samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At this point, I would like to underline once more that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, I would particularly like to highlight that assumptions regarding future stance of monetary policy underlying the inflation forecasts should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBT. 4. Risks  In the last part of my speech, I would like to elaborate the risks regarding the inflation outlook in the upcoming period and prospective monetary policy strategies to be implemented should these risks materialize. Developments regarding global economic activity would continue to be the main factor shaping inflation dynamics and the monetary policy outlook. Recently, leading indicators of economic activity continue to slow down, underscoring downside risks especially regarding the US economy. Furthermore, ongoing problems in credit, real estate, and labor markets across developed economies and uncertainties regarding the impact of fiscal consolidations suggest that the downside risks regarding the pace of global growth are likely to persist for some time. Should the global economy face a longer-than-anticipated period of anemic growth, the monetary tightening envisaged to start in the final quarter of 2011 under the  14  BIS Review 159/2010  baseline scenario might be postponed. Moreover, an outcome whereby global economic problems intensify and contribute to a contraction of domestic economic activity, may trigger a new easing cycle.

Therefore, we envisage no significant pressure on unit labor costs in the upcoming period. In light of these assessments, our revised inflation forecasts are based on a framework in which domestic demand is stronger compared to the previous period, external demand continues to restrain domestic economic activity, and thus aggregate demand conditions continue to support disinflation, albeit to a lesser degree. 10  BIS Review 159/2010  As for fiscal policy, MTP (Medium-Term Program) projections revised in October constitute the basis of our forecasts. In this respect, we envisage a temporary acceleration in public expenditures for the rest of the year, to be followed by a gradual decline in the ratio of primary expenditures to national income starting from 2011. We also assume that any fiscal space that may arise due to stronger-than-expected economic activity would partially be used to reduce government debt stock, congruent to the counter-cyclical fiscal policy approach. It was envisaged that the ratio of debt stock to GDP would continue to decline and no significant change would be observed in the risk premium throughout the forecast horizon. Moreover, our forecasts are based on the assumption that tax adjustments would be consistent with the inflation targets and automatic pricing mechanisms. Distinguished members of the press, Important developments since the July Inflation Report warranted a revision of the assumptions, which our forecasts are based on. I would like to provide some detailed information on these factors to ensure that our forecasts are better understood.
Surveys of market participants’ expectations of systemic risk – the closest analogue to inflation expectations on the financial stability side – have subsided over recent years (Chart 7). How much of that is attributable to the new regulatory regime, rather than external factors, is at present unclear. Looking internationally, unlike with monetary policy, consensus has yet to be reached on whether regulatory policy should also be set independently from government. A recent IMF  52  Hammond (2012). 53  Hayek (1979). 54  Calomiris (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  study found only half of macro-prudential regimes internationally were operated by central banks, though a number of others were in the hands of independent regulators. 55 Perhaps with the passage of time that will change, as with monetary policy independence. Psychology suggests it should. Because the risk cycle is even longer than the business cycle, myopia biases are even more likely when tackling crises than inflation. The case for independence is at least as strong for regulatory policy as it is for monetary policy. 56 Hubris biases Under the UK’s new framework, decisions on monetary, macro-prudential and microprudential policy are made by Committee, rather than by an individual. Committee members are individually accountable and drawn from inside and outside the Bank. This structure provides some safeguard against over-confidence bias – for example, by diluting the influence of any one individual’s views on policy decision-making. There is evidence to support this in monetary policy decision-making.

It has been argued that targeting a 2% inflation rate results in this zero bound constraint binding too frequently, inhibiting the effectiveness of monetary policy. 47 A higher target would loosen that constraint. This academic debate may run for some time. On the financial stability side, the position is less straightforward. There is no single, easily observable or quantifiable target for systemic risk against which to hold the FPC and PRA to  45  Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) first coined this term in the context of inflation–targeting. 46  Shiller (1997). 47  Ball (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  account. And the public at large often do not have well-defined or strong attitudes towards financial stability – except, perhaps, when things go wrong. Since 2012, the Bank has been surveying the general public on how they believe the Bank has performed in protecting the financial system. Some reassurance can perhaps be taken from the fact that this has moved from a net dissatisfaction score of 13 in 2012 to a net satisfaction score of 40 today. 48 Nonetheless, by itself this approach falls well short of having a clear objective against which the FPC and PRA can periodically be assessed. The FPC has begun publishing a set of financial stability indicators against which it assesses systemic risk and is held to account.
Second, the turbulent environment handicapped the money market and led to a widening of the spread, i.e. by means of an unwelcome interest rate hike. The SNB responded immediately by relaxing its lending conditions for banks. Contrary to certain suggestions, this measure was not intended as a means of increasing the amount of liquidity in circulation on a permanent basis. After all, inflationary pressure would potentially rise given such a scenario. Instead, we acted in a flexible way and adjusted our maturities in accordance with the demands in the lending market so as to provide this market with the buffer it needed. We have consequently introduced three-month loans, whereas the terms we offered previously were never longer than 30 days. We also took joint action with other central banks and provided US dollar liquidity to our counterparties – the first time we have ever taken such a step. 2  BIS Review 50/2008  The gradual tightening of lending conditions within our domestic market is a third factor, albeit one which is still to fully materialise. Indeed, the fear that the liquidity requirements of the two big banks may be having a detrimental impact on credit volumes in Switzerland cannot be excluded. However, the rest of the Swiss banking sector – which accounts for almost two-thirds of Switzerland’s domestic credit supply – posted excellent results in 2007, thereby helping to limit the burden of risk. Furthermore, our figures show that there has so far been no impact on lending growth.

This creates a tension between the domestic and the external, or exchange rate, dictates of policy - a dilemma which, in one direction or the other afflicts most countries from time to time, and which we ourselves have experienced at times in the past, though not during the past few years. The trouble in this instance is that the stronger exchange rate does not directly affect the build-up of domestic demand pressure, which is the problem we start with. It will, if it persists, have a one-off downwards effect (directly or indirectly) on the prices of perhaps a quarter of all goods covered by the retail price index, which will reduce the RPI during the course of this year; but this effect will gradually drop out of the 12-month calculation during 1998. The stronger exchange rate will also, if it persists, cause the external trade balance to weaken, and by relieving to this extent the pressure of overall demand, that may have a more lasting effect on the rate of inflation. We, of course, take these factors into account as best we can in making our forecasts of future inflation and in giving our policy advice, though there is inevitably a great deal of uncertainty over the timing and scale of their effects.
Denny H Kalyalya: Broadening financial services provision Opening remarks by Dr Denny H Kalyalya, Deputy Governor-Operations of the Bank of Zambia; at the opening of the Pilot Financial Inclusion Advisors (FIA) Programme, Lusaka, 6 April 2009. *  *  *  Chairperson The Deputy Minister of Finance and National Planning, Ms Chileshe Kapwepwe, MP Dr Mahaela Smith, Co-Founder and CEO, the Commonwealth Partnership for Technology Management (CPTM) Deputy Governor – Central Bank of Swaziland Distinguished Resource persons and representatives from Bank Negara Malaysia Regional Central Bank representatives Distinguished Participants Ladies and Gentlemen On behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to this pilot Financial Inclusion Advisers programme and to Zambia for our colleagues from other countries. Before going any further, please allow me to convey the Governor’s regret for not being able to be with us. He is attending to another important assignment, the AERC Senior Policy Seminar on the Global Financial Crisis and its implications for African Economies, also here in Lusaka. Nonetheless, he extends his welcome and good wishes for a successful programme. This important conference has brought together practitioners and regulators of microfinance institutions from different countries to share experiences. I also note that participants have been drawn from Central Banks in the region, the public sector, commercial banks, microfinance institution and other non-bank financial institutions.

