samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is not a trivial matter. Most countries have inadequate information on the composition of their external liabilities, especially those of the private sector. Nevertheless, monitoring and managing the exposures of the public and financial sectors are important to avoid a build up of potential vulnerabilities. In this respect, the IMF can play a helpful supportive role by providing assessments of vulnerability as part of the Article IV process, the new joint IMF/World Bank financial sector assessment programmes and debt management guidelines, and technical assistance on the data requirements implied by the need to monitor national balance sheets. 2. Second, limitations on official finance mean that countries should think carefully about the provision of self-insurance against a liquidity crisis. A simple, but often expensive, way to do this is to build up large foreign currency reserves, a strategy taken to heart by a number of emerging markets, including China and also Korea following its crisis. A potentially superior alternative is the creation of contingent credit facilities with both official and private sector creditors. So far, even at the high spreads on emerging market debt, these facilities have not proved attractive, and the CCL facility created by the IMF has lain dormant. The next few years will be a test of the value of such facilities. 3. Third, experience has shown the value of borrowing countries establishing good relationships with creditors well before any possibility of difficulty in repayment arises.

Another important area is to raise the professional standards of the industry that reflects the highest standards of professional conduct, knowledge and competence. In this regard, the grand design of the industry, the Financial Sector Blueprint, clearly emphasized on the need to develop talents across all levels of an institution, spanning from the entry level to senior management and the board of directors. Indeed, a holistic talent development and management is a good example of an initiative that combine art with science which a visionary institution must be able to master to achieve its goals. The second imperative is the ability of the industry to effectively leverage on technology to build strong, innovative and competitive businesses. This includes developing a deep understanding of how changes in technology impact people’s lives and transforming how consumers and investors behave and view the value proposition of businesses. For instance, mobile phone penetration in Asia alone makes up 52 per cent of total global penetration. The highly developed telecom markets of Asia with 3.6 billion people across Asia having mobile phones spread across a diverse range of markets, capitalising on mobile data/wireless broadband services would mostly likely chart the way of the future. Growth across Asia in high speed access to the internet by mobile wireless devices has been largely driven by highly competitive markets combined with a general population who are prepared to embrace new mobile technologies.
With (changes in) long rates being equal to (changes in) average short rates under the expectations hypothesis, the contemporaneous impact on the long rate thus depends on the persistence of the short rate. [10] See, e.g., Cochrane, J. H. and Piazzesi, M. (2008), “Decomposing the Yield Curve”, Working Paper, University of Chicago. [11] It is important to keep in mind that term premia are not directly observable: decomposing observed bond yields into the expectations component and term premia requires econometric modelling, which is subject to considerable estimation and model uncertainty. For an overview see Cohen, B., Hördahl, P. and Xia, D. (2018), “Term premia: models and some stylised facts”, BIS Quarterly Review, September, pp. 79-90. Most recently, researchers have highlighted that the level and dynamics of estimated term premia depend considerably on how the long-horizon expectation of short-term rates is modelled: linking those future end-points to the time-varying levels of the natural rate gives rise to term premia that display less of a trend decline than those from commonly used models with a time-constant equilibrium rate, see Bauer and Rudebusch (2019) op. cit. Recent research by ECB economists on the euro area finds similar evidence. [12] The exercise is based on the model by Geiger, F. and Schupp, F. (2018), “With a little help from my friends: Survey-based derivation of euro area short rate expectations at the effective lower bound”, Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 27. [13] Hanson, S. G. and Stein, J. C. (2015), “Monetary Policy and Long-Term Real Rates”, Journal of Financial Economics, 115(3), pp.

