samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For the prospective polytechnic graduate, this 12–18 month work-study programme will allow him or her to gain valuable employment experience at a financial institution and to receive training which counts towards a Specialist or Advanced diploma upon completion of the programme. These work-study programmes will be designed in collaboration with financial institutions, the polytechnics and the Singapore Workforce Development Agency (WDA). 41. I am pleased to see that the major banks in Singapore have committed to provide at least 200 places for polytechnic graduates in the coming year, through the Earn and Learn Programmes or their in-house structured programmes. (They include all three local banks – DBS, OCBC, UOB – as well as ANZ, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citibank, JP Morgan, Maybank and Standard Chartered Bank.) These will be in the banks’ core functions of technology, consumer banking, operations and risk management. 42. Wherever you start, we will help you progress. To give an example, Oryan Ang, graduated from Nanyang Polytechnic and joined DBS in 2004 as a Home Advice Specialist. He was given opportunities to learn on the job, demonstrate his abilities and rise through the ranks, and is today a Vice-President in Consumer Banking (Deposits and Secured Lending) at the bank. Developing strong core of Singaporean Leaders in Finance 43. Let me turn finally to the second thrust of our initiatives to develop professional talent and skills, which concerns leadership development. This too is a key priority under SkillsFuture.

However, many firms and households have taken on more debt during the pandemic. A deterioration in the economic outlook could threaten their financial health. This, in turn, would worsen the quality of banks’ balance sheets. Policy support remains essential to prevent balance sheet strains and tightening financing conditions from reinforcing each other. Conclusion Summing up, the euro area economy is clearly rebounding. However, the speed of the recovery continues to depend on the course of the pandemic and progress with vaccinations. The current rise in inflation is expected to be largely temporary and underlying price pressures will build up only gradually. The slight improvement in the medium-term inflation outlook and the current level of financing conditions allow favourable financing conditions to be maintained with a moderately lower pace of net asset purchases under the PEPP. Our policy measures, including our revised forward guidance on the key ECB interest rates, are key to helping the economy shift to a sustained recovery and, ultimately, to bringing inflation to our two per cent target. We are now ready to take your questions. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
In promoting the stability and efficiency of the financial system, we favour capital charges based on more sensitive risk measures. Some argue that such measures are procyclical and add to the vulnerability of the system as a whole. I will deal with this issue before going on to discuss some features of the new proposals. In particular I will consider the pros and cons of more complex rules, the use of internal ratings and the measurement of operational risks. I will end by looking beyond the current proposals at potential new chapters for the Basel Accord, including the harmonisation of provisioning policies and the development of capital charges for financial conglomerates. The role of the Bank of England in financial stability As many of you may know, the Bank of England has three core purposes: first, to maintain the integrity and value of the currency, generally referred to as our monetary policy objective; second, to maintain the stability of the financial system, both domestic and international; and third, to ensure the effectiveness of the UK’s financial services. The Bank’s monetary policy role is well known through the minutes of Monetary Policy Committee meetings and the quarterly publication of the Inflation Report. But a similar transparency is pursued in relation to financial stability with the publication semi-annually of the Financial Stability Review. Our interest in the regulatory architecture most obviously stems from this second objective.

It is certainly clear that a minimum capital framework, however sophisticated, cannot on its own capture the full range of risks in a banking organisation. This has been recognised by the Basel Committee; it is the reason why the Consultative paper introduces the supervisory review process for individual banks under Pillar 2 of the framework, as a complement to the minimum capital standard laid down in Pillar 1. It is equally clear that supervisors, even armed with powers to review the individual capital adequacy of banks under Pillar 2, may under some circumstances be less effective than the market at disciplining risk taking, which again is why the Basel Committee is emphasising the importance of enhanced public disclosure under Pillar 3 of the Accord. But to my mind there is very considerable scope for improving the risk-sensitivity of the minimum capital standard before the benefits of this begin to be outweighed by the costs of greater complexity. Indeed, greater risk sensitivity ought in some respects to mean more simplicity in the capital framework, achieved by aligning capital with a common underlying concept of risk, such as internal or external ratings. Internal ratings indeed offer a very significant opportunity to bring regulatory measures of capital more into line with the economic measures established by industry best practice: in the absence of this, arbitrage of the system through securitisation and other means will remain a problem. The current review also offers the opportunity to iron out some of the existing, fairly arbitrary, quirks of the current Accord.
Following the above forum, the first round of one-on-one meetings were held between 17 and 23 January 2014, with the Boards of Directors and senior management of banks and NBFIs, chaired by the Governor, to discuss their business plans under the newly announced plan and further clarify specific issues pertaining to particular institutions. Action 2: Communicating the mandate and time frame In line with the objectives of the financial sector consolidation programme, we provided the banks and NBFIs with a mandate to form internal steering committees to ensure a strategic fit by choosing a suitable partner and to ensure smooth transition to the new arrangement so that the process would ultimately generate synergies in the industry. Further, the relevant banks and NBFIs were requested to align their immediate future business expansion, new recruitments and other capital expenditure with the new developments and to submit periodic progress reports to the Consolidation Unit. We also requested the banks and NBFIs to formulate strategies to work in line with the time frame suggested by the Central Bank, which basically requires all consolidation plans to be submitted by 30 June and completed by end of 2014. Although this time frame was subject to criticism by some, we simply know by practice that unless we have a reasonable deadline, no plan would be effective. However, we maintained some flexibility in the time frame for the completion of mergers and acquisitions that are of a complex nature.

They also enable countries to maintain a fixed exchange rate while retaining some flexibility in domestic interest rates. And they might limit the movement of capital to lower taxed jurisdictions, thus slowing the inexorable decline of capital income taxation resulting from the development of a world capital market. But it is difficult to distinguish between controls on capital flows and flows related to trade. The growth of trade in services has highlighted the difficulty of separating currency trade-related flows from those representing investment. Thus, to be effective, capital controls are likely to impede trade flows. This would be a heavy price to pay and few countries have chosen to pay it. Permanent capital controls have other disadvantages. They forsake all the economic benefits of a free capital market. And controls are never implemented by wise, or even merely clever, economists. They attract rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour in both official and private sectors. And they undermine the cause of market liberalisation. There is no shortage of protectionist tendencies that seek to limit trade and investment. We should not add to them. So neither purist solution is likely to appeal – the one because there is insufficient political and financial support for an ILOLR, and the other because permanent controls go against the grain of promoting market reforms and good governance. But the present system is not sustainable. The danger is that we have the worst of both worlds.
Asset purchases refer to total amount of bonds purchased by the central banks. Annual asset purchases are obtained by summing net monthly purchases over corresponding 12 months. Monthly flows are converted into US dollars by using an average monthly exchange rate. Sources: ECB, Bank of England, Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, SIFMA, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. The Fed’s widely trailed intention to reduce gradually its holdings of US Treasuries could ultimately have significant effects on financial conditions globally. Although the precise degree and timing of this effect are subject to considerable uncertainty, the direction is clear: reducing the stock of purchased assets should increase the term premium for US treasuries (due to both portfolio balance and signalling effects). Fed staff recently estimated that balance sheet normalisation could ultimately lead to a 75 basis point rise in the 1038  year term premium. According to the July Primary Dealer Survey, the median expected rise in the 10-year  US Treasury yield over the next two years due to a reduction in the balance sheet is around 30 bps (with an interquartile range of 20-50bps). Whatever happens, Bank analysis suggests that around two-thirds of 39  changes in US term premia will spill over into the UK over time. IV. Should the Monetary Policy Framework be adjusted? In summary, global demand has become more important for pressures on domestic capacity (i.e.

Criticising these two pillars is not only pointless, but is also dangerous: • Pointless: the ECB was able, within its institutional framework and mandate, to be active, innovative and responsive…even more than some political institutions. Damage the central bank’s independence and you undermine its strength and agility, the very things that protect an economy in a crisis. • Dangerous: these two pillars, enshrined in the Treaty, are the legal and democratic foundation of our legitimacy and capacity to act – and not only in “Northerners” eyes. Furthermore, they are the foundations of European’s trust in their currency. To give only one example: the Eurosystem cannot cancel public debt, neither legally nor “fiduciary”: a suspicion of fiscal dominance would give rise to monetary distrust as seen in history and more recently in some emerging market economies. Independence and the price stability mandate are not an obstacle to the ECB’s powerful action. On the contrary, they are its two best levers. I will come back to this. II. What European policies for the gradual exit? Talking about European solidarity, arguably, Europe could have done more. But let us not forget that the glass is at least half full, thanks to the major support from the Eurosystem, but also the SURE framework of the European Commission to help preserve jobs, and the welcome agreement last Friday on unconditional ESM [European Stability Mechanism] credit lines to finance health expenditure. Page 6 sur 10 Let us now look to the future.
We recognised that this was not without risks - risks in terms of the build-up of household debt and of an unsustainable rate of increase in house prices, if not an actual bubble - which, if persisted in for too long, or if carried too far, could lead to an uncomfortable retrenchment further ahead. In a virtual world where we could control these things precisely, we could no doubt readily agree that we would like to see stronger growth in other major industrial countries, a stronger euro, more business investment in the UK and more moderate growth of consumer spending and household debt. That would offer a more certain prospect of better balanced, and therefore more sustainable, growth. But we live in the real world! We expected the global economy to begin a sustained recovery in the latter part of last year which would allow us to return to better balanced growth in this country, and so we took the view essentially that for the time being at least unbalanced growth was better than no growth at all. In the event, our economy as a whole did just about keep moving forward through the winter, and the global economy - including manufacturing output - bottomed out around the turn of the year.

In this regard, ASEAN members have agreed to prioritise efforts to liberalise the cross-border supply of Marine, Aviation and Goods in International Transit (MAT) insurance and to support the establishment of an ASEAN Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (DRFI) mechanism. Progress in these areas will enable ASEAN members to increase capacity for such risks which are growing in scale and complexity, and achieve broader diversification of risks across the region, leading to lower costs of insurance. It will also enhance the protection of ASEAN communities and economies against increasing exposures to catastrophes. Significant progress has also been made in promoting freer flow of capital and greater connectivity between the ASEAN capital markets through the various initiatives and measures by the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum. Market participants can look forward to more seamless cross-border investments with reduced costs and greater access to ASEAN investments. Financial integration initiatives are also focusing on harmonising further the operating environments for payment systems within ASEAN countries. A key outcome is to create an efficient, reliable and secure payment and settlement system which is able to operate smoothly across ASEAN. Consumer transactions such as cash withdrawals and payments for goods and services will be further simplified, contributing towards the growth of retail businesses in ASEAN economies. The development of more convenient and cost effective retail payment systems can also help realise the full potential for e-commerce in ASEAN. Efforts are also underway to promote the use of ASEAN currencies for trade settlement.
It goes without saying that, for instance, a foreign exchange or bond dealer must possess the technical competence in the respective markets to perform effectively and professionally. By the same token, a private banker or financial advisor must also have the necessary technical knowledge before he or she can recommend or market wealth-management products to customers. However, financial innovation or engineering in the last two decades have greatly increased the complexity of financial products and market dynamics. Some of the structured products and financial derivatives are so complex that it is a big challenge for traders to fully understand their features and risks, let alone for the less-sophisticated customers. To maintain technical and professional competence, financial firms and practitioners must ensure that they are kept up to date on the latest market developments and financial innovations. This is very similar to what other professions require. For example, in the field of medicine, doctors will need to keep updating themselves by reading medical journals and attending seminars to keep abreast of the latest medical advances. “Control” The second “C” is “Control”. It refers to the control and governance of banks, insurance companies, securities houses and other firms engaging in financial services. In general financial firms engage in two main types of business. The first type is the pricing and management of risks, which include credit, foreign exchange, market and maturity mismatch risks. Clearly in the process of risk-taking, the prudential soundness of the balance sheets of the firms is crucial.

It has taken Hong Kong many decades of untiring efforts to accomplish what we have today. There is a lot more that we need to do in order to maintain our niche when so many competing centres are trying very hard to catch up. To differentiate Hong Kong from its peers, we must maintain those qualities that are hard to copy and yet appeal to users and customers who can freely choose where to conduct their financial businesses. So what should we do? There are three layers of parameters that help shape behaviour and values. The first layer is what is prescribed in the statutes, regulations and rules, and with which compliance is compulsory. The second layer is set out normally in codes of conduct issued by the various professional or industry bodies. For example, the banking industry has, under the auspices of the HKAB and with the endorsement of the HKMA, promulgated a comprehensive code of banking conduct. Similarly, the TMA has also issued a code of conduct for its members. The third layer encompasses everything from what the society does in its civic education for children to what individual firms do in managing their business and the behaviour of their employees. Very often we see firms become overly aggressive in chasing profits by taking excessive risks or mistreating their customers.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  cyclical nature, the elevated property prices and the evidence of high risk appetite translate for the Swiss economy into a state of high vulnerability requiring caution and the exercise of responsibility by all concerned. The activation of the CCB and the adoption of other prudential measures have to be seen in this perspective. References Borio, C. (2012): The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt? BIS Working Paper No 395 Keynes, J. M. (1936): The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, Macmillan; Chapter 12 Minsky, H. P. (1982): Can “it” happen again?, Essays on instability and finance, New York 1982 Reinhart, C. and Rogoff, K. (2009): This time is different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press Schularick M., and Taylor, A. (2012): Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008, American Economic Review, American Economic Association, Vol. 102(2), pp. 1029–61 Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981): Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, The American Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 393–410. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In this vein, the Fund’s work should focus mainly on economies, developed or emerging, that have played an increasing role in the global economy developments. On multilateral surveillance, the Fund should deepen its analysis, while improving its communication capability and persuading the countries involved to adopt its recommendations. In this context, we are particularly interested, and strongly support the high priority given by the Fund’s management to the first multilateral consultations involving several systemically important members or groups of members such as China, the Euro Area, Japan, Saudi Arabia and the United States. This exercise constitutes an important collaborative effort among major countries that could provide an important forum for debate on issues of systemic or regional importance with a special focus on how to address global imbalances while maintaining robust global growth. The success of this exercise in making an effective contribution to orderly adjustment, thus reducing the burden of disorderly adjustments on the global economy, will depend crucially on the commitment of countries participating in the consultation. On the bilateral surveillance front, it is essential that the Fund’s staff make a clear contribution to strengthening macroeconomic and financial resilience of member countries. This could be achieved by promptly recognizing, and taking into account, cross-country differences, and also by upgrading the Fund’s capacity to perform stress-testing analysis. In particular, we are of the view that the Article IV consultations should focus more on core macroeconomic issues against the backdrop of the challenges posed by globalization.
This means that, with normal capacity utilisation and given a low level of inflation expectations, actual GDP can follow potential output. In such a situation some form of external shock is needed to shift inflation upwards or downwards. This can mean either that production falls below or rises above the level for normal capacity utilisation or that inflation expectations move up or down. The latter case is ultimately a matter of confidence in economic policy’s consistency and its future reactions. The ability of monetary policy to influence inflation has to do with the impact of the instrumental rate on the path of GDP and thereby on the degree of capacity utilisation, together with its effect on inflation expectations. In practice a period of restricted demand has frequently been necessary for the central bank to show that expectations of high inflation are unfounded. Besides monetary policy, expectations are affected by other factors. One of these is the budget. Unsustainably large budget deficits are liable to undermine confidence in long-term price stability. Our inflation forecast serves as a foundation for decisions about monetary conditions. If monetary policy is directed at stabilising inflation at 2 per cent, it will over time help to stabilise demand so that this is in line with the economy’s available capacity. In order to clarify our line of reasoning and our inflation assessments, the Riksbank publishes an inflation report four times a year.

BIS Review 47/1997  -2-  A new direction in economic policy The 1970s and ’80s illustrate how a period of inflation creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability, with a speculative climate and “short-termism” in economic decisions. Slowly but surely, production’s long-term conditions deteriorate. It was partly in the light of such experiences that Swedish economic policy was realigned at the turn of the 1980s. Since then, the focus on price stability has gained broad support in our society, including the political parties. However, in view of the severe economic problems in the early 1990s, with inflation expectations based on our historical record and a massive budget deficit, it took time for the new direction of economic policy to acquire credibility. This has been evident, for instance, in the periods of interest and exchange rate unrest. Financial market trends particularly in the longer run can be regarded as an indicator of the prevailing degree of confidence in the determination and ability to conduct an economic policy that is consistent and oriented towards stability. With the free movement of capital and the globalisation of financial markets, economic policy decision-makers need to be highly disciplined. In the light of our experience since the policy realignment at the turn of the ’80s, this is a fact that is widely recognised today in Sweden. Turning the clock back would not be feasible.