samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When we removed one fence, we put in a different defence in some other way in order to make sure that we are sheltered. Those protective steps are vital in all economies. These then are the challenges that all of us are facing. All in all, we have to protect our own economies from within as well as from outside. Let us therefore, look forward to the next three days with enthusiasm, because I believe that what you are going to do over the next three days will help the economies of the world to sustain and defend themselves, so that we can all move forward with confidence. Let me also wish you a happy Deepavali, and extend my warm wishes on the occasion of the festival of lights. It is an important festival in Sri Lanka and we are happy that you are here to celebrate the day with us. It is also a holiday. But yet, I am glad to see so many dignitaries here today. I am sure that that is because all of you believe that this Conference is such an important event. In particular, I wish to thank the Honourable Chief Justice, His Lordship Sarath N Silva, the Attorney General, Mr Priyasath Dep, the Secretary, Ministry of Justice, Mr Suhada Gamlath, the foreign dignitaries and our own Deputy Governors who have been very involved in this process. I also wish to thank our own FIU, which has been a tremendous source of strength to us to protect our own financial system.

Whether or not a banking licence is required, stable coin issuers must abide by certain regulations just like any other financial market participant. These range from investor and data protection to rules on combating money laundering and terrorism financing. As you see, ladies and gentlemen, stable coins present many regulatory challenges, which in turn require close cooperation between the various authorities. This is particularly true of cross-border projects like Libra. In addition to the regulatory issues, there is the question of whether stable coins might influence the effectiveness of monetary policy. If Swiss franc stable coins were to proliferate in Switzerland, this would have no immediate impact on the effectiveness of our monetary policy. In such a scenario, the Swiss franc would remain the relevant currency. The stable coins pegged to Swiss francs would simply be another Swiss franc-denominated form of money alongside bank deposits and cash. As long as prices, wages and loans are set in Swiss francs, the SNB can influence incentives for savers and borrowers via its monetary policy and thus ensure price stability over the medium term. However, if stable coins pegged to foreign currencies were to establish themselves in Switzerland, the effectiveness of our monetary policy could be impaired. How close stable coins will get to good money and what additional benefits they will offer versus traditional types of money remains to be seen. What matters is that the various book and token money providers operate under identical competitive and regulatory conditions.
The turnaround in the labour market usually occurs somewhat later than the turnaround in general economic activity, emerging first in an increase in hours worked rather than in job creation. This is illustrated clearly in recent statistics. In recent months, however, there have been indications that this process has come to an end and job creation is on the rise. In August 2011, the Central Bank forecast that inflation would rise sharply in coming months, peaking at about 6.8% in the first quarter of this year. This forecast, together with the assessment that the economic recovery was strong enough in spite of international headwinds to withstand modest interest rate hikes, lay behind the Bank’s decision to raise interest rates last year. The consumer price index for March was published yesterday. It shows that inflation measured 6.4% in Q1, driven primarily by a wide range of increases: in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  public and private services, housing costs, petrol, and other imported goods. Core inflation is also high, at 6%. The past few months’ depreciation of the króna plays a role in the recent rise in inflation. In small, open economies like Iceland, the exchange rate is a key factor in the inflation process.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Economic transformation and inclusive growth in frontier economies Welcome and opening remarks by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the conference on “Economic transformation and inclusive growth in frontier economies”, jointly organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Bangkok, 28 January 2013. *  *  *  Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. It gives me great pleasure and honor to welcome each and every one of you to Thailand, and more specifically, to the Conference on “Economic Transformation and Inclusive Growth in Frontier Economies”. This event is the second in a series of conference jointly organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 2. The topic of the conference is timely and relevant to current developments in the region. Frontier economies are new and becoming large markets. They all have the potential to grow into tomorrow’s emerging economies. In recent years, we witness faster economic growth in frontier economies than larger emerging economies. We have seen frontier economies integrate into the regional and global economy. 3. Frontier economies are full of potential. However, continued efforts on strengthening policy frameworks are still needed. This is to ensure long term economic growth and sustain robust economy. And I believe that today’s conference will contribute to these efforts as we will share and learn the appropriate lessons of others. One can leap jump the process, without repeating the mistakes.
2 Gerald P. Dwyer Jr., Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, and Free Banking in the  United States, Economic Review 6 (FRB Atlanta Dec. 1996) (hereinafter “Dwyer”). 3 Dwyer 4. 4 Dwyer 6. 5 Dwyer fn. 13. 6 Dwyer 6. 7 Dwyer 6. 8 Dwyer 2. 9 Arthur A. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, Free Banking, Wildcat Banking, and  Shinplasters, Quarterly Review 13 (FRB Minn. Fall 1982) (hereinafter “Rolnick”). 10 Dwyer 7. 11 Dwyer 5. 12 Rolnick 16. Specifically, the states varied on whether security for the notes would  be measured in par or market value. 13 Rosa Lastra, Central Bank and Bank Regulation, 204 (Sept. 1991) (Ph.D. thesis  London School of Economics) (on file with author DM # 172574). 14 John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years 237 (Werner Co. 1896) available  at https://archive.org/details/johnshermansreco00sher/page/236. 15 Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United  States, 1867-1960 17, 21 (1963) (hereinafter “Friedman”). 16 See e.g., 12 USC §26 (Comptroller to determine if institution is engaged in the  business of banking). 17 See Dwyer 16. 18 In 1935, the Treasury redeemed all debt that backed national bank notes. The  Glass-Steagall Act, passed in 1933 in the midst of the Great Depression, also shifted the calculus for holders of national bank notes. The act introduced deposit insurance and divided commercial and investment banking, each of which served to remove disincentives against holding deposits with banks.

Some might look at this list, and want a faster, ready-made solution. I can hear them now: “Why not just put this activity in the banking system and borrow a more robust regulatory structure?” I think we should consider that, but bank regulation may not be fit for purpose. History rhymes; it doesn’t repeat—that’s the last time I will use that line. So, at the same time we consider what banks will or should be going forward, we also should consider some more fundamental questions: (i) What is the most practical approach? (ii) What approach gives us the right balance of functional and risk-based regulation? (iii) What approach is the most neutral to technological change? (iv) What approach provides the clarity to the greatest extent possible (recognizing that every model will have its faults)? (v) What approach will last to and through the next cycle of innovation? I mentioned the SEC earlier. The SEC analyzes digital currencies using a test that the Supreme Court formulated almost 90 years ago—that is mind boggling, but for what the SEC does, it is also still very relevant—this is something worth striving for. You might be surprised that I don’t have the answer to what the next 90 years of digital currency regulation will look like, but I hope to have the opportunity to explore this issue with some of you. Thank you. 1 Many thanks to Joseph Torregrossa and Thomas Noone for their assistance with  these remarks.
Having said that, it is worth mentioning the results of empirical studies on the effects of the Federal Reserve’s first two QE programmes. Overall, they suggest that these programmes led to an economically significant reduction in long-term interest rates. However, the effects of the first QE programme appear to have been greater than the second. What can we say then about the risks associated with the accommodative monetary policy and unconventional measures? In public discussion, the focus is often on the risk of inflation. In many countries, the monetary base has grown very substantially. In the opinion of some observers, this will lead to a marked increase in inflation. I would therefore stress that inflation rates in the advanced economies have remained low against the background of capacity underutilisation. The same applies to inflationary expectations obtained from financial market data and surveys of households and companies. It is correct that the monetary base will need to be normalised when the crisis subsides. The challenge will be to determine this moment accurately. Yet this problem is not fundamentally different from the normal task of a central bank, which is to select the appropriate volume of liquidity. Apart from the risk of inflation in an accommodative monetary policy, another main area of public concern are the risks in central bank balance sheets. These risks have become greater with unconventional monetary policy and the associated lengthening of central bank  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  balance sheets.

This makes it necessary for the internal auditor to put him on a continuous learning path so that he could update himself of the new developments in banking as well as his own field. High tech and associated risks In modern banking, the internal auditor has been challenged by a new dimension of business process development in banks. This has basically arisen from the extensive employment of advanced technology, namely, information and communication technology, in banks and the consequential business process outsourcing that has sprung up throughout the world as an efficient cost-cutter for banking firms. The second would not have been possible, had the first had not taken place. With regard to the employment of high-tech in business processing, banks have been the pioneers in the game. With the rapid advancements that took place from around early 1960s, banks successfully resorted to advanced ICT so as to cut costs, have a wider customer outreach, supply a wide range of financial products and out-beat their less tech-savvy rivals. This resulted in a tremendous growth in banking business in the subsequent decades. The very same development has now paved the way for a further quantum leap type of business expansion in the form of business process outsourcing. Both have been beneficial to banks. Yet, they have brought new types of risks to banks as well. 2  BIS Review 143/2007  Internal auditor as the principal risk manager The internal auditor of a bank is the principal risk management officer as well.
The excessive financial expansion was also accompanied by a reduced perception of risk by investors and intermediaries, contributing to spending growth and the leveraged buyout boom. This situation was gradually changing as central banks tightened their monetary policy, but the most radical change took place from the summer of 2007, when the turmoil led to a rapid and substantial reassessment of the risk of financial instruments and a sudden standstill in many segments of the money and capital markets. There then began a process of deleveraging, the opposite of the one that took place in the previous years of this decade, in which debtors are striving to rebuild their balance sheets, while investors exercise the greatest prudence in choosing where to place their savings. During the stage of strong credit growth, the Spanish economy accumulated certain imbalances, linked to the fact that (residential and capital) investment exceeded national saving. However, Spain has preserved a number of very important stabilising factors, such as the balanced budget, to which I will refer later. Also, as I have mentioned in detail in other speeches, Spanish banks were not involved in the financial innovation operations that, through the creation of highly sophisticated instruments, lie at the source of the current financial crisis. This means that our institutions are in a somewhat more solid position to face the new stage than those of other countries.

Further, the long-term nature of much life insurance business should reduce some of the risks associated with resolving financial institutions, and therefore elements of a going concern regime can be phased in more slowly than would otherwise be the case. At the same time, an orderly transition will promote financial stability. Recent changes in the microstructure of some financial markets have reduced liquidity and made them more susceptible to disorderly trading even in response to small shocks. It is not yet clear how much impact Solvency II will have on the asset side of insurers’ balance sheets, but given that UK insurance firms manage in the region of £ trillion in assets, it would seem wise to implement the new regime carefully. In my view there is only one serious argument which could push us in the other direction. If the sector was undercapitalised under the current regime, then allowing a gradual transition to the new standard would present a risk. This was exactly the position we found ourselves in with the banking sector when implementing CRDIV, the European vehicle for Basel III. The financial crisis had made it abundantly clear that our capital regime for banks was wholly inadequate. So we decided to move quickly, to promote safety and soundness and financial stability.
Investors, on the other hand, were attracted by the relatively higher return in times of low investment rate levels and by the sense of security provided – among other things – by the assessment of rating agencies. The ultimate outcome was that instead of dispersing risks associated with bank lending, securitisation had the opposite effect of concentrating them in the banking system, with harmful consequences for financial stability. The size of the financial sector is another aspect which deserves close scrutiny. When the financial system grows too large it may eventually lead to a misallocation of resources. Of course, it has to be acknowledged that developed credit markets are important for business start-ups. However, while finance is a crucial element for the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, the recent financial crisis has also highlighted the role that large financial markets play in downside risk. A growing number of academics and opinion makers are questioning the theory that the effect of financial markets on growth is always positive and increasing. The relationship may well be non-linear: when of reasonable size, financial markets do help allocating resources efficiently and promote economic growth. However, as they grow larger, it may well be that financial markets may exert a decreasing marginal contribution to growth. In extreme cases, as the size of financial systems exceeds some threshold, their effect on growth could even turn negative.

Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: Financial integration and stability – efficiency gains vs pitfalls Keynote address by Ms Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the conference “Heterogeneous Nations and Globalized Financial Markets: New Challenges for Central Banks”, organised by the National Bank of Poland, Warsaw, 11 June 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen 1 , It is a pleasure for me to speak at this conference today here in Warsaw. Heterogeneous nations and globalized financial markets – the title of this conference – are an old phenomenon. In fact, in the late medieval ages of the 14th to the 16th century, the Kingdom of Poland, the Holy Roman Empire and the Hanseatic area have formed a well financially integrated area contributing to more specialization in trade and hence to economic growth at that time. In fact, despite the existence of many currencies, money was easy to transport and so financial integration was rather more advanced than the integration of markets for goods. The Kingdom of Poland was playing a particular role for the financial integration at that time as a key provider of silver from its silver mines for the coin production, also for the neighbouring regions. 2 In today’s modern economies, we think of financial integration having mainly two positive impacts. First, to improve the allocative efficiency of capital, and second, to help the diversification of risks.
At the end, I hope I have managed to pinpoint the main aspects of the ongoing and evolving discussion on the main challenges for the statistics on the backdrop of the “Great recession”. The crisis was hopefully once in a century adverse event, which made a revolution in the manner in which the statistics is thought of. Many issues and challenges in statistics which arose after the crisis have been tackled in the advanced world, but still there are many remaining challenges which are to be tackled in the times to come. As for the less developed countries and less developed statistical systems, the challenges are twofold. First, even absent the crisis, there was a lot of work to be done in order to converge to the systems and practices of the developed world. Of course, lots have been done and gaps have been narrowed. But the changes in the approach to the statistics in the developed economies after the crisis mean that their systems will gain additional layer of quality. Hence, the crisis has made the challenges for us even bigger, as the benchmarks for convergences in the area of statistics are much higher. But I am positive that the efforts and the energy that we invest in this will be enough to get us closer to what is currently being perceived as the best practice in the world of statistics. In fact there is no other alternative.

While the risk of increased trade protectionism seems to have abated somewhat, it remains a significant tail risk that could seriously injure global growth. Against this backdrop, a rising tide of populist backlash against globalisation is a wild card for the medium-term. These risks are not pre-destined. The world is in a better position than before to deal with these risks. Where we go from here hinges strongly on domestic policy responses in each of the major economies and the trade-offs they make today between the short-term and the long-term. 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Asia’s medium-term prospects are good Lest we forget, many parts of the emerging market world have not seen a significant backlash against globalisation. And Asia stands out in that regard. Asia remains committed to openness, is positioned for sustained growth, and offers much promise to investors. Led by China and India, Asia will remain the fastest-growing region in the world. The IMF projects that Emerging and Developing Asia will grow by an average of 6.3% p.a. from now to 2022. The ASEAN1 economies are expected to grow by about 5% p.a., China by about 6% p.a., and India by 7-8% p.a. Three factors will drive investment opportunities in the region. First, a growing middle class and rapid urban migration. According to the ADB, by 2030, about 1 billion people across China, India and ASEAN will be in the middle-income bracket. This is more than a threefold increase from today, and presents significant potential for growth in private consumption.
There seems to be a reluctance, perhaps just about understandable in some respects, to share information amongst home and host authorities and to co-operate when regulated firms are distressed, which of course is when it matters most that they should co-operate. The FSB needs to ensure that we confront and fix this. But a solution cannot emerge without political leaders making space for – indeed, without them positively encouraging – officials to cooperate properly. 2  BIS Review 145/2010  Capital markets: the financial network The second key plank of the FSB’s existing programme has been to mitigate the complexity of the financial network. We do not just live within a world, a financial system of massive but independent firms; we work in a financial system where everything is connected to everything else. That has been the case for long as I can remember. Central counterparties The use of central counterparties in over-the-counter derivative (OTC) markets is long overdue. But we will also need to ensure that these counterparties are robust. If ever a central counterparty fails, it will be a gigantic mess. Two have failed significantly over the past 30 years: a relatively small one in Paris, but the other was a significant one in Hong Kong during the 1987 market crash, which caused the Hong Kong equity and futures market to close. They were hard to reopen. And their securities markets and regulatory regime had to be completely overhauled as a result.

To receive an LOLR credit, a bank must on the one hand be systemically relevant and, on the other hand, be solvent and able to furnish sufficient collateral. Without collateral, the National Bank cannot grant any credit. This fundamental principle is enshrined in the National Bank Act. By disclosing our terms to the banks in advance, we are eliminating any possible misinterpretation of the liquidity risks and helping to ensure that preparations are in place for a liquidity crisis which can never be ruled out altogether. This is what we refer to as “constructive clarity”. Conclusion To sum up, I would like to reiterate that the situation of the Swiss financial system is stable. However, this gratifying conclusion should not allow us to rest on our laurels. Maintaining a stable financial system in the long term calls for constant efforts to prevent and cope with crises. While this challenge must primarily be met by the private sector, the authorities can, should and must support its efforts. Financial Stability Report 2004 (424 kb)  BIS Review 39/2004  3