SPEECH  The yield curve and monetary policy  Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Public Lecture for the Centre for Finance and the Department of Economics at University College London London, 25 November 2019  Introduction It is a pleasure to speak this evening at University College London (UCL). In my contribution, I wish to share some thoughts about the yield curve and monetary policy. [1] UK data offer scholars a unique opportunity to take a very long view: the long-term nominal gilt yields shown in Chart 1 reach all the way back to 1826, the founding year of UCL. Over the past 200 years, gilt yields have never been as low as today. That long-term nominal yields have decreased substantially over recent decades is not specific to the United Kingdom but applies across advanced economies: long-term German yields and euro area overnight index swap (OIS) rates (which are the closest measure of a euro area-wide risk-free rate available) are currently ranging near record lows. [2], [3] Long-term rates in the euro area have even reached negative territory. [4]  Chart 1 UK, US, DE and euro area OIS long-term interest rates (percentages per annum)  Sources: Bank of England, Bloomberg, FRED, Jordà et al. (2019), Thomson Reuters. Notes: For the United Kingdom, the series is the rate on a consol, taken from the Bank of England data series “A Millennium of UK Data” (Thomas and Dimsdale, 2017).
Unfortunately the most pressing concern also happens to be one that we have the least control of, that is the external demand. With uncertainty regarding the timing of economic recovery in the United States, Japan still having to undergo real and arduous reforms, and Europe not yet stepping up as the locomotive engine for the resumption of world growth, prospects for an export led rebound remains clouded. With these regions together constituting over 52 percent of the market share for Thai products, exports in 2001 are expected to fall in value by approximately 6 percent compared to last year. Assuming an economic rebound in the US, Japan, and Europe by mid-2002, exports should grow by around 3-5 percent in 2002. Real GDP growth is projected to be between 1-3 percent in 2002. Against the backdrop of increased uncertainty and weak external demand, safeguarding our economic recovery will require steady resolve, more reliance on domestic demand, and a supportive set of measures and reform. The main challenge for local authorities is to ensure proper coordination of fiscal and monetary policies as well as the acceleration of structural reforms efforts in the banking and corporate sector to facilitate a pickup in domestic demand, enhance confidence, and bolster foreign investment. Mr. Bosworth did mention yesterday that to resolve the crisis, bad loans must be placed in asset management companies and then AMCs must get rid of them. This is one of the top priority policies of this government.

Finally, the re-pricing of assets in world equity and bond markets have created unfavorable conditions for raising capital and have, to some extent, held back consumption through the negative wealth effects. Access to world capital markets has become more limited for developing countries and we have observed a major reduction in capital flows into these countries. Over the past few months, the external environment seems to have deteriorated quite considerably. The events of September 11th and the developments thereafter have put global financial markets on edge while exacerbating the already weak US economy, primarily through the effect on consumer confidence. Global demand continues to stagnate while difficulties in Latin America have heightened market uncertainty, increased investor’s risk aversion and tightened financing to emerging markets. In such a situation, it is important for the Government to come forward and play a major role in stabilizing and supporting the economy. In this light, I believe that the authorities here in Thailand have done a  BIS Review 99/2001  1  commendable job in providing the economy with timely fiscal support while adhering to fiscal discipline. Fiscal policy has been expansionary and the decision to increase budget spending this year was warranted. The central government deficit of 159 billion baht (equivalent to 3.2 percent of GDP) for the 2001 fiscal year provided the needed support for economic activity and the budget disbursement rate of 88.4 percent relative to the targeted 89 percent was an improvement from the past.
Is there a risk that the payments market will become an oligopoly, with high thresholds for competitors and where payment services are expensive? Can we ensure that those who do not have access to the banks’ services in the future will still be able to manage their payments in a safe and efficient way? What would happen in a future financial crisis, if the general public distrusts the banks and wants to withdraw savings in cash – but the banks no longer hold cash? 13 Withdrawals from ATMs have also declined significantly in recent years. In 2010, Swedes withdrew around SEK 225 billion and in 2015 they withdrew only SEK 153 billion. 14 See, for instance, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority's report on its task from the Government with regard to fundamental payment services, 27 February 2017: http://www.pts.se/sv/Dokument/Rapporter/Post/2017/Aterrapportering-av-PTS-regeringsuppdrag-inomgrundlaggande-betaltjanster---17-201-/ 15 To some extent the Riksbank has contributed to this development by reducing the number of cash depots in Sweden. See, for example, Daltung and Ericson (2004). 11 [14]  Central bank money will still be needed in the future These important questions must be answered. In my opinion, there is reason to examine whether the Riksbank should offer money in digital form to the general public. If the printing press made it possible to print banknotes in its time, then our current technology enables electronic payments.

With the purpose of increasing their liquidity safeguards and stabilizing real exchange rates, official reserves in emerging economies, accumulated through sterilized interventions, precluded current account adjustment, artificially boosting tradable sector growth. This led to global imbalances and, so the argument goes, facilitated (or even caused) global financial unrest. BIS Review 124/2010  1  The above argument depends on whether capital inflows to emerging economies, which were indeed substantial in 2006–2008 (see Figure 1), are driven primarily by interest rate differentials or by medium term growth prospects. It is noteworthy to see how these interest rate differentials have evolved over time. Figure 2 plots (simple) average monetary policy rates for a group of developed and emerging economies, as well as Chile. It is striking that, whereas on average it stood at 440 basis points (bp) between January 2006 and July 2008, now it is barely 50 bp lower (390 bp). Intriguingly, market expectations for interest rate differentials hover between 400 bp and 450 bp over the next year. It would require substantial sensitiveness to interest rate differentials to make the argument that these are the main drivers of capital inflows. Moreover, the decade from 1996 to 2005 witnessed an average differential above 1000 bp, affected of course by risk premia, but still indicates that crude short-term interest rate differentials by themselves are not suggestive of substantial capital inflows. In terms of growth prospects, the picture is markedly different. Figure 3 presents IMF’s past data and forecasts for economic growth in developed and emerging economies.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Towards the positioning of Islamic finance as an integrated component of the International Financial System Opening speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 5th Annual Islamic Finance Summit, London, 24 January 2006. *  *  *  It is my great pleasure to be here in London to speak at this 5 th Annual Islamic Finance Summit organised by Euromoney. Islamic finance has made significant breakthroughs to now gain a place in today's challenging global environment with its international dimension now becoming increasingly more significant. It has now evolved to become an integral part of the international financial system. As this international financial integration process intensifies, it will not only increase the potential for Islamic finance to contribute towards enhancing the prospects for more balanced global growth through fostering greater trade and wealth creation, but also through facilitating greater diversification of risks, it will contribute towards increased global financial stability. Rapid Evolution of the Global Islamic Financial Services Industry As recent as five years ago, the development of Islamic finance was still regarded as an infant industry striving to prove its viability and competitiveness in the global financial environment. At that time, the growth of Islamic finance was mainly organic and largely concentrated in countries where the Muslim population was significant. Islamic finance was also for the most part governed by conventional regulatory and accounting standards. In addition, the divergence of views on some of the outstanding issues called for greater harmonization.

that monetary union was a political endeavour, and that the final goal was political union, albeit a different union from those we are used to studying in textbooks. Creating the euro, adopting it or not adopting it, are not mere technical decisions but key political choices, and have profound political implications, which are quite different from being a member of the European Union. This might not have been fully realised by all. Let me give an example. No opt-out clause was offered to the Member States which joined in 2004, even though some of them might have been less enthusiastic about joining the euro area than joining the EU itself. A formalistic reading of the Treaty reveals that all countries except the UK and Denmark are committed to converging as soon as possible to the single currency, even in those countries where popular support for it seems to be still limited. A strict interpretation of the Treaty indicates that Sweden should not have had a referendum on the euro in 2003. Indeed, by ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, Sweden committed itself to joining the euro as soon as possible. In practice, nobody complains that the letter of the Treaty is being ignored, because a country cannot be forced into the euro if it is politically unready to join. Being part of a monetary union binds its members at different political levels, not all of which are easily visible. Take fiscal policy.
Should they carry contractual foreign rates or some typical ISK rate, such as the benchmark rate published by the Central Bank of Iceland? In the former case, the blow to the capital position of the banking system would have been very serious indeed, requiring massive recapitalisation and possibly jeopardising the overall stability of the system. Those responsible for financial stability gave a sigh of relief when the Supreme Court ruled in mid-September that loans with illegal exchange rate linkage clauses should carry reference ISK rates published by the Central Bank of Iceland. After this decision, it is clear that the blow to capital ratios should be well manageable and only a very limited recapitalisation will be called for, if any. The reconstruction of the domestic financial sector paves the way for badly needed debt restructuring among households and businesses. This issue has remained unresolved due to delays in recapitalising the banks and the uncertainty following the first Supreme Court ruling. But it has also lagged because the framework for such debt restructuring has been a highly contested political issue. We have seen that Iceland has made significant progress on three main policy fronts. But before investigating how this progress has stabilised the economy, let us turn back to the recession in the Icelandic economy. As I said earlier, Iceland was well on its way into recession in 2009 before the banks collapsed in the autumn of 2008, and actually before the currency crisis materialised earlier in 2008.

The effects of the currency collapse and the associated outburst of inflation, which rose from below 4% in late 2007 to 18% in early 2009, were magnified, as it hit one of the most indebted private sectors among advanced economies, with a high share of foreigndenominated or exchange rate-linked debt (20% for households, 70% for businesses, and 40% for municipalities). In addition, households’ CPI-indexed debt amounted to 75% of their total debt and the pass-through of exchange rate depreciation to inflation was speedy due to the magnitude of the depreciation and the lack of credibility of monetary policy at the time. Having set the scene, I shall now turn to the policy responses. The framework for these was set by the two-year Stand-By Arrangement agreed with the IMF in November 2008. The total financing associated with the programme amounts to around USD 5 bn, with just over USD 2 bn coming from IMF resources and USD 3 bn provided by bilateral loans from the Nordic countries, Poland, and others. The original Stand-By Arrangement provided for quarterly reviews; however, the first review was delayed, partly because of the deposit insurance dispute between Iceland and the Netherlands and UK, relating to online foreign overseas branches of the failed Landsbanki. The first review was completed in October 2009, the second in April 2010, and the third on 29 September 2010.
Second, we need to look at skills development, job placements, and career pathways in an integrated manner. We cannot look at skills in isolation from job roles. And we cannot look at job roles in isolation from careers. In other words, skills are the engine that will propel career mobility – laterally or upward. This is why IBF took two important steps last year. In April, IBF began to facilitate the implementation of Professional Conversion Programmes for the industry. Then, in August, IBF launched, together with our tripartite partners, the IBF Careers Connect, providing career advisory and job matching services. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  IBF is now the one-stop, single point of contact for all matters relating to jobs, skills, and careers in the financial industry. It is too early to tell if this new integrated approach will work, but the preliminary signs are promising. IBF has secured commitment from 19 financial institutions to reskill 4,000 existing finance professionals – to equip them with the skills necessary to take on new or expanded roles against the backdrop of transformed business activities. IBF has also provided career advisory and job matching services to more than 600 finance professionals whose jobs have been affected by change. Third, we cannot do business transformation without workforce transformation. But workforce transformation is a capability that financial institutions are only beginning to build up.

Indeed, while in the initial consolidated State budget for 2013 these three items accounted for around 18.2% of GDP, in 2014 they are expected to represent around 18.5% of GDP and close to 55% of total consolidated public spending. The budgetary adjustment will therefore continue to focus on government consumption, for which a real-terms reduction of 2.9% is projected in 2014 for overall general government, based partly on the civil servant wage freeze and on the extension of austerity policies in relation to public-sector employment; and, moreover, on the reduction in public investment. A further expenditure-containing factor will stem from the envisaged revision of pensions, set at 0.25%, in line with the floor established in the draft law defining the sustainability factor. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  How do these figures compare with those for the euro area as a whole? In terms of GDP, the weight of unemployment benefits continues to stand far above the euro area average, as a result of our high unemployment. Interest payments on debt in Spain are also expected to exceed the euro area average, while spending on pensions would continue to be below the average, given that demographic developments in our country remain more favourable. On the revenue side, a 2.4% increase in total tax receipts (including the share of regional and local government) is forecast, with very few tax changes. These are concentrated in the broadening of corporate income tax bases approved last June.
21  NOU (Official Norwegian Report) 1999: 27 “Ytringsfrihed bør finde Sted (There shall be freedom of expression)”. Sejersted was awarded the Ossietzky Prize for his contribution to freedom of expression in 2008. 22  In the Norges Bank Act of 1985, Norges Bank is required to “inform the public of the assessments on which monetary policy decisions are based”. In October 2009, a new government communications policy was laid down by the Ministry of Government Administration and Reform, promoting transparency as an important principle of good communication. The government’s communication is required to be open, clear and accessible. The government is also required to ensure that relevant information reaches the relevant parties and that the information is adapted to the relevant target groups. BIS Review 140/2009  5  Modern economic theory argues in favour of transparency I mentioned that the previous view was that monetary policy operated by surprising economic agents, while the prevailing view is that it works best by being predictable. According to modern economic theory, economic decisions are heavily influenced by expectations. 23 This has also become an important economic policy recognition. Today’s key rate is important, but even more important is the expected key interest rate ahead. When the owner of a firm takes up a loan to build a new factory, the expected interest rate over the life of the loan is taken into account.

On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making”, European Central Bank Working Paper No. 26. 47  As cited in Petra M. Geraats (2007): “The Mystique of Central Bank Speak”, in International Journal of Central Banking, March 2007, p. 37. 48  Effective communication to market participants is particularly important. As economists with a university background, we often feel the need to build up a series of arguments and weigh various considerations before arriving at a conclusion. But this can sometimes render communication less effective. Financial market participants prefer to be presented with the conclusion first so that they can respond to it quickly. 10  BIS Review 140/2009  The third criterion for good communication is that it must be honest. I referred earlier to the principle that the external communication should reflect the internal deliberations. It is an honest matter to communicate that decisions are difficult and often made on an uncertain basis. But it is just as important – and more challenging – to explain why it is difficult and which factors have been considered and given weight. Before the rebuilding of Bislett Stadium in 2004, the organisation Bislett Alliansen was to decide where the Bislett Games should be moved. The choice stood between Drammen and Bergen. They chose Bergen. The head of the organisation said to the Norwegian news agency NTB: “I have participated for almost 20 years, and this was the most difficult decision I have been involved in.