samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Allow me to say simply that some of the more recent comments about a “come back of inflation", which would allegedly put the Governing Council under strain, seem greatly exaggerated. So, where do we stand? The slowdown in per capita growth in advanced economies can actually be traced back to the 1970s [slide 2]. It worsened in several stages, the latest starting in the mid2000s, after the ICT revolution and before the Great Recession. The issue is that this prolonged slowdown raises questions about future potential growth, largely due to uncertainty about productivity trends. To assess the risks, I would like to elaborate on the three hypotheses that form the basis for today’s conference [slide 3]: first, are we simply underestimating growth? Second, is the slowdown a demand phenomenon? Third, is it a persistent phenomenon due to a slowdown in the pace of innovation? 1. Are we underestimating growth? New technologies usually lead to a mismeasurement of output. National accounts indeed have a hard time taking into account improvements in product quality and product entry or exit. As a result, they tend to overestimate inflation and underestimate output. For instance, there is currently an issue with IT hardware, as output of these products is inadequately recognised, even in the US. But the growing share of digital computing technologies in economic activity raises new specific challenges, both on a conceptual and practical level [slide 4]. Let me take the example of travel services.

Luis de Guindos: Building the EU’s capital markets - what remains to be done Speech by Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe Conference, Supervision and Integration Opportunities for European Banking and Capital Markets, Frankfurt am Main, 23 May 2019. * * * It is a pleasure to be here today to share my thoughts on the future of capital markets union (CMU). CMU is undoubtedly a key project for the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), but it is also important for the European Central Bank (ECB). The primary objective of CMU is to foster deep and diversified capital markets that provide a wide source of financing options to European companies and citizens and act as an engine for investment, innovation and growth. Vibrant EU equity markets and truly diversified cross-border debt markets would complement traditional bank lending by fostering risk-taking and investment.1 Indeed, capital markets can, for instance, provide different forms of funding sources that are better tailored to firms’ needs along their stage of development. A well-functioning CMU would also complement the banking union by providing channels to mobilise the large existing pool of savings towards financing the economy. It could help facing tomorrow’s challenges, such as climate change and digital innovation.
From the book, we can see a long list of CGC schemes introduced throughout the years, each reflecting the stage of development of the country then, and also consistent with the strategy of the country’s economic policies. From CGC’s earliest products such as the  1  Keluaran dalam Negeri Kasardan Pendapatan Negara Kasar pada Harga Semasa dan Harga Malar, Economic Planning Unit (EPU) statistics  2  Bank Negara Malaysia data  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Hawkers and Petty Traders Loan Scheme, catering to financing as low as RM500, to the recent Green Technology Financing Scheme, CGC has done well in providing the needed support to the ever-progressing and expanded nature of the Malaysian economy. CGC’s achievements would not have been possible without the support of the financial institutions. The successes of CGC’s guarantee schemes were the result of the trust and collaboration between the corporation and the participating financial institutions. It is for this reason that over the years many achievements have materialised. CGC has achieved a lot of success it can be proud of, but as with life, we must move forward. Change is constant it becomes more rapid. There are a few things that we could do for the SMEs. First, we can lower the financing cost for SMEs which obtain guaranteed financing under CGC. On the average, SMEs are being charged between 10 to 12 percent. This is about BLR plus 5 to 6 percent. The rate imposed is much too high.

