samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
See, for example, Sveriges Riksbank (2020) and Gustafsson and von Brömsen (2021). 2 [19]  We have described the motives for the purchases in many different contexts. 7 But it is still relevant to ask: Why such a focus on covered bonds? And the answer is: To ensure the interest rates charged to households and companies would remain low throughout the crisis. As the major Swedish banks fund a large part of their lending by issuing covered bonds, the Riksbank's purchases have had a direct effect on the banks’ funding costs and, ultimately, also on interest rates charged to households and companies. I believe that our measures during the crisis have essentially functioned as intended: keeping interest rates low and maintaining the supply of credit. The financial system was in this way able to assist in absorbing the macroeconomic shock, rather than posing a further problem – a financial crisis - on top of the health crisis and the economic shock that ensued. As I see it, these measures were entirely necessary to attain our monetary policy objectives: to attain an inflation rate of 2 per cent and to support the development of the economy. But we now find ourselves in a new situation. Current monetary policy – how do we manage the asset portfolio when the repo rate is raised? Inflation is now very high in many places, including Sweden (see Figure 1).

More emphasis will have to be given to keeping costs in check and to risk and asset-liability management. Perhaps banks will spend more of their resources on attracting deposits and a little less on selling loans. In any event: Keep an eye on your earnings. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 115/2007  17
It is more extensive than the FOMC’s as it will cover, among many things, structural changes: climate change, financial stability; and the effects of digitalisation. The Eurosystem will take its time, as the Fed did, to consider the different alternatives. But we can already today shed some light on three key points, especially after the excellent “ECB Watchers” conference in Frankfurt on 30 September: 1. A dual mandate like the Fed’s and the ECB’s two-tiered mandate are actually more similar than they look. 2. There is some room for clarification in our inflation objective. 3. We should look again at the “second pillar” of the ECB and its possible link with the so-called “secondary” objectives. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  1/ Our mandate puts a clear priority on price stability, and is not a dual mandate.

As I said on previous occasions4, our medium-term target needs to be viewed in two ways: it has to be forward-looking to guide inflation expectations, but it cannot ignore the past either. If credibly symmetric and medium-term, our inflation objective would probably achieve similar outcomes ex post than explicit average inflation targeting. 3/ Finally, we need to rethink our “second pillar” – the present monetary analysis – notably in light of financial stability concerns. To do so, we could track a broader set of nominal aggregates:  Financial aggregates, from the perspective of financial stability, and potentially look more closely at the assets of financial institutions including non-banks (such as their provision of credit in the broadest sense) rather than at their liabilities only (including money, as in the past). Other economic aggregates, starting with nominal GDP growth, which is a key metric in the assessment of private and public debt sustainability. But also employment and income distribution, which respond to the demands of the Treaties as well as to the expectations of the public. II. The three cornerstones to restore fiscal sustainability Of course we should not repeat the mistakes of the last crisis, and tighten, the fiscal taps too quickly. But in the longer term, fiscal discipline is also needed. In the current context of an unprecedented rise in public debt, some tempting illusions have arisen. We must not give into them. We cannot, for instance, allow ourselves to believe that cancelling the public debt held by the central bank is a viable solution.
An important question is whether this increased relative attractiveness of alternative liquid assets would also reduce the PMRR. Few of the firms we spoke to expected a big effect on their minimum holdings. That’s consistent with more detailed surveys carried out by the Federal Reserve, which suggested little response  15  In practice, of course, asset prices are jointly determined with reserves demand: they will have adjusted to ensure that the aggregate supply of reserves, determined by asset purchases, is willingly held. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  10  even to quite large changes in the opportunity cost of holding US dollar reserves.16 But we should be cautious of these findings when alternative rates of return have been so low for so long. Bringing all this together, our conversations with firms suggest the current sterling PMRR is of the order of £ Table 1 breaks this down into a base estimate of firms’ ‘true minimum’ demand to meet payments and liquidity outflow needs, and an additional estimate of the buffers held above these minima.17 These estimates draw on firms’ descriptions of their preferred holdings and their management of fluctuations in reserves levels, cross-referenced with our own analysis of historic reserves account activity.

In addition, these shocks have shown a greater tendency to spread rapidly to other financial markets. The rapidity with which the Asian crisis spread across East Asia in ’97-’98 is a good example. Many of us here today may wish that we have the ability to predict with certainty when the next crisis will strike. It is, however, far more fruitful to adequately prepare ourselves for the inevitable. And that, in short, means enhancing our risk management capability. BIS Review 7/2002  1  Risk Management Initiatives in Singapore MAS will introduce three risk management initiatives to help financial institutions in Singapore better manage the challenges ahead. The first initiative is a MAS guideline that aims to help banks prepare themselves to meet the ill effects of financial crises and shocks. One of the ”defining” features of a financial crisis is that it strikes suddenly and once it has struck, it gives very little time for financial market participants to react. How then can we better prepare ourselves for a crisis? Stress testing offers financial institutions a systematic methodology to prepare for financial crises. Stress testing is based on the old military saying, “the more you sweat in peace the less you bleed in war”. That is, financial institutions that have a comprehensive programme to stress test their portfolios will be better prepared when a stress event occurs.
Indeed, on these results, Spanish GDP is now ranked seventh among the industrialised countries, in front of Canada and only behind the United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France and Italy. Comparison with these seven countries can be taken as a basis to give us an idea of our strengths and weaknesses. In terms of job creation, Spain was once again prominent in 2006, with a growth rate of 3.56%. That ranks us first among the big seven, and if we compare absolute figures (almost 700,000 jobs), no other country in the developed world has created so much employment, with the sole exception of the United States. Turning to public finances, Spain's end-year surplus also compares very favourably with the deficits posted in the other main developed countries. Yet this should not hide the fact that we also ranked first in two unfavourable indicators. True, yearend inflation in Spain was 2.7%, below the figure of 3.7% the previous year and, of course, far below the level of 4% that marked the end of some of the high-growth years earlier this decade. But compared with the other seven major industrialised countries, Spain had the highest inflation in 2006. And likewise for the current account deficit. Our deficit in 2006 will no doubt be close to 8% of GDP, the highest figure among the big economies. The Spanish economy has performed well against the backdrop of an expanding world economy and, most importantly for us, the firming of the recovery in the euro area.

On the one hand we have the strong  BIS Review 32/2007  1  growth of household debt, linked to intense house purchases in a property boom, and which is the other side of the coin of the high external deficit I referred to earlier. And on the other is the persistence of an inflation differential with our European partners, which raises doubts about the future behaviour of our competitiveness. The Banco de España has issued warnings about these risk factors and will continue to monitor them closely and analyse the attendant developments in depth. Today, however, as initially stated, I should like to take advantage of the opportunity the Círculo de Economía has given me to take a longer-term perspective in examining recent developments in the Spanish economy and its future possibilities, moving beyond the usual short-dated horizon of economic forecasting exercises. Looking back, we can see how favourably the Spanish economy has fared over the past 20 years, which is an incontrovertible fact. With the exception of the 1993 recession, which was fairly widespread in Europe, our country has been growing since 1986 systematically at or above the level of growth in other European countries. And since 1994 we have had 13 uninterrupted years of growth, with mild oscillations around a generally high average rate. Spain's higher relative growth has many causes.
Figure 2 Long-term interest rates (percent) 4.5  4.5  4.0  4.0  3.5  3.5  3.0  3.0  2.5  2.5  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  Oct.08  10-year BCU  Jan.09  Apr.09  10-year U.S.A.  Jul.09  10-year Eurozone  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. 4  BIS Review 105/2009  Figure 3 Deposit rates (percent) 12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  02  03  04  30-89 days  05  06  90 days to 1 year  07  08  09  1 to 3 years  MPR  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

This has allowed us to confront the negative effects of the global turmoil on our country’s demand and output decisively. Let me begin by reviewing the monetary policy measures we have adopted since the beginnings of the global turmoil. The monetary policy measures to address the global crisis Since the early stages of the global crisis, monetary policy has acted aggressively to cushion the effects of the crisis on our economy. Our main policy instrument – the monetary policy rate (MPR) – influences the cost of interbank lending at one day term. Because the credits that banks provide to households and firms are at longer terms, what is central to determine the magnitude of the monetary impulse is the future path of the MPR expected by the market, rather than its current level. Thus, although the MPR was kept constant at 8.25% in the latter months of last year, the communication of the external scenario meltdown and its disinflationary consequences, together with the incorporation of an explicit bias, pulled down MPR expectations significantly between October and December, also affecting the market interest rates. This process was substantially heightened between January and March of this year, when the Board cut the MPR by 600 basis points, above what the market and analysts were expecting. Between April and June, the MPR was cut further, by a combined 150 basis points.
For the world as a whole, the IMF calculated that inflation will rise from around 4 per cent in 2007 to almost 5 per cent in 2008. Inflation expectations have also risen in several countries. The most probable development is that inflation will slow down next year. When adjusted for energy and food prices, inflation has been relatively stable. Normally, inflation slows down when growth slows down, even if this is with some time lag, and our forecast in the Monetary Policy Report is for growth in the world to be lower this year and next year. At the beginning of the summer we were also able to note that, unlike the situation in the spring, monetary policy expectations had swung towards higher interest rates in several countries. A tight monetary policy contributes to dampening inflation. But there is a risk that the inflation process will be more prolonged. It was estimated that growth in the world will continue to be relatively strong, despite a slowdown in the United States and the euro area. In a slightly longer perspective, when the slowdown in the United States and the euro area becomes an upswing once again, there is also a risk that the problem of rising commodity prices will return. Several emerging countries will experience rapid growth for some time to come. 2. Developments in Sweden  Weaker growth and labour market in Sweden Growth will also slow down in Sweden.

Dear banking system executives, As I mentioned above, this is a good moment, while the future still bears some questions. The economy is not exempt from this overall consideration. I take the opportunity to bring to your attention the fact that the institution each of you represents has a certain role to play in the everyday economic and financial life of the country. Now that we know the already-announced objectives of the Government of Albania for 2018, it is understandable that 2018 is a rather challenging year to further boost economic recovery and strengthen the financial stability of Albania. From this perspective, I would like to affirm that, like in 2017, in 2018 the Bank of Albania will continue to focus on:  guaranteeing a stable economic environment, keeping inflation rates in check, and having liquid markets with low volatility. The monetary policy will aim at an adequate supply, in terms of both quantity and price. The final monetary policy objective will be unchangeable, while the accommodative stance implemented in the past years will be present during 2018.  boosting credit recovery in Albania. We believe that the further boosting of the economy provides a friendly environment for lending to the economy. In addition, we will continue to insist in the implementation of the joint programme for the reduction of non-performing loans. In this light, we expect the banking system to be proactive in lending to the economy.
Major UK banks include: Standard Chartered, Santander UK, RBS, Barclays, LBG, HBOS, and HSBC but does not include Northern Rock. BIS central bankers’ speeches  23  Chart 15: One year ahead inflation and GDP forecast errors  Source: Bank calculations. 24  BIS central bankers’ speeches

What are the consequences of the introduction of the euro on the Swiss franc and on the effectiveness of Swiss monetary policy? And what are the effects of this new international monetary order on countries outside the dollar-euro block more generally? I will try to provide some insights on these questions today. First, I will present the change in monetary framework due to the introduction of the euro. Then I will enumerate the main fears that we originally had regarding the effects of that transformation, and our experience with the new environment over the past 5 years. Finally, I will share some lessons on the influence of the introduction of the euro for the international monetary system and for the autonomy of Swiss monetary policy. 1. A new international framework  January 1, 1999, constituted a true revolution for Europe. Many observers argue that the introduction of the euro represents the major postwar stage in European integration. They are right. The Maastricht Treaty, by removing national currencies and defining budgetary rules, lead to an important transfer of power from national capitals to European institutions. The French franc, the Italian lira, and the German mark were all symbols of national identity. The euro is now playing an integrating role in  BIS Review 32/2004  1  people’s minds. In this regard too, the new currency brings a revolutionary dimension. Is it not the case that national currencies were almost always and everywhere brought about by fundamental political changes?
674. Cielenska, O, Joseph, A, Shreyas, U, Tanner, J and Vasios, M (2017), ‘Gauging market dynamics using trade repository data: the case of the Swiss franc de-pegging’, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper, No. 41. Cœuré, B (2017), ‘Policy analysis with big data’, speech at the conference on “Economic and Financial Regulation in the Era of Big Data”. Coyle, D (2014), GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History, Princeton University Press. Duffie, D, Gârleanu, N and Pedersen, L (2005), ‘Over-the-Counter Markets’, Econometrica, Vol. 73, No.6, pp. 1815-1847. Dwoskin, E (2015), ‘New Report Puts Numbers on Data Scientist Trend’, Wall Street Journal, 7 October. Economist (2017), ‘The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data’, article on 6 May 2017. Ericsson (2017), Ericsson Mobility Report, November 2017. Farrell, D and Wheat, C (2015), ‘Profiles of Local Consumer Commerce’, JPMorgan Chase & Co. Institute. Financial Stability Board (2010), ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms’, Financial Stability Board. Fouquet, R and Broadberry, S (2015), ‘Seven Centuries of European Economic Growth and Decline’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 227-244. Ginsberg, J, Hohebbi, M, Patel, R, Brammer, L, Smolinski, M and Brilliant, L (2009), ‘Detecting influenza epidemics using search engine data’, Nature, Vol. 457, pp. 1012-1014. Goldsmith-Pinkham, P, Hirtle, B and Lucca, D (2016), ‘Parsing the Content of Bank Supervision’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 770.

35 For example, Albertazzi, Becker and Boucinha (2018) show evidence of the portfolio rebalancing channel from the ECB’s asset purchase programme. 30  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  New, highly granular data are also coming on stream on payment, credit and banking flows. Some of these have been used to help predict, or track, movements in economic activity. They have had some success. For example, in the US a dataset of over 12 billion credit and debit card transactions over a 34 month period 36  has recently been used to analyse consumption patterns by age, firm size, metropolitan area and sector. In time, it is possible these sorts of data could help to create a real-time map of financial and activity flows across the economy, in much the same way as is already done for flows of traffic or information or weather. Once mapped, there would then be scope to model and, through policy, modify these flows. This is an idea I 37  first talked about six years ago. Today, it looks closer than ever to being within our grasp. These are all areas where DAFM could contribute importantly to efforts to improve the quality and timeliness of data on the macro-economy and financial system. As is well-recognised, the scope for improvements in 38  the quality of National Accounts data is considerable. And those measurement challenges will only  become greater as we move towards an increasingly digital and service-oriented economy.
I am of the “old school” – the duties of the management and the board are owed to the company and to the shareholders. I do believe that the best among chief legal officers will see the job as more than just dispensing legal advice, and, as being the “guardian of the corporation’s integrity”. 1 But being the guardian of the corporation’s integrity cannot mean that integrity is defined by the chief legal officer’s personal value system and not the organization’s value system. We are not priests or rabbis. In a world where the consequence of rule breaking can lead to fines in the multiple of billions of dollars, lawyers and compliance officers can accurately claim that, in guarding the corporation’s integrity, they are enhancing shareholder value. When the BNPP case was announced, FBI Director James Comey said: “Until shareholders demand from their boards that those boards choose leaders who understand what it means to create a healthy culture of compliance, the money will keep walking out the door . . . .” 2 My remarks today have focused on the organizational value system as distinct from its rule set. Organizations should adopt and nurture organizational value systems because they are healthy for the company and its shareholders. The personnel in the organization will feel better about the work that they do, and they will do better work and more of it. It is good business to refuse to finance a jurisdiction that is sponsoring genocide.

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These include improvements in service delivery by the public sector, having a stable and sustainable tax system, maintaining stability in the exchange rate, preserving political stability, consistency in government policy, and continued investment in infrastructure development. Other areas highlighted include addressing high lending rates, increased efforts in the fight against corruption and reducing bureaucratic processes. Further, respondents were of the view that government needs to take appropriate measures to enhance private sector involvement in decision-making and streamlining licensing requirements. In closing, I wish to thank you all for attending this virtual meeting and hope that you will use the occasion to explore the survey findings and recommend appropriate measures to contribute to the enhancement of the business environment. It is now my singular honour and privilege to officially open the workshop and wish you all fruitful deliberations. I thank you for your kind attention. God bless you. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

And I would hope, on this evidence, that the future evolution of our approach to overall economic management would be in the direction of further improvements to our supply-side flexibility, rather than any retreat from the present emphasis on macro-economic stability. Of course I am well aware that a stable overall macro-economy does not - and cannot - mean equally stable economic conditions for every individual sector or individual business. A particular complication over the past few years has been the surprisingly persistent strength of the exchange rate against the euro, itself a reflection of the puzzling more general weakness of the European currency. This has contributed to an uncomfortable imbalance within the UK economy primarily between the euro-exposed sectors, which have been under consistent pressure, and the domestically-oriented sectors, which have by and large been doing relatively well. Understandably the suffering sectors and businesses tend to complain that monetary policy takes too little account of their position, often pointing out that inflation has for the past two years fallen somewhat below the target. The implication is that monetary policy has been tighter - interest rates have been higher - than was necessary, which, they say, in turn at least helps to explain the behaviour of the exchange rate. I hope you won't think me patronising if I tell you that I have genuine sympathy with their concerns. Indeed I very much admire the huge efforts that many of them have made to overcome the disadvantage coming from the strong exchange rate.