samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this context, I would like to suggest that the experience the United States has had with a large, unified capital market may point to ways in which a unified European capital market BIS Review 109/1997  may evolve after the advent of EMU. If the U.S. experience is of any relevance, we may expect to see a decreasing use of bank loans in favor of a growing use of securities in Europe after 1999. Repo markets would also likely grow, potentially along the lines we have seen in the United States, where institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds, state and local governments, and insurance companies have become the largest providers of capital under repo arrangements -- in contrast with Europe’s experience, where these types of investors tend to hold bank deposits. A growing role for repurchase arrangements is already apparent in Europe, and this growth may be expected to accelerate once the European central bank starts to operate in this market, accepting -- and fostering -- the use of a wide range of government paper as collateral. It is useful to keep in mind that the move to a single-currency, highly securitized European capital market cannot be expected to be completely painless. Clearly, since banks are the main intermediaries of cross-border transactions, the banking sector will bear the brunt of the costs associated with the changeover to a common currency. For example, it will suffer losses from reduced foreign exchange trading and transfer revenues.

What I confess I did not anticipate at that time was the difficult international environment in which we've had to operate over the past four years - including both the global economic slowdown and the persistent strength of sterling against the surprisingly weak euro. It must be that external environment - which has clearly had a dampening effect on demand and output in this country - that is, for us, the frost that burns. 2  BIS Review 64/2002  There was nothing that we could do ourselves directly to address the causes of these problems which had their origins abroad. What we could do - and indeed have done - is to offset as best we could the effects of the external frost by turning up the domestic heat in our economy, cutting interest rates to their lowest level for 40 years - which is where they've been for the past 12 months - consciously encouraging consumer spending on the back of rising house prices and a rapid build up of household debt. So although we've been reasonably successful in maintaining stability in the UK economy as a whole, we've had to live with a painful imbalance within the economy - between the internationally exposed sectors, including much of manufacturing, which have been having a torrid time, and the domestically-oriented sectors which have been doing relatively well. Essentially, faced with the external frost we've turned up the domestic heat - without that we'd all have felt cold! But this approach is not without risks.
In other words, whilst these may be a set of more or less necessary conditions for market development, they are unlikely to prove sufficient. However good the infrastructure may be, it is the issuers, investors and financial intermediaries which eventually determine whether there is a active market or not. Here in Hong Kong the debt market has grown significantly in the recent past, and the increase in issues by non-financial corporates has been encouraging. But we cannot escape the fact that we are still a relatively small market and that, despite the increases in primary issuance, secondary activity remains subdued. “So”, people ask me, “what is the Hong Kong Monetary Authority going to do about it?” In fact I am not particularly comfortable with the implied presumption that we should be the first port of call when any problems or deficiencies are identified. Thus, while I should like to take this opportunity to explain what we are in fact doing or intending to do, I want also to indicate what, in my view, we cannot or should not do. We are involved in the working group established by the Securities and Futures Commission to review Hong Kong’s laws and regulations relating to offers of securities. Over the years, several of the procedures have become outdated or have failed adequately to accommodate market innovations. In some instances they are an obstacle to bond market development. There are some complex legal and administrative issues here, which will take time to address.

