The executive body consists of three members with equal rights who jointly carry out the tasks defined in article 46 of the National Bank Act and bear joint responsibility for them. First and foremost, the law describes these tasks as conceptional and operational monetary policy decisions. The Chairman does not have any special powers. Consequently, responsibility is shared. Transparency and accountability are crucial, particularly in times of crisis, when the information needs of the general public and financial markets, as well as other authorities, are increasing exponentially. We have responded to this need. For instance, information on central bank balance sheet items and SNB Bills has been stepped up, and our news conferences can now be watched on our website. During the course of the crisis, in particular, at the time of the measures to strengthen the Swiss financial system in October 2008, the number of appearances of Governing Board members before parliamentary commissions increased significantly.8 I would like to hazard a guess that the SNB has never been as transparent as it is today. In this respect, it also stands up well to international comparison. 7  This is also laid down in the Message on the revision of the National Bank Act with regard to art. 7 para. 1 NBA (6191), “The SNB’s decision-making autonomy must be retained because its accountability would otherwise inevitably come into conflict with its authority to act independently of instructions (under art. 6).” Consequently, the SNB bears “sole responsibility for the mandates described in art.

3  Cf., for instance, Ricardo, David (1824), Plan for the Establishment of a National Bank; Hayek, Friedrich A. von (1971), Verfassung der Freiheit, pp 440–41, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck (4th edition 2005); Barro, Robert J. and Gordon, David B. (1983), A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (August), pp 589–610; Cukierman, Alex, Webb, Steven B. and Neyapti, Bilin (1992), Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes, World Bank Economic Review, 6 pp 353–398; Alesina, Alberto und Summers, Lawrence H. (1993), Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25 (May), pp 151–162. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  authorities, in other words, the Swiss sovereign power. Our independence comprises several dimensions – function, institution, finances and staff.4 I make a point of repeating the fact that we must fulfil our mandate without seeking or accepting instructions either from the Federal Council or from the Federal Assembly or any other body. The SNB is institutionally independent because it is a legal entity in its own right. It has the legal status of a special-statute joint-stock company. The financial dimension of independence comprises, on the one hand, the prohibition on state financing. Under article 11 of the National Bank Act, we are not permitted to grant the Confederation any loans. Neither are we allowed to acquire government bonds from new issues. These provisions are a strong defence against fiscal policy being bankrolled by the central bank.