samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This means liquidity should continue to be ample as monetary policy in the major economies need to focus less on inflation. Ample global liquidity, therefore, will be a positive factor for financial markets this year. Second, structurally, the US dollar may need to stay with its softening tone on account of the moderated US growth and the possible narrowing of interest rate differentials that used to benefit the US dollar. This is a conjecture consistent with the current market's fundamental view. And third, because of ample liquidity, cross-border capital flows look to gain further momentum this year as international investors continue to search for yield and move further ahead on asset reallocation and diversification. This last implication is important for the region, because it will mean continued flows of capital into Asia, putting pressure on the region's exchange rates and asset prices. Therefore, managing the macro implications of persistent capital inflows, as well as the risk of volatile and abrupt capital outflows, will be, in my view, an important policy challenge this year. To me, the context underlying these implications relates very closely to the process of the unwinding of global imbalance. Such unwinding, as we know, requires a weaker path of the US dollar and higher US interest rates. A weaker US dollar is something that we have been seeing.

Based on our experience with the PEPP, we could move towards some additional flexibilities, in terms of allocation and/or volume. The way negative rates are implemented continues to be effective. If needed, the present level of the DFR is not a floor. In particular, the tiering system limits the negative side effects on bank intermediation of low-for-long interest rates. The tiering multiplier could be adapted flexibly to support the “low-for-longer” policy. I would favor a more rule-based approach to adjust the level of the multiplier. For instance, this multiplier could depend on the change in excess liquidity (net of TLTROs). As the third instrument of the quartet, our forward-guidance gives visibility to the future path of interest rates and could be enhanced by stronger commitment  Page 8 sur 9 and communication. A particular focal point is the present puzzle between the date of anticipated lift-off and the expected inflation then, which at present remains under our target. To strengthen the impact of our forward-guidance on rates, we should clarify our state-dependent reaction function. Consistent with the symmetry of our objective, our willingness to tolerate upside risks on inflation has to be more widely understood. I would not go as far as embracing flexible average inflation targeting as the Fed did in its new strategy framework: it raises several complex questions and can create excessive constraint. But the forward guidance is a more tactical and adequate tool, stating clearly that we are ready to overshoot temporarily 2% before any rise in interest rates.
The essence of the middle way is to find practical steps forward to enable emerging markets to better manage the liquidity positions of their external liabilities, and to reduce their dependence on debt finance. Crises will still occur. But the aim is to reduce their frequency and severity. To that end there is one further policy which is fundamental to the success of the middle way – transparency. 5. Transparency  Transparency is one of the most popular words in economic policy today. And for good reason. Much has been said about transparency, and, interestingly, much has been done. Why is transparency so important? In itself, transparency will neither prevent nor resolve financial crises. But transparency can help reduce the frequency of crises – by alerting not only markets but also policymakers to problems on the horizon – and their severity – by minimising the surprises about the scale of any liquidity problems. In Korea, the foreign currency exposure of its banking system was not known until after the crisis had hit. And in Thailand, the true state of the foreign exchange reserves was unknown even to its own finance ministry,  7  BIS Review 95/1999  let alone financial markets. So transparency can be seen as a “second best” policy when purist solutions to financial crises are unavailable. It is in the context of the middle way that transparency comes into its own.

The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 formally established a “dual financial system” in this jurisdiction, setting the pace for the progressive development of an Islamic financial system that is equally competitive and sound as the conventional system. The Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 consolidated and updated the earlier legislations on Islamic banking and takaful. Its focus was to elevate the standards of Islamic finance regulation in Malaysia; drive greater innovation; and promote more inclusive growth. Today, Malaysia is internationally recognised for its comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for Islamic finance. Many emerging Islamic finance markets now see Malaysia as a model to emulate in this respect. Looking back, I believe that the certainty provided by our legal and regulatory framework has contributed significantly to the development of a sound and progressive Islamic financial system in Malaysia. This brings me to my second point, – which is the present. We are faced with both opportunities and challenges as we move forward. Global Islamic financial assets stood at USD1.9 trillion in 2016 – and is estimated to reach USD3.2 trillion by 2020. Muslims now make up 24% of the world’s population . This is a very large and rapidly expanding market. The potential is enormous. Islamic financial institutions and legal professionals in Malaysia stand to gain –from this, only if we position ourselves well enough to serve this boom. Doing this will require a variety of measures, and it is beyond the scope of my address today, to talk about all of them now.
In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress required the Board of Governors to consult with the Secretary of the Treasury on regulations to implement its emergency powers.20 It also required that the Board of Governors obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury before extending emergency credit.21 To some extent, the Dodd-Frank Act codified reality. The Board of Governors and the Department of the Treasury worked closely throughout the Financial Crisis of 2008. But Congress formalized a degree of cooperation that can make it hard to draw a theoretical line between monetary and fiscal authority—or between an independent agency and a political department. I should add that this working relationship between our country's monetary and fiscal authorities deepened following the Coronavirus Aid, Recovery and Economic Stimulus Act—known as the "CARES Act." That statute appropriated roughly $ trillion in economic relief. Congress sent about a quarter of that money to the Treasury for investments in Federal Reserve programs and facilities. I look forward, in the fullness of time, to more theoretical discussions about the proper role of a central bank in administering emergency economic relief. Some of this dialogue has already begun.22 Questions that catch my interest include: What should be the guiding principles and constraints on the design and establishment of 13(3) facilities?

23 See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority," 43 J. Corp. L. 437 (2018). 24 Martin Wolf, "Monetary financing demands careful and sober management," Financial Times (Apr. 9, 2020). 25 See Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN"), "The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Provides Further Information to Financial Institutions in Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic," Press release (Apr. 3, 2020) ("Compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) remains crucial to protecting our national security by combating money laundering and related crimes, including terrorism and its financing. FinCEN expects financial institutions to continue following a riskbased approach, and to diligently adhere to their BSA obligations."). 26 See, e.g., FinCEN, "FinCEN Issues Advisory on Medical Scams Related to COVID-19 and Companion Notice Providing Filing Instructions for Financial Institutions," Press release (May 18, 2020); Financial Institution Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), "FINRA Reminds Firms to Beware of Fraud During the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic," Regulatory Notice 20-13 (May 5, 2020); U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), "SEC Charges Microcap Fraud Scheme Participants Attempting to Capitalize on the COVID-19 Pandemic," Press release (June 11, 2020). See also Jennifer Achilles and Alejo Cabranes, "Banks May Need to Update Policies to Fight COVID-19 Fraud," Law360.com (June 16, 2020) (discussing the role of banks in identifying medical fraud in light of FinCEN advisory). 27 See Randall K. Quarles, Letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Apr.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Consumer protection and financial education Welcoming address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Financial Inclusion Policymakers Forum on “Consumer Protection and Financial Education”, Kuala Lumpur, 5 April 2011. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to welcome you to this Financial Inclusion Policymakers Forum on “Consumer Protection and Financial Education”. Bank Negara Malaysia is most honoured to host this event that brings together senior officials from the regulatory community from this region and participants from agencies with an interest in developing more inclusive financial systems. Financial inclusion has now emerged as an important global agenda in ensuring sustainable long-term economic growth. The G20 summit in 2010 recognised financial inclusion as one of the main pillars of the global development agenda. This is a significant development as it reflects the global recognition and importance being given to social and economic development and for such growth to be inclusive in its outreach. Financial inclusion is an integral part of such an inclusive growth process. A high degree of financial inclusion will allow for the various segments of the economy, regardless of income levels, economic activity and regions to have access to financial services. At its most basic level, financial inclusion provides the means and opportunity for undertaking essential financial transactions for savings and the accumulations of financial buffers and having access to financing. Promoting financial inclusion, however, remains a significant challenge.

