samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Neither more nor less.’ Hence, while more or fewer notes would have impaired Mozart’s harmony, more or less emphasis on money in the ECB’s strategy would have created monetary instability. The fact is that the development, implementation and communication of the ECB’s new monetary policy strategy went smoothly and successfully. This was a remarkable achievement, given the lack of data and the high uncertainty about the structure and functioning of a new and heterogeneous currency area. Commitment to price stability Ladies and gentlemen, allow me now to proceed to the second reason for paying tribute to Otmar, namely his commitment to price stability. Reportedly, back in 1998, finance minister Theo Waigel had to persuade Chancellor Helmut Kohl to appoint Otmar to the ECB Board, despite his uncontested merits. At the time, Otmar was considered to be sceptical about the early starting date for monetary union. Ultimately, Waigel convinced the chancellor that the appointment of Otmar Issing would help convince ordinary Germans that the future of the euro was in safe hands. In fact, at the ECB, Otmar continued his insistence on a policy oriented towards price stability in the medium term. Indeed, Otmar was convinced that a monetary policy that is geared to steadiness and medium-term objectives reinforces the stability of the economic area. When Otmar left the ECB in May 2006 at the end of his eight-year term, the ECB had gained a reputation for price stability and the euro had established itself as the world’s second most important currency.

First, we aimed to make these financial institutions healthy and profitable so as they could resume their normal function of financial intermediaries. In 2001, the Bank of Thailand issued a few measures and guidelines to enhance banks’ profitability; for example, the reduction of provision requirement for a normal loan which is not NPL to a more reasonable level and the classification of NPLs by account was introduced to replace NPLs by name. More important, banks were persuaded to change from the old practice of competing for deposits with higher interests which resulted in lowering the cost to support banks’ profits. Moreover, banks also have made substantial progress on productivity and risk management, with restructured work process that has significantly brought down operating costs. As a result, return on assets has improved from negative in 2001 to 0.7 percent in 2003 and the annualized rate of 1.5 percent for the first half of this year. At the same time, good progress has been made in NPL reduction. The proportion of outstanding NPLs to total loans has reduced from 24.5 percent in 2000 to 12.4 percent at the end of 2003 due to various efforts put to restructure NPLs. Now, with improved balance sheets and more stable financial standing of all banks, the Bank of Thailand has moved into the second step; and that is to improve the quality of banks’ businesses and management. The Bank of Thailand has recently tightened provisioning rules for NPLs.
Low interest rates, for example, can contribute to the build-up of  4  On this, see the discussion in Robert Shiller (2000), Irrational Exuberance, Princeton University Press. 5  This has been convincingly argued by Christina Romer (1990), “The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(August), 597–624  6  As quoted in John Lewis Gaddis (2005), The Cold War: A New History, Penguin Press. BIS Review 158/2010  3  financial imbalances via the so-called “risktaking” channel. 7 Simply put, very low interest rates may create incentives for banks to take on more risks. Recent research has provided empirical evidence compatible with such a notion. It has been documented, 8 for example, how market based measures of bank’s risks as perceived by financial market participants tend to react positively to changes in interest rates, so that a lower interest rate leads investor to perceive banks as less risky. By the same token, several papers 9 have shown that credit standards are correlated with the level of interest rates: lower interest rates, in particular, imply lower credit standards including to customers who are perceived as representing a higher credit risk. On the theoretical side, research done at the Banque de France 10 has shown that, when the regulatory environment is not transparent, a decrease in the level of real interest rate increases banks’ risk-taking behavior, in parts because it may facilitate the under-pricing of risks typical when asset prices rise.

