samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Compared with past experience in Spain, we are currently in a fairly exceptional situation: GDP and employment are growing at over 3%, and the economy is maintaining its gains in competitiveness vis-à-vis the external sector, whereby our exports continue to increase their market share and we continue to run a substantial external surplus. This combination, which has arisen solely over very short periods in Spain’s economic history in recent decades, obviously does not in itself guarantee any continuation, nor does it mean that Spain has managed to sufficiently overcome the consequences of the crisis that broke in 2007, as indeed the unemployment and foreign debt figures, among others, testify. Continuing to pursue fiscal consolidation policies – the only means of containing the increase in public debt relative to GDP and bringing about its subsequent reduction – and the policies that have brought about our gains in competitiveness will prove pivotal to controlling our financing costs, our balance of payments and, of course, the capacity of our economy to generate employment. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Figure 3: Actual MPR versus Taylor rule (†)  2.0  2.0  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  -0.5  -0.5  -1.0  -1.0  -1.5  -1.5 2010  2011 Lag  2012 Inflation  2013 GDP  2014 2015 Shock  2016 D(MPR)  2017 2018 Taylor rule  (†) Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4: MPR Chile vs US (†)  9  9  8  8  7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 2000  2002  2004  2006  2010  2008  2012  2014  2016  0 2018  CHL: Monetary Policy Rate US: Fed Fund Rate (†) Sources: FRED and Central Bank of Chile. Some key factors supporting the roles of ER as a shock absorber of financial and commodity price shocks A flexible ER regime is not a form of snake oil to alleviate any sort of global ailment. ER volatility can, of course, generate major wealth shifts, and even solvency problems to agents with large balance sheet mismatches—including government. They can induce major losses in competitiveness, which may harm overall activity if winners fail to capture benefits as fast as 6  losers realize costs. Constituencies around fixed prices—including the ER—are very concentrated and powerful.
Estimated effect on GDP after three years.1) Percent 0.2 Approved measures  Discussed measures  0.2 Gradual global tariff increases  0  0  –0.2  –0.2  –0.4  –0.4  –0.6  –0.6  –0.8  –0.8  –1  –1  –1.2  –1.2 –1.4  –1.4 US  China  Euro area  Globally  1) The effects are based on model estimates from the IMF and Norges Bank. Approved measures are described in the box “Trade conflicts create uncertainty” in Monetary Policy Report 3/18. Discussed measures include a 25 percent tariff on all US imports from China and a 25 percent tariff on US imports of cars and car parts, in addition to retaliatory measures by countries affected. Gradual global tariff increases imply a 1 percentage point annual increase in tariffs on all imported goods in all countries over the coming years. Sources: IMF and Norges Bank  Protectionism means reduced growth capacity, putting at risk the gains brought about by open borders. If the world enters a new period of rising trade barriers, a prime engine of growth and development may lose its momentum. The most serious consequences of new tariff barriers will be faced by developing countries. The WTO has more than 160 member countries. Many of the new countries have experienced rapid growth. Living standards have improved for large population groups. But not everyone has reaped the gains associated with globalisation and trade. Some have lost. Income gaps have widened.

That goal now seems to be within reach, thanks in no small way to the Government’s steadfast commitment to fiscal consolidation. The achievement of a political consensus on the euro is also a welcome development. The main remaining challenge is to meet the inflation criterion. Tonight I shall argue that the euro is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for faster growth. More specifically, unless we establish limits on how much we consume and, within limits set by the economy’s earning capacity, allocate a greater proportion of the national income to investment, the advantages of euro area membership cannot be fully realized. It is time for the country to disown an unfortunate legacy of its colonial past that is best reflected in the notion that it is possible to spend more without first producing more. To this day, political discourse contains frequent references to tax reductions and subsidies, when it should be rallying popular support for the need to strengthen the country’s capacity to generate wealth on a sustainable basis. The benefits of euro area membership As I have said, the adoption of the euro should enhance the economy’s potential to grow faster. The elimination of exchange rate risk and currency conversion costs should result in increased trade, while the lower interest rate and inflation environment of the euro area should make for reduced business costs and greater macroeconomic stability. Combined with the fiscal discipline associated with monetary union, this is expected to translate into higher credit ratings and better investment prospects.
Some types of cover, such as Employer’s Liability, might only be called upon years after the original policy was written. Having cover is essential to allow certain businesses to operate and such cover has, in the past, provided vital compensation to beneficiaries who have been affected by asbestos and other harms that may take decades to fully become known. It is so important, for everyone involved, that insurers will still be there, standing ready to pay these claims when they arise. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Annuities represent another kind of very long term and important promise. Policyholders may entrust the results of a lifetime of work and careful saving to an annuity provider; there are currently more than ten million such annuity policies in the UK2. These policyholders do this knowing that there are no refunds, and no chance to switch provider once they are committed. They are placing a huge amount of trust in their insurer’s promise to make payments to them for years into the future. For many customers, these payments may form a substantial portion of their retirement income. This enormous trust that policyholders place in their insurers has several significant benefits to the wider economy. I already mentioned how risk transfer allows innovation and growth, and smooths consumption.

Recall that one of the key attractions in working for a particular organization is association with people who are liked and respected. Do people like  2  See Corporate Executive Board, Research Reveals That Integrity Drives Corporate Performance: Companies With Weak Ethical Cultures Experience 10x More Misconduct Than Those With Strong Ones, Press Release, September 15, 2010. See also Anthony Salz, Salz Review: An Independent Review of Barclays’ Business Practices, 189‐191 (App’x C) (discussing the impact of culture on two archetypes of employee behaviors, and collecting sources). 3  Somewhat tautologically, the proof of a good culture might be the absence of bad behavior. As Bill Dudley, the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has observed: “How will a firm know if it is making real progress [on culture]? Not having to plead guilty to felony charges or being assessed large fines is a good start.” William C. Dudley, Enhancing Financial Stability by Improving Culture in the Financial Services Industry, Remarks at the Workshop on Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry, October 20, 2014. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and respect leaders who lack integrity? Good luck attracting top talent in that kind of organization. A third key component in a strong ethical culture is values. Most firms elaborate rules of proper behavior, often in well‐crafted codes of conduct. In some large, complex organizations, the rules can be difficult and tedious, like the rules for conflicting interests and for avoiding trading on insider information.
The financial conditions on the Mainland also present, in my opinion, a golden opportunity for the liberalisation of restrictions to facilitate the greater use of Hong Kong’s financial system and for the associated risks to be prudently managed. With nearly $ trillion, the Mainland is now the largest foreign reserve holder in the world: it is running a fairly large balance of payments surplus and its savings rate is probably the highest in the world. There may not be many precedents of any great significance, in the history of economic development in other countries, of having access to two financial systems in one country, and so we need to be cautious, as always, as we venture into something new. Deng Xiaoping, when giving guidance to the drafting of the Basic Law on 16 April 1987, also recognised that "one country, two systems" is "a new thing" and that "there are many matters we cannot predict" 4 . The important thing is to be clear about the principles behind what we are trying to do. The basic principle, as far as the financial system is concerned, has always been very clear, regardless of the characteristics of the political, economic and social systems, and this is the effective mobilisation of savings into the hands of those in need of funds to finance consumption, investment and other economic activities 5 .

So, what about the question I raised earlier on about whether the two financial systems of the country have a working relationship that maximises the mutual benefits of the two jurisdictions and therefore is in the best interests of the country? If you want an honest answer from me, it would I am afraid not be one in the affirmative. There seems to me considerable scope for a co-operative, complementary and interactive working relationship between the two financial systems, in which, as I said earlier, relative strengths are exploited and relative weaknesses addressed, and synergies maximised. The further question then is how such a working relationship should best, and realistically, be developed. It is quite natural to think that developing such a relationship between the two financial systems could be left to the market. While this is theoretically possible, it assumes that market forces are allowed to work freely across the two financial systems, which is not always the case. In merchandise trade, this is by and large true, and as a result the two economic systems specialise in areas in which they have respectively comparative advantage in producing. But in the provision of different services, as in the case of financial services, there are restrictions limiting the working of market forces, for example, restrictions on access of service providers to the other system and restrictions on the mobility of the user of services across the two systems.
This effort stems from a critical lesson from the crisis – that we need to better understand our firms and how they operate, including a greater understanding of how the governance of the firm works. We expect that by intensifying the supervisory relationship with those overseeing the health of the firm, we can improve the flow of information and dialogue. This should give us an earlier and clearer view into emerging business trends and risk strategies within the firm. It should give us a better sense of what the senior leaders and directors are thinking. And, it also creates a better dynamic where discussions are more frequent and less monumental so that dialogue flows more naturally through all means – not just in person, but also over the phone and via email. This effort extends not just to firms where we are the home country supervisor, but also to large global firms where we are the host supervisor. We realize the challenges in building any relationship, and the challenges in doing so across geographic boundaries, cultures and corporate entities are even more challenging. Nevertheless, where we have had success in building that dialogue and deepening the engagement with business leaders and directors of global firms, we have achieved a higher degree of understanding on both sides. As relationships develop, we have found more frequent, informal dialogue to be extremely productive for all involved. Firms are in a better position to understand what our concerns are and respond more appropriately and timely to these concerns.

