samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The second challenge thrown up by digitalisation is the unbundling of the value chain. In the past, the value chain – from payment initiation, through authorisation and clearing to complaints processing – was largely concentrated in the hands of a single entity. Thanks to technical innovations, however, payment service providers are now unbundling and reconfiguring the value chain. For instance, they are taking the products of specialised providers – e.g. relating to FX transactions, payment guarantees or ‘mobile wallets’ – and combining them. Established providers of payment services are having to adapt to this unbundling. They are having to cooperate with new players, invest in their value chains and simultaneously satisfy demand for ever faster and easier payment methods. The central banks, too, face a challenge: they need to develop the core payment infrastructure in such a way that the unbundling of the value chain can be successfully navigated – without new risks being created. As a result, we are seeing many central banks adapting their RTGS systems. For example, retail payments are increasingly being settled via RTGS systems (something which for a long time was unique to Switzerland), longer operating times are being introduced and settlement times are being shortened. These are major international trends, and we in Switzerland will have to think about how we wish to position ourselves. There is also the question of how to integrate the new players – the fintechs – into the payments infrastructure.

A number of idiosyncratic factors could influence the terms of that trade, such as how desperate the borrower is at the end of the day, which could add unnecessary noise to market rates. Figure 3 illustrates this change. 6 Turning to market discipline, Ulrich notes that the interbank market may perform this function particularly well because it is a peer-to-peer market. I would like to see more empirical research before I can feel comfortable that money markets provide much market discipline, especially in overnight markets. If the monitoring was so good pre-crisis, why did we have a crisis? One reason to question how much money market participants monitor the counterparties to which they lend is that it is hard to appropriate the value from such monitoring. Money market “freezes” may affect financial institutions somewhat indiscriminately, and, for that reason, lenders may prefer to withdraw short-term funding indiscriminately when they fear other lenders might do so. If money market participants provide some market discipline, we could expect nonbank lenders in U.S. money markets to do this effectively. They are sophisticated financial institutions that have established relationships with the banks to which they lend. And, because they lend to these banks on a consistent basis, they have strong incentives to monitor their counterparties. 7 While my assessment is necessarily preliminary, I don’t see a reason why one type of money market activity should be preferred over another.
Regarding the financial sector more specifically, the new legislative framework provides much better support for reducing non-performing loans (NPLs) compared with the situation a couple of years ago. This will help banks support economic growth and job creation more effectively. But let’s not forget where it all started. Never again should a euro area country end up in such an unsustainable position as Greece’s in 2010. We need responsible national fiscal and economic policies, and a better euro area governance framework. As for enhanced surveillance, it is not a new programme but rather a strengthened form of cooperation between Greece, the European institutions and the euro area countries to support the transition towards full market access. Make no mistake, the burden of gaining the trust of markets and depositors has now fully shifted to the Greek government. Don’t expect building trust among investors to be easier than convincing the institutions. What will be the ECB’s role in the context of enhanced surveillance? Will you provide your contribution as in the past? We will remain involved in the enhanced surveillance, as mandated by the European regulations underlying this framework (the so-called two-pack). But the end of the programme is also an opportunity for us to refocus our activities, as already indicated in the opinion we published in April 2018. Looking ahead, our work in Greece will now be focused on financial and macro-critical issues. More specifically, this includes financial sector stability, macroeconomic projections, headline fiscal targets, and sustainability and financial needs.

Will they manage to reach the NPL targets as agreed? Should the targets be tightened for the years after 2019? The capital position of Greek banks has strengthened substantially during the programme and is now quantitatively at higher levels than in other countries affected by the crisis. However, the quality of Greek banks’ capital is lower than elsewhere in Europe, consisting partly of deferred tax assets, and there is still a large amount of non-performing exposures (NPE) as a legacy of the crisis. There is a need to be prudent and to set ambitious targets in order to significantly reduce the NPE ratio by the end of 2019. The performance of Greek banks has so far been broadly in line with their approved NPL targets, as shown in the Bank of Greece’s quarterly NPL monitoring reports. However, the targets to be achieved by the end of 2019 are back-loaded. Beyond 2019, continued efforts are needed to further reduce the NPE ratio in Greece in the years ahead, until it is closer to the euro area average. Swift progress in resolving NPLs is crucial not only for economic recovery, but also for the forward-looking capital adequacy of Greek banks. This depends on the economic environment stabilising and, importantly, on the continued and improved effectiveness of the relevant legal frameworks (household and corporate insolvency, out-of-court workout, NPL sales and eauctions).
One prime example of this possible groundswell is the preparation, under the impulse of the Euro Retail payments Board (ERPB), of a pan-European instant payments scheme by the European Payments Council (EPC), based on the existing SEPA Credit transfer scheme. This new scheme, which should be finalized by the end of 2016 and operational before the end of 2017, will serve the development of further innovative products, especially via smart devices, for proximity and mobile payments. This is a relevant example of how the harmonisation and standardization work done in the context of the so-called “SEPA 1.0.” for legacy payment instruments (direct debit and credit transfer) may serve as a basis for market players to develop new innovative real time and paperless payment solutions, what I would call “SEPA 2.0.”. Secondly, we observe the emergence of new payment behaviors and new market players, in relation with further technological innovations. This is mostly led by the rising prominence of e-commerce, which has fundamentally changed payment usages in the last few years. The  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  search for a payment instrument adapted to these evolutions has first led to a wider usage of payment cards, beyond proximity transactions. These Card-not-present payments over the internet now account in France for nearly 7.5% of all card based-transactions in volume, and for 11.6% of the overall value of these transactions.

One of the main axis of the strategy aims at facilitating the use of cards for proximity payments through the modernization of card terminals and infrastructures which will boost the development of contactless payments, as a secure and efficient alternative to cash for everyday transactions. The National Payments Committee, which will take over from the National SEPA Committee shortly, will, similarly to the ERPB at the European level, involve all stakeholders under the aegis of Banque de France to foster the necessary dialogue for an effective implementation of the national strategy and feed the ERPB with input from the French community. 2) In addition to their catalyst role, central banks through their oversight function should aim at ensuring that competition between market participants does not translate into a race to the bottom, but rather translate into a race to the top in terms of security, by setting high level objectives and by overseeing that they are complied with. Indeed, while innovation is a promise  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and a vector for economic growth, it is also a door open to new threats for the very security of payments and public confidence in those. Changes in the customers’ usages generate new risks that may not be fully and comprehensively mitigated at the present time. I will only recall that Card-not-present payments, though accounting for “only” a little less than 12% of the overall value of card-based transactions in France, represent more than two-third of the overall value of fraudulent card-based transactions.
In the past five years, the National Bank has achieved an average yield of 2.9%. This more or less corresponds to the earnings forecasts underlying the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the National Bank regarding the distribution of profits. 2/2

Alongside this, changes to the incapacity benefits regime may well also have had the effect of bringing more workers into the market. The number of people under the age of 65 who are inactive because of incapacity is down by around 200,000 since mid-2008. For much of the post-war period, there has been in the UK a steady decline in the hours people have wanted to work. As income grew, the trend was to reduce hours and maintain income rather than to maintain hours and increase income. Not surprisingly, the largest fall in real pay since records began has reversed that trend; the evidence suggests that, as the economy has recovered, with lower real pay, many have sought to increase hours to maintain – or recover – income. That of course may well be a temporary effect and as and when real pay rises the pre-crisis trend may reassert itself. But it may be that this effect will last for some time yet. Another explanation for the weakness of pay despite the fall in unemployment might be that the pressure to catch up lost income is much weaker post recession than it has been in the past. Based on previous episodes in the UK, we might have expected a reduction in real incomes to result in increased inflationary pressure from the labour market.
FRBSF Working Paper # 99-13. http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/workingp/wp99-13.pdf  BIS Review 82/2000  2  increase in equilibrium rates. The large federal budget surplus has increased the supply of national saving, while the rising trade deficit was matched by an increased supply of capital from abroad. But overall, it appears that we would have been contributing to an inflationary monetary policy if we had tried to hold real rates at their old levels. The other two reasons support an actual tightening of the stance of policy. Inflation tends to decline initially when productivity accelerates in response to a technology shock, because increases in labor compensation tend to lag behind increases in productivity growth. Eventually, though, the shock wears off, as the rate of productivity growth stops increasing and wages accelerate to catch up. So a technology shock is a “golden opportunity” - initially, it gives us lower inflation without a slowdown in growth or a rise in unemployment. However, to lock in the benefits and keep inflation at the new lower level, monetary policy would have to tighten. After all, in the end, inflation is determined by monetary policy, not by productivity growth. The final reason has to do with the “permanent income hypothesis”. A technology shock raises the prospect that incomes will continue to be higher in the future: in other words, permanent income may increase. This could mean that we will see an increase in spending before the additional capacity comes on line.

