samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Despite fair growth prospects and subdued vulnerabilities, medium-term growth potential in the region seems insufficient to ensure pre-crisis pace of real convergence. The most recent data shows that the convergence is still there, but it has markedly slowed down. At the current pace, many countries in the region would need decades to reach German, Austrian or Swedish levels of income, countries that we like to use as benchmarks. The last crisis also showed that there can be events that will hold back growth and convergence for a protracted period of time and even work in an opposite direction, leading to divergence. We know that when it comes to living standards, in the long-run it is all about labour productivity, which can be decomposed into growth of capital per worker and growth of total factor productivity (TFP). While we can expect an investments to continue growing, it is not likely that the rates that we have witnessed in 2000s, with strong inflow of FDIs and related transfers of technology and know-how, will be seen again in the near future. That is why the TFP will ultimately prove to be the major determinant of longterm convergence. For us as policy makers, understanding the determinants of technology adoption, the TFP growth, is the key, as this gives us the channel to act through. There is an increasing number of theories and empirical papers linking development and the adoption of technologies to the role of institutions defined in a very broad way.

Promoting an environment that is more conducive to both the creation and closure of companies would be a very effective means of modernising the Spanish economy, since it could provide the measures of flexibility and adaptability that are needed to compete amid the pressures generated by globalisation and to boost the incorporation of technological and managerial innovations. But of all the structural policies, the most important is undoubtedly education. As I have said, the educational and training drives of the past decades are largely responsible for the results achieved by the Spanish economy, and improving education and training today is, once again, pivotal to our future growth. When assessing the functioning of the economy, we often refer to differentials with other peer economies in terms of inflation, productivity and many other variables. And it is right to do so since, against a backdrop of international openness and integration, relative behaviour and, in short, competitiveness are essential for the continuous improvement of well-being. However, the most serious gap between Spain and the other major industrialised countries is in the field of education. True, we have improved in this area in recent years. The proportion of the population aged 25-64 with a secondary education has risen from 24% in 1992 to 48% in 2005. But we have yet to reach 50% when the figure is 83% in Germany, 72% in the United Kingdom, 66% in France and over 80% in the Nordic countries.
We have already published a preliminary report last year. We are now in the process of updating this report and most likely during the summer or at the end of the year we will be ready to publish more definitive results. But there are findings that are already in the paper that was published last year that are interesting. First, we know, and it was explicitly evidenced in the paper, that the reforms at least provided for a financial system that was more resilient than at the beginning of the financial crisis. Banks were better capitalised, better funded, and this was done globally. It was not only done by some jurisdictions rather than others but banks were more resilient globally. It is also true that banks have continued to lend to households and businesses during the COVID-19 crisis, which is a very important difference as compared to what happened in the previous crisis. Even today, if you look at the solvency and liquidity ratios of banks, they are still very high, much higher than before the global financial crisis. Of course, disentangling whether the effects of this increase in resilience were basically the consequence of our reforms or the consequence of the fact that in this crisis, as Athanasios was emphasising, monetary and fiscal policy were very active, is very difficult. There has been extraordinary support for households and firms.

This is central banks should, in parallel, incorporate this evaluation into their own decision making, investing in research, which is something that we have done traditionally. There is an additional element that I think is important. We know that citizens very often do not understand what we are doing. It will also be very difficult for them to understand the results of our evaluation. This is why we should also invest in financial literacy and financial education. This is something that we are doing more and more. 1  So let me focus just for a few minutes on what the Basel Committee is doing. As you know, the Basel Committee is the global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and our main objective is to enhance global financial stability. When I was appointed chair of the Basel Committee three years ago, I was very positively surprised to find that the Basel Committee has a permanent evaluation programme of its own activities. In fact, now, we have two branches of this evaluation that are running in parallel. The first one is on whether the whole of the regulatory reform agenda that was approved after the global financial crisis is working as intended. The second, a decision that we took in 2020, is basically to see whether the COVID-19 crisis has also taught us anything in terms of whether the standards that we had approved are working as intended. So, let me share with you some of the results of this evaluation.
While there is a risk that the effects of the crisis may in some cases be asymmetric, we will not allow adverse market dynamics to lead to unwarranted interest rate hikes in some countries, and a fragmentation that would compromise the effective transmission of our monetary policy. Therefore, for the PEPP, clinging to the capital keys to determine each country’s purchase amounts would be an uncalled-for constraint that would undermine the very effectiveness of our intervention efforts. It is not a question of targeting spreads or pre-determined interest rate levels: a “yield curve control” or a “spread control” would be complicated and even counter-productive in the euro area. However, depending on market dynamics and liquidity conditions – and where these exhibit unwarranted gaps or there are risks of excessive volatility – certain national central banks must be able to purchase significantly more, and others significantly less, while ensuring the risks remain unshared. Allow me to say a final word on another development under discussion: the possibility of “going direct” to finance businesses without going through the bank channel. The truth is that we do this already, and have done since 2016, by being among the first central banks to buy corporate bonds. Last March, we extended our purchases to include short-term commercial paper.

I warmly welcome the proposal: in the absence of the “quantum leap” towards an EU budget, which could finally be financed by borrowing, this is the best political response that Germany’s leaders could have given to those who doubted their commitment to the euro. And it raises the prospect of a European policy mix that is finally better balanced and that does not place excessive strain on monetary policy alone: the Nordic countries, which are often the most sensitive to this balance, should therefore support this principle. Act II, which is currently unfolding, is one of a gradual but uneven exit from lockdown depending on the sectors or the countries involved. We will only provide our first estimates for 2020 and 2021 on 9 June but we already know that act I – general lockdown – cost the French economy almost 6 percentage points of lost annual GDP and that act II could lead to further losses of at least half this. Over the longer term, it is difficult to foresee the time needed to return to normal – or to a “new normal” – and some lasting potential growth losses are to be feared. In short, we have to face up to an unprecedented shock to both supply and demand, that is temporary and in part long-lasting, and symmetrical but also asymmetrical in terms of some of its national impacts. Intermediate objectives In terms of monetary policy, the context and its uncertainties have increased the need to meet several intermediate objectives at the same time.
The FPC reviews its housing actions regularly and will publish the results of its 2019 review, including, as I have said, an updated cost-benefit analysis. The Bank of England work published today is, in the same way, intended to contribute to that necessary transparency and accountability. I began this talk today by recollecting how the Bank had learned, slowly, from the crisis of 1846 about the need to support credit to the economy in a crisis rather than restrict it. I hope likewise, we have learned one of the lessons of the 2008 crisis that higher household indebtedness increases macroeconomic and macrofinancial vulnerability in a crisis and needs to be considered within macroprudential policies. The Committee has discretion to decide which types of debt to include – the 2014 measures only acted on owner-occupier mortgage debt. 23  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  13  References Andersen, Asger Lau, Charlotte Duus, and Thais Lærkholm Jensen (2016), Household debt and spending during the financial crisis: Evidence from Danish micro data, European Economic Review, 89, pp. 96-115. Anson, Mike, David Bholat, Miao Kang and Ryland Thomas (2017), The Bank of England as lender of last resort: new historical evidence from daily transactional data, Staff Working Paper No. 691, Bank of England. Anson, Mike, David Bholat, Miao Kang, Kilian Rieder and Ryland Thomas (2019), The Bank of England and central bank credit rationing during the crisis of 1847: frosted glass or raised eyebrows? Staff Working Paper No.794, Bank of England.

And central banks do not regulate casino visits. As you can see, I could easily spend all of my time today talking about the problems of cryptocurrencies, and of bitcoin in particular. I could talk about how much energy it consumes – at some points last year, the bitcoin ecosystem consumed twice as much energy as Nigeria, an oil giant with 190 million people. By the way, the energy consumed on a single bitcoin transaction until 2017 could power a typical American household for more than three weeks. I could talk about how a seven-fold increase in the value of bitcoin some time ago was driven by the manipulation of a single trader. I could talk about the volatility of bitcoin, which surpasses that of any other commonly traded commodity and which renders bitcoin useless for the vast majority of people. I could talk about the funny thing that bitcoin as a quasi-currency was created to make payments cheap and fast, while in reality it is more often than not expensive and slow. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  But instead, I will stress – and this is my point today – the positive philosophical influence of bitcoin on the conservative world of central banking.
I will also announce the steps MAS intends to take, as part of a comprehensive review of the financial advisory industry that we are launching. We call this new effort, “FAIR”, or the Financial Advisory Industry Review. FAIR will essentially build on the foundations laid by CEDLI and the FA Act ten years ago. It has two main objectives:   first, to enhance the professional standing and competence of financial advisers; and    second, to create a more competitive and efficient system for the distribution of life insurance and investment products. The overriding aim of FAIR is to protect and benefit the consumer. Putting the customer first – that must be at the heart of all our efforts. Raising the competence of FA representatives Let me begin with the competence of financial advisory representatives. MAS has been working with the FA industry to raise the skills, knowledge and expertise of representatives to serve customers better. The two aspects of this effort are:   improving the product knowledge of FA representatives; and    raising the entry requirements for FA representatives  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Product knowledge of FA representatives We have introduced new examination modules to ensure that FA representatives have sufficient knowledge of the wide and complex range of investment and insurance products currently available in the market. Most firms and FA representatives understand and support the need to raise knowledge and skill levels through a set of common examinations.

These companies are quickly internalising new economic realities which call for a fundamental re-orientation of business and operating models. A clearly defined and wellexecuted strategy for capturing new growth opportunities in the region is more than likely at this critical juncture to reap significant payoffs over the next few decades. A third reason that this period is significant for the insurance broking sector is the intensity of focus that is now being directed at the effects of climate change. Globally, catastrophes are increasing in frequency and intensity. The cost of catastrophes is estimated to have risen by USD870 billion in real terms between 1980 and 2011. In 2013 alone, global economic losses due to natural catastrophes amounted to USD131 billion. Only about a quarter of this was insured. According to a report released last week by the United Nation Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific, more than half of the world’s 226 natural catastrophes last year occurred in the Asia and Pacific region. Floods account for about 40% of the natural hazards affecting the region. Some 80 million people were affected by natural disasters, with economic losses tallying up to nearly USD60 billion. The region was found to be largely unprepared in its response to widespread floods and landslides. Despite the recurring nature of these events, only a fraction of properties and assets are fully protected against risks.
Pablo Hernández de Cos: How to assess corporate sector developments in real (pandemic) time Closing remarks by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chair of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Bank of Spain and European Investment Bank Conference "Recovering swiftly to limit COVID-19 scarring of Spanish corporates", 29 April 2021. * * * Good afternoon. It is a great pleasure for me to close this conference we have jointly organised with the European Investment Bank. This is the third conference our two institutions have co-hosted on issues related to the Spanish corporate sector, and I greatly appreciate the collaboration between our institutions. A collaboration that it´s now well established. The topic of this conference is most timely and relevant. This morning the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) organized a virtual event on which I had the opportunity to participate as chairman of its Advisory Technical Committee, whose focus was precisely on “Corporate insolvencies and public support measures” and where we have presented an ESRB report on “Prevention and management of a large number of corporate insolvencies”. The motivation of this report is indeed very similar to the discussions you have had in this seminar. Economic policies have played an important role in mitigating the impact of the COVID19 shock on our economies. And precisely thanks to these policies, and despite the significant fall in economic activity, we have not so far observed a significant increase in business mortality rates for existing firms.

The savings ratio increased in the United States at the same time as domestic demand increased more rapidly in China as a result of a fiscal policy stimulation package. The substantial fall in oil prices also played a role. The question is, however, whether the underlying causes of the imbalances have been corrected. The IMF believes that the imbalances will remain in place in the period ahead (see Figure 2). The oil price has also increased considerably during the last six months, which also indicates that the imbalances will remain. This is because this boosts net exports in oil-exporting countries, which tend to have current account surpluses, but increases costs for oil importers, who tend to have current account deficits. The G20 has pointed to the global imbalances as being an important factor for development in the global economy. One aspect that has been discussed is whether to adjust the nominal exchange rates in order to reduce the imbalances. If China, for example, maintains a fixed exchange rate against the dollar, this will make it possible to adjust the real exchange rate if China has a higher rate of inflation than the United States. However, this entails either a high rate of inflation in China, which the Chinese authorities are not likely to want, or to deflation in the United States, which the US authorities definitely do not want.
Albania owns around 24% of its territory as agriculture land, and offers still fully unexploited possibilities in the fields of agritourism and agribusiness. This potential should be considered a joint growth possibility to both agriculture and banking industry, as well as a possibility to diversify credit risk sources in your balance sheets. The continuous structural improvements, modernisation of agriculture and productivity growth, the enhanced support with funds and public attention, provide a new reality in agriculture sector. In this framework, the convergence process with the European Union provides for additional opportunities. In this light, without affecting its soundness’ indicators, I am confident that banking system will know to position itself as a supporting-development agent. This sector ought to increase its attention and the financing, analysing and advisory capacities, by fulfilling its mission for the sustainable growth of the country. Thank You! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

Christian Noyer: World financial crisis – public and private strategies to overcome the crisis Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at Paris-Europlace, Dubai, 22 January 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to be here and share some thoughts on the financial crisis and on solutions that may be found to overcome the situation. It is too early to draw definitive lessons from recent events in financial markets. It is however vital to start reflecting on the experience of the last few months. Even more in periods of tension than in normal times, action and reflection should reinforce one another. It is at the very moment of managing the crisis that we lay the foundations for the future financial system. Having said that, I propose to discuss with you two main topics: •  The nature of the financial crisis  •  The policies implemented to address it both from a public and a private sector perspective. The nature of the crisis The crisis first emerged as a liquidity crisis. The first symptoms appeared at the beginning of August 2007 when serious disruptions surfaced on the inter-bank market in the Western world. More than a year later, tensions on money markets are still with us. Recent months have witnessed abnormal levels of spreads, a shortening of maturities, and the contraction, or even closure, of some market segments.
Furthermore, as my fellow panelist Prof. Baumeister has highlighted, it is important to identify the original source behind the energy price movements in real time. This may become more challenging as the green transition involves a wide range of sectors and products. To help us navigate we might need new analytical tools and new models. Second: Central banks are not unfamiliar with fluctuations in energy prices, but should the frequency and persistence of supply shocks increase ahead we may more often be faced with the challenging short-term trade-off between stabilising inflation and promoting high and stable employment. Deciding on the right timing and dosage of monetary policy will be crucial. The appropriate response of monetary policy to energy prices depends on the source and nature of the disturbances and their expected persistence. It also depends on whether energy price shocks fuel inflation via second-round effects on other prices and wages, for instance through inflation expectations. Failing to respond to secondround effects, we may risk persistent overshoots of our inflation target and ultimately, a deanchoring of inflation expectations. On the other hand, wrongly interpreting temporary movements in energy prices as persistent, we could have larger output losses in the short term and may even increase inflation volatility. Moreover, changes in relative prices, for instance due to higher carbon prices, are effective signals that push the transition in the right direction. An appropriately flexible and forward-looking monetary policy would help those necessary changes in relative prices to feed through.

However, it is still premature to assess the effect of these shocks on world economic growth. Significant data are not yet available on how economies have performed after the shock. In any event, the size of the possible effect will depend closely on how much the US economy is affected by the turbulence that has arisen there. The information available so far shows that the United States is more resilient to the residential investment crisis than originally envisaged, so the foreseeable effects seem limited. This diagnosis is consistent with the forecasts of international organisations which, while acknowledging a considerable heightening of uncertainty and downside risk, continue pointing to a scenario of ongoing world buoyancy. Realistically, however, if the United States went into recession, a significant  BIS Review 134/2007  1  change in the world economic scenario could take place, although the impact would in any event be cushioned by the continued buoyancy of the emerging economies, which have generally been little affected by the financial turbulence. The extent of the impact on global growth will also depend fundamentally on the force and duration of the shocks generated. In the past, in episodes such as that of 1998 sparked by the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management fund and by the Russian debt crisis, the financial turbulence barely influenced world economic buoyancy despite the dark predictions that accompanied it.