samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to the Central Bank’s forecast from February, GDP growth will be robust in 2016 and above its historical average for the two years thereafter. This certainly entails an increase in the positive output gap this year, but that tension will subside as the forecast horizon progresses, owing in part to a tighter monetary stance. Inflation will also rise with a larger positive output gap and reduced deflationary pressures from abroad as the year progresses, but monetary policy will counteract it. According to the forecast, inflation will peak at just over 4% in 2017 and then taper off over the remainder of the forecast horizon. Unlike in many previous forecasts, the strong current account surplus will persist for the entire forecast period, which extends until 2018, in part because national saving will remain above the historical average. In this context, we must bear in mind that things can change quite suddenly. It is also worth noting that numerical economic forecasts, by their very nature, have a tendency to be much more stable than historical reality. In the recent past, we have reaped the benefits of developments abroad, but we do not know how long this will last, and tailwinds could turn into headwinds. History also tells us that we have a tendency to make economic policy mistakes during booms and mistake temporary positive shocks for permanent improvements. If history repeats itself, domestic demand and inflation could increase more than is assumed in the forecast.

Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula: Accelerating women’s economic empowerment – key to job and wealth creation; sub theme: financial inclusion Keynote address by Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula, Deputy Governor (Administration) of the Bank of Zambia, at the 2012 Month of the Woman Entrepreneur (MOWE) Conference, Lusaka, 26–27 September 2012. *  *  *  •  The Chairperson, Zambia Federation of Associations of Women in Business  •  Senior Government officials present  •  Country Director UNDP  •  Chairpersons of affiliated organizations  •  Distinguished invited guests  •  Members of the press  •  Ladies and Gentlemen  Ladies and gentlemen, I wish to thank Zambia Federation of Associations of Women in Business (ZAFWIB) for organising this very important conference, with an emphasis on achieving greater financial inclusion for women in general and women entrepreneurs in particular. We commend the focused attention being paid by the ZAFWIB to the subject of this year’s theme for the month of the woman entrepreneur which is: “Accelerating Women’s Economic Empowerment – Key to Job and Wealth Creation” under the sub theme: “Financial Inclusion”. Ladies and Gentlemen, it has been established in many countries that women entrepreneurs play an increasingly important role in the development process of an economy through job and wealth creation. According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), an estimated 31 to 38 per cent of SMEs in developing countries are owned or run by women. The figures are between 21 and 26 per cent for Sub-Saharan Africa.
However, what most of you probably do not know is that this is not my first spell at the Riksbank. I previously worked there for a period of almost 15 years, from the end of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s (see slide 1). When I began working at the Riksbank in 1977 times were very different, which was reflected in both the economy and the work environment The economy was marked, for instance, by the fixed exchange rate regime and the banking and foreign-exchange markets were extensively regulated – far from the economy that we have today. When I started at the Riksbank there was also just a very small group of people that drafted and made the important decisions. Today the Riksbank is a flat organisation and our personnel are highly involved in our main tasks. It was in the early 1990s that I left the Riksbank to begin working at what was then the Bank Inspection Board, now Finansinspektionen, and I stayed there until 2007 (see slide 1). As the financial markets have become increasingly interlinked, and since Sweden joined the EU in 1995, the international perspective has become increasingly important. This has led me to several international assignments.1 In the last two years before I returned to the Riksbank I was Managing Director of the Swedish Bankers’ Association, a trade organisation for banks in Sweden. This involved a readjustment as my perspective was now from inside the banking sector.

To increase confidence in the long term, however, we  2  This figure may vary somewhat depending on how it is calculated. 3  See also the article “The EMU and the debt crisis in Europe” in the Monetary Policy Report of February 2012. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  need real changes and the credible implementation of requirements for sustainable public finances. Nevertheless, the situation looks much better now than it did in the autumn. If we look outside Europe, we can see the beginnings of a turnaround in the US economy and China, for example, is still experiencing good growth. Despite this, however, we should probably expect the impetus to the Swedish economy from abroad to be limited over the next few years, mainly due to weak development in Europe. Inflation and growth prospects justify keeping the repo rate low Developments abroad, and above all in Europe, are thus highly important to the Swedish economy. But the development of domestic demand, for example household consumption, was also weak in the second half of 2011. Since then, however, we have received a number of somewhat more positive signals. Share prices have risen since the end of last year and confidence indicators are clearly pointing in the right direction, although from relatively low levels. There is thus potential for an eventual increase in household demand. Growth may gradually increase. The main objective of monetary policy is to keep inflation close to the target.
Even at an average price decline of 20% to 30%, we can expect a situation in which a substantial share of  10  Cf. Cuestas, J.C., M. Kukk and N. Levenko (2021), Misalignments in house prices and economic growth in Europe, mimeo; and Muellbauer, J. (2018), Housing, debt and the economy: a tale of two countries, mimeo. The ECB uses a similar model. Cf. ECB, Financial Stability Review, November 2015 and May 2021. 11 Cf. for example Poterba, J. M. (1984), Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupied Housing: An Asset-Market Approach. In the user cost model baseline, the long-term expectations regarding the real mortgage interest rate are set at the historical average of 2.6%. The versions ‘low interest’ and ‘very low interest’ are based on a real mortgage interest rate of 1.5% and 1.0% respectively. Page 9/12  mortgage loans is no longer adequately secured in the event of a default. As a consequence, banks would incur losses should borrowers default on these mortgage loans. These points demonstrate that the banking system is currently highly exposed to the vulnerabilities on the mortgage and real estate markets, and could face considerable losses in the event of an abrupt increase in interest rates. ... but adequate resilience is ensured overall due to capital buffers  At the SNB, we use stress tests to simulate the stress scenario of an unexpected and rapid rise in interest rates, also in quantitative terms.

Necessary conditions for bond markets To develop a domestic bond market, we need three essential components:  1  BIS Review 30/2000  First, there must be a deep and liquid government bond market to serve as a benchmark against which corporate papers can be priced. To ensure that the government bond market can continue to provide the benchmark yield curve, the supply of government bonds must be regular, predictable and transparent. In short, the framework of the budgetary process as well as debt management operation must support the continuing supply of bonds through operations such as automatic refinancing or refunding of maturing debt. Tools such as re-opening of benchmark issues, government bond buy-back schemes or repurchase operations are also essential for the efficient functioning of debt management operation. Second, there must be adequate infrastructure, both legal and operational, to support the trade and transfer of instruments and funds. Operational infrastructure includes such things as a delivery versus payment system that is safe, rapid and efficient to ensure finality of fund transfers. An efficient bond registration system is also essential to provide legal protection of ownership of bonds. Rules and regulations to support trading and financing operation such as repurchase agreements, securities lending, short positioning as well as hedging practices are all essential elements. Third, there must be a pool of market participants comprising both intermediaries such as dealers or inter-dealer brokers as well as end-users such as mutual funds, provident and pension funds, insurance.
After a few years of getting used to this new way of conducting monetary policy, there was a long period of relative calm in large parts of the world. Many countries introduced a similar policy that had the more or less explicit target of holding inflation close to 2 per cent. From the middle of the 1990s until 2008, inflation was on average fairly close to the target and developments in the real economy were more stable than before. Blanchard and Simon (2001) were among the first to document this phenomenon, which came to be called the ‘Great Moderation’. But even then, there were discussions of whether the phenomenon was due to structural changes, skilful macroeconomic policy, including monetary policy, or quite simply luck. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Riksbank's balance sheet grew in connection with the foreign currency reserves being reinforced through loans (see Figures 1 and 2). When the fixed exchange rate was abolished, it was decided that there was less need to hold foreign currency reserves for monetary policy purposes and the size of the balance sheet declined fairly rapidly. Between 1994 and 1998, domestic bond positions were sold off and foreign currency loans were repaid. 4 Instead, the Riksbank conducted monetary policy with a minimal toolbox in this new environment. The repo rate, which is the base for the lending and deposit rates the Riksbank applies with regard to the commercial banks, was adjusted to ensure monetary policy was well balanced.

Green Swan 2021 Global Virtual Conference – 2 June 2021 Never too much and never too many: how to transform global discussion into global action against climate change  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Ladies and Gentlemen, This “Green Swan 2021 Global Virtual Conference” co-sponsored by the Banque de France, the BIS, the IMF and the NGFS should have taken place in Paris, birthplace of the Climate agreement and of the NGFS, but it is my pleasure to welcome you online. Central banks’ commitment to the climate cause may seem obvious today. But few issues have seen such a rapid and massive change. My generation changed its mind, I changed my mind. Many of us now share the imperative of Hans Jonas: “In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your willi”. In Amsterdam three years ago, for the inaugural Conference of the NGFS, I referred to greening finance as our “new frontier for the 21st century”. Today, the challenge could almost look inverted: we have gone from the risk of “doing too little, too late” to the criticism by some of “too many doing too much”. No: we are not doing too much (I), and we are never too many (II). But before starting, I would like to draw two useful and cautious lessons from the above-mentioned criticisms. First, we, central bankers and supervisors, cannot do everything by ourselves; we are not the only green game in town.
Philipp Hildebrand: Global and Swiss economic outlook – overview for 2011/12 Introductory remarks by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Berne, 15 December 2011. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank (SNB) reaffirms its commitment to the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. It will continue to enforce this minimum rate with the utmost determination. It is prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities. The target range for the Libor remains at 0.0–0.25%, and the SNB continues to aim for a three-month Libor close to zero. Even at the current rate, the Swiss franc is still high and should continue to weaken over time. The SNB stands ready to take further measures at any time if the economic outlook and the risk of deflation so require. In the third quarter, the global economy picked up again slightly, thanks to positive stimuli from Japan, the US and China. Growth in Europe, however, remained weak and the economic outlook for the euro area deteriorated. In Switzerland, the pace of growth slowed considerably in the third quarter. The substantial appreciation of the Swiss franc over the summer is weighing heavily on the Swiss economy. For 2011 as a whole, real GDP growth of 1.5–2.0% can be expected. This is only because of the favourable economic development in the first half of the year. For 2012, the SNB is expecting economic growth in the order of 0.5%.

These activities have taken many forms ranging from equity and non-equity business collaboration, regulatory cooperation in setting the global development blueprint, information exchange and building consensus on issues for international prudential standards development, to intergovernmental memorandums of understanding for collaborative developmental initiatives in Islamic finance, and many others. BIS Review 30/2007  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, As Islamic finance continues to make significant inroads in the international financial markets with expanding scale, growing magnitude and greater sophistication, a critical need emerges for an expanded discourse on the developments and emerging issues with its global relevance and impact, of interest to all its major stakeholders. This is the first time that Bank Negara Malaysia has organized a full-scale, multi-disciplinary, international event of this nature on Islamic finance. These sessions include the annual Investors & Issuers Forum, and Financial Regulators Forum and the biannual Banking and Financial Law School. It is our hope that participants will benefit from any of the parallel sessions of their interests and have increased opportunities for network building among the widening groups of stakeholders participation in the Forum. These forums have been designed to provide dynamic and interactive formats to encouraging open and inclusive dialogues that foster a greater collective understanding in Islamic finance. Let me record our appreciation to the many distinguished speakers from various international institutions, financial practitioners, legal fraternity, regulatory bodies and other prominent thought leaders in Islamic finance.
The SNB is not closing itself off to changes that will be necessary over the course of time. However, it is worth recalling here that central banks are not all-powerful. What remains decisive for us is that our mandate for monetary policy and financial stability is formulated in a sensible manner and can be fulfilled. However, the SNB must also have the necessary instruments and be in a position to use them flexibly. In addition, it is essential that it can act independently when fulfilling its mandate. It can only take responsibility for its mandate under these conditions. This is another important reason why we are generally reserved when confronted with new tasks. A central bank which is guided by this model when fulfilling its mandate and consistently discourages excessive expectations makes the biggest contribution towards a prosperous development of the economy, thereby serving the overall interests of the country in the best manner. By fulfilling its price and financial stability mandate steadily and reliably over a  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  longer period, a central bank builds up confidence in the general public and on the markets – confidence which is extremely important for the development of the economy. If I have succeeded in persuading you to share this conviction with me, or strengthened your belief in it, my talk this evening has achieved its purpose. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9

This global movement has been more pronounced in Europe, because of a third uncertainty, related to banks’ exposures to peripheral sovereign risk. In addition, French banks have suffered from two specific vulnerabilities, one real, one exaggerated. The real vulnerability is their dependence on dollar funding, due to the scale of their international activities, which they may have been too slow to address effectively. It is currently being dealt with through a combination of deleveraging and consolidation. In the meantime, and since this is a broader problem for European institutions, in order to ease the transition, the Eurosystem, together with other central banks across the world, has decided to conduct three US dollar liquidity-providing operations with a maturity of three months. A more exaggerated concern about French banks is their exposure to peripheral countries’ sovereign risk. Let me just point out some facts and figures: total exposure of major French banks to the sovereign risk of so-called “peripheral countries” amounts to € which is only a limited fraction of their core Tier One capital. In terms of liquidity, the Eurosystem refinancing policy provides for an unlimited provision and the total collateral of French banks amounts to $ in eligible assets. I would note that both so-called “vulnerabilities” are a consequence of the internationalization of banking activities. And there is a certain paradox in a situation where globalized banks, with diversified activities and balanced business models are perceived as riskier than more specialized institutions. Let me now conclude.
It is particularly important to limit the potential shock to international financial markets, which have been operating in very favourable conditions marked by high liquidity, low risk premiums and an interest-rate term structure that has been propitious to long-term borrowing. In this respect, monetary measures to safeguard price stability must be accompanied by an appropriate communication policy and consistency in the application of fiscal rules and commitments, if the authorities are to avoid a sharp change in conditions on financial markets, which might induce exaggerated reactions. In particular, although long-term interest rates should no doubt resume a level more in keeping with past experience and with the current cyclical phase, this process should be orderly and without excessive propagation towards credit risk premiums on the corporate-debt and emerging sovereign-debt markets, or on foreign-exchange markets. Another source of vulnerability of the international economy lies, as discussed, in the global disequilibria. Broad international consensus has it that the correction of these imbalances requires an increase in public and private saving in the United States, structural reforms to invigorate the euro area economies and Japan, and greater flexibility in Asian exchange rates, especially in China. These policies would gradually correct the present current-account mismatches and would have to be accompanied by exchange-rate movements tending to bring positions closer to long-term equilibrium levels. The correction of these current-account imbalances would also ideally re-establish a more natural direction of capital flows between developed and emerging countries.

We are experiencing, I believe, one of those "Franco-German moments" that will mark history, and we can now rightly celebrate it: on 18 May, a Franco-German initiative on the European stimulus package; on 21 July, a historic agreement by the European Council in Brussels on a EUR 750 billion package, supported by a united Franco-German alliance; on 20 August, the Chancellor visited the President of the Republic in Brégançon. Despite any fears, faced with the threat of the Covid crisis, Germany has clearly and unequivocally opted for Europe and the euro. However, in its early stages, the crisis appeared to distance us, due to our different abilities to respond, and sometimes in different orders. Europe has once again demonstrated in this crisis that it is stronger than is commonly believed. I will concentrate here on economic matters, because that is where my competence lies. Naturally, there are broader issues in Europe, that are concrete and emotional: those of our borders, our institutions, our military and diplomatic power, and, in a wider sense, our common identity, which is apparent to our fellow citizens. The President of the French Republic speaks of the necessary "European sovereignty". I am aware that this expression gives rise to debate. In any case, it means that Europe must not passively put up with events, in the face of the growing rivalry between the United States and China. That we can and should be proud collectively of our achievements.
Not only would we continue with the operationalisation of the exchange, but we will proceed with a number of related activities that will give greater strength and effectiveness to the new facility. BIS Review 107/2007  1  In pursuance of this determination, we will advance the plan to create appropriate links between the capital market programme and the national privatisation programme, with a view to increasing the volume of shares traded on the exchange and provide for a high level of liquidity in the market. We will also proceed with the finalisation of modalities for the creation of a venture capital company, which would serve, inter alia, to improve the profile of some of the state enterprises earmarked for privatisation. This will increase their attractiveness to investors and improve the quality of shares to be traded on the market. As you would be aware, the present condition of some of the enterprises proposed for privatisation would require some further work for high value divestiture. Their value would be enhanced through a process of mentoring and nurturing. Moreover, the sale of these enterprises should not benefit only a small section of the society. The venture capital company will perform the mentoring function and also hold some proportion of the shares of some of these companies for periodical release to small private investors, who may not have the capacity to purchase such shares were they to be sold in a single parcel.

Over time, investors have become nervous about the valuations of financial instruments. Banks took large write-downs on mortgage-related assets and other risky securities. Major financial institutions reported huge losses. Some of them even came to on the brink of default and some of the hedge funds liquidated their positions in order to match the increasing withdrawals of the investors. The sharp decline in risk appetite and concerns about the counter-party credit risk has led to a significant deterioration in shortterm credit and money markets leading to a major liquidity squeeze. Liquidity problems, coupled with solvency crisis, have tested the resilience of global financial markets, and we are still waiting for the light at the end of the tunnel. The big losses of financial institutions and deep plunge in consumer confidence due to sharp fall in house prices and declining personal income have increased the possibility of a recession in the US economy, which may have already started as we speak. Deterioration in risk perceptions has increased the risk premia of developing countries, including Turkey. So far, the rise in Turkey’s risk premium was in line with that of other developing countries, although more recently the current political uncertainty has started to put Turkish financial markets under considerable strain. I believe Turkey’s risk premium would be even higher in the absence of improvements in macroeconomic conditions and institutional reforms implemented in recent years. Dear Guests, One can label the last two decades as the era of globalization, deregulation, and privatization.