samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Housing investment is expected to grow through this year, albeit less rapidly than last year. Housing investment growth will thereafter moderate further, and may fall somewhat towards the end of the projection period. House price inflation is expected to slow. 2  BIS Review 108/2006  Household indebtedness has increased in tandem with high activity in the housing market. Growth in household debt (C2) has abated somewhat in recent months, but remains at a high level. Higher interest rates and lower house price inflation will curb growth in household debt in the next few years. Intensified competition and adaptation to new capital adequacy rules in the financial sector have squeezed banks’ lending margins. This may have curbed the impact of higher policy rates on house price inflation. Growth in credit to mainland enterprises has also shown a sharp increase over the past year, partly reflecting increased fixed investment. With prospects of continued high capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy, solid profitability, ample liquidity and a high level of optimism among enterprises, strong growth in investment is expected again this year. As economic growth gradually slows, investment growth is also expected to moderate. Property management companies account for nearly 40 per cent of banks’ lending to the corporate sector. Activity in the commercial property market reached a very high level in 2005. The vacancy rate in Oslo has diminished steadily for two consecutive years and stood at 8 per cent in January 2006.

1  BIS Review 62/2000  The difficulty we face is that, while some part of sterling’s rise in the past few years probably reflects underlying strengths in the UK economy - the sustained growth in activity in recent years and the more flexible and competitive structure of the economy - it is very likely that sterling at its present levels is unrealistically high, and that this is principally a reflection of the persistent weakness of the euro over the past year or so rather than factors directly related to sterling. To compound the difficulty, it is in fact very hard to see why the euro has remained relatively weak at a time when growth in the euro-area economies as a whole has recovered strongly. For the moment, in judging the appropriate level of interest rates, we take very carefully into account the weakness of the UK’s external sector, and the impact particularly on manufacturing, as an immediate factor off-setting in part the buoyancy of domestic demand. But we also have to take into account the possibility further ahead that, if the exchange rate moves back to more realistic levels, as we expect, the boost that could bring to external demand could only be accommodated, without strain on the supply capacity of the economy as a whole, if domestic demand has moderated.
This could be done by establishing an effective framework for macroprudential policy that is a policy that aims to counteract risks in the financial system as a whole. 17  See for example Kuttner, Kenneth (2012), “Low Interest Rates and Housing Bubbles: Still No Smoking Gun”, under publication in The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability: How Has it Changed?, and Claussen, Carl Andreas, Magnus Jonsson and Björn Lagerwall (2011), “A macroeconomic analysis of housing prices in Sweden”, Chapter II.1 in The Riksbank’s inquiry into risks in the Swedish housing market. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  A separate macroprudential policy In January 2013, the Financial Crisis Commission presented an interim report that discusses, among other things, how financial crises can be prevented in Sweden. The Commission proposes the setting up of a council for macroprudential policy. This would entail the existing council for cooperation on macroprudential policy between the Riksbank and Finansinspektionen being established by law and complemented by independent experts and an observer from the Ministry of Finance. The council should also work to develop macroprudential policy instruments, analyse risks and discuss appropriate measures. The intention is that responsibility for deciding whether or not to apply a macroprudential policy instrument would lie with either Finansinspektionen or the Riksbank. The Commission’s proposal is well-reasoned and wise, but, as I see it, has one flaw: it is unclear who is ultimately responsible for conducting macroprudential policy.

In the latest issue of its report “Wage Formation in Sweden”, the National Institute of Economic Research assesses this rate to be around 7 per cent at present, but that it will fall to around 6 per cent in the years immediately ahead (see Wage Formation in Sweden 2012, National Institute of Economic Research). According to a calculation by Lars Svensson of how the deviation between the actual inflation rate and the inflation target affects unemployment, the mid-point of the Riksbank’s estimated interval is at 5.5 per cent (see “Correction of the Riksbank’s estimate of the long-run sustainable unemployment rate”, Appendix 2, minutes of the monetary policy meeting, July 2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  have levelled out. This differs from the situation in Norway where prices continue to increase, and in Denmark, where there has been a significant fall in prices. Figure 8. Real house prices Index, 1995=100 300  300 Norway Finland  270  270  Denmark Sweden  240  240  210  210  180  180  150  150  120  120  90  90 95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  11  Sources: Statistics Sweden and national sources. Figure 9.
The focus of my remarks today will be on the implications of these global trends for the emerging market economies in general, and the East Asian region in particular and the potential for achieving enhanced growth in this more challenging environment. Ladies and gentlemen The recent decade has also witnessed a dramatic change in the form and nature of the globalisation process. The initial waves of globalisation in the form of trade have been followed by globalisation of corporations and in the recent years by globalisation of financial flows. While it has been acknowledged that these developments have brought more complex and new risks, their impact is significantly more pronounced and far reaching for emerging economies. In this environment, emerging economies have been presented with a global landscape in which their very ability to participate effectively in the globalisation process has been rendered increasingly more difficult. Globalisation is not a new phenomenon for the East Asian economies. Indeed, the globalisation process has been an important element in the remarkable growth and prosperity that has been achieved by the East Asian economies. East Asia was able to ride the successive waves of globalisation in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Many of the economies experienced a quantum leap into the industrialisation process as trade flows expanded at double-digit rates during most of this period. While the East Asian economies benefited from this global trend, the economies have not however, been immune to external shocks arising from shifts in international demand.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Global trends for the emerging market economies Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 22nd ACI Asia-Pacific Congress on Financial Markets in the K-economy, Kuala Lumpur, 31 October 2002. *  *  *  The recent decade has experienced a dramatic transformation of financial markets with far reaching implications on the growth prospects for the global economy. The single most important source of this change has been the rapid advancement in technology. Indeed, the revolutionary process brought about by the advances in technology has created new challenges and opportunities. These developments have been reinforced by the process of financial deregulation and liberalization. The recent decade has also witnessed a new wave of international crises, although in the more recent episodes, widespread contagion has been contained. Nevertheless, with highly volatile financial flows and heightened uncertainty in the global financial markets, the potential for contagion remains. It is my pleasure to be here at this 22nd ACI Asia Pacific Congress on Financial Markets in the K-economy. In this more globalised, digitised and knowledge-driven environment, the challenge of restoring calm in financial markets is no longer a challenge being encountered by small emerging market economies alone, but is also a challenge being faced by the larger advanced economies. These developments have indeed tested policy makers across the globe.
The new Law replaces the standard insolvency proceedings of a bank with the resolution undertaken by the relevant authority. Banks’ failures and financial crises may be common events. They are very costly, as well, which, in some cases, can be as high as 40–60% of the Gross Domestic Product. This includes losses in deposits, weakening of access to finance and loss of public confidence in the financial system, which, in turn, reduces its capacity to support economic growth and decrease poverty. Also, standard insolvency 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  proceedings for failing banks proved inadequate in times of crisis because they did not address systemic risk nor ensured the continuity of critical functions; moreover, they did not protect depositors. These procedures require time, long negotiations as well as complex arrangements with creditors, which may damage and further diminish the asset value of the distressed bank, hence causing severe consequences for the real economy. For this purpose, the new Recovery and Resolution Law provides the Supervisory and Resolution Authorities with the legal capacity and the necessary instruments for restructuring bank operations, in the event its possible failure jeopardizes financial stability or undermines other objectives of the regulator. The aim is clear: on the one hand, we have the public interest on financial stability, while, on the other hand, remain the shareholders of the bank, who have voluntarily undertaken the risk by investing in the bank.

In addition, the structure of financial flows from abroad shows larger funding through FDI inflows, which mitigates the risks to external sustainability. However, debt financing is also mounting, attributed by both public and private sector. Although, according to most indicators of external indebtedness, Macedonia is still in the "safe zone", the growth of external debt is undoubtedly a signal for additional vigilance by policy-makers, which is especially true for developing countries. Bearing in mind that, despite the positive developments, the domestic savings rate in the Macedonian economy remains below the average and among the lower rates in the CESEE countries, an active contribution from all counterparties is necessary. For banks, this means continuous improvement of the offer of savings products, which will be price-competitive, but also adjusted to the needs of the "ordinary" depositor and keeping-up with the challenges of the modern life. In this context, I would also mention the savings that are still out of the official channels and whose attraction and channeling into official financial channels can significantly increase financial intermediation. Let's not forget the potential of the non-banking financial sector, which through a more active promotion and financial education of citizens on alternative forms of saving, can contribute to the mobilization of additional savings from the households. The development of the institutional investors creates a base for the development of the domestic capital market and increasing its importance as a financial intermediary in the economy. The role of the institutions is also important.
Chart 8 shows  2.5  that, given the constellation of shocks affecting the 2 -2 August , no stimulus -1  Output gap (%)  economy, opting not to provide monetary stimulus  1  would have meant, in all likelihood, inflation around  0 1.5  Preferred trade-off if 𝜆 = 0.1  Preferred trade-off 1 if 𝜆 = 1  Source: Bank calculations. A value of 0.1 gives an approximate lower bound on estimates of lambda over the post inflation targeting period (see text). A value of unity would correspond to a “balanced approach” which weighs inflation stabilisation and output gap stabilisation equally. the target at the two-year point of the forecast, but an output gap of some 1½%, implying around 1/4 million lost jobs. In other words, fully offsetting the persistent effects of sterling’s depreciation on inflation would have required exerting further downward pressure on domestic costs. And that would have meant even more lost output and a total disregard for higher  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches  15  unemployment. Given our remit, that would have been undesirable. Moreover, because spare capacity would have persisted in such a scenario, this strategy would have been unlikely to generate a sustainable return of inflation to the target once the effects of higher import prices had become fully reflected in the price level.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: The denar was and remains one of the key pillars of the stability of the Macedonian economy Address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, on the 29th anniversary of the monetary independence, Skopje, 26 April 2021. * * * Monetary sovereignty is one of the main components of the sovereignty of any state. Today we mark 29 years since the laying of the foundations of our monetary independence – the day when the denar replaced the Yugoslav dinar, and the National Bank began to function as an independent central bank, facing numerous challenges in those turbulent times of separation from the former Yugoslav state. Looking back through years, we can freely say that the monetary independence took place in an extremely difficult period marked with high macroeconomic instability as its main feature. Frequent exchange rate devaluations, when there were almost no foreign reserves, along with structural problems, ignited inflation, which reached four-digit levels, and all this had strong effects on the economy and the living standards of citizens. The economy has been declining 1996, when economic growth of 1.2% was registered for the first time since independence. Hence, no doubt that establishing a stable macroeconomic environment required great courage, commitment and professionalism of the National Bank team. The efforts of the National Bank, together with other policy makers and the academic community, have played a key role in ceasing the inflation spiral and stabilizing the exchange rate of the domestic currency.
It is expected that such support will boost their capital position and as a result ensure these banks to keep up their lending to the economy. Did the French banks really need such a boost to their solvency and capital? Setting aside DEXIA, the answer is not really. DEXIA was very specific: because of its large exposure to US monoline risks, public recapitalisation was absolutely necessary. By contrast, all the other French banks, without exception, have sufficient own funds, be it in terms of prudential requirements or in comparison with their peers from other developed countries. Public recapitalisation is not aimed at making up for faults or weaknesses. Rather, it is to anticipate potential problems. Circumstances are indeed exceptional; even the soundest and most profitable banks cannot take it for granted that they will be able to tap markets to meet their funding and capital needs. As long as such uncertainty pervades and markets continue to fail, it is the public authorities’ duty to protect the credit system and safeguard the financing of the economy. The macroeconomic outlook It is fair to say that the public opinion is worried about the economic consequences of the financial crisis. I understand these concerns. Yet, I do not totally share them. Let me explain. When attempting to understand the situation we are facing, it is tempting to look at the past and draw lessons by mere analogy.

This is the assessment that was described in the Monetary Policy Report published on 2 July this year. I will also comment on the new information received over the summer. Finally, I shall report how the majority of Executive Board members and I personally viewed monetary policy in July. But I shall began by describing developments in the financial markets, which are both the reason for the economic downturn being so severe and a necessary condition for growth to pick up again. Financial markets Improved situation in the financial markets The situation in the financial markets has improved over the past six months both in Sweden and abroad. Risk premiums in the interbank market, for instance the TED and basis spreads, have fallen and are now close to the levels prevailing prior to the outbreak of the crisis two years ago (see Figure 1). This is a sign that the interbank market is functioning better. Other positive signs that the situation in the financial sector has stabilised are that Swedish companies can once again take loans in the international capital market, that equity prices have risen and that the krona has strengthened. However, the problems in the financial sector are not over yet. Several other types of risk premium are still at higher levels than prior to the crisis, for instance, credit spreads for companies and Credit Default Swaps. Moreover, the banks’ loan losses will probably increase (see Figure 2). 1  1  See the Financial Stability Report 2009:1, Sveriges Riksbank.
All I can add today is that a gradual process is no longer sufficient. The seriousness of the situation requires the adoption forthwith of a reform that draws our labour market closer to the levels of job flexibility and security prevailing in most European countries. Reform of our labour institutions is very necessary for many reasons. First, to put an end to the personal and family drama that unemployment entails. But also to help reduce the budget deficit. Indeed a more efficient labour market, that gave us unemployment rates similar to those of other countries, would permit the costs of unemployment – which in Spain amount to around 4% of GDP – to be reduced, and would increase government receipts from income and consumption taxes without tax rates having to be raised. A reduction in unemployment and an increase in employment are also very important for the banking system. First, because high rates of unemployment eventually lead to higher default rates. Second, because a reduction in unemployment is essential to reverse a trend that is having very serious effects on banks, namely the fall in solvent demand for credit. That said, at present, owing to the worsening of the sovereign crisis, supply-side factors are also contributing to the decrease in lending to households and firms which, as usual in this type of situation, affects small and medium-sized firms disproportionately.

Finally, let me once again welcome our guests, the experts from the Czech Republic, who will pass on the Czech experience in the realization of the decade-long EU project – the establishment of the Single European Payment Area – SEPA. I believe that today’s panel discussions will encourage all stakeholders in the national payment system of Macedonia in creating realistically achievable integration initiatives in the area of cross-border payments in euros, which would open new opportunities for Macedonian companies and citizens for effective and cheap payments in the economic exchanges with the European Union. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
The Joint Staff Report on the Treasury flash event, the Treasury Department’s subsequent request for information, and the work that has followed identified a number of changes that have reshaped the Treasury market over the last decade. These include the increased electronification of trading, the changing nature of intermediation and liquidity, and the entry of new market participants. In light of these changes, the Joint Staff Report highlighted four important priority areas for additional work. In taking these efforts forward, we have benefited from ongoing engagement with market participants and other members of the public. The first priority is gatherings like this one, where both private and official sector participants come together to study and share views on what the market’s evolution means for its structure and liquidity. Understanding how the Treasury market is evolving can enable us to be good stewards of its trajectory. A second priority is improving the availability of data on activities in the cash market. After the historic volatility that occurred on October 15, 2014, the official sector had limited access to transaction data. This resulted in a months-long lag in the process to gather and analyze data from the event. The introduction this year of transaction data reporting by broker-dealers to the official sector is thus a critical step forward. While closing this data gap for the official sector is an important milestone, work remains to ensure that the scope of collection is sufficiently complete and dynamic to maintain coverage of relevant firms, as intermediaries and liquidity providers evolve.

The article pointed out the differences between an asset-price bubble and a bull market. The author was of the view that people who don’t manage to enter the stock market in time or don’t dare to do so when the market has gone up will regard it as a bubble and will support the government taking measures to cool things down; but investors who have entered the market will see the increases as a bull market. Price increases can be interpreted in many ways. Well, a nonmainstream view like this may have some merit and, right or wrong, it illustrates the difficulty of dealing with asset-price bubbles, particularly the courage needed to make decisions at critical moments. Whether these decisions are correct or not is difficult to say with total confidence and certainty beforehand, and mistakes may be made. But we cannot avoid mistakes by not making decisions because the damage to society of an asset-price bubble is too great to ignore. And we should not just rely on the government to stop the bubble expanding. It requires the involvement of banks, corporations and individuals – they need to be more risk-conscious and self-disciplined. My colleagues at the HKMA and I will do our best, and I invite everyone to work hard together to meet the challenges brought about by the global financial tsunami. BIS Review 167/2009  3