samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If monetary policy can be made expansionary without this causing economic actors to fear that inflation will rise sharply, their expectations of what inflation will be in the longer term will not be affected either. However, if fears of sharply rising inflation arise as a result of the expansionary policy, long-term inflation expectations may also begin to creep upwards. If the anchor comes loose completely, the long-term consequence may be that inflation continues to rise in a price and wage spiral. And, just as it may take a great deal of effort to restore confidence in public finances that have begun to erode, it may be difficult and costly to bring inflation back under control. As I mentioned at the start, in Sweden we have some experience of price and wage spirals of this type, even though this was some decades ago. Too low inflation is also a problem… However, it is not only an anchor that is drifting ‘upwards’ that is a cause for concern. Monetary policy can also have major problems if it drifts ‘downwards’ and inflation becomes persistently very low. In this case, monetary policy becomes less effective because the main instrument, the policy rate, becomes more difficult to use.

If public investments, which, sooner or later, may still need to be made, can be financed at a historically low cost, this would seem like a good opportunity to implement them. Ultimately, fiscal policy aims to increase the well-being of citizens. The development of deficits and public debt may be the means to achieve this, but it is not obvious from an economic point of view that it should be seen as an end in itself. A comparison with monetary policy can be made here: the target is formulated in terms of the outcome, that is, mainly how well the inflation target has been achieved, rather than the means, that is, the monetary policy tools. I think it would be useful if we were to start thinking more along these lines in fiscal policy as well.14 The conclusion of this reasoning is not that public borrowing is never problematic. For example, if the policy becomes too extensive or if it is not sufficiently explained and followed up, investors may nevertheless begin to fear that the government will not be able to manage its debt and may therefore demand a higher risk compensation for lending. This, in turn, may make the commitments even more difficult to meet – there is a risk that we will find ourselves in a bad equilibrium, expressed in economic terms.
This proposal will enhance worker remittances into the country and help to finance the widening trade deficit and maintain a positive balance of payment position. The budget reiterates the need for permitting professionals to earn in foreign currency and retain such funds in foreign currency accounts within the country. The budget also allows expenditure incurred on acquiring international accreditation as a deductible expenditure from taxation. These measures are expected to enhance foreign currency earnings and further facilitate the management of foreign reserves. The down-side risks Effective policy coordination is certainly the way forward as set out in the budget 2007 and it is interdependent on action by all policy-making authorities. If one or two policy areas lag behind, then the sustainability of achievements over the long term will become an issue. The monetary policy has to play its part to bring down inflationary expectations, while the investment policy has to attract FDIs and  BIS Review 7/2007  3  other investment flows. The reserve management policy should attempt to enhance foreign reserves through increased worker remittances and other flows. Pushing all these policy fronts to work within the open economic policy framework and keeping pace with each other is critical to the success of the medium term development plan. Very close coordination is essential for it and it is certainly a challenge. At the same time, the fiscal policy should make all attempts to stick to its revenue and expenditure targets.

A broad-based analysis of the data, taking the appropriate medium-term perspective and allowing for these considerations, confirms the underlying strength of money growth. In particular, the pace, maturity and sectoral composition of borrowing from banks suggest that, at the level of the euro area as a whole, the availability of bank credit has, as yet, not been significantly affected by the ongoing financial tensions. This notwithstanding, growth in loans now shows signs of moderation, as previously anticipated, with corporate demand for credit slowing. At the same time, the growth of loans to households continues to follow the downward trend observed over the past few years, as a result of higher short-term interest rates and housing market weakness in several parts of the euro area. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis clearly confirms the assessment of upside risks to price stability over the medium term. The information that has become available since the last meeting of the Governing Council has confirmed that annual inflation rates are likely to remain well above levels consistent with price stability for a protracted period of time. The growth of broad money and credit aggregates is now showing some signs of moderation, but the still strong underlying pace of monetary expansion points to continued risks to price stability over the medium term. The latest economic data also confirm the weakening of real GDP growth in mid-2008.
Durmuş Yilmaz: Central Bank monetary and exchange rate policies and economic outlook Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at a meeting organised by the Aegean Industrialists and Businessmen Association, İzmir, 8 June 2006. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is, indeed, a great pleasure for me to address another information meeting – yet another one in a series held since 2003 – organized in cooperation with Dünya Newspaper with a view to informing the business world. Today’s meeting is the first meeting of 2006. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Aegean Industrialists and Businessmen Association for their organization. Considering recent inflation figures, I am sure you are all expecting me to inform you of developments in the economy, especially those regarding inflation. However, before moving on to topical subjects, at this very first meeting of 2006, I would like to briefly touch on what the transformation process the Turkish economy has been undergoing since 2001 means to us. I also want to give you a framework of the macroeconomic outlook. My speech will cover the developments in inflation, the Central Bank’s interest rate and exchange rate policies, the developments in financial markets, growth, employment and the current account deficit. As I have mentioned earlier, the Turkish economy has been undergoing a structural transformation process.

