samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Within this framework, a more detailed examination of the struggle against inflation process in Turkey reveals that decline in inflation also helped mitigate the fluctuations in inflation and this means less uncertainty and less volatility in economy. While decreased uncertainty brings along decline first in risk premium and then in nominal as well as real interest rates, it decreases borrowing costs from the consumers’ point of view, and opportunity cost of investments from the producers’ view point. At this point, I would like to draw your attention to a risk factor in which the decline in borrowing costs has a significant role. Under chronic inflation conditions, consumers tend to renew durable goods such as automobiles, white goods and alike less frequently. However, when a certain point is attained in the process of reducing inflation, the consumers start purchasing their postponed needs. Demand for durable goods that the consumers defer to purchase tends to increase rapidly in the face of decline in inflation and fall in the borrowing costs. The recovery in demand is not yet at a level that could create an inflationary effect since it is coupled with a rise in productivity. Provided this demand does not assume a permanent nature and lasting economic stability is attained, it is expected that such fluctuations will become less frequent and less intense, but still, it should be monitored very closely. 2  BIS Review 63/2004  Meanwhile, there is another point that I would like to emphasize.

Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Monetary issues in the European Union and Iceland Speech by Mr Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a seminar organised by the Iceland Trade Council, Euro Info office in Iceland and the EU Commission on the theme: Does the Euro affect Iceland?, Reykjavik, 31 October 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen: The evolution of European integration during the second half of the last century is remarkable in many ways. This process began soon after the end of World War II and represented an effort to forge stronger bonds between European nations and thereby, among other things, reduce the likelihood of further conflict on the continent. Although I shall not go into its history here, many notable milestones can be cited along the course that has been taken. One of the most notable was the formal establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union in the beginning of 1999. Now the abolition of the individual member nations’ separate currencies is in sight. As of next year they will be replaced by Euro notes and coin. Not only will prices of goods and services be calculated and stated in a single currency in the twelve EMU countries, but the same notes and coin will be used for business in them all.
Caleb M Fundanga: International financial reporting standards for banks and other financial institutions Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of a workshop on “International financial reporting standards for banks and other financial institutions”, organised by the Bank of Zambia in conjunction with the Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants, Lusaka, 17 February 2005. * •  The Chief Executive, ZICA  •  Distinguished Resource Persons  •  Distinguished Participants  •  Ladies and Gentlemen,  *  *  I wish to welcome you all to this important workshop on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and International Auditing Standards, (ISAs) organised for finance officers and auditors from commercial banks, non-bank financial institutions and the Bank of Zambia. This workshop is organised by the Bank of Zambia in conjunction with the Zambia Institute for Chartered Accountants (ZICAs) out of the recognition that the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and International Auditing Standards (ISAs) are critical not only to the integrity of our financial system, but also to the Bank of Zambia’s efforts of ensuring effective supervision and regulation of banks and non-bank financial institutions. As you may be aware, three important factors have heightened the relevance of accounting and auditing standards to bank supervisors. These, include: •  First, IFRS and ISAs are a set of high-quality, transparent and globally renowned accounting and auditing standards that the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has included in its 12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems.

Which leaves us with the question: is that a price worth paying in order to avoid the fall-out when a bubble eventually bursts? And that leads us to the second judgement that underpinned the non-intervention doctrine. Prior to the latest crisis at least, many policymakers believed that the costs of allowing a bubble in financial markets to run its course were relatively small. Interest rates could always be cut after the event to “mop up” the damage. Blinder and Reis summarise the received wisdom beautifully in their review of the decision to loosen policy when the DotCom bubble burst: “If the mopping up strategy worked this well after the mega-bubble burst in 2000, shouldn’t we assume that it will also work well after other, presumably smaller, bubbles burst in the future?” The large and coordinated cut in interest rates at the start of this decade almost certainly contributed to the build-up of an ever larger bubble. So its not at all clear that the post-2000 mopping up strategy worked that well in retrospect – it just stored up more trouble for the future. And even if it did work well last time around, I hardly need to add that mopping up the fall-out from the latest crisis is stretching the world’s policymakers to the limit. It is evidently not safe to rely on being able to mop up after the crash. Lesson 6: Inflation targeting is necessary but not sufficient A more fundamental question is whether the Inflation Targeting regime itself needs to be rethought.
Putting all of the responsibility on monetary policy would probably mean such high interest rates that they would have seriously negative repercussions for the real economy. Moreover, the argument remains that it is difficult to determine when a credit boom changes from being beneficial for growth to becoming a risk that can trigger a financial crisis. I nevertheless think that the crisis has taught us that when we conduct monetary policy we must also follow a number of variables that are linked to the build-up of risk in the financial markets, primarily credit growth in different sectors of the economy. The fact that monetary policy alone cannot prevent financial crises does not mean that we can only look at an inflation target and otherwise disregard what a long period of low interest rates may entail with regard to risks in the financial system. This is also the view the Riksbank has expressed  BIS Review 149/2008  5  in recent years, occasionally, one must say under strong criticism from both academics and various other parties in society. Monetary policy can alleviate the consequences of the financial crisis The financial crisis has meant that the focus normally placed on monetary policy has been transferred to the measures taken to safeguard financial stability. Monetary policy cannot be used to resolve acute problems in the financial markets. This requires a different type of measure, as I have already described. What role can monetary policy then play in the current situation?

Confidence in the Swedish financial system could have been seriously damaged if a failure like the one at Lehman Brothers had been allowed to occur. The Riksbank’s assessment was that the two banks were experiencing temporary liquidity problems, but that their solvency was not threatened. Finansinspektionen later revoked Carnegie’s licence to conduct banking activities owing to serious deficiencies in the company’s risk management and violation of the law concerning asset management. The decision to revoke the licence thus had nothing to do with Carnegie’s liquidity problems or with the Riksbank’s loan. Carnegie is now owned by the Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank’s liquidity assistance has been repaid. The Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) has also introduced a new act concerning support to credit institutions, which will give the government the opportunity to take the necessary measures to strengthen stability in the financial system. For instance, a government guarantee programme has been presented to support the banks’ and mortgage institutions’ medium-term funding, and a stability fund has been established to manage potential future solvency problems in Swedish institutions. The current situation Despite the crisis in the global financial markets and the increasingly gloomy economic prospects, the assessment is that the Swedish banks still have good resilience to facing the situation that has arisen and future developments. 1 The losses arising from the international crisis have so far been limited, not least in an international perspective, and the Swedish banks have good financial strength.
It will be the Monetary Policy Committee’s task to decide how to respond to these different short- and long-term prospects, with the aim of keeping inflation close to target. Monetary policy instruments are currently being revised, with an eye to improving liquidity management and preparing for a tightening of banking system liquidity concurrent with the Central Bank of Iceland Holding Company’s domestic asset sales and other possible measures related to capital account liberalisation, which will cause short-term market rates to move closer to the centre of the Bank’s interest rate corridor. This could increase the Bank’s net interest income. The monetary policy currently being pursued is different than that prevailing before the crisis, owing to the presence of the capital controls and a managed float rather than the virtually free-floating exchange rate regime that was in place before the crisis struck. The policy described in the Bank’s December 2010 report “Monetary Policy in Iceland After Capital Controls” has therefore been implemented in part. It is possible that we could go even further in the near future and create a monetary policy framework that would supplant the joint declaration of March 2001, confirming some of the changes already in place and paving the way for others. If that is done, it is important to remember that there are limits to what monetary policy can achieve.

