samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Climate Finance Day 2018 – Paris, 28 November 2018 The role of finance: Anticipating climate risks, financing transition opportunities  Closing session: Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau Governor of the Banque de France  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr). Page 1 sur 6 Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to be here to conclude this fourth edition of Climate Finance Day. This event gives a concrete picture of what I like to call the “powerful coalition of the willing”. Each and every one of us – public authorities; academics, NGO’s and think tanks; corporates and financial institutions – have a part to play in this coalition. It is a shared challenge that no one can tackle alone, and you have worked during these last three days to bring tangible solutions to quickly and effectively finance the transition. Paris, chère Madame la Maire, has been a driving force committed to translating momentum into concrete action. Let me mention three key milestones: the COP 21 back in 2015, the “One Planet Summit” in December 2017, and this fourth edition of Climate Finance Day. To better address concretely the financial risks stemming from climate change, the Banque de France initiated a Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) at the One Planet Summit, with eight founding members. i In less than one year, we have been joined by 13 other members ii and five observers iii from the five continents. They work together with great energy and enthusiasm.

Macroprudential and monetary policy instruments must be coordinated The interaction between macroprudential policy and monetary policy instruments means that it will be necessary to coordinate their use. This is for three reasons. Firstly, there is a danger of the instruments conflicting if they are implemented in an uncoordinated manner by authorities with different objectives. This has been shown to lead to a “push-me, pull-you” problem in which monetary policy and macroprudential policy instruments are used more aggressively, in opposing directions, leading to a worse outcome than if the instruments had been coordinated. 10 Secondly, in most cases, monetary policy and macroprudential policy instruments should reinforce, not conflict with, each other. But it will still be necessary to monitor and understand the overlap between the instruments to ensure optimal policy. Thirdly, in some extreme situations, the use of instruments usually prescribed for monetary or macroprudential policy will be insufficient to meet their respective policy objectives. In such situations, monetary and macroprudential policy instruments will be required to work in tandem to meet the policy objectives. Close coordination will be needed to guide use of the tools in these circumstances, as the distinction between the objectives of the instruments will be blurred.
There are many ways we can protect ourselves from scams, but in my mind, they boil down to three steps, what we call “3S - Spot, Stop and Share”: Spot – Look out for signs of scams. Question, investigate and enquire to ensure that you are about to engage in a legitimate transaction; Stop – If anything looks doubtful or suspicious, it’s probably a In such cases, stop engaging with the suspected scammer. It is important that you do not provide any banking or payment details; Share – Share your knowledge of scams with friends and family, and help protect others by reporting scams to relevant authorities so that they can take action. This 3S concept is also in line with the theme of the virtual exhibition which is ‘Semak Sebelum Diperdaya’. I hope that the information and safety pointers from this exhibition can help the public avoid being scammed. This exhibition can be accessed through the website of the Museum and Art Gallery of Bank Negara Malaysia at https://museum.bnm.gov.my/fce. In closing, always remember that scammers will evolve their tactics to fool and ensnare customers. I hope that through this virtual exhibition, all of us will be more aware and better equipped to protect ourselves against scams. We can surely succeed in beating scams, but this requires collective efforts and action by all, and not just of the authorities. All of us can do our part to raise awareness and share relevant information on scams with others, being vigilant ourselves while also helping others do so.

Therefore, the measures to revise the capital adequacy framework for Zambia enhances the resilience of the sector to both internal and external shocks by improving the quality and quantity of the capital available for commercial banks;  3)  Introduction of the policy rate: the policy rate was introduced in order to provide a benchmark rate for the banking industry on which pricing for lending products can be based. It also promotes transparency in the price discovery mechanisms in the banking sector while minimizing information asymmetry particularly that associated with the credit markets;  4)  Statutory Instrument No. 33 on Bank of Zambia currency regulations: This measure was introduced with a view to reinforcing the use of the Zambian Kwacha as the legal tender in the Republic of Zambia. The increased use of foreign currency cash in our economy has implications for the effectiveness of the conduct of monetary policy given that foreign currency cash is outside the control of the central bank; and  5)  Currency rebasing: Since 2006, (except in 2008 when there were challenges arising from the global financial crisis) Zambia has enjoyed positive economic variables. For instance, overall inflation has been single digit and the country has continued to record favourable balance of payments surplus. During the recent past, inflation has declined to single digit levels such that in December 2011 it closed at 7.2%. This low level of inflation, coupled with favorable macroeconomic conditions, provided an opportune time to rebase the Zambian currency.
Advocates of market efficiency claim that our intervention is misplaced as it interferes with the working of free markets. My first academic paper on the “efficient market” hypothesis was published in 1977 and I remain convinced that the more moderate versions of this hypothesis are valid. In particular, I think investors should always start from the premise that the market is “hard to beat” and that “free lunches” are extremely rare. However, I also believe that the extreme form of market efficiency, according to which the market price always and immediately reflects and reveals the underlying fundamental value of the asset in question, has been disproved in multiple instances. Scholars have convincingly documented episodes of market overreaction, herd behaviour and momentum trading. There have also been numerous cases of what appeared ex-post to be manifest examples of mispricing in financial history, from the “tulip mania” in Holland in the 1600s, to the recent house price bubble in the United States. One possible reason for this, which has been stressed in recent academic literature, is that investors who disagree with market valuations, and wish to trade on their convictions, have little chance of making a profit if the mass of ill-informed or irrational (“noise”) traders is too large. In the rare case of a safe haven currency, like the Swiss franc, there is an economic justification for the central bank attempting to limit the detrimental impact of safe haven “financial” considerations on the real economy by, in a sense, accommodating demands for the safe haven.

Jean-Pierre Danthine: The strong franc and the future of Switzerland’s financial market infrastructure – two current challenges for the Swiss National Bank Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at a Money Market Event, Geneva, 3 November 2011. *  *  *  The speaker would like to thank Marlene Amstad, Anna Faber, Peter Kuster, Angelo Ranaldo, Andy Sturm, Dominik Salierno and Andreas Wehrli for their valuable support in drafting this speech and preparing this presentation. Introduction In today’s global economy, central banks face no shortage of challenges. Of the many issues we confront, I will discuss two that are currently of particular relevance to the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The strength of the Swiss franc is on everyone’s mind. This summer it became a predicament of unprecedented dimensions and it continues to put tremendous pressure on the Swiss economy. I will address this topic in the second part of my speech. By contrast, the challenge I will discuss first – the future of Switzerland’s financial market infrastructure (FMI) – is not making headlines at present. Essentially, the term FMI encompasses the exchanges, central counterparties, settlement systems, central securities depositories and other service providers which support the financial system. This infrastructure is central to the functioning of financial markets. It is crucial for the implementation of monetary policy and participants’ access to central bank liquidity. As long as the FMI functions smoothly, it rarely attracts public attention.
At the same time, the sustainability of national public finances must be ensured; this is essential for the smooth functioning of the monetary union. With this in mind, the European 2  In line with the findings of M. Alloza, D. Leiva León and A. Urtasun (2022), “The response of private investment to an increase in public investment”, Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin 2/2022, Banco de España. 3  See P. Cuadrado, M. Izquierdo, J. M. Montero, E. Moral-Benito and J. Quintana (2022). “El crecimiento potencial de la economía española tras la pandemia”, Documentos Ocasionales Nº 2208, Banco de España (English version forthcoming). 6  Commission is reviewing the European fiscal rule framework. In my view the framework needs to be simplified, by establishing an expenditure growth rule and a debt-to-GDP ratio anchor, and countries’ capacity to build up fiscal buffers in good times for use in crises needs to be reinforced. In the case of Spain, shoring up the sustainability of public finances calls for a medium-term fiscal policy strategy. This should involve immediately setting out a multi-year fiscal consolidation plan for implementation once the economic impact of the pandemic and of the war in Ukraine has been overcome. The plan should have broad political consensus and be accompanied by an efficiency review of public spending and the tax system, including all tiers of general government.

It would consist of an agreement between firms and workers, under the social dialogue framework, to share the inevitable loss of national income that higher commodity import prices entail. Fiscal policy should also play a key role, avoiding an across-the-board fiscal impulse and the use of automatic indexation clauses in expenditure items. Conversely, efforts should focus on supporting lower-income households, who bear the brunt of inflation, and the firms most vulnerable to this new shock. Moreover, any measures should be temporary, so as not to further increase the structural budget deficit. They should also be designed to avoid significant distortions to price signals. However, offsetting the adverse effects of the current supply-side shock also calls for ambitious policies to boost productivity growth and potential GDP. In the framework of the NGEU programme, investment projects must be carefully selected in order to optimally complement, and act as a catalyst for, private investment.2 But they must also be accompanied by structural reforms to support, for example, the reallocation of resources across firms and sectors. Indeed, a recent Banco de España paper3 shows that if projects with a high degree of complementarity between public and private investment are selected under the NGEU programme, and if structural reforms that reduce product and labour market rigidities are introduced, the potential growth rate of the Spanish economy could reach around 2% by the end of the decade compared with 1% in the absence of these effects.
Survey of Consumer Expectations So a second important example of data innovation at the New York Fed is the Survey of Consumer Expectations, which we introduced to the public just last month. Consumer expectations of future economic outcomes are crucial inputs to the policy process, but we felt that our standard measures of these expectations were quite limited. The primary goal of this new national survey is to collect timely, rich, and high-quality information on consumer expectations about a wide range of household-level and aggregate economic and financial conditions. The survey covers expectations about inflation, price changes for specific goods, home price changes, future wage growth, future quits and layoffs, and residential mobility, as well as expectations of household income, spending, taxes, and credit access. The SCE has two advantages over existing surveys of expectations: It collects information about consumers’ expectations and decisions on a broader range of economic and financial topics, and it does so in a way that captures respondents’ beliefs more fully. The objective is to measure an individual’s beliefs about the likelihood of future outcomes, thereby capturing how certain or uncertain the person is about future events. In some cases, we do this by eliciting a “density forecast,” where respondents are asked to assign a percent chance to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  different values (or intervals) for the outcome of interest.

And both loan-level data and aggregates like the Flow of Funds miss an important dimension of borrower behavior that became very important during the crisis and recovery – the relationship between different kinds of credit use by individual borrowers or households. The creation of the Consumer Credit Panel is an example of the use of pre-existing commercial data in an innovative way that had not previously been pursued. The panel is based on credit report data collected by Equifax (one of the three credit bureaus in the United States) and it contains information on all outstanding loans – including mortgages, auto and student loans, and credit card debt – at the individual consumer level. While credit records are primarily used by lenders to evaluate a potential borrower’s creditworthiness and ability to repay, they can also provide a comprehensive picture of outstanding balances and delinquencies and how they interact. Of course, all the data are completely anonymous – the dataset has been stripped of all personally identifiable information. The CCP was created by our research group using an innovative sampling procedure, based on the randomness of the last four digits of social security numbers. The resulting panel allows one to track individuals over time and across different locations within the nation, starting in the quarter in which they establish their credit report when taking out their first loan.
In addition, it would be appropriate to consider the possibility of developing centralised and binding dispute settlement arrangements, such as those in place in other European countries, possibly with the participation of the industry, to correct the shortcomings of the present system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  6. Final thoughts  Let me finish by saying that in mid-2010, at the height of the financial crisis, Alexandre Lamfalussy, one of the architects of European monetary and financial integration, with whom I was fortunate enough to work with in the mid-1990s and who passed away just a few days ago, ended one of his last public speeches as follows: All the actors – central banks, governments, international organisations and, naturally, market participants – are navigating in waters uncharted by reliable historical experience. The complexity of the current situation is without precedent. But there is no way of “opting out” of this complex world. Wishing that we could go back to the professional and intellectual comfort of the pre-crisis years is a pipe dream. This does not make me a pessimist.3 I believe that when one looks back at the work done to overcome the problems that beset the Spanish financial sector, Lamfalussy’s words are fully applicable. Thanks to the efforts made by all the agents concerned the most serious shortcomings of the banking industry have been remedied, allowing it to resume, gradually, full exercise of its role in the economic system and which is vital for our prosperity as a nation.

The process of ascertaining the audit scope must be robust, such that audits focus on higher risk areas as the company grows and evolves in its products and processes. Internal auditors should be constantly challenged to think beyond the scope of the audit framework and focus on the broader picture. The so-called ability to ‘connect the dots’ about the implications of the audit findings across the organisation is an important starting point to identify new and emerging risks. Secondly, internal audit should move beyond compliance to strategic auditing and to provide value-added recommendations for the betterment of the organisation. My view is that before an organisation seeks to venture into new or higher risk areas of growth, it is imperative for the board and senior management to seek assurance from the internal audit function so that the risk and control frameworks are rigorous in identifying gaps in the system. The Audit Committee should identify opportunities where the internal audit function is able to add value, through consultation and advice on business process improvements. The input from the internal audit function would also be helpful to craft initiatives to embed good behavioural norms, ethical and responsible culture within the organisation. Thirdly, the internal audit function must be supported by a strong quality assurance process. This requires internal auditors to be equipped with the requisite skills such that they are able to leverage on their expertise and experience to make sound judgement and challenge the norm.
That put excess upward pressure 4 BCBS report on “Early lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic on the Basel reforms”. 5 FSB report on “Lessons learnt from the Covid-19 pandemic from a financial stability perspective: Interim report”. 6 See statements made by the PRA, FPC, European Central Bank (ECB) and BCBS early on during the Covid-19 pandemic. 7 See October 2020 speech by Randal Quarles: “Lessons from Covid-19 stress on the financial system”. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  on requirements. And firms’ liquidity positions were initially worsening, including as they fulfilled debt buyback requests whilst supporting an increase in credit facility drawdowns. We were worried that the combined effect of these concerns would mean that banks either did not have enough resources to support the economy through the Covid period and the recovery from it; and/or that, even if banks did have enough resources, they would nevertheless act in a procyclical way by hoarding liquidity and restricting lending for precautionary reasons, amplifying the standard cyclical effects of the shock. This underpins the prudential actions I noted earlier. Recap on buffers As indicated earlier, an important feature here is the presence of various regulatory buffers in the framework that the Basel Committee introduced after the financial crisis. These are intended to absorb the effects of stress and ensure that banks can continue to lend to support households and businesses: it is our expectation that they will be used as necessary to support the economy.

As prudent regulators we cannot bank on the monetary and fiscal firefighters always being able to deploy as many resources to douse the flames of a future crisis. Rather we should follow John Dewey’s maxim to reflect on the experience we gleaned from this fire before the next one starts. Otherwise, we may live to regret it. Thank you. 13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  13  Annex Table 1: Baseline results on CCYB releasability CET1 ratio Mortgage lending (%) flows (%) (1) (2) Post-Covid x Dummy if bank has high CCyB pass through rate Post-Covid x Dummy if bank has low prepandemic effective surplus Bank controls Bank FE Time FE No. of observations R2 (Within)  Non govt. guaranteed lending flows (%) (3)  -0.946**  0.574  0.767  (0.047)  (0.848)  (0.818)  0.377  -1.331  -14.369*  (0.345) Yes Yes Yes 795 0.433  (0.440) Yes Yes Yes 212 0.082  (0.070) Yes Yes Yes 228 0.084  Notes: A “high CCyB pass through rate” bank is one with more than 50% pass-through rate in 2019. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. P-values reported in brackets are based on bank clustered standard errors. All columns contain bank and time fixed effects.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  0 2000  2004  2008  2012  UK Unemployment Rate US Unemployment Rate  Source: ONS, BLS  7  Chart 5:  Chart 6:  US participation rate falling, UK rate rising  US employment rate has fallen by more than UK rate  %  %  68  67 66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57  67 66 65 64 63 62 2000  2004  2008  2012  2000  2004  2008  2012  UK Participation rate  UK Employment Rate  US Participation rate  US Employment Rate  Source: ONS, BLS  Source: ONS, BLS  Chart 7:  Chart 8:  UK productivity exceptionally weak  UK real wages have fallen  £ at 2010 prices 40  £ at 2010 prices 600 550  35  500 30  450  25  400 350  20  300 15  250  10 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 Output per hour worked Trend  Source: ONS, Bank of England calculations  8  200 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 Real wages per week  Source: ONS, Bank of England calculations  BIS central bankers’ speeches

But Maastricht and the euro are naturally part of a broader history: the history of Europe, and its singular achievement of making the transition from war to peace. The euro has indeed provided us with a strong symbol of unity among European nations. It is true that there is currently some euro-scepticism and a surge of populism, but, a clear majority of euro area citizens support the euro today (73% according to the latest Eurobarometer) ii [slide]. From 12 at the start, the number of participating countries has risen to 19 today. Seven additional countries have decided to join the euro since 1999 –most recently Lithuania in 2015 –, and none has wanted to leave it. The euro is not a technocratic utopia: it is a political and democratic decision, supported 25 years on, with hindsight, by a clear majority of citizens. The fact is the euro has already delivered material benefits. In line with our mandate, inflation has been kept under control. This directly benefits household purchasing power and helps build confidence in the value of the currency. Let us take a historical perspective. In the 18 years preceding the introduction of the euro (1981-1998), inflation gradually declined but remained at 4.6% on average, with major disparities across countries. In the 18 years since the euro (1999-2016), inflation has been much more stable, averaging 1.7% [slide], and the disparities across countries have narrowed. Besides, better controlled inflation means lower financing costs, because it reduces risk premia [slide].