samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Their other features are: low administrative and marketing cost, and labor wages, simple routine procedures, highly efficient communications and readily available information needed for work therein, the usage of uncomplicated production and operation methods, the ability to cope with new changes with regard to meeting consumers’ preferences and tastes, the ability to change the composition of labor force, production, marketing or finance polices to face quick changes without any hesitation, helping them to overcome economic cycles and changes. In addition, SMEs are also characterized by the freedom to enter and exit the market because of the modest ratio of their liabilities to fixed or full assets, and the easiness to convert small enterprises into liquidity in a short time without incurring a significant loss. Furthermore, the exit of a SME will have no significant impact on the market. Finally, SMEs are flexible to move and spread geographically. In spite of these features, the growth of SMEs is facing a variety of challenges which may be similar to a great extent not only at the level of one country only, but also at the global level.

The most prominent challenges are the high cost of capital as a result of high interest rates compared to large enterprises (LEs), the difficulty of obtaining proper finance due to shortage of guarantees and modest credit record, inability to compete and affect the market’s powers and making advantage of economies of scale as is the case with LEs, weak capacity to face and facilitate governmental procedures to expand their work, and low spending on development research works. Dear audience, Business enterprises in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have witnessed notable growth over the last years. The enterprises subscribing to the Social Insurance system have increased from 121.5 thousand in 1426AH to 218.4 thousand in 1430AH, with an average annual growth of 16 percent. Individual enterprises represent 93.1 percent, limited partnership enterprises 4.7 percent, and joint enterprises 0.6 percent of the total number. These enterprises’ economic activity is concentrated in three areas, namely, commerce with 34.3 percent, construction and building with 32.3 percent, and manufacturing industries with 14.6 percent. Small enterprises employing less than five persons have accounted for the bulk share, representing 45.5 percent of total enterprises at the end of 1430AH, enterprises with  2  BIS Review 171/2010  5–59 employees constitute 42 percent, while the remaining 3.8 percent has been accounted for by enterprises with more than 60 employees. These data show that most enterprises in Saudi Arabia are small ones, based on the number of employees. The SME’s contribution to total GDP is low.
Subdued demand for exports As I mentioned in my introduction, Sweden is a small, open economy with a high degree of foreign trade. Our exports are affected by the level of demand abroad. We expect the BRIC countries to grow at a much faster rate than the United States and the euro area in the period ahead. One way for Swedish companies to adapt to this is to try to export to the rapidlygrowing countries to a greater extent. We can see that this is something that is already happening when we look at how high a percentage of our exports go to different parts of the world (see Figure 10). However, this is a process that will take time; the BRIC countries still account for only a small proportion of Swedish exports. If the trend we have seen over the last 10 years continues for  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  another 10 years, then the BRIC countries will have increased their share of Swedish exports to 15 per cent of the total, but they will still not have reached even half of the share of the euro countries. Europe and the United States will thus continue to be very important export markets for Sweden for a long time to come. The conclusion is that weaker growth in Europe and the United States will have a negative impact on exports, even though new markets are gaining ground. Growth in Swedish exports will therefore be subdued going forward (see Figure 11).

Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Improving the world economy Statement by the Hon Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland and Governor of the Fund for Iceland on behalf of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden, at the 2003 IMF/World Bank Annual Meeting, Dubai, 24 September 2003. *  *  *  Mr. Chairman, I am honored to address the 2003 Joint Annual Meetings on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic Constituency consisting of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden as well as my own country, Iceland. Let me begin by thanking the authorities of the United Arab Emirates for hosting the Annual Meetings in this vibrant city of Dubai. Prospects in the World Economy The world economy has been showing signs of a modest recovery and further strengthening is projected for 2004. Economic growth, however, remains unbalanced. Restoring sustainable growth is one of the most important economic policy challenges that lie ahead. Current accommodative policies are appropriate until a global recovery has been consolidated. Some economies have, however, now reached the point where little scope remains for traditional fiscal and monetary initiatives. Consequently, it is necessary to press forward in other areas such as by accelerating structural reforms, promoting good governance, increasing transparency, and harmonizing standards. Another important task involves enabling low-income countries to enjoy the full benefits of a globalized economy. An orderly unwinding of external imbalances also poses a major challenge.
Giving a greater degree of legal security to rental contracts, and liberalising the related terms, is absolutely necessary for reducing rental costs and for making a smoother real estate adjustment, without a collapse of the value of the wealth in which Spaniards have their assets concentrated. Re-launching privatisation, liberalisation and the boosting of competition in numerous sectors is vital because, by reducing unwarranted business margins, workers' real wages can be increased without harming competitiveness. And thus we could say for many more areas of reform. But we'd need many more speeches to talk about this. And fear not, I won't be making them today. Thank you. BIS Review 18/2009  7

