highly non-linear ways - moving within relatively narrow ranges for long periods, but then adjusting quite sharply. Sometimes these adjustments can be related to clear external events - such as the World Trade Centre attack. But often there is no such trigger. The types of circumstances that generate these outcomes are not particularly well understood. This is, I believe, a central theme of the recent work of some of your founder members, and it is one with significant operational as well as theoretical implications. I noted a few minutes ago that the original Basel Accord had given rise to a number of distortions between economic and regulatory capital. This problem came to a head during the course of 1990s as banks increasingly engaged in so-called 'regulatory arbitrage'. Better credits, over-weighted by the Accord, were progressively being securitised, leaving relatively poorer credits on the banks' balance sheets. And banks were getting little allowance for risk reductions achieved through portfolio diversification and the use of risk mitigation instruments.
Risk that banks liquidating buffers to meet outflows in a stress could exacerbate a fire sale. Less effective Mitigants RWCR: Susceptible to expansion into assets with low measured risk. Places no constraint on debt funding. LCR: 30 day time horizon only limits the expansion funded by very short term liabilities. RWCR & LR: Higher capital should in principle help banks retain funding, but does not provide a cushion if a run occurs. RWCR & LR: Require small fraction of liabilities to be non-runnable equity but a small amount relative to illiquid assets. RWCR & LR: Do not directly mitigate the likelihood of deleveraging due to liquidity problems. Capital and Leverage  The objective of the capital framework is to ensure banks have sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses and continue lending in situations of stress. RWCRs oblige banks to assign granular risk weights to their assets. If true risk of an asset can be estimated accurately – it is a “known known” - then the RWCR is typically better suited than the LR to guarding against solvency risk (Gordy (2003)). Greenwood et al (2017) conclude “the social optimum can be implemented with a single requirement that each bank maintain a sufficient ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets, provided the risk weights are chosen appropriately”. The last part of this sentence is, however, an important proviso. One key question is whether risks in the financial system are likely to be known with sufficient certainty that they can be estimated meaningfully and accurately.

The world of payments is one which has undergone many changes in its long history – from the idea in the 1770s that a single central location (the Five Bells Tavern once of Lombard Street) should be nominated as a meeting point at which at which to settle obligations to the launch in 1996 of real time gross settlement in the UK. We are currently living through another period of innovation, as FinTech has enabled payments to be decoupled from traditional banking services. The aim of the RTGS renewal programme is to deliver a more resilient, flexible and innovative sterling settlement system, and by doing so we will help ensure the UK remains a world-leader in payment systems. As well as providing a strong underpinning for monetary stability, RTGS will promote competition and strengthen financial stability. The programme will run over a period of years, but some key features have already been delivered including the opening up of access to RTGS to non-bank payment providers, who have been able to apply for accounts RTGS since July. One particularly noteworthy milestone was reached last Monday, when the Bank began to provide the direct delivery of the High Value Payment System, CHAPS, the workings of which are shown in this Vision 2020 style graphic (Slide 11). This brought to an end the split of responsibilities between CHAPS Co, the private sector administrator of the scheme, and the Bank, which provides the underlying infrastructure in the form of the overall RTGS system.
The December survey from the National Institute of Economic Research showed an unchanged inflow of orders and expectations of subdued production. The order statistics from Statistics Sweden, which fluctuate fairly widely from month to month, gave the impression of relatively weak orders in the fourth quarter of 1996. In December and January, however, the order inflow has picked up and more recent survey data likewise paint a brighter picture of activity in manufacturing. The improvement mainly applies to production for export but even the domestic market is somewhat optimistic about the future. Against this background, exports and industrial production could develop somewhat better than expected earlier. The changes are not very large but to date various indicators, including the continued undervaluation of the krona, do point in the same direction. In the case of private consumption, the indicators to date are not uniform. On the one hand, in the first three months of 1997 the number of new car registrations for private individuals has risen in annual terms by more than 60 per cent, albeit from a low level. Moreover, the survey of household purchasing plans by Statistics Sweden shows that since the autumn, household’s economic expectations have become more optimistic. The development of monetary aggregates such as M0 is also an indication of rising private consumption. On the other hand, the lower than expected savings ratio in 1996 may increase uncertainty regarding possible increases of private consumption in 1997 and 1998.