Tony Latter: Bond markets - where are we heading? Speech by Mr Tony Latter, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to the conference “The Credit Revolution: Charting Change in the Asian Debt Markets”, at the Conrad International, Hong Kong, on 12 July 2000. *  *  *  A notable feature of the world’s leading national bond markets over the past couple of years has been the adjustment required of both issuers and investors to the often remarkable shifts into surplus, or much reduced deficit, that have occurred in the financial positions of governments in most major economies - with the notable exception of Japan - as a result of the successful application of fiscal discipline, assisted in some cases by favourable economic growth or a beneficial cyclical position. This has led to significant net retirement of government debt, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, in January the US Treasury projected buy-backs of $ billion this year, and some observers now expect that figure to be exceeded. The design of debt retirement strategies has itself posed some unfamiliar, though perhaps not entirely unpleasant, challenges for the authorities, as they search for the most cost-effective means in terms of prospective interest savings, grapple with the novelty of reverse auctions, or consider how best to sustain and possibly reinforce liquidity of the key remaining benchmark issues. There are a number of significant consequences of this transformation of government finances for markets more generally.
Pablo Hernández de Cos: Consistent economic policies - a prerequisite for macroeconomic stability Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Enrique Fuentes Quintana conference cycle, organised by the Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, Madrid, 16 January 2023. *** Ladies and gentlemen, I would first like to thank the Real Academia de Ciencias Morales y Políticas and its Chairman, Benigno Pendás, for inviting me to participate in this conference cycle in honour of Enrique Fuentes Quintana. The idea of a cycle like this could not be any more relevant at such a complex economic and geopolitical juncture. In my opinion, one of Professor Fuentes Quintana's greatest contributions is helping to create a culture of macroeconomic stability in Spain. Continued economic growth that improves citizens' welfare is impossible without price stability, without budgetary stability and without financial stability. Enrique Fuentes Quintana – to whom, as a former professor of mine, I am intellectually indebted – helped create and spread this message not only through his actions as Deputy Prime Minister and by explaining it didactically to the entire nation in his now famous televised address a few days after being sworn in, but also because he garnered a following and helped invigorate institutions like this Royal Academy, so that those teachings would live on today and guide and inspire us. My address today will give a brief overview of the key current European economic developments in order to contextualise monetary policy conduct.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Payments in the digital era - inside out Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the 13th Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures, jointly organised by the National Bank of North Macedonia and the Netherlands Bank, Ohrid (digitally), 9 December 2021. * * * Dear Governor Knot, Minister Besimi, Dear speakers and participants It is my great pleasure to welcome you to our traditional conference on Payments in the Digital Era: Inside Out, hosted by our central bank together with the Dutch Central Bank, for which I express my deep gratitude to governor Knot and his colleagues. Our lives are becoming increasingly digital as a result of the proliferation of new technologies that transform public and private services making them more convenient and accessible to consumers. As our lives have gone digital, so have our payments. The digitalisation of consumer payment behaviour, which has been going on for years, has been accelerated by the pandemics that shifted it in a higher gear. Globally, last year cash payments declined by 16%, while the number of non-cash transactions increased by 6%. The pandemics has particularly accelerated the shift towards real time/instant payments that grew by 40%. In the euro area, according to the ECB survey on payment attitudes (2020)1, 40% of the respondents stated that since the onset of the pandemic they have used less cash and more cards (contactless in particular).
Svein Gjedrem: The economic outlook and monetary policy Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), for Norges Bank’s regional network, Oslo, 9 November 2006. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 1 November and Inflation Report 3/06. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  The economic situation The world economy is currently experiencing its strongest continuous upturn since the early 1970s. This has contributed to solid growth in the Norwegian economy. Norway’s terms of trade have improved by nearly 30% since 2000, and activity in the export industry is very high. Globalisation has resulted in a low rise in prices for imported consumer goods at the same time as strong growth in demand for commodities and semi-finished goods has led to high prices for many Norwegian export goods. The terms of trade for traditional goods and services have also improved, albeit to a lesser degree than for overall trade. So far in the cyclical upturn, the mainland economy has grown by an average of close to 4 per cent annually. Current information about economic developments indicates that the cyclical upturn is continuing. Corporate sector profitability is solid. Companies are borrowing and investing. There is strong growth in employment, unemployment has fallen markedly, and household demand continues to rise.

In the course of 2005, office rental prices began to pick up in the largest Norwegian cities, with considerable variation within the various quality and location segments. The rise in consumer prices has also edged up since the beginning of the cyclical upturn. The year-onyear rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 2.6 per cent in September. Energy products such as electricity and oil have put upward pressure on inflation over the past year. Electricity prices, including grid rent and taxes, were 48 per cent higher in August than one year earlier, while petrol prices were 1 per cent higher. Since the beginning of 2001, the rise in energy prices has been over 7 per cent on average. Variations in energy prices may also lead to wide monthly variations in consumer price inflation. As a result of high electricity prices, the rise in CPI inflation will remain steady though 2006. Energy prices are expected to fall in the spring of 2007, dampening the rise in CPI inflation. The rise in prices for non-energy goods has been moderate in recent years. Price impulses from imported consumer goods have been particularly weak. Their contribution to inflation has been negative virtually every year since the mid-1990s, partly reflecting increased trade, a shift in imports towards low-cost countries and a substantial improvement in distribution efficiency in Norway. Price impulses from imported consumer goods are expected to continue to exert downward pressure on inflation for some time ahead, albeit to a lesser extent than in previous years.
Caleb M Fundanga: Relations between the Embassy of France and the Bank of Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the memorandum of understanding between the Embassy of France and the Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 18 January 2005. * • • • •  *  *  Your Excellency, the Ambassador Members of the Press Distinguished Invited Guests Ladies and Gentlemen  It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to the signing ceremony of the memorandum of understanding (MoU), governing the conduct of French lessons, between the Embassy of France and the Bank of Zambia. For some time now, our two institutions have been collaborating closely on the details of this MoU to ensure that it captures the mutual interests and aspirations of our two institutions. Although it has taken a bit of time to complete due to circumstances beyond our control, it is pleasing to note that we are now able to conclude it. Your Excellency Let me begin by stating the reason for our existence as a central bank. Our Mission Statement is to, I quote: “formulate and implement monetary and supervisory policies that ensure price and financial system stability” End of quote. In order for us to achieve this Mission Statement successfully, we need competent and skilled staff who are able to communicate effectively with a wide range of clientele at international, regional and national fora where the bank’s and, indeed, the nation’s interests are advanced.

