samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The subsequent downgrading of SVB's rating by Moody's and the aborted capital increase by the bank fueled a negative spiral between liquidity and solvency, which led to its bankruptcy on 10 March 2023. Tech players, fearing the loss of their deposits, which greatly exceeded the minimum guaranteed by the US guarantee fund, withdrew them all the more massively and in record time - in one click - as they represent a financially and digitally “educated” clientele. Does this "one-click" bank run, which neither banking regulation nor supervision by the authorities responsible for enforcing it were able to prevent, means that the digitalisation of our economies and of finance is making this regulation and supervision fundamentally inadequate? 2  1.1. The current framework has not been invalidated by the current crisis... I will give a negative but cautious answer to this question. In other words, I will answer with a "no, but". The "no" seems justified to me for the following three reasons: - Since 2019, SVB has benefited from a very light regulation compared to the rules laid down by the Basel Committee to limit the liquidity and interest rate risks inherent to the transformation activity carried out by banks. As regards the first risk, these rules require that banks comply with short and long-term liquidity ratios, and as regards the second risk, that the sensitivity of banks' balance sheet to various interest rate shocks be monitored.

It is an essential competency for individuals to navigate the increasingly complex financial landscape. At a global level, in recent years, we have seen a significant increase in the complexity of financial products and services, making it more difficult for individuals to make informed decisions that safeguard their financial well-being. What is alarming is the fact that the level of financial literacy globally is very low. International research finds that, only 1 in 3 adults worldwide are financially literate. This is worrisome not only because of the negative repercussions at the individual level, but also, because of the potential impact it may have at the broader level of a country's economy, including financial resilience and stability. For instance, there are studies indicating that poor financial decision-making, including excessive risk-taking by individuals, preceded financial crises in the past. This phenomenon appears to be accentuated when the preceding prosperous periods have a longer duration than usual, as described by Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis. Examples include the Global Financial crisis, where  1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  many people became over-indebted to purchase real estate, as prices appeared, at least to them, to be ever-increasing. When the bubble eventually burst, they were unable to cope with their financial obligations creating a domino of bankruptcies thus, raising further financial stability risks. The negative repercussions of financial illiteracy and of other shortcomings of financial markets, especially on financial stability, can be addressed by enhancing the efficiency of financial regulation.
The price of entering goes up, or the Bulgarian thorny road to the euro Yes, some new EU members are still keen to join the Eurozone. Especially in Bulgaria, the desire is understandable: the country has held a fixed exchange rate visa-à-vis the euro since the common currency’s inception. Just like Denmark, Bulgaria has outsourced its monetary policy to Frankfurt, but unlike Denmark, it would also like to become an official member of the club to enjoy all the benefits of using one of the most prestigious world currencies. On paper, at least, Bulgaria appears to be an ideal candidate: unlike many of the current members of the Eurozone, it actually fulfils the key Maastricht criteria. But the idea of Bulgarian membership is not an appetizing one to many technocrats at the ECB and to the representatives of some Eurozone member states. So, for many years, Bulgarians have been tacitly discouraged from applying to ERM II, the antechamber of the euro. This year, however, they tried their luck: perhaps they felt that the conditions would never get any better than under Bulgarian presidency of the EU and Jean-Claude Juncker’s vocal emphasis on how the euro should become the currency of the entire Union. Complicated negotiations followed, and their result is of key importance to all EU member countries outside the Eurozone. It’s not enough that Bulgaria fulfils the important Maastricht criteria: new criteria were thought up specifically to make the Bulgarian path to the euro as difficult and humiliating as possible.

