samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, while recognising that many developed economies see a need to downsize their financial sectors and/or institutions, this need is not shared in the emerging world and less developed countries. The different mix of regulatory rules – allowing for faster growth of the financial sector in countries where its relative size is lower, even at the expense of higher riskiness of the sector, would also be welfare enhancing. After all, generally faster growth of less developed economies resulting from faster growth of their service sectors – comprising also financial services – would foster growth of the most developed countries’ export sectors and consequently overcome the slack caused by their need to restrict their financial sector growth rates. It is quiet fascinating how this observation – which in essence merely follows some of the basic logic of the Ricardian argument supporting free international trade – is being almost completely ignored in the current regulatory earthquake. This earthquake is mostly due to the financial crisis, which spread swiftly to the world primarily from the US and later from the Eurozone. The emerging markets were hit as well, some of them very strongly, but by and large their financial sectors have shown stronger resilience than in many developed countries. This was also the case of my country – the Czech Republic – as we have had no bankruptcy of any more significant financial institution and consequently no state aid in the financial industry for many years now. However, this is no reason for complacency.

Since 2003 major stock exchange indexes in CEE increased on average by almost 300 percent. While part of this asset price and credit growth may be explained by structural factors often referred to as “convergence”, the observed rates of growth are clearly unsustainable and they contribute to economic imbalances. With the benefit of the hindsight one could argue that monetary policy in the last few years did not properly take into account the possibility that prolonged period of historically low interest rates may contribute to asset bubbles and hence contribute to greater inflation  1 2  See IMF (2000) Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia. BIS Review 137/2007  1  volatility in the future. As argued by Rogoff (2006) when faced with a tail wind monetary authorities in both developed and developing world should have temporarily lowered the inflation target rather that reduce interest rates too much for too long. But there is another issue. It seems that globalisation tail wind is reversing these days and that in the coming few years central banks can face “globalisation headwind” amid rising food and energy prices. 1. Agflation is the rise of inflation due to increase of food prices. In recent months we have witnessed a significant increase of food prices, grain and oilseeds being the leaders. Prices of food products on international markets has risen by almost 40 per cent within last two years and prices of grain and oil seeds has almost doubled within this period.
Ardian Fullani: Recent economic and financial developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the press conference on monetary policy decision of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 25 May 2011. *  *  *  Today, on 25 May 2011, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council reviewed and approved the monthly Monetary Policy Report. Based on a thorough analysis of Albania’s latest economic and monetary developments and discussions on their outlook, the Supervisory Council decided to maintain the key interest rate unchanged, at 5.25%. The Supervisory Council judges that the current monetary conditions are appropriate to meet inflation target and continue the economic activity stimulus. Let me proceed with an overview of economic developments and main issues discussed at today’s meeting. *** The Albanian economy continues to maintain a positive development trend. Recovery in domestic demand over the first four months of the year and the positive contribution of external demand, have impacted on positive growth of the Albanian economy. Also, the major macroeconomic balances have remained stable and the financial system indicators appear to have generally improved. Following the shock of February, CPI inflation has followed a downward trajectory, reflecting the subdued inflationary pressures on the economy and Albanian financial markets. Available data on 2011 Q1 show that the economic activity has registered growth; however, the persistence of some spare capacity suggests that this growth remains below potential.

Negative output gap implies the existence of low domestic demand-induced inflationary pressures; however, persistent shocks to import prices caused inflation expectations to move up slightly. On the other hand, relative exchange rate stability and increased domestic food supply are factors that have made a positive contribution to lowering the inflation rate. Aiming at stabilizing inflation expectations in the medium term, the Bank of Albania raised the key interest rate by 0.25 percentage points at end-March. This move has been transmitted to financial markets, in line with the time lags of monetary policy transmission mechanism. Inflation rate rose to 4.1% in April 2011, falling back gradually towards the Bank of Albania’s target. Its performance has reflected the increases in food prices, in the excise tax of some goods, and to some extent, the administered price inflation. Higher supply of agricultural products, likewise in March, made a positive contribution to lowering the annual inflation rate. Compared to the previous month, consumer price index fell by 0.6%, hitting the lowest monthly inflation rate of April in the last decade. Processed Foods and Non-food Consumer Goods, including oil and pharmaceuticals, have been main drivers to inflation. The first item, following the increase in primary commodity prices in global markets, has determined and will continue to determine the inflation rate throughout 2011. The second item has registered positive upward values as a result of global conjuncture of this item’s commodity prices, particularly oil prices.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques – may Allah protect him- has paid great attention to economic affairs. He has presided the Supreme Economic Council since its inception. Under his instructions and guidance – may Allah protect him- a number of resolutions, aimed at raising the level of economic performance and paving the way for sustainable growth, were taken. A rapid review of the Royal Orders and Resolutions of The Council of Minsters pertaining to economic and financial affairs, issued during the last nine years, will reveal a huge quantum. Some of which are the following: the resolution to inaugurate the largest integrated economic city in the Middle East (King Abdullah Economic City), establishment of other economic cities in different parts of the Kingdom, establishment of a developed financial center in Riyadh city, that includes all financial institutions, setting up a National Anti-Corruption Commission, and establishment of an independent government authority concerned with the development of Saudi non-oil exports, called the Saudi Export Development Authority. The formation of two committees, one in Jeddah governorate and another in Dammam city, to settle disputes and violations set forth in Article XX of the Cooperative Insurance Companies Control Law, was approved.

