samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As an industry, banking institutions should continue to share infrastructure cost and compete on providing quality products and services. Basic payment infrastructure should not be a tool for competitive edge but rather as a means to reduce cost and adopting common standards. Migration to E-Payments to achieve cost savings Accelerating the migration to e-payments is one of the key strategies in the Financial Sector Blueprint. On numerous occasions we had highlighted that a successful migration has the potential to drive further efficiency gains and cost savings. It will improve the country’s competitive position. Research has suggested that successful migration to e-payments can save the country in terms of costs (of about 1% of GDP annually). Today, cheques and cash remain prevalent in Malaysia. Based on the last 3 years data, an average of 205 million cheques totalling to about RM2 trillion were issued on an annual basis. Our preliminary estimates showed that at RM2.70 cost per unit, the banking industry spends at least RM544 million annually on extending cheques issuing services. This is an expensive way of doing business. In terms of cash, over the last 3 years, an average of 547 million cash withdrawals at ATMs were made amounting to RM276 billion per annum. This represents 93% of the total financial transactions conducted at the ATMs, while only 7% of the ATM transactions were for noncash withdrawal.

After a thorough examination by a team of international experts, our financial system was certified as being healthy, well supervised in the context of a comprehensive legal framework, and strongly compliant with most of the relevant international standards and codes. We cannot, of course, afford to be complacent. A good reputation takes time and considerable effort to earn, but can easily be lost. It is the joint responsibility of the CBM and the MFSA, the credit institutions and the other financial service providers, and of all market participants, including the financial lawyers and accountants, to ensure that Malta’s financial centre remains synonymous with integrity, efficiency and reasonable costs. I emphasize this point because the recent rapid growth in the depth and breadth of the financial sector, and the expectation of further expansion, has sometimes given rise to behaviour - such as the use of aggressive methods to induce prospective customers to buy financial products and services and the resort to misleading advertising - which stretches the interpretation of our laws and regulations close to their limit. There should be no doubt in anybody’s mind that the CBM and the MFSA, acting in the common interest, will continue to exercise their respective responsibilities with diligence and rigour to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system. In conclusion, I would like to wish Mediterranean Bank success in their Malta venture and to express the hope that their presence here will also serve to enhance the reputation of our financial centre. 2  BIS Review 92/2006
The experiences during the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the formation of the new monetary policy regime, which targets low, stable inflation. The inflation target has been set at 2 per cent. That level allows some leeway to zero inflation, which, among other things, reduces the risk of deflation and enables adjustments in relative wages without normally requiring nominal wage decreases for different groups in the labour market. On the whole, as I mentioned, it has also worked well. Inflation has fallen at the same time as economic growth has been relatively high compared with the immediately preceding decades (see Chart 2). Unemployment has gradually declined since the crisis in the early 1990s, even though it is considerably higher than in the 1960s. After the introduction of the inflation target, we thereby had maybe the clearest evidence that there is no trade-off between inflation and unemployment since both fell at the same time during the 1990s. The absence of a long-term relationship between inflation and unemployment has also been confirmed by extensive studies in a large number of OECD countries. Monetary policy and employment in the short term Having now spoken about the Riksbank’s inability to influence employment in the long run, the question remains of how monetary policy can affect employment in the short term. Monetary policy can have a short-term impact on economic activity and therefore at best reduce the fluctuations in the cyclically determined component of unemployment. 2  BIS Review 65/2004  Monetary policy is estimated to affect inflation 1-2 years ahead.

However, I think it’s important to clarify a number of points regarding the criticism in which a number of commentators have claimed that the Riksbank’s actions have caused the loss of 20,000 to 75,000 jobs. The first is that we have an entirely symmetric approach to deviations from the target. It is just as bad to undershoot the target as to overshoot it. Sometimes I get the impression that at least some of the criticism is based on the idea that the Riksbank has some kind of “hidden agenda” that is leading us to deliberately try to keep inflation below our set target, or at least that we think it’s less problematic if inflation is below target than above it. I can assure you that we have no such “hidden agenda”. The Riksbank always aims to meet the inflation target. The second is that there is no such simple relationship between interest rate decisions and unemployment, as the criticism suggests. Were the repo rate able to steer developments in the economy so directly, inflation targeting would be much easier, but this is not the case. The economy is exposed to new shocks all the time, and it is difficult to discern their significance and how they can be countered by monetary policy.
Because inflation expectations matter to the behaviour of households and firms, the critical aspect of monetary policy is how the decisions of the central bank influence those expectations. As Michael Woodford has put it, “not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current conditions, very little else matters”. Indeed, one can argue that the real influence of monetary policy is less the effect of any individual monthly decision on interest rates and more the ability of the framework of policy to condition inflation expectations. The precise “rule” which central banks follow is less important than their ability to condition expectations. That is a fundamental point on which my later argument will rest. It should be clear that, just as Maradona could not hope to score in every game by running towards goal in a straight line, so monetary policy cannot hope to meet the inflation target by leaving official interest rates unchanged indefinitely. Rates must always be set in a way that is consistent with the overall strategy of keeping inflation on track to meet the target; sometimes that will imply changes in rates, at other times not. Learning and its implication for monetary policy The academic literature on monetary policy rules has performed a great service in emphasising the importance of expectations. But there are two basic problems with the use of rules. The first is that the validity of any given rule depends upon the model of the economy that underlies it being true.

and in terms of residential investment, which is slowing somewhat due to a tightening of financial conditions. As I have said, the extraordinary savings accumulated during the pandemic were concentrated among higher-income households, whose portfolios are also more diversified. According to the 2020 Spanish Survey of Household Finances, real assets1 accounted for 88% of the total assets held by households below the 20th percentile of the distribution (with their principal residence accounting for 66% of the total). However, for households in the 90th income percentile, real assets represented 73% of all assets and the principal residence just 34%. Similarly, a very small percentage of low-income households have listed shares or investment funds in their portfolios (less than 3%, compared with 33% and 22%, respectively, of households in the top decile of the distribution). One factor that influences households’ investment decisions is familiarity with financial products. Indeed, as the Bestinver-IESE/CIF observatory has shown, even in a study targeted at people more likely to be acquainted with financial investments, familiarity with savings vehicles and financial decisions vary across income, age and gender groups. These findings are consistent with those of the Banco de España’s latest Survey of Financial Competences. This survey, based on a representative sample of the Spanish population aged between 18 and 79, shows broad differences in the level of familiarity with the most common financial products.
I trust that the topics today help us consider the state of play of financial literacy in Malaysia, what works and how to improve our financial education interventions. I also look forward to the debate on the implications of digitalisation on financial literacy and consumer protection – this can sharpen our appreciation for the difficult trade-offs between the benefits and risks of digitalisation to financial consumers, and consider the role of digital financial literacy in promoting financial well-being in the digital age. Distinguished guests, Neil Armstrong once said that "research is creating new knowledge". As policymakers and practitioners, the research of the sort we will be deliberating today is exciting because it introduces valuable insights into designing and evaluating effective interventions, tailored to the needs of those in our population. There are many ideas out there on promoting better education outcomes – be it by refreshing traditional delivery approaches (like competitions, classes or webinars) or deploying new tools such as edutainment games or those driven by artificial intelligence. However, what matters most is not the novelty of new approaches, but whether or not our efforts work well – and yield a high return in terms of financial literacy and financial well-being. Insights from the research are important to develop targeted interventions that address the financial education needs in our population. It can also give answers to what are the challenges faced by consumers to access or obtain financial education.

With the rapid changes in society, technology and economy, we need to remain flexible, constantly iterating financial education approaches to adapt to what works best in the given context. This is where fresh ideas are welcomed, like those being featured and celebrated today. On this, I would specifically acknowledge and congratulate the three winners of the Best Paper Awards today. I understand that the winners and other shortlisted papers will be given the opportunity to publish their research in a renowned academic journal or an edited publication. I trust that their exemplary work will inspire many others to contribute to this area of research. In closing, I am hopeful that all of us here today can be increasingly effective in our shared aim to promote financial literacy in Malaysia. Today's event is a step in that direction. Let us take this opportunity to learn from one another and reimagine new paths forward – helping Malaysians regain financial resilience and improve their financial well-being. Thank you. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
26.06.2018  Taking up of office by the Governor of the Banco de España  Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Honourable Ministers and Authorities, ladies and gentlemen, dear colleagues and friends, I believe today calls, above all, for a round of gratitude. First, I wish to thank Ministers Calviño and Montero for their presence here today. May they rest assured I am firmly committed to maintaining the close and loyal collaboration traditionally offered by the Banco de España to the Ministries for the Economy and Finance. I also wish to thank the previous minister, Román Escolano, for his presence at this ceremony, and for his proposal and defence of my appointment before the Parliamentary Committee for the Economy and Competitiveness. And my gratitude extends to the representatives of the Committee accompanying us today. I undertake to make every effort to improve the capacity of the Banco de España to face the challenges addressed during the Parliamentary Committee hearing. Ministers, as I am surrounded above all by colleagues, I trust you will allow me to continue in a more informal tone. As you know, including a three-year tour at the European Central Bank, I now have two decades behind me at the Banco de España. Professionally speaking, this is, then, my home. It is a real honour for me to have been appointed governor.

The very high growth figures for productivity during the latter part of the 1990s reflected both the macroeconomic stabilisation, an expansion in the private sector relative to the public sector, and in particular the IT expansion. It is unlikely that the development will continue in the same way in the future. However, we know that productivity growth has been surprisingly high in recent years. Many economists are busy working on the question of which factors lie behind this development. It is clear that, unlike the 1990s, it is not a question of high productivity growth in the IT sector and major investment in IT. One theory that has been put forward is that it may perhaps be explained by delayed effects in other sectors of earlier IT investment; that it has quite simply taken time for companies to adjust and to take advantage of the new technology. It is thus difficult to say anything about the durability of the most recent development. However, there are many indications that the long-term increase in productivity now is higher than it was during the 1980s. The widespread structural changes that took place during the 1990s are also an indication of this. Nor should it be forgotten, that the labour force is better educated today than it was ten years ago, particularly with regard to the percentage of those with a university education. There are studies indicating that the improvement in qualifications has also contributed to the growth in productivity.
One of our greatest underlying economic strengths is our relationship with the Mainland of China, a relationship which helped fuel rapid growth in both economies over the last two decades. Our two economies maintain extensive and highly productive economic links yet at the same time operate entirely separate economic systems under the one country, two systems formula. Not much more than a year ago, just before the Asian financial crisis erupted and on the eve of the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong, pessimists were depicting this relationship as a weakness rather than a strength: they were predicting extensive meddling by the Central Government, and consequently a loss of autonomy and dynamism in Hong Kong. They have been very wrong on this. The track record so far has been impressive, and all the more so given the succession of crises over the last year. As far as Hong Kong’s monetary system is concerned, the transfer of sovereignty has meant more, not less, autonomy for Hong Kong. Whereas before the handover monetary policy often required close consultations with the Secretary of State in London, the Central Government in BIS Review 98/1998  -6-  Beijing has left such matters entirely in the hands of the HKSAR Government. Furthermore, it has strongly and clearly reiterated its support for what we are doing, its confidence in our ability to manage things on our own and its preparedness to help in the unlikely event that help is needed.

Under our rule-based currency board system, any change in the Hong Kong dollar monetary base must be strictly matched, at the linked exchange rate, by a corresponding change in the amount of foreign reserves held by the currency board. This is an autopilot mechanism, in which we in the HKMA have minimal discretion: the currency board simply acts passively in response to capital flows. Under the autopilot mechanism, an expansion of the monetary base causes interest rates to fall; a contraction causes them to rise. The crucial element in the monetary base influencing the rise and fall of interest rates is the aggregate balance that banks maintain in their clearing accounts held with the currency board. Notwithstanding the enormous volume of transactions that goes through our banks, the aggregate balance is minimal, because our financial infrastructure is so efficient. We have a real-time interbank payment system and no reserve requirements, so that banks in Hong Kong do not need to maintain large balances in their clearing accounts with the currency board: in August the aggregate balance was as low as $ billion. This meant that the aggregate balance, and hence interbank interest rates, was highly sensitive to speculative attack. We saw a series of such attacks over the past year, when various currency speculators took large short positions against the Hong Kong dollar with the aim of destabilizing the linked exchange rate. On all these occasions the attacks drove up the interbank interest rates to very high levels.
Open trade policies in the crisis helped Asian economies to benefit from the upswing in global trade and growth towards the turn of the millennium (see Chart 4), which in turn supported the post-crisis recovery. However, while there may be lessons to learn, what are the important differences between emerging Asia of the 1990s and the euro area today? Emerging Asian economies had greater policy leeway than euro area countries in dealing with their crises, in that they had flexible exchange rate regimes. Some might argue that this makes it hard to say which part of the Asian experience is relevant for Europe. But I would have a different interpretation: a lack of nominal exchange rate flexibility does not preclude real exchange rate adjustment. Sharing a currency entails a fundamental trade-off. It brings considerable microeconomic benefits but it creates responsibilities for participating countries. They should run prudent policies to make asymmetric shocks less frequent, ensure that relative prices can adjust if such a shock nevertheless occurs, and be prepared to insure each other against extreme outcomes when the former mechanisms are not enough. The conditions were unfortunately not met in the euro area. National policies were run on the misguided assumption that countries, companies and households could borrow forever.

The recognition of losses was postponed and, as a consequence, capital continued to be allocated to investments with limited positive impact on Japan’s long-term growth potential, which some have called “zombie lending”4. Ultimately, this resulted in Japan’s “lost decade”, namely an extended period of anaemic growth (see Chart 3). A second lesson is that institutional and structural reforms are essential Early in the crisis, emerging Asian economies strengthened prudential regulation and supervision, together with bank governance and market transparency and discipline, in order to prevent further instability and bring domestic standards closer to the international norms.5 Furthermore, they generally acknowledged that their economic “miracle” before the crisis was not sustainable. It was driven by over-investment encouraged by Colbertist policies, implicit government guarantees, and too often, opaqueness and political interference in market mechanisms.6 As a result, at the macro level, growth was led by capital accumulation in the wrong sectors and not by a rise in total factor productivity. In Paul Krugman’s words, the Asian miracle was “the fruit of perspiration, not of inspiration”7. To address the root causes of the crisis, structural reforms aimed at improving governance and challenging vested interests, both in public policy-making and in the corporate sector,  2  See FRBSF Economic Letter (2011). “Could We Have Learned from the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98?”, February 2011. 3  See Lindgren, C.-J. et al. (1999). “Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring. Lessons from Asia”, IMF Occasional Paper, 188. 4  See Fukao, M. (2003).
Since then, we’ve seen more positive readings on China’s economy, in part due to steps the authorities have taken to reignite growth. And financial markets have definitely rebounded from their winter doldrums. Still, we’re not entirely out of the woods regarding risks from a global growth slowdown. Signs of weakness in Japan, South Korea, and some regions of Europe continue, so I am particularly vigilant about monitoring the international data. Trade tensions and ongoing uncertainty regarding Brexit continue to present downside risks. Monetary Policy What does this mean for monetary policy? At last week’s meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee decided to leave the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged, between 2-1/4 and 2-1/2 percent. We also reiterated our patient approach to assessing the need to adjust interest rates in the future. In a nutshell: The economy remains on a path of healthy growth, with a very strong labor market and without the emergence of inflationary pressures. The current setting of policy positions us well to keep it that way. Although my view that we are in the right place in terms of monetary policy has not changed of late, the reasons for it have evolved in line with the economic and financial developments I sketched out earlier in my remarks. The strength of recent data on economic activity, the rebound of growth in China, and the reversal in the tightening of financial markets all imply that near-term risks to growth have receded somewhat.

This has increased my confidence that the economy remains on track for moderate growth going forward. At the same time, recent price data reaffirm that inflationary pressures remain muted. Conclusion Looking ahead, although the baseline forecast I laid out looks very good, the situation can change. We need to remain vigilant in responding to evolving economic conditions and the outlook, with our eye on sustaining the expansion, keeping the labor market strong, and fostering price stability. Thank you. I look forward to your questions. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches