samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition to such macroprudential buffers, we would like to have an opportunity to restrict highrisk lending not by raising the requirements for banks’ capital, as banks need capital for lending and, moreover, it is distributed unevenly across the system. These buffers are very efficient and might become a problem for some banks, whereas they are wholly useless for other banks and do not influence lending growth paces. We have prepared proposals for the Bank of Russia to be entitled, just as regulators in many other countries, to set direct quantitative limits for consumer loans. The relevant draft law has been submitted to the State Duma. We also hope for your support in this regard. In our opinion, this measure is absolutely essential and beneficial in all respects. Considering the current state of the banking system and our policy aimed at preventing the accumulation of systemic risks (this is an area we are closely monitoring to avoid a build-up of systemic risks in the financial area, and the financial area is an infrastructure, the circulatory system of the entire economy, as it is often called), the banking sector will maintain its stability further on and continue to provide lending to the economy. This makes it possible for us to start discussing the next step in the protection of depositors’ rights: jointly with the Deposit Insurance Agency, we are studying opportunities for expanding insurance for not only individuals and small businesses, but possibly medium-sized enterprises as well, and also social, educational and healthcare organisations.

Signing a bank deposit agreement or a loan agreement or buying an insurance product, individuals should have comprehensive information on the conditions, expected returns, the full cost of all services, their rights and obligations. The issue of hard selling of services has also been discussed at the State Duma for many years. We are developing an instrument whereby key information documents on financial products disclose compact and clear data to consumers regarding all the conditions. We are also addressing the topic of hard selling of extra services and various fees when individuals sign 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  a consumer loan agreement. At the end of last year, we issued an information letter obliging banks to include such additional ‘services’ (only so-called services because they generally provide no benefits to people) into the calculation of the total cost of credit. I have said ‘an information letter obliging’, but there is a contradiction here since these are only recommendations and, accordingly, they cannot oblige anybody. We propose that organisations should specify the total cost of credit from the very start so that people understand the actual costs for loan servicing. This will enable people to select more advantageous offers. However, we certainly need legislative changes. Such amendments have been drafted with the engagement of the Central Bank. They propose the introduction of a so-called open-ended cooling-off period, which will enable consumers to fully abandon any services foisted on them together with a loan (with the refund of all related payments).
As governor of the Banco de España, allow me to point out how, in its economic significance, this countercyclical buffer is close to the so-called “dynamic provisions” the Banco de España established more than 10 years ago — with, I should say, less success than, we now know,  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  would have been optimal. We believe this countercyclical buffer is a good instrument and we advocate its use as a new macroprudential instrument. The fact that many ailing banks have been systemic banks has been another consideration influencing supervisors’ stance as to what the response to the crisis should be. Consequently, another significant change in banking regulation arrangements is to set in place a capital surcharge for global systemic important banks (GSIBs). A global important bank is not only a large bank. It is a major bank with significant cross-border activity, a complex bank in terms of its structure, and an interconnected bank that is not liable to be replaced in certain markets. Regarding global systemic important banks, I should also mention the so-called “recovery and resolution plans”. It is important to highlight the value of this instrument in reducing systemic risk and also a formula for taking into account differences between business models in regulation and supervision. One of the final components of Basel III is the leverage ratio, which should be seen as a complement to the risk-based regulatory framework.

Basel III is a complex set of measures that attempts to respond to the regulatory failings that the crisis highlighted. First, many banks found themselves at the start of the crisis with low levels of capital. Second, this same capital had an excessive proportion of hybrid instruments, with a limited or, at least, uncertain loss-absorption capacity. Third, and finally, the procyclicality of Basel II meant there was a trade-off between capital requirements and growth, which could push banks to lessen the risk they assume, with the subsequent adverse impact on credit and the economy. Basel III has increased the minimum level of core capital, the highest-quality capital, to 4.5% from 2% under Basel II. On top of this minimum, Basel III has added a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and established a connection between banks’ dividend policy and compliance with this minimum capital level. Accordingly, to avoid any interference by the supervisor in their dividend policy, banks must at all times hold a minimum level of top-quality capital of 7%. For the first time, too, Basel III has added a macroprudential component to capital levels. The countercyclical capital buffer could entail an additional capital requirement of up to 2.5%. Building up a capital buffer in good times, with the aim of depleting it in not so prosperous times, is a macroprudential mechanism that will help reduce the contraction of credit when there is a recession, and temper the growth of credit in upturns. However, calibrating the buffer is no easy task.
Uniform and commonly applicable standards lower the cost of acquisition and analysis of information and reinforce the financial system stability. The most significant standards include, inter alia, the following: •  the principles of effective banking supervision, drawn up by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS),  •  international accounting standards, over 100 countries have adopted or based their own accounting standards on the International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),  •  master agreements on executing transactions on the interbank market ― ISDA, ISMA,  •  statistical methodologies elaborated by, inter alia, the IMF, the BIS, and the WB that ensure compliance of the data gathered with the statistical guidelines and their international comparability,  •  the principles of best practice, elaborated by professional associations of financiers. The development of the modern financial market infrastructure has also covered regulatory changes (e.g. the bankruptcy law) and the establishment of modern transactional systems, payment systems, settlement systems, risk management systems, and information services – such as Reuters or Bloomberg. Stock exchanges and brokers have created modern trading platforms which enable  3  Hannoun H. “Internalisation of financial services: implications and challenges for central banks”, speech at the 41 Conference of the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN), Brunei Darussalam, 4 March, 2006. BIS Review 60/2006  st  7  prompt offer-matching, executing transactions and straight through processing. Development of the infrastructure has removed barriers to further market globalization.

Developments in recent years, with strong production growth and falling or only slightly rising employment are examples of how contradictory the signals can be. One weakness in this context is that production data is revised regularly. This makes it particularly difficult to estimate the amount of spare capacity there is in the economy at present. The picture of how high capacity utilisation was at a particular point in time can look different when new data are received and earlier outcomes are revised. One example worth mentioning is that the first data regarding GDP growth in Sweden during the first quarter of 2005 was 1.4 per cent, while the most recent calculations indicate that the figure was actually 2.1 per cent. The fact that there is considerable uncertainty regarding such a central variable as capacity utilisation is, of course, a problem. Everything would be much simpler if it were possible to quantify capacity utilisation in the same way as inflation can be measured. However, as it is not possible, I believe it is wise not to pretend to have this knowledge. For similar reasons, precise money supply measures have also been abandoned. Our forecasts of growth and inflation must nevertheless essentially be based on a view of the position of the economy with regard to a situation with normal capacity utilisation. In practice, a large amount of information from different sources must be weighed together to make an overall assessment.
In 1999 the GDP growth rate is expected to be rather more than 3 per cent. This implies that in 1998 and 1999 growth will be stronger than the increase in potential output, for which the annual trend is estimated to be just over 2 per cent. That means that today’s surplus capacity will be activated by degrees. It is difficult to tell how quickly this will happen. The Riksbank considers that the output gap -- a way of attempting to gauge unutilised capacity in the economy as a whole -- is currently about 2 per cent of GDP. With the growth rates envisaged above, the gap would then close some time in 1999. Other information with a bearing on when inflation might be likely to accelerate was also included in the inflation report. Estimates of structural unemployment and thereby, indirectly, of the level of unemployment that can be combined with stable, low inflation, suggest that risks of inflation also exist less than two years ahead. The rate at which capacity utilisation rises may likewise play a part. A rapid reduction of unutilised resources might generate inflationary impulses even though there is still a capacity surplus at total level. Risks in the wage negotiations Wage formation is particularly relevant at present because the settlements that are due in the coming six months will cover a large part of the labour market. Labour shortages are not yet being reported from more than a few sectors, but experience shows that the domino effects can be substantial.

I want to try and illustrate some of that promise of Big Data, as well as the potential pitfalls, by drawing on examples from recent Bank of England research on the economic and financial system. I will conclude with some, more speculative, thoughts on future Big Data research. 1  The Path Less Followed The first thing to say is that Big Data and data analytic techniques are not new. Nonetheless, over recent years they have become one of the most rapidly rising growth areas in academic and commercial circles. Over that period, data has become the new oil; data analytic techniques have become the oil extraction and 2  refining plants of their time; and data companies have become the new oil giants. Yet economics and finance has, to date, been rather reticent about fully embracing this oil-rush. For economics and finance, the use of data analytic techniques has been the path less followed, at least relative to other disciplines. One simple diagnostic on that comes from looking at the very different interpretations put on the expression “data mining” by those inside and outside of economics and finance. For economists, few sins are more heinous than data-mining. It is the last resort of a scoundrel to engage in “regression-hunting” – reporting only those regression results which best fit the hypothesis the researcher 3  first set out to test. It is what puts the “con” into econometrics.
An ideal scenario would be if decisions on the asset portfolio could be converted into policy rate changes and added to the existing repo-rate path. However, while we are still learning more about the effects of changes in the asset holding on interest ratesetting, my aim is to ensure that the public continues to have confidence in our monetary policy. One of the main elements of our monetary policy throughout the period of inflation targeting has been our desire for transparency and clarity: What we are doing and what we achieve with our measures. By continuing along this path, the public should be able to rely on us at the Riksbank doing our job and maintaining price stability, that is, keeping inflation so stable that you do not really have to think about it. Thank you for listening! 27 See, for example, Di Casola (2021), Melander (2021) and Gustafsson (2022). 28 At that time, a few countries had introduced an inflation target: New Zealand was the first in 1990, followed by  Canada in 1991 and the United Kingdom in 1992. See also Jonung (2003). 29 See Skingsley (2021). 10 [19]  References Bailey, Andrew (2020), “The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past, present and future”, speech at Jackson Hole, published on 28 August, available at The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past, present and future - speech by Andrew Bailey | Bank of England.

It is clear, for instance, that the maturity of the covered bonds is considerably shorter than that of the government bonds, which means that most of the holding will have declined within five years through maturities, should the Executive Board decide not to make any reinvestments after 2022. Thoughts regarding the future In conclusion, I would like to talk about the lessons we can learn for the future. During the coronavirus crisis we made extensive purchases that we are now planning to phase out in a predictable manner. We believe that the purchases have worked well. But as you know, no two crises are the same. What strategies are available in the future? Go big and fast, buy a little at a time or take a middle way? One alternative is what Andy Bailey and others at the Bank of England have discussed, namely to 'go big and fast' and then fairly quickly dismantle the holding as soon as the situation improves, to have your ammunition ready for the next crisis or economic downturn.24 I think that the holding should be phased out when it is politically motivated and I am not keen on dismantling it to increase our purchasing scope. This is a variation on the theme of raising the policy rate just to be able to lower it later. Another option is to buy a limited amount of assets when the need arises, combined with a commitment to buy more if the situation deteriorates.
The Federal Reserve has undertaken to keep an ultraexpansionary monetary policy in place for as long as this situation persists and does not jeopardize inflation, which has important implications for the global financial scenario that the Chilean economy will continue to face in the coming years. Plus, the U.S. has a high fiscal deficit that reflects in an excessive increase of its public debt. If a political agreement is not achieved, early next year a number of automatic adjustments of taxes and expenses (the socalled fiscal cliff) will be forced into the economy. Given the sluggish growth in this country, if they have to apply such major adjustments, the economy will relapse into a new recession. Unfortunately, when the deadline is only days away, there are no signs of agreement in sight. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The emerging world continues to outperform the developed economies, although with greater diversity within the group. In China, indicators suggest that growth is picking up after the deceleration of most of 2012. Latin America, meanwhile, has shown reduced growth during the year and the outlook for the next two years has also been revised downward. The slowdown has been sharper in Brazil and it is not clear what the velocity of its recovery will be. Mexico and Colombia have also begun giving signs of a slowdown. Peru continues to grow strongly, while Argentina is dealing with major adjustments. The Chilean economy has remained on an upward slope, driven by strong domestic demand and, particularly, fixed investment.

There are clear risks in sight: in particular, heightened geopolitical tensions could dampen business and consumer confidence. Furthermore, the risk of insufficient structural reforms could weigh on the business environment. How can this uncomfortable cocktail of high unemployment (11.5% this July) and ultra-low inflation in the euro area (0.3% in August, i.e. far below the ECB’s target of below, but close to, 2%) be overcome? How, if at all, can Europe avoid a stagnation scenario such as that faced by the Japanese economy for decades? We do not see Japanese-style deflation in the euro area, as a number of factors differ distinctly from Japan in the 1990s. Firstly, we, the ECB, took decisive action at a very early stage in the crisis, and have continued to do so. Most recently, against the backdrop of a persistently weak inflation outlook, slowing growth momentum and subdued monetary and credit dynamics, we decided in early September to adopt a number of additional monetary policy initiatives which will complete and complement the measures already announced in June. On the basis of our current information, we expect inflation to remain at low levels, before gradually increasing during 2015 and 2016. Furthermore, while inflation expectations have declined, particularly at shorter maturities, our measures will underpin the firm anchoring of inflation expectations in line with our aim of maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2%.
Given the likely circumstances in which it would be occurring the tearing up of derivative contracts and winding down of a major clearing service could be a significant shock to the system. In those circumstances, I see a number of reasons why a resolution regime is necessary to provide public sector authorities with the option to step in – if necessary before the CCP has come to the end of its preagreed recovery and wind down actions. In such circumstances, where the actions or inaction by the CCP run the risk of amplifying a systemic problem, it is appropriate that a public authority be capable of intervening to manage that systemic risk and to thereby protect public funds from needing to be used. In contrast to CCP management who will owe fiduciary duties first and foremost to their shareholders, a resolution authority will have powers and duties that require and enable it to act in the interests of financial stability. The benefits of stepping in to stabilise the situation could take a number of forms. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  For example, if ‘voluntary’ measures such as auctions were failing and there was a serious risk of financial contagion from margin gains haircutting, the resolution authority could decide it was better to intervene quickly to tear-up a subset of contracts earlier than would otherwise be permitted under the rulebook. Doing so would return the CCP to a matched book before losses escalated further and before the damage became irreparable.

Over the past few years the NBR has used all its available instruments to fulfil its tasks in the area of achieving price stability, seeking to ensure a low volatility of the exchange rate – an exchange rate which is set by the market. In short, all our steps have focused on maintaining stability and rebuilding confidence. In conclusion, over the past 10–15 years most economists have discovered good governance – with its four pillars: transparency, accountability, predictability and participation – as a major determinant of economic growth. Thus, economic governance implies the need to ensure stable, transparent and predictable rules that encourage competition and fair access to public services. It is achieved through a country’s public and private sector institutions and the civil society. Moreover, the recent crisis, which today wreaks havoc given the structural interdependencies worldwide, has underscored the need for an in-depth reform of economic governance at global levels. As Mr. Jean-Claude Trichet, the former ECB President, said, in light of the global crisis, “International interdependencies are too large for purely national or regional rules to be optimal and there is a clear need to strengthen global governance, in particular in the financial field.” I would also like to share with you a few thoughts about corporate governance. I’m sure the debates on this topic will be comprehensive during all these days and you, as specialists, will be able to unveil its very generous facets.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the People’s Bank of China (PBC) are looking to enable designated banks in Singapore to offer custody and trading services for global investors in China’s bond market. Third, providing opportunities for our financial institutions to grow in each other’s markets. The Bank of China and ICBC are among the select group of nine Qualifying Full Banks in Singapore; five Chinese banks are licensed as Wholesale Banks. All three Singapore-headquartered local banks are incorporated in China. The Shanghai-Singapore Connection Within this broader canvass of financial co-operation, the ties between Shanghai and Singapore have been intensifying. Singapore banks are deepening their partnerships in Shanghai – DBS and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank in loan syndication and joint bond underwriting; OCBC and Bank of Shanghai in digital banking and supply chain financing; 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  UOB and Shenergy Group in establishing a consumer finance corporation. Our exchanges are working closer together. The Asia Pacific Exchange (APEX), a commodities derivatives exchange in Singapore, is collaborating with the Shanghai International Energy Exchange (INE) to attract more international institutional investors to China’s commodity derivatives markets. The co-operation between the regulators has been growing stronger. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and the Shanghai Municipal Financial Regulatory Bureau have been organising since 2017 a joint training and exchange programme for financial agencies and institutions from both cities. MAS and the Shanghai Municipal Financial Regulatory Bureau have also organised since 2015 four editions of the Singapore-Shanghai Financial Forum (SSFF).

Maja Kadievska-Vojnovik: Foreign investment’s importance to the Republic of Macedonia’s economy Speech by Ms Maja Kadievska-Vojnovik, Vice-Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the presentation of the Business Climate Survey in Macedonia, Macedonian-German Economic Association, Skopje, 10 April 2014. *  *  *  Dear Mr. Martin Knapp, Dear guests, It is an honor and pleasure to have this opportunity today to attend the presentation of the Business Climate Survey in the Republic of Macedonia, which is part of a regional survey of the representative offices of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce in Central and Southeast European countries. Namely, the Survey provides significant information on the companies’ perceptions about the Macedonian economy, and I would like to keep to some of its important aspects. It is more than clear that there are tight connections between Macedonian and German economy, which are being realized through several channels, such as: •  trade channels  •  capital flows and  •  through the remittance channel. First, Germany is and it raises its importance as the largest trade partner of the Republic of Macedonia. The share of the trade of goods with the EU member states in the total trade of RM of 52% before the crisis, in 2008, reached 67% in 2013.