samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This comprised foreign investment gains of $ billion, and a small positive currency translation effect of $ billion. After factoring in expenses of $ billion from domestic and other operations, MAS made an operating profit of $ billion. From that, MAS recorded a net profit of $ billion, after contributing $ billion to the Government’s Consolidated Fund. The investment return of $ billion in FY2018/19 is relatively high and reflects mainly the effects of an increasingly larger OFR base. First, the income from investing a larger stock of assets would be higher. Second, realised gains would also be higher, as a larger OFR base means a higher turnover of securities for rebalancing and other portfolio transactions. We do not expect investment returns to be sustained at these high levels as the OFR 8 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  base will now be smaller after the transfer of $ billion to the Government. Income from a smaller portfolio will be less, and portfolio transactions are also likely be fewer. MAS returned to Government the full net profit of $ billion and another $ billion from its general reserve fund, making a total of $ billion. MAS decided to return this amount to Government as a smaller OFR base would mean that we need less capital and general reserves as buffer. This does not mean that the Government is getting $ billion and another $ billion. The return to Government increased its deposits with MAS by $ billion.

As explained earlier, the transfer of $ billion of OFR to the Government will reduce its deposits with MAS by $ billion. FINANCIAL SECTOR Let me conclude with a quick update on the financial sector. MAS’ various regulatory and developmental initiatives are detailed in the annual report, so I will provide just a high level overview of the sector’s performance. In 2018, the financial services sector did very well, growing at 6.1%.1 This brings the three-year average growth rate of financial services to 4.1%, which is within striking distance of the Industry Transformation Map (ITM) target of 4.3% per annum over 2016–20. In 2019, financial services is expected to grow slower but should continue to outpace the overall economy. Prospects for financial intermediation are mixed, with credit demand weighed down by a slowing Chinese economy, though loans to Southeast Asia are showing a bit more resilience. The picture for insurance is more promising, on the back of growing demand for insurance products catering to high net worth and mass affluent customers in the Asia-Pacific. Growth in asset management will be lacklustre, weighed down by falling market valuations and fee compression. The payments services space should continue to thrive in line with continued expansion of e-commerce activities, both locally and in the region. FinTech-related activities should also continue to grow handsomely, boosted by ongoing digital transformation across the financial sector. Even more heartening than the growth numbers are the jobs numbers for financial services.
Complexity has meant that avoidance and arbitrage can flourish behind a curtain of opacity. And self-regulation has meant that even as one wormhole is closed, others can be created in their place. Taken together, this evidence does not paint an especially encouraging picture. Many of the intended aims and purported advantages of a complex, risk-based regulatory approach may not have materialised in practice. Worse, some of the assets of the risk-based approach may even have become liabilities. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Unintended consequences So much for the intended consequences of the shift to self-regulatory standards. What of the unintended consequences? Three are worth noting. (a) Cost and compliance First, regulatory complexity comes at a cost – the cost of compliance. These costs are borne, in the first instance, by the regulator and regulated firms. The costs of moving to Basel II, and the emergence of internal models, are difficult to calculate. But external estimates put it at tens of billions of dollars. For European banks, the costs of implementing Basel III are estimated at over 70,000 jobs per year (Harle et al (2010)). For US banks, the costs of Dodd-Frank are also estimated to be tens of thousands of jobs. The costs of Solvency II, the new capital standard for European insurance companies, have been put at tens of billions of euros – and it is unclear even whether this standard will be implemented.

Fraziali Ismail: COVID-19 and climate responsibility, commitment, and collaboration  change,  collective  Closing remarks by Mr Fraziali Ismail, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at Malaysia Showcase during Climate Week NYC 2020, New York City, 17 September 2020. * * * From time to time, we chance upon heart-warming stories of how seemingly small and random acts of kindness, result in something miraculous. I am talking about stories like Jadav Payeng, an environmental activist and forest worker from India, who planted a tree almost every single day for 40 years. Jadav was only 16 when he started working with the district’s social forestry division in a tree plantation drive. Upon completion of the 5-year project, Jadav chose to stay and continued on his quest to save his island. This led him to single-handedly create a real man-made forest, the Molai Forest, which houses several species of animals and thousands of trees that is now almost as big as New York’s Central Park. We also marvel at Afroz Shaz, who began picking up trash on Versova Beach in Mumbai, and inspired thousands of volunteers to join the cause. Versova’s dramatic transformation from filthy to fabulous went viral in India, with praises to Afroz and the volunteers for helping to restore the beach that was previously polluted by 15 years of piled up rubbish.
In my description of operational issues within the context of the single monetary policy, I have made numerous and concrete allusions to this reliance of the ECB on the national central banks, in the areas of monetary policy, payment systems and foreign exchange operations. This organisation scheme of the ESCB is in line with the principle of subsidiarity laid down in the Maastricht Treaty. According to this principle, the ESCB shall have recourse to the national central banks to carry out its operations, to the extent deemed possible and appropriate. Consistently with this principle of decentralisation in the execution of the ESCB’s operations, the counterparties (credit institutions) will keep their accounts with the NCBs. Operational decentralisation within the ESCB will be in the very interest of the System. In this regard, let me quote the President of the EMI, Mr. Duisenberg: “Reliance on the infrastructure and operational experience built up by the national central banks will prove a valuable asset. Given that the ESCB needs to be cognisant of differences between financial market participants and structures in the EU, operating through the national central banks will ensure that it has the best possible knowledge of market conditions throughout the euro area”.8 The credibility of the ECB as the decision-making centre will by no means be undermined by this decentralised scheme. It will not depend on the technicalities in the execution of operations.

It will also publish the results of its tender operations. It could equally wish to release daily aggregate data on the reserve holdings, if averaged reserve requirements are in place, and on the use of the two standing facilities, as measured in both cases at the end of the previous day. 2.2. Intraday operations: the spillover from intraday credit into overnight credit as a borderline case To ensure the smooth functioning of the TARGET system, the national central banks will provide intraday liquidity to participants in the real-time gross settlement systems. This will be done in the form of fully collateralised intraday credit operations, in the sense that a credit extended during the day falls due before the end of the day. From a monetary policy point of view, such operations create the risk of a spillover of intraday credit into overnight credit that would undermine the control of the ESCB over the euro monetary base. In other words, the spillover of intraday credit into overnight credit in the books of the central bank can be viewed as a borderline case between payment systems and monetary policy issues. Within the euro area, this risk will be limited as end-of-day debit positions will be automatically considered to be a request for recourse to the marginal lending facility, i.e. an ESCB monetary policy instrument that bears a penalty interest rate.
It is important for the banking community to work together to collectively tackle the issue and limit the harm inflicted by the “bad apples” on the system. 23. Earlier last year, the HKMA consulted the industry on a proposed mechanism for doing “conduct-related reference checking” between banks. We have received many useful comments during the consultation exercise, including those from ASIFMA, and we have issued the consultation conclusions in May this year to set out the operational framework for what we call “Mandatory Reference Check” – in short the “MRC”, Scheme. 24. The MRC Scheme will adopt a proportionate approach, where conduct-related reference checks would be required for certain categories of bank staff whose conduct and integrity are especially important. 25. Misconduct behaviours to be captured for reference will include breaches of legal and regulatory requirements; misconduct incidents and incidents relating to honesty, integrity or matters of similar nature; as well as internal or external disciplinary actions relating to conduct matters. 26. Our plan is to implement the MRC Scheme as an industry-led initiative with endorsement from the HKMA, instead of imposing it as a supervisory requirement. We trust that banks will be committed to effectively implementing the Scheme, given the benefits that it will bring to the industry as a whole. 27. The Scheme will be implemented in two phases. Phase 1 will cover directors and senior management positions. And Phase 2 will be extended to roles carrying out regulated activities.

This year, we are advancing to a deep dive into the incentive systems of front offices in retail banks. 16. Based on what we have learned from the self-assessment exercise, we noted that banks’ culture effort in the area of incentive systems is still very much an area of “work-inprogress”. And having appropriate incentive system is such an important piece for inducing desirable behaviour that we have decided to intensify our efforts on this theme. 17. Up till now, we have not seen any guidance published on stylised approach to incentive systems, I guess because the design and implementation of such systems are very much dependent upon the characteristics of individual banks. But we have decided to take up this challenge by looking into the incentive systems of front offices in 20 retail banks, and aim to provide some useful guidance, or at least reference points, to the industry. 18. As you can imagine, the Focused Review on this subject is a very large-scale exercise. We are examining the front-office incentive systems, as well as analysing the perception and behaviour of front-line staff, in 20 retail banks in Hong Kong. So far, as a key component of this review, we have completed an industry-wide employee survey to gauge frontline employees’ views on their banks’ incentive systems and culture. We are encouraged to see the active participation of surveyed bank staff, with an overall response rate of around 70%.
BIS Review 36/2005  9  Chart 3: Inflation and Unemployment by Decade RPIX inflation (%)  1950-1959  RPIX inflation (%)  1960-1969  30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5 0  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  1970-1979  8  10  12  -5 0  RPIX inflation (%)  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  RPIX inflation (%)  1980-1992  30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5 0  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  -5 0 2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  RPIX inflation (%)  1993-2005  30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 0  2 4 6 Une mployme nt (%)  8  10  12  Note: The unemployment rate used here is the Claimant Count measure, published by the ONS from 1971. Unemployment data before 1971 is from Haldane and Quah (1998). The published RPIX series starts in 1976. For observations before 1976, the allitems RPI was used. The RPI series before 1976 did not include mortgage interest payments.

Our knowledge is neither complete nor constant. At the other end of the spectrum, rational optimising behaviour can, in principle, generate a policy reaction function which takes into account uncertainty about the economy and the process of learning about economic relationships. Such a reaction function would describe how a central bank would respond to any conceivable shock in the future, and explain how estimates of parameter values and the weights attached to particular models would be updated. But even in very simple examples the cleverest economists find the solution of those decision problems almost impossibly complicated. Fully rational optimising behaviour is unreasonably demanding. In the words of Gerd Gigerenzer (2001), optimisation is for “Laplacean demons” not human beings – a reference to an imaginary being that “…could condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom…”10 Both approaches, for very different reasons, end up with a monetary policy rule. The simple rule is not credible because we do know some things and we can learn from the past. The complicated rule is not feasible because it places unrealistic demands on our ability to process information. Given the lack of further guidance from economists as to how to make decisions, central banks have often retreated to the position that setting interest rates requires the exercise of unfettered discretion. But this has problems of its own.
The Bank of England has taken a leading role in discussion with other governments and central banks, and with the private sector market participants, to find a more orderly approach to crisis situations and to avoid the kind of damaging scramble to withdraw funds from emerging market economies that marked the Asian Crisis. BIS Review 102/2000  4  The second area of Bank involvement is market infrastructure, the payments and settlements systems that underpin financial markets. Given the size of payment flows, domestic and cross border, the importance of robust and reliable systems is paramount. Any failure in payment systems would result in gridlock and widespread disruption. The Bank has an operational interest, closer to home, in that payment systems, especially in the wholesale market, often rely on the transfer of payments across central bank accounts. Because of this, under the MOU the Bank is explicitly given responsibility for the systemic oversight of payment systems. In carrying out this responsibility, we take a close interest in the interaction of these systems with other parts of the infrastructure - settlement systems and clearing houses. This interest extends to exchanges and the dizzying process of alliances, mergers and failed bids that has marked the attempt to consolidate global equities markets, especially in Europe where, despite EMU, trading is still widely split between markets. The third area of Bank involvement is regulatory policy.

These three most important elements are dependent on developments abroad, international financial markets, and global demand for commodities. The Swiss franc exchange rate, by comparison, does not play a decisive role. There is thus no contradiction between having a strong Swiss franc and a large current account surplus. Nor is the surplus a suitable measure for assessing Switzerland's share in global imbalances. It is much more the case that Switzerland and its extensive level of direct investment abroad contributes significantly to balanced global economic growth. SNB monetary policy is focused on ensuring price stability. In so doing, it takes due account of economic developments. To fulfil this mandate, the SNB must secure appropriate monetary conditions. The current account surplus does not play a role in monetary policy. In an open economy like Switzerland, however, sizeable exchange rate fluctuations have a strong impact on production and prices. In the current environment, and with interest rates close to zero, the minimum exchange rate is therefore the correct monetary policy instrument. The SNB will continue to enforce it with the utmost determination. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
14  Figure 5 Lending interest rates (1)  Credit growth (3)  (index, 2002-2017=100)  (real annual change, percent)  180  210  25  25  150  180  20  20  150  15  15  120  10  10  90  5  5  60  0  0  30  -5  120 90 60 30 02  05  08  11  14  17  Consumer  -5 02  Commercial  05  08  11  14  17  Housing (2)  (1) Weighted averaged rates of all operations performed in each month. (2) Loans denominated in UFs. (3) Dotted horizontal lines show average of the last 10 years of each series. Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF data. Figure 6 Consumer expectations : IPEC (*) (original series)  80  80 Country's economic situation in 12 mo. 70  Household's perceived situation one year ahead  70  60  60  50  50  40  40 Current personal economic situation  30 20 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Current economic situation of the country 14 15 16  30 20 17  (*) Value above (below) 50 indicates optimism (pessimism). Source: Adimark.

News conference  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg In my remarks today, I will begin with the developments in the Swiss banking sector environment. I will then provide an assessment of the current situation at the two globally active big banks, Credit Suisse and UBS, as well as at the domestically focused banks. Finally, I will talk about the impact the coronavirus pandemic is having on the use of cash. Banking sector environment  Economic conditions for the Swiss banking sector continue to be difficult. As already mentioned by my colleague Thomas Jordan, while global GDP has recovered somewhat since the downturn in the second quarter, in most countries economic activity remains well below its year-back level. As a result, credit risks in particular have increased worldwide, with ratings of corporate bonds deteriorating significantly over the course of the year. In comparison with the real economy, the situation on the global financial markets has eased considerably more since the spring. Risk premia on corporate bonds rose markedly after the outbreak of the pandemic, but have since largely declined again. Stock prices have also recovered from their downturn in February and March. The steep recession has thus far had very little impact on the Swiss credit and real estate markets. Lending volume in the mortgage market and prices in the residential real estate market continued to rise in the second and third quarters of 2020. Furthermore, the number of bankruptcies and value adjustments on existing loans has remained low.
Also, it would be useful if the Fund could develop its own in-house view of a benchmark risk scenario which then can be used, or shared with members, in stress-testing the vulnerabilities of their economies and financial sectors. I probably have used up my allocated time. I hope my remarks have been useful. Again, I would like to thank the Independent Evaluation Office for the invitation. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 95/2006

Long before I became Governor I said that my ambition was for monetary policy to be boring. You may feel that the latest decision was far from boring. But while it is true that the precise timing was unexpected by analysts, the direction in which interest rates were heading was predictable in terms of the underlying economic data, and indeed was quite clearly predicted – financial markets were anticipating a 25 basis point rise at the February meeting. Looking behind the stunned surprise in the headlines, much of the reaction to our latest decision was that it was only too clear why rates needed to be raised. As one paper wrote last week, “while the timing of last week’s rate rise caught many commentators on the hop, the reasoning behind the move is not at all a surprise”. So I have certainly not abandoned my ambition to be boring. The basis for our prosperity is business. And the excitement in the economy will, I hope, continue to come from your businesses, your new products and ventures. After all, the MPC is there to make inflation, and hence the economy as a whole, more stable. It’s up to you to steal the limelight and the headlines from us. BIS Review 9/2007  3
And improving our supply-side capacity is the major challenge confronting us all - at the national level but also here on the ground in the West Midlands. That's not something which monetary policy - which operates - as I say - on the demand side of the economy can do much about - at least directly. Government in all its forms - at the European, national, regional and local levels - has a vital role to play in this, by helping to improve the transport infrastructure, for example, and I know that you will be discussing that subject later this morning; or by raising the standards of education and training, which are critically important in terms of the available skills of the workforce; and by providing the right business incentives and encouraging investment. But the private sector, too, has a vitally important part to play - including at the regional level. Private sector businesses clearly have a strong commercial interest in the prosperity of the communities in which they operate.

You've already come a long way in the West Midlands. You have weathered the international storm in your more traditional industries far better than might have been expected, and you have been relatively successful in diversifying into higher value-added and more knowledge-based industries. I wish I could claim that life will get easier looking forward to 2020 - but I can't promise that and you wouldn't believe me anyway! But what I do say is that working together, with your “can-do” attitude, you are as well placed as anywhere to overcome the challenges ahead - and I wish you all possible success. 4  BIS Review 53/2002