samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Also, cross-border regulatory cooperation needs to be further enhanced. This includes greater exchange of confidential supervisory information so that national regulators can be fully informed about the conditions of the banks that operate within their borders. It also requires efforts to ensure a level playing field across jurisdictions so that the focus is on promoting safety and stability rather than trying to protect, favor, or shield national champions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In terms of the macroeconomy, there is both good and bad news. In the United States, the good news is that the economic outlook appears to be gradually improving. The household sector is far along in the deleveraging process, the housing sector is recovering, the banking system is healthier and credit conditions are easing, the corporate sector is highly profitable and awash in cash. Monetary policy has been effective at fostering easier financial market conditions, even with short-term rates pinned at the zero bound. To provide the appropriate degree of accommodation, the Federal Reserve has recently moved to an outcome-based approach in which the use of our tools is explicitly tied to developments in the economy and economic outlook. Currently, as part of this strategy, we are purchasing $ billion of longer-term Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed securities each month. After reviewing the efficacy and costs of this program, I have concluded that that efficacy has been as high or higher than I expected at the onset of the program and costs the same or lower.

The first, the stability oriented approach, can be characterised as attempting to dampen economic fluctuations by promoting stable economic growth over time, subject to the primary focus on price stability. The second, the activist view, can be seen as suggesting that, in addition to price stability, an equally important goal of monetary policy is to actively guide the economy towards attainment of its “potential.” That is, an important guide to policy is the “output gap”, which measures how far GDP deviates from its potential. But policy activism in this sense can be dangerous. Trying too hard to close real activity gaps can lead to worse results in both price stability and economic stability. The reason is simple. Too often, the measures of the output gap that our experts can produce give the wrong signal in real time, when policymakers need to take decisions. Distracting attention away from price stability by attempting to fine tune the real-economy might result in a central bank remaining too accommodative for too long following a recession. There are numerous examples of policy recommendations that have proved to be wrong for this reason, and not just from the 1970s. This risk must be avoided. Nothing should distract a central bank’s focus on preserving price stability. A central bank should strive to remain focused and be pre-emptive in its fight against inflation.
With fiscal consolidation beginning next year when the economy firmly recovers, the scheme sets a limit of fiscal burden at approximately 60% of the GPD which is still quite a manageable limit. The environment is therefore becoming more optimistic, the business prospects are becoming bright, and one should now plan for growth. What then, ladies and gentlemen, are the issues that we should pay attention to when we plan for growth? Preparing for rapid growth For emerging markets like ours, I think we have to address issues both at macro and micro levels. At the macro level, the authority has to ensure that there is adequate infrastructure to handle high volume of transactions safely and efficiently. The need here covers not only that of the point of sale hardware and communication technology. The problem is that these things become obsolete quickly and one has to ensure that the domestic system in use is compatible with the international system, as well as the level of security required. But far more important is the financial and legal infrastructure. I will highlight a few, starting with First, the need to clearly define the rights and obligations of card issuers, card users and other parties involved in the transactions particularly in case of frauds. In Thailand, we have now drafted the Credit Card Act to set this framework but its enactment is still pending. Secondly, the need to set up a good credit information system to help card issuers in their risk management.

This means able to identify what events will pose risk to you, which risks you should take, how they should be monitored and what measures can be employed to mitigate those risks. I must emphasize here that proper risk management simply cannot be done without a sophisticated system to gather process and analyse the information. The last issue I would raise today is that of accounting. Card issuers must ensure that they hold adequate and prudent levels of provision against bad debts in their accounts. Probability of default should be carefully analysed by various methods, making full use of the modern techniques available at credit bureaus. 2  BIS Review 44/2002  Ladies and gentlemen: For the next 2-3 years, I am looking only for a moderate growth, not a rapid growth. I am hoping for a firm and sustainable recovery in South East Asia. But for the recovery to be firm and sustainable, we must indeed plan for the event of rapid growth. And that means we have to be prepared in every way. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 44/2002  3
Under these plans, competencies in respect of financial stability and the prudential oversight of all types of financial intermediaries (banks, investment firms and insurance companies) would be under the roof of a single authority, integrated into the Banco de España; and responsibility for the oversight of markets and the supervision of the conduct of financial intermediaries would be assigned to a second agency established drawing on the current CNMV. The outbreak of the financial crisis shortly afterwards and the need to manage the delicate situation of the banking system, up until very recently, advised against implementing at that time an institutional reform which, undoubtedly, would have involved a considerable organisational challenge. At present, following the completion of the intense process of restructuring and reform of the banking system, the circumstances for resuming reflection on an ambitious reform of the institutional model for supervision are admittedly more favourable. I thus believe it would be worth considering again plans to reform the supervisory framework, taking as a reference, as was envisaged in 2008, the twin peaks model prevailing in Europe. In any event, the new supervisory model should be adjusted to accommodate, as it has in other countries, the setting up of a macroprudential committee (on which government authorities and supervisors would sit) coordinated by the Banco de España.

