samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Average life expectancy continued to rise sharply over the period, however. When it then became increasingly obvious during the 1990s that the ATP system was also going to be under-financed, a number of years of political debate passed before a majority of the Swedish parliament could agree on a new pension system that would be sustainable in the long term. With the implementation of the premium-reserve pension reform of 1998, a system was created that indeed is not guaranteed to result in high pensions for pension savers, but that at least will enable the public finances to bear the costs as an increasing number of people retire. However, Sweden is not the only country to be facing a difficult demographic challenge, quite the reverse. In the euro area, some countries will have a considerably larger frequency of retirement in the coming decades, which means that in 30 years there will be twice the number of pensioners per worker compared with today. Nevertheless, until recently pension reforms in most euro area countries have been conspicuous by their absence. In addition, the majority of these countries have only used a system whereby current pensioners are paid directly by current workers, and no funds have been reserved. The fact that this is unsustainable in the long run has been obvious for a long period. Yet, it has been politically impossible to bring about the kind of reforms that we in Sweden succeeded in introducing through political accord.

These are significant challenges, considering that the current employment rate averages around 64 per cent and the potential growth rate is close to 2 per cent. Furthermore, during the past two years employment growth has stagnated, and several economies are experiencing zero growth or even recession. For Sweden, the outlook is somewhat better. Growth has been comparatively favourable in recent years, despite the considerable international slowdown. However, employment growth has also been weak here, and recently we have even witnessed a decline in employment. The employment rate in Sweden nevertheless exceeds the established target already, as just over 77 per cent of the economically active population are employed in some way. That is not to say that Sweden can feel comfortable about its present situation. The Swedish figures conceal large, increasing numbers on sick leave, falling mean working time and total unemployment - open and hidden - of well above 6 per cent. So creating opportunities to raise employment is a key question for Sweden as well. But it is not only in the labour market where the EU Member States need to take action to attain the goal of the Lisbon agenda. When the World Economic Forum last reviewed how the Lisbon strategy has been implemented, it was found that Europe was lagging behind the US in a number of areas. The biggest differences were in areas such as enterprise environment, network industries, innovation, research and development, and financial services.
This is an important discussion, in which the decline of the natural real rate of interest plays a central role. Its measurement, an understanding of its drivers and its relevance to monetary policy are crucial issues that are in the spotlight of academic research and central bank discussions. See, amongst others, Brand, C., Bielecki, M. and Penalver, A. (2018), “The natural rate of interest: estimates, drivers, and challenges to monetary policy”, Occasional Paper Series, No 217, ECB; Bauer, M. D. and Rudebusch, G. D. (2019), “Interest Rates Under Falling Stars”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2017-16; Kiley, M. T. (2019), "The Global Equilibrium Real Interest Rate: Concepts, Estimates, and Challenges", Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-076, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and Clarida, R. H. (2019), “Monetary Policy, Price Stability, and Equilibrium Bond Yields: Success and Consequences”, Speech at the High-Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, 12 November. I will discuss the drivers of the low level of rates in another speech later this week. [5] Modelling and interpreting the level and the shape of the yield curve is an active field of research. Since Irving Fisher’s “Appreciation and Interest” and John Hicks’s “Value and Capital”, which are sometimes referenced as the earliest formalisations of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, hundreds of research papers on the joint dynamics of bond yields of different maturities have been produced.

