samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
By the way, we are talking here about a “European model” and not a “European way of life” which has been discussed a lot in recent days. In short, Europe can proudly define itself as a social, environmental and multilateral model. 2.1 The social model: the fight against inequalities The rise in inequalities has – fortunately, in my eyes – become once again a major economic and social issue, as evidenced by the success of the work of Joseph Stiglitz xii and Thomas Piketty. xiii This too long-ignored problem has been at the heart of election results – from Donald Trump to Brexit – and is one of the main reasons for the democratic crisis and the rise of "populism". On the economic front, international institutions, the OECD xiv and the IMF, xv have studied the impact of inequalities on growth. Their findings are clear: persistent inequalities reduce the long-term growth potential of economies. According to some OECD estimates, in the United States and United  Page 6 of 10  Kingdom, growth in GDP per capita between 1990 and 2010 would have been 20% higher if income inequalities had not increased. Much can be learned from the European model. Firstly, because it is less inegalitarian, especially thanks to redistribution. According to the World Inequality Lab, after redistribution, the income of the wealthiest 10% of US households is, on average, twelve times higher than that of the poorest 50%, compared to a ratio of eight in Europe.

» Issue Brief 2019-3 – March 2019 xvii Philippe Aghion, Gilbert Cette, Elie Cohen, Changer de modèle, Odile Jacob, 2014 xviii OECD (2016), PISA 2015. xix OECD xx OECD (2016), PISA 2015: on average, the PISA 2015 sample covers 90% of the national population of 15-yearolds in Europe/EU/euro area. For the OECD, this coverage rate is an approximate measure of enrolment rates in grade 7 or higher. xxi OECD (2018, 2016) Education at a Glance. xxii OECD (2018), Equity in Education: Breaking Down Barriers to Social Mobility, PISA, OECD Publishing, Paris. Performances measured in science xxiii Column in Les Echos, 20 April 2018 xxiv Hans Jonas (1991), The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of Ethics for the Technological Age xxv Mario Draghi (2019) Sovereignty in a globalised world, Speech at the University of Bologna, 22 February xxvi Simone Veil, President of the European Parliament, 1979
Will Big Data Keep Its Promise? Speech given by Andrew G Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England  Data Analytics for Finance and Macro Research Centre, King’s Business School 19 April 2018  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Shiv Chowla for his help in preparing the text. I would like to thank David Bholat, David Copple, Andi Joseph, Perttu Korhonen, Katie Low, Clare Macallan, Paul Robinson, Michael Saunders, Misa Tanaka, Silvana Tenreyro, Ryland Thomas, Arthur Turrell, Arzu Uluc and Michalis Vasios for their comments and contributions. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  I am delighted to be here to launch the Data Analytics for Finance and Macro (DAFM) Research Centre at King’s College Business School. I would like to congratulate Professors George Kapetanios and Georgios Chortareas, as Co-Directors (as well as former colleagues), for getting the centre to the launch pad and primed for take-off. To get my punchline in early, I believe the application of data analytic techniques to the many pressing questions in finance and macro holds great promise. That is the reason the Bank of England, around four years ago, set up its own data analytics division. And that is why I very much welcome the setting up of this new centre, as a means of realising that promise. But will Big Data keep its promise?

To date, they have focussed on items such as groceries and clothing. Although early days, the potential benefits in terms of increased sample sizes and granularity seem to be considerable. For example, the ONS have so far collected 7,000 price quotes per day for a group of 27  grocery items, which is larger than the current monthly collection for those items in the CPI. For GDP measurement, new sources and methods are also gaining ground. One recent study used satellite imaging to measure the amount of non-natural light emitted from different regions of the world. This has 28  been found to have a statistically significant relationship with economic activity. This approach could  potentially help in tracking activity in regions that are geographically remote, where statistical surveying techniques are poor or where mismeasurement problems are acute. A more down-to-earth example, used by the UK’s ONS and other statistical agencies, is so-called administrative data. This includes data collected by government agencies as part of their activities – for example, on tax revenue and benefit payments. In the UK, some of these data have recently become available for wider use through the government’s Open Data initiative, albeit subject to important checks. 23  Coyle (2014). Fouquet and Broadberry (2015). 25 Cavallo and Rigobon (2016). 26 Cœuré (2017). 27 See https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/researchindicesusingwebscrapedpricedata/august2017update 28 Henderson, Storeygard and Weil (2011).
The answer can be summed up in four dimensions: more transparency, better regulation, less procyclicality and less short-termism: 1. More transparency is needed to ensure that financial market participants return to their prime mission of assessing the quality of investment. Securitisation lessened lenders’ incentives for prudent screening and steady monitoring. Risk could be bundled, sliced and re-bundled for further sale. Risk management became difficult because information was unavailable to investors, buried in financial structures that were not transparent. Reform must ensure that sellers of securitised products disclose all information about the underlying loan structures so that both investors and rating agencies can correctly price the risks embedded in these products. 2. Better – that is, more effective – regulation will ensure that no financial product and no financial market participant can escape the eyes of supervising authorities. Many financial players with high leverage have gone unchecked by our regulatory system. Better regulation will expose the risks inherent in the financial system and make the system more stable. Needless to say, highly leveraged institutions should be part and parcel of this process. 3. Less pro-cyclicality of the financial system will reduce market volatility. Regulation should attempt to limit the risks that banks assume by imposing higher, countercyclical capital requirements, thus limiting leverage. Financial institutions will be asked to raise the quality and quantity of their capital base to ensure they have adequate buffers against future market disruptions. 4.

This is very low compared with other countries. 12  BIS Review 139/2009  The decline in employment has been less marked than the fall in activity would imply. Unemployment may be low partly because it may have taken time for enterprises to adapt their workforces to the sharp fall in production, and partly because some enterprises have decided to maintain their workforces in anticipation of a pickup in demand. In many sectors, the level of employment is nevertheless high in relation to output, and productivity in the past year has been at its lowest level since 1988. The projections are based on the assumption that productivity will gradually improve, reducing the pressure on firms’ costs somewhat. The projections are also based on improved profitability through an increase in prices. If firms instead reduce employment more rapidly and markedly in order to improve productivity, that will lead to higher unemployment and lower wage and price inflation than projected. The interest rate may then be kept lower for a longer period than currently envisaged in order to ensure that inflation returns to target. Wage growth is projected to decrease to around 4 per cent in 2009. Weak manufacturing profitability as a result of both a fall in product prices and a low productivity level suggest moderate wage growth ahead. At the same time, wage growth among trading partners is low. As a result, the competitiveness of internationally exposed industries may weaken further in the period ahead. In isolation, this may contribute to curbing wage growth.
This is obviously the description of the policy-mix at the current juncture. Moreover, in a context of low R*, fiscal policy is more effective and gains policy space thanks to the accommodation provided by the central bank (as r < g). In turn, the effects of monetary policy, which is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB), are reinforced by fiscal policy, which becomes today one of its main “transmission channels”. But in the longer run – and in the years to come –, the greatest risk is of course that monetary policy could become subordinated to fiscal policy. If and when inflation reappears, central banks must be able to normalise their stance and increase the interest rates paid on debt. Acting too late or too little, for short-term or political reasons, can be very costly for long-term interest rates and inflation. The best way to foster the current policy-mix congruence while preventing the risk of future fiscal dominance is to establish clear and credible reaction functions for monetary and fiscal policies: For the central bank, the mandate provides a clear guidepost. Forward guidance will of course be very useful in this process, to ensure a smooth and predictable exit. For governments, policy commitments and forward guidance are perceived as less credible because of the well-known time inconsistency problem.

The bottom line is that the long-term sustainability of public debt should be ensured by credible but flexible fiscal rules. In parallel, we could maintain the possibility of responding to large shocks through a permanent common fiscal capacity; in this respect, the Next Generation EU package is a positive breakthrough, and could be made permanent, although with more limited amounts. A few days ago, Mario Draghi, speaking at the Italian Senate in his current capacity as Prime minister, rightly backed “an increasingly integrated European Union that will arrive at a common public budget capable of supporting countries in times of recession.” In addition, a fully-fledged capital markets union is more necessary than ever, in order to supplement public risk sharing with private risk sharing across the euro area. In conclusion, let me say a few words on chamber music. Many of you have already heard the famous Piano Trio Number 2 by Franz Schubert. The harmony of the three instruments has charmed generations of music lovers, including Stanley Kubrick in “Barry Lindon”. In this piece, none of the instruments should be the only game in its own town. And none of them should be dominated by any of the other two, otherwise the harmony is broken. Quite the contrary, we can hear each instrument and the beauty of the piece comes from the response of each instrument to the others. The same applies to the three macroeconomic policies: monetary, macroprudential and fiscal.
That, after all, is our job. We are getting on with it, and we look forward to being judged on our performance. This represents my personal views and not those of the Bank. Any errors are my own. Particular thanks for their contributions to the speech go to Austen Saunders, Faith Bannier, Max Weidlich and Michael Pinder. My thanks also to the following people for their input and comments: Ala Marar, Andrew Bailey, Andrew Bell, Anna Jernova, Ben Dubow, Ben Guerin, Bronagh Kealey, Charandeep Biling, Charlotte Gerken, David Bailey, Eleanor Beamond-Pepler, Gao Yu, Gareth Truran, George Speight, Harriet Gamper, Jon Newton, Jonathan Haynes, Julian Gray, Lanze Gardiner Vandvik, Mariana Gimpelewicz, Matthew Willison, Millie Rettie, Nick Lock, Nigel Fray, Olatunji Jayeola, Paul Hawkins, Phil Evans, Rebecca de Hoest, Renée Horrell, Robert Miller, Sadia Arif, Sarah Breeden, Sam Woods. 1. For a taxonomy of different definitions, see: Berger, Thomas (2008), ‘Concepts of National Competitiveness’, Journal of International Business and Economy, 9(1), pages 91-111. 2. For a comprehensive literature review, see: Levine, Ross (2021), ‘Finance, Growth, and Inequality’, IMF Working Paper No. 2021/164; and Popov, Alexander (2017), ‘Evidence on finance and economic growth’, ECB Working Paper 2115. 3. ‘Growth and competitiveness – speech by Sam Woods, Mansion House’, 27 October 2022. 4. The MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) and FPC (Financial Policy Committee) have already important secondary objectives in relation to economic growth and the Bank of England as a Financial Market Infrastructure regulator is likely to acquire a new secondary objective in relation to innovation.

[5] That is why the PRA sets out clear expectations for firms wanting to branch into the UK. [6] It is why we build trusted relationships with supervisors in other jurisdictions, supported by a growing number of Memorandums of Understanding. [7] It is why the Bank provides support for the Government’s work pursuing free trade agreements with financial services chapters, and bespoke mutual recognition agreements, that facilitate safe access to overseas markets for UK firms. [8] And it is why we recognise that prudential regulation mustn’t create barriers that stop global talent working in UK firms whilst at the same time failing to advance our primary objective. For that reason we are reforming remuneration rules, starting with a consultation on removing the bonus cap. [9] As well as openness, we are acting to strengthen the UK as a global financial centre by providing a predictable and stable regulatory environment. This makes it easier for all firms – domestic and international – to do business here. We’ve improved the way we communicate. The Bank and PRA now work with six other regulators to produce a regulatory grid setting out our plans in one place. [10] And we are developing a new UK rulebook that will be easier to navigate than the labyrinth of regulations – many of them EU rules – we are replacing. [11] I should reassure you that stable and predictable regulation doesn’t mean static regulation. Innovation is one of the UK’s strengths.
All this combined with a strengthening  7/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  of the European project that improves the smooth functioning of the single market, reinforces risk-sharing channels within the euro area and makes it possible to guarantee the sustainability of public finances. Thank you very much. 8/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

