samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Riksbank has therefore on three different occasions (in July, September and October)  BIS Review 160/2009  5  offered loans of up to SEK 100 billion with a maturity of almost one year and at a fixed interest rate, to contribute to bringing down the interest rates households and companies have to pay. On the first two occasions the loan amount was fully subscribed, but on the most recent occasion the amount borrowed was SEK 95 billion. By setting interest rates on Riksbank Certificates and fine-tuning – and as we will come to shortly – setting interest rates on the Riksbank's loans to the banks, the Riksbank has been able to steer the short-term rate throughout the crisis. To summarise, monetary policy has been aimed at keeping inflation close to the target and at the same time dampening the fall in economic activity during the financial crisis. The repo rate has been quickly cut to an extremely low level. The steering of the short-term rates has functioned well throughout the crisis. The normal aim of only steering the shortest interest rate has been supplemented with lending to the banks at longer maturities to be able to also influence interest rates further out on the curve. This means that monetary policy approaches questions regarding financial stability, which I will now discuss. Financial stability Financial stability is the Riksbank’s other main task. Put simply, it is a question of ensuring that the financial system is stable and that the payment system functions.

For the Swiss mortgage market, there is currently only a small risk of a credit crunch. On the one hand, there have been no widespread excesses on the Swiss property and mortgage markets recently, which makes it unlikely that banks’ appetite for risk will decline to any great degree. On the other hand, opportunities for loan refinancing in Switzerland remain strong. The structure of mortgage lending in Switzerland is quite varied, and for banks the “Pfandbrief” mortgage bond is a refinancing tool that provides continuing strong opportunities for loan refinancing, and has experienced something of a renaissance since the financial crisis. As such, the already muted outlook for the Swiss economy is unlikely to suffer any additional impact from a credit crunch on the property market. BIS Review 107/2008  1
Ladies and Gentlemen, The financial sector in our region has now reached a new stage of development. Over the years, the role of the financial system has evolved, facilitating the various stages of development and growth. Increasingly, the financial services industry is also becoming a source of growth, especially as several countries in the region are moving towards a knowledge-based and services-led economy. In the process, the dynamic changes taking place are also being driven by technological advances and an increasingly competitive environment. As financial restructuring and reforms progress to a more advanced stage, financial institutions are also moving on to make the necessary adjustments to become more productive, innovative, and strategically more focused. Efforts are now focused not only on the creation of a sound and resilient financial sector but towards institutional development and capacity building of the financial sector to elevate it to a higher level of performance, efficiency and excellence. This represents an important  BIS Review 46/2003  1  phase in the development of the financial sector as highlighted in our 10-year Financial Sector Master Plan that was released almost three years ago. It represents an important development prior to moving towards a more deregulated and liberalised environment. In this context, we are envisaging forward-looking financial institutions that will be able to face the challenges of financial liberalisation and globalisation as we progress into our next stage of development.

Binghamton, on the other hand, has really been struggling with no signs yet of any meaningful recovery. Meanwhile, Northern New Jersey’s economy had been growing fairly steadily until this past winter when activity softened, probably due at least in part to the unusually harsh weather. Now that spring is finally upon us, we hope to see economic conditions improve more significantly. What kinds of jobs have been created during the recovery? Let me turn to the topic of today’s press briefing: how the types of jobs in the region have changed over the last business cycle. Firms often change the way they utilize workers and the mix of skills they employ during recessions and recoveries. The weakening demand during recessions forces firms to look for new ways to be more efficient to cope with hard times. These adjustments do not affect all workers equally. Indeed, it’s what we typically think of as middle-skilled workers – for example, construction workers, machine operators and administrative support personnel – that are hardest hit during recessions. Further, a feature of the Great Recession and indeed the prior two recessions, is that the middle-skill jobs that were lost don’t all come back during the recoveries that follow. Instead, job opportunities have tended to shift toward higher- and lower-skilled workers. As we’ll show, these same trends have played out in our region. While there’s been a good number of both higher-skill and lower-skill jobs created in the region during the recovery, opportunities for middle-skilled workers have continued to shrink.
In 2008, the Bank of Zambia issued banking licences to 5 new banks to operate in Zambia. As at 31 May 2011, Institutions under Bank of Zambia supervision as at 31 May 2011 were:   18 commercial banks,    10 leasing finance companies,    3 building societies,    51 bureaux de change,    1 savings and credit bank,    1 development finance institution,    26 microfinance institutions (MFIs) and    1 credit reference bureau (CRB). The sector has also recorded tremendous growth in business with growth witnessed in various innovative activities carried out by the banks in order to meet the needs of increasing number of customers. Some of the innovations include:   An increase in automated teller machines (ATMs) including deposit taking ATMs;    E-banking;    Telephone banking services;  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3    In-store banking services – banks can provide some banking services within the premises of stores;    Mobile top-up services – banks can sell airtime on behalf of mobile phone providers through ATMs;    Truck-banking services – the model entails engagement of agents for provision of cash-in/cash-out transactions for clients where banks have no footprint;    Bancassurance – banks can sell insurance products on behalf of insurance companies; and    Introduction of Visa debit and credit cards.

