samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Hence, the excess liquidity, which was TRY 3.9 billion at end-2007, turned into a liquidity shortage of TRY 10.4 billion at the end of November 2008. As a result, liquidity in the market dropped by TRY 14.3 billion (Table 3). Table 3: Changes in liquidity (Billion TRY) 31.12.07 28.11.08  Change  3.9  -10.4  -14.3  Funded via 1-Week Repo Auctions  0.0  - 19.0  -19.0  Withdrawn in IMM and ISE at Overnight Maturity  2.9  8.6  5.7  Withdrawn via Liquidity Bills  1.0  0.0  1.0  Liquidity in the market  The main items affecting liquidity in the market in 2008 are given in Table 4. BIS Review 3/2009  11  Table 4: Factors affecting liquidity (Billion TRY) 31.12.07 28.11.08  Impact  46.3  56.8  -10.5  Currency Issued  27.4  33.3  -5.9  Free Deposits  18.9  23.5  -4.6  Monetary Base  CBRT Operations Affecting Liquidity in the Market  11.0  FX Purchase against TRY  9.1  CBRT Interest Payments  1.9  Public Operations (excl.

Perhaps this minority view was based on the practice, now becoming quite common in other central banks, that the proceedings of monetary policy committees are published, so that the public is made aware of how monetary policy decisions are taken by those entrusted with the authority to make them. There are the examples of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve Bank in the United States and the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. The minutes of their meetings are published with an appropriate time lag. In Hong Kong we do not have an equivalent of the FOMC or the Monetary Policy Committee. This is simply because we do not have an independent monetary policy and an independent body making that policy. We do not have a system whereby the HKMA has to take discretionary decisions to determine interest rates or to specify monetary targets. There has therefore not been a need for a mechanism for public scrutiny of discretionary decisions because there is nothing to scrutinize. 23. Our monetary system is rule-based. To the extent that there is a need to have a mechanism for public scrutiny, it should be aimed at ensuring that the HKMA adheres to the rules and does not indulge secretly in discretionary monetary management. We have already volunteered this mechanism in providing real time information on the monetary base. Changes and forecasts of changes to the monetary base are announced almost immediately after the relevant transactions have been conducted.
They need to analyse information such as financial objectives and risk tolerance, to design holistic solutions to help consumers achieve their financial goals. Job Specialisation - Technology Jobs in Financial Sector  Let me now turn to job specialisation – technology jobs in finance. Technology has become central to how financial services are produced, distributed, and consumed. The Singapore financial sector has harnessed technology across a wide range of functions – from risk management, business analytics to customer service. We are now among the most tech-enabled financial centres in the world, supported by a vibrant FinTech ecosystem and strong foundational digital infrastructures. Singaporeans have benefitted significantly from digital financial services. We can: see our financial data across financial institutions and government agencies in one single portal to enable comprehensive financial planning; trade securities and buy insurance on the go; and pay for almost anything with just a mobile phone. Can we imagine what life would have been like during last year’s “circuit breaker” lockdown if we did not have PayNow or FAST? Many of these digital finance services would not have been possible without the strong technology workforce in the financial sector. Take for example SGFinDex, which provides a 360-degree view of our personal finances through a mobile application (app). The front-end of the app is simple and intuitive, a delight to use. Many of us have seen it.

