samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Committee has tried to balance the benefits of greater diversification of the liquidity pool against the cost of including slightly lower quality assets. •  We have also changed some of the assumed inflow and outflow rates that determine the size of the pool of liquid assets that a bank is required to hold. •  As in the case of the capital conservation buffer, the standards now make very clear that liquidity is to be built up and maintained in good times so that it can be used in times of need. In other words, liquidity is not useful if it is frozen. In addition, in light of the considerable stress facing banking systems in some regions of the world, the Committee revised the implementation plan of the LCR by introducing a phase-in arrangement. The LCR will come into force as planned in 2015, although banks now will have until 1 January 2019 to meet the standard in full. Nevertheless, I expect many banks will choose to move to the higher standard more quickly. In announcing the revisions to the LCR, many headline writers categorised it as some kind of win for the banking industry over the regulators. This is simplistic. We had an observation period for good reason: to make sure we got the settings right. There was, I think, legitimate concern that, as a minimum standard, the 2010 formulation of the LCR may have been calibrated too conservatively overall.

Assessments under the RCAP are currently underway for Singapore and Switzerland. Later this year will follow China, Australia, Brazil and Canada. As with all of the RCAP work, transparency is critical to success – all of these reports will, of course, be published in full when complete. It is important to note that, in undertaking this work, the Basel Committee has no enforcement power, so it would be meaningless to think we can force jurisdictions to change their local regulations if we find gaps. Our goal is therefore framed more positively: to deepen the implementation process and to help jurisdictions identify the gaps and address them. Ideally, the assessments provide a roadmap by which identified gaps can be closed. They also provide stakeholders and markets with a much higher degree of transparency about the extent of any local divergence from agreed international standards, and the importance of these. In this way, we believe we will establish the appropriate incentives for local rulemakers to apply the global standards, and for markets and others to apply appropriate pressure where banks may be subject to weaker-then-expected prudential requirements. More consistent domestic regulations will be an improvement. But beyond looking at how local regulators have transposed Basel agreements into domestic regulations, the Committee has also begun examining whether the framework(s) are producing consistent outcomes. Ultimately, what counts is that the capital ratio calculated and reported by individual banks provides a meaningful and comparable representation of their capital strength.
In the construction industry, the labour market is tight and enterprises are making use of foreign labour to some extent. The supply of skilled labour is, however, a constraint on growth potential. Signals from service industries also indicate that the supply of labour is becoming more limited. The general level of investment in this region is relatively stable. Investment activity in the public sector appears to be somewhat lower in 2005 than in 2004. In manufacturing and services, there are signs of increased investment activity. Tender prices are rising slightly in the building and construction industry as a result of increased costs and a higher level of activity throughout the country. Prices have risen slightly in manufacturing and service industries. In retail trade, prices have changed little or remained unchanged. Profitability is improving due to increased activity, but there are no major changes for small and medium-sized enterprises. In the approved budget for 2005, the structural, non-oil deficit increases compared with 2004. It therefore appears that fiscal policy will provide some stimulus to growth this year. In the National Budget for 2005, underlying spending growth over the central government budget was estimated at 5.2 per cent, which is somewhat lower than the previous year and somewhat lower than estimated nominal growth in mainland GDP. As from 2006, it is assumed that nominal growth in central government expenditure will be approximately the same as nominal growth in central government revenues and that the real tax level will remain unchanged.

This results in lower production costs. 6  BIS Review 47/2007  The strong growth in labour productivity does not seem to reflect an increase in the real capital behind each person-hour worked, but rather a considerable improvement in labour and capital efficiency. 2 Intensified competition in product markets may have contributed to the subdued rise in prices. New operators have entered markets that were previously fairly sheltered from competition, for example in the grocery trade, building materials, telecommunications, banking and insurance. With general confidence that inflation will be kept in check and that petroleum revenues are only gradually phased into the economy, low import prices, high prices and good market opportunities for our export goods, an ample supply of foreign labour and high productivity growth have made it possible to combine high growth with low inflation. It is possible that some of the driving forces that have boosted the growth potential of the Norwegian economy and restrained inflation may now diminish. Prices for imported goods are now falling at a slower pace. The shift towards imports from low-cost countries was less pronounced in 2006 than in previous years. The rise in prices for oil and other commodities over several years has resulted in a somewhat faster rate of increase in producer and export prices among our trading partners. Measured in foreign currency, prices for imported consumer goods rose in 2006.
1  A more flexible labour supply a possible explanation In my view, an important overarching explanation is that the labour supply has probably become more flexible and elastic than previously. In other words, the supply curve on the labour market is flatter. This implies that greater resource utilisation does not necessarily lead to higher wage increases. When demand in the economy rises, it can be satisfied by labour being drafted into the production process, without much of a pressure to increase wages. As I see it, there are primarily three probable causes behind the more flexible and elastic labour supply. The first is globalisation and increasing economic integration. Globalisation, and hence rising trade, increases labour supply in an indirect way. By this, I mean that products previously manufactured inside the 1 See for instance Leduc and Wilson (2017). 6 [16]  country by domestic labour can now often be manufactured abroad, often more cheaply, and then be imported. This implies that global labour supply affects domestic wage increases, especially regarding the less educated workforce. Economic integration within the EU affects labour supply in a direct way as a result of the free movement of labour within the Union. Many utilise the opportunities provided by free movement – some by moving permanently, others by working temporarily in other countries within the Union. The other cause is technological development. The electronic revolution has made it possible to organise work in a different way than previously. For example, it has made teleworking much more possible.

Major firms will need to continue to work to on demonstrating these capabilities in the run up to the 2022 deadline for ending ‘too big to fail’. And they will need to keep their capabilities ‘live’. While 2022 represents a clear milestone, it is not the end of the process of ensuring that the UK has an effective resolution regime which continues to be credible, transparent, flexible and proportionate. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10
The bail-in rules that will be then in place stem only from the European Commission’s communication on “State Aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis” of July 2013, which establishes that any public support to banks considered as State Aid should be preceded by bail-in of bank shares, capital hybrids and subordinated debt. The text contemplates that exceptions “can be made where implementing such measures would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results”. For specific cases at the end of the Comprehensive Assessment, it may be adequate to invoke such principles. On a more general note, it is clear that to avoid moral hazard, any public interventions should penalise shareholders and managers appropriately, as was done in the exemplary case of the Nordic banking crisis. Here financial and economic collapse was avoided with, in the end, virtually no costs for taxpayers when the restored banks were sold. Thus, after the misbehaviour of several institutions that triggered the recent crisis – which by the way is still being uncovered – I fully support the change of culture from easy public bailouts to a new culture of private bailing-in. The burden of proof should be put on those who want to invoke exemptions to the new approach. Yet, we need to bear in mind that it is not only direct public support for banks that has a cost for taxpayers, but also financial instability – indeed, the costs of the latter may be higher.

In addition, in cases pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2018/389 regarding corporate payment processes and protocols, a payment service provider will have to submit to the BNB an audit report performed by auditors with expertise in IT security and payments. The audit report should certify that those processes or payment protocols guarantee at least equivalent levels of security to those provided for strong customer authentication as per Article 100 of the Law on Payments Services and Payment Systems. The provider must notify the BNB of any change in the application of exemptions from strong customer authentication. In addition to these requirements, payment service providers applying the exemptions should perform the monitoring, as stated in Article 21 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389, and make the results available to BNB upon request. Charges on Cross-border Payments in Euro and Currency Conversion Charges Regulation (EU) 2019/5183 introduces the requirement for payment service providers in non-euro area Member States to levy equal charges for cross-border payments in euro and for corresponding national payments of the same value in the national currency of the respective Member State. Such a legal requirement has existed so far only in respect to equal charges for national and cross-border payments in euro. The requirement for equal charges will become mandatory for payment service providers as of 15 December, 2019.
05.07.2019  Ten years of the FROB and banking system transformations Opening address to the conference: “Tenth Anniversary of the creation of the FROB” Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Chairman of the FROB, Chair of the Single Resolution Board, Chair of the European Banking Authority, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, Chairman of the Financial Stability Institute, dignitaries, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. It is an honour and a pleasure for me to participate in the opening of this conference to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the creation of the FROB. I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the chairman of the FROB, Jaime Ponce, and also his predecessors, Fernando Restoy and Javier Aríztegui, and their teams, for the work they have performed over the last ten years. The FROB embodies one of the main institutional changes made during the restructuring of the Spanish financial sector in the last decade, a process that has been fundamental in paving the way for the recovery of the Spanish economy in the aftermath of the crisis. Transformation of the Spanish banking industry in the last decade This period has witnessed one of the most far-reaching transformations in the Spanish financial system in recent decades and the FROB has played an important role in bringing about this transformation. The Spanish economy was engulfed by the international financial crisis at a time when significant imbalances had built up, which were particularly significant in our financial system.

But we must be alert to the development of new forms of shadow banking, meaning substantial maturity transformation and leverage outside the banking system. The balance of activities may also shift between banks. The post-crisis reforms include additional capital buffers for globally-systemically important banks (G-SIBs), and, as the Governor has said, the FSB is on track to present a proposal for an international standard on total loss-absorbing capacity for these banks, to the Brisbane G20 summit this month. 2 These changes are intended to move G-SIBs further away from distress and to make orderly resolution possible if, nonetheless, they do fail. But it is possible that tougher regulation of G-SIBs might also encourage them to become less systemically-important over time, perhaps with some shift of activity to smaller banks. At this stage, it is too early to tell. And, in the other direction, there are some signs that higher regulatory requirements might be leading to greater concentration of activity amongst the largest firms in certain markets: for example long-term derivatives. That might be consistent with micro-economic theory, which suggests that, in oligopolistic markets with high fixed costs, an increase in marginal costs due to higher regulatory capital requirements may tend to lead to a higher concentration of activity amongst the biggest players (Chart 1). Authorities will need to monitor these trends closely. Within the scope of their business models, individual banks are also likely to change their mix of activities in response to changing regulatory requirements.
The second model is more traditional, with links to the Keynesian school. In the post-war era a long period of high demand has regularly given way to an economic slowdown. Historically speaking, the latest upswing has lasted unusually long, so perhaps it is not so odd that we are now experiencing a decline. But sooner or later activity will pick up, though this will take time. On the other hand, the ongoing downward phase will not be all that dramatic. The third model has its roots in the Austrian school and harks back to experience from the 1920s and ’30s as well as from before the Great War. Proponents of this view are wont to point out that a period of growth not infrequently ends in exaggerated optimism and over-investment. When profit expectations ultimately become more normal, share prices fall and investment undergoes a troublesome adjustment. Sometimes the adjustment problems give rise to some form of financial crisis that accentuates the downward trend. The economic difficulties in Japan in the 1990s are sometimes cited as an example of this model. Another instance is the crisis in the 1930s. Other examples in various countries are to be found in the period before 1913. This explanatory model suggests that the recovery will take time and it is conceivable that the global economic slowdown will continue for some time to come. Turning now to the economic situation in Sweden, we can say that activity has slackened as a consequence of the slowdown elsewhere.

This is more or less the growth rate that characterised the Swedish economy during the period 1975 to 1990. What we are looking at now is a single year following a period of very rapid expansion and during which the Swedish economy has been exposed to a sudden global slowdown that has largely been concentrated on a sector of great importance for Sweden, namely the IT sector. All in all, it would seem reasonable to assume that the conditions for the near future look relatively good for a cautious economic recovery, combined with an inflation rate in line with the Riksbank's target. However, it is important to follow developments closely in order to detect whether the course of events will strengthen or weaken. BIS Review 72/2001  5
Besides price stability, contributing to financial stability within its scope of operations has been also listed among the primary duties of the Bank in the Central Bank Law. To that end, CBRT has used a combination of macroprudential tools and automatic stabilizers. We view both price stability and financial stability as two indispensable components of balanced growth. 1  Borio, C. (2011). Central Banking Post-Crisis: What Compass for Uncharted Waters? BIS Working Papers, No. 353. 2  Akçelik, Y., Başçı, E., Ermişoğlu, E. and Oduncu, A. (2013). The Turkish Approach to Capital Flow Volatility. CBRT Working Papers, No: 13/06. 3  For sustainable debt levels, see: Cecchetti, S., Mohanty, M. S. and Zampolli, F. (2011). The Real Effects of Debt. BIS Working Papers, No. 352. 4  Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth S. Rogoff. (2009). This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Press. ; Taylor, A. (2012). The Great Leveraging, NBER Working Papers, No. 18290. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Distinguished Guests, Comprehending the importance of systemic risk along with macroprudential measures to mitigate this risk to ensure financial stability has necessitated reconsideration of the regulatory framework at global level. The enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in the US and the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in Europe as well as new regulations introduced in other countries aim to mitigate systemic risk via coordinated action across agents responsible for financial stability. To this end, Turkey established the Financial Stability Committee in the summer of year 2011.

Paul Fisher: An unconventional journey – the Bank of England’s asset purchase programme Speech by Mr Paul Fisher, Executive Director for Markets and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, based on a presentation to contacts of the Bank’s Agency for the South-West, Stonehouse, Gloucestershire, 11 October 2010. *  *  *  In March 2009 the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (the MPC) embarked on an “unconventional” journey. Having cut Bank Rate to an historic all-time low of just half of one per cent, the MPC initiated a programme of asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves – commonly known as “Quantitative Easing” or QE. 1 To date the Bank, in line with MPC decisions, has bought £ of assets, equivalent to some 14% of UK annual nominal GDP. In this talk, I would like to briefly recap on why we started the QE programme and how well it has worked. I then want to explain some of the details behind why it was done the way it was and some technical details on what we plan going forward. Let me be clear upfront that the purpose of this is to share some of our broader thinking about the asset purchase programme, not to drop any hints about the future direction of monetary policy.
This all suggests that investors may be attaching some probability to very bad outcomes, possibly the tail risk of economies becoming stranded in a debt trap. This market view is mirrored in elevated corporate caution. Investment remains subdued and businesses continue to build cash in many advanced economies. 6 This is one reason why the so-called “equilibrium” real interest rate is negative in many advanced economies, though it has risen and is possibly now positive in others like the UK. 7 Reflecting these real dynamics, central bank interest rates have had to be set at extraordinarily low levels and supplemented by large scale asset purchases simply for monetary policy to remain neutral. 8 Escaping a debt trap requires a suite of measures including structural reforms to boost productivity. But above all an economy needs to be able to channel all available savings – household, corporate and foreign – to those sectors willing and able to spend. In many respects, recent progress in the UK shows how. 3. How the UK is escaping its debt trap  In recent years, the UK economy has shown increasing signs of normalisation. Non-financial private debt has fallen by around 30% of GDP since its peak, the economy has grown consistently above trend, and unemployment has fallen from a peak of 8.5% to less than 6% today. This performance underscores several structural features necessary to escape a debt trap. The first is an integrated financial system which channels savings from one part of the economy to investment in others.

In net terms, these changes have contributed positively to the Bank’s net worth (dotted line in Figure 16), which had remained negative for many years due to the historical weight of Subordinated Debt, the effect of the exchange rate mismatch between assets and liabilities, and a negative rate differential (between local debt and international reserves). Not only does the higher profitability of domestic assets contribute to close this gap, but the reduction of the Bank’s long-term debt stock (through repurchases) will reduce the financial burden for the next years. In practice, while greater returns are being received on local assets, on liabilities the Bank is paying ever lower rates, a situation that will continue for a long period of time. In addition, the peso has depreciated due to the mismatch between a high proportion of foreign currency assets (reserves) and local currency liabilities (bonds and monetary base). These factors combined have generated a positive value of the net worth for the first time in many years 7, which in previous projections was only foreseen in 2028. With the ups and downs of the currency in the short term, net worth will fluctuate around its current values during the next few years, to settle in positive numbers towards the end of 2025. These long-term projections are of a dynamic nature and are constantly reassessed, including the desired level of reserves.