samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The COVID-19 pandemic is creating some fundamental changes in industry structure, work processes, and job functions. If we do not retrain to take on new tasks or move to new roles, we will be le behind by these changes. That is why government agencies are working together with their respective sectors of the economy to prepare their workers for the jobs of the future. https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/gearing-up-for-new-and-evolving-jobs-in-financial-services  2/18  04/12/2020  "Gearing up for New and Evolving Jobs in Financial Services" - Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authorit…  MAS is focused on the financial sector, working with IBF and the industry to drive an active jobs and skills agenda. Among central banks, MAS is probably unique in playing such an active role in the training and development of our financial sector workforce. As I had mentioned in 2017, “jobs and skills have moved to front and centre of MAS’ financial sector development agenda.” Growing Timber - The Financial Sector Jobs and Skills Agenda  This is where the Growing Timber series comes in. MAS wants to deepen and broaden our partnership with the financial industry and finance professionals to strengthen the Singaporean core in financial services.

What we have learned will, as you would expect, inform our considerations of potential Solvency II reform. 1  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/david-rule-2018-conference-on-bulk-annuities-and-longevity-risk-transfer and https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2019/david-rule-westminster-and-city-programmes-2019-bulk-annuities-conference 2 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/solvency-ii-review-call-for-evidence 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  1. Market developments since 2019  The annuity market largely bifurcates into bulk purchase annuities and the purchase of annuities from personal and occupational pensions. Since David spoke to you in 2019 the growth in the bulk annuity market has continued, and is expected to continue [Chart 1 in the Appendix]. From our perspective, the additional capital that annuity firms bring to back these pension obligations provides increased security for scheme members, and gives pension scheme sponsors the opportunity to benefit from de-risking. For some insurers, annuities are part of a wider product set, diversifying with for example term assurance or general insurance products. But for specialist annuity firms the increase in annuity sales leads to concentration in both longevity and credit risk. Chart 2 shows the composition of the solvency capital requirement (SCR) across a range of specialist and mixed-line annuity firms: What this chart does not convey is that the longevity component would be notably larger were annuity writers retaining all of this risk. We are aware that the design of the risk margin has had a number of unwelcome effects such as adding excessive balance sheet volatility which has contributed to longevity risk being something many annuity writers continue to look to cede.
Of course the City is in competition with other financial centres elsewhere in Europe. But as I have often pointed out before, at the macro-economic level such competition is a positive-, not a zero-sum game from which we collectively, borrowers and lenders and market intermediaries, all stand to gain. I have every confidence in the ability of the City to thrive in this competitive environment - but it will thrive not at the expense of the rest of Europe but alongside other European financial centres. And in that context suggestions that we should be somehow artificially disadvantaged are irrational. The third challenge confronting the City - and a much more fundamental one - is the accelerating advance of information and communications technology which is currently sweeping across the whole of the global economy. In the financial services sector in particular it is the major driver of change and innovation. It makes possible the introduction of a whole raft of essentially new financial services and products, and it is radically changing the way in which they and existing services and products are delivered, whether in wholesale or retail financial markets, at a fraction of the existing cost. In wholesale markets it will affect the whole spectrum of activity - from trading through payments and settlements, across the whole range of financial instruments, across national boundaries - not simply within Europe although that is an immediate focus of attention - and it has the potential to alter fundamentally the relationships between end-users of the markets, intermediaries and exchanges.

And, whatever the periodic outcry whenever something goes wrong - as it will from time to time - the demand for these services does not of course exist in a vacuum; it exists because of the very positive contribution that the business services sectors, including financial services, make to growth and employment and rising living standards in the wider economy. That is true nationally, but it is equally true in a global context. Indeed the unique characteristic of the City is its role as the predominant international financial centre. It accounts for a fifth of all international cross-border lending, for example; for a third of global turnover in foreign exchange and OTC derivatives, and as much as two-thirds of issuance and secondary trading in eurobonds, or of global turnover in international equities, with more foreign firms listed on the LSE than on any other exchange. And London has a near-monopoly in exchange-traded short-term euro interest rate derivatives. I will not labour the point further, Mr Chairman. Despite - or perhaps driven by - a continuous stream of shocks and competitive challenges, the City has in fact gone from strength to strength, most recently coming through the global financial turbulence of the last couple of years as well as the advent of the euro at least as strong as before. It is perhaps worth asking why the City is as strong as it is. Certainly it does have to do partly with history.
They consist, notably, of a reduction in governments’ debt financing needs, leading both to lower long-term interest rates (due to lower demand and declining risk premia) and to the release of revenues to finance more productive expenditure or growth-enhancing tax cuts. More leeway is then also created for the operation of automatic fiscal stabilizers in response to a cyclical downturn. In sum, fiscal consolidation is essential to secure public trust in the long-term sustainability of public finances, and to strengthen the foundations for sustained and durable growth. At the European level, fiscal consolidation should be in line with EU countries’ commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact, which provides the appropriate framework for the coordination of their fiscal policies. Given past experience of a slow and hesitant correction of excessive deficits, I see strong arguments for strengthening the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and reinforcing its rules for fiscal discipline. This could be complemented with enhanced national budgetary rules and procedures that are consistent with the EU fiscal framework. Monetary policy challenges Let me now turn to monetary policy and focus, in particular, on the response of the ECB to the crisis, and its current exit strategies. In response to the crisis and the ensuing subdued inflationary pressures, the Governing Council lowered its key interest rates to historically low levels. In particular, it reduced its main refinancing rate by 325 basis points to 1%, a level not seen in recent history in any of the euro area countries.

We will test separately these two assumptions: the shape of the curve and the break in the slopes. In terms of methodology, the analysis covers the OECD countries over the period 19902017, except for the United States where the data covers the period 1989 – 2017. Data sources for wages and inflation are the OECD and the FRED databases (for US), annual data. The reason for this selection is the availability of long-time data series on wages at OECD (they are only available since 1990), while for US the FRED database allows us to start from a known peak year, which was 1989. We used the following date: the average annual wage in 2017 constant prices at 2017 USD PPPs, exchange rate (national currency units/US dollar) and inflation (CPI) – annual growth rate, from the OECD database, and the real median household income in the United States, 2017 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars, from the FRED database. We transformed the average annual wage into local currency for ensuring comparability with the inflation rate, which reflects changes in local prices. Data sources for the inflation target of central banks are from the respective central banks’ websites. If a central bank targets a corridor rather than a level of the inflation rate, then the midpoint of the target band is considered. The year T0 is the peak year. We define a wage adjustment episode the adjustment in real wages that follows after the peak year.
With this regard, we need to further promote financial cooperation and more trade and investment facility arrangements such as today’s initiative. Ladies and gentlemen, 9. I would like to emphasize that there are still untapped opportunities abound along the whole spectrum of exchanges and cooperation between Thailand and China. As to give you food for thought, the followings, are a few examples. Firstly, regional supply chain network. Our region has already been regarded as high quality and cost-effective production bases. However, there is still gap to be filled and opportunity to be grasped. Since many economies in the region are not well integrated into the regional production networks. According to the latest World Bank’s Trading Cross Borders indicator which measures the time and cost of trading across borders, the newer member of ASEAN all score well below the ASEAN average. This is mainly due to the huge gaps in infrastructure. 10. Here, we can narrow the gap by mobilizing our region’s abundant financial resources into infrastructure investment. In this regard, China plays a strategic role in the progression of infrastructure development in our region. The improved infrastructure will allow regional economies at various stages of development to participate in regional production networks in line with their evolving comparative advantage. Infrastructure investment is costly but it is worth the expense. 11. Secondly, research and technical development. Although China has emerged into the world centre stage in just recent decades, China is now a world class technology lab who owns the broad range of advanced technologies.

Also, the improvement of domestic consumption and investment are slow due to a cautious private sector’s confidence. Externally, Thai economy is affected by the current uneven recovery of global economy which hinders Thai export growth. However, Thai economy is expected to recover up to 3.8% GDP growth this year from a mere 0.8% last year. Private consumption and the government expenditures will play key roles for 2015 outlook. 4. On the bright side, Thailand has been riding on the back of China’s economic prosperity. In other words, the regional prospect has pinned on improvement in intraregional trades of goods and services. China’s economic figures may be somewhat lower than its historical average, as a result of the sluggish recovery of the global demand and the continued structural reform in China. However, China growth rate is still at a satisfactorily high level. And China has yet remained an important engine in support of the growth of the Thai export sector. For the past few years, Thailand has become one of the most popular destinations among Chinese tourists, thanks to popularity of the ‘Lost in Thailand’ movie. Each week, hundreds of flights between Thailand and China have been landed to accommodate the increasing interest of Chinese visitors. We value this considerably as it not only helps boost the tourism and services sector of the Thai economy, but also tightens our cultural connections. 5. As we all know, Chinese economy has become a necessary ingredient for our secret recipe for the past decade.
BIS Review 77/1999  6  Forecast underlying inflation (UND1X) Percentage 12-month change 4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 95  96  97  98  99  00  01  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Increased employment is also foreseen and in the June Inflation Report we counted on a reduction of unemployment to below 5 per cent in two years time. Against this background, in the period 1999– 2001 the average annual rate of wage increases is judged to be 3.5–4 per cent. That seems to be consistent with a forecast annual rate of productivity growth of 1.5–2 percent and the same order of inflation expectations among the labour market organisations. I should perhaps underscore that this is a forecast, not a desired rate of wage increases. A lower nominal wage rise would create better conditions for a quicker increase in employment. How wages actually develop and the consequences of this for inflation and monetary policy will depend in large measure on how the labour market turns out to function in the coming upward phase. The Riksbank will be keeping a watchful eye on the available indicators. The estimates of the NAIRU and the output gap suggest that inflationary pressure is rising and that in our forecast period the economy will approach or even reach full capacity utilisation.

In our region, the recovery of activity and employment has continued, though the data indicate relatively stronger performance in New York State and New York City than in New Jersey, while Puerto Rico has yet to show any meaningful improvement. Our special topic shows a trend toward job polarization both in the nation and the region, which focuses our attention on the ever-growing importance for workers to acquire skills and upgrade their skills on an ongoing basis. I will now ask Jim Orr to present the update of economic conditions in our region. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The most high profile of these has been Libra – a new payments infrastructure based on an international stablecoin fully backed by reserve assets in a basket of currencies including the US dollar, the euro, and sterling. It could be exchanged between users on messaging platforms and with participating retailers.41 There are a host of fundamental issues that Libra must address, ranging from privacy to AML/CFT and operational resilience. In addition, depending on its design, it could have substantial implications for both monetary and financial stability.42 The Bank of England and other regulators have been clear that unlike in social media, for which standards and regulations are only now being developed after the technologies have been adopted by billions of users, the terms of engagement for any new systemic private payments system must be in force well in advance of any launch. As a consequence, it is an open question whether such a new Synthetic Hegemonic Currency (SHC) would be best provided by the public sector, perhaps through a network of central bank digital currencies. Even if the initial variants of the idea prove wanting, the concept is intriguing. It is worth considering how an SHC in the IMFS could support better global outcomes, given the scale of the challenges of the current IMFS and the risks in transition to a new hegemonic reserve currency like the Renminbi. An SHC could dampen the domineering influence of the US dollar on global trade.

They must, however, increasingly take account of effects that spill back on their economy as well as shifts in the global equilibrium interest rate that their actions can spur.28 As the weight of EMEs in the global economy has steadily risen, the size of the spillbacks from a tightening in US financial conditions has tripled relative to its 1990 - 2004 average. With EMEs projected to account for three quarters of the global economy by 2030, these spillbacks will only continue to grow (Chart 10). IV. Medium term: reshuffling the deck by reforming the existing system In the new world order, a reliance on keeping one’s house in order is no longer sufficient. The neighbourhood too must change. There can be innocent bystanders but there should be no disinterested observers. We are all responsible for fixing the fault lines in the system. Addressing Pull Factors in EMEs EMEs can increase sustainable capital flows by addressing “pull” factors including: -  reinforcing monetary policy credibility including safeguarding the operational independence of central banks;  -  building the resilience of their banks;  -  deepening their domestic capital markets to reduce the reliance on foreign currency debt; and  -  expanding the scope and application of their macroprudential toolkits to guard against excessive credit growth during booms.
This demographic structure thus not only contributes to enhance the potential of the economy but combined with rising incomes and improved standards of living, has resulted in increases in consumption spending. This resultant  BIS Review 64/2004  1  increase in purchasing power has strengthened domestic demand, making it an important driver of growth in the Asian economies. Indeed, these trends have strengthened the sustainability of consumption-based growth. As part of this process, women have become an important consumer target group with enhanced purchasing power. In fact, in several of the Asian economies, women are emerging as a key target market. This greater capacity for earning, spending, saving and investing requires ability for financial management, and hence the urgency for greater financial literacy. While financial literacy is important, regardless of economic status, it becomes even more important for those that are less privileged. For those that have less to manage, it becomes more vital to manage the finances even more effectively. It is also those that have been under-served by the financial system that need to be more aware of the financial services that they should be able to access, and the benefits that can be drawn from the various options available. They too have the same need for maximising the benefits from their limited resources, and to achieving financial and economic security. Strengthening their financial position becomes even more important for this target group.

Chinese banks in Singapore have committed more than RMB 500 billion (USD 73.4 billion) in financing Singaporean companies involved in Belt and Road projects, including the issuance of project bonds. China Construction Bank Singapore branch issued RMB 1 billion (USD 145 million) of Belt and Road Initiative bonds in August last year. And in May this year, Bank of China Singapore branch issued Belt and Road Initiative bonds worth RMB 4 billion (USD 600 million). Expanding the role of capital markets in financing growth Second, the CCI has embarked on a demonstrative project to expand the role of our capital markets. This complements the role of banks in financing growth and development. Specifically, we should facilitate the participation of institutional investors in development projects. Why? China has many public-private partnership (PPP) projects, where the state and companies involved own and operate infrastructure assets. In Chongqing itself, RMB 800 billion worth of PPP projects are expected to be in the pipeline between 2015 and 2020. But infrastructure assets are illiquid by nature. The capital invested is locked up and not available for use in other development projects. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  If we can securitise these PPP assets, we can help free up capital and diversify funding sources. We can make these securitised assets available to long term investors such as insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds, or even retail investors through a listing.
First, MSB has an important role in supporting an inclusive financial system and facilitating economic transactions that add to growth and prosperity. However, this role has not been fully exploited. For example, there are still significant number of businesses and migrant workers who still prefer informal remittance channels as their choice. It is timely for MSB providers to reassess their products and services in terms of cost, speed, convenience and trusts so that we can draw this group of users away from the informal channels. I believe innovation is key to achieve this and it has to be facilitated by a regulatory framework that is facilitative. Second, global and national efforts to address risks associated with the financial proceeds from criminal activity have turned the spotlight on the MSB industry. The industry’s long term prospects and its contribution to socio-economic development could be undermined if these risks are not properly understood and sensibly managed. The industry may choose to ignore such risks; regulators are inclined to exaggerate them; customers complain about the inconveniences caused by risks mitigants; and criminals exploit them. The regulatory community and the industry present here today have a responsibility to bridge these gaps in a way that protects the industry from abuse for criminal purposes and the integrity of the financial system and undermine the legitimate expectations by users of financial services. There are 3 areas which we should focus collectively and try to find suitable solutions.

In addition, the Riksbank entered into swap agreements with the central banks of the United States and the euro area to increase our access to dollars and euros. I will return to this later. In parallel with our liquidity assistance measures, we quickly reorganised our monetary policy. The repo rate was lowered from 4.75 per cent in September 2008 to 0.25 per cent by July 2009. Furthermore, our assessment in July 2009 was that the repo rate would need to be kept at this low level for slightly more than one year. To emphasise this and also to hold down the longer interest rates charged to households and companies, on three occasions the Riksbank offered one-year loans of up to SEK 100 billion at interest rates of 0.25 per cent. All in all, the Riksbank earned SEK 2.3 billion on the measures adopted during the crisis due to the interest rate differential between deposits and loans. Our primary intention was not to earn money through our measures, but, at the same time, it was important not to subsidise the banking system with public funds. (Figure 4)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 4 The repo rate Percentage points  Source: The Riksbank. Other authorities also acted to safeguard stability The Riksbank was not alone in adopting measures to safeguard the stability of the Swedish financial markets. Other Swedish authorities also intervened to counter the effects of the financial crisis.