samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Only when they begin their debt payment, would they realize that out of a total loan of 10,000 baht, and a monthly installment of 600 baht every month, they would need up to eight years to repay the aggregate amount of debt! Ladies and Gentlemen, The Bank of Thailand has also sought for the expansion of our regulatory framework to oversee the personal loan business. The Ministry of Finance has issued a notification giving authority to the Bank of Thailand on July 2005 to set the ceiling on interest rates at 28% per annum. Every enterprise now needs to register for a license and bring its ceiling rate down to no more than 28% per annum. Likewise, the Bank of Thailand has urged these licensed operators to clearly and transparently disclose the computation of their interest rate calculation in order to prevent confusion among consumers. Currently, we are monitoring closely the situation of consumer loans. If any further problems arise, the Bank of Thailand will not hesitate to take appropriate action. Ladies and Gentlemen, The proliferation of credit card and personal loan businesses have provided greater opportunity for people to spend more on necessary items before they start to save. This way of life would do no harm if individuals exercised self-control on their spending and were able to evaluate their capability to meet the expense of each installment. However, the effect of this easier means of payment is more likely to stimulate people to buy at the wrong time.

This has proliferated in various types of institutions, including commercial banks - especially foreign-owned commercial banks, and existing credit card companies. In addition, new foreign-owned non-bank companies, registered as limited companies and not as financial institutions, can undertake the business of lending to individuals, without requiring approval from the Bank of Thailand, as they are not deposit-taking institutions. These companies have opened branches in many major provinces throughout the country. In many cases, these businesses rent a shop-house as an office to provide personal loans to low-income borrowers, for example, at around 4,000 baht per month. While Thai commercial banks charged interest on personal loans at the rate between 12 - 24% p.a., foreign banks charged between 12 to 46% per annum, and foreign-owned non-bank companies charged an even higher rate of 12-58% per annum. Charges by non-bank companies sometimes seem misleading as they split the monthly interest charge into two parts: one part called interest rate, and the remaining part called fee. But their fee calculations are done in the same way as interest rate charges. For example, one non-bank company charges an interest of 0.99% per month plus a service fee of 3.98% per month. Many borrowers, who do not fully understand this financial technique, misunderstand that they have to pay a one-time fee of 3.99% and an interest rate of 0.99% each month, which seems quite reasonable. In reality, however, such a company charges an effective rate of up to 58% per annum.
The share of private sector gross product, which SMEs are part of, is 33 percent, while the share of SMEs in GDP is 57 percent in Japan, 64.3 percent in Spain, 56 percent in France, 44 percent in Austria, 43 percent in Canada, 33 percent in Australia and more than 50 percent in the United States. The SME’s modest contribution to GDP in Saudi Arabia could be ascribed to the immensity of the oil and public sectors, being the main catalyst for economic activity. SMEs coverage in the national income accounts might be low. Dear audience, Small and medium enterprises are facing clear challenges to obtain the necessary funding to meet their expansion needs because of several reasons; one of which is the lack of guarantees for granting credit. To overcome this problem in the Kingdom, the Ministry of Finance, in cooperation with Saudi banks, has established “Kafalah Program” for financing small and medium enterprises. It is a program administered by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund with a capital of Rls 200 million to cover a proportion of the risk of the funding entity in case the guaranteed enterprise fails to repay the finance or part thereof, and to encourage banks to finance viable small and medium enterprises, which cannot provide the necessary guarantees or accounting records that prove their eligibility for funding. The program has been performing well since its inception in 2006 up to the end of 2010.

