So is this the new paradigm of known-unknown? That is, we know what the major drivers of change are, but we cannot forecast outcome. So the key strategic challenge is how to deal with Known-Unknown. For the short-term, the key priority is dealing with the fragile and volatile global economy. Stability is the priority for banks and regulators. The strategic policy question is how to get the right balance between risk and return, stability and growth. Weaker banks will retrench, leaving rooms for the few stronger banks to take up market share. In Asia, we have seen banks from the Asia-Pacific, notably Japanese, Chinese, and Australian banks moved into market space where European and U.S. banks have retracted. ASEAN banks are also shifting strategy to play a greater role to support their conglomerates in the regional expansion. If this regional banking trend continues, what are the implications for banks, regulators, and central banks? While the region has so far remained relatively resilient to the first round impact of European bank deleveraging, there is significant concern about the second round impact through the slowdown in global trade and economy that will impact growth. Another known-unknown in the short-term is the impact of interaction of various traditional and non-traditional policy measures, such as monetary policy, prudential policy including macroprudential. As a result of this crisis, the acceptable policy space has been significantly widened, for example, macroprudential policy now includes sectoral measures such as those to prevent property bubbles or to control adverse impact of capital flows.

While these measures have merits in safeguarding financial stability, they could have complex and cross-border impact. Even on the monetary policy front, unconventional measures are becoming more conventional. Central banks in the major economies have increasingly used unconventional monetary easing. Though necessary to stabilize their economies at this juncture, these policies have side effects of large and volatile capital inflows into Asia. This  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  further complicates safeguarding of financial stability in other countries including Asia, and could, in turn, trigger some countries to resort to macroprudential measures themselves. Thus, in terms of policy space, we are dealing with a new paradigm of expanded policy tools, with new transmission mechanism, and requiring their own policy framework and governance. So we need to recognize the need for cross-border coordination as well as flexibility in execution given emerging uncertainty. Turning to the more medium-term structural issues, major regulatory reforms especially Basel III, Financial Stability Board reforms, and Dodd-Frank Act are still a known-unknown. We do know that they are designed to redress weaknesses that caused the crisis by enhancing capital and liquidity, while addressing the problems of procyclicality, and too-big-to-fail of SIFIs. For this, their merits are well recognized. But these reforms will reshape the global financial landscape and raise cost of financial intermediation. They will also have implications for cross-border level playing field, regulatory arbitrage, and alter risk profile of banks.