samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Mojmír Hampl: The euro – the case of the European monetary integration project and its former hegemon Speech by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Mont Pelerin Society Annual Conference, Prague, 4 September 2012. *  *  *  Many thanks to the organizers for their kind invitation – I’m really honoured to speak on such a distinguished panel. But excuse me first for making a small detour: the organizers forgot to mention in my CV that I also had the honour – together with a group of distinguished colleagues (some of whom are here today) – to help launch Laissez Faire here 14 years ago. This is a magazine devoted to the promotion of liberal/libertarian ideas in the Czech public domain (“liberal” not in the American sense of this word). Such libertarianism is rather unusual intellectual equipment for a poor central banker, especially in the current times. However, I very much believe it is an advantage, and many of the ideas mentioned in Laissez Faire are very much missing from normal European policy debates. What a shame. But back to the topic: What is the euro? As Barry Eichengreen demonstrated, it is a really unique animal, a unique monetary arrangement. I do not buy into many of Barry Eichengreen’s ideas, but I do agree with this particular statement. Why? Here is my definition of the euro.

So the only thing that remains rather difficult to understand is the former hegemon’s efforts to resolve what is, for it, the awkward situation of non-compliance with and infringement of the rules of the club (including its own infringements) by creating new and ostensibly better rules for the same club with the same members. Yes, Otmar Issing, for instance, rightly warns against Eurobonds and simple fiscal unification, but with the European Stability Mechanism and the planned banking union we are effectively creating something like common fiscal liabilities and common bonds, just with less transparency. Arguably, the German mark was – from a monetary point of view – a rather well administered pan-European public good. After the euro, this public good became overconsumed. Philipp  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Bagus, sitting today here in this room, argues that the euro is a classical example of a “tragedy of the commons” from the start, and that the smaller and weaker countries therefore inevitably ended up racing to make maximum use of the commons for their own benefit at the expense of the rest, thereby destroying this shared asset. The German mark can indeed be viewed as a sort of public good that became the subject of decisions made outside the public sphere in Germany and hence was fundamentally transformed. The average quality of the public good called monetary stability and good currency in the eurozone will very probably go down with the ultimate demise of the former European monetary hegemon.
Independence means institutional, operational and financial independence. We consider that comprehensive concept as an essential contribution to the clarity and the credibility of the single monetary policy. Transparency and communication: elected authorities, key economic players, as well as all citizens must be fully informed on the conduct of the single monetary policy. At the European level, the ECB maintains a permanent dialogue with the European Council and the European Parliament, as national central banks do with national institutions. The ECB was maybe the first central bank in the world to st introduce, on 1 January 1999, the concept of regular, frequent, real-time communication in the domain of monetary policy. Indeed, once a month, immediately after the meeting of the Governing Council, the President of the ECB holds a press conferences. The independence of a central bank and its democratic accountability are two sides of the same coin. In this respect, both public speeches and testimonies by the president of the European Central Bank and by the Governors of national central Banks, to the attention of institutions as well as public opinion, are significant, and an important part of our collective duty consists in tirelessly explaining the reasons and the arguments that underpin the decisions of the Governing Council. Lastly, decentralisation: as the subsidiarity principle underlies the whole European construction, decentralisation is a major principle guiding the architecture of the Eurosystem. The Eurosystem is a team whose members work in close co-operation, and the team spirit is really strong and fruitful.

Some observers thus claim that the lack of co-ordination between European economic policies, in the absence of a political federation, is likely to deprive the area of an appropriate policy-mix. Others blame the lack of instruments allowing us to tackle any asymetric shocks that may emerge, and underline the poor flexibility or the absence of mobility of the European labour force. Others claim that the presumed economic divergences and structural gaps among euro area countries are too large to ensure a viable monetary union. …appears invalid from an economic standpoint How can we address these important objections? It is not disputable that for EMU to function well, Member States, especially the major ones in terms of GDP, must be aware of the spill-over effects of all their national budgetary policies. The existence of spill-over justifies the implementation of close co-ordination between national economic policies. This is contained in the Treaty itself, which obliges Member States to treat national economic policies “as a matter of common concern” and subjects them to a multilateral procedure. In this regard, we have seen that for EMU to be successful, an appropriate level of co-ordination between economic policies is needed. To this end, Member States have designed institutions and mechanisms to promote the level of co-ordination. We can now say that EMU has in turn been beneficial to the European economic and financial integration as a whole.
Accordingly, since October last year we have lowered the monetary policy rate (MPR) by 150 basis points, keeping an expansionary bias for monetary policy. This, together with the performance of the internal and external macroeconomic scenarios, has heavily affected the structure of market interest rates. In particular, long-term rates are in or close to their all-time lows (figure 2). I must stress this because long-term interest rates are the ones that most influence investment. What is remarkable is that today they are even below the rates prevailing in 2008–2009, that is, even lower than they were at the height of the global financial crisis, when the MPR was down to 0.5 percent and unconventional monetary stimulus had to be added to the economy. Mortgage lending interest rates are also below where they were at the time and very close to their historic lows. At the same time, the lower cost of bank funding has been transmitted to the lending rates faced by firms and households. These rates have fallen by as much as 140 basis points since October last year. However, adjusted for inflation, lending has decelerated, particularly in commercial and consumer loans, influenced by the more cautious behavior of both suppliers and demanders of credit, as is apparent in our June Bank Lending Survey (BLS) and our August’s Business Perceptions Report (IPN).

