samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
While the nominal GDP has climbed up at a faster pace around 12 percent per annum despite the slowdown in global economies. 4. The fruits of our labors from past continuous development of the GMS have grown gracefully. The result of a more opened and transformed economy has led to a more interconnection that allows the GMS countries to realize what used to be the farreaching prosperities. Our people can now commute across GMS’s countries on the road network of over nine hundred thousand kilometers, 22 times of the equator’s length. 5. However, it has been quite often said “what get you here won’t get you there”. Despite a bright future for the GMS, there are still clouds on the horizon. To weather through existing and imminent challenges from external turbulences as well as domestic structural bottlenecks, the GMS cannot stand still, but should keep upgrading itself in order to continue to make progress on its economic transformation and achieve sustainable growth in the long term. 6. At this juncture, let me first walk you through “the three critical elements” that I deem essential in laying a strong foundation for the GMS on their journey of transformation. 7. First, we may already be aware that while regional integration brings about promising growth, it also entails greater external vulnerability which could dilute the effectiveness of the individual country’s economic toolsets.

While a college education is generally a good investment, the cost of attending a fouryear college has risen considerably faster than wages over the last several decades. This means that college has become increasingly unaffordable—which can act as a drag on economic mobility and the growth of a college-educated workforce, and by extension, on productivity growth and living standards. As has been well documented by my New York Fed colleagues, many young Americans have adjusted to rising tuition and fees by taking on more debt. This trend highlights the importance of the federal student loan program, which has helped mitigate the impact of the shift in financing of 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  higher education from state and local funding to students and their families over the past few decades. However, the end result is that more students leave college with significantly higher amounts of debt. Student loan debt has more than tripled over the past two decades and now totals over $ trillion. It is important to consider what these changes in financing higher education mean for economic mobility. First, New York Fed researchers have documented that a large percentage of student borrowers—especially those who attend less selective colleges or drop out—have trouble staying current on their loans, and often become delinquent and default on their debt. We also know that these factors—slow repayment, delinquency, and default—are most prevalent among those from more modest family circumstances. In addition, there is evidence that student debt acts as a drag on homeownership.
The magnitude, composition, speed, form of financing and focus of these reconstruction expenditures can have substantial effects on the baseline scenario in terms of output,  BIS Review 61/2010  5  inflation and the performance of financial markets. There are also risks associated with the time that it will take for productive activities to return to normal and for agents to materialize their expenditures. This has a direct incidence on the assessment of the immediate effects of the catastrophe in the first and second quarters. In any case, this risk is partly mitigated when considering that before the earthquake and tsunami, domestic output and demand were already showing a higher velocity than had been forecast. The external scenario shows a better outlook, although some risks persist. The fiscal situation of developed economies – especially in some European countries – is cause for concern because of its effects on the perception of risks and on the financial system, and its possible implications on the path of recovery of global growth. There are also risks associated with the administration of monetary stimulus packages, either if they are withdrawn sooner than necessary – considering that some countries’ financial systems remain weak – or later than advisable. As usual, the persistence of global imbalances entails risks because of both strong capital inflows to emerging economies and significant changes in the evolution of currency parities. The realization of some of these risk scenarios will have direct consequences on the country’s growth and inflation forecasts.

Table 3 Main international baseline scenario assumptions (annual averages) 2008  2009 (e)  2010 (f)  2011 (f)  Dec.09  Mar.10  Dec.09  Mar.10  Dec.09  Mar.10  World GDP at PPP (annual change, %)  3.0  -0.8  -0.6  3.8  4.3  4.2  4.4  World GDP at mkt exchange rate (annual change, %)  1.9  -1.8  -1.7  3.1  3.5  3.4  3.5  Trading partners’ GDP (annual change, %)  3.0  -0.8  -0.8  3.6  4.0  3.8  3.8  WTI oil price $  100  62  62  80  82  86  85  LME copper price $  316  230  234  270  310  270  290  Terms of trade (annual change, %)  -16.1  0.3  4.1  4.7  12.5  -2.3  -5.6  External prices, in $ (annual change, %)  12.2  -6.0  -6.1  9.6  3.7  1.0  3.0  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 12  BIS Review 61/2010  Figure 8 Expected Monetary Policy Rate (percent)  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 07  Jul. 08  Jul. 09  MPR EES March 2010 Last week of February 2010  Jul. 10  Jul. 11  Jul.
However, although it is clear that monetary conditions in Hong Kong were, as a consequence of being tied to those in the US through the currency board mechanism, looser during the mid-1990s than one might ideally have wished, and although empirical research suggests that there is a relationship between the property cycle and interest rates, this relationship is not found to be a particularly robust or powerful one. Moreover, there were other factors contributing to the developing property price bubble in the mid-1990s, such as the strong overall performance of the economy, linked to rapid development in Mainland China, some euphoria ahead of the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, demographics, 6 and the impact of local land release and public housing policies. The cessation or reversal of such influences helps explain the subsequent downturn. All in all, therefore, there is quite a range of factors which have come together to produce deflation in Hong Kong. There would be little point in asking precisely how much of deflation can be blamed on the currency peg since, before answering, one would need to specify what sort of monetary policy the authorities would have pursued instead of a currency board. In the absence of a liquidity trap (possibly a significant proviso in this age), it should be possible to choose a policy which could succeed in the narrow objective of eliminating deflation, at whatever cost or benefit in terms of other policy objectives.

