samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Overall, we are on track with the implementation of Basel II, thereby reaffirming our commitment to international best practice. With this brief initial remark, it is my hope that this seminar would provide the needed knowledge and skills to supervisors from SEANZA countries for the challenges posed by Pillar II. 2  BIS Review 56/2009

Ranee Jayamaha: The financial performance of the Credit Information Bureau in Sri Lanka during 2005 Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Annual General Meeting of the Credit Information Bureau, Colombo, 23 June 2006. *  *  *  Members of the Head Table, the Board of Directors, the Shareholders of the CRIB, Chief Executives and Officials of Banks and Financial Institutions, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am pleased to present to you this evening the Chairperson’s report of the CRIB which summarizes the significant growth in business operations and the financial performances of the CRIB during 2005. Sri Lanka’s CRIB is one of the pioneer credit information bureaux in the South Asia region since its establishment in 1990. The year 2006 is a landmark in its history as the CRIB will begin to re-engineer its core business processes with enhancements and upgrades to the technological infrastructure. As indicated in the Annual Report, during 2005, the CRIB has recorded a remarkable growth in its businesses and achieved its primary objective of collecting, collating and dissemination of aggregate credit information for the use of stakeholder institutions. Reporting of credit information to, and complying with the Bureau’s requirements are mandatory and the CRIB has made a conscious effort to educate the member institutions of the reciprocal benefits of providing reliable credit information. Throughout the year, the CRIB has continued follow up work in refreshing and updating the existing credit database.
Christian Noyer: The power of monetary policy Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Paris Europlace Financial Forum, Tokyo, 25 November 2014. *  *  *  Two weeks ago, I had the privilege to chair in Paris our triennial Banque de France Symposium. Governor Kuroda made us the great favor to participate. At that Symposium, one speaker remarked that, during the financial crisis, Central Banks in most countries had been (quote) “the only game in town” (end quote). And he went on wondering whether this would still be the case in the future. This observation captures the essence of my remarks today. I would like to talk about the power of monetary policy in the current – low inflation – environment. Central Banks have been all powerful and decisive in fighting off the biggest financial crisis of the last 70 years. And they succeeded in avoiding a prolonged recession and the collapse of our financial system. Today, however, they are facing a different challenge. Growth has been disappointing in many parts of the world and forecasts have been constantly revised downward. Even more worrisome for central banks, inflation has persistently undershot our definition of price stability. For the euro area, it has declined from 2.5% in 2012 to 0.3% in annual terms, as of last September. This drop in inflation has occurred despite the most accommodating monetary conditions ever witnessed in Europe.

Peter Pang: Pilot platform for cross-border investment and settlement of debt securities Remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary, at the Press Conference on Pilot Platform for Cross-border Investment and Settlement of Debt Securities – Hong Kong, Malaysia and Euroclear Bank, Hong Kong, 13 March 2012. *  *  *  Deputy Governor Muhammad Ibrahim, Mr Anso Thiré, ladies and gentlemen, Good afternoon. Let me welcome you all to this press conference to announce the launch of the strategic alliance of the cross-border bond investment and settlement platforms in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Euroclear Bank. The Pilot Platform to be launched on 30 March under this strategic alliance goes well beyond commercial cooperation amongst the partners. It will advance the important policy objectives of fostering bond market development and promoting financial stability at both global and regional levels. There are strong demand and supply side factors that focus global investors’ attention on bond markets in Asia. On the demand side, the European sovereign debt problems and successive downgrades of sovereign credit ratings of the advanced economies underscore the need for geographical diversification by global investors. Asia is the obvious choice as it stands out as the bright spot and engine for global growth. According to IMF’ s forecast, emerging Asia, with China as the core, will contribute about 57% of the world’ s GDP growth by 2016. Augmenting this favourable demand factor is the improved credit ratings of Asian sovereign issuers.
Then, if not before, wage costs are likely to accelerate and pull the rate of inflation up. That must not happen, of course, and in good time the Riksbank will do what it can to prevent it. Certain signs of shortages are already evident in some industries and occupational groups in some regions. Moreover, the matching process in the labour market is now working a little less smoothly - filling job vacancies is taking somewhat longer. In general, however, the Swedish economy does not yet appear to have reached a situation where labour shortages are widespread. At the same time, experience from our Nordic neighbours has shown that in an economic upswing such a situation can arise relatively quickly. So this calls for heightened attention from the Riksbank. Inflation held back this year by deregulations and competition Besides higher productivity growth and a more efficient labour market, other positive supply shocks have helped to achieve the rapid output growth without generating inflationary impulses. A positive supply shock is one that tends to lower the price level - slowing the rate of inflation more or less temporarily - at the same time as it stimulates demand. A single change’s impact on both inflation and GDP growth is normally transitory. All else equal, inflation moves up to the earlier rate and demand growth falls back when the shock has subsided. Higher productivity growth due to new technology is an example of a positive supply shock.

