samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Should house prices fall at the same time, the degree of discomfort will increase. If house prices fall by 30 percent, one in four households will hold debt in excess of the value of their dwelling.3 If many households curb consumption in order to reduce debt, the economy in aggregate will be adversely affected. Firms may then encounter payment problems, with a risk that rising bank losses may amplify the downturn. From a unique economic position to restructuring Oil prices have fallen by nearly 50 percent since summer. The price decline comes on top of a planned adjustment to a lower activity level in the oil sector. We have experienced that oil prices fluctuate. Market expectations indicate that prices will edge up again from today’s level. Low growth in the world economy has restrained growth in oil consumption, while the high prices prevailing in recent years have led to increased supply and more energy-efficient production methods. Last year, growth in global oil demand hit a five-year low, while non-OPEC production was record-high. New shale oil extraction technology has boosted the global supply of oil. Over three years, US oil production rose by more than 50 percent (see Chart 7). The additional supply from US shale oil is more than twice as high as Norwegian oil production. 2  Estimate based on calculations in Blix Prestmo, Strøm and Midsem (2015): Ringvirkninger av petroleumsnæringen i norsk økonomi [Spillovers from the petroleum industry to the Norwegian economy]. Forthcoming report from Statistics Norway.

Working with SNB over the last ten months to set up this branch has been a real delight for MAS. You are clear in your objectives, methodical in your approach, and always gracious and understanding in your dealings. Thomas, you will always have the full support of my colleagues and I at the MAS, as SNB grows its presence here. Once again, please accept my congratulations on the opening of your branch. Have an enjoyable evening ahead! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
As announced in March, the objective is still “to gradually bring the Libor down to the lower end of the new target range, i.e. to approximately 0.25%.” Progress will be slow, since monetary policy can only influence risk premia indirectly, for instance, by promoting a climate of greater confidence in the banking sector. The capital market was affected by forces working in opposite directions. On the one hand, long-term rates of interest, which were affected by global developments, rose slightly. This increase reflects renewed optimism about an upturn in the economy, inflationary fears and increased capital requirements on the part of the public sector. On the other hand, risk premia have fallen somewhat. Nonetheless, they remain elevated, and – moreover – the reductions that have occurred have been varied, depending on the quality of borrowers, the maturity of the bond in question and the industry. The months from November 2007 to March 2009 saw a significant appreciation in the Swiss franc, by 10% in trade-weighted terms and by 11% against the euro. Although interest rates had been reduced between October and December last year, the strengthening of the Swiss franc had the unwelcome effect of tightening monetary conditions. In view of this development, we decided at our March assessment to prevent further appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro by purchasing foreign currencies on the foreign exchange market. We achieved our objective.

This, in essence, is attributable to the prices of imported goods, which are down by comparison to their high levels in 2008. However, inflation for domestic goods and services, despite weakening during the year, will remain above 1%. BIS Review 77/2009  3  The outlook for the following years has been very slightly adjusted upwards. We shall return to this point in a few moments. Monetary policy decision At our monetary policy assessment in March, we identified a number of elements that led us to foresee negative inflation for 2009 and a risk of deflation for 2010 and 2011. In view of this threat, we relaxed monetary conditions by taking supplementary measures. We reduced the three-month Libor target range by 25 basis points to 0–0.75%, aiming for a rate of 0.25%. In order to achieve this, we granted longer-term repo credits and concluded foreign exchange swaps. To prevent the Swiss franc from further appreciating against the euro, we purchased foreign currency on the foreign exchange market; we also purchased bonds issued by private sector issuers to foster a decline in capital market risk premia. All in all, these operations achieved their objective. The situation is gradually normalising, although it remains very vulnerable. The risks are still clearly skewed to the downside and are major. Given these conditions, and in view of the inflation forecast, we consider that the time for a correction has not yet come, but that an additional relaxation of monetary conditions is not necessary either.
Consequently, the effectiveness of the supervisory framework, which has doubtless been broadly strengthened by the changes to prudential regulation, depends on three aspects: firstly, the legal availability of a broad set of instruments through which requirements or restrictions may be imposed on banks; secondly, the ability to effectively influence management decisions and policy through formally non-binding actions, and finally the ability to ensure the accounts give a fair view of the bank’s financial situation. True, these elements have largely been present in the supervisory framework in place in Spain in recent years. The Banco de España has had a relatively extensive range of powers and has, in the exercise of its supervision, frequently used moral suasion and the issuance of recommendations, which banks have always followed. Further, it has been empowered to issue accounting rules affecting individual statements, which banks and audit firms have used as a frame of reference to properly complete with the consolidated statements that, generally, must adhere throughout the European Union to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). This supervisory approach is not identical to that followed in other jurisdictions. Within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), most authorities, including the ECB, have somewhat less extensive powers than the Banco de España. Moreover, in various European jurisdictions, the supervisory strategy adheres to a greater extent than in Spain to the strict  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  use of the supervisory instruments formally recognised in the rules, with less dependence on recommendations or informal guidelines.

