samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In other words, we should pay close attention to the economic data in coming quarters and in particular we need to assess the extent to which the recent deceleration in growth and the current drop in inflation are temporary phenomenon or more structural in nature: Regarding growth, the current slowdown in the euro area is partly driven by temporary factors, such as disruptions causing contraction in the German manufacturing output, and the impact of the yellow vest movement in France. If these drags fade away, and if geopolitical risks recede, GDP growth could rebound from next spring or summer. Indeed, consumption remains solid and continues to be supported by rising wage growth especially in the core countries. But should a downturn last beyond that horizon – a less plausible scenario but one which cannot be excluded – we would be ready to adapt our monetary policy guidance. 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Regarding inflation, the fall in oil prices will have a significant downward impact in 2019. After peaking at 2.2% in October 2018, euro area headline inflation currently stands at 1.4% and will fall to around 1% in some months of this year. Beyond these temporary fluctuations, the key trend to watch is core inflation. The improvement in the labour market has already led to a substantial acceleration in wage inflation. However, it has not yet been passed through to core price inflation.

The means: independence We are all aware of the strong academic and empirical evidence in favour of independence of Central banks since the Great inflation of the 1970s.4 Nevertheless, independence is still contested in our democracies. On both sides of the Atlantic, the governments that are currently most critical of independence are the very same that most demonstrate its necessity: their unsustainable fiscal policies, without the anchor of a credible central bank, would pose a threat to price stability. Independence is not for the protection of central bankers; it is for the protection of the citizens, and their collective confidence in the currency. But independence only has real value if there is a clear mandate – price stability – and accordingly a robust performance-based accountability to the country’s citizens and their representatives: every year the President of the ECB testifies four times a year at the European Parliament and gives eight lengthy press conferences (compared with four press conferences for the Fed up to 2018). At the same time, the ECB must increasingly take heed of economic and social players. Independence is not only secured in legislation, but also by the people [its grandes homens] that have embodied it for the past 20 years: Wim Duisenberg, Jean-Claude Trichet, and today, Mario Draghi.
However, with the credit reference bureau now operational, to which I believe most of these institutions subscribe and access credit information on their borrowers, it is expected that the levels of delinquencies that the sector used to suffer through the non-repayment of loans by customers would decline. I therefore, implore all microfinance institutions to comply with the Bank of Zambia Directive of December 2008 regarding the use of the credit reference system and submission of credit data. I must emphasise that regulatory action will be taken against defaulting institutions. As I conclude, allow me to further urge microfinance and other financial institutions to continue revising their interest rates and charges in tandem with the movements in key macroeconomic indicators such as inflation. I am conscious to the fact that all microfinance institutions are in business and are therefore expected to make profits. However, making super profits at the expense of the poor and vulnerable is regressive to economic development. There is a need to make financial services more affordable to the majority of our people as well as small enterprises in order to expand their operations, employ more people, and thereby provide an impetus to significantly reduce poverty levels in the country. Let me, once again, extend my gratitude to MicroFinance Transparency and the Association of Microfinance Institutions of Zambia for inviting me to officiate at this launch of the Transparent Pricing Initiative in Zambia. It is now my honour and privilege to declare the workshop on Transparent Pricing officially opened.

The role that microfinance institutions play in financial inclusion is therefore very crucial. Over the years, the microfinance institutions in Zambia have played a significant part in the provision of financial services, particularly for low-income households. Although access to finance remains low, microfinance institutions have had a somewhat positive impact on the economic activity of low income households, in both urban and rural areas. I am hopeful that the microfinance sector will continue to bridge the financing gap especially to the unserved population. However, the Bank of Zambia continues to receive a number of customer complaints on the high cost of micro loans in the country. It has been observed that the interest rates charged by some institutions exceeded 300% per annum in some cases. Furthermore, in most instances the effective rate of interest and other charges are not disclosed to the customers resulting in them paying much more that what was initially publicised to them. This has raised ethical questions regarding transparency and the role of microfinance institutions in poverty alleviation and economic development in Zambia. In addition, although, the interest rates of microfinance loans may vary significantly relative to the duration and size of the loan, it is incumbent upon all microfinance institutions to provide clear information on the cost of the loans and options available. It is also important for institutions to sensitise customers on what products may best suit their incomes and to educate them to borrow prudently.
Secondly, Turkey had lived through the first stage of dollarization in which the foreign currency is used mainly as a store of value and partly as a unit of account, but not as a medium of exchange. In this context, the dollarization in Turkey can be called as financial dollarization. Distinguished Participants, After the 2001 crisis, the implementation of tight monetary and fiscal policies together with the structural reforms has enabled the country to bring the inflation down to single digit numbers and to reduce the ratio of public debt to GNP significantly. Also, financial markets have become deeper and less fragile. In this context, the banking sector reform that aimed to strengthen the regulation and supervision of the banking sector, restructure the public banks, improve the asset and loan quality and the capital adequacy ratio of the system has been of great importance. Additionally, the progress made towards economic stability, particularly the significant decrease in inflation, enabled us to drop six zeros from the Turkish currency. This currency reform has increased the credibility of the Turkish currency both in internal and external markets. The issuance of the New Turkish Lira debt instruments by foreign banks in the international markets is an important indicator of this increasing credibility. Consequently, the desire and the need to invest in foreign currency in order to hedge the value of wealth decreased significantly and investors have started to increase the share of Turkish currency assets in their portfolios.

