samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Housing construction has long been at a low level for several reasons, including weak competition in the construction sector, a low supply of land to build on and complex planning processes. 3 Neither has the design of the taxation system promoted mobility on the housing market, as it benefits homeowners ahead of renters. This is probably also helping to make the housing market more sluggish: the costs of moving are high at present, as taxation from the sale of a home is high compared with the current taxation of the home. The policy being conducted has distribution policy effects and has created a system of insiders and outsiders on the housing market, which benefits households 1 See Financial Stability Report, Sveriges Riksbank. Ingves, S (2006) and S Ingves (2007). 2 See, among others, European Commission (2019), IMF (2016), OECD (2019) and European Systemic Risk Board  (2016). 3 Emanuelsson, R. (2015). 1 [13]  that own their homes but, simultaneously, disadvantages households who are outside the housing market and have not been able to make corresponding deductions or take advantage of the rising prices. The failure of the housing market to function is not just leading to problems linked to indebtedness and the accumulation of risks this involves. A non-functioning housing market can also form a threat to the healthy development of society and can thereby create conflicts of interest between generations.

At the same time, high inflation could become entrenched as a result of increased secondround effects, requiring stronger monetary policy responses in other countries. Finally, there are still important downside risks to growth from the war in Ukraine and the pandemic. Page 2/5  Berne, 16 June 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Swiss economic outlook I now come to developments here in Switzerland. The Swiss economy has continued the favourable development it has shown since the beginning of the year. After modest growth in the fourth quarter of 2021, GDP increased by just under 2% in the first quarter of this year. The signals remain positive for the current quarter. The situation on the labour market has also continued to improve. The war in Ukraine has thus far had comparatively little adverse impact on economic activity in Switzerland. The effect has been most clearly felt in the higher energy prices and in the supply bottlenecks. For 2022, we still anticipate GDP growth of around 2.5%. Unemployment is likely to remain low. This favourable forecast is based, among other things, on the assumption that the global economy continues to grow and that the war in Ukraine does not escalate further. Our forecast for Switzerland, as for the global economy, is subject to large risks. If the energy supply in Europe were to be adversely affected, this could have a serious impact on the Swiss economy. The global supply bottlenecks and further increases in commodity prices could also slow growth.
Should house prices fall at the same time, the degree of discomfort will increase. If house prices fall by 30 percent, one in four households will hold debt in excess of the value of their dwelling.3 If many households curb consumption in order to reduce debt, the economy in aggregate will be adversely affected. Firms may then encounter payment problems, with a risk that rising bank losses may amplify the downturn. From a unique economic position to restructuring Oil prices have fallen by nearly 50 percent since summer. The price decline comes on top of a planned adjustment to a lower activity level in the oil sector. We have experienced that oil prices fluctuate. Market expectations indicate that prices will edge up again from today’s level. Low growth in the world economy has restrained growth in oil consumption, while the high prices prevailing in recent years have led to increased supply and more energy-efficient production methods. Last year, growth in global oil demand hit a five-year low, while non-OPEC production was record-high. New shale oil extraction technology has boosted the global supply of oil. Over three years, US oil production rose by more than 50 percent (see Chart 7). The additional supply from US shale oil is more than twice as high as Norwegian oil production. 2  Estimate based on calculations in Blix Prestmo, Strøm and Midsem (2015): Ringvirkninger av petroleumsnæringen i norsk økonomi [Spillovers from the petroleum industry to the Norwegian economy]. Forthcoming report from Statistics Norway.

