samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As regards the collection of data, the ESCB’s Statistics Committee (STC) and Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) will, in cooperation with the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, look at means of better aligning supervisory and statistical concepts, definitions and reporting formats, with the aim of reducing the reporting burden for financial institutions in the case of overlapping data requirements. The STC will also investigate the feasibility of reusing and sharing available micro-data for Eurosystem statistical purposes – particularly data contained in central credit registers, central balance sheet offices and business registers – while maintaining strict confidentiality standards. Furthermore, it is considered best practice for a central bank to integrate the overlapping parts of the various statistics it produces and to concentrate the production of all of its statistics within a single statistical organisational unit. As far as data processing is concerned, the feasibility of a move towards the consolidated or pooled collection and production of some types of Eurosystem statistics will be explored. In addition, NCBs are invited to exploit comparative advantages in their cooperation with other national statistical authorities, 11 for instance by setting up joint business registers. In this context, it is generally agreed that an enhanced exchange of confidential information between NCBs, the ECB, NSIs and Eurostat, strictly for statistical purposes, is indispensable in order to keep the response burden to a minimum and ensure the quality of both European and national statistics.

What we need to do as supervisors is to make sure that global banks have adequate risk management capabilities, sufficient loss-absorbing capital, and are subject to intensive and coordinated supervision, so that we are able to contain the systemic risk they pose without curtailing their contribution to economic growth worldwide. We have nothing to fear from global banks which are well-managed, well-capitalised and well-supervised by home and host authorities. What we should do is prevent the emergence of badly managed, badly-disciplined banks, whatever their geographical dimension, as they can expose our financial systems to important risks. I hope that this humble contribution provides food for thought. As I said at the beginning of my intervention, I do not have all of the answers. But I do think that we can and should learn lessons from all experiences, both positive and negative. My words reflect the experience that we have had with our global banks in the last three years. But of course, past successes are not, per se, a guarantee of future success. Sophocles wrote in one of his tragedies that “we cannot call a mortal being happy until he’s passed beyond life free from pain”. Following the same principle of precaution, neither supervisors nor credit institutions should succumb to the temptation of unfounded optimism about the future. This is the reason why we will continue pushing for a very intense supervisory process for these global institutions and we will ensure that they are complying with the highest standards in any field.
Low and stable inflation makes it easier for economic agents to distinguish changes in relative prices from changes in the general price level. Prices become a more accurate information vehicle. Alan Greenspan has defined price stability as “a situation in which households and businesses in making their saving and investment decisions can safely ignore the possibility of sustained, generalized price increases or decreases”. 5 This is the aim of monetary policy in all countries. When there is confidence in the inflation target, monetary policy can also contribute to stabilising output and employment. Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment in interest-rate setting. Past experience indicates that expectations as to future inflation remain stable even if inflation varies somewhat as long as the interest rate is used actively to curb the effects. Monetary policy cannot finetune economic developments, but it can prevent the largest effects from occurring when the economy is exposed to disturbances. In some situations, it may be appropriate to hedge against particularly unfavourable developments. If inflation deviates substantially from the target for a period, the interest rate will be set with a view to gradually returning it to the target, so that we avoid substantial variations in output and employment. Through the 1990s, inflation remained on the whole in the interval 1½ – 3½ per cent. Inflation has varied slightly more in the past few years.

