samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At the beginning of the 1990s, the tax system was reformed, and this entailed a substantial reduction in the opportunities for deducting interest expenditure. Interest rates rose substantially at the same time, and  4  BIS Review 51/2004  the Swedish economy was affected by an international economic slowdown. This had very negative effects on both household borrowing and house prices. Could a similar situation arise today? Although we have seen a rapid increase in both indebtedness and house prices in recent years, the present situation is quite different, with a low-inflation policy and thereby more stable economic environment. Nor have there been any extensive structural changes of a nature that would completely alter the conditions for households’ decisions on indebtedness and property purchases. Monetary policy takes account of other factors than inflation In principle, household indebtedness and developments in house prices could create problems for the payment system. This is something regularly analysed in the Riksbank’s Financial Stability Reports. The conclusion that can be drawn from the most recent report in June is that the risk of the household sector alone being able to create such large losses for the banks as to threaten the payment system is very slight. As I mentioned earlier, the assessment is that house prices over the country as a whole are reasonable. A special study of households in debt was included in the June report, and this showed that, on average, these households were assessed to have good margins for managing rising interest expenditure or increased unemployment.

This involves households making plans for the future and building up expectations of future economic developments, and also there being no systematic errors in these expectations. It is not unlikely that households’ rationalism is in some cases overestimated in the formal models. If this is the case, the conclusions regarding the effects of, for instance, repo rate rises that are calculated using these models may be incorrect. One such example would be if households did not include in their calculations the fact that interest rates rise when economic activity strengthens and that indebtedness and house prices therefore were being pushed beyond sustainable levels. Something that can give rise to special problems in the forecast context is that changes in indebtedness and property prices have a tendency to reinforce one another over the economic cycle. Low interest rates make it cheaper to finance house purchases, which means that house prices rise. As the value of the collateral for households’ loans mainly consists of houses or tenant-owned apartments, the price increase in itself contributes to making it possible to borrow more money. Sooner or later, interest rates will rise and the question is what happens then. If indebtedness and house price trends during the upturn phase have been based on over-optimism and unrealistic expectations among lenders and borrowers, house prices may fall sharply and households may experience difficulty in meeting their interest payments. Demand in the economy can then fall substantially.
This support was embodied and exemplified as early as 2014 with the signature by the Banque of France of two memorandums of understanding with the HKMA and the People’s Bank of China. ***  Cooperation will also prove invaluable in the face of the uncertainty caused by structural challenges. A first structural challenge is the digital revolution. The digital revolution is being fuelled by a wave of cutting-edge technologies, but also by the surge of new players. This new competition is being driven by fintech start-ups, but also, more importantly, by tech firms that have started to expand into the financial sector. Here in Asia, you can testify as to just how rapidly big tech firms can impact the financial sector. While ensuring a level playing field between competitors, our role as a central bank and supervisor is to guarantee that the digital revolution eventually delivers on its promises regarding increased security and efficiency. At the same time, incumbents should be prepared to adapt. Their business models are being challenged by the unbundling of financial services and by increasing customer expectations in terms of responsiveness and autonomy. The answers are not easy and cannot be uniform, but I expect that only the most digitally agile financial companies will eventually prove financially resilient. Against this background, France has many assets that can make it a leader in digital innovation in Europe, and the Banque de France is committed to playing its part in this regard.

Through its Fintech Innovation Hub, which has welcomed over 400 innovative players since 2016, the Banque de France promotes active and open dialogue with all market stakeholders, with the aim of building streamlined regulation for digital innovation. The Banque de France is also committed to leveraging new technologies for its own digital transformation. We are already running an interbank blockchain called “MADRE” to automate the generation of creditor identifiers. I am convinced that by conducting their own experiments, central banks and regulators are more capable of designing relevant policies and regulations for digital finance. ***  A second structural challenge is climate change, which is perhaps less tangible than the digital revolution but certainly no less significant. The transition to a low-carbon economy requires shifting thousands of billions of dollars from carbon intensive industries. As a result, beyond green bonds, we also have to develop new 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  financial products to bridge this green finance gap. I am thinking of green securitisation, green covered bonds, and green loans accessible to individuals, SMEs and start-ups. France is at the forefront of this challenge. Four out of the world’s top ten green bond book-runners are French banks. France is among the top three green bond issuers. This trend is being supported by public action: a law has been introduced requiring investors and listed companies to disclose their climate-related risks; the French State issued the largest green sovereign bond in 2017.
But there is no doubt that the unique, intra-European exchange rate certainty that would be provided by a single currency could nevertheless -- through increased competition as a result of greater price transparency and lower transaction costs, and through the associated improvement in resource allocation -- greatly increase the benefits that are to be derived from the single market. So, on the positive side there is no doubt that it would -- other things equal -- be a very desirable complement to the single market. The problem is that other things may not necessarily prove to be equal. Essentially, the downside is that there is a risk that the single monetary policy -- the single short-term interest rate -- throughout the euro-area, which is a necessary corollary of the single currency, may not, in the event, prove to be appropriate to the domestic needs of each of the participating countries. That risk was quite clearly recognised by the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty. They quite deliberately included in the Treaty the famous convergence criteria in order to ensure that countries wanting to participate in the euro-area should have to demonstrate, before they were allowed to join, at least a minimum degree of sustainable economic convergence precisely in order to reduce the risk of divergent national monetary policy needs once the single currency is introduced. Without that, the potential problems could be serious.

Effective surveillance of the financial market has entailed adoption of appropriate risk management policies and procedures meant to ensure that financial institutions do not undertake excessive risks that may increase the vulnerability of the country to external shocks. V.  Current state of the economy  Mainly due to the policies pursued the Zambian Authorities, the economy has shown appreciable resilience in the wake of the global economic crisis. Positive economic recovery trends have already started to be witnessed within 2009. (i)  According to the Central Statistical Office, GDP growth is now forecast at 6.3% for 2009, up from 5.7% recorded on 2008, primarily driven by increased output in the mining, construction and agriculture sectors: •  Mining growing by 21.4%  •  Construction by 15.5%  •  Agriculture by 7.1%  (ii)  Although inflation rose to 16.6% at end-December 2008 from 8.9% in 2007, much of this increase was driven by the rise in food and energy prices. By October 2009, annual inflation had fallen to 12.3%. (iii)  The exchange rate has also stabilised with the weighted inter-bank rate moving within a range of K4,600 and K4,750 per US dollar in the third quarter of 2009. (iv)  The external sector adjusted strongly with the strong rebound in copper prices, to above US $ per metric tonne, and increased output (primarily through a new mine, Lumwana Copper Mine). The merchandise trade balance recorded a surplus of US $ million (f.o.b.)
However, China’s reopening may temper inflation through its impact on supply bottlenecks. Indeed, the end of the zero-COVID policy will avert production distortions caused by restrictions. In the recent past, the COVID-induced production stoppages in China were key factors behind the bottlenecks and inflationary pressures and, therefore, the reopening could be seen as net deflationary. All in all, it is difficult to disentangle the net effects of all these factors on inflation and close monitoring will be needed. The resilience of euro area growth and its composition In the second half of 2022 the euro area economy proved more resilient than expected and the slowdown in the fourth quarter of last year was less severe than anticipated . This has occurred in a context on which a significant reversal of previous supply shocks (bottlenecks and energy prices) was observed, households and firms had plenty of buffers (in particular the household savings built up during the pandemic), the post-COVID rebound in demand continued to generate positive effects and monetary policy had not yet been fully transmitted. However, there is much uncertainty about the continuity of these factors. In particular, the sharp decline in European gas prices reflects unusually mild weather, energy-saving measures and strong inventory levels, which mitigate supply risks for next winter. However, 12  Ko lerus, Diaye and Sabo ro wski (2016) “China’s Footprint in Global Co mmodity Markets”. International Mo netary Fund.