Within the Eurosystem, the ECB has established a high-level task force to prepare a comprehensive analysis of the possible benefits and challenges related to retail CBDC, to be discussed in coming weeks within our Governing Council. • In this journey, we must set up appropriate synergies between public and private actors. Unequivocal support should be given to the European Payment Initiative (EPI): this project is essential for the safety, the rapidity and the European sovereignty of payments. Success of EPI is determined by (i) access to a large customer base, (ii) adherence of large merchants, and ultimately interoperability should EPI have ambitions to develop outside of Europe. • Let me stress there is no contradiction, as sometimes feared by commercial banks, between considering a euro-CBDC and supporting EPI. We may probably need both, and build complementarity. My preference would be to seek a renewed public / private partnership for the dissemination of central bank money in a retail form. Possible impacts on the banking sector could be reduced with different tools: for instance, limiting the quantity of digital euro in circulation would prevent excessive shifts of commercial bank money into digital euros. For the Eurosystem, this strategy would imply to clarify the interplay we would like to put in place between EPI and the CBDC, thus validating an intermediated model while providing enough customer proximity and value added to intermediaries (like front-end solutions).
On the other, there remains the risk of a default in Greece having an impact on global financial markets and GDP growth in the Eurozone. While these are still significant risks, the ability of the larger  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  central banks to handle these situations has improved, reducing to some extent the intensity of the negative impact of such events. This is not to say that there are no associated risks or that their persistence for so long would have lesser effects. A positive note is the more consolidated growth in the Eurozone, which has helped to configure a more balanced global economic scenario. In the emerging economies, there are still significant risks. While the risk of commodity prices dropping further seems to have eased, Latin American economies have been weaker for longer than expected. This has occurred in a context where the high fiscal and current account deficits persist in many economies, making the necessary adjustments expensive and difficult to implement. The risk of slower growth in China and its implications for the copper prices remains, although the Chinese authorities have given proof of their ability and desire to avoid abrupt corrections in their economy. Domestically, the economic recovery in the second half of the year should be accompanied by a significant improvement in confidence indicators, but so far it has not happened.

To the extent that this situation continues, it is possible that domestic output and expenditure will fail to show the greater dynamism that is expected in the baseline scenario. Conversely, a scenario where expectations improve significantly would allow for a faster recovery of the economy, particularly in 2016. Regarding inflation, pressures are somewhat milder than expected in March, due to lower activity and the fact that, although with volatility, the peso has not continued to depreciate. However, in a context of persistently high inflation, with bounded margins, strong wage growth, higher fuel prices and external risk scenarios that can drive a significant further depreciation of the peso, inflationary risks remain important. As we are permanently aware of our legal mandate, this is one risk we analyze and monitor with special care. After evaluating these risks, the Board estimates that the risk balance is unbiased for both output and inflation. Summing up, inflation remains high, despite some decline in recent months. Domestic activity picked up in the first quarter, but the outlook for the second half of the year has moderated. As has been mentioned before, macroeconomic policies have played a countercyclical role. In particular, the stronger monetary impulse translated into a reduction of 200 basis points off the monetary policy rate, which helped to drive the long-term rates close to their historic lows.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  running at about $ billion per month, consisting of roughly $ billion in new investments and $ billion of reinvestments. To meet this pace, the Desk has been operating in the market on nearly every available day. 9 The operations to date have gone well. Participation by the dealers has been strong, with an average offer-to-cover ratio of about 3.5, and the accepted offers have been allocated across a number of dealers and a wide range of securities. Given the robust participation in the operations, the Desk has received competitive and appropriate prices for the securities obtained. 10 Moreover, our purchases do not appear to be causing significant strains on the liquidity or functioning of the Treasury market. It is unusual for the market to have such a large, persistent, and one-sided participant, and we had to worry about how it would adjust to our presence. However, the available evidence suggests that market liquidity is decent at this time. Measures of liquidity, such as trading volumes, bid-ask spreads, or quote sizes, worsened in December, but that pattern appears to have been driven by year-end effects rather than our presence in the market. These measures have recovered since the year-end, moving back toward the levels observed before the start of the purchases. In addition, we do not see signs that the market is facing unusual scarcity of particular Treasury securities.

