samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chart 3: Percentage of central banks with  Chart 4: Governors’ and other policymakers’ 28  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  28  responsibility for bank supervision  speeches  Banking supervision inside the central bank Banking supervision outside the central bank  Speeches per year 100  Percentages of central banks 70  90  60  70  80  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  Sources: Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys: World  2010  2000  1990  1980  1970  1960  1950  1940  0  2011  1930  2007  10  0 1920  2003  20  10  Source: Bank of England. Bank (2003, 2007, 2011). Chart 5: Central bank transparency indices Sveriges Riksbank  Overall transparency score 15  Swiss National Bank Reserve Bank of Australia  12  Bank of Canada  9  Norges Bank  6  Reserve National Bank of New Zealand Bank of Japan  3  European Central Bank Federal Reserve  latest  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  0  Bank of England  Sources: Dincer and Eichengreen (2015) for data up to 2014, Bank of England calculations based on the index of Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) for latest datapoint.

Notes: Charts show number of mentions per decade  Chart 7: Publications containing ‘central bank communication’ as a percentage of publications containing ‘central bank’ Google Books (LHS) 0.3  Google Scholar (RHS) Per cent  Per cent  1.5  0 2015  0 2008  0.25 2001  0.05 1994  0.5  1987  0.1  1980  0.75  1973  0.15  1966  1  1959  0.2  1952  1.25  1945  0.25  Source: Google Books Corpus, search of http://scholar.google.com on 23/03/2017. Notes: Based on the methodology of Hansen and McMahon (2016). 31  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  31  Chart 8A: Word cloud for “labour market” topic  Chart 8B: Fraction of MPC minutes devoted to  in MPC minutes  “labour market” topic Proportion of minutes 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  0  Source: Bank of England calculations based on methodology of  Source: Bank of England calculations based on methodology of  Hansen, McMahon and Prat (2014). Hansen, McMahon and Prat (2014). Notes: Each word cloud represents the probability distribution of  Notes: The procedure estimates the allocation of each month’s  words within a given topic; the size of the word indicates its  MPC minutes to a topic which we label “labour market”. The  probability of occurring within that topic. chart shows a three-month moving average.
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 15  20  21  22  23  24  Figure 11 Oil and food price forecasts (1) (2) (levels)  Oil Jun.22 Report  125  Mar.22 Report  Foods Jun.22 Report  180  Mar.22 Report  104  100  83  94 69  75  83  155  160  92  140  50  155  147 126  77  157  139  135  120 100  25 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24  80 16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  (1) For oil it is the averaged WTI and Brent price. For foods, it is the FAO index. (2) Effective price/index is average for each year. DoƩed lines show the 2022-2024 projecƟons contained in each MP Report. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg.

On the one hand, it allows the economy a sufficiently long time span to accommodate significant changes in prices and monetary policy without entailing excessive costs in terms of lost activity or employment. The current environment is a good example of this. In the face of a shock such as the one we are dealing with, a shorter-term target would force a much more significant rise in the rate, thus increasing sharply the costs to the economy. On the other hand, a 24-month time horizon is a sufficient time limit for households and firms to avoid being affected by the uncertainty that could result from being unable to correctly anticipate how inflation will unfold. At a time when our economy is going through complex circumstances, reducing the spaces of uncertainty is greatly appreciated. Certainly, some of these spaces are beyond our ability to act, such as the war in Ukraine or monetary tightening in the world. But there are others where we do have the power to act. On our side, by assuring all those who live in Chile that the Central Bank will continue to do everything necessary to bring inflation down and return it to the defined target within the appropriate time frame. Maintaining and fulfilling this commitment is vital to help mitigate the costs that high inflation has on Chilean families.
Monetary policy, may, as Jeremy Stein said when he was at the Federal Reserve, be effective in tempering financial stability risks because when we change interest rates it “gets in all the cracks”. But because it gets in all of the cracks across all of the economy, using interest rates to deal with financial stability risks can carry a high cost. It is a very blunt instrument that affects the economy as a whole. So although it is an effective line of defence, it should be seen as one of the last lines of defence. The question then becomes how do we ensure that it does not – because we lack other instruments – have to be used as a first line of defence? Here the financial crisis and recession has led to the development of what is now called “macroprudential policy”. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In essence, macroprudential policy means using the regulatory “stance”, the underlying settings of the regulation of the financial sector, first to reduce the probability and impact of systemic crisis and then, by varying those settings, to counter emerging threats to financial stability. The Bank now has a sister committee to the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), with extensive powers to set and change the regulatory stance for the financial system as a whole in order to safeguard financial stability.

The objective is to see not just how each individual bank copes, but also how, when you put together all their responses to the stress, the system performs as whole. And the scenario we have developed is deliberately not what we think is likely to happen. In the stress scenario the UK suffers a severe recession: a drop of 4% in GDP and a rise in unemployment of over 5 percentage points. Due to the current account position, interest rates have to increase. House prices drop by 35%. This stress is a severe one; a chain of events and challenges that is very unlikely. But it is one that could plausibly happen. Many of these things have happened in the UK before: in the last recession, GDP dropped by 7%, in the early 90s recession, the unemployment rate rose by almost 4 percentage points and interest rates had to rise to nearly 15%. To repeat, this is not a combination of events that we expect to happen or think likely. But we do want our banks to be resilient to this level of stress, to such an unlikely but plausible scenario. We do want the financial system as a whole to be able to withstand such a shock without a breakdown in the essential functions on which the economy depends. And if we find that individual banks or the system as a whole are not resilient we will need to consider how stability should be reinforced.
Mr George discusses national and regional economic prospects in the light of the external environment  Speech given by Mr E A J George, Governor of the Bank of England, to the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce & Industry and Prince’s Trust on 26 January 2000. *  *  *  Mr President, Ladies and Gentlemen, It seems only a very short time ago that I last had the pleasure of visiting Northern Ireland - in fact it was in May 1998. Time flies when the world about us is changing fast as it certainly has been in so many respects in the intervening period. Let me start with the world economy. We were already then in the grip of the financial shock that had started in emerging markets in Asia in 1997. But that shock intensified through 1998 - spreading to Russia and parts of Latin America and elsewhere - and at one point, following the collapse of the US hedge fund LTCM, threatening to engulf the financial system of the industrial world. The economic consequence of this financial turmoil was a sharp slowdown in the world economy to around half its longer-term trend rate of growth. It could have been far worse. The slowdown could have turned into an actual downturn had the industrial countries - led by the United States and the United Kingdom and closely followed by the Eurozone and Japan - not succeeded in stimulating their own, domestic, demand.

Thirdly, Regtech benefits regulators: Earlier, Deputy Governor Fan had this to say, “In the era of the digital economy, the financial business environment is opening up more and more, services are becoming more virtual, business boundaries are blurring, and financial risks are becoming more contagious.” We at the HKMA recognise the importance of Regtech in managing the risks associated with the digital economy. Regtech can play a critical role in helping banks to maintain operational resilience, and that in turn makes it easier for regulators to better manage overall risk in the financial system. 8. I particularly enjoyed the analogy made by Mr Benoît Cœuré. Indeed, we regulators are often 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  referred to as watchdogs. Benoit is more specific. He noted that banks are like greyhounds – usually fast at adopting new technologies; while regulators are like bloodhounds – a bit slow and stubborn but having financial stability as their key priority. In fact though, I have to say that the HKMA is increasingly acting like a greyhound in our efforts to promote Regtech. How to overcome Regtech adoption challenges 9. So we have put forward clear evidence that Regtech can benefit many different stakeholders. But we also know that there are challenges associated with Regtech adoption. Part of our Regtech 2025 vision is to see Regtech being extensively adopted by the Hong Kong banking sector. To facilitate this, we aim to share success stories of Regtech implementation – how others overcame the challenges and develop practical guidance to banks.
Domestic and to an even greater degree foreign banks (which had better access to liquidity from their parent banks) increased their lending at a rapid rate and demand was further boosted by rather lenient fiscal policy in Latvia and Lithuania, although not in Estonia. However, the rapid growth led to the economies overheating. As early as 2007, for instance, the rate of wage increase was 20–30 per cent a year, bank lending to the corporate sector increased by 30–50 per cent and lending to the private sector by 50–70 per cent. The deficit in the current account was 25 per cent of GDP, although that in Lithuania was slightly lower. Foreign analysts, such as the IMF, came to the conclusion that this development was not sustainable in the long run. The course of the crisis As a result of the large imbalances in the Baltic economies, developments would sooner or later have led to an economic crisis regardless of the external circumstances. Now the global financial crisis acted as the trigger. Investors no longer wished to take on as much risk and as the Baltic region was considered risky, with a risk of their currencies devaluating, capital was withdrawn from the region. Governments and banks, both local and foreign-owned, experienced difficulties in finding funding. The outflow led to an acute currency crisis in Latvia.

This forms a natural part of our work in the financial stability field, which also encompasses other countries where the Swedish banks have a significant presence. We analyse statistics and other information from these countries and we discuss developments with management and employees at  2  BIS Review 11/2010  their central banks, governments and financial supervisory authorities. We also follow the reports on these countries from other sources such as the IMF, the EU/ECB and market data. Representatives of the Riksbank have accompanied the IMF on several of their visits to the Baltic countries and have taken part in the discussions with governments and public authorities there. The purpose of this participation, which has been at the invitation of the countries concerned and of the IMF on each individual occasion, has been to acquire up-todate knowledge of the situation in the country and of the negotiations, so that the Riksbank could, if necessary, provide financial support at very short notice. The Riksbank’s Financial Stability Report, which is published twice a year, sounded a warning as early as 2005 regarding economic developments in the Baltic region and the tone has gradually sharpened in the reports published since then. The Financial Stability Report also publishes the results of stress tests, in which the banks’ resilience is tested in the light of improbable but nevertheless possible scenarios. Examples of some of the scenarios tested include the effects on the banks of various crisis situations in the Baltic region.
Ravi Menon: Financial regulation - the forward agenda Keynote address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Annual Forum 2017, Singapore, 20 March 2017. * * * Mr Greg Medcraft, Chairman of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I am happy to join you for this ASIC Annual Forum on “Future Focus”, and congratulate ASIC for the choice of a timely topic. The global financial system experienced nine years ago a most devastating crisis. In response, we saw the implementation of perhaps the most wide-ranging set of regulatory reforms ever. We are now at an inflection point. I see three key areas of focus in the regulatory agenda going forward: First, take stock of the reforms to-date, with a focus on evaluating their effectiveness and effects. Second, go beyond rule-setting to foster a culture of trust and risk governance in our financial institutions and markets. Third, position regulation for the technological changes sweeping the financial industry, to harness the opportunities they present while managing their risks. Evaluating the effects of regulatory reforms Let me start with a stocktake of the regulatory reforms. Basically, the reforms set out to address the fault-lines that caused or exacerbated the global financial crisis of 2008. There are four key thrusts: Build resilient financial institutions. This is being done chiefly through the Basel III reforms, strengthening capital and liquidity buffers in banks. End too-big-to-fail.

Moreover, the Law incorporates a number of incentives for foundations to relinquish control of the banks in which they participate, something that will normally happen in most cases in less than four years. We believe that this approach will certainly promote better business management and facilitate access to capital markets. In doing so it will contribute to a smoother adjustment by saving banks to the new and very demanding environment, thereby contributing to the strength of the institutions themselves and to financial stability. But more importantly, the highly relevant social objectives of the cajas are fully preserved through the operation of the foundations. These foundations continue to contribute very 4/5  significantly to social welfare. It is just that the foundations´ wealth will now be more diversified and, therefore, they are likely to obtain a more robust stream of income with which to finance their activities. Of course, I would not dare claim that this formula be pursued everywhere. Other reform strategies may also work in other jurisdictions. Yet, I strongly believe that some form of restructuring is required in the European banking market and that the strategy followed in Spain is a reasonable response to the new challenges all credit institutions have to face while preserving the essence of the social value that saving banks have historically provided. Thank you for your attention. 5/5
Such examples include: establishing new deposit insurance systems and enhancing existing ones and contributing to safeguarding the stability of financial systems, by promoting international cooperation and encouraging wide international contact among deposit insurers and other interested parties. All these efforts have helped our deposit insurance scheme grow. Since the inception of the ADIA, the Bank of Albania has been strategically committed to creating and maintaining an efficient and effective deposit insurance scheme in Albania. From the beginning, one of the Bank of Albania’s responsibilities has been to develop a stable and safe banking system. Its efforts towards the new architecture of the banking sector – guided by international standards and consumer protection principles, and in coordination with government – have helped in setting up the Albanian Deposit Insurance Agency. The Parliament approved the ADIA law in 2002 to restore public confidence in the nation’s banking system. The Bank of Albania, by law, is the supervisory authority of the ADIA. The role played by deposit insurers is essential in crisis prevention and management, as already proved by the experience during the global financial crisis. This role has proactively evolved towards mitigating financial system vulnerabilities even in the absence of deposit runs or banks in default. It is now a fact that deposit guarantee schemes mitigated the recent financial crisis, using every possible instrument available to them, such as: increasing the deposits coverage limit; expanding the scope of the guarantee scheme; and providing faster deposit pay-outs or even liquidity support.

Of course, the topic becomes more sensitive considering the current global financial complexity and its fast-changing landscape, and in view of the newly-acquired functions of the Bank of Albania and ADIA under the new law “On the recovery and resolution of banks in the Republic of Albania”. According to this law, the Bank of Albania has been assigned as the Resolution Authority, whereas the Albanian Deposit Insurance Agency is responsible for the administration of the resolution fund, which encompasses investing it in accordance with the policy approved by the Resolution Authority. Moreover, the law gives a new role to ADIA as an important partner in drafting resolution plans, as well as a new source of financing banks’ resolution, therefore increasing the pool of resources available to the Bank of Albania for resolving failing banks. So, to conclude, once again, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today. It is a pleasure to have you here and I hope you enjoy the rest of your stay in Tirana. I wish you all a successful event! Thank you! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
The Bank of Thailand has been proactive in this aspect. We have already upgraded our cheque clearing system from paper-based to image-based system, namely ICAS in Bangkok and the Metropolitan areas and we will launch the ICAS for the entire country within next year, and the new version of BAHTNET system will also be launched next year. In addition, a policy to set up a system for local switching (i.e. a system for switching, clearing, and settlement of domestic payment transactions via local debit card) has been prescribed, and will come into force within 2013. •  In Long Term (beyond 2015), ASEAN payment and settlement linkage should be explored. Currently, the Bank of Thailand is exploring the potential of linking our payment and settlement systems with that of other countries, such as the linkage with Hong Kong USD CHATS which aims to reduce FX settlement risk. The second consideration is new channel of payment and new technology Advanced development in Information and Communication Technology (ICT) has made it possible for money to move faster and more safely. Important development nowadays is ATM ASEANPay, operated by National ITMX, which already connects ATM system between Thailand and Malaysia. More connections will be made in the future, which will help facilitate retail payment and money remittance across ASEAN countries. Moreover, other payment channels and instruments such as e-banking, e-payment, and mobile payment will play an important role in enhancing efficiency and inclusiveness of financial services.

Ladies and Gentlemen, When we talk about Thai banking system, I think it can be claimed, now, that we have safe and sound banking sector with sustained profitability, despite the ongoing global financial crisis and severe flood last year. The financial institutions have robust risk management system. The average capital adequacy ratio is highly above the minimum requirement at around 15%. Loans expand in line with economic recovery, while banks increase provision in anticipation of global economy. Loan quality also improves as reflected in the reduction in Non-Performing Loan ratio. There is also adequate liquidity in the system. In the second quarter of 2012, the banking system reported net profit of 49 billion baht, increasing 21% from the last quarter. While we have a stable and strong banking system, there are new challenges coming from the regional integration of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. The AEC is not, and has no intention of transforming ASEAN into a European style union. What the AEC does aim to do is to “transform ASEAN into a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region of equitable economic development, and a region fully integrated into the global economy”. 1 The AEC blueprint crystallizes this in its goal of a single market and production base by achieving free flow of goods, services, investment, and skilled labor, and freer flow of capital, while continuing to reach out to the rest of the world. The adoption of AEC will have many implications on financial institutions and central bank.
When prices for retail services, such as the use of cards or cash, are transparent and reflect the cost of production, they give incentives to efficient use of each instrument. Again, if actual costs of cash services were transparent to consumers and if the use of cash was priced according to the cost of providing cash services, the use of cards would probably increase substantially. I am sure that we will move in that direction, even though consumer acceptance of paying for the use of cash will increase only at a slow pace. Thank you.

In Chile, activity and domestic demand, specially consumption, have not worsened significantly. This does not mean that our vision of the effects that the crisis in the developed world will have on our economy or the rest of the world has changed. However, it is a fact that activity at the beginning of the year is at a higher level than we envisaged a few months ago. On the other hand, this has been compounded by an increase in the oil price. Political tensions in the Middle East have again put pressure on this price, thus affecting domestic prices. The effects of a higher oil price can be interpreted at least twofold, with opposing implications for monetary policy. On one hand, in a situation of tight output gaps – as is the case of many emerging economies, Chile among them – an increase in the price of energy may exacerbate domestic inflationary pressure, making the dynamics of inflation more complex and demanding great care when assessing the evolution of the inflation trend. On the other hand, in the face of existing risk scenarios, an increase in the oil price also has a negative effect on world activity. If we take into account the fragile state of households, businesses and governments in the developed world, a higher price of energy may further weaken their position and lead to a more lasting and deeper economic fragility.