samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The question now is how to sustain and strengthen this new simpler system. I have two answers:  First of all, keeping the spaghetti bowl untangled means global infrastructure. The deep pools of liquidity that make central clearing economical don’t correspond to national borders. Derivatives clearing is a global service. UK CCPs clear global markets for interest rates, foreign exchange, credit default swaps, and commodities. Foreign clearing members make up 63% of the clearing members at  6  Speech by Alex Brazier. How to: MACROPRU. 5 principles for macroprudential policy. 13 February 2017. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  UK CCPs. At the end of 2020 there were £ trillion of derivative contracts between UK CCPs and EU clearing members, and £ trillion between UK CCPs and US clearing members.7  The growth of global infrastructure that spans national borders is a direct result of the reforms we put in place after 2008 – again a feature not a bug. This cross-border nature of clearing means that there must be a consistent approach for the regulation and supervision of cross-border CCPs. The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure, issued in 2012, provide that foundation. It also means that regulators and supervisors must do something difficult and for some, radical: we need to trust each other. This trust should not be blind.

Philipp M Hildebrand: The international monetary system Opening remarks by Mr Philipp M Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the High-Level Conference on the International Monetary System, Zurich, 11 May 2010. * I. *  *  Introduction  Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a pleasure and special privilege to welcome you to this conference on the international monetary system. I am delighted that, together with the IMF, we have succeeded in bringing together such an outstanding group of policy makers and academics. I want to thank you for taking the time to join today’s discussion at this critical juncture for the international monetary system. I am especially grateful that the Managing Director of the IMF is with us today. Dominique, a very warm welcome to you. I know I speak on behalf of everyone here today when I say that we really appreciate your presence. Conferences on the international monetary system are held with great regularity, particularly in the wake of financial crises. It is therefore not surprising that the recent crisis has brought renewed attention to the functioning of the international monetary system. But as Herb Stein noted more than 40 years ago, it is not easy to define the international monetary system. Where does the international monetary system end and domestic economic policy begin? Did the recent crisis have its roots in shortcomings of domestic policies or in shortcomings of the international monetary system?
In Chart 5 (Four-quarter cash flow from borrowing) we measure the amount of borrowing – both mortgage and nonmortgage borrowing – that U.S. households were engaging in over time. Consider that in 2007, households were receiving in aggregate $ billion in cash from borrowing. These funds were available for consumption expenditures or for household investments such as home improvements. However, with their borrowing limits lowered as house values fell and income levels declined, households began to pay down debt rapidly. (Of course, while many households acted to pay down debt, some debt was written off through foreclosures and bankruptcies, and other households were increasing debt by borrowing for home purchases, as normally would be the case. But we exclude those kinds of transactions here.) In sum, however, households in 2010 actively reduced their net indebtedness by $ billion. The reversal in cash available for household expenditures was a massive $ billion over the period from 2007 to 2010. This fact was established by Brown, Haughwout, Lee, and van der Klaauw in our Liberty Street Economics blog in 2011.4 Allow me a brief digression here, because I think it touches on an important point. A lot of people refer to this pay-down of debt as “deleveraging,” but in my view that’s a misuse of the term. Since the distinction is more than just semantic, let me explain what I mean. Financial leverage is usually thought of as a ratio. Consider a typical home purchase with 20 percent down.

This means that, compared with past demand shocks, policy will remain more accommodative for longer, thereby likely muting further the pass-through of any growth-driven exchange rate appreciation. And with the current recovery in the euro area being largely driven by domestic demand, euro strength may also have less of an impact on growth than, for example, after the Great Financial Crisis. All of this suggests, therefore, that monetary policy never acts in isolation on the exchange rate and that, in periods of recovery, the positive confidence and stimulus effects of monetary policy are likely to offset, at least in part, the disinflationary effects of a stronger currency coming from expectations of tighter policy. Of course, this also means that should the contributions of the different shocks driving the exchange rate change over time, then also our assessment of the impact on inflation will have to change – expansion or not. Exogenous shocks to the exchange rate, if persistent, can lead to an unwarranted tightening of financial conditions with undesirable consequences for the inflation outlook. As shown on slide 6, the emerging disconnect between the euro’s exchange rate vis-àvis the US dollar and the long term interest rate differential between the US and Germany may suggest that we are entering such a situation. Against this background, the recent volatility in the exchange rate represents a source of uncertainty which requires monitoring.
Nonetheless, all three of Iceland’s large commercial banks recorded a profit in the fourth quarter of 2007, and they concluded the year with an ample equity position. Banks all over the world have been forced to write off large amounts of money because of their investments in securitised assets related to the US mortgage market. Icelandic banks’ investments in obligations of this sort were small. That being the case, they have had relatively little need for such write-offs – and some had no need whatsoever because they had not invested in securitised assets. Furthermore, it is worth remembering that changes in the share price of Iceland’s banks have not differed markedly from that of banks in other areas of the world. Over the past few years, for example, the share price of Icelandic commercial banks dropped by 7-30%, while various large Nordic banks fell 15-40% and the shares of well-known international banking giants depreciated by margins ranging from 30% to over 50%. The decline is greater if measured against the peak of share prices. Financial companies carry unusual weight in the Icelandic stock exchange’s share price index (OMXI 15) – at present, some two-thirds. No matter where one looks, the price of financial company stock has declined all over the world – in most locations, it has fallen more than that of other companies that constitute equity indices.

The Thai Economy: The Current State and the Way Forward Dr. Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, Governor of the Bank of Thailand Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) Thailand, 15 March 2022  JCC President Kazuo Hidaka, Distinguished members of the JCC, Distinguished guests. It is a great pleasure for me to be here. One of my first speaking engagements when I first took on this job was to come to speak to the JCC last year, a reminder of how quickly time flies as it has already been one year. What I would like to do today is to share with you some thoughts on the Thai economy, discuss where we are, how we got here, and what is next or what we can expect. Then, I would like to conclude by offering you some thoughts about going beyond, not only about some of the things that we see in the financial sector but also more broadly about the Thai economy and how it might fit in with you and your strategy in the region. Part 1: The Current State How we got here Let me start by discussing a few points about where we are today, but before I go there, it is important to talk about how we got to where we are today. The first point is that we were hit very hard by Covid-19, much harder than other countries in the region, because the Thai economy highly depends on tourism.
What the typical student expects from higher education in terms of quality will increase once he or she is contributing to its financing, and higher expectations are known to be one of the drivers of an improvement in standards. Anyone who perceives something sinister in these proposals might look up a recent study by economist Andre Sapir. Using a fairly well-established typology, Sapir grouped the EU15 into four main social models, the Continentals, Nordics, Mediterraneans and the Anglo-Saxons, and then estimated the efficiency and equity of each. He shows that there does not need to be a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Just as importantly, however, he underlines that efficiency is always necessary for sustainability 3 . How do other countries approach this challenge? The experience of Singapore, which is twice as well off as Malta on a per capita GDP basis, is instructive. There, undergraduate education is heavily subsidized by the government, but the remaining cost is borne by the student. The student’s annual contribution ranges from the equivalent of Lm1,300 for an engineering degree to Lm3,800 for a medical degree. There are, however, means for the student to finance this co-payment through borrowing from the Central Provident Fund. This is a social security savings plan funded by contributions from employers and employees, and which go into three accounts. Let me mention two of them. One is the Ordinary Account, which can be drawn upon to pay for the family’s educational expenses, or to buy a house.

Financing the necessary investment So where is the money to be found to promote improved higher education and ICT-related skills, entrepreneurship and innovation, or to be able to offer foreign investors custom-built premises at relatively short notice and of the standard they have come to expect, when almost 80% of recurrent Government expenditure goes on transfer payments and wages? As for the remainder, there is no room for discretionary cuts either: almost 9% represent interest payments on the public debt, and the balance is spent on essential supplies. Since EU funds alone will not be sufficient, the solution must encompass a further contraction of the public sector and a rethinking of the philosophy behind social spending programmes and other transfer payments. Compensation of public sector employees has been stable at 36% of recurrent expenditure. As a proportion of GDP, it peaked at just over 15% in 2004 and is projected to decline to 13% in 2008, reflecting moderate wage increases and a declining workforce. It is important that these trends continue. As for transfer payments, these account for some 40% of total recurrent expenditure. Social spending alone absorbs a third of the total. Growth in this area over time has been driven by the perceived need to preserve the social fabric and by demographic pressures. In the process, however, sight has been lost of the original objective.
If we are to believe the financial industry itself, this possibility has an impact on investment strategies. It cannot be ruled out that because this rule makes it possible to record substantial income flows during cyclical upswings, it has contributed to greater risk-taking by some institutions in order to maintain these income flows year after year. In a more general way, the extension of the scope of application of fair value accounting has very probably, during cyclical upswings, also contributed to many assets being accounted for at market value whereas the intention of market participants to manage these assets on a fair value basis was not clear. My aim here is not to make a judgement about the relative merits of accounting choices. It is to highlight the fact that these choices have implications that go beyond accounting policy. In concrete terms, therefore, the question that we need to ask collectively is: what is the optimum policy response? Do accounting conventions need to be modified? Or can other regulatory frameworks correct these effects? Consistency of valuation rules This leads me to the last point that I would like to an address today: the consistency of rules and practices with respect to valuation. There are currently differences of approach between accounting practices, prudential regulation and risk management practices. It is thus wholly accepted in the financial industry that there is inevitably uncertainty surrounding the valuation of financial instruments, particularly when they are complex or illiquid. In addition, the limitations of mathematical models are recognised.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Big shift – traversing the complexities of a new world Luncheon address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Khazanah Megatrends Forum 2012: “Big shift – traversing the complexities of a new world”, Kuala Lumpur, 2 October 2012. *  *  *  The global economy has now entered into a period of slower economic growth despite the significant and wide ranging pro-growth policies that have been implemented across the world. Why then has the world not been able to achieve a sustained long-lasting recovery? What has been holding back this prospect? In addition, the rapid and significant changes in the global environment have also brought with them new demands and new challenges. Our understanding of the factors that are containing the global growth prospects and the consequence of the new environment will better position us to face the fundamentally new landscape and to manage its consequent challenges. Let me first thank Khazanah for the invitation to speak at this Khazanah Megatrends Forum. The topic on the Big Shift that is being experienced in the world today is indeed highly relevant. While the international and national attention is currently focused on the immediate challenges of the global environment, equally important, however, is to recognise the long-term changes that will reshape our future. The first part of my remarks today will focus on the immediate challenges of the global economy, taking into account the fundamental factors that are likely to affect the growth outlook.
For the international community, these policies provide a clear signal on the country's seriousness about 2050, despite contributing only 0.7% of global GHG emissions. Along the transition journey, there are risks to manage, and opportunities to be seized. Technology is key. So is finance. Your actions and responses are critical. The partnership between you and your clients is critical. Your clients would need the "How" in terms of new forms of financial instruments – transition finance, adaptation finance and blended finance to name a few. For the SMEs, this goes beyond financing. For instance, they need the "How" in terms of where and how to begin greening their operations, tools to help them understand, measure and track their own emissions profiles. I am delighted and encouraged to see the Malaysian ecosystem and accompanying tools continue to mature. The progress thus far is commendable. But, we must not forget the long road ahead and work still to be done to achieve 2050 in an orderly and just manner. The Bank's experience in engaging with multiple stakeholders offers some insights as to the additional elements needed to further propel our transition. Allow me to share these insights to CAP off our discourse today – that is C for Communication, A for Alignment, and P for Proactivity. 1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Communication. The economy's transition doesn't just happen in high powered boardrooms and government offices. It happens in the everyday decisions made by households and small business owners.

