samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is no need for me to explain the dichotomy that arises when we have, on one hand, an industry that is becoming increasingly internationalised in nature and, on the other, a supervisory framework that remains predominantly based on national responsibilities and accountabilities. In a context where banking groups increasingly take decisions and manage risks on a global basis, inconsistencies or differences in the regulation and supervision across the countries in which they are active may create compliance costs and inefficiencies. Furthermore, adverse developments in one bank are more likely to have financial stability implications for several countries. These issues are certainly not exclusive to the EU. But the existence of the EU project adds an extra dimension, which brings challenges, responsibilities and also opportunities. Progress has been made in building the single market in financial services, but we are not there yet. In some segments of the financial markets, such as retail banking, there is a long way to go to achieve a fully integrated market. And recent experiences in relation to some cross-border acquisitions seem hardly compatible with the spirit of the single market. We face, therefore, several challenges: to safeguard the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of supervisory action in more global and integrated financial markets; and to reduce the remaining obstacles to cross-border finance, both in terms of cross-border consolidation and in the provision of products and services. Some of these national differences have developed over a long period of time and go beyond the prudential or supervisory sphere.

4  BIS Review 84/2005  I believe that we need to combine these four vertical and horizontal aspects – together with enhanced supervisory transparency at all levels – in order to have the most effective and efficient system. Conclusion In concluding my intervention today, I would be the first to admit that the ideas I have mentioned today are not revolutionary, but I believe that an evolutionary and balanced approach is the best way forward and provides the greatest chances of success. The flip-side of the coin in this evolutionary approach is that the responsibility to deliver is greater. But if we do not succeed in meeting our objectives, we should not be afraid to explore other, more radical solutions. The costs of non integration is too high. I would also like to re-emphasise that we have the possibility to make rapid and real progress in promoting an effective and efficient framework for European banking supervision. This should not only help us to achieve our goals within the EU, but could also promote greater convergence beyond the EU. Allow me to put my Basel hat on for a couple of final comments on related challenges of the Basel Committee. At a more global level, we face the same consistency issue in the implementation of Basel II, and as I said, in this case, Europe can lead this process, we in Europe have more instruments to do it, and the example can be very helpful for the Basel process.
Simon M Potter: Concluding remarks at the Monetary Policy Implementation in the Long Run Conference Concluding remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Monetary Policy Implementation in the Long Run Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 19 October 2016. * * * Thank you for participating in the conference “Monetary Policy Implementation in the Long Run” here at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Over the past two days we have engaged in productive and thought-provoking discussions of the evolution of monetary policy implementation across global central banks. These discussions will help shape the way the Federal Reserve thinks about monetary policy implementation in the future. The Federal Reserve’s implementation of policy has evolved in important ways in recent years, including using the balance sheet as an active policy tool at the zero lower bound (ZLB).

