samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is why they certainly need to be closely monitored, not only within individual firms but also at the level of supervisory bodies. •  At a moment when all activities are tending to accelerate and render location issues more acute, changes in the regulatory environment are crucial to fostering efficient financial markets. Let me mention in particular the UCITS (mutual funds) Directive and the directive on occupational pension funds, which ought to eliminate barriers to investment and, of course, the importance of the directive on take-over bids in the context of the integration of national stock exchanges. More generally, it is very important for the European Union to accelerate reforms in the financial field. In this respect, as I said, key directives have to be laid down and transposed adequately in national laws, whereby the public authorities within FESCO and professionals (like the members of your association) should play a role to facilitate a harmonized set of principles or recommendations. On all these subjects, we can expect a lot of progress in the following months, within the guidelines already issued by the European Commission (in its Financial Services Action Plan). France, for its part, has already expressed its intention to put these matters on the Agenda when it takes over the presidency of the European Union in July. 2.2 Coming now to the process of consolidation in the banking sector, there is no need to recall how banking and financial consolidation has sped up in recent years in Europe.

The focus is often on individual pension savings, but households’ total pension wealth also contains savings in collective funds, for instance, in systems for occupational pension schemes and premium pensions. The fact is that this form of saving currently comprises around half of total financial assets (see Figure 3). Moreover, we all have pension assets linked to the general income-based pension, which are not in funds but are linked to the pension rights we earn until we retire. Whether or not one has a job does play a major role for the size of the collective saving and the general income-based pension. It determines whether or not one receives an occupational pension and is also important for one’s income profile during the working life. Lower unemployment and higher employment should therefore have a levelling distributional effect for this reason, too. 8 The employment perspective on the income distribution in Sweden is described by, for instance, Bengtsson,  Edin and Holmlund (2014) and SNS (2017). 9 See, for instance, Government Bill 2011/12:100. 10 [14]  Figure 3.
Much as there are other building societies now, their impact on real estate finance is still minimal. Consequently, most of the people who are constructing nowadays are doing so out of their own funds. Since they are building using their own meagre resources, the quality of their structures leaves much to be desired and the projects take long to complete. This, in part, explains the mushrooming of shanty compounds I have alluded to earlier. What I have said clearly shows that there is need for new players in the real estate financing sector. To this effect, I wish to challenge the private sector to invest in the real estate financing business. Having said that, what is the role of the Bank of Zambia in enhancing investment opportunities in the real estate business? As you may be aware, the primary mission of the Bank of Zambia is to formulate and implement monetary and supervisory policies that will ensure price and financial system stability. BIS Review 46/2005  1  How does this tie in with real estate business? The relationship between real estate business and monetary policy and financial system stability is a much debated issue among academics and policy-makers, alike. The relationship brings to the fore important challenges involving policy design, financial regulation and risk management. In Zambia, however, like most other developing countries, we have had difficulties in quantifying the relationship due to paucity of reliable information on property markets, thereby limiting the scope for meaningful analysis as an input into policy formulation.

The second pillar is related to the regulatory framework of the activity of the banking system, therefore, related to the day to day activity of the Bank of Albania and the banking system. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We have identified the regulations that will be subject to amendments. In addition to the objective for creating higher flexibility in relation to certain aspects of the activity in the treatment of the credit portfolio, we will aim at adopting a new concept: the “background check (biografi)” of the client in relation to bank borrowing. We believe that this new element will help banks assess the borrowing potential of each client. In spite of what I said above, it is a fact that, recently, lending in the national currency has seen positive growth over the months. This phenomenon, among others, has been accompanied with a positive side effect at a higher speed and intensity in the pass through mechanism of the monetary policy in the economy. Dear guests, As I pointed out, at the beginning, economic activity at home remains in a positive trajectory, but it has not yet reached the level we wish it were. Research at the Bank continues to confirm that the Albanian economy has unutilised potential and that the closing of the gap remains the main challenge for policymakers. Interventions through both the monetary policy and macro-prudential elements insofar have not succeeded to definitively close the gap.
Edward Robinson: Central bank communications - evolution in theory and practice Opening remarks by Mr Edward Robinson, Deputy Managing Director (Economic Policy) and Chief Economist of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the IMF High-Level Peer-to-Peer Forum on “Central Bank Communications in ASEAN–5 Countries: From Principles to Practice”, Singapore, 4 December 2019. * * *  1. INTRODUCTION  May I extend warmest greetings and welcome to all visitors and overseas participants. MAS is very pleased that the IMF is organising this conference on a most pertinent topic in Singapore. 2. MONETARY POLICY COMMUNICATIONS—FROM OPACITY TO TRANSPARENCY  Since the 1990s, there has been a clear trend in central banking circles towards greater transparency. This marked a significant turnaround from previous decades that prized monetary policy-making as “an arcane and esoteric art best practiced out of public view”.1 Former BOE Governor Montagu Norman (1920–1944) reputedly had a personal motto of “Never explain, never excuse.” The change has much to do with the growing recognition that monetary policy is essentially about managing expectations. The increasing adoption of inflation targeting also spurred advances on the transparency front, with its communication-heavy requirements of policy targets, forecasts and outlook. The shift towards greater transparency is generally held as desirable for two broad reasons. First, transparency can enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.2 By helping to anchor long-term inflation expectations, transparency improves policy efficacy and facilitates the overall pro-equilibrating tendencies of the economy. Central bank communication increases the predictability of central bank actions.

Giving more information may induce not more, but less, clarity among market participants, as there are limits to how much information can be digested effectively.6 The public may not easily understand the uncertainty and conditionality surrounding central bank forecasts.7 Or worse still, agents might come to realise how uncertain the central bank is about economic conditions.8 Sometimes, it is just not feasible to provide that degree of clarity out in the public. Second, central bankers need to think about the potential interaction of greater transparency with the path of future monetary policy decisions. Policy expectations engendered by communication may unduly constrain policy action. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that there can be too much of a good thing, although anchoring the optimal degree of central bank transparency still proves elusive. A number of studies have found diminishing returns to central bank transparency on market expectations.9 Others also found that disseminating specific and detailed information, such as full meeting transcripts, provides little marginal value over more concise communication, such as policy meeting minutes, in terms of guiding market expectations.10 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  There are a set of papers showing that more information can result in destabilising market expectations.
•  The central government budget – growth in public expenditure – influences the krone and the size of the internationally exposed business sector in the medium term. Government expenditure and revenues must be in balance in the long term. •  Wage formation, the structure of the economy and incentives determine how well and how efficiently we utilise our labour resources and other economic resources. There is also an interaction: •  In its budget resolutions, the government authorities will attach importance to the effects of the budget on the Norwegian economy and will therefore take account of interest rate effects. In this way, they avoid a situation where growth in public expenditure and the interest rate push the economy in different directions. •  With a known monetary policy response pattern, the parties to the centralised income settlements can take interest rate effects into account when wage increases are negotiated. •  Moreover, the parties to public sector negotiations can take into account that the higher pay increases are, the fewer people that can be paid over government budgets. The interaction here became clear when public sector employment fell after the expensive wage settlement in 2002. The value of the Petroleum Fund, measured as a percentage of GDP, will rise in the years ahead. On the other hand, Norway, like many other countries, is facing substantial fiscal challenges. The expected dependency ratio, i.e.

At this point, I would like to briefly touch another obstacle that hinders access to capital: Fiscal dominance. Due to high level of public sector borrowing requirements in many emerging market countries, fiscal policy ultimately governs price determination in financial markets. Fiscal dominance reduces the amount of loanable funds available to private sector and disrupts effective credit allocation in the economy. Turkey can be seen as a case study. Years of high real interest rates and budget deficits in the 1990s forced the Turkish banking sector to credit rationing. Banks were not able to perform their intermediary function effectively. Instead, they mostly financed public sector deficits. Fiscal dominance has gradually eased following the reform program enacted after the 2001 crisis. The declining public debt burden and the diminishing fiscal dominance in Turkey put an end to the crowding-out of the real sector. That boosted the supply of loanable funds. Banks have returned to their traditional role of financial intermediation instead of financing government expenditures. Share of public securities in Turkish banking sector assets declined by onethird to 28% in the last 5 years; while share of credits to private sector more than doubled and reached to 49% during the same period. The credits extended to the small and medium enterprises by Turkish banking sector have also increased significantly to USD 95 billion as of 2007. This corresponded to almost 20% of the GDP. As a further note, 32% of these credits were in the category of credits extended to micro enterprises.
The personal independence of members of the ECB’s decisionmaking bodies is also unaffected, as they remain protected from arbitrary dismissal under the Treaty irrespective of the tasks they are exercising. Is the principle of independence under Article 130 of the Treaty applicable to the ECB in its macroprudential role? The last question I would like to analyse is whether the principle of independence under the Treaty is also applicable to the ECB’s role in macroprudential supervision. As a general principle, macroprudential competence lies at the national level. This is a reflection of the principle of conferral that governs the division of powers between the European Union and the Member States. According to that principle, the Union should act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. [50] Where a competence is not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties, it remains with the Member States. [51]  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  The primacy of national competence in the field of macroprudential policy is clarified in Article 127(5) of the Treaty, which states that “the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the financial system”. This implies that, in general, the Eurosystem has only a contributory role to the formulation of macroprudential policies.

Moreover, the President of the Council and Members of the Commission may participate, without voting  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  rights, in the meetings of the Governing Council (Article 284(1) TFEU) and the President of the Council may submit a motion for deliberation to the Governing Council (Article 284(1) TFEU). With regard to questions from Members of the European Parliament, it is interesting to note that during the 2004-2009 parliamentary term, 62 letters with questions from Members of the European Parliament were received. The number of letters more than doubled during the 2009-2014 term to 128 letters. In the current parliamentary term so far, between 2014 and March 2017, some 383 letters have already been received, of which 317 addressed to the President of the ECB and 66 to the Chair of the Supervisory Board. [22]Decision of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2004 on public access to European Central Bank documents, OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p.42, as amended. [23]Article 127(6) TFEU prescribes that specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions may be conferred on the ECB by the Council by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure. Article 1 of the SSM Regulation states “this Regulation confers on the ECB specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions”. [24]See para. 75 of the judgment in the OMT case. [25]See Article 4(3) of the SSM Regulation.
Let me go over quickly these points: In order to fulfill this inadequate access to financial services by under-served consumers, the Bank of Thailand initiated a pilot project on micro finance in collaboration with commercial banks. Against misconception that micro finance is an unprofitable segment, this project aims to demonstrate that the coexistence of profitability and satisfied customers is possible with a right business model. Late last year, we invited foreign speakers to share with senior management of Thai commercial banks their experience in successful conduct of retail business in their countries. Following this seminar, a number of banks already expressed their interests to participate in this pilot project. One social aspect that has clear benefits to all parties concerned is consumer education. It has two major dimensions, one on the cultivation of responsible use of credits and the other the introduction of new financial products and channels of distribution. While the former can improve the overall risk profile of financial institutions’ retail portfolio, and thus lower the lending rates, the latter can potentially stimulate more demands and lower the cost of service provision. It is therefore the responsibility of lending institutions to convey clearly the message of ‘no free lunch’. In other words, prudent lenders must ensure that borrowers are fully aware of the financial obligation of their debt burdens and legal consequence of default. Failure of either party could tarnish the healthy usage of retail credit.

If the risk of significant damage to growth from these financial market pressures is attenuated and if global growth remains strong and drives a continuing rise in energy and commodity prices, then inflation may not moderate as much as we anticipate. If the medium term outlook for inflation deteriorates significantly, the FOMC will move with appropriate speed and force to address this risk. This requires a fine balance. The principal challenge for policy is to provide an adequate degree of insurance against the downside risks that still confront the economy as a whole, without adding to concerns about inflation over the medium term. We cannot know with confidence today what level of the short-term real funds rate will be consistent with our objectives of sustainable growth and low inflation, but if turbulent financial conditions and the associated downside risks to growth persist, monetary policy may have to remain accommodative for some time. Liquidity provision Although concerns about credit quality are at the root of the current problems in financial markets, a substantial impairment in market liquidity conditions can exacerbate and prolong the adjustment in credit conditions. To mitigate this risk, we have taken a series of actions to help reduce the risk that market liquidity conditions exacerbate the adjustment process in credit markets.
In addition, an upswing is likely to be held back by product and labour market rigidities. BIS Review 19/2002  1  So all in all, it is hard to see how the coming economic upswing can be as rapid as earlier recoveries. But the world economic picture is now appreciably brighter than last autumn and the outlines of an upturn are becoming increasingly clear. Inflation in Sweden is high If the picture we present in the Inflation Report holds good, the present cyclical dip in the Swedish economy will turn out to have been the mildest for over thirty years. GDP growth was admittedly subdued in 2001 but the figures from Statistics Sweden do not show any negative rates. Neither has the labour market deteriorated as much as usual. Nor have any serious imbalances arisen. So thus far there is reason to be positive about the economic situation; most leading indicators point to an economic recovery, with an upturn in activity during 2002. There is, however, the problem that inflation has for a time been clearly above the Riksbank’s 2 per cent target. To a certain extent the comparatively high inflation can be explained by various supply shocks that have raised the prices of electricity, meat, fruit and vegetables, for instance. The background to these shocks includes the previous winter’s low precipitation for hydroelectric power, livestock diseases and poor harvests due to last autumn’s unusually cold weather in Europe.

Since last May, the risk of higher domestic inflation has been weighted into our decisions. Whereas the  BIS Review 19/2002  3  Swedish repo rate at the beginning of last year was lower than its counterparts in the euro area and the United States, it is now higher. Looking ahead, we have as usual not committed ourselves. What we do or refrain from doing with the repo rate will depend on the new information that becomes available and on how we assess and analyse it. What happened last year is a good illustration of the appropriateness of this approach. Neither positive nor negative surprises can be ruled out. We have to be ready to cope with that. That said, we have inflation that is relatively high, even though we count on it becoming a good deal lower in the coming six months. Resource utilisation is probably relatively high, too. The path of the interest rate will then depend – as long as inflation expectations remain in place – on how economic activity develops. If activity continues to strengthen as expected and there is no reason to reappraise the economy’s inflation propensity, it is reasonable to assume that the repo rate in Sweden will be adjusted successively upwards. This does not come as a surprise to participants in financial markets.
But I hope that increasingly there will be other things as well as regulation to talk about. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

We have seen an almost unprecedented series of such disturbances – unprecedented certainly in modern times. I am going to pick out four which have been at work in the last two and a half years and discuss them in broadly chronological order. I will start with the onset of Covid over two years ago now and its subsequent waves. It is worth briefly recalling the precipitous drop in economic activity at that time, and the speculation that it would be the largest drop in three hundred years. In the end it was very big, but not quite that big. It required a very large response from macroeconomic policy. Monetary and fiscal policy both acted to counter the cyclical downturn, reinforcing one another even as they were implemented independently. Moreover, the response had to be sustained because of the sheer scale of the uncertainty around the impact of further waves of Covid. It is worth recalling that the key aim of policy was to support businesses and households through the crisis, limiting lasting damage to the economy – which could have been compromised by a premature withdrawal of stimulus. Without that policy support, the economy today would be in a much worse position. Moreover, policy is necessarily made in real time, not in hindsight. Remember that we started with no functioning vaccine and the previous average time to implement one for viruses of this nature was 10 years. The second disturbance came with the recovery from Covid.
Conclusion In closing, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Islamic Financial Services Board for commissioning the "Surveys on Legal and Shariah Issues in the Islamic Financial Services Industry". The survey findings represent an important contribution towards augmenting the literature on the  2  BIS Review 35/2007  existing legal and Shariah framework across different jurisdictions. It serves as a useful source of reference for countries that are interested in establishing a legal and Shariah framework for their Islamic financial system. Deliberation on the survey results and the exchange of views and experiences among lawyers, Shariah scholars and Islamic finance practitioners will be important in contributing to increasing the efficiency in Islamic finance and facilitating its robustness as an integral component in the global financial system. Thank you. BIS Review 35/2007  3

The new concept has so far proven to be very effective in a turbulent environment, enabling the SNB to react to major shocks independently and flexibly. Moreover, it has strengthened confidence in the successful preservation of monetary stability. Compared with the SNB’s last quarterly assessment in March, many indicators now suggest strongerthan-expected growth. However, high commodity prices, rising capital market interest rates and turbulences in the equity and foreign exchange markets may also present new risks. On the whole, we still consider our strategy of gradual normalisation to be appropriate. Should the environment change, however, the SNB will not hesitate to review its monetary stance and adjust it, if necessary. The current cyclical boom should not obscure the fact that the Swiss domestic market still needs further structural reforms to ensure sustained economic growth, thus safeguarding our prosperity and preparing the economy for the demographic challenges ahead. BIS Review 56/2006  1