samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
After the global crisis in the 1930s, the path that was chosen up to around the 1970s (its duration varied from country to country) was regulation. Credit and exchange controls were reintroduced. In Sweden, the credit system had been liberalised in the middle of the 19th century but after the 1930s it was regulated once more. The risk of serious financial crises was countered by controlling the domestic credit supply in detail and more or less prohibiting cross-border capital movements that were not directly connected with trade in goods and services. But these controls also had the effect of hampering the financial system’s development. If the costs of this period of regulation could be identified and estimated, we would probably find that they were considerable. What this amounts to is that high capital requirements for banks are costly, not just for the banks but for the entire economy, and the same applies to controls on credit and foreign exchange. As this was recognised by more and more countries, national policies in this field were realigned in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. Controls were abolished and domestic capital markets were opened up for cross-border capital flows. But in many instances the financial system was unprepared for a freer environment. The era of regulation had lulled many banks into a false sense of security. Moreover, supervision concentrated on the wrong issues and was by no means appropriate. Neither did economic policy observe the discipline that a deregulated financial system requires.

In the view of this process, we stand ready to adapt them to the economic and financial developments, or support them with other measures. The stability of the financial system shall be at the foundation of each action of the Bank of Albania in this regard. Finally, I would like to remind all the representatives of the private sector, whether in production or financial industry, that under the effects and impact of the crisis, the public authorities, lawmakers, fiscal and monetary authorities, have made important changes in terms of philosophy, objectives and decision making, far from traditional considerations. These temporary changes aim at mitigating the crisis effects, stabilising the economy, consumption and private investment. The package I introduced today is a good example to illustrate this change. It is necessary, therefore, for the private sector to adopt such a temporary adjustment. Ms. Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, appealed that in the current situation, the goal of the private sector cannot be only profit; it must also be to add value, create jobs, develop the new ideas that drive an economy forward and provide stability. Boosted employment and higher income from employment means more consumption and investments, higher consumer demand for goods, services and lending instruments. The private and financial sector should be accountable to the real economy: a private sector that supports employees and consumers, and a financial sector that adds values instead of destroying them.
Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Welcome address - National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia fintech event Welcome address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the NBRNM fintech virtual event, Skopje, 28 July 2021. *** Good morning to all. It is my pleasure to welcome you to this virtual event today. The purpose of the event is twofold: 1) to share with you the results of the activities we are taking as part of our ongoing efforts to support the fintech development and 2) to announce our next steps in fintech segment. This event would not be possible without the European Fund for SouthEast Europe, an institution with a prominent role in promoting responsible financial sector development. We are very thankful for its continuous support in different areas of our activities, including Fintech. I would also like to extend a gratitude to Mr. Jay Tikam, a financial expert who will present the findings from the first national Fintech Survey that we jointly conducted. Let me now shed some light on a couple of important dimensions related to fintech such as the specific circumstances that brought this issue to the fore in the last decade, the benefits it brings to the society, the role of policy makers/regulators in this segment, the current state and the priorities and challenges ahead. Although "fintech" is a relatively new term, technology has always played an important role in the financial sector.

