samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In mid-September, Norges Bank submitted a report to the Ministry of Finance. This report carefully examines the reasons for the low level of inflation and the measures that have been implemented to bring inflation back up to target. There are still prospects of low inflation for some time ahead. Developments in other countries indicate that prices for imported goods and services, measured in the producer countries’ currencies, will not rise appreciably. It also takes time for the effects of last year’s appreciation of the krone to dissipate. However, this year’s krone depreciation will gradually have an affect on inflation and thus contribute to higher inflation. The analysis in the June Inflation Report showed that a reduction in the sight deposit rate towards 3 per cent, combined with some depreciation of the krone, could bring inflation up towards the target at 11 the two-year horizon . The prospect of more moderate wage growth ahead could provide a basis for an even lower interest rate and a weaker krone without the projections for inflation exceeding 2.5 per cent in the period. With reduced pressures in the economy and an inflation outlook that is below target at the two-year horizon, Norges Bank has reduced the key rate a number of times in the last year. This summer the interest rate has been reduced in larger steps than has been customary. Interest rate reductions have been an important element in preventing inflation expectations from taking hold at too low a level.

The public sector employs more than one-third of the labour force in Norway. In Northern Norway, public sector employees account for close to 45 per cent of the labour force. The primary industries are important for the counties in Northern Norway, especially the utilisation of the abundant fish resources in the coastal areas. A large part of the fishing industry is export-oriented and is increasingly competing with low-cost countries. These industries will be vulnerable when the rise in domestic costs is high. There are wide regional variations in unemployment. At the end of July, the number of registered unemployed in Northern Norway came to 4.4 per cent of the labour force, which is slightly higher than the national average of 4.1 per cent. Even though the region has somewhat higher unemployment than the national average, the rise in unemployment in Northern Norway has been relatively low in the last year. Unemployment has only risen half as much in Northern Norway as in the rest of the country. The number of unemployed has risen least in the county of Finnmark in the last year. This is probably related to the industry structure which is characterised by a relatively high share of employees in the public service sector. As I have mentioned, a look at the current situation in this part of the country and similar reports from the other regions represent important information in the work on setting interest rates. The short-term nominal interest rate in Norway has now reached a historically very low level.
This has been further exacerbated by the low value addition of the agriculture sector in the economy. While the contribution of the crop sector amounts only to 14 percent of GDP, the individual contribution by the sub-crops has been negligible with tea contributing 1 percent, rubber 0.4 percent, coconut 1 percent and paddy 3 percent. Hence, even if the output of agriculture is doubled, it would not make a significant contribution to country’s wealth creation. If agriculture has its limited capacity for an accelerated growth, why not concentrate on industry? This may be a pertinent issue to be addressed at this stage. Certainly, unlike the agriculture, which is faced with the limitation of land, industry does not have any capacity or demand limitations. The nonavailability of raw materials or essential inputs or even the domestic demand for the output does no longer inhibit industrial growth. With globalization of trade and services and the advancements in information and communication technology (ICT), the previous bottlenecks for industrial growth have been efficiently sorted out. In today’s context, industrial outputs do not belong to a particular nation or country. They are jointly held products to which many nations or countries would have contributed.

According to Dr S Arsaratnam 4 , both the Sinhala kings and the Dutch used Arabic traders to export elephants, gems, areca nuts and spices, and import rice, textiles and other requirements in the 16th to early 18th centuries. The British period that followed the Dutch rule is marked by a continuation of the open-economy policy pursued by ancient Sinhala kings. During this period, the country continued to rely on foreign trade for wealth creation and maintaining high standards of living. Hence, the reliance on services, especially commercial services, for wealth creation was not a new policy paradigm for Sri Lanka. Around the time Sri Lanka gained independence from the British rule, the country’s GDP was distributed in the proportion of 46 percent for agriculture, 20 percent for industry and the balance 34 percent for services. The high share of both agriculture and industry amounting to about a two-third of GDP indicated the prevalence of a limit for their continued growth devoid of a vibrant and efficient services sector. This anomaly was to be gradually, and in a slow pace, corrected in the subsequent five decades. In 1960, a slight improvement in the respective shares was observed with agriculture falling to 38 percent and services rising to 45 percent. The period since then recorded a virtual stagnation of services till early 1980s when the country moved to an open economy regime.
In today’s situation, private investors would probably have required considerably higher yields on sovereign bonds – as was the case in 2011 and 2012 – if they did not know that the ECB was buying large volumes of these bonds. No treatment is without side-effects. The same goes for low interest rates: there is little incentive to reduce debt and measures that could have strengthened government budgets can be postponed. Firms that are not making money can continue to operate. Monetary policy in Europe has been stretched to its limits. What monetary policy can do is to build a bridge – from the old economy in crisis to a new economy. But someone else – and something else – must create solid ground on the other side. Otherwise, the bridge will be left hanging in mid-air. Keynes would probably have supported the ECB’s policy. Without countermeasures, a crisis can become a catastrophe. A slower process of economic restructuring may be a reasonable price to pay. Europe is again seeing a modest pick-up in economic growth. Unemployment has reached the peak and is falling in countries such as Germany, Ireland and Spain. It is a slow process and the ordeal can seem unnecessarily protracted, but at least things are moving in the right direction. Can the crisis in Europe be curbed? The answer is probably yes, provided authorities succeed in establishing a form of coordination that has so far been absent. At a deeper level, there is a need for structural and institutional reforms.

In contrast to most European countries, Norway also has room for manoeuvre on the fiscal front, if necessary. But – as in the rest of Europe – the authorities cannot solve the deeper challenge, namely the need to establish new private sector activity. This is a task for the business sector. What the authorities can do is to establish framework conditions that promote innovation and growth. Hayek and Keynes In my introduction, I posed the question: can crises be curbed? quickly followed by: can misjudged attempts to curb a crisis sow the seeds of an even deeper crisis? Keynes and Hayek did not come to agreement on how a crisis should be managed. Their debate is still relevant today. Keynes advocated the use of public spending to curb crises. 6  See Financial Stability Board (FSB) (2011), “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” and FSB (2015) “Principles on Loss-absorbing and Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution”. 7  The first pillar of the European Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), with the ECB as supervisory authority for the 130 largest banks in the euro area, started in November 2014. The second pillar of the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), became operational in January 2015 and the joint crisis resolution authority, the Single Resolution Board, started its work. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Hayek warned against such a policy: the misjudged application of government measures could easily lead to deeper crises and credit bubbles. Both were right.
Neither has the Riksbank's outlook for the Swedish economy changed very much over the summer. However, new statistics indicate slightly stronger growth during the first half of this year compared with June. This means that the outlook for the Swedish economy now appears somewhat brighter than at that time. The repo rate cuts totalling 0.75 percentage points have also contributed to this. However, compared with August when we had our last Executive Board monetary policy meeting, we have not changed our assessment markedly. The Riksbank's assessment is now that continued stable growth in incomes, wealth and employment will contribute to smooth and relatively robust growth in household consumption. During 2004 and 2005 an increase in investment is also expected, although there are no signs of a turnaround yet. Some upturn in exports is now expected to occur in much the same way as usually happens during economic upturns. However, as a similar upturn is expected in imports, the net export contribution to GDP growth will be limited. Public consumption is expected to grow by approximately 1 per cent per year over the coming years. The improved economic activity will lead to slightly higher resource utilisation than forecast in the June Inflation Report, which in turn means that wages in the private sector are expected to rise at a marginally higher rate during 2004 and 2005. As a result, domestic cost pressure will also be slightly higher during these years.

The move to increase the resources for money laundering and terrorism financing investigations by the domestic law enforcement agencies, which currently is the emerging trend, needs to be supported with swift actions from the FIU and prompt response from reporting institutions. Another is that, at the international level, Malaysia will continue to enhance multilateral and bilateral relationships. I am happy to inform that we have recently concluded an MoU with the National Bank of Cambodia, bringing the total number of MoUs signed to 18. We have and will continue to provide assistance to countries in the Asia/Pacific region. Second is to provide greater focus in enhancing the competency and capacity of key stakeholders, i.e., the analysts, law enforcement officers and compliance officers. Despite the unfavourable economic condition, human resources and capacity building remain as one of our top focus. We plan to roll out capacity building programmes for analysts and enforcement officers covering fundamental, intermediate and advance level training programmes. The Certified Financial Investigators Programme, or CFIP, i.e., our flagship basic programme for financial investigators has produced 83 investigators with knowledge on the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001, as well as financial investigation techniques. We are open to collaborate with our foreign counterparts to conduct advanced level workshops. The third area is to further improve the quality of analysis. High quality STRs underpins an effective mechanism as quality STRs provide valuable intelligence for investigations.
Price stability is not sufficient for financial stability  The two decades leading up to the financial crisis had been characterized, across the developed world, by low and stable inflation, and, by historical standards, by exceptionally stable output growth. It is not by chance, indeed, that macroeconomists labeled those years as the “Great Moderation” era. At the same time, however, as extensively documented in particular by the BIS in several perceptive, early papers, 1 those years had been also characterized, compared with the previous portion of the post-WWII era, by a significantly more frequent occurrence of asset price bubbles and subsequent crashes. A longer-term perspective clearly shows that the occurrence of asset prices booms and busts under conditions of price stability, far from being a “fluke” of the Great Moderation era, had been, in fact, quite common. Until the outbreak of World War I, indeed, metallic standards had dominated for centuries, guaranteeing an extent of price stability which is, by today’s standards, virtually unimaginable. Just to mention a single example, the price level in England in 1661, five years before the Great Fire of London, had been virtually the same as that prevailing in 1913, one year before the collapse of the international Gold Standard. In spite of such remarkable price stability, however, metallic standards had been recurrently plagued by financial crises and asset prices booms and busts, from the South Sea bubble of  1  See in particular Claudio Borio and William White (2003), “Wither Monetary and Financial Stability?

Jarle Bergo: Oil revenues, monetary policy and economic cycles Lecture by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Telemark University College, Bø, 13 November 2002. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The lecture is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 30 October and on previous speeches. *  *  *  Petroleum activities constitute an important part of the Norwegian economy. A sound economic policy and high oil prices have contributed to the highest current account and budget surpluses that have been recorded in any OECD country. In 1998 when oil prices were down to USD 10 per barrel, we also recorded a surplus that came to 4 per cent of GDP measured in terms of government net financial investment. Societies that suddenly gain access to wealth have a tendency to spend the money and then fall into decline. Access to an abundance of natural resources can result in slower growth. The explanation may be that time and resources are spent on grabbing as large a share as possible of the acquired wealth. Historical experience therefore suggests that it is important to have decision-making systems to provide protection against individual groups gaining strong control over Norway’s petroleum wealth. In addition we must maintain and develop incentives to acquire knowledge and engage in innovative work.
Simultaneously, we have prolonged the maturity span of injecting operations to smooth down the upward slope of interest rate curve and we have expanded the base of eligible collateral to facilitate the access of financial institution in liquid funds. These operations of the Bank of Albania have helped control on interest rate level. Bank of Albania’s intervention has been more effective in controlling the short-term interest rates. The long-term interest rates of Government securities and loans revealed rising tendencies, owing to the Government’s demand for financing and the increased sensitiveness of the banking system towards liquidity indicators. In parallel, the depreciating exchange rate trends have complemented the easier monetary conditions framework, providing advantage to exports and trade deficit improvement. However, as we have constantly underscored in our statements, the Bank of Albania has been attentive to managing the momentary stimulus, aiming above all the achievement of its target for maintaining the macroeconomic stability, by preserving internal and external balances. Annual inflation in the first semester 2009 was 2.0 percent, recording a fall compared to inflation rates of the last year, but remaining within the Bank of Albania’s targeted band. Low inflation rates over the first semester of the current year are due to the weakening of inflationary pressures on the demand and supply side, consequent to raw materials price cut in the international market and the economic activity slowdown at home.

In order to avoid having crisis management being held up by conflicts of interests more than necessary, I am personally inclined to believe that a general key that is fixed once and for all is the preferred choice. Possible ways forward The title of this speech is a question: “Are we ready to deal with a cross-border banking crisis in Europe?” Regrettably, the answer is no! Before we can say we are anywhere near “ready”, we must deal with some serious challenges. In particular, we need to solve the problem of how to organise supervision, crisis management and crisis resolution for cross-border banks. Given the great complexity of the issue, achieving a practical solution will not be an easy task, and there is no altogether ideal solution. The amount of work that has already been set up for us on the European regulatory agenda is already quite staggering, which suggests that everything may not be achieved in the next few years. But we must not use this as an excuse for not starting to deal with these important issues. We can at least start the analytical process, take stock of the problems and examine the pros and cons of different solutions. The longer we wait to get this process started, the greater the risk that we’ll end up in a very serious mess. I, for one, certainly hope that we manage to have some solution in place before the next major financial disaster in Europe occurs.
Staff at the Federal Reserve has been using new data sets, analytics, and extensive market intelligence to deepen our understanding of the impact of these changes on money market dynamics. What follows is an illustration of this enhanced understanding. In the pre-crisis monetary policy framework, banks’ regulatory obligation to hold reserves was primarily driven by the required reserves framework, set forth in the Federal Reserve Act and Regulation D. 21 This framework involved banks meeting their requirement over a 14-day reserves maintenance period, as well as various other incentives that promoted short-term, but not extremely high-frequency, bank balance sheet management activity to maintain reserves at required levels—and the Federal Reserve had built analytics to provide good visibility into it. Today, while the Regulation D framework is still around, it is no longer likely to be the binding constraint on reserve levels for most large banks. 22 The new factors driving reserves demand appear to vary by financial institution, and seem to depend on a complex interplay of numerous new features of the financial system. On the regulatory side, these include the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), banks’ internal stress tests of their liquidity adequacy, supervisory expectations related to banks’ ability to monetize their liquidity portfolios during periods of financial stress, and the incorporation of liquidity into resolution planning. Other important factors include increased bank aversion to incurring intraday overdrafts, higher bank investor and creditor expectations for liquidity, and a lower opportunity cost of holding reserves relative to before the crisis.

In and of itself, this shift seems likely to have made money markets more segmented, and more prone to the “turbulence” in response to shocks I mentioned earlier. Longer term, this regulatory shift has catalyzed a deep and complex impact on the structure of money markets, which is still unfolding nearly two years later. These effects have included an ongoing increase in the role of FHLB advances as means of intermediation between government money funds and financial firms, as well as ongoing efforts by a wide variety of borrowers and lenders to broaden their counterparty lists and consider new operating frameworks so as to best accomplish their business objectives in the new money market environment. For example, although the FHLBs for years focused their liquidity management on the federal funds market because it provides a high degree of intraday liquidity, they are now beginning to explore greater use of bilateral repo, as that market has similar characteristics and can at times provide them with a higher return. It is likely that these ongoing shifts in money market structure have contributed to fluctuations in rates and spreads, and that they will continue to do so. 11  I view fluctuations in term money market rates of the magnitudes seen recently as normal parts of market functioning during a period of structural change. Wholesale dollar funding, though more expensive, has remained readily available both in the United States and abroad.
The regional economies recognise the importance of developing the capital market. Thus, coordinated efforts through various initiatives have been undertaken to remove impediments to the development of these markets. Confronted by the current climate of uncertainty in the global economy and financial markets, our resolve has most certainly been to maintain constant vigilance towards all sources of risks and vulnerabilities and to preserve economic and financial stability. Efforts are also on going in financial and corporate sector reforms to strengthen our financial and economic foundations. The progress achieved thus far has strengthened the resilience of regional economies and financial systems. At the same time, measures have also been put in place by many of the regional economies to manage the risks from both external and internal sources. From the Malaysian perspective as a small emerging market economy, the long-term solution is to enhance resilience and increase the tolerance level to absorb volatility and to be in a position to withstand external shocks and any slowdown in global growth. It is the underlying economic and financial foundations and its strength that will determine the capacity and resilience, and thus, the ability to ride out the storms and take advantage of the opportunities that the external environment accords to achieve sustainable performance over the medium and longer-term. 4  BIS Review 62/2002

The long run containment in inflation necessarily relies on containment of monetary expansion and increase in production in the country, particularly by improving productivity. As the Central Bank, what we can do? Obviously we cannot produce goods or services for the consumption of the economy, but certainly we can create the right conducive environment enabling the country’s economic performance. Why should the Central Bank be interested in productivity? Our role is to maintain economic and price stability and financial system stability. We also provide necessary payments and settlement infrastructure. We advise the government in economic affairs and policy making, and we provide important agency services such as exchange control, public debt management, provident fund management and regional development activity. In all these functions, our Mission is to “contribute to Sri Lanka’s prosperity”. At the same time, the Central Bank widely pronounces the theme of “success through productivity”. 4  BIS Review 116/2008  But, obviously this cannot be done by ourselves… The success through productivity needs a consolidated national effort. That is why we all have to push ourselves to a greater productivity level. We have to, •  work smarter,  •  combine better,  •  deliver results,  •  get it right. It should be noted that the private sector has continued to make commendable efforts in order to improve productivity in the country. What can the ICC Sri Lanka do? ICC Sri Lanka too can play a prominent and essential role.