First, quantitative easing, through the purchase of public and private debt, seeks to extend the effects of low short-term interest rates to the rest of the yield curve, including to longterm rates, over which monetary policy normally has no direct influence. To do this, the central bank purchases assets with long-term maturities, generating an increase in their price, or, tantamount to this, a reduction in their yields. These lower yields on the assets acquired by the central bank are in turn partly passed through to the yields on assets with a similar duration, such as the interest rates on bank loans, which tend to be the most relevant ones for the saving and investment decisions of households and firms, thus stimulating demand and price rises. Second, forward guidance seeks to transmit to private agents the central bank’s commitment to maintaining an expansionary monetary policy throughout the early stages of the recovery, in order to avoid the deanchoring of inflation expectations. These programmes, whose application has involved major challenges for central banks given the lack of any similar experience in the past, seem to be working acceptably well, assisting the economic recovery and avoiding the emergence of crisis-induced deflationary pressures. According to analysis carried out by the Banco de España, ECB action can explain around half of the nominal GDP growth in the euro area over the period 2015-2017. That said, it is important to stress that central banks cannot take sole responsibility for the recovery.
First, it is important for policymakers to remain agile in their approach to policies. We should not be too rigid in our own ways that we neglect changes in the environment and fail to change with the times. The world as we know it will be transformed with the rapid advancements in technology and communication, big data and the list goes on. If we remain stagnant, we are doomed to fail. The willingness to renew and redirect policy is critical to successful policymaking. From the outside looking in, the redirection of policy is often perceived to be regressive. In reality, they reflect policies that aim to be more, rather than less, responsive to changing conditions. In the same way that businesses expect governments to relax and adapt policy to capture new 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  opportunities, authorities have a professional duty to redirect policy, however unpopular, to maintain stability and harness our collective growth potential when risks or unintended outcomes become apparent. This requires much more confidence, boldness and courage. Second, policymakers need to protect and value their autonomy in the conduct of policies and not be constrained by prevailing rules and consensus thinking established by the international community. International organisations have come up with various definitions and primers on how they feel an economy should be managed. Their need for standardisation is understandable because of the need to dispense consistent policy advice across many countries.

There is a view in the international community that it is very difficult to identify an asset bubble before it materialises or even after it has already formed. This is true to a certain extent. For example, property prices in Hong Kong have increased nearly 20-fold in the past 30 years. Flats in the Taikoo Shing, a large residential estate on Hong Kong Island, were sold for only $ a square foot in the 70’s when they were built. The prices then spiralled upwards to over $ a square foot in the 80’s and reached a peak of nearly $ a square foot in 1997. Although there have been ups and downs in property prices in Hong Kong in the past 30 years, the trend has basically been up. During each upward leg, ordinary middle-class households usually felt that prices were too high and difficult to afford, and there were always questions about whether a bubble had developed in the property market. However, with the benefit of hindsight, the rises in the 70’s and 80’s were not the result of bubbles but were supported by economic fundamentals, including growth in productivity and household incomes. A real and massive bubble did occur in the 90’s as a result of a bull market. However, many people at that time tried to explain the irrational surges in prices as being part of the “Hong Kong miracle”. The bubble and its subsequent bursting in the third quarter of 1997 dealt a severe blow to Hong Kong.
Excess liquidity during the first half of the century gave way to plummeting liquidity during the depths of the crisis. Today, despite rock-bottom global interest rates, market liquidity remains below normal levels. Risk capital is parked on the sidelines. Balance sheet repair So what explains this continuing aversion to risk? Two factors are central: balance sheet disrepair and psychological scarring. In other words, both balance sheet fundamentals and market perceptions, perhaps detached from fundamentals, appear to be weighing on risk-taking. Since the start of the crisis, balance sheets have been a good news/bad news story. The good news is that balance sheet repair is underway in many sectors and countries. The bad news is that this process appears to be far from complete, providing a continuing strong headwind to risk-taking. Consider in turn the balance sheets of banks, households, companies and governments. Pre-crisis, banks’ balance sheets were furthest out of kilter. Average leverage in the global banking system – the ratio of banks’ assets to their equity – rose to highs of over 40 (Chart 9). At the height of the boom, every $ of bank assets was financed with $ cents of debt. The global banking system was financing itself with a 98% loan-to-value mortgage. Since then, global banks have raised their equity by around $ billion and shrunk their assets by $ trillion. As a result, global banks’ leverage has halved to around 20, close to its long-run average.

In the area of the SSM, these restrictions are particularly significant at the moment since, given the variety of supervisory practices and cultures in place, only adequate codifying of rules and procedures can help to ensure that banks are treated equitably, even if this means that some of the benefits, in terms of supervisory effectiveness, that an appropriate amount of discretion involve, have to be sacrificed. Clearly, as the new European supervisory regime matures, we must strive to develop a specific action framework that incorporates the best practices and that is sufficiently robust to enable its application to be adapted appropriately to each specific circumstance. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
For monetary policy, however, they are akin to a series of persistent positive supply shocks that may force central banks into action should these shocks cause a more general and broad-based reappraisal by the public of the medium-term inflation outlook.21  Greening monetary policy implementation So, the implications for the conduct of monetary policy could be substantial. The question, then, is whether central banks themselves should be doing more to prevent climate change in the first place.22 Some argue we have an obligation to act, since the EU Treaty states that “without prejudice to its primary objective, the ECB shall support the general economic policies in the Union”, which include a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, and mandates environmental protection requirements to be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Union's policies and activities.23 Certainly, the protection of the environment is not the only transversal objective assigned to EU institutions and hence to the ECB. Under the Treaty one could equally ask, for example, why the ECB should not promote industries that promise the strongest employment growth, irrespective of their ecological footprint.24 But equally importantly, the ECB is subject to the Treaty requirement to “act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition”. In the end, the Treaty grants the ECB a high degree of independence and it enjoys broad discretion in implementing its policies.

The 2018 task force on artificial intelligence led to the publication of a first report, and in turn to the launch of experiments with volunteer players, which shall continue in new forms next year. This work is a first step towards the publication of principles of governance for AI algorithms. The working group on remote customer identification led to a number of regulatory changes this year. We are now supporting ANSSI’s efforts to publish a framework so that these changes can be fully implemented. We have also set up two working groups with players from the crypto-asset sector. The first, which published its report last Wednesday, examines all anti-money laundering methods used by digital asset service providers: it highlights the potential of blockchain technology in transaction tracing, and sets out technical avenues for ensuring that electronic transfers meet the transparency requirements recommended by the FATF. The second aims to promote dialogue between digital asset service providers and banking players, to help cryptoasset entrepreneurs get access to the bank accounts and services that they need. II. The digital revolution in payments I would like to turn now to a subject that is closely linked to Fintechs: payments in the digital era. Innovations in the field of payments are disrupting the traditional split between central bank money and commercial bank money. People are using less and less cash, and therefore less and less central bank money, and more and more contactless payments.
As we have seen from numerous case studies during the financial crisis, weak corporate governance is often the key reason for the failures of financial institutions. 10. Much work continues to be done in developing regulatory requirements on governance in many jurisdictions. In Singapore, MAS has proposed enhancements to its corporate governance regulations and guidelines, drawing lessons from the recent financial crisis and international developments. The key proposals include strengthening the Board of Directors’ independence and oversight on risk management; ensuring that the Board has the appropriate skills and time to perform its role effectively; and requiring the Board to set appropriate remuneration policies to prevent excessive risk-taking. INCOME should benchmark itself against the best governance practices even though it is set up as a co-operative. Addressing the gaps in insurance needs 11. As for opportunities, there remain gaps in Singaporeans’ insurance protection needs. Studies commissioned by the insurance industry have suggested that Singaporeans are under-insured. Many are not insured at all while of those who are, many are underinsured. The under-insurance is greatest in the 30–49 age group. This is not surprising. Singaporeans in that age group tend to have heavier financial commitments and a greater number of dependants. So they find the cost of having to pay insurance premium a stretch. Unfortunately, if they were to meet an untimely death, critical illness or physical disability, their dependants would be caught without a breadwinner and saddled with financial commitments like mortgages and so on. 12. There are many reasons for the under-insurance.

It could be due to complacency and a false sense of security that misfortune would not befall the individual. Or it could also be a general lack of awareness of how much coverage would be considered adequate. But the more likely reason is the perception that getting the recommended amount of insurance protection is costly and beyond their means. Hence, it is given lower priority amidst other more pressing financial commitments like housing, children’s education and other day-to-day needs. 2  BIS Review 163/2010  13. What can we do to keep insurance protection affordable? I urge the insurance industry to make a more concerted effort to address this. Part of the problem lies in the conventional practice of insurers in bundling the savings and protection elements into what is known as Whole Life Plans. Since the savings element in such Whole Life Plans can be very significant, the insurance premiums could be 3–5 times that of pure protection Term Assurance plans, for the same level of protection. I faced the same problem when I first started work. I could not afford a Whole Life Plan but had the good sense to choose a Term Assurance policy. Protecting my young family then was more important than leaving them my Whole Life insurance payout after they are all grown up when they need the sum of money the least. 14. The insurance industry should not always push for a Whole Life Plan as it may result in under insurance.
Another consequence of higher productivity growth is that inflation tends to be held back in that unit labour costs are curbed. Labour costs are the dominant item of expenditure in the economy as a whole. Everything suggests that the higher productivity growth in Sweden has contributed to the favourable economic development since the end of the crisis in the early 1990s. But there are other explanations, too. Labour market working better than expected One is the workings of the labour market. Many studies have shown that, at least in a formal sense, Sweden’s labour market is characterised by more or less the same rigidities as continental Europe. So there was every reason to suspect that after the crisis in the early 1990s, unemployment would also stick at a high level in Sweden. Here are some of the grounds for this: •  Labour demand is liable to be low in a labour market that is heavily regulated. Firms are reluctant to recruit because of uncertainty about being able to cut costs if economic activity were to decline. •  Labour supply may be affected after unemployment has risen as steeply as it did in the early 1990s. People are excluded from the labour market. Long-term unemployment may leave competence out of line with what firms are now looking for. The determination to find a job can be affected both by a long period of unemployment and by the structure of unemployment insurance.