Let me also touch upon a very important area of our statistical work – co-operation between statistical authorities, namely between the Czech Statistical Office and the Czech National Bank, not only in the preparation of this conference but on a regular basis. This co-operation is aimed at an effective arrangement of statistical processes in our country and minimizing the burden on respondents. Coordinated data collection and sharing of information are the key points in this respect. As we know, a formal arrangement is always a necessary but not sufficient condition for good results. It has become a standard between these two institutions to meet once a year at an annual summit devoted not only to the assessment of the past twelve months’ work and designing the tasks for the period ahead, but also to informal discussions in a friendly atmosphere. This is also an important feature of statistical work since statistics do not involve only figures, but also people who create and compile them. 2  BIS Review 107/2009  Having finished the description of our co-operation in this way, I would like to wish all participants of the conference the same friendly atmosphere at the conference and at the same time interesting presentations and fruitful discussions in addressing the above mentioned or other statistical issues. Thank you for your attention  BIS Review 107/2009  3
The goal of this Regulation is to ensure a more rigorous regulatory treatment of issuance and transactions with some types of crypto-assets and the crypto-asset service providers will be subject to authorisation and control. The long-term trends in Europe are related to achieving a greater integration and autonomy of the European payment system. In its centre are positioned the instant payments and application of common technical and business standards across Europe. Bulgaria is an active participant in these processes. EU initiatives for development of retail payments are in the process of implementation on our domestic payments market. A still open question is whether the changes in the people’s payment habits will stay as a permanent feature and will set a direction for the forthcoming technical developments in the payments sector. In this very dynamic area the EU regulators will continue playing an active role. I wish interesting and productive work to all the participants in today’s financial forum. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Chart 5: Brexit as a source of uncertainty Aug-Sep 2016 Feb-Apr 2017 Aug-Oct 2017 Feb-Apr 2018  9  Share of respondents (per cent) 50 40 30 20 10 0  Not important  One of many sources 2 or 3 top sources  Top source of uncertainty  On the demand side, while Brexit did not lead to an immediate fall in GDP, it is nonetheless exerting a drag. In addition to its effects on investment, it has had a significant impact on real household incomes and therefore on consumption. The main vehicle for this impact has been the fall in the exchange rate, which remains some 15% below its pre-referendum peak. The rise in import prices caused by sterling’s depreciation has had a material and persistent effect on incomes: real household income has only risen by 0.2% in the seven quarters since the referendum, compared with averaged growth of over 1½ % per year in the five years prior to it (Chart 6). Given that slowing in real income growth, you could argue that it’s surprising that households haven’t adjusted consumption even more. Consumption growth has certainly slowed: it has averaged around 0.3% per quarter since the referendum, compared to 0.6% in the previous five years and nearly 0.9% in the pre-crisis decade. But households have also in aggregate reduced their savings – the household saving rate has fallen by some two per cent of income (Chart 7).
For this year, it is forecast that GDP growth will remain well above long-term growth in potential output and demand pressures will still increase, but that inflation is projected to remain below target for most of the year. This is uncertain, however, and various changes have taken place and others may lie ahead, which could affect future developments. The tradable sector is now experiencing stronger crowding-out effects from tourism, after the rapid growth of the latter in recent years. Sizeable pay increases in the recent term and last year’s strong appreciation of the króna cut into profits, and companies now have less scope to absorb pay rises. The recent appreciation of the króna is a result of growth in tourism and other favourable developments, and it tends to shift demand outside the domestic economy, thereby reducing the positive output gap. Although forecasts based on given assumptions and available models indicate that the exchange rate will continue to rise, it should be noted that this is highly uncertain. Capital account liberalisation could contribute to either a higher exchange rate or a lower one in the short run, depending on how expectations develop. The special reserve requirements imposed last June on capital inflows to the bond market and high-interest deposits have contained the rise in the exchange rate and will reduce the likelihood of a steep carry trade-related appreciation in the near term. From 12 March, when capital account liberalisation was announced, through yesterday’s official listing, the exchange rate of the króna had fallen by 3.8%.

As the graph shows, inflation in the first quarter developed as predicted by us (blue curve). The dashed red curve represents the new forecast. This is based on a steady three-month Libor of 0.5%. The forecast begins in the second quarter of the current year and ends in the first quarter of 2007. In order to analyse the inflation prospects, it is useful to differentiate three phases. I shall begin with the short-term inflation prospects. In particular, I shall discuss the role of oil prices. Then I will present our outlook for the economy, which affects the medium-term inflation forecast. Finally, I shall talk about the long-term inflation prospects. For this, an analysis of monetary developments is helpful. The development of oil prices In the short term, i.e. for a period of approximately one year, monetary policy can hardly steer price developments. Price levels are largely determined by monetary policy decisions made in the past. Inflation may, however, be temporarily influenced by events that are not attributable to monetary policy. We are currently experiencing such an event in the form of higher oil prices. Price increases for oil products have contributed significantly to the rise in annual inflation measured by the national consumer price index (CPI) from 0.5% in April to 0.9% in May. The increase in the oil price is also the main reason why our inflation forecast exceeds the March forecast until the first quarter of 2005 despite the higher interest rate level.
Page 1  UK monetary policy outlook − speech by Huw Pill Given at the Money Market Association of New York University (Money Marketeers) Event, New York  Page 2  Published on 09 January 2023  Speech Good evening everyone. Before I turn to the body of my remarks, I thought it would be useful to start the New Year with a few important reminders. Inflation in the United Kingdom is currently too high. Returning UK inflation to its 2% target on a lasting and sustainable basis is essential. Price stability must prevail if we are to create the environment in which firms and households can take the longer-term investment decisions that build the human and physical capital, which ultimately drives the dynamism, innovation, productivity and growth upon which prosperity and improving living standards rest. It is the job of monetary policy to return inflation to target. That is what we on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) are mandated to do within the UK’s institutional framework for macroeconomic policy. In the face of inflationary shocks over the past eighteen months, the MPC has tightened monetary policy significantly. The Committee will continue to act as necessary to ensure the inflation target is achieved on a lasting basis over the medium term, remaining alert to new economic shocks that might create further inflation disturbances. There should be no question about what the MPC is seeking to achieve or whether it is prepared to take the necessary actions to do so.

David Carse: Banking in Hong Kong after the Asian crisis  Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at a Luncheon Meeting of the Ginyukai, held on 21 August 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here to address this luncheon meeting of the Ginyukai. Although I meet Japanese banks on an individual basis quite frequently, I see them as a group less often than I used to before the Asian crisis. In my earlier days in Hong Kong, we used to meet regularly at the numerous opening ceremonies and receptions of Japanese banks who were setting up new offices in Hong Kong. Over the last two years however I have been dealing with the voluntary revocation of the licenses of many of these same banks as they depart the Territory. This is a much sadder task than cutting the ribbon at an opening ceremony. The figures tell their own story. In March 1997, there were 91 Japanese authorised institutions in Hong Kong. This includes some banks with multiple authorisations, for example as licensed banks and as deposit-taking companies. By June of this year, the number of authorised institutions had dropped to 35, a decline of 60%. The reasons behind this decline are varied. Some of the Japanese banks were forced to cut their overseas operations, including those in Hong Kong, because of critical balance sheet problems and heavy losses.
Regulations of Anti Money Laundering (AML) and Know Your Customer (KYC) should be enhanced to prevent such risks. Finally, use of digital services requires better telecommunication infrastructure and internet access in some areas. Central Bank Digital Currencies Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) represent an even more ambitious project that could be developed with a Blockchain/DLT infrastructure. A CBDC could imply several advantages for its users: (i) lower costs and higher speed for the interbank market; (ii) the possibility to implement central bank open market operations in a calendar of 24h/7days and reduce the current overnight transaction risk; (iii) an easier framework to pay interests on central bank currency and avoid restrictions coming from a zero-lower-bound (ZLB), and (iv) separate the current joint roles of credit and money creation by commercial banks, creating a more narrow banking system in which banks and financial institutions work with a 100% equity and no leverage. 12  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  Allowing a massive access, the balance sheet of the central bank creates almost unsurmountable challenges and risks, though. The main challenge is to move from a few dozens of wholesale partners to thousands or even millions of retail account holders, many of which could massively join as a part of a run on commercial banks.

6  Central Bank of Chile 29 June, 2017  Financial distortions that influence macro stabilization  Slide 10  ▪ Liquidity constraints prevent relative prices from helping macro adjustment ▪ Inefficient intermediation of savings reduces the return on real investment and balance incentives in favor of speculation and rent-seeking ▪ Underdeveloped financial systems are also prone to concentration and vertical integration, at the cost of clients and systemic risk  [SLIDE 10] The latter are rather dramatic examples of the challenges posed by protracted financial development for price and financial stability, the twin goals of central banks. But such challenges can take many more shapes. A low coverage of banking and credit means that a substantial fraction of the population and companies may not have access to liquidity when they need it, nor credit to live through a contingency. Liquidity and credit constraints prevent relative prices from resolving disequilibria, amplifying the impact of shocks on employment, production and consumption. Inefficient intermediation of savings reduces the return on real investment and tilt incentives in favor of speculation and rent-seeking. Shallow capital markets may be unable to hedge market risks, particularly exchange rate and term exposures, and foster concentration and vertical integration. Underdeveloped financial services can also contribute to economic informality. What is the point in registering a business, complying with regulations and paying taxes if you cannot get funding for working capital or investment projects? The financial dimension of informality is shadow, unregulated banking, which is prone to insolvency, abuse and fraud.
To the extent that such policies can be anticipated by market participants, financial intermediaries could be expected to price in the resulting shift in the relative supply of and demand for currency before capital flows take place. As a consequence, international portfolio rebalancing considerations may, at times, drive a wedge between expected future short-term rates and the exchange rate. My remarks today are by no means conclusive and they are based on tentative evidence. But I hope that they provide impetus to further, more systematic research on a topic that is not only intriguing from an intellectual perspective, but also of significant relevance to policymakers in their efforts to improve the understanding of the transmission channels of non-standard monetary policy measures. Thank you for your attention. 1 See e.g. Fratzscher, M., M. Lo Duca and R. Straub (2016), “ECB Unconventional Monetary Policy: Market Impact  and International Spillovers”, IMF Economic Review, 64(1), pp. 36-74; Georgiadis, G. and J. Gräb (2016), “Global Financial Market Impact of the Announcement of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme”, Journal of Financial Stability, 26, pp. 257-265; Rajan, R. (2014), “Competitive monetary easing: is it yesterday once more?”, remarks at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., April 10; and Bernanke, B.S. (2015), “Federal Reserve Policy in an International Context”, paper presented at the 16th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 5 and 6 November. 2 See Cœuré, B.

My point is rather that it is not surprising that central bank asset purchases may break with some of the regularities we have become used to. The reason is that asset purchases are monetary policy actions that can be anticipated by market participants, just like changes in key policy rates. Unlike conventional monetary policy, however, they have direct implications for the expected supply of and demand for internationally traded bonds and, hence, for the level of the exchange rate that, all other things being equal, clears the resulting capital flows. This may, at times, break the link between future expected rates and the exchange rate. This is clearly visible when we look at slide 6. The chart is based on the same methodology as the spillover chart on slide 4, but it illustrates how much, on average, of the variance in long-term bond yields in one country can be explained by the other country’s term premium and expected short-term rates respectively. 7 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  You can see that the moment short-term yields hit the zero lower bound, spillovers in bond markets by and large reflected term premia movements – in both directions. These spillovers may pull the exchange rate away from the path implied by expectations about the future shortterm rate. The extent of the decoupling, in turn, will depend on the expected direction, persistence and degree of international spillovers – something that is inherently difficult to project and price.
As you know, he was born in Europe but passed away in America – and it’s probably no coincidence. Accordingly, I would like to elaborate on three potential “candidates” as explanations for Europe’s lag: the first two – our social model and our macroeconomic policies – would be Keynesian failures and the third one – our lack of innovation – is on the Schumpeterian side. To put it in a nutshell, I don’t believe in the first two explanations, but I believe in the third one. Hence, Europe ultimately needs to gather together its two sons, to reconcile Keynes and Schumpeter. Page 5 sur 14 A. Our social model? A frequent explanation for Europe’s lag seeks to lay the blame with our common social model. In my view, this is not convincing. On the contrary. Look at the Nordic economies. They have a high ratio of social spending as a percentage of GDP (28% in Denmark, 25% in Sweden, 29% in Finland, well above the OECD average of 20%), and nevertheless their economic performances is better : for instance, the unemployment rate was 5.1% in Denmark, 6.8% in Sweden and 6.7% in Finland in 2019 (before the outbreak of the Covid crisis), which is well below the euro area average (7.6%). Sweden and the Netherlands successfully gave birth to “decacorns” such as Spotify and Adyen, etc.

The Bank of England’s own November Discussion Paper was only one manifestation. Another is the IMF’s recent review of the macroeconomic policy framework. 11 The basic question is whether the authorities could lean against credit-fuelled booms by tightening capital or liquidity requirements for lenders or, as some economists have advocated, by raising the amount of collateral that borrowers have to put up. 12 In principle, this could be aimed at aggregate or sectoral credit conditions, and it could have a goal of making our banks more resilient. It would need to be pursued by executive agencies under clear mandates from legislators, and it would benefit greatly from transparency. A painful lesson for the Bank of England is that our warnings of “underpriced risk” and system-wide fragilities in our Financial Stability Reports were perhaps admired by some but made no difference. And, alongside our domestic and international peers, we are not in this for plaudits! People – the markets, firms, households – take notice of our Inflation Report, MPC minutes and speeches on monetary policy not, essentially, because they might sometimes be interesting or well done, but for the simple reason that the MPC is the body that sets sterling interest rates in the real world. If the authorities were able to deploy credible macroprudential tools, their stability warnings would probably be taken more seriously in future, because they would be able to follow up words with actions. Monetary policymakers would need to be attentive to the use of such instruments, as they would affect credit conditions.