Maintaining a stable currency safeguards purchasing power over time and ensures the currency’s continuity across the territory, so that every individual can spend that currency anywhere and at any time and enjoy the same ability to purchase necessary goods and services. Back in the 18th century, France's authorities found themselves unable to guarantee this stability. After the bankruptcy of the John Law note-issuing bank in 1720 and several other  2  failed attempts to set up a central bank,5 the hyperinflation fuelled by monetary financing of the Revolutionary Wars and the ensuing default on two-thirds of France’s public debt in 1797 had destroyed confidence in the currency.6 The most pressing task facing the Consulate government was to rebuild the foundations of that trust, which it did by authorising the establishment of the Banque de France in 1800 and anchoring the value of the franc through the creation of the Germinal franc in 1803. In establishing the Banque de France, France set up a central bank that was capable, because it was trusted by the French people, of offering an “elastic” money supply, to use the economic jargon, that is, of adjusting the money supply to suit the needs of the economy. In this way, the foundations for an active lender-of-last-resort policy were laid very early, providing a means to combat financial crises and thus support the economy.
Christine M Cumming: Comments at the 10th Anniversary of CLS Remarks by Ms Christine M Cumming, First Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the celebration of the 10th Anniversary of CLS, New York City, 17 April 2013. *  *  *  I am honored to be here tonight to speak on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the founding of CLS. Today, it’s hard to recreate the shock created by Bankhaus Herstatt’s failure in 1974 and the revelation that even a relatively small, internationally active bank could pose such substantial financial risk to participants in the foreign exchange market. Herstatt’s failure was just one of several shocks in the early 70s that signaled the end of two plus decades of relatively tranquil recovery and growth after World War II. Another notable shock of those years, of course, was the breakdown of the Bretton Woods foreign exchange arrangements and the introduction of substantial and unfamiliar volatility to the foreign exchange markets. A saving grace was that the foreign exchange community has had the great good fortune over the decades to be led by participants who recognized the importance of a healthy, resilient and change-friendly marketplace and worked collaboratively to achieve that. Over the years, the foreign exchange community also forged bonds with central banks in major financial centers to promote foreign exchange market health. It has been a great model of public-private cooperation made possible by private-sector leadership.

We wish you another equally successful decade – and look forward to another decade of working successfully together. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
But there was a risk that we were seeing a release of demand that had been pent up in the years following the crisis – years in which housing supply had also grown very weakly.6  In response, the FPC introduced two new policies on household mortgage lending. The first was a loan to income (LTI) flow limit that limited the proportion of mortgages with LTI ratios of 4.5 or higher to 15% of new mortgages. The second was an affordability test for borrowers. This test had recently been implemented in the UK by the Financial Conduct Authority as a consumer protection measure.7 But the FPC recommended that the calibration of the test should take account of macro-prudential risks; we recommended that lenders assess whether borrowers could still afford their mortgages if interest rates were to increase by 3 percentage points.8 A number of factors pointed to the use of borrower-based tools. There are a range of house price indices in the UK. In 2014, the Bank of England’s policy committees typically used the average of Halifax and Nationwide price indices, quoted in the text. Since then they have switched to using the ONS’s measure which was a little lower at the time – showing house price growth of 6%. 6 UK households have been moving, on average, once every 10 years in the decade prior to the crisis whereas in the years following that had risen to once every 17 years (Cunliffe 2014).

The results suggest that in those circumstances the tail of highly indebted households would be slightly larger than it currently is (Chart 4). And, were a downturn to hit, that the impact of debt on consumption would be a little larger than today. Looking forward, the impact of these policies will continue to depend on how house prices and incomes evolve. If house prices and incomes grow broadly at the same rate then the distribution of indebtedness in the flow of new mortgages will not change much – and hence the impact of policies on the flow will not be large. But we will continue to see a change in the distribution of the stock of mortgages for some time yet as newer, higher LTI mortgages gradually replace older, lower LTI mortgages. If though, house price growth outpaces income growth in the future then the policies will have a greater impact. Without the policies in place, if prices grew twice as fast as incomes – as they did over 2014 to 2016 – and activity rose to the pace we were forecasting in 2014, 40% of new mortgages would be at more than 4.5 times the borrower’s income (Chart 5). Over time, this would lead to a significant increase in the share of households with higher debt to income. The models show that in such a case the fall in aggregate consumption in the event of an adverse shock could be up to around 20% larger than we find with our policies in place.
However, the headroom is only relevant if all of us – the financial firms, practitioners, regulators – work together to build the “Hong Kong Brand”, a brand that is widely preferred and cherished by customers looking for the best and most reliable financial services. We in the HKMA are fully committed and ready to build the “Hong Kong Brand”. I trust you all share the same commitment and readiness. Thank you very much! 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

In NOK - purchasing power parity  US Norway Switzerland Ireland Denmark Iceland Canada Netherlands Austria Australia Germany Finland Sweden 0  100000  Sources: OECD and Norges Bank  200000  300000  The large cash flows from petroleum activities are reflected in official income figures. Measured by GDP per capita, Norway ranks high in the statistics. These figures do not, however, provide an accurate picture of value added. When calculating GDP and national income, the cash flow from petroleum activities is measured in the same way as all other income. Extracting oil and gas from the seabed is measured in the same way as all other production. This means that Norway’s income is overestimated. Oil and gas represent wealth under the seabed. When oil and gas are sold, this wealth is invested abroad. This transaction does not in itself generate income, even though it is posted as income in the national accounts. The income is not equivalent to the entire cash flow, only to the return on this wealth. Chart 14. Adjusted GDP per capita in 2000 In NOK - purchasing power parity  US Switzerland Ireland Denmark Iceland Canada Netherlands Austria Australia Norway Germany Finland Sweden 0  100000  200000  300000  Sources: OECD, Ministry of Finance and Norges Bank  A more accurate picture of Norway’s income is obtained when GDP is adjusted for the transfer of petroleum wealth to financial investments abroad.
Luis M Linde: Stability and recovery in the euro area Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the opening of the Global Forum on Engineering and Public Works, organised by the Fundación Caminos (Association of Civil Engineers), Santander, 6 July 2016. *  *  *  I would first like to thank the Association of Civil Engineers, the Fundación Caminos and its Chairman for kindly inviting me to take part in the opening of this Global Forum on Engineering and Public Works. You are about to spend two days debating various issues relating to a sector of activity as important, or even as decisive, for economic activity and growth as that of investment in public works and infrastructure, this being all the more so given the current state of the European economy. The result of the recent referendum in the United Kingdom illustrates the complexity of the present situation for the European Union and the euro area. Before this referendum, the macroeconomic outlook for the euro area was for stabilisation of economic growth at around 1.6% in 2016 and 1.7% in 2017 and 2018. The balance of risks, although holding on a downward trend given the existence of various contingencies (including the UK referendum), also showed a somewhat better balance in anticipation of a pick-up in the growth and inflation outlook on the back of the latest monetary policy measures.

In the more medium term, the combination of negative demographics, low productivity growth and high levels of public and private debt constrains the euro area’s ability to regain precrisis growth rates, creating a breeding ground for disillusionment with and distrust of the European project. It is, therefore, essential that governments revive the reform momentum, to optimise the working of production factors and product markets, improve the business environment and complete the euro area governance framework. Important labour market reforms have been undertaken in recent years, especially in the countries hardest hit by the crisis. Empirical evidence shows the positive impact that those reforms have had on growth and employment. But preventing high unemployment rates from becoming entrenched and long-term unemployment from growing remain a priority. Where least progress is perceived is perhaps in reform of the product and service markets. Recent experience shows that it is important to implement the reform agenda in the right order, since early reforms, tending to enhance competition, may be vital to ensure that labour market reforms have the desired positive effects. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In various euro area countries, product market reforms should aim to improve the business environment, remove administrative barriers and increase competition. Revamped insolvency proceedings would help to improve management of the loan write-offs that currently place such a heavy burden on banks’ balance sheets. Insolvency proceedings, if well designed, can be an efficient way to reallocate resources to sectors and firms that offer higher growth potential.
9 For announcements of the various programs, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,  Coordinated Central Bank Action to Enhance the Provision of U.S. Dollar Liquidity, March 15, 2020; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Announces the Establishment of Temporary U.S. Dollar Liquidity Arrangements with Other Central Banks, March 19, 2020; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Coordinated Central Bank Action to Further Enhance the Provision of U.S. Dollar Liquidity, March 20, 2020; and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Announces Establishment of a Temporary FIMA Repo Facility to Help Support the Smooth Functioning of Financial Markets, March 31, 2020. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Page 9  Chart 6: Indicators of pay growth are elevated  Sources: HMRC, ONS and Bank calculations  A tight labour market is accompanied by resilience in business confidence. In line with evidence from the Bank’s Decision Maker Panel survey, this may reflect business-to-business pricing power within supply chains still suffering from supply disruptions. After all, within a single supply chain, one firm’s sourcing problem is another firm’s resilient demand. Supporting this view, the Banks’ Agents report that a further strengthening of margins is likely, especially in firms that are not directly facing consumer demand. Page 10  Chart 7: PMIs suggest business confidence is resilient(a)  Sources: S&P Global/CIPS. (a) A reading of above 50 indicates positive change on the previous month while a reading below 50 indicates negative change. Data for April 2022 are flash estimates. Chart 8: Banks’ Agents report further strengthening in margins is likely  (a) Question: ‘To what extent have you already passed through higher costs to prices?’  The influence of monetary policy On the back of this assessment, the current momentum in UK headline inflation developments is  Page 11  substantial. But, given lags in the transmission of monetary policy to price developments, high inflation today does not, of itself, justify tighter policy today. Rather monetary policy has to be forward looking, calibrating the policy stance to be appropriate at a horizon of 18 months to two years, once the transmission lags unwind. And that is where the MPC’s May forecast gets more complicated.