samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me re-iterate that sustainable economic development is not possible without adequate investment in the knowledge industry. It is precisely for this reason that the nations that have attained great economic progress are also those that have invested heavily in education. Ladies and Gentlemen; in the recent years, the Bank of Zambia has been striving to strengthen its focus on economic research in order to improve the formulation and implementation of monetary policy in this dynamic economic environment. The Bank has in this regard been publishing the BoZ Reader where members of staff and external researchers are encouraged to publish articles which have a bearing to the economy in general and monetary policy in particular. The Bank in collaboration with the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford University is also in the process of publishing a book on the economic prosperity in Zambia. I wish to take this opportunity to encourage all students and academic staff at UNZA to contribute to some of the forthcoming publications of the BoZ Reader. In conclusion, I wish to re-iterate that the Bank of Zambia commits to continue supporting the Economics Department and Research programmes at UNZA and hopes that the University will live up to its obligations under the framework of cooperation to be signed today. We challenge the Economics Department at UNZA through the Vice Chancellor to scale up its research activities in issues of interest to the Bank and the Zambian economy in general. For this is what this MoU entails.

Others have vulnerabilities in some of these areas, which may have been magnified by access to inexpensive, abundant credit in international markets. Chile’s macroeconomic framework Chile has gradually developed a scheme of macroeconomic policies that permits us to deal with the natural volatilities of the business cycle of any open, commodity-exporting economy. This scheme has evolved over time to address the new challenges, such as a growing degree of financial integration to the global economy. This scheme leans on several pillars. One such pillar is our fiscal policy based on a structural balance rule. This rule dictates clear fiscal commitments that ensure that public finances are both sustainable and predictable. Our fiscal policy is no longer a factor amplifying the business cycle as it was in the past, but on the contrary, it is a buffer. More precisely, under our regime fiscal spending is neutral to the cycle. In turn, the resources accumulated in the sovereign wealth funds are an important source of external liquidity and financing to withstand periods of low fiscal income. Plus our public sector is a net creditor. Indeed, net public debt of the central government is negative, at around minus 6% of GDP. Another pillar is the autonomy of our Central Bank and its commitment with its constitutional mandate to pursue price stability and its inflation targeting regime. Since the year 2001, Chile relies on an inflation target of 3% annually, with a tolerance range between 2 and 4%, which has been met over the years.
This is more than two and a half times the joint stock market value of the four major Swedish banks at the turn of the year 2012/2013. In Sweden, we succeeded in managing the acute phase of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009 in a way that made it possible to limit the costs to society. One contributing factor was probably that the crisis of the 1990s was fresh in the minds of the banks and they thus limited their risk-taking more than might otherwise have been the case, at least with regard to their operations in Sweden. As we know, not all countries were as lucky. The negative effects of the crisis are still in evidence in large parts of the world – not least in several countries in central and southern Europe – and will probably remain so for some time to come. In retrospect, it is easy to note that the combination of shortcomings in the regulations and the profit motives of the participants on the financial markets contributed to one of the worst financial crises of the modern era. The details regarding the build-up of risk and the course of the crisis have been described several times and I will not repeat them here. It is enough this time to note that banks with a limited amount of capital and banks with a high degree of market funding proved to be vulnerable when the storm broke.

The Swedish National Debt Office then carried out extra issues of treasury bills and provided loans through reverse repos in covered mortgage bonds. At the same time, the Riksbank expanded its list of approved forms of collateral. All in all, this meant that in principle the government assumed the risk that lay in the outstanding stock of Swedish mortgage loans. In order to convert borrowing in foreign currencies to lending in Swedish kronor without taking a currency risk, the banks usually conduct currency swaps. In simple terms, this is done like this: A Swedish bank borrows euros in Germany at a maturity of five years. However, as the bank does not really need the euros but needs kronor to fund mortgage loans to Swedish households, the bank has to exchange the euros for kronor. To protect itself against the currency risk, the bank enters into a currency swap in which the euros are exchanged for kronor today under an agreement to exchange the kronor back to euro at a predetermined rate in five years’ time. In this way the bank matches the currencies of its assets (the mortgages) and its liabilities and thereby eliminates the currency risk. The Swedish banks are thus dependent on acquiring kronor in the long-term from a counterparty in a currency swap. They can in principle do this in three ways: through a foreign bank, another Swedish bank or an insurance company. Today, it is often a foreign bank that acts as the counterparty in these swaps.
In this regard, we now recommend that banks study and incorporate those methods of interest rate risk assessment proposed by the BCBS. I recommend you to look at the results of this survey of banks published on the Bank of Russia’s website in the form of a consulting report. We are awaiting comments and suggestions from the banking community on the conclusions drawn. 6) On macroprudential stress testing And finally, coming to the end of my talk I would like to say a few words about the Bank of 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Russia’s plans for the development of macroprudential stress testing. The European Central Bank recently published an extensive document on this subject, and similar work has also come from the Bank of England and Bank of Japan. It is fast becoming standard analytic practice for central banks in ensuring financial stability. Why has macroprudential stress testing become so relevant? There are several reasons. As you will be aware, the Bank of Russia has long been engaged in stress testing of the banking sector. Traditionally this instrument has been used in the supervision of banks, in order to understand the risks posed to individual banks and the banking sector as a whole. However, across the globe we can see a new trend of conducting cross-sectoral stress testing, i.e.

It would also be conducive to the stability and integrity of the financial system. I would emphasise the word “international” as there is no reason to develop regional standards different from those that have already been developed by international financial institutions and professional bodies, together with supervisory agencies. 17. The fourth element concerns the strengthening of co-operative efforts in financial system development. As I have already noted, in Asia we have been making good progress in our efforts to develop the domestic and regional debt markets through various regional forums and involving the international financial institutions. In the context of developing Asian Bond Fund 2, for example, we have achieved a few firsts, including the introduction of the first exchange-traded bond index fund in Asia, arranging for two Asian markets to allow exchange-traded funds for the first time, and opening up the renminbi inter-bank bond market for the first time to foreign investors. 18. The final, and probably most difficult, step towards creating an integrated Asian financial market involves the relaxation of statutory restrictions on cross-border capital flows. It is likely to be the most difficult, in part because it depends on the ability of the financial system in individual jurisdictions to cope with the ensuing risks. 19. This last point brings me to the next issue I wish to touch upon in my remarks, namely, the need for a strong and efficient regulatory framework that is adapted to the integration of the domestic financial system with that of other jurisdictions. 20.
Volatility in other markets also increased dramatically. At that moment, the Central Bank’s main task was precisely to maintain financial stability and contain both devaluation and inflation expectations. The Bank of Russia then discontinued to reduce the key rate and made the decision to carry out proactive foreign currency sales within the fiscal rule. We believe that foreign currency sales linked to the oil price in the market were a key element that helped stabilise the foreign exchange market. At that period, there were concerns that the oil price might stay even below 25 US dollars per barrel for a long time. This algorithm made it possible to temper volatility using the resources from Russia’s foreign currency and gold reserves to a very moderate extent. This was crucial during that period since nobody was able to predict then how the pandemic situation would develop, how long-lasting and deep the crisis would be, and how high the risks to financial stability might be. In such an environment, it is essential to use the available safety cushion thoughtfully to be able to give an adequate response to challenges if they persist. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  The introduction of large-scale restrictions worldwide caused a deep decline in both domestic and external demand. In order to promote economic recovery, we shifted towards accommodative monetary policy as soon as the risks to financial stability abated. We resumed the cycle of the reduction in the key rate as early as April.

Owing to the amendments to laws adopted by the State Duma, the requirement for the testing of non-qualified investors wishing to purchase complex products will become effective as early as autumn, that is, six months earlier than initially scheduled and discussed. We are now authorised to establish the rules for selling financial products to ensure that market participants do not sell complex products to individuals who are unable to comprehend them, or products involving non-transparent conditions of returns, which makes it impossible to assess the risks of investment. Moreover, the new law allows us to set the rules for selling not only the investment products we discussed, but actually any financial products and services. Already this year, we will stipulate the main rules for the interaction between financial institutions’ employees and consumers and the rules for information disclosure. We will also evaluate how well they are complied with in the course of test purchases. It is no secret that financial institutions’ employees selling products often focus on their KPI, which is the basis for their personal bonuses. This KPI is the amount of products they sell and they might not care about the quality of products they sell to people. Of course, we need to alter this system. The protection of retail investors is an important but by far not the only area where we believe it essential to enhance financial consumer protection.
As a result of the tax reforms of 1992 and 2006, we are able to finance the welfare state fairly effectively. Our infrastructure is being developed. The security provided by our welfare system means that restructuring is easier than in many other countries. Like other Nordic countries, we apply labour market rules that for the most part do not impede restructuring. We learned a great deal about successful – and less successful – restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s. Two local communities that had to restructure are Kongsberg and Notodden. The cornerstone enterprises in these two communities had to cut their workforces substantially. Kongsberg fared well. When Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk declared bankruptcy in 1987, its defence business was continued while all its civilian production was split up and sold. The new companies and spin-off companies in Horten, Stjørdal and Egersund have posted solid growth and profitability. Several of the companies have become leaders in their field. An adequate supply of state-of-the-art technical expertise has been important for the companies’ restructuring success. Notodden did not fare as well. In the 1950s, Tinfoss Jernverk and Norsk Hydro employed more than 1500 manufacturing workers. Towards the end of the 1960s, they started shedding labour. The processing industry has now been closed down. Many workers are now commuting to other municipalities, including Kongsberg. The share of the population that is on disability benefits or participating in various labour market programmes is above the national average.

Coming to my second question, how should central banks react if they see the risk of an emerging asset price bubble? The options range from not reacting at all to consciously trying to prick an emerging bubble. Obviously, attempts to deflate an asset price bubbles are likely to require substantial interest rate increases which, in turn, could adversely affect economic activity and inflation. In view of the difficulties in identifying a bubble, it seems established wisdom today that central banks should be exceedingly careful in dealing with asset bubbles. There is, however, a more subtle way: to cautiously consider “leaning against the wind” when an asset price bubble is developing. Indeed, some academics have argued that, by accepting some short-term deviation from the pursuit of its stated objective of price stability, a central bank may improve the conditions for maintaining price stability over the medium to long-term. If a potentially costly bubble is firmly under way, then a somewhat tighter monetary policy stance than would otherwise be needed could be warranted. Certainly, there are also risks involved in “leaning against the wind”. First, as I mentioned already, there can never be full certainty as to whether an asset price bubble is under way. Second, by influencing market psychology, a monetary policy tightening could trigger dynamics that are difficult to foresee and may be hard to control ex post. Effective communication, as always, is crucial, especially in situations of heightened uncertainty.
On the assumption that the three-month Libor rate will remain stable at 0.75% during the next three years, inflation should average 0.7% in 2003, move up to 0.9% in 2004 and reach 1.6% in 2005. Forecast inflation will remain below 1% until the end of 2004 except in the fourth quarter of 2002. In the course of 2005, however, a marked acceleration will set in, with forecast inflation reaching the 2% mark in the fourth quarter of 2005. The new forecast is consistently below that of June 2002. It reflects the delay in the economic upswing. In the new forecast, inflation will rise more markedly at the end of the forecasting horizon due to an even more expansionary monetary policy since June. Expansionary monetary policy to be continued At our last media conference, I pointed out that the National Bank must be prepared to react quickly to changes in the economic situation. When the delay in economic recovery became discernible in summer, we acted immediately by again lowering interest rates. Since then, nothing of basic significance has changed in our assessment of the situation. We shall adhere to our expansionary monetary policy in the foreseeable future. We will thus contribute to the economic rebound and continue to keep Swiss franc investments unattractive. The low interest rate level and the relatively strong growth of monetary aggregates currently do not represent a threat to price stability. Once a sustained economic recovery becomes discernible, we shall have to review our monetary policy and adjust it to the new circumstances.

Subject to the caveat referred to above, these experts generally share our conclusion that there is no unequivocal indication of a significant misalignment in the exchange rate. If our EU counterparts in the ERM II-related decision-making process also share these views, one would, therefore, expect Malta to join ERM II with a central parity rate which broadly corresponds to the current exchange rate level. Some commentators have cautioned against what in their view is a hasty approach to euro adoption. How would you respond? A judgment as to whether the path to euro adoption is hasty or otherwise can only be made in relation to the economic principles which underlie the criteria and conditions attached to participation in EMU. This is precisely the approach taken in the Treaty, which contains indicators for measuring the degree of economic preparedness of a country, as also in our own study. The obligation to participate in ERM II for a minimum period of two years serves that purpose. The underlying premise is that once a country reaches the point at which it can derive the considerable, undeniable benefits of monetary union, it should do so. In the case of a small, open economy which must support an independent currency in a fully liberalised trade and capital environment, these benefits must also be evaluated in the light of the costs and risks - which are not negligible - of delaying participation. The report presented to Cabinet builds on that approach.
Gent Sejko: Comments on cooperation extension between Albania and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs Speech by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the ceremony of signing the Memorandum of Understanding between the Swiss Government's SECO and the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 1 March 2019. * * * Dear ladies and gentlemen, Today we start the second phase of the cooperation with the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), which provides, on behalf of the Swiss Government, technical assistance to support, among others, central banks. I take this opportunity to extend our profound appreciation and gratitude to the Swiss Government, which has continuously provided assistance to the Bank of Albania – either directly or through other financial institutions – in the areas of payments, financial inclusion and monetary policy. Today, we are signing a new cooperation agreement with regard to perfecting our analyses and decision-making processes. The development and the continuous enrichment of scientific capacities of our talented staff, and the implementation of research and analysis methodologies to support the decision-making and policymaking processes are a priority for the Bank of Albania. In this context, it is a pleasure and honour for me, as the Governor of the Bank of Albania, to sign, together with H.E. Ambassador Maître, this agreement between our two institutions. At the Bank of Albania, we are very enthusiastic about this cooperation.

To this end, the Bank, together with Securities Commission Malaysia and various Government ministries and agencies, collaborate through the Financial Education Network to increase the level of financial literacy and access to information and resources on financial matters. The Financial Education Network also serves as a focal point to drive the implementation of Malaysia’s National Strategy for Financial Literacy. I know that over the course of these webinars, we will learn much more about the priorities, approaches and strategies to advance sustainable finance development across the region. As we absorb the many valuable lessons and experiences shared towards this common goal, I am reminded of Winston Churchill who said, ‘It is no use saying we are doing our best. We have got to succeed in doing what is necessary”. In the end this is what counts. Policymakers and the financial industry have a responsibility to do what it takes to succeed in making sure that finance works for sustainable development. Let me end here and thank you very much for this opportunity to offer some remarks today. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
This was especially true for economies dependent on trade, such as Puerto Rico’s. In fact, Puerto Rico suffered much more than most because the Puerto Rican economy was already in recession when the financial crisis struck. While Puerto Rico interacts with many other economies, one partner looms especially large for the Commonwealth. For generations, the mainland United States and Puerto Rico have had a special economic relationship in many dimensions. One of the most obvious of these ties is the free flow of people between the mainland and the island. Indeed, according to the U.S. Census, about one half of the people who identify their origin as Puerto Rican lived on the mainland in 2008. The active migration, return migration and remittances to family  BIS Review 18/2010  1  members reflect and reinforce the close personal and economic ties between Puerto Rico and the mainland. Another link is our common use of the dollar. This means that tourists from the mainland can visit without worrying about changing currencies. In addition, businesses can make long-term investments in Puerto Rico without worrying that currency fluctuations against the dollar will undermine their competitiveness. It also means that when the U.S. dollar falls in value, Puerto Rico’s exports become more competitive around the world, although not, of course, in the United States. Somewhat less obvious are the consequences of the mainland’s role as Puerto Rico’s largest trading partner. The mainland accounts for half of the island’s imports and threequarters of its exports.

To improve our understanding of the Puerto Rican economy, the New York Fed has joined a group of local businesses – including some represented here – to sponsor and fund a household survey, undertaken by the Center for the New Economy, our hosts today, to benchmark Puerto Rican consumer finances. As of today, the data have been collected and Fed economists are collaborating with the CNE to provide technical assistance, to make the results of this study public and to make these data available for further research. To help businesses and government in Puerto Rico, we have also been providing technical assistance to Puerto Rico’s new Institute for Statistics. We recognize the importance of this work and applaud its efforts to improve Puerto Rico’s inflation measures, national income accounting and business activity measures, just to name a few. All of these activities, from monetary policy and financial regulation to fostering community development and economic literacy and measurement, complement and reinforce each other. Our policy actions are most effective when people understand how financial markets work. Our decisions are always better when we are well informed about the concerns of families and businesses. Thus, outreach to the region and communities we serve is an important part of my job. Thank you for your kind attention. I would be happy to take a few questions. 6  BIS Review 18/2010