Most recently, Fitch international credit rating raised the rating of the Kingdom from AA- to AA with a stable outlook, which highlights the strength of its economy and financial position, and makes it more attractive for domestic and foreign investments. There is a great and deep-rooted confidence in the continued strong growth and overall development of the Saudi economy under the wise leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. At the level of the financial and banking sectors, domestic liquidity increased from SAR 553.7 billion in 2005 to SAR 1,545.1 billion at the end of 2013, recording a growth rate of 179.1 percent, or an average annual increase of SAR 123.9 billion. The banking sector also registered strong and sustainable growth during that period, overcoming the repercussions of the global financial crisis, and, thereby, serving the national economy in accordance with the latest secure technology in the field of banking and financial services. The total assets of banks more than doubled from about SAR 759 billion in 2005 to SAR 1,893 billion at the end of 2013. The number of bank branches during the same period increased by 44.4 percent to 1,768. Automated teller machines rose by 202.6 percent, to 13.9 thousand distributed to various towns and villages in the Kingdom, providing modern and secure banking services. As for SAMA, its total assets went up from SAR 619.4 billion at the end of 2005 to SAR 2,738.7 billion at the end of 2013, increasing by 342.2 percent.
Tarisa Watanagase: The Thai economy – challenges and prospects Speech by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the European Heads of Mission Luncheon, Residence of the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bangkok, 21 February 2007. *  *  *  Ambassador Brümmer, Your Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen, At the outset, I would like to thank Ambassador Brümmer for inviting me to speak at this luncheon. It gives me great pleasure to share my views on Thailand's economic prospects with all of you. This talk is most timely for these are difficult times for Thailand. In the past year, Thailand under major political developments. We saw mass street protests against the previous administration, a military coup and the annulment of the 1997 constitution. The present government has promised an election and a new constitution but, as year-end bombings painfully show, political uncertainties remain. Economic uncertainty has also increased. In the past few months we saw rapid baht appreciation and declining consumer confidence. The threat of a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances still persists. In addition, the implementation of the reserve requirement and the introduction of the amended Foreign Business Act proved to be unpleasant surprises to investors and the global community. These are indeed difficult times. And difficult times require difficult choices to be made. Some of you may be concerned that Thailand may not be able to weather all these challenges. Some of you may fear that Thailand is turning her back on globalization.

