samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Looking ahead, our challenge is now to specify the rules and implement them. The main challenge for regulators now lies in finalizing the rules and incentives that will be conducive to reaching these targets. Thanks to the agreement reached by G20 leaders, ambitious regulatory reforms and markets initiatives are now under way. I recognize that the regulation of global finance is a considerable challenge: we have to preserve innovation while setting the limits on the capacity of instruments, markets or models to weaken the whole system. –  Our goal now is to ensure consistency across countries of the detailed regulations while keeping the momentum of the reform. Indeed, OTC derivatives are a global market, large banks are not local players and accounting standards should be a common language. Any discrepancies in the regulatory frameworks would be easily arbitraged, creating loopholes in the system. In that perspective, we clearly need to strengthen our coordination. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  ANNEXES : 1.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Turandot - an allegory about the state of the global economy Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Association of Corporate Treasurers Annual Dinner, London, 13 November 2002. *  *  *  This time of the year - between the end of summer holidays and Christmas - is always a particularly busy time for me: it's the season of annual dinners and international meetings. This year it's been even more hectic than usual. And it's been a particularly gloomy period - characterised by global economic uncertainty, financial market volatility and a pervasive sense of pessimism in business and financial circles, not to mention of course the media. That won't have escaped the notice of most of you here. So, in the middle of it all, I took time out a few weeks ago to go to Covent Garden to see one of my favourite operas - Turandot. And I thought it might be more agreeable for all of us if I talked about the opera this evening, rather than the prospect for interest rates. I'm sure you all know the story. The beautiful, but somewhat frigid, Princess Turandot decided to set her many suitors three tests. Turandot's tests were in the form of riddles - and she would only marry the man who could solve all three riddles correctly.
When an economy falls into a recession the central bank cuts its policy rate to boost demand and raise the too low inflation rate. If the recession is really deep, as during the financial crisis, the policy rate may need to be cut substantially. The average level of the policy rate largely depends on how high the inflation target is. If the inflation target is low, the average nominal policy rate is also low. This means that a low inflation target does not give very much scope to cut the policy rate before it hits its lower bound. The lower the inflation target, the more often one can thus count on the policy rate hitting this lower bound. Previously, it was assumed that the lower bound for the nominal interest rate was zero, but recently it has become clear that it is possible to have slightly negative policy rates. Less risk of hitting the “near zero lower bound” The higher the inflation target is, the greater the “buffer” monetary policy has if it is necessary to stimulate the economy – the nominal “close to zero rate” corresponds to a lower real interest rate. When the inflation-targeting policy was introduced in the early 1990s, a target of 2 per cent developed into something of a standard.

As regards the euro area, the Governing Council has judged that, in the current uncertain environment, it was appropriate to gather additional information before drawing conclusions for monetary policy, although the overall stance is “still on the accommodative side” and… “the medium-term outlook for price stability remains subject to upside risks”. Looking further ahead, difficulties in the subprime mortgage markets combined with the generalized securitization of loans will lead to losses whose localization in the financial system remains undetermined. This information problem is currently creating uncertainty and  1  Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model ; The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 84, No.2 (May, 1970)  BIS Review 105/2007  1  turmoil. However, things should be put in perspective. Available data indicate that, unless the economy unexpectedly deteriorates, those losses will remain small in comparison to total available capital in the financial system and should be easily absorbed. Of course, conditions remain fragile in many segments of the capital markets. Perverse dynamics may always develop. By acting to restore balance and stability in the interbank market, Central banks are just doing their job. 2  BIS Review 105/2007
*  *  *  BIS Review 47/1998  -8-  GDP growth 1980-1997 Index: 1980=100, seasonally adjusted  135  135 Trend: 1993-97  130  130  125  125 Trend: 1985-90  120  120  115  115  110  110  105  105  100  100  95  95 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 Sources: Ecowin and the Riksbank  Budgetbalance: Sweden and EU-average Per cent of GDP, 1998-1999 forecast by NI and OECD  8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 -12 -14  8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 -12 -14  Sweden EU-average  90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  Sources: OECD and National institute of Economic Research (NI)  BIS Review 47/1998  -9-  Wage curve: Sweden and EU area Wage/employee, annual percentage change, 1998-1999 forecast by OECD  14  14  12  12  Sweden  10  10  8  8  6  6 EU- area  4  4  2  2  0  0 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99  Source: OECD  Inflationexpectations of labour market organisations Per cent 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5  Jan-95 Feb-96 Nov-97 Feb-98  94  95  96  97  98  99  May-98  00  01  4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5  02 03  Sources: Statistics Sweden and Prospera Research AB  BIS Review 47/1998  - 10 -  Market and administered price components of the CPI Annual percentage change  5.0  5.0  4.0  4.0  Administered prices  3.0  3.0 CPI  2.0  2.0  1.0  1.0 Market prices  0.0  0.0 95  96  97  98  -1.0  -1.0 Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Krona exchange rate with US dollar and German mark 8.5 8.3 8.1 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.7 6.5 jan-95  5.6 SEK/USD (left scale)  5.4 5.2  SEK/DEM (right scale)  5.0 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0  jul-95  jan-96  jul-96  jan-97  jul-97  jan-98 Source: The Riksbank  BIS Review 47/1998  - 11 -  CPI and underlying rates of inflation Percentage 12-month change  12  12 CPI  10  10 8  8 UNDINH  6  6 UND1  4  4  2  2  0  0 90  91  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  Sources: Statistics Sweden and The Riksbanken  Average of CPI forecasts of external observers Annual change, per cent  2.5  2.5 Forecast for 1999  2.0  2.0  Forecast for 1998  1.5  1.5  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  Outcome for 1997  0.0 Aug-97  0.0 Oct-97  Dec-97  Feb-98  Apr-98  Jun-98  Note.

