samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The International Energy Agency has called for a 55% reduction in coal-related emissions by 2030 and a full phaseout of unabated coal in power generation by 2040. Early phaseout of coal is especially critical in the Asia Pacific. The region's coal plants account for about a third of APAC's total GHG emissions. More ominously, if they continue to operate as planned, they will exhaust twothirds of the carbon budget that we have remaining to keep the rise in global temperatures from increasing to within 1.5 degrees Celsius. The challenge of phasing out coal is also most acute in the Asia Pacific. Coal accounts for nearly 60% of power generation in the region. Asia's energy demand is projected to increase by two-and-a-half times by 2050, on the back of economic development, population growth, and urbanisation. The Asian Development Bank estimates that around 150 million people in APAC still do not have access to electricity. So this is a huge problem. Asia stands to suffer the most in terms of hundreds of millions of lives due to climate change, and yet the transition is going to affect them the most as well. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Added to the challenge, Asia's coal plants are young, less than 15 years old on average. This makes the economics of phasing out coal more challenging, especially as new coal plants continue to be built to keep pace with energy demand.

This is why the GFANZ APAC Network is launching today for public consultation a report providing detailed guidance on financing the managed phaseout of coal fired power plants in the region. The guidance aims to ensure that managed phaseout transactions are climate credible, economically viable, and socially inclusive. It proposes a three-step process. First, ensuring that there are credible plans for coal phaseout at the government, company, and project level. This is critical to address two key risks in managed phaseout projects: one, 'emissions leakage' where the closure of a coal fired power plant is offset by increased operation of other coal plants or new coal plants built. 2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  second risk, moral hazard, where a phaseout transaction perversely encourages more coal power generation in order to later benefit from a potential coal phaseout plan. Second, optimising meaningful outcomes across climate impact, financial viability and socio-economic considerations. There are several measures financial institutions can take to achieve this. one, prioritise projects that align with a science-based pathway that is consistent with timelines set by internationally recognised bodies; two, ensure measures are in place to support access to secure, reliable, and affordable clean energy; three, assess the programmes that are in place to mitigate adverse socioeconomic impacts, such as social cost assessments, stakeholder engagement, land repurposing plans, and worker and community transition plans; and four, conduct a holistic financial viability assessment of the project including the cost of socio-economic support measures.
In this way, I trust, we can reconcile those who feel left out, including many of the protesters gathered in Frankfurt this week, with a process of integration that has already generated so many benefits for three generations of Europeans. Let me conclude. This building is a credit to all those who have worked to bring it to fruition. It is a landmark for the city of Frankfurt. And it provides the ECB with an impressive new home to pursue its mandate. But it also stands as a powerful symbol of what European integration is about. It reminds us of where we have come from and where we have come to. Of the horrors that can happen when we split apart, and the huge steps forward we can make when we work together. So let us not undo what has been achieved. Let us not hanker for the past. Let us draw on the past to unite us in the present – to build a complete Union that can deliver the stability and prosperity we need. We as the central bank will do our part in this process by ensuring the integrity of our single currency. Our shared money is the most tangible sign of the trust we place in one another. As the ECB’s first President, Wim Duisenberg, put it at the launch of the euro more than 16 years ago: “A currency is far more than just a medium of exchange … A currency is also part of the identity of people.

