samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are also aware of the important role that the Development Bank of Zambia and others institutions that provide long term finance can play in this process. It is for this reason that the Bank of Zambia monitors the performance of these institutions to ensure that  2  BIS Review 53/2010  they are financially viable to be able to play this important role. Rather than thinking of Government recapitalising these institutions, we should think more in terms of developing the capital markets to enable these institutions raise resources for long term financing from the private sector. On the issue of the foreign exchange market, I wish to emphasise that we have a flexible exchange rate regime that has served us well after doing away with exchange controls in the early 90s. The exchange rate of the Kwacha against other international currencies has enjoyed relative stability since 2003 when the interbank foreign exchange market system (IFEM) was introduced. With this system, the Bank of Zambia intervenes in the market mainly to smoothen fluctuations and to build international reserves. The exchange rate is expected to be driven by economic fundamentals such as the terms of trade. An attempt to fix the exchange rate would have disastrous effects especially when the fundamentals suggest that the rate should depreciate as this would wipe out all the reserves we have struggled to build over the recent past.

These zones are expected to enhance the country’s efforts of promoting value addition to raw materials which will in turn boost the manufacturing sector. They are also consistent with the budget themes for 2009 and 2010 of “Enhancing Growth through Competitiveness and Diversification”. In collaboration with the development partners, Government will provide the necessary support institutions, infrastructure and services conducive to efficient and competitive manufacturing. I would like to strongly encourage Zambian firms particularly members of ZAM to take advantage of the opportunities created under this initiative. Mr President, as I conclude my remarks, I wish you and your members a prosperous 2010. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 53/2010  3
During the current year, however, the krona has weakened relatively sharply. In the markets, the focus at present seems to be very much on interest rate differentials in relation to abroad. Personally, I find the weakening of the krona somewhat surprising given that underlying factors such as the real economy, the relative inflation rate and so on point to the opposite. For that reason, we also expected in October that there would be an appreciation in the period ahead. I have difficulty seeing any reason for us now to change that assessment in our main scenario. But a weaker krona is a risk that we have to take into account. Were the krona exchange rate to remain weak, it would of course have implications for the inflation forecast. In October, as before, we forecast that inflation would rise gradually in the period ahead. Resource utilisation was expected to pick up both in Sweden and abroad. We predicted that productivity growth would slacken somewhat and that cost pressures would gradually become higher. Substitution in favour of cheaper imported goods was expected to continue, but rising global resource utilisation was estimated to mean that global price pressures nevertheless would increase slightly on the whole. Against that background, our assessment was that UND1X inflation would rise from today’s low level and be close to the target a couple of years ahead. In my opinion, the information that has been received since October suggests that our assessment of inflation prospects at that time is holding up well so far.

European governments have begun to take steps towards fiscal consolidation, and must convince markets that these steps are credible. Unfortunately, the private sector is not ready to take over the slack in public demand. Private sector debt-to-GDP ratios exceed 250% in the G3 economies. In the United States, where the household debt-to-disposable income ratio reached an unprecedented 135% in 2008, deleveraging is already underway with the recovery in private consumption well below historical rebounds. While Eurozone households are less leveraged than US households, disposable income is likely to grow more slowly in the Eurozone and hence be a bigger drag on consumption. A third source of deleveraging is the banking system. Banks in the Eurozone have to strengthen their capital adequacy position to meet new regulatory requirements as well as buffer against potential losses on their sovereign debt holdings. With uncertain prospects for raising fresh capital in equity markets and facing funding shortages in wholesale markets, some of them are looking to scale back their risk-weighted assets. The resultant crunch in credit could further exacerbate the slowdown in the economy. With governments, households, and banks all having to deleverage at the same time, we are looking at a prolonged period of sub-par growth in the advanced economies. In many advanced countries, debt-to-GDP ratios are not expected to stabilise until 2015 to 2020. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Asia: neither decoupled nor derailed What does deleveraging in the G3 mean for Asia? Asia is not immune to developments in America or Europe.
For now, from observing the data we see that one of the strongest factors in the downturn of both domestic demand and world trade, has been the global crisis of confidence, understood as worsened expectations and increased uncertainty around the world, not overlooking the impact of financial tightening that hit hardest in September and October of last year. The sudden and widespread nature of the downfall of demand across countries that are so heterogeneous is proof of how difficult it is to differentiate and to avoid the instant impact of such an acute crisis. The downfall made no distinction based on the economies’ strengths or weaknesses. GDP fell in nearly 90 per cent of the countries in the fourth quarter of last year (Figure 1). However, macroeconomic policies can build a solid base from where to weather the shock coming from abroad and create countercyclical impulses to mitigate them, thus making room for a rapid, sustained recuperation. BIS Review 65/2009  1  A few years back, it was hard to think that a world recession this big would not translate into major problems in our country and in developing economies in general, but it has not happened. The effects of the crisis in Chile have been mitigated thanks to policy efforts and to our own strengths as a country. This crisis will bring about long discussions and analyses of its effects, and lessons will be drawn.

Dimitar Bogov: Promoting Macedonia’s cultural and historical values Opening speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the opening of the exhibition titled “Wall Paintings from the Episcopal Basilica in Stobi” on the occasion of the International Museum Day, Skopje, 18 May 2012. *  *  *  Honorable Minister Kancheska-Milevska, Your Excellency, Ambassador Wohlers, Distinguished guests, This year we celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the monetary independence of the Republic of Macedonia, recalling with respect the period of creation of the Macedonian Denar and the processes that led to the proclamation of the monetary sovereignty of our country on April 26, 1992. Undoubtedly, this is an opportunity when it is necessary to say that in the past twenty years, the main carrier of these processes – the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, with all its capacity has adequately served the new democratic society, as an institution that is responsible for maintaining the stability of the Macedonian national currency and its monetary and financial system. Besides its primary activity, in the past 10 years, our institution has sought to continuously and systematically contribute to the preservation, care and promotion of cultural and historical values of Macedonia.
Bwalya K E Ng’andu: Benefits, problems and challenges associated with credit cards Remarks by Dr Bwalya K E Ng’andu, Deputy Governor (Operations) of the Bank of Zambia, at the launch of the Access Bank Zambia Limited Visa International Credit Card, Lusaka, 19 June 2013. *  *  *  The Board Chairman, Access Bank Zambia Limited, Mr. Caleb Mulenga; Access Bank PLC Executive Director – Subsidiaries, Mr. Tek Koroye; Access Bank Zambia Limited Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Jekwu Ozoemene; Members of the Diplomatic Corps; Government Officials; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen It is indeed a pleasure for me to be here this evening to join Access Bank on this important and auspicious occasion marking the launching of the Access Zambia Limited Visa International Credit Card. Through you Chairman, I wish to extend our congratulations to the Bank for this commendable addition to your range of products and services. Undoubtedly, this will go some distance in responding to demands and needs of customers who are looking to benefit from this product with its combination of credit and the application of technology in payment for goods and services. While acknowledging this initiative, I will fall short of presenting the introduction of a credit card service as cutting edge technology, because it is not. As you are aware credit cards have a long established history of extensive usage in many countries around the world, including a number of African countries.