In the initial years under the fiscal rule, petroleum revenue spending rose approximately in pace with the GPFG’s capital. The fiscal rule, based on a real return of 4 percent, thereby provided an effective constraint on petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget. In recent years, high oil prices and solid returns have resulted in strong growth in the value of the GPFG. This has provided scope for substantial increases in petroleum revenue spending, although spending has been around 3 percent of the GPFG’s value in recent years. In a period of low unemployment and solid economic growth, it has been appropriate to set aside a greater share of the revenues. Recent years have been characterised by wide fluctuations in returns, with extreme variability during the financial crisis. Volatility on the world’s stock exchanges and in financial markets impacts the market value of the GPFG and thereby the anchor for fiscal policy. Although the depreciation of the krone has increased the GPFG’s current value in krone terms, this veils the fact that its international purchasing power is unaffected by changes in the krone’s value. Such volatility has become more difficult to manage as the GPFG has grown in size. Oil prices have fallen sharply over the past six months. Even if prices edge up again, we have been reminded of the uncertainty associated with future revenues. Lower oil prices imply slower growth in the GPFG than previously estimated.
Timothy F Geithner: Asia, the world economy and the international financial system Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Economic Society of Singapore 2007 Annual Dinner, Singapore, 13 June 2007. *  *  *  Good evening. I am pleased to be able to join you tonight. The past decade has been one of remarkable achievement in Asia. This is a testament to the resilience and dynamism of this region, and yet the memories of the financial crises remain vivid and still exert a powerful influence on policy today. Tonight, I want to reflect on what policymakers learned from the crises, to review the extent of the progress since and to examine some of the challenges ahead. The Asian financial crises of the late 1990s were exceptional in many respects. Described at the time by some as the first crises of the 21st century, they were commonly regarded as without precedent and fundamentally different from previous emerging market financial crises. Here were countries with a remarkable record of rapid economic growth over several decades, substantial rates of investment, with low inflation and relatively strong fiscal positions. Most conventional indicators of economic performance and financial strength did not suggest acute underlying vulnerability. Yet the crises erupted with remarkable speed and force. The sudden collapse of confidence led to a sharp reversal of capital flows to the region.

The most important provision relating to the appropriation of profits of the Central Bank is the requirement that the Bank should build reserves out of profits to back its demand liabilities, viz., currency issue and demand deposits maintained by the Bank. Exter’s recommendation was that such reserves should be equal at least to 15 percent of the Bank’s domestic assets. Such reserves need not be built up against foreign assets, since those claims on the rest of the world would in anyway back the currency and demand liabilities. But, the domestic assets which are created by the Bank at its own discretion have no value in the domestic economy in a severe crisis. Since the build up of the reserves would prevent the transfer of profits to the government, Exter concluded that it would “prevent them from adding to the expansion of central bank credit”. Given the ever rising provisional advances granted by the Central Bank to the government and its permanent nature making such advances another form of implicit profit transfer, it is questionable whether the minimum of 15 percent is an adequate backing for the Bank’s currency and demand liabilities. For the provisional advances, there is no any collateral placed by the government with the Central Bank. Hence, they are akin to unsecured overdrafts given by a commercial bank to its customers.
It must also be noted that real lending rates, although they have been rising since the spring of last year, are still lower in real terms than those observed at the beginning of 1999. Overall, money and credit developments signalled an upward risk to price stability which had to be counteracted. The new monetary data for May which was released this morning broadly confirmed this assessment. The three-month average of the annual growth rates of M3, covering the period from March to May 2000 remained unchanged at 6.3% and loans to the private sector continued to grow rapidly. Let me now discuss the outlook for growth and inflation. This is a rather pleasant task, as the prospects for strong growth are very favourable. Indeed, let me reiterate our conviction that they have not been this favourable in many years. If central bankers are famous for anything, it would normally be for guarded rather than for exuberant views. So, for a central banker, this assessment is quite something. I therefore hasten to fill you in on some of the underlying details. The consensus view emerging from the forecasts currently available is that of strong economic growth of over 3% in the euro area both this year and next. This is clearly more than most forecasters expected at the end of last year, when projections were still very much made in the light of the previous crises witnessed in emerging market economies.

In periods of zero interest rates, such purchases help to counter the risk of deflation. The Swiss economy faces an exceptionally difficult year in 2009. Economic activity is set to pick up again gradually over the course of 2010, thanks to the extremely expansive monetary policy. This is, however, conditional upon an economic recovery by our main trading partners, as well as a return to stability on financial markets. The SNB measures are also aimed at reducing the risk of deflation in Switzerland. Despite the creation of massive amounts of liquidity, the SNB remains committed to ensuring price stability in the future. We will use all means at our disposal to reduce liquidity again in good time, so as to prevent any upsurge of inflation in Switzerland once the crisis has ended. BIS Review 33/2009  1
In mid-2005, it will reach 1%, in mid-2006 2% and near the end of 2006 a rate of 3%. This increase is a little flatter than forecast in September. It rests on the notion that in the next few years the output gap will narrow somewhat more slowly than predicted in September due to the productivity gains the upswing is expected to bring. From mid-2006 onwards, forecast inflation will no longer lie within the range that the National Bank equates with price stability. It must, however, be noted that, as always, our forecast is based on an unchanged three-month Libor rate, i.e. on the assumption that monetary policy will remain as expansive as now during the next three years. It is also important to understand that the uncertainty of the forecast increases with the length of the forecasting horizon. Continuation of expansionary monetary policy In the past two years, we have changed over to a strongly expansionary monetary policy. In so doing, we have reacted rapidly and unequivocally to the deterioration in the economic situation and the upward pressure on the Swiss franc. The favourable development of inflation provided us with the necessary leeway for the interest rate cuts we implemented. Between March and July, the Swiss franc weakened considerably vis-à-vis the euro, and the economy is gradually beginning to gain momentum again. The expansionary monetary policy was accompanied by growing monetary aggregates. The strong increase in the money stocks, does not, however, present a significant risk for price stability at the present time.

How these decisions materialise, which in the literature is known as “risk culture”, is particular to each bank and the responsibility of each one. Supervisors observe and assess but, ultimately, this is one of the idiosyncratic aspects of banks’ DNA. In short, governance structures should be capable of measuring, heading off and analysing current risks and those that are arising. While there are no strong signs of any easing, for activity as a whole, in lending conditions and of aggressive pricing that might suggest that risk is not sufficiently reflected, banks must be careful to retain a suitable profitability/risk trade-off that is sustainable over the cycle in all business segments. An individualised reflection, adapted to the characteristics of each institution. I shall conclude with a brief but nevertheless important reference. In addition to being comprehensive and strategic, reflection on the business model should also be individualised, i.e. adapted to the idiosyncratic characteristics of each institution. Indeed, the findings of the SSM thematic review of profitability and business models show that there is no one single approach and that, even among those banks with better profitability results, there are differences in strategies. Some pursue strategies geared to obtaining high income, which counter relatively high costs. Others place an emphasis on low costs that are compatible with relatively low income. And others strike a balance between a medium income-generating capacity and medium or low-level costs.
All in all, the banks’ capital position will be strengthened considerably compared with previous regulations, contributing to the boosting of confidence, both in the individual banks and in the system as a whole. …and carry out clear measures for liquidity In the light of the crisis of the autumn of 2008, the Basel Committee has decided, for the first time, on quantitative requirements for liquidity in the banks. Basel III works with two liquidity measures – one short-term and one long-term. The short-term measure is based on, in principle, every bank having sufficient liquid assets to survive for at least 30 days. It is difficult to consider such a requirement as unreasonable. The long-term measure, in principle, limits the gap between the maturity of a bank’s assets and the maturity of its debts. So this limits the duration risk of the bank. In the end, Basel III will be implemented as national legislation The regulations I have just sketched will eventually enter national legislation. They are to be fully implemented by 2019, with several sub-targets on the way. In the EU, Basel III will be implemented through what is referred to as the CRR/CRD IV.11 Those of you who have followed the ongoing negotiations know that both countries and EU institutions have different views about how implementation should take place in the EU. An important dividing line has been to what extent countries should be able to stipulate higher requirements nationally than those formulated in the common EU regulations.

Among others, the finance industry is one with many untapped opportunities. Currently, a wide group of people in our countries still needs a better access to finance and there are still lots of demand for financial services to be met – be they savings, loans, insurance products, or payment services for both domestic and crossborder transactions. By applying the airline industry’ experiences for policymakers, let me lay out five key conditions necessary to developing domestic financial systems and nurturing financial connectivity in the CLMVT in the periods ahead. Analogous to the “Open Sky Policy”, the first factor is to promote domestic financial liberalization policy and a well-integrated regional financial system. The financial liberalization policy should aim to lessen the degree of domestic financial repression, thereby strengthening financial institutions’ performance, and broadening their offer of financial  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  products and services. This can be done along with the policy to enhance financial connectivity by promoting the presence of capable players with regional focus. Under our mandate, the Bank of Thailand aims to promote financial connectivity through more connected banking networks and more integrated payment systems. Under the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, countries in the CLMVT should gear up efforts to strengthen regional banking networks, which will serve a diverse range of businesses and local people to gain more access to high quality banking services at fair prices.
One consequence of structural change is that when old sectors or companies fail to survive, scope for new employment is created in sectors where the country enjoys a comparative advantage or in domestic services that are not exposed to competition to the same extent as the goods sector. For a long time, the growth of the public sector compensated for the drop in employment in manufacturing and created new jobs at an even faster rate than the old ones disappeared. If such a change process is to proceed quickly and smoothly, it requires a lot in terms of the ability to adjust and the flexibility of people and companies. It also requires that policy facilitates the ability to adapt through the design of regulatory systems. The labour market has to function in a satisfactory way and it must be feasible to make the time difference between closure and new establishment as short as possible. In other words, it is a question of reducing the frictional unemployment that arises when industries or companies are wound up and people need to move or retrain in order to find work in a new location or in a new company or industry. The fact that employment is so low in Sweden today, given the state of the economy, may be a sign that the labour market is not flexible enough to meet the demands imposed by tougher competition or that the economy is not sufficiently dynamic. 1  IMF’s definition.

This is in addition to our other Government support schemes that FinTech players can benefit from: i) SPRING Singapore will provide Singaporean start-ups grants matching $ for every $ raised, up to a cap of $ ii) The National Research Foundation will co-invest, together with a technology incubator, up to 85% of an investment into a Singapore-based start-up. Deep skills and continuous learning 9 Not all of us can be entrepreneurs. But we all have to build the skills and expertise necessary to power the digital economy. The financial sector in particular has to build new capabilities. 10 We are often caught up in speculation as to which jobs technology will destroy and what kinds of new jobs it will create. The likelihood is that many jobs will remain but most jobs will be transformed, requiring new skills and capabilities to make the most of new technologies. 11 In the financial sector, there is already growing need for skills in data analytics, in digital and mobile user interfaces, and in application development, in addition to core finance skills. Take for example bank relationship managers who provide wealth management advisory services. They are unlikely to be completely replaced by robo-advisers. But relationship managers will increasingly use data analytics tools to analyse client profiles and offer better, customised financial solutions.
This policy has been complemented by three new extraordinary tools, designed to promote the more efficient and uniform transmission of expansionary monetary impulses and to foment a greater expansion of lending in the area. First, a new long-term refinancing facility has been set in place. Last September, the first of these fund-injection operations was carried out, and they will be extended to June 2016. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  These operations may have a maturity of up to 4 years and are carried out at a very attractive cost for banks: only 10 bp above the main refinancing operations rate, which is currently equivalent to a rate of 0.15%. So that these new long-term injections may translate into an increase in lending to the private sector, access to the funds has been tied both to the outstanding balances and to the flows of the credit extended by banks to households and firms. The ECB has also launched two new asset purchase programmes. The first, which is already under way, involves the acquisition of bonds issued by banks and backed by specific items on their balance sheets. This is the case, for example, of the various types of covered bonds traded in Spain. The second programme, which will be operational in the coming weeks, envisages the acquisition of securities derived from the securitisation of loans to households and firms.

This effort has been sufficient to create a primary surplus and, along with growth in the economy from H2/2010 onwards, to put debt on a downward trajectory as a share of GDP, which is predicted to be 85% gross and below 60% net in 2015. But this has not come without significant pain, and again, would not have been possible if private bank liabilities had been guaranteed more than was needed to keep the domestic payment system and basic banking services up and running. Let me conclude by summarising some of the potential lessons from this tale: 1. Iceland did not allow its entire banking system to collapse, it did not nationalise its banking system, and it did not default on sovereign debt. So, in spite of what one sometimes hears, the Icelandic case does not teach any lesson on the pros and cons of such measures. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  2. Iceland avoided sovereign default through a good initial fiscal position, the ringfencing of the sovereign as much as possible from collapsing cross-border banks, and a medium-term fiscal consolidation programme. The lesson is to practise fiscal prudence and avoid the socialisation of private sector losses. 3. Iceland protected its domestic payment system and deposits. The lesson might be bail-in, separability in resolution between the public utility element of banking from the rest, and deposit preference. 4. The EU system for cross-border banking is deeply flawed.