samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Chart: Long-term yields and term premiums In addition, the central banks’ purchases have pushed up prices for government bonds and pushed down yields. Term premiums on government bonds have fallen. While 10-year government bond yields in the US and UK are now at around 2 percent, German yields are as low as less than 1 percent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart: Credit premiums and equity prices Another important transmission channel into the economy is the portfolio rebalancing channel. Investors selling government bonds are left with a more liquid portfolio, which they then seek to invest in other financial assets. Prices for a number of securities have risen, and yields on bonds issued by banks and other enterprises have fallen. Premiums on covered bonds, for example, have fallen back to the very low levels prevailing in the pre-crisis period. A fourth transmission channel operates via global financial markets. Cross-border capital movements as a result of portfolio rebalancing have generated exchange rate fluctuations. Unconventional monetary policy can contribute to a depreciation of the domestic currency, providing a positive extra effect of the policy in the short term. However, the effect diminishes when a number of countries implement quantitative easing and policy rate cuts in parallel. Exchange rate movements may then quickly reverse. Increased volatility creates an environment of uncertainty. Capital inflows and a stronger exchange rate have at the same time created challenges in other countries, not least in some emerging economies.

Market scepticism has diminished with the growing realization that the European Central Bank will in fact be rigorous in pursuit of its mandate of maintaining effective price stability throughout the euro area as a whole - that the euro will in fact be soundly managed. And at the same time domestic demand growth and economic activity have started to pick up in the core European countries, causing the euro-currencies collectively to strengthen in the foreign exchange market and helpfully easing some of the cyclical tensions that might otherwise have complicated the move to a single monetary policy. All this is now overlaid by the successive financial shocks to the global economy from Asia, from Russia, and most recently from the need to rescue Long-Term Capital Management Fund (LTCM). In practice the euro currencies have been remarkably stable in relation to each other in the face of these shocks - demonstrating the market’s total conviction, in the words of one market participant recently that “the euro is a done deal”. The euro area has in fact been a zone of stability in turbulent currency markets - and that performance puts in proper perspective earlier excited talk about spectators waiting to rip the euro apart. That never was in my view a serious issue, given the political commitment to the process - the economic issue has, as I say, been about the sort of regional tensions that might subsequently emerge.
10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Table 2 International scenario assumptions 2013  2014 (f)  Jun.14 Report  Sep.14 Report  Dec.14 Report  Growth  2015 (f)  Jun.14 Report  Sep.14 Report  Dec.14 Report  2016 (f)  Sep.14 Report  Dec.14 Report  (annual change, percent)  Trading partners' GDP  3.5  3.6  3.4  3.2  3.9  3.8  3.5  3.9  3.9  World GDP at PPP  3.1  3.3  3.2  3.2  3.7  3.7  3.5  4.1  3.9  United States Eurozone Japan China India Rest of Asia (excl. Japan, China and Ind Latin America (excl. Chile)  2.2 -0.4 1.6 7.7 5.0 3.9 2.3  2.4 1.0 1.6 7.3 5.4 4.1 2.0  2.1 0.8 1.0 7.3 5.4 4.0 1.7  2.3 0.8 0.3 7.4 5.6 3.6 1.1  3.1 1.7 1.0 7.2 6.2 4.4 3.0  3.0 1.7 1.5 7.2 6.2 4.5 2.6  3.0 1.0 1.3 7.1 6.3 4.3 1.9  3.2 1.8 1.2 7.0 6.5 4.8 3.3  3.1 1.5 1.4 6.9 6.5 4.8 3.0  LME copper price $ Brent oil price $  332 109  310 108  315 106  311 99  (levels) 290 103  305 104  295 70  300 101  285 75  Terms of trade  -3.2  -0.5  0.0  -1.1  1.7  -0.5  -2.1  (annual change, percent) -1.5  -0.8  (f) Forecast.

This, considering that few bank credit operations are performed at rates higher than 41 and 39 percent, the actual TMC levels for the third quarter in operations between UF 0 and UF50, and between UF 50 and UF 200, respectively. Still, such provisions regarding the TMC are still in the process of being implemented, so future reductions  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  are expected, which might have a greater impact because of the significant number of operations that are performed with interest rates in the 35 to 40 percent range (figure 13). Bank financial indicators are sound and stress tests show that capital levels are adequate to confront a severe stress episode (figure 14). Although bank profitability has increased lately, this was boosted by the temporary effect of higher inflation. The interest rate spread has been stable over 2014 and continues to be the main contributor to the banking system’s profits. The impact of the stress scenario involves a drop in profits similar to the one in the previous IEF, but as the initial profitability was better the banks can obtain a positive closing ROE in this scenario. Bond issues, locally and abroad, have helped to diversify the banks’ funding sources (figure 15). Lower funding costs have favored debt issues locally and abroad, increasing the duration of liabilities. Some banks operate with high dependence on wholesale sources, which can be a significant vulnerability if these investors change their portfolio decisions or flows become more volatile.
Throughout the single market, there will be the same visibility of all prices, thus permitting immediate price comparisons, cost comparisons and therefore fostering competition in all markets. My conclusion on this point is that the single currency will not prevent Europe from embarking on eliminating economic rigidities, inducing market flexibilities and generating measures to cope efficiently and successfully with global competition. On the contrary, the single currency endeavour will help foster the structural reforms that are needed in Europe to improve growth prospects and job creation and counter unemployment. The second and third criticisms are based upon the argument that the Europeans will not set up an optimum currency area like the US because of the absence of a federal government and a federal budget and therefore that there is no possibility of ensuring an appropriate consolidated fiscal policy and ensuring shock absorption through automatic stabilizing transfers. In my eyes, the Maastricht Treaty gives a pertinent response to these pertinent questions. The thrust of the spirit and of the letter of the Treaty is that everything is done to construct the euro area as an optimum currency area. First by ensuring that it incorporates economies that have already proved being convergent in the fiscal field as well as in the monetary and financial fields. This is why the so-called five Maastricht criteria are important.

Indeed: - Franco-German monetary cooperation is based on solid foundations and has steadily developed during the last fifty years (1) - this cooperation will be crowned by the creation of monetary union in 1999 (2). FRANCO-GERMAN MONETARY COOPERATION IS BASED ON SOLID FOUNDATIONS AND HAS STEADILY DEVELOPED DURING THE LAST FIFTY YEARS In order not to bother you by an unduly long speech, I will focus on the last fifty years only! Nevertheless, one could easily demonstrate that our respective monetary histories have been deeply linked since the Middle Ages. Indeed, Emperor Charlemagne enacted a bill creating a unit of account common to its whole empire, which enshrined most of the present territories of France and Germany. The global features of the system (in particular the subdivisions) experienced an exceptional longevity of almost 1000 years. The last fifty years constitute, however, a rather homogeneous period, during which Franco-German monetary cooperation really developed. First, it is useful to underline the solid roots and foundations of this cooperation. These foundations paved the way for the emergence of a common destiny, which is best illustrated by the creation of the EMS. This community of views and interests have been crucial in the decision to create a European monetary union and a single currency. I will first explain the solid roots and foundations on which Franco-German monetary cooperation is based Franco-German monetary cooperation is based on historical and economic foundations. The historical roots of Franco-German monetary cooperation can easily be identified.
This found that, when a business invests £ in employability-related employee volunteering, the social return is over £ for society. 27 Of course, the precise social multipliers are likely to vary, charity by charity. To give you some idea of scale, the lowest multiplier we have found from one of PBE’s studies to date is around 2.5, while the highest runs into double-figures. And while the number of studies conducted by PBE is too small to constitute a representative sample – there are around 161,000 UK charities 28 – these studies demonstrate clearly two things. First, that evaluating these social benefits is usually possible, if sometimes with difficultly and imperfectly. And second, at least in the cases we have considered so far, the social returns from the voluntary sector, and hence from volunteering, can be significant multiples of the labour input cost. Social multipliers are typically well in excess of one. Despite this, the number of charities who have actually undertaken social cost-benefit analyses is depressingly small. Research by New Philanthropy Capital in 2012 found that 25% of charities surveyed, and nearly half of those with income below £ do not measure their impact at all. Given that charities with income below £ make up roughly 80% of all general charities, this means there is a huge number whose activities are not evaluated. 29 This has all the classic symptoms of a market failure: social welfare externalities which are not being understood, much less tackled. The reason is not difficult to fathom.

This also entailed the building up of expertise in our own country, which would secure a full order book for many years ahead – not only off our own shore. The activities on the Norwegian continental shelf would provide a boost to other industries in Norway. 1  Alexander Kielland (1880): Garman & Worse (Translation by W.W. Kettlewell). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Developing a new industry and spending the associated revenues also entailed challenges. The challenges were discussed in a white paper in 1974, Report no. 25 to the Storting, entitled “The role of the petroleum industry in Norwegian society”. If room was to be provided for supplying the oil sector and for increased consumption of goods and services, other industries would have to give way. The mechanisms described in the white paper are well known. I quote: “A transfer of production and jobs between firms and industries can occur via increased domestic cost pressures.” “Labour market pressures provide increased opportunities (...) for wage earners to find higher paid jobs.” “Firms in export- or import-competing industries (...) may be forced to downscale (...).” The country was indeed braced for structural changes and the attendant costs. But the white paper made it clear that restructuring was a necessary precondition for reaping the benefits of economic growth. We now know, more than 40 years later, that the structural changes did indeed come to pass. The industry structure of our economy has changed.
Corradin S., F. Heider and M. Hoerova (2017). “On collateral: implications for financial stability and monetary policy”. ECB Working Paper Series No 2107. Cunliffe, J. (2022). Letter to the Treasury Committee, 5 October 2022. Available here  . De Nicolo, G., G. Dell’Ariccia, L. Laeven and F. Valencia. “Monetary Policy and Bank Risk Taking”. IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/09. Frazzini, A. and L. H. Pedersen (2014). “Betting against beta”. Journal of Financial Economics, 111(1), 1-25. Hauser, A. (2022). “Thirteen days in October: how central bank balance sheets can support monetary and financial stability”. Speech at the ECB’s 2022 Conference on Money Markets. Hauser, A. (2023). “Looking through a glass onion: lessons from the 2022 LDI intervention”. Speech at the Initiative on Global Markets’ Workshop on Market Dysfunction, the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Lane, P. R. (2022). “The transmission of monetary policy”. Speech at the SUERF, CGEG|COLUMBIA|SIPA, EIB, SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE conference on “EU and US Perspectives:  Page 13  New Directions for Economic Policy”, New York, 11 October. Miranda-Agrippino, S. and H. Rey. (2020), “U.S. monetary policy and the global financial cycle”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol 87, No 6, pp. 2754-2776. Smets, F. (2018). “Financial stability and monetary policy: How closely interlinked?”. International Journal of Central Banking, 35th issue (June 2014). Schnabel, I. (2021). “Asset purchases: from crisis to recovery”. Speech at the Annual Conference at Latvijas Banka on “Sustainable Economy in Times of Change”. Stein, J. C. (2013). “Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses”.

Need to address communications  Finally, to successfully address this risk with a unified front, we must develop an approach to enhanced communications around cyber threats and events, and revisit supervisory guidance in this area. Silence and fear of sharing intelligence in this area could be detrimental to efforts to address the vulnerabilities systematically. We know that breaches have occurred and will continue to occur until the industry is better equipped to be ahead of the attackers, not playing catch up. Right now we are interested in learning from these breaches and using intelligence garnered to get ahead of game. There is a lot to think about here. With all this in mind, I will end this part of my remarks with a reminder of what we see as the key components of any solution designed to address cybersecurity. It must: •  Be comprehensive, risk-based and threat-informed;  •  Be a joint effort between public and private sectors;  •  Be flexible enough to evolve as technology advances; –  Automated  –  Scalable  •  Support information sharing;  •  Leverage best practices;  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Include all in the industry – regardless of size or processes (internal systems or external providers); and  •  Delve deeper than one step below the surface. Conclusion We live in an ever-changing environment where speed and agility are of the essence.
If not managed well, cross-border differences may hamper efforts to support bilateral or regional integration, such as where local payment companies look to expand or integrate to enable crossborder connectivity. Shifting market expectations is the third key challenge, which can lead to a gap between customer demand and payment services available. Consumers today are increasingly used to on-demand services that are instant and seamless. To this end, retail payments are making good progress – increasingly, more countries have developed real-time payment infrastructure that support instant peer-to-peer (P2P) payments. However, the same experience is increasingly expected – but not necessarily delivered – for other segments, such as in consumer-to-business (C2B) and business-to-business (B2B) payments. Gaps also remain on the cross-border front in terms of speed, transparency and cost. The growing complexity and depth of global financial markets, such as in securities and derivatives markets, also has implications on large value payment systems. Financial institutions and large corporates are gradually facing more difficulties in handling multiple types of financial instruments across multiple jurisdictions and across multiple functions within their organisations. Perhaps there may be demand going forward for payment systems to support greater sophistication in user functionality, such as liquidity optimisation facilities for banks and automated treasury services for corporate clients. Keeping in mind these challenges, a few questions come to mind. First, what is the appropriate role for regulators when it comes to digital innovation in payments?

And, most important of all, central banks must strive to maintain the medium-term credibility of monetary policy, as an essential pre-condition for the stability in which both the real and financial economy can thrive. Not pretending that the world is simpler or safer than the reality is one small part of that endeavour. 23  8  See, for example, the US Brady Report, and the report of the Hong Kong Securities Review Committee, 1987.
François Villeroy de Galhau: What are the economic prospects for the euro area? Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Conference at LUISS University, Rome, 29 November 2018. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be here with you this evening at LUISS University, in the magnificent ballroom of the Villa Blanc, and I would like to extend by warmest thanks to Vice President Paola Severino. LUISS University is renowned for the high standard of its teaching and one of your illustrious former presidents, Guido Carli, who gave his name to your university, was also a signatory to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. I am here to speak to you today as a friend of Italy, a country which I hold very dear. For several years in my professional career, I made monthly visits to Rome and had the pleasure of learning your language. I am pleased to see my friend Governor Ignazio Visco here, as he is also my closest neighbour in Frankfurt: we sit next to each other on the Governing Council. I am also here as a committed European, one who is familiar both with Germany and Belgium. This commitment is also shared by Sylvie Goulard, who is here today in her capacity as Deputy Governor of the Banque de France.

The banking union represents one of the greatest achievements of European integration. Banks are now supervised at the European level, which enables risks that transcend national borders to be identified. Completing the banking union, in particular by setting up a European deposit insurance scheme, should be a priority for national governments. If we look back 40 years, it’s clear that Spain today is a more prosperous and modern country. However, we must not forget that much remains to be done. Improving the functioning of the labour market is still an outstanding issue – more than 3 million people remain unemployed, and the youth unemployment rate is still above 30%. But there are grounds for optimism. Following the collapse in GDP during the hard years of recession, Spain, supported by the European Central Bank’s measures, has reached an annual growth rate of 2.8% over the last five years, well above the European average. Spurred by the need to search for new markets during the years in which domestic demand tightened4, Spanish businesses have managed to find opportunities overseas and many are now global leaders in their sectors. Spanish society has worked very hard to return to economic growth after almost a decade marked by the crisis, and it has done so while remaining true to its commitment to Europe. 40 years ago the Spanish people voted for a better country – one that was democratic, open and modern. The 1978 constitution and the process of European integration have enabled us to make this better country a reality.
The task of explaining monetary policy and the risks to Swedish inflation prospects one to two years ahead is an important aspect of our operations and in some ways is a precondition for our ability to attain our objective of maintaining price stability in the Swedish economy. Similarly, we publish regular reports that comment on stability issues in the Swedish financial system so as to ensure a safe and efficient payment system. But sometimes the Riksbank also needs to look beyond the current monetary policy situation or conditions in the country’s banks and comment on issues of a longer-term nature. Here, the Bank may give its views on the labour market, on competition in trade and industry or on the long-term conditions for growth in the Swedish economy. In light of this, the issues relating to the Lisbon agenda are something the Riksbank has been following with great interest. Potential growth plays a key role for monetary policy Long-term potential growth in particular also plays an important role in the Riksbank’s monetary policy assessment. Economic growth essentially depends on two factors - how much we work and how productive we are. Thus, in somewhat simplified terms, we could say that it is efficiency gains and growth in the working population that enables us to increase consumption. This is what we usually refer to as the potential growth rate, that is, the rate at which the economy can generate new economic resources without giving rise to shortages or surpluses.

Most importantly, we will not accept empty shell companies. All entities in the euro area must have adequate local risk management, sufficient local staff and operational independence. All that should be self-evident. Banks which seek to permanently book all exposures back-to-back with another entity in London should change their plans. And so should banks that plan to book all exposures with a euro area entity while having their risk management somewhere else. We are aware that it is a burden for UK banks to apply for a new licence in the EU. With a view to internal models, we would aim to be accommodating regarding the timing. There will be a transitional period in which new euro area entities might use internal models that have not yet been approved by the ECB. But of course, there are conditions attached. First, the relevant models must have been approved by the UK’s Prudential Regulation Authority. We would also reflect on any comments on the quality of the models from our UK colleagues. Second, the banks must have applied for internal model approval in the euro area. The transitional period will cease as soon as we have approved or rejected the bank’s model application. Ladies and gentlemen, sound banks are at the heart of a strong economy. Banks therefore should note Walter Bagehot’s words and remain cautious. It is our job as supervisors to help them do so and steer clear of risky adventures. Thank you for your attention. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches