samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
  Second, because banks are in the risk business it should be no surprise that the run-up to crisis was hallmarked by imaginative ways of manufacturing this commodity, with a view to boosting returns to labour and capital. Risk illusion is no accident; it is there by design. It is in bank managers’ interest to make mirages seem like miracles. Regulatory measures are being put in place to block off last time’s risk strategies, including through re-calibrated leverage and capital ratios. But risk migrates to where regulation is weakest, so there are natural limits to what regulatory strategies can reasonably achieve. At the height of a boom, both regulators and the regulated are prone to believe in miracles. That is why the debate about potential structural reform of finance is important – to lessen the burden on regulation and reverse its descent into ever-greater intrusiveness and complexity. At the same time, regulators need also to be mindful of risk migrating outside the perimeter of regulation, where it will almost certainly not be measured.   Third, finance is anything but monolithic. But understanding of these different business lines is complicated by the absence of reliable data on many of these activities. There are several open questions about the some of these activities, not least those for which returns appear to be high. This includes questions about the risks they embody and about the competitive structure of the markets in which they are traded.

Finally, as a corollary of the above, micro- and macro-supervision should not be done in silo. In fact, we need to bring together the perspectives and tools from different stakeholders – central banks and financial supervisors, as well as government agencies that can contribute to financial stability. The property sector cooling measures introduced in Singapore and a number of Asian countries recently, involved close cross-agency cooperation and coordination amongst financial regulators, fiscal authorities and the land  BIS Review 121/2010  3  offices of the respective countries. Bringing together the various agencies expands the policy options to deal with systemic risks. Different countries have different institutional arrangements, so each country will need to decide on the optimal arrangements. Achieving regulatory outcomes through effective supervision and shared responsibility with industry 23. Let me now say a few words on achieving regulatory outcomes, beyond good rules. Perhaps the most striking area is the critical need for all of us to strengthen supervision. Effective supervision is unapologetically firm and intense, grounded on a good understanding of the nature of the institutions and the financial system. Supervisors must think independently, avoid regulatory capture and be willing to enforce out-of-bound markers rigorously. In this regard, I welcome the efforts of FSB and standard setters in developing recommendations for more effective supervision of complex and systemic institutions. 24. Effective supervision requires talented and trained staff, who can understand and respond constantly to new markets, new services, and new risks.
From end-2007 to mid-2009, US GDP fell off by more than 4 pp; in the case of the euro area, the loss between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009 was close to 6 pp. After the double-dip recession, which ran until the first quarter of 2013, a slow recovery ensued, with modest but sustained rates of increase in output. Only in the second half of 2015, seven years after the first recession began, did the euro area regain overall the pre-crisis levels of income and consumption, levels which even today have still to be restored in the case of gross capital formation. As to the euro area unemployment rate, while it has moved on a declining trend since the current recovery phase began, it remains at close to 10%, almost 2.5 pp above the level prevailing in early 2008, and double the rate in the US economy. In Spain, which had built up most significant imbalances, the depth and seriousness of the crisis was unprecedented. From 2007 to 2013, GDP fell by close to 8 pp and, foreseeably, it will only be this year, in 2017, that income will reach its pre-crisis levels. As in other episodes of our economic history, the most severe costs were felt in the labour market. In the 2007-2013 period, employment declined by over 18%, taking the unemployment rate, four years back, to 26% of the labour force.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  At the regional level, the ASEAN Natural Disasters Research Works Sharing (“ANDREWS”) Committee has been formed to facilitate dialogue and information exchange between academia and insurance industry professionals on latest research and market developments relating to natural catastrophes. In Singapore, industry players have ramped up catastrophe analytics and modeling efforts rapidly in recent years. This is supported by scientific and state-of-the-art catastrophe risk research undertaken by research institutes such as the ICRM, the NUS Centre of Hazards Research and the Earth Observatory of Singapore. (iii)  Thirdly, a shortage of expertise to properly understand and assess catastrophe risks. Even where catastrophe models are employed, it is essential to overlay deep expertise and good judgment to challenge assumptions in modeling outputs, in order to have a more robust assessment and interpretation of the risks. The Thailand floods in 2011, for example, offered useful learning lessons about how there can be blind spots, without a deep understanding of the underlying risks: (a)  Thailand was not even designated by insurers as a catastrophe-prone prior to the floods, despite the potential risks and exposures;  (b)  Secondary losses arising from the business interruption claims were heavily underestimated; and  (c)  The accumulation of risks arising from Japanese cedants relocating their supply and production chains to Thailand from Japan, which had been hit with an earthquake and tsunami just months before, was generally overlooked.
ASEAN and its members have overcome many difficult challenges over the past three decades. Despite the crisis, we are much better off today than we were before the economic take off. The road ahead is indeed difficult. But the ingredients which fuelled our rapid growth in the past are all still there. Given the political will and the right policies, I am confident that in time ASEAN will recapture the lost ground, and thrive and prosper into the new century. BIS Review 111/2000  8

Last year, the Shenzhen Municipal People's Government issued offshore RMB municipal government bonds in Hong Kong for the first time, testifying to our strength as a platform for issuing RMB bonds, including green bonds, enriching the product range of the local dim sum market and paving the way for other municipal or provincial governments to follow. We will actively promote Hong Kong’s bond market to markets that are looking to strengthen their ties with China, and attract sovereigns and other issuers from these regions to arrange and issue bonds in Hong Kong. The third way we can expand our offshore RMB market is by enhancing our own financial infrastructure. At the core of this effort is the HKMA’s programme to develop the Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) into a major international central securities depository (ICSD) in Asia, to better support the connectivity between the Mainland and international  financial markets in cross-border clearing, settlement and custodian operations.
But unlike the market standard agreements addressed in the Protocol, scheme rules and commercial agreements provided by agency banks vary and preserve a good deal of discretion for the FMI or G-SIB acting as a quasi FMI. We are exploring how far that discretion can, or needs to be, constrained. Ultimately, there is a potential collective action problem we need to address. It should be in the interests of FMIs and agency banks to allow the resolution to succeed. After all, in an SPE strategy the legal entity they are dealing with is likely to stay outside resolution. But the temptation must be there, if you can in  4  International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2015) ‘ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol’. 5  Financial Stability Board (2015) ‘Guidance on Arrangements to Support Operational Continuity in Resolution’. 6  In the US these are known as Financial Market Utilities (FMUs). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  resolution, to grab collateral or to increase margin calls on an extraordinary basis. This is the behaviour we saw at various points in the crisis. We need to plan to avoid a repeat of that. This brings me to the other consultation paper 7 issued recently by FSB, related to funding in resolution. If it is clear on Monday morning that a bank in resolution can meet its obligations falling due, then the incentive for counterparties to remove liabilities or seize collateral should be reduced. The funding in resolution principles represent a step toward achieving this.

Where TLAC is issued in a group brings me to the final key dimension of TLAC – distribution. One of the big innovations of TLAC is to go beyond previous capital accords to address the distribution of loss absorbency within groups. This was always going to be necessary for resolution which operates at legal entity, not group level. And it is essential to engender trust and time consistency between authorities cross-border. As it is set out in the principles covering the Term Sheet, host authorities must have confidence that there is sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity available to subsidiaries in their jurisdictions with legal certainty at the point of entry into resolution. Internal TLAC – prepositioned loss absorbency down-streamed from the resolution entity to material subgroups, equivalent to 75–90% of the subgroup’s needs – is designed to achieve this, without pushing up overall TLAC requirements for the group as a whole. It also provides a mechanism in an SPE strategy through which by converting the internal TLAC via contractual terms, the key operating subsidiaries can be kept outside resolution and the losses can be transmitted to the top of the group for the resolution to take place in one legal entity, be that a holding company or a parent bank, in one jurisdiction. Again this addresses the concerns that some have expressed about making resolution work cross-border in different legal regimes. So if those are the trees, what is the wood?
Until last August, the MPC had shied away from providing such explicit guidance, lest it be misinterpreted as a promise independent of the state of the economy. Instead we preferred to provide an implicit steer through the medium of the projections contained in our quarterly Inflation Report. Last August, however, the MPC decided that more explicit guidance about our reaction function could be helpful. Rather than aiming to provide more stimulus as in the academic literature, we were merely seeking to ensure that the recovery was not nipped in the bud by a premature rise in market interest rates, despite there still being a significant margin of economic slack. We said then that we would not even countenance a rise in Bank Rate until unemployment had fallen to 7%, subject to overrides relating to excessive upward movements in inflation expectations and to the risks to financial stability, the latter being policed by the Financial Policy Committee. We chose unemployment in part because its behaviour is directly linked to one of the key uncertainties at the current juncture, namely the scope for a recovery in productivity. This has been unusually weak since the onset of the crisis for reasons we do not yet fully understand (Chart 2). If productivity rebounded, then unemployment would fall slowly. But in that case, there would also be more scope to maintain an expansionary policy before inflationary pressures began to rise.

Thus, by markedly loosening the monetary reins, we aimed to trigger an easing of lending conditions and discourage investment in Swiss francs. The volume of lending in Switzerland continued to rise, albeit at a reduced pace, but credit lines granted to Swiss borrowers were now less used. To date, the state of the bank loan market reflects a drop in demand and a slight tightening of lending conditions in connection with the decline of the economy, rather than an actual credit crunch. On the other hand, we have noted a substantial deterioration in financing conditions for companies on the capital market due to the prevalent mood of uncertainty and the shortage of liquidity. This is why we decided, on 12 March, to intervene in those market segments where the imbalances were most pronounced. BIS Review 48/2009  3  In this delicate phase of worsening credit market conditions, our monetary policy strategy proved to be particularly well chosen. Unlike most other central banks, the SNB has made it its objective to stabilise a market interest rate – the three-month Swiss franc Libor, which serves as a reference for numerous commercial rates – rather than a rate reflecting central banks’ short-term refinancing conditions for commercial banks. By keeping the Libor well under control, we have managed to shelter the Swiss market from the kind of degradation of credit conditions experienced by markets abroad.
3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  In 2016 we setup a formalised talent management process for all employees, to ensure everyone has equal access to opportunities to discuss their careers. To enable us to continue to hire graduates from a broader set of disciplines and train them as economists and technical specialists we have introduced our Central Banking Qualification, in which new hires can earn Masters Degrees in Central Banking. And now around half of our graduates study economics, with the remainder plucked from the sciences, business and the humanities. To help develop the next generation, we are working with schools and universities to encourage a more diverse set of students to study economics and finance. We provide free classroom materials through our econoME initiative, and by the end of 2018 one quarter of all state secondary schools had registered for the programme, reaching an audience of 90,000 students. Over the past year we have made more than 300 school visits, of which 75 were by the Bank's committee members, including myself. Second, fostering an inclusive culture As we attract a more diverse workforce, we’re taking a number of initiatives to enable and encourage participation. Traditionally central banks have been notoriously hierarchical and deferential. To break down these barriers, we have changed how we make decisions to ensure that everyone participating has the same information at the same time, and can put forth their views.

However, and this is a point I have made elsewhere, monetary policy is too blunt an instrument for addressing specific risks to financial stability, and it can sometimes cause collateral damage to the rest of the economy if it tries to do so. [10] An integrated policy framework could perhaps shed light on the circumstances under which monetary policy could also serve financial stability objectives, and whether there are benefits to jointly calibrating monetary policy and macroprudential policy, as well as how this calibration should be done. The BIS and IMF have both been undertaking research on these issues. Central bankers have at the same time gained considerable experience in employing an eclectic mix of policy instruments, with varying degrees of success. There is merit in bringing these practical experiences to bear in formulating an integrated policy framework. Conclusion Developing eﬀective policy instruments and using them in a coherent fashion will enhance macroeconomic and macro-financial stability. It will help to make financial globalisation safer, especially for EMEs, at a time when there are growing risks of fragmentation in international economic relationships. Your task is therefore vital. I wish you a fruitful conference ahead. [1] IMF Balance of Payments, IMF International Financial Statistics, MAS calculations. [2] Fratzscher, M., Lo Duca, M. and Straub, R. (2013), “On the international spillovers of US quantitative  easing”, ECB Working Paper No. 1557; Bhattarai, Chatterjee, and Park (2017), “Global Spillover Eﬀects of US Uncertainty”, Fed Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working Paper No.
In other words, domestic demand seems to be on the way to taking over as the main driving force for the ongoing expansion. It also looks as though last month’s Budget Bill will stimulate consumption in both the private and the public sector, above all next year. So we judge that fiscal policy will be more expansionary than we assumed in June. Today, moreover, there is the effect of a monetary policy that is more expansionary than at the time of our assessment in June. Of course we foresee that this, too, will contribute to a somewhat stronger increase in domestic demand than was assumed in June. Exports were weaker than expected in the first half-year but recent signals (monthly export statistics and business survey data on export orders) point to some increase. The favourable international trend is generating general conditions for good export growth. At present a weak krona is contributing to the stimulus. All this points to some acceleration of growth next year, followed by a good continuation in the following year. The labour market The situation in the labour market is still difficult to assess. Due to technical changes in the labour force surveys, interpreting recent developments has been particularly hazardous. With this reservation, there are some signs that the labour market is beginning to improve. The national accounts indicate that hours worked started to rise in the second quarter this year. So it looks as though firms’ possibilities of stepping up production without taking on more labour are becoming increasingly limited.

–  We are also exploring an “all-in-one” addressing system, that will enable us to pay someone electronically using the payee’s mobile number, email address, social network account, or other proxies. No need to know the payee’s bank account number. Two, seamless data sharing through publication of open Application Programming Interfaces, or APIs. –  We just had a two-day API conference earlier this week, where industry players shared their views on how we can take the API strategy forward. –  MAS is working with FIs to leverage on new technologies to share aggregated data to improve market and risk analyses, forecasts and projections. We are committed to building a Smart Financial Centre, where innovation is pervasive and technology is used widely to: •  Increase efficiency  •  Manage risks better  •  Create new opportunities  •  Improve people’s lives. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In recent weeks, my team has been travelling across the country, meeting with members of the public, businesses, community leaders, and students. This is not just to explain our work, but to also hear from them to get a better pulse of the nation. We will continue to simplify our messages to make them more relatable and easier to understand. In the same spirit, today's Symposium will offer a further opportunity to engage the public in deeper discussions around our work. It is my hope that the Symposium will also serve as a springboard for others to build on in order to move us forward in the interest of the nation. I am sure that the sessions today will be informative, lively and engaging, and so I don't plan to summarise the issues that will be covered. But if anything, I thought that it would be important for me to speak about the economy. Even as we face headwinds from abroad, domestic economic activity has already exceeded pre-pandemic levels. From real wages and employment prospects to investments and domestic demand, various indicators point to relative strength in our economy. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  This underscores the importance of a solid foundation. We entered the pandemic crisis economically stable and well buffered. We could not have achieved this without our sound fundamentals and the conventions of measured and evidence-based policymaking – as they say, "sains dan data". This is especially true of monetary policy.

The B40 and vulnerable groups are the ones who will be the most affected if we let inflation get out of hand, and we will not be able to preserve sustainable growth over the longer term. Let us also not forget that keeping rates too low for too long can have damaging effects on the economy. The devastation of the Global Financial Crisis more than a decade ago, which was rooted in the US housing market and caused a synchronised global recession, should continue to serve as a sober reminder of this. Let me briefly now turn to the second thing on everyone's mind when they think about the economy - the ringgit. When it comes to the ringgit, BNM's role is to make sure that its value does not swing too fast or too much either way, and to allow an orderly price discovery. Under a flexible exchange rate, it is reasonable for the ringgit to fluctuate from time to time. These adjustments allow the domestic economy to adjust to global economic and financial shocks. We saw this during the Federal Reserve's rapid and large interest rate adjustments last year, which caused huge shocks to the global economy. At one point, the ringgit declined as much as 11.5% between end-March to early November, before appreciating by 7.8% towards the year end. Yet the real economy grew by 8.7% during the year, thanks in no small part to the ringgit's role as a shock absorber.