Given the Federal Reserve’s experience in the agency MBS market over the past eight years, it is important to consider what role—if any— agency MBS transactions may have in the policy implementation toolkit of the future. 1 SOMApurchased agency debt from 1971 to 1981, so participating in one of the agency markets was not entirely  new in 2008. In addition, in 2011–12 a maturity extension program extended the maturity of Treasury securities in the SOMA portfolio, although it did not expand the size of the SOMA portfolio. 2 The share is calculated as of October 12, 2016, see System Open Market Account Holdings. 3 Since the start of the year, these purchases have averaged approximately $ billion per month. In addition to 7 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  conducting these transactions, the Desk reinvests maturing proceeds from Treasury securities, though the Treasury reinvestment transactions take place at auction rather than in the primary market. 4 The accommodative monetary policy stance of the European Central Bank (ECB) rests upon three nonstandard  instruments: a series of targeted long-term refinancing operations, a negative deposit facility rate, and an asset purchase program that includes private and public sector securities. The Bank of England (BoE) currently sets the Bank Rate at 25 basis points and is currently purchasing £ billion in gilts over a 6-month period; the Asset Purchase Facility will have £ billion in gilts when the purchase round ends in February 2017.
Therefore, we have a small increase in bad loans, which reached about 12 percent. I think this process will slowly wind down. Then, together with the reduction of the risks that banks see in the real sector, and which will come to the surface now after the positive signals from the European economy, lending to companies will become a little more intensive. In one of its reports NBRM has pointed out that one of the limiting factors for higher credit growth are some conservative strategies in the local banking groups. What specifically did you mean? Yes, we pointed out the conservative strategies. And it is no secret that here we primarily think of the problems that some of the banks present in Macedonia have in their home countries. Banks in Slovenia and Greece are in serious problems, even though their banks in Macedonia are among the best, by both the quality of corporate governance and the credit risk management, and also the level of capital and liquidity they have is the highest in our  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  banking system. So, their banks in Macedonia have no impediment to normally work and grant loans. But don’t they grant loans normally? Well, some of them are quite restrained. We constantly talk to them and they promise to be more active in the market. Which of them are restrained? Stopanska Banka has been quite restrained in recent years, but it always had positive rates of credit growth. It has never cut lending.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Global challenges, global solutions – IMFC issues Statement by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) Twenty-Third Meeting, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 16 April 2011. * * * On behalf of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, Lao P.D.R., Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga and Vietnam. Introduction 1. We thank Mr. Youssef Boutros-Ghali for his contributions to the IMFC, especially his leadership in completing the 2010 Quota and Governance reform. We congratulate Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam on his appointment as the new Chairman. With his rich experience in understanding the interests of advanced and emerging market countries, we have full confidence that Minister Tharman will be able to make significant progress in fostering a global consensus on many challenging policy issues. 2. Although the global recovery has gained strength since the last IMFC meeting, its prospect remains fragile as several downside risks continue to prevail. Having been successful in coordinating policies to contain the catastrophic damage from the global financial crisis, policymakers are now facing a more difficult task in forging a consensus on multilateral commitments for countries to take into account the impact of their policies on other members and the international monetary system (IMS). Such an agreement will not be easy to reach against the current backdrop of a multi-speed recovery and asymmetry in domestic policy requirements.
by overcoming the effective lower bound to interest rates, or injecting liquidity directly into the retail sector.8 But there is no sign that central banks are thinking of digital currencies in this way. The Bank of England, for example, has stressed that any CBDC would complement, not substitute for, physical cash.9  The Bank’s Index Linked Term Repo facility, for example, operates weekly, and allows all eligible counterparties to bid for six month liquidity against the full range of eligible collateral (see Bank of England Market Operations Guide: Our tools | Bank of England). 8 See, for example Securing macroeconomic and monetary stability with a Federal Reserve–backed digital currency | PIIE 9 See for instance Innovation to serve the public interest - speech by Andrew Bailey | Bank of England 7  Bank of England  Page 9  4. Digital currencies may affect the way central banks deliver monetary control Over and above any impact that digital currencies may have on the transmission mechanism, they could also have implications for how central banks achieve ‘monetary control’: i.e. ensuring that short term market rates are aligned with official rates chosen by policy makers.10 Today, most central banks achieve this control by ensuring they at least meet banks’ demand for central bank reserves, and remunerate those reserves such that market rates trade near or at the official rate. Other things equal, flows into digital currencies issued or backed by the central bank, will drain reserves from the system.

Digital currencies may alter the size and composition of central bank assets Most of my remarks today have focused on the potential implications of digital currencies for central bank liabilities. But of course, for every liability, there also has to be an asset. Whether those assets are, in total, any larger than today depends, in part, on whether new digital currencies cause a net increase in demand for central bank liabilities, or simply substitute for reserves or banknotes. A narrow digital currency that largely cannibalised banknote demand, for example, might have little or no impact. By contrast, a broad digital currency with many attractive payments features could materially increase the demand for central bank liabilities. The impact of any increase in demand on the size and composition of central bank assets depends on whether, and how, central banks choose to accommodate that demand. I’ve already noted that, in systems like the UK’s, digital currencies may cause some banks whose deposit bases have been partially disintermediated to increase their borrowing from market-wide facilities. A more interesting case could arise if the central bank chooses instead to back persistently higher demand with more long-lasting assets, for example to reduce rollover risk. At modest size, that may look little different to today’s banknote programmes.
Charles Bean: Measuring recession and recovery – an economic perspective Speech by Mr Charles Bean, Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy at the Bank of England, at the Royal Statistical Society (RSS) Statistics User Forum Conference, London, 27 October 2010. *  *  *  Good morning! It is a great pleasure to open this conference dedicated to exploring the way statistics are used in the study and control of the business cycle and, in particular, the issues thrown up by the Great Contraction of 2008–9. Before I turn to that topic, however, it might be useful if I start by saying a few words about the sort of information that the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) relies on when it sets the level of Bank Rate (or the amount of asset purchases) each month. First, and most obviously, there is the wealth of official statistics on the economy generated by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and other national statistical agencies, covering such variables as output, employment, pay and prices. That is the absolute bedrock on which our analysis and policy rests, and without it we would struggle to do our job. But the picture they provide is rarely perfect. Series often do not quite correspond to the appropriate economic concept, either because they are conceptually difficult to measure or else because only imperfect proxies are available. As an example, take output.

Chart 3 shows a swathe of alternative indicators of capacity utilisation drawn from business surveys. They suggest that the margin of spare capacity within firms is now relatively modest. As far as the labour market goes, the rise in unemployment has been only a little over two percentage points, notably less than in earlier UK recessions even though the fall in output has been greater; see Chart 4. Together, these observations suggest a far more modest margin of unused resources and, by implication, a substantial depression of potential output resulting from the Great Contraction. There is, however, an important qualification. The counterpart to the modest rise in unemployment is a much smaller fall in employment than would have been expected on the basis of past experience, in part reflecting a high degree of wage moderation in the private sector. This can be seen in Chart 5, which contrasts the evolution of employment and output with the experience during the recession of the early 90s, when output fell less but employment more. The corollary is that productivity growth has been extremely weak during this downturn. That is in stark contrast to the United States, where productivity growth has remained strong and there has been a large shake-out of labour. Now this could be indicative of a fall in potential output. But it could also indicate a considerable degree of labour hoarding, which would be consistent with a rather greater margin of underutilised resources than suggested by Charts 3 and 4.
The private sector is likely to maintain a high dependence on foreign workers. The latter, however, tend to stay for a relatively short period in Malta, which does not augur well for firms’ return on investment in human capital and productivity. It may also put at risk the competitiveness of our exports and job prospects to the extent that wages begin to increase faster than productivity. From this point of view, there is an urgent need to understand the factors behind the relatively short stay of foreign workers in Malta and devise solutions to this problem. A key factor that has been cited by firms and foreign workers alike is the recent rapid increase in rent in the private market, but there may be other reasons. The recently published White Paper on rent reform puts forward a number of proposals that should enable a better-informed assessment of the rental market in Malta and which seek to offer greater certainty and protection to landlords and tenants. With the public consultation on this subject now completed, we now look forward to the implementation of the proposed measures. Permit me at this point to note that the Central Bank is itself an employer of specialist foreign staff, thus we also speak on the basis of a direct feel for some of the problems they face.

Our growth forecast entails that resource utilisation is still expected to rise only weakly and thereby remain relatively moderate during 2004 and 2005. Signs of lower domestic cost pressure Last year employment growth in the business sector was weaker than expected, while economic growth was approximately in line with expectations. This means that productivity growth exceeded our expectations. The most recent National Accounts figures also indicate stronger productivity growth last year than was assumed in December. It is likely that this has contributed to lower inflationary pressure during 2003. However, of greater interest for monetary policy is what this says about the future; is what we’re seeing an indication of permanently higher productivity growth? We don’t know this yet of course. There are many problems associated with the data in this area and even if this were not the case, it would be difficult to determine what had caused the developments we have seen recently. But this uncertainty is no reason to completely disregard the new information we have received. Just like the latter part of the 1990s, when productivity was also unexpectedly positive, there is now perhaps cause for a somewhat more optimistic view of supply conditions in the Swedish economy. One important, perhaps decisive question is what consequences the weak labour demand and the strong productivity growth will have for the outcomes of wage negotiations. It is clear that labour market conditions suggest moderate wage rises.
As far as Sweden is concerned, it can also be added that developments in the Baltic countries represent an ongoing problem for the Swedish banks. In addition, the financial markets are still dependent upon the measures adopted by central banks and authorities to deal with the crisis (Figure 2). However, these extraordinary measures will be successively phased out when central banks and governments deem that  BIS Review 11/2010  1  the time is right. For example, we have ceased to issue dollar loans and have started to increase margins on variable interest rate lending in Swedish kronor. The lowest point of the international recession has now been passed, but uncertainty remains regarding the strength of the recovery The lowest point of the international recession has now been passed. World trade has made a partial recovery following the steep decline of almost 20 per cent from the summer of 2008 to the start of 2009. The total trade volume, measured in terms of the World Trade Monitor Index, rose by almost 9 per cent between January and October 2009 (Figure 3). GDP has started to increase in both the United States and the euro area after a number of quarters with negative growth. In our December forecast, we expect the world economy to have declined by around 1 per cent during 2009, followed by an annual average growth rate of approximately 4 per cent for the next three years (Figure 4).

Crucially, the Committee has also initiated an annual stock take of the supply side of the economy. It now publishes its best collective judgments on the natural rate of unemployment, the output gap, as well as the expected growth in productivity, labour supply and potential output. To draw out these points consider three examples of forward guidance by the MPC. The first occurred five years ago when the economy began to recover from the worst downturn since the Great Depression. During previous periods of accelerating growth and firming business confidence, the MPC had always tightened policy significantly (as evidenced in the correlation between survey indicators and MPC votes seen in Chart 1). On the basis of this past behaviour, the MPC would have raised interest rates by 2 to 3 percentage points between August 2013 and the end of 2014. For anyone who might suggest the MPC should have followed that reaction function, note that, even on unchanged policy, CPI inflation in the summer of 2016 was running at only about ½% and core CPI inflation around 1¼%. 3  In other words, the amount of volatility in interest rates should match the amount of uncertainty surrounding the economy. There should ideally be no additional volatility, or risk premium, due to uncertainty about how policy would respond.
If so, then the firm becomes subject to more legal and regulatory requirements, some of which may be inconsistent with those applicable elsewhere. The result of the geographic expansion then is to increase the risk of possible compliance problems and to make the management of a global business that much more difficult. Deregulation within individual countries is also something of a two-edged sword. Clearly it affords greater business opportunities to a firm, but it also raises challenges in managing compliance risk across a firm’s business units. For example, as a result of the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in the US, a single firm can now engage in commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance activities. The implication for the compliance function is that it must not only keep on top of issues  BIS Review 76/2006  1  within each of these diverse business lines but also the interactions between them - for example, in policing potential conflicts of interest across the firm. Somewhat similarly, the overall compliance challenge for the firm is more than just the sum of the challenges from financial innovation, from globalization and from deregulation. There are interplays between these developments that add additional layers of complexity to the compliance challenge. Level of scrutiny The second broad consideration I mentioned is the increased level of scrutiny of compliance in the U.S. and in other major financial markets - scrutiny that is driven by major industry and political events that have changed the legal and regulatory environment over the past five years.

In Remaking Malaysia, the strategy is essentially to focus on our distinct capabilities and to leverage on the areas of our strengths to secure our competitive advantage. Let me touch briefly on the current economic developments: •  Malaysia has seen a steady and strengthening economic recovery since 2001, with the growth performance strengthening substantially in the first half of this year increasing the potential for growth for the year as a whole to surpass our earlier estimates. •  This favourable performance has been accompanied by a rebalancing of focus between external and domestic sources of growth. In the external sector, there has been a greater balance between the traditional and new markets and between the goods and services sectors. •  In the domestic sector, there has been a greater balance between the economic sectors. The strategy to have a more diversified economic structure and more extensive markets has aimed to reduce vulnerability of the economy to global shifts in demand in any specific sector or to any particular region. •  The positive fundamentals of low inflation, strong external balance, low debt and stable employment conditions have accorded policy flexibility to support the growth during this period. Going forward, the process of rebalancing the economy to enhance the competitiveness of the economy can be expected to intensify and widen.