In this sense, I am convinced that in order to deliver a successful roadmap for the potential issuance of a digital euro, we must establish a certain set of priorities upfront. Allow me to be a bit more precise in this respect. To start with, I believe we should deepen the current standing of our work. This means not just promoting a wide-ranging exchange of views within the Eurosystem and with other European authorities and institutions, but also engaging other relevant stakeholders in our discussions, including the private sector and academia. In my view, it is this active dialogue that will help us understand the full range of implications of a CBDC and the minimum requirements that a euro-denominated CBDC should meet. Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, I believe we need to place a strong emphasis on developing a rigorous experimentation agenda that will help us make informed policy decisions about the different design options. This entails identifying the key questions that remain open and need to be further analysed by means of hands-on experience, and formulating the corresponding concrete testing proposals. And we must bear in mind that private agents could be instrumental for the ultimate success of this exercise, so it is important that we make sure to count them in early on. Lastly, international cooperation with other central banks needs to remain high on the agenda, to identify best practice, avoid unnecessary fragmentation and help achieve  2  According to Boar et al.
Another approach involves discussing and developing proposals for regulatory floors of different kinds, for example risk-weight floors like the one we have for mortgages in Sweden today or floors that cover the total capital requirement that is also in place today. Finally, it is a  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  question of tightening up supervision and improving transparency concerning risk weights. It is probable that the assessment of the banks risk weights will be broadened and eventually become a permanent part of the undertakings of the Basel Committee. As in the case of the leverage ratio, there are those that claim that these measures will reduce the banks’ incentives to effectively manage their own risks. However, in my opinion it is question of avoiding a regulatory framework that gives the banks incentives to use their own models with the aim of reducing their risk weights and their capital requirements more than can be justified by the risks in their operations. It is important to find solutions to this problem as it will otherwise be difficult to restore the credibility of the frameworks and thus of the banks. Basel III is also relevant to the Swedish banking system Once Basel III is in place around the globe, the safety margins in the global financial system will be greater than previously.

This means that downside risks for household income and debt-  2  BIS Review 75/2010  servicing capacity are likely to persist and that banks could face losses for some time, although there are important differences across countries. However, on a more positive note, there are signs that the past sharp falls in house prices, together with low interest rates, have improved housing affordability. This appears to explain, at least in part, the recent turnaround in the extension of new loans to households for house purchases, shown in the Chart 4 on slide 8, although substantial differences in these patterns remain across Member States. III. Main risks identified within the euro area financial system  Let me now turn to the three main risks that we have identified within the euro area financial system. The first is the possibility of a setback to the recent recovery of bank profitability. After the sizeable net losses, which were endured by around half of the euro area large and complex banking groups (LCBGs) in late 2008, many of them returned to modest profitability during 2009. Moreover, as shown in the left-side of Chart 5 on slide 10, banks’ financial performances strengthened further in the first quarter of 2010 and all LCBGs which have reported financial results so far have shown a positive return on equity. The same pattern can be seen as regards the return on assets. The leverage ratios of LCBGs have remained broadly constant after a sharp decline in the first quarter of 2009.
Howard Lee: Keynote speech - ASIFMA China Capital Markets Conference Keynote speech by Mr Howard Lee, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the ASIFMA China Capital Markets Conference, Hong Kong, 27 June 2023. *** Good afternoon, everyone. It's a pleasure to be here at the China Capital Markets Conference, and I'd like to thank ASIFMA for organising this event and inviting me to speak. Today's conference covers a wide range of topics, from opportunities and developments in China's capital markets to key trends like digital transformation, green and sustainable finance. As we all know, Hong Kong has always been the hub connecting Mainland and international markets, and currently intermediates two-thirds of cross-border direct investment and securities investment flows. It's an exciting time to be discussing how we can further leverage connectivity in China's and Hong Kong's financial markets and explore the key trends for the next stage of China's opening up. China's National 14th Five-Year Plan emphasises the importance of pursuing a higher level of opening up and promoting high-quality development. Despite the challenges presented by the Covid-19 pandemic, China's reform and opening up has continued to deepen. There are continued expansions of the Connect schemes, and foreign ownership limits on securities firms and mutual fund companies have been removed. These developments are encouraging and welcomed by the industry. Mainland authorities have reiterated that China will only open its door wider going forward, with Hong Kong continuing to play an indispensable role.

In closing, given the limited amount of time today, I could only briefly touch on two key themes in the broader opening up of China's capital markets. At the HKMA, we are continuously working with Mainland authorities and the industry towards new policy breakthroughs to better serve global investors and support the development of onshore markets. I warmly welcome your views and ideas on ways to further strengthen the connectivity between China's and Hong Kong's financial markets. Thank you, and I wish today's conference a great success. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
1/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Same inflation figures as in the early 1990s, but a different situation When I had just left the Stockholm School of Economics and started working at the Riksbank in 1990, inflation in Sweden was around 10 per cent. Now when I returned to the Bank at the start of this year, the inflation figures were at the same level. The background to, and reasons for, the high inflation now and then differ, of course. But the important thing is that the conditions for rectifying the situation are much better now. Looking at economic developments on average over the past thirty years or so, we have had low inflation combined with good economic growth, Real wages have increased steadily – with one exception last year – and we have also had, and still have, stable public finances. One important reason for this is the reforms of wage formation and the economic policy frameworks that Sweden implemented in the mid-1990s to address pricewage spirals, cost crises and an economic policy that was unable to stabilise developments. The inflation target and the transition to an independent central bank with a strong mandate to maintain that target were part of this. Since then, the inflation target and a monetary policy that independently steers towards this target have been a cornerstone of economic policy in Sweden. This is also reflected in the new Sveriges Riksbank Act, which applies from the start of this year.

News conference  15 December 2022, 10.00 am  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan Ladies and gentlemen It is my pleasure to welcome you to the news conference of the Swiss National Bank. I would also like to welcome all those who are joining us today online. After our introductory remarks, the members of the Governing Board will take questions from journalists as usual. Monetary policy decision  I will begin with our monetary policy decision. We have decided to tighten our monetary policy further and to raise the SNB policy rate by 0.5 percentage points to 1.0%. In doing so, we are countering increased inflationary pressure and a further spread of inflation. It cannot be ruled out that additional rises in the SNB policy rate will be necessary to ensure price stability over the medium term. To provide appropriate monetary conditions, we are also willing to be active in the foreign exchange market as necessary. The SNB policy rate change applies from tomorrow, 16 December 2022. Banks’ sight deposits held at the SNB will be remunerated at the SNB policy rate of 1.0% up to a certain threshold. Sight deposits above this threshold will be remunerated at an interest rate of 0.5%, and thus still at a discount of 0.5 percentage points relative to the SNB policy rate. With this tiered remuneration of sight deposits and open market operations, we are ensuring that the secured short-term Swiss franc money market rates are close to the SNB policy rate.
This is where we should bring our Ziel, our strategic objective, into our field of vision. And even more so since MREL requirements in the European Union are, on the whole, far more stringent than the TLAC international standards and their translation into other jurisdictions’ regulations. * ** Let me conclude by saying that, in 2022, after the first seven years of existence of the single resolution mechanism, it may be time to recall what Clausewitz rightly identified as the greatest difficulty: “to adhere steadfastly in execution to the principles which we have adopted.” That does not mean showing rigidity in technical implementation, on the contrary. It means taking a risk-based approach and conducting a balanced analysis of the best way forward in order to serve these principles in a relevant way. I will end my speech with another phrase of Roman wisdom: in medio stat virtus, virtue lies in the middle. I thank you for your attention.

