samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Going forward, these phenomena are expected to be reversed by a further adjustment of consumption and investment, under the assumption that the policies that spurred the sharp fall in national savings will not be repeated. As I will show you shortly, over the next two years today's current-account deficit will be substantially reduced. On the external front, global inflation continues to be high, although with some moderation in some countries. Inflationary pressures are mainly concentrated in the core part of inflation, which in several economies has been driven by the strength of the services sector (figure 9). As described in one of the boxes in the Report, the U.S. labor market remains tight and under high wage pressures. To varying degrees, this situation is also present in other developed economies and poses a risk to the decline in inflation in these countries. In fact, it is one of the factors behind the tighter global monetary policy outlook considered in the central scenario of this Report. Thus, the monetary policy implemented by central banks in the rest of the world has reinforced their contractionary stance. This has been particularly visible in developed economies, where monetary tightening processes began later. Both the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, along with significant hikes in their benchmark rates, have signaled a more protracted tightening than was expected some time ago. In Latin America, most central banks have continued to raise their interest rates, with the exceptions of Chile and Brazil.

In fact, the persistently high levels of inflation confirm the need for proper coordination of all policies. We at the Central Bank are firmly committed to our mandate and we will continue to conduct our monetary policy to ensure that inflation is reduced and ceases to be a burden for the Chilean people. Thank you. 9  Figure 1 Inflation indicators (1) (2) (annual change, percent)  Total CPI  21  Core CPI  Volatile CPI  15  18  Core goods w/o foods  Core services  12  15 9  12 6  9  6  3  3  0  0 15  16  17  18  19  20  21  -3  22  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  (1) Dashed vertical lines mark statistical close of March 2022 MP Report. (2) For details on groupings and shares in CPI basket, see Box IV.1 in Dec. 2019 MP Report, Carlomagno & Sansone (2019), and Economic Glossary. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 2 Structural decomposition of goods CPI w/o volatiles excl. Foods (*) (cumulative change since January 2020, percentage points)  10  Demand  8  Supply  Goods CPI w/o volatiles excl.
Moreover, the signs of a stronger global recovery and increasing global trade suggest that foreign demand should increasingly add to the overall resilience of the economic expansion in the euro area. However, economic growth continues to be dampened by a sluggish pace of implementation of structural reforms, in particular in product markets, and by remaining balance sheet adjustment needs in a number of sectors. The risks surrounding the euro area growth outlook, while moving towards a more balanced configuration, are still tilted to the downside and relate predominantly to global factors. Headline inflation has been recovering from the very low levels seen in 2016, largely owing to higher energy price increases. After reaching 2.0% in February 2017, euro area annual HICP inflation stood at 1.5% in March. This reflected mainly lower energy and unprocessed food price 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  inflation, but also a decline in services price inflation. Looking ahead, on the basis of current futures prices for oil, headline inflation is likely to increase in April and thereafter to hover around current levels until the end of this year. However, as unutilised resources are still weighing on domestic wage and price formation, measures of underlying inflation remain low and are expected to rise only gradually over the medium term, supported by our monetary policy measures, the expected continuing economic recovery and the corresponding gradual absorption of slack.

The oil price futures used in our forecasts turned out to be poor predictors in volatile oil markets.2  1  2  A recent BdF working paper argued that short-term unemployment is more meaningful than total unemployment when looking at the Phillips curve in the US. Cf. Ferrara L. and Sestieri G. in Banque de France, Quarterly Selection of Articles, No. 36, Winter 2014-2015. Bec, Frédérique and Annabelle De Gaye (Nov. 2014), “How do oil price forecast errors impact inflation forecast errors? An empirical analysis from French and U.S. inflation forecasts.” Banque de France Working Paper 523. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  But downside surprises also occurred for core inflation suggesting the need for complementary explanations. One candidate is the continuous appreciation of the euro between mid-2012 and the beginning of 2014, which has lowered prices of many imported non-energy industrial goods. One can expect this impact to be transitory as the euro has subsequently depreciated since the middle of 2014. This depreciation reflects the differences in the growth cycle between the euro area and its main partners and accordingly the differences in monetary policy. Those explanations do not account for the slowdown in domestic prices, which must then be attributed to an increase in domestic slack. For the European Commission the output gap widened from −2% in 2012 to −3% in 2013.
The growth of 0.3 pp in euro area GDP in the second quarter of 2013 has, naturally, been a positive surprise and plots a favourable course for the Spanish economy. But its duration and intensity are by no means assured. Indeed, recently revised medium-term forecasts for the euro area as a whole continue to augur very moderate GDP growth rates and overly high unemployment levels. In the financial domain, the degree of market fragmentation is lessening considerably, but is still not fully compatible with the normal functioning of a monetary union and with efficient monetary policy transmission. The cost at which households, credit institutions and the different levels of government can currently finance themselves in the countries subject to most tension is still above what the ECB monetary policy stance would warrant. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The ECB has in fact continued to reinforce its expansionary monetary policy stance throughout the year, both through conventional conduct and through non-conventional or extraordinary measures. In May there was a fresh cut in official interest rates which, along with the maintenance of the unlimited liquidity provision policy, is serving to set money market interest rates at extremely low levels. In July the ECB Governing Council decided to take a further step in its strategy of reinforcing its expansionary monetary policy stance with the use of a new instrument, known in the parlance as “forward guidance”.

But there’s little doubt that, for the UK’s clothing and textile businesses, globalisation mattered a great deal. And if you’re inclined to view de-industrialisation as a sorry tale, it can only be the sorrier for a sector that played such a prominent part in our history and in the industrial revolution in particular. During the ten years Adam Smith spent writing the Wealth of Nations, and a few miles further south of here, the inventor and entrepreneur Richard Arkwright was awarded patents for his new spinning and carding machines. He opened his famous mill at Cromford in 1776, the same year as the book was published. By 1790 mills using his new machines employed 30,000 people. By the 1820s, Britain was producing half of the global cotton  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  1  textiles . Famously, in his two-sector example of the principle of comparative advantage, Ricardo chose Portuguese wine and “English cloth”. And yet it is still worth bearing in mind Smith and Ricardo’s basic insights. If people can move relatively easily from one job to another, employment needn’t fall in aggregate even if it’s doing so in one particular sector. (Nationally, the rate of employment is significantly higher and the rate of unemployment far lower than in the mid-1970s.) And in the meantime, we have all had the benefit of cheaper clothes.
Essentially, we need to teach our young on how to learn and adapt, not how to work. I am confident that Malaysians as a whole are able to adapt to these changes, as we have proven on numerous times over the course of our short history. Conclusion Let me conclude. Malaysia has evolved significantly in the last 60 years. Our history has shown how Malaysia has been an economy that is able to adapt to an evolving environment. We welcome business, we provide an opportunity to profit, and we are pragmatic and agile in our policies to protect the interest of all. With more than a hundred years of history between us, Malaysia looks forward to a mutually beneficial relationship with both foreign and domestic investors alike. Thank you. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

It is really a great honor to have representatives from the central banks of the EU member states as well as from the candidate countries attending this conference, especially having in mind that on the last day of the conference some of them will have presentations and share their experiences in the domain of payment systems. Ladies and gentlemen, Now, allow me to declare the seventh conference on payment and securities settlement systems open! I would like to wish the chairman Mr. Michiel van Doeveren and his colleagues a successful conference. I hope the weather will be fine and you will enjoy the beauties of Lake Ohrid, and in the afternoon and in the evening, you will have the opportunity to visit the city of Ohrid, which is one of the best preserved material and spiritual legacies witnessing the millennial existence of our culture and historical heritage. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Figure 9 Nominal exchange rate (*)  Chile: Real exchange rate  (indexes 2 January 2008=100)  (index 1986=100)  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  Jan.08  Jul.08  Brazil Australia New Zealand  Feb.09  Sep.09  Mexico Canada Chile  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 88  91  94  97  00  03  06  09  1989-2008 average 1994-2008 average  (*) Parity with the US dollar. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg.

As a result, in less than ten years since the launch of the euro, the number of large value payment systems in euro operating in the EU will have been dramatically reduced: this number is to drop from 21 ( i.e the 16 components of TARGET1 plus 5 privately-owned systems) down to 2 (TARGET2 and EURO 1). To sum up, we should shortly be on the same footing as the United States in terms of the integration of large-value payment infrastructures. On the retail side, the situation is quite different. Indeed, there are today in the EU, 15 multilateral clearing and settlement systems in euro, almost the same number than 10 years ago, and there is no clear sign for the time being that this number is going to fall significantly in the short to medium run. The market is therefore characterized by this multiplicity of national multilateral retail payment systems, coexisting with various other payment arrangements such as bilateral schemes, international card schemes or banking “clubs”. It is fair to say that significant steps towards integration have nevertheless been made since the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins. In 2002, the European banking community launched the SEPA project, with the final objective that by 2010 “all payments are treated as domestic as far as speed, security, convenience and cost are concerned”.
The key question from a financial stability perspective is whether this process will proceed in an orderly manner. A major destination of funds searching for yield, namely emerging market bonds, were particularly exposed to increased volatility over the recent weeks (as shown in the chart on the right on slide 5). While spreads widened, they still remained very narrow. While the longer-term narrowing of spreads on emerging market bonds over the past couple of years has to a considerable extent reflected the improved fundamentals, including substantially reduced indebtedness in emerging market economies, it cannot be excluded that some mis-pricing of risk will be exposed when capital inflows are reversed. The turbulence in March in the Icelandic financial markets, although contained, reminds us that vulnerabilities exist in parts of the world financial system. 4. Euro area macro-financial environment  Let me now turn to the euro area macro-financial environment, focusing on developments in the corporate and household sectors that are of particular relevance for the outlook for financial intermediaries’ credit portfolios. The balance sheet of the euro area non-financial corporate sector has strengthened significantly over recent years following notable improvements in profitability as well as debt restructuring efforts. Looking forward, however, a number of risks could be looming. The chart on the left on slide 6 shows that after several years of decline, corporate sector borrowing in the euro area has picked up considerably over the past year.

These include the possibility of premium competition in the non-life sector, longevity risk in the life sector, and the possibility, albeit diminishing, of an influenza pandemic. The chart on the left on slide 12 portrays the performance of the insurance sub-sectors relative to the Dow Jones EURO STOXX. Whilst the impact on the reinsurance sub-sector of the damage caused by natural catastrophes is evident, other sub-sectors appear more resilient. The chart on the right on slide 12 shows the median expected default frequency and average subordinated debt spread for euro area insurance companies. Both measures of risk in the sector have reached new lows since 2001, indicating that market participants see an improving resilience in the sector. The current Review contains for the first time a specific section dedicated to assessing developments in the global hedge funds sector. The pace of growth of the capital under management of global hedge funds, which had moderated in the course of 2005, fluctuated rather sharply in the first months of 2006, partly due to the mixed performance of most strategies in the last quarter of 2005 and improved results in the first quarter of 2006. After several quarters of reduced inflows into the hedge fund sector, and an outflow in the last quarter of 2005, inflows re-bounded in the first quarter of 2006 as shown by the chart on the left on slide 13.
Three of the four major banks have carried out new issues since last autumn and Swedbank will soon conduct an additional new issue – all on the private market and without government guarantees. In many countries, where the banking systems have been affected by the current crisis to a greater extent, this has been impossible. In addition, all four major banks have strengthened their capital by reducing or cancelling dividends to shareholders for the previous year. It should be pointed out, however, that the danger has not yet passed. If the situation deteriorates more than expected, credit ratings may come under pressure and the banks may experience funding difficulties once again. The Riksbank's measures safeguard financial stability Since the financial crisis broke out, the Riksbank has entered into swap agreements with two of the Baltic states. We have made it possible for the Estonian central bank to swap Estonian kronor for Swedish kronor should the need arise, and for the Latvian central bank to borrow euros direct from the Riksbank. The aim of these agreements is to make it easier for the central banks in Estonia and Latvia to safeguard financial stability in the respective countries. Entering into these swap agreements also serves to safeguard financial stability in Sweden. In order to secure the supply of liquidity, the Riksbank has also lent kronor and dollars to the Swedish banks when they have not been able to acquire funding on the market.

This can lead to lower rents than those the construction cost estimates were based on and thus give rise to payment difficulties for construction companies and property companies. As I have said, the demand for properties in the Baltic states is very low at present. Eventually, however, the countries will recover and demand will return. There is also a strong underlying demand for property in these countries as much of the property there is old (it was built in the Soviet era) and in need of renewal. As property prices are already so depressed, this may mean that prices will increase rapidly when the economic turnaround finally comes. Property also has a lasting value, providing that it is maintained. To the extent that the banks in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have taken properties as collateral it is probable that these properties will not be sold until there is an upswing in demand. This is what happened following the Swedish property crisis in the early 1990s when Securum and other companies were specifically set up to manage the settlement of bad loans with property as collateral. The increasing market value of property in the Baltic states will also eventually lead to an increase in the supply of new properties. An important precondition for all this is, however, that the internal reform programmes of the Baltic states are successful so that costs do not begin to rise once more.
Speech at Cardiff Business School, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech448.pdf Devereux, M B and Engel, C (2001), “Endogenous currency of price setting in a dynamic open economy model”, NBER Working Paper No. 8559. Devereux, M B, Engel, C and Storgaard, P (2004), “Endogenous Exchange Rate Pass-through When Nominal Prices are Set in Advance,” Journal of International Economics, 63, 263–291. Ihrig, J, Marazzi, M and Rothenberg, A (2006), “Exchange rate pass-through in the G7 countries”, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 851, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Juvenal, J and Taylor, M (2008), “Threshold Adjustment of Deviations from the Law of One Price”, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics: Vol. 12: No. 3, Article 8. King, M (2010), Speech given at the Civic Centre, Newcastle, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech471.pdf  available  at:  Mankiw, N G and Reis, R (2002), “Sticky information versus sticky prices: A proposal to replace the new Keynesian Phillips curve”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1295–1328. Miles, D (2011), “Monetary policy in extraordinary times”. Speech to the Centre for Economic Policy Research and London Business School, London, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech475.pdf Nelson, E and Nikolov, K (2004), “Monetary Policy and Stagflation in the UK”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(3), 293–318. Posen, A (2011), “The soft tyranny of inflation expectations”. Speech at the Oxonia Distinguished Lecture, Oxford, available at: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2011/speech474.pdf Taylor, J (2000) “Low inflation, pass-through, and the pricing power of firms”, European Economic Review, Vol. 44, pp. 1389–1408.

In this context, primarily the measures taken in direct crisis management will be withdrawn, and, as is the case in the rest of the world, the exit strategy will be a cautious and gradual process that safeguards financial stability in our country as well. I would like to end my remarks by extending my regards to all the participating academicians and policy-makers for their contributions to the “Global Crises and Economic Governance” congress. Also, I would like to thank, once more, the staff of İnönü University and everybody for their contributions to the conference. BIS Review 79/2010  7
With low resource utilisation one can expect that inflation will be pushed down as the pressure on wage and price increases will be low. The weak international demand is of course one factor that is beyond the Riksbank’s control and in this sense monetary policy  housing market. In the case of Australia, there are no clear signs that they have faced this kind of trade-off during the period following the financial crisis. This is clearer for the period 2002–2004, but then inflation stayed within the target interval of 2–3 per cent and was only close to the lower interval limit for one quarter. 6  See Sveriges Riksbank (2014a). 7  See Sveriges Riksbank (2014a). 8  See Nekarda and Ramey (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  cannot be blamed for the low inflationary pressure. At the same time, it is the role of monetary policy to counteract this type of downward pressure to stabilise inflation around the target. Monetary policy may have contributed in different ways Personally, I believe that the monetary policy conducted is an important contributory factor to the fall in inflation. The fact that household indebtedness is taken into account in the monetary policy decisions – and the repo rate is thus held somewhat higher than the prospects for inflation and resource utilisation have justified – has probably made the krona stronger than it would otherwise have been and also held back domestic demand.

Expected inflation Per cent 4  4 5 years ahead 2 years ahead 1 year ahead  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 96  00  04  08  12  Note. Average for all survey respondents. Source: TNS SIFO Prospera  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Resource utilisation remains lower than normal Resource utilisation has been lower than normal for in principle the entire period since the end of 2008, when demand for Swedish exports fell heavily in connection with the global financial crisis. At the same time, developments on the labour market have been better than expected in some aspects. Although unemployment has remained around 8 per cent since the middle of 2012, employment has increased and the employment rate has risen around half a percentage point since then. One question that sometimes arises is whether it is actually possible to bring down the current unemployment rate of 8 per cent with the aid of monetary policy. Matching on the labour market appears to have deteriorated and a larger percentage of the unemployed consist of groups that are on the periphery of the labour market. This could mean that structural unemployment is higher than before, and structural unemployment cannot be affected by monetary policy. However, my impression is that one can at least partly determine how much of unemployment is structural by looking at wage increases.