samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We noted in a statement to the press that we expect to take account of the remaining issues and complete the text of the New Accord in the coming months and no later than mid-2004. This period of time will also allow us to take careful note of domestic consultations under way in some jurisdictions, including the process for the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the United States. Most of the comment letters that the Committee received focused on credit risk and the minimum standards in the first pillar. Respondents identified as one of the most important issues the proposed treatment of credit-related losses. As you know, with respect to the internal ratings-based treatment of credit losses, the CP3 calibrated regulatory capital on the basis of both unexpected and expected credit losses – or “UL” and “EL” in Basel terminology. This was intended as a practical compromise to account for differences in national accounting practices and supervisory authority regarding provisioning. Many respondents – including quite a few here in the U.S. – cautioned against this approach, as they believed that it departed from the traditional view that unexpected losses should be absorbed by capital, while expected losses are best managed through provisioning. Based on those comments, and following additional research, the Committee now intends to align regulatory capital more closely to economic capital by calibrating it on the basis of unexpected credit losses alone. A supplementary mechanism will help to encourage banks to provide sufficiently for expected credit losses.

There is still much to be done: I’ll discuss as examples our efforts to reduce the complexity of the rules; to ensure that they are sufficiently risk-sensitive without being overly conservative; and to maintain a level playing field. Finally, I’ll conclude with thoughts on some longer-term and future efforts that the Committee may undertake to continue to align the system of supervision with the best practices of leading institutions and practitioners worldwide. A Look Back As we resolve the final questions and complete the text of the New Accord, it’s important to remember why all of us put our best into its success. The existing Accord was already considered a milestone achievement in banking, as it offered the first internationally accepted “yardstick” for capital adequacy and a simple measure of risk. It had received praise for reversing a downward trend in bank capital levels and for serving as a benchmark measure of a bank’s financial health around the world. But the 1988 Accord was a blunt instrument that quickly fell behind the times. Innovations in technology, in banking products, and in risk management techniques changed the way that leading banks measure and manage their risks. By the mid-1990’s, bankers and supervisors agreed that the  BIS Review 46/2003  1  original Accord no longer provided a meaningful measure of risk for the largest and most sophisticated organisations.
In practice, the Central Bank has allowed the exchange rate to move within the band to the extent that it deems such movements consistent with its long-term goal of maintaining low inflation. Now the exchange rate is roughly 3.5% above the central rate and has appreciated by 2.7% since the middle of June when the Central Bank raised interest rates for the second time this year. In our present situation, we have sought to increase the transparency of our operations by explaining as thoroughly as we can the targets of monetary policy, our instruments, our methods, the assessments  3  BIS Review 117/1999  that underlie our policy in general and our individual actions in particular. This we do through our regular publications and interviews with the press. This is important in order to broaden the understanding of the main principles which underlie our monetary policy and its implementation. Financial supervision As you may know, until the end of last year, the Central Bank was responsible for the supervision of the operations of all financial institutions in Iceland except insurance companies. At the beginning of 1999, the Bank Inspectorate of the Central Bank and the Insurance Supervision Authority were merged into a new Financial Supervisory Authority which has the responsibility for supervising the operations of all financial institutions in Iceland. The change was in a way modelled on decisions which had been taken in some other countries, such as the United Kingdom.

(ii)  The preparation of the organisational framework, which will include the practical arrangements for cooperation between the ECB and the National Authorities, within six months of the entry into force of the Single Mechanism Regulation. (iii)  The drafting of the ECB Supervisory Manual, which will address procedural and methodological matters, including the risk assessment system that the Single Mechanism will implement, on-site inspections and other processes that form an integral part of the supervisory review process. (iv)  The introduction of the Technical Standards on prudential and accounting Supervisory Reporting, which will allow a significant degree of cross-country consistency to be achieved regarding the periodic confidential reports that banks file with supervisory authorities. (v)  A comprehensive assessment of the credit institutions of the participating Member States, including a balance-sheet assessment at a given point in time. I will elaborate on this in a moment. Integrating seventeen national supervision systems (some of them made up by two authorities) along with the ECB in order to set up the Single Supervisory Mechanism is, indeed, a major challenge. The centrepiece of this integration has been the concept of Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs), which are going to take care of the direct supervision of the significant banks. These teams will be made up of supervisors from the ECB and from the National Authorities; under the guidance of an ECB coordinator, they will be entrusted with the supervision of each of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  significant banks.
However, I believe Sri Lanka now faces one of its best chances since independence, to correct this situation. In particular, the country does not have a drag in terms of an internal conflict or regressive policies. Today, Sri Lanka is poised for a fresh leap of development. In that context, it is the responsibility of the Central Bank to provide a stable foundation to leverage the country’s excellent geographical location and favourable international relations to attract investment to foster more robust and sustainable growth and employment generation. Sri Lanka is twenty miles from the fastest growing large economy, India; in the middle of China’s Maritime Silk Route; and fortunate to have  At this juncture, I would like to share  excellent relations with a number of  some of my thoughts on the Sri Lankan  capital surplus countries in the world. economy in a broader perspective. Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  4  As I have repeatedly emphasised,  We have to establish a solid foundation  sustained growth requires  for the nation to meet the imperatives of  strengthening macroeconomic  a new economic growth model, built on  fundamentals, implementing structural  the core tenets of high value-added  reforms that increase the  entrepreneurship, creativity and  competitiveness of the economy, and  innovation to generate benefits for all  improving the business environment. Sri Lankans.

The challenge that we are having right  The country has a number of structural  now is to put in place policies that give  problems that have been amplified over  us sustained stabilisation of  the years by the large fiscal and trade  macroeconomic fundamentals in the  deficits, which are the core weaknesses  country, amidst uncertain global  of the Sri Lankan economy. Being a twin  conditions. deficit country increases vulnerability in  It is important to recognise that stabilising the economy after decades of  an uncertain and volatile global economic environment. fundamentally unstable macroeconomic  Unsustainable budget deficits boost  policies cannot be achieved without  excess and untenable demand in the  discipline. This will inevitably result in  economy. When there is excess demand,  some pain in the short-term. However,  it leads to inflationary pressures and  there is every possibility that a more  higher nominal interest rates in the  promising future can be realised  economy and there is also a higher  through the policies and programmes  propensity to import, given the  that are already in the pipeline. For this  limitations in domestic supply. That in  to happen, consensus must be built  turn, exerts pressure on the balance of  among politicians, policy makers and  payments and the exchange rate.
In retrospect, we might ask whether the interest rate was kept too low in relation to a reasonable long-term equilibrium level. In particular, this was a period of substantial fluctuations in the Norwegian economy, with high and variable inflation. The absence of a nominal anchor was one of the main reasons behind these pronounced swings in the Norwegian economy. Because of the extensive use of credit regulations, nominal interest rates remained low. With a policy of low interest rates and devaluations, inflation took root. Nominal interest rates were kept at a low level even though inflation and the value of tax- deductible interest expenses rose. The wide fluctuations culminated in a credit boom in the mid-1980s, followed by a deep recession and high unemployment towards the end of the 1980s. From the mid-1980s, during and after the credit bubble, it was recognised that a substantial revision of economic policy would be necessary and that the problems created by inflation had to be taken seriously. The exchange rate was chosen as the nominal anchor. The real interest rate gradually rose and was relatively high until the mid-1990s, partly as a result of the tight monetary policy that was conducted in order to reduce inflation. The real interest rate has fallen markedly since the beginning of the 1990s. Neither the neutral interest rate nor the equilibrium interest rate are variables that can be observed.

In the medium run, investments performance will reflect developments in internal and foreign demand performance. Given the need for a more competitive Albanian economy and its further orientation towards exports, stimulation of investment, increase of production capacities and adoption of more advanced processes and technologies should be priorities of the country’s development policies, in the macro- and micro economic aspects. Public expenditures provided a positive contribution to the aggregate demand of 2011 H1. Following the consolidated behaviour of last year, the fiscal policy was a stimulating one during this period. Public spending increased by 7.4% in annual terms, led primarily by current expenditures, with an added positive contribution of capital expenditures as well. On the other hand, budget revenues were slow, increasing by 1.1% in annual terms. The differences of growth rates for revenues and public spending materialised in the expansion of the public deficit. In GDP terms, budget deficit at the end of 2011 H1 stands at 4.1% or about 1.5 p.p. higher than a year earlier. Expanded fiscal policy was more present during the first quarter of the year, while in the second quarter it was more moderate. Revenue and spending growth rates reduced during the second quarter, leading to the need for the revision of the 2011 budget, in order to retain the parameters of public finance soundness in the short and long run. On the other hand, measures to control budget deficit through reducing public spending implies modelling the fiscal stimulus during the second half of 2011.
Mr. Davies looks at whether contemporary forces are eroding distinctions between central banks and pushing them towards some common model Text of the London School of Economic and Political Science Annual Lecture on Central Banking delivered by the Deputy Goveror of the Bank of England, Mr. Howard Davies, on 4/3/97. Central bankers are famous for their obsessive concern about credibility and consistency. By that token, I should be drummed out of the club I have only recently joined. Because when the Governor stood here a little over a year ago, he assured the audience that he was delivering the fourth and last in the series of LSE Bank of England lectures. But, in keeping with the usual practice of successful television shows, I am here tonight to open a new series. The LSE seemed to think you would prefer that to filling the schedule hereafter with repeats. This new series picks up where the last left off. In 1996 the Governor noted there is nowadays a broad consensus that the raison d’être of central banks everywhere is the pursuit of monetary and financial stability; but he observed that once you go beyond that level of generality, each central bank is unique - in terms of its constitutional position, the range of its activities, its size, structure and organisation. Many of these differences are the result of history. The question I plan to address tonight is whether contemporary forces are eroding these distinctions between central banks and pushing them towards some common model.

ECE and Russia rates  network  supervision Russia Poland Hungary Slovenia Czech republic Slovakia  system  debt  4 Alex Cukierman, Central bank strategy, credibility, and independence: theory and evidence, MIT  Press 1992, page 393.
François Villeroy de Galhau: Franco-German experiences and challenges in the euro era  relations  -  Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Europadialog, organized by the Investitions- und Strukturbank Rheinland-Pfalz (ISB), Mainz, 21 March 2017. * * * Madam Minister-President [Ms Dreyer], Madam Finance Minister [Ms Ahnen], Mr Spokesperson [M. Dexheimer], Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here with you today in Mainz, and I sincerely thank you for inviting me. On a more personal note, I am here as a committed European and a friend of Germany. I am particularly attached to the Franco-German friendship: I am French and live in Paris, but my family’s roots are in a neighbouring Land, Saarland, where my family has lived since the end of the 18th century and where its porcelain manufacturing company Villeroy & Boch forms part of the German “Mittelstand”. When I spend my holidays in Saarland and I go north, I admire Trier; or east, Neustadt an der Weinstraße. And when I come fortnightly to participate in the ECB Governing Council, I am very close to your beautiful town of Mainz. There is no doubt in my mind that “we, the citizens of the European Union, have united for the better”, as stated in the Berlin declaration of 25 March 2007. This was for the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, and this is still just as true four days before we celebrate its 60th anniversary.

How should we react? Not by less Europe. This would be a mistake if we want to take collective control of our destiny in this new world. But by a “better” Europe, less caught up in the detail, more focused on a few key priorities, and more efficient. To achieve this, Europe needs the energy of Germany and France, and of their remarkable friendship. I will now cite Chancellor Helmut Kohl: “The Germans and French must together build the hard core of the European Union – a union that sees itself not merely as a common market, but as a community of values, a democracy based on freedom, the rule of law and the social responsibility of the State”.3 Naturally I won’t talk to you this evening about the French election debate: I will simply say that as friends of France, you must not underestimate the strength of its institutions. I will talk to you even less about the German election debate. But I strongly believe that after these democratic elections, whatever the outcome, the governments of our two countries will have to confer to decide on a number of shared bilateral projects, and above all prepare a common initiative for Europe. Because for Germany and for France, the other country is certainly the best possible partner: there is no serious alternative, neither in the east nor the west for Germany, nor in the south for France.
The challenge from the monetary policy consequences of the financial crisis has placed a particularly heavy responsibility on the ECB to explain how the measures taken fall within the ambit of its price stability mandate. Non-standard measures have been designed in such a way that they cannot compensate for failures in other policy areas. The evolving institutional structure of EMU is further contributing to ensuring that, if at any critical juncture in future the macroeconomy faces risks, monetary policy will be able to concentrate solely on preserving price stability. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  1 As described in Barry Eichengreen (1992), Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–  1939, Oxford University Press, pp. 29–66, the credibility of the pre-World War I gold standard rested on international cooperation, with Britain at the centre, enjoying considerable leeway in observing the rules of the game, and France, Germany, and others willing to support sterling’s stability. The United States, at the time an agricultural exporter and a foreign borrower, with the Federal Reserve System not yet operating, faced more binding constraints. Seasonal swings in the demand for money, for example, triggered gold flows which could not be absorbed, thereby causing periods of deflation. 2 For a critical appraisal, see Charles Goodhart (1999), “Myths about the Lender of Last Resort”, International  Finance, Vol. 2(3). 3 Barry Eichengreen, op. cit.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Progress and advancement of Islamic finance Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Islamic Economy Award 2014, Dubai, 14 January 2015. *  *  *  It is my very great honour to receive the Lifetime Achievement Award for the global development of Islamic finance conferred under the patronage of His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. I am most humbled to receive this award. It has been my privilege to contribute to the international efforts to create the foundations for a sustainable and resilient Islamic financial system in the global financial system. This recent decade has been highly challenging for the world of finance, yet the experience of confronting the challenges has been tremendously fulfilling. The overall progress and advancement of Islamic finance has continued to be accompanied by growth, dynamism and stability. Islamic finance brings immense benefits to the overall economy. It is a form of financial intermediation that is well anchored to the real economy. With its internationalisation, that began at the turn of the millennium, it now serves to enhance and strengthen the interlinkages between economies, facilitating international trade and cross border investment activities. This trend has marked the beginning of intensified collective efforts to enhance the Islamic financial infrastructure to create a robust and resilient global Islamic financial system.
One way of maintaining credibility and support for the price stability target is, in our opinion, to show a high level of openness and clarity with regard to conducting monetary policy. Openness involves, for instance, reporting which considerations we make with regard to prospects for the business climate, etc. when we make decisions regarding interest rates. However, it also means that we are transparent with regard to the sources of knowledge we use as a basis for our decisions. Clarity is also often aimed at creating the right conditions for analysts in the banking sector to forecast how monetary policy will react to various types of new information. Consistent and symmetrical actions with regard to monetary policy increases confidence in the price stability target, which in turn should have a stabilising effect on inflation expectations. My speech today should be seen as part of our endeavour to achieve openness. In many cases, I will raise questions to which we do not have answers. Our ambition is to increase our knowledge both by studying existing research and by stimulating our own and others' research in this field. The banks are important for the Riksbank's tasks I will now move on to speak about the significance of the banks for our capacity to maintain price stability. The banks play an important role in enabling monetary policy to maintain price stability, in a number of ways. Firstly, the banks are central to the capacity to make payments in the economy generally.

In fact, Malaysia’s capital account remains free with free mobility of inflows and outflows of capital for investments. The market remains open to all market participants and we shall ensure the necessary liquidity to the market. In essence, the measures that were instituted over the past week are consistent with our long standing policy of non-internationalisation of the ringgit and one that we expect banks to fully adhere to without exception. We do not recognize or condone the non-deliverable ringgit offshore market. Those who engage in NDF or NDF-related transactions are doing so at their own peril. I understand that to some, these are challenging measures but as I mentioned earlier, they are not new. We need to remove the negative influence of the NDF activities that impacts the smooth functioning and stability of the onshore financial market. We need to protect the interest of genuine investors and businesses, irrespective of whether they are foreign or domestic. Only through a concerted effort by all the stakeholders of the ringgit market, can this objective be achieved. We need to remember, that integrity and proper functioning of our financial market is in 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  the interest of every market participant, and all of us have a role to play towards achieving this objective. Way forward To overcome these challenges and to take on new direction and impetus, we had formed the Financial Market Committee (FMC) earlier this year.