The cuts we have already made to the MPR have helped to smooth the business cycle, and, as we have mentioned before and now again in the Report I am presenting, a still stronger monetary impulse will likely be necessary in order to ensure compliance with the inflation target. In particular, given the present conditions, and barring a big change in the economic scenario, we believe that the monetary policy adjustments the market expects, which are implicit in the various expectations indicators at the closing of this Report – end of August – , will suffice to achieve the inflation target and help revive our economy. Monetary policy is an important and significant tool to tone down the cyclical fluctuations of the economy. Its countercyclical use is a privilege that we have earned after years of policy conduct that has strengthened the credibility of the Central Bank. But it is also important to note that powerful does not mean almighty. It allows to mitigate, but not fully offset, the natural fluctuations of a small, open economy like Chile. More importantly, if we wish the Chilean economy to attain higher growth rates in the medium term, it will be necessary to implement measures to encourage investment in both physical and human capital and promote productivity growth, all elements which, incidentally, are beyond the scope of monetary policy. This Monetary Policy Report contains a revision by the Board to its medium-term growth assumption for Chile over the coming years.
However, experiences show that it may take time before exchange rate changes have an impact on foreign trade. In the short term, the value of imports adapts in that import prices in kronor rise as a result of the weaker exchange rates. The initial effect of a weaker exchange rate on net exports can thus be negative. However, in the slightly longer term producers and consumers adapt and export and import volumes are affected. When the exchange rate weakens, exports increase while imports decline, as domestically-produced goods and services become relatively cheaper. The effect of a weakening in the exchange rate can thus be that net exports follow what is known as a J curve; first they weaken and then they improve. 12 In the long term one can thus expect a weaker exchange rate to lead to increased net exports, which in turn has a positive effect on total production (GDP). Overall view is important Although it may be informative to reflect on the isolated effects of exchange rate changes on the economy, it is difficult to know what causes what. At the same times as the krona weakened in connection with the financial crisis, production fell substantially, partly as a result of a large fall in the demand for exports. It is difficult in this type of scenario to isolate the effects of the weaker krona from the effects of other changes.

4  The new profit margin will be (120–115)/115, which is just over 4 per cent of the purchase price. 5  Goldberg and Knetter (1997) summarise the results of the research. Adolfson (2004) also provides an excellent survey, together with new results. 6  See, for example, McCarthy (2000) and Bachetta and van Wincoop (2003). 7  However, there are some complications with dividing CPI into import prices and other prices. See Hansson and Johansson (2007). 8  See Burnstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2002). BIS Review 3/2010  3  be various strategic reasons for not allowing import price increases to have a complete passthrough to consumers. Figure 1 illustrates some of the conclusions regarding the pass-through of the exchange rate. It shows the nominal exchange rate together with import and consumer prices in Sweden. We can see that import prices for consumer goods clearly co-vary with the nominal exchange rate, although there is no perfect correlation. It would thus appear that changes in the exchange rate nevertheless have a relatively large effect on these prices. Figure 1 Consumer prices, import prices of consumer goods and nominal trade-weighted exchange rate (TCW index) in Sweden Annual percentage change  Note. The import prices refer to consumer goods in the producer sector. Consumer prices are the CPI with a fixed interest rate (CPIF). Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. We can also see that the relationship with the exchange rate is much weaker for consumer prices than for import prices.
On a preemptive note, in response to a series of derivative debacles that was sparked off by the Barings crisis in 1994, Bank Negara Malaysia has taken steps to enhance prudential regulations on the derivatives business of banking institutions. In 1996, the Guideline on Minimum Standards on Risk Management Practices for Derivatives was issued to provide a framework that outlines the minimum risk management standards for the derivatives business of banking institutions. It requires banks to ensure that risk management controls and procedures are in place before engaging in derivatives business. The guidelines also ensure that derivatives can be offered to customers for hedging purposes only. In May 2003, as a step towards a more liberalized financial market, banking institutions are allowed to embed derivatives into investment instruments to enhance yields. The investment has to be principal protected, and may be offered to high net worth or corporate clients and for a minimum transaction amount of one million Ringgit. As part of the prudential requirements, no leveraging is allowed on the structure. Gradual liberalization allows the banking industry and the regulator to work in a collaborative manner in developing an innovative yet stable financial system. In the context of the significant growth in OTC derivatives, both in the domestic market as well as the global market, there is therefore an important need for prudential management in derivatives since speculation would itself introduce risks into OTC derivatives market and could deter the principal objectives of risk diversification and risk management.

