samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul: Some ideas for the new government in Thailand  Statement by Mr M R Chatu Mongol Sonakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the British Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, on 23 November 2000. *  *  *  Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce and all the chambers here today, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen. Good afternoon. Let me begin by saying that it behoves me, and I have to use that word as a career civil servant who has taken his duty righteously for the last 35 years, not to comment on the work of the present government especially during an election period. In any case what they have done is fast becoming history and we have to take it as facts. A datum from which we will have to operate. In my career, I have been unenthusiastic in commenting about history, and only study it with a view to creating the future rather than commenting on it. If I wanted to comment on history, I guess I would have continued my dual career as a university lecturer which ended abruptly after the first year of my working life, since I found the responsibility of turning up regularly on time every week for anything quite unbearable as well as preferring to be on the implementation side rather than a commentator or analyst.

The two must be made to intertwine and clear legislation should be made for the procedures for the central bank at appropriate intervals to agree monetary targets with the government and then to be allowed to implement its work independently and unimpeded. But I guess there’s no point in talking much about it now. Let’s wait and see what mandate people give during the election. The only obvious thing is that the present Senate seems to be quite qualified to take up such an important role as safeguarding the central bank. Let me continue on what the new government has to look at, for instance the general guarantee on deposit. This general guarantee cuts across all good banking practices. Banks that misbehave are not being penalised and those that try to do well are dragged down by those who are capricious with the general guarantee that the government gives. The general guarantee will have to be got rid of sooner rather than later if Thailand is to get back on an even path. Probably, in order to do this, some kind of deposit insurance will have to be in place and seen to be working. It does look like a long road for the new government, where sequencing and implementation of many difficult concepts is still needed before full prosperity returns. Let’s start on this road to prosperity as soon as possible.
Today, however, the economy is still operating below full capacity, which limits inflationary pressures and is consistent with monetary policy remaining significantly expansionary. Nonetheless, as output gaps close, inflationary pressures will be incubated which must be contained in time in order to ensure that annual inflation will stand at 3% over the two-year policy horizon. Hence, the Board estimates that achieving the inflation target in the projection horizon requires, as has been said in recent months, a progressive normalization of the current significant monetary stimulus. As a working assumption, the baseline scenario estimates that the level of the MPR one year ahead will be similar to the one inferred from private expectations. In the long term, it will converge to its neutral level (figure 8). As usual, the outlined scenario is subject to several risks. Internally, the greatest risks come from domestic expenditure. The baseline scenario considers that a significant part of its current strong expansion is temporary. However, there is a risk that said strength is largely the response to stimulative macroeconomic conditions, which would mean that the downturn foreseen in the second half of this year may not occur, speeding the closing of output gaps. The medium-term impact on aggregate demand of reconstruction works and the funding thereof will have to be assessed continually. In the immediate term, April data and the reaction of economic sectors to the earthquake and tsunami reduces the possibility of a generalized delay in the economic recovery.

Annual inflation figures are somewhat below levels foreseen in March. This is because the immediate effects of the earthquake and tsunami, if any, were bounded and certainly smaller than projected in the last IPoM or by overall market expectations. Despite this difference, the assumptions about changes in some specific prices such as public transport fares, the tobacco excise tax or the unchanged stamp tax will result – in the baseline scenario – in inflation being at the end of 2010 in the upper area of the tolerance range of the inflation target. Towards 2011 and 2012, annual CPI inflation will oscillate around 3% and will stay there through the end of the relevant projection horizon, this time the second quarter of 2012. Core inflation will show a slower convergence to 3%, to hit that figure over the course of 2011. These projections are consistent with June’s Economic Expectations Survey, which foresees y-o-y inflation for December of this and next year at 3.5% and 3.2%, respectively, and at 3% two years ahead (figure 7). Aside from the assumptions just described for domestic and external growth, the baseline scenario considers that in the long run the real exchange rate (RER) will be similar to its current level. This, considering that, with the current level of the nominal exchange rate and the parities prevailing at the statistical closure of this IPoM, the RER is aligned with its longterm fundamentals. The domestic growth scenario foreseen for the coming quarters assumes output gaps closing fully during 2011.
The profit they derive from their lending activities ultimately result from the interest spread between loans and deposits. It compensates banks for the credit and liquidity risks assumed, for services linked to customer deposits, and for the assessment and monitoring of borrowers. So banks will only grant a loan if doing so makes economic sense. Lending does not automatically generate a profit – each loan is the result of a careful weighing-up of risks and returns. In their calculations, banks take into consideration factors such as current and future interest on loans and deposits, the likelihood of deposit withdrawals and credit defaults, and the liquidity and capital adequacy requirements in force. All these factors constrain the lending – and thus also money creation – activities of commercial banks. Central banks, for their part, take a special interest in the impact of monetary policy on money and credit creation within the banking system. As you know, the SNB steers a short-term interest rate with its monetary policy and thereby influences the level of interest rates. A tightening of monetary policy leads to a rise in interest rates and thus dampens the demand for loans. Moreover, rising interest rates cause the economy to slow, which further reduces demand for loans. Higher interest rates also have a negative impact on the banks’ credit supply. As a rule, rising interest rates increase the likelihood of credit defaults, which means that the quality of banks’ loan portfolios deteriorates in the eyes of market participants.

The breakdown of the monetary base into banknotes in circulation on the one hand and sight deposits held by banks at the SNB on the other is determined by public demand for banknotes. If you, ladies and gentlemen, withdraw more money than usual before Christmas to do your Christmas shopping, the volume of banknotes in circulation increases, only to decrease again after Christmas when the money taken in by the shops flows back to the SNB via the commercial banks. Banks can, through the SNB, exchange banknotes against sight deposits and vice versa. They thus have access to both banknotes and a sight deposit account  2 3 4  In Switzerland, central bank money as defined by the SNB comprises banknotes in circulation and the sight deposits held by domestic banks at the SNB. The Federal Act on Currency and Payment Instruments (CPIA) requires unrestricted acceptance of Swiss banknotes as payment, and unrestricted acceptance of sight deposits with the SNB as payment by anyone holding an SNB sight deposit account (art. 3 CPIA). Residual risks are currency reform, settlement disruption in the payment system, and the possibility of banknotes being lost or stolen. Page 3/12  at the SNB, while the public has access to banknotes only, since private individuals cannot hold an account with the SNB. Sight deposits are used by banks for cashless interbank payment transactions.
By 2009, that long-term investor’s stake would have risen to $ Over the same period, the momentum traders’ stake would have returned $ Buy-and-hold would have out-performed bought-and-sold by a factor of around 36. How different the world may have looked. Fundamentals would have triumphed over momentum. The sheep would have been herded by the goats. Facing a losing streak, speculators may have gone the same way as despairing Dick Fuld or the ravenous robin. The gene pool may have been cleansed of the impatient. Patience may have helped ward off great disaster, the like of which we have recently seen. Just as patience can ward off great disaster, impatience can ruin a whole life. Generations of dieters and addicts are testament to that. So too is finance, not least in the light of the crisis. It is important finance sticks to the patient evolutionary path. To do so, the fidgeting fingers of the invisible hand may need a steadying arm. 14  BIS Review 114/2010  Annex  BIS Review 114/2010  15  16  BIS Review 114/2010  BIS Review 114/2010  17  18  BIS Review 114/2010  References Ainslie, G and Haslam, N (1992), “Hyperbolic Discounting”, Choice Over Time, Russell Sage Foundation. Ainslie, G (1974), “Impulse control in pigeons” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour 21(5). Angeletos, G, Laibson, D, Repetto, A, Tobacman, J and Weinberg, S (2001), “The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evaluation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(3), pp 47–68.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: Recent UK economic developments against the background of world economic activity Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Chartered Institute of Bankers in Scotland Biennial Dinner at the Exchange, held on 15 January 2001. *  *  *  Mr President, Lord Provost, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen, This is the fourth occasion on which I have been honoured to be invited to speak at this great biennial dinner of the oldest Institute of Bankers in the World; and it gives me particular pleasure this evening to join you in celebrating your 125th anniversary. On the three previous occasions I have been able to report to you steady progress of the overall UK economy, but then, as a central banker brought up to look for the dark side of the moon, I’ve gone on to discuss the prevailing risks and uncertainties and to pose the question: can that steady progress be maintained? I will adopt the same format this evening. Since your last dinner in 1999, we have in fact, come through the short, sharp, shock to the world economy, associated with the emerging markets financial crisis, relatively unscathed. Our own economy has now grown continuously quarter by quarter for over 8½ years at an average annual rate of 3%, which is well above most estimates – at least until recently – of a longer term trend rate of 2¼2½%.
This formula, which was conceived for the first Eurosystem cooperation programme with the Bank of Russia on banking supervision, was successfully implemented between 2003 and 2005. Over the coming 33 months, the ECB and the national central banks that I mentioned earlier will be working closely with the Bank of Russia on the programme. The project will be coordinated by a team consisting of Ms Gulsana Barpiyeva, from the Deutsche Bundesbank, who will be the Eurosystem project coordinator in Moscow, Mr Christian Fehlker, the Eurosystem team leader for banking supervision, and Mr Lukasz Kubicki, the Eurosystem team leader for internal audit. The project will be managed by an ECB team in Frankfurt. The expertise on the implementation of the Basel II framework and the risk-based internal audit practices will be provided by the national central banks and the ECB’s Internal Audit Department. In the context of this programme, Bank of Russia experts will have the opportunity to visit their colleagues in EU countries. Russia and the European Union are important partners. One key aspect of the partnership is the overall objective of the European Union and the Russian Federation to enhance the regulation, supervision and governance of financial markets in Russia. This should contribute to improving the investment climate and supporting closer economic relations between the EU and Russia. We very much appreciate the assistance of the European Commission in giving substance to this aim, as this cooperation programme is supported by the Delegation of the European Commission to Russia with a budget of € million.

