samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chart 11: Impact of monetary policy on income, across the income distribution (%)  Chart 12: Impact of monetary policy on wealth, across the wealth distribution £  Impact as of 2012-14 (% of annual income)  Impact as of 2012-14 £ 2013 prices) 40  400000 Financial asset prices Inflation effects House prices Pensions Total  30 20  350000 300000 250000 200000  10  150000 0 Interest receipts/payments Macro effects on labour incomes Total  100000 50000  -10  0 -20  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  All  -50000 1  2  3  5  6  7  8  9  10  All  Net wealth decile in 2012-14  Income decile in 2012-14 Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Note: Chart shows average cumulative real impact of policy changes since 2007 as of 2012-14 as a percentage of annual income. 4  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Note: Chart shows average cumulative real impact of policy changes since 2007 as of 2012-14 in pounds, using 2013 prices.

26  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  26  Chart 21: Impact of QE, across the income distribution  Chart 22: Impact of monetary policy on welfare, across the income distribution  Impact as of 2012-14 (% of annual income)  Utility Total income  50 House prices Inflation effects Financial asset prices Macro effects on labour income Total  0.035  Total wealth 0.03  Unemployment effect  40  Total  0.025  30 0.02 20 0.015 10  0.01  0  0.005 0  -10 1  2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9 Income decile in 2012-14  10  1  All  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  All  Income decile in 2012-14  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations Note: Chart shows average cumulative real impact of QE since 2007 as of 2012-14 as a percentage of annual income.
The continuity of reform momentum – especially that geared to product and  6/7  factor markets and to improving the business environment – is a key element for promoting growth. In Spain, the recovery is providing for significant headway in restoring the main macroeconomic equilibria. But we cannot maintain our growth if we abandon, or step back from, the agenda of reforms aimed at improving our productivity, our competitiveness and the flexibility of our productive system; these are the pillars of economic growth, of lower unemployment and of the re-balancing of public finances that ensures their sustainability and provides for fiscal policy headroom to boost investment and growth. Last but by no means least, the demographic developments our country will foreseeably face in the coming decades, like other EU members, place greater and more pressing demands on the economic policy responses to the foregoing challenges. This is because a progressively older population makes it more difficult to entrench budgetary sustainability and to ensure long-term economic growth. Conclusion As we all know, the economic and political context in which we must face these challenges is not exactly going to be an easy one. The plans for European unity, in their various configurations prior to those we have today, have over the almost 60 years since the project was launched overcome highly diverse difficulties.

The flood of closures, almost amounting to a panic, caused a further widening of interest rate spreads. LTCM’s situation deteriorated rapidly; by the end of September the fund had lost almost 90 per cent of its capital in the course of nine months. The U.S. Federal Reserve had initiated a meeting with some of LTCM’s counterparties and on 23 September fourteen banks with claims on the fund agreed to take over LTCM as a joint venture and try to wind up the positions in a more orderly manner. The Federal Reserve’s motivation for initiating a solution to the problem was not the sizeable losses that might have been incurred by many of the banks concerned. Its concern instead was the financial system in general. If the banks that had provided loans were to close their large positions spontaneously in a market that was already illiquid and turbulent, other agents who were not directly involved would be hit. The steep price fall would probably have paralysed  BIS Review 23/1999  6  the financial markets for a time and this might have triggered a vicious circle of declining confidence and further closures—the Fed perceived a large systemic risk. The ultimate consideration was, of course, the potential hazard for the global economy. It is difficult to say what might have happened if the Federal Reserve had not acted. The banks that were involved had a strong interest in achieving a controlled settlement of their commitments and would probably have acted at some stage.
It is also well-known that, despite their social challenges, many with autism have powerful intellectual skills – for example, in pattern recognition. That it is why it has been estimated that as many as 50% of Silicon Valley innovators may have Asperger’s Syndrome, a type of 8  autism. Yet how easy would it be for those with autism to thrive in our organisations? The facts rather speak for themselves. Only around 12% of high-functioning individuals with autism are in work. Another aspect to recruitment which inhibits diversity-building is that it tends to be judged with individual, rather than the organisational, attributes in mind. Let’s take a simple example to illustrate. Consider two candidates for a job sitting a test. The first scores 8 out of 10, the second 4 out of 10. The first person is clearly the best person for the job. But are they the right person for the organisation? 8  See The Economist (2016) ‘Beautiful minds, wasted: how not to squander the potential of autistic people’. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  That is not so clear. What if the second person answers correctly the two questions the first candidate gets wrong. And what if the same is true of most of the existing employees in the company – likely, as they will have probably helped set the test. In this situation, the second candidate may well be the better one for the organisation because they bring organisational strength through diversity, despite being individually weaker.

[38]As was done in Article 20 of the SSM Regulation in respect of the audit. [39]For general considerations on that matter, see Bini Smaghi, L. (2006), “  Independence and accountability of supervision in the European financial market”. [40]For instance, the German supervisory authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) is subject to  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  instructions from the Ministry of Finance. [41]See also Bini Smaghi, L. (2006), “  Independence and accountability of supervision in the European financial market”. [42]The Chair has a non-renewable term of office of five years  (Article 26(3) of the SSM Regulation) and may be dismissed from office following a special procedure by the appointing body (the Council) only in two specifically listed cases (Article 26(4) of the SSM Regulation). [43]The Vice Chair is chosen from among the members of the Executive Board and the independence safeguards for the Executive Board apply to her/him (Article 26(3) and (4) of the SSM Regulation). [44]The rules for the ECB representatives in the Supervisory Board are not set out in the SSM Regulation but in the ECB Decision on the appointment of representatives of the ECB to the Supervisory Board (ECB/2014/4), which defines a nonrenewable term of office of five years (Article 1(2)) and lists the two specific cases under which they can be dismissed from office by the appointing authority (the ECB’s Governing Council).
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Modern central banks have to have open communication with the public Address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the at the Journalist Workshop - 2019, organized by the NBRNM, Skopje, 27 December 2019. * * * Distinguished media representatives,  It is my honor and pleasure to welcome you at the beginning of our fifth workshop dedicated to you, journalists and the media. As a central bank, we are constantly investing in new ways and forms of public communication. But you – the seventh power in modern society, are the key link in the process of communicating our views to the general public, which is extremely important, given its heterogeneity. We all differ, we belong to different educational profiles and age groups, we have different interests and attitudes about risk, we respond differently to certain changes in the economy. Through your informative and research articles, you enable our analysis and data to be not only accessible but also understandable to more target groups. For us, this is very important, especially because as a central bank, we have an increasingly active role in both financial education and fostering financial inclusion. In modern times, communication with the public is actually part of the central banks’ set of instruments.

Through it, among other things, we not only influence on the economic agents’ expectations and behavior, but ensure our transparency, as well, which is especially important because the central bank is an independent institution, and independence goes hand in hand with accountability. After all, transparency and accountability are the fundamental principles underlying our operations – they guarantee the preservation of the confidence and integrity of the National Bank. Moreover, the public confidence in us and in our capacity to deliver macroeconomic and financial stability is a sine qua non to our success. The communication of central banks is a dynamic category. Several decades ago, globally, central banks were closed institutions whose communication was extremely complex – clear and close only to certain groups that knew central banking well. As FED’s former Chairman Alan, Greenspan’s once said: “If I’ve made myself too clear, you must have misunderstood me”. But today, we, the central banks, operate in a world of openness and clarity and tend to be understandable in our public speaking. Particularly significant changes in communication have been evident in the last ten years since the beginning of the global economic and financial crisis. And not just through greater openness in communication, but also in the way central banks present themselves in their releases. This is not surprising, since we all, during the crisis, faced with high uncertainty, mistrust, and we started using instruments outside the conventional set of instruments. With regard to these changes, I would particularly emphasize the ECB’s example.
Moreover, as bank balance sheets have shrunk, and as they have rebalanced more towards traditional banking than trading, they have become more focussed on the real economy. In short, any serious look at the experience of post-crisis reform shows that reform and regulation support – not damage – long-term prosperity. Furthermore, the reforms have also brought benefits in terms of the distribution of the costs and benefits of finance. The removal of the implicit taxpayer subsidy transfers the costs of excessive risk taking to private creditors and away from the taxpayer. And by making resolution of failing institutions a real possibility and facilitating smooth exit, the reforms will also promote competition. Before the crisis, the largest and most systemic firms enjoyed the largest subsidies. Now, over time, the absence of that subsidy will create a level playing field, transferring the benefits of finance to customers and clients. These benefits will accrue slowly over time. Indeed, they may never be obvious to many who don’t recall a different world. That is why it is vital that our sons and daughters are taught not that financial crises are inevitable, but that they are both avoidable and tremendously costly for jobs, growth and prosperity. The lessons of the crisis need to be learned and handed down to future generations in order that the next phase of reform is sustained. Those reforms have the potential to make finance more effective in serving the real economy. A more diverse financial system can be both more resilient and more effective.

Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives (2013), An assessment of the longterm economic impacts of stronger capital and liquidity requirements, www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf. Menon, R (2013), Global Regulatory Reform: What’s done, what to watch for, (Speech at the 4th Pan-Asian Regulatory Summit 25/09/2013). Sapir, A, Wolff, G (2013), The neglected side of banking union: reshaping Europe’s financial system, www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/792-the-neglected-sideof-banking-union-reshaping-europes-financial-system/. Shafik, M (2014), Making markets fair and effective, www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech771.pdf. Shanmugaratnam, T (2013), Effective Regulation, (Interview with Reuters, July 2013) Shin, H, Feroli, M, Kashyap, A and Schoenholtz, K & Shin, H (2014) Market tantrums and monetary policy, (Chicago Booth Research Paper 14–09). 22  BIS central bankers’ speeches
It is higher than in Sweden and the UK, but lower than in Denmark and the Netherlands. Norway is among the countries with the highest share of owner-occupied dwellings, at around 80 per cent. This high proportion partly accounts for the high mortgage debt of households. In recent years, new loan products have also been launched, facilitating mortgage equity withdrawal. Housing wealth has become more liquid. Borrowers have greater scope for choosing repayment profiles. We cannot identify the exact level of household debt that can be sustained over time, but the rapid build-up of debt makes households more vulnerable. BIS Review 28/2007  11  Housing investment for the household sector as a whole is now being fully debt-financed, which means an increase in net debt. It would appear that household saving has fallen markedly in Norway in the recent past. Saving was negative in the latter half of 2006, which is the first time saving has fallen since 1988. The pronounced fall in saving indicates that households are taking greater chances. At the same time, government revenues and savings are high. The long period of prosperity and government budget surpluses may have engendered a sense of security which is also affecting household saving and house purchases. Petroleum and the Government Pension Fund – Global  High oil and gas production and high prices, combined with high returns, have resulted in a rapid rise in the value of the Government Pension Fund in recent years.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Managing emerging market challenges – Thailand’s and Asian perspectives Remarks by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the reception of the 2011 Emerging Markets Central Bank Governor of the Year Award for Asia, Emerging Markets, Washington DC, 24 September 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished Ministers and Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great honor to receive this prestigious award, and I would like to thank the Emerging Markets for your kind recognition. In fact, such recognition is unexpected as I simply fulfill my obligations as central bank governor. To be awarded for doing your job, I guess the job must be quite difficult or challenging. More importantly, I consider this award a recognition of the dedication of the staff of the Bank of Thailand, who have worked hard to ensure Thailand’s sustainable economic and financial stability over the years. As the Bank of Thailand enters its seventieth anniversary next year, our institution is faced with a great challenge to maintain price stability while sustaining growth in the midst of heightened global economic and financial risks. We have no luxury of taking a wait-and-see approach but to continue our best efforts to better manage the external spillovers on our economy and financial system. With continued volatile global capital movements, central banks in emerging markets need to ensure that our financial institutions and markets remain robust; that they can safely and efficiently manage foreign capital inflows as well as outflows, without disrupting the real economy.
Cera, K. (2022), “Measuring market-based and non-bank financing of non-financial corporations in the euro area”, Financial Integration and Structure in the Euro Area, ECB, April, Box 2. 5. Giuzio, M. and Lenoci, F. (2023), “Corporate loans vs market-based finance: substitutes or complements?”, Financial Stability Review, ECB, May (forthcoming). 6. Grjebine, T., Szczerbowicz, U. and Tripier, F. (2018), “Corporate debt structure and economic recoveries”, European Economic Review, Vol. 101, January, pp. 77-100. 7. Grimm, N., Laeven, L. and Popov, A. (2021), “Quantitative easing and corporate innovation”, Working Paper Series, No 2615, ECB, November. 8. Dekker, L., Molestina Vivar, L., Wedow, M. and Weistroffer, C. (2022), “Liquidity mismatch in open-ended funds: trends, gaps and policy implications”, Financial Stability Review, ECB, November, Box 6. 9. Molestina Vivar, L., Wedow, M. and Weistroffer, C. (2023), “Burned by leverage? Flows and fragility in bond mutual funds”, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 72, June, pp. 354-380. 10. Grill, M., Molestina Vivar, L., Mücke, C., O’Donnell, C., O’Sullivan, S., Wedow, M., Weis, M. and Weistroffer, C. (2022), “Mind the liquidity gap: a discussion of money market fund reform proposals”, Macroprudential Bulletin, Issue 16, ECB, January. Copyright 2023, European Central Bank

Prices thus do not appear to have been driven by fundamental factors such as rents and vacancies, but instead by investors lowering their rate of return requirement. The size of this requirement depends  BIS Review 105/2006  1  partly on long-term interest rates, but also on how much risk investors are willing to take, what risk premium they require. As long-term interest rates have not fallen - they have more probably risen during the period, this indicates that falling risk premiums have pushed up prices. While this in itself is no great surprise – risk premiums on all kinds of high risk assets around the world have fallen in recent years, and it would have been surprising if Swedish commercial property had been an exception from this trend – there is reason to question whether the current low risk premiums are reasonable. If they were to be adjusted upwards to the earlier more normal levels, this would create downward pressure on commercial property prices. The Riksbank thus has reason to continue closely following developments in this field. Nevertheless, earnings and payment capacity in the property sector are good. Unlike the early 1990s, the property companies have on the whole sufficient capital to be able to manage a reasonable fall in property prices. My assessment is therefore that the commercial property sector does not constitute a threat to the stability of the financial system at present. The housing market Let me now move on to the housing market.
Overseas regulators (as host  2  See The PRA’s approach to the implementation of the systemic risk buffer: Statement of Policy; 5 December 2016. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  EMBARGO: not for release before 19:30 on Wednesday 4 October 2017  authorities) use their own rules to set requirements for the subsidiaries in their territories. They might consider these businesses to be systemic on a local basis. They might measure financial transactions under different accounting rules, apply different prudential approaches to assessing risks, or restrict capital transfer to the UK parent. Therefore, a UK bank’s overseas subsidiary might be required to have an outsize portion of its group’s capital. Back at home, the parent might fund the subsidiary’s higher capital requirement by raising debt externally. This is known as ‘double leverage’ and firms use it because debt is generally cheaper than equity. But servicing double leverage relies on flows of dividend income which are uncertain and at the discretion of local boards and supervisors across the group. Or the parent might be incentivised to under-allocate resources to unregulated but risk-taking entities within the group. We need to be mindful of the risks this can create, and so today we are announcing a new approach, to 3  ensure that UK banking groups are at least as strong as their parts . Subject to our consultation:   We will expect firms to demonstrate to us that they can manage the cash-flow and other risks associated with double leverage.

Some see this as a response to US rules that require large foreign banking organisations to establish an ‘intermediate holding company’ to hold the ownership interest of all their US subsidiaries. We are not persuaded that these developments are a good idea. Unlike retail banking, wholesale banking is international by nature. We risk kidding ourselves if we think it can be neatly chopped up into geographic units in which international banks can be supervised and resolved separately. If the real objective of the reform is to bring large investment firms within the scope of SSM oversight, that could be much more efficiently achieved by designating such firms, as we have done in the UK. Those eight firms which – by reference to published thresholds – have the potential to present systemic risk to the stability of the UK 10  financial system are supervised by the PRA as well as the FCA . The expectations on designated investment firms are in effect the same as on other subsidiaries of international banks. This system helps facilitate what is proving to be a highly effective and co-ordinated supervisory relationship with the US. It is best to deepen co-operation so that between us we can properly supervise wholesale banking through branches as well as subsidiaries. This will be challenging, but progress since the crisis shows it can be done. Governments and regulators came together through the Financial Stability Board in a spirit of co-operative resolve and enlightened self-interest to build a framework of global standards.