The policy decisions made by the FOMC in August and November were intended to influence financial conditions in a manner that would support the economic recovery and return employment and inflation, over time, to levels consistent with the FOMC’s objectives. One way that this might occur is through a portfolio balance channel. 12 Under this view, removing duration risk from the market would tend to keep longer-term real interest rates lower than they otherwise would be and would encourage investors to move into other types of assets, thereby making broader financial conditions more accommodative. These intended effects were apparent in financial markets from mid-August to early November, when investors increasingly anticipated the Federal Reserve’s decision to expand its balance sheet. Over that period, longer-term real interest rates declined, breakeven inflation rates moved up toward more normal levels, equity prices rose notably and risk spreads on many credit instruments narrowed. This configuration of asset price movements is the pattern that is typically associated with additional monetary policy easing. Since early November, one of the notable developments in financial markets has been the sharp increase in longer-term interest rates. At first glance, this change may seem at odds with the portfolio balance channel. However, it is important to understand the factors that led to the increase in interest rates in the current circumstances. The upward movement in longer-term interest rates in large part reflects the greater optimism among investors about the outlook for economic growth.
SPEECH  The complexity of monetary policy Keynote speech by Fabio Panetta, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the CEPR-EABCN conference on “Finding the Gap: Output Gap Measurement in the Euro Area” held at the European University Institute Florence, 14 November 2022 The output gap – the difference between actual and potential output[1] – plays an important conceptual role in central banking. In normal conditions, the output gap represents a gauge of inflationary pressure by signalling the amount of slack in the economy. [2] In turn, this provides a yardstick against which central banks calibrate monetary policy. By steering demand so that actual output matches potential central banks can stabilise inflation around their targets. From the global financial crisis until the start of the pandemic, variations in the output gap reflected prominently the role played by demand factors. The implication for monetary policy was relatively straightforward. The shocks to demand pushed output, employment and inflation in the same direction, leading to a positive correlation between output gaps and inflation. Monetary policy could aim to close the inflation gap without facing major trade-offs in terms of the output gap. Central banks ultimately faced the difficulty, not so much of diagnosing, but of delivering: once inflation fell too low, their conventional instruments were constrained as interest rates approached their lower bound. [3] Central banks had to deploy non-standard policy tools to lift demand. Today we are in a new environment.

But at this stage, they do not support the view that we are or will be facing a large positive output gap. Overall, my reading of the available evidence so far is that we cannot say – with sufficiently high confidence – that we are facing a large and permanent loss of potential. Implications for monetary policy My primary objective today is to illustrate the difficulties and the risks policymakers must contend with when assessing supply and demand dynamics in real time, as well as the implications of these dynamics for the medium-term inflation outlook. I will nonetheless offer some reflections on how the previous analysis is influencing my thinking on monetary policy in an uncertain economic environment. There is a common argument today that monetary policy faces asymmetric risks. If policy overreacts to inflation, it can always undo the damage later. But if it underreacts, and inflation gets out of control, it will have to subject the economy to a harder and more costly tightening to rein inflation back in. There are limits to this argument. Monetary policy certainly needs to adjust – even if the output gap is negative – because the risk of second-round effects has become too great. However, I also believe that given the uncertainty we are facing, the calibration of our monetary policy stance must remain evidence-based and focused on the medium-term inflation outlook. [19] And after the progress we have already done in adjusting our policy stance, an aggressive tightening is not advisable, for two main reasons.
We are mindful that for the NDF market to truly reduce in significance and adverse influences, the onshore market must become highly competitive, not just the foreign exchange market but also all aspects of the financial market. We are determined to realise the idea of having a market that possesses the breadth and depth to cater to the increasingly complex and diverse needs of the economy, and a market that is able to sustain and weather volatilities that contribute to the overall wellbeing of the economy. The early positive results of the measures speak for themselves. The onshore foreign exchange market now regularly records a healthy daily volume. In addition, the ringgit exchange rate has remained stable with volatility reducing by half since the introduction of these measures. The domestic bond market is now more resilient as speculative positions have mostly exited the market. There is a larger composition of stable and longer term investors. This fact is much more important than just looking at the percentages or size of non-resident holdings. Our experience suggests that there is a threshold where non-resident investors will become a destabilising force. The success of our measures and our continued faith in the market mechanism is now validated and restored. Ensuring trust, confidence and integrity of the financial market There are many lessons that we ought to learn. Some of the disruptions were caused from the uncompetitive market behaviors and questionable conduct by players.

To this end, I wish to mention that the Bank of Zambia with other stakeholders is in the process of putting in place a National Switch that will further enhance initiatives such as this one whose launch we are witnessing today. Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank of Zambia will continue to support any efforts and innovations by the private sector that extend the provision of financial services to the majority of our citizens. I look forward to seeing the product being launched today live up to the expectations of providing a safe, efficient, secure and reliable service to the Zambian people. I hope that all customers will enjoy using the Airtel Money service. With these few remarks, I wish to declare Airtel Money officially launched and wish it all the success. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In 2005, while the maturities of assets of the banking sector were extended, the liabilities still had short-term maturities. This shows that the vulnerability against the interest rate risk and the maturity mismatch of the sector increased. In order to facilitate banks’ interest rate risk management, it is deemed necessary to make regulations that will also allow floating rate consumer credits along with the currently available fixed rate credits. In 2005, the ratio of liquid assets to total assets decreased as a result of the continuation of the upward trend in credits. Nevertheless, despite the short-term structure of deposits, especially the renewable nature of the major portion of term savings deposits, low condensation and the fact that the assets, which can be accepted by the Central Bank as collateral, comprise a significant part of the assets of the sector are considered risk-reducing factors with respect to liquidity management. Distinguished Guests, In a falling inflation environment, increasing fundamental banking activities along with banks’ narrowing profit margins, and the rise in net wages and commission revenues, which is a more stable source of income, make a positive contribution to the diversity of assets and income of the sector. Hence, they have a favorable effect on profitability performance, which has an important role in financial stability. The capital adequacy ratio of the banking sector is realized well above the legal limit of 8 percent.

Zamani Abdul Ghani: Malaysia – seizing the opportunity to evolve Opening remarks by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Seminar on Financing for Overseas Project, Kuala Lumpur, 14 January 2010. *  *  *  I am pleased to be invited today to officiate this Seminar on Financing for Overseas Project. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I wish to thank and congratulate the EXIM Bank, the ICD and the CIDB for their efforts in organizing this important and invaluable Seminar. The continuous collaboration among Malaysian private and public related organizations with the IDB and its related organizations demonstrate the solidarity of the Muslim Ummah and the community at large towards achieving a strong and sustainable economic development. This also reflects the growing importance of cross border trade and investment among the OIC member countries. We, at Bank Negara Malaysia, are pleased to note that over 200 participants from more than 100 companies in Malaysia are participating in this Seminar. Today’s Seminar which brings together participants in the related industries, not only provide information on the business opportunities abroad, but also serves as an excellent platform to establish new networking links as well as sharing of innovative ideas and invaluable experiences. Malaysia has always accorded and will continue to accord a high priority on enhancing collaboration with the OIC member countries towards fostering intra-OIC trade and investment. Realizing the large business opportunities in the OIC countries, Malaysia entered into an MoU with the IDB in 2004.
In the wake of the controversy surrounding the intelligence community's assessment of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, IARPA set out to enhance the accuracy, precision, and timeliness of intelligence forecasts.3 The Federal Reserve and the broader economics and financial community have, of course, had to face similarly humbling shortcomings in our failure to forecast the Great Recession, despite the numerous signals that were available to forecasters and policymakers prior to 2008. On this issue, it is useful to recall a quote from an unusual source on economic forecasting, the Queen of the United Kingdom, who in November 2008 asked, "Why did nobody notice it?" We should not treat this as a rhetorical question. What are some of the underlying reasons individuals and organizations fail to predict? What should we change about our mindsets and practices to improve the chances that we "notice it" next time, whenever that may be? At the New York Fed, we've made investments in response to these critical questions. We've created a team that is raising awareness of the challenges that make it so difficult to "notice," innovating on how we approach analysis and decision-making, and making these approaches an essential part of what it means to work at the Bank. This is much in the spirit of what IARPA sought to do by sponsoring their tournament. To compete in the IARPA tournament, Tetlock recruited participants online from outside the intelligence community.

12 An early, working paper version of this research can be found in Marcelle Chauvet and Simon Potter,  Forecasting Recessions Using the Yield Curve, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, number 134, August 2001. 13 Brier scores measure probabilistic forecasting accuracy as a function of the distance between a probability  estimate and the actual outcome. For details on origin and calculation see “Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability,” Monthly Weather Review 78, no. 1, 1950. 14 See Michael D. Bauer and Thomas M. Mertens, Economic Forecasts with the Yield Curve, Federal Reserve Bank  of San Francisco Economic Letter, 2018–07, March 5, 2018. 15 Tetlock does discuss ambiguity aversion. Formalizing its role and that of asymmetric loss functions, seen for  instance in the work of Hansen and Sargent, is a good example where formal modeling can make significant advances over less structured judgmental approaches when it comes to decision-making based on forecasts. 16 The minutes to the July 31-August 1, 2018, FOMC meeting report on a Committee discussion about monetary  policy options at the zero lower bound. Although participants generally agreed that their current policy toolkit could provide significant accommodation, participants saw an apparent secular decline in neutral real interest rates as leaving less scope than in the past to reduce the federal funds rate in response to negative shocks, meaning spells at the ZLB could become more frequent and protracted than in the past.