samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In trade documentation, Singapore is exploring how we can use DLT to link our National Trade Platform to trade platforms in other countries, such as Hong Kong. The DLT-based platform will allow users to exchange digital trade documents across borders with confidence. A vibrant and growing DLT ecosystem in Singapore Innovation and technology will be the main drivers of growth in the future. The MAS has been working actively with the financial industry to create a Smart Financial Centre, where innovation is pervasive and technology is used widely. We want to do this to increase efficiency, manage risks better, create opportunity, and improve people’s lives. Building a strong DLT ecosystem is part of this broader FinTech strategy. And the DLT ecosystem in Singapore has been growing handsomely. There are now approximately 50 locally based FinTech startups in the DLT space. The local universities are doing research in various aspects of DLT. Venture capitalists are looking for interesting DLT ideas to invest in. Major technology consulting firms and system integrators have set up in Singapore dedicated practices or teams for DLT. An effective way to develop the ecosystem is through collaborative projects that bring together various parties. And MAS has been an active participant in such projects, helping to co-create solutions together with the industry. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Project Ubin: Using DLT for inter-bank payments Project Ubin is a good example of such collaboration as well as challenging the status quo.

The problem statement is this: In a real-time gross settlement payment system, transactions typically go through a single trusted party, often the central bank. The challenge MAS posed itself was: can we create a more efficient inter-bank payment and settlement system without MAS acting as the trusted party? This began Project Ubin – a collaborative effort among MAS, the Singapore Exchange, ten banks, six technology companies, and six academic institutions. Over the course of the project, more than 150 people were trained in DLT. Phase 1 of Project Ubin successfully demonstrated that banks are able to transact with one another on an Ethereum-based prototype without going through the MAS. MAS issued a digital representation of the Singapore Dollar – a central bank digital currency – and placed it on the distributed ledger for domestic inter-bank settlement. Phase 2 of Project Ubin – just recently concluded – successfully produced three software models that achieved decentralised netting of payments in a manner that preserved transactional privacy. The next step in Project Ubin is to extend the application to cross-border payment and settlement. Cross-border payments today rely on a correspondent banking network. Banks hold balances with one another and settlement occurs through the adjustment of these relative balances. There is counterparty risk, liquidity is split, and reconciliation is a major pain point. In cases where multiple correspondent banks are involved, transactions may take days and at high cost to customers.
Moreover, to the extent that the Committee wants to mitigate the risk of a sharp increase in long-term rates, it could judge that it would prefer not to commit to agency MBS sales. Expectations about future MBS sales or actual sales have the potential to generate or amplify such an upward spike in long-term rates. If the Committee believes that it could be costly in terms of credibility to incur a period of no remittances to Treasury – a notion I am personally somewhat skeptical about – avoiding MBS sales would also reduce this risk. Indeed, the Committee might conclude that it was better on all three counts to allow the agency MBS securities to run off passively over time.10  10  This would also provide additional stimulus at the margin, since the degree of accommodation provided by our balance sheet holdings is related to how long the public expects us to hold the assets. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  An important challenge for us will be to think carefully about what combination of actions and communications will best ensure that when we do eventually judge that it is appropriate to begin normalizing policy, the initial tightening of financial market conditions is commensurate to what we desire. There is a risk is that market participants could overreact to any move in the process of normalization.

Overall, economic activity is likely to be very weak for the remainder of this year, before gradually recovering in the course of 2010. In particular, the substantial fall in commodity prices since the summer of 2008 is supporting real disposable income and thus consumption. In addition, external as well as domestic demand should increasingly benefit from the effects of the significant macroeconomic stimulus under way as well as from the measures taken so far to restore the functioning of the financial system both inside and outside the euro area. Taking all these measures and their effects into account, as well as the pronouncedly negative growth in the first quarter of this year and the most recently published forecasts by public institutions, the risks to this outlook remain broadly balanced. On the downside, there are concerns that the turmoil in financial markets could have a stronger impact on the real economy, as well as that protectionist pressures could intensify and that there could be adverse developments in the world economy stemming from a disorderly correction of global imbalances. At the same time, there may be stronger than anticipated positive effects due to the decrease in commodity prices and to the policy measures taken. Annual HICP inflation was, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, 0.6% in April, unchanged from March. As explained on earlier occasions, the decline in inflation since last summer primarily reflects the sharp fall in global commodity prices over this period. Moreover, signs of a more broad-based reduction in inflationary pressure are increasingly emerging.
Mr. Meyer addresses the competitiveness of financial centres from a Swiss perspective Address by the Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Mr. Hans Meyer, at the International Bankers Club Luxembourg, held in Luxembourg on 23/3/98. Both Luxembourg and Switzerland are major financial centres in Europe. The performance and competitiveness of the financial services industry are thus of key economic and social importance to both countries. I should like to use this opportunity to say a few words on the subject from what may be a somewhat unusual perspective. The factors which determine the competitiveness of an industry are basically the same as those determining the success of the entire economy. In both cases, we are looking at a multitude of quite diverse factors with varying degrees of importance. Today, I would like to single out just three of them which I believe are of particular significance: economic stability, social equilibrium (i.e. political stability), and the human factor. Although each of these elements could be dealt with separately, they should ultimately be viewed in a broader context. Let’s start with economic stability. I define this as a state of balanced development across the economy as a whole, characterised by steady growth, a modest inflation rate and low unemployment. One of the main prerequisites for achieving such a state is the ability not only to create but to sustain an appropriate economic framework. This is primarily an objective for monetary policy, fiscal policy and competition policy.

In Norway, the banks dealt with the problem loans themselves, and there is good reason to try to achieve this, where possible: the originating banks themselves are the best placed to deal with the problem loans. However, this presupposes that the problem loans account for only a limited proportion of total lending, so that the banks are able to continue to operate normally. Sweden and Finland established a “bad bank” that took over the high-risk loans. But this was in most cases done only after the state had nationalised the banks and was thereby able to control the kinds of loans that were transferred to the “bad bank”. Third, banking crises do not need to be prolonged. In the Nordic economies the prompt and extensive writing down of problem loans and recapitalisation of the banks limited the economic downturn, which lasted only around a few years. This experience stands in contrast to that of Japan, where loan losses were recognised too slowly, with substantial and decade-long consequences for economic developments. All that said, however, the challenges facing banks today require a broader set of instruments than those used by the Nordic authorities 20 years ago, for two main reasons: First, the situation for banks is more complex. The authorities have to distinguish more clearly between insolvent banks and banks that are solvent but in need of more capital in order to increase lending. The lessons from the Nordic banking crisis can be drawn on for the insolvent banks.
Hughes, P and White, E (2010), ’The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster: A classic example of Groupthink’, Ethics & Critical Thinking Journal, Vol. 2010, Issue 3, pp. 63. Iaryczower, M, Lewis, G and Shum, M (2013) ‘To elect or to appoint? bias, information, and responsiveness of bureaucrats and politicians’. Journal of Public Economics 97, 230–244. IMF (2013), ‘Key aspects of macroprudential policy’, available at: http://www.imf.org/ external/np/pp/eng/2013/061013b.pdf. Janis, I (1972), ‘Victims of groupthink: A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascos’, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Janis, I (1982), ‘Groupthink: A psychological study of policy decisions and fiascos’, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Jensen, M and Meckling, W (1976), ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 3, Issue 4, pp. 305–360. Kahneman, D (2011), ISBN 978–0374275631. ‘Thinking  Fast  and  Slow’,  Farrar,  Straus  &  Giroux,  Kahneman, D and Tversky, A (1979), ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk’, Econometrica 47, Chart 10 shows the fan chart for inflation from the Bank’s most recent inflation report, pp 313–327. Kaplan, A (1964), ‘The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science’, Transaction Publishers. King, M (2010), ‘The MPC ten years on’, lecture to the Society of Business Economists. Available at: http://www.bis.org/review/r070507a.pdf. King, M (2013), ‘Monetary policy: many targets, many instruments. Where do we stand?’, Speech given at the IMF Conference on ‘Rethinking Macro Policy II: First steps and early lessons’. Available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/ 2013/speech649.pdf.

The Fintech Hub together with the FCA have just conducted the first survey of regulated firms’ applications of AI. The survey aims to establish a consistent picture of the state of deployment and readiness within financial services. This includes understanding how advanced firms are in their deployment of AI and what specific business lines they are applying it to. Deepening our understanding will help us work out where policy can support the safe and productive deployment of AI in finance. Conclusion My time today only allows me to give a partial picture of the Bank’s work on fintech. Even so, I hope the examples I have given have illustrated the breadth and depth of our commitment to enabling innovation, empowering competition and embracing fintech in a safe and effective way, as well as the role of the Bank’s Fintech Hub in driving that. 11  See https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cn/Documents/technology/deloitte-cn-tech-ai-and-you-en-170801.pdf See https://www.sas.com/content/dam/SAS/documents/marketing-whitepapers-ebooks/third-party-whitepapers/en/artificialintelligence-banking-risk-management-110277.pdf 12  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5
Additionally, despite the fact that the more productive companies have gained weight in their respective sectors over the past decade, there are still certain obstacles limiting the efficient allocation of resources. Specifically, there is a need to analyse the level of competition in sectors with persistently high profit margins. It would also be desirable to reduce the impact of factors preventing the most productive companies from growing. In this regard, the regulatory thresholds contingent on company size in the legislation need revising. Making decisive progress on this structural reform agenda is crucial to increasing the economy's long-term growth and laying the foundations for a society that offers its citizens more opportunities. Many of the policies I referred to earlier foster reductions both in the economy’s structural imbalances and in inequality, such that it should be possible to build a broad-based consensus for their approval, despite the obvious difficulties caused by the current political fragmentation. The challenges for the financial sector In the wake of the last crisis, Spanish banks carried out a thorough process of balancesheet clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring which, over the last four and a half years, has markedly improved the industry’s position on basic parameters, such as asset quality or levels of profitability and solvency. Starting with asset quality, between December 2013 and June 2018 there was a very significant reduction in non-performing loans and foreclosed real-estate assets. Similarly, return on equity returned to positive terrain with rates above the euro area average, recovering from its slump to -25% in 2012.

In the March 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  23 statements, the FOMC also announced it would start to purchase agency commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) to smooth market functioning in that market that helps to finance multi-family housing. For more on the deterioration of CMBS market functioning, the Fed purchases and their impact on the CMBS market during this period, see Woojung Park, Julia Gouny, and Haoyang Liu, Federal Reserve Agency CMBS Purchases, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, July 16, 2020. 9 FSB Sets Out Action to Maintain Financial Stability during COVID, July 15, 2020. 10 John C. Williams, Rising to the Challenge: Central Banking, Financial Markets, and the Pandemic, Remarks at  the 16th Meeting of the Financial Research Advisory Committee for the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research (via videoconference) (July 16, 2020). 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
To sum up, it is conceivable that banks could profit from the low interest rate environment in commission and trading business. However, earnings on interest business are expected to come under pressure, especially if interest rates are below zero. Therefore, the extent to which the current interest rate situation weighs on profitability depends not least on the degree to which a bank or banking system is geared towards interest business. In practical terms, what does this mean for the Swiss banks? For the Swiss banking sector as a whole, interest and commission business are of roughly equal importance as sources of revenue, with both contributing around 35% to net earnings in recent years (slide 6).In comparison, as this table shows, banks in the euro area generate more than half of their earnings from interest business. The banking system in Switzerland is thus generally less dependent on interest business than elsewhere. This is a consequence of the comparatively greater importance of commission and trading business at the big international banks and the asset management-focused private banks. Then there are the domestically focused banks – essentially the regional, cantonal and Raiffeisen banks. As is clear from their income statements, these institutions are principally active in interest business. Net interest income – i.e. the difference between interest income and interest expenses – accounts for almost 70% of their earnings.

9 The level of this imputed interest rate is not set by the regulator and  9  Banks generally stipulate that the cost of a residential property, based on an imputed interest rate of 5% plus amortisation and maintenance costs, must not exceed one-third of the borrower’s gross income. When assessing affordability risk for mortgage lending, the SNB likewise bases its calculations on an interest rate of 5%. Page 9/10  varies between banks. However, if this interest rate were to be lowered in the current environment, borrowers, banks and the economy as a whole would face significant risks. It is especially important when assessing affordability and the relevant interest rate to remember that real estate is normally purchased over a long time horizon of several decades. Interest payments for a mortgage will thus be incurred for the duration of this period, in the course of which rates may well be significantly higher than they are today. While a sharp interest rate rise is unlikely in the short term, there is considerable room for a substantial upward correction in the medium term. It is worth bearing in mind that long-term interest rates are currently about 300 basis points below what was considered normal during the pre2008 era. It is thus vital that borrowers and banks do not exclude the possibility of a sharp interest rate rise in the medium term and, that they ensure their ability to cope should such a scenario come to pass.
The main thing is that our future decisions shall remain dependent, first and foremost, on the economic data. Amidst the uncertainty, I am calling, more than ever, for pragmatism. What is the current level of market inflation expectations? After remaining fairly stable for a long period below the 2% inflation target, expectations initially increased markedly in the recent period – including five-year ahead expectations which are the most important for us – and rose to over 3% in spring 2022. 6  See François Villeroy de Galhau (2022), Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, 27 August 2022, “Monetary policy post pandemic: balancing between science and art, predictability and reactivity”. 5  Page 6 of 19  But these expectations have since improved spectacularly as energy prices have subsided; swap markets are now expecting inflation to fall rapidly towards 2%, including in one year’s time. This can also be seen in five-year options markets. 6  Page 7 of 19  These expectations can be regarded as too volatile, or a little too premature when it comes to the inflation decline. But they still have a significant impact on the rise in expected real rates, and this leads me to the channel of financial conditions. The channel of financial conditions and demand The fact that an expectations channel exists does not mean that monetary policy only works like a magical incantation.

4 For an analysis of the dynamics of the money supply during the public health crisis, see Bê Duc, Bricongne, Bussière, Jude, Penalver, Sédillot, Vari and Wicky, “The increase in the money supply during the Covid crisis: analysis and implications”, Banque de France Bulletin No. 239, 2022. 2  3  Page 4 of 19  The expectations channel While the steering of monetary aggregates has become less important, the steering of inflation expectations has gained significant ground in modern monetary theory, especially since the work of Michael Woodford.5 These expectations play a key role – be they those of the financial markets in determining the level of interest rates, or those of economic agents (businesses and households) in guiding decisions on future prices and wages. I shall come back to the expectations of households and businesses later on, as they are more difficult to measure and influence. At this stage I would like to concentrate on market expectations, and the way in which the central bank should guide them. The essential variable here is the credibility of its communication and action. This credibility is underpinned first by a solid institutional foundation: I would just like to point out that this year marks the 30th anniversary of the law of August 1993 granting  5  Michael Woodford, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy (2003), Princeton University Press. 4  Page 5 of 19  the Banque de France its independence.
Today, the Swedish bank market is far more dynamic and a large number of both Swedish and foreign financial companies offer products covering everything from unit trusts to mortgages. Although competition could probably be improved even more, developments are moving in the right direction. From a European perspective, the Swedish banks currently make relatively low charges for their services and have low profit margins on their deposits and lending - these are in any case no higher 11 than in the rest of Europe. Today the Swedish banks are in the forefront with regard to technology and have rationalised their operations, with fewer offices and employees than banks out in Europe. Despite this, profitability is relatively modest, which indicates that the price level is under pressure and competition is functioning. However, the company concentration is still very high on the bank market. The four major banks together have a market share of 70-90 per cent within most product segments. A number of "niche" banks have become established over the past year, but they still account for a small, albeit growing, share of the market. The bank market differs from, for instance, the retail trade in that the confidence and personal contact with the bank is perceived as very important. The customers also face complex choices; it is often difficult to assess and compare different services and suppliers. In addition, establishing new banking and insurance relations involves work for the customer.

6  BIS Review 25/2002  The EU and EMU  EU membership is one of the structural factors that are assumed to have increased competition in recent years. The idea in creating the EU's common market was to abolish the legal and administrative impediments to trade and thereby increase competition between and within the member states of the EU. This, together with better usage of economies of scale, would cause price levels to converge. It is now 9 years since the common market came into force and we can conclude that the price differences between the member states still remain. There are also considerable differences between the USA and the EU with regard to price spread. Almost one-third of all brands has a price spread of between 60 and 100 per cent within the EU. The corresponding figure in the USA is 9 per cent. One reason for this is that even if the legal trade impediments have been largely removed, there still remain a significant number of non-tariff trade barriers in the form of, for instance, various standards that segment the national markets. Transport costs and differences in consumer preferences are also factors that counteract market integration. A clear sign of market segmentation is that the price differences between the countries are significantly larger than within the countries. The EU/EEA countries trade almost 90 per cent with one another. Internal trade is therefore approximately as important or more extensive here than it is in the USA.