samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(2018) and Kuttner (2018) provide an overview of alternative instruments introduced by the central banks in the US, the UK, Japan and the euro area. They also refer to different estimates of the effect of alternative instruments on financial prices and interest rates, the real economy and inflation expectations. See also Filardo and Nakajima (2018), Hesse et al. (2017) and Haldane et al. (2016). 6 Borio and Zabai (2016). 7 Cf. Borio and Zabai (2016), Filardo and Nakajima (2018) and Hesse et al. (2017). 8 Borio and Zabai (2016). 9 The arrangement allowed banks in Norway to enter into agreements whereby covered bonds could be  temporarily swapped for short-term government securities. 9/9  BIS central bankers' speeches

Zdeněk Tůma: The role of the EBRD in the transition process towards fully fledged market economies Statement by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank and EBRD Alternate Governor, at the 15th Annual Meeting of the EBRD Board of Governors, London, 22 May 2006. *  *  *  Mr Chairman, Mr President, Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour to address the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors in London and I wish to express my appreciation also to the Government of United Kingdom and to the City of London for their hospitality. We are today participating in the fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors and we can look back on these years with considerable satisfaction regarding the role of the EBRD in the transition process towards fully fledged market economies. Many countries - including my country, the Czech Republic – have witnessed significant and considerable political and economic transformation. I am glad to say that the European Bank is one of those successful institutions that have significantly contributed to this process. The Board of Governors has today approved the Bank's strategy for the period 2006 – 2010 – the Capital Resources Review 3. The new strategy reflects the successful transition achieved in the “Advanced Countries” and the Bank's activities are being focussed towards the South-Eastern and Eastern countries of its operations. We support this move. In Central Europe the Bank focuses on just a few sectors today.
As representatives of international banks, I know that consistent cross-border implementation of Basel II is a high priority not only because you want supervision to reflect as much as possible the manner in which your organisations are managed, but also because you may be concerned about supervisory burden. Let me assure you that it is also in the best interest of supervisors that we try to minimise as much as possible any duplication of effort and make the most of our limited resources. Having said that, I should also be clear that Basel II will never be implemented with 100% consistency across borders, just as Basel I is not currently implemented with 100% consistency. There are important differences in laws, financial markets and supervisory practices, among others, that make it impractical to expect that Basel II will look exactly the same in every country. The role of the AIG, then, is to share information and promote—not mandate or enforce—consistency in implementation of Basel II. It is clear that there is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to implementing the new Framework. Rather, implementation should be tailored to the specific circumstances of a bank and the jurisdictions it operates in. It seems to me that to enhance consistency we need to work on improving vertical co-operation, namely home-host issues, and also horizontal co-operation, that is to say convergence of practices. We think that the bottom-up approach is the most efficient and less prescriptive method of achieving these goals.

This is to ensure that existing and future talent is fully utilised, and skill-related underemployment is kept at bay. The question is then how can Malaysia mould its social protection system to better protect and empower its workers and citizens? We can consider this through the lens of the 4Cs: Coverage, Consolidation, Conditionalities, and Comprehensiveness. On coverage, social protection must be deepened and extended towards the growing segments of informal and self-employed workers. Meanwhile, currently fragmented and overlapping programmes should be consolidated and rationalised, so as to channel funds to meet new needs of society, for instance better retirement aid. We can also impose conditionalities for various programmes to boost incentives and improve targeting capacity. Finally, there is a need for comprehensive active labour market policies to cater to the looming possibility of labour re-deployment under the fourth industrial revolution. Maintaining planetary health for sustainable economic growth This brings me to our third point. In our quest to transition to a high-income economy, we must do so without losing sight of the goal of prospering, thriving and living sustainably. Since last year, we have had to deal with a negative global shock in the form of Covid-19. The pandemic has taken a heavy health and economic toll, with profound effects on poverty. At the same time, displacement and disruptions due to climate-related events such as storms, flooding and droughts have persisted and intensified.
Economic growth in the euro area has become more broadly based, as is reflected in private consumption and investment. At the present juncture, the outlook for the euro area economy is still very much influenced by the uncertainties surrounding the evolution of the world economy in 1999. These uncertainties have adversely affected indicators of industrial confidence in the euro area and have fuelled expectations of a slowdown in economic activity in the short term. In part, the deteriorating external environment, which has its origins in the Asian and Russian financial crises, places a BIS Review 9/1999  –7–  high burden on overall growth prospects. The picture, however, is mixed. Order books and capacity utilisation point to a less optimistic outlook, while retail sales and the recent pattern in employment and unemployment suggest more favourable trends. Consumer confidence also remained high until late 1998. In general, this pattern of mixed evidence appears to characterise the economic situation in the euro area around the turn of the year, and we shall continue to monitor developments carefully. I should also like to emphasise that the Governing Council carries out a forward-looking assessment of inflationary pressures and carefully assesses risks to price stability, whatever direction these may take. With respect to the latest data on the HICP, the annual increase for November 1998 showed a further slowdown to 0.9%, compared with 1.0% in the two previous months. This development was in line with previous trends.

Mr Duisenberg reports on monetary policy in the euro area Speech by the President of the European Central Bank, Dr Willem F Duisenberg, at the New Year’s reception organised by the Deutsche Börse, at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Frankfurt/Main, on 25/1/99. Thank you for the invitation to speak at this New Year’s reception. 1999 is a special year: the year in which the euro was launched, and the year in which it will have to become a stable currency. This is the challenge which lies ahead. The introduction of the euro was a very happy event for all involved. The euro is present on all major financial markets around the globe. Currency trading in euro has commenced and for three weeks now shares have been denominated in euro on most European stock exchanges. Although not yet embodied in the physical form of new banknotes and coins, there is no doubt that the new currency is set to play an important role, both in the euro area and beyond. The euro is a symbol of the achievements of Europeans in the pursuit of common goals. It is unprecedented in European history. After years of intensive preparations and successful efforts towards convergence, the single monetary policy for the entire euro area is being determined by the European Central Bank (ECB).
What businesses banks chose to be involved in, and what business entities chose to own a bank, would be matters for themselves to decide. Over time, banks with the right configuration and mix of activities would succeed, while those without would fail or be eliminated by the competition. But regulators cannot leave it entirely to the market to sort out such matters, especially where the banks involved are not peripheral players but perform key roles in deposit taking and the payments system. Strong banks are important to the health of the financial system and to the entire process of credit intermediation. Regulators cannot guarantee that individual banks will never fail, but they have a duty to minimise the chances of a mishap and to maintain the integrity and overall stability of the financial system. A clear source of potential problems in this regard is the commingling of financial and non-financial activities within the same corporate group. Many regulators regard it as good banking and sound supervisory practice to require clear separation of the two. Firstly, separation will limit the risk of contagion from non-banking businesses to the bank. Banks with significant interests in non-banking activities are exposed not just to credit and market risks which are the primary risks of their business, and which the banks should assess and manage as part of their core competence. These banks will also be taking on the business risks of their non-financial activities.

This is especially true for banks, which are operating in an intensely competitive and dynamic environment. They need to muster all their talents and energies on the financial business, instead of dissipating them over many different businesses. For these reasons, banks should not commingle financial and non-financial activities. However, this does not mean that banks must refrain from engaging in venture capital or merchant banking business, which involves taking an equity interest in a diversified portfolio of non-financial companies for some period. It is not uncommon for the merchant banking business of well-run, international banks to take stakes in non-financial companies for three to five years. These activities are natural extensions of the lending business of banks. They are, however, quite different from taking long-term strategic stakes in non-financial companies which tie a bank’s reputation to these companies. In addition to the separation of banking and non-banking activities, regulators in several developed markets have also advocated dispersed ownership of banks. Often this has been achieved by legislation or via the bank’s own memorandum and articles of association, which sets limits on shareholdings to prevent any single shareholder or group of shareholders from dominating the bank. The result has been a “clean” corporate structure for their banks, i.e. there are no cross-shareholdings between banks and non-banks, and there is clear separation of ownership from management. Practice in other countries The US is an example of a financial system which has prohibited commingling between banking and commerce, and required dispersion of bank ownership.
But banks will need to be careful that this process is handled with tact and sensitivity. Otherwise, they may be open to accusations from sections of the community that they are neglecting their social responsibility by curtailing or increasing the cost of basic banking services to the economically disadvantaged. This was certainly the accusation made against the Australian banks after deregulation there. A further aspect is that the possibility of higher and more extensive charges for banking services will make it all the more important for the banks to deliver sufficient information to their customers about these charges. Let me clarify at this point the HKMA’s attitude to ethical matters and particularly the issue of “fairness” to customers. Our main responsibility under the Banking Ordinance is to promote the general stability and effective working of the banking system. In common with banking regulators in other countries, we interpret this to mean that our principal concern should be to determine that individual banks are financially sound and prudently managed. The aim is to reduce the risk of bank failure that would result in depositors losing money and threaten the stability of the banking system as a whole. We concentrate therefore on checking that the banks have adequate capital and liquidity and effective management and internal controls. However, this is not all that we do.

The end-result is that the offending companies have been “named and shamed” by the Government and pressurised into paying billions of pounds in compensation. The reputation of these firms, many of whom are household names in the UK, has suffered as a result. This comes at an awkward time when banks in the UK and elsewhere are attempting to expand their bancassurance activities and to persuade the public to trust them with their long-term savings. Banks in Hong Kong will need to bear this lesson in mind as we embark upon the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme. They will also have to be alive to the other types of ethical conflict that may arise as the banking environment becomes increasingly competitive and there is even more focus on the bottom line. The HKMA has already pointed out that as a result of interest rate deregulation that there will be both winners and losers among bank customers. Those with small balances and relatively large volume of transactions may find that increased fees outweigh the benefit of any increase in the interest paid on their deposits. As has happened elsewhere, banks may also become more selective in their choice of customers and the level of customer service may be affected if the number of branches is pruned to save costs. A move towards a user pays approach and a reduction in cross-subsidisation are manifestations of the greater efficiency that deregulation is intended to produce.
This is partly due to the fact that international price pressure appears to be continuing. The good international economic activity is one reason why economic prospects remain favourable here in Sweden (Figure 11). However, this is also due to the expectation that growth in domestic demand will be strong. This in turn is due to continued good productivity growth and that the labour market situation is continuing to improve. Household consumption is also being stimulated by the fact that interest rates are relatively low. Little by little economic activity in Sweden will enter a calmer phase. One reason is that international growth will slow down and another is that monetary policy will become less expansionary. We are also assuming that productivity growth will in future slow down somewhat, which will mean that the economy approaches more normal growth figures in the long term. With the development now forecast, it is reasonable to expect that inflation will rise (Figure 12). Domestic production costs are expected to increase more quickly as the economic upturn begins to make a greater impact on the labour market and thereby the rate of wage increase. The fact that productivity growth will gradually slow down also means that higher wages will have a greater impact on companies’ production costs than has been the case in previous years. However, inflation is nevertheless expected to be relatively low during the greater part of the forecast period. A number of factors contribute to this.

As officers at the frontline of risk management in the Bank, you are expected to be conversant with the risk management process that is being implemented at the Bank, and there is no better platform to provide that opportunity than now! To this end, the programme of that this workshop is organized in such a way as to be highly interactive. Therefore, I urge you to feel free to ask as many questions as possible. With these few words, it is now my singular honor and privilege to declare this workshop officially open. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 71/2008
Logically, the Spanish economy has not been 4/6  immune to these developments, which have contributed to explaining the significant slowdown in our export markets in the past two years and the subsequent deceleration in exports. Moreover, the Spanish economy’s trade exposure to the United Kingdom is quite significant. Goods and services exports to the UK account for around 3% of GDP. In the specific case of tourism-related revenue, the main market is the UK, which accounts for around 20% of the total. The effects of Brexit have meant that, since 2017, Spanish goods exports to the UK have faltered, weighed down in particular by consumer durables exports, including cars. Along with these more conjunctural risk factors, there are others of a more structural nature. Specifically, despite the notable correction to date in the net international investment debtor position, it remains very high both in historical terms and in relation to our peers. The continuous generation of current account surpluses since 2012 to which I referred earlier has given rise to a cumulative net lending capacity of around 16 pp of GDP. However, the correction of the external debtor balance built up during the previous expansionary phase has been somewhat more modest; as a result, in the third quarter of 2019, the net international investment debtor position still stood at 79.5% of GDP, some 9 pp down on 2012 (though 18 pp down on the mid-2014 peak). In any event, the current level of external debt is a risk we should not underestimate.

It is small firms (those with fewer than 50 employees) that have most stepped up their entry into foreign markets, although their contribution to total exports remains small compared with larger companies. At the same time, the number of regular exporting firms (i.e. those that sell their products abroad for four years running or more) has risen in this period by 32%. This increase has been particularly notable in target markets with high growth potential, such as North Africa, Asia and North America. The decision by a firm to begin to export entails fixed costs of a significant magnitude. This would suggest that, once these costs are assumed, the firm tends to remain in the market chosen. It also points to the fact that the broadening of the base of exporting firms might be predominantly structural in nature, as attested to by the fact that the persistent recovery in domestic demand since 2014 does not appear to have had a negative bearing on the number of regular exporting firms. 3/6  The Spanish productive system’s greater export orientation has boosted business investment. The evidence is that exporting firms have higher investment/capital ratios, whereby the broadening of the export base is estimated to have contributed to the buoyancy of investment in aggregate terms. As a result, the behaviour of investment during the recovery has been more favourable than that arising from the course of aggregate demand.
While the ECB and the national central banks of the European Union will be heavily involved in the ESRB framework, it is essential to make a clear separation between macro-prudential oversight and monetary policy. The primary objective of euro area monetary policy will remain the maintenance of price stability. Financial stability lays the conditions for the central bank to pursue its task of maintaining stable prices. It is also the outcome of an environment of steady macroeconomic prospects and confidence, which only stable prices can ensure. Current challenges for European integration Ladies and gentlemen, although the financial crisis did not originate here, it has profoundly challenged the European economy – and it is continuing to do so. Economic and Monetary Union – in short: EMU – is a union based on two foundations: economic and monetary. These are two foundations that reinforce one another. Responsibility for the “M” is centralised and assigned to the Eurosystem with the ECB at its core, aiming to ensure price stability in the euro area over the medium term. We have defined price stability as an average annual inflation rate below but close to 2% over the medium term. How have we performed against this objective since the introduction of the euro? Based on current staff projections for this year, by the end of 2010, the average inflation rate in the euro area since the introduction of the euro is estimated to be around 1.95%.

But we did not pursue this policy with the ultimate goal of reconstructing banks’ profitability. Rather, the purpose of our enhanced credit support has been to ensure the transmission of monetary policy transactions to the broader economy. Global economic governance The crisis has important implications for economic governance, and here remarkable efforts have been made or are under way. On the global level, the G20 has become the main forum for international cooperation, and a strong consensus has emerged within this group not only  2  BIS Review 59/2010  about the causes of the crisis but also about the appropriate policy responses. The G20 has been highly effective in addressing the global crisis. The more technical questions concerning regulation and financial stability are mainly delegated to the Financial Stability Board (FSB). The extension of both the membership and the range of tasks of the previous Financial Stability Forum have pushed the Financial Stability Board into a leading role when it comes to coordinating the reform of financial regulation. The European regulatory response to the crisis will include a new body that will provide macroprudential oversight and focus on the avoidance of systemic risk in the financial system of the European Union as a whole. This is the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the establishment of which intends to make macro-prudential oversight operational at the European level.