samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Yet, France also enjoys major assets. First, a high investment rate, which has returned to its 2008 peak for private non-residential investment – close to the US level, indeed – and remains above the euro area average for public investment. It also has a wealth of fast-growing innovative firms according to Deloitte. [slide 3] Second, a high level of hourly productivity, on a par with Germany and the United States, but with a more dynamic working-age population than in the rest of Europe, which will support potential growth in the medium term. [slide 4] That’s where we are starting from. I would like to underline that we are enjoying a favourable momentum, which offers a window of opportunity for reform. This opportunity is indeed being seized to implement ambitious and consistent reforms, so yes, France is heading in the right direction and at a fast pace. [slide 5] 1. A favourable momentum: a robust upturn creates an appropriate timing for reforms Business climate and consumer confidence increased sharply in 2017. Surveys in all sectors reached levels that had not been observed for several years. After the uncertainties surrounding the presidential campaign, the French institutional framework now seems solid to international observers. Allow me a one-second excursion from economic to political science. In the troubled democratic times we live through, France has the strong advantage of a clear two-round majority voting system, and 5-year terms for the President as well as for Parliament.

The unemployment rate decreased from 10.0% at end 2016 to 8.9% at end 2017 on the back of job creations of around 250K in the private sector, which exceeded expectations. In this context, the unemployment rate is expected to further decline and hit at end-2020 (7.9% in 2020 Q4) its lowest level since end-2008. [slide 8] This economic recovery and higher inflation in France as well as in the euro area as a whole (1.7% and 1.3% respectively for year-on-year harmonised inflation rates in March) have been decisively supported by our non-standard monetary policy measures. We are now following our central course of gradual normalization. And there is at present a high convergence in our views within the Governing council: whether our net asset purchases stop in September or December is not a deep existential question. Along with this clear sequencing of gradual normalisation, we also agree that our monetary policy will remain accommodative for an extended period of time. In particular, keeping a sizeable stock of assets is key for easing financial conditions over a long horizon by compressing term premia. So we are predictable, but we are not precommited. What could slow down this course of gradual normalisation? Certainly not fiscal dominance: let me be crystal clear, nobody should expect us to delay a warranted monetary normalisation in order to accommodate the debt problems of any Member state.
We know from experience that wages rise, sometimes so much that they generate inflation. Downward wage adjustments are less frequent. Seen from this angle, inflation might be regarded as a smooth way of achieving necessary adjustments to real business costs. Another risk, according to some observers, is that an unduly low inflation target leaves too small a margin for monetary policy. The economy is liable to land in a situation where the central bank is no longer in a position to influence the development of prices by pushing the real interest rate down. It simply is not possible to reduce the interest rate below zero per cent. As I see it, the Riksbank’s decision to target a specific annual rate of inflation and implement its policy symmetrically has eliminated a large part of the risk of our being caught in a deflationary spiral and the dilemma of zero interest rates. Everyone knows we strive to bring inflation back to the targeted level of 2%. Inflation expectations in recent years have in fact been stable around the 2% target. A specific target also means that the labour market parties know the rules of the game, which I believe has promoted reforms in wage formation. To a large extent, wage demands are now drawn up on the premise of inflation being 2%. All in all, I see no grounds today for reconsidering our 2% target. The objections in the literature to a target around 2% seem to be less relevant if anything than they were some years ago.

A great deal has been written on the subject. But perhaps it will suffice to recall the Swedish experience in the 1970s and 1980s. The high and widely fluctuating rate of inflation had clear negative effects on our economy. Productivity gains and investment growth in that period were low. Sharply rising prices led to an arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth. In order to rectify the corporate sector’s competitive position, the value of our currency had to be written down on a number of occasions. Bit by bit, however, more and more people, regardless of which political party they supported, realised that this economic policy could not be sustained. So in the early 1990s, Sweden finally joined the growing number of countries that had chosen to re-focus their policy on low inflation. 1  BIS Review 98/2000  But while it is not difficult to advocate low, stable inflation, it is less easy to argue that just 2% is the appropriate rate. When the inflation target was adopted in 1992, it was noted that this was approximately the level of ambition that important countries had chosen. Moreover, inflation was currently around that level when the decision was made. Alan Greenspan has argued that inflation should be so low that people generally do not give it a thought when making economic decisions. That points to 2% as a reasonable level. There are some objections, however. Some argue that an inflation target ought to be higher. One reason has to do with the downward rigidity of nominal wages.
Aleš Michl: The road to the target Speech by Mr Aleš Michl, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the University of Economics and Business, Prague, 15 May 2023. *** Dear Rector, esteemed guests, It was a privilege for me to study and obtain my master's degree and Ph.D. here at the University of Economics and Business. I have good news for the public today: inflation is finally falling. Annual headline inflation peaked in September last year, when it reached 18%. We managed to stop it. In line with our expectations, a gradual downward trend in inflation started in February this year. Inflation fell to 16.7% in February and then to 15%. And finally, in April, it stood at 12.7%. Within three months, it should be below 10% in annual terms. This is not a victory. In the second half of the year, inflation will still be at a level we must not put up with. We must not get used to it. We must not adapt to it. Interest rates will therefore remain high for longer. A strong koruna is also important for the economy. Based on FRA rates, the market is expecting a rate decrease as early as in the next quarter. We consider the market expectations regarding the timing of the first decrease in rates to be premature. We must continue to fight for long-standing low and stable inflation. A strong koruna played an important role in the turnaround in inflation. We adjusted the monetary policy strategy in July 2022.

Fiskální deficit a emise penz v eské republice v dob pandemie covidu-19 [The fiscal deficit and money issuance in the Czech Republic during the Covid-19 pandemic]. Politická ekonomie, 71(1), 68–88. DOI: 10.18267/j. polek.1375 Mandel, M. and Dvoák, P. (2021). Co nás eká s rostoucím státním dluhem? [What awaits us with rising government debt?] Bankovnictví 2021, . 6, 38–41. ISSN 12124273. Mandel, M. and Dvoák, P. (2022). Souasná globální inflace – pípad sui generis? [Current global inflation – a sui generis case?] Bankovnictví 2022, ro. 29(1), 38–41. ISSN 1212-4273. Mandel, M. (2022). Jsou souasné úrokové sazby dostaten vysoké? Problémy konceptu kladné reálné úrokové míry [Are current interest rates high enough? Problems of the concept of a positive real interest rate.]. Bankovnictví 2022, ro. 29(6), 50–53. ISSN 1212-4273. Michl, A. (2019a). Peníze a inflace: ztracená kointegrace [Money and inflation: Lost cointegration]. Politická ekonomie, 67(4), 385–405. DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.1255 Michl, A. (2019b). Ten years later: Lessons for DSGE builders and Czech policy makers . Review of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 159–174. DOI: 10.2478/revecp-2019-0009 Michl, A. (2022, 23 October). Governor's opening remarks at the CNB Discussion Forum [Audiovisual recording]. Czech National Bank. Michl, A. (2023, 5 January). Zanme spoit. A to hned! [Let us start saving. Now!] Mladá fronta DNES. 6/7  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. (2023a). OZDRAVNÝ BALÍEK 2024/2025 [Recovery package 2024/2025]. Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. (2023b). Píloha tiskové zprávy k Ozdravnému balíku 2024/2025 [Annex to the press release on Recovery package 2024 /2025]. Nováková, M. (2023, 3 May).
At the same time, I believe that the Federal Reserve System’s monetary policy responsibilities are allocated appropriately by the Federal Open Market Committee, with New York playing an important role to ensure that monetary policy is executed effectively even during periods of duress. Of course, the Federal Reserve System and the New York Fed are not perfect institutions. That is why we always must strive, in an open and transparent manner, to improve what we do and how we do it, for the benefit of the American people. Thank you for your kind attention. I would now be happy to take some questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

These expectations generate lower funding costs, in particular for the largest banks, which in turn encourages further expansion and concentration, worsening the too-big-to-fail dilemma. There is a self-perpetuating “doom loop” (Alessandri and Haldane (2010)). The size of the resulting “implicit subsidy” from the state to the big banks has been the subject of recent study – and no little controversy (Noss and Sowerbutts (2012)). There are a number of possible methods for estimating the subsidy. Perhaps the simplest is found by comparing the “standalone” and “support” ratings assigned to debt issued by large banks. 2  The data are from Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011). 3  This has strikingly close parallels with recent econometric evidence suggesting that growth is harmed at debt-to-GDP ratios above unity, for both the public sector (Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)) and private sectors (Cechetti et al (2011)). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The difference between these ratings gives an estimate, used by the market when pricing debt, of the probability of state support. Chart 3 plots the difference between these ratings for the 29 institutions deemed by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) last year to be the world’s most systemically-important. In the pre-crisis period, this difference averaged 1.3 notches. This sounds material, if not breathtaking. It suggests that, while non-trivial, too-big-to-fail may not have been a first-order driver of the rising scale and concentration in banking. Yet even small notches of support can translate into big implicit subsidies if balance sheets are large.
In 2015 only 4% of CSRs were fully implemented, down from 7% in 2014. In some countries excessive economic imbalances 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  persist and could harm other Member States. More can be done to improve national implementation and I see a lot of merit in the IMF's proposal that CSRs should be linked to outcome-based benchmarks that are concrete, measurable, and clearly linked to the ultimate reform objective[28]. The dismal implementation record of the CSRs nevertheless suggests that a governance framework that envisages European economic policy priorities being legitimised and implemented at national level has its limits. Looking forward, we will need to engage in a process at European level, based on shared institutions, that provides both economic resilience and the appropriate legitimacy. In such a process, consensus would be needed on (i) the policy areas that are crucial to preserve the resilience of the euro area, and on (ii) designating those policy areas as shared competences with democratic legitimisation at European level. And as I have said before, getting there will require both economic and political convergence. The success of the Single Market is one of the few uncontroversial achievements of the EU. It has shown that shared competences can be used to implement economic policies that lead to greater prosperity in each country and, at the same time, ensure greater resilience of the euro area and the EU as a whole. We should build on it if we want to make further progress.

There are however a few things that make our situation even more problematic than that of other large economies. First, the decline in trend growth has gone much further here than in, for instance, the US: the European Commission estimates potential output growth in the euro area to be about 1% this year, half  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  of the equivalent figure for the US. In contrast, the difference in 1992 was small: euro area potential output growth was estimated at 2.6%, compared with 2.8% for the US. [5] Although this is already a serious problem in itself[6], a close examination of the composition of potential output uncovers the full extent of the problem. Total factor productivity in the US has consistently outperformed the euro area for the last 15 years and is expected to continue doing also in the coming decade[7]. In other words, using Paul Krugman’s famous words, the euro area trend growth risks becoming a product of “perspiration rather than inspiration”[8]. There are two issues associated with this observation. First, as we know from the growth literature, input-based growth risks incurring diminishing returns. Second, in an imperfect monetary union, it raises the question of how those inputs are being allocated. Indeed, when it comes to allocating capital, we are still making a bad job of allocating and utilising existing resources[9].
The demand for trusted data will only grow as regulators strengthen reporting and disclosure requirements. Yet, the availability of good data remains a big challenge. The process of ESG data acquisition is manual, cumbersome and costly. There is also lack of transparency in the verification and reporting process. Technology can be a game changer in addressing these data challenges. First, the problem of data acquisition. FinTechs are offering solutions that connect directly via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to existing systems, such as waste management systems, to retrieve relevant environmental and energy consumption data more efficiently. Financial institutions are exploring the use of IoT devices and sensors to measure directly at source, carbon emissions, energy consumption, and pollution. Satellite imagery is being used to track the progress of reforestation and carbon sequestration projects, which enables nature-based solutions and offerings. Second, the problem of data provenance. Here, distributed ledger technology is being considered as a way to maintain provenance 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  and traceability in the data. For example, IBM’s Food Trust uses blockchain to connect participants across the food ecosystem, such as growers, processors and retailers, with data collected along the supply chain. This allows them to ensure that food safety protocols and sustainable food practices are adopted at each stage of the food chain. It also allows them to trace any food fraud incidents or food safety breaches back to their source.

In order to become a smart consumer he must try to understand the nature of different kinds of banking products and to avoid those products that go beyond his risk appetite or personal financial capability. This relates to the “smart” part. On the “responsible” part, it is important that when a person takes out a loan from his bank, whether to shop or buy a flat, he should fully assess his repayment capability in relation to his income and expenses. There is not much point in blaming the bank in granting you easy and cheap credit when you have overstretched yourself in exuberant spending or in taking excessive risks in properties or stocks. In the context of buying investment products from a bank, the customer must realise that he is bound by his signature on the agreement, and that he cannot imply obligations which are contrary to the express terms of an agreement. Put it simply, a customer may not succeed in civil litigation for investment losses on the ground that he did not fully understand the terms of the investment contracts. Recent court cases in Hong Kong have clearly demonstrated that the existence of mis-selling by the bank would be a relevant factor in determining the culpability of the bank, but the customer must not harbour the expectation that mis-selling, regardless of its nature and severity, would necessarily lead to full compensation for investment losses.
Jarle Bergo: Nominal and financial stability in a new economic world Speech by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), Valutaseminaret, Sanderstølen, 1 February 2008. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me once again to this venerable institution - Valutaseminaret. It is a pleasure to be here with you. This morning I will discuss with you some issues under the broad heading of “Nominal and financial stability in a new economic world”. Introduction The general economic environment has changed dramatically over the past 30-40 years. When I started my career as an economist in the late 1960s, a belief had evolved that the economy could and should be controlled and steered in considerable detail. A widespread view was that markets should be regulated and coordinated by authorities. Furthermore, the Phillips curve was embraced as proof that a long-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment existed. By merely accepting somewhat higher inflation, it was thought possible to reduce unemployment in the medium and long term. The economic policy of the 1970s and 1980s, which was based on these views, led to high and variable inflation and wide fluctuations in the economy. In the face of the disappointing experience from this period and advances in economic theory, put forward by among others the Nobel Prize winners Phelps, Friedman, Kydland and Prescott, views have now changed. We have learned that low and stable inflation is the best contribution monetary policy can make to high and stable growth.

Yes, as in the case of other negative supply shocks: Keeping inflation low and stable must be the overriding objective. And with regard to reducing emissions, keeping inflation low and stable is perhaps even more important, as this will help make changes in relative prices more visible. Concluding remarks Globalisation has so far given us the best of two worlds, high growth and low inflation. But looking ahead there might be challenges to both nominal and financial stability. 16  Kenneth S. Rogoff (2006, see footnote 8). BIS Review 14/2008  7  We must preserve a nominal anchor, even when times may become more difficult. History has shown us that low and stable inflation is the best contribution monetary policy can make to growth and macroeconomic stability. A new, globalised world does not change this paradigm. Financial stability is enhanced by “smart” regulations that provide the right incentives. It is important to encourage innovation and to avoid overregulation. We must expect losses to occur and the losses should be borne by investors and financial institutions themselves to the fullest extent possible. Some might argue that I am behind the curve and that I should rather be discussing the breakdown of the global financial system. George Soros has argued that “This is not a normal crisis, but an end of an era.” 17 I do not subscribe to this view, though I admit I might be proven wrong. I would rather regard the present turmoil as evidence of the self-correcting properties of our system.
Its key conclusions were: 1) when closing a multinational bank, supervisors should pay attention to the nature and timing of communications among themselves and of their communications with creditors, shareholders and management; 2) the nature of liquidation rules may be relevant to the manner in which multinational banks are supervised; 3) differences in liquidation rules across jurisdictions in a windingup can affect returns to depositors and other creditors and the operations of deposit protection schemes; and 4) coordination and cooperation between liquidators can affect the returns to creditors in a liquidation and can be affected by the role of supervisors in a liquidation. BIS Review 83/2009  7  adopted the Credit Institutions Reorganisation and Winding-Up Directive, albeit after quite a delay in 2001, under which a single-entity regime was introduced for the resolution of any bank incorporated in the EEA, applying to the parent bank and also to all its branches throughout the EEA. A little less than a decade after the BCBS’s report on the lessons from BCCI, the FSF/G10/BCBS produced a joint report on the orderly wind down of large and complex financial institutions. It was a good report. It called for a range of things, including Factbooks on key firms; contingency funding plans; wider crisis management plans; and so on. Perhaps most important, it underlined that, at that time, no one really knew how to wind down an LCFI. Quite a conclusion. A good one. It is a pity that the report wasn’t published.

•  And the regulation must be proportionate to the risk posed. Take for example internet-based payments or P2P lending that takes place outside regulated banks. •  2  We regulate banks chiefly because they take deposits. –  When they get into trouble, they have systemic consequences. –  So, we supervise their lending activity and their payments systems. BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  We do not regulate P2P lending platforms – as long as they do not take deposits. –  •  But if they get very large and pose macroprudential concerns, then we may consider regulation. Likewise, a payment service through the Internet will not automatically attract regulation –  These are typically small payments, often in connection with e-commerce. –  Only larger, more significant players that cross the materiality and other thresholds are regulated. –  Even then, we do not regulate them as banks and throw at them the whole kitchen sink of capital and liquidity requirements under the Banking Act. –  We regulate them under the Payment Systems Oversight Act or the Remittance Agents Act – modular regulation customised to address the specific risks or concerns they pose. –  But I must acknowledge we do not have ready-made regulations for all new technology solutions; often we must improvise the use of existing legislation, even as we draw up new ones. Third – actively promote the FinTech ecosystem and seek to harness its potential for good.