samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Later in the year annual HICP inflation rates are expected to increase slightly while displaying some volatility. Looking further ahead, in 2011 inflation rates should remain moderate overall, benefiting from low domestic price pressures. Inflation expectations over the medium to longer term continue to be firmly anchored in line with the Governing Council’s aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. This assessment is also reflected in the September 2010 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual HICP inflation in a range between 1.5% and 1.7% for 2010 and between 1.2% and 2.2% for 2011. Compared with the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of June 2010, the ranges have been revised slightly upwards, largely on account of higher commodity prices. Risks to the outlook for price developments are slightly tilted to the upside. They relate, in particular, to the evolution of energy and non-oil commodity prices. Furthermore, increases in indirect taxation and administered prices may be greater than currently expected, owing to the need for fiscal consolidation in the coming years. At the same time, risks to domestic price and cost developments are contained. Turning to the monetary analysis, the annual growth rate of M3 stood at 0.2% in July 2010, unchanged from June. The annual growth rate of loans to the private sector, which has been gradually increasing, rose further to 0.9%, but still remains relatively weak.

Some roles have undoubtedly been made harder: for example those involving the control of operational risk. But it has also forced us to exploit the benefits of technology in ways that many of us would never have dared do voluntarily. It has embedded flexible working in a far deeper way than before. It has brought a new understanding and respect for the challenges many staff have to deal with. It has given us back the many hours spent in mindless or stressful commuting. And, perhaps most profoundly of all, it has been a great leveller. Meetings conducted by video- or audio-conference have been more orderly – even if they are also more likely to be interrupted by over-exuberant children or misfiring wifi! Ideas and contributions matter more than who is making them, or how they are made. And we’ve become more inclusive, allowing us to share material in real time, bringing each other in and virtually raising our hands to talk. I am not sure that many people would have predicted that a global pandemic might end up being the thing that finally really moves the dial on diversity and inclusion. What I can say with some confidence is that it has been a privilege to lead the Bank’s markets function during this extraordinary period, and I look forward to discussing some of the themes I have outlined here with you further now. 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  15
Institutional change supported the role of the dollar, with the creation of the Federal Reserve System providing, for the first time, a market-maker and liquidity manager in US dollar acceptances. This was particularly helpful for promoting the use of the dollar in trade credit, reinforcing its use as a means of payment and invoicing currency. Yet the US was, at least at first, an unwilling hegemon. Under the gold standard, the Fed’s absorption of gold inflows exported significant deflationary pressures to the rest of the world.38 Europe was dependent on the recycling of capital flows by the US, which lent much of its surplus back to Europe to enable payments of war reparations and debt. Europe suffered severely when this stopped in 1928. Moreover, the increase in price levels that occurred as a result of the First World War left the global economy with too little gold in total to sustain money supply at the level consistent with full employment. Supplementing gold reserves with foreign exchange to boost money supply led to competition between the UK and the US to provide that service to other countries. The resulting world with two competing providers of reserve currencies served to destabilise the international monetary system, and, some would argue, the lack of coordination between monetary policy makers during this time contributed to the global scarcity in liquidity and worsened the severity of the Great Depression.39 The experience of the interwar period is a cautionary tale.

By collecting data on a broad range of expectations, it is possible to analyze how they interact with each other and jointly influence households’ decisions. We also study how expectations vary with demographics and other household characteristics. The broad scope of the SCE allows us to study many questions relevant to economic policy— such as understanding housing market decisions, disentangling credit demand from supply, analyzing job search behavior and measuring wage growth as people transition between jobs. In addition, the survey has been used to help answer other policy-relevant questions as they have come up in our discussions. Two examples are households’ spending response to the decrease in gas prices in early 2014, and households’ early experiences and perceptions of the Affordable Care Act following its enactment. Some of this analysis relies on the ability of our survey to shed light on whether consumers expect a specific change in economic conditions to be temporary or permanent. A second important feature of the survey is that—in addition to simple point forecasts—for some variables, such as inflation, we get respondents’ entire forecast distributions by asking them to assign probabilities to various ranges of future outcomes. These so-called density forecasts in turn allow us to measure households’ uncertainty about future events by looking at the spread in their subjective distributions. Density forecasts also allow us to monitor the perceived likelihood that respondents assign to specific events, such as deflation or a large increase in earnings. A third important characteristic of the SCE is that it is a rotating panel.
The CLMV countries have reduced tariffs on 98.86% of their tariff lines to the 0–5% tariff range in 2010, and are expected to eliminate tariffs on these goods by 2015, with flexibility for a few tariff lines until 2018. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  •  On services, ASEAN Member States have recently completed the eighth package of commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services. What this means is that we can expect the reduction of services barriers, such as foreign equity limits in the ASEAN countries. •  On investment, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement entered into force in March last year. This agreement has established stronger, pro-business rules, with enhanced investment protection for both ASEAN-owned investments and also foreign-owned investments based in ASEAN2. Singapore’s multilateral agreements However, to enable businesses to access major markets more easily, Singapore has also broadened our engagement with Asia Pacific beyond ASEAN. By doing so, we aim to reduce trading costs. To this end, Singapore actively participates in negotiations of several multilateral trade agreements. One example of such a multilateral trade agreement is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, which is a partnership between ASEAN and six other countries, namely Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, India and South Korea. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Renminbi (RMB) Internationalisation This agreement builds upon the existing ASEAN+1 free trade agreements (FTAs) FTAs by bringing together ASEAN’s existing FTAs with its key partners into a single comprehensive agreement.

RCEP will be one of the biggest FTAs in the world, covering 3 billion people and accounting for one-third of the world’s GDP. RCEP is a significant agreement for ASEAN. It is an ambitious attempt to deepen regional economic integration and to link ASEAN’s various trading partners, many of whom do not have existing trade agreements with one another. One key partner for ASEAN in RCEP is China. China will continue to play an increasingly important role in trade with ASEAN, and this will grow even further with its participation in RCEP. In 2012, ASEAN-China trade volumes reached a record high of $ billion, and by 2015, ASEAN is expected to be China’s top trading partner. As a result, in the next few years, we can expect a greater acceptance and use of the Renminbi (RMB) as a trade settlement currency, especially in ASEAN. What does this mean for us? China has already signed bilateral currency swap arrangements with key ASEAN countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Corporates, investors and financial institutions need to be prepared if they are to capitalise on the opportunities brought on by the increasing internationalisation of the RMB. In February this year, Singapore became the first country outside Greater China to have a Renminbi clearing bank when the Singapore branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was designated as such. This was followed by MAS and the People’s Bank of China signing an enhanced bilateral currency swap agreement in April.
Yet this ability to react, in particular, is of great importance for our economy, which is heavily dependent on economic exchange with other countries. The current paper money system based on an independent central bank committed to long-term stability provides an alternative, which – overall – achieves far better results than a gold regime could. Here, if you will allow me, I would like to return to the present day with a brief digression on the gold initiative I mentioned before. Although the advocates of the initiative do not wish to return to a gold standard, they do want to increase the role of gold within the currency reserves. They therefore demand that the SNB hold at least 20% of its assets in gold, that it sell no more gold and that it store all its gold in Switzerland. The initiative is both unnecessary and dangerous. It is unnecessary because, under the current monetary order, there is no link between price stability and the share of gold in the SNB balance sheet. Thus, the objective of price stability has been better achieved over the past few years than at times when the gold share was significantly higher. Moreover, compared to other countries, the SNB still holds high stocks of gold. It definitely values gold, as a part of its currency reserves, and has no plans to either purchase or sell gold. Finally, we are enormously vigilant in ensuring that our gold is stored safely in every respect, both in Switzerland and abroad.

Or, expressed in a different way, without the countryside uprising in the name of liberal ideas, 184 years ago, we might not have the SNB today. In my presentation, I will, for once, devote less attention to current monetary policy. Instead, I will examine the Swiss monetary system from a more long-term perspective. My aim is to show you the significance of sound money, and why it is a major pillar of our society. In this context, I will also take a critical look at four proposals to reform the monetary system. My reason for doing this is that interventions of this kind in an existing monetary order can have grave consequences for our country and the entire population. Talking of reform proposals: In the “Uster Memorial” document there is a demand which particularly appeals to me as a central banker, that, in the case of property charges such as tithes, it should be possible to transform them easily into mortgage claims whose interest level is appropriate. Appropriate interest rates or “appropriate monetary conditions”, as it is expressed in central bankers’ jargon – that is what modern monetary policy is all about. So you see that the demands made in Uster remain just as valid today.
Murat Çetinkaya: Recent economic and financial developments in Turkey Speech by Mr Murat Çetinkaya, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the press conference for the presentation of the Oktober 2016 Inflation Report, Istanbul, 27 October 2016. * * * Distinguished Guests, Welcome to the briefing held to convey the key messages of the October 2016 Inflation Report. The report typically summarizes the economic outlook underlying monetary policy decisions, shares our evaluations on macroeconomic developments and presents our medium-term inflation forecasts, which were revised in view of the developments in the last quarter, along with our monetary policy stance. Furthermore, I would like to talk about some of our evaluations on the recent steps taken by our Bank. In addition to the main text, the Report includes eight boxes, which entail analyses on current and interesting topics. These boxes evaluate the dynamics of inflation over the last decade; discuss how developments in the tourism industry affected food inflation and key macroeconomic aggregates; and look into Turkey’s export gains in the EU market on the competitiveness front. In addition, the Report also includes boxes that analyze the effect of agricultural banking on agricultural productivity; give a brief account of motivations for FX collateral deposits and then elaborate on their effects on currency swap markets; scrutinize recent loan developments through various indicators for loan supply and demand; and summarize the general framework and key features of the recent incentive systems introduced in Turkey. The titles of the boxes are shown on the slide.

If two people have telephones they can at least call each other, which has a value. For every new telephone owner that is linked to the telephone network the benefit of having a telephone to those who are already connected increases as the number of people that can be reached has now increased. This reasoning about telephony can easily be applied to payment services where everyone wants to be able to send payments to and receive payment from everyone else, for example a service for payments between private individuals (P2P). The reasoning becomes more complicated when we talk about payments from consumers to companies (P2B). Payment service markets with two distinct sets of customers for payment services and payment flows in only one direction are usually called two-sided markets. The market for point-of-sale payments (POS) is one such two-sided market. The payments on this market go from the private customer to the company and not the other way. The card market is only attractive to merchants if there are a sufficiently large number of consumers with cards. Similarly, it is only attractive for consumers to have cards if it is possible to use  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  them in a sufficiently large number of shops. A new payment service on a two-sided market must solve this “chicken and egg” problem, that is ensure that sufficient numbers of consumers and merchants start using the service. Launching a product that is not fundamentally based on existing payment services thus entails major problems.
The forecasts indicated that household consumption would rise and investment would continue to increase, but at a slightly slower rate than last year. We also envisaged continuing strong exports as a result of the good international activity. With regard to the labour market, we could observe an apparent upturn in demand for labour and that there were many indications that employment in terms of both persons in employment and of hours worked would increase further. Economic resources were expected to become increasingly strained and the rate of wage increase to become gradually higher. However, we assumed nonetheless that the increase in cost pressures would be relatively moderate as a result of continuing good productivity growth over the coming years. All in all, inflation was expected to rise, although at a modest rate, as a result of dampening effects from the developments in productivity and import prices. Our forecast was that underlying inflation would rise gradually and approach the 2 per cent target a couple of years ahead. This was the picture of developments painted in the February Inflation Report. What has happened since February? The world economy appears to have developed slightly more strongly than we foresaw then. New and revised national accounts figures have been published for the United States, parts of Asia and the euro zone. With regard to the United States, the statistics show that the end of 2005 and the beginning of 2006 were slightly stronger than we had assessed. For Asia the picture of a stronger development is even more evident.

A simple example can be when companies’ costs suddenly increase, for various reasons. Companies then often increase their prices to compensate for the rise in costs, but they usually also reduce the resources they use in production. The result may then be that inflation exceeds the target, while economic growth slows down. If, in such a situation, monetary policy aims to quickly bring down inflation, capacity utilisation in the economy may fall further. These problems can be alleviated if monetary policy aims to bring inflation back on target more gradually in such situations. In practice, of course, we must often deal with much more complicated situations than this type of textbook scenario. Take, for instance, the present situation. The high productivity growth we have experienced in recent years has led to a disruption – a positive one – in the supply side of the economy, while inflation has remained low. However, we have not yet experienced a clear conflict between the aims to attain the inflation target and to stabilise the real economy. The improved productivity has so far enabled a high growth rate without excessive strain on capacity utilisation in the economy. We have therefore seen scope to stimulate the economy by means of expansionary monetary policy. At the same time, the low interest rate has contributed to a rapid increase in house prices and to an expansion in credit.
The return on the GPFG in 2019 was the second highest percentage return since 1998 and the highest measured in NOK. But global equity markets fell abruptly in the first quarter of the year. The value of the GPFG's equity investments sank by over 20 percent, measured in international currency. Central banks and authorities all over the world have responded forcefully to dampen the crisis. Equity markets picked up. The GPFG posted a positive overall return in the first three quarters of 2020. Equity market volatility is not new. The GPFG has a long-term investment horizon. History has shown that we are able to ride out temporary falls in value. Measured over the whole period from 1998 to the third quarter of 2020, the annual net real return was 4 percent. As long-term interest rates are low, we cannot expect the return to be as high in the years ahead. The return on the GPFG is measured against the return on a benchmark index of global equities and bonds set by the Ministry of Finance. In 2019, the return on the GPFG was 0.23 percentage point higher than the return on the benchmark index. We arrive at the same figure when we measure the annual excess return over the whole period from 1998 through the third quarter of 2020. One of the areas that has generated a substantial excess return over time is our external equity management.

Constantinos Herodotou: Speech - visit Ms Lagarde Speech by Mr Constantinos Herodotou, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, during Ms Lagarde visit to Cyprus, Nicosia, 30 March 2022. *** It is such an honour for me to welcome to Cyprus a prominent European citizen. A reputable lawyer, a successful policy maker both during her term as a finance minister, as well as while being head of the IMF and the ECB. A great leader who during a turbulent time of serious and consecutive crises is steering us towards a better European Union, a more prosperous Eurozone and a more stable Eurosystem. We welcome today the President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde. I would like to express to you, dear President my sincere gratitude for accepting my invitation to visit Cyprus. You visit our island as the head of the European Central Bank, is something that bears a twofold significance. Firstly, it emphasizes that in the effort to overcome the common challenges we face, all European countries stand together and united. We are working in a coordinated manner, in close collaboration and aware of the difficulties we encounter, both large and small countries, as one European family. Secondly, it is a recognition of the active role of Cyprus - and allow me to say the Central Bank of Cyprus in particular – in contributing to the shaping of the common European monetary strategy. And this is an acknowledgment that fills us with great satisfaction.
In the US, the female/male earnings ratio has increased steadily since the 1980s (Blau and Kahn (2017)). This is typically attributed to improvements in women’s levels of education and experience (Stanley and Jarrell (1998), Jarrell and Stanley (2004), Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005)). Alkadry and Tower (2006) find human capital explains over 90% of the gender pay gap. Some studies have also found occupational representation and segregation has been a factor explaining gender pay gaps (Lewis and Soo Oh (2009)). Goldin (2014) provides one of the most comprehensive studies of the gender pay gap in the US across different age groups. She finds that, while the gap has narrowed for most age groups, the aggregate gap has remained fairly stable. By looking across the life-cycle, she finds that as workers get older the size of the gender pay gap tends to rise. It also differs significantly by occupation, with business occupations having the largest gender pay gaps and technology and science-related occupations the lowest. Like others, Goldin finds that the narrowing of the gap across age groups is largely due to a rise in the human capital of women relative to men, due to factors such as improved levels of education, experience, and labour force participation. The remaining pay difference can partly be explained by higher-paying occupations in the corporate, financial and legal worlds, especially at later career stages. This is disadvantageous for women who are more likely to work part-time or work fewer hours due to raising children.

Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. A negative pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men. Chart 22: Conditional gender wage gap under specification (5) Difference in lnpay  0.05 0 ‐0.05  Gender pay gap  ‐0.1 ‐0.15 ‐0.2 ‐0.25 ‐0.3  1994‐1998  1999‐2003  2004‐2008  2009‐2013  2014‐2019  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A negative gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men. 11 The regressions assume the effect of the controls on pay is homogenous between different groups. If we run a Chow test on this restriction, it fails in our sample. This would be a useful area for future research. 12 Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification. 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  We can replicate this regression for ethnicity with the same set of controls, except that the occupation, age groups, and children under 2 variables now interact with the ethnic minority variable. Where  (6) ln  ∝  h  =  ∗ 1 0  h  ∗  person does not belong to white ethnic group person belongs to white ethnic group  With this specification, the conditional gap for ethnic minorities averages around -11% and is again significant at the 1% level.