samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
More than half of the global population already live in cities. There are 23 megacities today; and it is projected that this number will double by 2030. Most of these new megacities will be in South and East Asia. OECD estimates that more than half of the infrastructure needed by 2030 has not been built yet. Growing cities will need to simultaneously deal with the problems of scarce resources and climate change. Even developed countries can be vulnerable to extreme climate changes. Hurricane Sandy left a quarter of New York City’s population without electricity, and shut down vital transport infrastructure including all 3 airports and all subway lines. Whether or not a global agreement on mitigating the effects of climate change is reached or not, there will be tremendous business opportunities for companies that can provide solutions to address the challenges of resource efficiency and to back up vulnerable systems and infrastructure. Innovative urban solutions and investments in infrastructure R&D will be sorely needed. As an early adopter of sustainable development strategies, Singapore is happy to share our experience learnt from sustainable growth strategies. The annual World Cities Summit, hosted in Singapore, serves as a platform for the exchange of leading-edge ideas on building liveable and sustainable cities. Beyond the exchange of ideas, Singapore is pushing the boundaries in sustainability research. Two National Innovation Challenge programmes are currently on-going,  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  addressing the themes of 1) Energy Resilience for Sustainable Growth and 2) Land and Liveability.

As China’s consumption increases, its rising import demand will have a positive impact on Asia and on the rest of the world. Besides China, India’s middle class is estimated to grow to almost 600 million people by 2025, and almost 60% of Indonesian households, in a country of 240 million people, are expected to reach middle-class status by 2020. The Asian Development Bank projects that, by the middle of the century, Asia will account for more than half of global GDP and will own half of the world’s financial assets and financial institutions. I’m sure all of you are cautious about long-term extrapolations, but this projection is one of many which are reflective of the optimism and growth potential that we see not just in China, but Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries. As these countries in Asia power ahead, they will drive further economic integration within this region. PricewaterhouseCoopers’ “Future of World Trade” study describes how new trade corridors will form within Asia as a result of this integration. In 1990, 20 years ago, the developed economies dominated the world trade map. Europe was responsible for over half of the world’s exports, although these were mainly intra-Europe flows. In 2010, this map has changed with the global shift in manufacturing to Asia, with China accounting for 9 out of the top 25 bilateral trade routes by value.
II.The euro as a catalyst for further progress While many acknowledge that the introduction of the euro has been broadly successful, one may ask at this point what needs to happen to ensure the success of the euro in the medium term. What is very encouraging in this respect is the fact that in a number of areas the euro itself appears to be as a catalyst for these conditions to be met. II.1. The euro and the single market a/ The euro is the crowning achievement of the single market. Need we mention the advantages inherent in the single market? It enables the productive sector to make significant economies of scale and allows savings to be allocated to the most efficient investments. It also enhances market visibility and boosts competition and innovation to the benefit of consumers. But the ultimate objective of the single market could not be achieved while monetary barriers continue to prevent the free flow of goods, services, capital and, in a way, people, by imposing unpredictable and erratic exchange-rate movements and transaction costs. The last step in this process will be made with the cash changeover at the end of this year; it will enable not only enterprises but all our citizens to enjoy all the advantages of using the same monetary instrument throughout the European continent, just like Americans do today throughout the territory of the United States. b/Moreover, the introduction of the euro brings about a significant change in the economic and financial environment.

First, it was geared to supporting banks which, while viable, required restructuring to ensure their ability to resume a path of sustainable profitability, by reinforcing their solvency with public funds. Significantly, in certain countries where the need for a similar instrument has been acknowledged, this has not yet been created. Second, the FROB involved giving the Banco de España wide-ranging powers to swiftly and effectively take control and resolve the problems of those banks that are not viable. Rounding off the remit of the FROB has been the approval of the reform of the legal regime for savings banks. To date, the limitations inherent in their legal status had prevented savings banks from reinforcing their core capital, except through the capitalisation of profits. The reform opens the way for savings banks to tap private capital by enabling them to issue core equity instruments, it provides for improvements in their management and it subjects them to greater market discipline. Restructuring was considered on the basis of two criteria that have proven to be most useful. The first is the requirement that those banks applying for public aid should reduce capacity. 2  BIS Review 171/2010  During the expansion, our banking system became excessively big in parallel with the growth of the construction sector. If aid had not been conditional upon the presentation of a capacity-adjustment programme, the profit and loss accounts of all banks would have continued to perform poorly, not only in conjunctural terms but also structurally.
Regional arrangements Another approach would privilege regional arrangements either for pooling reserves or redistributing them though permanent swap agreements. Asian countries, especially, are working on and implementing progressively such schemes through the Chiang Mai initiative. It should be noted that regional pooling is efficient only when countries are facing asymmetric liquidity shocks within the region. Pooling brings no additional benefits when shocks occur on a global scale and all countries are hit simultaneously. Also, regional arrangements cannot avoid the moral hazard problem that all multilateral schemes are facing. Nevertheless, there seems to be considerable scope for regional arrangements to prosper in the future. First, they can act as useful complements to more global schemes and be articulated with (and supported by) IMF facilities. Second, one can expect regional financial integration to progress, especially in those parts of the world where huge pools of savings are available and currently intermediated through financial systems located outside the region. With deeper financial integration, the probability of significant portfolio shifts inside one region increases markedly, creating the potential for asymmetric liquidity shocks. The development of regional liquidity arrangements may appear very useful to underpin the development of regional financial markets. Stores of value One consequence of the crisis has been to cast doubts on the ability of some assets, up to now considered as riskless, to serve as reliable stores of value. The ability of the private sector to create “safe” assets through financial innovation has proved largely illusory (Caballero, 2009).

The banks in a number of countries stayed open longer than usual to deal with the extra business, which was received positively. However, there have been reports that some banks did not wish to implement pure exchanges, but forced customers to deposit national currency in an account, only then putting the equivalent amount in euro at their disposal. This created some dissatisfaction that could have been avoided by giving customers more information in advance. In many countries the banks carried the heaviest burden, while in Finland, a country whose use of cash is similar to Sweden's, the retail trade had to shoulder a large part of the changeover, as the banks deal with cash to a relatively small extent. This example shows the importance of co-operation between the central bank, the banks, the post office, the retailers and other companies handling cash in order for a cash changeover of this scope to function. One important lesson is that the retail trade would play a major role in the introduction of the euro, particularly if Swedish banks further reduce their cash management. The studies we have made of other countries' changeovers show that the retailers have chosen different approaches, as I am sure you already know. In some countries they have had, for instance, special exchange desks to avoid handling double currencies in the normal cash desks, something that has had varying results.
Accounting for 33% of all announced international bonds and notes issues in 1999, compared with 37% for the US dollar, the euro nearly matched the dollar in that year. In the second half of 1999 euro-denominated bond issues even exceeded those in the US dollar. As far as the euro’s share in overall official reserves is concerned, the euro also represents the second most widely used currency behind the US dollar. According to the latest available data, at the end of 1999 the euro accounted for around 13% of the official foreign currency holdings of the world. Apart from some technical corrections on account of the conversion of the Eurosystem’s reserves into euro, which led to a slight decline in the euro’s share in overall reserves, there is no evidence of any reallocation of foreign reserves at this stage. It should also be noted that more than 50 countries in the world are currently using the euro as a nominal anchor. International cooperation Let me now turn to the institutional side. The introduction of the euro has brought about a major change to the institutional framework in which international cooperation takes place. In view of the rapid process of globalisation and episodes of crises in a number of systemically important emerging market economies, international cooperation should play a role in strengthening the international financial architecture. In this respect, the new institutional setting in Europe is to be taken into account.

By reducing the number of key players, the introduction of the euro will simplify the international policy cooperation process between the major economies. In particular, it should make this process more efficient by facilitating the reciprocal exchange of information and views, as well as the formulation of common understandings on economic and financial issues at the global level. Each of 3  BIS Review 72/2000  the main partners - the United States, the euro area and Japan - is in a position to speak for a comparatively large economic area. A more balanced relationship between the major players might help to induce each of them to take on responsibility for contributing to a stable global environment. In many ways, the ECB - which as a rule represents the Eurosystem externally - is already involved in the work of international institutions and fora in the area of competencies of the Eurosystem. Formal and informal agreements have already been reached with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and the several groupings of ministers and central bank governors (G7, G10 and G20). The involvement of the ECB was relatively straightforward for groupings created after the introduction of the euro, such as the FSF or G20. In the case of pre-existing international fora and organisations, however, the arrangements to be made were more complicated.
Those requirements were meant to be exacting if the securities were issued onto the public markets. In Europe, it seems most issuers of ABS and CDOs chose to list them in Ireland or Luxembourg. In many jurisdictions, including the USA, the requirements were deliberately less exacting if the securities were distributed solely via the “private markets” to wholesale or sophisticated investors. This prompts two thoughts. First, with hindsight, could Listing Authorities and securities regulators8 do more in the future to ensure that the disclosure around complex securities are comprehensible, coherent and, crucially, simple and short enough to be capable of being absorbed? And should Listing Authorities be more willing to step in and require changes to the structure of complex securities where they conclude that the disclosure is inadequate and just cannot realistically be made adequate? Have “risk factors” become so numerous, wordy and wide-ranging that they lose their impact? In their understandable desire to avoid validating products and securities, have securities regulators retreated too far towards simply checking that the required boxes have been ticked? Perhaps I am imagining it, but I recollect a period in which Listing Authorities were guardians of the integrity of primary markets. That over time came to rely upon disclosure. And that ended up meaning accepting documents that were comprehensive rather than comprehensible. Where something is incomprehensible, and has reached a scale where it could even jeopardise stability, the relevant authority should say so.

