samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, for a production increase brought about by adjustment in stocks to be durable, it must be supported by a lasting increase in demand. Household consumption continued to increase, but there was no upturn in investment. The imbalances in trade and industry in the USA were perhaps more tangible than many had anticipated. Bankruptcies and accounting scandals created further unease on the financial markets, which then fell at a rate reminiscent of the 1930s crisis. In Europe the signs of economic recovery mainly concerned more optimistic expectations; expectations which were not later realised. The largest euro economy, Germany, in particular proved to be in a poorer condition than anticipated. However, here it was not a question of imbalances like those in the USA, but structural problems, such as a high level of unemployment that had set in and weak public finances, which made it difficult to conduct an economic policy that would support the business climate. Furthermore, the expected supporting forces from the other side of the Atlantic for the export industry were weaker the expected. In Sweden, the slowdown during 2001 had a limited effect on unemployment. The Riksbank’s calculations at the beginning of 2002 indicated that resource utilisation was relatively strained. Economic policy had a stimulating effect on the economy, through lower taxes and higher transfers.

The personal independence of members of the ECB’s decisionmaking bodies is also unaffected, as they remain protected from arbitrary dismissal under the Treaty irrespective of the tasks they are exercising. Is the principle of independence under Article 130 of the Treaty applicable to the ECB in its macroprudential role? The last question I would like to analyse is whether the principle of independence under the Treaty is also applicable to the ECB’s role in macroprudential supervision. As a general principle, macroprudential competence lies at the national level. This is a reflection of the principle of conferral that governs the division of powers between the European Union and the Member States. According to that principle, the Union should act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. [50] Where a competence is not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties, it remains with the Member States. [51]  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  The primacy of national competence in the field of macroprudential policy is clarified in Article 127(5) of the Treaty, which states that “the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the stability of the financial system”. This implies that, in general, the Eurosystem has only a contributory role to the formulation of macroprudential policies.
At conferences like these, we tend to focus on the cost of misconduct. But, getting rid of scandals should not be the sole reason for changing culture.3 The public expects more from the financial sector than a lack of another financial crisis or scandal. The industry would do well to listen to Baroness Onora O’Neill: Think about your purpose.4 What are you for? Surely, no one would answer that question by saying, “We’re for a lack of misconduct.” Rather, the financial services industry should support a well-functioning, growing economy, reflecting the interests of all its stakeholders. Banking in particular should provide critical intermediation services—the economic infrastructure that allows businesses to grow, families to save and invest, and standards of living to improve over generations for as broad a cross section of people as possible. When society prospers, the financial services industry prospers, too. Creating a culture that encourages and rewards diversity of thought, perspective, and experience is one means by which the industry can both do good and do well at the same time. Thank you for your kind attention. 1 See Preet Bharara, Criminal Accountability and Culture, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s  Conference: Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Expanding the Dialogue, Oct. 20, 2016. 2 In re Wells Fargo, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Administrative Proceeding 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8,  2016) (Consent Order) ¶¶ 8-9.

People want to be team players.1 Those behavioral traits can be amplified through a firm’s culture, which can weigh on one’s willingness to do the right thing. This is, unfortunately, what seems to have occurred at Wells Fargo, one of the largest retail banks in the United States. Whether to obtain a bonus or simply to keep a job, employees felt they had to keep quiet and meet sales targets despite the cost to customers.2 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  So, how do you change a culture where silence leads to misconduct? I will offer two ideas that might help and one idea that will not. Here is what will not work: Merely telling your employees to speak up. Cultures do not change simply by exhortation. Eloquent speeches, a well-phrased value statement, and an annual requirement to acknowledge the code of conduct are just not sufficient. That’s the easy one. The two ideas that might work are harder. First, managers have to lead by example. Senior executives must be seen within the firm to expect and respect challenges, and in turn must challenge ideas themselves. And, they have to explain difficult decisions to their employees—sharing not only the news of what they have done, but why. More important, mid-level managers have to do the same. Of course, mid-level managers will not generally behave that way unless they see their senior leadership setting the example. Second, if your organization values people when they raise their hand, your incentives have to reflect that.
Andrew G Haldane: A leaf being turned Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, to Occupy Economics, “Socially useful banking”, London, 29 October 2012. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Financial Policy Committee. I would like to thank Mark Cornelius, Paul Fisher and Varun Paul for their comments and contributions. The theme for tonight is “Socially Useful Banking”. And what better place to discuss it than tonight’s venue – the main meeting hall of The Friend’s House, traditionally the venue for the annual meeting of the Quakers. The Quaker movement famously gave us two of the UK’s largest banks, Lloyds and Barclays. Between them, these banks have almost 600 years of history. For most of that period, no-one questioned their social usefulness. They extended loans to businesses and helped families buy homes. Nationally and regionally, they were part of the social fabric. Today, that fabric is torn. As the CEOs of these two institutions have both recently said, these banks need to rediscover their social usefulness. But this is not only a question for the banks. It is a key issue for wider society too, who have after all felt the financial consequences of banks’ failings and failures. What do we want our banking system to do? And how do we create that system? This is where Occupy enter the picture.

Additional challenge #1: Reinhart and Rogoff’s great contraction and debt overhang The Financial Crisis of 2008 left an enormous obstacle in the path of the U.S. recovery. From peak to trough, $ trillion of wealth was erased from household balance sheets. Although the value of households’ assets declined dramatically, their debt levels remained roughly the same. Many borrowers took on additional debt during the period of high and rising asset valuations, and high employment and income growth were key fundamentals for servicing these debt payments into the future. These debt burdens are key contributors to the headwinds I discussed earlier when I talked about the economic outlook. As I noted then, they appear to be substantially more onerous than we had expected. In their book This Time is Different, Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff documented the substantially more detrimental effects that financial crises typically impose on economic recoveries.7 Recoveries following severe financial crises take many years longer than usual, and the risk of a second recession before the ultimate economic recovery returns to the previous business cycle peak is substantially higher. In a related study of the current U.S. experience, Reinhart and Rogoff show that the current anemic recovery is following the typical post-financial crisis path quite closely, given the size of the financial contraction.8 It would be nice to point to some features of the recovery that suggest greater progress relative to the Reinhart-Rogoff benchmark. But those are hard to come by.
6 Climate Bonds Initiative and UNEP Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System (2015) “Scaling up green bond markets for sustainable development”. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  such a shift is in its infancy and is an area where further research and collaboration is needed to support progress. Experts and financiers in the City and China have a role to play here. The work being done by the Taskforce in its pilot is to be commended. Mobilising private capital today is essential. Almost two thirds of required financing will need to be directed at sustainable projects in developing countries. Governments alone will not be able to meet this challenge. Yet it is not obvious that private investors will naturally fill that gap. For instance, debt instruments issued by emerging market firms often do not fall within the mandate of advanced market investors due to a missing, or too low, credit rating. It is in this context that bilateral partnerships such as the UK-China Taskforce are so important in accelerating progress.

For a region where socioeconomic disparities are wide, where the rural-urban divide is pervasive and considerable segments of society are still excluded from the economic and social mainstream, these developments have enormous potential to transform the current state to one where the financial needs of all segments of society are catered to. Several pre-conditions however must exist to realise this potential, and they all have to do with securing the trust and confidence of consumers in the digital financial system. This includes a regulatory framework that is appropriate and proportionate, a secure digital financial infrastructure and incentive systems that are aligned with providers that are both responsive and responsible. In Malaysia, efforts that are underway to enact a new Consumer Credit Act will further strengthen the foundations for the development of consumer finance in the digital age. The proposed legislation is important on several levels. First, it will reinforce fundamental protections provided to consumers in the provision of credit, including that provided by a growing number of nontraditional entities through digital solutions. Second, it will institutionalise inter-agency arrangements between authorities responsible for regulating consumer credit activities to promote consistent minimum protections and fair treatment of borrowers. And third, it will provide stronger assurance of more responsive and coordinated consumer protection arrangements to take into account the fast-evolving financial services landscape going forward. Equally important is a strong focus on financial education to promote financially and digitally literate consumers.
There is also great uncertainty about how strong and stable the recovery will be. It is positive that there has been a clear improvement in the situation on the financial markets. This reduces the risk of a serious setback. On the other hand, the situation on these markets has not completely normalised. Central banks around the world will continue to use various measures to help the banks find funding. The extensive fiscal policy stimulation measures that have been and are being implemented in all the major economies have in all likelihood helped to dampen the fall in GDP. But, they are also leading to increases in national debts. This can create anxiety among the households and thus entails a risk that recovery will stop short. Nevertheless, the situation looks brighter today than it did a couple of months ago. This in itself justifies a somewhat tighter monetary policy than that which we regarded as a wellbalanced monetary policy in July. However, there are also factors that can have the opposite effect and thus represent arguments for a more expansionary monetary policy. The development of the krona has been stronger than we expected. Just as it is difficult to explain the earlier weakening of the krona in terms of developments in the Swedish economy, it is difficult to explain the recent appreciation in the krona. The best explanation might be that it is a question of an adjustment towards more normal levels after the exchange rate had strongly deviated from its long-term reasonable rate.

On the other hand, I believe that it is worthwhile for a central bank to act with some caution in areas where it does not have any previous experience to draw on. This is why I feel that it was justified to reduce the repo rate in small stages when we were already at a record-low level in the initial position. BIS Review 111/2009  3  Measures when the interest rate is close to zero What then should a central bank do when the policy rate can not be lowered to the level justified by the state of the real economy? Many central banks have struggled with this question during this crisis. One possibility is to allow the policy rate to remain at the lowest possible level for a longer period than would otherwise have been required. The effects of such a decision can also be reinforced in several ways. The central bank can, for example, lend money to the banks at a fixed interest rate at a maturity that corresponds to the period during which the policy rate is expected to remain at this low level. This can increase the credibility of the forecast that the rate will remain unchanged in the year ahead. It should also push down some interest rates at longer maturities. We decided to implement both of these measures. Since the monetary policy meeting in February, our forecast has comprised a low repo rate during a relatively long period of time.
As the Government has initiated various efforts to integrate people with disabilities into all aspects of life, the financial industry should also continue to play a more pro-active role in providing an enabling environment to ensure that their fundamental rights to have access to the banking and insurance products and services are actively promoted. Taking into account the Persons with Disabilities Act 2008, the financial industry are expected to give appropriate consideration and take necessary measures to ensure services and facilities are accessible by all in the OKU community. Clearly, these obligations signify our accountability and responsibility towards providing the necessary access for members of the OKU community and not to deny their rights to be included in our financial system. Moving forward, under the RMK11 recently announced, the Uniform Building By-Laws, 1984 is going to be strengthened with greater mandate to include the enforcement power of the authorities. With this possible enhancement to the legislation, the financial industry need to be ready to face this changing landscape whereby there is a possibility that action could be taken against those service providers that fail to provide the enabling environment to the OKUs. Against these backdrop of higher expectation from the OKU, stronger legislation and our aspiration of more inclusive financial system, today’s program provides a platform for us to further understand the needs of the disabled, to be more preemptive and anticipatory in our approach and to collaboratively work towards ensuring that the financial industry of Malaysia becomes completely disabled-friendly and truly inclusive.

Emilija Nacevska: Strengthening the capacities of the system for fight against counterfeiting of the euro Speech by Ms Emilija Nacevska, Vice Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the opening conference of the Twinning Light Project "Strengthening the capacities of the system for fight against counterfeiting of the euro", Skopje, 15 January 2019. * * * Dear Minister Oliver Spasovski, Your Excellencies Samuel Zbogar and Thomas Gerberich, dear Project Leaders Biljana Celeska Anevska and Peter Spicka, dear Mr Damir Bichanic, distinguished representatives of the Delegation of the European Union in the country and representatives of the Ministry of Interior, distinguished colleagues, dear guests, It is my honor and pleasure to greet you on the behalf of the National Bank and to welcome you to today’s event held in our institution, marking together the beginning of this very important Twinning Light Project aimed at strengthening the capacities of the institutions involved in the system for fight against counterfeiting of euro. At the very beginning of my speech, I would like to express the gratitude of the National Bank to the European Union, because it has recognized the determination of our key institutions responsible for fighting money counterfeit to put their maximum in establishing a strong and efficient system for protection of the national, as well as the financial interests of the Union.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  employment since 1997. It is difficult to understand why firms should increase employment so significantly if their existing workforce is not fully utilised. Some of this behaviour may be explicable if employment growth were concentrated in sectors of the economy which are expanding most quickly, especially those orientated towards the export sector. But it is striking that this pattern of rising employment and weak productivity is common across most sectors of the economy (Chart 2).5 It is also possible that firms in some parts of our economy are having to work flat out just to generate the same amount of business. Estate agents, for example, trying to match buyers and sellers in a thin housing market. Or M&A teams pitching for new business. The extra effort that is required may explain why these types of companies do not report much spare capacity. But it does not help to explain why companies facing these types of pressures should want to expand greatly their workforces. It is hard to reconcile the number of new jobs created over the past year with the belief that firms are sitting on a substantial margin of spare capacity. The recent weakness in productivity may also have been exaggerated by the sheer difficulty of measuring economic activity in real time. We know that early estimates of output are often revised as more comprehensive data become available. Recent productivity may look less disappointing if subsequent estimates of output are marked up.

But it was evident too in the formation earlier last  BIS Review 8/2002  1  year of the Guild of International Bankers, our co-hosts this evening, and of which you, Lord Mayor locum tenens, are the Founding Master. It takes on the mantle - or, perhaps more appropriately, takes over the ledger - from the Bankers Club which has contributed so much to the City's professional esprit de corps over so many years. So it has, as I said, been a long, hard year, President, but it has certainly had its positive moments. And I should like to conclude by paying tribute this evening to the role of the City Corporation and of the Mayoralty, and their contribution to many of the positive developments we have seen - through their own example in promoting community involvement, including their support for the Heart of the City campaign; through their own role in maintaining security and co-ordinating the "public" infrastructure - both vital to all our contingency plans; and through their support for the fundamentally international character of the City, not least in opening the way to the Guild. I am profoundly grateful to them for all the help and support they give to us all. It is in that context that I ask you now to rise and join me in a toast to "the Rt Hon The Lord Mayor, the Corporation of the City of London and the Sheriffs." 2  BIS Review 8/2002
Any action taken by a central bank today must be based largely on considerations about the rate of inflation one to two years down the road. So even though the underlying rate of inflation has been lower, central banks have to consider what is likely to happen to prices in the future. Long and variable lags made it difficult to know what the appropriate policy was at each moment for the purposes of fine tuning future economic activity. In addition, political pressures tended to emphasize the immediate or short-term benefits of stimulating the real economy at the expense of long-term increases in inflation from such policies (myopia). The combination of these lags and myopia imparted an inflationary bias to policy with the result that in the 1  BIS Review 95/2000  long run inflation was higher than it otherwise would have been, with no gain in real output. The more systematically monetary policy was used to fine-tune economic activity, the more the inflationary consequences of such policies were anticipated. An anticipated monetary stimulus would be passed through immediately to prices with no affect on real output. A second problem of the monetary policy is the need for a nominal anchor. If monetary policy could not be expected to dampen business cycles by fine tuning, it might do so by stabilizing inflation expectations as the result of a clear and credible commitment to a nominal anchor that is believed to stabilize prices on average in the long run.

Such a policy has two goals: the first is to provide the market with reliable information on what the rate of inflation will be so that investment, wage setting, and other market decisions can be made with greater confidence in what the future price level will be. The second is to ensure that the inflation rate is very low in order to improve the quality of price signals. Such a policy might minimize the gap between actual and expected inflation that spill over to the real economy. By removing the inflation bias of discretionary policy, nominal interest rates would be lower, and by diminishing uncertainty over the future price levels, a credible nominal anchor would reduce the inflation risk premium in both nominal and real interest rates. Here, there is a need for clear operational rules to know what short-run stance of policy would be appropriate for the future. The purest examples of such rules are a fixed exchange rate and a fixed rate of growth in a monetary aggregate. Either rule provides a clear anchor for inflation expectations. A credibly fixed exchange rate is the most transparent nominal anchor. A floating exchange rate with a money growth rule as the nominal anchor is also easy to monitor, if somewhat more difficult to achieve. Both anchors suffer, to some extent, from being indirect routes to the real objective of monetary policy, which is price stability.