samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Multilingualism is important in our world today not only in terms of communicating and advancing in the global economy, but also in order to understand other cultures. It is important because we need to know more about other nations’ cultures and history to improve world relations. In this regard, in October 2004, the Bank entered into an agreement with the Embassy of the Republic of France for the provision of French lessons to members of staff. To date several members of staff have benefited from this programme and can comfortably speak, write and understand the French language. Ladies and Gentlemen, the importance of China on the world economy cannot be overemphasized. With the sustainable development of the Chinese economy and the increasing promotion of the status of China in the world, particularly the China’s access to the World Trade Organization, the successful hosting of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and the World Expo 2010 in Shanghai, it is imperative to understand the Chinese language owing to its important role in business and trading. There is therefore a need for people to understand Chinese culture, economy, politics, and the lives of 1.3 billion Chinese people. Furthermore, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy has entailed greater demand for primary commodities like copper. Coupled with this, the demand for manufactured goods from China has increased in a number of countries including Zambia.

Caleb M Fundanga: The importance of multi-cultural awareness and language learning Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia, Lusaka, 22 December 2010. *  *  *  The Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Zambia, H.E Mr. Li Qiangmin The Chairperson – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr Li Tie The Deputy Governor Administration – Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula The Deputy Governor Operations – Dr Austin Mwape The Principal – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr. Tan Haitao Distinguished Teachers from the Chinese International School in Zambia Colleagues from the Bank Members of the Press Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen It gives me great delight, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to this important signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia. The MoU that we are about to sign today provides a framework for the provision of Chinese language lessons to members of staff at the Bank of Zambia. Your Excellency, the Bank of Zambia attaches great importance to the need for staff to learn other international languages. In the process of both economic globalization and diversity of culture, language has become more and more important.
The optimal policy consists of responding to the determinants of the forecasts of the target variables, not necessarily to the target variables themselves (unless they happen to be main determinants of future realizations of themselves). BIS Review 112/2009  7  Carney, Mark (2009), “Some Considerations on Using Monetary Policy to Stabilize Economic Activity”, in Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium. Cecchetti, Stephen, Hans Genberg, and Sushil Wadhwani (2002), “Asset Prices in a Flexible Inflation Targeting Framework”, in Hunter, W., G. Kaufman, and M. Pomerleano, eds., Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, Regulatory and International Policies, Cambridge, 427-444. Curdia, Vasco, and Michael Woodford (2009), “Credit Frictions and Optimal Monetary Policy”, working paper, Del Negro, Marco, and Christopher Otrok (2007), “99 Luftballons: Monetary Policy and the House Price Boom across U.S. States,” Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 1962-1985. Goodfriend, Marvin (2007), “How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(4): 47-68. Greenspan, Alan (2002) “Opening Remarks”, in Rethinking Stabilization Policy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, 1-10. Iacoviello, Matteo, and Stefano Neri (2008) “Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model,” working paper, Boston College. King, Mervyn, (1997), “Changes in UK Monetary Policy: Rules and Discretion in Practice”, Journal of Monetary Economics 39, 81-97. Kohn, Donald L. (2006), “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices,” speech on March 16, 2006, www.federalreserve.gov. Kohn, Donald L. (2008), “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices Revisited,” speech on November 19, 2008, www.federalreserve.gov.

