samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They could invest in technology and leaner construction methods to lower costs. For example, prefabrication and modularisation techniques enabled 14 bridges in the US state of Massachusetts to be replaced over just 10 weekends. These improvements across the entire value chain will ultimately make infrastructure projects more “bankable” and less costly to finance. This will create a virtuous cycle of enhanced efficiency leading to lower costs for governments, the project sponsors and the financiers. Capability building can help improve PPP standards and the “bankability” of projects, as well as assist companies in developing their talent pool across the infrastructure value chain Capability building for governments Finally, I would like to talk about knowledge sharing and capability building. Formalising public-private partnership (PPP) frameworks is an important pre-requisite in enhancing project delivery. Given the long-term nature of infrastructure investments, private investors also have to be assured that projects have been properly evaluated on economic viability, that there is strong political commitment to PPP, and that the broader legislative frameworks beyond PPP are conducive to investments. MDBs have actively supported countries on this front, in efforts to formalise project selection and approval processes, revenue models and concessions, and to encourage harmonisation of PPP standards in the region. At our inaugural Summit in 2009, we announced that the World Bank-Singapore Urban Hub partnership has been established to leverage Singapore’s experiences to help developing  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  countries structure commercially viable infrastructure projects.

Norman Chan: Hong Kong's development as the premier banking hub in Asia Opening remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Conference for Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs), Hong Kong, 16 March 2017. * * * Fellow INEDs, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. Good morning and a very warm welcome to all of you to the inaugural Annual Conference of INEDs of banks in Hong Kong! Today is a very special day for us because it is the first time in Hong Kong’s banking history that we have gathered in one place over 100 INEDs, which represents 82% of the total INED population of 123. 2. Today is also special because it marks an important milestone of the development of Hong Kong as the premier banking hub in Asia. 3. In case you do not know already, the size of Hong Kong’s banking sector, as measured in the amount of banking assets, has exceeded $ trillion by end of 2016. This equals to 8 times of Hong Kong’s GDP, which is a powerful manifestation of Hong Kong’s position as an international banking centre. Having said that, one of the things that we have learnt from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008: Big is not necessarily Beautiful. The bitter lessons of some of the aspiring financial centres such as Ireland and Iceland are clear and brutal reminder of the risks of pursuing fast expansion of the financial sector without giving proper attention to supervision and governance.
Up to the present, the full length of the bars show the actual amounts of Treasury securities and agency debt and MBS principal that matured or paid down early. Only the amounts above the cap were reinvested. As can be seen, we have delivered a gradual and predictable reduction in 7  This one day was December 31, 2015, when the federal funds rate printed at 20 basis points, or five basis points below the bottom of the FOMC’s target range. Potter, “Money Markets after Liftoff: Assessment to Date and the Road Ahead,” February 22, 2016, discusses this occasion. 8 I discussed dispersion as a means to evaluate the efficacy of monetary control and transmission in an earlier speech. These data suggest that the framework continues to perform quite well along this dimension. See Potter, “Money Markets at a Crossroads: Policy Implementation at a Time of Structural Change,” April 5, 2017. 9 See Potter, “Gradual and Predictable: Reducing the Size of the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet,” October 11, 2017, for a discussion of balance sheet normalization. 10 See the FOMC’s Policy Normalization Principles and Plans, September 16, 2014. 11 Statement Regarding Reinvestment in Treasury Securities and Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities, September 20, 2017. 3  the size of the balance sheet.

