samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Shortly afterwards, the SNB decided once again to increase banks’ sight deposits substantially, to CHF 120 billion; this step was followed by a further – final – increase, this time to CHF 200 billion. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  CHF 432.2 billion at the end of 2012 (cf. chart 3), proving beyond doubt that the SNB is willing to accept balance sheet risks in order to enforce its monetary policy. Last year, the SNB’s shareholders, the Confederation and the cantons all learned that these risks can have real consequences. For the year 2013, for the first time in its history, the SNB was unable to pay any dividends or distribute any profit, as the fall in the gold price and exchange raterelated losses had led to a very negative annual result. As you might expect, this decision was not greeted with rapturous applause. However, the critical point here is that the principles of the SNB’s profit distribution agreement were not called into question. People generally recognised and accepted the fact that a larger balance sheet goes hand in hand with higher potential loss. Despite having successfully enforced the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro for several years, in January 2015 the SNB concluded that the measure had become untenable and was therefore no longer justified from a monetary policy point of view. What led to this far-reaching reassessment? Let us briefly re-wind to 2014.

The industry trends underlying the pick-up in trade are encouraging. The global electronics sector is on a strong upswing. Semiconductor exports surged by 20% in 2017. This reflects both a cyclical upturn as well as a structural uptrend, as products ranging from smartphones to automobiles and home electronics become increasingly chip-intensive. The broad-based, geographical spread of the current economic expansion is perhaps the strongest basis for its durability. The rising tide is lifting most boats. The advanced economies are leading the charge. The US economy is expected to grow at or above trend, driven by strength in consumption, a healthy labour market, and better prospects for business fixed investment with the enactment of the tax reform package. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  The Eurozone economy was probably the most pleasant surprise of 2017, with a strong recovery in household spending and private investment. There is still slack in the economy, suggesting that the growth momentum is likely to be sustained. The Japanese economy has recorded the longest growth streak in 16 years, with a resurgence in exports and investment. Emerging market economies – especially in Asia – are benefitting from the positive spill-overs from the advanced economies as well as healthier macro fundamentals. Emerging Asia is benefiting from the pick-up in the global electronics cycle, recovery in commodity prices, steady domestic demand, and benign financial conditions. China is likely to see a moderation in growth this year but not cool off sharply.
These have, inter alia, (i) reintroduced prudential filters to neutralise the effect of the change in the value of public debt on capital; (ii) allowed reserves at central banks to be excluded from the leverage ratio calculation; (iv) incorporated a favourable provisioning treatment for exposures with public guarantees; (v) brought forward the entry into force of certain measures, such as the supporting factor for SMEs and the new prudential treatment of software; and (v) allowed market model overshootings to be ignored, given the volatility arising from the COVID crisis. 5  As regards the usability of buffers, the BCBS, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the SSM have in various statements referred to the objective pursued with the introduction of liquidity and capital buffers in Basel III, reiterating that such buffers may be used appropriately to support the economy in a situation like the current one. Also, the message has been conveyed that supervisors will allow sufficient time for these buffers to be replenished. At the same time, the BCBS and the EBA have published technical guidelines on the prudential treatment of guarantees and moratoria, clarifying that the flexibility required by the current health situation must not be at the expense of the prudence needed when recognising and provisioning for non-performing loans.