There was thus no scope for stabilising monetary and fiscal policies. Since then the pendulum has swung back a little with the neo-Keynesianism, which has reintroduced some of the elements of the classical Keynesian analysis. Due to different reasons it can take time before the economy returns to its long run equilibrium after a shock. Monopolistic competition and sticky wages are a few examples. The participants’ expectations can play a major role according to these theories. Monetary and fiscal policy can therefore be used to stabilise the economy. Macroeconomic analysis is often carried out with the aid of general equilibrium models (DSGE models, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium). 5 The Riksbank, like a number of other central banks, uses one of these models for forecasts and simulations. The Riksbank’s model is called Ramses (Riksbank’s aggregate macromodel for studies of the economy in Sweden). In Ramses, goods and labour markets are assumed to be in monopolistic competition and wages and prices are sticky. However, the Ramses model analysis is only part of the forecasting process, which is also based on other statistical analyses and of course assessments. In the short term, that is to say the current quarter and one quarter ahead – what is usually called “now-casting” – we use different statistical models and indicators to make an assessment of the current situation. This analysis strives for the best possible accuracy in the forecasts and is often only vaguely anchored in economic theory.
This is also why exchanges with fellow regulators during supervisory colleges are very helpful and important too. 13 I have earlier mentioned that rules and regulations should be risk proportionate. This is true as well for banking supervision. It is impossible for supervisors to review and inspect all the 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  financial institutions under our charge to a wide and deep extent given finite resources and time. This is neither feasible nor desirable. 14 It is more logical and effective to differentiate our supervisory intensity according to the risk profiles of each bank. In recent years, MAS has also moved towards greater use of thematic reviews and inspections. This means that we inspect a peer group of institutions at a time in a specific risk area. We find that such a peer group approach also facilitates better identification of vulnerabilities, and allow for industry benchmarking as well as the sharing of best practices. 15 An effective supervisory process should also involve a preparedness to take tough enforcement actions. It is a practical reality that no amount of regulations and supervisory reviews can catch all possible potential misdemeanours or excessive risk-taking. To do so, a financial regulator would have to be regularly and extensively intrusive to a point that a bank would find it hard to function. Ultimately, a bank’s Board and Management must be responsible for its business conduct and risk management.

Given the considerable attention on the Basel III reforms, it is easy to forget that a core mandate of the Basel Committee is with respect to its work on supervisory practices. 4 So this morning, allow me to share some thoughts on three areas with respect to banking supervision: i. The Next Phase – beyond the review on Capital and Liquidity rules; ii. Banking Supervision as a Craft; and iii. Supervisory Challenges and Opportunities. The next phase 5 As many of us will be familiar, the Basel III framework has a second Pillar that pertains to risk management and supervision including accounting for risks not captured under Pillar 1. Indeed, the Basel Committee devotes considerable attention to various pieces of work under this Pillar, such as on stress testing, accounting standards, corporate governance and supervisory colleges. Disclosure requirements are further reviewed under Pillar 3 to foster market discipline. 6 Following the recent finalisation of Basel III, the next phase will be centred on a “full, timely and consistent” implementation globally. This is important to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage. Every jurisdiction or region will of course be different in the degree of openness, internationalisation, and the maturity and sophistication of their banking systems. The Basel Committee has been 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  mindful that its standards are calibrated as minimum requirements, and in limited situations, some supervisory discretions have been provided including the use of Pillar 2. 7 Risk proportionality is not a new concept in international banking rules.
José De Gregorio: Exchange rate, macroeconomic policies, and the global scenario Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Senate at a special session on the exchange rate, Valparaíso, 14 December 2010. * I. *  *  Introduction  I am grateful for the Senate’s invitation to analyze exchange rate issues, some of the most complex ones facing our country, as well as Latin American and most emerging market economies. We are thus obligated to carefully evaluate the current economic environment, its implications on the performance of our economy, and the measures that can be taken if deemed necessary. In addition, these instances for analysis are important opportunities to communicate in a very transparent fashion the vision of the Central Bank of Chile. Along the last few decades, Chile has benefited enormously from being open and globally integrated. This has been one of the cornerstones of our economic growth. However, the international economy is at the same time a source of volatility for our economy. The prices of our exports, the economic activity of our trading partners, foreign interest rates and international investors’ appetite for risk fluctuate substantially. These variables affect our national income, fiscal accounts, external demand for our products, and the availability and cost of external financing and, indirectly, expenditure, output, the interest rate and the exchange rate in Chile. It is impossible to eliminate this volatility without sacrificing the benefits of our international openness.

At the country level, however, it must be said that production, employment, wages and investment are growing strongly. Our economy is totally back on its feet after the global recession and the outlook is good. 5  I am convinced that our country must grow in a harmonious way and the benefits of progress must spread to all the country. Economic growth and global integration generate sectoral and regional adjustments; some economic activities expand and some contract, with all the associated tensions. This is what progress is all about. To mitigate the costs of sectoral adjustments – and, above all, the social costs involved – without hurting economic growth, public policies face a tremendous challenge, but the instruments with macroeconomic reach such as the exchange rate are ineffective when it comes to resolving sectoral difficulties. Next week we will be presenting our Monetary Policy Report. We hope that our economy will continue dynamic over the next 24 months, boosting higher income and employment for our people. Our role is to ensure that the process is sustainable in an environment of stable prices. We will watch over it taking every measure necessary. In this presentation I have shown all the factors that may explain parity adjustments. However, many of the elements now pressuring the exchange rate may be reversed in the long term. As a matter of fact, today the real exchange rate is around the minimum levels believed to be consistent with its long-term fundamentals, hence the importance we assign to this issue.
17.06.2019  The Spanish banking system: transformations and challenges Opening of the seminar “Sustainable finances and their importance in the future of the economy”, Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo, organised by the Spanish Association of Economics Journalists Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, good morning: It is an honour and a pleasure to be able to participate in the opening of this seminar, organised by the Spanish Association of Economics Journalists (APIE) as part of the Universidad Internacional Menéndez Pelayo’s summer programme of seminars, being held, once again, on this Santander soil, of which I am so fond. I should like to begin by recalling, here in this historic Magdalena palace, that 2019 is particularly rich in anniversaries relating to the opening up and liberalisation of the Spanish economy. The process began with the Stabilisation Plan 60 years ago, while one of the most important milestones was passed 20 years ago, when Spain adopted the single European currency, the euro. And, exactly 25 years ago, in order to reach that stage, it was necessary for the Spanish parliament to approve the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España, which confirmed the Spanish central bank’s autonomy and independence. By means of this law, moreover, Spain established an institutional framework in line with the requirements for adopting the single currency, and also put in place a fundamental pillar for a culture of stability in the conduct of economic policy.

Accountability and transparency are essential counterparts of independence, and the media play a fundamental role in ensuring that they are put into practice, which is why our participation in events such as this one is so important. So I should like to thank the APIE for organising this event and inviting us to participate. This look back reminds us that, more than 10 years ago now, an international financial crisis hit Spain particularly strongly, arriving at a time when the economy was suffering from significant domestic and external macro-financial imbalances. Spain’s banking system was clearly excessively large at the time, over-concentrated on lending funds to real estate and residential construction activities and highly dependent on international wholesale financing. These significant vulnerabilities meant that the cost of the crisis in terms of GDP and – even more importantly for society – unemployment, was very high and much larger than for our main competitors. In fact, Spain’s GDP returned to its pre-crisis level only two years ago. As regards the labour market, the unemployment rate is still five percentage points higher than in 2008 and more than 10 percentage points higher than in countries like the United States and Germany. And that is a reminder of the importance of strengthening mechanisms to analyse and diagnose promptly the risks and vulnerabilities facing the economy and, in particular, the financial system.
But in the limit monetary policy can be a backstop – as booms and busts increase the likelihood that inflation will be volatile in the future. Overall, the Committee’s Forward Guidance can forestall avoidable uncertainty about its “reaction function”, about how policy will be set. But it does not affect the greater uncertainty about the evolution of the recovery. Uncertainties about the economic outlook Of course, financial markets inevitably transform the Committee’s state-contingent guidance into predictions of when the Committee will begin to withdraw monetary stimulus; the markets trade instruments with different maturities, ie with time-contingent features not with statecontingent contractual triggers. But the MPC provided state-contingent guidance for a reason. We cannot wave away the uncertainties surrounding the performance of the real economy. If we only understood why productivity growth has been so weak, we could be more confident about whether or not it will recover in tandem with a recovery in spending. If that does happen, the fall in unemployment could be slow, and monetary stimulus might not need to be withdrawn for some time. If, on the other hand, productivity growth remains weak, job creation as the economy recovers could be strong, as it has been on average over the past couple of years. That is why there is a wide band of uncertainty around the MPC’s August forecast for unemployment. My own probability distribution for unemployment is broadly “flat” in the sense that I do not regard one of those scenarios as materially more likely than the other.

3  This is consistent with Bean (2013), “Global aspects of unconventional monetary policy”, the Monetary Policy Committee’s Forward Guidance document (op cit); and with the Governor’s remarks during the August Inflation Report Press conference: “guidance is not a change in the reaction function, but it gives a better sense of the MPC’s reaction function to financial market participants”. 4  See remarks at the Treasury Select Committee hearing to discuss the Inflation Report on 28 June 2011, and 2012 and 2013 Annual Reports on Monetary Policy to the Treasury Select Committee. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  by-quarter. The threshold is not a target. Indeed, a monetary authority cannot have a target for unemployment; it can have a target only for price stability, as Paul Volcker recently stressed.5 That is why the Committee’s Forward Guidance incorporates, crucially, a “knockout” for inflation expectations, where individual members will have to judge whether they are “sufficiently well anchored”. Beyond that, I am glad that in its “financial stability knockout”, the Committee has in effect recognised that monetary policy influences risk-taking behaviour in the financial system.6 This does not mean that the MPC will suddenly lurch towards a supplementary goal of trying to control excesses in markets. The UK’s new architecture gives the Financial Policy Committee some tools to do that where there is a threat to the stability of the financial system.
Leif Veggum, director of Norges Bank’s Cashier’s Department, is soon going to tell us about the security features that make the banknotes almost impossible to counterfeit. However, if these features are to work as intended, it is important that, as users, we should familiarise ourselves with them. If you feel that you need to brush up your knowledge, I would encourage you to visit Norge Bank’s webpage newnotes.no, Norge Bank’s Facebook page or order the banknote brochure from Norges Bank. You will still be able to use the old 50-krone and 500-krone banknotes for one year after the launch of the new banknotes, ie until 18 October 2019. So use your old banknotes when you are out shopping or take them to your bank well before the deadline to help make the withdrawal of the old banknotes as smooth and efficient as possible. Good luck with the new banknotes! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

SPEECHES & INTERVIEWS  Governor's Speech at the Launching of Financial Crime Exhibition Speaker: Tan Sri Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus / Venue: Kuala Lumpur / Language: English / Speech/Interview Date: 26 Sep 2022 /  Welcome to the launch of the Financial Crime Exhibition. First of all, I would like to express my appreciation and gratitude to the Inspector- General of the Police for joining us at the launch of this virtual exhibition. Scams and cybercrimes have been on the rise of late, not just in Malaysia but all around the world. This is a concerning development which Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) takes seriously. This is especially so where these cases concern financial scams. We have been and will continue to step up efforts to combat financial scams, and in doing so collaborate with other stakeholders. These include rolling out preventive measures, pursuing more effective and coordinated enforcement actions, and raising public awareness. BNM requires banks in Malaysia to adopt high standards of security, especially for Internet and mobile banking services. From time to time, BNM also issues security advisories to the financial industry highlighting the latest modus operandi (tactics) of scammers and additional security measures that banks need to implement to protect their customers' savings. The reality, however, is that methods used by criminals will continue to evolve. BNM therefore continuously intensifies efforts and take steps to combat scams by introducing additional controls and safeguards from time to time.