samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The big swing from inventory liquidation during the recession back to accumulation will soon end as inventory levels come back into better balance with sales. And fiscal stimulus from the federal government is subsiding and will soon reverse. Coupled with the benign outlook for inflation, these headwinds to growth and employment explain why the Federal Reserve is keeping short-term interest rates unusually low. We want to do all we can to support more rapid economic and employment growth, subject to keeping inflation low and stable, and inflation expectations well anchored. The situation has improved and total employment is now growing – for example, U.S. payrolls rose by 290,000 last month. But we are still far from where we want to be. In this environment, finding a job will be tough, but when you hit the pavement remember that the job market is improving. Don’t get discouraged. Get your foot in the door by doing something productive, even if it may not be exactly what you want to do for the rest of your life. Gaining knowledge and experience is what is important at this point. The first job out of college is a foot on the ladder – the job doesn’t have to be perfect to be valuable to you. A bit of advice In terms of your career, my first bit of advice is: don’t rush. There is plenty of time for your careers to unfold. It’s not a sprint, it’s a marathon.

Lars Nyberg: Is it dangerous to borrow dollars? Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Svenska Handelsbanken, Stockholm, 17 May 2011. *  *  *  The lessons of the financial crisis are many. The world’s banks – and a number of institutions that were not banks – had far too little and far too low-quality capital. They also had too little liquidity. The conviction that the markets would always be at hand with more or less unlimited liquidity turned out to be wrong. Across the world, central banks were forced to intervene and to provide the funding that the banks were unable to obtain elsewhere. Now the new regulations known as Basel III are almost in place, even if it will take a few years to introduce them. The banks will need to hold both more and better capital and their buffers for managing liquidity shortfalls will need to increase. Of course, nobody is claiming that this will save us from all future financial crises, but it can reasonably be expected to strengthen the resilience of the financial system to shocks. The most apparent shortcomings brought to light during the crisis can be said to have been remedied. Even so, there is naturally still much work to be done. One issue that must be addressed is how to take care of banks that nevertheless become insolvent and must be wound down, as this is an area where the crisis revealed major shortcomings in a number of countries’ legislation.
But to acknowledge these complexities does not weaken the case for the importance of trying to make sensible judgments about how monetary policy should respond to asset price developments. Here are some considerations for how central banks should navigate through these challenges. 2  BIS Review 2/2006  First, in circumstances where the central bank observes a large realized movement in asset prices and is confident in its knowledge of the impact of those moves on the path of aggregate demand, monetary policy may need to follow a different path than might have seemed appropriate in the absence of those developments. In other words, when policymakers have already witnessed a significant move in asset values, and are confident in what that move means for the outlook, it should be prepared to adjust policy accordingly. Note that in order for this seemingly straightforward proposition to apply the central bank must be responding to its assessment of what an already observed movement in asset prices will mean for output and inflation. Of course central banks must always be prepared to respond when factors threaten to push aggregate demand away from aggregate supply and impact the inflation outlook. Movements in asset prices certainly have the potential to be one of those factors, and the implications of this approach apply in both directions.

In other words, asset values should be neither a target nor a goal of monetary policy. The rate of increase in asset values alone seems to tell us very little about underlying and future inflation. Because we know so little about how to assess the appropriateness of asset values against fundamentals, because we have so little capacity to both forecast and predictably affect the future path of asset prices, and because we know relatively little about how changes in wealth affect the real economy and inflation, we cannot use monetary policy responsibly or effectively to achieve specific objectives for asset values. Monetary policy does not today and is unlikely in the future to offer us an effective tool for directly reducing the incidence of large or sustained deviations of asset values from what might turn out to be their fundamental values, what some call bubbles. That said, monetary policy still has to take into account the impact of significant movements in asset values on output and inflation. Financial asset prices, by their nature, allocate resources between the present and the future and thereby affect consumption, investment and future growth. History provides us with numerous examples in which significant movements in asset prices have had sizable effects on the path of output relative to potential and on price stability. And experience suggests that asset values can be very sensitive to movements in monetary policy or to the perceptions of future policy moves.
2  Some of the factors that might have reduced productivity growth might also have affected the skill mix of employment, so it’s not clear whether this can legitimately be seen as independent effect: in the limit, saying productivity growth is weak “because” the economy has created more low productivity jobs has a slightly circular flavour to it. Note too that, at least in the short run, a given compositional effect on wages should not be translated one-for-one into productivity space – you’d expect the latter to be smaller (I explain this point in footnote 10). So the 3% figure should be viewed as a ceiling for the estimated impact of these shifts on productivity over the 2008–14 period. 3  Real wages can diverge from productivity either because average profit margins are changing or because the relative price of what firms produce diverges from the price of what consumers buy. In an open economy, for example, an improvement in the terms of trade will raise real incomes relative to productivity; the upward trend in profit margins in the US has depressed wages relative to national income. There has been no such trend in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  shocks to real take-home pay – whether from lower productivity, higher taxes or rises in import prices – without the unfortunate devices of higher inflation and/or higher unemployment.

