samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The question is not whether but how we should develop the machinery for tokenised transactions to settle in central bank money – in other words what will provide the most efficient, effective and fastest route to this end, given our current starting point. One way forward is for the central bank to tokenise the wholesale money, central bank reserves, we issue and to develop a ledger system for transferring the tokens between the wholesale players that have access to the Bank’s payment systems. We, like other central banks have been exploring such options. But there are other options. One would be for a trusted private sector network to hold an account with us and tokenise the reserves and operate the ledgers and transfers within that account. Only changes in the overall balance of the account would need to be recorded in our ledgers. In 2021 we introduced the option of an ‘omnibus account’[20] to facilitate the private sector development of such networks and there are private sector proposals in progress to introduce them[21]. Another possibility would be for a tokenised ledger, including a distributed ledger, to be securely and instantaneously synchronised with our central real-time gross settlement system (RTGS) .That is not possible today in our current RTGS. But we are now well advanced in the implementation of the next generation RTGS, which is scheduled to go live next year.

In my view, floating rates are not a panacea, they can be volatile in the case of market disruption. At times, the Swiss franc was pushed to levels no longer compatible with the economic reality of our country’s fundamentals. These episodes lasted for only a limited time, however. Another advantage of a flexible Swiss franc is that changes in the international monetary system have little bearing on our currency which is largely determined by Switzerland’s economic realities. Consequently, the launch of the euro - a major event on the monetary scene in recent years - did not lead to the disappearance or the destabilisation of the franc as feared by some. Though the euro - for all intents and purposes - is accepted as a means of payment in Switzerland, there are not more euros in circulation now than there were French francs or German marks prior to the monetary integration. Furthermore, the calm that has characterised the foreign exchange market in Europe since the disappearance of the national currencies mitigated the speculative pressures on the franc. Our currency is therefore less volatile than before. Last but not least, contrary to the pessimistic assumption that the Swiss National Bank would have to shadow the policy of the European Central Bank, it was able to set its interest rates according to the needs of the Swiss economy. On the whole, our monetary regime passed the test imposed by the change in the European monetary system with flying colours.
It would be too much to promise that that can never recur. Nor can we hope completely to eliminate the linkages within the system that can propagate distress. But this realism is not remotely a counsel of despair. On the contrary, I want to emphasise this morning that the emerging new regime will enable the authorities to lean against stability-threatening exuberance and will make the financial system much more resilient . The tendency to excessive risk in the system That excesses occurred in the run-up to the current crisis is not remotely in doubt. As leverage increased, asset prices rose, increasing net worth and so inducing more balance sheet expansion. The buoyancy in markets gave intermediaries the confidence to lend secured on wider classes of securities – temporarily enhancing day-to-day liquidity. Facing depressed returns from their core business of providing liquidity to customers, banks sought to sustain high headline returns by resorting to ever more leverage and maturity transformation. In other words, increasing leverage fed upon itself. This poses deep but pressing questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of capital markets in monitoring and pricing risk. Why did boards and investors in bank equity expect such high returns? Why didn’t the capital markets downgrade the value of bank equity and debt as leverage and other sources of risk increased? Why didn’t the markets distinguish more between banks? 1  These remarks draw on a chapter contributed to a book, edited by Andreas Dombret of the Bundesbank and Professor Otto Lucius, being published next year.

When credit markets become overly exuberant, not only do the balance sheets of lenders become stretched, cheap credit leads borrowers to become over indebted,  2  2  See Tucker (2012), “National balance sheets and macro policy: lessons from the past”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  raising the probability of default. When defaults eventually pick up, a general awakening occurs, triggering mass deleveraging. This matters to debates about risk measurement and management. It is not simply that the models employed over recent years – notably Value-At-Risk – make assumptions, such as normally distributed returns, that are manifestly false. 3 It is not just a matter of finding better models, useful though that might be. The problem of exuberance is not simply one of lots of Black Swans. It is that the collective behaviour of market participants can generate the tail events that sow the seeds of the system’s destruction. It can breed swans. What the authorities are doing Given the complex mix of factors behind the crisis, it would be surprising if there were a single policy initiative that could make the system safer in future. The response is multi-dimensional. But you will be relieved to hear that at this point I am not going to summarise the whole of the international agenda. 4 I’m going to put to one side, for example, the panoply of measures being pursued internationally to simplify capital markets through greater use of central counterparties, and to avoid the systemic risks of banking activity simply relocating to shadow banks.
In response to the weak demand, the Albanian economy is growing below its potential, inflation is low, public and private balance sheets show difficulties, and the banking system has been facing upward non-performing loans. These problems have been detected at an early stage by the Bank of Albania and we have, therefore, taken relevant measures to tackle them. The monetary policy of the Bank of Albania has been constantly on the easing cycle. The key interest rate reached the record low 2.75% last Wednesday, from 5.25% in 2011. In line with the best practices of central banking, we have adopted a forward-looking communication strategy. I am convinced that not only the financial market, but also the real economy has received our message that the monetary policy is and will continue to be on the easing side in the quarters ahead. Moreover, we have intensified our liquidity injection operations, which have succeeded in meeting all the market liquidity needs, by extending the horizon for injection and facilitating access to liquidity by broadening the collateral base. Time has proven our monetary and operational policies successful. The Bank of Albania has managed to contain and control the downward inflation pressures. We are convinced that the steps we have taken will bring inflation back to our 3% target, in the medium term. We have managed to anchor the economic agents’ expectations on inflation. This has enhanced the effectiveness of the monetary policy and contributed to maintaining confidence in the national currency and the Albanian financial system.

This is best illustrated by the following statistics: •  According to the Bank for International Settlement's triennial survey in 2004, our average daily foreign exchange turnover was close to $ billion, which was the sixth largest in the world;  •  On average, transactions settled through the various RTGS systems in Hong Kong amounted to $ billion each day in 2005;  •  New debt securities issued in 2005 amounted to $ billion; and The total amount of funds raised through IPOs reached $ billion in 2005. 3. Our treasury markets have done well in servicing the financial businesses behind these impressive numbers. Further globalisation of financial markets and financial liberalisation on the Mainland will likely place new and increasing demands on our treasury markets. We need to move with the times, if we are to maintain our status as an international financial centre, and I think the establishment of the TMA provides a good mechanism for us to do so. In my view, there are four key areas which the TMA should focus on: professionalism, market development, codes and standards, and publicity. 4. The professionalism of market practitioners contribute significantly to the competitiveness of a financial centre. An important area of work of the TMA is therefore to enhance the professionalism of the practitioners in the Hong Kong treasury markets.
Events that we once thought to be implausible or highly unlikely, have become the “new normal”. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  In many parts of the world, health care costs continue to rise, and many face uncertain futures as public sector safety nets and government finances come under increasing strain. Against this backdrop, financial inclusion for the underserved segments remains an elusive goal. For the insurance industry, this raises important issues. Two issues come to my mind. First is on the industry’s role in addressing a few of the challenges facing our economies and society. And second, the manner in which regulation and supervision can adapt to support broader economic and social development. In addressing these issues, I shall attempt to advocate the idea that a rethinking in approach is an imperative. New paradigms are needed to anchor business and public policy to the realities of the future. I will touch on three of them: competitive, stability and ethical paradigms. A new competitive paradigm In an increasingly interconnected world, traditional models of competition deserve a re-think. Network effects will become more important, both in increasing the value of insurance products and services, and to better manage risks. Rather than see the competitive landscape through a zero-sum lens, co-operative competition or “co-opetition” can result in synergistic benefits. The example of Hewlett- Packard (HP) clearly illustrates this idea.

Benefits and likely risks brought by this major transition in global finance will be discussed in length over the next two days by academicians and policymakers in six different sessions. I  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  believe that this conference will produce fruitful and beneficial outcomes for global financial stability. I would like to thank our participants and distinguished guests for their contributions and for being here with us. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
I have already mentioned in my intervention how the financial crisis has blatantly revealed the flaws with this measurement and how in certain circumstances, namely when markets are dislocated, applying full fair value accounting to the financial statements of the banking sector raises financial stability concerns and does not provide decision-useful information to investors. Just to re-emphasise, the ECB strongly opposes a full fair value approach. In this context, convergence should not come at the expense of high-quality accounting standards. Finally, with regard to recent assertions made by the IASB and FASB that convergence is on track, I would like to highlight that we are not so optimistic. In this regard, putting in place a reconciliation mechanism that simply discloses figures at amortised cost and fair value for each item on the balance sheet would certainly not achieve the aim of convergence. As regards governance, which improvements do you envisage in relation to the elaboration of accounting rules? First, I would like to stress that the ECB fully supports the concept of “independent accounting standard setting”. In their April 2009 DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, when identifying the main areas of concern in the accounting area, the Leaders of the G20 never challenged this concept. Second, the ECB very much welcomes the recent efforts of the IASB with a view to enhancing their public accountability. We appreciate the open dialogue between the IASB and various stakeholders, including prudential supervisors, on various accounting issues.

The important point is that the MPC’s approach then, as now, is to form an overall judgement about demand relative to supply and, as far as it can, to set the policy rate to keep the two in balance, so  1/3  that inflationary pressure is broadly constant. So with external demand very weak – and recall that by the end of 2001 world imports were actually falling – the logic of that approach pointed to leasing policy to encourage a faster growth in domestic demand. This approach worked well in the sense that it helped to ensure that the UK went on growing steadily through the world slowdown, while consumer price inflation remained close to the Chancellor’s target. But there were side effects. One was a marked increase in the UK’s trade deficit. Another was the creation of a monetary climate conducive to strong rises in house prices and consumer borrowing relative to disposable incomes – an experience shared with other countries such as Australia and more recently the United States. Together with structural and demographic trends, this has helped to push the ratio of both house prices and consumer borrowing to household disposable incomes to levels well outside the range of previous experience. If, against the background of a much flatter housing market, households now go through a period of rather subdued spending, strong external demand would help to support activity and rebalance the economy. But is that in prospect? And what are the risks?
This does not necessarily mean that Swedish bankers are more honest than American ones, just that the advantages of exploiting conflicts of interest are less and the costs are greater. My second conclusion is that it is important that all significant conflicts of interest should be discussed openly and publicly. There are justifiable claims for reliable information on borrowers and issuers, but the same applies to information on the measures taken by the banks to avoid exploiting conflicts of interest. I believe that there are relevant market solutions in most cases, as long as the conflicts of interest are clear. Thirdly, I would like to encourage the Swedish banks to carefully follow international developments within the field of compliance - i.e. the routines to ensure that internal and external rules are adhered to. In many cases the requirements have become much more stringent in recent years, and it is important to thoroughly assess developments in other countries. For instance, the Chinese wall has been repaired in the United States, and is now higher than ever. This has been achieved through legislation. It remains to be seen whether the Swedish banks can solve these problems themselves. Fourthly, I believe that the supervisory authorities play an important role with regard to identifying and overseeing potential conflicts of interest. Our Finansinspektion has begun to do this to a greater extent, not only with regard to banks but for the financial sector as a whole.

Rapid demand growth; commodity price volatility; the influence of a broad range of global conditions on wages: all these factors can trigger large changes in relative prices, and this makes the job of capturing underlying inflation harder. So we have to be careful not to focus too narrowly on one particular measure. Instead we need to look at many. And indeed here in the United States we look at a range of different measures of core inflation, for example, that take energy and food prices out of the overall index. We look at these over different time horizons. We look at a variety of other measures that use different statistical techniques to strip out the more volatile parts of the index. These all have limitations, and their relative merits may change over time. Central banks approach this challenge of capturing underlying inflation differently, but ultimately we are all judged by what happens to overall inflation over time. These issues are common to central banks everywhere. But economic and financial integration has brought particular challenges for monetary policy makers in emerging market economies. The broad pattern of exchange rate and monetary policy regimes in emerging market economies has shifted dramatically over the past decade. Most now operate a more flexible exchange rate regime, though a significant number have moved to the opposite extreme, relinquishing monetary sovereignty in favor of full monetary integration.
We are currently considering which of these options is most appropriate. In doing so, we will need to take two important considerations into account. The first is that, unlike commercial bank money which is protected by deposit insurance up to £ it will not be possible – initially at any rate – to give stablecoin holders industry funded protection against failure of the coin. This reinforces the need to ensure that the backing assets are at all times of sufficient value to meet redemption requests. And it also highlights the potential role of capital requirements. The second consideration is that the underlying objective of the legislation and the ensuing regulation is to open further the frontier for safe and sustainable innovation and competition in payments. Stablecoin business models should in general reflect this and be grounded in improved payments efficiency and functionality rather than in maturity transformation. There are other important questions to be resolved, such as whether there should be limits, initially at any rate, on stablecoins used for payments. While, from a public policy perspective, we want competition and innovation in payments we need to guard against rapid, disruptive change that does not allow the financial system time to adjust and could therefore threaten financial stability. The risks to financial stability from the development of digital money issued outside the banking system has been the subject of extensive analysis. The Bank of England’s assessment is that over time, the financial stability risks should be manageable including risks from the impact on the banking system[15].

John Gieve: Sovereign wealth funds and global imbalances Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Sovereign Wealth Management Conference, London, 14 March 2008. * * * Introduction Much of the debate on sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has focused on political questions: do they reintroduce the failings of public ownership into market economies by the back door, will SWFs use their ownership rights to pursue political ends, and will resistance to foreign ownership lead to a new wave of protectionism. I want to concentrate today on some economic issues: why have they become so prominent recently, how does that relate to imbalances in the world economy, how are they affecting financial markets and what are the policy implications of their growth. Background But first let me set out some of the background. There is no off the shelf definition of an SWF. What I have in mind is a government investment vehicle that manages foreign assets with a higher risk tolerance and higher expected returns than for central bank foreign currency reserves. 1 The size of such funds is hard to measure, but may be in the $ trillion range. Origins of SWFs Investments by SWFs are one type of capital flow between countries so they have always been closely related to global imbalances in trade. When countries run surpluses on their current account, they generate equal and opposite net capital outflows of one sort or another and those capital flows produce an investment income.
Given the gaps in traditional information sources, MAS is exploring some unconventional ways in which to gather data about the scale and scope of crypto token related activities. One, the crypto token blockchains themselves can provide a wealth of information – including time stamps, recipient and sender addresses. Two, the Application Programming Interfaces or APIs provided by crypto-exchanges present real-time insights on current flows in the crypto market, including information on the fiat currencies that are being exchanged for crypto tokens. Money laundering A clear and present danger posed by some crypto token activity is money laundering and terrorism financing. Intermediaries dealing in crypto tokens are already required to report any suspicious transactions to the Commercial Affairs Department. In addition, the proposed Payment Services Bill will require intermediaries that buy, sell or exchange virtual currencies to specifically address money laundering and terrorism financing risks. Intermediaries will be required to carry out customer due diligence and put in place controls and processes that are commensurate with their risks. Investor protection Investor protection is another immediate concern arising from the crypto mania. Where the crypto tokens represent ownership or a security interest over an issuer’s assets or any property, or a debt owed by the issuer, they may be regarded as securities under the Securities and Futures Act.

The second remark is that removing anticipations of state support/bailouts is a process that may take time and which must be handled with extreme care. The unexpected imposition of losses on some type of creditors to resolve problems in some banks can lead to shifts in expectations of public guarantee for other institutions, and create contagion and funding stress at other banks. The case of Cyprus was a perfect illustration of this. The difficulty is to guide the evolution in expectations over time, and avoid abrupt shifts that would increase financial instability and ultimately undermine the objective of the reforms. This ‘transition problem’ is in my view critical, and has been overlooked in many discussions. This conference is organized so as to facilitate exchanges with the audience. Therefore, I encourage you to be fully involved in the discussions and wish you fruitful debates. I now leave the floor to Augustin Landier from Toulouse School of Economics, one of the organizers of this conference with Regis Breton and Laurent Clerc from the Banque de France Financial stability directorate, who will chair the first session of the conference. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3