samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to estimates by the Institute of International Finance, net private capital flows into emerging markets in Asia increased nearly six times from 1998 to $ bn in 1999, and are forecast to increase again by 50% to $ bn in 2000. There is therefore a real danger that we might forget the severe pains inflicted by the Asian financial crisis over the past two years. It is also easy to forget the lessons learnt and to become complacent. However, if the recovery in the region is to be sustainable, we should remain vigilant and beware of the risks lurking under these bubbling activities. Risks and challenges in coping with international capital flows Challenges of domestic structural reforms In order to address such risks, we would need to tackle three challenges faced by Asia. The first challenge is that the globalisation and liberalisation of markets require structurally sound and resilient domestic systems. Prior to the crisis, the banking systems were often inadequately supervised and were prone to incurring excessive maturity mismatch risks by borrowing short-term funds to finance long-term investments. Moreover, the corporate sectors of many Asian economies were over-stretching themselves by engaging in risky or unproductive investments. To make things worse, both the banks and the corporates were taking excessive currency risks by borrowing in foreign currencies to fund projects that could only generate income in domestic currencies. Poor risk management on the part of banks, ineffective banking supervision, political interference, and a critical lack of transparency prevented disciplinary mechanisms from functioning properly.

The euro area has to act together, exerting some pressure on the IMF, which last year adopted a resolution to effectively strengthen its surveillance of currency markets. Lastly, regarding energy issues, it is necessary that developed countries, including Europe, put a stronger emphasis on energy savings and climate change. The experience accumulated in recent years has confirmed that although energy saving measures can slow down growth in the short term, costs connected to energy waste can be much greater in the long run. I will now close with the fourth line of action, which is linked to the previous one, though being on a more national scale. The ability of a European country to become part of the globalisation process depends not only on EU-wide initiatives but also on internal measures aimed at supporting economic growth. In essence, there are only two ways of absorbing the shock deriving from price increases in raw materials and to prevent it from becoming a reduction in purchasing power. The first way is to increase productivity in order to allow wages to grow in a non-inflationary manner. The second is the reduction in the price of items other than energy and food. Of course, these are not easy ways, but they are the only ones which can allow European economies to grow while preserving the purchasing power of its citizens, even in the presence of a worsening in the terms of trade.
The general impression among financial agents seems to be that a repo rate increase is probable some time in the coming winter. The timing of a change in the monetary stance is determined by the Riksbank’s assessment of inflation. The simple rule of thumb for the Riksbank can be formulated as follows: if the assessment of inflation, given an unchanged instrumental rate, points to a rate of inflation one to two years ahead that is in line with the target, then the monetary stance is well balanced. If the assessment indicates a risk of inflation rising above (falling below) the target, then the monetary stance is too expansive (contractive) and the repo rate should therefore be raised (lowered). The time has not yet come for an increase in the repo rate, but when it does, our action will hopefully be seen as a natural ingredient of a monetary policy for price stability. Our ambition is to take predictable and timely measures so that sizeable interest rate movements can be avoided. Still, it is hardly surprising that the direction of monetary policy is being discussed. At present Swedish monetary policy’s overall impact can be described as expansionary at a time when activity is becoming stronger. The short-term real interest rate is between 2 and 2.5 per cent, depending on the exact maturity and how inflation expectations are measured.

This successive increase in resource utilisation is already evident in some indicators. A growing proportion of firms are reporting, for example, that output is being restricted by productive factors rather than by demand. The gap between total demand and total resources for production is an important but elusive indicator of inflationary pressure. The Riksbank considers that the output gap, which is an attempt to measure the degree of unutilised resources in the total economy, is 2 per cent of GDP. With the GDP forecast from the inflation report, this means that the gap will narrow by degrees and close some time during 1999, in any event towards the end of that year. In the light of the assessments of resource utilisation and other factors, in the inflation report the Riksbank forecast that the annual increase in the CPI will be around 1 per cent in 1997 and around 2 per cent in both 1998 and 1999, with some upward tendency in the latter two years. This is our main scenario. BIS Review 101/1997  -4-  Like most other forecasts, however, inflation assessments are subject to uncertainty. Our forecasts as a foundation for monetary policy therefore do not consist of single point estimates of future inflation. In practice we construct a number of alternative outcomes and assess their probabilities. Normally there is one main scenario and two alternatives. Economic activity could be stronger than we have envisaged, so that inflation is somewhat higher; but it could also be weaker, giving lower inflation.
One must go as far back as the herring boom of the 1960s to find a comparable debt position. The end-2015 external debt ratio was probably more noteworthy than it might otherwise have been because the net debt position as measured according to international standards was nearly three-anda-half times GDP only a quarter earlier. That figure was highly misleading, however, because it included, at full price, all of the debt of the failed banks’ estates, even though it had long since become clear that those debts would not be repaid except in part. For this reason, the Central Bank had adopted the practice of publishing what it called the underlying external position,  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  which looked through the expected settlement of the estates. By this measure, Iceland’s net debt totalled just over one-third of GDP at the end of Q3/2015, down from nearly one GDP at the end of 2008. Nearly 40% of the reduction is due to the current account surplus and GDP growth during the period, and the rest is due to default, debt restructuring, and other factors. The reduction in the debt position in Q4/2015, from 35% of GDP to 14½%, is due for the most part to the settlement of the failed banks’ estates on the basis of stability conditions. As can be discerned from what I have just said, the state of the Icelandic economy is quite good. According to current forecasts, the outlook is relatively good as well.

How can the persistent current account surplus, textbook economic theory and the SNB’s own assessment be reconciled? Is the surplus in Switzerland perhaps even the result of a monetary policy designed to deliberately push down the exchange rate in order to boost exports? 1 International debate about certain countries’ current account surpluses and unfair exchange rate policy has intensified in recent years. In this context, Switzerland has been on the US Treasury’s ‘monitoring list’ since 2016, although it is not designated a ‘currency manipulator’ in the associated report as it does not meet all the relevant criteria. However, Switzerland is being specially monitored. We are maintaining a constructive dialogue on this matter with the responsible government agencies in the US. Foreign authorities and international organisations recognise Switzerland’s special position, and appreciate the rationale for the SNB’s monetary policy measures. According to the latest External Sector Report of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of July 2017, Switzerland’s current account is in line with macroeconomic conditions, and its monetary and fiscal policy is considered appropriate. Yet, international debate about current account surpluses and deficits has at times been heated and not always objective. Some observers have repeatedly denounced Switzerland for its persistent surplus. As criticism has focused on the SNB’s monetary policy, I am naturally keen to give you my analysis of the situation. Before we get into the details, let me outline the crux of my argument.
Michael Held: SOFR and the transition from LIBOR Remarks by Mr Michael Held, Executive Vice President of the Legal Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the SIFMA C&L Society February Luncheon, New York City, 26 February 2019. * * * As prepared for delivery Thank you for that kind introduction, and for the opportunity to speak to you all today. As always, my remarks reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.1 When I was thinking about what to talk about today, I recalled how everybody’s favorite question at these kinds of events is, “What keeps you up at night?” Of course, at the top of my own list is whether my daughter is going to get into a good kindergarten in Brooklyn. But not far below that is reference rate reform. Today I’ll keep the former to myself, and speak instead about reference rates. It’s not just me who’s concerned. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) named reference rate transition from the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to its alternatives as one of two leading fixed-income market developments for 2019.2 And the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has repeatedly identified reference rate transition as a financial stability risk.3 Today I’d like to give you an update on the state of that transition. Here’s the preview: The task is immense. But it is not insurmountable. Much work has been accomplished, and much work remains.

