samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In my view, without pretending to be exhaustive, these global issues on which  Page 6 sur 7 interests and deliverables could converge encompass the following three “Cs”: climate, crypto-assets, cross-border payments. 1. Of course, addressing climate change comes to mind first. In the wake of the IPCC’s January Synthesis Report, it is estimated that if emissions continue at current levels, the carbon budget to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited overshoot would run out in around six years. The latest IPCC report is the final warning from the scientific climate community to all of us policy makers. From a financial standpoint, the collective priority is to make green finance more mature. The path is clear: better data and better standards will allow us to shift from voluntary to mandatory climate-related disclosures, and still more developed climate stress-tests and transition plans for all financial institutions. At the international level, we must ensure the convergence, or at least the interoperability of the various disclosure standards currently under development. ISSB should be the international standard, and be assured the European standard – EFRAG – will be somewhat more demanding but fully compatible. 2. Second, crypto-assets. In light of last year’s debacle, there is a broad consensus in international fora on the need to regulate them. But this consensus must now be leveraged and translated into concrete action.

Lest you get carried away with excitement, I must note that some of the acceleration in activity will be a function of inventory adjustment, and much will stem from an unwinding of the disruption caused by the Japanese earthquake and tsunami as the Japanese make up for supply interruptions to the auto and other industries faster than many thought possible. Looking beyond 2011, I hope that growth above 3 percent can be sustained, again assuming the fiscal authorities get it right. As Jim has referenced, I may have called the bottom of the recession in the summer of 2009 well before most anybody else did, but I made the point in that Dallas Morning News interview that going forward, we were going to have a slow slog.8 I have said many times since then that, in light of the fact that we were recovering from “post-traumatic shock syndrome” stemming from the Panic of 2008 and 2009, economic recovery would proceed hesitantly, taking two steps forward and one step back until it finds its new legs. We took a step backward in the first half; I expect we will proceed forward, however haltingly, in the second half and into 2012. 6  Eminent Economists: Their Life Philosophies, ed. Michael Szenberg, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 7  “Consumer and Business Spending to Spur Expanding U.S. Economy,” by Phil Izzo and Justin Lahart, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 14, 2011.
Independent Commission on Banking (2011) ‘Final Report Recommendations’. Marques, L B, Correa R and Sapriza H (2013) ‘International evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector’, International Monetary Fund Working Paper no 13/94. Morgan, D P and Stiroh, K J (2005) ‘Too big to fail after all these years’, FRB NY Staff Report no 220. Usher, A P (1943) The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe, Harvard University Press. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9

First, the Fed's commitment to achieve and sustain 2 percent inflation is a now bedrock principle. This was not always the case. It's only been 10 years since the FOMC defined 2 percent inflation as its longer-run goal. 7 This transparency about our objectives provides a "North Star" for policy decisions and communications. It likewise improves the public's understanding of our goals and actions. It has also served us well in keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored. For example, the most recent Survey of Consumer Expectations shows that consumers expect inflation to decline over the next three years. 8 And market-based measures of inflation expectations have also remained well anchored. This anchoring of longer-term expectations is critical to keeping high inflation from becoming embedded in the psychology of consumers and businesses, which we know from the past is costly to undo. Economic Outlook So, what does tighter monetary policy mean for the economy? We are already seeing some of the effects. Broad measures of financial conditions, including borrowing and  3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  mortgage rates and equity prices, have become significantly less supportive of spending. This has led to a decline in activity in the housing market and signs of slowing in consumer and business investment spending. As this continues, I expect real GDP to be close to flat this year and to grow modestly in 2023.
First, the NPLs ratio dropped from 22% at end-2013 to 6.4% at end-2017, making it the largest adjustment in Europe over a relatively short time period. At the core of this adjustment were conservative requirements for provisioning NPLs, our hands-on supervision approach, and a fiscal facility that was conducive to the development of the secondary market for NPLs. Second, the share of local currency denominated loans in the total stock of loans has increased from one third prior to the crisis to two thirds nowadays. This reduced the contagion risk and improved the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy. A somewhat higher inflation and an earlier start in the policy normalization cycle have to be considered in view of another challenge, which is the lower level of financial intermediation. Some countries are facing the dilemma recently portrayed in a Bruegel Institute paper, between raising inflation and decreasing appetite for risk, the latter being reflected in the lower levels of credit to GDP. The solutions adopted are diverse. While some central banks are embracing a higher inflation, and try to stimulate financial intermediation, others try to reign in inflationary expectations and have already started the tightening cycle. Nevertheless, the issue of financial intermediation remains important, as credit for the corporate sector would need to replace direct fiscal incentives in most of these economies as a driver of growth, if we want growth to remain sustainable. The low financial intermediation in the banking sector comes, first of all, from the demand-side.

