samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If anything, it looks to be slightly lower than anticipated. However, so far this year wage costs per produced unit nevertheless appear to have increased by more than we had expected as a result of the weaker productivity. Employment continued to increase during the second quarter of this year, but unemployment remained largely unchanged compared with one year ago. The outcomes were close to the forecasts. The number of hours worked per week continued to increase during the first half of the year, which contributed to a decline in productivity. The Economic Tendency Survey in July was also weak. It fell and now indicates that the Swedish economy is much weaker than normal. It is mainly households that are contributing to the low level. This is the most pessimistic that households have been about the Swedish economy for 15 years. The confidence indicator for the Swedish business sector fell, but it is nevertheless at a level corresponding to the average since 1996. The Economic Tendency Survey also shows that sales prices in the wholesale and retail trade continued to rise to a large extent and that continued increases are predicted for the third quarter. Households’ and companies’ inflation expectations continued to rise. They even rose more than is indicated by statistical correlations between inflation and inflation expectations. However, inflation expectations as measured in the bond market, what is known as breakeven inflation, have declined. Inflation rose from 4.0 per cent in May to 4.3 per cent in June and 4.4 per cent in July.

Joseph S Tracy: What the Fed did and why Remarks by Mr Joseph S Tracy, Executive Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Westchester County Bankers Association, Tarrytown, New York, 25 June 2010. *  *  *  In my remarks this morning, I would like to look back over the events of the past several years and offer my perspective on what were the essential drivers of the financial crisis and the Federal Reserve’s interventions. 1 I will review the changes that have been taking place in the U.S. financial system and how these changes created the conditions conducive to the crisis. I will then discuss the developments in residential real estate financing that provided the catalyst for the crisis. With this background, I will outline the interventions that were carried out to mitigate the crisis, focusing on those conducted by the Federal Reserve. I will direct my remarks to the facilities that were created rather than to the actions taken for individual institutions since these have been discussed extensively elsewhere. The lessons learned from the crisis are important for the design of the policy response aimed at reducing the likelihood that the U.S. economy ever again experiences this degree of trauma. I begin with the simple exercise of what name we should assign to this past crisis. At first blush, this may not seem like a useful exercise. But, as Shakespeare reminded us, names are important as they convey a sense of our understanding of the event.
Two questions in particular tend to arise: Do we only take into account inflation, or do we also care about the real economy, for instance, the employment situation? And what do we think of the rapid increase in household indebtedness and in property prices? The aims of monetary policy To understand the monetary policy decisions, it is of course essential that there is no uncertainty regarding the objective of monetary policy. There is only one statutory objective for monetary policy and that is to maintain price stability. We at the Riksbank have then chosen to specify this objective in terms of an explicit inflation target. This entails an annual change in the consumer price index (CPI) of 2 per cent with a tolerance interval of ± 1 percentage point. One might ask why we allow a certain measure of inflation when Parliament has given us the task of maintaining price stability. One reason why we have chosen not to set the inflation target at zero is that an inflation target that is too low can under certain circumstances create adverse conditions for employment. There is an inbuilt resistance within the economy to nominal reductions in prices and  1  See “Monetary policy in Sweden", Sveriges Riksbank (this document can be downloaded from the Riksbank’s website, www.riksbank.com, or ordered as a booklet). BIS Review 84/2006  1  wages and a certain measure of inflation can therefore make it easier to implement necessary changes in relative prices and wages.