This will equip supervisors to deal with the future evolution of Basel II in a constructive and coordinated way. I also foresee greater transparency surrounding the risks faced by banks, and in how banks are measuring and controlling them. In the future, I expect banking supervisors to place greater emphasis on the techniques of securities regulators by requiring more information to be disclosed to the markets and the public. We will likely place even greater reliance on market processes and corporate governance to ensure that banks are soundly managed and well capitalised. Sound precepts of risk management and prudential supervision While there will inevitably be ongoing challenges to the vision of capital adequacy embodied in the new framework, particularly to its more technical aspects, I have no doubt that the sound precepts of risk management and prudential supervision that underpin the new framework will be an enduring feature of future versions regulatory capital requirements for banks. Alas, the requirements and modeling of certain types of risks may get excruciatingly complex. Indeed, for some of us, they have already reached that point. But in selecting and imposing such requirements, supervisors will be practical, and will look to the best risk management practices of banks and other financial institutions as the basis for setting risk sensitive capital requirements. And as supervisors become confident that the risk management processes of an institution are appropriate to match its risk appetite and operations, minimum capital requirements will edge downward.
Multiple supervisory agencies examine BSA/AML compliance, oftentimes at a single firm, which can result in mixed messages, delays, and overlapping and redundant work for you and for us. This is an area that warrants additional attention. Third, there are several other areas where the industry and supervisory community should consider working together, including issues like conflicting laws/regulations associated with an international footprint; subjectivity in some of the AML guidance that drives differences in approach by firms and by supervisors; and, the potential negative impact of AML compliance on the ongoing provision of vital banking services. And, finally, I still wonder whether communication has reached far enough into organizations to ensure that decisions made at both the top of the house and at the ground level don’t expose firms to ongoing AML/BSA risks. Weak BSA/AML compliance programs are often attributable to the failure by the boards of directors and senior management to actively and meaningfully promote AML compliance as a priority and take responsibility for it. AML needs to be managed on an enterprise-wide basis, while also addressing the unique aspects of every business line. 4. Culture  This last point brings me to my final thought – on culture.

For example, the MPC’s monetary loosening added around £ per year to the average household’s net interest income, £ to their labour income and £ to their net wealth. The lower part of Figure 1 looks at the effects of non-financial channels on well-being, namely the reduction in the probability of unemployment, translated into income-equivalent units. 44  The increased probability of  being in a job adds in excess of £ each year for the average household. All in, this gives a boost to welfare for the average UK household of close to £ This is large relative to annual household income of £  As a memo item, and point of comparison, Figure 1 also shows an estimate of the annual cost of undertaking monetary policy, using data from the Bank of England’s accounts. 45  On a broad estimate, this annual cost  amounts to around £ per household per year. This “servicing charge” for monetary policy is clearly a very small fraction of the annual benefit to households from looser monetary policy over the period. The disaggregated analysis set out means that, in principle, a monetary policy scorecard like this could be fitted to any individual’s circumstances. As an illustration, Figures 2-4 show scorecards for three different hypothetical households: a renter under the age of 30; a 30-50 year old mortgagor; and a 50-plus home-owning household.
The MAS may accumulate or sell foreign assets, principally through its intervention operations in the foreign exchange market, to manage the float of the Singapore Dollar. Given Singapore’s positive net savings and persistent capital inflows, the nominal exchange rate often tends to appreciate more than what is required to keep inflation low and stable. The MAS accumulates foreign assets on average in the process of managing the Singapore Dollar within its policy band even as it sells foreign assets during times of stress on the Singapore Dollar. As the central bank, the MAS is the most conservative of the three investment entities, with the OFR invested mainly in safe and liquid assets. The OFR is sized to take into account its role as a buffer against a large and sudden outflow of capital that would undermine confidence in the exchange rate and Singapore’s macroeconomic stability. Traditional measures of reserve adequacy such as the number of months of imports the OFR could finance if all other sources of foreign financing dried up are less relevant for Singapore. A sizable and liquid OFR sends a clear signal that MAS has the wherewithal to resolutely defend the Singapore Dollar against speculative attacks. The GIC is a professional fund management company that manages the government’s foreign assets. These assets are separate from the OFR. The history of GIC begins with the MAS. Through the 1970s, Singapore ran persistent fiscal surpluses, received sizeable capital inflows, and had an elevated private savings rate.

