samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It has become fairly common to say that such groups should be resolved on a regional basis, ie broken up. Maybe. But even if that is correct, “break it up” hardly amounts to resolution plan. What happens to the broken-up parts? Under a “breakup” strategy, a plan is needed for all of the parts, both distressed and undistressed. That can’t be a free for all. Indeed, it is worth underlining that, under the FSB Standard,3 it is the responsibility of the home authorities of the group to ensure that a group-wide resolution plan exists. There is no ducking that. It removes an ambiguity that has quietly haunted banking authorities for decades, including in the UK. Imagine an international commercial banking group whose operations in various jurisdictions are both big and complex. Good subsidiaries might be sold or floated off. But that won’t be possible for the bankrupt parts of the group. The realisation of the assets via a standard liquidation of those subsidiaries would be liable to destroy a lot of value, creating disorder that could spill over to other jurisdictions and possibly globally. Such subsidiaries need to be  3  4  FSB Standard Key Attribute 11.8. BIS central bankers’ speeches  resolved. That could be via bail-in of their bondholders and other creditors. But what happens if there are not enough bonds in issue to absorb all of the losses and recapitalise the operation? A way of cutting through that would be for each Deposit Insurer to be bailed in.

We will continue to take proactive steps to ensure our banking system is resilient to a possible reversal of the credit cycle, and to enhance banks’ liquidity planning and management in anticipation of any sudden outflow of funds. 19. In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, we will keep reminding and warning the public not to allow ourselves to incur excessive debt simply because interest rates are currently at very low levels. We don’t know whether and when these shocks will materialise, but we must stand ready to face them and be able to emerge from the next crisis relatively unscathed, as we have done in the past. 20. Thank you very much. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
BIS Review 50/2002  5  Labour costs in Norway and among trading partners1) Percentage growth  7  7  6  6  Norway  5  5  4  4  3  3 Trading partners  2 1  1  0  0 1993  1)  2  1995  1997  1999  2001  2003  Hourly labour costs in manufacturing  Source: Statistics Norway, TRCIS/IMF and Norges Bank  Fafo og Makt- og demokratiutredningen 6. september 2002  For a long time, a stable exchange rate and labour costs among our trading partners formed an anchor for wage determination. Since 1998, however, the rise in labour costs in Norway has been around 2 percentage points higher than that of our trading partners. High wage growth, combined with the global downturn and a strong krone, is having a severe impact on manufacturing. Sustainable wage growth • The 'Solidarity Alternative' (Aukrust model) Wage growth among trading partners  3-4 per cent  (+Productivity growth in Norway - productivity growth abroad 0 = Scope for wage growth in Norway  3-4 per cent  • Inflation target The Government's inflation target  2½ per cent  + "Normal" productivity growth  2 per cent  = Scope for wage growth in Norway  4½ per cent  Fafo og Makt- og demokratiutredningen 6. september 2002  Over time, growth in real wages must be consistent with growth in labour productivity.

From a cyclical perspective, a proposal to ensure that banks implement countercyclical capital buffers was part of the recent consultations and is also pending approval by the Federal Council. The proposal foresees that the ultimate decision to activate or modify the capital buffer requirement will lie with the Federal Council. This decision will be made on the basis of the SNB’s proposal and the FINMA’s response to it. Finally, in order to enhance the SNB’s capacity to assess the stability of the financial system and to take appropriate measures, the Bank has also called for improved access to information on financial institutions. VI. Conclusion  The preceding discussion has, I hope, clarified some of the complex interactions between price and financial stability. Within the Swiss legal framework, I am convinced that the central bank has been given an appropriate mandate. In order of priority, the SNB must ensure price stability, while taking due account of the developments of the economy. It must also contribute to the stability of the financial system. One important lesson to emerge from the analysis of the recent crisis is that an interest rate policy cannot be the sole, or even the main instrument, used to promote financial stability. It is imperative that central banks be endowed  20  6  Borio (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  with alternative “macro-prudential” instruments. This assessment is not only the product of careful application of the “Tinbergen principle”, according to which one needs as many instruments as one has objectives.
Si les investisseurs et les emprunteurs internationaux considèrent que l’euro deviendra une monnaie stable, ils détiendront des actifs libellés en euros pour réduire au minimum les risques dans le cadre de la diversification  BIS Review 22/1999  8  internationale de leurs portefeuilles. En outre, un marché financier de l’euro large et liquide peut conduire à un usage étendu de l’euro, usage qui, en retour, pourrait faciliter son développement en tant que monnaie de facturation ou de dénomination sur les marchés des produits de base . L’euro va progressivement accroître son rôle comme monnaie internationale utilisée par le secteur privé, même si le rythme de son internationalisation peut être variable selon la fonction considérée. b) Les relations de change de la zone euro vis-à-vis des principales devises mondiales En ce qui concerne les relations de change entre l’euro et les principales devises mondiales, à savoir le dollar et le yen, je pense qu’il ne faudrait jamais oublier ceci : dans un régime de changes flottants, la stabilité du taux de change dépend des données fondamentales de l’économie. C’est pourquoi des politiques saines et avisées dans les domaines monétaire et budgétaire sont les meilleurs garants d’un fonctionnement approprié du système monétaire international. Il est encourageant, à cet égard, de noter que des deux côtés de l’Atlantique, nous partageons la même optique globale au sujet d’une monnaie qui conserve sa valeur et d’un budget tendant à être proche de l’équilibre ou en excédent.

