samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Fed System is comprised of the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C. – a federal agency led by Chairman Ben Bernanke – plus 12 autonomous Reserve Banks that span the country. For example, the district overseen by the New York Fed includes all of New York, the 12 northern counties of New Jersey; Fairfield County, Connecticut; Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Each Reserve Bank is autonomous, with its own charter and a board of directors drawn from its district, but overseen by the Board of Governors. The law that created the Federal Reserve made us independent so we can make decisions in the national interest free from political pressure. However, the Fed is accountable to Congress. Congress has set an explicit objective for monetary policy: To pursue the highest level of employment consistent with price stability. This objective is often referred to as our “dual mandate,” because it combines two goals: high employment, and low and stable inflation. In order to promote these objectives, we also pay close attention to financial stability, because without financial stability, it is very hard to achieve our goals for jobs and inflation. The FOMC meets in Washington, D.C., eight times per year to deliberate and vote on monetary policy. As New York Fed president, I am vice chairman at these meetings and have a permanent vote. At these meetings, the 16 other members (the Board of Governors and the other Reserve Bank Presidents) and I each present our current outlook for the economy.

The TPI seeks to ensure that our monetary policy stance is transmitted smoothly across all euro area countries, a prerequisite for the ECB to be able to deliver on its mandate. The ECB’s actions over this period must be understood in light of the new monetary policy strategy approved in 2021, which establishes a symmetric medium-term inflation target of 2%. This medium-term orientation means that rather than basing our decisions on the latest inflation figure, or even the inflation that we expect for the coming quarters, we base them on our projections over a two or three-year horizon. This is because our actions affect inflation very gradually, reaching their maximum impact after about two years. Maintaining a medium-term horizon in the definition and attainment of the target is particularly important in the face of certain kinds of shocks (such as adverse supply-side shocks, which push inflation and activity in opposite directions in the short term). Needless to say, predicting inflation over a two or three-year horizon is a very challenging task. Especially in a setting as uncertain as the current one. With this in mind, we use various indicators, such as surveys of professional forecasters and financial market prices. Key data include the ECB staff projections, which, in turn, draw on a huge store of economic and monetary analysis. These projections have gradually revised medium term inflation upwards. Thus, in September the average inflation forecast for 2024 stood at 2.3%, above our target and the December 2021 projections (1.8%).
Of course, the big question now is what roles could policymakers play to support this transition. I see SMEs capacity building as one key area where the government needs to be actively involved. This includes proactive consultation and coaching, providing incentives for productivity-enhancing investments, prohibiting abuse of market dominance power by large firms, promoting digital adoption, as well as eliminating outdated laws and regulations hindering SME’s competitiveness. Although enhancing SME competitiveness might not be a direct mandate of a central bank, the Bank of Thailand has stepped up our policy focus on SMEs and worked with the banks on a number of initiatives. New digital payment platforms have been developed to lower costs of payment services, enhance payment efficiency, and provide a foundation for information-based lending and supply chain financing. A new database on system-wide SME loans by contract was set up to improve understanding of SME financing behavior and analysis of SME credit risks. We have also expanded the range of foreign exchange hedging products for SMEs and, recently, taken steps to encourage preemptive rescheduling and restructuring of SME loans to help facilitate their transition during this challenging period. 2  Dealing with financial spillovers The second issue for emerging nations in this new global environment is the size and volatility of financial spillovers that result from unconventional monetary policy after the GFC. Capital flows, especially portfolio flows, now account for a much larger portion of crossborder flows than current account flows, and have a much larger effect on the exchange rates for EMs.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Chart 8  Accordingly, the European banking industry is facing important challenges arising from the new macroeconomic environment, which is not conducive to income generation, and from regulatory reform which, in order to protect financial stability, is introducing new rules and safeguards that restrict the risk transformation business. As a result, there is a need for banks to adapt their business models and corporate strategies, and this will undoubtedly affect the structure of the sector. The role of the supervisor is not, generally, to impose specific strategic action, which should be determined by the banks themselves. Rather it is a matter of facilitating the process maintaining the required supervisory standards and, thereby, offering incentives so that the right decisions are made at the right time and in an orderly fashion, always for the benefit of the shareholders, which almost always contributes to the sector’s stability. Allow me to conclude by briefly mentioning the banking union. 4. The Single Supervisory Mechanism  The supervisory framework in Europe has been significantly strengthened by the setting up of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Barely a year and a half after it started to function, it has succeeded in putting into operation a supervisory model consistent with the most demanding standards.
The public interest objective underlying the status of independence leads me to view it as a value that should be preserved and strengthened, for the benefit of properly fulfilling the mission with which the agency has been entrusted and, thereby, of greater social well-being. In any event, independence should be accompanied by guarantees as to the professional competence and personal integrity of the members of the independent body, especially its senior officials, and as to the controls to which it is subject and its accountability. To attain these guarantees, controls and accountability, action must be taken on selection, appointment and dismissal procedures for individuals in management and governance positions in the independent body, on the transparency of conduct and results, and on the governance of the institution. I shall commence by reviewing the arguments that justify the independence of economic authorities and supervisors. I shall then address the elements that give shape to an institution’s formal independence, and their specific configuration in the case of the Banco de España. Thirdly, I shall offer my thoughts on the status of independence as a necessary, but insufficient, condition for independent agencies. I shall then highlight potential ways to strengthen the independence of the Banco de España, moving on thereafter to identifying potential improvements to the financial supervision model in Spain. Lastly, I shall refer to our institution’s control mechanisms and transparency standards, and certain governance aspects.