That points, I think, to keeping things as straightforward as possible, without glossing over uncertainties and risks. The two threads are intertwined. We have a better chance of keeping inflation expectations anchored to the target if the target is simple to communicate; and if we do not over elaborate, or slip in to being overly ambitious about, our conduct of cyclical policy. BIS Review 46/2006  11
The lesson is that today’s oil price should not be regarded as a forecast of future prices, not even if the level is priced into long-term futures. Substantial uncertainty must be expected. The management of the Petroleum Fund will be part of the State Pension Fund. This essentially involves a name change. The capital will not be earmarked for pension payments. On the other hand, the intention has long been for the capital in the Petroleum Fund to be used as a means of easing the burden in connection with the large pensioner cohorts expected from about 2015. With the assumptions set out in the last national budget, only a share of the rise in pension payments ahead can be financed by an increase in returns on the Fund. The bulk of the increase must be financed by higher ordinary tax revenues. A number of analysts have calculated that with high oil prices the Petroleum Fund will be sufficiently large to finance pension payments. Norges Bank has analysed the uncertainty surrounding such expectations. We have looked at the probability that the capital in the Petroleum Fund will be sufficient by calculating developments in market value and pension payments using a model with uncertainty. We have used Statistics Norway’s projections for pension payments. Standard assumptions concerning uncertainty with respect to returns on the Fund’s investments have been incorporated. The main uncertainty is nevertheless associated with the production volume and prices for oil and gas.

The probability that the cumulative real return over a period of 15 years will be negative would also increase somewhat, although not markedly. I have included this comment because these kinds of assessment are central to the choice of investment strategy for a fund such as the Petroleum Fund. Long-term plan The Petroleum Fund is a very long-term savings plan. The notion of a fund arose in the early 1980s, and the Fund was adopted in 1990 before the government had received any positive net cash flow from petroleum activities. Up to 1995, government investments in petroleum activities were so large that all the revenues were used for investment and to cover budget deficits during the recession around 1990. Now we have ten years of a rapidly expanding Fund behind us. Ahead of us, we still have at least 50 years, and perhaps more, where the Petroleum Fund or the Pension Fund will, I hope and believe, be an important part of the Norwegian economy. Every year,  10  The calculations are based on the market assumptions that formed the basis of our most recent review of the investment strategy for the Petroleum Fund. 7/8  the Storting will have to decide the scale of petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget. There is a long time ahead before the savings plan has been carried through. 8/8
Only then can they effectively perform their critical financial intermediation role in funneling funds from savers to borrowers, and in helping firms and households manage their finances and risk exposure. As I see it, incentives drive behavior, and behavior establishes the social norms that define culture. This means that bank leaders need to take a close look at the incentives they put in place with respect to compensation and promotion in particular. In addition, bank leaders must foster an atmosphere that encourages people to speak up when they witness questionable behavior. Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, highlighted the importance of getting people to speak up when he spoke at the New York Fed’s conference on bank culture in October. He argued—and I agree—that big problems can be nipped in the bud when people speak up and senior management responds appropriately. Therefore, bank leaders ought to recognize and reward those who speak up. Actions speak louder than words in shaping culture. Establishing appropriate incentives and fostering an environment in which people feel they can speak up would go a long way toward bolstering bank culture. I am gratified that many bank leaders and boards of directors are working hard to improve their firms’ cultures, and I very much appreciate the G30’s efforts in this area. I think most leaders recognize that good culture is fully consistent with strong financial performance, and that it helps enable banks to attract the talent needed to sustain such performance.

Yet, we could make greater progress more quickly if this effort were coordinated across the industry. I think bank leaders could benefit from sharing best practices and participating in surveys that would allow them to benchmark their strengths and weaknesses versus others on an ongoing basis. Building a financial system that is more resilient and robust, having a bank resolution regime that credibly ends “too big to fail,” and building strong cultures that restore the trustworthiness of the financial industry are all goals we must continue to pursue. Without success on all three fronts, I don’t think we can say that we have fully addressed the problems made evident by the financial crisis. Thank you for your kind attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches