samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Stefan Ingves: Is there an optimal way to structure supervision? Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the 4th Summit Meeting of the Islamic Financial Services Board, Dubai, 15 May 2007. *  *  *  Introduction Thank you for inviting me to this 4th Summit Meeting of the Islamic Financial Services Board. The issues of regulation and supervision are generally the same in a system of Islamic financial services as in any other financial system. You need the same authorities and the same regulations to ensure that your financial institutions and markets are safe and sound. My presentation is about finding the best way of structuring the financial regulatory authorities in a country. This issue has been hotly debated for a long time because of the important and political issues involved and the discussion is still going on. I will discuss the matter based on experiences from countries around the world, including situations in which I have been personally involved such as when a country reconsiders its institutional set-up after a crisis. First I will describe the alternatives for supervision that countries have chosen. Then I will discuss how certain key aspects for supervision, such as independence, accountability, transparency and efficiency can be accommodated under various supervisory structures. Third, I will debate the arguments for and against having supervision inside a Ministry or in a national central bank, which I will call NCB for short. I will also evaluate the arguments for and against combining various supervisory authorities.

Link  to  the  speech:  3  prevent that some weak banks run into acute problems. In fact, some research results 3 based on OECD countries have indicated that the inflation rate is higher and more volatile in countries where the central bank has the sole responsibility for banking supervision. A failure in a supervised entity might affect the reputation of the NCB to the extent that its capability to perform effective monetary policy is hampered. In a crisis, there is a management problem in that the solution of a crisis in the supervised entities will preoccupy the minds of the NCB management so that it will not have the time to focus on other important issues. The Finnish approach is an attempt to solve this dilemma by having a separate board for the supervisory decisions but still being a part of the central bank for its funding and sharing of administrative resources. An overarching argument is that the Parliament should not delegate too much power to a non publicly elected body such as the central bank. But I do not see this as a major problem. The Parliament should set the parameters and limits for the powers of the NCB and the NCB will have to account for its conduct on a regular basis. If supervision is located in another authority, there will be similar issues of delegation and accountability. I noted earlier that the current trend is to move supervision out of the NCBs.
Towards this aim, G20 Leaders have urged accounting standard setters to develop a single set of high-quality accounting standards. A global set of accounting standards is desirable from the perspective of both investors and regulators since it improves the comparability and transparency on a global basis. This contributes towards sounder investment decisions and thus to a more efficient allocation of resources as well as overall functioning of capital markets. Moreover, the financial crisis clearly revealed the shortcomings of different accounting rules on both sides of the Atlantic, as differences in rules contributed towards a lower degree of confidence in financial reporting. For all these reasons, the ECB welcomes the ongoing efforts of the accounting standard setters to achieve fully compatible, high-quality accounting standards in a direct response to the G20 request. However, we are concerned to hear that the FASB and the IASB are still far from reaching a consensus on key accounting concepts, such as the classification and measurement of financial instruments. The IASB has confirmed a “mixed measurement model” that measures financial instruments both at amortised cost and fair value. In contrast, the US standard setter, the FASB, is determined to move towards a “full fair value model”, claiming that only fair value provides decision-useful information to investors.

