samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Whether policymakers are always fully aware of the ultimate goal to promote the welfare of the people is another question. Policymakers in transition face many challenges and bold decisions. Let me mention just a few. Whether to privatize rapidly or not? Whether to open up the economy at once or retain external controls for some time? Whether to aim at zero inflation or not? The main point is that those (and other similar) questions should not be answered only from the viewpoint of either ideology or academic debate, but should be answered in the light of the fact that they are only means to achieve the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of a people in each country in transition. I would argue that policymakers tend to forget this and think of measures in transition as the goal in itself. For example, sometimes they are proud of rapid privatization regardless of its effects. The second danger is that policymakers do not care about the ultimate objective at all. Sometimes, politicians do things in order to enrich themselves, their family or friends, instead of increasing society’s welfare. Such behaviour is called a “bad” political culture (Hillman and Swank, 2000). It has to be stressed that those societies perform badly. Corruption is endemic, tax evasion high, resources are misallocated, growth lower, and inequalities higher. In the transition process people are sometimes forgotten. And here I do not refer only to the poor or deprived, but people in general.

In a market environment there are  BIS Review 43/2000  2  so many more decisions to be taken and almost each of them is associated with risk and its consequences. b)  In socialism there was no reason to worry too much about the future. Free schools, free education, free health insurance, no unemployment, secured pensions, in short very few incentives to take a long-term perspective on life. Questions like: How am I going to finance my children’s education? Should I save for my old age? Will I be able to afford a mortgage if I’m unemployed? were very rarely asked under socialism. So, it was comfortable to think only about the present, as someone else - “the socialist system” - would take care of the future. The same reasoning could be applied to companies. Why worry about the long-term market developments, when the almighty central planner would take care of that? For those reasons it is even more challenging for policymakers in transition to explain their goals and actions clearly to the population than it would otherwise be. In reality we do not seem to have acted consistently in pursuit of these goals of whether transition benefits the people and whether they understand the process. Sometimes the people get left behind and we embark on a reform without asking whether it fulfils the ultimate goal of raising people’s living standards.
And if a private-sector digital currency uses the technology to substitute for a third-party clearer, the central bank counterpart would do the opposite. The aim would be to widen access to the central bank’s balance sheet, beyond commercial banks. There’s no rigid correspondence here: in principle, one could introduce the technology and preserve the current arrangements, under which it is commercial banks that hold central bank deposits; it’s also possible to increase the number of counterparties without it. But the distributed ledger would probably make it easier to do so. That might mean adding only a narrow set of counterparties – perhaps a wide range of non-bank financial companies, say. It might mean something more dramatic: in the limiting case, everyone – including individuals – would be able to hold such balances. So although they might share the same technology, and the same name, the private and central-bank versions of a digital currency are actually rather different. The one would expand what the other seeks to replace. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As far as its economic effects are concerned, my guess is that much would depend on how exactly a central bank digital currency (CBDC) is designed – and in particular the extent to which it competes with the main form of money in the economy, commercial bank deposits. As individuals, we already have the ability to hold claims on the central bank, in the form of physical cash.

No bank can maintain public trust for long if  2  BIS Review 34//2005  it lacks sufficient capital, so supervisors impose capital requirements to safeguard the banking system. Since capital is the last line of defence against bank insolvency, regulatory capital requirements are one of the fundamental elements of banking supervision. I should note that strong banking supervision is not enough to ensure financial stability. While I believe that a sound financial system requires robust regulatory and supervisory frameworks, there are many other potential sources of financial instability outside the financial system. Many financial crises have not resulted from shocks arising in the financial system. Any regulatory or supervisory framework must be built on a series of preconditions and on the foundations of a sound supervisory system. With respect to preconditions, there is a set of issues that may be considered. Firstly, I think there is a broad consensus among all of us about the importance of promoting the implementation of appropriate macroeconomic policies consistent and sustainable over time. Secondly, an appropriate institutional framework is also needed. In particular, a set of mercantile and civil laws must be in place to safeguard agents' property rights. A legal and judiciary structure which provides legal security must thus be in place, together with the so-called safety net institutional arrangements, core principles. etc. Moreover, it will be necessary to consider microeconomic aspects related to payment-system and market structures.
We have already achieved more or less the right level of capitalisation for the banking industry through the initial set of Basel III reforms after the financial crisis. If we now precipitate a further increase in the level of capital requirements in the process of adjusting the framework and fine-tuning the calibrations, it would unduly constrain credit intermediation and consequently economic growth. We must guard against these unintended outcomes. It is therefore heartening that the Basel Committee has committed not to significantly increase overall capital requirements for banks. Distribution of Credit Matters as Much as Allocation of Credit Even as we hold the line on aggregate capital levels, we need to be sensitive to the effect of capital requirements on specific business lines and on different economies. •  This brings me to the second area that we should be watchful of: namely the distribution of bank credit across the economy as a consequence of regulation. The Basel Committee will be finalising this year its review of credit risk capital requirements, as it seeks to address excessive variability in risk-weighted assets. •  The revisions to the capital standards for credit risk that are currently being proposed will require bank exposures to be risk weighted under a Revised Standardised Approach instead of the Internal Ratings Based approaches. •  The return to a Standardised Approach is motivated in part by limitations in risk modelling, as the last crisis laid bare.

That made me very proud. Thank you. I am grateful to Jamie Bell, Alan Castle, Rashmi Harimohan, Jonathan Haskel, Bob Hills, Karen  Page 6  Jude, Nick McLaren, Rhys Phillips, Huw Pill, Andrea Rosen, Michael Saunders, Martin Seneca, Fergal Shortall, Silvana Tenreyro, and Laura Wallis for their assistance in helping me prepare these remarks.
•  Secondly, integrate tenets of good corporate citizenship into corporate structures and processes, create innovative and proactive Corporate Social Responsibility solutions, and collaborate with internal and external stakeholders on social challenges, and report and account for performance in this area. •  Thirdly, Corporate Social Responsibility awards can be introduced to acknowledge the works of those that make considerable effort and impact. This can help to act as an incentive to motivate employees and managers to advance Corporate Social Responsibility. The recognition can take place at different levels such as those of the project team, corporate management, company, specific industry sector, etc. •  Finally, companies can also have their managers and employees participate in networks and multi-partner organizations that aim to advance responsible business practices for the benefit of business and society. The partners can include other businesses, government, civil society, labour unions, investor groups, etc. As earlier alluded to, one of the tenets of good corporate citizenship is transparency and accountability. On the part of the Councils, the major challenge they face in this regard is the delivery of quality service to their clients, which is underpinned by better management of resources. 2  BIS Review 28/2006  In conclusion, Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the interest of enhancing the competitiveness of business and maximise the value of wealth creation in Mufulira District in particular and Zambia as a whole, companies are urged to make social responsibility an integral part of the wealth creation process.

Caleb M Fundanga: Corporate social responsibility - challenges that the private sector in Zambia should overcome Key note address by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Mufulira District Advisory Committee’s 2006 Business Forum, Mufulira, 18 March 2006. *  *  *  CHAIRPERSON, YOUR HONOUR THE MAYOR OF MUFULIRA MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER, THE TOWN CLERK, DISTINGUISHED INVITED PARTICIPANTS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN On behalf of the Bank of Zambia and indeed on my own behalf, allow me to thank you for this invitation to Mufulira. It is an honour to be invited to this important Forum to share a few words with the business community on the issue of Good Corporate Citizenship. In view of the growing role of the private sector as a partner in economic development in Zambia, this topic could not have come at a better time than now. In fact, when I was invited to come here by the Municipal Council, I took a bit of time to reflect on the challenges good corporate citizens face. On the outset, it is imperative to realise that despite the moral ethics that come with being a responsible and good corporate citizen, advantages can also be exploited by strengthening the synergies between private sector growth on the one hand and social, economic and environmental development on the other. In view of this, I prepared my address within the context of the underlying theme “Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges that the Private Sector in Zambia Should Overcome”.
While there are no indications that banks in Hong Kong are abusing the rules on connected lending, there seems to be uncertainty among some banks as to how the rules work. We have therefore recommended that the board should ensure that the bank fully understands its legal obligations under the Banking Ordinance and establishes a detailed policy on connected lending. •  Third, the board should ensure that it receives the management letter from the external auditor without delay together with the comments of management. We have specified that the management letter should normally be received within four months from the year-end. Of course, this is not something that is totally within the control of the bank. I would therefore put in a plea to any bank auditors in the audience to submit the management letter without delay. •  Fourth, the board should maintain an appropriate level of checks and balances against the influence of management and/or the shareholder controllers in order to ensure that decisions are taken with the bank’s best interests in mind. The key issue here is the number of independent non-executive directors there should be on the board of banks. We recommend a minimum of three to ensure that there is a sufficient pool of independent directors to sit on the various committees of the board and to cover absences. •  Fifth, the board should establish an audit committee with written terms of reference specifying its authorities and duties.