At least in hindsight there are usually fairly clear tell-tale signs of expanding fiscal deficits and/or lax monetary policies, classically accompanied by evidence of imbalance in the form of accelerating inflation or a rapidly deteriorating balance of payments. There were such signs, perhaps most notably in Thailand; but they were not for the most part particularly pronounced in Asia. In fact through the first half of the 1990s, and in some cases for much longer, the countries in question were remarkably successful. They attracted, by their very success, huge inflows of capital from the rest of the world in search of higher returns. The capital inflow made a major contribution to sustaining the economic expansion in Asia, but, with the benefit of hindsight, the increasing scale of the inflow, and particularly the form that it took, became an important part of the problem. It was not all effectively employed. There was overinvestment in some production sectors; much went into ambitious property development; and much went into financial rather than real assets. The hoped-for higher returns could not be maintained. Again with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify a number of structural weaknesses in the mechanisms for financial resource allocation in the recipient countries. There was, for example, a general lack of reliable financial information, and a lack of transparency in relation to the financial position, of both public and private sectors.
CCP recovery and resolution therefore poses some specific issues, some of which I will touch on today. However, at base there are principles that are common to the resolution of any systemically important institution. Perhaps the most obvious similarity between the resolution of banks and CCPs is in the common objective: resolution should deliver continuity of critical economic functions without reliance on solvency support from taxpayers to achieve it. For that continuity to be achieved it is not enough that the financial losses of the institution are fully absorbed; the going-concern resources of the institution, or of any successor institution, must be restored to a sufficient level to command market confidence prior to any post-resolution restructuring or wind-down. In the case of banks, this means that when a bank suffers losses eroding its going concern capital to the point where triggers for resolution are met, (i) it enters into resolution; (ii) its creditors are bailed in to recapitalise the firm; and (iii) this bail-in replicates what would have happened in a court-based commercial restructuring or insolvency. In other words, losses are allocated according to the creditor hierarchy but without the value destruction created by the hard stop of insolvency. This ensures that the resolution provides continuity and meets the safeguard that creditors are not worse off than in insolvency. While these are the essential elements of a resolution, they are likely to play out differently in the context of a CCP.

Central Bank of Chile September 2019 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Forum on Blockchain, September 2019  High-level Policy Panel Discussion on Central Bank Digital Currencies Remarks by Mario Marcel, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile Disruptive technologies in Finance or “FinTech” are transforming the financial industry landscape, challenging traditional business models. These technologies have been able to address some gaps in the traditional financial industry that can be grouped into five categories: Access, Speed, Cost, Transparency, and Security. Leveraging on open-source technologies and Smartphone penetration, FinTech has seen fast adoption, disrupting all areas of the financial services such as payments, investments, savings & lending, insurance and risk management. One example of the innovation across different financial services is this research framework from the World Economic Forum. Fintech innovations are identified and grouped into clusters, which in turn are a result of innovation triggered by common themes that cut across financial services. These themes are enabled by different technologies. The main takeaway here is to understand the potential of these technologies to innovate across all financial services and have a visual image of how this is reshaping the financial services. As this reshaping is taking place, the policy makers, regulators, and supervisors need to understand the forces driving this innovation wave, in order to assess the risks and opportunities of these new business models.
10 Moreover, the fact that European countries have tended in the past to merge failing banks, rather than resolve them, probably reduced space for new entrants: only a handful of new banks enter national markets each year. Against that background, the establishment of Banking Union will be catalytic in triggering a change in the banking landscape. The balance sheets of cross-border banking groups will become progressively more fungible, allowing liquidity and capital to be more efficiently managed at the group level. And with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the new resolution framework barriers to entry and exit into national markets are expected to fall. All this should meaningfully lower the cost of doing business for cross-border banks and increase efficiency in the sector. At the same time, a more integrated banking landscape implies greater risk-sharing within the sector, which should in turn support the stability of credit provision. Cross-border integration entails greater geographical diversification. 11 And the local affiliates of crossborder banks are also less likely to be exposed to the kind of market funding dry-ups we saw during the crisis, as intragroup funding acts as a shock-absorber. 12 That said, we of course do not want to move from a situation of too low concentration towards a banking landscape dominated by large banks with excessive market power. Recent research looking at the pre-crisis period suggests that where banks face limited competition in their domestic markets, financing constraints for SMEs are higher.

13  Ryan, R., O’Toole, C. and McCann, F. (2014), “Does bank market power affect SME financing constraints?”, Journal of Banking and Finance. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  other words, it creates the conditions for diversity and competition within the sector so that an optimal market structure can evolve. Conclusion Let me conclude. Repairing bank lending channel after a major financial crisis is inevitably a long and difficult process. Monetary policy has an important role to play, but the agenda is also broader: it involves supply and demand factors, and multiple aspects of national and European policy. The steps we have taken so far to strengthen the banking sector are necessary conditions for a stronger recovery in credit, and I am confident that we will see increasingly positive effects. But as banks transition to a new business environment, ensuring that they continue to have microeconomic incentives that coincide with our desired macroeconomic objectives is essential, as is developing a banking landscape that is sufficiently efficient and diversified to sustain credit supply. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
First, research undertaken in universities very frequently serves as a starting point for work undertaken in central banks. One of you may just have written a very good paper on the sensitivity of the New Zealand economy to international business cycles or the determination of capital flows between Thailand and the rest of the world. It may well be that this paper, unknown to the author, triggers research at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on how sensitive our economy is to external factors or on the determination of capital flows in and out of Hong Kong. Secondly, academic research undertaken in a free and open manner, and presented at conferences such as this, serves to improve the quality of research in central banks. There is a strong presumption in my mind that competition, no matter whether it be in the market for airline tickets or in econometric models of exchange rates, are beneficial to consumers - and central banks are large consumers of economic research. More directly, I know that some of the HKMA’s research staff will present papers here, and I am sure that your comments on the papers will trigger ideas for how they could be improved. Next time, they will be better. Thirdly, universities are the source of staff for central banks. We do hire your students and sometimes we are even able to hire academic researchers.

Non-Muslims have benefited from waqf as proceeds have been used to purchase medicine for needy Singaporeans, regardless of race and religion. The Malay/Muslim community in Singapore, while holding fast to the values of Islam also maintains an open and progressive attitude in the practice of its faith in our multi-racial and multi-religious society. The Singaporean Muslim's identity stresses the importance of contextualising one's beliefs to the environment, but without compromising the tenets of faith. The environment required to ensure the growth of waqf is similar to conventional charitable trusts. Singapore has established itself as a strong centre for the administration of charities and trusts. We have introduced several initiatives to make Singapore a more conducive jurisdiction for trusts, a vehicle commonly used for philanthropic purposes. This includes measures to modernise our trust laws, update our regulatory framework and make our tax regime more conducive for the establishment of trusts. This will help Singapore to become a centre for the development of waqf. Conclusion Let me conclude. Asia and the Middle East are becoming more interdependent. With our destinies intertwined, it is critical for Asia and the Middle East to continue our efforts at engaging each other, strengthening our bonds and enhancing mutual understanding. To overcome the common challenges we face, we should continue sharing our experiences. I hope that this conference is the first of many in bringing together interested parties from all over the world to explore new and innovative ideas, and to learn from each other.
Figure 12 The effect of an amortisation requirement on household indebtedness according to current proposals Per cent 220  220 Scenario without measures Amortisation requirements  210  210  200  200  190  190  180  180  170  170  160  160  150  150  140  140  130  130 05  10  15  20  25  Note. Broken red line shows an estimate of developments over the next 10 years without further measures. Shaded area indicates a feasible lower limit for when the risks are elevated in the economy. Broken yellow line shows an estimate of the effect of an amortisation requirement according to current proposals. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank. A change to tax relief on mortgage interest could lead to a faster and more direct effect on household indebtedness, as it affects all borrowers. However, as a reduction in tax relief initially raises mortgage costs, it is likely that existing mortgage borrowers do not pay down their loans immediately. The effect on the total debt-to-income ratio therefore occurs gradually, even in the case of changes to tax relief. According to these calculations, it is only  19  A borrower with medium indebtedness in Sweden taking out a new mortgage, or increasing existing loans, only amortises at a rate which leads to the new loan being repaid in 56 years.

Our monetary policy strategy is based on using a highly expansionary monetary policy to safeguard confidence in the inflation target, which has provided a nominal anchor for the Swedish economy for over 20 years. However, we are well aware that the low interest rate level increases the risk of problems arising on the housing market later on and that measures need to be taken elsewhere to make our strategy successful in the longer term. Consequently, when we discuss possible measures for the housing market and household indebtedness, this is a matter of risk management: of adopting measures today to prevent the risk of unfavourable events later on. When it comes to the exact design of measures, to some extent it is, therefore, a matter of subjective opinions and not an exact science. The mandate for macroprudential policy in Sweden must be clarified Macroprudential policy is the policy area which has come to dominate the international discussion about reducing risks linked to household indebtedness. 12 Several targeted tools are offered within macroprudential policy which could be used for this purpose. For example, requirements could be placed on banks’ equity by introducing countercyclical capital buffers and risk-weight floors on mortgages, and limits could be placed on how much households can borrow by way of loan-to-value limits and an amortisation requirement. It is therefore obviously very concerning that the previously adopted macroprudential policy framework in Sweden has encountered legal problems.