On the other hand, the objective of bringing inflation up to the target of 2.5 per cent and anchoring inflation expectations suggested in isolation that further interest rate increases should be delayed until there are clearer signs of a further rise in inflation. The trend in prices for consumer goods over the past two or three years is a result of favourable developments in the Norwegian and global economy. The shift in trade towards low-cost countries has led to lower prices and higher real income. In addition, the changes in the world economy have provided Norway with higher income because our terms of trade have improved. Increased competition has curbed the rise in prices for a number of domestically produced goods and services. When inflation deviates substantially from the target for a period, the interest rate will be set with a view to gradually returning it to the target, so that we avoid substantial variations in output and employment. Through the 1990s, inflation generally remained in the interval 1½ – 3½ per cent. Inflation has varied slightly more in the past few years. In a period of increasing cross-border labour flows, substantial technological advances, changes in competitive conditions and new trading patterns, we may, with our very open economy, have to accept a somewhat greater variation in inflation and deviations from the target, as we have witnessed over the past two to three years. An overall assessment implies that the interest rate in the baseline scenario gradually increases to a more normal level.
The net banking system result for 2006 stood at a profit of ALL 7.45 billion, about 12.9 percent more than in 2005. Revenues from the principal activity (net income from interest) resulted to 31.2 percent more than in the previous year, reflecting the banking system orientation to activities of higher return and a rise in the overall volume of assets. At end of 2006, the net income from interests was 92.6 percent of the gross banking system incomes, compared to 84 percent at end of 2005. This indicator has recorded constant growth, particularly over three last years, reflecting the overall net income sustainability for the banking system. During 2006, the banking system assets grew by All 127.7 billion, or about ALL 57.6 billion more than the growth of assets noted in 2005. The main contribution to the growth of banking system assets was given by large banks, though their share in the market is downward. The estimates show that the lending activity concentration level is lower than that of assets and deposits concentration. The significant growth of lending has been associated with increased share of nonperforming loans portfolio, by about ALL 3.1 billion compared to end of 2005. The loans portfolio quality indicator, expressed as a ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans portfolio in gross terms, is estimated at 3.1 percent as at year-end, against 2.3 percent as at year-end 2005. The banking system capability of covering loss loans with capital has been downward, but still at good levels.

Rodrigo Vergara: Chile – economic outlook Speech by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at seminars held during the Annual Meeting of the Inter American Development Bank, Montevideo, Uruguay, 12 March 2012. *  *  *  I thank Luis Oscar Herrera, Enrique Orellana and Tatiana Vargas for helpful comments. I would like to thank you for inviting me to present our views on Chile’s economic situation at this Conference. These last years have been particularly challenging for policymakers worldwide. Periodically we must make decisions in an uncertain environment, weighing the costs and risks of alternative scenarios. For this reason, we welcome opportunities for meetings and discussions such as this, as they allow us to communicate our views in greater detail, as well as to hear other opinions. A better understanding of our decisions strengthens the effectiveness of our policies. More than four years have elapsed since the onset of the financial crisis that triggered the Great Recession. Nonetheless, we are still handling its legacy, experiencing periodic episodes of financial stress that will likely continue for some time. The situation in the Eurozone is complex, due to the interaction among fiscal, financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities. From a historical viewpoint, growth perspectives for developed countries are weak. The outlook for emerging economies is noticeably better, although we are witnessing a slowdown whose pace is difficult to assess, particularly for China.
The structural changes described in it have come to pass. The resulting growth in prosperity was more difficult to predict. The development of an advanced oil service industry is an industrial adventure in its own right. We have extracted large quantities of oil and gas at very favourable prices, and have set aside a sizeable portion of the revenues – to the benefit of future generations. The oil age is far from over. But activity in the petroleum sector has passed the peak. In addition, we must be prepared for lower returns in the oil industry. The white paper also provides a glimpse into a time when belief in government intervention in the economy was far greater than today. That regulatory optimism has diminished significantly. We are left with an important recognition: The key to economic progress is the ability to restructure. We cannot rely solely on the sea to carry us forward: Let me again quote Kielland: “It is not true that the sea is faithless, for it has never promised anything...” Where our journey takes us is our own responsibility. Come what may. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  16  BIS central bankers’ speeches

One is that it takes time for policy to work. A change in interest rates has its peak impact on inflation only after a significant delay – probably eighteen months or more2. One implication is that, fully to offset the inflation we’ve seen through the course of this year, monetary authorities would have to have foreseen the various things that have pushed it up (including, for example, the recent problems with gas supplies). Another is that they would have to have tightened policy pretty aggressively – by enough to push up unemployment materially, with the explicit aim of depressing nominal wage growth – just ahead of or during the first wave of the pandemic. Using the Bank’s economic model, and assuming perfect foresight of the rise in tradable goods prices, a simulation suggests you would have needed comfortably more than an extra 2% points on the rate of unemployment – something around eight hundred thousand jobs – to have kept overall CPI inflation at 2% in the fourth quarter of this year (Charts 5a and 5b). Chart 5a. Tighter monetary policy to achieve 2% inflation now… Per cent  Chart 5b. …would have resulted in much higher unemployment Per cent  5.0  6.5  4.0  6.0  3.0  5.5  2.0  5.0  1.0  4.5  2019  2020 2021 2022 Inflation - N21 MPR  -1.0 2023 2024 Inflation - Scenario  CPI inflation excluding VAT. Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. 7.0  4.0 2019  2020 2021 2022 Unemp.
If these risks are present, then we should face up to the issue with tougher standards and enhanced supervisory oversight rather than leave the issue unaddressed. This has to be a superior approach relative to pretending these firms could not be TBTF and the problem doesn’t exist. Policy measures to reduce the adverse systemic consequences from failure Because no plausible level of capital and liquidity standards will be sufficient to reduce the probability of failure to zero, it also makes sense to work on the other major margin – to reduce the cost of the failure of a large, complex financial firm. We can do this by making changes so that such failures are less likely to impair the functioning of the broader financial system. In this area, although many initiatives are in train, I would conclude that we are still very far from where we need to be. One simple but meaningful step that already has been enacted is to put a brake on the ability of the largest and most complex firms to become even larger and more complex. To this end, the Dodd-Frank Act adds “the risk to stability of the U.S. banking or financial system” as an additional factor to be considered in evaluating a proposed merger or acquisition under the Bank Merger Act and the Bank Holding Company Act. As Governor Daniel Tarullo discussed in a recent speech, there is not a hard and fast rule to be applied here.

And it could do this without actually solving the problem of system risk externalities that aren’t related to balance sheet size. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Evaluating the socially optimal size, scope and organizational structure of financial firms is a complicated business, and so is establishing a viable transition path to a system of much smaller firms. It would be helpful in this regard if advocates of break-up solutions would put a bit more flesh on the bones and develop detailed proposals that address essential questions of how such downsizing or functional separation would be accomplished, and what benefits and costs could be expected. Such an analysis should answer several questions: How would you force divestiture (in good times and bad)? Should firms be split up by activity or reduced pro-rata in size? How much would they have to be shrunk in order for the externalities of failure to no longer create TBTF problems? How would global trading and investment banking services and network-type activities be supported? Should some activities be retained in natural monopoly form, but subject to utility type regulation? How costly would it be to replicate support services or to manage liquidity and capital locally? Are there ways of designing size limits that cannot be arbitraged by banks via off-balance-sheet structures and other forms of financial innovation? So far, advocacy for the break-up path has been strong, but without the detail to assess whether this is indeed superior to the course we are currently following. But, I’m openminded.
It is too soon to say yet, but we should be prepared to push harder for further standardization should the desired degree of standardization that we are striving for not materialize. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I also worry that implementation of the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures could falter over time. This could happen for several reasons. In particular, we should recognize that there is a tension between the profit motive of for-profit CCPs and full compliance with the PFMIs. Put simply, some CCPs will prefer to avoid the full costs of compliance. In other words, there will always be a risk of a race to the bottom, which we must continually push against. In this respect, the effort could also falter if countries were to fail to enact the relevant legislation and policies to put the PFMIs in practice. For the global system to be robust, the requirements for CCPs will need to be enforced across the different geographic regimes. I am also worried about fragmentation. In particular, I worry about the proliferation of TRs and CCPs geographically – in some cases in each of the major asset classes. In the case of CCPs, fragmentation would bring two costs. First, the netting benefits would be reduced and, second, the system would be more complex. In an ideal world, I would prefer very few, very robust CCPs, rather than a proliferation of many, less robust CCPs. But whether that is what we will get is unclear to me at this point.

This reflects the heightened state of vigilance in Bank Negara Malaysia as we continue to direct significant effort and resources towards strengthening our surveillance. In addition to macro surveillance, the supervision framework is also more forward looking including increased engagements and dialogue with senior management of financial institution, industry leaders, trade bodies and various chambers of commerce for the early detection of emerging issues and developments. BIS Review 58/2009  1  Facilitating access to credit and easing monetary policy Another area of importance is the continuing availability of credit from the banking sector. We have earlier highlighted the rate of growth in outstanding loans. In addition, the government has introduced specific guarantee schemes while Bank Negara Malaysia also, on its part, maintained a monetary policy easing stance that is conducive to achieve the same goal of facilitating access to credit at reasonable cost. At the same time, to assist the household sector, the Agensi Kaunselling dan Pengurusan kredit (AKPK) is also an avenue for individual borrowers and potential borrowers to seek advice and assistance in managing their finances and debts. Clients of the banking industry may also contact Bank Negara Malaysia hotlines and its LINK and TeleLINK for assistance for info. LINK refers to Laman Informasi Nasihat dan Khidmat. Association of Banks in Malaysia (ABM) has also introduced toll free lines for the benefit of its stakeholders. These combined efforts seek to lower borrowing costs and ease cash flows while at the same time promote financial discipline.
In addition, strategically important markets, such as telecommunications and broadcasting media have been opened up to competition. It is especially important that Sweden had a broad base of users of various technical systems at an early stage. A broad base is essential for users and producers to gain a real exchange from working in the networks comprised by the new technology. Ericsson’s successful broadening of its operations from fixed to mobile telephony and Sweden’s rapid licensing of first NMT and then GSM gave Sweden one of the world’s broadest bases of mobile phone users. The subsidised provision of personal computers to employees also broadened the user base and gave Sweden the highest PC density in Europe. This of course facilitated the use of the internet and thus the general e-mail revolution in Swedish companies and homes. The combination of internet usage and the high density of mobile phones means that mobile internet, despite its slow start, has already come further here than in the USA. Slide 4 shows a summary of Sweden’s position in various technological, network-based systems. As the internet is still in a phase of development, these figures can primarily serve as indicators of future growth. 4.

Uncertainty over the total effects of technological developments means that we must show greater sensitivity when formulating monetary policy. Let me call it being more “reactive” than would otherwise have been the case. By reactive, I mean that we must constantly reconsider our earlier assessments in the light of developments in the economy and the way the various parts actually react. I maintain that this has in many ways been a characteristic of our Inflation Reports over the past year. These reflect clearly how the view of potential growth and the connection between inflation and growth have changed as a result of the Riksbank’s analyses and models taking account of structural changes in their assessments. The repo rate could not have remained at its current level if price levels had not been affected by deregulation on several markets and the fact that we can see a positive development in productivity. Then there are of course a number of other important factors that must be taken into account, labour supply, wage formation, international price developments and, in particular, confidence in the monetary policy. However, developments in productivity will continue to play a central role in the assessments. The Riksbank monitors the various signs of the “new economy” and takes them very seriously. BIS Review 89/2000  8
Today we are defining the Strategic Plan 20232027, a process that reflects the Bank's viewpoint and the perceptions that the regions have about the Central Bank's work. I cannot be exhaustive in this time frame. However, I would like to stress that we are aware that our main role and obligation lies in inflation convergence and market stability. Our efforts are focused on this, aware of the importance they have on the welfare of so many households. These efforts are possible because this institution has teams of excellence committed to the country and a Board that seeks to contribute to this goal by setting its own example. I will now walk you through the pages of our recently published Monetary Policy Report. Macroeconomic scenario and projections Data for the last few months show that the Chilean economy continues its process of adjustment after the major imbalances it accumulated during 2021. As expected, annual inflation peaked in the third quarter. However, the high levels it has reached are a sign that the problem is far from over. This morning we learned that the CPI again posted a high month-over-month change of 1.0%, bringing inflation to 13.3% annually. Core inflation —excluding volatile items— also saw a significant increase of 0.9%, which placed it at 11%. Thus, by any standard, the level of inflation remains very high (figure 1). With regard to the factors that determine inflation behavior, it is worth noting that those linked to demand have begun to recede, in line with the macroeconomic and consumption adjustment.

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