These positive developments have been fostered and supported by the pass-through of the ECB’s monetary policy measures, which have significantly eased borrowing conditions for households and firms, notably also for small and medium-sized enterprises. Considering all of the monetary policy measures taken between mid-2014 and October 2017, the overall impact on euro area growth and inflation is estimated, in both cases, to be around 1.9 percentage points cumulatively for the period between 2016 and 2020. Our measures have put the euro area economy on a solid growth pathway, driven by endogenous domestic dynamics and thus more resistant to a potential slowdown in global demand. At the same time, inflation has yet to show more convincing signs of a sustained upward adjustment. After lingering at levels well below 1% for three years, with occasional dips into negative territory, euro area headline inflation has fluctuated between 1.3% and 1.5% since May last year. Annual inflation stood at 1.3% in January. The changes in headline inflation have been driven by movements in the more volatile components, namely energy prices and, to a lesser extent, food prices. Measures of underlying inflation – which we monitor for their information content concerning inflation dynamics – have remained subdued. Inflation excluding energy and food was 1% in January, and has ranged between 0.9% and 1.2% since April 2017. Let me now focus on the factors behind these moderate inflation developments from a longerterm perspective.
In a financial crisis of these proportions, “outside money” – an asset that is not a liability for anybody else than a central bank – becomes the sole trustworthy store of value. 4 Only a central bank, the monopoly provider of outside money, can respond to the scrambles for liquidity. The ECB injected its funding capacity into a market vacuum left wide open by bank retrenchment, dealer defaults and investor panic. In these conditions, inter-temporal financial arbitrage – of the type I described above – becomes impaired. The power of banks and dealers to engage in or finance inter-temporal trades of liquidity balances is degraded. So the main conduit of monetary policy – which depends on those trades – is lost. The ECB had to open a new channel, the “liquidity channel”, to get round the roadblocks facing the interest rate channel (see slide 4). More precisely, the ECB acted in two dimensions. It sought to alleviate the difficulties experienced by banks in getting liquidity from the interbank market, which was putting pressure on the assets side of banks’ balance sheets and increasing the risks of hindering credit supply. At the same time, it sought to restore the normal pass-through from short-term money market (lending) rates to other market and bank interest rates.

The first reason is associated with cash withdrawals and cash deposits by customers and from bank transfer payments intermediated by the Eurosystem – in its function as the clearing institution of the most important interbank payments system in the euro area. The other reason is that not all banks participate in the Eurosystem liquidity-providing operations, but prefer to cover their needs for reserves primarily in the interbank market. For example, in normal times, of the 1,700 banks that were eligible for Eurosystem monetary policy operations, less than 500 used to participate in liquidity allotments. 3  In a Eurosystem environment, the short-term inter-temporal calculus finds another anchor: the need for banks to fulfil their reserve requirements over a monthly maintenance period. In normal times, this is accomplished smoothly throughout the monthly period, again via an inter-temporal substitution of liquidity balances by each individual bank. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  of the short-term rates become the driving factor in the pricing of long-dated securities, and monetary policy acquires a potent handle on the economy. In August 2007, a sudden re-pricing in the US sub-prime mortgage market changed this world. The close and predictable relationship between the expected path of policy rates and market rates broke down because the liquidity premia widened and became volatile. The elevation of market premia was especially pronounced in the spread between the three-month EURIBOR and the expected three-month path of the overnight rate (see slide 3).
The key distinction is that, whereas the speculator takes a view based on the price which he observes in the market and acts upon it, the manipulator uses his resources and the advantage of a dominant market position to try to influence the price - in other words, he is a potential price setter rather than a price taker. Particularly in small markets where relatively small deals may be able to move prices significantly, we need to be alert to this potential problem, which may, if unattended, seriously undermine one's vision of competitive, efficient markets. Information The prices at which derivatives trade contain information which may usefully supplement other market data available to central banks as a means of monitoring expectations and sentiment. Let me give just two examples. First, in the foreign exchange market, whereas the forward rate may provide a point estimate of the expected future rate, data on option prices for different strike prices can provide a probability distribution for the future rate. This additional information, available only as a byproduct of derivatives trading, may be of interest to market analysts, including the monetary authorities. Within the HKMA we have conducted some research into this, which we are in the process of discussing with academics and other technicians. Second, with exchange traded products, where levels of activity are clearly visible, sudden surges or collapses in turnover may hint at shifts in sentiment for one reason or another.

But monetary policy needs to be forward looking, so that does not add up to a compelling case for a change in monetary policy. The question is how has the growth and inflation outlook changed as a result. In my experience, recoveries have momentum. While growth might not be totally steady and even across sectors, as recovery progresses, various mechanisms begin to operate which can give it added momentum. Pressure on existing capacity grows, causing companies to dust off their investment plans. Supply chains tighten and firms start to re-stock. Memories of the uncertainty created by the shocks that generated the recession fades and confidence recovers. The labour market stabilises and unemployment should eventually start to fall, improving job prospects. These things happen over a period of time, so from month to month not much change may be perceptible. But looking back over a longer period, improvement is clear. In my view, this is the process that has been underway for the last year, and this process of gradual healing and recovery is likely to continue in the absence of big negative shocks which could derail growth. Given our experience over the last few years, we should certainly worry about future major shocks from the international economy. But the big downside worries resulting from the financial crisis which were present a year ago have receded, in my assessment. And the response of monetary policy has played a part in that process – though it has not been the only factor at work.
This would institute a process by which these businesses, which are important infrastructure in the Thai foreign exchange market, are given attention and importance to ensure that they contribute to building confidence and trust. 12. In conclusion, let me congratulate once again the winners of this year’s FX Award. Let me also thank Thomson Reuters again for inviting me today. With the support and continued cooperation from all side, the Thai financial markets would continue to press on with the reform efforts that have been made over the years. These improvement will help raise the standard of practice and ensure that our financial market continue to make a positive contribution to the growth and development of the Thai economy which is the ultimate goal for sustainable development. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

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The rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services pushed up CPI inflation until this year, but since the beginning of the year this measure of inflation has edged down again. The 12-month rise in prices for goods and services produced in Norway, excluding energy, was 1.3 per cent in September. The reduction in day-care rates in January this year has pushed down domestic inflation by an estimated 0.3 per cent over the past year. The rise in prices has been lower than expected for both goods and services. It seems that strong competition between various producers within the food industry and the construction industry has curbed inflation. In addition, productivity growth in retail trade has been high in the past few years. Intensified competition may also have restrained the rise in prices for banking and insurance services. Continued strong competition, both foreign and domestic, and high productivity growth in recent years will probably contribute to curbing domestic inflation in 2007. Several factors, however, point to higher inflation in the period ahead, but the rise in prices will probably pick up somewhat later than the historical relationship between inflation and capacity utilisation in the economy would suggest. Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy is picking up. This will contribute to a higher rise in prices for domestically produced goods and services. A tighter labour market will probably lead to higher wage growth in the coming years.

So, even if the proposals of the Riksbank Inquiry were to be realised, there would be nothing to prevent shops and other establishments from refusing to accept cash. Neither is there any way to induce consumers to use cash. This development seems to be steered at least as much by demand as by supply. 8 In other words, the tendencies that led us to start our analysis of the e-krona are continuing. And neither is the Riksbank alone in analysing this issue. Many other central banks are expending resources in investigating digital central bank money and a number have already conducted experiments or developed pilot versions. 9 The Riksbank has met with many other central banks, politicians with responsibility in Sweden and representatives of the private sector. Reactions have varied from great enthusiasm to great scepticism. The banking sector in particular often argues that an e-krona is not needed and that launching one would be an intrusion into the private sector. But the Riksbank’s presence on the market and competition with the private sector’s payment services are actually nothing new. When private banknotes were first issued in the 1830s, the Riksbank had already been active in the issuance of banknotes for over 100 years. 10 The state started Postgirot in the mid-1920s to secure a national payment system, over 30 years before the private banks got started with Bankgirot.
Under the real-time gross settlement model payment instructions are exchanged and settled individually on a gross basis throughout the business day (unlike under a ‘deferred net settlement’ model where payments are exchanged by participants during a ‘clearing cycle’). Under the RTGS model ‘settlement risk’ does not occur and our financial stability objective is promoted as claims and liabilities between banks and other participants are settled in central bank money which is the ultimate secure and liquid asset. It is also the platform through which monetary policy decisions are implemented and provides liquidity to the financial system. Why are we renewing? Just metres from this conference venue is Pudding Lane where in 1666, after a long, hot summer it was an ember from a baker’s oven that set off the Great Fire of London. This triggered the rebuilding of St Paul’s Cathedral, the city’s gates and bridges and much more. I’m pleased to say that the Bank of England today finds itself in the far more fortunate position of renewing its critical infrastructure through choice rather than necessity. RTGS was launched in 1996, and the world, let alone the financial system, has changed dramatically in the intervening 22 years. RTGS has undergone various upgrades but now is time for a more fundamental renewal. Technology is changing, the payments landscape is changing and the demands of users and potential users are changing.

Amongst those considerations was what additional functionality the renewed RTGS service 2  KPMG, Value of Fintech, https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/uk/pdf/2017/10/value-of-fintech.pdf  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  would need to provide in order to enable platforms using innovative technology to optimise their access to central bank money settlement. 3  The results of the POC were published on the Bank of England’s website in June this year. The results were encouraging and demonstrated that participants using alternative technology, such as DLT, could connect and settle. If used in this way, it could enable a wider range of institutions and infrastructures to access prefunded settlement, supporting competition and innovation, offering efficiency gains for users preparing RTGS for future demand. Another area of research is synchronisation – sometimes known as ‘atomic settlement’. This would provide the ability to link payments (or other asset movements) so that each individual movement would happen if and, only if, they all do. Initial industry feedback suggested that for certain transaction types (such as housing transactions, corporate transactions, securities settlement and cross-border payments), synchronisation might reduce cost and risk, improve efficiency, and support innovative new methods of settlement. We 4  recently published a Call for Interest on synchronisation; the deadline for which is 28 September. ISO 20022  None of our ambitions; be they higher resilience, broader access, wider interoperability, improved user functionality, or stronger end-to-end risk management, would be possible without a messaging standard in place.
As a minimum, an economic model to be used as support for interest rate decisions should be based on the assumption that monetary policy can steer inflation. Economic agents can be expected to look ahead when making consumption and investment decisions. It is not only current economic policy that is likely to matter to them, but also what they expect it will be in the future. Expectations must therefore be incorporated and play a role in a monetary policy model. Furthermore, the functioning of monetary policy should be in line with theory and experience. For example, Norway’s recent history tells us that there is little likelihood that monetary policy will be able to influence the economy’s long-term growth potential. Chart: Growth and inflation Many economists previously argued that unemployment could be reduced by accepting slightly higher inflation over time. Monetary policy was oriented accordingly and inflation  2  Factor models, indicator models and VAR models. For a detailed discussion, see Aastveit, K.A, K. Gerdrup, A.S. Jore (2011) “Short-term forecasting of GDP and inflation in real time: Norges Bank’s system for averaging models”, Staff Memo 9/2011, Norges Bank. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  accelerated in many countries, without a sustained decline in unemployment. It turned out that bringing rising inflation under control involved substantial real economic costs. In the past 20 years, inflation has been consistently low and stable.

We are very much data driven; we are driven by facts. We'll look at how all kinds of circumstances, including trade but also the global economy generally and the momentum we have in Europe, feeds into eurozone inflation and that will be the basis for our decisions. So far we are coming from a starting point which is strong and where we have increasing confidence that our inflation objective will be met. When I look at some of the wage deals going around at the moment in Germany and beyond, I see very healthy wage growth of some of those deals as well. When's that going to start feeding through into broader inflation, the kind of figures you want to see to be able to feel more comfortable about raising rates to a normalised level? We've seen some uptick in inflation even in the most recent numbers. It is slow, because we are starting from a point where unemployment at eurozone level was high and broad. We know that it takes time for it to translate into wage pressures. We have to be patient, but there is no reason to think that this will not translate into higher price and wage pressures. We've started to see it. In terms of the cover you've given countries like Italy and others as well, do you feel they've squandered that cover that the ECB has given and the support the ECB has given them through a lower yield and lower borrowing cost?
Conclusion Let me conclude with the words of Nobel Laureate George Bernard Shaw – “Progress is impossible without change, and those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything”. Project Greenback has initiated a change in Sabah’s remittance landscape. Let us keep the momentum going. Sabah can be the model state to promote the use of technology for remittance. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in particular, is exploring to implement a similar initiative in the Philippines and we would be happy to share our experience. On that note, I wish you a fruitful event tomorrow. Thank you. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

The provision of liquidity had the desired effect of reducing strains in markets, narrowing the dispersion of rates, and keeping the federal funds rate within the target range.5 Moving to more recent events, in March of this year the global spread of the pandemic led to a rapid and massive movement of funds around the world as investors sought to protect themselves from the highly uncertain and darkening economic outlook. These flows threatened to overwhelm the financial system and resulted in intense strain and disruption in short-term funding markets and markets for Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities.6 Measures of market functioning deteriorated to levels near, or in some cases worse than, those we saw at the peak of the 2008 global financial crisis.7 In response to the extraordinary volatility and signs of market disruption caused by the pandemic, the Federal Reserve greatly expanded its repo operations and decisively and immediately began purchasing enormous quantities of U.S. Treasury securities and agency mortgage-backed securities. Our approach was to deliver a rapid and overwhelming response that would give assurance to market participants that liquidity would be there in the coming days and months. These actions, combined with the introduction of emergency lending facilities to provide liquidity to funding and credit markets, proved successful.