samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  BIS Review 94/2010  As for the banking system, we have built up sufficient bank capital, partly benefited from our prudent risk management. Our supervision developments have also come a long way. With intensive and continuous legal and regulatory reforms since the 1997 Asian crisis, our financial system is now resilient and in a good position to support growth. On this note, let me also say that the Bank of Thailand holds regular meetings with representatives from both Thai and Foreign Banks Associations, as well as meetings with their top management to discuss current issues and policy implications. This dialogue helps us to continuously strengthen risk management such that the financial system will remain in a strong position to serve the real economy efficiently. Third, thanks partly to export diversification over the years, Thai export is now recovering strongly despite a considerable shock to trades. A decade ago, Thailand relied mostly on G3 countries as our export market, but now, ASEAN market as well as BRIC (i.e., Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and other new destinations are emerging strongly and help diversify risk from the G3 countries. We also did not get much impact from the European debt crisis since our exports to PIIGS countries (i.e., Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) account for only 1.8 percent of total exports. Despite an impressive export growth now, Thailand needs to become more resilient against greater competition by an increasing number of emerging markets.

The crisis in Asia spread to Russia, where the decline in commodity prices led to an even further deterioration in government finances. The announcement that Russia could no longer service its debt was met with strong reactions in global financial markets in August and September. There were growing fears that the world economy would be caught in a financial crash. Many investors withdrew from small and risky markets, particularly in Latin America. The Brazilian currency came under pressure. It was difficult to raise loan capital even in the most advanced markets. As financial institutions throughout the world experienced growing losses, fears of a world economic depression intensified. Reductions in interest rates in the US and Europe facilitated access to credit and prevented a market collapse. Measures perceived as credible were finally implemented to resolve the Japanese banking crisis. Additional capital was allocated to the International Monetary Fund. There are still many challenges ahead. Brazil and Russia are running government budget deficits and are having problems establishing a credible monetary policy. China is bearing substantial costs as a result of the crisis in surrounding countries and may experience difficulties of its own. Other countries may also feel the contagion effect. However, even though the outlook points to lower growth in the global economy this year than forecast earlier, fears of a worldwide depression have receded. This is by no means the first time we have experienced an international financial crisis.
But while net financial income has fallen for the wealthiest households, the same is not true for wealth. Wealthier households tend to have a greater amount of housing wealth and house prices have risen since the introduction of negative interest rates. Extrapolating the HFCS forward using changes in equity, bond and house price data shows increases in the net wealth for every wealth quintile. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The ECB’s policy measures have been unambiguously positive for euro-area governments. Germany alone saved approximately 28 billion euro in 2015 in lower than expected interest payments. Such payments would ultimately have been financed from lower spending or higher taxes. Broadly speaking, the lower income the household sector has received from income payments from government bonds, either directly or intermediated through the banking sector needs to be offset against lower tax liabilities now or in the future. Indeed, research by Deutsche Bank4 shows that the impact of low and negative interest rates on the returns of German household financial assets has been limited so far. This was in part due to revaluation gains on the back of the ECB’s asset purchase programme as well as interest income from investment funds and insurance and pension products. It is still possible for savers to gain positive real returns by holding a diversified portfolio of assets.

And why, for countries where there have been larger and faster increases in household debt levels, recessions have tended to be deeper still. The Financial Policy Committee has already acted in response to the growing momentum in the housing market. As well as the general strengthening of bank capital, the FPC, in conjunction with other regulators and the Treasury, withdrew both the cheap funding and favourable capital treatment of mortgage lending introduced after the crisis to help support the housing market. And, we have asked the FCA that when lenders test whether prospective borrowers can afford, through time, the mortgages they seek they should bear in mind future Financial Policy Committee recommendation on the appropriate interest rate stress test to use in assessments of affordability. Whether and how to act further if, following the pause of the last couple of months, momentum continues to build will be the most challenging judgment the FPC will have to take in the coming months. The FPC’s response will depend on the nature of the risks to stability identified. The FPC’s powers of direction in relation to the capital banks and building societies bear most directly on mortgage lenders’ ability to weather a downturn and housing bust once it has emerged. Others, like the FPC’s powers to make comply or explain recommendations to the PRA and FCA could bear more directly on the crucial underwriting standards and affordability constraints like debt service to income, loan to income and loan to value.
See Assessing the resilience of market-based finance 20. In the non-bank financial system, leverage is used: to facilitate trading; to invest in companies and infrastructure; and to arbitrage price discrepancies and so improve the efficiency of financial markets. See The impact of leveraged investors on market liquidity and financial stability - speech by Jon Cunliffe  Page 9  21. During the dash for cash we saw liquidity mismatch driving run dynamics in money market funds (MMFs) and openended funds (OEFs). See Taking our second chance to make MMFs more resilient - speech by Andrew Bailey 22. The collection of margin reduces and mitigates risks that the failure of one firm could have a severe impact on the rest of the financial system. By design, margin requirements are procyclical in that they rise in stressed market conditions, to match the increase in expected losses and risks. This ensures that counterparty risk is properly mitigated. During the dash-for-cash, some non-bank financial institutions redeemed MMF shares, borrowed in the gilt repo market, and sold gilts and corporate bonds in order to raise cash to meet redemption pressures and margin calls, replenish their liquid asset holdings, or in anticipation of further calls. These actions contributed to selling pressures in those markets and the large withdrawals from MMFs. See The role of non-bank financial intermediaries in the ‘dash for cash’ in sterling markets 23. See DP22/1: Resilience of Money Market Funds  Sarah Breeden Executive Director, Financial Stability Strategy and Risk  ©2023 Bank of England

While the issues would not be exhaustion but I will attempt to give a different dimension on the matters raised. Development of Islamic finance Islamic finance is now the fastest growing segment in the global financial industry. Notwithstanding the global financial crisis, Islamic finance has shown strong growth. The size of assets under management may very well exceeded USD1 trillion. Islamic finance has maintained an average growth rate of 15–20% per annum. New areas of business continue to show encouraging progress. Islamic Mutual Funds is growing at average of 23% per annum. The Takaful industry is growing at 13% per annum. Islamic finance has attracted a lot of attention. It is no more peripheral to the conventional banking system but has grown from being a novelty to be a viable and attractive alternative to the conventional banking system. Giant banking and insurance groups are now very much interested in Islamic finance as a way to growth their business. Five years from now, the data that I am showing you could very well change in terms of numbers and structures. Interest in Islamic finance is no longer limited to Muslim nations and Muslim communities. The world realizes the economic clout of 1.5 billion people is a market that cannot be ignored. The Islamic finance market offers an enormous potential for future growth. Long established financial centers such as London, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Singapore have already begun the first steps to enhance their respective centers into vibrant Islamic financial centers.
•  A strong Europe is all the more necessary in a multipolar world, as a “balancing power.” By 2050, the divide will no longer be between emerging and advanced economies, but rather between who was prepared and who wasn’t. Ideas to enhance European economic governance are not new. Mobilization and implementation have proved tricky however: this is what I would like to focus my remarks on speaking of the motivations (I) and then of the concrete tasks of a Euro area Finance Minister (II). I. Why we need a “full coordination” institution in the Euro area  We know there is deep political resistance to sharing fiscal resources and sovereignty, as well as Euroscepticism. The sad example of the refugee crisis illustrates how European countries so far have displayed little solidarity to find a common solution. This is why we need to make the economic case for a stronger governance of the euro area: it is not a theological issue and not solely a political one either. This discussion is not about “more Brussels”, it is very concretely about more growth and jobs in Europe. Clearly, monetary policy cannot be a substitute for economic policy coordination or the lack of reforms. For that reason alone central bankers need to take part in this debate, while taking action will obviously be a decision for political leaders. This is also why our focus should be on the Eurozone economic governance. We should not fear different speeds in Europe.

The new appointment would be subject to the formal approval of the European Parliament, and the Finance Minister would be member of the Commission, as well as chair of the Eurogroup. The Minister would thereby have the legitimacy to represent internationally the euro area in Economic and Financial fora, alongside the President of the ECB. Second, the euro area Finance Minister would need to be backed by a genuine Treasury administration, which could include staff from the Commission’s Economic and Financial Directorate General, the ESM, and the Economic and Financial Committee Secretariat. Such a civil service would also benefit from the public advice of two independent bodies, the European Fiscal Board and the Competitiveness Council. Last, if we succeed in implementing further integration, we will need stronger democratic control over euro area affairs. To this end, we will need to consider institutionalising a euro area format of the European Parliament. Relationships between euro area MPs and national parliaments will also need to be enhanced, through an inter-institutional agreement, or by creating dedicated commissions. *** To conclude, let me quote Robert Mundell 4, father of the theory of optimal currency areas and a famous analyst of international spillovers. He did acknowledge that the euro area was far from optimal. Yet he remained confident, saying: “it will be achieved because, for Europe, it isn’t just the best game in town, it’s the only game.” Economic policy as a whole, not central banking alone, is indeed the only game in town.
Fourth, macro financial models that are used to create a medium- and long-term macro financial outlook on future trends that contribute to the financial policy decision-making. 2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In addition, the modelling part plays an important role in the stress exercises, which measure the vulnerability of the system and helps guide the activation and calibration of the buffer. Also, the Central Bank of Chile counts on complementary models that have been developed to discuss potential macroeconomic effects and support trade-off analysis. As stated in the policy framework, the activation and release of the CCyB requires expert judgment from the central bank's board. Also, interaction with the Financial Market Commission plays a crucial role in the decision process. Looking forward, our policy research agenda should continue looking at the interaction of different policies with the CCyB and its macroeconomic impacts, such as the interaction between financial and monetary policies; the relation with other prudential policies and/or other buffers and the evaluation of the impacts of a neutral level higher than zero for the level of the CCyB in "normal times". The first official Financial Policy Meeting, formally communicated to the market, took place in May 2022 and the most recent one occurred last November. On both occasions, the Board unanimously decided not to activate the CCyB. It was considered that, despite vulnerabilities focused on some sectors and a more complex international environment, the systemic risk analysis shows that banks have sufficient buffers to withstand severe stress scenarios.

As for the PSPP, Greek government bonds lost their eligibility on 21 August when the programme ended. At that point, the Eurogroup’s debt measures had still not been ratified. In any case, purchases would have been very limited over such a short period. Is there any chance that Greek bonds could be included at some point in the future in the reinvestment phase of the PSPP? How many years do you think the reinvestment of maturing securities will last? Without a programme, Greek government bonds are now treated like any other bonds for the purpose of ECB eligibility. Once they regain investment grade status they could be included in all ECB programmes, subject to a Governing Council decision. As you know, we intend to reinvest the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the asset purchase programme (APP) for an extended period of time after the end of our net asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. The government seems to have put on hold, for the time being, plans to return to the markets. Do you think that Greece has now regained full access to international capital markets? Do you think it should wait until after the elections to go back to the markets? Greece’s market access conditions have clearly improved compared with one year ago.
As a consequence, institutional independence should be subject to a functional analysis of the need for those new tasks to benefit  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  from the same broad independence framework. If central bank independence is to be modelled in a functional manner, then its pendant – the central bank’s accountability and disclosure requirements – also need to reflect this modelling. Accountability and transparency The principles of accountability and transparency are essential for independent central banks. Accountability is a political duty and sine qua non for the democratic legitimacy of an independent central bank that is answerable for the exercise of its decision-making powers. [18] Accountability refers to the ex post explanation and justification of autonomous decision-making. [19] Transparency is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of a central bank’s policies by communicating them in real time, or even in advance, thus facilitating the public’s understanding of the central bank’s objectives, behaviour and decisions. [20] The channels through which the ECB is held accountable for the performance of its monetary policy function are laid down at constitutional level, i.e. in the Treaty. The Treaty was concluded by the national governments and ratified by the national parliaments of the EU Member States, and in some cases endorsed by popular referenda, in accordance with national constitutional requirements. This gives the ECB, as an independent institution accountable to the EU institutions as well as to the public at large, a profound degree of democratic legitimacy.

