samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, the Central Bank cannot make any commitments related to the level of exchange rates in an implicit or explicit manner, nor use the exchange rate as a policy instrument. It is out of the question and is impossible. Under these circumstances, the value of the Turkish lira is determined in the short term by short-term expectations, developments related to foreign exchange supply and demand and the behaviors of market players, while the said value is determined in the medium and long-term by economic fundamentals, the course of structural reforms and the medium and long-term expectations. However, the fact that exchange rates are determined under market conditions does not imply that the Central Bank will not conduct any transactions in the foreign exchange markets. The Central Bank basically conducts transactions with two different aims. The first of these transactions comprises foreign exchange purchase auctions that are held with the aim of building up reserves. These transactions are conducted via daily, transparent and exchange rate-dependent mechanisms in the periods where the foreign exchange supply increases in the market and with no intention of affecting the level of exchange rates. As a result of these transactions, Turkey’s foreign exchange reserves increased by 181 percent in the last four years and reached USD 57 billion as of 25 August 2006. Nevertheless, due to the decline in foreign exchange supply, foreign exchange purchase auctions were suspended on 16 May 2006.

In such an environment, productivity increases become the main factor in competition. Sectors with the highest productivity increases became the sectors, which grew most rapidly and increased their exports the most. Studies to increase productivity and specialization in technology and capital-intensive sectors that create high value added are more critical for the sustainability of increases in exports in the long term, than the advantage of exchange rate movements. In order to be able to persevere in such a strong competitive environment, medium and long-term strategies – rather than short-term perspectives – are needed. To this end, public and private sectors should act in cooperation and harmony. In this framework, the public sector should try to create an environment for the private sector, in which it can compete with competitors in international markets under market conditions. In the meantime, the public sector should continue to take measures in order to increase its productivity, build robust and transparent balance sheets, turn towards capital markets, attend to risk management principles and try to allocate resources for research and development activities. When we look at the course of growth in 2006, we see that indicators of consumption and investment expenditures provide signals for a rapid course of growth in the second quarter of the year. Meanwhile, it is anticipated that the environment of uncertainty created by the fluctuations in financial markets in the second quarter will affect domestic demand in a slightly unfavorable manner and hinder the rapid growth process, starting from the third quarter of the year onwards.
I therefore think that Sweden, with its large cross-border banks, should consider membership of the Banking Union. To enable the Riksbank to carry out its tasks and deal with the challenges offered by the changes in the financial system, the monetary policy instruments need to be fit-for-purpose and flexible. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that a combination of several instruments – not just the policy rate – may be needed to stabilise the economy in a crisis situation. The Government has in its proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act suggested several restrictions to practical monetary policy. I think this is unfortunate, as it makes it more difficult for the Riksbank to safeguard an efficient and stable financial system, if the proposals are put into practice. 2 [35]  The Riksbank’s balance sheet is currently very large, and this is mainly due to the extensive purchases of government bonds we began making at the beginning of 2015, and to the measures taken during the pandemic. I believe that our balance sheet will remain large for some time to come. There are several reasons for this. In particular, the generally low interest rates mean that it will become more difficult to use the policy rate in monetary policy, but many of the changes in the financial environment are also important reasons. My assessment is therefore that the bond purchases and holdings of bonds will play a larger role than before.

Additionally, some firms are considering how to expand analysis to more indirectly impacted sectors, such as transportation and industrials, or to move beyond lending exposures to trading positions. Finally, firms are evaluating how to best execute on public commitments to transparency in the climate space. Nearly all global systemically important banks, including all eight U.S. G-SIBS, have signed onto the Task-Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), and many of these have started disclosing under this framework to various extents.5 Firms continue to be challenged in the identification and measurement of climate risk embedded in their portfolios, however, so these disclosures may take some time to develop as the industry considers how to 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  establish common standards. Role of Supervision I’ll turn now to the perspective of a bank supervisor.6 In the context of climate change, in my view, bank supervision should focus on ensuring that appropriate risk management frameworks are in place, rather than using supervisory tools for broader objectives. That is, supervisors can focus on identifying and managing risks, both microprudential and macroprudential, that emerge along a transition path to a more sustainable economy. Bank supervisors, however, are not in the position to advocate for, or provide incentives for, a particular policy outcome. Those broader policy goals are the purview of elected officials and governments, and policymakers. Supervisors can and should use our oversight tools to ensure financial institutions are prepared for and resilient to all types of relevant risks, including climate-related events.
Ms Hessius discusses the role of the central bank and market liquidity  Speech given by Ms Kerstin Hessius, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a seminar of Sveriges Finansanalytiker Förening on 14 September 1999. *  *  *  The financial sector plays a central role in our society’s economy. It is this sector that enables us to make payments, to transform savings into investments or future consumption and to spread and minimise potential financial risks. It is therefore essential that the financial sector functions smoothly when we pass from one millennium into the next. Many actors share the responsibility of a smooth transition. Naturally, the Swedish Riksbank is one party involved, but everyone – from private savers and investors to public authorities and the media – must bear their part of the responsibility. Agents in the financial sector addressed early the potential problems that may arise in connection with the transition to a new millennium. Substantial resources have been devoted to measures designed to minimise the risk of any technical problems arising and to ensure that all systems can cope with the transition. The Financial Supervisory Authority has closely monitored work on systems adaptation since 1997. The role of the Riksbank in this connection is bound up with our regular tasks as Central Bank in the economy – to implement monetary policy, to promote a secure and efficient system of payments and to ensure that sufficient notes and coins are available in the economy.

