samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The implementation of this strategy is funded through levies on the financial  BIS Review 139/2010  1  services industry and through partnership programmes with a range of stakeholders, including financial services providers. There appears to have been little contestation of the strategy, with broad support from the industry, the Treasury and other stakeholders. In South Africa, the Financial Services Board (FSB), the regulator for non-bank, non-credit financial services, has developed and championed two national strategies; a strategy developed in 2001 and a revised version in 2008. The 2001 strategy received limited support from stakeholders and the FSB revised it in 2008. However, the revised strategy did not receive much support and is currently under review. Contestation of the South African strategies arose mainly from the fact that the FSB is not the regulator for the banking sector, and banks were against having their activities regulated through a non-bank regulator. Contestation also came from civil society organizations and other regulators, in particular, the credit regulator. Ghana has had an approved strategy for financial literacy and consumer education since January 2009. In the first attempt, largely consultant driven, it appears there was insufficient stakeholder buy-in. However, in the second process which was driven through the Ghana Micro-Finance Institutions network, there appears to have been sufficient stakeholder buy-in, and in due course, the Ministry of Finance accepted responsibility for the strategy and has been tasked with its implementation.

Caleb M Fundanga: The Financial Sector Development Plan Welcome remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) National Financial Education Strategy Consultative Workshop, Lusaka, 20 October 2010. *  *  *  The Guest of Honour, Honourable Situmbeko Musokotwane, Minister of Finance and National Planning M.P. ; The FSDP Steering Committee Chairman & Secretary to the Treasury, Mr. Likolo Ndalamei; Distinguished Excellencies; Co-operating partners; Chief Executive Officers and Representatives from Banks and Non-bank Financial Institutions; FSDP Working Group Chairpersons and Vice Chairpersons; Distinguished Invited Guests; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen. It gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) National Financial Education Stakeholders’ Consultative Workshop. Honourable Minister, this very important workshop comes at the time when the FSDP is gearing up to implement many of its activities under phase II which the Government approved earlier this year. As you are aware, one of the activities identified under the FSDP II is the development of a national financial education strategy for Zambia. Let me hasten to say, financial education needs in Zambia are many and varied. They stem from inadequate understanding, by a good proportion of the population, of basic financial terms and concepts on the one hand, and a lack of knowledge of financial products and services that are increasingly available, on the other.
Higher living standards cannot be created by politicians out of thin air. As one of my predecessors, Mr Lino Spiteri, wrote recently, “They don’t make magic wands that work any more.” In the real world, a key precondition for prosperity is higher productivity. It should, therefore, be our common task, but particularly that of the political class, to promote policies and practices that are conducive to a more efficient use of the nation’s scarce resources. BIS Review 113/2006  5

Therefore, I believe that the cooperation will continue in the same spirit and will further advance through other forms of cooperation in various central banking areas. Concerning the NBRM, it is my pleasure to emphasize that with the ECB colleagues, we have jointly established the current progress of implementation of the recommendations from the Needs Assessment of the NBRM, and defined the follow-up steps. On this occasion, let me point out that the NBRM will remain committed to the implementation of the recommendations provided in the report, bearing in mind that many of them have already been incorporated in the NBRM Strategic Plan. Hence, the further support of the ECB and the Eurosystem in terms of experience and knowledge is of immense importance, as well as the assistance of our strategic partners, with whom we hope to continue working together on the implementation of the recommendations. Eventually, allow me to express my gratitude to the ECB and other central banks of the Eurosystem involved in the programme, as well as the hosts, hoping to have future opportunities to meet at similar event. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
For Hong Kong, we have in our linked exchange rate system the most extreme case of an exchange rate target that is perceived to be impregnable – and has been proved to be impregnable under the most adverse of conditions. The link, in combination with sound fundamentals and well managed banks, has helped us through the recent crisis: not without hardship, it must be acknowledged, but with considerably less damage and uncertainty than we would have experienced had it not been in place. The tight discipline it exerts on our economy is helping to propel improvements in productivity, an important element in our current robust recovery. Indeed, the evidence to date suggests that Hong Kong experienced one of the fastest rebounds in productivity growth in the region. Labour productivity, measured in terms of GDP per person employed, registered the strongest gains of 10% in the post-crisis period, well above other Asian economies, whose gains were in the range of 5 to 8%. Because the exchange rate link suits an externally oriented, entrepot economy, it will continue to serve Hong Kong well in its expanding role as a regional and international hub, as China enters the WTO. And this applies, it should be added, regardless of the path taken by the renminbi – a path that will likely involve careful and controlled experiments with greater exchange rate flexibility in the not too distant future, and cautious and considered moves towards currency convertibility in the fullness of time. Technological advance 20.

