samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In 1999, the Fed adapted its post-meeting statement to communicate more information about the outlook for the economy and the implications for monetary policy by disclosing a so-called bias. In December 2004, the FOMC decided to advance the release of the minutes to a date three weeks after the meeting, and in doing so provided a more timely picture of the FOMC’s rationale for its decision, its view of the economic outlook and the implications for monetary policy going forward. In January 2005, the FOMC added a year to its semiannual public forecast of the outlook for growth and inflation, and by extending the horizon the forecast, provided greater insight into the inflation preferences of members of the committee. These changes in the transparency of the conduct of U.S. monetary policy have been motivated by a judgment that monetary policy works more effectively if the central bank is more explicit about its objectives, about its view of the outlook for growth and inflation, and about the framework it uses to make policy choices. Since monetary policy operates through its effects not just on the overnight inter-bank rate but on expectation about the future path of that rate and other asset prices, greater disclosure about the Fed’s forecast and the rationale for its decisions should help financial market prices reflect more accurately the future stance of monetary policy and make monetary policy more effective.

All three layers – national, regional and global – must complement and reinforce one another. Well-designed, they can operate as a package, offering a comprehensive suite of financial options to countries in need. AMRO – The focal point of regional surveillance 20. Let me now turn to AMRO, the emerging focal point for regional surveillance underpinning the CMIM. AMRO was set up to perform three important functions:   to conduct surveillance and contribute to the early detection of risks in the region;    to facilitate the implementation of remedial action; and    to inform the decision making of the CMIM. 21. These functions help to ensure that any activation of the CMIM mechanisms will be predicated on informed and independent judgement. 22. AMRO will give ASEAN+3 authorities a new and vital perspective as it considers the impact of global developments on ASEAN+3 as a region. AMRO’s surveillance toolkit will be based on its own in-house capabilities, access to policymakers in ASEAN+3, and regular dialogue and exchange of information with the IMF and other international financial institutions. We envision AMRO emerging over time as an authoritative interpreter of economic and financial developments in the Asian region. 23. AMRO’s progress since its establishment in May 2010 has been remarkable. It commenced operations just a year later, in May 2011. It has since conducted a number of surveillance visits in the region.
No one dared to lend money to anyone else because of fears that the other party could go bankrupt and the money that had been lent would disappear. What triggered the financial turmoil almost two years ago was problems in the US housing market. After several years of rising rapidly, house prices began to fall in autumn 2006. At the same time economic activity in the United States began to slow down. An increasing number of borrowers experienced difficulties in paying their interest and instalments. This applied in particular to borrowers with subprime loans. Mortgage institutions had often packaged subprime loans together with other loans in what were known as structured products, which had been sold mainly to investors in the United States and Europe. When credit losses increased it was difficult to determine who owned the high-risk assets and how large these risks were. But the underlying causes of the current crisis are more than just subprime loans and the new financial products. One important cause is the imbalances in the global financial system that have developed over a long period of time. Savings have been too small in the United States and too large in China and the oil-producing countries. The United States has had large deficits in its current account while other countries have had large surpluses. At the same time, monetary policy has been very expansionary in the United States, with low interest rates.

Starting with the institutional limitations, the key innovation of the SSM is that it creates genuinely European supervision, by which I mean supervision on both core and peripheral banks. From November next year, every bank in Europe will be part of the same system. This puts supervisors in a better position to prevent boom-bust cycles caused by excessive cross-border lending – and if they fail to do so, there will be collective responsibility for that failure. In line with the subsidiarity principle, European supervision will involve centralised and decentralised elements. For the big significant banks (around 130), the ECB will be the direct responsible supervisor, but supervision will take place at both the European and national levels. We will integrate these levels by setting up Joint Supervisory Teams (JST) for each significant bank. Let me use the example of Santander to illustrate how this will work. For the parts of the banking group resident within the SSM, there will be a core supervisory team comprising of staff from both the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs) in the countries where Santander is active – that is 9 within the euro area. Within this team there will be a national coordinator for each country, drawn from the respective NCA, and an overall coordinator, who will be an ECB staff member. The national coordinators will manage the permanent experts working at the national level, while the ECB coordinator will ensure quality and take responsibility for output sent to the Supervisory Board.
Chart 1  Chart 2  GDP projection based on market interest rate expectations and £ billion asset purchases  Projection of the level of GDP based on market interest rate expectations and £ billion asset purchases  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Chart 3 CPI inflation projection based on market interest rate expectations and £ billion asset purchases  The recent data has not been particularly encouraging. Official figures for 2010 Q4 and 2011 Q1 suggest that there was no underlying growth (allowing for the unusual impact of snow in December). And the unemployment rate remains at just under 8%. The data may not be totally reliable – they never are – but the message we get from our business contacts in all parts of the United Kingdom is not inconsistent with this broad picture painted by the official statistics. Meanwhile, CPI inflation is likely to go yet higher if (as the MPC expects) rises in the price of energy get reflected in utility bills in due course. The largely unanticipated path of CPI inflation over the past couple of years can be explained by three factors: changes in the standard rate of VAT, unforeseen changes in wholesale oil and gas prices and higher-than-expected import prices following the 25% depreciation of sterling since mid-2007. Given our target of 2%, the recent path of CPI inflation is uncomfortable to say the least.

As a result, my individual views on policy have mostly been wrapped up with those of others in the MPC Minutes and the Inflation Report. So today, I want to offer some more personal thoughts on how I see the economic outlook developing; how I interpret the balance of risks to output and inflation in the medium term; and why I have been voting for no change in Bank Rate or the scale of asset purchases at recent meetings. The outlook for growth The financial crisis brought with it the deepest recession the UK has experienced since at least the Great Depression of the 1930s. The MPC responded by cutting Bank Rate as low as it could reasonably go and injecting £ of extra money into the economy (14% of annual nominal GDP). Since the trough in output in the autumn of 2009, the UK economy has been on a gradual, if bumpy, path of recovery. That was to be expected. Historically, and internationally, we know that economic recovery after a major financial crisis is usually slow and seldom smooth – the MPC (and I personally) have been aware of this and flagging it for some time. Even though we have been predicting a rough ride, the output data at the end of last year and the beginning of this still came as an unwelcome surprise. Analysis of past data suggests that the most likely explanation is that we are currently going through a temporary soft patch.
Nor does it seem feasible that further substantial contributions of private capital will be forthcoming if the tensions on international financial markets do not subside. From an overall perspective the Spanish system is in a position to overcome all these challenges, though as I have reiterated, talk of immunity is completely out of place. Indeed, not all banks are in the same position when it comes to coping with the tensions. This is because they have pursued different lending policies over recent years in terms of the rate of expansion of loans and of the degree of risk concentration. Even among banks that have followed similar strategies, notable differences can be identified regarding the selection of specific risks, their ability to manage them and the buffers, in terms of profitability and solvency, available to them to alleviate the effects of any risks that may materialise. For all these reasons banks should make the changes necessary to adapt to the new circumstances. These changes unavoidably involve stepping up efforts to rationalise operating costs and to correct the overcapacity in the sector which arises from a worldwide tendency towards lower levels of leverage. 8  BIS Review 79/2009  This overcapacity in the banking industry should be tackled through restructuring processes that allow a sound and efficient financial intermediation system to take root.

As regards microprudential supervision, the Report proposes the creation of a European Financial Supervision System. Under this system, the current Level 3 Committees for banking, insurance and securities would be transformed into three European supervisory authorities with the power to take binding decisions in certain fields. As to macroprudential supervision, the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board was proposed. Its main purpose would be to detect general risks, apprising the competent European authorities thereof, where pertinent, so they might take the appropriate decisions. These are some of the initial steps of a process which will no doubt be long, but which will profoundly affect the systems of each and every European country. It is thus important that Spain should participate actively in the work of these international fora. In this respect, it is most satisfying that Spain has been welcomed as a member of the Financial Stability Board,  BIS Review79/2009  9  the successor of the Financial Stability Forum created in 1999, in which we had not hitherto participated. To be sure, the Banco de España’s experience in the design and implementation of a regulatory and supervisory system that has proven most effective during this crisis has been one of the factors that have helped Spain merit this position. And here I shall conclude, though not without first thanking the Governing Council, the Executive Commission, the Directors General and all our staff for their work this year.
I will conclude by returning to my starting point, to the importance and the scarcity of time in dealing with a troubled financial firm. The important role time plays at a failing firm The seeds of any financial failure are generally planted years earlier. The cycle is familiar to us all – in good times, most business strategies thrive. Financial institutions commence an  BIS Review 140/2010  1  activity that has high initial marginal returns; over time the activity attracts more competition, pricing goes down and risk appetite goes up. Overexpansion leads to an inevitable correction, with the losses incurred testifying to the long-term unsuccessful nature of the strategy. U.S. banking, securities and finance companies in the early 1990s experienced the late stage of just such a cycle in which commercial real estate and leveraged buyout lending overexpanded. The result was that many large financial institutions had to be merged into others or unwound. Banking supervisors responded to these problems by requiring banks with large, problematic exposures to implement a three-part program. First, the bank comprehensively identified its problem loans and assigned them to workout specialists. Second, the bank developed and executed a capital plan and strengthened its liquidity. Third and essential to raising new capital, the bank developed a new business plan demonstrating its ability to return to profitability. This program worked, in large part because it was applied timely enough. Stylized facts about time’s role on the value of a failing firm created urgency in implementing the program.

