samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As you know, on 4 November the first pillar of the Banking Union project, namely the Single Supervisory Mechanism, came into being. The Single Supervisory Mechanism aims to harmonise banking supervision in the euro area so as, among other things, to sever the negative link between confidence in banks and doubts over the sustainability of public finances. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Intense work was needed to implement the new supervisory system. Milestones included the completion of the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation in October 2013; the approval of another regulation assigning responsibilities to the European Central Bank and national authorities; and the drafting of a supervisory manual setting out the best supervisory practices of each country and implementing common procedures for all members of the system. One of the main objectives of the new institutional design is to ensure that the ECB’s supervisory functions do not clash with its monetary policy responsibilities. To this end, a new Supervisory Board was set up in the ECB to plan and conduct banking supervision. This Board will be responsible for making proposals on supervision to the Governing Council, which continues to be the highest decision-making body of the ECB in both monetary policy and supervision. The start-up of the SSM constitutes an unprecedented transformation of the responsibilities of the participating national supervisory authorities, which naturally include the Banco de España. The Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation distinguishes two groups of banks.

As shown in Chart 3, 2008 stands out as one of the worst years in this period. Ten years ago, on 25 November 2008, Norges Bank presented the GPFG’s results for the third quarter. Lehman Brothers had gone bankrupt. The world’s central banks were making large and frequent cuts in policy rates. In the course of autumn 2008, the US stock exchange fell more than five percent on as many as ten separate days. Norges Bank wrote in its press release that “The third quarter of 2008 was an unusually demanding quarter for the management of the Government Pension Fund – Global.” And it was to get worse. The GPFG posted a return for 2008 of minus 23 percent, measured in terms of the fund’s currency basket. Chart 4: Post-crisis paths have differed Chart 4 shows developments in the US equity market from 2008 onwards. The rapid reversal in equity markets, shown in the chart, also affected the GPFG’s results. In 2009, the fund posted a positive return of 26 percent, largely thanks to a 34 percent return on the equity portfolio. The return continued to rise in 2010. While the fall in the fund’s value as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 was historically large, the fund’s recovery in 2009 was stronger and faster than had generally been expected. Owing to a weakened krone, the GPFG’s return was less negative in terms of NOK than in terms of the fund’s currency basket.
Spain's per capita income today stands 17% below that of the euro area, a gap that is 4 pp narrower than was the case in 1978, but 8 pp wider than in 2005. Behind this persistent negative gap lie two well-known shortcomings in the Spanish economy: low productivity and a low rate of employment, which have moreover historically been negatively correlated. 1  Today, if I may, I will focus on the first of these factors, since productivity is the only failsafe means of improving living standards.1 What's more, our low productivity issues are very closely related to some of the weaknesses of our labour market, which, in turn, condition our ability to converge in terms of the employment rate. Second, it is well worth stressing that the convergence of the Spanish economy should be sustainable over time. With this in mind, it must be acknowledged that some of our economic problems these past few decades have stemmed from a failure to understand the obligations and restrictions that come with forming part of the European integration process and, in particular, of the euro area. This led, for instance, to the build-up of serious financial imbalances after joining the euro, which meant that our economy was particularly hard hit during the global financial crisis. Since the outbreak of that crisis, the Spanish economy has displayed a healthier pattern of growth that has, in fact, partly corrected the imbalances built up over the previous upswing.

At the end of April, the daily turnover of RMB foreign exchange transactions in Hong Kong had reached $ billion equivalent, more than eight times greater than five years ago. The average daily turnover of Hong Kong’s RMB Real Time Gross Settlement system also exceeded RMB1 trillion recently. Going forward, we should see more products denominated in RMB. This is an area where market participants can play their part and why we also think seminars like this are important in bringing together ideas and looking at solutions. Building market infrastructure The HKMA has played a major role in promoting market development, with our strategy focusing on strengthening market infrastructure to support offshore RMB business. Indeed, liquidity is the linchpin in growing this offshore business and the HKMA has in place a RMB400 billion currency swap agreement with the People’s Bank of China which can be activated when market conditions warrant. In addition, we have made available an RMB liquidity facility to banks which is currently offering intraday repos of up to RMB10 billion, as well as overnight funds on T+0 basis and one-day and one-week funds settled on T+1 basis. We have also appointed seven banks as Primary Liquidity Providers (PLPs) and provided each with a bilateral repo facility of up to RMB2 billion. These facilities have helped banks to better manage their RMB liquidity and played a significant role in offshore market development. These facilities will be reviewed from time to time with the aim of providing better liquidity support to the offshore RMB market.
Second, when interest rates are at the zero lower bound, the risks of tightening a bit too early are likely to be considerably greater than the risks of tightening a bit too late. A premature tightening might lead to financial conditions that are too restrictive, resulting in a weaker economy and, in turn, an aborted lift-off. This would be problematic in that it would harm the Fed’s credibility and, more importantly, would be difficult to rectify. The U.S. experience during the Great Depression and the Japanese experience over the past two decades illustrate the risks of raising interest rates too soon, especially when inflation is running below the central bank’s objective. Finally, given the still high level of long-term unemployment and the outlook for inflation, there could be a significant benefit to allowing the economy to run “slightly hot” for a while in order to get those that have been unemployed for a long time working again. I believe this can be done without jeopardizing our price stability objective. If the long-term unemployed are not employed relatively soon, their job skills will erode further, reducing their long-term prospects for employment and, therefore, the productive capacity of the U.S. economy. This would be a very unfortunate outcome for them, their families and the country. Market expectations that lift-off will occur around mid-2015 seem reasonable to me.

Mortgage lenders continue to be extremely risk averse in extending new credit, and mortgage availability to those with lower credit scores is still significantly constrained. I don’t anticipate that this situation will change in a material way any time soon. Second, because motor vehicle sales are now close to their pre-recession levels, the future growth impetus from this cyclical sector will likely also be restrained going forward. Third, growth in the rest of the world has slowed slightly and the dollar has appreciated somewhat. This will limit the growth in U.S. exports, and suggests that the trade sector is unlikely to provide much support to growth over the next year or two. Inflation: lower now, but likely to drift gradually higher next year Let me now turn to discuss the inflation outlook. Inflation has been running below the Federal Reserve’s objective of a 2 percent annualized rate for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) deflator. For example, over the past twelve months, the overall PCE deflator has risen by 1.4 percent, and the core PCE deflator, which excludes food and energy, has increased by 1.6 percent. Recently, the overall index has been pulled down by sharply lower oil and gasoline prices. Also, I expect that core goods prices will be held down somewhat over the near-term by the recent appreciation of the U.S. dollar. Nevertheless, I expect inflation will begin to move back towards our 2 percent objective in 2015.
Since its inception, this platform has successfully helped to support action that led to the prosecution and deportation of individuals with suspected involvement in terrorism financing and proliferation financing. We will continue to leverage on MyFINet to facilitate information sharing on latest trends and typologies of modern-day scams, so that we can learn from each other. In addition, Bank Negara Malaysia will also work with the financial industry and law enforcement agencies to explore other arrangements for exchanging information on scams with foreign authorities, including foreign financial intelligence units, given increasingly complex networks of financial crimes. After all, cybercrime knows no borders. While I have focused much on fraud, we must remember that crimes tend to be interconnected. As such, we should be just as diligent and vigilant in our efforts to combat all crimes, particularly high-risk crimes identified in NRA 2020 such as corruption, organised crimes and illicit drug trafficking. Not forgetting also, environmental crimes involving illegal importation of plastic waste and illegal waste dumping that contributes to climate change risks have been rising. As professionals in your respective fields, it is imperative for us to be aware of these risks as we continue to strengthen our individual and collective response to such risks. With this in mind, I urge all of you to remember: we have done much in the past but we cannot let our guard down. As the conference theme rightly highlights, we are now at a new frontier of compliance. The fight against financial crimes is one fought on multiple fronts.