This fact, highlighted many years ago by Steve Davis and John Haltiwanger in the US, was no less apparent during the great recession in the UK. Employment fell by over half a million between 2008 and 2010. But even over that period there were over nine million new jobs created, over ten million if you include job-to-job flows. On average, over the past 10 years, gross inflows and outflows into and out of employment have run at an annualised rate of around one sixth of the stock (Chart 1). As I say, this has been long understood. Nor should it be forgotten that, whatever the complicated texture underneath, the aggregate economic data still exhibit significant empirical regularities over the business cycle. Chart 2 is one example. Using annual data during the inflation targeting period, the black line plots annual growth in average earnings, less inflation expectations, against the rate of unemployment. At least until the past couple of years, when AWE growth appeared unusually weak, the fit was pretty good. Higher unemployment has gone hand-in-hand with lower real wage growth. Uncannily, the regression line was pretty much exactly the same as that identified by A.W. Phillips, using data from the classical gold standard period (1870–1913), in the 1958 paper that gave the relationship its name (that regression line is in blue). Yet, from time to time, what happens under the surface has material effects and can distort these aggregate relationships. Today I want to describe one such example, involving compositional shifts in the labour market.
The experience of the financial crisis has taught us that this is important. In closing, I would like to thank the Supervisory Board and the Monetary Policy Committee for their collaboration, and I wish to thank the Central Bank’s many colleagues and collaborators for their cooperation – not least the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, and the Financial Supervisory Authority. I would also like to thank the financial institutions with which the Bank interacts for their cooperation. Furthermore, I would like to thank the Parliament of Iceland, particularly the Economics and Commerce Committee, for their collaboration. And last but certainly not least, I want to thank the staff of the Central Bank for their tirelessness, dedication, and outstanding work in the past ten years. And at this turning point, I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to all of you who have come here today and have attended the Bank’s annual meetings in the past. Central banks can be a force for change, but history and tradition are also strong, and they contribute to strength and steadfastness in the work they do at any given time. It means a great deal to me that here today are two former Governors and other former Central Bank employees have attended the Annual Meeting every year during my term as Governor. Thank you for that. 8

The slow pace of financial integration relative to trade, in my view, is a reflection of three specific factors. BIS Review 95/2006  1  First, trade integration has a much longer history in East Asia, of which the key turning point was the introduction of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992. Therefore, trade integration benefits from an established policy structure and a more simplified policy framework of tariff reductions, compared to that of financial integration. Second, financial integration has essentially been a market-driven process, with the policy supports focusing on removing market impediments and developing financial infrastructure. Therefore, there has been less of a deliberate policy push while the different levels of financial market developments in the region also act as a constraint to rapid integration. And the third factor is that, compared to trade integration, financial integration is complicated by a wider set of rules and regulatory framework, especially on cross-border capital flows, that tends to be more difficult to dismantle quickly. At the same time, the policy approach on capital flows liberalization in East Asia has been more cautious following the Asian financial crisis because of the risk of capital outflows and the weakened external financial positions. This, in my view, is one reason that led to a more cautious approach in liberalizing cross-border capital outflows. Let me now come to the second part of my talk, that is, the prospect for financial integration in the region going forward, and what should be the role of policy.
However, this is not a convincing argument. Swedish conditions also affect the prices of the goods we import. The world market price of a product is not the price that Swedish households see in the shops. The value of the krona in relation to other currencies for example plays a part. Demand and factors such as transport, mark-ups in the wholesale and retail channels are also significant. What the Riksbank can do is to conduct well-balanced monetary policy so that consumer prices on average rise by 2 per cent a year. When the Riksbank raises the repo rate, demand is dampened, which reduces the scope for price increases in all areas, including energy and food. It is important that monetary policy is aimed at keeping down the general price increases and that the inflation target is not redefined merely because some prices are rising more than others. Households’ total purchasing power is affected when prices of imported goods change, and this would be the case even if we had an inflation target that excluded these prices. When, for instance, the price of oil rises over a longer period of time there is a risk that price increases will spread to other areas of the economy. This risk would hardly decline if the inflation target was formulated differently. Of course one must be open to change that could improve the current monetary policy regime. But it is important to think things over very carefully. And we shouldn't fix something that isn't broken.

