samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS Review 76/2010  1  The amounts involved are indeed sizeable, but it appears that the markets are unclear about the way in which they might be mobilised… In my view, the concrete implementation of the mechanism is taking place properly, and the most remarkable aspect is the speed with which parliamentary decisions have been taken in the countries in question. If, for some reason, Greece does not honour its commitments, might there be a need for a “plan B”? That is not part of our working assumption. Greece must and will honour its commitments. The European Commission, together with the ECB on the one hand and the IMF on the other, is following developments in the recovery programme very closely. Should we anticipate a debt restructuring programme? No, but allow me to make a general comment: the euro area has an average annual deficit – as a percentage of gross domestic product – of around 6.5% and 7%, which is substantially lower than that of the United States, Japan or the United Kingdom, where it is around 10% or higher of their gross domestic product. Sometimes, one imagines a sort of Anglo-Saxon plot against the euro. What do you think of this? No, one should be wary of any conspiracy theories. I simply believe that some international investors struggle to understand Europe and its decision-making mechanisms.

What do you think of the European Commission’s proposals for each country to create an insurance fund specifically for banks to assist them in case of need? We take a very cautious view on bank taxes. It seems to us that we must first draw the lessons from the financial crisis with regard to prudential regulations, in particular the Basel III rules. The question of a possible tax should come second. That said, I am deeply concerned by this gulf between the values of our democracies and those of the financial world, reflected particularly in the abnormal behaviours observed so often in recent years. This problem is faced by all of our democratic societies, and certainly on both sides of the Atlantic. The values of the financial world must change. In the prevailing ethos, they will no longer be tolerated as they are. 4  BIS Review 76/2010
That will tend to bear down in the 19  future on Spanish banks’ net interest income which, given the banks’ type of business, is the main component of their profit and loss account.6 In short, the financial situation of both the non-financial private sector and the financial sector is, admittedly, significantly healthier than in the previous crisis; but the degree to which the outlook for the Spanish economy has worsened, combined with uncertainty over the duration of the downturn, obliges us as supervisors to monitor closely the risks to financial stability. I believe it is important that, both in this area and in others, we take as a starting point the experience of the past crisis. And that experience should lead us to do everything possible to prevent the current situation from having a significant financial component. As we witnessed what is now a decade ago, crises that have such a component are also characterised by being deeper and longer-lasting. I thus think our shared aim should be to prevent the crisis from being accompanied by a generalised tightening of financing conditions or from seriously damaging our financial system. 6  R. Blanco (2020), "Retos del entorno de bajos tipos de interés para la política monetaria y la estabilidad financiera”, Documentos Ocasionales, Banco de España, forthcoming. 20  Fiscal policy as the main defence mechanism Generally, the various economic authorities - supranational and national alike - have appreciated the enormous dimension of the challenge facing us.

This is why the Banco de España opted, in its publication on 20 April, to prepare several alternative scenarios using different analytical tools.2 In any of the scenarios considered, confinement would translate into a very severe contraction in Spanish GDP in 2020, all the greater the longer the period during which it is necessary to retain the restrictions on economic activity, and with greater risks that the 2  See Banco de España (2020), “Reference macroeconomic scenarios for the Spanish economy after Covid-19”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 2/2020. 11  liquidity problems many economic agents are currently facing will lead to situations of insolvency. Looking ahead to next year, these scenarios outline a recovery in activity and employment which, nonetheless, would be insufficient for GDP to attain its pre-COVID-19 trend level. Specifically, in the two scenarios recently published by the Banco de España that seem most realistic at present, having ruled out the third which projected a shorter and more moderate recession, GDP is expected to fall by 9.5% and 12.4%, respectively, in 2020 (and post subsequent increases of 6.1% and 8.5% in 2021).3 The figures in the first of these scenarios do not differ significantly from those reported by other national and supranational institutions, public and private alike. Thus, for example, the Spanish Government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission have recently projected declines in our economy of 9.2%, 8% and 9.4% for 2020, respectively.
At the heart of debates about climate change, the Chilcot Inquiry into the war in Iraq, and the speed of the necessary fiscal consolidation of our public finances, lie questions about how to evaluate and respond to considerable uncertainties. At that seminar in 2005, we discussed three questions. First, in modelling the phenomenon of interest, what is the right balance between simplifying assumptions and technical rigour? Second, how open should we be about what we don’t really know? Third, in communicating uncertainty, how can we prevent the intended audience from focussing excessively on one or two parameters of the underlying distribution at the expense of the whole picture? The discussions compared the Bank of England’s fan charts for the outlook for inflation with the Met Office’s plume charts for forecasts of temperature. This paper updates that discussion, and presents some new ways of communicating uncertainty which are under evaluation by the Monetary Policy Committee. Reference to economics and meteorology is not just because the interests of some of us span both. They are two disciplines united by a common need to grapple with complex systems and communicate forecasts to a wide audience. It is not enough to explain only to experts. Much of the value of forecasts is in their being understood – in all their subtleties – by the general public, or at least sub-groups such as the agricultural industry in the case of meteorology and those involved in wage bargaining in the case of economics.

This thinking has been applied to the financial system showing that a priori identical shocks can have differing effects depending on where the shock hits. And, inspired by the literature on sand piles, Scheinkman and Woodford’s (1994) model of inventory dynamics shows how small shocks may cause aggregate fluctuations. 2  BIS Review 36/2010  different states of the system, depending on its history. 3 Many economic systems also exhibit forms of hysteresis or path dependence. For example, changing social attitudes towards personal bankruptcy, inflation or unemployment may affect equilibrium outcomes for those variables. 3. Policy responses to unpredictability  Predicting the precise timing and dynamics of instability in all of these settings is very difficult. It is, however, possible to identify a sand pile or forest as being prone to large scale instability and determine the factors that contribute to that instability. Analogously, many people, including at the Bank of England, did identify the vulnerabilities of the financial system before the crisis without actually being able to predict when or how the crisis would begin. Economists have been able to learn from other disciplines about how to cope with these types of instability. For example, insights from ecology and epidemiology have been applied to financial networks (for more discussion, see Haldane 2009), and economists have learned much from engineers about how to control dynamic systems. The key is for policymakers to focus on making the structure of the underlying system more robust to shocks.
But, above all, it has been a key tool for ensuring the maintenance of affected employees’ income and for improving the prospects of recouping employment once the restrictions on activity imposed by the state of alert are lifted. The particular characteristics of this shock, which temporarily shut down many workplaces, and the incentives approved for the use of this instrument after the state of alert was declared have contributed to a much greater resort to ERTEs than in past crises. Hence, if we focus on the arrangements available for permanent employees, at end-April the number of workers affected by an ERTE totalled 3.4 million. Since then, this figure has fallen significantly. Moreover, on the information available, only a very small portion of wageearners who have emerged from this situation have gone into unemployment or become idle, whereas most of those affected have returned to their pre-crisis job. These developments are qualitatively consistent with the objective pursued; namely, that ERTEs would be a temporarily used tool while the transitory shutdown in activity lasted. In late June, coinciding with the end of lockdown-easing, 1.8 million workers continued to avail themselves of an ERTE. This figure is almost half the end-April peak and accounts for close to 10% of total wage-earners, confirming that one of the characteristics of this recovery is its incompleteness. From the standpoint of the labour market, what we have is also an uneven recovery. This is because the reduction in the number of workers on ERTEs has been very uneven across the productive sectors.

It is also worth noting that other changes are under way in the markets as well as EMU. The most notable is the advances in technology which have enabled electronic trading to start to challenge traditional open outcry. In response, open outcry exchanges are looking to automate and streamline their trading through technology to reduce costs. And it would seem that the exchange-traded futures industry is coming under some pressure from the OTC derivatives market, which appears to be expanding at a more rapid pace. All of these changes will run in parallel with the introduction of the euro, and as far as competition is concerned, success in those areas may well dominate the euro factor. But I said earlier that the outcome of these competitive skirmishes cannot be simply determined in advance by an analysis of existing competitive advantages. It will depend on the efforts of the different players and on the extent to which they are well prepared in advance. Here I found your own survey rather depressing. The assessment was that relatively few market participants in London had made serious preparations for EMU, and seemed unsure of how to proceed. Only 6 per cent of brokers and own account traders had made contingency plans for the introduction of EMU. But this survey was undertaken in April of last year, and I am confident that the responses would be different today.
And once we start, at least initially, we should raise rates slowly to make sure the economy can weather less accommodative financial conditions. In sum, we should be exceptionally patient in adjusting the stance of U.S. monetary policy – even to the point of allowing a modest overshooting of our inflation target to appropriately balance the risks to our policy objectives. Before I expand on these thoughts, let me note that the views I express are my own and do not necessarily represent those of my colleagues on the FOMC or within the Federal Reserve System. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Outlook Improving growth but slack remains After many years of false starts, the economy now seems to be in the midst of more sustained solid growth. My forecast is that real gross domestic product (GDP) will increase at an average rate of about 3 percent over the next year and half. The incoming data support this outlook. In the second quarter, consumer spending grew at a solid but unspectacular 2-1/2 percent pace, and it appears to have risen at roughly the same rate during the third quarter. The news from the business sector generally has been good. Reports from our business contacts have been improving for some months and are now almost uniformly positive.

Moreover, as our population is ageing fast, we should all start to save for retirement now, and I strongly encourage banks to develop and promote more products to satisfy this growing customer segment. There is also a growing class of older people who have too little knowledge or weaker capabilities to manage their own financial wealth after retirement. This is another area that banks can help. For SMEs, which contribute significantly to employment in Thailand, we need to work together to promote their access to funding. This calls for a joint effort between the government, banking sector, and SMEs to improve available information and its flow. In this regard, as bankers, such as guests here today, are close to the SMEs, see their account movements, and provide financial advice you will play a key role here. I believe there are a lot of rooms for banks to provide funding for SMEs, both directly and indirectly, perhaps through more innovative products that can benefit from banks’ own information and more collaboration between banks. Equity financing, including venture capital, for SMEs will also be promoted in our plan. In my opinion, innovation and entrepreneurship of SME, which need supports from banks, is one of the most important drivers for Thailand to overcome the middle-income trap. As for large corporates, Thai conglomerates now operate in multiple countries, and as their businesses grow, they would require more cross-border services to meet their needs.
66 former European Economic Area (EEA) passported branches have entered the Temporary Permissions Regime (TPR) and are applying for authorisation as third country branches (TCBs)2 ;  b. A small number of former EEA branches have been authorised as subsidiaries as they have material retail deposit taking activity; and c.  Many UK banks and large international groups who have subsidiaries here have established and built out their EU subsidiaries, meaning changes in their structure and the nature of their booking models. The fundamental philosophy underpinning the statement is responsible openness A good place to start is with the guiding philosophy underpinning the PRA’s approach to international supervision – responsible openness. The UK has long been a vibrant financial centre, with banks from around the world coming here to contribute to, and benefit from, the efficiencies and diversification provided by international trade. Our banking system is characterised by: a. the scale of international business undertaken here - around one fifth of global banking activity is undertaken in the UK with overseas banks playing an important part. They account for almost half of the banking assets held in the UK; b. the range and diversity of participants - approximately 150 branches and 90 subsidiaries from 50 countries and all of the Globally Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) have entities operating in the UK; and c.  its global interconnectedness – with significant amounts of business booked cross border into and out of the UK.

  For a small number of you, we will need better information and visibility going forward to bring you in line with others. We will start that discussion with you now.   For those going in to TPR, it will be a gradual evolution. These firms have had extensive interaction with the PRA’s supervisors over the past three years – we have seen substantial preparations by  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  these firms as part of their authorisation submissions and we have worked together with firms on a large number of thematic reviews.   And, for those considering coming to the UK to operate, it provides clarity on our approach so you can consider how best to meet our expectations. For our regulatory colleagues around the world, we look forward to continuing to build our open and supportive relationships. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 18  Figure 11 Labor contribution to trend GDP growth in 2017-2026 (percentage points)  1.2  1.2 Immigration (0.1pp) Female participation (0.1pp)  0.8  0.8  Job quality (0.35pp) 0.4  0.4 Working age population (0.45pp)  0.0  0.0 Hours worked (-0.2pp)  -0.4  -0.4  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 12 Growth breakdown in Chile (percentage points)  Mining 15  15  Non-mining 8  10  10  6  6  5  5  4  4  0  0  2  2  -5  -5  0  0  -10  -10  -2  -2  -15  -4  -15 2000  2004  2008  Physical capital  2012  2016  Human capital  8  -4 2000  Mining ore  2004  2008  Revised TFP  2012  2016  GDP  Source: De la Huerta and Luttini (2017).

In this new scheme, meetings will be held roughly every six to eight weeks, in January, March, May, June, August, September, October and December of each year. In addition, the meeting will be extended from one day to one day and a half, starting the afternoon before the day of the policy decision announcement, thus giving the Board more time to discuss the background information and analyze the monetary policy options. This will give more time to gather information between meetings and to evaluate the impact of the different economic indicators on the baseline scenario, allowing for a more robust analysis of the recent evolution of the economy. The communication and the minutes of the Meetings is also being changed, in the sense of backing the decision having more information at hand than we currently do. Thus, the press release will be extended to include the main antecedents of the recent behavior of the economy, the grounds on which the Board based the decision and the voting. The minutes, meanwhile, following a usual practice in inflation-targeting central banks, will  10  provide additional information on the Board's discussion, which may be useful for the public to better understand its decisions and future implications. In addition, we have decided to publish the transcripts of the Monetary Policy Meetings with a ten-year lag. They contain information of the topics analyzed and opinions expressed by the participants, identifying who opined what. Disclosing them fulfills several objectives.
Our Report has sought to explain what happened, to provide fundamental data, to set out the decisions adopted, along with their consequences and costs, avoiding pre-judgements and relatively unfounded conclusions; but it has not masked the failings or insufficiencies, placing them in their context. In short, our Report was drafted in an attempt to serve the general interest as best possible. Thank you for your attention. 13/14

Since this time last year 10-year government bond yields in the major markets - with the notable exception of Japan - have all risen by over 100 basis points. And with credit spreads widening during much of the summer, the rates that corporate borrowers have faced have shown even greater increases. Despite this, however, it has been another very active year for you all. Over the past few years a notable feature of the international bond markets is that each subsequent year has set a new record in terms of volume, and 1999 has certainly been no exception to this. What is of particular note about issuance in 1999 though is the scale of this increase: up by almost a half from the level of 1998 - a pretty remarkable performance. I think that there are two major reasons for this increase: First, and most obvious, is the successful introduction of the euro. I can best demonstrate this with the fact that international issuance in the euro in 1999 was more than double that of the level that legacy currency issuance reached in 1998. This is a clear indication that the euro has established itself as a currency for international finance in its first year of existence. Not only did the volume of issuance rise, but perhaps even more strikingly, the diversity of issuers increased too.
Constantinos Herodotou: Introduction - 13th Limassol Economic Forum Introduction of Mr Constantinos Herodotou, Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, at the 13th Limassol Economic Forum, Limassol, 21 October 2022. *** I would like to start with thanking Yiannis and Mario for accepting my invitation to participate in this panel discussion with me. – Mario, Obrigado por aceitar o meu convite. It is a pleasure to discuss the inflation challenges during these difficult times of high inflation and elevated economic uncertainty with my Governing Council colleagues and friends Mario and Yiannis. The war in Ukraine has disrupted the return to normality that we expected after the end of the pandemic lockdown periods. Central Banks around the world are facing the challenge to put under control excessive and persistent inflationary dynamics. So it is informative to look at the main components of these inflation dynamics, in other words which items drive inflation up the most. The war exacerbated massively cost push inflation, primarily through the energy price shock. In measuring energy inflation we include among others the prices of fuel, gas as well as electricity prices. This inflationary dynamic continues to persist with energy price pressures, in the most recent measure last month, being extraordinarily high at 40.7% compared to 38.6% in August. The second major contributor to inflation is food prices which grew by 11.8% in September compared with 10.6% in August. This is attributed to higher input costs related to the energy price increases, disruptions to trade in food commodities and adverse weather conditions.

Once the decision is taken to publish accounts, it is natural to change the frequency of monetary policy meetings to six-week. This will give space for producing the accounts and yet not create confusion with regards to following meeting and any action that might be taken. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Conclusion While many uncertainties remain, actions taken during the last two months show that the Eurosystem is flexible, responsive, and, as we have said many times, ready to take any actions that may prove necessary should downside risks further materialise. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches