samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Until there are equally secure electronic means of providing that anonymity, eliminating currency is not warranted. Economists have proposed many clever ways to implement the taxation of currency, or, equivalently, the payment of interest on currency holdings. Some of the proposals entail decreasing the value of the currency by imposing a negative rate of interest. This can be likened to making currency out of ice. As you can imagine, such cold currency would slowly disappear as the ice turns into liquid water. (Other proposals would, in effect, attempt to raise or lower the temperature of the air surrounding the ice money.) One might conjecture that the loss of purchasing power is the same whether a person holding a dollar for a period of a year sees the value of that dollar decline owing to inflation of 1 percent, or because he had to pay a penny of interest in an environment of stable prices. However, there is a subtle difference between a negative rate of interest charged on currency, and inflation decreasing the value of currency. With inflation, a dollar remains a dollar, but its purchasing power declines. In contrast, with negative interest rates, the dollar of currency is slowly whittled away as one makes interest payments, even though its purchasing power can remain unchanged (this would be the case if prices fell by the same rate as the negative interest rate). In other words, the value of the unit of account is unchanged when a negative interest rate is charged on currency.

95 5 1292  4    57 3  )*++,-  #77 477 277   1 54 77 44 2 77 4#4 87737  5#4  6 54 4#4 #77   4#4 2 4#4 <   74 4#4 ;@ <4A5  5 57 75  847 54 8 7   4  354%  54' '   8  54 ' ( 735 447 4 '   736 ( 7   &7 54')0+ $ 54%')00+ ( 2  $  ( 54  736 44 46 4')0H+  6 641 641 56 8 7 641 41   816 74641 6 7641 6  6 4776 76841 81 56 8  74 7   6 56 47 6 456 76841 56  1641 56 8 6  164 166  56 56 7 71 54451 41  +  56 841 64 841  5 74641 1  841  16 1641  1 6 6 856 47 1 46 6 4   <=>? @ABC=>   95   10 10   /5%!85  $
Mr. George discusses Britain in Europe and the economics of EMU Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E.A.J. George, at the Borsen in Copenhagen on 6/3/98. I am delighted to be here this morning, and to have this opportunity to meet with the Danish financial community. I would like to use this opportunity to explain to you something of the British attitude to Europe - as I see it - and in particular our attitude to monetary union. I am well aware that we British have something of a reputation for stubbornness about Europe. I should like to try to persuade you this morning that while we do have some - not wholly irrational - misgivings, we are nevertheless as anxious as anyone to see the project succeed. We have to be - it is clearly in our national interest that it should. Let me make clear at the outset that, of course, I recognise that monetary union is fundamentally a political issue. It necessarily involves some deliberate pooling of national sovereignty over important issues of public policy - monetary policy and overall fiscal policy - just as the single market involved the pooling of sovereignty over aspects of trade and competition policy and so on.

But the Chancellor also made it clear that the British Government is not opposed to euro membership as a matter of principle; it will make its decision on pragmatic, economic, grounds, and submit that decision to Parliament and to the British people in a referendum. The Chancellor recognised that - barring some fundamental and unforeseen change in economic circumstances - it was unrealistic to think that a decision could be made during the lifetime of the present Parliament - which could extend to May 2002. But he stressed that in the meantime the United Kingdom should prepare - both for the euro’s introduction on the Continent on 1 January 1999 and for our own eventual participation. BIS Review 23/1998  -3This statement was the first by a British Government to declare for the principle of monetary union. It implies that the United Kingdom is to be regarded effectively as a “Pre-In”. It recognised that the single currency will affect us whether we are in or out of it, and that it is clearly in our national interest to play a full part in ensuring that the euro is successful. This, in my view, provides a solid foundation for a continuing, positive and constructive relationship between the United Kingdom and those EU member states that do participate in the first wave of the euro.
As the core issue is the holistic management of risks across the institution, MAS will, in our implementation of these Principles, incorporate these into the Corporate Governance Framework. That way, the various governance elements pertaining to risk management can function in a balanced and coherent manner. Role of advocacy bodies So far I have spoken mainly on the role of regulators in setting out good corporate governance Codes and practices. However, the quality of corporate governance depends critically on people and values. Industry groups such as SIAS have an important role in formulating and implementing higher standards of corporate governance practices. I would like to take this opportunity to applaud SIAS for being a tireless advocate of investor rights. Mr. David Gerald, in particular, has contributed significantly in this area. SIAS has played its part in empowering securities investors through education and information, most recently with regard to structured products. It has also played a role as a "corporate integrity watchdog" by actively engaging corporations that have fallen short of good corporate governance practices. The effort to promote good corporate governance practices and to cultivate ethical corporate culture and behaviour is also supported by advocates in the media, academia and professional associations. Our local media have highlighted good and bad practices. Several journalists have written thoughtful pieces. It is useful to have discerning commentary that points to deficiencies in specific firms without over-generalising.

The world’s financial markets have been plunged into turmoil which some say is unprecedented, or at least comparable to the levels experienced in the most severe financial crises of the last century. Notwithstanding this, our financial system has demonstrated a level of stability which to an extent has been derived from the strong capital positions that have characterised the Zambian banking industry in the past few years. However, this turbulence has already resulted in a reduction in projected global economic growth and a decline in demand for Africa’s exports. Notwithstanding this, we remain confident that the banking sector will continue to show resilience and expansion through branch networks, thereby acting as a channel through which services will be extended to the financially excluded. Ladies and Gentlemen, a recent survey established that fewer than 15% of the Zambian adult population have access to the services provided by commercial banks. The key reasons for this low level of access were cited as the distance that needs to be overcome in order to access the services and the cost of these services. It is therefore a welcome development that commercial banks have responded to these challenges by reaching out through new branches. However, banks need to be mindful of the fact that the many of our people who need these services most of all are not able to bear the heavy charges that are sometimes levied, and the goal of inclusion will stand to be compromised if this matter is not addressed.
The widening wealth gap, coupled with lower yields on savings has led to the feeling of less hope of a better future. Amidst this frustration with the status quo, sentiments of anti-present economic establishment such as anti-globalisation, antitrade, and even anti-bankers have become more widespread. We see increases in non-tariff trade barriers and oppositions to trade deals, polarization of views among people, Brexit, and the US Election. Populist and nationalist policies are flourishing among middle and lower income people in many countries. Against this backdrop, we also face fast changes in technology. Not since the industrial age, have we witnessed such rapid adoption of technology and innovation, thanks in part to the digital revolution. Although technology increases economic productivity and improves people’s standard of living, it can be a source of stress for the working-age population. Many, even the highly skilled, such as investment professionals, fear being replaced by robots and artificial intelligence. Current business models are rapidly rendered obsolete by new business models and the sharing economy such as Uber or Airbnb. Owing to changing economic environment, social sentiment, and technological advancement, I see five imperatives for ASEAN’s banking sector going forward. First, innovative technology is fast changing financial business landscape and we have to be proactive in embracing technology. Given the low-growth and low-interest rate environment, banks’ income is facing pressure from declining spread and fees. Consumers’ needs and behaviour have changed and they now demand faster and more convenient services.

CEPS Forum: Reconstructing the Union EMU governance: a reality check Address by Dr Mario Vella Governor of the Central Bank of Malta Brussels, 23 February 2017  The Five Presidents’ Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union argues that economic and political convergence underpinning EMU needs to go deeper if it is to ensure prosperity for all its members and fairer outcome for its citizens. In the first phase, which was meant to be completed in June, the report envisages a number of steps including: −  a new boost to convergence, employment and growth, through the creation of a euro area system of competitiveness authorities and stronger implementation of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure;  −  the completion of the banking union and the launch of the capital markets union;  −  the establishment of a new advisory European Fiscal Board;  −  a reorganisation of the European Semester, with greater parliamentary control and accountability. The Commission should soon be publishing a related White Paper on the future of Europe. Before moving forward, let’s see what’s been achieved so far. In the twenty-five years since the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the euro has been established a successful currency. It is widely accepted as a medium of exchange and store of value, not only within the euro area itself, but also beyond it. It enjoys popular acceptance and support.
Chart: Output and employment  3  The gaps express deviations from estimated trends in seasonally adjusted figures for mainland GDP and CPI adjusted for tax changes and excluding energy products (CPI-ATE), respectively. The trends are estimated using a Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter on quarterly data with λ=40000. The output gap is a technical estimate and does not fully correspond with the output gap in Norges Bank’s Monetary Policy Report. 4  The correlation between these two data series is highest when the output gap is deferred 4–5 quarters into the future. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The path from changes in output to inflation passes through the labour market, among others. We have seen that when economic growth has picked up, unemployment5 has declined one to two quarters thereafter. The relationship between the “output gap” and the “unemployment gap” is fairly strong. This is a useful observation because GDP figures are published with a considerable lag and often subject to revision, while unemployment data are published at the end of each month and are not revised. If there is uncertainty about the GDP figures – which there often may be – falling unemployment can be an indication of a recovery in economic growth. Chart: Unemployment and wage growth Labour market developments, in turn, affect wage growth, as illustrated by the blue line in the chart. High unemployment results in low wage growth, and vice versa. The chart shows that in periods of falling unemployment, wage growth6 moves up fairly rapidly.

As a minimum, an economic model to be used as support for interest rate decisions should be based on the assumption that monetary policy can steer inflation. Economic agents can be expected to look ahead when making consumption and investment decisions. It is not only current economic policy that is likely to matter to them, but also what they expect it will be in the future. Expectations must therefore be incorporated and play a role in a monetary policy model. Furthermore, the functioning of monetary policy should be in line with theory and experience. For example, Norway’s recent history tells us that there is little likelihood that monetary policy will be able to influence the economy’s long-term growth potential. Chart: Growth and inflation Many economists previously argued that unemployment could be reduced by accepting slightly higher inflation over time. Monetary policy was oriented accordingly and inflation  2  Factor models, indicator models and VAR models. For a detailed discussion, see Aastveit, K.A, K. Gerdrup, A.S. Jore (2011) “Short-term forecasting of GDP and inflation in real time: Norges Bank’s system for averaging models”, Staff Memo 9/2011, Norges Bank. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  accelerated in many countries, without a sustained decline in unemployment. It turned out that bringing rising inflation under control involved substantial real economic costs. In the past 20 years, inflation has been consistently low and stable.
We can now benefit from the lessons we learned the hard way from the profound financial and real crisis we suffered in 1982-1983. Chile has steadily built throughout the years solid macroeconomic and financial institutions that, although they do not shield us from world events, do permit us to adjust to external shocks at substantially lower costs than we would have faced in the past. Therefore, as we have also said since the current crisis turned into chaos, Chile has never been better prepared to weather a shock like the one we are now enduring. Proof of this is the enormous countercyclical effort of macroeconomic policies carried out in the context of a solid, stable financial system. In fact, with respect to October of last year, and compared with the rest of the world, ours has been one of the greatest easing efforts of monetary policy, and our monetary policy rate (MPR) is at its historic low (Figure 2). Such an expansionary monetary policy has been implemented within the context of a credible inflation targeting regime, which ensures its effectiveness facing shocks of the magnitude we are seeing now. Chile’s inflation was among the highest between early 2007 and October 2008, a period that saw commodity prices soar. Also, Chile’s inflation has been one of the fastest to drop (Figure 3).

Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Bureau of Statistics (INE). 8  BIS Review 65/2009  Durable exports (percentage of total exports)  Figure 5 Share of durable goods in total exports and contribution of exports to GDP quarterly growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 HK  60  SIN  50  COR  HUN FIN  RCH  40  TAI  ALE  30  HOL CAN  BEL  R2 = 0.52 -35  -30  -20  -15  -10  -5  NZL  10  AUS CHL  ARG  -25  20  BRL  NOR  COL  5  10  0  Exports (contribution to GDP, annualized quarterly change, percent) Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 6 Lending interest rates (1) (percent) 16  38  14  35  12  32  10  29  8  26  6  23  4  20  2  17  02  03  Commercial (2)  04  05  06  07  08  09  Consumer (2)  Housing (3) (1) Weighted average rates. (2) Nominal rates. (3) Rates in UF. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Thus, by promoting a digital euro we must acknowledge that the Eurosystem is potentially putting its reputation at stake in that it remains liable for the overall functioning of the digital euro architecture whether it decides to rely on third parties for its distribution and operation or not. That said, the biggest source of concern is how a non-controlled expansion of the digital euro as a form of investment could, indeed, threaten the ability of authorities to properly maintain financial stability. As a matter of fact, a too attractive and accessible digital euro could foster a significant migration of banks deposits, thus compromising their intermediation and lending capacity plus also likely destabilizing the entire banking system in times of financial stress. To prevent these macroeconomic consequences from happening, ongoing discussions are currently focusing on what potential safeguards could be built into the digital euro, yet final decisions remain pretty much open at this stage. The main reason being they not only depend on the practical feasibility of the various available tools but also on the likelihood of different scenarios to materialize and the extent to which the latter may actually compromise banks’ resilience. As such, the fine-tuning of design features of the digital euro calls for additional research which I strongly believe the members of CEBRA are best positioned to provide us with. As of today, operational and legal considerations have been the bulk of our work thus far.

In effect, the mere existence of a digital euro would offer a fallback solution in the event of geopolitical tensions. Moreover, when carefully designed, a digital euro could be a catalyst for innovation at a wider scale in that it could support intermediaries’ role in developing new types of services on top of it while enjoying Pan-European reach. 1  Negroponte, N. (1995). “Being Digital”, Vintage International. Random House, New York. Cunliffe, J. (2022) “Some lessons from the Crypto Winter” (https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2022/july/joncunliffe-speech-on-crypto-market-developments-at-the-british-high-commission-singapore). 2  1  A digital euro does, however, exhibit a number of non-trivial risks as well. If, for example, anonymity was to be allowed as a means to provide the highest possible level of privacy, we would be compromising our commitment with fighting money laundering and the financing of criminal activity. What’s more, this setup would put into question the effectiveness of the tools to limit the use of digital euro as a store of value, a point on which I will come back later. In that respect, a balance needs to be struck between minimizing the Eurosystem’s and intermediaries’ involvement in the processing of users’ data and still ensuring compliance with the law. A digital euro is likely to increase as well the Eurosystem’s general operational responsibilities over the payments channels irrespective of the role it ultimately intends to play in the settlement of these transactions.
The monetary policy response to climate change will depend on the nature of the shocks, their intensity and their expected duration. 8 According to our assessment, the overall threat posed by climate risks that are capable of affecting Switzerland’s economic and financial stability appears to be moderate at present. Nevertheless, these risks and the assessment of associated exposure could change, which is why the SNB remains vigilant. This is all the more important as our country is not an island – Switzerland’s economy and financial system are closely interconnected with the rest of the world. The SNB participates in dialogue at both national and international level. The SNB and FINMA regularly discuss climate risks of relevance to the Swiss financial sector. In addition to this, in April 2019, the two institutions joined the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS). This network, which currently has 46 members, was set up to promote the sharing of best practice in handling climate issues and support the development of climate risk management in the financial sector. It also aims to enhance the role of the financial system in enabling the transition to a low-carbon economy. The NGFS’s work is carried out in three dedicated workstreams. 8  •  The first, in which FINMA participates, looks into the implications of climate risks for the microprudential supervision of the financial system, and banks in particular.

Any attempt on the part of the SNB to hedge this risk would increase the demand for francs, which would run counter to its monetary policy objectives. The SNB’s risk profile therefore differs significantly from that of other institutional investors. While the currency risk (orange shading in chart 4) represents 78% of the total risk exposure of our investments, in the case of a representative Swiss pension fund, this proportion is only 16%. Due to its particular risk profile, the SNB is exposed to significant fluctuations in its investment result from one quarter to the next. Given these fluctuations, we exploit all available room for manoeuvre in order to diversify our investments. This allows us to optimise our risk/return profile and maintain the value of our reserves over the long term. To do this, we invest in equities and corporate bonds. Equities are an attractive asset class for the SNB. Their high degree of liquidity ensures the necessary flexibility in monetary matters, while their higher return potential helps to improve the risk/return profile. The SNB differs from other central banks in that it has a relatively high equity exposure (currently 20%, cf. chart 3). Our equity portfolio, which is worth more than CHF 150 billion, is highly diversified. We invest in some 6,700 corporate securities from more than 40 countries. We hold shares in companies which together account for more than 95% of global market capitalisation. Overall, our investments are denominated in some 30 currencies around the world, including those of emerging economies.