samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Specifically, in the case of the 2022 revision, on Banco de España estimates, higher commodity prices, increased uncertainty and the lower growth of world markets will reduce growth by 0.7 pp, 0.6 pp and 0.5 pp, respectively. These factors by far outweigh others operating in the opposite direction. These include the fact that, on the latest Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) figures published,2 GDP grew more vigorously in the second half of 2021 than anticipated in the December projection exercise. Likewise operating in favour of output growth is the stimulus provided by the measures included in the National Plan to respond to the economic and social consequences of the war in Ukraine, approved on 29 March by the Spanish Cabinet,3 to which I will refer briefly later on. In any event, assuming that the war will not extend over a long time horizon, activity will continue to be underpinned by the foreseeable improvement in the epidemiological  1  See “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2022-2024)”, Box 1, “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2022, Banco de España. 2 Specifically, the new QNA figures revise the GDP growth rate in 2022 upwards by 0.8 pp. 3  The projections do not incorporate estimates relating to the proposal submitted to the European Commission by the Spanish and Portuguese Governments to reduce the impact of higher gas prices on wholesale electricity prices, because it is not yet clear how this measure will ultimately materialise.

On average, it will rise to 2.8% in 2022 as a whole, but then gradually slow over the rest of the projection horizon. Compared with the December projection exercise, the inflation forecast for 2022 is revised upwards significantly (by 3.8 pp), due, above all, to the recent energy component surprises. The balance of risks in this projection exercise is tilted to the downside in the case of economic activity and to the upside in that of inflation, amid extraordinary uncertainty as a result of the war in Ukraine and its geopolitical implications. In particular, economic activity and inflation will be very sensitive to energy and commodity market developments, to the hypothetical emergence of second-round effects on prices and wages and to the path of household consumption and saving. By way of example, later on I will describe in some detail the adverse repercussions for the Spanish economy of such second-round effects, underscoring the need to adopt an economic policy response that pre-empts these risks via an incomes agreement. The economic policy response The magnitude of the effects of the war will also ultimately hinge on the economic policy response, which has a crucial role to play. Allow me to offer a few thoughts on that response. European economic policies Like the pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine is a very adverse, exogenous shock common to the European Union (EU) as a whole, albeit with uneven effects across countries, sectors and firms.
In particular, fiscal spending will evolve in accordance with the fiscal rule and the consolidation objectives set forth by the Administration, which has pledged to reduce the structural deficit by about one quarter of a point of GDP per year. The worsened external scenario relevant for Chile is the main factor behind the downward revision to 2016 growth. This phenomenon is shared by all emerging and commodity-exporting economies, mainly because of the substantial drop in the terms of trade and less favorable external funding conditions. Commodity prices fell again in recent months, influenced by the steady appreciation of the dollar and slower global growth. In the case of copper, one must add prospects that the Chinese economy’s recomposition by sectors will continue to erode the demand for the metal. Thus, at the statistical cutoff date for this Monetary Policy Report, copper was trading at under 210 cents per pound, accumulating a drop of nearly 30 percent in the year. This, combined with a discouraging short-term outlook, has prompted a significant reduction in our copper price forecast for 2016 and 2017. We now estimate that it will trade at an average of 225 dollar cents per pound, compared with the almost 250 cents we anticipated in September. The price of oil has also dropped in recent months, to less than 40 dollars per barrel as of the closing of our Monetary Policy Report, around 30 percent with respect to the beginning of the year.

