samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The clearest and most pressing example, in light of the economic and social consequences of the burgeoning number of jobless Spaniards, is the employment and labour market policies of those countries which, even at the height of crises, keep unemployment rates low. However, within the realm of financial regulation and supervision policies, the opposite is the case: our supervisory arrangements are being closely studied for reforms in other countries. The ingenious idea of Governor Rojo and his team to set in place a countercyclical mechanism in order to try and soften credit growth or at least mitigate the adverse consequences of its cyclical behaviour on the banking system was a forerunner of the countercyclical capital buffers envisaged in the Basel III Accord. The constraints on complex products and the obligation to consolidate are further examples of rules or guidelines that are characteristic of Spanish banking supervision and regulation and which fully coincide with the direction in which global financial system reform is advancing. Spain’s approach to restructuring its banking sector has demonstrable advantages. The process has been undertaken using the FROB (Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector), which was set up following Parliamentary approval over 18 months ago and has since overseen numerous integration processes between savings banks that have reduced their number from 45 to 17. The design of the FROB was based around a twopronged approach.

First, it was geared to supporting banks which, while viable, required restructuring to ensure their ability to resume a path of sustainable profitability, by reinforcing their solvency with public funds. Significantly, in certain countries where the need for a similar instrument has been acknowledged, this has not yet been created. Second, the FROB involved giving the Banco de España wide-ranging powers to swiftly and effectively take control and resolve the problems of those banks that are not viable. Rounding off the remit of the FROB has been the approval of the reform of the legal regime for savings banks. To date, the limitations inherent in their legal status had prevented savings banks from reinforcing their core capital, except through the capitalisation of profits. The reform opens the way for savings banks to tap private capital by enabling them to issue core equity instruments, it provides for improvements in their management and it subjects them to greater market discipline. Restructuring was considered on the basis of two criteria that have proven to be most useful. The first is the requirement that those banks applying for public aid should reduce capacity. 2  BIS Review 171/2010  During the expansion, our banking system became excessively big in parallel with the growth of the construction sector. If aid had not been conditional upon the presentation of a capacity-adjustment programme, the profit and loss accounts of all banks would have continued to perform poorly, not only in conjunctural terms but also structurally.
This is something that characterises monetary policy in many countries and the reasons for this are primarily international, with specific Swedish conditions playing less of a part. My assessment is that the root causes are connected to long-term structural changes in the financial system around the world. It is therefore not just connected to temporary crises. Consequently, I also consider that changes in the central bank’s holdings of various assets will be an important part of monetary policy for a long time to come, even if the policy rate will remain an important instrument. One lesson from the last few decades is that central banks need to pay attention to how the financial sector transforms over time and to be well prepared to act rapidly and broadly in times of crisis. With the broader range of monetary policy tools developed over the last decade – which, in many ways, are reminiscent of how monetary policy was conducted in times past – the Riksbank is better equipped to fulfil its tasks. And considering the Riksbank’s long history, this is nothing new – we have to move with the times! 12 [13]  References Adrian, Tobias (2020), “‘Low for Long’ and Risk-Taking”, IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department, departmental paper series no. 20/15, November. Andersson, Björn, Magnus Jonsson and Henrik Lundvall (2020), “The new macroeconomic environment after the global financial crisis”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, no. 1, Sveriges Riksbank.

