samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I would like to remind you in passing that the term "crypto-currency" is misleading and often used incorrectly, as no crypto-asset currently fulfils the three functions of money, i.e. a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. This crypto-asset market has grown exponentially since the Covid-19 pandemic. However, in 2022, the succession of spectacular crises including the collapse of the ill-named (algorithmic) stablecoin Terra USD and the collapse of the FTX platform, brought to light the vulnerabilities of this emerging ecosystem and the nascent bridges between crypto-assets and traditional finance. The collapse of FTX led to the bankruptcy of two banks - Signature and Silvergate - while, conversely, the failure of the Silicon Valley Bank threatened the deposits of Circle (the USD Coin issuer) which were placed there. Some of these vulnerabilities are specific to the crypto sector, such as the high volatility associated with the lack of economic fundamentals underlying some cryptoassets; others are shared with the traditional financial system, such as operational risk and in particular cyber risk. All of them may jeopardise the stability of the financial system as a whole. How then should these new players be regulated? 2.2 The existing framework - Europe is leading the way thanks to DORA and MICA The European regulatory authorities reacted swiftly to regulate the new risks that big techs’ inroads into the financial sector carry, with the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) on operational resilience, and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) on fair and non-discriminatory access to platforms.

Digital finance: a regulatory challenge [Go toslide 5] I will now turn to digital finance and its regulatory and supervisory challenges. 2.1. Rapidly growing markets but increased risks This digital finance relies on new players, new assets and new infrastructures. Among these new players are big techs, which should not be reduced to the GAFAMs alone. These have made targeted and fragmented inroads into financial services. These incursions include the provision of cloud services to financial institutions, which are progressively migrating their IT systems and infrastructures to these new solutions in order to reduce costs, increase the flexibility and security of their infrastructures, and improve customer experience. Furthermore, big techs are setting up their own financial activities, in a fragmented and unregulated manner, in the form of technical services (e.g. Apple Pay digital wallet, Google Pay, etc. ), or in the form of financial products and services (savings products, loans, issuance or trading of cryptoassets, etc.) which are developed in-house or in collaboration with traditional players. For example, Apple offers a savings account in partnership with Goldman Sachs, while also offering its own fractional payment service. What are the risks associated with these inroads into financial services?
We counted on GDP growth rates last year and this of 4 and 3.5 per cent, respectively. Since then our appraisal of resource utilisation has changed a good deal. We now know that last year’s growth stopped at 3.6 per cent and for this year we are counting on 1.3 per cent. This means that as a percentage of GDP, resource utilisation at the end of 2001 will be between 2 and 3 points lower, which is a marked downward revision. Another aspect is that the slowdown is connected with a weak tendency in the rest of the world. Consequently our assessment of international export prices has also been revised downwards and this, too, counters the inflationary impact of the weaker exchange rate. So although we continue to point to the weak krona as an inflation risk, this risk now seems to be smaller, mainly in view of the downward revisions of capacity utilisation. In June we had some additional factors to consider. The krona suddenly weakened dramatically in the absence of a general increase in financial unrest. This suggested that the causes were specific for Sweden. As inflation had moved up appreciably more than expected in the previous months, this was particularly troublesome. Although a large part of the increased inflation was presumably transitory, the Riksbank perceived a risk of higher inflation expectations. Rather than take that risk, we decided to raise the interest rate and intervene in the currency market.