Elvira Nabiullina: Current economic environment and monetary policy in Russia Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the State Duma of the Russian Federation on the Bank of Russia Annual Report for 2014, Moscow, 16 June 2015. *  *  *  Good afternoon, distinguished colleagues! While introducing the Bank of Russia Annual Report, I will give a brief overview of our activities such as monetary policy, banking and financial market regulation and supervision, and the national payment system. Before passing on to the report, I would like to briefly describe the current economic situation, the environment, in which we implement our policy. The last year was a troubled one, oil price fall and financial sanctions emerged as serious challenges to the Russian economy. The economy has slowed while decline in investments became manifest in the period of high oil prices and rather low interests rates. This determined the specifics of the current situation – unfavourable developments in external conditions overlapped structural economic slowdown. The situation was especially challenging as the economic downturn coincided with high inflation. Currently, we have managed to curb inflation. According to our forecast, an economic growth (quarter-on-quarter) is expected to resume later this year. Certainly, a lot will depend on the efficiency of the joint efforts of the Government and the Central Bank. The observed improvement and financial stabilisation must be supported by structural changes. They are indispensable for a sustainable economic growth. These include a better business climate and higher labour productivity.
The credit cycle and monetary policy The knock on effects of defaults in the US sub prime market and the impact of big investors on asset prices are factors we need to assess not just in trying to understand the financial sector and the stresses it faces but in gauging the state of the economy more widely. The story of the sub prime market illustrates a wider point. In traditional banking markets in the past there has been an observable tendency for banks to overshoot both in offering credit at the top of the cycle and retrenching afterwards. That feeds through into asset prices and can have an impact on the wider economy. Despite the sophistication of the new capital markets, a very traditional cycle seems to have been alive and kicking in sub prime. 3  The definition of the official sector in the US Treasury survey also includes public bodies such as oil stabilisation funds. 4  See ‘International capital flows and US interest rates’, NBER working paper 12560, October 2006. 6  BIS Review 84/2007  A similar story could be told about the credit card and other unsecured lending over the last few years. The growth rate rose in the late 90s until defaults began to build up over the last 2 years and the banks and other lenders tightened up terms and conditions sharply (Chart 13). The path of commercial property prices in recent years suggests the same has been happening there (Chart 14).

As Figure 2 shows, the membership of the Bank’s Sterling Monetary Framework has increased from 70 in 2007 to 139 and counting. And the collateral we will accept in our regular operations now extends from AAA bonds all the way to own name raw loans. Changes such as these provided the basis for Governor Mark Carney’s declaration that the Bank of England is “open for business.” I think changes made since 2007 indicate that we are also “open about our business.” The Winters Report highlighted that ambiguity around the Bank’s published liquidity insurance framework is rarely constructive. And the Bank is committed to providing clarity around the circumstances under which it would provide liquidity in the event of market-wide or large idiosyncratic stress: •  The Bank’s Red Book 7 clearly sets out the aims and objectives of the Sterling Monetary Framework with regard to the provision of liquidity insurance. •  Each SMF participant has a “relationship manager” and we aim to give them clarity about the circumstances in which they can expect to borrow. •  We have improved our external accountability by producing an Annual Report overseen by the Bank’s Court which assesses how the framework has performed relative to its objectives. But hardwiring the lessons learned from the last crisis into our operations will not necessarily provide the agility to provide the liquidity insurance that may be required in the future.
The single monetary policy Basic features The European Central Bank (ECB) has been responsible since the beginning of this year for the single monetary policy in the euro area, with the primary objective of maintaining price stability. The general formulation of this objective has been defined more precisely by the ECB as being a year-onyear increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2 per cent. In that this definition refers to the rate of increase, it means that deflation is excluded in practice and the annual rate of change in the HICP should accordingly be between 0 and 2 per cent. The single monetary policy is based on assessments of a wide range of economic and financial indicators of inflationary pressure. A prominent position is likely to be accorded to the money supply. 1  BIS Review 76/1999  As a reference value for annual monetary growth, the ECB has initially set a rate of 4½ per cent. The combined strategy — focusing on inflation but with a reference value for monetary growth — is motivated by the great uncertainty as to how the aggregate euro economy will function initially. The ECB therefore wants to avoid having to stand on only one leg in its assessments. The ECB also states that the objective is to be fulfilled over the medium term and thereby underscores that the single monetary policy is not to parry every short-term shock. Deviations from the target may be acceptable during a relatively short period.

Carving out resilience from within is always less painful than having to build it anew. Like their counterparts in the euro area, our banks have strengthened their balance sheets and capital positions in recent years, and this ensures that the sector is wellprepared to adapt to risks as, and when, they materialise. Our stress tests also confirm that capital remains above regulatory requirements even under extreme scenarios, and that banks are operating with healthy liquidity buffers. Profitability is also improving, so it is opportune to strengthen capital buffers rather than to have to re-build them in a potentially less benign environment at some point in the future. 3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  It is less painful to provide adequately for credit risks and the stock of doubtful loans through the cycle, rather than having to deal with a potential increase in non-performing exposures at some other time in the future. Thus, an increase in forborne loans - mostly reflecting the expiration of pandemic related loan moratoria - need to be addressed at some stage or another. In this respect, I am pleased to note that banks have proven to be quite conservative when providing for risks during the Pandemic. I encourage banks to be proactive in complying with micro and macro prudential policies when formulating distribution policies going forward. Foresight is key, as the generation of resilience from within is ultimately what drives the long-term value of any firm's equity and its stability. Of course, macroprudential policy has to do its part.
10 As far as monetary policy is concerned, it is only the participant’s net position with regard to the Riksbank that  is important. If a participant in RIX borrows, say, SEK 10 billion in RIXRTGS and invests the same amount in its account in RIXINST the net position with regard to the Riksbank and thus the participant’s interest expenditure, will be zero. 7 [8]  Using the same technical platforms as most of the rest of Europe will, I believe, make it easier for Swedish payment service providers to establish themselves in Europe. And in the same way it will become simpler for foreign companies to compete in Sweden. It is also probable that it will become easier to make instant cross-currency payments in the future if the central banks use the same technical platform to settle payments. What happens next? During the spring, my colleagues on the Executive Board and I have discussed the Riksbank's future role in the payment infrastructure. My baseline in these discussions was that Sweden – like most other countries – has long had a model where the banks have settled payments in risk-free accounts in the central bank. This has been important in preserving the stability and credibility of the payment system. Now that the payment market is moving towards larger, more numerous and more important payments outside of RIX normal opening hours, the Riksbank needs to modernise the services it offers so that central bank money remains the norm when financial institutions settle payments.

The answer is not entirely clear, but much indicates that the Riksbank will find it more difficult to carry out its task of promoting a safe and efficient payment system in the future if we don't raise our level of ambition regarding the services now offered to RIX participants. I see two main reasons for this. First, settlement in central bank money is the safest means of settling payments. Private settlement platforms can, with the aid of the central bank, imitate part of the security offered by settlement in central bank money. In Sweden, this is done by the institutions that are participants in BiR allocating money in a special client funds account in RIX that acts as collateral for the payments settled in BiR. This hybrid system has enabled instant payments in Sweden without the Riksbank’s payment system having to be rebuilt from scratch. As long as the volumes are relatively small, this type of system is fully adequate, but financial stability will become increasingly dependent on the reliability of these hybrid systems if the volumes increase substantially. Sooner or later one therefore reaches a point where it is difficult to see the value of a hybrid system that tries to copy the safety offered by central bank money if the central bank could just as well offer this settlement itself. The Riksbank would in addition be able to offer participants better and more cost-efficient liquidity management than is possible in a private system. Second, the payment system is one of the economy's critical infrastructures.
These prospects are favoured by natural resources and low labour costs, but above all, they must rely on our opportunities and abilities to be integrated into the value-added chain of the European economies. The road ahead is long and arduous. In short and medium term, it needs political will and wisdom to carry out reforms, and increased attention to issues of Albania’s macroeconomic and financial soundness. In the long term, the structure of the Albanian economy should be more aligned with those of the European countries; economic growth should be based more on production factors  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  productivity, and Albanian businesses should pay more attention to finding and exploring new markets. Being heedful and aware of the challenges ahead, the Bank of Albania has started to analyse new tools and techniques to fulfil its mission. Pinpointing the economic slowdown as the main risk facing the Albanian economy and financial system, and assessing the role of bank credit to economy, on March 2013, the Bank of Albania adopted a set of macroprudential measures oriented toward promoting lending and lowering banking system risk. Briefly, these measures consist in easing capital requirements to boost credit, easing liquidity requirements, reducing provisions for restructured loans, and increasing capital requirements for assets abroad above the rates required by the Bank of Albania. These temporary measures are another sign of our willingness to accomplish the mission and our legal duties.

The HKMA has now decided that Participating AIs can include two more types of RMB assets, namely “RMB sovereign bonds issued in Hong Kong by the Ministry of Finance of China” and “RMB bond investment through the Mainland interbank bond market”, in the calculation of this limit. The above two relaxations take effect today. I believe they will help expand the scope of development for offshore RMB business in Hong Kong and provide banks with a greater flexibility in RMB asset management, which will be conducive to further development of the market. Third, the HKMA has imposed some restrictive arrangements on the inclusion of RMB assets as liquid assets in calculating the statutory liquidity ratio of AIs. As the offshore RMB market in Hong Kong becomes more mature, I believe there is room for suitably relaxing these restrictions. Since the adjustments to be made in the calculation are more complicated and technical, we shall announce the details later. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Dealing with capital inflows Traditionally, the primary concern in emerging market economies about large capital inflows has been that they may be financing an unsustainable current account deficit that could derive in a sudden stop of capital inflows. A sudden stop scenario is particularly costly since it involves a painful restructuring of the economy from non-tradables to tradables and a large correction in the exchange rate with potentially large balance sheet effects, which could result in high volatility and output losses. This view regarding large capital inflows has largely been shaped by current account crises like the ones in Mexico and East Asia in the 1990s. As the evidence I showed, the current account in emerging market economies still displays, on average, a surplus. Therefore, they do not currently present a serious threat, but it is necessary to explore the policy implications of large capital inflows. 1  1  Here I will discuss briefly the main tools from a macro point of view. For further discussion on these policy options, see De Gregorio (2010a). 2  BIS Review 124/2010  In many experiences capital inflows have been exacerbated by policy actions. Most noteworthy are the attempts of authorities to defend an artificially weak currency. The expectations of an appreciation generated by this policy create further incentives for capital inflows. For this reason a flexible exchange rate should be the first line of defense. This is also consistent with providing the monetary authority independence to use monetary policy.

This is an important factor explaining why, contrary to many other experiences with international crises, the financial systems of emerging market economies were extremely resilient during the global financial crisis, and expansionary monetary policies have been very effective because of well functioning financial systems. I will illustrate these points with the case of Chile. Even though capital requirements in the Chilean banking industry still follow Basel I (only credit risk-weighted assets), it is possible to infer that the new BIS capital requirements do not appear restrictive. In fact, considering estimated capital charges due to market and operational risk, Tier 1 and Total Capital indicators are considerably above the BIS minima for 2019 (Table 1). This capital looseness allows for coverage of the conservation buffer and also the countercyclical buffer. As for common equity, more precision is needed. In its most acid definition, common equity corresponds to “paid-in capital”, which represents approximately 65% of Tier 1 capital. In somewhat looser definitions, retained earnings may be accounted for as common equity, which in that case may capture as much as 70% of Tier 1 capital. Either way, implementing a limit on the common equity to risk-weighted assets (RWA) ratio should not represent severe restrictions. Additionally, the Tier 1 leverage ratio for the Chilean banking system is  BIS Review 124/2010  5  approximately 7%, more than twice the BIS preliminary suggestion. The healthy capital condition of the industry average is reflected at the individual bank level (Figure 5).