samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The second area relates to operational harmonization and global support system To sustain the current pace of growth in this new industry, global takaful alliance is indeed crucial. The takaful industry needs to present itself as a united front with a common voice in operational and even Shariah matters. Although minor differences are needed to propel innovation and creativity, major divergence in operational practices and Shariah application would pose unnecessary confusion to the consumers at large. For this, the transformation of an informal grouping of ASEAN Takaful Group or ATG into a registered legal entity limited by guarantee called "Global Takaful Group" or GTG is indeed timely. I am glad to note that the Annual Meeting of GTG was held yesterday in conjunction with this Convention. I believe GTG will serve as the best platform to enhance greater mutual co-operation and foster cooperation and interlinkages among the takaful operators globally. It is a tangible vehicle of cooperation among takaful operators and provides a conduit for exchange of information on all facets of takaful operations among the members. I understand that currently there are more than 20 member companies of GTG and it is our hope to see more takaful operators from all over the world to join this Group. I wish to urge all takaful operators to leverage on this Group as an official platform for greater interaction and collaboration, not only among the players, but also with other stakeholders such as the regulators, Governments and the public at large.

In this context, despite high volatility of consumer prices and exchange rates in trading partners, including the sharp decline in oil prices in the second half of 2008 (one of the main fundamentals in Algeria’s economy), the REER has remained near its equilibrium level and the external financial position remains comfortable. 4  BIS Review 168/2009
Fourth, the impact of the materialisation of the physical and transition risks of climate change may be very uneven across geographical areas and economic sectors. Moreover, apart from this geographical and sectoral diversity, the impact is also likely to be very uneven across economic agents. Given these special features, we banking regulators and supervisors have launched various initiatives to assist and oblige banks to take these risks properly into account. Thus, the European Banking Authority (EBA),8 the European Central Bank (ECB)9 and the Banco de España10 have each published supervisory guidelines and expectations explaining how banks are expected to consider these risks in their daily operations, their business strategies 7  See, for example, A call for action. Climate change as a source of financial risk, NGFS, April 2019, and Climate-related risk drivers and their transmission channels, BCBS, April 2021. 8  EBA report on management and supervision of ESG risks for credit institutions and investment firms, EBA, June 2021. 9  Guide on climate-related and environmental risks, ECB, November 2020. 10  Banco de España supervisory expectations relating to the risks posed by climate change and environmental degradation, Banco de España, October 2020. 3  and their risk management.

Benoît Cœuré: Challenges to the single monetary policy and the European Central Bank’s response Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Institut d’études politiques, Paris, 20 September 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, 1 It is a great pleasure for me to speak here today at Sciences Po Paris. 9 August this year was the fifth anniversary of the start of the financial crisis. The past few years have been times of hardship, financial turbulence and risks. At the same time, the crisis has exposed weaknesses in the framework of the economic and monetary union and provided an impetus to strengthen its foundations and to begin the process of bringing all euro area countries back to a more sustainable fiscal and macroeconomic path. The crisis has also brought challenges and opportunities for monetary policy, which is going to be the focus of my remarks today. Let me elaborate on two of them. The first challenge I will describe is that after Lehman’s collapse central banks had to combat exceptional threats to price stability arising from financial instability and recessionary forces. At that time their standard tool of monetary policy – changes to the short-term interest rate – was losing traction due to the dislocation in the financial system.
Caleb M Fundanga: Enhancing access to finance in Zambia Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the Access Bank Zambia Limited Acacia and Longacres branches and the Visa Debit Card, Lusaka, 16 February 2010. *  *  *  Your Excellency the High Commissioner of the Republic of Nigeria in Zambia, Ms Marcus Folake Bello; The Chairman of the Board Access Bank Zambia Ltd, Mr Caleb Mulenga; The Group Deputy Managing Director, Access Bank Plc, Mr Herbert Wigwe; The Managing Director, Access Bank Zambia Ltd, Mrs Mukwandi Chibesakunda; Members of the Board of Directors for Access Bank Zambia Ltd, present; Management and Staff of Access Bank Zambia Ltd; Colleagues from Bank of Zambia; Distinguished Invited Guests; Members of the Press; Ladies and Gentlemen. It is my privilege and honour to officiate at this important launch of the Longacres and Acacia branches of Access Bank Zambia Limited. As the Central Bank and regulator of the banking sector, we are always pleased to be associated with the achievements of the institutions that we regulate, particularly where these developments lead to increased access to banking services as well as convenience for the Zambian public. Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a well known fact that bank branch expansion programmes play an important role in increasing access to the banking services.