There are valid http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  arguments for granting operational and financial independence to supervisors and, in fact, it has been accepted that operational independence is one of the core principles for effective banking supervision. The specific question that I am exploring is whether the highest possible level of independence granted to a central bank by virtue of Article 130 of the Treaty for the pursuit of the primary objective of price stability may be extended to the supervisory function of the ECB. Operational independence of the ECB as a supervisor When the Council conferred supervisory tasks on the ECB, it also set out the principles and conditions governing the exercise of those powers, including the level of independence for the ECB. Instead of including a direct cross-reference to Article 130 of the Treaty,[38] as was the case in relation to the scope of the ECA’s mandate vis-à-vis the ECB, the independence of the ECB in an SSM context is set out expressly in Article 19 of the SSM Regulation. The wording of Article 19 of the SSM Regulation is similar to, but does not replicate, Article 130 of the Treaty. It stipulates that when “carrying out the tasks conferred on it by this Regulation, the ECB and the national competent authorities acting within the SSM shall act independently.
Since there has not been any significant crisis situation in our financial system except for some non-systemic failures of a few mismanaged financial institutions in the recent past, the question raised by many local and international agencies was why the Central Bank came up with this financial sector consolidation programme for a well-functioning stable financial system. The past global experiences show that all the consolidation programmes implemented to stabilise the respective economies’ financial systems were introduced as a national policy to relove a crisis situation. Therefore, we have a duty to explain very clearly the factors that prompted the Central Bank to introduce the financial sector consolidation programme. Given the time constraint, I will present the main arguments for consolidation in six points. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Reason 1: Rapid transformation of the domestic economy and the need for a strong and stable financial system to steer future economic growth We all know the conflict period of nearly 30 years was extremely challenging for our economy and the country. Nevertheless, with the country gaining peace and returning to normalcy from May 2009, we have been able to overcome many challenges and reach greater heights in economic performance. Social indicators and global rankings of our country have improved notably while regional disparities have reduced and the standard of living of the people has improved. Further, in the midst of the global economic downturn and the slower than expected recovery, we have been successful in delivering an oasis of tranquillity and stability.

Dimitar Bogov: Challenges of bolstering growth rates and ensuring their sustainability Opening statement by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, to the Bank for International Settlements Working Party on Monetary Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, Skopje, 11–12 February 2016. *  *  *  Dear colleagues, dear guests, It is my honour to welcome you for the Annual Meeting of the BIS Working Party on Monetary Policy in Central and Eastern Europe, hosted by the National bank of the Republic of Macedonia. I look forward to discussions on the key issues the policymakers are currently facing. Many of the economies in our region have strong trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world. Therefore, a natural starting point would be to assess how conducive the global environment is for our key goal of bolstering growth rates and ensuring their sustainability. Unfortunately, almost a decade after the acute stage of the crisis, it seems that the global environment is still fragile. Although the world economy is recovering, growth rates do not seem to be strong enough, and what is even more problematic, this “low growth mode” might be here to stay. The frequent downward revisions of global growth prospects indicate that uncertainty is weighing on growth. Global growth rates are staggering slightly above 3%, on average, and the medium-term prospects do not seem to differ much.
In the 1980s and 1990s, Malaysia and Thailand sought to emulate the export-oriented success of the “tiger economies” while China and India pursued market-oriented reforms and opened up their economies to international trade. After the shock of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s, strong growth continued in the 2000s with China emerging as a major global economic and industrial power. We are now in a third phase of rapid economic growth in Asia in which there is more emphasis on the growth of domestic demand and self-sustaining growth, particularly in the larger economies in the region. With an expanding middle class and rising living standards,  1  See, for example, Maddison (2007). 2  See World Bank (1993) for a detailed analysis. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  domestic consumer demand can provide a much stronger engine of growth. And a number of Asian economies – including China – are also investing heavily in public infrastructure. The sharp fall-off in export markets in the recent global recession has given added impetus to the desire to expand domestic demand and this provided an important platform for the recovery of Asian economies from the global recession.

In the European context, our colleagues from De Nederlandshe Bank and Banco de Portugal, Mr Michiel van Doeveren, Mr Rui Pimentel, Mr Carlo Winder and Mr Richard Derksen will provide relevant information about the ongoing changes in payment systems and services in Europe. Thus, a discussion will be developed about the three main pillars of the Strategic Vision 2020 of the Eurosystem: achieving a consolidated Eurosystem market infrastructure by bringing the two infrastructures TARGET 2 and T2S closer together, harmonization of its own collateralization techniques and procedures and development of pan-European instant payment services. In addition, the latest developments in the legal spectrum regulating payments at European level, with special emphasis on PSD2 Directive, will be elaborated. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Also, significant attention will be paid on developments in safe and secure payment services as well as the conceptual and practical issues regarding the oversight on FMIs. On the national level, our efforts are focused on the harmonization of the Macedonian legislation with the EU regulation. The new Law on payment services and systems and related bylaws will implement PSD and part of the provisions from PSD2, Settlement Finality Directive and E-money Directive. Thus, a panel discussion is scheduled where esteemed representatives from the payment service providers, NBRM and experts from Slovenia, Mr Peter Centrih and Bulgarian expert, Mr Antonio Barzashki will elaborate the new package of Macedonian legislative on payments.