samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, a major critique of utilitarian ethics is that it ignores the interests of the minority in favour of the majority, downplays the importance of family and society over individualism and strangers, and prioritises aggregate benefits over other ethical principles such as justice or equality. One could thus argue that the Maqasid Shariah, which underpins the foundation of Islamic Finance and the Islamic Economy, has a more holistic perspective on the pursuit of public interests, in that it aims to leave no one behind in pursuit of prosperity while building a cohesive society. In Malaysia, Islamic financial institutions are leading the sustainability agenda and spearheading 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  sustainable finance through the adoption of value-based intermediation (VBI) initiatives. VBI is the vehicle to transform the industry, from one focused on profits and shariah compliance to one that is also focused on positive impact. Through VBI, Islamic finance will bring various stakeholders together to advance the sustainability agenda, encouraging Islamic financial institutions to assess how they create value and impact, particularly in response to changing economic, social and environmental conditions. This will support the socioeconomic development in line with Malaysia’s long-term agenda of economic growth and shared prosperity for all. The commitment by the Islamic finacial institutions has been encouraging.

For example, reduction in fossil fuel use may lead to significant trade-offs with growth and poverty reduction objectives, particularly in the short to medium-term. Targetting sustainable growth and development amidst capacity and funding constraints can thus present significant challenges for political leadership, economic priorities and social outcomes. In this context, given the higher cost of transition, the country may need a longer time to transition towards more sustainable growth policies. This may however result in delayed actions which would heighten physical risks. For the Bank, given the importance of financial inclusion, this could also involve placing different priorities on the impact of climate change in different community segments and to tailor interventions that are appropriate and relevant to provide effective financial protection, particularly to vulnerable segments. A corollary of our pursuit towards a more sustainable, greener economy, would also be that some segments of the economy may face declining demand, big shifts in asset values or higher costs of doing business. “Brown assets” or non-sustainable assets such as fossil fuel reserves for example would potentially become “stranded assets”, which has implications on the value of investments in energy companies, particularly those dealing with oil, gas and coal. Globally, it is 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  estimated that more than 80% of the known coal deposits, 50% of gas, and one third of the oil reserves cannot be used for energy production if global warming is to be kept below 2°C .
For example, the recent crisis drew the attention to the banking industry, many times blamed to have caused the global turmoil. There is no use repeating now how guilty the banks are, that is, the well-known sequence of events: the “sub-prime” lending, the “toxic” assets, the need to bail out banks and the subsequent economic and fiscal dimensions of the crisis. However, we should not turn a blind eye to the root cause: the role of politics and politicians. What about the call for “affordable housing” which was dominating the political ideology in the last two decades in the US (and not only there)? What about the related environment of low policy rates, coupled with the failure of regulators to identify and control systemic risks? Was that not really at the root of the asset bubbles and risky behaviour of the banks? We all know the answers. The “greedy” bankers are not the only ones to blame. Learning from emerging Europe At least, that is the story in the “advanced” countries. We should bear in mind that no shocks came from the so-called “periphery” of the euro area and emerging Europe. Rather, the crisis set in with the failure of financial markets and institutions in countries where they had supposedly been best regulated, most experienced and of highest liquidity. Being part of the global markets, the countries of emerging Europe became also part of the crisis. From today’s perspective, they could serve as a good example of mitigating and weathering the crisis.