C.  The need to preserve the stability of the financial system in order to prevent the emergence of “tail risks” to price stability  The best illustration of tail risks to price stability on the downside associated with financial crises comes from the historical experience of the United States during the Great Depression which followed the collapse of the stockmarket and housing bubbles of the second half of the 1920s, and by that of Japan following the collapse of the real estate bubble of the second half of the 1980s. In both cases a dramatic expansion of credit fuelled bubbles which pushed asset prices to dizzying heights. In the case of the 1920s United States, in particular, such credit expansion was associated with a wave of euphoria caused by “new-era” thinking  2  See Richard Dale (2004), The First Crash: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble, Princeton University Press. 3  See Irving Fisher (1933), “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”, Econometrica, Vol. 1(4), pp. 337–357. 2  BIS Review 158/2010  which, in turn, had been ignited by the dramatic wave of technological innovation which swept across the country during that decade. 4 The attempt, on the part of young Federal Reserve, to gently deflate asset prices via interest rates increases backfired, and the result was the 1929 crash, with the associated destruction of a staggering amount of financial wealth, and the injection into the economy of a significant extent of uncertainty.
As with an independent central bank that houses supervision and liquidity provision under one roof, there are advantages to combining country surveillance and lending in one global institution, with an impartial and experienced staff. And risks are most efficiently pooled at a global level. This is the raison d’etre for the IMF. 8  4  Bank of England staff estimates based on the spread between returns on reserve assets and those paid on domestic bonds. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Unfortunately, signs of fragmentation of the global financial safety net are obviously in part a reaction to the failure to implement the 2010 quota and governance reforms to bolster the IMF’s resources and the representation of emerging market economies. The priority must be to implement those. But we also need to consider whether and how the temporary resources collected by the IMF in the form of bilateral loans when it passed the hat around in 2012 could be put on a more permanent footing. One possibility is to extend these bilateral loans further. Another possibility is for the IMF to borrow directly from capital markets 9 during a systemic crisis which would create safe assets when demand for them is high, allowing funds to be recycled to those parts of the world with temporary liquidity needs. A more reliable and flexible resource base would allow the IMF to more credibly perform a crisis prevention role of providing committed lines of credit to sound sovereigns through its Flexible and Precautionary Liquidity lines.

We hope that you would have a better appreciation of why the Bank of Thailand needs to call for even more on your directorship role. But before I dwell into the topic of the duties of directors, let me take this occasion to extend to you my deepest appreciation and thanks for the tremendous efforts and cooperation you have given the Bank of Thailand in the course of the year. Your institutions have continued to lend strong and valuable support to the recovery programme for the businesses affected by the Tsunami disaster, and those affected by the violence and unrest in the three southern provinces, by extending the concessional lending programme for another year. To support the reform in the banknote management system, you have made substantial changes to your operation nationwide to take on the additional role of handling and moving banknotes. This cooperative spirit truly demonstrates a shared understanding of the benefits of reform, despite the adjustments required on your part. Last year we also had a cause for celebration with the progress made in the Data Management System which helped improve efficiency of the reporting system for financial institutions, customers, and foreign exchange transactions data. Going forward, we continue to receive full cooperation from banks in building the country’s economic database. The project is expected to be completed this year. Turning to the payments system, the ITMX project designed as infrastructure for a modern payment system, has also made tremendous stride with the full cooperation of all Thai banks.
Svein Gjedrem: A central banker’s comparison of the Nordic countries Introduction by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the panel discussion of the ACI Nordic Congress, Göteborg, 24 August 2002. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  For outsiders, it may be convenient to see the Nordic region as consisting of countries with very similar characteristics. However, the countries are different in several ways. First, they differ in their relations to the EU and with respect to their monetary policy regimes. Sweden, Denmark and Finland are members of the EU. Finland is also a member of EMU. The euro has replaced the markka as legal tender, and Finland and the other 11 member countries of EMU have a common monetary policy. Denmark is in ERM II while Sweden, Iceland and Norway have inflation targets. In Norway the inflation target of 2½ per cent was adopted on 29 March 2001 and now functions as the nominal anchor for the Norwegian economy. The introduction of the inflation target did not imply a significant shift in the way monetary policy was conducted. However, the introduction of the inflation target brought monetary policy in Norway more in line with common practice internationally, and facilitated communication. Although the approaches differ, inflation has been relatively low and stable in the Nordic countries in recent years. Second, the Nordic countries are different in terms of industrial structure.

This has resulted in somewhat modified market dynamics and less efficient price determination mechanisms. In order to safeguard the smooth functioning of the markets, the diversity of participants’ behaviours must be protected or even reinforced. This necessary diversity should logically reflect natural differences in time horizons, strategies and reaction functions of market players. On this point, I would like to explore three possible avenues for future action for both authorities and the industry. First avenue: Strengthen the continuing efforts aiming at market transparency •  Experience shows that uncertainty and incomplete information are determining factors in mimetic behaviour. These shortfalls in market transparency make mimetic behaviour seem rational to agents, who prefer to follow bigger participants, who are thought to be better informed, rather than develop their own analysis. Strengthening transparency therefore continues to be a priority. •  One of the objectives of transparency is to enable better differentiation of borrower creditworthiness. A key feature of mimetic behaviour is that all borrowers are "tarred with the same brush". So when one emerging economy encounters difficulties, all neighbouring countries are treated in the same way – regardless of their actual economic and financial situation. The same applies to businesses operating in the same economic sector. Transparency as substantially improved since the Asian crisis thanks to a solid global consensus. Let us continue and reinforce these efforts. Second possible avenue: Taking into account the medium and long-term perspective of some market participants.
In this scenario, it could be argued that one could relax the policy horizon or the target level to accommodate these inflationary shocks with small output costs. However, based on my previous discussion, this could be very detrimental for the future. Giving up on inflation will lead to losing the inflation anchor on expectations, more backward- than forward-looking behavior of wage and price setters, and an increase in output volatility. In other words, we would be achieving an inefficient outcome for monetary policy and losing the benefits of the Great Moderation. Hence, central banks must carefully monitor inflation expectations. However, in the current juncture of extreme uncertainty and inflation volatility, the breakeven measures that compare nominal and inflation protected securities appear to be excessively high world-wide, thus apparently showing an important increase in inflation expectations, which could even reflect the loss of the nominal anchor. This has also been the case in Chile, especially since the deepness of the market of inflation protected instruments tends to make them the natural safe haven. Therefore, in uncertain times like the ones we are enduring today, breakeven measures may increase without necessarily implying un-anchoring expectations, making their timely recognition more intricate. Some could incorrectly argue that a way to avoid the monetary policy reaction to some specific inflationary shocks is to focus inflation control on core rather than headline measures of inflation.

For that reason, our approach to liquidity insurance continues to evolve: •  In November 2014 we extended eligibility for membership of the Sterling Monetary Framework to include broker-dealers and Central Clearing Counterparties (CCPs), giving non-banks access to our permanent liquidity insurance facilities for the first time. •  The range of acceptable collateral continues to extend: we have started to approve pools of auto loans and invoice finance receivables as eligible collateral for the first time. And we have started work to ensure there are no technical obstacles to our ability to accept equities as collateral should the need arise. 4  The Bank introduced US Dollar repo operations in September 2008, and their usage peaked at the equivalent of $ in October 2008. The Bank also provided a peak of $ to RBS via Emergency Liquidity Assistance. 5  The Bank’s commercial paper purchase schemes opened in February 2009 with a peak usage of £ The corporate bond purchase scheme opened in March 2009, with a peak usage of £  6  Plenderleith (2012) and Winters (2012). 7  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/redbook.aspx. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  The Bank will commence work in the second half of 2015 to assess the feasibility of establishing a Shari’ah compliant facility. By providing an additional highly liquid asset for Islamic banks, such a facility would be a significant step forward in their liquidity management capabilities. •  We are continuing to develop our capacity to lend in currencies other than sterling.
This is something that characterises monetary policy in many countries and the reasons for this are primarily international, with specific Swedish conditions playing less of a part. My assessment is that the root causes are connected to long-term structural changes in the financial system around the world. It is therefore not just connected to temporary crises. Consequently, I also consider that changes in the central bank’s holdings of various assets will be an important part of monetary policy for a long time to come, even if the policy rate will remain an important instrument. One lesson from the last few decades is that central banks need to pay attention to how the financial sector transforms over time and to be well prepared to act rapidly and broadly in times of crisis. With the broader range of monetary policy tools developed over the last decade – which, in many ways, are reminiscent of how monetary policy was conducted in times past – the Riksbank is better equipped to fulfil its tasks. And considering the Riksbank’s long history, this is nothing new – we have to move with the times! 12 [13]  References Adrian, Tobias (2020), “‘Low for Long’ and Risk-Taking”, IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department, departmental paper series no. 20/15, November. Andersson, Björn, Magnus Jonsson and Henrik Lundvall (2020), “The new macroeconomic environment after the global financial crisis”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, no. 1, Sveriges Riksbank.

Hence, I very much concur with the conference’s theme of “A Call for Action.” It takes courage to lead a transformative 2  journey into an unknown territory. The collective wisdom shared among directors here will enable all of us to make better informed decisions and lead our organizations, and more importantly, lead Thailand, onto the right path – the path which will rise above disruptions, as the IOD has eloquently put it. As Thailand embarks on the journey for digital transformation, we must focus on three key imperatives of productivity, immunity, and inclusivity. Technological advancement provides tremendous opportunity for us to uplift these three areas like never before. While policymakers and regulators can provide support at the infrastructure level and promote a stable environment conducive for innovation, it is at the firm level that actions can be and must be taken to drive meaningful changes for the country as a whole. First, on productivity: uplifting the country’s productivity is necessary to ensure continued long-term economic growth. Specifically, structural changes due to an aging workforce have hastened the need for our country to improve productivity just to maintain output level. In fact, Thailand’s labor productivity growth has been on a decline. From 2002 to 2017, our annual growth of labor productivity averaged 2.9 percent, a significant drop from an average of 5 percent during 1986 to 2001. In contrast, countries such as China and Indonesia have been experiencing rises in productivity growth.
Also, in cooperation with the Institute of Archaeology, a one-week seminar was organised on Ancient coins, attended by the students of history, archaeology and cultural heritage. This year commemorates the pan-national Year of Skanderbeg, our National Hero. The Museum 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  has organised temporary exhibitions, displayed both inside and outside the Museum, on the figure of Skanderbeg, featured in the Albanian currency. Financial education has been given an important focus in the work of the Museum. Throughout the year, many students and young people have been involved in educational activities and projects, actively participating during the Money Week events, attending the lectures held at the Museum, and using our educational publications and products. The Museum will continue to work in these two aspects by supporting: i) the scientific, economic, and monetary history of the country; and ii) the financial education of the new generations, with the support and cooperation with the most distinguished actors in these fields. As an institution that keeps and promotes an important part of the cultural heritage of the country, such as the currency, we are privileged and obliged to collaborate in order for the Museum of the Bank of Albania not to be just an exposition of the rare collections, but a place where the public may find adequate and specialised literature and expertise to learn about the economic and monetary history, and become more financially educated.

Gent Sejko: Welcome address - Second Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania Welcome address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Second Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 20 September 2018. * * * Distinguished professors, Dear participants, It gives me a great pleasure to welcome you to the Second Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania, via this recorded message. I wish I were present to attend in person the proceedings of the Conference, but, regrettably, due to the rather tight agenda I will not be able to. Nevertheless, I will have the possibility to read all the presentations, discussions, and input in the Conference book that will be compiled subsequent to the Conference. As I have already emphasised, the Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania is one of the most prominent events, providing us with the opportunity to enrich and further the studies on the exposed collections, and serves as a platform for Albanian experts to discuss and share their research findings. We are pleased to see that the Museum of the Bank of Albania brings for the second time together representatives from renowned research institutions, such as: the Albanian Institute of Archaeology and History, European Universities and central banks to present their studies. As the title suggests, this Conference will address the role of money in wartime.