samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They are now used by most car buyers, including (one presumes) those who are overall savers. According to the government the majority of student loans will not be fully repaid (the ONS has recently decided that most of it should therefore be re-allocated to the government, an accounting change planned for later this year.) Taken together, car finance and student loans account for almost all the rise in households’ unsecured gearing in recent years, as currently measured. The remainder – comprising the more conventional credit card balances, consumer loans and overdrafts – is plotted in blue in Chart 5. It hasn’t grown much and is pretty much the same as it was, relative to income, in the mid-1990s. 2  You might, however, expect to see them in first differences (i.e. in the growth rate of debt), as these could help cleanse the data of enduring country-specific differences in the sustainable level of debt.

Ardian Fullani: A short overview on the latest Albanian banking system achievements Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the EBRD 2005 Annual Meeting and Business Forum, Belgrade, 22 May 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to participate in this prestigious event of the EBRD Annual Meeting and Business Forum. For this purpose, I would like to thank the organisers of this meeting who provided us such an opportunity to present our achievements and ambitions for the future. Allow me first to tackle an important issue, which within the context of this meeting, I believe, is of paramount importance. I mean by that the regional co-operation, an initiative that has been completely supported by the European Central Bank. We have already taken the first steps in this regard through establishing bilateral relationships in banking supervision with National Bank of Macedonia, Central Bank of Montenegro and Banking and Payment Authority of Kosovo. Meanwhile, we are in the process of negotiating with National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, National Bank of Serbia etc... I estimate that regional co-operation is an important forerunner of the integration process of the region with the rest of Europe; therefore I will not stop working to encourage a regional co-operation of high standards among the financial systems of Balkan countries. I hope that you share the same opinion with me, because only in this way, our region will be more credible and efficient to have its European dream.
As a result, monetary policy will have to keep short-term interest rates very low for a sustained period in order for the Committee to achieve its objectives. My view is that the neutral federal funds rate consistent with trend growth is currently very low. That’s one reason why the economy is not growing very fast despite the current accommodative stance of monetary policy. Although the neutral rate should gradually normalize over the long-run as economic fundamentals continue to improve and headwinds abate, this process will likely take many years. In the meantime, the federal funds rate level consistent with the Committee’s objectives of maximum sustainable employment in the context of price stability will likely be well below the long-run level. Fixed-rate, full allotment overnight reverse repo facility Before I conclude, I want to discuss a new tool that the Open Market Trading Desk (the Desk) at the New York Fed will be testing and developing in coming months. The new tool is a fixed-rate, full-allotment overnight reverse repo facility that would be available to a broad range of counterparties – not just open to the primary dealers through which we have historically conducted our open market operations.5 By being available to a much broader array of counterparties, this should allow the Fed to tighten its control over money market rates. I’ll first explain in plain English what this facility is. Then I’ll explain why we are testing it and what having such a facility in place might accomplish.

Second, the fact that the degree of  1  This number refers to the change in the high-employment budget deficit for fiscal year 2013 as estimated by the CBO in March. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  restraint lessens next fiscal year could understate the actual impact on the economy because the full impact of some of this year’s cuts may not yet have been fully felt. For example, consider university research spending that depends, in part, on federal grants. As the grant budget falls under sequestration, this will eventually squeeze university budgets over time and likely lead to additional belt-tightening. Next, let’s take a deeper look at how the major sectors of the private economy that might play a role in the strengthening story are doing currently: consumption, housing, business investment and trade. When we’re done, I think you’ll agree that there still are some reasons for caution. Turning first to consumer spending, such spending has remained fairly subdued outside of interest rate-sensitive consumer durables. In July, for example, real personal consumption expenditures were flat, and it is unlikely that third quarter consumption growth will be much above a 2 percent annual rate. Moreover, the drivers of consumer spending do not look particularly supportive. In particular, real disposable income growth has grown at less than a 1 percent annual pace since March. Furthermore, the recent data do not yet clearly indicate a firming in the income growth rate, or the two important components of labor income growth – hours and compensation.
And if, despite all the extra protection they do fail, we need to ensure they can be “resolved” – by which I mean revived or sold or broken up or wound down – in a way that does the least damage to the economy and that does not require taxpayer bailouts. We are now close to the agreement of an international standard requiring systemic banks to hold a set amount of debt in a form that can be readily “bailed-in” to recapitalise and stabilise the firm if it fails, so that it can be resolved over time without doing wider damage. Macroprudential policy is about more than banks. Other parts of the financial system can drive up booms and amplify busts. Derivatives traded between financial firms acted as an amplifier of the crisis when their values changed very quickly and the firms did not have the resources to compensate each other for the change. We are now shifting bilaterally traded derivatives onto central counterparties where there is better identification and protection against the risks of sudden changes in value. Similarly, minimum standards on lending 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  against securities, another amplifier in the crisis, are being introduced to reduce the impact on firms when the value of those securities changes quickly. Seven years on from the crisis, the contours of the new regulatory framework are clear and in the main agreed; we are well into the implementation of many of its main standards.

Page 25 of 27  Table 3 Structural parameters Long-term copper price  Long-term oil price (dollars per barrel)  (dollars per pound)  Trend non-mining GDP next 10 years  Nominal neutral MPR (percent)  Technical mínimum MPR (percent)  (annual change, percent)  Dec-15/Mar-21  Dec-15/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jun-19/Mar-21  Jul-09/Mar-21  2.7  70  3.25-3.75  3.75-4.25  0.5  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  June 2021  3.3  60  2.4-3.4  3.25-3.75  0.5  Source: Central Bank of Chile. ***  Page 26 of 27
Once the terms of the bail-in are finalised, conversion ratios for the CEs into shares will be established and CE holders will be able to exercise their rights under the CEs resulting in legal title and voting rights being transferred to those bailed in bondholders entitled to compensation. In order to receive legal title and voting rights to the shares, the CE holders are required to provide evidence of their underlying beneficial ownership of the bonds, confirm that they are not acting as a controller and provide instructions for settlement. In this way beneficial ownership of the bank in resolution will stay in the private sector throughout the process. 4  e.g. BRRD article 43. 5  BRRD articles 36 and 74 and associated technical standards. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  •  Reorganisation: Finally, where a firm has been stabilised through a bail-in, this must be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring plan. Bail-in is – explicitly – a prelude to reorganisation and the stability that it creates buys the time to achieve this 6. How much time is required will depend on the options available and how easily and quickly they may be implemented but it is essential to address directly the causes of failure and to restore market confidence so that the firm can access funding and operate normally.

The development of fully unified European instant payment systems, integrated capital markets, and the possible creation of a safe euro-denominated asset should among others contribute to the international expansion of the euro. ** At this critical time, let me conclude with verses from Othello: “To mourn a mischief that is past and gone is the next way to draw new mischief on”. In modern English it means: “when you lament something bad that’s already happened, you’re setting yourself up for more bad news.” Making the best of such a misfortune as Brexit is the surest way to overcome it. Our collective response to Brexit should be the further integration of Europe: if we remained mired in technical nit-picking with self-satisfaction in some quarters and attacks from others, and distrust on all sides, we would not only have missed an opportunity, we would, collectively, have failed in our duty. Thank you for your attention. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
So for many reasons, I focus my attention primarily on how we are progressing and expect to progress relative to our dual mandate objectives. In this context, simple policy rules are an input, but my judgment also is informed by the economic environment and what we learn about the responsiveness of the economy to monetary policy. Nevertheless, it is possible to translate my assessments into a language that would be more familiar to those who think in terms of a Taylor-type rule. Recall that in a Taylor Rule framework, five major parameters can be adjusted:   The inflation objective and the estimated output gap.   Different weights can be placed on deviations of output relative to its potential and inflation relative to the Fed’s objective.   The estimate for the neutral real short-term rate of interest. Thus, while the Taylor Rule generally is viewed as a fixed formula, its underlying framework is sufficiently flexible that such a rule could be modified to reflect certain types of new information. What values should we use? In the United States, the inflation objective is well specified – a 2 percent annual rate for the personal consumption expenditures deflator.6 The FOMC has formally committed itself to this objective. In contrast, there is disagreement among FOMC participants about how far the U.S. economy is operating from potential. Our staff forecast at the New York Federal Reserve estimates that the long-term unemployment rate is about 5 percent.

As is well known, the long lags of policy creates a need for central banks to “take the punch bowl away when the party gets going”. Given the longer duration of financial cycles, the need to act well before the risks become obvious may mean that central banks will have to “take the punch bowl away even before the party gets started”. But that is a political economy challenge that needs to be resolved and managed through careful redesign of central bank mandates. Heed must be paid also to institutional arrangements, especially for central banks where the financial supervision authority lies with another body as coordination will be harder. This will take time. But the risks to financial stability is immediate. In the interim, central banks may need to interpret their mandates more flexibly and avoid overly narrow and zealous interpretations of price stability. Inflation targets need to be implemented flexibly and over longer horizons. All the while explaining clearly and consistently the logic of policy. In doing so, it should be stressed that fundamentally, macroeconomic and financial stability are two sides of the same coin. Macroeconomic trajectories cannot be sustainable 9  if the financial sphere is out of equilibrium. And the avoidance of financial boom-bust cycles leads to better economic outcomes over the long run. The perceived trade-off between growth, inflation, and financial stability, therefore, is to a large extent an artifact of the short horizon focus of policy.
But, some of this was also due to the lack of transparency about certain markets – the OTC derivatives market for credit default swaps is one notable example. Fourth, an inappropriate structure of incentives encouraged excessive risk-taking. This was evident within firms in the form of “the trader’s option”, in which compensation was based mainly on fiscal year results with no clawback when mark-to-market profits on illiquid securities and other assets turned into losses. It was also evident in the ability of the largest firms to benefit in terms of their funding costs via a perception that they would be “too big to fail”. BIS Review 131/2010  1  Fifth, regulators and market participants did not appreciate how the financial system was interconnected so that shocks were transmitted broadly through the financial system, often intensifying rather than dampening as they spread. The severe economic costs generated by the crisis indicate that the primary goal must be to reduce the likelihood and the severity of future financial crises. To accomplish this, we need a financial system that is better suited to withstand shocks of all kinds, regardless of their source. We need a financial system in which market participants face the appropriate set of economic incentives so that they do not take excessive risks, but instead behave in ways that generate outcomes that are supportive to economic growth and ongoing financial stability.

Third, higher bank lending spreads almost certainly will push some activity into the capital markets, constraining the magnitude of the rise in total lending costs. Finally, banks may be forced via competitive pressures to lower their compensation levels. By cutting compensation costs, banks could have smaller lending margins and still earn sufficient profits to generate a level of returns necessary to attract capital. Given all the potential margins for adjustment, there are good reasons to expect that the increase in lending margins will actually turn out to be quite modest. Although any increase will be a real cost, this appears to be a necessary and appropriate price to pay for a much more resilient financial system. The cost represented by higher lending spreads has to be weighed against the benefits of a more robust and resilient banking system. Recent years have surely taught us that easy access to credit that is underpriced because it is not backed by sufficient capital is not a sustainable route to prosperity. Indeed, to the extent that tougher standards reduce the misallocation of resources in the real economy that often accompanies periods of financial excess, ensure more consistent access to finance over time and encourage investment by holding out the prospect of greater economic stability, the new standards could be consistent with a more rapid sustainable growth rate over the long run.
The problems Europe is facing – terrorism, security, the refugee crisis, but also growth and employment – are problems that we have to overcome together, and if each government turns inwards to focus on national interests and preparing for elections, there will be no more capacity for acting as one. And at the same time, Donald Trump is setting an example, a bad example, and the United States will become inward-looking as well. Geopolitical risk – the risk of a change in the international balance of power – is another risk 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Europe will have to face next year. Benoît Cœuré, should the whole of Europe be worried about a banking crisis? Because among the uncertainties, and even though we were told that the banks were sound, we’re hearing that Deutsche Bank has problems, that Portuguese and Italian banks are struggling, and that certain banks have to be recapitalised. What do you say to that? I don’t believe there will be a banking crisis, but I do think that European banks have profitability problems and that there are too many banks in Europe, so reforms are needed. In other words, some banks have to go. Yes, but that’s an issue for the banks themselves. Solutions must come, first and foremost, from the private sector – banks are commercial enterprises and public money won’t resolve the issue. So banks will disappear, but not in France. Just to reassure us, how are the banks doing?

Caleb M Fundanga: Fourth quarter 2010 media briefing Presented by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 18 February 2011. *  *  *  Executive summary 1. This brief examines monetary policy implementation and its outcomes in the fourth quarter of 2010. The brief also reviews other economic and financial sector developments, and concludes with an inflation outlook for the first quarter of 2011. Monetary policy 2. The focus of monetary policy during the fourth quarter of 2010 continued to be the achievement of the end-year annual inflation target of 8.0%. In this regard, the Bank of Zambia utilised largely Open Market Operations to maintain reserve money within the programmed growth path. This was supported by the auctioning of Government securities. Inflation 3. Quarterly overall inflation increased to 2.5% in December 2010 from 1.6% in the third quarter, and was above the 2.3% recorded in December 2009. This outturn was mainly attributed to the rise in food inflation to 3.6% from –0.1% in the previous quarter, as non-food inflation slowed down to 1.5% from 3.2% during the same period. 4. Similarly, the annual overall inflation rate rose to 7.9% in December 2010 from 7.7% in September 2010, but was in line with the end-year target of 8.0%. This outturn was largely on account of the rise in annual food inflation to 4.4% from 2.8% in September 2010, as annual non-food Inflation decreased to 11.3% from 12.5% during the same period. 5.
When used in connection with these products, the Internet no longer acts solely as an access device to communicate payment information to merchants and banks. Instead, the transfer of “value” over the Internet will become, for all practical purposes, the modern day equivalent of tendering currency in satisfaction of a debt. While private electronic money will not have “legal tender” status, electronic money issuers will use private contractual relationships to effect discharge of their obligations. “Electronic money” is essentially the re-emergence in the United States of privately-issued currency, the value of which depends on the financial health of the issuer. Because electronic value is simply a promise of the issuer to pay on demand, the question arises as to whether the issuance of electronic value should be limited to banks and other supervised institutions. In the United BIS Review 26/1998  -3States, banks have been intricately linked to the payments system and, as a result, are subject to unique regulatory burdens such as reserve requirements, deposit insurance premiums, and extensive supervision. Some argue that the safety and soundness of the payments system require limiting the issuance of electronic money to banks. In fact, some foreign jurisdictions, such as Japan and the European Union, have limited the issuance of electronic currency to banks or credit institutions in EU parlance. Unlike Europe and Japan, however, the United States is, at least for the time being, remaining silent on the issue of nonbank issuance of electronic money.

Because of the use of the hash function, a digital signature allows the receiver of a message to determine whether the message has been altered since it was digitally signed. State legislation in this area tends to address either electronic signatures (23 states) or digital signatures (16 states), but not both. States with legislation on electronic signatures differ on the question of what qualifies as an electronic signature. Several states have taken the UCC Article 1 approach and recognize any form of electronic mark intended to serve as an electronic signature. Other states, however, require that several conditions be met before an electronic signature will be legally enforceable. Generally, for these states, in order for an electronic signature to be effective it must: (1) be unique to the person using it; (2) be capable of verification; (3) be under the sole control of the person using it; (4) be linked to the data in such a manner that if the data is changed the signature is invalidated; and (5) conform to regulations adopted by the Secretary of State. Digital signature statutes typically provide for the promulgation of regulations governing the implementation and use of a digital signature infrastructure. The digital signature infrastructure contemplated by these statutes involves a trusted third party, usually a certification authority or CA, whose job is to confirm that the private key used by a sender to sign an electronic message is in fact the private key of the purported sender.