Urban Bäckström: Swedish economy in transition  Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Independent Academy of Building & Construction, on 2 October 2000. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to talk with you this evening about the Swedish economy and monetary policy. The issues I have chosen to consider are why the Swedish economy is performing so well and what can be done to ensure that this continues. As you know, output and employment are rising rapidly at present. Annual output growth has averaged 3% over the past six years and the current rate seems to be somewhere between 3 and 4%. Unemployment has come down and is still falling to levels that few had believed possible some years ago, particularly in view of the high European rate. At the same time we have seen that even comparatively low nominal wage increases can result in higher real wages. As a matter of fact, the real wage increases have exceeded most people’s expectations and been higher than for many years. Moreover, inflation has remained low in spite of all this. But monetary policy may still have challenges to face as resource utilisation in the Swedish economy becomes increasingly strained. The current situation also contains a number of risks that have to be assessed.
However, the importer must initially choose between raising the price in kronor to compensate for the higher purchase price and reducing the company’s own margins. Let us assume that the price Swedish cheese importer has to pay is set at 10 euro per kilo, and that the price set for customers in shops in Sweden is 120 kronor. The exchange rate is  2  BIS Review 3/2010  initially 10 kronor/euro. The purchase price thus corresponds to 100 kronor per kilo. The Swedish importer thus has a profit margin of 20 per cent of the purchase price. 1 If the krona depreciates by 15 per cent, to 11.5 kronor per euro, the import price in kronor is 15 per cent higher, or 115 kronor per kilo. To retain a profit margin of 20 per cent of the purchase price, the price offered to customers in Sweden also needs to be raised by 15 per cent, from 120 kronor to 138 kronor per kilo. In this case the pass-through of the exchange rate to the price of the cheese will be complete, as both the exchange rate and the price of the cheese change by 15 per cent. However, this can be expected to lead to lower sales, as consumers may choose to buy, for instance, Swedish cheese instead of French. It is therefore not necessarily the most profitable pricing strategy. Another alternative for the importer is to hold the price in kronor completely unchanged.

Taking into account inflation expectations, the pricing behavior and the course of other factors affecting inflation, we will maintain our tight monetary policy stance as long as deemed necessary. Chart 3. Chart 4. (2-Week Moving Average, Billion TL)  (Percent)  CBRT Funding*  *Marginal funding is O/N funding quoted at the upper limit of the corridor. Source: CBRT. CBRT Rates and BIST Interbank O/N Repo Rates  Source: BIST, CBRT. The yield curve, which was nearly flat in the last quarter of 2015 as in the entire year, assumed a positive slope in January 2016 (Chart 5). This was mainly due to long-term rates that rose amid the uncertainty surrounding global markets, geopolitical risks and heightened inflation expectations, which also affected the spread between 5-year market rates and the BIST overnight interbank rates. After remaining negative across the fourth quarter of 2015, the spread turned slightly positive in the first weeks of January as a result of rising 5-year market rates (Chart 6). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5. Chart 6. Yield Curve Between October 28, 2015- January 22, 2016 (Percent)  (Percent, 5-Day MA)  Source: Bloomberg,  Maturity (Year)  Money Market Rates  Source: Bloomberg, BIST. Regarding our Turkish lira liquidity policy, there has been some decline in banks’ FX swap deals with the market for short-term funds owing partly to changes we made to the guidelines for the use of FX deposits as collateral following the announcement of our road map.