samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
28  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  28  (7) ln Where  ∝  =  ∗  ∗  1 0  person does belongs to ethnic group person belongs to white ethnic group  From Table 3, the mixed ethnic group does not have a statistically significant pay gap. All other ethnic groups do have a significant and negative pay gap, varying from -6% and -7% for Indians and Chinese through to -20% and -13%, respectively, for workers from a Bangladeshi and Pakistani ethnic background. In other words, once we account for compositional effects, a more consistent pattern of negative ethnicity pay gaps emerges, although the size of the gap varies significantly across different ethnic minority groups. Table 3: Conditional granular ethnicity pay gaps for specification (7)  Ethnicity  Mixed ethnic Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese Any other Asian background Black/African/Caribbean/Black British Other ethnic group Observations  Coefficient (compared to coefficient for White)  Pay gap, per cent  Number of observations for ethnic minority groups  0.0186  2%  3,022  -7%  10,480  -13%  3,521  -20%  1,235  -6%  1,797  -13%  3,893  -13%  10,222  -8%  4,623  -0.82 -0.0774*** (-10.29) -0.144*** (-13.19) -0.228*** (-12.98) -0.0617*** (-3.35) -0.139*** (-11.90) -0.135*** (-17.04) -0.0824*** (-7.34) 251,064  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: Coefficients are recalculated into percentages as per Palmquist (1980) due to log-linear specification.

38  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  38  Jarrell, S B and Stanley, T D (2004), 'Declining Bias and Gender Wage Discrimination? A Meta-Regression Analysis', Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 828-838. Lang, K (2007), Poverty and Discrimination, Princeton University Press. Lang, K and Lehmann, J-Y K (2012), 'Racial Discrimination in the Labor Market: Theory and Empirics', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 959-1006. Lang, K and Manove, M (2011), 'Education and Labor Market Discrimination', American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 1467-96. Lewis, G B and Soo Oh, S (2009), 'A Major Difference? : Fields of Study and Male-Female Pay Differences in Federal Employment', The American Review of Public Administration, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 107-124. Longhi, S and Brynin, M (2017), 'The ethnicity pay gap', Equality and Human Rights Commission, Research Report, No. 108. Manning, A and Swaffield, J (2005), 'The gender gap in early career wage growth', CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. McKinsey & Company (2016), 'The power of parity: Advancing women's equality in the United Kingdom', McKinsey Global Institute, September 2016. Neal, D A (2004), 'The Measured Black-White Wage Gap among Women is Too Small', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 112, No. S1, pp. S1-S28. Neal, D A and Johnson, W R (1996), 'The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage Differences', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 104, No. 5, pp. 869-895.
My answer to the first question is that we should continue to bring these activities and entities within regulation, for three reasons. First, and most obviously, the need to protect consumers/investors. Whether or not one thinks it is sensible to invest or trade in the highly speculative assets that make up most of the activity in the crypto world, investors should be able to do so in transparent, fair and robust marketplaces, with the protections that they would get in conventional finance. There will probably always be some who prefer – for a variety of reasons – to invest and trade in an unregulated, opaque world. But we should not push the majority who do not want those risks into that world because there is no regulated alternative. My second reason is the need to protect financial stability. While the crypto world, as was demonstrated during last year’s crypto winter and last week’s FTX implosion is not at present large enough or interconnected enough with mainstream finance to threaten the stability of the financial system, its links with mainstream finance have been developing rapidly. We should not wait until it is large and connected to develop the regulatory frameworks necessary to prevent a crypto shock that could have a much greater destabilising impact. The experience in other areas of digitalisation has demonstrated the difficulty of retrofitting regulation on new technologies and new business models after they have reached systemic scale.

But I do want to emphasise that this work, and any future decision to introduce a digitally native pound should not be seen in the context of the status quo but rather in the context how current trends in money, payments and technology might evolve. And above all, in this, as in the work on regulation that I discussed earlier, our aim is to ensure that innovation can take place but within a framework in which risks are properly managed and which safeguards the sustainability of such innovation. The events of last week provide a compelling demonstration of why that matters. Thank you. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England, the Monetary Policy Committee or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Amy Lee, Teresa Cascino, Emma Butterworth, Katie Fortune, Bernat Gual-Ricart, Jenny Khosla, Grellan McGrath, Marilyne Tolle, Andrew Walters, Daniel Wright and Cormac Sullivan for their help in preparing the text. 1. ‘CPSS-IOSCO Review of Standards for Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems. (2010)’ 2. The intuition here is generally quite familiar to people - you probably would think twice before buying fire insurance from a company being run out of the house next door for example. 3. Information for FTX customers | FCA 4. For an argument of this position see for example ‘Let Crypto Burn: Just say no to legitimacy-inferring regulation’ – FT Alphaville  (17.11.2022)  5.
The Fed discloses descriptive information about the models, including the general statistical approach and key variables, but does not release the code or detailed equation estimates. Industry groups and individual banks have called for the Fed to release more detail about its models, including the specific formulas and equations.5 On one level, full disclosure of the Fed’s supervisory stress test models might seem like good public policy. Such disclosures would provide insight into how the stress test calculations are made, making the results predictable to the banks subject to the tests. Greater predictability of the stress test results could enhance banks’ ability to do capital planning, because any constraints arising from the supervisory stress test results would be known ex ante. Detailed 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  disclosures could also enhance the credibility of the stress test regime by allowing external parties to critique the Fed’s models, a form of “peer review” that could lead to improved modeling techniques or identify areas of emerging risk that the Fed’s models do not adequately capture. But these benefits could come at significant cost to the broader goals of the supervisory stress testing regime. My co-author, Til Schuermann, has argued that increased reliance on supervisory models, especially in the context of the CCAR program, provides powerful incentives for banks to abandon innovation in stress test modeling and instead devote their energy to mimicking the Fed’s models.

In my view—and I really cannot say this strongly enough—ensuring that the largest and most systemically important banks do robust capital and liquidity planning, have strong internal controls, do good risk identification and have very healthy amounts of capital (especially common equity) and liquidity resources is fundamental to fostering a stable banking system that can perform its critical financial intermediation role in both calm and stressed economic environments. What I hoped to do today is simply to point out that one of the key objectives of the original SCAP stress program—leaning into the wind during a severe economic downturn— might be getting less emphasis as the time since the financial crisis grows, the economic expansion continues, and the supervisory stress testing regime evolves. Thanks for your attention this morning. I hope that you enjoy the rest of the conference. 1  See, for example, Viral Acharya, Irvind Gujral, Nirupama Kulkarni and Hyun Song Shin. 2012. “Dividends and Bank Capital in the Financial Crisis of 2007 2009.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 8801. February 2012; Beverly Hirtle. “Bank Holding Company Dividends and Repurchases during the Financial Crisis.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 666. March 2014; and David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein. 2008. “This Bailout Doesn’t Pay Dividends.” New York Times. October 21, A29. 2 Beverly Hirtle, Til Schuermann and Kevin Stiroh. Macroprudential Supervision of Financial Institutions: Lessons  from the SCAP, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report no. 409. November 2009. 3 Randal K. Quarles.
The British economy is facing strong pressure of demand on supply capacity, on the one hand, and low inflation, below the 2% target, on the other. Whether that combination can or will continue is, as I argued earlier, not easy to know. Since our August Inflation Report, the rise in oil prices, now at their highest level in real terms for twenty years, has moderated somewhat the outlook for the world economy. And there have been two developments at home, with conflicting implications for inflation. First, there are some signs that the economy is experiencing a softer patch after rapid growth in the first half of the year, even if the official production data are not entirely easy to square with business surveys. Second, sterling has fallen significantly, by some 4% on its effective rate against all other currencies, from its previous high level, and there is continuing rapid expansion of total money spending, broad money and credit. Looking ahead the MPC will have to balance the impact on inflation of this evidence of weaker activity against the fall in sterling and other signs of cost pressures. The implications for interest rates will depend on developments in the economy which the MPC will monitor carefully both in the official figures and through our regular visits to this and other parts of the United Kingdom. So, if you are interested in the future path of interest rates, don’t read my lips, read the economic data!