I doubt that rules alone can accomplish this. Telling people to be ethical doesn’t make it so. Seeing others engage in ethical decision-making is, by contrast, quite powerful. With that prologue, let me turn to my first message: Stay in banking. This might be a surprising message in light of my introduction. Nonetheless, banking is important work. Society relies on its financial system to “create substantial value for our society.” 3 As investor and author John Bogle has written: “[Banking and finance] facilitate the optimal allocation of capital among a variety of users; it enables buyers and savers to meet efficiently; it provides remarkable liquidity; it enhances the ability of investors to capitalize on the discounted value of future cash flows, and other investors to acquire the right to those cash flows; it creates financial instruments [. . . ] that enable investors to assume additional risks, or to divest themselves of a variety of risks by transferring those risks to others.”4  To fulfill its potential for creating value for society, the financial system needs talented and dedicated people at the helm. This is especially true for banks, which are indispensable to our economic system. As the philosopher Onora O’Neill has observed, banking requires more than just technical competence.5 Bankers must reproduce their efforts and results with reliability. And, above all, bankers must be honest. They must do what they say and say what they mean. This is necessary for the financial system to be viewed as trustworthy.
One obvious concern would be if a prime broker or clearing bank was paralysed, including for reasons unconnected to its activity in fast markets – say because of a cyber attack. I think it is fair to say that our understanding of how market functioning would respond in such a scenario – i.e. one in which a number of, in particular high-frequency, liquidity providers were denied market access – remains relatively limited. If there is a common theme across all three of my examples, it is the limits of our understanding. None of the points I have raised with regard to market resilience are wholly new. We at the Bank are following developments in the structure of these markets and their implications for financial stability closely, 19  including through discussions within the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee (FPC). And as regulator both  of many participants in electronic markets and some of those markets themselves, the Financial Conduct 19  See, for example, Shafik, M (2015), ‘Dealing with change: liquidity in evolving market structures’ and the analysis of the sterling flash crash in box 3 of the Financial Stability Review, November 2016 (pages 39-41). 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  Authority (FCA) too has remained deeply engaged and responsive to those developments which fall under its purview. 20  Likewise, in none of these cases have I argued that there is a risk flashing red that requires an immediate response.

12  So whilst these behaviours are presumably rational – and cost-effective – for individual market  participants, we are mindful that an aggregate reduction in transparency has the potential to hamper efficient price discovery. 13  Moreover, the steps some participants are taking to conceal information raises questions  about how the aggregate efficiency benefits from faster markets are shared. Finally, the occurrence of flash crashes indicates that, even if fast market prices are more efficient in general, they are not always so. Collectively, these observations suggest we should at least temper the headline conclusion that fast markets are more efficient: as is often the case, the story here is somewhat nuanced. Fast markets and market resilience I want to look now at the implications for resilience, both of individual firms and of markets – that is, whether they can function effectively in bad times as well as good. Again, fast markets may bring some important benefits. For example, because they place less reliance on risk warehousing by intermediaries, they were generally resilient during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Stresses were concentrated in those markets that had relied on dealer balance sheets: in our case the Bank of England introduced a ‘market maker of last resort’ scheme for corporate bond markets in 2009 to offset 7  A regulated multilateral trading system, subject to a range of regulatory requirements relating to: pre and post-trade transparency and non-discriminatory access. 8 A trading venue where counterparties can post trading interest without making such information publicly available.
Mr Meyer gives a central banker’s view from Switzerland  Speech given by Mr Hans Meyer, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, in New York on 1 October 1999. *  *  *  Environment The Swiss will remember the last few years as a time of important economic and social challenges with mixed feelings. If one attempts to put events into a larger context, the first thing that comes to mind is that in the course of time, there have always been periods of intense change which were followed by calmer ones. Such fluctuations can occur because different events, with their positive or negative consequences, may have a more or less coincidental cumulative effect. As a rule, however, there is a remarkable logic behind the way events unfold. All things considered, it appears to be entirely logical that at the close of this century, we should have reached an economic and social turning point. An era is coming to an end, which – in a broad sense – we still associate with the post-war period. During this period, our economic development was characterised by remarkably steady real growth. Especially during the first decades following the Second World War, pent-up demand created extraordinary dynamism. Economic output improved continuously not only in terms of quantity but also of quality, leading to unprecedented growth as well as more widespread prosperity. In the course of this development, the public sector witnessed a remarkable expansion.

To briefly illustrate the current state of play of our supervisory practices, I would like to mention the “suptech” approach underway at the ACPR: the supervisory authority’s aim is to take advantage of innovation to better carry out its missions at the best cost for the community and thus prepare the supervision methods for tomorrow’s financial processes. To date, four tools developed in intrapreneurship with the support of the Banque de France’s Lab, our space dedicated to innovation, have been created and should concretely increase the efficiency of our supervisors. But I would like to focus for a moment on the contribution that we can make, as a central bank and supervisory authority, to the development of the regulatory framework. In this area, I think it is important to recall a few principles that underpin our vision as a supervisor and central banker with regard to the changes in the regulatory framework of the financial system. First of all, I would like to stress that no regulatory framework is set in stone. We must keep an open mind, and have the necessary understanding and lucidity to adapt frameworks to technological evolutions - or even revolutions -, as well as to their challenges and associated risks. Secondly, this adaptation must, in my view, preserve and consolidate two fundamentals of financial sector regulation: the financial stability objective and the principle of monetary sovereignty.
Against this backdrop, we welcome two European texts that are currently being finalised (i) the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), which aims, among other things, to bring critical service providers under the supervision of financial regulators; (ii) and the Digital Market Act (DMA), which is intended to ensure that service providers have equal access to the hardware and software components of electronic devices. These competition and sovereignty concerns should also be taken into account in the revision of PSD2. Secondly, the industrial lever. While our market is and must remain open, it is nonetheless essential to encourage innovation by European players. This is why, in the area of payments, the Banque de France actively supports the EPI2 initiative for a modern European solution. In conclusion, we can see that the changes taking place in the financial sector offer the prospect of even more accessible, efficient and innovative financial services, while at the same time raising new challenges for both market participants and public authorities. I am convinced that the only way to meet these challenges is through a multi-faceted approach, with cooperation between public and private players. That is why the Banque de France is fully committed to promoting innovation within a framework of trust: first, at the level of the regulatory framework and as a supervisor, then by facilitating private initiatives and mobilising the market, and lastly, as a driver and player in innovation.

The deployment of tokenised settlement assets across borders would also pose a risk to our monetary sovereignty, if it resulted in the use of stablecoins backed by foreign currencies or CBDCs. B- To reconcile competition and sovereignty, a “retail” central bank digital currency is obviously a potentially important lever. 1- This was the main aim of the investigation phase launched by the Eurosystem in July last year. Issuing a retail CBDC, nevertheless, raises a number of operational challenges. In particular because financial intermediaries, including banks, play a key role in the security and financial stability of our monetary and financial system. Introducing a CBDC must therefore neither result in the conversion of a significant proportion of bank deposits into assets held in CBDCs – in normal times as well as in times of stress – nor compete with banks in their day-to-day relations with their customers. These issues need to be addressed by design in the architecture and functionality of a digital euro, for example by introducing holding limits or by promoting an intermediated model. This is why it is essential that the financial intermediaries, along with the other stakeholders, be properly involved in the investigation phase that we are conducting: an expert advisory group has already been set up at European level,1 and this consultation will be extended to all stakeholders in the coming months, in particular via the European and French market bodies at our disposal. 2- But other levers will be needed to reconcile competition and sovereignty. First and foremost, the regulatory lever.
Rubin also points out that the president was able, by showing a clear respect for the Federal Reserve's independence, to increase his own credibility and build-up confidence in economic policy in the United States and in the functioning of the financial markets. This is a view I can sympathise with. The question is then how we in Sweden should act to ensure that confidence in our total economic policy is as great as possible. Essentially, this of course means doing the right things. In our case, ensuring price stability in accordance with our own definition. However, I believe that the ways in which the authorities responsible for fiscal policy and monetary policy cooperate can also play a role here. In this aspect I can see clear advantages in the interplay between government and central bank in the United States and the United Kingdom. Maintaining mutual respect for one another's tasks, they have a close cooperation to conduct an overall policy that will benefit their country as much as possible. This is a desirable form of cooperation, particularly for small countries and I believe that we in Sweden have come a long way towards this since the mid-1990s. It would be a negative development if the pattern were broken and we instead slipped into a form of interplay similar to that in continental Europe, where national finance ministers blame their problems on the ECB and where sharp words are regularly aimed in the opposite direction. Thank you.

(Figure 3). 3. CPI and UND1X inflation Percentage 12-month change 14  14  12  12  10  10  CPI UND1X  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2 1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  -2 2004  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the  It is not easy to determine what effect the various changes in economic policy have had individually. However, when taken as a whole they have led to an overall changeover in stabilisation policy. A clearer allocation of roles has been created in economic policy. The task of monetary policy is to attain  BIS Review 9/2004  3  price stability, while fiscal policy is to secure a long-term sustainable development in public finances. The government and the Riksdag (parliament) also have the task of increasing the number of those in regular employment to 80 per cent. This clear allocation of roles is an important reason behind the more successful economic policy over the past ten years. The current monetary policy situation The international recovery is increasingly evident During 2001 there was a downturn in global economic activity, which was partly due to the financial setback following on from the stock market bubble in the second half of the 1990s. Resource utilisation fell and growth in the OECD area as a whole was 1 per cent that year.
In Chile, these needs are particularly important because, in the first weeks of the social crisis, many companies found themselves in a similar situation, which may have consumed a large part of their liquidity cushions and may have been unable to replenish them. To facilitate access to credit for individuals and companies, especially smaller ones, the CBC Board established the Conditional Facility for Increased Lending (FCIC) whereby 4-year loans are granted to banks, with an interest rate equivalent to the MPR and in a magnitude that increases according to the refinancing and credit operations in the most stressed segments. This facility will initially provide resources of about USD 5 billion. A third transmission channel relates to the deterioration of business and consumer expectations and its impact on investment and consumption. Prior to the aggravation of the sanitary emergency, both were already in pessimistic territory and the current situation makes a reversal difficult. A box in this Report presents the results of a survey that the Bank conducted in the second half of March among the participants in the Business Perceptions Report. A major deterioration in their outlook for employment and activity during the next six months was revealed, which must be weighed in the light of the impact on businesses since the social unrest of October 2019.

