samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In 2016 intra-regional trade contributed USD521 billion or 23.5% of total trade. IntraASEAN investments rose to a record level of USD24 billion in 2016 and accounted for 25% of total FDI flows into the region. Within the region, Indonesia and Thailand are important partners to Malaysia both in trade and direct investments where there is continuous growth propelled by inter-company linkages and cross-border investments. In 2016, Malaysia shared a bilateral trade volume of USD13.8 billion with Indonesia and USD13 billion with Thailand. However, only 5.8% and 11.4% of our trade with Indonesia and Thailand, respectively were settled in local currencies. This is an enormous business opportunity for the financial sector, which has yet to be realised. Similarly, on the investment front, Malaysia has invested USD13 billion and USD2 billion of direct investments into Indonesia and Thailand, as at second quarter of 2017. Indeed, the completion and enhancement of the Frameworks is an important step towards the use of local currencies to support cross-border settlements for trade and direct investments among the three countries. It is an opportunity to mitigate the impact of volatilities in major trading currencies on regional trade and investment activities. We can recall the Global Financial Crisis, where the tightening of global US dollar liquidity was a contributor to the 19% contraction of total trade and 11.5% contraction of total inward FDI into the region.

Moreover, an enabling environment for the effective use of local currencies will bring about greater cost efficiency and stability for businesses and increase demand for local currency financial products. That will, in turn, be the impetus to strengthen regional financial markets’ development. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  I am pleased that the event today is made possible by all three central banks, mutually agreeing to grant regulatory flexibilities to the appointed banks under these Frameworks, enabling them to provide a wider range of financial services under their respective jurisdictions. Taking this opportunity, I wish to introduce the appointed banks in Malaysia for these Frameworks, namely, Maybank Berhad, CIMB Berhad, RHB Berhad, Public Bank Berhad, Hong Leong Bank Berhad, Bangkok Bank Berhad, United Overseas Bank (UOB) Berhad and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (BTMU) Berhad. The implementation of these Frameworks will complement our existing close partnership and cooperation as neighbors, with common objectives and shared aspirations. On this note, I look forward to witness the growth in the use Indonesian rupiah, Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit for cross-border settlement of trade between Indonesia and Malaysia, and Thailand and Malaysia, respectively. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
That is enough to offset a reduction in GDP of some 1.5%10 – three times the Bank’s estimate of the hit from the direct effects of the tariffs implemented so far (Table 1). Indeed, the scale of market moves suggests a shock to US and Chinese business confidence and investment analogous to what has happened in the UK (Table 3). Table 3: A significant confidence shock could lower US GDP by more than 1½ % Change in level of GDP (%) US  China  Euro area  UK  World (PPP-weighted)  Severe shock to business confidence in the US and China  -1.8  -1.8  -0.7  -0.7  -0.9  Direct trade effects if all measures are implemented  -2.1  -1.2  -0.6  -0.4  -0.8  Total  -3.9  -3.0  -1.3  -1.1  -1.7  See sources and notes to Table 1. 8  Currently a sample of over 7,000 companies. More details on the Panel are available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/research-datasets. 9 Similarly, in the Deloitte Survey of CFOs, 54% of respondents rated the level of uncertainty as high or very high in 2019 Q1, up from 25% in 2018 Q2. 10 This assumes a multiplier of 1 – that is, a 1 percentage point fall in the federal funds rate boosts US GDP by 1%.

