samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And we want to do this in a way that is meaningful for the economy. That is why it is not a quantitative increase in liquidity (quantitative easing or QE), but is targeted and aimed at facilitating the flow of credit. In a way, I would describe it as a qualitative increase rather than as a quantitative one. However, we should not get into a debate over terminology. At the ECB, we do not believe in magic words, QE or otherwise. What we want to do is to devise a monetary policy that is effective in the current economic situation and that fits Europe’s economic framework. Thus, inevitably, the ECB’s monetary expansion is unlike that conducted in the United States or the United Kingdom. We are at a different juncture and our economy is structured differently. In fact, we cannot draw too many lessons from what other central banks have done, because our situation is so different. Q: Has an actual target been set for the expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet? A: No, we have not set a particular target, because we will do whatever is useful to facilitate the flow of credit to the economy. We have announced a programme to purchase assetbacked securities and covered bonds. Depending on its impact on growth and inflation, this programme can be expanded. The Governing Council will monitor developments, discuss them, and take decisions as appropriate. Q: You have been accused by some of instigating a bubble, particularly of public debt.

A: It is true that there is currently an enormous amount of liquidity at the global level in general and in the euro area in particular. And there are very low risk premia across all asset classes, not just for public debt. This necessitates great vigilance on the part of investors and authorities in order to avoid encouraging excessive risk-taking. And it will also be very important to exercise macroeconomic vigilance, because there is going to be abundant  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  liquidity in the next few years. To achieve this, macro prudential instruments should be used to their full extend. Q: Spain is issuing bonds at historically low interest rates, but its debt is standing at around 100% of GDP and within ten years it will be faced with enormous payouts upon maturity. What is going to happen then? A: It is no mystery: debt sustainability depends on a sound fiscal policy, and Spain is on the way to achieving this. It is taking time, but Spain has already made good progress on reducing the deficit. This work is not yet done and should continue until equilibrium is reached. Debt sustainability requires a significant increase in nominal GDP growth. The ECB’s contribution is to bring inflation back to levels below and close to 2% for the euro area as a whole, as set out in our mandate. However, in the long term the most important thing is real growth and this can only be achieved by increasing productivity.
And that would generate risk premia and additional volatility in financial markets. The challenge in achieving price stability Implementing a symmetric mandate in current circumstances is not an easy task. I see three challenges in the current situation First, in finding the optimal mix of non-conventional instruments. Central Banks in general, and the ECB in particular, have been quite innovative. New methods of forward guidance have been developed that have proved very efficient in the euro area in bringing down the short end of the yield curve. The main question, in my mind, concerns the best combination of the other  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  instruments: negative deposit rates and asset purchases. There is no certainty that they can be implemented together in a consistent way. Asset purchases are expected to act both through changes in asset prices and a flattening of the yield curve. They inject central bank liquidity that forces banks to hold excess reserves in significant amounts. However, the negative rates create a sort of tax on those reserves. The apparent rationale is that negative rates would push banks to grant new loans or buy assets, therefore reinforcing the impact of asset purchases. But since loans create deposits, and the sellers of assets receive liquidity that they need to deposit on bank accounts too, there is simply no way this liquidity can disappear until the central bank decides to withdraw it.

However, long periods of low interest rates unavoidably create incentives for risk taking and “search for yield”. That dilemma can, in principle, be solved through proper macroprudential policies. I will return later to challenges we face in that specific area. The meaning of price stability Let me start with a crucial point. Central banks have a strong mandate to preserve and achieve price stability. Strict adherence to this mandate – and the clear willingness to fulfil it – is their main protection against the dangers created by the zero lower bound. As we all know, inflation is ultimately driven by expectations. Inflation expectations were remarkably stable during the whole first decade of the euro. Today, the major risk in the euro area is a downward drift that would durably set long-run inflation expectations at a level below our objective of price stability. We do not know much about how expectations are formed. However, I have no doubt  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  that the perceived reaction function of the central bank plays a major role in anchoring price stability. Second, symmetry is of the essence. For a significant period of time, we have been well below our definition of price stability in the euro area, both in terms of effective inflation and long-term expectations. There is a temptation to take a benign view of this situation and consider that low inflation is beneficial per se, irrespective of its level.
As I have suggested at the outset, advances on these fronts will contribute to the overall gains from financial development through more effective financial intermediation, more efficient risk sharing and risk management, and increasing opportunities to make transactions between time zones smoother. Each requires modifications in domestic regulations and institutions as well as significant coordination between jurisdictions. I believe that progress in one area will be reinforced by progress in the others in a virtuous circle. I am impressed by the extensive work carried out by the World Bank in its Flagship study, and I once again thank them for their contribution to the economic development in the region through this work. Ladies and Gentlemen, with these brief opening remarks I hope I have conveyed how important I believe the topic of our conference is, and how pleased I am to see you all here to participate in the event. I wish all participants productive discussion in the coming two days. Thank you. BIS Review 61/2006  3

Investors in stock market are interested in businesses that are merging in order to gain size, increase their market share, and squeeze out their smaller rivals. In some cases, this leads to monopolistic power, with ability to take even more advantage of their customers and consumers. 2  BIS Review 43/2006  The younger generation places importance on success measured by numbers and quantity rather than quality, value, and merit. The government, which is supposed to be a role model for the public in general, seems to be concerned only with high GDP growth rates – the higher the better. Issues such as mega projects and the rally in the stock index are more welcomed. All success factors are tied-in with increases in monetary value, or in other words, “only money matters”. Under this environment of “only money matters”, and with growth and profit as key determinants of success, the business sector naturally strives to achieve these goals without regard to what is destroyed or lost along the way. For example, many tourist destinations have been created at the expense of local natural habitats and environments. In order to minimize their own costs, industrial factories release untreated wastewater into our waterways, creating adverse consequences for our communities. In the retail sales business, Western influences have attracted us to large chain stores and franchises, such as Tesco-Lotus supermarkets or 7-11 convenience stores. At the same time, traditional family-run businesses and mom-and-pop stores are fast disappearing.
The sector has been restrained by several factors including the large shadow inventory making its way through the foreclosure pipeline, tight underwriting standards for new mortgage origination, and the sharp slowdown in household formation. Although the corporate sector as a whole is now relatively healthy, there still is a significant constraint on the availability of credit to small business. Business investment continues to expand, but at a restrained pace. I presume that this partially reflects uncertainty over the economic outlook, including the risks around the evolution of U.S. fiscal policy and the crisis in Europe. Fiscal policy has already become restrictive as state and local governments have cut expenditures in response to revenue shortfalls. Moreover, we face the so-called “fiscal cliff” at the start of next year. At the beginning of 2013, federal fiscal policy is scheduled under current law to become sharply contractionary, with abrupt increases in taxes and cuts in spending. Businesspeople tell me that the uncertainty about how Congress and the Administration will deal with the fiscal cliff – and our fiscal challenges more broadly – is already inhibiting hiring and investment. The fiscal cliff represents a threat to the recovery that is wholly avoidable. But we will only avoid it if our politicians act responsibly. We need a credible strategy for bringing down the federal budget deficit over time in a manner supportive of ongoing economic recovery. Any plan should start slowly, but build steadily over time.

It should be bipartisan in nature so that the plan is viewed as sustainable across the political cycle. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Meanwhile the crisis in the eurozone has resulted in a sharp slow-down in economic growth in Europe and tighter financial conditions globally. It has hurt U.S. consumer and business confidence and is already a material drag on U.S. growth. Economic momentum in many other regions of the world has also slowed somewhat and this is also restraining the demand for U.S. exports. Assuming that Congress avoids the fiscal cliff and European leaders successfully manage through their challenges, there are solid grounds for expecting that growth will gradually strengthen in coming years. U.S. banks are healthier and credit conditions, while still tight, are gradually easing, the housing sector is showing early signs of recovery, and households appear quite far along in the deleveraging process. On the inflation side, we have succeeded in delivering inflation very close to our 2 percent price stability objective. Over the past year or so, price trends have been a bit stickier than one might have anticipated given the large amount of slack in the economy. To some degree, this likely reflects earlier upward pressures on commodity prices, the anchoring exerted by stable inflation expectations, and the stickiness of nominal wages. With gasoline prices now falling sharply and upward pressures from apparel prices now appearing likely to dissipate, I expect that inflation will decline a bit in coming months, falling somewhat further below our 2 percent objective.
Table 4: Conditional gender pay gap for specification (5) and (8)  Specifications (5)  Female  (8)  Coefficient  Pay gap, per cent  Coefficient  Pay gap, per cent  Number of observations per group  -0.159***  -15%  -0.163***  -15%  291,859  -10%  38,793  (-11.17)  -0.102***  Ethnic minority  (-23.01) 0.0719***  Female*Ethnic minority Observations  (-11.30)  7%  (-13.57) 537,177  524,612  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. In order to calculate the pay gap for female ethnic minorities, we have added up the coefficients of the female, ethnic minority, and the female-ethnic minority interaction dummies, as all of these dummies take the value 1 for a female ethnic minority. If we run these regressions over time, the same broad pattern emerges. White men earn more than any of the other three categories (ethnic minority males and females and white females), although all of these pay gaps have shrunk somewhat over the past 25 years (Chart 24). Pay gaps for ethnic minority males have tended to be a little smaller, but have also fallen less rapidly. Pay gaps for ethnic minority women, while halving over the period, remain strikingly high.

There is still disagreement, however, on how to deal with flows, on who bears the burden of adjustment, and on the scope for global policy cooperation. However, there is perhaps a deeper lesson to be drawn from the global financial crisis. The crisis came largely as a surprise; not because we did not see the bubbles forming, but rather because the central banking community as a whole failed to fully take into account the vulnerabilities resulting from the growth of the shadow banking sector, the opacity of the novel financial instruments that helped fuel the bubble, and the complex domestic and international linkages between different financial sector intermediaries. A fundamental lesson to be drawn from the global financial crisis is the need to develop an integrated, forward-looking approach to central banking that brings together: •  Comprehensive, granular (and perhaps “real time”) financial sector surveillance that focuses on identifying systemic risk and develops adequate market infrastructure and reporting systems;  •  Market intelligence that captures short, medium and long-term trends in the financial system, including, for example, the potential impacts of the rapid evolution of electronic trading platforms and algorithmic investment strategies; and  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Research and analysis that spans monetary, exchange rate, and macroprudential policies. We have made some progress in this direction here at the Central Bank of Brazil, but we expect to continue to develop this integrated approach to central banking for some years to come.
Fourthly, the information technology infrastructure and capacity of financial institutions would be strengthened, thus allowing more efficient utilization of technology to serve increasing customer needs, while supervisory standards would focus on ensuring security of services. Finally, there is the need to enhance the capacity of human resource in the banking sector. Ladies and gentlemen, In any financial system development and reform, regulation must be able to keep up. Let’s now turn to the third and final part of my talk: key measures in risk-based supervision to ensure stability. In this regard, the Bank of Thailand continues to work closely with the Basel Committee, through our participation as member of the Standard Implementation Group, or the SIG, and Basel Consultative Group, or the BCG, as well as work with other regulators in the EMEAP  BIS Review 20/2010  3  region to reform the global financial system. Through these forums, we participate in key reform areas such as refining of risk measurement, formulating measures in handling systemically important institutions, calibrating regulations, such as Basel II capital requirements, stress-testing, and accounting rules to alleviate such problems. Our role in these forums helps us to steer much reform in ways that are consistent with our own national context, and would be key to ensure proper matching of risk profile in our system with emerging regulations. At home, empowered with the recent improvement in the legal framework, namely the Financial Institutions Business Act, we will remain committed to performing risk-based supervision and ensuring proper governance within individual financial institutions.

This may, for example, include microfinance bank, custodial or trust bank, Islamic bank, and investment bank. Such entry would depend on the value added generated for the economy, in terms of increased efficiency in services, and expanded access to underserved segments. In the last year of the Plan, 2014, we may also consider entry in terms of full commercial bank license, if this adds value to the economy, through serving Thailand’s international trade and investment interest, including trends in regional integration. We will also work on improving and developing necessary financial infrastructure to support banks and other microfinance service providers in reaching this untapped market. And for the still missing pieces of the jig-saw, SFIs will take the lead. On the third pillar. There are five key areas of financial infrastructure improvement. First, in response to changes in customer needs that are becoming more complex, efforts would be made to enhance the capability and tools for risk management of financial institutions, including credit, market, liquidity, and settlement risks. Secondly, there needs to be improvement in the information system for risk management of financial institutions to help them in strategic planning and service expansion, while of course, ensuring appropriate protection of client confidentiality. Thirdly, financial laws that support risk management of financial institutions in dealing with credit risk and NPL and NPA management would be reviewed.
I will be happy to do my level best to avoid answering any questions you might have. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

On the domestic front, several years of subdued growth may have caused some underlying erosion that could compromise the economy’s ability to grow in the medium term. Deterioration of the labor market is particularly risky because it could weaken household consumption, which, by growing 2%-2.5% annually over the last three years has provided support for domestic demand and, ultimately, inflation. On the other hand, private investment may recover faster if export demand and expectations improve faster than expected. Longer-term perspectives 7  18. In 2012-2013 the Chilean economy was exposed to a substantial external shock given by the end of the commodities super cycle. However, contrary to past episodes, the economy did not fall into a recession. In fact, despite a substantial slow down, the signs of an economic contraction are not visible. Salaried employment slowed down but no massive layoffs have taken place. Companies saw their margins compressed by rising input costs and weak demand, but bankruptcies have not picked up. The demand for loans has weakened, but NPLs have remained stable. 19. The former is due to two major reasons. First, the macroeconomic policy framework has provided countercyclical support while allowing relative prices to adjust to the new circumstances via the exchange rate. Between mid-2013 and early 2016 the Chilean peso depreciated some 55%, putting some pressure on inflation, but the Central Bank kept monetary policy on a steady course until inflation decelerated from nearly 5% to less than 2% in less than a year. 20.
Another possible explanation for the high level of saving may be that the households underestimate how much is saved in the public pension system following the reform of the system. 18 If this is the case, our level of saving could be unjustifiably high and could remain so for some time to come. Figure 5 shows saving in different sectors in Sweden. Figure 5 Finance balance in different sectors in Sweden Percentage of GDP, current prices 10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  Households  -10  -10  Public sector Companies  -15  -15 80  82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the National Institute of Economic Research  It may also be the case that the explanation has more to do with investment. Sweden has had a lower investment ratio than both the OECD and the EU averages since the 1990s. The difference is almost entirely explained, however, by the fact that investment in housing has been lower in Sweden (Figure 6). This has partly been an adjustment following the very high level of investment in housing in the 1980s, but also probably relates to changes in the regulation in connection with the tax reform of 1991 and the fact that a new housing finance system was introduced in 1993.

An SME Credit Bureau and the Central Credit Reference Information System (CCRIS) complements the infrastructure that is in place for SME financing by collating vital credit and transaction information that enable SMEs to build their credit reputation from a wide range of informational sources. The Bank also continues to actively reach out to support SMEs through the provision of financial planning and risk management services, and the promotion of financial literacy alongside similar initiatives by financial institutions. Public-private partnerships between The Association of Banks in Malaysia and Bank Negara Malaysia have also worked successfully to encourage improvements in customer service levels and the turn-around time taken to process SME financing applications. These initiatives have yielded tremendous payoffs to the national economy. Malaysia also ranked in first place in the world in 2009 in the category of access to credit by the World Bank in their “Doing Business 2010 Report”. BIS Review 98/2010  3  International and regional cooperation In a global economy, efforts to support SMEs must also address frameworks for facilitating trade, payments and financing beyond national borders. Effective regional and international collaboration can add significantly to enhance further the long term contribution of SMEs to the economy. The endeavour by APEC in the establishment of the APEC SME Working Group in 1995 has provided an important collaborative platform for policymakers and private sector leaders to come together in designing regional strategies for SME development.
Second, we have seen a steady decrease in dependency ratios, which has stimulated excess savings and therefore lowered the equilibrium rate. This trend, too, will reverse soon, as the increase in the share of the elderly population will outpace all other population groups. Dependency ratios around the world will rise, which will buoy the equilibrium rate. Third, inequality has risen in past decades, again adding to the increase in the mean savings rate. But note that we are now observing a decrease in (at least) wage inequality in many countries, including the Czech Republic. Inequality, broadly defined, has decreased in most countries around the world since the crisis (World Bank, 2016). I believe that the discussion on inequality tends to be overly pessimistic. Fourth, more and more developing countries have been getting fully integrated into the world economy, releasing their supply of savings into global markets and giving rise to the notion of a “savings glut”. I see no reversal here, which means that this factor will continue to depress the equilibrium real rate of interest. Fifth, the relative price of capital goods has been decreasing. In consequence, capital has become cheaper relative to labor. This is reducing the total demand for capital (when counted in nominal terms) and thus lowering the equilibrium rate. Again, this trend is likely to continue. Sixth, we have witnessed a preference shift away from infrastructure projects, which is again reducing the demand for capital. In many countries, environmental regulations have made it difficult to invest in infrastructure.

“Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest: International Trends and Determinants,” Journal of International Economics, vol. 108(S1), pages 59–75. Rachel, Lukasz & Smith, Thomas D., 2017. “Are Low Real Interest Rates Here to Stay?” International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(3), pages 1-42. World Bank, 2016. “Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality”. World Bank Group report. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches