samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Initially motivated by concerns over bilateral trade imbalances, trade measures are now being taken in response to issues ranging from immigration to Intellectual Property protection to control of the technologies underpinning the Fourth Industrial Revolution.2 It has even become fashionable for some to speak of a new Cold War. That bears a moment’s reflection for a lot has changed. At the height of the Cold War, US-USSR trade was worth $ billion a year; today, US-Chinese trade clocks $ billion a day. More broadly trade in intermediate goods and services has doubled since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and production has become increasingly integrated across borders.3 The longer current tensions persist, the greater the risk that protectionism becomes the norm. Once raised, tariffs are usually slow to be lowered. Consider that half a century ago the US imposed tariffs on light trucks due to a dispute over chicken exports to Europe. While the chickens were soon forgotten, the truck tariffs remain in place. Reflecting the more febrile atmosphere, a trade war has shot to the top of the risks most worrying investors (Chart 3) and measures of global economic policy uncertainty have reached record highs (Chart 4). Such concerns are contributing to sharp reductions in corporate earnings expectations (Chart 5), though for the time being the falls in expected policy rates have cushioned the impact on equity prices. The markets’ faith in the power of monetary policy is notable.

Certainly the portents are worrying. The storm that the modern Prospero has conjured is having an impact. Over the past year, the global economy has shifted from a robust, broad-based expansion to a widespread slowdown, with the proportion of the global economy growing above trend falling from four fifths to one sixth. In its May Inflation Report, the MPC projected that global growth would soon stabilise before recovering to around its potential rate by the middle of next year. This reflected: i)  the relative absence of fundamental imbalances in the global economy that would by themselves be expected to derail the expansion;  ii)  a considerable degree of expected policy support to the expansion; and  iii)  some positive momentum in trade discussions. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  On 5 May, with the ink on the MPC’s Report barely dry, President Trump announced further increases in tariffs on imports from China and China retaliated. Later that month, the US additionally threatened new tariffs on Mexico despite having only recently agreed a revised NAFTA accord. The US threat to increase tariffs on auto imports from Europe remains. The latest actions raise the possibility that trade tensions could be far more pervasive, persistent and damaging than previously expected. The rationales for action are broadening.
A large financial system can be more readily versatile, i.e. provide investors and those in need of financing with a full range of options to choose from according to their requirements. What does all of this mean for financial stability in the euro area? First of all, I should like to remind you that the financial system of the euro area showed a high degree of stability during last year’s period of financial turbulence as well as during the rather dramatic structural shift connected to the changeover to the euro. In the former case, it is true that there was a significant spillover effect for the euro area markets, but they recovered quickly and without suffering any lasting damage. There was no disruption to any of the basic functions of the financial system, and public confidence in it remained strong throughout. Second, the foreseen structural changes require, as I mentioned earlier, the need for adjustment to be taken seriously by all participants in the financial system. This adjustment appears to have intensified recently: there has been an increase in merger activity, an establishment of alliances and an introduction of new products and services, often based on modern information technology. The process of structural change contains risks, but if these risks are identified early and analysed carefully, they do not present a threat to financial stability. After all, we are talking about decision-making and planning by people who are dealing with risks every day at the highest professional level.

News conference  Berne, 13 June 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  In my remarks today, I will present the key findings from this year’s Financial Stability Report, published by the Swiss National Bank this morning. In the first part of my speech, I will talk about the big banks, before going on, in the second part, to outline our assessment of the situation at the domestically focused banks. Big banks  The global economic and financial market conditions that the two Swiss big banks are facing have become slightly more difficult since our assessment this time last year. Nevertheless, further progress has been achieved in implementing the revised ‘too big to fail’ regulations. This holds true for both areas covered by the regulations: resilience and resolution. As regards resilience, the Swiss big banks Credit Suisse and UBS have slightly improved their capital situation overall. As a result, they are now close to full compliance with the lookthrough going-concern capital requirements on a consolidated basis. The current calibration of these regulatory requirements is necessary to ensure adequate resilience at both banks. This is confirmed by both our loss potential analyses and the historical loss experience during the last financial crisis. The market’s assessment of the two big banks’ resilience is generally similar to that of the previous year. Their stand-alone ratings, which evaluate the intrinsic financial strength of the banks, assuming no extraordinary external support, remain unchanged.
Conclusion To sum up, in the last few quarters we have witnessed a deceleration of the global economy, particularly sharp in the euro area and affecting also the Spanish economy. As a result, the macroeconomic projections have been revised downward in most countries, including Spain, and the diagnosis as to the balance of risks also remains on the downside, mainly as a result of the geopolitical uncertainty over developments in trade tensions and Brexit and, in the case of Spain, over the future course of economic policies. Against this background, the Spanish economy, despite the improvements achieved during the recovery, continues to face significant imbalances, including most notably the high unemployment, government debt and external debt. In addition, Spain’s capacity for future growth is constrained by its very weak productivity dynamics and the foreseeable impact of population ageing. 15  See D. Acemoglu and D. Autor (2011), “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment and Earnings”, Handbook of Labor Economics, 4, pp. 1043-1171. 17/18  Given this setting, the government resulting from the coming elections must urgently take the initiative and marshal sufficient support to push through reforms to resolve the vulnerabilities still persisting in the Spanish economy and enhance its growth capacity. It is, therefore, time to put our headlights on high beam and forge a broad consensus to protect the well-being of the coming generations. Thank you. 18/18

Spain has been one of the first European countries to have incorporated a balanced budget requirement into its constitution, with broad Parliamentary backing. A more recent example is labour-market reform. This is of great importance, because Spain had not taken such a significant step in this area since the 1984 reform. If the 1984 reform allowed Spain to create millions of jobs and to increase the welfare of Spaniards during upswings, the reform approved this year should put an end to a situation in which dismissal and an increase in unemployment are the only way of adjusting the economy. This reform leaves workers and employers free to agree to increase competitiveness by increasing productivity and/or adjusting wages, with the only obstacles or impediments being those laid down by law. It is sometimes said that all this has been done too late. Should labour-market reform have been carried out five years ago? It certainly should have. Or ten years ago in 2002, when we were enjoying the long upswing? It would certainly have been better for Spain. The same can be said about financial reform. Why were savings banks not reformed during the good times? Why were bank resolution schemes, such as the FROB, not drawn up ready to resolve the banking problems created by the upswing? These questions merely lead to gloominess and, moreover, ignore the fact that, not only in Spain, but almost worldwide, key reforms are introduced at the worst times.
Meanwhile, the risks that stem from the countries possibly diverging from the euro area average are perhaps also clearer than for Sweden (which is a country that is unusually well-integrated with euro area countries and has a similar economic structure). But some factors suggest that the new Member States in central Europe do not need a different monetary policy than that of the euro area. These countries also have close ties with the rest of the EU, which is their biggest trading partner by far, accounting for some 50-70 per cent of imports and exports. Having said that, the countries are still undergoing a period of quick change; it is conceivable that any potential shocks during such a transitional period would be managed better through a national monetary policy. Their growth is and should be considerably higher than the EU average as long as they continue to reduce the differences in their standard of living compared with the rest of the EU. This always entails risks of overheating similar to that experienced by the fast-growing Irish economy. The assessment of the risks related to the process of change and of the long-term gains varies between the different candidate countries depending on how open and flexible their economies are. Nevertheless, it seems that the advantages of integration will outweigh the disadvantages when the new countries have assessed the euro, even if it is likely that some of the new Member States will have to wait longer than others before introducing the euro.

Even conservative estimates indicate a considerable rise in trade within currency areas, and attendant welfare gains. Other studies, which are directly based on trade dynamics in the last decade, suggest that trade between the euro area countries may have increased by 5-10 per cent as a result of the euro. BIS Review 47/2003  1  Another long-term gain is in price competition. The limited and temporary rise in prices of certain goods and services in conjunction with the introduction of the euro notes and coins should be weighed against the long-term gains from price transparency, the effect of easier price comparisons when prices in the entire euro area are expressed in the same currency. Previously, this particular gain was also perceived as minimal as cross-border trade is relatively small and companies themselves are said to be capable of converting prices regularly between currencies without suffering any major efficiency losses. However, at the same time, there were price differences in the EU of 20-30 per cent on a number of goods (cars, for example) that should be relatively easy to both transport over the border and compare in terms of price. These differences appear to have diminished quicker since euro banknotes and coins were introduced in 2001. New research also suggests that the effects of a common currency on prices may have been underestimated.
Øystein Olsen: The purpose and scope of monetary policy Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) / BI Norwegian Business School, Oslo, 26 October 2017. * * * Accompanying slides On 23 June this year, the Central Bank Law Commission submitted its proposal for a new central bank act and for the future organisation of Norges Bank and the Government Pension Fund Global.1 I want to commend the Commission, headed by my predecessor Svein Gjedrem, on its thorough work. Important issues have been thoroughly examined and deliberated. Norges Bank has carefully scrutinised the Commission’s proposals before submitting its response to the consultation document. As our response was published today, this speech provides a good opportunity to elaborate on Norges Bank’s views on some of the key aspects of the Commission’s recommendation. I will primarily focus on the Commission’s proposal for an objects clause in the new central bank act and in particular on one of the core functions of the central bank – monetary policy. What is the main objective of monetary policy, and what scope is available to monetary policy for pursuing other goals? Towards the end of my speech, I will also discuss the future organisation of the central bank and the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG).

Such a basis will also provide legal clarity regarding the necessary access to EUwide macro-prudential information as well as to supervisory data concerning individual institutions, subject to adequate confidentiality arrangements. The next steps towards the implementation of the de Larosière Group proposals will require a number of legal, institutional and organisational issues to be addressed. In this regard, the ECB stands ready to contribute to the necessary preparations in a constructive and timely manner. We look forward to the communication from the European Commission and the decision of the European Council in June that will lay the foundations of a new system of macro-prudential supervision in the EU. Speedy progress towards that goal is of the essence, for the strengthening of macro-prudential supervision in Europe is an important and urgent policy objective – and one which the members of this Committee have strongly supported in a consistent and, indeed, visionary manner. *** Madam Chair, honourable members of the Committee, I would like to thank you on behalf of the Executive Board and the Governing Council for our enriching exchanges of views over the past five years. Owing to the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament, today’s presentation of our Annual Report is the last before your Committee in its current composition. I have always appreciated your cooperation and our fruitful dialogue. Thank you for your attention. I am now at your disposal for questions. BIS Review 49/2009  5
Here indeed we have a backlog, and we need to cross over to this new system in order to reduce costs for the financial sector and ultimately reduce the cost of credit. This will also result in cheaper loans. We will be carrying out tests on the market of new technologies, such as distributed ledger technology based on a blockchain technology, and we have already begun this process in order to implement the regulation of new technologies rationally, protecting the markets from risks. At the beginning of this speech I mentioned the strategic objectives of the Bank of Russia. These are our key priorities. You may have noticed that the tasks we set ourselves four years ago and those for the year 2016, which I have been speaking about today, as well as challenges of the future, are all, of course, related to each other. We consider it to be very important to respect the principles of continuity, consistency and predictability. We will no doubt be responding with flexibility to any given situation. The situation is volatile, there is a lot of uncertainty in the world. We will have to react in accordance with the challenges presented to us. But the consistency of our policy, I think, is very important. The preservation of trust is vital to development, as well as to financial markets. This is a key category – trust in the financial market and trust in monetary policy have been the most influential factors in terms of economic growth.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of Russia's economic and financial developments in 2016 Speech by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the plenary session of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 June 2017. * * * Dear Vyacheslav Volodin, and deputies of the State Duma! The Central Bank is guided in its actions by strategic objectives. I want to note that across the country, every employee of the Bank of Russia knows what these are. They are the basis on which key performance indicators for employees are formulated. These objectives are: price stability; financial market sustainability; availability of financial products and services for households and businesses; development of the national payment system; development of technologies and support of innovations in the financial market. These objectives follow directly from the functions of the Central Bank, as defined by the Constitution and by the law. Yesterday, I took another look at the speech I gave to the Duma four years ago. Yes, of course, life has made adjustments. No one back in 2013 expected such negative external factors, the sanctions, and the drop in oil prices. So the task of ensuring financial stability has come to the forefront of our activities. But in dealing with this problem, we have tried not to lose sight of strategically important activities that we assigned ourselves four years ago, and we must continue to work towards the completion of these.
World trade also declined, after having exhibited strong growth in the last few months of 2013, which had raised hopes of a sustained economic recovery. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In the US, GDP declined in the first quarter. However, we consider this to be a transitory phenomenon which can be largely put down to an exceptional cold snap experienced this winter. Growth in the euro area was weak and varied greatly from one country to another. While economic activity continued to pick up in Germany, renewed stagnation in France and Italy gave rise to disappointment. We continue to expect the global economy to firm in the coming quarters. However, the global economic recovery will remain very subdued by historical standards. Compared to the last monetary policy assessment, we now anticipate somewhat slower growth, in both advanced and emerging economies. It is entirely possible, however, that global economic growth will be weaker than we have assumed. The euro area continues to face significant challenges. These include the consolidation of public sector finances as well as the implementation of institutional reforms and reforms to promote growth. In addition, various emerging economies are suffering from structural problems. Should the current geopolitical conflicts worsen, this would also hold back activity in the international economy. Since the major currency areas are in different phases of the monetary policy cycle, there is also a danger of greater volatility in the financial and foreign exchange markets.

Thomas Jordan: Swiss National Bank’s assessment of the economic situation Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the media news conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 19 June 2014. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen Welcome to the Swiss National Bank’s six-monthly news conference. As usual, I will begin by explaining the monetary policy decision and outlining our assessment of the economic situation. Afterwards, Jean-Pierre Danthine will present our latest Financial Stability Report, before Fritz Zurbrügg comments on current developments in the financial markets. Following our introductory remarks, we will be pleased to answer any questions you might have. Monetary policy decision I will begin with the monetary policy decision. The SNB is maintaining its minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. The target range for the three-month Libor will remain unchanged at 0.0–0.25%. The Swiss franc is still high. We will therefore continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination. If necessary, we are prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. With interest rates close to zero, the minimum exchange rate is the right tool to avoid an undesirable tightening of monetary conditions. This applies especially if the upward pressure on the Swiss franc were to intensify once again. And, if required, we are also willing to take further measures. Our new conditional inflation forecast shows that inflationary pressure has receded once more in the medium term.
By providing another avenue for financing with the development of the corporate bond market, firms are able to improve their ability to balance debt and equity to better manage the degree of leverage while reducing the impact of shocks arising from over-dependence on any single form or source of financing. The development of corporate bond markets in the region has also enhanced the efficiency of capital allocation by providing an avenue for investing one of Asia’s hallmarks - its large reserve of savings arising from trade surpluses. By developing the regional bond markets, it would enable firms to tap alternative sources of financing at competitive cost thereby contributing to increased efficiency, higher investment and consequently to overall growth. The launch of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) in June 2003 marks the first significant step in regional financial co-operation and integration, and augurs well for the future development of the Asian regional bond market. The Asian Bond Market will not only serve to facilitate the re-investment of a portion of Asia’s reserves back into the region but what is equally important is that it allows for the efficient allocation of savings for productive investments and at the same time broadens and deepens the regional bond markets. In the process, the level of corporate governance in the region would be enhanced as well. Indeed, developing such an alternative source of financing would serve as a more resilient source of long-term financing with improved matching of the currency and maturity profiles of assets and liabilities.

The difference between 3-month interbank rate and expected policy rate (basis-spread)  Sources: Reuters EcoWin and the Riksbank  2.World trade stabilising World trade monitor index, 2000 = 100, seasonally-adjusted data 180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  20  20 0  0 90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Source: Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis  8  BIS Review 111/2009  3.Growth in Asia GDP, annual percentage change 15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5 China South Korea  -10  -10  Taiwan Japan  -15  -15 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  Sources: National sources  4.House prices in the USA Index, January 2000 = 100, seasonally-adjusted data 250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0  0 88  90  92  94  96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Source: Standard & Poor's  BIS Review 111/2009  9  5.Growth increasing in the world GDP, quarterly change in per cent calculated as an annual rate, seasonally-adjusted data 10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4 Euro area  -6  -6  USA  -8  -8  TCW  -10  -10  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  Sources: National sources and the Riksbank  6.GDP Quarterly changes in per cent calculated in annualised terms, seasonallyadjusted data 10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5 July  -10  -10  September  -15  -15  -20  -20 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  Note.