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Some growth epochs have seen secular stagnation, others secular innovation. Understanding the  1  Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009). 2  Measured at purchasing power parity exchange rates and, for the moment, not on a per capita basis. 3  Summers (2014), Vox-EU (2014). 4  Hansen (1938). 5  For example, Gordon (2012, 2014), Summers (2014), Cowan (2014). 6  For example, Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), Mokyr (2014), Arthur (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  determinants of these growth phases – sociological and technological – provides insight into the forces of secular stagnation and innovation operating today.7 What follows is a cocktail of economics, history, sociology and psychology. For those seeking a common denominator, it is sitting between your ears. Psychologist Daniel Kahneman says the brain has two ways of thinking (fast and slow). 8 The same may be true, and for many of the same reasons, when understanding growth (fast and slow). The short history of growth Let me start with the short history of growth. This is shown in Chart 1 which plots (log) world GDP per capita back to 1750, the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Save for wars, it suggests a straight-line growth path over the past 250 years or so, averaging 1.5% per year. That means each generation has been around a third better off than its predecessor. Growth has driven secular rises in living standards, generation by generation. While steady, growth has not been constant.