I will highlight today three dimensions to consider, among many others, in case the introduction of CBDC is decided: liquidity configuration, policy rates and access to central bank balance sheet. 1. First potential impact: the launch of CBDCs could affect monetary implementation through a change in the liquidity situation of the banking system. - While the design of the CBDC should ensure that any risk of sudden large shifts from bank deposits to CBDC would be avoided, it could still substitute a limited part of retail deposits, through an increase of what we call in central banking jargon “autonomous factors”, i.e. an item not linked to monetary policy but affecting the liquidity situation of the banking system. - This could in turn imply that the central bank – depending on its preferred liquidity position – provides additional liquidity through refinancing operations and/or asset purchases. In case of collateralized refinancing operations, collateral availability would also need to be checked to accommodate the operations. While it is very much a speculative thought at this stage, liquidity-providing or liquidityabsorbing operations would need to remain available at any time to ensure that central banks can choose to operate in the monetary policy implementation framework they choose, even in the case of the launch of a CBDC. 2. Second: the chosen remuneration scheme, as well as possible limits, are key parameters for the usage of CBDC that also need to be assessed for the monetary policy framework.
Jean-Claude Trichet: Interview with the Börsen-Zeitung Interview with Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, and the Börsen-Zeitung conducted by Dr Jürgen Schaaf on 16 December 2008, published on 31 December 2008. *  *  *  Question: Do you believe that the citizens of the euro area will one day have a similarly strong relationship to the euro as the Germans used to have to the Deutsche Mark? Answer: Confidence in the currency, in the central bank as an institution and in the independence of the central bank to deliver price stability is crucially important. When asked whether they considered the ECB’s independence from politics to be an important condition for price stability, 78% of the 320 million fellow citizens of the euro area said “yes”. And that was before the recent intensification of the financial crisis. Question: And now? Answer: All evidence suggests that, since then, the sentiment of our fellow citizens on the importance of the euro and of the ECB as an independent institution has even increased. Question: Studies have shown from time to time that the support of the population for the stability of the currency is even more important than the institutional independence of the central bank. Has the euro already achieved this status? Answer: As a symbol of European unity, the euro is already extremely successful. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the euro and the ECB have become, even more visibly, a central anchor for confidence.

The Annual Report concludes that these barriers are the outcome of various factors: inappropriate regulations, small firm-size, limited regional and sectoral job mobility, a degree of educational mismatch between labour supply and demand, and insufficient innovative capacity. Overcoming these constraints calls for responses that are not always straightforward or simple either in technical or political terms. But it should be stressed that these reforms can bring about positive synergies with the expansionary monetary policy being pursued by the ECB, even in the short term, owing to their impact on growth expectations. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
  While we currently plan to start operating the new service with the existing hours for CHAPS, the new service will have near 24x7 capability, and so when there is clear demand we expect, in consultation with industry, to extend operating hours. This flexibility means we can respond quickly to changing demands and an increasingly globalised economy.   We will also provide Application Programming Interface (API) access to users to enable read and write of payments data. The Bank has committed to providing an exposed API to allow external participants to develop sophisticated and automated real-time tools for accessing RTGS transactional and liquidity data. We plan to announce in a few months our initial thoughts on the approach and implementation. And with a visionary new system, we want more participants to be able to benefit from it. In 2018 we expanded direct access to non-bank payment service providers, making it possible for a broader set of firms to compete with banks. Five non-bank payment service providers currently hold accounts in RTGS and many more firms are exploring the possibility of joining. In addition, the renewed RTGS service will further reduce barriers to entry for new players – for example on-boarding will be quicker and testing will be streamlined making joining speedy and efficient. For CHAPS, we expect to be able to meet demand from dozens of new participants a year, rather than a handful as currently. There are two clear benefits from expanding access.

First, increasing the number and diversity of firms that can directly access central bank money helps to reduce financial stability risk from events such as market wide shocks or a single firm failure. Second, it promotes competition and innovation in payments. Firms that have direct access to payment systems can benefit from faster transaction times and reduced individual transaction costs. By extending these benefits to a wider range of firms, the Bank hopes to encourage a greater diversity of players in the payments market, thereby encouraging innovation and competition through development of new business models, new products and services and ultimately cheaper and more efficient payments. This is an ambitious Programme - and rightly so. The Bank is on track against published milestones. Having defined the Programme scope, with input from the payments industry, we are now running a competitive procurement process under the Official Journal of the European Union to appoint a Technology Delivery Partner. They will work with the Bank on the design and build of the core settlement engine. We plan to enter the contract with the Technology Delivery Partner in May 2020. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  We then move to delivery, with the first technology changes in the first half of 2022. In light of other international migration plans, the Bank is revisiting its approach to the introductory phase of ISO 20022 implementation in 2022 – in particular on how we can support early adopters of enhanced ISO 20022 data.
Therefore, we still hold the view that the return to global equilibrium will be slower and more uncertain than is usually the case at the end of a recession. Swiss economic outlook The Swiss economy is also on the road to recovery: Swiss GDP growth turned positive in the third quarter. However, value added continued to contract in the manufacturing industry. Overall, demand for labour is still falling and unemployment numbers are on the rise. We are projecting a moderate recovery for 2010. Private consumption growth will be held back by weak household income growth. Exports will benefit from a gradual return to strength of external demand. This should allow manufacturing production to recover, albeit unevenly across the different segments. In particular, new orders in the equipment goods segment will probably continue to suffer from the excess capacity at the international level. In Switzerland, too, the increase in manufacturing production will not be enough to allow excess production capacity to be reabsorbed. Consequently, equipment investment is unlikely to see any improvement for several quarters, and there could be a fall in the number of manufacturing jobs. In the construction industry, on the other hand, where the degree of resource utilisation is more than satisfactory, demand should stabilise. For 2010 as a whole, the SNB expects real GDP growth of between 0.5% and 1%, following a decline of around 1.5% in 2009.

This reflects extreme movements in oil prices, which reached USD 145 a barrel in July 2008, only to fall to USD 35 in December of the same year. The temporary nature of fluctuations in inflation was correctly anticipated, as evidenced in our previous inflation forecasts. Since it takes time for the impact of monetary policy to feed through, it would have been futile to attempt to counter these movements. The path of inflation in the near term will be largely dictated by recent movements in oil prices and the associated base effects. Inflation will already return to positive figures from the end of this year. This is mainly due to the base effect linked to the USD 35 low reached by oil prices in December 2008. Inflation will tend to decline thereafter, despite the recovery in growth. In fact, economic activity will remain subdued and will return only gradually to normal. Inflation will nevertheless remain positive throughout 2010. Assuming that our monetary policy remains unchanged, our new forecast shows that inflation will begin to increase again from the beginning of 2011, to reach 2% in the first half of 2012. Our expansionary monetary policy cannot be maintained indefinitely without incurring inflation risks. Considerable uncertainty remains attached to this inflation forecast. Global economic developments could be less favourable than I described in the first section of my remarks. The financial crisis could reappear. Monetary policy decision The inflation outlook has not changed since the September assessment.
The inclusion of RMB assets into global indices has driven up the demand for these assets and a good part of the investment is done through Hong Kong. At the same time, we are also working closely with the Mainland to expand and enhance these Connect schemes, including expanding the product scope to cover derivative products in the case of Bond Connect and ETF in the case of Stock Connects. 9. Talking about China opportunities, one key development is the Guangdong-Hong KongMacao Bay Area (the Greater Bay Area, or GBA). The GBA combines Mainland China’s wealthiest and economically most advanced cities along the Pearl River Delta into a metropolitan cluster. It covers a population of nearly 70 million and generates GDP of about $ trillion, providing a unique stage for financial institutions to launch and expand their business. Besides, the depth of Hong Kong’s financial markets could help enterprises in the GBA to access global capital. At the initial phase, we are studying ways to facilitate capital flows within the GBA at the individual level, such as cross-border use of mobile payment and mutual access of wealth management products by residents in Hong Kong and in the Mainland part of the GBA. 10. Apart from being a major platform for capturing China opportunities, the HKMA is actively moving towards the new era of Smart Banking. We launched the Faster Payment System (FPS) last September – a round-the-clock instant payment platform that achieves full connectivity between banks and stored value facilities.

