samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Comments at the Institute of Regulation & Risk, Hong Kong, 30 March 2010. IMF 2011: Global Financial Stability Report 2011. Grappling with Crisis Legacies. Swiss National Bank 2012: Implementing the countercyclical capital buffer in Switzerland. Concretising the Swiss National Bank’s role. Fact sheet, June 2012. White, William 2009: Should Monetary Policy “Lean or Clean?” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper No. 34. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15

It is important, but especially if you have been tied to the euro for a very long period of time. It is of crucial importance that a country’s economic policy mix as a whole is credible and consistent. Based on our own experience, we can say that much of the impact was already felt even before formal euro accession in terms of the investment flows and in terms of the restoration of confidence. Finally, what have been some of the experience over the last more than two years? The precise impact of the adoption of the euro is very hard to determine as there were so many other things going on, most notably the global financial crisis. Future generations of economists, with the benefit of hindsight and data will be better placed than us to make a firm evaluation of costs and benefits. Nevertheless, we can point to several positive developments which appear to be related to the broader agenda of reforms and policies, including euro adoption. Most notably, the Estonian economy has successfully weathered a fragile global economy and come through the uncertainties within the euro area. Over the last few years, our export sector has led the economy to a path of relatively rapid and well-balanced growth. That has, in turn, created the scope for a still quite significant contribution from domestic demand to growth. Indicators of better balance include a much lower current account deficit, better consistency between productivity and wages and lower private sector indebtedness.
Boosting the determinants of long-run prosperity is the job of government’s structural, or supply-side policies. These government policies influence the economy’s investment in education and skills; its capacity for research and development; the quality of its core institutions, such as the rule of law; the effectiveness of its regulatory environment; the flexibility of its labour market; the intensity of competition; and its openness to trade and investment. The Chancellor’s recent Autumn Statement begins the process of rebalancing policies. While fiscal prudence will continue, the degree of fiscal drag will be reduced somewhat, and major investments in the structural drivers of productivity including R&D and strategic infrastructure are planned. 1  To be clear, these improvements in financial distributions were not explicit objectives but; but welcome outcomes. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  14  Chart 16: Productivity explains all of the shortfall of GDP; while monetary policy has offset all headwinds to it pp deviation from 1993-2007 trend 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 Headwinds 2008Q1  Monetary policy 2010Q1  2012Q1  Productivity  GDP 2014Q1  -25 2016Q1  Source: Bank Calculations. “Headwinds” include the drags on demand from deleveraging, subdued world growth, fiscal consolidation, and uncertainty. The contribution of monetary policy is computed by considering the impact on demand of maintaining Bank Rate the level prevailing immediately before the crisis. VI. Building a Globalisation that Works for All To address the deeper causes of weak growth, higher inequality and rising insecurity requires a globalisation that works for all.

On the contrary, countries that have in the past undertaken consolidation measures as part of a comprehensive reform agenda have fared best both in terms of boosting growth and sound public finances. These countries (e.g. Ireland in the late 1980s and Spain and some others in the mid-1990s) have benefited from strong supply-side effects on growth and – rather quickly – from the confidence effects of reform, which mitigated the adverse demand effects of fiscal consolidation. 15 So, given this evidence, if euro area countries are to benefit fully from the globalisation process, attaining sound public finances is a prerequisite. Concluding remarks Let me now conclude, in what is going to be my last public speech as a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank. By coincidence, – on 8 May 1998 –, just before the beginning of my mandate at the ECB , I gave a speech in Vienna at that year conference organised by the OeNB (title of the speech: Welche geldpolitische Strategie für die EZB?). I am again back in Vienna at the end of my mandate. Distinguished economists have often criticised the very concept of European Monetary Union, mainly because the Member States in question did not fulfil optimum currency area criteria, having for example a low degree of labour mobility, inflexible real wages as well as sharp differences in commodity prices and segmented financial markets.
And the Bank’s Agents have heard reports of some smaller businesses preferring to seek out non-bank alternatives for finance, including peerto-peer lending, insurance companies and investment funds to diversify their funding sources. So when assessing trends in credit supply, it is important to consider flows of lending from all sources, not just the banks. The extension to the FLS to include lending related to non-bank credit providers (including finance leasing corporations and factoring companies) recognises the importance of some of these forms of lending to SMEs. Finally, there are a number of small “challenger” banks who are successfully using the FLS to help expand and take market share from the more traditional lenders. You sometimes see the phrase “the banks are not lending to SMEs”. That is simply not true when you look into the details. The data on SME lending is not fully comprehensive nor of the best quality. But the data we do have suggest that since the launch of the Scheme, gross lending to SMEs has been around £ although repayments have been slightly higher, so the overall picture of slightly negative net lending is the difference between two much larger numbers. Within that aggregate picture there are many individual banks which have expanded their net lending to SMEs whilst others have contracted. That is partly why I have been advising business contacts to “shop around” for credit if they can.

At that time, Middle East tensions had not induced further Western military intervention and the oil price had been relatively stable, falling to around the $ mark. One could argue that central banks – and other authorities – had validated expectations. During this period from the Autumn of 2012 to the Spring of 2013, financial markets were relatively calm but periods of “risk on” were lasting for longer and leading to greater risk taking. Equities and other risky asset prices generally rose. Interest rates were low and stable at the short end and increasingly depressed at longer maturities as the FOMC maintained its asset purchase programme. The hunt for yield intensified, especially down the credit spectrum, with some investors being driven by return targets, mandates and benchmarks rather than a true reflection of risk-adjusted returns. The volatility of market prices also became compressed during this period (Chart 1). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Chart 1 Implied volatility from various asset markets 27 Feb 2009  Standard deviations from mean since 2006 USDGBP  01 May 2013 16 Jul 2013  3 2 1  Japan long rates Japan short rates  JPYUSD USDEUR  0 -1 -2  US long rates  FTSE 100  US short rates  S&P 500  UK long rates  Nikkei 225 UK short rates  Chart 2 shows a “heat map” constructed by colleagues in the Bank’s Financial Stability Directorate, showing how market functioning has changed over time based on issuance levels and spreads.
[6] Understanding the underlying structural trends that drive this balance requires a structural model. Recent research by staff at the Bank has developed a model of the world economy that brings together several key structural factors that could account for the decline in Global R*. [7] These are productivity growth, population growth, longevity, the relative price of capital, and government debt. The structural model generates a path for Global R*, as well as a decomposition of the contribution of each of these factors. Some key results of this exercise are laid out in Table 1. This includes both the baseline model simulation, and a range of alternatives that vary some key underlying parameters and assumptions. It focuses on the period since 1985, given the attention it has received in much of the existing literature. The sample ends in 2015 due to the process used to extract the underlying trends in the structural factors and the timeliness of some of the data required for the simulation. [8] Given the focus on slow-moving structural drivers, omission of the most recent data is unlikely to have a material effect on the estimate of the trend real rate. And I will come on to consider the more recent period and the potential impact of the Covid pandemic later in the speech.

This can have implications for the macroeconomy and for financial markets. As a central bank, we must adapt to the economic effects of climate change. In Norges Bank, climate risk has long been on the agenda in the management of the GPFG. For the rest of the Bank, this field of work is a more recent addition. There is still a great deal we do not know about the economic and financial consequences of climate change. That is why we are working with other central banks to build up expertise in this field. Our aim is to play a role in strengthening the resilience of the Norwegian economy to the challenges posed by climate change and climate risk. Thank you for your attention. 1 Parker, M. (2018): “The Impact of Disasters on Inflation”. Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Volume  2, Issue 1, April, pp. 21–48. 2 Regional Network 3/2019. Norges Bank. 3 Skånland, H. (1989): “Refleksjoner ved utgangen av 1980-årene” [Reflections at the end of the 1980s]. Speech  on 23 August 1989. Norges Bank. 4 Carney, M. (2019): “Remarks given during the UN Secretary General’s Climate Action Summit 2019”. Speech on  23 September 2019. Bank of England. 5 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction and Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters  (CRED) (2019): “2018: Extreme weather events affected 60 million people”. Press release, 24 January 2019. 7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
Seven Moments in Spring: Covid-19, financial markets and the Bank of England’s balance sheet operations Speech given by Andrew Hauser, Executive Director, Markets  Bloomberg, London 4 June 2020  I am grateful to Gregory Kidd for his help in writing this speech, and to Andrew Bailey, James Benford, Christine Boykiw, Ben Broadbent, Nicholas Butt, Rohan Churm, Victoria Cleland, Amber Evans, Michael Foster, Richard Gordon, Sarah Hall, Andrew Harley, Ronan Hodge, Al Hughes, Lance Jones, Adam Newell, Will Parry, Rhys Phillips, Jo Place, Eugenia Planas, Dave Ramsden and Tim Taylor for their advice, comments and guidance. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Introduction  I have always had a funny feeling about Friday the 13th – and 13 March 2020, Mark Carney’s last day in the office as Governor of the Bank of England, was no exception. Two days earlier, on Wednesday 11 March, the Bank and HM Treasury had launched an unprecedentedly comprehensive package of measures to respond to the rapidly growing economic consequences of the spread of Covid-19. Hailed globally as a shining example of how monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies could work together to reinforce one another, the combination of interest rate cuts, government spending, cheap funding and capital easing measures seemed sure to stabilise markets and restore some muchneeded confidence to households and businesses. So it cannot have been hugely welcome when, on Friday morning, with the removal vans waiting outside, I suggested the Bank’s Governors needed to meet again before the weekend.

But what is driving the growth of London in particular? One approach to this question is to ask executives in major financial companies, both in the UK and abroad, why they choose to locate business here. A number of these surveys have been conducted recently and they show several common factors. 11 London benefits from English as an international language of commerce, and from its time zone, which means the working day overlaps with Asia in the morning and America in the afternoon. London also has well established financial infrastructure and telecommunication networks. Many of those surveyed point to the regulatory and legal environment. This is partly a matter of the regulatory style – the “risk based and proportionate” approach that the Financial Services Authority has adopted based on general principles where possible. It is partly the simplicity of dealing with a single regulator. 10  Caballero, R. “On the macroeconomics of asset shortages” NBER WP 12753, December 2006. 11  For example, Cook, G. A. S., Pandit, N. R., Beaverstock, J. V., Taylor, P. J. and Pain, K. (forthcoming in 2007). “The role of location in knowledge creation and diffusion: Evidence of centripetal and centrifugal forces in the City of London financial services agglomeration”. Environment and Planning A. 4  BIS Review 29/2007  English law, which is also the basis for financial services law in the United States, prevails here, with the added advantage that practitioners are less likely actually to invoke the legal system.
The scale of the unbanked in term of numbers is still significant globally and financial inclusion as a development agenda can contribute immensely towards resolution of this matter, but it requires collective and concerted efforts among diverse group of people. According to the FINDEX 2014 data by the World Bank, 2 billion adults worldwide do not have access to financial services. The International Finance Corporation and McKinsey reports that 380 million Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises in developing countries do not have adequate access to credit. The extent of financial exclusion is still formidable. Recognising the scale and extent of financial exclusion, national authorities, regional groupings and international organisations have elevated financial inclusion as a policy priority. In Malaysia, we had decided to legislate this agenda into our statute as one of Bank Negara Malaysia’s primary functions, embedded in the Central Bank Act 2013. Recently, at the regional level, the ASEAN Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors agreed to establish a Financial Inclusion Working Committee to deliberate and coordinate efforts to enhance financial inclusion within its member countries. International organisations such as the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), the World Bank and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) are also actively developing financial inclusion knowledge, and supporting countries in implementing financial inclusion strategies globally. Over the years, we have since witnessed the rapid deployment of innovative financial inclusion solutions that have changed the lives of many.

The consequence of such a correction might be that the economy developed weakly over a long period of time. It would also have effects on inflation. It may be necessary to take these risks into account in monetary policy decisions in a different way than in the normal approach, where the forecasts for inflation and the real economy for the next two years serve as the foundation. This can be done, for instance, by beginning a phase of interest rate increases slightly earlier than would otherwise have been the case. Of course, the hope is that this will contribute to a smoother adjustment process for house prices and thereby to a more stable development of inflation and the real economy. Let me say, to round off my contribution on this subject, that there are some questions here that are still debated among central banks and within the academic world. As yet, there is no consensus as to how monetary policy should be used to manage risks related to rapidly rising house and asset prices. I would also like to emphasise that, all in all, I do not see any major differences between the Riksbank’s view and the authors’ view. The approach we have chosen has in practice only meant a marginally different timing of our interest rate decisions. Given this, the fairly strong focus in the evaluation on the Riksbank’s way of managing house prices appears slightly exaggerated, but I agree with the criticism that we should have communicated our actions more clearly.
I will mention three sets of policy responses that will inevitably have to figure in our toolkits. First, there is much sense in curtailing volatility in the exchange rate over the short-term. The costs of volatile and uncertain exchange rates are high in small open economies especially – which is what most of our ASEAN economies are. Accordingly, Malaysia, Singapore and several other Asian countries have not felt comfortable leaving their exchange rates entirely to market forces. Their central banks, within each of their monetary policy frameworks, have sought to instil a focus on longer term fundamentals. There is merit in allowing exchange rates in Asia’s emerging economies to appreciate gradually over the long term, reflecting their more rapid growth. If we resist these long term trends, we are likely to see more inflation in our economies. But some stability in the short term is wise. Second, macro-prudential policies are now an important part of the policy tool kit. Many Asian countries have introduced new macro-prudential measures to try and avoid bubbles in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  their property markets over the last two years. Malaysia brought in stricter limits on loan-to-value ratios on housing loans. Singapore and Hong Kong have done similarly, and have introduced additional stamp duties or transaction taxes to discourage speculative demand for residential properties. These targeted administrative and prudential measures are not conventional macro-economic tools.

•  I am glad there is good progress on the joint venture by Temasek Holdings and Khazanah Nasional, Pulau Indah Ventures Sdn Bhd to co-develop two separate sites in Medini. •  Other significant projects include a $ billion integrated eco-friendly tech-park by Ascendas and Malaysia’s UEM Land Berhad in Nusajaya (one of the five flagship  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  zones in Iskandar). Once completed, the park will accommodate a range of industries including electronics and precision engineering. •  Just in the last month, we have seen other significant investment commitments in Iskandar reported by Singapore companies. Iskandar Malaysia will enhance the complementary space between our two economies. It is a win-win. To ensure continued progress in Iskandar, Singapore and Malaysia will continue to take steps to improve connectivity, cross-border trade facilitation, and immigration processes. Conclusion I would like to conclude by emphasising once again that I am basically optimistic about the prospects in our bilateral and regional cooperation. We face many challenges in this post-Global Financial Crisis era. But the opportunities for us in Asia are intact, and our ability to cooperate with each other to achieve our full potential as a region is an asset for all our countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Winners from globalisation Speech given by Ben Broadbent, Deputy Governor Monetary Policy, Bank of England  Scottish Council for Development and Industry, Aberdeen 11 July 2017  I’d like to thank Will Abel, Alina Barnett, Gene Kindberg-Hanlon and Jeremy Martin along with other colleagues for their helpful comments and assistance. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Two hundred and fifty years ago, a few miles south of here, Adam Smith began working on the Wealth of Nations. It was published a decade later, in 1776. So there were (at least) two revolutions that year, one marking the birth of a country, the other the birth of modern economics. One of Smith’s main targets was the doctrine of mercantilism – the idea that international trade is a zero sum game, one you win by exporting more than your neighbour. He pointed out that, if it allows you to concentrate on things you do relatively well, and buy more cheaply the stuff that others do well, international trade can make both parties better off. A precise definition of “relatively well”, in this context, had to wait until David Ricardo’s Principles of Political Economy, published in 1817. What matters for trading patterns, he explained, was not just absolute advantage – whether a domestic sector was more productive than its peers in other countries – but also its productivity relative to other sectors at home (“comparative advantage”).

In Asia, insurance protection against natural catastrophes has not kept pace with economic development. There is a significant protection gap. Over the last 20 years, Asia has accounted for almost half the world’s economic losses from natural disasters, amounting to more than $ billion. Yet, less than 5% of economic losses in developing Asia were insured, compared to 40% in developed countries. This means governments in Asia have had to finance the cost of recovery by raising revenues, issuing debt, or relying on donations from abroad, on an ex-post basis. This is not sustainable, and comes at the cost of economic development. Insurance can and should play a bigger role to reduce the financial impact of natural disasters and improve disaster resilience. Insurance not only provides emergency relief post-disaster. More importantly, it is an ex-ante risk financing solution, as part of a comprehensive disaster 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  risk reduction strategy. Asia needs to close this natural catastrophe protection gap. Let me outline four key enablers: technology and data; product innovation; research and development; and an integrated ASEAN market. Technology and data First, technology and data. Through the use of sensors, satellites, and IoT devices, more data is being captured about the causes and impact of natural catastrophes. Big data analytics enables better quantification and pricing of risks, and helps strengthen ex-ante risk resilience measures. Take for example remote sensing. Satellites are being used to monitor rice growth patterns and anticipated yields in Vietnam, Philippines, India, Thailand and Cambodia.