samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Logan, “Operational Perspectives on Monetary Policy Implementation: Panel Remarks on The Future of the Central Bank Balance Sheet,” May 4, 2018, provides a comparison of the technical operation of the pre-crisis and current frameworks. 7 This one day was December 31, 2015, when the federal funds rate printed at 20 basis points, or five basis points below the bottom of the FOMC’s target range. Potter, “Money Markets after Liftoff: Assessment to Date and the Road Ahead,” February 22, 2016, discusses this occasion. 8 The distribution of traded rates underlying the secured overnight funding rate (SOFR) is broader than that underlying the EFFR and overnight bank funding rate (OBFR). This reflects SOFR’s construction, which was designed to improve repo market transparency by including rates on transactions across three segments of the repo market. 2  Of course, monetary control does not stop at the federal funds market: our framework must ensure that the stance of monetary policy is passed through into other money markets. It has also been very successful in this sense. Figure 3 shows a broad selection of secured and unsecured overnight money market rates; it is clear that increases in the target range for the federal funds rate have passed through fully and immediately to the other rates, as expected and intended. Moreover, I have been very encouraged by the relative stability and high degree of comovement among short-term money market rates.

Caleb M Fundanga: Strengthening the Zambian banking sector Address by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Commissioning and Official Opening of Access Bank (Zambia) Ltd, Lusaka, 24 September 2008. *  *  *  • H.E, Acting President of Republic of Zambia, Mr. Rupiah Banda M.P; • Honourable Ministers; • H.E Nigerian High Commissioner to Zambia; • Access Bank Group Deputy Managing Director; • Access Bank Zambia Chairman; • Access Bank Zambia Managing Director; • Distinguished guests; • Ladies and Gentlemen. I am greatly honoured to be given this opportunity to make brief remarks at this formal commissioning and opening of Access Bank (Zambia) Ltd. I wish to extend a warm welcome to all of you gathered here today, particularly those who have travelled from outside the country. Your Excellency, Honourable Ministers, today’s event is a crowning moment and demonstrates the fruits of the economic reforms that the Government has continued to implement in the financial sector in particular and the economy in general. Indeed it is a landmark achievement in the Government’s concerted efforts aimed at attracting foreign investors. It is also gratifying to note that Access Bank Zambia Limited is the first bank to be registered in the country since 1999. I am also happy to inform you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the Bank of Zambia is currently reviewing other applications for banking licenses. In this regard, we expect a few more banks to be registered in the near future.
This includes wider representation from non-bank payment service providers and user groups such as consumers, merchants and government agencies. The NPAC now comprises a Steering Committee, a User Consultative Group and a Service Provider Consultative Group. The consultative groups serve to promote dialogue, encourage alignment and canvass new ideas to improve payment solutions. This provides important inputs to focus on the strategic and tactical priorities for the development of the payment systems in Malaysia. Continued support from all stakeholders necessary to ensure the successful migration to PIN verification Before I end my speech, allow me to take this opportunity to commend the industry on its efforts to achieve a smooth transition from signature to PIN verification of payment card transactions. Collectively, we shall achieve our targets to migrate users to PIN verification by 1 July 2017. We have seen tremendous commitment and intensified efforts by banks to meet these targets and I am pleased to note that we are near completing the replacement of all active payment cards and POS terminals with PIN functionalities. We have been clear that there will be no extension to the deadline of 1 July 2017 for turning off signature verification. By that date, only PIN will be accepted for domestic payment card transactions, so it is important that in the next 40 days, we should not be complacent and no effort is spared to encourage the migration to PIN. From the latest data we have, the PIN bypass rate has now been reduced to 10% in April.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: The dawn of a new era in Malaysia's payment systems Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Malaysian E-Payments Excellence Awards, Kuala Lumpur, 22 May 2017. * * * I am glad to be with you at this 2nd Malaysian E-Payments Excellence Awards organised by MyClear. This evening, we are recognising the contributions of the financial industry, businesses and government agencies to the country’s e-payment agenda. The achievements showcased by the award winners today reflect the broader innovations and involvement that we continue to witness in the payment space to make e-payments more convenient, cost-efficient and safe for users. I am encouraged that contactless payments, for example, are gaining greater appeal for smaller value payments. Equally important have been the collective efforts made to educate and inform users. This helps to drive changes in payment habits away from cash and cheques to epayments. Malaysians are increasingly embracing e-payments Malaysia has long recognised the importance of e-payments as a key enabler to drive national efficiency and competitiveness, and as a catalyst to facilitate the creation of new sources of growth. Promising progress has been made in achieving the country’s e-payment targets. In a period of 6 years between 2011 and 2016, the number of e-payments per capita has almost doubled from 49 to 97 transactions per capita. This largely reflects the accelerated adoption of electronic fund transfers to displace cheques.
Likewise, we foresee that fiscal policy will contribute to expenditure growth significantly during this year, especially through increased public investment. As usual, our projections rely on a number of assumptions, and an important one is that consumer and business expectations will recover. Recent data show a slight revision upward of these indicators, which are still clearly pessimistic nonetheless. Meanwhile, information gathered in the Business Perceptions Report a quarterly publication by the Bank, points to moderate performance in businesses in 2015, with investment plans primarily focused on capital replenishment. Turning to inflation, in the baseline scenario the CPI will stay above 4 percent annually for some more months, approaching 3 percent over the course of 2016. For the CPIEFE, our preferred measure of core inflation, our forecast for 2015 is revised up and is expected to approach 3 percent in 2016 and stay in the neighborhood until the end of the projection horizon (figure 9). This trajectory assumes that the pass-through from the peso depreciation of recent months to prices will stand in the upper part of historic patterns; that real wages will be adjusted in line with productivity; and that capacity gaps will persist over the projection horizon. For the real exchange rate, the forecast uses as a methodological assumption that it will remain similar to its current value, considering that it is within the range believed to be consistent with the state of the business cycle and its long-term fundamentals.

the CPI excluding foodstuffs and energy, CPIEFE, from 4.3 to 4.7 percent annually between November and February. However, the lower oil price in international markets and its pass-through to domestic prices helped to moderate annual growth in CPI inflation, which went from 5.5 percent in November to 4.4 percent in February (figure 1). Recent inflation figures have taken the market by surprise, as it had assumed a clearly downward position with respect to the behavior of prices, even below our predictions in the December Report. Thus, the market expectation for inflation at the end of 2015 has been revised to somewhat above 3 percent, as has been inflation one year out. Expectations two years out remain anchored in 3 percent (figure 2). On the contrary, output and expenditure have evolved as forecast in December. Again this time the baseline scenario I will be sharing with you in a moment foresees a gradual recovery that will gain strength towards the second half of this year. Consistently with this scenario and the Board’s statement, market expectations for the monetary policy rate (MPR) have ruled out new cuts and, in some cases, point at a cycle of increases beginning late this year. In what follows I will describe the macroeconomic scenario we believe to be the most likely for the coming quarters, and its associated risks. Macroeconomic scenario The external environment and related risks remain largely determined by the impending monetary normalization process in the United States.
This demographic trend can be measured using the old age dependency ratio, which measures the ratio of people over 64 to the working age population. An ‘older’ population has a higher old age dependency ratio. Chart 3 shows that the old age dependency ratio in Switzerland, as in many other countries, is rising. Pensioners live off their savings. And an ageing population needs to save more today in order to be able to finance a specific level of consumption in the future. Another cause of the increased supply of savings is the integration of China into global financial markets. Savings in China are high as a result of its ageing society and its rudimentary state pension system. In the current economic situation, uncertainty regarding the future development of the economy in certain parts of the world may also have pushed up the supply of savings. While the propensity to save has increased, the willingness to invest may also have fallen. On the one hand, this may once again reflect heightened uncertainty over future economic conditions. On the other, expectations of lower productivity growth might also be playing a role. Furthermore, industrial economies are being transformed into service economies, with potentially lower capital needs. All these factors have resulted in a relatively low real equilibrium interest rate today – across the world, and thus also in Switzerland. Moreover, global monetary policy is expansionary due to undesirably low inflation and subdued economic growth in the wake of the financial crisis.

This has generally been negative over the last five years, as you can see in chart 7. The biggest contribution to low inflation, the red bars in the chart, comes from imported goods. Also, the fall in oil prices, the yellow bars, has contributed to low inflation. Thanks to the stabilisation of both the  Page 5/16  exchange rate and oil prices, inflation has been climbing since the end of 2015, and we forecast that it should re-enter positive territory in the coming quarters. Now let me turn to the credit channel. In a functioning transmission mechanism, you would expect to see a lower general interest rate level and rising credit volumes following an interest rate cut by the central bank. Did interest rates in Switzerland fall after the introduction of negative interest? And how have credit volumes and bond issuance changed? Since the reduction in interest on banks’ sight deposits held at the SNB to –0.75% in January 2015, yields on long-term Confederation bonds have fallen by more than half a percentage point, as chart 8 shows. 2 Interest rates on corporate bonds, the red curve in the chart, have also declined sharply. The financing costs of bond-issuing companies have thus fallen. The situation regarding interest rates for bank loans is rather different. As you can see in chart 9, initially they did not fall; indeed, they rose slightly.
It’s also crucial that these efforts are coordinated at the global level, given the global dimension of the risks and the potential spillovers that can arise through interconnections between the real and financial sectors. In this regard, at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), we are conducting a “gap analysis” to identify areas in the current Basel Framework where climate-related financial risks may not be adequately addressed or are not captured. This gap analysis will be comprehensive in nature, and will cover regulatory, supervisory and disclosure elements. Building on the analysis, we plan to explore practical solutions to address any identified gaps. In addition to a set of principles or guidelines on effective supervisory practices for assessing climate-related financial risks, the Committee will explore whether any policy measures under the regulatory framework should be taken, and how the Basel Committee could support international efforts related to the development of globally consistently sustainability reporting requirements. Importantly, any changes proposed by the Basel Committee to its regulatory framework would be in pursuit of its mandate to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. As to monetary policy, central banks should definitely be a part of this optimal policy mix as well. Here, it is useful to distinguish between central banks' monetary policy operations and those other operations not related to our monetary policy mandates. I will start with the latter, if only because it is easier to draw some conclusions in this case.

Policies and measures will be formulated to not only increase the capacity and the capability of the Islamic banking players but also to set the stage for Malaysia to be an active player in global developments in Islamic banking and finance. Ladies and Gentlemen, New players, new technologies, the push to globalisation and continuing deregulation are still driving change in the financial services industry. Productivity, service quality, customer satisfaction and cost are key factors that drive the performance in a financial services organisation. In this uncertain world, the drive towards excellence can only be realised if strategic steps are taken today to enhance capability and capacity, thereby securing the well being of the banking industry and thereby the ability of the industry to contribute to the overall economic prosperity of our nation. On this note, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish you a successful Summit. Thank you. BIS Review 33/2002  5
Besides the WTO, ASEAN and its members need to take full advantage of APEC, supporting its concept of “open regionalism”, and its goal of free trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region. ASEAN also needs to explore links with other regional groups, for example with North East Asia through a possible free trade area with China, Japan and South Korea. At the Informal Summit, the ASEAN plus three countries clearly recognised that it is not in their own interest for the divide between Northeast and Southeast Asia to continue widening. The “plus three countries” want to work with ASEAN, to develop closer and deeper linkages between the two sub-regions. The way to strengthen ASEAN economic cooperation is by participating actively in these external fora, and not by opting out of them. This will send a strong signal to the world that ASEAN remains an open and outward looking organisation, with its members welcoming competition and strengthening themselves as a group. It will help restore ASEAN’s credibility as a vigorous and effective organisation that plays a responsible, relevant role on the international stage. Corporate sector restructuring The third area on which the crisis countries have to focus attention is their corporate sectors. Insolvent and non-viable companies have to be restructured, to set growth on a firm basis and restore confidence. The problems differ from country to country, but some fundamental issues are common.

China’s imminent entry into the WTO is a major plus for China’s economic development. Asia will benefit from China’s continued stability and prosperity. But China’s entry will also mean stronger competition for ASEAN countries, particularly those which depend on labour intensive industries. ASEAN’s exports will be affected, as will its foreign direct investments. South East Asia In South East Asia, many countries are still tackling economic and political issues. Economically, the broad view is that progress in reforming the banking and corporate sectors has been slow, causing the region to remain vulnerable to any softening of external demand. Politically, Indonesia is in the midst of a wrenching transition, with the final resolution still unclear. In the Philippines, the political unrest and now the impeachment and trial of President Estrada has affected the peso, the stock market, and the economy. In Malaysia, UMNO is striving hard to win back the Malay ground, and is fending off a strong challenge from PAS, the opposition Islamic party. Thailand is preparing for general elections. ASEAN The crisis has also raised doubts about ASEAN’s credibility and relevance as a regional organisation. ASEAN appeared divided and slow in responding to the crisis, and even now is seen as weakened and drifting. The expansion of ASEAN to 10 members has made it harder for the organisation to maintain focus and reach consensus. From a long term geopolitical perspective, this expansion is crucial for ASEAN’s strength. But in the short term it has added to doubts about ASEAN’s viability.
But even with this substantial source of income, only a share of future pension payments – which basically are financed by current income – will be matched by revenues from the Pension Fund. Estimates show that the capital in the Fund will only cover some 50-60 per cent of public pension expenditure in the future. One key element of the Fund Management Model is accountability. The role of the political authorities as well as of Norges Bank as manager is clearly defined. Another key feature is transparency and disclosure of information. The management of the Fund is based on two ethical commitments. 16  BIS Review 37/2008  First, there is the consideration relating to future generations. The Fund must ensure high capital returns at a moderate risk, by means of professional management with effective control of operational risk. Since 1997, the average annual net real return has been a little above the expected 4 per cent, partly due to excess return attributable to Norges Bank’s management. Second, the Fund must respect the fundamental rights of those affected by the companies in which the Fund has invested. The instruments used here are the exclusion of companies from the Fund’s investment universe and the active exercise of ownership rights. The Ministry of Finance excludes companies that produce certain types of weapons. They also exclude companies when they identify an unacceptable risk of contributing to gross corruption, severe environmental degradation, and serious violations of human rights and of fundamental ethical norms.

Let me now turn to the case of the Icelandic banks, which highlights these issues in an extreme form and at the same time throws light on the flaws in the EU setup for cross-border banking. When its three cross-border banks failed in the first week of October 2008, Iceland was already on its way into a recession partly related to macroeconomic imbalances that accumulated during 2005–2007. The banking collapse and the associated wealth loss and further depreciation of the currency significantly deepened the ensuing recession. Before the collapse, the banking system had expanded very rapidly, growing in just five years from a combined balance sheet of less than 2 times GDP (at the end of 2003) to almost 10 times GDP (in mid-2008). Most of this expansion was cross-border, and a significant part of it was really off-border, having very little to do with Iceland, as both financing and investment took place abroad. In the panic that gripped global financial markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, these banks were faced with a wholesale run on their foreign currency liabilities and were therefore heading towards a default on those liabilities in the absence of LOLR assistance in foreign currency. However, given the size of the balance sheets involved (10 times GDP overall, nearly three-fourths of it in foreign currency), it was impossible for the Icelandic authorities to provide such assistance on their own and could have been catastrophic for the credit of the sovereign if they had made a full-scale attempt to do so.
In the first half of the twentieth century – described by Isaiah Berlin as “the worst century there has ever been” – thousands of Australians went to fight on the other side of the globe and to give their lives to a cause that transcended national interests. One of the consequences of globalisation is that the impact of change in one part of the world on the lives of people in other parts is growing. In areas as diverse as trade, energy, combating terrorism, climate change, and the economic consequences of massive global imbalances with capital flowing from poor to rich countries, there are now growing spillovers from decisions in one country to the lives of people in others. In contrast to the horrors of two World Wars and the Great Depression, the strains and stresses of today’s world do not seem insurmountable. How can we best deal with these challenges? When the movement of people in Manchuria from subsistence rural agriculture to industrial employment influences which industries flourish in Manchester and Melbourne, and when changes in attitudes to asset management in Beijing affect currency values and hence living standards from Birmingham to Brisbane, it is in the interest of all nation states, recognising their growing interdependence, to make commitments to each other about what they will and won’t do. Such commitments are embodied in international institutions – they are the rules of the game. Impressive offices and grand meetings are not the test of whether our international institutions are successful.

It is now clear that rating agencies’ models failed in the recent past as a result of wrongly basing their ratings on the correlations observed during good times. In my opinion, the recent methodological changes, imposing stricter rating caps (above the rating of the sovereign), in particular for EMU countries, amount to treating crisis times as structural changes making the new methodologies based again on extreme assumptions. Thus, the error is the same, this time in the opposite direction. Policy-makers timely acknowledged the fragilities in the design of the EMU, identifying the most crucial reforms needed. These will increase the robustness of the euro area economies against adverse shocks. Rating agencies do not fully recognize the ongoing process. Instead, they decide to change their procedures exactly at the moment in which the institutional framework of the EMU is responding to the very same conditions that motivated such move. In this regard, it is important to emphasize that EMU countries are about to be equipped with a banking union, which will contribute towards breaking the link between sovereigns and the banking/financial system. Further relevant institutional changes include the creation of the European stability mechanism, the Fiscal Compact, the new role of the ECB in eliminating runs on sovereign debt (through the Outright Monetary Transactions programme) and a comprehensive set of EU regulations aimed at avoiding fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances. Therefore, rating agencies are moving countercyclically with the EU institutional advances and risk becoming irrelevant.