samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(a) Spread of three-month Libor to three-month overnight indexed swap (OIS) rates. Five-day moving average . Chart 4: Major UK banks’ and LCFIs’ equity prices  Index: 2 July 2007 = 100  120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Jul. Oct. Jan. 2007  Apr. Jul. 08  Oct.  Jan.  Apr. 09  Sources: Bloomberg and Bank calculations. (a) Data to close of business on 12 June 2009. BIS Review 108/2009  11  Chart 5: BIS banks’ cross-border lending (a)  Percentage changes on a year earlier 25 20 15 10 5 + 0 Domestic lending  5  Cross-border lending  10 03  04  05  06  07  08  Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Bank for International Settlements and Bank calculations. (a) The data are weighted averages of fifteen banking systems, where the weights are based on the relative size of each banking system's cross-border claims on non-banks. Chart 6: Trust in different industries  *Source: 2009 Edelman Trust Barometer Report  12  BIS Review 108/2009  Chart 7: Contributions to annual lending growth to UK non-financial companies  Other monetary and financial institutions Foreign lenders Major UK-owned banks (b) Total  Percentage points 25 20 15 10 5  + 0  Source: Bank of England. (a) Chart shows twelve-month growth rate in the stock of lending. 04 05 groups of06 07HSBC, (b)03Includes consolidated banking Barclays, LBG, Nationwide and RBS.

So the economics of banking do not suggest that bigger need be better. Indeed, if largescale processing of loans risks economising on the collection of information, there might even be diseconomies of scale in banking. The present crisis provides a case study. The desire to make loans a tradable commodity led to a loss of information, as transactions replaced relationships and quantity trumped quality. Within the space of a decade, banks went from monogamy to speed-dating. Evidence from a range of countries paints a revealing picture. There is not a scrap of evidence of economies of scale or scope in banking – of bigger or broader being better – beyond a low size threshold.12 At least during this crisis, big banks have if anything been found to be less stable than their smaller counterparts, requiring on average larger-scale support.13 It could be argued that big business needs big banks to supply their needs. But this is not an argument that big businesses themselves endorse, at least according to a recent survey by the Association of Corporate Treasurers.14 Take Grameen Bank – not a household name in the UK, I realise. This grew out of a microfinance project in Bangladesh which began in 1976.15 Grameen operates as a set of local credit cooperatives, often comprising as few as five members. The bank’s relationship with its borrowers is bound not by legal contract but by trust.
The medium term agenda We all have lessons to learn from the turmoil of the last fifteen months. I would like to pick out three in particular, two of which are international and one UK specific: •  the need to develop new “macro prudential” policies to bridge the gap between monetary policy and the regulation of particular institutions and markets;  •  the need to establish a more effective regime in the UK for handling failing banks; and  •  the need to improve the handling of cross border crises and bank failures. Central Banks have always paid close attention to asset prices and credit growth in deciding monetary policy but they are setting interest rates for the whole economy and there is no guarantee that the rate or the rapid changes in rates that could be needed to dampen asset price growth will be appropriate more widely. On the other side, regulation and supervision are focused on the resilience and conduct of individual institutions: their management, risks controls, capital and liquidity and so on. What we have found in the last few years is that the sum of what makes sense at the level of individual institutions does not necessarily add up to what is needed for the system as a whole. We need to develop what are called “macro prudential” policies to bridge that gap.