And this approach has the full backing of the central bank. Ten years ago, supporting euro adoption in our country was a sign of “good social morals among the better classes”, whereas today only the brave confess to ardently supporting it. That’s how much the mood of the elite and the electorate has changed over the last decade. Why is that so? Here my seven personal comments come into play. The euro and political union A stateless monetary union is inherently unstable. A currency is usually a consequence, not a cause, of the establishment of a state. In Europe, however, we began to build the “currency house” from the roof down, and then in 2008 everyone was very surprised at how the tiles flew off when the first wind appeared. Is there a prospect of a political union – a single European state – in the pipeline? Even if there is, do we want to be part of it? If the question is no, which would seem to be the case, thoughts of introducing the euro in the Czech Republic should, for that reason alone, be left on the back burner. Autonomous monetary policy Autonomous monetary policy is a kind of “absorber” of economic shocks. It is meant to reduce their impact and smooth the economic cycle. It prevents an economic contraction being borne by the unemployed and those on low incomes more than is necessary.
The Bank of Albania cut the key interest rate by one percentage point, down to 5.25 per cent during this period. It also  2  BIS Review 11/2010  steadily increased liquidity injection, according to banking system needs for liquidity and the economy demand for funding. Concerning liquidity injection, the Bank of Albania has made use of the entire range of monetary policy injecting instruments, facilitating at the same time the access to and easing the cost of operation of the banking system with the central bank. Also, in the presence of the exchange rate depreciation, such policy has brought about easing monetary conditions, serving the promotion of the economic activity. However, the pass-through of easing monitoring policy on interest rates of banking products has been limited, due to liquidity constraints of the banking system and weakened demand of the public sector for funds. On the other hand, the banking system itself has been reserved with regards to lending, as a result of the increased risk in the economy and performance of loan portfolio quality. The alleviation of these problems would help to more fully transmit the monetary policy and enhance its effectiveness. The country’s external position continues to be characterized by a high and upward current account deficit. During the first three quarters of the year, the deficit was fully covered by capital and financial account inflows, resulting in increased foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Albania. However, the inflows have been significantly favoured by privatization receipts and by public sector borrowing.

In a medium-term horizon, the global economic growth rate is expected to converge in a lower balance than the one that has prevailed over the last two decades. This slowdown may be accompanied by economic and social problems for those countries, which would not know how to figure out their relevant implications. In a short-term horizon, discussions on the state’s role in the economy, on economic development and growth patterns, on the philosophy and appropriate practices regulating the financial markets, will dominate the political round-table debates. In particular, the economic growth model will be a sensitive topic for economies significantly affected by the crisis, including many Eastern European countries. Promoting competitive advantage and increasing competitiveness in global markets will be the subject of discussions and intended reforms. BIS Review 11/2010  1  Turning to domestic economic developments, the analysis of available indicators shows that the Albanian economy has had a positive economic growth during the first nine months of the year. However, these indicators suggest that the growth rate was characterized by a progressive slowdown during 2009. Such performance was conditioned by reduced foreign demand and slowed domestic demand, in the presence of a tight liquidity situation, financing restriction and increased uncertainty. According to preliminary data from INSTAT, the economic growth for the first nine-month period of the year was 4.9 percent, against 7.8 percent recorded for the same period of the previous year.
The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past, present and future  Speech given by Andrew Bailey Governor of the Bank of England  Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium 28 August 2020  I am grateful to Jonathan Bridges, Richard Harrison, Josh Jones, Aakash Mankodi and Nick McLaren for their assistance in helping me prepare these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  Introduction It’s a great pleasure to be participating in the virtual Jackson Hole conference. Well done to the Kansas City Fed for keeping up the tradition – albeit we have to imagine the beauty of Jackson Hole is around us. A tradition of the Jackson Hole conference is to encourage us to look forwards. This time is not only an opportunity to do just that, but in doing so to apply the lessons of the last few months, as well as the last decade or so since the financial crisis of 2007-09. I am going to do that through the lens mainly of monetary policy, but bringing in financial stability where relevant, with a particular focus on central bank balance sheets. My remarks are a summary of a paper being released today.1 It isn’t a review of the record of monetary policy or the framework of policy, but it does cover a good deal of recent evidence and experience. The paper, and my remarks today, focus on the UK case, drawing on lessons from international experience.

For example, if an asset bubble has caused a buildup of debt that now needs to be reduced significantly, then lower interest rates that ease financial conditions may not stimulate aggregate demand very much. Separately, in a protracted zero bound episode, the monetary policy impulse may become attenuated over time. Lower interest rates may make financial conditions easier, lifting wealth, and encouraging households to shift spending from the future to the present. But when the future arrives, spending may then be lower as a consequence. The linkage between financial conditions and economic activity may vary depending on how long the accommodative monetary policy regime has been in place. So what are the implications that stem from the fact that financial instability can impair the efficacy of monetary policy? I think there are at least three major implications:   The central bank has a strong stake in preventing financial instability.   When financial instability occurs, the central bank has an important role in taking steps to mitigate that financial instability. This includes ensuring that credible liquidity backstops are available and forcing banks to strengthen themselves, for instance by raising additional capital.   The stance of monetary policy needs to be judged in light of how well the transmission channels of monetary policy are operating. When financial instability has disrupted the monetary policy transmission channels, following simple rules based on long-term historical relationships can lead to an inappropriately tight monetary policy. Let me now consider each of these implications in turn.
Road shows to investors in the US and Europe ceased to be the preserve of the international giants and became common among smaller players whose whole asset base was in the UK. As the difficulties in the financial system have persisted and worsened, it has become clear that these developments have created real structural weaknesses in the banking sector. In particular: •  inflated aggregate balance sheets, whose expansion had outpaced growth in the real economy;  •  expansion into assets whose underlying value, credit quality and liquidity were uncertain;  •  liability structures which were overly reliant on sustained availability of wholesale funding whose maturity was often short;  •  capital and liquidity buffers which became too low , given these asset and liability risks; and  •  underappreciated, but potent interconnections between firms in the global financial system. Policy response For most of the last year, the Bank has adopted a twin track approach, as part of the Tripartite partnership with the FSA and the Treasury. The first track has been to provide liquidity to the market in order to give most banks time to make the necessary adjustments – including by raising capital. That has involved an increasing range of measures including long term repos on a wide range of collateral and the introduction of the Special Liquidity Scheme which allows banks to swap illiquid assets for Treasury Bills for periods of up to three years.

Page 25 of 27  Table 3 Structural parameters Long-term copper price  Long-term oil price (dollars per barrel)  (dollars per pound)  Trend non-mining GDP next 10 years  Nominal neutral MPR (percent)  Technical mínimum MPR (percent)  (annual change, percent)  Dec-15/Mar-21  Dec-15/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jul-09/Mar-21  2.7  70  3.25-3.75  3.75-4.25  0.5  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  3.3  60  2.4-3.4  3.25-3.75  0.5  Source: Central Bank of Chile. ***  Page 26 of 27
The banking sector has maintained adequate capitalization and all the banks met the minimum capital requirements of 5% for primary capital and 10% for total regulatory capital. However, in January 2007, the Bank of Zambia revised the minimum required capital to start a bank from K2 billion to K12 billion. The Bank of Zambia anticipates increased economic and investment activity in Zambia in the coming years and so banks operating in Zambia need to stand ready to safely provide the required level of financing. It is therefore the expectation of the Bank of Zambia that all banks will comply with this requirement by June 2008. Ladies and Gentlemen, since our two countries, Zambia and China, established diplomatic ties 43 years ago, the relationship has been both cordial and beneficial as seen by the growth in Chinese investment into Zambia in mining, textile, construction, banking, and agriculture. Currently, China is Zambia's third largest investor, after South Africa and the United Kingdom. The expected creation of the $ million special economic zone on the Copperbelt, the first of its kind in Africa, will show case the significance that the Zambia-China relationship and further strengthening the existing friendship between our two countries. This also provides an opportunity for Bank of China (Zambia) to strategically position itself to take advantage of the immense business opportunities that will arise from this development. Ladies and gentlemen, the Zambian Government is committed to the implementation of prudent economic policies aimed at economic growth and poverty reduction, and results are beginning to show.

Caleb M Fundanga: Overview of Zambia’s banking sector Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary of Bank of China (Zambia) Limited, Lusaka, 13 April 2007. *  *  *  • His Excellency – the Chinese Ambassador to Zambia; • Vice-President of the Bank of China – Head Office; • Chairman of the Board of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; • Managing Director of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited; • Distinguished invited guests; and • Ladies and gentlemen Let me first express my sincere gratitude for having been invited to speak on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Bank of China (Zambia) Limited. Ladies and Gentlemen, during the last ten years, the performance of Bank of China has been satisfactory with total assets steadily increasing to K391.4 billion in December 2006from K6.4 billion in December 1997 and total deposits increasing to K294.2 billion in December 2006 from K2 billion in December 1997. On this basis, Bank of China had grown to become the eighth largest bank in Zambia albeit operating with only one branch. Bank of China (Zambia) is a 100% subsidiary of Bank of China which went through a successful initial public offer (IPO) and has resulted in Bank of China being a top tier globally listed bank. Over the same period in Zambia, the overall financial performance and condition of the banking sector has been satisfactory.
Therefore, we made a downward revision in output gap forecasts that constitutes the basis for our medium-term forecast (Table 3). This change yielded 0.1 percentage point downward revision in the end-2010 inflation forecast. Overall, the mid-point of the end-2010 inflation forecast has been revised down by 0.9 percentage points, owing to the downward revisions in food and energy prices assumptions and the recent slowdown in core inflation indicators. Now I would like to share with you our inflation and output gap forecasts produced in line with the framework that I have outlined so far. While producing our forecasts, we assumed that the measures outlined in our exit strategy would be completed to a large extent during the rest of the year, and that policy rates would be kept constant at current levels for some time to be followed by limited increases in 2011, with policy rates staying in single digits throughout the 3-year forecast horizon. Within this framework, medium-term forecasts suggest that, with 70 percent probability, inflation will be between 6.5 and 8.5 percent with a mid-point of 7.5 percent at end-2010, and between 3.6 and 7.0 percent with a mid-point of 5.3 percent by the end of 2011. Furthermore, inflation is expected to decline to 5.0 percent by the end of 2012 (Figure 33).

The Bank of Albania was given the conventional functions of central banks, such as: monetary policy, currency issuing, foreign exchange market; while the National Commercial Bank, together with other banks, were given the conventional banking functions, such as accepting deposits, extending loans and other banking services. The Laws “On the Bank of Albania” and “On the Albanian banking system” adopted in 1992 constituted the grounds needed for this transformation. It is worth mentioning that one of the fundamental elements of the Law “On the Bank of Albania” of 1992 was the granting of a relatively high degree of independence to the central bank, as a legal, institutional, financial and personal independence. This independence has been increasing constantly throughout these years, not only as a legal and institutional independence, by amendments made to the Law in 1996 -1997 and after the approval of the Constitution, but also as an independence in the real aspect. Under the Law of 1992, the dependence of the Central Bank passed from the Government to the Parliament, being given simultaneously the functions of determining the volume of credit, issuing, banking interest rate, the payment system, etc. At that time, the reform in second-tier banks was focused on three main directions: 1. Introduction of a new regulatory and supervisory framework;  2. Institutional policies in treating the non-performing loans;  3. Plans related to the privatization of state-owned banks.
If any large fraction of that money really was demanded, our banking system and our industrial system would be in great danger.’ In Bagehot’s time, the role of the Bank of England was to act as guardian of the reserve of bullion that underpinned the credibility of the whole banking system. The technology may have changed, but in essence the role of the Bank today is one that Bagehot would recognize. Central bank money is the ultimate settlement asset. And banks still demonstrate their ability to meet depositors’ demands for repayment by holding a sufficient stock of high quality securities against which central banks—and in normal circumstances the markets—will lend. Confidence in the modern financial system is therefore underpinned by the preparedness of central banks to lend against such high quality security without question. Central banks have, therefore, a keen interest in developments that affect the demand for and supply of liquidity. It is not surprising that they try to limit the likelihood of events that might lead to excessive increases in demand for liquidity or constraints on its supply, and also try to have in place the operational apparatus to respond to such developments, if felt necessary, at minimum cost. The traditional sources of liquidity risk for banks are unusually heavy demands from depositors for repayment and from their customers to draw down pre-committed funding. Today’s environment encourages us also to recognise disruption to markets as a potential trigger for such extraordinary demand.

The HKMA has also been very focused on raising the market’s awareness of LIBOR transition. We have spoken in different conferences on this topic, and also encouraged industry bodies, such as TMA, to organise seminars to explain the background and implication of LIBOR transition. All of the efforts, by us or by the industry, have a common goal – that is to reach out to a wide range of audience for their attention and get ready for this important LIBOR transition. Urgency of the LIBOR Transition 10. As we all know, time is running short, and end-2021 is fast approaching. Now, with a clear and certain timetable for LIBOR cessation, we should all work together with a sense of urgency. Although certain US dollar LIBOR settings will continue to be published until endJune 2023, this 18-month extension is intended to allow time for more legacy US dollar LIBOR contracts to mature. And, this won’t alter the fact that – LIBOR will come to an end. It is therefore vital for us to continue our preparation that is currently underway, and avoid any further build-up of LIBOR-related exposures going forward. With that in mind and to smoothen the transition process, we expect banks in Hong Kong to cease to issue new LIBOR-linked contracts by the end of this year. Development of the HKD Overnight Index Average (HONIA) Linked Market 11. As we have stepped into the fourth quarter, we will soon move into a post-LIBOR world.