Like many central banks in central Europe, the Riksbank has accordingly moved from a situation that pointed to the likelihood of a relatively quick succession of continued interest rate increases to one where the need of higher interest rates in the near future seems to have disappeared. With the bright inflation prospects and a strict interpretation of the Riksbank’s rule for monetary policy decisions, today there may even be grounds for considering a minor downward repo rate adjustment. What the Riksbank now has reason to consider is whether such an adjustment would lead to good conditions for stable economic development in the future.
A sharp rise in labour costs is currently fuelling brisk growth in the prices of goods and services produced in Norway. Inflation is being kept at bay because the rise in prices for imported goods is close to zero. A stronger krone exchange rate, increased trade with China and eastern European countries, a reduction in tariffs and the global downturn have kept import prices low. If the krone exchange rate remains at today’s level, imported price inflation will remain subdued. Wage growth has remained at between five and seven per cent every year since 1998. It appears that this year’s wage settlement will result in a similar outcome. Strong wage growth is the result of a tight labour market. The interest rate is higher in Norway than in most other OECD countries. This is a direct result of considerably higher nominal wage growth in Norway. The phasing in of petroleum revenues increases the demand for labour from the public sector and from enterprises selling goods and services to households. With little slack in the economy, employment in the internationally exposed sector must decline. As competitiveness has deteriorated, manufacturing employment has been scaled back in waves. Competitiveness deteriorated by around 10 per cent from 1994 to 2001. If wages in Norway relative to other countries develop along the same lines as last year and the krone exchange rate remains at the present level to the end of the year, competitiveness will deteriorate further by around seven per cent.

Our new conditional inflation forecast has been revised downwards once again. Above all, the appreciably lower oil price will push inflation into negative territory during the next four quarters. Moreover, the economic outlook for the euro area has deteriorated once more. Together with persistently low inflation across the globe, this is dampening the medium and long-term inflation outlook for Switzerland. For the current year, we have revised our forecast downwards by 0.1 percentage points to 0.0%. For 2015, we are now even anticipating a negative inflation rate of –0.1%, with inflation turning positive only in 2016, at 0.3%. This constitutes a downward adjustment of 0.3 percentage points for 2015, and 0.2 percentage points for 2016. These forecasts assume that the three-month Libor will remain at zero over the entire forecast horizon, and that the Swiss franc will weaken. The revision of the inflation forecast is a clear sign that deflation risks have increased once more. Global economic outlook The SNB’s inflation forecast is embedded in a global economic scenario. Let me now discuss our assessment of the global economy. Global economic developments continue to be mixed. The US, UK and China all saw robust growth in the third quarter. In the euro area and Japan, by contrast, it was weaker than expected. In addition, inflation in the advanced economies was below central bank targets – in some cases by a considerable margin. In the euro area, it is only just in positive territory.
Chart 3: Compositional effects currently  Chart 4: Low skilled employment more  weak, generally counter-cyclical  cyclical in the US  Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey and own calculations  Source: U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Chart 5: Productivity growth very weak  Chart 6: Pay surveys better match for AWE  in recent years  ex compositional effects  Source: ONS, CBI and BCC  Source: ONS  Table 1: Detailed questions in the Labour Force Survey Characteristics  LFS Question  Age  How old are you? Occupation  What was your (main) job in the week ending Sunday the [date]? Tenure  In which year did you start working continuously for your current employer? And which month was that? Education  This next section is about qualifications gained in the UK. Please think about ALL qualifications you have ever gained [in the UK], even if it was a long time ago or you are not using them now (please exclude expired qualifications). Sector/ Industry  What did the firm/organisation you worked for mainly make or do (at the place where you worked)?

