samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, the gap between producer and consumer inflation has recently increased well above the long-term average in many advanced and emerging economies. For instance, PPI is four times the rate of CPI in the euro area. In the price developments during the pandemic, we have seen that a limited group may have a significant contribution to inflation. For example, the durable goods group, which had decelerated on average in the US for the last 25 years, has been one of the items that had the largest contribution to the recent rise in inflation, due also to supply constraints. In the reopening and economic normalization period, energy and services prices registered significant increases across the world. Global central banks think that energy and pandemic-driven high rates of price increases in some sectors will prove to be temporary with the normalization in demand composition, easing of supply constraints, and waning base effects. These factors will also have a downward effect on Turkey’s inflation in the upcoming period. Having touched on the current state of global inflation and how it has been affected by pandemic-driven conditions, I would now like to share with you our evaluations of inflation developments in Turkey. In August, annual inflation rose by 0.30 points to 19.25%.

This trend appears to be in stark contrast to the 2008 crisis. As the services sector is a labor-intensive sector, the cost that the pandemic imposed on employment has been much higher than that of the financial crisis of 2008. In this process, central banks all over the world took extraordinary expansionary policy measures such as interest rate cuts, asset purchases, liquidity steps and credit support programs. The experience of policy makers in unconventional monetary policy after the 2008 crisis and the expansion of the toolkit has made a positive contribution to the policy response to the pandemic. Central banks of advanced and emerging economies used the existing policy space without hesitation and promptly, and cut policy rates as a first response to the crisis. Central banks also reintroduced bond purchases that they had included in the post-crisis toolkit. It is noteworthy that emerging market central banks also resorted to bond purchases, unlike in the 2008 crisis. Central banks have provided more funding through repo transactions and extended the maturity of funding to prevent liquidity squeeze in the money market and to facilitate access to liquidity. In this period, when economies came to a standstill, this intervention by central banks was appropriate and vital for the functioning of the financial system. Globally, policy rates have been rapidly lowered and the average interest rate in both advanced and emerging economies has fallen below the levels in the 2008 crisis.
Conclusion Now when we are assembled here for an important conference, with interesting contributions from a number of the world’s leading experts in the field, we would do well to be temperate in our appraisal of what we believe we know today. To this end I shall quote Lawrence Summers. In connection with the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s symposium on “Achieving Price Stability”, Summers considered the major changes that have occurred in macroeconomic thinking in the past two decades and then rounded off by saying: “It would be a misreading of history to think that we have now identified final truth or that some of the views expressed here will not look archaic twenty years from now.” That is a stimulating and challenging statement. Think how dull life would seem if we ever arrived at the final truth. As luck would have it, the increasingly complex reality in which we live is an endless source of challenges for researchers as well as central bank colleagues throughout the world. References Alchian, A. & Klein, B., (1973), “On A Correct Measure of Inflation”. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 5, no. 1, February, pp. 173–191. Goodhart, C.A.E., (1995), “Price Stability and Financial Fragility”. In The Central Bank and the Financial System, pp. 263–302, Macmillan, London Summers, L., (1996), “Commentary: Why are Central Banks Pursuing Long-Run Price Stability?”. In Achieving Price Stability. A Symposium Sponsored by Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 29–31, pp. 35–43. BIS Review 58/1998