3 Mark Carney, Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – Climate Change and Financial Stability, September 29,  2015. 4 Climate Risk Management at Financial Firms: Challenges and Opportunities, GARP Risk Institute, May 29,  2019; Climate Risk Management at Financial Firms: A Good Start, but More Work to Do, GARP Risk Institute, May 29, 2019. 5 We’re Only Human: Culture and Change Management, James Hennessy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,  September 2019. 6 Misconduct Risk, Culture, and Supervision, Stephanie Chaly, James Hennessy, Lev Menand, Kevin Stiroh and  Joseph Tracy, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December 2017. 7 Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, John P. Kotter, Harvard Business Review, January 2007 and  How to Beat the Transformation Odds, McKinsey and Company, Survey, April 2015. 8 Joint Statement on Innovative Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System, SR 18–10, December 3, 2018. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
I am not going to talk today about what banks must do, which is a lot. I will merely give some examples of the tasks outstanding for the authorities. With regard to cleaning up balance sheets and levels of capital, the latest reform has been a very important step, but nothing in life is final. If the Spanish economy eventually recovers, it will have been more than enough, but if the economy deteriorates by more than expected, then capital will have to continue to be increased and improved if banks are to remain solid. Also, new instruments to increase credit to SMEs will have to continue to be tested. Some of these were discussed at a workshop held by the Banco de España in February in collaboration with the Spanish National Securities Market Commission (CNMV). At some point political decisions will need to be taken in this area. Another area of work is to continue to reduce the size of savings bank governing bodies in order to avoid any duplication when they have transferred their financial business to banks they have set up, which must be stock-exchange listed when above a certain size. A more substantial alternative would be a law requiring savings banks to cease holding significant stakes in credit institutions, within a reasonable period, and to invest as they see fit, perhaps obtaining higher returns, in order to continue to pursue their welfare aims.

In the past, the processes of raising interest rates in the US were surrounded by complex economic and financial developments in some economies. In the 1980s, the most critical case, there was the debt crisis in Latin America. Then in the 1990s, the most significant effects were circumscribed to some countries. In the 2000s, the emerging world was not so affected directly, but the subsequent subprime crisis in the United States and all its implications for the world resulted the Federal Reserve rate hike. Today, the conditions in which the United States and the emerging world confront the episode are different as seen from both sides. China's growth and the size of Europe make them a potential risk for the Fed, so it cannot overlook the effect of its decisions on these economies. At the same time, economic policy frameworks have changed in emerging markets and are more capable of dealing with external shocks. Anyway, it is still an element of risk. A box in this Report provides a deeper analysis of these topics. 5  Beyond the volatility of recent months, the dollar remains strong with respect to most currencies, developed and emerging. Our peso, which has depreciated a little more than 30% from its 2013 average, has behaved similarly to most of our trading partners’ currencies, so its multilateral variation has been much smaller. Accordingly, the real exchange rate index with base year 1986=100 is now near 93, some 3% above its 2013 average (figure 10).
Including financial sector debt in the total leads to some double counting. But in my view, including financial sector debt is informative as it reveals information about the financial system that is intermediating credit - and as such, about financial stability. 7 ‘Down in the slumps: the role of credit in five decades of recessions’ by Jonathan Bridges, Chris Jackson and Daisy McGregor (Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 659). As reported in Carney (2019), ‘The global outlook’, over half of recessions are preceded by private sector credit booms and within advanced economies, two-thirds of private credit booms have also ended in recessions. 8 See, for example, Schularick and Taylor (2012), ‘Credit booms gone bust: Monetary policy, leverage cycles and financial crises, 1870-2008’, American Economic Review, 102(2): 1029-61, and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), ‘The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance of payments problems’, American Economic Review, 89: 473-500. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6  Between 2000 and the crisis in 2008, total global debt as a proportion of global GDP grew by over 60 percentage points, a growth rate of nearly 30%. Between 2008 and 2018 it has grown by around 25 percentage points, a growth rate over the last 10 years of just under 10%. However, the bulk of the post crisis growth occurred in the first 5 years after the crisis as governments stepped in to offset private sector deleveraging and support the economy.