During property market and economic downturns, the chance of default for this group of borrowers can be significantly higher than those with only one property under mortgage. In view of this, the HKMA considers it necessary to require banks to further tighten the underwriting criteria for mortgage loans to borrowers with multiple property mortgages to reduce the risk of banks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  6. Besides, the HKMA notices a recent trend of lengthening average tenor of new mortgage loans. The average tenor for new mortgage loans now is 25 years, which is three years longer than that of 22 years in 2009. Some banks have extended the maximum tenor to even 40 years. Prolonged loan tenors will not only increase credit risk of banks, but may also weaken the ability of borrowers to withstand interest rate risk. In particular, when mortgage rates return to more normal levels, borrowers with a loan that already stretches to 30 or even 40 years simply cannot seek to reduce their monthly instalment payment burden by extending the tenor, and may therefore face financial difficulty. Therefore the HKMA has now required banks to set the ceiling for the maximum loan tenor for all new mortgage loans to not more than 30 years. 7. The above measures take effect immediately. However, loan applications in respect of property transactions with provisional sale and purchase agreements signed today or earlier will not be affected. 8. Mr Arthur Yuen, our Deputy Chief Executive, will explain the details of these measures later.
MONETARY POLICY REPORT PRESENTATION BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMISSION OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC  Mario Marcel Governor Central Bank of Chile 5 December 2018    The December 2018 Monetary Policy Report can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Introduction Mr President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, Senator Juan Pablo Letelier, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen, I am grateful for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile (BCCh) on the recent macroeconomic developments, prospects, and implications for monetary policy. This vision is contained in detail in our December 2018 Monetary Policy Report published this morning. Its contents provide the background for the decision adopted by the Board at yesterday’s Monetary Policy Meeting, and consider the October Imacec1 that was released today. At yesterday’s meeting, the Board decided unanimously to keep the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) unchanged at 2.75 percent. At the same time, we reiterated that the evolution of macroeconomic conditions make it possible and necessary to gradually reduce the monetary stimulus. This decision is consistent with the analysis and baseline projection scenario I will be sharing with you now. This analysis begins noting that annual inflation has risen throughout the year. After being under 2% almost the entire second half of 2017, today annual inflation is around 3%.

Figure 6 Real loans (1) (2) (annual change, percent) 25  Interest rates by type of loan (3) (index, 2002-2018=100) 25 200  Consumer  20  Commercial  20 175  Housing Commercial  15  200  15 150  175 150  Consumer  10  10 125  125  5  5  100  100  0  0  75  75 Vivienda (4)  -5  -5 02  05  08  11  14  50  17  50  02  05  08  11  14  17  (1) Real data built with CPI splicing of 2013 annual base (2) (3) Weighted average rates of all operations performed each Dashed horizontal lines show each series' average for the last 10 month. (4) Loans denominated in UFs. years. Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF data.
This followed a 100% acquisition of the share-holding of ICB from ICB Financial Group holdings AG of Switzerland by a consortium led by First Merchant Bank Ltd (FMB) of Malawi. Afility Investment Ltd, a Zambian controlled investment holding company, is part of this consortium. I am informed that First Capital Bank will be a local bank with 51% shareholding to be held by Zambians. As a matter of fact, First Capital Bank is among seven foreign owned banks which have sought and received approval from the Bank of Zambia to convert to locally owned banks following the new capital requirements. This is a welcome development as it is in line with our Government’s goal of ensuring that Zambians actively participate in the development of the economy. With the launch of FCB at Kwacha Pension House, the two branches of former ICB situated at the corner of Washama and Great North Roads, and Cairo Road will automatically become part of the First Capital Bank. This means that FCB will evolve with three branches in Lusaka. Chairperson I am glad that the transition from ICB to FCB has taken place very smoothly without any loss of jobs. The members of the Board and the new shareholders deserve special commendation for this. I also commend the existing customers of the bank who were steadfast and reposed their confidence in the new shareholders.

A partial representation of the economic structure can only partially help in monetary policy decision-making, notably in real time. For instance, it is very difficult to find empirical models that allow for an integral view of both non-financial (‘real’) and monetary-financial phenomena. So, it may be impossible to arrive at a convincing explanation of the origin and propagation of a significant financial shock, say, on the basis of sets of equations that do not elaborate on the role of the financial sector or account for only tenuous links between that sector and the rest of the economy. Another example is provided by the many pitfalls that come with using “synthetic” indicators of inflationary pressure. The most famous of these “synthetic” indicators is the so-called “output gap”. The “output gap” can be defined as a measure of the deviation of the aggregate output of an economy from the maximum level that would be consistent with price stability. This maximum level is then the “potential output”. When current output is above potential, the pressure on the scarce resources should then translate into an increase in prices, that is, inflation. In the real world, the monetary authority constantly faces the challenge of observability and measurement. Unfortunately, we cannot “assume” to know the “potential output”. The best we can do is to try to “estimate” the output gap by using observations of many other correlated variables. We all know how imprecise and model-dependent this “estimated” measure can be.
The extent and scale of the actions taken in the euro area since the spring of 2014 to address the risks of too low inflation have been unprecedented, covering four strategic lines: negative remuneration in the deposit facility; communication policy and the use of forward guidance; several programs aimed at restoring the bank lending channel of monetary transmission; and the program of quantitative easing that entails large scale purchases of private and public assets. Since October 2014, the size of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet has increased by 50 % up to € with the implementation of the Extended Asset Purchase Program, whereas the deposit facility rate, which is a key money market reference in the current context of excess liquidity, has remained in negative territory, reaching its lowest record at –0.40 % in March. The ECB has not been alone in the use of unconventional monetary tools once interest rates reached its effective floor. The Federal Reserve engaged in successive rounds of quantitative easing through asset purchase programs. All in all, the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve increased from 870 billion in September 2008 to more than 4.4 trillion, holding now more than 30 percent of the stock of outstanding Mortgage Backed Securities and nearly 25 % of outstanding Treasuries. The Bank of England also embarked in quantitative easing through purchases of public sector assets, and holds now almost 25 % of the total outstanding UK public debt.

A typical example is a financial crisis situation in which a macroprudential policy authority wishes to reduce the capital buffers of banks in order to stimulate lending while, from a microprudential perspective, it would instead be desirable to see the banks strengthening their balance sheets with more equity. So, there is a need to coordinate these policy areas too. Also, the knowledge about individual institutions generated in microprudential supervision work is important to understanding risk build-up at systemic level. Wind strength is also affected by other policy areas Not only is there a strong link between monetary and macroprudential policy and a need to coordinate macroprudential and microprudential supervision – the need to lean against the wind is also affected by other policy areas. Fiscal policy has a significant influence on borrowing and lending incentives. However, other policy areas can also come into play, such as housing policy when it comes to household indebtedness. There is thus a limit to what can be achieved by macroprudential policy, or monetary policy for that matter, which depends on other policy areas. The opportunities and limitations of macroprudential policy – the example of the Swedish household sector I will now be much more specific about the opportunities and limitations of macroprudential policy by focusing on a concrete example. By now, it is well known that, for a number of years, the Riksbank has seen substantial risks associated with household indebtedness.
5 As economic and financial relations between Shanghai and Singapore expand, there  is scope to foster even closer collaboration between both financial centres, and reinforce key areas of cooperation undertaken at the Government to Government (“G2G”) level. Let me outline five key areas, which I hope would lead to further discussion during the forum today. Belt and Road Collaboration between Shanghai and Singapore 6 First, Shanghai – bridgehead of the BRI – and Singapore can foster the development of  a comprehensive financial ecosystem to support the wide range of financial needs related to the Belt and Road initiative. a. As an international financial centre in the heart of Asia and one of the largest offshore RMB centres in the world, Singapore can play a key role in financing and advancing Belt and Road projects, particularly in Southeast Asia. Singapore signed the Guiding Principles on Financing the Development of the Belt and Road during Premier Li’s recent visit to Singapore. These principles advocate for inclusive participation, mutual benefits and risk-sharing as participating countries work together to build a long-term, stable, sustainable financing system that is well-placed to manage risks. Singapore set up Infrastructure Asia this year to catalyse stronger partnerships for infrastructure development across the region.

The second drawback is that a nominal income growth target would probably mean less to the average person than does an inflation target. One virtue of an inflation target is it provides people with a simple heuristic for forming their expectations of how fast prices will rise. That would be muddied under a nominal income growth target. The bottom line from all this is that I do not believe that a shift to a nominal income growth target would represent a major change in the regime. Most of the time, policy settings would probably be pretty similar. The main consequences would instead lie in how the MPC explained and justified its decisions. The same cannot be said of a shift to a target for the level of nominal income, as recently advocated by Michael Woodford.8 As the incoming Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, explained in a recent speech,9 such a target would ensure that past control errors have to be subsequently corrected. Bygones are not bygones, in other words. In the current context, this is usually taken to mean returning nominal income to a continuation of its pre-crisis trend line. As Chart 3 reveals, the nominal income shortfall in the United Kingdom is presently very large – in excess of 15% in fact. Such history dependence in policy is potentially of value when private agents are sufficiently forward-looking and the regime is fully credible.