samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What is impracticable – akin to Canute holding back the tide – is to confront reality standing behind ridiculous theoretical instruments. That way lies only bitter impotence.”5 A second role of ideology is to provide initial starting points as to how, a priori, these ends might be addressed when we lack sound evidence of the best course of action to attain them. To some extent, ideology occasionally fills the gaps that rigorous evaluation based on reliable data can leave, which I highlighted earlier. In this second area, there is ample room for fruitful dialogue between ideology and evaluation, with only one pre-requisite: that, no matter how firm ideological postulates are about the means that should be used, economic policymakers should be willing to be swayed by the findings of rigorous and independent evaluations. The outcome of this dialogue may be very enriching for society: the emergence of a minimum consensus on how to tackle, using public policies, specific challenges that are identified as such by a very wide political spectrum. As discussed on previous occasions, ever since our society and economy were impacted by the pandemic, such basic social and political consensus has become key to contending with situations of enormous uncertainty like the present, where farreaching reforms are needed to improve citizens’ well-being.

Ex post assessments of policies are admittedly much further along in their development at the practical level, and their benefits as a part of the overall public policy process are wellestablished in the most advanced democratic societies. Yet they also come up against theoretical and empirical limitations that we cannot conceal. On this front, Spain is lagging behind our peers. And this is not because of a lack of know-how but rather, in my opinion, on account of the existing limitations in the current administrative, political and social ecosystem which do not sufficiently encourage the insertion of the assessment process into the public-policy-programme design and review cycle. True, there have been some promising developments of late, such as the mandatory periodic evaluations to assess the functioning of the minimum income scheme. Yet in much of the Spanish administrative apparatus there are still significant technical hurdles to building potential ex ante or, at least, ex post assessments into the design of public programmes. These impediments not only limit the general government’s own ability to conduct thorough assessments, but also prevent the findings of external assessments from being fully harnessed. Political action to address them is also an important long-term policy; for example, the creation of technical posts and hiring mechanisms that attract people with adequate training. Setting up agencies without long-term hiring plans does not work. Nor is it just a question of public-sector shortcomings.
Willem F Duisenberg: Changing fortunes - financing world growth Speech by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the 2003 Spruce Meadows Round Table, Calgary, 5 September 2003. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure for me to be part of this round table discussion today and I would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to share some thoughts with you on the topic of financing world growth. Since 2000, we have witnessed terrorism, war and declines in world equity markets, all of which contributed to increasing an already ongoing deterioration in confidence in most countries. Now with the end of the major hostilities in Iraq, the reduction in geopolitical uncertainties and lower oil prices, a gradual upturn in world economic activity is expected and it is important that policy-makers do all they can to support it. Given the breadth of this topic and therefore the strong temptation to overrun on my time allocation, I will focus on just two points. First, I would like to say a few general words about the roles and, may I add, limitations of monetary and fiscal policy in reviving global demand, and the importance of microeconomic policies in this respect, in particular the role of structural reform in increasing potential growth. Second, with the help of regional-specific examples, I would like to present some future challenges with respect to microeconomic policies and structural reforms in the world.

More than ever, corporations’ fortunes and survival are now more closely linked. New realities require new paradigms. Co-opetition. How we cope with the new realities will depend on our ability to re-set our minds and leverage on networks to create value; at the customer, the firm, and at the system levels. There is enormous potential in re-defining strategies in competition and cooperation. Imagine the possibilities that could be achieved with strategic investments in shared infrastructure and the ability to share data securely across individuals and entities. We could significantly reduce costs, improve access, deliver superior customer experience which was previously not possible, with the network of shared information, better management and improved resilience against risks. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  A new paradigm on stability It has been 10 years since the global financial crisis. The global insurance industry is now on stronger and more stable foundation. Industry leaders and supervisors may be satisfied with what was achieved since then, but there is certainly no room for complacency. Achieving stability objectives will become more challenging as the complexities of risk identification increase. We know that insurance companies can create systemic risks, even though we may differ in our views over the intensity of such risks. There is a ‘constructive tension’, arising from the need to significantly strengthen regulation and supervision while balancing the need for growth, development and innovation. In a world characterised by fierce competition, complex product offerings and evolving customers’ needs, there is always the risk of administering excessive and complicated regulations.
I understand that ICRM is actively involved in a number of PPPs in the region, including the Global Earthquake Model (“GEM”), a PPP with OECD aimed at developing and deploying tools and expertise for earthquake risk assessment worldwide; and the ASEAN Earthquake Model (“AEM”), targeted at developing earthquake risk assessments for the region. Conclusion 15. Let me conclude. Natural catastrophe risk management will be an increasing priority for Asia. The interconnectedness of natural catastrophe risk management calls for going beyond borders; and across stakeholders, both government and industry, to coordinate holistic strategies and manage natural catastrophe risks in a sustainable manner. 16. The ICRM annual symposium serves as a unique opportunity for various stakeholders to come together to discuss challenges, and chart the course for natural catastrophe risk management in Asia going forward. I understand that there is a line-up of interesting presentations covering very pertinent topics such as post-disaster impact analysis  6  4  “Source: ‘IFC Partners with MAIPARK to Provide Earthquake-Index Insurance for Indonesian Banks’”, CAN Newswire, 1 October 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  experiences and the types of catastrophe risk transfer and financing solutions, over the next 2 days. 17. On this note, I wish you a productive and memorable time at this Symposium and in Singapore. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

In exchange for receiving valuable operating benefits, a bank’s implicit codes of conduct-that is, its culture-must reflect the public dimension of the services that banks provide. Third, the reform of bank culture should aim to restore trust.7 The bedrock of the financial system is trust and the word credit derives from the Latin notion of believing or trusting. We saw seven years ago that the public’s trust is critical in a crisis. The repair of the financial system would not have been possible without public support. If another crisis were to happen tomorrow, would there be that support? A lack of trust-or, more accurately, low trustworthiness-also imposes day-to-day costs.8 For starters, there are fines. Then there are the legal costs in investigating allegations and defending lawsuits. Internal monitoring also becomes more expensive as rules become more extensive. Some might say that the proliferation of rules since the Financial Crisis is inversely proportional to a decline in the industry’s perceived trustworthiness. The choice between rules and standards depends on the trustworthiness of the regulated. A more flexible, standardsbased legal regime requires a degree of trustworthiness that, in recent years, banks have not demonstrated. Those are the measurable costs of low trustworthiness. There may be other, longer-term costs that are more difficult to price. Let me raise just two. If employees perceive a firm as  6  E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual Report, January 1983.
In the next decade, the world can be grouped in two categories: on the one hand, advanced economies, with high absorption capacity, low savings and high debt with ratios close to 100%. On the other, emerging economies, with high savings, low debt (around 30% GDP on average) and  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  less absorption capacity. Our common prosperity will therefore depend on our ability to create stable channels of financial intermediation between those two parts of the world. That, in turn, will crucially depend on the existence of assets that can be considered safe stores of value. But, as I have argued from the start, public debt may not be able to play that role to the same extent as before. The ultimate safe asset, therefore, could be the currency itself. Markets will trust currencies that are managed with one overriding priority: preserving price stability and the intrinsic value of the currency unit. On this fundamental basis, we can look at the future of the euro with realistic optimism. I see the recent decision by the Swiss central bank to peg the Swiss franc to the euro as an illustration of this conviction. **** A few words now on the French banking sector. First, banks have been hit in all advanced economies by the downward revision of growth prospects. This reaction can be explained by the fact that slower growth means lower profits, thus lower dividends.

According to SWIFT data, almost 40% of transactions are denominated in euro. It truly is the second most important currency in the world after the dollar. The European Commission has recently taken steps to further strengthen the role of the euro, which are most welcome. iv Among other things, the Commission has launched the Capital Markets Recovery Package that introduced targeted amendments needed to develop euro-denominated derivatives for energy and raw materials. 1. Supplying euro denominated safe assets and enhancing Capital Markets Union An international currency is only as strong as the safe assets it can offer. The euro sovereign debt market is still fragmented and only a few Member States are issuing global assets in a sufficient quantity. In this regard, there have been interesting recent developments in Europe. In June 2021, Europe launched Next Generation EU (NGEU) which will raise over 800 billion euros through a joint issue of European bonds. More broadly, the deepening of European Capital Markets Union should, at end, be instrumental. v It would help both for the allocation of capital within the euro area and for the stability and balance of the International Financial System. Such an initiative is important as we face new policy challenges. The transition to a greener economy will require immense financing, and the digital transformation will also require both public and private investments. This all calls for investments in global public goods to be increasingly managed at the EU level. Two open questions remain.
Let me give a brief account of some of these: The assumption that the repo rate would develop in accordance with implied forward interest rates should in the long run provide more realistic assessments of the future repo rate than the assumption of a constant repo rate. This is particularly the case when there are market expectations of considerable changes in the repo rate during the forecast horizon. For instance, it is difficult in such circumstances to combine the assumption of a constant repo rate with reasonable forecast paths for the exchange rate and long-term interest rates since these are affected by market expectations about movements of short-term interest rates. This in turn also affects the forecasts for growth and inflation. The new interest rate assumption therefore creates the prerequisites for making better inflation forecasts and also more coherent forecasts for individual macro variables. This will eventually improve the basis for monetary policy decisions. Another advantage of making forecasts on the basis of a more reasonable assumption about future interest rates is that it will be easier to assess the forecasts. In normal cases, it is not realistic to assume that the repo rate will remain unchanged in a two-year perspective. An inflation forecast based on that assumption will therefore normally be inaccurate. It will thus also be difficult to make meaningful evaluations of the inflation forecasts.

Risk Management During the Pandemic Crisis Now, I'd like to share how our risk management practices and culture have helped us manage challenges throughout the pandemic crisis at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In mid-March of 2020, the health crisis was especially severe in the New York City area, where our main office is located and where most of our employees live. To protect the health and safety of all employees and to continue our critical activities, we had to adapt to a situation none of us had ever seen before. That started with changing how we worked. To reduce the health risks to our employees, we only allowed staff who had to be onsite to remain in the office, while everyone else worked remotely. For example, some open market operations, cash services, and technology support activities could only be conducted on location. To protect onsite staff, we implemented a range of protective measures including masking, social distancing, quarantine requirements, and staggered work schedules. Another priority was helping employees cope with added responsibilities like lack of childcare and elder care, so we provided as much flexibility as possible to staff to manage their time. On the technology side, we had an immediate need for teleconferencing bandwidth to support remote work. While not all technology worked perfectly right away, our technology providers quickly adjusted. With most staff working from home, a new risk we identified and addressed was the failure of home internet connectivity.
Moreover, there are strong indications that the deceleration in domestic credit activity in Malta is not due to any shortage of liquidity in the banking sector but rather to the reluctance on the part of banks to extend their exposure beyond certain limits to a number of economic sectors. A promotional or development bank could enable such sectors to gain better access to financing support that may not be readily available from other sources on reasonable terms. A promotional or development bank can thus complement the domestic financial sector in instances where free market conditions may appear to be insufficient to achieve the desired public policy objectives. Such an institution would normally be underpinned by certain privileges geared to optimise promotional activities and therefore one would need to ensure that the promotional operations of such a bank would not give rise to any distortions in competitive conditions in the market. More specifically, it would have to ensure that its activities will be fully in line with EU State Aid regulations at the final beneficiary level. A promotional or development bank would be on similar lines as in many EU countries, particularly Germany, where such banks undertake very successfully at a regional level a role in promoting the economy and assisting the government in social and environmental projects. Such banks have the backing of a government guarantee and thus can borrow on the basis of the sovereign rating of the government either locally or from supranational institutions.

In recent months, Malta’s HICP inflation may have been biased upwards because of methodological changes related to the measurement of tourist accommodation. Meanwhile the RPI, which is unaffected by accommodation prices, stood at 2.9%. It is the RPI that determines with a lag the COLA increase. The core RPI inflation rate, which is a good gauge of persistent inflation, stood at 2.0%. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  On the other hand, a number of labour market indicators remain positive. As seen in Chart 8, the most recent LFS unemployment rate is 6.5%, the same as it was on average in 2007, prior to the euro area crisis. In fact, Malta’s unemployment rate is at the lower end of national unemployment rates across the euro area. Meanwhile the latest registered unemployment rate stands at 4.2%, in June. Malta has avoided the two essential sources of the Euro area crisis: the deficit ratio has been moving in the right direction while the banking model followed by the core domestic banks remained prudent. In Malta, the core banks generally rely on traditional, domestic sources of funds, specifically retail deposits. Malta’s banks remained largely unaffected by the euro area crisis, averting the need for any government assistance and avoided what in other countries became a major source of fiscal overruns and distress. Malta must position itself in a way that builds on the strengths of the economy and minimises its vulnerabilities.
We are continuously estimating this lag, which is quite small and adheres to the standard accepted in other countries. Therefore, even the reduction of 0.25 pp may drag down rates for the ultimate borrower. Having said that, risk assessment factors for specific borrowers are essential for banks, and we can see that this factor prevails. Question from Bloomberg: Before asking my question, let me congratulate you on behalf of all my colleagues on the Russian President’s decision to launch the procedure for expanding your mandate. It proves that your policy is correct and, as far as I can see, everybody is satisfied with it. My question is as follows. When you participated in the online reading of ‘The Master and Margarita’, you read a passage from Chapter 29 of the novel, in which Matthew asks Woland to let the Master have some peace. Have you asked for some peace from the President? And anticipating your answer, what will be your objectives for the new term? Thank you very much. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: Thank you for your question. Peace is something we can only dream of, I would say. Though I would prefer external factors to display more certainty and structural reforms to progress faster. This would make it easier for us to pursue our monetary policy. As for objectives, our monetary policy goal is, as a I have told you today, to ensure low and stable inflation everybody could rely on and feel the benefits of.

These preliminary estimates suggest a one-off inflation impact of 1 to 2 percentage points. Moving forward, the impact would ride on the range of products affected, as well as, among other things, on the timeline: whether it would be a one-step or a two-step move. The many unknowns in this area prevent us from making any final estimates. When making this decision we certainly took into account that potential changes to the tax system are not impossible. These have been discussed and will be discussed moving forward. While we are on this subject, we would like to ask the Government to make the parameters of these initiatives known before they are implemented so these could be reflected in our monetary policy, enabling a consistent and smooth monetary policy stance. This is what we would like of the Government in relation to tax reforms. QUESTION from TASS Agency: When you reviewed lending to the economy, were you guided by certain adjustments to the macroeconomic forecast? Also, could you please comment on capital outflow. Were there any revisions in the three-year estimate? Thank you. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: Yes, we have indeed made some corrections. Overall, as I have noted, our assessment of 2017 is more positive, while 2018–2019 assumptions are unchanged. This does indeed translate into movement in various indicators. On the subject of lending, we are expecting growth, and we expect this growth to be gradual and sufficiently smooth.
Peter Praet: Interview in La Libre Belgique Interview with Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in La Libre Belgique, conducted by Ms Isabelle de Laminne and Mr Vincent Slits and published on 21 December 2015. *  *  *  What is the situation in the euro area on the eve of 2016? How do you see the coming years? The economic outlook has improved, in an environment where interest rates are low and oil prices have fallen sharply. The positive effects of the structural reforms in a number of countries, such as Spain and Ireland, should also be underscored. These factors have had positive effects on the labour market and on the economic recovery. Fiscal policies will be more neutral too, even slightly expansionary. In fact, they will contribute 0.1% to GDP growth in the euro area in 2016 and 2017. Enormous fiscal efforts have been made, although debt levels are still too high. However, we must bear in mind that real GDP in the euro area in the first quarter of 2016 will barely return to its level of early 2008. This means that over the last eight years the GDP of the euro area has not grown in real terms, on average, even though countries like Germany saw reasonable growth. Other countries have experienced a severe fall in their living standards for a very long period of time. This poses a number of problems.

Or does it represent more of an opportunity? Europe must show that it is a prosperous and secure area. In the short term migration will have an economic impact in the form of a fiscal expansion with some positive impact on growth. Germany’s fiscal situation is likely to deteriorate by around 0.3% to 0.4% of GDP in 2016 and 2017. This deterioration will be weaker in other countries. In the long term we will also have to look at the impact of the refugee crisis. This population is different, and care will have to be taken in integrating the migrants into the labour market, especially in Germany. In the medium term, from a demographic point of view, it can be a positive factor. The key issue is that of integrating migrants into the labour market in line with their profiles. All of these economic aspects are known and straightforward. From an economic perspective, this situation is not insurmountable; it is above all a political issue. The more integration we achieve at the economic level, the more it will be accepted politically. But all of this cannot be done in a day. Europe needs a young and well-trained workforce. We can create an opportunity out of a tragic situation, but it is not going to be easy. It is possible for a country to organise migration, and we have already done so in the past. The issue of security to combat the threat of terrorism will become a major challenge for governments in the months to come.