samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
While Malaysia will always be affected by such external developments, the strategy has been to have the flexibility to absorb and adjust and the strength to rapidly rebound. While each crisis or setback has been different, there are several common features that have allowed Malaysia to rapidly recover from such shocks. For each respective major shock confronting our economy, Malaysia has registered V-shaped recoveries. This has essentially reflected the flexibility of the economy to adjust and the early and comprehensive policy response. The ensuing periods were often marked by structural reforms and institutional development that were designed to rebuild the fundamentals of the economy, address the weaknesses and vulnerabilities and to forge new areas of growth. This has, decade after decade, resulted in vital changes in our economic structure, from being export-led to now being predominantly domestic demand-driven, and from being over-reliant on specific sectors to having a more diversified economic structure with the manufacturing and services sectors having now transitioned to higher value added activities. In essence, the structure of the economy has now become significantly more diversified in terms of sources of growth. While the export sector remains an integral component of our economy, domestic demand has now become the key driver of growth, anchored by strong private sector activity that now accounts for 70% of GDP. Underpinning the robust domestic demand is the sustained consumption spending and the revival of investment activity by the private sector.

On the external balance, the more diversified exports and markets has allowed the balance of payments position to remain sound. Thus, despite the fall in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  commodity prices, the trade and current account is expected to remain positive, sustained by manufactured exports while the financial account is expected to adjust in an orderly manner. During this same period, the financial sector restructuring, rationalisation and reforms, the institutional development, the strengthening of the regulatory, supervisory and legal framework and the development of the domestic financial markets have also diversified the financial sector and has enhanced its ability to disperse external shocks throughout the system. In particular, the financial reforms also involved the transition to greater market orientation and more liberalised financial system which has allowed for greater flexibility to adjust to the effects of shifts in global liquidity. The now deep and robust financial system is also underpinned by high levels of capitalisation and sufficient levels of liquidity. This has ensured that financial intermediation continues to be effective in providing support to economic activity. It is therefore not the recent policies nor the new measures that have placed Malaysia on a stronger position to manage the external challenges. Rather it is the economic restructuring and financial reforms and development undertaken during the recent two decades and the building of several layers of buffers that has allowed us to weather the current challenging operating environment.
Barbro Wickman-Parak: The economy and the labour market Speech by Ms Barbro Wickman-Parak, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB), Stockholm, 29 April 2010. *  *  *  Sweden’s GDP fell by almost five per cent in 2009, compared with the previous year. We need to go back as far as the 1940s to find an individual year with a correspondingly large fall in growth. The large demand shock that followed in the wake of the financial crisis had an unavoidable and drastic impact on production and employment. It has been possible to alleviate these effects, but not to prevent them, despite forceful monetary policy measures and expansionary fiscal policy. Normally, changes in employment and unemployment occur two quarters after changes in production. This time, however, it appears as though the upturn in employment has already begun and unemployment has stopped rising, which is surprisingly early given the large fall in GDP. But unemployment is still high, and we are expecting a slow recovery in employment in the coming period. During the past three months unemployment has been around 9 per cent as a share of the labour force. Today I intend to talk about developments in the labour market in Sweden. I will begin by describing how employment usually varies over the business cycle and then discuss what is different this time. I shall conclude by discussing how we Executive Board members viewed developments in the labour market at our monetary policy meeting last week.

3  The relationship estimated is: Change in unemploymentt = a + b0*(GDP growth)t + b1*(GDP growth)t-1 + b2*(GDP growth)t-2+ q*(Change in unemployment)t-1. εt . 4  IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2010. 2  BIS Review 58/2010  Studies have shown that unemployment may suffer long-lasting effects from a deep recession. This is partly because a person who has been unemployed for a long time loses part of his or her human capital and therefore becomes less attractive in the labour market, and partly because some people, after job-seeking for a long time, quite simply give up and leave the labour force. What is usually referred to as structural or “natural” unemployment may thus increase during periods of high and protracted unemployment. Labour market policy can counteract these effects to some extent, by for instance, offering further education and retraining to the unemployed. The situation today is in contrast to what we saw during the crisis in the 1990s. Then, GDP fell for three years and the fall in employment was greater than the fall in GDP. That crisis was domestically-generated and it was generally known that tough times lay ahead, as public finances were to be consolidated. This time, the crisis has come from outside and there has been scope for forceful fiscal policy and monetary policy measures. It is always difficult to make forecasts. Moreover, I believe it is more difficult than normal in the current situation.
Our banking system, for example, is strong, with the capital adequacy ratios of locally incorporated banks averaging around 17% and problem debt ratios of less than 2%. Although the irrational exuberance that has been a feature of asset markets in the Asian region was also present in Hong Kong, prudent risk management practices have enabled our banks to absorb the inevitable asset price deflation that has occurred as the contagion of financial turmoil spread in the Asian region7. 9. The prudent behaviour of our banks has also encouraged prudent business practices generally. There is, in the non-bank sector of Hong Kong, much less of a maturity mismatch in borrowing short-term money to make long-term investments and a currency mismatch in borrowing foreign currency without foreign currency income. These are some of the tragic errors responsible for the dire state that some of the Asian economies have now found themselves in. Furthermore, with the benefits of financial liberalization creating an euphoria that regrettably encouraged neglect on the need to build a robust financial system in order to cope with the associated volatility in financial flows, it seems inevitable, at least with the benefit of hindsight, that there could be tremendous pressures on their currencies. Not so for Hong Kong, already with a long history of liberalized markets and the absence of any forms of exchange control. We have learnt our lessons in the early eighties and have been meticulous in building ourselves a robust financial infrastructure and continuously upgrading it.

Benchmarking against the OECD principles and the practices of some advanced economies, the HKMA is of the view that Hong Kong has been doing quite well in protecting bank customers’ interests. We also strive to make changes and improvements from time to time. Yet, I believe there is a need and room for further improvements as to how banks deal with their customers. This is because bank customers are essentially entrusting most of their liquid assets or funds with banks that they trust. Trust between banks and their customers is beyond that between general service providers and their customers. Also, as compared to other financial institutions, it is indeed easier for banks to earn confidence and trust of their customers. In addition to bringing business opportunities and profit to banks, customers’ confidence and trust in banks are also the cornerstone for banking and financial stability. 4. Let me borrow a famous quote and put it simply that with “great trust” comes great responsibility. First, banks should ensure their prudential operation and risk management are in place to safeguard customer deposits. Second, banks should treat their customers fairly when providing various services and financial products to them, and should stand in customers’ shoes in pursuing profit. But how can we achieve this? In the past few months of discussion with the industry, we found that the basic principles of fair treatment to customers are indeed not so complicated. Mr Benjamin Hung, Chairman of the HKAB, will brief us on the five principles in the Charter. 5.
12  (annual change, percent) -0.3 -0.7 -2.3  6.2 5.3 3.9  4.1 3.8 2.7  3.8 3.5 2.7  3.8 3.3 2.5  3.6 3.2  4.2 4.1 3.2  4.2 3.9 3.2  3.9 3.6  -3.5 -4.2  3.0 1.9 4.4 10.4 10.6 7.8 6.4  1.7 1.5 -0.7 9.2 6.7 4.2 4.4  1.8 -0.1 2.0 8.2 7.7 4.4 3.6  2.1 -0.3 2.0 8.1 7.3 4.3 3.6  2.0 -0.6 2.7 7.9 6.5 3.9 3.3  2.2 1.0 1.6 8.5 8.0 4.8 4.0  2.3 1.0 1.6 8.5 7.9 4.8 4.0  2.0 0.3 1.3 8.2 7.2 4.6 3.7  80  111  107  107  102  115  97  -6.9  -3.5  -0.1  -1.5  9.2 0.2 -2.0  (levels) Brent oil prices $  121  (annual change, percent) Terms of trade (*)  3.6  19.4  0.5  -6.7  -5.3  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. (*) Forecasts at December, projected with national accounts, base year 2003; 2010 and 2011 figures, plus forecasts at March and June, with national accounts, base year 2008, considering chained indexes. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Table 3 Economic growth and current account (*) (annual change, percent) 2011  2012 (f) Report Dec. 11  Report Mar. 12  Report Jun.

External sector of the economy continued to be characterised by a positive, though falling, contribution of foreign demand to economic growth. The correction pace of the trade deficit was slower in this quarter. Trade deficit reduced by 1.2% compared to two-digit correction rates recorded in the first half of 2010. This situation of the trade deficit is determined mainly by the acceleration of imports, which marked a year-on-year increase of 10.8% in the fourth quarter of 2010, recording a growth for the third consecutive quarter. On the other hand, Albanian exports increased by 48.8% year-on-year, maintaining high rising rates. The Bank of Albania holds that the Albanian economy will find it difficult to maintain the same growing rates of exports during 2011; among other things, this projection reflects temporary factors that influenced on 2010 growth and is in line with the global economy situation and basic statistical effects. Nevertheless, external demand is expected to generate positive contribution to the economic growth during 2011, as well. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Monetary indicators, financial markets and inflation Performance of monetary indicators continues to generate controlled monetary inflationary pressures on the domestic economy. Money supply increased by 12.5% in December 2010, reflecting a good performance of deposits in the banking sector during the second half of the same year. Our assessments indicate that monetary expansion is in line with the private sector demand for real money.
The Joint Forum’s study suggests that no single model for organising an integrated risk management function has become dominant. In some financial organisations, the function may exercise a considerable degree of control over individual businesses. In others - and especially in insurance companies - local business units continue to operate autonomously to a great degree. Yet nearly all firms that establish integrated risk management units are highly dependent on the quality of their information technology to collect, analyse, and report firm-wide data efficiently and effectively. Some participants have found that the greatest challenge in developing a centralised risk management structure lies in constructing compatible and efficient management information systems across all of their businesses. As a result, they devote substantial resources in terms of personnel and expenditures to the maintenance and enhancement of their management information systems. B. Risk aggregation into a single measure. Collecting risk data across many business lines has catalysed further efforts to aggregate those measures of risk by quantifying them in a rigorous fashion. This is the second major risk management trend identified in the Joint Forum report. The quantification of risk is certainly not a new concept in the insurance industry. Actuaries have long sought to estimate the likelihood of various events taking place. In recent years, however, we have seen financial risk managers and researchers apply mathematics, statistics, and modelling to many risk exposures that were previously not thought to be readily quantifiable.

Extraordinary growth in practices such as securitisation and in the use of sophisticated derivative products allowed banks to transfer credit risk in ways that the 1988 Accord does not capture. In addition, some banks began to manage their exposures to operational risk separately and as a comprehensive practice comparable to the management of credit or market risk. By the late 1990s, it became increasingly clear to leading banks and their supervisors that the original Accord no longer provided meaningful measures of risk for the most sophisticated banking organisations. As a result, the Basel Committee and others began to discuss ways to revise the existing capital rules to account for these advances. Supervisors sought more than a simple revision of the existing framework. We wanted to align our capital requirements more closely with the best measures of economic risks that banks actually face. We sought furthermore to fortify the stability of the banking sector so that banks could continue to serve as a source of credit through good years and bad. In our view, promoting financial stability will benefit not just banks, but also other businesses and consumers as well. To incorporate the latest advances in risk management, and to develop a more forward-looking approach to supervision, the Committee embraced a “three-pillar” approach to capital requirements. Rather than simply setting out a static minimum requirement for capital levels, the new capital framework will rely on three mutually reinforcing policy approaches.
In the Minutes of that meeting, the MPC emphasised that it will take the actions necessary to return inflation to the 2% target sustainably in the medium term, in line with its remit. The scale, pace and timing of any further increases in Bank Rate will reflect the Committee’s assessment of the economic outlook and inflationary pressures. The Committee will be particularly alert to indications of more persistent inflationary pressures, and will if necessary act forcefully in response. Bringing inflation back down to the 2% target sustainably is our job, no ifs or buts. Tonight I will step back from the current situation and consider some of the longer-term forces affecting our economy, and shaping the economic landscape in which monetary policy is conducted. Assessing the policy landscape Monetary policymakers are typically focused on cyclical movements in the economy, since monetary policy is often thought to have its most powerful effect on inflation 18-24 months ahead. As cyclical shocks hit the economy, monetary policymakers must analyse incoming data to identify the underlying causes and form a view on their implications for the outlook for GDP and inflation. Page 3  Adjusting policy in response to the cyclical shocks in the foreground of the macroeconomic picture is therefore a core part of our role.

The behaviour of investment while the wedge was falling does not present a puzzle. However, as described below, the behaviour since the 1990s is more difficult to rationalise and so that is the focus of the analysis here. 19. See Bailey et al. (2022). 20. Gutierrez and Philippon (2017), Autor et al. (2017), De Loecker et al. (2020). Page 22 21. In other words, if intangible investment is underestimated, total investment flows and (hence) the capital stock will be underestimated. In that case, the wedge will be over-estimated. See also Haskel and Westlake (2018). 22. See Gopinath et al. (2017) on financial frictions and Mian et al. (2021b) on sluggish demand recovery. This result is also in line with Döttling et al. (2017), who found that, contrary to the United States, the missing-investment puzzle in Europe is more conjunctural than structural. 23. Goodridge and Haskel (2022). 24. See Haskel and Westlake (2022) for a literature review. 25. See De Ridder (2016) and Haskel and Westlake (2022). 26. See De Ridder (2019) and Aghion et al. (2019). 27. See Akcigit and Ates (2021) for evidence in the United States, Bailey et al. (2022) for evidence on the United Kingdom. Similarly, Gutierrez and Piton (2020) show that the labour share has not fallen in the United Kingdom, contrary to the United States. The economic landscape: structural change, global R * and the missing-investment puzzle - supporting paper
This movement has produced various results: in some places it has been reflected in increased protectionist barriers, in other places in isolationist policies, in others in repatriation of capital and refocusing of activity in home countries. The result of the 23 June referendum on the relationship between the UK and the European Union is one of them. The anti-globalist movement and barriers to the free movement of goods, people and capital appear as harmful to the overall global economy. However, their negative effects fall disproportionally on emerging countries, such as Albania, and the Western Balkans in a broader sense. Let me know outline our assessment on the potential negative implications resulting from Brexit and the relevant effects on the central banks in the region. 2. Potential implications resulting from Brexit for Albania and the region Brexit is certainly a determinant factor for the European Union and the euro area. As such, it has left its mark in Albania and the region. It may be accompanied by direct or indirect, short-term or long-term negative effects in the labour, goods and services markets. Overall, the direct implications for Albania and the region are assessed as minor ones, given that 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  trade exchange with the United Kingdom is low. To illustrate my point, the export of Albanian goods to the UK accounts for only 0.2% to the total over the past ten years, whereas the share of imports amounted to around 1.1%.

The economies in the region seem to be set on the growth path, and are now based on a better understanding of the determining factors for the long-term development, and a more comprehensive framework of endorsing policies. The experience gained and the lessons learnt are undoubtedly elements that will help us steer safely, as we navigate our way into the future. As a typical Western Balkan country, Albania is in a similar development stage to its peers. Our analyses and forecasts confirm that the Albanian economy is on a positive track. Economic growth is expected to improve progressively over the next three years. Such growth continues to be fuelled by the recovery of the domestic private demand. The accommodative monetary policy of the Bank of Albania, the improved financing conditions and strengthening of private agents’ confidence are considered as the main elements underlying the recovery. The gradual return of the economy to equilibrium will help improve economic indicators across the board, more specifically: increase in employment; return of inflation to target; reduction of public debt; and  2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  further strengthening of private sector balance sheets. The acceleration of economic growth in Albania attests the private sector dynamism. This is an encouraging development given that the fiscal policy implemented over this period focused on showing prudence and rendering public finance healthy, while the macroprudential policy and measures of the Bank of Albania have sought to further strengthen financial stability.
But technology risks may be higher, such as runaway algorithms or cyber criminals stealing customer information. 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Then there is the question of systemic or macro-financial risks. Here we simply do not know enough. But here are a couple of points to ponder: The failure of a robo-advisor could potentially lead to contagion among other algorithm-driven service providers. This could present systemic risk if investors seek to withdraw their investments in securities through fire sales. The pro-cyclicality arising from algorithms is another unknown, as the interaction between algorithms could exacerbate market trends. Often, with these risk assessments of FinTech, there is a certain“fear of the unknown” or tendency to “imagine the worst”. A degree of conservatism and caution are indeed laudable virtues for regulators, but we should guard against taking too pre-emptive an approach when dealing with the uncertainties of FinTech. Regulators need to keep pace with innovation but regulation itself must not front-run innovation. Introducing regulation prematurely may stifle innovation and potentially derail the adoption of useful technology. MAS’ approach is to apply a materiality or proportionality test. This means regulation kicks in only when the risk posed by the new technology becomes material or crosses a certain threshold. And the weight of regulation must be proportionate to the risk posed. In 2015, MAS laid out a vision for a Smart Financial Centre, where innovation is pervasive and technology is used widely.

Taking advantage of hindsight, I would like to stress two chief lessons learned from this twenty-year process of modernisation. The first is that regulator and banks have formed a “joint partnership”, prompting a fruitful “virtuous cycle” and matching goals and efforts in order to attain efficiency and soundness. Close communication and constant exchanges of views are the principles currently governing this relationship. The second lesson is that, at the end of the day, there has been no trade-off between profitability and soundness: the competitive capacity of Spanish banks has not been dented by supervisory policies. These policies have been oriented towards enhancing the solvency  BIS Review 56/2008  3  and internal governance of banks, and to increasing the confidence of the public and the markets in the banking sector. However, this transformation has not been painless. It has to be recalled that the Spanish financial system had to overcome a deep-seated crisis in the mid-seventies to early eighties. By the end of the 70s, our banking system was weak, closed, corporatist, old-fashioned and highly regulated. Such regulation affected many of their operating areas, curtailing competitiveness. Interest rates were set administratively and credit institutions were obliged to meet investment ratios to finance certain economic sectors with maximum interest rates. This environment made for weak structures with no incentive to compete and no professional teams or systems to accurately identify and manage risk. At that time a range of new banks were allowed to set up.