The crisis, for example, had a different impact on the Albanian economy, from what we had historically experienced. At the time, the Albanian economy did not seem to be vulnerable to the foreign sector. Subsequent analysis, however, showed that domestic imbalances had built and, indeed, made the economy vulnerable to a foreign credibility shock. It is crucial that research in central banks focus on available information and methodologies, which scrutinize existing paradigms, making this information useful to policymaking, before it becomes or leads to vulnerabilities. In light of the financial and human capital constraints faced by central banks in small, open economies, such as Albania, we believe that it is important for these topics to be discussed, in this workshop, with fellow researchers from academia and other central banks. I would like to encourage our researchers to publish their papers in relevant, peer-reviewed 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  journals as the most important certification of their work. This will make your research projects more useful and facilitate speedy implementation in mainstream policy making. Despite recent success in publications, one of the things that I hear the most is that there is not much research interest in the scientific study of small, developing or emerging market economies like Albania. From my prospective, I think that there is interest in the scientific study of small, developing or emerging market economies such as Albania, because of the particular and distinguishing characteristics of our economy, which can be different from those represented in mainstream research findings.
The US Federal Reserve estimates that the rate of increase in industrial production has been held back a couple of percentage points in August and September overall. However, preliminary National Accounts data for the third quarter point to continued firm growth. Households and companies have continued to boost their consumption and investment at a fairly stable rate. The purchasing managers index for both the manufacturing sector and the services sectors in October indicate relatively firm developments at the beginning of the fourth quarter as well. Elsewhere in the world, too, there have been a number of positive economic signals. In October, the purchasing managers index rose in several European countries and in Japan. The German IFO index also showed a positive trend in October. In the UK, however, the recent economic slowdown has continued, as shown, among other things, by preliminary GDP data for the third quarter. Inflation abroad has turned out somewhat higher recently than we anticipated in the latest Inflation Report. In the US, inflation rose sharply in September, to almost five per cent. Excluding energy prices, though, it is still at roughly two per cent. The US Federal Reserve again raised the federal funds rate at its latest monetary policy meeting, bringing it up to 4 per cent, i.e. 3 percentage points higher than when the monetary tightening cycle was begun in June 2004. In the euro area and some other countries, too, inflation has picked up more than anticipated recently.

In that case, we could witness a more drastic adjustment that would drive the economy into a deeper and more protracted slump that would be difficult for economy policy to manage. This is a risk scenario that the Riksbank’s Executive Board has devoted some attention to in recent years. It is also a risk that individual households have reason to take into account when they are about to take on new loans. So these mechanisms are something that we have to take into account when we make our monetary policy decisions. The current economic situation International economic activity still firm International economic growth was high last year. In the latest Inflation Report in October, we noted that the slowdown in international economic activity earlier this year appeared to have been temporary. The oil price had turned out considerably higher than we previously expected, however, prompting us to sharply revise up our oil price forecast. This was expected to contribute to an increase  1  See Financial Stability Report 2005:1. 2  Inflation Report 2005:3, page 43. 3/6  in international price pressures and to a slight moderation of growth. These effects were forecast to be relatively limited, however. The picture of relatively firm economic growth abroad in the coming years was thus broadly unchanged. Consequently, Swedish export markets also were estimated to grow at a firm pace in the next few years. In the US, the hurricanes and oil price increases in recent months have contributed to dampening the economy somewhat.
Despite the facilities offered by these money transfer systems, there still remains a significant portion of remittances of un-skilled workers that are not captured by the formal money transfer systems. Enabling regulatory environment An enabling regulatory environment is necessary to enhance cross-border remittance transfers. While recognizing the need to deter money laundering and terrorist financing through cross-border transfers, laws relating to this type of activities should not discourage genuine remittance flows through the banking system. Nor should they be discriminatory or prohibitive to remitters or receivers. Most countries with fully open current and capital accounts have facilitated cross-border transfers than the countries with capital controls. The situation is expected to be improved with the relaxation of exchange controls in both the remittance originating country and the recipient country. There is also a need to monitor and regulate the agencies and other service providers which recruit migrant workers. It is reported that, in some instances, the agencies tend to persuade migrant workers to go for lower wages and salaries or employ them under harsh working conditions. There have also been instances where the agencies or agents take money upfront from workers and have left them in the lurch. Remittances through informal channels According to estimates, still 30–40 percent of remittances are transferred through the informal institutional networks and private channels. In some instances, informal systems do not transfer foreign currency from the origin/host country to the recipient/home country. Arrangements are made to provide funds in local currency at the recipient's end.