This deceleration will clearly have some dampening effects on euro area net exports. The euro area is a large economy where exports of goods and services amount to around 17% of GDP only. Economic activity in the euro area is therefore determined mainly by domestic factors. Overall, the fundamentals of the euro area remain broadly favourable. While, as recently published data show, real GDP growth slowed somewhat in the second half of last year, the level of business and household confidence has remained high, supported by, inter alia, high degrees of capacity utilisation and ongoing unemployment declines. Moreover, real income in the private sector will benefit from lower oil prices and from the reductions in direct taxes in 2001. Hence, while downside risks to real GDP growth exist, growth is very likely to continue at a reasonably robust pace. Developments in the euro area bond markets are in line with this outlook for economic activity. Moreover, inflationary expectations implied by bond yields confirm that the financial markets expect current levels of consumer price inflation to be temporary, and price stability to be maintained in the medium term. This assessment may also have been reinforced by the recent moderation in oil prices and the movement of the euro exchange rate in the period since the end of October 2000. BIS Review 8/2001  1  Lower oil prices and the appreciation of the euro have already produced some effects on price developments.
BIS Review 67/2009  1  Figure 1: Contribution to Annual CPI Inflation  14 12  Food and Energy*  Tobacco and Gold**  Services  Basic Goods  10 8 6 4 2 0  03 07  05 07  07 07  09 07  11 07  01 08  03 08  05 08  07 08  09 08  11 08  01 09  03 09  * Food and Energy: Food, non-alcoholic beverages and energy ** Tobacco and Gold: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and gold. Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. In the first quarter, the increase in food prices lost pace over previous years in response to the significant slowdown in the processed food group and energy prices dropped owing to the lagged effects of the recent decline in oil prices. Goods prices excluding food and energy slumped by a lower margin over the first quarter of the previous year. The slowdown in services prices became more pronounced (Figure 2). Figure 2: CPI Sub-Groups (First Quarter Percentage Change) 10  2007  2008  2009  8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 Food  Energy  Goods excluding Food and Energy  Services  Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. 2  BIS Review 67/2009  The unprocessed food group posted monthly price hikes of significant levels in the last quarter of 2007 and the first half of 2008 on account of production losses and cyclical developments all over the world. Annual inflation in this group surged to 25 percent.

Thus, by working to ensure price stability as well as maintenance of a safe, sound and efficient financial sector, the Bank is contributing to the achievement of sustainable economic growth and, ultimately, poverty reduction. In a nutshell, following the amendment of the Bank of Zambia Act in 1996, the Bank’s main responsibilities comprise price and financial system stability. The Bank ensures financial system stability by licensing, supervising and regulating the activities of banks and non-bank financial institutions so as to promote the safe, sound and efficient operations and development of the financial system. BIS Review 74/2004  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, I trust that, as members of UNZABECA, you have actively participated in these series of lectures and expanded your knowledge of the functions of the Bank of Zambia. On our part as Bank of Zambia, we strongly encourage investment in education, which has been demonstrated by the sponsorship of these Lectures. In this regard, I wish to take this opportunity to call upon other institutions to support our university by either sponsoring a series of lectures, like the Bank of Zambia has done, or rendering any financial assistance. As many of you may be aware, most of the companies in Zambia have benefited, in one way or the other, from the services offered by our universities. As for the Bank of Zambia, most of its management members of staff, including myself, are graduates of this university and were members of UNZABECA.
It should be abundantly clear by now to any financial institution that is serious about VBI, that, the task of building the human and intellectual capital to achieve and sustain value-based business models cannot be left solely to the human resource departments. It requires nothing less than strategic direction and resourcing decisions at the highest levels of the organisation. Changing mindsets Einstein once said “The world as we have created is a process of our thinking. It cannot be changed without changing our thinking”. The world today continues to push the limits of social and environmental thresholds, that are posing increasingly serious threats to humanity. VBI is therefore, much more than a current and passing fad, but a deeper conviction of the critical need 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  to begin the process of changing mindsets in a lasting way. Financial institutions are a key, but not the only catalysts in this process. Customers and investors need to be supported with relevant information, along with the means and ability to compare such information, in order to better understand the value propositions of Islamic finance. The encouragement of pension and institutional funds with a sustainable investment orientation, particularly in markets where such funds remain largely underdeveloped, would be important to provide a stronger impetus for VBI. Credit rating agencies could also be important contributors to a new landscape, with stronger emphasis on economic, social and environmental sustainability in assessment frameworks and methods.

But it brings very material benefits through increased competition as a result of greater transparency of prices and lower transactions costs, through broader and more liquid financial markets, and through the associated improvement in economic resource allocation. And there is no doubt that intra-European exchange rate certainty in particular will enhance the benefits to be derived from the European single market. Whether or not it is essential, therefore, most people would, I think, agree that, other things equal, the nominal exchange rate certainty that comes with the move to the single European currency is very desirable in this context. What then are the economic arguments against it? Essentially they can be summarised as the risk that the single monetary policy - the single, one-size-fits-all, short-term BIS Review 88/1998  -2-  interest rate within the euro area, which is a necessary corollary of the single currency - will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic needs of each of the euro-member countries. There is no doubt that such risk exists. It may result from cyclical divergence within the euro area, with some participating countries needing to stimulate domestic demand while others are already operating close to capacity. It may arise from differences in fiscal positions even though these are to be constrained through the Stability and Growth Pact. Or it may result from economic shocks of some sort that have a bigger impact on some countries than on others.