Two elements are vital in this process. The first is to ensure that the domestic intermediation process remains strong so as to support domestic demand. And secondly, the fiscal stimulus is key to containing the effects of the external developments and to placing Malaysia in a position to resume growth once conditions in the global economy stabilises. During this challenging period, financial institutions including Islamic financial institutions have an important role to ensure the continuous access to financing by the private sector. Key to this, is the forward looking business strategies being adopted by banking institutions, the organisational structure and the operational capability that is put in place. I would like to take this opportunity to highlight two other important dimensions in the development of Islamic finance, going forward. For more than two decades, the Islamic financial system in Malaysia has gradually transformed into a comprehensive Islamic  BIS Review 25/2009  1  financial landscape. This has been reinforced by a legal and regulatory framework, the essential financial infrastructure, and an environment conducive for product innovation. Notwithstanding the success of Islamic finance, the global ramifications of the crisis also calls for more concerted efforts to bring the industry to a higher level of resilience. Of importance, in this process, is to embrace the values of Islamic finance of justice and fairness that benefits the society and the system. It is thus important for Islamic finance to transcend beyond just the pursuit of growth and monetary performance but also to emphasise ethical market conduct practices.
Government influence also directed bank lending into uneconomic projects and non-viable companies. This government involvement lent credence to the view that regional banks were effectively government guaranteed, which made it easier for these banks to borrow in the global interbank market. This provided the fuel for the irresponsible lending which took place. Hong Kong did not suffer from these structural and systemic weaknesses. But it is the case that imbalances had emerged in the economy, and this became particularly evident during 1997 as confidence grew that the Handover would proceed smoothly - as indeed it did. This was reflected in soaring residential property prices - up by an average of 48% during the year to October 1997 and a record level for the Hang Seng Index of 16,820 in August 1997. The boom in asset values was to a large extent financed by the banks. The sharp escalation in asset prices and in bank lending was clearly unsustainable. A downward adjustment would have been necessary and would have happened sooner or later. All that was required was an external shock to bring it about. This of course is precisely what happened in BIS Review 48/1998  -2-  the third week of October when the Hong Kong dollar came under speculative attack. The operation of our currency board system meant that the sales of the Hong Kong dollar depleted the clearing balances which the banks maintain with the HKMA for settlement purposes and the resultant shortage of liquidity caused interest rates to rise sharply.

Even if property prices do fall further, there is a strong incentive for homeowners to continue to service their mortgages. The main problem loans we have seen so far have been in the corporate sector and in trade finance. Some companies have run into unavoidable problems because of the regional situation while others may have over-extended themselves. However, it is worth noting that the corporate sector in general in Hong Kong has avoided the excesses seen in the rest of the region. In general, companies in Hong Kong are not highly leveraged compared with their counterparts in the region and have not poured resources into an indiscriminate build-up of fixed assets. The banks have also tended to follow more prudent lending policies than those elsewhere and are better protected by their ability to take and realise good collateral. We do not therefore expect to see the collapse of asset quality that has occurred in some regional economies where corporates and the banks have also had to contend with massive exchange rate depreciation. The local banks in Hong Kong also have the benefit of the cushion provided by their high capital adequacy ratios. This means that even if the banks do have to make higher provisions this year, it will be their profitability rather than their solvency that is affected. While lower profitability is by no means welcome, it is not, by itself, a cause for concern in terms of the stability of the banking system.
It therefore follows that our commitment to an expansionary monetary policy includes a firm commitment to fight against an unwelcome tightening of monetary conditions in the event of a marked appreciation of the Swiss franc. 6  BIS Review 44/2003  ANNEX  Graph 1  Global Price Development  [%]  Consumer prices, unadjusted, change in % versus previous year  30  World Japan USA Switzerland Germany  25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 1957  1967  1977  1987  1997  Source: Datastream. Table 1 Standard Deviation of Four-Quarter Growth or Real GDP per Capita 1960-1983 1984-2002 USA 2.7 1.7 Germany 2.5 1.5 Japan 3.7 2.2 United Kingdom 2.4 1.7 Source : Stock and Watson, 2003  BIS Review 44/2003  7  Graph 2  Swiss Price Deflators 220 200 180 160 GDP deflator Export price deflator  140 120 100 1973  1978  1983  1988  1993  1998  2003  Graph 3  Labor Productivity 1870 - 1998 GDP per hour worked (in 1990 international USD per hour) 35 Switzerland  30  USA  25  Germany 20 Western Europe (12)  15 10 5 0 1870  1913  1950  1973  1990  1998  Source: A. Maddison (2001): "The World Economy - A Millenial Perspective". Paris: OECD. 8  BIS Review 44/2003

The interest rate applicable to the long-term financing facility, which aims to stimulate lending, was reduced and an expanded asset purchase programme was announced. This programme includes, in addition to the purchases of asset-backed securities and covered bonds issued by the private sector, purchases of bonds issued by euro area central governments, agencies and European institutions. The size of this expanded programme is ambitious, with monthly purchases amounting to € billion. The purchases will commence in March and, in principle, it is intended that they will be carried out until September 2016, although the Governing Council of the ECB has given itself the option to continue to make purchases if the path of inflation is not consistent with its aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The programme requires that, to be eligible for purchase, securities must be at least investment grade, or if not, that their issuers are under an EU-IMF financial assistance programme. These conditions are similar to those applied in the requirements for collateral to be eligible for monetary policy operations and those envisaged, in August 2012, in the announcement of the sovereign bond purchase programme known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). Of the additional asset purchases, 12% will be purchases of bonds issued by European institutions and the other 88% will be purchases of bonds issued by central governments and agencies of countries in proportion to their shares in the ECB’s capital key.
The IMF should not thus provide unlimited and unconditional financial support, its catalytic role remaining a core element of  BIS Review 49/2001  3  financial crisis resolution. As a consequence, IMF financial assistance should be ex ante limited in terms of quotas. Access above these regular limits should be exceptional and allowed only in cases of systemic risks. However, if short-term financing is the bulk of IMF lending role, the IMF should also promote macro-stability, including structural matters relevant for macro-economic policies. As a consequence, the IMF needs a medium and long term surveillance and medium and long term facilities for adjustments to take hold. -  2. As regards its role in crisis management, the IMF could concentrate on agreeing with the crisis country a program which ensures adjustment and financing over the short and medium-term: ·  This means, for example, that IMF conditionality should cover short and medium and long term issues. The Asian crisis has led to an extension of IMF conditionality to structural areas, mainly as regards financial systems restructuring issues. This extension was somewhat criticised but I do not share such views: including structural matters in the IMF conditionality is clearly in line with IMF missions as regards financial stability and should reinforce its efficiency. In that respect, the review of IMF conditionality under process should not mean, in my opinion, that it should necessarily be weakened, by focusing only on short term macroeconomic variables.

This will not only facilitate the task of monetary policy, but will contribute to the continued reduction of unemployment in the euro area. It is the best recipe for sustainable robust growth. In addition, long-term growth perspectives for the euro area will be strengthened if Member States intensify fiscal consolidation. All in all, looking ahead, GDP for the euro area is expected to grow approximately close to trend potential growth. In a context of moderate but still substantial economic growth and of inflationary pressures, which are expected to weaken over the medium run, the Governing Council of the ECB decided on its Thursday 10 May’s meeting to adjust the key ECB rates by 25 basis points. More precisely, as our President Wim Duisenberg explained on behalf of the Governing Council, the decision was grounded on the following key monetary, financial and economical developments: On the monetary side, which constitutes as you may know the first pillar of the ECB monetary policy strategy, M3 growth no longer poses a risk to price stability. Such a statement results from the following considerations:  BIS Review 49/2001  1  -  M3 growth has been on a gradual downward trend since the beginning of last year, reflecting the tightening of the ECB monetary policy, which started in November 1999.
It is therefore not entirely correct to compare the income  3 In the research literature, one often tries to distinguish the independent, “pure” effect of monetary policy from  the effect of the monetary policy that systematically reacts to changed circumstances. This is done by identifying monetary policy “shocks”, that is, changes in monetary policy that are unexpected, given how the central bank normally reacts to changed circumstances. The size of the monetary policy effect will thus depend on, among other things, the assumption of how monetary policy normally reacts. 5 [14]  and wealth distribution after a period of expansionary monetary policy with the distribution prior to these measures being taken. The point of comparison should rather be how the distribution would have looked without the expansionary monetary policy. Another difficulty is what time perspective one should have to determine the effects of monetary policy. I have argued that it is important to take into account the total effect of monetary policy on the economy. Asset prices are affected relatively rapidly, but it takes time before the total effect of monetary policy has an impact on the real economy and ultimately inflation. Moreover, a common starting point when discussing the effects of monetary policy is that in the long term it is neutral with regard to real economic quantities such as growth, unemployment and income distribution. In this perspective, one can therefore argue that monetary policy should only have minor distributional effects, if any at all.

This relates first to the completion and implementation of the FSAP and its follow up. The FSAP should give rise to genuine common financial legislation and regulation for market players. The so-called Lamfalussy framework, which allows for flexible technical rules at the EU level complemented by enhanced co-operation as regards national implementation and enforcement, has for good reasons been extended from the securities field to banking, insurance and financial conglomerates. A second area of structural reform in capital markets is the further consolidation and integration of market infrastructure and the further harmonisation of the standards and conventions routinely used by market participants. There is a large variety of remaining obstacles to a fully integrated and efficient euro area market which still needs to be addressed by the relevant actors. A simple but telling example of the benefits that collective action can bring in this regard is the development of the EONIA overnight interest rate index by market participants organised within a trade association. This index has become the generally accepted reference in the euro overnight interest rate swap market, leading in turn to the impressive development of this particular market segment. Turning to labour markets, a number of structural reforms have been undertaken in recent years and efforts are still on-going in several Member States. Although unevenly implemented across countries, the positive impact of past reforms in the labour market has become visible.
The country’s natural resources are untouched by the financial crisis, and its human resources are relatively unscathed. The problem we face is not primarily a debt problem; it is a payment flows problem, which can be attributed in part to the fact that owners of frozen ISK assets either do not want to own them because they lack confidence in the Icelandic economy or are barred from owning them by regulatory provisions or investment strategies. If this, and not an underlying debt problem, is at the core of the issue, there are two main ways to restore balance in the foreign exchange market and lift the capital controls: the Central Bank could use its limited foreign exchange reserves to buy up unstable assets, or it  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  could render unstable assets more stable by creating a forum for long-term investors to buy them with foreign currency. The problem with the former of these options is that it transfers private sector debt to the public sector, at least temporarily. The foreign exchange reserves are leveraged, and this option requires reducing reserve assets although the debts remain. The Treasury’s net debt position deteriorates as a result. The problem with the latter option is that, for the short term, the supply of krónur is too large in comparison with long-term investors’ capacity to invest. If it is executed too rapidly, the exchange rate of the króna could fall sharply, at least temporarily, or the foreign exchange reserves could be depleted excessively.

This is a clear example of how we are harnessing the advances made by the leading institutions within the industry. Furthermore, to encourage those institutions which are not at the leading edge in this field to make enhancements in their internal controls and risk management processes, the New Accord will offer explicit economic incentives to adopt - over time - more accurate measures of risk and more sophisticated means for controlling their exposures to such risks. However, the Basel Committee recognised that relying on uniform rules alone would have introduced certain drawbacks. Rules tend to be inflexible and therefore might preclude or ignore innovation. Applying uniform rules may also fail to account for a bank’s unusual businesses or risk profiles. Consequently, our second pillar, supervisory review, addresses some of those drawbacks. It introduces judgement into the policy mix. Banks and supervisors will exercise discretion in determining capital needs relevant to their particular businesses and risk profiles. That degree of discretion makes the supervisory framework more flexible and better able to adapt to change and innovation. Finally, the third pillar, market discipline, adds greater transparency to the process. When a bank discloses information that offers meaningful insight into its risk positions and exposures, marketplace participants are better able to assess its financial health. Counterparties, investors, rating agencies, and even customers can reward banks that manage their risks properly and penalise those that hold unrealistically low amounts of capital for their risk.