samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
You should have first set up a political federation, with a federal government and a federal budget. Then you could have introduced a single currency.” Two main arguments were put forward. First, without a federal budget of some significance the policy mix would have been very erratic, depending on the random behaviour of the different national fiscal policies of the member countries of the Monetary Union. And second, without such a federal budget it would be impossible to weather, with the help of the fiscal channel, asymmetric shocks hitting one particular member economy of the Monetary Union. These two economic arguments are perfectly valid and would have been sufficient to discourage the creation of the Euro had we not set up a profoundly original concept of national fiscal policy surveillance. It is this concept, the Stability and Growth Pact which guarantees the coherence and the consistency of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), namely a single currency area without a political federation. On top of these fundamental economic underpinnings a number of other considerations are worth mentioning. In particular, a fiscal policy that is set according to rules, and is lived up to, adds to macroeconomic stability by providing economic agents with expectations of a predictable economic environment. This reduces uncertainty and promotes longer-term decision-making, notably investment decisions, and economic growth. In addition, sound fiscal policies can contribute to lower risk premia on long-term interest rates and thus support more favourable financing conditions for the entire economy.

Both new and current Member States alike will be able to enjoy the mutual benefits of a wider Union, in particular from the expanded internal market, as the cases of past enlargements showed. Trade integration has already reached a high level in the acceding countries, where 67% of the total exports and 60% of total import stems from the EU. Both the current and new Member States have prepared intensively for enlargement. Let me first focus on the situation in the new Member States and then in the present Union members. I will concentrate on the ultimate objective of enlargement from the monetary standpoint, namely the future adoption of the euro by the new EU Member States. The acceding countries have made remarkable progress in recent years. They significantly advanced macroeconomic stabilisation and structural reforms. Moreover, the former centrally planned economies have been able to establish functioning market economies. Overall, the progress they have made so far is encouraging. There remain, however, great challenges. The key ones are to advance real convergence while safeguarding and, where necessary, enhancing macroeconomic and financial stability. Locking in inflation at low levels, preserving the soundness of the financial sector, correcting of unsustainable external imbalances in a few cases and renewing efforts towards fiscal consolidation are all of the utmost importance. Moreover, the gap in per capita income between the  BIS Review 23/2004  1  current and most of the new Member States remains large.
Another topic which is concerning the ECB and national lawmakers is virtual currencies. Luxembourg and other countries in the EU are granting more and more importance to virtual currencies, but you seem to be really cautious. What do you see as the biggest potential threats emanating from cryptocurrencies? One should consider various aspects. One is financial stability, the second is consumer protection, the third is investor protection, the fourth is market integrity and the fifth is anti-money laundering. Concerns regarding these aspects are especially high in relation to what you call cryptocurrencies. I call them virtual tokens, by the way. They are like the tokens you buy when you go to a casino. Studies have shown that 50% of transactions made using these virtual tokens and 25% of users are linked to illicit activities. There are four main risks. The first risk is market liquidity. The market is excessively concentrated, with about 96% of transactions being carried out by 2% of account holders. Second is liquidity risk. These currencies still always need transferring to the real economy because your bakery will not accept them. There were conferences on bitcoins where they said you could pay with bitcoin. But when you tried to pay the entrance fee with bitcoin, it took so long that the conference was over by the time the payment was received. It is not an efficient system. The third risk is that people use cryptocurrencies to create leverage because they don’t get leverage any more in the real economy.

I have noticed that although real growth is evident in the region, it is accompanied by some important risks and vulnerabilities. One of the challenges attached is related to the sustainability of this growth. The National Bank of Romania shares your 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  view. We should not forget the saying “easy come, easy go”. Loose economic policies, unbalanced budgets and wage-price spirals could cost us much when the economic downturn check is due. This problem hit us severely in the recent past, but we have hardly learned the lesson. Because I have mentioned the economic laws, I will turn now to the legal environment: the report covers extensively the rule of law, the role of institutions and the judiciary. In the report, Central and Eastern Europe is presented as an example of effective measures and progress in this respect, which is of no small importance. Romania finds itself in an upright moment when economic performance is associated with strong achievements in the reform of institutions. We should not waste this moment. In the long run, the economy’s, the institutions’ and the society’s progress goes hand-in-hand, and, conversely, so does their regress. Therefore, we have to be careful not to reverse the current trend. Banks in Europe seem to ride better on the economic tide, also thanks to wide-ranging reforms brought by the Banking and Capital markets Union. Credit is still below its potential and the needs of the economy.
First, requiring that we see inflation reaching two per cent not only “well ahead of the end of our projection horizon” but also “durably for the rest of the projection horizon” ensures that interest rate policy will not react to inflation shocks that are expected to fade away before the end of our projection horizon. Second, the condition that “realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term” serves an important purpose in our analysis of the incoming data: it sharply differentiates between the volatile components of headline inflation and the dynamics of underlying inflation, which is the persistent component that is the best guide to medium-term inflation dynamics. The inclusion of a condition that is based on realisations of underlying inflation takes into account the intrinsic uncertainty of economic forecasts, especially during periods of structural change that generate “disparate confounding dynamics”.1 Since the services sector constitutes a large share of the overall price level and since wages (adjusting for productivity) are the principal component in the price of services, the persistent component in wage dynamics plays a central role in the determination of underlying inflation. Accordingly, tracking wage outcomes and differentiating between transitory and persistent shifts in the growth rate of wages will play an important role in assessing progress in the realised path of underlying inflation.

A second basic conclusion is that, if the economy is close to the effective lower bound, it is vitally important to adopt especially forceful or persistent monetary policy action to avoid negative deviations from the inflation target becoming entrenched. In turn, this may also imply a transitory period in which inflation is moderately above target. In particular, the review identified forward guidance, asset purchases and longer-term refinancing operations as instruments in the monetary policy toolbox that can help to address the constraint of the effective lower bound on policy rates. At its 21 July monetary policy meeting, the Governing Council revised its forward guidance on policy rates in line with this new strategic orientation. In particular, the new forward guidance specified three conditions that need to be met before we would start raising our policy rates. The first condition is that the Governing Council “sees inflation reaching two per cent well ahead of the end of its projection horizon.” The second condition is that the two per cent target is reached 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  “durably for the rest of the projection horizon.” The third condition is that the Governing Council “judges that realised progress in underlying inflation is sufficiently advanced to be consistent with inflation stabilising at two per cent over the medium term.” Let me highlight today two key features of this rate forward guidance.
With the coming into force of the Payment Card Reform Framework on 1 July 2015, the cost of accepting debit cards has been made more affordable through a fivefold reduction in the interchange fees from about 1.00% to 0.21%. Concurrently, the industry has also committed to invest about RM1.1 billion to enhance the payment card infrastructure over the next five years. This would comprise efforts to expand the number of payment card terminals, adopt PIN-based verification for enhanced security and roll out contactless debit cards for greater transaction efficiency. The industry should capitalise on the lower interchange fees and the Market Development Fund created under the Payment Card Reform Framework to expand the number of payment card terminals among lower tier merchants. Additionally, the industry should leverage on the roll-out of contactless debit cards to promote the use of debit cards to displace cash. In this regard, an industry-wide promotional campaign should be launched in a coordinated manner focusing on educating and incentivising cardholders to use their ATM cards as debit cards to make purchases instead of making ATM cash withdrawals. Financial institutions should also review the effectiveness of the promotional campaigns from time to time and make the necessary adjustments to ensure the intended outcomes are attained. 3. Fostering synergistic collaboration between MyClear and financial institutions  Synergistic collaboration between MyClear and financial institutions is critical as investments in technology are expensive.

I am confident that we will continue, with the same intensity, our joint efforts to integrate this very important factor into the Albanian economy at the fastest and broadest extent possible. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Thank you! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Resolution would naturally go hand-inhand with a greater reliance on instruments such as contingent capital. And there would be enormous challenges in resolving global banks that span countries with different legal jurisdictions. Extending resolution procedures to large institutions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for stability of the banking system. 7. More radical reforms  All of these potential reforms would be steps in the right direction. They would all help to put more of the costs of maturity mismatch on the shoulders of those who reap the benefits. But taxes, the Basel capital requirements, special arrangements for systemically important financial institutions and enhanced resolution procedures all have drawbacks and are unlikely to do the job perfectly. So, if we cannot rely solely on these types of measures, are there more fundamental directions in which we could move that would align costs and benefits more effectively? One simple solution, advocated by my colleague David Miles, would be to move to very much higher levels of capital requirements – several orders of magnitude higher. A related proposal is to ensure there are large amounts of contingent capital in a bank’s liability structure. Much more loss-absorbing capital – actual or contingent – can substantially reduce the size of costs that might be borne outside of a financial firm. But unless complete, capital requirements will never be able to guarantee that costs will not spill over elsewhere.

All this must be attained in a setting in which new developments and circumstances will be emerging – and they are in fact appearing already – to make our analytical and supervisory tasks more demanding. In any event, enjoying society’s trust and recognition will involve being able to respond successfully to this challenge. To be able to accomplish our mission and reach both objectives, the Banco de España is going to have to adapt. But such adaptation must also stand on sound pillars. The first of these pillars is our independence. Independence is a necessary condition for achieving the aforementioned objectives and it is independence alone that can offer us the best guarantees of success. Secondly, the exercise of independence should be underpinned by analysis and decisions based on the utmost intellectual rigour. This is also the best base from which to address the necessary accountability and transparency to society. Thirdly, we can only properly perform our dual role of members of the Eurosystem and public servants by the pursuit of excellence in our work and by promoting the excellence of our staff. Such excellence has been and is, no doubt, one of the hallmarks of this institution. It is my firm commitment to maintain and enhance the Bank’s human capital. To conclude, I shall adhere to the tradition launched by Governor Linde when he took office and end, as he did, with a quote.
I don’t suggest for a moment that the right answer would be to abandon macro-economic discipline and revert to old-fashioned demand management policies. In anything other than the very short term that would be likely to make matters worse. I share the broad consensus view that Europe’s unemployment problems originate essentially in rigidities on the supply-side of the economy. The point is that unless we are all more successful in bringing down this structural unemployment, through micro-economic policies designed to improve structural, supply-side flexibility, then some countries could find it difficult to continue to live with a common macro-economic discipline without significant tensions. Some people on the Continent who basically share this concern are inclined to argue that if the government of a euro-participating country were to find itself in this situation - and given that it would have no macro-economic way out, for example, through exchange rate adjustment, or monetary relaxation, or fiscal stimulus beyond the limits of the Stability Pact - then it would have an overwhelming incentive to take the sort of supply-side measures which have proved so difficult to implement hitherto. And the people in those countries would similarly have the incentive to accept structural change. I am not wholly persuaded that you can necessarily rely upon that making life very much easier.

So BIS Review 29/1998 ˝  -2-  that although we know that in principle at the macro-economic level free trade and competition are a powerful positive sum game - and although we have seen it clearly enough in practice - there are always likely to be visible - and vocal - losers. And that is bound to provoke outbursts of popular resistance. Against that background establishing and maintaining free trade to the extent that that has been achieved in the EU is in itself a remarkable achievement. But the EU has already in many areas gone well beyond just free trade, in establishing the single market. That involves more than the free movement of goods and services within Europe. It involves also the free movement of both labour and capital, as well as supporting European legislation to avoid market distortions from, for example, state aids, or government procurement, or restrictive practices within the private sector. This further pooling of sovereignty has essentially the same purpose - it is designed to reinforce the macro-economic benefits from free trade and competition and act as a stimulus to growth and employment by allocating resources still more effectively based on comparative advantage, enabling savings to flow to where they can be most productively invested and production to be located where it can be most effectively carried on to satisfy consumer demand. The advent of the euro represents a massive new step in the same direction.
Against this background, key concerns of Asian central banks focus on the global economic slowdown, tightened global liquidity, and potential capital outflow. Indeed, slower export growth to major advanced economies, and adverse changes in equity market wealth on real consumption, investment, and income will certainly affect export-dependent Asian economies. BIS Review 135/2008  1  As for financial market volatility going forward, some of the growth projections that came out of various sources, including the degree of volatility in asset and currency markets, would quite easily exceed even the most conservative stress-test scenario that most banks would have carried out six months ago. However, if the experience of Asian crisis is anything to go by, one should remain alert to the possibility of a long period of correction and adjustment. Moreover, given the global contagion, economies and markets with less structural resiliency, and lacking width and depth and thus liquidity, may eventually encounter dislocations in their real sectors. What does this combination of global slowdown and heightened market volatility mean for banks and financial regulators? Ladies and Gentlemen, In this scenario, credit risk management would be the priority for banks and regulators, to ensure that going forward, asset quality remains sound, and banks have adequate capital and provision to absorb this risk. Indeed, the underlying cause of the present global financial crisis is the lapse in credit culture and credit risk management, which has allowed excessive leveraging and indebtedness.

Rates are considerably lower in Sweden (4.25), Denmark (3.50) and Finland (3.25). Wage developments over the last few years can contribute to explaining the differences. In Norway wage growth has been high over the last five years, reflecting a tight labour market. Looking at data for wage growth from the OECD, the ranking of interest rate levels in the Nordic region corresponds to the ranking of average wage growth since 1998. The Norwegian krone has appreciated by around 15 per cent since mid-2000. Seen over a longer period, the krone has been rather stable. The present level is only around 6 per cent stronger than in 1990. Over this longer period, other Nordic currencies have shown larger fluctuations. Over the last two years, the appreciation of the Norwegian krone has been driven by the wide and increased interest rate differential between Norway and other countries. The interest rate differential reflects high growth in wages and aggregate demand in Norway. There is thus a clear link between cost pressures in the Norwegian economy and the exchange rate. The link works through interest rate expectations driving the krone upwards. The appreciation of the krone has a dampening effect on inflation. At the same time, profitability in the internationally exposed sector is under pressure both due to higher wage costs and the appreciation of the krone. But the krone can move in both directions. It will not appreciate indefinitely. If the krone follows the path of the forward rate, it will depreciate in the years ahead.
Can households pay for consumer goods with debit cards, cheques or credit cards, or do they have to carry significant amounts of cash with them? Can workers in urban areas transfer money to their rural families by simply sending an SMS, or do they have to carry it with them on a dangerous bus ride? Particularly in Africa, where distances are vast and security is often a concern, the availability of non-cash payment instruments can increase the returns to economic activity for businesses and households. Figure 3 shows that today, most economies in Africa are still strongly cash based. Both in sub-Saharan and northern Africa, more than one-third of funds available for immediate payments are in cash form. The notable exception is South Africa where the level of non-cash money is above 80%, and thus similar to that of Switzerland. Developments over the past 15 years show a promising picture for other countries on the continent as well. Since 1995, the share of non-cash money has increased from 50 to 60 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, and 55 to 65 percent in North Africa. This mirrors the increased availability of electronic payment instruments available to businesses, but also to households.

Philipp M Hildebrand: The role of central banks in fostering economic development Speech by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Inaugural Meeting of the Africa Emerging Markets Forum, Gerzensee, 1 October 2007. The speaker gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance provided by Raphael Auer, Martin Brown and Werner Hermann in preparing this speech. * 1. *  *  Introduction  On behalf of my Governing Board colleagues, let me warmly welcome you to the SNB Study Center Gerzensee! It is an honour and a privilege for the Swiss National Bank to host the Inaugural Meeting of the Emerging Markets Forum for Africa. I trust you are well rested this morning. By now, you will have noted that the Study Center Gerzensee is not a five star hotel. Compared to other conference centres, the service provided here is modest. We like to think that we emphasise substance rather than style. We try to create an atmosphere conducive to learning. The Center serves multiple purposes. It is here, for example, that we organise advanced courses for selected central bank professionals from all over the world. According to the traditional policy of the Center, only one participant per country is allowed in each Central Bankers Course. In the 25 years since the creation of the Center, more than 300 participants from African central banks have attended these courses.