samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These lessons are helpful when it comes to thinking about the future UK regulatory landscape. For example, some early observations. Solvency II was written to facilitate insurance business by eliminating significant differences between Member States’ regimes and thus aims for uniform rather than dynamic application. We could think about measures that would improve the PRA’s ability to supervise firms through a cycle. An alternative could have been for firms to hold additional regulatory capital during more benign times, buffers which the PRA could then allow to be released during a market down-turn. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  This would be similar to the effect of the symmetric adjustment. At present, buffers held in excess of the solvency capital requirement (SCR) are determined by each insurer’s risk appetite to avoid breaching the SCR, and are thus less likely to be used in a stress. In relation to internal models, we could review the balance between assessment against tests and standards and supervisory judgements concerning calibration of the overall capital requirement. Ultimately, the extent to which the UK’s regulatory framework is similar to or different from EU regulation after the implementation period is a political choice. But as Solvency II is based on the same principles as the preceding UK regime, revolution is less likely than evolution.

Christian Noyer: Monetary policy and macroprudential policy Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the conference on “The future of Monetary Policy”, Rome, 1 October 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to be here today at this joint Banca d’Italia, Einaudi Institute and Banque de France conference, which has provided a lot of stimulating ideas on the future of monetary policy frameworks. In my intervention, I will start with some reflections on the relationship between the objectives of price stability and financial stability, and I will then proceed to discuss several issues concerning the joint implementation of, and the interaction between, monetary and macroprudential policies. I. General considerations on the relationship between financial stability and price stability  Both the experience of the last decades and, looking much further back, economic history provides a useful perspective on the relationship between price and financial stability: first, price stability is not a sufficient condition for financial stability but second is necessary; third, a key reason why the authorities in charge of monetary policy have a stake in maintaining financial stability is that financial instability may give rise to “tail risks” to price stability. Let me elaborate on these two issues in turn. A.
We needed financial firms, and a financial system, that was better prepared to weather all storms. In 2011, we developed the Framework for Supervision – a framework designed to ensure we had firms and a system that were less complex, more resilient and better managed. Collectively, we have made a lot of progress since 2011 – and the industry is in much better condition relative to the pre-crisis period. But, as you all know, business does not stand still and this constant evolution results in new risks and new challenges. Before turning to one of the biggest risks or challenges I see, I want to pause and recognize two things: •  First, it’s clear that progress has been made across the industry in a number of areas – particularly in making firms and the system more resilient through improvements in capital and liquidity, as well as enhancements in risk management, including capital planning and stress testing across the range of risks firms face. But, in the remaining two areas of the Framework – less complex and better managed – I think it’s safe to say that despite the fact that firms are addressing a number of outstanding issues, these areas continue to present challenges in reaching the desired end state. •  Second, as I’m sure you would agree, we collectively still have quite a bit of work to do to fully implement all of the changes required under new rules and regulations.

It is no exaggeration to say that the world count on the leadership of the OECD in many fronts such as those that we are going to discuss today: financial inclusion, capital flows, migration, among others. This is the fifth edition of this Conference organised by IEMed, with the support of the Banco de España, to discuss economic and financial matters in the Mediterranean region. The first and third editions took place in Barcelona, in 2014 and 2017, the second in Rabat in 2015 and the fourth in Tunisia in 2018, on those occasions with the support and hospitality of Bank Al-Maghrib and the Central Bank of Tunisia. Past editions of this conference had provided useful exchanges of ideas between different actors with interests in the economic and financial developments in this region. I firmly believe that forums like this are particularly relevant to shape public policy in times of change as those we are witnessing today. The deep-rooted transformations in economic and financial relations globally force us to re-think the design of economic policies in order to better contribute to the progress of our society. In particular, these forums are instrumental for central banks in its role of providing guidance for economic policies that are not in their mandates. Let me add that in order to exert this role of assessing public policies, central banks need to be granted with political and operational independence, in order to provide recommendations free from political pressure or vested interests.
The background to this is that developments in the euro area in general and in Germany in particular look rather gloomier than they did before. The euro area’s export industry is hampered by international uncertainty, as well as a stronger euro and a weak labour market is affecting households’ consumption and confidence in the future. This means that the international economic prospects look rather poorer now, which was also the conclusion of the Executive Board at its monetary policy meeting on 6 February. However, this assessment is based on the assumption that the Iraq crisis will develop in a way that will not significantly deteriorate economic prospects. Flat growth path for the Swedish economy The financial unease has also affected the Swedish economy. Industrial production has stood still during the autumn and order books have been slow to fill. This is perhaps not so strange in the light of the “wait-and-see” mentality prevailing on important export markets. However, as the international economic climate improves, this and the cyclical pattern for investment are expected to give impetus to industrial production in Sweden. Over the past six months, Swedish households have become increasingly pessimistic in their view of the future, which is perhaps understandable taking into account the negative news with which they are confronted: rising energy prices, higher taxes and expected cuts. The scope for consumption will be under pressure from these factors in the near future.

