samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What is also important is our high degree of flexibility in the use of instruments and lengthening of the balance sheet. These two facilities allow us to combat major economic disruptions rapidly and effectively, as shown so impressively in the crisis. New monetary policy instruments merely serve to fulfil our mandate in a transformed environment. What also appears important to me is that central banks do not take on tasks that they cannot tackle with their existing instruments, thereby awakening false expectations and hopes. To ensure that monetary policy remains effective, it is important that central banks do not depart from their mandate of price stability. If expectations are too high, central banks are bound to disappoint them in the long run. This will cause them to lose credibility in their core BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  area, and this could lead to politicians becoming involved. In this situation, central banks’ independence would be at stake. Caution is to be recommended with respect to monetary policy trends. Certainly, the SNB will not simply go with the general flow, but will instead pursue its own path tailored to the needs of our country. Extended role and new financial stability approach I will now say a few words about financial stability. Financial stability means that financial system participants are able to carry out their functions and are resilient to disruptions. It is an important prerequisite for economic development and effective monetary policy implementation.

Therefore, the Eurosystem, as a major provider of critical wholesale clearing and  settlement services in euro, should be open to experimenting these innovations in 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  order to revisit and possibly improve the conditions under which we make available central bank money as a settlement asset. We, at the Banque de France, have started gaining exposure and experience with those innovations and in particular DLT. We were the first central bank to develop, regarding the specific use of SEPA creditor credentials, a decentralised register system based on a blockchain infrastructure, the “MADRE” register. Of course, this is only a first step, which does not exhaust an extremely vast and diversified field of experimentation. One possibility often mentioned would be for us to issue a central bank digital currency to support wholesale clearing and settlement services on a decentralised basis using DLT. We, at the Banque de France, are therefore quite open for experiments in that  direction, together with the ECB and other central banks of the Eurosystem, in particular with regard to a wholesale Central Bank Digital Currency. Another operational contribution, which could be worth considering – and experimenting – by central banks, is related to one of the major failings of the current payment systems, which is cross-border retail payments. One solution to the weaknesses of private initiatives in the field of cross-border payments could be to interconnect these systems. It is technically and legally feasible for a given area, for example, in the euro zone.
To take account of the experimental phase that crypto-assets are presently in and to satisfy the key requirements of ensuring payment security while encouraging innovation in the area, a possible alternative to the optional approach currently favoured by the PACTE Bill would be to maintain a proportional approach. This has been the basis for the European regulation of payment services up to now and consists in setting a mandatory framework whose requirements are adjusted according to the nature, development stage and risk of the associated services. This approach was employed under the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) to regulate the market development of account aggregators and payment initiators. In conclusion, it is hard to anticipate the role that crypto-assets might play in the payment system of the future, especially since the characteristics and features of these assets look set to change considerably. Right now, there are major limitations to their everyday use in retail  payments, and crypto-assets still have to prove their attractiveness in this regard, particularly since an extensive range of payment solutions is available, and these solutions continue to modernise to address the need for instant exchanges, with, for example, 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  the introduction of mobile payment solutions and instant transfers. That said, the underlying  technologies that I mentioned, and especially blockchain, open up interesting development prospects for major payment and market infrastructures.

Uncertainty over the future of crypto-assets in the world of payments does not relieve us of the need to regulate their development, given the attendant risks. Adopting a framework that  protects participants in the real economy will help to increase their confidence in the mechanisms associated with crypto-assets, thereby promoting growth in the new assets. The intrinsically digital and global nature of crypto-assets means however that a coordinated international approach must be taken to avoid creating an opportunity effect, because experience tells us that participants can easily relocate to another territory offering more flexible laws. Several international organisations have set up working groups to explore this question, under the leadership of the G20. While some of the discussions are still in their infancy, the aim in the medium term is to come up with a framework and an international code of conduct to preserve security for everyone and promote financial stability, which is a common good that we all share. Thank you for your attention. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Prospective buyers must be mindful of their ability to cope with the potential risk that may arise from possible changes in the property cycle as well as mortgage interest rates. 7. The HKMA will continue to monitor the property market closely, and will introduce appropriate counter-cyclical measures to safeguard the stability of the banking system. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches

William C Dudley: “Remarks at the New York Fed’s Economic Press Briefing on the Regional Economy” Opening remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Press Briefing on the Regional Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 18 August 2016. *  *  *  Jaison Abel, Jason Bram, Hunter Clark, Giacomo De Giorgi, Richard Deitz, Jack Gutt, Andrew Haughwout and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. Good morning and welcome to the New York Fed’s Economic Press Briefing. I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak with the journalists covering our region. You are an important communication channel to the people in our District. This morning I want to focus on economic conditions in our region, giving particular attention to job growth. I also want to discuss our ongoing work on Puerto Rico. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or the Federal Reserve System. The New York Fed is deeply committed to serving our region. This commitment manifests itself in several ways. We produce business surveys and local economic indexes to help our constituents track regional economic conditions. My staff writes papers and blog posts on economic issues important to our region. We meet with a number of advisory boards comprised of community and business leaders.
Pointing to the Future I trust you have gathered by now that for many reasons the crypto-assets in your digital wallets are unlikely to be the future of money. But that is not meant to dismiss them. Their core technology is already having an impact. Bringing cryptoassets into the regulatory tent could potentially catalyse innovations to serve the public better. Indeed, crypto-assets help point the way to the future of money in three respects:  -  By suggesting how money and payments will need to adjust to meet societies’ changing preferences, particularly for decentralised peer-to-peer interactions;  -  Through the possibilities their underlying technologies offer to transform the efficiency, reliability and flexibility of payments; and  -  By the questions they raise about whether central banks should provide a central bank digital currency (CBDC) accessible to all. 27  In the EU, the revision of the 4th AML Directive will bring exchanges and wallet providers in the scope of the anti-money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism rules. In the US, virtual currency exchanges are regulated as money transmitters and required to abide by Bank Secrecy Act obligations. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  Let me take these in turn. First, crypto-assets are part of a broader reorganisation of the economy and society into a series of distributed peer-to-peer connections across powerful networks. 28  People are increasingly forming  connections directly, instantaneously and openly, and this is revolutionising how they consume, work, and communicate.

The Future of Money While Adam Smith was cautious about the role of the state, he recognised it should furnish the rules and conditions within which private innovation can flourish. In the monetary sphere, this means providing money which citizens can use with confidence and ease. The Bank of England delivers just that through the quality of our banknotes, the stability of UK inflation, the resilience of our financial system, and efficiency and reliability of our core payment systems. We are overhauling our system, RTGS, so that private innovation can flourish. Bringing crypto-assets onto a level regulatory playing field could also catalyse private innovation to create a more resilient, effective payments system. With these foundations in place, the scene is set for better payments, a better economy and a better Friday night out. 32  Oliver Wyman and Santander estimated that distributed ledger technology could reduce banks’ infrastructure costs attributable to cross-border payments, securities trading and regulatory compliance by $ per annum by 2022. See: https://santanderinnoventures.com/fintech2/ 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15
Our lawyers perform pro-bono work for homeowners facing foreclosure and advise on legal reforms, while our researchers and market analysts have developed proposals to mitigate current problems and improve the future structure of housing finance. In my presentation today, I will explain why a more robust housing market matters for the wider economy. I will also highlight those factors specific to the housing market that create a risk that it will linger in an extremely weak state for longer than is necessary and remain vulnerable to further weakness. I will make the case for further housing-related policy interventions that would help stabilize home prices, improve the housing outlook and generate an earlier recovery in housing activity. I believe such actions would support growth and make monetary policy more effective in promoting the dual mandate given to the Federal Reserve by Congress – maximum sustainable employment in the context of price stability. The housing bust Given the excesses of the housing boom that took place in the early to middle part of the last decade, a substantial downward adjustment in housing was unavoidable. Since peaking in the second quarter of 2006, home prices have fallen by about 30 percent,2 returning to levels that last prevailed in mid-2003. In the states of Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada, where home prices rose much more than the national average, prices have declined by roughly 40 percent. Over the past year, house prices have declined by another 4 percent, though they remained roughly flat, when one excludes distress sales.

There are over 2½ million Gulf War II veterans alone, many of whom served multiple tours of duty overseas, and a significant proportion of them might otherwise not be able to purchase homes today. Our nation owes them a great debt, and such a policy would provide a boost to housing demand quickly. Moral hazard Some argue that any interventions to improve the real estate market would lead to moral hazard – that is these intervention would reward bad behaviors. I think these concerns are overstated. First, the programs that have been proposed can be designed with the proper incentives to limit moral hazard and to encourage desireable behavior. Second, in contrast to the earlier phase of housing crisis when mostly subprime borrowers came under stress, many of the borrowers running into trouble with their mortgages today took out conforming loans subject to standard downpayment requirements, had respectable FICO scores and borrowed a moderate amount to finance an average house. The problem was that these purchases occurred near the peak in the market and now many of the buyers have suffered an adverse life shock such as unemployment or illness. This isn’t a moral hazard issue, this is just the bad luck associated with the timing of the purchase and an exceptionally weak jobs market. Punishing such misfortune accomplishes little. The taxpayer interest I believe that the proposals I put forward are strongly in the public interest. I also believe that they would be good for taxpayers. Consider, for instance, the proposal for earned principal reduction.
And were we to further integrate the consideration of the international financial cycle into the setting of domestic macroprudential policies, it would likely improve the available set of outcomes further still. However, the body of evidence required to justify including the interests of other nations in the setting of domestic policy is understandably large, even when the long run benefits would be to all. This is more true now than ever, as the unequal distribution of benefits from globalisation has increased scepticism about international co-operation. The analysis I have outlined today shows that even without consensus around a fully articulated global framework for macroprudential policy, we can make quite a bit of progress by countries pursuing their local national interests. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  8  TECHNICAL APPENDICES  1. Foreign credit growth and domestic financial stability Cesa-Bianchi, Eguren Martin and Thwaites (forthcoming) explore the effect of ‘foreign’ credit growth (that is, domestic credit growth in the rest of world) on domestic financial stability. In particular, they look at the effect of foreign credit growth on the probability of experiencing a banking crisis at home. In order to do so, they extend the baseline regression in Schularick and Taylor (2012), which only looks at the effect of domestic credit growth, by also considering its foreign counterpart.

In order to put this number in perspective, it is useful to note that the domestic analogue of this figure is 1.6 p.p., and that the overall frequency of crises in the sample is only 3%. 2. Model of monetary and macroprudential policy coordination with market-based finance  Aikman, Giese, Kapadia and McLeay (forthcoming) use a calibrated two-period New Keynesian framework to examine the trade-offs and interactions between macroprudential and monetary policies. Their model includes the possibility that rapid credit growth in the first period leads to a future financial crisis, and analyses the decision facing a policymaker with access to both a macroprudential tool, a countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), and a traditional monetary policy tool, the policy interest rate. In the variant of the model used for the results shown in Chart 8, some credit is provided by a market-based finance sector, which reduces the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. This model is described by the following set of equations, where all variables except 𝐵1𝐵 , 𝐵1𝑀 (growth rates), 𝛾1𝐵 , 𝛾1𝑀 and 𝛾1 (probabilities) are expressed as deviations from steady state.
borrow short term for funding longer term lending, it is irrational to assume plentiful liquidity to prevail at all times without treating liquidity as part of risk capital;  •  Increased financial pressures may lead financial institutions to shift their efforts away from focusing on the conduct of business requirements and from maintaining and strengthening business as usual;  •  Market participants and consumers may lose confidence in financial institutions and in the authority’s ability to safeguard the financial system;  •  A significant minority of consumers could experience financial problems because of their high levels of borrowings; and  •  Tighter economic conditions could increase the incidence or discovery of financial crime or divert the institution’s resources away from tracking financial crime. 2.3 In addition to these, there could also be institution specific risks, which may bring in potential disturbances. Conventional wisdom now is that the more recent episodes like Northern Rock were an accident waiting to happen as banking regulations have not been emphasizing on liquidity risks. The recent turmoil has exposed the vulnerability of a regulatory framework that places so much emphasis on how well capitalized a bank is, but makes little reference to whether it has an adequate cash cushion and liquid securities to see the institution through a period of market turbulence. In this instance, the Basel II regime also does not seem to offer much help.

Adopting an integrated GRC framework is a challenge  4.1 Understanding the demands of the organization’s stakeholders is the key in terms of performance and conformance, and aligning the organization to deliver against these objectives. Considering the risk appetite and risk tolerance of the organization, the processes and technology should be designed and deployed so that the achievement of objectives is measured, risks are assessed and continuous improvement is realized in support of effective GRC. Integrating GRC has become a challenge for virtually every financial institution looking to establish an integrated and consistent approach to controlling exposures, managing risks and creating value. 4.2 The major challenge in adopting an integrated GRC approach is the aligning of the GRC framework and processes to standalone and isolated solutions that are already in place. The difficulty is to integrate these isolated solutions through a flexible and add-on basis to embrace new requirements. Changing core business solutions without overhauling business requirements is considered to be a nightmare by many financial institutions. If it is  4  BIS Review 15/2008  properly planned and designed, it would not be that bad and those who have taken the bold decision to do so will be the winners in the future. 4.3 Another important challenge would be to adopt a GRC framework, which is consistent with international standards. To enable this, new policies and procedures have to be written with links to automated systems.
However, in the 2010 survey, the largest share of volume reported by dealer respondents was for transactions with “other financial institutions” – a category that includes nonreporting banks; 5 other financial institutions such as institutional investors, hedge funds, and proprietary trading firms; and official sector institutions. This shift continued through the 2013 survey, when “other financial institutions” accounted for just over half of reported volume, reinforcing evidence of a broadening in foreign exchange trading, with nondealers playing a greater role in the market. The 2013 survey broke out the “other financial institutions” category for the first time. The data showed that nonreporting banks accounted for about 45 percent of the category’s trading volume while institutional investors and hedge funds/proprietary trading firms each accounted for about 20 percent. In a market where daily trading volume exceeds $ trillion, this represents significant activity and is consistent with a general theme of increased participation by nondealers in the FX market. Execution in the FX market One factor contributing to the expansion in participation by nondealers in the foreign exchange market has been the increased ease of entry into the market, attributable to an expansion in the number of execution platforms and services. In part, this has been supported by technological advancements, which, in some cases, have reduced trading costs, increased the speed with which transactions take place, and improved transparency.

And third, the expansion of that work into the current international effort to develop and implement a single global code of conduct for the foreign exchange market and to enhance adherence to that code among all market participants. Work of the Financial Stability Board’s Foreign Exchange Benchmarks Group (FXBG) Given the global nature of the FX market, as well as the number of jurisdictions in which wrongdoing has been uncovered, efforts to strengthen the market must be global in nature as well. Recognizing this imperative, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system, established the Foreign Exchange Benchmarks Group (FXBG) in early 2014. The purpose of the FXBG was to review FX benchmarks and associated market practices, including potential misaligned incentives, and make recommendations for change. The FXBG, which consisted of representatives from more than twenty countries, engaged with a range of market participants to analyze the market structures and incentives as they related to trading around benchmark fixings. The group produced a series of recommendations to enhance the structures and behaviors around FX benchmark trading. I would like to focus on two particular aspects of these recommendations – first, changes to the WM/Reuters calculation 10 and second, changes aimed at strengthening market conduct. The FXBG report highlighted the dominant use of the WM/Reuters (WMR) 4 p.m. London fixings by many different sets of market participants, including some not otherwise active in the foreign exchange market.