samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It took the British over four decades to lift the capital controls that were imposed partly for this reason. The most usual way to describe the problem is to consider the capital that is likely to seek an exit as soon as the controls are lifted. This includes the failed banks’ estates, the potentially volatile ISK assets held by non-residents – usually called offshore krónur – and possible outflows from Icelandic residents as well. In this context, we are best equipped to predict what would happen if the controls were lifted from the estates without any mitigating measures, as we have mapped out the estates in infinitesimal detail. There is greater uncertainty about the offshore krónur. Following the Bank’s foreign currency auctions in the past few years, some of the remaining capital could be held by patient investors, as some of the parties behind it swear faithfully that it is. But it is safer to verify and secure this before we open the exit doors wide, and there are ways to do it. The greatest uncertainty centres on potential outflows from residents. To a degree, it is possible to estimate resident investors’ need to increase the share of foreign assets in their portfolios, but naturally, they may undertake such foreign investments at varying tempos. The most important factor either way is the level of confidence in Iceland and its financial system at the time the controls are lifted, which is obviously an unknown at this point.

Well, returning for a moment to our earlier discussion. The owners, now in the form of hundreds of thousands of shareholders, have only limited “skin in the game”. Their personal or family wealth, outside of their bank shares, is not at stake if the bank fails and they can now in most cases exit from their shareholdings swiftly through trading on a stock exchange. So their perspectives can now be much shorter-term and, as they alone benefit from increases in a firm’s “value”, they may actually favour greater risk-taking to maximise share price valuation in that shorter-term. This “short-termism” mindset is more pronounced amongst some asset managers and hedge funds, which in recent years would appear to have accumulated increasing amounts of bank shares and become more proactive in  3  Capitalist Fools. Joseph E Stiglitz January 2009 (The Great Hangover: 21 Tales of the New Recession from the Pages of Vanity Fair). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  exerting pressure on bank management. As these asset managers are themselves rewarded on the basis of the annual valuation of their funds’ holdings, including the bank shares, they have every incentive to push the banks to achieve higher profitability. So board directors and senior management were, and still are, under constant pressure to pursue higher RoEs. It is not difficult to see why capital raising, which improves the resilience of banks, is often rejected or delayed as it is negative for share prices in the short term. The result?
As to reinforcing institutions’ solvency, mention may be made of the July 2010 savings bank reform (Decree-Law 11/2010 of 9 July 2010) which, among other measures, sought to ease their access to capital markets through the issuance of equity units with voting rights, or the pursuit of activity through a bank, separating banking activity from the Foundations that could control the savings banks; and the February 2011 Royal Decree-Law to reinforce the financial system, which included new solvency requirements in line with the standards of the revised Basel II Accord, stealing a march on the European Directive. Among other aspects, the legislation introduced greater capital requirements and more demanding definitions for their various components, along with stricter definitions for risk-weighted assets. 7/14  Moreover, in June 2010, the Banco de España reinforced accounting requirements with a view to increasing coverage more swiftly through provisions for non-performing assets. As a result of these measures, deposit institutions’ overall solvency ratio increased from December 2007 to December 2011 from 10.6% 212.2%. At end-2011, the volume of provisioning set aside by our banking system and savings banks as a whole exceeded € billion (13% of GDP). This strategy was greatly affected and indeed interrupted in 2012, with the euro area crisis. The crisis saw various periods of tension, the result of the interaction between sovereign, banking and macroeconomic risks.

This meant that, for example, the differences in the risk premia applied to the various issuers of government debt disappeared. It was thought – and this was a widely held viewpoint – that membership of the Monetary Union would reduce the risk linked to current account deficits, because they could be financed within the Union in light of the free movement of capital. This approach, which would be proven to be mistaken with the crisis, led, among other things, to the risk associated with our economy’s growing external debt not being properly estimated. As regards demographic growth, the population rose by around 5,000,000 between 2000 and 2007, an unprecedented increase in such a short period since population series have existed in Spain, i.e. since the mid-18th century. Almost 90% of this population increase was attributable to net immigrant inflows, most of whom adults, which fuelled the growth of the real estate sector by means of both a permanent increase in the demand for housing and, on the supply side, by providing the labour that helped the construction sector expand.
We are collaborating with the Bank of Thailand to explore the potential of a blockchain-based Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) network, with a view towards more efficient crossborder payments. 35. We have already developed a Proof-of-Concept prototype that enables real-time crossborder funds transfers on a peer-to-peer basis. In the next phase, we are exploring business use cases such as cross-border trade settlement and capital market transactions. We will soon bring banks and large corporates into trials to test the network using actual trade transactions. 36. Looking into the future, further studies will be undertaken to extend the architecture to a 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  multi-CBDC platform. Leveraging the wholesale-CBDCs on this platform, e-wallet service providers may be able to offer retail use cases such as remittances and cross-border payments for travelers within the region. We hope this initiative can provide the market with efficient, cost-effective, and transparent cross-border payments services. 37. Together, the CDI and CBDC initiatives show the HKMA’s commitment to delivering on our market development mandate. They are live examples of our focus on applying technology to achieve better banking. We believe they hold great potential for bank customers in Hong Kong – and for innovators like you. Concluding remarks 38. I said earlier that the principles of service, trust, and capital management are timeless and core to good banking. I hope that what you will take away from my remarks today is that the HKMA is committed to creating a healthy fintech ecosystem to enhance these principles.

The few examples that I have just described show how research on macro modeling and forecasting is important for our work. We are well aware that there will always be ample room for improvement in our toolbox, and we are fortunate to have such prominent speakers with us here today. This workshop is a great opportunity for us to become familiar with recent advances in Bayesian econometrics. In addition to the pleasure of the scholarly discourse, I also hope you will have the opportunity to enjoy Oslo. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Developments in price level and inflation with a price level target and inflation target Price level  114  Price level target Price level with price level target  114  114  Price level  114  Price level target Price level with inflation target  112  112  112  110  110  110  110  108  108  108  108  106  106  106  106  104  104  104  104  102  102  102  102  100  100  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  112  100  0  12  24  36  48  60  Inflation  4  1  0  Inflation target Inflation with price level target 0  12  24  36  48  60  0  0  0  12  24  36  48  60  Inflation  100  4  1 Inflation target Inflation with inflation target 0  12  24  36  48  60  0  Note. Constructed example. Vertical axis measures index value (price level) and per cent (inflation). Horizontal axis measures number of months. Source: Andersson, B. and C. A. Claussen (2017), “Alternatives to inflation targeting”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2017:1  Figure 8.

What I have in mind here is a strategy that is usually termed “lower-for-longer” or “makeup strategy” and which has been advocated by the previous chairman of the Federal Reserve (the US central bank) Janet Yellen. 8 The idea is pretty straightforward. Let us assume that the central bank in a recession has cut its policy rate as far as it considers to be possible. Exactly how low the interest rate can be set is not obvious and the assessments vary from country to country. The Federal Reserve usually regards zero as the lower bound and talks about the “zero lower bound”, while in Sweden and other countries, which have cut their policy rates below zero, we talk about the “effective lower bound”. For the sake of simplicity I will from now on refer to this simply as the “lower bound” for the policy rate. Let us now assume that the central bank would actually have needed to cut the policy rate lower than the lower bound for monetary policy to become sufficiently expansionary. To compensate for not being able to do this, the central bank can instead hold the policy rate at the lower bound for a longer period of time (see Figure 4). 9 Seen in a slightly longer perspective, for instance a ten-year period, this should give roughly the same average policy rate as if one had been able to cut the rate below the lower bound.
To conclude, let me just stress that it is not clear to me what is going to be the future of the crypto ecosystem and the shape that the financial landscape will eventually take as a result. Market forces will decide. But what is clear to me is that, for the crypto ecosystem to overcome the confidence crisis it is currently facing, and to develop on a sustainable basis, a confidence prone regulatory and supervisory framework is needed. Central banks have an important role to play in helping develop that framework, and in facilitating a very much needed convergent and coordinated framework at the international level. Thank you for your attention. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

