samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
After extensive discussion and a careful evaluation, the Governing Council concluded that the revised design concept of Coop Himmelb(l)au best meets the functional and technical requirements specified by the ECB, and has features that reflect the ECB’s values and transforms them into architectural language.” [Quotation of the Press Release] On 13 February 2004 an international jury consisting of architects, Eurosystem representatives and a representative of the City of Frankfurt chose three winning designs in accordance with the following criteria, as laid down in the Competition Rules out of the 12 design concepts submitted in the Second Phase of the competition: 1. Overall town-planning, architecture and landscape;  2. Compliance with the main features of the functional and spatial programme, including modularity;  3. Feasible approach to an energy/environmental concept and compliance with the main features of the ECB’s technical requirements;  4. Compliance with the relevant rules, in particular in the field of building law and environmental law. The first prize was awarded to Coop Himmelb(l)au, Vienna; the second prize to ASP Schweger Assoziierte, Berlin; and the third prize to 54f architekten+ingenieure, Darmstadt, in cooperation with T.R. Hamzah & Yeang, Selangor. On 18 March 2004, the ECB’s Governing Council decided to invite all three prize winners to revise their design concepts in accordance with the Jury’s recommendations and the ECB’s requirements. The purpose of this Revision Phase was to remedy the remaining functional and technical deficiencies of the concepts.

Using the atrium as a large communicative zone within the two tower buildings was also welcomed. The Governing Council noted that all requirements for the energy concept had basically been fulfilled and that the design complied with the relevant regulations in the fields of building and environmental law. 2  BIS Review 5/2005  Next steps So where do we go from here? The Governing Council decided that the next step would be an “optimisation” phase in which the selected architect would again review his design on the basis of further guidance from the ECB. We will reassess the ECB’s functional and spatial requirements and, on that basis, seek to further optimise the design with the aim of reducing costs. With regard to the cost, the estimates available at present, taking into account the optimisation potential, suggest that the construction costs will be about € million. The total investment costs, however, will be higher, since they include additional elements, such as the cost of purchasing the Grossmarkthalle site, planning fees and other infrastructural costs. Some of these additional cost items are related to the construction costs, while others depend on further deliberation and specification. More precise information on the cost aspects of the project will be provided at the end of the detailed planning phase. I should like to emphasise that we will continue to work closely with the City of Frankfurt authorities in the coming phases of the project, especially in view of the urban development plan that will be adopted by Frankfurt’s City Council.
At some point the "insurance premium" becomes too large, but I do not think this can be said to have happened yet. 17  For a comprehensive survey of the valuation of the Swedish housing market, see Sørensen (2013), in which the following conclusion is drawn (p. 71-72): “[A] cautious reading of the evidence gives reason to expect downward pressure on Swedish real house prices in the years to come. And if the Swedish economy were to be hit by a large negative shock, the downward adjustment of house prices could become more rapid than the analysis … would suggest.”  18  See Dagens Industri (2013b). 19  Bernanke (2010) describes the difficulties experienced by the Federal Reserve in determining whether or not the housing market in the United States was over-valued. 20  Similar ideas can be found in, for instance, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2013), p. 7: “[G]iven what we have learned about the costs of inaction, higher type I errors (assuming that it is a bubble and acting accordingly, when in fact the increase reflects fundamentals) in exchange for lower type II errors (assuming the increase reflects fundamentals, when in fact it is a bubble) may well be justified.”  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Are better instruments than the policy rate already available? The third question concerns the access to other tools than the repo rate for managing risk. Those who are critical of using the repo rate claim that there are already other and bettersuited instruments available.

It is no coincidence that we are meeting here today under the theme "Choices for monetary policy" or that the IMF and other organisations arrange conferences on how our ideas on macroeconomic policy should change and that sessions on monetary policy have titles such as "Many targets, many instruments – where do we stand? "29 Nor is there any major doubt about the direction to be taken. The financial crisis made it clear that much more effort must be put into trying to prevent financial imbalances and manage risk in the credit and housing markets. That central banks will play an important role in this work is also fairly obvious. It is already clear that monetary policy will not be conducted in exactly the same way as prior to the crisis – when the policy rate was in principle set with consideration to the short-term business cycle, and when financial stability was more or less taken for granted. One clear lesson is that financial imbalances must be taken seriously and that central bankers' analyses and model work need to evolve to take this into account. I also believe that the analysis of risks will become more central and that "robust” monetary policy will be discussed more than before while ”optimal” monetary policy will be discussed less.30 It  have proven their effectiveness, so that there is no ground at present to dismiss the relevance of financial stability considerations for monetary policy deliberations.” (p. 22).
14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Annex 1: The UK balance sheet and the crisis  Chart 1: Private saving and investment Prior to the crisis the private sector financial balance had moved from small surplus of around 2% of GDP in 2003 to a slight deficit (Chart 1). Housing investment increased by around 1.5pp of national output; but private sector saving fell by around the same amount. That was the counterpart of a doubling in the UK’s net borrowing from abroad, the current account deficit, to reach around –3% of GDP. Chart 2: Household saving and financial flows The household sector accounted for the fall in private sector saving (Chart 2); its saving rate fell to just 3%. Younger households, including first-time home buyers, accumulated mortgage debt to acquire properties whose value was appreciating. Older households, including “last- time sellers” and those scaling down, realised housing equity and invested the proceeds in financial assets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  Chart 3: UK household debt Overall, household debt rose from 90% of income in 1997 to 160% by 2007 (Chart 3); and from 30% of financial wealth to over 50%. In real terms, house prices rose to nearly 2½ times their level a decade earlier; and the ratio of house prices to earnings almost doubled to approach 9x, up from around 5x in 1997. The corporate sector was a net saver in the five years prior to the crisis, running a financial surplus of 2–3% of GDP.

Second, sound system of financial institutions, with adequate capital fund, good risk management, corporate governance, and systematic and effective system of financial and market information disclosure that promotes market discipline is important for economic  BIS Review 135/2008  5  stability. Finally, the private sector should increase competitiveness and the ability to adapt, with emphasis on human resource development and key infrastructure. Ladies and Gentlemen, With increased globalisation and financial integration, emerging market economies has become more synchronized with advanced countries. As the turmoil is unfolding, we must work even more closely together to ensure smooth adjustment and safeguard economic and financial stability. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 135/2008
It helps the Banque de France make sure that the economy is supplied with enough financing to grow, and it enables us to track developments in financing for businesses, households and general government simultaneously. The Monetary Policy Council will keep a close eye on other indicators, including all leading indicators of changes in prices, such as capacity utilization rates, production costs, developments in incomes and commodity prices. The Monetary Policy Council will also monitor long-term interest rates and the current account balance. *  *  *  Before announcing the Council's monetary policy decisions for 1997, I would like to discuss the results achieved in 1996. 1. The 1996 results are in line with the targets we set. The ultimate monetary policy goal, which is price stability, was met. Businesses delayed passing on part of the August 1995 two-point increase in the standard rate of VAT until the beginning of 1996. The twelve-month rise in consumer prices was equal to and then above 2% during the first seven months of 1996, but subsequently fell back to 1.ó% in August and September, once the VAT effect had disappeared. The twelve-month increase stood at 1.5% to 1.ó% in November and the latest forecasts predict a price rise of close to 1.5% for the end of 1996. The twelve-month price increase thus resumed its pre-August 1995 trend and will be less than 2% at the end of 1996, in line with the objective set by the Monetary Policy Council.