The readiness to issue a CBDC can prove an important lever to that end. - In such a context, even if the jury is still out whether we will have to use it, it is essential that we show openness to change and to investigate ant test practical solutions, among central banks and with the private sector. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
On the other hand, compared to the CPI index with the base year 1994, the CPI index with the base year 2003 includes more of the commodities groups with prices susceptible to exchange rates, and thus causes the effects of exchange rate movements on the general index to be somewhat higher. As for the PPI, the start of the release of those prices, excluding taxes, together with the index with the base year 2003 heightened the susceptibility of this index to exchange rates. Having said that, independent of the nature of the index, when compared with the pre-2001 period, the exchange rateinflation relationship is forecasted to have been at lower levels and is concluded to have weakened structurally. Graph 7: Pass-Through Effect of Exchange Rates on Prices 0.6  WPI CPI  0.5 0.4  0.3 0.2 0.1  05-04  01-04  09-03  05-03  01-03  09-02  05-02  01-02  09-01  05-01  01-01  09-00  05-00  01-00  09-99  05-99  01-99  09-98  05-98  01-98  0  Source: Kara, H., Küçük-Tuğer, H., Özlale, Ü., Tuğer.B., Yavuz, D. ve Yücel, E.M. (2005),“Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Turkey: Has it changed and to What Extent?’, TCMB, Working Paper. Another significant development stimulated by the disinflation process and the environment of relative macroeconomic stability was the launch of the operation to drop zeros from the Turkish lira, i.e. the eventual launch of the monetary reform in 2005.

Therefore, in order to make sure that central bank independence is understood, internalized and safeguarded by the public, it is necessary for them to fully comprehend the rationale of independence, understand why it is important and become convinced that central bank independence does not imply independence from society. For this reason, I firmly believe that it is vital to talk about independence frequently. 20  BIS Review 36/2005  As I have reiterated before, it is a globally accepted phenomenon that achieving price stability is the prerequisite of establishing a sound market economy and attaining sustainable growth and employment rates in the long run. Another globally accepted phenomenon is that price stability can only be achieved by employing lasting, sound and stable policies. For this reason, the public provides central banks with freedom from political authorities in order to enable them to implement the necessary long-term targets to control inflation and attain price stability, to achieve full employment and to sustain growth. This structure gives central banks the opportunity to reject the implementation of policies that pose risks to attaining price stability and creates an environment in which they can give warnings when required. These are the reasons why central bank independence is essential. Monetary policy implemented by a central bank that is able to effectively exercise its independence, is accepted by all sections of the public and the political authority.
By pursuing price stability - by keeping aggregate demand consistently, broadly in line with the underlying, structural, supply-side capacity of the economy to meet that demand - we hope to be able to moderate, rather than aggravate, the cyclical swings in output and prices and to ensure that growth is sustained in the medium term and hopefully then greater in the long term than it would otherwise be. The operation of the Monetary Policy Committee That then is what the Monetary Policy Committee is trying to do. Let me say a word about our procedures. On the Friday before our regular monthly decision-taking meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee members are given an intensive, all-day, briefing by the Bank of England professional staff on all the latest relevant data and on the staff’s analysis. This includes real economic and financial, statistical, anecdotal and survey, information and analysis, comparison with the work of outside analysts and commentators, and, importantly, input from our 12 BIS Review 18/1998  -4-  regional Agents who are in regular contact with all sectors of economic activity across the country. This includes, of course, input from our Manchester Agent, Tony Strachan, who I am sure is very well known to many of you. The, currently eight, MPC members, alone with just a small Secretariat, then reconvene on the following Wednesday afternoon to identify and discuss the key issues and any tactical considerations, before meeting to take and announce our decision the following morning.

That is, both current and future residents are willing to pay the tax cost of servicing this debt because of the benefits that they receive from the services supported by that debt. Now consider a different scenario – one in which the jurisdiction is borrowing to pay for a current year operating deficit. This kind of borrowing is inconsistent with running a balanced budget, which is in principle required in all but one state. But, as people in this room are well aware, states and localities can often find ways to “get around” balanced budget requirements if they are determined to do so. One example of this was New York City in the 1960s and early 1970s, where annual operating deficits were repeatedly financed with shortterm debt, until the fiscal crisis exploded in 1974–1975. The key distinction between these two types of borrowing is that in the former case an asset is producing services that help to offset the cost of the debt, but this is not so in the latter case. Indeed, using debt to finance current operating deficits is equivalent to asking future taxpayers to help finance today’s public services. When this occurs, it means that the fiscal surplus offered by the jurisdiction in the future will be diminished by the value of these additional debts. That is, in the future, the cost of servicing this debt will drive a wedge between the taxes paid by households and businesses, and the current services provided to them.
They issued shares to their own membership, raised funds as bulk loans from development banks, retailed such funds among members, undertook various economic enterprises, provided quick loans to membership at affordable market interest rates and maintained accounts in terms of more stringent Sri Lanka Accounting Standards and met all the statutory requirements of getting accounts audited by qualified chartered accountants and holding annual general meetings 26 . When the Central Bank was convinced that the people’s companies had the required maturity, exposure and experience to run the Isuru Project on its own under the Bank’s general guidance and supervision, a decision was made to hand over the district level project activities on a phased-out basis to the people’s companies. This unwinding operation began in 2007 and is planned to be completed by 2010. The objective of this strategy has been for the Central Bank to withdraw from the project gradually and allow the beneficiaries who are now matured and seasoned micro financiers to run their own businesses. The first two years of power transfer has been completed successfully. All the People’s Companies have begun their operations on a sound financial footing. The recruitment of their own staff to run the operations has already commenced. The encouraging early signs foretell that the sustainability of the project has now been formally established. Part III Forward sale contract system: a mechanism to ensure price stability in agricultural produce A perennial problem faced by farmers world throughout has been the wide fluctuation of prices of agricultural produce between seasons.

Hence, the overconcentration on agriculture in pro-poor growth strategies appears to be principally supply driven and there are no demanders who actually wish to utilise them to derive benefits. Hence, the continuation of providing state support for rural agriculture, however much it is well intentioned, would trap an unwilling rural population in agriculture, thereby delaying the adjustment which has to take place by way of transferring the excess labour to other gainful areas of the economy and improve the productivity and efficiency of the agricultural sector of the country. This means that the growth strategy should focus on providing gainful employment to the rural poor in other growing areas such as the services sector and integrate it with the global economy so as to ensure income sustainability 14 . Two main issues have been present in Sri Lanka’s state sponsored poverty alleviation programmes in the past. One was the moral hazard problem and the other was the adverse selection problem. Since the poverty alleviation programmes anticipated providing benefits to selected poor individuals free of charge, those individuals did not have to work hard to receive such benefits. Hence, the schemes did not provide any incentive for participants to work hard and get out of poverty. As a result, individuals who were taken into the schemes preferred to be in the scheme forever, thereby perpetuating poverty and raising the cost of its eradication significantly 15 .
The recent developments were triggered by a perception of higher credit risk originating from a perceived deterioration of the credit quality of assets held both by banks and by special  BIS Review 130/2007  3  investment vehicles, with which banks were associated either through liquidity commitments or reputation issues. The situation deteriorated when liquidity buffers of banks were put under stress by the need to meet their liquidity commitments and to take on their balance sheet assets which had become illiquid. Then, banks also became unwilling to provide unsecured lending to other banks, in particular at longer maturities, because of uncertainty whether they would themselves obtain liquidity if needed. Once this stage was reached, the deterioration of liquidity conditions became self-reinforcing, and turned out to be painfully durable, as can be seen for instance from the still exceptional three-month EURIBOR spread relative to three-month repo rates. What could central banks do about this? First, they provided extra liquidity through open market operations. This not only contributed to bringing down short-term interbank rates to target levels again, fulfilling monetary policy implementation purposes, but may also have contributed to supporting the willingness of banks to lend. Second, accepting that availability of central bank eligible collateral is the ultimate line of defence against illiquidity for banks, many central banks widened the set of eligible collateral. For instance, the central banks of Canada and Australia took such actions, and also the US Fed clarified that it would accept certain instruments in its discount window.

Against this background, some further work needs to be done on the harmonisation of the oversight framework for securities clearing and settlement in the European Union. The continuous absence of such a harmonised oversight framework generates a number of undesirable effects. However, after the recent ECOFIN decision, I am very optimistic that we will soon see the finalisation and adoption of the ESCB-CESR recommendations for securities clearing and settlement. •  The relevance of collateral for liquidity issues has been clearly recognised by central banks. During the past ten years, central banks have – especially in the context of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and other Basel committees – focused jointly their attention on the use of collateral in financial transactions,  6  BIS Review 130/2007  including the cross-border use of collateral. 4 Cooperation in this respect is very useful and, especially for emergency situations, I would think that central banks –by enabling the cross-border use of collateral – could make a positive contribution to financial stability. Ladies and gentlemen, let me now close my introductory remarks by once again welcoming you all and by thanking all of those who have been involved in preparing this conference, in particular Daniela Russo and Mark Manning. 4  CPSS report on “Cross-Border Collateral Arrangements”, Bank for International Settlements, Basel, January 2006. BIS Review 130/2007  7