The unemployment rate is 8-1/4 percent – well above the rate anyone on the FOMC sees as being consistent with our longer-run goal; in my view, this is a substantially higher rate than one might attribute to supply-side factors, such as extended unemployment insurance and a heightened degree of mismatch in labor markets. Realistically, this is a 2-1/4 to 3 percentage point deviation from our current maximum employment objective. Because this occurred with nominal interest rates stuck at the zero lower bound since December 2008, I believe it’s hard to say that we are not in a liquidity trap. Recently, the U.S. data have been more encouraging, with the labor market improving and private demand showing a little more traction. Without a doubt, these are welcome developments. But even the more optimistic forecasts see output increasing only moderately above its potential growth rates; no one has an expectation for a surge in activity that would quickly close resource gaps. At the same time, the outlook for inflation is subdued, with most FOMC participants’ forecasts for increases in total personal consumption expenditures prices averaging roughly between 1-1/2 and 2 percent over the next three years. Furthermore, private sector long-run inflation expectations are quite well anchored.
Andres Lipstok: How to exit the economic crisis? Presentation by Mr Andres Lipstok, Governor of Bank of Estonia, at the conference “Majandus, kuhu lähed? Kas õigus saab aidata?” (Quo vadis, economy? Is law able to help? ), Tartu, 8 May 2009. *  *  *  Dear ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the conference organisers, especially my good friend Paul Varul, for the invitation to speak at today's very topical conference. How to exit the economic crisis – this is the most urgent question for the policy and economy of both Estonia and Europe in 2009 and also the next years. The destiny of the Estonian economy greatly depends on what is going on around us, i.e., in the EU and entire world. Therefore, the first part of my presentation addresses the possibilities and ways out of the crisis from a slightly broader perspective, in the context of the world and the EU. First, let us have a look at the global economic situation. The global economy is in a deep recession at the start of 2009. For the first time after World War II, the global GDP is forecast to decline in 2009. According to the IMF's forecast, the decrease may amount to 1.3% We all know the global crisis originated in 2007 from the USA with the collapse of the high-yield bonds market. This event caused loss of confidence in bonds, investment funds and large banks. When the financial system stopped functioning, investment consumption and trade contracted as well.

The stability and credibility of the banking groups operating here, supported by close cooperation between Baltic and Nordic countries also help Estonia overcome the crisis. Banks in Estonia have sufficient funds to support restructuring in both the business sector and the entire economy. Eesti Pank's analyses confirm that the current capitalisation is sufficient to cover possible larger loan losses without banks having to include additional capital. The resources of banks allow their lending decisions to be based on favourable medium-term and longer-term economic outlooks, since Estonia's economic convergence, i.e., the movement of our income level towards that of EU richer countries, will continue also in the future. Thus, the goal of banking and financial sector policy is cooperation with the home countries of the banks operating in the EU and Estonia to ensure the functioning of the common banking market and group-level stability. The steps taken by the home countries of the banks operating in Estonia have considered the interests of the entire group and thus supported financial stability in Estonia. In this light it has to be emphasised that the measures to support the economy approved in Estonia allow state aid also in a situation where financial markets no longer function normally. But the main aim of the state support measures is to organise the financing of starting and exporting enterprises. The total debt burden of Estonia's enterprises is relatively big and a decline in the total volume of debt in 2009 is a natural reaction to previous years' rapid increase.
Those working on the bill at the Ministry of Finance at that time were probably in doubt as to whether any petroleum revenues would ever be saved, and perhaps they also questioned the utility of such a fund. Initially, the fund structure was merely an exercise in accounting. Government petroleum revenues were deposited in the fund, but the entire amount was transferred back to the central government budget to cover some of the non-oil deficit. However, the Norwegian economy rebounded and transfers to the Fund started in 1996. The Fund has since acted as a buffer between widely fluctuating oil revenues and public expenditure. The decision regarding annual petroleum revenue spending can be made independently of the size of the revenues. Thus, the fluctuations in government petroleum revenues do not have an automatic impact on the Norwegian economy. The Fund also has a stabilising effect on the krone exchange rate because capital outflows increase when Norway’s petroleum revenues rise. The fiscal rule for petroleum revenue spending, which was adopted in 2001, states that the government may spend – as an average over the business cycle – the expected normal real return on the capital in the Fund over the central government budget. This return is estimated at 4 per cent. The rule ensures that the capital in the Fund is not drawn on unless the real return on the Fund is lower than 4 per cent. In this way, future generations will also benefit from the oil wealth.

Det framtidige omfanget av petroleumsvirksomheten på norsk sokkel” [The future of petroleum activity. The future scale of offshore petroleum activity in Norway]. BIS Review 145/2010  1  The Committee had limited confidence in the government’s ability to save: The Committee stated the following concerning a savings fund: “It is up to the political authorities to determine whether such a fund construction designed to avoid a future decline in income is realistic. The Committee chooses not to build on such an assumption.” The notion of a sovereign oil fund matured through the 1980s. The government, under the premiership of Kåre Willoch, called for the establishment of such a fund in the Long-Term Programme presented in spring 1986, and the Act on the Government Petroleum Fund was passed in 1990. The main rules are: First: The totality of government petroleum revenues is transferred to the Fund. Second: The Fund is integrated into central government budgets and accounts. The non-oil deficit is covered by an annual transfer from the Fund. The government cannot borrow to finance current expenditure as long as there is capital in the Fund. Third: The capital in the Fund can only be used for domestic spending via general budget transfers, and not for earmarked transfers. Fourth: The Fund’s capital must be invested abroad. When the Act was enforced, the Norwegian economy was in a deep downturn, with high unemployment and government budget deficits. Projections also indicated that offshore production would pass the peak in the early 1990s 5 .
You have probably seen pictures of bank runs – when queues form outside banks in crisis as people want to withdraw their money in the form of (safe) cash. This is why central bank money is still the linchpin of the system, even if it is rarely used in normal circumstances. The fact that it is available as an alternative acts as a kind of guarantee for the private bank money. 4 It is also the case that some key systems for payments are increasingly concentrated to a few agents. See, for instance, the card payment market where two American companies are entirely dominant in Sweden. Unlike our neighbouring countries, we do not have any domestic card payment network. This means that we are dependent on foreign infrastructures to make the majority of households’ payments. Without cash, therefore, an important part of the Swedish infrastructure would be completely in private ownership and dependent on foreign infrastructures and foreign companies. So if the use of cash continues to decline, it is not enough to say that this works fine at present, because the future will look rather different, regardless of whether we produce an e-krona. Other functions that cash has performed include functioning as a back-up when there have been disruptions to other forms of payment. It has also helped ensure  3  See, for instance, Fung et.al. (2018) and Söderberg (2018). 4 See, for instance, Tobin (1985).

This should give more flexibility to firms and contribute to supporting employment. The ongoing apprenticeship reform aims at making this status more attractive for both workers and firms, in order to tackle youth unemployment. In a context where the number of job vacancies remains too high, the ongoing reform of lifelong vocational training, which is currently too costly and inefficient, should help to better match the skills of workers to the needs of firms. Add very significant reforms of primary and secondary education and university, and you can expect a steady improvement in French labour’s skills in the coming years. The unemployment benefits reform will also be an essential building block in improving the functioning of the labour market. More control over the job-search effort should increase labour force participation and also contribute to tackling structural unemployment, while improving the efficiency of the welfare state. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  [Slide 11] Finally, consistent tax reforms have aimed at rebalancing the tax burden from production factors towards broad-based taxes. Labour costs were lowered, with in particular a tax credit on payroll, implemented in 2013 and reinforced by social contribution cuts this year. Regarding capital, important measures have also been taken to alleviate taxation on productive capital and savings: the scrapping of the household wealth tax on everything except property assets, the introduction of a 30% flat tax on household capital gains, dividends or interests and a decrease in corporate tax from 33% to 25% in 2022 to ensure convergence towards the EU average.
The future member states, which previously had been among Europe’s most closed economies, were transformed in a few years to the most open economies in Europe - foreign trade corresponds to more than 130 per cent of GDP in Hungary and the Czech Republic, more than countries of an equivalent size in the EU, such as Austria and Sweden. The EU became completely dominant in trade, while Russia and the former Soviet republics shrank to become a relatively small trading partner. The countries’ share of the old EU countries’ trade rose quickly. For Sweden the eight new member states have been the trading partners that have always increased their share steadily from the beginning of the 1990s - through the Asian crisis and the bursting of the IT bubble - and that today comprise 5 per cent of Sweden’s foreign trade, i.e. on a par with France and more than double China’s share. All indications suggest that the trend will both continue and deepen. The proportion of intermediate goods (components) produced in the new member states on behalf of Western companies is becoming an increasingly large part of trade, as is the proportion of goods with higher technological content from the new member states. Mobility for goods has gone hand in hand with mobility for capital. Several studies of the balance of earnings and costs associated with enlargement (e.g. from the European Commission and the independent institution CEPR) have high-lighted increased investment as one of the most significant advantages of EU entry.

The flexibility of their wages and prices makes them therefore unusually well-suited to a currency union like EMU. At the same time, these countries have not shied away from reforms that many leading EU countries have not yet been able to bring about. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Poland have, for example, carried out comprehensive reforms of their pension systems, which now resemble the Swedish model with savings partly invested in funds. In these areas in particular, it is rather the EU that has something to learn from the candidate countries than the other way around. It is as Pope John Paul II said, that now finally can “Europe breathe with both lungs”. The new member states enrich the EU, not just economically but also intellectually, and of course also culturally and in human terms. The enlargement puts the EU in motion; not just the trade and investment, but also the institutions and the ideas. BIS Review 51/2004  5
This programme will contribute to reinvigorating a market which has been greatly affected by the financial strains caused by the crisis but which, once suitably redirected and stripped of its toxic components highlighted by the crisis, should play a key role in the financing of the private sector, particularly in the case of small enterprises, whose direct access to the capital markets is very limited. In addition to these measures, I would also like to recall that the ECB remains, with the unanimous support of its Governing Council, committed to resorting, as and when necessary, to additional measures. The Spanish economy In contrast to the progressive weakening of the euro area, the recovery in the Spanish economy has remained firm. The year-on-year rate of change in GDP in the third quarter rose to 1.6%, and might draw close to 2% in the final stretch of the year, at which rate it might hold on average in 2015. Naturally, this forecast is conditional upon the risks I shall refer to not materialising. Figures for the labour market have also trended favourably, showing net job creation since the second half of last year, which has prompted a 2 pp decline in the unemployment rate over the past 12 months to 23.7% of the labour force. Of course, this remains an unacceptable level that reflects the most serious imbalance in our economy, the correction of which must be the chief objective of our economic policy.

Reactivating national demand has taken on a decisive role in the recovery, enabling the rebalancing of the internal and external components of expenditure. This change in the dynamics of domestic expenditure compared with events during the crisis years is in response to a series of factors, including most notably the growing normalisation of financial conditions, headway in the construction of the Banking Union, favourable developments in the labour market and the unquestionable improvement in confidence. Against this backdrop, both private consumption and business investment have regained momentum, underpinned by the improvement in the financial environment. Mention should also be made of the role being played by investment in construction, which might begin to turn around in 2015 or 2016. Recent developments in house prices are along the same lines, although certain caveats should be voiced: for the first time in six years, growth rates in the aggregate domestic indices of real estate prices are close to zero, or slightly positive, although significant differences across regions remain. Since the crisis began, spending by private agents has been constrained by the need to reduce the high levels of debt built up during the expansion that ran to 2008. Recently, there has been progress in private sector deleveraging, while the attendant restrictive effects on spending are being mitigated by a shift in lending flows towards more creditworthy agents and, in particular, towards companies better placed to commit to new investment projects.