I believe that these fears and concerns are unfounded and that Thailand will persevere. Our outlook for the Thai economy in the medium term is positive. Our forecasts show the Thai economy growing by 4-5 percent in 2007 and by 4-5.5 percent in 2008. These are respectable growth estimates for Thailand in light of the challenges and our focus on growth with stability. In the rest of my talk, I will address in detail the challenges and prospects for the Thai economy going forward. This brings me to the first of my three key points. The first key point is that the Thai economy is no stranger to difficult challenges. And we have always persevered in each instance. In 1997, we had the Asian crisis and undertook painful reforms; in 2001, the global economic downturn adversely impacted the Thai economy; and in the past two years, we had the Tsunami, SARS, the avian flu, southern unrest, political uncertainty, and the recent oil shock. The recent oil shock in particular proved to be a difficult test for the Bank of Thailand. High oil prices have two adverse effects: pressure on prices and a drag on economic growth. Tightening interest rates is the Bank of Thailand's primary defense against inflation. However, high interest rates would burden firms and households already trying to cope with high oil prices. Domestic demand would be adversely affected. There was no clear or easy choice to make.
As a result they will not shift the underlying macroeconomically-relevant monetary trends in the economy, which ultimately pin down developments in the price level. They are not intended to cap or control longer-term interest rates or to offer more favourable underlying financing conditions to the institutions involved – or, for that matter, to the Government – than would have prevailed in an orderly market environment. In the spirit of the famous Bagehot rule addressing the threat of bank deposit runs, yesterday’s intervention is intended to prevent painful, adverse self-fulfilling market dynamics emerging. That is why yesterday’s intervention is a “temporary and targeted financial stability operation”. It is intended to allow the inevitable and necessary re-pricing of financial assets stemming from recent macroeconomic news – including last week’s fiscal announcements – to take place in an orderly way. So yesterday’s intervention was not a monetary policy operation. The temporary and targeted character of the Bank’s intervention is key to the distinction between financial stability and monetary policy that I have emphasised here. With that in mind, let me now turn to the responsibilities of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), of which I am a member. The MPC will make a comprehensive assessment of the macroeconomic and monetary situation ahead of our next meeting in early November, before coming to a decision on the monetary policy stance. Hopefully, what I am about to say is self-evident. But in current circumstances it bears saying nevertheless.

Toyota’s worldwide car sales have also increased by some 20 per cent to 8.9 million units. As a result of the economic policies being implemented by the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, we may increasingly see some spillover effects on ASEAN and other Asian economies. ASEAN, however, is unlikely to be too negatively affected and may instead benefit from a weaker yen given its role as a “downstream producer” for Japan. For example, countries that serve as a production hub for Japanese companies are likely to benefit from Japan’s increased export competitiveness. Overall, stronger Japanese growth is expected to stimulate its imports from ASEAN. In contrast, economies with a high degree of export similarity to Japan, such as Korea, and to some extent Taiwan, could face greater competition in the short run due to the negative substitution effect favouring relatively cheaper Japanese goods. We may also see increased capital inflows into the region, as Japanese institutions are increasingly hard-pressed to secure adequate returns at home. As long-term interest rates decline further in Japan due to the Bank of Japan’s new asset purchase programme, we can expect more “search for yield” activities. As interest rates are already very low in the region and asset price inflation is becoming a concern in many economies, ASEAN policy makers need to remain vigilant against a build-up of domestic financial and asset market excesses.
Even if it is too early to tell, we can see that the financial support plans have contributed to a certain degree of recovery in the markets. Interbank rates are falling, credit spreads are narrowing and liquidity is returning in some markets. However, most of the content of the support plans is directed at handling the most pressing problems in the financial system. In the longer term other measures will be needed, and this is what I will discuss now. What are the future challenges? Let me first say that we need to realise that times of financial turbulence are unavoidable and something that we have to learn to live with. What is important is that we learn from previous experiences and use this knowledge to lower the probability of future crises occurring, and when they actually do happen, to mitigate their costs. We also need to realise that despite the many similarities between various crises they are never exactly the same. Therefore, flexibility is needed in the policy frameworks aimed at preventing and managing financial crisis. If I may start on the prevention side, it is hard – given the present circumstances – not to get in to a discussion of what role monetary policy can play in preventing the build up of economic imbalances.

In our case, about 46% of women participate in the labor force. Why activity rate of women on the labor market is low? According to a World Bank survey, about half of the inactive women reported that they do not seek employment because of family or caring responsibilities – twice the share of women stating this reason in the EU28. Another economic impact is also visible through the income channel. For example remittances, which are very important source of disposable income in the region including our country, plunged across the board last year. According to the UN study, the decrease was more prominent among women than men; especially among women in rural areas, and among women 35–44 years of age. Although wage data is still not available to see how the COVID crisis has affected this wage gap that existed even in the pre-crisis period, some indicators point out that probably the wage gap has widened throughout this period. For example, in North Macedonia assessment is that the wage gap has hovered throughout the range of 16–20%, which is already large. Apparently, the crisis has hit women and men unevenly, which is a natural consequence of the fact that it did not hit all the sectors equally. It had more pronounced effect on the services, especially services dependent on social interaction, and informal economy where women tend to be presented more. For example, in our country these sectors employ about 27% of all employed women and about 25% of all employed men.
A Transition in Thinking and Action  Remarks given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  International Climate Risk Conference for Supervisors, De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam 6 April 2018  I am grateful to Alice Carr, Edd Denbee, Tanveer Hussain, Carsten Jung, Krish Kistnassamy, Alex Michie, Alex Ntelekos, Dimitris Papachristou and Matt Scott for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is a great pleasure to be here in Amsterdam, at the International Climate Risk Conference for Supervisors, jointly organised by the De Nederlandsche Bank, the Banque de France and the Bank of England. In my remarks, I will take stock of the progress made in addressing climate-related financial risks since the Paris Agreement of late 2015. In particular, I will consider how far there has been a transition in thinking and action. As we’ve heard today, the thinking has coalesced around three channels through which climate risk affects financial stability: -  the physical risks that arise from the increased frequency and severity of climate- and weatherrelated events that damage property and disrupt trade;  -  the liability risks stemming from parties who have suffered loss from the effects of climate change seeking compensation from those they hold responsible; and  -  the transition risks that can arise through a sudden and disorderly adjustment to a low carbon economy. The last risk is the most challenging.

