samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
From the start of 1999, lending to the private sector grew at an annual trend rate of about 10% in connection with the pick-up in activity, but probably also the significant rise in the prices of property and financial assets, which were very responsive in certain sectors and economies of the area, as well as the rising number of mergers and acquisitions, many of which reflected direct investment outside the euro area. In France, twelve-month growth in total domestic debt stood at 8.1% in December 1999, compared with 4.5% in 1998. Among the elements forming the second pillar, the exchange rate of the euro is an important monetary policy indicator. The depreciation of the euro seen in 1999 is a matter of concern because it causes production costs and the general price level to rise. In addition, this depreciation of the European currency simultaneously reflected and boosted the negative financial flows, in the form of both direct and portfolio investment, that affected the entire euro area in 1999. The French economy, like the euro area’s, is enjoying favourable monetary and financial conditions and high competitiveness. These factors are facilitating a durable, non-inflationary upturn in activity. However, while a sound monetary policy is a necessary condition for economic success, it is not sufficient in itself to guarantee growth and job creation.

But they do not say anything about preparedness regarding liquidity in foreign currencies. This is particularly important to us in Sweden. Around 50 per cent of the banks’ funding is through the markets, and a large part, around two thirds, through the international markets. This requires that we at the Riksbank can provide the banks with liquidity in foreign currency when funding runs short. We must therefore hold liquid funds in our foreign currency reserves, and this costs money. The Riksbank is thus supplying an insurance – an insurance that the banks know they can use but don’t pay a premium for. This type of problem is not dealt with in the Basel regulations, or anywhere else for that matter, but it is something we need to discuss here in Sweden. So although I hope I have made it clear that neither Finansinspektionen nor we at the Riksbank – nor our international counterparts – have been idle, there is still a lot of work that remains to be done to make the bank system less vulnerable and more resilient. Both globally and here in Sweden. And at the same time we must continue our daily work on maintaining financial stability. We at the Riksbank are constantly trying to refine our analysis so we can detect at an early stage any risks that could threaten the stability of the system. And we must be clear in communicating the risks we see.
Several analytical approaches for the identification of the factors contributing to the building up of systemic risk may be used and different policy tools may be employed to address them. One policy instrument introduced by Basel III is the countercyclical capital buffer. In line with our past experience of dividing responsibilities, the Ministry of Finance will implement countercyclical capital requirements from 2013. Norges Bank will make recommendations for its buffer decisions. We therefore need to strengthen our understanding of macroprudential regulation and develop relevant analytical tools for our recommendations. The financial crisis called renewed attention to the fact that developments in the real economy and the financial sector are closely linked. In response, Norges Bank has decided to provide monetary policy and financial analyses in a joint report published quarterly as from 2013. The reports will form the basis for both monetary policy decisions and for our advice on the buffer. The primary objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation over time. We operate a flexible inflation targeting regime, which also aims at stabilising economic activity. Furthermore, Norges Bank gives weight to the risk that a prolonged period of low interest rates could lead to elevated risk-taking and excessive debt accumulation in the household and business sectors. There is always room for improvement. We will seek to improve systemic risk indicators and macro-stress testing approaches, keeping them at the research frontier. We will also work to better incorporate the financial sector in our macroeconomic models.

Very often leaders are ahead because they are supported, respected and loved by their followers or, in this case, passengers, who actually want them to take the front seats and lead. 7. On the question of what constitutes good and long lasting leadership, there exists tremendous amount of academic research and literature, which I do not propose to talk about. What I would like to say today is to draw on the teaching by one of our great ancient teachers, Confucius. More than two thousand years ago, Confucius taught his students how to become a “Gentleman” or “Jun Zi (君子)”. What strikes me most as the qualities of a successful “Jun Zi” or “Leader” are the three words used by Confucius: “Wisdom”, “Morality” and “Courage” ( 智、仁、勇). I strongly believe that Confucius’ teaching was right not only in ancient times but also in the modern world. As a master degree graduate in the specialised fields of business and finance, you clearly are knowledgeable, but you may not be wise. So you need wisdom, a quality that can only be acquired with a sense of modesty and humility, understanding fully there are more things that you don’t know than you know. Treat learning as a life long process that won’t stop even after you have graduated from the university. Success is your desired destination but you must not seek to achieve your goal with immoral means.
Companies applying to list on the SGX will also send their draft prospectuses to the exchange for vetting to ensure that they meet SGX's disclosure requirements. When the capital-raising provisions in the Companies Act are transferred to the new SFA later this year, MAS will take over from RCB as statutory regulator for prospectus registration. We are now reviewing the prospectus registration regime with a view to enhancing market accountability, and raising the standards of prospectus disclosure. Under the proposed regime, MAS will register a prospectus not earlier than 14 days and not later than 28 days after an issuer has lodged the prospectus with MAS. This period will allow for both regulatory review by the MAS and SGX, and public scrutiny and comment. (Currently, there is no public scrutiny before a prospectus is registered.) The prospectus will be published on the Internet to give investors the opportunity to scrutinise the prospectus prior to its distribution, and raise any issues of concern. This model is similar to that which has been introduced in the Australian markets. There will be a more measured approach to prospectus review by the regulator. I was told that SGX currently vets an average of five drafts for every prospectus that gets published. This is clearly not desirable going forward. The review of prospectuses by the MAS and SGX will focus, respectively, on compliance with laws and SGX's listing requirements on prospectus disclosure.

In addition to this work, let me also mention a few other areas related to financial literacy where the CBC is currently actively involved. First, since 2022 the CBC has assumed a coordinating role for the Global Money Week in Cyprus, a global public-awareness campaign coordinated by the OECD annually, aiming at raising awareness among young people on the importance of strengthening financial literacy, skills, attitudes and behaviours. In fact, this conference is organised in the context of the Global Money Week in Cyprus for 2023. Also, the CBC has recently become a full member of the International Network on Financial Education (INFE) of the OECD, in which it aspires to have an active role in the Network's activities. Finally, I would like to mention that the CBC continues to devote resources on research of this topic, particularly in examining the link between financial literacy and financial stability. According to preliminary findings from the 4th wave of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey in Cyprus, financially illiterate individuals are 7-11% more likely to have late loan payments, providing evidence on the negative correlation between the level of financial literacy and financial stability risks. The analysis is still work in progress. More extensive results on the issue are expected from further analysis as well as from the new more elaborate survey on which we are collaborating with the OECD.
In emerging Asia, domestic demand is holding up, but growth is vulnerable to developments in America and Europe. The full extent of weakness in exports, and its effects through regional production and trade linkages, has probably not filtered through completely. I must add that our forecast is based on three assumptions: no recession in US, no significant escalation of the Eurozone crisis, and no “hard landing” in China. If one or more of these assumptions do not pan out, Singapore’s GDP growth could dip below 1% for 2012. But growth of 1–3% should be seen in perspective. The economy is operating at full employment and capacity utilisation is high. The Singapore economy has expanded by an average of 5.8% over the past five years, faster than economy’s underlying potential. The moderation in growth thus brings the economy closer to its sustainable level of output, and will help relieve cost pressures. Let me touch on inflation now. CPI-All Items inflation for 2012 is expected to come in at 4.0– 4.5%, but Core Inflation will continue to come down and approach 2% by end of the year MAS is narrowing forecast range for CPI-All Items inflation in 2012 to 4.0–4.5%, but the forecast for Core Inflation remains unchanged at 2.5–3.0%. 1  Refers to average growth on a quarter-on-quarter seasonally-adjusted annualised basis. Growth for Q2 is based on Advance Estimates of –1.1%. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Bringing down inflation remains one of MAS’ top priorities.

The commercial banks distribute the cash among the people and companies of Estonia, in the same way that it is done around the world. Eesti Pank is not aware of any country anywhere where the central bank is responsible for operating the cash network serving people and companies directly. It would require massive investment and fixed costs for Eesti Pank and the outcome would most likely be unwieldy and unclear for the public in their use of money. The commercial banks are much better able to do this and do it more efficiently. However, Eesti Pank is responsible for managing cash circulation, and we consider it important to engage in looking for ways of making sure services can be accessed across Estonia. Access to banking services is a problem globally, this is not an issue that is unique to Estonia. A parliamentary commission in Australia looked into the matter ten years ago, and similar questions have been discussed in Canada and Sweden and other countries. The trend is for the number of bank branch offices and cash machines to be cut, and this is happening everywhere in the world in response to advances in technology, trends in demography and changes in consumer preferences. To some degree this is a natural evolution against which it would be pointless to stand. Equally it creates problems of access to banking services, and such problems need to be resolved.
Ardian Fullani: Monetary & financial stability policies – lessons from the crisis Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 8th International Conference of the Bank of Albania: "Monetary & Financial Stability Policies – Lessons from the Crisis", Tirana, 17 September 2009. *  *  *  Honourable Mr. Prime Minister, Dear Governors, Distinguished guests, I feel deeply privileged to open the proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the Bank of Albania entitled: “Monetary & Financial Stability Policies – Lessons from the Crisis”. I hope the proceedings will help the participants better realize the issues facing the global economy during this period and draw the proper lessons. I am personally convinced that the prominent speakers’ reputation is a guarantee in this regard. Before I invite the guests to discuss the features and lessons drawn from the global and regional crisis according to their viewpoints and experiences, allow me to say a few words on this conference. The topic chosen to be dealt with in this conference is at the forefront of the institutions’ agenda, responsible for macroeconomic policies and financial system surveillance at a national and international level. The panic that followed the Lehman Brothers’ failure almost a year ago transformed the turmoil in the U.S. mortgage loan market into a genuine globalwide financial crisis.

The type of auction for the injection of liquidity changed to fixed-price auctions, the collateral base for repo agreements expanded, the use of the required reserve increased from 20 to 40 percent, and the spread between the Bank of Albania’s key interest rate and overnight loan reduced from 175 to 75 basis points. Third, through a special act, the Bank of Albania required higher capitalization of banking activity from the banking sector, adding to the guarantee of the banking sector’s financial soundness. Current financial system developments show that the overall situation in the banking sector has improved constantly. Deposits are back to the banking system, attesting to the improved public confidence. 2  BIS Review 118/2009  Credit to economy has also shown signs of recovery. Another positive development relates to the fact that lending in the Albanian Lek has increased considerably. The European markets have been performing amid a more optimistic climate. Statistics show that the recovery of the crisis began even before the most optimistic forecast. Distinguished guests, I believe the prominent panellists and the central bank governors of our region will address all the issues related to the crisis and the lessons drawn from it thoroughly. However, allow me to briefly address some issues I believe are of interest to the audience. First, the large-scale globalization of the world economy in the past two decades could not but spread the crisis throughout the world; consequently, there was an immense need for coordinated protection at an international level.
To illustrate the quality change and the new product bias, imagine that we go shopping in Harrods both today and in 1910. Suppose that we are given £ to spend - the same amount in both years. In 1910 you could have bought a vacuum cleaner, a record player, an iron, a camera, and a telephone. The vacuum cleaner would have spread as much dust as it removed, the record player would have been hand-cranked and the iron would need to be filled with coal. The camera would have been bulky and awkward to set up, and the telephone would have been largely silent because so few people owned one. Today you can buy a similar bundle of goods for the same total outlay, but all would be of vastly superior quality. So for durable goods it is not clear that the cost of living has increased at all. But if we buy food, however, the results are very different. Unlike appliances, many of the food items in 1910 are unchanged today - McVitie’s digestive biscuits, Quaker oats, Rose’s Lime Juice, Bournville cocoa, Frank Cooper’s Oxford marmalade, Marmite, Heinz baked beans and Colman’s mustard are only some of the familiar items for which precise comparisons over the years are possible. In 1910 you could have fed yourself on 10p a day by eating Marmite on Hovis toast for breakfast; eggs, bacon and toast for lunch; Heinz beans on toast for dinner; with a pint of milk to drink.

Its third article states that “the Bank shall have as its purposes to look after the stability of the currency and the normal functioning of internal and external payments.” It then adds that “the authority of the Bank, for these purposes, shall include regulating the amount of currency and credit in circulation, the performance of credit transactions and foreign exchange, as well as the issuance of regulatory provisions regarding monetary, credit, financing and foreign exchange matters.” In addition, it establishes that “no public expenditure or credit of any nature may be financed either directly or indirectly with loans granted by the Bank.” Finally, article six states that “when passing its resolutions, the Board shall consider the general orientation of the Government’s economic policies.” This is a clear mandate for the Central Bank of Chile, by which it establishes instruments and mechanisms for the designation and removal of Board members, as well as vehicles for coordination with the Executive. In addition, its autonomy is further reinforced and legitimated through the achievement of said objectives and by the Bank’s communication and transparency policy, whose effects go far beyond the provisions in the law regarding the obligation to inform about its decisions. In this presentation I will address some of the main elements concerning the autonomy of central banks, as well as an evaluation of the principal accomplishments of the past twenty years. The reasons for pursuing autonomy High inflation is costly for society because it is associated with higher price volatility, which distorts resource allocation.
The framework has been strengthened in various ways since the turn of the century; for example, by enhancing the Central Bank’s independence, adopting an inflation target, and appointing a Monetary Policy Committee. Even though performance over most of the period under scrutiny has fallen short of set objectives and has been poor in comparison with other countries, inflation has declined more rapidly in the wake of the recent financial and balance of payments crisis than after the inflation episodes of the 20th century, when it often proved extremely persistent, partly because interest rates were held abnormally low. The monetary framework might be strengthened further, however, by providing the Central Bank with supplemental tools, in addition to its interest rates, that could boost the efficiency of monetary policy.1 Applying macroprudential tools effectively and strengthening the regulatory framework governing the financial activities that have caused the recent instability could possibly improve performance. 2. Second, economic policy, more generally, might explain the poor track record. Fiscal dominance and an employment policy that placed too heavy a burden on monetary policy probably contributed significantly to high inflation in past decades. Enhanced Central Bank independence and the prohibition on direct Treasury borrowing from the Bank have reduced fiscal dominance. This has been beneficial, as is indicated by the fact that the inflation episodes in the first decade of the 21st century have been shorter-lived than those in the latter half of the 20th.

Considering those characteristics, adopting any currency other than the euro would have serious drawbacks.8 Therefore, reforming the current regime appears preferable to a radical change should EMU membership be unattainable, at least for the next decade. The fact that the vast majority of small countries either use another country’s currency or pursue some type of rigid fixed exchange rate policy could indicate, however, that a floating currency may face difficulties over the long haul (Chart 3). Ladies and gentlemen: No monetary framework or choice of currency will solve Iceland’s economic problems once and for all. The set of solutions labelled “cure-for-all-ills” is an empty set. Protracted discussions of the contents of an empty set are not only empty in themselves; they are absolutely pointless. Irrespective of the framework, economic policy must be pursued with greater discipline than has been the case to date. However, imposing a framework that forces the authorities to adopt more long-term oriented policies could improve performance. One way to do this is to join a currency union. The experience of Greece and other countries on the periphery of the EMU shows, however, that if economic policies remain short-sighted and solving imminent fiscal problems is delayed for too long, the imposed discipline is anything but palatable. I think Iceland’s experience of its collaboration with the IMF indicates, however, that it would flourish under such discipline. But if EMU membership is not an option, that discipline must come from within.
Traditionally, transparency rules have focused on ensuring that customers receive all due information and that, at least formally, they declare to have understood it and accept the conditions to be applied to them. However, the financial crisis has given rise to more demanding legislation. Regulations now require that banks not only inform but that they act more honestly, impartially, transparently and professionally than before, bearing in mind the greater status, rights, interests and needs of their customers. This phenomenon, extensively aired in the media in recent years, is apparent also in the figures on claims lodged with the Banco de España. Most claims have concerned mortgage loan contracts. They span both those relating to the application of the so-called “floor clauses” to variable-rate mortgages (in 2013-2014) and those relating to the payment of mortgage loan arrangement costs, which peaked in 2017, with 23,040 claims. As you all know, the most paradigmatic case in terms of media coverage and social and economic impact has been that of the floor clauses. The number of claims for this reason and the scale of the figures meant extra-judicial avenues had to be used, so as to pave the way for the refund of the amounts unduly paid, in keeping with Supreme Court jurisprudence. Specifically, Royal Decree-Law 1/2017 obliged banks to set in place a pre-claim system. On the latest figures released (September 2020), more than 1,220,000 individuals had submitted claims, with almost € billion refunded.

Taking the case of floor clauses, it is widely known that marketing transparency, or rather its absence, was why the Supreme Court declared these clauses null and void in May 2013. In its ruling, the Supreme Court considers that it is not enough that the clause may have been comprehensible in isolation. The bank should rather have explained, in an understandable fashion, all the legal and economic implications of this clause, so that the consumer might understand what its effects would be during the life of the contract. The clause thus needs to be clear and understandable, and explained in detail by the bank. But it is also evident that, to be able to take this type of economic decision appropriately, customers must, in addition to having all the necessary information, be capable of understanding the longterm consequences of what they are signing. Patently, contracts must be transparent and understandable, and decisions, sensible. Consequently, financial education and knowledge are vital tools for improving financial inclusion, but also for preventing future crises and promoting financial stability. Fortunately, this view is an increasingly shared one. Financial education is seen today as a pivotal feature of stability and balanced economic development in society. Following OECD recommendations, many countries have developed national financial education strategies. In Spain, since 2008, impetus has been given to the Financial Education Plan by a collaborative agreement between the CNMV and the Banco de España, which have subsequently been joined by other central government agencies.