The ECB thus decided to develop a benchmark rate: a new daily euro short-term rate, also known as ESTER. This rate will complement existing rates by the private sector and serve as a backstop to them. The ECB will start publishing ESTER by October 2019. This project will entail significant challenges. Every working day, we will need to produce a reliable rate, based on individual transactions. This will need to happen within a very narrow time frame, while ensuring full quality control. Leadership Ladies and gentlemen, I have talked a lot about past achievements and future challenges. And I have talked about the need to work together as a team. But, of course, all good teams need good leaders. And speaking of good leaders brings me to Aurel Schubert. As Aurel is due to retire soon, I would like to take the opportunity tonight to say a few words about what he has done for this institution. For eight years now, he has steered the ECB statistics ship with great competence. Aurel has made invaluable contributions to some of our most ambitious projects: the granular Securities Holdings Statistics, the MMSR and Anacredit. Thanks to his leadership, supervisory statistics were available from the start of European banking supervision. He helped amend our statistical legal framework to align it with international standards. But, of course, his career started long before he became Director General of Statistics. He has worked in the field since 1997.
However, organisations which have been taking preventative approaches to combat cybersecurity threats are coming to realise that this strategy have not always been successful in blocking malicious attacks. A paradigm shift is required to move from the ‘old ways’ of trying to prevent every threat. Organisations need to emphasize on detecting and responding to malicious behaviors and incidents, because even the best preventative controls will not prevent all incidents. There is just no such thing as perfect protection. As there are more and more innovative financial inclusion initiatives coming on-board, we will all need to continually reassess how much risk and controls are appropriate. The disparity between the speed of compromise and the speed of detection is one of the starkest failures discovered in breach investigations. According to a 2015 report by Mandiant, the average targeted malware compromise was present for 205 days before detection. The longest malware presence was 2982 days, and 69% were actually discovered by external parties and not internal IT security functions. Additionally, the 2015 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report highlighted that, “in 60% of cases, attackers are able to compromise an organization within minutes." In this digital world, the pace of change and innovation is already too fast to anticipate and, combined with advanced and persistent attacks, it will be impossible to defend against every type of cyber-attack. Organisations must invest in technical, procedural and human capabilities to detect when a compromise occurs.

Had there been one, the Northern Rock recovery plan should have challenged the management and the Board on how its business model could adapt to and survive the closure of its key funding markets, given the sheer scale of its dependence on securitisation. Likewise, how could it have handled a serious stress when it had pursued a business model of aggressively taking market share by squeezing its net interest margin and accepting more borrower default risk? And then moving further into the guts of the bank, how would it deal with stress to a funding model where the bank was excessively dependent on cash deposits from the securitisation master trust but with a hard rating agency trigger linking that funding to the position of the bank, thus creating a severe amplification of any stress? Finally on Northern Rock, how would the bank deal with a funding stress when it was having to encumber such a high proportion of its good quality assets in order to over-collateralise its securitisation master trust? A very good example of the need for resolution plans is the case of Lehmans in Europe. Two questions are relevant here: what should the resolution plan have contained; and what changes to its organisation and operations might have made the massive task of dealing with Lehmans more straightforward? You will, I hope, appreciate that I can only scratch the surface of the Lehmans case in the time available so I apologise for the laundry list approach.
William C Dudley: Key developments in the tri-party repo market Introductory remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Workshop on “Fire Sales” as a Driver of Systemic Risk in Tri-Party Repo and Other Secured Funding Markets, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City, 4 October 2013. *  *  *  Good morning. I am pleased to have the opportunity to open this workshop and discuss key developments in the tri-party repo market. In my remarks, I would like to give a brief overview of some of the problems that surfaced in this market during the financial crisis of 2008, recognize the improvements that have occurred since then, and most importantly, highlight significant vulnerabilities that still persist despite the progress we have made. While we can feel proud of the enhancements that are currently underway in the tri-party repo market, today I want to underscore the fact that significant work remains to be done. The tri-party repo market constitutes a vital component of the U.S. financial system. It plays an important role in providing financing for broker-dealers that make markets in Treasury and agency securities, and is an important mechanism that supports dealer intermediation of credit. The market also provides a secure investment vehicle for those that manage large amounts of liquidity and need an investment vehicle to park these monies.

Demand for construction, household products and infrastructure will be strong for many decades. There is ample opportunity for Asian savings to find Asian investments. BIS Review 28/2003  3
In fact, the persistently high levels of inflation confirm the need for proper coordination of all policies. We at the Central Bank are firmly committed to our mandate and we will continue to conduct our monetary policy to ensure that inflation is reduced and ceases to be a burden for the Chilean people. Thank you. 9  Figure 1 Inflation indicators (1) (2) (annual change, percent)  Total CPI  21  Core CPI  Volatile CPI  15  18  Core goods w/o foods  Core services  12  15 9  12 6  9  6  3  3  0  0 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  -3  22  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  (1) Dashed vertical lines mark statistical close of March 2022 MP Report. (2) For details on groupings and shares in CPI basket, see Box IV.1 in Dec. 2019 MP Report, Carlomagno & Sansone (2019), and Economic Glossary. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 2 Structural decomposition of goods CPI w/o volatiles excl. Foods (*) (cumulative change since January 2020, percentage points)  10  Demand  8  Supply  Goods CPI w/o volatiles excl.

In a context of more contractionary monetary policies in the developed world, the prospects for world growth have fallen again. The central scenario foresees that the U.S. and the Eurozone will enter a recession in 2023. Our trading partners will thus grow 2.1% next year (2.6% in September). Commodity prices are still expected to take a downward path from their current levels. Copper will trade at average prices of $ and 3.45 in the next two years, while oil will trade around $ in the same period (figure 14). 6  Monetary policy At our monetary policy meeting yesterday, we decided to keep the benchmark rate flat at 11.25%. We also communicated that the policy rate will remain unchanged until the state of the macroeconomy gives signs that the process of inflation convergence to the 3% has been consolidated. Monetary policy has made a significant adjustment and is favoring the resolution of the imbalances still present in our economy. Nonetheless, inflation is still very high and its convergence to the target is still subject to risks. Regarding future movements of the MPR, the boundaries of the MPR corridor that we present in this Report reflect some scenarios where the pace of the process of inflationary convergence gives way to either earlier or later adjustments of the rate compared with the assumptions in the central scenario. One important factor is the assessment of inflationary persistence, which owes to either the magnitude and sign of new inflationary surprises, or to the degree of adjustment of expectations.
This means that growth in prices has generally been higher than growth in productivity. Potential rigidities in labour and product markets and, in some cases, an excessively loose macroeconomic stance may have complicated the delivery of low inflation rates. Indeed, while all countries have reduced inflation to moderate levels, the entrenchment of a low inflation environment still constitutes a challenge in many economies. 2. Importance of ensuring polices that support fast and sustainable output growth  The second aspect of convergence that I would like to highlight relates to the growth model followed by some new EU Member States. Given its lower starting point in terms of real income, it could be expected that, in a world with full financial integration, large capital inflows would flow into the region. Moreover, as people expect to be richer tomorrow than today, they may choose to smooth consumption over time by borrowing today, the more so the higher the expected gains in disposable income. A process of gradual real exchange rate appreciation, supported by strong, domestically driven output growth and temporarily accompanied by relatively large current account deficits, would seem fully in line with what the theory of convergence suggests. 1  According to Mihaljek, D. and M. Klau (2008), over the period from the mid-1990s to the first quarter of 2008, the Balassa-Samuelson effect would explain around 24% of the CEE inflation differentials vis-à-vis the euro area. For more details, see, “Catching-up an inflation in transition economies: the Balassa-Samuelson effect revisited”, BIS Working Paper.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In Zambia, although the financial sector was not adversely affected by the crisis in a direct fashion, over the period 1995–2000, the sector experienced numerous episodes of bank failures that have had adverse effects on the confidence in the financial system. A total of ten banks were closed during this period and a major weakness noted in all the failures were the weak governance structures and practices in the banks. A close examination of the failed banks identified the following weaknesses which were common in most of them; large credit exposures, lending to connected parties, poor or absence of a credit policy, incompetent management coupled with ineffective boards, foreign exchange exposures and an absence of or inadequate risk management frameworks. In other banks, the board chairman was also the majority shareholder and the chief executive of the bank. Such basic risk management failures, to a large extent reflect a breakdown in corporate governance. Chairperson, you may wish to note that the Zambian Banking system is stronger and properly regulated today than it was in the 1990s. The Bank of Zambia has been periodically reviewing the Banking and Financial Services Act (BFSA) to bring it up to date with international standards and current global practices. One of the areas the Banks has continued to strengthen is the corporate governance provisions to ensure that the board of directors and senior management of banks and financial institutions conduct the affairs of their institutions prudently.