To achieve a reasonable return on capital, firms are obliged instead to make production more efficient and that tends to result in better productivity. Many factors have accordingly contributed to our economy’s good performance in recent years. A number of favourable circumstances have coincided, making it possible to combine high growth with price stability. Demand must be adjusted to growth sooner or later Looking ahead, most things suggest that the rapid growth can continue for a time. But in the end - though it is not clear when - demand for goods, services and labour will have to slacken and move more in line with what the long-term growth trend can sustain. Letting demand be too high for too long raises the prospect of accelerating inflation and ultimately a recession, with falling output and rising unemployment. The Riksbank must therefore do its utmost to avoid marked fluctuations in economic activity and endeavour to create conditions for sustainable growth. Demand can come into line with long-term growth as a result of a spontaneous economic slowdown, for instance in connection with a slackening of growth in the rest of the world. It can also result from a fall-off in household demand for durables after the high procurements in recent years. A further possibility is that the positive supply shocks fade, which would admittedly involve some increase in inflation but also a downward effect on demand.
To evaluate that, you need an effective TCA tool that goes beyond measuring just the observed spread to include market impact, price variation, hold times and fill ratios, and can give you guidance pre-trade, as well as post-trade analysis. TCA is already well established in equity markets, reflecting amongst other things the European regulatory obligation to show best execution under MIFID II. But FX poses different challenges. There is no MIFID obligation for most spot FX business. And effective data are harder to come by, given the lack of market-wide pre- or post-trade transparency. TCA data sourced exclusively from one liquidity provider are unlikely to provide an objective evaluation. Platforms typically only give access to their post-trade data to active users. And very large shares of FX turnover are internalised by the large liquidity providers. So it’s hardly surprising that less than two-thirds of European FX desks use any form of TCA16 – and only a fraction of this (according to our market intelligence) involves picking trading strategies, using genuinely independent data. It remains to be seen whether independent third-party TCA providers can develop business models in FX that are both sustainable economically but also robust enough in terms of their quality and breadth of data inputs to drive widespread adoption. Establishing common standards for effective TCA, and sharing post-trade data anonymously, are areas where the buyside can usefully collaborate.

3  Ibid. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As income increases and wealth accumulates, the demand for modern services is likely to grow faster, as they have higher income elasticities. Thus, we expect that demand for financial services in Asia – such as wealth management – will rise more than proportionately to the increase in household income. For instance, assets under management attributed to mass affluent and high net worth investors in Asia is expected to expand by 60% to reach USD 176 trillion by 2020. 4 7. These positive economic factors will continue to drive the growth of Asian financial institutions and Asian capital markets. Today, five of the top ten largest banks in the world by market capitalisation are Asian banks. 5 Primary market capital-raising in Asia via IPOs is the highest in the world. In the debt market, capital raised via Asian bond issuances have also doubled since 2009 after having achieved record sales in each of the past three years. II. Asia’s capital markets are ripe for closer integration  8. The strong growth of Asian economies and financial markets has created the conditions that are driving greater financial integration in the region. In China, home to the largest bank in the world by assets, banks and asset managers have acquired sufficient scale domestically to expand and look abroad to grow their businesses. Since 2012, the total amount of RQFII quota awarded by China has more than doubled for qualified foreign institutional investors to purchase mainland RMB-denominated securities.
The question is whether these netting benefits will prove robust in a major stress – if not, the aggregate leverage ratio for firms in our sample would fall by up to 70 basis points. Second, the growth in synthetic prime brokerage (sometimes the clue is in the name – “double-leverage” is another classic of the genre, and one we have recently issued more guidance on in order to head off unsafe practices). Prime brokers can provide exposure to an asset via repo or synthetically using a total return swap, and the synthetic approach now accounts for around half of the prime brokerage activity undertaken by firms in our sample. The exposure measure does a reasonable job of capturing this activity, by requiring the firm to capitalise the effective notional position. But firms can hedge the position and thus avoid capitalising much of it where they are able to offset two client positions on equal, opposing TRSs. We should keep testing how robust these “internalisations” are likely to be in stressed conditions, to ensure that we have captured the impact of these exposures on firms’ capital positions in the same way we’ve already captured their effect on liquidity – if they came unstuck because of clients withdrawing positions then our rough worst case estimate of the impact on firms’ aggregate leverage ratio is 10 basis points. I make these points on missing leverage not to suggest that we have any short-term intentions to re-litigate these issues at Basel or elsewhere.

Now, it may be that these shifts are well within firms’ management capabilities, and they should be well captured by our capital framework. But we should be watching them like a hawk. Second, UK mortgage risk-weights for large firms using internal models have been declining significantly over the last decade – from an average of 15.1% in 2009 to 9.7% in 2018. In other words, the capital requirement which results from that part of our regime (“Pillar 1”) has dropped by one third (see Chart 5). It is also notable that the average modelled mortgage risk-weight in the UK is lower than in many other jurisdictions (see Chart 6). This trend has essentially been driven by two things: a cyclical fall in modelled Probability of Default because realised defaults have been low; and a fall in modelled Loss Given Default due to rising house prices. Both of these factors are real, and our teams make strenuous efforts to ensure that firms are modelling them in a suitably prudent way. Still, I think we should approach this trend with a very sceptical eye and need to consider whether there is a case to impose more floors in firms’ models – particularly given the current stretch in some measures of house price valuation. As to the level of risk-weights, a vital mitigant against cyclical modelling of mortgage credit risk is of course our stress-testing regime, which requires firms to carry today the amount of capital they would need to keep lending through a severe housing bust.
That is, lending to companies who have high levels of debt.8  Chart 16 The flow of gross issuance of leveraged lending to UK companies has declined from post-crisis highs and there is a tail of highly indebted firms Annual flow £ 60  % of total debt 40 Net debt to EBITDA >4x 35  50  30 40 25 30  20 15  20  10 10 5 0 01  03  05  07  09  11  13  15  17  19  0 00  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  18  Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence. Notes: Gross issuance of leveraged loans by UK companies on a 12 month rolling basis. Net debt to EBITDA ratios of the top 500 largest non-financial corporates by revenue outside of real estate and oil & gas weighted by debt. That rapid growth has now eased right off. But it has left a legacy on the balance sheets of some companies and on the balance sheets of those who have lent to them. The legacy on the balance sheets of companies is that more than a third of corporate debt is now in companies that have debt more than four times their cash flow (Chart 16). That can raise the underlying level of economic vulnerability. As we saw earlier, high-debt corporates are likely to cut back more sharply in downturns.

