samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Most have accumulated massive international reserves, well in excess of what would be needed for precautionary reasons. All in all, this paints a very different picture as compared to past episodes of global turbulence, when these economies used to be not only “influenced” by the ups and downs of the changing risk preferences in global financial markets, but simply “driven” – even “drowned” – by them, sometimes regardless of their economic fundamentals. In my view, this separation from the main stream of the turbulence constitutes an achievement in itself. From other stand point, it is certainly striking that in this period of global financial turbulence inflation is identified as the key economic challenge for emerging economies. Indeed, the rise of inflationary pressures on food prices derived from the commodity boom, is becoming a very worrying concern. The large change in relative prices that underlies this prolonged boom is having a stronger impact on developing economies, with very negative and substantial effects on the well being of the poorest portions of their populations. Therefore, as inflation creeps up the concern of policymakers deepens, not only in the sphere of macroeconomic stability, but beyond. In connection with this, the fact that monetary policies have remained focused on inflation stability in most emerging market economies is an additional novelty to mention in the context of the present turmoil.

The latest issuance of 30-year green bond by the HKSAR Government is indeed the longest tenor green bond issued by a government in Asia and the Global Medium Term Note Programme is the first such programme dedicated to green bond issuances set up by a government in the world. Encouraged by overwhelming market response, we plan to double the overall borrowing ceiling to $ billion which will provide more room for exploring future issuance in other currencies, project types and channels. 12. By the end of 2019, $ billion of green bonds had been arranged and issued in Hong Kong with a significant number of them by Mainland and overseas entities. While we do not have the 2020 figure yet, our estimates show that the issuance pipeline remained strong during the year despite the disruptive effect of Covid. We are seeing increased issuer and product diversity and expect the strong momentum to continue. Mainland China has just announced the ambitious 2060 carbon neutrality target. We believe Hong Kong, which adopts international standards in green bond issuance, is the ideal platform to raise green capital from international investors to support this transition and are looking at ways to facilitate this, in particular within the Greater Bay Area. Clearly structured credit products can also take a place in helping to meet this huge financing needs in the many years to come. 13. Of course we also have other initiatives that specifically promote the structured credit market here.
But producers have also gained because price stability helps them to plan ahead. Lower inflation and confidence in central bank policies have, in turn, reduced uncertainty about future price developments. The lower inflation risk premium is allowing even industrial economies to grow at lower real interest rates than in the past. And, finally, an unambiguously beneficial consequence of the new international monetary order is that it allows for more efficient distribution of capital. At the same time as the current polarisation of exchange rate regimes has come into being, financial globalisation has intensified. Capital controls are being lifted in a growing number of developing countries. In the 1970s, net flows of private capital to the world's poor countries amounted to a little over 1% of host-country GDP. 3 By the end of the 1990s, this percentage figure had grown by a factor of three. Today, there is a broader acceptance of the benefits to be derived from financial liberalisation. Indeed, the gains expected from a free market for international capital are substantial. Global finance allows for a better allocation of world resources, enhancing the prospects for growth of all nations. For richer countries of the world, there are new investment opportunities to finance the expanding needs of their aging populations. Younger and poorer nations obtain access to capital to realise their high potential growth. This is the basic teaching of the theory of international capital flows.

By the late 1960s, fundamental misalignments between the major economies had become too great to support an international fixed exchange rate system and, reluctantly, we had to accept that the security we had taken for granted had become an unsustainable fiction: with ever growing international capital mobility, pegged regimes had become increasingly difficult to maintain. The reason is easy to understand: with capital free to move across national borders, the price of any currency is determined like the price of any other internationally traded asset – through the interaction and expectations of actors that operate beyond the borders of the issuing country and in response to variables that are beyond the area of influence of national authorities. By the early 1970s, central banks could not ignore this basic truth, and by 1976 all major currencies were floating. The Bretton Woods system was dead. In the decades that followed, many countries, especially developing ones, tried to cling to a dollar peg with periodic adjustments, in an effort to bring stability to their currencies. They were operating what economists call intermediate exchange rate regimes. The series of costly crises of the 1980s and 1990s proved how dangerous this path could be. The adjustable pegs that were able to channel thin capital flows were completely ineffectual when it came to containing the huge capital flows  BIS Review 120/2006  1  encountered in a more globalised world. By 1996, flexible exchange rates predominated in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, non-industrial Europe and the Western Hemisphere.
Jan F Qvigstad: On making good decisions Speech by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Oslo, 9 November 2010. The text below may differ from the actual presentation. This speech does not contain assessments of the economic situation or current interest rate setting. *  *  *  I would like to thank Øyvind Eitrheim, Amund Holmsen, Marie Norum Lerbak, Kjetil Olsen and Øistein Røisland for their valuable assistance in preparing this lecture. I would also like to thank Helle Snellingen for her contribution to the translation of the Norwegian text into English. 1. Introduction  When Hans Rasmus Astrup was appointed minister in Johan Sverdrup’s government in 1885, he sold his business in Stockholm and moved back to Norway. As I mentioned in my lecture here two years ago 1 , Astrup was at the time perhaps Norway’s wealthiest man. On his return to Norway, he needed a place to live, bought a plot of land here in Drammensveien and decided to build the house we are sitting in now. The question might be raised whether it was a good decision to build such a large and ostentatious house. But Astrup was not just looking for a home for his family. The house was also intended to provide a venue for interdisciplinary and political discussions. 2 We all make many decisions every single day, some more important than others.

37  Nor was this decision criticised by the business sector or the press, and in its publication “Økonomiske utsyn over året 1949”, Statistics Norway wrote that “the Norwegian external economy is so closely linked to that of the UK, that there was hardly any alternative to following the pound sterling”. See Jahn, Eriksen and Munthe (1966), p. 371. The decision to devalue the krone in 1949 is also discussed in Jansen (1975). BIS Review 147/2010  9  that alone. From a consequentialist standpoint, it matters little whether the intentions were good, if the consequences of the decision were not. Our decisions are good only if we reach the objective of price stability. As mentioned, our performance cannot be measured by whether inflation is always at target, partly because the economy is frequently exposed to abrupt and unexpected shocks. We will nearly always be slightly over or slightly under the target. But over time we can expect that these disturbances will even out, and in the long run we must also be evaluated on whether or not we achieve the objective of monetary policy. Have we, or have we not, achieved price stability these past ten years? 8. Conclusion  Making a good decision is of little use unless one also manages to have it implemented. Norges Bank enjoys a privileged position. When we make a decision, we can also implement it. Our independence gives us the freedom to decide what the key policy rate shall be.
Looking ahead, the uncertainty about the potential rise in the NPL ratio is notable since this crisis is on an unprecedented scale and is deeper than that envisaged in the adverse macroeconomic scenarios applied in the stress testing of the financial system in recent 10  years. The timing is also very different since in this episode, if current macroeconomic forecasts are confirmed, the adjustment to GDP would be concentrated in the first year of the shock (2020), to be followed by a recovery whose strength is still uncertain. In addition, the impact will hinge on the size and duration of the measures adopted, which will influence their effectiveness. In any event, the increase in NPLs is expected to be higher among smaller firms operating in sectors involving greater social interaction; and, in the case of households, in exposures not secured by mortgages. Accordingly, banks are already recording earlier part of the provisions that they might have to set aside in the future. Furthermore, my previous remarks about the aggregate situation of the system mask considerable diversity. This is mainly because the starting positions of the various institutions, in terms of own funds and credit quality, are already different. Likewise, some segments of households and non-financial corporations are also still in highly fragile financial situations. For example, smaller firms are more vulnerable to a scenario of falling revenues.

