samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, whether – (a) the bank is locally incorporated with majority Singaporean/PR Board representation, and what types of businesses are conducted by the locally incorporated entity; (b) Singapore is one of the major markets for the bank group, constituting a substantial part of group profits and assets; (c) major business lines and key decision makers are headquartered in Singapore; and (d) the bank serves a comprehensive spectrum of the local community in Singapore. A bank that demonstrates these and other characteristics can be considered significantly rooted. (iii) MAS will consider awarding new QFBs only under FTAs where there are substantial benefits to Singapore. New QFBs that are granted under future FTA offers will have to first locally incorporate before they may establish up to 25 places of business. This evolution of our QFB scheme, and it is an evolution, should ensure that our local banks continue to have majority share of domestic deposits, while banks awarded QFB privileges can build a deeper presence. Given the size and maturity of Singapore’s domestic retail banking market, we have to calibrate our moves to ensure that greater foreign bank participation does not result in a fragmented and inefficient market, but instead leads to a more robust and competitive system. Banks with a meaningful market share will be in a better position to reap the benefits of scale from a more extensive network, to respond to customers’ changing needs and at reasonable cost, and to be better rooted in Singapore to contribute to our financial stability and growth.

Banking liberalisation provided the spur for our local banks to raise their game and compete with some of the world’s largest banks while maintaining high prudential standards and they have done well. We had previously announced the Government’s policy of maintaining the local banks’ market share at no less than 50% of total resident deposits. This remains our position. We are committed to having strong local banks at the core of the banking system. In a very real  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  way, our three strong local banks also give Singapore the confidence to continue opening up the banking sector to foreign competition. Encouraging foreign banks to deepen their Singapore roots A diverse international presence and global connectivity must remain key strengths of Singapore’s financial centre. We host many international banks, who conduct an increasing share of their activities out of their Singapore offices. Some banks have moved their global heads of business to Singapore, or hubbed specific business lines or IT operations in Singapore. Consumers and corporate customers have benefited from the wider range of products and services, offered at competitive rates. The majority of foreign banks in Singapore operate as branches, taking advantage of the cost efficiencies arising from branching within an international bank. We continue to support the use of branches for the vast majority of banks in Singapore, which are in the wholesale and investment banking businesses. Additional measures may be appropriate for retail banks that are important to the domestic market.
As I mentioned before, food expenditures in developing countries constitute a larger share in the basket of consumer prices than those on developed countries. It is as low as 15 percent in the U.S., as high as 60 percent in India. Moreover, income elasticity of food is also significantly higher in less developed countries. In Bangladesh, one percent increase in household income leads to 0.73 percent increase in food demand. In the U.S., however, a typical household who receives one extra dollar spends only 10 cents more on food. What does it mean? It means that as long as rapid growth rates in developing countries continue, the food demand is also likely to rise rapidly. In the post war period, we did not observe a similar surge in food demand, because the engine of world economy at that time was mainly advanced economies. Today, we face a different picture. Emerging market countries are growing fast. Their share in world consumption is three times higher than what it was in early 80s. More importantly, these countries, like China, India, and Indonesia have huge populations. According to our estimates at the Central Bank of Turkey, the contribution of only two countries (China and India) on food demand growth in the world reached almost 50 percent in 2007 – up from 10 percent in 1980. The growth in global food demand is estimated to exceed the growth in global food supply since early 2000s and it is likely to stay that way in the near future.

The world needs transition finance – to provide the funding support for businesses and sectors that are not so green, to adopt cleaner technologies, increase energy efficiency, and become greener over time. Inclusive transition is about decarbonising without compromising social and economic development. Hundreds of millions of people across Asia, Africa, and Latin America still do not have access to electricity, modern sanitation, and drinking water. Economic development will drive demand for fossil fuels, which is still the cheapest way to generate electricity and power mobility in many parts of the world. The switch to cleaner energy cannot be made in one leap. We need to shift the energy mix progressively, first to relatively less emissions-intensive fuels like natural gas, and then to renewables. Finance can be a powerful enabler for such a transition. Second, Asia – this is where the battle against climate change will be won or lost. Asia accounts for half of the world's greenhouse gas emissions and is home to about 60% of the global population. The issues of transition are most acute in Asia, with growing affluence and rapid urbanisation alongside the urgent needs of poverty alleviation. About 85% of the energy consumed in Asia comes from fossil fuels and Asia's demand for energy is projected to double in 2030. Asia is also most vulnerable to climate change, with large populations living close to locations prone to drought, floods, and rising sea levels.
The loans in kronor may be concluded in October 2010 as long as no decision is taken on new loans. The extraordinary measures will thus cease once the economy has recovered, and the situation in the financial sector has stabilised. The Riksbank’s balance sheet will then decline. However, the financial crisis has shown that we should maintain a greater readiness to meet any new problems than we had prior to the crisis. How this might affect the balance sheet is a question the Riksbank will be considering over the coming period. 16  BIS Review 160/2009  Appendix: Figures 17 and 18 The Riksbank’s assets and liabilities  30.09.09  31.12.07  Changes  Gold  28 295  25 827  2 468  Foreign currency reserves  297 335  172 544  124 791  Dollar lending to the banks  25 869  Lending in SEK to monetary policy counterparties  337 501  9 129  328 372  Other assets  7 529  4 394  3 135  Total assets  696 529  211 894  484 635  Liabilities, SEK million  30.09.09  31.12.07  Changes  Banknotes and coins  105 998  114 324  -8 326  Fine-tuning, etc.

The recovery thus seems to be holding, but it should be acknowledged that expectations for economic growth in the area continue to be very moderate in the short and medium term. The ECB continues with an expansionary policy stance. We have reached an all-time low in the interest rates on the main refinancing operations, now at 0.25%; since July, a forward guidance policy has been pursued, conveying to economic agents the ECB’s decision to keep interest rates low for a prolonged period and to maintain generous liquidity provision. Maintaining and stepping up this expansionary monetary policy has naturally had to do with the recent course of inflation, proxied by the consumer price index, which stood in October at 0.7% for the euro area as a whole, a rate substantially off the target of 2%. Against this background, the first signs of the start of a recovery in the Spanish economy have begun to emerge. As you know, in the third quarter of this year Spain posted its first positive quarter-on-quarter rate of change in GDP since mid-2011. In the past two quarters, consumer spending has shown signs of stabilising, and even of picking up slightly. This positive trend should continue over the coming year, although the need for households to carry on reducing their debt will probably check the expansionary behaviour of this demand component.
For instance, for Benjamin Franklin, the term “temperance” should be understood as follows: “Temperance first, as it tends to procure that coolness and clearness of head, which is so necessary where constant vigilance was to be kept up…”. This, to my mind, is one of the virtues that central bankers must impose on themselves. My Eurosystem colleagues and I have made it one of the guiding principles of our actions. Benjamin Franklin continues his description of these virtues in the following terms “Frugality and Industry freeing me from my remaining debt, and producing affluence and independence, would make more easy the practice of Sincerity and Justice, ...,”. He emphasises the importance of being freed from one’s debts and recovering one’s independence. We know from his political activity that he attaches a great deal of importance to the independence of the Nation, but here we are talking about that of individuals and therefore of the institutions for which they are responsible. As we will see later, this is the type of independence that lies at the heart of the Eurosystem. Furthermore, sincerity can be associated with transparency, another key principle of the Eurosystem. As in most human activities, the conduct of monetary policy involves some risk-taking and may, justifiably or not, be subject to debate and criticism, as we will see later on.

The achievement of the overriding policy objective: price stability Confronted with a series of adverse exogenous supply shocks (affecting in particular oil prices, food products and services prices) leading to a rise in the HICP of above 2% in year-on-year terms from 2000 to 2002, the level around which the HICP has hovered since, the Eurosystem has been able to achieve its main objective: since the Eurosystem became responsible for monetary policy in the euro area, HICP inflation has averaged 2%, which is near to the “close to but below 2%” at which we aim over the medium term. Let me remind you that HICP inflation was around 4% in the 1980’s and about 9% in the 1970s [see Figure 1]. Until recently, the single monetary policy also succeeded in stabilising and anchoring medium to longterm inflation expectations at around 1.8% to 1.9%, despite all the above mentioned shocks. That is to say, once again, at a level close to, but below, 2% in accordance with our definition of price stability – whether one takes the inflation expectations derived from surveys (for example, Consensus Forecast, or the ECB survey of professional forecasters – [see Figure 2] ) or those drawn from market data, notably index-linked government bonds. Recently, the awareness of a durable higher cost of oil has pushed expectations slightly above 2%. The last December key ECB interest rate’s hike has however brought these market expectations back to 2% that is to say in line with our definition of price stability over the medium term.
And if, within the criticism, there’s an implicit assumption that there’s an alternative universe in which everything else stays the same – real economic growth, real incomes and risky asset prices – but real interest rates are materially higher, then I’m not sure that’s right. I don’t think such a universe exists. Uncertainty and investment  Let me start with the August forecast, and the downward revision to investment in particular (Chart 1). It is often said that because consumer spending accounts for the lion’s share of aggregate demand - 65% of it in 2015, compared with 10% for business investment – the economic cycle depends mostly on household consumption. But investment is far more volatile than consumption (Charts 2 plots their growth rates, in annual data, since 1  1835 ). Allowing for this, their arithmetic contributions to aggregate demand growth are equally variable. There’s no reason to suppose investment is any less important than consumption in driving economic cycles. In fact, in many cycles, including during the financial crisis, it appears to move ahead of consumption. Chart 1: Business investment revised down in  Chart 2: Investment far more volatile than  August  consumption  Percent, 4qma 30 20  Standard deviations from mean .

(b) An update of the estimates in Rachel & Smith (2015). This is calculated as the nominal yield on 10-year sovereign bonds minus 1-year ahead inflation expectations from Consensus Economies. Figures have been GDP-weighted together for 20 advanced economies . 8 The notion that the neutral real rate had been falling goes back well over a decade. The more recent references include King and Low (2014), Miles (2014), Broadbent (2014), Rachel and Smith (2015) and Bernanke (2015). 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  9  generally reckoned to be several percentage points a year. On that basis, and within reason, a fund could tolerate a deficit and still afford to meet its obligations, simply through holding higher-yielding (if riskier) assets than those used to discount its liabilities. Furthermore, if equities and bonds move in a similar direction – as, for example, they did through much of the 1990s (Chart 10) – then those deficits should also be relatively stable. The fund would be hedged against factors that push equities and bonds in the same 9  direction . But over the past decade or so, equities and bonds have been negatively correlated (Chart 11 is a scatter plot of their daily changes since 2002). More to the point, the general tendency has been for bonds to do well – for yields to decline – and equities poorly. It’s this outperformance of the safe asset, highly unusual over such a sustained period, that has been the main problem for DB schemes.
Moreover, Spanish banks’ business models are strongly oriented towards the retail segment, which bolsters their resilience to adverse shocks to wholesale market financing conditions. This has also allowed the sector to record a favourable financial performance of late, both in terms of higher profitability and improved balance sheet quality. In any event, in a situation in which interest rates have had to be raised swiftly, banks face upside and downside risks to their net interest income, the value of their financial instrument holdings and their balance sheet credit quality. Banks whose average lending rates have adapted to the new situation faster than their average deposit rates (e.g. those with a greater share of variable rate loans and/or shorter maturities, and a greater share of retail funding) are seeing a substantial improvement in their net interest income, which has boosted their profitability. Conversely, the value of fixed income financial exposures (e.g. bonds, especially those with longer maturities) has declined. 5  This was particularly due to the growth in their RWAs on account of their business expansion abroad. 6  Autumn 2022 Financial Stability Report. 7  Specifically, the adverse scenario considers a cumulative fall in GDP over the three years of 1.3% (as opposed to growth of 9.8%) and a certain rise in risk premia. 8  By contrast, the baseline scenario, drawing on the December 2022 economic forecasts, envisages a moderate increase in the CET1 ratio of 0.35 pp in the period 2022-2024.

17.05.2023  18th Banking Industry Meeting* IESE Madrid Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor *lEnglish translation from the original in Spanish  Allow me to begin by thanking the IESE for inviting me once again to this event. On this occasion, I would like to share with you the Banco de España’s analysis of the situation and outlook for the Spanish banking industry. In terms of the macroeconomic setting, most strikingly, economic activity in Spain and the euro area has proved more resilient than expected in recent quarters, amid highly adverse negative shocks. Further, there appear to be signs of renewed buoyancy in 2023 to date. According to the Banco de España’s latest projections, in 2023 real GDP growth in Spain will be substantially lower than in 2022. However, faster than expected growth in the first quarter, together with the recent revision of the historical series, suggest that GDP growth this year could exceed the 1.6% envisaged in our most recent projections and outstrip 2% on average in 2024 and 2025. This sharper GDP growth would be driven by, among other factors, the expected easing of inflationary pressures (and the ensuing recovery in agents’ confidence and real income), the disappearance of the global production chain disruptions and the deployment of the Next Generation EU funds. However, these projections are subject to very high uncertainty and there are risks that less positive scenarios will materialise. In particular, the possible duration of the war in Ukraine continues to be the main source of risk.
We look forward to ADB’s continued engagement with its members to provide support that will cater for their changing needs as the region continues to progress and transform. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

And this takes considerably more time than addressing or doing away immediately with problems by injecting public funds. Yet this requirement to promote private solutions does not fully explain the enormous workload that has fallen on the supervisor over recent years. Insofar as it was decided at first to retain without major changes the singular legal arrangements for savings banks, and particularly their governance, this made it necessary to pursue most complex negotiations with the parties involved, namely trade unions, managers, regional governments, etc., each with very different interests from those that prevail in any mercantile company, where market discipline leads owners to worry about minimising losses and increasing shareholder value, and not about maintaining power, or the total amount devoted to early retirements, or about where headquarters should be established. In merger operations, processes such as determining shares of interest are reasonably easy to agree upon, since it suffices to make a proper valuation and to assign to each party what corresponds to it. But those who have followed the news in recent years will have witnessed the long drawn-out discussions, on a flimsy economic basis, that have been necessary to determine the power apportioned to each player in savings bank integrations. Before their transformation into banks, observance of the legal structure of savings banks meant that their restructuring could only move forward very gradually, step by step and with great prudence.
If the same is true now, we would expect the recent rapid rise in broad money growth to translate, in time, into higher money spending growth. In fact, the projections recently published by the MPC for UK nominal GDP growth over the next year are already in double-digits. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  16  Another way of interpreting these rises in the money supply is as the financial counterpart of the excess, or involuntary, savings accumulated by households and companies during the Covid crisis. These reflect the combined effects of restrictions on spending at the same time as relatively stable incomes. In the US, these excess savings total around $ trillion and in the euro-area almost $ trillion, although these savings are unevenly distributed across household types. In the UK, the picture is much the same. Excess savings currently total around £ billion for households and over £ billion for companies, with the lion’s share of these savings are in highly liquid bank deposits. This leaves money growth, or accumulated liquid savings, in a very different position than at the time of the global financial crisis (Chart 14). Chart 14: M4 after the Global Financial and Covid Crises  115  Start of episode=100  110  105  100  95  90 t  t+6  t+12  t+18  t+24  t+30  t+36  Quarters  GFC  Covid  Source: Bank of England and Bank calculations.

The sluggishness of the recovery in many advanced economies from the global financial crisis – the so-called Great Recession - was striking even by historical standards. For example, the level of activity in the UK lies very significantly below its level at the equivalent stage following the 1930s depression (Chart 7). The UK’s Great Recession was far-worse than the Great Depression. A number of factors are believed responsible for the persistence of weak global demand. One often given prominence was heightened risk-aversion among lenders, consumers and businesses, which in turn constrained credit and spending growth in the economy. This so-called “psychological scarring” of risk appetite was also a dampener of credit and aggregate demand following the Great Depression. 7  7  Malmendier and Nagel (2011). 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  On the supply-side of the economy, several factors have contributed to subdued global inflation over recent decades.
With pre-crisis rules of thumb and the BoE’s pre-crisis reaction function in mind, there were many and loud calls for pre-emptive tightening to prevent the build up of inflation pressure. 2  The Committee’s reluctance to tighten was of course motivated by the sizeable output gap and the need to allow a stimulative policy stance more time to squeeze out slack in the labour market – or as one Committee member put it at the time “don’t just do something, stand there…(and think)”. 3  But underlying this, there were more fundamental doubts about what had happened to the supply side of the economy during the crisis, particularly around the labour market and around the collapse of productivity growth. It was these concerns that underlay the Committee’s decision, shortly before I joined, to give forward guidance that it would not consider changing policy until unemployment fell to a certain level. As the expansion progressed from mid 2013 towards the Brexit referendum in 2016, evidence grew that the supply side was not returning to pre-crisis norms. Unemployment reached 5% - the pre-crisis estimate of the natural rate - in early 2016 without any hint of upward pressure on pay. Pay growth serially undershot the MPC’s forecasts (Chart 1). At the same time, as the expansion progressed, it became disappointingly clear first that the UK would not recover any of the productivity growth lost in the crisis and ensuing recession and then that it would not recover anything like the pre-crisis rate of productivity growth (Chart 2).

7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  Chart 7: whole economy regular pay growth  Chart 8: measures of domestically generated inflation Per cent  5  Three-month on three-month annualised  4  4  Three months on a year earlier  3  3 2  2 1  1 0  0 Unit labour cost growth  -1  GDP deflator  -2 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  -1  -2  Core services CPI  18 2013  2014  2015  2016  -3 2018  2017  Notes: dotted lines show 1997-2007 average for each measure. There is no clean measure of domestically generated inflation, the chart shows a subset of the range of measures that the MPC considers as a guide to domestically generated inflation. We have of course seen false dawns before. Last November, with those very much in mind, I voted against a rate rise. For me, structural uncertainties about the economy warranted a stodgy approach. In the face of these types of uncertainty I was prepared to trade off moving more slowly in order to let evidence accumulate, with a little more resistance in our reaction function, rather than moving more in line with the forecast. I will await our August forecast of course for the latest assessment of the evolution of domestic inflation pressures and of the first quarter of the year.