14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  14  Chart 17 Map of who holds leveraged loans and in what form Indicative estimated global stock of leveraged  Indicative estimated holdings of leveraged loans by  loans by product type  global investors  Sources: BarclayHedge, Bloomberg Finance L.P., FCA Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), Firm public disclosures, LCD, an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence, Morningstar, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Solvency II submissions and Bank calculations. Notes: (a) Estimates of the total stock are based on Bloomberg’s definition of leveraged loans. Given the lack of a consistent definition of leveraged lending, there is uncertainty over the total stock of outstanding leveraged loans. (b) For loans that are distributed to non-bank investors and CLOs, allocation across investors is based on ‘bottom-up’ estimates of holdings from a range of sources. Hence, there is a significant proportion of institutional loans that are unallocated. (c) For hedge fund holdings of leveraged loans and CLOs we scale up holdings reported to UK authorities by non-EEA managed AIFs to reflect the size of the global hedge fund universe. This means these estimates are particularly uncertain. (d) Revolving credit facilities and amortising term loans are allocated to banks given that they are typically the holders of these facilities. This picture is consistent with wider developments in corporate credit. Non-banks account now for 56% of the stock of UK corporate debt.
This was because, in both cases, the shocks were related to a lasting shift in the geopolitical landscape, and reductions in oil supply could not be fully offset by oil from other sources. [6] Today, although the EU response will cushion the rise in energy costs, fossil fuel prices are likely to be higher for some time. Fully replacing European imports of Russian fossil fuels is a challenge in the short term, even though there are an increasing number of examples of substitution effects taking place. [7] Over the longer term, the war is likely to accelerate the green transition in Europe, including the switch to renewables. This will require considerable green investment but will also weigh on investment in oil and gas production during the transition phase. That could put upward pressure on fossil fuel prices while demand for those fuels remains high. If energy prices are durably higher during the transition, it may have an impact on industrial production in Europe, affecting both supply and prices. This is certainly how firms in the euro area see the situation. In a recent ECB survey, at least 80% of respondents expected the ongoing transition to  make the raw materials and energy they use more expensive, leading to higher prices for their products. [8] Second, globalisation is and will be changing. The disruptions created by the pandemic, the exposure of vulnerabilities, the new geopolitical landscape and the prospect of higher energy and transport costs look set to trigger a reassessment of global value chains.

In that regard, there is now reasonable global consensus that the origin of the turmoil could be traced to excessive risk taking due to pure and simple greed; recklessness driven by intense, unadulterated greed; leading to the creation of massive “bubbles” in many developed economies, that were not supported by a robust, representative real asset base. No doubt, such risk taking had often been fuelled by lax and short-sighted regulation. To make matters worse, many rating agencies too, tacitly and indirectly, encouraged the excessive risk taking by assigning top ratings to toxic financial instruments, thereby helping to blow up the bubble even bigger. The bubble creating drivers had also been strongly supported by the global ability to transact business at unbelievable speeds and in mind-boggling volumes. This capacity provided the scope to move capital, wealth and resources across borders instantaneously, almost without restrictions or regulatory oversight, at the press of a button. But whatever may have been the drivers, the end result was that this greed and its ill-effects created and nurtured massive “bubbles” in many developed economies; and the subsequent puncturing of these massive bubbles has now revealed just how hollow and empty the financial structures that we relied upon, had been. However, even at that stage, the usually conservative multi-lateral “watchdogs”, rating agencies and experienced academics could not realize, let alone predict, that the world’s financial system was fast reaching breaking point!
We will see a negative inflation rate this year if we measure inflation by the consumer price index, the CPI. But this is largely due to our own interest rate cuts. The low inflation rate is temporary and should not trigger expectations of future deflation. Inflation expectations according to, for instance, Prospera’s survey, are anchored in a slightly longer perspective around the target of 2 per cent. My view at the April meeting was that we should begin to see signs next summer or autumn that the extremely low interest rate needs to be raised. I said then that it was not merely a question of an upturn possibly being on the way; I also pointed out that monetary policy is forward-looking and its effects come after a time lag. It is therefore more guided by developments in 2012 and 2013 the closer we come to this period. I also emphasised that although inflationary pressures were not a problem at that point, or in the near future, the situation could look very different in a year or two. For example, commodity prices could have begun to rise more than we had predicted, or the expansionary monetary policy and fiscal policy conducted in large countries could have pushed up international inflation with a risk of increased imported inflation. I also mentioned that we could not be certain that the krona would strengthen in the way we had assumed, or that productivity would recover as we had predicted.

I am pleased to see that the recent euro barometer showed a steady progression in the satisfaction of the Maltese with the adoption of the euro (from 40% in September 2005 to 64% in June 2007). Let me hand over the euro star to Governor Bonello to symbolically flag that the Central Bank of Malta will join the Eurosystem on 1 January 2008. We look forward to welcoming you wholeheartedly into the euro area. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 110/2007  1