samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The alternative scenarios for the repo rate show different monetary policy alternatives. What would happen to the economy if the Riksbank followed a repo rate path that was higher or lower than that in the main scenario? The consequences of various monetary policy alternatives can thus be compared. This can systematically justify the repo rate path chosen by the Riksbank. Introduction of repo rate path not entirely uncontroversial Many people welcomed the Riksbank’s decision to introduce its own repo rate path. However, there were also some misgivings. For example, there were fears that confidence in the Riksbank might be harmed if the actual repo rate in the future deviated from the earlier forecast. This was also the type of misgiving expressed when the Riksbank began publishing forecasts for inflation and growth. In addition, there was concern that the Riksbank might hesitate to change the repo rate forecast for reasons of prestige, even if circumstances indicated this was necessary. If there were fears that the Riksbank might be unwilling to change the repo rate path when the situation required, this fear has come to nought. Autumn 2008 is a very good example of this. Now, three years after its introduction, I believe I dare say that the repo rate path is regarded as a natural part of the Riksbank’s policy. I also believe that the discussion outside of the Riksbank is characterised more by long-term discussions on monetary policy than on individual decisions.

Productivity growth and labour force participation have been satisfactory over the past decade while relative labour costs and prices have reached yet higher levels. It remains to be seen whether the real krone exchange rate will gradually fall back when increases in petroleum revenue spending can no longer be sustained and the relative size of the oil supply industry decreases. Thank you for your attention! BIS Review 145/2010  9  10  BIS Review 145/2010  BIS Review 145/2010  11  12  BIS Review 145/2010  BIS Review 145/2010  13  14  BIS Review 145/2010
The point-to-point change in the Colombo Consumers’ Price Index (CCPI) which is popularly considered as “inflation”, has been increasing since April 2006 and the CCPI increased by around 19 per cent during each of the last two months. Although it was noted that a part of the increase was due to very high prices in vegetables, affected by extreme weather conditions, we noted with concern that core inflation too, which is a measure of inflation directly caused by demand pressures, had also risen to 15 per cent by November 2006. These pressures were somewhat aggravated by supply side developments, such as the upward adjustments in administered prices, increases in prices of some of the imported consumer items, and adjustments in import tariffs applicable to some consumer food items. Such factors, of course, would essentially cause a one-time price increase and would necessarily contribute to long term inflation only if such impact is accommodated by continuing monetary expansion. In the meantime, we observed with satisfaction that increased economic activities had led to lower unemployment during the year. The Labour force grew by approximately 1.0 per cent to 8.1 million by end 2005, and was expected to increase further to 8.2 million by end 2006. As a consequence, the  2  BIS Review 8/2007  unemployment rate declined to a level of 7.2 per cent in the first quarter 2006 and to its lowest level of 6.3 per cent in the second quarter 2006. Savings and investment, both recorded upward trends.

6  BIS Review 8/2007  Therefore, continued regulatory vigilance and timely interventions would be necessary to avoid and/or mitigate any harmful effects of all such threats. It should also be noted that a continuing high budget deficit could also pose a formidable challenge in the conduct of monetary policy, as such deficit requires borrowings by the Government from the banking system, making it difficult to maintain the monetary expansion along a pre-determined, tight path. As seen from the case studies of many successful countries, rapid infrastructure development is a strong contributory factor towards achieving sustainable high growth. However, the timely mobilisation of necessary resources for infrastructure development while maintaining budget deficits and debt at reasonable levels would be particularly challenging for a developing country like Sri Lanka. At the same time, maintaining a comfortable and reasonable level of foreign currency reserves in order to be able to mitigate the impacts of external shocks is also a challenging task for any developing country. Needless to say, it is vital to manage the foreign reserves at an appropriate level, while ensuring that the exchange rate fluctuations are within reasonable limits, in order to enhance the confidence in the economy. These and other challenges would need to be faced by our country and it is clear that our policies and actions would have to be so designed in order to deal with, and respond to, such challenges if we are to be successful. 5.
6 The ECB has for some time tried to use information relating to money and credit markets when forecasting inflationary pressures. The ECB bases its strategy on two pillars, an economic pillar and a monetary pillar, which collects various short and medium-term indicators, including aggregates and prices of financial assets. These indicators are not used mechanistically, but rather to gauge whether the conduct of monetary policy is broadly consistent with achieving the target. It was on the basis of these indicators, which showed strong dynamics, that the ECB decided to increase interest rates at the end of 2005 – that very controversial decision which subsequently proved to have been correct, as I mentioned earlier. 7 The second aspect on which a debate is developing concerns the objective of monetary policy. In most countries monetary policy has price stability as its primary objective. There are also other, secondary objectives to be pursued insofar as they are consistent with price stability. The question which has been asked as a result of the crisis is whether the central bank also ought to have financial stability as an explicit objective, on the same level as price stability. Indeed, if price stability is a necessary condition for the achievement of financial stability, it is not sufficient. On the other hand, without financial stability, there is a risk that price stability will not be durable. It thus seems reasonable to assign central banks the objective of financial stability too.

The effects of monetary policy on financial market developments, in particular in fostering the subsequent financial bubble, have led to a reassessment regarding the conduct of monetary policy. The debate is under way and concerns various aspects, which I will summarise briefly. The first concerns the tools of monetary policy. Recent experience has shown that the approach followed by most central banks, based on inflation targeting (which involves forecasting inflation on the basis of an economic model and changing interest rates so as to ensure that inflation forecasts are in line with the target), does not sufficiently take into account financial developments, in particular with regard to asset prices, which may affect the stability of the markets and, in time, inflation. It is argued by some that monetary policy should act proactively to avoid the excessive tendencies of the financial markets, known as “leaning against the wind”. 5 In other words, one should be ready to hinder the creation of speculative bubbles, among other things by raising interest rates, before inflationary pressures emerge. This is easier said than done. If it is difficult to forecast inflation, it is even  2  Ben S. Bernanke (2002), “Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here”, remarks before the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., 21 November 2002; Alan Greenspan (2004), “Risk and uncertainty in monetary policy”, remarks at the Meetings of the American Economic Association, San Diego, California, 3 January 2004.
For instance, for a regional cross-border banking group, I imagine the supervisory team to be based in the relevant region, perhaps in the same premises as the national supervisor, and to consist of staff from that region. As for crisis resolution, one could think of the EU building up a deposit insurance fund for the largest cross-border banks, possibly within the framework of the new European supervisory agency, akin to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the USA. This would considerably reduce the risk of destructive negotiation games. Such a deposit insurance fund would certainly be better diversified than the national funds are today, which would, all else being equal, enable it to charge lower fees or hold a larger risk-adjusted buffer. However, the fund itself would lack the ability to handle the largest banking failures. In order to cope in the event of a really large bank or several large banks failing, the fund should be able to borrow in the capital market. To be able do this in a cost-efficient manner, it would need backing by a government guarantee from the 25 member states. In the event that the European deposit insurance fund is not able to recover enough money from a troubled bank to repay its creditors in the capital markets, a key for burden sharing would need to be in place. One could establish a system of committed payment obligations, where the fund has the right to receive contributions according to the agreed key to pay back its capital market loans.

Mario Draghi: Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament Introductory statement by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, before the Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 15 February 2016. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Honourable Members of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, Ladies and Gentlemen, The first weeks of this year have shown that the euro area and the Union at large face significant challenges. A strong effort by all policy makers will be needed in the months ahead to overcome them. I am therefore grateful to be back before your committee to discuss these challenges and how the ECB can contribute to tackling them. In my remarks today, I will address in turn the global economic context, recent financial developments and the state of the euro area recovery. I will conclude by briefly presenting our most recent decision to disclose the Agreement on Net Financial Assets – or ANFA – as I know this topic is of concern to some of you. The state of the global economy Let me start with the state of the global economy. In recent weeks, we have witnessed increasing concerns about the prospects for the global economy. Activity and trade data have been weaker than expected, turbulence in financial markets has intensified and commodity prices have declined further. Slowing growth in emerging market economies is a focal point for this uncertainty.
But even if we can – and the financial markets’ response to the latest developments in Brazil, as well as the beginnings of a recovery in capital flows to some countries in Asia, are reasonably encouraging in this respect – we are now having to cope with the economic aftereffects of these earlier financial disturbances. The IMF has cut its most recent forecasts for world growth to close to 2%. And the risks almost certainly remain on the downside. That’s still not global slump or recession. But large parts of the world economy are in fact in recession and the prospect for the world as a whole turns very much on what happens in the major industrial countries. In essence, what we have seen is a brutally sharp cutback in capital flows to much of the emerging world and to some of the transition economies, creating a corresponding need for  5  BIS Review 19/1999  urgent improvement in their current accounts. This has caused massive currency depreciations and forced the emerging countries to make equally sharp cutbacks in domestic demand. The counterpart is a sharp decline in net external demand in the industrial countries, which, if it were not to be offset by action to stimulate domestic demand in those countries, could indeed lead to weakening global activity and price deflation.

The exchange rate has, in fact, tended gradually to soften since last spring when the decision to go ahead with the euro was finally confirmed; but increasingly since the autumn the internationally-exposed sectors of the economy have been dealt a further massive blow as a result of global economic turbulence. This started, in fact, with the financial disturbances in Asia in the latter half of 1997, but even as late as the beginning of last summer it seemed as if it might have only limited impact on the overall world economy. The IMF, for example, was then still projecting 3-3¾% world growth in 1998 and 1999 respectively, which was certainly a setback compared with their forecast of over 4% just six months before, but it was hardly catastrophic. Since last summer it has become increasingly clear that things are likely to be significantly worse than that. The financial collapse in Russia, deepening recession in Japan, the long battle – then sudden defeat – in Brazil to hold its exchange rate, and fluctuating fears of possible knock-on effects on the major countries’ financial markets, all contributed to an increased sense of financial fragility, which has not been easy to contain, though I am now hopeful that we will be able to stop the financial rot.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Enhancing the professionalism of Malaysia’s Islamic financial services industry Speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of the Chartered Institute of Islamic Finance Professionals (CIIF), Kuala Lumpur, 6 November 2015. *  *  *  Today’s official launch of the Chartered Institute of Islamic Finance Professionals (CIIF) marks a momentous occasion that reflects our collective effort to enhance the professionalism of the Islamic financial services industry. We are embarking on a long journey to create a new landscape of talent development, one which is permeated with a strong culture of professionalism, integrity and ethics. Greater professionalism among Islamic finance practitioners will instil greater confidence and capability to the Islamic finance industry to better serve public interest. The recent global financial crisis has brought to the fore the importance of trust, confidence and integrity in the financial services sector. The banking industry is subjected to continuous scrutiny on their values, professionalism and work ethics. This has prompted a host of initiatives both domestically and globally, aimed to strengthen the industry, given the significant role financial institutions have to the broader interest of society and the overall economy. Maintaining public confidence is critical. It is therefore in the industry’s interest to always place public trust above everything else, and only if we are able to do this, we shall enjoy the confidence that ensures the long-term growth of the industry.

I am confident CIFF would embed a culture that places unequivocal commitment to professionalism and ethics that would raise the prestige of the Islamic finance industry and its practitioners. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
So it is logical to expect stabilization, and perhaps reduction of the level of banks’ bad loans. Banks which have huge excess liquidity, have reservations regarding lending to companies, and they locate the reason in the emphasized risks. Is the placement of those funds in Treasury bills and Central Bank bills a solution, even at the cost of a decline in the economy? The monetary policy is trying to trigger a certain behavior of the banks which it considers is appropriate at a particular time. But banks independently manage excess liquidity and it is their decision whether more will be placed in the form of loans or in risk-free securities. At the beginning of the second quarter, with several measures we released substantial excess liquidity placed in CB bills over the level that we considered it was necessary to be maintained. It is a fact that banks placed only a small part of that surplus in loans. One of the reasons is certainly the perception of banks for increased risks in the domestic and global economy. But just as important, if not even more important reason are the corporate strategies of the banking groups in the Euro area that are owners of the Macedonian banks. Some of these banking groups have serious problems in their home countries. Although their banks in Macedonia have excellent capitalization and record liquidity, they must implement the strategy of their foreign parent banks, which due to the insufficient capital, refrain from lending in all countries where they are present.

At the moment we are sure that risks to price stability undermining are eliminated, we will apply monetary measures appropriate for the slower economic growth. Маy pressures be coming from the fiscal policy? So far, they have not, and I hope it will remain that way. The best confirmation of that are the balances in the economy. After all, exactly because of that, we had room for the so far most relaxed monetary policy without jeopardizing the stability of prices, Denar exchange rate and the banking system. Banks’ non-performing loans will decrease This year, liquidity was the biggest problem of the companies. The figures showed that the indebtedness in the real sector is huge, over Euro 5 billion, with the country’s debt to the companies being over Euro 220 million. In such circumstances, banks have reduced lending to firms to a minimum and they struggle with the growth of bad loans. Can we expect the situation to improve? In the statistics that are known to me I have not found such figures. However, when economic growth and exports slow down and budgetary payments are late, usually the liquidity of companies deteriorates. Therefore they are late in the settlement of obligations to the banks. Despite that, non-performing loans of the Macedonian banks amount to about 10 percent, which is the lowest share in the region from Slovenia to Greece. Announced debt repayments from the budget will contribute to the reduction of the debts among companies, and finally debts toward the banks.
10  BIS Review 61/2010  Figure 7 CPI inflation (1) (annual change, percent)  Core CPI inflation (1) (annual change, percent)  12  12  12  12  9  9  9  9  6  6  6  6  3  3  3  3  0  0  0  0  -3  -3  -3  -3  07  Jul. 08  Jul. 09  Jul. 10  07  Jul. 08  Jul. 09  Jul. 10  U.S.A.  Eurozone  Chile (2)  Latin America (3)  Emerging Asia (4)  Emerging Europe (5)  1) Geometric average of headline inflation and core inflation of a sample of countries from each region. (2) Chile’s core CPI inflation is CPI without foodstuffs and energy. (3) CPI includes Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Core CPI includes Mexico and Peru. (4) CPI includes China, Indonesia, Korean Rep., Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan. Core CPI includes Korean Rep., Thailand and Taiwan. (5) CPI includes Czech Rep., Hungary, Russia and Turkey. Core CPI includes only Hungary. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg, CEIC Data and National Statistics Bureau (INE).

In this context, future efforts at policy coordination should start by setting out a clear and concrete medium-term goal, then followed by a few but concrete and specific issues to be addressed or projects to be executed. A case in point is the development of a shared regional financial infrastructure such as linking the clearing and payment systems, harmonizing minimum regulations on cross-border investment flows, and developing a shared facility to promote greater flows of investment information. This type of specific efforts and projects would be easier to win region-wide political commitment and support. 2  BIS Review 66/2006  Another suggestion is that, for the market-based approach to work efficiently, we may need to engage more formally the cooperation of the private sector. On this, I think East Asia can learn a lot from the experience of the EU in engaging the private sector in planning and reviewing major financial initiatives. Specifically here, I am thinking of the Giovannini Group of private experts, established in 1996, which has done at least four useful reports for the EU Commission. Their inputs have helped the EU in introducing the necessary directives. My last point is on the role of IFI’s such as the World Bank. In recent years, in a good way, we have seen active involvement of all major IFI’s in the region’s financial market development. They contribute to research, ideas, technical assistance, policy advice, and funding. Some are even involved as market participants.
Jon Cunliffe: Is the world financial system safer now? Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at the Chatham House City Series conference on Global Financial Markets: new rules on market structure, trading and funding, London, 17 March 2014. * I. *  *  Introduction  On 17 November 2008, for the first time ever, the leaders of the G20 came together to try to find a way through the worst economic and financial crisis since the 1930s. As I sat there, in Washington, in the National Building Museum, Benjamin Franklin’s famous warning came to mind: “If we do not hang together, most assuredly we will hang separately”. That Washington summit, and the ones in London and Pittsburgh that followed in quick succession, were extraordinary in many ways. Most striking, there was no rancour, no finger pointing between the leaders of the G20. Rather, the dominant mood was that we were indeed “all in it together”, or in Franklin’s words, would hang separately if we did not hang together. And, in contrast to the familiar run of Summits and Councils and international meetings, from the outset, there was a powerful bias to action: “what can we do to counter this crisis?” And, also from the outset, “how do we make sure it cannot happen again?” History has already started arguing about whose idea that first G20 summit was.

Caleb M Fundanga: Strengthening the Zambian financial services industry through education Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Zambia Institute of Banking and Financial Services 8th Graduation Ceremony, Lusaka, 21 February 2009. *  *  *  • The President, Zambia Institute of Banking and Financial Services, Mr. David Chewe; • Distinguished Council members; • The Chairman, Bankers Association of Zambia, Mr Saviour Chibiya; • Chief executives of Banks and Financial institutions present; • Representatives from other Learning institutions; • Distinguished Parents; • Graduates; • Distinguished Invited Guests; • Ladies and gentlemen It is an honour and privilege for me to officiate at this 8th Graduation Ceremony of the Zambia Institute of Banking and financial services. There is nothing more pleasing than witnessing young men and women climbing the ladder of success in life. Mr President, as we speak, our economy is facing numerous challenges emanating from the global financial turmoil. As you are no doubt aware, the crisis has already resulted in a reduction in commodity prices including that of copper our main foreign exchange earner. The Zambian foreign exchange market has also been adversely affected as is reflected in the volatility and weakening of the Kwacha exchange rate in the recent past. The result of all this is lower Government revenues and more expensive imports which would in turn culminate in higher inflation.