samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It accounted for one third of international issuance of green and sustainable bonds in Asia. In 2022, we continued to see strong momentum, in particular in the area of green and sustainable loans. The vibrant green bond market is in part a result of the many breakthroughs made by the Government Green Bond programme. Since 2019, the HKMA has assisted the Government in issuing nearly $ billion worth of green bonds targeting both institutional and retail investors. We made use of each issuance to innovate and expand the suite of green bond products in terms of currencies, tenors and distribution channels, thus laying the foundation for other public and private sector issuers in the region. These issuances kept pushing the boundaries. Just over the last few years, we made the world's largest retail green bond issuance, Asia's largest ESG bond issuance, and issued the world's first tokenised government green bond. We will continue to seek new breakthroughs. In the coming five years, planned annual issuance of Government Green Bonds will increase from $ billion to $ billion. The mandate of this programme will be expanded to cover sustainable bonds as well. We will also consider how best to incorporate green and sustainability elements into a new infrastructure bond programme we are developing for the Government.

Again, this experience is not unique to the United States, indicating that it stems from factors common across countries, rather than issues unique to our economy. Indeed, most inflation-targeting advanced economies have struggled to achieve their inflation goals on a sustained basis over the past decade. This brings us to last week’s announcement and the issuance of a new consensus statement of our policy framework. It is a culmination of extensive outreach and conversations with communities and stakeholders across the country, careful and thorough analysis, and active 45 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  discussion and debate among Committee participants.4,5 We took important lessons from the experience of the past decade, reassessed the evidence, and looked at the challenges ahead of us. All this effort was worth it: this new statement means we are better positioned to achieve our goals. In fact, the process worked so well, we’ve committed to repeating it roughly every five years! The new framework statement directly and effectively addresses the problems caused by a low neutral rate and persistently low inflation. First, it stipulates that, following periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, a temporary overshooting of the longer-run inflation target will likely be desirable to keep inflation and inflation expectations centered on 2 percent. Second, it makes clear that we seek inflation that averages 2 percent over time, consistent with our longer-run target. Finally, the statement makes unequivocally clear that we seek maximum employment and will aim to eliminate shortfalls from this broad and inclusive goal.
Decisive and effective action in boosting the knowledge economy should contribute to substantially increasing technological capital and to bridge the gap blighting the Spanish economy in this area. And improving the competitive environment in which businesses take their decisions is crucial if all these steps are to result in overall gains in efficiency and competitiveness. One key area for progress along these lines is liberalisation in the services sector, which encompasses some of the most dynamic activities with the greatest employment-generating capacity and where new forms of labour relations may be more successful. Further, the growing interaction between industry and services has increased the influence of the latter in determining international competitiveness. It is likewise necessary to continue pushing through liberalisation and competition in the network industries, so that the conditions in which inputs are provided to other productive activities allow Spanish companies to compete on an equal footing with other developed countries. The liberalising impulse must be regained, in particular, in the energy, telecommunications and rail transport sectors. I shall devote the final part of my address to analysing the situation of the Spanish banking system in greater detail. An economic environment marked by a real and financial global crisis poses a first-order challenge to the normal pursuit of banking activity. As stated, the first wave of shocks, confined essentially to the financial arena, did not have appreciable direct effects on our banks, and the indirect effects were absorbed in an orderly fashion.

Nor does it seem feasible that further substantial contributions of private capital will be forthcoming if the tensions on international financial markets do not subside. From an overall perspective the Spanish system is in a position to overcome all these challenges, though as I have reiterated, talk of immunity is completely out of place. Indeed, not all banks are in the same position when it comes to coping with the tensions. This is because they have pursued different lending policies over recent years in terms of the rate of expansion of loans and of the degree of risk concentration. Even among banks that have followed similar strategies, notable differences can be identified regarding the selection of specific risks, their ability to manage them and the buffers, in terms of profitability and solvency, available to them to alleviate the effects of any risks that may materialise. For all these reasons banks should make the changes necessary to adapt to the new circumstances. These changes unavoidably involve stepping up efforts to rationalise operating costs and to correct the overcapacity in the sector which arises from a worldwide tendency towards lower levels of leverage. 8  BIS Review 79/2009  This overcapacity in the banking industry should be tackled through restructuring processes that allow a sound and efficient financial intermediation system to take root.
Market participants do not anticipate a rise in key rates in the US, the euro area and the UK until the end of 2010. The interest rate differential between Norway and trading partners has increased. The krone exchange rate has remained fairly stable through winter, although it is somewhat stronger than projected in October. The krone is expected to remain at about the current level to the end of the third quarter and then gradually depreciate somewhat thereafter. BIS Review 38/2010  1  Growth in the Norwegian economy came to a halt in autumn 2008, and Norway entered a downturn in early 2009. The decline appears to have ended in the second quarter of 2009. Capacity utilisation is lower than normal, but the downturn seems to be relatively mild. Activity has been underpinned by substantial interest rate cuts combined with higher public spending and high oil investment. Fiscal policy was very expansionary in 2009. Petroleum revenue spending increased sharply, and by close to 3 per cent of mainland GDP. Revenue spending will rise further this year. Our projections are based on information from the final budget and the projections in the National Budget for 2010. In line with this, the level of the structural, non-oil budget deficit is maintained at this level to the end of the projection period. According to the fiscal rule, the fiscal deficit should be reduced to about 4 per cent of the capital in the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) when the economy resumes a normal level of activity.

A strong krone may also lead to lower activity in exposed industries and thereby lower capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy. This suggests that the interest rate should not be raised too rapidly. Monetary policy cannot fine-tune developments in the economy, but it can mitigate the most severe effects when the economy is exposed to shocks. Overall, the outlook and the balance of risks suggest that the key rate should be gradually increased ahead, although somewhat later than we envisaged in October 2009. On 24 March, the Executive Board decided that the key policy rate should be in the interval 1½–2½ per cent in the period to the publication of the next Report on 23 June 2010 unless the Norwegian economy is exposed to new major shocks. The interest rate was kept unchanged at this meeting. This is based on the assessment that inflation and capacity utilisation may for a period be slightly lower than previously projected and that the interest rate should be increased somewhat later than expected in autumn 2009.
My interpretation is that the advocates of “leaning against the wind” consider that the central issue is that something should be done – and this does not necessarily mean raising the policy rate. So it would  BIS Review 70/2010  5  appear that we are approaching some form of consensus. At least to the extent that most people now seem to consider it more dangerous to do nothing than to do something. Given the proportions the debate on monetary policy and asset prices has taken on, it would be easy to believe that there are a whole number of practical examples of “leaning against the wind”. However, this is not the case – with regard to either successes or failures. One of the few examples usually taken up is the policy conducted by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) 2002–2004. The RBA adjusted its policy rate to try to dampen house price rises that were fairly clearly of a speculative nature. The fact is that this type of strategy is relatively untested. And we cannot refer to practical experiences where central banks have systematically and over a long period of time tried to apply the principle of “leaning against the wind”. Other and better weapons? Most people probably agree that the interest rate cannot do the whole job if we want to try to slow down developments in the property and credit markets that appear to be getting out of control.

On the other hand, authorities like Finansinspektionen may need to take the same type of measure for their task of protecting the consumer. Their proposal for a ceiling for loan-to-value ratios, for instance, is based on consumer interests. The question of how responsibility and roles should be divided between the different authorities will probably be discussed in detail in Sweden and abroad in the coming period. And it is important to find a system that works efficiently. Some of the criticism of the strategy of “leaning against the wind” with the policy rate also applies to alternative measures. If the central bank or another authority takes such measures, one must have a good understanding, as with the policy rate, that the measures are really being implemented at the right point in time. Otherwise there is a risk that the fluctuations in the banks’ credit granting will be greater rather than smaller. Monetary policy and house prices Credit volumes and house prices are not targets for monetary policy. They are indicators that should affect monetary policy if they are expected to affect inflation and resource utilisation in the economy. But my assessment is that there may also be occasions when indicators such  6  BIS Review 70/2010  as house prices and credit growth contain information on future economic developments over and above what we can capture in our quantified forecasts.
I see this as a reasonable possibility, and therefore I think it might be possible that the decline in reserve balances has pushed up overnight rates a bit over time. 17 At this point, I see no evidence that we are at, or close to, the “steep” portion of the demand curve. 18 Let’s run through some places where evidence of such a possibility might be found. To begin with, if we were closing in on the “steep” part, I might have expected to see more above-IOR lending in the unsecured overnight markets, as at least some banks each day found themselves short of reserves and had to borrow them from another bank. In fact, the amount of such above-IOR lending remains low as a share of the overnight bank funding market, as shown in Figure 9. 19 I might also have expected to see shifts in bank payments behavior—for example, more daylight overdrafts or more effort by banks to “optimize” their payment flows— but I have not seen this either. But, most fundamentally, I might have observed a day-to-day relationship between shifts in the stock of reserves and overnight interest rates. Figure 10 shows a scatterplot of daily changes in reserve balances against daily changes in the spread between the IOR rate and the effective federal funds rate; there is no visible relationship. 16  The classic paper on this topic is Poole (1968).

Some researchers have considered the Federal Reserve’s FOMC committee under the leadership of Alan Greenspan to be an example of such a committee. 4 The changes made recently indicate that the FOMC is more of an individualistic committee. The Riksbank is one of the central banks with the most pronounced individual responsibility. Major changes in the way the material for the decision is produced During the years I have worked at the Riksbank there have been major changes in the work on producing the material for monetary policy decision-making. Six years ago our forecasts were based on the assumption that the repo rate would be held unchanged, regardless of whether or not this was a realistic assumption. The forecasts extended two years ahead, compared with the current three years. The analysis was to a great extent based on assessments and discussions. Formal models were used but did not play the same central role as they do today. Although this functioned fairly well, it also involved limitations. For example, it is difficult to see how alternative scenarios – something that is being given greater scope in our analysis – could be used without a more coherent model. The fact that we are now using models more also makes it easier to explain how a forecast is made and to assess the forecasts. In recent years we have made some major changes that have had significance for the way we organise our internal forecasting work.
But because it is so unprecedented and such an exceptional situation, we really have to monitor that very carefully. Whether it is going to be faster, whether it is going to be a bit more slow because there has been variation in the terms of loans, for instance, to both corporates and mortgages and therefore the transmission is not operating as smoothly as it would if everything was at floating rates. All of that we are looking at extremely carefully to measure the transmission and see how fast it moves. Suffice to say that we are seeing it already. Do we see all of it? Obviously, no. We want to see it all the way down to inflation. Two questions from me. Firstly, the Bank of Canada recently restarted its rate hikes, saying that the reason for this was that it thought the neutral rate had risen from its previous expectations. Do you think similarly? Is that part of the reason that you're continuing to raise rates and signal more rate rises are ahead? The second question is about whether the ECB could consider skipping rate rises, certain meetings, perhaps going to only changing policy when you're issuing forecasts – similarly to the Fed's pause or skip yesterday. It's difficult to say whether we're in the same position as the Bank of Canada because we did not pause. So, in a way we don't have to ask ourselves whether we are at neutral rate or not. We believe that we have ground to cover.

So, we are not where we want to be if we want to reach our target. In terms of having to pause or having to skip: as I said, number one, we have not discussed it at all and we have not begun thinking about it because we have work to do. I have two questions. The first question is: today you confirmed, repeated, that rates will be kept at the restricted levels for as long as necessary. Because inflation will be above 2% in 2025, we can expect restrictive rates for long. How is the Governing Council concerned that you're going far and you, at the same time, would like to avoid unnecessarily harming economic activity? How far do you look at growth weakening in response to your policies? Then a second question regards this June. That is a historical month for the ECB; the € billion repayment of TLTROs is seen as the biggest daily reduction of the ECB balance sheet. On the top this June is also the last month of APP reinvestments. So, what is the impact of these two unprecedented events in the ECB on tightening of financing and monetary conditions? 7/10  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  I thought you were going to say that it's an important month because we are celebrating our 25th anniversary – which was also the date when the ECB was opened first on the ground here in Frankfurt. As I said, the objective that we have is very clear. The destination we know.
While the internationalisation of the banking industry holds the potential for efficiency gains, and increased household welfare, it has also added a score of new challenges. Perhaps the most serious of these challenges is what has been termed the home-host problem. This can, in all its essence, be described as follows: Suppose a bank, which is of marginal importance in its home country, sets up a branch in another country, which turns out to be systemically important for that country. Given that the bank is not important in its home country, the home supervisors, who have responsibility for the supervision, might not think that the bank merits close supervision. However, for the host country, which will foot the bill for the salvage operation in case the bank fails, the incentives to monitor the bank are huge. This dilemma is not new in theory, but has now become of great practical importance as financial globalization progressively is making national borders less relevant. Asset prices, financial stability and monetary policy Are there instances when these goals come into conflict with each other? This question has become particularly relevant in the last few years as asset prices have surged, while, at the same time, consumer price inflation has remained muted. On the whole, I think it is reasonable to assume that price stability in the long run reinforces financial stability. The main reason for this is that low and stable inflation reduces the risk of misallocating investments.

Lars Nyberg: Monetary and financial stability from a central bank perspective Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the conference on the 10th Anniversary of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 13 September 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, What is the interaction of monetary and financial stability? This is one of the most discussed issues in central banks and academia today, and is likely to remain high on the agenda for the foreseeable future. Many central banks, including the Swedish Riksbank, now have dual tasks: maintaining price stability and promoting financial stability. I will begin by discussing these tasks separately, and then turn to the questions the success in bringing down inflation has raised with regard to financial stability, and how this has influenced the conduct of monetary policy in Sweden. Before proceeding, I should stress that the views I am about to express are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the other members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that my remarks primarily are based on my own experiences from an inflation targeting central bank, operating in a small open economy. Price stability The taming of inflation, after the destructive price-wage spirals of the 1970s and 1980s, is one of the major success stories in modern economic policy making. Economic theory tells us that high inflation is bad for a number of reasons. These theories now appear to have been vindicated.
51, No. 4, s. 657-665. Schadler, S., Drummond, P.F.N., Kuijs, L., Murgasova, Z., Elkan van, R. 2005. “Adopting the euro in Central Europe: Challenges of the Next Step in European Integration”, Occasional Paper No. 234, International Monetary Fund, Washington. Wicksell, K. 1898. “Interest and Prices”, tłum. R.F.Kahn, MacMillan, New York, 1936. Woodford, M. 2003. “Interest and Prices”, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. 4  BIS Review 6/2007

Let me end with a few reflections about European financial integration in my capacity as Governor of the Bank of Spain. European financial integration should also be further enhanced by taking further steps to cover the existing gaps in the Euro area financial architecture that still prevent the complete eradication of fragmentation risk among European countries. Completing these well-known gaps by finalizing the Banking Union should also come to the fore of EU financial policy priorities. While banking activity transcends national frontiers, and supervisory and resolution powers have been transferred to common institutions, the guarantee on deposits is still borne by Member States. Completing the third pillar of the Banking Union, namely a fully-fledged Deposit Guarantee Scheme, will not only provide a credible safety net for depositors in an integrated banking market, but also will provide the necessary legitimacy of any institutional arrangement. In sum, completing the Banking Union is a crucial ingredient in helping to create the appropriate institutional and regulatory conditions for banks, investors and other stakeholders to adapt to the profound challenges the financial sector is and will be facing in the future. Many thanks for your attention. 3/3