samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indeed the repercussions from their impending exit from these measures may be even more significant. Therein lies the importance for emerging and developing economies to strengthen our economic and financial foundations, reduce our risks and vulnerabilities and spur a balanced and inclusive growth. The events since the eruption of the global financial crisis have also altered our view of the world in a number of other fundamental ways. Global reforms in the financial system are re-shaping the regulatory landscape. The lines that define financial intermediation activities, and which connect the financial system to other parts of the economy and other parts of the world, are also being re-drawn. In this environment, emerging and developing economies need to be engaged to ensure that unintended consequences on our financial systems and consequently on our economies are minimised. A key concern in this environment is thus the strengthening of the protection of segments of society, in particular, small businesses and households, from being marginalised by market forces, and from the disproportionate impact of instability, crises and reforms. Related to this is the need to reinforce socially responsible finance, and to ensure that financial systems serves the real economy and to address the new and growing risks of financial exclusion which can result in part of our community to be disenfranchised, particularly, but certainly not only, during periods of financial crises. In this environment, financial inclusion has gained greater prominence as a key priority for the reform and development agenda.

In current conditions of uncertainty, investors – reading our rate guidance – tend to anticipate a more extended period of time to the date of a rate hike. By the chained structure of our forward indications of all instruments, this automatic adjustment mechanism extends the horizons for full reinvestments too, and thus reinforces the impact of rate guidance on longer-term interest rates. Moreover, our new series of long-term refinancing operations (TLTRO-III), which started in September 2019 and will end in March 2021, help to ensure favourable bank funding conditions in support of an efficient bank-based transmission of monetary policy in the euro area. The combination of our monetary policy measures continues to prove effective in stabilising the economy and in ensuring very favourable financing conditions. This is evident in the successful pass-through of our policy measures to financing conditions that matter for the real economy. In fact, bank lending rates for both firms and households have continued to decline in the recent months and remain close to historical lows. Loan growth to non-financial corporations, while moderating in tandem with the slowdown in the economy, is still supporting capital creation and the mortgage market. Our recent Bank Lending Survey confirms that credit supply conditions are favourable. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Overall, the present monetary policy stimulus lends substantial support to growth and inflation developments, buffering to a large degree the negative impulse from global factors.
The rise in the consumer price index adjusted for taxes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) is projected to moderate, approaching 1¾ per cent next summer. At the end of 2004, inflation is projected at 2½ per cent. The projections for inflation have been revised downwards from the June Inflation Report, as a result of a higher interest rate and a stronger krone. The projections for growth among trading partners have been revised down. We have assumed higher oil prices in light of recent developments. Against this background, the uncertainty surrounding oil prices and global growth is considered to be balanced. Production and demand growth in Norway are projected to be lower and unemployment higher than in the June Inflation Report. We consider the uncertainty surrounding the projections for the Norwegian economy to be balanced. Interest rates were left unchanged at Norges Bank's Executive Board meeting on 30 October. The sight deposit rate therefore remains at 7 per cent. According to Norges Bank's assessment, with an unchanged interest rate, the probability that inflation two years ahead would be higher than 2½ per cent was the same as the probability that it would be lower. BIS Review 65/2002  3  A time horizon of two years when setting interest rates allows monetary policy to contribute to stabilising production. This horizon prevents monetary policy in itself from causing unnecessary fluctuations in the economy. Alternatively, we could have sought to sustain the level of inflation at 2½ per cent six months to a year ahead.

The table shows the economic outlook as assessed by the Executive Board prior to the interest rate decision 15 days ago. The figures and conclusions are from the Inflation Report that was presented on the same day as the interest rate decision. Norges Bank projects strong growth in private consumption, while real growth in general government consumption will probably decline. This partly reflects high wage growth in the public sector, which swallows up a large share of government budget allocations. Mainland investment is exhibiting sluggish growth, while petroleum investment is expected to be high next year. Mainland GDP growth will pick up through the projection period, averaging 2¼ per cent in 2004. It appears that this year's wage settlement will result in the highest real wage growth in this generation. The results of this year's wage settlement suggest that the social partners considered the labour market to be very tight this spring. Wage growth will remain high for the next two years and contribute to robust growth in household real income. The inflation outlook for the next two years is marked by two opposing forces. High wage and cost inflation will on the one hand sustain high prices for Norwegian produced goods and services. On the other hand, the pass-through from the appreciation of the krone will result in a temporary fall in prices for imported goods. If the krone remains at the level of the past few months, the effect of the appreciation of the krone will be greatest towards the middle of 2003.
13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13  The weakness in investment has weighed on growth in the potential supply capacity of the UK economy, through lower growth in the capital stock and reduced process innovation. Brexit-related uncertainties may have dissuaded companies from expanding supply capacity or entering new markets. And companies have spent considerable time and resources planning and preparing for various contingencies, limiting their ability to produce output and take strategic decisions that would boost innovation and productivity. 15 The MPC has repeatedly emphasised that monetary policy cannot prevent either the necessary real adjustment as the UK moves to its new trading arrangements or the weaker real income growth likely to accompany that adjustment. Monetary policy does, however, have a role to play in supporting the economy during the adjustment process. The balance of Brexit’s effects on demand, supply and the exchange rate meant the MPC faced a trade-off between the degree of support it provided to jobs and activity on the one hand and how fast it would return inflation sustainably to the target on the other. Once again it was in a unique position relative to other major central banks, which were in positions of “divine coincidence” in which both output gap and inflation rate pointed the policy stance in the same direction (Charts 9a and 9b).

Much hinges on the speed with which domestic confidence returns. As is entirely appropriate, there is a debate at the MPC over the relative merits of near term stimulus to reinforce the expected recovery in UK growth and inflation. 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  19  On the one hand, there is a modest but rising degree of spare capacity in the UK and core inflation remains subdued. There are downside risks from global growth and the possibility that uncertainties over future trading relationships could remain entrenched. With the relatively limited space to cut Bank Rate, if evidence builds that the weakness in activity could persist, risk management considerations would favour a relatively prompt response. On the other hand, global growth is showing tentative signs of stabilising. The global manufacturing PMI has returned to expansionary territory, helping push the composite to a six month high in December. Past global monetary policy stimulus is gaining traction and global financial conditions are supportive. Early indicators, from financial market prices and the limited number of business surveys since the election, suggest that there has been some reduction in Brexit-related and domestic policy uncertainties. The labour market remains tight and domestically generated inflation remains generally firm. And total monetary policy space is larger than conventional measures would suggest. In the coming weeks, the MPC will watch closely surveys of business and consumer confidence (including intelligence from our Agents) as well as global developments. We will also undertake our annual supply stocktake.
Swedish economy is continuing to perform strongly According to the preliminary version of the National Accounts, GDP grew by 3.0 per cent during the second quarter compared with the same quarter last year, see Figure 7, which was more than both the market and we had expected. Despite GDP growth being a little stronger than expected, both consumption and investment were slightly weaker, which was counteracted by unexpectedly weak imports. The number of hours worked developed roughly as expected, which means that labour productivity was stronger than we assumed in the July Monetary Policy Report. During the summer (June and July) unemployment has become lower than we predicted, at the same time as the labour force and employment showed weaker development than expected. However, the labour market surveys statistics are particularly uncertain during the summer months, which makes it difficult to draw any definite conclusions. Further outcomes are needed to be able to determine whether the earlier positive development in employment and the labour force has really been subdued. Our forward-looking indicators regarding demand for labour on the whole point to the labour market continuing to improve in the coming period. The number of redundancies is still low and newly-registered vacancies at the Swedish employment service are at a high level. Employment plans in the National Institute of Economic Research’s Business Tendency Survey rose somewhat in July, after having fallen earlier in the year, and indicate rising employment in the business sector.

Low interest rates entail risks Increasing debt levels and rising housing prices The low interest rates contribute to household debt as a percentage of disposable income continuing to increase and to housing prices continuing to rise. This creates risks that can threaten future economic developments. If there were to be an economic slowdown for any reason, this could be significantly strengthened when indebted households are forced to cut back on consumption and other expenditure, particularly if housing prices were also to fall in connection with this. It is therefore important that household debts do not continue to increase. Their debts have increased more than their disposable incomes since the middle of the 1990s and the debt ratio is now at just over 170 per cent, which is a record-high level, see Figure 13. As can be seen in Figure 14, housing prices, and especially prices of tenant-owned apartments, have risen sharply in the past ten years. Prices of tenant-owned apartments have more than doubled since 2005. We can also see that prices of tenant-owned apartments have increased substantially in relation to the consumer price index in the past ten years, but even in relation to disposable income the increase is significant. This development indicates that there are structural problems in the Swedish housing market. The fact that the rental market functions poorly is a problem. Another problem is that too little housing is being built.
Greater substitutability between money and bonds – something which might be seen as symptomatic of ‘well-functioning markets’ where financial frictions are modest – will reduce the overall impact of QT since less capital gain is required to sustain the higher holdings of bonds after implementation, but implies that a larger proportion of QT’s overall impact on asset prices occurs upon announcement rather than implementation. I appreciate that this description of the model’s intuition is a little hard to digest. So let me simply draw out three positive implications of the modelling exercise. First, the exercise is consistent with the view – already embodied in the Bank survey paper that I mentioned – that the impact of QT (or QE) works via its impact on asset prices. Crucially, asset price developments – at least for core assets such as gilts – are observable in real time on open markets. Although the mechanisms at play in this interpretation of QT are fundamentally derived from monetary quantities and portfolio behaviour, they find practical expression in the market yields and spreads on which monetary policy decisions are normally conditioned. Second, the exercise sheds light on the issue of whether QT (or QE) works mainly through its impact on the stock of assets held at the central bank or via the flow of purchases made by the central bank.

For each wage adjustment episode in a country, the data sample starts at year T0 (the peak year) and it ends when a new peak is detected (at year T0 new – 1). We apply this only if the cumulative real wage gap has been closed before reaching the new peak. If the cumulative wage gap has not been closed, then we continue to consider the new peak as part of the same adjustment episode. A wage adjustment episode within a larger wage adjustment episode is not considered. This approach prevents data overlapping and it secures research consistency and integrity. In the analysed period, there were three historical episodes of wage adjustments. Data shows that the cumulative real wage gap was closed in all countries which experienced the first wage adjustment episode, with the exception of two countries (Japan and Korea). In the case of the second wage adjustment episode, the cumulative real wage gap has not yet been closed, with the exception of other two countries (Mexico and Latvia). These latter two countries entered a new wage adjustment episode, the third one. For simplicity reasons, the wage adjustment episodes are numbered with reference to the time periods and not to the country-specific episodes. We considered as the first wage adjustment 5  episode any episode which started in the last decade of last century (1990-1999) and the second wage adjustment episode any episode which started after the year 2000.
There was a time back in history when it could have been claimed with some justification that HSBC, as it is now known, which then served as clearing bank to the banking system, wielded considerable influence over monetary conditions, but that capability was dismantled progressively, by the requirement introduced in 1988 for HSBC to hold a countervailing balance with the Exchange Fund, by the creation of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in 1993, and by HKMA's subsequent assumption, in 1996, via the Exchange Fund, of the role of settlement institution for the local payments system. Government and Monetary Authority So, having dismissed the possible involvement of a number of other players, we are left with the clear conclusion that it is in essence the Hong Kong government which determines monetary policy. More specifically, the authority rests in the first instance with the Financial Secretary, since the Exchange Fund Ordinance places him in control of the Exchange Fund, which in effect provides the resources for  1  For a discussion, in lighter vein, of the relationship between HKMA and other central banks, including PBoC, see the Viewpoint article "Central Bank Cooperation", 8 November 2001, at www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/viewpt. BIS Review 31/2002  1  the conduct of monetary policy. He is, however, obliged to consult the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee in the exercise of his control of the Exchange Fund.

I am also pleased that Stanbic fulfilled the new capital requirements well ahead of the time set for the exercise. Before the end of May 2012 Stanbic had fully met the capital increase requirement well ahead of the deadline of 31st December 2012. We are confident that the measures taken collectively by the Bank of Zambia and commercial banks will provide enhanced scope for more financing at lower cost thereby facilitating further growth of the economy and the SME sector in particular. Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me take this opportunity to appeal to all SMEs and individuals that obtain financing from financial institutions to be responsible borrowers by ensuring that these loans are paid back as the failure to settle obligations destabilises the banking sector and leads to increased cost of borrowing. As you all are aware, banks play a crucial role in financial intermediation and this is enhanced by branch network expansion programs. Thus, there is need for all financial sector players including MSMEs to play their role in augmenting savings mobilization which will in-turn provide the necessary financing to the productive sectors in the economy. In concluding, I would like to encourage banks to seek various ways of supporting the SMEs not only in Soweto Market but in other underserved places throughout the country. For instance Buseko Market in Lusaka and Chisokone Market in Kitwe would offer huge opportunities for banks and other financial players.
10 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches

The Swiss export industry is understandably especially keen to see that the franc is not exposed to any further revaluations against the euro. Sudden and precipitous adjustments to the exchange rates are also undesirable from a monetary policy perspective. The unrelenting rise in oil prices surprised many market analysts. Since the beginning of 2004, the dollar price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil has climbed by more than 50%. In real terms, however, the ascent was not nearly as sharp as in earlier oil price shocks. In Europe, the hike was further cushioned by the erosion of the dollar. The reasons behind the bullish oil prices are manifold. The main trigger, however, is likely to have been the structural increase in demand coming from the emerging economies, particularly from China and India. In addition, supply flexibility is currently quite weak, as investment spending in the drilling, transportation and storage of oil was somewhat neglected in the years when oil prices were low. Potential geopolitical risks also push up the prices. Last but not least, raw materials - such as gold traditionally - are playing an ever greater role in international investors’ asset allocation, which also tends to generate an increase in demand. That notwithstanding, the influence of financial players on the price of oil should not be overestimated. The development of the long-term futures prices of crude oil indicates that the price spike was primarily triggered by a sustained increase in consumer demand.
At the international level, the IAIS work on systemic insurers and the international capital standard (or ICS) has recently made significant strides. As you know, as part of its post-crisis action plan, the IAIS developed in 2013 an identification method for systemic risks, reviewed in 2016. This led to the identification of nine global systemically important insurers, to which specific measures are applied (increased supervision, specific management plans, chiefly for liquidity, recovery and resolution, and a capital add-on measure, currently postponed to 2022). Given the recognised shortcomings of the methodology, including weak factual basis, the FSB asked the IAIS to review it with three key focuses: developing an activities-based approach supplementing the entitybased approach, which itself will be reviewed in order to correct deficiencies. A new framework is hence being developed which will make it possible to reconcile an activitiesbased and an entities-based approach, to better capture relevant risks and systemic undertakings. In the meantime, the list of global systemic insurers will remain frozen for 2019 and could be suspended beyond and until 2022, so that enough experience is gained with the new approach.

This would imply that the taking into account of CSR in management models would result in a certain form of self-regulation, for example with recognised codes of conduct. Different incentives are contributing to this, such as pressure from direct stakeholders and NGOs and regulatory incentives, in particular in terms of reporting. Lastly, I would like to say a few words about the Banque de France. I wish to stress that, as a company, CSR is of great importance. Its current sustainable development strategy combines a two-pronged approach: an Environmental Footprint Reduction Programme and a review of its tasks in the light of sustainable development. In this respect, the Banque de France will, for example, seek to develop the financial culture of the public, spread best practice in the fight against money laundering, encourage economic and financial research in new fields, such as the development of “carbon finance”. I attach great importance to these subjects, and my wish is to see the Banque de France adopt its own sustainable development charter, which formalises its commitments. This should be achieved by the end of this year and will no doubt further enhance the actions of the Banque de France. In the light of this collective awareness of the environmental (finitude and fragility of natural resources), economic and societal implications, central banks perform their task of preserving financial stability while taking into account and anticipating events. This approach, as recent developments have shown, has to be increasingly systemic and co-operative, involving companies, banks, governments and central banks.