This applies for amounts of up to SEK 250,000 per customer and institution. It is only if the deposit has been made by another financial institution or in some cases if the amount is frozen that the deposit guarantee does not apply. This reasoning concerned what we could do in a situation where financial stability is threatened. Some central banks have recently been forced to take this type of measure. But none of the Swedish banks has had problems with its liquidity in the way I described in my example. So how do we view the current situation? Recent developments As I mentioned earlier, the financial turbulence has been included in our analyses for some time now, both with regard to monetary policy and financial stability. The Riksbank has regularly emphasised many of the risks in the financial system and what could happen if the financial turbulence should grow worse. The Riksbank bases its assessment on an analysis that focuses on the four major Swedish banks, as they account for around 80 per cent of the market. The Swedish banks have considerable equity, good profitability and limited loan losses. Our assessment is that there is a high degree of resilience to the international turmoil  BIS Review 119/2008  3  that has prevailed for some time now. But this is not the same as saying that the Swedish financial markets and banks are not affected by the situation. Of course they are.
Ranee Jayamaha: SAARC Payments Initiative and policy responses Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the inauguration of "SAARC Payments Initiative", Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 28 March 2008. *  *  *  1. It is with great pleasure that I thank all of you for attending the inaugural session of the SAARC Payments Initiative. It is indeed a historic event and a landmark in the development of payment systems in the SAARC region, because this is the first time the member central banks, as a group, have decided to pay focused attention to this area of activity. It is also an important achievement for the Central Bank of Sri Lanka to be able to pioneer the efforts in establishing the SAARC Payments Initiative. 2. The SAARC Payments Initiative, which is launched today, intends to  •  assist individual SAARC countries to prepare a domestic payment strategy and a forward looking development plan;  •  design a coordinated regional approach to cross-border payments, taking into consideration the implications for trade, investment, central bank policy, foreign exchange positions and their management; and  •  clear any impediments experienced by the members in the areas of policy, operations and communications, legal and regulatory aspects, technical and institutional infrastructure, and engage in research and statistical analysis. 3.

If I may quote from John Exter’s Report of 1949 on the establishment of the Central Bank of Ceylon, (the former name of the present Central Bank of Sri Lanka), it states “It is the monetary, financial and payment systems that facilitate the flow of money in the economy and as such, the Central Bank of Ceylon undertakes a great responsibility in promoting the economic well-being of the country”. Although modern central banks concentrate primarily on price stability and financial system stability, these objectives cannot be satisfactorily achieved without simultaneous development in the payment systems. Therefore, at some stage, all central banks have to  BIS Review 35/2008  1  pay attention to payment system development, although it was taken for granted by many until recent times. 5. Advances and transformation in payment systems development  5.1 Payment systems have undergone profound changes in recent years, primarily in terms of the increased complexity of the production and differentiation of payment services offered to customers nationally, regionally and internationally. Payment systems are evolving towards an evermore universal and sophisticated level of operation. In both wholesale and retail areas, new technologies, new participants and new alliances are beginning to transform the payments system landscape. This transformation is largely due to developments in information and communication technology, and integration and globalization of financial markets at the regional and international level. 5.2 One by-product of this transformation is the blurring of the distinction between wholesale and retail activities.
[Chart: December 2008: Market rates shifted down markedly after policy announcement] As shown by the black line in this chart, we cut the key policy rate substantially at the monetary policy meeting in December 2008. The dashed blue line, which shows the market path the day before we announced the rate cut, indicates that a significant cut was anticipated by the market. However, in addition to cutting the policy rate, we also published a new interest rate forecast, shown by the solid purple line, which was considerably lower than our previous forecast, shown by the dashed purple line. The market had not fully anticipated this, and forward rates shifted down markedly after the meeting, as indicated by the solid blue line. The interpretation could be that we provided news to the market about the strength of the action deemed necessary by Norges Bank as a response to the financial crisis. On this special occasion, when uncertainty was larger than usual, we believe that publishing the interest rate forecast was particularly helpful in making monetary policy more effective. This example suggests that we can indeed guide the market and affect expectations. [Chart: Interest rate expectations one year ahead] Further evidence supporting our ability to affect expectations comes from household survey data. In this chart, the purple line shows a diffusion index of households’ bank rate expectations one year ahead.

The illustration is from our third Monetary Policy Report in 2012. If monetary policy at that time had given weight only to the low level of inflation, the key policy rate should have been lowered sharply and kept close to zero for some time, as indicated by the red dotted line in the upper left panel. Inflation would then have been predicted to pick up relatively fast, partly owing to a weaker exchange rate. Taking into account our second criterion for an appropriate interest rate path, the key policy rate would have been somewhat higher in the short term, as indicated by the blue dotted line. Inflation would have been predicted to take somewhat longer to rise towards the target, but developments in output and employment would have been more stable. Finally, taking into account considerations of robustness (criterion 3), we reached the interest rate forecast indicated by the black dotted line. [Chart: Decomposition of change in the interest rate path] Our communication of interest rate decisions is aided by a decomposition of changes in the interest rate path. This is a model-based illustration of how the change in the interest rate forecast from one report to the next can be decomposed into contributions from exogenous disturbances. The intention is to communicate the driving forces behind any changes in the interest rate path. The chart illustrates the different forces behind the change in the interest rate path from the last report in 2012 to the last report in 2013.
The aim of the plan is to provide clarity of the vision and objectives that are to be achieved in the context of a more challenging environment that is driven by rapid change in a world that is becoming increasingly more integrated and more technology and knowledge-based. In the development of our Islamic financial system, a comprehensive approach has been adopted. Malaysia has given emphasis to the development of a comprehensive financial infrastructure that includes the Islamic financial markets, Islamic financial instruments, contract law and law enforcement procedures, Shariah governance framework, Islamic accounting practices and valuation standards, appropriate disclosure requirements as well as an efficient and secure payment and settlement system. Attention has also been directed to develop the prudential regulatory and supervisory framework that underpins the stability of the Islamic financial industry. Today, my remarks will focus on three key areas in which greater attention is needed in order to secure a promising future for the Islamic financial services industry. These areas include accelerating the pace of financial innovation, strengthening risk management capabilities and leveraging on information technology. Accelerating the pace of financial innovation As we advance forward in the development of Islamic finance, innovation will be key in securing the competitive advantage. It will be vital to the future of Islamic finance.

News conference  Berne, 25 March 2020 Thomas Jordan  Introductory remarks by Thomas Jordan  Ladies and Gentlemen First, on behalf of the entire Swiss National Bank, I would like to express our sympathy to all those directly affected by coronavirus. Swiss society and our country’s economy face enormous challenges. The SNB is working closely with the Federal Council, the authorities and the business community to overcome this crisis. The measures adopted by the SNB complement those of the Confederation and are intended to cushion the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Monetary policy supplements the various fiscal measures taken by the public authorities. The Swiss National Bank has set up the SNB COVID-19 refinancing facility (CRF). This instrument is designed to strengthen the supply of credit to the Swiss economy by providing the banking system with additional liquidity. There is no upper limit on the amounts available under the CRF, and drawdowns can be made at any time. The CRF will be available from 26 March 2020. The CRF operates in conjunction with the federal government’s guarantees for corporate loans. The facility allows banks to obtain liquidity from the SNB, which is secured by these federally guaranteed loans. In taking this action, we are enabling banks to access the required liquidity that will allow them to expand their lending rapidly and on a large scale. The interest rate for these refinancing transactions corresponds to the SNB policy rate, currently −0.75%.