Throughout Malaysia’s more than 50 years of development, the country has demonstrated economic flexibility to successfully shift to the new areas of comparative advantage to the new areas of growth. I believe, with the foundations in place, Malaysia has every potential to transition into a high value-added, high income economy. Concluding remarks Asia’s new role in the globalisation process has only just begun. The continuous dynamic evolution of Asia as greater regional economic and financial integration take place will contribute towards raising the standards of living in this region. In this context, the important partnership between the Government and the private sector remains a key element in ensuring stability and sustainable economic development in the future. 4  BIS Review 43/2010
4  I am grateful to Benoit Coeuré of the French Treasury for this comment (see Coeuré, 2007). 5  Summers (2007) has a similar table which also includes countries that already have SWFs. 6  The Greenspan-Guidotti rule is based on the definition of a sufficient level of reserves as equal to the level of short-term foreign currency debt of the country. Excess reserves are calculated as reserves in excess of this level. 2  BIS Review 150/2007  Second, in terms of size, SWFs have become important financial market participants. The 14 largest SWFs are estimated to have approximately USD 2.2 trillion under management. 7 Some market estimates put combined assets as high as 3.5 trillion dollars. 8 The estimated combined assets of the world's 14 largest SWFs now constitute nearly half the size of the world’s total official foreign exchange reserves. 9 As I pointed out at the beginning, however, the assets of the world’s SWFs are still much smaller than the assets invested in mutual funds (USD 19.3 trillion) or global pension funds (USD 21.6 trillion). 10 Third, SWFs are likely to grow substantially in coming years. Market forecasts, which assume that high oil prices and the large current account surpluses in South East Asia will persist, project that SWFs will increase three to fivefold in nominal dollar terms over the next five to ten years. 11 My own view is that such simplistic linear forecasts will likely prove to have been flawed.

At the same time, the balance of inflationary pressures generated by supply-side factors is assessed as contained, given the reduced imported inflation and anchored inflation expectations. Taking into account the insofar developments and expectations for the future, Bank of Albania projections show that, with 90% probability, consumer price inflation for 2012 will range within the 0.7%–2.8% band. Materialisation of this baseline scenario will be reflected in retaining the stimulating nature of the monetary policy in the course of the year. Moreover, the Bank of Albania remains heedful to future developments and ready to respond in the appropriate time and extent in order to comply with its target on inflation. Based on the analysis of the information set out above, the Supervisory Council holds that pressures on consumer prices at home remain low over the monetary policy relevant horizon; they have been, however, on the down side over the recent months. On the demand side, below-potential economic growth will continue to generate low inflationary pressures, while shocks from the supply side are expected to be moderate. At the conclusion of discussions, the Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 4.25%. This decision aims to establish the appropriate monetary conditions to comply with the inflation target in the medium run. Given these conditions, we deem that the monetary policy provides the necessary support to stimulate the aggregate demand. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Timothy F Geithner: Principles to guide the future evolution of financial supervision and regulation Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Bond Market Association's Annual Meeting 2006, New York, 19 May 2006. *  *  *  Thanks for inviting me to speak to you today. You are meeting at a time of significant confidence in the strength of the global economy and in the overall health of the financial system. On the available evidence, the core of the U.S. financial system is stronger than it has been in some time. Capital levels are higher and earnings stronger and more diversified. This strength is the result of many factors. It is the result of the length and strength of the economic expansion in the United States and the associated improvements in credit fundamentals. It reflects increases in the scale and scope of the operations of the largest institutions. It is the result of the dramatic innovations in the technology of finance and in the opportunities that has created for managing risk more effectively. And it reflects the increased integration of national financial institutions and the resulting competitive pressure and opportunities for diversification. We have seen substantial improvements in risk management practice and in internal controls over the past decade. These improvements are the product of large investments in people and technology, as well as changes to the internal architecture around control and compliance.

Rather than starting with a presumption that we will act in the United States and then hope to induce the world to follow, there are some areas where the more effective approach will be to start with the borderless solution by which I mean one designed to apply to a class of institutions and financial instruments, independent of geography and currency. Where this does not prove possible on terms or in a time frame we like, we of course preserve the option to move alone. Third, we live in a financial system in which nonbank financial institutions play a much larger role than they did in the past, a system in which the differences between the activities of the bank-centered financial institutions and nonbanks has diminished, and in which the largest commercial banks and investment banks compete with each other and with other nonbank institutions in both the United States and abroad. These changes in market structure have many positive implications for financial efficiency and stability, but they also mean that differences in the size and nature of the incentives faced by institutions with different supervisory and regulatory regimes can have larger competitive effects. The resulting opportunities for regulatory arbitrage have the potential to reduce the impact of provisions that apply only to regulated or supervised institutions. The risk that regulating the core of the system simply pushes financial activity to the periphery can raise the risk that distress among nonbanks can cause greater damage to the financial system.
To increase our exports, domestic costs have to remain on a moderate path and the strategies for opening up the economy and fostering trade have to be developed. There are government initiatives to promote economic and trade relations with new areas (such as the Integral Market Development Plans), which are delivering good results and in which firms should not hesitate to take part. Finally, firms should continue to pursue innovation and quality as a means of enhancing competitiveness, a strategy which calls for specialised, well-trained workers. In this respect, education should pay greater heed to the practical needs of the productive sector by involving the business world more closely in the design and definition of vocational-training and university course contents. Here it is fitting to point out that some areas of education in  BIS Review 117/2008  5  Spain continue to produce disheartening results: in particular, the percentage of young people completing secondary school studies continues to be among the lowest in Europe. Hence government policies aimed at remedying this underperformance (in which the regions play a central role) should be prioritised. Firms, along with trade unions, also face the challenge of containing the effect of the adjustment on employment. Given the repercussions that unemployment has for spending and, above all, for household confidence and the general climate of uncertainty, this variable is crucial, since a smaller impact on employment would reduce the fall in demand and lower the probability of being caught in a vicious circle.

Moreover, growth in the world economy is expected to remain relatively resilient, benefiting mainly from sustained growth in emerging economies. This should support external demand for euro area goods and services and thereby investment. This outlook is also reflected in the September 2008 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. The exercise projects average annual real GDP growth in a range between 1.1% and 1.7% in 2008, and between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009. In comparison with the June Eurosystem staff projections, real GDP growth figures for 2008 and 2009 are lower. In the view of the Governing Council, the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic activity is particularly high at the current juncture and, generally, downside risks prevail. Risks stem particularly from renewed increases in energy and food prices, which could dampen consumption and investment. Moreover, downside risks continue to relate to the  BIS Review 105/2008  1  potential for the financial market tensions to affect the real economy more adversely than currently foreseen. The possibility of disorderly developments owing to global imbalances also implies downside risks to the outlook for economic activity, as do concerns about rising protectionist pressures. With regard to price developments, annual HICP inflation has remained considerably above the level consistent with price stability since last autumn, standing at 3.8% in August according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 4.0% in June and July 2008.
M. Trichet presents the monetary policy guidelines of the Bank of France for 1997 BANK OF FRANCE, PRESS RELEASE, 17/12/96. 1. The ultimate goal of monetary policy is to ensure price stability, as required by legislation. The objective of the Monetary Policy Council is that the increase in prices, as measured by the consumer price index, should not exceed 2% in 1997, as in the medium term. 2. To meet this ultimate goal, the Banque de France uses two intermediate objectives, one of which is external and the other internal: -  The objective of a stable external value of the currency: as it has been for ten years, the stability of the franc will be maintained against the group of the most credible currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. -  An intermediate internal growth target for the money supply as assessed by the development of the narrow and broad monetary aggregates: in 1997, the money supply should be able to show a medium-term growth trend of 5%. This figure is consistent with price inflation of no more than 2% and non-inflationary real GDP growth of about 2.5%, which could be exceeded, in view of the potential for growth to catch up in the medium term. The Monetary Policy Council has decided to simultaneously monitor the main narrow and broad money aggregates in order to obtain a concise estimate of all monetary developments. 3. Total domestic debt is an important indicator.

The SEPA credit transfer and SEPA direct debit schemes replaced all domestic payment schemes in the euro area, using fully interoperable global standards. Catering for innovation In the current age of rapid technological progress, it is vital to ensure that innovation delivered by banks and non-banks reaches all European citizens. Innovative bespoke national solutions using 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  national – or, more frequently, non-European – technology could threaten the integration achieved by the various SEPA schemes. Innovation may start at domestic level, but it should not face barriers preventing pan-European expansion. Thus, national solutions should provide for pan-European reach in their initial design. As these solutions tend to be provided by non-banks or disseminated by local banks on behalf of non-European entities, third-party providers need regulated access to payment accounts. The revised Payment Services Directive (PSD2), which is currently in the process of being implemented, will provide secure and interoperable payment account access and will allow innovative new payment services to be provided in the EU. What we don’t need is integration with non-European countries that runs counter to European standards. While legislation is indispensable for an integrated market and to promote innovation, it is not the only precondition. Cooperation between stakeholders is also essential in order to ensure smooth and harmonised processes throughout the EU. The ECB has brought the market together, initially via the SEPA Council and then via the Euro Retail Payments Board (ERPB).
The latest three-month average of M3 growth, covering the period from May to July 1999, rose to 5.4%, compared with 5.3% in the previous three-month period from April to June 1999. Overall, the annual rate of growth of M3 has been moving away from the reference value of 4.5% since the start of the year. This upward movement may be explained to a large extent by the very low opportunity costs of holding monetary assets, especially the most liquid components, but perhaps also by the gradually improving economic conditions in the euro area. At the same time, the annual growth rate of credit to the private sector remained high, even though it declined by 0.5 percentage point in July, to 10.4%. The monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem assigns a prominent role to the behaviour of M3. Accordingly, recent monetary developments merit close attention. At the same time, taking into account the fact that we are still in a very early phase of Monetary Union and that figures for broad money growth have been subject to some revisions in recent months, shorter-term monetary developments need to be interpreted with caution. Concerning financial market indicators, the upturn in long-term interest rates in the euro area, seen since early May, continued in August and early September. Domestic factors seem to have played a dominant role, as indicated by the fact that differentials between US and euro area bond yields have narrowed further.

On 25 September 1999 the ECB and the EU national central banks will conduct a demonstration of the TARGET Year 2000 compliance in which – according to current information – several hundred EU credit institutions will participate. Prior to this, the ECB and the national central banks have already successfully tested their TARGET components first at the national level and thereafter in cross-border tests. To a large extent, credit institutions have already taken part in these tests. In parallel, as announced a few weeks ago, on 29 June 1999 the ECB together with the national central banks successfully completed the bilateral testing of the ESCB applications that are necessary for the conduct of monetary policy operations. The testing exercise, together with the parallel remedial actions, has proved that these systems are Year 2000 compliant. BIS Review 96/1999  2  You may recall that on 15 July 1999 we decided to close TARGET on 31 December 1999 in order to smooth the transition not only for the ESCB institutions, but also for the other financial institutions. This day can thus be kept free for end-of-year operations and for making full back-ups of the relevant systems. In the area of TARGET, as well as in the area of monetary policy implementation and liquidity management, we are also reviewing our contingency procedures to minimise any potential Year 2000-related impact. It is worth noting that general contingency procedures had already been put in place shortly before the launch of the euro.
This balance is critical to deliver the welfare benefits of financial innovation and avoid stalling the development of digital finance with the risk of leaving someone behind. I look forward to the presentations and discussions by the participants at the conference that I am sure will provide interesting reflections on the abovementioned challenges casting light on the fast changing financial innovation landscape, especially in the payments area. I wish all of you an enjoyable and rewarding conference in Ohrid, our charming city, protected by UNESCO for its natural and cultural heritage. Thank you! 1 The Pulse of Fintech 2018: Biannual global analysis of investment in fintech, 2019,  KPMG,  assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2019/02/the-pulse-of-fintech-2018.pdf 2 The future of banking is open: How to seize the Open Banking opportunity, 2018, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,  retailbankinginnovation.fintecnet.com/uploads/2/4/3/8/24384857/the_future_of_banking_is_open.pdf  4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Asset markets supported by an artificially low interest rate environment rather than economic fundamentals will skew resources allocation in society from expanding the productive sectors to pursuit of asset price appreciation. Such a shift will easily lead to investment mismatch, thereby eroding medium to long term productivity growth as well as growth potential of the economy. In addition, the more sizable and prolonged quantitative easing becomes, the more difficult and riskier will be the exit plan. Central banks should realise that there is not much they can do. In order to solve the structural imbalances built up in the past two decades, we must get to the bottom of the problem. Ladies and Gentlemen, up until 2008, the industrialised countries and various emerging economies had been enjoying a golden period of development which lasted for two to three decades. Income levels and living standards continued to rise. Some academics call this a period of “Great Moderation”. However, no one is sure why life during this period was so easy. Some say that this is due to technological and financial innovation of modern society, the so-called “paradigm shift”. We should now be awakened to the reality that this golden period was probably underpinned by little more than excessive debts, and is in fact unsustainable. If the major industrialised countries will have to undergo deleveraging in the foreseeable future, how will the global economy evolve?