samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The growth of money supply mainly attributes to the growth of its ALL component, while foreign currency loans and deposits contracted in 2009. The creation of money in ALL has been based on the fiscal sector’s domestic borrowing and the preservation of the private sector’s ALL credit rates. In addition to the higher banks’ sensitivity to their liquidity indicators, private sector credit activity was carried out under the conditions of a more conservative behaviour of banks’ lending in 2009. This conservative behaviour owes also to an increased caution of banks to certain banking products, such as:   foreign currency loans to certain segments of the economy exposed to exchange rate fluctuations, and    consumer loans. In the second half of the year, demand for loans declined as a result of the tight lending standards and the slowdown of economic activity. Despite the easy monetary policy of the Bank of Albania, private sector credit maintained a uniform slowdown trend during 2009. As at year-end 2009, credit annual growth rate marked 12 percent versus 33 percent in 2008. The growth of credit has been triggered by the business demand to finance the liquidity needs, while the households’ loan portfolio contracted over the same year. 1.4  Balance of payments and the exchange rate  In the presence of slow domestic demand and reflecting the difficult situation of the global economy, current account deficit narrowed by about 3 percent in 2009, standing at 15.3 percent of GDP.

Although the loan portfolio growth is below the previous years’ levels, it is satisfactory and at higher levels than in the region. Based on the periodical stress-tests, the Bank of Albania has identified all banks’ needs for capital, thereby enabling a rapid increase of the capital when necessary. Banks’ responses were instantaneous bringing in new capital. Total regulatory capital of the banking system increased 37.7 percent, being dominated by the core capital providing evidence for a qualitatively good and sustainable regulatory capital. The banking system’s capitalization level was significantly above the regulatory minimum required by our regulations and international practices. Efficiency indicator shows almost the same level as at year-end 2008, attesting to a prudential and stable growth of banking activity in general. On the other hand, shareholder’s equity is estimated to have increased 18.7 percent in 2009 versus 2008. Financial leverage reduced gradually during 2009. The decline of the financial leverage from 11.7 to 10.4 percent over a year implies that the system has relied less on debt to finance assets. Compared with the European Union countries, the Albanian banking system’s financial  6  BIS Review 78/2010  leverage remains low attesting to a low degree of the system’s borrowing practice. This indicator provides further evidence for the sound situation of the banking system. The network expansion of banking branches and agencies in the territory of Albania persisted in 2009 however at lower rates compared to the previous years.
In the euro area, they are equivalent to 1.7% of GDP and are expected, according to the IMF, to contribute to raising growth by 0.9 point in 2009 and 0.3 point in 2010. Fourthly, governments’ very strong commitment to guaranteeing the solvency of banks should prevent risks of a credit crunch. In France, the two structures set up, the Société de financement de l’économie française (SFEF) and the Société de prises de participation de  BIS Review 75/2009  1  l’Etat (SPPE), give the government considerable room for manoeuvre to recapitalise the banking sector and ensure its financing, and thereby that of the economy. Last, but not least, the 325-basis-point decline in the ECB’s refinancing rate since July 2008 is unprecedented, both in terms of size and speed. In an environment characterised by fixed rates, the effects of this decrease shall spread progressively, but rates on new loans are already falling, in line with the cuts in policy rates. In addition, the ECB has embarked on a quantitative easing policy aimed at banks, which, by contrast with the United States, provide 80% of the financing of the economy. Since October 2008, the ECB has been providing unlimited liquidity and has eased collateral rules for its refinancing operation. At its May meeting, the Governing council has decided to extend the maturity of its provision of liquidity up to one year and to purchase euro-denominated covered bonds issued in the euro area.

), and to move over to a type of regulation based on the roles performed by different players in the stability of the system (liquidity provision, deposit-taking, market making, etc). Lastly, the G20 has set out a road map to improve accounting standards. Agreement on this point is not as broad as on the previous ones. The members of the G20 have sometimes divergent views about the role of accounting rules. In particular, one of the controversial  2  BIS Review 75/2009  points relates to mark-to-market and the scope of application of fair value accounting. Nonetheless, I observe that the G20, by asking that the accounting standard setters take greater account of financial stability constraints, implicitly acknowledges that the impact of accounting choices on the latter are not neutral. In any event, the countries agreed on three objectives: reducing the complexity of accounting standards, increasing the harmonisation of standards internationally and introducing a more forward-looking system of provisioning. The discussions at the G20 summit find a strong echo in Europe. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the Europeans are a driving force in the international projects I have just described. In regional terms, the report by the high level group chaired by Jacques de Larosière is a cornerstone for the new financial regulation and supervision that will emerge in Europe after the crisis. These recommendations appear highly relevant to me. They reconcile efficiency and pragmatism.
We have therefore appointed a special commission of inquiry into the Swedish housing market – a broader and more coherent approach which will supplement the analysis of individual issues that we and others conduct. The inquiry will be based on two perspectives – financial stability and monetary policy. …not just the Riksbank’s field Having said this, I would like to point out, or rather repeat something I have mentioned on previous occasions. Monetary policy can probably only function as a complement to effective regulation and supervision. Moreover, households have a responsibility to make realistic assessments of what interest expenditure they can manage in the long run. The current interest rate reflect the management of an acute crisis and not monetary policy under normal circumstances. And as shown in our interest rate forecast we will probably begin raising the repo rate within six months. The banks must also make responsible assessments when lending money. Here Finansinspektionen, the Swedish financial supervisory authority, plays an important role due to its task of examining banks and credit institutions from a consumer perspective. Finansinspektionen also has the possibility to implement more targeted measures than the Riksbank has. The repo rate is a blunt instrument that affects the whole economy. In February Finansinspektionen warned that even moderate falls in house prices could mean that a number of households have mortgages that exceed the market value of their property. Finansinspektionen believes there is reason to consider new regulations regarding household loans in relation to collateral to create better margins.

We will probably have to live with some of the repercussions of the crisis for some time to come, but we expect the financial markets to normalise. But it is necessary to achieve a balanced economic growth even beyond the monetary policy forecasting horizon. If we are to do so we must attend to any deficiencies regarding, for instance, regulation, supervision and the allocation of responsibility, deficiencies which have come to light rather clearly in recent years. It is important to establish a system that covers all aspects; a system that prevents unnecessary risks and imbalances from building up. Experiences of the financial crisis in the 1990s have in many ways contributed to changes that have given our economy better resilience during periods such as the past few years. Merely the fact that we entered this crisis with sound public finances, a surplus on our current account and a lower, more stable inflation rate has given us room to manoeuvre that we previously lacked and which many other countries lack now. Some changes have also been made with regard to financial supervision and analysis of the bank sector. The banks themselves have also learnt from the previous crisis and have acted, at least in Sweden, in a much more responsible manner with regard to credit granting, for instance. But to some extent I think our memories were too short in the 1990s, when the acute crisis was behind us and crisis management was no longer such a pressing issue.
Ensuring AMRO’s success is a shared responsibility. Let us work together to make AMRO a strong and credible institution, reputed around the world for its expertise in the economic affairs of our region. 27. 4  Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches

2  BIS Review 134/2009  I would like to thank everyone, particularly Bahçesehir University and Koç University, who have contributed to the organization of this conference. I hope that it will be a productive conference and I would also like to extend my regards to the contributors of this event, to the participants and all the guests. BIS Review 134/2009  3
The capacity of the Bank to react to a global worsening has been already proven during the episode of 2008–2009. The Board, as has been said time and again, has the flexibility and disposition to use these tools as needed. In this scenario, our latest Monetary Policy Report assumed that a somewhat more expansionary monetary policy would be necessary in order to accommodate and reduce the negative effects of the forecast external developments. The 25 basis point reduction in the monetary policy rate we applied in our last monetary policy meeting goes in this direction. At present our policy rate is at normal levels, and projected inflation and expectations two years ahead are aligned with the target for this variable. This situation grants us the flexibility we  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  need to conduct monetary policy in the eventuality of a sharper deterioration of the external scenario with significant consequences to the Chilean economy. The financial markets have exhibited an increase in external credit premiums paid by Chilean banks and firms abroad, offset to some extent by base rates in record lows. In the local money market we have seen some frictions. As a response, the Bank has applied more active management of liquidity in domestic currency, in order to make sure that the money market operates in consistency with the orientation of our monetary policy.

