samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Policy  The FPC introduced its housing measures in 2014 following the evidence from the post-financial crisis recession that aggregate household indebtedness and the prevalence of highly indebted cohorts had amplified the recession and its impact on the financial system. The tools therefore aim to enhance the resilience of the financial system. The measures aim to act as general structural ‘guardrails’ rather than as a countercyclical tool, though the FPC reviews their calibration periodically. Such a review is in train and be completed by the end of this year. As I have set out, since the introduction of the tools the housing market, outside London, has been relatively quiet by UK standards. But, as I have also explained, there are likely to be many factors behind this in addition to the FPC’s housing measures. The Bank has published extensive analysis on the impact of the tools and a forthcoming “Bank Overground” post will examine the extent to which the measures have acted as a constraint on renters entering the housing market. This analysis finds that minimum affordability requirements and lenders’ internal limits on loan-to-values are likely to have been the dominant constraint for most renters. It estimates that only 2% of renters would have 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  15  been able to afford the median-priced first-time home in their region had they not been constrained by the affordability test.

In any event, the still-high spare capacity in the economy presages a gradual recovery in inflation over the next two years. The factors underpinning the recovery The path of recovery of growth and employment has essentially been underpinned by the restoring of macroeconomic and financial equilibria, which were severely eroded in the crisis. Progress has been visible in the correction of the external imbalance, the deleveraging of households and firms, the redressing of fiscal balances towards levels more compatible with the sustainability of public finances and the restructuring and consolidation of the banking sector. Unemployment, too, is showing clear signs of a correction. The reforms undertaken within Spain, along with the headway in economic and monetary union and the application of the highly expansionary monetary policy by the ECB, have proven key to restoring confidence and providing for the progressive absorption of the imbalances. By way of illustration, the proportion of Spanish public debt held by nonresidents has risen from 30% in 2012 to 44% at present, an increase indicative of the improved confidence in our economy, but also of its dependence on the perception abroad of the soundness and continuity of our recovery. Despite what has been achieved in growth, employment and restoring equilibria, we are far from having overcome all the factors of vulnerability. Doubts over the continuity of the macroeconomic, fiscal and financial rebalancing drive might curtail and lead to backtracking from these achievements. We must not forget that the legacy of the crisis is still burdensome.
Individuals’ substantial foreign currency indebtedness and the adverse movements in the exchange rates of several currencies of late (the strong appreciation of the CHF and of the US dollar, as well as the uncertainties surrounding the euro exchange rate) make it even more difficult for a number of borrowers to repay their debt. Other countries reported similar repayment difficulties on loans to households as well and applied various government-backed schemes to support individuals improve their debt service (the United Kingdom, Ireland, the US, Latvia, Croatia, Iceland). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  IV. NBR measures vis-à-vis foreign currency lending  The NBR has implemented at an early stage a mix of measures to deter the unsustainable increase in foreign currency lending. The measures envisaged: (A) monetary policy, (B) prudential regulation, (C) prudential supervision, (D) public warnings, and (E) implementing the recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on lending in foreign currencies. Romania ranks among the countries that had to come up with unorthodox measures in order to deal with the challenges arising from the full capital account liberalisation, euroisation of the economy, massive foreign capital inflows, etc. Some of these measures, previously seen as administrative measures at the moment of their implementation, are currently deemed macroprudential instruments (e.g., debt service to disposable income ratio and loan-to-value ratio). A.

