samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Among the measures taken, banks have established command centres to monitor the situation and to take appropriate action following reports of confirmed or suspected cases of infection among staff. Typically, this involves sending home colleagues in contact with the infected staff member and cleansing the office or branch concerned. This is part of a more general increased focus on office and personal hygiene. Staff are generally being required or strongly encouraged to wear masks and gloves for their own protection and to limit the spread of the disease. The banks have also activated back-up sites for critical operational areas such as computer systems, dealing and settlement. Teams of staff that could man these operations in an emergency have been identified and have been segregated in locations outside the main office such as the back-up site or other branches. Some staff have also been working from home. In some cases, arrangements have been made with overseas branches to cover at least part of the activities of the Hong Kong operations in case of need. The number of overseas trips and meetings has been cut back. 2  BIS Review 21/2003  So far these special arrangements seem to have been effective. Banks have been able to maintain their operations without major disruption, except for the temporary closure of a few branches. Hopefully, it will be possible to wind down the arrangements in the near future. No doubt lessons have been learned from the experience that can be incorporated in the banks’ contingency plans.

The SGX has direct and frontline regulatory responsibilities of the securities and futures markets, and over the broker-dealers who trade on the exchange. This MAS-SGX regulatory relationship applies to all the major areas of regulation: a. Regulation of capital raising  •  SGX defines and enforces the rules that apply to companies that seek to raise capital on the exchange through primary or secondary issues. •  MAS' approval must be sought for any changes to SGX's listing rules. Under the proposed SFA, the SGX will have to notify the MAS of any rule changes 21 days before its announcement. MAS will be able to approve, alter or stop any rule change during that 21-day period. b. Continuous listing and disclosure requirements  •  SGX enforces the continuous listing requirements on companies, to see to it that listed companies maintain timely and adequate disclosure of material information. SGX has the power to suspend and even de-list a counter if a company fails to meet the standards set out in the listing rules. BIS Review 14/2001  3  •  Continuous disclosure by listed companies will also become a statutory obligation under the proposed SFA. This means that non-disclosure or late disclosure of material information will be a breach of the law, not just a breach of SGX's listing requirements, and carry either civil or criminal penalty. c.  Market surveillance  •  SGX carries out market surveillance to detect unusual trading activities that could reflect attempts to manipulate the market.
In large part, that demand follows directly from the increased breadth and scale of central banks’ responsibilities and financial exposures. But in the Bank of England’s case the desire to build a strengthened financial risk framework also reflects an important consequence of taking on responsibility for the micro-prudential regulation of banks, which is that we should be willing to do unto ourselves as we would do unto others: a Golden Rule for central bankers. And it reflects a strong desire to investigate new ways of driving innovative analysis and lean against the risks of groupthink. Strengthening the Bank of England’s financial risk framework  The Bank has had strong first- and third-line financial risk functions for some time. An expert first-line team assesses, prices and haircuts the wide range of collateral pre-positioned with us, monitors the specific risks taken in live operations on a day-to-day basis, and evaluates the financial condition of our counterparties, 6  liaising with our supervisory colleagues in the Bank’s Prudential Regulation Authority arm . And internal and external auditors regularly assess the effectiveness of the Bank’s financial controls. Until recently, however, the Bank has not had a dedicated second-line financial risk function, reflecting a perception that central banking operations did not give rise to tensions of the sort seen between profit making and risk control in private firms. The amount of residual risk to which the Bank was actually exposed, after taking account of large collateral haircuts and government indemnities, was also felt to be relatively small.

It also sits at the base of a particularly steep waterfall: since any loss in a lending operation would be expected to be met, first by a solvent firm’s own resources, second by the central bank’s collateral haircuts, and only then by its capital. Any loss beyond that implicitly falls to the government, as the ultimate owner of the central bank (Chart 6). Chart 6: The central bank capital waterfall  banking system  Central bank balance sheet  General Government  Probability  Self-insurance  Haircuts Capital  Risk-sharing with the Treasury More severe losses  Central banks across the globe differ in how they divide up this pie. In the UK, the Bank of England operates with a relatively low level of capital, and has few means of rapidly replenishing that capital if it is depleted (Chart 7). As a result it has tended to rely heavily on UK government indemnities for its larger operations, such as the quantitative easing example I gave a few moments ago. The Bank’s measured leverage ratio is 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  just 1%, reflecting the fact that it supports a balance sheet of around £ on less than £ of equity. 12  But the ratio for its non-indemnified balance is materially higher, reflecting the significant role played by indemnities.
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Living with capital flows – a delicate balancing act Speech by Mr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 5th Annual Euromoney Thailand Investment Forum, Living with capital flows: a delicate balancing act, Bangkok, 22 March 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It’s an honor to speak before you today in the 5th Annual Euromoney Thailand Investment Forum. Since yesterday, you must have already heard many interesting discussions about Thailand’s prospects. Here, I would like to reaffirm that Thailand is indeed on a recovery path. Over a longer horizon, the prospects of ASEAN integration and the rise of Asia are also offering causes for optimism. As international investors, you naturally would want to participate in Thailand’s exciting prospects. Before putting more money into Thailand, however, I suspect that you would want to understand our macro-policy environment. Our recovery has been gaining momentum, and the central bank has been echoing more vigilance regarding inflationary pressures. Meanwhile, the global environment suggests that more capital is likely to flow into our economy. In this complex situation, I believe that you might want to know what the central bank’s view and stance are. Since the majority of you are in the capital markets, the focus of my talk today will be related to capital inflows. Capital inflows have always been and will continue to be welcomed into Thailand. Indeed, capital inflows have been vital for Thailand’s development.

Consumer price inflation among a number of our trading partners is high as a result of rising energy prices, but the increase in prices for other goods and services remains moderate. Continued solid growth among our trading partners is in prospect. As global capacity utilisation increases to a more normal level, demand for Norwegian exports might remain buoyant. More export enterprises are facing capacity constraints. Export growth in the years ahead will probably occur in industries such as the engineering and shipbuilding industries. Production growth is now high in these sectors, and employment is rising after declining for several years. High growth in the global economy has also pushed up prices for non-oil commodities. Rising commodity prices and buoyant activity in markets that are important for Norway have generated growth impulses to the Norwegian economy. Since May this year, commodity prices have varied widely, but on the whole edged up since end-June. International equity markets have stabilised since the turbulence in May, and have edged up since the previous monetary policy meeting. The benchmark index on the Oslo Stock Exchange is now at a good 12 per cent higher than at the beginning of the year. Interest rates are still low among many of our trading partners, in spite of the increases in several countries as a result of rising energy prices and higher consumer price inflation.
We have called the new macro model “Norwegian Economy Model”, or abbreviated “NEMO”. In the work on developing the model, we have benefited greatly from our close cooperation with the IMF and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. We have also been inspired by and learned from the work of a number of other central banks, for example in the UK, Sweden and Canada. In addition, we have the benefit of a long history of model-building in Norway. NEMO belongs to a class of macroeconomic models that tends to be referred to as DSGE models, which stands for “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium”. The term dynamic means that the entire path from the short term to the long term is modelled. The model is stochastic in the sense that the economy is exposed to random disturbances. Such disturbances can, for example, stem from a change in preferences, technology and market structure. General equilibrium implies that supply equals demand at all times in all markets, but there may be considerable temporary deviations from the long-term growth path. BIS Review 4/2005  5  A prominent feature of this type of model is that the behaviour of different economic agents is modelled explicitly. Each model parameter therefore has its own economic interpretation. Households maximise utility and choose the optimal distribution between work and leisure and between consumption and saving. Firms maximise profit. The authorities have defined specific economic policy objectives.

We have invested in a profitable oil industry and found a balance between spending petroleum revenues domestically and saving petroleum revenues. On the other hand, it seems that both the public and private sectors are having difficulties finding profitable mainland investment projects. Taking a longer view, this is a source of concern. Should petroleum revenues shrink, our economy needs more pillars to stand on. Otherwise, we as well would have to embark on a path of adjustment towards renewed growth. Perhaps Norway is not so much an economy apart after all. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13
This included a new program to purchase an additional $ billion a month of agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS). The FOMC reiterated in October that it will continue its purchases of agency MBS, undertake additional asset purchases, and employ its other tools as appropriate until there is a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market in a context of price stability. Monetary policy works in large part through its effect on financial markets and financial conditions. The impact on economic activity depends on the extent to which policy actions are effectively transmitted to key sectors of the economy. While actions such as MBS purchases help ease financial conditions more broadly, a key channel through which monetary policy affects the economy is through the housing and mortgage markets. An easing of policy lowers the secondary market rate at which mortgage-backed securities trade, which puts downward pressure on the primary mortgage interest rate. A lower primary mortgage rate enables borrowers to refinance their existing loans at lower rates, and increases demand for home purchases, supporting house prices and household wealth, which in turn may increase household access to credit. We have seen this channel in operation since the September FOMC meeting. Yields on newly issued agency MBS have declined about 45 basis points and the Freddie Mac survey 30-year primary rate has declined 23 basis points to 3.32 percent.

Similarly, after five years in which housing production was well below what is consistent with underlying demographic trends, it now appears that we have worked off the excess supply of housing built up during the boom years of the last decade. Existing home sales remain on an upward trend, and a widely followed national home price index is up around 12 percent over the 12 months ending in July.1 Indeed, anecdotal reports suggest that this higher-thanexpected increase in home prices is due to a lack of homes for sale. However, a number of risks to the outlook are evident. Long-term interest rates, including mortgage rates, have risen significantly since early May. Since then, we have seen a sharp drop in refinancing mortgage applications, a more moderate but significant decline in purchase mortgage applications and fairly flat housing starts and new home sales. Although I do not anticipate that the rise in long-term rates will lead to a downturn in housing, these developments do suggest that higher mortgage rates have cut into the upward momentum of the housing sector. We will need to monitor upcoming data closely to assess more fully the impact of higher rates on the housing recovery. Another risk is that federal fiscal policy could exert further restraint on the economy during the rest of this year and in 2014. It is difficult to assess how much of the contractionary effects from sequestration, for example, have already occurred, or still remain ahead. A related issue is the high degree of uncertainty about fiscal policy.
5  I say “to a degree” because the constraint wasn’t fully binding. Sterling was devalued in 1967, even before Bretton Woods started to break down. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  First, the fiscal position is not, on its own, a reliable predictor of inflation. The prevailing institutional arrangements, and in particular the integrity of the monetary regime, matter at least as much. It’s hard to say whether the UK government’s concern about its financial position was in any sense a cause of the inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. There were probably many contributing factors. But it’s surely at least as relevant that there was no fixed nominal anchor guiding monetary policy and no independent authority setting it. Also relevant is the cause of the increase in government debt. In wartime, debt goes up because the government is spending significant sums on actual goods and services, thereby putting significant pressure on economic resources. It buys more stuff and employs more people. All else equal, this is inflationary. It often requires real interest rates to rise, in order to “crowd out” spending by the private sector and its demand for those same resources. After the financial crisis, by contrast, debt rose not because government spending on goods and services went up but because, in the face of a sharp downturn in private-sector demand, tax receipts collapsed. The downturn in aggregate demand, actual and expected, depressed the appropriate level of real interest rates and bond yields.

Deposit rates dropped significantly at maturities of one year or more, while the rates on our instruments at terms of two or more years, also fell after the announcements. One issue that has been on the table, not only in Chile but in the developed world and a number of emerging economies as well, is precisely the behavior of longer-term interest rates. Unlike those at very short term, which are largely arbitraged by the monetary policy stance, interest rates on long term government bonds are more influenced by, among other factors, the appetite for risk, the evolution of interest rates around the world and the widespread uncertainty prevailing in the economy. This last point is connected with expectations for long-term inflation and growth and fiscal solvency prospects, with particular strength in those economies that have had to embark in costly financial packages and bank bail-out programs, thereby multiplying their levels of public debt. In some emerging economies, and even in some developed ones, this increased debt has spurred doubts about the sustainability of their fiscal accounts and monetary arrangements, questioning their capacity to grow in the coming years. Although luckily, and thanks to the efforts made, the Chilean economy is not in such a situation, the determination of the long-term interest rates does depend indisputably not only on the prospects for growth and inflation – and thus on monetary policy – but also on portfolio decisions of domestic agents and the appetite for risk. Developments early this year are very illustrative.
I have discussed elsewhere (King, 2001) the potential importance of money in reducing the transactions costs of firms by reducing liquidity premia in a wide range of financial markets. There is much to learn here. (ii)  Incomplete indexation of the tax system  A second cost of anticipated inflation is the added inefficiencies that arise when an already distortionary tax system is incompletely indexed. Martin Feldstein (1999) has edited a major study of the costs of incomplete indexation which includes a detailed analysis of the tax distortions to saving, consumption and investment in several major countries, and to which the Bank of England contributed. The benefit of reducing inflation in an already low inflation environment is estimated to be lower in the UK than in some other countries because some parts of the tax system are indexed. Nevertheless, the authors estimate that a reduction in inflation by 2 percentage points would bring an annual benefit equivalent to 0.2% of GDP. That may sound small, but it is a large absolute number. Against that, the end of mortgage interest deductibility will have lowered the impact. (iii)  Front-end loading of debt burdens  A third distortion is that of front-loading of the real debt burden when debt contracts are fixed in nominal terms. Inflation reduces the amount that households borrow because it raises the cost of servicing the loan in the early years. In this way decisions on consumption and investment may be distorted.

This part of the city survived the 1963 earthquake, when nearly all the city's beautiful neoclassical 18th and 19th century buildings were destroyed. After the earthquake, international financial aid poured into Skopje in order to rebuild the city. Today, Skopje is seeing a makeover in buildings, streets and shops, and many projects (Macedonian Struggle Museum, the Archeological Museum of Macedonia, National Archive, Constitutional Court, New Philharmonic Theatre) were finished in order to return some of the looks and spirit of the city. In economic aspect, being many times since 2006 on the list of 10 best reformers by the Doing Business rank of the World Bank, proves that Macedonia has undergone considerable economic reforms. It has developed as an open economy with the trade accounting more  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  than country's GDP in recent years. Although the environment was highly difficult, first with the global financial crisis, afterward with euro area crisis and more recently, with Greece crisis, our GDP growth was on average above 3% for whole this period, which is one of the highest in Europe, and for 2015 it is expected to be around 3.5%. The unemployment from a very high level, throughout this period is on declining path, by implementing many structural reforms and ALMP. The government strategy to attract foreign investments and establishment of a good business environment for the development of small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) was paid off.
Relative prices are distorted leading to inefficient allocation of resources;  v.  High Cost of Investment as interest rates skyrocket;  vi. Savings propensity is low as savers are discouraged by negative real interest rates;  vii. In an inflationary economy, interest rates are high and borrowing for investment is inhibited, which leads to:   Limited access by productive (private) sectors to investment funds;    Low investment, output and employment; and    Lesser impact on the social sectors. Ladies and gentlemen, as you share thoughts in this workshop, allow me to underscore the importance, we at the Bank of Zambia attach to capacity building programmes for all employees in the financial sector. I am reliably informed that during the workshop you will cover a number of important topics including the following: i.  Analysing the framework for collective bargaining and exploring new trends in collective bargaining;  ii. Enhancing negotiation skills and knowledge base of Union Officials; and  iii. Developing a pool of professional union negotiators in ZUFIAW. I am fully aware that some of the topics that you will be discussing during this Forum may not be entirely new to you, but I firmly believe that they may be necessary for purposes of reinforcing what you already know. I therefore, urge you all to take keen interest in all the deliberations if you are to realise the full benefit of the workshop.

Michael Gondwe: Collective bargaining Remarks by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW) Negotiations Forum – Phase 1, Lusaka, 20 March 2012. *  *  *    The ZUFIAW President, Mr Cephas Mukuka    The General Secretary of the Zambia Union of Financial Institutions and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW), Mrs Joyce Nonde Simukoko    The Executive Secretary of Federation of Free Trade Union in Zambia, Mr Lyson Mando    The Representative from the International Labour Organisation    Workshop Facilitators    Distinguished Participants    Ladies and Gentlemen  I wish to welcome you all to this important Workshop, on Collective Bargaining, organized by the Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers (ZUFIAW). Let me take this opportunity to commend ZUFIAW for taking the initiative to organise this Forum, which is intended to facilitate exchange of information and views on aspects of effective collective bargaining. Mr President, as you are aware, in spite of the recent global economic crisis, our country has continued to enjoy relative macroeconomic stability, with favourable prospects for the future. As a result of consistent implementation of appropriate macroeconomic policies: i. The country has registered positive real GDP growth averaging 6.5% annually since 2007. This is a necessary condition for poverty reduction efforts;  ii. Inflation and exchange rates developments have also been favourable.