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The available supply and demand-side factor breakdowns reveal that in the euro area and Spain the former are predominantly behind the rise in, and persistence of, inflation. 10. The observed stylised facts reveal some important differences compared with the United States, where inflation is currently somewhat lower. Food is making a similar contribution, but that of the energy component is considerably smaller (around 20%). By contrast, the contribution of the core component is larger. Indeed, in August underlying inflation stood at 6.3%, with wage growth and the weight of demand-side factors being significantly higher. A key determinant of the economic outlook is the course of the war in Ukraine and its impact on energy markets Europe is particularly exposed to the economic effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, given its geographical proximity, its close trade and financial ties to Russia and, above all, its high dependence on fossil fuel imports from Russia, with limited capacity to replace them in the short term. At the outbreak of the war, gas imports from Russia accounted for approximately 40% of European gas consumption and 10% of its total energy consumption. The invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call for us about this vulnerability, which has materialised through the reduction of almost 85% in the natural gas supplied via pipelines from Russia.

On the contrary, support should focus on 16  Indexation clauses already cover 24.4% of wage-earners with an agreement in force for 2022, compared with 16.1% at end-2021. By 2023, they will cover 45% of wage-earners with an agreement in force for that year, although as yet this only includes a limited number of workers. 11  lower-income households, who bear the brunt of inflation, and the firms most vulnerable to this new shock. Moreover, any measures should be temporary, so as not to further increase the structural budget deficit, which was already very high even before the pandemic. They should also be designed to avoid significant distortions to price signals. But offsetting the adverse effects of the current supply-side shock also calls for ambitious policies to boost productivity growth and potential GDP. In other words, the optimal economic policy response to an adverse supply shock, such as the present one, entails structural reforms (including, naturally, of the energy market) to ease the supply-side tensions. The common European instrument to realise this ambition is the European Union’s NGEU recovery plan. Under NGEU, investment projects must be carefully selected in order to optimally complement, and act as a catalyst for, private investment. But they must also be accompanied by, or even help fund, structural reforms to support, for example, the reallocation of resources across firms and sectors. At the same time, the sustainability of national public finances must be ensured; this is essential for the smooth functioning of the monetary union.
In Norway, credit and capital markets nevertheless feature some weaknesses, with thin securities markets and a narrow investor and ownership base compared with other countries. The reasons, and hence the solutions, can probably be found in the structure of the taxation of dwellings, property and financial assets, in a high level of state ownership of enterprises and in the organisation of pension saving in Norway. Investing even more government capital in Norway would reduce the return on investments in the Norwegian business sector and prompt other investors to invest elsewhere. Allocating even more capital to the Norwegian economy would probably lead to a rapid relocation of jobs to other countries, as the krone would tend to appreciate. Effects on industry structure The planned use of petroleum revenues will increase demand for public and private services. The guidelines imply an increase in the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget of around 3½ per cent of mainland GDP by 2010. This may add 2½ -3 per cent of total employment in the service sector. As long as there are labour shortages in Norway, a comparable decline in manufacturing employment is likely to occur. Although the phasing in of petroleum revenues is a gradual process, the contest for labour resources will intensify. As a result, monetary policy is likely to remain fairly tight in the years ahead. A high interest rate level may in periods result in a strong krone. This may accelerate the scaling back of manufacturing industry.

Kalin Hristov: Monetary unions in history Welcome remarks by Mr Kalin Hristov, Deputy Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, at the Conference “Monetary Unions in History”, jointly organised by the Bulgarian National Bank and the European Association for Banking and Financial History (eabh) e.V., Sofia, 1 July 2022. * * * Dear Members of the Association, Dear conference participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour to welcome you to this conference which the Bulgarian National Bank organises in cooperation with the European Association for Banking and Financial History. I am also delighted to have this event, together with yesterday’s workshop on the “Digital rebirth of historical datasets”, taking place in Sofia alongside the annual meeting of the Association. This year marks twenty years since the Bulgarian National Bank became a member of the Association; this is the first time, however, that an annual meeting and events of the Association are hosted in Bulgaria. Let me, therefore, extend words of gratitude for the excellent cooperation with the Association regarding the organisation of this series of events. The Bulgarian National Bank is one of the oldest central banks in the world, thirteenth by order of its establishment in 1879. Our institution has understandably cultivated a profound respect for banking and financial history, as seen from our topical publications and research projects we take part in. For us history is also vibrantly present today – exactly twenty-five years ago, 1 July 1997 was the day of introduction of the currency board in Bulgaria.
And in some cases there is also a willingness among central banks themselves to adopt a looser interpretation of their existing mandates. This tendency has strengthened noticeably of late. In our case, for example, there have been a series of motions in parliament calling on the SNB to do more with regard to climate protection. The same applies to the issue of inequality, ever since the use of central bank balance sheets to tackle the global financial crisis has increasingly raised questions regarding the redistribution of wealth. Time and again, there have been initiatives from politicians demanding that central banks directly finance government tasks. For example, a popular initiative was recently launched in Switzerland seeking to amend the Federal Constitution to give the SNB a direct role in financing the national pension scheme. How is the SNB to deal with these demands? All these concerns – from climate protection to the redistribution of wealth and securing pension provision – are important matters that are Page 9/16  rightfully being raised. That said, I am convinced that attempting to solve these issues with monetary policy instruments would entail a significant threat to the effectiveness of monetary policy over the medium to long term. The SNB naturally has to take into account the influence that changes in the economic structure have on inflation. For example, climate change can have an effect on potential growth, and this has to be considered when setting the monetary policy stance. However, the mandate of a central bank must not be overburdened.

Our definition of price stability is particularly beneficial for a small, open country such as Switzerland that is exposed to strong external shocks. Other approaches would have often required more drastic and disproportionate monetary policy responses in recent years. Given the openness of our economy, fine-tuning inflation is unrealistic. Our strategy has thus also made a significant contribution to the credibility of our monetary policy. The SNB’s mandate is clearly focused and should remain so, regardless of important societal problems such as climate change and the financing of pension provision. A narrow mandate allows a central bank to concentrate on the essential task of ensuring price stability, but is also of fundamental importance in safeguarding its independence. Independence seeks to achieve and requires distance from politics. This distance is therefore not something to be given up lightly. Page 12/16  Chart 1  Chart 2  Page 13/16  Chart 3  Chart 4  Page 14/16  Chart 5  Chart 6  Page 15/16  Chart 7  Chart 8  Page 16/16
For instance, a few days ago, Accenture announced opening a new centre in Warsaw, which deals with outsourcing of business processes, offers finance services, delivery management and HR management. Ultimately, the centre will employ up to a thousand of highly qualified experts and offer services in a dozen of languages. The outsourcing centre in Warsaw will be another one Accenture opens in Central and Eastern Europe, with similar having been launched in Prague, Bratislava and Riga. 16  See e.g. the McKinsey Global Institute “The Emerging Global Labour Market”, June 2005. 17  See e.g. AT Kearney Offshore Location Attractiveness Index; or Ernst & Young European Attractiveness Survey 2005. BIS Review 64/2006  9  Today, due to time constraints, I did not touch many topics closely related to the emergence of the global labour market. For instance, we should consider why, in the ranking of Boston Consulting Group covering a hundred companies with the highest global growth potential on the emerging markets, there is no Polish company 18 , whilst the ranking is dominated by China and India, plus some companies from Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, Thailand or Mexico. For instance, we should consider what impact of the demography, migration, off-shoring, and outsourcing will be on the income of global employees. The available results demonstrate that poorly qualified workers in expensive countries may experience their wages go down or even become unemployed 19.

Beaucoup de réflexions actuelles  Page 7 sur 14 en France – dont celles récentes de la commission Arthuis – avancent le principe d’une telle norme de dépenses, à juste titre. Mais il faudra en fixer le niveau, ce qui relève du débat démocratique : les exemples chiffrés que je viens de citer peuvent l’éclairer. C’est un objectif exigeant mais accessible : nombre de nos voisins européens y sont parvenus. B. Our macroeconomic policies? The lack of macroeconomic policy coordination has long been the “usual suspect” for the weakness in our economic union. This was true during the euro crisis: monetary stimulus, whether powerful enough or not, was not sufficiently supported by fiscal policy, which was tightened too early. This lesson has not been forgotten in this crisis. Along with my colleagues on the Governing Council, I personally will never forget that night of March 2020 when, locked down in our homes, we took, in less than three hours, some of the strongest measures in the history of the euro, creating our now almost famous PEPP [Pandemic emergency purchase programme]. On the fiscal front, with its Next Generation recovery plan of EUR 750 billion, financed by a shared debt instrument, the European Union demonstrated an unprecedented level of solidarity towards the countries most affected by the Covid crisis. Monetary policy is no longer the only game in town, and Europe has reacted appropriately over the past year.
The outcome was similar to the risk scenario that we presented in a Monetary Policy Report in February 2007 before the collective bargaining process began. This undermined the possibility to conduct a relatively expansionary monetary policy with low interest rates and still reach the inflation target. 4  BIS Review 154/2008  Somewhat higher wage increases in 2007-2009 than in the preceding agreement period In February 2007, the Riksbank's assessment was that hourly wages would increase by 3.9 per cent per year in the three-year period 2007-2009. When more information on the result of the rounds of collective bargaining became available in June 2007, this assessment was increased to 4.2 per cent per year. My personal belief was that hourly wages would increase more than this. Since the spring of 2007, the development of the economy has been much weaker than we expected. The crisis on the financial markets has entailed a dramatic downturn in the US economy which has had a dampening effect on economic development in other countries, including Sweden. This can in turn have made the companies more cost conscious and less willing to employ new personnel and increase wages above the levels stipulated in the agreements. It is therefore reasonable to assume that there will be lower wage increases during the threeyear agreement period than we could predict in 2007.

All these policies, and others which, for brevity’s sake, I have not mentioned today, are essential to generate solvent credit demand and to ensure that a solid banking system can respond to such demand. Having tried to raise your spirits, I must tell you that, despite the huge effort made so far, we are unlikely to see a prompt recovery in the Spanish economy. Emerging from crises caused by over-borrowing and competitiveness losses in a monetary union is a very slow process,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  and for that very reason we cannot afford to be complacent. The pace of the changes and reforms adopted by this country in recent years has to continue steadily. What remains to be done in relation to the current-account balance and bank restructuring (to continue with the examples chosen)? To improve the current-account balance Spain must continue to improve its competitiveness, in order to generate current-account surpluses for a number of years and so reduce its negative net international investment position. Moreover, this is urgent while the worst consequence of the euro crisis, i.e. financial market fragmentation, persists. As regards bank restructuring, much has been done, but there still remains much to do, not only to continue to repair the effects on the banking system of an economic crisis that regrettably can still not be deemed to be over, but also to give us a framework for action to enable us to combat future crises.