samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Meanwhile, on the supply-side of the economy, there is little evidence as yet in the productivity data that would suggest an acceleration in the underlying rate of capacity output growth such as we have seen in the US, and which, while it lasted, would allow the economy to grow correspondingly faster without necessarily generating inflationary pressure. We might all fervently hope to become infected by that particular disease - but the actual evidence so far suggests that up to now we have remained immune. That does not necessarily mean that we will not see accelerating productivity growth. But we can’t afford to gamble on that happening either. When people approach me with the sound-bite “give 3  BIS Review 18/2000  growth a chance”, what I hear them saying is “take a risk with inflation”. But equally when they say “you must take no risks with inflation”, I hear them saying “the world will never change”. The truth is that nobody knows with any great confidence. The important thing is to keep an open mind and to monitor intensively all of the data as they becomes available to us, and then draw what inferences we can as to how those data affect the balance of risks around the inflation target looking ahead. And that of course is precisely what we do in the Monetary Policy Committee.

So I’d like to begin by taking an opinion poll! I’d like to put to you two questions. The first is how many of you agree that monetary policy should have the control of inflation as its overriding objective? May I ask all those of you who agree that monetary policy should have control of inflation as its overriding objective, please, to raise a hand. Now please would those who disagree that monetary policy should have control of inflation as its overriding objective please raise a hand. Now let me ask you a second question - and I’m afraid that only those who voted in favour in response to the first question are entitled to vote this time - I don’t want a biased result. Given the objective of control of inflation - the 2½% inflation target - please would those of you who think interest rates should be higher than they are at present raise a hand? Please raise a hand now if you think interest rates are at the right level? And will those of you who think that interest rates should be lower than they are at present now please raise a hand - but remember you can only vote if you agreed that monetary policy should be directed to controlling inflation! Welcome to your first meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee! Your votes will all be individually recorded by the Chairman and published with the minutes in a fortnight’s time!
In other words, we are not “inflation nutters”, who want to bring inflation back on target as quickly as possible, whatever the cost. The importance of inflation forecasts for interest rate decisions Let me move on to talk about the assumption for the repo rate that we use when making forecasts in our Inflation Report. 2  BIS Review 84/2006  The forecasts in the main scenario in the Riksbank’s Inflation Report have been based over the years on the assumption that the repo rate is held unchanged during the forecast period. This assumption had the advantage of providing a very simple and clear policy rule for monetary policy: If the forecast for inflation at the end of the forecast period was below two per cent, the repo rate would normally be cut, and if it was above two per cent the interest rate would be raised. If the forecast was very close to two per cent the repo rate would remain unchanged. Of course, this rule could not capture all of the nuances in the monetary policy discussion, but it provided a rough explanation of the monetary policy decisions. However, there were several disadvantages with the assumption of a constant repo rate. In situations where the market expected clearly rising or falling interest rates, it was difficult to compare our forecasts based on the assumption of a constant repo rate with those made by other forecasters.

The two-year horizon should be interpreted as a restriction as to how much consideration can normally be given to real economic developments. It is a restriction that we have imposed upon ourselves – like the specified inflation target – to create credibility for the price stability target. Similar reasoning lies behind the set tolerance interval we have chosen around the target. While the tolerance interval provides an interval within which inflation can normally be expected to fluctuate as a result of unexpected shocks and insufficient knowledge of exactly how monetary policy affects the economy, it provides a limit as to the size of the deviations that can be tolerated. However, let me point out that there can be certain situations where the shocks to the economy are so great that there is reason to allow even longer than two years to bring inflation back on target. If our assessment was that such a situation had arisen, we would make this clear when publishing our monetary policy decisions. One condition is that we do not find ourselves in a situation where we would risk undermining confidence in the inflation target or in monetary policy. These thoughts on how to take into account developments in the real economy are of course not unique to the Riksbank. Although the guidelines for inflation-targeting monetary policy vary slightly from one country to another, all central banks with inflation targets conduct monetary policy that to some extent takes into account the real economy. This is usually termed flexible inflation-targeting.
To ensure stability as regulations are lifted, leveraging on technology to improve data monitoring systems have enhanced the ability to monitor developments to assess any emerging risks to the system. During this period of strong fundamentals and rising potential for economic expansion, Malaysia has the flexibility to introduce measures not only to support growth but also to improve the quality of the growth and its long term sustainability. This includes significant investment in education and according priority towards achieving socio-economic stability. Overall, a balanced and holistic approach to economic management is aimed to ensure the foundation for a strong economy and its competitive position in the global economy. Thank you.

I am very sceptical about this strategy, as it could turn into an indirect yield curve control, which is not the intention.25 There is a considerable risk of misunderstanding between the central bank and market participants. I think that the experiences of the coronavirus crisis clearly indicate a middle way. During the initial phase of the crisis, economic uncertainty was monumental. We decided to go big and fast, as illustrated, for instance, by the fact that most of the measures were decided within a week of the WHO declaring a pandemic on 11 March 2020. The rest of the measures were adjustments or additions to an existing plan. As decision-makers, we did not have the luxury of awaiting detailed research results on what would be the best response, but acted to avoid the real economic crisis developing into a financial crisis. Both the Swedish Coronavirus Commission and the external assessment of monetary policy by Flug and Honohan concluded that such an approach was favourable to economic developments in Sweden.26 So much for big and fast. However, I am very doubtful about the rapid phasing out of assets on our balance sheet through active sales. One reason I have already mentioned is that the maturity of our assets is relatively short. But another reason is that the aggregate international experience with QT is very limited, and there are very few data points for estimating the effects. The precautionary principle 24 See Bailey (2020).
More pensioners can in the long run lead to lower saving and thereby a higher real interest rate On the other hand, the saving may decline gradually as an increasingly large percentage if the world population attain the age of retirement. However the speed and strength of the impact that demographics will have on savings is uncertain. It depends partly on the extent to which older people choose to remain in work for longer and to what extent those who work save more for their retirement when their life expectancy rises. Greater income disparities also affect propensity to save Another factor that can explain why the propensity to save has increased is the increased income spread. In most developed countries, income spreads have increased since the 1980s. High-income earners normally have a higher propensity to save than low-income earners. The increase in the income spread could therefore have meant that saving has increased. At the same time, it should be said that even if income disparities have increased within a number of countries, they have declined on a global level in that the emerging markets are catching up with the developed economies. It is therefore difficult to say how global saving has been affected. Wages as a share of added value have declined The greater income spreads are also visible in other ways. The trend towards increased saving has been so extensive that wealth has risen substantially in most industrial nations.

One possible explanation could instead be that the global population increase has fallen over a long period of time, and is expected to continue falling in the coming period. This could contribute to lower potential growth in that the labour force will increase at a slower pace. At the same time, this effect will be counteracted if labour productivity rises. Slower population growth and the fact that the working age population is shrinking indicate that growth will remain lower than in the pre-crisis decades. The prospects for labour productivity are much more difficult to assess. The rate of increase in labour productivity declined in connection with the economic downturn following the financial crisis and it is uncertain how lasting the effects will be. Demography affects propensity to save and thus the real interest rate Demographic developments also affect the propensity to save. Life expectancy has increased and the birth-rate has fallen in recent decades. This has meant that the population has aged in most parts of the world. It applies especially in developed countries but also in countries such as China and several other emerging markets. Merely the fact that people are on average living longer means that they need to save more money for their old age, unless the retirement age is raised at the same pace as the increase in life expectancy. Developments have also entailed a percentage increase in the older working age population (40–65 years old) – which normally has a high level of saving – in recent decades.
MAS has therefore re-centred its exchange rate policy band at the current level of the nominal effective exchange rate of the $ while maintaining a zero percent appreciation path and no change in the width of the policy band. Promoting key growth areas in the financial sector The weaker domestic and regional economic environment in the last two years has dampened growth in Singapore’s financial sector. Financial sector value-added contracted by 4.8 per cent in 2002 compared with a rise of 2.2 per cent in 2001. The banking industry was affected by weak loan demand. The insurance industry experienced a sharp decline in activity following three years of rapid growth. The securities industry was dragged down by falling equity market volumes and bearish market sentiment. But the weakness in overall financial activity masks strong performance in key growth areas such as asset management and treasury business. Total assets managed by Singapore-based financial institutions grew a healthy 12 per cent in 2002, bucking the global trend of a decline in assets under management. In the debt market, 2002 saw continued healthy growth in structured debt and a record number of issues by foreign entities. Singapore has also benefited to some extent from the consolidation of financial sector companies worldwide. Various institutions have chosen to centralise their regional operations in Singapore. For instance, in treasury, several global players consolidated in Singapore their regional foreign exchange and derivatives business.