Mr. Bäckström gives a broadbrush picture of the Swedish economy and monetary policy Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Urban Bäckström, held at seminars before the Midland Bank and Merrill Lynch, respectively, in New York on 30/4/97. Economic developments in recent years In the past few years Swedish economic policy has achieved tangible results. •  By an improvement in credibility, important progress has been made towards greater economic stability. Favourable economic growth in Sweden has been combined with a rate of inflation that is the lowest for several decades. •  There is broad political agreement in Sweden on the consolidation of government finance. This is manifested in the so called convergence programme that aims to eliminate the budget deficit not later than 1998. The budget reinforcements which the Government and the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) have undertaken in recent years are extensive. The six-monthly monitoring arrangement provides a means of ensuring that government finance is developing as planned. Moreover, in the Economic Bill this spring the Government states that the long-term target for the general Government budget is a surplus of 2 per cent of GDP as a cyclical average. The gradual adjustment to this goal is also specified. The general government financial balance has been strengthened from 12.3 per cent of GDP in 1993 to -2.5 per cent in 1996. This is a substantial improvement.
This means that the rising demand pressure in the Swedish economy in recent years has not shown up in higher CPI inflation. Contrary effects have come from other factors. To clarify this, we can take a look at inflation’s constituents. Diagram1. Inflation during 1997 until 1999  1. Inflation 1997-1999 CPI and different measures of underlying inflation  4 UND1X = CPI excluding interest expenditure and indirect taxes and subsidies  3  UNDINHX = UNDIX excluding goods that are mainly imported  2 1 0 1997  1998  KPI  UND1X  1999  UNDINHX  Source: Statistics Sweden  1  BIS Review 28/2000  From Diagram 1 it will be seen that in the past three years, underlying domestic inflation (UNDINHX)1 has been almost continuously in the vicinity of the 2% inflation target. The pressure from domestic demand has been countered, however, by a weak international price trend. This is evident from the path of UND1X inflation, which also includes imported prices. The main explanation for the weak development of import prices in this period is the crisis that began in Asia in the autumn of 1997. It can be mentioned that towards the end of 1998, just the prices of coffee, petrol and domestic heating oil lowered the price level in Sweden by almost half a percentage point.

Deviations should be permissible if the CPI change figure is influenced by transitory factors (for example, changes in indirect taxes and subsidies or household interest expenditure) or if bringing inflation promptly back to the targeted level would be costly for the real economy. The magnitude of these factors is to be stated in advance by the Riksbank. In this way, the members of your Committee, as well as other observers, will be in a better position to assess the Riksbank and the policy we implement. For each decision it is clear which transitory factors the Riksbank has chosen to disregard in the formation of policy. These clarifications are essentially a codification of the approach that the Riksbank has applied to the formation of monetary policy in recent years, although any deviations from the target were then discussed less precisely. In the period from 1997 to 1999 the path of inflation was affected to a large extent by transitory price movements that the Riksbank considers should be of secondary importance for monetary policy. Policy has therefore focused on the underlying or core rate of inflation as measured by UND1X; this averaged 1.2%, with constituent annual rates in these three years of 1.4, 0.9 and 1.4%. The Report that has been submitted to the Committee today contains an appendix that is intended to serve as a foundation for the Committee’s evaluation of the implementation of monetary policy and its outcome in the period 1997-99. This is something that the Committee requested earlier.
The Monetary Policy Report  The evolution of the macroeconomic scenario, in Chile and around the world, continues to be driven by the spread of the Covid-19 and the containment measures needed to protect the health of the population. The information at hand shows that, after a sharp fall at the beginning of the second quarter, in recent months the Chilean economy has shown signs of stabilization, combining an incipient improvement in some sectors and deterioration at the margin in others. This stabilization has responded to the evolution of sanitary restrictions, the adaptation of various sectors to new operating conditions and the boost from economic policies. The economic impact of the pandemic, however, is very significant and recovery will pose major challenges for public policies, institutions, and economic agents. The magnitude of this challenge is especially evident in the high number of people and businesses whose source of income has been disrupted. Reversing the loss of jobs, the fall in household income and the deterioration in consumption, together with responding to the financing needs of businesses, avoiding bankruptcies and enabling them to recover, are the greatest challenges for economic policy at this stage. As I will show later, based on known activity data and short-term perspectives, we estimate that GDP will end 2020 with a fall of between -4.5 and -5.5%, which compares to the -5.5 to -7.5% range estimated in the June MP Report and which implies a significant recovery in the second half of the year.