Ajith Nivard Cabraal: Overview of financial and economic developments in Sri Lanka Keynote address by Mr Ajith Nivard Cabraal, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at the Opening of the Financial Services Academy at the Centre for Banking Studies, Rajagiriya, 5 March 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen: Today we all have gathered here to witness an important step towards the development of the financial landscape and knowledge pool of the country, the establishment of the Financial Services Academy, a landmark organization that we hope, would shape the future of our financial services industry. As we know, the Sri Lankan economy recorded a growth of 7.8 per cent in the first three quarters of 2006 and according to current available data, it is very likely that the economic growth in 2006 would be well over 7 per cent. This will be the highest since 1978. Towards such growth, the contribution of the services sector was easily the highest and of such high growth sector, the growth in financial services was highly significant. It is therefore widely acknowledged that the contribution of the financial sector for the achievement of growth of the country is enormous, and whatever we do in that connection, would be of overall immense value. The developments in the financial sector also helps the economic growth through several other channels as well: It improves the efficiency of business processes, attracts investment, reduces unemployment and enhances access to finance, to name a few.
But we have so much to learn from experts in other fields. Strengths as Blind Spots One of the most important lessons I’ve learned as a CEO is that there’s no fixed endpoint when it comes to shaping an organization’s culture. You can never take a step back and say, “We’ve finished the culture project. Well done! Now it’s time to focus our efforts elsewhere.” Culture is constantly evolving, and therefore needs to be constantly nurtured. One of the most challenging elements is that there’s no clear benchmark for success. And sometimes your greatest strengths can become your blind spots. As an organization with a public mission and regulatory responsibilities, the Fed needs to have a particular focus on compliance. But cultures with a heavy focus on compliance can breed a sense that individuals aren’t responsible for their actions. As a CEO, I’ve tackled these issues by focusing on principles and values rather than writing extensive policies that try to cover every potential decision. This puts a premium on individual accountability to do what’s right and creating an environment where everyone has the ability and responsibility to speak up. Somewhat paradoxically, focusing on principled decision making and accountability, rather than relying exclusively on rules and policies, can be the most effective safeguard against wrongdoing and unethical behavior. What’s the Way Forward? Creating a positive work culture is challenging and ongoing work. And there’s no silver bullet that can solve cultural problems overnight.

This defence must be accompanied, on the one hand, by a reform of the rules of world trade so as to include more effective mechanisms to guarantee a more balanced playing field; and, on the other, by domestic policies (flexibility of the labour market, a sound social security network, and the creation of educational and training opportunities) that adequately address the distributive problems that may stem from trade exchanges. It is also worth mentioning the promotion of trade openness in new sectors, mainly services, where the potential profit margin is significantly higher. Without further ado, let me introduce the panelists. We are honoured to have with us today three very experienced representatives of the central bank community of the Mediterranean region. 4/5  Mr. Abdellatif Jouahri, Governor of the Bank Al Maghrib. Mr. Sadiq al-Kabir, Governor of the Central Bank of Libya. Mr. Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director and Special Adviser of the Governor. They are very well suited to address the topics of this panel as they have a far-reaching knowledge of the economies of the region and long-dated experience as policymakers. Governor Jouahri, the floor is yours. 5/5
Obviously, it is part of our mission here at the National Bank of Romania to monitor, understand and assess these and related phenomena which may affect - both positively and negatively - the Romanian monetary system and banking system and more generally our economy. That being said, the reason we have invited her here today is related to this specific aspect of her more recent work. So far we have seen blockchain and cryptocurrencies mostly discussed and assessed from the perspective of information technology and economic theory. We are interested at the same time to see how the cryptocurrency problem is also perceived from the perspective of an analysis largely rooted in the experience of intelligence studies and practice, and of an expert in strategic decision making in conditions of risk and uncertainty. We are also interested to see how such an expert is framing the problem of cryptocurrency as a massive economic challenge to the national economies, a problem requiring a strategic assessment of the alternatives; to see how an expert in structured analysis may present the issue in a systematic, methodical way. Last but not least, we are interested in the evaluations which are emerging out of this exercise, including the opportunities as well as the warnings. Hence the title of the presentation: "Bitcoin Versus Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC): The Most Important Economic Decision Nations Have Ever Faced. Analytical Frameworks for Comparative Assessment and Strategic Decisions." In terms of how we are going to proceed, the event will have two parts.

We will start with the presentation of Professor Khalsa for about 40 minutes or so, which will be followed by a questions and answers segment. I would like to invite Professor Khalsa to take the floor. Thank you! 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
An improved wage-setting process, in conjunction with an active fiscal policy, contributed to curbing the real economic costs. Hence, the experience of 1986 and the beginning of the 5  BIS Review 14/2000  1990s probably provides a realistic picture of the minimal costs associated with stamping out high inflation. At the same time, an active fiscal policy enhanced the credibility of monetary policy because it led to lower unemployment than would have been the case otherwise. In Norway, high inflation is a war phenomenon and phenomenon of the 1970s and 1980s. In the aftermath of high inflation, we experienced substantial real economic losses and financial instability. The cost of inflation has been high. History shows that lower unemployment cannot be achieved in exchange for higher inflation in the long run. A monetary policy that fuels inflation does not generate economic growth. On the contrary, the result is booms and speculative bubbles, which are the precursors of recession and unemployment. In the absence of nominal stability, employment and production will not show stability either. The economy must be endowed with a nominal anchor. This is the task of monetary policy. The Norwegian economy was lacking a nominal anchor during the period of low interest rates and devaluations in the 1970s and 1980s. This led to rising inflation and instability. From 1986 the fixed exchange rate regime restored confidence in monetary policy and subsequently laid a foundation for more stable economic developments.

Accordingly, since October last year we have lowered the monetary policy rate (MPR) by 150 basis points, keeping an expansionary bias for monetary policy. This, together with the performance of the internal and external macroeconomic scenarios, has heavily affected the structure of market interest rates. In particular, long-term rates are in or close to their all-time lows (figure 2). I must stress this because long-term interest rates are the ones that most influence investment. What is remarkable is that today they are even below the rates prevailing in 2008–2009, that is, even lower than they were at the height of the global financial crisis, when the MPR was down to 0.5 percent and unconventional monetary stimulus had to be added to the economy. Mortgage lending interest rates are also below where they were at the time and very close to their historic lows. At the same time, the lower cost of bank funding has been transmitted to the lending rates faced by firms and households. These rates have fallen by as much as 140 basis points since October last year. However, adjusted for inflation, lending has decelerated, particularly in commercial and consumer loans, influenced by the more cautious behavior of both suppliers and demanders of credit, as is apparent in our June Bank Lending Survey (BLS) and our August’s Business Perceptions Report (IPN).
This, in turn, has raised the level of employment compatible with price stability, or, put differently, lowered the inflation rate for any given level of employment. The effects of globalisation may also be felt more indirectly through increased competition, both on the products and labour markets. On the products market, globalisation has eliminated the least productive domestic firms (those that set the highest prices) and reduced the pricing power of remaining domestic firms. It may also have created the conditions for wage moderation by increasing the degree of competition on the labour market. Overall, these developments have made it easier for Central Banks to bring down inflation without real costs to the economy. But it is doubtful that we can count indefinitely on such "tailwinds". Inflation only partly depends upon imported prices. Many goods and most services are still produced domestically with little competition from abroad. Domestic factors thus remain crucial determinants of inflation rates. Globalisation lowers the relative price of tradables to non-tradables in an open economy. But the overall level and dynamics of prices ultimately remain determined by the monetary authorities provided they ensure that steady growth in overall nominal demand is maintained through an appropriate monetary policy. 1 In addition, it is possible that the effects of globalisation on inflation will be reversed in the future. Strong growth in big emerging economies is increasingly putting pressures on the price of oil, food and other commodities.

In an open economy, domestic demand changes can easily be satisfied through increased imports. As a consequence, domestic inflation may become less sensitive to the domestic output gap and more sensitive to global tensions on production capacities. 2  2  Notably put forward by Laurence Ball. BIS Review 103/2007  Finally, it is possible that (due to immigration and structural reforms) labour supply has become more elastic in many countries, and, as a consequence the cyclicality of wages (and prices) has been reduced. 3 Flatter Phillips curves may be a mixed blessing for Central Banks. In such circumstances, looking at actual and projected inflation may not be sufficient to detect incipient imbalances between supply and demand. In other words, inflation becomes less informative about the output gap. There is a risk, then, that imbalances are allowed to build up to a point where a stronger reaction may become necessary. To prevent that risk, Central Banks may want to look at information coming from a broader set of indicators, chosen because of their ability to detect, at an earlier stage, potential inflationary pressures. Obviously, monetary and credit aggregates for instance are good candidates for such a job. What role for money in monetary policy? As you may know, this is precisely what is done in the context of the Eurosystem’s two-pillar monetary policy strategy which assigns an important role to money. This structure is based on a particular premise and has one important implication.
And if London was important to the world, the world was also crucial to London; more than half the value of securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange was accounted for by loans for foreign companies and governments. 7 As an editor of the Economist during the period put it: “It [the City] is the greatest shop, the greatest store, the freest market for commoditites, gold and securities, the greatest disposer of capital, the greatest dispenser of credit, but above and beyond, as well as by reason of all these marks of financial and commercial supremacy, it is the world’s clearing house.” 8 The benign international environment disappeared with the outbreak of the Great War, and the UK’s political and economic standing in the world fell away steadily through the following 60 years. By 1950, average incomes in the UK were below those in the United States, and they fell below Germany and France by 1970. The economic dominance of the United States ensured New York’s place as the leading financial centre and the American commercial banks became the world’s largest. In the 70s and 80s the growth of Japan propelled Tokyo up the rankings. And in Britain, the share of foreign securities issuance fell to only 6% in 1961, as against more than half before 1914. So by the 1970s London was benefiting from few of the factors which had produced its golden period before the first War.

Many have been established and are staffed by people who acquired their skills and earned their capital at the more established investment banks and fund management firms of the City. Being at the heart of world markets helped them spot the opportunities and assess the competition. Once they struck out on their own, they could draw on a network of former colleagues and contacts for staff, information and expertise. Future prospects of the City of London So what are the prospects of the City of London? One of the clear lessons from history is that any position can be lost. It is always possible to throw away an advantage by ill judged decisions. Any widespread operational disruption or fear about security could also be very damaging, which is one reason why we and the other tripartite authorities are spending so much time on improving crisis response and management. But in the absence of disaster the structural factors I have discussed seem likely to favour further concentration of financial business in the City. First, the entry of China and India international market has been associated with a massive expansion of international trade and finance in relation to overall world GDP. That seems likely to continue and has been a major factor in the growth of London in the past. Fifteen years ago people worried that developments in information technology would undermine centres like the City of London.
Before I comment on the significance of board charters in augmenting good corporate governance in the financial sector, I think it is appropriate that I acknowledge the commendable work that has gone into implementing the FSDP through collaborative effort involving government and other institutions. The Government, working with the three financial sector regulatory bodies, namely, the Bank of Zambia, the Pensions & Insurance Authority and the Securities & Exchange Commission has continued to take the lead in implementing various reforms. This effort has been supported by private sector experts and representatives responsible for the technical aspects of implementing the FSDP recommendations.

If in adopting model charters, some of you find certain provisions too onerous, it may be necessary to consider a phased approach to their adoption. In this way, the process of adopting model charters will not place on an  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  organisation undue difficulties. The model charters, it is hoped will act as guide for institutions to adopt elements that are applicable to their sub sector and industry and act as a benchmark, for you, and for assessing board and management and for assisting the oversight function by regulatory supervisors., such as ourselves. I expect that individual institutions requiring further advice will continue to engage us, as well as the consultants, to ensure that they extract maximum benefit from the work that has gone into this phase of the FSDP. I thank you all and wish you fruitful deliberations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
First, globally it is not normal for prudential regulators to have an actual competitiveness objective – to my knowledge there is only one example amongst 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  the main prudential regulators. I worry therefore that having such an objective might be seen by others as an intention to weaken regulation in the UK, and thus undercut our authority in international bodies. I also think it’s a bit of a red herring. A robust prudential regime focussed on objectives of safety and soundness and policyholder protection is part of the national infrastructure that underpins the attractiveness of UK firms as counterparties. Second, it is wise not to give regulators too many objectives and have regards. Loading something up with ever more objects is an excellent way to decorate your Christmas tree but it’s not the best way to create an effective regulator. Solvency II Review So much for theory. What about practice? In particular the main event of this year: you may think it is defeating Covid, but of course it is in fact the review of Solvency II. I don’t want to bore this audience (any more than I have already) with a discussion of detailed measures. But I have a few brief points to make about the review itself. Perhaps most importantly, the review will stay true to the basic principles of Solvency II.

Andrew Bailey: Modern challenges for the modern central bank perspectives from the Bank of England Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at the LSE German Symposium, virtual event, 5 February 2020. * * * It is a great pleasure to participate in the LSE German Symposium, and congratulations to the organisers for such an interesting programme. I want to take the opportunity today to step back a little and offer some thoughts on the context and framework of monetary policy. It is fast approaching twenty five years since the UK decisively changed its monetary policy framework and embraced the idea of an independent central bank with a mandate to maintain price stability in the form of an inflation target. Now, 25 years may not seem long in the broad sweep of history, but the history of UK monetary regimes points to a quarter of a century representing a relatively long-established one. Long may it last, because it has been successful, and it has delivered the much desired price stability. But the context in which policy is made does not stand still. The first decade of the MPC was with hindsight very benign – the impact of demand shocks to the economy was small, and supply shocks were typically in a favourable direction. The next decade and more has been quite different, with much larger shocks – a mix of both demand shocks and more adverse supply shocks.