samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, the new regulatory changes, both prudential and resolution policy-related, require not only the availability of ample capital levels but also, moreover, of other liabilities-side instruments able to be converted into capital if needed. Taking advantage of the foreseeable improvement in economic conditions to raise the return on equity, while responding to new regulatory requirements, is a notable challenge for the financial system. 3  4  Note that this figure does not include the sale of shares of Bankia by BFA (100%-held by the FROB) in February – accounting for 7.5% of capital, at the price of € per share – insofar as the liquidity obtained remains in the selling institution and is not therefore a refund of assistance until BFA’s capital is amortised. BIS central bankers’ speeches  The path pursued by the sector as a whole – to contain financial and operating expenses while combining diversification with the harnessing of competitive advantages and moderating dividend pay-outs and remuneration – is an appropriate one for adjusting to the new competitive, regulatory and supervisory environment within the framework of the SSM. Turning to what are essentially institutional matters, several challenges remain. I would like to indicate three of these. First, to conclude the reform of the Spanish banking sector, it is necessary to complete the adaptation of savings banks to the new arrangements stipulated in Law 26/2013 of 27 December 2013 on savings banks and bank foundations.

These APSs, therefore, involve a cost that depends on the actual losses incurred whose real amount will only be known at the end of the period over which the guarantee is in force. In any event, the expected value of this cost shall be regularly evaluated by independent experts so that the guarantor agency (the FROB or the DGF) may make the related provision in its financial statements. Finally, the third type of public aid comprises State-backed guarantees of debt issues by certain banks and the extraordinary credit facilities offered to provide liquidity to the sector. As regards these guarantees, no loss from these contingencies is expected to arise for the State, which will in turn receive revenue in the form of fees and commissions. Currently,2 69% of the guarantees granted have been returned and the termination process is expected to continue in accordance with the redemption of the issues. Likewise, all amounts drawn down on the credit facilities were duly repaid and the other available facilities have been settled following the recapitalisation or, where appropriate, disposal of the recipient banks. As of today, therefore, the public assistance granted is essentially in the form of the capital contributions made and the guarantees offered. That said, not all of the public assistance granted that I have described involves a direct cost to the taxpayer, since the banking industry has also contributed via the DGF.
Before I turn to Iceland’s situation now and in the near future, I would like to place us in a wider international and historical context. Iceland is truly a small country, and individual positive or negative shocks can trigger economic short-term developments that deviate markedly from those in the rest of the world. But in the end, the possibilities are always limited by global trends. Since the latter half of 2009, the global economy has begun to grow again after the recession that followed the peak of the 2008 financial crisis, but there are still a number of questions about what will come next. Output growth varies greatly from region to region, with a number of emerging economies soaring ahead while many of the developed economies hit hardest by the crisis are not growing fast enough to reduce unemployment, and near-term developments are a source of concern. At work here, to some extent, is the long-term tendency for the divide between emerging and developed countries to narrow. The trend is not necessarily a linear one, though; it tends to play out in fits and starts. But in my opinion, more is involved. Last month I had the opportunity to attend a conference held annually in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, by the US Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