4 See PWC (2018), 21st CEO Survey, The Anxious Optimist in the Corner Office, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2018/pwc-ceosurvey-report-2018.pdf 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Second, climate disclosures. There has been a series of actions to transform climate disclosures. 2017 was a record year for climate-related shareholder resolutions, with a threefold increase in motions (184 vs 63) and with investment managers controlling over 45% of global assets under management backing shareholder actions on carbon disclosure. Several of the world’s largest asset managers – including the two largest, Blackrock and Vanguard – have written to a number of public companies calling for such disclosures. Other long-term investors have joined forces to press for disclosure through groups such as Climate Action 100+ and the International Investors Group for Climate Change (IIGCC). Meanwhile ISS and Glass Lewis, who account for over 90% of the shareholder advisory services market, have updated their 2018 proxy voting policies to make clear that they will assess the adequacy of climate disclosure. 5  With the providers of capital demanding enhanced disclosure, and the TCFD recommendations providing a framework for doing so, a number of public companies have begun disclosing their climate-related financial risks for the 2017/18 year end. Reporters drawing on the TCFD include energy giants and extractors through to financials and consumer goods companies. The Task Force is delivering two initiatives to support this process.
If a settlement bank encounters difficulties and there are no back-up solutions, there will be a risk of widespread disruption of the payment system. This risk can be reduced through good back-up systems. Second-tier banks have recently improved their back-up solutions. Most banks have an account at Norges Bank. In the course of 2013, all 106 of the second-tier banks with an account at Norges Bank have submitted authorisations permitting the bank to be moved up automatically to first-tier level if the settlement bank should fail, enabling them if necessary to participate in net settlements at Norges Bank directly at short notice. This makes second-tier banks and the settlement system as a whole less dependent on the private settlement banks. The authorisations have strengthened financial stability. Banks participating directly in net settlements are required to have sufficient cover for their clearing positions. Satisfying this requirement is the banks’ own responsibility. They can do this by either depositing funds at Norges Bank or pledging approved securities in favour of Norges Bank. Our analyses show that the great majority of second-tier banks have sufficient liquidity in Norges Bank’s settlement system to be able to participate directly in the net settlements. However, clearing positions can vary widely. Banks participating directly in the settlements over time must maintain sound liquidity management. Conclusion Allow me to conclude by highlighting that new and improved regulation of banks will help to reduce the likelihood of deep financial crises.

And though the euro area unemployment rate is declining – down almost 1.5 percentage points from its 2013 peak – a great deal of slack still remains in the labour market. Indeed, if unemployment continues to decline at its current pace, it may take years before the euro area returns to its pre-crisis unemployment rates. And as we have seen in the UK and the US, even at that point – when the so-called “NAIRU” is reached – there may still be a substantial time lag before a tight labour market translates into higher wages. This suggests that, for services inflation to rise over the medium-term, we will need to see a faster closing of the output gap in the euro area and a quicker return towards full employment. 2  “Understanding Inflation Dynamics and Monetary”, Policy Panel remarks by Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB, at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 29 August 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The ECB’s monetary policy response So putting the picture together, we have seen two factors that could endanger medium-term price stability in the euro area and warrant a monetary policy response: a global environment of volatile oil and commodity prices that could feed into expectations; and a domestic environment where persistent slack continues to constrain price pressures. But as we have shown, even with interest rates at zero, we have an array of conventional and unconventional measures to deliver that response.