samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Heng Swee Keat: Talent management strategies in Singapore Opening address by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Chairman of the Institute of Banking & Finance (IBF), at the 2nd IBF Annual Conference, Singapore, 20 June 2008. *  *  *  Welcome to the 2008 IBF Annual Conference which is held in conjunction with our 33rd Annual General Meeting. When we held our last AGM and Annual Conference in May last year, the mood among global financial institutions was buoyant. The outlook for the global economy and financial markets was positive. The main concern among firms was the severe shortage of staff. Today, the mood is cautious. The credit crisis is still working its way through, inflation has become a major concern everywhere, and economic prospects are more uncertain. In Asia, investors and economists remain cautiously optimistic about the growth prospects of the economies. While financial institutions had limited exposures to sub-prime assets and related credit derivatives, financial markets in Asia are not isolated from global markets. We are seeing a similar rise of risk aversion and tightening of credit conditions. The situation in the coming months will remain fluid and we must remain vigilant. Talent management – a strategic imperative The developments in global financial markets in the last one year have important implications on human resources strategy.

Should the general economic situation indeed deteriorate further, the solvency of borrowers would also worsen. This would result in losses in the big banks’ lending portfolios. The effect on banks with a domestic business focus would depend on the extent of the deterioration in the international environment. Entering into risk is a bank’s core business and, as such, is desirable. What is important is that these risks can be both calculated and carried. However, experience shows that is not always the case. In each of the three most recent international financial crises, a Swiss big bank was particularly hard hit. Each time a crisis occurred an increasing amount of equity was wiped out. This should serve as a warning. If the wheels are not set in motion now, the impact of the next crisis could be even more severe. Should a big bank collapse, the consequences for Switzerland would be dire. Therefore, measures need to be taken now in order to ensure that the Swiss big banks are sufficiently  BIS Review 80/2008  1  resilient in the future. The SNB and the Swiss Federal Banking Commission recognise a need for action in – basically – four areas: capital, liquidity, monitoring and crisis management. In our stability report we discuss measures in all four areas. Today I would like to focus on the most important measures in the area of capital. It is in the nature of the financial markets that there will always be crises.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Asia’s role as an important growth centre in the global economy Opening address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the First Asian Central Banks’ Watchers Conference, organised by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) and the Lafferty Group, Kuala Lumpur, 1 November 2011. *  *  *  It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the first Asian Central Banks’ Watchers Conference organised by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) and the Lafferty Group. Bank Negara Malaysia is very pleased to host this event here in Kuala Lumpur. Central banks have generally been the most watched organisations given the significance and far reaching implications of their actions on financial systems, the economy and the economic well being of the public at large. This is even more so during periods of financial stress and economic distress. During such periods, central banks have generally been at the forefront in managing such crisis and its consequences. Indeed, this current global crisis has prompted central banks in the United States and Europe to be closely watched given the impact of their actions on not only their own national economies but also on the rest of the world. With the growing significance of the emerging economies in the world economy, our policy actions have increasingly drawn significant interest.

Rigid parameters, imposed by multilateral agencies and sometimes by rating agencies and the market also contribute towards reinforcing these conventions. Current and future conditions are likely to be highly complex and varying and therefore not lending itself to rigid rules. In an environment that will continue to remain challenging for some time, this Conference provides an important opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues from Asia’s perspective, thereby contributing to the international discussions and understanding of the issues and their business and policy implications. Asia’s experience will also provide additional insights in contributing towards the solutions for building a more resilient international financial system. I wish you an engaging and productive discussion. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
If you want to bag a mallard, you don’t aim where the bird is at present, you aim ahead of its flight pattern. To me, the flight pattern of the economy is clearly toward increasing employment and inflation that is approaching our 2-percent target. Thus, I was encouraged by the wording we negotiated at the last FOMC meeting. I was pleased that we dropped the reference to “significant” in describing the remaining labormarket slack and that wording was included indicating we might well move to raise rates BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  sooner than thus far assumed, should the economy proceed along the trajectory I think we are on. To me, this neutered the adjective “considerable” in stating the time frame under which we might act. This is why this particular hawk voted “yes” in support of the statement we released on Wednesday. Now to the exit... Of course, I am concerned with what will happen to all the liquidity that remains in the system in the aftermath of our QE programs. The depository institutions we transact with have put back to the 12 Federal Reserve Banks some $ trillion in excess reserves. “Excess” means they cannot find better uses for that money than earning the 25 basis points (25/100ths of one percent per annum) we pay them until they can find creditworthy borrowers to lend to at significant multiples of that amount.

