samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Basel Committee has proposed several reforms to minimise the risk of failure of global systemically important banks (“G-SIBs”), and to minimise the impact if any of them should fail. It is also recognised that some banks are systemically important within their own domestic markets even if they are not internationally active to the same extent as the G-SIBs. The failure of these domestic systemically important banks (“D-SIBs”) can have a major impact on an economy, and indeed unpredictable consequences for a broader region. Bankia for example, is not a G-SIB. The Basel Committee has recommended higher loss absorbency requirements for G-SIBs, and is studying an appropriate regulatory framework for D-SIBs. MAS is very much part of that discussion. However, in order to keep to the spirit and intent of the new measures, sensible judgement will be the key to implementing the new rules. Sensible implementation requires national regulators to take into account the impact of their actions on economic growth and international finance even as they exercise national discretion to address prudential issues in their banking system. There are two risks of a broader nature that we have to keep clearly in focus in international discussions, so that what we do now to strengthen our respective national systems does not lead to new problems and vulnerabilities internationally, further down the road. First, we have to ensure that the cumulation of enhanced capital and other requirements on global banks do not impede them from playing their critical roles in global finance.

However, the revision will work only if necessary policy stance is adopted. For this reason, the second pillar of monetary policy comprises the implementation of a monetary tightening that is consistent with the new inflation targets. Newly set targets are references that would help decision makers in the economy understand the reasoning behind the policy stance, i.e. the factors that have led to monetary tightening and the extent of monetary tightening if and when necessary. In other words, the Central Bank has announced, via the target revision, the limits of its tolerance to the first round impacts of supply side shocks. While concluding my speech, I would like to extend my thanks to the Central Bank of Argentina, and all other institutions and individuals who contributed to the organization of this significant event. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 109/2008
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, another major finding from the survey is that the stock of private sector foreign assets rose by 16 percent to $ billion in 2020 mainly due to the increase in currency and deposits by the mining and deposit-taking corporations. The surge in the holdings of currency and deposits contributed significantly to the increase in foreign asset flows by 60 percent to $ million. However, FDI asset acquisitions slumped to $ million in 2020 from $ million in 2019 owing to the reduction in the mining sector’s debt flows to fellow enterprises. The United Kingdom was the major recipient of foreign asset flows and most of the private sector assets are domiciled there. Ladies and gentlemen, with regard to investor perceptions, political stability, ease of doing business, availability of resources, and market potential continued to feature as the main factors that influenced re-investment in Zambia. Despite the unprecedented effects of the covid-19 pandemic in constraining the business investment, the promotion of the use of digital financial services and the reduction in the monetary policy rate were seen as positive measures that supported business activity. However, the temporary closure of some commercial bank branches and the revision of banking operating hours due to the Covid-19 pandemic were perceived as having had a negative impact on investment. Esteemed invited guests, as I conclude, let me share with you some key measures recommended by the majority of the respondents to enhance investment.

At the micro-supervisory level, the PRA Board will need to explain some of its remedial measures using the published stress tests. This can make for a richer public discussion of prudential supervision, as well as encouraging firms to address latent vulnerabilities promptly. That brings me back to resolution. Occasionally a firm will be revealed to be so feeble that major surgery is needed. Sometimes recovery measures, overseen by the supervisors, will suffice. Sometimes they will not, with a firm having to go into resolution instead. A sensible stress-testing regime – indeed effective supervision in general – cannot work without a welldesigned resolution regime. That should not be a surprise, but is in fact one of the great lessons of the crisis. Conclusion Over past decades, banking, and banking supervision, somehow got detached from the most essential truth: that banks can fail. Thus, we have banks using brands that do not represent any legal entity, as if banks were simply trying to sell something, not running a business in borrowing and lending. We have an international regime that encourages but does not require adequate loss-absorbency in each and every entity within a banking group. We have had a regime that is focused on the capital needed in a going concern, but not on the organisational and capital structures that would help the authorities to contain disorder in the face of chronic distress. All those issues are now, I believe, in the open. There is a clear way forward on resolution.
BIS Review 61/2004  5  In this respect, there is equilibrium in the Norwegian economy. But the current inflation rate is low, and external and domestic interest rates are low. Lagged effects of the strong krone in 2002 are exerting downward pressure on inflation. At the same time, a change in trade patterns and external economic conditions are pushing down import prices, even when measured in terms of what Norwegian importers pay in foreign currency. In Norway, intensified competition appears to be resulting in high productivity growth, which is probably contributing to low inflation. The inflation rate was lower than expected this summer, but picked up in September and is now approximately in line with projections in the July Inflation Report. Growth is high in the Norwegian economy. Monetary policy affects the economy with a lag, and there is always substantial uncertainty surrounding inflation developments. The fall in the value of the krone through 2003, low interest rates and solid growth in the real economy are expected to gradually push up inflation. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 61/2004

7  P. Aghion, P. Askenazy, N. Berman, G. Cette and L. Eymard, 2012. “Credit Constraints And The Cyclicality Of R&D Investment: Evidence From France,” Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(5), pages 1001–1024, October. 8  P. Aghion, D. Hémous and E. Kharroubi, 2014. “Cyclical fiscal policy, credit constraints, and industry growth,” Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 41–58. 9  A. Bergeaud and G. Cette and R. Lecat, 2016. “The role of production factor quality and technology diffusion in 20th century productivity growth,” Working papers 588, Banque de France. 10  C. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff. 2010. “Growth in a Time of Debt.” American Economic Review, 100(2): 573–78; Lane, Philip R. 2012. “The European Sovereign Debt Crisis.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3): 49–68. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  impediments to the flow of resources, in particular in the labour market and in the way credit was allocated between sectors, hence revealing that a malfunctioning of the financial sector can reinforce structural weaknesses. 11 In some cases both were present at the same time. Of the uttermost importance were the structural changes targeting an improvement in the monitoring and the resilience of our financial system. Arguably the financial crisis partly resulted from excess risk taking and overinvestment in low productivity sectors. 12 The Basel 3 framework worldwide and the Single Supervisory Mechanism in the euro-zone provide new supervisory and prudential tools to mitigate these risks in the future.
Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Interaction of monetary and financial stability in small open economies Welcoming address by Mr Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the SUERF Seminar, Reykjavík, 3 June 2004. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentleman On behalf of the Central Bank of Iceland, I warmly welcome you to this seminar on the Interaction of Monetary and Financial Stability in Small Open Economies. It is an honour for us to co-sponsor the seminar with SUERF. We are grateful to David Llewellyn, Eduard Hochreiter, Beatrix Krones and Micheal Bailey at SUERF for the excellent cooperation which we have enjoyed with them in its preparation. The topic of the seminar is an appropriate one which is attracting increasing attention, both within and outside central banks. I trust that the presentations and discussions over the next two days will leave us with a better understanding of this interaction and of the issues on which we wish to focus our attention in the period ahead. We will be assisted by very impressive speakers and participants. I wish to extend my gratitude to those who have agreed to give lectures and present papers and I look forward to inspiring and stimulating contributions by them. In this address, I will briefly describe our own recent experience in the areas of monetary and financial stability. The current Act on the Central Bank of Iceland was adopted in 2001.

The Central Bank has also systematically built up its foreign exchange reserves in order to strengthen the external liquidity position of the economy. 2  BIS Review 34/2004  As it happened, the Icelandic economy landed remarkably softly after the turbulent period of 1998 to 2001. I mentioned earlier that inflation was brought under the inflation target in late 2002. The external current account was more or less in balance in 2002 only two years after the deficit had measured 10% of GDP, credit growth came to a halt, and in stark contrast to what happened in other Nordic countries a decade earlier, the banks emerged from the period in a satisfactory position and have gained considerable strength since. No doubt there are many reasons for this relatively favourable outcome. One could mention the generally good external conditions during the adjustment period, a relatively sound fiscal policy, and the swift correction of the external imbalance, as well as the rapid turnaround in the exchange rate after it reached its trough and the decline in the rate of inflation to below the inflation target. In a follow-up to its report of 2001, the IMF recognized in mid 2003 the successful adjustment of the Icelandic economy, the significantly increased strength of the financial system and important changes in the regulatory framework. The principal objective of the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Iceland is price stability, as I mentioned earlier. Its other principal goal is financial stability.
If all stakeholders do their part well, not only will we have fair and efficient capital markets that everyone has confidence in, but we will also make Singapore a competitive and vibrant financial hub in Asia. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9