But on account of communication barriers, Zambian businesses might not take advantage of our close proximity. This goes to show Your Excellency that our reliance on English as a lingua franca is detrimental to our national interest, especially in our quest to alleviate poverty in our society. In this regard, the need for us to speak, read and write French so that we communicate effectively at the regional and international level cannot be overstressed. BIS Review 5/2005  1  Furthermore, recent developments in the global economy dictate that we should be able to interact effectively at various international fora where appreciation of the cultures, values and customs of other people is important. Therefore, in view of the foregoing, we, at the Bank of Zambia, have realised that there is a compelling need to overcome our communication barrier by developing our employees’ multi-lingual skills, particularly, in French so as to, among other things: (i)  develop the required patience in their interactions with our non-English speaking counterparts;  (ii)  acknowledge the unique talents and contributions of others;  (iii)  uncover and show concern for the pressures and constraints which others face and modify the demands we may place on them;  (iv)  actively seek facts and data that explain and support others’ views and incorporate others’ feelings and values when restating their perspectives; and  (v)  reduce the cost of hiring external interpreters which impacts adversely on our limited resources.
In addition, efforts also continue to be directed towards building institutions to protect consumers, to  2  BIS Review 94/2010  promote financial inclusion, enhance market discipline and to augment management capabilities. These efforts have ensured continued financial intermediation process and that this access to finance remains an important factor that supports the growth of the economies in the region. Intensification of regional economic and financial integration in Asia The second major development that has been taking place in Asia is the intensification of regional economic and financial integration. While the individual economies in Asia continue to implement policies and reforms at the national level, greater attention is being placed on strengthening economic and financial linkages in the region. Intra-regional trade which has been a major contributor to the recent recovery in Asia, has risen from an average of 32% of total exports in 1995 to exceed an average of 50% in 2008. Of importance is the rising share of intra-regional trade for final demand in Asia. This reflects an important change in the pattern of trade amongst the Asian economies. The pace of intra-regional investment flows has also gained momentum. Businesses in the region are increasingly leveraging on regional complementarities as well as taking advantage of the opportunities created by the growing markets throughout the region. A more recent development is the strengthening financial integration within the Asian region.

You could see this initiative as helping to meet citizens’ self-expressed desire for firmer educational foundations on all matters economic and financial. To help dig the footings of that foundation, the Bank will be visiting around 200 schools this year to give talks and lectures using its newly-enlisted ambassador army, some with the help of our partner, the charity Speakers for Schools. The Bank also now runs two schools competitions, the most recent announced just last week in partnership with the Financial Times. 11  The most significant of the Bank’s educational initiatives will take place in the classroom itself. We have developed, in conjunction with We Are Futures, classroom materials for use in the Personal, Social, Health and Economics (PSHE) component of the curriculum. We have involved and consulted teachers in designing and refining these materials. They will be rolled-out in schools from 27 April. The Bank would like to see PSHE and, within that, economics become a compulsory part of the curriculum, echoing the views of parents and pupils. I have recently written to the Department of Education to say that. 12  (c) Regional Tours  A third strand is regional engagement. The Bank has had, for the past 90 years, a network of regional Agencies dotted across the UK. 13  They are the Bank’s eyes and ears, playing a key role in collecting  intelligence on the economy and financial system, largely from companies. That intelligence feeds directly into the Bank’s policy deliberations.
From a long-term perspective, such polices were inconsistent with the need to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. Under these circumstances, the key challenge the Central Bank had to face was how to defend the exchange rate peg amidst policies which did not promote exports. The only choice available for the Central Bank at the time was to restrict the use of available foreign reserves and impose severe exchange control restrictions. In a way, the Central Bank at the time was successful in maintaining low inflation, which is one of the key responsibilities of the Bank, but it failed to support the multiple objectives, which were often in conflict with each other, of the then Central Bank. In addition to pursuing inward looking economic policies, successive governments also ran high budget deficits mainly to provide subsidies and various free entitlements. Such budget deficits, even at moderate levels, caused more demand for imports in the midst of weak export performance, creating continued current account deficits, while the Central Bank was required to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. This was an impossible task for the Central Bank. As a result, the Central Bank, from time to time, either devalued the rupee or maintained a dual exchange rate along with severe restrictions on the use of foreign exchange. This monetary policy framework lacked credibility and created severe distortions to market pricing.

Even if some allowance is made for changes in velocity of money or money demand due to possible behavioral changes and financial sector development, the growth of money vs. the real growth of the economy and inflation cannot be explained for this period. 15  This was sufficient evidence that the strong and reliable relationship between the goal of price stability and the nominal anchor of money growth, which was essential for the success of the monetary aggregate targeting framework, has significantly weakened over time. This phenomenon was not limited to Sri Lanka, but was observed over time in many other economies as well. With the ending of monetary aggregate targeting in Canada in as early as 1982, Gerald Bouey, Bank of Canada Governor at the time famously stated “we did not abandon monetary aggregates. Monetary aggregates abandoned us.” Even the recent experience with quantitative easing in many advanced economies yet again proved that the tremendous expansion of central bank balance sheets that these countries undertook was insufficient to raise either growth or inflation. Earlier it was argued that Sri Lanka’s achievement of single digit inflation for 105 consecutive months had little to do with monetary aggregate targeting. Instead, it was a result of the Central Bank’s ability to anchor inflation expectations, by repeatedly emphasising its utmost desire to maintain inflation at mid-single digit  16  levels. The behaviour of the Central Bank during the 2008-2009 episode of disinflation would have raised credibility of monetary policy.
Of course, it is not desirable that the only possibility is to withdraw the license of an institution whose capital adequacy falls below the eight per cent level. In Sweden, there is every reason to look more closely into the obligations and powers of authority of Finansinspektionen. Another motive for the authorities to act quickly is to be able to quickly pay the deposit guarantee. To be able to make the necessary preparations for this, the authorities therefore need to have access to and control over relevant data files at an early stage when an institution gets into difficulties. This has been a problem in earlier cases of compensation from the Swedish deposit guarantee. If the financial system is threatened, the authorities must also be able to temporarily take control over the bank to maintain vital functions. The banks’ central role in the payment system means that payment defaults by one bank can have substantial domino effects. The consequences for the rest of the financial system may then be difficult to survey. With regard to institutions lacking a long-term survival capacity, it is of course important that they are wound up as quickly and smoothly as possible. There must be several different alternative methods for winding up banks to make it possible to choose the model that is best suited and entails the least cost to society. Of course, it would be best if one could get another bank to take over this institution’s activities.

In addition to this are the owners’ interest in their legal rights and not least society’s interest in the administration of justice functioning in the field of economic crime. 8  BIS Review 30/2008  All of these interests, and probably more, are entirely legitimate and must of course be taken care of in the legislation. But they must be classified according to their relative significance to society. Otherwise it will not be possible to distribute the roles between the different authorities in the best way when managing problem institutions. There is also a risk of wasting valuable time on managing conflicts between different interested parties instead of managing the institution’s problems. In other words, it is necessary to have a bird’s eye view when drawing up regulations. The regulations must be formulated to give the state the right tools I know that the Ministry of Finance is currently working hard on a proposal for public administration of banks in distress. The design of the deposit guarantee and Finansinspektionen’s powers of authority are also being reviewed. We eagerly await these proposals. Even if the work is carried out on parallel tracks, it is important that the final result is coherent. Otherwise it could be difficult to manage a future crisis in the financial system. It is also important that the proposals are not toothless. Running a bank is not a right, rather it entails considerable responsibility towards both society as a whole and the customers who have entrusted their savings to the bank.