This high uncertainty has various causes, but we must be clear that the Chilean economy and society will hardly be able to withstand the prolonging or intensification of this uncertainty without more permanent damage to entrepreneurship, investment, and employment. 11  And last but not least, a final challenge will be to enhance the capacity for long-term growth. In this MP Report, trend growth estimates for our economy have not been updated due to difficulties in gathering data for a refined estimate, but it is clear that factors have emerged in recent months that could put downward pressure on it. Higher costs associated with security and human distancing in the provision of services, as well as higher transaction costs in the face of greater uncertainty and deteriorating confidence, point to reduced productivity, while higher hiring costs, low investment and business failures may affect the availability of labor and capital. These are not irreversible phenomena, in the face of which innovation and technological development cannot have a compensatory effect, but the challenge today is certainly greater than it was a year ago. Going through this list should make it clear that these challenges far exceed the mandates and competencies of the Central Bank. Many of the policies needed to create jobs, facilitate the adjustment or reconversion of production and raise productivity are within the realm of the Executive, of the structural reforms being discussed in this Congress or of private initiative.
We will see what the precise outcome of the present dialogue will be, but already I would like to say that I find some of the resistance shown by banks generally, and even more so, the controversy that has arisen in Italy in particular, inappropriate and unfounded. For non-performing loans, we have to plan ahead if we are to stop picking up the pieces afterwards. If we ever needed proof of the necessity for independent European supervision, this controversy has provided it. II. The second challenge is to encourage consolidation within the Banking Union  Consolidation must be the result of consistency, and consistency is considering the Banking Union as a unique jurisdiction. -  We must therefore stop hindering cross-border bank consolidations in the euro area. 3  We need to ensure that the implementation of new regulations does not give rise to new barriers. The development of cross-border banking activities is essential to reinforcing the single market, facilitating the allocation of savings and financing investment. We still lag far behind the American market in this respect: the market share in the United States of the top five banks is more than 40% whereas the market share in the euro area of the top five banks is less than 20%. Sound and safe cross-border consolidations would make banks better able to diversify their risks across the euro area, and channel savings more effectively towards productive investment.

While inflation is rising and growth prospects are improving internationally, global interest rates may have passed their lowest point. Expected money market rates indicate that short-term interest rates among our trading partners will rise in the years ahead. However, interest rates will probably remain low, compared with pre-crisis levels, for an extended period of time. If developments abroad take an unexpected turn, the Norwegian economy will be affected. The challenges may become more severe than they seem at present. However, we believe the economic policy setup, with substantial fiscal policy leeway, a flexible labour market and our monetary policy framework, will enable us to face these challenges. And not to forget – a normalisation of monetary policy is most notably an indication of a normalisation of economic developments in the countries surrounding us. This is most welcome. Thank you for your attention. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
In spite of this preoccupation, the real life was, in almost all the cases, different. This kind of historical research, stretched over a longer period of time, could reveal to which extent the solutions adopted in time were the appropriate ones. Given the interest shown by both economic and political decision-makers, we find it useful to highlight the role that central banks have played in the catching-up process. I have to confess that I am personally interested in this topic and I look forward to seeing the outcome of your debate. I do wish you success. Allow me to say a few words about the South-East European Monetary History Network. After a decade since it has been launched in Sofia, the Network achieved notable results in its aim to collect and extract value from statistical and historical data. The most important one was the release, in 2014, of a book titled “South-Eastern European Monetary and Macroeconomic Statistics from the Nineteenth Century to World War II”. It was the result of the joint efforts of specialists from all seven participating banks and several members of the academia. The National Bank of Romania shared the costs of editing this publication with the central banks in Austria, Bulgaria and Greece.

I will conclude here my brief address, wishing you fruitful debates and viable, useful solutions by the end of today. To all the foreign guests, may you enjoy your stay in Romania. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches