samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But of course, the handing of such powers to an unelected group of people raises serious issues and challenges. How can such a group be trusted to implement what our society wants when it cannot be sent packing through the ballot box? How can it be legitimate that unelected technocrats take decisions that affect people’s lives? These are understandable, real concerns. And they must be addressed. Those of us to whom a degree of independence has been granted must remember that we have no natural right to it. We are citizens in service, not people in power. Two important features of the way power has been delegated to us make that so. First, Parliament delegates to us a clear mandate. We cannot pursue whatever our own preferences may be. That’s why we have, as it’s known in the trade, instrument independence, but not goal independence. We do not have the independence to decide what the instruments are used to achieve. 5 Second, our performance against Parliament’s mandate must be able to be assessed. This means we can be held to account for delivering what we’ve been told to deliver. These two features were central to the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee in 1997. It has a clear remit from Parliament: a target of 2% consumer price inflation. There is no danger of the committee being able to impose any other standard. 5  Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer. "How independent should a central bank be?". Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994.

I think we have a significant role to play in-terms of capacity building not just in the banking sector, but in several other sectors that are vital to the economy. That is the challenge that all of you have to remember and try and participate. I myself, when I worked in these institutions few decades ago, the Ministry of Industries, in the Treasury, it was a very enriching experience personally. But at the same time, I carried over the expertise I had picked up in the Central Bank and enriched those institutions as well. So that tradition should continue and I think it is incumbent on the central bank to really use our manpower. All of you are a concentrated pool of brainpower in this country. I do not think any other institution has so many qualified individuals. We have engineers, we have people from all sorts of fields, not just economics, in this institution, and we have to really build on those skill sets. One of the plans I have, which I am discussing with the DGs, AGs, is to try and deepen our skill sets. We have to identify specific skill sets which are necessary for the central bank in the first instance, and also for the broader nation and to try and deepen those skill sets in a conscious basis so that our manpower development, what you call the improvement of our human capital becomes much more entrenched and becomes much more integrated interms of the national economic developmental effort.
In this context I define the “new economy” as an increase in the potential growth of the economy. In the last few years, the growth of the American economy has surpassed most forecasts. Not only has the rate of growth been high in historic terms during the present upswing - around 3.5% per year on average since the end of 1991 - it has besides been very stable and unusually long lasting. At the same time, unemployment has fallen to near 4%; levels this low have not been witnessed since the 1960s. However, in distinction to previous booms, there has been no increase in the rate of inflation and the underlying rate of inflation has been more than halved since 1991, from over 4% to 2%. Public finances have improved considerably, from a deficit of 5% of GNP in 1991 to an expected surplus of around 1% this year. Looking at productivity per hour worked in American business, which is perhaps the best measure of how good a country’s growth potential is in the longer term, this has risen sharply, by over 2.5% on average since 1997; this figure can be compared with an average growth of productivity of around 1.5% over the period 1974-96. A substantial part of the improved productivity of labour can be explained by very high investments - so-called “capital deepening” - not least in computer equipment. In spite of the fact that unemployment has continued to fall throughout the period, the growth of productivity has been impressively high.

This market power might also lead to high fees for payment transactions that could reduce the revenues – and hence the innovative capabilities – of partner banks. C. Consolidate European integration and sovereignty in the area of payments  The limits of Europe’s integration and sovereignty in the area of payments have been highlighted once again by the entry of tech giants into the field of payments and the emergence of a systemically important project such as the Libra/Diem initiative, which could see non-European participants providing new solutions on the European market. Although implementation of the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) project was beneficial in supporting defragmentation for credit transfers and direct debits, non-European participants have been able to leverage regulatory harmonisation in their efforts to conquer the entire European market, whereas domestic participants have struggled to expand beyond their country of origin. Meanwhile, European integration in the area of card payments has failed. The so called international card schemes exclusively manage all cross-border payments within the European Union, not to mention a large share of domestic payments. This situation has created a dependency with multiple consequences. I am talking particularly about the definition and control of technical standards, financial aspects, but also challenges related to payment data, i.e. our capacity to protect these data and enforce compliance with European standards such as the GDPR, if decision-making centres are based outside Europe. II/ What is the Banque de France doing?
Luis M Linde: Profile of Professor Nicholas Bloom – winner of the XII Germán Bernácer Prize Opening remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XII Germán Bernácer Prize Ceremony, Madrid, 24 September 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen It is a great pleasure for me to introduce this award ceremony for the 12th Germán Bernácer Prize. First of all, let me once again thank the organizers and sponsors of the Prize. They have established an excellent programme to support economic research in the fields of macroeconomics, monetary policy, and financial economics. This is the 10th time that the Bernácer Prize award ceremony has taken place at the Banco de España. The continued support and backing of this initiative of the Observatory of the European Central Bank by the Banco de España is justified by its conviction of the importance of macroeconomic research, insofar as it concerns the functions to be performed by the European System of Central Banks. By recognizing the relevance of a prize like this, which has been awarded, in every instance, on the basis of academic excellence, the Banco de España reaffirms its commitment to economic research. As many of you know, this Prize commemorates a distinguished Spanish macroeconomist who worked at the Banco de España, as director of its Research Department, during the 1930s. Despite the isolation of the Spanish economics profession at that time, Germán Bernácer obtained substantial international recognition for his research contributions.

Some have rightly pointed out that the economic fundamentals of Asian EMEs are now much more robust than two decades ago, with improved current account balances and better coverage of short-term external debts by sizable foreign reserves. And currency and maturity mismatch in foreign liabilities are no longer a serious issue. Moreover, the more flexible exchange rate regimes adopted by many Asian economies should give regional currencies more flexibility to adjust according to market forces and may therefore serve as a shock absorber in the case of capital outflows. A number of Asian EMEs, Hong Kong included, have also stepped up their macro-prudential measures in recent years to tackle the spill-over effects of the unconventional monetary policies of the advanced economies. 8. There is, however, no room for complacency. We should also be aware that the external environment has become much more challenging for Asian EMEs compared with the 1990s. The global economy is now much weaker, meaning that EMEs may be less able to look to support from external demand to cushion the effect of tighter domestic liquidity conditions along with US monetary policy normalisation. Concerns over further economic moderation in Mainland China have also weakened market sentiment towards Asian EMEs and the strength of the region’s “pull factor” to attract global capital flows. 9. More importantly, the region is now facing new risk factors that were unseen before.
Unit costs and list prices L is t p ri c e  NOK  U nit c o s t  30  30  25  25  20  20  115 5 110 0 55  rs T ra nsfe  e e qu Ch  in a term  ed  EF TP OS Ow nb ank 's A TM Oth er b a nk 's A W it TM hd r aw als /de pos its  l gir o  ter  as h by c  Gir op a id  Pa  per  -b a s  iro il g Ma  ec oun  oa t th Gir  its  al g ir o  d eb  rmin  Dir e ct  nic te  iro  Ele ctro  PC /Inte  Pho ne g  rne t  00  7. Cost coverage in 1988, 1994 and 2001 1988  2001 Prices  Other  Other  1994  Float  Other  Prices  Prices  Float  Due to changes in banks’ service range, users participate more extensively in the production of payment services and cover some of the costs directly. This applies in particular to the use of terminals, PCs and telephones for bill payment and to cash withdrawals in connection with goods purchases. The survey does not cover customers’ time and travel expenses and expenses related to telephone or PC.

Indeed, I would like to acknowledge in particular today the very substantial contribution that Nigel has made to the business community here in Northern Ireland over the past two decades, in the face of many challenges and over a period of great change and opportunity. The Northern Ireland economy has made great progress since those days in the late 1980s and early 1990s when I came here with my CBI economist hat on. Through the 1990s and in the 2000s prior to the financial crisis, Northern Ireland achieved an average rate of growth of 3% a year – significantly above the growth rate recorded in the UK as a whole. 1 Unemployment fell by two-thirds, from over 12% of the labour force in the early 1990s to just 4% in the mid-2000s. As in the rest of the UK, the unemployment rate here in Northern Ireland has risen in the recession. But it remains below the UK average – in contrast with the 1980s and 1990s when unemployment here was significantly above the national average. There are clearly some particular challenges facing the economy here in Northern Ireland as we move into the recovery phase of the cycle. Compared with the rest of the UK, employment is more dependent on the public sector and the participation rate in the labour force is lower. Ireland’s fiscal and banking problems may well have a bigger impact on the economy here than elsewhere in the UK.
This morning I will talk about economic conditions in the mainland and in Puerto Rico, paying particular attention to the developments since my visit last year and to the role of exports. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. Introduction to the New York Fed By way of introduction, let me start with a synopsis of what the New York Fed is, what we do, and what makes my job so interesting. The New York Fed is part of the Federal Reserve System, America’s central bank, which was created by Congress in 1913. With this act, Congress delegated to the Fed System its constitutional authority to manage the supply of money in the nation’s economy. Congress designed the central bank to be decentralized, representative of all regions of the country – including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands – and independent of the political process. The Fed System is comprised of the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C. – a federal agency currently led by Chairman Ben Bernanke – plus 12 regional Reserve Banks that span the country. For example, the district overseen by the New York Fed includes all of New York, the 12 northern counties of New Jersey; Fairfield County, Connecticut; Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Each Reserve Bank is distinct, with its own charter and a board of directors drawn from its district, but overseen by the Board of Governors.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: The progress of the euro  Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Cercle de L’Union Interalliée in Paris on 24 October 2000. *  *  *  Thank you, Mr Chairman. I am grateful to the French Section of the Franco-British Council for giving me this opportunity to address this distinguished audience here in Paris, and I am delighted to share this public platform with my dear colleague, Jean-Claude Trichet. You have invited us to speak about the progress of the euro. I am very happy to do so from my British perspective - at least for the time being - as a keenly interested observer. My perspective you might expect would be very different from that of Jean-Claude, who was, and is, one of the principal architects of and a major driving force behind the process of European monetary union - one of the true founding fathers. In fact you will find that our analysis and assessment of the euro’s progress so far is very similar. I hope that will not come as too great a disappointment to you! We would certainly, I think, agree that the preparations for and introduction of the euro at the beginning of last year were a technical triumph. The euro-payments infrastructure is generally working well and has underpinned the integration of the euro money market which is an essential precondition for the effective implementation of Eurozone monetary policy.
Specialised features of these assets affect both how easily they can be sold or restructured, and how attractive they may be to other market participants. Bespoke and sometimes innovative features of some of these assets may increase uncertainty around this. Since Solvency II was implemented, the range of asset types in MA portfolios has expanded substantially, including increased investments in a wide variety of illiquid loans and other forms of private credit. We estimate that annuity firms’ holdings of assets other than corporate or UK government debt has grown, from around 15% of assets backing annuities at the end of 2014, to around 45% of MA portfolios at the end of 2020[3]. The PRA is attuned to the merits of these investments, both in terms of risk diversification for firms, and for the real economy of the UK. It is in that spirit that the PRA has worked with the BPA sector over the last six years or so to  Page 6  support the safe growth of more diverse MA portfolios than was the case when the MA requirements were drafted. Indeed, there is now a very wide range of assets in firms’ MA portfolios as shown in Chart 3. However, all assets are not equal in terms of the MA they generate with, for example, Chart 4 indicates that current investments in student accommodation benefit from almost double the MA of current infrastructure holdings.

These are important function with regard to cash management in the economy. At the end of the 1990s, the Riksbank began work on achieving greater efficiency in cash management. We observed in the surveys made then that there were deficiencies in the system. This was partly due to the way the Riksbank organised its work. By offering a service to the banks without charging in full for it, the Riksbank had contributed to the preservation of an outdated cash management structure and inefficient methods of working, which included extensive cash-in-transit transports to and from the Riksbank for the sole purpose of avoiding interest costs overnight. This system was very costly, while it led to unnecessary risks for cash-in-transit companies. The Riksbank therefore wanted to make the cost of cash management more visible and allow the banks and other participants to bear the costs, which would give them a clear motive to make operations more efficient. The aim was to stimulate greater competition and increased product development for services all along the cash management chain, even outside of the banks. However, there were not merely economic reasons for reviewing the cash management system. The Riksbank’s own office network, its depots and working methods were considered too costly, for instance having overly large premises and surplus capacity. By allowing the banks to take greater responsibility for cash depots, for instance, the Riksbank can focus on its own core activities: maintaining low and stable inflation and promoting a safe and efficient payment system.
Jean-Pierre Roth: Recent economic and financial developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 14 December 2006. *  *  *  As stated in our press release, the Swiss National Bank is raising its target range for the three-month Libor with immediate effect by 0.25 percentage points to 1.50–2.50%. The SNB intends to hold the rate in the middle of the target range for the time being. Economic activity in Switzerland is very robust. Next year, the economic trend is likely to continue favourable, albeit somewhat less pronounced. This will have a positive effect on the labour market. The National Bank is expecting real GDP to grow by just under 3% in 2006 and by around 2% in 2007. Declining oil prices have pushed back inflation. Average inflation for 2006 is likely to stand at 1.1%. By lifting the target range, the National Bank ensures that the inflation outlook will remain favourable, even in view of the high level of utilisation of economic resources. On the assumption of an unchanged three-month Libor of 2.00%, it expects annual inflation to reach 0.4% in 2007 and 0.9% in 2008. If the economy performs as expected, the SNB will further pursue its strategy of gradual normalisation of its interest rates.

Increasingly, money services business provides and support tourism, business travel and cross-border trade activities in a more globalised world economy. According to a World Bank report, it is estimated that nearly 1 out of 7 persons is a migrant, reflecting the large and diverse diaspora community in the world today. Worker remittances to developing countries were in excess of USD400 billion last year and represent a key source of external resource flows. These flows support economic growth in developing countries, far exceeding official development assistance. More than USD 1 trillion was spent on global business travel expenditure in 2013 and more than 1 billion in international tourist arrivals are recorded each year. In 2013, business activities supported world trade volume of over USD 23 trillion. All of these developments have created new and greater demand for remittance, currency exchange and other financial services that can be offered by money services businesses. The industry itself has also become more diverse. Advancements in technology have enabled new business models, offering new product and service, innovations and forming of new alliances. These enhancements have the potential to further lower cost and increase convenience to consumers. Global money services companies exist alongside niche and smaller companies that focus on serving local communities. This has fostered competition and helped to fill market gaps. Today, money services are provided through a network of branches and agents of money services entities, retail outlets, post offices, banks and mobile channels. Operational standards are also diverse across entities.
It also made for a lucrative line for insurers, not least as motor cover was compulsory, though the period was also marked by a good number of insurers that failed. In response to this, the Cassell Committee on Compulsory Insurance was established in 1937. With its recommendations temporarily stalled by the onset of the Second World War, which understandably diverted Parliament briefly from the noble topic of insurance supervision, they were implemented somewhat belatedly in the form of the Insurance Companies Act 1946. Crucially, the Act strengthened the powers of the Board of Trade (later the Department of Trade and Industry, or DTI) and introduced solvency margins, with the amount being set as the greater of £ or a 34  tenth of premiums . In addition, insurers had to have at least £ in paid up share capital and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau was established to fulfil claims for victims of uninsured drivers, funded by a levy on the motor insurance industry. Despite these reforms, nine motor insurance companies failed in the period 1966-67. In typical fashion, a new piece of legislation was enacted in response. The Companies Act 1967 further strengthened the hand of the DTI, which was now empowered to refuse authorisation, impose conditions on a firm’s operation and 35  prevent control of the company from those individuals not deemed fit and proper . Thus, we see elements of a supervision regime begin to emerge which persist in the PRA to this day.

The statute’s definition of non-financial resources specifically mentions human resources – that will likely include many of you here today – and we have reflected this emphasis in our Senior Managers Regime to give specific responsibilities to key individuals in firms for the implementation of the prudential framework. Whilst we, as supervisors, may identify issues that warrant further investigation, we will not spot everything. Ultimately, it remains the responsibility of senior managers and Boards of Directors to identify and mitigate the risk that firms are not complying with the spirit of the regulation. Indeed, we hold industry to account for its compliance with the Fundamental Rules and Senior (Insurance) Managers Regime, just as much as we hold it to account for its compliance with the detail of our regulations. Solvency II contract boundary. Turning to an insurance example, Solvency II has introduced some changes to the way insurance companies calculate the reserves for their insurance products. In particular, the rules defining the ‘boundary’ of an insurance contract means that firms cannot recognise future premiums on 49 50  Individual Capital Adequacy Assessment 2.1 and Individual Liquidity Adequacy Assessment 2.1 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/555/article/2/made 22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  unit-linked savings policies that do not include any insurance cover or financial guarantee of benefits.