samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  BIS Review 44/2010  In addition, real interest rates in Norway fell markedly through the 1990s from high levels. This was because the fixed krone exchange rate regime maintained through the period managed to bring down inflation and inflation expectations. Moreover, growth in public spending was rapidly reduced once business sector activity had recovered. Economic shift Over the past decade Norway experienced an economic shift. The cost level began to rise. This was related to the sharp improvement in Norway’s terms of trade at the time and a gradual pickup in growth abroad. Prices for Norwegian exports such as oil, gas, metals, minerals, fish and freight, rose markedly, while prices for imported goods fell. From 2003 to 2008, terms-of-trade gains alone pushed national income up by more than 20 per cent, or a good 4 per cent per year. Institutions and mechanisms had also been put in place to manage the sharp increase in income. Norway’s sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global, and the fiscal guidelines were established with the express purpose of making the mainland economy less susceptible to fluctuations in the oil price. Improved terms of trade, higher revenues and increased government spending contributed to a stronger krone and a shift in real resources towards sheltered sectors. At the same time, the fiscal rule provided a basis for growth in business sectors other than the oil industry and the public sector through the decade.

Shaping the global governance structure At their summit in Pittsburgh last September, the G20 leaders “…designate[d] the G20 to be the premier forum for our international economic cooperation”. As an effective and powerful group, the G20 featured prominently in the broad international efforts to stabilise the global economy in late 2008 and early 2009. Without its prompt and comprehensive action, the consequences of the crisis would have been much worse. Among the G20 measures of 2009 were the efforts to strengthen confidence in international financial institutions, the IMF in particular, to permit it to play an effective role in tackling the crisis. Indeed, the G20 increasingly uses the IMF as an instrument of its policy implementation. 4  The membership of the G20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Korea, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. The G20 was formed as a new forum for cooperation and consultation on matters pertaining to the international financial system. It studies, reviews, and promotes discussion among key industrial and emerging market countries of policy issues pertaining to the promotion of international financial stability, and seeks to address issues that go beyond the responsibilities of any one organization. 5  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organisation of 186 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world.
It must be recognised that structural reforms, and specifically financial sector reform, is of crucial importance if this recovery is to be turned into sustainable economic growth. A bank with the mandate to promote development in Asia must surely have a role to play in all this and I look forward to greater involvement of the Bank, in whatever capacity, in maintaining the momentum of structural reforms in Asia. Mr President, the efficiency of financial markets in the region in performing the important function of financial intermediation has been found lacking. There has been notably little disagreement about the desirability of developing domestic and regional bond markets. But there has also been little progress. And there has been no lack of explanation of why this is the case. The often quoted impediments include the lack of clearing and settlement infrastructure, the absence of a broad institutional investor base, the lack of a benchmark yield curve, low liquidity, and so on. While these impediments are recognised and are being tackled earnestly by national authorities, there is one problem that has attracted relatively little attention so far. The problem relates to the generally low credit ratings of the Asian issuers, including the sovereigns, granted by the international rating agencies. 1  BIS Review 38/2000  I do not wish to provoke a debate on the objectivity and reliability of the ratings and the rating process of the international rating agencies.

The reality is that many Asian governments and corporations receive credit ratings that are lower than the minimum thresholds acceptable to institutional investors, including the managers of official reserves. There is certainly merit in strengthening the dialogue between the Asian issuers and the international credit agencies to facilitate a better understanding of the Asian situation by the rating agencies and improve the transparency and accountability of the rating process. There is also a case for considering whether it is advisable or viable to establish national or regional credit rating agencies, with or without support from the authorities. On top of these, I think there is a need to consider the introduction of market-based mechanisms for credit enhancement or guarantees. In Asia, I am aware of problems encountered by private sector initiatives in this field. It has proved difficult objectively to assess and manage the risks involved in such operations. Indeed, one feature of the recent explosion of international finance is market volatility that has been much higher than had been thought possible in the light of historical experience. But I think we have learnt from the recent years of financial turmoil and I hope we are now in a better position to identify and therefore properly price the risks involved in the provision of credit enhancements or guarantees.
Broader access: The Bank wishes to promote membership of RTGS and has made steps towards this by extending direct access to RTGS accounts for non-bank Payment Service Providers (PSPs). We will also continue to focus on streamlining the onboarding and testing regimes for direct members. Wider interoperability: We will promote ways in which users can reroute payments especially if outages occur. This will reduce the risk of downtime and help to keep the economy moving. Implementation of the ISO 20022 Common Credit Message (CCM) across CHAPS, Bacs and FPS will aide in this. Improved user functionality: The new system will be designed to better support the needs of users, for example enhanced liquidity management. And we will also look to extend opening hours. Strengthened end-to-end risk management: A more robust system with greater oversight and governance from the Bank of England has been introduced since the operation of CHAPS was brought in-house in November 2017. The Bank now has responsibility for system-wide risk management, including relationships with participants, and clearer lines of responsibility and integrated governance will help to reduce further the risks in the High-Value Payment System (HVPS).

We have a fintech industry which 2  employs over 60,000 people. This success is not limited to London; centres of excellence exist across the country including Manchester, Leeds, Edinburgh and Cambridge (where Sir Dave Ramsden is today chairing a fintech roundtable). Innovation is not the preserve of those in the fintech sector; the banking industry as a whole is making system-wide changes to improve how it serves the people of the UK. The Bank is also no stranger to innovation and in my previous role as Chief Cashier I oversaw the introduction of the new cleaner, safer and stronger five pound and ten pound notes. We decided not to build the renewed RTGS on Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), wanting to first see greater proof of resilience and scalability. However, we are keen to facilitate the use of new technologies and we are working to deliver a service that has the capability to interact with DLT systems should demand emerge. The Bank has recently concluded a Proof of Concept (PoC) with a number of fintech firms on this topic. The purpose of this PoC was to (a) understand how RTGS could be capable of supporting settlement in systems operating on innovative payment technologies. (b) To understand the limitations that such systems might need to navigate.
The reality is that many Asian governments and corporations receive credit ratings that are lower than the minimum thresholds acceptable to institutional investors, including the managers of official reserves. There is certainly merit in strengthening the dialogue between the Asian issuers and the international credit agencies to facilitate a better understanding of the Asian situation by the rating agencies and improve the transparency and accountability of the rating process. There is also a case for considering whether it is advisable or viable to establish national or regional credit rating agencies, with or without support from the authorities. On top of these, I think there is a need to consider the introduction of market-based mechanisms for credit enhancement or guarantees. In Asia, I am aware of problems encountered by private sector initiatives in this field. It has proved difficult objectively to assess and manage the risks involved in such operations. Indeed, one feature of the recent explosion of international finance is market volatility that has been much higher than had been thought possible in the light of historical experience. But I think we have learnt from the recent years of financial turmoil and I hope we are now in a better position to identify and therefore properly price the risks involved in the provision of credit enhancements or guarantees.

Many banks were closed on 1 January and an enthusiastic general public wanted to get hold of the new cash as quickly as possible, preferably on New Year's Eve. This meant that there was tremendous pressure on converting the ATMs to euro as quickly as possible at the end of the year, which the banks succeeded in achieving. On 2 January, 91 per cent of the ATMs in the euro area had been converted to euro, and it took only a couple more days until they all worked with  BIS Review 23/2002  1  euro banknotes. Many countries also distributed lower denomination banknotes (five and ten euro) via the ATMs to facilitate change for retailers. Despite this, and despite the advance distribution of coins, there arose a shortage of coins and of five-euro banknotes in a few places, although the system worked well on the whole. With regard to other types of machines, it has been reported that, for instance petrol machines could not accept euro banknotes at first. However, this is being overcome. The changeover to the euro was done in different ways in different countries. Naturally, help was required from all those who handle cash, and despite this there were long queues in many places. However, the customers seem to have accepted this with relative equanimity, perhaps because it was a holiday period and many had vacation at that point in time. The situation improved rapidly in the retail trade, but it took a little longer in the banks.
Moreover, climate change claimed its first S&P 500 bankruptcy last year,3 climaterelated shareholder resolutions spiked to 90 last year,4 investment managers controlling over 45% of global assets under management now back shareholder actions on carbon disclosure, and companies representing over 90% of all shareholder advisory services now support the TCFD. Not surprisingly, the supply of disclosure is responding. Over 600 organisations, with a total market capitalisation of $ trillion, have endorsed the TCFD recommendations since 2017. The TCFD’s September 2018 Implementation Report assessed, using artificial intelligence, some 1800 companies, and analysed in detail an additional 200 of the largest companies, drawn from eight representative sectors from across the G20.5 In both cohorts, the majority of companies were already disclosing information in their 2017 filings that aligned with one or more of the TCFD’s recommendations. This is commendable given companies only had six months to respond to the final TCFD recommendations, but more progress is needed. In particular:   Financial implications are often not yet disclosed;    Disclosures are often in multiple reports making comparisons harder; and    Disclosure varies by industry and region, with higher percentages of European firms and higher shares of those on the climate frontline – such as the energy sector – disclosing more information aligned with the recommendations.

To my mind, the answers will invariably call attention to three imperatives – a rethinking of value; a rethinking of risk; and a rethinking of human capital. Allow me to briefly address these in turn. Key Message 1 – Rethinking value through a renewed focus on the fundamentals of Shariah First, rethinking value. The industry must elevate the fundamentals of Shariah to realise its full promise. The business models of Islamic financial institutions should be guided by the 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  overarching objectives of Shariah (Maqasid Shariah) – which are to preserve and advance the common interest of society at large, by preventing harm and maximising benefits. This is now more important than ever to steer growth and development on a more sustainable path. In Malaysia, the industry with the support of the Central Bank, is taking concrete steps to drive strategies aimed at increasing the positive impact of finance on society. This is outlined in a Strategy Paper on Value-based Intermediation (VBI), which was released in July last year. The commitment to adopt VBI is a significant step by the industry to clearly identify Islamic finance with sustainable practices, as it should. It has also set in motion initiatives that will raise the bar for processes, practices, offerings and conduct that promote sustainable businesses and communities. We expect that over time, the adoption of VBI will have a significant impact on business models of Islamic financial institutions, including the drivers of profitability and risks.
Table 3 The credit cycle and subsequent crises  Total peaks 1880–2008*  Crisis years** within 5 years following a peak  % peaks with crisis years within the following 5 years  Banking crisis within 5 years following a peak  % peaks with Banking crisis within the following 5 years  AUS  9  6  66.7%  2  22.2%  CAN  11  6  54.5%  2  18.2%  DEU  9  2  22.2%  1  11.1%  DNK  10  4  40.0%  3  30.0%  ESP  8  5  62.5%  2  25.0%  FRA  5  3  60.0%  1  20.0%  GBR  9  7  77.8%  3  33.3%  ITA  11  8  72.7%  6  54.5%  NLD  8  1  12.5%  1  12.5%  NOR  13  5  38.5%  2  15.4%  SWE  10  4  40.0%  2  20.0%  USA  9  6  66.7%  5  55.6%  112  57  50.9%  30  26.8%  * Interwar data missing for most countries. Data coverage incomplete for other countries e.g. only post-1945 data available for France. ** Defined as years in which either a banking crisis or a currency crisis or both (“twin crisis”) occur. Source: Bordo et. al. (2001) and Bank calculations.

Data is incomplete, theory patchy, policy experience negligible. Monetary policy then was conducted by trial and error. The same will be true of macroprudential policy now. Mistakes will be made. But as experience with the other arms of macroeconomic policy has taught us, the biggest mistake would be not to try. BIS Review 168/2010  25  Annex 1: Model proofs  Reputational probabilities: Here we motivate the conditions that . Suppose the market has prior that a banker’s ability is high. If a banker is of low ability, she achieves positive returns on loans with probability when the macro state is good, while high ability bankers achieve positive returns on loans with probability 1 when the macro state is good. When the macro state is bad, all bankers achieve zero returns. Let be the probability that the macro state is good. Let the market conjecture that under a risky policy and a bad state of the world, earnings are positive with probability , while under a risky policy and a good state of the world, earnings are positive with probability . Conditional on risky policies and observing positive earnings, the probability of being of high ability is  which is increasing in  . Similarly, under tight policies,  which is decreasing in effects. . The conditions in the text that  capture these  Equilibrium: Our model satisfies following conditions, set out in Morris and Shin (2003), viz. : Condition 1: Action Monotonicity:  is non-decreasing in .
That is of course just one example, among many, of how we are drawing on the various approaches to establish what is “best practice” as the basis for our supervisory activity. This process will not be completed by 4 November, but will rather be further refined over the coming years. Horizontal analyses and a level playing field Another considerable advantage of European banking supervision will be the possibility to draw comparisons across European countries and to establish a level playing field. The banking sectors of many European countries are dominated by a few large banks. The national supervisory bodies were therefore faced with the problem of having to assess circumstances on the basis of just one bank, or on that of a very small group of banks. I am not just thinking of the assessment of specific portfolios here, but also of the early identification of risks, which only become visible, or are at least easier to identify, in horizontal analysis. Although international working groups and the European Banking Authority (EBA) have addressed this problem, it is only with the establishment of the SSM that a quantum leap forward can be made. The SSM is able to draw on detailed supervisory information from across the euro area and prepare comparative analyses. And I am using the present tense here on purpose. With the ongoing comprehensive assessment, we are already active at the European level.

Philipp Hildebrand: (The) productivity (imperative) Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at Avenir suisse, Zurich, 24 September 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Just a few years ago, the weak growth of the Swiss economy was a dominant topic in public debate. For four years now, the economy has been advancing strongly. Is this merely a cyclical boom? Or has structural change taken place, affecting both productivity and the associated potential growth path? This would have far-reaching implications, not least for monetary policy. A number of factors indicate that structural change is indeed occurring and that this could ultimately result in an increase in the underlying productivity trend. However, time lags and cyclical distortions make it difficult to identify such changes. BIS Review 104/2007  1
Mervyn King: Uncertainty in macroeconomic policy making – art or science? Lecture by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Royal Society conference on “Handling Uncertainty in Science”, London, 22 March 2010. Accompanying slides to this speech can be found on the Bank of England’s website. David Aikman, Philip Barrett, Sujit Kapadia, Mervyn King, James Proudman, Tim Taylor, Iain de Weymarn and Tony Yates (Bank of England) contributed to this paper. * 1. *  *  Uncertainty and public policy  Most questions of public policy relate to uncertainties. Answers depend upon an ability to understand and evaluate those uncertainties. Yet many commentators and members of the public want to believe in certainties. They want to cut through the thickets of caveats and technical difficulties to the “bottom line”. We see this in economic policy, weather forecasting and the interpretation of secret intelligence. Five years ago, the Bank of England and the Met Office held an informal seminar to exchange ideas on how to communicate measures of uncertainty to the general public. Although we failed to persuade broadcasters to explore the issues of economic and weather forecasting in more depth, the bilateral relationship which developed between the Bank and Paul Hardaker, who moved from the Met Office to take over the Royal Meteorological Society, flourished. Today’s conference is a tribute to Paul’s persistence. It could hardly be more timely.

The initiatives can also fit in with the broader agenda of ASEAN integration, to leverage on regional resources and promote regional economic integration simultaneously. Closing remarks Let me close my remark by thanking all of you once again for your invaluable contributions to the Thai economy. The Bank of Thailand will continue our work of ensuring a stable financial and economic environment, so that businesses can continue to thrive and individuals can enjoy better standards of living on a sustainable basis. I hope that Thailand will continue to be a destination of choice for your investment, and a country of shared opportunity and prosperity for us all. Thank you  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
This has allowed sharper and more specific criticism from outside, something on which we thrive. In addition, I think that decision making should be made in a way which contributes to insight and which gives good possibilities for evaluation and requires responsibility. I think that this is something the Swedish people should expect from an institution which has been given such a strong and independent position as the Riksbank now enjoys. BIS Review 38/2001  5

In doing so, we have endeavored to ensure that the “New Basel Accord” is not merely another set of rules, but rather a framework that recognizes the important innovations in risk management that banks have achieved and encourages continued improvement over time. In my remarks today, I’d like to share with you some thoughts on how bank supervisors have worked to embrace and encourage those developments. My remarks will cover three related areas. I’ll begin with thoughts on how enhancements in banks’ risk management processes, driven by business imperatives, have concurrently led supervisors to move to a more process-oriented, risk-focused approach to supervision. Next, I’ll spend a few moments discussing how provisions in the New Basel Accord - or “Basel II” - support further changes in our supervisory approach, and promote further enhancements in risk management. Finally, I will describe how these developments will be coming together in our supervisory approach going forward - particularly in terms of our supervisory expectations for management of market risk, credit risk, and operational risk by large banking organizations. While I will offer my views as a former banker and now as a bank supervisor, I believe that many of the themes offer insight for other sectors of the financial services industry as well. BIS Review 5/2003  1  Complementary effort by Banks and Supervisors to Assess Risk Let me begin by sharing some thoughts on the efforts banks themselves have undertaken to develop a more forward-looking approach to risk management.