samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The significant increase in the share of OIC member states in our exports might be, at first sight, attributed only to the economic slowdown in the European Union. However, related figures indicate that the share of OIC members in Turkey’s exports had already increased from 13% to 19% between 2000 and 2007 before the start of the global financial crisis. Besides, visa exemptions probably played an important role in the recent improvement in Turkey’s trade with the region’s countries. Distinguished Guests, Regional collaborations have made a significant contribution to the increase in the volume of intra-emerging markets trade. Although tradable products can be transported to markets of any distance owing to advancements in transportation infrastructure and technology worldwide, distance is no less important than it was previously. Due to increased competition among countries, factors such as distance and transportation costs continued to be among the leading determinants of competitiveness. Various academic studies also confirm that the distance elasticity of trade is on the rise. As it is known, complementary value added chains have been formed particularly among Asian countries, and having benefited from the proximity of neighbor countries and their individual advantages in different fields, these countries have experienced a high-speed development process through regional cooperation, where low-costs-for-all have boosted the competitiveness of all economies in the region.

Although the decoupling of countries seems highly difficult in a global environment where all countries get increasingly interpenetrated via capital flows and financial integration, it is a fact that developing countries have ended up in a much better position in the recent global crisis in comparison to their economic performance in the past crises. It would not be wrong to assert that the main reasons underlying this transformation are the increased commercial, financial and economic relationships among developing countries, accompanied  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  by strong economic and institutional governance practices formulated in view of lessons learnt from past crises. The increase in the volume of trade among developing countries has reduced the adverse effects of the weak course of external demand from advanced economies. Therefore, production and employment levels in developing countries have assumed a more rapid pace of recovery. At this point, by using Turkey’s export data, I would like to exemplify the importance of diversification of export markets driven by improving relations with countries in the region. As it is known, the European Union countries have the largest share in Turkey’s exports. Nevertheless, the share of member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Turkey’s exports is rapidly growing. During the period between end-2000 and end2010, while the share of the European Union countries in total exports of Turkey declined from 56% to 46%, that of OIC member states rose from 13% to 29%.
But what was surprising was the very different states of readiness for dealing with the transition and associated risks demonstrated by the plans submitted. Supervisors will be working closely with firms on this. iii. More generally, I only see the level of supervisory engagement on this topic intensifying to make sure firms are ready for end 2021. The response to the Dear CEO letter provides a basis for this engagement to continue. As well as publishing thematic findings, we are following up with each firm individually through the supervisory dialogue. Having senior focus on achieving an orderly transition is necessary. It is firms’ boards which will allocate the resources needed to get through the work. While we appreciate there are a number of other large projects that firms are currently dealing with, transition from Libor is an issue that needs engagement from the most senior executives and committees in firms. As such I was pleased to host the first meeting of a new Sterling Senior Advisory Group this morning. Tushar will speak about this group more, but it is the engagement of such senior leaders that will enable us – the authorities and industry – to work through the complex issues and make positive progress. The Bank is committed to this transition being orderly and managed. Ultimately transition needs to be market led, but will be enabled with the continued coordination and collaboration between the public and private sector.

The financial inclusion mandate of the Bank is further reinforced by The Financial Sector Blueprint 2011–2020, which charts the future development of the Malaysian financial system. It details the Bank’s holistic approach toward achieving greater financial inclusion. An important evolution in the advancement of our financial inclusion strategies is the increasing focus on data and measurement. Success can only be celebrated if it is proven by visible developments that is felt on the ground. Hence, one of the cornerstone recommendations under the Financial Sector Blueprint is the development of a Financial Inclusion Index, a framework to measure accessibility to financial services as well as its  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  usage and quality. Our performance on this agenda has therefore been measured, consistent with our drive for accountability and excellence. Further policy initiatives have included the introduction of agent banking which has enabled 99% of Malaysians today to enjoy convenient access to safe, reliable and affordable financial services. International efforts to enhance financial inclusion measurement Internationally, there is an emerging common understanding that measurement is an essential policy tool for implementation. In this regard, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, a network of central banks and financial regulators from 96 countries, has provided an important platform in advancing the global agenda of financial inclusion measurement. With the Sasana Accord, which was agreed upon in 2013 during the Global Policy Forum held here in Sasana Kijang, AFI members underscored the importance of measuring the progress of financial inclusion using a common set of measurable indicators.
Though the latest Budget and OSR plans imply a somewhat bigger fall in the public spending share of GDP than in the mid-1990s, this is offset by a smaller rise in the tax burden. Taking tax and spending together, the projected impact is broadly similar. Public borrowing fell by over 8 percentage points of GDP between 1993/4 and 1998/9, compared with a 9 percentage point fall projected over the next five years in the coalition government 2010 Budget. 10 It is also important to recognise the profile for total public spending conceals significant variations between different areas of spending. But the overall total is not being cut back as dramatically as some of the media headlines suggest. The broadest measure of public spending – Total Managed Expenditure – is still set to rise in cash terms at 1.5% per annum over the four years to 2014/15, not far below the targeted inflation rate of 2%. The profile for real spending in future years is not dissimilar to the mid-1990s when there was also a virtual standstill in the real growth of spending. In the 1990s, the public spending squeeze was also accompanied by a significant reduction in employment in the public sector, not dissimilar to the figures currently projected by the Office of Budget Responsibility. Despite this, unemployment fell in the 1990s from over 10% of the labour force to around 5% later in the decade because the private sector generated many more jobs than were lost in the public sector.

However, the political and economic progress made over the last two decades, as well as some of Northern Ireland’s traditional economic strengths – a high-quality education system, a close-knit business community and a strong manufacturing tradition – should provide grounds for encouragement about recovery prospects, despite these challenges. Here in Northern Ireland, and throughout the rest of the UK, it is the strength and vitality of business which will determine how well the economy recovers from recession. After a period in which the public sector has played an important role in helping to support demand in the aftermath of the financial crisis, government spending now needs to be restrained to put public finances on a sounder footing. Against that background, the key challenge now facing the UK economy is to ensure that the private sector and the nation’s business community  1  Average annual growth of Gross Value Added in real terms in Northern Ireland in the years 1990 to 2007 averaged 3.0%, compared with 2.4% in the UK over the same period. BIS Review 158/2010  1  can be a powerful and sustained engine of job creation and growth as the public sector rebalances. I can think of no better place to discuss this challenge of “getting back to business” than at an event jointly hosted by the CBI, the UK’s leading business organisation – which I am still very proud to have been associated with earlier in my career.
This turn-around from recession was helped initially by the inventory cycle, but it has been underpinned by resilient consumer spending, which itself has been encouraged by the strength of the housing market, offsetting some of the negative wealth effects of lower equity prices. Meanwhile manufacturing output recovered - notably in the semiconductor, computer and communications equipment sectors - and investment appears at least to be no longer contracting. Certainly the macro-economic data are mixed - they almost always are, but on the whole they remain reasonably positive. More fundamentally, the financial system - notably the commercial banking system - has held up well, far better than one might have expected through the slowdown. Market interest rates have fallen where they were pointing higher earlier in the year. And perhaps most importantly, although there has been some deterioration in the labour market, average annual productivity growth has remained strong - at around 2½% since 1995, well above the 1.5% rate averaged over the preceding 20 years. At current growth rates that means there is no inflationary pressure - and both monetary and fiscal policy remain supportive, indeed US monetary policy was eased quite sharply further last week to underpin the expansion. All in all, we - along with many other macro-economic forecasters - expect that after somewhat slower growth in the 4th quarter - US GDP will continue to expand at an annual rate of 3-3½% over the next two years.

Ravi Menon: Budget carefully, borrow responsibly, invest wisely Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Launch of the Tamil Financial Literacy Guide, Singapore, 16 November 2014. *  *  *  Mr Kumaran Barathan, CEO of SINDA Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Value of patience and prudence In the 1960s and 1970s, a psychology professor at Stanford University in the US conducted a study on children’s behaviour.   He offered each child a choice: get a marshmallow immediately or, if they waited a little longer, get two marshmallows.   Some children did not want to wait, or perhaps they had doubts about the professor keeping his word. So, they chose to have their sweet there and then.   Others were more patient and received two marshmallows, as promised. Fast forward 20 years. Follow-up studies were done on the same group of children.   Those children who had chosen to delay getting their marshmallow generally performed better in their lives.   They achieved better test results in school, for example.   And yes, they kept themselves in better shape too! The results have intrigued psychologists, social scientists, and educators ever since. Many more studies are being conducted and more elaborate theories are being proposed to explain them. But maybe our forefathers knew the answer all along: the value of patience and prudence; in other words, delay rewards today so that we can reap greater rewards tomorrow.
Forecasts for Inflation and Output Gap Forecast Range*  Output Gap (Base Scenario)  Uncertainty Band for 2009  End-Year Inflation Targets  12 Control Horizon  10 8 6  Percent  4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 4 2008  1  2  3 2009  4  1  2  3 2010  4  1  2  3 2011  4  1 2012  *Indicates a 70-percent confidence interval for the forecast  To sum up, the sharp weakening in aggregate demand has not only led to faster-thanenvisaged rate cuts, but has also required a downward revision in the medium-term inflation forecasts. The revised forecast suggests that the recent rate cuts have lowered the probability of significantly undershooting the end-year inflation target. However, given the tightness in financial conditions and the absence of clear signs of recovery in the global economy, it may be necessary for monetary policy to maintain an easing bias for a considerable period. It should be emphasized that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in monetary policy stance. Therefore, I would like to repeat once again that  BIS Review 67/2009  17  the assumptions on future policy rates underlying the inflation forecast should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the Central Bank of Turkey. 4.

With the reversal of these effects since the second half of 2008, the downward trend in annual inflation of this group gained pace in this quarter (Figure 3). Meanwhile, the downward trend in the annual rate of increase in food prices is expected to continue in the second quarter as well. Figure 3: Food Prices (Annual Percentage Change) 27 Processed Food  24 21  Unprocessed Food  18 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3  03 08  04 08  05 08  06 08  07 08  08 08  09 08  10 08  11 08  12 08  01 09  02 09  03 09  Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. Esteemed Guests, I would like to further clarify the developments related to services prices as I deem it helpful to focus on them to better understand the significant downturn in the underlying trend of inflation. Services inflation, which had remained relatively elevated in the first three quarters of 2008 due to the second round effects of energy and food prices, has eased considerably since the last quarter of 2008 following the sharp contraction in aggregate demand. The cumulative rate of change in services prices during first three months of 2009 was merely 0.53 percent on lower costs and weaker domestic demand, which is the lowest percentage recorded in the 2003 based CPI index’s history. The slowdown in the growth rate of services prices has spread across all services subgroups (Figure 4).
While the initial ambition was to create a unified area where European banks could operate efficiently, we are still struggling with intra-European borders. The European banking sector remains far too fragmented. In 2019, the market share of the top five US banks was 43% [of domestic consolidated assets], compared with only 23% for the top five in Europe. There are still too many roadblocks to cross-border restructuring: geographical ring-fencing practices prevent groups from managing liquidity and capital efficiently on a consolidated basis. As a result, fewer than ten cross-border M&A deals have been signed since 2014, compared with 180 domestic deals over the same period, a historic low: at present, Banking Union has meant that our banks are actually not more Pan-European. This paradox is intolerable. Why it remains crucial. The creation of the Banking Union itself was a direct response to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and its impact on the bank-sovereign nexus in a context of fragmented supervision. Beyond the need to mitigate any future crisis, the achievement of the Banking Union remains of the utmost importance, for both micro and macro reasons. At the micro level, moving further towards a true single banking market through cross-border restructuring is a matter of strategic autonomy. Genuine Pan-European banking groups could operate more effectively, raise their profitability thanks to scale effects and better face up to foreign competition, especially from the United States.

