samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The fact that low inflation is not sufficient to achieve a moderate price trend in asset markets is illustrated by the development of the American stock market in the last few years. Naturally, this represents something of a dilemma. What should central banks do? Does this mean, then, that monetary policy should, to a greater extent than hitherto, be used to take firm action in response to rapid price increases in asset markets? There is no easy answer to this question, but the predominant view nowadays is that the answer is no. Nevertheless, as a decision-maker I must keep my options open on this one. Situations may arise in the future that we cannot predict today in which monetary policy might have a role to play. BIS Review 128/1999  4  Perhaps the main reason why it is normally not advisable to try to influence asset prices is that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to be sure when a bubble has formed and when rising prices are due to improvements in underlying economic factors. The appropriate monetary policy must be determined by the fundamental causes of the rise in asset prices. Let us assume, for example, that a rise in share prices reflects better prospects of higher future corporate profits as a result of faster underlying growth in productivity. In that case, the rise in prices is the result of an improvement in fundamental economic factors, which means that it is based on “real”, rather than psychological, causes.

The federal guarantees for the COVID-19 loans and the liquidity provided at favourable conditions by the SNB have contributed towards Switzerland being able to avoid a credit crunch in the past few months. Page 3/4  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Thomas Jordan  News conference  It will take some time yet before the economy recovers, and uncertainty will remain high for the time being. We will therefore be seeking to do our utmost with our monetary policy to ensure price stability and to contribute to the economic recovery. Climate change and the SNB  I would now like to talk about the significance of climate change for the SNB. We have been working intensively on this topic for some time now. We want to properly assess possible consequences of climate change for the economy, for financial stability, and for the management of our foreign exchange reserves in order to ensure that we can fulfil our statutory mandate at all times. To this end, we also collaborate with other central banks, in particular in the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), and we work together closely with FINMA. As regards monetary policy, we are continuously deepening our analysis into how climate change could affect economic growth and inflation. The dialogue with other central banks is particularly important in this area. When it comes to financial stability, the SNB focuses its efforts on determining the impact of climate risks on the stability of the Swiss banking system.
MONETARY POLICY REPORT PRESENTATION BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC  Mario Marcel Governor Central Bank of Chile 1 April 2020    The Monetary Policy Report of March 2020 can be visited at http://www.bcentral.cl. 1. Introduction Mr President of the Senate’s Finance Committee, Senator Jorge Pizarro; Senators members of the Committee, ladies, gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation to the Board of the Central Bank of Chile (CBC) to present our view on recent macroeconomic developments, its outlook and implications for monetary policy. This Monetary Policy Report is seeing the light in unprecedented circumstances, both because of the worldwide sanitary emergency and because of the economic consequences of the policy responses to stop the spread of COVID-19 in many countries. Unprecedented also because the need to restrict social contact has prevented us from presenting this Report normally instead of by this remote connection. The Monetary Policy Report we released this morning shows the dramatic change in the economic scenario that our country and the entire world are confronting. The global spread of COVID-19, the measures that have been adopted to contain it and the uncertainty about its reach have been reflected in plummeting stock markets and asset prices around the world, triggering a global economic recession in 2020. Chile will also feel this contractionary impact: in the baseline scenario that I will share with you in a few moments, we project that the Chilean economy will contract between 1.5% and 2.5% this year.

Central Bank of Chile March 2019  CBC-IADB Joint Workshop on “Basel III in the Context of the Macroprudential Approach” Opening Remarks by Mario Marcel, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Santiago, Chile – March 29, 2019 Good morning and welcome to the “Basel III in the Context of the Macroprudential Approach” workshop which is co-organized by the Central Bank of Chile and the Inter-American Development Bank. It is a pleasure to host this event in Santiago, at a very appropriate timing. After a year and a half of legislative discussion, on January 12th of this year, the new General Banking Law was enacted. This is the most significant change to solvency regulations since 1986, setting the basis for the implementation of the Basel III framework in Chile. A second reason goes back 35 years. In a few more days, the Central Bank will receive the last repayment of the subordinated debt originated in the rescue of the Chilean financial system of the early 1980s. It has been a long way since this episode, and the fact that only now can we finally put it behind us, highlights the importance of doing everything in our reach to prevent the occurrence of major financial disruptions. Allow me to go briefly over the history of the Chilean financial system over the last five decades, and how regulation has reacted and evolved over time. Some 50 years ago, banks where almost the only source of financing for companies and households.
This gives rise to something called convexity effects, which indicate negative risk premiums. These convexity effects are normally limited, but will grow if uncertainty about the future increases. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  expectations provide such a mixed picture, it is not surprising that different analysts reach different conclusions. Figure 1 Two-year forward interest rates and money market agents’ repo-rate expectations two years ahead according to Prospera Per cent  Sources: Reuters EcoWin and TNS SIFO Prospera. Note. Forward rates have been adjusted for risk premiums and describe the expected overnight rate. Risk premiums include both credit risk and maturity premiums. The dates of Prospera’s surveys refer to the dates the surveys were carried out. So, how should you go about assessing market expectations in such a situation? This is a difficult question and I have no complete answer. However, this should not stop us from trying to determine how to evaluate different measures of monetary policy expectations. Let me begin with forward rates. Forward rates have many merits. They reflect market expectations for many different time horizons and they can be observed continuously, which makes it possible to analyse how market expectations are affected by different events. Often, but not always, they also provide a fairly reasonable picture of market expectations. However, the problem with forward rates, as we have already seen, is that they are also affected by a range of other factors and this sometimes means that they provide a misleading picture of market expectations.

For example, an unfavourable scenario in which a burst asset bubble leads to a deflationary situation that is hard to overcome will be assigned greater importance than a high-inflation scenario. Experience from Japan in the 1990s illustrates this. Assessments of this type must be taken into account in the monetary policy decision. The moral of the story is that monetary policy cannot be reduced to a mechanical reading exercise. However well-prepared the material on which monetary policy decisions are based, there will always be complex and important aspects that policymakers must take a stance on. It is important that these aspects are discussed from several different perspectives. This is one reason why we have an Executive Board made up of economists with different backgrounds and expertise. It is beneficial and important for us to conduct a wide-ranging debate on monetary policy at the Riksbank and not just externally. I believe that it leads to better monetary policy decisions. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches
We have also expanded our balance sheet on a scale that would have been unthinkable before the crisis: around 55% in the last 12 months. Question : The ECB expects that the economy will gradually start to recover again in 2010. Where are the impulses for growth likely to come from? Answer: The growth and inflation projections you mention come from the staff of the Eurosystem central banks. They are not the forecasts of the Governing Council of the ECB. BIS Review 1/2009  3  We look closely at these projections, but we also consider other forecasts, such as those from the private sector. Question: And what conclusion do you arrive at? Answer: Taking into account the staff projections, we believe that the risks to growth in the euro area are on the downside. That being said, we are in an environment of great uncertainty and we must treat new data and figures with the greatest humility. But we also have to take into account the fact that some developments, such as the drastic reduction in the price of oil and other commodities, are simultaneously disinflationary and expansionary. Question: Why is the Governing Council of the ECB so reluctant to give indications regarding the interest rate decision in January? Answer: As I said at the last press conference when reporting on the position of the Governing Council, we are concentrating at present on the impact of our previous decisions. We have already cut rates by 175 basis points within a very short span of time.

16  There is nonetheless some heterogeneity across banks, owing to differences in factors such as the composition of their private sector credit and debt securities portfolios, their international presence or the extent of their lending under the ICO programme. For instance, the impact of the scenarios on firms’ probability of default varies notably according to their size and sector of activity. These factors and others, such as the relative weight of mortgage credit (relatively safer) and lending to firms, mean that impairment losses are more prevalent at some banks than at others in Spain. Conclusions In short, the Spanish banking industry looks to maintain satisfactory aggregate resilience were the extreme macro-financial risks identified to materialise. While the materialisation of such risks would entail a significant capital charge in the sector, this would not be so substantial as to jeopardise the stability of the financial system under the scenarios analysed. In any event, the current uncertain environment calls for prudent behaviour on the part of the industry and the careful monitoring of risks, which may evolve rapidly and require that new stress scenarios be considered. Moreover, the short and medium-term challenges I refer to above must not allow us to overlook the need to address the structural challenges already facing the banking sector before the onset of the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In particular, the need for capacity adjustment and the growing competition from tech firms, as well as the potential adverse impact of climate-related risks. 17
Going forward, the securitized credit markets will be shaped importantly by regulatory efforts, with some potential changes such as risk retention and transparency requirements still undecided. Defining the Central Bank’s role as liquidity provider Let me now turn to the broader issue of the appropriate role of the central bank as a provider of liquidity during periods of market strain. In effect, both of the programs I have just discussed expand the reach of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity policies to a broader set of firms than those with access to our traditional discount window program. Moreover, the Federal Reserve launched a number of other facilities during the financial crisis that reached other types of firms and markets. The scope and process for launching similar liquidity facilities in the future will be guided by the legislative efforts currently under way. Still, it is important for the Federal Reserve to reflect on what we have learned through our experiences so that we may better judge the actions that should be taken in the future within that legislative structure. The liquidity programs that were launched by the Federal Reserve shared some common characteristics. In all cases, the programs provided credit in stressed markets, and for those facilities that offered credit at a predetermined interest rate, the rate was set at a penalty relative to normal market functioning. This approach yields several benefits. First, by acting in markets that are under stress, such programs have the scope to produce substantial improvements in market conditions.

The need to reduce the levels of indebtedness of all sectors and the prevailing conditions of access to external financing will continue to curb the possibilities for any expansion in domestic spending. Exports might be the only component of output to increase in 2012. Admittedly, the international situation is subject to a high degree of uncertainty and, in particular, the activity of the euro area as a whole is expected to flatline or fall slightly. But it is also true that the behaviour of exports has been very favourable over the last two years and Spanish firms have been increasingly diversifying their exports towards third markets with more dynamic demand. Unfortunately, the stimulus provided by external demand will not suffice to offset the effect of the other contractionary forces on employment, which can be expected to fall further. If the labour reform were to begin to produce its effects soon, wages might grow somewhat slower than in 2011. And along with productivity gains, that would lead to further declines in unit labour costs, thus enabling competitiveness gains to be made. Prices will continue on the moderating path on which they embarked in the second half of last year, although the risk of rising energy prices has not disappeared. To sum up: the scenario described indicates that domestic demand will continue to adjust in step with the ongoing financial deleveraging and fiscal consolidation.
Chart 11: Private sector job-to-job flows have picked up, having moved closely with wages in the past, but less closely recently…  Chart 12: The REC survey measure of pay for new recruits has picked up sharply, but its relationship with official data on average pay has become less robust. Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey and Bank calculations. (a) The number of people who report being in a private sector job in the first quarter, and then report being in a private sector job for less than three months in the second quarter of the survey. Source: ONS, KPMG/REC/Markit and Bank calculations. (a) Left-hand scale, lagged three months. The REC measure is produced by weighting together survey indices for the pay of permanent and temporary placements using shares in employment. (b) Right-hand scale. Private sector regular pay growth versus single month a year earlier.

22  It is the average of real unit labour costs across firms in the economy that matters for inflation. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  need to be mindful of the possibility that it represents part of a longer-term trend towards job polarisation. What matters for inflationary pressures, irrespective of the type of job, is the relationship between wages and productivity, as captured by unit labour costs. Across the economy, wage growth is barely above productivity growth. Unit labour costs are currently soft (growing at only around 1% in the economy as a whole), are below the growth rate necessary to meet the inflation target, and indicate that there is further to go before we reach the new sustainable level of employment. In other words, there is still slack in the labour market that must be used up, and the recent revisions to the profile of UK output up to 2012 seem unlikely to change that assessment materially. That slack is wasteful. And if it were to remain, inflation would remain below the 2% target. The MPC’s current best collective judgement is that, while it has narrowed rapidly, this slack is broadly in the region of 1% of GDP. As this margin of slack continues to narrow, we expect wages to pick up slightly faster than productivity, and unit labour cost growth should increase, consistent with meeting the inflation target. However, the MPC expects it will take the better part of three years for this to happen.
Mr. McDonough gives his perspective on the Year 2000 problem and the challenges it poses Remarks by the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. William J. McDonough, before the Regional Y2K Meeting for Financial Regulators in the Asia/Pacific Region, held in Sydney on 19/10/98. I am delighted to be here today at the first of several regional forums on the Year 2000 problem that the Joint Year 2000 Council is organizing. As an original sponsor and ex officio member of the Council, I am especially pleased that it has been successful in rapidly organizing today’s events to coincide with the International Conference of Bank Supervisors meetings. This gathering provides another example of how financial market supervisors and regulators such as yourselves are leading the way in tackling this issue around the world. In my remarks today, I will provide my perspective on the Year 2000 problem and the challenges it poses. My experience with the issue draws first on my role at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where we are addressing Year 2000 challenges as a central bank, as a bank supervisor, as a payment system operator and as a business much like any other business. Internationally, I became involved with the issue through the G-10 Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and spoke out about the need for payment system operators worldwide to address the Year 2000 problem.

To help you better understand the various methods, we will have a brief demonstration to illustrate these methods towards the end of the press conference. A series of promotional activities will be launched by the banking industry and individual banks from June 2005 onward to help customers to fully understand this security measure. Mr He will highlight the key features of the consumer education programme to you. Two-factor authentication strengthens the security controls of Internet banking and protects bank customers from Internet banking frauds. We are confident that with the joint efforts of the banking sector, bank customers, the Police and the HKMA, Internet banking will continue to flourish under a safe and sound environment in Hong Kong. BIS Review 44/2005  1
We can’t be confident about the effects in this country of the new economy - though we remain open-minded. Nor can we be confident of either the extent or the likely persistence of what appear to be exceptional downward pressures on retail margins. We don’t know for sure what is likely to happen to the oil price - and so on. We will - in the best central banking tradition - need to be eternally vigilant. But for all the uncertainties, the overall prospect for the economy as a whole over the next couple of years - in my view, but it is a view that I think is broadly shared by most of the other members of the Monetary Policy Committee, is for continuing steady growth, at or a bit above its longer-term trend, for continuing high employment, and for continuing low inflation at around the Chancellor’s target. And that, too, my Lord Mayor, is not a bad prospect either. Our problem - and it has been a persistent headache over the past two or three years, as I have repeatedly tried to explain on earlier occasions - is the imbalance between the domestic sectors of the economy, which have by and large been doing pretty well, and those that are heavily internationally exposed. Those sectors have had a tough time over the past few years - what with the global economic slowdown and particularly more recently with the seemingly remorseless rise of sterling against the euro.

But they are likely to remain part of our policy toolkit, at least for the foreseeable future, given the real risks to macro-economic stability that an environment of very low global interest rates poses. A third and more fundamental strategy has to focus on building greater depth in Asia’s capital markets, while ensuring that our banking systems remain sound. A good example of this strategy is in fact in Malaysia. Bank Negara’s Financial Sector Blueprint II (2012–2020), released as part of the government’s Economic Transformation Programme (ETP), will build on the solid foundations of Malaysia’s financial system, including developing a deep and vibrant bond market. The banks in several leading Asian countries, including Malaysia and Singapore, are generally well-managed and well-capitalised. They were a source of strength for us during the global financial crisis. However, Asia’s capital markets, and especially the corporate bond markets, need much more depth. Broader and deeper capital markets will allow investors to invest for the long term while hedging against risks. They will help us meet the growing infrastructural and other long term investment needs of the region. This is therefore a very important priority in the region, and there is in fact significant scope for future development of Asian capital markets. Regulators are working to harmonise rules and market practices across the region, such as issuance procedures and settlement standards. We also need to develop the securitisation markets, with appropriate safeguards, so that banks can recycle their capital.