Here we should also include the functions relating to the resolution of financial institutions, which in Spain are separated into the preventive resolution authority (the Banco de España) and the executive resolution authority (the FROB),15 within the framework of the European Single Resolution Mechanism. This is a more complex arrangement than found in other countries, where, with rare exceptions, the two resolution functions are united under the same banking supervision authority (in Spain, the Banco de España). Combining the two under the banking supervisor can be justified on the grounds of economies of information and cost, and consistency vis-à-vis assessing the implications for financial stability. In any event, changes to financial supervision arrangements such as I have outlined should come in parallel with the corresponding adjustments to the governance frameworks of those institutions whose functions are amended. 6 Governance, transparency and accountability As I have emphasised, in addition to independence, the independent authorities must have the highest transparency and accountability standards, since these are vital for conferring legitimacy upon them. Accountability by independent bodies and authorities for their actions and activities should preferably be before Parliament. This requirement is formally enshrined for the Banco de España by two means. First, there is parliamentary control over the Banco de España’s  14  Supervision of conduct is more than just resolving conflicts or user complaints since it includes, among other facets, verifying that financial products are marketed properly, controlling advertising and assessing whether transparency and consumer protection rules are correctly applied.

As a member of the Executive Board, the ECB President occupies a prominent position and exercises exclusively certain reserved functions and, if absent, these functions are performed by the Vice-President: chairing meetings of the Governing Council, the General Council and the Executive Board of the ECB; representing the ECB abroad; and presenting the ECB’s annual report to the EU Council and to the European Parliament. Additionally, the President is invited to attend certain meetings of the European Council (Heads of State or Government) and participates regularly in meetings of the EU Council in its configuration as the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and in the Eurogroup. 1.3 The Governing Council of the ECB Under the TFEU and the Statute, the ECB’s Governing Council is assigned the power to adopt the most important and strategically significant decisions for the Eurosystem. The Governing Council usually meets twice a month – with the possibility of convening other ad hoc meetings, if necessary – and it also approves a large number of decisions on a daily basis using the so-called “written procedure” (which is explained below). Monetary policy decisions are adopted every six weeks and, although the minutes of these meetings are confidential, the Governing Council publishes an account of its deliberations one month after the meeting. The Governor of the Banco de España, as a governor of an NCB of the euro area, is a member of the Governing Council, together with six members of the ECB’s Executive Board and the other governors of euro area NCBs.