samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And one in five trans people would not report transphobic bullying in the workplace. Employers need to adopt a zero tolerance policy for bullying and harassment and they need to encourage reporting of incidents. This needs to include ways to call out bad behaviour as well as clear processes for reporting and dealing with incidents. In addressing these issues, we can also benefit from our experiences with gender and ethnic diversity. One of the major lessons we have learned from promoting gender diversity is the need for visible support by senior leadership. That means empowered employee networks with executive sponsors. But it also needs a wide range of senior management to participate in and lead LGBT+ events and initiatives, within their own organisation and externally. Visible buy-in from the top is necessary for change to permeate and catalyse a cultural shift. We also need to raise awareness amongst staff and managers on LGBT+ issues. This is especially important as the concerns of the community may not be familiar to those outside it. A more informed workforce will inevitably be more understanding and inclusive. Finally, we need to track our progress. That means finding ways to encourage colleagues to disclose by handling data sensitively and explaining why it is needed in the first place. Our commitment - an ‘out and proud’ charter  Building on our experience with gender and ethnicity, we see the value in making a formal commitment to supporting LGBT+ colleagues that will drive change through our organisation.

And to offer a very practical suggestion as to how each of you might be able to do more in your organisations too. Why diversity and inclusion matters The Bank’s approach is to consider all aspects of diversity as part of a broad strategy to deliver an inclusive working environment for all our colleagues. And I can tell you from speaking with senior leaders throughout the City that diversity and inclusion are no longer seen as HR buzzwords, but as critical ingredients to running a successful organisation. A workforce that lacks diversity will never be as effective as it could be. That should be obvious. If we look the same, think the same, and come from the same backgrounds, then we are bound to make the same mistakes. Strangely enough, I have found an analogy to this issue in my day job as the supervisor of UK banks. If a bank has substantial exposures in one sector or geography, it is running significant risk. On the other hand, a bank with a diversified portfolio is less exposed to something going wrong in any one area, and so will likely find itself better positioned, in most states of the world, to weather bad times. Launched in 2011, “The Network of Networks” (TNON) serves as both a forum for sharing best practice and a support community for the leaders of employee networks.
World growth projections for the period 2010–2011 have been revised upward and commodity prices will remain near current levels (table 3). The above projections include the assumption that monetary policy will remain very expansive in the following quarters. Towards the end of the projection horizon, the monetary policy rate will converge to a level similar to the one indicated by March’s Economic Expectations Survey. However, its pace of normalization will be somewhat faster than what was considered in that survey. It is important to consider that, until the last week of February, market expectations for the MPR indicated that its upward phase would begin in the second quarter and that the rate would stand between 2.5 and 3.0 percent by the end of the year. After the earthquake and tsunami, the expectations of analysts and survey respondents about the level of the MPR and its velocity of increase fell. In particular, the expected level for the MPR for the end of 2010 stands in the 2.0–2.5 percent range (figure 8). As usual, the scenario outlined here is subject to several risks. Compared with December forecasts, the recovery process and development prospects for the Chilean economy have not been hindered by the earthquake and tsunami; however, in the short run, the risk scenarios are dominated by the catastrophe. Particularly relevant is the medium term effect of the aggregate demand impulse originating in the reconstruction works that will be carried out.

Finally, there will be an additional effect associated with the public and private reconstruction efforts. The ultimate impact on growth and inflation will  BIS Review 61/2010  3  depend, among other factors, on the magnitude, composition and timing of those efforts, on the sources of funding that are used and on the focus of the related expenditures. As for the size of the loss in productive capital stock, the Board’s working assumption for this Report’s baseline scenario is that the catastrophe destroyed 3 percent of the economy’s net capital stock. Such an estimate, which is detailed in a box inside the Report, is based on the damage survey published by the government on March 23 and on the historical ratio between the gross value and the net value of the capital stock. To clarify this calculation, it is important to explain how this capital stock is measured. First, the gross capital stock equals the value of assets used in the productive process, valued “as new”. In other words, the nominal gross value of the capital stock can be proxied by the replacement cost. Second, the net value of the capital stock is the gross value of the capital stock minus the assets’ depreciation. This distinction between gross and net value of capital is important, because the latter – the net value – is what matters when measuring the economy’s productive capacity and, therefore, trend GDP, the output gap and inflationary pressures.
Yet another ‘G’ - the G20 - is in the process of being established. Hong Kong’s significant voice on the subject means that some of us have to be travelling and attending international meetings all the time. Yet our extensive involvement is necessary if the plight of the small open markets, particularly those that are international financial centres, is to be adequately heard and taken into account in the reform of the international financial architecture. BIS Review 120/1999  4  International reform Our stance in these discussions is that we support the free flow of international capital but that there is a need to limit its destabilising influence on financial markets, particularly those in small open economies. And specifically we point to the two interrelated aspects of excessive volatility and inadequate transparency that need to be addressed. Volatility is largely the result of herding behaviour, which is in turn the result of the lack of information on which market participants can make rational decisions. All this is made a lot worse when, because of the lack of market information, particularly in the case of the over-the-counter markets, market concentration develops, whether consciously or unconsciously. And market concentration has a tendency to lead to market failure and possibly market manipulation. The international solutions we put forward, therefore, are greater disclosure and, where applicable and practicable, enhanced regulation. It is in our reference to market manipulation that I think we touched a few raw nerves, particularly against the background of the controversial action we took last summer.

Then there are the standing invitations from us to other central banks in the region to have their real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payment systems, when constructed, linked up with our own. And if such linkages are also established among themselves then we will have a robust network of RTGS payment systems to facilitate the safe transfer of money in this region. We also have another standing invitation to others to have debt clearing systems similarly linked up to form what we would like to call the Asiaclear, to facilitate investment flows across markets in this region. This will also help the development of a regional debt market. We shall persevere with these efforts. * This could be a reformed IMF or a BIS with enhanced roles. Or it could be a new World Finance Organisation (WFO), mirroring the WTO. BIS Review 120/1999  6  Domestic responses On the domestic front, we all, in the first place, have to put our own house in order, if indeed there are shortcomings in economic policies generally, or monetary and financial policies in particular. But one lesson from the financial crisis is that, even if you are white as snow, you are still vulnerable to the vagaries of international finance, and will continue to be so, if they are not satisfactorily addressed soon at the international or regional levels. This vulnerability makes the authorities, particularly those of small open markets, uneasy, as the task of maintaining monetary and financial stability has become a very onerous one.
Davíð Oddsson: Recent economic and financial developments in Iceland Speech by Mr Davíð Oddsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a seminar organised by the Iceland Chamber of Commerce, Reykjavik, 7 November 2006. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Iceland Chamber of Commerce for giving me the opportunity to say a few words here as has become customary at this time of year, following the Central Bank of Iceland’s interest rate decision and the publication of Monetary Bulletin. That publication provides indications of the position and outlook at the end of this year and what is to be expected over the forecast horizon of the next two years. Of course the Bank’s long-term forecasts are presented with due humility and respect towards the uncertainties that time may bring. Something of a milestone was reached on November 2 when the Board of Governors of the Central Bank decided to leave the policy interest rate unchanged at least until the next interest rate decision day, which was in fact brought forward to December 21. The last decision marked an end to 17 successive hikes on interest rate decision days. At this juncture it is uncertain whether a real turning point has been reached, because the decision was presented more as a deferral of a rise in the policy rate than as an end to the hike process. In other words, the data available to the Central Bank supported raising the policy rate still further.

Strong legislation to back up the requirement to provide insurance products As for the development in the insurance industry, life insurers in Australia are permitted under the Disability Discrimination Act to offer applicants for insurance different terms based on the risk they present, provided they are basing this discrimination on actuarial data or statistics. It is unlawful under the Disability Discrimination Act for insurers to deny applications for insurance without having reasonable and relevant information and data to support their decision. In Malaysia, we often received complaints from the OKU community that their applications were imposed with high premium loading as the OKUs are considered high risk. Therefore, we urge for the insurance industry here, to base their decisions on statistical evidence and not purely on assumptions. In light of these global trends, going forward, being a vibrant and progressive financial industry, we must always be at the forefront, embrace new innovation and adopt best practices in serving the needs of all segments of society including the OKUs. Expectations moving forward: Role of industry’s association – to drive industry towards OKU inclusive Moving forward, each party has to play its role in promoting and contributing towards this important agenda. Given the need to address the issues faced by the OKU community in gaining access to financial services in this country, the associations should drive the industry in enhancing the role of the financial sector towards this endeavor.
Rachel Lomax: Inflation targeting in practice - models, forecasts and hunches Speech by Ms Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the 59th International Atlantic Economic Conference, London, 12 March 2005. I am most grateful to Jens Larsen, James Bell, Fabrizio Zampolli and Robin Windle for research support; and to Charlie Bean, Peter Andrews, Spencer Dale, Phil Evans, Laura Piscitelli and other colleagues at the Bank of England for helpful comments. *  *  *  Introduction Five and a half years ago in his Monnet lecture Charles Goodhart1 was able to talk with some confidence of the features that particularly distinguished the UK’s approach to inflation targeting. Today with over 20 countries, in every habitable continent, formally operating some variant of inflation targeting and many more adopting some parts of the framework, all actively sharing experience and best practice, I suspect that most aspects of our approach would find a counterpart somewhere else in the world. But Charles’s focus on the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) personal engagement in producing a published inflation forecast still seems to me to capture the essence of the UK’s approach. Today I want to talk about the role that forecasting has come to play in helping the MPC to take and communicate its decisions. In what sense does the Committee really ‘own’ the published forecasts that go out under its name? How much use do we make of models, and what models do we use?

so that no one expected a change in rate and this was what actually happened) then the statement that surprises are bigger in Inflation Report months is no different from the statement that rates are only expected to change in these months. The closer the distribution comes to being degenerate, the more weight should be attached to that interpretation. But both the average surprise and its variance are significant. BIS Review 17/2005  7  On closer inspection, this finding seems to relate to the decision in Inflation Report months – not the publication of the Report itself a week later, or the minutes the week after that (Panel E shows that the market reaction to the policy decision is, on average, significantly bigger than the reaction to the Report and the minutes). This might imply that it is the rethink during the preparation of the Inflation Report that counts. But, once announced, the decision itself (and the accompanying press notice, if rates have changed) provides most of the information the market needs to understand the Committee’s approach. This would be consistent with a fairly high degree of policy predictability. It is worth emphasising that the observed tendency for interest rate changes to coincide with the publication of an Inflation Report does not imply that interest rate changes are tied in any mechanical way to the central projection for inflation. The assessment of risks is always a material factor in determining policy, as well as an important aspect of the presentation of the forecast.
Until now, the U.S. dollar has played a dominant role in world trade quite out of proportion to the size of U.S. trade flows. This is particularly the case in Asia, where, despite Japan’s strong commercial and financial influence, the yen has failed to play a major role as an anchor. While the Hong Kong dollar has been well served by its solid link to the U.S. dollar, less solid commitments to the dollar in other economies have proved to be expensive and disruptive. Thus, despite the pre-eminence of the U.S. dollar, the Asian region as a whole lacks a viable exchange rate anchor. This is a problem that has to be addressed, and we would do well to look into it, especially once the current crisis has subsided. We have benefited from our own peg to the U.S. dollar, and other countries could similarly benefit from links to key currencies when they are in a strong enough position to make such links fully credible. The introduction of the euro will challenge the supremacy of the dollar elsewhere in other hemispheres by introducing a second currency pole in the global currency system. It will also offer another solid investment option to Asian central banks. The time may come when we might want to consider the possibility of our own Asian currency - perhaps something along the lines of an Asian Currency Unit - that would form an anchor currency for our region.

The excessive reliance in Asia on short-term financing from overseas lenders through weakly regulated banking systems, and all the turbulence that this has entailed, is a reflection of the lack of deep and diversified debt markets in the region. The essence of the problem is the failure of our financial systems to keep pace with the strong underlying growth in other sectors of the Asian economies: the industrial and trade sectors surge ahead, while the financial sector lags behind. Too large a share of Asia’s financial resources has consequently been recycled through overseas markets, with the inevitable loss of information flows, and a tendency towards the kind BIS Review 2/1999  –9–  of market volatility that has caused us such problems. We need to establish local debt markets that bring both borrowers and lenders into more direct and long-term relationships, and which leaves both sides less exposed in terms of currency and maturity mismatches. Ironically, the underdeveloped state of our debt markets is attributable in part to the traditional absence of large budget deficits in most of the region, which has limited the development of government bond markets. Debt market development needs some official help, since individual issuers are not in a position on their own to create deep and liquid markets. The APEC initiative on bond markets - in which Hong Kong plays a leading role, will provide some impetus.
The availability of  longevity reinsurance has limited any drag on growth in the bulk purchase annuity market. Although one possible effect has been to make it more expensive for pension schemes with a high 5  The Chancellor’s letter to the Governor of 8 March 2017 setting out recommendations to the Prudential Regulation Committee (PRC) about aspects of the economic policy of the government to which the PRC should have regard when considering how to advance its statutory objectives includes “The government wishes to ensure financial services markets make a positive contribution to sustainable economic growth in the UK economy in the medium and long term, through the facilitation of finance for productive investment and as a productive sector of the UK economy.” 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  proportion of younger members to achieve an insurer buy out. This is because reinsurers have had a lower appetite for deferred than in-payment annuities. Although I hear that this might have changed recently. As Sam Woods wrote to Nicky Morgan in June of last year6, the PRA does not currently see a durable way to implement a change in the risk margin with sufficient certainty for insurers to be able to rely on it for pricing, capital planning and use of reinsurance. We continue to keep this position under review. Current issues Despite the diversification into direct investments, corporate bonds are likely to remain the largest category of assets backing U.K. insurers’ annuity liabilities.

As a creature of the G10, the Committee could originally lay claim to coverage of most of the world’s truly internationally active banks. But as banks and financial markets became increasingly integrated across national borders, this claim to be the standard setter for all internationally active banks became more and more difficult to justify. During the 1990s and 2000s, the Committee made good use of its Core Principles Liaison Group to seek advice from members outside the G10. The CPLG’s contribution was highly  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  constructive when Basel II was developed, for example. But as the size and importance of jurisdictions “outside the tent” grew, even this arrangement became increasingly untenable. And so, in 2009, the Committee essentially stepped up from a G10 to a G20 foundation as it sought a truly coordinated response to the global financial crisis. Indeed, we now have more than 40 organisations representing 27 member jurisdictions around the table. As a result, the Committee’s coverage of global banking assets has gone from about 60% to 90%. This much greater inclusiveness lends, in turn, greater legitimacy and credibility to the Committee’s standards, as they are now set by a process that is truly reflective of international markets. The fourth key influence is a more recent one – the shift in thinking from a micro- to a macroprudential perspective. For much of its life, the Committee focused primarily on microprudential issues.
Although they capture subtly different dimensions of market power, there is a weakly positive relationship between measures of mark-up and market concentration at the sector level (Chart 4), which is statistically  6  De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) use a dataset that largely includes publicly-traded companies, but there are also some privately held firms. 7 Similar estimates have recently been provided by Díez et al (2018). 8 OECD data. 9 De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) estimate that mark-ups in the US are a little larger than in the UK, so the boost to UK TFP from eliminating them would be smaller than the 35% estimate for the US in Baquee and Farhi (2018), albeit of a similar order of magnitude. 10 The methodology is explained in the Appendix. The data include around a little over 1000 firms, on average, per year. These firms account for around one-third of UK employment. Their sales are equivalent to around one-third of UK turnover and around two-thirds of UK nominal GDP. We exclude financial sector firms and, having estimated mark-ups, trim outliers, i.e. those firm-level mark-ups that are below the 1st percentile and above the 99th percentile of the firm-level mark-up distribution in a given year, 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  significant at the firm level. 11  The same has been found among companies in other countries (Díez et al  (2018)). This gives some degree of reassurance that the rise in measured market power has been a genuine one.

Keynes said of sound bankers that they were ruined in a conventional way along with their fellows so that no-one could be blamed (Keynes (1932)). If Keynes was right, then asset managers may be a different breed. Yet even if the “fail” element of too-big-to-fail is a red-herring, the “big” is not. Distress at an asset manager may aggravate frictions in financial markets, in particular frictions in market liquidity. One example would be an asset fire-sale. This might arise if assets from a failing fund were offloaded at a pace and scale that caused indigestion in the underlying market (Office of Financial Research (2013), Hau and Lai (2012)). If so, asset prices would be driven south, possibly to well below their long-term or fundamental value. Put differently, illiquidity risk premia in those markets could be driven to sub-optimally high levels. This fire-sale friction might be fanned by the actions of investors or counterparties. Falling asset prices may be the prompt for withdrawal (in the case of open-ended funds) or sales (in the case of closed-end funds). In some respects, this would mimic a banking “run”, albeit operating through non-conventional channels (Chen et al (2010)). This could itself induce a further round of asset fire sales in an amplifying loop. The good news here is that, unlike in banking, history is not littered with examples of failing funds wreaking havoc in financial markets. The historical examples we have tend to be confined to small and isolated corners of the financial system.