samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Low inflation is not simply an end in itself - it is a necessary means to the end of sustainable growth, to sustained high levels of employment, and to rising living standards which are, of course, the really good things of economic life. And what gives me personally - and my colleagues - real satisfaction is the fact that stable, low inflation has over this period been accompanied by steadily increasing overall output and employment, and by a progressive fall in unemployment. GDP growth since the Spring of 1992 until this summer has averaged just about 3% a year - which is well above most estimates of our trend rate of 2¼%-2½% - and the longest period of sustained quarter-by-quarter growth we have enjoyed since quarterly records began in the UK in 1955. Employment increased steadily from a low point of 25 ½ mn people in the Spring of 1992 to a peak of over 28mn in the summer of this year. And the rate of unemployment has fallen from a peak of over 10½% on the LFS measure to around 5%; while on the Claimant Count measure it has fallen from some 10% to just over 3%, which means that the number of people claiming unemployment benefit, at under 950,000, is the lowest for 26 years. And what has been a good period for the UK economy as a whole, has also been good - in an absolute sense - for Wales.

Here on an LFS basis the rate of unemployment fell from the recent peak of over 10½% in November 1993 to below 6% in July this year for the first time since these data were collected; and, on the Claimant Count basis, unemployment, which touched 10% in the winter of 1992--93, had fallen to 3.8% in August, the lowest rate since June 1975. But I freely acknowledge that it doesn't necessarily feel like that today - certainly not to everyone. I am only too well aware that there are a lot of people in every part of the UK - both business people who've been under real pressure and employees who have lost their jobs - who will react to these statistics by saying "Well you could have fooled me!" That may well be true of some of you here this evening. The Bank receives detailed reports every month from each of our 12 agencies throughout the UK, including reports from Sue Camper based in Cardiff. Many of you will know Sue already - and I encourage those who don't to make yourselves known to her. The reports which she and her fellow agents make each month, based on their direct, first hand, knowledge of what's happening in their area, are fed directly into our Monetary Policy Committee process. They play a vital part in informing our understanding of the macro-economic statistics which in themselves can only capture the overall, aggregate, picture.
Partnerships will thrive and add value when they are supported with effective decision-making structures and organisational frameworks to ensure the smooth translation of ideas from conception to implementation. These factors create partnerships with real impact as they are able to fully BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  and sustainably utilise their specialist skills, knowledge and technological capacity in ensuring successful outcomes. Conclusion In conclusion, the road to a promising and sustainable future for ASEAN is not one that can be traversed in isolation, especially in a world that is becoming increasingly borderless. As we see our economies prosper, our society will also mature with our improved growth potential. However, we must bear in mind that having good ‘genes’ does not guarantee successful results until we come together to activate and realise our latent potential. Therefore policymakers, business community and civil society must collaborate effectively for this better future, together. On this note, I wish you an enriching, dynamic and productive Forum. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The reserve accumulation program and liquidity provision Confronted with the uncertain outcome of the financial crisis in developed countries, where difficulties in funding for emerging economies could not be ruled out, and at a time when the Chilean peso had appreciated significantly, the Central Bank of Chile deemed appropriate to strengthen its international liquidity position. To that end, in April it began an international reserve accumulation program. In recent weeks, particularly after the downfall of Lehmann Brothers in September, signs of more severely constrained international financial markets and tight foreign currency liquidity conditions began to surface. Chile was no exception. Accordingly, on September 29, the Board of the Central Bank of Chile decided to terminate the reserve accumulation program. During its application, 5.75 billion dollars were acquired, amounting to 70% of the initially announced plan, which is the equivalent to an increase of 30% in international liquidity over the level of end of March 2008. In addition, and to reduce tensions in foreign exchange market liquidity, the Bank has auctioned off one billion US dollars under the foreign currency swap modality where offers are made in terms of libor plus a premium. At first, this program considers two more auctions for a combined total amount of one billion US dollars. To sterilize the monetary effects of these operations and prevent effects on peso liquidity, Repo window operations are being offered at the monetary policy rate at 28 days. In this aspect, it is necessary to contextualize the Chilean banking sector foreign indebtedness, especially the short-run component.
But countries are staring down the barrel of increasing expenditures and decreasing revenues… Countries will experience a deep recession that will have an impact on their public finances. This will entail greater funding needs, of between € trillion and € trillion, an amount the likes of which we’ve probably never seen before. They will also issue public debt to finance themselves, which is precisely why the ECB’s intervention in the bond markets aims to avoid fragmentation at an extremely difficult time. The ECB balance sheet is overflowing with debt from euro area countries. Where will this end? Is it possible that in the future this debt could be forgiven or written-off? Debt levels in the euro area are sustainable and when this crisis is over, economic conditions will get back to normal. We are not looking at any scenarios where this debt is a problem. It’s not a scenario I’m considering. Nevertheless, EU institutions are going through a severe crisis as they finance the cost of the pandemic. At the most recent EU summit and last Eurogroup meeting, we saw unprecedented clashes involving EU founding members, such as Italy. Europe currently has three main instruments at its disposal. First, the EIB guarantee fund that I mentioned previously, with € billion made available to provide support of up to € billion.

Luis de Guindos: Interview in La Vanguardia Interview with Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, and La Vanguardia, conducted by Mr Manel Pérez and published on 12 April 2020. * * *  What is your assessment of the global economic situation in the midst of this coronavirus crisis? The global economy will enter recession and so will the European economy, albeit an even more severe one. The ultimate fall in GDP will depend on how long the lockdown lasts. International bodies have calculated that the economy will shrink by 2% to 3% for each month of lockdown. So one and a half months would be around 5%. Three months would be double that. Do these calculations also apply to the Spanish economy? Spain had an advantage at the start of this crisis – it was seeing growth that was higher than the average of its euro area peers. But it also had a problem – its economy is more exposed to the crisis as it is more dependent on services like tourism, which are heavily affected by the pandemic. This makes it very likely that Spain will experience a deeper recession. And coming out the other side of the crisis, what do you think the economic recovery will look like? In the euro area, the most likely scenario is that we will see some signs of growth starting in the third quarter, but we will have to wait until 2021 to see a genuine recovery in economic activity.
Davíð Oddsson: Economic and financial developments in Iceland Address by Mr Davíð Oddsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the Bank's Annual Meeting, Reykjavik, 28 March 2008. *  *  *  Mr. Chairman, Mr. Prime Minister, honourable Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen: The Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland welcomes you all to the Bank’s 47th Annual Meeting. At the recently concluded meeting of the Supervisory Board, the Prime Minister ratified the Bank’s annual accounts, which are available here, together with the Annual Report for the year 2007. Here in Iceland there are various cliffs that people scale in order to gain a better overview of the surroundings than they would have on the level ground below. From this vantage point, the Central Bank at Arnarhóll, the telescope points, in all weathers, at inflation – at how it develops and how it behaves. It focuses both on the components that are measured with the officially required tools and on those that lie beneath the surface, not least on the indicators and expectations concerning how these components of inflation are likely to manifest themselves in the near future.

Iceland’s overall level of debt has grown to an uncomfortable degree, and the CDS spreads of Icelandic banks have reached exceptional heights despite their excellent capital adequacy ratios, their steady history of profitability, and the improvements they have made in their funding procedures relative to, for example, two years ago. The present credit crunch and difficulties in the market are far from being uniquely Icelandic; they are a global phenomenon, and the recent turnaround seems to have taken everyone by surprise. When the current problems reared their heads in mid-2007, many  2  BIS Review 36/2008  clung to the hope that these headwinds would be short-lived and soon pacified. The general feeling seems to have been that there was still a glut of capital around the world, and that the temporary distrust in the market – even a sort of misunderstanding of the market – would vanish as soon as it became clear that the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States, despite its scope and size, was only a drop in the proverbial ocean of international finance, and that cheap capital must surely be unleashed anew and the Utopian dream would take the market in its arms once more. At which point, all would be happy once again and all unpleasantness a forgotten dream.
The improvement in terms of trade has benefited both wage-earners and enterprises. Low import prices have resulted in a slow rise in consumer prices and a solid increase in wage-earners’ real wages. High export prices have contributed to holding down the rise in real wages. Combined with high productivity growth, this has resulted in high corporate earnings and solid growth in employment. Equally important is the ample supply of foreign labour in Norway. There was a particularly sharp increase in inward labour migration after EU enlargement in 2004. Over the past two years, these labour inflows have accounted for over 30 per cent of growth in the labour force in Norway. At the same time, this has enabled Norwegian companies to be bolder in accepting new assignments and making investments, in the knowledge that they can procure labour not only from the Nordic countries but throughout Europe. Norwegian firms also have greater scope for relocating production to other countries if labour costs become too high. This has resulted in intensified competition in the labour market and has probably had a dampening effect on wage demands. Increased globalisation may have resulted in permanent changes in the Norwegian labour market. The integration of additional countries in the global economy – in particular India and China – and changes in the social structure in these countries has led to a doubling of the global labour force. Norwegian enterprises have access to this labour supply through trade, capital flows and outsourcing of jobs and capital.

In Norway, a relatively large share of the population is now economically active, after lagging behind our neighbouring countries up to the 1990s. It should be noted that, even though labour force participation is high and unemployment is low, the average employee in Norway works far fewer hours per year than employees in the other Nordic countries. This gap seems to have widened through the 1990s and up to today. The standard working year is short in Norway, and Norway also has a higher percentage of part-time employees than other countries. The opportunity to work part-time has for a long time made it easier for women and young workers to enter the labour market. BIS Review 107/2007  1  There are considerable outflows from the labour market into various social security schemes. Sickness absence is high, and the share of the working-age population on rehabilitation schemes or receiving disability pensions is rising. Many workers choose to take early retirement under the AFP scheme (contractual early retirement) when they reach the age of 62, and this number will probably increase in the years ahead. In Norway, close to 600 000 persons of working age receive social security benefits or pensions. This is equivalent to 25 per cent of the labour force. A disturbing aspect is that disability is increasing among young people. We know from experience that this group tends to remain outside the labour force for parts or all of their lives.
We will continue to pursue these goals, with no concessions to our primary mandate and our independence. 3. Beyond this action of the Eurosystem entrenched in the Treaty, the euro area needs a new and concrete leap towards stronger financial integration. It is true that we have made enormous progress for more regulation and created new tools, but the different episodes of the crisis have demonstrated that a monetary union can be stronger if it relies on a financial system whose health is not ultimately dependent on national mechanisms: –  the homogeneous health of the financial system is key for the proper transmission of a single euro area monetary policy;  –  as long as the euro area’s financial health is vulnerable to problems in one country, negative feedback loops between sovereign and banking risks can materialise – this is precisely what happened in the euro area;  –  in a monetary union, capital is free to move very quickly from one country to another, thereby augmenting the potential incidence of “bank runs” if no supranational deposit guarantee mechanism is in place. Therefore, we have to build a truly federal authority in the Euro zone, a structure combining the US FDIC’s functions with the ones of the US Federal Reserve System would be a major advantage for the future of the euro area.

I believe that there is another very important reason why the euro area has been so badly hit by the crisis; it is because we are a very highly integrated economic area but do not have the appropriate institutional mechanisms for this integration. In particular, this explains the contagion effects and the negative feedback loops between banks and States, which have made matters much worse in the area. Obviously, a good and coherent functioning of the banking sector is absolutely vital for an overall solution to the euro area crisis. This conviction is based on two fundamental observations: –  Appropriate financing is essential for our economies to achieve strong and sustainable growth. In Europe, the banking system is the main source of financing, and hence its strength is of crucial importance. However, financial markets naturally also play a key role and they should focus on serving the economy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  –  Secondly, financial stability is critical not just for creating the right conditions for the appropriate financing of the economy. It is also an extremely valuable asset in fostering confidence, which has been severely lacking in recent years and is another key condition for growth. It is also a vital condition for the effectiveness of monetary policy as it allows the normal functioning of transmission mechanisms. In addition, given the feedback loop between banks and sovereigns and the potential impact of a financial crisis on a country’s fiscal position, financial stability makes a major contribution to fiscal stability.
The fairly low level of growth in employment, as measured by the number of employed, must be seen in the light of the sharp decline in sickness absence through 2004 after rising for several years. The decrease in sickness absence has increased companies’ supply of  2  BIS Review 18/2005  labour and reduced the need for new employees. Measured in person-hours worked, employment growth was solid last year. Person-hours worked increased by 2.2 per cent from 2003 to 2004. A corollary to the increase in the number of person-hours worked is partly reduced sickness absence and partly three more working days in 2004 compared with 2003. An increase in available person-hours and increased competition and rationalisation in many sectors led to higher-than-normal growth in potential output last year. The economy has therefore been able to grow a fairly rapidly for a period without the emergence of bottlenecks in the labour market. In the business tendency survey, manufacturing industry reported higher output volumes and capacity utilisation. Average capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector is now close to its historical average. Norges Bank’s regional network reports that nearly half of the contacts would have some or substantial problems in increasing production in excess of planned levels. This may indicate approximate balance between supply and demand in the economy, and that capacity utilisation is about normal. A normal level of capacity utilisation is consistent with an output gap – the percentage deviation between actual and potential output - that is now close to zero.

I am sure there will be very interesting and fruitful exchange of views and ideas on the major financial stability issues, including those that I have mentioned earlier. Once again, thank you all for being with us today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
What the Riksbank must consider further ahead is whether economic developments require further interest rate cuts and whether the current monetary policy then needs to be supported by more unconventional methods. We must be prepared to be able to implement an alternative monetary policy if developments should so require. However, one should be aware that the situation in the financial markets differs in different countries, which means that not all central banks choose to take exactly the same measures. 6  BIS Review 56/2009  I would also like to mention in this context that the Riksbank is not the only institution involved with regard to managing the alternative measures to improve the functioning of the financial markets. It is important in this situation to analyse the financial structure in Sweden and how one wishes this to look in the future. The measures will to some extent govern the structure of the financial sector when the crisis is over. There is also a discussion on whether the Riksbank should try to weaken the krona directly in a situation where the repo rate cannot be cut further. I would like to emphasise that such measures are not under consideration. If inflation risks rising more quickly than expected in the future, monetary policy will have to be tightened sooner than is indicated by the repo rate path It is important to emphasise that the Riksbank has changed over to very expansionary monetary policy over the past six months.

In  3/7  addition, the number of bank branches has declined by 43%, while the number of Spanish banks1 has fallen from 122 at the start of the crisis to 61 in 2018. Also, all the former savings banks, apart from two, have been transformed into commercial banks, and most of the mergers and takeovers that have taken place have given rise to healthier institutions and have resulted in significant cost savings. The FROB, for its part, has played a prominent role in promoting some of these consolidation processes. These efforts to correct the excessive size of the sector were also accompanied by a significant balance sheet clean-up. As we all know, the financial crisis caused the quality of Spanish bank assets to deteriorate significantly. Indeed, in just five years the nonperforming loan ratio reached unprecedented levels (of around 14% at the end of 2013) and foreclosures rose to over € billion in 2014. The decline in the return on assets and the increase in net provisions for bad debts caused the banking industry as a whole to post a loss in 2012. This weakened bank solvency and, moreover, led to significant capital requirements for some banks, to the extent that public support was necessary to cover the capital shortfalls identified and to guarantee financial stability and, ultimately, the deposits of the general public. The FROB was once again fundamental in this area since, along with the deposit guarantee scheme, it injected around € billion of capital into the system.