samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The executive branches have taken the decision to organise a line of defense against the “systemic solvency risk” that was threatening national, continental and global finance. We had asked ourselves for such decisions to be taken. But I certainly will not underestimate the difficulty of the tasks of governments to put taxpayers’ money and risk at stake for the guarantees and the recapitalisation that were necessary. In the euro area, in the UK, in the US, it called for courageous decisions. FT: Are there limits to the effectiveness of monetary policy because of the situation we're in, and if so, should the reaction of central bankers be to do more or less in such circumstances? And then what is the role that should be played by exceptional measures that you have at your disposal, the quantitative easing debate essentially? Trichet: First of all, we made the point clearly that there was a clear separation between monetary policy stance, which was designed to deliver price stability in the medium term in  BIS Review 159/2008  5  line with our definition, and our interventions in the money market aiming at permitting a smooth functioning of this market at the level of the short term interest rates that we had decided. And we have continued to look at inflation expectations with extreme care during the entire period.

But to the extent that we are only ten years old, this test is of course particularly important for a young institution. FT: What was the most difficult moment for you at the ECB in terms of crisis management? Trichet: I would certainly say that these were the first hours at the outset of the financial turmoil. The Executive Board had to make a diagnosis of the situation in a very short time span, assess what kind of problem we had to deal with, and take decisions almost instantaneously. FT: …this is July/August 2007, yes…. Trichet: This was on 9 August 2007. We had a very important decision to take, which was in a way the first important decision that central banks had to take in order to confront these exceptional circumstances. I remember I was keen on thinking, “This is a grave situation that calls for appropriate responses”. And then we had a great number of important decisions to take in the subsequent months, which were largely “firsts”, in terms of supplying liquidity at fixed rates and even in terms of expanding our collateral framework which, from the outset, was already a very comprehensive collateral framework. It has been a big challenge. One of our challenges is that we had to take decisions very rapidly at the level of the Governing Council. And we again proved that, thanks to teleconferencing, in one hour and a half or two hours we could make a full judgment and take a decision.
The measures implemented by central banks and governments have had a stabilising effect on financial markets. Credit and money market premiums have decreased and activity has picked up. Daily fluctuations have become less pronounced. With the improvement in financial markets over the past six months and the increase in the credit supply, global trade is now picking up slightly, albeit only gradually and from a low level. Manufacturing output has recently risen in the US, Japan and many emerging economies, while it continues to fall – albeit at a slower pace – in many euro area countries. Manufacturing output in Japan and the US is still at a very low level. Despite the pickup in growth, capacity utilisation in advanced economies will remain very low for the next two-three years. 2  BIS Review 139/2009  Uncertainty in equity markets has eased and risk premiums are lower, reflected in a rise in leading US stock indices of more than 50 per cent since equity markets bottomed out at the beginning of March 2009. Oslo Børs has risen by about 70 per cent since the beginning of March. The price of oil has risen somewhat since the June Report, and has doubled since the trough in December 2008. Metals prices have also risen. The increase in oil prices reflects low growth in oil production, more positive expectations as to the world economy and a weaker US dollar.

