samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
quick redemption of a holding in a money market fund should be assured. But there are situations where, say, holding a three month tenor instrument is appropriate because it satisfies treasury management objectives. The critical need is to avoid ambiguity of definition and mismatches between an instrument’s liquidity and its use. Funds that do not meet this requirement should be clearly labelled and treated as part of the investment fund world, serving a different purpose (where there are also issues, but these are not my focus today). You may well say “he really is labouring this point”. Yes I am, because the post financial crisis reforms did not tackle it conclusively. So, what reforms are required to establish money market funds as cash-like without ambiguity? The first thing to say is that no single reform will solve things on its own. We must identify a coherent package of reforms that address the current vulnerabilities in the money market fund sector. It is easiest to describe three broad approaches to illustrate the potential options available that could deliver this objective. These are intentionally somewhat stylistic, to draw out the tradeoffs we face in addressing these issues. First, at one extreme, asset holdings could be limited to government instruments. Given the low risk and liquid nature of these instruments, run risk would be materially reduced.

Dimitar Bogov: The Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia Address by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the presentation of the Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia in the process of accession to the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem to the public, Skopje, 22 January 2013. *  *  *  Your Excellency Ambassador Orav, Honorable Director General of the International and European Relations at the ECB, Mr Moss, Ladies and gentlemen, distinguished guests, media representatives, It is my great pleasure and honor to greet you today at the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia for the public presentation of the Needs Analysis Programme for the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia in the process of accession to the European System of Central Banks and the Eurosystem. First, I would like to thank the EU for the financial assistance provided and to express my special gratitude to the EU Delegation in our country for the given support in obtaining the project. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the ECB for the efforts and readiness to carry out the project with the NBRM and to the national central banks of the Eurosystem involved in the project for their willingness to contribute to its implementation.
Even in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami of February 2010, Chile rapidly returned to a path of sustained growth, with an unprecedented recovery of employment, and unwavering strength. All within a context of low inflation, despite the international price shocks. Monetary policy has given practical proof that it can act with flexibility and determination, and be resolute in attenuating the effects of the external cycle on our economy. As I said, at three years after the outbreak of the crisis we are still enduring its consequences. Chances are, its reverberations will continue for a while longer. The task of monetary policy is to preserve its necessary capacity to react in difficult times, the same capacity it has displayed to withdraw the stimulus packages in due time and prevent costly adjustments later. The Board will continue to fulfill its legal mandate of safeguarding price stability and the normal functioning of the payments system. Accordingly, it reaffirms its commitment of conducting monetary policy with flexibility, in order for projected inflation to stand at 3 percent over the policy horizon. An environment of low inflation improves households’ welfare, particularly those less capable of protecting themselves from rising prices. Furthermore, keeping inflation low and stable permits to soften the fluctuations of output and employment, which contributes to the people’s well-being. Chile must continue on a path of growth that will ensure continual progress of the living standards of its inhabitants. The world, including our country, is living a decisive moment.

Add to this that monetary policy interest rates are at their all-time lows, with which the capacity of central banks to increase the stimulus is also limited. In short, the tools traditionally used to boost growth have little room for maneuver in the developed world. Another source of risks that is being increasingly debated is the possibility of developed economies, especially the U.S., enduring a long time of slow growth. Excessive private debts, particularly of households, and public debt, combined with weak labor markets, are determinants of this assessment. This could shape a similar situation to that of Japan after the bursting of its housing bubble in the late 1980s, which gave way to a period of stagnation that has seen no end. Although we believe this to be an unlikely scenario, its consequences on the global economy could be severe. Amidst these conditions, emerging economies continue to grow strongly. The risks of overheating we saw only a few months back have diminished, partly because of the very action of the adopted economic policies and, especially, of monetary measures. There are still risks, however. For one, it is obvious that if developed economies continue to lag, the external demand facing the emerging world will fall, hurting their growth potential. Although in the current scenario some dynamism and a certain degree of decoupling are expected, this cannot go on indefinitely. Given the weakness of domestic demands in developed countries, they rely on their exports to grow and to resolve their global imbalances.
William C Dudley: Risks of wholesale funding Welcoming remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the workshop on the “Risks of Wholesale Funding”, New York City, 13 August 2014. *  *  *  Michael Fleming, Jamie McAndrews, Susan McLaughlin and Joseph Tracy contributed to preparing these remarks. It is a pleasure to welcome you to the New York Fed today to discuss the important issue of wholesale funding. As you all know, the financial system plays an essential role in modern economies, and liquidity is in turn critical to the functioning of the financial system. Because financial intermediation is critical to economic activity and intermediation is dependent on funding and liquidity, disruption to funding and liquidity can cause severe damage to the economy. The experience of recent years revealed serious flaws in the system. Risk was mispriced and there was a build-up of excesses before the crisis. Structural weaknesses in the financial system then amplified the effect of the sharp decline in U.S. house prices, and the result was a widespread financial crisis and a deep recession both here and abroad. The extensive use by financial firms of short-term wholesale funding was one critical factor in the crisis.

The above indicators unveil the Central Bank of Kuwait’s prudent policy and proactive approach that helped banks to weather one of the most difficult economic crises from a position of strength, and continue providing their services efficiently. Having considered the positive results and resilience of the banking sector, the Central Bank of Kuwait decided to lift restrictions and lay down a map to redirect its regulatory mitigants to prepandemic thresholds. Notwithstanding the banking sector’s sound indicators, high liquidity ratio and strong solvency, the estimated liquidity and solvency ratios above the minimum regulatory thresholds, and outlook of healthy growth, the Central Bank of Kuwait decided to gradually unwind the regulatory mitigants in line with the IMF recommendations. The first phase of our 2-phased transition began early 2022 by withdrawing 50% of the regulatory mitigants. The second phase of withdrawal process shall be completed early 2023 to return to the previous pre-crisis regulatory thresholds. Meanwhile, we shall still support small and medium enterprises by maintaining the same risk weight, and closely monitor the performance of the banking sector and conduct stress testing on its various units. Though the Central Bank of Kuwait is satisfied of the resilience of the banking and financial sector in the State of Kuwait, the developments recently seen in the world and the evolving risks surrounding the prospects of the global economy drive our efforts to protect our economy and banking and financial sectors from external shocks through proper monetary policies and supervisory measures.
Irma Rosenberg: Monetary policy in Sweden Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedbank, Stockholm, 18 September 2006. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here and speak. The topic of the conference is economic prospects and I will of course provide my views on these. However, I will speak in fairly general terms – a more detailed analysis will be presented in the Riksbank’s Inflation Report, which is published at the end of October. Before I move onto economic developments, however, I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words about how monetary policy is conducted in Sweden in general, or the monetary policy strategy, as it is usually called. More specifically, I intend to take up some questions that have arisen in the discussions in the media and elsewhere as there still seems to be some confusion. This applies in particular to the objective of monetary policy. Do we attach less importance to the inflation target now, or have we even introduced other objectives in addition to the inflation target? Let me emphasise right now that no such changes have been made. Our focus is on the inflation target and the central aim is to anchor inflation expectations in the economy around this target. However, when we formulate our monetary policy we also give consideration to the way the rest of the economy is developing. It is our reasoning on this that I intend to begin with.

