samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The good news is that Malaysia's Financial Capability and Literacy Index score has improved since the last survey. But behind that index score are much more layered observations of our society's financial attitudes and behaviours. And they reveal that putting financial knowledge into the hands of individuals is just the start. Helping people use that knowledge wisely and effectively in order to bring about lasting changes in behaviour is the race that all of us here are running together - to help as many people as possible reach the finish line of their financial goals. More details on the results of the 2021 FCI Survey will be available in the upcoming publication of Bank Negara Malaysia's Financial Stability Review which will happen in the coming week. 4. For those of you who may not be familiar with the Financial Education Network, or FEN, we are an inter-agency platform of eight partner institutions that are committed to raising the level of financial literacy in Malaysia. In 2019, FEN developed a five-year National Strategy for Financial Literacy which is currently in its fourth year. 5. Let me take the opportunity to recap the aims of the National Strategy. They are to empower Malaysians to: first, save, manage and protect their money; second, plan ahead to secure a sustainable future; and third, protect against fraud and financial scams. 6. Fast forward four years, and these goals are as, if not more, relevant today.

The transmission of instability typically occurs as a consequence of increased margin calls and mark-to-market losses that strain firms’ liquidity and capital positions and put additional pressure on firms to further deleverage. Such scenarios can have material adverse repercussions on other market segments and market participants. It is vital that we take steps to address this risk now, during a period when markets are functioning without stress, in order to improve the resiliency of this market before the next crisis occurs. This is especially important in light of the heightened threshold established by the Dodd-Frank Act for future central bank interventions in the event of a market disruption. Even if this constraint did not exist, the experience of the recent financial crisis has served to strengthen our resolve to ensure that the market is structured in a way where risk is accurately priced and resilient to stress on a day-to-day basis, without the need for official sector intervention as a first resort. As many of you know, the Federal Reserve has been calling for action on this issue over the past two years, and all three Financial Stability Oversight Council annual reports have highlighted this as a significant issue worthy of our attention. However, the diversity of participants in the tri-party repo market has made it difficult to move forward quickly with a market solution that addresses the risk I have outlined. Industry leadership is absolutely critical to overcoming these challenges.
William C Dudley: Remarks at panel discussion on fiscal challenges Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at panel discussion at 2012 US Monetary Policy Forum, sponsored by The Initiative on Global Markets, University of Chicago Booth School of Business, New York City, 24 February 2012. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here today on a panel with Charles Plosser of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and Juergen Stark, formerly of the European Central Bank. Our topic today is fiscal policy–for central bankers always dangerous waters to swim in. I will focus my remarks on the United States as others are better qualified to comment on the situation in Europe and elsewhere. To start, let me stress that it is essential that the United States put in place a credible program of medium-term fiscal consolidation that addresses our sizeable and growing structural deficits in a manner that is consistent with supporting ongoing economic recovery. Today I am going to discuss two specific issues relevant to U.S. fiscal policy. First, I am going to highlight the importance of taking the increase in debt service costs into account that will take place when economic conditions permit the normalization of monetary policy. I will argue that we are in an unusual period in which net interest expense is temporarily depressed.

With net credit creation being largely reliant on bond finance, such a reallocation could generate a sharp deterioration in credit conditions for corporates and the risk may be particularly pronounced for cross-border flows to emerging markets. But what, beyond talking about it, can be done about this risk? Managing the risks in markets will require global co-ordination. The FSB provides the platform for authorities to monitor, analyse and address risks in a timely way. It brings all the relevant bodies together to develop this substantial body of work. Anticipating and managing market risk channels will be core to the future financial reform agenda. This point is relevant to work, currently underway, to develop a framework for identifying globally systemic non-bank non-insurer financial institutions. The fund management industry has become more concentrated, with the top 10 firms now accounting for almost one fifth of assets under management. However, size will not necessarily be the best indicator of systemic importance. It seems plausible that large unlevered funds with little maturity mismatch could pose few systemic risks. At the same time, smaller funds could be systemic if clusters of them conduct similar activities that do pose risks. Those activities include concentrated investments in illiquid assets, the potential for large short-term redemptions, and leverage, whether financial or embedded. As such, there may be merit in this activity-based systemic risk assessment over and above a purelyfirm-focussed approach to systemic designation. Of course, identifying systemic firms is just the first step in managing risks to global stability.
In the committee stages, the majority - or more precisely the median - vote was implemented once all committee members had entered a vote into their respective computers. Participants were told nothing at the start of the experiment about the structure of the economic model with which they were playing, or the disturbances that it was subject to, other than that a structural change occurred at some point during each play of the game. In short, they were operating - much like real-life monetary policy makers - in uncertain conditions, doing their best to identify the shocks that hit the economy and offsetting their impact by adjusting the short-term interest rate. To quantify their performance, players were scored according to their ability to keep inflation close to a pre-specified target and to minimise output fluctuations, and were paid a modest amount for doing so. Chart 1 shows the pattern of average scores over the different stages of the game. Three features are striking: (i)  The significant upward trend in the results. Players clearly learned how to play the game as time went on. (ii)  The large upward movement in scores when players moved to committee decision-making. (iii)  The large downward move in scores when participants returned to playing as individuals. These results support the idea that committee decisions represent a significant improvement over those of the individuals that comprise them. What might account for these results? The Blinder and Morgan and Bank studies suggest two main reasons.

On the Committee itself various suggestions have been made: to extend the terms of appointment of members of the MPC, to make those longer terms non-renewable, and to appoint people with more diverse backgrounds. By far the most fundamental of these suggestions is the proposal to appoint representatives of different industries or regions to the Committee, as opposed to monetary policy experts. That would change the nature of the debate and undermine the mutual confidence of members of the Committee in each other if it were felt that some were representing a specific interest group. With experience of the MPC, I think that this argument has come to be accepted. The proposal that the minutes of MPC meetings should include more description of individual views I discussed earlier. The Committee has been opposed to such a change for the reasons I gave. In its early days the Committee was sensitive to the view that the minutes, then published six weeks after the meeting, should be published earlier, and it shortened that lag to 13 days in October 1998. The forecast process has attracted much attention, and was discussed at length in the Kohn Report. Presenting the forecast in terms of a fan chart, in order to highlight the balance of risks to the outlook, has proved successful. But it has proved more difficult to explain the role of a projection conditioned on the assumption of constant official interest rates.
But then they receive everything that is left. The advantage with prioritising the payments in this way is that one can sell the tranches to investors with different risk appetites. Those with a high risk appetite can buy the higher risk tranches, while more cautious investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds, can buy the tranches that are assessed to have the lowest credit risk. But although there are advantages to packaging together securitised loans in a CDO, there are also disadvantages. One disadvantage is that it is expensive, time-consuming and difficult to assess the credit risk in the different tranches. The underlying assets may be of a heterogeneous nature. Moreover, there are products where a CDO is repackaged and in turn included as a component in another CDO, which will of course make it more difficult to gain an overview of the risk content. The credit risk in the structured products is often assessed  BIS Review 136/2007  1  by the credit rating agencies, which also rate the different tranches, at least the more senior ones. The credit rating agencies thus play an important role with regard to the structured products. Pricing is another problem. Tailor-made products are not in general subject to regular trading and price listings are rare. One is often reduced to employing mathematical models, which are based on estimated default frequencies for various credits, given the development previously observed.

However, supplementary training may need to be constantly kept up to date, in order that the Management Accountant has a meaningful impact on the organization. This would be made even more difficult because issues, problems and responses are no longer of a local nature. In most cases, responses need to be regional or even international. If we act together we can pool our resources, learn from our experiences and be ready for the unknown. That is what we need to be doing. In that sense, the Management Accountants of the world, seem to be on the right track. We say, we wish to be seen as Strategists and as Performance Management Specialists. If so, what should we do? (a)  As far as education and training is concerned, in addition to all what we learn now, a greater focus in communication and human resource management may be necessary. These new skills would be the tools to; (i) manage better, (ii) perform better, and (iii) deliver outputs better. (b)  Develop skills in marketing and understand the importance and the specialist nature of the subject. (c)  Develop the proper managerial attitude which focuses on outputs rather than inputs. If a person is to focus on “outputs” a few important steps would need to enter his work and life. These are very well enunciated in the 2500 year old teachings of Lord Buddha. Usually, we seek the guidance of this Great Teacher in spiritual matters.
The IMF’s Chief of Mission at that time asked me to meet “in six eyes”: mine two and their four. He suggested a devaluation of at least 20%. I told him that I will answer tomorrow. The next day I told him that we will discuss again in autumn during his next visit. The situation calmed during the summer. We started purchasing foreign currency, and the favorable situation continued. Nobody ever opened this issue again. They gave up. The second moment was the closing of Makedonska Banka and forcing few other shareholders to abandon the banking business. It was a very erratic experience. They played extremely unfairly. They were developing and managed to develop dirty plots. They also threatened. They made a mistake. The decisions we believed in were unchangeable. We cleaned the banking sector from shareholders who were not eligible, on any ground. We fixed several weak points in the system thanks to our decisiveness and integrity. And, as to the organizers of dirty campaigns, you know the information. The third, extremely dramatic moment was the end of 2008 and the first half of 2009: the global recession. In that period we spent 500 millions of Euros defending the exchange rate – one third of their total level. We had to try our hardest, otherwise we were about to face an economic disaster. We were criticized for undertaking measures contrary to those undertaken by developed economies. They failed to see that such comparisons will not wash.

Spain, France and Italy have experienced the most rapid growth rates, but in Germany further declines or only moderate increases in prices have been reported. An evaluation of the risks to euro area financial stability stemming from the household sector depends on the balance sheet situation of households as this determines their resilience to adverse financial shocks. Both the households’ debt-to-financial assets ratio and the debt-to-liquid financial assets ratio have continued to grow, but more moderately compared with the rapid increase at the beginning of the current millennium. Although this implies a further deterioration of households’ financial position, the household sector’s liquid assets still exceed its debts. 5. Euro area financial system  5.1. Euro area financial markets  Let me now briefly turn to the euro area stock and corporate bond markets, both of which continued to develop dynamically until very recently. The Review points out that despite the favourable economic outlook, a risk of a slowdown in market dynamics cannot be excluded if risk-free interest rates continue to edge upwards and credit ratings and/or earnings growth surprise to the downside. On the positive side, structural developments in euro money markets, described in Box 6 of the Review, and the increased use of collateral in borrowing and lending transactions, discussed in Box 7, suggest an overall strengthening of the financial system’s resilience to a systemic shock.
If the telecom industry is excluded from the figures for trade and industry, productivity increased by only 1.9 per cent during the period 1995-2000, compared with a growth of 2.8 per cent if it is included. This sector has now greatly declined in importance and there is apparent confusion over its future development. Given this, the average rate of wage increase should not exceed 3.5 per cent over the coming years. In conclusion, it may be worth pointing out that if Sweden joins the Eurosystem, there will be other factors affecting the nominal wage cost scope. This is because the ECB's inflation target may be even more ambitious than the Riksbank's. In this case, and if productivity growth remains unchanged, a lower rate of increase will be needed for nominal wage costs. Summary I shall conclude with a summary. The realignment of stability policy has contributed to wage formation functioning better than previously in the two most recent wage bargaining rounds. The rate of increase in nominal wages has approached reasonable levels, while wage earners have experienced large increases in real wages. This development is underpinned by a good development in productivity. When we look ahead, the picture is more worrying. Profits are under greater pressure. It is not certain that productivity growth can remain as high as it was during the latter part of the 1990s. Given these factors, and taking into account international developments, there is a need to bring the average rate of wage increase down to, or even below, 3.5 per cent.

It is not sustainable in the long term to have a wage development that entails the cost of labour increasing more than the value of the goods and services produced. This means that real wage costs can only increase at the same rate as productivity growth. The stronger the growth in productivity, the higher the wage costs can be without triggering inflation, as long as they take into account any reduction in working hours and other secondary wage costs. The basis for this reasoning is that the economy is in balance, which is characterised by, for instance, stable wage shares and profit shares. Profit shares - profits as a percentage of value added - have fluctuated around 30 per cent for the entire economy. Since 1995, real wage costs have risen more quickly than productivity growth and wage shares. This is not sustainable in the long run. It is necessary, in the long term, for wage shares and profit shares to be at a level where profitability in Sweden is on a par with our competitors to safeguard a level of capital formation and employment that will best promote the development of our welfare. 2  BIS Review 7/2003  A couple of different approaches/rules of thumb are used in the wage formation debate to evaluate the scope for wage increases in the long term, or to estimate a "wage cost norm".
Gains can be reaped as the SMEs grow in significance in the economy. Positioning the central bank to meet the challenges ahead My presentation on institutional development and capacity enhancement would not be complete if it did not include the central bank. The new environment in which central banks are operating has also changed dramatically. Central banks are continually being confronted with the need to balance between conflicting objectives, and conflicting means to achieve the objectives. To stay at the forefront in dealing with the new challenges that we are faced with, our own efforts have also been focused on strengthening our capacities and capabilities. This includes measures to continually review our strategic orientation and key priorities and the necessary changes that need to be made so that we are positioned to effectively deal with new challenges and changes taking place. Central banks in emerging market economies have a much broader mandate than our counterparts in the more advanced and mature economies. Of importance, is our developmental role in charting the development of the financial system, institutional development and the overall economic management. To achieve our strategic intent and build the infrastructure to support our strategies, investment in technology and the appropriate skills, and the transformation of our organisation into a knowledge-based organisation were among some of the major initiatives made. 6  BIS Review 40/2003  Conclusion To conclude, the East Asian region has, since the financial crisis, experienced pronounced economic and financial transformations.

The consideration of robustness also implies that monetary policy seeks to mitigate the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. Hence, house price inflation and debt growth are also important for monetary policy. Norges Bank weighs the different types of risk against each other. Six years have now passed since the global economy was hard hit by the financial crisis. The Norwegian economy has fared well in the years following the financial crisis, stimulated by vigorous activity in the petroleum industry. Growth has slowed in recent years and a decline in oil investment will result in low growth for a period. Against the background of weaker growth prospects for the Norwegian economy and reduced foreign interest rates, Norges Bank lowered its forecast for the key policy rate through 2014 and reduced its key policy rate in December 2014. Chart: Money market rates for trading partners Global economic growth remains moderate, but there are wide differences across countries. The sharp fall in oil prices is positive for most of our trading partners, but is dampening activity in oil-producing countries at the same time. Growth in the US is now on a firm footing, even though developments have been slightly weaker recently. An expansionary monetary policy appears to be working and both consumption and investment have picked up. Unemployment has declined. Euro area activity is picking up, but growth remains low. Household consumption is on the rise, while business investment remains at a low level.
We need to walk the talk and address the question of “how”. 4. Let me begin with the concrete actions we at the HKMA are taking. Our action plan is guided by the green and sustainable banking initiative unveiled in May 2019. We have been making significant progress since then. 5. As one of the largest reserves managers globally, we embrace responsible investing. ESG principles are now an integral part of our investment criteria, processes, and asset allocation. 6. As a banking regulator, we are working together with banks to manage climate risk. Being a good corporate citizen is important, but for banks there is the added dimension of managing the climate-related physical risk and transition risk associated with the projects and businesses they are funding. We have already developed a common assessment framework to help banks to assess their individual “greenness baseline”. In June this year, we issued a white paper that sets out our initial thoughts on the supervisory approach to addressing climate-related and sustainability issues. This will pave the way for setting our supervisory expectations for banks’ implementation. 7. Managing climate risk brings new opportunities in green finance. The IFC estimates $ trillion in climate investment opportunities in emerging markets over the next decade. Today Hong Kong is already a green finance centre with a vibrant and efficient ecosystem that matches the demand and supply of green financing. But more needs to be done in this fast-growing space. 8.

Very soon we will reach out to stakeholders to join us in this most meaningful project. 13. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches