samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This substantial, but not insuperable, reservation aside, I am confident that, in terms of producing business for Hong Kong’s banks, the creation effect of WTO entry will outweigh any diversion that will arise from the preference of some foreign banks and enterprises for dealing directly with the Mainland. There will still be factors that will encourage international businesses to use Hong Kong as a financial centre. These include the efficiency and sophistication of Hong Kong’s financial markets and the financial infrastructure, the critical mass that goes with being the world’s fourth largest banking centre, and all the qualities that single out Hong Kong, of which an audience such as this needs little reminder: the rule of law, the free movement of goods, capital and information, light government, and a trained and energetic workforce. Globalisation 10. WTO is about globalisation. So let me turn to that subject now. Hong Kong’s openness, and our connectedness to the larger world, place us in an excellent position to take advantage of the acceleration of globalisation that trade and financial liberalisation, and other forces are bringing about. Globalisation is not a new phenomenon. Our ancestors embraced the idea with the opening of trading routes, the building of canals and steamships, and the laying of railway lines and telegraph cables. And for a hundred and fifty years or more, Hong Kong has been a classic example of a global hub – a city at the crossroads of a number of regional and transcontinental trading routes.

7. How do banking and finance fit into all of this? We expect to see two main developments over the next few years. The first is the greater demand for banking services resulting from the growing volume of business that will follow WTO accession. The second is the financial deepening, stimulated by more rapid financial liberalisation, greater banking competition, and product innovation induced by the terms of WTO accession. These developments will accelerate the reforms already in train within China’s domestic banking sector – reforms that cover the whole spectrum of banking management and services from corporate governance to the professional training of staff. The developments will also progressively open China’s business environment to competition from banks from outside the Mainland. In two years’ time, foreign banks will be able to conduct RMB business with Chinese enterprises in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian. Within five years, they will be able to deal with all Chinese enterprises without any geographical restriction. The advantages for banks with a base in Hong Kong are obvious. Many of them have a head start on the Mainland, with networks of branches and more than a generation of practical experience. They also have all the advantages of geographical proximity, a common language and culture, yet separate financial and legal jurisdictions that Hong Kong’s unique position in China brings. Forty per cent of the Mainland’s trade is routed through Hong Kong. Hong Kong is the Mainland’s largest source of foreign direct investment and China’s main financial conduit and funding centre.
These include the two episodes of bird flu that have affected production and exports of poultry, and the uncertainty linked to the situations in the south which has importantly affected consumer confidence and business sentiment. So, for the most part, the performance of the Thai economy this year is essentially a story of how the domestic economy has been adjusting to the risks that emerged. This includes adjustments in the domestic financial markets and the real economy, as well as the implications for economic and financial stability. Let me go through each of these points in turn. As for the domestic financial markets, the adjustment has been led by the repricing of financial assets that has been underway since the second quarter. Yields on long bonds have been rising. Equity prices have declined. There have been some outflows of short - term capital, and the Baht has weakened from last year. In all, the adjustment has been smooth and orderly, and has benefited from the flexible market mechanism that underpins the movements of the economy’s key prices. And for the real economy, the adjustment has been accompanied by a moderation in growth in the first quarter to 6.5 percent, led by the slowdown in agriculture because of drought and the bird flu. Output of manufacturing and services, however, has continued to expand robustly.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Thailand’s economic conditions and prospects - a mid-year update Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a luncheon organised by the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 27 August 2004. *  *  *  Let me begin first by thanking the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce for the invitation to speak to you today. For the Australian-Thai Chamber, this is the first for me and I am very pleased to be here. Today, I plan to cover the evolving economic pictures both at home and abroad. For the global economy, a number of interesting new themes are now emerging and I will try to put these developments into the perspective as we understand it at the Bank of Thailand. As for the domestic economy, despite a number of risks and challenges, this year the economy has managed well under the circumstances. Growth momentum remains firm and economic stability remains intact. Today, I will not open up any new kind of inquiry on the Thai economy, but will simply update you on the recent economic outturn and explain the rationale behind this week's decision by the Monetary Policy Committee to increase the policy interest rate. This decision, which is the first increase in three years, has been expected by the market following signs of increased pressure on domestic prices and following our own assessment and communication to the market that low interest rates have become less necessary given the changed outlook on inflation.
Kevin Stiroh: The impact of the pandemic on cultural capital in the finance industry Remarks by Mr Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President of the Financial Institution Supervision Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Risk USA Conference (delivered via videoconference), 16 November 2020. * * * Good morning and thank you for the opportunity to participate today, the first day of what looks to be a very interesting four days featuring a range of important and timely discussion items for the financial sector. As I looked through the agenda, I was impressed with the diversity of topics the panels will be covering, including traditional banking risks, emerging risks like climate change, and the industry’s response to the pandemic. Today, I want to focus my time on the importance of a firm’s culture in determining business outcomes and how that culture may be impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. Through my remarks today, I will address two core sets of questions. One, what is cultural capital, why does it matter, and how does it evolve? Two, how is cultural capital impacted by the pandemic? I think we’ll hear more about how the pandemic is impacting financial firms in a wide variety of ways throughout the conference. Before proceeding, I will emphasize that I am speaking for myself and my views do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. What Is Cultural Capital? First, what is cultural capital?

Since March, our world and the financial industry have changed before our eyes. Our workplaces were transformed overnight from offices to our homes. Our office mates now include our spouses, kids, and roommates. And, our colleagues became voices on the other ends of our phones or faces on our screens. What does all of this externally-driven change do to a firm’s culture? In the early days of the pandemic, the financial industry and the official sector responded quickly and forcefully to ensure that the provision of critical financial services continued despite the tragic health crisis, significant economic and financial uncertainty, and substantial operational challenges. Many were focused on solving the immediate problems and figuring out how to work remotely. This proved surprisingly effective, at least in the short run. From the perspective of cultural capital, this sudden and dramatic shift in how we work raises multiple questions. First, how does cultural capital influence outcomes in this new environment? How are we drawing on, or depleting, the cultural capital that already existed? Does this environment pose new challenges regarding behavioral risk? And finally, is it possible to identify new opportunities to build cultural capital in a predominately remote environment?
The success of the principle-based approach to regulation will depend on the ability of banking institutions, individually and collectively as an industry, to make use of the flexibilities given without giving rise to excessive risk taking, overpricing, credit rationing and other actions that could threaten stability in the financial system and overall economic well-being of the nation. The key is for banking institutions to act responsibly, as the actions of banking institutions would have implications on all segments of the economy. Due attention must be given to ensure that all segments of the society have access to banking services at reasonable cost and no groups should be marginalised in this process. In this respect, while we advocate a principle-based regulatory framework, Bank Negara Malaysia will closely monitor the performance and actions of banking institutions, and would intervene and prescribe specific regulations in the event that actions by banking institutions could jeopardise financial stability and public confidence in the financial system. As a custodian of public funds, and as a service-oriented industry, the banking sector must continuously strive to maintain public confidence in the system and deliver high standards of services. Maintaining public confidence entails efforts beyond maintaining strong financial results and having a wide range of products and services for customers. As customers become more financially savvy and better informed of their rights, the conduct and practices of banking institutions will increasingly be scrutinised by the public.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Strengthening the banking sector for further competition Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the dialogue session with banking institutions, Kuala Lumpur, 17 February 2005. *  *  *  Bismillahirrahmanirahim Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Economic transformation, a more competitive environment, advances in technology, strengthening international linkages, and more discerning customers will be the important forces that will drive changes in the domestic financial landscape in the years ahead. Economic transformation can be expected to be more pronounced as efforts intensify to shift resources to new areas of growth. A more competitive environment will emerge from increased deregulation and further liberalisation. Advances in technology will continue to increase the potential for creating new instruments, new business processes and enhance the ability to measure and manage risks. Strengthening international linkages will come as foreign presence and participation in the domestic financial system increases and as initiatives are taken by domestic groups to operate beyond domestic borders. Against this background, more demanding customers with higher expectations will see greater consumer activism exerting their influence on the financial landscape. These developments will indeed present a dynamic environment with new challenges for the banking industry. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to welcome you to the dialogue session between Bank Negara Malaysia and banking industry.
However, the difficulties in pricing the structured products linked to sub-prime mortgages and, above all, the patent lack of transparency in the process of pooling, segmentation and redistribution of credit risk carried out through these products are causing problems of confidence between institutions. All these problems have practically paralysed the interbank markets for term loans, in which transaction volumes are very low, and led to interest rates above those expected under  2  BIS Review 134/2007  normal circumstances. European stock market prices, particularly for financial and construction firms, have also been adversely affected, while some investors have shifted to lower-risk assets such as government debt, resulting in declines in yields on these securities. The uncertainties deriving from all these movements pose evident added complexity in monetary policy decision-making. Fortunately, the financial turbulence described reaches Europe at a time of high economic buoyancy and, therefore, notable resilience in the euro area. The GDP of the euro area grew somewhat less than expected in the second quarter of the year, but 2007 to date represents, overall, a continuation of the economic boom initiated in the area in mid-2005. The sound financial position of firms, the expected profit rates and the favourable response of employment to the step-up in activity suggest that this stage of output expansion will persist over the coming quarters at a rate that, although it may well be slightly lower than anticipated some months ago, continues to be around potential growth.

The pace of recovery however varies across regions. Though global conditions have improved, recent developments in Europe have once again unsettled financial markets as doubts have arisen over the fiscal sustainability of several countries in the Euro zone. These episodic concerns serve as broad reminders that the world economy still faces serious challenges as governments, financial institutions and corporations adjust to the new realities of greater prudence, tighter market conditions and lower tolerance for weak governance and excessive leverage. 4. In Asia, economic growth has rebounded strongly above pre-crisis levels and become more broad-based. Fundamentals in Asia continue to be strong, boosted by robust domestic demand, healthy balance sheets and strong resurgence in intra-regional trade. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Asia is expected to grow by an average of 7.1% in 2010 and 2011, up from 3.4% in 2009. Having reformed and restructured their economies following the Asian Crisis a decade ago, Asia was better positioned with less fiscal imbalances or corporate excesses to emerge faster from the downturn. Prospects for sustained growth in ASEAN are also good. Its outlook is enhanced by continuing efforts to create an integrated single market by 2015. With improved trade links with the two Asian giants – China and India, ASEAN will become an even more dynamic and vibrant region within Asia. 5. The GCC countries too enjoy solid growth prospects, and look set to achieve around 5% GDP growth in 2010 and 2011, according to the IMF.
One is a decision to “not do” and the other is decision to “do”. The first is the “not do”. We decided in the early 1990s not to implicitly subsidize cash anymore by storing it all over the country and allowing for overnight deposits. It took some time to implement this strategy. But as of a few years back, the Riksbank only has one cash depot in the entire country. It is the market’s responsibility to store and transport cash, hence those costs are now borne by the market. The second is a “do”. A few years back, we engaged in a dialogue with a consortium of banks and the Swedish clearing house on how a fast payment system available 24/7 could be created. For a payment system to be safe, you want to assure an eventual settlement over the central bank’s  2 [4]  books that is in central bank money. This can normally only be done when the central bank’s payment system is open. After some thinking, we found a way to connect the instant payment system with the Riksbank’s system and by allowing ring-fenced overnight balances for this purpose - or to put it differently by extending a secured credit overnight - we managed to construct a scheme where the fast payments are backed by central bank money even when our system is closed. The result?

Today over half of the Swedish population have downloaded the fast payments app (Swish) on their smart phone and it has become a prominent feature in the retail payment landscape, providing a substitute for cash in person to person (P2P) payments. Cards and cash are the most common payment methods among consumers  Source: Sveriges riksbank. These two examples shows that a central bank may need to be both “hands off” and “hands on” depending on the situation to foster innovation. The trick is to find the right degree of intervention at the right time. And to perform that trick there are no short cuts. A thorough analysis of costs and benefits is needed. 3 [4]  Another lesson is that in the wake of such fundamental changes, like the one currently transforming the Swedish retail payments market, new questions keep arising. With change, there will be winners and losers. In this case the winners are the Swedes who have adapted to electronic payment means. Losers are the ones who want, or for some reason need, to keep on using cash and who increasingly find themselves in a world where access to cash, and acceptance of cash, are on the decline. This creates a new challenge for society. This change needs to be managed. For a central banker, the transformation of the retail payments market also implies a more fundamental question. If cash basically disappears, then the general public will lose access to central bank money – they will only have access to commercial bank money.
The exchange rate remained stable up to autumn 1996, partly because wage growth was low and overall demand did not generate pressures in the economy. Gradually, the krone began to show wider fluctuations. The experience of the latter half of the 1990s demonstrated that monetary policy cannot fine-tune the exchange rate. Developments in international financial markets led to more pronounced fluctuations. And more fundamentally, when labour market pressures rose and incomes policy failed, exchange rate developments no longer provided signals to wage formation and fiscal policy. High petroleum revenues, fiscal slippage and expectations of increased government petroleum revenue spending contributed to this. The exchange rate was therefore no longer suitable as a nominal anchor. Towards the end of the 1990s, monetary policy placed emphasis on the fundamental preconditions for exchange rate stability. Monetary policy instruments were oriented in such a way that price and cost inflation was brought down to the price stability objective of the European Central Bank (ECB). Pursuant to the Regulation of March 2001, the mandate for monetary policy stipulates that monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s internal and external value, thereby contributing to stable exchange rate expectations. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin  2  BIS Review 90/2006  fiscal policy by contributing to stable developments in output and employment. The operational objective of monetary policy is low and stable inflation, with annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time.

Some said that the development in the last three decades was a miracle and was almost incredible. Instead, I would describe it as a “world-shaking” development. Having encountered enormous difficulties and challenges at every single stage of reform and opening up, China, as the country with largest population in the world, managed to carry out an unprecedented transformation from a planned economy to a market economy. As there was no precedent to learn from, China could only rely on its own efforts and took one step at a time. Hong Kong has played an extremely important and irreplaceable role during the process of China’s reform and opening up. At the initial stage of opening up, China focused on attracting foreign investors to set up manufacturing factories. Hong Kong manufacturers were the first to move their operations to Mainland China. In the past 30 years, Hong Kong has always been the largest source of direct investment in the Mainland. In 2009, Hong Kong invested $ billion in China, accounting for one half of the total foreign investment in the country. In the course of investing in China, not only has Hong Kong injected capital but, more importantly, it has introduced skills in production and management. In the past decade, the Mainland projects in which Hong Kong invested have gone through some significant changes. The focus has been shifted from investment in the manufacturing industry to a range of diversified and multi-dimensional investments that include investment in all kinds of service industries.
That is to say, they sold foreign currencies on the foreign exchange market and paid the proceeds into sight deposit accounts at their banks. 7 In other words, the liquidity expansion created in the Swiss banking system by the SNB was largely reflected in customer deposits. However, for some time, statistics have been suggesting a change in this behaviour. In contrast to the first phase, no additional customer deposits have been forming following the sale of foreign currency. One possible explanation for this development is that, instead of holding francs on their accounts, domestic investors have been keeping their assets in the relevant foreign currency, but have been hedging them using derivatives (forward foreign exchange transactions and foreign exchange swaps); 8 investors may, via their banks, have been purchasing francs using forward contracts, for instance. The banks, in turn, may have hedged the resulting foreign currency risk by demanding Swiss francs on the spot market. This demand then ultimately resulted in upward pressure on the Swiss franc, which the SNB countered by means of appropriate foreign currency purchases. The rise in hedging transactions using derivatives is notable at Swiss pension funds. For a long time, diversification and return considerations have prompted institutional investors to hold a significant portion of their assets in foreign currency investments. However, the associated currency risk is increasingly being hedged using forward foreign exchange 6 7  8  As far as equity prices are concerned, the development of the Swiss market has been similar to that of the rest of Europe.

Despite very high demand for Swiss francs, the percentage fell from 21% to 15% between 2008 and 2014; since negative interest was introduced, it has fallen further and now stands at only about 11% (cf. chart 7). Conversely, the share of domestic investors has risen. This group often favours domestic bonds for their long-term investments, or is obliged to hold a given percentage of such bonds for regulatory reasons. Nonetheless, demand from foreign investors remains strong in some segments of the Swiss franc bond market, notably that for money market debt register claims. How do we explain this apparent paradox? One contributory factor is the distortions on the FX swap market mentioned before. While they make borrowing more expensive for foreign issuers, they have the opposite effect for foreign investors and offer special arbitrage opportunities. This allows investors from the US dollar or euro areas to achieve higher returns on a hedged basis. 5 The weekly auctions have been clearly oversubscribed, as can be seen from chart 8. Although the average yield to maturity is very low, bids have been significantly higher than actual allocation (blue), with some 60% of outstanding money market debt register claims currently in the hands of foreign investors. All in all, we can say that, despite strong demand for Swiss francs and low interest rates in Switzerland, the outstanding volume of the Swiss franc bond market has barely changed.