The global financial crisis has tested both the ECB and the organization that I am privileged to serve, the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve’s financial stability role, my topic for today, was at the center of the response to the crisis in the United States. Because this was the worst financial crisis in the United States since our Great Depression, conditions within our national economy produced instability, which naturally provoked a reaction from the Federal Reserve. From my personal perspective, one of the most inspiring moments was when Chairman Bernanke spoke in February of 2009 at the National Press Club. There, he said “the Federal Reserve has done, and will continue to do, everything possible within the limits of its authority to assist in restoring our nation to financial stability and economic prosperity . . . .”1 No statement encapsulated the financial stability objective as succinctly and as clearly. In speaking here at the ECB, I would be remiss if I did not mention a substantially similar statement by ECB President Mario Draghi in July of 2012. President Draghi said that “[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”.2 Whenever I have referenced President Draghi’s “whatever it takes” statement, Antonio is quick to note that President Draghi, unlike Chairman Bernanke, appended a forecast to his version of “whatever it takes”. He assured everyone that “it will be enough”.
If the importance of macro-prudential instruments was revealed by the global crisis and the forex interventions of central banks went back in fashion during the same period, there is a fact well known from the conventional economic wisdom, but highlighted once again by the crisis: the countercyclical stance of both monetary and fiscal policies is essential for ensuring a smooth trajectory of the economy. We all saw how unsustainable public finances and high levels of debt have impeded the effectiveness of a stability-oriented monetary policy. This was also the case of Romania, where the fiscal impulse was positive during the period of rapid growth before the financial crisis, contributing to the overheating of the economy and fuelling the imbalances accumulated in the economy. Moreover, the pro-cyclicality of the fiscal policy during the pre-crisis period exhausted the fiscal space needed to stimulate the economy in recession, leading to the need to reduce the budget deficit during the crisis (primarily due to financing constraints) and to perpetuating the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy. As stated by Fritz Zurbrügg (2012), successful monetary policy is predicated on healthy fiscal policy, and vice versa, and to achieve stability and prosperity in the long term, fiscal and monetary policies must both focus on sustainability. In the past, the high fiscal deficit has resulted in the fiscal dominance of monetary policy with its inevitable monetisation of the government debt, but nowadays most central banks no longer directly finance government expenditure.

After all, information is a  2  BIS Review 2/2008  public good and rating agencies are the providers of this good. But the case for further regulation has not as yet been compelling. First and foremost, we should consider the contents of possible improvements. I would pinpoint three areas, among others, for consideration: first, greater transparency of rating methods and the overall role of rating agencies in the securitisation process. Second, a marked difference in the metric used for rating bonds and structured products, which would restore confidence in ratings. This could be done in two ways, which could also be combined: either by adopting another rating scale for structured products (with another symbol for example); or by including an additional measure in the credit rating, in particular on its volatility in times of market or liquidity stress. Third, a specific rating for liquidity risk. I am aware that rating agencies are considering this, despite the difficulties of such an exercise. We must hope that the discussions currently underway in international fora, such as the FSF and groups of central bankers in which the Banque de France is actively involved, will restore the integrity of the ratings system, given its prominent role in the development of modern financial markets. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for your attention. BIS Review 2/2008  3
I would also like to take the opportunity to express Norges Bank’s views on how the Fund’s strategy can be further developed. The Fund’s investment performance, which receives a great deal of attention, is primarily determined by the allocation of assets across different classes such as equities and bonds. Asset allocation is an important component of the Fund’s strategy. Chart: Timeline for managing Norway’s petroleum wealth After Norway discovered oil in the North Sea in 1969, it became clear early on that this would be a source of substantial wealth. The revenue would transform Norwegian society 3 . In 1983, the Committee on the Future of Petroleum Activity 4 – chaired by Hermod Skånland who was appointed central bank governor in 1985 – launched the idea of an oil fund. The proposal was to set up an equalisation fund. According to the Committee, government oil revenues would be transferred to the fund. Each year, an average of the past years’ oil revenues would be transferred to the central government budget and spent on a par with other revenues. 1  Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”, NBER Working Paper 5398. 2  Halvor Mehlum, Karl O. Moene and Ragnar Torvik (2006): “Institutions and the resource curse”, The Economic Journal 116, pp. 1–20. 3  See for example Report no. 25 (1973–74) to the Storting: “Petroleumsvirksomhetens plass i det norske samfunn” [The role of petroleum activity in Norwegian society]. 4  NOU (Official Norwegian Report) 1983:27 “Petroleumsvirksomhetens framtid.

