samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
François Villeroy de Galhau: The digital payment revolution Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Fintech Forum, Paris, 7 October 2020. * * * Mr Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to welcome you here to the Banque de France’s premises this morning. I would also like to welcome those joining us remotely. We are all aware of just how important new technologies are in ensuring continuity and stability in this crisis. My dear Cédric, you’d clearly be the first to say so. I would also like to welcome Alain Clot, President of France Fintech, and of course Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF, with which we have organised this Forum. Your presence among us, Mr Minister, is proof of public authorities’ commitment to Fintechs. And that is my first message this morning: the Banque de France and the ACPR are also fully committed to supporting Fintechs. I shall then go on to tell you how we intend to act in the digital payment revolution. **  I. The Banque de France and ACPR’s support for Fintechs Let’s start with a question I consider particularly important, and on which there should be no shred of ambiguity between us: why do the Banque de France and ACPR regard Fintechs as important? Because they are an essential element for the financial sector: they deliver creativity and they understand new needs rapidly.

To give another example, under the transposition of the second European Payment Services Directive (PSD2) in 2018, third-party payment service providers – which do not hold client funds – are subject to reduced annual reporting requirements. However, this proportionality does not mean being less demanding, especially with regard to the fight against money laundering. The general principle of “same activity, same rule” must apply. Indeed, it is in the Fintechs’ own interest that we should help them to apply the regulatory framework. We also want to help them when new rules are put in place. Under the PSD2 framework, the ACPR was the first European authority to grant authorisations for payment initiation and aggregation services. In total, it has authorised more than 20 actors to offer these new services since 2018. It has also worked to promote the development of open banking, by making sure that all actors can work together on the deployment of APIs. The eight workshops this afternoon, led by experts from nearly all of the ACPR’s directorates, are testament to the focus we place on teaching and informing. But if we can do even better, even more, tell us today. I shall finish by focusing on the ACPR-AMF Fintech Forum which is what brings us here today. Created in 2016, it is a forum for exchange which we try to make as efficient as possible by setting up, where needed, targeted working groups to make concrete progress on key topics.
BIS Review 36/2005  9  Graph 8: Growth and Rates of Inflation* 15 140  Inflation (%)  100  5  80  0  60  -5  Growth (%)  10  120  40 -10  20  GNP (right scale)  WPI  2005  2003  2001  1999  1997  1995  1993  1991  1989  1987  1985  -15  1983  0  CPI  * The data for 2005 is the forecast value for growth and the target value for the CPI. Source. SIS, CBRT. Together with the fall in interest rates in recent years and the appreciation of the Turkish lira, the production of private firms has acquired a capital-intensive nature. Besides, firms resorted to a series of measures in the post-crisis period, to remedy the inefficiency of the production process. All these developments led to high-rated increases in productivity in recent years. Productivity increases not only raised the return on capital, but also encouraged investments. The positive impact of these favorable developments in productivity increase as well as the high growth performance of the last three years began to be seen in employment. Total employment increased by more than 5 percent in the last quarter of 2004 compared to the same period the previous year. The implemented stability program naturally enabled the share of the private sector to increase. As a result of this, the increase in employment is recorded mainly in this sector.

This global resolve is in fact, fundamentally in congruence with, and accentuates the role and relevance of Islamic finance on the global economic stage in this post-crisis era. Islamic finance, through its emphasis for the attainment of socioeconomic goals based on the objectives of Shariah, provides the discipline that enhances the prospect of strengthening the global economy and overall financial stability. The relatively better performance and the sustained momentum of the growth in Islamic finance during this period of global financial turmoil exemplifies its inherent strengths – its emphasis on a strong linkage to productive economic activity which predisposes the economy to financial deepening without the excesses, its emphasis for accountability, disclosure and transparency and its inbuilt checks and balances, all of which underpin Islamic finance as a stable form of financial intermediation that strengthens its prospects as a contributor to economic growth and financial stability. While the amount of funds managed in the Islamic financial system is still only a fraction of the total assets of the international financial system, it represents that portion of financial activities that is truly supported by underlying productive capacity that generates growth of economies across continents. It is this form of financial activities that we would want to encourage, as opposed to the financial flows that are destabilising and not contributing to generating real economic activity.
Economies of scale and scope may have been changing in different areas of banking and even taking different directions. For example, the rapid development of information technology has made the collection and processing of information considerably cheaper, but at the same time technological investments are taking a larger share of banks’ resources. Therefore, economies of scale in some aspects of the collection of information may have been reduced, but at the same the time investments in more sophisticated technology have increased economies of scale and scope in some areas of banking. While I do not wish to go into detail on this matter, the general picture that emerges is that the banking industry has to be in a position to adjust to a new situation and take these factors into consideration. Indeed, in the course of the last few months, a number of bank mergers in the euro area, including mergers between relatively large institutions, have been announced or are being contemplated. Such “high-profile” mergers are likely to contribute to an acceleration of the pace of both the consolidation and integration of the banking systems of the euro area. However, it should be remembered that the recent pattern of consolidation represents part of a longer-term trend in the European banking industry, as is highlighted by the large decline in the number of credit institutions in the euro area countries over the past decade or so. In the mid1980s there were more than 11,000 credit institutions in the euro area countries; today they number around 8,000.

Concerns that systemic sovereign issuers may lose market access fed fears that they may be forced to redeem their liabilities in a currency different from the euro, and thus de facto leave the euro area. “Redenomination fears” became a new source of market anxiety. There was a risk that such unwarranted concerns would become self-fulfilling and the spectre of destructive tail scenarios was looming. In this context, the process of financial integration, which had evolved at a rapid pace since the inception of the euro, was partially reversed, giving way to fragmentation. Interbank financial fragmentation per se was not a new phenomenon in the post-Lehman world. However, during the most severe stages of the sovereign crisis the fractures across the euro area were not idiosyncratic but systemic – that is, they ran along national borders. This reversal of the integration process risked undoing one of the key benefits of the common currency. Fragmentation led to an impairment of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The monetary impulse that the ECB had swiftly introduced in response to the rising risks to price stability was no longer transmitted uniformly throughout the entire euro area. While the ECB had brought its official policy interest rates to historical lows, a number of countries were not in a position to take advantage of monetary accommodation. Banks in those countries were tightening credit conditions, running against the monetary policy intentions of the central bank, with negative repercussions on access to finance, in particular for small and mediumsized enterprises.
Any further narrowing of the interest rate differential  5 6  Other hypotheses relating to the fall in the real interest rate are discussed in the economic literature. However, they are likely to provide less of an explanation than the factors of ageing and declining productivity growth. The adjusted method for calculating the exemption threshold takes effect on 1 November. The income the SNB earns from negative interest is currently expected to almost halve. Page 4/8  would increase the upward pressure on the franc, which would lead to lower economic growth and higher unemployment. The measures taken by the central banks to combat the financial and economic crisis – low policy rates, forward guidance on the expected course of short-term interest rates, and securities purchases – have undoubtedly increased downward pressure on the general level of interest rates in the short and medium term. But the decline in capital market rates, which we saw in the chart earlier, began long before the outbreak of the crisis. This reinforces the notion that when interest rates fall, it is the aforementioned powerful structural drivers which are at work – i.e. persistently lower inflation expectations, greater propensity to save and lower propensity to invest. From today’s perspective, therefore, the neutral interest rate that is relevant for monetary policy is also below previous empirical levels. Consequently, shortterm interest rates could remain below their usual levels even if the central banks normalise monetary policy again at some point in the future.

I myself am convinced that the central bank’s credibility can best be served by an open and transparent discussion of all of the available alternatives. This discussion should be held in good time before any of these alternatives may be needed, but in the hope that none of them will be needed. With a broad understanding that forceful measures are available, and with a readiness by the central bank to resort to these methods if the situation should so require, the general public and the market need not fear that the central bank will lose control of the situation and of inflation expectations in a situation with a zero interest rate. 10  BIS Review 19/2009  Appendix How the current output gap is determined at the zero lower bound  BIS Review 19/2009  11  12  BIS Review 19/2009  How the current exchange rate depends on the expected future price level  BIS Review 19/2009  13
However, the lower dynamism estimated for the last quarter of the year leads us to expect that 2016 growth will be in the lower bound of the range projected in September. Going forward, we estimate that the economy will return to near-potential expansion rates towards the end of 2017, although at a somewhat slower pace than we estimated in September. Abroad, the biggest news has been the changes in financial markets after the US election. The movements that followed took a toll on financial conditions, despite that they are still 1 / 19  BIS central bankers' speeches  expansionary from a historical standpoint. Last week the Federal Reserve raised the policy rate for the second time, a decision that was widely expected by the markets. The surprise was the confirmation of a slightly faster withdrawal of the monetary stimulus, which has shaken the financial markets in recent days. As for activity and inflation, they continue to show advances in the developed world, while they are tending to stabilize in the main emerging economies. We see some improvement in the terms of trade in the near future. Considering all the above and its effects on the medium-term outlook, the baseline scenario of this MP Report has revised the 2017 inflation trajectory from September downward. This is because core inflation—what we call the CPIEFE (i.e. excluding foods and energy)—is expected to drop significantly, due to the important weight in inflation of import-related prices.

Interpreted broadly, this can include relatively simple indicators, such as interest rates, interest rate spreads, and returns. They include other measures related to the value of financial or tangible assets like bonds, stocks, housing, and gold. And of course they also include more sophisticated, data-intensive estimates of risk, which we hope to discuss today. For central banks, one of the main questions that arises is whether financial market indicators are useful in setting monetary policy. And if so, which ones are most useful for central banks, and for what purpose? In general, financial market indicators are used by central banks to: (1) gauge market sentiment with regards to expected changes to policy variables; (2) identify types and sources of shocks to the economy; and (3) predict future developments in economic activity and inflation. Such predictions of longer-term inflation are also useful in checking how markets view the credibility of the authorities’ commitments to their final price target. So financial indicators can be used to double check econometric and judgmental predictions as well as flag a problem of asset price misalignment, which may need to be addressed by policy. In addition, financial market indicators have the potential to reflect developments at critical stages of the transmission process. This is due to the fact that financial markets in general adjust faster than goods markets, and their prices are timelier and less prone to measurement error. Today’s workshop will give us the chance to discuss these and many other issues.
Salaried employment is growingly concentrated in bigger companies (more than 50% of total). 6. Chile's real wages have increased significantly for all income brackets but high dispersion remains associated with employment duration. 7. Women's incomes are smaller and grow more slowly, even after controlling for features such as education, occupation and expertise. 8. Women have a lower probability of holding their jobs, and a greater propensity to go from unemployed to inactive. 16  Table 4 Mobility, income profiles and aggregate productivity  1. A labor mobility paradox is that, although more often than not a job change is associated with a wage gain (54%), many (46%) are not. 2. This paradox is more prevalent among workers that exhibit high turnover and low income. 3. Those lower-turnover workers have significantly larger wage gains over time, reflecting the value of developing employer-specific human capital as well as higher gains from direct transitions between jobs. 4. High turnover workers obtain smaller gains from staying in the job and from direct transitions, and exhibit slower growth in income throughout their working lives. Tabla 5 Cyclical adjustment of the labor market  1. The Chilean labor market has multiple adjustment margins to respond to cyclical shocks, reducing the impact on employment: the composition between salaried work and self-employment, changes in participation rates, high turnover rates and rapid transitions between salaried jobs, job creation in new firms and the wage flexibility of hired work. The wage flexibility of hired work is present mainly in transitions to new jobs.

***  10  Figure 1 GDP growth (real annual change, percent)  6  6  4  4 Total  2  2  Non-mining  0  0  -2  -2 14  15  16  17  18  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 2 Manufacturing output index  Private salaried hours worked (*)  (annual change, percent)  (seasonally-adjusted levels, weekly average)  12  12  43  45  8  8  42  44  4  4  41  0  0  40  Habitual (right axis)  43 42  Effectivas -4  -4  39  41  -8  -8  38  40  14  15  16  17  18  10  12  (*) Black dashed lines show annual centered moving average of respective series. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
As a Welshman now working in Threadneedle Street, I appreciate that the Bank of England can appear a remote institution, apparently focused on the City of London and far away from the day-to-day concerns of people living elsewhere in the UK. The work of the Agencies provides a bridge between the Bank and the households, businesses and communities it serves. Through my discussions over the past couple of days, I have learnt about how Brexit has affected trading relationships on the island of Ireland and across the Irish Sea. And our Citizens Panel on the cost-of-living emphasised the distinctiveness of the retail energy market in Northern Ireland, which has been in focus of late given the sharp rises in utility bills. I am not going to discuss those issues this evening – although I realise that they are important, as well as politically and economically sensitive. I have been in listening mode, and can now take some of the lessons learnt back to our deliberations at the Bank. I originally hoped to spend the bulk of my time exploring the macroeconomic motivations underlying MPC decisions in the past few months. I hope to return to those issues in a moment. But given recent events and actions, it would be remiss of me not to address market developments. Over the course of the past week, there has be a significant repricing of financial assets. Part of  Page 3  that re-pricing reflects broader global developments.

Svein Gjedrem: Price stability is not self-generating Opening address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference on historical monetary statistics hosted by Norges Bank, Bogstad gård, Oslo, June 2005. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  Introduction We can learn from the past, so that we are better equipped to make the right choices in the future. This is the second conference on historical monetary statistics hosted by Norges Bank. The conference was arranged for the first time last year, when we presented a book on historical monetary statistics. The Bank’s objective has been to obtain data that can be used in research in two of the Bank’s core areas, monetary policy and financial stability. Our statistics are compiled in close cooperation with academic institutions, primarily the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Later today, Professor Ola. H. Grytten will be presenting historical wage statistics from 1730 up to 2004. Historical research can be used to shed light on economic relationships and perhaps reveal patterns. The next reasonable step would seem to be to search for the answer to the question “what is the norm?”  What is the norm? An examination of 500 years of price history in Norway is of particular interest to monetary policy. History shows that price stability is the norm, and that high inflation is a phenomenon associated with war, times of famine and the 1970s and 1980s.
And of course the future path of the climate risks themselves is subject to huge uncertainty. But given the urgency of our challenge, we cannot let uncertainties and complexities lead to inertia and inaction. Scenarios are generally comprised of three key components:   Transition models that set out how energy production and land-use can adjust to lower emissions and meet a given carbon budget or temperature target;    Physical models that set out projections for how living conditions and extreme weather would shift given a pathway for emissions; and    Economic models that quantify the potential impacts from both transition and physical risk on the economy. This is unfamiliar territory for most central banks, businesses and the financial sector. It is however territory we all need to get familiar with if we are to find the right climate path. Our desire to improve our understanding and capability to measure and monitor these risks inspired us to launch a project to co-design climate scenarios together with world leading climate scientists and 60 other central banks and supervisors that are part of the macrofinancial workstream of the Network for Greening the Financial System or NGFS.4  It has been a truly interdisciplinary effort. We have had to integrate a suite of models across each of the areas – physical, transition, economic, financial – to deliver insights [figure 3].

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Riding out of the global financial crisis – banking reforms and revival Closing remarks by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 13th Malaysian Banking Summit 2009 "Riding Out of the Global Financial Crisis – Banking Reforms & Revival", Kuala Lumpur, 12 May 2009. *  *  *  On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia , I would like to thank ASLI for the opportunity to make the closing address for the 13 th Malaysian Banking Summit. Indeed the theme chosen is highly appropriate and timely as we are currently facing a period that is most challenging. The current global economic slowdown, as many are aware, has been compared to the Great Depression of the late 1920s. It began with the stock market crash in October 1929, otherwise known as “Black Tuesday”. As to whether the current global slowdown reach such proportions, it remains anyone's guess. But as events unfold and with lessons of hindsight gaining clarity, we have seen how institutions failed to fully understand or underestimated the complexity of products, and were unable to adequately measure tail risks as well, the procyclical impact of fair value accounting. While these may have merits in sharing the blame, others like the high levels of risk concentration and gearing together with the failure to manage maturity mismatches, are also equally apparent, if not fundamental, in contributing to the financial crisis. Comforting, however, is that none of our Malaysian institutions undertook complex derivative transactions.