samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The adverse effects of the reduction in output are meanwhile compounded by higher consumption, which tends to crowd out investment expenditure and exert adverse pressures on price levels and the external balance of payments. The desirable outcomes of policies intended to meet population ageing are, therefore, not hard to identify. Such policies must aim at producing an increase in productive capacity and output, and stimulating saving and investment, thereby alleviating pressures on inflation, fiscal resources and the external account. Indeed, these outcomes are desirable independently of population ageing, but are rendered even more urgent by the onset of the phenomenon. It is the way in which this strategy is to be implemented that is often subject to contention. Opinions tend to diverge because it is not always appreciated that any course of action chosen, including a passive stance, involves sacrifices. An increase in resources devoted to pensions must imply higher taxation, a reduction in funds allocated to other equally worthy causes, or burdens on society as a whole in terms of higher inflation and interest rates. On the other hand, reforms that should engender a win-win situation in the long run could perhaps impose sacrifices on a number of individuals in the short term. It is, therefore, important to promote an informed debate which takes account of the costs and benefits involved in any course of action, with a view to reaching agreement on viable solutions.

Inevitably, this aspect takes on greater importance. For one reason, supervisors expect banks to operate above minimum regulatory capital ratios included in the Basle Accord – and prudent assessments can help to inform by how much. For another, supervisors seek to intervene early enough to prevent capital from falling below prudent levels – and bank assessments can provide another useful tool in identifying key issues before they become major problems. With these thoughts in mind, supervisors are tackling the challenge of developing a more systematic approach to the review of capital adequacy. Supervisors also are discussing ways to enhance market-based discipline. Most agree there should be a greater role for private-sector monitoring of banks. Of course, there already exists a fair amount of market-based monitoring; however, the collection and use of these kinds of information usually are not systematic or complete. The first goal is to improve information available to the market. With enhanced risk disclosure, supervisors will be more able to rely on the opinion of market investors. These opinions are reflected quickly in the price of bank debt and share prices, and the ease with which banks can access capital. By relying more on these market signals, supervisors will be better able to identify and address waning capital levels at problem institutions. To the extent banks develop disciplined internal approaches to evaluating capital adequacy and capital plans, and enhance disclosures, supervisors will be able to place greater reliance on all three pillars and meet the challenges of a more complex financial marketplace.
The Central Bank has also systematically built up its foreign exchange reserves in order to strengthen the external liquidity position of the economy. 2  BIS Review 34/2004  As it happened, the Icelandic economy landed remarkably softly after the turbulent period of 1998 to 2001. I mentioned earlier that inflation was brought under the inflation target in late 2002. The external current account was more or less in balance in 2002 only two years after the deficit had measured 10% of GDP, credit growth came to a halt, and in stark contrast to what happened in other Nordic countries a decade earlier, the banks emerged from the period in a satisfactory position and have gained considerable strength since. No doubt there are many reasons for this relatively favourable outcome. One could mention the generally good external conditions during the adjustment period, a relatively sound fiscal policy, and the swift correction of the external imbalance, as well as the rapid turnaround in the exchange rate after it reached its trough and the decline in the rate of inflation to below the inflation target. In a follow-up to its report of 2001, the IMF recognized in mid 2003 the successful adjustment of the Icelandic economy, the significantly increased strength of the financial system and important changes in the regulatory framework. The principal objective of the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Iceland is price stability, as I mentioned earlier. Its other principal goal is financial stability.

In isolation, higher carbon prices could carry the risk of households facing higher prices, without being able to switch their consumption expenditures towards greener technologies. Strong public and private investment efforts are therefore needed to prevent consumers from being locked into carbon-intensive technologies. Public investments can serve a catalytic function in this context. Infrastructure investments, for example for charging electric vehicles, can trigger wide-ranging changes in the type of energy mix used in public and private transport. The coronavirus crisis offers a must-seize opportunity. The costs of letting the current crisis go to waste would be exceptionally large, for two main reasons. First, business dynamism in Europe has been comparatively weak for a long time (see figure 3). There are considerably lower shares of both growing and shrinking firms than in other advanced economies, holding back productivity growth as well as technology creation and diffusion. [6] Put simply, new firms are more likely to adopt new and greener technologies, and we are not seeing enough of them in Europe. Figure 3 New business creations (thousands)  Notes: Number of new businesses created outside of agriculture (FR, DE, IT, ES), and number of business applications outside of agriculture (US), 12-months rolling average. Data for France excludes sole proprietorships. US data has been transformed from weekly to monthly, data for Italy from quarterly to monthly and data for Spain from annual to monthly. Data for Spain available only until 2018. Sources: INSEE (FR), Destatis (DE), Banca d'Italia (IT), Census Bureau (US) and INE (ES).
Mr Duisenberg discusses the ongoing dialogue on monetary policy, the overall economic situation and other activities of the Eurosystem  Introductory statement by Dr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the Hearing before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, on 20 March 2000. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to continue today our ongoing dialogue on monetary policy, the overall economic situation and other activities of the Eurosystem. Since our previous hearing in November, the European economic outlook has brightened further, while, at the same time, the balance of risks to price stability has shifted upwards owing, in particular, to external factors. Against this background, the decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB to raise interest rates in early February and last week, as well as the reasoning behind these steps, are at the centre of my presentation today. Moreover, I should like to touch upon the overall European economic environment. Finally, I shall briefly turn to some other activities of the Eurosystem which might be of particular interest to you. 1. Current economic developments and prospects  As you are aware, the Governing Council of the ECB decided on 3 February and 16 March 2000 to increase the three main ECB interest rates. These two decisions followed the interest rate decision taken on 4 November 1999.

The Governing Board feels strongly, however, that there are significant advantages in aggregating the information from our different models and indicators in an internal process and subsequently publish a single SNB inflation forecast. Let me simply mention the most obvious one. In the SNB’s integrated approach, the Governing Board avoids the potential communication problem of conveying the impression that fixed weights are attached to the monetary and non-monetary analysis in the conduct of monetary policy. The biggest challenge the SNB Governing Board has so far faced with regard to the integration of both the monetary and nonmonetary views was in 2003. While monetary aggregates rose significantly, negative output gap  1  2  3  2  As extensively documented in Nelson (2006), "the competition between monetary and non-monetary views of inflation" was "resolved earlier and more decisively in favor of the monetary view" in Switzerland than in other countries, with the close observed relationship between money growth and inflation playing a determinant role in shaping monetary policy since 1973. The new regime was announced on October 1, 1978 and lasted until the end of 1979. It can be seen as an illustration of the fact that the SNB had traditionally employed money targets in a flexible way. Jordan and Savioz (2003)  BIS Review 107/2006  measures suggested a disinflationary risk. Similarly to what is described in the Fischer et al.
We can preempt such a rise in inflation by tightening monetary policy at a later time. 2  BIS Review 27/2003  Relaxed monetary policy Our interest rate cut of 50 basis points last March was the last possible downward interest rate adjustment. Our intention was to resolutely counter the appreciation of the Swiss franc vis-à-vis the euro in the current difficult economic environment. So far, it has been a successful step: the Swiss franc has depreciated markedly against the euro. Monetary conditions have again become considerably more relaxed. For the time being, we intend to continue to implement an expansionary monetary policy and to support the economic recovery in Switzerland. Swiss franc investments are to remain unattractive in the foreseeable future. Economic recovery is still uncertain. There is even recurring talk of a deflation risk in Switzerland. We consider this to be a minimal risk. In a few months, inflation may well be negative. An actual deflation spiral leading to a strong decline in the demand for goods and in output is, however, highly unlikely as long as the Swiss franc does not appreciate inordinately. We shall therefore continue to take decisive steps to combat a tightening of the monetary conditions brought about by any significant rise of the Swiss franc against the euro. You will certainly have taken note of the high growth rates of the money supply aggregates in the last few quarters. The money supply aggregates are currently growing at rates last seen at the end of the eighties.

Certainly I seriously underestimated the scale of the downside risks from a potential financial crisis, and that implied overrating the ability of monetary policy to offset this shock. I will return later to the question of how a more long-term perspective might sometimes alter the desirable approach to policy. Before that, I want to discuss some issues around the MPC’s inflation projections and how we assess uncertainty. The balance of demand and supply The MPC’s projections for inflation, absent external shocks, are determined to a significant extent by our judgements about inflation expectations and about the likely developments in the pressure of demand on supply (this phrase is a better description than the more usual “output gap” – however I will now use the latter as a convenient shorthand). During my stint  4  Large (2005). 5  Gieve (2009). 2  BIS Review 27/2010  on the MPC, the way in which we have chosen to assess the output gap, as reflected in the assumptions underlying our main macro-model, has changed on a number of occasions. Of course, one model has never been the sole guide to our projections – a number of other models are also drawn on as appropriate. And the final shape of the fan charts published in the Inflation Report is the product of the MPC’s judgement including on the insights from these models.
10. The ABF2 project has been a good example of co-operation between the public and private sectors. While this is an official initiative with seed money of $ billion provided by the EMEAP central banks, we relied on the private sector for product design, implementation and marketing. The nine fund managers and the global custodian for the nine funds were selected based on a very competitive process. After all, the private sector is much better at making these products marketoriented than central bankers. 11. The ABF initiative has also been successful in a wider sense in a number of ways. First, it has helped to promote product innovation. ABF2 Funds by themselves represent a new class of bond products, which has helped to raise the awareness of Asian bonds among investors. Some ABF2 Funds take the form of a bond Exchange-traded Fund (ETF), which is the first of its kind in Asia. They are a convenient and cost effective way for regional and international investors to gain exposure to Asian bonds. With their low costs and low entry thresholds, the funds also facilitate retail participation in bond markets. ABF2 has also led to similar products and derivatives coming into the market. We notice that some banks have come up with their own Asian bond funds, a welcome development, while an investment bank has issued a structured note using PAIF units as the underlying asset. 12. Second, ABF2 has led to improvements in financial market infrastructure.

Indeed, the question has been receiving increasing attention in the international financial community, and attempts are being made on both the academic front and among those with policy responsibility to model financial stability and integrate it with the more traditional macroeconomic analysis, in both the domestic and international dimensions. I await with keen interest the emergence of an authoritative analytical framework of general application. Meanwhile, I share the views of some that financial stability can be negatively defined as the lack of financial instability, given that it is easier to define what the latter is. In my opinion, when the financial system fails to function properly, in terms of mobilising savings to finance economic activities - the all-important process of financial intermediation that promotes economic growth and development - then there is financial instability. When, as a result of a shock to the financial system, money is suddenly not available even for the creditworthy fund raisers no matter how high a price they are prepared to pay, then financial stability is not achieved. Alternatively, when, because of a breakdown of confidence for one reason or another, those with surplus money are simply not willing to trust the financial system with it, by placing it with banks or investing in financial instruments, then financial stability is not achieved. 17.
One such platform is the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre (MIFC) initiative that comprises a community network of the country’s financial and market regulators, including Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia), Securities Commission Malaysia, Labuan Financial Services Authority and Bursa Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange); Government ministries and agencies together with industry participation from the banking, takaful, capital market institutions, human capital development institutions and professional services companies which are participating and working collaboratively in the field of Islamic finance. The creation of International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation (IILM) recently was the outcome of the High Level Taskforce on Liquidity Management that was formed by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). It is a  BIS Review 151/2010  1  collaborative effort to develop a liquidity framework that can provide widely acceptable liquidity solutions to Islamic financial institutions, to promote better liquidity management. IILM will be an issuer of Shariah compliant financial instruments that are highly liquid and tradable in the secondary financial market. This is an important infrastructure capacity building since it would expand the scope of business for Islamic finance globally and was achieved through collaborative effort. Another initiative is the creation of a Sukuk Investment Fund – foreign currency funds to be disbursed to selected Islamic Fund Management Companies (IFMCs) to invest primarily in foreign currency sukuk issued out of Malaysia.

I will conclude by extending my appreciation to the organizing committee for extending me the invitation to this dinner. I wish you a very pleasant and enjoyable evening, and look forward to further strengthening the mutually beneficial relationship between Bank Negara Malaysia and the Persatuan. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 151/2010
It also depends on the political environment within which a central bank operates, since markets are concerned about more than just the formal autonomy of the monetary authorities. They also pay attention to the degree of political acceptance of central bank decisions. If monetary affairs are subject to permanent political debate, this can become a hindrance to credibility. Recognising that monetary matters should be conducted in a relatively calm setting does not mean that the policies adopted by the central bank should escape all democratic controls. Nowadays this form of control is tighter than ever before. Indeed, most monetary regimes now require that the central bank report to the legislative authorities on the execution of its mandate. This is also the case in Switzerland, since article 7 of the National Bank Act requires that we present a report on the fulfilment of our tasks to the Federal Assembly each year. Despite these measures, National Bank affairs are often the focus of animated political debate. Paradoxically, these debates do not relate to monetary policy in the narrow sense of the word, but rather to other aspects of a more operational nature – such as the level of the monetary reserves or the distribution of the profits. BIS Review 34/2006  3  Allow me to give you an example.

This would mean that last year's results were good, but no more than that. To hope that the SNB could distribute considerably more than CHF 1 billion in profits over a sustained period is tantamount either to forcing it to take more risks in managing its reserves, or to cutting back the level of funds set aside as currency reserves. In other words, its position on the markets would be weakened. Given our current level of reserves, this would be unwise. Dear shareholders Dear guests The Swiss National Bank must retain the confidence of the population and the markets if it is to conduct its policies effectively. The Cosa initiative is playing with fire. It constitutes a permanent  4  BIS Review 34/2006  invitation to press never-ending financial demands. It places the SNB at the centre of a permanent political debate which threatens both its credibility and the effectiveness of its policies. That is why good sense dictates that it be rejected. The SNB needs the support of everyone in this tricky phase and, in particular, the support of its shareholders. I would like to thank you for your attendance today, and for your continual interest in our activities. BIS Review 34/2006  5
In this regard, the Committee has over the last six months been engaged in a significant research program to assess whether the size of a borrowing firm should be explicitly considered when banks calculate their capital requirements. BIS Review 27/2002  3  At this point, the Basel Committee is discussing whether and how to factor a firm’s size into the new framework. A lower capital charge for a portfolio consisting mainly of loans to many small companies makes economic sense because that portfolio is likely to be better diversified than one concentrated in loans to a handful of large companies. Assuming the discussions within the Basel Committee continue to proceed in this direction, it means that loans to small and medium-sized borrowers would have lower capital requirements than loans to larger companies that are otherwise rated the same. One point should be made about the treatment of loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. The Basel Committee wishes to ensure that our new framework reflects the sound risk management practices of banks. For example, many banks manage and evaluate their loans to smaller businesses in a way that is similar to the way they handle consumer loans. The design of the internal ratings-based framework will, therefore, allow a number of such loans to be treated like retail credits, as opposed to corporate loans. This principle also will apply to another important issue within our capital framework, namely the role of a loan’s remaining maturity.

2  BIS Review 27/2001  Modified capital requirements Let me begin by explaining what we are doing to ensure that the capital held against loans made to small and medium-sized companies is truly reflective of risk. The Committee has on two occasions over the past year asked banks to assess the impact of the revised Accord. The data gathered have enabled us to evaluate the level of capital that our proposals would generate and to consider several modifications. As you may know, our early findings suggested that the internal ratings-based approach as outlined in the Second Consultative Paper would have required banks to set aside too much capital. Contrary to the Committee’s clear intent, banks would not have received a capital incentive for adopting this more sophisticated approach to capital adequacy. As a result, we had to adjust the capital requirements to provide banks with the right incentives under the new framework. The Committee’s aim is to avoid unintended consequences stemming from the new proposals. That’s why we are taking additional time to make sure our proposals are right. To this end, we published in November a change in the IRB formulas for calculating bank capital requirements. This change – based on the Committee’s internal research as well as additional input by bank risk management experts – reduces the extent to which capital will vary with the internal ratings banks assign to their exposures.