samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The reason why I attach such a special importance to this subject and put emphasis on this with similar expressions in almost all my speeches is to draw attention to the possible risks that the economic units may confront under the floating rate regime and increase awareness. Otherwise, the deterioration brought about by the mis-management of risk affects the economy as a whole. Dear Guests, When the course of the value of Turkish currency versus foreign currency from 2002 up to now is taken into account, it is observed that as long as tight monetary and fiscal policies are maintained; structural reforms are implemented, political stability is maintained and the decisiveness for macroeconomic stability is sustained; the basic tendency will be in favor of the appreciation of the Turkish currency. This is a process in which the Turkish currency is increasingly preferred for investment as in every robust economy although it is subject to occasional interruptions. Therefore, the value of the Turkish currency emerges as a clear consequence. Determination of the foreign exchange rates under the market conditions as a requisite of the floating exchange rate regime does not imply that the Bank shall not undertake any transactions in the foreign exchange markets. As it was also explained in detail in our announcement called “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy for 2007”, the Central Bank undertakes transactions in the foreign exchange markets for two objectives.

Latest digital and printing technology has revolutionised the banknote production to the highest degree of speed, accuracy and consistency, using technologically enhanced high speed printing machines to print millions of banknotes every day. Despite the rapid innovation of technology, one fundamental and specific aspect of banknotes production has never changed. When it comes to banknotes design, no technology can replace the required dexterity and the innovative mind of a design artist. Banknotes design has always been made by hand and the work is inevitably involves a process that is time consuming and requires painstaking efforts. The artist has to meticulously draw in great detail every aspect of the banknotes. Indeed as you will see at the exhibition, all these micro lines of icons give a distinguishing character to the banknotes and contribute to their uniqueness. But all the details serve more BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  than an aesthetic purpose. They also serve as the first line of defence against counterfeiting. So far, no digital copier, despite having the best resolution of contemporary technology, is able to copy micro lines and lettering on the banknotes. So if any of you here have any doubt whether a banknote in your wallet is genuine or not, place the banknote under a magnifying glass and look for micro lines. You will be enthralled at how detailed the banknote design when you get to see the blown up version of banknotes on display here in this exhibition.
In the US, general cost inflation has also been rising. In other countries, energy prices have only been passed on to a limited extent to other prices so that core inflation is still moderate and stable. The fall in oil prices through the autumn may curb inflation in the period ahead. In isolation, lower energy prices might result in lower interest rates than otherwise and contribute more directly to growth in total demand in many countries. The price fall is related primarily to reduced uncertainty about the supply of oil. A number of the risk factors that pushed up oil prices this summer, such as the conflict in the Middle East and reduced production in Nigeria and the US, have been reduced. In addition, global oil stocks are high and OPEC has announced that they will reduce production, which will increase spare production capacity correspondingly. The fall in prices is also due in part to lower demand and increased supply of alternative energy sources following several years of high oil prices. In addition, slower growth in the US may reduce the pressure on prices for energy and other commodities. Oil prices are of importance for the activity level in the Norwegian economy and for central government revenues. In spite of lower oil prices recently, Brent Blend futures prices may indicate that oil prices will remain high several years ahead. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that futures prices do not provide particularly reliable indications about oil price developments.

Sources: Thomson Reuters and Norges Bank  The shift towards a greener and more sustainable economy places heavy demands on businesses and investors, but also creates opportunities. Technological advances and innovation are necessary for achieving more sustainable economies. Economic instruments such as emission allowances and taxes make the quest for new solutions profitable. Climate policy has already led to rapid-fire progress in the area of solar, wind and battery technology. Old, polluting equipment is gradually being replaced by new, cleaner and greener technology. At the same time, climate change entails new risks for business and industry. Climate risks include the impact of climate change, uncertainty surrounding future climate policy and potential disruptive technologies. Expected return and risk are influenced by firms’ response to potential structural changes. That is why many investors require companies to report on climate issues, 8  as has the GPFG. Managing climate risk is part of the GPFG’s systematic work in the area of responsible investment. Financial investors must manage climate risk on a par with other risks. Virtually all economic activities lead to emissions, either directly or from complex production chains. Climate risks are therefore difficult to isolate and quantify, both at firm and sector level. NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 14 FEBRUARY 2019  Identifying the winners in the green transition is a demanding exercise. Kristoffer, whom we met in the introduction, had earned a lot on his investment in Green Equities. But Kristoffer is realistic.
This Office has also acted as the go-between with the head office of the Bank of Japan in Tokyo, for which I thank it sincerely. While the Banque de France has been seconding a representative to the French Embassy in Tokyo since 1976, the Representative Office of the Bank of Japan was set up in Paris over 50 years ago. This Office is an extremely strong and precious link between our two institutions, which enjoy exceptionally good long-standing relations. The Banque de France is very attached to the presence of this Office in Paris and strives to provide it with assistance and information. This Office is also, I believe, for the Bank of Japan, a prime vantage point for observing the French economy and the Paris Financial Centre, naturally, as well as a particular vantage point for the euro area, which is highly complementary with that provided by its Office in Frankfurt. For these reasons the Bank of Japan has retained this representation in Paris, and we are extremely pleased that it has. In addition to this very strong institutional foundation of the relationship between the Banque de France and the Bank of Japan, you, Governor Fukui, bring an important personal dimension in the form of your personal attachment to our country. It should be pointed out that, in the early 1970s, you yourself worked in the Bank of Japan’s office in Paris.

