samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We decided to target the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It is an indicator easily followed by all economic agents and is an effective way of accurately measuring the cost of daily life. However, we also announced that because the CPI is affected easily by several disturbances that are not under the control of monetary policy, several core inflation indicators will also be monitored closely. We set the inflation target as a “point target” and at the same time, we set a three-year time horizon for year-end targets. The year-end targets for 2006, 2007 and 2008 are 5 percent, 4 percent and 4 percent, respectively. Bearing in mind the transition from 2006 onwards to a three-year government  4  BIS Review 19/2006  budget practice, the announcement of a three-year target path is expected to increase the internal consistency of inflation targets and their harmony with other macroeconomic projections. We defined plus and minus two-percentage points around the target as an uncertainty interval. We thought that measured by a comprehensive index such as the CPI on one side and data and model uncertainty in the economy on the other side, it is not possible for the Central Bank of Turkey to ensure that inflation will not deviate more or less from the point targets.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Central bank communication policies and the challenges posed by the financial crisis Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the presentation of the “BZ-Preis für Lokaljournalismus”, Berne, 27 November 2008. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The financial crisis has prompted a rekindling of press interest in central bank operations, following a long period in which monetary authorities scarcely attracted any media attention. Our communication policy has thus been faced with new challenges in recent months. Today, central banks operate with the market, rather than “against the market”, as in the past. Financial market participants are therefore able to foresee central bank actions. Since the early 2000s, our communication policy has focused on transparency, and our experience with this has been positive. Thus, transparency increases the effectiveness of monetary policy. Yet, in the recent financial turbulence, transparency in monetary policy operations also turned out to be a double-edged sword, as communication problems arose. Indeed, there is a risk that operations to provide extraordinary liquidity assistance will impair the reputation of the recipient organisations, and thereby destabilise the market. There are a number of possible solutions with which a balance can be achieved between transparency and stability. BIS Review 147/2008  1
•  Figueiredo, Ivo (2007) “Henrik Ibsen: Masken (Henrik Ibsen: the Mask)”, Aschehoug. •  Jonung, L. (2005) “Den skandinaviske myntunionen 1873-1924 – en översikt (The Scandinavian Currency Union 1873-1924 – an overview)”, in Eitrheim, Ø. and J. F. Qvigstad (ed.) “Tilbakeblikk på norsk pengehistorie. Konferanse 7. juni 2005 på Bogstad gård (Norwegian monetary history in retrospect. Conference, 7 June 2005, Oslo)”, Norges Bank’s Occasional Papers No. 37, Norges Bank. •  Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1977) “Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans”, Journal of Political Economy, June 1977. •  Minsky, H.P. (1978) "The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A restatement”, Thames Papers on Political Economy 78. •  Qvigstad, J.F. and A. Skjæveland (1994) “Valutakursregimer – historiske erfaringer og fremtidige utfordringer (Exchange rate regimes – historical experience and future challenges)”, in Berg, S. A., J. F. Qvigstad and K. Storvik (ed.) “Stabilitet og langsiktighet: Festskrift til Hermod Skånland (Stability and a long-term perspective: Festschrift for Hermod Skånland)”, Aschehoug. •  Schreiner, P. (1982) "Er Ola Nordmann smart nok? Den fulle sysselsetningen i fare! (Is the average Norwegian smart enough? Full employment in jeopardy! )", Universitetsforlaget. •  Snowdon, B. and H. R. Vane (2005) “Modern macroeconomics: Its origins, development and current stage”, Edward Elgar. BIS Review 111/2008  9  •  Steigum, E. (2000) “Samspillet mellom pengepolitikken og finanspolitikken ved et inflasjonsmål (The interplay between monetary policy and fiscal policy under an inflation targeting regime)", in Røisland, Ø. and J. F. Qvigstad (ed.)

And we will advocate at global regulatory and central banking fora for public sector involvement on data standards, similar to the public sector role on the LEI. So our call to action today is that firms, large and small, join this process, and give it the benefit of their expertise and perspective on the design of common data standards, and on which standards the group  9  A fuller description of our approach to promoting standards, including timeframes, is set out in the Transformation Plan. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  should focus on first. Different firms with varying business models may have different preferences, so we need a broad range of views represented. I hope that some of you listening or reading are already dreaming of better, more commonly adopted standards and reporting solutions in your area of expertise. In which case, step forward! We will need industry to contribute experts who work with data to collaborate with their peers on the development of these crucial data standards. The task ahead is a considerable one. The lesson from the development of the LEI is that the development and adoption of common data standards is a long-term process, and one that needs patience, continued engagement and sustained, expert resource.
When it comes to the costs of the expansionary monetary policy, there is also a risk that losses will arise on the Riksbank’s balance sheet as a result of the bond purchases. In pure accounting terms, the bond portfolio will be booked at market value. This means that the value of the portfolio will vary as interest rates change. The cost of funding the holdings will therefore increase when short-term interest rates eventually rise. If the Riksbank were to suffer a loss, however, it would not entail any particular problem, but it would lead to the surplus we pay to the state every year declining. There will thus be less money for the Swedish Treasury. We have nevertheless chosen to take these measures to emphasise that we want to safeguard the role of the inflation target as nominal anchor for price-setting and wage formation. Moreover, we have said that if more is required to get inflation to rise towards the target, we will do more. And we are prepared to do so with force. 2012 and Christensen, J. H. E. and Krogstrup, S. “Swiss Unconventional Monetary Policy: Lessons for the Transmission of Quantitative Easing”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2014–18. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Concluding reflections In my speech today I have tried to describe current monetary policy from an historical perspective. I hope that you have gained a deeper understanding of current monetary policy.

This assessment is also reflected in the September 2010 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, according to which annual real GDP growth will range between 1.4% and 1.8% in 2010 and between 0.5% and 2.3% in 2011. Compared with the June 2010 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the range for real GDP growth this year has been revised upwards, owing to the stronger than expected rebound in economic growth in the second quarter as well as better than expected developments over the summer months. For 2011 the range has also been revised upwards, reflecting mainly carry-over effects from the projected stronger growth towards the end of 2010. In the Governing Council’s assessment, the risks to this improved economic outlook are slightly tilted to the downside, with uncertainty still prevailing. On the one hand, global trade may continue to perform more strongly than expected, thereby supporting euro area exports. On the other hand, concerns remain relating to the emergence of renewed tensions in financial markets and to some uncertainty about growth prospects in other advanced economies and at the global level. In addition, downside risks relate to renewed increases in oil and other commodity prices, and protectionist pressures, as well as the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. With regard to price developments, euro area annual HICP inflation was 1.6% in August, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, compared with 1.7% in July. The small decline in inflation is likely to reflect base effects in the energy component.
What really counts is the direction for monetary policy on the basis of the information available at the time the decision is taken, not what should have been done if it had been possible to predict the future with perfect accuracy. When we experience major disturbances or changes in the economy, we cannot merely concentrate on the effects on prices. Let me illustrate this with reference to oil prices. If we assume that oil prices rise. Inflation rises, which means that real wages fall, partly as a result of petrol and heating oil becoming more expensive, which means that consumers have less money over to spend on other goods. This leads to a decline in demand and thereby in prices on other goods. Higher oil prices can thus lead to both rising prices and lower demand, which in the long term will once again subdue inflation. It is difficult to predict oil prices as they do not always reflect the demand and supply situation, but are also connected to politics. The current situation can illustrate this difficulty. Are oil prices rising because the increase in global demand and growth is higher than was assumed, or is the political uncertainty in the Middle East the most important factor? What is the resource situation within the economy? A price rise that occurs when resource utilisation is on its way down can lead to a rapid and profound decline.

There are also rapid developments in these in the form of volume growth but also in new or improved activities and instruments. BIS Review 111/2006  5  The insurance sector which was as restricted in its activities as the banks during the regulation years has grown strongly in Sweden after deregulation, both for non-life and life insurance products. The demography of Sweden is such that we have an ageing population. Thus savings for retirement, for instance in the form of pension schemes, have become increasingly important. Some of the insurance companies are owned by banks, forming financial conglomerates, but others are independent. Mortgage banks have always played a strong role in Sweden. Most of them are owned by the major banks, but a few remain independent. The banks themselves are also allowed to extend mortgage credits so there is open competition. The market for mortgage loans is highly competitive because the product is simple and comparable so it is difficult to argue for a higher interest rate. Credit market companies, leasing companies, factoring companies, and card companies provide specialised financial services. Some of them are linked to the bank groups while others are independent. Many of them are quite small. Equity and bond markets and exchanges for specialised products such as derivatives have grown tremendously both in volume terms and in terms of offering a wide variety of instruments ever since the first Treasury bills were issued in Sweden in the early 1980s.