We can all look forward to another step forward in international cooperation at the G20 Leaders’ Summit, in Cannes, next November. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Although the Central Bank has announced its intention to intervene in the foreign exchange market more actively than it has in the past in preparation for lean times, such intervention should not be expected to have a profound or lasting impact on the exchange rate.5 Other ways to reduce harmful exchange rate fluctuations should therefore be considered. Negotiations are currently underway concerning Iceland’s possible accession to the European Union and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), upon fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria. If there is no advantage to a floating exchange rate – or even less than no advantage – then there is clearly no benefit in delaying membership of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II), which precedes full membership, provided that EU membership is approved in a national referendum and by member states. How quickly Iceland fulfils the Maastricht criteria is primarily in the hands of the authorities and the social partners. In my view, the timing of membership will be determined primarily by how quickly the general government debt ratio can be lowered towards the Maastricht criteria. According to the formal requirements, general government debt must be less than 60% of GDP or fall quickly enough towards that target. Belgium, Italy, and Greece were admitted to the EMU with general government debt in excess of 100% of GDP – a decision now rued by many. Iceland will probably be subjected to more stringent requirements, for which I am tempted to be grateful.

It is because the play raises questions of a more enduring nature. Perhaps we have to recognise that the closest we can get to eternal truths is, precisely, eternal questions? 26  The quotation continues: But truths as aged as that are always worn frightfully thin, and nevertheless it is only then that the majority recognises them and recommends them to the community as wholesome moral nourishment. There is no great nutritive value in that sort of fare, I can assure you; and, as a doctor, I ought to know. These “majority truths” are like last year’s cured meat – like rancid, tainted ham; and they are the origin of the moral scurvy that is rampant in our communities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11
3 The key findings of the Finscope Survey on the demand for financial services included the following: •  Only 34% of the population were “financially served”, i.e., used formal and/or informal financial products, whilst 66% had no access to financial services;  •  77.5% of Zambians report to have never had a bank product or service;  •  40% of salaried staff reported not having bank accounts, signifying that they received money in cash rather than through the financial system;  •  The barriers to accessing financial services include cost, distance, time and transport to reach the bank or financial service provider;  •  Rather than purchase treasury bills, buy life insurance or stocks on the stock exchange, most of the respondents preferred to invest in agriculture or a business;  •  Microfinance institutions although used by only 5% of the adult population plays an important role in increasing levels of access to financial services; and the  •  The informal sector in Zambia played a significant role in the provision of financial services catering for 11% of the population, compared with other countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) where similar surveys have  3  The FinScope™ 2005 survey was a representative, nationwide survey of 4,000 households, with questions on the use of a wide range of financial services focusing on four main product types: savings, credit, insurance and transactions, both formal and informal. The survey focused on the use of personal financial products and services.

That be as it may, like in many other developing countries the financial sector in Zambia still faces a number of challenges. The Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP) Report of 2002 highlighted a number of these including limited access to financial services by the rural and peri-urban population and doubtful sustainability of financial services in Zambia. In light of these findings, and in recognition of the strategic importance of the development of the financial sector in contributing to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, the Government of the republic of Zambia developed and launched the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) in 2004. The FSDP is a comprehensive five year strategy to build and strengthen the financial sector infrastructure to enable it to support economic diversification and sustainable growth. In addition, and in furtherance of the objectives of the FSDP, the BoZ Strategic Plan for 2008 – 2011 has made financial inclusion as one of its key strategic objectives. Under the FSDP two important studies, the FinScope™ Surveys of 2005 and 2007, on the demand for and supply of financial services in Zambia have been completed. These studies have augmented the earlier findings of the FSAP with respect to the key developmental challenges for the financial sector in Zambia.
But nested within these objectives is an instruction that our objectives are to be advanced by avoiding adverse effects on the stability of the UK financial system. In other words, although our work is primarily microprudential we have an important role to play in ensuring financial stability. What does this imply for how the PRA should take an interest in operational resilience? It implies that we are interested in operational resilience for its own sake, not just because its absence can have a financial consequence for firms. But we are interested only to the extent that it could have a negative impact on safety and soundness and/or the stability of the UK financial system. That is a fairly high bar. In practice this is likely to mean that we put more emphasis on operational resilience for larger firms doing activity whose disruption could have a financial stability impact. For smaller firms we are only strongly interested where something is going on that is big enough to threaten the firm’s safety and soundness. So for example: if you are a big bank you can expect us to take an interest in your ability to process payments; if you are an insurer with a large annuity book, we will want to know what the operational risks are to your ability to supply people’s retirement income; and if you are a smaller firm spending huge sums on a 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  major IT project, we will be interested in that.