Consider, for instance, the influence that the level of interest rates, which is decided by the central bank, has on variables so closely related to financial stability as the desire of banks and other agents to assume risk, or changes in financial asset prices. Alternatively, bear in mind the effect of the bank prudential requirements on the supply of credit for financing the economy and, therefore, on activity and prices. Therefore, given the evident interaction between the realms of monetary policy and of prudential policy, it is essential that the principle of separation between them should be applied with the appropriate measures of flexibility and pragmatism. In the case of the relationship between prudential oversight and resolution measures, the need for coordination is even more marked. The Regulation governing the creation of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Single Resolution Mechanism confers on the latter not only the management of orderly resolution processes for ailing institutions, but also the prerogative to initiate the process by declaring an institution non-viable (a competence it shares with the supervisor) and, to this end, it empowers it to gather all the information it needs and to conduct its own inspections. That is to say, without appropriate coordination, there is a risk that vulnerable institutions – which are naturally those that require more attention by the prudential supervisor – may be subjected to the dual scrutiny of the two agencies, and that discrepancies and frictions may emerge that may complicate the task of maintaining financial stability.
But there is less evidence to support that hypothesis in the UK, with the pace of relaxation broadly in line with the May MPR scenario (Chart 10a). On the face of it, this suggests some greater than expected degree of underlying strength in consumer spending in the UK economy. Chart 10a: Lockdown stringency (actual and May  Chart 10b: Share of consumption basket that is  MPR-consistent)  unavailable  Stringency of government measures  Restricted consumption share  0.5  80 70  0.4  60 50  0.3  40 30  0.2  20 10  0.1  0 Jan  Mar  May May MPR-consistent  Jul  Sep Index  0.0 Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Sources: University of Oxford, ONS and Bank calculations. Note: Blue line simply in Chart 10a takes Stringency Index as of early-May, and extrapolates it based on May MPR assumption that “The illustrative scenario is conditioned on social distancing measures and government support schemes remaining as they are until early June, before being gradually unwound by the end of Q3.”  Taking this evidence together, Bank staff now expect consumer spending to be around 20% lower in Q2, relative to nearly 30% in the MPR scenario. By the end of Q2, spending is likely to be around 10% lower  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  than at the start of the year.

For those without a university qualification, the probability of being in work three years from now might be 27-37% lower.16  During jobs recessions, many workers choose to move down the skills spectrum to regain a foothold on the jobs ladder.17 But if many displaced workers have low levels of skill and experience, the option of moving down the skills spectrum may not be available or may at least have lower value. Skilling or re-skilling will then be needed. This adds to the time it takes workers to re-enter the jobs market, prolonging high unemployment. 16 17  Henahan (2020). Haldane (2019), Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016) and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2018). 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  The possibility of labour market mismatches, whether by sector or skill, increases the chances of high unemployment proving persistent, with scarring effects on the economy’s supply potential. Put differently, labour market mismatches raise the economy’s NAIRU – the level of unemployment at which supply bottlenecks and wage pressures re-emerge. The higher the NAIRU, the smaller the degree of slack in the economy. Historically, pandemics have not tended to have a persistent upward impact on prices.18 But a higher NAIRU would be one reason to be cautious before jumping to that conclusion. A second is that the policy response to the Covid crisis, both monetary and fiscal, has been significantly more expansionary than any previous pandemic.
The proposed reduction in the corporate tax rate for companies seeking listing in the stock market as well as those already listed, and the postponement of the restoration of the VAT rate until September 2002 will further set the stage for more support in the revival of domestic demand. Additional stimulus will come from the 71.3 billion baht village fund designed to boost investment and facilitate job creation in rural areas. It is important to emphasize that the planed increase in fiscal spending does not compromise the Government’s commitment to fiscal discipline. Total public debt will remain below 60 percent of GDP while debt service (principle and interest) will account for less than 16 percent of the budget. In regards to monetary policy, the inflation targeting framework gives the Bank of Thailand sufficient flexibility to respond quickly to fast changing domestic and external developments. With inflation remaining subdued and likely to remain contained in the range of 1.5-2.5 percent for 2002, the emphasis in the near future will be to strike a proper balance between domestic growth and external stability. While the current stance of monetary policy under the inflation targeting framework with emphasis on external stability is accommodative and appropriate given current conditions, the Bank of Thailand is constantly monitoring developments and will move decisively should circumstances change.