Apart from the developments in the nature of financial risk due to globalization and regional integration, the ramifications of the Basle II capital accord, and the potential for developments in Islamic derivative instruments, I am aware that there are many other highly technical matters that need to be appreciated and understood. I will leave this to the experts who have given their valuable time to share their knowledge with us today at this banking and law school event. I wish you an engaging learning experience. This is also a rare opportunity to develop your networks, share your knowledge with your peers and reflect upon how this learning experience will make a difference in your professional career. 4  BIS Review 11/2004
The old notes will Page 3/4  Berne, 12 December 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  lose their status as legal tender from the date of recall, although it will still be possible to exchange them at the SNB or at one of our agencies. The partial revision of the Currency and Payment Instruments Act (CPIA), recently adopted by parliament, abolishes the previous deadline for exchanging banknotes with effect from 1 January 2020. It thus allows for banknotes from the sixth series, issued in 1976, and all subsequent series to be exchanged at any time. Page 4/4

And deep and liquid capital markets will also go a long way towards strengthening the international role of the euro and bolstering Europe’s strategic autonomy. Everybody needs to be ready for the profound changes currently sweeping our economies and our societies. The ECB’s ongoing strategy review will ensure that its monetary policy strategy is fit for purpose, both today and in the future. Listening to European citizens’ expectations and better understanding their economic concerns and expectations before making decisions is an important part of this review. [10] If the right actions are taken now, this crisis can be an opportunity for us to create the conditions for more inclusive, greener and more digital growth. To come back to Jean Monnet’s words, this crisis can be an opportunity for Europe to take a step towards the forms of organisation of the world of tomorrow. Conclusion Let me conclude. Almost 60 years ago to the day – on 23 September 1960 – the Europe Bridge crossing the Rhine between Kehl and Strasbourg was inaugurated. It has become a symbol of how close our two countries have become. The success of the Franco-German “bridge” was clearly reflected in the pain caused to families, businesses and commuters by the closure of the Franco-German border at the height of the pandemic, as many of you know all too well. The challenge in front of us is not only to build “bridges” between European countries.
In Q1/2022, global debt has increased by $ trillion to a new record of over $ trillion, largely driven by the world’s two largest economies, China and the US, while China’s debt rose by $ trillion in Q1, the US added $ trillion (Figure 3). Page 1 of 3  intense than during the taper tantrum and the initial Covid shock in 2020. Currency movements have largely mirrored USD appreciation. Part of this reflects stronger fundamentals and large buffers: including deeper local markets, sound fiscal positions; high foreign exchange reserves; well-capitalized banks; low foreign currency debt; and lower foreign holdings of local assets. •  How small open economies should respond varies by country, depending on their context. Countries with stronger policy frameworks, sound external and internal finances, and a broader range of tools--including FX intervention and macroprudential measures--are in a better position to manage the risks and trade-offs resulting from tighter global financial conditions. In Thailand, for example, our circumstances have allowed us to take a more gradual and measured approach towards policy normalization. Part 2: The second challenge is the shifting international trade and geopolitical landscape •  The need to build more resilient supply chains, coupled with the more polarized international environment, has given greater impetus to de-globalization or at the very least to reglobalization. A survey of Fortune 1000 companies found that 94% experienced problems from supply chain disruptions from Covid-19. The likely trend towards reshoring, near-shoring, and friend-shoring is leading to potential reconfigurations of global supply chains.

Governor’s Speech - the Budapest Eurasia Forum 2022 “Challenges facing small, open economies in the changing global landscape” Dr. Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, Governor, Bank of Thailand Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Budapest, 19 September 2022  Excellencies, distinguished participants,  It is a great pleasure and privilege to be here at the Budapest Eurasia Forum. While the global landscape is constantly changing, the speed and scale of the changes happening now are particularly large and rapid. Many of these changes pose particular challenges for small, open economies. I would like therefore to focus my remarks on three key challenges facing small, open economies in this changing global landscape. Part 1: The first challenge is rapid and synchronized monetary policy tightening •  We are going through one of the most rapid and concerted monetary policy tightening cycles in recent memory. About this time last year, the Fed Funds rate expected for the end of this year was under 0.5%; markets now expect it to be around 4%. Almost all central banks have raised rates as part of what one might call the “Great Policy Normalization”. This reflects the rapid return of inflation. Two years ago, of the 60 countries tracked in the BIS database, 42 had inflation below 2%. Today, that number is zero. •  Adding to the challenge, the prevailing initial conditions under which the major economies are embarking on this “Great Policy Normalization” are far from ideal.
Strengthen the continuing efforts aiming at market transparency Experience shows that uncertainty and incomplete information are determining factors in mimetic behaviour. These shortfalls in market transparency make mimetic behaviour seem rational to agents, who prefer to follow bigger participants, who are thought to be better informed, rather than develop their own analysis. Strengthening transparency therefore continues to be a priority. One of the objectives of transparency is to enable better differentiation of borrower creditworthiness. A key feature of mimetic behaviour is that all borrowers are "tarred with the same brush". So when one emerging economy encounters difficulties, all neighbouring countries, or countries that share common characteristics, are treated in the same way – regardless of their actual economic and financial situation. The same applies to businesses operating in the same economic sector. Transparency has substantially increased since the Asian crisis, thanks to a solid global consensus. Let us continue and reinforce these efforts. Take into account the medium and long-term perspective of some market participants Some investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, have to invest funds in order to enable their customers to build up wealth over the medium and long term, notably in preparation for retirement. Consequently, these types of investors are supposed to behave differently from traders and short-term investors, who are working on a very different time horizon. But at times it seems that they are all pushed to behave in much the same way, on the basis of a very short-term horizon.

Household income has been sharply restricted, particularly in 1995–96. So have public activities. In one respect, moreover, the outlook is still troublesome, namely as regards employment. Despite the economic recovery, a rapid expansion of employment has proved difficult to achieve. It is worth noting, however, that the number of private sector jobs, in services in particular, has in fact been rising continuously since 1995. But this has not made up sufficiently for the contraction of employment during the 1990s in, for example, the public sector and construction. After this review of developments in recent years, I shall now discuss the Riksbank’s appraisal of the coming twenty-four months, which is the period we need to consider when conducting monetary policy. 3. The message in June In the latest inflation report last June the Riksbank presented an economic forecast for Sweden and its implications for the path of inflation up to the middle of the year 2000. Our assessment was that the trends in recent years, with high growth and low inflation, would continue in the years ahead. The economic upswing was assumed to continue in the forecast period, with annual growth rates around 2.5 per cent this year and 3 per cent in the next two years. The forecast involved an increasing contribution from rising domestic demand, accompanied by a successive fall-off in export growth. Private consumption was expected to pick up, partly in view of rising household income.
Because different banks were acquiring the same merchant so that they could offer the merchant lower on-us rates for their cards dipped in their own terminals. This was good for merchants, and even for the consumer as the merchants passed on some discounts to them. But there were hidden costs: Cashiers had to be trained on different terminals, customers at self-checkout lanes fumbled with which terminal to dip their card into. So we set out to study the market, see which merchants had more than one POS terminal, prioritise them by the volume and value of transactions that they handled, and worked closely with their acquirers one-by-one to on-board onto a single terminal that can accept all schemes that use chip and contactless near-field communication (NFC). Today, the process is still underway, but you can already see these UPOS terminals deployed in supermarkets, convenience stores and petrol stations – these are merchants that we visit daily, if not weekly. Besides addressing the challenges I mentioned above, this has certainly made the self check-out experience a delight. 17. Second, Singapore Quick Response (SGQR) code. Besides chip and contactless NFC payments, many mobile payments are optical via a Quick Response (QR) code. Just as we started to tidy up the POS terminals at merchants, we started to observe a proliferation of payment QR codes as each e-payment company deployed its own QR code sticker at each merchant’s cashier. We identified the problem early and immediately formed an industry task force comprising payment schemes and acquirers.

The products we are getting ready to launch soon, that means the confidence indices, have to justify their designation. Stated differently, the public must believe the product of the Bank of Albania is reliable, that product is the object and the real indicator of the public’s expectations. In the meantime, we expect to have back the echo of the public’s trust. Wishing you all a fruitful working-day, Thank you! 2  BIS Review 118/2006