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The normative Ramsey model of 1928, devised for a central social planner to decide about the optimal intertemporal path of saving and investment was surprisingly put at the centre of macroeconomics, with the assumption that it could serve as a good descriptive model of the way a capitalist market economy really works. Considered a general equilibrium model of representative agents, the model initially had no money. Money was later inserted back in via the unkeynesian assumption of rigid prices and wages but finance remained completely excluded as if it didn´t matter to explain real economy fluctuations. The crisis has put into question these standard models as good and useful representations of how the economy works. Several researchers, followers of the paradigm, are now working hard to incorporate as many financial frictions as possible into their models. However, other academics belonging to the core paradigm have been raising more fundamental doubts. For instance, Ricardo Caballero wrote: “Rational expectations is a central ingredient of the current core; however, this assumption becomes increasingly untenable as we continue to add the realism of the periphery into the core”. 1 Willem Buiter, questioned the paradigm more acidly: “Most mainstream macroeconomic theoretical innovations since the 1970s ( the New Classical rational expectations revolution ...and the New Keynesian theorizing ...) have turned out to be self-referential, inward-looking distractions at best. Research tended to be motivated by the internal logic, intellectual sunk capital and aesthetic puzzles of established research programmes rather than by a powerful desire to understand how the economy works”.

Caleb M Fundanga: Moderating the impact of the global meltdown on the Zambian financial system Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limited Ody’s Excel Centre, Lusaka, 22 April 2009. *  *  *  The Chairman, Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limited, Mr Michael Mundashi The Managing Director of Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limited, Mrs Mizinga Melu Distinguished Guests Members of the Press And may I simply say Ladies and Gentlemen I am pleased to be here today at the official opening of the new Excel Centre of Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Limited. This event is taking place at a time when our economy is faced with challenges emanating from the impact of the global financial and economic crisis. Although the Zambian financial system is not fully integrated with the world’s financial markets, the impact of the crisis is already clear. Mr Chairman, the financial turmoil has resulted in a reduction in projected global economic growth and a decline in demand for commodities. As a commodity exporting country, Zambia has experienced a decline in her export receipts due to the decline in commodity prices reflecting a weak demand for these commodities. The declining export earnings and reversals in portfolio investments have been reflected in the depreciation of the local currency and consequent inflationary pressures towards the end of 2008.
My first source of concern is perhaps a little far-fetched.8 Let us say that for some reason we find ourselves in a situation where the repo rate is low and many households are heavily indebted. In this situation a repo-rate increase could have large negative consequences for the indebted households and consequently for the economy as a whole. Then households might believe that future economic policy will be formulated so that such negative consequences are avoided or alleviated. They may then choose to take on even higher debts if they believe – with or without justification – that economic policy will take this into consideration. And these problems risk increasing the longer the repo rate is kept at a low level. Figure 5 Households’ mortgage-rate expectations one, two and three years ahead Per cent 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  Households' mortgage-rate expectations Repo-rate + 2 percentage points  1  2  1  Repo-rate + 1.5 percentage points  0  0 13  14  15  16  17  18  Note. Repo-rate forecast from the September MPU. The households’ mortgagerate expectations refer to expectations regarding the variable mortgage rate. The broken lines show an interval based partly on an interval for the long-term repo rate of 3.5–4.5 per cent and partly on an interval for the difference between a three-month mortgage rate and the repo rate of 1.5–2 percentage points.

It is namely the case that the preliminary works to the Sveriges Riksbank Act emphasise that the monetary policy instruments shall only be used to maintain price stability, and thus not to promote a safe and efficient payment system.3 We sometimes say that monetary policy shall take financial risks into account, as it can be difficult to stabilise inflation around the target if households are forced to rapidly reduce their debts.4 Such difficulties could arise, of course, but for me it is not consideration of the inflation target that mainly justifies letting monetary policy take financial risks into account. Instead I perceive taking financial risks into account to follow on from the task of “supporting the objectives of general economic policy with the aim of achieving sustainable growth”. A monetary policy that leads to an unhealthy build-up of credit or other financial imbalances is scarcely compatible with sustainable growth. But this task, like the task of stabilising economic activity, is subordinate to the inflation target. Monetary policy’s consideration of financial risks must therefore be weighed against the inflation target and economic developments. 1  For a tool to be sufficient to meet the inflation target and attain a balanced development in economic activity, it is necessary for the economy to mostly suffer demand shocks, not supply shocks. This observation is sometimes called the divine coincidence, an expression coined by Blanchard and Gali (2007). 2  See the Riksbank (2013a) p. 3. 3  See Bill 1997/98:40, p. 54. 4  See, for example, the Riksbank (2013b).
Hence, and to help banks obtain the biggest amount of financing possible in these operations, the ECB relaxed its collateral framework conditions. For instance, it reduced the average haircut applied to collateral assets and accepted riskier assets and, most especially, loans backed by the national authorities’ various programmes, such as the ICO (Official Credit Institute) guarantees in Spain’s case. As a result, commercial banks could increase the liquidity they obtained from the Eurosystem by using their loans to the real economy as collateral. The combination of these measures was successful. The weekly LTRO operations provided substantial amounts of liquidity to banks during the most difficult months of the pandemic. In the June TLTRO-III operation, participating banks received a total of € trillion, a record high in Eurosystem refinancing operations. 5  All these operations played a vital role in preserving the supply of bank lending in the euro area. They contributed to the momentum shown by the new refinancing operations particularly in the case of lending targeted on firms and the self-employed - from the outset of the pandemic, and they kept interest rates on loans at record lows. The complementarity of these measures and those adopted by national governments (in particular through the public loan-guarantee programmes) and by the macro- and microprudential authorities (which enable financial institutions, for example, to use some of the capital buffers built up in recent years) has been pivotal in providing for the flow of financing in the economy during the crisis.

Nonetheless, euro area GDP is expected, at end-2022, to still be somewhat less than 4 pp below the level that would have been observed according to last year’s December projections (the latest before the COVID-19 outbreak). 7  Given the exceptional uncertainty over future pandemic-related developments, this baseline scenario has been accompanied by a more favourably defined alternative scenario. In it, euro area GDP would, at the end of the time horizon considered, be slightly higher than was envisaged in December 2019. Another, more adverse scenario was also laid down, in which the negative gap relative to the 2019 reference would be around 9 pp. Inflation fell in August to - 0.2%, and its core component, which excludes energy and food, stood at a very low level of 0.4%. The ECB’s projections point to a gradual recovery in the coming years. At the end of the projection horizon, inflation would stand at only 1.3%, some distance off our related target. Moreover, several factors tilt the risks to economic growth to the downside: uncertainty over how the pandemic will evolve; the possibility of a no-deal Brexit; and a potentially more adverse reaction by unemployment and in the dynamics of corporate start-ups and company failures once the support measures have run their course. In parallel, there has been a progressive appreciation by the euro in recent months. This introduces disinflationary pressures at a time when the euro area inflation outlook is, as I said, for a record low.
These frameworks, which have been put in place during the good times, are also being supported by ongoing work, in the area of building a consistent regulatory environment given the increasing presence of Asian banks in each others’ jurisdictions. This is reinforced by cooperation among national supervisors and in the development of arrangements for crossborder resolution. Regional platforms have been established for structured forums for the assessment of risks and vulnerabilities to the region, to increase the prospect for pre-emptive actions to be taken. Collaborative efforts are also ongoing in the area of building regional financial infrastructure, including the financial markets and payment systems to facilitate the efficient intermediation of financial resources in the region. Collaborative efforts are also accorded to the area of anti-money laundering, to ensure the integrity of the increasingly integrated financial systems in Asia. Finally, collaboration has also progressed in the area of capacity building, to strengthen the institutional capability of the central banks in the region to deal with the new challenges of the new environment. Finally, one of the most significant but often under-appreciated trends across most economies in these recent two decades, is the significant rise of inequality within economies. The economic crisis has worsened this trend given the conditions of high unemployment in many parts of the world. In many areas of policy-making, inequality is often not given explicit consideration.

Other unilateral regulatory initiatives, although not being imposed outside the respective countries, are also charting a path forward that is likely to have wider ramifications, given the significant cross-border operations of the affected institutions. Policy priorities in emerging Asia Let me turn to the policy priorities in emerging Asia. While most emerging economies entered the global financial crisis from a position of strength, policy-makers continue to be challenged by the weaker global economic environment and the effects of the global policy spillovers. While the emerging economies in Asia have been affected by these external developments, most have demonstrated resilience during this period. Let me confine my remarks to the policies that have contributed to this resilience. First, it is the payoff from a decade-long of policies and financial and economic reforms following the Asian financial crisis. Second, it is having an enhanced policy toolkit and the policy flexibility to manoeuvre in this environment. Third is the increased cooperation and collaboration in Asia, in the areas of surveillance, in the assessments of the risks and vulnerabilities to the region, and in the consideration of the policy options to address many of the new challenges. An important policy shift following the Asian financial crisis is to rebalance the economy and to diversify our sources of growth. This has involved wide-ranging policies and reforms to promote domestic demand, in particular domestic consumption and investment activities by the private sector.
Nonetheless, this exercise shows that Cracow and the entire Poland have fast become a part of the global economy. Dissemination of information and telecommunication technologies is bound to drive the acceleration of the globalization process, which will in turn enhance labour productivity. At the same time, a search for “derivatives” gives 55 million websites, “global markets” – 287 million, “currencies” – 97 million and “stocks” – 244 million. This shows that financial markets are global. Let us consider the reasons behind and the effects of globalization of financial markets. Globalization on financial markets Globalization of financial markets is part of a wider phenomenon of globalization of national economies. The rapid growth of the international trade in goods and services, which has been in progress since the beginning of the 1960s, has entailed an increase in capital flows. Between 1970 and 2000 the value of world exports of goods and services increased twenty-five fold, accompanied by a fifty-fold increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Chart 1 and Chart 2). Many countries, having realized that the FDI is an important factor that accelerates the economic growth, have introduced changes to their legal regulations, aimed to attract foreign capital (Table 1). The globalization process on the financial markets started following the decline of the Bretton Woods system. Globalization of the financial markets exhibited a pronounced acceleration in the 1980s and 1990s.

Once Malta is an EMU member, the foreign currency and local currency rating will be equalised but at what level will depend mostly on the fiscal account.”  BIS Review 61/2004  3  ECB; and that even if the degree of business cycle synchronisation with the euro area is already significant, national economic and financial structures might respond to the ECB’s monetary policy stimuli differently from the average euro area Member State. While this might not matter much when other tools of adjustment such as the exchange rate are available, the argument continues, the use of these tools is thwarted in a single currency area such as EMU. On the one hand, exchange rate flexibility is conditioned by the maximum allowable bands in ERM II, and is given up altogether upon the irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate at the point of euro adoption. Additionally, the Stability and Growth Pact constrains the use of fiscal policy for fine tuning the economy. Consequently, any underlying imbalances in the economy are bound to persist. While based on sound theoretical principles, this argument is largely not applicable to Malta. In particular, the business cycle is already fairly synchronised with that of the euro area, and the degree of trade integration is also quite significant. At the same time, sectoral GDP and employment data both reveal a strong correspondence with euro area economic structures, after allowance is made for the relatively more dominant role of tourism in Malta.