samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Therefore, the global financial standards-setting organisations have initiated extensive regulatory and monitoring work to ensure that stablecoins do not threaten financial stability. For my part, I note that the interest in  7 One example could be the mobile payment services in each country. Here, certain steps have already been  taken with the intended merger of Norwegian Vipps, Danish Mobilepay and Finnish Pivo, announced in June this year. 7 [15]  stablecoins show the need for the existing payment systems to be improved to meet people's needs for efficient and cheap payments. More about that later. To conclude, having a credible issuer of money, and one single monetary unit within a jurisdiction, seems to be the prevailing system throughout history. With a trusted issuer, which has been the task of central banks for the past 300 years, the intrinsic value of money doesn’t matter. We accept that banknotes and coins are just paper and some fairly cheap pieces of metal. In addition, quoting prices in a host of different units that may fluctuate in value will never be efficient. The importance of monetary uniformity to a country’s prosperity can hardly be overestimated. Technology and innovation of ideas drive change My second lesson concerns the drivers behind evolution in payments. Based on history, one important force for changes has clearly been technological developments, often in industries far away from financial services. For example, the printing method invented by Gutenberg in the 15th century was a prerequisite for going from coins to paper notes.

This could be promoted further if complemented by  6 Minouche Shafik, “A new heart for a changing payments system”, speech, Bank of England, London, 27 January  2016. For more about the early days of clearing cheques, see the Cheque and Credit Clearing Company, “History of the cheque”, https://www.chequeandcredit.co.uk/information-hub/history-cheque/clearings-early-days. 6 [15]  common Nordic payment solutions or by making payments between existing domestic schemes feasible.7  Lessons learned Drawing conclusions based on a period spanning millennia can only be strongly subjective. Yet, certain factors stand out to me as constants during the history of payments. Some may even be more relevant than ever, one could argue. Allow me now to elaborate further on my four basic lessons, before I turn to our ongoing work to develop the current infrastructure. Trust and uniformity of money is essential Firstly, for money to work properly it needs to have the trust of its users. Otherwise, buyers and sellers will look for other mediums of exchange. This increases transaction costs, hampering trade and economic activity. Historically, trust has benefitted from a credible issuer, that is, from money being a claim on a party that everyone expects to honour its obligations. This speaks in favour of giving the right to issue money to the state with its powers of taxation. This is also what happened in most countries with the Bank of England as an early role model. In addition, I also believe in the value to society of having one commonly agreed monetary unit in a given jurisdiction.
Indeed, given the scale of the exchange rate shock, it is possible inflation could overshoot this target in the period ahead. In principle, this combination of inflation-above-target and output-below-capacity poses a dilemma for monetary policy. Tighten to counter the first or loosen to cushion the second? In practice, in my personal view, there is no real policy dilemma here and little ambiguity about the appropriate monetary policy response, either in direction (easing) or scale (significant). One reason for saying that is because I do not think the risk of higher inflation becoming entrenched is especially great. Even before the events of the past month, the Phillips curve here in the UK (the relationship between wages/prices and unemployment/output) was as flat as a pancake. In a world of potentially stalling output and rising unemployment, I find it hard to imagine wage and price pressures will intensify greatly in the period ahead. Indeed, it is striking that despite the sharp fall in the exchange rate and the temporary boost this will provide to inflation, there are no indications so far of this having dislodged mediumterm inflation expectations. The most direct measure we have is from financial markets where they have shown few signs of ticking-up (Chart 32). Indeed, at longer maturities inflation expectations have nudged down from already fairly low levels. With household and company measures of inflation expectations also at historically low levels, in my personal view the risk of inflation expectations being dislodged to the downside is greater than on the upside.

Benoît Cœuré: Cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures Introductory remarks by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the High-Level Meeting on Cyber Resilience, Frankfurt am Main, 19 June 2017. * * *  Introduction It is a pleasure to welcome you here today to this strategic high-level meeting on cyber resilience for pan-European financial market infrastructures. The aim of bringing together high-level representatives from large European market infrastructures, critical service providers and public authorities is threefold: First we would like to gain a deeper understanding of the cyber threat landscape in Europe. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) will make a presentation on the cyber threat landscape and its relevance for the financial sector. Second, we will share with you the Eurosystem’s cyber strategy for financial market infrastructures and also explain ECB Banking Supervision’s approach to the issue of bank cyber resilience. Third, we would like to hear your views on how we can all collaborate in a trusted environment to enhance the cyber resilience of financial market infrastructures. More specifically, we would like to assess with you how much interest there is in creating a highlevel cyber resilience forum for pan-European financial market infrastructures, critical service providers and competent authorities. Before we start, let me briefly set the scene.
The reduction in Norges Bank’s key rate through 2003 and into 2004 resulted in low interest rates. Low interest rates have contributed to a relatively sharp rise in household demand throughout this upturn. At the same time, solid growth in other countries has generated increased demand for many Norwegian export goods, resulting in high prices. Petroleum sector fixed investment has increased strongly, resulting in growing demand for goods and services supplied by mainland enterprises. Mainland fixed investment has also picked up. Commercial property markets After several years of fairly low activity, the number of commercial building starts is now increasing nationwide, including in Hordaland, where growth in this industry is solid. Through last year and so far this year, building activity has been particularly high in the retail trade sector. Commercial building starts have more than tripled since the trough in 2003. These developments are reflected in the lending figures. Through 2004 and 2005, banks’ and mortgage companies’ lending to enterprises in property management and services, and the retail trade and hotel and restaurant sectors increased markedly. In the first quarter of this year, total lending to these sectors was NOK 440 billion, an increase of close to NOK 73 billion compared with the same quarter last year. The value of shop premises has risen more than the value of office premises since the mid-1990s, and more in line with the rise in the housing market. Developments in the value of office premises in Norway have tracked developments in a number of other European countries.

In many countries, the key to this success has been inflation targeting. Although the main reason for introducing inflation targeting in many cases - not least Sweden’s - has been frustration over the previous regime and economic performance, it has subsequently proved to work so well that it now stands out as an interesting option also for already well-functioning economies. This is demonstrated in particular by the current debate regarding a possible introduction of inflation targeting in the United States, where the economic performance in recent decades has been remarkably good and monetary policy successful. But first, before I go into a problem that currently feels significant for us at the Riksbank and that I also think is central to the discussion in the United States and elsewhere - the balance between concerns for output stability and inflation stability - allow me to say a few words about my fundamental views regarding inflation targeting policies. Unsurprisingly, I see considerable advantages of having an explicit, symmetric inflation target. It is also my impression that this view enjoys considerable support in the academic literature, an assertion, however, that no assembly is better placed to question than this one. The clear framework encompassing an inflation target, published forecasts and a specified target horizon has generally worked well as a guide for policy. There have been communication problems here and there, but it is not obvious that the situation would have been much better under a different regime.
According to the estimates of GDP growth for the fourth quarter, the economic expansion extended into the final part of 2015, setting the rate of growth at 3.2% for the whole year. Spain thus recorded the strongest economic growth amongst the main economies in the euro area. Certainly, these developments were supported by some tailwinds, whose impact on growth rates is expected to decay over time. I refer here to the fall in oil prices, the depreciation of the euro and the easing in financing conditions. But, quite obviously, these factors were also present in other economies which posted significantly lower growth rates. This underlines the fact that elements of a more permanent nature lie behind the recent performance of the Spanish economy, these elements being linked to the correction of the previous imbalances and the reforms that have been undertaken. Concerning prices, the latest estimate for the harmonized price index in Spain was moderately negative in January (minus 0.4%), due to a decline in energy prices, and it is expected to remain in negative territory for the coming months. The indicator that excludes energy prices went up moderately in the course of last year, in line with the reduction in the degree of slack of the economy. In the euro area, overall prices showed an increase of 0.4% in January, that is, 0.8 pp above the rate recorded in Spain. Thus, the Spanish economy continues to gain competitiveness vis à vis the euro area.

But this market has grown very weakly and in real terms is smaller today than it was at the start of the 1990s. It is not that the market for company financing has shrunk, but it seems to have scaled back its connections to the major banks. That is partly because large Swedish companies can turn to foreign banks or directly to the capital market for funding. Also, it is probably partly because Swedish banks in the wake of the banking crisis have made a conscious decision to reduce their share of risky lending. However, it does not seem as if the Swedish banks have fully managed to compensate for this lower lending through increased advisory services or other ”intermediary services”. In essence, Swedish banks have strong positions in a number of areas but these markets are either mature or else the banks’ shares are shrinking. If we were to assume that the trend oracle will be right, I envisage two possible ways forward for the major Swedish banks, both of which represent extremes. The first strategy would be based on the banks’ proven proficiency in terms of organisation and distribution, and to refine this strength and also become better at peripheral advisory services. Fewer resources would be invested in product development and risk-taking – products can easily be copied and risks sold on to other, hungrier investors.
The bonds have so far increased in value but there is every indication that they will lead to a loss in the future, and hence contribute to a period of lower or zero dividends to the government. 2 Today, I would like to outline how the bond purchases have created these interest-rate risks and how future interest-rate developments will affect the Riksbank’s profits and dividends.   Thanks to Carl-Johan Belfrage, who has helped me write the text, and to Jan Alsterlind, Heidi Elmér, Henrik Erikson, Rickard Eriksson, Ola Melander, Marianne Sterner, Ulf Söderström and Anders Vredin, who have contributed valuable comments and observations. 1 See af Jochnick (2015). 2 Another change is that the Riksbank has built up a larger foreign exchange reserve. This larger reserve does not, however, involve any actual increase in the currency or interest-rate risks as it is funded by foreign exchange loans with approximately the same maturities as the new assets. But the larger foreign exchange reserve will still lead to the Riksbank’s reported profit being more sensitive to interest rates. This is because the Riksbank’s assets but not its liabilities are reported at market value. The lower interest rates have therefore improved the Riksbank’s reported profit via value increases in the foreign exchange reserve, but will contribute to lower reported profit a few years ahead. 1 [12]  Chart 1.

If we hold the bond until it has matured, we know exactly how many Swedish kronor the Riksbank will receive in interest on it. And we also know how much it cost to buy. But we don’t know what the funding cost for the bonds will be. Because the cost depends on how the repo rate develops up until the bond matures. This maturity transformation is actually quite similar to operations pursued by commercial banks to make a profit, i.e. holding long-term assets funded by short-term borrowing. And even if such operations are associated with an interest-rate risk which makes for an uncertain return, one can normally count on making a profit more often than making a loss. This is because short-term rates (such as the repo rate that has a one-week maturity) are usually on average slightly lower than long-term rates (e.g. the rate for five-year government bonds). In economics jargon, this is referred to as term premiums on the financial markets normally being positive. In practice, however, it is very difficult to determine how large these term premiums are at any one particular time. The premiums cannot be directly observed on the financial markets but must either be estimated based on a forecast for future shortterm rates or estimated using statistical methods based on historical connections between interest rates at various maturities and different asset-types. 7 The ECB’s (2012) interpretation of this is that central banks should avoid prolonged periods with negative  equity.
Economists and central bankers were remarking on the low level of real interest rates as early as 2005.1 The MPC discussed the factors behind the more recent decline, since the financial crisis, in the February 2014 Inflation Report, in the context of its forward guidance. My colleague David Miles went through some of these arguments in more detail in a speech in February this year. The debate about “secular stagnation” has also focussed a lot of attention on the issue. The only wrinkle here is to distinguish those factors that are good for risky assets from those that are bad – and, in doing so, to say something about distributional effects. I also want to caution against mistaking cause for effect and in particular, when it comes to asset prices, putting central banks at centre stage. Autonomous changes in monetary policy certainly can have an impact on asset prices. But that does not mean they’re the only thing that actually  1  Bernanke (2005). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  does so. Over time, trends in real asset prices are determined by real (non-monetary) forces: we may occasionally be prominent actors but it’s someone else who’s written the script.

Since 1999 UK and US equities have delivered a real cumulative return of only 2% a year, only a touch higher than term bank deposits and a lot lower than the 4½% average return on longdated gilts (Chart 10). The implications for the distribution of wealth are therefore more  13  The economist Michael Woodford describes optimal policy exactly in these terms – the task is to set the real short-term interest rate close to its natural, or equilibrium level (Woodford (2003)). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  complicated. Either way, it’s not clear there have been any for the broad distribution of income, as between capital and labour (and as opposed to wealth). The low level of real interest rates has recently fuelled talk of a “secular stagnation”. Whether this situation persists – whether the stagnation in real interest rates really is “secular” – is, quite honestly, anyone’s guess. If forced to have a go myself, I’d say that neutral real rates are likely to stay low for some time yet – with the implication that any rises in official policy rates are likely to be “limited and gradual” – but that, eventually, as the headwinds previously highlighted by the MPC dissipate, they are likely to rise. My instinct is to set more store by the very long-term average for both productivity growth, and real interest rates, than the more recent trends.
All of us need to make sure we are paying sufficient attention and applying appropriate resources to the Year 2000 issue. Only in that way will we be able to insure that the millennium changeover is an occasion for joy and optimism. BIS Review 87/1997

There are two factors which could explain this apparent resilience. The first is the atypical buffers for consumption that households have available in the current environment. They are still benefiting from sizeable fiscal policy support to shield them from rising energy prices, amounting to around € billion in 2022 and 2023, and they still have around € billion in excess savings built up during the pandemic. [9] The second factor is the reduced sensitivity of the labour market to slowing growth, which is supporting labour income and households’ employment expectations. Faced with labour shortages, firms are responding to weaker demand first by hoarding labour – that is, by further reducing hours worked rather than by cutting jobs. And now, with energy prices falling and wages rising, household disposable incomes are set to increase. This was reflected – before the recent financial market tensions arose – in our projections for a stronger  recovery this year. So, for inflationary pressures to ease, it is important that our monetary policy works robustly in the restrictive direction. And that process is only starting to take effect now. The first leg of the monetary transmission process – from policy measures to financing and monetary conditions – is already having a substantial impact. The cost of borrowing is increasing steeply, and loan dynamics look to be contracting faster than during previous hiking cycles. Credit growth to firms has dropped markedly since the third quarter of last year.
Firstly, while the crisis demands action with great urgency, the policy response to restore the functioning of the financial system and to get growth in the economy again, there also needs to be a continued commitment to the financial inclusion objective. This becomes all the more vital given the more adverse implications of the crisis on the poor segments in the economy. Secondly, while the policies and regulation of financial inclusion are essential to ensure the soundness and sustainability of an inclusive financial system, of equal importance are the policies, instruments and framework to deal with distress in an inclusive financial system. This is to ensure that the strategies for resolution will provide a total solution that addresses the entire spectrum of the financial system, from that which is large and highly connected  BIS Review 54/2009  1  with systemic implications to that which is small and highly vulnerable. This includes measures relating to relief and support and the mechanisms for resolution to ensure the sustainability of an inclusive financial system even during unstable financial and economic conditions. In recognising the importance of financial inclusion, the United Nations established the United Nations Advisory Group on Financial Inclusion in 2006. The group advises the United Nations and member states on issues relating to the advancement of the financial inclusion agenda on a global scale. Since its establishment, many successes have been achieved.

Indeed, the first time I came to Reading was in 1977 when I was supporting a pub-rock band called Sounder, who persuaded me to drive the band members to a gig in the town centre. Also around that time, the great rock band Led Zeppelin released a film and soundtrack album called “The Song Remains the Same” – featuring their live performances around the world in the mid-1970s. The question in my mind now is how long the monetary policy song can remain the same, when it might be out of tune with the rest of the background music from the real economy – of economic recovery and above target inflation. That Led Zeppelin album “The Song Remains the Same” contained an extremely long live version (lasting nearly half an hour!) of a track which appeared on their first album – entitled “Dazed and Confused”, in which Jimmy Page plays his guitar with a violin bow – something I must say that I have not attempted in my guitar-playing career. There have been many aspects of the current financial crisis and the recent performance of the economy which have left us all “dazed and confused”. The financial crisis has served as a severe jolt to the prevailing view in the mid-2000s that the economy had entered a period of “Great Stability” of steady growth and low inflation.