samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the face of this exceptional health crisis, financial institutions and supervisors alike are responding rapidly and powerfully 2.1 Rapid, powerful and unprecedented responses to support the real economy during the pandemic Unlike in 2008, banks are at the heart of the solutions this time round, and not at the centre of the crisis. With their staff, whom I would like to commend, they have gathered their forces to put in place strong measures to support the real economy. That includes the rapid implementation of state-guaranteed loans: to date, 559,000 requests have been received for a total of EUR 105 billion, of which EUR 85 billion have already been granted. In France, loans have therefore been rapidly channelled to VSEs and SMEs, in contrast with the difficulties seen in Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. Bernard Delas will come back to the measures taken by insurers, but let me just highlight the ACPR’s work on the conditions for the payment of compensation for loss of earnings, in order to better identify the challenges faced by the industry. 2.2 A responsive monetary policy Since this morning we have been in the silent period, so I shall limit myself to some retrospective remarks on monetary policy. I have often stressed that monetary policy is not made for the banks, but rather for the entire economy. And the banks have often been overly critical of monetary policy, holding it responsible for all their ills.

I therefore think it is all the more important to stress that the ECB’s recent decisions, in the face of the crisis, have aimed to preserve the effective transmission of monetary policy via the bank channel: the conditions for TLTRO-IIIs, these targeted longer-term refinancing operations, have been significantly eased (up to 50 percentage points lower than the deposit facility rate if the target for lending during the “Covid period” is reached, or currently –1%). This radical innovation represents a reduction of several billion euros in annual costs for the European banking system. New operations have also been announced (bridge LTROs, PELTROs or Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations). Since the implementation of these measures, the outstanding amount of refinancing provided by the Eurosystem to euro area banks has increased sharply, to more than EUR 1,000 billion, even before the June TLTRO. The easing of the collateral framework, for its part, has significantly increased the amount of assets eligible for operations, and supported the supply of credit to the private sector. First, by expanding the use of credit claims (bank loans) as collateral. But also by temporarily lowering the haircut applied to collateral by 20 percentage points for all assets (and by an additional 20 percentage points for credit claims), or by increasing from 2.5% to 10% the maximum share of unsecured bank debt securities in a credit institution’s 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  collateral pool.
François Villeroy de Galhau: Europe at a crossroads – how to achieve efficient economic governance in the euro area? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, recorded for the event at Bruegel, Brussels, 22 March 2016. *  *  *  Summary There is a growing perception of the need to rethink the economic governance of the euro area. Compelling ideas have been put forward to that effect; yet their implementation is tricky, especially in the present climate of Euroscepticism. Shifting from ideas to action has become urgent if monetary policy is not to remain the only game in town. Clearly, the single monetary policy cannot be a substitute for the coordination of national economic policies or the lack of reforms. To be sure, the debate over EMU reform is politically loaded; but for euro area citizens the poor coordination of national policies involves a high cost in terms of growth, of several points of GDP. The economic case therefore needs to be made: this discussion is not about “more Brussels”, it is about more growth and jobs in Europe. In addition, it is not a choice between domestic reforms or European coordination; we need both. Between complete integration – of the monetary-policy type – and monitored national policies, as currently conducted, the missing link is “full coordination” of fiscal and structural policies. This is clearly shown in a matrix crossing these three degrees of integration and the four policy dimensions (monetary, financial, fiscal and structural).

