samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, unemployment has risen markedly and manufacturing is suffering from the continuing low level of technical capacity utilisation. Finally, the events of the past two and a half years have shown exactly how vulnerable our country is in the event of a banking crisis, particularly one involving large banking institutions. I would therefore like to begin by outlining a few of the Swiss National Bank’s thoughts on the “too big to fail” issue. I will then briefly review our monetary policy in 2009, and describe the  BIS Review 59/2010  1  challenges facing the SNB in this area. In the final part of my speech, I will address the recent discussion surrounding the appropriate level of inflation. II. The “too big to fail” issue  Without appropriate countermeasures, Switzerland would remain very exposed to any fallout from a banking crisis. True, the big banks have substantially cut their balance sheets, something which the SNB explicitly welcomes. Yet the size of those balance sheets still represents a multiple of our country’s GDP. And the big banks continue to hold a dominant position in domestic lending and investment business. They are thus still “too big to fail”. In a comparable crisis, the government and the SNB would once again face an impossible choice: either they accept the devastating consequences of a big bank failure for the Swiss economy, or they take on the considerable financial risk of stabilisation measures.

We need to take these international regulatory developments into  2  BIS Review 59/2010  consideration to ensure the global competitiveness of our financial centre. Yet, as the past two and a half years have shown all too clearly, in the event of a crisis each country must take responsibility for its own banks. The formulation and implementation of measures at the national level must take into account the specificities of the country concerned. Here in Switzerland, the “too big to fail” issue is particularly pronounced, hence the need for a “Swiss Finish”. Reform of financial sector regulation and oversight is, without a doubt, a tough challenge. But the SNB is also faced with equally tough challenges in the area of monetary policy. III. Review of monetary policy in 2009  In 2009, the SNB’s monetary policy activities were focused entirely on combating the financial and economic crisis and the associated deflationary trends. Price stability, which is not compatible with either deflation or inflation, remained the core objective. As early as autumn 2008, the SNB had adopted an expansionary monetary policy stance as a result of the increasingly unfavourable economic outlook and the prospect that inflation would be low for the foreseeable future. Between October and December 2008, the SNB lowered the target range for the three-month Libor by a total of 225 basis points, to only 0.0–1.0%. The SNB also ensured a generous supply of liquidity to the money market. The economic situation continued to worsen into the spring of 2009.
However, that confidence must be tempered by a proper understanding of model limitations and assumptions, which the use test indeed also requires. Insurers should try to de-mystify models as much as possible and avoid any sense that they are “black boxes”. They need to understand for what purpose a model has been developed and the boundaries of its legitimate application. Criticism of the model ought to be welcomed and followed up: for example, arising from independent validation. Stress testing should be used to explore and improve understanding of model weaknesses. Management should challenge the outputs of complex models using other simpler models, rules of thumb and expert judgement. 7 For example, internal model estimates of capital can be compared to simpler standard formula or leverage measures. We encourage insurers to develop their own model drift measures and not limit themselves to the PRA’s metrics. To take another example, in a rapidly changing world, it is good practice for insurers to pay close attention to claims 6  Model risk: illuminating the black box, British Actuarial Journal, 22 August 2017, R. Black, A. Tsanakas, A. D. Smith, M. B. Beck, I. D. Maclugash, J. Grewal, L. Witts, N. Morjaria, R. J. Green and Z. Lim. 7 In the Dog and the Frisbee, 2012, Andy Haldane and Vas Madouros explained how simple rules of thumb often outperform complicated models in complex, uncertain environments. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/paper/2012/the-dog-and-the-frisbee  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7  experience as a risk indicator.

The financial crisis clearly demonstrated that high quality and up-to-date statistics are indispensable to policy makers and market participants alike. Thank you very much for your attention. Now, the Director General Statistics, Mr. Steven Keuning, will present more detailed features and the first results of the new statistics. Following his presentation we stand ready to answer your questions. 2  BIS Review 165/2009
There are economies of scale in the beta function. We see commercial managers that are providers of beta-exposure that are up to 15 times the size of the Government Pension Fund. Yet we are able to perform these tasks more cost-efficiently in-house. Hence we believe we now are sufficiently large so as to harvest most of the benefits of scale. Economies of scale are more elusive when it comes to active management. On the one hand the excess return potential is reduced because there will be a higher degree of market impact. On the other hand, size can be an advantage in obtaining access to information and in active positions where the objective is to reap the benefits of being a liquidity provider. The setting for the Government Pension Fund with its long investment horizon is well suited for such an objective. All of the passive investment (enhanced indexing) is done internally both for equities and fixed income. On the active side however, we use a large number of external managers. The split differs between equities and fixed income. On the fixed income side, most of the active risk is taken internally while the opposite is the case for equities. In total, about 60 per cent of the active risk stems from external managers. The guiding principle behind this choice is an assessment of expected returns after costs, and a strong belief in diversification among managers. There is no favouring of internal (or external) managers.

Thus, three successive governments have been loyal to this guideline and it still enjoys a substantial majority backing in the Norwegian parliament. Adherence to this policy is also scrutinized closely by the public who have developed a sense of ownership of the Fund. Another important feature of the model is that there is consistency between the size of the Fund and Norway's net financial wealth. This is ensured by the Act relating to the Government Pension Fund where it is stated that the government cannot borrow as long as the balance of the Fund is positive. The Fund has become large and is still growing very rapidly. It is projected to reach 200 per cent of Norway's GDP around the year 2010. The huge cash flow into the Fund has posed an operational challenge, which I will return to later. In 2006, the name of the fund was changed from the Government Petroleum Fund to the Government Pension Fund – Global. But the name change did not imply any operational changes and the return (the 4 per cent) continues to be a general support to the budget, not ear-marked for any specific purpose. This reflects that the Fund has no formal link to a liability side. Let me turn to the management of the Fund. The Fund is formally owned by the Ministry of Finance, while operational management is delegated to Norges Bank. This arrangement is formalised through a management mandate given to the Bank by the Ministry.
7  The launch of the new ICO (Official Credit Institute) line of guarantees, recently announced by the Government and worth € billion, will significantly reinforce at a most timely juncture this important instrument for combating the economic effects of the pandemic. Against this backdrop, the findings of the latest Bank Lending Survey anticipate the possibility of a tightening of credit standards for European firms in Q3 this year. Should this be confirmed, prolonged or increased support measures for the financing of firms would be advisable, in order to sustain the recovery. In any event, in this second phase of the economic policy response, credit support mechanisms should focus on prioritising access to these funds for firms with sound viability prospects, with a view to providing for the necessary cross-firm and cross-sector reallocation of productive resources. Likewise, it is admittedly highly likely that a significant number of firms will emerge from this crisis with high debt levels and with diminished demand prospects, at least for some time. In this respect, it is also a pressing concern to review corporate restructuring and insolvency processes, with the aim of establishing pre-emptive, flexible and simplified administrative procedures enabling firms to pursue their business activity while they are still viable. The second decisive contribution of economic policies to alleviating the consequences of the crisis has been the use of furlough arrangements (ERTEs). This has also been a very important instrument for mitigating firms’ liquidity needs.

That includes ensuring that the common monetary policy is properly transmitted to all sectors of the economy and to all countries, and to prevent the financial fragmentation of the area. We also stand ready to adapt all our instruments should it be necessary. Naturally, we must also remain vigilant regarding the risks to financial stability. Evidently, the banking sector is facing this crisis from a healthier position than in the previous recession, which highlights the importance of the far-reaching changes made in this sector over the past decade. The ECB has also taken resolute action here. Among other measures, it has allowed banks to use the capital buffers available, which were created precisely for situations such as the present one. But, undoubtedly, the crisis will significantly impact the quality of banks’ credit portfolios, on a scale that will depend on its ultimate severity and which will be uneven across banks. The outcome will depend on banks’ starting position, on their business model and on the distribution of their exposures to the sectors and regions most affected by the pandemic. Accordingly, we supervisors must continue to closely monitor the risks to financial stability and we must be ready to provide a forceful, panEuropean response should such risks materialise. In short, European and national economic authorities must share the objective of preventing the current crisis from being accompanied by an across-the-board tightening of financing conditions or from seriously harming the stability of the financial system.
Even surveys of small businesses – most recently, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s survey of companies with less than $ million in sales and fewer than 500 employees – indicate that fewer than 10 percent of small enterprises (which employ half of the private sector’s workers) are having problems accessing credit.3 The National Federation of Independent Business specifically noted just yesterday that “91 percent [of those surveyed in June] reported that all their credit needs were met or that they were not interested in borrowing.”4 U.S. banks and businesses are awash in liquidity. Adding more is not the answer to our problems. With monetary policy having reached the limits of accommodation, and the federal government at sixes and sevens, what then is the foreseeable economic outlook? Are we going to grow through the rest of the year and on into the next, or are we going to dip back into recession? Forecasting economic growth is not a precise business. Economics is an art form, not a science; it is very judgmental and subjective. The FOMC is composed of 17 thoughtful, introspective and deliberate men and women. Five of the members serve full time in Washington as Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, appointed by presidents of the United States with the approval of Congress.

The GPFG is to be managed within an adequate control and risk management framework and in a responsible and efficient manner with a high degree of transparency. The Bank pursues a variety of investment strategies. The strategies are complementary and aimed at delivering good returns over time. In 2018, the return was 0.3 percentage point lower than the GPFG’s benchmark index. Over the whole period since 1998 when Norges Bank established Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the annual return has been 0.25 percentage point higher than the return on the benchmark index set by the Ministry of Finance. A cost-efficient management operation contributes to the aim of highest possible return. Management costs are low, measured as a share of capital under management and compared with other managers. In 2018, the return was weak both in absolute terms and relative to the benchmark index. In 2017, the return was 13.7 percent, as much as 0.7 percentage point higher than the benchmark index. The Executive Board is prepared for wide variations in return from year to year, and applies the principle that performance must be assessed over time. From that perspective, the return of the GPFG has been good and higher than the return on the benchmark index. In the report to the Storting on energy stocks, the Government intends to remove exploration and production companies from the GPFG’s benchmark index and investment universe.
Luis de Guindos: Integration and convergence - from the peseta to the euro Remarks by Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at an event in honour of the 40th anniversary of the Spanish constitution, organised by the Spanish Ministry of Economy, Madrid, 18 December 2018. * * * This month marks 40 years since Spain began writing the most optimistic chapter of its history1. On 6 December 1978 the Spanish people did more than just vote in favour of a democratic country that would uphold the values of the rule of law and equality. Our support for the constitution also laid the foundations for Spain to modernise its economy and become an integrated part of the European family. In addition to safeguarding fundamental rights and civil liberties, Section 38 of the constitution states that “free enterprise is recognised within the framework of a market economy” and confirms that the public authorities guarantee its exercise. In practical terms, this meant Spain would align itself with the western model of parliamentary democracy, based on a market economy and free competition and underpinned by the social rule of law. A little more than a year later, negotiations began for Spain to join the European Economic Community, a historic milestone that would be achieved in 1986. But this wasn’t an easy road to follow.

At the same time, deposits from households and non-financial corporations also rose in October. Overall, more observations are needed to distinguish between shorter-term volatility and more lasting factors. Unlike in the case of monetary developments, there has been little change in credit growth. The annual growth rate of loans to the private sector (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) remained at –0.4% in October, unchanged from September. But this development reflects further net redemptions in loans to non-financial corporations, which led to an annual rate of decline in these loans of –1.5%, down from –1.2% in September. The annual growth in MFI lending to households remained unchanged at 0.8% in October. To a large extent, subdued loan dynamics reflect the weak outlook for GDP, heightened risk aversion and the ongoing adjustment in the balance sheets of households and enterprises, all of which weigh on credit demand. Furthermore, in a number of euro area countries, capital constraints, risk perception and the segmentation of financial markets restrict credit supply. In order to ensure an adequate transmission of monetary policy to the financing conditions in euro area countries, it is essential to continue strengthening the resilience of banks where needed. The soundness of banks’ balance sheets will be a key factor in facilitating both an appropriate provision of credit to the economy and the normalisation of all funding channels. Decisive steps for establishing an integrated financial framework will help to accomplish this objective. A single supervisory mechanism (SSM) is one of the main building blocks.
Kristina Persson: Sweden and the Euro Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish Chamber of Commerce for Germany, Frankfurt, 27 November 2002. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me begin by thanking the Swedish Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to this conference on a subject of immediate importance to Sweden and of course to the Riksbank. This is also a subject in which I have taken a strong interest for many years, as a Member of the Riksdag and also briefly as a Member of the European Parliament. We live in a challenging time for the euro area, facing both the present downturn of the global economy, and the future enlargement to include the new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. It is also a decisive period for Sweden, as the issue of EMU participation is now coming to the fore. Given that we are approaching a decision on a euro referendum in Sweden the Riksbank will naturally step up its preparations to ensure a smooth and rapid transformation of Sweden and the Riksbank to the Eurosystem. I will here today share with you some views on the development so far of the euro area and on the possible Swedish membership. My presentation will naturally focus on the economic aspects of EMU, but let me nevertheless emphasize that I personally think that the political arguments for European cooperation remain crucial, especially at times when nationalism is on the rise on our continent.

Caleb M Fundanga: Growth and development of the Zambian economy Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of the Standard Chartered Bank Plc, Livingstone, 7 January 2009. *  *  *  The Deputy Minister of Southern Province, Hon Daniel Munkombwe; The Standard Chartered Bank – Acting Managing Director, Mr. Robin Bairstow Members of the Press; Distinguished Guests; Ladies and Gentlemen Allow me to begin by thanking Mr Bairstow and his Colleagues for inviting me to this occasion which marks the official opening of the Standard Chartered Bank Plc , Livingstone Falls Park Agency. I congratulate Standard Chartered Bank Plc for yet another milestone achievement. Hon. Minister, I have stated at various fora that it is important for banks in Zambia to take actions which support the growth and development of our economy. We need banks to open new branches, such as this one, to increase the convenience for our people to access banking services; thereby increasing the efficiency of our economy and empowering our citizens. In particular, I have been encouraging banks to expand their services to areas with vast economic potential like Livingstone, which represents a Win-Win situation for both the bank and the City. I am glad that, although, Standard Chartered Bank already has an established branch in Livingstone, it has chosen to expand its services to other areas of the City in order to bring its products and services to the customer’s door step.
Jarle Bergo: Projections, uncertainty and choice of interest rate assumption in monetary policy Speech by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Foreign Exchange Seminar of the Association of Norwegian Economists, Sanderstølen, 27 January 2006. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The speech does not contain new assessments of the economic situation or of current interest rate setting. *  *  *  Introduction First of all, I would like to thank you for inviting me to this seminar. Participants at this and other seminars have occasionally shown some interest in Norges Bank’s views on future interest rate developments. For a long period, our analyses were based on the assumption that the interest rate would move in line with market expectations, and the discussion was usually about whether the bank agreed with this interest rate outlook or had a different interest rate path in mind. In Inflation Report 3/05, projections were based on the Bank’s own projected path for future interest rates for the first time. In other words, from using technical assumptions and others’ assessments of our future monetary stance, we have now in a sense “assumed ownership” ourselves of the interest rate path in our projections. This seminar would therefore seem to give me an appropriate opportunity to provide some background on this issue and on the assessments underlying our forecasting.

Forecasts for inflation, output, the interest rate and other variables are based on an assessment of the current situation and a perception of how the economy functions. Disturbances to the economy may result in changes in the forecasts. Our ambition must be to reduce uncertainty with regard to our own response pattern. That actual interest rate developments will deviate somewhat from Norges Bank's forecast must be expected to be the rule rather than the exception. There is, in other words, substantial uncertainty associated with future interest rates. I would draw your attention to the fact that the Executive Board, when providing a more precise indication of where the interest rate level should lie over the coming four month period, operates with an interval of around one percentage point. Uncertainty does not of course diminish as we look further ahead. This is a familiar situation for financial market participants, who are constantly changing their expectations concerning future interest rates as the economy is exposed to disturbances. Market participants’ interest rate expectations can be calculated on the basis of observed money market rates. The deviation between market expectations and the actual interest rate has been substantial in periods. One important reason for this is that the Norwegian economy has been exposed to  7  For more about these criteria, see Qvigstad, J.F.Q. (2005): “When does an interest rate path “look good”? Criteria for an appropriate future interest rate path - A practician’s approach”, Staff Memo 2005/6, Norges Bank, se www.norges-bank.no.