Banks and financial institutions should be more innovative and make arrangements to collect/capture remittances from legal/illegal migrants at the field level and coordinate with the host country’s banking/financial institutions to transfer monies to remitter's home country speedily and at a reduced cost. Informal transfers largely take the form of cash. The absence of an efficient financial infrastructure at the remitter's end as well as receiver's end is also found to be a discouraging factor that contribute to the use of informal channels. In some destinations, there is no access to sophisticated infrastructure in the host countries for cross-border transfers. Migrant workers, therefore, depend heavily on informal systems. In this context, a global attempt should be made to facilitate cross-border remittance transfers as such transfers have a significant impact on the development of many nations. 2  BIS Review 3/2007  Part II - Importance of remittances in Sri Lanka's economy I now proceed to illustrate how dependent Sri Lanka is on worker remittances. Over the last couple of years, worker remittance has been the single largest inflow of foreign exchange after exports in Sri Lanka. Remittances have played a significant role in financing the widening trade deficit and maintaining balance of payment surpluses. During 2005, over 75% of the trade deficit was financed by worker remittances.
An increased credit risk means that it becomes more difficult and more expensive for the banks concerned to fund themselves on the credit markets, which can hold back lending. This also dampens the real economies in the countries concerned. (Figure: CDS premiums for the banks). Reduced concern, but still not normal In an attempt to assess the stability of the banking sector the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, CEBS, carried out stress tests on 91 European banks in July this year. The results of these stress tests have now been published. The assessment is that all but 7 banks have sufficient resilience to manage a worse scenario in the period 2010–2011. The CEBS has here assumed a weaker economic growth, higher interest rates and poorer stock market than in the European Commission’s forecasts, as well as losses linked to the banks’ holdings of European government bonds. The four major Swedish banks included in the survey managed all of the stress tests with a good margin. 2 The results of the stress tests have generally been well-received by the market. However, it should also be pointed out that there has been some criticism, which has concerned the CEBS’ assumptions not being sufficiently tough. Nevertheless, interest rate differentials towards Germany declined after the CEBS reported its results, as did the basis spreads and the CDS premiums for banks in the four countries concerned, although they have risen again in August and the levels remain higher than they were in the spring.

The US central bank, the Federal Reserve, noted at its most recent monetary policy meeting on 10 August that the recovery has slowed down and that inflation has fallen in recent months. The Federal Reserve’s assessment was therefore that the recovery will be slightly weaker during the coming period than was previously anticipated. At the same time, the Federal Reserve repeated that it would hold its policy rate low for a longer period of time. They also notified that – unlike the ECB and the Riksbank – they will be holding the size of their balance sheet unchanged by reinvesting the funds the central bank receives when its holdings of securities mature in long-term government bonds. The Federal Reserve is thus postponing the start of its normalisation of monetary policy, compared with earlier indications. (Figure: Central banks’ balance sheets). Weak but rising growth in Europe According to the Riksbank’s forecast in June, GDP growth in the world as a whole will be strong. However, growth in our own region will be modest. The Riksbank’s assessment was that GDP growth in the euro area will be 0.8 per cent this year, but that it will increase in 2011 and 2012. (Figure: GDP growth in the euro area). The factor behind the upturn in the euro area is exports. Exports benefit from the strong growth in Asia and from the fact that the euro has weakened in relation to other currencies.
In the UK, it has been stated that a maximum of 15 per cent of the banks’ new mortgages may have a loan-to-income ratio exceeding 450 per cent, while in Ireland it has been stated that a maximum of 20 per cent of the banks’ new mortgages may have a loan-to-income ratio  20  16  Our updated calculations indicate that the effect of debt-to-income limits would be slightly greater than those presented previously in the Financial Stability Report 2015:1, for example. BIS central bankers’ speeches  exceeding 350 per cent. 21 In the UK, the exempted share is expressed in terms of the number of new mortgages, while in Ireland it is expressed in terms of the volume of new mortgages. It is not easy to calculate the effects of exempting, for instance, 15 per cent from a rule, but in Figure 13 we have tried to make such an estimate. We can see that the effect is somewhat smaller than if there is no exemption, but the difference is not major. There is already a loan-to-value limit in Sweden. One alternative could be to lower this from the current level of 85 per cent. But as I mentioned, there is a clear point to complementing the loan-to-value limit with a debt-to-income limit. Our calculations also indicate that a reduction in the loan-to-value limit would lead to relatively minor effects on total household indebtedness.

Let me begin by discussing different types of measure more generally, and then I will say a few words on the quantitative effects of household indebtedness. Put simply, we can say that there are two different ways to manage the problems on the housing market: either attempt to increase the housing supply in order to dampen housing prices, or dampen demand for housing and mortgages by making it more expensive to borrow, or simply limit how much households can borrow. In terms of measures which subdue demand, it is important to differentiate between measures which affect all loans, or the whole stock of credit, and measures which only affect new loans, or the flow of credit. But let us begin with measures which affect the supply of housing. An increased supply of housing could dampen price increases – but it would take time! Structural problems on the Swedish housing market are the main reason why housing construction has been unable to meet rising demand. An increased supply of housing is a central piece of the puzzle, as it can subdue the increase in housing prices, which would also help to limit household indebtedness. However, the quantity of housing is not the only significant factor in terms of household indebtedness. It is also necessary to review how we can exploit the current housing stock more effectively. The distribution between purchased and rented housing is significant.
At that time, the FSA eased banks liquid asset requirements following a recommendation from the FPC, and also the FSA relaxed capital requirements on eligible net new bank lending as part of a deliberate set of actions to combine the objective of resilience with supporting activity in the economy. Since then, the focus has been on the capital of the banks more than anything else. The FPC has recommended to the PRA that it should seek to establish a minimum level of capital on the final Basel 3 measure of at least 7% after taking account of three issues, namely uncertainty around asset valuation in more vulnerable portfolios, possible future conduct of business costs, and aggressive use of risk weightings. A further test is to consider whether banks are making acceptable progress towards the Basel 3 minimum leverage ratio (leverage is a simple concept in many respects, but it is confusing in one respect, namely that you might – but Basel doesn’t – describe this as a maximum leverage ratio). The PRA is in discussion with the banks on the issue of capital. I read a lot on this most days of the week. Let me make a few points. Many commentators and journalists have worried publicly that these recommendations will lead to lower bank lending. I want to reassure you, that is not the case. Capital is not money that has to be stashed away for a rainy day. Essentially, it is the shareholders’ stake in the company.

For all the noise about QE, the key thing for me is that it has thereby contributed to keeping stable the cost of finance for companies during the Covid period, and that has been very important both for monetary and financial stability. QE has also provided insurance against the sort of market volatility and dysfunction that we saw at the outset of Covid. It has therefore helped to prevent any liquidity-driven rise in yields, should such an event have occurred and in particular ensuring that the corporate sector was supported through this crisis. That said, the current programme of asset purchases is currently scheduled to end in December. It follows that the monetary policy response, if we need to make one, to the inflation pressure should involve Bank Rate not QE. There is no reason to beat about the bush on this point. Let me turn to that response. The MPC’s task is to set monetary policy to meet the inflation target, and in a way that helps to sustain growth and employment. The remit makes clear that it is appropriate to focus on inflation in the medium term, which is appropriate given the lags between changes in monetary policy and the impact on inflation. In our view, there are good reasons why the current above target inflation will be temporary, as I described earlier. In considering how to use monetary policy, it is also important to understand the nature of the shocks that are causing higher inflation.