samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The questions I would like to focus on today is what could we learn from the success of the airline industry? And, how will we make this happen in other areas of the service sector that have potentials to serve the region? BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  For the first question, the fast development of the airline industry can be mainly attributed to two factors: the right business model for our market and the enabling infrastructure and eco-system. On the private sector’s part, the low-cost airlines know the region’s untapped market and come to serve the large unmet demand with the right business model. Needless to say, they offer customers with simple products, including no-frills service with a single cabin class. Their business model is successful at minimizing operating costs by using a single aircraft model and by choosing the most fuel efficient plane type to reduce fuel and maintenance costs. The airlines also revolutionized the ticketing system by first offering internet booking, paperless tickets and mobile check-ins for greater convenience and lower costs. Apart from the right entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector, policymakers are to be credited with the creation of the airline network in our region. There are at least five factors policymakers have contributed to the success of the regional airline industry.

The ECB does not vote. Where I do agree is that making the presidency of the Eurogroup a permanent position could strengthen the institutional architecture of the euro area. How would the hypothetical independence of Catalonia affect its relationship with the ECB? At the ECB we act according to regulations, and the treaties. We would adhere firmly to the legal provisions and we would not do anything that is not legal. What conditions would need to be met in order to gain a seat at the ECB? Whether this is political fiction or not, I don’t know. But the ECB only acts on the basis of facts, not hypotheses. If the number of countries in the euro area were to increase then we would respect that, but there would be no shortcuts unless they are provided for by the Treaty. The European Commission has launched an investigation into the use of deferred tax assets (DTA) in the banking sector in Spain and various other countries. The ECB was very critical about DTAs when it had to be evaluated during the banking stress tests. There are four countries that resorted to using these measures widely and the legislation that they adopted varies from one country to the next. I believe that we must look at each case separately and in context. Personally I dislike the idea of resorting to attempts to create the impression that a balance sheet’s loss absorption capacity is greater than it is in reality.
This should be set against the Riksbank’s costs for conducting its operations, which amounted to around SEK 750 million a year. Net interest income was thus almost ten times higher than expenditure. If we make the same calculation for 2014, the picture is rather different. Based on the interest rates that applied at the turn of the year, net interest income is around SEK 3.5 billion. Now the bank also has sizeable interest expenditure amounting to SEK 2.4 billion (and this despite the repo rate being zero, so the bank does not pay interest on liabilities in Swedish krona). Net interest income is thus SEK 1.1 billion, which still covers the costs of conducting the bank’s operations – but now with a much smaller margin than before. As you can all see, this is a very rough and simplified calculation. The return on a bond portfolio is not just determined by the interest rate at a particular point in time, but also by the yield curve and how it moves over time. We have calculated this, too, and when we estimated the expected return on the foreign currency reserve, we have used data from interest rate forecasts by the National Institute of Economic Research.6 From 1988 onwards, the Riksbank’s results have on average exceeded SEK 8 billion a year. I have chosen 1988 as starting year as this was when we began to apply the principles for how to calculate the size of the dividend, which still apply today.

EU legislation prescribes that it is the highest decision-making body in the central bank that shall decide on the size of the bank’s equity. It is of course important that the decision is made after a preparatory process that is transparent and predictable, with a healthy balance between promoting on the one side the need of the Riksbank to have sufficient equity on each occasion and on the other side the interest of the Swedish government to minimise the Riksbank’s costs for tying up capital. To summarise, we can note that the Riksbank currently only has one source of funding that it determines itself, namely monetary policy liabilities. In other words, the Riksbank can always make payments by increasing liquidity in the banking system. But all other forms of funding are affected in one way or another by things beyond the bank’s control. At present, the repo rate is at zero and this means that the Riksbank does not have any interest expenditure for the monetary policy liabilities. But this is temporary, and as the repo rate is raised, the bank’s interest expenditure will increase. This will also mean that profits decline. The coming years – profits declining, no dividends I have now spent some time on describing the Riksbank’s balance sheet and discussing some of the challenges the bank is facing. But I have not yet said anything about the largest challenge for the bank in the short term. By this I mean the extremely low interest rates, both here in Sweden and abroad.
In addition, Malaysia’s economic flexibility has allowed us to shift resources from industries in which we no longer have comparative advantage to new areas of growth. It is these factors that will continue to underpin the positive growth outlook of the Malaysian economy into the near to medium term. Key Imperatives to prepare for the new global landscape The changing global landscape presents significant new challenges for both the developed and emerging economies. Important is to be well-positioned to manage the new risks and to build the necessary capability and capacity to have the agility and flexibility to adjust to the rapidly changing conditions. As the emerging economies aspire towards achieving higher levels of income and living standards, a different path from that which led the way for the advanced economies will now need to be considered. The current global financial crisis and the Asian financial crisis have provided us with many important lessons that should form the underpinnings for our business models and our policies for growth and development. A key priority of policy should be to balance the need of ensuring sustained stability while having in place the necessary foundations to secure long-term development. Avoiding and preventing the build-up of excesses is a critical imperative. The recent crisis has forcefully shown that markets cannot be exclusively relied on to rein in excesses. Market discipline needs to be complemented by policy interventions to effectively manage the build-up of imbalances in the financial sector and in the economy.

The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation extended guarantees for money market mutual fund shares, issuance of certain types of debt by bank holding companies and unlimited amounts of deposits in transactions accounts of commercial banks. Later, with the passage of the TARP legislation, the federal government addressed the excessive leverage and shortages of lossbearing capacity through the injections of capital in October 2008 and in April 2009 in conjunction with the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, or stress test of the major U.S. bank holding companies. Ultimately, the 2007–09 crisis was about both leverage and liquidity in the financial system as a whole, and not only in the tightly supervised sector of banking firms. This suggests that official sector efforts should aim at forward-looking monitoring of financial vulnerability that take both leverage and maturity transformation into account, and to broaden supervision to include broader coverage of the financial sector. In addition to many other efforts, the Federal Reserve is conducting tests of exactly that sort through its capital and liquidity assessments, the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review, or CCAR, and the Comprehensive Liquidity Analysis and Review, or CLAR. CCAR is the Federal Reserve’s annual process for evaluating capital adequacy of large and complex financial firms under normal and stressed conditions. CLAR is the Federal Reserve’s annual, horizontal exam to evaluate the liquidity position and liquidity risk management practices of those firms.
Stefan Ingves: Cash management - an important social issue Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the first meeting at the Sveriges Riksbank of the cash management advisory board, Stockholm, 26 April 2006. *  *  *  I would like to welcome you all to the first meeting of the new cash management advisory board. All of you sitting at this table are in some way concerned with cash management in the economy: banks, cash-in-transit companies, representatives of the retail trade, trade unions and authorities such as Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority), the police and the Swedish Work Environment Agency. My hope is that the advisory board will function as a forum for identifying and discussing issues in the field of cash management. The idea is that we should meet once or twice a year, and I look forward to fruitful discussions. Before opening the debate, I would like to mention two questions that I believe can form a starting point for our discussions: •  The process of change undergone by cash management in recent years and the new structure for cash management that the Riksbank is establishing together with the banks. •  The social problem comprised by the many and increasingly violent robberies of cash transports. Towards a more expedient structure for cash management One of the Riksbank’s tasks is to promote a safe and efficient payment system, and we are responsible for issuing banknotes and coins.

It is sometimes claimed in the media that there is a link between the Riksbank’s closure of its depots and the increase in cash transport robberies. I would doubt that claim. First and foremost, it must be remembered that approximately 85 per cent of the cash transports that are attacked are on their way to ATMs, and the Riksbank has never been involved in these transports. Only a very few transports to or from our offices have been the target of robberies. Furthermore, the large increase in the number of robberies took place while the Riksbank still had a network of cash depots throughout Sweden. One possible explanation for the increase in the number of cash transport robberies, which has been suggested by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), is that criminality may to some extent have been transferred from robbing banks and post offices to robbing cash transports. Other possible explanations, according to BRÅ, are that cash transport robberies yield much larger amounts than bank and post office robberies, while increased security in post offices and banks may have discouraged prospective robbers. I think that we should ask the question of why Sweden has so many more cash transport robberies than other countries, not just other Nordic countries, but the majority of European countries. There have occasionally been suggestions put forward in the general debate that if one tried to reduce the use of cash in society, the number of transports to ATMs could be reduced.
But we also intend to develop the huge opportunities related to the financing of the transition towards a low-carbon economy – up to USD 90 trillion are needed till 2030 –, while preventing the risk of “green washing”. It would certainly make sense to promote a convergence towards a harmonised European standard for green bonds – including UK –, leveraging the Green Bond Principles approach in terms of processes and transparency, and building on the Climate Bond Initiative approach with regard to taxonomy. Much has to be done in the coming years. In that regard, I am very happy to count the Bank of England among the founding members of the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) that was launched by the Banque de France last December. This is an enthusiastic and rapidly developing “coalition of the willing”: the nine founding members should shortly be joined by three new members and two observers: the BIS and the OECD. Several other major central banks and supervisors are on the verge of applying. Stephen Hawking once famously said about the Internet: “We are all now connected […] like neurons in a giant brain”. This could also apply to the finance of tomorrow in an interconnected world. Each of us – whether regulators or professionals – is at least a neuron; we need to be connected to other neurons to produce innovative ideas.

Financial stability is our common good, and we should also face a more subtle threat to it: debt complacency on a global level, in the context of accommodative monetary policies which will be less warranted in the near future. Global debt was already about 200% of world GDP before the crisis (2007), but is up to 220% today. Sound fiscal policies for public debt, responsible lending by financial actors for private debt and – if needed – macroprudential measures, should react against this debt complacency. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  More broadly on multilateralism, we should continue to work together to preserve the world economic and trade order. We Europeans, shoulder-to-shoulder with Canada, Japan and others, must resolutely defend international economic relations based on commonly respected rules and multilateral institutions: we are all aware that an escalation of protectionist threats from the United States would dampen growth everywhere. The recent uncertainty is probably already having some negative effects on investment: you saw it in the British economy since the Brexit vote in 2016. And real tariffs would hurt more: according to most calculations including ours, a 10% increase in tariffs would diminish world trade by double digit figures, and decrease global GDP by more than 2%, starting in the United States. 2. The finance of tomorrow Let me now turn to my second point: the finance of tomorrow in an interconnected world.
Dear ladies and gentlemen, In capacity of the Governor of the Bank of Albania, as well as the Chair of its Supervisory Council for the last seven years, I had the privilege to serve in one of the highest public positions of the country. Throughout this period, I have conceptualised and supervised the implementation of a set of important reforms, which have affected the organisation and activity of the institution, and have enhanced the ability and accomplishment level of our legal tasks and our institutional commitments. Due to the limited time to provide a complete overview of the institution’s achievements, which have been maximally assessed in the annual resolutions of the honoured Parliament, allow me to focus on some of the main directions of my work. The main mission of the Bank of Albania is to achieve and maintain price stability. This mission is interpreted as an average inflation rate of 3% in both the medium and long term The Bank of Albania, in fulfilling this mission, conducts exclusively and in independently the monetary policy function. The monetary policy of the Bank of Albania has performed a notably qualitative leap throughout the previous term. In this light, in 2015 we have adopted a clear inflation targeting regime, which represents the golden standard in this field, by: building up the necessary infrastructure of analysis and forecast; improving the operational framework for the monetary policy implementation; strengthening transparency and improving its communication effectiveness to the Parliament, public and various groups of interest.

Communication with public, the Bank of Albania is already a more transparent institution and in turns more accessible to the public at large. The regular communication of our decisions and views, the organisation and participation in academic conferences, and the rigorous accomplishment in a timely manner of requests for information, are assessed by our international partners. In more concrete terms, the National Bank of Austria in the last report, ranked the Bank of Albania first among all the banks of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern countries, for the level and quality of public communication. Dear members of the Committee, Notwithstanding the successful results that I listed above, I still do not consider my mission as complete so far. Looking forward, I see that the Bank of Albania has a lot to achieve in all aspects. Allow me to briefly list the priorities in my agenda for the second term. First priority is related to monetary policy and price stability. In capacity of the Governor of the Bank of Albania, I have been heedful and I will make sure that the quantity and cost of money in economy enables: the stability of prices; the sustainable economic growth and the improvement of welfare. In the medium term, addressing inflationary pressures stemming by the upsurge of prices in international market will be the main challenge. In my view, commitment to the legal mandate of price stability is a non-negotiable objective. The drafting of a prudential and forward-guidance monetary is required from the successful accomplishment of this term.
Kevin Stiroh: Policy efficiency in supervision Remarks by Mr Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the conference "Bank Regulation, Lending and Growth", sponsored by The Bank Policy Institute and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, New York City, 1 March 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery  Introduction Good morning. Thank you very much for the kind introduction. I am very happy to participate in this conference on “Bank Regulation, Lending, and Growth,” sponsored by Columbia University and the Bank Policy Institute. The agenda covers a number of important banking issues and I will talk about the idea of policy efficiency from a supervisory perspective.1 Before beginning, let me emphasize that the views I express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Public policy strives to be efficient, but efficiency is not a simple concept, particularly in the context of the supervision of large financial firms where the world is complex, the official sector has multiple objectives, and impact lags are long and uncertain.2 For example, supervisors care about the safety and soundness of individual financial firms, about the provision of financial services to support the real economy, about consumer welfare and financial inclusion, and about financial stability.

While it is difficult to make this distinction in practice, I believe it is useful to keep the difference in mind as we discuss and explain our work. 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  In my view, communication is vital, and we should explain our goals as clearly as possible and acknowledge all expected outcomes of policy changes. By recognizing the full set of expected outcomes, including those that are not desired, I believe we can more effectively communicate the goals of supervisory policy, increase accountability and transparency, and better fulfill our mission to promote a safe, sound and stable banking and financial system. Thank you for your attention. 1 I would like to thank Jim Bergin, Dianne Dobbeck, Hampton Finer, Robert Fitchette, Lauren Hargraves, Bev  Hirtle, Michael Holscher, Anna Kovner, Don Morgan, Siobhan Sanders, and Katherine TilghmanHill for helpful comments and discussions. 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervision and Regulation Report, November 2018 and  U.S. Department of the Treasury, A Financial System that Creates Economic Opportunities, Banks and Credit Unions, June 2017. 3 This can be thought of as determining optimal policy that considers the net benefits as in Bank for International  Settlement, An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements , August 2010 or as promoting the sustained provision of financial intermediation across a wide range macroeconomic conditions as in Kevin J. Stiroh, A Perspective on Supervisory Objectives, and Trade-offs, February 23, 2017.
As I have also said repeatedly, this is how the Central Bank of Chile contributes to the Chilean economy’s growth and stability. 6  BIS Review 9/2010  Figure 1 World growth (1) (annual change, percent) 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12  15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 80  84  88  92  96  00  04  World at market exchange rate  08  Chile (2)  (1) Gray area shows projections from 2009 onwards. (2) Growth for 2010 is the midpoint in the range of forecasts included in the Monetary Policy Report. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Figure 2 Difference in growth in 2009 (*) (percent) 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3  Poland  Norway  Australia  Israel  Greece  Colombia  Chile  Brazil  Switzerland  Denmark  Korea  Canada  China  New Zealand  France  Belgium  Singapore  Netherlands  Spain  Sweden  United Kingdom  Thailand  Italy  United States  Germany  Japan  Finland  Turkey  -5  Hungary  -4  (*) Actual growth minus estimated growth. Growth estimate for 2009 based on change in the terms of trade, population, and per capita GDP. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

(2) Includes the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Eurozone. (3) Includes Australia, Canada, Norway and New Zealand. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on data from CEIC and the International Monetary Fund. Figure 10 Long term indebtedness and financial burden (percentage of disposable income) 80  18  70  15  60  12  50  9  40  6  30  3  20  0  Jun.02  Jun.03  Jun.04  Jun.05  Jun.06  Indebtedness  Jun.07  Jun.08  Jun.09  Financial burden  Source: Central Bank of Chile based on information from SBIF, SVS, SuSeSo. BIS Review 9/2010  11  Figure 11 National employment and unemployment rate (seasonally-adjusted series, percent)  3  12  2  10  1  8  0  6  -1  4  -2  2  97  99  01  03  05  Quarterly change in employment  07  09  Unemployment rate  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau (INE).