European credit institutions have operated in recent years under adverse macroeconomic conditions. In a market characterised by low interest rates, bank margins have been subject to downward pressure which, combined with asset impairment losses, has affected their capacity to obtain profits. One of the priorities of European supervision for 2015 is to identify the determinants of profitability and to attempt to detect aggressive strategies contrary to financial stability. In the prudential realm, one of the main challenges is for banks to adapt to the stricter capital requirements of the new Basel III solvency regime. The SSM, like the Banco de España in 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  previous years, issued a recommendation of prudence to banks in connection with the distribution of its dividends. In our case, having regard to the difficult economic and banking situation in 2013, dividend payments above 25% of profits were broadly restricted; the European supervisor’s recommendation imposes restrictions solely on banks facing a tighter situation in terms of solvency. One priority matter is the review of the national discretionality and options permitted under European solvency regulations, in order to harmonise the legislation applicable to SSMsupervised banks. The review has begun recently and is being jointly tackled by the ECB and the national competent authorities. The second element of the Banking Union, prepared in 2014 with a view to its entry into force in 2015, is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), which establishes a common European framework for the restructuring and resolution of credit institutions.
2  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/events/2019/june/last-orders-calling-time-on-libor https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/prudential-regulation/publication/2019/firms-preparations-for-transition-from-libor-torisk-free-rates.pdf?la=en&hash=EA87BD3B8435B7EDF25A56C932C362C65D516577 3  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  The challenge was what rate to charge. Rates on US Treasury debt were judged too volatile, affected as they were by volatile economic policy at that time, and ‘flight to quality’ flows. And giving any one firm in the syndicate the right to pick a rate was both inequitable and hard for the borrower to police. So the rate was instead based on an average of the short-term wholesale unsecured funding rates of a set of banks in the syndicate, adjusted for outliers, and periodically updated every three or six months. There was no incentive for banks to lowball this number, dubbed the ‘London interbank offered rate’, because that would reduce their income. And competition to be in the syndicate was meant to curb excessive increases. This approach to setting a floating dollar rate was so successful that its use rapidly spread to pricing marketable corporate debt in the early 1970s – and later to the eurodollar markets that sprang up, first in the form of derivatives contracts to hedge against macroeconomic volatility, and then as bank funding instruments. The latter accounted for over half of the dollar money market by the mid-1980s. Demands for a more formalised governance and data collection process led to the BBA taking on responsibility for producing LIBOR in 1986.

This seminar will be a useful platform for constructive dialogues among the financial industry, infrastructure-related business sectors, and AIIB, to exchange views on the latest infrastructural development trends, and how we can harness the opportunities arising from the establishment and projects under AIIB. I shall now hand over the time to President Jin for his most anticipated speech. Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
The Committee is sensitive to the concerns raised about the need to respect the long-term lending culture prevalent in a number of countries. In this context, we will examine carefully how, or even whether, maturity factors should apply to lending to smaller businesses. Treatment of equity exposures The changes I have referred to concern bank loans, which, of course, are a key source of funding for many companies. Nearly all businesses – especially those growing into medium or large-sized firms – also rely on investments from outside parties to build up their capital base. Here, I’m referring to outsiders who provide “venture capital” for growing firms, as well as to investors who buy the publicly traded stock of more established firms. What do I mean by venture capital? Many small firms seek an “angel” investor, one who sees the potential in the firm’s strategy and is confident enough of its success to make a substantial investment. The angel might be a single wealthy individual, an investment fund or, in some cases, even a bank. In exchange for the investment, the investor receives an ownership interest in the income and assets of that firm. The Basel Committee recognizes that both venture capital and equity investments often are catalysts for innovation and growth in the economy. At the same time, we recognize that such investments can represent high-risk activities for banks.

Miroslav Singer: Central Bank Governor of the Year for Emerging Europe 2013 Acceptance speech by Mr Miroslav Singer, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Central Bank Governor of the Year for Emerging Europe 2013 awards, Washington DC, 12 October 2013. *  *  *  Let me start by thanking you for this award. I see it not so much as personal recognition, but more as recognition of the team of people that make up and define the Czech National Bank that I have the pleasure to represent here. Special thanks go to those I work with directly, among others to my colleagues on the board for their unlimited patience with my generally awful manners and attempts to claim leadership. Whenever I meet a group of investors or analysts, I always start by noting that any issues and questions requiring knowledge and wisdom would be better addressed by our experts, those requiring only wisdom would be better be fielded by my colleagues on the board, and those requiring neither knowledge nor wisdom can be safely left to me. So, let me share some of my knowledge- and wisdom-free observations with you. Ten years ago, when I was working in restructuring, I could never have imagined that I would join the central bank in less than two years and later rise to the top job there. But the offer came, and it was one I truly could not refuse.
Durmuş Yilmaz: Press conference for the presentation of the inflation report Speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the press conference for the presentation of the inflation report, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Ankara, 31 January 2008. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests and Press Members, Welcome to the press conference for the presentation of the Inflation Report that is one of the most important communication tools of the formal inflation targeting regime that we implement. In this conference, I would like to give you a short summary of our evaluations and the Central Bank’s inflation forecasts which appear in the Inflation Report that will be posted on our website shortly today. 1. An assessment of the year 2007  I would like to start by a general assessment of inflation developments in the year 2007. The monetary tightening exercised since mid-2006, has been successful in leading to a significant reduction in the underlying inflation. Especially the 3.6 percentage points fall in the services inflation, which confirmed the marked disinflation trend during 2007, was remarkable. The fall in headline inflation, however, was more limited, owing mainly to factors beyond the control of monetary policy, such as developments in energy, food, and administered prices. Accordingly, inflation realized as 8.39 percent at the end of 2007, breaching the upper bound of the uncertainty band of 6 percent.

For instance, scenarios should take account of the extent to which many firms might respond to a common shock in a similar way, with potential implications for market prices or market liquidity. The likely amplification of price moves as financial institutions attempt to exit “crowded” trades and liquidity dries up is an important example. Indeed, given the importance of market liquidity for the efficient execution of banks’ dynamic hedging strategies and for their activities in the wholesale funding and credit risk transfer (CRT) and securitisation markets, it is essential that stress tests factor in extreme, yet plausible, scenarios for liquidity conditions in these markets, recognising that market liquidity can evaporate very quickly, particularly for complex structured financial instruments. And it is also essential to factor in increased liquidity needs linked to contingent calls, associated, for instance, with funding margin payments. Capital and liquidity buffers A sizeable buffer of capital and liquidity can help a bank to withstand a shock that threatens its solvency or would otherwise leave it with insufficient liquidity to meet its obligations as they fall due. But a bank’s private choice as to the size of its capital or liquidity buffer may not be aligned with the socially optimal choice, as firms will not naturally take account of (or “internalise”) the implications of their distress or failure on the financial system more broadly – for example through the possibility of contagion to other firms and impairment of the financial intermediation system. That provides the justification for prudential regulation.
It is now time to act in Europe: four accelerators of the Economic Union In Rome, on 25 March of this year, the Member States all expressed their clear willingness to work “towards completing the Economic and Monetary Union". We are in agreement on the “why". Let me say one word about our monetary policy. Taking into account our progress, the Governing Council decided at the end of October to pursue a gradual normalisation. We will clearly follow this path of gradual normalisation, with caution but combining the whole range of our instruments – and there shouldn’t be excessive focus on the net purchases of assets. But monetary policy cannot be the only game in town, and therefore we should not overburden it. Furthermore we aim at greater stability, to counter the risk of a new crisis befalling an unprotected euro area, with all its damaging political and economic repercussions; and greater growth, to catch up our past lag on the United States and finally treat the fatal disease of mass unemployment in Europe. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  With this objective in mind, how, concretely, can we make progress on Economic Union? In my view, we should trigger four accelerators: a macro accelerator, which would consist of a collective economic strategy shared by all euro area Member States; a micro accelerator, which would take the form of a Financing Union for Investment and Innovation, going beyond the Capital Markets Union; a fiscal accelerator, which would draw on a euro area budget.

Could our road system cope with trucks hauling containers all over the territory? And is this what we want for Hong Kong? 5. In fact, Hong Kong’s position as an intermediate trading hub for Mainland China’s external trade has become more prominent over the past decades. In 1979, our trade intermediation activities (including logistics industry) accounted for about 15% of GDP and rose to 20% in 1990. Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001, direct competition from the Mainland has increased, but the pie has also grown much bigger. The total trade volume of the Mainland surged from $ billion in 2001 to $ trillion in 2013. And, while the percentage of trade being directly processed in Hong Kong has been trending downwards (from 30% to 10%) during the same period, the value of goods has risen  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  sharply from $ billion to more than $ billion. Taking into account the fastgrowing offshore trade, the total value of trade in goods handled by Hong Kong would jump from some $ billion to $ billion during the same period. This shows that the trade creation effect is much greater than the diversion effect. Hong Kong’s trade intermediation activities (including logistics industry) amounted to $ billion in 2012, accounting for 25% of our GDP and employing 770,000 workers (21% of the total workforce).
If rating agencies were regulated who would you blame if mistakes are made: the rating agency, the regulator, or both? 9. Implications of networks  Finally we need to consider the financial stability oversight implications of the networks which increasingly hold the financial system together. These are the plumbing or the nervous system of the financial world. This is the world of payments, clearing and settlement systems. Such networks can and do both generate significant economic benefits, but they also create vulnerabilities. The economic benefits of scope and scale from such networks come as a result of the development of standardised messaging, IT protocols and other areas of interoperability. However, the universal  BIS Review 5/2004  5  reliance on these networks makes the financial system increasingly vulnerable to any failure, whether financial or physical. If the market all settles in one system and is faced by single points of failure how could we work around these? Secondly, if there is a failure, what about data retrieval? If an entity containing a series of uncompleted transactions fails, how can that data be retrieved or recreated so that you can get markets up and running again? Fortunately significant effort is being put into developing innovative solutions: something which may give confidence to the many who are unfamiliar with this area. 10.

It explains endeavours to encourage or enforce compliance with them, through a variety of measures including international bodies, such as the Basle Committee, IOSCO, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, the IMF, and the World Bank - and others too numerous to mention. The Financial Stability Forum is noteworthy too, as it brings together the three sets of key bodies involved in financial stability oversight - central banks, regulators and finance ministries - to supplement the actions of other international organisations in promoting standards globally. 13. Public policy response - if things go wrong  I spoke about identifying threats and the steps to mitigate them, but we also need to be able to intervene if things do go wrong. In a non-zero risk environment, failure is a possibility. So we need to look at both mitigants in relation to the impacts of financial crisis, and how to restore confidence. This is true both for financial crises which could occur as a result of business failure, as well as possible major operational disruption - whether from terrorism, cyber failure, or natural calamity. They are situations where predictability is so vital, when normal mechanisms for decision making may be in abeyance. I have left until last the tricky question of emergency liquidity injection and lender of the last resort. This is an area full of mystique and ambiguity.
4/7  To offer an overall view of the scale of the measures adopted by the ECB, the size of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet has more than tripled since the crisis broke in 2008, up to figures close to 40% of GDP. The scale of its balance sheet currently exceeds that of the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, although it is far below the size of the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet, namely 90% of GDP. This extensive range of measures has been effective in easing financial conditions, in reducing financial fragmentation, i.e. the existence of greatly differing financing conditions in different jurisdictions for borrowers presenting similar risks, and in preventing the period of negative inflation rates that the European economies experienced from turning into a deflationary spiral. Our estimates indicate that the package of monetary policy measures adopted since mid2014 will have had a cumulative effect in the 2015-2017 period, for the euro area as a whole, of 1.7 pp on the level of GDP and of 1.5 pp on the level of prices. According to these calculations, the monetary policy measures may be viewed as responsible for around 50% of the nominal GDP growth recorded in this period. In sum, for the first time in the 10 years that have elapsed since the international financial crisis broke, we may declare the current cyclical juncture of the euro area to be sound and that we have left the risks of deflation behind.

Likewise, further headway would be needed in reducing sovereign-banking links, which contributed notably, as is known, to heightening the severity of the crisis in the euro area. In this connection, the banking union requires supranational support that would increase the financial capacity of the Single Resolution Fund in the event of a systemic crisis and which would afford it greater power during the transition process established for its full constitution. The European Commission’s proposal that the European Stability Mechanism should provide this support might be an appropriate solution. It is also necessary to create a common deposit guarantee scheme whereby depositors’ confidence in banks is irrespective of the health of their Public Treasuries. Progress on the set of initiatives encompassing the Capital Markets Union would also contribute to achieving greater financial integration, diversifying sources of financing and empowering to a greater extent private mechanisms geared to sharing the risks that originate through these markets. Conclusions In any event, it should be stressed that, although the recovery is providing for the correction of some imbalances, some fallout from the crisis remains at large. The high levels of unemployment and of public and private debt, low productivity growth and the weakness of the capitalisation process pose challenges that require greater reformminded ambition.