4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  raise GDP per capita by about 11% after ten years for the average EU country. In the US, which starts from a more favourable position, the benefit would be under 5%. 10 And it is not difficult to understand why the benefits of reform could be so high in the euro area. High levels of structural unemployment, compounded by high numbers of underemployed and discouraged workers, imply a latent potential in our economies for a major positive shock to labour supply (Chart 5). We also have scope for a large catching-up in terms of productivity growth. TFP has increased by only 1.5% between 2000 and 2014 in the euro area, far below the 10.9% increase in the US over the same period (Chart 6). The type of policies that could release this upward shock to potential growth are not just those focused on price flexibility. They include, on the labour supply side, policies aimed at providing job search support for the long-term unemployed and requalification for the low skilled. And on the TFP side, policies that encourage the reallocation of resources – which could be powerful in the euro area given the wide and skewed distribution between the least and most productive firms 11 (Chart 7) – and policies that accelerate the diffusion of new technology, where the euro area on the whole lags some way behind the US (Chart 8). There are many other examples one could give.
Moreover, their liquidity ratio has exceeded 100%, three years ahead of the Basel III deadline. The French insurance sector too is robust, and has swiftly adapted to Solvency II. New assessments are under way, but using the previous standards, France’s major insurance groups cover their own funds requirement by around 230%. Clearly, financial stability is a priority for us; and by the way that is why financial regulators – including Banque de France and ACPR – pay close attention to the proposed merger between the London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse. ***  Let me draw a parallel to illustrate the situation. In France and in Europe, we have the raw materials – savings. We have the processing industry – the financial sector. But we are missing two links in the economic chain: downstream, we need to open up new opportunities in productive investments via a broader range of processed savings products; and upstream, we need stable and legible rules to allow the industry to conduct its business. Therefore, I see two ways forward. First, better channel our abundant savings towards productive investment. As I said, the core challenge for increasing innovative investment is to boost equity financing, both in France and in Europe: –  In France, this means new savings products and an appropriate trade-off between risk and return. Indeed, the share of households wealth invested in risky assets is more than three times lower in France than in the US: 77% of GDP versus 241% of GDP.

Therefore, some key issues need to be tackled before licensing an Islamic bank, regarding especially: -  their governance, with for example the role of the Shariah’ Board,  -  the legal classification of profit-sharing investment accounts and its consequences in terms of coverage by the French deposit guarantee scheme,  -  and liquidity management and access to the Eurosystem funding, especially the issue of assets eligible as collateral. Let me stop here. I would like to thank you very much, Ladies and Gentlemen, for your attention. 4  BIS Review 118/2009
The improvements in the functioning of markets, together with wage moderation, have contributed to strong employment growth and a considerable reduction in unemployment over the past couple of years. This is clear proof of the benefits of committing to a rigorous implementation of the agenda agreed in Lisbon and confirmed in Barcelona. However, while a number of initiatives were taken in this direction in the course of last year, it is of the utmost importance that further progress in these areas be achieved. To conclude my statement, I should like to express my confidence that the euro will prove a stimulus for further economic and financial integration. The introduction of the euro banknotes and coins has not only enhanced price transparency, it will also highlight the fact that the European Single Market is not yet complete and that a number of regulatory, administrative or legal impediments to the free circulation of goods, the cross-border provision of services and to labour mobility still exist. It is my belief that the euro, as a visible symbol of European identity in everyday life, will increasingly bring these obstacles to light and stimulate efforts to eliminate them. In this way, the euro will accomplish one of the pre-eminent functions of the single currency, namely to "crown" the establishment of a single market in Europe. Finally, I should like to mention that this is my last appearance in this forum as Vice-President of the ECB.

2  BIS Review 72/2002  Chairman, I could go on reflecting on our own experience of all this - but I'm conscious that the weekend beckons - and the relevant question is how it all relates to the development of the single financial market across Europe. The potential benefits of integration I take for granted. The continuing debate is about how - given that we all start from different positions and with different traditions and with different public policy priorities, we get from here to there. It may well be that continuous public pressure for higher and higher standards in financial markets everywhere are leading to greater official intervention any way. But integration was itself always bound to involve more intervention as the EU member states moved towards some degree of harmonisation of standards, requiring legal agreement at the European level and then reflected in national legislation. And a great deal of progress has, of course, already been made in that direction through the Financial Services Action Plan which is due in principle to be completed in 2005. But everyone accepts that a great deal remains to be done - in the context of the integration agenda - and in fact it is bound to be an ongoing process as markets evolve and new issues arise. In that context the recent agreement on Alexandre Lamfalussy's proposals for a faster track procedure in securities markets has been generally welcomed. But the on-going debate extends beyond that to where more precisely we want to get to.
This will not last and the fiscal authorities need to factor this in when considering what needs to be done to put the federal budget deficit and the nation’s debt burden on a sustainable path. Second, I will argue that fiscal consolidation should take into consideration the offsetting adjustments needed to keep the economy on an even keel. While fiscal consolidation is a necessary condition for a healthy economy over time, it is not a sufficient condition. Fiscal adjustments require offsetting changes in private-sector spending and saving behavior, and in the trade sector. Prudent economic policies and international coordination can help ensure that such adjustments take place in ways that support economic activity (and, by extension also support government revenue). As always, what I have to say today reflects my own views and opinions and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. As we all are aware, the federal budget deficit is very high and the federal debt burden has climbed sharply as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 1). Despite this, the net interest burden on the outstanding debt remains low as a share of GDP (Figure 2). This is due, of course, to the unusually low level of short- and long-term interest rates. These unusually low interest rates are the result of monetary policy actions taken by the FOMC.

This is because the Fed’s balance sheet is unusually large, as a result of asset purchases undertaken to promote the dual mandate, and because the spread between the cost of the Federal Reserve’s liabilities (mainly the 0.25 percent rate that the Fed pays on excess reserves) and the return on its assets is unusually high. As shown in (Figure 3), the Fed’s net remittances to the Treasury have climbed sharply in recent years, rising to more than $ billion per year over the past two years, after averaging about $ billion over the 2005–07 period. 1 Subtracting net remittances from the Fed from the Treasury’s net interest cost (as a share of GDP), one can see that the increase in our enlarged federal debt has not yet generated a significant rise in the net debt service burden (Figure 4). However, the low interest rates and enlarged balance sheet, which has generated these reduced borrowing costs, will not be sustained over time. Recall that the Federal Reserve’s policy decisions are motivated solely by monetary policy considerations–how best to achieve maximum sustainable employment and price stability. This means that the ancillary effects on the federal deficit from the Fed’s monetary policy actions are incidental and will prove temporary. Eventually, as economic and financial conditions improve, the pursuit of the dual mandate will lead to a different monetary policy stance, one that requires higher short-term interest rates. And, the Federal Reserve will also eventually shrink the size of its balance sheet.
The Fed’s own estimates indicate that its effects should be similar to what would result with a policy rate cut of 50 basis points. This is surely an effort in the right direction, but its incidence will be limited because of their weak economic situation. The problems in Europe are more severe and worrisome because of its consequences on the world economy and financial markets. Europe is at the core of any debate on the state of the world economy. The serious insolvency of one country, Greece, which is a tiny fraction of the Eurozone, spread throughout the continent as a major confidence crisis (figure 14). There is a vicious circle from weak growth to weak fiscal accounts to weak banking. The crisis is in full swing, and its resolution is uncertain. Unlike what could be expected in the first half of the year, the market does not rule out a disorderly resolution of Greece’s problems, which could result in a default of its sovereign debt and, in a worst-case scenario, in its departure from the euro. This could be very costly, so the Eurozone authorities are fiercely committed to helping it out. The proposals under discussion call for a firewall to avoid the contagion of the sovereign debt, recapitalizing banks and find a solution to the specific case of Greece. This is obviously difficult to do without first having established the firewall for the rest of the region.

We should thus rekindle trust in our economic and fiscal framework, by making it more effective in ensuring sound policy making at national level. These actions can also be further supported at the European level by the recent decisions to launch an instrument for convergence and competitiveness for the euro area. To tackle future cyclical crises, the two layers of protection against shocks – the diversification of risk through the private financial system on the one hand, and public countercyclical support through fiscal instruments at the national and European levels on the other – need to interact in a complete and efficient manner. Achieving these reforms is not idealistic, nor utopian if we work together. And at the Euro Summit in December, leaders renewed their political commitment to strengthen EMU. If we want to realise in full the benefits of the euro, we need to capitalise on this commitment and translate it into concrete policy actions. Conclusion Mr Chairman, Honourable members of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I have used the word “together” several times today. As this is the last time that we will be together in this legislative term, let me add a few words to you personally. I would like to thank you all for the role that this Committee has played over the past years. In my first hearing here, I remember saying that was my first exercise in democratic accountability with the European Parliament and how grateful I was for it.