Perhaps the best indicator of their vigilance against money laundering is the number of reports of suspicious transactions made to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU). These numbers suggest that institutions are certainly improving, as both the number of reports, and the number of institutions making reports, has been increasing over time. The number of reports made to the JFIU rose from only 264 in 1992 to 4210 in 1997. Our own on-site examinations also suggest that the level of awareness, and the training of staff, is improving. So, overall, institutions are doing well. However, there is always room for improvement, and I would urge those with responsibility for this area not to relax their guard. This brings me to my concluding remarks. I started out today by talking about the important elements of a control system, and how banking supervisors assess the effectiveness of institutions’ controls. I discussed some of the common threads of recent “problem bank” cases, and the control issues they highlighted. Finally, I stressed the importance of controls in the area of money laundering prevention. While I hope this was of interest to you, and at least gave you a slightly different perspective on some familiar issues, I think I should end by saying that I certainly lay no claim to having all the answers. Please do not sit back and expect the banking supervisors to issue guidelines telling you exactly what you need to do.
A recent innovative arrangement introduced this year is the risk-sharing arrangements between the government and banks to provide opportunities for the lower income and younger segments of the population to own homes and thus accumulate wealth at an earlier age. Another important form of wealth accumulation is the collective investment schemes such as unit trusts. The pooling of savings provides economies of scale, access to professional investment managers, as well as a diversified investment portfolio. In Malaysia, this was initially promoted through the establishment of government sponsored national savings scheme (Amanah Saham Nasional). Participation of the average household has now paved the way for the growth in the private unit trust industry. The formation of such national savings schemes has also contributed to the development of an institutional investor base in Malaysia that has been able to mobilize substantial volumes of savings. The mobilization of these funds provides the potential for funding of businesses and the corporate sector and for project financing including for infrastructure development. As SMEs and micro enterprises form the majority of business enterprises in most countries, and as they contribute significantly to GDP, employment and wealth creation, efficient access to finance is critical. The Malaysian experience to address this has been the establishment of the Credit Guarantee Corporation to assist viable SMEs with inadequate track record to access financing by providing guarantees and credit enhancements for SME financing. The credit evaluation is carried out by banks, and by the CGC.

My stance was based on the assessment that we could have given a slightly smaller impulse to further indebtedness and at the same time contributed to bringing inflation and inflation expectations back on target by limiting the cut to 0.25 percentage points and at the same time signalling a willingness to wait before increasing the rate again until 2016, even if this looked as though it might mean that inflation would overshoot the target. Economic activity in Sweden is now beginning to improve, supported by very low interest rates charged to households and companies and by stronger developments abroad. However, our forecasts are, as I have argued, quite uncertain, especially a couple of years ahead. Anyone wanting to know more definitely what will happen needs a crystal ball that can describe all the situations that will arise here in Sweden and abroad over the coming years. However, there is no such crystal ball, so as always when making decisions in an uncertain situation we will have to deal with what happens as it comes. 3  Poloz, Stephen S., “Monetary Policy as Risk Management”, speech on 12 December 2013. Several central bank governors have expressed this opinion, including Alan Greenspan in the speech ”Monetary Policy under Uncertainty” on 29 August 2003.
Writ large, the objective of recovery and resolution are the same for systemically important banks as they are for CCPs – to ensure the maintenance of critical economic services during stress. But the similarity pretty much stops there. The main challenge with a bank that has exhausted too much of its prefunded loss absorbing resources – ie its capital - is to be able to bail in resources and to reduce its liabilities. By contrast, if pre-funded resources at a CCP are insufficient to absorb losses, the CCPs is able to bail in more resources from its members to absorb losses. If that is insufficient, unlike banks, it is able to reduce its liabilities – ultimately to zero. All of this would happen outside insolvency. And it would be “orderly”, in the sense that it would be a prescribed sequence of action that has been pre-agreed between the members of the clearing house and within contractual arrangements between clearing members and their clients. Given the scale of the loss absorbing resources held by and available to CCPs and the fact that their rulebooks provide ultimately for their wind down outside insolvency, some have argued that while resolution is relevant for banks, it is simply not a relevant concept for CCPs. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  I see some force in this argument.

This concept of “no creditor worse off’’ (NCWO) is a central tenet of resolution regimes for banks. Resolution powers can interfere with property rights and the NCWO protection is needed to constrain use of these powers by the authorities. In the case of a bank, the test is that no creditor should be worse off than if the bank had gone into insolvency. For the reasons set out above, the insolvency counterfactual needs to be modified for CCPs; to assume that in insolvency the pre-agreed order of losses in the rule book would be followed. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Non default losses  Finally, it is important to emphasise that I have been talking throughout about losses at a CCP following default of a clearing member. This, as I said at the outset, is the main vector of risk for a CCP. But it is not the only one. Non-default losses can arise for a number of reasons, particularly operational failures, including following cyber attack, or losses arising from the investment of the collateral held by CCPs. In such cases, CCPs do not generally have recourse to the resources of their members. Losses need to be absorbed by the capital of the firm and if that is insufficient the CCP faces insolvency like any other firm.
This is in the light of an important contemporary directive of European Union, which we are working to introduce in our banking legislation. Last, but not least, we will continue our efforts during 2016 for the further institutional perfection the Bank of Albania, aiming a fast approximation to the model of ESCB central banks. The new organisational structure and the three-year development strategy of the Bank of Albania will guide a set of decisions of the Bank of Albania's Supervisory Council to improve legal and sub-legal acts. The daily activity of the Bank of Albania's departments, the mobilisation and motivation of human resources, efficient management of funds for the financing of the activity, the strengthening of the internal audit and risk management in the activity of the Bank of Albania will be the main priorities in our work during 2016. Thank You! BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Paulo Sergio Cavalheiro: Regulation of capital and financial stability Speech by Mr Paulo Sergio Cavalheiro, Deputy Governor for Supervision of the Central Bank of Brazil, at the International Seminar “The New Basel Capital Accord: Challenges and Opportunities for the Americas”, held jointly by “Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos - CEMLA”, “Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas - ASBA” and “Federación Latinoamericana de Bancos FELABAN”, in Mexico City, Mexico, 12-13 July 2004. *  *  *  The final version of the Capital Accord, also known as Basel II, has just been released. The document maintains the basic framework initially proposed, that is, three pillars, the first one dealing with the calculations of the capital requirements per se, comprising market, credit and operational risks (this last being the real novelty), the second describing the supervisory review process and the third detailing the market discipline to be achieved via disclosure. In Brazil, capital requirements were introduced by Resolution 2099, in August 94, which specified 8% of risk weighted assets as the minimum capital required. Following Resolution 2099, in October 94, Circular 2500 modified some values for minimum capital and net worth required for the establishment of banks, in accordance with the location and size of institution. The supervisory authority raised the minimum capital required to 10% of risk-weighted assets in June 97. In November 97, Circular 2784 again raised this value, this time to 11%, which is still the minimum ratio.
1 These models help to explain when and why investors may face un-diversifiable risks when holding specific types of securities, such that they become imperfect substitutes for otherwise similar assets. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), for example, marketmakers face uncertainty over the  1  2  In addition see Duffie, Gârleanu and Pedersen, (2007). BIS Review 29/2010  timing of customers’ trades. They are unable to hedge perfectly this liquidity risk because of borrowing constraints, so that less liquid securities are imperfect substitutes for more liquid ones. This liquidity risk leads asset prices to diverge from “fundamentals” determined by underlying cash flows. Researchers are also beginning to make a number of important contributions that introduce various forms of financial frictions into otherwise standard macro models. For example, in Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), firms face a “liquidity constraint” in financing their investment which arises from a combination of borrowing constraints and a difficulty in selling their illiquid assets. This need for liquidity gives rise to an endogenous demand for money. An important feature of this model is that the central bank can offset the effects of liquidity shocks by purchasing illiquid assets with central bank money. 2 Building on Kiyotaki and Moore’s resalability constraint, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009) introduce a funding friction for banks, whereby banks need to hold capital in order for depositors to be willing to deposit funds. Such a funding friction affords a role for the authorities to lend directly to firms when capital constraints bite on banks.

Second, the Committee stands ready to make further asset purchases should the outlook warrant them. Just as with movements in Bank Rate in more normal times, a pause in monetary loosening does not necessarily mean that loosening has come to an end. It will all depend on how the outlook for inflation evolves. Looking further ahead, the Committee at some point will need to reduce the current exceptional degree of monetary stimulus. Some commentators have suggested that the MPC has been less forthcoming than other central banks in explaining its exit strategy. But to a large extent this reflects the fact that we have less to communicate. The Committee has two instruments through which it can withdraw the stimulus, raising Bank Rate and selling assets. Unlike some other central banks which need to create new instruments to drain excess reserves or alter the terms of existing facilities, the structure of the Bank’s operating framework means these two instruments can be used at any time, in any order. And the strategy guiding our policy decisions will be unchanged – monetary policy will continue to be determined by the outlook for inflation relative to target. The most difficult decision will be to decide the timing of the withdrawal, but that is always the case. The aftermath of the financial crisis posed many questions for the theory and practice of monetary policy.
Issues raised by Malta’s prospective participation in ERM II During the ERM II phase, which for most new members would start soon after EU accession, the Maltese lira will be fully pegged to the euro and the exchange rate would be allowed to fluctuate by up to ±15% around a central rate to be agreed with the European Central Bank (ECB). A major issue, therefore, concerns the level of the central rate and the size of the fluctuation bands. Although the central rate could be re-aligned if it cannot be sustained within the chosen bands, the initial determination of this rate is crucial because it signals to the market what the authorities consider to be the appropriate level of the exchange rate. Determining the appropriate central rate, however, is not an easy task. While the available evidence suggests that in the current economic environment the Maltese lira exchange rate is sustainable at prevailing levels, the Central Bank is nevertheless undertaking the necessary econometric work in order to estimate an equilibrium rate. The choice of the fluctuation bands is equally important. A narrow band has the advantage of limiting exchange rate risk and contributing to the Bank’s credibility in the area of monetary policy. A wider band, on the other hand, would ease pressures on the monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to maintain the exchange rate within the agreed bands.

Complying with regulations, submitting to supervision, and churning out disclosure documents for the markets is not always an appealing prospect. 7 In short, the Goliaths of the financial world have become more nimble-footed, and are both competing with and partnering the Davids. 8 That said, we are still at an early stage of FinTech, globally. It has spurred greater competition in every segment of the value chain of finance. It is too early to say who the winners will be. 9 The traditional financial institutions have the advantage of scale and a reputation amongst customers. But those that fail to keep up with technology will see part or all of their business models disrupted. Consumers are cautious about shifting their wallets to new players, but they are also looking out for services that offer the best value. 10 But many FinTech start-ups will also fail. It is in the nature of innovation that few new ideas and technologies will develop scale, sustain funding and end up as winners in the market. The 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  collapse of many peer-to-peer lending platforms in the US, UK, and China is a reminder that it will not be plain sailing for FinTech companies. A growing FinTech ecosystem in Singapore 11 Singapore’s strategy is not to choose between financial institutions and new FinTech players but to provide the conditions for both to innovate, compete, and collaborate. Our aim is to create a FinTech ecosystem where innovation thrives.
The terms of trade have improved, with copper prices above $ per pound in recent weeks. This, in a context in which the price of oil, with fluctuations and considering the Brent - WTI average, is slightly below those at the cutoff date of the previous Report. The copper price rise has coincided with a well-stocked market despite supply-side problems, in the context of a weak dollar. China's low interest rates and better performance lend support to higher prices in the short term. In any case, although its price is not expected to remain stable, it is projected to average more than June's estimates. In our baseline scenario, the pound of copper should trade at an average of $ in 20172018, and at $ in 2019. Stronger economic growth in the developed world has also consolidated. The United States, like it did several quarters ago, shows a good performance of consumption and a dynamic labor market. Europe has seen a strong recovery in its growth rates, all across the economies making up the group, beyond the differences that persist among them in variables such as the size of the gap and the unemployment rate. Growth in Japan surprised positively, and expectations have been revised upwards. Meanwhile, inflation has tended to subside and the monetary authorities of the developed world have made no big changes to their monetary policy strategies.

The document I am presenting today is the result of six months of review, updating and consolidation work of many studies carried out at the Central Bank, combined with incoming new empirical evidence that enrich our knowledge of the Chilean economy. It provides an in depth analysis of the medium-term trend growth of Chile in the horizon spanning from the years 2017 to 2050, with a special focus on the GDP growth projection for the next ten years. This document projects the evolution of the productive factors (labor and capital) and total factor productivity (TFP) for sectors other than natural resources, while for the latter, the projection of its expected evolution is updated in the light of diverse sectoral background. It includes both the study of the history of the variables and a cross-country comparison, which allows us to look at the Chilean experience in the context of other 8  countries that experienced our current levels of development before us, showing us what we can expect in the future. It also stresses the major importance of productivity, both in explaining current differences in income levels with the developed world, and in projecting future growth. Therefore, special care is given to analyzing the evolution of TFP, providing new evidence on the importance of generating the proper conditions for an efficient allocation of resources. Primarily, we estimate that a range around 3% to 3.5% is reasonable to place trend GDP growth for the ten years ahead of us.