samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The possible need for speedy assistance necessitates that a central bank must have internal procedures for managing requests for liquidity support and doing so very rapidly. To accomplish this, central banks need to have a detailed crisis plan that can be put in place within very short notice. The crisis plan should include the following types of information: Organisational structure •  A division of responsibilities for analysis, information, decision-making, etc. •  Staffing requirements for different tasks, with substitutes. Analysis plan •  A description of the information necessary to make a decision about whether or not a systemic crisis may occur. •  Necessary information about systemically important individual banks. Information strategy •  A plan for informing and coordinating information and decisions with the other domestic agencies involved in the crisis. •  A plan for informing authorities in other countries about the situation. •  A plan for communicating with the financial markets. •  A plan for spreading information to the public and media (ex ante and ex post transparency). Plan for implementing ELA •  A clear description of the routines which must be followed and the legal requirements which must be met for ELA. Legal procedures, for example contracts, for lending against other collateral than what is normally eligible •  An inventory of the instruments available for implementing ELA. •  Guidelines for acceptable collateral and appropriate haircuts.

The way other crisis management procedures are set up also affects the scope for ELA. This is covered in the first part of this note. Second, the way ELA issues are organised within the central bank is also very important for whether it is an effective measure and, in particular, whether it will reduce or increase moral hazard in the financial sector. This is discussed in the second part of the note. Before discussing these two aspects, the importance of speed in granting ELA must be emphasized, as the speedy implementation of ELA is essential to its being effective in a crisis situation. ELA is the only measure in the crisis management framework that normally can be used quickly. It should be seen as an acute measure that is used for avoiding a sudden disruption of the large-value payment system, in particular when threats to the system emerge suddenly. Incidents like the failure of Barings bank, LTCM and the Swedish currency and banking crisis show that threats to the financial system may indeed emerge suddenly, and that authorities must react very quickly - if not within minutes, at least within hours. The growth and increasing globalisation of financial markets, the high volatility in these markets and the increasing complexity of financial institutions, are all examples of factors that increase the risk for sudden crises and increase the probability that such crises will spread from one market to another. 1.
This does not bode well for productivity. Thailand’s infrastructure continuously needs improvement in several areas, particularly logistics, irrigation and quality of education. These public investments will also influence private investment through the “crowding in effect” as public and private investment complement each other. Therefore, the government policies should be prioritized, be gradual and have specific target in their spending. Priority should be given to productivity enhancement project and spending should be selective and targeted to certain areas to ensure policy’s effectiveness. At the same time, graduality of policies is necessary to minimize inflationary pressure and allow time for private sector to adjust. Second, fiscal stance, like monetary policy, is also required to normalize in order to ensure fiscal discipline and sustainability. In a time of normal trend growth, there is a lesser need for a fiscal stimulus. Rising public debt, together with increasing contingent liabilities, may endanger fiscal sustainability in the long run. Reforms of the tax revenue collection and tax structure should be implemented along with rising expenditure to ensure a healthy balance sheet of the fiscal sector. Third, political stability is a vital condition to the private sector for maintaining an investment-friendly environment. These three challenges, if prevail, will put Thailand forth into a competitive frontier. Likewise, the private sector contribution is as equally important. One immediate challenge which businesses face today is the problem of labor shortages.

Ladies and gentlemen, over the past years, the Thai economy has been very resilient to numerous economic shocks, ranging from the oil price shock, natural disasters such as flood and drought, series of political uncertainties as well as the 2008 global financial crisis. Nevertheless, Thailand’s average annual growth rate for the last decade registered at 4.4 percent which is within the range of our estimated potential growth. The Bank of Thailand expects economic growth for this year to return to this normal trend, with moderate growth in the first half of the year and steady growth in the second half after the supply chain disruption unwound. This is the first aspect of returning to normalcy, or growth normalization, which is a feature of resilient economy. Such economic expansion is on the back of sound external and domestic demand. On the external side, however, risks to the global economy have increased recently due to damages caused by Japan earthquake, a weaker-than-expected US economy and concerns over Euro area fiscal crisis. These developments will have to be monitored closely. As of now, we expect a slightly lower global growth prospect but this should not change Thailand’s economic outlook to the extent that derails the economy from its present growth path. In particular, Thailand’s export remains robust. Supply chain disruption due to the Japan earthquake is proven to be limited and temporary; limited in the sense that impacts are mostly felt in the production and exports of vehicles.
In particular, based on the prices implicit in futures contracts over the ten days prior to the statistical closure of this Report, the average price for oil will be 52 and 64 U.S. dollars per barrel this year and next, respectively (Table 4). The peso has appreciated since the statistical closure of the January Report. As a methodological assumption, the long-term real exchange rate (RER) is assumed to be close to the levels it showed in the two weeks prior to the statistical closure of this Report (Figure 11). On the other hand, unit labor costs’ annual variation has risen in the past few quarters, due to sharp changes in productivity measures based on the path of output and employment. The increase in nominal wages, after peaking around 8 percent annually, began to decline. These dynamics suggest that the labor market is behaving in line with usual indexation clauses and the stage of the cycle. The baseline scenario assumes that these wages will be revised to accommodate the decline in inflation, the wider output gaps and movements in the employment rate. One crucial aspect in the evolution of Chile’s business cycle and prospects of higher growth in the rest of this year and during 2010 is stimulus of monetary conditions. The reductions in the monetary policy interest rate have transmitted to lending rates quite rapidly, reflecting more favorable financial conditions for both firms and households.

Instead the objective was to assess their capital needs under a deeper and longer recession than was the consensus in early 2009, and then require them to meet these capital needs in the very near term, before the adverse scenario developed. One important rationale for the program was that the presence of the additional capital would make the adverse scenario less likely. The credibility of this strategy was dependent on the availability of the U.S. Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program to provide capital if the private market was unable to do so. Moreover, a brave decision was made to be transparent about the procedures the supervisors were using in their assessment and to pre-commit to disclose detailed results. In addition, the main measure of capital needs would be in terms of common equity rather than the preferred equity that was used in the U.S. Treasury’s Capital Purchase Program. BIS Review 81/2010  7  The assessment process took just under three months to complete. It involved many innovations in the supervisory process that will continue to influence the approach to the supervision of large complex financial institutions in the future. The results of the assessment were striking. Under the more adverse scenario of a longer and deeper recession, the twoyear loss rates on average across the 19 banks were projected to be as high as experienced during the Great Depression. Further, this average hid an incredible amount of heterogeneity across both banks and asset classes.
We currently have an extremely low interest rate and we are in a crisis that to some extent stems from having had a low interest rate for a long time. We must be aware of the imbalances that may build up and neither be “deflation nutters” nor “inflation nutters”. BIS Review 73/2009  7

Norges Bank will be an active owner and support companies through the climate transition, encourage climate reporting, and further develop our analysis of the fund's exposure to climate risks and opportunities. At the heart of our efforts is driving portfolio companies to net zero emissions by 2050. An operationally robust organisation helps safeguard the fund's assets. Geopolitical risk may be a greater source of uncertainty in the management of the fund in the years to come. Organised cyber-criminals are becoming increasingly specialised, sophisticated and well-funded. It is difficult to identify geopolitical events before they occur or lead to financial losses for the fund. For a large, global fund, there is nowhere to hide. Risk in the Government Pension Fund Global is reduced by diversifying its investments across asset classes, countries, sectors and companies. This should continue. The Sverdrup Committee, which is centre stage in this year's white paper, found that the fund is, in principle, well equipped for an uncertain future, but that its ability to deal with various changes and crises could be improved. We share this view and strive continuously to strengthen our situational understanding, develop our work on scenarios and stress testing, and improve our contingency planning. The Ministry of Finance announced in its white paper that it will be reviewing the matter of investing in unlisted equities. Norges Bank looks positively on this review, and we will return with our advice and assessments towards the end of the year.
Christine Lagarde joined the French government in June 2005 as Minister for Foreign Trade. In June 2007 she became Minister of Economy and Finance, being the first woman to hold the position of Finance Minister of a G-7 country. From July to December 2008, she also chaired the ECOFIN Council. In 2009, Financial Times ranked her as the best Minister of Finance in the Eurozone, considering both her excellent work within the French government and her involvement in the management of the financial crisis. Madame Lagarde acted with diplomacy as Chairman of the G-20 when France took over its presidency for the year 2011. All these achievements in her current position led Forbes Magazine this year to rank her among the most powerful and influential women in the world. Besides her contribution to official matters, Madame Lagarde has broader interests and is involved in various fields of expertise as well as global issues. For example, she has signaled the major risk in not addressing climate change saying with humor: “Our kids will be grilled, fried, toasted and roasted.” She also militates for encouraging women to seek education and enabling them to be more independent and provide for themselves and for their children. Christine Lagarde is Chevalier de la Légion d’honneur since July 2000, and Commander of the Order of Mérite agricole. She has an Honorary doctorate from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium). Madame Lagarde will address you today on a thought-provoking topic: Eastern Europe and Romania: The Path to Prosperity.

Josef Bonnici: Lessons from the recent past and the road ahead Address by Professor Josef Bonnici, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at KPMG’s biennial Financial Services Conference “Maintaining the vision – driving value from change”, St. Julian’s, 1 November 2011. *  *  *  The euro area is currently addressing the challenge of a number of interacting problems: the economic slowdown, the sovereign debt crisis and financial sector instability. The sovereign debt crisis has been aggravated by the impact on fiscal balances of slower economic growth and, in many countries, government support for distressed banks. In turn, sovereign debt problems have damaged the balance sheets of euro area banks and impaired the supply of credit to the economy. The fact that this monetary union is made up of sovereign and autonomous Member States shows up at various levels. Looking at national fiscal and structural policies in the recent past, one notices sharp differences in the extent to which different countries have exercised budgetary caution and preserved their international competitiveness. Other national differences can also be observed. In the case of Greece, for example, the country’s problems were compounded by the statistical understatement of the budget deficit and debt. In the case of Ireland, as another example, it was imprudent bank lending policies, particularly to the real estate sector, which led to a massive rise in the debt burden of the state.
All in all, we estimate that the risk balance is biased downward for short-term activity and unbiased for medium-term activity and for inflation. Thus, all the above considered, our opinion as a Board is that monetary policy must use all its expansionary tools for an extended time span, thereby placing the MPR at the floor of the corridor. There are other scenarios where the performance of the economy would deviate away from the projection ranges just discussed. Although the vast majority of central banks and fiscal authorities have adopted very strong measures, the unprecedented nature of the COVID-19 emergency makes it difficult to estimate its short- and medium-term implications, and more so if considering the vulnerabilities in some financial system segments after a decade of low interest rates. This is partly what has led to the sharp increase in risk aversion and the quest for safe assets. If this continues, a severe tightening of financial conditions cannot be ruled out which could end up affecting the global payment chain, seriously damaging the financial position of various public and private entities and generating much deeper drops in activity. In this case—and Chile will not be spared—it would be necessary to use policy tools that go beyond the usual monetary policy making, prioritizing financial stability considerations. 3. Final thoughts Chile, like most countries, has been hit by an unprecedented economic shock.

In the short term, forces operate in opposite directions; on one hand, the significant fall in the oil price and, on the other, the depreciation of the peso. On the latter, it is important to stress that, unlike the depreciation driven by the social unrest, this time the depreciation is not idiosyncratic, but responds to the global appreciation of the dollar. Thus, its transmission to local prices should be less. Meanwhile, although in the current situation price increases could originate in supply-side issues (e.g. products in short or null supply), projections are that the sharp fall in demand for other goods and services will predominate in the inflationary dynamics over the medium term. In the baseline scenario, inflation follows a downsloping trajectory in the coming quarters, down from 3.9% in February to around 3% annually in the last quarter of this year, to remain in the neighborhood throughout 2021 (Figure 10). In this scenario, medium-term inflationary pressures have fallen substantially, so the convergence of inflation to the 3% target requires that monetary policy remain in this highly expansionary stance for an extended period of time. Accordingly, during March the CBC Board lowered the policy rate by 125 basis points to 0.5%, its technical minimum. In doing so, monetary policy has attained a high level of expansion, exceeding that of some comparable economies (Figure 11).
Participants in the Lloyd’s market know all too well that what appear to be low probability risks can evolve into large and unforeseen costs over a longer timescale. Claims on third-party liability insurance – in classes like public liability, directors’ and officers’ and professional indemnity - could be brought if those who have suffered losses show that insured parties have failed to mitigate risks to the climate; failed to account for the damage they cause to the environment; or failed to comply with regulations. 17  Discussions on correlation are not new. For example, a current issue is the extent to which European windstorms occur in clusters, such as windstorms Daria, Vivian, Wiebke and Herta in 1990 and Lothar, Martin, and Anatol in 1999. 18  See Standard and Poor’s – “Climate Change Could Sting Reinsurers That Underestimate Its Impact” (2014). 19  In 1992 after Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki hit the US, the price of reinsuring weather risks spiked and several carriers left the market, leading to a rise of up to 40% in premiums in some parts of Florida. A series of hurricanes affecting the Bahamas has prompted several insurers to withdraw flood cover for low-lying areas. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Asbestos alone is expected to cost insurers $ on a net ultimate claims basis in the United States – equivalent to almost three Superstorm Sandy-sized loss events.

In ten weeks representatives of 196 countries will gather in Paris at the COP21 summit to consider the world’s response to climate change. It is governments who must choose whether, and how, to pursue that 2 degree world. And the role of finance? Earlier this year, G20 Finance Ministers asked the Financial Stability Board to consider how the financial sector could take account of the risks climate change poses to our financial system. As Chair of the FSB I hosted a meeting last week where the private and public sectors discussed the current and prospective financial stability risks from climate change and what might be done to mitigate them. I want to share some thoughts on the way forward after providing some context beginning with lessons from the insurance sector. 9  Few business leaders list climate change as a near-term pressing risk. See, for instance, PWC’s annual survey of CEOs (www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-agenda/ceo-survey.html) and the Bank of England’s Systemic Risk Survey (www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/srs/srs2015h1.pdf). 10  Even credit ratings typically only look out to 3-5 years. 11  For instance, IPCC (2014) Conclusion SPM 2.1 notes that “cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond”. The Stern review observes that “many greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, stay in the atmosphere for more than a century” (See The Stern Review of the Economic Effects of Climate Change (2006)). 12  The Cancun Agreement in 2010 committed governments to “hold the increase in global average temperature below two degrees”.
At the same time, labour shortages have persisted in many sectors and overt unemployment has been stable and low. The business sector must restructure rapidly when real wages increase sharply. Many activities will no longer be profitable and will be shut down. This could lead to higher unemployment. However, lower employment will not necessarily be reflected in unemployment figures. We may instead see a flow of discouraged workers into, for example, disability pensions, early retirement schemes or different types of adjustment packages. The extent to which these schemes are used will depend on financial incentives and entitlement thresholds. 8  BIS Review 20/2002  In Norway, the employment rate is among the highest in the OECD area. This reflects both high labour force participation and low unemployment. The picture becomes more mixed when average working hours are taken into account. The average is lower in Norway than in other countries. The sickness absence rate is high. Part-time employment is widespread. The average number of person-hours worked in the working-age population is relatively low, despite high labour force participation and low unemployment. Among OECD countries, the only countries with lower figures than Norway are those with very high unemployment. In Norway, average working hours have fallen by more than 20 per cent in the last thirty years. This can be partly explained by the way working life and child care are organised, but similar trends are also seen in many other countries, especially in Scandinavia.

This led to the creation of IBF in 1974, as a dedicated institute for financial sector training. More initiatives were introduced to deepen skills, such as the launch of the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) examinations locally in 1982 and the establishment of the Wealth Management Institute (WMI) in 2003. As the training landscape  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  developed over the years, we subsequently evolved IBF into a standards-setter for financial sector competency. Today, Singapore’s financial sector comprises almost 12% of Singapore’s GDP, with more than 1,000 financial institutions performing roles in Singapore, the region and globally. It employs almost 190,000 people, of which about 70% are Singaporeans. The jobs are now diverse and increasingly complex. Beyond traditional corporate lenders and retail bank tellers, many more jobs have been created in portfolio management and investment analysis, product structuring, risk management and technology. Our financial sector has significant opportunities ahead of it. However, growth will demand deeper skills and expertise, rather than a large expansion of jobs. The deceleration in job growth in Singapore’s financial sector in the last few years1 is not a temporary happening. It reflects the slowdown in our local labour force growth, as well as major forces that are reshaping global finance. I will say a little more about these global forces, before going on to talk about what we have to focus on to remain a competitive and dynamic financial centre in the years to come. The evolving global financial landscape Globally, we are seeing countervailing forces.