Warwick Economics Summit – 4 February 2022 Twenty years later… and twenty years ahead  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr)  Page 1 sur 9 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you today, though I would have preferred to actually come to Warwick and your world-renowned University. And I am deeply honoured to offer today, with this speech, the very first of the Persaud Lectures, launched this year by Professor Avinash Persaud – none other than the son of Professor the Honourable Bishdonat Persaud. I borrowed my title from the famous French writer Alexandre Dumas: Twenty Years Later was his sequel to the Three Musketeers. January 1st marked 20 years since the introduction of the euro as cash. And if central banking isn’t quite as much fun as the tales of d’Artagnan and his friends, our young currency has had a few adventures and it is worth drawing some lessons from them. I will then turn to the next twenty years and the two main transformations facing Europe. Before I plunge into this longer view, allow me to say a few words about the European Central Bank’s latest monetary policy decision as set out by ECB President Christine Lagarde. Yesterday, in the face of increasing uncertainty on inflation, our key word was « more than ever » optionality.
the inflation targeting regime is flexible. The third and final, criterion states that monetary policy should be robust. The interest rate should be set in order to mitigate the risk of a buildup of financial imbalances, and so that acceptable developments in inflation and output are likely also under alternative assumptions about the functioning of the economy. The various considerations taken into account in the criteria must be weighed against each other. At our most recent interest rate meeting the key policy rate was reduced by 0.25 percentage point to 1.50 percent. In its assessment, the Executive Board stated that “...weak growth prospects abroad and the strong krone are contributing to keeping inflation low and dampening economic growth in Norway (...). If the interest rate is set too high, the krone may appreciate further, inflation may continue to fall and growth in output and employment may become too low. This suggests that the key policy rate should be reduced further. On the other hand, there is virtually normal capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy. Moreover, low interest rates over time may induce households and enterprises to take excessive risks and accumulate excessive debt.” By taking account of the deviation in the nominal interest rate from a normal level when setting the key policy rate, Norges Bank seeks to counter the buildup of financial imbalances that may disturb activity and inflation further ahead. This does not mean that the level of the key policy rate is an independent objective in its own right.

Rather, the purpose is to overcome weaknesses in our analytical tools related to the possible buildup of financial imbalances resulting from keeping interest rates low over time. Monetary policy will continue to react to shocks that affect the medium term path for inflation, output and employment. After a decade of learning, inflation targeting has become more flexible. Flexibility is good to have, and easy to lose. The inflation target has to be reached over time, otherwise our credibility is put at risk. In assessing various considerations, monetary policy must be geared to meeting its primary objective of low and stable inflation. There are limits as to how many goals monetary policy can meet. Other instruments must be used to attain other objectives. To ensure that new or further financial imbalances do not build up we also need a tighter international overarching policy framework to address the stability of the financial system as a whole. A macroprudential policy framework should be part of this new framework. Macroprudential policy framework Financial market participants can trigger self-reinforcing economic fluctuations. Individual banks and investors do not necessarily take into account the overall risk in the financial system. The consequences became clear during the financial crisis: banks had inadequate equity capital, relied excessively on short-term wholesale funding and had insufficient buffers of liquid assets. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The new international regulatory framework is intended to remedy this situation.
2.3 Technological innovation Lastly, and as I said at the start of my address, I wish to focus on the challenge posed by technology and the changes it may bring in the banking sector. We unquestionably face a situation in which digital innovation is transforming traditional banking. This transformation is already apparent in our ability to communicate with banks without having to go to a branch, in the constant supply of new products and services, in the new ways that data can be used or in the improvement of market systems and infrastructures allowing instantaneous execution of transactions which previously took several days. Further, technological innovation is giving rise to the penetration of some areas of banking by new firms known as “fintechs”, which provide financial services under a wide range of business models. The implications of this technological revolution are complex and varied both for the banking sector and for regulators and supervisors, and must be analysed with caution taking into account the particularities of the banking sector and avoiding oversimplification. For example the use of technology for high-speed analysis of a large volume of heterogeneous data – known as “big data” – may have multiple applications in banking. Banks have a large amount of diverse information on their customers. Careful analysis of this information may give banks a better knowledge of their customers’ behaviour and enable them to refine their products by fine-tuning them to the particular needs and risk profile of each customer.

Matters such as the privacy of personal information, security, the risk of cyberattacks or even the risk of exclusion, must 6/8  be monitored and, where appropriate, duly regulated. Regulation has to achieve a balance, protecting financial stability and confidence in the system, without unjustifiably hindering the exploitation of these technological innovations by industry and society in general. It is still too soon to gauge the impact of the technological revolution on the traditional banking sector. I believe that technological innovations will complement traditional banking activities, but to achieve this banks must be sufficiently flexible and dynamic to reap the benefits of technological innovation. There is no question that innovation is also favouring the proliferation of new fintech firms, of highly varying profiles and business models, which may conceivably compete with traditional banks in a specific part of the banking value chain, but are more likely to engage in new ancillary services. One example is joint financing through online platforms, known as “crowdfunding”. It is an alternative source of financing which may offer certain improvements over traditional banking in terms of convenience, speed and cost. But risks have also been identified, such as a potential increase in fraud or greater weaknesses in terms of investor confidence. There is a well-known case of a Swedish P2P platform which went bankrupt late last year after the detection of malpractices in credit extension, prompting a fall in the activity of the sector and closer regulatory attention.
One may have expected that gap to close rapidly. Even today, however, only around four-fifths of small firms have a website. E-commerce is another technology that has arguably been surprisingly slow to propagate through the UK economy. In 2016, over 80% of UK individuals ordered goods or services online, more than any other OECD country. One may have expected that to have been mirrored by a large share of UK businesses selling online. In practice, the UK is only marginally above the OECD average. And between 2009 and 2016, the share of UK businesses making e-commerce sales increased by only 6pp, from 17% to 23%. 71  Swinney (2018), Giles (2018). Schneider (2018). Haldane (2017), Jacobs et al (2017), Swinney (2018), for instance. 74 OECD data. 72 73  20  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  20  If the story, then, is one of diffusion dynamics being more sluggish in the UK than elsewhere, what might be done to improve matters? Institutions, and within that universities, may well have a role to play. At present, a relatively small sub-set of the UK’s universities operate as innovation hubs. They conduct world-leading research using world-leading researchers. And, in an increasing number of cases, they are doing so in tandem with businesses in spin-off science parks, acting as incubators of innovation.

There is at present a long list of reform agenda items being debated internationally: these include strengthening financial institutions by requiring them to hold more capital and liquidity; changing compensation practices to discourage excessive risk taking by bankers and reforming regulatory structures to ensure more effective supervision, especially of large and complex firms that have systemic implications. 5. It is therefore very timely today that we have five very distinguished speakers joining this Panel to share with us their insights into this complex and important question of how we should go about reforming the international financial architecture and regulatory regimes in different jurisdictions. They are, by order of their appearance in the programme: (i)  Mr Rintaro Tamaki, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs of Japan;  (ii)  Dr Jong-Goo Yi, Standing Commissioner of the Financial Services Commission of Korea;  (iii)  The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Financial Services of Australia;  BIS Review 7/2010  1  (iv)  The Honourable Mr Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah, Minister of Finance Two of Malaysia; and  (v)  Professor KC Chan, Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, HKSAR. I understand from the organiser that we will invite Professor Chan to speak first as he may need to leave earlier for the Legislative Council meeting. The order of other speakers will follow the programme. Professor Chan, please. 2  BIS Review 7/2010
Financial literacy, the Cyprus perspective and the role of the Central Bank of Cyprus In December 2020, an ad-hoc Committee was established in Cyprus with the aim of formulating a National Strategy for the promotion of financial literacy and financial education in the country. The CBC has coordinated the work of the ad-hoc Committee, which consists of members from the CBC, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education, Sport and Youth, the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission and two academic experts from the two public universities in Cyprus. The Committee was also supported by a Secretariat from the CBC and external scientific collaborators, all of whom are here with us today. The formulation of the National Strategy drew heavily from the results of the CBC survey on financial literacy. A key finding of the survey was that the average financial knowledge score in Cyprus is below the minimum level considered by the OECD as sufficient for someone to be counted as financially literate. The results of the survey also indicate specific population groups, which are in greater need for financial education such as the young, the unemployed, women, low income and lower  2/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  education citizens, and individuals who did not take economics courses during secondary education. They also indicate specific domains where lack of financial knowledge is evident, namely, interest compounding and diversification.

Lately, the “dark side” of financial integration has increasingly come into focus. The global financial crisis was a vivid demonstration of what happens when the system flips over from stable to instability. And the prescribed treatment has created increasingly serious side-effects ever since. With monetary policy in advanced economies having been kept at ultra loose levels for over 5 years and still further unconventional monetary stimulus being embarked upon in some cases, the repercussions on the rest of the world are testing the limits of macroeconomic management, especially for emerging market countries. Large capital inflows have lowered long-term yields and compressed risk spreads across a wide range of asset classes, contributing to increased risk-taking. The marked rise in the co-movement of asset prices across countries, particularly in bond yields, is making it harder for policies to achieve desired financial conditions domestically. At the same time, upward pressure on exchange rates risks undermining export competitiveness, complicating the trade-offs between macroeconomic stabilization and financial stability. And should inflows reverse abruptly, the resulting asset price and exchange rate swings could induce broad contagion effects that prove disruptive to economic activity. In all this, the underlying concern is that integration has amplified the vulnerability of domestic financial conditions to external shocks, while limiting the effectiveness of the tools that policymakers have for addressing those shocks. This is not solely an emerging market problem. Indeed, the degree of co-movement in bond yields appears to be even stronger for advanced economies.