samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Domestically, the prolonged period of economic slowdown has subjected indebted households and smaller businesses to financial strains. Loan quality for weaker borrowers has deteriorated somewhat as a result. The good news is that these risks have been confined to specific sectors, and the banking system remains strong and has weathered the slowdown very well, owing to their prudent risk management policies. Externally, we also cannot rule out further episodes of volatile capital flows owing to shifts in monetary policy abroad. Our economy has proven resilient to such shocks in the recent past, thanks to strong macroeconomic fundamentals and robust policy framework. We will closely monitor the adjustment process to ensure that risks to financial stability continue to be contained. To summarize, the economy seems to be at an inflection point. The outlook for growth has improved following the political event in May. But a new set of challenges has also emerged. Now that political uncertainties have waned, what should be the priorities for public policy? What are key areas of needed “economic reform”, and what should such agenda entail? This brings me to the second topic of my talk, that of challenges to public policy management during the current period of transition. Challenges to public policy management The agenda for economic reform under discussion today is wide-ranging and may at times seem confusing to the public. To organize one’s thoughts, it might be helpful to revisit the basic role of government in a modern economy.

To build a common analysis of balance sheet positions and a shared understanding of the implications of that analysis for the world economy, a trusted, independent and expert secretariat is needed to facilitate those discussions. Only if countries are willing to share confidences with each other - discuss their "policy reaction functions" - will international meetings justify their cost. Those three tasks do not exhaust the responsibilities of an international financial institution. From time to time, there may well be financial crises when it would be appropriate for the international community to provide temporary financial assistance to mitigate the costs of sharp adjustment in trade flows and output. But such a role should not be the principal focus of international monetary co-operation, and, as I have pointed out, it has not been the role for the IMF vis-a-vis any developed economy for many years. Moreover, nor is it likely to be true of many important emerging market economies in the future. As I argued in my K.B. Lall Lecture in 2001, following the Asian crisis of the late 1990s it was likely that countries might choose to build up large foreign exchange reserves in order to be able to act as a “do it yourself” lender of last resort in US dollars. It is now clear that this is exactly what many Asian countries have done. Nevertheless, it is sensible to provide the Fund with the capability to act when necessary. How should the IMF be reformed?
However, in a context where inflation has turned out to be higher than expected; where inflationary expectations remain above target; where the peso is weaker than normal; where the global inflationary problem has become more complex and there are doubts as to how policies to address it will affect the global economy and financial markets, we must acknowledge that the risk of experiencing a more persistent inflationary phenomenon is our primary concern. Monetary policy makers will remain attentive to these developments and, as I mentioned a few moments ago, future movements of the MPR will be contingent on them. Urgently resolving the inflationary problem does not imply that we should set aside our medium-term challenges. More than two years into the pandemic and almost three since the social unrest of October 2019, our economy has suffered a string of events that have put the effectiveness of our economic policy framework and the authorities' ability to react to the test. In addition to the inflationary effects, some of the measures adopted to deal with the effects of the pandemic generated significant costs in the local financial market. Withdrawals of pension funds reduced the size of long-term savings and possibly also the economy's capacity to react to external shocks, especially under conditions of high uncertainty. Therefore, the strengthening of financial markets should be an important item on the economic agenda.

