samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The concept Dutch disease stems from the negative effects on the Dutch economy of the spending of revenues from the substantial gas resources of the Groningen field. From the end of the 1960s, these revenues financed strong growth in public expenditure, which led to higher costs and a decline in manufacturing. The situation went too far, resulting in large balance of trade and government deficits which required tightening measures. This in turn led to a sharp rise in unemployment in the first half of the 1980s. But the Netherlands is not the first example of a nation that failed in this respect, and far from it 2. A very clear example is provided by Spain as early as in the 17th century when the colonisation of South and Central America provided the country with access to vast natural resources and gold. The historian David Landes describes the effects on Spanish society in his book “The Wealth and Poverty of Nations” where he cites a happy Spaniard who proclaimed the following in 1675: “Let London manufacture those fabrics of hers to her heart’s content; Holland her chambrays; Florence her cloth; the Indies their beaver and vicuna; Milan her brocades: Italy and Flanders their linen, so long as our capital can enjoy them. The only thing it proves is that all nations train journeymen for Madrid and that Madrid is the queen of Parliaments, for the world serves her and she serves nobody.”  1  See Report no.

7  Recent research indicates that a discount rate of 4 per cent may be somewhat high for investments with a very long horizon, see Kåre P. Hagen and Karl R. Pedersen’s newspaper article “Lønnsom infrastruktur (Profitable infrastructure)” in Dagens Næringsliv, 3 June 2010. 4  BIS Review 78/2010  Let me conclude. The adventures of Askeladden are often tales of success. Askeladden embraces every challenge and always comes out ahead. It is too early to draw conclusions as to how successful Norway has been in managing its oil wealth. In ten years or so, when petroleum production falls markedly and the oil fund is no longer increasing in size, the cost level in Norway will have to be reduced relative to other countries. This process may be painful, even though Norway has its own currency and a floating exchange rate. Our welfare state may also have become too large and the adjustment required here may also prove to be very demanding. Nonetheless, there are aspects of our oil wealth management that have served us well. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 78/2010  5  6  BIS Review 78/2010  BIS Review 78/2010  7
It’s important to keep in mind that the Taylor rule’s theoretical underpinnings are loose, especially compared with the seminal 1979 John Taylor article 10 on optimal monetary policy in a rational expectations model with sticky prices. Indeed, the Taylor rule parameters are not necessarily stable. In particular, consider the intercept term. The usual specification of the rule assumes that this intercept term is a constant 2 percent equilibrium level of the real interest rate. However, it is well known that equilibrium real rates of interest are not constant, and modern macroeconomic models of optimal monetary policy all take this into account. Assuming that the equilibrium real interest rate is constant is just as egregious an error as failing to account for the time-varying nature of the natural rate of unemployment. We all know that mis-specifying the natural rate of unemployment can lead to seriously inappropriate monetary policy outcomes like double-digit inflation in the 1970s. It certainly seems that the fallout from the financial crisis and persistent headwinds holding back economic activity are consistent with the equilibrium real interest rate being lower than usual today. Indeed, if you put any weight whatsoever on the secular stagnation hypothesis that Larry Summers and Paul Krugman have described, 11 an appropriate analysis would recognize lower expected real rates of interest.

The 1930s’ deflation and the 1970s’ double-digit inflation clearly indicate that the nation is well-served by the Fed having a long-run inflation objective and making sure it achieves that objective within a reasonable period of time. The employment mandate is more nuanced. Because maximum employment is determined by nonmonetary factors that affect the structure of the labor market, we can’t have a simple, time-invariant goal. We do, however, project where we think the longer-run normal, or “natural rate,” of unemployment is currently. Today, our estimates for this rate generally range between 5.2 percent and 5.6 percent. Such assessments can vary over time. However, the most important determinants of the natural rate change only slowly, so today’s assessment is an important input into policy. Being explicit about it contributes greatly to our accountability. Accountability is key. Much as corporations require corporate scorecards and earnings calls to explain quarterly performance, the Fed needs to regularly communicate its policy strategy and evaluate how it’s doing. And, when we are missing our policy goals, the public needs to know what we are doing about it. We need to decide on the appropriate actions to achieve our objectives and communicate them to the public. To that end, in our longer-run strategy statement we’ve said that when the economy deviates from price stability or maximum  2  2  Federal Open Market Committee (2014c). BIS central bankers’ speeches  employment, we’ll take a balanced policy approach that achieves both goals within a reasonable period of time.
In this regard, a payment platform is being developed to  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  23  effect government payments,  applications to strengthen security of  particularly the payments to Sri Lanka  electronic payments. Customs, through the Common  In year 2016, the Central Bank adopted  Electronic Fund Transfer Switch (CEFTS)  the Cabinet approved National Policy on  in real time. A National Card Scheme  Anti-money Laundering and Countering  (NCS) is being introduced as a cost  the Financing of Terrorism. Currently, all  effective alternative to currently  the stakeholders are in the process of  available international card schemes and  developing their internal frameworks to  a Common Point-Of-Sale Switch (CPS) is  support the national policy on Anti-  being developed to facilitate clearing  Money Laundering and Countering the  and switching of payment cards issued  Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). under the National Card Scheme. A Common Mobile Switch (CMobs) will be implemented to ensure interoperability between mobile wallets. Further, we will monitor the progress of licensed banks and other financial institutions joining the CEFTS, CPS and CMobs and adopt policies with a view of increasing the efficiency of electronic retail payment systems and minimising risks associated with such payment systems. Going forward, we will strengthen the supervisory framework and carryout onsite and off-site supervision of licensed service providers of payment cards and mobile payment systems to ensure compliance with regulations and guidelines.

However, it is the private sector that must decide on the economics of using the RMB for international payments and receipts. Institutions like HSBC can play a very helpful role in educating their clients and the broader business community in Malaysia on the possibilities of the RMB, as well as providing feedback to policymakers on what more we can do to create a more conducive environment to allow RMB trade to grow. Conclusion To conclude, ladies and gentlemen, the internationalisation of the RMB has gained significant momentum over the last year or so. That is encouraging and it appropriately reflects the growing role of China in the global economy. As I stated earlier, there is no doubt that the RMB will be an international currency. The only question is how big of an international currency. To answer that question, it is worth reminding ourselves that China is  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  internationalizing the RMB not because it believes that it is good for the world, but because it believes that it is good for China. Therefore, whether the RMB internationalisation will be able to maintain its momentum, or even accelerate, will depend very much on what happens in China in the coming years. If the Chinese policymakers are successful in managing the political, economic and financial trade-offs entailed in moving to a global currency, than the 21st century may indeed very well be the century of the global RMB. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
We are accountable directly to Parliament through regular public testimony to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons. Policymakers in few other countries are called before Parliament as often as we are. We have a duty to make ourselves accessible, and to explain ourselves, not just to Parliament but also to people up and down the country. Their trust in us to do the job we’ve been given will not arise from trying to sound clever or from obfuscating with acronyms. Their trust in us rests on having it proved that we’re doing what we’ve been asked to do in the way we’ve been asked to do it. That’s why there’s a web version of our 100-page financial stability report that’s just eighty three words and three pictures. The whole report is captured in six tweets. It’s why a phrase such as “The 2018 stress test shows the UK banking system is are resilient to deep simultaneous recessions in the UK and global economies that are more severe overall than the global financial crisis and that are combined with large falls in asset prices and a separate stress of misconduct costs” has become…  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  … “banks can lend to households and businesses in bad times as well as good”. And it’s why those of us who make the decisions are hosting Citizens Panels around the country. These are groups of 20-30 citizens from all walks of life and a diverse range of backgrounds.

Excessive risk taking or overly aggressive expansion usually lead to rather unhappy endings, as the financial history is littered with so many such failure cases. As for the regulators, they should stay true to the risk-based approach with the right sense of proportionality and should adopt an open mind on how the risk can be addressed. The regulators should stand ready to discuss with the industry to see if (c) there can be alternative ways of dealing with the risks identified. The industry is always closer to the markets and the clients they serve and should therefore have a better sense of how to get things done in a way that would cause less disruption or inconvenience. The regulators must not fall into the trap of complacency, and should constantly stay on alert and maintain a sense of unease even in good or peaceful times. Banking and (d) financial crises can never be avoided all together, but we can at least build sufficient buffers to lower their chance of occurrence or when they happen, the damage can be reduced or contained. The industry should stand ready to challenge the regulators if the severity of the risk is overstated or there are better alternatives than what has been put on the table. On the (e) other hand, the industry must avoid over-interpreting or gold plating the regulators’ requirements in such a way that is safe from the compliance point of view but would create bad customer experience without enhancing the underlying risk management outcomes. 16.
Data is incomplete, theory patchy, policy experience negligible. Monetary policy then was conducted by trial and error. The same will be true of macroprudential policy now. Mistakes will be made. But as experience with the other arms of macroeconomic policy has taught us, the biggest mistake would be not to try. BIS Review 168/2010  25  Annex 1: Model proofs  Reputational probabilities: Here we motivate the conditions that . Suppose the market has prior that a banker’s ability is high. If a banker is of low ability, she achieves positive returns on loans with probability when the macro state is good, while high ability bankers achieve positive returns on loans with probability 1 when the macro state is good. When the macro state is bad, all bankers achieve zero returns. Let be the probability that the macro state is good. Let the market conjecture that under a risky policy and a bad state of the world, earnings are positive with probability , while under a risky policy and a good state of the world, earnings are positive with probability . Conditional on risky policies and observing positive earnings, the probability of being of high ability is  which is increasing in  . Similarly, under tight policies,  which is decreasing in effects. . The conditions in the text that  capture these  Equilibrium: Our model satisfies following conditions, set out in Morris and Shin (2003), viz. : Condition 1: Action Monotonicity:  is non-decreasing in .

Gorton, G and He, P (2008), “Bank Credit Cycles”, Review of Economic Studies 75(4), pp 1181–1214, Blackwell Publishing. Group of Thirty (2010), Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience: Macroprudential Policy,Tools, and Systems for the Future. Hamilton, J and Lin, G (1996), “Stock Market Volatility and the Business Cycle”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 573–593. Harvey, A.C., and Jaeger, A. (1993), “Detrending, Stylized Facts and The Business Cycle”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 8, 231–247. Holmstrom, B and Tirole, J (1997), “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3), pp 663–91, MIT Press. IMF (2009), “Lessons for monetary policy from asset price fluctuations”, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, October. IMF (2010), “Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System”, Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, April. Kay, J (2010), Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation. Kashyap, A K, Stein, J C and Hanson, S (2010), “A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation”, Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Perspectives. Keynes, J M (1931), “The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of Money Values”, Essays in Persuasion, Macmillan Publishers. Keynes, J M (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan Cambridge University Press. Kindleberger, C.P. (1978), Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Palgrave Macmillan. King, M (2010), “Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and back again”, Speech given at the Second Bagehot Lecture Buttonwood Gathering, New York City.
That Was The Week That Was was a popular TV programme which ran for two series in 1962 and 1963. That was the time when inflation was just starting to rise and although it averaged well below 5 per cent throughout the 1960s it picked up sharply in the early 1970s and didn’t fall back to below the MPC’s current 2% target until 1998 (Chart 10). Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. See The path to 2 per cent − speech by Silvana Tenreyro | Bank of England. See Shocks, uncertainty, and the monetary policy response- speech by Dave Ramsden I Bank of England 16 17  Bank of England  Page 16  2022 has been a very challenging year for the UK economy. Millions of households and businesses are experiencing great hardship as a result of the cost of living crisis. As a member of the MPC I am acutely conscious that our actions are adding to the difficulties caused by the current situation. The past history of the UK economy demonstrates the damage to households and businesses that would result if high inflation persisted. Unlike these earlier periods of high inflation, exacerbated by ineffective policy and policy frameworks, we now have a monetary policy framework which empowers us to take action. However challenging the short term consequences might be for the UK economy, the MPC must take the necessary steps in terms of monetary policy to return inflation to achieve the 2% target sustainably in the medium term.

The last year has been characterised by large moves in exchange rates and falls in risky asset prices but the repricing of government bonds and of expectations for monetary policy have been particularly striking. Significant UK specific factors emerged in September and October, which have been covered in detail elsewhere12. The UK policy premia which opened up have now disappeared. The cumulative increase in yields on UK 10 gilts over the last year is now very closely in line with the change in US and German 10 year bonds (Chart 7). Having peaked at 4.6% in late September yields on 10 year gilts were back down at 3.2% at close yesterday, their level at the start of September. Source: Bloomberg L.P., and Bank calculations Notes: The path for Bank Rate implied by forward market interest rates are based on overnight index swap rates. Latest yield curve refers to forward market interest rates at cob 21 November 2021. UK fiscal policy developments in response to the energy price shock have been a key contributor to the outlook for inflation. In early September the Government announced an Energy Price Guarantee (EPG) for households (and a business equivalent) to cap average energy bills at £ up until April 2023. In the Autumn Statement on 17 November, the Government announced an increase in the cap to £ for the year to April 2024.
The harmonisation of these criteria would be highly desirable, especially in relation to the classification of exposures (an area in which the European Banking Authority has made notable progress in recent months) and, in particular, provisioning policy. It should be noted that, although the supervisor may adjust the capital requirements, imposing higher levels of capital does not sufficiently make up for the lack of adequate provisions. That is because the level of provisions always has direct and transparent implications for the profit or loss of the bank, while an increase in the minimum capital requirements via Pillar 2 is not usually transparent (as the Pillar 2 requirements are not public) and, in most cases, does not have any practical effect, insofar as the bank has a capital buffer that enables it to cover the new requirements. Accordingly, the supervisor should be concerned to promote the application of rigorous and uniform provisioning criteria involving the appropriate recognition on the balance sheet of the value of each exposure. Clearly, the formal publication of binding accounting criteria by the SSM may be contested, insofar as accounting does not form part of its competencies according to the EU regulation under which it was set up. At the same time, subjecting all banks active in the markets to IFRSs for consolidated accounts, certainly reduces its ability to exert an influence in this area. In short, the Spanish experience shows both the usefulness and feasibility of an involvement of the supervisor that is compatible with the law in force.

In particular, the supervisor should have the real capacity to influence bank managers’ decisions through moral suasion and to formulate non-legally binding recommendations, in the sure knowledge that they will in practice be very widely followed. Supervisory actions would otherwise be excessively hampered by a regulatory framework which, despite having been honed in recent years, can hardly envisage all situations of supervisory significance or include the full range of instruments needed to tackle such situations with the speed required in each instance. Finally, it is difficult for supervision to be effective if it does not include a thoroughgoing review of banks’ financial statements. Allow me to elaborate on this point. Evidently, an essential aim of supervision is to oversee banks’ solvency through the monitoring of capital ratios. Insofar as these ratios are calculated on the basis of accounting information, it is essential to ensure that such information properly reflects the value of the bank’s assets and liabilities. It is true that auditors and securities supervisors also perform this task. However, the specific nature and complexity of bank business, the evident relationship between published financial information and financial stability, and the occasional lack of specificity of prevailing accounting principles all make it advisable that the prudential supervisor should contribute to encouraging supervised banks to follow the best practices, in full conformity with current regulations and the distribution of competencies among institutions thereunder.
More importantly, the available evidence suggests that participating banks (both Spanish banks and those in the euro area as a whole) have used a significant portion of the funding received to continue to provide credit to the real economy.2  1  See the speech delivered by the Governor of the Banco de España “The role of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy in the COVID-19 crisis”, October 2020. 2 See, for example, the Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for October. For a summary of the results of the survey for the Spanish banks participating in the survey see Á. Menéndez Pujadas and M. Mulino (2020), «The October 2020 Bank Lending Survey in Spain», Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin, 4/2020, Banco de España. 2  The second block of measures related to asset purchase programmes. Since late February, financial conditions had tightened in the euro area, with both corporate and sovereign risk spreads widening considerably. This spread widening in the euro area was uneven: countries that started from weaker fiscal positions, with higher debt levels, and those that were most affected by the first wave of the pandemic experienced a much more pronounced increase in their financing costs. This cross-country financial fragmentation was a challenge for the transmission of a single monetary policy throughout the euro area, and even posed a threat of a repeat of the 2012 sovereign debt crisis. In this context, in March the ECB announced the launch of the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP).

13.11.2020  The European response to the COVID‑-19 crisis Opening address - Fundación Internacional Olof Palme Conference Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  *English translation of the original speech in Spanish  Why joint European action was/is necessary As in the rest of the world, the COVID-19 outbreak has triggered in the euro area a health and economic crisis that is unprecedented in recent history. Against this backdrop, the economic policy response has had to be very forceful to mitigate the short-term economic effects and to prevent those effects from becoming persistent and affecting growth in the medium and long-term. The fact that this crisis is global also means that a coordinated response among the different countries is more effective both in combating the pandemic and as regards the capacity to facilitate economic recovery for all. The need for a coordinated response is particularly evident for European Union (EU) Member States, given the very high level of economic and financial interconnectedness. This is especially true in the euro area, because it shares a common currency, which increases both the economic benefits of joint action and the negative consequences of possible inaction. Although the shock triggered by the pandemic is global, this crisis is affecting the EU unevenly, reinforcing the reasons for acting jointly at the supranational level. Several dimensions of heterogeneity are particularly significant in this setting. First, the crisis associated with the pandemic is having a highly significant heterogenous impact at sectoral level.