The Federal Reserve responded by purchasing $ trillion in MBS and agency debt as part of QE1, the program of balancesheet expansion that ran from late 2008 through the spring of 2010. Holdings of MBS and agency debt were then allowed to run off and by September 2011 had fallen to a little under $ trillion. Holdings were stabilized at that level when proceeds from maturing agency securities and MBS began to be reinvested in MBS, starting October 2011. The renewed expansion of MBS holdings that began in October 2012 as part of QE3 was motivated less by any sense that the mortgage-finance market was dysfunctional than by the notion that normal frictions in that market potentially provided monetary policy with leverage to stimulate the housing sector – and thus the economy as a whole – at a time when moretraditional policy tools had been exhausted. The FOMC majority pushed aside concerns that providing targeted support to housing is more properly the province of fiscal policy, and voted to proceed. From the start of QE3 to its conclusion, the Fed’s portfolio of agency securities and MBS expanded by about $ billion. In the latest version of its normalization principles, released this September, the FOMC indicated that it expects to reduce its holdings in future years primarily through attrition. What of the expansion of the Federal Reserve’s holdings of longer-term Treasury securities under QE3? Fed purchases of longer-term Treasuries amount to nothing more than the transformation of long-term Treasury obligations into short-term obligations of the Federal Reserve.
But, the stress tests we have performed at the Banco de España to calibrate the potential scale of this risk for banks show, broadly speaking, that the policy followed in recent years of accumulating  4  BIS Review 44/2008  provisions and capital has given rise to a buffer that would enable shocks of an order of magnitude comparable to those experienced at the height of the crisis in the 90s to be absorbed. I now come to what I consider to be the main source of uncertainty at the present moment. This is none other than future developments on the international wholesale financing markets, where the possibilities of raising funds have been at extraordinarily restricted levels that are not in keeping with a developed international financial system. Spanish banks have so far largely managed to evade the consequences of this sudden financial market squeeze. Firstly, because their liabilities were issued at relatively long maturities, so that the need to refinance the loans granted is arising much more smoothly than in other systems in which the relative weight of short-term securities is greater. The low level of dependence on funds raised in the interbank deposit markets has been another mitigating factor. I should point out here that once the subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks have been excluded, whose liquidity management is strongly governed by the geographical diversification strategies decided by their parents, the rest of the Spanish credit system does not borrow in these markets but instead maintains a net credit position in them.

