samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Lim Hng Kiang: Brief overview of economic links between Vietnam and Singapore Opening remarks by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Minister for Trade and Industry, at the Launch of Vietnam-Singapore Listing Preparatory Program, Hanoi, 2 April 2007. *  *  *  His Excellency, Vu Van Ninh Minister of Finance of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen It gives me great pleasure this morning to join His Excellency, Minister Vu and all of you in Hanoi at the official launch of the Vietnam-Singapore Listing Preparatory Program. As Minister Vu has shared earlier, today’s programme adds yet another pillar to our growing economic relationship. Today’s launch is especially meaningful for me, as looking back at 2005, our two countries inked a historic Framework Agreement on Vietnam-Singapore Connectivity to strengthen our relations and to cooperate across the many areas in which we have shared interests. I am thus very glad that my officials from the Monetary Authority of Singapore have been working closely with Vietnam Ministry of Finance and the State Securities Commission to see through the implementation of the terms provided under the Connectivity Agreement. The objective of the Connectivity Agreement had been to build closer Government-to-Government relations between Vietnam and Singapore, to bring about more opportunities for mutual collaboration and exchanges between our two countries.

Officials from the Monetary Authority of Singapore have been in close dialogue with Vietnam MOF and SSC to develop a meaningful programme catered at helping Vietnamese enterprises understand the workings of the international capital markets and the regulatory standards as well as market standards required for a listing in an international market outside of Vietnam. We have invited representatives from the Singapore Exchange, as well as professionals from leading investment banks, accountants and lawyers to join us at today’s seminar, and they will cover a wide-ranging programme that helps to prepare Vietnamese enterprises on cross-border listings, training on corporate governance, listing rules and accounting standards, amongst others. I understand that there are also plans for Vietnamese companies to be introduced to institutional investors based in Singapore at a later stage. All these efforts will pave the way for Vietnam to tap on Singapore’s capital markets as an additional channel to connect with global investors. We believe this will contribute to speeding up the pace of Vietnam’s economic growth, even as you are taking significant measures to develop your own capital markets. Singapore is now home to a wide pool of institutional funds, with more than $ billion of assets under management. As a well-managed pro-business marketplace, Singapore is particularly  BIS Review 35/2007  1  attractive to international companies seeking an offshore listing. Currently, more than 700 companies are listed on the Singapore Exchange. Amongst them, more than 30% are foreign companies from around the globe.
In essence, pricing at penalty rates incorporates an exit strategy into the design of the programs. But while the various liquidity programs shared these features, they differed in other dimensions, and it is these differences that prompt questions about the future scope and design of liquidity facilities. A primary question is whether liquidity support during times of stress should be offered only to banks or to a wider set of financial institutions. We have a financial system in the United States that is heavily dependent on nonbank institutions in the extension of credit to firms and households. Indeed, as noted earlier, the amount of credit provided by the securitization market has rivaled that provided by banks. Moreover, nonbank firms in many cases are just as vulnerable to liquidity pressures and run-like dynamics as are banks. Accordingly, there may be benefits to having the central bank extend credit to both banks and nonbank financial intermediaries during periods of financial stress. The experience with the TALF suggests that nonbank lending efforts can be successful at restoring market functioning and the flow of credit to firms and households. A second issue is the extent to which the Federal Reserve should be flexible in setting the structure of its liquidity programs to meet the needs of the market. As noted earlier, the TALF did this in several ways, including its extension of the duration of the loans beyond the shortterm nature of most other liquidity facilities.

These developments paved the way for subsequent commercial mortgage-backed deals to come to the market without TALF support. The TALF accomplished these benefits while exposing the Federal Reserve to a limited amount of risk, as its design provides considerable protection. As I mentioned earlier, loans were made only against the highest rated asset-backed collateral. 4 Moreover, TALF borrowers contributed significant capital in the form of a risk-based haircut, which means that the market value of collateral pledged exceeded the principal amount of the TALF loan. The prices of securities pledged to the facility have risen, giving the Federal Reserve an even larger cushion against loss, and no securities have been put to the facility to date. In addition, Treasury backstopped the facility by committing up to $ billion to absorb any losses associated with the loans before the Federal Reserve would be at risk. And lastly, the interest earned on our loans is accruing, with about $ million earned to date, and serves as a buffer against loss. 3  Sources: Morgan Markets; Bloomberg L.P.; Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 4  Importantly, the Federal Reserve performed due diligence on each of the bonds pledged to the facility as a part of a detailed risk assessment process. 4  BIS Review 80/2010  The risk to the Federal Reserve is also limited by the amount of balance sheet employed, which has been considerably less than envisioned at the height of the crisis.
So far they have found them in bio-fuels, which in turn put pressure on agriculture commodity prices. Signs of mounting cost-push pressure from oil and commodity prices can be observed in the recent acceleration of domestic headline inflation, which rose above 5 per cent in February. 2  BIS Review 33/2008  Such increase, if continued, can pose risk to the incipient recovery in private consumption as it lowers households’ purchasing power. Rising production and construction costs can also dampen business profit, especially in the face of tight control on final goods prices. Dampened prospects for profits in turn may lead to delays of planned investment. While this downside risk is substantial, there is also an upside. Higher commodity prices strengthen farm income, which tends to benefit a large section of the Thai workforce. Ladies and Gentlemen, The risks to global growth and global inflation have both increased in the near-term. At this point, we cannot be sure how the slowdown of global growth will affect global inflation this year. And even though, from an asset price perspective, there is a positive probability for a correction in oil and commodity prices going forward, we cannot be certain that such correction will be substantial enough to bring the inflation risk down. One thing is more or less certain, however: Global financial interconnectedness almost all but ensures that we should expect higher financial volatility in the near term, as market players alternate between yield-seeking and risk-aversion investment strategies.

The outcome on this front is quite favorable, as headline and core inflation were well contained at 2.3 and 1.1 percent, respectively, by end2007. Despite the unusual global situation, the Thai financial markets also remained resilient through 2007 with only moderate fluctuations. And while credit and deposit grew slowly, profitability of banks and financial institutions remained at a satisfactory level. Overall NPLs in the banking system remained moderate, as low income households’ ability to service debt started to decline mostly on account of slow income expansion. Ladies and gentlemen, These growth and stability outcomes under significant downside risks paint a picture of a resilient economy. As far as the outlook for the Thai economy in 2008 is concerned, I would like to address first the growth momentum and then talk about the risks and uncertainties confronting the economy this year. Preliminary data indicate that private consumption and investment are firming up after recovering during the fourth quarter last year. This is good news, as private consumption and investment constitute almost 70 per cent of total demand. Clearer political landscape postelection and continued spending by the government has helped revive private demand. Reflecting that, we have started to see strong pickup in imports in January. February data also confirmed the strength of imports. Moreover, plans for further fiscal stimulus as well as accelerated budget disbursement should ensure that domestic demand revival is firmly in place.
Let me be clear. We must deal with the fire sale issue in tri-party repo and the heightened run risk it creates. I believe there are three potential ways forward, all of which are superior to the status quo. First, tri-party repo transactions could be restricted to open market operations (OMO) eligible collateral.11 Such collateral would likely remain quite liquid during a time of crisis.12 In addition, such collateral could, in a crisis, potentially be passed directly by a broker-dealer to the discount window under Section 13.13 authority, or, because of beneficial treatment under Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, be financed by a banking affiliate that would then itself borrow at the discount window. Thus, one could construct an effective lender of last resort backstop for an OMO-eligible- only tri-party repo system. However, there are also some significant disadvantages to such an approach. The less liquid collateral could just migrate to be financed elsewhere, with associated run and fire sale risks. Also, given that housing finance reform could cause the agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be replaced by something different that was not OMO eligible under the Federal Reserve Act, the share of assets that are OMO eligible could diminish over time. Finally, this approach would do little to mitigate the risk of fire sales of a defaulted dealer’s collateral by its investors once a dealer is bankrupt.

M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Efficiency enhancements and risk management Remarks by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Asian Bankers’ Seminar, Bangkok, 16 March 2006. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Fellow bankers, Ladies and Gentlemen, Today’s seminar covers wide-ranging topics of interests to the banking community ranging from efficiency enhancements to risk management needed to achieve sustainable business growth. While these issues are topical and useful to bankers, I believe that one cannot simply reduce risks by relying on risk management process alone. An effective risk management system has to be supported by proper governance of the bank’s Management and its Board of Directors. One of the painful lessons of the 1997 crisis was that improper governance practices at the Board level were amongst the root causes of the downfall of too many financial institutions. Back then, it was not unusual for banks to lend to related parties with close connections to their owners, directors, and management without the proper credit analysis. Board members of banks often neglected their responsibilities to blow the whistle against these imprudent activities. Many Board members also did not have adequate and timely access to the necessary information to detect such misdeeds so that appropriate actions could be taken to prevent the resultant damages. The concept of “governance” as understood in Western society and now introduced into our business organizations, including financial institutions, has served as a good starting point to rectify some of the root causes of the crisis.
Third, the statement gives an indication of how the MPC intends to respond to future data developments. In line with the argumentation that I have already offered, it emphasises that the MPC will be focused on ‘indications of more persistent inflationary pressures’ – in my view, this places emphasis on identifying potential second-round effects in price and wage setting behaviour. This helps to clarify how the MPC defines it policy ‘reaction function’ at present, prioritising the more persistent component of inflation developments over the headline spot measure. Fourth, by signalling preparedness to ‘if necessary act forcefully in response’ to indications of  Page 11  greater persistence in inflation, the statement reflects both my willingness to adopt a faster pace of tightening than implemented thus far in this tightening cycle, while simultaneously emphasising the conditionality of any such change in pace on the flow of new data and analysis. Much remains to be resolved before we vote on our August policy decision. How I vote on that occasion will be determined by the data that we see and my interpretation of it. And finally, harking back to the opening section of my remarks, the statement places a direct and clear statement of the MPC’s commitment to return inflation to target at its heart. This is something all MPC members agree on – and the main message addressees of the statement should extract. As I said earlier, it is also the message I would like you to take from my comments today.

Improving access to finance and responsible lending by the financial institutions coupled with sensible and prudent use of credit by the borrowers are an imperative for the consumers and for the wider economy. Being financially competent can also act as the first line of defence against falling prey to financial scams or frauds and abusive selling practices. Indeed, financial education initiatives complemented by fair and responsible business conduct are not only essential complements to financial inclusion, they contribute to broader financial stability and consequently improving the lives of members of society. For financial educators and policymakers, the challenge ahead is a daunting one, given the scope of the task and the rapidly changing environment. There has been no time like the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  present, where the financial education and financial inclusion agenda has risen to such prominence at the global, regional and national levels. We should seize this opportunity. The increased visibility of financial education and financial inclusion should at least make our work a little bit easier especially in securing top level commitment to advance this agenda and ensure better alignment among various stakeholders. It is in this context that the global leadership of institutions like the OECD, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) and the World Bank is important to sustain the momentum for greater progress and champion the financial education and financial inclusion agenda.
This amplified the cyclical upturn in our part of the world. Towards the end of the decade, during the financial crisis, policy interest rates were reduced sharply and to record-low levels. That was a natural and necessary response. But a persistently low interest rate poses challenges in an economy where there is a strong appetite for borrowing and property prices are rising, as this may increase the risk of imbalances further ahead. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  These experiences have provided new insights into how the interest rate functions under an inflation targeting regime. Norges Bank’s analyses and communication have evolved. Economic agents have become familiar with our response pattern. When setting the key policy rate, we do not exclusively assign weight to bringing inflation back to target, but we also take into account the impact of the interest rate on output and employment. Inflation targeting has become more flexible. In our most recent Monetary Policy Report, published in March 2012, we further clarified the Banks’s response pattern. By way of three criteria, we highlight what we take into account when we set interest rates. The first criterion states that the interest rate should be set with a view to stabilising inflation at target or to bring it back to target if a deviation has occurred. The second criterion states that the interest rate path set by the Bank for the period ahead should provide a reasonable balance between the path for inflation and the path for overall capacity utilisation in the economy, i.e.

When these young economists returned home, they had learned that another world was possible. They had received key inspiration about the proper business of a central bank and the proper conduct of monetary and credit policy. Today, the Bank has a Research Unit. The research is useful but it is a drop in the ocean compared with the research taking place in the wider world. But the Research Unit is important for ensuring that we are vigilant. It is the Bank’s bridge to the academic world inside and outside Norway. Internationally recognised scholars visit the Bank on a weekly basis to relate the latest news from the research front and challenge our perceptions and ways of thinking. The actual presence of in-house researchers with specialist expertise in central banking sharpens the minds of other Bank staff. The Research Unit ensures that as an institution the Bank does not isolate itself and become inward-looking and self-satisfied. The third measure is to ensure that the Bank’s governing bodies and Bank staff work together as a team. Most of the literature on “making good decisions” focuses on the composition of the governing board (external vs. internal and governance by experts vs. general governance expertise) and work structure (collegial committees vs. individualistic committees). Just as important is how the governing board manages to make the most of staff expertise. If an institution like the central bank slowly slips into mediocrity, it will not be discovered until it is too late. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In the first months of 2020, CPI inflation slowed substantially, reflecting a fall in electricity prices. The rise in the CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE) moved up through spring and summer and remained above the inflation target, primarily owing to higher imported goods inflation. Higher imported inflation reflects the krone depreciation in early 2020. Annual CPI inflation was 1.3 percent in 2020, while CPI-ATE inflation was 3 percent. Towards the end of 2020, higher electricity prices pushed up CPI inflation. In March 2021, the 12-month rise in the CPI was 3.1 percent, while underlying inflation was somewhat lower. Surveys indicate that inflation expectations are firmly anchored around the 2 percent inflation target. In the immediate aftermath of the Covid-19 outbreak in Norway, housing market turnover fell and house prices edged down. But through spring 2020, housing market activity picked up and prices rose. In April 2021, house prices were more than 12 percent higher than at the same time in 2020. Growth in household credit increased slightly through 2020, but is still lower than in the 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  years prior to the pandemic. Economic policy Let me now say a few words about the economic policy conducted since Covid-19 hit Norway. Fiscal policy has taken the lead and played a decisive role in limiting the adverse economic impact of the pandemic and the measures to contain it.

[12] As we move forward, we will reassess whether a normalisation strategy is sufficient to bring us back to 2% inflation over the medium term. Ultimately, the terminal rate at which our hiking cycle ends must be compatible with inflation returning durably to our target – and that rate will depend on how the economic environment evolves around us. One key factor will be how the persistence of the shocks we are facing affects inflation expectations and potential output. If there were evidence that high inflation risked de-anchoring inflation expectations, then the policy rate that is compatible with our target would lie in restrictive territory. Similarly, were we to conclude that ongoing supply shocks had durably lowered economic potential, we would have to ensure that demand remains aligned with supply. Another key factor will be how the growth outlook affects inflation. Negative supply shocks will result in a growth slowdown, which will likely have an impact on the prevailing inflation rate. In past euro area recessions going back to the 1970s, headline inflation has fallen by about 1.1 percentage points a year later, while core inflation has fallen by about half that amount. [13] But this is not a hard-and-fast rule: in some recessionary episodes, such as those triggered by a worsening of supply conditions, inflation has stayed the same or even risen.
Not only does this raise serious concerns on the risk to systemic stability, it also undermines the integrity and efficiency of the markets. By virtue of their sheer size and aggressive trading strategies, the highly leveraged institutions, through their agencies, who usually also provide them with the credit, and possibly also ride along with them, often use their market power to influence the prices in smaller markets. Almost always an attack on a currency in Asia starts late on a Friday afternoon when the domestic markets in Asia are thin and when the international currency markets in London and New York open for business. Almost always a succession of big sell orders is placed for execution in a short period of time. And almost always the banks, when asked, say that they are executing those orders on behalf of their customers, whose identity and purpose cannot be disclosed because client secrecy is sacrosanct. And all this is supported with an immaculately timed commentary of gloom and doom. Some are more objective than others, but regrettably the impression one gets, particularly as a regulator, is that they are aimed at generating undue pessimism and panic, and consequent sharp and widespread movements across the currency and other related financial markets in favour of those behind the attacks. Most of the activities of the highly leveraged institutions are carried out through the OTC markets, which are very opaque.

Second, the inflation target is quantified. The actual target varies, however, from one country to another. In some countries, such as New Zealand and Israel, the target has been set as a target band for inflation, and not as a single target figure. Other countries like Canada and Sweden have a target figure with a target band around it. Common to all inflation-targeting countries is the existence of symmetry: It is equally important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high. Monetary policy in the US and the euro area is not usually considered to be inflation targeting. In the US, low and stable inflation is an important long-term monetary policy objective, but no explicit target has been set. In the euro area, price stability is the most important monetary policy objective. This is stipulated by a treaty. The ECB has defined price stability as a rise in consumer prices that is less than but close to 2 per cent. This means that there is no symmetry. The ECB differs here. It also appears that the ECB has a longer time horizon for its assessments, and the bank emphasises developments in the money supply. For most inflation-targeting countries, the explicit target is linked to a level or a band for the consumer price index. Some of the prices in the consumer price index vary considerably, however, due, for example, to tax changes, weather and wind.