What impacts of cyber-criminality on financial stability? There is one question we must pay particular attention to: the virtual currencies. Recent operations against financial criminality have evidenced that new payment methods using the internet, and linking the virtual sphere with the real sphere, are a privileged way for cyber criminals to launder money. Virtual currencies have indeed recently drawn attention from authorities and from central banks in particular. Designed as alternatives to official currencies but with no guarantee of reimbursement, they cannot be classified as currencies because they lack legal tender and therefore do not infringe the central banks’ monopoly in the issuance of money. However, although they currently do not pose a significant threat to financial stability, they do pose serious questions in terms of money laundering and can be perceived as vehicles for speculative investments. Virtual currencies therefore bring challenges to authorities when it comes to regulating them. Our speakers on the virtual currencies topic could address such questions as: should the use of virtual currencies be prohibited to protect us from cybercrime and the expansion of money laundering or  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  terrorism? Or is it better to set out the legal, regulatory and ethical issues of the virtual currencies? A round table dealing with financial sector solutions to curb new cybercriminals’ strategies will follow. To what extent do current guidance and principles deal with the threat of cybercrime? Can cybercrime be effectively deterred or only defended against?

2  “Principles for the sound management of operational risk”, BCBS 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This systemic risk derives first from the dramatic development of interdependencies across financial intermediaries due to increased automation in financial activities, including in clearing and payment activities, which are a major vector of interconnection. The systemic risk also derives from the possible loss of confidence from the general public in electronic payments that would be triggered by a failure to protect the integrity and reliability of data processed by these payment systems. However, responses to cyber threats can conflict with other established priorities. This is particularly true for financial market infrastructures. For instance, the principle 17 of the CPSS-IOSCO on operational risk clearly states the business continuity requirements for financial market infrastructures. Business continuity plans should aim for the timely recovery of operations, resuming operations within two hours after disruption, and settlement should be ensured before the end of the day in extreme conditions. However, meeting this requirement is raising specific challenges in case of a cyber-attack or in case data is found to be corrupted, when the highest priority might no longer be a swift resumption of operations, but to first recover the quality and integrity of data in order to avoid any risk of contagion. This is also true for the access that could be granted to third parties for accessing online a payment account in order to assist in the initiation of payments.