samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This assessment of low inflationary risks is also supported by the declining trend in the growth rate of loans to the private sector. However, a continuation of strong M3 growth could call for a reassessment of monetary developments, especially if there is further evidence of a recovery in the euro area economy. BIS Review 9/2002  1  Regarding the second pillar, while actual euro area production growth in the fourth quarter of last year and in the early part of this year is still expected to be subdued, new data confirm our expectation of a gradual improvement in economic activity in the course of the year. Uncertainty as regards the global environment seems to be gradually decreasing. In the euro area, the economic fundamentals remain sound and financing conditions favourable. Together with higher growth in real income, stemming from the past and future declines in inflation, these factors should support overall demand. This assessment appears to be reflected both in recent improvements in survey data and in financial market developments. Although the timing and strength of the upturn remain uncertain, the overall evidence points to a resumption of economic growth. We also continue to expect no medium-term upward pressures on inflation. However, as already indicated on several occasions, annual inflation rates at the beginning of this year will be somewhat erratic. Preliminary HICP data for January 2002 confirm this expectation but should not give rise to concerns as regards the medium term.

European Central Bank: Press conference - introductory statement Introductory statement by Mr Willem F Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank and Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the press conference, held in Maastricht, 7 February 2002. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, as the Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht exactly ten years ago today, it was decided that it would be fitting to hold the fifth meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB outside Frankfurt here in this city in order to mark the tenth anniversary of what has become known as the "Maastricht Treaty". Indeed, the Governing Council today met in the same rooms in which the Heads of State and Government successfully concluded the Treaty negotiations. I should like to thank Governor Wellink, the Queen's Commissioner in the Province of Limburg, the staff of de Nederlandsche Bank and the city of Maastricht for their hospitality and for the outstanding way in which the meeting has been organised. When the Maastricht Treaty was signed, many doubted whether Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) would ever amount to more than the solemn words of a Treaty or a laudable objective to be reached at some point in the distant future. However, during the 1990s, policy-makers, governments, central bankers and other political and economic agents showed great resolve and determination to ensure that the single currency would become a reality.
48 49  42  See E. Gerald Corrigan (1990): “Future Priorities in Banking and Finance”, Remarks given before the 62nd Annual Mid-Winter Meeting of the New York State Bankers’ Association, 25 January 1990. Published in Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review/Winter 1989-90, p.7. See also p. 36 in “Norske finansmarkeder – pengepolitikk og finansiell stabilitet (Norwegian financial markets – monetary policy and financial stability)”, Norges Bank’s Occasional Papers, no. 34 (2004). 43  The concept of “constructive ambiguity” refers to the deliberate use of ambiguous language in order to advance a political purpose. The concept has been particularly associated with Henry Kissinger, said to be the foremost exponent of constructive ambiguity as a negotiating tactic. 44  See Riksrettstidende 1926/1927. 45  On 7 November 2008, Bloomberg LP (on behalf of Bloomberg News) filed a federal lawsuit against the Federal Reserve for violation of the Freedom of Information Act. The news agency had called on the central bank to identify the US banks funded by its emergency lending because the taxpayers should be aware of the risks involved in these investments. The Fed refused to name the borrowers, disclose the amounts of loans or the assets banks provided as collateral, arguing that doing so might “set off a run by depositors and unsettle shareholders”. See article “Fed makes taxpayers ‘involuntary investors’ in banks, suit says”, Bloomberg, 15 April 2009. 46  See for example Bernhard Winkler (2000): “Which kind of transparency?