In a globalised world, the French and Japanese economies have found themselves in very different environments, with France and Germany leading a very structured regional institutional construction with the European Union, first in terms of trade, then at an economic and monetary level, while Japan has been the economic leader of a de facto integrated area, with remarkable dynamism thanks to its productive, capacity and technological investment. Growth of international capital flows has resulted from domestic policies and global factors, such as the increasing interdependence of economies. The French and Japanese economies have benefited from this while experiencing an unprecedented boom in technical progress and productivity growth, mainly as a result of considerable investment in information and communication technologies. Thanks to technological progress and financial globalisation, the efficiency of financial markets has strengthened over the decades. Cross-border links between markets are closer than ever, yet the current crisis is revealing the persistent nature of the risks to financial stability. Thus, the existence of trust-based relationships built on long-standing mutual experience is a particularly strong asset for central banks to help them respond to uncertainty. Their network can enable them to find ad hoc solutions such as those adopted in a concerted and co-ordinated manner in December to facilitate market liquidity during a period of great uncertainty. Relations between the Banque de France and the Bank of Japan are particularly valuable in the analysis, comparison and understanding of differences in of our regions’ economic cycles.
The armistice ending World War I took effect on 11 November 1918. This undeniably joyous event was followed by a deep economic recession. In autumn 1919 came the Great Crash, when the price of Iceland’s most important export product – salted herring – collapsed. As the winter advanced, Iceland became virtually unable to sell its fish. Foreign exchange revenues stopped flowing into the country. It was in late summer 1920, when the Prime Minister of Iceland was in Copenhagen intending to pay some outstanding debts, that Danish banks refused to accept the proffered mail order cheque issued by Íslandsbanki, which functioned at the time as Iceland’s central bank. Iceland had no foreign currency and had to ration goods the following winter. The economy took a nosedive – one that turned out blessedly short-lived. The years to follow brought major improvements, until the Great Depression in the 1930s. But that is yet another story. Honoured guests: American author and satirist Mark Twain is quoted as saying “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes” – just like a good Icelandic quatrain. Now, a century after achieving sovereignty, we Icelanders are facing many of the same challenges as in autumn 1918. But with one major difference: in 1918 the country was destitute and unprepared – with the authority of a sovereign but without social infrastructure such as a healthcare system. Today we are in a vastly different position.

The disturbances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will inevitably delay many streamlining and integration measures, however. Nevertheless, merging the tasks of the Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority into a single institution better enables us to face shocks like the current one and rise quickly and decisively from the downturn that lies ahead. I am convinced that, under these circumstances, the incontrovertible mathematical formula – that 1+1=2 – does not apply. The strength of the two institutions unified will be much greater than the sum of its parts. The new Central Bank is an institution that dares to act, can act, and will act. Although a number of policy actions have been taken in recent weeks, we have not emptied our toolbox – far from it. We have a number of other economic policy measures available and will use them if and when the need arises. We will do what is needed to face down the deep but brief economic shock currently threatening our country. Honoured guests: We thank you for listening. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
In the various situations, the impact of monetary policy can be contractive, expansive or neutral, depending on the degree of resource utilisation and the risk of inflation deviating from the target in either direction. The relevant rate of inflation here and the one that is affected by total demand, is the underlying trend. In that this trend is in line with the target, conditions are created for sustainable growth. In the event of a demand shock there is thus no conflict between combating inflation and promoting growth. Transient price effects of secondary importance Besides effects from demand shocks, price movements are influenced by disturbances in supply. Supply-side shocks vary both in kind and in the duration of their effects on the economy. The monetary policy response accordingly depends on how suddenly such a shock occurs and how soon it fades. A supply shock with a direct effect on prices, for example a VAT increase, should be distinguished from an increase in productivity, which affects demand via resource utilisation. Let me start with the former case. A VAT increase will tend to subdue demand at the same time as it adds to the 12-month rate of CPI inflation over a period of one year. In this case, in the first year after the tax increase, demand and inflation move in opposite directions. If the monetary stance were to be tightened in order to achieve a prompt return to inflation’s targeted rate, it would cause demand to fall further.

This complies with EU agreements. ERM membership is voluntary. But even in a flexible regime, exchange rate movements constitute an important policy indicator, albeit more indirectly. •  If the exchange rate weakens and remains at the weaker level, demand in the Swedish economy is stimulated via increased exports and decreased imports. BIS Review 35/1998  ˝  -6-  In this way, a permanent depreciation can lead to higher inflationary pressure. The Riksbank then has to keep its instrumental rate at a higher level than otherwise in order to fulfil the price stability target. •  A permanent appreciation of the krona tends to dampen demand, leading to lower inflationary pressure. All else equal, the Riksbank can then keep the instrumental rate at a lower level. With reference to the exchange rate, the Riksbank is wont to talk of “permanent” or “lasting” developments and that is applicable here. We do not react to occasional market movements because they are unlikely to influence inflation prospects. The Maastricht Treaty requires all member states to treat exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest; this applies even if the exchange rate is flexible. An EU country is expected to focus economic policy - both monetary and budget policy - on stability to the same degree as the other EU countries. This, basically, is the absolutely crucial condition for sustained exchange rate stability. An exchange rate that deviates permanently from the long-term real equilibrium level may be an indication that economic policy lacks credibility.
However, policy-making becomes significantly more challenging at times of market stress, when historical regularities cannot be entirely relied upon, while increased volatility blurs the information content of market variables and other indicators. In periods of stress, analytical tools that under normal conditions provide valuable inputs into the information set available for policy decisions may at least to some extent lose their utility. And although comparisons with previous episodes of turmoil may add historical perspective and provide benchmarks for policy actions, spells of financial tensions often resemble each other only to a limited extent. Indeed, when thinking about the dynamics of financial turmoils and crises, one is tempted to recall the Ana Karenina’s opening that “All happy families resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Indeed, the current turmoil has been “unhappy” in its own way. From its origin in the relatively small sub-prime segment of the US market for mortgage loans to its somewhat unusual dynamics of transmission (for instance, the fact that the current turmoil initially manifested itself in the difficulty for banks, mainly European, to obtain short-term liquidity in the US dollar market), a number of factors have set this episode of turmoil apart from previous experiences. Thus, during the current turmoil we have been less able to rely on standard analytical tools and conventional information sets, particularly in the area of liquidity management. To illustrate this point, let me briefly recall how our liquidity policy normally works.

Of course, any such support policy, if anticipated, will be taken into account when banks establish their risk management frameworks for “tail” events. Still, one cannot generally conclude from this that central banks should not re-act and support the system in the case of severe tensions. To rigorously analyse moral hazard issues relating to financial crisis management by central banks, one first needs to distinguish between different but interrelated types of policy interventions. The reason for this is that the possible effects on incentives of different measures can be very diverse. However, this differentiation has often been missed when criticising central bank actions on the grounds of moral hazard considerations. 3  A. Giovannini and L. Spaventa (2007), “Subprime lessons: fix the information gap”, 5 November 2007, http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/690. BIS Review 143/2007  5  Let me distinguish briefly between four possible types of central bank measures: First, moral hazard issues have been raised in relation to the case in which the central bank lowers its key policy rate in response to financial turmoil. It has been argued that, if central banks lower interest rates at a time of market corrections and declining asset prices, economic agents may believe that the policy-makers are prepared to use monetary policy to support asset price valuations in order to prevent market downturns. If such belief becomes widespread, investors are likely to engage in excessive risk-taking behaviour, thereby sowing the seeds of future financial crises.
That the Riksbank always aims at the objective of 2 per cent unfortunately does not mean that the price increases will always be limited to 2 per cent. First knowledge of the path leading from interest rate changes to their impact on inflation is insufficient to enable us always to expect to be able to achieve the objective. Second price increases as measured by the consumer price index will continually be affected by various kinds of temporary factors. There may be, for example, changes in indirect taxes or external shocks in the form of changed oil prices. Often such disruptions should not be counteracted (as long as they do not risk affecting the long-term inflation process). In addition, there is a continuous flow of new information that can change the inflation outlook. These factors can make the consumer price index diverge from the target ex post, so to speak. This insight is the reason for the Riksbank’s decision to establish a tolerance interval around the inflation objective. (Diagram 5. CPI and Underlying Inflation) In the Inflation Report of December, the assessment was that economic growth would be around 3 per cent in 1998 and somewhat more in 1999. The rise in demand was expected to result in a gradual reduction of the output gap in the coming years and in increasing inflationary pressure. Given an unchanged repo rate, inflation was expected to rise gradually to 2.5 per cent during 1999.

In order to achieve a harmonized application of legislation at European level and to support payment initiation and account information service providers, the European Banking Authority (EBA) adopted an opinion on obstacles in early June 2020. within the meaning of Art. 32 (3) of the regulatory technical standards for in-depth identification of the customer and common and secure standards of communication1. The opinion highlights a number of technical or organizational obstacles that payment service providers, which maintain accounts, pose to the new services and which should be removed. Examples of such obstacles include the unavailability of all procedures for performing in-depth identification of the customer when using the new services, requiring manual entry of the IBAN on the payment account from which payment is initiated or requesting account information, repeated in-depth establishing the identity when initiating payment, the need to provide prior consent to the client to use the new services, etc. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  Improving the security of electronic payments is the second major aspect of PSD2. In September 2019, the requirements for payment service providers to apply a procedure for indepth identification of the customer when the payer accesses his payment account online, initiates an electronic payment transaction or performs another remote action that could occur risk of payment fraud. These requirements have started to apply to credit transfers made through the Internet and mobile banking platforms.
As crypto asset prices began to fall, this has led to large margin calls and automatic liquidation mechanisms – a feature of some protocols designed to protect against risk – that further amplified price falls. We have seen a range of crypto funds taken down by these effects; one of the biggest has been here in Singapore with Three Arrows Capital filing for bankruptcy last week. I could mention other examples – risks that arise from weak governance for example, or the lack of transparency and understanding of investor rights[4]. But the basic point is the same: new technology does not change old risks. The second lesson I take from the crypto winter is that regulators need to get on with the job of bringing the use of crypto technologies in finance within the regulatory perimeter. Or to put it the other way around, the lesson we should not take from this episode is that ‘crypto’ is somehow ‘over’ and we do not need to be concerned about it anymore. I should note at this point that even with the recent collapse crypto assets and crypto markets have not posed a systemic risk, though I recognise of course that this of is little comfort to those nursing substantial losses. That is not in itself a surprise; regulators, myself included[5], made clear, when crypto reached its highs last year, that it was not yet large enough or integrated enough into the rest of the financial system to be an immediate systemic risk.

Investment advice by persons not carrying on a business: a growing number of online discussion fora, chat-rooms and bulletin boards allow persons to post their opinions concerning securities. An entity providing a platform for public discussion of securities would not attract licensing.11 Neither would a participant, as long as he is not deemed to be “carrying on a business” of providing advice. In the context of dealing, we will treat two common practices as passive conduits. First, websites providing hypertext links to, or advertisements for, licensed dealers. But websites should not advertise for, or link users, to unlicensed dealers, including overseas dealers not licensed by MAS. Second, licensing is not necessary for providing prospectuses and application forms passively on websites, or via email upon the request of investors. These merely improve on the efficiency of paper distribution.12 Websites must not go beyond being passive conduits. MAS will consider portals or websites providing facilities for accepting or relaying orders to dealers as licensable. This is because such a facility carries the risk of failure to transmit trade orders in a timely and accurate fashion, potentially to the detriment of investors. Overseas websites specifically targeting Singapore residents Our final principle deals with overseas websites. MAS will apply the same licensing principles to overseas websites which specifically target Singapore residents, as it does to local websites. This is to ensure that foreign and local internet players are treated on the same regulatory basis.