These discussions aim to help us all on a journey we have embarked, a journey that can only be made through constant and diverse dialogue until we reach common ground and close to perfection possible solutions. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention. I wish you a lively and successful debate. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Lee Hsien Loong: Consolidation and liberalisation: building world-class banks Speech by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Association of Banks Annual Dinner, Singapore, 29 June 2001. *  *  *  Introduction Two years ago, MAS embarked on the first phase of a programme to liberalise the banking industry. The aim was to strengthen our local banks through competition, provide Singaporeans with quality banking services, and enhance Singapore's position as an international financial centre. We phased in the liberalisation measures progressively, to give local banks time to upgrade themselves to meet the competition, and maintain the stability of the financial system. The first package of measures in 1999 comprised a few main elements. MAS permitted 4 Qualifying Full Banks (QFBs) to establish up to 10 locations each, relocate their existing branches and share ATMs among themselves. We granted 8 new Restricted Bank licences to banks that wanted to expand their wholesale $ business. We also gave Offshore Banks more flexibility to lend in Singapore dollars and engage in $ swaps, and even wider leeway to 8 Qualifying Offshore Banks. These measures marked the start of a major and irreversible process of change. We could not foresee exactly how the industry would respond and develop. So MAS committed to reviewing progress at the half-way mark before deciding on further liberalisation measures. We have now completed this review.

Today, I would like to speak more on the roles of the Government and the financial sector. Role of the Government and the financial sector First, the Government. The roles of Government to lead, convene, set standards, invest, educate and champion – are all quite obvious. The Government plays a leading role in setting the stage for the nation’s climate agenda. This includes setting the national targets for green projects according to identified priority sectors, as well as the financing needs and technical information. It is important for this information to be available publicly to create the requisite awareness for mobilisation of green finance. Moving forward, the push for disclosure through the establishment of a national framework for carbon emissions reporting is another critical enabler to increase data availability and transparency for a systematic transition to a low-carbon economy. This will contribute towards the development of more data driven climate policies and targeted carbon emissions reduction schemes. Second, the role of finance. We have spoken about the critical need to bring in private capital for green investment. The Bank, as a financial regulator, recognises this key role of finance and has introduced various measures towards this end. Given physical, transition and liability risks and their implication to the economy and financial system, there is a bona fide recognition that climate risk is well within our mandate of safeguarding monetary and financial stability. With that, the Bank has taken a phased and proactive approach in strengthening financial system resilience to climate risk and in driving sustainable finance.
We remain committed about both the need for the market to continue to drive transition forward moving new 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  issuance onto alternative rates and converting legacy exposure where possible; and also to ensuring there is a solution for those contracts that legitimately cannot be converted from Libor. That is why the UK government announced last month its intention to legislate to provide the FCA with increased powers to deliver an orderly wind-down of critical benchmarks, such as Libor. 7 It remains in the interests of financial markets and their customers that the pool of contracts referencing LIBOR is shrunk to an irreducible minimum ahead of LIBOR’s expected cessation, leaving behind only those contracts that genuinely have no or inappropriate alternatives and no realistic ability to be renegotiated or amended. Those that decide to rely on regulatory action, enabled by the legislation the UK Government plans to bring forward, will not have control over the economic terms of that action.

I am sure that its long experience, accumulated knowledge and proficient staff make the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey an institution that can fulfil these expectations. I am proud of this institution. I owe a great debt of gratitude to my colleagues, who have greatly contributed to our accomplishments and to our policy implementation. BIS Review 47/1997