While a floating regime plainly provides greater flexibility to attempt to influence the price level (although such attempts may not always succeed), Hong Kong sees no reason to abandon its monetary regime, which has served the economy well for almost twenty years. 4  BIS Review 38/2002  Source: International historical statistics: Europe 1750-1993 / B. R. Mitchell, London: Macmillan Reference; New York, N.Y.: Stockton Press, 1998  BIS Review 38/2002  5
In the last Inflation Report the Riksbank viewed that growth would be around 4% this year and average almost 3.5% in the next three years. This seemed to be a higher rate of growth than the economy could sustain in the long run. As available resources are utilized, price pressure will grow. The task of monetary policy is to ensure that growth does not deviate too far from a rate that is sustainable, thus causing shortages and price pressure. Diagram 6. The task of monetary policy  Function of the monetary policy Growth New economy Potential growth Real growth  Time  The Riksbank was of the view that, in the next few years, the inflation rate would be lower than what might be expected with such strong growth. One reason for this was that the modest increase in underlying domestic inflation anticipated in our forecasts was offset by a stronger krona and lower oil prices. Our assessments also took into account the fact that in recent years domestic price pressure had been lower than expected. We do not know exactly why domestic inflation has been so low in the last few years. Deregulation of the electricity and telecom markets is one important factor. But competition has increased in other product sectors too, due to globalization in general and to membership of the EU in particular. Our forecasts are also strongly influenced by our estimates of capacity utilization in the economy and of potential growth. There is some uncertainty in both cases.

At this point, I would like to emphasize that we closely monitor pricing behavior as inflation hovers around high levels, albeit for a temporary period. I would like to hereby remind you that we will provide public with the updated evaluations and forecasts on medium-term inflation outlook along with possible risks and policy measures, more extensively in the Inflation Report to be published on 29 April. BIS Review 68/2010  13  Distinguished Guests, 37. Throughout 2009, as the Central Bank, we focused on policies oriented towards containing the adverse effects of the crisis on the economic activity and on financial stability while also overseeing price stability. Thanks to the experience gained from domestic crises in the recent past, we were able to make prompt and effective decisions, thus we were able to do our part to minimize the adverse impacts of the global crisis. In this period, the soundness of the financial system in addition to the relatively limited deterioration in the risk premium provided monetary policy with an extra room for maneuver. 38. Accordingly, envisioning that undershooting the inflation target at year-end has been more likely, we continued the rate cut cycle that we initiated in November 2008 by pursuing a front-loaded monetary policy in early 2009.
In these “exceptional circumstances” the MPC’s remit requires explicitly that Committee balance these considerations and, if necessary, that it set policy with a view to taking somewhat longer to return inflation to target3. For these considerations to matter, clearly, these “trade-off-inducing” shocks should be sufficiently persistent, or sufficiently foreseeable, to affect inflation further into the future than the usual policy lags. I’ll return to these points in the conclusion. Before then I want to look at the latest evidence on traded goods prices – trying to define a little more precisely what how word “transitory” should be understood in this context – and then the domestic labour market. “In exceptional circumstances, shocks to the economy may be particularly large or the effects of shocks may persist over an extended period, or both. In such circumstances, the MPC is likely to be faced with more significant trade-offs between the speed with which it aims to bring inflation back to the target and the consideration that should be placed on the variability of output. In forming and communicating its judgements the Committee should promote understanding of the trade-offs inherent in setting monetary policy to meet a forward-looking inflation target while giving due consideration to output volatility”. 3  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Will inflation in traded goods prices prove “transitory” (and what have people meant by the word anyway)?

At a deeper level there are also some signs of a rotation away from goods demand and back towards services. Non-auto durables spending in the US has fallen back a little in the second half of this year. And although trends in the UK are less important in this respect (our share of global goods demand is small), you 6  See “Asian countries are at last abandoning zero-covid strategies”, The Economist Oct 9th 2021 edition. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  can see from Chart 11 that retail spending here has also declined since the spring. I mentioned a moment ago that some of the shifts in spending caused by the pandemic had persisted, even as pandemic itself receded. You can also see in Chart 11 that spending on transport is still a long way short of pre-pandemic levels, not least because many of us are still working from home (to some extent, at least). But total spending on services has nonetheless outgrown that on goods in the second half of this year. Finally, and more generally, we know that, in many instances, tradable goods prices exhibit a significant degree of mean reversion. More often than not, big  Chart 12. Shipping costs have fallen in recent months and forward contracts suggest further material declines Jan 2017 = 100 400  rises are followed not just by slower growth but  Latest  outright declines.
This step was necessary at this time to stop the turmoil in Turkey’s financial markets and calm depositors’ nerves. Now, as we all know, the 100 percent coverage may subject both bankers and depositors to moral hazard in the form of willingness to take greater risks to earn higher returns. Depositors may encounter moral hazard when they ignore greater risks associated with their choice of a depository institution which offers them higher rates for their deposits. But even though all the drawbacks of the present system of deposit protection are well known, current conditions in the world financial environment and their effects on the Turkish financial system have prevented us from making the necessary changes in the existing deposit insurance scheme just now. Once we manage to stabilise the macroeconomic environment, we will be able to reduce the 100 percent coverage to internationally acceptable levels. BIS Review 31/1999  4  How a powerful and effective supervision could be implemented for the Turkish banking system was foreseen many years ago. The system in effect during the 1930s had revealed its inadequacies, but the first step was not taken until 1959 with the establishment of the Board of Sworn Bank Auditors. The system was first applied to the Turkish economy under the direction of the Ministry of Finance. The Board recruited many valuable employees, trained them, and gained the power to supervise the system.

But as I mentioned earlier in connection with the need for additional principles to preserve the soundness of the system, the rapid changes of recent years, their consequences and events occurring in the international environment have underlined the importance of effective supervision. In 1997, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) enumerated the 25 Core Principles to be used for banking supervision. The need for such principals was well understood after the financial crises in Asia and Russia. I may say that, during these events, which have been going on for several years, the majority of the Turkish banking system has gained great advantages from adopting these changes. These banks have succeeded in keeping pace with the era, especially with respect to technological innovations, strategies for risk-taking and management techniques. Besides these advances, there were some factors that damaged the system. These are: 1) High inflation. 2) High public sector borrowing requirement. 3) The lack of an efficient legal framework. In addition, the style of banks’ operations and strategies are somewhat different in a high inflation, as opposed to a normal, environment. On the one hand, banks try to sidestep the harmful effects of inflation. On the other hand, they revise their methods of overcoming uncertainty and taking risks. And more important, as the public persists in continuing to borrow, which leads eventually to crowding-out, the banks turn to the public sector as a simple method of investment.
To use a tennis analogy, I see Alan as the central banking equivalent of the non-playing captain of a Davis Cup team, encouraging the younger and less talented members, and stressing the importance of footwork, timing and getting into position early. Alan, thank you for raising the respect which others give to our discipline of economics and our profession of central banking. 2  Transparency in monetary policy. At the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Policy Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, October 11, 2001. This definition was set out much earlier, in similar terms, in Alan Greenspan’s statement before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, January 25, 1990. 2  BIS Review 56/2005

Irma Rosenberg: The inflation target and the CPI Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the CPI committee’s 50th anniversary, Norra Latin, 4 May 2004. *  *  *  Allow me to begin by thanking you for the invitation to attend this anniversary seminar. I have previously been a member of the CPI committee so I have some insight into the issues with which the committee has contended down through the years. As you know I have a different role today and it is in this capacity, as a monetary policymaker, that I today intend to provide some reflections on the CPI's role as a target variable for monetary policy. In January 1993, a few months after the Riksbank had been forced to abandon its defence of the fixed exchange rate, a monetary policy strategy was introduced that was pretty much untried, not only in Sweden but also internationally: Monetary policy was to be aimed at achieving a quantified target for inflation. The rate of price increases was to be stabilised at 2 per cent a year with a tolerance range of 1 percentage point. Right from the beginning the target was defined in terms of the rate of increase in the CPI, even though other measures also featured in the discussion. There were several reasons for choosing the CPI as the target variable. Perhaps the most important of these was that the CPI, with its long history, is the best known measure of price developments in Sweden.
Bearing in mind the structure of the European System of Central Banks, the merit of endowing the euro zone monetary policy with a single voice and, more important, a single soul in such a short time has been immense. It is thus a privilege for me today to be accompanied by two very distinguished economists and policymakers, from whose experience and expertise I am sure we will all benefit greatly. Introduction: The concept of efficiency The analysis of efficiency is a matter that has required the attention of a sizable number of papers in the literature. Both the approaches adopted and the results obtained differ. Of what there is no doubt is how important the idea of efficiency has been and continues to be. It is a pleasure for me today to share some thoughts with you on the dimension this concept acquires for the financial system as a whole and for savings banks. I would wish these thoughts to be of a general nature; but they will inevitably be influenced by the Spanish savings-bank experience. Efficiency relates the cost incurred to the product obtained. In general terms, the idea of efficiency broadly refers to the fact of using limited resources in the best possible way. In other words, an economic system is efficient if it does not waste its resources, in such a way that it maximises individuals’ well-being. BIS Review 31/2003  1  I would add two further thoughts on applying the idea of efficiency to credit institutions.

I wanted to speak to this, not to continue the debate about the rights and wrongs of this case, but instead to highlight some of the lessons that the Bank and industry might draw from it. In particular, I want to dispel the urban myth that has developed around these events. While the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) can impose financial penalties and suspension under the SMR, we do not run for our regulated entities a disproportionate “one strike and you are out” regime for an honest mistake. Neither explicitly nor implicitly. Not I as Governor, not the CEO of the PRA, not the head of the FCA. Not any of our supervisors in the PRA. The SMR is about clear responsibilities, proportionate consequences, and developing a culture of openness and accountability. Proportionate means taking into account the severity of the incident, the track record of the individual and their firm, as well as the firm’s wider response. An honest mistake that is freely admitted for which a firm takes prompt remedial action is not a firing offence. And here’s my point: we must not let recent events inadvertently tighten perceived standards for the industry because that could have Senior Managers running scared, drive compliance underground and undermine 12  For TSC report see: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmtreasy/.../1092.pdf  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  our collective objectives. Another risk, flagged by some, is that it will also become harder to find candidates of sufficient calibre willing to take on senior roles.
In addition, money market experts have noted the exercise’s importance in the current environment of promoting market functioning; for example, it reduces the likelihood of pervasive, negative short-term rates trading. Conclusion In the five years since the FOMC has set the target for the federal funds rate at its zero lower bound, the landscape for the implementation of monetary policy has changed. The tools to implement monetary policy have also changed, and I focused here primarily on a possible new overnight, fixed-rate, full-allotment reverse repo facility. Although the current overnight, reverse repo exercise provides us with useful observations that allow us to improve the technical execution of policy, our knowledge is naturally limited by the exercise’s capped nature. Important questions will remain about the broader money market effects of a fully operational facility. Larger policy and implementation questions will also entail whether – and if so how – other tools would be used in conjunction with this facility and IOER, and how the facility might or might not fit into the Federal Reserve’s longer-run policy framework. But while there’s still a lot to learn, the potential addition of an overnight, fixed-rate, full-allotment reverse repo facility offers a promising new technical advance in the Desk’s implementation of monetary policy.

Open market operations are merely a means to an end – tools for implementing the FOMC’s decisions.1 In designing these operational tools, the Desk aims to effectively and efficiently implement the FOMC’s directives.2 Of course, Desk operations don’t take place in a vacuum. We  1  Additional policy tools related to depository institutions, such as the discount window, interest on reserves, and the Term Deposit Facility, are overseen by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and implemented by the Federal Reserve Banks. 2  The FOMC issues a “directive” to the New York Fed after each of its meetings. The directive outlines the approach to monetary policy that the FOMC considers appropriate for the time period between its policy meetings (for example, its target fed funds rate or range, or an amount of long-term securities to purchase) and authorizes the Desk to conduct transactions in the SOMA in furtherance of it. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  operate in the open market, conducting transactions with a range of private market participants who are motivated by their own business needs, balance sheet constraints, regulatory incentives or disincentives, and individual perceptions of current and future economic conditions and risks. We rely on both internal and external infrastructure and systems to trade, settle, and clear our transactions.