samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This in turn means that the board and the senior management are now placed with greater accountability and responsibility in this area. This approach also benefits the industry as they are not hamstrung to introduce new and innovative products and services. The intent is also to improve the time-to-market. However, it comes with a responsibility. Financial institutions are expected to apply the standards judiciously and proportionately. This should take into account risks within their business activities and strategies, and the role and relationships within the broader financial system. Another issue organisations face in the conduct of their businesses arises from principal-agent relationships. Establishing clear behavioural norms with the right combination of controls and incentives, to shape the desired behavior is key. For all the above, the compliance function can play a meaningful role in this process. Compliance in the context of broader responsibilities to society As the theme for this conference suggests, compliance is a responsibility. What I have said so far has focused on perspectives from the point of view of individuals within the industry. However, compliance must also be viewed in relation to the broader financial system and society itself. A key lesson from the global financial crisis in 2008 was that individual behavior, even though well intended and rational from an individual’s point of view, can cause massive damage at the aggregate level. In many ways, the complexity of rules that apply to the financial system is a reflection of its important role in the economy and society.

Stefan Ingves: Norges Bank 200 years Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the celebrations to mark Norges Bank’s (Central Bank of Norway) 200th anniversary, Oslo, 16 June 2016. *  *  *  Sweden and Norway have a lot in common. We understand one another’s languages. We have a common labour market, though it is nowadays mainly Swedes who travel to Norway to work. And we get a little irritated when our ski champions lose to our neighbours. But above all, we have in many respects a common history. Today we are celebrating the 200th anniversary of Norges Bank. However, the monetary history of Norway starts even further back in time, 1000 years earlier, when the Vikings spread fear throughout Europe. Coins first arrived in Nor-way with Vikings returning from raids in England. In 995 AD the first Christian king, Olav Trygvason, came to power in Norway. He is also important in numismatic history since the first known Norwegian coin is a penny attributed to him. Around the same time, the first Swedish coin was minted by Sweden’s first Christian king, Olof Skötkonung. There have been many links between Sweden and Norway throughout the centuries, from the Kalmar Union of Norway, Denmark and Sweden in the late Middle Ages to the union between Sweden and Norway in the 19th century.
Sustained negative inflation, or even a deflationary spiral – a negative feedback loop involving an economic downtrend and falling price levels – is thus not expected. Closing remarks In conclusion, let me reiterate that the minimum exchange rate was introduced as an exceptional and temporary measure during a period of unprecedented turmoil for the financial markets and the global economy. It served Switzerland well for more than three years, partially correcting the massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc. Last year, monetary policy in the euro area and Switzerland increasingly began to diverge. This was reflected in a very sharp depreciation of the euro against the US dollar. A minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro was thus no longer sustainable. The high and rising volumes of currency intervention that would have been necessary to maintain the minimum exchange rate would have resulted in an uncontrollable expansion of the SNB’s balance sheet. In the long term, this would have severely restricted its room for manoeuvre in monetary policy matters, and in turn its ability to fulfil its mandate. Given prevailing international conditions, the negative interest rate – and our willingness to intervene on the foreign exchange market as necessary – give us the tools to ensure price stability in the medium term. Seen from the current perspective, too, there is no threat to price stability in the medium and long term. The impact of the appreciation on consumer prices is temporary, although it may linger for some time.

On our part, we will make the necessary modifications in the supervisory and regulatory framework that target the above mentioned issues with a realistic and flexible approach. The sole purpose of this conformist approach to supervisory rules, is to provide a cushion for avoiding potential future disturbances in the financial stability. Finally I would like to strongly emphasize for all business community, households and all other economic agents that Bank of Albania will make all efforts to ensure and further consolidate the general macroeconomic equilibrium in Albanian Economy, with specific role on financial stability. I believe that business community comprehends this important mission. Bank of Albania intends to be vocal regarding its prospects for economic developments, so that none of its actions should come to you as a surprise. Therefore I invite you to interpret our signals fairly and smoothly integrate them into your decision making process. I would like to remind you that our medium term agreement with IMF and focused policy orientation toward EU and European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) provides additional collateral for our pledge. Thanking The Economist Conference for giving me this opportunity I am open to take questions and share comments. BIS Review 85/2006  3
In order to reap the benefits from economies of scale and scope, Nordea has chosen to concentrate its different functions, such as treasury operations, credit decision-making and risk management to specific centres of competence within the group. It is therefore questionable whether the different entities within the group really are selfcontained, even if they are legally independent subsidiaries. With this structure, it is also less likely that the group as whole can survive a failure of one of its entities. Hence, operationally and in economic terms, Nordea increasingly resembles a bank with a branch structure. A consequence is that the present regulatory structure may be less well-suited for efficient supervision and regulation of the group. A fourth challenge is that the practicalities of supervision and crisis management are greatly complicated as the number of relevant authorities increases. In normal times, this means that the regulatory burden for the financial firms increases. Also, the need for supervisory cooperation increases, which demands new supervisory procedures and the creation of common supervisory cultures. In times of financial crises, sharing information and coordinating action becomes a difficult priority, especially since time is a scarce resource in crises. A fifth challenge is that conflicting national interests emerge as banks become truly crossborder. The national authorities have a national mandate and are responsible to the national government or parliament. They are therefore unlikely to take the full external effect of their actions in other countries into account.

And do the authorities themselves have arrangements in place to produce comprehensive assessments of the operations and the risks of these groups? Under the prevailing regulatory structures I am afraid that the answers to both of these questions are likely to be no. Policy actions are needed As I have tried to illustrate so far, financial integration gives rise to several challenges related to the supervision of cross-border banks. Most importantly, I have argued that the present  BIS Review 83/2007  3  supervisory arrangements are not designed to prevent the cross-border externalities that financial crises may result in. This, of course, is a growing problem in an integrated world. Furthermore, I have argued that there are deficiencies in how the supervision of internationally active banks works in practice, which can partly be explained by limitations in legislation and partly by supervisors not being sufficiently coordinated. In my opinion all this gives us good reasons to reflect on how to take actions for revising the present regulatory frameworks. We need to find ways for countries to cooperate closely and establish mechanisms for coordination and conflict resolution. Motives for a coordinated financial supervision Most of what I have said so far is probably pretty uncontroversial both in terms of the analysis of the challenges of integration and of the need for action. However, it may be more difficult to reach agreement on how to move forward. A number of alternative solutions have been brought into the debate.
Of course, when such models were used to compile background material at central banks, larger models with more variables became necessary. But the transmission mechanism remained very clear and simple, and details on how the financial sector works were not explicitly included. However, as instructional tools to illustrate important points about inflation targeting (for example, the balance between real economic stability and how quickly inflation can be brought back to the target after a shock), the models worked well. See, for example, Bailey et al. (2020) for a description of how the Bank of England’s monetary policy has changed since before the financial crisis. 4  4 [13]  The financial crisis showed that more complex models were needed... For a more thorough and detailed discussion of monetary policy in practice, models like this were insufficient and this became obvious in conjunction with the financial crisis over ten years ago, if not sooner. There were several reasons for this. The first reason was that, as the financial markets had a subordinate, or almost non-existent, role in the models, the consequences of shocks on the financial markets could not be described. The models certainly included households that save and companies that invest, but in some way, these were assumed to find each other without financial intermediaries like banks or somewhat developed financial markets.

10  And fourth, the emergence of the digital economy poses significant challenges and opportunities for tax systems  9  See, for instance, Card, D. and J. E. DiNardo (2002): “Skill-biased technological change and rising wage inequality: Some problems and puzzles,” Journal of Labor Economics, 20 (4), pp. 733-783. 10 See Guner, N., M. Lopez-Danieri and G. Ventura (2016): “Heterogeneity and government revenues: Higher taxes at the top?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 80, pp. 69-85. 5  around the globe. For instance, research for the US suggests that profit-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions reduces the tax bill of US-owned companies by about 20%. Thus, 11  globalisation and the growing reliance on intangible assets demand new ideas to limit the erosion of corporate income tax. In this situation, the international dimension of tax design emerges at the forefront of the policy debate. Against this backdrop, for instance, the OECD has launched a welcome initiative, known as the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (BEPS), which brings together 115 countries with the aim of ensuring that profits are taxed where the economic activity takes place and where value is created. 12  As you can see in the conference programme, we have an excellent menu of papers covering a large amount of topics, related to these and other issues. They will provide new and valuable insights in the realm of fiscal policy, and will therefore improve our understanding of this field, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
Private savings for financing higher education should increase considerably. Finally, in addition to openness and the culture of risk-taking, a competitive society needs responsible macroeconomic and financial management. Indeed, stable money, low and predictable inflation, and fiscal responsibility are probably the most essential public goods governments and central banks can provide over a short term to support innovation. It is equally well known that market-based access to finance enables to quickly mobilise necessary funds for innovation. Single financial market supported by common infrastructure plays an essential role in increasing the competitiveness of the European Union. Ladies and Gentlemen, let me once more welcome you to Tallinn. I wish you a successful and thought provoking conference. 2  BIS Review 63/2007

A summary of the results has for some time now been published in our quarterly Business Cycle Signals report. The enclosed study explains the objectives and the methods underlying these company talks. You will also find the latest issue of the Business Cycle Signals in your press kits. Both of these sources of information are, of course, also available on our website. Page 5/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Fritz Zurbrügg. Page 6/6
Purchase of foreign currency The aim of our buying foreign currency is to prevent an appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro. This is the key component of our unconventional monetary policy. It is important to emphasise that we do not engage in foreign exchange interventions in order to  BIS Review 77/2009  1  bring about a depreciation of the Swiss franc, but to prevent any further appreciation of the franc in its role as a safe haven currency. Therefore, the reproach we occasionally hear that the SNB’s policy is encouraging an international depreciation race is unjustified. A look at exchange rate movements shows a clear appreciation of the Swiss franc during the course of the financial market crisis (cf. chart 1). So there can be no question of the SNB conducting a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. We give ourselves a great deal of latitude with regard to our foreign exchange interventions. There is no fixed threshold beyond which we become active; we simply decide in accordance with the situation at hand. And markets should not become used to a certain level of intervention. We feel that this approach promises the highest possible impact, which in turn will allow us to phase out the strategy more easily when the time comes. Furthermore, we do not comment on the volume of our foreign currency purchases. The purchases of foreign currency have fulfilled their purpose – and with these I am referring to our first unilateral interventions in the foreign exchange market since 1992.

Thomas Jordan: Challenges for the SNB in extraordinary times Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the half-yearly media news conference, Berne, 20 June 2008. *  *  *  Around the world, the effects of the financial crisis on the implementation of monetary policy and the composition of central banks’ balance sheets are becoming more and more apparent. On the one hand, conventional monetary policy has all but exhausted its options, and unconventional measures are being increasingly used. On the other hand, some central banks are having to manage the illiquid assets which they took over in an effort to stabilise the banking system. Both of these situations also apply to the Swiss National Bank. Therefore, after giving a brief assessment of the developments in the international financial markets, I will turn my attention to the unconventional monetary policy measures being taken by the SNB. I will then move on to discuss the SNB StabFund. To conclude, I will look at the risks facing the SNB that are associated with these activities. Situation in the international financial markets Although the first few weeks of the year saw stock markets around the globe experiencing their lowest levels in many years, the surprisingly positive results from the US banking sector in mid-March prompted a turnaround in market sentiment. Stock markets have since been recording strong price gains. Other financial market segments also saw a significant recovery.
The EEA Agreement is basically a mechanism through which EFTA countries like Iceland and Norway were allowed to participate in the EU single market, which includes free movement of capital and provision of financial services. The underlying principles are those of home licensing for operation anywhere in the area and of a level playing field for competition, where size and location are not supposed to matter. It therefore goes against the underlying principles of this framework to consider the size of banks relative to GDP as a metric for concern, as is now so rightly in fashion. This so-called European “Passport” enabled the Icelandic banks to operate throughout the EEA, including through branches in other EEA countries. We now know that there are deep flaws in this framework and that these flaws are important elements in the current euro area crisis. A key issue here is the contradiction between the European Passport rights, on the one hand, and national supervision, national deposit insurance, and national crisis management and resolution regimes, on the other. This is what recent proposals of a banking union are supposed to address. All of these problems are much aggravated when different currencies come into play, and for EEA countries and EU countries outside the euro area, this framework also has embedded in it a potentially huge foreign currency liquidity risk in the banking system that is not covered by a LOLR.

Many big European banking names might not still be with us had it not been for the USD swap lines granted to the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England (BoE), and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). So the financial crisis revealed a major fault line in cross-border banking in the form of large foreign currency balance sheets featuring significant maturity mismatches, but with limited LOLR facilities in terms of foreign currency. Maturity mismatches are, of course, the bread and butter of banking, and we know how to deal with the risk in a domestic setting: with central bank LOLR operations and deposit insurance complemented by regulation and supervision, partly to deal with the moral hazard issues created by this safety net. This process is facilitated by two factors. First, and abstracting from leakages through the FX market, the funds withdrawn from banks during a domestic run flow in one form or  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  another to the central bank, which can then redirect them back to the banks. Second, central banks have a very large short-run capacity to expand their balance sheets. In the current setting, it is far from guaranteed that this process can be replicated at the international level. In normal times, of course, managing liquidity across currencies from countries with free movement of capital and relatively developed capital markets is not much of an issue.
For those groups comprising a series of regional subgroups in a hub-and-spokes structure, there may be intermediate holding companies for each region. The preference of some of the regional authorities might be for a SPE resolution of ‘their’ subgroup. In other words, a MPE resolution strategy can incorporate SPE resolution being planned for some parts of the group. The precise approach applied to the different regional/local subsidiaries would be a matter for the relevant host authorities. But it should not be a mad scramble. Under the FSB KAs, the home authority for the group has the important role of ensuring that the operation is well co-ordinated and not competitive. Preconditions for SPE and MPE resolutions There is obviously a lot to be said about how to apply the two headline strategic options for resolving SIFIs. The FSB plans to finalise its Guidance on implementation before the summer holidays and so decently ahead of the Summit of G20 Leaders in September.

Overall, the outlook and the balance of risks suggest that the key policy rate should be gradually increased in the period ahead. The projections are uncertain. New information may reveal aspects of economic developments that suggest the Norwegian economy is following a different path than projected. Higher capacity utilisation or a weaker krone may, on the one hand, result in higher-than-projected inflation. On the other hand, inflation may be lower than projected if the krone remains strong or productivity picks up more rapidly. Should the krone appreciate considerably more than projected, the interest rate may be increased to a lesser extent or later than currently envisaged. The key policy rate should be in the interval 1¼-2¼ per cent in the period to the publication of the next Monetary Policy Report on 24 March 2010 unless the Norwegian economy is exposed to new major shocks. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 139/2009  15
Peter Pang: A decade of Hong Kong Dollar settlement in the CLS system Opening remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the 10th anniversary celebration of Hong Kong Dollar settlement in CLS, Hong Kong, 21 October 2014. *  *  *  David 1, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured to be here today to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Hong Kong dollar settlement in the CLS system. Opening 2. If we were a married couple, this event would mark our Tin Anniversary, with tin symbolizing durability and pliability. It is good to note that our bonding remains robust, despite the fact that CLS has 16 other currency partners, and its desire to have more in the future. 3. According to Jane Austen, “happiness in marriage is entirely a matter of chance”. Being a monetary authority, the HKMA would not leave such an important financial infrastructure for addressing the FX settlement risk to chance. 4. The one thing that keeps our bonding with CLS strong is our common vision – to provide the solution to help market players eliminate the FX settlement risks through a highly effective and efficient settlement platform. 5. Our decision to join the CLS in 2004 was based on the simple fact that CLS provides the most powerful global solution to eliminate the FX settlement risks among market players. And CLS has delivered such a solution without a hitch in the past decade. Good times 6.

To adjust the average daily value data to equate to the same reporting convention used by the Bank for International Settlements, the gross values should be divided by two. 3  BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, FX turnover in April 2013. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  20. So, what’s next? I expect markets to keep changing, and they will only change faster in the coming years. 21. As technology advances, and Asia providing the engine for global growth in the medium term, I see plenty of opportunities for CLS to put its strategic focus in the region. The HKMA welcomes the CLS’ efforts to put more new currencies and members into its orbit. 22. I look forward to seeing this happen sooner rather than later, and welcome opportunities for cooperation and knowledge sharing between us. This is all because of what I said earlier – that we shared a common vision, and a more widely participated system should mean even less settlement risks for market players. 23. I look forward to celebrating our silver anniversary in 2029. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3