samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Even if the Guidelines themselves remain as they are, and there is some merit in the flexibility which their current brevity provides, it may be appropriate to re-launch the Guidelines as part of an initiative to improve the familiarity of banks with the Hong Kong approach to workouts. This would stress among other things the need for a spirit of give and take, and a recognition on the part of the banks that “united we stand, divided we fall”. One way of doing this would be for HKAB and the HKMA to host a joint seminar on the Guidelines to which the chief executives of all banks in Hong Kong would be invited. However, it is clear from what I have said earlier that the head offices of foreign banks may also have to be brought more into the picture, in particular to try to ensure that decisions on workouts can be made in a more timely manner. One possibility would be for the HKMA to write to the head offices of all the foreign banks in Hong Kong to describe the thinking behind the HKAB Guidelines and to explain that we expect banks in Hong Kong to comply with them to the fullest extent possible. I intend to write to HKAB to seek its views on these initiatives. The preparation of this speech has helped to concentrate my thoughts on the issues involved, and I would like to thank Amcham once again for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today.

But it all serves the same ultimate purpose, of providing public infrastructure for private innovation, consistent with our mission to promote the good of the people of the UK. 19  https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/payments-landscape-review-call-for-evidence https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/950206/HM_Treasury_Cryptoasset _and_Stablecoin_consultation.pdf 21 https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2020/august-2020.pdf 22 https://committees.parliament.uk/work/834/future-of-financial-services/ 20  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7
We must create a banking community that does not tolerate imprudent business practices and lax systems and control. These are the sins of the past. Thailand, for instance, is carefully fostering a new business culture with the right values. On our part, the Bank of Thailand has since March 2002 announced guidelines supporting the practice of good corporate governance of banks' Board and management to ensure that they look after the interests of their stakeholders in an effective manner. These rules are not ground-breaking; they are just simple common sense. But we need to communicate clearly to the private sector what our expectations are and what the consequences are if the efforts fail. Ladies and Gentlemen, The cost of financial restructuring in Thailand was, after all, too enormous in figures and too painful in real terms to allow us to continue with our old way. In addition to changing the corporate culture, we are also amending a few key laws to solidify the foundation of our financial infrastructure. The new Financial Institutions Businesses Act will empower banking authorities with the necessary power to supervise financial institutions on a consolidated basis and to take appropriate actions against weak banks, with the provisions of prompt corrective actions. The Deposit Insurance Act will support a deposit insurance system to limit the loss of public money and reduce the moral hazard inherent in the current guarantee system.

François Villeroy de Galhau: The digital payment revolution Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Fintech Forum, Paris, 7 October 2020. * * * Mr Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to welcome you here to the Banque de France’s premises this morning. I would also like to welcome those joining us remotely. We are all aware of just how important new technologies are in ensuring continuity and stability in this crisis. My dear Cédric, you’d clearly be the first to say so. I would also like to welcome Alain Clot, President of France Fintech, and of course Robert Ophèle, Chairman of the AMF, with which we have organised this Forum. Your presence among us, Mr Minister, is proof of public authorities’ commitment to Fintechs. And that is my first message this morning: the Banque de France and the ACPR are also fully committed to supporting Fintechs. I shall then go on to tell you how we intend to act in the digital payment revolution. **  I. The Banque de France and ACPR’s support for Fintechs Let’s start with a question I consider particularly important, and on which there should be no shred of ambiguity between us: why do the Banque de France and ACPR regard Fintechs as important? Because they are an essential element for the financial sector: they deliver creativity and they understand new needs rapidly.
Notwithstanding considerable efforts at the public and private level to search for a better way, no magic bullet or formula has been found, although at times some have been asserted. •  Nor is one likely to be available. Experience and a reading of the historical record suggest that the seductive allure of grand solutions must be resisted. Cases differ greatly with respect to what is possible and desirable in terms of their implications for the interests of the public and private sectors. Moreover, history tells us that new developments in markets and practices quickly will render obsolete those measures that might seem well attuned to today’s circumstances. •  Allow me to explain how I think progress can be made by first focusing a bit on the problem that confronts us. I would like to highlight some of the important changes that have taken place over the past two decades in the patterns and instrumentation of capital flows to the emerging world, and in the nature of crises that can arise associated with these flows. G  First, it is important to keep in mind that the constellation of investors and the range of instrumentation have broadened considerably over the past two decades. Equity investors (both direct and portfolio) are now the principal source of net inflows for emerging market countries, and most medium-term debt is held in tradable form by a broad array of diversified, well-capitalized, fixed-income investors. G  Second, there have been equally important changes in the destination of flows.

I would also like to take the opportunity to express Norges Bank’s views on how the Fund’s strategy can be further developed. The Fund’s investment performance, which receives a great deal of attention, is primarily determined by the allocation of assets across different classes such as equities and bonds. Asset allocation is an important component of the Fund’s strategy. Chart: Timeline for managing Norway’s petroleum wealth After Norway discovered oil in the North Sea in 1969, it became clear early on that this would be a source of substantial wealth. The revenue would transform Norwegian society 3 . In 1983, the Committee on the Future of Petroleum Activity 4 – chaired by Hermod Skånland who was appointed central bank governor in 1985 – launched the idea of an oil fund. The proposal was to set up an equalisation fund. According to the Committee, government oil revenues would be transferred to the fund. Each year, an average of the past years’ oil revenues would be transferred to the central government budget and spent on a par with other revenues. 1  Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner (1995): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”, NBER Working Paper 5398. 2  Halvor Mehlum, Karl O. Moene and Ragnar Torvik (2006): “Institutions and the resource curse”, The Economic Journal 116, pp. 1–20. 3  See for example Report no. 25 (1973–74) to the Storting: “Petroleumsvirksomhetens plass i det norske samfunn” [The role of petroleum activity in Norwegian society]. 4  NOU (Official Norwegian Report) 1983:27 “Petroleumsvirksomhetens framtid.
In this regard, a stress testing system, introduced in 2007, already contributes to better assessing banks’ risk management and evaluating adequacy of capital assets to potential risks. In view of the large number of foreign banks presently operating in Algeria, continued efforts are being made to develop bilateral cooperation on their supervision. In conclusion, prudent management of resources and continued strengthening of the financial and banking system stability allow Algeria to consider its medium term economic objectives with a relative confidence. However, the deepening of the international financial crisis and its drastic spillover effects on the world economy is already affecting the country through a number of channels, notably: •  a reduction in its savings capacity. The sharp decline in oil prices is drastically reducing hydrocarbon export receipts and consequently government’s savings capacity. A prolonged weakness of oil prices would inevitably erode the financial wealth accumulated in the stabilization fund with a correlative reduction in international reserves;  •  a reduction in the yields on the investment of international reserves, as a consequence of low interest rates in international markets. 2  BIS Review 21/2009

A suitable and pragmatic approach could be a first step focused on providing the liquidity needs of the national deposit guarantee schemes, as proposed by the European Commission last October. We don’t need from the start an integrated European guarantee. Third, sovereign debt restructuring. It is legitimate and important to ask ourselves how to make the euro area better able to withstand sovereign debt crises in case they happen. In this regard, enhancing market discipline can be part of the solution – the proposals to set up a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism build on this idea. However, we have to be very cautious and make sure that it does not become part of the problem. When rules are rigid, market expectations may prompt sudden chain reactions or speculative attacks and put financial stability at risk. And nobody should underestimate the “transition problem” on the existing debts if such a policy were to be announced. Fourth, the institutional architecture of the euro area. If we make progress on the substance (the three instruments I mentioned), there is a strong case for a euro area Finance Minister in order to implement them. He would be President of the Eurogroup and a member of the European Commission, as mentioned in the European Commission’s proposals published in December 2017. As a compromise between rules and discretion, this Finance Minister could rely on the expert advice of an independent institution such as a strengthened European Fiscal Board. Let me sum up.
Figure 16  Inflation forecasts  (annual change, percent)  14  Headline  Core (w/o volatiles)  Forecast (from 2023.QII to 2025.QII)  12 10 8 6 4 2 0  19 II III IV 20 II III IV 21 II III IV 22 II III IV 23 II III IV 24 II III IV 25 II Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. 16  Figure 17  GDP (2)  GDP growth forecasts (1)  (index, 2018=100)  (annual change, percent)  MP Report Mar.23 MP Report Jun.23  120 115 110 105 100 95  25(f)  24(f)  23(f)  22  21  20  19  18  90  (1) Forecasts contained in each MP Report. Arrows indicate change with respect to March 2023 forecast. (2) For 2023, 2024, and 2025, GDP forecasts consider midpoint of projected ranges in this MP Report. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Table 1  Domestic scenario 2024 (f)  2023 (f) MP Report Mar. 23  MP Report Jun. 23  MP Report Mar. 23  -0.5/0.5 -4.0 -3.0 -2.9  -0.5/0.25 -4.2 -3.3 -3.0  1.0-2.0 1.1 0.7 -0.7  -3.0 -3.8 4.5 -6.5 -4.0 18.7 23.3  -3.4 -4.9 2.4 -8.3 -3.7 19.1 23.0  1.1 0.9 3.7 2.5 -4.1 18.9 23.2  2025 (f)  MP Report Jun. 23  MP Report Mar. 23  MP Report Jun.

This point is important, because it reflects the significance for our economy of having undergone a process of inflationary control that started earlier and was more intense than in other economies. This has allowed our inflation rate to advance towards the target and us to begin to analyze the possibility of reducing the restrictions associated with monetary policy. The fact that the monetary policy rate has remained contractionary for several quarters has contributed significantly to the decline in inflation. Following our Monetary Policy Meeting yesterday, we stated that the most recent economic developments are pointing in the required direction. If these trends continue, the MPR will begin a downward path in the near term. The magnitude and timing of this process is something that we will analyze on a meeting-by-meeting basis, considering the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario and its implications for the inflation trajectory. 1  Let me go into more detail on our assessment of the macroeconomic scenario and the main projections in this Report. Our macroeconomic scenario As I said at the beginning, headline and core inflation have declined in line with expectations. The decline in the latter has been slower and more limited than total inflation. Thus, in May, the annual variation of the CPI was 8.7%, while that of the core CPI (no volatility) was 9.9%. The trajectory of inflation has been driven by the volatile components. In core inflation, the goods component has declined, while the core services component remains high and without a clear trend (figure 1).
That is exactly why we put credit risk at the top of our list of Supervisory Priorities11 for UK deposit takers in our annual letter to CEOs in January. What do we expect mutuals to do? As I noted at the start, your services are instrumental in supporting UK households and businesses. It’s in all our interests that this is maintained, both to the members who rely on your services and also to support the resilience of the broader economy. But it is also vitally important that the risks of doing so are managed prudently. Whilst the mutual sector generally has a good track record of doing this, it is important that firms continue to enhance the way they manage risk. Aligned with this, we’ve seen the most proactive firms taking steps that include: • •  • •  • • •  Using early warning indicator frameworks that highlight emerging risks in portfolios at an earlier stage than more traditional, backward-looking credit metrics. Reviewing credit risk management frameworks to ensure they remain appropriate, with robust governance and controls around credit and affordability assessments. Reviewing lending criteria to ensure they remain prudent and sustainable. Assessing concentration risks in their portfolio. This is especially important for firm-specific concentrations, for example in the type or location of their customer base. Regularly analysing whether the levels of credit loss provisions are sufficient and ensuring these are recognised in a timely manner.

Early outreach to customers whose finances are most vulnerable in the current circumstances whilst bearing in mind relevant FCA guidance12. Ensuring that customer support and collections arrangements are appropriately scaled so they can expand rapidly if need be. This is, of course, not an exhaustive or comprehensive list but simply highlights some of the good practices we are seeing amongst the firms we supervise. However, the message is clear: the outlook is highly uncertain; and we expect firms to be proactive in enhancing the way you manage the risks in your credit portfolios – rather than simply  11 UK Deposit Takers Supervision: 2023 priorities (bankofengland.co.uk) 12 FG23/2: Guidance for firms supporting existing mortgage borrowers impacted by rising living  costs | FCA  Bank of England  Page 5  relying on historic approaches. Doing so will enable you to continue to support your members in a sustainable way. As your supervisor, we have been increasing our own focus on credit risks. You will probably have seen this in your firm’s engagement with our supervisory teams; through the questions we are asking, the data we are collecting and the reviews we are conducting both with individual firms and thematically. And, of course, our Annual Cyclical Scenario stress test will enable us to assess the resilience of the largest UK deposit takers. The results of this will be published in July. We expect all other firms to use the PRA published scenario as a benchmark in their own stress testing processes.
The development of cheap and innovative digital payment solutions is leading to a decline of the use of cash in transactions, and an increase of cashless payments, which leads to a wider use of commercial bank money. Besides, our European ecosystem has become critically dependent on non-European players – already major global card-schemes, and more and more Bigtechs – with little control over business continuity and data protection. Meanwhile, the development of crypto-assets and socalled “stablecoins” aims to create a new category of settlement assets. Stablecoins may compete against both commercial and central bank money, even though they do not offer the same guarantees in terms of credit risk, liquidity, service continuity, and neutrality. Indeed, current digitalisation triggers at least two important risks: (i) the risk that BigTechs will build private financial infrastructures and “monetary” systems, competing with the public monetary sovereignty; and (ii) the symmetric risk that some jurisdictions judge that the only way to respond to the overwhelming private payments’ wave would be to issue and spread on a domestic but also a global basis, “their” CBDCs (Central Bank Digital Currency). 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  I already called – including here at Europlace – for a holistic European payments strategy. The good news is that in the last months we made decisive progress in designing it, thanks to the commitment of the Commission and the ECB. Christine Lagarde as President, and Fabio Panetta as Board’s member in charge of payments changed the game through their personal involvement.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Brexit, digital payments, seize the day Closing speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Paris Europlace International Financial Forum, Paris, 7 October 2020. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to conclude this Europlace International Financial Forum, and to congratulate Chairman Augustin de Romanet and his team for having overcome all obstacles. Today, Paris is, thanks to you, a financial capital of Europe…. and it is more than a short-lived satisfaction, it is a lasting and collective success. The title of today’s session – “From crisis to recovery…” – reminds us of a quote from Hannah Arendt: “a crisis becomes a disaster only when we respond to it with preformed judgments, that is, with prejudices.1” Today crises are multifaceted and our duty as policymakers is to prevent them from turning into disasters. To this end, we have to put aside prejudices and come up with concrete solutions. In my speech today, I will focus on two short-term challenges: Brexit obviously, and perhaps more surprisingly the future of Europe payments. I. Preparing for Brexit: a top priority Brexit is a burning and unavoidable issue. I will not comment on the UK’s domestic politics nor on the ongoing negotiations with the EU. But amidst all this deep fog, one thing remains clear: achieving a fair and well-balanced Brexit deal would be in the economic interest of first and foresmost Britain but also the EU.
I hope that these reports will be interesting reading and thank you for having me here today. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Local banks recorded average growth in pre-tax profits of 15% per annum in the six years prior to the Asian crisis. Moreover, most banks remained profitable during the crisis itself and all continued to maintain high capital ratios. Financial distress was therefore not a driving force for merger, as it has been in other Asian countries. But there are signs that the consolidation process is gathering pace in Hong Kong. The reasons for this are to some extent the same as those elsewhere. These include increased competition from both domestic and global players, deregulation, the need to invest in new technology and the increased focus, even for family-owned businesses, on generating shareholder value. All this means that the life of a banker in Hong Kong is not an easy one at present. Some of the old certainties are breaking down. The removal of the remaining interest rate controls in a month's time will usher in a new era of full competition on the liabilities side of the balance sheet. While the surplus liquidity in the system may mitigate the immediate impact to some extent, banks will face new challenges on products, pricing, fees and charges, and asset and liability management. This comes on top of the challenges that the banks are already facing to generate new lending business. The residential property market, which has been the mainstay of most of the local banks' business, is currently drifting without clear direction, and mortgage business is still sluggish, as the latest figures for April demonstrated.
We did not intend to overhaul the capital rules for trading book exposures, but rather to seek to address narrowly a handful of concerns that relate either to potential inconsistencies that could arise with the new treatment for banking book assets or to a limited number of issues that have arisen since the adoption of the Market Risk Amendment. I cannot comment on the proposals, given that they have not yet been formally approved by both organisations. As far as the Basel Committee is concerned, this approval was given yesterday, obviously pending the approval of IOSCO, which will study it in a few days’ time. I can tell you that, in my personal opinion, the proposals appear to be prudent, balanced and appropriately sensitive to risk. Moreover, I believe that they support our goal to encourage continued improvement in the measurement and management of these exposures. The rapid progress that we achieved here largely reflects the contributions that the IIF, its members, and many others in the industry provided in the discussions with the various working groups. For that, I would like to express my thanks to the IIF and its members. I look forward to continuing our discussions on the solutions proposed in the coming weeks. I am confident that we will then be able to finalise the rules by early July so that national rule-making processes and banks’ own preparations can incorporate them in time for Basel II’s implementation.

We have also published a working paper entitled: “Studies on the Validation of Internal Rating Systems” Although validation is foremost the responsibility of banks, supervisors must have a thorough understanding of validation in order to ensure the overall integrity of banks’ activities in this area. I think these principles set out clearly what supervisory expectations are, and should provide a useful guide to the industry. Our work on validation will accelerate over the coming months, although our focus will be more on sharing and cataloguing information and approaches, and not on trying to develop a prescriptive method. Close dialogue with the industry in our work will be of great importance. Let me finish by saying that we, the supervisory community, continue to devote significant resources and efforts to improving the consistency of cross-border implementation. Consequently, the excellent dialogue between supervisors, organisations such as the IIF, and the industry more broadly, must continue in the coming months and years ahead. I welcome the discussions that we have been having, both inside and outside this conference, and look forward to hearing more of your thoughts and perspectives. BIS Review 23/2005  3