samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the meantime, we don’t think firms should have to wait before we provide more accessible rules. That’s why have already launched a new Policy Index. [18] It is an online resource that divides policies into sectors and topic areas. For each topic area, a dedicated webpage lists relevant policy material and provides quick access links, allowing firms to find applicable policies more easily. Conclusion I’m going to conclude by reminding you that while these are our ideas about how the PRA should make policy, we really want to hear your views. That is why we have published our discussion paper on our approach to policy making. I encourage you to submit responses. If Parliament approves the changes that make up the FRF, we will consult on proposals for how we make policy. Responses to this discussion paper will help us shape those proposals. I would like to thank Austen Saunders for helping me write this speech. I would also like to thank Andrew Bailey, Charlotte Gerken, Hannah Schraer, Gareth Truran and Sam Woods for their helpful comments. Any errors are my own. 1. PRA Discussion Paper 4/22 ‘The Prudential Regulation Authority’s future approach to policy’, September 2022 2. ‘Our responses to coronavirus (Covid): regulatory measures for PRA firms’  Page 8 3. PRA Dear CEO Letter ‘Existing or planned exposure to cryptoassets’, March 2020 4. PRA Discussion Paper 3/22 ‘Operational resilience: Critical third parties to the UK financial sector’, July 2022 5.

Another method would be to lower the loan-to-value ratio of each property. Both of these possibilities will be open to the banks themselves when they consider that there exists due cause. But they are also measures that Finansinspektionen can prescribe if it is deemed that developments are beginning to be cause for concern. In its recently-published risk report, Finansinspektionen discussed these possibilities. We at the Riksbank will make an announcement when we feel that a serious imbalance risks accumulating. As regards the housing market, I do not believe that the greatest risk is a matter of either monetary policy or financial stability. The greatest risk is that more and more households forget that interest rates will be back at normal levels quite soon, which will entail mortgage interest expenditure of possibly three to four times current levels for those with variable interest rates. And most households in Sweden have variable interest rates. We occasionally hear from analysts or the press that the Riksbank is not making it sufficiently clear that interest rates will eventually rise. So let me repeat this once again in clear language, just to be on the safe side. When the economic upswing gathers speed – and the recovery has already started – interest rates and, accordingly, households’ loan costs will rise very rapidly. This should be considered very carefully by those borrowing, just as it should be considered very carefully by bank staff handling lending to households.
When the Executive Board met for the first time, it clarified the approach to be adopted in monetary policy. It was already the case that inflation measured by CPI was to amount to 2% with a tolerance interval of plus/minus 1 percentage point. The Riksbank had also previously announced that the target horizon would be 1-2 years in normal cases. We clarified that we can decide to disregard certain factors affecting prices which are not related to resource use in the economy and which only have a temporary effect on inflation. However, the prerequisite is that the effect on prices is temporary and should thus not affect inflation expectations. Subsequently, we have also said that there may be reasons for taking into account developments before and after the target horizon. When  3  BIS Review 98/2000  we depart from the main rule, we have undertaken to say that we are doing so and give reasons for why we are departing from the rule. The monetary policy decisions are based on forward-looking assessments of inflation measured as CPI. This assessment is based on the interest rate being unchanged during the forecast period. An important factor for determining inflation is the degree of resource use in the economy, the output gap. The thinking underlying this is that inflation will be stabilised if the increase in output is in accord with the long-term growth track.

The committee, has discussed issues such as: (i) annual work plan and internal audit engagements for the year; (ii) periodic reporting by the Inspector General on the auditing activity; (iii) financial statements; and, (iv) performance of operational risk management at the Bank of Albania. It has met regularly, without the presence of the administrators, with the Inspector General. Lastly, I would like to emphasise that the Council has regularly complied with Bank of Albania’s accountability obligations to the Assembly and its transparency obligations to the public, and the financial system. Albanian economy and monetary policy in 2018 The monetary policy maintained, even strengthened, the accommodative stance in 2018. The policy was in line with our inflation target convergence objective, consistent with the cyclical position of the Albanian economy, and aligned with the consolidation trend of the fiscal policy. 2/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  The Albanian economy performed positively throughout 2018. Aggregate demand increasingly expanded, enabling thus a further increase in production, employment and wages, and contributing to the improvement of the main economic and financial balances of the country’s economy. A few figures to illustrate it. According to INSTAT data, the pace of economic growth accelerated to 4.1% in 2018. Economic growth was broad based; it reflected positive contributions from the expansion of the consumption of households and enterprises, and of exports. According to INSTAT data, employment in the economy rose by 1.6% in the previous year, whereas the unemployment rate fell to 12.3% from 13.4% a year earlier.
But that’s not the only thing going on. Spending on some of these “non-risky” things have actually risen faster than incomes – in some cases faster than they have for many years. So it looks as though consumers  10  Chapter 4 of that Report went through a number of reasons why, at least in the short term, the response of inflation to demand might be smaller than usual under these circumstances. Services prices tend to be “stickier” than average, so a downturn centred on consumer services may be less disinflationary in the first instance. If orders take time to respond, a cut in prices will initially reduce a firm’s profits. When balance sheets and cashflow are under pressure, firms may therefore be more reluctant to make such cuts. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  14  used some of the money they would have spent on riskier activities – going to restaurants and so forth – to buy other things instead. This makes sense. A pound less spent on one thing needn’t mean a pound less in total. Indeed under some (admittedly extreme) conditions you’d expect substitution of this sort to be one-for-one. If people are entirely indifferent between different sorts of consumption – if they’re just as happy with “non-risky” as “risky” stuff – aggregate spending wouldn’t fall at all (for given income). What they saved on one would be spent in its entirety on the other.

The third – and almost certainly the most important – factor is the range of furlough schemes put in place this year. These have introduced an even bigger wedge between GDP and household incomes, shielding consumers from the huge drop in national income. This has been done only at the expense of a material rise in public-sector debt, something that will have to be paid for over time. But as far as households are concerned, the schemes have succeeded in smoothing out that cost, helping to sustain both incomes and consumer spending in the meantime. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Let me now turn to another important contributor to the anomaly in Chart 1, and the main focus today – the extent to which consumers have responded to the pandemic by substituting some forms of spending for others. I’ll begin with what some simple economics has to say about what you might expect to happen, depending on the circumstances, and then look at a bit of evidence. The direct impact of the pandemic on aggregate consumption Imagine the government suddenly slaps a big excise duty on something people buy. Let’s suppose – just for the sake of (wholly unrealistic) argument – it’s restaurant meals. Imagine too, just to make the parallel a little closer, that the government compensates you for the cost of this (it redistributes the proceeds of the tax). So you don’t lose out in terms of income.
Tackling climate for real: progress and next steps Speech given by Andrew Bailey Governor of the Bank of England  BIS-BDF-IMF-NGFS Green Swan 2021 Global Conference 3 June 2021  I am grateful to Thomas Viegas, Chris Faint, Zane Jamal, Theresa Löber, Timothy Rawlings, Matthew Trott, Michelle van der Merwe, and Karen Jude for their assistance in helping me prepare these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  It is a pleasure to be participating today, at such a unique event. Over recent decades, our global economic system has faced multiple shocks or swan events, ranging from the Covid-19 pandemic to the global financial crisis of 2007/08. But if we turn our eye to the future, we can see another swan lurking in the reeds, and it’s green. That green swan is why we are here today, the threat posed to our economies and our financial system by climate change. Central banks, regulators and policymakers came together in the aftermath of the financial crisis to reform the system so that it could better weather future shocks. Like before, we must come together again to address the threat of climate change. But unlike before, we cannot wait until the aftermath to do so.

The NGFS have started to explore this, but more work will be needed as the impacts of climate change and the transition to net-zero start to come into sharper relief. At the Bank, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) recently had its first informal discussion on the macroeconomics of climate change, and climate is an increasingly important part of G7 discussions between central banks and finance ministries. But more work and discussion is needed. Specifically, there is particular value in: (1) further integrating climate and macro modelling; (2) understanding and sizing related transmission channels; (3) going beyond the aggregate impacts to understand sectoral implications; and (4) assessing how the transition might affect the demand and supply sides of the economy. What is increasingly clear is that the effects of climate  3  See A first assessment of financial risks stemming from climate change: The main results of the 2020 climate pilot exercise, ACPR, May 2021 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  3  change and the transition to a net-zero economy will manifest over time - so analysis needs to span the short, medium and long-term to capture fully these effects. Let me now turn to how we are embedding climate risk management in the financial firms that we regulate. We have worked to deepen our understanding of risks to the financial system and build resilience to climate change both at the macro and micro prudential level.
However, today, when it is clear that bank-based systems are inferior to more capital market-based ones, and when loan-to-deposit ratios are close to one, the goal should probably be to turn towards developing more efficient structures of the financial markets. How should we, as policymakers, react to this? What are the next steps that we have to take? How much do we know? Well, we know that when it comes to standards of living, in the long-run it is all about labour productivity. And labour productivity, in turn, depends on the amount of capital per unit of labour and something that we call total factor productivity (TFP) or multifactor productivity. The problem is that both of these components are hard, or impossible, to measure, so we have to estimate them, and that is by no means an easy task. Much has been said about the TFP growth in the context of the discussions on the slowdown in the productivity growth, or discussions of the convergence in Europe. However, if you try to decompose the data that are used in these discussions, I believe that you'll come to realise that there are serious measurement issues. For example, it is hard to believe that there has been almost no increase in capital stock per worker in Romania and at the same time, the country managed to increase its TFP by far the fastest rate compared to any other country in the region, or to believe that an almost similar situation was seen in Slovakia.

And not only their quality, of course. Yesterday morning I spoke in Croatia about the need to improve the efficiency of the judicial system. It is fair to say that many reforms have already been undertaken across Europe and that many countries are now seeing the benefits of such policies. For the last couple of quarters, every new GDP data release by Eurostat has been a positive surprise, while forecasters have been raising their GDP forecast for the EA and the EU. However, while growth has resumed in all countries, medium-term growth potential in the region is insufficient to ensure pre-crisis pace of real convergence. Namely, for convergence to be sustainable, long-term potential per capita growth must be consistent with an expansion of demand. In other words, GDP growth that results from strong capital inflow, foreign demand shock, or fall in interest rates due to perhaps euro area enlargement process, could prove to be unsustainable. So, the question is, did we take convergence for granted? Was one of the great features of the European integration process only a temporary and unsustainable phenomenon related to the 2  initial 'low-hanging fruit' reforms that corrected vast resource misallocation problems, followed by a huge inflow of foreign capital before the crisis? Will convergence return back to a faster speed, will it continue at a slower speed, or maybe even stop or reverse? Is convergence still here and, even more importantly, is it here to stay?
Monetary policy can, however, support the economy during the adjustment process. During these exceptional circumstances, the MPC is required by its remit to balance the trade-off between the speed at which inflation is returned to target and the support that monetary policy provides to jobs and activity. 14  The MPC set out our framework for managing this trade-off including guidance on its tolerance for the overshoot of inflation of target under exceptional circumstances. Chart 6 illustrates the MPC’s framework for setting policy to manage this trade-off. The red lines represent the potential trade-offs that the Committee could strike: mapping the size of the inflation overshoot that it could be prepared to tolerate for a given amount of spare capacity, and vice versa. The flatter the line, the less weight the Committee places on output stabilisation and the more it is willing to tolerate large output gaps in order to eliminate small overshoots in inflation. Chart 6 also demonstrates how the expected trade-off has evolved in successive MPC forecasts since the referendum. It shows the MPC's central projections at Year 2 for CPI inflation on the vertical axis against those for spare capacity (the opposite of excess demand) on the horizontal axis from successive Inflation Reports since August 2016. The projections are conditioned on the market yield curves prevailing at the time the forecasts were made.

As Fehrenbach puts it, the key to overcoming the odds in the Lone Star State has been that “the Texas ethic and Texas society rewarded enterprise,” ... “work was the real virtue.” … “We chose this land; we took it; we made it bear fruit.” We are a people, in Fehrenbach’s words, for whom “the cult of courage was obvious.”1 And he distills the Texas spirit that prevails to this day in one sentence: Here, “men who exist get overrun by men who act.”2 It is time for our great Latino population to have the courage to face the facts: They must do a better job as families and within their communities to dedicate themselves to educational achievement. And it is time for all Texans, Hispanics and non-Hispanics, to act to create the conditions that will safeguard and nourish the prosperity of all our children and that of our children’s children. ¡Ándale pues! Delve into the Hispanic experience. Help us understand through this conference and your various studies how to advance Hispanic prosperity. For in doing so, you are helping us advance Texas and the nation. Thank you. 1  Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans, by T.R. Fehrenbach, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1985, pp. 708–12. 2  See note 1, p. 717. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
The Commission made no specific recommendations for how the challenges related to supervision and regulation of critical ICT service providers and data centres should be followed up. In its consultation response, Norges Bank wrote that the following points deserve particular attention: The significance and management of concentration risk because many critical functions 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  rely on a small number of ICT service providers and data centres. The supervisory frameworks for ICT service providers and data centres that are important for key public functions, including the payment system. Whether the contingency arrangements of key ICT service providers and data centres are sufficient. ICT service providers, FMI owners and financial institutions need to address cyber risks. Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank have recently taken the initiative to engage in a dialogue with the industry on whether to introduce a framework for testing cybersecurity in the banking and payment system in Norway. This framework, called TIBER-EU, has been developed by the European Central Bank (ECB). A number of Norway’s neighbours, including Denmark and Sweden, have introduced or are about to introduce the ECB testing framework, ie TIBER-DK and TIBER-SE, respectively. Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank are planning to invite the industry to a dialogue on this testing framework. It can also be used to bolster security linked to key ICT service providers in the banking and payment system.

Another example is Apple, which is restricting which payment services can be offered on its mobile devices. In addition, plans are constantly being launched for new kinds of money and payment systems that offer both customer services and settlement, most recently Libra, a venture backed by Facebook and other investors. As an authority responsible for promoting an efficient payment system, Norges Bank needs to consider the whole payments chain. We also need to ask ourselves whether it is enough to be a promoter and regulator or whether we need to take on greater operational responsibility in order to perform our social mission. Second, changes are taking place in the ownership of critical parts of the payment system. A relevant example is Mastercard’s planned acquisition of one of the key parts of Nets. The Nordic P27 initiative is hardly the last push for more international ownership of infrastructure for payments in Norwegian kroner. At Norges Bank, we need to assess the best way for us to ensure that society’s interests are being safeguarded. Future structure of real-time payments Norway was an early adopter of digitalisation and its payments infrastructure has been worldclass. We have reaped the benefits for many years. But then the development of common infrastructure came to a halt. A number of neighbouring countries have built payment infrastructures that in some areas are now ahead of ours. Common infrastructure makes sense. It enables us to realise economies of scale, a wellfunctioning payment network and a level playing field.
On the one hand, the recovery of developed economies goes on, but only moderately and insufficiently to reduce the high rates of unemployment (figure 1). Risks are substantial. In fact, the intensity and velocity of the events we saw in Europe in early November are proof of the fragility of the world economy. On the other hand, growth prospects in emerging markets are still positive; commodity prices are still high, with copper standing out recently at record highs, and external financing conditions are good. The sustainability of this imbalanced scenario for the global economy is one of the primary risk factors for next year. Some of the questions we must try to answer and monitor closely are: How fast can emerging economies grow if the advanced economies are further weakened? How can advanced economies grow without incurring in unsustainable current-account deficits? How will the financial tensions in Europe be resolved? Is it possible for expenditure in Chile to grow excessively while ignoring the risks coming from abroad? In this context, the Board has continued to gradually normalize the monetary policy interest rate (MPR), setting it at 3.25% in its December meeting. In the most likely scenario, it will continue to gradually withdraw the monetary stimulus, which will depend on the unfolding of internal and external macroeconomic conditions. Let me now take a closer look at the scenario we believe is the most likely for the next two years and its implications for inflation and monetary policy. Macroeconomic scenario I will begin with the world economy.

Commodity prices remain high by historic standards, consistently with the strength of emerging economies, some specific supply-side elements and the depreciation of the dollar. Worth noting are the recent sharp increases in the international prices of some foodstuffs and the copper price peaking at $ per pound (figure 4). The baseline scenario in the IPoM we are presenting today assumes that some of these factors will persist over the projection scenario. In the case of copper, even if it will not be as high as today, it will exceed September’s projections, at $ and $ per pound in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The price outlook for WTI oil is also revised up from September, to $ per barrel in the two years. The baseline scenario for the international economy is good, albeit with important associated risks. We expect an average growth rate of 4.2% for the world economy over the next two years, fairly high by historic standards, but around 0.3 percentage points below the market consensus forecast. This differential is based on the effects of the financial turbulences in Europe, tighter fiscal adjustment plans in the region and the absence of a vigorous recovery of demand in developed economies. In addition, because of the inflationary pressures present in some emerging economies, it is obvious they cannot continue to grow at the same pace they did this year (table 1).