Petroleum investment has increased considerably in recent years, but is projected to fall somewhat towards the end of 2009. According to the petroleum investment intentions survey from Statistics Norway, petroleum investment will remain high in 2010. Exploration and production spending appear to be increasing markedly, but the increase will to some extent be offset by reduced spending on goods and services for field development and fields in operation. The change in investment composition will contribute to reducing demand for goods and services from the Norwegian supplier industry. Several investment projects are planned on the Norwegian continental shelf for the coming years. There are indications that some of the planned investments will require an oil price of around USD 70 per barrel to be profitable. Our projections are based on a rise in the oil price in line with oil futures prices. These prices suggest that the oil price in 2010 and 2011 will be USD 5-10 above the current level. Petroleum investment is therefore projected to be high in the period 2010-2012. Should the global growth outlook deteriorate again, the price of oil may fall markedly. This might lead to a decline in oil investment and also have an adverse impact on the wider Norwegian economy. On the other hand, a fall in oil prices normally results in a depreciation of the krone. Should the krone depreciate for an extended period, inflation may become too high.
We also have a complementary interest in enabling innovation and encouraging competition – including in the fast-moving payments landscape. To deliver against these objectives, we must embrace diversity in the broadest possible sense. As the Bank of England Governor Mark Carney recently stated, ‘a public institution should reflect the public it serves.’2 If we want to respond to the needs of the public, we need to understand what matters to them – and what better way of doing that than having a diverse range of staff reflecting the population? Diverse teams can reduce group-think and excessively optimistic views, and ultimately reduce the likelihood of poor decisions. And research has shown that companies with more diverse leadership teams tend to outperform their peers in terms of profitability and that diversity in companies is positively correlated with innovation. 3 4  Payments is an area which is responding well to an increasingly vocal and diverse range of preferences and demands across the world. Different people want - and may need - different ways to pay. They want genuine choice in how, when and where they make payments: they want a new finance.5 Back in the 17th century, the Amsterdam stock exchange would have been relying on exchanging coins and printed stocks and bonds. The world of payments has grown significantly – banknotes, cheques, credit/debit cards, and now a plethora of mobile payments, e-wallets and even the ability to pay using a watch.

Our network of Bank of England Agents is extremely important in this area. Around the country we have twelve Agencies, in general staffed by long-serving Bank of England people, constantly collecting information at the grass-roots level from their many business contacts. And the information, which they provide direct to the MPC on a monthly basis, can often prove helpful: either in helping us unravel inconsistencies in the data; or, as was the case in the Summer and Autumn of 1998, alerting us to problems in the economy before they show up in the official data. Notwithstanding the help of the Agents, problems with interpretation of the data abound. Some of these will be discussed in our Quarterly Inflation Report, due to be published on Thursday this week. I hope you will have the opportunity to read it. Financial stability Perhaps I could now turn from monetary policy matters to financial stability; and to the second part of my job as the Deputy Governor responsible for this part of the Bank’s work. Go back a little over three years and the Bank had a large department with four hundred and fifty staff supervising banks. Hard on the heels of the decision to grant the Bank independence, the Government decided in May 1997 to establish the Financial Services Authority bringing together existing UK  3  BIS Review 102/2000  financial regulators and supervisors under one roof.
Christian Noyer: Banking in the euro area Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the 30th Anniversary of the Association of Foreign Banks' Representatives, Frankfurt, 8 November 2001. *  *  *  I am very grateful for the invitation to speak to you on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Association of "Foreign Banks' Representatives in Germany". Your Association has 117 members from a large number of countries. Several of the member institutions are counted among the 30 major European banks, or among banks from elsewhere with important operations in Europe. For many banks represented by your Association, the topic of my speech "banking in the euro area" is part of day-to-day business. It is also day-to-day business for the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Eurosystem as a whole, as we conduct our monetary policy operations and run the TARGET large-value payment system. The further integration of the European banking system and financial markets is in the interests of both banks and the central bank. For banks, it means the liquidity benefits of deeper and wider markets and lower costs when operating in several countries. From the central bank perspective, it enhances the efficient and consistent implementation of the single monetary policy. We already enjoy the benefits of a common euro area banking system in important respects.

Finally, I wish you a productive and fruitful time here at the HKMA Fintech Day, and trust that you will benefit from today’s rich plenary and parallel sessions. 21. Thank you very much. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
But we must be humble and thank those wanting to lecture us on free markets, if only for the purpose of keeping us on our toes. Hong Kong is changing and one would expect any dynamic city to be different after the passage of 20 years. But, surprise, surprise, the policy of positive non-interventionism has not changed. Many may have chosen to ignore or forget the true meaning of this policy, but not the administration of the HKSAR. Certainly, I have not forgotten it. And, having worked continuously and closely with five financial secretaries in succession, I can vouch for all of them in their firm adherence to this policy of positive non-interventionism. It applies also to the specific case of the current intervention in the stock and futures markets. As a firm believer in such a policy, I am responsible for conducting the intervention. The nostalgia has prompted me to take time off watching the markets to read some of the long-forgotten literature on positive non-interventionism. This gives me great pleasure, particularly when I see the rare sentences and, if I am more fortunate, paragraphs attributable to my drafting that survived the final texts. Yes, Sir Philip was a great financial secretary with a great mind. Even many of our critics hold him in high regard. I hope that in quoting him, our stance in the stock and futures market can be put into a context that our critics may be able better to appreciate.

Those are the words of Sir Philip, the architect of that policy and someone who commanded and still commands a lot of respect. Indeed as Monetary Authority chief, I have no responsibility over that policy. It rests on the broad shoulders of Sir Donald Tsang who is carrying it bravely. Let us all make a little effort to give him the support that he needs, spiritual or otherwise, by trying to gain a better appreciation of what the policy of positive non-interventionism really means. BIS Review 67/1998  -4Whilst on the subject of intervention, may I reiterate that our intervention in the stock and futures market to deter currency manipulation does not imply any weakening of our resolve to adhere to the linked exchange rate system. This resolve has never been stronger. Indeed, as I have mentioned elsewhere, there simply is no better alternative for Hong Kong. The experience of many of our neighbouring economies in the past year or so underlines why. As the financial storm in this region spreads to almost everywhere now, and with increased intensity, the discipline of currency board arrangements of our linked exchange rate system is our best safeguard for our long-term prosperity and stability. BIS Review 67/1998
In the Annales, he wrote: “The destruction of private wealth precipitated the fall of rank and reputation. At last, the emperor interposed his aid by distributing throughout the banks a hundred million sesterces, and allowing freedom to borrow without interest for three years, provided the borrower gave security to the State in land to double the amount. Credit was thus restored, and gradually private lenders were found.” 1 Replace “emperor” with “governments and central banks”, “sesterces” with “dollars” or “euro”, “security” with “collateral”: this two thousand year old quotation could sound surprisingly familiar. Yet, even though two thousand years have passed, with many financial debacles in between, I think it is fair to say that we entered the current crisis less than ideally prepared. First, we had to improvise with an economic interpretation of the causes that led to those unprecedented market disruptions. The dramatic fall in confidence revealed a source of risk that macroeconomists had not modelled carefully and that had not even been considered relevant by most theorists of finance. Now, the concept of “systemic risk” is almost common knowledge. Second, we had thought that the financial system would act as a shock absorber. Portfolio theory had demonstrated that the dispersion of individual risks would attenuate aggregate risk. But the mispricing of risk multiplied exposures, and the assumption of similar risks by market participants increased the potential for contagion. In the event, we learned that dispersion does not necessarily mean effective diversification.

It seems to me that we are all – industrial countries as well as emerging economies – very much united in purpose: correct distorted incentives, improve very significantly the resilience of the financial system, and counteract pro-cyclical mechanisms and behaviours. We are also convinced on both sides of the Atlantic – and here in Stanford, I would say also on both sides of the Pacific Ocean – that the success of the enlarged governance of global finance and the global economy through the G20, the Financial Stability Board and the cooperative activities of the Central Banks, is key for the stability and the prosperity of the present unified global economy. Concluding remarks At the height of the crisis – when irrational exuberance had turned into excessive pessimism – I repeatedly stated that regaining confidence was of the essence. Since then, confidence in the short term has been restored, not least because of bold and courageous policy actions around the globe. Going forward, we need to strengthen longer-term confidence, and this requires policy frameworks that will help to prevent a future crisis. I started with Tacitus’ example of bold policy action. I would like to end with Cicero’s fides. There was a famous controversy between Julius Caesar and Cicero 80 years before the crisis described by Tacitus. Rome, at that time, was struggling with a debt overhang. Caesar proposed partly to remit the debt. Cicero strongly opposed such action.
Will inflation remain under control? Will the financial system do its job? Will I keep mine? Such issues are why monetary and financial stability are fundamental pre-requisites for effective economic adjustment and sustained prosperity. Discharging the Bank’s responsibilities for these public goods demands rigorous analysis, objective judgement, and effective transparency. We will not shirk from these obligations. The Bank and its independent policy committees will continue to provide analytically based, clear-eyed assessments of the economic and financial outlooks. And we will outline the risks to these forecasts so that we and others can prepare to manage them. The near-term challenges facing the UK economy can’t be wished away. But they can be addressed. A clear plan is needed, and its measures must be implemented with resolute determination. After briefly reviewing the relationship between uncertainty and the economy, I want to review how the Bank of England’s contribution to that plan will unfold over the coming weeks. But at the outset, I want to re-emphasise that the Bank has taken all the necessary steps to prepare for these events. And we will not hesitate to take any additional measures required to meet our responsibilities as the United Kingdom moves forward. 1.

To emerge from an uncertain world with confidence, people and businesses need a fixed point by which to navigate. Once identified, everyone can then play a role supporting the strategy to get us to our destination. That strategy must be grounded in the bedrock of the UK’s existing macro policy institutions and frameworks. That means fiscal policy anchored in a clear commitment to long-run sustainability and buttressed by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility. And it means respecting the frameworks for the other major arms of macroeconomic policy as they are set out in statute and conducted by the Bank of England. The Bank has clear remits and can deploy a wide range of instruments. With its goals defined by Parliament, the Bank has operational independence. Its policy strategies and communications are decided by independent, expert committees whose members are individually accountable to Parliament for their analysis and policy actions. The Bank conducts policy consistently, transparently and accountably. Its policy committees are straight with the British public about the risks and trade-offs in the pursuit of our objectives. This institutional framework is critical to reduce uncertainty and essential to promote prosperity. With this backdrop, let me now describe the concrete steps the Bank has taken to address uncertainty and how we can be expected to act in the weeks and months ahead. 3.1  Financial policy  Let me begin with financial policy.
EU-Singapore FTA (EUSFTA) Finally, as we seek to maintain an open economy and to stay relevant, Singapore will work on deepening our engagement beyond the Asia Pacific, for example, with the EU. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Negotiations on the EU-Singapore FTA were recently concluded. This is the first FTA which the EU has concluded with an ASEAN country. The EU-Singapore FTA can serve as a pathfinder FTA for EU’s on-going bilateral FTA negotiations with other ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia and Vietnam, and it signals the EU’s interest to engage with the region. When implemented, the EU-Singapore FTA will enhance Singapore’s attractiveness as a gateway for EU companies seeking to tap the opportunities in our region. Conclusion So ladies and gentlemen, to summarise, Singapore is pursuing a strategy of broader and deeper economic integration with major economies through multilateral agreements, such as the RCEP, TPP and EU-Singapore FTA. In addition, we are enhancing our role as a trusted and modern financial hub by expanding into new services, such as offshore Renminbi trading. These initiatives will help investors and companies based in Singapore to “open doors” and “unlock value”. Let me once again express my appreciation to Deutsche Bank for holding the annual Deutsche Bank Access Asia Conference in Singapore and bringing together thought leaders, investors and policy makers together to find ways to tap the opportunities that are being created by Asia’s economic growth. I wish you all a very fruitful conference. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Stefan Ingves: Coming stronger out of a crisis – lessons from Sweden Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Brussels Economic Forum, Brussels, 18 May 2011. *  *  *  “If in debt, you are not free.” This expression was widely used by Göran Persson, Sweden’s former prime minister, to explain the need for the extensive fiscal consolidation process that Sweden underwent after the crisis in the 1990s.1 In 1997, a three-year nominal expenditure ceiling was introduced. This was an important step towards increasing budgetary discipline and strengthening the long-term perspective of the budget process. In addition, as part of this fiscal consolidation process, a new fiscal policy framework that included a budget surplus target of 1 per cent over the business cycle was introduced in the year 2000. With these instruments in place the debt to GDP ratio fell from 56 per cent in the year 2000 to 35 per cent today. Recent developments in many European countries remind us of Göran Persson’s words: small, open economies are vulnerable to crises of confidence when financial markets are in turmoil. They need to stand on very solid economic foundations and be supported by a credible and sound fiscal-policy framework. Sweden was lucky enough to be in this position when the recent crisis struck. This was indeed fortunate as the crisis had a major impact on the Swedish economy. GDP fell by more than 5 per cent in 2009 – the largest fall since the 1930s.