3  Article 7(4) of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España, in keeping with Article 130 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which states: “When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks." 4  In practice, the personal independence of the institution’s senior officials is sought through the arrangements in respect of appointment, exercise of mandate and stand-down from the post set in place, as a general rule, beforehand.
While I have my own views as to the application of United States banking and securities laws to this fact situation, I prefer not to spell those out in my prepared remarks. Instead, we all might prosper by sharing our views as to the proper application of our home country’s laws to individuals in our countries who might do business with IIB. I should note that this fact situation is a pure figment of my imagination. The cooperative efforts of bank supervisors over the world should be designed to ensure precisely against this sort of bank. In other words, like Atlantis, IIB should never surface above water. Our discussion should include responses to the following questions: (1) is IIB engaged in an impermissible activity in your home country; (2) if it is impermissible, what authority has responsibility for enforcing that law; (3) if impermissible, is that a civil or criminal violation; (4) if impermissible, is there any way for IIB to qualify to do business in your home country; and finally, (5) does your home-country court have jurisdiction to hear cases brought by a customer against IIB? Conclusion To conclude, I simply wish to commend the banking and legal communities for learning as much about electronic and Internet banking as they can, now, and for trying to stay ahead of the curve of ever evolving and improving technology. I fully agree with the philosophy of letting the markets decide what will work and what will not.

It is thus due to the instruments available on the market that the largest part of our foreign currency investments is in euros (55%) and in US dollars (25%). The remainder of our investments is composed of yen (10%), Canadian dollars (4%), pounds sterling (3%) and other currencies (3%). Finally, taking a general and somewhat longer-term view, the following point should be noted. The SNB’s currency reserves are made up of foreign currency investments and gold. In a risk-averse environment, losses tend to occur on foreign currency investments and profits on gold, while in a risk-friendly environment the opposite is true. Consequently, diversification of a portfolio to include gold and foreign currency helps to stabilise earnings over an entire risk cycle. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Turning to Spain’s case, there was a more than 10-year-long boom during which credit hit double-digit growth rates and the current account, which was practically in balance in 1996, began to run a systematically and continuously widening deficit. Over this period the markets were not exactly profuse in giving signals about the imbalances that were building up. The markets, like Spaniards, thought the Spanish economy was doing fine. We should acknowledge, as Raghuram Rajan does when talking about the US economy, that this delay in realising the actual problems was shared by all agents in the economy. But that does not mean that, although they are late, the messages from markets do not merit being heard and given due assessment. If we think that investors’ evaluation of problems is reasonable, then the most recommendable response is to follow their advice. We’ve also learned that the markets may not only err when they are late offering their advice, but that their judgments may also be mistaken. Frequently, their information is diffuse or insufficient, and investors’ view of different economies is shaped in an overly simplistic  BIS Review 171/2010  3  fashion. What we’ve seen, when this is the case, is that criticising their ignorance is of little use in practical terms. The proper response is to provide them with the most and best information possible. Generally, when investors have the right information, they incorporate it appropriately into their judgments.

Should we always heed the advice of the markets? Not necessarily. It’s highly recommendable to do so when their messages are sensible ones. And frequently, albeit belatedly, they demand we do what benefits us. But they also make mistakes occasionally and, in those cases, there’s no sense in our getting worked up and calling them ignorant. That serves no purpose. The right response is to offer them the most information possible and to explain to them our reasoning. This is how to convince somebody, and it is how we should react to the markets. Indeed, the markets are no more than people. That is why when I’m asked how we should react to them, my usual advice is to treat them like the people they ultimately are. Thank you. BIS Review 171/2010  5
Together with the measures that the National Debt Office have taken, the Riksbank's lending of both Swedish krona and US dollars contribute to a general strengthening of liquidity primarily in the Swedish credit markets, thereby also creating conditions for the markets to return to more normal conditions and allowing financial stability to be maintained. Second of all the Riksbank has – as I just mentioned – also provided special liquidity assistance to Kaupthing Bank Sweden. This loan is against collateral and with an interest rate that is above normal lending costs. Even if this measure is aimed at an individual bank, it should also be viewed as an initiative to safeguard financial stability and to maintain confidence in Sweden's entire credit and payment system. The decision is based on the assessment that although the bank is solvent, it is unable to perform its obligations without  4  BIS Review 125/2008  liquidity assistance. What happens next with Kaupthing Sweden is mainly a question for the bank's owner, the Icelandic state. The liquidity support to Kaupthing differs in many regards from the Riksbank's other measures. In this case the support is aimed at an individual institution and not at money market participants in general. In Kaupthing's case the point was to enable the bank to obtain any funding whatsoever and thereby continue to exist.

The ABF Hong Kong Bond Index Fund made history by being the first bond exchange-traded fund launched in Asia. The PAIF has also set two records. It is the first listed Asian bond fund to invest in as many as eight bond markets in the region. As a listed fund, it allows easy access by both institutional and retail investors who wish to have exposure to the Asian bond markets in a cost-effective and convenient manner. Secondly, the PAIF is the first foreign institutional investor that has access to the interbank bond market of Mainland China. This is an important step in the opening up of China’s bond market to foreign participants. I am glad to see that the PAIF has played a catalytic role in development not only in China but also in all the markets in which the fund invests. 4. I take this opportunity to thank State Street Global Advisors (SSgA), the fund manager of the PAIF, for their commitment and dedication to the development of this innovative product and to the idea of an Asian bond market. We have seen a favourable response to the ABF Hong Kong Fund, and I hope that the PAIF, with its broader investor base, will also be well received by markets. I wish you every success in promoting the PAIF. Thank you. BIS Review 50/2005  1
We are proposing this as the first step in collaboration. I hope that the Association will actively participate in this. Specifically, by expressing the interests of smaller, regional banks. Incidentally, I support the idea that we look separately, systemically at approaches for the development of banks with a basic licence. A certain period has passed, we met regularly, and discussed this topic. Certainly, I support the initiative that Mr Aksakov expressed. Another important issue that I want to mention, in fact, cannot help but mention is cyber security. Yes, the epidemic has accelerated digital transformation both in customer service and, actually, in the internal processes of financial organisations. This is certainly linked with increased cyber risks. Risks are posed not only by attacks by fraudsters but by the acceleration of digital transformation due to the pandemic: practice shows that inobservance of information security, often due to the fact that the bank wants to launch a new service onto the market, can lead to vulnerabilities in technology and the theft of customers’ funds. A recent example of one of the banks once again confirmed this. Also, it is clear that, when deciding to go online and expand their online services, banks need to take into account information security issues and the costs involved. As we see it, security should be a priority equal to profit. This should be the same KPI as, for example, industrial and transport safety. The role of information security in the financial sector should be just as key.

In the future, of course, problems may “catch up” with borrowers in those industries where demand is recovering more slowly, both because of the restrictions and because of the change in people’s behaviour. But in general, the situation does not currently look too alarming. Retail lending is also gradually recovering: after a decline in April and stagnation in May, the growth rate in June—July reached almost pre-coronavirus levels. In contrast to 2019, most of the growth comes from the mortgage sector thanks in large part to the Government’s preferential programs. For example, in June they covered about 45% of all mortgage loans issued. Specifically, more than a third (37%) were covered by the “6.5 Programme”. Since the beginning of the year, the retail portfolio on the whole has grown 6%. During the same period last year, growth stood at 11%. However, back then the main driver was unsecured loans. At the end of 2020, we expect retail portfolio growth to be up to 9% as well. That said, the growth structure of retail lending (more mortgages, fewer unsecured loans) is a positive factor. During the pandemic, some households experienced a sharp temporary decline in income, which is linked with an increased debt burden on borrowers. To ensure that this situation does not increase pressure on banks’ capital, we have reduced macroprudential buffers by 30– 50 percentage points. The maximum reduction is for borrowers with a low debt burden, so that the recovery of retail lending occurs without a dangerous increase in household debt overburden.
As long as it remains the case, it raises questions about whether the lessons from the crisis have truly been learned. Races in financial sector pay can also be tackled, albeit indirectly, by placing restrictions on leverage and by avoiding linking remuneration to return on equity targets. Restrictions on cash distributions by banks to shareholders and staff can also help. This has been a favoured recommendation of the FPC over the past six months, as a means of bolstering UK banks’ capital defences against risks in the euro-area. In response, there is some evidence of UK banks having modestly reduced cash distributions to staff in 2011. A more direct approach to tackling pay races would be to set remuneration codes. This can be justified as a regulatory means of leaning against excessive risk-taking incentives – incentives which might be fanned by remunerating in equity.31 These have already been developed by the Financial Stability Board internationally and by the FSA in the UK. They specify, for example, maximum ratios of cash distribution and minimum periods of pay deferral. Yet whether these codes go far enough in aligning pay and performance, in equating risk and return, is an open question. For example, consider the issue of pay horizons. Bonuses are typically set on an annual cycle, with deferral or claw-back for maybe three or four years if guidelines are followed. But this return cycle is materially shorter than the typical risk cycle. The risk cycle might last perhaps 20 years.

In fact, now standing at 5.9 percent, the unemployment rate has fallen about 4 percentage points from its high – and a full percentage point over the last year. Other measures of labor market health also suggest significant improvements: Notably, layoff rates are low and job opening rates are back to their prerecession levels. But we still aren’t back to full labor market health. At 5.9 percent, the unemployment rate remains above what most people think of as its long-run neutral level. For example, according to the central tendency in the FOMC’s latest Summary of Economic Projections, 1 the estimate of the neutral unemployment rate is between 5-1/4 to 5-1/2 percent, with my own judgment at the bottom of this range. This leaves a significant gap between our goal and current conditions. Moreover, the labor force participation rate has dropped a good deal. Most of the decline in labor force participation since 2000 is due to demographic trends, such as baby boomers moving into retirement age, and long-running trends, such as reductions in male and teenage labor force participation. These trends are structural in nature, and monetary policy is not the appropriate policy tool to address them. Nonetheless, the labor force participation rate has fallen somewhat more than what would be expected given these structural trends. And it is  1  2  Federal Open Market Committee (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  also lower than what would be expected from its historical relationship with the unemployment rate.