samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 14 December 2018. * * * Today the Bank of Russia Board of Directors has decided to raise the key rate by 0.25 pp to 7.75% p.a. This move is aimed at limiting the scale of inflation risks in the coming year. I will subsequently elaborate on the rationale of this decision. The second decision made today was to resume regular fiscal rule-based foreign currency purchases from 15 January. As we said earlier, the postponed purchases will be made gradually in the course of several years. We will decide on the fiscal rule-based foreign currency purchases postponed in 2018 in due course, after regular purchases are resumed. We have factored in this decision in our forecast. Let me now proceed to give you the details of the key rate decision. Today’s Board meeting took an in-depth look at the reasoning for both keeping the key rate unchanged and revising it upwards. The main argument in favour of an unchanged key rate is the performance of the domestic demand. It is expanding moderately without posing any inflation risks. This primarily concerns consumption. In October, annual growth of retail sales came in at 1.9%. The heads of Bank of Russia regional branches, who contribute to the key rate decision, have also pointed to low demand and mixed consumption dynamics across regions.

As we know, the literature on international monetary policy cooperation indicates that there are gains to be made from policy cooperation, though the size of the potential benefits is subject to considerable debate. On the other hand, the lack of policy coordination will lead to sub-optimal outcomes. The relevant question is then why not greater international coordination of monetary policy to ensure sustained global growth and stability? Similarly, for emerging markets Asia, a question can be raised about the gains that can be had from greater coordination of macroprudential policy standards on a regional basis, as a way of dealing with the macro-implications of capital inflows from a financial stability perspective. I do not have firm answers to these questions. But at a time when emerging markets are increasingly being relied upon as the engine of global growth, I think discussion on any initiatives that lessen the vulnerability of emerging markets economies to boom-bust cycles would be in the global interest. Thank you. BIS Review 141/2010  3
I wonder how long it will be before documents will be deemed to have been delivered to shareholders so long as they were sent by e-mail or posted to the 3  BIS Review 15/2000  person’s interactive television; and the response period may be compressed on the assumption that you can pick up your mail wherever you are and at any time. All of this may sound fanciful for the moment, but is not impossible at some stage. What we still need, but may be in danger of losing, is the chance to pause for breath. We need time not only to think things through for ourselves but also to consult others. If, having dispensed with your human stockbroker because you resented paying his level of commission, you buy a company’s shares via the internet at what you think is a bargain price, but in ignorance of the fact that a couple of minutes previously the company issued a profits warning, you have only yourself to blame. But you may have felt forced into dealing in that manner by peer pressure, or for fear of loss of face if some colleague in the office starts boasting about what a killing he has been able to make on such-and-such a “day-trading” deal. If that is indeed a fair characterisation of the atmosphere which many of us nowadays breathe, then I have to say that I find it rather distressing.

But the world of finance is moving forward not only in the realms of such highly complex or sometimes - dare one say - gimmicky instruments. Continuous change and innovation are observable at the more prosaic level too. Looking at Hong Kong alone, over the past year there has been an impressive list of innovations, actual or planned, in the financial sector. These are not necessarily all of specific interest to the corporate treasurer but are nonetheless significant in a more general context. Thus, first, we have established a reciprocal link with South Korea for access to each other’s bond settlement and custody systems (following earlier links of this sort with Australia and New Zealand). Next, Hong Kong has launched the Tracker Fund as a means of disposing of part of the Exchange Fund’s Hong Kong dollar equity portfolio; although this bears many characteristics of a conventional index-tracking unit trust, it also has some unique innovative features. In addition, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation has successfully introduced its first mortgage-backed securities programme. And notes issued by HKMA and HKMC have been listed on the stock exchange for the first time. Finally, we are preparing a US dollar clearing system which we hope will offer a wider range of facilities than any other offshore clearing; I would not want today to anticipate the more detailed announcements about the planned timetable for this project, which we expect to make shortly. The foregoing is not necessarily an exhaustive list of changes which are being implemented here.
(2016), “Assessing the implications of negative interest rates”, speech at the Yale Financial Crisis  Forum, Yale School of Management, July. 9 These challenges are set out in more detail in an ESRB report on the macroprudential issues arising from low  interest rates and structural change in the EU financial system. 10 European Systemic Risk Board (2016), “Macroprudential policy beyond banking: an ESRB strategy paper”, July. 11 European Systemic Risk Board (2016), “EU Shadow Banking Monitor”, July. The methodological background to  the ESRB’s EU Shadow Banking Monitor is described in: L. Grillet-Aubert, J. Haquin, C. Jackson, N. Killeen and C. Weistroffer (2016), “Assessing shadow banking – non-bank financial intermediation in Europe”, ESRB Occasional Paper no.10. 12 European Systemic Risk Board (2012), “Recommendation on money market funds”, December. Further  analysis of money market funds’ systemic importance is provided in J. Ansidei, E. Bengtsson, D. Frison and G. Ward (2012), “Money market funds in Europe and financial stability”, ESRB Occasional Paper no. 1. 13 Abad, J., I. Aldasoro, C. Aymanns, M. D’Errico, L. Fache Rousová, P. Hoffmann, S. Langfield, M. Neychev, and T.  Roukny (2016), “Shedding light on dark markets: First insights from the new EU-wide derivatives dataset”, ESRB Occasional Paper no. 11. 14 European Systemic Risk Board (2015), “Report on the efficiency of margining requirements to limit pro-cyclicality  and the need to define additional intervention capacity in this area”, July.

Your thoughts and comments will reflect the unique valueadded of the ESRB: to bring policymakers together to exchange expertise and coordinate policy action, with the common aim of reducing the risk of financial crisis. On that note, I am pleased to open this first annual conference of the European Systemic Risk Board. 1 Pagano, M., S. Langfield, V. Acharya, A. Boot, M. Brunnermeier, C. Buch, M. Hellwig, A. Sapir, I. van den Burg  (2014), “Is Europe overbanked?” ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee Report no.4. 2 Becker, B. and V. Ivashina (2014), “Cyclicality of credit supply: firm level evidence”, Journal of Monetary  Economics, 62: 76–93. 3 Langfield, S. and M. Pagano (2016), “Bank bias in Europe: Effects on systemic risk and growth”, Economic  Policy, 31(85): 51–106. 4 Levine, R., C. Lin and W. Xie (2016), “Spare tire? Stock markets, banking crises, and economic recoveries”,  Journal of Financial Economics, 120(1): 81–101. 5 European Central Bank (2015), “Report on financial structures”, October. 6 Summers, L., “US economic prospects: Secular stagnation, hysteresis, and the zero lower bound”, Business 3/4  BIS Central Banker's Speeches  Economics, 49(2). 7 For an analysis of the sensitivity of US banks’ pre-provision income over one year to changes in short-term  interest rates, see M. Gomez, A. Landier, D. Sraer and D. Thesmar (2016), “Banks’ exposure to interest rate risk and the transmission of monetary policy”, ESRB Working Paper no.13. 8 Cœuré, B.
Implementation Has Been Satisfactory But More Needs to be Done Achieving international consensus on the key elements of bank regulatory reforms is laudable. But for the reforms to have their intended effect, implementation is crucial. •  The FSB has formed a Standing Committee on Standards Implementation to monitor the implementation of the financial reforms among its members  •  I chair this Committee and so have particular interest in the issue of implementation. The Basel III standards have generally been implemented in a timely manner. •  Basel III risk-based capital rules have been rolled out in all 24 FSB jurisdictions. •  Final liquidity rules have been issued in all but two jurisdictions. In bank resolution, progress is more mixed. •  On the positive side, regulators have set up crisis management groups and developed recovery plans for all G-SIBs  But significant work remains on operationalising these resolution plans. •  And not all FSB jurisdictions have bank resolution regimes that are in line with FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes. Implementing reforms in a timely manner is one thing; implementing them in a consistent manner across jurisdictions is another. Ensuring consistency and level playing fields, and minimising opportunities for regulatory arbitrage have become the focus of implementation monitoring. The Basel Committee conducts in-depth assessments of member implementation of the Basel III capital standards to check for consistency.

With prices remaining stable, interest rates low and a good level of competitiveness, our economy is well equipped to resume a brisker growth trajectory in line with the global economy. 4  BIS Review 30/2005  As in the past, however, the international environment remains fraught with uncertainty at both the economic and monetary level. The independent course steered by the National Bank has made it possible to create a monetary framework conducive to the development of our economy. This success hinges not only on the correct interest rate decisions, but also on the credibility conferred upon us by our autonomy of action and by sufficient resources for intervening in the markets. It is in the nation's interest to preserve this achievement. Thank you for your attention, and for your interest in the Swiss National Bank and its activities. BIS Review 30/2005  5
Wage growth is now put at 4.5-5.0 per cent in most sectors. It is reported to be even higher in building and construction. Profitability continues to improve in all industries in region South-West. In many industries, profitability growth is somewhat lower than in the previous round. The exception is import-competing manufacturing where profitability is stable and in the service industry where it is improving further. So far, the buoyant activity level in the region has resulted in an accelerating rise in prices in highly sheltered sectors such as building and construction and services. More generally, enterprises report that prices have risen in the past 12 months. Six of ten companies expect prices to continue rising at the same pace during the next 12 months, while more than 25 per cent of the companies expect prices to rise at a faster pace. For the country as a whole, inflation has edged up since the beginning of the cyclical upturn. The yearon-year rise in the consumer price index (CPI) was 1.9 per cent in August. Energy products such as electricity and oil has accounted for a considerable portion of the rise in prices over the past year. Electricity prices, including grid rent and taxes, were 25 per cent higher in August than one year earlier, while petrol prices were close to 11 per cent higher. Since the beginning of 2001, energy prices have exhibited an average increase of over 7 per cent. Variations in energy prices may also lead to wide monthly variations in consumer price inflation.

This raises the expected inflation in the short term with respect to what we estimated in the IPoM. In this context, the BCCh Board raised the Monetary Policy rate (MPR) to 11.25%, and estimates it has reached its maximum level of the cycle that began in July 2021, and that it will remain there for as long as necessary to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target over the two-year policy horizon. The macroeconomic scenario presents high risks whose short- and medium-term implications must be evaluated carefully. The Board will monitor closely the unfolding of these events, and hereby reaffirms its commitment to conduct monetary policy with flexibility, in order for projected inflation to stand at 3% annually in the policy horizon. The corridor for the MPR delivered in the September IPoM considered scenarios that might require a somewhat different monetary policy action. The ceiling of the corridor corresponds to a scenario where foreign financial conditions tighten more following a need of greater monetary adjustment in the U.S. Events after the September IPoM were published are consistent with that scenario although the magnitude of the changes have been smaller. And with last Wednesday's move, the MPR remains in the corridor. It should be noted that, the real monetary policy rate is around 4.5 pp above neutral, if we consider its current level minus expected one-year inflation according to market expectations. This is one of the most contractionary rates in the region 1.
Given our country’s climate risk profile and the fact that the bulk of these risks is insured, a climate-related natural disaster is unlikely to threaten the stability of the entire banking system in Switzerland, even if some individual institutions could be affected. 6  According to the National Centre for Climate Services (2018), the number of days with snowfall at altitudes below 800 metres has halved since 1970. For a simulation of the implications of the various modalities for introducing a carbon tax on the Swiss economy, see Marcucci, A. and L. Zhang (2019), ‘Growth impacts of Swiss steering-based climate policies’, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 155(9), pp. 1–13. Page 4/12  Let’s now move on to the second category of climate change risks, transition risks. These include the economic costs and benefits resulting from adjustments to regulations and government policies aimed at decarbonising the economy. Examples are the scrapping of polluting production processes, the growth of investment into researching and developing green technologies, and an unanticipated adoption of new taxes or subsidies. As with any other tax, the introduction of a carbon tax could change the sectoral composition of domestic production in a way that is significant but hard to quantify. That being said, transition risks are above all likely to impact the financial system – through the revaluation of assets. A sudden shift in climate and energy policy could reduce the value of assets in the sectors most affected by the new regulations (e.g. commodities, automotive, heavy industry).

The higher SNB policy rate should via its impact on borrowing costs and the exchange rate contribute to curbing the development of inflation in Switzerland. From today’s perspective, and assuming that the SNB policy rate remains constant at −0.25%, our new inflation forecast shows the rate of inflation temporarily declining to around 1.5% before rising back to 2% over time. Without  Page 3/5  Berne, 16 June 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  today’s SNB policy rate increase, inflation would be clearly above the range consistent with price stability at the end of the forecast horizon. The new inflation forecast shows that further increases in the SNB policy rate may be necessary in the foreseeable future to stabilise inflation in the range consistent with price stability over the medium term. The current environment is subject to great uncertainty, also with regard to exchange rate developments. If there were to be an excessive appreciation of the Swiss franc, we would be prepared to purchase foreign currency. If the Swiss franc were to weaken, however, we would also consider selling foreign currency. We will be observing the developments closely and are prepared to take the necessary measures in every situation to ensure price stability in Switzerland over the medium term. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. It is now my pleasure to give the floor to Fritz Zurbrügg. Page 4/5  Berne, 16 June 2022 Thomas Jordan  News conference  Page 5/5
These modern-day Vikings try their fortune in distant places in the hope of quick gain and handsome returns, which they can no longer find closer to home. What will happen when these bold hunters of yields and expectations suddenly lose their nerve? Or their appetite? Regardless of whether this is caused by events that have occurred somewhere else and under completely different conditions from here, or due to persistent rumours, speculation and theories about the situation in Iceland and risks that have little or no foundation at that time. Will they load everything aboard and sail off, like the  Vikings in the past, with what they have managed to gather up, and look for shelter with their bounty against real or imaginary threats? If this happens, might the high-yield countries suffer a shock? And if so, will that shock be felt the most by the smallest countries, where investors naturally have the least knowledge and confidence? Then the question will arise about the impact that all this will have on the effectiveness of the Central Bank’s policies for controlling inflation developments, and whether we might be better off locked away inside one of the super-currencies, obeying the laws that apply there and at the mercy of the decisions of others. All these considerations and many others can stoke the fires of debate at this conference in Iceland. Some people maintain that the incredible gains that Iceland has made over a very few years could only have been achieved because the country had its own currency.

4. Similar platforms have proliferated around the world, but the trade finance gulf continues to widen. According to the Asian Development Bank, about 10% of global trade suffer from the trade financing gap.1 To put this into perspective, the value of the gap amounted to USD $ trillion in 2020, marking a 15% increase from just two years before. SMEs, in particular, accounted for an alarming 40% of rejected trade finance requests. These figures illustrated that global efforts are nowhere near enough, and we should all rethink why the gap is continuing to widen, and how to make our efforts as effective as possible. 5. A recent report published with the support of Fung Business Intelligence suggested a possible reason: the various digital trade finance platforms mostly work independently and do not synergise with each other, resulting in what we call digital islands. It is as if we are all putting our heads down and concentrating on developing our own platforms, forgetting that it is equally important for the platforms to communicate and work with each other. As suggested in the report, interoperation between the platforms could help to further modernise the global trade finance ecosystem and close the gap. 6. The Commercial Data Interchange, also known as CDI, which the HKMA is building, is precisely designed with enhancing interoperability in mind. By way of introduction, CDI aims to enhance the sharing of commercial data. Currently, every time a bank wants to connect to a data provider, it has to set up a new, separate connection.
In the euro area and the United States, R* is estimated to have fallen by between 150 and 200 basis points over the past 15 years. Page 3 of 14  The scale of this variation can only be explained by structural factors. Slower growth in the working population and in total factor productivity have led to a slowdown in the trend rate of GDP growth, and this is estimated to account for roughly a quarter of the decline.iv  Source: Bergeaud, Cette, Lecat, 2016  The other three quarters are estimated to stem from the increase in the supply of savings coupled with reduced investment demand. The global savings glut is being fuelled by increased life expectancies, rising inequality – older and wealthier individuals tend to save more – and the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in emerging economies. Page 4 of 14  Source: IMF  Conversely, the decline in investment demand can be attributed to the rise in the non-material economy, which requires more human capital than physical investment, and no doubt to lower confidence in the future. The euro area in particular has seen a rise in its saving ratio and a marked weakness in its investment ratio since the financial crisis. Source : Refinitiv Datastream  These trends, which can be observed the world over and have been going on for a long time, are not, therefore, attributable to monetary policy: I shall nonetheless turn now to the role of central banks.

Page 5 of 14  1.2 The cyclical causes The primary mission of central banks, and of the European Central Bank (ECB) in particular, is to ensure price stability, notably by “smoothing” fluctuations in the economic cycle. They do this by setting the level of shortterm interest rates. In 1998, the ECB established a quantitative definition of price stability that it went on to clarify in 2003: to maintain inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. More recently, other central banks have adopted this 2% inflation target, for example the US Fed in 2012 or the Bank of Japan in 2013. Our monetary policy has pursued this inflation target since 1999, with tangible results: inflation has remained close to target at an average of 1.7%. Page 6 of 14 Source: Eurostat  In the past decade, however, euro area inflation has been too low: 1.3% on average between 2011 and 2019, and 1.3% today [Core inflationv is also at 1.3%]. This weakness in inflation, which can be observed in the majority of advanced economies, has reignited the debate over the 2% target. Some, such as one of my great predecessors, Jacques de Larosière, say we should be content with the current 1%. Others, on the contrary, such as Olivier Blanchard, former chief economist at the IMF, are arguing for a higher target of up to 4%, which would leave more room to lower interest rates at the bottom of the cycle. It is tempting simply to ignore these arguments.