samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Finally, advancements in cryptography and distributed-ledger technology have led to a proliferation of digital assets and tokens, some of which circulate in parallel infrastructure outside of regulatory control and oversight. It has also spurred a concerted effort by central banks to harness these new technologies, through CBDCs and other initiatives, in order to ensure that central bank money remains fit-forpurpose in a digitalized monetary system. Shifting conceptual frameworks A radically different economic and financial landscape has forced some deep fundamental rethink of conceptual frameworks guiding policy, tracing out a second fault line. Facts on the ground are increasingly testing long-standing analytical paradigms on which central banks can rely to inform their policies. Most prominently, the recent surge in inflation has upended the Phillips curve as a model of inflation. The supposedly low sensitivity of inflation to measures of slack, or in other words the flat Phillips curve, turned out to be anything but low; the lack of any internal persistence generating mechanism implies that the framework underplays the possibility of wage-price spirals, and the assumed independence of structural parameters to the level of inflation rules out self-reinforcing transitions from low to high inflation regimes – a very real danger that central banks are grappling with. The upshot has been a systematic underprediction of inflation. We definitely need a better model of the inflation process: one that can capture how relative price shocks translate into persistent price movements as well as non-linearities in expectations and cost passthrough.

Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput: Central banking amidst shifting ground Welcome remarks by Dr Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the BIS-BOT conference on "Central banking amidst shifting ground", Bangkok, 2 December 2022. *** Governors, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure and great honor for me to be welcoming so many distinguished members of the central bank community to Thailand. Thank you for making the journey here from near and afar. Let me also extend a warm welcome to speakers and panelists joining us on-line today. We truly appreciate your participation in the conference. I would like to also express my sincere appreciation to the BIS for helping usorganize and host this event. During a period where the world is grappling with challenges that threaten to pull us apart, the BIS has continued to serve as a cornerstone of central bank and regulatory cooperation acting to pull us together. Indeed we are all here together in large part due to the convening powers of the BIS. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Bank of Thailand. This conference is an opportune moment for us to take stock and reflect on how far we have come and chart the way forward. In light of the rapid and seismic changes we have experienced, such reflection is needed more so now than ever.
Between 2009 and 2012, they doubled their lending to infrastructure projects globally from $ to $ However, is more lending the solution? Despite a doubling of their lending in the last three years, they only contributed 16% of project debt financing volumes globally in 2012. Conceptually, a more efficient way to utilise their financial resources may be in the form of risk mitigants such as credit or risk guarantees. The G30 Working Group on Long-Term Financing has in fact recommended that governments and MDBs should provide risk mitigation instruments to help lower the higher risks involved, especially during the early phases of long-term projects. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  This is definitely worth considering. Given their status, MDBs and export credit agencies are seen as very credible counterparties that can provide risk mitigants. It is probably harder for the private sector to play such a role, especially given the long tenor of project finance. I would add that MDBs and export credit agencies already have guarantee products that mitigate credit and political risks for project loans. The issue at hand is how to extend these products to say capital market instruments to “crowd in” participation by a broader group of institutional investors. For instance, the Credit Guarantee & Investment Facility or CGIF, established by the Asian Development Bank and ASEAN+3 nations, recently completed its first guarantee transaction on a 3-year Thai baht bond issuance by Noble Group.

Ardian Fullani: A summary analysis of domestic economic developments and the banking sector situation Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the regional meeting, Shkodra, 20 January 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, The Bank of Albania considers its communication with the public a key element to an effective communication of its decision-making. To serve this purpose, it makes use of all forms and types of communication. However, direct contact with the people provides us with a real perception and interpretation of their position and expectations and supports a more effective decision-making process. Therefore, I am pleased to be again in your city, the centre of a region of well-known intellectual, cultural and patriotic heritage, which also gives a significant contribution to the country’s gross economic product. I would like, to start this direct communication with you with a summary analysis of domestic economic developments and, after that, dwell in more details on a number of concrete issues that affect the strength of relations between families and businesses on one side, and the financial system and banking sector on the other. During 2010, the Albanian economy is expected to have recorded a satisfactory growth. For the third quarter, annual economic growth is estimated at 4.9 per cent. The economic growth rate has been stable for the last two years, thus proving a good level of resistance to the effects of the international economic crisis. Other macroeconomic indicators have ranged within acceptable and expected levels.
It has no longer been possible to do both; the Riksbank has been forced to choose. I think it has been an absolute necessity in this case to prioritise confidence in the inflation target. It is not just because this is the Riksbank's main task. In my opinion, it is rather obvious that the problems on the housing market are deeper than the currently low interest rate. Housing prices and household debt have risen in parallel and almost constantly for twenty years, and during this time the interest rate has been both relatively high and very low (see Figure 9). Another observation that underlines the claim that the interest rate does not play the leading role is that developments in housing prices in Germany have been quite different from those in Sweden, despite a rather similar monetary policy (see Figure 10). As I see it, it is not reasonable given this to advocate that the Riksbank shall sacrifice its main task – to maintain confidence in the inflation target – to perhaps attain some easing with regard to housing prices and debt, which would in any case only be temporary unless other measures were taken. If we are to attain a long-term sustainable development in the Swedish economy there is no way around managing the risks in the housing and credit markets with targeted measures in housing policy, taxation policy and macroprudential policy. Anything else would be a very strange and ultimately untenable allocation of roles in economic policy. 9 See, for example, Jansson (2014).

Nessén, Marianne (2016), Discussion of ”The case for unencumbering interest rate policy at the zero bound” by Marvin Goodfriend”, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25-27 August. Rachel, Lukasz and Thomas D. Smith (2015), “Secular drivers of the global real interest rate”, Staff Working Paper No. 571, Bank of England. Rogoff, Kenneth (2016), “It would be wrong to abandon the policy of negative rates”, Financial Times, 11 October. Rosengren, Eric S. (2015), “Changing economic relationships: Implications for monetary policy and simple monetary policy rules”, speech on 16 April, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Skingsley, Cecilia (2016), “Should the Riksbank issue e-krona?”, speech at the FinTech conference in Stockholm, 16 November, Sveriges Riksbank. Turk, Rima A. (2016), “Negative interest rates: How big a challenge for large Danish and Swedish banks?”, IMF Working Paper WP/16/198, International Monetary Fund. 13 [20]  Figure 1. Good GDP development in Sweden after financial crisis Index, 2007 Q4=100  Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Office for National Statistics and Statistics Sweden Figure 2. Inflation fell early in Sweden Annual percentage change  Note. The CPI for the US and the HICP for others. Sources: The Bureau of Labor Statistics, Eurostat and Statistics Sweden. 14 [20]  Figure 3.
If governments wish, for political or humanitarian reasons, to ease further the contractual debt burden of an indebted country, this should be carried forward as a conscious and transparent policy decision, which would surely involve usage of taxpayers' money unless it was reliant on coercion of banks. In practice, there are many developing countries which are effectively cut off from commercial bank finance because of a track record of default, political instability, economic mismanagement, corruption and so on. Banks generally need certain minimum assurances, relating to the political climate, the legal system, transparency, corporate governance, etc, over and above the narrower assessment of the servicing capacity of the borrower. Fortunately, most economies in the APEC fold can be classified as open for bank finance. But there are many other countries in the world which are passed over by the international banking community because of the lack of the basic essential attributes, or because they are simply too poor to afford credit on commercial terms, in which case they become dependent on concessional finance from the international institutions as the only reasonably accessible source of external funding. Banks have to abide by prudent standards. Regulators, depositors and shareholders all expect as much. Most banks would leap at the chance to lend more to assist development, if such lending was assessed to be commercially viable.

I know of no sure way of predicting what will happen, but my personal view is that the internet is likely to emerge more as a channel to build on existing relationships and to increase the efficiency of basic services than as something which changes the landscape of the banking industry. But perhaps I am guilty of thinking that everyone else possesses the same inertia as I do when it comes to changing one's habits. Concluding remarks I have skimmed over a few issues which can rather loosely be said to fall under the heading of banking and development. There are many experts attending this symposium who will, I am sure, offer much deeper and more provocative insights into the economic outlook in general, and the relationship between financial development and growth in particular. I wish you all a fruitful and enjoyable couple of days. 4  BIS Review 59/2001
(iv) providing the operational structure with sufficient flexibility against unexpected developments in the markets. Another important factor that determines the general framework of the Central Bank’s liquidity management is the level of liquidity in the market. The main factors that directly affect the liquidity in the market are as follows: (i) Changes in monetary base, (ii) The Central Bank’s foreign currency purchase/sales transactions, (iii) Interests paid/collected by the Central Bank for open market operations and interests paid by the Central Bank for TRY reserve requirements, (iv) The Treasury’s primary surplus, (v) The spread between the Treasury’s redemption and issue of net TRY government bonds, excluding the Central Bank, (vi) Privatization and SDIF-related TRY transfers to the Treasury. In addition, as Treasury determines the TRY-denominated borrowing requirement, the Treasury’s net FX-denominated collections or payments including domestic and external  10  BIS Review 3/2009  borrowing, the Treasury’s redemption to the CBRT and CBRT profit transfers can all indirectly affect TRY liquidity in the market. Excess liquidity conditions, which were created by government bonds bought by the Central Bank in 2001 from public banks and banks within the SDIF, and later by large amounts of FX purchase, prevailed in the market until May 2008. The liquidity shortage that emerged in the market in May 2008 continued for the rest of the year.

The expansionary fiscal policy is contributing to a strong development of household disposable income in the coming years, providing a basis for higher private consumption as well as increased saving. Exports rise during the forecast period but the increase is relatively modest both on account of the international upswing being tentative initially and because the krona is expected to appreciate. GDP growth is judged to be 1.6 per cent this year and then accelerate to between 2.5 and 3 per cent in the coming years, which as fare as can be judged is somewhat more than the Swedish economy can sustain in the longer run without giving rise to inflationary tensions. With the high resource utilisation, labour costs are judged to rise somewhat more than we foresaw in the December Report. Partly for this reason, domestic inflation in the forecast period is somewhat higher than foreseen earlier. CPI inflation stops at 2.2 per cent one year ahead and 2.4 per cent after two years. The corresponding forecast for inflation’s underlying rate, UND1X, is 2.2 per cent both one and two years ahead. Monetary policy focuses in the first place on the latter rate. In this price forecast, the supply shocks that are now leaving their mark on inflation are judged to drop out of the twelve-month change figures successively during the late spring. Inflation is accordingly expected to approach 2 per cent in the early summer.
Unemployment appears to have peaked at just below 8% of the labour force whereas  1  2  Total employment grew by 1.4% in the year to Dec-Feb 2011, according to the latest Labour Force Survey, while private sector employment is estimated to have risen by 1.9% over the course of 2010. This compares with average employment growth of around 1% per annum between 1997 and 2007. BIS central bankers’ speeches  it rose to over 10% following the early 1980s and early 1990s recessions. And I am pleased to note that despite the recession, the number of people employed in the UK is now back above the level recorded when I joined the MPC in October 2006.2 For me, it is not the growth or employment performance of the UK which has been disappointing over the period of economic recovery, but the persistence of relatively high inflation. The primary responsibility of the Monetary Policy Committee within our current policy framework is to maintain price stability – defined in terms of a 2% target for CPI inflation. Yet the current level of inflation is 4% and the most likely scenario is that it will rise further as we move through this year. And this is not just a one-off episode. Over the 55 months I have spent so far as a member of the Monetary Policy Committee, inflation has been above target more than five times as often as it has been below – 46 months compared to 9 months.

Throughout the postwar history of the UK economy, policy-makers have had to strike a balance between the impact of the external value of the currency on the competitiveness of exports and its potential effect on inflation through import costs and the pricing climate. In my view, we have allowed the pound to depreciate more than is necessary or desirable to support the growth of manufacturing and exports. For example, allowing sterling to rise by about 10% from its current level against the euro £ = € would still leave it at a relatively competitive level by historical standards £ = € The very significant fall in sterling from mid-2007 to early 2009 probably helped to support manufacturing industry and exports and hence stabilise the economy in the depths of the recession. But now the world economy is recovering, exports and manufacturing activity are being strongly boosted by the growth of world trade. Meanwhile, worries about deflation have been replaced by the concern that the UK economy now faces a sustained period of relatively high inflation which is endangering our track record of price stability. In these circumstances, our approach to the value of sterling needs to strike a different balance from the view we took in the depths of recession.
On the contrary, and since the very construction of the Euro was based on continuity with the most credible national currencies, it was foreseeable that interest rate convergence inside the future Euro area would take place progressively on the basis of a merge of different yield curves of the various currencies with the benchmark yield curve corresponding to the most performing and credible ones, as it effectively happened. The nay votes from France and the Netherlands to ratifying the EU constitution rattled Europeans concerns for the future. Some observers immediately conjectured that the single currency was directly responsible for the muted economic performance of the euro area and publicly questioned its durability; however, the track record of the Single monetary policy, after 8 years of implementation, has been really impressive: the inception of the euro has been so far associated with an increased macroeconomic and price stability within the euro zone, despite an unusual sequence of unfavourable events, adverse supply shocks and periods of global financial turbulences. The extent to which the recent episode of financial distress will affect the global outlook remains an open issue but the Eurosystem has demonstrated its ability to withstand such a shock as well as the effectiveness of its operational framework. The point I would like to set out today is that a high degree of credibility, transparency and predictability of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy is a key condition for its efficiency.

The achievement of the overriding policy objective: price stability  Confronted with a series of adverse exogenous supply shocks (affecting in particular oil prices, food products and services prices), the Eurosystem has been able to contain inflationary pressures despite considerable volatility: since the Eurosystem became responsible for monetary policy in the euro area, HICP inflation has averaged 2.0 % (1.7% excluding unprocessed food and energy), which is near our definition of price stability at which we aim over the medium term. This figure mainly reflects the sharp increase in oil prices over the last two years. However, HICP inflation has remained below 2% since September 2006. In addition, let me remind you that HICP inflation was around 4% in the 1980s and about 9% in the 1970s [see Figure Annex p3]. Until recently, the single monetary policy also succeeded in stabilising and anchoring medium to long-term inflation expectations at around 1.8% to 1.9%, despite all the above mentioned shocks. That is to say, once again, at a level close to, but below, 2% in accordance with our definition of price stability – whether one takes the inflation expectations derived from surveys (for example, Consensus Forecast, or the ECB survey of professional forecasters – [see Figure Annex p4] ) or those drawn from market data, notably index-linked government bonds. Recently, the awareness of a higher cost of oil has pushed expectations slightly above 2%.
First, I feel that the ECB deserves recognition for having been the European institution that provided the quickest and the most ambitious response to the crisis. It assumed, in exceptional circumstances, a key role in vanquishing doubts as to the continuity of the euro, in underpinning the recovery and, subsequently, in combating the risks derived from the current situation of near-zero or even negative inflation rates. Notably, the ECB’s unique role as the monetary authority of various states and economies did not weaken its resolve as it pressed ahead with its four broad lines of action: First, key policy rates were reduced almost to the bottom of the possible range. Thus the marginal deposit facility rate, which had been negative since 2014, stood at –0.4% in March this year. In the current context of abundant liquidity, this rate is a key reference in monetary policy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Second, the ECB Governing Council strengthened its communication policy through the publication of forward guidance. Third, the liquidity-providing instruments used since 2008 were adapted to the new circumstances. In mid-2014 longer-term refinancing operations were commenced with the specific objective of stimulating credit expansion, i.e. making access by banks to very long-term funding from the ECB conditional on them granting credit to households and nonfinancial corporations. In March it was decided to extend this instrument to 2017.

Looking further out, price inflation is projected to drift down further to a level notably below wage inflation. Chart 4 Policy rate raised from a very low level  The policy rate was cut to zero during the pandemic in order to cushion the downturn in the Norwegian economy. When we saw that economic conditions were normalising, we embarked on a gradual normalisation of the policy rate. But when the labour market tightened and the inflation outlook indicated that inflation might run above target for some time, it was appropriate to raise the policy rate faster in order to bring down inflation. Monetary policy is starting to have a tightening effect on the Norwegian economy. We do not know with certainty what the peak policy rate will be, but we believe we are approaching that level. This may imply a more gradual approach to policy rate setting ahead. Chart 5 A somewhat faster rate rise Our projections are based on a rise in the policy rate to around 3 percent in the course of winter. With this path for the policy rate, the interest rate on housing loans may move up to between 4 and 4½ percent. The reason the rate path is little changed since June, despite far higher-than-projected inflation, is that we are now seeing clear signs of a slowdown in the economy. Easing economic pressures will contribute to curbing inflation further out.