Maintaining financial stability, including a well-functioning payment system, is, explicitly or implicitly, an important objective for central banks. In my overview of best-practice monetary policy in Svensson (2002), long before the crisis but during an ongoing debate about monetary policy and asset prices, I briefly discussed how this objective can be reconciled with flexible inflation targeting, how conflicts can arise and how they could be handled. 4 One question is whether financial stability belongs in the loss function for the central bank, together with inflation and resource utilization. I argued that a good way of handling this additional objective is as a constraint on monetary policy rather than as a separate target variable that appears in the loss function. The idea is that financial stability is normally pursued with different instruments, such as supervision and regulation, and is normally not a concern for monetary policy. Under normal circumstances, at least in industrialized countries, financial stability is good and does not impose any constraints on monetary policy. Only rarely, when financial crises occur, does financial stability impose constraints on monetary policy and force the central bank to modify its decisions.
One important element is the importance of the services the firm provides to the broader financial system and the economy and the ease with which customers can move their business to other providers. Another is the extent to which the firm’s structure and activities create the potential for contagion – that is, direct losses for counterparties, fire sales of assets held by other  1  This would presumably require legislation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  leveraged financial institutions, or loss of confidence that might precipitate runs on other firms with similar business models. The presence of large negative externalities creates a dilemma for policymakers when such firms are in danger of failing, particularly if the wider financial system is also under stress at the same moment. At that point in time, the expected costs to society of failure are very large compared to the short-run costs from providing the extraordinary liquidity support, capital or other emergency assistance necessary to prevent catastrophic failure. The market’s belief that a TBTF firm is more likely to be rescued in the event of distress than other firms weakens the degree of market discipline exerted by capital providers and counterparties. This reduces the firm’s cost of funds and incents the firm to take more risk than would be the case if there were no prospect of rescue and funding costs were higher.

In my view, this initial exercise has confirmed that we are a long way from the desired situation in which large complex firms could be allowed to go bankrupt without major disruptions to the financial system and large costs to society. Significant changes in structure and organization will ultimately be required for this to be achieved. However, the “living will” exercise is an iterative process, and we have only taken the first step in a long journey. The second way to potentially minimize the negative externalities from a firm’s failure would be to avoid a bankruptcy proceeding altogether and instead resolve the firm under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Title II orderly liquidation authority.7,8 The “single point of entry” model has much promise, but much remains to be done before it could be implemented with confidence for a globally active firm. Title II authority is U.S. law. Subsidiaries and affiliates chartered in other countries could be wound down under the bankruptcy laws of those countries, if authorities there did not have full confidence that local interests would be protected. Certain Title II measures including the one-day stay provision with respect to OTC derivatives and other qualified financial contracts may not apply through the force of law outside the United States, making orderly resolution difficult. The other essential dimension of solving TBTF is to make the financial system more robust – addressing structural vulnerabilities that tend to amplify shocks rather than absorb them.
Through the events of recent months, we are called upon to learn the lessons from the banks’ limited ability to measure risk and – as a logical consequence – the limited scope afforded to the relevant supervisory authorities. Despite the welcome improvements provided by Basel II, it is naive to assume that weighted capital requirements can guarantee fool-proof bank capitalisation assessments. There is a substantial margin of error which must be taken into consideration. In order to take account of all the variables, a tightening of the traditional requirements in the area of the bank capitalisation, liquidity and indebtedness is necessary. For a financial centre like ours – which includes international banks whose private banking arms generate substantial revenue and consequently rely on having a spotless reputation – such action is vital. BIS Review 50/2008  3  Finally, the banks that have been buffeted by the financial storm must take a careful look at the various ways in which they apply corporate governance. In particular, they should examine the role of their respective boards of directors in carrying out the necessary checks and balances to ensure efficient risk management, and they should correct the excesses of their remuneration systems in a manner that does not put short-term results ahead of the long-term performance. The latter aspect has been the subject of debate for some years already, and now it is time for answers. Impact on monetary policy The turmoil on the financial markets has also had implications with regard to monetary policy.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Review of the Swiss economy in 2007 and the outlook for 2008 Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 25 April 2008. *  *  *  Mr President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests As history has shown, and the President of the Bank Council has reminded us just now, celebrations to mark our various anniversaries have often taken place amid difficult circumstances. Such was the case in 2007, when confidence in the quality of numerous financial products began to fade from August onwards in the wake of the US real estate crisis – subsequently placing a substantial provisioning burden on international banks and leading to a crisis of confidence on the markets. A worsening of the economic outlook and major stock market corrections then ensued. Nevertheless, 2007 as a whole can still be regarded as a successful year in economic terms, with global economic growth settling in at around 5%. This excellent performance is mainly attributable to the continued momentum of the emerging economies, notably in Asia, although favourable financial conditions also played a positive role until the middle of the year. Global economic performance was less homogeneous than in 2006, however.
While the “rags to riches” story has been a popular theme in U.S. history, income mobility in the United States is now notably lower than in many other advanced economies. Unfortunately, substantial differences in economic mobility exist within the United States. Important research by Raj Chetty and his co-authors suggests that upward mobility strongly depends on where one grew up.4 That is, places themselves seem to have a measureable effect on economic outcomes for children as they reach adulthood. In particular, this research indicates that higher upward mobility is associated with areas that are less residentially segregated by race or income, and that have higher-quality schools, stronger social networks, greater community involvement, and stable family structures. Significantly, they find that places with greater upward economic mobility tend to have lower income inequality. This evidence suggests that there is a fundamental inequality of opportunity for advancement that is tied to where people live. Reducing inequality of opportunity is something we should all work toward. Directions for Policy So, what are some specific ways policy can address inequality and improve economic mobility? While this is a difficult and complex set of issues with no easy answers, I do have a few thoughts. First and foremost, we can improve the quality of education for our most vulnerable citizens. Children who attend better schools and attain higher levels of education have more favorable long-term outcomes, including better job prospects and higher earnings.

