samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is hoped that the discussions during the forum will assist in gathering a consensus on the viability of such an initiative where efforts and resources involved may be substantial. Indeed, it should be noted that there is certainly potential in the development of this shared platform, where combined resources and expertise would foster greater efficiency and provide fresh impetus for a more meaningful and far-reaching development of Islamic finance in the international stage. The prospects of such pioneering works with the possibility of international appeal, if successful, would certainly be exciting. Ladies and gentlemen, SSO, at first sight, seems very much the domain of large global players – where opportunities for significant cost arbitrage involved in, say, the relocation of call centres from the UK to Malaysia seem to be very compelling and obvious options. Understandably, the issue of SSO is tread very cautiously by the smaller and boutique players in the industry. Where bottom lines are concerned, an institution's Board may find little appeal in the proposition of outsourcing where the cost-savings involved may seem minimal. However, there are many rewards to be reaped by an institution's successful execution and maintenance of SSO arrangements and a reduction in operating costs may only form part of the picture. The outsourcing of back office operations, say, allows institutions to accord greater focus on their core competencies and core businesses such as the execution of growth strategies or capturing market share.

ISBN: 9780691242248. Frait, J. (2023, 17 March). Monetary Macroeconomics and Central Banks in Turbulent Times [lecture transcript]. Czech National Bank. Kunert, J. (2017). eské banky musí býti konen oporou a prkopníkem eského vývoje hospodáského. [Czech banks must finally be the backbone and pioneers of Czech economic development] Bankovnictví 2017, No. 8, 10–15. Mandel, M. and Dvoák, P. (2021). Co nás eká s rostoucím státním dluhem? [What awaits us with rising government debt?] Bankovnictví 2021, No. 6, 38–41. ISSN 12124273. Michl, A. (2019a). Banky by mly zvednout úroky u vklad [Banks should raise interest on deposits]. Mladá fronta DNES, 17 January 2019, p. 11, Interview section. Michl, A. (2019b). Ten years later: Lessons for DSGE builders and Czech policy makers (external link). Review of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 159–174. Michl, A. (2022, 23 October). Governor's opening remarks at the CNB Discussion Forum [Audiovisual recording]. Czech National Bank. Michl, A. (2023). The road to the target. Discussion on "Inflation: The road to the target" University of Economics and Business, Prague, 15 May 2023. Rajan, R. (2023). Less is more (external link). Finance and Development Magazine, March 2023, 11–14. 1 CNB Archive, Živnostenská banka archive, ŽB/1777/3, Minutes of the Board of  Directors' meeting of 14 March 1934, Report by Dr. Jaroslav Preiss for the Board of Directors' meeting, p. 3, cat. no. 1777. 6/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
At our monetary policy meeting in May we were able to observe that the new information received since the publication of the Monetary Policy Report in February indicated higher inflationary pressures than we had predicted. One reason was that the result of the spring wage bargaining rounds indicated that wages could increase more quickly during the forecast period than we had estimated in the main alternative in the report published in February. The motive for high wage increases not being part of our main scenario was that we considered that the spare capacity in the labour market still appeared substantial, which would slow down the rate of wage increase. How high wage increases will be in total will depend not only on the collective wage agreements, but also on how much wages rise outside of the agreements. As I mentioned in May, it is reasonable in the currently strong labour market situation to count on wage increases outside of the agreements being higher than they have been in recent years. How high will depend on how well the labour market functions. I pointed to a number of important questions then. Will the labour supply increase to the extent expected? Will the matching of demand for and supply of labour function? How will the stronger labour market situation affect wage negotiations? At the May meeting we were also able to observe that the statistics received for the first quarter showed a slightly more strained labour market situation than we expected to see in February.

2  BIS Review 38/2002  Hong Kong In Hong Kong, other contributors to deflation over the past few years have been the general strength of the US dollar and the process of price equalisation across the border with the Mainland, although both the IMF and we in the HKMA have found that this latter effect is rather weaker overall than a few 5 well publicised examples might lead one to believe. Hong Kong's deflation, of some 12% in CPI terms over four years, seems, however, to be considerably more than could be accounted for by the above list of essentially non-cyclical factors. We therefore infer that much of it has been cyclical. To what extent has the currency board been responsible for this cycle? About half of the fall in our CPI can be attributed to a collapse of property prices, which feed through both directly and indirectly to the CPI. This in turn was largely the result of the bursting of a previous asset price bubble. This is the part of our deflation which may appear most obviously to be linked to domestic monetary conditions rather than to any global cyclical factors.
Market expectations are very similar to the forecasts included in our latest Report, and also point to CPI inflation fluctuating around our 3% target starting the end of this year. Convergence of inflation rests on two main assumptions. The first one, that our RER will remain relatively stable at its current levels; a level we believe is consistent with fundamentals. And the second one, that the output gap will gradually close by the end of this year (figure 3). Figure 3  CPI Inflation (*)  Core inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Mar. 2017 Report  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Dec. 2016 Report  (*) The grey area, starting from the first quarter of 2017, corresponds to the forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. 5. Actually, activity has been worse than expected. According to recent data the output gap is currently somewhat larger than we anticipated in December. GDP grew by 1.6% in 2016, in line with what was anticipated then.

Most of the time, they are driven by rapid inflows and outflows of capital. We still vividly remember the crises in Mexico, Asia, Russia and Argentina. Obviously, these crises have not been restricted to the financial sector, but have had a profound impact on the real economy as well. The lifting of restrictions to cross-border holding and trading of financial assets has unleashed massive capital flows. According to World Bank figures, global debt and equity flows (excluding foreign direct 2 investment) expanded by more than five times since 1991, from USD 794 billion to USD 4.3 trillion . Without doubt, this development reflects a long-term trend. More and more investors decide globally and on the basis of risk-adjusted expected returns. Taking place in a system of increasingly integrated capital markets, capital allocation has become more efficient. The other side of the coin, however, is the increased volatility on financial markets. Indeed, portfolio investments, in particular those in markets with relatively high liquidity, have become more erratic, as fund injections and withdrawals respond very quickly to new information. According to the IMF, assets managed by institutional investors on mature markets are estimated at about USD 30 trillion in 1998. Thus, any shift in such a huge portfolio is very likely to exacerbate economic cycles and will possibly lead to contagion among financial markets. The impact of portfolio re-balancing will be all the more powerful as macroeconomic policies seem to be unsustainable and as financial institutions show fundamental weaknesses, often with regard to financial strength, supervision and transparency.
Financial literacy is becoming even more relevant given the last decade’s proliferation of the innovative services offered by new FinTech companies. The tighter regulatory grip on traditional sources of finance, on the one hand, and promotion of new alternative sources of finance underpinned by technology, on the other hand, have been conducive to emergence of array of new financial products and services. This promotes higher financial inclusion, but also exposes consumers to new risks. The fact that FinTech solutions can be very complex make the task of risk identification and mitigation by service providers and/or regulators difficult. According 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  to “Southeast Europe focus on Fintech and Innovation” the FinTech is the fastest growing IT branch and the two largest FinTech segments in the region, each comprising a quarter of all FinTech companies, are payments services and crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending. Over the last couple of years, this trend has even led to discussions for risk of financial exclusion in case financial education does not keep pace with financial innovations. It asks for a greater vigilance, awareness and knowledge by all of the stakeholders on the possibilities it offers, but on the risks and threats as well. Going beyond the importance for the well-being of the individuals and the overall financial stability, financial literacy can play an important role in increasing the domestic savings, which is one of the key factors in speeding up the real convergence in the region.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Opening address - Fifth Meeting of the Regional Working Group for Financial Education of Southeastern Europe Opening address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the Fifth Meeting of the Regional Working Group for Financial Education of Southeastern Europe, Skopje, 27 September 2019. * * * Distinguished representatives of the central banks, Dear representatives of international institutions, Dear guests, ladies and gentleman, It is my great pleasure to give the opening address at the Fifth Meeting of the Regional Working Group for Financial Education of Southeastern Europe, hosted by our national bank. I am more than certain that joint fora, such as this one, are important venue for raising our awareness and knowledge on matters of mutual interest. And, there is no dilemma that financial education, as a spotlight of this working group, is an issue of mutual interest gaining prominence and importance among all stakeholders – central banks, regulators, financial services providers, consumers. We are all faced with rapidly evolving financial landscape, in which being knowledgeable means being capable of reaping the benefits and mitigating risks. Now allow me to shed some light on a couple of important dimensions such as relevance of the financial literacy and the benefits it brings to the society, the specific circumstances that brought this issue to the fore in the last decade, the role played by the central banks in this segment, the current state and the challenges ahead for the region and our country.
Once the consultative period has concluded and the best practices are finalized, the TMPG calls for all participants in the Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS markets to adopt these business practices. As primary dealers, you are, of course, also expected to implement these best practices. We also expect you to be good citizens of the Treasury market more broadly, and to be proactive in identifying worrying trends or suggesting further enhancements to these best practices as the market evolves further. You play a critical and central role in ensuring that the Treasury market remains a robust and efficient fixture of the global financial landscape. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9

Broadly speaking, this operational philosophy is guided by the need to steer the short-term interest rates in the interbank market close to the key interest rate set by the monetary authority. As such, it serves better to keeping the short-term horizon of the interest rates’ curve under check, making the conduct of monetary policy more transparent and providing clearer signals for the economic activity. Steering our operations to the stability of interbank market interest rates will serve to a more relaxed functioning of the interbank market and lowering of risk premiums. In addition, this operational target is well-framed in our mediumterm steering and commitment to adopting the inflation targeting regime, making up an important link of its successful adoption. Concluding my theoretical discussion of this change, I would like to underline that our longterm commitment to keeping our foreign reserve at optimal levels to cope with the shocks Albania may be faced with remains an unquestionable objective of our monetary policy. In an institutional aspect, I would like to note that such a move does not only attest to the level of maturity of our interbank market. It also crowns our constant efforts in achieving its utmost efficient management. In this context, the Bank of Albania has made utmost efforts to develop liquidity forecast models, to dampen the impact of fiscal flows into the money markets and to develop optimal procedures and modalities of interbank market interventions.
When it comes to mutual insurance against asymmetric shocks, it is clear that fiscal risks do not always stem from fiscal action, but from unsustainable economic and financial policies elsewhere. Therefore, any move in this direction should be accompanied by a new convergence process towards more resilient economic structures. Such a process would allow us to advance together towards a better-equipped EMU, outlining a clear path of reform and a commitment to a fiscal capacity. Political convergence is needed to kick off such a process, as any new convergence process can only be as effective as the legitimacy underpinning it. Conclusion Let me conclude by saying that protection against moral hazard is of course very important. At the same time, it should not be used as a strategy to relegate the move towards a fiscal capacity for the euro area to never-never land. The move towards a fiscal capacity could take the form of a gradual and conditional process that allows us to move in parallel towards restored fiscal buffers at the national level, convergence in the capacity to absorb shocks at the national level and a strengthening of institutions at the euro area level, while moving, equally gradually, towards more central fiscal stabilisation. 3  See Cœuré, B.: “Drawing lessons from the crisis for the future of the euro area” speech at “Ambassadors Week”, Paris, 27 August 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I think we should be more ambitious in that respect.

We should be the ones to be thankful to you. Finally, let me express a special “thank you” to the teachers here for making this event happen, and for the wonderful guidance and support you have given to your students. Let me also add a “thank you” to some people who are not here, who are your families, for the support they must have given to you to be able to reach such an achievement today. You are very lucky to be so well taught – even if you might not have realised it; or even if your teachers might not be aware of how much good they have given to you; or even if your families are not aware of how much good they do to their children. It just comes with being a father or a mother. So again, let me congratulate you and congratulate everyone who has been involved in your success. Let’s now open our discussion. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
To the extent that a move to off-balance-sheet activities raises banks’ risk, Basel II will result in higher capital charges – and thereby reduce banks’ incentives and possibilities to arbitrage around a leverage ratio. More importantly, the Basel Committee is now in the process of improving the treatment of off-balance-sheet items under Basel II. Second, if we conclude that despite the ongoing reforms of Basel II, off-balance-sheet exposures continue to undermine adequate capital provisioning, the leverage ratio can easily be enhanced to include such exposures. In Canada, for instance, some off-balance-sheet items are added to banks’ total assets when calculating the leverage ratio. Alternatively, we could go further and consider defining a “managed leverage ratio” as proposed by Professor Joseph Mason of Louisiana State University, “which takes all the securitisations and puts them back on the balance sheet”. 21 •  Pro-cyclicality: There are valid concerns that a leverage ratio may amplify the financial cycle. First, the imposition of a leverage ratio in the middle of the current crisis would put additional de-leveraging pressure on banks. Second, in the long run it would make the availability of credit more volatile. Banks would be forced to cut down on lending in a downturn in order to comply with the leverage ratio requirements. Unfortunately, this so-called pro-cyclicality is inherent to all forms of capital regulation. The problem stems from the fact that in most cases, specific capital minima have to be respected throughout the cycle.

As the industry gears itself for the next phase of growth in the more challenging environment, our commitment and strategies to keep raising the bar to bring Islamic finance to a new level will enhance its prospect to contribute to achieving our shared vision of inclusive growth in an environment of financial stability. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
And if many firms make these mistakes at the same time then the result is an unnecessary fluctuation in aggregate output. Another decision affected by uncertainty about prices is investment. Many investments are specific to a particular model or product, and so they become sunk costs. For such irreversible investments it may pay to wait before investing since time will resolve some of the uncertainty. A Premiership football team may decide to postpone the construction of a new stadium until their survival in the League is assured. Or a car manufacturer may postpone a decision about opening a new plant to see if a rise in demand is temporary or appears likely to last. And that uncertainty could stem from a difficulty in disentangling relative from absolute prices. In the language of finance, there is an option value to waiting when there is uncertainty about the returns on an irreversible investment. So a project must offer a rate of return sufficient not only to cover the cost of financing of the project, but also the option value to waiting. That may explain why surveys of firms show that their hurdle rates of return are often well in excess of the cost of either equity or debt finance. For example a CBI survey last year found that the average real hurdle rate for UK firms was 11.3% - down from rates of around 15% in surveys conducted in 1994 - but still well above the cost of financial capital.

Decisions on interest rates were taken out of the political arena in May 1997 and delegated by the Chancellor to the new Monetary Policy Committee. It is too soon to compare the nine-member Monetary Policy Committee with the Council of Nine that ruled Siena during the fourteenth century. Exactly 660 years before the Chancellor created the MPC, the Council of Nine commissioned Lorenzetti to paint the marvellous frescoes in the Palazzo Pubblico showing the virtues of Good Government and the vices of Bad Government. There are few more convincing representations of the case for stability than those frescoes. Since the MPC has not, at least yet, discovered a modern Lorenzetti, I shall present the case for price stability in a more orthodox, if less compelling, visual form. Chart 1 shows consumer price inflation in this country over the past fifty years. The decade of inflation targeting stands out as a period of low and stable inflation. Table 1 shows that not only has inflation been lower since inflation targeting was introduced, but that, as measured by its standard deviation, it  BIS Review 68/2002  1  has also been more stable than in recent decades. Moreover, inflation has been less persistent - in the sense that shocks to inflation die away more quickly - under inflation targeting than for most of the past 1 century. Now this fall in inflation has led to sharp reductions in nominal interest rates, at both short and long time horizons, as shown in Table 2.
Strike two comes from the fact that central banks are not subject to financial solvency constraints in the way that commercial banks are. And that, again, is because their ability to create fiat money means they can always meet liabilities denominated in our own currencies. As a result, there is nothing impossible about a central bank trading with negative capital. Indeed, some (particularly those defending foreign exchange rate pegs) have done just that (Table 1). Chart 1: Central banks as financial firefighters  Table 1: Example central bank equity ratios Equity /  Risk tolerance  Private financial system  Central banks Normal conditions  Liquidity crisis  Degree of systemic stress  Total assets (%) European Central Bank  16  Swiss National Bank  10  Bank of Japan  2  US Federal Reserve  1  Bank of England  1  Bank of Israel  –6  Central Bank of Chile  –7  Source: International Monetary Fund; Bank of England; central bank financial statements Equity and total assets are measured on an accounting basis so do not account for factors such as off-balance sheet exposures or government indemnities. Balance dates are February 2016 for the Bank of England, March 2016 for the Bank of Japan and end 2015 for other central banks.

As of 2011, fiscal deficits in the region have narrowed once more to an average of 1.1% of GDP. 35. Asian economies must continually recalibrate their monetary and fiscal policies, as external demand conditions and domestic cost pressures pull in opposite directions. Maintaining flexibility in macroeconomic policies must go hand-in-hand with reforms to strengthen domestic demand. Breaking new ground in macroprudential policies 36. The de-synchronisation of global macroeconomic cycles between the advanced economies and emerging market economies poses more challenges for the latter than the former. As long as monetary conditions in the advanced economies remain easy, emerging market economies face the risk of misallocated resources and disruptive capital flows, which in turn can affect both price stability and financial stability. 37. Low interest rates and abundant liquidity have contributed to asset price accelerations in some Asian countries, especially in real estate markets. Residential property prices in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, for example, have increased by 35% on average since 2009, while nominal wages have risen by only 13%. 38. No doubt, increased capital flows to emerging market economies reflect the superior growth prospects of these economies. There is a structural rebalancing of global investment portfolios towards emerging markets in general, and Emerging Asia in particular. A multi-pronged policy response is needed to ensure that inflationary pressures remain contained in the face of this “wall of money” – including a gradual appreciation of nominal effective exchange rates.