samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The purpose is thus to make it easier for companies to borrow in that the banks are given better scope for financing. It is primarily large companies that issue commercial paper, but smaller companies should also benefit as the banks’ increased scope for borrowing from the Riksbank means their total lending capacity will be less strained. So far, however, the banks have chosen to use only a small part of the credit facilities offered by the Riksbank. It remains to be seen whether this is because the companies have  2  BIS Review 149/2008  nevertheless succeeded in borrowing elsewhere or whether they consider the bank loans to be too expensive. Despite the fact that some companies are experiencing problems with borrowing, bank lending in Sweden is continuing to rise. However, this should not automatically be interpreted to mean that the supply of credit is functioning well in every aspect. The international credit markets are still largely closed to Swedish companies and they cannot borrow from foreign banks to the same extent as before. The Riksbank has also granted special liquidity assistance during the autumn to Kaupthing Bank Sverige AB and Carnegie Investment Bank AB. The liquidity assistance was offered in the form of loans against collateral and at a higher interest rate than on normal loans. The market turbulence and the great uncertainty that prevailed were reasons for granting liquidity assistance to safeguard financial stability, even though these institutions were relatively minor participants in the Swedish financial market.

Putting all of the responsibility on monetary policy would probably mean such high interest rates that they would have seriously negative repercussions for the real economy. Moreover, the argument remains that it is difficult to determine when a credit boom changes from being beneficial for growth to becoming a risk that can trigger a financial crisis. I nevertheless think that the crisis has taught us that when we conduct monetary policy we must also follow a number of variables that are linked to the build-up of risk in the financial markets, primarily credit growth in different sectors of the economy. The fact that monetary policy alone cannot prevent financial crises does not mean that we can only look at an inflation target and otherwise disregard what a long period of low interest rates may entail with regard to risks in the financial system. This is also the view the Riksbank has expressed  BIS Review 149/2008  5  in recent years, occasionally, one must say under strong criticism from both academics and various other parties in society. Monetary policy can alleviate the consequences of the financial crisis The financial crisis has meant that the focus normally placed on monetary policy has been transferred to the measures taken to safeguard financial stability. Monetary policy cannot be used to resolve acute problems in the financial markets. This requires a different type of measure, as I have already described. What role can monetary policy then play in the current situation?
Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Road map for monetary and financial sector policies in 2007 and beyond Speech by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Central Bank International Conference hall, Colombo, 2 January 2007. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Your Excellencies, Members of the Monetary Board, Deputy Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome to all of you and wish you a very happy new year. As we mark the new year 2007, we thought it would be appropriate and timely for the Central Bank to enunciate its policies as well as the rationale therefor, so as to enhance policy predictability and transparency. We shall also take this opportunity to indicate our policy targets and share our latest available information in relation to the economy, upon which our analysis and targets have been based. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka was established in August 1950 under the Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949, and the Act sets out two inter-dependent core objectives. These are the attainment of the economic and price stability and the maintenance of the financial system stability. Today, the Central Bank follows a monetary targeting policy framework in conducting monetary policy to attain Economic and Price Stability, i.e., to achieve a sustainable, low and predictable level of inflation. Such an outcome, among others, is a prerequisite to achieving sustainable economic growth and development.

Correlation was not expected to be high between investments in, for example, Japanese inflation-indexed government bonds, bonds issued by international organisations such as the European Investment Bank, European covered bonds and US mortgage-backed bonds. These experiences and the abrupt turnaround in market liquidity suggest that active management of the fixed income portfolio should be limited and measured on the basis of a number of criteria, as laid down by Norges Bank’s Executive Board. The Fund currently has extensive holdings of bonds that are difficult to trade in today’s market. Realised losses related to these investments have, as mentioned above, been limited. The flipside of large book losses is that this portfolio has a high return, reflecting not only the increase in credit risk but also high liquidity premiums and fears and uncertainty in the market. The return, measured as the difference in the effective interest rate between the actual portfolio and the benchmark portfolio, is now close to two percentage points. History has seen a number of deep financial crises, and market conditions will return to normal in time. The final results of the management of the Fund’s fixed income portfolio since the beginning of the financial crisis cannot be deduced from the quarterly results while the crisis is at its  BIS Review 53/2009  3  most intensive. Values are not lost as long as borrowers fulfil their obligations. The Fund is prepared to retain ownership of a large volume of bond holdings until they mature in a few years.
The Committee noted that an ON RRP facility will be used only to the extent necessary and will be phased out once it is no longer needed to help control the federal funds rate. With respect to the Fed’s balance sheet, the Committee intends to reduce securities holdings in a gradual and predictable manner, primarily by ceasing to reinvest repayments of principal on securities held in the SOMA. 3 In the longer run, the Committee intends that the Federal Reserve will hold no more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively, and that it will hold primarily Treasury securities. The March 2015 minutes augment the September Principles and Plans with additional details about the FOMC’s intended operational approach at the commencement of policy firming. Specifically, the Federal Reserve intends to target a range for the federal funds rate that is 25 basis points wide, and to set the IOER rate and the offering rate associated with an ON RRP facility equal to the top and bottom of the target range, respectively. It intends to allow aggregate capacity of the ON RRP facility to be temporarily elevated to support policy implementation. It can also adjust the IOER rate and parameters of the ON RRP facility, and to use other tools such as term operations, as necessary for appropriate monetary control based on policymakers’ assessments of the efficacy and costs of their tools.

More generally, all over the world, the best private sector involvement is foreign direct investments, privatisation and going back as soon as possible to spontaneous market financing. FTD: Is the ECB sticking to the line that any solution for Greece that leads to a credit event, a selective default or a default must be avoided? Trichet: The Governing Council has not changed its position. Again we are in a domain where Governments are responsible. Our duty is to say clearly what we judge appropriate in order to avoid the risk of adverse developments in the euro area and in Europe. As you know there has been several times in the past when our advice was not followed, such as when we advised solemnly against watering down the letter and the spirit of the Stability and Growth  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Pact. If this advice had been followed, we may have avoided some of the problems we are facing today. FTD: How is the ECB helping to battle the crisis? Trichet: The most important thing for the Governing Council of the ECB is, for the future as it did in the past, to stick to its mandate and ensure price stability for the euro. The fact that the euro is a stable and credible currency is a prerequisite, a necessary condition for mastering this difficult situation. The ECB is an anchor of stability and confidence which is particularly fundamental at a time when everything else seems to be moving and shifting.
CPI is affected by technological changes, making it cheaper to make phone calls and to use the Internet. Inflation is also affected by the changes that come under the designation of globalisation, and that lead to increased trade and competition and to, for instance, cheaper imports of TVs. During the first three months of the year, inflation has not been as low as expected in the forecast made in February. This is mainly because energy prices have been slightly higher than calculated. In February we believed that CPI would be 1.5 per cent in March. Instead it was 1.9 per cent. Higher costs lead to higher prices One explanation as to why inflation is expected to rise in future is that growth in productivity – how much is produced per hour worked – is slowing down. At the same time, wages are rising slightly faster than they have done in recent years. All in all, this means that companies' costs are rising more quickly. It is difficult to say when a higher rate of increase in costs will lead to a higher rate of increase in prices. Many Swedish companies are currently making large profits and can probably manage a period with higher costs without raising their prices. There are also other factors holding back inflation. For instance, prices of many imported good are continuing to fall. Better understanding productivity Inflation has been below target since the beginning of 2004, but we can now see that it has begun to increase again.

Let me now turn to some of the thinking that has already begun surrounding implementation of the New Accord. To ensure that our new rules have gotten it right, the Basel Committee has just completed collecting data for its third Quantitative Impact Study - or “QIS 3” - in conjunction with supervisors around the world. The industry demonstrated tremendous support for this survey, and 265 banks from nearly 50 countries performed concrete and comprehensive assessments of how the Committee’s proposals will affect them. At this early stage, the results suggest that the incentives built into the New Accord are functioning as we had hoped. We are completing a detailed study of the results and will ascertain the need for any adjustments prior to the release of an updated proposal for public comment during the spring. The Committee intends to finalize the New Capital Accord in the fourth quarter of 2003 such that it can be implemented in each member country at year-end 2006. During this three-year period, banks and supervisors are expected to adapt and develop the systems and processes necessary to conform to the standards of the New Accord. In that regard, the supervisory agencies represented on the Basel Committee are making good progress in their preparation for the new framework. To ensure that the New Accord is implemented in a consistent manner across various jurisdictions, such that market competition is driven by each bank’s strengths, rather than by differences in each country’s rules, the Basel Committee established the Accord Implementation Group.
The future size of the Petroleum Fund depends on oil price developments. The guideline ensures that we only use the return on wealth that has already been accumulated. This makes policy robust to changes in oil prices and ensures that petroleum wealth will be of benefit both today and in the future. The guideline provides a framework that contributes to making the central government budget an appropriate tool for setting political priorities. It sets a limit on the share of petroleum revenues that the government can use each year and does not distinguish between domestic and foreign spending. This eliminates the waste of resources that two separate budgets would necessarily entail. The government invests petroleum wealth in foreign securities through the Petroleum Fund. Government wealth is thereby more diversified. These investments have no impact on the Norwegian capital market. Both mainland private saving and business fixed investment have been high in recent years. In Norway, credit and capital markets nevertheless feature some weaknesses, with thin securities markets and a narrow investor and ownership base compared with other countries. The reasons, and hence the solutions, can probably be found in the structure of the taxation of dwellings, property and financial assets, in a high level of state ownership of enterprises and in the organisation of pension saving in Norway. Investing even more government capital in Norway would reduce the return on investments in the Norwegian business sector and prompt other investors to invest elsewhere.

Allocating even more capital to the Norwegian economy would probably lead to a rapid relocation of jobs to other countries, as the krone would tend to appreciate. Effect on industry structure The planned use of petroleum revenues will increase demand for public and private services. The guidelines imply an increase in the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget of around 3½ per cent of mainland GDP by 2010. This may entail an additional 60 000 person-years in the service sector. As long as there are labour shortages in Norway, a comparable decline in manufacturing employment is likely to occur. Although the phasing in of petroleum revenues is a gradual process, the contest for labour resources will intensify. As a result, monetary policy is likely to remain fairly tight in the years ahead. A high interest rate level may in periods result in a strong krone. This may accelerate the scaling back of manufacturing industry. However, in the long run monetary policy cannot influence overall employment or its distribution across industries. A lower interest rate would have resulted in higher price and cost inflation, which would also have weakened profitability in the manufacturing sector. The end result would have been the same for employment and production, but in addition we would have had to face the costs of high inflation. Even if employment and production in manufacturing are affected, the situation for Norwegian enterprises will not necessarily be negative.
A good, albeit somewhat extreme, example of the scope of the new resolution powers took place very recently when a very small cooperative bank reached the point of non-viability. That bank proved unable to find by itself a suitable solution. As a consequence, the Banco de España put the institution into resolution and appointed the resolution fund (FROB) as an administrator. The FROB then took full control of the institution and sold it – through an express auction – to another cooperative bank. The whole process was conducted in roughly 24 hours and entailed no cost for depositors, creditors or even holders of capital instruments. All resolution actions have been taken with sufficient care, particularly with respect to the fulfillment of the no-creditor-worse-off principle. Indeed, so far we have faced very limited litigation, and no decision has been successfully challenged to date in the courts of justice. I believe that the recent Spanish experience may offer some insight into issues aired in the ongoing debates in the European Union and the rest of the world. First, as I said, the Spanish bank restructuring process was conducted without a clear European resolution framework. Yet, as in all cases in which Member States offer support to weak institutions, resolution and restructuring plans had to be submitted to the Directorate General for Competition of the European Commission to clear compliance with EU State Aid  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Rules.

5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  1980s, to around $ over the past decade (Chart 1). Chart 1: Weather-related losses worldwide (1980-2017)  $ billions (2015 values)  350  Uninsured losses 300  Insured losses Moving average total economic losses (a)  250  Moving average insured losses (b) 200 150 100 50 0 1980 82  84  86  88  90  92  94  96  98 2000 02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  (a) Total Economic Losses = Insured + Uninsured losses. (b) 10-year moving average Source: Munich Reinsurance Company, Geo Risks Research, NatCatSERVICE  General and reinsurers insurers have long deployed sophisticated modelling of climate and weather-related physical risks, and have adjusted their cover and business models accordingly. Lloyd’s of London underwriters, for example, are required to consider climate change explicitly in their business plans and underwriting models. Their genius has been to recognise that the past is not prologue and that the catastrophic norms of the future are in the tail risks of today. For example, by holding capital at a one-in-200 year risk appetite, under a forward-looking capital regime, UK insurers were able to withstand the events of 2017, the worst year on record for weather-related insurance losses at around $ Given evidence that suggests increasing levels of physical risk, insurers will need to consider the potential impact of more intense and clustered weather-related events.
[13] Building block 14: The European Central Bank is migrating to ISO in Real-time Gross Settlement (RTGS) payments in November 2022,[14] with the Bank of Japan having already migrated to ISO and completing version upgrade in 2025. To support further progress, in May 2022, the CPMI published reports on expanding access and extending operating hours. [15] These relate to two foundational building blocks that can enable the progress of many other building blocks of the roadmap. Today I want to discuss why these two reports are critical and how central banks, industry and public authorities can play a key part in advancing the roadmap. How improving direct access can enhance cross-border payments The Building block 10 report assesses the benefits and risks of expanding access to domestic payment systems in particular RTGS systems. Expanded access could enable non-bank PSPs, financial market infrastructures (FMIs) and foreign banks to gain direct access to the payment systems they rely on to provide payment services to end-users, without relying on an intermediary (who maybe also be a competitor). According to a CPMI survey, approximately 30% of the payment systems allow non-bank PSPs and FMIs direct access[16] and 28% reported have made significant changes to their direct access policies since 2010. And despite the fact that the 61% of payment systems that are considering to expand access within the next 5 years, only 7% have concrete plans to do so. Expanding access could have some clear benefits for cross-border payments: 1.

Enhancing Cross-border Payments - Stage 3 Roadmap (FSB Report 2020)  Page 9 8. Targets for Addressing the Four Challenges of Cross-Border Payments (FSB Report October 2021) 9. Trireme - DK findout! 10. Speech: Real-time payments in Australia 11. RBI to give some non-banks access to payments systems 12. Expansion of operating hours and associated changes for the Fedwire  and Fedwire Funds Service  s  13. Sweden completes first phase of migration to TIPS 14. TARGET consolidation: Timeline 15. Extending and aligning payment system operating hours for cross-border payments (CPMI Report May 2022) and Improving access to payment systems for cross-border payments: best-practices for self-assessments (CPMI Report May 2022) 16. Improving access to payment systems for cross-border payments: best-practices for  self-assessments (CPMI  Report May 2022) 17. Extending and aligning payment system operating hours for cross-border payments (CPMI Report May 2022) 18. RTGS Renewal Programme | Bank of England 19. Roadmap for Real-Time Gross Settlement Service Beyond 2024
The breakdown suggests that, by contrast with the spillovers we saw in the previous chart, monetary policy shocks seem to have contributed comparatively little to exchange rate movements in the first half of 2014.14 6 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  Instead, an exogenous shock, which can be interpreted in the context of this discussion as a time-varying risk premium shock, appears to have put mainly downward pressure on the dollar. To the extent that risk premium and bond term premium shocks are driven by the same fundamentals, this would be consistent with the view that the signalling and portfolio rebalancing channels were sending conflicting signals. This train of thought is in fact very similar to the view put forward by Charles Engel and Kenneth West on the relationship between risk premia and the exchange rate.15 They saw the dollar depreciation in 2007 as evidence of investors thinking “this is a US crisis”. And they saw the dollar appreciation in 2008 as a change in this thinking to “well, this is actually more of a global crisis”. As with the events of 2007–08, what ultimately caused the initial resilience of the dollar and the sharp fall in term premia in 2014 will remain a matter of speculation. Factors other than the actions of the Federal Reserve and the ECB are likely to have contributed to these developments. But that is not my point.

The goal of the conference was to bring together academic and Fed researchers and policymakers to study the implications of low inflation and the ZLB from a variety of perspectives.6 Looking back, what stands out the most from this conference was the richness and diversity of thought brought to a topic that had lain mostly dormant for many decades. There were papers on the historical experience with very low inflation and interest rates, and on financial market functioning in such an environment. The conference concluded with an international policymaker panel. Three of the conference papers were directly related to conducting monetary policy in relation to the ZLB. Specifically, Ben McCallum’s paper examined the use of the exchange rate as an additional instrument for monetary policy in the context of a model where a “portfolio balance” channel allowed for deviations from uncovered interest parity. 7 In my paper with Dave Reifschneider, we explored the effects of the ZLB on the macro economy and evaluated alternative monetary policy strategies, including versions of average-inflation and price-level targeting.8 To his credit, Marvin Goodfriend went outside the box and considered three avenues to overcome the ZLB: charging negative interest rates on reserves and cash; conducting largescale purchases of long-term securities to reduce the external finance premium; and outright monetary transfers to the public.9 What is striking rereading these papers today is how all authors took for granted that the ZLB was a real problem that needed addressing, and how they approached it in novel and different ways.