samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The consequences of these factors on investment and trade are being amplified by a deterioration in business confidence. Projections for 2020 also point to weak momentum, as most of the prevailing sources of uncertainty are expected to persist. While global GDP growth is expected to reach 3.4% next year according to the IMF, this is still below the 3.8% recorded in 2017 and the pick-up is largely driven by emerging and developing countries. By contrast, average GDP growth in advanced economies is expected at  Page | 1  1.7% this year and next, down from 2.3% in 2018. A lower rate is projected for the euro area, as growth in its larger economies with the exception of Spain is expected to stand far below 2.0%. Although Malta is a small economy with a relatively high exposure to the international business cycle, it has maintained its resilience. In 2018, GDP grew by 6.8%, the second highest rate in the European Union. This mainly reflected a very robust expansion in domestic demand. Although smaller, the contribution of net exports was also positive, reflecting continued export growth. While GDP growth moderated in the first half of 2019, at 4.7% it remained comfortably above the euro area average of just above 1.0%. We expect the positive momentum in Malta to persist in both 2019 and 2020. Domestic demand is foreseen to remain the main driver of economic activity.

Source: Bloomberg. 14  Figure 13  Share prices of U.S. regional banks and S&P 500  Stock of bank credit to enterprises  (index, 1.Mar.23=100)  (index, Dec.2019=100)  Regional banks index  120  S&P 500  110  130  100  120  90  110  80  100  70  90  60 Jan.23  Eurozone  United States  140  80 Feb.23 Mar.23  Apr.23  May.23  20  Jun.23  21  22  23  Sources: Bloomberg and respective central banks. Figure 14  Two-year inflation expectations (1)  Inflation expectations of enterprises (EDEP) (2)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  12  Financial Traders Survey Economic Expectations Survey Breakeven inflation  5  in two years  in one year  10 8  4 6 3  4 2 Nov.21 Mar.22  2 17  18  19  20  21  22  23  Jul.22  Nov.22 Mar.23  (1) For details,, see note to Figure I.18 in June 2023 MP Report. (2) EDEP: Price Determinants and Expectations Survey. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 15  Figure 15  Economic uncertainty (DEPUC) (*) (index)  500 400 300 200 100 0 21  20  22  23  (*) Dashed horizontal line corresponds to 2020-2023 average DEPUC. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
In the old days, transactions were conducted predominantly with the use of physical cash. And so the focus of attention in currency board theory was merely that the issue of cash should be backed 100 per cent by foreign reserves and rather simplistically that cash arbitrage would keep the exchange rate stable. There was nothing much about the monetary base and the adjustment process in response to capital flows involving movements in domestic interest rates. The theory also did not take into account the many and much larger volumes of transactions nowadays conducted with the use of electronic money and settled electronically without the use of physical cash. As a result, the crucial part of the monetary base is no longer the amount of cash in circulation but a much smaller yet highly leveraged element in the form of the aggregate balance that banks have in their clearing accounts maintained with the currency board, that is the HKMA. 18. The old theory also did not take into account the need for the currency board to be controlling the interbank payments system and therefore performing the role as provider of liquidity to the banking system. As a result when our currency board arrangements were modernized through monetary reform in the past ten years, many of our actions were misunderstood even by leading monetary economists. But to be fair, even we ourselves were not entirely sure about a few things, as we moved into the uncharted waters of modern currency board theory and practice. 19.

Yet we have been, somehow, controlling, or we claimed to have been controlling, the monetary base ever since the linked exchange rate system was established in October 1983. 16. Even assuming that the definition of the monetary base is well understood, there is then the important question of how it should be controlled. Herein lies one of the most interesting subjects in monetary management and that is the choice between discretionary control with people making decisions, and automatic rule-based control with no discretionary decisions involved. Associated with this are considerations concerning, and possibly another choice between, flexibility in management and the credibility of the monetary system. Even the most professionally competent central banker can be wrong. A system that involves discretionary decisions is therefore subject to human errors of judgement that may undermine the credibility of the system, and some would go as far as to argue that this would eventually lead to failure of the system. On the other hand, an entirely rule-based system without any discretion is inflexible and may not serve the best interest of the community, even though short-term interests may sometimes be involved - witness the many calls for lowering interest rates even when the exchange rate is under pressure. 17. Another related conceptual issue that needs to be put across clearly is that the classical currency board system, as structured in the old colonial era, whilst still theoretically sound, has long become impracticable in coping with the complexities of modern finance.
In our region, the recovery of activity and employment has continued, though the data indicate relatively stronger performance in New York State and New York City than in New Jersey, while Puerto Rico has yet to show any meaningful improvement. Our special topic shows a trend toward job polarization both in the nation and the region, which focuses our attention on the ever-growing importance for workers to acquire skills and upgrade their skills on an ongoing basis. I will now ask Jim Orr to present the update of economic conditions in our region. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The new constituent law also incorporates a specific provision for the Bank to participate and provide appropriate resources in arrangements, schemes, programmes, or initiatives with any other central banks or international financial institutions or authorities to promote bilateral, regional and international monetary, financial or economic co-operation. Conclusion In conclusion, the supporting legal framework for central banking and the financial system is a key element to addressing the challenges faced by central banks. I have highlighted three areas which are currently very relevant in the current global financial system. Central banks in the advanced financial systems have resorted to unorthodox measures to prevent a systemic collapse of the global financial system. While action has been based on the sense of urgency and to avoid a total collapse of the system, in the aftermath of the crisis, an extensive review of the legislation needs to be made. The more challenging part is to effectively address cross-border issues facing national financial systems. Regardless of whether we are in a state of crisis, these challenges will continue to be relevant given that conditions will continue to be dynamic and the trend towards a more globalised world will not reverse. On this highly complex subject, this two day conference will likely generate highly engaging discussions. I wish the Banking and Financial Law School a highly productive outcome and hope that your stay in Malaysia will be enjoyable and memorable. 4  BIS Review 113/2009
By allowing greater flexibility with regard to the short-term achievement of goals, it is possible to achieve more stable developments in the real economy. But confidence in the nominal anchor must not be undermined. This may lead to a less favourable trade-off, as illustrated in the chart by the broken line. If there is insufficient confidence in monetary policy, economic agents may expect higher price and cost inflation to persist. This will be taken into account when setting wages and prices. The result will be a wage and price spiral. Experience shows that this in turn leads to slower growth and lower employment. A lack of confidence therefore entails a risk of higher unemployment. In consequence, monetary policy must also focus on movements in nominal variables when the economy is subjected to supply-side shocks in order to prevent the economy from entering a vicious circle. The building of confidence in nominal developments must be given sufficient priority. If there is confidence in monetary policy, economic agents will expect the rise in price and cost inflation to be of short duration. Higher prices will then not feed through to prices for other goods and to wages to the same extent, and there will be less risk of a recession. Confidence in monetary policy therefore results in a better trade-off between nominal fluctuations and fluctuations in production and employment. I have been talking about supply-side shocks to the economy.

Whereas a trawl of the web reveals over 200,000 articles referring to LOLR, there are around 1,500 mentions of MMLR, most of them published over the past year or so. 24 And like all new territory, it needs to be thought through. One recent contribution 25 suggested that if the purpose of LOLR in a bank-based system is “to stabilise the balance sheets of banks”, in a market-based system it should be “to stabilise the limit-order book, by placing orders to buy”. By analogy with the more familiar “LOLR” function, the following thoughts suggest themselves for debate in our community. First, as with LOLR, central banks cannot engage in MMLR operations if to do so would interfere with monetary policy. Securities are purchased in exchange for cash, entailing an injection of reserves into the banking system. That has to be consistent with the target for the central bank’s net supply of reserves. Second, a MMLR should aim to charge a penalty (eg buy at a discount) to the fundamental value of an asset. Put another way, any bid-ask spread should be unattractive relative to peacetime conditions in private markets. Third, any purchase (auction) mechanism should be designed to reveal information about the state of the market and the fairness of prices paid. Fourth, while the MMLR cannot avoid the risk inherent in outright purchases, it absolutely must not over reach its capital resources. Fifth, the MMLR should aim to be catalytic, helping ideally to kick-start the market rather than replace it.
4  BIS Review 19/2007

Also, we must recognize that, at times, actions will be taken that are clearly inconsistent with the spirit of the rules that are place, or the rules will simply be violated. Consider the use by Lehman Brothers of so-called Repo 105 transactions to window-dress its balance sheet. Beginning in late 2007, Lehman used Repo 105 transactions to temporarily remove securities from its balance sheet for a few days in order to mislead investors and counterparties about its financial condition. These transactions had the benefit of being 4/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  recognized as “sales” even though they were nearly identical to standard repo transactions that stayed on the balance sheet. In another example, following the introduction of Basel III, some banks tried to reduce their capital requirements by transferring risk to other counterparties. In certain cases, this occurred even when those counterparties did not provide any additional resources to absorb potential losses— either because they were very thinly capitalized, or were affiliated with the banks in question. I would also note that the establishment of too many bright-line rules may prove counterproductive to the goal of encouraging good bank cultures. For one thing, detailed rules can be construed as implying that the responsibility for good conduct rests with the public authorities. For another, rules may create opportunities or incentives for legal or regulatory arbitrage. When banks work to find creative ways around rules, it can have an insidious effect on culture.
Similarly, after the BCCI and Bearings crisis, the Bank of England introduced a series of financial regulations and also handed over its supervisory functions of  BIS Review 6/2007  1  financial institutions to the Financial Services Authority set up in 1998, with the primary objective of regulating financial markets in a meaningful manner. How has Sri Lanka fared? Sri Lanka’s financial sector is not insulated completely from global changes and their impacts. The financial authorities in Sri Lanka also faced the challenge of maintaining the overall financial system stability while trying to ensure that financial markets and intermediaries operate prudently and competitively. So they brought in necessary regulations. Over the last few decades, Sri Lanka also reduced the level of statutory pre-emptions, dismantled the complex structure of administered interest rates, laid down capital adequacy requirements, introduced prudential norms and liberalized entry norms for domestic and foreign banks. Most of these measures have the backing of specific legislation, under which the Central Bank has issued financial regulations. So, financial regulations are not a one-way street to tighten conditions but also to open up and promote competitiveness. Financial regulations are like traffic lights which stop financial intermediaries from going at the same speed in terms of mobilizing funds, borrowing, lending, introducing innovative products, taking risks and engaging in speculative activities. When they have to stop at the traffic lights, financial intermediaries not only in Sri Lanka but also elsewhere, complain that they are over-regulated.

Ranee Jayamaha: Glimpse of current financial regulations Inaugural speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Client Seminar on International Trade, organized by HNB (Hatton National Bank), Colombo, 13 November 2006. *  *  *  Mr Theagarajah, officials of HNB, Mr Richard Lightbound from Wachovia Bank, distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for the invitation extended to me to be present at the client seminar on Trends in International Trade. Let me congratulate HNB for taking the corporate social responsibility seriously and arranging a forum to exchange stakeholder views on an important subject. Generally, regulations are not liked by anybody. Same goes with the financial community in Sri Lanka. However, the common factor is that even regulators do not like to rule by regulation. For a better appreciation of the past and present financial regulatory environment, let me first set out the key elements underlying financial regulations. In summary: (a) regulations are mainly a reaction to an action by the financial community, although there may be instances in which regulations are brought in on hindsight with a forward-looking approach, but they are a few; (b) there is a clear difference between the objectives of regulators and market participants; (c) regulations are not necessarily a oneway street. They are not there only to tighten markets.
One of the key changes will be the creation of the UK Common Credit Message (CCM).The proposed CCM would provide a set of definitions, structures and rules for inputting data into a payment message for Payment Service Providers and users. Domestic adoption of the CCM will ensure that the majority of the content in high-value and retail payments is aligned, streamlining processes for payment services providers and potentially enabling rerouting of payments between different payments systems in the event of operational disruption. Other benefits arising from ISO adoption will be much improved information concerning the identities of those in payment transactions. This will include the adoption of Legal Entity Identifiers (LEIs), which when rolled out more widely have the potential to enable banks and non-bank payment service providers to deploy next-generation fraud prevention measures. The Bank will ensure that this functionality is in place but it will be up to industry to deliver these enhanced services for customers. As with the overall RTGS Programme the Bank is committed to proactively engaging with industry to get this right. A consultation on ISO 20022 closed in July 2018 and the Bank, in collaboration with the NPSO, is reviewing the responses received. There will be an update on next steps and how the Bank will structure future ISO engagement towards the end of the year. We are also maintaining an active dialogue with the NPSO as it takes forward plans for the New Payments Architecture which will also deploy on ISO 20022.

There are also a wide range of domestic and international policy changes ranging from the creation of the New Payments Architecture to the implementation of PSD2 so now seems an opportune time to promote the transformation of the payments landscape. The Bank is committed to introducing the new service in a safe and sustainable way which ensures the integrity of the high-value payments system and provides for close levels of co-ordination with participants. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  A core objective in the renewal programme is to ensure the resilience and safety of the UK’s payment infrastructure whilst also supporting competition and innovation in the financial services industry. We want to support new ways of doing business and serving society’s payment needs. Our vision of the future RTGS 1  was set out in a Blueprint published in 2017. In developing this vision we undertook considerable dialogue with industry: it is essential that the new system meets its needs. Our vision  Five guiding principles sit behind our vision for the renewed Real-Time Gross Settlement service. Higher resilience: Resilience to operational and security issues will be at the heart of the new service, as it is today. The renewed RTGS will continue to offer best-in-class resilience which means it will be designed to deliver an improved objective of zero or near-zero downtime for currently known resilience problems.
If we were to repeat our calculations from 2016, the changes in interest rates alone would have reduced the estimated expected real return from around 3 percent to about 2 percent annually.3 Such estimates are fundamentally uncertain. The actual return may be substantially lower or higher than this estimate, as the history of the GPFG has shown. Even so, this uncertainty is something that we should bear in mind when drafting future central government budgets. 3 Other assumptions underlying the calculation of the GPFG’s expected real return, including an estimated equity risk premium of 3 percentage points, are held constant. 14  CONCLUSION  NORGES BANK  Eleven months ago, Norway had to lock down. At that time, we had no vaccine or medicines that could prevent the illness from spreading. We had to resort to wellknown remedies: Hand disinfectant, soap, hot water and not least – social distancing. Here at Norges Bank, it has not been any different. ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  But times have changed. During the Spanish flu pandemic, Norges Bank decided to dispense a daily dose of cognac to employees who were ill or not feeling very well.

Maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment, and the improvement of the level for a better law and order, and land and property rights, fair competition, are very important factors that will improve business financing in Albania. As supervisory authority we will try hard for microfinance future growth to be sound. The credit bureau project that our bank is undertaking shortly is also expected to boost credit through ameliorating information problems. Thank you for your kind attention. BIS Review 88/2005  3
Opening remarks by Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a conference organised by the Bank and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee on The uncertain future of global economic integration, Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre, Reykjavík, 14-15 September 2017. I welcome all of you to this conference and the foreign participants to Iceland. The conference is organised by the Central Bank of Iceland and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee. The heading is broad and probably reflects in part the worries that some of us might currently have about the future of global economic integration. The topic encompasses both real economic integration – that is, trade in goods and services and the flow of labour and equipment across borders – and financial integration – that is, cross-border capital flows and stocks and associated activities of banks and other entities. The financial integration part will probably dominate the proceedings, not least because most of the speakers are current or former central bankers. I do not see that as a problem, as in my mind more work remains to be done in assessing the costs and benefits of global financial integration than regarding real side economic integration. After all, the post-war global economic order was initially based on the principles of free trade in goods, current account convertibility, and monetary stability through fixed but adjustable exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Open capital accounts were the exception, however. Real side economic integration was seen to be more important for economic progress than financial integration.

It worked well for a long while, and some call the period from 1950 to 1970 the golden years. Yet there were inherent flaws in this set-up that contributed to its demise in the early 1970s, not least the well-known Triffin dilemma regarding the conflict between the domestic economic objectives of the country providing the main reserve currency and the required international supply of that currency. Then capital accounts were opened up, with strong momentum in the 1980s and early 1990s. Capital controls were increasingly undermined by technology and financial innovation, and strong arguments were being made to the effect that open capital accounts would bring significant benefits. After all, ongoing real economic integration at a global level demanded at least some degree of global financial integration. As the BIS reminded us in its latest Annual Report – and Jaime Caruana might touch on in his keynote speech later in this session – trade and finance tend to go together. Freer capital movements in turn undermined pegged exchange rates and thus contributed to the spread of flexible exchange rate regimes and inflation targeting. 1  There can be little doubt that both real and financial global integration have brought enormous economic benefits. Still, it has been increasingly questioned of late. We partly understand why. We know that there are significant gains from real integration but that there are winners and losers. The losers can be compensated in principle, but in practice this does not always happen.