As a component of trust, fairness involves being aware of such differences and to find ways to prevent, mitigate or compensate redistributive effects that are particularly undesired. Within an institution, fairness also involves the creation of a working environment that fosters productive exchange of ideas, free of harassment and discrimination. Fostering trust in a Central Bank The OECD taxonomy may be useful in providing a conceptual basis to go beyond generalizations on public trust and to take a more proactive approach to nurture it. In particular, it provides a good framework to develop ways to assess trust and to identify concrete levers that an institution can use to foster trust. However, can this framework be applied to a central bank? In my view, this is not only possible, but necessary as well. Assessing trust on a central bank by inserting a question in an opinion survey suffers from the same limitations as with government institutions and a few more. Answers to a broad question may be more reflective of prejudice than of attitudes that may shape the response to future policy decisions or incoming information and may come too late in a process of social or market change to make any difference. In addition,  Page 5 of 8  Central Bank of Chile July 2019  experience with opinion surveys in different countries has shown that no more than half of respondents have some basic knowledge of central banks.
Given the apparent current compression of risk pricing, such a correction could be a sharp one. Conclusion  The level of the global debt stock relative to GDP remains near its record high, though it has stabilized over the past five years. The sustainable level of debt to GDP is not, however, a constant and there are reasons to believe that the lower trend real rate will likely support sustainability. While less expected, however, a relatively small increase in the trend rate could lead to a reassessment of debt sustainability. While there is evidence that the level of debt, as opposed to the growth rate, does not appear to be a good predictor of recessions and financial crises, the level does seem to be associated with depth of losses when crises occur. The historically high level of debt may generally suggest a higher vulnerability in periods of stress. The composition of debt, within the aggregate numbers, has changed since the crisis. Emerging market debt has grown as a proportion of the global debt stock, over the past 10 years, with much of the increase driven by China. Advanced economy public debt has risen but household and financial sector debt is lower now and the lower post crisis levels have been stable for a number of years. Advanced economy corporate debt, however, has grown rapidly in recent years in some major jurisdictions, particularly the US, and its riskiness has increased. The pricing of risk in financial markets is relatively compressed by historic standards, as is market volatility.

This has taken place in a global environment in which the world economies and financial systems are increasingly becoming more integrated. As a result, it can be expected that there is increased interdependence, events that take place in one part of the world will have implications on other parts of the world. This is likely to be more pronounced in the ASEAN economies and financial systems, given their openness and their high degree of integration with the global economy and international financial system. As the ASEAN and the EU continues to evolve as strategic partners, new opportunities can also be realized. An enhanced relationship will also contribute towards more effective management of the new challenges in the ever-changing global environment. Indeed, this Conference takes place at an important time when it becomes even more constructive and meaningful for our two regions to strengthen our associations, our inter-linkages and our relationships. Learning from the experiences of the EU Ladies and Gentlemen, The unification of Europe on many fronts is a major structural enhancement to the global economic and financial landscape. It is very likely however, that in view of our diversity and different structures and stages of development, the route for the integration process will be significantly different. It can be stated with certainty however, that integration will nevertheless occur. Indeed, the process has already commenced and it is likely to gain momentum as we advance forward. The motivation being the greater stability it brings and the increased growth potential it generates.
But even though this is not inconceivable, and though history shows that the market is living proof of the most improbable outcomes, the likelihood is that the probability of winning the wait-and-hope game is measurably poorer than that accompanying the purchase of a Lotto ticket. Therefore, it is appropriate to assume that the situation will not right itself very much in the short term, and if it does right itself to any measurable degree, it will hardly return to its prior state. If people haven’t prepared themselves already, there is no reason to wait. We must seek all possible ways to strengthen the liquidity position of companies – particularly financial companies – and at the same time we must re-examine market models. In athletic terms, one could say that this means that now is the time to consolidate our defences and be content with a goal if opportunities emerge in spite of all odds. Though exaggerated pessimism is obviously unnecessary, it is as bad or worse to paint the situation in rosy colours for the benefit of ourselves and the public and imply that there is some sort of magical solution to the problem that faces us. As the saying goes, “Lying to others is a wicked bent; lying to oneself breeds a lethal event.” The fact that the past few months have seen dubious conduct in the international markets is another matter altogether. Recent examples include a rumourmongering campaign against the British bank HBOS, causing substantial, though temporary, damage. That case is now being investigated.

But if the foreign reserves are evaluated as a percentage of foreign debt, Iceland is relatively weak. On behalf of the Board of Governors, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people and institutions whose representatives are here today for a very satisfying collaborative relationship. BIS Review 36/2008  5
3 However, as in the case of the impact of consolidation measures on growth prospects, one could argue that the alternative to requiring a higher level of capital adequacy would be even worse. Without such requirements for banks with a low degree of capitalisation, there is a risk that the crisis will spread to other banks through poorer access to market funding. Although we ourselves do not belong to the euro area, we are still highly affected by developments there. Sweden is a small, export-dependent country and our most important export markets are in Europe. It is therefore of crucial importance to the Swedish economy that the euro crisis is managed in an orderly way. Can crises be avoided with different fiscal and monetary policies? As the European drama has unfolded, many observers have asked how we can prevent similar crises from occurring in the future. When, like me, you come from a central bank, it is natural to ask whether a different monetary policy had been able to prevent the crisis. Some analysts have identified the low interest rates that prevailed in many countries, and above all in the United States, for some years before the crisis as an important cause of unsustainable increases in indebtedness and property prices.

For example, the mandate could include demands that the body must take action, or publicly explain why it refrains from taking action, when certain predetermined levels for key variables are passed. Accountability would also be facilitated by demands for far-reaching transparency and reporting, for example to the Riksdag. Macroprudential policy is only a complement I have now expressed my heartfelt support for the need to make it possible to conduct effective macroprudential policy in Sweden. However, I would like to conclude by referring back to what I said initially about having realistic expectations of what macroprudential policy can achieve. We can ask ourselves, for example, if we would have avoided the stress on the financial markets that we have seen recently if an effective macroprudential policy had been conducted in the euro area. No, we probably wouldn’t have, because the problems essentially relate to the fact that monetary policy and fiscal policy have not been appropriate given the economic development in a number of euro countries. Macroprudential policy cannot take the place of well-designed monetary and fiscal policies. But it can act as a wellneeded complement, as well-designed monetary and fiscal policies provide no guarantees against being hit by financial crises. Thank you! References Assenmacher-Wesche, Katrin and Gerlach, Stefan (2010): Credit and Bubbles, Economic Policy, July 2010, 437–482. BIS (2012): European bank funding and deleveraging, BIS Quarterly Review, March 2012. Bank of England (2011): Instruments of Macroprudential Policy: A Discussion Paper prepared by Bank of England and Financial Services Authority staff, December 2011.