In other words: the same target but our way of attaining it – which is to say the tools at our disposal and also how we can be expected to act and react to events in the economy – has had to change. The international changes I have described affect most other central banks. Looking abroad, we can also see great similarities at various central banks in how monetary policy has changed. 4 In other words, the Riksbank is part of an international development. Monetary policy – then, now and in the future Until the financial crisis, it was most common to analyse and discuss monetary policy on the basis of a relatively simple model with a small number of variables. Inflation was primarily assumed, in a fairly simple way, to be affected by real economic activity (which was usually described in terms of measures of resource utilisation, unemployment or some other measure of capacity utilisation). One tool that the central bank had perfect control over, the policy rate, was assumed to have a clear effect on inflation via real economic activity. The transmission mechanism, which is to say the chain of events from changes in the tool (the policy rate) to the final effect on the target variable (inflation), was assumed to be stable and to have few details. And monetary policy worked in that when the interest rate was cut, demand was stimulated, meaning that capacity utilisation rose and thus so too did inflation.
26.06.2018  Taking up of office by the Governor of the Banco de España  Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Honourable Ministers and Authorities, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues and friends, I believe today calls, above all, for a round of gratitude. First, I wish to thank Ministers Calviño and Montero for their presence here today. May they rest assured I am firmly committed to maintaining the close and loyal collaboration traditionally offered by the Banco de España to the Ministries for the Economy and Finance. I also wish to thank the previous minister, Román Escolano, for his presence at this ceremony, and for his proposal and defence of my appointment before the Parliamentary Committee for the Economy and Competitiveness. And my gratitude extends to the representatives of the Committee accompanying us today. I undertake to make every effort to improve the capacity of the Banco de España to face the challenges addressed during the Parliamentary Committee hearing. Ministers, as I am surrounded above all by colleagues, I trust you will allow me to continue in a more informal tone. As you know, including a three-year tour at the European Central Bank, I now have two decades behind me at the Banco de España. Professionally speaking, this is, then, my home. It is a real honour for me to have been appointed governor.

But, above all, I feel a great responsibility at having inherited the enormous legacy of an institution with the history, functions and position in the Spanish economy of the Banco de España. I wish to begin this new stage thanking those people who have steered my career over the years. I have learnt from all of them and their teachings have been a source of wealth for me. My sincere thanks to all of them. Thanks, of course, to José Luis Malo de Molina, under whose leadership of the Research Department I have pursued most of my career, and, among others, Eloísa Ortega and José María Bonilla. They were most forthcoming with their trust and have, at different times, been a major source of guidance and support for me. Thanks also to Fernando Restoy, above all for being a point of reference in terms of competence and dedication to public service. Thanks especially to José Manuel González Páramo, who oversaw my Ph.D. and took me to Frankfurt. That experience gave me, early on, a first-hand view of the work of the European Central Bank and of the Banco España’s potential as a member of the Eurosystem. Naturally, my greatest gratitude is to Governor Luis María Linde for naming me Director General for Economics, Statistics and Research almost two and a half years ago. That was, unquestionably, the necessary step for taking me to where I am today. 3/5  Thank you, Governor, for your constant support over this period.
The Riksbank has a crisis organisation to enable it to make rapid decisions in this type of situation. The banks' lending is important Another reason why the banks are particularly interesting in monetary policy terms is that lending from the banks plays an important role for the impact of monetary policy interest rate changes. If the Swedish banks for some reason reduce the supply of credit, companies and households cannot fully replace this loss with financing for consumption and investment elsewhere. Smaller companies are particularly dependent on the Swedish banks and the customer relations they have built up. Larger corporations, on the other hand, have access to other sources of financing, such as borrowing in the bond market, from foreign banks or via new share issues. The banks' supply of credit and their setting of interest rates can therefore influence how quickly and how much monetary policy affects activity in the economy and thus inflation. We can begin by stating that the repo rate is one important determining factor when the banks decide on their lending rates. When the lending rates are determined, the bank's own internal rate is crucial and it is normally determined by the repo rate. This is because the banks' financing of deficits and investment of surpluses arising at the end of the day can normally be done in the interbank market, where pricing depends on the repo rate. If a bank lends money to a company, the loan could be financed in the interbank market.

Philipp Hildebrand: Thoughts on asset management in Switzerland Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Funds Association, Berne, 28 March 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch)  *  *  *  Summary Asset management is an important source of earnings for banks in Switzerland. The financial industry, in turn, is the largest sector in the Swiss economy and of crucial importance for economic development. Assuming that the world economy stays on its expansionary course, global assets will continue to grow strongly. Moreover, the rapid increase in the volume of accessible information means that clients are often better informed. It is also giving rise to a broader product range and generating tougher competition and cost pressure amongst providers. These trends will bring about far-reaching changes in asset management over the medium term. Money market, equity and bond investments managed on a moderately active basis often fail to pay the consistently above-average yield that would warrant their costs. They will probably lose ground to passively managed, inexpensive products. Substantially better performance will be essential for the traditional products that remain. Alternative investments, too, will benefit from the structural changes. However, this area will continue to be affected by the limited supply of exceptional portfolio management expertise. Asset management in Switzerland compares fairly well on an international scale in terms of performance and operational efficiency.
However, after some time, employment is expected to increase, as new products and services are being introduced and fresh energies are being unleashed and made productive. The liberation of large segments of activity that were previously suppressed will soon create a potent constituency for reform and  2  European Commission (2003): “Jobs, Jobs, Jobs. Creating More Employment in Europe”, report of the Employment Taskforce chaired by Wim Kok, November. BIS Review 59/2004  3  structural advancement. Importantly, all consumers and firms which in a regulated environment had to bear the cost of financing the subsidies will immediately enjoy the benefits from the reform. These prospective gains and the tilting of the balance of social preferences that these gains will bring about are often overlooked in the public debate. In fact, for the time being, the challenge to gain the support of parliaments and the public for implementing structural reforms is formidable. It is therefore imperative to make it clear to the public that, if governments and social partners deliver those reforms, the net benefits will be significant for the public at large. Fiscal policy Implementing structural reforms to raise potential growth is a major challenge for the European economies. But it is not the only one. In any economy, achieving sustainable, non-inflationary growth also requires fiscal soundness. In the absence of such fiscal soundness, price stability can only be maintained at a higher cost in terms of interest rates, and thereby lower growth and employment.

The active participation of the conference is provided and encouraged through panel session on “Payments challenges in an integrating world”, in which panelists from payment institutions and payment systems will be exchanging thoughts and ideas. Last but not least is the expected interactive participation in the working groups scheduled for the last day of the event. I look forward to the discussions and wish all the delegates an enjoyable and rewarding conference, as inspiring as its location – the beautiful city of Ohrid and the Ohrid Lake which I hope you will be able to enjoy too in the following Conference days. Thank you! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
17  Lastly, the Draft Budget envisages an inflation rate of 0.9% in 2021, mid-range between the two scenarios considered in the Banco de España’s September projections (inflation of 1% under scenario 1 and of 0.8% under scenario 2). However, as I indicated earlier, the price dynamics observed since these projection scenarios were published would clearly introduce a downward bias. A further bias – also downward – would come from the downside risks to which I have already referred affecting the future course of activity. Before analysing the main lines of action of budgetary policy for 2021 defined in the Draft Budget, I first wish to outline the basic principles that, in my opinion, should guide budgetary policy in the circumstances in which we now find ourselves. First, the budgetary policy stance over the coming year must be clearly expansionary. Bearing in mind the incomplete, unequal and fragile nature of the ongoing economic recovery, and the considerable downside risks it faces, the stimulus measures cannot be prematurely withdrawn. Second, budgetary policy must be selective. Despite the huge injection of funds that the European monies will entail, the magnitude of the challenges facing the Spanish economy in both the short and the medium term – including, without doubt, the need to undertake an ambitious fiscal consolidation process in the coming years – means that public resources must be used highly efficiently.

04.11.2020  Testimony before the Parliamentary Budget Committee in relation to the Draft State Budget for 2021* Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  *Traducción al inglés del discurso original en español  Ladies and gentlemen, I appear before this Committee as part of the process to discuss and approve the State and Social Security Budget for 2021. The main aim of this Budget should, in my view, be to provide for the recovery of the Spanish economy in the coming quarters and to mitigate the considerable adverse impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic to our economic growth and welfare. I shall begin by first describing the recent behaviour of the Spanish economy and, against a background marked by exceptional uncertainty, its possible course in the coming quarters, in light of the Banco de España’s projections. This description will allow me to assess the Government’s macroeconomic forecast which, as is habitually the case, frames the Draft Budget. Secondly, I shall offer my view of the main aspects of the Draft Budget for 2021, including the fiscal policy stance, its composition and the risks to the budget deficit target being met. Lastly, I shall set out what I consider to be the most significant challenges for Spanish fiscal policy in the medium term.
Reflective of this development is the fact that Icelandic banks have begun to grant credit to borrowers in other countries on a measurable scale, particularly in areas where they have a competitive advantage in analysing the soundness of the prospective borrowers. The title of my presentation is Iceland in a Global Setting. What I have briefly described is a country that has followed the path of many countries, including the Nordic Countries, in liberalising its economy, both internally and externally. This has exposed the economy to market forces and competition from abroad and a monetary regime bent on securing a low rate of inflation was chosen. Iceland is, as mentioned, not a member of the European Union and membership is not on the agenda of the present Government. Iceland operates its own small currency on the margins of the US dollar and the euro. These facts place firm requirements on economic policy while at the same time offering Iceland to reap important benefits from globalisation. This is indeed born out by developments over the last few years that were years of rapid growth of GDP and years which tested the ability of economic policy makers to steer the economy in an environment of liberalised markets and capital movements. More generally, the lesson to be drawn from our experience is that countries only stand to gain from full participation in the global economy. Aside from subjecting the domestic economy to competition from abroad, it disciplines economic policymaking.

Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Iceland in a global setting Keynote speech by Mr Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Euromoney conference on the Nordic Financial Markets and Investment Opportunities, Stockholm, 13 September 2002. *  *  *  Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to participate in this ambitious conference on the Nordic Financial Markets and Investment Opportunities. I will in my remarks today mainly focus on aspects relating to Iceland. Size separates Iceland from the other Nordic Countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Other factors separate the Nordic Countries as well. Finland is a member of the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU, as well. Denmark and Sweden are members of the European Union but are outside the EMU. Norway and Iceland are outside the European Union but maintain very close ties to it, particularly through the European Economic Area Agreement. That agreement makes Norway and Iceland a part of the single market of the European Union, which entails among other things that they are obliged to maintain financial market legislation, which fully conforms to that of the European Union. The Nordic Countries have different monetary regimes. Finland is a member of the EMU, Denmark is linked to the EMU through an ERM II agreement entailing that the Danish krona is very closely tied to the euro. Sweden, Norway and Iceland have chosen an inflation-targeting regime as their monetary framework (Iceland in March 2001).
Nevertheless, the Executive Board did not find  BIS Review 39/2005  1  grounds – given the prospect of continued low inflation for a period ahead – to deviate from expectations in the money and foreign exchange markets at present.” There are a number of uncertainties that may lead to different developments than those indicated by the projections in the Inflation Report. Increased current account imbalances in major countries along with high oil prices and volatile oil markets are contributing to the uncertainty concerning developments in the global economy. Household debt One area of uncertainty associated with the economic outlook in Norway, stressed by many observers, is the high level of and strong growth in household debt. In the rest of this speech, I will consider possible causes of this strong growth. I will also say something about the possible consequences of debt accumulation for the economic outlook in general and for financial stability in particular. I. Causes of household debt growth  Debt is growing far more rapidly in the household sector than in the enterprise sector. Growth in household debt has generally been high during the last five years. The interest rate reductions since December 2002 seem to have amplified debt growth somewhat. It appears that this high growth will continue in 2005. Growth in debt has also been appreciably higher than income growth, so that the debt-to-income ratio, often referred to as the debt burden, has increased markedly.

We, as the National Bank, within our competencies, will continue to support the savings in the future period as well, by further maintenance of the macrofinancial stability and prudent regulations, maintaining a safe and sound banking sector, contributing to maintenance of the confidence in the financial system, which is a key prerequisite for domestic savings. Finally, let me congratulate you all the employees in the banking sector in the Republic of Macedonia on the World Savings Day, 31 October, and wish you a success in future by attracting more deposits and their efficient channeling in productive investments that will bring 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  benefits to the society as a whole. Thank you! 1 Measured by the share of the total deposits of the non-financial entities in the GDP. 2 Measured by the share of total gross loans of non-financial entities in GDP. 3 IMF Regional Economic Issues, Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe – How to Get Back on the Fast Track,  May 16. 4 Refers to the total domestic savings calculated as a difference of GDP and consumption, expressed as a  percentage of GDP. 5 Slovenia and the Czech Republic are exception. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches