samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For the sample taken, the number of e-wallets rose to 1.3 million active accounts in 2018 from 86,066 in 2014 while the value increased ten-fold in the last five years, to K405.6 million in 2018 from K42.7 million in 2014. It is gratifying here to note that the gap between men and women has been reducing – from 89% male dominance in 2014 to 80% in 2018. Ladies and gentlemen, we can conclude from the above findings that the large gender gap in account ownership between men and women suggest that women inherently face more challenges in accessing formal financial products and services. Further, most financial institutions, especially non-banks have limited or do not have genderfocused product differentiation. This limited differentiation by gender is a missed opportunity for financial institutions considering that women are better savers and are less likely to default on their loans, and therefore good for the financial institutions’ bottom-line. Distinguished guests, financial institutions therefore need to place greater emphasis on segment performance to support individual women and women entrepreneurs who should be assessed as a profitable business proposition, not as part of corporate social responsibility. The market segmentation should go further to also devise age-specific products and services within the sex-differentiated products and services. We must however, take cognizant of the rapid rise in the use of mobile money as holding great potential to accelerate financial inclusion for women and help reduce the gender gap. Financial service providers must therefore, innovate gender-focused digital financial products and services that will bridge the gap.

It is available on our website along with other data and information useful to policymakers, business people and the general public. We use our website to share what we learn about our diverse District, and you will find detailed information about the region at the site. I invite you to visit newyorkfed.org to explore our highly localized maps and information on small business, credit and housing conditions and even the latest job openings at the New York Fed. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Finally, and crucially, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, we are working with our colleagues in Washington, D.C., and at other agencies to help put the nation’s financial system on a firmer footing. Our supervisors are working hard to ensure that our District’s banks are operating safely and soundly. Although much has been done, we are not finished and are determined to keep at it. I recognize fully that there can be no return to pre-crisis business as usual – whether on the part of the financial sector or on the part of regulators like ourselves. All in all, there is a lot to keep myself and my colleagues busy. National economic conditions Now I’d like to turn to the national and regional economy. The incoming data on the U.S. economy generally has been a bit more upbeat over the past few months, suggesting that the recovery may be finally establishing a somewhat firmer footing.
The dispersion seen in this probability distribution can be attributed to two factors: disagreement across point forecasts and uncertainty around individual point forecasts.6 Uncertainty, which is calculated by first taking the standard deviation of each dealer’s distribution and then averaging these individual uncertainties, provides a sense of how confident respondents are about their individual point forecasts. Based on this calculation, the uncertainty around dealers’ expectations for the size of the SOMA portfolio at the end of 2014 is large. In fact, at around $ billion it is almost as large as the entire size of the large-scale asset purchase program announced in November 2010 or the MEP announced in September 2011. Moreover, this uncertainty has not changed significantly since the start of the purchases in September 2012. The dispersion around individual point forecasts likely reflects uncertainty about both how the economy will evolve and how the FOMC will adjust its purchases in response to changes in the economic outlook or changes in its understanding of the efficacy and costs of the policy. Disagreement among dealers about the likely amount of purchases is measured as the standard deviation across their average forecasts for the size of the SOMA portfolio at the end of 2014. In the January survey, disagreement was about $ billion, significantly lower than its level in October.

Investors’ disagreement and uncertainty about the overall stance of monetary policy will reflect their views on the future evolution of both the federal funds rate and the SOMA  5  See, for example, Question 8 in the January 2013 Survey of Primary Dealers. 6  The measures of forecast uncertainty and disagreement discussed here are based on Rich and Tracy (2006) and Wallis (2004, 2005). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  portfolio. One way to get a sense of the overall level of policy uncertainty is to convert the SOMA portfolio into “fed funds equivalents”.7 With this translation, it is possible to estimate the hypothetical level of the federal funds rate that would provide a similar amount of monetary policy accommodation as both the actual level of the federal funds rate and the size of the SOMA portfolio. Figure 2 shows the disagreement and uncertainty around this measure of policy uncertainty 12 months in the future. Disagreement about current policy is quite low relative to the past few years, which likely reflects the effect of forward guidance on expectations about the federal funds rate and the relatively low disagreement about the size of the portfolio that I mentioned earlier. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is relatively high and larger than the amount of disagreement. Since there is very little uncertainty about the level of the federal funds rate one year from now, most of this effect comes from uncertainty about the size of the portfolio.
At present, criticism is coming from both directions, and many critics maintain that interest rates are lagging behind developments in inflation and economic recovery. Whether this is true will come clear in the next few months, and if it is, remedial action will be taken. At its March meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee stated that further nominal rate increases were likely in coming months but that the scope of such action would depend on near-term developments in inflation and the exchange rate. Further ahead, it will be necessary to reduce the slack in monetary policy as the slack in the economy diminishes. The degree to which this takes place through higher nominal Central Bank rates will depend on future inflation developments. In order to understand current monetary policy, it is necessary to place it in the larger context of post-crisis adjustment and recovery. In a sense, it can be said that the inflation that has plagued Iceland since the crash is a three-fold phenomenon. First of all, it stemmed from the currency depreciation that was part of the economic adjustment that inevitably followed the overheating of 2005–2007 and the subsequent financial crisis. Monetary policy should not have quelled it, nor could it have done so. The real challenge as I mentioned in my speech at  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the Annual General Meeting of 2010, was to allow the adjustment to take place without permitting inflation or unemployment to become entrenched afterward.

To that end, it is of key importance to move unstable offshore krónur out of the hands of those who cannot hold them and do not want them and into the hands of investors prepared to commit capital in Iceland for a long period of time. It is also important that the general conditions provided for in the liberalisation strategy be met as fully as possible, for this will reduce the risk of instability when the controls are lifted. These conditions include ample foreign exchange reserves, Treasury access to foreign credit markets, and a sound banking system that can fund its activities in an environment free of capital controls. Great strides have been made in this respect, as can be seen in the Treasury’s foreign bond issue last summer, the Bank’s sizeable foreign exchange reserves, the prepayment of loans from the IMF and our Nordic neighbours, improvements in Iceland’s sovereign credit rating, declines in Iceland’s CDS spread, and the banks’ sound capital position in spite of the court judgments handed down in cases involving exchange rate-linked loans. But it is also important that the Treasury’s net domestic borrowing need be as small as possible once liberalisation begins, as it is probable that financing costs will rise sharply at that point in time. In this context, it is interesting to note that the Treasury’s real domestic financing costs in 2011 were negative by roughly 0.7%. It is therefore vital to adhere closely to the plan to achieve an overall Treasury surplus in 2014.
The improvement is visible for CEE and Baltic states, while SEE region registered worsening of the international position, albeit from initially lower levels. Despite the downward adjustment, at end 2015 the IIP in most of the countries is above the threshold set by the European Commission’s Macro Imbalance Procedure (-35% of GDP), which points to a still relatively high exposure to potential external shocks. Given the banks’ deleveraging process and their higher reliance to domestic sources, the credit growth in the region is still anemic without significant pressures on the aggregate demand and current account deficit. Furthermore, the analysis of the developments at the stock exchanges in the region also do not point to any sizable flows resulting in notable price changes misaligned with the general economic developments. The stock indices in the region have been gradually recovering especially since 2013, but in most cases they have not recovered to the pre-crisis levels. Concerning the real estate market, the prices have been also recovering, though they are still below the pre-crisis levels, with the fastest upward adjustment in Hungary and the Baltic States.

While the internationalisation of the banking industry holds the potential for efficiency gains, and increased household welfare, it has also added a score of new challenges. Perhaps the most serious of these challenges is what has been termed the home-host problem. This can, in all its essence, be described as follows: Suppose a bank, which is of marginal importance in its home country, sets up a branch in another country, which turns out to be systemically important for that country. Given that the bank is not important in its home country, the home supervisors, who have responsibility for the supervision, might not think that the bank merits close supervision. However, for the host country, which will foot the bill for the salvage operation in case the bank fails, the incentives to monitor the bank are huge. This dilemma is not new in theory, but has now become of great practical importance as financial globalization progressively is making national borders less relevant. Asset prices, financial stability and monetary policy Are there instances when these goals come into conflict with each other? This question has become particularly relevant in the last few years as asset prices have surged, while, at the same time, consumer price inflation has remained muted. On the whole, I think it is reasonable to assume that price stability in the long run reinforces financial stability. The main reason for this is that low and stable inflation reduces the risk of misallocating investments.
The total banking sector assets in all new member states are only 345 USD billions at the end 2002 (thus just 31,5% of Citigroup, or 43,4% of Deutsche bank, or 45,5% of HSBC). Structure of ACs Banking Sector Assets  3%  2% 2% 1%  1% POL CZ  7%  HUN 38%  7%  CYPR SVK SLO LAT LIT  15%  EST MALTA  24%  * As of 31st Dec 2002, recalculated by market exchange rate  BIS Review 53/2003  19  3  A look at financial depth [as measured by banking sector assets to GDP] of individual markets in five accession countries [Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia] shows that there is still significant space for growth of financial intermediation. Financial depth in the CR is the highest among the transition economies, but it is still significantly lower than in the EU [EU average 270%]. Financial Depth (Bank Assets/GDP in %) 130 120 110 100 CR HUN SVK POL SLO  %  90 80 70 60 50 40 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  7  Besides developments in banking, we can observe continuous growth also in non-banking financial intermediation [illustrated by Czech Republic]. In the Czech Republic, the share of non-banking financial intermediation on GDP increased over last two years from 19% to 21,7%. The highest increase was in the share of insurance companies and financial leasing institutions.

