samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, in our country this is clearly contained, thanks to the soundness of our economy, with strong macroeconomic fundamentals, and capable of implementing and sustaining policies that mitigate the impact from abroad. Our financial system, unlike that of other countries, has suffered no dislocations compromising its solvency. Inflation has rapidly been reduced, and medium-term expectations are consistent with the target. The Board has reduced the MPR aggressively and does not rule out that further cuts may be necessary. Accordingly, it reaffirms its commitment to conduct monetary policy so that projected inflation stands at 3 percent over the policy horizon. The worst part of the financial turbulence seems to be fading into the past, but its effects on output and employment will remain with us for a while. Monetary policy will continue to aim at reducing these effects. It has proven to have significant degrees of flexibility, always consistent with reaching the inflation target. While in quiet times a gradualist behavior of monetary policy can be expected, when confronted to extreme conditions like we see today, proactive action is called for, and that is what we have been doing. We know this world crisis cannot last forever, and we are confident in the healthy fundamentals of our economy and in the expansionary capacity of the unprecedented and significant macroeconomic stimulus packages that are now under way. 6  BIS Review 65/2009  Thank you very much.

The Governing Council welcomes the ongoing work and urges further specific and decisive steps to complete the banking union and the capital markets union. We are now at your disposal for questions. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Of course at the Banque de France we are all the more impressed by the reactions and the demonstrations since we suffered a loss ourselves … … Bernard Maris, the economist and journalist, was one of your board members. C.N. Yes, it was a horrible shock for us. Bernard Maris was a man of culture and tolerance, a free spirit and he was murdered because of his ideas. It is a huge loss for all of us. Do you see any economic consequences from these attacks? C.N. I do not think they will have significant economic consequences. Before the attacks everybody was looking towards Greece. Could the elections of the 25th trigger a new round of crises in the euro area? C.N. In my view the risks of a crisis for the euro area are much lower than a few years ago. Greece has clearly taken a path of reforms and restoration of its competitiveness. It is in the interest of Greece to continue following that path and to benefit from an accelerated improvement in their recovery. The second point is that we have built many significant defences against the risk of crisis and destabilisation in Europe. What is the scope for a more lenient policy in Greece or even for debt restructuring? C.N. We all know that the debt level of Greece is very high. The programme of the Troika foresaw a decrease in the debt ratio in the years to come.

It is with the Bundesbank that we have developed most of the projects for the euro area, with which we organise conferences, and with which we cooperate in the international field. This cooperation is beneficial for both of us. Is it sad to leave at a time when central banks have become such important players? C.N. It is not good that we are seen as the only game in town. We cannot replace governments, simply because they are not seen to be acting quickly enough. We have created in the euro area many new institutions and new rules. They must now be used. It is up to the parliaments and governments to decide the reforms to be made, but they have to take their responsibilities. Mr Noyer, thank you for this interview. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The devaluation of the currency would raise the stock of the debt in relation to GDP, which in turn would further contribute to make the peg more difficult to sustain and thus fuel speculative attacks against the currency, in a vicious circle. Under these circumstances, if a peg could not be sustained, the devaluation would have to be accompanied by a restructuring of the debt or a partial default to stabilise the situation. This is not the case in most advanced economies, either because the debt is generally denominated in domestic currency or because the peg is a “super-hard” one, as in Greece’s case. Certainly, if Greece were to exit the euro – a hypothesis that I make just for the sake of reasoning, but which I consider absurd – its debt burden would de facto worsen given that it is denominated in euro, and partial default or restructuring would in that case be unavoidable. However, thanks to the irrevocable nature of participation in the euro, the debt trap is avoided. What many analysts – or I should say doomsayers – have not understood is that the debt problem is the biggest incentive for Greece to remain in the euro area. Second, in many previous crises in emerging market economies, the debt issued by the country was largely held by foreigners. A restructuring of the debt thus mainly hit foreign citizens and was thus, from a political and economic viewpoint, relatively less costly for domestic residents.

It ultimately depends on the country’s ability to raise taxes and sustain a level of primary  BIS Review 126/2010  3  surplus that enables the debt to be stabilised and reduced over time. This depends both on economic and political factors that are not easy to summarise in the nice differential equations that economists like to work with. It is thus inevitable that simplifying assumptions are made, but it is often forgotten that excess simplicity may lead to partial or even wrong results. Let me briefly elaborate. The analysis of the sustainability of sovereign debt has largely been based on the experience of developing or emerging market countries. It is now applied to advanced economies, starting with Greece. How often do we hear that Europe should learn from the Brady bond experience to address the Greek debt problem? We should, however, examine the risks associated with reasoning by analogy in this way. The risk is that solutions devised for a particular case are not applicable to other cases. Let me give you some examples. First, in many debt crises of the past in emerging market economies, the fiscal problem was not necessarily the main cause of the crisis. More usually, the crisis originated in the combination of an unsustainable exchange rate peg and foreign denominated debt.
Mojmír Hampl: Monetary policy and the current macroeconomic environment in the developed world Speech by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Deutsche Bank Prague Client Conference, Prague, 25 October 2016. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, Good afternoon. Thank you very much for inviting me again to your flagship event. It is my utmost pleasure to be here. Actually, this is the third time in a row I have had the chance to speak here. In 2014 my topic was, quite expectedly, the exchange rate commitment and its introduction in November 2013. I recently looked at my slides from 2014, and I would not change anything about them. Only the timing of the exit has changed – quite radically, I have to admit. The following year, 2015, the obvious topic was a comparison of the Czech and Swiss cases. This was especially interesting given the abrupt and completely surprising Swiss exit from their exchange rate commitment in January 2015. I thought to myself: “What would be a natural candidate for this year?” I put my mind to work and suddenly a topic appeared: our own Czech exit, our own way of abandoning the exchange rate commitment, which is almost three years old now. However, I somehow feel that the exit will be a key topic for your questions and comments. So, I eventually decided to speak about something else, something more abstract and may be a bit more general: the constraints on monetary policy in the developed world.

Caleb M Fundanga: Local bond market developments in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, on the occasion of the Listing of the Development Bank of Zambia Bond, Lusaka Stock Exchange, Lusaka, 4 April 2007. *  *  *  • The General Manager – Lusaka Stock Exchange • The Chairman, DBZ Board of Directors • The Chairman, Standard Chartered • The Secretary – Securities and Exchange Commission • Mr Ade Adebajo, Director, Standard Chartered Africa Debt Capital Markets • Member of the DBZ Board • All Senior Government Officials Present • Acting Managing Director, DBZ • Managing Director – Zambia State Insurance Corporation • Chief Executive Officer – Stock Brokers (Z) Limited • Representative of DBSA • Distinguished invited guests; and • Ladies and Gentleman Today marks another important milestone in financial sector development indicative of the coming of age of the Zambian financial system in general and local bond market in particular. The issue of the K68.620 billion senior unsecured floating rate note under the Development Bank of Zambia (DBZ) K150 billion Medium Term Note Programme and listing of the note on the Lusaka Stock Exchange (LuSE) is a landmark transaction for two key reasons. The first is that this is the first time in the history of the local bond market that a local currency medium term note programme has been established. The second is that this transaction marks the largest single issue ever offered to Zambian fixedincome institutional investors.
One possible approach to assessing the impact of our asset purchases is to consider the growth of broad money. A key principle underlying the asset purchase programme is the belief in a causal mechanism running from increased money balances into higher asset prices and nominal spending. This mechanism can be expressed in terms of a process of portfolio rebalancing in which yields of different assets adjust in order for the higher level of money balances to be willingly held. But the same mechanism could be expressed in terms of a monetarist approach, in which asset purchases work through measures of money disequilibrium which in turn spur additional spending. These different frameworks are sometimes presented as conflicting models of the transmission of asset purchases. But I view them as essentially two sides of the same coin. Importantly, they share the same fundamental assumption about why monetary policy at the zero bound can stimulate nominal spending: namely, imperfect substitutability between money and other assets. Over the past year, despite money-financed asset purchases totalling £ billion, broad money has increased by just £ billion. 6 What should we make of this weakness? In part it speaks to the counterfactual. The falls in nominal spending and the desire by banks to reduce leverage means that, absent the monetary injection, broad money would have almost certainly been far weaker. But it is also symptomatic of the scale of the new equity and debt raised by UK banks over this period which, together with retained profits, totals more than £ billion.

Taken at face value, the extraordinary policy measures implemented by the Bank, alongside those enacted by the Government, appear to have been successful in averting a deeper and more severe recession. And the hope now is that a sustained recovery in demand will follow consistent with the objectives of those polices. But the contribution of our asset purchases in bringing about this stabilisation is still an open question. One year on, what have we learnt about QE? Today, I will address three key questions. What is the theoretical foundation for such a policy? What are the key channels of transmission? And what can we say about its impact to date? These questions are critical for the operation of monetary policy. But they are equally important for the study of monetary policy. The financial crisis posed questions which the models most commonly used to analyse monetary policy were not well suited to answer. BIS Review 29/2010  1  There is an emerging literature that responds to these shortcomings. It is important – both for the theory and practice of monetary policy – that this continues. The theoretical foundation for unconventional monetary policy Let me turn first to the theoretical foundation for quantitative easing. Over the past 15 years, the canonical New-Keynesian New Classical synthesis model has become the benchmark for economists to study the operation of monetary policy.
For instance, a few days ago, Accenture announced opening a new centre in Warsaw, which deals with outsourcing of business processes, offers finance services, delivery management and HR management. Ultimately, the centre will employ up to a thousand of highly qualified experts and offer services in a dozen of languages. The outsourcing centre in Warsaw will be another one Accenture opens in Central and Eastern Europe, with similar having been launched in Prague, Bratislava and Riga. 16  See e.g. the McKinsey Global Institute “The Emerging Global Labour Market”, June 2005. 17  See e.g. AT Kearney Offshore Location Attractiveness Index; or Ernst & Young European Attractiveness Survey 2005. BIS Review 64/2006  9  Today, due to time constraints, I did not touch many topics closely related to the emergence of the global labour market. For instance, we should consider why, in the ranking of Boston Consulting Group covering a hundred companies with the highest global growth potential on the emerging markets, there is no Polish company 18 , whilst the ranking is dominated by China and India, plus some companies from Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand or Mexico. For instance, we should consider what impact of the demography, migration, off-shoring, and outsourcing will be on the income of global employees. The available results demonstrate that poorly qualified workers in expensive countries may experience their wages go down or even become unemployed 19.

Workplaces are being relocated in search for employees – outsourcing and off-shoring For the purpose of this speech, a simplified definition may be adopted, under which outsourcing means relocating orders, services, production, employment or, in broader terms, a business process to another company (irrespective of its location), whereas off-shoring means relocating a business process abroad (irrespective whether to another company, or within the same enterprise). 9 There are, however, not too many hard data which would allow for an assessment of the scale of outsourcing/off-shoring. Until now, there have been only estimates and fragmentary research results available on this subject, limited to some countries only. However, the data on global trade in goods and services and foreign investment proves the growing scale of this phenomenon. Over the past 15 years, there were significant changes in the share of particular regions in the global trade, with the decline of the UE share accompanied by increasing shares of the developing countries, including Asian countries. In global terms, foreign trade as percentage of the GDP increased from the average 19% of the GDP in the period from 1980 to 1989, to 25% between 2000 and 2004. 9  6  Where off-shoring takes place within the same company, the English name captive o ff -s h o ri ng is used. BIS Review 64/2006  Table 3. Shares of individual regions in global trade.
In general, it can be stated that all these elements depend on: •  The moment the responsible deposit insurance institution is put into function, as in the case of the Albanian experience;  •  The degree of banking market development;  •  The way of its integration and of banking institutions’ integration into more developed markets;  •  The development degree of financial markets in general;  •  The level of legal and regulatory framework completeness and perfection (not only the one closely related to deposit insurance); and  •  The level of public education in relation to services provided by the banking industry and by the financial market in general. The more advanced we are in the above developments, the higher in quality and number are the alternatives that allow the responsible deposit insurance institution a major role in administration of crises the insured institutions may be faced with. In fact, besides the “wealth” they provide in approximation of deposit insurance practices in the banking activity, the above changes in the legal framework and in the practices of deposit insurance activity, lay down the need of a more general harmonization, in regional level and maybe even further. In this way, we would prevent any legal stipulations, which in practice may prove to be non-functional or at high cost.

