samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is true that the past, global financial centres emerged in jurisdictions with huge trade surpluses: Amsterdam in the 16th century, London in the 19th century New York in the early 20th. But London’s re-emergence 60 years ago was long after the global economic dominance of the UK – and long before the single market in financial services developed in the EU. Openness, time zone, language, law, developed domestic financial markets and, crucially, the concentration of skills and expertise and talent, seem better explanations of the agglomerations of economic activity that are today’s global financial centres.3 The EU has the ambition to build a more integrated and more market based financial system – the Capital Markets Union. I certainly believe this is the right ambition; a greater role for risk capital and for market based rather than bank-based finance will help to diversify risk across borders, reduce costs to the real economy and avoid too great a reliance on the banking channel of credit intermediation. BIS (2019): UK’s share of global 2019 (April) turnover in OTC interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange UK’s FinTech adoption rate was 71% in 2019, global average is 64 3 Roberts, R. (2005). London as an international financial centre, 1980-2000: global powerhouse or Wimbledon EC2?. In: Cassis, Youssef and Bussière, Eric (eds.) London and Paris as International Financial Centres in the Twentieth Century. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 287-312. ISBN 9780199269495. Wójcik, D., Knight, E., & Pažitka, V. (2018). What turns cities into international financial centres?

9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  Rather, and in line with the way in which global governance has developed, it requires a relationship built on the assessment of similar outcomes, in a non-discriminatory way, paying due respect to home country regimes in line with FSB norms. Both the EU and UK have I think recognised principle. Second, future regulatory and supervisory arrangements between the EU and the UK need to be stable and built on good faith. This is not primarily because cross border activity beneficial to both sides will not be maintained in an unstable environment – true though that is. It is because abrupt disruption of cross border activity in the financial sector is in itself a source of risk. Of course, even in a relationship grounded on similar outcomes and deference, it must be possible for supervisory and regulatory arrangements to change over time – for one side or the other to conclude that due to changes in the regulatory framework or new challenges handled in different ways, financial stability risk cannot no longer be managed in the current framework. In such a case, additional controls and restrictions on cross border activity may be needed. But these need to be clear and transparent regulatory and supervisory decisions, grounded in evidence and applied within agreed procedures to ensure that their implementation itself does not become a source of risk.
It is obvious that no country, not even Estonia, when planning its economic policies should assume, for example, a 8-8% current account deficit spanning several years. Even if the latter is in the initial years financed through foreign direct investments, the adaptation of the economy is inevitable. The slower the economic growth is during the adaptation period, the more painful it is for the society. The goal of the economic policy should be the prevention of the internal demand-driven boom immediately prior and after the EU accession which will be followed by a significantly slower growth phase. Pre-accession economic programme and macroeconomic risks All these important issues are, to a certain extent, reflected in Estonia’s pre-accession economic programme which was recently approved by the government of the republic. I stress that the projections which form the basis of the national pre-accession programme and the premise that in Estonian economy the real total output is going to increase at the rate of about 6% per year are attainable only if the current economic policy continues. Keeping of the macrobalance is of critical importance for sustaining the economic growth and credibility of the monetary policy. The kroon’s fixed exchange rate and the forthcoming entry into the euro zone are by no means “free lunches”.

