samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Finding solutions to this problem is not going to be easy. But this is where efforts to revive the domestic economy will need to focus on. New lending is perceived as risky given the current negative factors on the macro fronts and external factors, while NPL overhang preoccupied bankers’ attention and kept them from renewing their client relationship. To address this problem, the authorities have chosen to approach the problem in three ways:  BIS Review 70/2001  3  ·  First, to further accelerate corporate debt restructuring by improving the legal frameworks and by setting up a national asset management corporation to deal with the remaining unresolved problem loans. Progress on this front is most visible. The law establishing the Thai Asset Management Corporation, or TAMC, was passed and operations set to begin soon with all asset transfer to be completed by September. A key benefit of TAMC is the advantage of being a single creditor of the transferred asset. This would allow TAMC to deal effectively and speedily with the unresolved debts that involve multiple creditors. Also, the vast executive powers given to TAMC by law would make it easier for TAMC to take a comprehensive approach to debt restructuring, and have the ability to deal with cases that might warrant corporate restructuring and change of management. ·  Second, to introduce a scheme of credit guarantees which would provide a facility of risksharing between corporate borrowers, the Government, and banks based on market mechanism.

Additionally, an integrated ASEAN market will also serve to facilitate the meeting of global standards as SMEs upgrade to meet the more harmonised compliance requirements across the region. Thirdly, SMEs will also benefit from the drive to strengthen connectivity in the ASEAN region. As highlighted in the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, a comprehensive roadmap of strategies has been outlined to address connectivity challenges on three key areas, namely physical infrastructure, institutions and the people in ASEAN. Increased connectivity across all three dimensions will provide the physical and soft elements needed to create the enabling business environment for SMEs. Fourthly, various SME-specific policies by the ASEAN member countries will also benefit SMEs in the region. This includes the establishment of a regional SME internship programme which has assisted SMEs in seven ASEAN countries to enhance the skills of their employees through structured staff exchanges and capacity building workshops. A further initiative is the recent launch of the online ASEAN Marketplace which aims to provide SMEs with information on the business environment in each respective ASEAN country and a business directory of SMEs to facilitate the access to the markets in the region as well as the potential for collaboration of SMEs across the region. To date, more than 1,000 SMEs across the region have registered with this online portal. It is expected to attract more than 20,000 businesses during the course of this year.
Fixed commitments in the form of wages, social transfers and interest on the public debt absorb more than two-thirds of the total. Furthermore, these expenditures are destined to grow autonomously. This is because, while the ongoing reduction in the public service headcount may restrain growth in wage costs, the impact of the slow pace of planned fiscal consolidation on the debt servicing burden and, in the longer term, of population ageing on the health and pensions budgets, cannot be easily avoided. In these circumstances, cutting the deficit while at the same time rebalancing the thrust of fiscal policy towards investment in growth-enhancing projects will be difficult. A determined effort must nevertheless be made. Areas which offer scope for rationalisation include health care and education, which have both been identified as producing relatively less efficient outcomes in terms of output compared with the EU average. Further savings could also be realised in the areas of social transfers to households and subsidies to enterprises. The latter are still equivalent to about 3 per cent of recurrent expenditure even after substantial recent cutbacks. Subsidies not only aggravate the fiscal burden, they also distort the price-signalling mechanism. The implications of this fiscal scenario are far reaching. Two recent reports, one by the Today Public Policy Institute and another by the European Commission, conclude that in the long run Malta’s welfare system is unsustainable.