The supervisory activity, along with prevention of extreme cases of insured institutions’ bankruptcy, carries out also the administration of such institutions, in cases when they fail irrecoverably. In this stage, the role and contribution of the Deposit Insurance Agency, until that moment “invisible”, appears with the whole magnitude and importance. It is indispensable not only in terms of treating depositors that have had savings at the bankrupt institution, but also in the “calming down” effect for all the depositors of the banking system. In fact, the world experience has indicated that the deposit insurance function of the customers of the banking system is an important instrument in the framework of maintaining the banking system sustainability and keeping public confidence in it. The timely payment of the deposit value at the insured amount, in the case of a bank’s bankruptcy, allows responsible authorities to be focused on the procedures intending the isolation of the case and the recovery of the values of the bankrupt institution. The activity of responsible deposit insurance institutions has different characteristics in different countries. Their legal framework provides responsibilities that are limited only in the role of the payer of the available fund and other cases, when responsibilities are extended further, up to the recovery of the insured institutions’ values that have gone bankrupt.
In an environment of structurally low interest rates, like the one we are in at the moment, the adverse effects of very high levels of government debt are less visible in the short run. Indeed, the fact that interest rates are lower than nominal growth rates increases the possibilities of expanding government debt before it begins to rise exponentially, but there is a risk that the differential between nominal interest rates and the nominal GDP growth rate will at some point cease to be negative, in which case the unfavourable effect on the dynamics of the government debt ratio will be all the greater the higher the level of debt. In any event, the evidence regarding the adverse effects of running high levels of government debt is abundant. High government debt tends to lead to a decline in the financing available for private spending, as well as an increase in its cost, ultimately hampering the accumulation of private capital and hindering economic growth. High levels of debt, moreover, increase the likelihood of episodes of financial vulnerability, as in the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis when rising funding costs and falling 27  volumes reached extreme levels. Finally, the greater the level of government debt, the less the scope for fiscal policy to respond to the downturns that may arise in the future. During the sovereign debt crisis, all these effects were apparent.

FAITH AND WISDOM It is very important not to ignore your spiritual wellbeing. It is what will make you a whole being. I will end by sharing with you a scripture passage from the Paul’s Second letter to Timothy Chapter 2:22–25 “Have no part at all in the wrong things that young men like to do. Believe. Have love. Follow what is right. Live at peace. Do these things along with others who have a clean heart and talk to God.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
That would tend to show itself as labour securing a smaller slice of the income pie, as we have seen. In sum, the third industrial evolution appears to have resulted in an intensification of trends already fledgling in the first two: a hollowing-out of employment, a widening distribution of wages and a fall in labour’s income share. The key question is what happens next? A re-run of the 19th century, with productivity gains eventually boosting wages and the labour share? Or, different than in the past, a permanent re-shaping of the labour landscape? Race against the machine A number of authors have recently argued, persuasively, that it is the latter. Based on past patterns, it is argued that information technology may be poised for exponential growth, as its full fruits are harvested. Indeed, we may be on the cusp of a fourth Industrial Revolution or Second Machine Age (Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), Ford (2015)). Its defining feature would be that new-age machines will be thinking as well as doing, sensing as well as sifting, adapting as well as enacting. They will thus span a much wider part of the skill distribution than ever previously. As robots extend their skill-reach, “hollowing-out” may thus be set to become ever-faster, ever-wider and ever-deeper. Or that, at least, is the picture some have painted painted. How much wider and deeper?

Source: Frey and Osborne (2013); Bank calculations. Notes: The UK probability of automation figures are based on estimates in Frey and Osborne (2013) matched against UK occupations.