Second, that a clearer signal about what we believe will be the path of interest rates in the future helps to have a more efficient transmission of the Monetary Policy, particularly in turbulent times. In fact, in the more recent period, marked by a higher than normal level of uncertainty associated with both a grimmer outlook for the Chinese economy and the normalization of monetary policy in the United States, we have made a special effort to signal the financial market what is the likely direction of our monetary policy in our baseline scenario as well as the risks involved. We have done this by increasing the transparency of our analysis and, especially, by being more precise in our communication. Of course it is too soon to make a comprehensive and definite analysis about the costs and benefits of this policy, but in my view this extra amount of forward guidance has been positive in order to achieve a smoother economic adjustment in difficult times. I thank you for being here, and without further delay, welcome to our nineteenth annual conference: “Monetary policy through asset markets: lessons from unconventional measures and implications for an integrated world.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
The decision entails  BIS Review 64/2007  3  a tough trade-off between lower interest rates that boost the economy today but invite inflation tomorrow. Tightening interest rates burden households today but pre-empt inflation tomorrow. In the most recent episode of high oil prices in 2004-2006, the Monetary Policy Committee’s decision to tighten interest rates to maintain price stability was crucial for sustaining economic stability and growth in the current period. Inflation has been well contained and its persistence pre-empted. Last year, consumer price inflation came down from a peak of 6 percent in the second quarter, to 3.3 percent in the last quarter. In the first quarter of this year, headline inflation registered 2.4 percent. Ladies and Gentlemen, My third and final point is that Thailand must enhance its ability to compete through productivity improvement to continue reaping the benefits of globalization. The challenges of globalization are constantly changing. To meet these challenges from without, it is critical that the Thai economy build strength from within: by continuously improving the flexibility and efficiency of its firms, the resiliency of its households, and the competitiveness of its business environment. In this respect, public policy must engage in financial and real sector reforms and policies that promote a stable macroeconomic environment and a competitive private sector. Looking ahead, our financial and legal infrastructures will continue to be strengthened particularly through the introduction of a number of legislations and amendments. The new Financial Institutions Act and the Deposit Insurance Act are in the pipeline.

Over a mediumterm horizon, balance of payments trends remain unchanged. This year’s revision of the estimate for foreign currency reserves from $ billion to $ billion comes a result of higher foreign currency purchase volumes based on the fiscal rule in the context of higher oil prices. In conclusion, I would like to make the following comment. Should the situation unfold according to our baseline forecast, we hold open the prospect of a key rate reduction somewhat sooner than we assumed back in December last year. We do not rule out that this may occur in 2019. The Bank of Russia will make its key rate decisions, as it always does, taking into account inflation and economic dynamics against the forecast as well as risks posed by external conditions and the reaction of financial markets. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Ranee Jayamaha: Recent economic developments, challenges and strategies – proactive strategies in reducing inflation Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 25 May 2007. *  *  *  Inflation is a common enemy. Its impact will be felt by every single person in a country. Managing inflation and reducing inflationary expectations cannot be achieved by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) alone. It can only be done collectively and with cooperation from all stakeholders. Who are these critical stakeholders ? CBSL, the government, banks and financial institutions, fund managers/traders/dealers operating in various markets, investors both local and foreign households and consumers. 1. Central Bank of Sri Lanka  Given its prime objective of maintaining price stability, CBSL has been proactive in the conduct of monetary policy, which is the instrument through which this purpose can be achieved. CBSL sets monetary targets taking into consideration growth prospects of the economy, liquidity requirements necessary to facilitate growth and inflation at a desired level. The ultimate aim is to keep inflation at desirable levels and reduce inflationary expectations. CBSL, at its disposal, has a limited number of instruments to conduct monetary policy. The current framework places greater reliance on market-based instruments, such as changes to the policy interest rate and conduct of open market operations. Accordingly, CBSL has announced its monetary policy strategy and targets at the beginning of 2007.

However, there have been a lot of challenges and lessons have been learnt from the experiences we have undergone through as a country. These lessons must be turned into a platform to design and implement more effective medium and long-term policies. It is also important to note that one of the challenges confronting developing countries such as Zambia is the need to reduce inflation and ensure affordable credit through low lending interest rates. In this regard, I wish to appeal to professional bodies, like yours, to come up with options or ideas on how the issue could be tackled within the existing liberal financial environment. Although significant steps and progress have been made in improving the performance of the foreign exchange market, a number of challenges still remain. The main challenges in this area remain that of maintaining a stable and competitive exchange rate as well as diversification of the export base in order to tap into alternative sources of foreign exchange. Zambia’s continued reliance on the mining sector as a major source of foreign exchange has contributed to volatility in the exchange rate. Hence, there is an urgent need to explore all possibilities of diversifying the export base. To this effect, the different exchange rate regimes implemented since independence have provided us with good lessons upon which we can build our foreign exchange market and contribute to the buoyancy of our external sector.
In the Baltic countries, which have not yet adopted  4  BIS Review 56/2010  the euro, but have retained fixed exchange rates throughout the crisis, one can even see falling wages. The situation of the United Kingdom has certain similarities to that of the group of countries I have just described. Following several years of a deficit in the region of 3 per cent of GDP, the crisis entailed a rapid deterioration to a deficit of 13 per cent in 2009. According to the OECD’s forecast, gross public debt in the United Kingdom will double between 2007 and 2011. Here, too, we can see an increase in unit labour costs compared to the euro area, but the crucial difference is that the weaker pound has made it possible to strengthen competitiveness. (Slide: General government net lending in the United Kingdom). Things look better in Sweden Public finances in Sweden are in a much better state than in many other countries. However, our experience of the severe Swedish crisis in the early 1990s is reminiscent of the situation I have just outlined for some of the euro countries today. At that time, our public finances deteriorated from a surplus of 3 per cent of GDP in 1990 to a deficit of 11 per cent of GDP in 1993. (Slide: General government net lending in Sweden).

My second point concerns the mitigation of moral hazard. We absolutely have to avoid situations in which the payment of taxes or levies is understood as a de facto bailout policy insurance. In this respect, the allocation of the tax to a resolution fund or to the general budget does not enable public authorities to totally remove such a risk. Against this background, I think that an adequate, median way would be to extend the mandate of National Deposit Guarantee Schemes to early intervention tools and resolution powers. Moreover, we should build on the experience gained from ex ante risk-sensitive premiums, which seem to be very important for mitigating moral hazard. Most of these remarks have focused on the major and vital incentive to enhance financial regulation. Let me conclude by looking into the future. A macro-prudential policy framework could provide further room for manoeuvre. Indeed, the crisis has illustrated the necessity to have a wider spectrum when designing financial regulation. We should also not forget that financial intermediaries are primarily tools to promote a stable financing for the economy. That said, in practice, developing a well-articulated macro-prudential policy framework raises some challenges. I trust that the benefits of addressing them are worth the impressive hard work currently underway. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 57/2010
But we can accompany the movement and even lead some parts of the transition: -  we can do our best to incorporate climate and biodiversity dimensions within our non-monetary portfolios (the equity components of our own funds and pension liabilities portfolios). This is what we have started to do at the Banque de France.xxvii  -  we can also push for innovative approaches to integrate nature-related concerns within our monetary operations, as the ECB has started to do for climate change, looking in particular at its collateral assessment. -  we can also promote new nature-related stress testing exercises (including both climate and biodiversity shocks) for banks and financial institutions and for global financial stability; and improve our knowledge, as we have started to do with our NGFS task force and as we are doing with this conference. Regulators can also facilitate the work of central bankers. For example, the European Union has been at the forefront of the reflections around the question of what is material for investors. We consider that financial institutions and non-financial corporations are not only vulnerable to environmental risks (dependent) but also contribute to environmental degradation through their actions (they have an impact). In line with this concept, the article 29 of the 2019 French energy-climate law makes it mandatory to disclose not only on climate- and biodiversity-related risks, but also on how financial institutions and corporations align their strategies with international climate and biodiversity goals.

1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  As regards other economic developments specific to the euro area, despite the recent favourable GDP outturns, Russia's unjustified war against Ukraine and its people, continues to act as a headwind to euro area growth. Whilst supply chain bottlenecks are gradually easing and the supply of gas has become more secure, inflationary pressures remain elevated. Specifically, following a peak of headline inflation at 10.6% in October 2022, in February this year it still stands at 8.5%. At the same time, core inflation, which excludes the volatile items of energy and food and therefore captures demand pull forces of inflation, continues on an upward trajectory moving from 5.0% in October 2022 to 5.6% in February this year. In addition, wages continue to grow fast, supported by robust labour markets, with some catch-up to high inflation becoming the main theme in wage negotiations. In this setting of high headline and core inflation, monetary policymakers must ensure that inflation does not become entrenched. Therefore, from an expansionary monetary policy up until the end of 2021, the ECB has moved through the neutral range and continued moving into the restrictive monetary policy interest rate range, currently at 2,5%. At the last ECB Governing Council meeting beginning of February, we reiterated the need to stay the course in raising interest rates at a steady pace and keeping them at restrictive levels to ensure a timely return of inflation to our two per cent medium-term target.