Some of the adjustments might be a reflection of the unsustainable pre-crisis imbalances, some of them are cyclical, and some might be a result of structural shifts that boost competiveness, enable export to grow and narrow the gaps. Latest available results from the IMF external sector assessment points to a general conclusion that the region’s current account balances are broadly in line with fundamentals (five out of eleven counties have current account in line with fundamentals, four have stronger position, while three 15  show weaker position than what the fundamentals suggest). The vulnerabilities are more visible, when financial and NIIPs are observed, with several countries having moderately weaker positions that indicates necessity for further policy changes, or bold structural reforms to improve the productivity and correct for the imbalances on the external front. Looking into the future, given  the uncertain global environment and the rising trade tensions, external flows and stock imbalances could widen again, although this would depend on the assumed policy responses in different countries. Further disruptions to trade and supply chains are one of the major risks that can affect the external imbalances. Higher tariffs on bilateral trade can come at significant economic cost, not only for the countries involved. These effects are greatly amplified by global supply chains, which transmit spillovers from bilateral tariffs, affecting countries up and down the value chain. Thus now more than ever there is an urgent need for policies that reduce external vulnerabilities, and prevent adverse spillovers. Bibliography  1.
Public-Private Partnerships 21 Moving on, I would like to touch on public-private partnerships – the other equally important arm of our alternative risk transfer strategy. 22 Continued industrialisation, expanding cross-border trade, and infrastructure development are at the heart of Asia’s growth. These create vast investment opportunities in the region, and will also drive demand for insurance solutions to mitigate a variety of business risks. 23 One such initiative is China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, the most ambitious infrastructure project of its kind to-date. OBOR seeks to connect China and countries across Asia, the Middle East and Europe through a series of land and sea trade routes. Vital public infrastructure, such as roads and railways, gas pipelines, power plants and ports will be built in over 60 countries, with total estimated infrastructure investment to exceed USD 1 trillion. 24 However, modern risks lie along these ancient routes. There are a myriad of geopolitical, legal, credit and environmental risks in many countries along the corridor. Political instability, rioting, terrorism and conflict can lead to contractual issues and financial losses. Unfamiliarity with legal frameworks and regulations can lead to expensive delays. Non-payment risks can be exacerbated by emerging markets’ vulnerability to external shocks, such as currency and commodity price volatility. 25 The MAS is thus seeking to co-create new risk solutions with regional governments and the industry, and utilise these solutions on a pre-emptive basis to help governments and investors safeguard against key risks like natural catastrophes, construction risks and political risks.

Sadly, as Keynes recorded, Aston Villa lost 3-1 and finished that season as runners-up to Blackburn. It is unclear whether Keynes ever again visited a football ground, and there must be a real possibility that, for him, Villa Park was the sum total of his football experience. In later years some of Keynes’s disciples forgot not only his connection with Villa Park but also his view that price stability was a necessary condition for a successful economy. Tomorrow is the 80th anniversary of the death of Lenin, and it was to Lenin that Keynes attributed the remark: “The best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch the currency. By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens”. After doing their best to test this proposition, successive British governments have committed themselves to stable and low inflation. And for the past decade, inflation has ceased to be a dominant consideration in the economic decisions of families and businesses. That has been achieved by aiming at a symmetrical inflation target. Crucial to the success of such a policy is the ability to anchor inflation expectations on the target. For this to be the case, the target must be clear and well understood. From May 1997 the target was 2½% for RPIX inflation. But in December the Chancellor gave the Monetary Policy Committee a new target for inflation.
All these instruments, with the exception of foreign exchange reserves and interest rate caps, have been used or are being used in practice.” 2 Milton Friedman had already predicted five years earlier that this system of managing the economy would collapse because economic policy expectations reduced the scope for pursuing the objective of permanently low unemployment. Friedman proved to be right. The Great Inflation in the 1970s and into the 1980s, combined with an economic management crisis, spurred a new paradigm shift in the field of economics. Regulations and planned economies had to give way to economic thinking guided by the central role of wellfunctioning markets. The shift also occurred in Norway, but it took somewhat longer than in other countries. The US banks that had been harnessed in the 1930s were freed up. The trend gradually pervaded Europe. The freeing up of the banking sector was a bit too abrupt for many and banking crises again made their appearance in western countries, not least here in the Nordic countries. The big picture is nonetheless one of a long period of stable growth and low inflation from the 1990s and into the 2000s. At the same time, debt levels rose in many countries. Deregulation fuelled the flow of capital across borders. Banking regulation had to be coordinated at an international level. The Basel regulatory framework came into place towards the end of the 1980s and represented a breakthrough. But the regulations would prove to be too weak.

“Happiness is a time without debt and reading the end of a book when in bed Happiness is ours in a prosperous nation with a just appropriate level of inflation» Odd Nordstoga sings on.” Nordstoga reminds us that happiness is not only about little debt, but also the other areas of Norges Bank’s operations. A prosperous nation is also dependent on the sound management of the Government Pension Fund Global, which is operated by Norges Bank Investment Management. An appropriate level of inflation is also the objective of monetary policy. We call it inflation targeting. By just appropriate we mean that inflation should be not too high, nor too low. A balanced economic policy must first be in place in order to provide a sound basis for financial stability. Macroprudential policy can then make an important contribution to reducing the sizeable costs associated with financial crises. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
As there is a time lag of 1 to 2 years before an interest rate adjustment has its full effect on the rate of price increases, the Riksbank has to work with forecast inflation. When we have reason to fear that inflation is rising above the targeted rate, it will soon be time to raise the instrumental rate and vice versa. Assessments of future inflation are presented by the Riksbank four times a year in the series of inflation reports. The assessments are published as a guide to economic agents in their own deliberations about what the future level of interest rates is likely to be. The reports also provide a basis for the discussion of monetary policy’s construction that the Riksbank is interested in encouraging. Simplifying somewhat, inflation is determined by two factors: the situation concerning demand and supply and economic agents’ expectations of future inflation. The first factor is fairly straightforward; when demand tends to exceed what the economy is capable of producing, the resultant shortages and bottlenecks will normally push prices and wages up. The part played by expectations may be less evident. If firms and employees expect increased inflation, they will tend to raise prices and demand higher wages, respectively. This may be sufficient to start and continue an inflationary process. Another factor of importance for inflation is the value of the krona, both because it directly affects pricing and demand and because it can serve as an indication of expected inflation. 2.

Miroslav Singer: Czech central bank head sees lowered risk of deflation – interview in The Wall Street Journal Interview with Mr Miroslav Singer, Governor of the Czech National Bank, in The Wall Street Journal, conducted by Paul Hannon on 11 October 2014. *  *  *  The threat of a slide into deflation or a long period of very low inflation in the Czech Republic has diminished, the head of the country’s central bank said Saturday, although he intends to maintain the weak-koruna policy at least into the start of 2016. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal during the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund in Washington, Miroslav Singer said he had been encouraged by the stimulus measures announced by the European Central Bank since June, since he had expected it to take longer to react to very low inflation rates. Mr. Singer also said that he was confident the central bank could bring its weak-koruna policy to an end without risking a “snapback,” or a sharp strengthening of the currency. The Czech Republic is a member of the European Union, but has chosen not to use the euro. It does have close economic ties to the currency area and particularly Germany. As a result, low growth and low inflation in the eurozone have been a big problem for the central bank.
Data on Romania: - Housing cost overburden is very high for the first quintile, and above EU average for up to the fourth quintile (Figure 10); - Savings behavior: there is a strong asymmetry in the deposits’ distribution (83% of depositors have 6.6% of total deposits, while 2.7% depositors have 60% of total deposits) (Figure 11); - Access to mortgages: skewed distribution of access to mortgages (Figure 12); less than 1% of the 1st quintile, less than 2% of the 2nd and 3rd quintile. Even in the top quintile the access to mortgage is 12%. Aggravating factors: high share of mortgages in foreign currency (more than 2/3 before the crisis) and at variable rates (more than 90%); - Inequality data show that a large part of the population cannot afford to buy a new house in the absence of a stock of savings and that at least the first two quintiles of households struggle with the living costs in the houses they currently own; - Because of the lack of access to bank finance, some low to middle income households resort to loans from non-bank financial institutions (NBFI), which have very high interest rates on very short maturities. This behavior leads to further exclusion from bank-related financial services, because of very high debt servicing costs for the NBFI loans. 3  - Inequality matters also for the transmission of monetary policy to the economy. For example: marginal propensity to consume, which determine household responses to a change in interest rates, varies with income.

Access to credit  Mar-17  Oct-16  May-16  Dec-15  Jul-15  Feb-15  Sep-14  Apr-14  Nov-13  Jun-13  Jan-13  Aug-12  Mar-12  Oct-11  May-11  Dec-10  Jul-10  Feb-10  Sep-09  Apr-09  Nov-08  Jun-08  Jan-08  Aug-07  Mar-07  percent 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0  Interest rate of mortgage loans, RON (%)  Interest rate for new mortgage loans, RON (%)  ROBOR 3 M  price to income  Source: Eurostat, NBR, Credit Bureau  10  Figure 14. Mortgage credit and the gross savings rate percent 30  percent 16 14  Figure 15. Share of local currency mortgages percent 100  25 75  12 20  10 8  15  6  50  10  4  25  5  "First house" (%GDP) Mortgage credit other than "First House" (%GDP) Gross saving (%GDP) (rhs)  Source: NBR, FNGCIMM, World Bank  dec.-16  mar.-16  iun.-15  sep.-14  mar.-13 dec.-13  iun.-12  sep.-11  dec.-10  mar.-10  Mortgage credit (%GDP)  0 iun.-09  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  0 2007  0  sep.-08  2  Share of outstanding RON mortgage-backed credit (%) Share of new RON mortgage-backed credit (%)  Source: NBR, Credit Bureau  11  Figure 16.