samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A recent study of ours suggests that differences in educational attainment level are relatively persistent, which may be understood as a system failure insofar as ensuring equality of opportunity is concerned.26 Thus, the average educational attainment level in 2001 among the residents of a specific locality born in 1974 predicts, with a correlation of more than 90%, the level achieved at the same age (27 years) by the residents of the same locality born 10 years later.27 This persistence is also seen across generations, with the correlation between the educational attainment levels of parents and their offspring standing close to 35%, similar to that observed in other countries.28 Thus, an increase in the population’s human capital is fundamental not only to increase productivity and convergence with the euro area, but also to ensure that opportunities are more equally distributed across the population. Mitigating the adverse effects of the various social vulnerabilities identified requires public action across a very broad range of areas, such as regulation (inter alia, of the labour and housing markets), taxation, public services (e.g. education and health care) and income and transfer policies. In fact, raising productivity and the employment rate are key elements of any strategy aiming to achieve a sustainable reduction in inequality. And these actions must be rigorously evaluated in terms of both equity and efficiency. Conclusion In short, ambitious, lasting economic policies will be needed if the challenges facing the Spanish economy in the years to come are to be addressed decisively.

I wish you an enjoyable and productive day, and give the floor to President Jean-Claude Trichet. BIS Review 28/2008  3
My remarks here are a mix of what we see happening in practice and how we might expect things to work in principle. To begin with, financial institutions within the regulated core of the financial sector have become larger, and the industry considerably more concentrated. The 10 largest bank holding companies now hold roughly half of banking assets, compared to less than a third in 1990. These institutions now operate with greater geographic scope and offer a broader range of financial products, but overall volatility of earnings has not changed much relative to capital. Hedge funds, private equity funds and other leveraged financial institutions control increasingly large shares of aggregate financial capital and play very active roles in many asset markets and in credit markets. Although assets under management in hedge funds still represent a relatively small share of total financial assets, their relative share has increased significantly and their ability to take on substantial leverage magnifies their potential impact on financial market conditions. These private leveraged funds have become an important source of protection to regulated institutions by being large sellers of credit insurance in the rapidly growing market for credit default swaps. In terms of enhancing overall market efficiency, the growth of these private leveraged institutions can be expected to provide benefits in terms of improved liquidity, price discovery via arbitrage, diversity of opinion and diversification opportunities for investors. The increase in the share of assets managed by private pools of capital devoted to arbitrage activity should improve the overall functioning of markets.

For others, the message is perhaps that the crypto world and its technologies are a very long way from influencing, let alone changing, the way financial services, including payments, are delivered at scale in the real world. It is, as I said earlier, very difficult to predict which technologies will be successful and when and how they might begin to change the way we do things. The bursting of the dot.com bubble in the early years of this century did not herald the end of the development of internet commerce though it took longer than its original enthusiasts imagined and emerged in a very different form, dominated by big tech platforms. Our work on a digitally native pound is driven by the trends we now see both specifically in payments, including the reducing role of cash, and more generally in the increasing digitalisation of daily life. It is motivated by two primary concerns. First, that in a world in which new, tokenised forms of money emerge, enabled by new technology, we remain able to ensure that all forms of money that circulate in the UK are robust, interchangeable without loss of value and denominated our unit of account – the pound sterling. Physical cash plays a role in ensuring that, at present, all forms of commercial bank money in the UK have to be redeemable in cash - Bank of England money - on demand in cash and without loss of value.
Both these guides to monetary policy reflect the historically low level of the equilibrium interest rate, or r*.9 As the Bank of England has long emphasised, a number of forces have depressed r* 10 – a view that has been validated by muted inflation over the past five years, despite a long period of historically low interest rates.11 As the Federal Reserve has observed, incoming data will provide important information about the evolution of the equilibrium rate.12  8 The PBOC have introduced several easing measures since April 2018 including cuts to the reserve requirement ratio, relaxing capital requirements for banks, and introducing credit support for private businesses. 9 The equilibrium interest rate is the level of the real policy rate that, if allowed to prevail for several years, would place economic activity at its potential and keep inflation low and stable. 10 A set of profound forces in the world economy, both secular and cyclical, has pushed down on the level of world real interest rates over the past 30 years by as much as 450 basis points - see Carney, M (2013), ‘The spirit of the season’ and Rachel, L and Smith, T (2015), ‘Secular drivers of the global real interest rate’, Bank of England Working Paper No. 571). The global equilibrium interest rate is likely to rise in coming years as some of the shorter-term factors pushing it down ease.

Svein Gjedrem: The outlook for the Norwegian economy and monetary policy assessments Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a presentation of the Monetary Policy Report 1/09 at Goldman Sachs, London, 26 March 2009. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 25 March, Monetary Policy Report 1/09 and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Introduction Norges Bank’s Executive Board decided yesterday to reduce its key policy rate by 0.50 percentage point to 2.00 per cent. The Monetary Policy Report, published yesterday, indicates that the key policy rate should be gradually reduced further to a level of around 1 per cent in the second half of 2009. Financial crisis but active public measures In September 2008, the turbulence in financial markets erupted into a full-blown global crisis. Global economic growth was already slowing, but the situation has deteriorated in the past few months of 2008. The turnaround hit hard, with synchronised effects on virtually all financial and goods and services markets, not only in the US but also in Europe, Asia, Latin America and Oceania. We are now in the deepest downturn in OECD countries in the postwar period. GDP in the OECD area as a whole is expected to fall in 2009 for the first time since the Second World War.
At the same time, new guidelines for fiscal policy were drawn up, providing for the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund. 2  BIS Review 90/2001  The new guidelines for monetary policy did not entail any significant change in the conduct of monetary policy. Quantifying an inflation target, in line with international practice, has made it easier to explain and understand Norwegian monetary policy. The implementation of monetary policy Monetary policy influences the economy with considerable and variable lags. Our analyses indicate that a substantial share of the effects of an interest rate change occurs within two years. Two years is thus a reasonable time horizon for achieving the inflation target of 2½ per cent. The effects of interest rate changes are uncertain. In addition, it may be difficult to assess the current situation. Different indicators may point in various directions and economic statistics are normally published with a lag. This suggests that a gradualist approach to setting interest rates is appropriate. We will then acquire new knowledge and can adjust interest rates underway. If evidence suggests that inflation will be higher than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be increased. If it appears that inflation will be lower than 2½ per cent with unchanged interest rates, the interest rate will be reduced. There is symmetry here.

It is just as important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low, as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high. Economic policy in the euro area The introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 also meant the introduction of a single monetary policy in the eleven member countries. Greece joined as the twelfth country on 1 January 2001. The population of the euro area is a little more than 300 million and the euro area economy accounted for about 16 per cent of world GDP last year.1 Price stability is the primary objective of the single monetary policy in the euro area. The Governing Council of the European Central Bank has defined price stability as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2 per cent. The project will be completed in January and February 2002. On 1 January, euro banknotes and coins will be put into circulation. During a changeover period, national currencies can be used as a means of payment alongside the euro. This period is no longer than two months in any of the member countries. As from the beginning of March, the euro will be the only legal tender in all euro area countries, and all prices will be in euros. The objective of monetary policy in the euro area is price stability in the euro area as a whole.
This picture has been confirmed by the latest National Accounts data and was underlined as early as in our December assessment. Since then it has become clearer, and the somewhat better productivity was an important argument for the rate cut in February. It is likely that the more robust productivity has partly been due to the developments in economic activity; at the beginning of a recovery, existing production resources are utilised more efficiently and only when the revival has been established will a rise in investment and new jobs begin in earnest. But this explanation is not enough since productivity appears to have risen more than normal given the economic situation. This pattern is very clear in the US but is also somewhat discernible in Sweden. One possible interpretation is that it is due to unusually large-scale investment in, for instance, IT at the end of the 1990s. It is also conceivable that it reflects more permanent changes that could be related, for example, to technological advances in IT and telecommunications. At present, it is not possible to determine exactly what has caused the improvement in productivity. However, when we look ahead to the coming years, we see reason to expect a better productivity outlook than that we had in December. The new inflation data that have been received also point to somewhat more subdued inflationary pressure.

Indeed, growth rates of money and credit which are persistently in excess of those needed to sustain non-inflationary economic growth may, under certain circumstances, provide early information on emerging, and potentially destabilising, asset price bubbles. In this respect, they act as a permanent admonition for vigilance in the face of unusual movements in asset prices. 6  BIS Review 66/2004  From what I have said, it has become clear that it is important to monitor asset prices and to try to avoid the emergence of unsustainable, pronounced movements in asset prices which may subsequently lead to sharp recessions. Obviously, there cannot be a mechanical link between asset prices and monetary policy instruments. Central banks, however, should take asset price movements into account, especially if large swings in asset prices imply long-term risks to financial and economic stability. Concluding remarks As you can see, there are a number of key concepts which I have emphasised in my speech today: “strong vigilance”; “careful monitoring and analysis”; “medium-term orientation”; “prompt reaction”. These are central elements of our approach to monetary policy-making, both at the current juncture and in connection with the specific topic of asset price developments that I discussed in the second part of my address. We live in a world of considerable uncertainty, not just in terms of economic shocks - which by definition are impossible to predict - but also in terms of our knowledge of how the economy functions, how economic agents form expectations and react to events and changing conditions.
The problem: real interest rate too high I have already said that, in the case of a binding zero lower bound for the interest rate, the real interest rate is too high compared to the level appropriate to stabilise inflation around the inflation target and at the same time stabilise the real economy. To be precise, it is the real market rate, that is the market rate met by households and firms minus expected inflation, that is too high. The market rate exceeds the repo rate with a spread that is determined by  3  See Svensson, Lars E.O. (2003), "Escaping from a Liquidity Trap and Deflation: The Foolproof Way and Others," Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(4), 145-166, for literature references and a review of this research. My own contribution to this research can be found on my website, www.princeton.edu/svensson. 2  BIS Review 19/2009  various risk and liquidity premia. This spread is now unusually large due to the financial crisis. This means that the market rates are positive even if the repo rate is zero. With some simplification, the real market rate can be specified as: Real market rate  = Nominal market rate – expected inflation = Repo rate + spread – expected inflation. Even if the repo rate is reduced to zero, the real market rate can be too high, because the spread is large and/or because the expected inflation is low. 4 The real market interest rate can thus be lowered, if the spread can be reduced.

Norman T L Chan: Removal of RMB conversion limit for Hong Kong residents Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 12 November 2014. *  *  *  I am glad to announce that the RMB conversion limit for Hong Kong residents of RMB20,000 per day will no longer be applicable with effect from 17 November 2014. Under the new arrangement, banks will square their positions arising from RMB conversions conducted with Hong Kong residents in the offshore market instead of the onshore market. As a result, the prevailing conversion and other relevant restrictions for onshore conversion will hence be no longer applicable. The HKMA has just issued a circular to banks setting out the detailed arrangements. The HKMA has had many rounds of discussions with the banking industry and Mainland authorities on relaxing the restrictions on RMB currency conversions by Hong Kong residents. We consider that the best option is for RMB conversions by Hong Kong residents to be done in the offshore market instead of the onshore market. With the size of the offshore RMB liquidity pool in Hong Kong exceeding RMB 1 trillion, and considering the scale and depth of the RMB foreign exchange market, we do not foresee any problem for banks to square their positions for Hong Kong residents’ RMB conversions in the offshore market.
FTD: Some euro area governments have said that Chancellor Merkel has frequently acted too slowly and has thus made the crisis even worse. Is that true? Trichet: Not in the least. I would see a discussion of this kind as being completely misplaced in the current situation. FTD: Do you fear that the euro area countries could fail to get the crisis under control? 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Trichet: No. The countries of Europe have always demonstrated that they pull together when the challenges are very high. My strong belief in the continued integration of Europe, as a key historical endeavour to ensure stability, prosperity and peace, has not been shaken in any respect by the crisis. FTD: Some governments want to beat the crisis by merging national government bonds to create eurobonds. Is this a good idea? Trichet: The Governing Council has looked at the various proposals and is not in favour of them at present. What counts now is that we make optimal use of the instruments at our disposal. This includes a quantum leap in the economic surveillance governance of euro area countries. In addition, the adjustment programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal must be implemented in a decisive manner. It also means that the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) should be used as flexibly and effectively as it possibly can be. FTD: The stress tests are very detailed in terms of various exposures of the tested banks (sovereign risk, housing risk, etc.)

Trichet: In the event of a decision by the governments leading to a selective default or a default, which, again, we are warning against loud and clear, the governments would have to take care that the Eurosystem is presented collateral that it could accept. FTD: When it comes to deciding whether a default has occurred, will the ECB rely, as it has until now, on the rating agencies, or might the decision not be dependent on what they say? Trichet: Again, it is not the working assumption of the Governing Council. FTD: Let’s talk about the crisis management of the euro area governments. The Heads of State and Government and the finance ministers give the appearance of being a chaotic bunch. They often create such a cacophony that it inflames the crisis rather than dampening it. What needs to change? Trichet: There is an absolute need to improve “verbal discipline”. The governments need to speak with one voice on such complex and sensitive issues as the crisis. It is, of course, complex to take into account the need for sound, shared management of the Economic pillar of the Economic and Monetary Union, whilst fully respecting the functioning of the 17 democracies of the euro area. But speaking with one voice in a period of crisis is of essence. And, after all, it is what was possible after Lehman Brothers at the end of 2008.
(ii)  Banking supervision  This potential conflict between monetary policy and maintaining the stability of the banking system is not one which has greatly troubled most western industrial countries in recent years. But in some transition economies, such conflicts have been real. In most, the problem has not been so much to maintain the stability of the banking system as to create a robust banking system from a number of often insolvent state-owned banks spun off from the old monobank, together with newly created commercial banks whose behaviour has frequently been far from prudent. BIS Review 33/1997  -7-  In contrast to the diverse arrangements in the west, banking supervision in transition economies is nearly always the responsibility of the central bank (although in some cases the Ministry of Finance is also involved in the licensing of banks). An exception is Hungary, where supervisory responsibilities have in large measure been transferred to the State Banking Supervision Office: the central bank is nominally responsible only for monitoring banks’ liquidity and foreign exchange positions, although in practice its role extends rather more widely. In most of the countries - especially in those with hopes of acceding soon to the EU - banking legislation approximating to western standards is (or is about to be) in place. But in practice, banking supervision has proved a difficult topic to master.

The UK, Sweden and Denmark have so far chosen to remain outside EMU. Sweden and the UK have inflation targets and floating exchange rates, while Denmark’s monetary policy is oriented towards a fixed exchange rate against the euro. These three countries are important to Norway, both because of their geographical proximity and because they account for close to 40 per cent of Norway’s foreign trade. If these countries join EMU some time in the future, it is possible that the use of the euro by Norwegian households and businesses will increase somewhat. However, extensive use of the euro as a means of settling domestic payment transactions is unlikely. In those cases where we have seen partial or total currency substitution, such as in some countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America, it has usually been a result of strongly deteriorating confidence in the local currency. Confidence can deteriorate when inflation is high and variable or when government finances are on the verge of collapse. By influencing the volume of NOK in circulation, Norges Bank will always be able to ensure that the internal value of the Norwegian krone is maintained in line with the guidelines for monetary policy. If the introduction of the euro increases efficiency and economic growth in the participating countries, this will have positive spillover effects on the Norwegian economy. Stable economic developments in the euro area are also very important for the Norwegian economy. Thank you for your attention. 8  BIS Review 90/2001