samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To contribute to the reflection, we are about to publish a discussion paper on the possible regulatory options for DeFi. In order to build the most appropriate framework, taking notably into account the question of proportionality, we need to feed our thinking with input from all stakeholders: financial services or crypto-assets industry professionals, IT specialists, academics, other regulators and supervisors- That is why this document will be open to a wide consultation and I look forward to listening to your reactions on it. 2. The second axis is to use DeFi innovation to serve the possible development of tokenised finance and to improve cross-border payments Our monitoring of DeFi is not just motivated by financial stability risk but also by our intuition that its innovative potential could serve the development of an ongoing trend: the tokenisation of finance. To do so, central banks and the traditional financial players need to understand how DeFi operates and master its innovative aspects in order to use them in a secure way to do something else than speculate on crypto-assets. This is what we are trying do with the project Mariana, our ongoing experiment with the MAS, the Swiss National Bank and the Eurosystem, Singapore and Switzerland BIS Innovation Hub Centres. Basically, we are building an automated market for the exchange of CBDCs based on a concept imported from DeFi. This project is really at the crossroads of a number of topics: enhancing cross-border payments, CBDCs interoperability, understanding of DeFi and the development of tokenised finance.

To go beyond this first step, we need to build a regulatory framework adapted to the specificities of DeFi. In my view, when designing this framework we should not try to replicate existing financial regulations at all costs. On the contrary, it could be advantageous to draw inspiration from regulations in other sectors. For example, one could imagine setting rules on "products" even when their "producer" or "issuer" is not clearly identified. In addition, we have to recognise the technical specificities of decentralised finance and pay a particular attention to the three layers (blockchains, applications and access gates) that schematically constitute DeFi. First, we should evaluate the resilience of the blockchain infrastructure supporting DeFi. That leads to an open question: can public blockchains provide the right level of security, and if so, how? Second, we need to address the security of the applications, on which DeFi "services" are provided. A logical avenue for regulation would be to define the perimeter of protocols that are deemed "secure", i.e. whose computer code has been certified. Of course, this leads to many subsequent operational issues that deserve careful analysis. 2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Third, we should regulate access to DeFi, in order to protect users, and in particular individual customers. Intermediaries – or "access points", whatever their form – who provide access to DeFi should comply with rules of good conduct, and be subject to a duty of care and advice as well as KYC requirements, when necessary.
Asset markets supported by an artificially low interest rate environment rather than economic fundamentals will skew resources allocation in society from expanding the productive sectors to pursuit of asset price appreciation. Such a shift will easily lead to investment mismatch, thereby eroding medium to long term productivity growth as well as growth potential of the economy. In addition, the more sizable and prolonged quantitative easing becomes, the more difficult and riskier will be the exit plan. Central banks should realise that there is not much they can do. In order to solve the structural imbalances built up in the past two decades, we must get to the bottom of the problem. Ladies and Gentlemen, up until 2008, the industrialised countries and various emerging economies had been enjoying a golden period of development which lasted for two to three decades. Income levels and living standards continued to rise. Some academics call this a period of “Great Moderation”. However, no one is sure why life during this period was so easy. Some say that this is due to technological and financial innovation of modern society, the so-called “paradigm shift”. We should now be awakened to the reality that this golden period was probably underpinned by little more than excessive debts, and is in fact unsustainable. If the major industrialised countries will have to undergo deleveraging in the foreseeable future, how will the global economy evolve?

But I judged that removing some of the monetary stimulus was warranted. I would like to tell you that this judgement was driven by “nice” reasons. That I was confident that the recovery would continue apace. That the very low level of Bank rate reached at the depth of the recession was no longer needed. That we were in a position in which monetary policy could begin a gradual process of normalisation. But I’m afraid these nice reasons were not the factors driving my decision. In particular, I’m not at all confident about the strength of the recovery. My central view – similar to that in the February Inflation Report – is that growth is likely to be close to its average historical rate over the next few years. But that is a pretty disappointing outlook given the depth of the  Mumtaz (2007)) while others have argued this was due to better monetary policy (Batini and Nelson (2005), Nelson and Nikolov (2004)). BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  recession from which we are recovering. And there is considerable scope for growth to surprise to the downside, particularly if households retrench further. Rather, my vote to raise rates was driven by a concern that – despite a relatively weak outlook for growth – the risks to the inflation target in the medium-term were to the upside.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Establishment of the Financial Services Professional Board in Malaysia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Official Launch of Financial Services Professional Board, Kuala Lumpur, 24 September 2014. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to welcome you to this occasion of the official launch of the Financial Services Professional Board. Among the key challenges emerging from the global financial crisis and the recent episodes of financial market manipulation is for the need to have a strong culture of professionalism, integrity and ethics permeating throughout the financial services industry to restore public trust in the financial system and to secure long-term sustainability of the industry. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted how business decisions that were predominantly driven by short-term incentives critically undermined the health of some of the largest global companies. This in turn had enormous consequences on entire economies. Not only has public confidence in the financial services industry been shaken, but the prevailing business models of financial institutions have been questioned with calls being made for changes that are more aligned with long-term sustainability. These changes relate to both the general structure and activities of financial institutions, and to the governance and culture within the institutions. While financial institutions have to create value for shareholders, of fundamental significance is also the need to serve the public interest given the importance of a well-functioning financial system in the economy.

If you want to maintain confidence, you simply do not have the luxury of time. But even if you cannot hinder a crisis, addressing it as early as possible and with determination can at least limit its effects. So my second principle of effective crisis management can be summed up as acting swiftly. While this principle is easy to support, crisis management in practice is often characterised by the opposite: taking too little action, too late. Essentially, there are two main reasons for supervisory and other authorities to neglect taking sufficient action in time – they lack either the willingness to act or the ability to act – sometimes both. There are many reasons for supervisory and other authorities to not want to act. Pressure from the industry and politicians is one of the first that springs to mind. Sometimes – consciously or unconsciously – supervisory and other authorities also want to let banks gamble on turning themselves around. And banks and their shareholders are often more than willing to play along – they face a one way bet as they approach the brink of failure. But in the end, the longer you wait, the harder you fall. For that reason, I don’t have a high opinion of regulatory forbearance or other excuses for supervisory inaction. Ability to act may also be constrained. First and foremost, the ability to act is, of course, dependent upon the tools available.
This pricing indicates, if anything, that the market prefers to hold government bonds rather than central bank reserves and hence that the Riksbank’s bond purchases are reducing the supply of the safest assets. Another indication of this is that the term premiums on government bonds have been very low, and probably negative, in recent years. 20 This suggests that government bonds with long maturities are not being priced with risk premiums in relation to Riksbank certificates or government securities with short maturities. 7 [16]  I have now discussed arguments that could indicate that the Riksbank should continue to maintain a large portfolio even in the future, and I don’t consider these arguments to be particularly strong. But does this mean that the size of the balance sheet has no significance or are there strong arguments indicating that the Riksbank’s balance sheet should be small? Arguments against substantial bond holdings in normal times Maintaining a large balance sheet can be associated with risks, but the nature of these risks depends both on the assets held by the central banks and how these are funded on the liability side. The risks may relate to the central bank’s financial position and ability to conduct monetary policy and simultaneously fund its own operations, as well as to its reputation and possibility to safeguard its independence in monetary policy issues. Plosser (2018) discusses risks to reputation and argues that the central bank must have a narrow mandate to be able to justify continued independence from the political sphere.

Currently, they could even absorb the kind of losses that a sharp rate rise would entail. The introduction of the countercyclical capital buffer – which requires banks to hold capital beyond minimum requirements if momentum on the Swiss mortgage and real estate markets is deemed excessive – has played a role here. A capital buffer of this kind has been in place – specifically with respect to mortgage-backed loans for financing residential real estate in Switzerland – since the end of September 2013. So overall, as things stand today, we may draw three conclusions. First, exceptionally low interest rates are putting pressure on interest rate margins and this is weighing on the profitability of Swiss banks. This is particularly true of the domestically focused banks, whose operations are heavily geared towards interest business. Second, the negative interest rate per se has not thus far caused an additional erosion of these banks’ profitability. This is due in part to the fact that, thanks to the exemption thresholds granted by the SNB, for most domestically focused banks negative interest has not yet resulted in any material direct costs. At the same time, these banks have responded to profitability pressure by raising asset margins. Third, they have further increased their risk appetite. The risk exposure of the Swiss banking system is nevertheless manageable at the moment, thanks to the capital surpluses currently available. 8  Cf. SNB (2016): Financial Stability Report 2016, www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/stabrep_2016/source/stabrep_2016.en.pdf.
There is still no indication of a general overvaluation based on the current price level, yet several indicators suggest that overheating is already becoming apparent in the owner-occupied apartment and apartment  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  building segments. There are also considerable regional differences, although there are signs that, already now, real estate prices in some regions are no longer justified by fundamentals. Should real estate prices continue to rise at the current pace and move away from the level justified by fundamentals, a significant price correction is more likely in the medium term. Such a price correction, together with a significant rise in mortgage loan defaults, would pose a threat to financial stability. Overall, however, there is some uncertainty about banks’ risk exposure. Given this uncertainty and signs of potentially adverse developments in the real estate and mortgage markets, there is a need for action in many respects. Therefore, the SNB and FINMA have already taken the first steps and intensified their monitoring of the mortgage market. For this purpose, at the beginning of 2011, the SNB launched a comprehensive quarterly survey of banks. In this survey, detailed information is collected on key risk indicators such as loan-to-value ratios and affordability criteria in the granting of mortgage loans. The survey results, which are expected from the autumn of this year, should contribute to a better analysis of the vulnerability of the Swiss banking sector and close existing gaps in data.