McConnell, M. and G. Perez Quiros (2000), Output Fluctuations in the United States: What Has Changed Since the Early 1980s?, American Economic Review. Mian, A. and A. Sufi (2009), The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, Quarterly Journal of Economics. Morgan, D. (2002), Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry, American Economic Review. Rajan and Diamond (2009), The Credit Crisis: Conjectures about Causes and Remedies, American Economic Review. Rochet and Vives (2004), Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?, Journal of the European Economic Association. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Illustrative of this point is the fact that the territorial governments are responsible for more than 90% of public spending on education. As regards supply-side policies, the main thing is to bring about an improvement in the capacity of the economy, its agents and its markets to adapt, which enables them to respond flexibly to a changing and highly competitive environment. Better supply-side functioning would help square the continuation of the current strong employment generation with the attainment of productivity gains. The National Reforms Plan lays down a series of measures geared in this direction, and they should be resolutely applied. Moreover, there are areas such as the labour market where it is still necessary to push through reform measures to increase flexibility and efficiency, harnessing the current good times to adopt reforms that will prevent a cyclical change from causing job destruction as occurred in the past. The picture that emerges from the recent information I have set out is that of an economy which continues to show signs of high dynamism, with the prospect of this continuing - with somewhat less momentum - in the coming years. Yet this favourable situation prolonging an exceptionally long upturn should not be understood as signifying the absence of problems in the medium term. On the contrary, over a longer horizon the Spanish economy will have to face major challenges in competitiveness, productive efficiency and the flexibility of the markets for goods, services and factors.

Michael C Bonello: Malta's experience of EU membership Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, to the European Documentation and Research Centre, at the Conference “Malta in the EU 2004-2009”, Valletta, 15 May 2009. *  *  *  Introduction When I argued the case for membership of the European Union (EU) in November 2002, 1 the underlying premise was that given Malta’s small size and lack of natural resources, wealth could only be created by adding value to imported inputs and transforming them into products for which there was a demand abroad. In a globalizing, increasingly competitive world economy Malta’s only viable option, therefore, was to seek a more secure access to foreign markets. In this context I went on to argue that deeper integration with our major trading partner, with whom two–way trade was already equivalent to around 65% of GDP, represented a logical response to the challenge of creating a modern economy with the capacity to grow in a sustainable manner. I did emphasise, however, that this objective could only be met if we were prepared to question the way we had managed the economy in the past and resolved to make the necessary changes to institutions and mindsets, policies and work practices.
As early as November 1973, at the Conference on Managers in a Changing Hong Kong Environment, Sir Philip spoke on, amongst other things, the role of public policy. He said that, “the Government must accept such responsibilities as are necessary to ensure that management decisions are not frustrated by imperfections in the operation of the market mechanism, leading to economic inefficiency or social distress which only the Government can remove.” In September 1979, he talked about interventionism and the adjustment mechanism, amongst other things, in a speech on the Hong Kong Economy in Transition. He said that: “A pragmatic view dictates an admission that interventionism can be relevant to the maintenance of economic stability in Hong Kong even in the general context of a philosophy of positive non-interventionism”. In the same speech he cautioned against taking for granted the “efficiency with which [the] essentially automatic adjustment mechanism operates in restoring equilibrium”. He then went on in the same speech to identify areas that could be collectively referred to as market imperfections which justifies market intervention. BIS Review 67/1998  -2But it was the speech he made to the Federation of Hong Kong Industries in December 1980 (and as Principal Assistant Secretary for Economic Services then it was my honour to have a hand in drafting part of the speech) in which he made abundantly clear his stance on the policy of positive non-interventionism. Here I quote two paragraphs of his speech in full.

(2010) stated that “it was tempting for macroeconomists and policymakers alike to take much of the credit for the steady decrease in cyclical fluctuations from the early 1980s on and to conclude that we knew how to conduct macroeconomic policy. We did not resist temptation. The crisis clearly forces us to question our earlier assessment”. Since we participate today in a seminar dedicated to banking and financial history, please allow me to put things into perspective. In the 1970s, inflation was high and there was a divorce between theoreticians and practitioners concerning the monetary policy effectiveness on real variables. In line with Sargent and Wallace’s Policy Ineffectiveness Proposition (1976), towards the end of the 1970s many were thinking of monetary policy as being powerless also in the short term, not only in the long term, as Friedman (1968), Phelps (1968) and Lucas (1972) had already stated. However, practitioners were aware that their monetary policy decisions were effective in the short run with respect to both inflation and activity. This divorce lasted for a while, until the New Keynesian economists, starting with Fischer (1977) and up to Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983), found solutions to incorporate nominal rigidities into their models with a view to putting them in line with practice. The economists belonging to the Real Business Cycle mainstream opted for exploring the lack of rigidities to the maximum and created general equilibrium models.
There simply has not been a full cycle’s experience to draw on. When we published our Financial Stability Report in April we drew attention to the sub prime history as a warning of what could go wrong in bigger and more central credit markets. Developments since then underline that message. If some of the price moves in the sub prime CDOs have spread to CLOs based on leveraged loans and buy-outs, that is hardly a surprise given recent growth in that market (Chart 8). There are signs that the speed with which the pipeline of leveraged deals is being warehoused has slowed down at least temporarily and the terms of some of the lending has tightened a little. But that said there are some significant differences between the sub prime and corporate loan markets. First corporate profits remain robust and there has not been the step up in defaults that ushered in the sub prime crisis. Second while the total size of the corporate bond market dwarfs the sub prime mortgages market that is not true of the leveraged corporate loan market (Chart 9). The weight of money – pension funds and sovereign wealth funds A second development in financial markets in the news at present is the growth of sovereign investors and of “Sovereign Wealth Funds” in particular. While these have long been established in Singapore, Norway and the Middle East, the decision of China with its huge foreign exchange reserves to diversify its investments is new.

Countries that are more self-sufficient in terms of energy (at least in net terms) do not face the same weakening of activity and inflation in the medium term that stems from the terms of trade channel. In the UK, weighing up the immediate inflationary impact against the potential disinflationary impact in the medium term is central to the baseline projections published by the MPC in May. This framework defines the difficult ‘narrow path’ it has to navigate over its upcoming meetings. Labour market tightness and supply chain disruption Further complications for UK monetary policy stem from tightness in the labour market and the strength of corporate pricing power, at least in some sectors. The tight labour market owes largely to weakness in labour supply rather than strength of labour demand. UK GDP is still only slightly above pre-pandemic levels, despite unemployment rates falling back to the low levels seen ahead of the lockdowns. Higher rates of inactivity among UK workers following the pandemic (on account of early retirement and a rise in long-term sickness), as well as the impact of Brexit on the flexibility and cost of EU workers, appear to have weighed on labour supply. With vacancies and hiring strong, nominal wage growth has increased to rates above those usually deemed consistent with achieving the inflation target. [11] In parallel, firms are striving to re-establish profit margins. As consumer demand weakens, corporate pricing power is concentrated in the business-to-business sector.