Three types of stress tests are conducted: Historical: Shocks are applied to the portfolio using asset price movements seen in historical stressed episodes, such as the Global Financial Crisis, 2000 dot-com bust, 1994 bond market selloff, etc. Vulnerability-based: The portfolio is subject to hypothetical scenarios which stress in turn each of the portfolio’s risk factors such as equity, interest rate, credit, inflation, and foreign exchange. Thematic: These are forward-looking stress tests and are designed by taking into account prevailing market conditions and potential risk events on the horizon. 4/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Depending on the stress test results, MAS will consider appropriate responses and portfolio adjustments when needed. The risk management framework is reviewed on a regular basis to ensure it remains fit-forpurpose. Balanced asset allocation Subject to the liquidity and risk tolerance thresholds, MAS seeks to achieve good long-term returns on the OFR through a balanced asset allocation. MAS invests the OFR in a well-diversified portfolio, probably more diversified than is the case for most central banks. The portfolio is geographically diversified across advanced and emerging market economies, with investment-grade bonds in advanced economies making up the largest share. The portfolio is diversified across asset classes – in cash, bonds and equities. The portfolio has a diversified currency mix, with about three-quarters of the OFR denominated in US Dollars, Euros, Japanese Yen and Pound Sterling, with the US Dollar forming the bulk. Each asset class in the portfolio serves a function.
This is so because of the low industrialisation characteristic of the continent, whose economy is still trapped in the shackles of economic stagnation. Sadly the  BIS Review 74/2004  3  rate, at which industrialised nations are emitting especially greenhouse gases, implies that Africa will also soon begin to experience effects of global warming. The effects of global warming, which include floods, hurricanes and general weather changes that can also affect agriculture production, with prospects to damage material wealth and property will negate the little gains that African economies have attained thus far. To complicate the situation further, majority of African economies do not have buffer resources to enable them rebuild infrastructure that may be damaged from the effects of global warming. Consequently, in respect to effects of global warming, the tendency in most of Africa will be increased poverty, exacerbation in poor sanitation and outbreaks of epidemic. Ignoring environmental sustainability, even if doing so leads to short-run economic gains, can hurt poor people and undermine long-run poverty reduction (UNDP, 2003). The two areas, economic growth and the environment are interrelated. Therefore developments in one coexist with developments in the other. The exclusion of accounting for the value of nature in economic indicators such as the Gross National Product (GNP) and the Human Development Index (HDI), gives a subordinate role of nature in promoting growth; in addition to this, property rights to natural capital are frequently difficult to establish (Dasgupta, 2002).

Despite this, we expect manufacturing output to continue to expand because of improving domestic demand and foreign demand for U.S. manufactured exports. Yet, if this recovery follows the typical pattern for past recoveries, the prospect for growth in factory jobs will likely be weaker here than the rest of the nation. Longer term, the sector’s prospects are likely to be governed by a continuation of the trends I mentioned before in international trade, technology and consumption patterns. This means that output and wages will likely continue to rise, both nationally and regionally. However, the sector is unlikely to be a major source of job growth. Beyond the national trends that work against an expansion of factory jobs, the New York-New Jersey region faces ongoing competitive pressures as a location for manufacturing production. That competition comes from other regions of the country, as well as from abroad. One key to meeting these competitive challenges will be for the region to ensure that it develops and attracts a highly skilled workforce that can meet the needs of innovative and rapidly changing firms. IV. The Empire State Manufacturing Survey  In order to monitor conditions in the region, the New York Fed conducts a monthly survey of manufacturing firms in New York State, our Empire State Manufacturing Survey. Let me tell you a little about the survey and then review recent patterns. The survey is sent to a pool of about 200 manufacturing executives in a wide variety of industries across the state. About 100 responses are usually received.
The IMF has a key role to play in this implementation process, through their assessments of compliance with standards and transparency about these assessments. But even with preventative measures in place, liquidity crises will still occur from time to time. Creditors may sometimes choose to flee simply for fear of other creditors doing so before them. A country can face a liquidity “run” in much the same way as a bank. And these types of coordination failure are difficult to resolve with standard macroeconomic policy tools, like monetary policy. So what policy alternatives are available? One means of resolving this rush for the exits is for the IMF to provide emergency liquidity support in potentially unlimited amounts - a classic international lender of last resort. But virtually no-one envisages the IMF (or anyone else) playing such a role. As a practical matter, the IMF simply lacks the resources. Its usable resources are currently less than $ billion. The external debt of the developing countries is well over $ trillion. So the IMF’s ability to fill financing gaps is already heavily circumscribed and will become more so over time. Even with the resources, it is very doubtful whether unlimited IMF lending would be desirable. More likely, it would simply stoke-up moral hazard problems for the future, potentially increasing the incidence of crisis and the corresponding cost for taxpayers. So an international lender of last resort appears both impractical and undesirable.

As from the date on which the ECB’s decision on the establishment of close cooperation became applicable, the management of the Bank Resolution Fund (BRF) was taken over by the BNB. The funds in the BRF were respectively allocated into a sub-fund for funding the resolution tools and powers in relation to branches of third-country credit institutions and a sub-fund for raising the contributions from the credit institutions located in Bulgaria. The two sub-funds are managed separately. In compliance with the Intergovernmental Agreement on the transfer and mutualisation of contributions to the Single Resolution Fund, ratified by the Republic of Bulgaria in 2018, immediately after the initial date of close cooperation the amount of EUR 81 018 259.53 was transferred from the sub-fund for collecting credit institutions’ contributions to an account of the SRF. This amount is specified in a decision of the SRB of 18 September 2020 and is the first contribution to the SRF, equal to the amount which would have been transferred by the Republic of Bulgaria if it had participated in the SSM and the SRM as of 2016 – the year in which the Agreement became effective. After the first transfer, the money left in the sub-fund for collecting credit institutions’ contributions will be deducted from the banks’ liabilities for future contributions to the SRF, but it may not be used to directly fund the resolution of credit institutions operating in Bulgaria.
First, and as already stated, low risk premiums and very low volatility led to a strong increase in leverage on international financial markets and a big appetite for risk in the search for high yields, a tendency in which certain financial institutions in some countries participated. Also, and in relation to the foregoing, the development of a banking model focusing on the origination of loans for their subsequent distribution on the financial markets, underpinned by the securitisation of assets through certain complex structured products and by the use of off-balance sheet investment vehicles, introduced inappropriate incentives as regards the granting of financing and the subsequent management of the associated risks. In my view, it is these latter elements which explain the intensity and speed with which the turbulence has spread. Starting from this idea, I shall draw five lessons which I consider highly relevant for the future. I will then evaluate the Spanish banking system in relation to each of them in order, finally, to identify certain tasks which we should, each from our own area of responsibility, address so as to limit the adverse consequences for the Spanish economy of the international financial market turbulence. First lesson: on the originate-to-distribute model In recent years some banking systems have developed a banking model based on the origination of loans for subsequent distribution on the financial markets. This type of model has been largely underpinned by asset securitisation, a process that enables bank loans to be batched and converted into marketable products.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Turbulence in the world markets – a Spanish view (five lessons and some homework) Address by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the “Círculo Financiero”, Barcelona, 14 May 2008. *  *  *  Let me begin by thanking you for the invitation to deliver this speech. I shall not be going into details today on either the sequence of events that have triggered the turbulence in international financial markets, or on the various suggestions for reform that may prevent a similar situation from arising in the future. We currently have several reports by various institutions addressing these matters in depth, including, for example, the most thoroughgoing report by the Financial Stability Forum. The scope of my speech this evening will be more modest: to examine the Spanish banking system in the context of this turbulence. The central idea I wish to convey is as follows. Spanish banks and savings banks have not contributed to any extent either to the generation or to the subsequent propagation of the turbulence, which in principle puts them in a sound position to withstand it. However, and as recent events have clearly reminded us, we live in an increasingly global world. Accordingly, the Spanish financial system cannot remain immune to the consequences of the current problems, which affect not only those who originated them but all of us.