Moreover, small and medium enterprises serve as a wide arena for developing workers’ technical and management skills. They also assist large enterprises in the marketing process and providing crude materials and primary commodities throughout the phases of production. Most regional and international donor institutions and organizations have a growing tendency to provide financial resources and technical assistance to these small and medium enterprises to be self-dependent and play their necessary role in the economy. Dear audience, Some may wonder what small and medium enterprises are, how we can differentiate between them and do they have an international definition. In fact, there is much difference in  BIS Review 171/2010  1  their definition at the international level, and it is difficult to reach a uniform definition. If we depend on the capital criterion, for example, we will find that an enterprise with a capital of 10 million Euros is considered a small-sized enterprise in the European Union while it is regarded as a medium or probably large enterprise in some developing countries. Moreover, “small” and “medium” are two comparative words and have relative concepts that vary from one sector to another and from one country to another. However, the general practice in every country or region is to depend on a number of criteria, including manpower numbers, capital, volume of annual sales and total financial position at the end of the period.
Our post-crisis regulatory framework points towards a stronger banking sector, based on a more solid capital foundation that ultimately serves to protect deposits and taxpayers’ money. In this perspective, the Bank of Albania has reinforced banks’ capital position with higher requirements for core capital and is developing new demands for macro-prudential buffers, to build up the lossabsorbing capacity of banks in case of financial crisis. Moreover, the financial safety net already in place was further strengthened with a new mandate for the Bank of Albania as the resolution authority. A transposition of the BRRD, the new resolution law empowers the Bank of Albania with the necessary tools and instruments to resolve failing banks, with no eventual impact on financial stability. Nevertheless, going back to the important lessons of the crisis, these efforts would be insufficient unless undertaken in coordination with all the relevant institutions and players of the crisis management platform. Clearly, effective crisis management requires ongoing communication and coordination among: supervisors and resolution authorities, financial market authorities, deposit insurers and the government. The Financial Stability Advisory Group (FSAG) is assigned with the important role of assisting in safeguarding financial market stability in the Republic of Albania. The FSAG was established in 2006 and comprises the Ministry of Finance and Economy, the Bank of Albania, the Albanian Financial Supervisory Authority and the Albanian Deposit Insurance Agency.

When it comes to monetary policy, we must restore balance to the economy and bring inflation down to 2 percent on a sustained basis. Earlier this month, the FOMC raised the target range for the federal funds rate to 4-1/2 to 4-3/4 percent, the eighth consecutive increase. The FOMC said it anticipates "ongoing increases in the target range will be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time. In determining the extent of future increases in the target range, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments. "3 The Committee also said it will continue to reduce its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities, according to the framework it announced last May.4  3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  One aspect of inflation that's important for achieving and sustaining price stability is the anchoring of inflation expectations.
Our assessment is that the recovery in Sweden will be slower than most of the previous recoveries have been. One reason for this assumption is that studies indicate that recessions in the world economy caused by problems in the financial sector are followed by a weaker recovery than in other recessions. What caused the crisis? There have been many discussions on what caused the crisis and different analysts emphasise different factors. Those factors that most often feature in these discussions are macro economic imbalances, US housing policy, inadequate regulatory frameworks and supervision, and an overly expansionary monetary policy, particularly in the United States. Here I shall briefly discuss these factors. Macro economic imbalances At the macro economic level the US economy prior to the crisis was characterised by very low savings and a high level of household indebtedness. The US economy as a whole used more goods and services than was produced, which was reflected in a large deficit in its international trading. The opposite situation applied to a number of Asian countries, where saving was high and the net export figure was positive. One can say that there was a saving deficit in the United States and a saving surplus in some Asian and oil-producing countries. Large parts of the saving surplus in countries like China were invested in US debt securities and contributed to low long-term interest rates in the United States.