Indeed if you were to plot inflation against unemployment on a chart - described by economists as the Phillips’ curve - you would see not a downward-sloping line of the conventional wisdom but a completely flat line. Over the nice decade, the unemployment rate fell from nearly 9% to below 3% on the claimant count measure. Yet over the same period, inflation was broadly constant and never deviated from its target rate by more than 1 percentage point. Not only was there no longrun trade-off between inflation and unemployment, there was no short-run tradeoff either. As a result, both inflation and unemployment were lower than the Monetary Policy Committee had expected. And the inflation figures released this morning, with CPI inflation at only 1.1%, show that inflation has remained low - below the 2% target - despite a tight labour market. The position was very different in the 1980s. Unemployment then fell by a similar amount, from around 11% in 1985 to just over 5% in 1990. But inflation rose from 5 to 9.5%. How should we interpret this reduced sensitivity of inflation to changes in unemployment? Does it mean that the economy can grow faster than before without leading to a pickup of inflation? Or is there a risk that the apparent insensitivity of inflation to movements in the economy is only temporary, and might lead to mistakes in monetary policy if low inflation were taken for granted?
But I disagree with those who want to go much further, for reasons which are at the heart of what we are doing. First, because to argue for much higher capital on top of what has been done since the crisis is to argue that what is being done on resolution and loss absorbency is of little use. This misses the point that resolution is about being able to stabilise and then where necessary close or restructure failing banks. In other words, resolution is a much more extensive approach, and in my view very necessary. The design of international policy measures to end too big to fail is now largely complete for banks, but substantial work remains to put these into effect in terms of resolution plans. Second, understanding how banks take and manage risk, the controls they have and the quality of risk management, is at the heart of the job of a prudential supervisor. That’s what we do every day, and the standards of this work have been raised extensively since the crisis, which was very necessary. Now, it is possible I suppose to argue that a focus on oversight of risk management should be pursued alongside a sole focus on a non-risk based capital measure like the leverage ratio. But in my view that is a flawed argument because the prevailing capital regime has a strong influence on how firms take and manage risk, in other words it creates the incentives.

This will require the approach to be comprehensive, meeting the highest standards and in close collaboration with the industry so that the learning solutions will continue to remain relevant. The breadth of talent development solution Human capital development needs to be comprehensive and holistic in meeting the requirements for all levels. The horizon of talent development solutions has to be widened towards attracting, developing and retaining talents with required skills and expertise for the industry. It must also meet the specific requirements of the workforce career progression, from the pre-employment stage, during employment and up to the leadership positions. Talent development solutions must also be for beyond the circle of the financial services community, to include other business communities, such as legal fraternity, Government officials and IT solution providers. The advancement of the industry is also dependent on these parts of the private and public sector. Their training needs must also be met through structured training programmes to facilitate their understanding of the specificities of Islamic finance and its value propositions. Raising standards of training and education programmes The education and training programmes in Islamic finance also needs to achieve the highest quality, be credible and globally recognised. The qualifications developed need to fulfill the expectations of the industry. To ensure the standards, the required infrastructure for standard setting and accreditation for Islamic finance training and education has now been put in place.
Broken lines refer to the Riksbank’s forecasts  Sources: The IM F, Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Lower employment Thousands, seasonally-adjusted data, 3-month moving average  80  24 New vacant jobs Unfilled vacant jobs  70  21  Redundancy notices (right scale)  60  18  50  15  40  12  30  9  20  6  10  3  0  0 80  85  90  95  00  05  10  Note. Redundancies include outcomes for October  Source: Swedish Public Employment Service  BIS Review 138/2008  17  Lower inflation CPI, annual percentage change 5  5 M PR 2008:3 M PU September 2008  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Note. Broken lines refer to Riksbank’s forecasts  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Lower repo rate Per cent, quarterly average  6  6 MPR 2008:3 MPU September 2008  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  Note.

Today we are once again in a situation where such bank support authorities are being established in many parts of the world, including Sweden. We are also facing a period of poorer economic activity. But this time the situation is very different for Sweden. Experience and measures have given resilience The anxiety that has had a stranglehold on the financial markets since the end of September comes from outside this time, not from problems in the Swedish bank sector. Swedish banks have on the whole shown much more responsible credit granting, both compared with the years following credit deregulation and compared with parts of the US mortgage market. The banks have good capital buffers and can manage substantial loan losses, even if they are nevertheless affected by the general mood of distrust on the market. We are also much better equipped in many ways to meet an economic downturn than we were at the beginning of the 1990s. I am thinking here of the effects of the changeover in monetary and fiscal policy after the crisis, and the fact that we now have sound public finances and a substantial surplus on the current account. Although a small, open economy like Sweden’s is never immune to what is happening in the world economy, and particularly to an international financial crisis, we learnt a lot from the difficult years in the 1990s. This applies to the banks as well as to the supervisory authorities and the political system.
Kerstin Hessius: The new economy seen from a central bank perspective  Speech by Ms Kerstin Hessius, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a seminar on the IT revolution and the new economy, organised by Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Institutionell Förvaltning, at Moderna Museet Stockholm, on 12 October 2000. *  *  *  I would like to begin by thanking the organisers for choosing such a stimulating and appropriate environment for this seminar as Moderna Museet. If there is one place where you can see the effect of structural change, it is in art. A country’s economy is constantly subjected to changes, which lead to new structures. However, this is nothing new. Every time an economy has undergone significant structural changes, it has been regarded as a new economy. In many ways today’s “new economy” can be seen as one of many such major structural changes. Nor is there any accepted definition of the “new economy” concept; what I am referring to is primarily an increase in the growth potential of the economy. “Multiplied intellectual capacity” The new information technology and the internet have revolutionised the methods in which we work, shop and communicate today. As someone once said, it is as though IT multiplies intellectual capacity in the same way that the industrial revolution multiplied physical capacity. In addition, the costs of using the new intellectual capacity have fallen drastically over a short period of time, which facilitates a rapid dissemination.

In itself, a difference in the weight of a small state and a large state may make sense; but if certain EU member states have a much bigger informal impact than others on the positions that the EU takes in international political or economic forums, the big-impact states may be tempted to “nationalise” the voice of the EU. Many attempts at nationalisation of EU positions are due to what might be called the “French complex”: Some leaders of bigger countries still have not fully absorbed the fact that their country is no longer the superpower it used to be and no longer leads the world, so they often try to abuse their EU-wide voice to support their national interests, positions and agenda. When they call for Europe to speak with “one voice”, they often seem to expect that the single voice of 500 million EU citizens will be the voice of their national leaders, articulating their national tastes and priorities. Of course, the agent, the European Commission as an executive arm of the EU, also sometimes has this temptation to define or steal the voice of the EU. Needless to say, the risk that proper integration will be derailed is particularly high when the two effects mentioned above are combined – when the EU administration ceases to behave as an agent of the less powerful principals but remains under the spell of a few very strong principals.
Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag's Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 26 February 2008. *  *  *  I would like to begin in roughly the same way as I did when I was last here – by saying a few words about the objective and basic purpose of monetary policy. It is in the light of this that we make our interest rate decisions. And our actions should be assessed against this background. Our most recent economic assessment and the material for assessing monetary policy are also what we are here to discuss today. We must always bear in mind that the basis for monetary policy is the price stability objective which the Swedish people, through the Riksdag, have delegated to the Riksbank. And this is actually not merely an objective, it is also a means. By keeping inflation low and stable, monetary policy shall help to create the best possible conditions for good and sustainable economic development. To do this in the best possible manner we must constantly learn from what is happening and try to become better at what we do. Part of this process involves, of course, examining, assessing and discussing monetary policy in a constructive manner. Here the Riksdag Committee on Finance plays an important role, both in examining and in developing the examination process. The Committee has recently taken several good initiatives.

Although GDP growth will slacken and employment will increase more slowly this year, resource utilisation will nevertheless be higher than normal. On the other side there was an increased risk of weaker growth in the world economy. There is considerable uncertainty over which direction developments in the US economy will take and how this will affect the rest of the world. And the financial markets have continued to be marked by unease and turmoil. BIS Review 22/2008  1  When all of these factors were weighed together, the majority of us reached largely the same view regarding the repo rate as expressed in our December forecast, that is, that the interest rate needed to be raised in order for us to attain the inflation target. However, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding economic indicators and inflation prospects. It therefore appears particularly important to point out that the interest rate path is a forecast. It is not a promise! And the interest rate decisions that are made in the future will of course depend on how new information affects the prospects for inflation and economic activity in Sweden. Communication in connection with the interest rate decision It can hardly have escaped the notice of anyone here that the Riksbank received a good deal of criticism in connection with this interest rate increase. What has been criticised is, perhaps, not so much the increase as such, more that the interest rate decision took many by surprise.