samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In parallel, there has also been an increase in the variety of goods and services exported, with intermediate goods and services accounting for a growing proportion. Since 2007 the number of Spanish goods-exporting companies has increased by more than 40%. And this despite the difficulties the international environment has undergone and the competition from the emerging economies. Moreover, the contribution of SMEs to this process is beginning to be significant. A further reflection of the internationalisation of the Spanish economy in the past two decades has been its growing share in international direct investment flows, not only through foreign capital inflows, but also through investment by Spanish firms abroad. Spain has become a net issuer of direct investment, running counter to the historical pattern. Large Spanish companies initially directed their foreign investment towards Latin America, diversifying subsequently towards the European Union. Currently, these two areas account for 50% and 30%, respectively, of total Spanish foreign direct investment in the rest of the world. Direct investment flows into Spain, after having been interrupted at the height of the euro area financial market tensions in 2012, are regaining their pre-crisis levels. The gains in competitiveness and the reforms undertaken have no doubt increased the attractiveness of our economy to investors. The headway made in the internationalisation of the economy against a particularly difficult background underscores the competitive capacity of part of the Spanish productive system.

In this regard, I  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  believe that our Flexible Inflation Targeting framework will continue to serve us well. This conclusion is based not solely on Thailand’s favorable experience with the framework, but also echoes the experiences of many other central banks around the world. Supplementing this framework with macroprudential measures should help to further strengthen our ability to deliver long-term economic and financial stability. While the current monetary framework gives priority to inflation, the BOT gives a balanced consideration to economic growth and financial stability as well. In the face of severe disruption to economic activity from the floods, elevated risks and uncertainties from the global economy, and moderating inflationary pressure, monetary policy has recently shifted toward addressing risks to economic growth. This is reflected in the two consecutive reductions in the policy rate in the last two meetings before yesterday. These actions have helped to shore up confidence and accelerate the return of economic activity to normal levels. At this juncture, upside risks to inflation have begun to increase. Externally, geopolitical problems in the Middle East have pushed global oil prices up strongly. Domestically, postflood pickup in public and private spending is adding to demand pressure. In addition, various government measures, including the reduction in the oil subsidy and a hike in the minimum wage, may also boost prices in the short term. As I understand, the minimum wage increase is one of the chief concerns for many of you here.
“UK Monetary Policy – ‘Crossing the river by feeling the stones,” speech given at the Confederation of British Industry, Newcastle upon Tyne. Bank of England  Page 14  Pill, H. (2019), “Whatever it takes within our (new?) mandate” in R. Barwell and J. Chadha (eds.) Renewing our monetary vows: Open letters to the Governor of the Bank of England, pp. 37–54 (London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research). Pill, H. (2010). “Monetary policy in a low interest rate environment: A checklist,” NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 6(1), pp. 335-345. Tenreyro, S. (2022). “The economy and policy trade-offs,” Dow Lecture, National Institute of Economic and Social Research. Bank of England  Page 15  Endnotes 1  2  3 4  5 6 7 8  9  10 11  12  13  14  15 16 17 18 19  20  See: Vickers (2022). “The regulation of inflation: Reflections on 25 years of the MPC,” Beesley Lecture, 9 November 2022. The MPC’s communication following its 3 November 2022 meeting set out why both the market-implied path of future Bank Rate and the path where Bank Rate was maintained at a constant 3% level were seen as inappropriate given the prevailing economic circumstances. This is a form of guidance. But the preferred outlook for Bank Rate was left to be determined by the evolution of the data. See: Evans et al. (2015) for an articulation of this approach.

Bank of England  Page 1  Monetary policy and central bank asset purchases: Substitutes and complements − speech by Huw Pill Beesley Lecture given at the Institute of Directors, London 23 November 2022  The views expressed in this speech are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would particularly like to thank Saba Alam, Rohan Churm, Rich Harrison, Jack Meaning and Fergal Shortall for helpful discussions in the preparation of this speech. The text has also benefitted from helpful comments from Andrew Bailey, Jamie Bell, Ben Broadbent, Sarah Breeden, Alan Castle, Swati Dhingra,  Bank of England  Page 2  Andrew Hauser, Catherine Mann, Dave Ramsden, Martin Seneca, Silvana Tenreyro and Danny Walker, for which I am most grateful. Opinions (and all remaining errors and omissions) are my own. Bank of England  Page 3  Speech Good evening everyone. It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to speak here at the Institute of Directors and participate in the long-running Beesley Lecture series. As his prodigious academic record and contributions to public policy attest, Professor Michael Beesley was among the most influential industrial and regulatory economists of his day. With the passage of time, his advocacy of road pricing in the 1960s looks increasingly prescient. And, even after almost four decades, his guidance of privatisation and shaping of the subsequent regulatory environment continue to govern the structure of important UK network industries, such as rail and telecoms.
When they’re low, the world appears less risky, so less compensation appears to be needed for 12  risk. The trouble is that these are not measures of risk. They are a reflection of the risk appetite of those selling insurance. Taking on more risk because implied volatility is low is the equivalent of ignoring the road conditions and driving faster because your insurance got cheaper as a herd of new entrants flooded the car insurance market. When accidents start to increase, the whole thing can go into reverse. Those who had been selling insurance can incur losses. What might have looked like a profitable insurance business won’t do so any more. The terms on insurance can shift abruptly. The result: driving speeds slow down to a snail’s pace. In markets, this means price adjustments, whatever triggered them, might be followed by sharp withdrawal of cheap insurance… ….which removes the need for dealers to act as a stabilising influence… …Leading to greater market volatility…. …And sharp reduction in risk appetite. Market moves are amplified. These dynamics are difficult to size. They may or may not be of consequence. Exploration is needed about behaviour in some of the furthest corners of the system in order to take a firmer view on the form and extent of this fragility. As the Office of Financial Research in the United States noted, “Available data on investor portfolios are not sufficient to assess this…adequately”.

We must continue to make progress towards economic union in order to achieve more and to further join forces in the new international context. To do so, Europe should seize the opportunity to move forward on three concrete steps towards Economic Union: The first step, as of today, is to build a “Financing and Investment Union” (FIU) to steer abundant savings into productive investment. Resources are not lacking: in the euro area, the current account surplus, which is a measure of the excess of savings over investment, stands at more than 3% of GDP. This trend is often described as a “saving glut” but I believe it is more fitting to talk of an “investment crunch” [slide 6], since we lack productive investment. The FIU would merge together the initiatives already in place: the Capital Markets Union of course, but also the Juncker Investment Plan – which aims, through the use of limited public guarantees, to foster private investments totalling EUR 630 billion in six years –, and the Banking Union. We need to put the pieces of the puzzle together in order to magnify their impact through synergies. There are two objectives: [slide 7] increased diversification of firms’ financing – with more equity financing –, and higher resilience of the euro area thanks to private risk-sharing across domestic borders. [slide 8] The second step, after the FIU, would be a collective economic strategy for the euro area.
We have tried to avoid this, for instance by not arguing with each other in public. We have also refrained from evaluating colleagues’ arguments and proposals. Before choosing an approach to communication and transparency, we again tried to learn from other central banks. The main issue in the public debate seems to have been the minutes of our meetings. I believe the publication of minutes has advantages. The minutes provide a clear opening for the evaluation of what individual Board members contribute to the monetary policy discussion, besides facilitating the democratic control of and insight into our work. In my opinion, the arrangements we have chosen can promote a better understanding in society in general of the Riksbank’s policy and our deliberations. That is important not least in a small country where the discussion of stabilisation policy is not all that broad. 6  BIS Review 24/2001  Some conclusions Work on monetary policy has been arranged in ways that differ from country to country. This has to do with historical differences that stem from the society in which the policy is constructed. Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries require a greater degree of openness, for example, than countries in Central Europe. The duration and acceptance of low-inflation policies also play a part. A reluctance to change a winning concept was no doubt an important reason why the Bundesbank continued to adhere to money supply targets in its communication for so long even though academic studies showed that in practice its policy was being guided by inflation forecasts.

Lars Heikensten: Behind the granite walls up at Brunkebergstorg - monetary policy in practice Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag's Social Democrats, Stockholm, 21 March 2001. *  *  *  The theme for today’s seminar is monetary policy in practice. I find it extra stimulating because it is a subject I don’t often get a chance of talking about. While thinking about how to arrange what I want to say, I felt that, besides talking concretely about how we at the Riksbank go about assessing inflation, it would be a good idea to spend some time on some matters of principle. In that way I hope to lay a good foundation for the ensuing discussion. First I shall say a little about monetary policy’s purpose and our target. Then I shall describe how we make our assessment and how the Executive Board works. Before winding up, I shall also consider some issues connected with communication and transparency. ‘Hate inflation’ As we all know, monetary policy’s purpose is to safeguard low inflation. That has been the case in any event since the beginning of the 1990s. It became explicit, of course, when the Riksbank adopted an inflation target in February 1993. Since 1999, moreover, the Riksbank Act states that the objective of the Riksbank’s operations shall be to "maintain price stability". So why is this our objective?
EIOPA, in liaison with the British authority, has rightly made British insurance undertakings aware of the necessity to draw up plans to deal with Brexit, irrespective of the fact that negotiations are still underway. This is particularly important to ensure that Brexit takes place as smoothly as possible, with limited effects for policyholders. For the future however, it is worth considering the need to adjust the European institutional framework, so that it remains as efficient as possible. The review of the ESAs should prompt us to strengthen EIOPA missions. There are two areas in particular where enhanced convergence is needed, so that all European consumers are protected wherever the insurer is located in the European Union: construction and medical liability insurance. EIOPA has already launched cooperation platforms in order to facilitate information exchanges regarding construction liability insurance. We are strongly in favour of pursuing these initiatives and adopting measures to 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  harmonise supervisory practices in this regard. At the same time we should maintain a clear distinction between the day-to-day supervision entrusted to National Competent Authorities (NCA) and the regulatory harmonisation role that has to be played by EIOPA.

On this issue, I would like first of all to pay tribute to EIOPA which has done remarkable work to promote sound and consistent European regulation and harmonised supervisory practices within the European Union, since it was established in January 2011. The creation of EIOPA, following the Larosière report, reflected the need to move towards more integrated European supervision following the 2007–08 financial crisis, and I believe that it has been a success. In a context of increasing financial market integration, EIOPA has contributed to ensuring a true level playing field for all actors in the insurance and occupational pensions sector at the EU level, in coordination with national authorities and the other European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). This well-balanced supervisory framework helps us deal with the “institutional” innovation – this is my first point – that we are starting to see as a consequence of the Brexit vote. Some British entities are indeed considering the possibility of simply setting up empty shell corporations in the European Union, mere company nameplates, while keeping their resources in the United Kingdom. I fully agree with EIOPA that vigilance is called for in this respect. Moreover, Brexit brings with it certain risks, and consequently the need for contingency plans. I am thinking in particular of the European policyholders who took out insurance directly with British undertakings and who should continue to benefit from the same protection.
UK 10-year real government bond yields have fallen 115 basis points; by contrast 10-year real government bond yields in the US are down by around 25 basis points only. 2  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  the outlook and therefore on the potential timing of any Bank Rate increase. But all expect that any changes would be limited in scope and gradual in pace. From my perspective, given the mixed signals on consumer spending and business investment, and given the still subdued domestic inflationary pressures, in particular anaemic wage growth, now is not yet the time to begin that adjustment. In the coming months, I would like to see the extent to which weaker consumption growth is offset by other components of demand, whether wages begin to firm, and more generally, how the economy reacts to the prospect of tighter financial conditions and the reality of Brexit negotiations. During the negotiating period the economy will be importantly influenced by the expectations of households, firms and financial markets about the nature of both the transition and the longer term economic relationships with the EU and other countries. Markets have already anticipated some of the adjustment. Depending on whether and when any transition arrangement can be agreed, firms on either side of the channel may soon need to activate contingency plans. Before long, we will all begin to find out the extent to which Brexit is a gentle stroll along a smooth path to a land of cake and consumption.

This meeting of great minds will be the path towards building future leaders and respected finance professionals. It will be a hub where the best minds in finance will come together to contemplate, reflect and discuss on the frontiers of finance. In the pipeline are also plans to develop a mentorship programme supported by financial industry leaders, including bankers for fintech startups. This will expand horizons for ideation, enable cross-fertilisation of knowledge and boost startups in their journey to be successful ventures. This will be launched by the end of the year. Guardians of the future With the acceleration of technology, the financial sector of the future will be vastly different from what it is today. Fintech innovation, regulatory reforms, deepening integration and shifts in consumer demographics and preferences are some of the forces that will drive this change. Future bankers of the Malaysian financial sector will encounter opportunities and challenges not seen before. New jobs will be created and existing jobs will change or become extinct. Automation will change the back and middle office functions. Artificial intelligence will change how banking services are delivered to the consumer. Data science and big data will change the way financial and data analytics are conducted. Yet, the fact remains that we cannot predict the future with great certainty. In one of my speeches last year, I mentioned four possible scenarios on how the future of finance may unfold. The possibilities are exciting and almost limitless.
So I would like to start my remarks with a quick overview of those risks and opportunities, from my central banker perspective, then turn to the public policies that can help maximize those opportunities and limit those risks and the contribution that a CBDC can make, and end up with a few thought on the impact the issuance of a CBDC may have on the implementation of monetary policy. A. Risks and opportunities of new technologies: a central banker perspective 1. Let me start with the opportunities and risks from a macro financial perspective. The digitalization of finance holds many promises for society. It can reduce the cost of payments, especially cross-border ones. Digitalization, thanks to the use of Big Data and AI can also improve the allocation of savings, for instance by improving the information set used in credit decisions. The tokenization of financial assets can make financial exchanges safer and faster. Digitalization can also enlarge access to finance to more people, for instance, new insurance contracts may emerge through smart contracts. More generally, the hope is to make finance more user-centric and stimulate financial inclusion. From a purely monetary point of view, the digitalization of the financial system is also an opportunity. The entry of new players can reduce rents in the financial sector, allowing for a faster and smoother transmission of monetary policy to the economy. But digitalization also raises new risks.

Such recovery plans should: •  Identify actionable options that the firm can take in response to financial weakness that will restore the confidence of the firm’s counterparties in the firm without the need for extraordinary official sector support;  •  Incorporate processes that analyze the root causes of their problems and identify longer-term strategies that will need to be employed as other recovery options to restore capital and liquidity are being executed; and,  •  Be regularly tested and updated to ensure they remain reasonable. For some types of firms – like financial market utilities, recovery planning is actually an even more important issue. Because FMUs provide critical services to the industry, experiencing a major disruption that could lead to resolution – or dissolution – is unacceptable. It is important, then, that a CCP be structured in a way, and develop and have tools available, to enable it to recover from losses and continue operations under extreme scenarios. Simply put, the debate on ‘less complex’ for financial market utilities is much more about recovery than it is about resolution. Steadfast resiliency may include casting a more critical eye on the resources needed for a single CCP to withstand a plausible, severe shock. Conclusion While there is still work that needs to be done to make financial institutions more resilient, better managed and less complex, we have also made a great deal of progress.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Comparing financial crises Special address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Tun Ismail Ali Chair in Monetary and Financial Economies: Lecture on Comparison of the Financial Crises: "Japan and Asia in 1997-1998 vs. US 2008-2009", Kuala Lumpur, 10 July 2009. *  *  *  This year Bank Negara Malaysia celebrates 50 years of Central Banking. While a number of special events are taking place during the course of this year, perhaps the most significant one has taken place yesterday. It is most meaningful that I inform you on this occasion of the Public Lecture organised in honour of the first Malaysian Governor of Bank Negara Malaysia, Tun Ismail Mohamed Ali that yesterday the new Central Banking Act for Bank Negara Malaysia was passed by the Parliament. This new Act represents the culmination of more than two years' work to address many of the issues and challenges that are confronting Central Banks in the 21st century. The Act provides greater clarity of the mandate for which the Central Bank is accountable for, ensures adequate powers to undertake these mandates, and ensures autonomy in achieving these mandates thus providing for the integrity and credibility of the decisions made by the Bank. This is further reinforced by legislating the checks and balances in the Bank and a higher level of transparency to the Government, the legislature, the market and the public.

When each use case is finished, and value has been delivered, lessons learnt can be applied to the next use case. To give a concrete example, an early use case we identified in last year’s review was data on lending for commercial real estate. Commercial real estate lending, or CRE, is an important sector for any central bank charged with guarding financial stability. Following the great financial crisis, Andy Haldane (then the Bank of England’s Executive Director for Financial Stability, now our Chief Economist), suggested that commercial property has contributed more to financial crises than any other area of industry outside of banking6. As Alex Brazier, his successor as Financial Stability ED subsequently put it, when commercial real estate catches a cold, the whole economy starts to shiver7. So we need good data on CRE lending. But the sector has a tradition of negotiated, paper contracts, and a lack of automation in how loans were agreed and managed. This has meant that accessing good quality data on the CRE market is difficult, both for regulators and for market participants. To help address this, industry participants are working on creating a central utility for accessing granular CRE data8. But creating this utility will mean firms need to share the data used to run their CRE businesses. And they will need a common way to identify and label core CRE data – for example a consistent way of labelling the ‘Loan amount’ of a CRE loan, or the loan’s ‘arrangement fees’.