In addition, one of the most important decisions for resolution authorities will be which legal entities within a systemically important firm to place into insolvency proceedings and which entities can and should be maintained for sale as going concerns. In his September 1 testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, my colleague, Tom Baxter, general counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, described how Lehman’s brokerdealer was not placed into insolvency, remained a going concern temporarily funded by the central bank and was sold within days after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. The work needed to understand how coordinated resolution might work and when it will work underscores for us that an immediate jump to a fully fledged international resolution process is not really feasible. This is in fact why doing the hard and painstaking work of resolution planning is so important. Resolution planning is a smaller version of the statistical simulation I described, more closely tied to the specifics of the individual institution’s case, in which the financial authorities in the jurisdictions where the firm’s major operations are located work through potential scenarios. Those scenarios will reflect the current structure of the firm and the normal range of the distribution of assets and liabilities across legal entities. Resolution planning is likely to contribute a great deal of insight into how a full-fledged international process could work, insight that we do not have today.
However, on receiving your much appreciated invitation, I thought I’d take advantage of the sense of calm reflection which university fora instil to pause and ponder on what may happen to the Spanish economy after the crisis, when the global economy recovers. It is worth reflecting on the aftermath because the global nature of the crisis is "homogenising" the different economies. And by blurring the differences from one economy to another, it is hard to discern the different tasks awaiting them. As the crisis left nobody unscathed, not even those countries which acted prudently, i.e. those that did not incur excessive debt or whose competitiveness did not worsen, are faring better than those which were not so virtuous. But when the crisis ends, differences will re-emerge. When a plane taking off from New York almost crashed last month, the health and well-being of all the passengers hinged on how the crisis was resolved, without this depending on their youth, cholesterol levels, excess weight or the state of their lungs. The drama was the same for everybody. Luckily, they all emerged safe and sound from the landing on the Hudson. But after that, with the crisis behind, their health and well-being depends once again on the state of their organs, diet and exercise, and on taking the right medicine. Countries worldwide have entered into a similar negative spiral (a deep slowdown in – and in some cases the collapse of – consumption, employment, output, credit, investment...).

In the past year we regrettably posted once again the highest unemployment rate in the OECD; and furthermore, the speed at which joblessness in Spain is increasing during the current crisis is the fastest among all the developed countries. In countries facing a contraction in activity similar to that in Spain, the unemployment rate rose only slightly last year (e.g. by 0.2 pp in France), or even fell (Germany). We might argue that these countries show much lower increases in the labour force than Spain and that the expansion in their construction sectors was not comparable. The problem is that when we compare with countries that do have these two characteristics, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, Spain's unemployment increase continues to stand out. Specifically, the US unemployment rate rose by "only" 2.3 pp in 2008, somewhat more than in the United Kingdom, where the increase from January to October 2008 was 1.4 pp. These are very moderate increases when compared with the figure of over 5 pp for Spain in 2008. Evidently, the Spanish economy’s labour adjustment mechanisms are not working properly. Another harmful effect of an inefficient labour market is that it reduces the room for workers' real compensation to improve. In recent years, the Spanish economy has had to compete abroad on the basis of holding down its real labour costs, which was imposed by the economy’s low productivity.
BIS Review 2/2007  Table 1: Macroeconomic and asset price annual volatility  UK GDP US GDP  1951-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-91 1992-2005 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.3 0.9 3.3  UK Inflation (1)  Percentage change between 60-69 and 92-05 -41.8  Percentage change between 80-91 and 92-05 -59  1.7  2.5  2.5  1.1  -36.4  -56  1.5  5.5  3.4  1.0  -34  -72  US Inflation  1.8  1.2  2.0  2.3  0.5  -55  -76  S&P 500 (2)  14.0  15.7  19.1  12.0  15.2  -3  27  20.4  43.3  12.1  15.2  -25  26  5.4  7.8  15.4  9.6  78  -38  3.1  11.2  7.7  4.9  57  -36  £ ERI (5)  6.9  4.5  2.3  -49  $ ERI (5)  5.4  4.4  2.9  -34  Yen ERI (5)  9.9  4.3  4.0  -8  € ERI (5)  1.8  3.0  3.0  -3  FTSE All Share (2)(3) 10-year UST (2)  3.4  10-year UK gilt (2)(4)  Notes: 1. UK inflation is consumption deflator inflation; 1960-69 includes 1956-59 2. Nominal returns deflated by consumption deflators. 3. FTSE All Share starts in 1962 4. 1960-69 includes 1956-59 5. Trade weighted real exchange rate indices start in 1975 4.

Mr. Hannoun discusses the operational framework for EMU and the challenge of managing price stability Speech by the Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, Mr. Hervé Hannoun, at the Financial Times European Economic and Monetary Union Conference in London on 20/11/97. I am delighted to take part in this discussion on the framework for the single monetary policy in Stage Three. I will address what I consider to be the two main categories of issues in this context: those related to monetary policy strategy on the one hand, and those related to the execution of monetary policy operations on the other hand; in other words, strategic and operational issues. 1. STRATEGIC ISSUES What are the main strategic issues relating to the formulation of the single monetary policy? I will consider in turn: •  the final objective,  •  the intermediate target,  •  the role of the exchange rate as an indicator, and  •  the starting level of interest rates in the euro area at the end of next year. 1.1. Final objective: a quantified definition of price stability The final objective of the single monetary policy is clearly stated in the Maastricht Treaty: according to article 105, “the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability”. Only a monetary policy geared towards the objective of price stability can create the conditions for durable and sustainable growth.
The Goldin specification is:  (5) ln  ∝  Where  ∗  ∗  =  1 0  female male  We regress the natural log of average gross hourly pay on a binary female coefficient and a set of controls, wider than the ones used in Goldin (2014). The set of controls comprises both individual and job-specific characteristics. It includes: age, female-age group interactions, usual hours worked, public or private sector, full time or part time, contract type, whether born in the UK, has a child under 2, female and child under 2  26  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  26  interaction, occupation, female and occupation interaction, educational qualifications, tenure, region of home and sector (Annex Table 1A).11 Once we take account of these factors, Table 2 suggests that there was, on average, a conditional gender pay gap of just under -15% between 1994 and 2019.12 This gender pay gap is highly statistically significant. To understand how it has changed over time, we split the sample into five periods (1994-1998, 1999-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013, 2014-2019) and re-estimate (5). As Chart 22 shows, the gender pay gap has fallen over time, though it remains around -10% and is statistically significant by the end. Table 2: Gender pay gap for specification (5)  Female Observations  Coefficient  Pay gap, per cent  Number of observations for females  -0.159***  -15%  291,859  (-11.17) 537,177  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations.

Jean Claude Trichet: Welcome Malta! Speech by Mr Jean Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the event for launching the joint communication campaign for the euro changeover at the Central Bank of Malta, Valletta, 30 September 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour and pleasure for me to be here at this festive moment. This is to mark the launching of the joint communication campaign for the euro changeover in close co-operation with the Central Bank of Malta and with our friend, Michael Bonello, just 92 days before Malta adopts the euro on 1 January 2008. This will signify a great milestone in Malta’s history, especially since Malta only joined the European Union (EU) almost four years ago, on 1 May 2004. Let me first offer my warm congratulations to all of those who have helped bring Malta to this point. In 2002 for the countries that were in the euro area at the time, as well as for Slovenia this year, it was a memorable moment and a positive step. So I can well imagine how the Maltese feel at the moment. You can be proud of Malta’s successful convergence process. In fact, we are very pleased about the fruitful cooperation between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Central Bank of Malta in the preparations for the changeover, be it at the technical level or through the participation of Governor Bonello as observer in the Governing Council since last July.