I see no tension on this issue between the interests of regulators and firms – we all want to reduce the risk of disruption. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6    Third, just in case things go badly we have been working with firms to ensure they have in place liquidity sufficient to accommodate a severe dislocation in financial markets. This is another shared endeavour – we all need to be ready for a range of outcomes. Conclusion I have aimed to describe in this speech two different modes in which we often find ourselves operating at the PRA. First, ‘battlegrounds’ where there is an inherent degree of tension between our interests and those of firms, and we play the bad cop role. This covers many of the more traditional areas of prudential regulation such as capital and we should not be discomfited by a certain amount of conflict on these as we come out of the reform phase. Second, ‘common grounds’ where we and firms collectively face a challenge and have a shared interest in tackling it. In these areas we are good cop and we should simply find the most effective and pragmatic way of dealing with problems. The Brexit risks are the most pressing current example of these shared endeavours and I hope that we, firms and EU27 colleagues will succeed in working together to mitigate them. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7
But the price for receiving protection is that banks must be subject to some regulation and supervision. Having acknowledged this, I am not a fan of extended bank regulation but rather regulation of a limited and transparent type, intended to protect society against major incidents and costs but allowing banks to conduct and develop their business as flexibly as possible. Clearly, bank regulation must aim at promoting efficiency and stability. Only efficient banks will remain stable in the long run. The old-fashioned type of regulation forcing banks to do business on other than market-oriented terms must be abolished. If the government wants to subsidize certain activities, such as banking for people in remote geographical locations, mortgage lending on favourable terms, or lending to important borrowers or projects, the costs for this should be transparent and show up as a part of the fiscal budget. Such activities should not be conducted by directives from the government to the banks. Another type of regulation which is becoming increasingly obsolete and inefficient is when the authorities try to micro-manage the behaviour of the banks by setting upper or lower limits on fees, deposit rates, lending rates, and credit expansion. The situation in the economy changes so rapidly that the authorities will never be able to catch up and their actions could then be more harmful than helpful. The type of regulation I would like to promote is flexible.

The authorities may instead extend excessive financial support to the problem bank through the central bank for instance in the form of exceptional liquidity assistance which is sometimes abused to cover solvency problems, or through the fiscal budget. Occasionally, even failing banks’ owners have received public financial support to continue the operations of the defunct bank. The overwhelming evidence from experiences in different countries and situations is that letting problem banks continue to operate without taking adequate action simply means that the problems will increase over time and they may in the end result in a systemic and very expensive crisis. To sum up on the preconditions, these must be taken seriously into account when you modernise your banking system. Where there are shortcomings you must deal with these in the appropriate ways, such as through legislation. While waiting for the preconditions to improve, the authorities and the banks must compensate for the shortcomings. Let me stress this again: Your banks, as well as other financial institutions, cannot operate efficiently and soundly in an environment where the necessary preconditions are inadequate. 4  BIS Review 104/2006  Regulation Banks perform special and unique services to society, such as accepting deposits and transforming them to credits, and for providing payment services. The combination of receiving short-term deposits and extending long-term loans makes banks inherently unstable. For this they may receive some protection by the public, such as the possibility of liquidity support and depositor guarantees.
Compared to the start of the year, the expected timing of any further Fed interest rate hikes has been pushed back, and the expected upward trajectory of U.S. short-term rates is now much flatter. There are several reasons to explain these shifts. First, assessments of the neutral real shortterm interest rate have declined as economic growth has consistently fallen short of consensus forecasts. With the U.S. economy having grown at only a 2.1 percent annual rate over the past seven years, it has become harder to sustain the view that the neutral real short-term interest rate is close to, or will soon be close to, its historical level of around 2 percent. Estimates of the neutral real short-term interest rate obtained from many of the DSGE models used within the Federal Reserve System are currently clustered around zero, and this seems reasonable to me. An implication is that at present there is only a small gap between the actual real shortterm rate of about -1 percent and the neutral real short-term rate. In other words, U.S. monetary policy is accommodative, but only moderately so. In addition, I suspect that many have come to question the view that headwinds from the financial crisis are temporarily depressing the neutral short-term rate, and that the neutral short-term rate will significantly rise in the near-future as these headwinds dissipate.

A lot of our exports are in sectors which have a large carbon footprint and will be susceptible to policy measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism currently being put in place by the European Union (EU), as part of the EU green deal. So, what role can sustainable banking play in taking Thailand from where it is today to where it needs to be in terms of reducing its vulnerability to climate change? Banks in Thailand can play an important role in getting us to where we need to go. Banks play the predominant role in channeling credit to the private sector. Over 90 percent of private credit comes from the banking sector. So, banks will need to increasingly incorporate sustainability considerations into their lending decisions and increasingly need to improve disclosure on climate-related information. They will also need to improve their risk assessment tools. For all these to work, there needs to be a very clear tone from the top from these institutions. There has been progress to date. The Thai banking sector, including the Thai Bankers’ Association and the Association of International Banks in Thailand, have developed and adopted Sustainable Banking Guidelines in 2019. We have seen concrete steps taken by Thai Banks to incorporate sustainability into their business strategy. We have seen them setting up clear governance structure on sustainability issues such as dedicated sustainability committees, developing risk assessment tools, and disclosing ESG-related information.
ROMANIA: TEN YEARS AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS Liviu Voinea, Deputy Governor, National Bank of Romania Macroeconomics Panel - 2018 FP Investor Days  Your Excellencies, Dear Guests, Ten years ago, in mid-September 2008, the Lehman Brothers’ collapse became the trigger of the global financial crisis. The main cause of the global financial crisis was, in my opinion, excessive deregulation, which fuelled speculative bubbles on many markets, primarily on the derivatives markets comprising mortgages. That crisis has thrown US and EU in the midst of financial turmoil, leading to recession, deflation, and forcing central banks to take unorthodox measures, including quantitative easing, which led to negative real and even nominal interest rates. Since then, US and EU have recovered, but the exit from these unorthodox policies proves to be harder in the EU, particularly because some countries are not better off in terms of public debt than they were before the crisis. Emerging markets were hit even harder, and their resources for recovery were limited. Everyone felt the wave of the global crisis, but in the case of some emerging markets that was exacerbated by their domestic vulnerabilities. Today, this is more evident than before, when we witness some emerging markets being hit not by a global crisis, but by their in-built vulnerabilities. This is why I would like to speak today about the Romanian economy, ten years after the global financial crisis. Are we better off? Are we more protected against contagion risks? Have we put in place stronger prevention mechanisms?

The net real wage was higher by 42.7% in 2017 as compared to 2008, while the number of employees is also higher by 2.4% in 2017 compared to 2008. As social contributions and other taxes were reduced, the increase in real wages was only partially mirrored by the increase in compensation of employees. When compared against EU average, labor productivity raised faster than compensation of employees over the entire period, therefore the unit labor cost, relative to our main trade partners (EU), decreased by 7.7 percentage points (Figure 3). This explains the positive dynamics of exports. Public debt, as a percentage of GDP, is three times higher now than it was in 2008 (35% in 2017 compared to 12% in 2008), but this is a misleading figure for a number of reasons. First, in 2008 and few years before that, Romania did not access international markets, by its own choice, as it financed the deficit from one-off revenues. Second, international reserves were 10 billion euro higher by the end of 2017 compared to the end of 2007 (Figure 4). International reserves include a foreign exchange buffer which has been built since 2011, reached an average of 4 months of financing in 2013 and fluctuated around this level since then. This buffer is the first line of defense against short-term external shocks which may affect emerging markets, and our opinion is that it is a very good instrument which needs to be preserved and consolidated.