samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The key here is to ensure that just because something is packaged in shiny technology we don’t somehow treat the risks it poses differently. Private Money: the basics Before I turn to stablecoins I want to spend a minute on one of the reasons why the idea of private money feels innovative and flashy. Even though most money we use every day is already private money, the vast majority of us don’t think about it. Luckily, regulation means we don’t have to. Popular culture often simplifies our ideas around what form our money takes and can reinforce the idea that banks are simply storing our sterling issued by the central bank for us, and that when we pay electronically, what is being moved is central bank-issued money. For example, remember those iconic scenes from ‘Mary Poppins and ‘It’s a Wonderful Life’ which feature people demanding that banks give them back their money. But in reality, when you tap your debit card in a shop or pay your friend back via a bank transfer, the money you are paying with isn’t sterling issued by the Bank of England with a promise to pay the bearer – it’s a bank deposit. Those are just a record of how much a private company – here, the commercial bank – owes its customers. Think of it as an IOU from the bank.

Islamic banking assets now account for 17.4% of the total banking assets of the Malaysian financial system while in the bond market, the sukuk market constitutes 57% of the total market as at end-2008. The product range has now also expanded into broad array of innovative instruments. Several innovative Islamic financial products have been introduced which included residential mortgage backed securities, commodity based financing, as well as investment and equity linked products based on musharakah, mudarabah and ijarah. Today, however, the international and domestic environment in which we are operating is going to become even more challenging. Delays in the resolution to the financial crisis in the advanced economies have resulted in a sharp and rapid deterioration in the recent months. The inability to stabilise conditions is highly likely to have a more protracted effect on the global economy. While there has been concerted monetary policy action and fiscal stimulus across the globe, confidence needs to be restored. This can however, only happen when the financial system in the crisis affected countries are repaired and credit continues to flow again, when markets continue to function efficiently and when prices reflects the value of the assets. While Malaysian banks are sound and well capitalised and our economy is not over leveraged and our external position remains strong, Malaysia as an open economy is already adversely affected by these global developments. The domestic conditions are expected to remain challenging in the coming quarters and a range of policy responses are being implemented.
Last year, another report13 analysed how climate risk shocks could spread throughout the financial system, harming companies and banks alike. Transition risks stemming from, for instance, a surge in carbon prices may be magnified because of economic and financial linkages between and across financial institutions and companies. Interdependent natural hazards, such as water stress, heat stress and wildfires – which are painfully familiar to us in Spain – can amplify physical climate risk, as they can cluster together and exacerbate each other. Market dynamics can also magnify the financial impact of physical risks. Given the identification of potential systemic financial risk associated with climate change, it is necessary to study the development of appropriate macroprudential policy tools to tackle it in a manner consistent with prudential mandates to preserve financial stability. For the near term, the ESRB-ECB report suggests the adaptation of existing regulatory instruments, such as the systemic risk buffer or concentration thresholds, as a possible avenue to tackle climate risk in the banking sector. In any case, this is a task that demands joining efforts between macroprudential policy and microprudential supervision, and taking adequate stock of developments in other policy realms, such as fiscal and monetary initiatives. 12  Advancing macroprudential tools for cyber resilience, ESRB Report, February 2023. 13  The macroprudential challenge of climate change, July 2022, by ECB/ESRB Project Team on climate risk monitoring. Conclusion The ESRB’s general Warning that I referred to in the first part of my intervention called for heightened awareness of risks to financial stability.