Within the European Union, we have gathered extensive experience with the implementation of Basel II which we are happy to share. As part of this cooperation programme, experts on banking supervision from the Eurosystem will travel to Moscow and support the Bank of Russia’s internal work on implementing Basel II. With regard to the internal audit component of the cooperation programme, the Eurosystem will offer its expertise and advice on risk-based internal audit methods and best practices. The objective of this cooperation with the Bank of Russia is to enhance the capacity of the Chief Auditor’s Service to carry out risk-based internal audits. In today’s world, central banks also need modern and sophisticated internal audit procedures. Risk-based internal audits provide, on the basis of a risk analysis, assurance on the proper functioning of central bank  BIS Review 32/2008  1  activities, especially on those aspects where the risks are highest, rather than performing a less differentiated, simple compliance audit. Such a risk-based approach represents, in our view, the appropriate response to the challenges faced by the internal audit services and we are pleased to share our experience in this field. During this part of the project, Eurosystem experts will train about 350 Bank of Russia experts on internal audit. In the implementation of this cooperation programme, we will employ a coordinated “Eurosystem approach” which involves the ECB and a number of national central banks of the euro area.
deposits of less than € secured liabilities, such as covered bonds; and liabilities arising from participation in payment systems, along with interbank liabilities with an original maturity of less than seven days. The draft Directive further requires Member States to set up ex-ante resolution funds. These funds will be used to temporarily support banks under resolution by means of loans, guarantees, asset purchases or capital for bridge banks. They will also be used to fund what may be called an “element of flexibility” of the Directive, which I shall refer to in a moment. Over the next 10 years these funds must be built up to a volume equivalent to at least 0.8% of the insured deposits of the country’s credit institutions. In this connection, banks must make annual contributions based on their liabilities. The draft Directive leaves to the discretion of the Member States the matter of whether resolution funds and deposit guarantee funds are merged or kept separate. Finally, as I said earlier, the Ecofin agreement introduces an “element of flexibility” so that national resolution authorities, in certain exceptional cases and subject to strict criteria, may fully or partially exclude any category of liabilities from the bail-in, and use the resolution fund to finance this exclusion. However, as a general rule, they may only resort to such flexibility after losses have been imposed on shareholders and creditors for a minimum amount of 8% of the total liabilities of the bank subject to resolution.

Although the exchange rate, still less the level of interest rates, may not be the root cause of all our present sectoral, and related regional, pressures, there is no doubt that the exchange rate in particular is adding to the pain that some of you are going through. So what then is my defence? My first, and principal, witness, is the macroeconomic data - the data relating to the UK economy as a whole. For the past seven years or so - starting well before the MPC came into existence - monetary policy has been directed specifically to achieving a low and stable rate of retail price inflation - the inflation target set by the Government. Low inflation is not simply an end in itself. Achieving it consistently involves keeping aggregate demand continuously broadly in line with the underlying supply-side capacity of the economy as a whole to meet that demand. So low inflation is in effect a measure of macroeconomic stability in a much broader sense - it, too, in fact is a “policy with a purpose”, the purpose in this case being sustainable growth of output and all that that means for a high level of employment and rising living standards. 1  BIS Review 31/2000  Since that policy was adopted some seven years ago we have in fact achieved the longest period of sustained low inflation we’ve known for a generation. Retail price inflation, on the Government’s target measure, has averaged 2.7%.
3/5  Central banks’ summit on inflation targeting Some of the topics I just listed were discussed yesterday, Wednesday 19 October, in the Summit that the Central Bank of Chile organized with governors, board members and head economists from 25 central banks that either have inflation targeting regimes in place or are considering the adoption of one in the near future. Discussions were very fruitful, because they allowed for a constructive exchange of experiences and challenges among the attending central bankers, IMF officials and renowned academics, also present at this conference. Four issues were covered at the Summit: (i) the refinement of requisites for a successful adoption of inflation targeting, (ii) the influence of considerations such as financial stability and asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy, (iii) the assumptions behind and communication of future policy interest rates and parities, and (iv) how various forms of uncertainty affect the way monetary policy is conducted. The ninth annual conference of the Central Bank of Chile The purpose of this ninth annual conference of the Central Bank of Chile is to promote and discuss advances in economic research of interest for central banks, in matters relating with the conduct of monetary policy in inflation targeting regimes. The conference will gather new results from analytical investigation and empirical evidence on the conduct of monetary policy under inflation targeting and its effects on the Chilean economy and the world at large.

For peripheral euro area countries, which cannot devalue, the way to improve competitiveness is via domestic wage restraint and structural reforms to boost productivity. In an environment where domestic debt overhangs are large, the former approach runs the risk of creating a debt-deflation spiral: domestic nominal incomes are driven down, while the nominal debt remains unchanged, thereby increasing the real burden of previously accumulated financial imbalances. 10 Yet Europe’s sovereign crises have erupted in the context of a worldwide recovery, led by strong growth and a potential for inflationary pressure in the emerging markets. Such a situation contrasts with the global disinflationary environment of the Latin American crisis in the early 1980s, and the cyclical slowdown affecting Asia in the mid-1990s. Because of the inflationary pressure in some of their many export markets in the emerging world, euro area countries are more likely to regain price competitiveness now than other crisis-hit countries were in the past. The third difference between the euro area and the EMEs is that European countries generally have more sophisticated domestic financial markets than was the case during the Asian financial crisis. In particular, government debt plays several important roles: sovereign yields are the basis for the pricing of many other instruments; government bonds are widely used as collateral in private repo markets; and public debt is an important asset in the balance sheets of domestic banks and the wealth holdings of the private sector.
What has been agreed on with the SSM – within the framework of Target operating models (TOM) – in relation to the relocation of staff and assets has to be implemented at once and in any event before the end of this year. Regarding CCPs, equivalence decisions by the Commission will ensure continuity of access to UK CCPs after 31 December 2020, until 30 June 2022. Beyond this transition, it is key to address the financial stability risks stemming from an excessive dependence on UK CCPs. The 18 month limited equivalence decision aims to give market participants the time needed to reduce their exposure to UK CCPs that are systemically important for the Union. This timeframe will also be used by ESMA to conduct a comprehensive review of the systemic importance of UK CCPs to the Union as foreseen by EMIR 2.2. This will include a fully reasoned assessment whether some of the clearing services are of such substantial systemic importance that the CCP should for euro-denominated activities be relocated on the continent. Considering the size and the concentration of some of these clearing services, betting on the status quo would be a losing 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  proposition, including for clearing members: a swift relocation is in the interest of all participants and relies as such on the attractiveness of the clearing offer that EU CCPs are encouraged to build in order to help the emergence of a new liquidity pool.

Several factors have contributed to reduce the impacts of the global financial crisis on our national economy. The most important factors are the strength of our domestic financial sector and increased government spending despite of the decline in crude oil prices. The government spending stood at R1s 596.4 billion in 2009, reaching unprecedented record levels. The balance of payments recorded a surplus for the eleventh consecutive year, amounting to R1s 85.4 billion in 2009. The monetary and banking sector contributed efficiently to enhancing these good results by providing appropriate liquidity to finance economic activity. Money supply increased by 10.7 percent during 2009 and commercial banks expanded in providing modern and miscellaneous banking services. Moreover, positive economic developments included lower levels of domestic inflation, measured by the general cost of living index, standing at 5.1 percent in 2009 compared to 9.9 percent in the preceding year. Currently available economic data indicate an expected and notable improvement in the domestic economic performance for the current year despite of resumed inflationary pressures. The inflation rate stood at 6.1 percent in August 2010 compared to the same month of the preceding year. I must take the occasion to indicate that some important international reports have commended some of the Kingdom’s achievements.