While the outlook for the global economy remains firm, the persistently higher oil prices and some softness in the recent US data have shifted the balance of risks more to the downside. The key issue at this time is thus the oil prices, and the key question is how the higher oil prices will affect the global economy going forward. Ladies and Gentlemen, This year prices of oil have gone up by more than 40 percent. The Dubai price, which is the key reference price for Thailand, went up from last year’s average of $ 27 per barrel to now about $ 39 per barrel. Domestic retail oil prices, however, have gone up by less because of the price support scheme that the Government has been running. This has helped limit the immediate effects of the high global oil prices on the economy. But notwithstanding the subsidies, domestic inflation has been rising. Headline CPI inflation, for example, rose to 3.1 percent in July. At this time, we believe there is substantial price pressure building up in the economy that could eventually translate into higher consumer prices once the proft margin is adequately squeezed. This pent - up price pressure is linked not only to the higher global oil prices that have yet to be passed through to the consumer prices, but also to the continued high level of capacity utilization and to the reported tightening in some segments of the labour market.
And shouldn’t it also depend on the kind of vehicle? One could easily think of many more questions like these. So even a seemingly simple rule can quickly start to become more and more complicated. The world is complex and uncertain, particularly when it comes to finance and banking. That leaves us with two options. Either we come up with more rules to try to cover every potential situation. Or we allow supervisors some discretion within a set framework and let them judge specific situations on their merits. In the end, these two options need to be in balance, and we must be careful not to disturb this balance. And here is where I see some cause for concern. Regulators might be tempted to lay down rules to cover every eventuality – think of the example I just gave you. And their motivation would certainly be laudable. But their goal would be unattainable. It is just not possible to cater for every potential situation. There are too many possibilities, most of which we cannot anticipate. No one knows what financial innovations might emerge; no one knows where technological change will lead us; and no one knows how the economy will evolve over the coming decades. If we try to cover everything, the rulebook will, at some point, become too detailed, too big and too complex. From that point onwards it will stop making the banking sector a safer place and instead create new problems. First, overly complex rules facilitate regulatory arbitrage.

They should be empowered to assess the risks that a bank poses to its stakeholders and the financial system. This will enable them to deal with risks at an early stage. But if the rulebook becomes too extensive and too detailed, supervision turns into a simple boxticking exercise. A large, detailed and seemingly comprehensive set of rules would make supervisors less flexible and effective; it would leave no room for discretion. Supervisors would no longer be able to react quickly to newly emerging risks in an ever-changing banking sector. They would be walled in by rules that were devised to cover every possible situation but, in reality, were outdated right from the start. So, looking ahead, we must fight the urge to make the rulebook ever more detailed. But don’t get me wrong – we shouldn’t unwind any of the reforms. What has been done was necessary. But we should be cautious about going too far. A few clear principles can be more effective than 1,000 complex rules. The two pillars of regulation and supervision are equally important and we should not favour one at the other’s expense. And this brings us to the third pillar of a stable banking sector: market discipline. With all this talk about rules and supervision, we must not forget that banks operate in a market economy. So why not use market forces to keep risks in check? There is nothing like the prospect of failure and financial loss to keep a lid on risk-taking.
And climate-related risks being adequately represented on banks’ balance sheets will contribute to these risks being appropriately priced. So if ECB Banking Supervision recognises the financial risks emanating from climate change, this will have a dual effect – it will compel banks to take these risks into account, which in turn will induce companies and households to factor them in as well. This alone will not fully internalise the damage caused by greenhouse gas emissions; other institutions are in charge of making sure of that. But it is an important piece of the puzzle. The urgency to act – climate change is irreversible The EU has committed to becoming carbon-neutral by 2050. The change that our economies need to undertake must be structural. We must reduce the use of fossil fuels as quickly as possible and move towards greener infrastructure that can support the global economy in a way that is sustainable and that protects our planet’s ecosystems and biodiversity. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Much has been made of the dip in carbon emissions that resulted from the economic shutdown in 2020 in many countries. But to reach the Paris target, every single year we need reductions in emissions that are greater than last year’s, and we need to bring about these reductions by ramping up the use of clean technologies, not by shutting down our economies. Unfortunately, even the too-small drop in emissions we saw last year seems set to be all but reversed in 2021.

Commodity prices remain high by historic standards, consistently with the strength of emerging economies, some specific supply-side elements and the depreciation of the dollar. Worth noting are the recent sharp increases in the international prices of some foodstuffs and the copper price peaking at $ per pound (figure 4). The baseline scenario in the IPoM we are presenting today assumes that some of these factors will persist over the projection scenario. In the case of copper, even if it will not be as high as today, it will exceed September’s projections, at $ and $ per pound in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The price outlook for WTI oil is also revised up from September, to $ per barrel in the two years. The baseline scenario for the international economy is good, albeit with important associated risks. We expect an average growth rate of 4.2% for the world economy over the next two years, fairly high by historic standards, but around 0.3 percentage points below the market consensus forecast. This differential is based on the effects of the financial turbulences in Europe, tighter fiscal adjustment plans in the region and the absence of a vigorous recovery of demand in developed economies. In addition, because of the inflationary pressures present in some emerging economies, it is obvious they cannot continue to grow at the same pace they did this year (table 1).
But, as Otmar Issing (2005, p. 70) recently put it, central banks must ensure that they do "not end up merely executing the expectations developed in the market". The information about expected future developments reflected in market prices must be continuously cross-checked against a wide range of monetary and economic indicators in what amounts to a “checks and balances” approach to monetary policy. 8  See also Mervyn King’s speech at the Jackson Hole Symposium 2005, where he warned about unstable inflation expectations, "It may be risky to infer from the observation that inflation expectations are stable that all is well. There will be times when large and persistent shocks occur, and it would be unwise to count on inflation expectations remaining stable when actual inflation starts to deviate substantially from its recent range". 6  BIS Review 30/2006

Whether it is the volume of foreign exchange reserves or the growth of foreign exchange turnover or the amount of savings that needs to be mobilised for promoting economic growth and development, Asia is likely to occupy top position in the world, if it is not already there. The prospects of a strong relative shift of financial market liquidity into Asia are clear, so is the need for upgrading professionalism in finance, hopefully at a pace that is commensurate with its increasing importance in global finance. It is therefore absolutely right for the first regional office of ACI to be established in Asia and, if I may add, for it to be established in Hong Kong, as the truly international financial centre in the region. On the choice of Hong Kong, we are of course grateful and feel honoured, and I as Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and as Honorary President of the Treasury Markets Association offer the full support of the two organisations to the activities of ACI and ACI Asia. Thank you. BIS Review 90/2008  1
One goal is to create a fast, robust, and secure software development lifecycle that stays current by design (perhaps enabled through the agile development methodology and cloud platforms). And, approaches like red-teaming, threat hunting, and external benchmarking can provide insight into cyber resilience strengths and areas to improve.17 On the people side, does the current organizational culture help people successfully adapt to rapidly changing environment? Do staff have the skills that are needed to achieve organizational objectives today and in the future? These are important questions to explore and potential priority areas to address if there are mismatches. Final Thoughts I'd like to wrap up with a bit of realism followed by optimism. Here's the realism: while we might prefer never to be surprised, we will be. The optimism is: effective risk management can help us be less surprised and respond better when we are. And, a strong risk management ecosystem will be self-sustaining because it generates demonstrable value – that is, practical and timely By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. solutions to material problems – to help our organizations succeed in all environments. 1 I would like to thank Greg Gaskel, John Reda, Dubra Shenker, David Stein, and other colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for their feedback.

And it is the combination of the uncertainty derived from the war (and more in general from geopolitical tensions) with the increase of inflation and the rising interest rates that has generated, ultimately, a general deterioration of the economic outlook with, for example, one-year ahead recession probabilities having increased markedly, in both the euro area and other major advanced economies. This challenging financial stability outlook is well laid out in the Warning on vulnerabilities in the EU financial system that the European Systemic Risk Board issued last September. Indeed, the ESRB has alerted of the heightened uncertainty and the increased probability of tail-risk scenarios materialising. In particular, the ESRB has warned of three severe systemic risks :  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  (i) first, the deterioration in the macroeconomic outlook combined with the tightening of financing conditions, leading to negative consequences in terms of balance sheet stress for non-financial corporations and households, especially in sectors and Member States that are most affected by rapidly increasing energy prices. (ii) second, a possible sharp fall in asset prices, leading to large mark-to-market losses, amplified market volatility and liquidity strains. In addition, the increase in the level and volatility of energy and commodity prices has generated large margin calls for participants in these markets and this has created liquidity strains for some participants. (iii) and third, the potential deterioration of asset quality and the profitability outlook of credit institutions.