Jan F Qvigstad: Could the financial crisis have been avoided? Challenges to international cooperation and conflict Speech by Mr Jan F Qvigstad, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a seminar on the financial crisis arranged by Prio, Oslo, 8 December 2009. *  *  *  What happened? Confidence between financial market participants collapsed in September last year following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The price of credit jumped up both in money and bond markets. Equity prices declined, increasing the cost of raising new equity capital. The authorities worldwide responded by supplying substantial liquidity to banks and central bank key rates were reduced. In many countries, the authorities provided extraordinary loans or took over banks to maintain confidence in institutions and market activity. In some countries, the authorities have purchased securities to bring down long-term interest rates. Stimulus has also been provided through increased public sector demand and government budget deficits have grown to unprecedented levels in some countries. The reaction of households and businesses was to increase saving and private sector demand declined. Credit standards were tightened and risk premiums soared. The drop in demand rapidly translated into a contraction in trade and output. In spring 2009, world trade was around 20 per cent below the level prevailing one year earlier. In many countries, the total value of goods and services production (GDP) declined over several consecutive quarters. Countries that were heavily reliant on exports of manufactured goods were particularly hard hit.
Tonight all of us here would like to pay tribute to your work since you became Lord Mayor, and to thank both the Lady Mayoress and yourself for the splendid hospitality which you have extended to us all this evening. So I invite you all to rise and join me in the traditional toast of good health and prosperity to "The Lord Mayor and the Lady Mayoress, David and Theresa Lewis". BIS Review 79/2008  3

This includes wider representation from non-bank payment service providers and user groups such as consumers, merchants and government agencies. The NPAC now comprises a Steering Committee, a User Consultative Group and a Service Provider Consultative Group. The consultative groups serve to promote dialogue, encourage alignment and canvass new ideas to improve payment solutions. This provides important inputs to focus on the strategic and tactical priorities for the development of the payment systems in Malaysia. Continued support from all stakeholders necessary to ensure the successful migration to PIN verification Before I end my speech, allow me to take this opportunity to commend the industry on its efforts to achieve a smooth transition from signature to PIN verification of payment card transactions. Collectively, we shall achieve our targets to migrate users to PIN verification by 1 July 2017. We have seen tremendous commitment and intensified efforts by banks to meet these targets and I am pleased to note that we are near completing the replacement of all active payment cards and POS terminals with PIN functionalities. We have been clear that there will be no extension to the deadline of 1 July 2017 for turning off signature verification. By that date, only PIN will be accepted for domestic payment card transactions, so it is important that in the next 40 days, we should not be complacent and no effort is spared to encourage the migration to PIN. From the latest data we have, the PIN bypass rate has now been reduced to 10% in April.
In addition to development costs, there are operating costs for personnel and IT and communications systems. Moreover, the payment system must be protected against various forms of threat, for instance, cyber attacks and large-scale frauds.8 The Swedish market is not sufficiently large to carry such a platform on its own shoulders cost-effectively. If the Riksbank is to supply a settlement service for instant payments, it is therefore preferable if it can do so by sharing a technical platform with other central banks. The more who share the cost of running the platform, the cheaper it will be and the more attractive to use. Platform sharing with the Eurosystem As I mentioned earlier, the Riksbank is not the only central bank thinking about how its payment system needs modernisation to meet the demands of tomorrow, not least with regard to instant payments. The Eurosystem therefore decided in 2017 to add a new technical platform to its payment system TARGET2 (the Eurosystem's equivalent to RIX). This platform is called the Target Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS). It has been developed and run by the Italian central bank since November 2018. During the spring the Riksbank has investigated the potential for using TIPS to settle instant payments in Swedish krona. The platform was initially built with the function of being able to settle payments even in other currencies than the euro,  8 See Reducing the risk of wholesale payments fraud related to endpoint security, CPMI Papers No 178, BIS 2018.

A medium-term analysis of the relationship between productivity, wages and unit labour costs suggests that this is indeed the case. Between 2000 and 2008, productivity grew by 3.6 per cent but nominal wages increased seven times faster, by almost 28 per cent. As a result, unit labour costs rose by more than 23 per cent during this period, compared with 15 per cent in the euro area. Thus, despite the more moderate pace of relative cost growth during the last few years, Malta must still recover the ground lost in the early years of this decade. In the absence of relevant data, a sectoral diagnosis is not possible, but given that the export sector is a price taker and continues to attract investment, it is likely that the greatest effort must be made by other, mainly non-traded, sectors, including the public sector. To a large extent, Malta’s weak productivity record explains why per capita GDP in relation to the euro area average has stagnated at around 70 per cent since 2003. It is true that this subdued productivity performance was partly offset by higher labour utilisation in the past two years, but the latter is still some 88 per cent of the euro area level. This analysis suggests that the economy’s growth potential can indeed be raised. This should be a key objective. As things stand, for example, should the Commission’s growth projections prove accurate, in 2011 Malta’s real GDP would only have recovered to its 2008 level.
Central Bank initiatives  4.1 In the interest of the wider financial system stability, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka is responsible to ensure smooth, speedy and safe operations of the nation’s payment, clearing and settlement systems. Since 2003, the Central Bank has taken the lead to introduce an efficient and safe payment and settlements for both high value and time critical transactions by introducing the Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system for interbank and third party customers. The RTGS system is a computer-based fund settlement system, which processes and settles each payment instruction individually and irrevocably on a real time basis, using funds in the participants’ RTGS Settlement Accounts or Central Bank funds provided under an intraday liquidity facility. At present, the value of transactions settled in the RTGS system accounts for about 81 per cent of the non-cash high value payments in Sri Lanka. The majority of RTGS transactions are on account of the inter-bank call money market, the government securities market, open market operations, the Rupee leg of transactions in the foreign exchange market, urgent and time critical payments of customers and net obligations under the clearing system operated by LankaClear Ltd, a venture jointly  2  BIS Review 13/2008  owned by the Central Bank and commercial banks. In early 2004, the Central Bank implemented the Scripless Securities Settlement (SSS) System for settlement of government debt instruments in electronic or scripless form and settlement of trades of such scripless securities on a Delivery Vs. Payment (DvP) basis.

Some of these uncertainties are already having a negative impact on the world economy and have the potential to affect significantly growth prospects. As an illustration, a hypothetical interruption of energy commodity imports from Russia would hit the European and Spanish economy hard. Indeed, simulations prepared by Banco de España staff show that such a scenario would have a negative impact of between 0.8% and 1.4% on Spanish GDP in the first year, depending on the assumption made regarding the European economies’ ability to replace Russian energy sources. 2  In this uncertain scenario, one of the main worrisome developments is being the significant increase in the rate of inflation at the world, European and Spanish level. In particular, inflation in Spain rose significantly in 2021 and accelerated further in early 2022, reaching 10% in June. Moreover, although the price rises were initially concentrated in commodities and food and seemed to be relatively temporary in nature, in recent quarters their intensity has systematically surprised on the upside, spreading to the rest of the goods and services in the consumption basket and showing signs of greater persistence. Therefore, analysing the current inflationary episode, with a particular focus on the factors that may influence the persistence of these dynamics in the future is of paramount importance for the recovery of the Spanish economy. Wage and mark-up dynamics are particularly relevant in this regard.