This is the starkest example of fundamental uncertainty – science cannot say that this will happen, but neither can it completely rule out disastrous outcomes. Threshold effects occur when climate change reaches a tipping point and cannot be reversed, but instead speeds up further change. There are several examples: melting icecaps, thawing permafrost, forest fires that can devastate areas of the Amazon rain forest. Considering uncertainty is a natural part of all decision-making. In the monetary policy process, for example, there is uncertainty about underlying economic correlations, about data, about forecasts, etc. In this process, it is common to formulate decisions so that outcomes are as good as possible on average. 5  See also Lane (2019) for a discussion. 4 [18]  When it comes to decision-making in the climate area, Martin Weitzman’s research has had a substantial impact.6 In his view, decisions should be formulated in order to avoid the worst outcomes. This is easy to understand from an insurance perspective. When we take out a fire insurance policy, for example, we give higher weight to the worst outcome (the house burning down) in our risk assessment than the most likely outcome (the house not burning down). If we had not done this, we probably would not have taken out fire insurance. We should use the same thinking regarding climate policy. When we are exposed to serious threats at the same time as there is considerable uncertainty, we should insure ourselves so that we avoid and reduce the consequences of the worst outcomes.
In a nutshell, during this first phase of the crisis, the Eurosystem (1) more flexibly used its open market operations by changing the time-path of liquidity provision and employing fine-tuning operations, (2) lengthened the maturity structure of its open market operations (for instance, operations with a maturity of six months were introduced, whereas the maximum length had been three months before the crisis), and (3) coordinated with other central banks around the world to provide US Dollar funding.4 The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the subsequent very severe financial market tensions led the Eurosystem to adopt further measures. Official interest rates were cut by 325 basis points in just a few months to the then-historically low level of 1 per cent by March 2009. Open market operations were conducted as tenders with a fixed rate and full allotment. This implied that the ECB no longer controlled the aggregate supply of liquidity to the banking sector, but that the aggregate demand by banks, subject to individual banks’ availability of adequate collateral, determined total liquidity provision. As a consequence, the Eurosystem’s balance sheet increased, and short-term money market interest rates dropped to levels close to the deposit facility rate. Moreover, the ECB further widened the set of eligible collateral. Finally, and importantly, the ECB introduced a limited number of open market operations with maturities of one year (three such operations were conducted in 2009). The objectives behind this second wave of measures differed from the first wave.

Finally I will highlight the expected benefits associated with moving towards a strong banking and financial union in the euro area. Banking sector’s deleveraging From a policy perspective it is useful to think about banks’ deleveraging as arising from two possible sources: demand factors and supply factors. Although somewhat artificial, this distinction may be instructive in guiding the appropriate policy response. Typical demand factors are the lack of profitable opportunities for investment or the presence of deleveraging forces arising in other sectors of the economy. Supply factors are related to banks’ insufficient balance sheet capacity to hold assets. This can arise from capital shortfalls or funding strains – or both. Banks can address capital shortfalls and funding strains by adjusting the asset and/or liability side of the balance sheet. Asset shedding is the most far-reaching solution. If balance sheet pressures arise from funding strains, banks may decide to sell the most liquid assets and non-core assets that can be liquidated in a short space of time. On the other hand, if deleveraging pressures are mainly related to capital positions, banks have an incentive to shed more capital-intensive assets to induce the largest reduction in risk-weighted assets. Abrupt adjustments of the asset side of the balance sheet can lead to a credit crunch, if they are made by many banks simultaneously.
The fact that inflation has been lower than inflation expectations means that the longrun sustainable rate of unemployment may have been overestimated The Riksbank (2012a) presents a briefer estimate of long-run sustainable unemployment in the form of the interval 5–7.5 per cent, thus with a midpoint of 6.25 per cent. Long-run sustainable unemployment is calculated in two stages, as by the Ministry of Finance (2011). In the first stage, long-run sustainable unemployment in 2006 is estimated in the form of the interval 6.5–7.5 per cent, that is, with a midpoint of 7 per cent (to be compared with the Ministry of Finance’s corresponding estimate of 6.6 per cent). The second stage entails estimating the effect of government reforms and changes in the composition of the labour force on long–run sustainable unemployment since 2006, in the form of an interval of 0 to 1.5 percentage points, that is, with a midpoint of 0.75 percentage points (to be compared with the Ministry of Finance’s corresponding estimate of 1.6 percentage points). When this interval is deducted from the first one, we get an interval of 5–7.5 per cent, with a midpoint of 6.25 per cent (to be compared with the Ministry of Finance’s corresponding estimate of 5 per cent). The Riksbank uses as a base in the first stage the average rate of unemployment during the period 1999–2006, that is, about 7 per cent, which is then made into a midpoint in the estimated interval of 6–7.5 per cent.

The importance of state and local governments manifests itself in different ways, which are really different sides of the same coin. First, the sector directly produces a very large amount of economic activity. In 2014, state and local governments generated output valued at about $ trillion. This represents over 11 percent of total U.S. GDP and is more than 50 percent higher than the federal government’s contribution. And, even after years of retrenchment following the financial crisis, state and local governments employ almost 20 million individuals – nearly one in seven American workers. Clearly, a successful and stable state and local government sector is a vital contributor to overall output and employment. On the other side of the coin, we find the real effects of this activity: the provision of public safety, education, and health; as well as water, sewer and transportation services. These are the core public services that our citizens need, and which are absolutely fundamental to support private sector economic activity. So, as a central banker, I recognize the essential role that state and local governments play in the economy. Without successful state and local governments, the Fed’s dual mandate of maximum sustainable employment with stable prices would be much more difficult to attain. A final important dimension of the state and local sector – and the one that is perhaps most obviously front and center for today’s discussion – is its debt. The municipal bond market is very large, with outstanding issues totaling over $ trillion.
2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  The Bank is also seeking to increase our cognitive diversity, which shapes our perspectives – how we think about problems and solve them  iii  Cognitive diversity doesn’t lend itself to targets. But it’s no less important. iv  Research shows that while older  colleagues often view diversity as an issue of representation and fairness, millennials tend to view cognitive v  diversity as essential for a diverse and inclusive organisation. This younger generation is interested in connecting with each other, collaborating across teams and exploring a variety of ideas to solve problems. That’s not just interesting, it’s necessary. The spirit of the millennial is better suited to the complex challenges that central bankers face in a risky and uncertain world. So our commitment to diversity cannot only be about meeting targets. It must promote an environment that brings cognitive differences to the fore, and it must create a culture where everyone can maximise their potential. We need a richness of ideas and perspectives that are exchanged in the pursuit of clear goals under an overarching mission. This is the crux of inclusion: an organisation where people feel empowered, enabled and engaged in pursuit of a common goal. The why  Increased trust  As a central bank, we need to be understood, credible and trusted for our policies to be most effective. The Bank’s work often requires deep technical skill and knowledge.

Along with the low demand of businesses and households, its performance reflects the selective and prudent behaviour of banks in lending. Regarding lending problems, the Bank of Albania deems that banking system’s balances are sound, sufficiently liquid, and well capitalised to comply with the economy’s demand for monetary assets. The positive position of its balances triggered the lending growth during the past years, while many countries in our region experienced contraction of lending. The banking system has reviewed and tightened lending standards during the last years; this behaviour to enhance the financial discipline of the economy is welcomed and shall positively support the long-term growth of Albania. On the other side, credit performance is increasingly experiencing the lack of demand, which is triggered by the consumers and businesses reluctance to carry out expenses and investments. Bank of Albania deems that, notwithstanding the cyclical situation of Albania’s economy, the perspectives on medium and long-term development remain positive. This is reflected by the interest of foreign investors to increase their exposure toward the Albanian economy. In particular, economy sectors related to exports, tourism and agriculture, which serves to the domestic and regional markets, provide unused development potentials. Bank of Albania deems that, within the sound business’ logic parameters, the Albanian entrepreneurs and consumers have room for a more active approach toward the growth of investments and their consumption. Financial markets showed low interest rate fluctuation and operated under sufficient liquidity terms in the second quarter of 2012.
In conclusion, let me assure you once again that you will find in the Bank of Albania a loyal, supportive and serious partner, adherent to its legal mandate. Our decision-making will be transparent and all our initiatives will be guided by a spirit of cooperation with the banking sector, aiming at ensuring highest efficiency. I wish you a successful and prosperous year for you and your families. Thank you for your attention! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

Vittorio Corbo: Recent trends and perspectives for the Chilean economy Speech by Mr Vittorio Corbo, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Seminar “Business and Economic vision 2007-2008”, organized by Sofofa and Universidad del Desarrollo, Santiago, 17 October 2007. *  *  *  The insertion of the Chilean economy into global markets has implied that its economic cycle has been determined by a mix of domestic macroeconomic policies, world economic events and by idiosyncratic conditions, such as recent energy supply shocks. In recent years, the prominent external environment for the Chilean economy has been favorable. On the one hand, a rising demand and high prices of our exports, and on the other hand, low import prices of consumption and capital goods. In addition, firms have also faced favorable financing conditions. In this presentation I will start by discussing the outlook for the World Economy. Next, I will discuss recent trends in the Chilean economy and, finally, some reflections on the conduct of monetary policy and the main risks we currently face. Perspectives of the world economy The last five years have been the best five-year period in growth, inflation and financial conditions that the World Economy has experienced in over 30 years. However, this scenario has been changing in the recent months.
Second it showed up the limitations of the models which underpin the valuation and rating of structured products and the excessive weight that had been given to them not just by the naive or unwary, but by some of the most sophisticated players in financial markets (including many of the sponsoring banks who underestimated the risks they were running in retaining super senior tranches). Third, it illuminated the adverse incentives that had been allowed to develop in the distribution chain for credit products including the strong incentives for originators to put quantity above quality, for the rating agencies to expand their scope as widely as possible, and for banks to use off-balance-sheet vehicles to finance structured credits. It may also reveal some flaws in the compensation schemes in banks. In some cases these incentives arose despite regulation, in others they were the consequence of faults in the regulatory system. Finally it showed again how measures of risk used by companies and regulators can be pro-cyclical, encouraging more risk taking at the top of the cycle and potentially exacerbating the downswing. In the last few weeks, markets have been calmer. Liquidity pressures in short-term funding markets have eased, helped in part by the co-ordinated action by central banks to address elevated funding rates over the year end (Chart 3). And, as losses have been declared it has proved possible for a number of firms such as UBS, Merrill Lynch and Citigroup to attract new capital including from Sovereign Wealth Funds.

8  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Feb Mar AprMay Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec End Dec Source: MoneyFacts. BIS Review 7/2008  Chart 9: Household saving ratio  Chart 10: Correlation between growth in house prices and consumption Rolling ten-year correlation coefficient between real annual house price inflation and consumption growth  16% 14%  1.0 0.9 0.8  12%  0.7  10%  0.6  8%  0.5 0.4  6%  0.3 0.2  4%  0.1  2%  0.0  0% 1970 1975  1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006  1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005  Source: ONS  Source: Bank calculations. Chart 11: Commodity prices  Chart 12: General public inflation expectations  US dollars per barrel Index, 2000=100 120 350 Economist food index (rhs) 100  Economist metals index (rhs)  300  Brent oil spot prices (lhs)  250  80  3.2 Bank/NOP  3.0 2.8 2.6  200  2.4  60 40 20  150  2.2  100  2.0  50  1.8  0 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Source: datastream and bank calculations  BIS Review 7/2008  1.6 Feb00  Feb01  Feb02  Feb- Feb03 04  Feb05  Feb06  Feb07  Source: Bank of England/NOP public attitudes to inflation survey. 9
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Welcome address - National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia fintech event Welcome address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the NBRNM fintech virtual event, Skopje, 28 July 2021. *** Good morning to all. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this virtual event today. The purpose of the event is twofold: 1) to share with you the results of the activities we are taking as part of our ongoing efforts to support the fintech development and 2) to announce our next steps in fintech segment. This event would not be possible without the European Fund for SouthEast Europe, an institution with a prominent role in promoting responsible financial sector development. We are very thankful for its continuous support in different areas of our activities, including Fintech. I would also like to extend a gratitude to Mr. Jay Tikam, a financial expert who will present the findings from the first national Fintech Survey that we jointly conducted. Let me now shed some light on a couple of important dimensions related to fintech such as the specific circumstances that brought this issue to the fore in the last decade, the benefits it brings to the society, the role of policy makers/regulators in this segment, the current state and the priorities and challenges ahead. Although "fintech" is a relatively new term, technology has always played an important role in the financial sector.

The combination of unbundling and more agile technology could provide customers with more choice, better-targeted services and keener pricing. Increased competition from fintech firms has also contributed to increased innovations by traditional players and increased collaboration between them and newcomers that will fundamentally and permanently change the traditional conceptions of banking and insurance, as we understand it today. Along those lines, the annual Survey of the National Bank shows an increasing use of modern technologies by the commercial banks, especially cloud services, biometric identification and NFC for digital wallets. Overall, this transformation can bring about a more efficient, effective and resilient financial system. New finance channels can also improve the overall economy, for example, allowing merchants to enhance profitability by selling goods and services online, or indeed driving exports. However, the benefits go hand in hand with new risks and invites new thinking on how to preserve fundamentals such as consumer privacy and security, as well as how to preserve monetary and financial stability. Amidst this background, we must consider how policy-makers can best support the development of a fintech ecosystem, but doing so in a safe manner. How are we as a regulator embracing these challenge? Like many other central banks, we have already embarked on a digital journey. Considering our role in the oversight of the financial system and preserving financial stability, we must look forward and anticipate emerging trends so that we can react proactively.