In the event  5  BIS Review 126/1999  that a bank’s internal capital adequacy process is lacking, supervisors must have the knowledge and authority to take corrective action. There can be no doubt that implementing the supervisory review of capital will require considerable insight and flexibility on the part of supervisors because they will have to tailor their efforts to the unique risk profiles of particular institutions. At the same time, this approach should allow supervisors to draw on their cross-institutional knowledge as they assess the strengths and weaknesses of a bank’s risk management and capital allocation processes relative to those of its peers. The G10 supervisors recognize the obvious implications that this approach will have for supervisory resources. In order to keep pace with industry innovation, it is clear that we will have to step up our training and consider effective ways for making the most use of our limited resources. The Basel Committee also recognizes the importance of these issues for the non-G10 countries and is working toward providing the training and other types of support needed to allow these countries and their supervisors to move in this direction. The third element in the proposed new capital adequacy framework has to do with market discipline - another critical component of a safer and more stable financial system. More extensive disclosure and greater dependence on market forces complement improvements in risk management, banking supervision, and minimum capital standards.
2  Walker, David (July 2009), "A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities", Her Majesty's Treasury; G20 Working Group 1 (March 2009), "Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency", G20; OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance (May 2009), "Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis - Key Findings and Main Messages", OECD. 2  BIS Review 147/2009  complacent. We must not let up in our efforts to improve our regulations and codes, as well as in the actual practices and governance culture. As part of this effort, I am pleased to announce that we will be establishing a Corporate Governance Council, comprising members from the private and public sectors. The objective of the Council will be to promote a high standard of corporate governance in companies listed in Singapore so as to maintain and enhance investors' confidence. In turn, this will enhance Singapore's reputation as a leading and trusted financial centre, and benefit all players involved. In conceptualising the Corporate Governance Council, the CCDG serves as a useful reference. Unlike the CCDG, which also had responsibility for promulgating accounting standards and improving disclosure practices, the Corporate Governance Council's focus will be squarely on corporate governance matters. Among the Council's roles will be the identification of opportunities for continuing professional development of directors and the development of practical guidance for Board committees. By taking into account perspectives of relevant stakeholders, the Council can develop initiatives that are robust and balanced, and achieve broad support and alignment of all parties.

It is ironic that only when problems in advanced economies led to contagion elsewhere and large number of central banks entered into such swap agreements with the Federal Reserve, did the IMF agree to such an instrument. This also reconfirms the need for greater voice and representation of emerging markets in important international financial institutions (IFIs) as highlighted in the recent G-20 Summit Declaration. While the reform is underway under the IMF, it is only with hope that other fora, including, the FSF will take the issue into consideration more seriously. Let me elaborate further on the importance of having emerging markets participated in the systemically important international fora. I think you all agree at this advanced economies or emerging markets are all prone to sectoral imbalances, which, if left unchecked, can lead to a full-blown crisis, anywhere, any time, when the bubbles burst. The impact of a crisis in an advanced, systemically important country can be much broader and deeper, creating a larger scale of world-wide externality. Emerging markets, unlike others, have had our share of coping with new challenges brought on by this phenomenon as well as those created by us one decade ago. It is, therefore, not only the responsibility of advanced countries to be in charge of global surveillance but also the responsibility of emerging markets to share our views and experiences of how to reform ourselves to be better prepared for greater uncertainty.
I am not sure if this is a dimension covered in Professor Genberg's paper on Endogenous Dollarisation, but it is of particular relevance to Hong Kong. The third paper, to be presented by Professor Kumhof, deals with issues regarding price dynamics. Professor Kumhof's paper focuses on pricing policies and inflation inertia, at a time when we are experiencing deflation in Hong Kong: I am sure, however, that there are insights that we can derive from the paper and the discussion. Research on price formation is high on the agenda of the HKIMR and the HKMA, and possibly in academic and other organisations active in economic research in Hong Kong. We have had deflation for some five years now and we are still debating the relative importance of cyclical and structural factors behind that deflation. There is also debate on whether measures could and should be taken to limit the damaging effects of deflation, notwithstanding the fact that Hong Kong is a highly externally oriented economy. Views on price dynamics will contribute to these debates. As you know, the HKIMR was established by the HKMA. This reflects the importance we attach to thorough analysis of monetary and financial issues that Hong Kong is facing. Developments in the local, regional and global economies provide many opportunities for Hong Kong, but also serve as potential sources of risks. It is therefore critical that we actively seek to understand these developments.

To promote economic research of the highest quality, it is essential that the research activities of the HKIMR are, and are seen to be, carried out freely, without interference from interested parties, including the HKMA. It is therefore not desirable for the HKMA to exercise control of the  BIS Review 38/2003  1  HKIMR's day-to-day activities. But, of course, the professional quality and academic integrity of its activities need to be monitored and ensured. For this reason, a Council of Advisors, whose members are all distinguished economists working in and outside of Hong Kong, has been established. Many of them are in fact here today. The role of the Council is to ensure the quality of the HKIMR's activities and to alert the Board of Directors if shortcomings become apparent. While the relationship between the HKIMR and the HKMA remains close, the HKIMR does enjoy independence in research matters. One consequence of this is that the views expressed in its different publications do not necessarily reflect those of the HKMA. One of the distinguished members of the HKIMR's Council of Advisors is our first speaker today, Charles Goodhart, and it is my great pleasure to introduce him. It was very much his visit to Hong Kong that gave the HKIMR the idea of organising this workshop. As you all know, Charles is one of the world's foremost monetary economists and an expert on central banking issues.
Stepping back, I have to recognise that we have predicted higher nominal wage growth in the past, and have been serially disappointed. Since the Referendum, downside news on nominal wages has been augmented by the inflationary effect of the fall in sterling, meaning real wage growth has been strikingly weak. Over the two years to 2018Q2 real wages fell by 0.5%, more than 4pp below the MPC’s May 2016 forecast of 3.8% cumulative growth. 26  But we are now forecasting both nominal and real wage growth to pick up from here. Given our forecasting history it would be foolish of me to rule out being disappointed on wage growth again – although developments over the past year have so far broadly matched our expectations, with private sector regular pay in particular now growing at 3%, a little stronger than our forecast of a year ago. One additional important factor to bear in mind here is that our past downside errors on wages have largely come from weaker productivity. But what matters for businesses’ costs and so for inflation is wages relative to productivity, that is to say, unit labour costs; and here our forecast errors have been somewhat smaller.

Looking at our experience over the last decade, there is a good case for bringing financial stability higher in our priorities. That may imply, in particular, that, when assessing the economic and financial environment, central banks should take a longer term perspective and be more alert to incipient financial imbalances. •  I would note, in passing, that the Eurosystem is well equipped to take such a perspective. Our "two pillar "approach allows us to look permanently at the dynamics of money and credit aggregates, which are essential to detect both long term risks to price stability and potential threats to financial stability. •  But more should be done. It is now broadly accepted that a "macro prudential" approach should be taken when implementing financial supervision. That means looking both at system wide implications of our prudential decisions and their impact on financial imbalances and the real economy. •  Central banks have a major role to play in this process for four reasons: (1) they have an incentive to act, since well functioning financial markets are essential for the transmission of monetary policy; (2) being equipped to permanently look both at financial markets and economic cycles they may have an informational advantage in analyzing their interaction; (3) there independence allows them to produce dispassionate and candid assessments of risks; (4)and, finally, their proximity to the banking system provides them with an intimate knowledge of financial dynamics.
I shall discuss each of these during the rest of my welcome address. However, first allow me to recount a few stages in a career full of accomplishments. Otmar Issing was born on 27 March 1936 in the university town of Würzburg. At the age of 18, he enrolled for classical philology, the study of classical languages, but soon switched to economics. He earned his PhD in 1961 and received his habilitation in 1965. From 1967 to 1990 he was a professor of economics. In 1990 he joined the Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank. And in 1998 he became a founding member of the Executive Board of the ECB and its first Chief Economist. Since 2006 he has been president of the Center for Financial Studies at the Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main. Architect of ECB strategy Ladies and gentlemen, let me now focus on the three attributes central to our decision to honour Otmar Issing with this lecture. I will begin with his role in the conception of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy, his most important and enduring contribution to Europe’s new monetary order. While Chief Economist of the Bundesbank, Otmar had written a paper claiming that a future European central bank should have a monetary target, essentially emulating what the Bundesbank had achieved. But when he arrived at the ECB, his thinking changed. He realised the risk of a monetary target in a totally new environment. Thus, a tailor-made strategy to achieve price stability was called for.

Speech  Embargo 20 September 2018, 5.30 pm  Third Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture Introduction of Otmar Issing, ETH Zurich  Thomas J. Jordan Chairman of the Governing Board Swiss National Bank Zurich, 20 September 2018 © Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 2018  Page 1/4  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to welcome you all to the third Karl Brunner Distinguished Lecture. In this Lecture Series, the Swiss National Bank pays tribute to academics whose research is of particular relevance for central banking. This year, we are expressing our appreciation of an outstanding monetary policy theorist and practitioner, an independent mind and a leading voice in economic affairs. From this description, you may doubt that I am talking about just one person. But I am. That person is, of course, Otmar Issing. Professor Issing’s life has been extraordinary and widely admired. His scholarly activities and policymaking contributions have been both impressive and mutually reinforcing. His publication list includes numerous articles in scientific journals and periodicals. His collected speeches and articles in the library of the Bundesbank amount to 21 volumes of about 10,000 pages. His textbooks have shaped the understanding of monetary theory and policy of entire generations of students, myself included. While there are many reasons for the SNB to honour Otmar Issing with this Karl Brunner Lecture, three stand out: his role as chief architect of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy strategy, his tireless commitment to price stability, and his significant influence on general economic debate.
John C Williams: The economic recovery - are we there yet? Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Women in Housing and Finance 2021 Annual Symposium, 4 May 2021. * * * As prepared for delivery Hello, everyone. I’m pleased to join you today. While virtual meetings like these do have some benefits—I haven’t gotten stuck in Midtown Manhattan traffic or experienced a flight delay in over a year—I know we are all looking forward to meeting again in person when it’s safe to do so. During this pandemic, we have now made an entire trip around the sun, and then some. The events since March of last year have been devastating on many levels. The ongoing human toll is a tragedy we will never forget. The shutdown of a wide range of everyday economic and social interactions posed tremendous challenges to families, businesses, and communities. And this extraordinary public health crisis has also had profound economic consequences across the globe. Of course, we continue to be affected by the pandemic in so many ways. But if you look out your window today, the view is very different than it was a year ago. Now, more than half of American adults have received at least one vaccine dose, and millions more are receiving vaccines every week.

The output gap is subsequently one of the factors that play a key role in the inflation cycle. All things being equal, the growth outlook thus  BIS Review 95/2001  3  exerts an influence on monetary policy, namely the worse the outlook, the lower the interest rate, and the contrary. For as long as inflation remains at its present high level, however, it is unavoidable to allow the output gap to shrink sufficiently and the Central Bank cannot apply its instruments at this stage to prevent that happening. High interest rates are counter-inflationary The Central Bank has held the view that, until clear signs emerge that its August inflation forecast will hold good, it is still not safe to lower interest rates. Impulsive action could entail a risk that inflation will magnify even further, with very dire consequences for households, businesses and economic growth conditions. Claims have also been heard that Iceland’s high interest rates are inflationary rather than counter-inflationary. The Central Bank does not agree with this view, which cannot be supported with economic theories, studies or research. On the contrary, there is every indication that interest rates have a similar effect in Iceland to that elsewhere. The Icelandic economy was showing signs of strong overheating which apparently peaked last year. It is beyond doubt that the tight monetary stance made a major contribution towards cooling the economy.
Salaries, earlier paid monthly would become payable first fortnightly, then weekly and daily and finally hourly. It would entail a tremendous cost on the employers to meet the demand for paying salaries every hour. Similarly, all other contracts would also be very short term contracts. People would not think of the future, but only on the passing moments. This type of short-term behavior on the part of people would cause the economy concerned to collapse on itself due to a lack of long term commitments. Inflation normally brings in several other irreparable damages to an economy. In the first place, inflation discourages exports, encourages imports and widens the gap between the imports and exports known as the trade gap causing problems for the balance of payments and the exchange rate. If the domestic prices are higher, there is no reason for exporters to sell a product abroad. For instance, if inflation raises the price of a coconut to Rs 100 in the domestic market and its given price in the international market is Rs 50, an exporter would sell the product in the domestic market to gain the price advantage. Similarly, imports are encouraged, because of the lower price in the international markets than the domestic market. This is equivalent to imposing a tax on exports and giving a subsidy to imports. Second, inflation favors borrowers and discourages savers, if interest rates are not adjusted to reflect the going inflation rate.

The duty of the central bank in such a situation has been to keep the lid of the jar tightly so that the child is unable to take out cookies at its own pleasure. This is not a popular measure, but central banks throughout the world have been found to keep the cookie jar in tight control for the benefit of the society. Given the above economic costs, inflation is undoubtedly the public enemy number one. 4  BIS Review 55/2007