Denny H Kalyalya: Financial access and sustainability of financial services in Zambia Paper presented by Dr Denny H Kalyalya, Deputy Governor Operations, Bank of Zambia, at The Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants Annual Business Conference, Livingstone, 7-8 August 2008. * 1.0  *  *  Salutation  • The Guest of Honour • Chairperson • Distinguished participants • Ladies and Gentlemen It is an honour and privilege for the opportunity to make a presentation to this important ZICA Annual Conference. Before going any further allow me to convey the Governor’s sincere apologies for not being able to come due to prior commitments. He did also send his good wishes for a successful conference. 2.0  Introduction  In my brief intervention, I will endeavour to address the question of financial access and sustainability in Zambia. It is generally recognized that the financial sector plays a critical role in the mobilization of development finance and stimulation of economic growth and development in general. An efficient, broad-based and dynamic financial sector is an essential element in the attainment and maintenance of high rates of economic growth and sustainable development. Through their services, banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), they provide an efficient mechanism for the allocation of savings and investment and they enable financial transactions to take place at minimum cost. To discuss the issues of financial access and sustainability in Zambia in a little more detail, our presentation is organized as follows.
At the level of the system, the underlying issue is not that bankers are wicked or stupid. There is, though, a nasty collective action problem. In the period leading up to the turmoil, many market participants on both sides of the Atlantic thought financial risk was under priced, especially in credit markets. But they did not know when the correction would come, or indeed that it would definitely come abruptly. Each feared that by “stepping off the bus” before their competitors, they would crystallise “business risk” as customers and activity flowed away from them. This seems to point to the need for some kind of intervention by the authorities. And, perhaps with hindsight, it is baffling that the authorities internationally contented themselves with issuing warnings. What instruments might the authorities have? There are already welcome exercises underway to make the Basel Capital Accord less procyclical. The accountancy world is also moving towards understanding that its policies affect behaviour and so system-wide conditions. On both these fronts, the design of micro measures affects macro outcomes. At a more macro level, we need to debate whether or not it would be feasible to design discretionary levers that the authorities could employ as credit-cycle circuit breakers. Candidates include the authorities adjusting industry-wide benchmark capital requirements or margin requirements to slow commercial banks’ supply of leverage to the financial system during the upswing. The debate needs to be international, as capital flows freely across borders and so the capability of national authorities to act alone is constrained.

First, not enough was done to reflect changes in business models in disclosure regimes and practices. In some distant world, banks in, say, Germany were exposed largely to German companies and households; and similarly Californian banks to Californian borrowers and projects. So if conditions deteriorated in Germany, California or wherever, the markets would be alert to the need to scrutinise the “home” banks operating in those regions or sectors. In today’s world, the markets knew that risk really had been dispersed. But they did not know where it might be concentrated; and, crucially, did not know how or how far it might flow back to the banking sector and so towards the core of the payments system that supports our  BIS Review 77/2008  1  monetary economy. It is in the interests of banks themselves – and certainly in the interests of their creditors and shareholders – to make those risks clearer in future; and if they do so, they will face stronger incentives to avoid risk concentrations. But my second point is that talk of the shift to “Originate & Distribute” can be overdone. Many of the largest global banks seem to have occupied a half-way house. They retained large positions on what amounted to a view that macroeconomic conditions could never get so bad as to cause material impairment, but booked them to portfolios that were marked-to-market (or to models).
These implies abrupt change of the environment in which central banks operate. From more than a decade of extremely accommodative monetary policy to deal with the "low prices" puzzle, all of the sudden we had to shift gears to deal with multi-decade high inflation. Last year world inflation accelerated close to 9%, which is more than twice as high as the average from the previous two decades (3.9%). CESEE economies are not an exception. Last year inflation abruptly accelerated reaching 13.3%. Even more so, we are not dealing with a conventional demand shock that drives the surge of prices, but rather with multiple shocks. Although some empirical studies are emerging, precise disentangling of supply versus demand, external versus domestic, transitory versus permanent drivers at least at this point seems challenging. However, what seems clear is that we are seeing faster and stronger passthrough of these shocks into prices. In the past, pass-through of producer to consumer prices typically took about two years, while now, according to an ECB study, it is much faster (around half a year) and more intense, as firms maintain and in some sectors even increase their profit margins1. 1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Upward inflationary risks are amplified by the structural forces in play – such as geopolitical tensions and risks of economic fragmentation. A BlackRock study on 68-risk events since 1962 indicates that geopolitical tensions typically have had shortlived impact on markets and economies2. But this time it seems different.

As we are lagging behind advanced Europe in terms of income and productivity, sustaining banks' financing can contribute in narrowing those gaps. At the same time, climate change and technological innovation continue to accelerate, pressing on our societies to transform towards greener and digital future. Banks can have a crucial role in financing the twin transition. To sum up, as policy makers we do face a difficult conundrum. After long time of economic moderation, all of the sudden we have to deal with major global shocks that impose tectonic shifts in the economic order, modify conventional macroeconomic paradigms, and accentuate the tradeoffs in policymaking. In this current context, it is crucial to preserve stability- stability of prices, as our primary objective and contribute to stability of the financial system. We all recall how profound consequences and scars instability causes, which is why we have to remain determined, focused and clear. It is the only way to preserve public trust, and as Brunnermeier said "the public is the ultimate source of central banks power and independence". Thank you and looking forward to the insightful debate! 1 Cited from "Monetary Policy in a High Inflation environment: Commitment and Clarity  ", Lecture by Christine Lagarde, November 2022. 2 Geopolitical risk dashboard, Black Rock, December 6, 2022 3 "Front-loading" monetary tightening: pros and cons", BIS Bulletin 63, December 2022. 4 Three have increased the rate (Slovakia, Bulgaria and Czech Republic) while other  four introduced the buffer for the first time (Croatia, Romania, Hungary and North Macedonia).
The whole point about price stability - even when, as now, it involves a temporary slowdown in the growth of activity - is that it is a necessary condition for the sustainable growth of activity and employment and rising living standards, which are of course the truly good things of life, and which we surely all want to see. That is, I think, what we have seen over recent years. BIS Review 98/1998

House prices have, as I mentioned in the introduction, increased by 140 per cent since 1996; annual changes are now in the vicinity of 8 per cent, down from around 13 per cent a year ago. As in many other countries, these developments have been the subject of much attention in the media, and calls have been made for the Riksbank “to do something about it”. Here some pedagogical challenges arise. We must explain that we do not target house prices but that we do not ignore risks associated with them. This is far from having a target for house prices. House prices vary in response to changing economic conditions, one of them being the stance of monetary policy. In Sweden, as in many other countries, house prices have increased in an environment characterized by strong macroeconomic conditions, rising disposable incomes and increasingly sophisticated financial markets. In this environment it is impossible to pin-point an appropriate rate of change in house prices. But policy makers always have to take decisions under a high degree of uncertainty. BIS Review 96/2007  5  Concluding remarks In conclusion, let me say that we have tried to be open and honest about the uncertainties surrounding the effects of house price developments on the rest of the economy and the appropriate monetary policy response. We have, in fact, been open about our own uncertainties and the differences in opinion, albeit small, that have arisen at times. This may have given rise to “confusion about the confusion”.
Preventing Financial Problems The market disturbances of the past 18 months have focused a great deal of attention on the need for greater transparency and for increased attention to corporate governance, legal and accounting matters, without diminishing the traditional supervisory focus on credit, liquidity and capital. Recent events suggest that we are seeing new ways in which the links between credit and liquidity are increased in the financial system. Wider credit spreads in virtually all actively traded financial markets, accompanied by declines in liquidity in many markets, signal us that credit concerns are rising in the financial system. We, as supervisors, must interpret and respond to those signals, often in shorter time frames than we are comfortable with, and often in concert with a high level of market volatility. One anomaly is that these issues arise in the face of apparently genuine improvements in liquidity in the high-yield bond, syndicated loan, and emerging markets that we have seen at various times since the early 1990s. Four questions about the current developments appear to offer well-defined avenues which supervisors can pursue. First, are current market conditions signaling a loss of confidence in prior credit judgments, perhaps in response to the growing awareness of how capital markets instruments, especially derivatives, can transform the risk profile of customers and counterparties?

On this issue, as on all the others we have discussed this morning, we in the Basle Committee must work and will be working closely with supervisors around the world. To that end, we hope to work with the Core Principles Liaison Group, and the much broader Core Principles Consultation Group, which met earlier this week. One of our goals in 1999 is to enhance further the utility and the dialogue in those Groups, to ensure that we are jointly building the supervisory framework for the 21st century. BIS Review 86/1998