The Asian Leadership Index therefore aims to contribute towards a greater understanding of “what do business leaders in Asia need to do to get more energy and commitment from their most important followers?” As part of the study, selected senior leaders and emerging leaders in companies operating in Asia were asked to describe what their leaders need to do for them as professionals if they were to participate wholeheartedly with that leader, and be fully invested in their organizations over the longer term. They also indicate what they see as missing from the leaders to whom they report. As leadership is about being able to deliver results even in the most challenging of environment, it is therefore also about generating the drive and energy in the organisation, and thus creating an environment in which the best talent will gravitate to, and contribute with the same energy and drive. In an international environment in which high quality talent is scarce, this aspect of the expectations of leadership becomes important. In essence, leaders need to be supported by high powered and committed teams. The expectations of talent is however not only rapidly evolving but may differ when contextualised to different parts of the world. This study undertaken by ICLIF provides insights on such expectations of leaders in Asia and on the areas that need to be addressed if sustainable impact and influence is to be achieved. What then are the findings of the study?
It is one thing to note that such revisions have affected the historical development of the krona. It is quite another to forecast such revisions and to allow this to influence the forecast for the krona. In my view, the assessment of interest rates abroad on which the analysis in the latest Monetary Policy Update was based was largely in line with market expectations. This means that my view of the future development of the krona in December was based on the assumption that the market would not significantly revise its view of interest rates abroad. Housing prices and household indebtedness may lead to financial imbalances Another important but difficult-to-assess factor that we as monetary policy decision-makers have to take a stance on is the rapid increase in housing prices and household indebtedness that we have observed for some time now. I am among those who are somewhat concerned about this situation. The debate on the role of housing prices in monetary policy has been slightly unclear. As I see it, it is not a question of steering housing prices or other asset prices towards a set target. Nor is it a question of trying to puncture a price bubble by means of drastic repo rate increases. Nor do we assess that financial stability is threatened by the build-up of household debt. This can be seen, for example, if you read our latest Financial Stability Report, which was published in December.

Exports were expected to move upwards, driven by the progressive recovery of foreign markets in 2016 and by the effects of exchange rate depreciation heightening the gains in competitiveness built up over the last few years. Imports were projected to remain buoyant, in line with final demand. The data on foreign trade transactions for the first half are in line with this forecast made in June. Until June the balance of payments performed more strongly than last year. In the first six months the current account balance reached a surplus of 0.6% of GDP compared with a deficit of 0.1% last year. The bulk of this improvement derived from the smaller energy deficit due to cheaper imports, and from the smaller income deficit. By contrast, the non-energy goods surplus has continued to shrink due to the greater vigour of our imports of this type of goods. The dynamism of imports stems in part from the momentum of domestic spending. It should be kept in mind that gains and losses in competitiveness manifest themselves not only in export capacity, but also in competition in the domestic market between national production and imports. The vigour with which imports are reacting to the upsurge in demand signals the need to maintain and further pursue the improvements in competitiveness. The recovery of output has been accompanied by the somewhat more expansionary behaviour of employment than might be expected from historical patterns.
If central banks assume responsibility for such objectives, there is a serious danger of other state institutions refraining from taking necessary and effective – but potentially unpopular – measures to achieve these goals. Expanding the monetary policy mandate can therefore be counterproductive. Second, a broad mandate can blur the clear focus of monetary policy on price stability and create unnecessary conflicts of interest. This can in turn give rise to doubts as to whether the central bank is at all times taking the necessary measures to ensure price stability. Such doubts can ultimately weaken the anchoring of inflation expectations, and so make conducting monetary policy more difficult. And third, a broad mandate or one that is interpreted too broadly can jeopardise the independence of a central bank over time. Even if central banks did have suitable instruments at their disposal, taking steps to address climate protection or wealth redistribution is a political decision. When it comes to matters of a political nature, the democratic process is  Page 10/16  essential and must not be circumvented by broadening the interpretation of the central bank’s mandate. Independence also requires accountability, and rendering proper account is only possible if the objectives entrusted to the central bank can be achieved within a reasonable timeframe. Independence can only be legitimised if the central bank has a narrowly defined mandate that it can achieve and can then give due account of having done so.

The Bank’s sermons on the storms ahead would have had more influence if at the same time a collection plate was passed round the congregation so that money was available in the event that the church roof had to be replaced. But a macro prudential regime also has a key role to play in the downswing phase of the cycle. Since 2008, credit conditions have tightened, jeopardising the recovery and, in turn, threatening renewed losses for banks. By allowing banks to draw on their macro prudential capital buffers, while credit conditions remain tight, the system is counter-cyclical. In other words, a credible macro prudential regime could help forestall both excessive exuberance and unnecessary caution. By altering the pressure on the financial brakes according to circumstances, regulation, far from being an inflexible foe, would become a flexible friend. This type of regulatory regime, and its objectives and tools, are largely untried and untested. But that is not a reason for not trying and not testing. The Financial Policy Committee will be a first. Over the next few years we will put in place a framework for financial stability to  BIS Review 84/2010  3  parallel that for monetary stability. We need both. As we have seen, one without the other is not enough.