samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The euro area suffers from a lack of competitiveness and productivity, which of course take different forms in individual Member States. Structural problems and current weak demand lead to unsatisfactory economic growth and unacceptably high unemployment in many countries. Tackling these challenges in the long term is not the job of monetary policy. Crisis management must tackle the root causes for the long term and we, the ECB, will therefore not tire of reminding governments that we can only provide them time for the urgently needed reforms. Against this backdrop we could ask whether it was appropriate that the ECB took action. I think it was – precisely because of the path of inflation, even if there is room for discussion about the some of the measures and their design. The list of our crisis management measures is long. In June and September this year we lowered key interest rates further. The main refinancing rate is now just 5 basis points. The interest rate channel has thus been exhausted. For the first time in our history we have resorted to a negative deposit rate in an effort to achieve the desired monetary policy accommodation within the tried and tested corridor system. This justified monetary policy step – which favours investment – was not an easy decision for us, not least because of its possible side effects for the financial sector and for savers.

Short-term developments are not key, especially when they are largely determined by energy and food prices. The underlying trend and the firm anchoring of inflation expectations are decisive, as well as the orientation of the euro area as a whole. Low inflation rates in some Member States – even when negative – are not in themselves a breach of the target. They can be necessary to restore lost competitiveness. One could also argue about whether it is really necessary to consider further measures given that the measures already taken have not yet been able to have an effect. Monetary policy does not take effect immediately, but only with a certain time lag. As a rule we should take this time and wait and see. Which measures are we talking about here? The large-scale purchase of securities, including government bonds, is often seen as a panacea. As I said, even for innovative or unconventional measures, the costs and benefits, and the opportunities and risks must be carefully considered. Some central banks have used quantitative easing to quickly and decisively provide monetary policy impetus, adjusted to the specificities of their environment. It is these particular central banks and their measures to which we are compared. For me, these are idle comparisons. The following saying applies here: those who constantly compare themselves with others might become more like them, but they won’t necessarily become any better.
Not only do we have an 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  economy that is growing at an above-trend pace—at a time when the labor market is already quite tight—but the economy will be getting an extra boost in 2018 and 2019 from the recently enacted tax legislation. Moreover, even though the FOMC has raised its target range for the federal funds rate by 125 basis points over the past two years, financial conditions today are easier than when we started to remove monetary policy accommodation. This suggests that the Federal Reserve may have to press harder on the brakes at some point over the next few years. If that happens, the risk of a hard landing will increase. Historically, the Federal Reserve has found it difficult to achieve a soft landing—especially when the unemployment rate has fallen below the rate consistent with stable inflation. In those circumstances, the Federal Reserve has been unable to both push up the unemployment rate slightly to a level that is consistent with stable inflation and avoid recession.8 Now, I don’t want to imply that a recession is inevitable once the FOMC finds it necessary to nudge up the unemployment rate to a sustainable level. The starting point in terms of the inflation rate is also important because it will influence how far the FOMC is likely to go in terms of making monetary policy tight. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that the track record on this score is not encouraging.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Recent economic and financial developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the half-yearly media news conference, Berne, 14 June 2007. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank is raising the target range for the three-month Libor with immediate effect by 0.25 percentage points to 2.00–3.00%. With this move, the National Bank is ensuring that inflation prospects remain favourable. The SNB intends to hold the rate in the middle of the target range for the time being. Switzerland's economy is in excellent shape. Indeed, the economy is developing even better than expected back in March. For 2007, the National Bank now expects real GDP to grow at a rate of close to 2.5%. The healthy economy in the neighbouring countries and exchange rate developments have been contributing factors. Together with a renewed rise in oil prices, this has led to a slight deterioration in inflation prospects – even after today's increase in the interest rate. Assuming that the three-month Libor remains unchanged at 2.50%, the National Bank expects an average annual inflation rate of 0.8% in 2007, 1.5% in 2008, and 1.7% in 2009. Consequently, forecast inflation continues to rise. However, at present there is considerable uncertainty with regard to the assessment of the inflation outlook. On the one hand, structural changes in the economy still have a dampening effect on prices.
The Riksbank therefore began its repo rate increases, but was force to back down when it became clear that the global economy was weaker than anticipated. Moreover, long-term inflation expectations fell. In 2015, the interest rate was cut to –0.5 per cent. The Riksbank also bought a large amount of government bonds to further stimulate economic development. The Riksbank has also reinforced the foreign currency reserves to have a better preparedness to give Swedish banks access to foreign currency in a crisis situation. Both of these measures led to the Riksbank's balance sheet becoming much larger than it was before (see Figure 1). The Riksbank's response to the coronavirus At the beginning of 2020, the world once again suffered a global economic crisis, this time in the form of the repercussions of the coronavirus outbreak. The measures taken to reduce the spread of the virus have had very large economic consequences and created a need for support measures from various authorities. The Riksbank’s role in the initial stage of the crisis has been to ensure that there is no lack of liquidity so that lending can continue and we can conduct an expansionary monetary policy to support the economy. We have therefore taken a large number of measures to reduce the economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. When it becomes clearer how lasting the crisis is likely to be, it may be appropriate to further adjust the expansiveness of our monetary policy.

The argument for raising the inflation target is that this would increase the average scope for monetary policy in future recessions, as the average nominal interest rate is the sum of the real interest rate and inflation. If the real interest rate falls, the inflation target can, in principle, be raised by as much to restore scope. Does it matter to the economy if the inflation target is two or, say, four per cent? Empirical research has certainly identified a relationship between the level of average inflation and growth, but this relationship is quite weak and primarily seems to be relevant when inflation is relatively high. High inflation also seems to coincide with greater variation around the average level. There is thus a certain support for the view that the inflation target should be fairly low. However, the  12 [25]  inflation target’s most important function is to provide the economy with a nominal anchor, for example for wage formation activities to coordinate around. There are practical aspects that must be considered if the inflation target is to be changed. Establishing a new level may require a great deal of work, as it takes time for the participants in the economy to get used to new targets and a change may also lead to the private sector starting to expect further changes of the target later on.
But apart from our interest in the effective transmission of monetary policy, there is a broader reason why central banks wish to see greater integration. At the end of the day, the ultimate objective of a central bank, as of any public policy maker, is to enhance citizen welfare. A number of pieces of empirical evidence reveal that financial integration has a positive effect on economic growth and, therefore, on welfare. The European Commission, London Economics and several researchers have provided us with interesting studies which estimate that a total removal of national barriers in European financial markets would imply a long-term increase in GDP growth of up to one percentage point. There is also evidence for the US, based on analysis of the effects of the removal of restrictions on cross-state bank branching and ownership, which points in the same direction. These two aspects – monetary policy transmission and promoting citizen welfare - explain the efforts that central banks have made to contribute to the integration process, although the leading roles and initiatives rightly correspond to the European Commission and to market forces. Maybe the most telling example of the central bank contribution is the establishment of TARGET, promoted by the Eurosystem and introduced at the beginning of Stage Three with the aim of integrating the system of large value payments across the euro area. It is widely recognised that its success has played a crucial role in the integration of interbank markets in Europe.

In a joint pilot project with FINMA, the SNB is currently identifying the concentrations of risk of Switzerland’s largest two banks in respect of sectors exposed to higher transition risks, i.e. possible implications of future amendments to laws. With regard to our investment policy, in connection with the issue of climate change, we have decided to make an adjustment to our exclusion criteria. Since 2013, we have already been excluding investments in companies that cause severe environmental damage, violate human rights or produce condemned weapons. With these exclusion criteria, we ensure that our investment policy reflects the fundamental and broadly accepted values held in Switzerland. We are now expanding the exclusion criterion pertaining to the environment by additionally taking climate-related issues into consideration. In Switzerland, a broad consensus has formed in recent years in favour of phasing out coal. We have therefore decided that we will from now on exclude all companies primarily active in the mining of coal from our portfolios. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Fritz Zurbrügg. Page 4/4
However, as I have mentioned in the past when referring to public policies in general, the different social and economic transformations that we advocate and support have transitory costs and affect the public at large in different ways. The digitalisation phenomenon in banking is a good example of these adverse and uneven effects. Something that will deliver great benefits for society overall in the medium term may, nevertheless, entail costs and lead to frustration, inconvenience or even exclusion for certain population groups, as a result of the difficulty or inability to adapt to these changes. These are real problems, as the testimonies we have received from many members of the public in recent months show. Some of these individuals are here with us today and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for putting together this information and bringing it to the attention of the authorities. As I say, these problems are real and, as such, require real solutions. The Protocol that the banking sector is presenting here today must, of course, be part of the solution. It provides specific answers for individuals with fewer digital skills or difficulties in accessing these new channels and thus require more support and assistance in the digital transition. Naturally, we will have to analyse the practical implementation and sufficiency of the protocol in the coming months.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Financial sector talent enrichment programme – syllabus enhancement Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the launch of the “Financial Sector Talent Enrichment Programme (FSTEP) – Syllabus Enhancement”, Kuala Lumpur, 20 July 2010. *  *  *  I am delighted to be here this morning to officiate the launching of the Financial Sector Talent Enrichment Programme – Syllabus Enhancement which will be implemented for the next 5 batches until batch 10. Today marks a milestone for FSTEP as the programme has delivered more than 680 graduates to the industry and is now poised to deliver another 500 graduates under an enhanced syllabus. The development of human capital in the financial services industry is core in promoting a well-functioning and stable financial sector. Human capital development is critical in nation building as a whole. At Bank Negara Malaysia, for many years, we have embarked on strategies to strengthen human capital development in the financial services sector. Various institutional platforms were established such as INCEIF, the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance; ICLIF, the International Centre for Leadership in Finance; AIF, the Asian Institute of Finance; and of course, FSTEP, which is entrusted with equipping talents with the right skills and knowledge for their smooth transition into the financial services industry in Malaysia. It is such initiatives that would put the necessary foundation to promote Malaysia as a centre of learning for financial services this region.
All wars are different – in terms of their scale and duration, their location and their impact on the world around them. Instead, we must brush up on our possible knowledge of history and try to see if there are past historical episodes from which we can learn something for the current situation. It is of course also important to study the available literature on the economic consequences of war to see whether it is possible to find common denominators that can give clues regarding the situation that has arisen. What I intend to do today is to first briefly review what research literature has to say about the connection between war and inflation. Then I will look back at previous episodes when war was associated with rising inflation in Sweden and draw some conclusions from this. Finally, I intend to say something about how I view  * I would like to thank Mikael Apel for his work on this speech, Johan Almenberg, Anna Breman, Bul Ekici, Char-  lotta Edler, Rebecka Hallerby, Stefan Ingves, Åsa Olli Segendorf and Anders Vredin for valuable comments and Elizabeth Nilsson for translation. 1 [14]  the current situation from a monetary policy perspective. As usual, it is my personal views that I am expressing. War often leads to inflation The fact that war and inflation often go hand in hand has been known for a very long time.

We have not had any problems with excessive inflation since then, until perhaps now. The problem has usually been the reverse, that is, that inflation has been lower than the target. Some conclusions from the history of inflation So what conclusions can be drawn from this review of Swedish inflation history since 1900? One conclusion, which was also in some way the starting point, is that inflation tends to rise in connection with war, and that this also applies in countries like Sweden, which has been fortunate not to be directly involved in any war during this period. 20 Drechsler et al. (2020) provides an alternative explanation for ‘The Great Inflation’ in the United States, which  is based on the failure of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. A special law, Regulation Q, imposed a ceiling on the banks' deposit rate. When the Fed raised the interest rate to slow down inflation, this ceiling meant that the interest rate changes made no difference for most people. When Regulation Q was lifted at the end of the 1970s, monetary policy once again had an impact and inflation fell. 21 The Economic Commission (1993). 9 [14]  Another conclusion is that the first three inflation peaks in the 1900s were so short-lived that expectations of higher inflation in the longer term were never built into price- and wage formation.
The continued run-down in inventories limited production and resource utilization and therefore curbed the effect of the recent rapid growth on inflation. Moreover, high unemployment rates have continued to suppress domestic demand. Accordingly, aggregate demand conditions have continued to support disinflation. Figure 23: GDP  Figure 22: GDP Growth by Periods  (Seasonally Adjusted, at 1998 Prices,  (Percent)  Billion TL) 27  15 9.4  10  8.4  6.2 5.3  7.2  6.9 4.7  5  2.8 0.9  24 1.0  0  21  -5 -5.7  -6.5  -10  -7.0  18  -15  -14.3  12 34 12 3 41 23 41 23 4 1 2 34 12 34 1 2  Source: TURKSTAT. 2009-2  2009-1  2008-4  2008-3  2008-2  2008  2008-1  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2002  2001  -20  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 2009  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. On the production side, value added fell year-on-year across non-farm sectors. The 3.1 percent value added in services provided the most negative contribution to GDP growth (Figure 24). On the spending side, the adverse impact of private demand on annual GDP growth substantially decreased compared to two preceding quarters. Meanwhile, the unfavorable trend in private investment expenditures continued in the second quarter and private investment became the demand component that made the most negative contribution to GDP growth (Figure 25).

0206 0506 0806  0609  0409  0209  1208  1008  0808  0608  0408  0208  1207  5  Auto Lo an Inflation Report  5 0  1106 0207 0507 0807 1107 0208 0508 0808 1108 0209 0509 0809  Housing Other Consumer Corporate (rhs)  1.2  * Monthly interest rate on consumer loans, yearly interest rates on business loans. Source: CBRT. Source: ISE, CBRT. Against this background, referring to the partial improvements in labor and credit markets, I would like to remind you once more that the Monetary Policy Committee indicated after the October meeting that a slowdown in the pace of rate cuts would be considered at the next meeting depending on economic data and developments. However, it was also noted that lingering problems across the global economy were still a concern and that uncertainties regarding the strength of the recovery remain. Taking these factors into account, I should reiterate that it would be necessary for monetary policy to maintain an easing bias for a long period of time. 3. Inflation and monetary policy outlook  Distinguished Members of the Press and Esteemed Guests, After summarizing inflation and monetary policy developments in the third quarter of 2009, in this part of my speech, I would like to share with you the evaluation of the inflation outlook and monetary policy of the Central Bank of Turkey in the upcoming period. Firstly, I will briefly describe the economic framework underlying these forecasts.
starting at end-2007 and during the whole of 2008, being concerned first of all because of the growing inflation but also of the growing deficit of our economy to the rest of the world, we undertook a number of measures for tightening the monetary policy. However, in the meantime, the world crisis has deepened. In the fourth quarter of 2008 it started delivering to us high „paying invoices”. The demand as well as the prices for our main export products dropped dramatically . This continues even stronger in the first quarter of the this year. At the same time domestic aggregate demand (stimulated by the wage and pension growth, higher budget consumption and the high credit growth) was not appropriately and timely accommodated in accordance with the foundations of the economy. The trade as well as the current account deficit were growing, without being followed by the appropriate inflows in both, the capital and the financial account in the balance of payment. Practically, imbalances and pressures on the foreign exchange market were growing and so continue to grow thus being increased by the not that seldom carelessness or by, I even don’t exactly know what, other reasons, in creating numerous well founded negative expectations related to the foreign exchange rate stability.

Petar Goshev: Macedonia’s prudent monetary and fiscal policy Speech by Mr Petar Goshev, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the press conference, Skopje, 26 March 2009. *  *  *  I. For longer than one decade now, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia has been successfully implementing the strategy of retaining the stable foreign exchange rate of the denar, through a successful mix of prudent monetary and fiscal policy. The choice for this strategy is not incidental. Macedonia is a small, fully open economy and extremely import-export dependant and unfortunately highly euroized country. Historically, it had suffered high inflationary as well as hiperinflationary schocks, which are deeply curved in people’s memory. For such characteristics of the economy and with such negative experiences, the stable foreign exchange rate of the denar has a tremendous importance for the price stability and for the positive expectations of the economic agents related to macroeconomic environment. Since none of the stated characteristics of our economy has not been changed, we in the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia deeply believe that following up with the existing monetary strategy – keeping the stable exchange rate of the denar, as the main anchor in the economy – should continue. This means, i.e. let me repeat once again, that we continue to defend the stability of the foreign exchange rate with all instruments and measures available as of the monetary institution. II. In accordance with this strategy, during the past period, i.e.