Likewise, adopting Basel II now will maintain banks’ momentum in innovating and in strengthening their products and processes so that they can better serve as sources of credit and growth to businesses and consumers tomorrow. Incentive-based approach It is clear then that Basel II is about much more than just setting better quantitative minimum capital requirements. It is about establishing incentive-based approaches to risk and capital adequacy management, within the framework of the three mutually supporting pillars. On a micro level, the new approach will promote better risk management, adequate capitalization and transparency. On a macro level, it will contribute to financial stability and the resilience of the banking system. Let me expand a little on the latter point. I am convinced that when banks have the right incentives to manage their risks appropriately, to hold sufficient capital and to improve transparency, the banking system will become more resilient, more stable and better able to serve as a source for credit and growth. Those characteristics matter greatly to the livelihood of our citizens, to the outlook for commerce and business, and more generally to the health of our economy as a whole. In order to reinforce its relevance as a macro standard, the new framework incorporates a number of elements such as the requirement to use longer time horizons in the design of internal rating systems and in the average calculations of key variables, and also the need to carry out stress tests and conduct calculations in downturn conditions.
The expanded swap lines have since been used heavily, with the stock of dollar borrowing approaching $ trillion – by far the highest usage since the GFC (Chart 4). Pressures in sterling and euro FX swap markets (measured by the gap between onshore and offshore dollar rates) fell back rapidly. Yen markets took a little longer to normalise. But all of the major onshore and offshore dollar rates are now back within tight ranges of one another (Chart 3). Moment 3: dysfunction spreads to the gilt market Would the dash for cash engulf the UK gilt market too? It seemed distinctly possible – the gilt functioning indicators we monitor had started turning red2 as the week progressed, and by Friday 13th we were hearing ‘you’ll be next’ warnings from anxious funds. On the other hand, leveraged trading in gilts was less prevalent than in USTs. And the Federal Reserve’s announcement on Sunday 15 March of an eye-popping $ (later unlimited) asset purchase programme to support market functioning and meet the global need for cash was seen as a game-changer by some. Any misplaced optimism on that front would be short-lived. Gilt markets may have taken a little longer to react – but they were not immune. As a new week began, selling pressure continued to drive yields up sharply (Chart 5), and functioning worsened further (Chart 6).

And we won’t give in to fiscal dominance: nobody should expect us to delay a warranted monetary normalisation in order to accommodate the debt problems of any Member state. 2. Our structural acceleration: France is catching up  [Slide 8] Monetary policy plays its full role but cannot be the only game in town, as it may have only a limited impact on national economic adjustments within the euro area. Since the financial crisis, several European countries, including Spain, have successfully launched major reforms and reached higher and sustainable growth while preserving their social model. [Slide 9] However, efforts should be pursued to spur economic growth in the medium term. Structural unemployment remains high and potential growth remains significantly below its 1990s or 2000s average. Structural reforms are needed to unleash the full economic potential of European countries. The case of France, today, is particularly interesting in that regard. France faces important structural challenges but as already said, the economic environment for reform has never been more favourable since the financial crisis. So it is our imperative to “fix the roof”, now. And the good news is that reforms are on a firm upward path. I stress it as a fully independent Central Banker: the new government has indeed displayed a strong commitment to reforms and already implemented major structural reforms to boost employment, productivity and resilience. [Slide 10] The recent labour market reforms have widened the negotiation space given to social partners for decision-making and reduced the uncertainties of labour disputes.
Given that the current turmoil will bring about changes in the financial landscape, both the policymakers and private sector have to adapt themselves in an effective manner. To increase financial system resiliency, including by improving the credit information system,  4  BIS Review 135/2008  regulatory reform could possibly mean more stringent prudential guidelines during the upturn to help financial institutions achieve bigger cushions during the downturn period. In this challenging time, the private sector has to be alert, yet prudent with the new opportunities available. The board of directors and senior management has to oversee the operations and risk profile of their organization closely and regularly. Ladies and gentlemen, Just before ending note, allow me to touch on the situation in Thailand and the impact of the global crisis. The latest assessment of Monetary Policy Committee projected that growth is expected to moderate, to a range of 4.3 to 5 percent this year, and 3.8 to 5 percent next year. Inflation should subside next year, with headline CPI at around 3 to 4 percent. External position will remain strong with current account surplus for this year and next year, international reserves currently at around 104 billion US dollars, while external debt is 65 billion US dollars as of August, of which just over one-third is short-term. Overall, the economy does not have imbalances that could pose as vulnerability.

Leong Sing Chiong: Remarks - Official Opening Ceremony of the FM Global Centre Remarks by Mr Leong Sing Chiong, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Official Opening Ceremony of the FM Global Centre, Singapore, 8 November 2022. *** Thank you, Mr Malcolm Roberts, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Good morning. It is a pleasure to join you at the official opening of the FM Global Centre. 2 The launch of the FM Global Centre is yet another significant milestone in FM Global's long and rich journey with Singapore. Since 37 years ago, the Singapore office has grown significantly, and became the Asia Pacific Headquarters for FM Global in 2019. Today, it provides commercial property, risk advisory and engineering solutions to over 400 clients, across 36 markets in Singapore and the region. The Global Centre is the second biggest centre, outside of the US. 3 The choice of Singapore to house the FM Global Centre is very timely, and is reflective of two key factors. First, strong growth prospects. Asia's property insurance industry is projected to grow from $ billion in premiums in 2020, to almost $ billion in 2025.1 This is due to continued commercial expansion and infrastructure development as part of the region's growth. Second, it also reflects Asia's growing need for natural catastrophe and climate risk financing solutions, given the region's significant exposure to climate risk.
In part to avert regulatory arbitrage, there was a quest for greater risk-sensitivity. Regulatory capital rules became more finely calibrated to banks’ underlying portfolio of risks. In practice, that meant two things. First, the number of independent categories of risk assets increased. And second, greater use was made of banks’ own internal models to generate the risk metrics associated with each asset class. The consequences of this regulatory shift for system complexity have been extraordinary. For large and complex banks, the number of risk categories has exploded. To illustrate, consider the position of a large, representative bank using an advanced internal set of models to calibrate capital. Its number of risk buckets has increased from around seven under Basel I to, on a conservative estimate, over 200,000 under Basel II. To determine the  3  For example, Perrow (2007) and Cliff (2011). 4  Hansen and Sargent (2007). 5  Haldane (2009), Haldane and May (2011). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  regulatory capital ratio of this bank, the number of calculations has risen from single figures to over 200 million. The quant and the computer have displaced the clerk and the envelope. At one level, this is technical progress; it is the appliance of science to risk management. But there are costs. Given such complexity, it has become increasingly difficult for regulators and market participants to vouch for the accuracy of reported capital ratios. They are no longer easily verifiable or transparent.

This maps to a new risk-weighted assets number for the retail mortgage book, and a new capital ratio for this portion of the bank’s book (assuming the initial capital ratio is 100). This error is simulated 5,000 times for each of two banks and the chart shows the resulting distribution. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3: Cumulative losses on trading book relative to capital requirements £ Capital held against trading book exposures (a) Cumulative trading book write-downs (b)  16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0  HSBC  Barclays  LBG  RBS  (a) As of end-2007. Capital charges against trading book exposures are calculated as the the sum of market risk and counterparty credit risk RWAs, multiplied by 8%. This might overestimate the amount of capital banks hold against their regulatory trading books as some market risk and counterparty credit risk capital charges relate to positions booked in the banking book. (b) Cumulative between 2007 H2 and 2009 H1. Includes writedowns due to mark-to-market adjustments where details are disclosed by firms. Not all these positions will necessarily be included in the regulatory trading book.