This would be above the range which the SNB equates with price stability. The forecast shows that the current level of interest rates cannot be maintained once the economic situation normalises. Since monetary policy has been expansionary for a long time now, there is a greater threat of inflation in the future. If the economic outlook continues to improve, it will be necessary to make adjustments to monetary policy. With our decision to leave the three-month Libor unchanged, we are adhering to our previous monetary policy course for the time being. We continue to support the economy, using the leeway available to us. This policy should guarantee longer-term price stability. As mentioned before, the SNB will respond appropriately if the Swiss franc appreciates rapidly, and is keeping all its options open for this eventuality, as it has done in the past. Observed inflation June 2005  Inflation forecast on March 2005 with Libor at 0.75% and of June 2005 with Libor at 0.75%  Inflation forecast of June 2005 (53 kb)
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In sum, while our primary concern will always be stability, we recognise that, given the importance of the Bank’s settlement operations to the overall system, our decisions will not only reflect but also shape the future payments landscape. The second issue is the desired level of functionality. RTGS has evolved considerably over its twenty years. Recent examples from a long list include: the introduction of a liquidity savings mechanism in 2013, reducing the risk that banks will be unable to settle payments due to liquidity shortfalls 9; the introduction of “pre funding” in 2015, ensuring that all net exposures in retail schemes that settle in RTGS are backed by central bank money; and the planned extension in June this year of RTGS opening hours. 10 Against this backdrop, we will ask what further changes might be required from a new platform, as the needs of the wider payments universe develop. There are many potential questions. What are the implications of growing demand for a “24x7x365” model of retail payments? What enhancements to cyber security will be required in future years? Have we pitched the balance between minimising settlement, liquidity and operational risk in the right place? What will be the impact of relatively nascent technologies such as the distributed ledger? Should RTGS adopt the latest messaging standards, not least to promote their use more broadly within the UK’s financial system? Are stakeholders comfortable that the right types of payments are being made in real-time across RTGS?

And rapid growth of non-bank payment providers could have profound implications for the business models of banks, challenging their revenue streams, altering the economics of credit provision and changing the risks to financial stability. 5  The Faster Payments Scheme launched in May 2008 and allows payments to be made 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 6  Further information on the One Bank Research initiative can be found here: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/ research/Pages/onebank/agenda.aspx  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  New payments technologies also pose practical challenges, such as ensuring they interface effectively with legacy IT systems in banks and payments infrastructure. What does all of this mean for the future of RTGS? Because of the changing context I have described, the Bank of England has decided the scope of the blueprint should be broad. We need to understand these trends, whilst recognising that there is considerable room for debate about the impact of the current wave of technological innovation. We need to think about to whom we give access to the advantages of central bank money with its unique qualities of finality of settlement. Trying to predict the future is a risky business, but when we make decisions about investment in systems that will last for a decade or more, they need to enable the kinds of changes that users will demand. So we need to make sure that we have “optionality” built in so that we can cope with different states of the world.
For example, there may sometimes be a little too much focus on the potential antagonism and differences of opinion within the Board – and in the worst case on a person rather than a policy. But one positive effect that people perhaps do not think about is that topical and important issues, often those in the forefront of academic research, are quickly implemented in the Riksbank’s practical work. The fact that the Executive Board publicly debates what role the policy rate should play to influence household debt means that the Riksbank’s analysis apparatus is activated on this issue to a greater extent than would have been the case without this open discussion. Although I would not say that there are any more concrete results yet, there is definitely a lot of deliberation being put into this issue. I do not believe that this would have been the case – at least not to the same extent – if all of the Board members were agreed that the repo rate should be held slightly higher to subdue household debt. In other words, the open debate hopefully helps us to move forward in this field. References Armelius, Hanna and Hans Dillén, “The relation between household saving and falls in house prices”, Economic Commentary no. 4, 2011, Sveriges Riksbank. Assenmacher-Wesche, Katrin, and Stefan Gerlach (2010), “Monetary policy and financial imbalances: Facts and fiction”, Economic Policy 25, pp. 437–482.

Finally, as the United States has broken the nuclear agreement with Iran, there might be further tensions on the oil market, with adverse effects on world growth. In the current setting these risks are relevant to the Spanish economy, given that it still has high levels of public and external debt, which make it particularly vulnerable to negative developments on the international capital markets. At the same time, further increases in oil prices might particularly affect our economy in view of its high foreign energy dependence. Elsewhere, the political situation in Catalonia does not appear to have stabilised, thereby posing a further factor of uncertainty, with potentially adverse consequences for the Spanish economy as a whole. In the medium term, the expansion of our economy should cease to rest on the expansionary impulses of demand-side policies and come to depend on more durable factors. The estimates available on potential growth are relatively modest, meaning it is crucial to attempt to address some of the problems restricting it. These include most notably high structural unemployment, population ageing, a poor productivity trend and the technological capital deficit. Budgetary policy in 2018 I shall now discuss the main items of the draft State Budget for 2018 approved by the Government on 27 March, and complemented by the Stability Programme Update for the period 2018-2021, submitted to the European authorities on 30 April. This second document already includes some of the measures added to the draft Budget in its passage through Parliament.
Permit me to return to last year's discussion about energy prices in order to illustrate what I believe could be one of the problems. As I mentioned, the repo rate was not lowered in April 2003 despite the fact that our forecasts pointed to below-target CPI inflation two years ahead. The reason was that the forecast of CPI inflation was depressed by energy price effects that were judged to be transitory and that were expected to subside just beyond the forecast horizon. However, the measure that was considered a better reflection of longer-term cyclical inflation, UND1X excluding energy, was forecast to be in line with the inflation target at the end of the forecast period. One perhaps likely interpretation, and an interpretation that was obviously common, was that the Riksbank had not departed from its policy rule of adjusting the repo rate when inflation deviates from the target, but that the target variable itself had been changed. And since the new supposed target variable was in line with the inflation target there was no reason to change the repo rate. Our intention, however, was rather the reverse, i.e. to highlight UND1X excluding energy to point out that fluctuations in CPI inflation were driven to a great extent by temporary variations in energy prices, also somewhat beyond the normal two-year horizon, and that this was an occasion on which there was reason to depart from the rule.

At the onset of the crisis, it was not clear that the pandemic would not lead to a slowdown. This can, however, be explained in retrospect. Interest rates have remained low and support measures have significantly cushioned the impact of the crisis on the income of households and companies. Data released since the publication of our report in June show that the price momentum is continuing unabated. Second, it is to be expected that the global low interest rate environment will remain unchanged for some time to come. One reason is that the structural factors behind the downward trend in interest rate levels over the past decade, such as the ageing of the population and the decline in productivity growth, are still in play. Another reason is the expansionary monetary policy pursued by central banks in the advanced economies. Such policy continues to be necessary in order to counteract the impact of the coronavirus crisis. It is therefore to be expected that interest rates will remain low for some time yet, which means that incentives for increased risk-taking will remain in place. 13 This could prolong the period in which growth in mortgage volume and residential property prices is higher than can be explained by fundamental factors. Moreover, the longer the current cycle lasts, the more likely it is that memories of past crises fade and that market participants increasingly disregard the risks in question. Against this backdrop, it is important to continue to closely monitor developments on the mortgage and real estate markets.
We will be hearing from leading voices in the field on: Macroeconomics of Climate Change Blended Finance Transition Planning Nature-Related Risks Let me briefly share what the NGFS is doing in each of these areas, to set the backdrop for today's Workshop. Macroeconomics of climate change Both the physical and transition dimensions of climate change will significantly impact output, inflation, labour markets, and the long-term growth potential of economies. 1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The NGFS is seeking to develop the tools necessary for central banks and regulators to make sense of how climate change will affect the macroeconomy and financial system. This includes work on: identifying relevant climate-related data; developing analytical frameworks and models; understanding the implications for monetary policy; and designing climate scenarios for stress testing. The NGFS has brought together an expert network of statisticians and data scientists on climate-related data. They will help member central banks and supervisors build up capacity on climaterelated data such as adverse climate events, carbon emissions, energy intensity, and so on. This will include building climate data directories and setting up green finance data hubs in central banks. The NGFS is developing theoretical frameworks and quantitative models to evaluate the impact of climate change on the macroeconomy. Policymakers need to better understand the channels by which physical risks and transition efforts can affect the economy.

Our response to the nature-related crisis should therefore be as ambitious as our response to the climate-related one. The world needs to account for, manage, and mitigate the financial risks posed by biodiversity loss. The NGFS has set up a task force to mainstream the consideration of naturerelated risks across all its work. A key focus of this effort is to develop a conceptual framework for nature-related risks that central banks and supervisors can utilise to develop policies and actions on nature-related issues. The financial industry can also play a positive role in addressing the degradation of nature. First, do no harm.Financial institutions should disincentivise production processes that are harmful to biodiversity and proactively manage the risks that would arise from biodiversity loss. Second, provide the necessary funding to develop resilient and sustainable production systems that factor in the interdependence of food, water, and energy systems. Let me conclude. The financial industry working together with central banks and financial regulators can make a decisive difference in addressing climate change and environmental degradation. To enable this collaboration, the NGFS aims to be a pathfinder for emerging initiatives to strengthen the climate resilience of the financial system and to facilitate financing flows for the transition to a net-zero world. I encourage you to participate actively in today's Workshop, so that we can collectively advance our understanding of the issues we need to tackle. I wish you fruitful and productive discussions. 5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Ardian Fullani: The western Balkans – from regional cooperation to EU membership Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the conference “The western Balkans: overcoming the economic crisis – from regional cooperation to EU membership", Brussels, 9 December 2009. *  *  *  During the last 20 years the region has undergone significant structural changes, which have fueled economic incentives and economic growth. In the early stages of transition a fast and significant transformation in the labor and later in the capital market reoriented all factors of production toward more productive sectors. This contributed to higher total factor productivity and consequently fast economic growth. The final stage of transition was dominated by a robust financial deepening process fueled among others from EU based capital inflows. This financial intermediation busted credit growth and consumption yielding to absorption led growth model in the region. In the aftermath of crises our policy choices are limited. From a broad prospective the region should chose a new philosophy, different from the boom-bust model of the last decade. I strongly believe this must be the focal point of the Regional Policies. The current crisis pointed out several problems in our growth models. The so called catching up process was a model of unsustainable consumption behavior rather than sustainable long run equilibrium. Despite the overall fiscal consolidation and relatively high rate of growths, it resulted in increasing macroeconomic imbalances mostly evidenced in the fast enlargement of current account deficits.

While the global economy is adjusting toward a new equilibrium, solid macro-prudential long run policies should replace current stimulating efforts. Therefore the challenge for our economies in the long run is to address current problems and the inherited ones based on a new model of growth, based on: (i) higher savings and investments, aiming toward a contained consumption matched by domestic production; (ii) persistent FDI inflows oriented toward tradable sectors; (iii) regional cooperation. BIS Review 164/2009  1  Let me briefly share with you some of my thoughts on the importance of this last remark, namely regional cooperation. Following arguments illustrate the benefits of cooperation, at several levels: •  From a development point of view, increased cooperation and integration on a regional level creates a greater scope for economies of scale. This would increase incentives for local and foreign investors to undertake big investment project that would not be profitable otherwise. A related advantage would be increased specialization of our economies, leading to a higher economic performance. •  On a policy level, coordinated macroeconomic policies, legal and prudential frameworks, would tend to improve the allocation of resources and to prevent beggar-thy-neighbor policies. This race to the bottom type of philosophy would not benefit the region as a whole. •  From a strategic point of view, our region is in competition with several emerging regions on a global scale.
In particular, we support expanding the scope of the resolution framework to ensure that the failure of small and medium-sized banks can be addressed in a more effective and harmonised way. At the same time, ensuring adequate resolution funding is critical to make resolution feasible for smaller banks. This includes using deposit guarantee schemes to help unlock access to the Single Resolution Fund and introducing a single-tier depositor preference. The proposals form a coherent package which must be preserved in its entirety. We call on the co-legislators to adopt it swiftly, preferably during the current institutional cycle. The events of this spring have demonstrated the need for effective and agile crisis management frameworks for banks of all sizes. To complete the crisis management toolkit for large banks in the EU, we also need to make progress in other areas, such as liquidity in resolution and a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. The missing third pillar of banking union The large gap in our institutional framework is still the missing third pillar: the European deposit insurance scheme. As long as deposit insurance remains at the national level, the sovereign-bank nexus will continue to be a source of fragmentation in the banking union, as the level of confidence in the safety of bank deposits may differ across Member States. In a crisis, we run the risk of deposit outflows towards other Member States and non-banks, thereby exacerbating systemic liquidity stress.

We will continue to be actively involved in the finalisation of the international reforms. The combined package of national and international reforms represents a decisive step in the process of resolving the ‘too big to fail’ issue in Switzerland. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Domestically focused banks: adequate resilience, despite substantial increase in mortgage exposure This brings me to the domestically focused banks. For these banks, whose activity centres on Swiss lending and deposit-taking business, I would like to highlight three developments. First, these banks’ risk exposure to the Swiss mortgage and residential real estate markets rose markedly in 2015, with their mortgage lending volume growing at a similarly robust pace as in the previous year. In addition, they further increased their affordability risk and interest rate risk exposure from maturity transformation, against a background of slightly higher imbalances on the mortgage and residential real estate markets. Second, in 2015, these banks’ interest rate margins stabilised at a low level, after having fallen steadily and significantly since the start of the low interest rate period at end-2008. This stabilisation is remarkable, given that pressure on interest rate margins continued last year. Swiss money and capital market rates fell once again in 2015. At the same time, the interest paid by banks on customer deposits remained largely unchanged. Thus, the difference between these two interest rates – the liability margin – narrowed further.