samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Due to the growing dependence of the provision of payment services on the provision of outsourced ancillary services by subcontractors that are currently non-regulated entities, some of these services and their providers may possibly be included in the scope of the Directive and become subject of supervision; - In addition to the review of PSD2, a review will also be carried out of the Settlement Finality Directive4, and assessment will be made if payment institutions and electronic money institutions should be eligible for direct participation in designated payments systems, subject to certain conditions and risk mitigating measures. 2. General trends in payment digitalisation Amendments to the legislation are an important prerequisite for the quick take-up of innovations in the market, but no less contribution to it have the standardisation activities pursued by the industry itself. Main developments, trends and technologies in the payment area, as well as the required regulatory activities, will cover: - Standardisation and achievement of interoperability between end-user applications used for payment transactions, including standardisation of the QR codes used in Europe; - Expanding the access to the necessary technical infrastructure for payment execution – e.g.

This presupposes gradual decrease in the use of elements with lower degree of security, such as static passwords, and limiting the use of older technologies and communication channels that are prone to attacks (such as SMS text messages); - Prevention of new types of fraud, particularly in the context of instant payments, as well as strengthening payer’s protection and regulating a chargeback procedure in specific cases (e.g. an error), which would make instant payments come close to card transactions; - Review of the possible exceptions from applying strong customer authentication, such as contactless card payments, also exploring the possibilities for introduction of an individual limit set by the customer, for which no PIN entry is required; - Potential measures to reduce the risk of fraud due to ‘social engineering’ or ‘targeted phishing’, with a possible requirement for a match between the names of the payee to the payment transaction and the account holder, and the implementation of technological solutions for validation of the e-mail correspondence sender; - Possibility for additional standardisation in terms of the information provided to users in their account statements, particularly for card payments. The sophisticated business models using multiple intermediaries result in users’ confusion, e.g.
Direct impact of this shock on financial markets, and especially on government securities market was about 2% of GDP. However, their indirect impact was even greater. As in other countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, banks originating from  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  the euro area countries adopted a more conservative behaviour, manifested in further slowdown of lending during the year. As a result, the Albanian economy slowed further over the past year, leaving spare capacities in the labour and capital markets. This development was associated with low increase in wages and producer costs and was reflected in slightly increased consumer prices. Supply shocks were few and of low intensity over the past year, inflationary expectations remained anchored and liquidity position was favourable to keep inflation in check. This balance of factors was materialized in low annual inflation rates and the annual consumer price rise eased to 2.4% at end-2012. Low inflationary pressures and lack of fiscal stimulus made room for further easing of monetary policy in 2012. The Bank of Albania cut the key interest rate three times, to 4.0%, from 4.75%. The monetary conditions were eased to stimulate the domestic demand and create better conditions for meeting the medium-term inflation target. Also, the Bank of Albania increased significantly the liquidity-providing operations in the banking system to calm down financial agents, control the rising interest rate trends and ensure the smooth functioning of markets.

In respect to the conditions prevailing in Malaysia, Malaysia's strong economic fundamentals, with low rate of inflation, strong external balance, low level of foreign debt, strong reserves levels and strengthened banking sector have provided strong support for the pegged exchange rate regime. Malaysia also has sufficient flexibility to undertake adjustments on all sectors of the economy to remain competitive. The diversified economic structure, the enhanced mobility of capital and labour has also provided Malaysia with increased resilience to weather external shocks. Malaysia also had the flexibility of policy to respond to the circumstances. In all cases, when an exchange rate regime has failed, it was not due to the regime itself, but due to the weaknesses in the economy and the financial system. Having undergone significant transformation and emerging with a much strengthened set of fundamentals, the Malaysian and regional economies are better able to absorb the volatility in the exchange rates. Countries are also more cognizant of the costs of currency depreciation, particularly on confidence. As an example, comparing the response of regional currencies during the two episodes of yen depreciation, one in the early part of 2001 and the other towards the end of 2001 and early 2002, it is clear that the response of regional exchange rates was significantly more muted during the most recent episode.
At the same time, recent weeks have seen an appreciation of the dollar, which would be consistent with the expectations of further US interest rate rises, at a swifter pace than that in other economic areas. However, this appreciation might also be partly in response to a certain safe-haven effect, in a context in which certain risks appear to be rising, in particular in some emerging markets and areas subject to a high degree of political uncertainty. This latter factor is also contributing to heightening the uptrend in oil prices witnessed in recent months. The decline in activity observed in the euro area during the first three months of 2018, from 0.7% to 0.4% in terms of the GDP growth rate relative to the previous quarter, should be analysed with care. On one hand, it should be borne in mind that last year’s growth was particularly sharp (the highest since the start of the crisis, almost a decade ago); accordingly, it is reasonable to expect there should be some moderation. On the other, the as-yet very partial information available does not allow us to specify to what extent the change witnessed may have been due to transitory factors, relating to the weather and the high number of strikes in recent months in certain euro area countries, as opposed to other more durable factors. In any event, forecasts continue to suggest that the sustained rates of increase of euro area activity will continue in the coming months, albeit with a tendency to ease.

8/9  As this is my last appearance before the Senate as Governor of the Banco de España, and to conclude, I should like to express my gratitude for the consideration that has always been extended to the Bank and to me in this chamber, and for the quality of the interventions and questions raised on which I have had to comment. I have always thought, and have said so on different occasions, that the lower and upper houses are the “natural fora” in which an institution such as the Banco de España should preferentially express itself, cooperating and contributing, as best it can, to parliamentary functions. Thank you for your attention. 9/9
In addition, the use of local currency in regional trade and investment has been promoted to lower business transaction costs and mitigate volatility of the major currencies. We hope that policy to strengthen financial connectivity with our neighbors will facilitate closer economic integration for the shared benefits of the region. The second plan is the Payment Systems Roadmap. The plan is aimed to promote safe and efficient electronic payment services with new technologies and innovation, with a view to reducing transaction costs, improving governance standards, and being supportive of expanding economic activities. In particular,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  integrated payment channels, such as mobile phones, internet, debit/ credit cards, and emoney along with a competitive fee structure, will support e-Commerce/ m-Commerce and benefit both businesses and consumers alike. The Bank of Thailand will also continue to work with regional regulators to advance payment systems connectivity to support international trades, labor movements, and tourisms. Under this roadmap, the Bank of Thailand has worked closely with the government to advocate the idea of digital economy by taking a lead in the National e-Payment Plan to promote Any ID infrastructure and debit card usage. Development of a new payment infrastructure as the “open architecture” to allow network interoperability among various types of players will lower payment fees and discourage the use of cash, thus resulting in much lower operating costs and higher efficiency for the corporate and banking sectors.

Veerathai Santiprabhob: Monetary and financial sector policy – moving forward Speech by Dr Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand (FCCT), Bangkok, 1 June 2016. *  *  *  Members of the FCCT Executive Committee, Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, Good evening to you all, It is my pleasure to be here with you tonight. Although this is my first time speaking at the FCCT, I can feel the vibes of active journalism, which underpins the club’s foundation and its long history in the community of journalists in Thailand. As one of the oldest press clubs in Southeast Asia, I would like to thank you for your continued commitment and contribution to the Thai economy and the Thai society. Public perception and expectation indeed play a large part in establishing credibility and effectiveness of economic policy. As public opinion influencers, journalists greatly contribute to achieving desired policy outcome. As we progress half way through the year, today I would like to share with you the Monetary Policy Committee’s latest economic assessment and monetary policy stance to support the current economic recovery and safeguard stability of the Thai financial system. After that, I will turn to the Bank of Thailand’s financial sector development policy, with a view to facilitating Thailand’s economic transition towards strong, sustainable and inclusive growth. Let me start by talking about recent developments in the global financial markets.
About once every 20 years, on average, a shock came along which could be either very good or very bad; it either increased or decreased GDP by around 12%. Much less frequently there came a very much larger – and always negative – hit to GDP. On average this very bad shock came along about once a century; reducing GDP by over 30%. In this type of model first developed by Barro, the shocks to GDP are permanent and so could be expected to affect asset values by comparable magnitudes. So once we allow for rare – but very big – shocks that do not follow a normal distribution then there will be larger benefits from banks having much more capital. And without allowing for such shocks it is not possible to explain the historical variability of economic activity across countries. In summary, even taking a conservative view of the cost of extra bank capital the net benefits of stricter capital requirements are potentially large. But relaxing these conservative assumptions implies the costs of higher capital requirements are likely to be much lower. Furthermore, the benefits of capital requirements are likely to be considerable, especially if one does not assume that the shocks to economic output and banks’ asset values follow a normal distribution. 12  See for example “Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century” by Robert Barro, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006, 121, no. 3.

Prior to 1970 published accounts understated the true level of banks’ capital because they did not include hidden reserves. The solid line adjusts for this. 2009 observation is from H1. (c) Change in UK accounting standards. (d) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were adopted for the end-2005 accounts. The end-2004 accounts were also restated on an IFRS basis. The switch from UK GAAP to IFRS reduced the capital ratio of the UK banks in the sample by approximately 1 percentage point in 2004. Sources: Bank of England, Financial Stability Report June 2009 and “The British Economy, Key Statistics 1900–1970”, published for the London & Cambridge Economic Service. From 1968 the liquidity ratio is: Cash + Bank of England balances + money at call + eligible bills + UK gilts as a percentage of banks’ total asset holdings. Prior to 1968 the ratio is calculated as the liquid assets of the London Clearing Banks as a percentage of gross deposits, as defined in “The British Economy, Key Statistics 1900–1970”. Furthermore, in recent years the quality of banks’ capital deteriorated as banks exploited the availability of new hybrid capital instruments which often had the tax advantages of debt. In practice hybrid capital did not absorb banks’ losses despite being treated for regulatory purposes as if it was like equity.
For example, in an assessment of monetary policy, this becomes an issue of whether the central bank attaches a reasonable relative weight to the stabilisation of resource utilisation and whether the central bank is reasonably consistent over time.10 The numerical inflation target has signified great progress for practical monetary policy and made it possible to measure and evaluate the target achievement of monetary policy in a much more effective manner than before. However, the fact that monetary policy is not just directed towards stabilising inflation, but also towards stabilising resource utilisation has, in the absence of quantitative measures of stability in these variables, made it difficult to measure and evaluate target achievement in this stability dimension. However, the quantitative measure implied by the mean squared gaps makes it possible to measure and evaluate this target achievement. Using the mean squared gap may entail a progress similar to the earlier introduction of the numerical inflation target. Following the introduction of published policy rate paths, this is another step towards a better and more effective monetary policy and better opportunities to evaluate monetary policy’s target achievement. 10  According to Bergo (2007) and Holmsen, Qvigstad and Røisland (2007), an optimal policy of  = 0.3 is compatible with the monetary policy forecasts published by Norges Bank (with a discount factor of 0.99 and a weighting in interest rate smoothing of 0.2). The steeper straight line in Figure 3 corresponds to  = 0.3, while the flatter line corresponds to  = 1.

It is essential that this cooperative approach should be maintained in the future. Otherwise, we would run the risk of seeing the degree of integration of financial systems slip backwards, and that, along with the trade protectionism we have so far managed to avoid, would be a most negative consequence of the crisis. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
But these opportunities can only be realised if new forms of digital money are safe – which means recognising and properly regulating the elements that are age-old. I am grateful to Morgane Fouche, Matthew Osborne, Stephanie Haffner, Robert Page and James Pople-Hoskins for their help in preparing these remarks. I am also grateful to Antoine Lallour, Nicholas Butt, David Copple, Shiv Chowla, Andrew Hauser and Victoria Cleland for their helpful comments. 1 Private money mainly takes the form of deposits held in bank accounts. The only form of public money  accessible to the general public is cash, in the form of coins and notes. 2 This is based on the amount of cash held by the public as a share of total cash and sight deposits. See Part V  of ‘A millennium of macroeconomic data’, Research dataset, Bank of England. 3 See LINK News and media contact, 'Coronavirus Crisis means cash use down but UK still withdrawing  £ from ATMs each week’Opens in a new window; See LINK, 'Statistics and trends’Opens in a new window; See chart A in ‘New forms of Digital money’ DP, June 2021. Moreover, in practice, the UK authorities remain committed to ensuring access to cash to those that need it. The Bank, HMT, FCA and the PSR have been working together on the Joint Authorities Cash Strategy group to monitor the use of cash, ATM availability, and ensure cash remains available despite the impacts of Covid. 4 See the example of the Corralito in Argentina.

Confidence in the credibility and stability of private money are fundamental components of financial stability. Innovation But let’s go back to stablecoins and innovation in payments. Stablecoins are digital tokens that aim to maintain a stable value vis-a-vis existing forms of money6. Their origin stories generally trace back to the crypto world. Most forms of cryptoassets, like Bitcoin, are too volatile to be attractive as a widespread means of payment. We have seen time and time again that if money is not reliably stable most people will not want to use or accept it as payment. There is no reason to think this time is different7. To solve this, stablecoins have turned to the age-old solution of anchoring their value to national currencies, often with a promise to ensure that the value remains 1 for 1 at all times. Stablecoins therefore could potentially serve as a substitute for a commercial bank deposit. Both stablecoins 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  and banks are offering a representation of what a private company owes its customers – an IOU – which can be transferred as a means to pay for things. Both are promising (or at least aspiring to) stability against and interchangeability with money issued by central banks. It is possible in this context that stablecoins could scale up and grow rapidly, and become widely used as a trusted form of sterling-based retail payments. To be clear – I don’t know if this will happen.
SPEECH DATE:  6 May 2022  SPEAKER:  Cecilia Skingsley  VENUE:  Handelsbanken  High inflation and a rising repo rate – what happens to the Riksbank's balance sheet?1 As you know, inflation in Sweden is now at the highest levels in several decades. We have entered a period in which the repo rate needs to be raised – and much more than we expected earlier. ‘The inflation map has been redrawn’, and this is a situation we share with many other central banks worldwide (see Figure 1). However, as you also know, the Riksbank implemented strong monetary policy measures during the coronavirus crisis, where an important element was asset purchases. The question then arises: Now that we are starting to raise interest rates – what happens to the assets on our balance sheet? When I answer that question, I would first like to go back in time a little and explain how the assets originally got there. Background – why we purchased debt securities for SEK 700 billion.

I am further informed that ATI has so far this year supported Zambian companies and businesses by offering insurance cover to some very large and essential projects primarily in the energy, mining, manufacturing and agriculture sectors valued at over $ million. The Agency has also continued to assist many African countries by facilitating foreign direct investments with its political risk insurance that protects investors. Ladies and Gentlemen, the role that trade plays in the economic growth and development of a Country cannot be emphasised. There are many regions and countries of the world that have been able to lift their peoples from poverty to prosperity through trade. However, although Africa in general and Zambia in particular has an economy which is characterized by a relatively high degree of openness, trade has not been utilized to an extent of achieving rapid and sustainable economic development necessary to eliminate poverty. This failure for trade to serve as a catalyst for sustainable economic development could be attributed in part to the nature of Africa’s export trade which is heavily concentrated on primary commodities that are characterized by relatively slow growth, price instability and long‐term deterioration of terms of trade. The need for African countries and Zambia in particular to participate in the dynamic sectors of global trade such as manufactures and services cannot be over-emphasised.
The bottom line is that the long-term sustainability of public debt should be ensured by credible but flexible fiscal rules. In parallel, we could maintain the possibility of responding to large shocks through a permanent common fiscal capacity; in this respect, the Next Generation EU package is a positive breakthrough, and could be made permanent, although with more limited amounts. A few days ago, Mario Draghi, speaking at the Italian Senate in his current capacity as Prime minister, rightly backed “an increasingly integrated European Union that will arrive at a common public budget capable of supporting countries in times of recession.” In addition, a fully-fledged capital markets union is more necessary than ever, in order to supplement public risk sharing with private risk sharing across the euro area. In conclusion, let me say a few words on chamber music. Many of you have already heard the famous Piano Trio Number 2 by Franz Schubert. The harmony of the three instruments has charmed generations of music lovers, including Stanley Kubrick in “Barry Lindon”. In this piece, none of the instruments should be the only game in its own town. And none of them should be dominated by any of the other two, otherwise the harmony is broken. Quite the contrary, we can hear each instrument and the beauty of the piece comes from the response of each instrument to the others. The same applies to the three macroeconomic policies: monetary, macroprudential and fiscal.

companies or legal entities that are established either in Malaysia or in Labuan). Based on the assessment, legal entities are rated as “medium risk”. Taking into consideration experiences from the investigations conducted by the LEAs, there are various instances where legal entities have in the past being used to facilitate laundering activities by the criminals. Similar assessment was also conducted for the Non-Profit Organisation (or the NPO), especially from the perspective whether these NPOs are being used to facilitate financing of terrorism. Although, based on the LEAs investigations there are no known NPO involve in the terrorist financing activities, minimum supervision on the NPOs makes the sector vulnerable to be used by criminals or terrorist. The NRA on its own has no meaning unless the results are used to facilitate greater understanding among all stakeholders involved, including the financial institutions to better understand the money laundering and terrorist financing risks in their own sectors, as well as other sectors that they have dealings with. This will allow financial institutions to better assess the adequacy of their internal AML/CFT controls in mitigating the risks identified and to strengthen these controls where necessary. As the country gathers its understanding of money laundering and terrorist financing risks through the NRA, similar expectations are also incumbent upon the financial institutions.