In the aftermath of the crisis, the configuration of the world economy will be transformed as changes in the pattern of global demand take place, as demands for greater efficiency and lower costs occur, as actions are taken for a reduced role of government in the economy, as new regulatory regimes are being introduced, and as efforts are being undertaken to enhance our capacity to manage systemic financial crisis. Many of these changes will involve cross border arrangements and collaboration. We are all stakeholders with interest in what the post-recovery world will look like. Indeed, the issue of new economic models in the context of these developments is relevant not just to Asia but also for other parts of the world. We have seen how within the short period of less than a decade, the rapid escalation of debt-driven consumption in North America led to chronic financial and economic imbalances that has resulted in a significant economic dislocation on a global scale. Several lessons can be drawn from these developments. The Asian economic model for the future needs to be redefined if the economic progress is to be sustained, taking into account the global changes that are taking place. Asia's success which has been described as a “miracle” has been well documented. It has been acknowledged that “the miracle” is not the result of any one single factor but rather, a confluence of factors. Structural change and pro-growth policies were coalesced synergistically with hard work ethics.
To be more precise, the exchange rate can be used as a policy instrument when it is no longer possible to lower the interest rate because it is already zero. Unlike the policy rate, the exchange rate has no upper or lower limit, as Bennett McCallum pointed out early in the discussion of Japan's liquidity trap. 12 When the real economy and inflation can no longer be stimulated by cutting the policy rate, it is still possible to achieve the same stimulation by using the exchange rate as a policy instrument and depreciating the currency. This is the background to my proposal of a “Foolproof Way” for a small open economy to escape from a liquidity trap. 13 The Foolproof Way consists of the following three parts: 1. A price level target is introduced in the form of a path as I described earlier. In the event that unwelcome low inflation or deflation has already arisen, the price level target can be set correspondingly higher than the current price level. 2. An exchange rate target that is consistent with the price level target is announced and the exchange rate is pegged to this exchange rate target until the price level target is attained. If, for example, the price level is to be raised by 10 per cent, the exchange rate target is set so that the currency depreciates by 10 per cent. 3.

For these reasons alone,  BIS Review 21/2005  3  the use of petroleum revenues may in periods deviate from the 4 per cent rule. Spending was also increased in response to the economic downturn. We can therefore safely affirm that the fiscal rule has been normative for fiscal policy. At the time of the introduction of the fiscal rule in 2001 projections pointed to a continued increase in the use of petroleum revenues. We had to expect this growth in spending to lead to weaker competitiveness in Norwegian manufacturing, either through higher wages or an appreciation of the krone. With wage growth in Norway higher than abroad, the competitive position of Norway’s manufacturing industry has weakened by about 15 per cent since the mid-1990s. Competitiveness is about 4 per cent weaker than the average for the past 30 years. The krone has been influenced by high oil and gas prices and prices for other Norwegian export goods. Monetary policy has also influenced the path for Norway’s relative costs, but the nominal value of the krone is about the same as 10 years ago. Strong growth in public spending and expectations of moderately higher growth in the use of petroleum revenues now seem to have been factored into the cost level. Over the past 30 years manufacturing has been scaled back in waves. The last wave occurred around the turn of the millennium, but a substantial decline also occurred in the period 1977 to 1984 and from 1987 to 1992.
Immigration can be divided up into people who intend to stay and people who are in a country temporarily, for  19 See also Olli Segendorf and Theobald (2019) for a more in-depth discussion. 16 [24]  instance, to fill a shortage of labour. One problem with the official statistics is that they in many cases miss the temporary immigration. This can also make it more difficult to assess resource utilisation. If the supply of labour is greater than the measurement in the official statistics, there is more spare capacity than the statistics reveal, that is, resource utilisation is not as strained as the official statistics would imply. An improvement in the statistics in this respect would be desirable so that we have a better, more correct, basis to make our monetary policy decisions, for instance. Falling long-term real interest rates in Sweden and on the global financial markets I began by showing that the long-term real interest rate is important to the longterm level of the policy rate. In small open economies like Sweden, with free movement of capital, interest rates are strongly affected by interest rates abroad. This means that the long-term real interest rate in Sweden is largely determined by interest rates abroad. One difficulty in the monetary policy analysis is to calculate the long-term real interest rate, since this is not directly observable. There are many different methods for calculating it in the literature, but none that is generally accepted.

Sources: Adolfson, M., M. Andersson, J. Lindé, M. Villani and A. Vredin, (2007a), “Modern Forecasting Models in Action: Improving Macroeconomic Analyses at Central Bank”, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3, December, pp.111-144. 10  For a more detailed justification of the decision to publish our own interest rate forecast, see Irma Rosenberg’s speech “Riksbank to introduce own path for the repo rate”, held on 17 January 2007. BIS Review 77/2008  9  Adolfson, M., S. Laséen, J. Lindé and M. Villani, (2007b), ”RAMSES – a new general equilibrium model for monetary policy analysis”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, no. 2. Blinder, A.S. and C. Wyplosz, (2004), “Central Bank Talk: Committee Structure and Communication Policy”, Working Paper, prepared for the ASSA meeting, Philadelphia, January 7-9, 2005. Dincer, N.N. and B. Eichengreen, (2007), “Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why and with What Effects?” National Institute of Economic Research Working Paper 13003. Rosenberg, I., “Riksbank to introduce own path for the repo rate”, 17 January 2007. Pollard, P., (2004), “Monetary Policy-Making around the World”, Powerpoint presentation, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 10  BIS Review 77/2008