samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Source: Bloomberg. 14  Figure 13  Share prices of U.S. regional banks and S&P 500  Stock of bank credit to enterprises  (index, 1.Mar.23=100)  (index, Dec.2019=100)  Regional banks index  120  S&P 500  110  130  100  120  90  110  80  100  70  90  60 Jan.23  Eurozone  United States  140  80 Feb.23 Mar.23  Apr.23  May.23  20  Jun.23  21  22  23  Sources: Bloomberg and respective central banks. Figure 14  Two-year inflation expectations (1)  Inflation expectations of enterprises (EDEP) (2)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  12  Financial Traders Survey Economic Expectations Survey Breakeven inflation  5  in two years  in one year  10 8  4 6 3  4 2 Nov.21 Mar.22  2 17  18  19  20  21  22  23  Jul.22  Nov.22 Mar.23  (1) For details,, see note to Figure I.18 in June 2023 MP Report. (2) EDEP: Price Determinants and Expectations Survey. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 15  Figure 15  Economic uncertainty (DEPUC) (*) (index)  500 400 300 200 100 0 21  20  22  23  (*) Dashed horizontal line corresponds to 2020-2023 average DEPUC. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

23  1.25-2.25 1.0 0.8 -1.0  2.0-3.0 2.1 1.9 2.3  2.0-3.0 2.0 1.9 2.2  1.5 1.5 4.4 2.2 -4.0 18.7 23.0  1.8 1.9 2.2 0.5 -4.0 19.2 23.2  1.8 1.8 2.5 0.6 -3.9 19.2 23.2  (annual change, percent) GDP Demanda interna Domestic demand (w/o inventory change) Gross fixed capital formation Total consumption Private consumption Goods and services exports Goods and services imports Current account (% of GDP) Gross national savings (% of GDP) Nominal GFCF (% of GDP) (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 17  Figure 18  Growth forecasts for selected economies  (annual change, percent)  8  2013-2019 average  2023 (f)  United States  Eurozone  2024 (f)  2025 (f)  7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  China  Trading partners (*)  (f) Forecast. (*) For definition, see Glossary. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 19  Commodity prices (1) (2)  (dollars/lb; dollars/barrel; index)  Copper  Oil (3)  4.5  Foods (FAO) 150  110  140  4.0  90  130  3.5  120  70 3.0  110 50  2.5 2.0  100 90  30 15  17  19  21 23(f) 25(f)  15  17  19  21 23(f) 25(f)  15  17  19  21 23(f) 25(f)  (f) Forecast. (1) Actual price/index refers to average of each year.
They review such issues as whether the model is based on reasonable assumptions, whether the firm is making appropriate use of backtesting, and how the model performs under normal and stressed market conditions. In addition, they are spending significant time on key controls related to the overall use of models, including the model validation process and the new product approval process. Likewise, as banks rely increasingly on their own assessments of credit and operational risk when determining their capital needs, our examiners will have to become well-versed in the changing technical aspects of those models. Some of the conventional, static metrics that we now use - for example, on the credit risk side, those to judge asset quality and to assess the adequacy of credit loss reserves - are likely to be supplanted by more sophisticated quantitative measures. As is the case with credit risk, we are in the process of developing a more integrated framework for assessing the adequacy of banks’ operational risk management and measurement approaches. We are focusing heavily on how banks are managing operational risk from a corporate-wide perspective. We begin by developing a feeling for the "tone at the top" - that is, the board of directors’ and senior management’s commitment to effectively manage its operational risk. Then we assess whether that commitment translates into an effective operational risk management and control structure - including the quality of management reporting, and the degree of integration of operational risk into a bank’s overall risk management approach.

It is clear to me that only if the industry and supervisors work together - each meeting our responsibilities and reinforcing the other - will we be able to successfully manage and supervise a modern financial system. While perspectives may differ from time to time, our objective is the same to maintain a strong and vibrant financial system over the long term. Thank you very much. 6  BIS Review 15/2003
10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Table 3 Inflation (annual change, percent) 2008  2009  2010 (f)  2011 (f)  2012 (f)  Average CPI inflation December CPI inflation CPI inflation in around 2 years (*)  8.7 7.1  1.6 -1.4  1.4 2.8  3,0 3.3  3.0  Average CPIX inflation December CPIX inflation CPIX inflation in around 2 years (*)  8.4 8.6  2.8 -1.8  0.5 2.3  2.7 3.1  3.1  Average CPIX1 inflation December CPIX1 inflation CPIX1 inflation in around 2 years (*)  7.8 7.7  2.8 -1.1  -0.7 -0.1  2.0 3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  (f) Forecast. (*) Inflation projected at fourth quarter of 2012. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Gráfico 9  Inflación IPC (*) (annual change, percent)  10  EEE: Expectativas de inflación (porcentaje)  10  7  7  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  5  5  2  2  4  4  0  0  3  3  -2  -2  2  2  -4  -4  1  1  06  08  10  IPoM Sep. 2010 IPoM Dec. 2010  12  02  04 06 08 10 At December 2010 One year ahead At December 2011 Two years ahead  (*) Gray area, as from the fourth quarter of 2010, indicates forecast.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 1  World output (*) (index, second quarter 2007=100)  Unemployment rate (*) (percent)  120  120 10  10  110  110  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  100  100  90  90  07  08  09  10  08  Jul. 09  Jul. 10  Jul. Emerging economies  Developed economies  (1) Regions weighted at PPP. Developed economies include: Australia, Canada, the Eurozone, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. Emerging economies includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Hong Kong, India Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Venezuela. (2) Regions weighted at PPP. Developed economies include: Canada, the Eurozone, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. Emerging economies include: Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on Bloomberg, OECD and each country's statistics offices, and U.S. Federal Reserve.
Alan Greenspan has suggested that consideration be given to simple rules of thumb such as that countries without a track record of international borrowing should maintain unencumbered foreign exchange reserves sufficient to meet all foreign currency liabilities over the following year, and that the average maturity of external liabilities should exceed three years. Rudiger Dornbusch has proposed the use of value at risk assessments of country balance sheets. Ideas such as these, precisely because they focus on the national balance sheet, are sure to be centre stage. (3)  Encourage inflows of equity rather than debt finance. This is an extension of the need to manage the national balance sheet. The imperative is the old adage: borrow long not short. A credible legal and institutional infrastructure for private investors would go a long way to encourage equity inflows. Reserve requirements on short-term debt inflows, as adopted in Chile, might help to modify the pace of vulnerable capital inflows, but will in themselves do little to help in times of rapid capital outflow. It is also time to reconsider the incentive to the provision of short-term finance provided by the Basel Accord risk weights. (4)  Promote the better design of debt contracts which provide a framework for negotiation between creditors and debtors when financing difficulties arise. The particular proposal – advanced initially by a G10 Deputies’ report in 1996 and subsequently endorsed by the G7 – for the use of collective action clauses in sovereign debt contracts has stalled.

The song “Roll out the Barrel” was written by the Czech composer Jaromir Vejvoda, and the New World Symphony was composed by the world famous Czech composer Antonín Dvořák. So you can find at least some Czech marks in many areas of everyday life. How about my domain, finance? Well at least one thing originates in this country. You sometimes pay with US dollars, or Canadian dollars or Australian dollars for that matter, so you should know that the name dollar comes from the original Czech name tolar – TOLAR – which was a small silver coin minted in Western Bohemia in the 16th century. Now it is world famous. And while I am talking about the traces left by the Czech language, I should not forget that there is at least one Czech word which has spread from my very complicated mother tongue to almost all languages. That word is robot – the invention of Czech writer Karel Čapek. It comes from the Czech word “robota”, which means unfree and unpaid labour, or corvée in English. Ladies and gentlemen, I can only hope that I have succeeded in convincing you that this is a country with a long track record in many areas and that it is not a waste of your time to explore its history, beauties and treasures, be it here in Prague or elsewhere. I’d say you might find many other surprises as well. I wish you every success with your conference. Enjoy it, enjoy Prague and enjoy the Czech republic.
This not only applies to the less regulated players in the financial system, such as hedge funds, but also to a certain extent to banks. For instance, the rating agency Moody’s came to the conclusion in a report 1 published last year that banks generally do not disclose their risks sufficiently. In our Financial Stability Report, we also point out that it would be beneficial if Swiss banks were to provide more data in this regard. By providing more comprehensive data, banks would be helping investors and authorities to better assess the risks banks take. Banks should, for example, publish more results from their stress tests. Similar to crash tests, stress tests examine how severely the bank would be affected by a major crisis. Secondly, it is difficult to assess how the traffic would react in poor weather conditions. Even though the braking distance is relatively short on a dry surface, this is by no means a guarantee that the car will react in the same way on a wet or even icy road. A number of instruments currently in use in the financial system have not yet had to prove their worth in extreme stress situations. It is therefore not clear whether the risks for these new and complex products have been adequately assessed. These products are typically not assessed in a central market, but by using complex models. In other words, the analysis is not a mark-to-market one, but a mark-to-model one.

With that I mean first and foremost the increased level of efficiency that has been achieved in the financial system in the past few years. This rise in efficiency can be ascribed to the innovativeness of financial markets. New financial instruments, such as credit derivatives, enable banks to separate their credit risk and transfer it either completely or partially. This facilitates a better distribution of credit risk in the financial system and means that the risk is borne by those who want to and are able to bear it. The improved efficiency has resulted in a reduction in the financing costs of companies and households. Lower financing costs help the economy and stock markets to achieve greater growth. The increased efficiency also appears to have improved the ability of global financial markets to absorb shocks. The downgrading of General Motors’ credit rating in 2005, for instance, or the major losses suffered by the hedge fund Amaranth last year had no lasting impact on stock and credit markets. All in all, global financial markets are currently better able to absorb shocks, at least small to mediumsized ones. Accordingly, serious turbulence in the financial system seems less likely today. From a financial stability perspective, this is a positive development indeed. However, the greater the stability of the financial markets, the greater the risk appetite of market participants tends to be. This in turn can increase the likelihood of a crisis and, in the event of one occurring, the extent of the damage.
Last week the Riksbank presented a new assessment of economic and inflation prospects in this year's third Inflation Report, which led to our decision to leave the repo rate unchanged. Assessment of economic activity and inflation It is our assessment that there has been an improvement in the economic outlook for Sweden and the world economy since June. But the picture is neither clear-cut nor problem-free. Economic conditions in Europe have continued to be gloomy, with several countries experiencing a decline in GDP during the second quarter, in particular large countries such as Germany and France. Elsewhere, mainly in the US, expansionary economic policy appears to have had some impact. This has been reflected in high consumption and signs of a recovery in business investment. The positive signals have been mirrored in rising equity prices and long yields in the financial markets. Moreover, in the US labour market there are indications of a possible turnaround, which is a precondition for a sustainable upswing in economic activity. Asia has also been witnessing relatively favourable economic conditions, particularly in China, where economic growth has been approximately 8 per cent per year. In Sweden, GDP growth was somewhat more robust during the first half of this year than we previously thought, and the outlook for the economy appears now to be slightly brighter. Adding to this is the repo rate cuts totalling 0.75 percentage points during the summer. However, in the labour market, conditions remain weak.

2  BIS Review 46/2003  Growth and welfare in the long run A monetary policy that leads to price stability creates favourable conditions for economic activities, consumption, trade and investment. But monetary policy in itself cannot generate growth. Other economic policy decisions can, however, especially those that affect people's willingness to work and invest in new businesses. Between 1975 and 1995 Sweden lost its previously so prominent position in the world. These years were also characterised by substantial wage increases and high inflation. Average inflation during this period was 8 per cent per year. We also lagged behind our Nordic neighbours. Had we experienced the same growth as Norway, Denmark and Finland during these years, the standard of living in Sweden today would be about 20 per cent higher. Partly as a result of the economic policies of the 1970s and 1980s, Sweden found itself in serious economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. This led to large deficits in both the central government budget and the current account, as well as to unemployment that quadrupled in the space of a few years. It was the largely the lessons drawn from this crisis that formed the basis for the changes in economy policy at the beginning of the 1990s. It was then that price stability was introduced as the objective of monetary policy. As regards fiscal policy, an expenditure ceiling and surplus target for central government expenditure were introduced, while cutbacks were also implemented.
The high priority that European policymakers have attached to climate policies can guide the ECB when carrying out its supportive role and help justify the incorporation of climate change considerations into our monetary policy framework under our secondary mandate. These considerations imply that the Treaties provide a solid legal basis to explore the ECB’s leeway for policy action under the primary and secondary mandates. But even a favourable legal assessment would still beg the question of how the ECB should operationalise its policy support to accelerate the green transition. What could the ECB do? A growing number of policy proposals suggest that the ECB should modify its monetary policy framework in order to more explicitly address climate considerations. The public debate has largely focused on our asset purchases. However, the implementation of our asset purchase programmes is only one potential lever the ECB could use to address climate change. There is a wide spectrum of other possible avenues that the ECB and other central banks could pursue to contribute to the global fight against climate change. It is widely acknowledged that the ECB should adapt its macroeconomic models to better integrate climate change-related risks into our monetary policy decisions. Such an adjustment of our models will, for example, improve our theoretical and empirical understanding of how climate risks affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Any climate change policy hinges on the availability of reliable data. The ECB can contribute to developing statistical indicators at granular and aggregated levels.

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Accounting for 33% of all announced international bonds and notes issues in 1999, compared with 37% for the US dollar, the euro nearly matched the dollar in that year. In the second half of 1999 euro-denominated bond issues even exceeded those in the US dollar. As far as the euro’s share in overall official reserves is concerned, the euro also represents the second most widely used currency behind the US dollar. According to the latest available data, at the end of 1999 the euro accounted for around 13% of the official foreign currency holdings of the world. Apart from some technical corrections on account of the conversion of the Eurosystem’s reserves into euro, which led to a slight decline in the euro’s share in overall reserves, there is no evidence of any reallocation of foreign reserves at this stage. It should also be noted that more than 50 countries in the world are currently using the euro as a nominal anchor. International cooperation Let me now turn to the institutional side. The introduction of the euro has brought about a major change to the institutional framework in which international cooperation takes place. In view of the rapid process of globalisation and episodes of crises in a number of systemically important emerging market economies, international cooperation should play a role in strengthening the international financial architecture. In this respect, the new institutional setting in Europe is to be taken into account.

And an ambitious reform of overall economic governance has been launched, strengthening the mechanisms to align national economic policies with the aims of the Union as a whole and designing a plan to move towards a deeper and sounder union in four stages: banking union, economic union, fiscal union and, finally, political union. Highly significant progress has already been made in the first of these four areas. In November next year the new Single Supervisory Mechanism will begin to operate within the ECB, and it should be complemented by a single bank resolution system and, later, a Single Resolution Authority and a Common Resolution Fund although, as is known, these latter steps pose complex legal and political problems that might delay their effective start-up. National governments, too, have reacted within their remit. On one hand, to contain the worsening of public finances, one of the main imbalances underlying the European strand of the crisis. And on the other, to make markets more flexible and to promote investment, growth and employment. Since late last year the quantitative and, above all, the qualitative indicators have improved markedly. In the second quarter this year, there was a year-on-year increase of 0.3% in euro area GDP. This positive figure has put an end to six consecutive quarters of contraction. The rise in output has been across the board, spanning both domestic and external demand.
Globalisation has been given a powerful push forward. Even though setbacks are possible, it is reasonable to believe that the supply shock produced by Asia’s low-price exports will continue to depress prices in the world for many years ahead. China’s government has set a target of quadrupling its GDP during 2000-2020, as happened over the last twenty-year period. In rural parts of China there are hundreds of millions of people who dream of a better life in the cities and of working in a modern company. In Sweden we can see how inflation in recent months has turned out lower than we expected, because price increases for imported goods have been weaker than anticipated. The productivity gains that we have witnessed, and that have also contributed to such a low inflation rate, may also be due to the increased global competition. Another dampening effect can be expected from the abolition of the import quotas for textiles. At the same time there is as usual reason to believe that world market prices will increase as economic activity improves. The rapid growth in the new industrial countries is also pushing up the prices of commodities, not least oil. It is therefore uncertain how long import price pressures will remain very low. In any event this is a very important issue for monetary policy in the coming year, and at the Riksbank we are keeping a close eye on import price developments. Allow me to round off with some thoughts regarding the stance of monetary policy.

There is little to suggest that the US federal budget deficit will narrow to a sufficient extent. That is worrying, especially given that the country in the long term will see sharply increasing costs for medical care, health care and pensions. As a result there is a clear risk of rising market rates in the US that could trigger a fall in house prices, which in turn could dampen private consumption. A reduction in public expenditures would also have a tightening effect but in the long term would lead to a more balanced development and thereby prevent an overly quick rise in rates. Another risk factor is the oil price. As the US is more oil-dependent than the euro area countries, its economy is more sensitive to changes in oil prices. Should the oil price remain at a high, fluctuating level it may curtail growth in the US. All in all, this picture of large global imbalances implies a clear risk that growth will be more subdued over the coming two-year period. The question is how fast this slowdown may come about. If controlled, the moderation would be softer, while rapid changes could entail a considerable weakening of the world economy and thereby also check Sweden’s economic performance in the period ahead. In addition to the competition problems that an ever stronger euro means for Europe there is the issue of how we are to meet the competition from low-wage countries, both the new member states of the EU and the emerging economies in Asia.