samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The news is mostly good—longer-run inflation expectations in the United States have remained remarkably stable at levels broadly consistent with the FOMC’s longer-run goal. Inflation uncertainty has increased, but this does not appear to be due to unmoored longer-run expectations. The one surprising wrinkle worth further study is the increasing divergence in views about future inflation, including the high share of those expecting deflation, and what this portends for the future. Table and Figures References Armantier, Olivier, Fatima Boumahdi, Gizem Kosar, Jason Somerville, Giorgio Topa, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and John C. Williams. “What Do Consumers Think Will Happen to Inflation?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, May 26, 2022. Armantier, Olivier, Leo Goldman, Gizem Kosar, Giorgio Topa, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and John C. Williams, “What Are Consumers’ Inflation Expectations Telling Us Today?,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, February 14, 2022. By continuing to use our site, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Statement. You can learn more about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. Armantier, Olivier, Gizem Kosar, Jason Somerville, Giorgio Topa, Wilbert van der Klaauw, and John C. Williams. “The Curious Case of the Rise in Deflation Expectations,” Staff Report 1037, October 2022. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, January 24, 2012. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2020 Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, August 27, 2020.

SPEECH  A Steady Anchor in a Stormy Sea November 09, 2022 John C. Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer Remarks at SNB-FRB-BIS High-Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, Switzerland As prepared for delivery  It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss a timely and important topic: the anchoring of inflation expectations. Against the backdrop of the stormy seas of the global inflation of the past year and a half, a steady anchor is more critical than ever. But, what does it mean for inflation expectations to be well anchored, and how would we know if they are? In my remarks, I will describe three criteria for well-anchored inflation expectations. I will then provide an initial assessment of the behavior of inflation expectations in the United States against these three criteria since inflation surged in the spring of last year. I should emphasize the word “initial,” since we are still in the midst of the storm, and definitive conclusions on the anchoring of expectations will await the ship’s safe return. This is the perfect time to give the usual Federal Reserve disclaimer that everything I say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. The critical importance of anchoring inflation expectations is now enshrined as a bedrock principle of modern central banking. One way central banks have sought to anchor expectations is through a commitment to an explicit longer-run inflation goal.
There have been suggestions that, with the market now expecting the appreciation of RMB to slow down – or even reverse – there will be less interest in conducting RMB business. It seems to me that this would be a one-sided interpretation of a much more positive story. From a macro perspective, given the Mainland’s substantial trade and investment links with other parts of the world, it is safe to expect that a fair – and growing – portion of such activities will be conducted in RMB. Considering that the percentage of China’s trade settled in RMB is only less than 10% now (compared with 30% of Japanese trade denominated in Japanese Yen), it is reasonable to expect RMB-denominated trade to grow further. And with the Mainland economy continuing to grow faster than other major economies, we can also expect that the incentive for individuals and institutions outside China to hold more RMB assets will remain, if not get stronger. Consider also that, a more two-way RMB exchange rate will be conducive to a more balanced, and hence sustainable, development of offshore RMB business. For instance, when the RMB exchange rate expectation is no longer skewing towards just one direction, the incentives for both the payee and the payer to settle a trade transaction in RMB will be more balanced. Corporates will also be more willing to raise financing in RMB when it is not expected to appreciate strongly.

At the bottom of the chain are service providers such as fund administrators, custodian banks and dealer brokers. They provide services to the asset managers. Therefore, asset allocation decisions by end-investors, either institutional or private wealth owners, have a knock-on impact throughout the rest of the asset management value-chain. Currently, the portfolios of asset owners in the advanced economies are still significantly underexposed to emerging markets. For example, at present, a typical US pension fund has just 6% of their investment exposure in emerging markets. Not surprisingly, given the economic challenges facing the advanced economies outlined earlier and the growth opportunities in Asia, there is growing interest from these end-investors in increasing their investment exposure to Asia, rather than relying on investing in fixed income products of the developed economies as they have in the past. This change in allocation preference towards Asia will generate significant demand for asset and wealth management services that Hong Kong’s financial institutions are well placed to provide. But the immediate question is: are we in Hong Kong ready to meet this growing demand? Well, we do start with a number of strengths and advantages. As Asia’s premier asset management centre, Hong Kong is the largest hub for Asian hedge funds and the second largest hub for private equity in Asia, only slightly trailing Mainland China. Hong Kong’s private banking platform offers unparalleled access to the growing wealth pool in Mainland China and across Asia.
If markets on which firms now rely for some of their  We also obtain a great deal of additional information in the course of our own market operations, through our involvement in payment systems and other infrastructure, through our counterparties and contacts, and in other ways. Intelligence of this sort allows us to understand the environment—the products, techniques, and markets—in which firms operate and how they and the markets in which they trade may behave in times of stress. It therefore supports analysis of how stress might spread and how the authorities can most effectively respond; and it helps to identify the appropriate channels for communicating this response. But analysis from intelligence can also provide early warning of symptoms of actual or incipient stress; for example, a high degree of leverage coupled with crowded trades in markets that can be illiquid. The authorities then have time, where appropriate, to publicise any concerns so that firms can take action to prevent the risks from crystallising, and factor them into stress tests and scenario analysis. We provide such analysis regularly in our Financial Stability Review. And were a crisis to develop, an understanding of the ‘systemic conjuncture’ is also required to enable the authorities to assess on a continuing basis the likely systemic impact, and to choose an appropriate policy response. As well as information exchange, strong co-ordination of decision making between central banks, regulators, and ministries of finance, is likely to be essential for effective crisis management.

Sir Andrew Large: Financial stability - managing liquidity risk in a global system Speech by Sir Andrew Large, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the Fourteenth City of London Central Banking and Regulatory Conference, London, 28 November 2005. * 1. *  *  Introduction  Much is written today about the search for yield. Much is said about the factors that underlie it: accommodative monetary policy; savings gluts; and financial engineering which multiplies the opportunities for increasing leverage. And much, too, is said about new instruments, such as those involving credit risk transfer, or new players, such as hedge funds, that trade them. However, my main concern today is not with the search for yield as such, nor with market innovations or new players. Rather, it is with the financial vulnerabilities to which they could give rise, and what can be done to mitigate those vulnerabilities. Because it seems to me that the search for yield also highlights some less benign aspects of today’s financial system: the opacity of markets in some new instruments; the difficulty of knowing the real value of assets and contracts; reliance on models that have not been tested in the full range of economic conditions; the uncertainties over behaviour of new participants in the markets should events turn adverse; and the difficulty we have in judging just how deep markets will prove to be should a substantial number of investors decide simultaneously to try to realise their investments.
5  See Jansson, P., and A. Vredin, (2004), ”Preparing the Monetary Policy Decision in an Inflation Targeting Central Bank: The Case of Sveriges Riksbank”, in the conference volume Practical Experiences With Inflation Targeting, Czech National Bank, Woodford, M. (2005), “Central-Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness”, essay presented at a symposium organised by FRB Kansas City ‘The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future’, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 25-27 August and Faust, J., and D. W. Henderson, (2004), “Is Inflation Targeting Best-Practice Monetary Policy?”, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review, 86(4), 117-143. BIS Review8/2007  5  Openness, clarity and communication This brings me on to the final point that I intend to take up today: openness and communication. Openness and clarity are important when justifying our monetary policy decisions so that confidence in price stability can in the long term be combined with flexible inflation targeting. They are also a condition for retaining the legitimacy of our activities and independence. 6 Moreover, it contributes to greater efficiency and quality in our internal analyses. Openness was therefore given high priority right from the start when the new monetary policy framework was introduced, and it is no coincidence that the Riksbank is usually ranked high in international comparisons of monetary policy transparency in central banks. 7 Let me mention some concrete measures we have taken to increase openness. Three times a year the Riksbank publishes Inflation Reports which include the analytical base for the interest rate decision made.

We do not think, act or communicate in the same way today as we did when the inflation targeting regime was new. The driving force behind the changes has come partly from practical experiences, both in Sweden and other countries conducting an inflation-targeting policy. Academic research has also played an important role. Before I go into greater detail on how the Riksbank’s way of conducting monetary policy has developed, I intend to begin by describing the background to the establishment of an inflation target in Sweden. The background to Sweden introducing an explicit inflation target Today the Swedish krona has been floating for fourteen years and two months. 19 November 1992 will always have a special significance for the Riksbank. This was the day when we were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate, under very dramatic circumstances and after a stubborn defence of the Swedish krona. At that time we were in the middle of the most serious economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930s – a tragic end to almost 20 years of stabilization policy problems. The idea behind the fixed exchange rate policy was to ensure that inflation in Sweden would be in line with that in the countries that were our most important trading partners, and that the fixed exchange rate would function as a nominal anchor. But for various reasons the economic policy conducted in the 1970s and 1980s tended to be too expansionary.
Our position, put simply, is that we do not believe that customers should be responsible for any security breach or system problem that is not due to negligence on their part, and we have requested that this should be reflected in the contractual agreements for internet banking services. Reputational risk Risk of damage to the bank’s reputation goes along with the other risks I have mentioned. It can arise, for example, from operational risk even if customers suffer no actual damage. If a hacker successfully 3  BIS Review 108/1999  breaks into a bank’s website and makes alterations, the bank concerned can suffer substantial damage to its reputation although customers’ balances are safe and the hacker has not obtained any financial benefit. This does not only affect the individual bank concerned but may also undermine confidence in the security of e-banking more generally and therefore slow down development in this area. Systems breakdown, even if only temporary, is another example of how banks may be affected by bad publicity. Given the fact that the element of trust is so fundamental to banks’ business, banks will find it increasingly important to adopt measures to manage reputational risk and incorporate public relations strategies into their overall risk management framework. Banking risks As I have already mentioned, an internet-based bank is faced with the same types of banking risk as its traditional counterparties. In some ways, the internet may heighten these risks.

Then I would like to address some of the questions and issues about Basel II that banks and supervisors in emerging market countries have shared with me. After that, I look forward to hearing the thoughts of my fellow panelists and those of others on what Basel II might mean for the Indian banking sector. Why Basel II is necessary: an overview of the new capital framework Before we discuss how Basel II may affect banks in India, allow me to begin by addressing why the Basel Committee drafted Basel II. The Committee published the text of the new capital framework this past June. This marked the culmination of nearly six years of difficult work for supervisors and for banks. Why did we take such pains to revise the existing capital rules? After all, the 1988 Basel Accord was a tremendous success in many ways. I think that several factors led us to conclude that a new approach was necessary. As you know, the 1988 Accord established the first internationally accepted definition and measure of bank capital. It was adopted in over 100 countries. As a result, it became acknowledged as one of the benchmark measures of a bank’s financial health. While the simplicity of the 1988 Accord was an asset in promoting its acceptance, today its simplicity is quickly becoming a liability for some bankers and supervisors alike. Over the past 16 years, the methodologies for measuring and managing risk have evolved in ways that the architects of the 1988 Accord could not have anticipated.
Their technical recommendations, free of short-term political pressures or 7/9  vested interests, may provide valuable guidance for other economic policies. Although this function is not always formally incorporated into the legal framework, in the case of the Banco de España this role is recognised in our Law of Autonomy. Indeed, this legislation establishes a function to “advise the government”, which supports our role in evaluating other public policies. This is also the case of the European Central Bank, on which the Treaty confers an advisory function with regard to proposals for European Union and Member States’ legislation within its fields of competence. 5. The key importance of transparency and accountability The fifth and final reflection concerns highlighting the importance of pursuing the highest standards of accountability and transparency vis-à-vis both society and the political representatives. Indeed, accountability and transparency support both the effectiveness and also the legitimacy of central bank independence. We need to keep in mind that monetary policy is now more complex and society is constantly raising the bar for these standards. The adoption of unconventional tools marked a shift away from the “one goal, one instrument” policy setting in which accountability was easier. More instruments at play might have also raised concerns about the possibility that central banks have stepped beyond their mandates, thus potentially endangering the public perception about the value of their independence.

Likewise, the progressive re-opening of commercial establishments deemed non-essential since early May prompted a pick-up in retail sales that month, more markedly so in the case of products whose sales were more affected during the lockdown, such as personal equipment goods, home equipment and motor fuel. This improvement in consumer spending is expected to have run into June, according to the information available on payments made using cards. Throughout Q2, the labour market moved on a path of recovery similar to that described for economic activity. Consequently, the fall in Social Security registrations eased in May and, especially in June, following the heavy declines recorded in the second half of March and in April. In any event, registrations provide a partial picture of the scale of the labour market adjustment since the start of the crisis, insofar as the workers affected by furlough-like schemes (ERTEs) continue to be considered as registered, despite the fact they are not contributing to production. For a truer assessment of changes in the labour force since the onset of the crisis, regard is had to the series of registrations after having stripped out workers subject to ERTEs. This series, which might be dubbed “actual registrations”, is estimated to have shown a year-on-year decline of 22% at end-April, with much sharper reductions in some of the services segments most affected by the restrictions on movement 2  associated with the state of alert, such as the hospitality sector.
Their firms are devoting more resources to marketing abroad – particularly in Asia – and expect their export sales to be higher in the next 12 months than in the past 12 months. BIS Review 100/2010  3  In sum, the region is showing signs of a moderate recovery, and the manufacturing sector is playing a key role in that recovery in parts of the region. Thank you for your kind attention. I will now ask Jaison Abel to provide more details on current regional economic conditions. 4  BIS Review 100/2010

Thomas Jordan: Current monetary policy and its significance for the real economy Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the General Meeting of the Aargauische Industrie- und Handelskammer, Wettingen, 20 May 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In the current situation, the challenges for the SNB’s monetary policy remain formidable. On the one hand, against the backdrop of the economic recovery we have witnessed since mid2009, there is a danger of inflationary tendencies and the renewed formation of a bubble. This is because the current monetary policy is too expansionary in the long term. On the other hand, downside risks are still present or are again reappearing, and should not be underestimated. They relate, in particular, to the further development of the debt crisis in Europe. A deterioration of this situation entails the danger for Switzerland of renewed deflation and recession as well as the risk of another destabilisation of the global financial system. Between these opposing risks the SNB must walk a fine line, moving in terrain that is constantly and rapidly changing, depending on which risk gains the upper hand. With a monetary policy strategy aimed at maintaining price stability, the SNB is well equipped to face these challenges. What are the short and medium-term consequences for the real economy of addressing these challenges?
The total of banking assets measured as percentage of GDP shows that our region lags behind when compared to developed economies. Meanwhile prudential measures indicate problems with the credit portfolio quality, and the speed of growth could be beyond what is generally accepted sound. The risks that usually accompany fast credit growth could soon exerting pressures on monetary policy and financial stability. In my opinion the low financial and real economic integration among countries in the region constitutes as well as international financial markets constitutes another major problem in the region. The problem could become more severe if you were to keep in mind the very integrated ownership structure of banking system in the region. Cross-border lending and borrowing, or other forms of international financial flows are still relatively insignificant. With the stabilization of the economy and the rescheduling of debts, the countries together with their financial sectors have started to be gradually integrated in the international markets. Sovereign ratings given for these countries have accompanied and accelerated in some cases these developments. While the financial sectors, and particularly commercial banks, have strengthened their international ties and have been gradually integrated in the international financial markets, the competitiveness from cross-border banking activities remains still restricted. Cross-border lending activity increased slowly in the countries of the region. However, even in this field there is room to move more quickly.

Many of them have referred to it as the "Switzerland of the Balkans" or as the "rock garden of southeastern Europe." On the other hand, the country's uncommon isolation from the world, arising generally from its rugged, mountainous terrain, has led foreigners to speak of it as "the Tibet of Europe" or as a country more mysterious than central Africa. The great eighteenth-century British historian, Edward Gibbon, speaking of Albania, said that it is "a country within sight of Italy, which is less known than the interior of America." BIS Review 119/2007  1  The remoteness and isolation of the country became practically legendary and all too frequently gave rise to reports and descriptions of the land and of the people – even in books and encyclopedias – that were closer to legends than to reality. Perhaps because of its romantic remoteness and other reasons, Albania has exerted a continuous fascination on artists, including poets, playwrights, composers, and more recently film makers and producers of television programs. Shakespeare set his comedy Twelfth Night in Illyria – the name by which Albania was known in ancient times. Lord Byron, who visited southern Albania in 1810, wrote some stirring lines about her landscape in his poem “Childe Harold”. Morn dawns: and with it stern Albania's hills... Robed half in mist, bedewed with snowy rills. In Mozart's comic opera “Cosi fan tutte” the principal male characters, Ferrando and Guglielmo, appear for the most part as two "Albanian noblemen" in clever scheme to test the love of their fiancés.