Estonia abandoned all possible barriers to import and export of goods and services, created equal opportunities to all investors and privatised state-owned banks. These steps laid the foundation for our current success. To date, 10 years later, Estonia like the European Union discusses widely how to create a truly free market of infrastructure services which until now have been either directly or indirectly protected by the state. And principal solutions to this problem shall not differ from the decisions made in the first half of 1990s. It is true that, for example, opening up of the electricity market to free competition is definitely more time-consuming than privatisation of many industrial enterprises. But, surely, restructuring of the electricity sector does not differ in principle from the reform in the banking sector. In both cases the state must ensure the availability of the critical infrastructure in Estonia and communication with the external markets - in one case, it means payment systems, in the other case interconnections with the European and Scandinavian grids. In both cases the government has to ensure supervision over the market actors’ behaviour and establish clear rules. In both cases the government must have action plans or guidelines for crisis management. And when these guidelines and relevant national policies are in place, there will be no impediments to the complete opening of the market. The task of the government is not to delay the opening of the market but rather to speed it up.
The latest Banque de France survey shows that the capacity utilisation rate has reached a record high. This state of affairs makes the recommendation issued by the Council over the past four years more appropriate than ever: “Now is the time to invest”. •  lastly, actively seek improvements in productivity, which lie at the very heart of economic growth by embracing technical progress, the digital revolution, the new information and communication technologies, biotechnology and material sciences and by promoting a high level of research and development in the productive sector in France as well as Europe. This openness to technical progress and rapid productivity enhancement is one of the keys to maintaining low inflation and a long-lasting growth, which is vibrant, sustainable and creates jobs. *  *  *  This, Ladies and Gentlemen, is what I wished to say about monetary policy and the French and European economies as we stand on the verge of the year 2001. May I draw your attention to the press kit that will be handed out to you. It contains documents that should prove very useful to a sound understanding of the economic and monetary situation, in particular the charts on production bottlenecks and recruitment difficulties. I would also like to point out the one hundred questions-andanswers on the changeover to the euro. These should provide individuals, professionals and the specialised press with clear and accurate information on any questions that may arise regarding the challenging events that await us in the years 2001 and 2002.

To this end, the Bank, together with Securities Commission Malaysia and various Government ministries and agencies, collaborate through the Financial Education Network to increase the level of financial literacy and access to information and resources on financial matters. The Financial Education Network also serves as a focal point to drive the implementation of Malaysia’s National Strategy for Financial Literacy. I know that over the course of these webinars, we will learn much more about the priorities, approaches and strategies to advance sustainable finance development across the region. As we absorb the many valuable lessons and experiences shared towards this common goal, I am reminded of Winston Churchill who said, ‘It is no use saying we are doing our best. We have got to succeed in doing what is necessary”. In the end this is what counts. Policymakers and the financial industry have a responsibility to do what it takes to succeed in making sure that finance works for sustainable development. Let me end here and thank you very much for this opportunity to offer some remarks today. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Only in this way, they may find themselves able to sail into the international waters. Thank you. BIS Review 148/2008  3

China  5  (a)  China  4 3 2 1 + 0 -1 -2 -3 -4  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  Source: IMF. (a) 2016 is a forecast. These shortcomings also explain much of the sharp fall in global nominal growth since the crisis. Since 2007, global nominal GDP growth (in dollars) has been cut in half from over 8% to 4% last year, thereby compounding the challenges of private and public deleveraging (Table 1). In an unforgiving global environment even those economies with resilient private demand, like the UK, must manage policy with vigilance and dexterity. Table 1 Global nominal growth halved since 2007 %  China  US  Euro area  UK  Japan  World  1998-2007 average  13.0  5.3  4.4  5.3  -0.2  6.5  2007  23.1  4.5  5.6  5.5  1.2  8.4  2013  10.1  3.1  1.0  4.2  0.8  4.9  2014  8.2  4.1  1.8  4.7  1.6  5.0  2015 (estimate)  6.5  3.4  2.8  2.6  2.5  4.0  Source: IMF and Bank calculations. Renewed appreciation of the weak global outlook appears to have been the underlying cause of recent market turbulence.
The financial crisis in an international perspective Course of events – from increased spreads to bank failures Developments during the financial crisis can be illustrated in several ways, for example by using the so-called TED-spreads1, that is, the difference between three-month interbank rates and government security rates. 1  The TED spread is the difference between an interbank rate and a government bond rate. As the banks lend to one another without collateral (that is, with a credit risk) in the interbank market, while government  BIS Review 7/2009  1  The first signs of problems emerged already at the beginning of 2007 when the interest rates of certain so-called structured products with links to the US housing market began to increase. They fell during the spring but rose again in mid-June 2007 when the US investment bank Bear Sterns was forced to liquidate one of its hedge funds due to major losses. But it was in August that the indications of an approaching financial crisis became clearer and the TED spreads increased significantly. One reason for this was that the French bank BNP Paribas announced that it had stopped withdrawals from three of its mutual funds. The lack of liquidity in certain market segments with financial instruments linked to the US housing market had made it impossible to value the underlying assets. The banks began to protect their own liquidity and were unwilling to lend to each other. The gap between the "uncertain" interbank rate and the safe government security rate increased.

Although the US foreign liabilities exceed the assets by over USD 2.5 trillion, the current account income balance of the US in 2005 was positive. This has led  1  As presented by A. Blinder and R. Reis in „Understanding the Greenspan Standard”, presented at the Fed conference in Kansas City in August 2005. (Economic Performance in the Greenspan Era: The Evolution of Events and Ideas). An example of such delays in the possibility of recognising a certain phenomenon is the rapid acceleration of the growth trend in labour productivity in the USA in mid-90s. The former Federal Reserve President Alan Greenspan formulated a thesis that such an acceleration took place in 1995, whereas econometric models where capable to show it only after five years from its occurrence. BIS Review 19/2006  1  to creation of a new hypothesis, according to which the USA exports “dark matter” 2 . It claims that, since the US revenues on foreign assets are higher than the costs of servicing of foreign liabilities, some “other assets” must exist which, being measured incorrectly in the statistics, affect the “real” international investment position of the USA, which is not negative. In such a case, the US current account deficits observed in the recent years would be a statistical illusion. The aforementioned concept has stirred a very lively debate and has been forcefully criticised by many economists, including Willem Buiter 3 , a former EBRD chief economist.
Mark Carney: Fortune favours the bold Lecture by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, to honour the memory of The Honourable James Michael Flaherty, P C, Dublin, 28 January 2015. * 1. *  *  Introduction  It is a pleasure to be in Dublin and an honour to give this Iveagh House lecture in memory of Jim Flaherty. Jim’s attitude and actions typified the Flaherty family motto: Fortune Favours the Bold. Born the sixth of eight children in La Chine, Quebec; Jim Flaherty worked odd jobs and won a hockey scholarship to put himself through Princeton. Successful in private and public sectors; he rose to become Attorney General and Minister of Finance of his province before becoming Canada’s 37th Minister of Finance. Once there, his accomplishments were legion, ranging from creating and enhancing support programs for the disabled and care givers to setting the country back on the path to fiscal balance after the crisis and ensuing recession. His tenure as Canadian finance minister was shaped by that crisis and its aftermath. It was my honour to work with him as Canada weathered the storm. And many of you worked closely with Jim as Ireland negotiated agreements with the Troika and devised policies to rebuild its battered economy. I am confident he would be proud of the progress Ireland has made. I suspect he would be more than a little frustrated with the euro area, however.

In contrast to the nominal exchange rate, which is the relative price of different currencies, the real exchange rate is the relative price of groups of goods. More specifically, the real exchange rate is defined as the amount of domestic goods that has to be provided in exchange for a given amount of goods from abroad. The value of the real exchange rate is calculated in practice as a quotient, the denominator being the product of the nominal exchange rate and an appropriate price index for foreign goods and the numerator the corresponding domestic price index. The real exchange rate is commonly regarded as a measure of a country's international competitiveness. The weaker the real exchange rate - the more domestic goods that are needed to balance a given amount of foreign goods - the cheaper it is for firms and consumers abroad to buy Swedish products: our competitiveness is stronger. It follows that the real exchange rate is a measure of purchasing power; the weaker the real exchange rate, the smaller the amount of foreign goods that can be bought for a given amount of domestic goods. This needs to be kept in mind when discussing what are appropriate central and conversion rates. A weak rate can admittedly confer competitive advantages but it also means that people in Sweden are poorer. Sweden's full participation in the monetary union locks only one of the components of the real exchange rate - the nominal exchange rate.
This may be market discipline, but it does not operate in a way that makes the financial system more stable. The SEC is leading an effort to reform the money market mutual fund industry. Second, the Basel liquidity coverage ratio is under review to ensure that it accomplishes its goals without creating adverse unintended consequences. It will be implemented but in a somewhat altered form, since the proposal is not locked down to the same degree as the Basel III capital standards. Ensuring that financial market utilities (FMUs) are robust is another important workstream with a number of important elements. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act has provisions that enable the Financial Stability Oversight Council to designate particular FMUs as systemically important and, therefore subject to tougher prudential standards. Internationally, the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (CPSS), which I chair, and the International Organization of Security Commissions (IOSCO), have proposed a comprehensive set of operational standards for FMUs, which I expect will be finalized early next year. We expect that these principles will be endorsed and adopted by the G20 countries, establishing a minimum standard for important FMUs around the world. However, progress is slow and uneven. For example, it is unlikely that the G20 countries will meet the goal to clear all standardized over-the-counter derivative trades through central  1  In general, I think progress on liquidity is inherently more difficult than on capital because tougher liquidity standards conflict with one of the basic function of banks-maturity transformation.

Savers want to hold their funds in highly liquid, short-term assets. But borrowers want to lock up their funding over long time periods. Banks help bridge that gap. Pushing banks hard on the liquidity side runs up against this constraint. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  clearing counterparties by the end of 2012. Similarly, I have my doubts whether the next set of industry recommendations to reduce risk in the triparty repo market will be sufficient to eliminate all the major potential sources of instability – including inadequate risk management practices and lack of resiliency to a dealer default. Experience suggests that it is not easy for market participants to agree on measures that enhance financial stability when this goal conflicts with the commercial and business interests. If the private sector falls short in this instance, public authorities may need to intervene and impose more forceful regulatory solutions. I also think that the scorecard is mixed with respect to making financial institutions, in their practices and structure, less prone to amplifying and propagating shocks. On one hand, the capital rules and the CCAR process should cause banks to husband their capital better during times of stress than was the case during the financial crisis. Also, compensation practices are improving in that more pay is deferred and over longer time periods. Similarly, risk management practices have improved.
I think it would be good if we introduced a structure for macroprudential policy that does not differ too much from those being introduced in other EU countries, as the financial markets are strongly integrated and a similar structure for macroprudential policy within the EU would  13  Here I am giving my personal views on the Financial Crisis Committee’s proposal. The Riksbank will present a consultation response later in the spring containing more detailed views and comments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  facilitate international cooperation. The need for international cooperation is based on the fact that measures introduced, or not introduced, on one country can often have consequences for the financial stability of other countries. As I mentioned earlier, it is extremely important to create a clear mandate and efficient tools for macroprudential policy in Sweden. I would like to have seen the Financial Crisis Committee present a proposal that provided a more active structure, and which was closer to the ESRB’s recommendation.14 For instance, it will probably often be unclear who should react to a risk that has arisen, and it will therefore also be difficult to hold an authority accountable for what it has done or failed to do. However, I am glad that the Financial Crisis Committee has now presented its proposal, as it provides an important contribution to the discussion on how macroprudential policy should be developed and organised in Sweden.

And as we have seen in the current crisis, the impact from an externally-induced crisis through contagion can be as large as an internally-induced or home-grown crisis. Second, given the tendency that lessons from past crises will encourage policymakers to adopt more cautious policy and reform, this change in the policy conduct will help reduce the likelihood of an internally-induced crisis based on policy weakness, domestic misalignment, and moral hazard. Instead, the nature of future crises will relate more to the externallyinduced factors. Third, features of the externally-induced crises will mirror a fundamental shift from crises based on macro-misalignment in the individual economies to crises based on failures of key markets, system, and institutions, that are systemically important and have a global-wide impact because of the underlying interconnectedness. The issues of trust, robustness of markets and financial infrastructure, counterparty-risk, information gap, as well as, liquidity will become important possible triggers of the future market disruptions. In addition, geopolitical events or trade tension can also lead to disruptions in global liquidity and trigger a global-wide impact. The main message here is that, going forward, future crises will be different. They will relate less to misalignment in the individual economies because of better policy and regulation, but will relate more to the resiliency of the global system, market and institutions, as well as the ability of the policymakers to prevent or address the vulnerabilities beforehand.