Let me now turn specifically to financial regulation. To the extent that financial regulation contributes to procyclicality and excessive risk-taking, supervisors could design their regulation in a counter-cyclical fashion to reduce procyclical behaviour of financial institutions. Reflecting this thinking, discussion to date on the role of financial regulation to address procyclicality has focused on four areas. The first is to reduce procyclical tendencies of the Basel II capital regulation by aligning capital requirement more with a longer-term perspective of risk. On this, key measures under discussion include: (1) building capital buffers by capital conservation measures; (2) reducing procyclical effects of minimum capital requirement by adopting through-the-cycle risk parameters to achieve a less pro-cyclical capital ratio; (3) promoting forward-looking provision that can cover loan losses that are not yet incurred but expected, with supporting accounting rule and valuation; and (4) using additional capital charge for the large and more complex banks based on indicators of systemic relevance. The second area of focus is the use of macroprudential supervision. The aim is to use prudential measures, when needed, to restrain the build-up of risk either in the overall financial markets or in specific asset class. Examples here include use of loan-to-value ratio on real estate loans and margin requirements for derivatives and securities transactions. Also, a recent idea of using leverage ratio to help take account of the unknown risk beyond those identified by the risk-adjusted capital regulation also falls into this category.

It is only when confidence improves, typically following a major policy intervention, that the downturn both in the business and financial cycles begin to stabilize. With reference to the current crisis, there were at least two specific features of the financial structures in the advanced economies that amplified the procyclical tendencies in the three cycles I have just described, thereby making the situations worse than might have been. First, the duration of the upswing in the financial cycle was made longer by changes in the financial structures that resulted from financial innovation, misplaced incentives, and the way businesses had expanded by circumventing financial regulation which allowed risk to be underrecognized for a long period. A case in point is the originate-to-distribute model, the CDO derivatives, and the use of SIVs as a vehicle for taking risk out of banks’ balance sheets. Second, in this crisis the downturn of the cycles were particularly damaging partly because of the interactions or feedbacks within the financial system, as opposed to the interactions between the financial system and the real economy. These within-the-system interactions took the form of positive feedback loops in various market segments that were set in motion in the downturn as market participants responded to the emerging problems and distress. Such feedback loops included the SIV shutdown and its compounding effects on CDO losses, the asset fire sales driven by risk management response by banks, and heightened concern about counterparty risk that precipitated the hoarding of liquidity.