samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I shall therefore explain and inform you, as far as possible, how the Riksbank will manage the supply of liquidity. I shall also give my opinion of the risk of liquidity problems actually arising in practice. In Sweden, all major payments between accounts are managed within the RIX payment system which links together the Riksbank and all major credit institutions. A bank that has a payments deficit always has the option of financing this deficit by borrowing from the Riksbank against collateral at the Riksbank’s lending rate. Similarly, a bank that has a surplus always has the right to invest it at the Riksbank at the Riksbank’s deposit rate. These rates at present stand at 4.25% and 2.75% respectively. However, a bank that has surplus liquidity always gains by lending it to a bank that has a deficit via the market for lending between banks, the interbank market. The bank that lends its surplus funds then receives a higher rate of interest than the Riksbank’s deposit rate, while at the same time the bank that borrows money pays a lower rate of interest than the Riksbank’s lending rate. Loans on the interbank market occur within the framework of set credit lines so that here no collateral is required. If the financial system as a whole has a liquidity deficit with respect to the Riksbank – as a result of the banks ordering banknotes from us – the deficits and surpluses cannot be settled on the interbank market.

The key to realising the higher return is to adhere to the strategy also in times of heightened uncertainty, as we did through the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. An official framework for rebalancing back to a set allocation to equities has now been established. This will help ensure that this strategy is carried out during the next period of high volatility in financial markets. Chart: Lower costs Management costs for equities are higher than for fixed-income securities. The cost of managing many small shareholdings is higher than managing a few large ones, as is the cost of managing investments in emerging markets in relation to developed markets. Overall management costs as a percentage of the GPFG have nonetheless fallen over time. We have exploited its size to realise economies of scale. In the past few years, costs have been reduced also in krone terms. This is partly due to reduced use of external managers. Costs for external services, such as IT, custodian and settlement services, have also been lowered. Relative to the size of the GPFG, management costs are modest. Norges Bank continuously seeks to achieve efficiency gains without impairing the quality of investment management. In 2012, management costs came to 0.05 percent of the GPFG. Chart: Transparent and professional management Norges Bank meets international and national transparency standards relating to investment management. We have high ambitions with regard to transparency. Yet, we must weigh different considerations.
Luis M Linde: Monetary policy – current situation and challenges Closing remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the launch of the yearbook “Anuario del euro 2014”/Fundación de Estudios Financieros-Fundación ICO, Madrid, 28 January 2015. *  *  *  Firstly, I would like to thank Irene Garrido, chairwoman of ICO, Fernando Fernández and Juan Carlos Ureta for kindly inviting me to attend the launch of this new edition of the Anuario del Euro. I will begin by reviewing the current economic situation in the euro area and the measures adopted by the European Central Bank. Then I will go on to briefly comment on the leeway available to monetary policy in a context of very low inflation rates, and conclude by saying something about the different position in the monetary policy cycle of the main developed economies. The economic situation in the euro area and the ECB’s monetary policy The euro area’s economy is in a situation of weakness, with overall expected growth of 0.8% for 2014. After remaining fairly dynamic in first quarter of 2014, GDP grew only modestly in the following two quarters, and according to available forecasts, the path of recovery, both in the short and medium term, will be fragile, with disparities between countries. According to the European Central Bank’s projections, in line with the consensus, 2015 and 2016 will see growth of 1% and 1.5%, respectively.

Rather, it is a crucial step in the economic and monetary integration of the European Union (“EU”) countries and the creation of the single market. This change will involve 300 million consumers, 16% of world GDP and 29% of world trade. This demonstrates why the euro is an important event for Hong Kong. As the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer recently made clear, we are now living in a global economy, in which each economy can directly affect the prospects of every other. Where the economy concerned is the size of the EU, its potential to affect other economies - for good or bad - is without question. This is reinforced by the existing trade and financial links between Hong Kong and the EU countries: • the EU ranks 3rd among Hong Kong’s trading partners in the world; • in the first eight months of this year, the EU accounted for $ billion or 13.2% of Hong Kong’s total trade - much of this represents entrepot trade between the EU and mainland China; • the EU is the largest external investor in Hong Kong, accounting for over $ billion or 34% of the total; • more than 700 EU companies use Hong Kong as regional headquarters or regional offices; • the EU is the 2nd largest source of visitors and 4th largest source of tourist earnings for Hong Kong; • there are over 50 licensed banks and other authorized institutions in Hong Kong from the EU countries, the largest concentration in Asia.
The test will motivate banks, insurers and asset managers to address data gaps and to develop cutting-edge risk management approaches consistent with a range of possible climate pathways. The Bank will develop the approach in consultation with industry, including best practice insurers, and other informed stakeholders including experts from the Network for Greening the Financial System and the PRA’s Climate Financial Risk Forum. Return There is increasing evidence that sustainable investment can generate excess returns, particularly for investors, like insurers, with longer term horizons. One of the biggest hurdles to channelling mainstream finance to sustainable investment is the inconsistent definition and measurement of environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria. An agreed taxonomy would allow markets to understand better where there is real outperformance and direct investments accordingly. The EU’s Green Taxonomy and the Green Bond Standard are good starts but they are binary (dark green or brown) and don’t account for progress from brown to green – progress that could make a significant contribution to our climate goals. One possible solution, as recommended by the UN’s Climate Financial Leaders Initiative, could be the development of transition indices which track companies in high-carbon sectors that adopt low-carbon strategies. Such approaches are essential for our citizens to make sure their money is being invested in line with their values. Conclusion Ultimately, the speed with which the new sustainable finance develops will be decided by the coherence and credibility of countries’ climate policies.

20 countries, which account for 17% of global GDP, have already committed to or legislated for a net-zero emissions goal, with the UK becoming the first in the G7 to do so. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  Insurance, Risk Financing and Development event, 22 September 2019 I would like to speak briefly about the role of insurance in smoothing the transition to a 1.5 degree world. This sector brings three things: expertise, money and perspective and those are all crucial in helping society adjust to the reality of that transition. My message is, whether it’s reducing the protection gap, financing resilient infrastructure or improving reporting, risk management and return optimisation across the financial sector, your contributions could be decisive. The insurance industry has a unique contribution of large capital (over $ trillion), deep risk management expertise and long-term perspective. Insurers are well aware that the physical risks of climate change are being felt across the globe with a plague of extreme weather events. The human costs are immeasurable. The financial losses however can be measured and they are significant. Insured losses in 2018 were $ billion, double the inflation-adjusted average for the past 30 years.10 But protection gaps in low and middle income countries mean that even greater costs are being borne by the uninsured.
In Banking Banana Survey this year indicated that technology risk rose from no. 18 in 2012 survey to no. 4 due to a high increase in the frequency and sophistication of cyber-attacks. Financial institutions have exposed to all risks of technology security: access risk, accuracy risk, availability risk, and agility risk. Concerning the systemic risks, the Bank of Thailand as a regulator established the IT principle called “SIA”, which stands for Security, Integrity and Availability that covers infrastructure protection at the prevention stage of both physical and logical controls: CCTV / access control; firewall, IDS / IPS, AntiVirus and password, respectively. In the arrangement of contingency plan, all systems will be tested or reviewed regularly. Furthermore, key risk indicators and risk tolerance will be closely monitored, and loss data collection will be reported to the board of directors and the Bank of Thailand. Lastly, the Bank of Thailand has to correct the IT contingency plan implementation. Additionally, market conduct will serve as an alignment to each stage to determine customer protection by sharing correct information and suggestions to customers; and by interacting with customers’ complains. As a central bank, we wish to support more on inter-operability for both wholesale and retail which is a part of standard setting I mentioned earlier: for example, standardized codes for all banks and real sector.

WC-PSS created cross-border payment innovations: international stock markets network, electronic payment message standard, and ASEAN retail payment system network. In addition, BOT in association with Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) launched a new cross-border payment-versus-payment (PvP) link between Hong Kong’s USD CHATS, Hong Kong dollar Clearing House Automated Transfer System (CHATS) and Thai BAHTNET to ensure the simultaneous delivery of US Dollars in Hong Kong and Thai Baht in Thailand in order to eliminate or mitigate settlement and counterparty risks. The link operationally started since 28 July this year. Aligning with cross-border payment innovations, growth of IT investment is another matter that the Bank of Thailand has promoted and monitored. The widespread adoption of advanced technology in banks’ key systems is to advance efficient internal operations – Big Data Analytics for processing customers’ information to analyze customers’ behavior and Cloud Computing for allocating IT resources, and to provide products and services through online platform such as Mobile Electronic Data Capture, Net Bank, Virtual Card, Near Field Communication Contactless, and etc. However, many people, especially in the baby boom ages, have not experienced the online banking services yet, partly because they have concerns about security. So it is our job to secure them. BOT has continuously promoted online banking systems and are aware of their risks and impacts at the same time since we believe that no matter what we have in online mode, they are all connected. As digital banking products thrive, so do the competency of cyber threats.
It is this cost-benefit calculus that both motivates a role for macro-prudential policy, and helps us define precisely what we mean by it. In short, macro-prudential policy aims to improve the trade-off between the financial system’s contribution to the rewards expected in a growing economy and the degree of risk that we will face in the bad times. To return to my analogy, we might liken it to the NHS and to health insurance where we pay a bit in the good times to protect ourselves should our health take a turn for the worse. Principles of good policy making Macro-prudential authorities, like the UK’s FPC, work to ensure that financial systems are resilient to, and prepared for, the wide range of possible shocks they could face. Their aim is to ensure that when shocks occur, the financial system is able to absorb those shocks, rather than to amplify their impact on the economy. We ground what we do in two elements of good macro-prudential policymaking:  Macro-prudential policy should be targeted to provide a net benefit to the overall 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  economy. Where interventions incur costs, these should only be imposed when they are outweighed by the benefits over the full cycle. This is perhaps equivalent to starting a course of new medication, where a good doctor must be aware of potential side effects as well as intended benefits.

For a more detailed analysis, see Banco de España (2020), “Recent developments in the most important Latin American banking systems for Spanish banks”, Box 2, “Report on the Latin American economy. Second half of 2020”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 4/2020. 8 For a stress test analysis of the 61 largest banks in Latin America, see Annex 4 of the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook (2020), Pandemic Persistence Clouds the Recovery. 9 See A. Werner, A. Ivanova and T. Komatsuzaki (2021), Latin America and Caribbean’s Winding Road to Recovery, IMF blog. 5  First, in addition to the human cost in lives, the effects on poverty and income distribution have been very severe.10 Indeed, during 2019, bouts of political tensions and social unrest in several countries, partly related to this situation, fuelled economic uncertainty; this in a region where numerous elections are due to take place in the coming quarters. A second challenge is that posed by shrinking fiscal space following the increase in government debt in the region during 2020, positioning it as the emerging region with the highest government debt-to-GDP ratio and, where debt refinancing is concerned, leaving it highly vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment. Against this background, monetary policy is supported by the accommodative policies of the main developed economies and by low inflationary pressures.
A recent instance is, for example, the run up to European monetary union and the attention this drew to Sweden’s commitments as a member of the European Union. Some observers believe that the Riksbank may have an (unacknowledged) exchange rate target. That is a misconception. The Riksbank does not target the krona’s exchange rate. In a flexible exchange rate regime with a price stability target, the exchange rate is admittedly a major factor, but only one of many factors that impinge on inflation. A permanent appreciation or depreciation of the krona affects inflationary pressure via import prices, for example. A given exchange rate trend may well support monetary policy’s drive for price stability; when this is not the case, however, the Riksbank has to intervene and adjust the repo rate. At the same time, the exchange rate is the price of an asset that is current throughout the economy; the value of the krona is highly important in many economic decisions, not least for export companies. This makes a stable exchange rate fundamentally desirable. It is then easier for all economic agents to make decisions. All else equal, this should lead to higher growth. BIS Review 47/1998  -5To this basic endeavour to keep the price of the krona stable should be added our European undertakings. As a member of the European Union we are committed to treating our exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest.

The dynamics of the political cycle in 2021 led to a pause in the institutions’ work in the process in the country. All the factors are now in place for its resumption through the continuation of the Coordination Council for Bulgaria’s preparations for euro area membership; and the institutionalisation of the Euro Adoption Plan. The draft of this plan, adopted by the Coordination Council on 30.06.2021, has already gone through the formal procedure of public consultation and inter-agency coordination, and has the support of our external partners. In spite of the delay in the formal process, the BNB remained the institution that continued to work actively in all areas related to the euro area accession, falling within the scope of our responsibilities. To this end, we established the necessary internal organisation of work and good operational communication with the European Central Bank. Specific individuals and channels for partnership were identified on both sides. In this sense, the central bank is ready to carry out the huge amount of technical work related to the adoption of the euro in a timely manner, notwithstanding the emerging tighter work schedule. In conclusion, 2022 is promising to be a year of challenges but also opportunities for the banking sector. The achievements of 2021 show that the sector is in a strong starting position to meet the challenges and make good use of the opportunities. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
The banking union will deliver a higher level of structural coherence to the euro area’s financial system, which has already been considerably strengthened since 2008: banks’ capital levels have been substantially consolidated, certain activities have been streamlined and the most stressed banks have been restructured. Recent numbers show major advances for European banks in their efforts to strengthen their capital base, in line with Basel III requirements and, in particular for big international banks, quite comparable to capital  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  strengthening in US banks (when differences in accounting standards are neutralised). The banks have reimbursed half of the liquidity injected via the two LTRO programmes. 4. The Eurosystem  From the very first signs of the crisis (remember the Eurosystem injected 90 billion euros in August 2007 to counter the impact of the first freeze in the financial markets), the Eurosystem has provided constant support to bank funding (and thereby underpinning credit to the economy). We have been able to use our collateral framework – with a wide range of counterparties accepted – to relieve the liquidity constraints faced by banks. The maximum maturity of our operations has increased from three months before the crisis to three years. Through these measures, we have addressed the liquidity pressures on banks and avoided a genuine credit crunch. Both our standard and non-standard monetary policies have prevented the materialisation of deflation risk. The programme we launched a year ago – Outright Monetary Transactions – succeeded in countering speculation about a euro area break-up.

If our monetary policy impulses are not transmitted uniformly to all of the area’s countries because of the bank-sovereign link, it undermines the very foundation of Europe’s monetary union; remember that three quarters of the financing of the euro area’s economy consists of bank loans. By breaking this link, a banking union would restore the federal dimension of monetary policy. Today the first pillar of the banking union is being constructed: the Single Supervisory Mechanism. We are currently working on legal issues, on identifying systemically important banks within the euro area, on the supervisory model, on the future data reporting and, of course, on the asset quality review that will be undertaken before we take on the responsibility of supervision. The governance structure we have adopted will guarantee that, while the Governing Council will keep the decision power, there will be no conflict of interest between monetary policy and banking supervision. On the contrary, more consistent supervision across the euro area should allow for the early detection of potential risks and imbalances and, ultimately, improve the transmission of monetary policy. This is a fundamental first step and its rapid implementation will be a major success for the euro area. But, alone, it cannot achieve the objectives of a banking union. That is why we must rapidly construct its two other pillars: a supranational bank resolution authority and a unified deposit insurance system.
This task has, for example, been the reason for the crisis measures that the Riksbank has taken since the autumn. However, we need to discuss whether situations can arise in which flexible inflation targeting conflicts with the aim of promoting financial stability. If so, should interest-rate policy be modified or is it more appropriate to use other instruments to, for example, counteract the development of financial bubbles? I have no ready answers to these questions today. They partly relate to the question of the causes of the current financial crisis. Has monetary policy contributed to the crisis through low interest rates or do the causes lie in entirely different factors, such as global imbalances and/or inadequate regulation and supervision of the financial markets? The analysis of the causes of the crisis has begun, but it is still far too soon to draw any clear conclusions about the contribution of different factors. The current economic situation But what are the prospects for the economy in the period ahead and what challenges are we facing now? The financial crisis reinforced the international economic downturn. It is therefore natural to expect that a recovery will only come when the situation on the international financial markets has normalised. Stabilisation of the financial sector The situation on the financial markets has continued to improve during the summer.

You are all of course familiar with the global financial shock which hit Asia in 1997 and spread to other emerging market countries and transition economies through 1998 and the early part of last year. This shock impacted the UK economy in two main ways. First, the withdrawal of external finance from the immediately affected countries meant that they had no option but to rein back their domestic economies, resulting in a sudden, sharp, slowdown in world demand - including demand for industrial countries’ exports. That in turn had the effect of dampening aggregate demand in the industrial countries. Had the industrial countries - led by the United States and the United Kingdom and closely followed by the Eurozone and subsequently also by Japan - not acted to stimulate their own domestic demand, we could indeed have seen the serious world downturn which many were anticipating only a year or so ago. In the event, the global slowdown was contained, but at the expense of the build-up of substantial external imbalances within the world economy, and at the expense, too, of substantial imbalance between strong domestic and weak net external demand in a number of industrial countries - most notably in the US and here in the UK. Second, these developments in the world economy had a major impact on the international pattern of exchange rates. In the first place, many of the countries most adversely affected by the interruption of international financial flows saw their currencies fall dramatically in foreign exchange markets.