On this front, Thailand has done remarkably well, registering a substantial increase in net inflow of foreign direct investment in the four years following the crisis despite the overall net capital outflow due to debt repayment within the banking sector. Foreign direct investment (to the non-bank sector) increased from an average around 1.4 billion US dollars during 1992-1996 to 3.4 billion US dollars during 1997-2000. Though much work is required on the corporate sector in the march toward modernization of the Thai economy, the government and the central bank also have vital roles in maintaining stable economic environment and providing the required infrastructures to allow the private sector to drive forward to create wealth and prosperity. Several long-term plans have been made in the past couple years. On the macroeconomic front, the Bank of Thailand has adopted Inflation Targeting as a framework of our monetary policy since May 2000. It may be a little too early to claim our success, but the results thus far have been encouraging. Long-term interest rates of the interpolated 14-year government bonds were reduced from 8.3 percent at the beginning of 2000 to currently at 6.1 percent. Inflation remained subdued and will stay within the target range during the next two years. The maturity of state enterprise debentures offered in the market increased from a maximum of 7-year in 1998 up to 20 years in 2000, reflecting greater confidence on the long-term economic stability.
Mr. Bäckström gives a broadbrush picture of the Swedish economy and monetary policy Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Urban Bäckström, held at seminars before the Midland Bank and Merrill Lynch, respectively, in New York on 30/4/97. Economic developments in recent years In the past few years Swedish economic policy has achieved tangible results. •  By an improvement in credibility, important progress has been made towards greater economic stability. Favourable economic growth in Sweden has been combined with a rate of inflation that is the lowest for several decades. •  There is broad political agreement in Sweden on the consolidation of government finance. This is manifested in the so called convergence programme that aims to eliminate the budget deficit not later than 1998. The budget reinforcements which the Government and the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) have undertaken in recent years are extensive. The six-monthly monitoring arrangement provides a means of ensuring that government finance is developing as planned. Moreover, in the Economic Bill this spring the Government states that the long-term target for the general Government budget is a surplus of 2 per cent of GDP as a cyclical average. The gradual adjustment to this goal is also specified. The general government financial balance has been strengthened from 12.3 per cent of GDP in 1993 to -2.5 per cent in 1996. This is a substantial improvement.

Experience from other countries, where the policy realignment had already been made in the early 1980s, indicates that the creation of confidence in a low inflation regime takes time and a lot of hard work. But it also shows that after a while, such a process does yield its reward in the form of low interest rates, a stable currency and ultimately a favourable economic development. The price stability target Following the move to a flexible exchange rate, monetary policy in Sweden is directed at a quantified inflation target. In this it resembles the situation for monetary policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, where inflation targets are also used. In Sweden the target is formulated as being to limit the increase in the consumer price index to 2 per cent. This target is to be assessed, not in terms of isolated twelve-month change figures but in a somewhat longer, annual, perspective. As monetary policy obviously cannot control price developments exactly, the target is accompanied by a tolerance interval of ±1 percentage point. This tolerance interval also serves to absorb temporary deviations from trend inflation. Such deviations may arise, for instance, from political decisions to alter indirect taxes and subsidies, changes in interest rates as well as from international price shocks. For March 1997 the consumer price index showed a twelve-month fall of 0.4 per cent. However, this figure was to a large extent influenced by last year’s sharp repo rate cuts.
Our calculations also indicate that households with debts on average have a relatively good safety margin for interest rate rises and reductions in income. We therefore do not at present envisage any major problems for the household sector as a whole, even if interest rates rise significantly. However, this does not mean that problems will not arise for individual households in the case of higher interest rates. It is important that borrowers include rising interest rate expenditure in their calculations and carefully consider what level of indebtedness they can manage when interest rates sooner or later begin to rise. For this reason, we have emphasised in connection with our monetary policy decisions over the past six months that interest rates are at present low in a historical perspective and will need to be raised in the long run. With regard to house prices, the calculations we have made so far do not indicate that prices for housing in the country as a whole are substantially unbalanced. The developments can be explained fairly well by factors such as disposable income, living costs, construction costs and the fact that there is relatively little new building, despite strong demand. Supply is expected to increase at a slightly slower rate than demand over the coming years. My assessment is that at present no imbalances have been built up that could risk leading to a sharp fall in prices further ahead. However, the rapid increase in house prices and indebtedness occurring now is something we shall monitor closely.

That's the way it goes: Times of crisis permit dramatic and rapid changes that would not be implementable, or even thinkable, under normal circumstances. But when the dust settles, it is very difficult to reverse them. All thinking people in the financial sector should want to ensure that the rash solutions adopted in the present bad times, many of which will do little or no good anyway, do not in the long run generate much worse times for the industry, and hence its clients. Putting out a fire is one thing. But improving the fire regulations is quite another. Certainly a large fire can provide inspiration for future fire prevention. But it is by no means wise to fight the fire while simultaneously changing in haste all the fire regulations. The risks of such an approach are considerable, especially if the public – as well as part of the industry itself – increasingly accepts the dogma that the financial sector provides quasipublic or even purely public goods and services. I'm sure that a thoughtful discussion about the causes of the crisis and ways how to prevent them in the future would require much more time, cool-headedness and, above all, more input from academics and trained professionals and less from politicians and European bureaucrats. Maybe I'm a bit skeptical. But I have a very vivid imagination influenced also by the tragic excommunist and state interventionist experience of the Czech Republic. And my imagination allows me to foresee some extreme scenarios.