samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Finally, this Summit itself is a platform to promote regional integration, as it can be an important avenue to discuss and showcase developments of the ASEAN fixed income market and bring together policy makers and industry participants. Given the benefits and outcome that can be derived from this Summit, our ASEAN financial market community would be better served if this Summit is organized on an annual basis and hosted by rotation among the ASEAN countries. This would provide an excellent opportunity to each ASEAN member country to showcase their domestic fixed income market to regional policy makers and investors and further deepen our own understanding of the region. On that note, I wish all of you a productive Summit, one that generates ideas for us to expand and prosper from the rapid economic growth of ASEAN. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In any case, such reforms are a necessary foundation for dynamic and sustainable growth in the future and they must be vigorously pursued. There is no doubt that the euro area as a whole will benefit from these national reforms that represent a significant asset for us in the global economy. 2.2. The challenge for the banking system: continuing to ensure that the economy is properly financed while strengthening the financial sector  The dilemma here is easy to understand: on the one hand, it is absolutely necessary to strengthen banks’ balance sheets to enable them to better absorb shocks, protect public finances and re-establish normal market functioning. On the other, a disorderly deleveraging would create enormous problems and add credit constraints to the many headwinds currently facing our economies. The euro area is currently making sure that these two objectives – although sometimes difficult to reconcile – are achieved. Banks are meeting their new capital requirements. The capital plans submitted to the European Banking Authority (EBA) indicate an intention to exceed the benchmarks set by  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  more than 20%. French banks already comply with the Basel 2.5 regulations. At the same time, bank lending seems to be stabilizing, although at a relatively low level. Banks are starting to assess their financial situation more positively and in many cases their willingness to grant loans is increasing. This would not have been possible without the strong support of the Eurosystem.
The objective is to reduce risk in the payment system. At the other end, state issued ‘cash’ – notes and coin – is used mainly for the smaller value payments that settle the bulk of transactions in our economy. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  That has not always been the case. At the end of the 1970s, 90-95% of payments by volume in the economy were made using cash. 8  Private money, in the form of cheques, bank transfers and more recently credit and debit cards were simply too expensive and too cumbersome to use for small value payments. The trend, however, has been away from cash towards a greater use of private bank money in the economy. The spread of credit and debit card technology meant that by 2000, cash payments accounted for less than 75% of payments by volume. 9  And a number of recent inter-linked developments in what I have called the technologies that support our money may be driving an acceleration of that trend. New regulations have reduced the cost of credit and debit card transactions by capping the fees that card companies and banks can charge merchants.

Banks succeeded in withstanding the first wave of these shocks, remaining at positive territory, in terms of both system level and individual level. Meanwhile, measures are gradually being taken to adequately manage investment portfolio, in line with the established conditions. Capitalisation of the banking system has continued to grow this year as well, to 19.26%, from 18.53%, reflecting also the enhancement in the regulatory requirements on macroprudential reserves and the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL). Both elements have strengthened the resilience and security of the banking system. The purchasing and then the merger of the OTP Bank with Alpha Bank drove to the further materialised consolidation of the banking system in 2022. This development introduced another important player in the group of large banks, which share above 70% of market, and it is expected to contribute positively towards a more competitive and expanded market. The segment of payments and the supportive infrastructure have also marked rather positive developments in terms of their processing during 2022, on the back of measures undertaken in the framework of the Albania National Retail Payments Strategy. The AIPS EURO system is already a reality, while your clients, consumers and businesses are experiencing its benefits, together with you. Based on available  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  statistics, we see that the euro-denominated interbank transactions within Albania have considerably picked up.
But I would like to point out that the reforms in the fiscal policy area have also been very important. The relatively good central government finances over the past ten years have undoubtedly been a source of strength for the Swedish economy. If we had instead had large budget deficits, a large national debt and unclear regulations in the fiscal policy field it would probably have been difficult to win credibility for monetary policy. In this context it may be worth mentioning that the Riksbank actually had some experience earlier of conducting monetary policy with an inflation target. We were the first central bank in the world to introduce a price stability target for monetary policy after abandoning the gold standard at the beginning of the 1930s. The Riksdag supported the Riksbank’s monetary policy programme and evaluated the policy conducted in a modern manner on several occasions during the 1930s. The price stability target contributed to anchoring inflation expectations, which probably helped Sweden manage the 1930s crisis better than, for instance, the United States. But after this we had many decades with a fixed exchange rate and the episodes I have just described. The Riksbank’s inflation target and legal position In January 1993 the Riksbank made its target of low and stable inflation more concrete. The annual rate of change in the consumer price index, CPI, should be 2 per cent, with a tolerance for deviations of ± 1 percentage point. The target would formally apply with effect from 1995.

A necessary condition for this is openness and clarity! But there are also other important reasons why most central banks, and not least the Riksbank, have moved towards greater transparency. One reason is that the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on how well we succeed in communicating our intentions to the financial markets and the general public. By being open and clear, the possibility to influence interest rate-setting in the way we desire increases, both in the short term and the slightly longer term. This gives better conditions for achieving the price stability objective which the Swedish people, via the Riksdag, have allocated to us. The Riksbank’s ambition is of course to live up to, in the best manner possible, the requirements of openness and clarity made of us, both in our role as public authority and in our dealings with the financial markets and the general public. But the fact that the world around us is constantly changing leads to new demands. In practice, it means that we must be constantly developing and improving our ways of working. One expression of this is, for example, that we have begun to publish our own forecasts for the development of the policy rate. And it is probably difficult for a central bank to be clearer than this with regard to its monetary policy intentions – we actually say what we consider to be a well-balanced monetary policy in the coming period.
In the interview Skogstad Aamo flatly denied rumours of a krone devaluation. But before the interview was printed, the news agency NTB reported that the krone had been devalued by 12 per cent. 16 Perhaps the journalist was disappointed but Skogstad Aamo was not criticised for breaking the eighth commandment. Over the last decade, the objective of monetary policy has not been a fixed krone exchange rate, but price stability through low and stable inflation. 17 According to the monetary policy regulation the objective is inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. But how long is over time? And what is close to 2.5 per cent? With these formulations, it is no longer that easy to evaluate monetary policy. There are several reasons for this. First, it takes up to one to two years for a change in the interest rate to feed through to inflation. Second, inflation is not only influenced by the interest rate. For example, precipitation levels can have a strong impact on electricity prices. Third, we set interest rates also with the aim of promoting stability in output and employment. If the economy is exposed to severe shocks, we may at times seek to bring inflation rapidly back to target, while under other conditions we deliberately choose a longer horizon. An evaluation of monetary policy cannot therefore be based on the latest figures for inflation.

Let me now turn to the challenges arising from greater financial globalisation and the growing importance of international cooperation in ensuring sustainable economic and financial integration across national borders. In this environment regulators are confronted with the challenge of adapting regulatory and legal norms from a nation-centric system to norms that are more reflective of international business and finance. The issue is how to complement the domestic agenda and the international agenda. Regulatory problems arise not only because of the need for domestic regulators – operating within diverse national regulatory norms and cultures – to cooperate and coordinate in the domestic environment but also across jurisdictions. Operational and legal issues in cross-border resolution arise where the regulatory frameworks of different countries do not provide for a common solution in areas such as the unwinding of financial transactions and the enforceability of secured parties' rights to collateral in the foreign jurisdiction. Failure to address such resolution issues promptly, generally within a matter of days, can lead to increased uncertainty and potential crossborder conflicts. Authorities must also have access to information that is not regularly  BIS Review 113/2009  3  exchanged in the normal course of supervisory cooperation. This needs to be supported by consistent requirements for the coordinated execution of regulatory actions. Equally important is an effective legal infrastructure for the mediation of claims against insolvent institutions with international operations Concurrence among regulatory authorities on key elements of effective resolutions would be an important step forward.
This, together with strong demand, pushed the real exchange rate higher than it would have been otherwise and exacerbated macroeconomic imbalances, as could be seen most clearly in a sizeable current account deficit. These developments and the banking crisis contributed to the currency crisis that struck in the first half of 2008. In formulating the monetary policy framework after capital controls, we must take into consideration the experience that has been gained in recent years in pursuing independent monetary policy in small, open economies with unrestricted capital flows in a world that is increasingly integrated financially. This is becoming ever more difficult, as we saw in New Zealand and in Iceland before the crash, and more recently in countries such as Switzerland and Sweden. We ourselves got a taste of what can happen under these conditions last summer and autumn, when strong inflows of capital into the domestic bond market turned the slope of the yield curve around. This is because capital markets are growing more effective at smoothing out the difference in risk-adjusted asset returns in different countries, with the result that monetary policy transmission along the interest rate channel is severely weakened in small, open, and financially integrated economies where long-term interest rates are determined to an increasing degree by rates in large countries. In such cases, monetary policy transmission takes place to an ever greater degree through the exchange rate channel.

Thomas Jordan: Real estate, mortgages and monetary policy Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the IAZI, Schweizer Immobilienkongress 2009, Zurich, 10 November 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  There is a close interrelationship between real estate, mortgages and monetary policy. On the one hand, monetary policy impacts on the real estate and mortgage market. When the central bank reduces interest rates, this eases the burden on household and company budgets and fosters the demand for real estate. On the other hand, monetary policy also takes account of developments on the real estate market because these can affect economic growth, inflation and financial stability. Once again, the current financial crisis has thrown these interrelationships into sharp relief. Problems in a number of mortgage and real estate markets – in particular in the US and the UK – triggered the financial crisis and plunged the global financial system into a systemic crisis. This impacted on Switzerland’s financial stability and made it necessary to create the StabilisationFund for the transfer of illiquid UBS assets. The Swiss real estate and mortgage market played a positive role in various measures adopted by the SNB to handle the financial crisis. Swiss mortgages played a role in securing Swiss financial stability in the Limmat Pfandbrief transactions, whereby big banks improved their refinancing situation by issuing covered bonds.
14  2020 (f) Mar.19 Report  Dec.18 Report  2021 (f) Mar.19 Report  Mar.19 Report  3.25-4.25  3.0-4.0  2.75-3.75  3.0-4.0  2.75-3.75  3.8 3.9 6.0 3.3 4.1 5.0 -2.7 20.9 22.6  3.7 3.9 6.2 3.3 3.6 4.5 -2.9 20.1 21.8  3.3 3.6 3.9 3.5 2.8 3.0 -2.8 20.8 22.8  3.5 3.7 4.3 3.5 2.9 2.9 -2.7 20.3 22.0  3.3 3.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 -2.7 20.4 22.2  Fig 12 CPI inflation forecast (1) (2) (3)  CPIEFE inflation forecast (1) (2) (3)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6 6  6  5  5 5  5  IPoM Dec.18  4 3  IPoM Mar.19  2  4 4  3  2 2  2  1 1  0  0 0 16  17  18  19  20  4  3 3  1  15  IPoM Dec.18  21  IPoM Mar.19  0 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  (1) As from January 2019 the new indexes with 2018=100 annual base are used, so they are not strictly comparable with past figures. (2) Gray area, as from first quarter of 2019, shows forecast.

17 17  Jul.17  1818  Jul.18  19 19  (*) As from January 2019 the line uses the new indexes with 2018=100 annual base, so they are not strictly comparable with past figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 9  Figure 3 Selected CPI prices (indexes, January 2018=100)  Mobile phone services  101  Telecom package services  101 105  105  100  100 100  100  99  99  95  95  98  90  90  98 16  17  18  19  New cars  110  16  105  100  100  95  95 16  17  18  18  19  Air transport services  110 160  105  17  160  120  120  80  80  19  16  17  ----2013 basket  18  19  ----2018 basket  Source: National Statistics Institute (INE).
As I see it, a few questions about this program remain and are worth addressing. The first question is why do this at all. After all, the Fed has had a large balance sheet for many years now. In my view, the balance sheet expansion was undertaken in response to an extraordinary set of circumstances—a deep recession, short-term interest rates at the zero lower bound, and the economy far away from our dual mandate objectives. Now that these circumstances no longer hold, it seems appropriate to begin to reduce the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. In thinking about the decision to reduce the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, I see two important, opposing factors. One is that a large balance sheet could conceivably make further asset purchases less attractive. This factor suggests that we should use the opportunity to shrink the balance sheet during good economic times so that this tool will be fully available to us in the 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  future if necessary. However, on the other side, reducing the size of the balance sheet is another form of monetary tightening, one with which we have little experience. This suggests we should proceed with caution. The FOMC has judged that a gradual, predictable approach to normalization is the best way to appropriately balance these two factors. Another question is how long the normalization process will take.

Consequently, it is also probable that inflation a couple of years ahead will be close to 2 per cent, roughly as forecast by the Riksbank in August, even if inflation in the forthcoming year may be lower. Long-term perspective Before rounding off, allow me also to touch upon the longer-term perspective. Over the last decade, the economic policy debate has largely centred on stabilisation policy. The fact that stabilisation policy was in focus during the first half of the 1990s is easy to understand. Following a severe crisis caused largely by mistakes in stabilisation policy, we changed our exchange rate regime and altered the focus of both our monetary policy and fiscal policy. In the EMU debate, it has been natural to continue the discussion of monetary policy and exchange rate systems. I, at least, believe that this discussion went a bit too far. It was easy to get the impression that welfare in Sweden depended solely on the Riksbank's actions. BIS Review 42/2003  3  This is not the case of course. The objective of monetary policy over the past ten years has been to ensure price stability. This has proved rather successful - inflation is in line with the Riksbank's target and it is important therefore that it lays a solid foundation for growth. But when we alter interest rates, it is mainly with a view to affecting demand around a long-term output trend. While this is important, it must be remembered that we do not affect the trend itself.
They therefore provide a sufficiently good indication about future developments to enable the Board of Governors to make decisions on the basis of them. Better forecasts have not been available. Nonetheless, the Central Bank has frequently been criticised for the quality of its forecasting and the allegedly incorrect monetary policy decisions based on them. For example, the Bank came under harsh fire for raising the policy rate in the second half of 2006. It was claimed that the forecasts were wrong and the hikes therefore unnecessary. In some cases, critics selected limited and minor areas of Central Bank forecasts which they considered to be based on incorrect assumptions, and dismissed the entire forecast as a result. Now that the year is over, it is obvious, of course, that the Bank’s forecasts did not fully hold. For instance, in July 2006 the Bank forecast higher second-half inflation than proved to be the case. Explanations for the deviation include the appreciation of the króna after the middle of the year, the effect of lower global fuel prices on the price level, and the fact that wage settlements made in the middle of the year did not provoke wage drift on the scale that the Bank had forecast in July. The first two factors were hardly foreseeable, and it should be pointed out that the Bank’s overforecast for wage drift was not far from that made by the social partners themselves when the wage settlements were signed.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Building a robust Islamic financial system Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 2nd International Conference on Islamic Banking, Kuala Lumpur, 7 February 2006. *  *  *  Let me first of all extend a warm welcome to the participants of this Second International Conference on Islamic Banking: Risk Management, Regulation and Supervision, jointly organized by the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) of the Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). This forum has an important role of not only fostering the dissemination of knowledge and exchange of experiences on the subject of risk management, regulation and supervision, in facilitating a better understanding on the issues confronting us, and thus contribute towards advancing forward the development of the industry. Effective risk management capabilities is particularly important in this more challenging global financial environment of heightened uncertainties and increased potential for financial vulnerabilities. And an effective regulation and supervision will ensure the soundness and stability of the system. In the recent decade, the Islamic financial system has experienced remarkable growth and transformation, demonstrating its potential as a competitive form of financial intermediation. Today, Islamic finance represents a multi-billion dollar industry with a comprehensive range of products and services, serving a broad spectrum of consumers and businesses that extends beyond the Muslim world. In developing the Islamic financial system, it is important to focus on the appropriate pre-requisites that will facilitate its efficient evolution.
Alongside the ongoing efforts by firms to get closer to the frontier of best practice in risk management, it is very important to see a substantial and sustained investment in improving the infrastructure that underpins the over-the-counter derivatives market. The major dealers in the credit derivatives market have begun a major effort to close the gap between the level of the business they are undertaking and their operational capacity to manage effectively the legal, operational and settlement risks in that business.

They mean that in thinking about ways to mitigate systemic risk it is not tenable to focus simply on bank-centered financial institutions, and it is not feasible to achieve change through national approaches applied only to the institutions of the home country. For these reasons, where we see a need to induce a broader change in market practice, a broader range of informal mechanisms of cooperation among supervisors, among market participants and involving supervisors and market participants would be useful. The second generation of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, led by Jerry Corrigan, is one example of a market-led initiative to define a set of common challenges and recommendations for  4  BIS Review 14/2006  change. Supervisors in the major financial centers are following progress against those recommendations closely. The effort to improve the post trade processing infrastructure for over-the-counter derivatives is an example of regulatory cooperation to help address a collective action problem among market participants, with some encouraging initial results. In this effort, the 14 major dealers along with almost as many supervisors and market regulators from the United States and other major countries, met at the New York Fed in September 2005. We outlined our concerns and asked the dealers to give us a plan for how to fix the problem. They came up with a credible plan, with a set of outcomes-based targets, and agreed to report progress on a common set of metrics.