A surplus of more than 3 % of GDP, for an economic area which still has a negative output gap of more than 2%, is clearly suboptimal. In sum, all these figures point to a significant cost of non-coordination, of at least 2% of the EA GDP at present. C.  To take the debate forward, three principled choices have to be made. These principled choices are needed: (i) to resolve the debate between coordination and reforms; (ii) to simplify rules and embrace institution-based policymaking; in order (iii) to achieve full coordination. First, we do not have to choose between coordinating economic policies and domestic reforms. This is the cornerstone of any French-German agreement: breaking the political gridlock on coordination versus reforms, and making parallel progress on both domestic reforms and European coordination. This requires overcoming distrust and putting both aspects under the same umbrella, namely a common institution. Second, institutions with a mandate are superior to rules without institutions. To bolster policy consistency and coordination, we admittedly need simpler rules. For instance, the complexity of the reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the so-called “Fiscal Compact” is such that Finance ministers privately admit they do not know whether their country is completely abiding by the rules. But we learnt in real life that we cannot rely simply on rules. They should be supported by strong institutions with discretionary powers.
Some individual parts of the regulatory rulebook - such as the use of internal ratings-based risk weights - also remain complex. The new regulatory architecture has also introduced measures which are likely to make for a greater degree of regulatory discretion. The authorities in the US, UK and euro area have moved to annual stress-testing exercises in which the stress scenario, modelling framework, success criteria and regulatory response are each subject to significant degrees of regulatory discretion. Regulators internationally are also now setting a CCyB requirement, which is also set in a largely discretionary fashion. 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  In short, the new regulatory framework involves a larger number of regulatory constraints, many of which are individually complex, operating with a greater degree of regulatory discretion than in the past. Some have questioned whether this system may be too complex (for example, Admati and Hellwig (2011)). And some of the recent debate on regulatory reform in the US also raises those same concerns (US Department of the Treasury (2017)). There are several different dimensions to regulatory complexity. Much has already been written on the complexity of individual rules or regulatory constraints and the associated potential for regulatory arbitrage (Haldane and Madouros (2012), Aikman et al (2014), Behn, Haselmann, and Vig (2016)). The Basel Committee’s Task Force on Simplicity and Transparency are looking into these questions at a practical level. We do not explore those issues further here.

Benefits for the non-participating Member States The SSM is open to the participation of all EU member States, including those that have not adopted the euro and perhaps many will do so. How will those states that do not participate in the SSM be affected by Banking Union? It is important to stress here that the playing field really will be level. There will be no disadvantage for banks in countries like Britain that stay out of the SSM. Banking Union will benefit all Member States that are part of the single financial market. And as the leading provider of financial services in Europe, I can see only advantages for Britain from its creation. First, Banking Union will facilitate the completion of the single financial market by simplifying supervisory and regulatory practices, which will facilitate wider market access for banks and investors across Europe. Second, Banking Union will reduce the scope for coordination failures between national supervisors, which will in turn allow for more effective implementation of the single rulebook and convergence of supervisory practices. In this way, the presence of the SSM can be seen as reinforcing the coordination function of the European Banking Authority. The SSM will operate in full compliance with EBA guidance and actively contribute to its work. Third, Banking Union will enhance financial stability in the Europe – and this, more than anything, is what is required for the single market in financial services to thrive.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques – may Allah protect him- has paid great attention to economic affairs. He has presided the Supreme Economic Council since its inception. Under his instructions and guidance – may Allah protect him- a number of resolutions, aimed at raising the level of economic performance and paving the way for sustainable growth, were taken. A rapid review of the Royal Orders and Resolutions of The Council of Minsters pertaining to economic and financial affairs, issued during the last nine years, will reveal a huge quantum. Some of which are the following: the resolution to inaugurate the largest integrated economic city in the Middle East (King Abdullah Economic City), establishment of other economic cities in different parts of the Kingdom, establishment of a developed financial center in Riyadh city, that includes all financial institutions, setting up a National Anti-Corruption Commission, and establishment of an independent government authority concerned with the development of Saudi non-oil exports, called the Saudi Export Development Authority. The formation of two committees, one in Jeddah governorate and another in Dammam city, to settle disputes and violations set forth in Article XX of the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law, was approved.

[10]Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (SSM Regulation), OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63. [11]The provisions of Article 130 TFEU are also mirrored in Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB, which is annexed to the Treaty as Protocol Number 4. [12]Similar classifications are used in the in  ECB convergence reports, adopted on the basis of Article 140(1) of the Statute of the ESCB , which assess the progress made by non-euro area Member States in fulfilling their Treaty obligations regarding the achievement of economic and monetary union. [13]Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag, para. 75 (ECLI:EU:C:2015:400). [14]The ECB has its own capital, which is paid up by the national central banks (Article 28 of the Statute of the ESCB) and other assets, including claims relating to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem, securities held for monetary policy purposes, foreign reserves and other financial assets. The ECB’s accounts are audited by independent external auditors recommended by the ECB and approved by the Council (Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB) and the competence of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) is limited to examining the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB (Article 27.2 of the Statute of the ESCB). [15]BVerfG,  2 BvR 2728/13, 14 January 2014.
As you all know, unregistered employment is about 50% in our country. This rate is higher in agriculture, construction and the services sector, where inflation is relatively higher. Unregistered economic activities prevent firms from attaining the most efficient scale of production and producing at the lowest unit cost. Firms failing to attain the lowest cost scale price their products at a relatively higher level. One of the factors influential in this is the financial burden brought about by registration procedures. In order to remain unregistered, firms are not willing to grow in scale. They also abstain from applying for bank credits and delay technological renovations due to financial hardship. On the other hand, the competitive power of registered firms is eroded against their competitors, which take advantage of remaining unregistered. Besides, growing in scale becomes harder for these registered firms. Major reforms were made in Turkey in 2003 to improve the business environment. The most remarkable of these are the regulations to reduce the procedures in starting businesses and to ensure that all the required transactions are carried out under the body of a sole authority. As a matter of fact, the results of the “Doing Business” report by the World Bank reveals that our country ranks fairly high compared to other countries in terms of the duration for starting businesses, reservation of ownership, enforcing contracts and paying taxes. The concrete consequences of these reforms are apparent in the number of newly launched businesses in the period following the year 2003.

To that end, investments in human capital aimed at improving the quality of the labor force in our country should be intensified and competition should be enhanced through effective regulations and implementations, especially in the goods market. The Competition Authority is one of the main institutional building blocks of the “open economy growth model” implemented in the period after 1980 and is based on strengthening the market economy. Competition policies and price stability, which is the core objective of the Central Bank, are strongly related. In an environment where competition conditions are ensured, monopolistic market behaviors will not be possible. Simplifying the entry and exit of firms to the various  BIS Review 37/2008  1  sectors and increasing transparency are the main factors preventing pricing habits that are based on a high profit margin. Additionally, due to pressures from both domestic and foreign competition, firms choose to implement strategies with the aim of increasing productivity, which in turn triggers innovation and technological development and contributes to the acceleration of the potential growth rate of our country. If firms increase profitability through measures that decrease costs instead of increasing prices, our country can reach higher growth rates in an environment of low inflation. Various instruments can be utilized to establish an effective competition environment in an economy.
While our responsibility is for the UK’s system, the pivotal position of London as a major international financial centre means that we have to take a wider view of global developments and can share that perspective with colleagues abroad. One way of reducing the probability and impact of the risks to the UK financial system is by helping the private sector to improve their identification and management of risks. We contribute to that by talking to market participants about their businesses and drawing those threads together with our economic analysis of financial markets and trends. This enables us to feed back to market participants the broader picture to inform their understanding and management of their own risks. 3  1  Thornton, H (1802), An enquiry into the nature and effects of paper credit of Great Britain (Chapter 7), page 121. 2  Allen, F & D Gale (2000), Comparing financial systems, MIT Press. 3  Bernanke (2006) also highlights risk management lapses by the private sector as a key source of crisis and stresses the vital role of market discipline in preventing such lapses from recurring. See Bernanke, B (2006), Hedge funds and systemic risk, remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference, Sea Island, Georgia, 16 May. BIS Review 70/2006  1  In the latest edition of the Bank’s Financial Stability Report, we have sought to improve the way that we present our assessment of risks.

Ladies and gentlemen, as you are aware the Zambian economy has taken a turn for the better over the last few years. We are fortunate that the rise in copper prices has created a greater interest to invest in the mines. We have also witnessed increased investment in other areas such as agriculture, tourism, construction and manufacturing. This has culminated in a 25.6% increase in non-traditional exports to $ million by November 2007. This obviously gives a wider spread of lending opportunities for the banking sector. It is important to note that this growth in non-traditional exports is to a large extent associated with small and medium scale enterprises. The commitment by Barclays Bank Zambia to upscale their support to the SMEs is thus very welcome. This commitment has been exemplified by your decision to locate a branch in Chilenje. I am also happy that your commitment to the community has extended to the renovation of the Community Centre, a building which carries a strong historical background for this country. We encourage you to extend this further by helping with other requirements such as the drainage system in the locality, street lighting for specific areas and enhancing other communal facilities as part of the Keep Lusaka Clean campaign. Ladies and gentlemen, without further ado, it gives me great pleasure to declare the Barclays Bank Zambia Plc Chilenje Branch officially open. I thank you! 2  BIS Review 5/2008
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Policy prescription Given the economic scenario and inflation outlook I have discussed, if it were possible, I would favor cutting the federal funds rate by several percentage points. But since the federal funds rate is already near zero now, that’s not an option. To date, the Fed’s policymaking committee, the FOMC, has used a number of nontraditional policy tools to impart greater financial accommodation. I have fully supported these policies. However, I would argue for further policy actions based on our dual mandate responsibilities and the strong impediments of the financial crisis. In a recent Financial Times commentary, Michael Woodford of Columbia University discussed how greater clarity in policy communications would help.6 I agree. As I see it, current financial conditions are more restrictive than I favor, in part because households, businesses and markets place too much weight on the possibility that Fed policy will turn restrictive in the near to medium term. The FOMC’s announcement in August that it anticipates short-term rates remaining low through mid-2013 was certainly a step in the right direction because it significantly raised the hurdle for early policy tightening. But I think we could go even further. One way would be to make a simple statement about our policy plans that clearly lays out our conditionality in terms of our dual mandate responsibilities and observable economic data.

In strict inflation targeting, all policy actions are aimed at hitting an inflation target. In flexible targeting, policymakers balance deviations from both the unemployment and inflation targets. Usually, the policy prescriptions from the two targets are not in conflict. Above target unemployment is typically associated with muted inflationary pressures, and accommodative policies are appropriate to reduce both gaps from their respective targets. At times, however, conflicts can occur. When they do, a flexible targeter does not accept a large miss in one target in order to hit the other perfectly, but instead accepts moderate misses in both in order to minimize the total loss. A corollary is that any flexible inflation targeter has to accept the idea that optimal policy may involve inflation running for a time above the long-run target if that is a consequence of policies designed to bring unemployment more in line with its target rate. 3  For example, the economy may have experienced some permanent loss of potential output during the recession partly because of reduced capital deepening with lower rates of investment and partly because of other factors. In addition, extended unemployment insurance benefits and difficulties in matching workers with jobs may be temporarily pushing up the natural rate of unemployment. 4  See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011). 5  See Evans (2011).
So let me conclude by mentioning some other changes in fields where retailing is not directly involved. Other changes: Securities  BIS Review 41/1997  -6-  The countries in the euro area may, and should, denominate new sovereign issues in euro. A country wishing to convert its outstanding debt into euro will be allowed to do this, too. We can also pass national laws enabling, for instance, the Stockholm Stock Exchange, OM and the Securities Register Centre (VPC) to switch to euro right from 1999. Many institutions and agents are in favour of this. The above institutions as well as participants in the Swedish securities market, banks, financial institutions and others unanimously recommend a big-bang solution - a quick, concerted changeover from kronor to euro right from the beginning of 1999. With a single monetary policy and no exchange risk, the only factor behind interest rate differentials for sovereign securities will be the credit risk. The market for Swedish government paper will be more or less integrated with the euro market for government securities. Given a reasonably similar debt situation, government bonds issued by different countries can then be handled in a similar way. Banks. During 1996 the banks have worked on strategies and routines for changing over to euro. It has been agreed that during the changeover period banks, the postal giro, the bankgiro and the private giro will handle kronor as well as euro.

Pressures increase from regulated entities, which complain about regulatory uncertainty, and from policy-makers, who are keen to foster economic recovery and growth after 8 years of low economic performances almost a lost decade! Keeping the momentum relates to three objectives: –  complete the regulatory agenda, in particular regarding what is named now as “market-based finance”, so as to effectively and comprehensively strengthen the financial system and remove regulatory uncertainty;  –  make sure that the regulatory spectrum expands well beyond the sole banking sector so as to avoid unfair level playing field, regulatory arbitrage and a paradoxical outcome that is favoring and encouraging those who are still “in the shadows.” On top of that, keeping pace with the creativity of all players is no small challenge. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  –  devoting adequate resources and designing the proper organization of supervision which needs to be intrusive. 2  Preserving diversity  While the objective of expanding the scope of regulation beyond the banking sector may require applying similar – though not identical- regulation to similar asset classes or risks, irrespective of the legal status of the intermediary bearing them, it must also be acknowledged that business models, accounting frameworks, liability structures, time horizons of decisions may differ across sectors and entities. In that respect, it can be argued that that “one size does not necessarily fit all” and that one should preserve and ensure diversity.