Caleb M Fundanga: Barclays Bank home loan product Vote of thanks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the Barclays Bank home loan product, Lusaka, 25 January 2006. *  *  *  •  The Minister of Finance and National Planning, Hon. Ng’andu Peter Magande M.P. •  The Board Chairman of Barclays Bank Zambia PLC, Mr Hakainde Hichilema and Board Members present here today  •  The Acting Managing Director Barclays Bank Zambia PLC Mr Daniel Nel,  •  Barclays Bank Zambia PLC staff,  •  Distinguished Invited Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen  I feel greatly honoured to be invited to give a vote of thanks to the Honourable minister’s speech at the launch of the Barclays Bank Home loan product. On behalf of Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, I would like to congratulate Barclays Bank Plc Zambia for leading the way in establishing long-term finance for the real estate sector. Distinguished invited guests, its just a few months ago that I was invited to talk to an audience on the theme, “Investment opportunities in the Zambia real estate business: The role of Bank of Zambia” at a workshop on Investment Opportunities in Zambia – Integrating African Property Markets. I remember telling the audience then that although the share of the real estate sector in GDP has been increasing over the years, it could perform even better if certain issues were addressed.
Sustained buying of government paper by the central bank would only postpone problems and delay the necessary fiscal adjustments, ultimately resulting in a build-up of inflationary pressures. The ECB has never hesitated to reaffirm and remind all Member States, in very concrete terms, that compliance with the principles of budgetary discipline is absolutely fundamental. Naturally, since member states do not control their currency alone, they are vulnerable to liquidity episodes and multiple equilibria. Creditors’ assessments can change, e.g. via contagion effects, even when the fundamentals would not justify it. The high degree of financial integration within EMU means that, if left unchecked, contagion in the banking sector can spread rapidly via cross-border holdings of sovereign debt. For the sovereigns themselves, sudden shifts in market re-pricing of risk can lead to unexpected liquidity challenges. These dynamics underscore the importance of strengthening the mechanisms that prevent such risks – the SGP, surveillance of broader macroeconomic imbalances and stronger financial supervision. However, the liquidity dry-ups and the contagion risks also call for stronger backstop mechanisms, to provide significant, albeit temporary, liquidity assistance. The SMP aims to create a better functioning transmission mechanism of monetary policy to all parts of the monetary union and is therefore in full compliance with the prohibition of monetary financing. Also, we sterilise the impact of the SMP on our total liquidity provision.

These highlevel governance reform changes will also filter down to the corporate level, especially at the level of financial institutions, affecting also borrowers and lenders across the economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Toulouse School of Economics – Toulouse, 8 December 2022 The magnitude and distribution of the energy and trade shocks in the euro area and in France Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 of 14  I am delighted to be with you today and I would like to warmly thank TSE, Jean Tirole and other professors for giving me the opportunity to make this speech. My topic will be a very important issue at the current juncture, namely the external shock related to energy prices and the deterioration of the terms of trade, which are currently hitting European economies. Today, in commodity-importing countries, the prices of imported products, especially energy products, are rising much more than the prices of exports. This is a net cost for commodity-importing countries, including France. In economic terms, the terms of trade, i.e. the ratio of export prices to import prices, are falling for those countries, thus reducing their purchasing power. In this speech I will start by describing the various ways we can assess the energy and trade shocks we are facing, and remind us of some measurement challenges they raise. The comparisons across countries and across time will also be instructive. The second key issue I will discuss is how this shock has so far affected the economic agents in France, and how the burden of this shock should be shared across categories of agents. I.

It is likely that more information will have come in by then and we will have to update our forecasts. Monetary policy Monetary policy is expansionary Since the financial crisis worsened last autumn, monetary policy has been aimed at moderating the depth of the economic recession following in the wake of the crisis. The repo rate was cut from 4.75 per cent in September 2008 to an all-time low of 0.25 per cent in July 2009. The Riksbank has also supplied the banks with liquidity to counteract the negative effects of the financial crisis. In this section I shall discuss in slightly greater detail our reasoning at the most recent monetary policy meeting, and the risks I see of developments being better or worse than we forecast. In July we cut the repo rate from 0.50 to 0.25 per cent. The economic recession appeared likely to be deeper than the Riksbank had earlier forecast and we were expecting GDP growth to be slow over the coming years. Resource utilisation would therefore remain low throughout the entire forecast period. At the same time, the forecasts for underlying inflation were close to the inflation target of 2 per cent. We therefore considered that the repo rate probably needed to remain at this low level until autumn 2010 (see Figure 22). We also decided to grant loans to the banks of SEK 100 billion, with a twelve-month maturity and at a fixed interest rate.
In practice, the concrete design and use of monetary policy instruments will depend crucially on the degree of volatility of the short-term rate chosen as the operational target that the ESCB will be willing to accept. This volatility will in turn depend on several factors: •  the width of the corridor defined by the two standing facilities available to absorb or provide liquidity (the deposit facility for the floor and the marginal lending facility for the ceiling). Under normal circumstances, the two facilities will bound the overnight interest rate. They will operate at the overnight maturity and will be accessible at the discretion of counterparties and for unlimited amounts, provided, in the case of the marginal lending facility, counterparties can supply adequate collateral. A very narrow corridor, allowing very little room for the functioning of the money market, would not be strictly in line with market principles. On the other hand, a very broad corridor would not help contain excessive market volatility. As a consequence, the width of the corridor is likely to be set pragmatically (currently, it is around 2% for most central banks that operate an interest rate corridor similar to the one planned for the ESCB);  •  the frequency of fine tuning operations could be a more discriminating factor for interest rate volatility. Very frequent intervention of the ESCB in the money market would not, in my view, be fully consistent with market principles.

Two possible strategies have been selected by the EMI Council as potential candidates to be recommended to the ECB, namely monetary targeting and direct inflation targeting.2 In the case of direct inflation targeting, the inflation forecast made by the central bank can be viewed as fulfilling the role of the intermediate target.3 Let me dwell a moment on the choice the ECB will have to make between direct inflation targeting and monetary targeting, unless it chooses to combine elements of both strategies. Inflation targeting stresses the responsibility of the ESCB for achieving and maintaining price stability. However, there are some difficulties in the process of forecasting inflation over the medium and longer term. As Mervyn King recently stated, “such a forecast cannot be a single number. It must be presented for what it is, namely a probability distribution”.4 Furthermore, inflation targeting could imply more formal cooperation with the Government since the latter is in a position to influence price developments. Finally, inflation targeting has admittedly proven useful in progressing towards price stability, as the experience of the United Kingdom has shown. Nevertheless, the track record of inflation targeting is fairly short and has mostly taken place in a context of world-wide disinflation. Monetary targeting (in concrete terms, targeting a broad money aggregate such as M3) clearly indicates the responsibility of the central bank for developments that are more directly under its control and would therefore correspond better to the independence of the ECB. Moreover, it is based on observed information, which makes it more transparent.
In brief, it is because we believe that financial stability is a precondition for sustainable economic 2 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  growth.2 A stable and well-functioning financial system exists to serve us all. It enables the efficient allocation of resources, so that businesses can exploit productive opportunities and households can meet their needs. And it allows the risks incurred in the course of generating economic growth to be shared. The banking system supplies credit to households, to buy homes or spend more than they currently earn; and to businesses, so that they can hire more workers, invest in capital, and innovate and expand. Non-bank financial firms further transform long-term savings into new investments via bond and stock purchases; and they enable both households and businesses to insure themselves against risks that could prove costly were they to crystallise. The financial system also facilitates payments, so that households and businesses can pay safely for the goods and services they choose to receive. A stable financial system is one that is resilient to shocks and so is able reliably to support households and businesses through the consistent supply of the vital services that they demand. Financial stability thus supports growth and prosperity, just as good health supports us in our daily lives.

In addition, while recognising that many developed economies see a need to downsize their financial sectors and/or institutions, this need is not shared in the emerging world and less developed countries. The different mix of regulatory rules – allowing for faster growth of the financial sector in countries where its relative size is lower, even at the expense of higher riskiness of the sector, would also be welfare enhancing. After all, generally faster growth of less developed economies resulting from faster growth of their service sectors – comprising also financial services – would foster growth of the most developed countries’ export sectors and consequently overcome the slack caused by their need to restrict their financial sector growth rates. It is quiet fascinating how this observation – which in essence merely follows some of the basic logic of the Ricardian argument supporting free international trade – is being almost completely ignored in the current regulatory earthquake. This earthquake is mostly due to the financial crisis, which spread swiftly to the world primarily from the US and later from the Eurozone. The emerging markets were hit as well, some of them very strongly, but by and large their financial sectors have shown stronger resilience than in many developed countries. This was also the case of my country – the Czech Republic – as we have had no bankruptcy of any more significant financial institution and consequently no state aid in the financial industry for many years now. However, this is no reason for complacency.