Now it’s hard to say how much weight to put on that because historically consumer confidence goes up and down, and it doesn’t just necessarily feed into consumer spending. But the increase in business confidence is quite striking, especially for smaller businesses. And so one of the big open questions that we’re going to be assessing over the next few months is: is that improvement in animal spirits, so to speak, going to actually feed through and lead to more spending? So, I think where a year or two ago, I think our anxieties were more about the risks to growth to the downside, so as that – well, a year ago, we were worried about events in China, we were worried about uncertainties about Europe. I think now the balance of risk is gradually shifting, where the possibility is that growth could actually be stronger than expected, rather than weaker than expected. The markets expect fiscal stimulus out of this Administration. That’s another factor that probably will over time tilt the equation more to the upside. But on fiscal policy, it’s really hard to factor into your forecast at this point because we don’t know what it is, how big it is, or when it will happen. Other than that, we have it completely nailed down. So, it’s really hard to sort of put that into your forecast. And so the way I think about the fiscal policy outlook is that we’re probably going to get some fiscal stimulus at some point.
During the four euro area business cycle expansions since 1970, there have been 50 soft patches – defined as a two-quarter growth slowdown – and only 4 recessions.4 In fact, the euro area faced an analogous situation in 2016, when the economy also went through a soft patch triggered by a contraction in world trade. At that time, the strength of the domestic economy was able to shield the recovery from external uncertainties. The key question is whether, with monetary policy continuing to support the expansion, domestic 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  demand will remain as resilient today. The demand component typically affected most by a weaker global environment is investment. ECB internal analysis shows that the more exposed euro area listed firms are to foreign markets, the more sensitive they are to uncertainty when making their investment decisions. And there are some signs that external demand may be affecting investment via manufacturing value chains within the euro area. In particular, both extra and intra-euro area trade slowed steeply last year, whereas in 2016 intraeuro area trade was robust to the external slowdown. Such a recoupling of intra- and extra-euro area trade growth in a downward direction has not occurred since the start of the global financial crisis. Intra-euro area exports of intermediate and capital goods were hit particularly hard, with capital goods exports registering their strongest contraction since the sovereign debt crisis. A further rise in global uncertainty could therefore lead to a deceleration in trade and investment.

This has been reflected, since late summer 2017, in a growing discrepancy between the growth of the GDP deflator and core inflation. The GDP deflator has followed a more pronounced upward trend, rising from 0.6% at the end of 2016 to 1.5% at the end of 2018. One development that may have contributed to lower imported inflation was the appreciation of the euro exchange rate by around 8% in nominal effective terms over the last two years. ECB internal analysis suggests that this had an impact on non-energy industrial goods inflation in 2018, especially for durable goods.15 The upshot is that the pass-through of wages to prices is likely to be moderate until these various factors have played out. But there are several reasons to believe that they will unwind over the medium term. Our monetary policy will remain accommodative and will respond to any changes in the inflation outlook. The effects of exchange rate appreciation have now reversed. Demand should recover, so long as the downside risks to our outlook do not materialise. And with stronger demand, firms should be able to rebuild margins. Moreover, even if the economy were to slow more than expected, the risks to wage growth may be contained. Since the end of 2017, wage growth has been driven less by wage drift16 and more by negotiated wages, which are more persistent and react more slowly to cyclical labour market conditions. Negotiated wages for 2019 have to a substantial degree already been set by previous negotiating rounds.
GDP per capita and labour productivity in Sweden and abroad 1(a ) GDP per capi ta  1(b) La bour productivi ty  110  110  105  105  100  100  95  95  90  90  85  85  80  80  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  00  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  Note. Index, 2007 = 100. Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Consensus Bureau, Conference Board, Eurostat, Japanese Ca bi net Office, Ja panese Statistics Bureau, Office for National Statistics, Statistics Sweden and Sta ti stics Ca nada  The long recovery after the crisis is also reflected in the fact interest rates in many countries are still very low. Central banks reacted quickly when the crisis broke out and cut policy rates to close to zero to avoid a further deepening of the crisis (see Figure 2(a)). Inflation also fell sharply in many countries (see Figure 2(b)). This was partly because the price of oil fell heavily and inflation recovered relatively quickly to begin with. But since then, it has remained at levels some way below many central bank targets. Figure 2.

We have strong economic activity at the same time as monetary policy continues to be expansionary. Inflation has been below target for a longer period, but is now rising and approaching 2 per cent. The expansionary monetary policy is necessary for inflation to stabilise at 2 per cent. Despite the difficulties encountered in recent years in bringing inflation up, I think that flexible inflation targeting, on the whole, works well. But monetary policy cannot, by itself, solve all the economic problems Sweden and the rest of the world are struggling with. Real interest rates have fallen for a long time in the rest of the world and in Sweden. It is also likely that interest rates will remain low in the period ahead. This may make it more difficult to stimulate the economy with interest rate cuts when economic activity becomes weaker and inflation is below target. In such a case, it could be necessary, both for the Riksbank and other policy areas, to implement other measures. When the interest rate has been low for a longer period, it also entails increased risks for the financial system and financial stability. Stability is a condition for both monetary policy and fiscal policy to succeed. The free movement of capital and 20 [23]  the rapid financial development have led to increased capital flows that affect asset prices, indebtedness and exchange rates. And this limits monetary policy’s degree of freedom, above all in smaller economies such as ours.
15  Figure 7 Parities with the US dollar  Real exchange rate (3)  (change accumulated since 29 May 2017, percentage points  2  (índice 1986=100)  2  120  0  110  110  -2  -2 100  100  -4  -4  90  -6  80  90 Spot (09/06) 80  -8  70  70  Latin America (1)  0  120  2002-2016 avg 1997-2016 avg  TCR  Chile  Commodities currencies (2)  -6  -8 05-17 06-17 07-17 07-17 08-17  89 93 97 01 05 09 13 17  (1) Includes Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. (2) Includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. (3) Preliminary estimates for August 2017. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. Figure 8 China: Indicators by sector (*) (annual change, percent)  25  30 Railroad freight traffic (right axis)  Retail sales  20  Electric power production  15  20 10  10  0  5  Manufacturing output  0  -10 -20  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  (*) Quarterly series. Source: Bloomberg. 16  Table 1 International scenario 2016  2017 (f) Jun.17 Report  Terms of trade Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP World GDP at market exchange rates United States China Eurozone Latin America (excl.

In this new scheme, meetings will be held roughly every six to eight weeks, in January, March, May, June, August, September, October and December of each year. In addition, the meeting will be extended from one day to one day and a half, starting the afternoon before the day of the policy decision announcement, thus giving the Board more time to discuss the background information and analyze the monetary policy options. This will give more time to gather information between meetings and to evaluate the impact of the different economic indicators on the baseline scenario, allowing for a more robust analysis of the recent evolution of the economy. The communication and the minutes of the Meetings is also being changed, in the sense of backing the decision having more information at hand than we currently do. Thus, the press release will be extended to include the main antecedents of the recent behavior of the economy, the grounds on which the Board based the decision and the voting. The minutes, meanwhile, following a usual practice in inflation-targeting central banks, will  10  provide additional information on the Board's discussion, which may be useful for the public to better understand its decisions and future implications. In addition, we have decided to publish the transcripts of the Monetary Policy Meetings with a ten-year lag. They contain information of the topics analyzed and opinions expressed by the participants, identifying who opined what. Disclosing them fulfills several objectives.
12  applied when the recovery takes hold, is also key in order to foster the credibility of economic policy. In this context, in the prudential area, the recommendation by the European Systemic Risk Board, the European Central Bank and national authorities to limit dividend distribution will not foreseeably be extended beyond September 2021, providing there is no further worsening in economic and financial conditions. In any event, institutions must continue with their policy of anticipating the recognition of credit losses, ensuring appropriate and timely recognition in keeping with supervisory guidance. This would guarantee a reliable and prompt diagnosis of the situation at all times, enabling institutions to continue to fulfil their role of providing financing to households and firms. At the current juncture, authorities should continue to closely supervise the sufficiency of the provisions made and to monitor credit quality. Second, banks should continue to be permitted to use their capital buffers so as to maintain the flow of credit to economic activity in this initial period of recovery. Banks should also have sufficient time to restore any capital buffers used during this period. Third, to address the challenge of low profitability, it is essential that banks continue to make efficiency gains by cutting costs and making more intensive use of new technologies. To enhance their efficiency, banks should make optimal use of the information they hold. This requires significant investment in digitalisation and also the incorporation of new data processing technologies to allow them to change their business model while controlling their risk profile.