The ABF Hong Kong Bond Index Fund made history by being the first bond exchange-traded fund launched in Asia. The PAIF has also set two records. It is the first listed Asian bond fund to invest in as many as eight bond markets in the region. As a listed fund, it allows easy access by both institutional and retail investors who wish to have exposure to the Asian bond markets in a cost-effective and convenient manner. Secondly, the PAIF is the first foreign institutional investor that has access to the interbank bond market of Mainland China. This is an important step in the opening up of China’s bond market to foreign participants. I am glad to see that the PAIF has played a catalytic role in development not only in China but also in all the markets in which the fund invests. 4. I take this opportunity to thank State Street Global Advisors (SSgA), the fund manager of the PAIF, for their commitment and dedication to the development of this innovative product and to the idea of an Asian bond market. We have seen a favourable response to the ABF Hong Kong Fund, and I hope that the PAIF, with its broader investor base, will also be well received by markets. I wish you every success in promoting the PAIF. Thank you. BIS Review 50/2005  1
Recognizing these changes, SIBA enlarged its membership, and took on its current name in 2000 to reflect its role in representing a wider group of members. That was a very timely move. Developments in Singapore's capital markets In the last 3 decades, Singapore's capital markets have grown in tandem with the growth in the global markets. New listings have grown, and the Singapore Exchange has attracted many foreign companies. Foreign listings now account for more than a quarter of total listings, making SGX the most international among Asian exchanges. Our debt market has also grown, with outstanding corporate debt issuance rising from $ billion in 1995 to $ billion in 2004. SIBA and its members have contributed to our success in developing our capital markets. The association has not only represented the interest of the investment banking community well; its initiatives have also facilitated the development of investment banking activities in Singapore. The professionalism and integrity of SIBA members in executing financial transactions have ensured that we maintain investor confidence in our markets. Going forward, capital markets worldwide will continue to evolve and present new challenges. For Singapore's capital markets to capitalize on fresh opportunities, we must all, as regulators, as market participants and as an industry body, do our utmost to keep up with changes. I hope we can work in close partnership to break new grounds for the industry here. I believe there are 3 fundamental factors that will enable our capital markets to stay ahead.

Firstly, a high standard of industry practice, enabled by high industry standards, and a strong, responsive supervisory framework. Secondly, a strong pool of market participants with deep expertise. Thirdly, a good network among the players and regulators to promote collaboration and the introduction of new products; as well as to promote Singapore as the choice location for capital raising and trading. All these are to be done without of course undermining competition or investors' interests. I believe SIBA can play key roles in each of these areas. Allow me to elaborate. 1/3  High standards to maintain confidence A fundamental building block of a good capital market is trust and integrity. Investors must have confidence that the market is clean, transparent, and provides fair dealing for all participants. They demand a high standard of corporate governance, timely disclosures, and compliance with regulations. Hence, MAS, as well as other relevant agencies like the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority and the Singapore Exchange, have actively worked on various initiatives to enhance disclosure, strengthen market discipline and improve corporate governance of listed companies. These efforts included the Code of Corporate Governance, revisions to the SGX listing rules, as well as the introduction of the new civil penalty regime under the Securities and Futures Act that provides an alternative enforcement mechanism. In September 2005, MAS released the Guidelines on Corporate Governance to provide guidance on the best practices for financial institutions on corporate governance.
To this end, the Committee has been working to formulate a set of disclosure requirements that will ensure the availability of sufficient information to assess the appropriateness of a bank’s capital relative to risk, while taking into account the bank’s proprietary needs. This is particularly important in relation to the internal ratings approach to credit risk. In January of this year, the Committee issued a discussion paper detailing guidance for strengthening the third pillar of the new capital framework. This paper provides recommendations on disclosures of banks’ capital structures, risk exposures and capital adequacy. The Committee is continuing to expand on these recommendations as its work on the first and second pillars of the new capital framework evolves. As the Committee continues to fine-tune the new capital framework, we are focusing on issues of primary concern to the industry and supervisors world-wide, seeking to avoid getting bogged down in secondary issues that could slow the overall process. This most certainly is a broad-scoped effort that will not, indeed cannot, meet every priority and concern of everyone. But we are well aware that the perfect cannot be the enemy of the good. With this in mind, I fully expect that we will meet our goal of releasing a new capital adequacy framework by early next year, followed by a short international comment period and then implementation in each of the member countries.

It consequently proposed the use of external credit assessments, such as credit ratings, as a means for helping to assign risk weights, and hence capital charges, on claims. We were pleased that on the whole respondents agreed with the goal of increasing the sensitivity of the standardized approach to credit risk. Nonetheless, given the difficulty of achieving the right balance between sensitivity and simplicity, the proposal to base the standardized approach on external credit rating agencies’ ratings has raised real concerns. Some have noted that, especially in emerging market countries, very few borrowers have credit ratings, and the new framework might then not be able to differentiate credit risk substantially between borrowers. Some also raised questions about the performance record of some ratings agencies, particularly in the context of various regional financial crises around the world. Unfortunately, few alternatives were suggested during the comment period. Still, we remain open to fresh ideas and are working hard to address the concerns noted. For example, we are exploring the use of other indicators of a borrower’s credit quality to differentiate between risk exposures in a way that could be applied by any bank. Moreover, in response to suggestions made by commentators that the standardized approach could be expanded to allow for even greater risk differentiation, the Committee is actively evaluating whether it would be feasible to incorporate additional risk weights, particularly for corporate claims and the riskiest assets held by banks.
Lars Nyberg: The repo rate - Spring 2002 Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish taxpayers’ association in Malmö and Kristianstad, 22 April 2002. *  *  *  I should like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to this discussion and the opportunity to develop some ideas on the Swedish economy as it looks in spring 2002. I shall start with the Riksbank's most recent Executive Board meeting on 18 March, where we decided to raise the repo rate by 0.25 percentage points to 4.0 per cent. It may seem as though the interest rate hike did not come at the most appropriate point in time, as economic activity is still weak. Why did we raise the rate so quickly and before most other central banks had done so? Moreover, we, in common with most of the analysts in the market, expect the inflation rate to fall during the spring. Why did we raise the repo rate when inflation is on its way down? These are questions that I shall try to answer today. Some analysts also consider that the Riksbank has made a sudden U-turn in its assessment of inflation and so I thought I would explain a little about how our view has changed and why. However, it was not actually a major change and cannot really be regarded as a total U-turn. Why was the repo rate raised when inflation is on its way down?

In that case, national authorities would licence domestic banks that would face significant restrictions on the type and magnitude of cross-border activities they would be allowed to undertake; for instance, by limiting the size of foreign currency balance sheets and maturity mismatches and not allowing collection of foreign currency deposits in foreign branches. These banks would then be supervised by the national supervisor, their deposits would be insured by the domestic deposit insurance system, and the national central bank would be their LOLR. Those banks that want a European passport would be licensed and supervised by an EU authority, however; they would be part of an EU-wide deposit insurance system, and in most cases, their LOLR would be the ECB. Let me now say a few words about the national level. The key issue here is that, as long as global risks and EU flaws are not dealt with, individual countries are forced to take action to protect themselves: action that might contribute further to the retreat of cross-border banking. These might take the form of restricting international activities of home banks and placing much more strict prudential limits on foreign currency maturity mismatches. For example, when Iceland lifts its current capital controls on outflows, it will probably impose restrictions on both the size and composition of foreign currency balance sheets of home-headquartered banks. Some might see such restrictions as capital controls in another form, but I see them as prudential rules.