samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I would not have taken the job I have now if I wasn’t convinced that it is possible to combine low unemployment with low inflation, as in the first decades after the Second World War. I understood and criticised the fact that the transition from high inflation would be costly in terms of temporary job losses and a decline in income. But that cost is now behind us and the conditions are in place for a lower level of unemployment in the long run. However, this requires a willingness to discuss the real causes of the weak employment growth in Sweden. BIS Review 65/2004  5  1. Inflation rate Annual percentage change  18 16  16  Inflation rate Average inflation rate  14 12  14 12  1975-1994 8.1%  10  10  1965-1974 5.6%  8 6  18  8  1956-1964 3.4%  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001  -2  Source: Statistics Sweden  2.

Averages for the periods 1970-1989 and 1995-2003  10  10  9  9  8  8 7  7 1970-1989 1995-2003  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1 0  0 Inflation  GDP growth  Productivity change, Nominal wage rises, whole economy whole economy  Real wage rises, whole economy  Open unemployment  Source: Statistics Sweden  6  BIS Review 65/2004  3. Open unemployment i different counties Share of the labour force i each county respectively 8  8  7  7  2002  6  6  2003  Norrbottens  Gävleborgs  Skåne  Örebro  Dalarnas  Västmanlands  Värmlands  Södermanlands  Blekinge  0  Västernorrlands  0  Gotlands  1 Östergötlands  1 Kalmar  2  Västra Götalands  2  Hallands  3  Stockholms  3  Västerbottens  4  Uppsala  4  Kronobergs  5  Jönköpings  5  Source: Statistics Sweden  4.
More fundamentally, stronger than currently expected wage developments would pose significant upward risks to price stability, not least in view of the favourable momentum of real GDP growth observed over the past few quarters. It is therefore crucial that the social partners continue to meet their responsibilities. In this context, wage agreements should take into account price competitiveness positions, the still high level of unemployment in many economies, as well as productivity developments. The Governing Council will monitor the upcoming wage negotiations in the euro area countries very carefully. The monetary analysis confirms the prevailing upside risks to price stability at medium to longer horizons. Annual M3 growth was unchanged at 9.8% in January, thus remaining at the highest rate observed since the introduction of the euro. At 10.6%, the annual growth rate of loans to the private sector also remained strong in January. Strong growth in private sector credit reflects the continuation of the upward trend in the growth of borrowing by non-financial corporations seen since mid-2004. Meanwhile, in the context of rising mortgage rates throughout the euro area and a slowing increase in house prices in some regions, the growth of household borrowing has shown some further signs of moderation in recent months, albeit remaining at still high rates. Taking the appropriate medium to longer-term perspective for assessing trends in money and credit growth, the latest developments confirm the continuation of a persistent upward trend in the underlying rate of monetary expansion.

Future demand growth has been judged to exceed what the economy can cope with in the long term without generating higher inflation. To date, however, price trends - not least in the domestic economy - have been lower than we had expected, even though our forecasts were below those of most other observers. One recent event is the notable fall in share prices. To date, however, this seems to be more of a desirable normalisation than a fall that endangers economic activity. There are also more and more indications that the recent strong growth of production and employment is tending to slacken. To date, however, that has been broadly in line with our earlier assessment. Finally, there is the rather mixed information about the ongoing wage negotiations. This year’s wage outcome is, if anything, somewhat lower than expected. At the same time, it looks as though several of the demands that have been presented are a little bit high in relation to the inflation target, particularly considering the risk of future wage drift in an increasingly strong labour market. These are matters we will be deliberating in the Riksbank in the run up to the next Inflation Report and monetary policy meeting in December.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Chart 4 Negative rates in European government bond markets Positive Negative  Switzerland  1 -0.89  2 -0.99  3 -0.81  Maturity (years) 4 5 6 -0.61 -0.47 -0.38  Germany  -0.27  -0.25  -0.24  -0.21  -0.16  -0.09  -0.02  0.05  0.13  0.20  Finland  -0.20  -0.18  -0.15  -0.11  -0.08  -0.06  -0.03  0.09  0.14  0.22  -0.18  -0.15  -0.13  -0.07  -0.05  0.00  0.07  0.17  0.26  -0.31  -0.04  Netherlands  7 -0.32  8 -0.29  9 -0.24  10 -0.11  Denmark  -0.80  -0.62  Austria  -0.16  -0.17  -0.17  -0.12  -0.06  -0.05  0.02  0.12  0.19  0.29  Belgium  -0.16  -0.16  -0.13  -0.08  -0.06  0.02  0.15  0.24  0.34  0.43  France  -0.19  -0.20  -0.16  -0.09  0.01  0.08  0.18  0.27  0.36  0.45  Sweden  -0.16  -0.17  0.01  0.24  0.44  0.61  Spain  0.07  0.10  0.18  0.28  0.47  0.63  0.74  0.88  1.05  1.15  Italy  0.03  0.11  0.23  0.36  0.50  0.65  0.79  0.93  1.06  1.19  Norway  0.73  1.34  1.45  UK  0.35  1.82  1.91  0.76 0.59  0.87  0.92 1.12  1.31  0.15  1.16 1.47  1.61  1.72  0.26  0.73  Bl oomberg a nd Ba nk ca l cul a ti ons  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

We definitely have a lot to learn from Malaysia in respect of product development and market operation. As I see it, Hong Kong and Malaysia each has different edges in the financial services industry, and the potential synergy between the two places in developing the Islamic financial markets is tremendous. 10. Malaysia is undoubtedly an important leading centre in the global Islamic finance industry that has accumulated vast experiences and invaluable expertise over the past three decades. It has developed a well-diversified Islamic financial market, offering a full suite of products covering sukuk, Islamic equities, Islamic funds, Islamic ETFs, etc. Its sukuk market is by far the largest in the world, accounting for more than 70% of global sukuk issuances last year.4 It has also put in place well-developed financial infrastructure which can facilitate local and overseas market players alike in conducting Islamic financial transactions. 11. On the other hand, Hong Kong as an international financial centre has developed a deep and highly liquid capital market with a diverse base of investors coming from all around the world. More importantly, with Hong Kong’s unique role as a gateway to Mainland China and a leading hub for offshore RMB business, Hong Kong can offer an ideal platform to link Islamic and RMB financing together by developing financial products that are Shariah-  4  2  Zawya. BIS central bankers’ speeches  compliant and, at the same time, denominated in RMB.
Taken together, these developments should accommodate the moderation in the rate of growth of consumer spending, which we anticipate and may now be beginning to see. In the meantime we have seen a rise in the rate of inflation - to 3% on the target measure - driven notably by last year's sharp rise in house prices and by the rise in the oil price in the run up to the invasion of Iraq. And it may well rise somewhat further, for example, as a result of the prospective rise in Council Tax and the somewhat weaker exchange rate. But most of these influences at this stage seem likely to be largely one-off effects on the level of retail prices, rather than persistent influences on the rate of inflation. There is no significant evidence at this point of continuing, second-round, effects,  2  BIS Review 16/2003  for example in the labour market, so that inflation seems likely to fall back to the 2½% target rate in the course of next year. On this basis - and although the MPC will of course be monitoring the inflation prospect very carefully we concluded at our most recent meeting that policy should remain on hold. Mr Chairman, you can see that I meant it when I said earlier that we haven't yet reached the promised land! We have in fact been going through a difficult patch, and we remain heavily dependent upon developments abroad which are beyond our control.

Progress has been made in several areas, but the problems’ complexities and the political difficulties to deal with them are huge. This, coupled with the delicate position of consumers and firms, has translated in deteriorating economic expectations in the region, anticipating a recession during this year. The situation in the United States, while less severe than that in Europe, is also complex, especially because of the slow recovery and little room for fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate the economy. The emerging world, Chile included, will undergo a period of slower growth than in the past few years. Market consensus forecasts, last week’s IMF projections, and also those in our December 2011’s Monetary Policy Report point in the same direction (table 1). Most recently, the information coming from the U.S. shows a somewhat better performance than was forecast some weeks back, but does not modify medium-term problems and risks affecting its economy. In fact, last week the Federal Reserve extended from mid-2013 to end-2014 the period during which it would hold the fed funds rate at the minimum level where it is today, which reflects the magnitude of the problem. Meanwhile, information from China reveals its economy is growing strongly. It also shows a relief of inflationary pressures in that country, providing more space for policy-making. The prices of commodities, especially copper, have recovered significantly in the past few weeks. Actually, today’s price of this metal is substantially higher than we had forecast for the year.
The estimated regression line has clearly shifted to a lower position since the crisis and the period of weaker productivity growth that has ensued. However, if people come to accept the implications of that weaker productivity trend for the real wage increases they can expect to receive – the “norm” for real pay growth being one thing that determines the position of the Phillips curve – that’s precisely what you’d expect to see. It would also shift leftwards if structural improvements in the labour market had lowered the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The MPC reduced its estimate of that equilibrium rate, from 5% to 4½%, in February. In real time, as it’s happening, it’s statistically  Chart 10: Phillips curve: down but not out  difficult to distinguish a shift from a flattening and there is clearly room for caution about our forecasts for growth of wages and unit costs. But, over time, I think the evidence looks more in favour of the former. The curve still seems to have a slope – all else equal, a tighter labour market is likely to mean faster wage growth. Conclusion  Sources: ONS, Bank of England, and Bank calculations. I was in Aberdeen earlier this year and, when asked by a wily reporter what I planned to vote at 11  the following MPC meeting, fobbed off the question by referring to a number of “imponderables” . I’ve talked about some of those today.

On this view, someone who thinks his or her income will be persistently lower from tomorrow would reduce the level of spending today. In the interim – until income actually declines – the saving rate goes up. So the behaviour of the saving rate should tell you something about how consumers expect income to evolve over the future. Expectations of strong income growth lower the saving rate, a more pessimistic view does the opposite. 6  Now we know that, in the real world, there are reasons why consumption doesn’t exactly behave like this . We also know, from our own NMG survey of households, that there are many households who do say they expect EU withdrawal to have a negative impact. Since September last year this biannual survey has included three Brexit-related questions. One asks for your overall opinion – do you think leaving the EU is a good or a bad idea? (One would imagine the responses here are well correlated with what people actually voted in the referendum; consistent with that, the households surveyed in September 2016 were more or less split down the middle on this question.) The second asks about the impact of Brexit on the economy, the third asks how households expect the referendum result to affect their spending. The balances on these last two questions are drawn in Chart 6. They’re divided between those who answered the first question positively, in green – let’s call them the “leavers” – and the “remainers” in red.
It is already clear however that it will amplify the headwinds to the strong recovery that the euro –area has been experiencing in 2021, and that it will intensify inflation pressures in a context where inflation has already increased significantly and will remain high over the coming months. The general uncertainty that marks the euro-area macroeconomic environment has implications for the conduct of monetary policy. In these conditions, it is important to balance carefully the risks of waiting too long to act as opposed to those of normalizing too soon. In any case, the  commitment of the ECB is clear: the Governing Council will do what is necessary to bring inflation firmly and durably to around two per cent over the medium term. The forward guidance, relying on state contingent criteria and the “sequencing” are instrumental to this goal. Policy normalization will follow a clear order: the ECB will end its asset purchases first, likely in Q3 2022, then raise the key interest rates, eventually reducing its balance sheet in a third step. All along this gradual process of normalization, the Governing Council of the ECB made it clear that it will maintainoptionality; gradualism and flexibility in the conduct of monetary policy. In that context, financial markets are currently considering that the rise in interest rates might start in the near future, with a first 25 bps hike almost fully factored in (90 %) as of next July, followed by two others by the end of this year.

But it must be clear that beyond regulators and central banks, the private sector has also a key role to play to ensure that the digitalisation of finance indeed brings about the efficiency benefits it is expected to deliver without jeopardizing the stability of our financial system. From that perspective I would like to underline the strategic importance of the European Payments Initiative. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The EPI is currently the only project aiming to offer an integrated pan-European payment solution with a common brand, and not based on the interoperability of heterogeneous domestic solutions. I regret that part of the European banking community has prioritised other interests over a common, lasting project. This shrinking of the number of shareholders has inevitable consequences on the capacity of the initiative, leading EPI to give up on a European card scheme, and leaving this field open for international schemes in the short and medium term. On the other hand, we can also acknowledge that EPI has decided to invest in the next generation of payments: mobile, account-to-account and instant payments. Eight of the first ten European banks and the two largest European payment processors are part of the project. We therefore hope that the launch of the first EPI solutions, expected for the beginning of 2023, will convince other banking communities to join this new digital pan-European solution, which stands as a great chance for the European market to build the independence of the European payments market for the future.
The increased volume of foreign exchange transactions, the process of internationalization and market-determined prices have all increased the market risk that the banks are exposed to, and this, in turn, has increased the need to introduce risk measures aimed at protecting banks’ capital. For this purpose, regulatory studies are jointly conducted by the Central Bank and the Treasury, and commonly accepted risk measures, such as limits on net open foreign exchange positions, and capital adequacy ratios, have been introduced in addition to credit limits and other measures consistent with EU standards. Another practice followed to make supervision more effective and obtain better evaluations of banks’ real financial standing is consolidated supervision. Authorized independent bank auditors play an important role in the bank supervision process. Each bank in the sector must obtain an independent audit report every year. These reports are prepared by authorized independent auditing firms operating in accordance with the commonly accepted international accounting and auditing principles. Another important feature of the Turkish banking system, and not a new one, is its deposit insurance scheme. It was first introduced in 1933 and redesigned in 1983 with the establishment of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. This Fund’s main source of income is a premium paid by banks, equal to a certain percentage of their savings deposits. In 1994 a new Decree came into effect and all banks’ deposits, whether denominated in Turkish lira or foreign currencies, were fully insured by the Fund.

Mr Erçel talks about the Turkish banking system Speech by the Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Mr Gazi Erçel, on the occasion of the American Turkish Council meeting in Ankara on 18 March 1999. First, I would like to thank the ATC arranging this gathering in Ankara. I am very pleased to be here today, and I would like to talk about the Turkish banking system. Let me begin by recalling that banks are important and serious institutions. They depend on trust. They borrow money from the public and use it. They also perform the function of intermediation of funds. For many centuries they have been institutions that contributed to economic development. There are a number of generally accepted, long-standing principles that apply to these institutions. The most important are: -  Providing effective supervision over these institutions. -  Maintaining an environment in which they can function efficiently. -  Making risk-taking measures adaptable and applicable. -  Helping to improve the culture of credit. Most of these responsibilities are assigned to public authorities, although some of them are the responsibility of the banks. During the last two decades, however, financial developments taking place all over the world have brought many changes in the practice of banking. Innovations in information technology, the liberalization process of financial markets and a rapid increase in the sheer number of financial transactions have also affected banking. Competition in banking and other sectors has increased.
The Riksbank has specified this as a target for inflation, according to which the annual change in the consumer price index (CPI) is to be 2 per cent.”    “At the same time as monetary policy is aimed at attaining the inflation target, it is also to support the objectives of general economic policy with a view to achieving sustainable growth and high employment. This is achieved through the Riksbank, in addition to stabilising inflation around the inflation target, also striving to stabilise production and employment around long-term sustainable paths.”  1  Monetary Policy in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank, 3 June 2010. BIS Review 130/2010  1  Production and employment are thus included in the monetary policy analysis in two ways. Firstly, stable production and employment around levels that are sustainable in the long run are important objectives for economic policy. Secondly, the level of production and employment in relation to potential production and employment – or put another way, resource utilisation – is an indicator of future inflationary pressures. How are potential GDP and resource utilisation measured? Resource utilisation can be measured in many different ways. I would like to focus on the GDP gap. The GDP gap has the advantage of providing the most comprehensive picture of the extent to which resources in the economy are being used and GDP is the central forecasting variable. The GDP gap is the difference between actual GDP and potential GDP.

To encourage greater labour market participation, the disbursement of unemployment benefits was made conditional on the taking up of appropriate training, and fiscal incentives were introduced aimed at encouraging the return of women workers to the labour market and the employment of those over 40 years old. In parallel, steps were taken to simplify administrative and business procedures and extensive investments were made in state-of-the art technologies and in broadening the outreach of the information society. This investment appears to have paid off, as Malta now ranks second in the EU in terms of the provision of online government services, 3 and two  2  The deterioration was most significant in the electronics sector, which saw a 31% drop in 2001 and a further 9.5% drop in 2002. Tourist receipts fell by around 2% in 2001 but recovered by 4% in 2002, such that over the period at a whole it had grown by only 2%. This marginal increase notwithstanding, its share in total services exports had fallen from 54% to 49%. 3  Eurostat ICT indicators. 2  BIS Review 14/2008  different sources suggest that it ranks among the 25 most technologically advanced countries in the world. 4 Economic performance post-reform Although the reform process is still underway, Malta’s economy was judged by the EU Council in July 2007 to be sufficiently well equipped to operate within the policy parameters of monetary union. In the Commission’s words, Malta had achieved ‘a high degree of sustainable convergence’.