samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I and my colleagues on the Executive Board will thus continue to go out and talk about monetary policy and financial stability, but there will be no signals regarding coming interest rate decisions. We  BIS Review 62/2007  1  will each express our own assessments, but this will be a case of justifying and explaining our own considerations after a meeting and not of signalling a stance to be taken at a coming meeting. The third change we decided on was to state our names in the minutes of the monetary policy meetings, with effect from the meeting to be held in June, so that it is possible to see who said what. Previously, we have only named members who have entered a reservation against the decision. This change will make differences of opinion between Executive Board members even clearer. It means that it will become easier both to predict how monetary policy will be conducted in future and to assess it. This change is also a step towards increased openness and clarity. The monetary policy decision on 3 May This naturally leads me on to the stance I myself took at the most recent monetary policy meeting in early May. My assessment was then that the new information received indicated that the repo rate should be raised more during the forecast period than was implied by the forecast in the February Monetary Policy Report.

From now on, we will hold press conferences after each monetary policy meeting, regardless of what decision has been taken. Until now we have only held a press conference if the repo rate has been adjusted or if we have published a Monetary Policy Report. But to understand the monetary policy conducted, it is equally important to explain why the repo rate has been held unchanged as to explain why the repo rate has been changed. By publishing our own interest rate forecasts and by holding press conferences after each monetary policy meeting we will provide more detailed and more regular information on the considerations taken by the Executive Board. We have also decided to make changes in our way of signalling. By signalling I mean how we communicate our monetary policy intentions. Previously, when we Executive Board members have gone out and talked about the current economic situation between the monetary policy meetings we have sometimes given indications of how we consider the repo rate should be set at the next meeting. This has been on the condition that it is clear that the points of view expressed are the individual member’s. The idea was that when the interest rate decision was taken at the monetary policy meeting, enough information on the different Executive Board members’ views would already have been given by degrees so that the decision would not surprise market agents.
The United States drew benefit from the flexibility of its economy, which allowed a better and swifter adaptation to a more demanding environment, while policies took on an unmistaken expansionary stance. Conversely, the Japanese economy had neither the flexibility to adapt, owing to its numerous rigidities, nor scope for stimulus from its demand-side policies, whose room for manoeuvre essentially petered out some time back. Finally, the euro area economy, also beset by structural rigidities, was relatively inflexible in that fiscal policy leeway was directly proportionate in each country to the consolidation drive pursued in the previous upturn, with room for manoeuvre proving greater in the case of the single monetary policy. Consequently, the experience of recent years shows how vital it is to harness economic upturns so as first, to increase the flexibility of economies in order to absorb more readily the impact of adverse disturbances; and further, to give economic policies sufficient headroom in contractionary phases. In this context, it is of paramount importance that macroprudential policies should remain particularly vigilant and react promptly and decisively in the face of potential signs of weakness in the segments of the financial system under their supervision. In the wake of the crises of recent years, an increasing number of emerging economies undertook with varying degrees of ambition and success - structural reforms aimed at greater flexibility. Yet these improvements did not prevent crises from continuing in some of these countries, virulently so in Latin America in 2002.

But Spanish companies must also set in train strategies enabling them to harness the opportunities of enlargement and to increase their presence in the new areas of the single market, channelling their foreign direct investment efforts in that direction. Financial aspects of the Spanish economy Some of the financial features of recent developments in the Spanish economy are of particular importance. As I have said, monetary and financial conditions remained generous in the Spanish economy and, in step with this, financing received by households and firms grew by around 14% last year. This increase, which far outpaced the average for the euro area countries, led to a fresh increase in the private sector’s debt ratios which, in a few short years, have attained the average levels for the euro area. Significantly, the ongoing resort by companies and, above all, by Spanish households to debt in order to finance higher investment and consumption levels is principally a reflection of the favourable impact on agents’ expectations of the new setting of macroeconomic stability, which provides for higher sustainable growth in income and employment. One of the clearest consequences of the recent trend of financial flows in the Spanish economy has been the contribution made to curbing the scope of the recent cyclical downturn in Spain. That has helped the private sector maintain buoyant expenditure on the basis not only of its current revenue but also of its expectations of future income.
Market inflation expectations have risen, particularly for the short term, but are still close to 3% over the policy horizon. In this Report’s baseline scenario we foresee that GDP will grow this year between 4% and 5%. This range is higher than December’s, as it responds largely to the faster output growth of late 2011 and early 2012. In addition, a number of the risks that were examined in the last Report have moderated and the dynamic of the domestic demand adjustment will be somewhat more gradual than was envisaged in December. This scenario assumes a stronger impulse from abroad, associated with better terms of trade and external credit conditions. Overall, the occurrence of temporary and limited frictions in international financial markets is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. We also assume that growth will continue to approach its trend levels – which the Board still estimates at 5% – and respond to the lagged effects of the increases made to the MPR in 2011 (table 2). The baseline scenario foresees a current account deficit in 2012 that is virtually unchanged from the December forecast: 3.4% of GDP, after posting a deficit of 1.3% of GDP in 2011. This enlargement obeys primarily to a bigger deficit of the trade balance, determined mainly by the copper price, which is down from 2011. Furthermore, the oil price has risen from last year.

Under the leadership of Tan Sri Azman Mokhtar as the Chair, it is envisioned that the Council will also evolve into a fully industry-led structure that will be better able to respond to - and capitalise on - global opportunities in Islamic finance. We are confident that with stronger industry stewardship, we will be able to foster greater market dynamism. We are also seeing greater industry leadership in many areas. In particular, I wish to acknowledge the work of AIBIM and MTA for their efforts to further advance VBI implementation, including the VBI report by AIBIM and the VBIT roadmap by MTA that will be launched today. I would also like to mention that we are delighted to see many action-oriented leaders in Islamic finance. The Royal Award for Islamic Finance recognises outstanding contributions in Islamic finance. I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate Tan Sri Dr. Mohd Daud Bakar – the 2022 winner of the Royal Award for Islamic Finance. He is an eminent Shariah scholar, recognised for his instrumental role as the Chairman of the Shariah Advisory Councils for both Bank Negara Malaysia and Securities Commission Malaysia, and in developing the first Shariah standard on gold issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), among other achievements. I would also like to congratulate in advance the winners of the Emerging Leader Prize and Impact Challenge Prize – two additional new prizes introduced this year in conjunction with RAIF – that will be awarded later today.
This is important because long-term  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  unemployment can cause job skills to atrophy making it more difficult for such people to find jobs in the future. While the good news is that the job-finding rates of the long-term unemployed have not yet deteriorated as many feared, we ought not to take this for granted going forward. Although energy prices have begun to rise again, total inflation, as measured by year-overyear changes of the Consumer Price Index, is still around 1¾ percent – less than half the rate in September of 2011. In recent months, core inflation has also slowed and it is now also under 2 percent. Higher energy and grain prices mean that headline inflation will likely edge somewhat higher for a few months before moving slightly lower again. But measures of the underlying rate of inflation are moderate, wage gains remain subdued, and longer-term inflation expectations are fully consistent with our longer run inflation objective of 2 per cent as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator. Near term, the economic outlook is that the growth pace is likely to remain disappointing. On the positive side, motor vehicle sales in August increased solidly. Nevertheless, retail sales outside of autos and gasoline were soft in August as households continue to be cautious. One brighter spot has been the housing market. Housing starts and sales of new and existing single-family homes are trending up gradually.

Page 11 of 19  How to define “future expenditure” More broadly, it is still difficult today to formally calculate productive or "future" expenditure, i.e. spending that would have the most favourable long-term effects on economic growth and output capacity or on the climate transition. A consensus appears to be emerging in economic research literature whereby spending on public investment has a more positive effect on growth than operating expenditure. For example, according to our internal models, mediumand short-term multipliers are higher for public investment than for public sector wages. But would this also be true in respect of expenditure on any roundabout or multimedia centre? There is fierce debate around what exactly investment or productive capital actually includes: “basic” infrastructure like roads, bridges and airports generally form the common denominator, to which building construction is sometimes added. “Social” infrastructure such as education or public health  Page 12 of 19 facilities constitute another potential category of productive expenditure: investment in education and skills boosts labour productivity and the economy's innovation capacity. More recently, “digital” infrastructure has sometimes been included in productive expenditure, albeit with less clearly defined boundaries, and before us the enormous challenge of artificial intelligence. This  list  of  questions  without  answers  may  appear  frustrating. But it is also, primarily, a call for more research, and Paris should be a centre of excellence here thanks to institutions that are pioneers in this area (France Stratégie, OECD in the international arena, etc.).
The TAF program was designed to deal with the stigma problem associated with the discount window and also to make it easier for the New York Fed to sterilize the liquidity injections into the financial system. The TAF program auctioned off a fixed quantity of term funding to depository institutions using the same collateral to back up the loans as can be pledged at the discount window. Since the quantity of funding was set in advance, it made it much easier than for discount window borrowing to offset this liquidity injection. More important, however, was the design concept: term funding priced and distributed in a competitive auction would hopefully avoid any stigma for the winning participants of the auction. The TAF auctions were essentially a better way to dump more water on the same section of the forest covered by the discount window. However, the fire was still burning elsewhere. The inadequacy of the Fed’s traditional liquidity tools and their recent enhancement with the TAF came to the forefront in the spring of 2008. Conditions were deteriorating for several primary dealers, including Bear Sterns. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (all of the governors are appointed by the U.S. president and confirmed by the Senate) decided to activate a little known or used section of the Federal Reserve Act – section 13(3) – which gives the Fed the ability lend to any “individual, partnership or corporation” in “unusual and exigent circumstances”.

Being pragmatic means having the right reservation about it, taking a careful step toward it, and be willing to take the needed action to deal with the unintended consequence. This is not going to be easy, but it is probably the best that we can do for now. Thank you. BIS Review 142/2008  3
Krzysztof Rybiński: Inflation targeting and the challenges ahead Opening remarks by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at the “Inflation Targeting - Third Joint NBP & SNB Seminar on Monetary Policy”, Warsaw, 18-20 May 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to welcome you at the third seminar on monetary policy organized jointly by the Swiss National Bank and the National Bank of Poland. Let me start by thanking staff members from the host central banks, who have not spared their efforts on preparing this seminar. For the first time in our seminar, apart from economists from the host central banks we have invited representatives of other central banks to share with us their knowledge and experience with inflation targeting. Thus I would like to warmly welcome our guests from the Czech National Bank – the first inflation targeter in Central and Eastern Europe, and from the Central Bank of Turkey – a brand new inflation targeter, which has adopted the framework only this year. The topic of this year’s seminar is inflation targeting (henceforth called IT). As the distinguished former Fed chairman Paul Volcker recently remarked 1 , inflation targeting may sound like an oxymoron since usually central banks strive to fight inflation rather than to breed it. So should we gather here to discuss ways of breeding inflation?

That reflects the strong dynamism of exports, driven in recent months by the improvement in Spanish competitiveness and the buoyancy of the euro area markets; but it is also indicative of the weakness of domestic expenditure, giving rise to the contractionary behaviour of imports. As a consequence of these developments, Spain will show a net lending position against the rest of the world of around 2% of GDP, an unprecedented and record figure in recent decades. Over the past months, inflation, proxied by the CPI, has been declining notably, essentially as a result of the tapering off of the effects of the VAT increase over more than a year back. Thus, in October, the CPI fell by 0.1%. Foreseeably, however, positive though moderate rates of change will resume in the coming months, therefore proving compatible with the necessary continuation of the ongoing improvement in competitiveness our economy requires. For 2014, a central scenario has been outlined in which the factors that have been affecting domestic demand progressively slacken. It is projected that the processes of adjustment in the economy, and most particularly the redressing of private-sector debt and the ongoing fiscal consolidation, will continue to influence the pace of recovery of demand and activity; but, at the same time, the reduction in uncertainty and the culmination of the restructuring of credit institutions, along with their improved results, will lay the foundations for improving financial conditions for the resident sectors.
Cashiers will redenominate payments in the currency used for the institution's system, regardless of which currency the customer has used. Bank branches will provide two versions of their forms, one for kronor and one for euro; new cheques and other forms will therefore be produced. Statements of account will specify the rate at which the currency has been converted. The automatic teller systems (Bankomat and Minuten) will also have to be adapted. Moreover, banks must be prepared for people who want to make giro payments in euro right from the beginning of 1999. Some large companies may also wish to pay out wages in euro before the new currency is available in the form of banknotes and coins. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to foresee the magnitude of demand for euro services and how soon companies and individuals will switch from kronor to euro. Monetary and exchange rate policy. A single currency implies a single monetary policy, which in EMU will be decided by the ECB. The Riksbank and the other national central banks will have the task of executing this policy. The changes for Swedish banks and other financial institutions will probably not be all that great. The Riksbank is likely to remain the financial sector's counterparty. The main differences from today for Swedish banks are a much larger market for intra-day money and counterparties located all over Europe. The detailed conduct of monetary policy is not yet clear. The final decisions are due when the ECB has been established in 1998.

It is already clear however that it will amplify the headwinds to the strong recovery that the euro –area has been experiencing in 2021, and that it will intensify inflation pressures in a context where inflation has already increased significantly and will remain high over the coming months. The general uncertainty that marks the euro-area macroeconomic environment has implications for the conduct of monetary policy. In these conditions, it is important to balance carefully the risks of waiting too long to act as opposed to those of normalizing too soon. In any case, the  commitment of the ECB is clear: the Governing Council will do what is necessary to bring inflation firmly and durably to around two per cent over the medium term. The forward guidance, relying on state contingent criteria and the “sequencing” are instrumental to this goal. Policy normalization will follow a clear order: the ECB will end its asset purchases first, likely in Q3 2022, then raise the key interest rates, eventually reducing its balance sheet in a third step. All along this gradual process of normalization, the Governing Council of the ECB made it clear that it will maintainoptionality; gradualism and flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy. In that context, financial markets are currently considering that the rise in interest rates might start in the near future, with a first 25 bps hike almost fully factored in (90 %) as of next July, followed by two others by the end of this year.
Despite the fact that FinTech have so far not had a significant effect on the market, specific events, such as the implementation of PSD2, may alter the current picture. There is concern over the possibility that third parties may have access to customers’ bank data. But I must point out here that it is in fact banks that currently have all this information. Naturally, the problem lies in knowing whether banks are ready to extract and properly exploit this information. There is much talk about interaction with customers, the quality of apps and the user experience. Yet I would like to stress that it is even more important to undertake technological change “in-house”, as regards data aggregation and quality and internal applications. Here there is much potential for improvement, although Spanish banks are not in any way worse positioned than their European rivals. Banks should be capable of extracting, exploiting and analysing their customers’ data. And in this connection, it will be necessary in many cases to invest in systems. Managers must have the information to take decisions. Without it, evaluation and transformation of the business model will not be possible. Against this background of technological change, I would like to refer briefly to the recent announcement of the launch of the “libra” project, the virtual currency sponsored by Facebook. The reaction by the public sector, supervisors and central banks to this announcement has, to put it mildly, been shrouded in caution.

As indicated, the lower use of IRB models by our banks means they will not be affected by this concept. However, other changes, such as the new operational risk and Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA) frameworks, or the introduction of changes in the standardised approach, will indeed affect our banks, which should prepare themselves to absorb the new requirements. 8/15  MREL  Another challenge banks face stems from the introduction of the new eligible liabilities requirements, known as MREL. As you will be aware, the introduction of MREL is the consequence of the change in paradigm in crisis resolution. We have now moved from the bail-out to the bail-in. The aim is to ensure that banks have sufficient unsecured liabilities on their balance sheet, whether own funds or “bailinable” debt, if you will allow me to use this expression, so as to avoid the use of public funds in the event of failure. The Single Resolution Board (SRB) has set MREL objectives for each significant institution at the European level. It has also informed them of the maximum time available to cover these requirements, which must be met through organic growth of specific liabilities and new issues. It is essential that each institution should plan the issues to be made appropriately. It is worth recalling here that the characteristics of these liabilities make them rather unsuitable for distribution among retail customers.