samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At this point, I would like to underline once more that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, I would particularly like to highlight that assumptions regarding future stance of monetary policy underlying the inflation forecasts should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBT. 4. Risks  In the last part of my speech, I would like to elaborate the risks regarding the inflation outlook in the upcoming period and prospective monetary policy strategies to be implemented should these risks materialize. Developments regarding global economic activity would continue to be the main factor shaping inflation dynamics and the monetary policy outlook. Recently, leading indicators of economic activity continue to slow down, underscoring downside risks especially regarding the US economy. Furthermore, ongoing problems in credit, real estate, and labor markets across developed economies and uncertainties regarding the impact of fiscal consolidations suggest that the downside risks regarding the pace of global growth are likely to persist for some time. Should the global economy face a longer-than-anticipated period of anemic growth, the monetary tightening envisaged to start in the final quarter of 2011 under the  14  BIS Review 159/2010  baseline scenario might be postponed. Moreover, an outcome whereby global economic problems intensify and contribute to a contraction of domestic economic activity, may trigger a new easing cycle.

Dear participants The productivity and the quality of work are major determinants of life quality, affecting nutrition, health and education, social protection, and fair treatment. Jobs are particularly important for the poor, whose labour is often their only asset and a primary route to poverty eradication. It is for this reason, that we at the central bank recognise skills development as an economic imperative. This is because it increases productivity of economic agents. Chairperson In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis of 2008, employment has re-emerged as a top priority area across the world. A large and growing young population can be a driver for economic growth and social progress provided they access quality education and health, and are engaged in decent employment, without which, many young people will not be able to escape negative social vices and poverty. In recognition, of the foregoing, the National Budget for 2013 whose theme is; “Delivering Inclusive Development and Social Justice” has for the first time put job creation at the centre of its development agenda by explicitly targeting the creation of 200,000 jobs in 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Sectors targeted for these jobs are agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and construction (including infrastructure). Ladies and gentlemen Sustained efforts to bring in private investment coupled with supportive public policies and investment, would contribute to enhancing productive capacities and generating the much needed jobs in our country.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Monetary independence and monetary stability two sides of the same coin Luncheon address by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to the FEBRABAN Brazilian Federation of Banks, Sao Paulo, 18 November 2004. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen It’s a real pleasure to be with you today. As you may know, our two countries have a long history of mutually beneficial relationships, going back as far as the 16th century. As very often in long-standing relationships, the first steps were quite difficult. In 1557, Protestant emigrants from Calvinist Geneva tried to found a “New Geneva” close to today’s Rio de Janeiro. Unfortunately, their obedience to the Protestant church was not considered as an asset at the time, and they had to leave the country rather precipitately. But hard work is a Swiss characteristic, and business relations between Brazil and Switzerland developed intensively in the 19th and 20th centuries. In 1907, diplomatic representatives were sent to Berne and Rio. As a matter of fact, the enormous potential of Brazil has been attracting Swiss firms from every sector of our economy. Nestlé and Jacobs-Suchard were among the first to cross the Atlantic in the 20s of the last century, but the chemical industry with Ciba, Geigy, Sandoz and Hoffmann La Roche rapidly followed in the 30s. After the Second World War, the machine-tool industry with Brown-Bovery, Schindler and Sulzer, to name only the most famous, joined the Swiss club, followed later on by Swiss banks.

An update of our monetary strategy became necessary. In 2000, we decided to abandon our traditional monetary targeting in favour of a new monetary policy concept based on an inflation forecast. 2  BIS Review 70/2004  Overall, despite difficult times, our policy has been a success. The annual average rate of inflation in Switzerland over the last 25 years amounts to 2.8%, one of the lowest in the world, and price stability has provided Switzerland with an important comparative advantage: the so-called Swiss interest rate bonus, which means that nominal and real interest rates are lower in Switzerland than in the rest of Europe. Strategy towards monetary stability Is there any secret about Switzerland’s success in preserving price stability? I do not think so. Switzerland, as a small and open economy that is deeply integrated in trade flows, has always felt that price stability was a necessary ingredient of competitiveness. In the almost 100-year history of the Swiss National Bank, fighting inflation has been a permanent objective, and there were only rare occasions of disagreement between the government and the Bank on monetary issues. Actually, central bank independence had been a tradition in Switzerland even before it became fashionable elsewhere. In my country, most politicians consider monetary stability as a kind of common good which should escape partisan disputes. The fact that our federal government plays only a limited role in economic policy also supports the view that monetary decisions should be left to technicians.
In taking these initiatives, the Eurosystem has maintained a clear separation between monetary policy and financial stability operations. This clear separation has ensured that we kept fulfilling our primary mandate to safeguard price stability. My sense is that we have been successful. In the Euro area, at no time during the crisis have inflation expectations significantly deviated from our price stability objective. This was most crucial, when headline inflation stayed in negative territory, the output gap was strongly negative and the risks of deflation about to materialize. II. Financial stability cannot be achieved irrespective of fiscal conditions  11. Recent developments in Europe have proven that disorder in public finances could lead to disorder in financial systems. This did not come as a surprise. Central banks have  2  BIS Review 113/2010  long been concerned with fiscal positions in Euro area countries. Indeed, we, at the Banque de France, as well as many ECB members, have regularly called upon policy makers to pay due attention to debt dynamics. 12. Delay in addressing long-lasting fiscal imbalances is primarily responsible for the situation, but the financial crisis has exacerbated the problems. The first trigger was the mechanism of automatic stabilizers that resulted in rapidly declining fiscal receipts due to the synchronized recession. Secondly the imbalances have been aggravated by greater public spending via unprecedented fiscal stimuli plans and large public financial commitments, in particular via capital injection into the banking sector and debt guarantees schemes.

Exogenous changes  0.5  in firms’ pricing power are one example – so-called cost-push shocks. Shocks to the exchange rate, the  0 Source: Bank calculations. economy’s supply capacity, or commodity prices also  10  See Blanchard, O., and J. Galí (2007). "Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model". Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39(1), pp. 35-65. 11 See Broadbent, B (2013), “Conditional guidance as a response to supply uncertainty”, speech at the London Business School. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  6  Chart 2: … whereas after the financial crisis, the economy experienced a challenging monetary policy trade-off  have this flavour. 12  Because monetary policy’s  influence on inflation is predominantly an indirect one, via demand, in such circumstances inflation can only  Financial crisis and after  6  Inflation (%)  be controlled by delivering an opposing movement in aggregate spending. If something pushes up on  5  inflation directly, monetary policy can only bring inflation back down by causing a reduction in  4  spending via higher interest rates. The speed with 3  which this adjustment is delivered is determined by the monetary policy maker guided by their remit.
Mugur Isărescu: Some considerations of the impact of monetary policy on the economic convergence Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Conference on Europe Economic Integration 2018 "How to finance cohesion in Europe? ", Panel 1 "The role of monetary policy in catching-up", organized by the Central Bank of the Republic of Austria (Oesterreichische Nationalbank),Vienna, 26 November 2018. * * * As prepared for delivery Ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured to join such a distinguished audience. After so many years spent as the Governor of the National Bank of Romania, today’s discussion gives me yet another opportunity to look back at the role that monetary policy has played in supporting nominal and real convergence in Romania. It is almost two decades since the Romania – EU accession negotiations had been opened (back then, in 2000, I served as the prime-minister). Romania has been an EU member for more than 10 years already. Allow me to share with you my view, shaped by the lessons learned over all these years, on the relationship between monetary policy and economic convergence. Let me first make a couple of considerations about economic convergence. First, while the nominal convergence criteria are deeply rooted in the minds of policymakers, the Maastricht Treaty also explicitly stipulates that “a high degree of sustainable convergence” is needed. Yet, this requirement seems to have been overlooked sometimes. Second, practical experience with euro adoption so far has proved that real convergence is also critical for success.

Even in the absence of a clear definition and a consensus on a numerical benchmark, it became clear that a high-enough level of real convergence is a prerequisite for minimising the costs associated with losing monetary policy independence after euro adoption. Recent years have shown that the euro area is not a cosy place for economies with lagging competitiveness or rigid markets. We should not forget that euro adoption involves a permanent commitment, as Otmar Issing, the first ECB chief economist, pointed out. Romania made significant progress in terms of real convergence, with growth resuming and gaining momentum after the global economic crisis. This led to a rise in GDP per capita as a percentage of euro area average (based on PPS) from 31.7 percent in 2005 to 58.6 percent in 2017. The advance was the fastest within the group of peer countries which recorded similar trends. Clear prospects for EU entry favoured Romania’s real convergence before 2007. Afterwards, actual membership in the EU “convergence club” has fuelled the catching-up process. The obvious next stage is joining the euro area. A successful adoption of the single currency, however, requires optimal timing. This, as I pointed out before, is mainly conditional upon achieving a high-enough level of real convergence, alongside compliance with the nominal convergence criteria. Unlike the EU, the euro area is not a “convergence club”, as its current members did not necessarily increase their convergence level after adopting the euro.
As you know, the project has suffered significant delays, and only a few months ago the chances of it going ahead seemed to be only 50-50. However, a number of the logjams have now been cleared and a revised timetable has been announced. The intention is now to release a revised set of consultation papers in May of next year. This would take account of a further quantitative impact study which will be held later this year to test the calibration of the revised proposals. If all goes well, the final Accord would be released before the end of 2003 with implementation targeted for 2006. I know that there have been a number of false alarms on the New Accord, and that some of the banks here today may be inclined to take a wait-and-see attitude. To such banks, I would say that the pendulum has swung in favour of implementation. It would therefore be sensible to plan on the basis that the New Accord will now go ahead on the revised schedule, and that it will include an explicit capital charge for operational risk. This does not leave all that much time for those banks which might want to use the advanced approaches in the New Accord to measure credit or operational risk to get themselves ready. I would advise such banks to start their preparations now if they have not already done so. I would particularly recommend that banks begin to collect default data for credit risk and loss data for operational risk.

A framework for doing the latter is set out in the Basel Committee’s Sound Practices paper in the form of the two-dimensional matrix I described earlier, which assigns losses arising from the various loss event types to the major business lines of the bank. Conclusions Operational risk has many facets, and the events which give rise to it cover a huge range from highfrequency low-impact at one end to low-frequency high-impact at the other. There is a correspondingly wide range of controls and techniques that can be used to prevent or at least mitigate losses. Sound  BIS Review 33/2002  3  documentation lies at the more bread and butter end of the spectrum of such controls and techniques. But it is no less vital for all that. The Association is therefore to be congratulated for its initiative in putting in place an essential building block in the form of the standardised documentation that is being launched today. This will help to promote the development of the syndicated loan market in Hong Kong and in the region more generally, and will also serve the objective of enabling banks to better manage their operational risk. 4  BIS Review 33/2002
Svein Gjedrem: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 28 September 2004. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The statement is based, among other things, on the assessments in Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2003 and Inflation Report 2/2004. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Storting for again inviting Norges Bank to appear before this Committee to report and answer questions on monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s credit report. Inflation-targeting countries Price stability, in the sense of low and stable inflation, is the objective of monetary policy in a number of countries. Historical experience from Norway and other countries has shown that high inflation has resulted in unstable output and employment. In addition, a fall in the price level will often accompany a period of decline. The first inflation target was introduced in New Zealand in 1990. Canada followed in 1991, the UK in 1992, and Sweden and Australia in 1993. In Norway, the government issued a regulation introducing an inflation target in 2001. Monetary policy in euro area countries and Switzerland is also aimed at price stability, even though this is not referred to as inflation targeting in these countries.

We have a very open economy with free capital movements. Stable inflation expectations also contribute to more stable exchange rate expectations. Inflation targeting means setting the interest rate so as to achieve a numerical target for inflation. Norges Bank sets the interest rate with a view to stabilising inflation at 2.5 per cent within a reasonable  BIS Review 53/2004  1  time horizon, normally 1-3 years. The more precise horizon will depend on the disturbances to which the economy is exposed, and how they affect the path for inflation and output. The inflation target represents a framework for, not an obstacle to, monetary policy’s contribution to stabilising output and employment. We have chosen flexible inflation targeting. Variability in output and employment as well as inflation is given weight. The objective of monetary policy is to safeguard the value of money in the long term, and seek to contribute to stabilising economic developments in the short and medium term. Like other central banks, Norges Bank publishes reports about the economic situation, the inflation outlook and the conduct of monetary policy. The transparency of the basis for monetary policy decisions has increased. Norges Bank presents an account of both the main aspects of economic developments that influence interest rate decisions and of the Executive Board’s assessments. The alternatives considered by the Executive Board are made public. Interest rate decisions are taken on the basis of an interest-rate setting strategy drawn up by the Executive Board every four months.
22  MP Report Jun.20 4.75-6.25 7.7 6.9 8.0 6.6 3.2 11.2 -0.7 17.2 20.6  2022 (f) MP Report Sep.20  MP Report Jun.20  MP Report Sep.20  4.0-5.0 5.6 7.0 8.0 6.8 5.0 8.6 -2.5 16.8 21.8  3.0-4.0 4.1 3.5 4.7 3.2 3.3 5.8 -1.3 17.3 20.9  3.0-4.0 2.7 2.4 4.9 1.7 4.8 2.2 -1.7 18.2 22.2  Table 3 International baseline scenario assumptions  2021 (f)  2022 (f)  MP Report MP Report MP Report Sep.20 Jun.20 Sep.20 (annual change, percent)  MP Report Jun.20  2019 (e) 2020 (f) MP Report Jun.20  Terms of trade Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP Developed economies' GDP at PPP Emerging economies' GDP at PPP United States Eurozone China Latin America (excl. Chile)  -0.6 2.9 2.8 1.7 3.8 2.2 1.3 6.1 -0.7  LME copper price $ Oil price, WTI-Brent average $  272 61  4.9 -3.6 -4.5 -7.0 -2.4 -6.4 -8.7 0.6 -8.3  4.1 -3.5 -4.6 -7.2 -2.5 -6.0 -8.9 1.9 -9.2  250 40  270 41  -0.5 4.2 4.4 3.4 5.3 2.5 4.4 7.3 1.5 (levels) 260 43  MP Report Sep.20  -0.5 4.7 4.9 4.1 5.5 2.4 6.7 7.3 2.0  0.2 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.9 4.8 4.1 6.3 2.9  0.3 4.5 4.6 4.1 5.0 4.1 5.2 6.1 2.9  280 47  275 47  290 49  (e) Estimate. Except for commodity prices. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

I also believe what science teaches about behavior: Our actions are a product of both individual disposition or volition and the situation in which we function. And, the situation might be more potent than we might think.5 So, I wonder, for example, whether the thought of “getting caught” even crosses someone’s mind if a prohibition is so routinely disregarded that violating that rule is normal. In the LIBOR and FX cases, for example, traders discussed openly their manipulation of 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  reference rates in electronic chat rooms that they knew were recorded and monitored. The fact that those traders used a back channel to communicate evidences an awareness of wrongdoing —not to mention the brazen content of their communication. I have to conclude that the risk of getting caught either never crossed their minds or was massively discounted. On behalf of their firms, compliance personnel can help identify the root causes—especially the situational factors—that contribute to control failures. A thorough and honest exploration of those factors can help inform structural and governance changes mandated in enforcement actions. It is in everyone’s interest for those reforms to succeed, to fulfill the mantra of “Never again.” I do not think this type of inquiry is easy—not because the root causes are unknowable. Rather, it may be uncomfortable to ask the right questions. Here are some examples. There are sure to be others. Are behavioral expectations—and the consequences of violating those expectations—clear?
At the same time, the SSM will develop its own more detailed supervision manual, which lays down the supervisory approach to be taken by the SSM including on off-site and on-site reviews, risk assessments and model validations. The ECB and the EBA are cooperating closely to ensure that these two projects are fully consistent. Here again, the existence of the SSM will greatly facilitate the work of the EBA, as all SSM members will naturally converge in their supervisory practices. Third, the conduct of stress tests. The Council Regulation requests the SSM to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the banks that the ECB will supervise directly. This will have two main building blocks. First, a balance sheet assessment, which is a point-in-time evaluation of the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Second, a forward-looking assessment of individual banks’ capital positions and provisioning levels in the form of a stress test. This stress test, and future stress tests undertaken as part of the SSM’s regular supervisory functions, will be conducted in close cooperation with the EBA, in particular regarding the design and timing of the exercises. European Systemic Risk Board As regards interactions with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the activities of the SSM will have a clear systemic dimension and so cooperation between the SSM and ESRB will be essential.

household income and long-term interest rates) have been exceptionally favorable in the past few quarters. Meanwhile, the profits of small and medium-sized construction enterprises have deteriorated, which could result in an increase in the sector’s payment delays. Finally, the outlook for the supply of new office space remains high by historical standards. The Chilean economy is well positioned to deal with the changing internal and external conditions ahead. Internationally, conditions facing the Chilean economy have been benign for a long time, with high terms of trade and very favorable external financing conditions. At home, the progression of the investment cycle has led to strong growth in employment and spending in a context of contained inflation and neutral ranges for the MPR. Indicators of recent months suggest that external and internal conditions have started to normalize. The adjustments in relative prices, such as the real exchange rate, have gone in the right direction to help the economy to accommodate the new situation, that is, lower terms of trade, and the normalization of domestic demand and external financing conditions. The Board follows the evolution of external and domestic macroeconomic conditions and their implications on inflation closely, and reiterates its commitment to conduct monetary policy so that projected inflation stands at 3% over the policy horizon. Let me finish with some reflections. Final reflections The economic conjuncture always presents challenges to those of us who are in charge of economic policy making. Now we must face a different configuration than what we’ve seen in recent years.