2  Some of the factors that might have reduced productivity growth might also have affected the skill mix of employment, so it’s not clear whether this can legitimately be seen as independent effect: in the limit, saying productivity growth is weak “because” the economy has created more low productivity jobs has a slightly circular flavour to it. Note too that, at least in the short run, a given compositional effect on wages should not be translated one-for-one into productivity space – you’d expect the latter to be smaller (I explain this point in footnote 10). So the 3% figure should be viewed as a ceiling for the estimated impact of these shifts on productivity over the 2008–14 period. 3  Real wages can diverge from productivity either because average profit margins are changing or because the relative price of what firms produce diverges from the price of what consumers buy. In an open economy, for example, an improvement in the terms of trade will raise real incomes relative to productivity; the upward trend in profit margins in the US has depressed wages relative to national income. There has been no such trend in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  shocks to real take-home pay – whether from lower productivity, higher taxes or rises in import prices – without the unfortunate devices of higher inflation and/or higher unemployment.
If no referendum is sought, we assume that the Federal Council will put the new Law into force on 30 April 2004, i.e. the date of our Annual General Meeting. The new Law will modernise the legal framework of the National Bank. It lays down the mandate of the Swiss National Bank in detail, guarantees the SNB independence in its decision-making, regulates its accountability vis-à-vis the Federal Council and Parliament and strengthens the supervisory powers of the Bank Council. The latter will no longer consist of 40 members as at present; it will comprise only 11 members, six of whom are elected by the Federal Council and five by the SNB’s Annual General Meeting. The new Bank Council will be constituted on the day of our Annual General Meeting. The new Law extends the National Bank’s room for manoeuvre on the operational level. Until now, the Law laid down exactly what assets the SNB was permitted to invest in and what securities were eligible as collateral in Lombard business. In future, the National Bank will be responsible for making these decisions itself. At the time when the new Law enters into force, we shall publish two directives. One will spell out the technical preconditions for our monetary operations; the other will set out how we shall use our extended investment policy scope. My colleague, Philipp Hildebrand, in his address will present our first ideas on this subject.

While this is a unique crisis, it brings in tow unique opportunities for us to recalculate our approach, correct structural imbalances, and construct economic components on stronger, firmer foundations so that we may build a brighter future for our homeland and ensure sustainable prosperity for all. We hope that everyone stays safe. Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -9-  Sources:           International Labour Organization. International Monetary Fund. Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Report as of 25 May 2020. Bensirri Public Relations COVID-19 Kuwait Business Impact Survey 13 May 2020. McKinsey Kuwait Business and Employee Sentiment Survey 26 April 2020. Ajar Report on Boosting Rent Collection in the Coronavirus Crisis. World Health Organization. Official press statements. Press coverage of official press releases. Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬
José Manuel González-Páramo: The role of information and communication in central bank policy – the experience of the recent financial turmoil Keynote address by Mr José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the SUERF Conference on “Tracking Financial Behavior: Where do Macro and Micro Meet?”, Milan, 3 December 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, 1 I am very pleased to be able to speak at this prestigious SUERF conference today. As a policy-maker at an institution with responsibilities in both the areas of statistics and market operations, I am particularly pleased to see that much high-quality work is being done to improve and deepen our understanding of financial activity. The recent turmoil in financial markets has reminded us of the importance of timely access to accurate and comprehensive information on financial events as well as of the need to ensure that financial development and innovation are accompanied by advances in financial statistics. Let me take the liberty to narrow my intervention from the rather general issues suggested by the programme to the more specific subject of the role of information and communication in the recent financial turmoil, particularly for the implementation of monetary policy.

To some extent, the resulting amount was taken as guidance for successive allotments carried out in the format of variable-rate tenders, which were reduced in size, in parallel with a temporary easing of tensions at the shortest end of the money market term structure. More generally, at times of market stress, a central bank has to operate in an environment characterized by an extreme level of unrest, in which interest rates are much more volatile than usual, and the martingale property loses its power to tie interest rates to the desired level. In such conditions, central banks can act quickly only if they have access to timely and accurate information. Indeed, differences in the speed, frequency and magnitude of interventions by central banks during financial turbulences can be due not only to structural distinctions in the banking sectors or in the operational frameworks and policy principles of the central banks, but might more simply reflect differences in information sets. Let me at this point briefly recall some of the main sources of information of interest for the Eurosystem in the current turmoil. Market intelligence. Over the last few months we have extensively used market information and activated our regular communication channels with the banking and financial industry. Particularly useful in this context has been the work of the Money Market Contact Group, a discussion forum on issues related to euro money market gathering representatives of the central banks of the Eurosystem and of the commercial banks from all over Europe.
And as a result, inflation and its second round effects have been well contained. Headline inflation came down from a peak of 6 percent in the second quarter, to 3.3 percent in the last quarter, and to 3 percent in January this year. Meanwhile, external stability continues to improve, with current account turning into surplus, and a strengthening of international reserves to almost 67 billion US dollars. The economy proved to be quite resilient to external shocks. And growth momentum continued satisfactorily at 5.1 percent for the whole of last year. But most of you are probably more concerned about prospects for this year and the next. This is understandable. This year, the economy will continue to face a number of important challenges. Economic uncertainty has increased, as evidenced by declining investor sentiment and consumer confidence. Outside Thailand, the threat of a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances still persists. At home, the implementation of the reserve requirement and the introduction of the amended Foreign Business Act turned out to be unpleasant surprises to investors and the global community. And on top of all these, political uncertainty remains a material factor in the private sector's decision to invest. The concern that some of you may have is: Can Thailand weather all these challenges well? Are we turning our back on globalization? A confluence of events in the past few months does appear to present a cause for concern.

Accordingly, should a bank find itself in resolution, it would be able to continue to perform its critical functions – essentially lending and holding deposits – without having to resort to public support and without jeopardising the financial stability of the system. Although the Resolution Directive entered into force on 1 January 2015, setting of the MREL requirements is still at a preliminary stage and there is as yet no specific date for compliance with the requirements. The Single Resolution Board, which is the European resolution authority, will set the MREL requirements for the institutions for which it is responsible, that is, those that are directly supervised by the SSM, at the end of the year. These requirements, for which the transition period for compliance therewith has still not been determined, are not expected to come into force before 1 January 2019. In the case of the less significant institutions, for which responsibility lies with the national resolution authorities, the time frame for adaptation to the new requirements will foreseeably be longer. The requirements set will fundamentally depend on two components: the loss absorption component, which in general will be common to all banks and will be equivalent to their capital requirements; and the recapitalisation component, the amount of which should depend on the resolution strategy deemed most appropriate for each institution.
These remain firmly anchored around 2 per cent. Much of my reasoning here on the Riksbank’s monetary policy strategy is described in a booklet entitled “Monetary policy in Sweden”, which we published a few months ago 1 . The most important aim of this booklet is to explain how the Riksbank, when setting its interest rate, has scope to take into consideration developments in both inflation and in the real economy. One step in this direction was taken already back in 1999 when the clarification of monetary policy was published by the Executive Board for the purpose of explaining that the Riksbank conducted flexible inflation targeting 2 . In the period since 1999 we have learned even more about how flexible inflation targeting is conducted. There has also been considerable progress in the academic research on this subject. New insights led to a decision to issue a new document on monetary policy strategy. This is essentially a question of developments and changes in the method of describing and communicating inflation targeting policy rather than in the basic strategy itself. Inflation in focus, not the interest rate Let me conclude this section of my speech with a few words on a concept that has been used in the discussions on monetary policy recently, namely that the Riksbank has begun a “normalisation” of the repo rate.

Against this background, the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 led to a re-launch of the process by shifting the strategy’s focus more strongly on growth and employment. As an outcome of this process, all EU countries have prepared so-called National Reform Programmes that outline structural reform steps for the years 2005-2008 20 . These measures are designed to, among other things, enhance the sustainability and quality of public finances, promote flexible labour and product markets, support a favourable business environment, and ensure a fully operational EU internal market, including the markets for energy and services. Applying comprehensive structural reforms is of particular importance for the euro area countries, in order to increase wage and price flexibility and the resilience to shocks, facilitate structural adjustment, raise potential output growth and job creation, and reduce price pressures, thereby facilitating the task of the single monetary policy. Also the ECB’s monetary policy has a role to play in supporting the implementation of structural reforms. A credible monetary policy aimed at maintaining price stability in the medium term contributes to a stable economic environment. In a stable macroeconomic context, it is not only easier to single out where reforms are needed, but the benefits of reforms are also made more visible, thus supporting their acceptance. In turn, structural reforms can also have important consequences for the transmission of a monetary policy which is committed to price stability.