samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
More importantly, the licensing of new retakaful operators in Malaysia will also ensure that the technical knowledge is made more readily available and enhanced in the market, particularly in takaful and retakaful underwriting, as well as in promoting product development and innovation. Under this initiative, qualified applicants will be allowed to conduct in both the Malaysia Ringgit and international currencies retakaful business under the Takaful Act 1984. Flexibility is accorded to the retakaful operators to conduct its retakaful business in Malaysia by way of an incorporated entity or a branch. Foreign applicant is also welcome d to conduct retakaful business in Malaysia through a joint-venture with Malaysian companies, subject to the merits of each case. It is anticipated that this measure would serve as a catalyst in our efforts for Malaysia to become the centre for takaful and retakaful business through the establishment of a significant number of strong and reputable retakaful operators. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me conclude by saying that the future prospects of the takaful industry will be very much depend on the combined efforts of all the relevant parties; the regulators, market participants and the international community at large, to chart the strategic direction for the industry. Collective effort is crucial in order to maximize the potential for the industry. Sharing common vision and goal will be an important first step. I believe that our sincere efforts in realizing this noble objective would InsyaAllah, God Almighty will shower us with His blessings, guidance and assistance.

I hope all of you will be able to draw new insights and perspective as well as leverage on the initiatives and best practices shared in this Workshop, potentially to emulate it in your respective jurisdictions. For your benefit, the Secretariat will upload the relevant presentation materials and outcome report on the APG website after the conclusion of the Workshop. I would also like to encourage any further dialogue between the delegates on these issues post the Workshop and I am sure the Secretariat will be able to assist in connecting the delegates. There will no doubt be challenges in networking under a virtual setting, but these are the ‘new normal and conditions’ that the more we are accustomed to, the more we are able to adapt. The APG itself is still in the initial phase of using the virtual platforms and the Secretariat would appreciate any feedback on how to improve this further. In line with the APG Co-Chairs’ Priorities, we are also continuously working with the Secretariat to deliver more capacity building initiatives for the members, especially in the areas of Public2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Private Partnership (PPP), DNFBPs Supervision and Data Analytics. Before I conclude my remarks, let me take this opportunity to thank the APG Secretariat in organising this Workshop and all partners, including the Alliance for Financial Stability with Information Technology, and the Global Centre on Cooperative Security. Special thanks as well to the speakers and discussants from the APG members and observers.
Clearly, these adverse developments have affected many sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the same way as they have affected other investors. It is, however, difficult to determine how strong the impact has been as available information about individual SWFs and their inflows, outflows, return and market values vary. Let me therefore use the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global as an example. As you can see from this chart, the Norwegian fund is among the largest sovereign wealth funds, with total assets of some USD 350 billion at end-2008. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global Before I talk about the Fund’s performance last year, please allow me to explain the principles and strategies underlying the Fund. The Norwegian oil era started some 40 years ago, when oil was first discovered in the North Sea. Since then, the petroleum sector has grown to become an important part of our economy. Today, petroleum accounts for approximately 25 per cent of Norway’s gross domestic product (GDP) and nearly 50 per cent of total exports. Norway’s total petroleum production will remain high for many years to come, even though production of oil is now declining after peaking around the turn of the millennium. The economic challenges posed by petroleum extraction were widely recognised early on. As early as in 1974, the Norwegian parliament discussed these challenges in depth, and in the early 1980s, the idea of a fund that would stabilise petroleum revenue spending was launched.

John C Williams: The economic outlook Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Foreign Policy Association, New York City, 5 March 2020. * * * As prepared for delivery Thank you so much for this award. It’s a genuine honor to be recognized in this way. And allow me to add my congratulations to all the other organizations and individuals that have been commended this evening. The work that you’re doing—particularly in the area of corporate social responsibility—is so important. On Tuesday, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) lowered the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/2 percentage point.1 This action was in response to the evolving risks the coronavirus poses to the U.S. economy. Tonight, I’ll use my remarks to provide more context around that decision and about our response as we look ahead. But before I give this evening’s remarks I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. Economic Outlook To start, let me emphasize that the fundamentals of the U.S. economy remain strong. We’ve seen continued solid job growth, unemployment is at a historically low level, and we entered 2020 with very good momentum. After a year that was characterized by uncertainties, global growth appeared to be stabilizing, and geopolitical risks receding.
In addition to a set of principles or guidelines on effective supervisory practices for assessing climate-related financial risks, the Committee will explore whether any policy measures under the regulatory framework should be taken, and how the Basel Committee could support international efforts related to the development of globally consistently sustainability reporting requirements. Importantly, any changes proposed by the Basel Committee to its regulatory framework would be in pursuit of its mandate to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. Climate Change and the Conduct of Monetary Policy Let me now turn briefly to the second topic: the implications of climate change for monetary policy, an issue that is also being analysed in the ongoing review of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy. As you know, the EU Treaty sets price stability as the single primary objective for the ECB. At the same time, the treaties also establish that, without prejudice to the primary goal of price stability, the ECB shall support the general economic policies of the Union, among which the fight against climate change has become a priority. Indeed, it can be argued that given the long-reaching implications in so many economic and financial domains of climate change, in our pursuit of price stability, monetary-policy makers cannot ignore the transition and physical risks that I mentioned before.

In fact, it has to be recognised that around the world domestic authorities have been putting in place defensive measures, mostly below the radar of commentators, over the past few years. This comes back to the use of public money. A world in which public money is used to bail out banks or dealers, is a world in which balkanisation is likely because the authorities that deploy public money are accountable to domestic tax payers – people with votes in their jurisdiction – and to nobody else. But by delivering the FSB’s global agenda – not only on resolution, but more widely – we will significantly reduce, if not remove, the need for some of those balkanising tendencies. By making finance safe and orderly failure possible, I think we can take off the stage the most basic force towards balkanisation. The stakes are high. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
In the US, by contrast, the Fed’s asset purchases reached a significant scale with the successive rounds of quantitative easing, aiming at lowering the cost of financing over the whole of the yield curve. These divergences in the use of non-conventional tools reflected not only the specific characteristics of the respective financial systems – the banks predominant role in the euro area compared with a greater importance of capital markets in Anglo Saxon countries – but also the institutional framework and the differing perceptions and assessments of the risks that may be assumed by central banks. Thus, I would say that the Euro system’s response has been more complex, adapting itself to the difficulties that have arisen at the different stages of the euro area crisis, seeking to act on the segments of the transmission monetary policy mechanism that were seen to be most impaired. On the other hand, the US strategy involved some blurring of the boundary which separates monetary policy from fiscal and financial stability policies. This entailed risks for  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the monetary authority’s independence that the ECB, as the central bank of 17 countries with full sovereignty in other non-monetary policy areas, could not assume. In short, the financial crisis compelled central banks to adopt, along with robust monetary policy responses, exceptional measures and an unprecedented expansion in their balance sheets.

It is clear that some of the old beliefs will remain more or less intact: for instance, the idea that fiscal policy is limited as a stabilization tool. There are, however, two areas where I see more changes. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  First, the conduct of monetary policy, through the implementation of non-conventional monetary policies; and, second, the monitoring of the efficiency of financial markets and the banking sector, and their interaction with macroeconomic stability. Let me comment on these two issues. Non-conventional monetary policies At the outset of the crisis, all central banks reacted using conventional monetary policies. First, they reduced interest rates in a rather aggressive way to prevent the disinflationary process from translating into deflation. The outcome of these decisions is that official rates in the main developed economies (Euro area, United States, Japan and United Kingdom) stand now at values very close to zero. At the same time, faced with the freeze of interbank markets, the main central banks, including the Fed and the ECB, had to take on, directly, the task of redistributing liquidity. In the early stages, the Fed and the ECB provided a generous monetary base to meet the gross needs of banks. The ECB used its flexible array of financial instruments, while the Fed was forced to adapt its operational framework to introduce new forms of intervention. However, when the crisis worsened after the Lehman Brothers crisis, it became necessary to take stronger action. This required the use of new, non-conventional, monetary policy measures.
Finally, a fair market is one with open access, in which clients feel they can trade safely and on the basis of merit, with counterparties who hold to clear standards of market practice and integrity. And here, clearly, FX markets have had ground to make up over the past decade. Standards in some parts of the market fell  1  See Section 5.2 of https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs37.pdf. See the July 2019 Financial Stability Report, at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2019/july2019.pdf. 2  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  unacceptably short in the years running up to, and following, the financial crisis – and that led to a concerted push to turn the corner with agreement of the FX Global Code. The overall takeup numbers are impressive: as of 9 September, there were 956 public commitments to the Code on the Global Index.3 And the Code has driven some beneficial changes in market practice – eg on information sharing. But it will take time to see whether it has led to a persistent step-up in behaviour. So, while it may be an ‘A for effort’ on fairness, it’s also a ‘must show consistent improvement’. Technology and FX market fragmentation  In many ways, though, the most profound change in FX markets has been happening elsewhere, in response to hard economics and technological innovation. As a relatively standardised, high volume product, spot FX had embraced widespread electronic trading well before the financial crisis.

The newly formed TMF takes on a much broader mandate in that it focuses not only on the foreign exchange and money markets, but also the debt, derivatives and other treasury markets. With rapid financial innovations and rising demand from customers for a one-stop service, the dividing line between the traditional treasury and trading functions of a bank with other types of financial market services has become rather blurred. In other words, the treasury departments now encompass a wider variety of functions that cut across different markets, notably forex, money, debt and derivative markets. The formation of the TMF, with representatives from the HKCMA and other industry associations, offers great synergy in helping enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s treasury markets, thereby contributing to Hong Kong’s position as the premier international financial centre in the region. In carrying out its work, the TMF focuses on the “3 P’s”. That is: “People”, “Product” and “Profile”. Let me explain further. Firstly, “people”. As with other service industries, financial services are a “people business”. The competitive edge of a financial centre depends largely on the availability of a large pool of highly professional market practitioners. A priority area for the TMF is therefore to work with the industry to enhance the professionalism of practitioners in the treasury markets. As you may be aware, with the support of the TMF, the Financial Markets Association of Hong Kong (ACIHK) has recently launched a new membership regime, together with a revamped professional training and accreditation programme.
Consequently, I would like to point out that the problems associated with debt seem to be both more extensive and more comprehensive than we have previously realised. Chart 6. Change in debt among individuals with mortgages, July 2012–July 2013 Percentages 16%  24% Increased 0 to 10 years 10 to 30 years 30 to 50 years  24%  10%  >50 years Unchanged  10%  16%  Source: The Riksbank  The risks associated with household debt should be viewed in the light of vulnerabilities in the financial system The risks relating to the development of household debt should be viewed in the light of the vulnerabilities that exist in the Swedish financial system as a whole. The Riksbank has pointed this out in its Financial Stability Reports. The Swedish financial system, of which the major Swedish banks form a substantial part, is large in relation to the Swedish economy. For example, the assets of the Swedish banks amount to 400 per cent of GDP. This is a high figure in an international perspective. Events that lead to problems in the banking sector will, not least because of the size of the sector, have serious consequences for both the financial system and the real economy. At the same time, all of the major banks have a large proportion of lending to the Swedish household sector and are also closely interlinked in that they have similar exposures.

The major Swedish banks fund about half of their operations on the capital markets of which a substantial part is in foreign currency. In simple terms this means that more than one of  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  every two krona that are lent to Swedish households is ultimately governed by conditions that are set by anonymous capital managers in Sweden or elsewhere in the world. Moreover, approximately half of the banks’ funding consists of covered bonds which are partly held by foreign investors and partly by the other major Swedish banks. All in all, this means that developments on the mortgage market in Sweden are not only important to individual banks but also to the banking sector as a whole. If the providers of the banks’ market funding were to lose confidence in the banks, or in the situation on the mortgage market, the price of funding could increase and access to funding decrease. This would entail higher interest rates for households and perhaps also for companies, depending on the ability of the banks to parry such a situation. It is therefore vital that our financial system is resilient and inspires confidence, and that the development of household debt is deemed to be sustainable in the long term. We are in a situation in which the development of debt in Sweden and the Swedish mortgage market are not only matters of importance to us here in Sweden but also to international investors.
Latest Eurostat's flash estimate data revealed that Cyprus HICP is expected to reach 9,6% in August 2022 compared with 3,3% in August 2021. 4/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Taking into consideration the said inflation developments, we expect that our domestic short-term inflation outlook will continue to remain, overall, at very elevated levels, similar to the euro area inflation developments, amid the ongoing significant uncertainty and volatility resulting from the Russian-Ukraine war. More specifically, Cyprus HICP inflation for 2022 has been revised upwards in our most recent projections, reaching 8,4% compared with 7,0% in the CBC June 2022 economic bulletin. Banking sector Now let's consider the developments in the Cyprus banking sector. Data from the sector demonstrates that despite the negative international economic environment, the Sector is proving resilient, exhibiting a solid and healthy financial standing. The solvency position, as measured by the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was edging up to 17,5 percent in the second quarter of 2022, a level higher than the respective European average of 15,2 percent. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio, indicating the availability of liquid funds against deposit outflows over a 30 day stressed period, stood at the level of 320 percent in July 2022 which is more than 3 times higher than the minimum requirement of 100 percent, placing Cyprus amongst the most liquid banking sectors in the Union, where the average LCR amounts to 168 percent.

In addition, thanks to the solid solvency buffers and the support of the Central Bank of Cyprus that relaxed temporally the capital and loan origination requirements, the banking system has supported the domestic economy by providing fresh lines of credit from January 2020 to June 2022 of 8,1 billion Euros. 2,6b euros have been granted to households for mortgages, whilst 1,6 billions and 0,6 billions have been granted to the Wholesale and Hotel Industries which have been affected severely by the pandemic. Nevertheless, all the banks need to remain cautious, prudent and active in order to confront a challenging period that lies ahead us. Whilst the first round effects from the geopolitical crisis has been up until now manageable, the second round effects have  5/6  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  not yet materialised and uncertainty in an environment with high inflation and weakened growth prospects is elevated. Adverse macroeconomic developments may deteriorate banks' profitability and asset quality, causing delinquencies and an upward trend in impairments and provisions. Interest rate normalisation policies may support the banks' revenue capacity through higher yields. However, they might fall short to balance out the structural deficiencies that would be magnified if the economic prospects follow an adverse route. It is therefore of pivotal importance for banks to adapt their business strategies to the new realities forged by the consecutive crises. And this would not be an easy ride as challenges emerge, often in unpredictable ways.
First, we could just be too optimistic about our growth and inflation forecasts. Second, we could be right about our forecasts, but the rise in short-term rates could provoke an outsized tightening of financial conditions that might cause the economy’s forward momentum to slow more than we anticipate. In either case, the economy would not be growing fast enough to put increased pressure on resources. In such circumstances, underlying inflation might not rise and inflation expectations could become unanchored to the downside. Consequently, not only might the FOMC be forced to reverse course and ease monetary policy, but the efficacy of additional stimulus measures could be attenuated by the fall in inflation expectations. Avoiding a Japan-like experience in which inflation expectations have become unanchored to the downside should be an important consideration in the conduct of monetary policy. On the other side, there are several risks of delaying the start of lift-off and normalizing more slowly. The first one is that the unemployment rate could fall to an unsustainably low level that is not consistent with our long-run price stability objectives. Monetary policy works with long and variable lags, so overheating is a risk. If overheating did occur, the FOMC might need to tighten monetary policy more aggressively in order to keep inflation from significantly overshooting its 2 percent objective. In such circumstances, the risk of a recession would probably climb significantly.

For households with debts, the scope for consumption is also affected by interest rate adjustments if the share of income used for interest payment changes. Accordingly, we take this into consideration when we make our inflation assessment. There has been a swift increase in household debt and house prices over a long period. One potential cause of concern, which we cannot disregard, is that if this trend continues at the same rapid rate, a situation could develop where, at a later date, there is a risk of a considerable slowdown in growth and employment as a result of households finding themselves compelled to increase savings owing to a heavy debt burden. The risks involved here are very difficult to quantify in forecasts or pinpoint in time, but could none the less be a threat to macroeconomic stability. Inflation could then also revert to a state that might prove difficult to deal with. However, it should be underlined that the likelihood of such a scenario arising is regarded as slight, in particular when we have identified it in good time. We have taken these factors into consideration even if they have not been crucial for our monetary policy decisions. The Riksbank does not have a target for the krona exchange rate. However, since the exchange rate is one of many factors affecting growth and inflation, we must naturally take the path of the krona into consideration in the inflation assessment. The exchange rate affects inflation directly and generally relatively quickly through prices of imported goods and services.