2  Broadbent (2012). 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Divergences in expectations: why demand and the exchange rate can move independently  Let me now turn to the point about expectations. This is of particular relevance for the current inter-regnum, the period following the referendum but before Brexit itself. At least until the formal departure date what 3  people expect of it is the main way – arguably the only way – in which it can affect the economy . This is an obvious point. But I think we should pay it some heed, not least because it’s unclear how these expectations will evolve. If it’s not a unique event Brexit is certainly an exceptional one. People haven’t much history to go on. It’s therefore reasonable to imagine that predictions about its consequences might Chart 4: Share prices of UK-focused companies have underperformed  4  vary over time: we will all of us learn more about its effects as Brexit unfolds. It’s also understandable if these expectations differ across the population. It’s clear that financial markets have relatively pessimistic expectations. Since the referendum share prices of UK-focused companies have significantly under-performed both their international peers and those of companies quoted in the UK but whose earnings come from overseas (Chart 4). Sterling’s exchange rate has also fallen very sharply. As Sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations.
This cluster, accounting for 17% of GDP, comprises retail and food services as well as construction activities. The real estate and retail segments will be weighed down by subdued consumer sentiment and the shift to overseas retailers via e-commerce. Public construction will be supported by infrastructure projects, such as the ongoing extensions to the rail network, but private construction is likely to remain subdued. Inflation has come in within expectations. Both core and headline inflation are on a modest uptrend but underlying price pressures remain benign. MAS Core Inflation is projected to average 1-2% in 2017, up from 0.9% in 2016. The rise in core inflation since Q4 2016 has largely reflected higher prices of oil-related items. Domestic sources of inflation remain contained partly because the pass-through of business costs to consumer prices has been quite weak. CPI-All Items inflation is expected to come in at 0.5-1.5%, up from −0.5% last year. Accommodation cost will likely continue to exert a drag on headline inflation Generalised demand-induced price pressures have been relatively muted for some time. But MAS is closely watching developments for the rest of this year, especially if upside risks to GDP growth materialise. MONETARY POLICY The current neutral stance of monetary policy has helped to stem disinflation pressures in the economy. MAS has adopted a 0% p.a. appreciation path for the $ policy band since April 2016. This neutral stance has facilitated a turnaround in headline CPI inflation, which had been negative for 24 consecutive months.

On 22 May 2013, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, first mentioned the possibility that the ongoing third quantitative easing programme might be tapered off. The possibility that the Federal Reserve might announce a reduction in the monthly bond purchase programme sparked an increase in long-term US interest rates, which had risen by over 100 basis points by the beginning of September (cf. chart 4). All other major markets reacted in the same way – this included interest rates in Germany – despite the fact that the course of monetary policy in the euro area actually pointed to sustained expansion. The tapering debate coincided with a more favourable economic outlook in the advanced economies. This, in turn, increased uncertainty with regard to the future monetary policy path of the major central banks, and term premia – which form part of bond yields – rose. However, at the same time, short-term interest rates stayed firmly in place. Despite the recent increase, bond yields in advanced economies are at a very low level in historical terms. The impact on foreign exchange markets varied. The currencies of the emerging economies reacted particularly strongly, with capital outflows exerting very substantial downward pressure, as can be seen in chart 4. This shows that a number of emerging economies are still vulnerable to foreign portfolio investments, or hot money flows. The G4 currencies, by contrast, have been largely unaffected by the tapering debate (cf. chart 5). In trade-weighted terms, the US dollar has gained very slightly.
All of this tells me that Bronx households have a considerable way to go before they reach more comfortable debt levels. Conclusion To sum up, over the first half of 2011, the slowing of economic growth in the nation and the weak labor market has been a major disappointment. Recently, growth has picked up modestly, but not enough to reduce unemployment. Despite some bright spots in the U.S. economy, strong headwinds are preventing a more vigorous recovery. Inflation, which has risen in recent months, is poised to slow soon. The Fed is doing – and will continue to do – everything within its power to promote jobs and price stability. 2  See, for additional discussion of this topic, William Dudley. 2011. “Job Creation in the Region”. Remarks at the Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing, New York City. August 12. 3  Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, August 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  High poverty, unemployment and delinquency rates suggest that the Bronx faces a number of challenges. However, the continued job growth in the Bronx and rest of the city should create more opportunities for Bronx residents to improve their incomes and personal finances. Going forward, the key challenge for the Bronx will be to prepare its residents for the best jobs being created in the region. The Bronx must strive to build the human capital – that is, education and skills – of its workforce. A region’s human capital determines a large part of its economic success.

These indications show that businesses are seeing the economic and business merit of Shariah-compliant products and services and that its appeal extend beyond the traditional captive market. However, growth of the magnitude that Islamic finance experienced over the last decade would increasingly become more difficult if the industry does not continue to be nimble and agile in its approach. Innovation is therefore a key priority for Islamic finance players to keep expanding and gain market share. As indicated by the results of the retail consumer banking and insurance survey in the country report, the demand for Islamic banking by survey respondents far exceeds that for its conventional counterpart. This should be an encouragement for Islamic banks to boost its innovativeness in meeting customers’ needs. The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 is already paving the way for the development of Islamic banking solutions that are differentiated from conventional products by allowing funds to be mobilised either through deposits or investment accounts. This classification brings greater options for the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  public and reflects an enhanced risk-sharing approach to Islamic banking. It also gives the industry additional options to create creative solutions for its customers. Greater engagement and collaboration between industry and academia would also ensure mutually-reinforcing efforts in driving innovation through the development and implementation of new research findings and breakthroughs.
In other words, does the company say, “This is the conduct we want, and this is how we will hold you accountable for it.” Does the company employ leaders who are visible role models of good conduct and fire those who are not? Are systems of compensation and promotion aligned with corporate goals and purposes? And, if there is a pattern of misconduct, are you sure that your incentive programs are based on merit? Can the heads of business lines—the people responsible for P&L— explain how it is that each part of their business makes money and manages the associated risks? If not, are they really capable of effective oversight? When misconduct comes to light, does the company assess itself and challenge assumptions with brutal honesty? Upon learning of misconduct, is the company willing to intervene in a timely fashion? If there is an emerging pattern of misconduct, how quickly is it identified and addressed? Finally, are there particular desks or teams in which everyone is quite junior? Too junior, perhaps, to have worked through a down business cycle or the financial crisis? If so, are we giving that area adequate supervision and compliance attention? Concluding thoughts I want to raise one final topic with you today, which, to my mind, is related to the question of accountability. It is the risk that control groups in large institutions can evolve to a place where they are driven by their own self-preservation or immediate concerns.

I think it is correct to say that second only to the articles of association, a Board Charter is probably the most important corporate governance policy document which defines the respective roles, responsibilities and authorities of the board and management in setting the direction, the management and control of an organisation. It is a document that is useful to both old and new directors, particularly those who may not be familiar with how a company conducts its business and what is expected of them as directors. In this respect, the charter serves the following functions among many; One-source reference – a board charter is a one-source document which clearly sets out how the board and directors are to perform their roles. As an induction tool – a board charter acts as an induction tool for new directors and senior managers. Standard key board documentation – it contains documentation templates for such things as the board meeting agenda and board paper format. Having said this, I need to place a rider by stating that these charters that you will be examining this morning only set out minimum standards of what the boards are required to do. Some institutions present here may already have charters which are more elaborate than the model charters. That is fine as you will not be required to downgrade your existing charters. But for those institutions which might not have any charters, it may well be useful to consider customising the model charters.
The central projection in our February Inflation Report is for it to rise further, to around 3%. That pronounced pickup stems from sharp rises in commodity prices around the world. Food prices on world markets are more than 50% higher, and oil prices two-thirds higher, than they were a year ago. To some it might seem odd that an inflation targeting central bank has not tried to offset those inflationary pressures. That is because we operate “flexible” inflation targeting within a framework that recognises that it is not, in practice, always possible to keep inflation at target. The remit for our Monetary Policy Committee states that: “The framework takes into account that any economy at some point can suffer from external events or temporary difficulties, often beyond its control. The framework is based on the recognition that the actual inflation rate will on occasions depart from its target as a result of shocks and disturbances. Attempts to keep inflation at the inflation target in these circumstances may cause undesirable volatility in output”. BIS Review 36/2008  1  The time lag between changes in interest rates and their impact on inflation means that the MPC can have little effect on the short-term path of inflation. What is crucial is that the pickup proves to be temporary, just as the rise in inflation last year was. As commodity prices stabilise, inflation will fall back towards our target next year. But that does not mean we can ignore the pickup in inflation that is now underway.

But serious thinking and a willingness to contemplate radical change will be necessary. BIS Review 36/2008  3
The agents in the model also have rational expectations, that is, they use the information available in the best possible way when they make their decisions. This type of model is usually referred to in the research literature under the generic term of New Keynesian DSGE models. 7 The methods have been developed in close cooperation between academic researchers and economists at central banks who have exchanged ideas and experiences. The Riksbank has developed its own macro model for the Swedish economy At the Riksbank we have developed a dynamic macro model for the Swedish economy which is known as Ramses. 8 This is a so-called general equilibrium model and belongs to the group of New Keynesian DSGE models. General here means that it tries to explain the whole economy and not merely a particular section of it, such as private consumption or the labour market. The fact that it is an equilibrium model means that it assumes that market mechanisms create a balance between supply and demand in the different markets of the economy. Ramses is currently used to make forecasts, to interpret economic developments and to calculate the effects of monetary policy, for example. Some areas are not yet very well developed in Ramses. This includes, for example, fiscal policy and the credit market. We therefore use partial models that focus on certain individual variables as a complement to Ramses. We also use so-called Bayesian VAR models.

In brief, the principles entail the dividend level remaining stable, the majority of the profit shall be paid as a dividend, and that the calculation shall not take into account developments in the government budget. In concrete terms, this means that 80 per cent of the average results in the past five years (adjusted for exchange rate effects) shall be paid as dividend to the government. The majority of the profit has been paid to the Treasury. The fact is that if we include the two extra dividends of SEK 20 billion each paid at the beginning of the 2000s, the Riksbank has paid somewhat more than its profits in dividends during this period. The smallest dividend paid during the period is that paid in spring 2014, SEK 3.3 billion. Losses await If we instead look ahead, we see that the Riksbank will probably make losses over a couple of years. The results for 2014 (which have not yet been established) were still positive, but if interest rates rise in the way that the National Institute of Economic Research forecasts, it will be some time before the Riksbank can show a profit again. It looks as though the bank will have losses in the years 2015–2018 amounting to around SEK 5 billion a year. 6  The Riksbank regularly makes forecasts for the bank’s dividends to the state as part of the National Financial Management Authority’s work on planning the state finances.
The amount of average weekly leave taken – a sign of worker confidence – has recovered sharply over the last two years but remains someway off its pre-crisis level. And long-term unemployment and the proportion of part-time workers who say they want full-time jobs remains elevated. To the extent that workers do not yet feel confident in asking for a pay increase, that might be one reason why wage growth has been relatively unresponsive to the sharp fall in unemployment. And we may still be seeing some cyclical effects from changes in the composition of those in work; low skilled, low paid workers tend both to lose their jobs early in a recession and regain employment late in the recovery. The increases in employment over the last year or so have added proportionally more younger and lower skilled workers and hence pushed average pay down. Second, on top of some of these scarring effects, the deflationary shock from lower energy prices does seem to be having some effect on pay. The Bank’s Agents have reported that low inflation is restraining pay awards. And the resulting increases in real disposable income may have made workers less willing to press for higher pay. Medium term inflation expectations appear to remain anchored and consistent with the inflation target. But the current very low rate of inflation may have made it less necessary for employers to increase pay now especially given low productivity.

It has also proved possible to combine low unemployment, compared with other European countries, with low inflation, contrary to what many experts expected. But open unemployment has only come down towards 4 per cent in a few occasional years, and stands today at 5.5 per cent. The number of employed now is lower than before the crisis, and some 1.2 million people of working age (16-64 years) are not participating in the labour force. The regime shift and employment Against this backdrop it's not surprising that a lively debate arises from time to time about unemployment and what can be done about it. What is perhaps more surprising is that some people still assert that the shift in stabilisation policy regime at the beginning of the 1990s is what has caused unemployment to be higher today than it was during the 1970s and 1980s. Sometimes the argument goes that Sweden has given up its previous objective of full employment in order instead, for some more or less obscure reason, to introduce a target for inflation. If we only were prepared to return to the high-inflation policies of the 1970s and 1980s, then everything would be better. There is much to say about this. Firstly, it is difficult in a more general sense to imagine that the markedly improved stability in economic policy that the shift in regime brought about in the long run could be something negative for employment.