samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We – in this case I mean the IMF, its major creditors and the governments in the region – treated these cases as closer to the illiquidity extreme on the continuum, rather than to the insolvency extreme. In the Asian crisis countries, unlike in Russia or Argentina, there was no plausible case for arguing that the sovereign governments had accumulated debts they were unable to repay. A forced restructuring of the external debt of a country or a forced suspension of payments on those obligations would have made the crisis in Asia, and more broadly, substantially worse. These were not conditions of insolvency, but nor were they purely temporary liquidity problems that could have been addressed through the quick infusion of unconditional finance without any change in policies. The crisis economies all tried that strategy in the weeks and in some cases months before going to the IMF for assistance. Those strategies failed not simply because the governments ran out of reserves, but because they had failed to embrace a broader set of policy changes powerful enough to restore confidence in future stability and growth. It is worth emphasizing that the strategies ultimately adopted in each case were quite unorthodox and were certainly not uniform. Besides the novel approach adopted in terms of the scale and structure of financing and the degree of international cooperation in support of the programs, the policy packages were also notable in the degree of emphasis placed on, for example, financial-sector reform and improvements to disclosure.

However, for reasons not very clear, this assistance was sought from USA and not from the UK, the traditional advisor of the country. Thus, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was approached by the then Minister of Finance, J. R. Jayawardene, to obtain the services of a suitable consultant. The Bank, in turn, informed the government that it could not release its best consultant, namely, David L Gosse, for this purpose, because he had been occupied in some other assignment at that time. Gosse was considered the ideal expert for the job, because he already possessed the required experience for the job at hand by pioneering the work relating to the establishment of the Central Bank of the Philippines. However, Gosse was kind enough to recommend his assistant, John Exter, for the job. Hence, Exter was not the first choice, but an engagement done by default. Yet, the wisdom, erudition and professionalism shown by Exter in both making the recommendations and subsequent running of the Bank, is a testimony that he was the correct choice for the job at hand. John Exter had an illustrious academic as well as professional career. After graduating from the College of Wooster, he completed post graduate work at both the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Harvard University. After a brief stint at MIT during World War II, he joined the Federal Reserve System as an economist. Then, in 1948, he was on release to serve the Government of the Philippines as advisor to its Secretary of Finance.
But the amount of data we collect through these processes has been growing. It’s hard to capture all of our data collections in a single measure. But the accompanying chart shows the number of data points we collect through our regular rule-based banking collections. Since 2014, this has grown around seven-fold. This growth has partly been a response to the financial crisis of 2008, when regulators and authorities around the world discovered huge gaps in what they knew, and what they could see, of risks emerging in the financial sector. At the same time, technological change has been increasing the volume of data being produced, and the demands we can put upon the data. Like many of the financial firms we regulate, we want to make more extensive use of this bountiful data, using bigger datasets and newer, more complex analytical techniques. These developments – the availability of, and need for, more data, and the desire to do more with it - have put growing strains on the processes and systems we use to collect it in the first place. That poses a growing challenge for us and for firms who are sending us the data, each firm doing so independently and in a different way. And if it’s hard for firms to supply us the right data, well, that matters for us. It may take industry longer to meet our requests. And if different firms interpret our requests in different ways, that makes it harder for us to draw conclusions from the data we receive.

How we manage the fund in the best way possible and ensure that its assets benefit current and future generations alike is a question that is more relevant than ever. A part of the answer is to make the most of the fund’s defining characteristics – size, liquidity and long-term horizon – to create excess return. The experience of the past 20 years shows that this is possible. As a large, long-term investor, we manage the fund responsibly. This requires active ownership. We engage in dialogue with companies worldwide in order to improve their long-term earnings and weed out companies with business models that are not sustainable. Here we must also take active investment decisions. Such a large fund cannot be managed passively. Responsible investment requires active ownership. Active management and active ownership are closely related. This interaction has huge potential. Active management entails risk. To mitigate this risk, the Bank’s Executive Board and investment management organisation have established a set of investment strategies. These strategies complement one another and constitute a whole. Over time, they have yielded excess returns, well within the risk limits set in the Bank’s mandate. Finally, we depend on the people in the organisation to achieve our set objectives. Many of our asset managers have built up unique expertise by monitoring companies closely through many years’ work. Others contribute ideas and approaches to developing new methods and analyses. Still others help to make choices large and small every day to create excess returns.
14  See page 54 of the November 2017 Financial Stability Report. See the December 2015 Financial Stability Report. and ‘Has corporate bond market liquidity fallen?’ 16 See page 27 of the July 2016 Financial Stability Report. 17 Calculations based on sterling corporate bonds for the United Kingdom, private non-financial companies in the euro area and corporate and foreign bonds held in the United States. UK and euro area data from 2008 to 2017 H1. US data from 2008 to 2017Q1. 15  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  If a fund is selling assets in timeframes shorter than typically need to obtain the market price, then redemptions result in a transfer of value to redeeming from remaining investors. When investors think others might redeem, they might face an incentive to run to the exit. 18  This isn’t an issue in markets like equities where sale periods are typically shorter than the daily redemption term of the mutual fund. But for funds investing in corporate bonds and particularly less liquid assets like commercial property, it could be, in principle at least. Unless it can be corrected through appropriate pricing arrangements in the fund, this structure might create an advantage to getting out first. Existing ‘swing pricing’ arrangements go some way to doing this but may not be sufficient to correct it fully.

Frank Elderson: The European Central Bank's monetary policy strategy - delivering our mandate in all circumstances Keynote speech by Mr Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the European Parliament conference on "Greening monetary policy in times of soaring inflation", Brussels, 28 September 2022. *** Many thanks for giving me the opportunity to deliver the introductory remarks at this conference on greening monetary policy at a time when inflation is far too high. Although I am delivering these remarks remotely, it is always a privilege to speak directly to you, the elected representatives of Europe's citizens, the very same citizens – served by EU institutions, including the European Central Bank – who are united in their commitment to foster peace and stability in their part of the world, even when that very world is subject to significant transformation and upheaval. The pandemic and the war have shaken the environment in which the EU must address the vital challenges that it faces, including the ongoing climate and environmental crises. Since Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the global economic outlook has become much less favourable. Having said that, the invasion has not shaken the EU's resolve to address the challenges faced. In actual fact, the war and the ensuing energy crisis have only served to increase EU authorities' determination to reduce the bloc's dependence on fossil energy sources.
* At the end of the summer 2020, when we began ‐ at our modest deputy level – to launch this conference, we were convinced that the message of the Green Swan was worth spreading, but we were far from sure that it would attract such a prestigious set of speakers. This was before the new momentum we are experiencing thanks to the political shift in the United States, following the ambitious Italian G20 and UK G7 presidencies. Now, only a few months later, the context is quite different. Governments are more aware than ever before, that they need to act, to anticipate; there is more appetite for multilateral cooperation. The private sector is making many commitments to net‐zero emissions. However, a number of questions arise that we cannot answer easily. Three of them seem particularly important: 3  International Energy Agency – IEA (2021). Net Zero by 2050. A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector. Accessible at: https://www.iea.org/reports/net‐zero‐by‐2050  2  Should we focus on climate change or broaden the scope? How can we make sure that public policies are consistent? How to thrive within limits? Allow me to develop these points. * I. BEYOND CLIMATE? The Charter of the NGFS,4 adopted in December 2017, states that the network aims, in particular, to “contribute to the development of environment and climate risk management”. It is key to consider how ecological crises are in fact multiple and interconnected.

by opposing techno‐utopians and techno‐pessimists, or proponents of “degrowth” to proponents of “green growth”) is not constructive Lastly, given the well‐known limitations of GDP as a measure of well‐being, it is also important to bear in mind that the definition of growth itself is bound to evolve in the future. For instance, as recently stressed by Professor Nicholas Stern and co‐authors in an IMF working paper,17 we should move from a “flow‐ 16  See Keyßer, L.T., Lenzen, M. (2021). 1.5 °C degrowth scenarios suggest the need for new mitigation pathways. Nature Communications 12, 2676. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467‐021‐22884‐9 17 Bhattacharya, A., Ivanyna, M., Oman, W., Stern, N. (2021). Climate Action to Unlock the Inclusive Growth Story of the 21st Century. IMF Working Paper 21/147. 7  centred focus on GDP” to a “stock‐centred focus on a broad definition of capital”; “the conceptual framework used by policymakers must treat planetary boundaries – notably climate overshoot – as a hard constraint”. They also propose to establish an annual carbon budget at the national level which would be binding. In short, if we are to hold a serious discussion about what an ecological transition means for central banks, including the impact it will have on output and other key macroeconomic variables, we need to be able to engage in a responsible and scientific manner on these difficult questions, rather than sweeping them under the rug.
Moreover, as banks deleverage – pressed by the new Basel III capital rules – financing through the capital markets will allow businesses to directly access the large savings pool in Asia for funding. Conclusion Let me conclude. The Asian growth story remains intact. It is not a foregone conclusion, many things can go wrong, but the odds are that emerging Asia will remain the fastest growing region in the world. But most of Asia is still relatively poor in per capita terms, its financial markets are still under-developed, and it lacks truly global businesses. Europe may be beset with economic uncertainties but European companies remain among the most dynamic, most technologically advanced, and most global businesses in the world. Together – Asian economies and European corporates – can create opportunity and prosperity. European firms can promote long-term capital investment into Asia and provide expertise in niche sectors, such as in shipping, aviation, and sustainable finance. For European financial institutions, emerging Asia represents an enormous growth opportunity. Many European corporates are expanding their footprint in Asia as Asia becomes an increasingly important source of revenue. For financial institutions, this is even more relevant because banking is about relationships – though thick and thin – and global financial institutions play a key role in financing the needs of businesses in Asia. European banks currently account for 11% of banking system assets in ASEAN, according to estimates by Deutsche Bank, and French banks, for instance, play an important role in commodities trading and infrastructure financing in Asia.

2021, a year of uncertainties, but also one of work, the year of a rebound and even a year of progress: that is all I wish for us, and that I wish to each and every one of you. Happy New Year!
And, finally, new precautionary motives may lead to a fundamental indeterminacy in the demand for reserves. The future demand for reserves As mentioned above, during the crisis, foreign exchange reserves were used as a tool for internal – as well as external – financial stability. National Central Banks, especially in Latin America, acted as dollar lenders of last resort to their domestic banks. This function will develop in the future and is bound to impact the demand for reserves. In a sense, countries face the same dilemma as private institutions. They need liquidity in times of stress but it is costly to hold in normal times. Their reactions, however, are opposite. Private institutions tend to underestimate their liquidity needs because, in case of shock, the Central Bank can step in as a lender of last resort. For countries, the bias goes in the other direction. Provision of international liquidity, whether private or official, is contingent, conditional and uncertain. With no international lender of last resort, precautionary motives could lead to unlimited accumulation of liquidity. This may be seen as major market failure and source inefficiency but is also unavoidable in the current financial architecture. One characteristic of liquidity shocks is that the net demand for liquidity may become almost infinite. Ex ante, no buffer is ever big enough. No amount of reserves will fully protect a financially open economy against a systemic shock.

Jean-Pierre Landau: An international financial architecture for the 21st century – some thoughts Remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Landau, Second Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the 17th Central Banking Seminar of the Bank of Korea, Seoul, 1 June 2010. 17th Central Banking Seminar of the Bank of Korea; Seoul, 2 October 2009 (this text is a revised version: 1 June 2010). *  *  *  International financial and monetary arrangements are currently extensively debated. For many countries, both advanced and emerging, the crisis has shown that there is a close link between internal and international financial stability. In addition, rebalancing of the world economy stands at the forefront of the G20 policy agenda and there is a perception it may be difficult to achieve under current arrangements. In this paper, I would like to discuss the foundations for a future international financial and monetary system. One central point I will make is that “financial” and “monetary” aspects cannot be dissociated from one another. To a large extent, international monetary arrangements, as well as current account imbalances, are the by-products of policy choices made by countries on their capital account regimes and financial development. Therefore, one must try and take a long term view, encompassing all aspects of the financial interrelationships between nations. I will only deal tangentially with exchange rate regimes and their implications for monetary policies. Those have been abundantly analysed and discussed in the literature and the policy debate (Blanchard et al., 2005).
One interesting question is whether contingent capital, i.e., debt that is converted to capital if a particular event is triggered, can be devised in such a way as to enhance capital standards. There may well be a role for contingent capital, in effect defining in advance a debt-to-equity swap. In order for such a contingent convertible capital structure to be effective, it will be  7  It will thereby be important to carefully assess the combined effect of these changes. To this end, the Basel Committee will conduct a quantitative impact study in 2010, before determining the final calibration of the improved requirements. 8  To reduce the procyclicality of capital regulation, promoting more forward-looking provisions is an additional promising avenue to pursue. In this area, progress will depend a great deal on the accounting standard setters. The Basel Committee is working closely with accounting standard setters on this issue. 9  In the case of Switzerland, several adjustments are made to total assets. Most importantly, the domestic lending business is excluded. BIS Review 145/2009  3  crucial that the converted capital be equivalent to true, loss-absorbing core capital and incorporate a precise definition of the event that triggers conversion. The Basel Committee and the FSB have committed themselves to examining this further. 10 More robust liquidity requirements The crisis has also provided a number of important lessons regarding liquidity. On the whole, banks’ liquidity holdings were clearly insufficient. This holds true for the quantity but, crucially, also for the quality of liquidity.

Such a system needs to ensure that failure of a large bank does not have serious negative consequences for the provision of financial services to the real economy. There are several possible routes to achieve this goal. We need to examine all the available options with an open mind. The optimal policy is likely to combine different elements. As I explained in the introduction to this speech, here in Switzerland the problem of “too big to fail” is particularly pronounced. Accordingly, the FINMA and the SNB are jointly evaluating different avenues. The two big banks are now closely involved in this work. We welcome their active engagement. At the international level, the FSB and its member bodies are also addressing this problem at the request of the G20 leaders. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is imperative that a real solution to this problem be found. At the forefront of our efforts to mitigate the “too big to fail” problem must be an internationally agreed and orderly process to allow for the wind down of large, systemically important financial institutions in the event of a severe crisis. Obviously, there are many technical and legal problems that have impeded any meaningful progress in reaching international coordination in this matter. But what has been missing is a bold and international political commitment to put in place a framework for the orderly resolution of large cross-border financial institutions. Provided we have such an unequivocal commitment, solutions will eventually emerge.
Today, more than half of the Thai labour force is in the non-agricultural sector (including services), which is more averse to changes in global competition for trade and investment. Moreover, to maintain competitiveness, our economy needs the labour force that possesses higher and more flexible skill sets to move up the valued added chain of production and trade. In reality, Thailand, just like other countries, has weakness in the mismatch of skills produced through formal schooling from those which firms find useful. Government policies need to address this weakness quickly, by finding ways to align formal education with training through vocational schools and apprenticeship programs organized by private businesses. Key questions will be on designing appropriate incentive structures for players in the education and business sectors, while being mindful of social safety net considerations when businesses close. This is especially important because the agricultural sector now accounts for about 10 percent of the overall economy and cannot provide social-safety support for the non-agricultural sector should a downturn hit. In addition to government policies, investors and firms can play their parts in helping to improve labour skill and quality development. This can be achieved through building more experience in the workplace by investing in the best technology and capacity to use that technology efficiently. Importantly, we also need to focus on the quality of investment that will help build skills and enhance production techniques that adds higher values and saves costs. Ladies and Gentlemen, To close, let me highlight another important underlying strength of the Thai economy.

Since the US crisis will most dominantly affect the Thai economy through the trade channel, we also have to watch for growth trends in Europe and Asia to see how extensive the adverse impacts of the US recession are. Nevertheless, during the first three months of 2008, the value of exports continued to grow strongly by 21.1 percent. But, this was outpaced by the growth of imports of 34.5 percent, resulting in a small trade deficit. However, we expect the overall trade balance in 2008 to be in surplus due to the expansion of exports to new markets. As for the current account, we expect that the surplus will amount to about 4-7 billion US dollar for the whole year, up from the surplus of 3.1 billion US dollar for the first quarter of 2008. At present, the focus of monetary policy is tilting more toward price stability. Data for April showed headline inflation at 6.2 percent and core inflation at 2.1 percent, respectively. These compared to the average first quarter data of 5.0 percent for headline inflation and 1.5 percent for core inflation. At this juncture, it is clear that global price pressure is yet to peak as world demand for oil and commodities continue to face tight demand-supply situation. We also cannot discount the possibility of potentially adverse geopolitical events, unfavorable weather condition, and further dollar slide which could drive up oil prices in the future.