Given continued high structural unemployment and low potential output growth in the euro area, the ongoing cyclical recovery should be supported by effective structural policies. In particular, actions to improve the business environment, including the provision of an adequate public infrastructure, are vital to increase productive investment, boost job creation and raise productivity. The swift and effective implementation of structural reforms, in an environment of accommodative monetary policy, will not only lead to higher sustainable economic growth in the euro area but will also raise expectations of permanently higher incomes and accelerate the beneficial effects of reforms, thereby making the euro area more resilient to global shocks. Fiscal policies should support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the European Union. Full and consistent implementation of the Stability and  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Growth Pact is crucial to maintain confidence in the fiscal framework. At the same time, all countries should strive for a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Clearly this put the ball very much in our own court in the sense that we needed to do all that we could to persuade successive Governments, but also financial markets and the public at large, of our integrity and objectivity on the one hand and of our technical and analytical competence on the other. Without that our input to policy would not have been worth very much, and would not have carried conviction. In fact integrity and objectivity together with professional competence are in my view the essential foundations of effective independence whatever the statutory framework. Fundamentally it is up to us! For much of the period after 1946 two contextual factors served in any event to limit the degree of independence we could realistically expect to achieve. The first was the post-war context of direct intervention and controls, including initially the physical allocation of scarce materials and consumer rationing but extended to the financial system for example through credit ceilings and directional guidance as well as exchange controls, which were only finally removed in 1979. Direct resource allocation rather than allocation through market mechanisms involves intrinsically political judgements - choices between the social value of some forms of activity against others - which cannot easily be devolved to appointed officials. It would put the officials dangerously in the political firing line - calling their impartiality and objectivity into question - if they were.
Besides, it has also estimated that roughly 8 trillion US dollars2 will be required to meet the infrastructure needs of Asia over the next decade. Although this amount is daunting, I believe that it can be fulfilled, given the current global capital surge and the fact that Asian savers put away around 7 trillion of US  1  2012, ADB website (http://www.adb.org/countries/gms/news-releases)  2  http://www.adbi.org/files/2009.08.31.book.infrastructure.seamless.asia.pdf pp.181  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  dollars3 each year. Like directing the flow of flood to the right river so that it can become benefit for those living in the area, this overflowing capital can be harnessed to benefit needed long-term projects. 7. To meet the region’s financing requirements, we should look into new means to attract funding. Firstly, by promoting private sector participation in infrastructure development through public-private partnership (PPP). The PPP model can improve the efficiency of long-term projects by adopting the private sector’s expertise and reducing the burden on government budget. Although the PPP model has long been discussed, the implementation of this model is still a trial-and-error practice. Regardless, I believe that through clear governance and suitable regulatory framework, PPPs could promote private sector’s participation and bring in the untapped resources. Secondly, by customizing innovative financial instruments. This calls for inter-agency collaborative efforts to introduce innovative financial instruments which link specific funding requirements and market preferences. To name a few, Thailand has recently launched its first infrastructure fund to finance its sky train extension.

It is clear that further increases in the policy rate are required for inflation to return to the target. I will return to this later. But let me say now, that I am confident that the Riksbank will do what is needed to attain the inflation target. In contrast to the early 1990s, we now have a better mandate and a constitutional independence that enable us to take decisive action to attain the target. However, this must not lead us to underestimate the challenges we are facing. New vulnerabilities have been built up over the past 30 years: High indebtedness among households and businesses3, housing shortages, a divided labour market and a lack of investment in, for instance, defence, infrastructure, and climate transition. This means that the tightening will severely affect some households and businesses, while higher interest rates risk making necessary investments more difficult and costly. Diagram 1. The Riksbank’s policy rates since 1907 Per cent 100 80 60 40 20 0  -20 1900  1920  1940  1960  1980  2000  2020  Note. The Riksbank's policy rates consist of the discount rate, the marginal interest rate and the current policy rate (formerly known as the repo rate). Source: The Riksbank. Today, therefore, I would like to invite you to discuss the economic policy framework.
Gent Sejko: Overview of Albania’s latest monetary and economic developments and outlook Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 4 March 2015. *  *  *  Today, on the 4 of March 2015, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania reviewed and approved the Interim Monetary Policy Report. After scrutinising the current and expected performance of inflation and other economic indicators, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 2.0%. *** The domestic and external economic environment has generated low inflationary pressures. According to INSTAT data, annual inflation was 1.3% in January, up from the rate registered in December. Inflation fluctuations in the last two months have been determined mainly by the volatility in food prices. The fall in food inflation in December and its rise in January were driven by developments in international markets and the performance of domestic production. In parallel, the decline in oil prices has generated downward pressure on inflation. Prices of other consumer goods’ categories did not display any significant change. The rise in inflation in January was in line with our projections; however, the rate of inflation remains below Bank of Albania’s target. The Bank of Albania evaluates that inflationary pressures will increase gradually and inflation will return to target within the medium term.

However, Bank of Albania evaluates that inflation will remain below the target for the most of this period. Its performance will continue to be determined by the degree of recovery in economic growth, supply-side domestic and external shocks, and economic and financial agents’ inflation expectations. The Albanian economy is assessed to have improved in 2014. According to INSTAT data, the economic activity grew by 1.4% during the first nine months of the year. We expect the growth rate to accelerate in the fourth quarter, driven by the strong fiscal stimulus in this period. Due to damages caused by floods in the south of the country, our projections on the performance of the economy during 2015 are revised slightly downwards. However, their effect is expected to be temporary and the economy is projected to remain in an upward trend in the medium term. Economic growth for 2015 is projected to be higher than that in the previous year. The expansion of economic activity will continue to be driven, to a large extent, by private sector growth. Foreign demand is expected to play a small positive role and the speed of fiscal consolidation is expected to be reduced. While upward, our projections suggest that the economic activity at home will remain below its potential in 2015, generating incomplete utilisation of production capacities. Incomplete capacity utilisation is underpinned by a relatively high unemployment rate and is reflected in low pressures on wage increases and production costs.
Irrespective of all electoral cycles, the support for the currency board by the business community, the general public and all political parties has stayed intact. The current crisis started to affect Bulgaria towards the end of 2008, with the decline in external demand and the lower capital inflows. However, the banks in Bulgaria did not have any exposure to foreign “toxic” assets and did not suffer directly from the “domino effect” of collapsing financial institutions abroad. The Bulgarian case was different from the AngloSaxon scenario because we had learned our lessons from 1996–1997 and we had accumulated enough reserves to serve as a cushion. To talk in numbers, the government entered the crisis with a fiscal reserve of 12% of GDP at the end of 2008. The gross international reserves of the Bulgarian National Bank were 36% of GDP then. The banking system average capital adequacy was 14.9% in December 2008. Our banking system has never been a source of problems. Engaged in traditional commercial banking, our banks were affected by the crisis only when the general economic activities declined and as a result some of their clients found it harder to service their loans. The banking system itself withstood the crisis, displaying outstanding soundness and stability. But this did not happen on its own, neither was it simply due to the presence of reputable names on our market. We, the BNB, as supervisors have always believed that the good times with strong growth must be used to “save for a rainy day”.

Accordingly, the region’s economic performance has a most significant influence on Spanish banks’ balance sheets, and the risks arising from these exposures may potentially become systemic. At the Banco de España, then, several directorates general – including Economics, Statistics and Research; Financial Stability, Regulation and Resolution; and Banking Supervision – devote many resources to monitoring all that occurs in the Latin American region from the real and financial perspective. However, the Banco de España remains ambitious to strengthen its knowledge of and links to the region’s economic agents. Our first Strategic Plan, for the 2020-2024 period, approved in January last year, actually set as one of its priorities that of increasing our contribution to this objective. As part of this aim, we are pursuing a series of medium and long-term-oriented actions in the sphere of cooperation with Latin American central banks and institutions. We also seek to extend and enhance our analytical capacity in respect of the region’s economies and financial systems. We are convinced that these seminars are a firm step forward in this direction. The aim of this webinar is to shed some light on how remittance flows during the health crisis have influenced Latin America’s macroeconomic and financial stability. As you are well aware, the Latin American economic situation has been particularly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Along with the human cost in lives, the effects on poverty and income distribution have been very severe.