samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I have said on several occasions, this is the main contribution of the Central Bank of Chile to growth and stability of the Chilean economy. Thank you very much. 6  BIS Review 99/2010  Figure 1  Real interest rate gap: Real MPR minus indicated neutral interest rate (percent)  Monetary policy interest rate (MPR) (percent) 10  10  6  6  8  8  3  3  6  6  0  0  4  4  2  2  -3  -3  0  0  -6  -6  07  08  09  10  00  02  04  06  08  10  Rate implicit in CBC's forecasting models Rate derived from consumptionbased model  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2  Commodities prices (indexes, 02/01/2006=100)  Stock-market volatility (percent)  100  100  250  250  80  80  200  200  60  60  150  150  40  40  100  100  20  20  50  50  0  0  0  0  07  08  09  10  Developed markets (1) Emerging markets (2)  06  07  08  Copper  09  10 WTI Oil  (1) VIX volatility index. (2) Estimated volatility of MSCI index in dollars. Sources: Bloomberg and Morgan Stanley Capital International.

Credit has begun to present month-on-month increases, lending rates remain fairly low and the evaluation of both suppliers and demanders of credit show less restrictive lending standards despite the earthquake (figure 6). As highlighted in the IEF, it is important for the local banking industry to remain proactive in keeping and diversifying the sources of external credit and adequately manage credit risks within a context of economic recovery. Since mid-2008, household borrowing ratios and their financial burden have decreased. Consumer and firm expectations are still near or somewhat above their neutral values. This combines with the labor market recovering in aggregate terms, which overall was not affected by the earthquake and tsunami. Investment growth relies on both favorable macroeconomic conditions and the boost of reconstruction efforts. As for fiscal policy, the baseline scenario considers that the structural balance will be reached towards the end of the current Administration and that there will be tax changes, budget reallocations and new financing sources for the reconstruction, according to the government’s announcements. BIS Review 99/2010  3  The performance of output and demand will result in a current-account deficit of 1.2% of GDP this year. Measured at trend prices, this deficit is large by historical standards, but it responds partly to temporary reconstruction and replacement expenditures associated with the earthquake. Year-on-year CPI inflation has continued to rise in recent months, consolidating in positive figures. Core indicators for annual variations are still in negative territory but they steadily approach above-zero numbers.
With pre-crisis rules of thumb and the BoE’s pre-crisis reaction function in mind, there were many and loud calls for pre-emptive tightening to prevent the build up of inflation pressure. 2  The Committee’s reluctance to tighten was of course motivated by the sizeable output gap and the need to allow a stimulative policy stance more time to squeeze out slack in the labour market – or as one Committee member put it at the time “don’t just do something, stand there…(and think)”. 3  But underlying this, there were more fundamental doubts about what had happened to the supply side of the economy during the crisis, particularly around the labour market and around the collapse of productivity growth. It was these concerns that underlay the Committee’s decision, shortly before I joined, to give forward guidance that it would not consider changing policy until unemployment fell to a certain level. As the expansion progressed from mid 2013 towards the Brexit referendum in 2016, evidence grew that the supply side was not returning to pre-crisis norms. Unemployment reached 5% - the pre-crisis estimate of the natural rate - in early 2016 without any hint of upward pressure on pay. Pay growth serially undershot the MPC’s forecasts (Chart 1). At the same time, as the expansion progressed, it became disappointingly clear first that the UK would not recover any of the productivity growth lost in the crisis and ensuing recession and then that it would not recover anything like the pre-crisis rate of productivity growth (Chart 2).

Arthur Yuen: Welcome remarks - HKMA Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Technology Forum Welcome remarks by Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) Regulatory Technology (RegTech) Forum (Excerpt), Hong Kong, 22 November 2019. * * * 1. First of all let me welcome you all to this AML/CFT Regtech Forum, which we intend to be the first in a series. 2. In particular let me thank everyone for the very positive response and participation of key stakeholders including the FinTech Association of Hong Kong, experts, academia, other regulators as well as our partners in government bureaux, Companies Registry, Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and Hong Kong Association of Banks. 3. Let me start with a question that speaks to why we are all here today: how effective are we, really, in our important role in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing? We all recognise the efforts of the banking sector over many years – and continuing today – in helping to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. This has recently been praised by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which gave us a very good score card in its Mutual Evaluation Report on Hong Kong. 4. But, despite the mutual evaluation result, no system is perfect and most of the challenges we face – money laundering from fraud, tax crimes and corruption to name but a few – are global in nature.
I agree with Professors Mandel and Dvoák (2022) from the University of Economics and Business who stated in their article "Current global inflation" that Milton Friedman's view that restrictive monetary policy is not dependent on the support of fiscal policy and can be effective in its own right was formulated for a situation where there was an appropriate amount of bank liquidity. In a monetary system with huge excess liquidity and induced high inflation, a reduction in the state budget deficit plays a key role in the fight against inflation and significantly eases the position of the central bank. Therefore, defeating inflation in the long term is conditional on coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. If fiscal policy records increasing budget deficits, monetary policy will find it very hard to ensure low inflation on its own, in a system with such a huge liquidity surplus and a willingness of banks to buy bonds. That is why I said at the press conference after each of our monetary policy meetings that reducing the country's debt is a further key condition for lowering inflation. It is essential in the fight against inflation that the state budget deficit falls as much as possible compared with the actual outcome of the previous year. It would be ideal for the fight against inflation if expenditure declined year on year compared with the actual outcome of the previous year (to dampen demand) and indirect taxes were not increased (to avoid increasing inflation).

However, that is a political decision and it is not within my competence. In any case, we need our tightest monetary policy in twenty years to be accompanied by a credible budget consolidation plan, which the public will trust to support our efforts to reduce inflation. Inflation is our responsibility. However, we are in this together with the government. We need support from fiscal policy and from you. Reducing inflation is in the country's interest. We have already tamed several money flows in the economy. Above all, reducing the country's debt is now needed for a long-lasting return of inflation to low levels. However, banks should also raise interest paid on all household deposits and motivate people to save even more. And this is what we should fight for together. For less debt and more savings. In the interest of the republic. References Adam, T. and Michl, A. (2022). Inflace v R:cyklický i acyklický píbh? [Inflation in the Czech Republic: A cyclical or acyclical story?] (cnBlog – official blog of the Czech National Bank). Adam, T. and Michl, A. (2023). Inflace klesá – prbžné vyhodnocení dezinflaního procesu v esku [Inflation is falling – an interim assessment of the disinflation process in the Czech Republic] (cnBlog – official blog of the Czech National Bank). Bianchi, F. and Melosi, L. (2022). Inflation as a Fiscal Limit (external link). (FRB of Chicago Working Paper No. 2022-37). 5/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Cochrane, J. H. (2023). The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. Princeton University Press.
The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: Some thoughts on the coexistence of affluence and poverty in the United Kingdom  Text of the St Paul’s Cathedral Lecture by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE, Governor of the Bank of England, held in London on 28 November 2000. *  *  *  I have to confess that for me, as a banker - even if I’m a central banker rather than a commercial banker - to be invited to address this audience in the magnificent setting of this cathedral is a somewhat daunting experience. But if it’s a daunting experience, I recognise that it is a great honour, which I very much appreciate; and I welcome the opportunity it gives me to share with you this evening some thoughts on the age-old question, which continues to trouble right-minded people everywhere - how can we explain, let alone justify or tolerate, the coexistence of obvious affluence and well-being cheek by jowl with equally obvious poverty and deprivation. It’s a question of very broad relevance, with personal, local, national and international dimensions. It’s a question to which great minds have applied themselves across the centuries.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Managing emerging market challenges – Thailand’s and Asian perspectives Remarks by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the reception of the 2011 Emerging Markets Central Bank Governor of the Year Award for Asia, Emerging Markets, Washington DC, 24 September 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished Ministers and Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great honor to receive this prestigious award, and I would like to thank the Emerging Markets for your kind recognition. In fact, such recognition is unexpected as I simply fulfill my obligations as central bank governor. To be awarded for doing your job, I guess the job must be quite difficult or challenging. More importantly, I consider this award a recognition of the dedication of the staff of the Bank of Thailand, who have worked hard to ensure Thailand’s sustainable economic and financial stability over the years. As the Bank of Thailand enters its seventieth anniversary next year, our institution is faced with a great challenge to maintain price stability while sustaining growth in the midst of heightened global economic and financial risks. We have no luxury of taking a wait-and-see approach but to continue our best efforts to better manage the external spillovers on our economy and financial system. With continued volatile global capital movements, central banks in emerging markets need to ensure that our financial institutions and markets remain robust; that they can safely and efficiently manage foreign capital inflows as well as outflows, without disrupting the real economy.
But we have so much to learn from experts in other fields. Strengths as Blind Spots One of the most important lessons I’ve learned as a CEO is that there’s no fixed endpoint when it comes to shaping an organization’s culture. You can never take a step back and say, “We’ve finished the culture project. Well done! Now it’s time to focus our efforts elsewhere.” Culture is constantly evolving, and therefore needs to be constantly nurtured. One of the most challenging elements is that there’s no clear benchmark for success. And sometimes your greatest strengths can become your blind spots. As an organization with a public mission and regulatory responsibilities, the Fed needs to have a particular focus on compliance. But cultures with a heavy focus on compliance can breed a sense that individuals aren’t responsible for their actions. As a CEO, I’ve tackled these issues by focusing on principles and values rather than writing extensive policies that try to cover every potential decision. This puts a premium on individual accountability to do what’s right and creating an environment where everyone has the ability and responsibility to speak up. Somewhat paradoxically, focusing on principled decision making and accountability, rather than relying exclusively on rules and policies, can be the most effective safeguard against wrongdoing and unethical behavior. What’s the Way Forward? Creating a positive work culture is challenging and ongoing work. And there’s no silver bullet that can solve cultural problems overnight.

Employees may enter an organization with a strong sense of right and wrong. What they may not realize is that group norms can exert a powerful magnetic pull on their moral compass. The junior banker knew the way the number was being presented was unethical, and yet she complied with her boss. The response from the senior analyst, describing the situation as a “judgment call,” is a common phenomenon. Using a euphemism to describe the inflated statistic camouflages the wrongdoing and makes it sound more acceptable to others. We see it in our daily lives—terms like “troublemaker” and “not being a team player” are often used to shift the onus from the person whose behavior is being challenged to the challenger. Ann Tenbrunsel’s work has been very important for revealing how we use language to disguise or excuse behavior we know to be unacceptable.3 One of the other issues this example illustrates is how organizational norms affect our own sense of what’s right and wrong and whether to speak up. Many of you here today will be familiar with the Asch experiment, where students participated in a vision test. There was a control line and three other lines labelled A, B, and C. Participants had to state aloud which line was the same length as the control.
NBFI has exhibited recently several vulnerabilities related to liquidity risk, such as liquidity mismatch issues in open-ended funds, or the excessive use of leverage, leading to liquidity strains notably in the event of unanticipated spikes in margin calls in times of stress. This is the common pattern of the three financial instability episodes we have experienced recently: the dash for cash of MMF in March 2020, the commodity market this year, and also pensions funds use of derivatives in the UK, resulting in fire sales of gilts. It is high time that we moved forward to enhance the regulatory framework for NBFI that will ensure better liquidity management on financial markets. Currently, the design, calibration and use of existing tools is the responsibility of market participants whose incentives are not always aligned with financial stability goals. Tackling systemic risks in NBFI may therefore require the  development of additional rules both for leverage and for liquidity management in case of systemic risk developments. Stricter requirements as well as a macroprudential approach would contribute to prevent ex ante moral hazard, and thus avoid ex post central bank interventions. Second, interest rates are going up at a time when the level of public and private debt are at historic highs in many countries – 97% of GDP at end 2020 vs 79%  Page 6 sur 11 of GDP in the aftermath of the GFC. In particular, nominal debt levels have increased by a total of almost $ trillion for all FSBii member jurisdictions in the post-GFC period.

First, Europe has developed a consistent corpus of regulation on extra-financial disclosure (taxonomy, SFDR, CSDR) to tackle climate-related risks. We also took our part as central bank by carrying out a pilot climate stress test – followed by a recent ECB exercise completed this summer. Meanwhile, Europe is also adapting to the challenges arising from the digital revolution through a dedicated framework: the objective is, first, to enhance IT security requirements for the entire financial sector (DORA), and second, to establish a European harmonised regulation for crypto-asset issuers and crypto-asset service providers (MICA). Yet I hear repeatedly from the banking sector that prudential regulation is now excessive, and too much of a burden. Let me explain why these claims seem unfounded. In the past ten years, the regulatory framework has done nothing to hinder the sound financing of the European economy: in France for example, the distribution of loans to households and businesses by the French banks has even increased; since end-2010, the outstanding amount of credit grew almost three times faster than GDP (57% vs 21%). As time passes, we must be careful not to succumb to the “temptation to forget”. This very specific phenomenon has a nickname in economic theory: it is called “disaster myopia”. In order to prevent this today, we must absolutely implement the Basel III accord.
These figures are similar to those presented in previous years, reflecting that the Board has not changed its view on the medium-term productive capacity of the Chilean economy. However, we cannot ignore the fact that, because in recent years the growth rates of investment and productivity have been below their trend levels, short-term productive capacity has suffered. Actually, the Board estimates that the potential growth of the economy is now around 2.5%, a little short of previous estimates. Adjustments to the monetary policy making process Another area where we are making progress is in the transparency and communication of our monetary policy decisions. The Bank conducts its monetary policy in an inflation targeting framework, which, to function correctly needs to properly communicate its actions and the reasons behind them, as well as a good diagnosis of the evolution of the economy, locally and internationally. The adoption of these decisions and their communication are structured around the Monetary Policy Meetings and the Monetary Policy Report, whose organization, priority, content and dissemination are currently based on procedures and standards that were mostly established in the first half of the 2000s. After a thorough internal assessment based on accumulated experience and international best practices, the Bank Board has decided to make some modifications to its monetary policy decision-making and communication process. Essentially, the number of Monetary Policy Meetings (MPM) is reduced from twelve to eight per year, to align them with the most common practice among the central banks of low-inflation countries (figure 14).

As governor of the Banco de España, allow me to point out how, in its economic significance, this countercyclical buffer is close to the so-called “dynamic provisions” the Banco de España established more than 10 years ago — with, I should say, less success than, we now know,  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  would have been optimal. We believe this countercyclical buffer is a good instrument and we advocate its use as a new macroprudential instrument. The fact that many ailing banks have been systemic banks has been another consideration influencing supervisors’ stance as to what the response to the crisis should be. Consequently, another significant change in banking regulation arrangements is to set in place a capital surcharge for global systemic important banks (GSIBs). A global important bank is not only a large bank. It is a major bank with significant cross-border activity, a complex bank in terms of its structure, and an interconnected bank that is not liable to be replaced in certain markets. Regarding global systemic important banks, I should also mention the so-called “recovery and resolution plans”. It is important to highlight the value of this instrument in reducing systemic risk and also a formula for taking into account differences between business models in regulation and supervision. One of the final components of Basel III is the leverage ratio, which should be seen as a complement to the risk-based regulatory framework.
The existence of fraud, perpetrated for some time, appears to have been demonstrated. Consequently, high-tech firms participating in banking activities can pose risks similar to those entailed in banking. As has been proven, the technological complexity may actually hinder the detection of potential instances of fraud. Furthermore, these examples suggest that the financial supervision and regulation architecture may not be up to addressing the risks that these emerging players pose. Once again we should remember the “same activity, same regulation” principle, since they may entail equivalent risks. The volume of business and interconnectedness are other factors to bear in mind. These require us to adopt a global view. If companies grow too much, conduct significant cross-border business or have critical interdependencies, we must also consider the same systemic dimension as we already do for the banking sector. For decades we have been demanding that banks manage conflicts of interest, stressing the importance of appropriate governance arrangements, and requiring transparent corporate structures, compliance with legislation at consolidated level based on uniform criteria, coordination among supervisors focusing on the same corporate structure, etc. Let us not therefore make the same mistakes as in the past. If a new crisis takes us by surprise, it should at least be original. Allow me to clarify that we, the supervisors and regulators, are not against innovation or it being spearheaded by new players. Innovation is what drives us forward. Without it, the changes reflected in the report presented today wouldn’t be occurring. True, regulation often hinders the development of innovative solutions.

Secondly, the great harmoniser between the real and nominal convergence are the structural reforms. The more reforms one has implemented, the less costly the disinflation is and the stronger the longer term economic growth. I would finish up with the main point. The strategy on behalf of the European Union should be not to delay the entry of the candidate countries into EMU but to encourage the candidates to complete structural reforms. The cost of disinflation would be lowered and the long term economic would be helped. This is a win-win strategy as it helps the candidates and ensures the existing EU members that the new members would be economically stable and dynamic. Thank you very much. 2  BIS Review 1/2002