However, for a production increase brought about by adjustment in stocks to be durable, it must be supported by a lasting increase in demand. Household consumption continued to increase, but there was no upturn in investment. The imbalances in trade and industry in the USA were perhaps more tangible than many had anticipated. Bankruptcies and accounting scandals created further unease on the financial markets, which then fell at a rate reminiscent of the 1930s crisis. In Europe the signs of economic recovery mainly concerned more optimistic expectations; expectations which were not later realised. The largest euro economy, Germany, in particular proved to be in a poorer condition than anticipated. However, here it was not a question of imbalances like those in the USA, but structural problems, such as a high level of unemployment that had set in and weak public finances, which made it difficult to conduct an economic policy that would support the business climate. Furthermore, the expected supporting forces from the other side of the Atlantic for the export industry were weaker the expected. In Sweden, the slowdown during 2001 had a limited effect on unemployment. The Riksbank’s calculations at the beginning of 2002 indicated that resource utilisation was relatively strained. Economic policy had a stimulating effect on the economy, through lower taxes and higher transfers.
With this objective in mind, how, concretely, can we make progress on Economic Union? There is an absolute prerequisite: the implementation of national reforms. Let me say, as an independent central banker, that the new French government, under Mr. Macron’s presidency, has already made decisive steps in that direction [slide]. A substantial labour market reform was approved last summer and has already been implemented. A forthcoming reform of vocational training and apprenticeship is expected next year. Moreover, measures have been taken to keep public deficits below the threshold of 3% of GDP. For the first time in 10 years, the government deficit should be below this threshold in 2017 (2.9%). Needless to say, these efforts have to be pursued in the future. Furthermore, in my view, we should also trigger four accelerators [slide]:  -  A macro accelerator: a collective economic strategy in the euro area. It is premised on one simple fact: economic growth and employment would be stronger in the euro area if we combined more reforms in countries where they are needed, like France or Italy, and more stimulus in countries with leeway for it, like Germany or the Netherlands. To achieve this collective economic strategy, euro area Member States have to seal a deal, which could be prepared and adopted as early as 2018. It could be supplemented by the creation of a Stabilisation Lending Instrument, aimed at supporting, through credits, Member States facing asymmetric shocks.

* At the end of the summer 2020, when we began ‐ at our modest deputy level – to launch this conference, we were convinced that the message of the Green Swan was worth spreading, but we were far from sure that it would attract such a prestigious set of speakers. This was before the new momentum we are experiencing thanks to the political shift in the United States, following the ambitious Italian G20 and UK G7 presidencies. Now, only a few months later, the context is quite different. Governments are more aware than ever before, that they need to act, to anticipate; there is more appetite for multilateral cooperation. The private sector is making many commitments to net‐zero emissions. However, a number of questions arise that we cannot answer easily. Three of them seem particularly important: 3  International Energy Agency – IEA (2021). Net Zero by 2050. A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector. Accessible at: https://www.iea.org/reports/net‐zero‐by‐2050  2  Should we focus on climate change or broaden the scope? How can we make sure that public policies are consistent? How to thrive within limits? Allow me to develop these points. * I. BEYOND CLIMATE? The Charter of the NGFS,4 adopted in December 2017, states that the network aims, in particular, to “contribute to the development of environment and climate risk management”. It is key to consider how ecological crises are in fact multiple and interconnected.
But we also have to remember that we need to work with the staff of the bank, to help them to deal with the shock of the resolution taking place, usually following a very difficult period in which the bank has been under great stress, and through all of that ensure that the doors open on Monday morning. I am lucky to have very talented colleagues in the Bank and the other authorities and advisors who don’t mind the stress and the risk, or at least that’s what they tell me. Issues arising The resolution of Dunfermline was in my opinion a success: on Monday morning depositors knew their money was safe. But it illustrated well the difficulties of resolving banks. Resolution is after all invasive surgery on a bank. I want therefore to highlight a number of areas where in my view more work is needed to hone our regime further. The first concerns funding of the FSCS. In my view we should be doing everything we can to minimise the reliance of the industry on public money, this is just not an acceptable state of affairs. One thing that can be done over the coming years, but gradually, is to pre-fund the FSCS with industry contributions. This would reduce the need for the FSCS to borrow from government and would provide a larger bulwark before the use of public money has to be contemplated. It is welcome that the Government supports pre-funding.

Andrew Bailey: The UK bank resolution regime Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Executive Director for Banking Services and Chief Cashier of the Bank of England, at The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) Financial Services Faculty breakfast, London, 26 November 2009. I am grateful to Peter Brierley, Victoria Cleland, Iain De Weymarn, Geoff Davies, Tony Foster, Andrew Hauser, Orla May and Paul Tucker for their comments and assistance. *  *  *  The UK bank resolution regime Thank you for inviting me to speak this morning. One of the characteristics of bank resolutions, to which I will return later, is that they have to be done quickly to a fixed deadline and involve working through the night. They also require extensive involvement by accountants and lawyers, so, I have had some experience with spending nights and early mornings with accountants. The only, but important difference, is that I don’t get to choose when to spend my early mornings on resolutions, whereas you did choose to listen to me early this morning, for which I am very grateful. Some history The 2009 Banking Act, passed in February, created the new bank resolution regime in the UK. In its first nine months it has been used once, at the end of March for the Dunfermline Building Society.
However, one should not forget that the strike at Escondida, while very relevant to explain the first quarter figure, is a oneoff event that is not expected to generate significant spillovers on activity elsewhere in the economy, nor on inflation. 13. For these reasons we reduced our growth forecast for 2017, and we are now projecting GDP will be in the 1-2% range (1.5-2.5% in December). At the same time, for 2018 we are expecting the economy to grow between 2.25 and 3.25% (table 1). The growth recovery is based on the fact that the economy does not appear to have any relevant imbalances, the mining-related investment adjustment is expected to end, and as I mentioned at the beginning of my presentation, the global outlook appears more favorable. Fiscal policy is assumed to follow the fiscal consolidation path announced by the Government.

As a result, we used the working assumption that the MPR would follow a trajectory similar to the one implied by financial asset prices during the ten days prior to its statistical closing. In practice, this meant at least one additional 25bp cut. It is always worth remembering that this is a working assumption and as such, contingent to the new developments and their impact on projected inflation. If incoming information points at the necessity of an additional boost or, on the contrary, if this is no longer needed, we will react promptly, communicating the justification of doing so. Consistent with the assumption used in our March Report, in April we decided to lower the MPR by 25bp, to 2.75%. The press release issued then stated that we will assess the need for some additional increase in the monetary impulse, which will hinge on the medium-term inflation outlook (figure 8). This way, our monetary policy continues to be one of the most expansionary in a group of comparable economies. Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent)  5  5  MPR  4  Financial asset prices, December 2016 Report (*)  3  Financial asset 4 prices, March Report (*) 3  EES Financial asset prices (17 April)  FBS 2 14  15  16  17  18  2  19  (*) Constructed using interest rates on swap contracts up to 10 years. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 15. As usual when making forecasts, our macroeconomic scenario faces several risks.
Establishing an Oil Stabilisation Fund, which ensures that the government balance sheet is strengthened when oil price movements are favourable, should help insure against the type of debt servicing problems faced by many emerging market economies during the difficult international environment of 1997-98. Iran was able to maintain an excellent debt service record through this period, and prudent debt management policies should help preserve this record going forward. Total external debt is expected to decline to around 10% of GDP this year, and short-term debt to only about 40% of reserves, having fallen from around 65% in 1999/2000. The strong external position has encouraged the World Bank to approve loans of some $ million this year. Importantly, it should hold Iran in good stead in attracting inflows of private capital, which are so crucial to a country’s long-term growth prospects. The international financial crises of 1997-98 stemmed largely from vulnerabilities within countries’ financial systems. In the aftermath of the crises, the official community has been assisting the financial sectors in emerging market economies through technical assistance and improved surveillance. This has been an area of notable success in the redesign of the international financial architecture. A key step in this regard has been the joint IMF-World Bank initiative of Financial Sector Assessment Programs, or FSAPs.

I am well aware that it raises substantial questions, for banks themselves – for their governance, their brands, their relationships with customers – as well as for deposit guarantee schemes. On this latter issue, the current legislative framework needs to be revised in order to remove the strict limitations on the transfer of past contributions to the new DGS in the case of a branchification. These questions are all the more reasons to seriously investigate this option with the banking industry, as soon as possible. 2. Finding alternatives to EDIS.On the “third pillar” of the Banking Union, we must acknowledge the intractable oppositions to a fully-fledged EDIS, and adopt a more realistic 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  approach. By changing the name and the content, perhaps we could regain momentum and willingness to make progress together. We could call it the “Common deposit mechanism”. It would combine a well-known idea with a new one: (i) the well-known idea of a liquidity support system between national DGSs, – and obviously ensuring that each of them is funded as expected – combined with (ii) a renewed approach, in which foreign subsidiaries would be affiliated to the home DGS. The first leg of this new tool would already provide increased funding possibilities. The second leg would provide a serious safeguard to host countries, as they would not bear the cost in the event of an idiosyncratic crisis. 3. Completing the resolution framework. The third pillar – deposits – has been excessively polarising discussions for years.
In light of this, businessmen and the press started to become concerned about the potentially higher unemployment, which exacerbated confidence further. Turning to economic stability, inflation pressure has dissipated starting August 2008. Headline and core inflation rates, which were at 9.2 and 3.7 percent respectively at their peaks in July 2008, fell to 0.4 and 1.8 percent at the end of the year. As for the financial sector, our banking system is healthy in terms of profitability and capital base. I will return to touch on the financial sector later on. Economic stability on the external front is also very strong. For 2008, the current account recorded a small deficit of 0.2 billion US dollar. Our international reserves amounted to 111 billion US dollar, which is 4 times of short-term external debt. The exchange rate remains competitive and stable. For 2008, the capital account recorded an overall surplus of 12.8 billion US dollar, of which foreign direct investment or FDI was 9.9 billion US dollar. FDI from Europe accounted for about 11 percent of total FDI. Excellencies, For the prospect of the Thai economy this year, the Bank of Thailand sees a growth rate of 02.0 percent and 2.0-4.0 percent next year. I wish to emphasize that the growth performance depends not only on how fast the global economy recovers, but also on how fast confidence within the country could possibly pick up, which will help ensure the recovery of domestic demand.

Tarisa Watanagase: Thailand's weathering the global downturn Address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a Luncheon with EU Ambassadors, Bangkok, 3 February 2009. *  *  *  Your Excellency Ambassador Hotek, Excellencies, Honourable Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to join this luncheon gathering of prominent Ambassadors of the Council of European Union in Thailand, under the presidency of Ambassador Ivan Hotek of the Czech Republic. Indeed, I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to Ambassador Hotek for his kind invitation for me to update Excellencies from the EU countries on recent economic developments in Thailand and the prospects for 2009. Let me begin with the overview of Thailand's economic performance. The Thai economic performance was satisfactory for 2008 as a whole. GDP is estimated to grow by around 3.6 percent, driven by the growth momentum during the first three quarters of the year. Notably, from October 2008 onwards, economic developments have been deteriorating. During the fourth quarter of 2008, exports weakened considerably, falling by 9.4 percent from the same quarter of the previous year. Since October, exports showed large reduction in manufacturing products, especially high-technology products. On the domestic side, demand as well as consumers' and investors' confidence have deteriorated as evidenced by several indicators reported by the Bank of Thailand, including the Business Sentiment Index, which fell to the lowest level at 34.4 in November last year.