samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Developments were marked by the financial crisis, which resulted in low wage agreements which were largely in line with the Riksbank’s forecasts. The crisis also meant that the commonest agreement period became two years instead of three years, as had been normal since 1995. The centrally-agreed wage increases were calculated to average 1.8 per cent per year in 2010 and 2011. However, the economic recovery was significantly stronger in 2010 than most people had expected. The growth in GDP was the highest in 40 years. The labour market also developed above expectations. Among other reasons, this was because the decline in employment was primarily concentrated on the manufacturing sector, which is less labour-intensive than many other sectors. Furthermore, the so-called crisis agreements in the manufacturing sector contributed towards dampening the decrease of employment. Due to the low agreed wage increases, the wage bargaining rounds in 2010 probably contributed to the strong development of the Swedish economy we experienced in 2010 and the start of 2011. According to our present assessment, the average increase of hourly wages in 2010 and 2011 has been 2.8 per cent per year, which is 0.5 percentage points per year more than we had estimated before the wage bargaining rounds. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  But at the same time, the wage bargaining rounds in 2010 entailed a couple of problems for future developments. One such problem was that the dates for the expiry of the various agreements became more spread out than before.

The establishment of temporary credit institutions or bridge banks is emerging as a key resolution tool, but the new resolution frameworks need to address a number of related technical issues, such as the question of who provides the necessary capital and liquidity to the bridge institution, how the bridge bank can use the infrastructure of the failed bank, and how and when it is ultimately dissolved, since bridge banks are temporary entities needing a good exit strategy. Finally, the design of bank levies, which could usefully be collected into resolution funds, is also a delicate area. Mechanisms are under examination both to recoup the losses of the crisis and to create provisions against future events. I believe that ex ante funding is a crucial element, since it may reduce moral hazard and improves the authorities’ ability to react to crises earlier, thus strengthening the credibility of such actions. Levies are valuable revenueraising mechanisms with which to finance crisis measures. Uncertainty remains as to how they would affect the particular problem of moral hazard in the financial sector, and both the rate and the base of levies need to be determined with care, especially if we want to include the aspect of systemic risk as well. However, maintaining a level playing field and coordination between Member States remains in my view paramount in order to avoid a distortion of fund contributions and resolution tools. Challenges ahead – more integration I am confident that the emerging EU regime will appropriately address all these challenges.
Building confidence and credibility Monetary policy MAS was born in turbulent times. It was 1971. The US dollar was under intense pressure, due to mounting inflation and balance of payments problems brought on by the Vietnam War and Great Society programmes. In August 1971, just months after MAS was formed, the US suspended convertibility of the US dollar into gold, plunging international currency markets into turmoil. In June 1973, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates finally collapsed, and the Singapore dollar was floated. Having witnessed these tumultuous events and the instability they caused, the Singapore Government enshrined a strong and credible currency as one of the key pillars of macroeconomic policy, and charged MAS with the responsibility of ensuring it. Tight fiscal discipline, a healthy balance of payments, and a vibrant Singapore economy underpinned the steady strengthening of the Singapore dollar. A second defining moment in the evolution of MAS’ monetary policy came in 1981 when global inflation accelerated in the wake of the second oil shock. Dr Goh Keng Swee, who took over as Chairman of MAS, clarified low inflation as the key policy objective, and shifted the focus of monetary policy onto the exchange rate as the principal policy instrument. The high import content of our domestic expenditures meant that domestic inflation in Singapore was largely determined by changes in foreign prices and the exchange rate. Traditional monetary policy instruments such as money supply and interest rates were ineffective in controlling output and prices given the openness of our economy.

2  BIS Review 93/2009  I feel entitled to use the word "colleagues", not just because I have enjoyed a very close and productive relationship with the financial media, but also because I too, albeit uninvited and unpaid, have for the past 11 years served as a columnist in several newspapers through my weekly "viewpoint" articles. I should like to thank those newspapers who have faithfully reproduced these articles, week after week, even when the content may not always have been as newsworthy as they may have hoped. Ladies and gentlemen, this evening's gala dinner, in recognising excellence in financial services will provide encouragement for the future development of financial markets in the region. It is also an opportunity to celebrate Euromoney's 40th anniversary and its long association with Hong Kong and this region. I should like to offer Euromoney heartiest congratulations on its birthday and the very best of wishes for a flourishing future. BIS Review 93/2009  3
It is perhaps inevitable that as time passes and memories fade, there is less political focus on these issues and less will among jurisdictions to ensure governance keeps pace with the risks. Fatigue sets in. For example:   Before the crisis Basel II, which was not particularly ambitious, took 10 years to agree.   By contrast, post-crisis the key elements of Basel III, which was a significant step-change, took just 2 years.   But as the crisis receded and fatigue developed, it took a further 5 years to finalise Basel 3.1, which implemented less sweeping changes. The lesson fades that in an integrated global economy we are all ultimately in the same boat or in the words of Benjamin Franklin that “if we do not hang together we will most assuredly hang separately”. This had led to fragmentation in the way we implement the reforms we have agreed. Moreover, the circle of players has grown. The governance reform efforts of the last 50 years have been predominantly led by the advanced economies whose financial institutions dominated the global economy. That is changing with the increasing importance in the global economy of emerging markets – indeed much of the financial innovation we see today is happening in the emerging market and developing world rather than in the advanced economies. We are now in short having to work harder to generate the consensus to keep the governance necessary for financial globalisation moving forward in line with the risk. And we can see major challenges emerging.

They do not, for example, cover how the supervisors of the large EU banks active in London will cooperate with the UK supervisory authorities to  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  8  provide assurance about the risk being imported into the UK. Or how the EU authorities – at European and at member state level – will manage the pooling of EU risk in the global markets of London. We have a good basis on which to build. Most obviously we leave the EU with the same legislation and regulation – ‘equivalence’ at the starting point of this new relationship should not take the regulatory authorities on either side very long to establish. The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England has made clear that it is committed to maintain a level of financial sector resilience that is at least as great as that currently planned, which itself exceeds that required by international standards. On the supervisory side, the Bank of England has over the last 18 months signed 30 MoUs with EU and EU member state authorities covering pretty much all aspects of financial sector activity. The Financial Conduct Authority has done likewise. The issue therefore is not the starting point but how our regulatory frameworks and supervisory practices and cooperation will develop over the future. The UK has been very heavily involved and instrumental in the development of the EU regulatory framework. That will no longer be possible.
9  This was comprehensively covered in a recent speech by Jan Vlieghe. See Vlieghe, G (2017), ‘Real interest rates and risk’; 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  Stretched asset prices have not been matched with less prudent financing. But developments in the world economy show that we cannot take for granted that it will stay that way. The IMF Global Financial Stability Report showed how, across the G20, appetite of investors for risk has loosened financing conditions and propelled nonfinancial corporate debt levels to new highs. Even excluding China (where corporate debt developments deserve much more attention than I can give them here), between 2006 and 2016 emerging market economies in the G20 saw corporate debt increase from 42% to 57% of GDP, and advanced economies saw it go from 80% to 86% of GDP. In the United States, levels of (non-financial) corporate sector debt have been testing previous highs. Moreover, averages can mask important underlying shifts. Leveraged lending in the US reached new highs last year. 10  Net debt to EBITDA ratios have been trending upwards in recent years and underwriting  standards have been loosening. Three quarters of issuance is now ‘covenant-lite’. 11  All this goes to show that it’s more than a hypothetical that levels of corporate debt can come to rely on stretched credit markets and investors’ lack of concern for their own safety.

And despite the good starting point, there are some quiet signals of the need to be alert in the UK. The level of debt relative to corporate profits has started slowly rising again. The evolution of corporate debt levels will bear close scrutiny in this market environment. 4. Is the banking system exposed to an adjustment of asset prices? The answer here is given by our stress test last year: Britain’s major banks are resilient to an economic and market stress more severe than the global financial crisis. The 2017 stress test subjected the banks to simultaneous UK and global recessions, a deep market shock and stressed estimates of conduct redress fines. The test included a sharp adjustment in corporate credit markets and commercial property markets. Sterling investment grade corporate bond yields were assumed to snap up almost 800bps as long-term gilt yields rose by over 500bps and credit spreads blew out. Commercial property prices were assumed to fall by 40%. 10  These are typically syndicated loans to large companies which have either high levels of indebtedness, a non-investment grade credit rating, or are owned by a private equity sponsor. For more information, see pages 30-31 of the November Financial Stability Report. 11 As a percentage of institutional leveraged loan issuance. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  More than 5% of UK and global business loans would have been impaired over the first two years of the test period.
As I interpret matters, it seems as though advocates of the strategy of “cleaning up afterwards” have partially modified their view, primarily because the potential profits of limiting bubbles seem to be greater than previously estimated. It seems to be an increasingly accepted view that a central bank should at least do something when it suspects that a credit-driven imbalance is building up on the property market. 9 This is not necessarily a matter of increasing the policy rate, even if it now seems to be increasingly accepted that this can also be considered. 7  See, for example, Donald L. Kohn, “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Revisited”, speech held 19 November 2008, Federal Reserve Board. 8  Stefan Ingves, “Housing and Monetary Policy: A View from an Inflation-Targeting Central Bank”, in Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, 2007. 9  See, for example Alan S. Blinder, “How Central Should the Central Bank Be?”, Journal of Economic Literature XLVIII, March 2010. BIS Review 68/2010  15  Can time-varying regulations prevent a credit-driven property boom? I mentioned earlier that an international discussion is underway regarding the more timevaried application of regulations within the framework of macroprudential policy. Even if this discussion primarily addresses the prevention of risks to financial stability, it is conceivable that the time-varied application of regulations may also be used to prevent a credit expansion that may destabilise the real economy, without any threat to financial stability being perceived.

There’s uncertainty about future average tax rates on investment income, for example, or the future pace of average labor productivity gains. This is aggregate uncertainty. There is also uncertainty that widens the distribution of asset returns across firms or the distribution of income prospects across households, while leaving aggregate average asset returns and aggregate average productivity prospects unchanged. This is cross-sectional uncertainty. Finally, there’s the uncertainty that you feel when you think that you understand how the world works and then discover that you don’t because something happens that you thought unlikely to happen.3 In the extreme, these are “black swan” events: the “oh spit” moments we experience when we realize that we have fundamentally and disastrously miscalculated. Black swans induce paradigm shifts: The world – or, at least, our thinking about the world – is never the same again. The Great Depression was one such event. The housing-market collapse that began in 2006 and then spilled over to financial markets is another. If the U.S. government defaults on its debt later this month, we’ll have a third example. The unthinkable will have become real, and the “full faith and credit” of the United States will be a mirage rather than accepted fact. There are myriad other events that, on a much smaller scale, lead people to question their understanding of the rules.
Market-based Capital Ratio = Market Capitalisation/Risk Weighted Assets  Chart 12: Estimates of implicit subsidy Value of implicit subsidy, £  Notches of ratings uplift 4 3 2 1 0 2010  2011  2012  2013  Quantity of implicit subsidy (RHS)  2014  2015  50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0  2016  Average ratings uplift (LHS)  Sources: Moody’s, Bank of America and Bank calculations. Notes: Includes Barclays, HSBC, LBG and RBS. Calculated by multiplying the spread between indicative bonds at standalone and supported credit ratings by the volume of ratings-sensitive liabilities; end-year data. Published in: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/treasury-committee/capital-andresolution/written/69208.pdf  46  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  46  Chart 13: Long-run UK and US leverage ratios Per cent 25 (d)  (c)  United States(a)  20 15 10  United Kingdom(b)  5 0  1880  1900  1920  1940  1960  1980  2000  Sources: United States: Berger, A, Herring, R and Szegö, G (1995), 'The role of capital in financial institutions', Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol 19(3-4), pages 393-430; SNL and Bank calculations.

This trend appears to be in stark contrast to the 2008 crisis. As the services sector is a labor-intensive sector, the cost that the pandemic imposed on employment has been much higher than that of the financial crisis of 2008. In this process, central banks all over the world took extraordinary expansionary policy measures such as interest rate cuts, asset purchases, liquidity steps and credit support programs. The experience of policy makers in unconventional monetary policy after the 2008 crisis and the expansion of the toolkit has made a positive contribution to the policy response to the pandemic. Central banks of advanced and emerging economies used the existing policy space without hesitation and promptly, and cut policy rates as a first response to the crisis. Central banks also reintroduced bond purchases that they had included in the post-crisis toolkit. It is noteworthy that emerging market central banks also resorted to bond purchases, unlike in the 2008 crisis. Central banks have provided more funding through repo transactions and extended the maturity of funding to prevent liquidity squeeze in the money market and to facilitate access to liquidity. In this period, when economies came to a standstill, this intervention by central banks was appropriate and vital for the functioning of the financial system. Globally, policy rates have been rapidly lowered and the average interest rate in both advanced and emerging economies has fallen below the levels in the 2008 crisis.
4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  And just as it is important for senior leadership in an organisation to set the tone from the top, we think it equally important to share our commitment publicly - with the rest of our industry and more broadly. So we have codified these principles into an ‘Out and Proud’ Charter which we are publishing today. This principles-based Charter aims to ensure that we take steps to create a safe, inclusive environment where people from the LGBT+ community can bring their whole selves to work, irrespective of their sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression. While important, this is only a first step. Policies and frameworks take us so far. However a 2018 study7 found that an LGBT+-supportive climate and supportive workplace relationships are more impactful than formal policies in improving the lives of LGBT+ colleagues at work. So the key will be to translate these principles into specific actions which deliver real outcomes for the LGBT+ community. We will do that by publishing at a later date, and after consultation with colleagues, specific actions that reflect the principles in the Charter. Our hope is that your organisations and others can use this Charter, or one similar to it, to help you on your own journey of fuller LGBT+ diversity and inclusion. I mentioned earlier our decision to put Alan Turing on the new 50 pound note. Few people have had as big an impact on modern society as has Turing.

Armed with such insights, the ESRB can help design appropriate policy responses. Stress testing of the investment fund sector can be expected in the future, complementing existing stress tests of banks, insurers and pension funds. The ESRB is also beginning to access detailed derivative trade reports from trade repositories across the Union. By pooling national expertise and leveraging the ESRB’s unique access to the entire set of trades, authorities can better understand the complex webs of derivative transactions and how they could propagate and dampen risk across the system. It can also assess the impact of mandatory central clearing and whether it shifts risks to other parts of the system such as direct clearing banks. 3. Greater openness can require shared approaches to managing risks  In some cases, shared understanding is not sufficient; authorities also need shared ways of managing risks. The ESRB is the only hub where all the relevant authorities are present, including central banks, bank supervisors, and securities authorities. Through our regular dialogue we can establish and update best practice. Consider residential real estate. This year ESRB’s work emphasised how these markets were influenced by structural differences, from Loan-to-Value restrictions to tax treatments, across the EU. Its analysis identified the tools authorities may use to respond to different vulnerabilities, ranging from capital measures to restrictions on debt-to-income ratios and collateral.
Lars Nyberg: The financial crisis Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at HQ Bank, 15 October 2008. *  *  *  Over the past year my colleagues on the Executive Board and I have spoken on several occasions about the financial turbulence currently affecting the entire global economy. We have had reason to return to the topic because the turbulence is constantly taking new twists and turns. The turmoil has intensified during the autumn and once again we have reason to reflect on what is happening and what will happen. That is also what I intend to do in my speech here today. I would also like to take this opportunity to speak about the role of the Riksbank and other authorities in relation to this situation and about what needs to happen to calm the unrest. However, I would like to begin with a brief glance at the past. Run-up to the crisis The financial turmoil began over a year ago with the notorious subprime crisis. For a long time, US financial institutions had engaged in aggressive lending to borrowers with weak credit histories, after which the loans were repackaged and sold to investors all over the world. When the credit losses on these loans became unexpectedly large, it was clear that those who had invested had grossly underestimated the risks.

According to the Consumer Finances and Socio-economic Survey of the Central Bank 6 , the underemployment in the agriculture sector in 1996/97 stood at 31 percent of the employed. This rose to 36 percent by 2003/04. In contrast, the underemployment in the services sector fell from 20 percent to 18 percent between the two reference periods, while that in the industry remained unchanged at 20 percent. The message conveyed by this unfavorable development is clear: remove a greater part of those employed in the agriculture sector in order to raise its efficiency and future sustainability. Hence, the appropriate policy strategy should be to raise productivity in agriculture through intensification of farming with high-yielding varieties by employing a lesser number of work-force. Agriculture has a further limitation in the form of low productivity and low contribution to GDP. Since about a one third of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, its total output is distributed among a large number of workers. According to the World Bank data 7 , the agricultural value added per agricultural worker in Sri Lanka, measured in 2000 dollars, has been $ 696 for 1989 – 91. This rose marginally to $ 737 in 2001 – 03. The comparable figures for other countries have been much higher than this: USA $ 26,105 and $ 47,566; Australia $ 26,601 and 26,957; Sweden $ 20,416 and $ 30,469; Malaysia $ 3694 and $ As a result, the income of agricultural workers in Sri Lanka has been very low, keeping them below the poverty line.