Cumulatively, these factors can undermine consumer confidence and trust in the industry, with important implications for business growth and persistency. Globally, financial institutions need to get serious about addressing the trust deficit in the financial industry. The hallmark of an industry that engenders trust often goes back to the basics of serving its core purpose, and doing it well. This begins with product innovations that should be aimed at increasing the level of public engagement and interest. The industry must abandon the mindset that “insurance is sold not bought”, and design products that people actually need and want to buy. Such products must also be able to afford protection to the underserved segments of society through affordable and simple product solutions. Such products will be easier to sell, lowering distribution costs and contributing to even lower prices in a virtuous circle that delivers benefits to all parties. The industry also needs to explore new cost-efficient delivery channels. The industry has not done well in this respect. As a catalyst, beginning next year, insurers will be required to offer pure protection products through a direct channel without commissions. The high internet and mobile phone penetration in Malaysia suggests that internet or mobile insurance makes good sense. Other untapped channels include banking agents, retail chains, employers and cooperatives. We expect the industry to fully adopt these channels to diversify delivery of services.
The major external crises we have faced in the past have been associated with overly rigid exchange rate regimes, which exacerbate credit cycles and mismatches, delay relative-price adjustments and when they finally occur, they have high financial and real costs for the economy. As usual, our baseline scenario reflects those events that are believed to be the most likely with the information at hand at the closing of this Report. There are risk scenarios, however, which if materialized, may reshape the macroeconomic environment – in some cases, significantly – and therefore, may alter the course of monetary policy. On this opportunity, having evaluated the alternative scenarios, the Board estimates that the risk balance is biased upward for output and unbiased for inflation. Internationally, the probability of negative scenarios in the United States have moderated in recent months and in China the threat of a sharp correction in growth has eased. However, the possibility of tensions intensifying in the Eurozone has not receded. The fiscal and financial fragility in this region persists and the ability of policy makers to implement reforms is weakened due to meager growth prospects. The recent episode of Cyprus is a case in point. Italy also deserves special concern, because of the size of its public debt and its weight in the European banking system. New stress episodes in international financial markets could lead to adjustments in the prices of financial assets and commodities, and in global growth prospects.

In some instances, the DFIs have widened and diversified their scope of activities, to cater to the financial needs of new growth areas, such as information and communication technology (ICT), and biotechnology. Many of them have expanded their financial products to include providing short-term working capital loans, equity participation and investment banking. While operating with the widened scope of activities, it is observed that the majority of DFIs continue to maintain the provision of medium to long-term finance and project finance as the core of their activities. At the same time, the DFIs still fundamentally remain complementary, especially in supporting strategic sectors such as the SMEs and agriculture. As reflected by the term, "development financial institution", DFIs are not only expected to provide development finance for nation building, but also to undertake a higher degree of developmental role to nurture and develop the targeted sectors. With regard to this, the DFIs have been demonstrating outstanding performance in their developmental role. For instance, the KfW Mittelstandbank, a prominent DFI in fostering SME development in Germany, is providing credit facilities to not only the established SMEs but also the new start-ups. Another example is the Organisation for SMEs and Regional Innovation of Japan which focuses on providing advisory and consultancy services, and training to nurture and develop the SMEs. Let's now look at the prospects and challenges for DFIs, i.e., the second part of this presentation.
Secondly, promoting competition in certain markets for goods and services used as inputs in other productive processes would contribute to reducing the gap between Spanish firms’ average productivity growth and that observed in other developed countries. Specifically, it would be worth reviewing some of the regulatory elements in place in certain network industries, such as telecommunications, transport and energy, and professional services. Finally, there are aspects of labour market regulation that have a bearing on weak productivity growth. The tying of firm-level wage increases to productivity is still very limited. For instance, the figures available indicate that fewer than 6% of workers are covered by firm-level agreements. In addition, the fact that employees with temporary contracts continue to bear the brunt of adjustments to negative shocks raises the volatility of employment and discourages the formation of human capital. Lessening the differences between the different types of contract, which would be negative if it were a disincentive to the demand for labour as a whole, would contribute to promoting productivity gains and reducing inequality. The challenge of reducing public debt I shall now address the high level of public debt, one of the most notorious legacies of the crisis. After increasing by more than 60 percentage points relative to its pre-crisis level, the public debt/GDP ratio has stabilised at around 100% of GDP, against a background in which our budget deficit level remains high when compared with other euro area countries. 6/8  We need to consider the risks this situation poses.

However, we are still far from achieving the employment levels prevailing before the crisis, given the enormous impact that it had on our labour market. Unlike in previous upturns, the growth of activity and employment is proving to be compatible with the ongoing correction of the economy’s imbalances. The more balanced and sustainable nature of the current recovery is closely related to the factors that have made it possible, some of which should be considered temporary while others may have a more persistent impact. I would like to refer to two central issues to explain this more balanced growth: the improvement in competitiveness and the normalisation of financial conditions. Competitiveness improvements One of the most important changes in the functioning of the Spanish economy since the crisis has been the recovery in external competitiveness. Cost and price adjustments have stimulated exports and have also enabled our productive sectors to compete better in their domestic markets with imports. This has led to an increase in the demand for resources, driving business investment decisions and encouraging job creation. The increase in employment, favoured by moderate wage growth, has led to a significant recovery in household consumption. Unlike in previous upswings, the moderate growth of prices and costs is helping to ensure that the increase in economic activity is not achieved at the expense of a deterioration in the external balance.
Regulatory arbitrage  I have spoken extensively about the steps we have taken, especially over the past few years, to build a robust regulatory framework and maintain a fit but lean army of supervisors to ensure it is implemented. It is worth noting here that we are not pig-headed about the specific way in which all elements of the regulatory framework fit together. Where we see something is not working as well as intended, we are prepared to make adjustments as long as we do not jeopardise financial resilience as a consequence. Take the modification the PRA made last year, in which central bank reserves were excluded from the exposure measure in the UK leverage ratio. This change was made to ensure the effective transmission of 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  monetary policy was not impaired and was recently followed up with a proposal to increase the minimum leverage ratio requirement from 3% to 3.25% to maintain the resilience of the standard overall. Where it makes sense to make a design improvement to better align with policy intent, we will do so. But on the whole, my sense is that we have the right shape of regime. So with reforms to the regulatory framework almost complete, how do we as supervisors remain vigilant in defending it? I mentioned that the PRA’s supervisory approach relies on a healthy dose of judgement.

Following the Barings episode, banks were required to publish their balance sheets on a monthly basis; whilst this heightened awareness of competition between the banks, ultimately it did little to change the role of the Bank in overseeing the sector. The Bank’s interaction with firms continued largely unchanged and the system of regulation relied on the Bank’s soft power (partly derived from its position as defender of the gold standard) and willingness to intervene in a crisis as the lender of last resort (or at least coordinate such a response). During the first half of the twentieth century, the status of the Bank (as a private institution with semi-public responsibilities and lack of statutory powers) explains in part why the system of regulation relied on a high degree of self-regulation and a light supervisory touch throughout the early decades of the 1900s. Nonetheless, in the rushing about at Threadneedle Street to deal with the Barings crisis more than a century ago I can clearly discern people doing what I and colleagues have had to do at various times when firms have been under stress over the last decade – it is called supervision. 5 6  Ibid, p.137 Ibid, p.148 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  A number of factors began to change the nature of supervision in the UK. First, the Bank’s nationalisation in the 1940s moved it onto a different footing as a truly public institution.
Indeed, the third major difference between the US and the euro area can be found in the structural flexibility of their respective economies. Many euro area economies entered the crisis with long-standing structural rigidities. In a more flexible economy, output tends to be less affected by shocks as relative prices adjust more quickly, and the recovery in output is faster since the economy can reallocate resources in a 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  more efficient way. Unemployment has decreased more slowly in the euro area than in the US, not only due to a weaker demand environment, but also because of labour market rigidities. Indeed, every time since the 1970s that there has been a downturn in economic activity, unemployment in the US has quickly readjusted when the economy picked up, while in euro area it has taken much longer to do so. And once the unemployment rate starts falling it rarely returns to the previous low. The result is that euro area unemployment has risen steadily for 40 years. So in sum, in this second phase of the crisis, monetary policy in the euro area, which works primarily through banks, had to contend with a protracted process of banking sector repair, exacerbated by a sovereign debt crisis and a lack of fiscal space, and compounded by suboptimal institutions to tackle structural issues and support the transmission process. The measures we adopted were specifically aimed at addressing the impairments of the transmission mechanism.

Malaysia’s journey will not track exactly the same path as others, nor should we expect it to. But we can all learn something from the footsteps left by others as we move forward. I hope that our collective journeys, as shared in this forum and others like it, will help us harness the full potential of microfinance to build stronger, fairer and more resilient communities. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
In that episode and with the global financial crisis intensifying it was deemed appropriate to accumulate about 4 percent of GDP over a period of 8 months. This process was suspended after the collapse of Lehman Brothers that triggered a sharp depreciation of most currencies in EMEs. During that episode, the currency depreciated almost continuously by about 18 percent between early April and late August. Two very important issues help explain to a large extent the difference between the two episodes. In 2008, the dollar strengthened and the price of copper fell. Today, the dollar has remained weak and the copper price has reached all-time highs (Figure 2). This example shows how the effects of the intervention are confounded by other macroeconomic developments. Overall, available estimations indicate that, without the intervention, the peso would be between 3 and 5 percent stronger than it is today. A key uncertainty for policymakers in EMEs is how long the period of decoupling and “exchange rate tensions” will last. Part of the tensions will be persistent, as many EMEs have proven very resilient in the current crisis – validating their policy frameworks. This resilience should be factored into a lower risk premia for the assets issued by these economies. However, some of the tensions will prove transitory and will subside once activity in  1  For further discussion, see “International Reserve Holdings in Emerging Markets” by José De Gregorio, Central Bank of Chile Economic Policy Paper No. 40, January 2011.

In addition, central banks may choose to participate in distorted financial markets where there may be threats to financial stability, as is sometimes done with reserve accumulation and exchange rate intervention in EMEs, or as has been the case of some interventions in debt and other asset markets in advanced economies. However, interventions beyond currency markets must be truly exceptional and only on the grounds of preserving financial stability or complementing monetary policy. Another way to control the vulnerability of the system to the reversals of asset prices is to limit the amount of debt that finances the purchase of those assets with higher prices or increase capital buffers for such debt. In terms of macro prudential policies there are a series of options for this. Higher capital requirements for intermediaries participating in the business of making leveraged purchases of financial assets are one option. In the same vein, reducing loan to value (LTV) ratios in mortgage loans, increasing provisions for housing loans or increasing capital requirements on mortgage lending are all viable options if the distortion is in the housing market. Several countries in Asia have been actively using LTV caps over the last couple of years to reduce the risks from housing price booms. Which of these tools should be used will depend, however, on the institutional setting of each country, the functioning of the financial system and the asset price that is distorted.
Developments in other countries are just as important for the krone as developments in the Norwegian economy. Capital flows freely and flows can change rapidly. This can spill over to exchange rates and interest rates as well as output and employment. Currency swings are driven by cross-border capital movements. Capital flows were heavily influenced by investor focus on stock market returns until the downturn began. In the US, equity prices almost trebled between 1995 and 2000. Stock markets in other countries followed suit. The decline was amplified after the downturn in the global economy deepened as a result of terror and fears of war. Investors sought to avert the risk in the stock market. Capital inflows into the stock market resulted in a strong dollar. However, expectations concerning corporate earnings were higher than later proved to be warranted. When expectations were lowered, equity prices fell. Demand for bonds increased, resulting in low long-term interest rates. BIS Review 14/2003  1  In response to heightened uncertainty and fears of war, traditional safe havens for capital, such as the Swiss franc and gold, have become increasingly attractive. The Swiss franc appreciated after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and towards the end of last year. Gold prices moved up sharply after UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was adopted in November last year. Oil prices fell markedly after 11 September 2001, but have since risen. Fears of war in Iraq have increased the uncertainty surrounding global oil supplies.

However, towards the end of the upturn the economy was facing labour shortages, higher wage growth and a sharp increase in household consumption and debt. Interest rates had to be kept at a high level in Norway. The turnaround abroad took place two years ago, but the Norwegian economy continued to show a high level of activity. This led to a widening of the interest rate differential against other countries. The main explanation for the wide interest rate differential is not that interest rates are high in Norway, but that interest rates are at a historic low abroad. Interest rates in the US have not been at such a low level since the 1960s. A further jump in wages in 2002 amplified the imbalances in the economy and fuelled the rise in prices for goods and services produced in Norway. This is why monetary policy has been tight. The real interest rate, i.e. the interest rate adjusted for inflation, rose in 2000 and was thereafter somewhat higher than the average for the past 30 years. With the reductions in the key rate this winter, the real interest rate is no longer particularly high. The tight monetary stance is reflected in the strong krone. 2  BIS Review 14/2003  Over the autumn and winter, it has become clear that global growth is weaker than we and other observers had expected. Several central banks have responded by reducing interest rates further. Interest rates in the US and Europe are unusually low.