samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is important for ensuring that resources would be allocated efficiently and that the direction of development would be in line with the needs of markets, which reflect private sector’s priority and expectations. At the initial stage of development, as is the case now for the Asian Bond Market, government policies and efforts will be important to spearhead the process of growth and development. But once the momentum takes off, market mechanism should take over to ensure that the pace and focus of development are consistent with market expectations. And, at this level, the role of policy should be to support and facilitate market development by streamlining rules and regulations, by facilitating cross-border trade and investment flows, and by providing the necessary financial infrastructure. This approach will help ensure that the region’s financial environment remains conducive to private sector activities and participation. Let me take the opportunity here to stress that, at this juncture of financial markets development in Asia, I think that support from the authorities is still important and remains a crucial factor. But in order to leverage the impact of government’s support and involvement to the fullest, it is important for the authorities to be clear and firm on their commitments to develop the markets. Government involvement should also be focused and concentrate on issues that cannot be tackled by private market participants.

Such an institute will also play an important role in  2/3  supporting the development of financial markets in Asia, as well as producing the next generation of Asian Financiers. The second area that should also be considered is the harmonization and streamlining of the existing rules and regulations. This is especially important for cross--border capital movements so that the region’s financial resources can flow more smoothly between economies in the region. Streamlining rules and regulations will help reduce unnecessary barriers, and through lower transaction costs, will allow a more efficient allocation of resources. For example, measures to protect domestic markets from outside competition may need to be relaxed. Along the same line, there is room to harmonize taxes on capital market transactions so that tax implications are neutral and do not act as a constraint to efficient resource allocation. Ladies and Gentlemen, My last thought for today is on ways we should proceed to expedite the pace of regional financial cooperation. At this juncture, there is no disagreement that we all would like to see more and faster progress on regional financial cooperation. And, to ensure its progress, we have seen policy makers in Asia ready and prepared to take bold and important policy actions. My view is also the same. I also want to see a faster pace of development rather than a slow one. But one also needs to underscore that, to achieve long term sustainability and continuity, the process of development needs to be market driven rather than policy driven.
The impact that changes in Fed policy can have beyond our borders has led to calls for us to do more to internalize those impacts, or even further, to internationally coordinate policymaking. As I’ve already noted, we are mindful of the global effects of Fed policy, given the central place of U.S. markets in the global financial system and the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. Accordingly, we seek to conduct monetary policy transparently and based on clear principles. Promoting growth and stability in the U.S., I believe, is the most important contribution we can make to growth and stability worldwide. There is, of course, the argument that Fed policy has been too accommodative for too long, creating risks for financial stability worldwide. Here, I think it’s important to consider carefully the counterfactual. Would countries beyond our borders really have been better off with a weaker U.S. economy – an economy that might have required exceptional monetary policy accommodation for a much longer period of time? The fundamental issue is whether U.S. monetary policy has helped support our dual objectives of maximum employment in the context of price stability, and whether this support is consistent with a healthy global economy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  While explicit coordination looks neither feasible nor desirable, there may be more that central banks in general, and the Fed in particular, could do to be better global stewards. As an example, I would emphasize the importance of effective Fed communication.

The Riksbank's losses do not reflect the overall result The Riksbank's task is not to generate profits. Our mandate is to maintain permanently low and stable inflation and also to contribute to a balanced development of production and employment. The bond purchases made prior to the pandemic were part of the expansionary monetary policy that would safeguard the credibility of the inflation target. In addition, during the pandemic, the intention was to support the real economy by ensuring that credit provision continued to function. An evaluation of our asset purchases cannot therefore be based solely on the financial gains or losses that have arisen on the Riksbank's balance sheet. One needs to examine, among other things, how government finances were affected. 32 Until the end of last year, the government bonds we purchased in phase 1 had increased in value. Unrealised  value increases of SEK 9 billion were therefore recorded in revaluation accounts, see Table 4. 33 These calculations are based on the cash flows that have so far been generated for each bond purchased, combined with a market valuation at current prices of the bonds that have not yet matured. The calculation can therefore be seen as the final result of the purchases, assuming that the remaining holding is sold today. 18 [30]  Two examples of questions that need to be answered are: Did the government's borrowing costs fall? Did growth and employment in the economy rise, so that state tax revenues increased?
To-day some kind of herd behaviour drives a lot of observers and actors in the opposite direction: overwhelming pessimism as regards the present situation and the economic future. Both attitudes are equally totally inappropriate. It is up to the Central Banks to remain moderate in their judgments, pragmatic and lucid in the various circumstances and to offer an anchor not only for monetary and financial stability but also for stability of judgment. -third, fostering confidence is a major contribution of the Eurosystem to the prosperity of the European economy. Confidence is a very precious ingredient in the present European conjuncture, as recently emphasized by the European Council in Ghent : confidence in the euro, in price stability, in its ability to be a highly reliable instrument for savings, in its medium and long term solidity. Confidence of the consumers in price stability underpins growth through dynamic household consumption – which is today a major motor of economic growth. Confidence of the savers underpins growth through a favourable financial environment. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 96/2001  7

In Dubai, the efforts by the authorities to create the Islamic economy initiative to further enhance the inter-linkages with other Islamic financial centres is also a step towards strengthening the international economic connectivity especially between our regions. The efforts will not only enhance Islamic finance as an effective financial intermediary but also as a binding force for the other segments of the Islamic economy, including with other parts of the world. Our collective efforts in developing Islamic finance will provide an important platform to unlock the potential opportunities that lie therein to benefit every segment of the society and the business community that now extends beyond our domestic borders. In this highly dynamic and rapidly changing world environment, efforts will need to be unrelenting on  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  developing further the enabling infrastructure, the foundations for stability and enhancing the internal capability. And with the greater international linkages, the greater will be the importance of working collectively for the common goals we aspire and for which the benefits will be mutually reinforcing. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
On this view, the slowdown in prospect would have relatively benign effects in terms of the longer term sustainability of the global economic expansion; and developments so far have already had positive effects both in terms of their impact on the world oil price, and in terms of their impact on the pattern of exchange rates, notably by reducing the exaggerated weakness of the euro. On that basis the global economic environment should provide a reasonable background for our own economy. We – and our partners in the European Union – would be relatively little affected by the US economic slowdown. The world economy as a whole would certainly be helped by the somewhat softer oil price. And the recovery of the euro – including its recovery against sterling – will help to ease the severe imbalance within our own economy between the domestically-orientated sectors which have typically been doing relatively well and those businesses and sectors that are most exposed to competition from the Eurozone and which have been having a rough time. That imbalance is, I know, a real concern to many up here in Yorkshire, including many of you here in Sheffield. It has, for some time, been one of the most difficult issues confronting us in conducting monetary policy. What then are the major domestic uncertainties?

In the worst case, this may even lead to a situation with a more fragmented and nationally-oriented regulatory and supervisory system. To paraphrase the quote from Mervin King: global banks would still be national in death, but less international in life. That would, in my view, be a step backwards. I do of course realise that it is unrealistic to ask for the creation of an international institution with supranational powers to deal with distressed cross-border banks. So, in the absence of a common global regime the best we can do is to try to develop a common international approach to crisis management and resolution. If we cannot do it as one, at least we need to make sure that we can do it similarly and in a coordinated fashion. So we need to embark on an even bolder agenda than the present supervisory reforms. Here, we may draw some inspiration from the last century. After the war we created the IMF to provide some basic rules for the monetary system, recognising that the system is interlinked and that problems in one country may also create problems in others. In the 1980s we agreed on the Basle Accord with joint supervisory rules for the internationallyactive banks. Recognising now that supervisory convergence hinges on agreement on crisis management and resolution, I think that it is time to address this issue in a serious way. I see  BIS Review 134/2009  3  this as a necessary step for Europe, given our single market.
It is obvious that there will be need to rebalance fiscal and monetary policies in these economies once growth becomes more broad-based and entrenched to avoid a build up of inflationary pressures. As the crisis was mainly a result of weak regulatory framework and poor supervisory oversight in advanced economies, there is also need to continue undertaking measures to reform the financial systems and enhance global standards for the supervision of the financial sector. Zambia weathered the crisis relatively well, with growth in 2009 actually increasing to 6.3% from 5.7% in 2008. This growth was largely driven by increased output in the mining and quarrying, construction, agriculture, and energy sectors. Although the Zambia’s financial sector was not directly exposed to toxic assets, the financial crisis and the global recession that it triggered did impact Zambia’s macroeconomic environment. The Zambian economy suffered reversal of short term capital flows and a slowing down of foreign direct investment, which had an adverse impact on the exchange rate of the Kwacha against the major currencies. The collapse in commodity prices as global demand contracted also impacted on Zambia’s mining sector and its related support industries, leading to losses in output and employment that fed back into the deterioration in the loan book of commercial banks. Nonperforming loans in the banking sector, for example, rose from around 6% in June 2008 to 12.6% at the end of 2009.

Atchana Waiquamdee: Brief look at financial market indicators Opening remarks by Dr Atchana Waiquamdee, Deputy Governor for Monetary Stability, Bank of Thailand, at the Workshop on Financial Market Indicators, Bangkok, 7 June 2007. *  *  *  Good morning, and allow me to welcome you to Bangkok, and to this morning’s Workshop on Financial Market Indicators. The issue we are about to discuss today, namely the use financial indicators, itself is not a new topic. Especially in more developed financial markets, the use of financial indicators has been integral to the well-functioning of markets. In those cases, utilizing financial market indicators in the policy-making process is nothing new. In many of the emerging markets of Asia, however, this has not been the case. Financial indicators in the emerging markets have been more difficult to come by, and even much more difficult to interpret – due largely to gaps in market development. Yet, as the financial markets of Asian economies began to gather both depth and breadth, more and more financial market indicators are becoming readily available for policy use. Since the availability of the indicators in emerging markets is rather recent and the fundamental conditions in these markets are still very dissimilar to those of the more matured ones, the use of financial market indicators in emerging markets for policy purposes merits much thought and attention. So what exactly are we talking about when referring to financial market indicators?
The belief that nonbank FinTech companies will play a significant role in the future financial landscape is well established if we look at investments in fintech industry. The cumulative investments globally have more than ten-doubled the last five years and are estimated to exceed $ the next 3-5 years. This, in addition to changed customer expectation and increased digitalisation, may be the reason why today we are witnessing a trend of stronger cooperation between banks and fintechs, including in the area of innovation labs. The new technologies, such as blockchain and distributed ledger technology, though young and still-evolving, show the potential of restructuring financial industry, even encouraging discussions for cashless society with central bank digital currencies replacing the fiat money and underpinning the proliferation of cryptocurrencies. The cryptocurrencies have registered a spectacular rise – in 2017 their market valuation increased from USD 30 billion to USD 400 billion, and widened, with the rapid increase of “initial coin offerings” – fundraising facility for startup investors. So, are the cryptocurrencies, although unregulated becoming a substitute for fiat money? Are they incorporating the basic features of the fiat money such as being a medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account? Despite the rising trend, they play a marginal role globally as a medium of exchange in comparison with standard payment options; as they are not backed by legal authority and are marked by high value volatility and rather illiquid non-regulated markets, they obviously cannot be treated as unit of account and store of value.

What I have started to describe is the first objective that the new legislation gives to the PRA, namely the safety and soundness of the firms we will supervise. But there is another important leg to the definition of the objective, namely that the underlying objective of our pursuit of safety and soundness is the stability of the financial system. For banks, this had led us to emphasise that we will be a proportionate supervisor, putting more emphasis on the large firms that have more scope to damage the stability of the system. We think we can do this for banks because the depositor is protected by the deposit insurance arrangements on the first £ of deposits provided by the FSCS for all banks except branches from other EU countries (where the insurance comes from the home country), and because as a consequence of the crisis the resolution regime is now set down in statute, though we clearly have work to do to make the larger banks resolvable using those resolution powers, supplemented we expect by future EU legislation. For insurers, the legislation gives the PRA a second objective, namely the protection of policyholders. We do not have a comparable objective for depositors. Policyholder protection means in effect that our approach of proportionality in supervision cannot be the same for insurers. Why? This is a good question because the FSCS is set up to cover insurance.
In the event  5  BIS Review 126/1999  that a bank’s internal capital adequacy process is lacking, supervisors must have the knowledge and authority to take corrective action. There can be no doubt that implementing the supervisory review of capital will require considerable insight and flexibility on the part of supervisors because they will have to tailor their efforts to the unique risk profiles of particular institutions. At the same time, this approach should allow supervisors to draw on their cross-institutional knowledge as they assess the strengths and weaknesses of a bank’s risk management and capital allocation processes relative to those of its peers. The G10 supervisors recognize the obvious implications that this approach will have for supervisory resources. In order to keep pace with industry innovation, it is clear that we will have to step up our training and consider effective ways for making the most use of our limited resources. The Basel Committee also recognizes the importance of these issues for the non-G10 countries and is working toward providing the training and other types of support needed to allow these countries and their supervisors to move in this direction. The third element in the proposed new capital adequacy framework has to do with market discipline - another critical component of a safer and more stable financial system. More extensive disclosure and greater dependence on market forces complement improvements in risk management, banking supervision, and minimum capital standards.

The fact that a number of other international groups have in recent years also developed “core principles” in their respective areas of expertise confirms to me the value of the Basel Committee’s approach. Today, approximately 120 countries endorse the Core Principles. Just last month, I am pleased to report, the Basel Committee, in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, produced a follow-up report called the Core Principles Methodology. This follow-up report was initiated in response to requests from a number of countries for additional guidance on how to interpret and implement the Core Principles. What the methodology report does is to develop specific criteria to evaluate how the Core Principles are being implemented in individual countries. The new methodology provides two sets of criteria for each Core Principle. One set of criteria focuses on issues deemed essential for the minimum implementation of the Core Principles; the other focuses on those issues deemed to represent “best practice.”  1  BIS Review 126/1999  The IMF and the World Bank currently use this new methodology to assess the banking sectors in individual countries. Looking ahead, the Basel Committee plans to bring together some time next year supervisors from emerging market countries and representatives from the IMF and World Bank to discuss the lessons learned from this initiative. The projected meeting is part of the Basel Committee’s ongoing commitment to ensure that the Core Principles remain on point and relevant to banking supervisors worldwide.
Among them, an increase in private employment under contract and a decrease in involuntary part-time work are worth singling out. Self-employment, although growing at a higher rate than its salaried counterpart, has slowed down and the unemployment rate is now near its levels of a year ago, slightly higher than at the end of the first quarter (figure 4). Nominal wages' annual growth rate stopped falling. In June they expanded between 4.4% and 5.0%, compared with rates of 5.5% and 6.0% in June of 2016. Real wages increased 2  their annual variation, mainly due to low inflation. All this contributed to real incomes, measured by the real wage bill, slightly increasing their annual growth rate, to 3%. Add to this that consumer expectations have improved systematically in the last five months, although they are still in pessimistic territory. Moreover, the cost of credit is at record lows, consistent with the expansionary instance of monetary policy (figure 5). Unlike consumption, investment remains weak, especially its construction and works component, which has steepened its annual fall from mid-2016, hand in hand with a drop in housing investment and reduced public investment. Investment in machinery and equipment, despite some annual deceleration from the previous quarter, continues to outperform recent years, especially after discounting the non-regular transportation item, thus accumulating a nine-month string of positive growth rates (figure 6). On the external side, a more favorable scenario for the emerging world and Chile has been strengthening.

Villy Bergström: The labour market and wage formation Speech by Mr Villy Bergström, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at the Association of Swedish Engineering Industries' HR director conference, Rimbo, 22 November 2005. *  *  *  Introduction Thank you for your invitation to come and speak here. Today, I will not be touching upon current economic policy in Sweden or the weakening of the krona exchange rate. I will return to those issues in a couple of days in a different speech. The shift in economic policy at the start of the 1990s has entailed better conditions for wage formation in Sweden. Among other things, the adoption of the inflation target has reduced uncertainty over future price developments. Wage-earners do not have to worry that their wage increases will be eroded by excessively fast price rises, while it is easier for employers to determine their scope for wage costs. The lower uncertainty over inflation is reflected in the fact that inflation expectations since the mid1990s have been firmly anchored around 2 per cent. It is important to remember that the current conditions for wage formation in Sweden – a floating exchange rate and inflation target – are considerably different from our previous regime with a fixed exchange rate. A fixed exchange rate was the norm in Sweden for some 130 years, even though the systems for maintaining it changed.