samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The intuition we think is that the lowest value note should be sorted most often, and the highest value note least often. The reason for this order is that the lowest value note will be nearest to a pure transactional instrument, and the highest value note nearest to a pure store of  BIS Review 162/2009  7  value instrument. As the chart indicates, the intuition holds for all denominations except the £ On average, at £ note passes through a cash centre for sorting nine times a year, a £ four and a half times, and a £ just under once a year. But the £ has seen a decline from five times a year in the mid-1990s to one and a half times a year now. This goes a long way to explain the problem we have with the £ We need to see more dispensed so that they are less scarce and therefore they return to cash centres for sorting more often. In the last few years we have had some success in increasing the total number of £ in circulation. The overall value of £ in circulation had been stuck at around £ since the early 1990s. In the last two years it has risen to £ But the evidence from turnover indicates that we have a lot more to do. Recently, we have therefore run two pilot schemes.

In order to avert damage to Switzerland, on the Sunday before last the authorities decided on extensive measures to safeguard financial stability. Within the framework of its mandate, the SNB contributed to this solution, acting as lender of last resort to ensure the stability of the Swiss and global financial system. Today we are talking about another element of our mandate: ensuring a well-functioning system of payment transactions in Switzerland. All three elements – price stability, financial stability and a well-functioning payment system – are important for public confidence in money. This evening, we will be looking at the future of cashless payments. The payments system is currently undergoing extensive change, both in Switzerland and around the world. The main drivers of this change are the ongoing digitalisation and the increasing use of new technologies such as distributed ledger technology (DLT). These are enabling new forms of money and are fundamentally changing the way we make payments. The key question we are addressing in our talk today is: How can we harness the potential of digitalisation and new technologies in payments while maintaining confidence in the payments system and in money itself? In other words: How can we innovate while safeguarding the tried and tested? To achieve this, we first need an effective division of labour between the public and the private sector. The public sector lays the foundation for public confidence in money.
Where once trust was anonymised, institutionalised and centralised, today it is increasingly personalised, socialised and distributed. Facing these new constraints, the challenge for central banks is to rebuild trust among a wider set of societal stakeholders, more distrustful and diffuse than ever previously, using a set of trust-building technologies, less well-understood than those used previously. As they have through their history, central banks will need to adapt their customs and practices to these new social norms and technological possibilities. 7  This is a big agenda. It is not one remotely unique to central banks. And it is not one I could remotely do justice to tonight. Nonetheless, given the policy weight these days being placed on central banks’ shoulders, and the changing social and technological landscape facing them, it is probably as good a time as any to begin exploring these new frontiers of central bank engagement. Those new frontiers include communicating in simpler, narrative language that engages a wider audience using localised, personalised messaging; finding new ways to engage with cohorts of society currently out of reach, listening as often as talking; and using new technologies – nudging and polling, naming and gaming – to better understand the views and behaviours of wider society. For central banks, this is a brave new world. The Rising Tide of Central Banking th  Let me start by looking backwards. The 20 century may yet be seen by monetary historians as the one when central banking came of age.

My reflections on amendments to the framework The fact that the different proposals for amendments in the monetary policy framework all have their advocates among well-reputed economists shows that there are advantages and disadvantages with all of them and that none is clearly better than the others. Personally, I believe, as I said at the beginning, that one needs to think very carefully before changing the current framework at all. One must be very certain that one has come to the end of the road, and we probably aren't there yet, as I see it. For instance, many of the problems I have taken up will be resolved, or at least alleviated, if the global neutral interest rate rises. Although most people believe that it will be low for a long time to come, there are also those who believe an upturn is not that far away. 33  32 Disregarding this long-term argument it is not obvious how a target for nominal GDP growth will contribute to resolving, or even alleviating, the problem of the interest rate’s lower bound. 33 For example, Goodhart and Pradhan (2017) say that global demographic trends in the coming decade will turn around the downward trend in the global neutral interest rate. 15 [24]  Higher inflation target a natural further development But if I were nevertheless forced to take a stand, I would say that I lean towards raising the inflation target as the most natural means of further developing the monetary policy framework.
The consequences of our inherent vulnerability to external events, and of a large State apparatus which subsidizes inefficient public corporations and offers its citizens notionally free services irrespective of income levels as well as generous welfare benefits are catching up with us very rapidly. In the meantime, the world has changed beyond any expectation. For those of us who remember the days when famines and inefficient state-controlled economies were endemic in Asia, today’s realities are not easy to comprehend or to accept. The former EU Internal Market Commissioner, Fritz Bolkenstein, captured the momentous nature of this change most strikingly when he observed recently that “The true heirs of the capitalist revolution now live in Asia.” We in Malta, too, need to change if, like them, we want to turn globalization from a threat into an opportunity. We must shake off our ambivalent attitude to reform: we know that the status quo is unsustainable, but it is also comfortable, and so we are reluctant to bear the cost of change. Hence the slow pace of reform, characterized by the commissioning of reports followed by long drawn-out consultations in search of a consensus, which frequently proves elusive. But time is running out faster than many appreciate.

2  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organisation of 186 countries, working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world. BIS Review 22/2010  1  The accumulation of capital in the Fund reflects the depletion of a non-renewable resource. The assets of the Fund now amount to some USD 450 billion, the equivalent of 115% of Norway’s GDP in 2009, or around USD 100 000 per capita. About 40% of the Fund’s investments are in fixed income instruments and 60% in listed stocks. The Fund invests globally according to market value weights. It roughly holds 1% of all listed equities. This would not be possible without open and accessible international capital markets. Norway has a strong and vested interest in the well-being of global financial markets. Norway participated actively in the formulation of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign Wealth Funds, the “Santiago Principles”, a process coordinated by the IMF. Our sovereign wealth fund respects these principles. Norway has weathered the crisis better than most countries. We believe a strong fiscal position and well-anchored inflation expectations have contributed to our relative success. In addition, investment activity in the petroleum sector held up well, our exposure to the hardest hit sectors in the global downturn was fairly limited, and our banks are small and relatively solid.
But history is full of stories of reformers who made progress, declared victory, and paused, only to find their accomplishments threatened or reversed. For the post-crisis reforms to be durable, we cannot rest on our laurels – we have to keep learning and adapting. CCPs should keep themselves central by again being part of the solution. Over the past two years, two episodes of extreme market stress caused by external factors have tested the system: first, a once-in-100 year pandemic and second, the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by Russia. We should use the lessons from those episodes to make central clearing stronger. Global Pandemic – Spring 2020 In early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic sparked a ‘flight to safety’ by investors, with considerable volatility across asset classes, including government bonds. We saw the biggest two-day price  Page 3  moves for some cleared products in the past decade. [1] Thankfully, the financial system entered the pandemic in a much stronger position than in 2008, with at least $ in additional collateral against over the counter (OTC) derivative exposures; [2] and a significant increase of central clearing in OTC markets. [3] CCPs in this period functioned as intended. Very significant and sudden changes in asset prices did not lead to counterparty credit risk – actual or anticipated. There were no major clearing member defaults during the pandemic, so clearing was not tested to the limit. But there was no panic about counterparty credit risk, no ructions in the interest rate swap markets.

Indeed, monitoring the robustness of the financial system requires the evaluation of various factors that threaten the financial system as a whole and create systemic risks. For this reason, the perspective of the Bank is a macro and risk-focused one, similar to the perspective used in the financial stability reports published by other central banks. The definition of objectives and functions of central banks are different from those of supervisory authorities. Though central banks increasingly tend not to deal directly with the monitoring and supervision of banks in recent times, they continue to monitor developments in the banking sector as well as the basic systemic risks. Today, 38 central banks around the world publish the Financial Stability Report. In a total of twenty countries, fourteen European and six non-European countries, supervisory authority is separate from the central bank. Especially in systems where the power to monitor is granted to autonomous institutions other than the central bank, the function of monitoring and supervising the financial system focuses on the issue of financial soundness and effectiveness of individual institutions. However, the monitoring of the financial system as a whole in terms of financial stability is carried out by central banks. In countries such as England, Australia, Norway, Finland and Sweden, where the supervisory authority is not the central bank, central banks, including that of Turkey, focus on the objective of price stability and carry out operations consistent with monetary policies by monitoring the developments in financial markets.
The SFR plays a minor part on the stage of the global currency game - it is a dwarf among giants, so to speak. Its position may be described by means of three indicators. First, by the SFR's share in the global turnover in foreign exchange trading. Volume composition in Forex (Daily foreign-exchange transactions, $ billion 500 450  Tradi ng wi t h ot her currenci es Tradi ng wi t h US dol lar  430  400 350 300  300 250 200  158 291  267  101  100  73 44 79  £  Y  DM  0  58  42  AUD  50  FFR  118  CHF  150  This chart is based on data collected by the BIS in 1998, i.e. during the period prior to the introduction of the euro. The columns illustrate the composition of an average daily volume of approximately 1.5 trillion USD by currencies. The USD clearly predominates. This is shown by the size of the lower areas, which represent the respective trading volume vis-à-vis the USD. It seems very likely that the advent of the euro has not significantly changed the pre-eminence of the dollar. The new figures to be expected this year will be instructive in this regard. The SFR accounted for USD 100 billion, i.e. approximately 7% of the total daily volume in 1998. This may seem modest, but relative to the size of our economy it is a very respectable figure.

At that time it was inconceivable what we witness today: namely, that a couple of sunny days on the stock market are able to produce a gain in wealth potentially several times the size of an entire years' deficit or surplus in the current account. Thirty years later, the assessment of floating exchange rates is more differentiating. The system with all its advantages and despite its drawbacks is now firmly established and has even become increasingly widespread in the past twelve years. The number of countries which allow their currency to float more or less freely without a formal peg has risen from just over 30 to approximately 100. By and large, the experience gained with floating exchange rates may be summarised in two statements: First, the system occasionally generates large real exchange rate shifts that last longer than just a few days or weeks. They may extend over several quarters or even years, long enough to cause considerable harm to the real economy. Such distortions are not only observable in emerging economies but also between the currencies of the Big Three. One of the most spectacular distortions in the past decade was the rise and fall of the USD against the yen: Up 80% from April 95 to August 98, then down 31% until the end of 99. More recently, the longawaited appreciation of the euro in the past 12 weeks amounts to 13% against the USD and 20% 1  "THE CASE FOR FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES", IN: FURTHER ESSAYS IN MONETARY ECONOMICS, CAMBRIDGE (MASS.)
For example, at any point in time, the Federal Reserve will likely need to contemplate a series of current and future policy actions in order to effectively influence the trajectory of the economy and better achieve the goals of monetary policy. In order for households, businesses and financial markets to conduct business in accordance with the Fed’s planning, the public must believe that the Fed will carry out these future actions as expected to achieve its well-understood objectives. Credibility requires a clear public understanding of the Fed’s policy objectives, as well as a belief by the public that the Fed’s actions are consistent with achieving these objectives. Lower levels of credibility would be associated with erratic and misunderstood policy actions that seemed inconsistent with the stated objectives of monetary policy. At this point, it would be useful to describe the typical way in which monetary policy is set by central banks with any eye toward discussing how deliberations should be evaluated for effectiveness and credibility. The policy decision process In setting monetary policy, a central bank like the Federal Reserve must deliberate systematically about a wide variety of important issues. Perhaps at the cost of oversimplifying, I will broadly characterize this deliberative process as consisting of four steps. First, members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) must have a clear vision of the goals of monetary policy.

The work will stocktake current and emerging post-trade technology solutions, identify key pinch points and barriers to adoption across markets and products, and look at the cost and benefits of different solutions to address these barriers. Conclusion  The post-trade system is a key component of a bigger effective, efficient, and resilient financial system; one much reformed since the financial crisis of eleven years ago. A key feature of the financial system is it is one of multiple interdependencies, and it is this interdependent nature which is why I chose to focus on resilience and innovation today On the face of it, these two concepts are quite different – one referring to the ability to return to a previous state, the other referring to making change. But in practise they are irrevocably linked. An environment that prioritises resilience and innovation is one that ensures post-trade continues to thrive and adapt to technology, finance, and wider changes in the economy, whilst avoiding costly fragmentation. The Bank is playing its part here, with strategic goals on the one hand focussing on the need to innovate and drive change (Fintech; RTGS), but on the other on maintaining resilience (operational resilience; RTGS) – demonstrates that well. That’s why we’re focussing on providing a platform, via the right hard and soft infrastructure, for innovation to flourish. And why we will never slacken our focus on the criticality of resilience. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7
Financial Institutions are required to conduct customer due diligence to deter and detect proceeds from serious foreign tax offences, even if they are not offences in Singapore. •  We will automatically extend Exchange of Information (EOI) assistance in accordance with OECD standard to all existing Avoidance of Double Tax Agreement (DTA) partners without the need for negotiation. •  We signed the OECD Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  What is less well-known is the rigorous supervisory regime in place to combat financial crime. MAS’ approach is preventive. •  We seek to identify control weaknesses early so that financial institutions can strengthen their processes and prevent attempts to launder money or finance terrorism. •  This is more effective than punishing financial institutions only after actual acts have been committed and detected. Our coverage is comprehensive. •  Over last three years, MAS conducted total of 108 Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) inspections covering banks, insurance companies, money changers, remittance agents, and licensed intermediaries. •  Financial institutions have enhanced AML/CFT controls over the years, and most have in place the necessary policies, procedures and controls to combat money laundering and terrorism financing. Financial institutions with control deficiencies are firmly dealt with. •  •  Example: –  A bank which facilitated ship-closing transactions, did not conduct adequate due diligence on the final identity of buyers behind these transactions.

MAS’ monetary policy stance since 2010 has underpinned the gradual improvement that we are seeing in Singapore’s inflation-growth trade-off. •  MAS is committed to ensuring that recent improvements in inflation are sustained. •  The current policy stance of modest appreciation of the Singapore dollar is appropriate in containing the re-emergence of strong cost and price pressures in a restructuring economy. Strong Singapore Dollar impacts MAS profits despite good investment returns Let me now move on to MAS’ financial results. MAS made investment gains of $ billion for the FY ended March 2013. •  This is lower than the $ billion earned in the previous FY, due primarily to lower interest income as interest rates continued to decline in FY 2012/13. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  But MAS recorded an overall loss of $ billion after taking into account translation effects from an appreciating Singapore dollar. •  In FY 2012/13, the Singapore dollar appreciated against all major currencies  •  In particular, the Singapore dollar strengthened 5% against the Euro, 6% against the Sterling, and 14% against the Yen during FY. •  It also appreciated against traditionally strong currencies like the Aussie Dollar and the Canadian Dollar. In short, we made good investment returns, but when measured in Singapore dollars, these gains more than offset by strength of the currency. •  This is an issue of reporting currency. If we had reported our profit and loss in international currency, it would show healthy profit.
The reduction of the liability margin was offset by an increase in the asset margin, and by taking on greater interest rate risk. Third, domestically focused banks were able to maintain their level of resilience compared to the previous year, despite the increased risk exposure. Overall, their capitalisation is well above regulatory minimum requirements, and is also adequate according to SNB stress tests. The currently available capital surpluses at most banks would be sufficient to cover the losses projected in these stress tests. Given the level of prevailing risks, this is positive. However, the risks to financial stability could increase further. As we saw in 2015, even a lower momentum on the Swiss mortgage and residential real estate markets can cause imbalances on these markets to increase. This can happen, for instance, when combined with comparatively weaker developments in fundamentals such as GDP growth. Moreover, in a sustained period of low interest rates, real estate prices will remain subject to upward pressure. Another rise in prices or decline in yields could occur particularly in the residential investment property segment. This would increase the risk of a substantial correction in the event of an interest rate rise, which would put pressure both on leveraged investors and on the banks who finance their investments. At the same time, in an environment of persistently low interest rates, the pressure on interest rate margins would continue. Such pressure creates powerful incentives for banks to take on more risks.

However, to meet the requirements applicable from the beginning of 2020 – i.e. after the phase-in period – action will need to be taken. This is particularly the case as regards meeting the leverage ratio requirements, but also as regards gone-concern instruments. The latter are used to recapitalise a bank in the event of imminent insolvency without recourse to government support. This is achieved by writing off designated debt instruments or converting them into equity. In addition to the reforms at national level, reforms are also underway on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s international capital framework. It is likely that riskweighted assets will increase as a result of these international reforms. This expected increase has, as far as possible, been factored into the calibration of the revised Swiss ‘too big to fail’ regulations. All of these reforms – especially the higher leverage ratio requirements – will result in a further strengthening of the Swiss big banks’ resilience. In light of the fact that, in an international comparison, these two institutions are particularly large relative to the economy, this strengthening is necessary for two reasons. First, the big banks’ loss potential relative to their capitalisation is substantial. Given their significance to the Swiss economy, it is important that the big banks remain adequately capitalised, even in the event of such losses occurring. Second, while leverage ratios at both Swiss big banks have improved by international standards, they are still below the average for large globally active banks. The SNB welcomes and supports these reforms.