The Island has been suffering from a vicious cycle. As employment declines, people move to the mainland to find jobs. Accordingly, economic activity and tax revenues decline, forcing the government to raise taxes and cut spending, which further reduces employment and prompts still more residents to move. At this point, the outlook for anyone who has been living here must be bleak, and it may be hard to imagine this situation turning around anytime soon. And yet, history tells us that a turnaround, though not inevitable, is indeed achievable. Lessons from past crises New York City is probably the most famous example of a municipality that experienced a major fiscal crisis, recovered and is now thriving. New York City’s experience is viewed, in retrospect, as a major success, and some, including myself, have pointed to it as a hopeful example of what 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  could come to pass in Puerto Rico. But, there are important caveats to the New York City story and its applicability to the Commonwealth. Like Puerto Rico, New York City experienced a number of years of both political and economic pain as a result of its fiscal crisis in the 1970s. On the political side, New York City residents lost a large measure of their ability to chart their own fiscal direction for several years. Decisions about tax and spending policies were removed from elected city officials.
Assuming that developments in Swedbank’s and SEB’s other markets continue to be relatively good, however, the bank groups should be able to cover most of the losses from the Baltic region with the earnings from the remainder of their operations. Swedbank and SEB have subsidiaries in the Baltic countries, while Nordea has a branch. According to EU regulations, the authorities in the country where subsidiaries are located have responsibility for their supervision, while the home country authorities have the responsibility for branches and for the bank group as a whole. Around 80 per cent, equivalent to SEK 320 billion, of the Swedish banks’ lending to the Baltic countries is in euro. These euro are lent almost exclusively in the international loan markets by the parent bank in Sweden. BIS Review 11/2010  1  The Baltic economies developed rapidly after these countries gained their independence, although there have been some setbacks. This development was supported by extensive inflows of capital from abroad, particularly after EU membership in 2004. Much of the money came from neighbouring countries such as Finland and Sweden. The average standard of living for the populations in the Baltic countries increased rapidly from 41 per cent of the EU average in the year 2000 to 62 per cent in the year 2008.

I am confident CIFF would embed a culture that places unequivocal commitment to professionalism and ethics that would raise the prestige of the Islamic finance industry and its practitioners. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
How governments deal with this income disparity will not only be reflected in social and political outcomes, but also economic ones as it is the low and middle income groups that have the highest marginal propensity to consume. Similarly, a lack of success in dealing with the high youth unemployment in the crisis affected economies could have lasting consequences and put these young people on a permanently lower earnings path, further contributing to both income inequality and weaker growth. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  To conclude, let me summarise my key message: Economically, things are looking better than they have been in a long time. However, the legacy of the crisis remains and will remain with us for some time yet. And this will continue to cloud the outlook and will be a concern and challenge to policymakers as they try to steer the global economy out of the crisis on to a more sustained and sustainable growth path. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Chart 1: Regulatory-Supervisory Independence and central bank independence, 1999-2019 (a)  (a) The data on central bank independence is drawn from Bodea and Hicks (2015) and Garriga (2016). Weighted versions of the indices are used to aid comparison. The weighting is based on Cukierman et al (1992). The second step in the analysis was to examine whether there is an association between the Regulatory-Supervisory Independence index and financial stability. Defining an ex ante quantitative indicator of the success or otherwise of prudential regulation is hard, unlike with monetary policy where such measures are easier to arrive at. But fortunately, this is less of a problem for this analysis because we have ex post observations of distress in the banking system. The authors used rates of non-performing loans at banks as a measure of financial (in)stability.9  They analyse whether reforms that increased regulatory-supervisory independence were associated with subsequent a reduction in the rates of non-performing loans. Panel data regression show a 9  That is, non-performing loans as a proportion of total gross loans. I would like to thank Matthew Willison, Hugh Burns, Nicolo Fraccaroli and David Swallow for their assistance in preparing these remarks 9  negative and statistically significant association between independence-increasing reforms and rates of non-performing loans – see Table 3.
Chart: Interest rate forecast with fan chart in the June 2011 Monetary Policy Report The interest rate forecast is shown in a fan chart. Our forecasts provide an expression of what we consider to be the baseline path. But the forecasts are uncertain, as illustrated by the fan chart. Our interest rate forecast is not an unconditional promise, but signals how we will set the interest rate if developments in the Norwegian economy are in line with our projections. The interest rate path presented in June indicated that the interest rate would gradually be raised towards a normal level in the next years. It followed that the interest rate would, with some degree of probability, be increased in August. This was conditional on the economic outlook we presented at that time. Chart: Interest rate forecast with fan chart and alternative scenarios in the June 2011 Monetary Policy Report The Bank’s Monetary Policy Report also presents alternative scenarios for the Norwegian economy. If developments are broadly in line with expectations, economic agents can expect that the interest rate will be set in line with that projected by Norges Bank. If conditions change, as was the case in August, Norges Bank will naturally adapt the monetary policy stance in the light of new economic prospects. Through our communication and the reports we publish, it is possible for an external observer to anticipate this reaction with a fair degree of accuracy.

Norges Bank has developed the Norwegian Economy Model (NEMO), which we use as an aid when drawing up one-yearahead to four-year-ahead forecasts. NEMO is a model for analysing cyclical fluctuations around a long-term trend. In the medium term, the economy may in periods deviate substantially from trend, but when the fluctuations subside, we must assume that the economy is moving towards equilibrium. The model does not explain the long-term trend so we have to look to other economic theory. For example, economic growth over time will be determined by technological developments and the supply of labour and capital, and there will likely be a relationship between the real interest rate and potential growth. When we set the interest rate, we give weight to the current situation and the outlook two to three years ahead. The statistical models help us understand the current situation, while the equilibrium properties frame the analysis. NEMO describes how the interest rate can be set to bring the economy from its current starting point back to the long-term equilibrium path. As a support tool in making monetary policy decisions, such a model apparatus is thus particularly relevant. I will come back to the main features of NEMO later. Chart: Monetary policy model requirements Norges Bank operates under a formal monetary policy mandate. The Bank’s objective is to stabilise inflation and provide the economy with a nominal anchor.
Only through the achievement of surpluses during a cyclical upswing can there be room for countercyclical deficits in a downturn. The retrenchment currently being experienced in many countries highlights the consequences of leaving fiscal imbalances unaddressed. Fiscal consolidation is also necessary to bring the debt ratio below the 60% limit. For example, if the deficit ratio does not shed one percentage point in 2011 as planned, the deficit would be some EUR65 million higher than the projected amount. At current interest rates, this would imply an addition of about EUR3.3 million to the annual interest charge on the debt, which at EUR 198 million this year is considerably more than government  4  BIS Review 156/2010  investment in the infrastructure; and the debt ratio would rise by an additional percentage point to 70%. Improving the long-term sustainability of public finances assumes additional importance in view of the expected doubling of the share of the elderly in the Maltese population by 2060. As a result, age-related spending is set to increase by more than 10% of GDP. Partly because of these demographic trends, Malta is among the group of EU countries facing the greatest challenge in terms of fiscal sustainability. 10 Since this task can only be addressed gradually, we have to start now. Completing the planned reform of the pension system must be part of the solution. In particular, introducing funded pensions promises to deliver benefits on several fronts.

Several measures have already been taken, including in the Budget for 2011, such as incentives for women to re-enter the labour market, and trying to remove “unemployment traps” that arise from the interaction of the tax and welfare system. The gradual increase in the retirement age will also help. But this will not be enough. Efforts to get more people to work must, moreover, be accompanied by measures to raise their productivity. We need to invest more, and more efficiently. Malta’s educational attainment levels in particular, though improving, remain low. In 2009 just over one quarter of adults aged between 25 and 64, much less than half the EU average, had completed at least an upper secondary level of education. 6 The solution here does not lie solely in allocating more resources. It is also a question of how the money is spent. According to a recent study, public spending on education in Malta amounts to around 5.5% of GDP, which is above the EU average. 7 But the study also shows that this spending is not very efficient, especially in the case of tertiary education. Despite the significant amounts spent, Malta’s tertiary educational attainment level, at 21.1%, is well below the EU average of 32.3% and the Europe 2020 target of 40%. 8 This situation must be reversed because well-remunerated jobs cannot be created in the absence of high-quality post-secondary education. As the recent Browne report in the UK  3  Source: Eurostat. 4  Source: Eurostat.
On these occasions, the Riksbank’s forecasts overestimated the prospects for inflation to a greater degree than those of other forecasters. As I said earlier, the overestimations were due to concern on the part of the Riksbank that significant increases in the prices of oil and food during the spring, in combination with unusually high inflation expectations, would lead to an increase in inflation. The credibility of the inflation target Confidence in the inflation target in the form of stable inflation expectations close to the target is fundamental to the Riksbank’s efforts to achieve price stability and stable resource utilisation. This is because inflation expectations affect wage formation and pricing. Stable inflation expectations thus contribute to stable inflation. A high level of credibility for the inflation target also increases the possibility of the Riksbank to stabilise resource utilisation. If an increase in inflation was rapidly reflected in higher inflation expectations, the Riksbank would be forced to act more quickly and more forcefully than would otherwise have been necessary to dampen demand and prevent the inflationary impulse gaining a lasting foothold. The fluctuations in the real economy would thereby be greater than if inflation expectations were better anchored. Establishing credibility for the belief that inflation will be keep low and stable is therefore important in the effort to increase macroeconomic stability.

4 My assessment is that risk premiums have been very low, and perhaps even negative, a view that is supported by a number of studies. 5 I think the recent surveys have probably provided a fairer indicator of monetary policy expectations than forward rates. This is not to say that conducting a survey of expectations is the ideal way to measure monetary policy expectations. 6 However, one advantage of surveys is that they constitute more direct and more robust measures of monetary policy expectations, as they are not affected by risk premiums, which have been more difficult to assess than usual recently. According to the Prospera survey, monetary policy expectations two years ahead were also below our repo-rate path during the autumn. However, the Prospera survey published after our repo rate decision shows that expectations of the reporate are now almost entirely in line with the Riksbank’s repo-rate path. However, we should not limit ourselves to forward rates and surveys when trying to determine monetary policy expectations. Interest rate forecasts made by other analysts and model forecasts that reflect historical links are also useful indicators of expectations. These indicators also support the assessment that forward rates have been lower than other measures of market expectations over the last six months. I have wanted to discuss this theme partly because it is current and relevant, and partly because it illustrates how we must adopt a stance in the course of our decision-making process even if clear and unequivocal background information is not available.
Willem F Duisenberg: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Introductory statement by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, Brussels, 17 February 2003. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to appear before your Committee today. As usual, I will begin my introductory remarks by reporting to you on the ECB's assessment of economic and monetary developments, before turning to the ECB recommendation on the adjustment of voting modalities in the Governing Council, which the ECB adopted following the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice and on which the European Parliament and the European Commission have been invited to give their opinion. 1. Economic and monetary developments  In its first meeting of December 2002, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to lower the key ECB rates by 50 basis points. The basis for this decision was the assessment that the prospect for inflation to fall below 2% in the course of 2003, against the background of subdued economic growth, and for it to remain in line with price stability thereafter, had strengthened. With this move, the key ECB interest rates reached a very low level by historical standards. Before turning to our assessment of the current economic outlook for the euro area, I would like to report that on 5 December 2002 we also reviewed the reference value for monetary growth, which plays an important role under the first pillar of the ECB's monetary policy strategy.

We are very satisfied with our strategy and with the fact that it has given appropriate and effective guidance to monetary policy decisions. Let me also assure you that there will be no change in our firm commitment to our overriding objective of maintaining price stability over the medium term, i.e. avoiding both inflation and deflation. Indeed, this could not be otherwise, since the achievement of the price stability objective is at the core of our mandate in the Treaty. 2. The ECB Recommendation on the adjustment of voting modalities in the Governing Council  On 3 February 2003, the Governing Council adopted a recommendation on the adjustment of its voting modalities, which will prepare the Governing Council for a future expansion of the euro area. With the timely submission of this recommendation, and a hopefully rapid completion of the overall procedure, we hope to preclude any uncertainty about the continued effectiveness of the ECB's governance structures in view of a future expansion of the euro area. In this context, I should like to emphasise how much I appreciate your Committee's efforts to respect an ambitious timetable in order to present in good time the Opinion of the European Parliament as foreseen by the Treaty. As you are aware, the task of coming up with a new voting system presented the Governing Council with a formidable challenge.