Fraziali Ismail: Non-performing loans in East Asia and the Pacific practices and lessons in times of COVID-19 Opening remarks by Mr Fraziali Ismail, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the webinar and the launch of World Bank’s Report on non-performing loans (NPL) in East Asia and the Pacific, 27 October 2021. * * * A very good morning to everyone! It gives me great pleasure to welcome you to this webinar in conjunction with the launch of the World Bank Report on “Non-Performing Loans in East Asia and the Pacific: Practices and Lessons in Times of COVID-19”. This event comes at a time where many of us in the region are still navigating through uncertainties with the pandemic. Recovery in many regional economies including Malaysia has begun to gather pace in recent periods in tandem with the recovery in global economic activity. However, the outlook remains subject to large downside risks as the potential for new variants of COVID-19 remains high. These developments are also happening amid the gradual expiry of policy support extended to households and businesses affected by the pandemic. The unprecedented level of support extended has so far helped to keep loan impairments at bay. But, as these measures are gradually unwound as the economy recovers, we would expect to have much greater visibility on the true asset quality of banks.
Moreover, raising new private capital in this environment is a very tall order; while the option of public capital injection very costly for shareholders and tax payers. Therefore, it is imperative that banks need to be even more vigilant in managing not only their asset quality but also their internal capital, funding, expenditure including executive pay, and dividend policy. Looking at banks in the Asian region, such as Thailand, despite rapid development of capital market in recent years, the core banking businesses remain traditional; largely deposit taking and loan extension. Meanwhile, treasury operation remains relative small. Moreover, with the financial market predominantly bank-based rather than market-based, there tends to be less risk and complication arising from the originate-to-distribute models of securitisation. Nevertheless, in the past few years, banks have expanded business scope, operating as universal banks or financial conglomerate, with securities and insurance arms. Therefore, organisational structure and risk profile, of even the more traditional banks, have become much more complex. This, in turn, demands that bank’s risk management, Board’s oversight, and supervisory framework can match the increasing complexity and ensure adequacy of capital and risk management system on a consolidated basis. On market risk, some banks in Asia and Pacific countries have been exposed to the subprime related assets such as CDOs as well as assets of failed institutions. The losses so far have been limited to foreign assets and are addressed by private and government assistance. On hindsight, this crisis highlights the fact that it is easy to overestimate one’s risk management ability.

Banks with CDO exposure have already made full provisioning and recognized losses in line with IAS 39, and presently all sub-prime related CDOs have been unwound. Thai banks also have very low exposure to investment banks like Lehman Brothers and have no investment in US GSE securities. In all, total exposure of Thai banks to foreign investment is about 1.2 percent of total assets, about half of which are sovereign assets. Having said this, we are very mindful of the risk from second round effect of slowdown in global growth and domestic growth, which can affect credit, market, as well as liquidity risk. To handle this, the Bank of Thailand has been holding dialogue with top managements of banks to discuss financial stability outlook, and have conducted stress-test to ensure that banks are alert to these risks and are able to manage them to ensure adequate capital and liquidity. We will continue to hold candid and two-ways dialogues with all the banks operating here to ensure that we can manage these challenges and dynamics of the global turmoil. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to conclude with some lessons learned so far to increase our immune system going forward. First, growth must be based on strong macroeconomic foundation, with prudent fiscal and monetary policy, flexible policy options, and strong external positions.
On the other hand, some consequences of central clearing may increase systemic risk: •  as a result of growing risk concentration in CCPs and in a limited number of large global dealers, which act as general clearing members as a gateway for other financial institutions to CCPs,  •  as a consequence of mutualisation, risks may spread among participants and markets more widely and the distribution of losses is more difficult to predict,  •  in order to avoid mandatory clearing, we might see migration of risk outside of the regulated universe through the artificial creation of bespoke (and hence risky) products that are not suitable for central clearing. Moreover, the systemic effect of clearing depends on whether risk is redistributed to those who are more able to deal with it, which is difficult to determine. Finally, the overall systemic effect depends on the incentives for risk-taking and central clearing that accompany risk redistribution. [slide 5] To promote central clearing and avoid regulatory arbitrage, a number of reforms have been adopted including: (i) mandatory clearing, (ii) margin requirements for non-centrally cleared trades, and (iii) higher capital requirements for non-centrally cleared trades. This highlights the crucial complementarity between the regulation of banks and the regulation of financial market infrastructures (FMIs), with the overall objective that regulation reduces overall risk, and does not shift it around the financial system.

(2003) showed that T-Bill yields track movements in the fed funds rate more successfully since the  1990’s, while Kohn and Sack (2003) found that statements released by the FOMC significantly affect market interest rates. 4 Demiralp and Jorda (2002) found that a smaller quantity of open-market operations have been required for the  Fed to achieve its desired policy rate since 1994. 5 Hubert and Labondance (2018) found that the ECB’s forward guidance announcements persistently reduced  rates across the yield curve, with the strongest effects at the longest maturities. Moesser (2013) found greatest effects for the US at the three-year horizon. However, Chehal and Trehan (2009) found little evidence that the Bank of Canada’s forward guidance in April 2009 significantly affected market expectations of interest rates. 6 Kahnemann (2003) 7 Mishkin (2004) 8 Cruijsen et al (2010) 9 See Dincer and Eichengreen (2014). Cruijsen et al (2010) also found diminishing returns in reducing  dispersion of inflation expectations, with expectations dispersion declining initially as transparency rises but rising beyond a certain level of transparency. 10 Hayo and Neuenkirch (2018) 11 Samuelson (1994) famously likened this problem to a monkey looking at a mirror. The monkey reacts to its  mirror image, unaware that it is looking at its own reflection. 12 Morris and Shin (2018) 13 Gaballo (2018) 14 Goodhart and Lim (2011) 15 Free exchange: A little less conversation, “Can central bankers talk too much?”, The Economist, 26 Oct 2019. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Let me go over quickly these points: In order to fulfill this inadequate access to financial services by under-served consumers, the Bank of Thailand initiated a pilot project on micro finance in collaboration with commercial banks. Against misconception that micro finance is an unprofitable segment, this project aims to demonstrate that the coexistence of profitability and satisfied customers is possible with a right business model. Late last year, we invited foreign speakers to share with senior management of Thai commercial banks their experience in successful conduct of retail business in their countries. Following this seminar, a number of banks already expressed their interests to participate in this pilot project. One social aspect that has clear benefits to all parties concerned is consumer education. It has two major dimensions, one on the cultivation of responsible use of credits and the other the introduction of new financial products and channels of distribution. While the former can improve the overall risk profile of financial institutions’ retail portfolio, and thus lower the lending rates, the latter can potentially stimulate more demands and lower the cost of service provision. It is therefore the responsibility of lending institutions to convey clearly the message of ‘no free lunch’. In other words, prudent lenders must ensure that borrowers are fully aware of the financial obligation of their debt burdens and legal consequence of default. Failure of either party could tarnish the healthy usage of retail credit.

Preference of traditional channels of service provision over e-banking In terms of service distribution channel, brick banks still have competitive edge over click banks as consumers still prefer to conduct banking transaction with human contact at bank branches or sub-branches. E-banking is not yet well-accepted by consumers on account of: •  uncertainty surrounding accuracy of the services;  •  lack of transaction evidence that might be useful in case of dispute settlement; and  •  lack of knowledge among some retail customers. The use of automated teller machines is quite well-spread while the use of phone banking and Internet banking is still limited to a small fraction of customers. According to the survey, high-income retail customers tend to make use of phone banking and Internet banking more often than do low income customers. Usage of phone banking and Internet banking by corporate customers is still low, though  2  BIS Review 22/2004  large and medium corporate tend to use phone banking and Internet banking more often than do small corporate. Financial service needs expected in the next few years Due to the current low return on savings with commercial banks, both individual and corporate consumers revealed preference towards alternative saving instruments such as saving bonds and government bonds. As for financing, the needs expected by individual customers are those for the purposes of working capital, residential, education and business expansion, while those of corporate customers remain financing for long-term investment for business expansion and short-term working capital requirements.