samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Banks have responded to the new requirements by increasing interest margins to boost earnings. It can be safely assumed that once they have adapted to the new requirements, interest margins will decrease. The countercyclical capital buffer is not an instrument for managing business cycles. The key policy rate and the buffer are designed to promote different objectives. Monetary policy is geared towards ensuring low and stable inflation and is the first line of defence for managing business cycles. The countercyclical capital buffer is designed to strengthen banks’ capacity to withstand periods of large losses. The simultaneous failure of many banks will paralyse the economy. The payments system and flow of credit for investment will seize up. The downturn could be long-lasting. This is why it is often the case that the authorities ultimately intervene in support of failing banks. This is what transpired during the Christiania crash – and it has occurred many times since then, both in Norway and other countries. It may be necessary to provide support to banks in distress, but it comes with a major drawback: Banks will expect support also in the future, which is a source of moral hazard. In spite of the term, this is not about morals, but about incentives. The banks’ creditors are induced to charge low interest rates on loans to banks. This leads to the underpricing of risk, which may in turn lead to excessive risk-taking in the banking sector. The problem must be nipped in the bud. No bank should be promised life eternal.

It is only one year ago that we witnessed the steepest fall in global capital markets in our time. By maintaining the fund’s risk profile it is fairly probable that the average return will gradually approach 4 per cent again. The government can choose the composition, required rate of return and risk profile for its investments without taking into account the funding needs of Norwegian enterprises. Norwegian enterprises can choose their debt and equity capital structure independently of the government’s financial investments. There is a capital market between the government as investor and corporate capital needs. The government’s foreign savings plans do not therefore influence Norwegian companies’ access to capital and required rate of return on their investments. The profitability of government investments is based on a discount rate of 4 per cent. This secures the same required rate of return as the government expects to achieve on its wealth fund investments over time. One question that nevertheless arises is whether there is a queue of sound and profitable projects that have to wait because of an excessively tight fiscal policy. It is difficult to find support for this. In the National Transport Plan for 2010–2019, which can perhaps be considered representative of government spending, spending on road investments is set at around NOK 140 billion. 10 The profitability of about two-thirds of the investments has been evaluated. The calculations capture time saved and reduced costs related to accidents and the environment. Investment costs and future operating expenses are deducted.
•  Trade between ASEAN and China is at a record $ billion. •  This large and growing cross border trade will fuel greater RMB trade settlement activity in Singapore over time. The RMB clearing bank will be an important channel for RMB liquidity to circulate between Singapore and China. 4. Singapore’s deep and liquid capital markets will be able to support RMB financing needs in the region. We have already seen companies here issuing RMB-denominated bonds. The Singapore Exchange has announced that it is ready to quote, trade, clear and settle RMB-denominated securities. We can expect the range of RMB-denominated product offerings to expand, as regional corporates raise RMB financing through bond issuances and equity listings, to tap on the strong investor base in the region. 5. There will also be strong and growing demand for RMB trade services. There is a critical mass of international trading companies based in Singapore that will demand such services. With the new RMB clearing arrangements, we can expect financial institutions based in Singapore to reach out to local and regional corporates and investors, and encourage greater participation in the offshore RMB market. 6. MAS is delighted to have ICBC Singapore as our RMB clearing bank. ICBC Singapore has considerable experience in RMB business and is well placed to launch a reliable and efficient RMB clearing service. With the QFB privileges it now enjoys, ICBC is committed to growing its business in Singapore.

But monetary policy can not – and should not – seek to prevent those adjustments. They are necessary for the long-run stability of our economy. Rather the job of monetary policy – and of public policy more generally – is to ensure that these adjustments occur in an orderly manner and within an economic environment which is consistent with hitting the 2% inflation target. Because it is new and untested, there is understandably considerable nervousness about the Monetary Policy Committee’s asset purchase programme – a.k.a. quantitative easing. How is it supposed to work? Will it work? The essence of the asset purchase programme is to increase the supply of money and credit in the economy. An important point to stress is that the success of the programme does not depend on banks returning to a position in which they are able to lend normally. The policy works by supplying money directly into the economy, not through the banks. Much of the money is being injected by purchasing government bonds from institutional investors, such as insurance companies and pension funds. These purchases encourage investors to switch their portfolios away from gilts into corporate bonds and equities, so improving the supply of credit to businesses. Companies’ access to credit is further enhanced by the Bank’s purchases of commercial paper and corporate bonds, which improve the functioning of these markets. But is it working? The objective of the asset purchases is to increase the growth of nominal spending.
Additionally, within the National Committee for Macroprudential Oversight, the NBR has underlined the financial stability risks deriving from soft budget constraints in the economy. In order to strengthen the economy’s resilience to external shocks, particularly those related to credit risk, it is necessary to have in place a prudent and balanced mix of economic policies that should pursue the return to the medium-term objective (structural deficit narrowing) and the improvement of payment discipline economy-wide. 9  Charts  Figure 1. Public debt (2017) 180  Figure 2. Romania: Average residual maturity of public debt  percent of GDP  9  years  8  160  5.8  6  120  8.0  8.1  5.7  5.8  5.8  3.5  3.5  2016  Jul.17  7.2  7 140  7.8  6.2 5.3  5 4.0  4.1  4.4  4  100  3.8 3  80  2 60  3.0  3.0  2014  2015  2.4 1.6  1.7  2011  2012  1  40  0 2013  20  Source: AMECO  EU EA  GR IT PT BE CY ES FR UK AT HR SI IE HU DE FI NL MT PL SK LT RO SE LV DK CZ BG LU EE  0  average residual maturity – total debt average residual maturity – domestically issued debt average residual maturity – eurobonds Source: MPF 2  Figure 3.

The portfolios for which the expected loss will be higher than current impairment loss are those of loans granted to the retail segment and regional governments. Heterogeneity is higher for banks at individual level, but is not likely to affect their stability considering the substantial surplus in solvency indicators (Figure 17). Starting with this issue of the Report, the NBR Board has decided to contain the number of presented risks to five at most, for two reasons: the opportunity to focus the analysis and draw attention to the most important messages, and the harmonisation with international good practice of central banks that publish financial stability reports, the ECB in particular. A full comparison with the risk map in the previous reports is therefore unfeasible. 3  No severe systemic risk has been identified, but a combination of the identified risks may induce a severe risk, amid unfavourable market conditions. The main risks to financial stability are set out in the table below. Map of risks to financial stability in Romania Deterioration in investor sentiment in emerging economies Tensions surrounding macroeconomic equilibria Higher household indebtedness through both banks and NBFIs Weak payment discipline in the economy, vulnerabilities in firms' balance sheets Faster increase in property prices severe systemic risk high systemic risk moderate systemic risk low systemic risk Note: The colour shows risk intensity. Arrows indicate the outlook for risk in the period ahead.
Iceland now has access to enough foreign currency reserves to pay all Treasury debt falling due from now through 2013 – and through 2015, if it draws in full on the loan facilities associated with the IMF Stand-By Arrangement. There is an underlying current account surplus. The real exchange rate is still at a low level, which indicates that investments in krónur should be appealing for the long term. If efforts to attract direct investment in export sectors are successful over the medium term, the conditions for gradual removal of the capital controls will improve. The Central Bank emphasises lifting the controls in a way that minimises exchange rate and bond market instability to the maximum extent possible. Careful preparation will take place before the next steps are taken. However, the Bank cannot create greater certainty in the markets than it faces itself. BIS Review 138/2010  9

The Kijang Emas Scholarship is distinct from the Kijang Scholarship in that the recipients are given the freedom to pursue any field of study at top universities in any country of their choice. The Bank also does not impose any bond on the recipients except that they return, contribute and partake in the development of our nation. To date, 44 high potential talent have been awarded the Kijang Emas Scholarship. The recipients have graduated or are currently pursuing their studies in diverse fields of study including Medicine, Engineering, Law, Economics, Dietetics, Actuarial Science, Accounting, Dentistry, Biochemistry, Genetics, Architecture, Psychology and Geophysics in top universities around the world such as MIT, University of Pennsylvania and the University of Cambridge. Thus far, 11 Kijang Emas scholars have completed their undergraduate studies and have returned to serve the nation, while another seven scholars are expected to complete their studies in the next six months. For the 2015 Kijang Emas Scholarship, we received a total of 212 applications from top SPM students scoring straight A+ for their 2014 SPM. From this, the Bank shortlisted the top 24 students based on their SPM results and also on their level of involvement in co-curricular and sports activities. The students then underwent a rigorous evaluation process under the Bank’s “Kijang Academy” which assessed their technical and leadership competencies, as well as their values. We are pleased to award four outstanding students the Kijang Emas Scholarship this year. Having just completed their SPM, they will be enrolled into the respective pre-university programmes.
In a scenario where the world fails to transition to a low-carbon economy, the risk increases, including for the fund, because the consequences of large-scale climate change will be felt everywhere. As an investor in equities, bonds and real assets, we have investments in everything from real estate and infrastructure to forestry and food production. All of these investments could be hurt by changes in the environment such as heatwaves, floods or fires. We own a little of everything. For a large, long-term, global fund, there will be nowhere to hide. Climate risk is an important long-term risk that the fund needs to address. What does a long-term goal of net zero emissions mean for the fund? One key recommendation from the expert group is that Norges Bank’s responsible investment is given a long-term goal of working towards net zero emissions from the companies in which the fund is invested. Norges Bank supports this recommendation. Some might interpret this as a plan to divest from companies with high emissions. But that is not our intention, nor is it what the expert group is recommending. Instead of divesting, we aim to use active ownership to be a driver for change, pushing companies to make the transition to net zero emissions. To have that influence, we need to be on board as a shareholder. And we believe that our active ownership works. It works because we are large.

34  At that time, little academic research was available on alternatives to a fixed exchange rate regime or money supply targeting. Leading politicians and economists were sceptical about the idea of abandoning the fixed exchange rate regime. Money supply targeting was regarded as out of the question because of instability in the money supply. John Taylor’s works on interest rate rules that could contribute to stabilising inflation and the real economy, through transparency and predictability, were not published until 1993 (Taylor, John B: “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice”, Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214). 35  Storvik, Kjell (1998) “Aktuelle økonomiske og pengepolitiske problemstillinger (Current economic and monetary policy issues)”. Lecture at Forex Norway, 28 August. Norges Bank was prepared for a change in regime, cf . the discussions in Choosing a Monetary Policy Target, Christiansen, A.B. and J.F. Qvigstad (Eds. ), Universitetsforlaget (1997) and Perspektiver på pengepolitikken (Monetary policy perspectives), Qvigstad, J.F. and Ø. Røisland (Eds. ), 2000. A workshop entitled “The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Open Economies” was also held at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters in October 2000. 36  Article in the newspaper Aftenposten on 5 January 1999 in connection with the appointment of Svein Gjedrem as governor of Norges Bank, lecture by Svein Gjedrem, Gausdal, 28 January 1999: “Utfordringer i den økonomiske politikken (Challenges to economic policy)” and article by Svein Gjedrem in Aftenposten 4 May 1999: “Utfordringer i pengepolitikken (Challenges to economic policy)”.
The thinking behind this division is that measures of this kind require comprehensive economic analyses, with which we are familiar. An excellent example of a cyclical measure is the countercyclical capital buffer. The Federal Council decides on the activation of this tool at the request of the SNB. In the designation of systemically important banks and functions, the SNB also has a comparative advantage because its approach is geared to the financial system as a whole. Although powers and responsibility for specific macroprudential measures are clearly allocated to one authority, overlapping and mutual dependencies can always occur. Consequently, it is very useful for the institutions to work together closely and engage in a certain amount of coordination. That is why the Swiss authorities have clearly specified how they will differentiate their tasks and work together. From a purely theoretical point of view, a strategy where one institution bears sole responsibility for financial stability might be more appealing. However, experience from the financial crisis does not provide any evidence that the one-authority-for-all model is superior – in systematic terms – to other organisational forms. On the contrary. In this country, the UBS case clearly showed that it is very possible, in an emergency situation, to carefully and discretely draw up a bundle of comprehensive measures in support of financial stability, and to implement these in good time, even where various institutions are involved.

A priori, there is no right or wrong approach here, since the design and character of the macroprudential instruments chosen must take account of the special features of the banking system in the individual country in question. What approach has Switzerland chosen? In the area of financial stability, it has opted for an approach in which responsibilities are clearly allocated to existing institutions. The principle adopted in the case of the structures and tools is “as much as needed but as little as possible”. In my view, this regulation approach is well suited to our country. Concentrations of power are not in line with the culture of balance and limitation of powers which is fostered in our country – a culture which has served it well. Thus, contrary to the international trend, microprudential banking supervision here has not been transferred to the central bank, remaining the responsibility of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA. A lean approach was also chosen for the macroprudential area, with the new responsibilities clearly divided between the two institutions. FINMA is responsible for measures of a more structural nature, such as the increased capital requirements which systemically important financial institutions are required to meet in order to alleviate the “too big to fail” issue. The aim of these instruments is to improve regulation of and incentives for individual institutions. Consequently, it makes sense that FINMA, which is experienced in supervising institutions, is responsible for this area. Conversely, the SNB takes on a key role when it comes to cyclical measures.
More stable inflation expectations shift the Taylor curve in Figure 3 closer to origin and make the balance between the stability of inflation and the stability of the real economy more favourable. As the central bank's inflation forecasts in the short and medium terms may deliberately deviate from the target, it is also interesting to compare inflation expectations with the central bank's inflation forecasts. If the economic agents share the central bank’s view of how inflation will approach the target, inflation expectations at different time horizons should be close to the central bank’s forecasts. The degree of correspondence between inflation expectations and the central bank's inflation forecasts then becomes a measure of how credible the central bank's inflation forecasts and analyses are. Such a correspondence between expectations and forecasts is of course also desirable for forecasts for the real economy and, not least, for forecasts for the policy rate, which I will now discuss. Was the implementation of monetary policy effective? I have spoken earlier about what characterises efficient monetary policy decisions. This was in relation to the balance between stabilising inflation and stabilising the real economy given the information available at the time of the decision. Another important aspect is to investigate how effective the implementation of monetary policy has been, in the sense of affecting the economy in the desired direction and to the right amount.

For a long time, the Riksbank, for example, based its forecasts on the assumption that the policy rate, that is the repo rate, would remain unchanged during the forecast period. Some central banks base their forecasts on both a constant interest rate and a constant exchange rate, which are often completely unrealistic assumptions. In such cases, the forecasts for inflation and the real economy are of course not the best forecasts. For a while, the Riksbank instead used the assumption that the repo rate would follow the market's expectations regarding the development of the repo rate. Although this is a more realistic assumption, it is not necessarily the same as the Riksbank's best forecast. These difficulties no longer apply to the Riksbank's forecasts as, since February 2007, the forecasts are based on the Riksbank's best forecast for the repo rate. In order to arrive at a fair comparison of the forecasts of various analysts, we should also take into account the fact that the forecasts are made at different times and are therefore based on different quantities of information. A forecaster that, for example, always publishes its forecasts later than other analysts has generally speaking more information on the economic situation when the forecasts are made. A comparison of the accuracy of the forecasts should therefore make adjustments for the forecasts being made at different times. Such a forecast comparison is included in the material for the evaluation of monetary policy in the period 2006-2008 that the Riksbank published a month ago.
As a result, we used the working assumption that the MPR would follow a trajectory similar to the one implied by financial asset prices during the ten days prior to its statistical closing. In practice, this meant at least one additional 25bp cut. It is always worth remembering that this is a working assumption and as such, contingent to the new developments and their impact on projected inflation. If incoming information points at the necessity of an additional boost or, on the contrary, if this is no longer needed, we will react promptly, communicating the justification of doing so. Consistent with the assumption used in our March Report, in April we decided to lower the MPR by 25bp, to 2.75%. The press release issued then stated that we will assess the need for some additional increase in the monetary impulse, which will hinge on the medium-term inflation outlook (figure 8). This way, our monetary policy continues to be one of the most expansionary in a group of comparable economies. Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent)  5  5  MPR  4  Financial asset prices, December 2016 Report (*)  3  Financial asset 4 prices, March Report (*) 3  EES Financial asset prices (17 April)  FBS 2 14  15  16  17  18  2  19  (*) Constructed using interest rates on swap contracts up to 10 years. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 15. As usual when making forecasts, our macroeconomic scenario faces several risks.

Strength of our country is the fact that compared to earlier low-growth periods it has more liquid external funds available. At the same time, the financial sector is healthy and non-performing loans have diminished over time. Reforms currently under discussion, particularly a New General Banking Law, aim to bolster resilience and improve banking capital adequacy ratios (figure 10). Figure 10 Regulatory Capital  NPL  (percent of risk-weighted assets)  (percent of total loans)  Latin America (*)  Chile  18  18  15  15  12  12  9  9  6  6  3  3  0  0 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 10  11  12  13  14  15  16  (*) Shows the region’s simple average. Source: Global Financial Stability Report, IMF. The medium- and long-term outlook 19. The Chilean economy has endured a long period of slow growth, while its potential growth has dropped to a range between 2.5% and 3%, i.e., less than estimated a decade ago (4% to 5%). In principle, this change is explained by: (a) a smaller contribution of the accumulation of productive factors, inherent to a maturing economy; (b) a drop in gross fixed capital formation that has lasted several years; (c) reduced mining productivity; and (d) a limited contribution of productivity growth in the other sectors. 20.