samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The models being tested at present are simply too rough and ready. They tend to sound the alarm about events that never occur and miss those that actually happen. Although the picture looks bright, we know there are countries in the global economy that are vulnerable, with a situation that may deteriorate. Share prices, moreover, have climbed very high, not least in the United States. There are also imbalances in the US economy that may affect the future course of events. There is also the possibility, however, of demand growth in Sweden becoming even stronger. We do not know how other components of economic policy will be constructed in detail. I am thinking in particular of the current discussion about the direction of tax policy. The Riksbank is in no way opposed to tax cuts. On the contrary, strategic tax reductions could make the Swedish economy function better and thereby lead to higher growth. But we have a duty to issue a warning about a tax policy that would give additional force to a growth of consumption that is already rapid and thereby lead to economic overheating in Sweden. At the same time, I believe that decision-makers are aware of these risks. Taken together, all these factors make it difficult to assess the future development of demand. So there is reason to monitor developments closely. Conclusion At present I do not for my part see any direct, immediate threat to price stability in the Swedish economy.

We try to do our work as best as we can, which is to ensure price stability in the euro area. And I don’t think we have to be negative 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  about Europe. Not everything is going very well. There are plenty of things which don’t work well and which need to be improved. But what would we say to the millions of eastern Europeans who have returned to prosperity thanks to Europe, if Europe didn’t exist today? What would we say to the millions of French people who work in companies which are exporting to Europe? And when you travel round the world, Europe is admired. Why? Because it is a prosperous region, but also because it is a place of security, and of social protection. Europe is one of the few places in the world where, if you go to hospital, you won’t be asked for your credit card. That’s what we need to safeguard, but we need to safeguard it together, as Europeans. Emmanuel Macron wants a euro area budget and greater solidarity between the Member States. Will that be achieved soon? It’s necessary because the Member States have to regain budgetary firepower. It would not be reasonable to expect the European Central Bank to sort out all of Europe’s economic problems indefinitely. Economic capacity and budgetary capacity have to be recreated. But that won’t happen overnight; French ideas won’t be imposed on Europe by magic, it will be a long discussion.
Bearing these two requirements in mind, we invest our assets according to the criteria of liquidity, security and return. What does that mean specifically? First, our portfolio must be as liquid as possible. This is crucial, particularly as regards our objective of being able to use the balance sheet for monetary policy purposes. We have to be in a position to buy and sell assets quickly in crisis situations. It should always be possible to expand or reduce the SNB’s balance sheet if necessary. At the end of 2016, the SNB held approximately 70% of its foreign exchange reserves in foreign government bonds. A substantial proportion was invested in the world’s most liquid bond markets, where liquidity does not dry up even during a crisis. This ensures the SNB’s ability to act at any time. Second, the SNB’s portfolio must be as secure as possible. We regard security in this context as a comprehensive concept, aimed at preserving the value of the currency reserves in the long term. One of the first prerequisites for ensuring that a portfolio is as secure as possible is to make sure we invest in bonds with a high credit rating. In this way, we minimise the risk of large-scale defaults. Another prerequisite is to diversify as broadly as possible. This is why we spread our investments, not just over different currencies, but also over different investment categories. We are continuously expanding our investment universe.

It continually has to earn it. For this reason, in the run-up to the introduction of the euro, the Bank of England is playing a key role in preparing London’s global marketplace for this major new opportunity, alongside market practitioners themselves: We are ensuring that the necessary financial infrastructure in London is in place so that anyone who wishes to do so can trade and settle in euro in London from the first day of EMU. We are also helping to ensure that City firms whatever their nationality - are properly prepared so that they and their customers can make full use of the infrastructure. We are providing information to the London market so that firms - whatever their nationality - are as well informed as possible about the technical side of the preparations for the euro. This is the significance of our broadly quarterly series of publications on ‘Practical Issues’, which now has a circulation of around 40,000, of which 5,000 go directly overseas. We also aim to promote agreement between central banks and market practitioners across Europe on practical issues in areas where the market requires a degree of co-ordination. In conclusion, I want to emphasise three points. First, the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 will create a major currency for financing, with significant depth and liquidity. Second, London will be ready for the introduction of the euro. Anybody who wishes to do so will be able to trade and settle in euro in London from the first day of EMU.
Secondary market purchases of Treasury securities reached about $ billion per month during the second LSAP program (a time when proceeds from agency debt and MBS were being reinvested in Treasuries), and we doubled our per-issue concentration limit from 35 percent to 70 percent. Meanwhile, monthly purchases of agency MBS were successfully ramped up from a pace of $ billion per month for just reinvestments in the first half of 2012 to more than $ billion per month later that year when additional purchases under the third LSAP program were also conducted. This volume represented a substantial share of monthly gross issuance.25 Staff actively monitored indicators of market functioning available in the broader market and through our own operations for signs of any material deterioration.26 As necessary, we modified our operational schedules (while still meeting the policy directive we were given) to ensure smooth functioning, such as periods of ramping up or winding down purchase programs. The Fed also put in place active policies to help prevent market dysfunction as a result of its operations. Preventive measures included concentration limits on holdings of individual Treasury securities and prohibitions against purchasing some specific, highly-demanded securities.

The exercise considered minimum capital thresholds which had to be exceeded in each of its parts: the asset quality assessment and the baseline and adverse scenarios of stress tests. Banks not exceeding any of these thresholds had to submit within two weeks a capital plan for remedying their capital shortfall within a period of six to nine months. With the methodology used, 25 of the 130 banks assessed had a capital shortfall, which for the whole of Europe amounted to € billion. It should however be noted that, in anticipation of the exercise, many European credit institutions strengthened their solvency over the past year. Of the aforementioned 25 banks, 12 increased their capital sufficiently in 2014, so only 13 of them, with a capital shortfall of € billion, will have to take additional action to reinforce their solvency. We consider the results of the Spanish banks to be positive. Only one bank was below the threshold in one of the parts of the exercise, specifically in the asset quality review. In this case the estimated shortfall was very small and, during 2014, the bank took measures to strengthen its capital by an amount well in excess of that needed to cover its shortfall. Taking  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  into account these actions, at present all Spanish banks amply exceed the thresholds set in the exercise.
The problems are tackled by strengthening Eurostat and allowing it to make methodological visits in the member states, to discuss budget issues. A new high level group with a mandate to advise Eurostat will be established. As Eurostat monitors the member states’ compliance with the agreed practice, the high level group also, indirectly, advises the member states. My view is that all the reforms in this area of the Stability and Growth Pact go in the right direction since they encourage fiscal prudence. However, given the complicated process and the short time since the Pact was changed, it is too early to determine whether the changes have been a complete success. Changes in the preventive arm Changes in the preventive arm have been made in the area of medium term objectives (MTO) for the budget balance. Member states are divided into groups depending on their debt level. Stricter MTOs are required for countries with higher debt. The MTOs for the euro area and the ERM2 countries range from a deficit of 1% of GDP to balance or surplus depending on the debt level. The countries that have not achieved their MTOs are supposed to follow an adjustment path to the objectives. The path requires more consolidation in good times. For the euro area and ERM2 states, the adjustment requirement is a yearly improvement of the cyclically adjusted deficit net of one off effects by 0.5% of GDP.

This is a strengthening compared to the earlier agreement among the euro area countries, changing the requirement from targeting the cyclically adjusted deficit to targeting an improvement in the structural deficit. When deciding the adjustment path, public investment and structural reforms can be taken into account. If structural reforms are to be taken into account, they should have a large and proven positive effect on the economy and there should be a safety margin to the 3% deficit floor. My view is that there is a possibility to use the newly defined MTOs in a wise manner, more closely adapted to the situation of the individual country. However, the scope for interpretation is so large that there is a high risk of lax and uneven implementation. The experiences of the first year indicate that some member states have more ambitious MTOs than required by the Pact. This is often countries with their own national budgetary rules, such as Sweden, which comprise MTOs. At the same time,  2  BIS Review 88/2006  there are other member states who need to do more to achieve their MTOs. The measures are often postponed too far ahead and are not sufficiently explicit and concrete. Changes in the corrective arm The third part of the changes refers to what happens when a country has an excessive deficit. As before, exemptions can be granted if the country is suffering from a severe economic downturn that it could not foresee, so called exceptional circumstances.
With its long history and impressive membership, ACI has developed very much into an icon of professionalism in finance, contributing to "market development through education, market practices, technical advice and networking events for the financial practitioners of the world". The Association therefore has a very important role to play and faces in the coming years much greater challenge than before in promoting and upholding professional and ethical standards in finance. One interesting, perhaps even perplexing, aspect of the current financial turmoil is that emerging markets, particularly those in Asia, have only been lightly affected, so far. One reason is that financial innovation, in the form of credit risk transfer through securitisation by the "originate and distribute" model, has not caught on in Asia to the same extent as in the United States. Indeed, economies in different stages of financial sector development face different issues, notwithstanding the clear trend of globalisation in finance. Correspondingly, in promoting and upholding professionalism in finance, there may be a need for different emphases and approaches, having regard to the different development stages that individual regions and economies are undergoing. But it is also important that these different emphases and approaches should be developed within the framework of global standards. I therefore wholeheartedly support regional outreach initiatives of international standard setting bodies such as the ACI. Asia, of course, is region of rising importance in the global context, particularly in terms of finance.

Whether it is the volume of foreign exchange reserves or the growth of foreign exchange turnover or the amount of savings that needs to be mobilised for promoting economic growth and development, Asia is likely to occupy top position in the world, if it is not already there. The prospects of a strong relative shift of financial market liquidity into Asia are clear, so is the need for upgrading professionalism in finance, hopefully at a pace that is commensurate with its increasing importance in global finance. It is therefore absolutely right for the first regional office of ACI to be established in Asia and, if I may add, for it to be established in Hong Kong, as the truly international financial centre in the region. On the choice of Hong Kong, we are of course grateful and feel honoured, and I as Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and as Honorary President of the Treasury Markets Association offer the full support of the two organisations to the activities of ACI and ACI Asia. Thank you. BIS Review 90/2008  1
The declining trend in labor force participation also influences how fast the economy can produce new jobs in the long run. Our estimate of the trend in payroll employment growth over the past 15 years averages roughly 100,000 jobs per month. Looking ahead, we think that declines in the labor force participation rate and population growth will bring the trend in payroll employment growth down to fewer than 50,000 jobs per month by 2016. This new benchmark probably will only become apparent in the monthly data once the economy closes the current 3.8 million employment gap. But barring sizable changes in immigration policy, policymakers and the public will need to get accustomed to a slower base of employment growth by the latter part of the decade. Job openings and hiring This brings me to the issue of hiring and job openings. The job openings rate, as measured by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) data, started climbing immediately after the recession and made it back to its pre-recession high this summer. 6 Yet, despite some improvement, the JOLTS hiring rate remains disappointingly below where it stood before the recession began. 7 Why might firms advertise openings aggressively but be slower to fill them? Posting a vacancy is only part of the hiring process. Jason Faberman of the Chicago Fed, in collaboration with Steve Davis of the University of Chicago and John Haltiwanger of the  3  Aaronson et al. (2014).

These data are collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics as part of its monthly Current Population Survey. 2  Aaronson and Sullivan (2001). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  since then. 3 Among the many robustness analyses they performed, their models produce nearly the same trend for labor force participation as they have since 2001. 4 Depending on the details of the specification, Chicago Fed economists estimate that at the end of the second quarter of 2014, the labor force participation rate was between 1/2 and 1–1/4 percentage points below trend. Furthermore, the participation rate was as much as 3/4 of a percentage point below predictions based on its historical relationship with the unemployment rate. This disparity suggests that there likely is an extra margin of slack in labor markets beyond that indicated by the unemployment rate alone. It is interesting to dig further into these “labor force participation gaps.” Virtually all the gap during this cycle has been due to withdrawal from the labor market of workers without a college degree. By contrast, a participation gap never materialized for college graduates, even during the depths of the recession. There is no simple explanation for this striking contrast. It could be yet another symptom of long-running but difficult-to-model trends in the economy, such as job polarization and changes in social programs, which particularly impact the lower-skill work force. 5 Regardless, the divergent work behavior across education groups strikes me as an important fact and deserving of much further research attention.
While the country has experienced great prosperity during most of the period, our economic and financial progress has also been punctuated by episodes that have tested our resolve. Rising to address these challenges, the growth and economic transformation experienced in these fifty years have been achieved in an environment of macroeconomic and financial stability. During the five decades, Malaysia has experienced an average annual growth that has exceeded 6 per cent and annual inflation that has been less than 3 per cent. The continued increase in incomes and the low and stable inflation have not only promoted a high rate of savings that has exceeded 30 per cent of GDP but it has also resulted in the financialisation of savings. This has allowed Malaysia to rely on domestic sources of funding to finance our growth and development during this period, thereby minimising our levels of external indebtedness. Monetary stability Being a highly open economy, the sources of monetary instability have generally emanated from external price shocks, which have occurred during periods of high commodity and energy prices, and to a lesser extent, from periods of excess demand and overheating conditions. There essentially have only been two episodes in our history in which overheating conditions have generated inflationary pressures; the major period being prior to the Asian financial crisis. Since the 1990s, monetary policy has been further complicated by volatile capital flows.

It was a time when there was an absence of speculators. It was only in 1997-98 when the ringgit and other regional currencies came under speculative attack. The volume of foreign exchange transactions had become massive, far exceeding volume of trade and the normal financial flows. This resulted in exchange rate volatility during the Asian crisis that occurred wave after wave. Regional currencies continued to plummet during this period. After more than a year of this turmoil and uncertainty in the foreign exchange market, Malaysia implemented selective capital controls and de-internationalised the ringgit. This was instrumental in restoring stability in the market. It acted very much like a circuit breaker. Offshore trading of the ringgit, the major source for financing the speculative attacks, was effectively eliminated. Within a year, all the controls that were imposed were removed. More than 10 years later, the ringgit, however, still remains non-internationalised. An important precondition for the internationalisation is the development of a robust foreign exchange market in our financial system. Financial stability The events surrounding the current financial crisis has brought into sharp focus the role of central banks in financial stability. As these events continue to unfold with great uncertainty on the financial markets and broader economy, allow me to reflect on Bank Negara Malaysia's own role in financial stability. In addition to its functions as the lender of last resort, Bank Negara Malaysia has also had the responsibility for the regulation of banking institutions.
In the time of the preparation of the Treaty I worked with many German friends, for example the Bundesbank Presidents KarlOtto Pöhl, Helmut Schlesinger and Hans Tietmeyer. One of the most inspiring phases was the wording of the Treaty with Hans Tietmeyer, Horst Köhler and Jürgen Stark in particular. It was due to them that the Maastricht Treaty was well constructed and worked. Here you saw the will to unite Europe and the influence of this particular friendship between us. DIE ZEIT: You mentioned independence as the legacy of the Bundesbank. Do you have an absolute independence in mind? An independence that forbids even critique from the political side? Trichet: It is simpler than that: I refer to Article 108 of the Maastricht Treaty. It says the executive branches in particular should not try to influence our decisions. It is a very clear wording. So it's not the ECB who defines its independence, it is the Treaty, which was approved by the people of the member states, by the people of all our democracies. Everybody is welcome to criticise our policy - the media, the analysts, the academics. And we are, as an independent institution, as a last resort, accountable to the people of Europe. By the way it is not known that I go more often to the European Parliament than our friends from the American Federal Reserve go to the US Congress.

Mojmír Hampl: Should non-euro area countries welcome the banking union? Speech by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Europolis Conference “Auf dem Weg zu mehr Stabilität”, Technische Universität Berlin, Berlin, 5 April 2013. *  *  *  My remarks today focus on non-euro area countries’ attitude to the SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism), as it is the key part of what is called the banking union (BU) which is “almost” finalized. Let me start with a statement that the so-called BU is currently only an emerging concept. We are very far from the final version and it is difficult to guess what the final outcome might be. Nevertheless, what we get in the end will be critical for the position of non-euro area countries. So, what is it all about? The proposed BU is based on four/five pillars, or “legs”: a.  CRD IV – the Capital Requirements Directive, or single rules  b.  SSM, or the Single Supervisory Mechanism under the ECB  c.  Single resolution and recovery mechanisms a rules  d.  A single system of deposit guarantees  e.  Finally, a fiscal back-up through the ESM  Problems emerge immediately, because each pillar is at a different stage of negotiation and approval, involves different rules of approval and, more importantly, so far each applies to a different group of countries: a. The ESM already exists.