samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Government has launched a variety of technology initiatives. It set up a $ billion dedicated Innovation and Technology Venture Fund. It injected $ billion into the Research Endowment Fund of the Research Grants Council. And it is funding the Hong Kong Shenzhen Innovation and Technology Park, which will enable Hong Kong to tap the supply chain capabilities and talent pool across the border. 33. The administration has boosted incentives for the Fintech industry by increasing the tax deduction for R&D expenditure. And government support has also helped seven local universities launch Fintech undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. 34. In particular, I would like to mention that in collaboration with the HKMA, the Hong Kong Science and Technology Parks will set up a new Fin+Tech platform to organise accelerator programmes and hackathons. There will also be a new Innovation Hub at the governmentfunded InnoCentre, where the HKMA will host its latest proof-of-concept studies. These two initiatives will provide open platforms for different stakeholders to collaborate on Fintech development. Bracing for New Trends 35. I hope I have outlined what all of us in different sectors in Hong Kong have achieved in developing Fintech in Hong Kong, under the joint effort as “Hong Kong Inc.”. I would like to wrap it up with you some thoughts about three macro trends that I believe will influence the future of Fintech. 36. First, financial services will increasingly integrate with social platforms and other lifestyle channels.

The current surge in oil and commodity prices also poses a challenge to global growth, though, we expect the supply shock to have a limited impact due to several reasons: first, increased oil resiliency, second, real oil prices are still lower than its peak in 2008 and third, many emerging markets administer prices to cushion the blow. There is a downside risk that this environment of global liquidity amid uneven recovery and geopolitical risk in the Middle East may threaten global growth and stability. This scenario has a low probability of happening. Nevertheless, we should be mindful of it. In this scenario, oil prices will surge upward again and remain high due to strong demand from emerging markets, partly fueled by global liquidity, and supply constraints arising from adverse weather and widespread and protracted unrest in the Middle East. Global recession may result; or worse, global stagflation. The outcome depends on how US and Euro policy makers will respond. US and European monetary policymakers are therefore between a rock and a hard place of balancing structural risks to growth and new risks to inflation. If US or Euro recovery is still fragile, policymakers may choose to keep interest rates low, prompting stagflation further down the road. The US and Euro policymakers are therefore in a race against time. Their economic stimulus packages must revitalize the economy before the negative side-effects return home to derail the recovery. In such a world, what can the Bank of Thailand do?
In FY22/23, the US Federal Reserve raised the target range for its policy rate by a total of 4.5% points. Singapore Dollar interest rates also increased sharply. The Singapore Overnight Rate Average (SORA) rose by 3% points during this period. MAS could not have avoided this interest expense. Doing so would have undermined exchange rate policy and domestic market functioning. If MAS had not intervened in the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate would have appreciated even more, and this would have severely hurt the export sector and economic growth. If MAS had not mopped up the excess liquidity created by this intervention, the market mechanism for determining interest rates and allocating capital would have broken down. This in turn would have created financial vulnerabilities such as excessive credit growth and inflated asset prices. The negative currency translation effects and interest expenses reflect the consequential cost of carrying out MAS' function as a central bank – which is to conduct monetary policy conducive to sustained non-inflationary economic growth. The relevant measure of MAS' financial performance is not currency translation effects or interest expenses but how well its investments have done. MAS made a small gain of $ billion on its investment portfolio amidst a depressed market environment. Last year was an unusual year for financial markets, with both equity and bond markets performing poorly. The rapid increase in policy rates by global central banks, elevated inflation and slowing economic growth adversely affected both bond and equity prices.

They are wonderfully talented and represent the diversity in interests and perspectives of the team that we have here at the Bank. Celebrating the beauty and diversity of nature is as good a reason as any for an art exhibition. This is the first time that I have had the distinct pleasure of launching an exhibition here at the Gallery, and I am thrilled and honoured for it to be on this particular theme. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  I am grateful to all who have taken the time to be here today – to share an appreciation of not just the artistic works exhibited, but also their message. I would like to thank in particular all the artists, Dato’ Dino of the WWF and the team from the Bank Negara Malaysia Museum and Art Gallery who worked to put this exhibition together. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
There have been a number of positive effects from the policy of injecting additional money into the economy – including a sharp fall in corporate bonds spreads, a rise in equity prices, and the fall in three-month LIBOR back towards expected Bank Rate. 12 In addition, the MPC’s continuing strong commitment to support the economy and therefore achieve of the inflation target over the medium-term has had a positive effect on confidence. Most indicators of consumer confidence have been improving fairly steadily from low points in early 2009, as have indicators of business confidence. A significant part of the transmission mechanism has been via the rise in the prices of riskier assets. As yet, I don’t consider the evidence suggests that this rise in asset prices has gone too far, and therefore do not believe that this has become another risk to future economic stability. Rather, my concern is that this channel might become less powerful if quantitative easing were to be extended, as confidence effects might be less apparent, and there might be reluctance to engage in further portfolio rebalancing as the price of risky assets rose. This could prove a concern, given that there are still some risks on the downside to the path of economic activity, including a continuing weakness in the world economy, particularly the EU. Credit conditions also remain a concern.

Today I want to pursue a number of monetary policy issues, looking back over the almost nine years I have been on the MPC and seeking to draw lessons from that experience for the very difficult decisions that seem likely to face the Committee over the next couple of years. In particular, I will make some observations about the problems that policymakers inevitably face in assessing the implications for inflation of the pressure of demand on the economy’s supply capacity, and also about the time horizon over which the MPC seeks to bring inflation back to target. A more general theme of this discussion reflects on whether the approach to policy should be somewhat different in the more uncertain economic environment we face today, compared with the relatively tranquil period of the MPC’s first ten years. The pre-crisis period Given the scale of the recent financial crisis and consequent recession, it is not possible to look back over my lengthy period as a policymaker with the degree of satisfaction I would have wished. The big question it seems natural to ask is: to what extent did the conduct of monetary policy contribute to that crisis? Here the real issue must be about the role of policy in the period prior to the summer of 2007. Once the financial crisis was underway, I remain doubtful that monetary policy could have done very much more to alleviate the depth of the recession.
In particular, the Central Bank’s review process focuses on adherence to Risk Management Guidelines and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations as well as Prudential Guidelines that detail minimum, “Know Your Customer” requirements that financial institutions should adhere to. The overarching objective of all this is to ensure that our financial system is safe sound and stable. In a nutshell, there is an existing supervisory framework to ensure the safety of mobile banking solutions. This framework will continue to be reviewed in line with the changes in the mobile banking space. As you may be aware, some of these innovations may require collaboration with the regulators in the telecommunication sector. As such it is our intention to work closely with the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority in promoting safe and sound mobile banking services. Mr Chairman, it is also worth noting that since the last Mobile Banking Conference in 2009, a number of positive developments have occurred in the telecommunication sector. For instance the partial privatization of the Zambia Telecommunications Company (ZAMTEL) will result in intensified competition in the sector. This will no doubt lead to better quality service for the consumer. Further, following the liberalization of the International Gateway, we have already seen mobile service companies reducing their rates significantly. This, coupled with the now affordable cell phone handsets, will enhance access to mobile phone services and an opportunity for many of our people to be financially served.

Banks of all shapes and sizes have the opportunity to benefit from the recovery in the Hong Kong economy when it comes. Some banks will however do better than others, and our research indicates that a more efficiently operated and diversified bank will achieve higher profits. I hope that all the banks sitting here today will be among those that fall into this category. BIS Review 32/2003  3
The ongoing rigidity in prices of the services group and the volatilities in prices of agricultural products due to weather conditions are being closely monitored for the achievability of inflation targets. After dwelling on the latest developments in inflation and the interest rate policy of our bank, I would like to present the general outlook of the floating exchange rate regime and the exchange rate policy. The floating exchange rate regime applied under formal inflation targeting is the main element of our policies as it has been during the past five years. When the legal framework for setting the exchange rate regime is analyzed, we see that the exchange rate regime is set with the Government, while the design and application of the exchange rate policy to be conducted in the framework of the regime is under the authority and responsibility of the Central Bank. The essence of the floating exchange rate regime is that the value of the Turkish lira against foreign currencies is formed under market conditions and according to developments in supply and demand conditions. In this respect, the Central Bank conducts two kinds of transactions in markets: Firstly, the Central Bank purchases foreign exchange to build up reserves. These purchases are made via FX purchase auctions. In 2006, the daily purchase amount for these auctions including options is USD 60 million. These auctions were suspended on May 16, 2006 due to market conditions and the decline in FX supply. When the conditions for these auctions mature, they will be resumed.

It would naturally require commitment of substantial capital and human resources from both the banks and the regulators. We should all work together, therefore, to achieve these goals. This should not only be the objective of the Central Bank as we are all guardians of financial stability – I trust this conference will provide an adequate forum for open discussion. Thank you. 2/2
Set against this, sterling’s strength, essentially against the euro since the dollar rate has remained fairly constant for some time, continues to bear down on some sectors and some regions. Within the MPC we are very conscious of the resulting sectoral imbalances in the economy and you may have seen from the latest minutes that we have discussed the issue at length. One of the standard policy responses in these circumstances would be a fiscal tightening, but active use of fiscal policy in this way is by no means straightforward. In the circumstances, it is not clear how monetary policy in the short run can help in bringing sterling down to what we might regard as a more appropriate level. A decision not to have raised rates would not necessarily have resulted in a fall in sterling. In the context of buoyant domestic demand and a tight labour market pointing to strong underlying domestically-generated inflation,the market might have been left with the expectation that tighter policy had simply been deferred, and this might have had the perverse effect of putting further upward pressure on sterling. Another possibility that the Committee considered was foreign exchange intervention; but there is no indication that market support for sterling at these levels is fragile and any intervention operation that failed would be damaging to the credibility of the Committee and thus of the new UK monetary policy framework.

I want to set out the other work we have done, and are continuing to do, to stabilise a G-SIB going through a resolution process. The first is ensuring continuity in financial contracts in keeping with the KAs. Across FSB members, we have addressed this issue domestically in our respective jurisdictions with statutory powers to stay close-out. But that has left a risk of cross-border close-out under foreign law contracts. That could be solved by statute if hosts had powers recognise or support home country resolution actions. Indeed this is included in the KAs. But in some important cases, including the US, resolution regimes have been implemented without statutory powers of recognition. Absent a reliable statutory approach, changes in all relevant contracts were needed instead. This underlines the importance of the achievement we have made in getting the ISDA Protocol 4, and credit is due to industry and ISDA for making that happen. Most of the G-SIBs have already adhered to the expanded Protocol covering not only OTC derivatives but also securities financing transactions. By the end of this year, the remaining advanced economy G-SIBs will also have adhered. But more importantly, with the jurisdictional modular protocol in place and regulation requiring adherence published for the largest jurisdictions the way is clear for the rest of the market, in particular buyside firms, to adhere.
In this account, failures of financial regulation and supervision – rather than of monetary policy – lay at the heart of the crisis. 1 Yet an influential body of opinion takes an opposing line, claiming that an overly accommodative monetary policy – at the global level, and perhaps especially in the United States – was among the key causes of the crisis. 2 Its advocates argue that short-term interest rates were kept “too low for too long” following the bursting of the dot-com bubble at the turn of the century, and led to the economic imbalances that ultimately threatened the financial and macroeconomic stability of the world economy. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two extremes. No doubt financial regulation and supervision were weak. No doubt price stability is necessary but insufficient per se to achieve financial stability. Yet there is also no doubt that a monetary policy which turns out to be too lax to achieve price stability is likely to be responsible for fuelling excessive credit growth and thereby creating the potential for financial instability. There is substantial literature explaining this relationship, on which I will not elaborate further. 3  1  See: B. Bernanke (2010), “Monetary policy and the housing bubble”, speech at the 2010 AEA meetings http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm. 2  For a response to Bernanke (2010), see: J. Taylor (2010), “The Fed and the crisis: A reply to Ben Bernanke”, Wall Street Journal (11 January).

Yet the usual business cycle indicators are subject to a variety of measurement errors. As has been demonstrated extensively in the literature, the empirical proxies used to capture the output gap are subject to constant revision. 20 Clearly, policy-makers who rely exclusively on such assessments of the cyclical position can be seriously misguided in their real-time conjunctural assessment. To the extent that these indicators are central to the implementation of flexible inflation targeting, over-reliance on them may have led to an over-activist and at times inappropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, policy makers might also have formed an overly benign assessment of the situation prevailing in 2002–2004 if they relied excessively on output gap measures, as these measures were based on overly optimistic assumptions about potential growth. For instance, in early 2003 the IMF estimated the US output gap for that same year to be slightly above 2%. In early 2006 the estimate was revised down by 1 percentage point and one year later by another 1 percentage point. With the benefit of hindsight it turned out that in 2003 the output gap was basically nil (See figure 3). 21 Such considerations plague other composite indicators derived from the literature, such as the natural real interest rate. Understanding current inflation developments can also prove challenging. Headline inflation rates may be volatile in the short term, reflecting the impact of temporary relative price shocks. 22 Monetary policy-makers need to look through such noise. But conventional measures of so-called “core inflation” can themselves be misleading.
Bond premiums are nevertheless likely to remain clearly higher than prior to the financial crisis. Investors cannot be certain that government will cover bond investors’ losses when banks’ capital evaporates during the next banking crisis, c.f. the planned UK proposal to impose a “living will” on the large institutions. A favourable source of funding for banks is covered bonds, referred to as OMF in Norway. These debt instruments are secured by sound collateral backed by residential mortgages, public loans or commercial property loans. The risk premium on these loans is therefore lower than on ordinary bank bonds. The covered bond market was also heavily impacted by the financial crisis. Activity in the secondary market has been low, and investors showed little interest in new issues. The swap arrangement introduced by the Norwegian authorities eased the situation for banks. The market has recently improved. Covered bonds have a long tradition in other countries’ housing markets. As manager of the Government Pension Fund – Global, Norges Bank has taken initiative to strengthen the European covered bond market. Together with several other large investors and support  14  BIS Review 131/2009  from a number of central banks, the “Covered Bond Investor Council” was established. One of the main aims of the Council is to improve liquidity in the covered bond market, through for example more transparent and standardised borrowing terms. The Norwegian covered bond market is new and small compared with that of other countries.

And there has from the beginning been clear evidence of the anticipated broadening and deepening of euro financial markets more generally, reflected, for example, in increasing issuance of euro-denominated commercial paper, corporate bonds and equities. (If you would like chapter and verse on all this I commend to you the Bank of England’s half-yearly publication, “Practical issues arising from the euro” - available free from our public information department.) I am happy to say that the City of London has played a positive role in this process of euro market integration: it is in fact the greatest contribution that we can make to the success of the project from outside the Eurozone. And it runs in parallel with the distinct, but closely related, pressure for broader international integration of financial markets which is currently reflected in a whole series of market initiatives to unify trading platforms and both clearing and settlement systems, in which both London and Paris are, of course, very much involved. I have no doubt that increased financial market efficiency has an important part to play in improving overall economic efficiency - the question is how best we can bring it about. Jean-Claude and I would also agree, I suspect, that the introduction of the euro has contributed to the increasingly positive macro-economic performance of the Eurozone economy, taken as a whole, over the past couple of years.
Of course, we recognise that the objectives we are seeking cannot be achieved overnight and that they are dependent on building good relations and trust between supervisors. As part of this effort, the AIG will be meeting again with the Core Principles Liaison Group’s working group on capital in the  BIS Review 33/2004  7  middle of this month. Among other things, the two groups will discuss cross-border issues and case studies and will exchange current thinking on implementation strategies. I believe that each and every effort and initiative to improve communications between supervisors around the world should be strongly encouraged. 4. Moving to the New Framework  These are just a few examples of how Basel II has been improved to make it more suitable for national circumstances and domestic banking systems in many countries. The members of the Committee and I recognise, and we have consistently stressed, that only national authorities can decide when to adopt Basel II. Adopting Basel II on the same timetable as the member countries of the Basel Committee is not feasible for all countries. In fact, Basel II may be a lesser priority compared to other ongoing efforts to promote the fundamentals of safety and soundness in each country’s banking system. All of us must think long and hard about the state of our markets, our banking systems, and our supervisory structures to determine when we are ready to adopt the new approach to banking supervision that Basel II implies.

The double-digit deficits in the years before the crisis have been replaced by sizeable surpluses from 2009 to this day. Iceland had significant fiscal surpluses in the years leading up to the crisis. As expected, the crisis had a big impact on government finances: through the direct fiscal costs of the banking crisis, the loss of tax revenue, and higher unemployment expenditures as the economy went into recession. This impact was big as can be seen on Figure 6 showing the direct and indirect impact of selected banking crises on government debt and fiscal balance. But yours was bigger! A deficit on the central government amounting to 8% of GDP opened up in 2009. It had to be financed domestically. Capital controls helped in that respect. To build confidence and open external market access, a medium-term fiscal consolidation plan was implemented as a part of the programme with the IMF. In 2009, automatic stabilisers were mostly allowed to do their work, but in 2010 a phased deficit reduction plan set in, with a primary surplus targeted for 2012 and an overall surplus for 2014. This fiscal consolidation was sizeable in international comparison, as can be seen from Figure 7, but it did not derail the recovery that began around the middle of 2010. It helped that monetary policy could be relaxed over the course of 2010, as the closure of loopholes in the capital controls in late 2009 contributed to the stabilisation of the exchange rate.