However, supplementary training may need to be constantly kept up to date, in order that the Management Accountant has a meaningful impact on the organization. This would be made even more difficult because issues, problems and responses are no longer of a local nature. In most cases, responses need to be regional or even international. If we act together we can pool our resources, learn from our experiences and be ready for the unknown. That is what we need to be doing. In that sense, the Management Accountants of the world, seem to be on the right track. We say, we wish to be seen as Strategists and as Performance Management Specialists. If so, what should we do? (a)  As far as education and training is concerned, in addition to all what we learn now, a greater focus in communication and human resource management may be necessary. These new skills would be the tools to; (i) manage better, (ii) perform better, and (iii) deliver outputs better. (b)  Develop skills in marketing and understand the importance and the specialist nature of the subject. (c)  Develop the proper managerial attitude which focuses on outputs rather than inputs. If a person is to focus on “outputs” a few important steps would need to enter his work and life. These are very well enunciated in the 2500 year old teachings of Lord Buddha. Usually, we seek the guidance of this Great Teacher in spiritual matters.
During this recent two decades, there has also been a discernible shift towards voluntary private provision for healthcare and retirement, including defined contribution pension schemes, given the rapid increase in life expectancy and medical care costs. This trend will become more pronounced as the need to broaden the coverage of welfare is taking place in an environment in which fiscal consolidation is being pursued. As of 2009, the value of private pension funds in 19 OECD countries was almost 50 percent of aggregate national income. Despite this, the IMF estimates that global pension liabilities could be underestimated by up to 50 percent of 2010 GDP. Efforts to close this gap will need to include measures that result in greater risk sharing between governments, pension providers and individuals, the development of capital markets to better support the increasing longevity, and extending the retirement age to be in tandem with the longer life span. While  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  these trends present enormous opportunities for the insurance industry, it also presents the important challenge of building the capacity to support new, larger, more complex and more concentrated risks within a much more compressed timeframe. Risk management, product development and underwriting capabilities will be particularly important at the institutional level while at the system-wide level, closer attention will be needed to enhance the financial safety nets for the protection of policyholders and to avoid economic and social dislocations in the event of large-scale insurance failures.

In December 2017, the chief executives of the five main retail banks in Ireland informed the Department of Finance of their intention to establish an Irish Banking Standards Board.12 In the U.S., the idea of industry benchmarking has been raised and discussed in the past, but no industry action has emerged to move this idea forward. At the New York Fed’s workshop on culture measurement and assessment, several participants recommended either joining the BSB’s benchmarking survey or creating a similar U.S. organization.13 Some noted that it would be helpful to include non-banks in the effort, and to collaborate with other corporations that have experience building strong cultures. Participants also discussed the importance of sharing 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  “lessons learned” and developing best practices as an industry. In my view, these types of industry-led initiatives can offer useful insights as firms compare and contrast their efforts and outcomes with peers. Official Sector A final perspective is that of the official sector. In my view, there is a clear role that follows the traditional focus on prudent risk management and the goal of building resilience. This reflects both the direct impact to firms mentioned above and the potential for industry-wide spillover if conduct and performance issues at one firm cause customers, counterparties, and investors to lose trust in the industry as a whole. This type of spillover suggests a role for the official sector to coordinate efforts and push the industry forward.
We have also been able to note that productivity growth has shown an increase trend over the past decade. This has confirmed our opinion that structural factors in the economy lie behind the strong productivity growth. It is one thing to observe structural changes in the economy and have an opinion on the direction in which they will have an effect. It is another thing entirely to be able to predict with any accuracy how large and how lasting the impact will be. One of the conditions that must be taken into account is that  2  BIS Review 17/2007  productivity growth usually varies over the business cycle. At the beginning of the business cycle, for instance, productivity growth is usually quite high. Part of the strong productivity in recent years has probably therefore been cyclical. But exactly how much is difficult to say. At the same time, the assessment of productivity growth is an important building block in the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts. Gaining a deeper knowledge of the driving forces behind productivity growth will therefore remain a high priority area for the Riksbank. The Bank already has a project aimed at improving understanding of the correlation between, among other things, IT investments and productivity growth. We also intend to invite various researchers to an in-depth discussion on the driving forces behind productivity in Sweden and abroad. Hopefully, this will give us some new insights into productivity development.

As employment rises and the lack of labour increases, it is also reasonable to assume that the rate of wage increase will be gradually raised. The Riksbank’s forecast assumes that wage increases will grow as resource utilisation in the labour market rises. A rising rate of wage increase and a stabilisation of productivity increases at a more normal level will mean that cost pressures in the economy increase in the coming years. With more rapid cost increases, price increases will also be greater in the long term. There is thus good reason to believe that inflation will increase during the forecast period. At the same time, what we are expecting is a modest upturn in inflation, despite a strong upturn in employment and relatively high GDP growth. This is due to continuing favourable supply conditions. For one thing, productivity growth is expected to remain at a relatively high level, and for another thing the labour supply will probably increase more than during previous economic upturns. A larger supply of labour  4  BIS Review 17/2007  will hold back the pressure for higher wage increases. Moreover, it appears that international price pressures will remain high. These hold back price increases on imported goods. But I would also like to emphasise that the inflation forecast is uncertain. This is illustrated by the uncertainty bands around the inflation forecast that is included in our report. The uncertainty bands are based on the Riksbank’s historical forecasting errors.
High charges and commissions and the use of cheque float by banks, despite the introduction of the Cheque Imaging System, which aimed at preventing paper cheques from being transported to different destinations, are clear deterrents in disbursing funds at the recipient’s level. Similarly, the delays and paperwork involved transactions through the formal sector has been a deterrent. The distant work  4  BIS Review 3/2007  sites in some of the Middle Eastern countries with no access to banking facilities has been reported as another factor which provides opportunity for informal channels to capture remittances. On the recipient's sides too, the unnecessary expenditure incurred on their savings through purchases of non-priority consumer items has been cited as an imprudent way of spending valuable foreign currency. In addition, migrant workers are faced with numerous social issues due to family breakaways and health hazards through consumption of liquor and drugs etc. by remitter's family members. This is not the forum to discuss these issues, although they are also important factors affecting the remittance industry. Part III - possible solutions Macro level In discussing possible solutions to improve remittance flows across countries, it is important to refer to the General Principles for International Remittance Services prepared by the WB and the BIS. These guidelines are prepared at a global level and require both host/home country support to implement the recommendations underlying these principles.

Eurogiro, based in Europe offers several products for payment transfers through the Eurogiro system to accounts of postal members or to the accounts of third party banks. In addition, Eurogiro provides cash and money order services, Western Union urgent cash, cash on delivery, cheque payments and also bulk and pension payments. The Eurogiro postal network uses Tele Money Order (TMO), which is linked to a two-day cash project using Eurogiro bulking principles. Among their products, cash transfers, card payments and direct debits are also popular. In addition to the postal service, Eurogiro connects with banks, other alliances and financial institutions. Sri Lanka's postal service should explore the possibility of partnering with post office members in the remittance originating countries. Issues relating to remittance transfers Despite the promotional activities, institutional arrangements, favourable legal and regulatory framework, improved payment infrastructure, there still remains several un-resolved issues relating to remittance transfers. The lack of awareness of facilities available through formal channels is a prime factor. The absence of, or ineffective links between banks/financial institutions and migrant workers prior to their departure is another factor, which persuade migrant workers to use informal channels. The lack of transparency of full knowledge of the pricing at the point of sale or at the time of delivery of remittances is another important factor that needs to be addressed early by the formal channels.
Eddie Yue: Internationalisation of the renminbi – trends and developments Keynote address by Mr Eddie Yue, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the 5th Hong Kong - London RMB Forum, Seminar on RMB Business, Hong Kong, 11 December 2015. *  *  *  Katharine [Braddick], Peter [Alexander], distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to be hosting the 5th Hong Kong – London Renminbi (RMB) Forum. May I extend a very warm welcome to all of you attending this Seminar which forms part of the Forum, especially our guests travelling from London. This annual congregation is a reflection of the importance we place in the long-established RMB business co-operation between Hong Kong and London. And, the Seminar could not have come at a better time. Just 10 days ago, the International Monetary Fund announced its decision to include the RMB in its Special Drawing Rights basket. Naturally, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority welcomes the announcement as it represents a milestone in the development of the RMB. The IMF’s decision reaffirms the Chinese currency’s status as a freely usable currency, and enhances the representativeness of the SDR basket. Indeed, based on market projections, the RMB’s inclusion in the basket could bring up to $ trillion worth of investments in RMB assets by central banks, sovereign wealth funds, supranational organisations, large pension funds and institutional investors over the next five years.

This is a high level, not just from a historical perspective but from an international one too. The Riksbank’s credit data on the stock of mortgage borrowers shows that households with mortgages had an average debt-to-income ratio of 338 per cent in September 2017, which is an increase of 36 percentage points compared to 2011. 10 The same data also shows that 31 per cent of households with mortgages (640,000 households) have a debt-to-income ratio exceeding 400 per cent and 13 per cent (260,000 households) have a debt-to-income ratio exceeding 600 per cent. Since 2011, debt-to-income ratios have increased in all income groups. This means that households are becoming more sensitive to several types of changed economic conditions, such as rising interest rates, falling housing prices and higher unemployment. Allowing this trend to continue is not compatible with taking responsibility for the Swedish economy. See, for example, Alter et al. (2018), Lombardi et al. (2017), Mian and Sufi (2018) or Emanuelsson et al. (2015) for a review of the literature. 7 See Sveriges Riksbank (2013). 8 Dermani et al. (2016). 9 Sveriges Riksbank (2019). 10 Blom and van Santen (2017). 6  3 [13]  The development of the housing market can affect confidence in the banks Another aspect of the Swedish housing market is that the banks, via their lending to both households and companies, are exposed to the property sector.
Pay gaps have not only been large but persistent, strikingly so among ethnic minorities, even once we make allowance for differences in skill and job attributes. This suggests, despite progress, much remains to be done. Third, even where we can “explain” pay gaps using various fundamental factors, this should not be taken to imply these gaps are necessarily justifiable. For example, consistent and large education and skills differences between cohorts could themselves be taken as evidence of a policy failure. So too might a preponderance of certain types in certain sectors or occupations. Fourth, consistent with that, our results suggest that existing pay biases can be amplified and exaggerated by the effects of age, the nature of the employment contract, educational qualifications and having children under the age of 2. On average, these too tend to further the pay disadvantage for women and ethnic minorities. In terms of policy implications, a number of important government initiatives are already underway, among central banks and more widely. The Bank of England began publishing its gender pay gaps in 2017 and has chosen voluntarily to publish its ethnicity pay gap too since 2018. In 2019, the median gender pay gap was 23% and the median ethnicity pay gap was just under 7%, reflecting lower representation of both groups at senior levels. Published pay gaps were a further useful prompt for action by the Bank. The Bank is committed to closing these pay gaps, including by setting stretching targets for representation, in general and at senior levels.

The results are more interesting if we interact having a child under 2 with a variable capturing full or part-time employment. While for white men, the effect on earnings is still positive, for women the effect of having a child under 2 is only positive for women working part-time. For women working full-time, having a child under the 2 reduces earnings by around 6%. This suggests women in full-time jobs experience a ‘maternity penalty’, whereas men and women in part-time employment do not. (e)  Financial sector. Compared to earnings in the benchmark sector (agriculture), most sectors have  higher pay. The sector with the highest relative pay is finance, with a 46% premium relative to the benchmark. This premium is notably higher for men than women (58% versus 32%), although it is highest for ethnic minority men (76%). These are large pay gaps, bearing in mind these estimates take account of differences in the individual characteristics of the workers, such as age and educational achievement. (f)  Born in the UK. Being born in the UK, on average, leads to slightly lower earnings than not. However, this average masks sharply opposing trends among whites and ethnic minorities. Being born in the UK and white reduces earnings by around 7% compared with whites born outside the UK. This largely reflects the effects of those with “other qualifications”, and the fact that white people born outside the UK tend to be more educated.
The same message was also conveyed repeatedly by my predecessors, in three quarters of all press conferences since the introduction of the euro. The term “structural reforms” is actually mentioned in approximately one third of all speeches by various members of the ECB Executive Board. By comparison, it features in only about 2% of speeches by governors of the Federal Reserve. Our strong focus on structural reforms is not because they have been ignored in recent years. On the contrary, a great deal has been achieved and we have praised progress where it has taken place, including here in Portugal. Rather, if we talk often about structural reforms it is because we know that our ability to bring about a lasting return of stability and prosperity  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  does not rely only on cyclical policies – including monetary policy – but also on structural policies. The two are heavily interdependent. So what I would like to do today in opening our annual discussions in Sintra is, first, to explain what we mean by structural reforms and why the central bank has a pressing and legitimate interest in their implementation. And second, to underline why being in the early phases of a cyclical recovery is not a reason to postpone structural reforms; it is in fact an opportunity to accelerate them. The importance of structural reform Structural reforms are, in my view, best defined as policies that permanently and positively alter the supply-side of the economy.

I am not appointed by a president of the United States or subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. I, along with the 11 other Federal Reserve Bank presidents, operate the business of the Federal Reserve as efficiently as any bank in the private sector. And as Kirk mentioned, we make money for the U.S. taxpayer: We returned over $ billion to the U.S. Treasury in 2009 and 2010. You are looking at one of the few public servants that make money from its operations, rather than just spending taxpayer money. This wouldn’t be possible without a first-rate staff, led by my chief operating officer, Helen Holcomb, and the other senior officers that Kirk introduced. I love and admire these folks and too rarely get to single them out for public praise. So, please join me in applauding them. Two matters As Kirk has already said much of what I planned to say today about how the Fed works, I would like to address two non-operational matters. First is the record of job creation in Texas. For obvious reasons, this has become a subject of intense interest to the national media; my staff and I are being hounded by the national press corps for data and commentary. Today I will try to separate fact from fiction, with a heavy focus on the data. The second matter I wish to address is why I dissented from the consensus at the last meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).