For many years after the second world war in this country, during the 1960s and 1970s, macroeconomic policy - overall fiscal policy and monetary policy operating together and with various forms of direct control - was aimed at juggling what were seen as the conflicting objectives of economic growth and falling unemployment on the one hand and limiting inflation and maintaining a  1  BIS Review 110/2000  manageable balance of payments position on the other. Essentially the policy levers would be set initially at go, to stimulate demand and encourage growth and employment, until the evidence of overheating became intolerable, when the levers were thrown abruptly into reverse, to bring about a juddering economic slowdown. This was the infamous go-stop economic policy cycle which led to the boom-bust economic cycle. While the objective was no doubt to ensure that we never again experienced the depression and mass unemployment of the inter-war period, the effect was to induce uncertainty and short-term economic decision-making, with an increasingly damaging impact on our overall economic performance. And the situation became progressively worse from one economic cycle to the next as each peak produced higher and higher inflation and each trough higher and higher rates of unemployment - with the peaks becoming progressively shorter-lived. It became a classic example of more haste less speed.
Øystein Olsen: Economic perspectives Address by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank and invited guests, Oslo, 17 February 2011. *  *  *  Nearly a decade has passed since the inflation targeting regime was introduced. In spring 2001, Norges Bank was charged with the task of setting the interest rate with a view to keeping inflation low and stable. At the same time, new fiscal policy guidelines, also known as the fiscal rule, were implemented, charting a course for petroleum revenue spending. For the first time in a long time, economic policy in Norway was given an overall long-term anchor and a binding operational objective. In Report No. 29 to the Storting from 2001, the Storting was informed of the new guidelines. The report may not qualify as poetry, but it is a document to which I have a close relationship. This evening I will take a look at the experiences of these operational guidelines and discuss the following questions. Has the inflation target and the fiscal rule lived up to the expectations of ten years ago? And how can the experiences of the past ten years be used in addressing today’s challenges? In 2011 it is also ten years since Georg Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for their work on asymmetric information. The theories provide a backdrop to understanding the financial crisis that engulfed the world economy in 2008.

What is more important that the core purpose of banking remains intact – that is to provide reliable passage for resources to move to productive use, including under the most challenging conditions. I thought I would close these remarks by quoting Machiavelli ‘There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things’. Ladies and gentlemen, the future is about a new order of things. Thank you. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
And in order to limit risk-taking by banks there is also a strong case for relating the payments made by different banks to finance the insurance scheme to the risks that they will fail. And in that context, some element of pre-funding is natural and is used in many countries, including those with banking systems similar to our own, such as Canada and Sweden. A degree of pre-funding is one of those ideas that is bound to be unpopular before the fund is called upon, but seems decidedly wise after the event as it lessens the burden on the banking system in a time of stress. On the regulation of bank liquidity, the FSA has already issued a discussion paper, and I support strongly the case for reform of liquidity regulation made this morning by Sir Callum McCarthy. I very much hope that an international initiative to include liquidity in the Basel capital regime, in which the Bank is playing a leading role, will come to fruition. For our own part we, along with other central banks, have been reviewing the way in which our market operations can alleviate stress in the banking system. The primary objective of our money market operations is to ensure that the interest rate on overnight lending in the market is close to the Bank Rate set by the Monetary Policy Committee. That constrains the net amount of central bank money we lend to the system.

The existing tripartite framework needs to develop so that the authorities are able to reduce systemic risk not just by effective management of crises but by creating incentives for financial institutions to avoid excessive risks. Some of the elements of such a framework I described in my evidence to the Treasury Committee on 20 September last year. In line with international experience, they included a special resolution regime for failing banks, changes to deposit insurance to reduce the incentives for bank runs, and a proper regime for the regulation of bank liquidity. At the heart of the case for a special resolution regime is the need to find a way to allow banks to fail in an orderly manner. As the Treasury Committee said in its report The Run on the Rock, “Banks should be allowed to ‘fail’ so as to preserve market discipline on financial institutions”. It is clear from the responses to the Consultation Document that there is widespread acceptance of the basic case for a resolution regime. But that is tempered by concerns about the details of its design. I want to highlight three key features that will be central to the success of the new regime. First, responsibility for resolving a failing bank should be delegated to a resolution authority which should have a wide range of instruments available to help resolve a failing bank. Which body assumes the role of the resolution authority is less important than the granting of those powers to some body.
The second strategy is to ensure that we achieve the goals of social equity and economic efficiency in operationalisation of waqf projects. While projects developed from waqf proceeds should benefit society at large, it is my humble view that it makes sense from an economic efficiency standpoint to allow market mechanism to allocate these scarce resources. As waqf is intended to generate benefits in perpetuity for all generations to come, operating the fund on commercial terms allows it to be invested and managed in a manner that ensures preservation of capital. Prioritising economic efficiency can help strengthen the position of waqf to carry out its social equity objectives effectively. To illustrate, rental of waqf-developed commercial complexes should be market determined, but lots with preferential rental rates could be designated for deserving community purposes, such as co-working spaces for start-ups and entrepreneurs. In healthcare, waqf hospital charges should be comparable with private medical fees, but different pricing tiers could be provided for the B40 segment and other deserving patients. Similarly, waqf-owned universities should charge full tuition fees to all, but offer scholarships and other forms of need- and merit-based assistance for high-potential students from less privileged backgrounds. This approach is indeed in line with the conditions for waqf creation – ziyadah and nuqsan, idkhal and ikhraj, which grant flexibility and openness to redirect waqf benefits to those in greater need. If executed well, waqf can be both economically efficient and sustainable, while at the same time fulfiling its socio-economic objectives.

'     323/ 02 3 03 @29 59735 345 3275940 73 293 E2 374 3 53 345 53 72753 9 7473 345 53 722743 345 722743 722743 925745 33 345  7 6587 17 7887 9 7 7 7 78 778517 1171*+3- 7787  13 1 13 3 0401 5  54 4 43 5304 5  ' 5   435 30 45 A 705  4 B 23 045705   CD+*/E10D+  0 46 8 8 171798 84 7 781786 67 ,46 1798 648 1  03  813 74 7 846 7814 8 6 13  8 7  88 8 85 7+ 8 7  5 6 8  8     5 ' 5   88  88 7 8657 88 7 8657 + 686 +86572 8 ;6  8 7 &67+2 7& 7 # 8  (67 7  8 78 76A ,67 8 78 7&2 8 6 76 0 &8    668   8
[13] We would therefore expect that banks that have more AT1 instruments issued are even more wary of breaching their MDAs. And this is what my colleagues find happened during the pandemic. Banks with more AT1 capital[14] and low capital surpluses before the stress defended their capital ratios to a greater extent than their peers after the onset of the pandemic. They also reduced lending, especially to riskier borrowers. The evidence suggests that we need to find a way to preserve the intended effect of MDAs – the capital conservation effect – and get rid of the unintended effect – the market stigma inducing firms to deleverage. One way to do so might be to consider a broader form of capital conservation that applies distribution restrictions to firms irrespective of their capital ratios during the stress. A similar tool, would achieve two main objectives. First, it would support resilience and avoid that banks, after the release of the CCOB, make imprudent capital outlays instead of supporting lending to the real economy. Second, a sufficiently broad-based application of restrictions would mitigate the market stigma generated by firm-specific MDAs and support more buffer use. Such tools were used during the early stages in the pandemic when uncertainty was at its peak – they were unpopular in part because of fear of investor reaction but also because they were not an explicit and predictable part of the framework; this proposal will enhance predictability.

For example, the 10-year real rate beginning in 10-years’ time implied by current government bond yields is -¾%. The comparable number over 2000-2006 was +1⅔%. And even during the height of the financial and euro area crises over 2008-2012 it was +¾%. (Chart 7) In the long term, the most important determinant of potential output growth is productivity growth, which is in turn determined by the rate at which new ideas are generated and implemented. And given the very disappointing productivity performance of the UK over the past 7 years, it would perhaps be understandable were financial markets to have lost hope that productivity growth would ever return. Perhaps they agree with those who argue that recent innovations cannot contribute as much to productivity growth as historical ones such as the electric light bulb, the internal combustion engine and indoor plumbing once did. 14 Human history has had many periods in which pessimism about innovation and technological progress has been proven wrong, dating at least back to Malthus. There is much by way of exciting innovation that has yet to be fully exploited. 15 3D printing is transforming the R&D process by vastly increasing the capability to produce prototypes. Advanced robots are being developed that will allow increased precision and safety in their use, thus increasing our ability to automate many routine activities. Firms are learning how to harness the power of Big Data, which will allow them to personalise their products better and reduce waste.