So the risk of central banks having “too little” scope to carry out LOLR is real. At the same time, the public has a legitimate interest in avoiding “too much” LOLR. We cannot afford for financial institutions to view liquidity support as a substitute for prudent financial management: central banks must not be “lenders of first resort”. And lending to institutions that are in need of capital rather than liquidity is the wrong solution. Given the uncertainties involved, neither outcome can be avoided with certainty. But it is right to seek robust safeguards against them. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  A well-designed LOLR framework must therefore get the balance right between lending “too little” and “too much”: –  To help avoid “too little” LOLR, central banks must be given clear responsibilities and the tools and powers needed to carry them out, including the ability to lend to individual institutions, covertly if necessary to maintain financial stability. –  To help avoid “too much” LOLR, central banks must have strong risk management, be ring-fenced from special interests (in public or private sectors), have a clear public mandate specifying their scope for action, and be subject to strong transparency and accountability requirements. There are powerful parallels between these design challenges, and those for monetary policy. Like monetary policy, LOLR is vitally important to an economy’s health, but involves intrinsically complex, technical judgments – including the solvency or otherwise of potential borrowers, the pricing, scale and maturity of loans, and the appropriate collateral.

The 2012 MoU sets out a panoply of safeguards against the repetition of such an incident, including a requirement for timely notification from the Bank to HM Treasury of any risk to public funds, and analysis of the systemic impact of alternative policy options. The MoU makes it clear that the Chancellor has sole responsibility for the use of public funds, approves all ELA (including the terms on which it is provided), and may if necessary direct the Bank to extend ELA – though this is a backstop power, whose use is not expected to be considered in the majority of crisis situations. Where it is judged necessary to keep ELA covert for a period in order to minimise the risks to financial stability, key Parliamentary Chairs will be briefed orally by senior officials on any government indemnity attached to such lending – and full disclosure to Parliament would be made at the earliest subsequent opportunity once the risk of damage to the public interest had passed. 6 Covert operations, particularly those involving a fiscal component, are often cited as the most troubling forms of LOLR by those concerned that central banks have a bias to lend “too much”. In the United Kingdom, the disclosure of large covert loans to HBOS and RBS in late 2009 (more than a year after the loans were advanced) triggered a public debate about the  3  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/smf/annualreport15.pdf. 4  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/mous/statutory/moufincrisis.pdf. 5  “The view from No.11” by Nigel Lawson, pages 402-6. 6  See page 22 of http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmtreasy/181/181.pdf.