In regards to monetary policy, the global slowdown and heightened market uncertainty has increased Thailand’s external vulnerability prompting the Bank of Thailand to pay increased attention to the issue of external stability; particularly Balance of Payments and International Reserves. Healthy outlook in the country’s external financial position is always useful in maintaining investor’s confidence in times of greater uncertainty. The one time increase in the 14-day repurchase rate in June to 2.5 percent was partly intended to foster increased support to Thailand’s external stability in the face of a more challenging global environment. Indeed, since then distortions in the interest rate structure have been corrected, the negative differential between domestic and international interest rates has been reversed, capital outflows seem to have decelerated, the baht has become more stable, our real effective exchange rate continues to be competitive, the level of international reserves remains at a comfortable level, with reserves to short-term debt ratio as high as 140%, and inflationary pressures are well contained-headline inflation for the third quarter stood at 1.5 percent year on year, while core inflation remained well below target at 1.6 percent. With a firmer position on macroeconomic stability, the economy is expected to grow by around 1.3-1.8 percent this year. However, the economic recovery process remains fragile and is now being undermined by the weakening global environment as well as declining consumer confidence. Looking to the future: More to be done Going forward, I believe we are faced with significant challenges.
In particular, the creation of a fully mutualised European deposit insurance scheme would boost both public and market confidence. It would also contribute to greater risk-sharing in the euro area, and thus help reduce potential fragmentation episodes. 15  From highs of 119.9% and 85.6% of GDP, respectively, in 2010, to 72% and 53% at end-2022. 16  The 3-month EURIBOR is the main benchmark rate for non-financial corporations’ funding costs. 17  These figures are obtained drawing on different hypotheses as to the percentage of debt expiring and renewed in the short term. The top-end figure (6.8 pp) is the effect of all debt expiring in the short term being renewed. 18  A firm is considered to be under high financial pressure when the ratio of (gross operating profit + financial revenue) to financial costs is less than one. 19  The 12-month EURIBOR is the main benchmark rate for households’ funding costs. 20  The net interest burden is considered to be high when the ratio of (debt service expenses - interest income from deposits) to household income is over 40%. 7  On a global scale, an in-depth analysis is also needed of the recent banking turmoil from a regulatory and supervisory standpoint. The Federal Reserve System has now published an assessment of the reasons for the recent events in the United States. On the Financial Stability Committee and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, we have embarked on an analysis of the recent developments, to enable lessons to be drawn.

The absence of a sufficiently thorough system of banking supervision and the lack of transparency not only became problematic before the crisis, but also caused confidence problems later on. Fourth, the quality of the assets of the banking system is vital for the soundness of macroeconomic policy. In allocating savings to investment use, the banks should be extremely careful about the risks that must be taken for a variety of reasons. There are five main types of risk that the banking system and of course the appropriate authorities have to deal with: interest risk; foreign exchange risk; maturity risk; loan risk; and market risk. A sound financial system is the best assurance of efficient monetary and fiscal policies. In my view, all four of these factors contributed to the change of foreign perceptions and sentiment and produced a cutback in normal financing (in fact, 95 percent of external flows to emerging market countries come from the private marketplace). This cutback, in turn, weakened the external reserve positions of these countries. Then the combination of weak reserves and a weak financial sector brought on a liquidity crisis. We are now in a position to draw some lessons from the East Asian crisis. First, policy implementation must pursue sound macroeconomic policies in order not to lose the confidence of the markets. And second, four main principles must constantly be kept in mind: •  The currency should not be allowed to appreciate, except as part of a bold anti-inflation program.
I shall not elaborate here on this change in style, but let me stress its historical nature, since it entailed the recognition of a far different world from that when the Bretton Woods institutions were designed at the end of the Second World War. But the change in substance has not been any less. The philosophy behind international regulation until then had been based on the idea that private financial institutions knew better than anybody what they had to do, and we could therefore count on self-regulation. Meantime, in many countries, hands-off supervision was the prevailing philosophy: the less the public sector laid its hands on financial activity, the better. The crisis and the initiative of the G20 leaders have called this philosophy into question. An example of this is the radical change in direction of the work of the Basel Committee. Although the so-called Basel II reform had some very positive aspects, such as the greater sensitivity to risk of regulatory requirements and the consequent stimulus for banks to set in place better risk management systems, the Committee’s work was naturally infused by the self-regulation approach then prevailing. However, since late 2008, financial regulation has taken a radically different road.

This improvement evidences their willingness and ability to respond to market demands and to future regulatory requirements, although additional adaptive efforts to raise higher-quality capital may be required of some banks. 4  BIS Review 51/2010  With regard to liquidity, Spanish banks have always been attentive to this risk, as evidenced by their bond issues and long-term securitisations, despite the fact that the cost of short-term funding was more attractive. This conservative funding term structure on the liabilities side is one of the factors explaining the strength of Spanish banks during the crisis. However, the financial markets are still far from being back to normal, so it is essential that institutions continue paying particular attention to liquidity and funding. In the medium term, and despite that strong starting point, the new regulations will require additional efforts, particularly with respect to the short-term liquidity buffers which banks must have in place. Hence, in addition to the uncertainty resulting from the depth and duration of the financial crisis, banks have to deal with the additional pressure put on them by the new regulations, still to be defined in many cases. Banks have to make a special effort to explain to the market how they will meet the challenges posed by the crisis and to convey their plans for successfully coping with the regulatory changes. This transparency drive will have to be stepped up in the immediate future.
This generally wasn’t necessary during the Great Moderation, when the economy was largely subject to a series of demand shocks. The inflation target could be achieved without causing undesirable volatility in 2  output and employment (so-called “divine coincidence” ). Despite the crisis, divine coincidence has continued to reign in the euro area and the US (see charts in the Appendix). Large output gaps and below-target inflation have pointed monetary policy in the same direction. That, unfortunately, has not been the case in the UK economy, which has been subject to a series of major supply shocks over the past five years, creating tensions between short-term output and inflation stabilisation. Brexit is the latest and potentially largest example. Brexit is a regime shift that has markedly increased the range of possible outcomes for the UK economy and therefore the potential paths of monetary policy. 1  Another dimension to uncertainty is ‘model’ uncertainty around the structure of the economy. That is distinct from uncertainty about possible future events, or ‘shocks’, affecting economy. Model uncertainty captures uncertainty around how the economy responds to those events, including to changes in monetary policy itself. 2 See Blanchard, O., and J. Galí (2007). "Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model". Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 39(1), pp. 35-65.

Each bar stored abroad has a bar identification and remains the property of the SNB. The availability of our gold holdings is fully guaranteed at all times. As with many other central banks, the SNB has never made the storage locations public. The SNB reviews the geographic allocation of its gold reserves periodically and adjusts it if necessary. In addition to security considerations, avoiding public discussions when gold is being relocated was one of the reasons why storage locations have so far been treated confidentially among central banks. However, the SNB is aware that there has been a growing need for transparency in our population in the last few years. We have therefore decided to provide more detailed information in this matter. This is the only way for us to rectify the misinformation and misconceptions with regard to storage locations which have increasingly surfaced. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Of our 1,040 tonnes of gold, more than 70% – and thereby the overwhelming proportion – is stored in Switzerland. The remaining 30% is distributed between two countries. Roughly 20% of the gold reserves are kept at the central bank of the United Kingdom, and approximately 10% at the central bank of Canada. The SNB has been storing gold exclusively in these countries for over ten years. A number of clearly defined criteria are used when selecting countries for gold storage. First, adequate regional diversification and good market access for the storage of gold must be ensured.