The argument was rather that the economy could suffer a deep recession in the long term if developments led to a bubble arising which then burst. 9  ECB (2009). 10  IMF (2009). 11  Borio and Lowe (2004). 6  BIS Review 162/2009  The economists Francesco Giavazzi and Frederic Mishkin expressed concern in their assessment of Swedish monetary policy between 1995 and 2005 that the Riksbank had given too much consideration to house prices. 12 However, monetary policy that entails flexible inflation targeting – like that conducted in Sweden – has the aim of stabilising inflation around the inflation target and also resource utilisation. This means that temporary deviations from the inflation target may be motivated if the inflation target is attained in the longer term. This was also the assessment made by the Riksbank. House prices in Sweden rose by 3 per cent between the second and third quarters of this year, after a slowdown in 2008 and the average price increase since 1996 has been around 8 per cent a year. The question is whether this is a sustainable long-term development. There may be risks with this, even if the upturn is not as large as in some other countries which have recently experienced downward adjustments. Developments in the housing market in Sweden also differ in that new construction has been considerably lower than in a number of other countries.
However, the decision-making system in the United States is constructed in a way that makes it difficult to take the necessary type of decision. Moreover, my impression is that the problems with the public finance deficit are underestimated in the United States to the extent that they believe growth will resolve much of the problems. On the other hand, they have now decided on certain budget-strengthening measures and the United States usually succeeds in managing difficult problems in the end. The sovereign debt problems in the euro area are actually smaller than the US problems. The deficit in public finances in the euro area is calculated by the IMF to correspond to around 4 per cent of GDP this year. All in all, there is thus less need of budget strengthening measures in the euro area than in the United States and the tightening effects need not be so great. But the deficit is unevenly distributed and some countries have very large deficits and/or national debts. The problem is that even in Europe it appears to be difficult to reach decisions on credible long-term programmes for consolidating public finances. Instead, many countries have been forced by the markets to decide on further budget strengthening during the summer to increase confidence. However, even if the sovereign debt problems in the United States and the euro area are essentially the same, the market turbulence may lead to the situation deteriorating.

Although uncertainty has increased, and economic activity abroad so far has been slightly weaker, the Swedish economy has developed largely in line with the outline we sketched in July. Moreover, the repo rate is still low. Swedish banks are stable The Riksbank has two main tasks. The first is to conduct monetary policy with the objective that inflation shall be low and stable. The second is to safeguard financial stability. The Riksbank therefore closely monitors developments in the financial markets. During the summer we have extended out monitoring as a result of the international turbulence. Swedish banks are still financially strong. They currently have good access to funding on all of the markets they normally use. The Riksbank’s stress tests also show that they have a good capacity to manage increased loan losses. But as the Swedish banks obtain funding largely through market borrowing in foreign currency, they are of course vulnerable to problems abroad. We currently have daily contacts with the banks and we have access to data on their funding. So far, there is nothing to indicate that it will be necessary for us to lend money to the banks. Next decision is on 6 September We are currently working hard on new analyses and forecasts for the monetary policy meeting on 6 September. I have today attempted to outline events during the summer and the issues I consider we will discuss at our next monetary policy meeting.
  In addition, I would expect to see increased RMB trading in the forex market, which in turn should lead to the development of more sophisticated instruments. The second change to offshore RMB markets we can confidently expect is the further development and strengthening of links with the onshore RMB market. As a critical piece of infrastructure that supports the internationalisation of RMB, the offshore RMB market cannot operate in isolation. Given continued liberalisation of cross-border RMB transactions by the Mainland authorities, we will see more and wider channels for the flow of RMB between the onshore and offshore RMB markets. This will be critical for the sustainable development of the offshore RMB market and, thus, the future role of Hong Kong. Role of Hong Kong And this brings me now to my third point, the development of Hong Kong as the offshore RMB business centre. Let me start by saying that Hong Kong’s role is not an accident or a result of chance. It stems from our city’s historical and indispensable role facilitating the opening up of the Mainland economy. Since China’s liberalisation and reform began three decades ago, Hong Kong has served as the global gateway for trade and investment with the Mainland. Even to this day, Hong Kong still intermediates some 30% of the Mainland’s external trade and accounts for some 60% of cross-border direct investments in both directions.

Moreover, the shape of the underwater part can be difficult to judge by looking at the section which is visible above the surface. This is in my view a useful metaphor, because as the crisis gradually unfolded, a chain of unexpected problems came to the surface and vulnerabilities that were previously underestimated became apparent. Let us consider first the tip of the iceberg, namely the liquidity crisis. Tensions in money markets erupted in August 2007 when the US mortgage market, which was at the epicentre of a complex network of financial derivative products held globally, started to un-ravel. Liquidity in interbank markets worldwide dried up as market participants became paralysed by uncertainty. The key problem was that counterparty risk – which had hitherto remained  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  limited – suddenly increased in great proportions because the distribution of risk exposures to US subprime mortgage markets was markedly opaque. This led some market segments to partially freeze and others to close completely. This is where the second layer of the iceberg comes onto the stage. The collapse of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008 triggered an exceptionally abrupt re-pricing of risks globally. It led to a very significant intensification of the financial crisis; to a temporary freeze in trade financing and a global trade decline; to a curtailment of credit and domestic demand; and, ultimately, to a severe decline in global demand and output.
Let me conclude by saying that Iceland has made great strides since the autumn of 2008. The next major task is to re-integrate Iceland financially into the global economy, but hopefully in a safer way this time. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9

In comparative terms, the NPL ratio of the Spanish banking industry in consolidated terms stands at similar levels to the European average, although it is still above those of some of the main European countries. 2 Challenges That said, as I indicated at the start, the banking sector needs to address important challenges, affecting not only Spanish banks but also the other euro area countries. 2.1 Profitability The first challenge I wish to mention is profitability; adequate profitability is essential to ensure banks’ viability for the medium and long term. Since the onset of the crisis, the banking sector’s profitability has been quite low, well short of the double-digit figures observed in earlier periods. Last year, Spanish deposit institutions overall saw their return on equity fall by 1.3 percentage points, from 5.6% in 2015 to 4.3% in 2016, although it remains slightly above that of the main European countries and the European average. As you are aware, there are several factors exerting downward pressure on banking sector profitability. The very low interest rate environment, in response to a euro area inflation rate that is below the ECB’s target rate, is one of the main factors behind the low levels of profitability in recent years. Against this low interest rate backdrop, both financial revenues and costs have fallen, although it is increasingly difficult to achieve further cuts in the cost of liabilities, now that levels close to zero have been reached, and this has a direct impact on the net interest income of Spanish banks.
If one were to type “life insurance” and do an image search over the internet, a very common picture is that of the umbrella; and it is easy to understand why – insurance as protection, a cover, or a shield. But the umbrella has to be a dependable one, when one needs it most. 4. Two critical factors underlie consumers’ confidence in the life insurance industry: i. First, insurers, together with financial advisers, must be regarded as trustworthy and reliable. Consumers must be able to depend on them to provide appropriate financial advice and life insurance products to meet their needs; and issues of fairness and transparency must underscore the relationship. ii. Second, given the long-term commitments, insurers must be financially resilient to be able to weather different economic, financial and industry cycles and have adequate financial resources to be able to honour claims. 5. Today, let me therefore take stock of two key policy thrusts that MAS has embarked on with many of you here – the FAIR initiatives and RBC2 – to enhance trust and resilience of the insurance industry respectively. Enhancing consumers’ trust in the life insurance industry: FAIR initiatives 6. I will start with the Financial Advisory Industry Review or FAIR. MAS first announced FAIR in 2012 with the formation of a review panel. FAIR aims to improve the quality of financial advice provided by the financial advisory industry by promoting fair dealing, and to raise the efficiency of the distribution of life insurance and investment products in Singapore. 7.

This is again to be expected as one of the main objectives of the RBC2 review is to improve risk sensitivity of the capital framework so as to more accurately reflect the different risk profiles of insurers. 25. MAS will continue to review and study the QIS results and take on board many of your feedback and suggestions. 26. As examples, we are going through comments from some industry participants relating to widening the eligibility criteria for the matching adjustment feature of RBC2, the possibility of giving some credit to the illiquid nature of some other liabilities that do not qualify for the matching adjustment, the calibration of risk charges for equities and long-dated corporate bonds, and the calibration of the operational risk charge, which has also been discussed with the industry. 27. Let me emphasize that we will implement RBC2 only after we have done a thorough calibration and assessment. We want the new capital framework to be more risk-sensitive and robust, but it should also be fit-for-purpose and not hamper well managed insurance businesses unduly. At individual firm level, the new framework does not seek to make it  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  better or worse for you compared to the current RBC, but only that how much capital that you will hold in future be more sensitive to your risk profile. 28. The MAS will embark on another stage of consultation and we are also targeting an additional QIS in Q2 2015.