samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Today, we can see that banks now have much more opportunities to manage their liquidity risks and the market has an adequate amount of highly liquid assets. Generally, such credit lines are granted when the market as a whole experiences a shortage of highly liquid assets, including, for instance, when we had to address the problem of small public debt. Currently, Russia’s public debt is still small, yet the market already has a sufficiently large amount of highly liquid assets. We are now resuming our plans for a progressive increase in the cost of irrevocable credit lines, but this process will be more gradual than we assumed before the pandemic. The fee of 0.15% on lines opened beginning on 1 April 2021 will remain effective until 1 October (previously we planned a rise from 1 April). After this date, the fee for using these lines will be raised to 0.5%. As to an individual limit for systemically important banks, we will reduce it over the next 12 months not by 30%, as we planned before, but only by 15%. The next topic I would like to address is preferential lending. As you know, President Putin has given the instruction to develop proposals on how preferential programmes should be implemented over the next period, until 2024. In this regard, I would like to present our view. We believe that preferential lending as an anti-crisis measure has been very efficient, yet it should be terminated in due time exactly as an anti-crisis measure.

The rest of this paper goes through the new auction structure in more detail. The ILTR demand curve During the auction, counterparties submit their bids for reserves.13 Some bid against the narrow collateral set, others against the wider set and some against both (using a so-called “paired bid”).14 One could think of bids against each collateral set as separate. The auctions are uniform price so that all counterparties pay the lowest accepted rate (on each collateral set) regardless of their bids.15 In theory, this should mean that there is no incentive for banks to try to “game” the auctions, nor is there a need to speculate on other bidders’ behaviour. Instead, bids should reflect the true demand for reserves since, if their bids are accepted, they will either pay the rate they bid, or a lower one. 12  See Bank of England, Annual Report, 2009. This issue doesn’t arise in the short-term OMOs, as the term of the repo runs from one MPC decision to the next, so the difference between the rate we received in the OMO and that which we pay on reserves is fixed. 13  The Bank places no restriction on the number of bids submitted but places restrictions on the total value of bids received from a single participant. Participants may choose to submit multiple bids against either collateral set.
Well, by the next day, the markets had figured it out; the projections are made by all FOMC participants, while the statement reflects the policy views agreed upon at the meeting by the voting members of the Committee. We all come into the meeting with our projections, but we then do have a real meeting: All of the participants exchange ideas and argue points of views, and then the voters on the Committee come to a consensus and make a collective policy decision. The information regarding the federal funds rate in the SEP does not substitute for this formal decision of the voting members of the FOMC. That said, the diversity of views is a fact of life. Policymakers may well have differing judgments on the appropriate stance of monetary policy in the particular economic circumstances of the moment. These communications initiatives cannot eliminate these differences of opinion. But they further discipline the parameters of our discussions, clarify the judgments that underlie our policy decisions and enhance transparency and the public’s ability to evaluate current monetary policy with alternative approaches. Forward guidance and policy commitment in an explicit state-contingent policy The macroeconomic environment The new policy tools can also complement the kinds of accommodative policies I have been advocating for some time. The U.S. is now more than two and a half years into its modest and uneven recovery from the Great Recession. Real gross domestic product growth has averaged just 2-1/2 percent.

Included alongside the two already mentioned are failure of climate-change adaptation and biodiversity loss.1 Thus, the transition towards a carbon-neutral economy is necessary, calling for the mobilisation of financial resources to facilitate the process. Funding the fight against climate change is one of the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement, which set a target of $ billion a year to be mobilised by the developed countries starting in 2020, with a view to increasing this amount before 2025. In terms of public investment, the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan, which forms part of the European Green Deal, envisages the mobilisation of at least € trillion in sustainable investments through the EU budget over the coming decade, to advance towards the goal of ensuring a carbon-neutral economy by 2050. 1  See WEF (2023). The Global Risks Report 2023 18th Edition, January. In the EU's recovery plan Next Generation EU (NGEU), 37% of the € billion Recovery and Resilience Facility is being spent on climate-related objectives. Moreover, an overall climate target of 30% applies to the total amount of expenditure from the long-term EU budget for 2021-2027. The European Commission will issue green bonds to finance part of the NGEU funds. According to the first report on the allocation of funds,2 823 projects will be financed for almost € billion, around one-third of the total NGEU funds. Clean transport and infrastructure will be the biggest recipients of these funds (accounting for 55.6%), followed by energy efficiency (33.4%).
The assets managed by Singaporebased fund managers grew by 24% to almost $ in 2006. 4  BIS Review 76/2007  Second, the sources of funds flowing into or through Singapore continue to diversify. The Middle East has becoming increasingly important, along with South Asia. Funds sourced from the Middle East and South Asia grew by 21% and 36% respectively year-on-year. One of our local banks, DBS Bank, recently formed a joint venture with a group of Arab investors to set up Singapore’s first Islamic bank. This will spur the development of Islamic financial products in Singapore. I understand that Japan is also moving into Islamic finance. We can learn from each other and work together. Third, the critical mass of asset management activity in Singapore is continuing to grow. In 2006, 57% of the total AUM in Singapore was invested in the Asian region. Fund managers continue to use Singapore as their regional headquarters because they see Singapore as a prime location to service clients, raise capital from the region, as well as invest into the region and beyond. Singapore has also grown as a centre for hedge fund managers. Not only have these alternative investment managers contributed to the growth of our asset management industry, they have also added to its breadth and depth. Why has Singapore seen such strong growth as a financial centre? I think much of it has to do with our continuous efforts to enhance Singapore’s position as a gateway to Asia by transforming Singapore into a global city.

It seems that pricing mechanism doesn’t price properly the guarantees given by CGC. We ought to work on this. On the part of CGC, we need to response quickly to the banks when guarantees are being called upon. An ideal situation is akin to an irrevocable undertaking where once a guarantee is called upon, it will be made good immediately. Second, to intensify promotion and awareness program on CGC products and services. CGC needs to work closely with the trade associations and generate more media exposures through radios and TVs. Make CGC a household name among the SMEs. Third, expand further advisory services, its reach and contents. Not all SMEs require financing, some might need more “hand holding”, and rather than access to financing above. Lastly, come up with new and specific guarantee products for new growth area, start-ups and young entrepreneurs. Existing guarantee products might not be suitable to meet the needs of these groups. CGC should embark a study on this matter and come up with an action plan. Before I end my speech, I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations and appreciation to the Board, Management and staff of CGC for 40 years of service to the Malaysian SMEs. It is our greatest wish that CGC will continue to walk and grow alongside our SMEs in our effort to make our country prosperous. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Since 2015, the banks’ individual exemption thresholds have been set as a common multiple of their statutory minimum reserve requirements. In such a system, some banks’ holdings of sight deposits will exceed the exemption threshold they were granted. These banks have an incentive to provide this liquidity to other banks. They will, for example, be willing to transact in the repo market if paying the repo rate costs them less than paying the SNB’s negative interest rate on sight deposits. Conversely, there are also some banks whose holdings of sight deposits fall below their exemption thresholds. These banks have an incentive to enter the repo market as cash takers and earn the repo rate, which they will be willing to do as long as the repo rate is below zero. This system, characterised by the negative interest rate on sight deposits and exemption thresholds, has led to a sizable and sustained increase in liquidity redistribution via the interbank market since the beginning of 2015. For this system to work, there must be a sufficiently large volume of sight deposits subject to the negative interest rate. Clearly, in aggregate, the sum of all exemption thresholds must be smaller than the sum of all sight deposits. Otherwise, banks could carry out money market transactions such that no remaining balances would be subject to negative interest, resulting in money market rates close to zero.

Put differently, for money market interest rates to stay close to the SNB’s negative interest rate on sight deposits, the supply of liquidity must exceed the demand for liquidity by a sufficient amount. In a system of bank-specific exemption thresholds, this means that the supply of liquidity by the cash-providing banks – that is, by the banks whose sight deposits exceed their exemption thresholds and which are therefore willing to provide liquidity – must exceed the demand for liquidity on the part of the cash-taking banks – that is, banks which have an unused portion of their exemption threshold and are therefore willing to accept additional sight deposits on their balance sheet. Provided this condition holds, it is possible to reduce the burden on the banking system through exemptions, without jeopardising the monetary policy objective of the negative interest rate on sight deposits. If we take another look at the time series trajectory of money market interest rates depicted in Chart 3, we notice that this condition must have been met in practice, as market interest rates have indeed been close to the negative interest rate on sight deposits ever since that rate was first introduced in 2015. Page 8/13  The exemption thresholds have significantly reduced the burden on the banking system as a whole. When the SNB initially introduced its negative interest rate on sight deposits at the beginning of 2015, around two-thirds of total sight deposits were exempt from negative interest.
Is the way forward to remain a niche player, sizeable in the domestic market, but small by international standards? Or must they achieve greater scale by expanding into the region? If so, what strategy will minimise the risks and maximise the benefits of operating in different countries? How can they build strong management teams, to execute a sound strategy well? Each bank must answer these questions for itself. Their long term profitability and viability depends on their finding the right answers. Challenges for the financial sector Let me move on to some of the opportunities and challenges for the financial sector. I will discuss three issues - developing the wealth management industry, growing our capital markets, and increasing our human capital. Wealth management The Asia-Pacific is the fastest growing market for private banking in the world. Rapid development is producing large numbers of wealthy individuals, and huge amounts of private wealth to be managed. Asian savers and investors are increasingly sophisticated and are seeking best of breed products and managers. Non-Asian clients are increasingly demanding geographical diversification for their assets. Institutional assets in Asia will also grow progressively as countries reform pensions, and deregulation frees up assets from insurance companies and other corporates for professional management. These factors favour Singapore as an Asian centre, because of our sound economic and political environment, conducive legal and tax policies, reputation for integrity, and strict enforcement against crime and money laundering.

Anita Angelovska Bezoska: Journalists are one of the main transmitters of monetary policy messages Address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the Journalist Workshop - 2018, organized by the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 25 December 2018. * * * Distinguished media representatives,  Welcome to the fourth Journalist Workshop hosted by the NBRM. I am glad to see you in greater numbers this year, which is confirmation of your interest in the topics that will be the focus of today’s event. Allow me to take a brief look at several basic, yet important aspects of central bank communication: 1. Why is central bank transparency and communication important and needed? 2. How has central bank communication evolved over the years? What were the challenges in the period after the outbreak of the global crisis and how were they addressed globally? 3. Challenges in central bank communication in the Republic of Macedonia. A comparison between the current and the past transparency level and central bank communication shows an exceptional transformation in this segment. The need for strengthening central bank transparency was brought to the fore for the first time in the 1990s, implying enhanced communication with the public, including the media. This change is associated with the concept of central bank independence, or the independence of the monetary policy from fiscal policy.
What is particularly pleasing to me about the preparations of the European Money Quiz is its massiveness. It is noteworthy that the number of registered classes is much higher than expected. It is assessed that about 3,000 students aged 13–15 years will participate in the internal testing phase. Such an approach envisaging testing of entire classes, enables all these students to become familiar with the issues of financial education, with aspects related to the operations of the central bank, commercial banks, securities markets. It is a significant benefit, which is probably, the goal of the initiator – the more massive scope, the wider education. Of course, some will be more successful and continue in the next stages of the competition, however it is a great benefit that all participants will have the opportunity to expand their knowledge in finance and economy, which is our common goal. In the end, let me once again express the readiness of the National Bank to actively support the overall process of preparation, both for the national and international competition in Brussels. I wish you the mentors, a successful work with the students, best luck to all, and of course, let the best students win! Thank you! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

And in aggregate, intelligence suggests that LDI funds raised over £ billion in funds and made over £ billion of gilt sales during our operations, both of which have contributed to significantly lower leverage. As a result, LDI funds report that their liquidity buffers can withstand very much larger increases in yields than before, well in excess of the previously unprecedented move in gilt yields. And so the risk of LDI fund behaviour triggering ‘fire sale’ dynamics in the gilt market and self-reinforcing falls in gilt prices is – for now at least – significantly reduced. It is important that it stays that way. Others need to act too. Banks have an important role to play in reducing risks both to themselves and to the wider system from non-bank leverage. That starts with information. As seen with Archegos, imperfect information on overall positions leads to inadequate risk management. So a first step is for lenders to require greater transparency of hidden leverage taken by their counterparties. Prime brokers should have access to data on a fund’s overall leverage, not just the portion to which they have contributed, just as banks ask household borrowers about their student loan repayments and credit card debts when issuing a mortgage. Banks, like their non-bank clients, need also to improve their stress testing to include better understanding of market dynamics and structural shifts that might change correlations and norms.
The Discussion Paper asks for your views about how these trade-offs should be managed. If a fully focused approach based on a very small number of conservatively calibrated requirements represents one extreme, 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  and a modestly streamlined approach which trims a few elements from the current rulebook represents another, where on the spectrum between those poles would you prefer us to be? Key questions Let me conclude by summarising some of the key choices we seek comments on. First, is it right to start (as we suggest) with the smallest banks and then move in time towards bigger ones as we build a graduated strong and simple framework? Is this the right first step? Second, are the scope criteria we suggest the right ones and, if so, where should we draw the line in terms of size? Third, would you prefer a focused approach with few more conservative requirements, or a streamlined approach? The Discussion Paper contains questions addressing these choices along with questions about other, more detailed choices which we will face as we design a simpler regime. I strongly encourage you to submit comments on them all. As I began by saying, we approach all of these questions with an open mind and we will use your comments when we answer them. We will be accepting comments until 9 July.

That is to develop a ‘strong and simple’ prudential framework for non-systemic banks and building societies. Sam Woods spoke about this in his Mansion House speech last November.2 He said then that the PRA would publish a Discussion Paper in the spring of this year explaining more about what we want to achieve with this initiative and how we think that might be done. That Discussion Paper was published today. I will go on to explain some of its most important elements and to describe the type of responses we hope it will prompt. But I want to start by emphasising the openness of this Discussion Paper. I explained that accountability will sometimes include discussions with industry and stakeholders about the right way forward. That is why we are publishing a Discussion Paper about the strong and simple framework before developing detailed policy proposals for consultation. We are doing this because we recognise that there are many ways a strong and simple framework could be designed and that each has its advantages and disadvantages. The Discussion Paper sets out the key design choices which will determine the overall shape of the strong and simple framework, explains the trade-offs which need to be weighed up when choosing between them, and invites comments about the merits and drawbacks of different options. Those comments will help us when we come to design proposals for consultation. The Discussion Paper is therefore open about the choices which confront us. And we have an open mind about what options we might choose.
Institutional investors are allocating more funds to Asia, in search of higher yields and to benefit from the strong growth in the region. Improvements in corporate governance are part of this story. But even in this positive climate, we must remain wary of risks. Terrorism and avian flu are not distant threats. The abundance of liquidity in global and Asian markets has also led to a narrowing of credit spreads that is unlikely to persist for long. The repricing of risk may be triggered by a variety of events, arising for example from a geopolitical disturbance, an unexpected setback in economic growth, or the failure of a major borrower in global financial markets. The repricing of risk, unwinding of spreads and contraction of liquidity in higher risk assets and markets may be sudden, and may not be orderly. On the positive side, the innovations we have seen in global financial markets, including the extensive securitization of assets and growth of the derivatives market, has parceled out risks more widely and perhaps more evenly in the system. But it also makes the system less predictable in the event that things go wrong. We cannot predict how contagion will spread in global markets. It is critical that the hard lessons on corporate governance learnt during the fall out from the Asian crisis are not lost during the current period of benign economic growth and relatively easy availability of funds.

The objective is to equip market participants with better information, let them take responsibility for making their own decisions and to judge the quality of the corporate governance of companies. But a disclosure-based approach can only work well if it is backed up by a robust enforcement regime. This is key to maintaining the confidence of market participants in the disclosure-based regime. In recent years, our regulatory authorities have acted decisively in the face of breaches by market participants, such as in the cases of ACCS, Citiraya and China Aviation Oil. Equally important for a disclosure-based regime is the raising of the bar on corporate governance standards themselves. Singapore’s approach here is a flexible one, recognising the need to cater to a range of companies of different sizes and resources. It comprises a balance of mandatory rules, captured in our legislation and listing rules, and best practice recommendations in the form of the Code of Corporate Governance. Listed companies are required to either adopt the best practice recommendations or to disclose instances where they have not done so and provide explanations for these – in other words companies must “comply or explain”. We will keep both our legislation and best practice codes up to date through regular refinement, so that they stay relevant to a changing environment. We will also keep close watch on developments internationally, to see if they might be relevant to the Singapore environment.