Let me also touch upon a very important area of our statistical work – co-operation between statistical authorities, namely between the Czech Statistical Office and the Czech National Bank, not only in the preparation of this conference but on a regular basis. This co-operation is aimed at an effective arrangement of statistical processes in our country and minimizing the burden on respondents. Coordinated data collection and sharing of information are the key points in this respect. As we know, a formal arrangement is always a necessary but not sufficient condition for good results. It has become a standard between these two institutions to meet once a year at an annual summit devoted not only to the assessment of the past twelve months’ work and designing the tasks for the period ahead, but also to informal discussions in a friendly atmosphere. This is also an important feature of statistical work since statistics do not involve only figures, but also people who create and compile them. 2  BIS Review 107/2009  Having finished the description of our co-operation in this way, I would like to wish all participants of the conference the same friendly atmosphere at the conference and at the same time interesting presentations and fruitful discussions in addressing the above mentioned or other statistical issues. Thank you for your attention  BIS Review 107/2009  3
Employment in this sector rose by more than 40% in France and Germany. Besides the improvement in the job situation in the euro area, which results from better economic prospects, it should be mentioned that over the past few years the European Union has embarked on determined efforts to promote structural reforms aimed at improving the functioning of labor markets. European countries increased flexibility in the labor market, in particular by developing part-time and temporary contracts. Let me quote some figures to illustrate this point: –  From 1995 to 1999, part-time employment rose from 14% to 17% of total employment in the euro area. This proportion is more important than in the United States, where it amounts to around 13% of total employment. More than half of overall net job creation was due to part-time employment. –  In conjunction with this development, temporary employment in the euro area rose to 15% of total employees in 1999. It is also worth mentioning an emerging trend towards more cross-border mobility of human resources, especially among young people. More and more university degrees include a stay in one or two foreign universities, thus helping to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers in Europe. Last but not least, a key feature which has fostered job creation in the euro area in recent years is wage moderation, together with reductions in the social charges imposed on employers.

This could be classed as a failure by global standard setters. To some extent, the criticism can be justified – not enough has been done in the past to ensure global agreements have been truly implemented by national authorities. However, just as the Committee has been determined to revise the Basel framework to fix the problems that emerged from the lessons of the crisis, the RCAP should be seen as demonstrating the Committee’s determination to also find implementation problems and fix them. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  It would be easy to continue to ignore any problems. A fascinating1 history of the Basel Committee published recently by Professor Charles Goodhart2 notes that the Committee has on more than one occasion over the past 35 years considered undertaking more detailed analysis of domestic implementation of global standards, but shied away from this as being “too intrusive”. However, we have now taken that step, since if we are serious about fixing the problems of the past, then we need to not just look at the policy settings, but also their application. Our efforts on implementation should therefore be seen as an integral part of the reform agenda – not just an adjunct to it. When it comes to our country-by-country assessments, thus far the Committee has conducted detailed assessments of the final regulations adopted in Japan, and the draft regulations in the European Union and the United States.3 Follow-up assessments in the European Union and United States will be conducted once final regulations are available.
(a)  Do we need an IMF? The apparent success of central banks has led some economists to argue that the widespread adoption of inflation targets and floating exchange rates is sufficient to ensure the smooth running of the international monetary system – a regime which Professor Andrew Rose calls the ‘reverse Bretton Woods system’. There is no need for an international institution such as the IMF to watch over the system. It is certainly true that the most important thing any nation state can do to minimise the spillover effects it has on others is to maintain domestic economic stability. And that is exactly what Australia, Britain, and other countries have done during the recent period of economic success, known as the “Great Stability”. But domestic stability is not sufficient to eliminate spillover effects. The impact of national macroeconomic policy decisions is transmitted to other countries through important prices in the world economy: real exchange rates; real interest rates, and prices of important commodities like oil. Changes in spending by US households affect export demand in the rest of the world, both directly and indirectly through movements in the dollar. Changes in saving by governments in Asia affect spending in the rest of the world through movements in real interest rates. Changes in the supply of oil from the Middle East affect incomes and spending elsewhere through movements in oil prices.

Actual and estimated repo rate Estimates with a simple forecast-based rule  it = 1.29 + 0.66it - 1 + 0.50(πFt , 1 – 2) + 0.26(πFt , 2 – 2) + et 10  10  9  9  8  8  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  0 2000 2001 Source: The Riksbank  Diagram 1, published in our latest Inflation Report, shows the actual path of the repo rate and estimations obtained with a simple forecast-based rule. It seems that on the whole, our actions can be explained fairly well by applying an equation based on the Riksbank’s own series of forecasts of inflation one to two years ahead plus a term for the repo rate’s “inertia”. Considering the rule’s simplicity, the deviations from it must be said to be small. The diagram accordingly shows that the Riksbank’s actions have been reasonably systematic and based on the Bank’s inflation forecasts. It is, of course, too early for a more thorough evaluation of explicit inflation targeting regimes compared with other monetary policy strategies. It is also the case that Taylor rules, albeit in a somewhat modified form, likewise give comparatively good explanations for a number of central banks that have not explicitly adopted an inflation target, for example Deutsche Bundesbank and the U.S. Federal Reserve.
Mr. Patrikis discusses global electronic commerce Speech by the First Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. Ernest T. Patrikis, at the 1998 International ACH Conference in Seattle on 9/3/98. I am very pleased to be here today to discuss global electronic commerce. At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, we have a tradition of embracing emerging technologies as a means of fostering the growth of commerce. As early as 1914 the Federal Reserve System was using the telegraph to wire funds across the nation. By 1918, the Federal Reserve Banks had introduced their first dedicated funds transfer network. Today, over 350,000 funds transfers are sent over Fedwire every day with a total value of more than $ trillion. So, electronic commerce itself is not new. What is new is the emerging global network environment and its electronic access capabilities. The promise of this global network has brought electronic commerce to the forefront of public-policy making. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and other international organizations have expressed their belief that “the exponential growth and diffusion of the Internet is quickly making the promise of widespread electronic commerce a reality.

Tony Latter: Preserving monetary stability in the face of budget deficits Speech by Mr Tony Latter, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Insight Investment conference in Hong Kong, 20 November 2002. *  *  *  Introduction There has been much talk recently in Hong Kong about the possible threat to exchange rate stability from the burgeoning budget deficit, which is predicted by many to reach about 6% of GDP for the current financial year as a whole. Evidence of this concern is apparent when any media report suggesting a deterioration in the fiscal position is invariably accompanied by a weakening, even if shortlived, in the forward exchange rate of the HK dollar. This phenomenon is not confined to Hong Kong. In Europe, news of widening budget deficits, threatening to breach the terms of the stability and growth pact, and allegations of lack of commitment among officials to the degree of fiscal discipline necessary to conform to that pact, have tended to weaken the euro's exchange rate, at least temporarily. But there is another story which can be told. This is of an economy where the budget deficit rose from about 1½% of GDP to 4½% in the space of 4-5 years. What happened to its exchange rate? It strengthened over the same period by some 70% in trade-weighted terms. The authorities reined in the deficit somewhat over the next couple of years, but then it began to expand again.
The rise in average mark-ups globally since 1980 would, on this calibration, be expected to 1  raise the trade-off parameter in the Golden Rule ( ) from around 0.1 to 0.4. This is a reasonably significant 𝜖  shift in the terms of trade between inflation and output variability. Chart 19 seeks to brings all of these points together graphically; it is an empirically-calibrated version of Figure 1. Point A is the starting equilibrium, before any rise in the (trend and variability) of mark-up shocks, with the policy possibility curve tangent to the policymaker’s loss function. A rise in the (trend and variability) of mark-ups then has three distinct effects. First, an increase in mark-up volatility causes an outward shift in the policy possibility frontier (A to B), calibrated here to be equivalent in scale to the outward shift from the counterfactual simulations. Second, there is the clockwise rotation of the Phillips curve, and hence in the policy possibility frontier (B to C), calibrated to be equivalent to the mark-up rise among firms globally since 1980. And third, there is the shift in the relative weight placed on output stabilisation by the policymaker, calibrated in line with the mark-up shift (C to D). The net effect of increased market power is a significant rise in inflation variability but relatively less change in output variability. Chart 20 uses the same calibration, but looks at the relationship between inflation and interest rate variability.

To open this webinar, I would like to share with you some thoughts on this ambivalence of cryptoassets from the point of view of a central banker and a supervisor: First, the challenges and opportunities of crypto-assets development. Second, what we are doing at the Banque de France to address these challenges. 1. Challenges and opportunities The world of the blockchain and crypto-assets is still an immature ecosystem: it is difficult to predict in which direction and in which scale it will develop, but the emergence of many use cases related to decentralised finance, the creativity of the ecosystem, point to many opportunities. In particular, one can imagine that the innovations being developed will improve our payment systems, especially for cross-border transactions, or also securities issuance and settlement mechanisms... The main challenge is therefore to ensure that the emergence of crypto-assets and, more generally, decentralised finance contribute to the effectiveness and security of our financial system. Because this nascent ecosystem is also a source of many risks. The international work of public authorities highlighted these issues from the risk of money laundering to the risk of the consumer or investor. I would like to highlight one of them: the risk related to the network effect. This risk was mentioned when some Bigtechs considered creating supra-national “currencies": by offering to an extremely large customer base, these projects raised questions about monetary sovereignty of the states, as well as serious questions about the functioning of competition.