Another objection to central banks publishing their own interest rate forecasts is connected to the functioning of the market. This means that in principle the financial market agents could stop looking for other information if they have access to the central bank’s forecasts for interest rates in the slightly longer term. How the market views economic prospects is normally reflected in the long-term market rates. This source of information could thus be lost and this would impair the functioning of the market. But as I perceive it, there have not been any such signs so far. In addition, I find it very difficult to imagine that the market agents would stop making independent assessments because we are publishing our own view of interest rate developments. They if anyone know that the interest rate path is a forecast and they therefore have strong reasons for continuing to search for information via other channels than the Riksbank. So far it has been clear that we and other market agents have actually had slightly different views regarding how the interest rate will develop in the future. And this is actually a sign that things are as they should be. It is quite natural that forecasters make different judgements, particularly in the slightly longer term. In the long term, there are also more factors than expected monetary policy that have significance for interest rates.
Bwalya K E Ng’andu: Workshop on Zambian banknotes Opening remarks by Dr Bwalya K E Ng’andu, Deputy Governor (Operations) of the Bank of Zambia, at the G&D Workshop on Zambian banknotes, Lusaka, 22 November 2011. *  *  *    Mr. Werner Reisch and all resource persons from Giesecke and Devrient GmbH    Acting Director – Banking, Currency and Payment Systems    Ladies and Gentlemen  I wish to welcome you all to this workshop on Zambian banknotes and in particular allow me to welcome Mr. Werner Reisch and his team from Germany. As Bank of Zambia, we appreciate your efforts to organise this workshop and would like to assure you that by the end of the workshop all participants will have been enriched with new information on cash management. I am reliably informed that this workshop will be divided into two sessions, with this session targeting employees from Bank of Zambia and the next session that will take place tomorrow targeting commercial bank employees. Ladies and Gentlemen, As you may be aware G&D is a reputable printing company based in Germany which has been in existence since 1852. The Bank has a long standing business relationship with G&D going as far back as 1996 when the company first installed the ISS 300 money counting machines in our Currency office and subsequently the BDS 400 banknote destruction system in 2000.

The Bank’s relationship with G&D developed further as the company was awarded a contract to print the K10,000 denomination in the 2007–2009 currency supply contract. Currently, G&D are the printers of all banknotes under the 2010–2012 currency supply contracts. Further, G&D are the suppliers of the Bank’s current banknote processing equipment, the BPS 1000 machines integrated destruction system and the off-line BDS 400 destruction system. Distinguished participants, The Bank of Zambia, under the Bank of Zambia Act (1996), is empowered to “issue notes and coins to be legal tender in the Republic and regulate all matters relating to the currency of the Republic”. In line with this function, the Bank pursues a clean note policy which entails effective and efficient management of banknotes. We therefore, welcome this initiative by G&D to conduct this Workshop, which is aimed at empowering the cash handlers from both the Bank of Zambia and the Commercial Banks with knowledge needed for effective and efficient cash management. I have noted that the programme covers topical issues such as Banknote processing, Banknote security features, counterfeit notes, just to mention but a few, which are all relevant to both the Central Bank and Commercial Banks being the main cash handlers. Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me briefly touch on one of the issues that will be addressed at this workshop, that of counterfeit notes. The Bank of Zambia faces challenges in this area, especially with regard to the highest value denomination, the K50,000. However, the volumes are not alarming as evidenced by the prevailing statistics.
Prices for imported consumer goods showed a considerable smaller decline than in the three preceding years. Our inflation projections were revised downwards in the light of actual developments through 2006. Underlying inflation has recently picked up somewhat and is more closely in line with that expected one year ago. At the same time as inflation has been low, growth in the mainland economy has been strong, and stronger than expected. The Norwegian economy is booming, after a strong upturn since summer 2003. The upturn followed a period of slow growth from 1998 and a mild recession in 2002 and into 2003. Growth has been stronger and occurred earlier than in the cyclical upturn in the mid-1990s. When Norges Bank reduced the key policy rate in 2003, demand and output rapidly recovered. Strong productivity growth supported the upturn, which was reflected in exports, petroleum investment and  BIS Review 47/2007  3  after a period in general government demand. So far in this cyclical upturn, the mainland economy has grown by an average of a little more than 4 per cent annually. The upturn is now in a mature phase. Even though production increased rapidly, it took a long time for employment to pick up. Employment growth was lower for a long period compared with the upturns in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, high growth in labour productivity partly reflected a marked fall in sickness absence in 2004.

Encik Abu Hassan Alshari Yahaya: Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism Welcoming remarks by Mr Encik Abu Hassan Alshari Yahaya, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the ASEAN Regional Bank Supervision Workshop on “Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism”, Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 2015. *  *  *  Welcome to Malaysia. I hope you have had a pleasant journey travelling to KL and managed to have a good rest. I also hope that the facilities being offered here at our Lanai Kijang are adequate to meet your expectations. It is a great honour for Bank Negara Malaysia to host and co-organise the ASEAN Regional Bank Supervision Workshop on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the World Bank for formulating the programme and organising this workshop and our utmost gratitude to the Government of Canada for the generous financial support that has made the hosting and organizing of this course possible. As a country that has just gone through its on-site mutual evaluation process, we have seen that the role of supervision is very important in the development of a country’s AML/CFT regime. There is critical need for the integration between AML/CFT, prudential and business conduct supervision as well as between those supervisors and the law enforcement authorities. These inter-linkages prove to us that collective effort is key in combating ML/TF effectively.
2.3  Strengthening of regulatory and supervisory framework  The design of strong and appropriate rules and their rigorous monitoring constitutes a guarantee for the preservation of financial stability. The Bank of Albania has been active in improving the regulatory framework, consolidating it further in compliance with the legal provisions and the Basel Committee principles, the European Council directives and the best practices in the area of regulation and supervision of financial institutions licensed by the Bank of Albania. The main objective was the harmonization of the best practices in:   strengthening internal control;    improving banking institutions’ governance;    strengthening the risk management capacities; and    increasing the level of banks’ transparency to the public. With respect to the latter, the Bank of Albania has required higher and improved communication of the banking system with the public about the products and services being provided, the promotional campaigns for new products and the provision of information on their real financial situation and risk profile. BIS Review 78/2010  7  3. Other Bank of Albania activities  After the analysis of the two key functions of the Bank of Albania, I would like to elaborate on some other aspects of the central bank’s work. 3.1  Payments’ system  The payments’ system reflected security and efficiency in 2009. On average, 225 transactions a day were processed and settled in the AIPS system, with an average daily value of ALL 19 billion.

Total assets have amounted to ALL 353,6 billion, whilst liabilities have amounted to ALL 321 billion. Realized profit totalled about ALL 10 (9,993) billion, the highest in the last three years. This result has increased the Bank of Albania’s capital. Pursuant to the obligations of Law No. 8269, dated 23 December 1997, Article 9, 25 percent, about ALL 2,5 (2,479) billion, of the net profit was capitalized, causing the general reserve to amount to ALL 10 (9.994) billion. Similarly, the Bank of Albania has observed the obligation of transferring the net profit to the State Budget pursuant to Article 10 of the same Law, and paid to the State Budget about ALL 6,74 billion for the year 2009. Pursuant to Article 10, in March 2010 the balance of 2009 net profit amounting to ALL 2,4 (2,436) billion was paid to the State Budget. BIS Review 78/2010  9  Honourable Ms. Chairwoman, Dear deputies, Thanking you for your attention, on behalf of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, I want to guarantee the Parliament of the Republic of Albania that the central bank will remain a responsible decision-making institution in 2010. Our decision-making will:   remain transparent both for the financial market and the public at large;    consider all possible information in and out of Albania;    rely on qualified human resources, and    improve its policy and operational framework, considering the best contemporary and international practices.