Persistent low inflation could signal that the equilibrium interest rate – the rate consistent with inflation at target and the economy operating at full capacity – is lower than currently assessed, and therefore the stance of monetary policy is tighter than intended. Here again, trade tensions and wider economic policy uncertainties are relevant as both could reduce the equilibrium interest rate. 11 If so, that monetary policy space could be more limited in some jurisdictions, increasing the desirability that fiscal policy supplement it if a downturn materialises. Chart 10: Market measures of long-term inflation expectations drifting down in US and euro area Per cent 3.0  Per cent 4.0 UK adjusted (lhs)  3.8  UK (lhs)  3.6  2.8 2.6  3.4  2.4  3.2  2.2  3.0 Euro area (rhs)  2.8  US (rhs)  2.0 1.8  2.6  1.6  2.4  1.4  2.2  1.2  2.0 Jul. 16  1.0 Jan. 17  Jul. 17  Jan. 18  Jul. 18  Jan. 19  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., and Bank calculations. Notes: The chart shows 5-year inflation 5 years ahead. The UK series has been adjusted higher to account for the fall in inflation swap rates that took place on 17 January following publication of the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee Inquiry into the use of RPI. See ‘Real interest rates and risk’, speech by Gertjan Vlieghe at the Society of Business Economists’ Annual conference, 15 September 2017.
As was the case before the crisis and indicated in the June 2011 principles, the Committee intends to adjust the policy stance during normalization primarily through actions that directly influence the level of the fed funds rate and other short-term interest rates rather than through active management of the size or composition of the Fed’s securities holdings. Specifically, when economic conditions and the economic outlook warrant a less accommodative stance of monetary policy, the Committee will raise its target range for the fed funds rate. During normalization, the Committee intends to move the fed funds rate into the target range primarily by adjusting the rate of interest on excess reserve balances (IOER) that it pays. We expect changes in the IOER rate to have a significant influence on the fed  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  funds rate and other short-term interest rates. However, to help control the fed funds rate, the Committee also intends to use an ON RRP facility and other supplementary tools, as needed. The Committee will use an ON RRP facility only to the extent necessary, and will phase it out when it is no longer needed to help control the funds rate. With regard to the Fed’s balance sheet, the Committee intends to reduce securities holdings in a gradual and predictable manner, primarily by ceasing to reinvest repayments of principal on securities held in the SOMA.

Of course, the principles and continued testing are part of prudent planning, and do not imply that normalization will necessarily begin soon. As always, the views I express are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The committee’s normalization principles and plans Let me start by briefly reviewing the statement on normalization principles and plans that the FOMC published following its September meeting. Importantly, this statement is intended to provide the public with information about the eventual normalization process and does not signal a change in the current or future stance of policy. As the Committee indicated in its September post-meeting policy statement, it continues to anticipate that it likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if projected inflation continues to run below the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and provided that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. Many elements of the normalization principles and plans are similar to the principles adopted by the Committee in June 2011, while others have been revised in light of the changes since then in the size and composition of the System Open Market Account (SOMA), the Fed’s securities portfolio, as well as enhancements in the tools the Committee will have available to implement policy during normalization.
Thirachai Phuvanat naranubala: How to create a stable financial environment in emerging market economies Remarks by Mr Thirachai Phuvanat naranubala, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Cape Town, 19 September 2002. *  *  *  The title of “ How to create a stable financial environment in emerging market economies ” is almost a contradiction. The events in the past few decades will bear me out. It has been difficult for emerging market economies to maintain stable financial environment over a long period of time. Crises and disturbances have erupted every now and then, resulting in losses of output, employment and livelihood. The problem is -- emerging market economies and stable financial environment do not always go hand in hand. Some of the reasons are obvious. Emerging market economies are the countries in the process of integrating themselves into the new environment of globalization. They are invariably at some points in their journeys in enhancing free trade, attracting foreign direct investments and capital inflows, adopting rule based supervision and control, and introducing market discipline. The risks to stability occur because they have to learn and put into place the framework and the machinery to regulate, supervise and monitor their financial markets in the tight time span of years what developed countries had taken decades to do. For the emerging markets, globalization is like sailing out of the inland waterway where the environment is safe and calm into the international ocean with its more choppy water.

The country has to ensure that the agency entrusted with this task has sufficient power to act. I can still remember that in Thailand long ago, when government successions often did not come from elections but through military actions, it was very common for commercial banks to have army generals sitting on their boards. Banking supervision under such an environment was a challenge. But the biggest challenge is what to do when banks suffer such losses that they are unable to continue. This happened when Thailand went into the crisis in 1997. We closed down two-thirds of our finance companies. As for the commercial banks, we had 15 local banks then. Six banks had to be taken over by the authority. The private shareholders were forced to take full losses, and new capital provided by the authority. Management was totally revamped. We have merged four of these banks into the others, and have carved out non-performing loans to a national asset management company. Two government-owned banks are now ready to be privatized to the general public. The banks that remained were forced to recapitalize. Three of them were unable to find domestic capital, and decided to invite foreign strategic partners. We allowed the foreign banks to own majority shares and control management. Now for the bad news! Despite your effort in trying to strengthen your ship, it may not always be smooth sailing. I wish to point out two dangers that may crop up.
Singapore has grown over the past decade to become the largest REIT market in Asia outside of Japan. Building on this strength, players in Singapore have established the world’s largest Shariah-compliant REIT, which draws in conventional and Islamic investors around the world. Third, opportunities for interaction and collaboration. As Islamic finance gains prominence, conventional financial institutions increasingly want to be involved to tap these opportunities. Financial centres like Singapore serve as intersecting nodes where Islamic financial institutions collaborate with their conventional partners to jointly grow the industry. By applying the same regulatory framework to both conventional and Islamic financial institutions, Singapore aims to encourage financial institutions here to grow their suite of products and services for the Islamic finance industry. Conclusion Let me conclude. Islamic finance has come a long way. As it embarks on its next phase of growth, the industry must overcome the challenges posed by slower growth and global deleveraging, and build scale and reach critical mass. This requires financial institutions, regulators, and international standard setting agencies to work closely together. Forums like these are ideal platforms. I wish you fruitful discussions. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Inflation is well above that target for a multitude of reasons, which will not be itemised here. These contributing factors have been discussed numerous times by the Central Bank, in verbal and written form. Suffice it to say that enormous investments, radical changes in the domestic financial markets, ready access to inexpensive credit from abroad, and – last but not least – the substantial increase in disposable household income, especially in the past year, have played their part. Critics maintain sedulously that the Central Bank’s tools are weak, that its policy of restraint is ineffective, and even that its inflation target is a failed experiment. The Bank rejects this. It can be considered established that, were it not for the Central Bank’s tight monetary policy, inflation would have been much higher than it has indeed been – with the concomitant strain on households and businesses. It is not the Central Bank’s objective as such to keep interest rates high – indeed, the Bank is of the opinion that it is disadvantageous if the policy rate is high for a sustained period of time. Inflationary pressure has been greater than forecasts indicated – and more than was easily dealt with – and as a result, it has proven difficult to contain inflation. It took a while before the impact of the Central Bank’s restraining measures was sufficiently felt, but considerable changes took place over the past year, when policy rate decisions made themselves felt more strongly in all areas of the credit market.
The reforms since 2011 to the public pension system (the progressive raising of the retirement age; the definition of a sustainability factor linking the initial pension to changes in life expectancy; the introduction of a new pension indexation system; and the segregation from the system of specific non- contributory pensions that should be financed through general taxes and not through social security contributions) have been in the right direction as far as the sustainability of the system is concerned. Apart from these reforms, there are insurance and saving mechanisms that can help supplement the unfunded pension system. But, as I said earlier, a key factor for the public pension system is the buoyancy of employment. It is in this nexus between employment, pensions and public finances where, I believe, the “hard core” of the difficulties facing our economy in the years ahead is concentrated. 3. The reduction in private debt and in the net external debit position  The third challenge facing the Spanish economy is high private debt and the heavy dependency on external financing. The Spanish economy’s net external debit position stood at around 93% of GDP at end2015, far above the level in other euro area or developed countries in a debit position, not to mention core Monetary Union economies such as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, which run an external credit position.

While important progress has recently been made in Europe on the arrangements that will contribute to containing significant high-risk events, and in paving the way towards a more sustainable and integrated European region, its immediate-term effects on economic recovery is likely to be limited. There are several factors that are containing the potential for sustained growth in these economies. This can be classified into seven categories. Firstly, is the gradual process of unwinding the excesses that had been built up over several years. These include the high degree of indebtedness by households, the financial sector and the public sector. Secondly, is the significant long-term structural adjustments that are needed to regain relative competitiveness. This will involve greater efficiency and innovation within existing industries, and the shifting of resources out of industries in which these economies no longer have comparative advantage, into new industries which have comparative advantage. While the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  former may result in economic gains, it may not necessarily be accompanied by increased employment, and the latter may result in temporary economic dislocation and increased unemployment. Thus, even if such policies were to yield results, they may not produce a robust recovery of economic activity and a reduction in unemployment in the short and medium term. The third is the need for the introduction of new institutions and the transformation of existing institutions to render them relevant to the changed environment.
Revenues have recorded a slight rise related to the previous months, while there is noticed a reduction in realised expenditure pace. In annual terms, during the first nine months of the year the budget revenues have recorded a growth of 6 percent, whereas the budget spending has increased by 22 percent. The budget deficit remains at comparably high historical levels, but within the budget limits reviewed lately. To a great extent, this deficit reflects the high level of public capital expenditures during 2009. Public expenditures and fiscal policy have provided a tangible contribution to the maintaining of the economic activity along this period, but they have been associated with increased pressures over the money markets. The Bank of Albania considers that the fiscal policy should continue to be prudent towards these balances in the future, and should take into consideration the long-term fiscal stability while drafting and implementing mid-term and long-term budget plans. External trade was featured by weakening in the trade volume during the first nine months of the year. However, trade exchanges value recorded during September is the highest recorded since 2009. After about three months of constant narrowing, the trade deficit enlarged during this month by about 9 percent in annual terms. Exports dropped by about 18 percent in annual terms, though the lek’s weak position vis-à-vis the Euro is a favourable factor for exports. Imports recorded positive growth rates for the first time since January of the current year.

Short-term interest rates in the interbank market have reflected decreased borrowing cost by the Bank of Albania and have been steady. Furthermore, the primary market was featured by agents’ response to loan pricing, reducing the T-bill yield. The 12month yield, which serves as a reference rate in determining other costs, has decreased by 0.15 percentage points during November, down to 9.28 percent. The supply for financing the government demand has been sufficient, without exerting upward pressures on interest rates. Interest rate performance of new deposits denominated in lek and in Euro has also been stable during September, enabling deposits return to the system. In the meantime, new ALL and Euro credit interest rates continue to carry over tightening lending policies by the banking system in general, and fluctuate around isolated preferential policies. After discussions, the Supervisory Council agreed on keeping the key interest rate unchanged. This decision aims at further preservation and consolidation of macroeconomic balances, regarding the macroeconomic stability as an indispensable precondition for the long-term sustainable growth. It also guarantees appropriate monetary support for the economy during this stage of its development. In the future, the Bank of Albania is willing to operate in line with the actual and expected performance of economic indicators. The shifting to the downward side of inflationary risks balance and the consolidation of financial stability and inflationary expectations in the economy will be taken into consideration in Bank of Albania’s future decision-making. BIS Review 153/2009  3
Although that means that a given amount of growth translates into bigger employment gains, it certainly is not an unmitigated good development. Also, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the economy still faces significant headwinds and there are some meaningful downside risks. In the headwinds department, I would include the  1  This recurring pattern has led some economists to question whether the depth and duration of the Great Recession has distorted the usual patterns of seasonal adjustment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  run-up in gasoline prices mentioned earlier because that will sap purchasing power, the continued impediments to a strong recovery of the housing sector, and fiscal drag at the federal and state and local levels. In terms of downside risks, these include the risk that growth abroad disappoints and the risk of further disruptions to the supply of oil and higher oil prices. On the inflation front, the overall rate of increase of consumer prices, as measured by the 12-month change of the consumer price index slowed to 2.9 percent in February from a recent peak of 3.9 percent last September. Despite the recent rise of gasoline prices mentioned above that may interrupt this pattern, we expect this moderation in the growth rate of consumer prices to resume later this year.

So, we target some key initiatives specifically to low- and moderate-income groups. Here on Long Island there are pockets that suffered greatly in the recession. In Nassau County, communities in Hempstead, Baldwin, Roosevelt and New Hyde Park have a foreclosure rate over four times the national average. The same holds true for parts of Brentwood, Central Islip and Patchogue, in Suffolk County. We have worked hard to help neighborhoods that face high foreclosure rates. Over the past three years, my staff has come to Long Island to meet with housing counselors and legal services practitioners. We have provided housing advocates with the latest information on mortgage conditions, via mortgage briefs, roundtables, presentations and newsletters. We have now developed an online resource that shows delinquency and foreclosure conditions in neighborhoods each month. We believe that this site will be a useful complement, aiding the work of housing counselors and other parties seeking to help these communities. To share what we learn about our diverse District, we have a website, with detailed information about the region. I invite you to visit newyorkfed.org to explore our highly localized maps and information on small business, credit and housing conditions and even the latest job openings at the New York Fed. Finally, and crucially, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, we are working with our colleagues in Washington, D.C., and at other agencies to help put the nation’s financial system on a firmer footing.