samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Rodrigo Vergara: Chile’s latest Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 5 September 2012. The Monetary Policy Report of September 2012 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. *  *  *  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate, Senator Camilo Escalona, honorable senators. I am grateful for your invitation to the Board of the Central Bank of Chile to present our latest Monetary Policy Report. As usual every year in September, this presentation coincides with the annual report of the Central Bank Board to the Senate, which contains our view on recent macroeconomic and financial developments in Chile and in the world, as well as their outlook and implications for the conduct of monetary policy. In the last few months, the differences between the performance of the global economy and the Chilean economy have deepened. The situation abroad is still very complex. Forecasts for world growth have weakened, mainly because of sharper than expected deceleration in emerging market economies (EMEs). Tensions in international markets have eased in recent weeks, but fundamental problems are still present. The Chilean economy, however, in contrast with most of the rest of the world, is performing strongly. In the second quarter, domestic output and demand grew above projections, showing that, so far, the effects of the frail external scenario on the local economy have been mild.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: The outlook for Thailand’s economy in the face of concerns about the slowing US recovery and Europe’s debt crisis Address by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand, Bangkok, 3 November 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished FCCT Members and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank the FCCT Board for inviting me to share my view on Thailand’s economic outlook in the face of the U.S. economic slowdown and the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis. Actually, the organizer’s original intention reflects very well what was in the back of everyone’s mind over the past few months when we talked about key challenges to the Thai economy. But as all of us here today might agree, things have changed so dramatically over the past month alone, with the country now being swept over by the flood. While our feet need to stand firm weathering through and recovering from the flood together as a nation, our eyes cannot lose focus on what happens in the U.S. and the Eurozone. I think it is fair to say that what happens in the U.S. and the Eurozone will likely reshape the global financial and economic landscape over the years to come. And for Thailand, these factors and their implications on the global economy will also determine whether the recovery from the flood will be a rosy or a painful one. So, my talk today will be divided into two parts.
Debt service costs will move sharply upward in coming years as federal debt continues to grow and interest rates likely increase further. Additionally, entitlement spending is likely to increase sharply as members of the baby boom generation continue to retire —myself included.7 The shift toward a more aggressive U.S. posture on trade also likely increases uncertainty. On the one hand, such a posture could lead to revised trade agreements that provide the United States with greater access to foreign markets and better protection of intellectual property. This would tend to raise U.S. productivity and real GDP growth. On the other hand, tougher bargaining could lead to retaliation and higher trade barriers, here and abroad. In contrast to the first scenario, this outcome would be quite negative—leading to higher inflation, lower productivity, and slower potential GDP growth. 8 Over time, how U.S. trade policy evolves will have important implications for the performance of the U.S. economy—and, by extension, for U.S. monetary policy. By increasing uncertainty around the economic outlook, these shifts in fiscal and trade policy could make it more difficult for the FOMC to achieve its dual mandate objectives in the years ahead. Longer-term monetary policy issues Over the longer term, the FOMC will also need to address a number of other important issues.

Third, in a payments industry that is experiencing a period of rapid change in technology, Cloud technologies are growing in importance. The Bank is taking steps to facilitate its adoption, including issuing a supervisory statement later this year. The use of a Cloud model is an evolution of, and a key element in, the supply chain for many financial institutions – including those who access CHAPS. We believe the use of Cloud technologies has the potential, if used appropriately, to minimise end-to-end risk and improve operational resiliency of the CHAPS system, taken as a whole. As the operator of CHAPS we want to enable our current and potential Direct Participant to realise these benefits in a safe and controlled way, without compromising the resilience of the CHAPS ecosystem. We are assessing the risks that the use of Cloud technology  8 9  https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/technology-cyber-resilience-questionnaire-cross-sector-report.pdf 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  presents to the CHAPS system, and the nature of mitigating controls that we require. In due course, we expect to propose new controls for Cloud usage as it relates to CHAPS. Policy Development  Development and implementation of requirements must be supported by strong and innovative policy thinking. The Bank works collaboratively on policy with other FMIs and central banks internationally. Some work-streams focus on resilience, others support greater innovation: and increasingly we look to combine the two.
It is essential to realise that for the most part, the financial system is not an end in itself but a means to an end and the measure of the success of the financial system must relate to its success in accomplishing broader societal functions. Innovations in the financial system that help it perform these tasks better and at lower cost almost surely lead to increased societal well-being, and to the extent that our GDP measures capture these benefits, in higher measured growth. Notwithstanding the benefits of innovation, it is important to note that the opening up to new activities and products, particularly the expansion of the credit portfolio, brings in a myriad of new risks associated with the new activities. Studies have shown that increasing financial innovation and deepening of financial markets brings with it challenges and risks, which if not well addressed, can threaten the health of the financial system and may cause havoc to the stability of a financial system. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  4.0  The role of the Bank of Zambia in promoting innovation and competition  The Bank of Zambia (BoZ) acknowledges that a stable, sound and efficient financial sector has to be underpinned by infrastructure development. The BoZ achieves this by creating an enabling environment through the legal and regulatory frameworks that promote financial systems stability and development.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  7.0  Measures to reduce interest rates  Although interest rates have trended downwards in the recent past with commercial banks average lending rate at 26.2% in March 2011 from 54.5% in 2001, the reduction is not in tandem with the fall in inflation and yield rates on government securities. The Government and the Bank of Zambia continue to take measures to provide macroeconomic stability necessary for the reduction of interest rates in Zambia. Some of the measures undertaken so far include the following: (i)  Inflation: the other challenge with regard to lowering lending rates is to attain and sustain low (preferably single digit) annual inflation. An upward trend in inflation is undesirable, as it raises inflationary expectations causing banks to increase their lending rates. Prior to 2006 inflation in Zambia was persistently high and above single digit. However, from 2006 inflation has been contained in single digit except from the 2008 when the financial crisis resulted in the increase of inflation to 16.6%. Inflation was recorded at 7.9% in December 2010 from 30.1% in January 2001. This has resulted in a fall in interest rates with banks Average Lending Rate coming down to 26.2% in March 2011 from 54.5% in December 2001. (ii)  Domestic financing: to contribute to efforts aimed at lowering lending interest rates, the Government has adopted prudent fiscal policies with domestic borrowing significantly reducing over the recent years.
Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Harnessing sustainable growth in emerging markets Keynote address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the 2nd World Management Summit 2008, Karachi, Pakistan, 11 March 2008. *  *  *  As salaam Aleikum, Ayubowan, Good Morning. Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen, At the outset, I wish to thank the organizers of this World Management Summit for inviting me to deliver the keynote address. I am also greatly touched by the wonderful hospitality accorded to me in this very interesting and historic city of Karachi. Mr. Chairman, I consider it a privilege and honour to share my thoughts and views on a very timely topic, “Harnessing Sustainable Growth in Emerging Markets” at this important forum. I hope I would be able to plant a few seeds in your distinguished minds so that such seeds may be nurtured by you in your deliberations to follow. As a first step, let us examine the current global and regional trends in relation to World Economic Growth, so that we could deal with this topic in a wider perspective. As we know, over the past few years, the global economy has been experiencing one of its’ strongest sustained periods of growth, since the early 1970s. This expansion is projected to be very strong even after accounting for the impact of the recent financial market turbulence. Significantly, this growth has, as its foundation, the strong results of the emerging markets which have been leading the way.

Eight, the active use of technology in economic transformation, so that backward societies or groups could “leap-frog” rather than drift along at “snail’s pace”. At the same time, we also have to keep in mind that the sustainability for growth in developing countries will be greatly enhanced by political stability. Therefore, care must be taken to ensure that any political crisis which threatens to undermine economic progress needs to be resolved quickly and satisfactorily, so that the growth momentum will not be hampered in the short to medium terms. Mr. Chairman, we should all be glad that we are today here in Karachi, deliberating on the topic of “Harnessing Sustainable Growth”, because it is a topic that will touch our lives very closely, today as well as tomorrow. In doing so, we will naturally have to closely study the worldwide conditions, trends, needs, challenges, future strategies and the many issues connected to the realization of this outcome. It is certainly a complex topic, and it will not have cut and dried answers; nor will it have an easy path, free of obstacles. At the same time there is one fact that we must all be very clear about. i.e., harnessing growth will only be the beginning. If so, we must all realize that while the beginning would be vital, we would need to methodically build capacity to sustain the growth and to keep going, amidst whatever challenges we may encounter. Implementation of policies would therefore be the key to sustainable growth.
This concentration creates a higher degree of dependency on this small group of firms. The trend towards the globalisation of clearing has benefits and risks. On the one hand, there is greater scope for netting that allows for collateral savings, the lower cost of direct access and using CCPs, and an increase in transparency for both regulators and CCPs. On the other hand, there is a potential for systemic risks as CCPs may become too big to fail. Also, market power may push up clearing fees and restrict entry. This could create disincentives for central clearing and could undermine the efficiency gains reaped in the first place by eroding the pricing power of global dealers. There could also be cross-border regulatory frictions in the case of multiple (and inconsistent) national regulations, and last but not least the cross-border liquidity provision in several currencies becomes more complex. This leads me to the last and maybe most challenging “unknown”. Given CCPs’ role as financial market utilities that has been reinforced by mandatory clearing requirements, and their increasing systemic relevance, would the world be a safer place, if CCPs had been established as non-for-profit institutions? My tentative answer is no. I have outlined the importance of good risk management in CCPs, and the ability to adapt to a changing market environment in terms of counterparties, products, and technologies. I am convinced that this will be better done in a market environment.

This brings me to the FX Global Code and its global implementation, which I will share more about today. Launch of the FX Global Code The FX Global Code was launched in May 2017 by the Bank for International Settlements (or BIS). It was developed over 2 years by the BIS Foreign Exchange Working Group (or FXWG), which comprised central banks from the key FX jurisdictions. The effort was also supported by a public-private partnership between the central banks and active engagement from key FX market participants. The private sector participants included the sell-side, buy-side, trading platforms and other market infrastructure. What we have now is a single, global code of conduct for the wholesale FX market. Benefits of the Code How will the Code benefit the FX market? Let’s take a step back and look at the nature of the wholesale FX market. It is inherently complex: Activity takes place across multiple venues; there is no single trading venue and no single price. Trading happens 24 hours a day, spanning multiple centres, with the day’s trading starting in 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  New Zealand, Australia, and moving to Singapore and London as the day progresses, before ending in New York. Participation is diverse – with banks, asset managers, corporates, and central banks, each transacting FX to meet different objectives. Participants act as principals or agents, and the responsibilities pertaining to each may not be well understood. Hence, there could be market failures, asymmetry in information and potential conflicts of interests.
On 18 April 1999, the Swiss voters approved a total revision of the Constitution. In this revision, the requirement that a certain percentage of banknotes be backed by gold was removed. The abolition of this requirement constitutes the first step in the dismantling of the old order based on the gold standard. The new Constitution will enter into effect on 1 January 2000. In the course of the next few months the Swiss Parliament will debate on the revision of the Federal Coinage Act, which will henceforth be known as the Federal Law on Currency and Payment Instruments. The Coinage Act vested the right to fix the gold parity of the Swiss franc in the Federal Council. In future, no reference will be made to a gold parity. In this respect, too, one of the chief characteristics of the gold standard will disappear. Parliament is expected to pass the new Federal Law on Currency and Payment Instruments before the end of this year. The Law will enter into force in spring 2000 unless, in the meantime, 50,000 citizens would request for a referendum on the subject. If a referendum is to be held, it would probably take place in autumn 2000. To my mind, however, the probability that signatures will be collected for a referendum is slight indeed. I am fairly confident that the new law will enter into effect in spring 2000 without delay. By the time the law on payment instruments will be in place in early 2000, gold will have been demonetised.

In short, good governance works and we should all simply try it! In conclusion therefore, I would like on behalf of Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf to commend the Zambian commercial banks, international banks and development finance institutions that have participated in this syndication. This is not only testimony of their confidence in Celtel Zambia plc but confidence in the Zambian people and the economy as well. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 126/2006
As a result, euro area countries cannot afford to implement a sovereign default without suffering as a consequence of such a default a major breakdown of their financial, economic and social structure. There is no post-war example of a government in an industrialised economy restructuring its debt. For a euro area sovereign to seek to restructure its debt would be a huge leap into the unknown. This aspect is frequently omitted by financial analysts in their  10  The classic reference is Fischer. I (1933). “The debt-deflation theory of Great Depressions”, Econometrica 1(4), pp. 337–357. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  newsletters or by commentators or academics in their short op-eds. And this is the reason why they do not get the point right when they state that default and restructuring is unavoidable in the euro area. The fourth difference is that, given the much greater depth and intensity of financial and economic integration in Europe, the strength of contagion across financial institutions and markets is potentially more significant within the euro area today than was the case in Asia in the 1990s. That is not to say that there was no contagion in the 1990s. But the cross-border exposures within the euro area are an order of magnitude greater than was the case for such intra-regional cross-holdings in Asian EMEs. This means that the potential for spillovers and a systemic area-wide crisis is much higher and has to be factored into the policy responses.

Second, the financial tensions led to a disruption of domestic financial intermediation, with severe consequences for both private and public financing. In Greece, the banks – which were reasonably strong in a “stand-alone” sense – were undone by revelations about the weakness of public finances. In Ireland, causation ran in the opposite direction: the bloated and failing domestic banking system imposed an intolerable burden on what, prior to the crisis, had been a superficially strong fiscal position. Regardless of the causation, the consequences were the same: as confidence eroded, the inflow of foreign capital dried up. Subject to a “sudden stop” in external financing, 4 the European sovereign debt crisis – itself inextricably linked with problems in the financial sector – erupted, forcing Greece and Ireland to seek financial assistance from the European Union and IMF. 3. What can we learn from the emerging market crises of the past thirty years? The developments I have just described might give those of you living in emerging economies a sense of déjà vu. And indeed it has become commonplace to draw comparisons between recent events in Europe and the periodic financial crises seen in emerging market economies (EMEs) over the past three decades: Latin America’s debt crisis in the 1980s; the Mexican tequila crisis of 1994; the Asian financial crisis in the second half of the 1990s; and the Argentine crisis of 2001. Extensive economic literature has analysed these events and identified important roles for many of the phenomena I have just described.
Long-term interest rates are also very low, companies in general have very good liquidity and good profitability. It can also be noted that in connection with the Riksbank cutting its repo rate in June as a result of weaker economic growth than expected at the beginning of the year, some voices were raised warning that the low interest rates could lead to an excessive credit boom and overly high house prices. The consideration that has to be made between growth in demand over the coming two years and the risks linked to high indebtedness, for instance, are still relevant and current, and I will return to this shortly. Monetary policy, productivity and jobs One consequence of the high level of productivity is that employment has not improved very much, despite several years of good growth. It is not likely that the link between economic activity and employment has disappeared but - and this has been clear during the current economic upturn – the relationship may very well vary from one economic cycle to the next. We have produced larger quantities but using fewer employees. One possible reason for the high productivity growth is earlier investment in IT, in particular. Another is that the stiffer competitive pressure, which among other things originates from the internationalisation of the economy, has forced companies to make their production more efficient. This is essentially positive, as productivity gains contribute to increased income, investment and growth, which should in the long term lead to new job opportunities.

I think the consensus at present, as reflected in the recent discussion at the LegCo Financial Affairs Panel, is that neither the current volume and nature of complaints nor the deficiencies in existing arrangements would justify the creation of such elaborate machinery. The second option would be to give the HKMA a clear mandate to arbitrate and resolve consumer complaints and the powers to impose sanctions. This option could go some way towards addressing the current gap between the expectation of bank customers and what the HKMA can do for them under its existing powers. However, I think there is a consensus that this is not the right time for the  BIS Review 39/2002  3  HKMA to be given such a role. It would require a considerable increase in resources and some form of cost recovery from the banking industry, and it would also require addressing concerns about conflict of interest between different branches of the organisation - a problem that is not insoluble, but which would nevertheless require some careful thought. This, at least for the time being, does not seem to be the preferred option. The weight of opinion seems, then, to fall on the third option, which is to rely mainly on the industry itself to ensure that complaints are properly handled. There are three things which banks can do in helping to promote self-regulation: •  First, AIs should strictly follow the Code of Banking Practice, which is issued by their own industry associations.