Following the decision of the September meeting, the MPR stands near the maximum level considered in the central scenario of this Report. Future movements in the policy rate will depend on the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario and its implications for the convergence of inflation to the target. The Board will be especially vigilant of the upward risks for inflation, considering both today's high level and the fact that two-year inflation expectations remain above 3%. The upper bound of the MPR corridor reflects sensitivity scenarios where the global inflationary problem calls for a more aggressive response of monetary policy around the world, particularly from the Federal Reserve. In such an event, there would be a sharp deterioration in global financial conditions and growth, with sharp declines in commodity prices and a further appreciation of the dollar. In a scenario where domestic inflation and expectations remain high, further peso depreciation would require a tighter monetary policy response than that described in the central scenario. The same would occur if, irrespective of the cost pressures in the external scenario, local inflationary dynamics proves more persistent as a result of the high medium-term inflationary expectations of households and firms. The lower part of the MPR corridor reflects scenarios where inflationary pressures subside faster. This could be the case if the contraction of activity and demand is more intense as a result of a faster adjustment of private consumption and/or weaker investment, which would also negatively affect the performance of the labor market.
CONCLUSION Norges Bank has assessed whether the equity share in the GPFG’s strategic benchmark index should be changed. The current equity share is slightly higher than 60 percent. In Norges Bank’s assessment, the equity allocation can be increased to 75 percent. The Bank’s proposal is based on a broad analysis of changes since the equity allocation was last assessed. In financial markets, bond portfolio characteristics in particular have changed over the past ten years. Expected returns on investment grade bonds have fallen sharply. At the same time, the expected excess returns on equities over bonds are now estimated to be somewhat higher than when the equity allocation was last assessed. Moreover, there is reduced covariance between bond and equity returns. In short, bonds have become a better, but also more costly, hedge against fluctuations in the fund’s value. Both of these factors suggest that some increase in the equity allocation would be appropriate. If the analysis is expanded to include the relationship between return and risk for overall 6/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  petroleum wealth, we arrive at a similar conclusion. Today, the GPFG accounts for a far larger share of petroleum wealth. This means that the fund’s owner can accept a higher level of risk associated with the return on the fund while keeping the level of risk associated with petroleum wealth unchanged. A higher equity allocation means that the expected return on the fund will increase. The realised return, however, may differ considerably from expectations.

These strengths are found in the sector’s strong capital base, its limited exposure to subprime-related and other toxic assets, and its low reliance on external funding. As a result, the impact of the crisis on the Thai banking system so far has been limited. The Thai banking system is resilient with good fundamentals, and continues to function normally to support the economy. In the last two quarters, despite the consecutive negative GDP growths, the performance of the Thai banking sector remains satisfactory. The sector continues to see profits in the last two quarters, while the increase in the non-performing loans has not been large. This robust performance reflects a number of common responses that have been undertaken by the banks to manage the increase in credit and market risks. The responses include parring down of investment in foreign assets, lowering the loan growth target in line with the economy, strengthening risk management and credit standards, paying close attention to liquidity, and acting early to assist clients to adjust to the impact of the shock. These measures have helped banks to contain credit risk, and so far we have seen the gross NPL ratio rising slightly to 5.5 percent in March from 5.3 percent in December. As for the Bank of Thailand, our approach to bank supervision during this time of global stress is to ensure that the banking system is healthy, and the system continues to operate fully to support the economy with good risk management and adequate capital.
While the outlook for the global economy remains firm, the persistently higher oil prices and some softness in the recent US data have shifted the balance of risks more to the downside. The key issue at this time is thus the oil prices, and the key question is how the higher oil prices will affect the global economy going forward. Ladies and Gentlemen, This year prices of oil have gone up by more than 40 percent. The Dubai price, which is the key reference price for Thailand, went up from last year’s average of $ 27 per barrel to now about $ 39 per barrel. Domestic retail oil prices, however, have gone up by less because of the price support scheme that the Government has been running. This has helped limit the immediate effects of the high global oil prices on the economy. But notwithstanding the subsidies, domestic inflation has been rising. Headline CPI inflation, for example, rose to 3.1 percent in July. At this time, we believe there is substantial price pressure building up in the economy that could eventually translate into higher consumer prices once the proft margin is adequately squeezed. This pent - up price pressure is linked not only to the higher global oil prices that have yet to be passed through to the consumer prices, but also to the continued high level of capacity utilization and to the reported tightening in some segments of the labour market.

For those of you who have not been home for a while, cleanskin wine is quality wine that is sold more cheaply because it is unlabeled. So, you are getting something good but you don’t know why because you don’t know what it is. Half an hour ago, the Thai economy this year to many of you was like cleanskin wine. You know the economy is doing better but you don’t know why. BIS Review 50/2004  3  In this brief space of time, I hope I have given you an adequate account of how we at the Bank of Thailand see the Thai economy evolving this year, and hopefully have helped improve your understandings of the economy. As with the cleanskin wine, I will definitely go back for more. I only hope you will do the same by continuing to have confidence in the Thai economy and remain a trusted friend and a dependable partner of Thailand for many many years to come. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 50/2004
You have to make do with estimates, which in the nature of things are uncertain and therefore have to be interpreted with caution. Still, the available estimates do suggest that in Sweden the equilibrium level of unemployment rose in the early 1990s and is somewhere in the interval 4.5 to 7.5%, expressed in terms of registered unemployment.1 The OECD also concludes that the level has increased markedly in the 1990s and judges that in Sweden equilibrium unemployment is around 6%.2 Not everyone agrees, however, that equilibrium unemployment is markedly higher than before.3 But even though we cannot be certain about its exact level, an increase is indicated by the fact that 1  2 3  See e.g. Calmfors, L (1995), Will high unemployment in Sweden become persistent?, Swedish Economic Policy Review 2:1. Economic Surveys – Sweden 1999, OECD, Paris. See e.g. Åberg, R (1997), Är stigande jämviktsarbetslöshet huvudproblemet på arbetsmarknaden? (Is rising equilibrium unemployment the principle labour market problem? ), Ekonomisk Debatt 25:1. BIS Review 106/1999  4  otherwise the currently high unemployment would be acting as a strong restraint in wage formation. Instead, the wage level in Sweden is still rising somewhat faster than in our main competitor countries. Considering that the rate of registered unemployment is currently around 6% and thus inside the estimated interval for structural or equilibrium unemployment, this might suggest that the Swedish economy is relatively close to full capacity utilisation.

With the budgetary measures that have been proposed, the fiscal stance will also exert an effect on demand that is more expansionary in the future. In the absence of negative shocks, such a direction of policy normally tends to generate GDP growth above the rate that the economy is capable of sustaining in the longer run. If such a situation is allowed to continue for too long, it can lead to problems with bottlenecks and inflationary tendencies. In time, expectations of inflation’s level in the longer run may be adjusted upwards and this can result in a price and wage spiral that brings inflation above the targeted rate. Such a course of events has to be prevented by the Riksbank, which the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) has made accountable for maintaining price stability. So sooner or later the level of the repo rate will have to be normalised in order to counter an acceleration of inflation in an upward cyclical phase. This is something that the Riksbank is discussing, as was evident from the published minute of the Executive Board meeting on 12 August. In the present circumstances what we have to do is decide when – not whether – the time has come to initiate the shift towards a less expansionary monetary stance.
Despite the rise in oil prices, the Norwegian krone has been fairly weak since 2014. A weak krone has a positive influence on exporting companies. At the same time, prices for imported goods and services increase. A weaker krone therefore leads to higher inflation. Measured by the import-weighted exchange rate index (I-44), the krone appreciated somewhat in the period to autumn 2018, but depreciated again towards year-end. The depreciation coincided with a fall in oil prices and heightened uncertainty in global financial markets. Chart: Growth mainland Norway Growth in the Norwegian economy has been solid since autumn 2016. At the same time, labour market conditions have improved considerably. The number of employed has increased by more than 100 000, and unemployment has declined. Solid global growth, higher oil prices and low interest rates have contributed to lifting growth. The enterprises in Norges Bank’s Regional Network reported rising output growth through 2018, particularly for oil service providers thanks to the rebound in petroleum investment on the Norwegian shelf following several years of decline. There was also a pick-up in exports from oil service companies. Chart: Employment as a share of the population After some years of solid growth, spare capacity has gradually diminished. At the end of 2018, capacity utilisation appeared to be close to what we regard as a normal level. Employment also appears to have returned to a more normal level.

Owing to a high employment rate, the number of employed persons as a share of the working-age population is now close to the level prevailing before the sharp fall in oil prices in 2014. In 2018, employment rose in most sectors of the Norwegian economy, including oil-related industries. More people entered the labour market, but unemployment nonetheless edged down. There are signs of growing pressures in the economy. A rising number of Regional Network contacts report little spare capacity. A number of employers report difficulties in finding skilled and experienced labour. In the wake of the oil price decline, wage growth has been moderate. The improvement in the labour market has contributed to a pick-up in wage growth in recent years. At the same time, inflation has been high. As a result, real wage growth has been low, with little improvement in household purchasing power. Chart: Consumer prices 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Consumer price inflation edged up through 2018, primarily reflecting a sharp increase in electricity prices. Underlying inflation also moved up, partly owing to the pick-up in wage growth and higher imported inflation. Annual consumer price inflation (CPI) was 2.7 percent in 2018. Persistently high debt growth has added to the vulnerability of the household sector. High house price inflation has fuelled debt growth. In 2018, house price inflation was low, and debt growth eased somewhat. Debt nevertheless grew faster than household disposable income.
Other costs have also continued to rise, reflecting an underlying theme of supply constraints and bottlenecks: the oil price has now reached $ per barrel, non-oil commodity prices have continued to rise, and the sustained rise in shipping costs that we have seen since 2020 has also continued. And those cost pressures appear to be passing through to manufactured goods. That said, some of the most extreme price pressures, for instance in the lumber futures market, do now appear to be easing. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  Table 1: Estimates of Q2 economic performance Nov 2020 MPR  May 2021 MPR  Latest nowcast/data  GDP growth (% YoY)  20¼  21½  22¾  CPI inflation (% YoY)  1.7  1.7  2.1  Private sector regular AWE (% YoY)  4¾  7¼  8  When thinking about how these latest developments might affect the economic outlook, it’s important to keep things in perspective. The projected GDP growth rates shown in Table 1 compared with a year ago show just how unusual this period is economically, with growth of 22¾% expected in 2021Q2 relative to the trough in activity a year ago . And relative to that, the forecast revisions between the November 2020 MPR and the staff’s latest ‘nowcast’ for GDP growth to 2021Q2, while noteworthy, are relatively small. Nevertheless in the near term the signal is clearly to the upside.

31.10.2022  Remarks at the Conference “Building resilience in uncertain times: safeguarding financial stability, encouraging investments” 2022 Conference of Mediterranean Central Banks/Banco de España, Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye, OECD and European Institute of the Mediterranean Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you all to this Conference on Building resilience in uncertain times: safeguarding financial stability, encouraging investments. We could not have asked for a more delightful setting for this Conference than this beautiful city of Istanbul. Let me start by thanking our colleagues from the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye, the OECD and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and, in particular, Governor Kavcıoğlu, Ambassador Florensa and Achraf Bouali for jointly organising this Conference. I would like to especially emphasise the decisive commitment of IEMed, thanks to which we are now opening the seventh edition of this Conference, which is becoming a reference among the fora for dialogue and cooperation in economic and financial relationships in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The last edition of this conference was held in June 2021 in a fully virtual format, as we were in the middle of the pandemic. On that occasion, an incipient recovery was taking place and there was optimism about the outlook, given the good progress made with vaccination. However, almost a year and a half later, even if we have returned to a face-to-face event, we are once again in a highly uncertain environment.
We also see limited overall risks to euro area financial stability. Without sufficient mitigating action, however, a cliff-edge Brexit could have an adverse impact in certain areas of centrally cleared derivatives markets. Sources of risk from outside the EU have grown since May. A stronger US dollar and heightened trade tensions triggered renewed stress in a number of emerging market economies. Financial integration and the deepening of EMU Thanks to our collective efforts at the European and national level, we have come a long way since the start of the financial crisis. However, to strengthen our economies and preserve financial stability, we need to go further. Let me highlight in particular some of the concrete steps in the area of financial integration that we need to take at the European level. First, we need to complete the architecture of the banking union. The benefits of having a euro area supervisor are clear when we look at banks’ strengthened balance sheets. Still, more needs to be done to reduce the risks for citizens as both taxpayers and depositors and to break the remaining link between banks and national governments. In addition to the adoption of banking package which is currently under negotiation among EU legislators, a genuine banking union needs further regulatory harmonisation, for instance through greater reliance on Regulations 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  instead of Directives. In particular, unwarranted national options and discretions still stand in the way of a level playing field for banks.

We face important global challenges that are naturally causing concern among the people of Europe, especially those who feel left behind. Common institutions and collaboration among Member States give Europe a strong voice in the world. More importantly, they make it possible for us to find effective answers to joint problems. In other words, we are stronger together. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches