samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In parallel, the reduction by 5.6 percentage points of the interest rate on lek credit compared to 2011 – when the monetary policy easing started – helps Albanian firms and households to save around ALL 15 billion per year. Third, the accommodative monetary policy has supported Albania’s financial stability. Growth of demand for goods and services and reduction of debt costs led to the improvement of the solvency of firms and households, and has encouraged loan restructuring. Also, the orientation of lending toward lek credit has reduced the exposure of the economy and of the financial system against exchange rate volatilities. Monetary policy-related measures undertaken by the Bank of Albania have contributed to the expansion of aggregate demand and boosting economic growth. Our assessments suggest that the accommodative monetary policy stance has contributed positively, on average by 0.5 percentage point, to economic growth in the last two years. Also the accommodative monetary policy stance has contributed to the stability of the domestic currency. Both transmission channels have contributed and will continue to contribute to price stability in Albania. The current trends in the development of the economy and our projections suggest that inflation will converge toward the target within a two-year horizon. Banking supervision and financial stability The main aspects of our work for safeguarding financial stability were strengthening the stability of the banking system, enhancing its resilience to shocks, adopting international standards on supervision and regulation, and administration of consolidation processes in the banking sector.

Gent Sejko: Albania's economic and financial developments in 2018 Introductory statement by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, presenting the Annual Report 2018 to the Parliamentary Committee on Economy and Finance, Tirana, 23 April 2019. * * *  Honourable Chair, Honourable Members of the Committee, Thank you for your invitation! The Annual Report and the financial statements are the key instrument for the accountability of our institution. In this light, the Bank of Albania considers the presentation of this Report as an opportunity to foster and enhance the dialogue with the Assembly. During 2018, the work of the Bank of Albania focused on three main aspects: First, on the objectives and duties set out in the legal and sublegal framework, which regulates the work of the Bank; Second, on the objectives set out in our Medium-term Development Strategy; and, Third, recommendations left by the Assembly of the Republic of Albania in the Resolution “On the assessment of the activity of the Bank of Albania for 2017”. The results of our work show that the Bank of Albania marked progress in all the three abovementioned aspects. Let me present a brief overview of developments.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  reduced state and federal subsidies, educational institutions raised tuition, leaving students and their parents paying a greater share of the cost of higher education, thereby leaving students less of the surplus and a lower net return on their investment. There are therefore reasons to be concerned about the viability of the current system (with various income-based repayment programs) as well as an alternative income-based repayment system. The high delinquency rate and very low repayment rates among recent cohorts have implications for the sustainability of higher education financing more generally. While there is considerable uncertainty about the ultimate amount, it appears likely that a significant portion of the outstanding federal student loans in income-based repayment-type programs will ultimately be charged off after 20 or 25 years. Another potential threat to the sustainability of the current system, especially visible in the current low interest rate environment, represents the entry of private lenders engaged in cream skimming, providing loans that slightly undercut the administratively set interest rate on federal loans for those enrolled in high-return and low-risk programs towards business, medical and law degrees at top ranked institutions. There is a risk given the rapid growth of this industry that this could have a considerable impact on the average quality of loans held by the federal government. A primary policy challenge in higher education financing is to increase access to higher education to more people through grants and loans but in such a way that the private and social net returns remain positive.

Financial institutions in general need to offer structured financing that best suits the Zambian economic landscape. It is only through such activities that we will see further developments in the whole Zambia rather than the few areas along the line of rail. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, we have come to Chipata not only to tell you what we expect of you but also to listen to what you expect of us. I therefore declare this meeting open and invite you to make your contributions. I thank you! 2  BIS Review 15/2008
For example, while it may capture some important aspects of how asset purchases work it’s not really an accurate representation of how the conventional policy rate is set. That’s fine for today, as I’m focusing more on QE. But one should at least be aware that the monetary authority needn’t vary the supply of reserves in order to change its policy rate[7]. Second, the downward slope of the MD line was often justified, in the textbook account, by the assumption that reserves don’t pay interest. This would mean that any rise in bond yields is bound to make central bank money comparatively less attractive to hold. These days, however, reserves do pay interest (at the official central-bank rate). As a result, central bank money and government debt – the two sides of the QE transaction – are closer substitutes than they otherwise would be. This has the effect of making the downward slope of the MD line less pronounced. Third, the model – the way it was often taught in the textbooks, at least – glosses over the distinction between “narrow” and “broad” money. For the wider economy it’s clearly the second that matters. Firms and households don’t have deposits at the central bank – for them, “money” is  Page 13  what they hold in their commercial bank accounts. But, as conveyed to students, IS-LM elides the two, assuming that the one is just a multiple of the other[8].

Mugur Isărescu: Overcoming economic problems, the experiences of Sweden and Turkey – an inspiration for Romania? Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the conference “Overcoming economic problems, the experiences of Sweden and Turkey – an inspiration for Romania?”, Bucharest, 23 September 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Your Excellences, Distinguished Guests It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the National Bank of Romania. I salute the presence of such a distinguished audience: Their Excellences, the Ambassadors of Sweden, Turkey, Brazil, Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands, members of the diplomatic corps, economists, bankers, businessmen, journalists. We are honored to host this international conference: “Overcoming economic problems, the experiences of Sweden and Turkey: are these an inspiration for Romania?” The title is, I believe, self-explanatory. In today’s globalized world, learning from other countries’ experience is of utmost importance. And while it might be true that no one really learns but from his own mistakes, one can hope that some other mistakes may be avoided when learning from other people’s experiences. Why Sweden and Turkey? Before answering this question I wish to emphasize that the National Bank of Romania is open and willing to host other conferences with similar topics. And today’s conference might be considered the first of a series, involving clusters of countries with relevant interactions.
Chart 11: Overall openness and productivity GDP per hour worked 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 R² = 0.4635  30 20 10 0  400  300  200  100  0  Total MGI Connectedness Ranking Sources: McKinsey Global Institute, OECD and Bank calculations. Notes: Data for 2014. GDP per hour worked in $ at constant prices, in 2010 PPPs. UK marked in red. 34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  Chart 12: Productivity for exporting and non-exporting firms Density 0.018 Non exporter  0.016  Exporter  0.014 0.012 0.01 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002 0 -0.002  -50  0  50  100  150  200  250  300  GVA per worker, £ Sources: ONS Research Databases and Bank calculations. Notes: Kernel density estimate; real GVA per worker for 2013 and 2014. Chart 13: Productivity for foreign-owned and domestically-owned firms Density 0.016 Domestic  0.014  Foreign 0.012 0.01 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.002 0 -0.002 -50  0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  GVA per worker, £ Sources: ONS Research Databases and Bank calculations. Notes: Kernel density estimate; real GVA per worker for 2013 and 2014.

A useful framework for thinking about the determinants of technological diffusion has been provided by economists Diego Comin and Marti Mestieri. 25  Drawing on evidence from a wide range of countries and  technologies over many centuries, they highlight four structural factors which are crucial for technological trickle-down within and across economies. I shall consider the UK evidence on each in turn. (a)  External Openness  Over recent decades, globalisation has resulted in secular rises in cross-borders flows of good and services, capital, people and information. One of the key potential benefits of this sweeping globalisation and 19  Cornell University, INSEAD and WIPO (2017). Which currently stands at 12th, but just you wait… 21 Between 2013 and 2017, the UK fell from 18th to 38th in the global ranking for knowledge diffusion. Since 2012, England have fallen from 6th to 12th in the FIFA world rankings. 22 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2017). 23 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (2017). According to Rhodes (2017), the UK is estimated to have had 5.7 million private sector businesses. 24 European Commission (2018). 25 Comin and Mestieri (2013). We use a slight variant of Comin and Mestieri’s organising framework. For example, we do not consider the influence of demand expectations on innovation and diffusion - a shorter-term cyclical factor affecting firms’ investment plans and capital-deepening. Tenreyro (2018) discusses the contribution of reduced capital-deepening to the UK’s post-crisis productivity performance.
In other words, the conversion window in Shanghai serves a supplementary rather than the main source of RMB funds for trade settlement purpose. In order to further promote the steady development of the RMB market in Hong Kong, the following refinement measures will take effect from January next year: (1)  Participating AIs can square their positions with the Clearing Bank when there is a shortfall of RMB arising from conversions with customers for cross-border trade settlement transactions. In other words, Participating AIs should first utilise the RMB trade proceeds purchased from their customers to satisfy requests for RMB conversions for trade settlement transactions before purchasing RMB through the Clearing Bank in Shanghai. (2)  Participating AIs can only purchase RMB through the Clearing Bank in Shanghai for their customers in relation to trade transactions due for payments to the Mainland within three months. The HKMA and the PBoC estimate that the demand for RMB conversion in Shanghai would be within RMB 4 billion in the first quarter of 2011. The volume of conversion will be assessed and appropriately adjusted after the first quarter taking into consideration the actual circumstances. (3)  In order to maintain a steady supply of RMB, the HKMA will, as a standing arrangement, provide RMB funds of RMB 20 billion through its currency swap arrangement with the PBoC, for cross-border RMB trade settlements.

The value of exports increased 6.7%, y-o-y, in the first quarter, reflecting the moderation in the foreign demand and performance of global market prices. Over the period, imports contracted by 0.9%, y-o-y. These developments led to an annual contraction of trade deficit by 5.4% until August, positively influencing the aggregate demand growth. Also, the sharply decreased current account deficit in the second quarter is a positive signal for the long-term stability of this indicator and assists in stabilizing the demand for and supply of foreign currency in the domestic market. Developments in the monetary sector attest to low inflationary pressures in the economy. Monetary assets expansion slowed over the third quarter, reflecting the decline in the domestic demand for money. The public sector’s prudential behaviour has led to a low demand for monetary assets, particularly from the banking sector. On the other hand, the slow economic activity and available spare capacities appear to have restricted the private sector’s demand for monetary assets. Private sector credit increased by 5%, y-o-y, in August, following the slowing trajectory having started since the second half of 2011. Developments over the past months show that banks are more active in national currency intermediation, while they have decreased their foreign currency intermediation. This development is driven by banks’ readiness to invest lek funds and economic agents’ increased awareness of foreign currency credit risk. Regarding lending concerns, we would emphasise that the weak credit performance owes mostly to economic agents’ low demand for monetary assets. However, the bank credit supply appears somewhat tightened.
14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 14  CPI inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  CPIX1 inflation (*) (annual change, percent)  10  10  10  10  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  0  0  -4  -4  -2  -2  -4  -4  07  09  11  13  07  09  11  13  Sep.2011 Report  Jun.2011 Report (*) Gray area, as from third quarter of 2011, shows forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

Like all happy marriages, the bonding should foster growth and help the partners to realise their potential during good times; and provide an anchor to help them to face the challenges of the bad times with resilience and confidence. 7. Both partners have certainly done well during the good times in the past decade. (i)  HK’s developments  8. During this period, Hong Kong has continued to consolidate its role as a premier international financial centre and has become a more globalised economy: –  The total assets of the banking system have increased 2.7 times to $ trillion, with foreign currency assets accounting for about 60% of the pool. –  The market capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has become more than 4 times bigger, advancing from number 8 to number 6 in the global ladder. –  The bond market has also increased by about 3 times, with foreign currency denominated bonds accounting for about 40% for most of the time. 9. Hong Kong has also become a hub for private wealth and asset management. Nearly 80 of the top 100 global money managers are in Hong Kong. The total assets under management hit a record high of $ trillion in 2013, with 72% of the funds sourced from  1  Mr David Puth, CEO of CLS Group Holdings, and CLS Bank International. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  non-Hong Kong investors.
Chart 2: Banking concentration Per cent 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1996  2000  2004  2008  UK  Euro area  2012  2016  US  Sources: Bank of England, European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Bank calculations. Notes: Data refer to banking sector assets of the five largest institutions in each region as a share of total banking sector assets. UK banks are all UK resident monetary financial institutions (MFIs). These data cover only the UK assets of the MFIs. As such they differ from the institutions' own published accounts that will comprise the global assets of the group. Euro-area data prior to 2006 are constructed using data for the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain holding the share of these countries relative banking sector sizes constant, at their 2006 level. This is due to data availability limitations pre-2006. 25  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  25  Chart 3: UK-listed firms’ average mark-ups Mark-up (e.g. 1.2 = 20%) Mean (weighted by total sales)  1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0  1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005  2008  2011  2014  2017  Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bank calculations. Note: Details of how mark-ups are estimated are described in the Appendix. Individual mark-ups are weighted by their share of total sales in the sample in a given year.

I maintain that. WSJ: What do you think the risk is that this wrenching process will cause the breakup of the euro or its membership? TRICHET: Of course the euro is there and will be there in the future. I do not comment on what I consider absurd hypotheses. I am used to such questions from the very beginning of the euro. The paradox is that, years ago, the question was about Germany supposed to be at that time the “sick man of Europe”. I was responding that Germany was doing hard work that its economy was catching up on competitiveness. Now the same hard work has to be done by those that were growing rapidly over the past years but at the same time had lost their competitiveness. One has to accept that within a vast economy that has the size of the euro area, with 331 million people, there are economic differences. For instance when I look on both sides of the Atlantic I see that the differences between the fastest and slowest-growing U.S. states, it is more or less of the same order of magnitude as between countries in the euro area, for instance between Oklahoma and Nevada, 13 % differences in growth in 2009; between Slovakia and Ireland more than 9 % in growth in 2008. WSJ: The U.S. copes with these differences through labor mobility and a federal budget. Does the euro zone ultimately need a big federal budget?
The ECB also takes note of estimates of the natural rate of unemployment but recognizes that these are subject to enormous uncertainty – like estimates of all other “natural” variables. The ECB would not tighten policy based solely on an estimated unemployment gap. 2. How could we clarify the price stability objective? The main substantive change by the FOMC is the introduction of an inflation make-up strategy. Rather than being solely forward-looking, the FOMC will, or could, now correct for past inflation shortfalls. Let us here also discuss the areas  Page 5 sur 10  of continuity as Jay Powell did in his speech of 27 Augustv – and the possible differences:  The Fed confirmed our common strategy of inflation targeting and it has kept 2% as its numerical goal. This “conceptual convergence” remains a cornerstone of modern central banking.  Average inflation targeting is a flexible tactic, possibly temporary, within a wider strategy of keeping inflation sustainably where expected. Still more importantly in my view, the inflation target should be perceived as flexible, symmetric and medium term. Allow me to be a bit more specific about these three requirements. o flexible is the most obvious one. We cannot guarantee to achieve precisely our numerical objective either all the time or straight away. o Symmetric means that our numerical objective is a target and not a ceiling. As a consequence we might be ready to accept inflation higher than 2% for some time, without mechanically triggering a tightening of our monetary stance.

In our discussion to come, I believe we could study two types of aggregates:  Page 7 sur 10   Financial aggregates, from the perspective of financial stability, and potentially looking more closely at the assets of financial institutions including non-banks (such as their provision of credit in the broadest sense) rather than at their liabilities only (including money, as in the past).  Other economic aggregates, starting with nominal GDP, which has the virtue of combining real growth and prices – two variables that statisticians sometimes have difficulties separating in our measures. But also employment and income distribution, which respond to the demands of the Treaties as well as to the expectations of the public. Allow me some remarks on the substance of these “secondary” objectives. To achieve financial stability, in an ideal world, we would have a box of macroprudential tools that could maintain financial stability whatever the monetary policy stance. However, in practice our set of macroprudential tools is comparatively limited. We need a monetary policy strategy that reflects this reality. We should go beyond the old debate of “separation principle” versus “ leaning against the wind”. I advocate a median way, which we could call “coordinated” or “integrated”.viii We have now a range of unconventional monetary instruments and our objective should be to pick the right combination that delivers the necessary accommodative monetary stance while minimizing of adverse side-effects on financial stability.
Some have rightly pointed out that the economic fundamentals of Asian EMEs are now much more robust than two decades ago, with improved current account balances and better coverage of short-term external debts by sizable foreign reserves. And currency and maturity mismatch in foreign liabilities are no longer a serious issue. Moreover, the more flexible exchange rate regimes adopted by many Asian economies should give regional currencies more flexibility to adjust according to market forces and may therefore serve as a shock absorber in the case of capital outflows. A number of Asian EMEs, Hong Kong included, have also stepped up their macro-prudential measures in recent years to tackle the spill-over effects of the unconventional monetary policies of the advanced economies. 8. There is, however, no room for complacency. We should also be aware that the external environment has become much more challenging for Asian EMEs compared with the 1990s. The global economy is now much weaker, meaning that EMEs may be less able to look to support from external demand to cushion the effect of tighter domestic liquidity conditions along with US monetary policy normalisation. Concerns over further economic moderation in Mainland China have also weakened market sentiment towards Asian EMEs and the strength of the region’s “pull factor” to attract global capital flows. 9. More importantly, the region is now facing new risk factors that were unseen before.

Peter Pang: Diverging monetary policies, global capital flows and financial stability Opening remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the conference on “Diverging Monetary Policies, Global Capital Flows and Financial Stability”, jointly organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/European Central Bank/Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas/Hong Kong Monetary Authority, hosted by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 15 October 2015. *  *  *  1. It is my great pleasure to welcome all of you to this Conference jointly organised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. 2. Today’s Conference is very timely. With the US Fed contemplating an imminent liftoff in policy rates, while the ECB and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) are still preoccupied with quantitative easing (QE), central banks around the world are carefully weighing the potential impact of the expected divergence in monetary policies on global capital flows and financial stability. Financial markets often move ahead of the real economy. We have seen global financial markets tumbled and emerging market economies (EMEs) experienced quite intense capital outflow pressures during this summer. Many would be interested to know whether such gyrations of capital flows and asset prices have already captured a good part of the adjustment process or are just a curtain raiser for even stronger threats to financial stability of the EMEs. 3.