samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It has provided the platform needed going forward to restrain inflation pressures, and to maintain anchored inflation expectations, at a time when, understandably, there is public debate about the outlook given that CPI inflation rose above 3% for the first time, triggering an open letter from the Governor, on behalf of the Committee, to the Chancellor. Looking ahead, my votes, and my approach to communicating our monetary strategy, will depend on balancing the medium-term prospect for demand pressures alongside uncertainties about supply conditions and near-term inflation expectations caused by volatility in energy costs. This will entail making judgments about a whole range of influences, including whether or not residual slack in the labour market might in time, given robust business investment, help to ease capacity constraints; whether or not competitive conditions amongst retailers will dampen the feed through of accelerating producer prices into consumer prices; and, most crucially of all, whether wage bargainers and price setters recognise the absolute determination of the Committee to maintain price stability. Risks to the global capital markets If anchored inflation expectations have so far been maintained, here and elsewhere, two other risks in, and for, the global financial environment continue to preoccupy commentators: current account imbalances; and compressed risk premia, together with an apparently high risk appetite, in credit markets. There are, I would suggest, some interesting contrasts between these two risks, which – following the Bank’s Financial Stability Report – I shall call “global imbalances” and “low risk premia”.

But in the long term, this strategy was unsustainable. Expectations that increased costs could be compensated for though devaluations weakened the incentive for restraint in price and wage formation. Put rather simply, for a devaluation to be successful, price and wage increases after the devaluation must return to the same level as among competitors. Sweden never succeeded with this in the 1970s and 1980s. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The two larger devaluations of the early 1980s were followed by the deregulation of the credit market in the mid-1980s. This was followed by the dramatic expansion of credit and rapidly increasing property prices. This led to the overheating of the Swedish economy, a property bubble that eventually burst, and, subsequently, the banking crisis of the early 1990s. Following increasingly persistent speculation on a new devaluation, the fixed exchange rate was abandoned in November 1992. Wage formation has worked well since the mid-1990s Since the mid-1990s, conditions for the strong development of the Swedish economy have improved significantly, compared with the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, three important changes have taken place. Firstly, the framework for fiscal policy has improved. After the crisis and the large public finance deficit at the start of the 1990s, a new fiscal policy framework was established.
As such, it is  market participants and the general  expected that the low inflation  public through multiple means providing  environment that prevailed for several  greater clarity and understanding about  years would be sustained in a range of 4  policy. Moreover, launching of the  – 6 per cent in the medium-term, which  revamped corporate website of the  is also consistent with the inflation  Central Bank is expected to provide high  target bands stipulated under the EFF  quality content with dynamic and  arrangement with the IMF. interactive features. We would also continue to strengthen  At the same time, continuing the  the technical capability, particularly with  practice that has been followed in the  regard to the compilation  past, we intend to make monetary policy  methodologies of macroeconomic  announcements according to an  statistics in line with international  advance announcement calendar. The  standards. This will promote sound  calendar for 2017 is set out below. Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  15  Monetary Policy Announcements in 2017  expending US dollars 4.0 billion of scarce external reserves in a futile attempt to  1  7 February, Tuesday  2  24 March, Friday  3  9 May, Tuesday  4  27 June, Tuesday  defend the external value of the rupee through market intervention.

These include a rate of inflation no higher than 1½% above that in the three EU countries where it is lowest, a one-year record of average nominal interest rates on long-term bonds no more than 2% higher than in the three EU countries where inflation is lowest, and membership of the ERM for at least two years without devaluing the currency and without exceeding the deviation band. Iceland will obviously not be fulfilling these conditions in the immediate future. Some form of EMU membership in the future would therefore not release Iceland from the obligation to bring inflation down to a similar level to that among its trading partner countries. It may be added that even if Iceland fulfilled all these conditions, it is extremely unlikely that it would be able to negotiate, in the foreseeable future, associate membership  4  BIS Review 95/2001  of the EMU or some kind of other bilateral currency cooperation with it. All the signs point in the opposite direction, whatever the phrasing of individual articles in the Treaty of Rome and Maastricht Treaty might suggest. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that twelve Eastern European countries are waiting to be admitted to the European Union and, later, the EMU. The ECB and Community leadership have firmly underlined that these nations should fulfil all the conditions for participation in EMU. Thus the EU is highly unlikely to agree to set any precedent which these nations could take advantage of as a short-cut into the EMU.
The second crisis is a typically Spanish crisis, associated with excesses in the real estate sector, private-sector debt and deteriorating competitiveness, a crisis which in principle seemed to be a familiar bugbear. However, this time the imbalances emerged within a monetary union, which has invalidated many of the instruments used in the past to overcome apparently similar crises. The third crisis is in the euro area, the clearest but not the only sign of which has been the sovereign debt crisis, which has affected Spain with particular force. The upshot of the overall impact of these three crises is an extraordinarily complex scenario with multiple and unprecedented interactions, which means we must avoid intellectual laziness and seek innovative solutions to manage an exit from the situation. This is because many of the solutions used in the past are not only no longer available or useless, but – given the side-effects – may even prove harmful. I shall now try to draw your attention to the responses that crises prompt. As is well known, crises, which entail so many personal tragedies, may ultimately have beneficial effects in the countries they affect if the response to them is the correct one. My first observation is that any crisis usually generates not only one response but three types of response. The first  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  reaction leads to the design and adoption of measures whose aim is to prevent a similar crisis recurring.

So as not to overstay my welcome, and given that next week several meetings involving these European institutions are to be held, I propose that we assume that these meetings will eventually see the adoption of the decisions needed to turn the markets around. This assumption about what the European institutions will do allows me to conclude my address by talking exclusively about our national problems. What must Spain do to emerge from the crisis? As I said at the outset, the conjunction of three economic crises, and in particular the worsening of the sovereign debt crisis, mean that precise economic policy implementation is extremely difficult at present, although the diagnosis as to what must be done is relatively simple and widely known. At present, what is most important is to promptly pursue an ambitious reform of our labour market institutions, while continuing to make headway on two key fronts: budgetary consolidation and financial system restructuring. In the past two years significant steps have been taken in both these areas, but to achieve fully satisfactory results, perseverance with the path of reform is needed. Starting with the reform of the labour market institutions, certain measures have been taken recently. But the truth is that, since the outset of democracy, Spain has not been capable of making any meaningful progress in this area, whereas most European countries have used the past three decades to reform their labour systems, in order to achieve higher levels of flexibility and job protection, i.e. greater “flexicurity”.
As well as extensive changes to risk-weighted capital requirements, the Basel Committee has published standards for a leverage ratio requirement, liquidity requirements and large exposures limits. 1  This is a count of publications by the Basel Committee of the publication type ‘Standards’. Where a standard was published in the period and subsequently superseded by another standard within the same period both standards are counted. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  In the United Kingdom, we have also developed a range of domestic reforms reflecting the importance of the banking system as a share of our economy. 2  These reforms range from the development and implementation of a new institutional framework for macroprudential policy to deal with threats to financial stability, to the design of microprudential remuneration rules that better align risk-taking incentives with variable pay, to the Senior Managers and Certification Regime aimed at improving individual accountability at PRA-authorised institutions. We have also undertaken structural reform to protect retail payments and lending to households and businesses from shocks to other parts of banking groups specialising in serving wholesale customers. We are well on track to deliver structural reform in January 2019, including higher capital buffers for ring-fenced banks. Yesterday, the PRA issued for consultation proposals to implement leverage ratio requirements and buffers for ring-fenced banks whose groups are required already to meet leverage ratio 3  requirements on a consolidated basis, and to reflect these higher leverage buffers in group capital.

And it is important that plans are legally robust and that they are regularly tested. Another lesson from the recent episode is that disclosure practices in relation to liquidity risk management objectives, controls and metrics vary significantly. In some cases banks go as far as providing information on stress tests and contingency funding plans; in others there is a relative paucity of information. That hampers market functioning: in times of heightened uncertainty a lack of information can lead to defensive reactions by market counterparties that provision of additional information could prevent. There are some risks from greater disclosure. For example, a bank revealing a weak funding position could precipitate an adverse reaction, although that should of course lead to stronger risk management as a precaution against that risk. There are also measurement challenges. It is difficult to present a simple, representative summary measure of liquidity risks run by a given bank – any single definition of such a complex array of risks will necessarily be approximate. But that does not seem a sufficient reason not to disclose any measure – indeed there may be some parallels with market risk where a single metric such as a firm’s overall value-at-risk is not viewed as encapsulating all dimensions of such risk. Nonetheless, the degree of disclosure on market risks which banks are now providing under Pillar 3 of the Basel II Accord marks a definite improvement in this area.
In many cases, most prominently in China, this growth has been fueled by increasing leverage. Uncoordinated because in a highly integrated world, monetary policy and financial regulatory policy generate substantial cross-border spillovers yet they are being conducted with almost exclusive focus on domestic mandates. And finally, unsustainable because a world in which up to a third of all government bonds in some advanced economies are held by their own central bank and over a third of all developed-country government bonds trade at negative nominal yields cannot be a viable long run equilibrium. This precarious state of affairs is, to a large extent, a reflection of key fundamental forces that have been at play for some time, with their impact now becoming increasingly self-evident. What I want to do today is to set out these underlying forces, draw out their implications for monetary policy, and offer some tentative suggestions of how central banks may respond. In doing so, I will focus from the perspective of emerging markets. As the old saying goes, the only constant is change. But the speed of that change is not constant. The pace of change tends to pick up around major transitions before settling down again when some sort of equilibrium is reached. The Great Moderation was a period of relatively steady change during which world output grew steadily and inflation was low and stable. The global financial crisis created a major upheaval that led to the Great Recession.

And they are typically much less leveraged. But increasingly they do offer a liquidity promise – that the investors can redeem the value of their investment at very short notice. In this way they can create liquidity mismatches when investors in funds are offered a greater degree of access to investment than is consistent with the ease with which the assets in which they are invested can be sold without a big impact on price. A particular concern occupying both the FPC and authorities internationally is that simultaneous redemptions from open-ended funds offering short-term redemptions could test the resilience of market liquidity, with wider adverse effects through mark-to-market pricing and collateral calls. This risk has increased due to the growing importance of open ended mutual funds. As described in the FPC’s July 2015 Financial Stability Report, global assets under management have grown significantly over the past decade, to around $ trillion. Within that, the share of funds typically offering investors near-term redemptions such as open ended mutual funds has increased, from just below 40% a decade ago to approaching half. This could give rise to particular risks where a liquidity promise offered by a fund gets too out of line with the liquidity characteristics of the assets the fund holds. Corporate bond funds could be relevant here. These funds have more than doubled in size over the last 10 years, from $ trillion to almost $ trillion AUM.
Paul Tucker: The repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system – last resort lending, market-making, and capital Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, at the Bank of Japan 2009 International Conference “Financial System and Monetary Policy: Implementation”, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, 27-28 May 2009. *  *  *  Everything – and I mean everything – about central banking stems from our liabilities being the base money of the economy. From this flow our roles in monetary policy and financial stability. And, in consequence, the manner in which central banks supply our money – overnight, intra-day, and for term maturities; in routine and in various stressed circumstances – just could not matter more, even if much of the time it seems like an obscure corner of the financial system’s plumbing. About half a decade ago, I set out the thinking that underpins the Bank of England’s management of our balance sheet, focusing principally on the implementation of monetary policy. 1 Today I want to explain how, over the past eighteen months, we have developed our system for providing liquidity insurance to banks in the interests of preserving financial stability; and how that bears on the prudential regulation of banks’ liquidity.

A measure of success is not how much paper we buy, but whether providing a backstop assists the functioning of the market. The Bank’s second facility is in some ways more interesting in the context of the debate about MMLR. We are acting as a back-stop buyer of sterling corporate bonds, by regularly holding auctions in individual securities. To protect against risk, the Bank sets (and updates)  24  Many of them by Willem Buiter. 25  Cecchetti S G (2009), “Central Bank Tools and Liquidity Shortages”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Conference, 19-20 February 2009. The quote is from the slides used at the conference. BIS Review 67/2009  11  reserve prices, which draw on CDS spreads, models of risk etc as well as qualitative information. The amounts we offer to buy in each auction are small. The objective is explicitly catalytic. It is to reduce the inventory risk run by bank market-makers in the securities, and to reduce liquidity risk for market participants more generally. Perhaps the best way to think about it in the abstract is that it is akin to our stepping into the market with a narrower bidoffer spread than private sector intermediaries would otherwise offer, with a view to those very same dealers bringing their bid-offer spreads inside ours and to investors reducing the liquidity premium they require.
11 Supervisory Statement 3/21 - Non-systemic UK banks: The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to new and growing banks following Consultation Paper 9/20 – Non-systemic UK banks: The Prudential Regulation Authority’s approach to new and growing banks. 10  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  are likely to grow out of the simpler regime. And the Discussion Paper asks for comments on how that kind of optionality could be introduced. But that might not always be possible or appropriate for all firms, so we will need to design the simpler regime in a way which minimises barriers to growth as far as possible. To sum up our approach to the complexity problem: we are looking for ways to simplify requirements for small firms which, as a package, will reduce the costs of regulation without reducing firms’ resilience. I will now move on to the question of how that can be done. Streamlined or focused It’s possible to imagine two approaches to creating a simpler regime. One approach would see us sitting down with the current rule book and, working through it pen in hand, striking or simplifying out those parts which aren’t needed for non-systemic banks and building societies. The result would be a thinner version of the current rulebook with the same chapters but fewer words. That is what I will call a ‘streamlined’ approach because it would deliver a streamlined version of current requirements.

This will be updated  1  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2020/the-ideal-post-eu-regulatory-framework-speech-by-victoriasaporta.pdf?la=en&hash=2BBC9A3AD75F8C6DDB2FE04273A7220F3011A66D 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  2  to function in the context of an open, yet safe, approach to international markets, maintaining standards at least as strong as those required internationally, in a way that is fit for purpose for the UK . And we have a great opportunity to re-emphasise the role of simplicity in our policymaking – particularly relevant for today’s speech – to ensure that prudential policy is no more complex than needed to address the nature of the risks that it is designed to address. To guide our overall approach, we have a vision to be an accountable, responsive and accessible policymaker. By accountable, we mean that we will be clear on the issue we are seeking to address with any given policy, how our intervention solves the problem, and how it fits into our overall regulatory strategy. On our new ‘have regards’, we will give evidence-based accounts of how our proposals impact the relevant issue – and explain what effect this has had on our policy choices. In some areas of policymaking, we will start with very open discussions with industry and other stakeholders to determine the right way forward, given the number of possible options. As part of this, and to inform our judgments, we will have to work with industry to gather the relevant data - it is in our collective interests to do so.
Some improvement in the euro area Developments in the euro area have been relatively calm over the summer, despite some political uncertainty in Portugal, Spain and Italy. Moreover, there have been assessments of Ireland and Greece, for instance, that indicate the on-going reform work is progressing well. The reform work in both countries has been approved, which has paved the way for continuing aid payments. But the problems remain, and during the summer both Italy and France had their credit ratings downgraded because of poor growth prospects. Perhaps the most important thing is that new statistics show that the euro area GDP has begun to grow again. After being negative for six quarters in a row, GDP growth was 1.1 per cent in the second quarter of this year, according to preliminary figures and calculated as an annual rate. In Germany, which is very important to Swedish exports, GDP growth was clearly above the average for the euro area as a whole. At the same time, indicators for the  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  start of the third quarter point to a continued improvement. The aggregate purchasing managers’ index rose in July to just over 50, for the first time since the start of 2012, and consumer confidence also began to rise. New labour market statistics also show that unemployment in the region has stabilised, albeit at a very high level. All in all, the new information confirms the picture that the recovery in the euro area has begun.

What attracted me most at that time was the collection of journals he, as a college student, was having in different subjects: Free World from the US Embassy; Commonwealth Today from the British High Commission; Nawa Yugaya from the Lake House; Rasawahini from the Times Group etc. I had the habit of leafing through those magazines and enjoying the titles and photographs. He did not mind our bothering him. He, in fact, encouraged us to write to the respective Missions for complimentary copies. When I entered the Vidyodaya University (now, the University of Sri Jayawardenapura) to do my undergraduate studies in management in late 1960s, Professor Tilakaratna had just returned to the island having completed his doctorate at the prestigious Queen’s University in Canada. He took all our courses in economics: micro, macro, welfare economics, international finance, international trade, public finance, development economics etc. Hence, we could safely say that our whole undergraduate knowledge of economics was imparted to us by him. He had referred to all the latest text-books, meticulously prepared his notes and updated them continuously. I still recall that the students were eagerly waiting for his lectures. This was because of the comprehensiveness of the lectures and the unique method of delivery. He used to explain the technical terms again and again as and when they emerged in his lectures, until their meaning was permanently implanted in our minds. We were all benefited by his up to date treatment of the subject.