Today, I will focus on one of the most discussed elements of the monetary policy response, our interventions in the foreign exchange market. Before doing so, I would like to stress a key element of the Swiss financial market structure that has shown particular resilience and has helped to provide appropriate financial conditions throughout the crisis in the Swiss economy: the Swiss franc repo market. The good performance of this market is closely related to another element of the SNB’s policy that has drawn public attention, and even criticism – our collateral policy. 1  During the recession of 1974–1976, real output in Switzerland fell by more than 10%. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I. An important feature of the Swiss money market: the SNB’s collateral policy  A plausible and popular diagnosis for the recent financial crisis is that it started with a bank run.
The creation of investor relations programmes and the regular briefing of creditors about developments in economic policy can play a role in providing the information which the market requires to assess the riskiness of sovereign loans. It is never too early to build a relationship with actual or potential creditors. The IMF, in collaboration with the private sector, have recently drawn up a set of guidelines that countries might usefully follow when setting up an investor relations programme. The second aspect of relationships with creditors is the insertion of collective action clauses in sovereign debt contracts. This proposal, advanced originally in a G10 Deputies' report in 1996, has gradually become accepted as a sensible step forward. The UK has introduced collective action clauses into its foreign currency debt instruments. And just last month, the G7 Finance Ministers agreed on the importance of introducing collective action clauses into debt contracts to facilitate crisis management. Again, time may be on the side of reform. 4. Fourth, in the long run, the best way to avoid the problem of liquidity crises is for the composition of capital flows to emerging markets to move away from debt, both bank and bond, finance towards portfolio equity and direct investment. Shocks to the borrowing country would take the form of a fall in equity prices, not a liquidity run with its associated risk of a financial crisis and the need for external finance. Encouragingly, the pattern of capital flows to emerging markets is already evolving in that direction.

The vulnerability of countries to financial crises when private capital is freely mobile was uppermost in the mind of officials then, and has recently returned to prominence in the wake of recent crises. Capital flows do, however, bring real economic benefits. They enable savings from around the world to move to those countries with the most profitable investment opportunities, benefiting lenders and borrowers alike. And such capital flows also transfer knowledge and expertise. The most important task of any financial system is to guide the allocation of scarce capital. As Larry Summers, the former US Treasury Secretary, said earlier this year, "If you are looking for reasons why some countries succeed and why other countries do not succeed in the new global economy, a very large part of it goes to the greater success of the successful countries in channelling capital into the right places, and then making sure that it is used in a disciplined way." At Bretton Woods it was thought that post-war reconstruction could be financed by capital provided by the new World Bank, the twin of the International Monetary Fund. Hence it would be possible to finance reconstruction from long-term investment supplied by official institutions, without the necessity of allowing free movement of private capital that might raise the problem of the "impossible trinity". Soon, however, the demand for capital imports exceeded the ability of international institutions to supply loans. Private capital markets came into their own.
All societies, whether open or closed, must find ways of ensuring that people are not excluded when technological progress makes old industries unprofitable. All societies also have a responsibility for production and consumption not having too great an impact on the environment since the welfare and health of future generations will otherwise be imperilled. We must be clear that development and collaboration are good. Almost everyone, including many of the poor in the world, has experienced great improvements in the past decades. In many respects, it is exactly the increased contacts and trade between countries that has contributed to it being possible to solve the problems that I have just mentioned. Growth in the industrialised countries has led to us being able to afford to conserve our environment, which most poor countries cannot afford to do. To reverse the trend - to attempt to isolate countries from one another - is not the way forward. Globalisation makes new demands I will now make some remarks on challanges specifically related to globalisation. Like all other development, globalisation is not without problems. These were clearly expressed in the severe economic crises that we have seen in recent years - in Mexico in 1994-95, in South-East Asia in 1997-98, in Russia in 1998 and in Brazil in 1999. These crises illustrate that increased trade and financial flows makes new demands public policy. Firstly, requirements increase on the national institutional settings - on laws, authorities and practices.

Meanwhile, depreciation of the Turkish lira due to excessive volatility observed in international markets in May and June, led to hikes in the prices of petroleum products, consumer durables and the prices of goods that are set in terms of foreign currencies and prices of imported goods. One of the sub-groups that are most severely affected by this situation is the transportation group. Petroleum products prices, which are registered under the transportation group, increased by 5.9 percent and 3.3 percent in June and July, respectively. Meanwhile, automobile prices registered under the same group increased by 10 percent in April-June 2006. Prices of processed food products, which displayed a limited rise in the  2  BIS Review 89/2006  first six months of the year, displayed a higher rate of increase in July due to the lagged effects of the fluctuations in exchange rates. The contribution of the depreciation of Turkish lira to consumer inflation in the May-June period reached 1.5 percentage points. When we analyze inflation under two groups as goods and services, it is observed that inflation in the services group has decreased throughout 2006 compared to the same period last year, however especially due to the high rates of increase in house rents and restaurant-hotel prices, annual inflation in the services group became 11.7 percent annually as of July and maintained its high level. The 20.5percent rise in house rents is remarkable in this group.