samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This would be in line with the greater concern at all levels to avoid the funds extended through the banking system being used, among other activities, for terrorist financing or money laundering. 8  BIS Review 39/2004  Customer knowledge on the part of financial institutions has a second but no less important dimension. The products offered to financial-services consumers must be tailored to their needs, with the institutions helping them to assess the risks that they wish to and are able to assume. In a context of rapid credit growth like that in Spain, it would seem to be enormously important to help customers assess the commitments they are capable of assuming on the basis of both their present and future circumstances. The challenges I have referred to justify the need for a response by supervisors and regulators. The focus of our concern is currently the promotion of the stable functioning of the financial system, and the need to boost the incentives offered to ensure that it continues to enhance the scope and quality of the services that it has traditionally offered to society. The New Capital Accord is undoubtedly a significant step in this direction and represents a great opportunity for the banks to review, update and improve their capital strategies and risk management systems. It is, therefore, a suitable framework for boosting financial stability. The New Capital Accord proposes a comprehensive approach based on the combined operation of a number of complementary elements and considering a broader set of risks than its predecessor.

In the medium term, cost contanment and continuous improvement in efficiency will be pivotal in ensuring sound profit and loss accounts. Spain’s membership of the euro area, which has made its economy more stable, has nevertheless enabled a faster pace of credit expansion than traditionally seen in this country, without Spanish institutions having suffered notable financial imbalances. That said, their managers have to continue to act prudently and responsibly, considering possible changes in the economic situation that may arise during the course of the cycle and adopting strategies designed for the medium and long term. Another matter on which institutions should reflect from this medium-term standpoint is the quality of their own funds. Indeed, it should be borne in mind that their strengthened ROE has been driven in the last decade by increased leverage of the quality of their capital (i.e. the growing weight of subordinated debt relative to capital stock and reserves). Insofar as that leverage is reaching a maximum, no further improvements in ROE derived from changes in the composition of regulatory capital should be expected. The challenges to be faced by financial institutions are, however, not limited to those deriving from the more conjunctural factors; they are in fact largely traceable to the important changes in financial systems in the last few years.
All recent incoming information had fully confirmed our view that, in a context of vigorous money and credit growth and sound economic fundamentals in the euro area, the risks to price stability over the medium term are clearly on the upside, as I said, on behalf of the Governing Council, after our meeting on Thursday, 6 December 2007. The recent substantial increase in oil and food prices, together with unfavourable base effects from energy prices, owing to the marked decline in oil prices a year ago, are having a strong upward impact on inflation in the current context. Looking ahead, the inflation rate is expected to remain significantly above 2% in the near future, and it is likely to moderate only gradually in the course of 2008. Hence the period of temporarily high inflation rates would be somewhat more protracted than previously expected. Looking further ahead, the December 2007 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections foresee annual HICP inflation to be between 2.0% and 2.2% in 2007, to then rise to between 2.0% and 3.0% in 2008, before moderating to a range of 1.2% and 2.4% in 2009. Compared with the September 2007 staff projections, the ranges for 2007 and 2008 have shifted upwards. These staff projections are based on two key assumptions. The first is that recent oil and food price dynamics and their impact on HICP inflation will not have broadly-based second-round effects on wage-setting behaviour. The second key assumption is that growth in profit margins will moderate over the projection horizon.

Jean-Claude Trichet: Overview of recent euro area developments and the effects of globalisation on prices and real estate Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the meeting of the Management Board of the CDU, Wiesbaden, 5 January 2008. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure for me to be invited as a guest speaker here today. Let me briefly sketch out the main topics I want to address. First, I will present to you our views on the current economic situation in the euro area. Then, I will explain the ECB’s liquidity operations following the tensions in the money markets since August last year as well as our views on the stability of the euro area financial system. To conclude, I will say a word upon the effects of globalisation on price developments and on developments in the real estate sector. Economic and monetary developments Let me first say that we are presently in the purdah period, namely within a week before the next decision meeting of the Governing Council. Nothing in what I will say should be interpreted in terms of our future decision next Thursday. I will stick to explaining what has been our diagnosis and judgment on the occasion of our last meeting.
This was the mechanism that made it impossible for us to keep the fixed exchange rate regime in 1992. At the time of the deregulation, Sweden had a history of high inflation and other imbalances. Doubts  BIS Review 9/2002  1  regarding the stability of the Swedish economy led to capital outflows, rising interest rates and a shrinking foreign currency reserve. Despite massive supporting purchases of the Swedish krona and a drastic defence involving a 500 per cent daily lending rate for banks borrowing from the Riksbank, the defence of the exchange rate failed. This meant that the general public had to live for a period with a 25 per cent interest rate for long-term mortgages! Lottery with a good chance of winning Financial capital is very transient, if not "restless". It is difficult to obtain good statistics on capital flows, but I have managed to find the following observations. Cross-border trade in shares and bonds in the USA more than doubled as a percentage of the US GDP between 1970 and 1993. During the same period, the corresponding volume rose from almost zero to 10 times GDP in the UK. A fixed exchange rate offers speculation at no risk, if there are signs that the currency is over-valued. This was the situation in Sweden in the early 1990s. The fixed exchange rate regimes signalled to speculators that the exchange rate could only weaken.

Yves Mersch: Back to stable Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Zahlungsverkehrssymposium, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt am Main, 29 May 2019. * * * The primary objective of the ECB is to ensure price stability. This is also the best contribution we can make to achieving sustainable growth.1 Since the launch of the euro, the ECB has delivered on this commitment and rendered price stability a reality, maintaining an average inflation rate of below, but close to, 2%. And that is why the majority of euro area citizens trust the euro.2 Their trust is contingent on the independence of the central bank. Independence is granted to central banks to prevent politicians from seeking electoral gain through measures which boost economic activity in the short term but damage the long-term health of the economy and the country. It is also recognised that legal tender needs to be issued by a public authority. In the case of the EU, it falls to the ECB to issue the euro and decide on the denomination of banknotes. We could not accept a situation in which, for anti-European or populist motives, certain euro denominations were not allowed to be used in some parts of the EU. This established consensus is being challenged by private initiatives triggered by technical innovation. We are seeing ever more solutions in search of a problem. Bitcoin and other crypto-assets claim to need neither trust nor the backing of a sovereign.
Rodrigo Vergara: The Monetary Policy Report and the Financial Stability Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Finance Commission of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 1 July 2013. *  *  *  The Monetary Policy Report of June 2013 and the Financial Stability Report of the first half of 2013 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, Senator Andrés Zaldívar, senators members of this Commission, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate your invitation to present our Board’s vision on recent macroeconomic and financial developments, their prospects and implications for monetary and financial policy. This vision is contained in detail in our Monetary Policy Report of June 2013 and our Financial Stability Report of the first half of 2013. The macroeconomic scenario facing the Chilean economy has undergone significant changes in recent months. Output and demand decelerated and, although some moderation in their growth rates was expected and desirable, the first quarter brought a sharper adjustment than had been anticipated. On the external front, there have been significant developments in the composition of global growth, the trajectory of commodity prices and the evolution of global financial markets. From a medium-term perspective, recent developments point to a healthy normalization of the unusual international conditions that have prevailed for some years now, and their effects on our local economy.

Let me expand a little on these vulnerabilities: Repeated downward revisions to the economic outlook and accommodative monetary policy actions on both sides of the Atlantic have put downward pressure on global bond yields across the whole maturity spectrum. For the first time in history, large parts of the yield curve for many euro area sovereign bonds, in particular those issued by governments with high credit ratings, have entered negative territory. It is often said that low or negative interest rates inflate asset prices as investors search for yield and take on more credit and duration risk. Equity and corporate bond prices, for instance, have appreciated across the globe over the past decade as yields have followed a path of long-term decline. Abrupt corrections, especially in equity markets and markets for lower-rated bonds remain a risk, particularly in the face of high economic and political uncertainty. Low funding costs can encourage firms to increase their leverage, which might intensify vulnerabilities in the event of an economic downturn. This risk has increased as the economic outlook has worsened and the share of triple-B ratings has grown. Concerning the second vulnerability, in several countries debt in the public and/or nonfinancial private sectors is lingering at levels that are high by historical and international standards. This leaves public and private finances exposed to the risk of a sudden change in market sentiment or deteriorating macroeconomic conditions. Third, parts of the banking sector continue to exhibit weak performance.
Most of all, being open in spirit and mindset, staying open to diversity, being comfortable working in multi-cultural settings, thriving in a globalised world. We must also remain a resilient society. Able to ride the ups and downs of business cycles and structural changes. Able to adapt, learn new skills, continually improve. We must become a more innovative society to be dynamic. Willing to experiment and accepting failure as a halfway house to success. Investing in R&D, leveraging on technology. Most of all, having an enterprising spirit – always seeking new and better ways to do things. In the end, we must be an inclusive society. It is probably not a coincidence that IPS has chosen to make the theme of this conference ‘Together’. The two forces that offer the most promise for sustained economic dynamism are globalisation and technology. But how far we can reap the benefits of globalisation and technology will depend on how well we bring all our people together. The path of dynamism is also the path of continuous disruption, even dislocation. To sustain the momentum and consensus in favour of globalisation and technology, we must help those adversely affected by them and equip Singaporeans to succeed. And to maintain cohesion in the face of population ageing and growing healthcare burdens, those who have benefitted from our growth and dynamism must contribute to the larger society – through taxation, philanthropy, community service. We then become not just a dynamic people but also a compassionate one.

no additional new citizens or permanent residents on a net basis) and no additional foreign workers – will have important implications for economic growth. From the perspective of the supply-side capacity or potential of the economy, GDP growth can be seen as the sum of productivity growth and labour force growth. This means, holding productivity growth constant, a decline in labour force growth will have a direct impact on economic growth. This correlation appears to be borne out in the past empirically. If labour force growth falls to near zero, then the only source of GDP growth is productivity growth. If productivity growth stays at about 1.5%, which is what we have likely averaged over the last 7 years (based on mid-year employment), then GDP growth will approach that level. 4 / 17  BIS central bankers' speeches  This then is the demographic trilemma. We have three possible objectives that various people in Singapore have advocated in the past. The reality is, at any one time, we can achieve only two out of the three objectives. The three possible objectives are: Positive labour force expansion Zero net immigration, that some would prefer No increase in share of foreign workers in total workforce So, what are the trade-offs? If you look at the corners of the triangle, that’s where the trade-offs are: If we want labour force to grow and have zero net immigration, then we have to allow the share of foreign workers in the workforce to rise. That’s the bottom left of the triangle.
Rather, the intention is that each host authority should be able to carry out these responsibilities more effectively by relying to some extent on the work of others. It cannot possibly make sense for, say, 30 different supervisors to crawl over the controls centralised and concentrated in one location? We are keen to examine the practicability of allowing one co-ordinator to carry out the role defined above. Enthusiasm from the US has been more muted, although commercial BIS Review 21/1997  - 15 -  banks are, of course, already subjected to consolidated supervision. Here I know there are political issues at stake too, and any foreigner is well advised to tread carefully. I would hope, nevertheless, that these important issues can be considered carefully. More problematic is the position of the US investment banking groups who, uniquely amongst the banking and securities industries in major countries, are not subject to legislation requiring consolidated supervision. Some have banking subsidiaries in the UK, owned by companies established under Article XII of the New York State Banking Act. Accordingly these companies and their UK subsidiaries are subject to consolidated supervision by the New York State Banking Department. The involvement of a home country supervisor in this way gives us a degree of comfort which allows the ring-fencing to be less stringent than it would otherwise be. However this clearly falls a long way short of comprehensive consolidated supervision of the entire investment banking group.

I also have a number of specific remarks and views to make on the aspects of East Asian financial markets to be discussed in the next sessions. But for the benefit of time, I think I should leave them for later opportunity. For now, let me close by saying a little bit about the role of policy. Government policies, in my view, have played an important role in the current development of East Asian financial markets. The key policy, of course, has been the implementation of financial sector reform which has resulted in a much improved financial system, especially the banking sector. Policies have been directed at developing the region’s capital markets too, especially the bond market. Policy coordination has also been strengthened to increase regional financial integration and to develop a policy coordination framework that can help the region deal better with the likelihood of a crisis. I am referring here to the CMI or the Chiang Mai Initiative and its surveillance process. But while policies have been important, the process of financial market development in East Asia has essentially been left to the market, in the sense that the process is basically a market-driven one. But on account of what is perceived to be a slow progress, question arises whether policy should do more. My view is that the process should continue to be market-driven and not policy-driven. But there are areas that government policies can do more, especially on issues that involve efforts on a region-wide basis.
In my view, we have to renounce a fully-fledged EDIS as a prerequisite – which is the main deadlock – and opt for an alternative set-up where national guarantee schemes would bring one another liquidity support, and where subsidiaries across the EU could be affiliated to the home deposit guarantee scheme. Other pragmatic steps are possible in a parallel approach. Resolution tools could be used for small and medium banks too, without increasing the size of the Single Resolution Fund. We could significantly improve the coordination between Supervision and Resolution, and better incorporate the cross-border dimension in our requirements for MREL (which are still significantly higher than the TLAC international rule). Having found workable solutions for worst-case scenarios, we will be able to focus on further moving beyond home/host issues in normal times. Banks should be able to make broader use of cross-border liquidity waivers, as currently allowed by the regulation. New waivers for capital requirements should be envisaged as well. On the prudential topic, I take the opportunity to underline that the Commission’s draft transposition of Basel 3 fully takes into account the specificities of European banks and provides sufficient time to adapt to the new features of the supervisory framework. The proposed exemptions will help maintain financing capacities but they have to remain temporary; otherwise, our international credibility and Basel 3 compliance would be harmed.

We also regard our definition as a particular advantage in the post-pandemic phase, with its heightened uncertainty regarding structural equilibria. Why is this so? And how can three adjustments that have been discussed internationally be put in context against the backdrop of the specific situation in Switzerland and our definition of price stability? The first possible adjustment relates to the level of the inflation target. A credible higher inflation target would lead to both an increase in expected and realised inflation. The consequence would be higher average nominal interest rates, which would reduce the likelihood of the effective lower bound being reached. As a result, unconventional measures – Page 7/16  in our case primarily foreign exchange market interventions – would need to be used less frequently. Why do we not aim for a higher rate of inflation? We do not believe a higher inflation target would truly free us from the problem of the effective lower bound. It would take a significantly higher inflation target to sustainably lift interest rates from the lower bound. However, such a target would no longer be compatible with our statutory mandate to ensure price stability. Furthermore, it would not tally with the pronounced preference of the Swiss people for low inflation. Higher rates of inflation would be neither understood nor accepted in Switzerland. A survey of more than 400 Swiss companies in the first half of 2022 showed a large majority in favour of low inflation, by which they typically mean a rate between 0% and 2% (cf.
One of the most infamous is the 1998 study based on just 12 children published in the Lancet claiming there was a link between the MMR vaccine and autism. Uptake of the MMR vaccine subsequently dropped to under 80% nationally, and mumps reached epidemic levels in Britain in 2005. It later transpired that the lead author of the article had failed to disclose his role as a paid adviser in a lawsuit claiming MMR had harmed children. He was struck off, later studies have failed to establish a credible link between vaccines and autism, and the Lancet has fully retracted the article. if policymakers had systematically overambitious goals for economic activity they would succeed only in generating extra inflation. A seminal paper by Rogoff (1985) first suggested that delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank can overcome the inflation bias problem, delivering lower inflation and output variability. 9 See Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (See “Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes”, The World Bank Economic Review, 1992) and Crowe and Meade (See “The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007). I define central banks with an index score greater than 0.4 on the Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) index as having a ‘moderate’ degree of independence.

Fullwood, J (2016) “A cat, a hat and a simple measure of gobbledygook: How readable is your writing?”, blog on Bank Underground (https://bankunderground.co.uk/2016/10/04/a-cat-a-hat-and-a-simple-measure-of-gobbledygook-how-readable-is-your-writing/) 20 21  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Chart 2: Level of reading comprehension required for various publications  a  % of population proficient at each level 100 - Mark Twain  90 80  - Tabloid Newspaper - Political Speeches - This Speech  70 60 50  - Bank of England publications - Commercial bank T&Cs - Broadsheet newspapers  40 30 20 10 0 Rudimentary (1-2)  Basic (3-6)  Intermediate (7-10)  Adept (11-15)  Advanced (16+)  Literacy Grade Level of Adults Source: Fullwood, J (2016), US national adult literacy survey (1992), Flesch-Kincaid readability test a Literacy grade level and % of population proficient at each level are based on US data. Experts’ attempts to make themselves heard is also made more difficult by the changing landscape of trust. The age of deference is certainly over. The Edelman Trust Barometer for 2017 finds that in two-thirds of countries, less than 50% trust mainstream institutions of business, government, media and NGOs to do what is right. 22  It is important to note that measuring trust is perilous because reliable longitudinal data is scarce  and when available does not show a clearly declining trend in all areas.