samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will discuss that framework later on. This framework can be seen as an evolutionary response to crisis experience, not just this crisis but a great many previous ones. It is impossible to know if this framework will proof us against future crises. But in remembering those errors of the past, it gives us a fighting chance of not repeating them. So I want to take you on an historical journey charting the Bank of England’s role in financial crises and its response to them. Now, I know what you are thinking. The evolution of financial stability in the UK viewed through the lens of the Bank of England sounds deadly dull. So I am going at least to try to add a touch of colour to the events and personalities of the time. The very beginning Let’s start at the very beginning. The Bank of England was put on earth, way back in 1694, to do none of the things it does today – namely, preserving monetary and financial stability. Instead, it was a confection of the then monarchs, William III and Mary II, to pay for their war debts. At the time the Bank was little more than a branch, with a mere twenty staff. Pretty early in its life, however, the Bank began to involve itself in the business of banking. It began to grow its balance sheet by taking deposits from and extending loans to other banks, typically by the practice of “discounting” bills of exchange.

Monetary policy was embarking on a path which targeted inflation and which, unlike monetarism before it, downplayed money and credit. And the regulation of banks, long the preserve of central banks, was in many countries being hived off to separate regulatory agencies. What happened next was truly extra-ordinary. Whether by coincidence or causality, the world experienced the largest banking bubble in history. Between 1990 and 2007, global bank balance sheets rose by a factor four. On the eve of the crisis they had reached around $ trillion, or almost 1.5 times the annual output of the entire planet. At the Bank for International Settlements, Andrew Crockett saw trouble brewing. In 2000, he gave a speech calling for a “macro-prudential” approach to regulation.12 Crockett argued that central banks needed to look at, and act on, developments across the whole financial system if systemic risk was to be headed-off. Credit booms, the like of which was occurring for real at the time, sowed the seeds of that systemic risk. The rest is of course history, as pre-crisis credit boom turned to shuddering bust. Or rather it would be history were it not for the fact that this crisis, whose seeds were sown in the credit boom, is still with us. Output in the UK is still well below its 2007 level. The so-called Great Recession in the UK is already as severe as the Great Depression of the 1930s. In response, the policy framework has, once more, been radically augmented. Macroprudential policy is the next big thing.
Ranee Jayamaha: Glimpse of current financial regulations Inaugural speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Client Seminar on International Trade, organized by HNB (Hatton National Bank), Colombo, 13 November 2006. *  *  *  Mr Theagarajah, officials of HNB, Mr Richard Lightbound from Wachovia Bank, distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for the invitation extended to me to be present at the client seminar on Trends in International Trade. Let me congratulate HNB for taking the corporate social responsibility seriously and arranging a forum to exchange stakeholder views on an important subject. Generally, regulations are not liked by anybody. Same goes with the financial community in Sri Lanka. However, the common factor is that even regulators do not like to rule by regulation. For a better appreciation of the past and present financial regulatory environment, let me first set out the key elements underlying financial regulations. In summary: (a) regulations are mainly a reaction to an action by the financial community, although there may be instances in which regulations are brought in on hindsight with a forward-looking approach, but they are a few; (b) there is a clear difference between the objectives of regulators and market participants; (c) regulations are not necessarily a oneway street. They are not there only to tighten markets.

At the end of 2003 the foreign reserves of BoA reached $ covering 4.7 months of imports. BoA continues to maintain its view of a free exchange rate regime. This was reflected in the fewer episodes of BoA’s intervention in the foreign exchange market during the first half of 2003, when the purchase of foreign currency was almost four times that of the second half of the year. Nonetheless, this did not hold back the domestic currency from appreciating against the euro and the US dollar, with a stronger appreciating trend in place in the second half of the year. The appreciation of the domestic currency was one of the factors behind BoA’s 2.0% interest rate cut during year 2003. Monetary indicators have generally been performed in compliance with the forecasts set out in the Bank’s monetary programme. The annual growth rate of lek deposits was 19.1% by the end of the year, which is significantly higher than the annual rates of the pervious years. The credit balance rose by L11.9bn or 30.9%. The new credit increased by 50% meanwhile 76% is in foreign currency. The loans/GDP ratio is still low, at about 7%. The banking system experienced important developments during 2003 and in the beginning of 2004. The entry of two new banks of Albanian capital was soon followed by the successful privatisation of the Savings Bank from the Raiffeisen Zentralbank (RZB) Austria. Now, all in all there are 16 banks in the Albanian Banking system.
Even if neurological differences exist, they should not be exaggerated. For example, research has suggested these gender differences are typically smaller than the differences in brain wiring that exist within each gender. Or, put differently, neuroscientists have challenged the notion that brains are either “male” or “female”. Instead, most brains are transgender, a property known as “mosaicism”. 53 Our androgynous brains are also far from static. They evolve and re-wire over time in response to experience and circumstance. Neurologists call this property “plasticity”. 54 The malleability of our brains means that differences in the environment facing the sexes can have a lasting impact on their behaviour. Indeed, some studies have suggested that, once allowance is made for these environmental factors, behavioural differences between the sexes effectively disappear. For example, differences in the relative competitiveness of the sexes tend to be equalised once environmental factors are take into account. 55 And differences in mathematical performance  46  This is measured as the fraction of high-tech industry output relative to that in the economy as a whole. 47  Florida (2002, 2011). 48  For example, Charness and Gneezy (2012). 49  Coates (2012). 50  For example, Lagarde (2014), Davies (2015). 51  For example, Ertac and Gurdle (2011). 52  Ingalhalikar et al (2014)  53  Joel et al (2015)  54  Brooks (2011) . 55  Wozniak et al (2009), Cardenas et al (2014).

It has been enjoyed by generations of children, so it has a particular resonance at tonight’s event supporting Children in Need. And it has a happy (diverse, multi-cultural) ending. But The Sneetches also shines an uncomfortable spotlight on a psychological flaw in us all – the desire to differentiate, to stereotype. A half-century on, this flaw is one with which society continues to wrestle, not least in a world where the co-mingling of cultures, races and creeds has never been greater. In practice, this co-mingling has not always had such a happy ending. Tonight, I want to discuss some of the issues around diversity. These are relevant to groups large and small, from communities and organisations to economies and nation states. These issues affect all of us, children and adults, whether at school, work or play. In keeping with the spirit, I want to discuss diversity by drawing on a diverse a set of disciplines to explore the lessons they hold. And I will conclude with suggestions for some new directions in promoting diversity, in particular in organisations such as the Bank of England. We are all sneetches Let me start with what might appear, on the face of it, a rather controversial statement. Everyone is this room is a star-bellied Sneetch. I am, all of you are and everyone outside this room is too. By that I mean we all discriminate, to a certain degree and in certain situations, based on the characteristics and creeds of the individuals we encounter.
Some enterprises could be at the forefront of technological developments and increase efficiency in pace with the relatively high rate of growth in real wages in Norway. In recent years, we have also seen that many enterprises have moved large portions of their production abroad, particularly the most labour-intensive production. Norwegian manufacturing companies could therefore remain profitable even if the size of the manufacturing sector in the Norwegian economy is reduced. However, the scaling back of manufacturing also involves a risk. It makes the economy more vulnerable. The growth potential of the economy – the basis for learning, innovation and development – may be impaired when less of the business sector is exposed to intense foreign competition. Over the last thirty years, manufacturing industry has been scaled back in waves. The sharpest declines were observed in the years between 1977 and 1984 and from 1987 to 1992. The declines were preceded by a deterioration in profitability in this industry. It may take time for a weakening to spill over to output and employment, but when the turnaround first occurs it takes place rapidly and on a large scale. Primary industries, in contrast, are scaled back gradually. These developments will take place in addition to the effects associated with the increased spending of petroleum revenues. All in all, employment in manufacturing and agriculture may fall by some 50 000-100 000 person-years in the period to 2010. Employment in the manufacturing sector may drop to below 250 000.

At the same time, an increase in life expectancy for each cohort will reduce the annual pension. This motivates the individual to remain in employment and to ensure that the system is sustainable. The National Insurance Scheme’s expenditure is financed directly over the central government budget. Decisions about national insurance benefits have a substantial influence on future taxpayers. These costs are not transparent when the budget is decided. Developments since 1967 show that such a pay-as-you-go system is not robust. Benefits change over time and costs can easily be pushed into the future. The alternative is a system where pension expenditure is covered by accumulated capital, i.e. a funded system. In a funded system, a decision to increase pensions or reduce the age of retirement will require the allocation of capital today to cover future expenditure. Such a fund provides a measure of the cost of increasing pension expenditure. Our pension system is complicated. In addition to the National Insurance Scheme, many other operators, including the central government, have established additional pension schemes. There are different rules for coordination and entitlement. Any shift to a fund-based system for the National Insurance Scheme will probably require transitional rules for many years ahead. However, I believe that it will be possible to find solutions to these practical problems. Distributional and practical considerations imply that minimum benefits in the pension scheme cannot depend on earlier employment, but should apply to everyone.
The second piece examines the high child poverty rate in Puerto Rico and its impact on the long-term economic sustainability of the island and its ability to recover from Hurricane Maria. The island’s child poverty rate is almost three times higher than that of mainland, and has remained stagnant even during times of economic growth, suggesting the issue is not just rooted in labor demand. This chapter discusses the dual programmatic and policy strategy of the Boys and Girls Club of Puerto Rico and its sister organization the Youth Development Institute. Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to provide a quick overview of today’s sessions. First, my colleague Patrick Harker, President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, will discuss key shifts in perspective needed to see workforce development as an investment. Then there will be three panel sessions, each dedicated to the overarching focus of a volume in the publication – investing in workers, investing in work, and investing in systems. The day will then end with a luncheon panel discussion where speakers from various sectors will discuss what needs to happen to realize the goal of seeing workforce development as an investment in inclusive economic growth that benefits workers, employers, and communities. I am thrilled that we can bring together national and regional leaders representing the private, public, and nonprofit sectors to engage in a dialogue that can inform workforce development programming across the country and learn from one another about the opportunities for investing in America’s workforce.

BIS Review 32/2003  3
Where once trust was anonymised, institutionalised and centralised, today it is increasingly personalised, socialised and distributed. Facing these new constraints, the challenge for central banks is to rebuild trust among a wider set of societal stakeholders, more distrustful and diffuse than ever previously, using a set of trust-building technologies, less well-understood than those used previously. As they have through their history, central banks will need to adapt their customs and practices to these new social norms and technological possibilities. 7  This is a big agenda. It is not one remotely unique to central banks. And it is not one I could remotely do justice to tonight. Nonetheless, given the policy weight these days being placed on central banks’ shoulders, and the changing social and technological landscape facing them, it is probably as good a time as any to begin exploring these new frontiers of central bank engagement. Those new frontiers include communicating in simpler, narrative language that engages a wider audience using localised, personalised messaging; finding new ways to engage with cohorts of society currently out of reach, listening as often as talking; and using new technologies – nudging and polling, naming and gaming – to better understand the views and behaviours of wider society. For central banks, this is a brave new world. The Rising Tide of Central Banking th  Let me start by looking backwards. The 20 century may yet be seen by monetary historians as the one when central banking came of age.

Notable milestones among the world’s major central banks have included: in 1994, the Fed’s decision to announce immediately its target interest rate after each meeting; the announcement of different forms of forward guidance, starting in Japan in 1999; publishing minutes of policy meetings, most recently introduced by the ECB in 2015; and forecasts for interest rates, which the Fed has done since 2012 (Table 1). The major central banks’ engagement strategies have been equally as impressive. For example, the Federal Reserve has a long-standing and extensive commitment to promote community development at the national, regional and local levels. That includes working with communities whose residents are low- and moderate-income. The various initiatives of the Community Development team at the San Francisco Fed are excellent examples of this work. 20  The Federal Reserve has also sought to learn from listening to the views of those same communities. In 2015, the Federal Reserve Board formed a new Community Advisory Council, which contains a diverse group of 15 citizen representatives. It meets with the Fed Board twice a year to provide information and recommendations on policy matters, with a focus on issues relevant to low- and moderate-income residents. Bringing this together, it is possible to construct weighted-average aggregate transparency indices. These show a steady ratchet-up in openness across a range of central banks over time (Chart 5). And if we look at mentions of the world’s major central banks in the main newspapers, these have also been on a steadily-rising trend over time (Charts 6A and 6B).
Which of the two ratios binds first depends on the kind of risks that banks are running. The leverage ratio automatically places tighter limits on expansions in the balance sheet through supposedly low-risk assets. The international community has made progress on the leverage ratio. The definition guiding how it should be calculated was agreed at the start of this year. This will provide the basis for banks to disclose the ratio over the next 3 years in the light of which the international community will decide in 2017 on the calculation of a minimum standard. A number of authorities, including the US, the Netherlands, and the Swiss, have already introduced or are considering a leverage ratio in advance of the international standard. In the UK, the Prudential Regulation Authority has already asked the eight major UK banks and building societies to take steps to achieve a leverage ratio above 3%. The Financial Policy Committee has been asked by the Chancellor to review whether a leverage ratio framework should be introduced in advance of the international framework. This could include a power for the FPC to vary the ratio to counter macro-prudential risks. The FPC will consult on the review and expects to publish its conclusions towards the end of the year. There is also important work underway to ensure the risk-weighted framework is robust. Reviews are underway to build a credible standardised approach to calculating risk-weights for banks’ trading activities and their loan books; this too should help reduce the system’s exposure to model risk.

And the Bank intends to consult the market shortly on what the requirements should be in respect of loan-by-loan information for such assets to be eligible in the future. Along with other monetary authorities taking similar actions, 8 standardisation of information provision may help improve investor confidence in the underlying securities. Non-bank lending Also during 2009, the Bank used its market and corporate contacts to identify why bank lending dominated the supply of credit and what the obstacles were to lending from nonbanks. There appeared to be no easy wins but a recent HMT consultation paper which draws  8  6  See the ECB announcement: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2009/html/pr091223.en.html. BIS Review 23/2010  heavily on the Bank’s investigation, explores options to facilitate the supply of credit from non-bank lenders. 9 Interactions with other monetary policy actions The commercial paper and corporate bond schemes seem to have been reasonably successful in helping to improve key markets and hence facilitating access to credit, at least for larger corporates. Smaller firms who supply those larger firms, may also have seen some “trickle down” benefits. One indicator of this is that the rise in the level of company insolvencies during the recession has been surprisingly small so far, given the fall in output (Chart 7). But the major supportive factor has probably come from the very low level of Bank Rate and the programme of quantitative easing.
Bandid Nijathaworn: The future of monetary policy Remarks by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at “South East Asia Central Banks/Bank for International Settlements (SEACEN/BIS) Seminar on Central Bank Challenges in Emerging Market Economies in the Post-Crisis Era”, Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, 21 January 2010. *  *  *  First, let me thank SEACEN and the BIS for asking me to lead off the discussion on this important topic. For the SEACEN economies, I think two important questions stand out. The first is what went wrong with monetary policy and what can we learn from it? And the second is what more can we do to improve our understanding of monetary policy so that long-term price stability can be assured while the risk of financial instability is avoided? Although the current global financial crisis has been a dramatic experience for central banks, it also offers an opportunity to reassess both the intellectual underpinning and the practical implementation of monetary policy. As we all know, monetary policy in the last fifteen years did cover almost the whole of a global business cycle, starting from the period of the socalled “great moderation” when there was a perceived end to economic volatility with interest rates remaining low for an extended period, to the current global financial crisis that saw aggressive use of monetary policy by the major central banks to combat economic contractions with near-zero interest rates and the use of unconventional measures.

For instance, a distinction should be introduced between “proprietary trading” and “market making” in line, by the way, with the draft banking sector reform that is being currently discussed in France. Concluding remarks Ladies and Gentlemen, let me conclude. Central Banks have played a crucial role in the economic and political response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Their use of new and non-conventional tools was decisive to control the financial deterioration and economic contraction that the world was confronting at the beginning of 2009. In so doing, central banks have moved away, to a certain extent, from the old monetary policy model. It might be said that a new one is emerging where central banks will use two sets of policies – monetary and macroprudential policies – to ensure a broadly defined financial stability objective. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5