Looking back, the convergence process that was triggered, after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, was very impressive, in particular in Italy, eventually paving the way for this country to be among the first to adopt the euro. This convergence process has also contributed greatly to macro-economic stability and sound economic policies, both in this and in other European countries, a practice nowadays entrenched in the Treaty, in particular in the so-called Stability and Growth Pact. Where many did not have considered this to be possible, Italy has thus become a member of the stability-oriented family of European nations. Also in this respect, it is a pleasure for the Governing Council to meet here. We are living in a period in which history is made, almost every day. In two weeks time, ten countries will sign the so-called Accession Treaties, making it possible for these countries to become a member of the European Union, in the spring of next year. This enlargement of the European Union to the east  and south of our continent is another historical event, ending the rift that was created after the Second World War. The benefits of this enlargement, both in political as well as economic terms, are clear. However, this does not make it less of a challenge, also for the ECB and the national central banks.
Many approaches were tried, some proved their worth, while others were abandoned. The establishment of these monetary institutions was not a constant reinvention of the wheel; rather, progress was evident. The sound institutions that have grown in this way represent valuable capital for our country and have made a significant contribution to Switzerland’s prosperity. I feel that it behoves us to become familiar with the history of our monetary and currency institutions. This is true not just for the employees of the SNB, but in particular for them. In fact, this was the original idea behind Professor Baltensperger’s book, namely to improve employees’ knowledge of Switzerland’s economic history. Or, expressed in a different way: To encourage them to “become familiar with the ground on which we lay our foundations”. On the initiative of the former Chairman of the Board, Jean-Pierre Roth, an internal seminar on the history of the Swiss currency in the 19th and 20th centuries was organised in the autumn of 2008 and in the spring of 2009. It became clear that no work yet existed which covered the entire period of the history of the Swiss franc. It was this realisation that laid the foundation for this book. The book was ultimately written by expanding on the material derived from the internal seminar. As you will be able to conclude for yourself after reading the work, the result can certainly be considered a resounding success. The book by Professor Baltensperger is a beautifully illustrated work with fascinating contents.

Thomas Jordan: The Swiss franc – a success story Address by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the launch of the book Der Schweizer Franken – eine Erfolgsgeschichte (The Swiss franc – a success story), Zurich, 3 October 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to begin by welcoming you all to the launch of the book Der Schweizer Franken – eine Erfolgsgeschichte. Since this book was commissioned by the Swiss National Bank, I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words as to how it came about. After I have finished, first Hans-Peter Thür, publishing director of NZZ Libro, and then Professor Baltensperger, the book’s author, will speak to you. After their comments, and before we close this event with a standing lunch, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. The German theologist, Hans von Keler, 1 is said to have commented “History is more than what has already happened; it is the layers of the past beneath our feet, the ground on which we lay our foundations”, and it seems to me to be particularly fitting for today’s book launch. Institutions do not just fall from the sky – they are created by people. Switzerland’s present monetary and currency institutions have come into being as the result of a gradual process. Professor Baltensperger’s book is an impressive account of the efforts to establish sound institutions over a period of more than 150 years.
Second, some EU bodies are obsessed with the “all EU countries must be same” approach. While there may be some point to this, why insist on it in the case of the single resolution system, for instance, if it has been negotiated that the SSM only applies to euro-area countries plus volunteers? One can hardly expect non-euro area countries not participating in the SSM to jump at the single resolution system if it means sharing the burden with those inside the banking union without the same treatment in the area of a fiscal back-stop. At the same time, would you join the SSM if you did not have a clue how the single resolution rules were going to work? The CNB’s position was: let’s discuss the whole thing (BU) in one shot as a one compact and coherent package where the balance between powers, duties, responsibilities and money always remains assured. And negotiate everything as a single animal, so that illogical inconsistencies are not being produced all along. Sure, that would take much more time, but the final outcome might look better and we would not build up the house from the roof down. We are debating the supervisory part first, while burden-sharing (money) is being left for the future. The sequence of steps should ideally be exactly the opposite one. Why? My observation is that the way the various bail-outs and the SSM have been negotiated so far shows that the readiness and willingness even among euro-area countries to share money is declining over time.

And this is exactly the opposite of what should have been happening if a functioning banking and contingent fiscal union had been emerging. So we are risking creating a half-baked BU which will not necessarily be ready for future bad times. And it is also a partial answer to the question of potential participation of some non-euro countries in the SSM. Simply, it is too premature to judge whether the BU is going to be a good project worth participating, or not. Only after the whole project with all it “legs” is created can one seriously answer this question. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches