samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Page 10 of 19  Figure 3 Step-by-step Plan (1)  Mobilty by macrozones (2)  (population by stage, percent)  (population by stage, percent)  100  100 20  20  80  80  0  0  60  60 -20  -20  40  40 -40  -40  20  20 -60  -60  0 0 28-Jul. 28-Sep. 28-Nov. Initial opening Preparing Transition Quarantine Advanced opening  -80  -80 Feb.  Apr. Jun. Aug.  Oct.  North (3)  Center (4)  South (5)  Metropolitan  (1) Considers announcements and information up to 7 December 2020. (2) Considers information up to 1 January 2020. Average of the categories stores and leisure, supermarkets and pharmacies, transport stations and workplaces. (3) Includes the Arica-Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta, Atacama, and Coquimbo regions. (4) Includes the Valparaíso, O'Higgins, Maule, Biobío, and Ñuble regions. (5) Includes the Araucanía, Los Ríos, Los Lagos, Aysén, and Magallanes regions. Aysén is omitted between 17 August and 16 September due to lack of data. Sources: Central Bank of Chile using data from the Chilean Ministry of Health and the Covid-19 Community Mobility Report, Google. Figure 4 Imacec index by sectors (annual change, percent)  20  20 Wholesale & retail trade  10  Production of other goods (*)  Services 0  10 0  Manufacturing -10  -10  -20  -20  -30 Jan.19  -30 Jul.19  Jan.20  (*) Agriculture-forestry, Fishery, EGW and waste management, and Construction.

However, we will evaluate its possible extension and changes in access parameters to facilitate their use to respond to the needs of the economy at this stage. As always, the CBC will remain on the alert for financial stability risks, acting promptly and decisively with the instruments at its disposal whenever required. For the time being, the entry into force of the law that allowed a second withdrawal of pension savings will involve a significant liquidation of assets by the administrators of these funds. An orderly liquidation is crucial to preserve the stability of the financial markets and the efficiency of the price formation process, which is why we have established several measures. Among them are the reopening of the special programs of CC-VP and Term Deposit Purchase Program. These measures have preset caps and a limited duration, the same that were used for the first withdrawal. The macroeconomic scenario continues to show more uncertainty than usual, so projections are highly conditional on the evolution of the pandemic and its effects on the income of businesses and individuals. There are scenarios where the evolution of the national economy could deviate from our forecasts. The risk Page 5 of 19  of a significant increase in infections remains fully valid and could have important economic effects if it becomes necessary to re-impose stricter sanitary measures. In the medium term, this scenario is not as severe, given the advances in the development of a vaccine.
The board must also be conscious that it is the owner’s representative – its loyalty must lie with the principal. If this emphasis is misplaced, it can damage the position of the fund in the public consciousness. Finally, I would like to underscore the importance of preserving cost-effective investment management. In the course of 20 years, Norges Bank has built up a competent investment management organisation. Considerable economies of scale have been realised – investment management costs are low. The level of management costs over time is particularly important for the owner’s net return. We must keep the GPFG’s management costs at a low level, regardless of whether the fund remains within the Bank or is organised outside the Bank. Norges Bank concurs with Central Bank Law Commission in that neither the fund nor its management tasks should be divided among several entities. This will raise management costs. Any gains, however, would be difficult to come by. Conclusion Norway has managed its petroleum resources well. We have set aside wealth for the future and have created a stable institutional framework for the management of the country’s savings. In the 6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  quotation I began with, the Prime Minister points out that Norway has also been somewhat lucky. Oil and gas prices were high during a period where production was also substantial. Luck is hardly a permanent condition. Oil prices are now far below the levels prevailing just a few years ago.

Thomas Jordan: Current monetary policy and its significance for the real economy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the General Meeting of the Aargauische Industrie- und Handelskammer, Wettingen, 20 May 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In the current situation, the challenges for the SNB’s monetary policy remain formidable. On the one hand, against the backdrop of the economic recovery we have witnessed since mid2009, there is a danger of inflationary tendencies and the renewed formation of a bubble. This is because the current monetary policy is too expansionary in the long term. On the other hand, downside risks are still present or are again reappearing, and should not be underestimated. They relate, in particular, to the further development of the debt crisis in Europe. A deterioration of this situation entails the danger for Switzerland of renewed deflation and recession as well as the risk of another destabilisation of the global financial system. Between these opposing risks the SNB must walk a fine line, moving in terrain that is constantly and rapidly changing, depending on which risk gains the upper hand. With a monetary policy strategy aimed at maintaining price stability, the SNB is well equipped to face these challenges. What are the short and medium-term consequences for the real economy of addressing these challenges?
Current inflation is low, but our recent history shows that without a nominal anchor inflation was high and variable and that we did not achieve higher growth in exchange for inflation. An economic policy that fuels inflation does not generate higher economic growth. On the contrary, it paves the way for subsequent recession and unemployment. High and variable inflation usually accompanies instability in output and employment. But inflation should not be too low over time either. This is partly because the structure of the economy evolves over time. Demand for labour with different qualifications changes. Restructuring requires changes in real wages and relative wages. Nominal wages do not readily fall. With some measure of inflation, real wages and relative wages can be changed without reducing nominal wages. Some degree of inflation oils the economic machinery. In periods, it will be appropriate to stimulate the economy with low, or even negative, real interest rates. If inflation becomes entrenched at a very low level, the interest rate will be less effective as an instrument because it cannot be set below zero. If the economy is again exposed to unexpected negative disturbances, we will have little scope for manoeuvre. The most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments in the long term is low and stable inflation. The inflation target provides an anchor for economic agents’ expectations concerning future inflation. We have a very open economy with free capital movements. Stable inflation expectations also contribute to more stable krone exchange rate expectations.

The downturn has  10  See press release by the Council of the European Union’s Extraordinary Council meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 9/10 May 2010. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  been less severe in Switzerland and Swiss output has been the first to reach its pre-crisis level. Overall, GDP rose by 2.6% in 2010, after having fallen by 1.9% in 2009. Chart 9 shows the evolution of inflation together with our most recent conditional forecast. The inflation rate recovered to 0.7% in 2010 after hitting a low of –0.5% in 2009. Why are the SNB interventions often perceived as unsuccessful? For outside observers studying the performance of the Swiss economy going in and out of the crisis and looking at Charts 8 and 9, this must be a puzzle. All the more so when they realise that this performance was not the result of an amply expansionary fiscal policy; on the contrary, the Swiss policy mix, a very expansionary monetary policy combined with a more contained fiscal policy, was appropriate given the circumstances. With the crisis originating almost entirely in foreign markets and hitting the export sector very strongly, a large domestic fiscal stimulus would have missed the target.
Overall, although liquidity remains ample, it is unlikely at this stage that it will give rise to inflationary pressures, given the current economic environment and the expectation that some of the portfolio shifts will be reversed once the financial market uncertainty diminishes. This assessment is supported by the continuing moderate growth of loans to the private sector, particularly to non-financial corporations. As regards the information under the second pillar, recently published data and survey information indicate that economic growth in the euro area remained subdued around the turn of the year and that the overall sentiment in the economy remained lacklustre. While these indications suggest that growth dynamics will remain weak for the early part of this year, the most likely scenario remains that of a gradual increase of real GDP growth rates, starting in the second half of 2003. The current low levels of interest rates should contribute to this scenario materialising. In addition, while the appreciation of the euro over recent months is likely to contribute to a dampening of export growth to some extent, this should be counterbalanced by the assumed recovery in the world economy. In this respect, it should also be taken into account that the price competitiveness of euro area companies remains favourable in a medium-term perspective. At the same time, uncertainty regarding the economic outlook remains high, in particular due to the ongoing geopolitical tensions.

We did it because inflation is too high, but especially core inflation at 4,3%: there is for sure a significant energy and supply component in the euro area inflation; but it is also becoming broader and more domestic, and this is the field where we have to act. And second, we clearly show our determination to bring inflation back to 2% in the medium term: this is not only our target, it is our commitment towards European citizens; our will and our capacity to deliver on our mandate cannot be subject to any doubt whatsoever. That said, yesterday’s significant move sometimes raises two questions: - what about the next move? Let me be clear: we have our hands completely free. Nobody should speculate that this will be the magnitude of the next step – we did not create a new “jumbo habit” –; nor that we simply must emulate other  Page 2 sur 3 important Central banks. We obviously go in the same direction as them, but not necessarily at the same speed or with the same final level: because the nature of inflation has its differences on both sides of the Atlantic, the monetary answer has its differences too. - and this brings a second frequent question: what about the destination of the journey?
Yet the words “corrupt”, “self-serving” and “greedy” are hard to square with “trustworthiness”, as are opinion polls putting bankers at risk of relegation from the trust league table. Opinion polls of the public are not an objective truth and talk can sometimes be cheap. But it appears these concerns are not confined to financial outsiders: financial insiders appear to harbour serious doubts about their trustworthiness and culture too. As survey in 2013 of financial professionals found, rather remarkably, that over half believed their competitors engaged in illegal or unethical behaviour. 22 A smaller, but still high, fraction of 24% believed their own company engaged in such practices. Similar percentages believed their industry did not fulfil its fiduciary function of putting clients’ interests first. The significance of these findings is not the precise percentages, as striking as these are. More fundamentally, it is because of what they reveal about finance’s perception of itself, the mirror it holds to the social identity of finance. Psychologists and economists have, over recent years, begun to recognise the importance of social identities in explaining otherwise puzzlingly irrational behaviour. 23 A now-famous study examined the academic performance of Afro-Caribbean boys in US schools, which was systemically weak almost irrespective of ability. A large part of the explanation was found to lie in social identities. Specifically, the social identity of young black boys was defined by doing poorly in class.

Prior to the decisions made in March and in the weeks that followed, the Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee met frequently, often at short notice. On 12 March, we decided to cut the policy rate by 0.50 percentage point. The countercyclical capital buffer requirement was reduced the day after, helping banks to absorb losses and still have the capacity to provide credit. A week later, we reduced the rate further to 0.25 percent. And at the May monetary policy meeting, we took a step further and reduced the policy rate to zero. The Committee also stated that in its current assessment of the outlook for the economy and the balance of risks, the policy rate would most likely remain at today’s level for some time ahead. With a policy rate close to zero, there is a limit to how much further it can be lowered. Other 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  countries have experienced that policy rates can continue to have an impact at slightly below zero, but it is uncertain how negative rates will influence the economy and financial markets, particularly in the current situation. The Committee stated at the monetary policy meeting in May that it is now of particular importance to ensure well-functioning financial markets. The Committee does not envisage making further policy rate cuts. Low interest rates cannot prevent a severe downturn, but can help dampen the decline in activity.
The depreciation of the RMB, alongside a pullback of foreign funds from the region, triggered downward pressures on the region’s currencies. Since the RMB move on 11 August, Emerging Asia currencies have depreciated by an average of 3.2% against the US Dollar, with some falling by as much as 7%. 2  While markets seem to have calmed somewhat, a sense of uncertainty prevails and the risk of renewed volatility remains. What is happening? Financial markets are essentially coming to terms with four significant “re-pricings”. •  First, the stock markets in China are adjusting downwards from unsustainably high levels. •  Second, the RMB has become de-coupled from the US Dollar and is moving towards a more market-determined exchange rate. •  Third, oil and commodity prices have eased considerably this year, marking the end of what some have called a “super-cycle”. 1  Emerging Asia economies refer to China, India, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 2  Excluding the Hong Kong Dollar. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  Fourth, the effects of an impending interest rate hike in the US – the first after seven years of extremely easy monetary policy – are being priced in across Asian markets. These are not necessarily unwelcome developments. The correction in China’s stock market is not surprising given the stretched valuations that had developed over the preceding year.

The increasing interest in the region is also motivated by the need at many pension funds and sovereign funds to achieve more diversified investment portfolios. •  These funds are increasingly diversifying their portfolio allocations across geographies and reducing the home bias towards investment in domestic markets. •  They are also diversifying across assets to include more non-traditional assets such as real estate, private equity and infrastructure, which promise sustained and attractive risk-adjusted returns. Emerging Asia offers both asset and geographical diversification. •  Emerging Asia will remain one of the fastest growing regions in the world offering prospects of higher long-term returns, while the depth and liquidity of its asset markets should continue to improve. •  The growth dynamics of Emerging Asian economies is not only different from that of developed Europe and America but also differentiated from one another. •  Emerging Asia offers great potential for the development of alternative investment assets such as infrastructure, for which the region has enormous need. I congratulate NPS on the opening of its Singapore office and wish you continued success in your regional strategy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Mohammed Laksaci: Banking sector reform and financial stability in Algeria Communication by Mr Mohammed Laksaci, Governor of the Bank of Algeria, for the 38th meeting of the Board of Governors of Arab Central Banks and Monetary Agencies, Alger, September 2014. *  *  *  Introduction After being strongly involved since 2008 in addressing the liquidity crisis through massive liquidity support and expansion of their balance sheets, central banks in advanced countries must now pay more attention to monitoring systemic risk, in a context of interaction between banking and sovereign risks. Seven years after the burst of the international economic and financial crisis, the global financial sector reform agenda remains incomplete, while it is now important to also face the issues related to the difficult situation of the global economy transition. This calls for strong efforts to accelerate the repair of banks’ balance sheets in the euro zone and the early establishment of a unique and independent mechanism of crisis resolution. The prospects of monetary policies normalization (in particular in the United States) and its negative effects on emerging economies through capital flows require sustained attention. Like other central banks, the Bank of Algeria had to face the need of further strengthening systemic risk monitoring. This requires the deepening of the banking system reforms. 1.

We need to actually look at how the market reacts to the measures introduced. It can only be done if we have an effective surveillance framework. Fifth, effective communication is crucial 4Cs – clarity, concise, consistent and credible – core features of effective communication: i. Clarity – market, investors and public typically fear the worst in absence of clear information. ii. Concise – “more” is not always effective; we allow for some “constructive ambiguity”. iii. Consistent way of communication across time and different stakeholders would strengthen credibility. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  iv. Credible – reducing misinformation helps shape and influence expectations. It may not always be possible to engage with affected parties prior to the implementation of some macroprudential policies. For example, there was a spike in the growth of average house prices in the few months leading up to the announcement of the first LTV ratio limit. This could be due to a rush to lock in financing at a higher LTV ratio prior to rumoured timing of implementation of the limit. Some developers and banks also used aggressive marketing campaigns (e.g. “buy before the LTV ratio limit kicks in!”) before the effective date of the measure. In this case, we opted to impose the measures with immediate effect on the date of announcement to minimise circumvention. Let me delve on another key policy priority, which is financial inclusion. I will raise five points that I hope will provide some perspectives on financial inclusion based on our experiences back home.
Such a system needs to ensure that failure of a large bank does not have serious negative consequences for the provision of financial services to the real economy. There are several possible routes to achieve this goal. We need to examine all the available options with an open mind. The optimal policy is likely to combine different elements. As I explained in the introduction to this speech, here in Switzerland the problem of “too big to fail” is particularly pronounced. Accordingly, the FINMA and the SNB are jointly evaluating different avenues. The two big banks are now closely involved in this work. We welcome their active engagement. At the international level, the FSB and its member bodies are also addressing this problem at the request of the G20 leaders. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is imperative that a real solution to this problem be found. At the forefront of our efforts to mitigate the “too big to fail” problem must be an internationally agreed and orderly process to allow for the wind down of large, systemically important financial institutions in the event of a severe crisis. Obviously, there are many technical and legal problems that have impeded any meaningful progress in reaching international coordination in this matter. But what has been missing is a bold and international political commitment to put in place a framework for the orderly resolution of large cross-border financial institutions. Provided we have such an unequivocal commitment, solutions will eventually emerge.

Opposition to infrastructure reform by those firms that have in the past benefited from complexity and lack of transparency must be firmly overcome. At the same time, we need to keep in mind that central counterparties themselves can become single points of failure, with potentially devastating consequences. Central counterparties must therefore have sufficient financial resources to withstand the default of the largest participants. Operators and regulators should carefully evaluate the adequacy of the risk management models and financial resources of central counterparties. Only if central counterparties are financially sound can they play their critical role in preserving financial stability. Finally, as an ultimate resort, we cannot ignore the need to consider measures that address the size of banks, indirectly or directly. 13 Admittedly, there are some benefits from size. But the empirical evidence suggests that these benefits are rather limited. Economies of scale, whereby larger amounts can be produced at lower average cost, already appear to have been exhausted in the case of relatively small banks. 14 Obviously, banking systems made up of only small banks are not immune to crisis episodes. But let us not make the mistake of using another problem as an excuse to shy away from the severe moral hazard problem associated with the largest banks. It is also sometimes argued that interconnectedness matters more than size when it comes to systemic importance. It is evident that both size and interconnectedness matter. Recent empirical evidence, however, indicates that systemic importance increases more than proportionately with size.