samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Still, given the rationale and the features of central banking policies, as Ben Bernanke (2015) states: “By comparison to the influence of (these) long-term factors, the effects of monetary policy on inequality are almost certainly modest and transient”. These long-term factors influencing inequality relate to globalization, technological progress, demographic trends, and institutional changes in the labor market. How should we tackle the chronic problem of uneven income distribution, which seems a symptom of many fundamental weaknesses of the system? How to return the greatness of the opportunities that modern society should bring? Should the way forward be stronger regulation, more active redistributive role of the state or as Prof. Zingales claims through harnessing the power of competition? As economists, we all know that market based system inherently brings some inequality, but its disruptive power is unthinkable when boundaries are crossed. At the current juncture, when global growth slowdown is on the horizon pro–growth and pro–equality policies seems inevitable. I am sure that distinguished speakers and panelists will reflect on the array of available policies, including improving access to markets and levelling the playing field, increasing financial inclusion, investing in human capital, regulatory and institutional reforms, that strengthen the rule of law and promote competitive and fair business environments. We, as policymakers, cannot only have the role of “innocent bystanders”, scrutinizing and stocktaking, but putting in place reforms that promote strong and inclusive growth that by its nature reduces inequality.

However, our situation is by no means unique, and both the emerging, and more developed economies have felt the effects of what has turned out to be a global recession. The challenges presented to our economy in general and the financial sector in particular, brings to the fore the critical role that the Zambia Institute of Banking & Financial Services is expected to play in equipping young men and women with the much needed capacity to strengthen the financial services industry. We shall no doubt be confronted with such and many more similar challenges as we strive to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction in our country. Ladies and Gentlemen, in order to be well prepared for such trying times ahead, we need to groom our best talents to assume leadership positions in all sectors of the economy especially in the financial sector. To achieve this vital task of nurturing our future leaders, the Government is trying its level best to provide education to all Zambians. However, providing support to education for the benefit of all citizens is never an easy task. It is for this reason that the Government recently classified Education and Health as economic sectors. This entails that private investors are now provided with incentives to invest in the area of Education. This policy is expected to provide the much needed investments in institutions such as the Zambia Institute of Banking and Financial Services. Looking around in this gathering, I see people who are very well connected to private investors.
For some types of financial activities, this framework allows financial service providers from third countries to continue to serve EU clients provided a number of strict conditions are met. For example, in the area of central clearing – which I touched upon earlier – cross-border market access is widespread: 15 jurisdictions are considered equivalent by the EU and 33 third-country central counterparties (CCPs) are recognised by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). At the same time, given the euro area’s reliance on UK CCPs, strong safeguards must be put in place to preserve financial stability and a level playing field. In this respect, I am very pleased that EU legislators have adopted a new supervisory framework for CCPs in the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR 2). This framework requires third-country CCPs which are critical for the EU to meet EU prudential requirements under ESMA’s supervision, with the involvement of the relevant EU central banks. If UK CCPs are to continue to provide euro clearing services on a systemic scale under the equivalence framework, they should be subject to the rigorous application of these safeguards. In central clearing or other areas such as trading or listing, the extent of continued market access will depend on whether or not a decision is taken to grant equivalence to the United Kingdom. These decisions are beyond the purview of the ECB, and it is not my place to comment on them. Suffice to say that there is no automatic right to equivalence.

The asset management industry plays a key role in the economy by channelling savings towards investment, both for companies’ and governments’ capital needs. In other words, asset managers play an important intermediary role in the financial system. In 2008, assets in the fund industry amounted to about EUR 13 trillion. Ten years later, the outstanding amount of assets is more than 3 times higher at EUR 42 trillion. Half is located in the United States and about 35% in Europe.1 The asset management sector is the largest component of non-bank financial intermediation defined by the Financial Stability Board as “credit intermediation involving entities and 1  Sources : EFAMA, International Statistical reports  4/9  activities outside the regular banking system”. It’s true that in many respects, investment funds have bank‑like financing activities: they don’t collect deposits but they do collect funds, they carry out liquidity and/or maturity transformation and, in certain cases, they perform their intermediation with leverage. And like banks, more than two-thirds of investment funds (in asset value) are susceptible to runs.2 I would like to conclude this first part of my speech by some anecdotal evidence showing how the traditional bank-centric intermediation model is shrinking, while a more diversified intermediation model is gaining traction: -  in 2010, 60% of the new leveraged loans (that is, loans made to indebted corporates) were granted by banks in Europe;  -  in 2018, 69% of the new leverage loans were granted, not by banks, but by asset managers.
I have given my views on the current monetary policy situation and described the principles that guide monetary policy. I have also mentioned some of the practical problems we face. When it comes to the current monetary policy situation, my assessment is that the picture we painted of inflation prospects in the February Inflation Report still holds true to a great extent, although it now looks as though energy prices may contribute to higher inflation in the short term. Monetary policy needs to become less expansionary. With regard to the monetary policy strategy, one important message has been that we do not always aim to bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible; we also give consideration to the real economy. We cannot rule out the possibility of situations arising where it may be necessary to set our sights further ahead than the time period normally used to guide monetary policy decisions. However, in this case we will make it clear in advance that we envisage such a development. Thank you! BIS Review 44/2006  5

With the present fiscal stimulus no longer a factor, however, economic growth is likely to slow down distinctly again next year but should remain robust. We still anticipate an upswing in the EU in the coming year. It is probable, however, that it will take slightly longer to close the output gap than we assumed as recently as September. Inflationary pressure from abroad will thus remain moderate although inflation in other countries will not recede as markedly either in the coming year as we expected three months ago. Furthermore, we anticipate a decline in the price of oil to approximately USD 25 per barrel in the course of 2004. On the assumption that the three-month Libor rate will remain stable at 0.25% during the next three years, inflation should average 0.4% in 2004, 1.0% in 2005 and 2.3% in 2006. The inflation trend according to the new forecast will exceed the September forecast until mid-2005. Until the end of 2004, inflation is likely to remain fairly stable at around 0.5% and to fluctuate only slightly due to basis effects. The new forecast shows that the threat of negative inflation rates has diminished. This is the result of an improvement in the global economy and of the less marked decline in inflation abroad, as also of the weaker Swiss franc vis-à-vis the euro. As from the beginning of 2005, inflation will show a rising trend due to the expansionary monetary policy we took as an assumption.
Based on the outlook for Iceland’s underlying trade balance and the prospects for domestic output growth, this would be sufficient to reduce its debt position by 18 percentage points of GDP through 2017. Considering the uncertainties in the estimate, it is likely that the net external debt position lay in the range of 35–80% of GDP at year-end 2012. But the upper end of this range is not enough to create a debt sustainability problem as, even in this case, Iceland’s debt will still continue to decline through this period. In addition, it should be noted that this estimate assumes that the current stock of offshore krónur is assessed at the onshore exchange rate and the failed banks’ ISK assets are assessed at nearly full book values and at the onshore exchange rate. That will not be the case, of course. In order to gain some perspective on the amounts involved, it is useful to note that each 25% reduction in the valuation following the sale of these assets from the estates and their expatriation from  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Iceland reduces the measured debt position by a full six percentage points of GDP. The final figure will be much large than this, of course. Is there no problem, then? Yes, there is. The report shows that the balance of payments problem could become substantial in a very few years if domestic access to foreign capital and refinancing does not improve.

balance sheets Risk tolerance  Private financial system  Percentage of annual nominal GDP 120  120  110 100  110 100  90 80  90 80  70 60  Financial institutions - lending to private non-financial sector (a)  50 40 30 20 10 0 2005  Bank of England(b)  2008  2011  2014  Open for business  70 60 50 40  Unconventional Central banks MP  30 20  Normal conditions  10 0 2017  Liquidity crisis  Degree of systemic stress  Sources: Bank of England, ONS (a) Data as at February. Sterling net lending to non-financial corporations and household sector. (b) Data as at February. Final data point shows the latest published balance sheet data, at 29 February 2016, plus the increase in the loan to the Asset Purchase Facility since this time. The financial instruments underpinning these expansions tend not to be particularly complex when compared to those on commercial bank balance sheets. But the Bank of England has also accumulated material new contingent exposures, reflecting its much wider post-crisis range of policy responsibilities, and a more comprehensive liquidity insurance toolkit. The Bank’s new responsibilities for banking supervision, macro-prudential policy and resolution imply a range of potential new calls on its balance sheet.
Creditor safeguards and CCP resolution Intervention by a resolution authority, especially at a point where default management procedures have yet to be exhausted is action that cannot be taken lightly. Nor can the discretion of a resolution authority to deviate from the existing rules of the CCP be unbounded. Appropriate creditor safeguards are central to ensuring that an effective resolution regime does not unduly interfere with property rights or undermine its own value by introducing unnecessary uncertainty into a financial institution’s contractual relationships both in resolution and outside of it. Perhaps the most fundamental safeguard to creditors in resolution is that the actions of the resolution authority will not leave them worse off than if the authority had not intervened and the firm had instead entered a liquidation proceeding. For the purposes of determining this No Creditor Worse Off protection 6, bank resolution takes an insolvency counterfactual; recognition that a failing bank that meets the conditions for resolution would in most likelihood lose its licence at that point if not resolved, thereby tipping it into insolvency (whether cash-flow, balance-sheet or both) if it was not there already. That insolvency counterfactual requires an ex post assessment of the value of assets and liabilities of the firm. That is no easy task but one that can, and has been, credibly undertaken.

That is not to say the macroprudential angle was ignored, but there was certainly a view – quite prevalent in the pre-crisis world – that if banks were individually stable, the financial system would itself stay upright. During the Great Moderation, little appetite existed for new tools and international regulations of a macroprudential nature, even if the Committee could have foreseen all of the looming threats. The financial crisis brought home the lesson that financial stability could not be assured only through the use of microprudential tools. And so Basel III represents another important step in the Committee’s development. Basel III has substantially enhanced the microprudential framework. And, in the countercyclical buffer, it has also introduced the first international agreement on a macroprudential tool. Subsequent work on the framework for systemically important banks (both global and domestic) has further expanded the Committee’s input into this relatively new field – a trend that is unlikely to be reversed. My fifth key influence on the Committee’s evolution is also quite recent, and hence its eventual impact on the Committee’s work is still difficult to foresee: its role in monitoring the implementation of Committee standards. Post-crisis, the Committee has not only expanded its membership, but it has also taken on the role of monitoring the implementation of the standards agreed by its members.
Unusually during an expansion, business investment has contracted in four out of the past seven quarters and is currently estimated to be just 1½% higher than at the time of the referendum, with cumulative growth more than 20 percentage points less than forecast in the MPC’s May 2016 projections. Household spending growth has remained more resilient, supported by strength in employment and pay, but over the past year it too has slowed as uncertainty about the overall economic outlook has become more entrenched. 18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  18  Chart 12: More recent deterioration in global and domestic growth a) Global GDP growth Percentage changes on a year earlier 4  EU referendum  3.5 PPP-weighted world GDP 3 2.5 2  UK- weighted world GDP  1.5 2014  2015  2016  2017  2018  2019  Sources: Datastream from Refinitiv, IMF October 2019 WEO and Bank calculations. b) UK GDP growth Quarterly growth (%) 0.5 GDP growth  Potential GDP growth  0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0  2017-18 average  2019 average  In the MPC’s most recent projections, we expected these negative trends to reverse. Overall, UK GDP growth was projected to pick up from current below-potential rates, supported by the reduction of Brexitrelated uncertainties, an easing of fiscal policy and a modest recovery in global growth. This rebound is not, of course, assured. The economy has been sluggish, slack has been growing, and inflation is below target.

SPEECH  Things That Have Never Happened Before Happen All the Time October 27, 2022 Joshua Rosenberg, Executive Vice President and Chief Risk Officer Remarks at the Central Bank of Nigeria’s Second National Risk Management Conference (delivered via videoconference) As prepared for delivery  Good morning, good afternoon, or good evening depending on whether you are at the event in person or logging in remotely from another part of the world. I am very grateful to Dr. Blaise Ijebor for inviting me to present today at the Central Bank of Nigeria's Second National Risk Management Conference.1 Let me start by saying that the views I will express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. Today, I'd like to share my perspectives, experiences, and learnings to reflect on how we can use risk management to enable us to achieve our goals even in the face of surprises and challenges. The main point I want to make is that, by integrating risk management into plans, decisions, and actions, we can succeed over a wider range of possible futures, not just the future we expect (or hope for). I'll initially highlight a few potential misunderstandings that might prevent us from getting the most out of risk management. The first is that risk management is mainly a way to stop bad things from happening.
in the past ten years to the level of 48% of GDP in 2017. However, despite the positive trends, the need for further increase in the total domestic savings is evident, which is a common feature of the CESEE countries. Thus the IMF analysis of May 20163 mainly indicates "insufficient" domestic savings4 in CESEE countries, i.e. the average savings rate (as a difference between gross domestic product and consumption) of about 20% of GDP, which is lower than the current investment rate, lower than the estimated optimal rate of investment (25% of GDP), as well as the rate in countries with a relatively faster process of real convergence in the past (28% of GDP). The rate of total domestic savings is particularly low in 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  the SEE countries, where in 2017, on average, it is 17% of GDP, including in the Republic of Macedonia where it is close to the average in the region. The relatively low domestic savings are an obstacle for stronger investment support, partly explained by the fact that, even after more than 25 years from the beginning of the transition, the level of accumulated capital per capita in most CESEE5 countries is still relatively low, corresponding to about one-third of the levels in developed European economies. In RM the capital level per capita is lower than the average of the EU-28 countries, and it equals around 24%.

We, as the National Bank, within our competencies, will continue to support the savings in the future period as well, by further maintenance of the macrofinancial stability and prudent regulations, maintaining a safe and sound banking sector, contributing to maintenance of the confidence in the financial system, which is a key prerequisite for domestic savings. Finally, let me congratulate you all the employees in the banking sector in the Republic of Macedonia on the World Savings Day, 31 October, and wish you a success in future by attracting more deposits and their efficient channeling in productive investments that will bring 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  benefits to the society as a whole. Thank you! 1 Measured by the share of the total deposits of the non-financial entities in the GDP. 2 Measured by the share of total gross loans of non-financial entities in GDP. 3 IMF Regional Economic Issues, Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe – How to Get Back on the Fast Track,  May 16. 4 Refers to the total domestic savings calculated as a difference of GDP and consumption, expressed as a  percentage of GDP. 5 Slovenia and the Czech Republic are exception. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Compared with the December Inflation Report the forecast for GDP growth in 2005 has been revised up marginally to 3.2 per cent, mainly due to higher investment and increased services trade. Towards the end of last year investment in the economy grew more than expected and there is much to suggest that the fast increase will continue in early 2005. Despite last year’s robust productivity growth the number of employed fell for the second consecutive year. The fact that firms were able to boost output so sharply without hiring new staff was due to a rise in both productivity and average working time. It is reasonable to believe, though, that a continuation of strong GDP growth will result in higher employment during the forecast period. Different indicators from the labour market also suggest that a turnaround is on the way. For example, the number of temporary employees has risen since summer 2004 and the number of new job vacancies reported to Swedish employment offices rose in annual terms in the period November-January after having dropped for almost two years in a row. There is reason to expect average productivity growth in the economy to decrease somewhat as the economic upswing continues. Nevertheless, the Riksbank’s assessment remains that there has been a lasting increase in the rate of productivity growth, and the Bank’s forecasts for the coming years are therefore relatively high in a longer historical perspective.

The broader economy should see a recovery in the second half of this year alongside strengthening global demand and further progress in our vaccination programme. Trade-related activities such as manufacturing and wholesale trade will be supported by resilient global trade flows and robust upswing in the global tech cycle. Modern services, particularly the financial and ICT sectors, are set to expand at a firm pace this year, amid a pickup in credit intermediation activities and the ongoing digitalisation of business processes which has been accelerated by the pandemic. Moreover, compared to a year ago, Singapore is much better equipped to handle the pandemic, with more effective testing and tracing, swift isolation of infected cases, and vaccination. Singapore’s GDP growth could exceed the upper end of the 4 to 6% forecast range, barring a setback to the global economy. Last month, the official forecast range was maintained at 4 to 6% in light of the deterioration of the domestic COVID-19 situation and consequent Phase Two (Heightened Alert). MTI, together with MAS, will review the forecast range in August when preliminary estimates for Q2 GDP are available. The resident unemployment rate should continue to gradually decline. Total employment expanded by 14,000 in Q1 this year, the first expansion after four consecutive quarters of contraction. The Phase Two (Heightened Alert) measures and continued restrictions under Phase Three (Heightened Alert) however will have a transitory impact on employment in the domesticoriented services sector.