6  Jan in’t Veld, Fiscal consolidations and spillovers in the Euro area periphery and core, European Commission Economic Paper 506, October 2013. 7  Dawn Holland and Jonathan Portes, Self Defeating Austerity, National Institute Economic Review No. 222 October 2012. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I could elaborate on the financial dimension of EMU. The Banking Union, when completed, has the potential to move up to the highest level of institutional integration. Similarly, the Juncker Plan is a useful integrated instrument, although too weak and slow at present. I have stressed elsewhere the need for and the benefits of moving ahead with a much stronger “Financing and Investment Union”, incorporating these steps forward and going well beyond the proposed Capital Markets Union. Yet, today I prefer to focus on the fiscal and structural policy dimensions of EMU. In practice, our fiscal framework has been implemented as a fairly weak monitoring framework. Likewise, on the structural front, the MIP (Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure) is clearly lacking teeth. An institution is clearly missing to develop a mandatory and, hence, full coordination of national policies in the fiscal and structural areas, an idea I will elaborate upon in a few moments. The highly political nature of the debate should not hide the strong economic rationale for such a reform. 15 years ago Peter Kenen 8 argued that a fiscal integration could make currency areas thrive, even though they did not meet all the features of an optimal currency area.
International Capital Flows in the Post-crisis World, September 2019 CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE  Non-bank lenders  In terms of arrears, CCAFs is the only component consistently increasing its delinquency rate affecting its profitability measured through ROA  12 10  Arrears of 90 to 180 days (1)  Exposure to the consumer segment (2)  ROA and leverage ratio (3)  (percent of loans)  (percent of system assets)  (percent of bank consumer loans)  Retailers  CCAFs  S&Ls  F6Ls  12  Direct  Retailers  FL&A  CCAFs  S&Ls  10  Car dealerships  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  2015  2016  2017  2018  ROA Reta ilers FL&A CCAFs S&Ls  4.7 3.3 -0.1 2.2  4.9 3.2 0.9 2.7  4.8 2.6 1.6 3.8  4.6 2.6 2.3 3.8  Leverage ratio Reta ilers FL&A CCAFs S&Ls  33.4 21.1 34.5 32.1  32.2 20.5 36.9 29.1  30.8 17.2 37.7 28.2  22.2 16.5 36.9 27.2  0  0 13  14  15  16  17  18  13  14  15  16  17  18  (1) Data through December 2018, except for retailer, which are through September 2018. F&Ls include arrears on factoring and leasing. Arrears are 90 to 180 days, except for CCAFs. (2) Indirect exposure includes retailers, FL&A, CCAFs, and S&Ls. FL&A combines factoring and leasing companies and car dealership.

In the consumer portfolio, NBLs include retailers, family compensation funds (CCAF), savings and loan associations (S&Ls), factoring and leasing companies (F&Ls), and car dealerships. The mortgage portfolio includes endorsable mortgage loans (“mutuos hipotecarios”) issued by banks and mutual societies included among the assets held by life insurance companies (LICs). Finally, factoring and leasing companies mainly provide trade credit to businesses. Therefore most, if not all, of the lending activities of this sector is done in local currency. Having said that, we monitor this sector carefully, since the household debt issued by NBLs has increased a share of total consumer debt. Nonbank loans had a real annual growth rate of 11.5% in the fourth quarter of 2018. The contribution of debt with retailers was 4.5%; car dealership, 3.9%; CCAFs and F&Ls,1.2%; and S&Ls, Page 5 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  0.8%. In the same period, bank consumer loans grew around 5.7%. Nonbank consumer loans together were equivalent to about 58% of total bank consumer loans. This rate has been stable since 2012, although the composition has changed. Specifically, the share of retailers has been steadily increasing since mid-2013, while the share of companies oriented toward car financing has expanded more recently. As of December 2018, retailers accounted for 24.3%; car dealership, 12.1%; CCAFs, 12.1%; S&Ls, 6.6%; and F&Ls, 2.8%. High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation?
In its internal audit report published in March 2013, the FSA highlighted several issues pertaining to the breakdown of the internal audit function, which led to the manipulation of the rates. Despite the Group internal audit functions carrying out their routine audits in this area, deficiencies in the banks’ systems, controls and policies were not adequately highlighted. The lessons learnt from the above cases and others clearly reinforce the key roles played by both the internal audit function and the Audit Committee. My view is that the strength and effectiveness of the internal audit function will influence the risk and compliance culture in an organisation. The function has to continually be refreshed such that it remains robust and effective. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Clearly, the job is now more difficult and challenging than ever, given the increased expectations by stakeholders and heightened scrutiny when things go wrong, as well as increasing obligations under the statute that place additional fiduciary responsibilities on audit committee members. I would like to share my thoughts on four matters where efforts are necessary to raise the bar on audit standards and audit quality. Firstly, the audit coverage and scope should not be confined to compliance or risk-based parameters. The audit scope should be holistic, encompassing new risk areas and tail risk events that originate from the evolving operating environment and financial landscape.

The fundamentals of an internal audit function involve identifying risks that could threaten the viability of the company and keep it from achieving its goals, ensuring management fully understands these risks, and proactively recommending improvements to minimise these risks. Internal auditors are essentially the eyes and ears of the Audit Committee and the overall Board. The failure of audit functions can result in devastating consequences as seen in recent times. The case of the British Petroleum (BP) oil rig explosion in 2010 is one that reinforces the important role of the internal audit function. Occupational safety is widely regarded as a critical success factor for a company that undertakes oil exploration. The BP oil rig was awarded as the industry model for safety in 2009. However, in 2010, the oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, causing one of the worst man-made disasters in history. The U.S investigation commission attributed the disaster to the “failure of individuals involved to identify risks they faced and to properly evaluate, communicate and address them”. This indirectly highlighted the shortcomings of the internal audit function as a contributory source of failure in the lines of defence in the company. Some level of scepticism to consider the remote possibility that the safety measures in place may not work in the event of disaster, could have avoided the risk event from occurring. Another example is the LIBOR manipulation scandal involving several banks which culminated in substantial fines imposed by the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA).
Ravi Menon: Monetary Authority of Singapore at forty Welcome address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at MAS 40th Anniversary Dinner, Singapore, 28 November 2011. *  *  *  Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman MAS, Tharman Shanmugaratnam Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Staff and management of MAS are delighted to welcome you to our 40th anniversary celebrations. 1. one. An anniversary is a good time to thank all those who made the journey a successful  First, we thank the past leaders and staff of MAS 2. Economic and financial stability that Singapore has enjoyed over last 40 years is result of tireless efforts of generations of MAS officers. 3. The pioneers, led by our first Chairman, Mr Hon Sui Sen, and first Managing Director, Michael Wong Pak Shong, laid the foundations for an integrated central bank and financial regulator while navigating a turbulent global environment – the collapse of Bretton Woods, global recession, and double-digit inflation. 4. With Dr Goh Keng Swee as Chairman at the start of the 1980s and Mr Lim Kim San and Mr Yong Pung How as Managing Directors, MAS adopted the exchange rate as the principal tool of monetary policy, at a time when the conventional tools were monetary aggregates and interest rates. 5.

This need not be the case. 17. Let us in Singapore together build a financial industry:    that is economically purposeful: generating real value-added and good jobs    that is socially redeeming: creating opportunities for individuals and enterprises; and    that is ethically sound: acting with integrity at all times. Finally, we thank our international partners 18. At our genesis in 1971, we had no experience in central banking or financial supervision. We learnt much from other central banks – like the Bank of England, Bank Negara Malaysia, and the Reserve Bank of Australia. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  19. The IMF seconded to MAS a generous array of advisers, from whom we learnt core skills in banking supervision and economic research. I still recall the IMF’s Article IV Consultations of twenty years ago, when I was a young economist in MAS. To many of us, they were the best tutorials in macroeconomic analysis that we have ever had. 20. Being part of the community of central bankers at the BIS was another way in which we learnt from the rest of the world. We continue to benefit to this day from the collegial spirit of Basel, working together to craft international standards, and co-operating in cross border supervision. Conclusion 21.