samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
6  BIS Review 133/2010  During the second quarter, the fall in inflation and increased downside risks regarding the global economy have vindicated the monetary policy stance of the Committee – that it may be necessary to maintain policy rates at current levels for some time, and to keep them at low levels for a long period. Accordingly, we see that market expectations regarding future policy rates were revised downwards (Figure18). Market rates also reflect growing expectations of delay and moderation in the rate-hike cycle. Accordingly, benchmark bond yields fell during the second quarter and continued to hover around historic lows despite the increased risk aversion (Figure 19). The downturn in market  BIS Review 133/2010  7  rates was also driven by the improved inflation outlook. The flattening of the yield curve in July compared to April indicates that policy rate-expectations of market players have been revised downwards (Figure 20). The downslide was more significant in market rates than in inflation expectations during the second quarter, pushing medium-term real rates down to historic lows (Figure 21). Yet I would like to underline that real market rates in Turkey did not decouple substantially from other emerging economies (Figure 21). 8  BIS Review 133/2010  The ongoing downward trend both in market rates and the tightness in credit conditions contributed to the maintenance of low levels in loan rates. No remarkable change is observed in loan rates in the second quarter despite the continuing improvement in credit markets (Figure 22). 3.

Parallel to the recovery in domestic demand, credit markets continued to rebound robustly in the second quarter, leading to rapid loan growth in the real sector (Figure 28). The ongoing recovery both in commercial and consumer loans indicates that credit conditions support the rebound in economic activity. Accordingly, as in the previous quarter, our revised forecasts are based on an outlook that envisages the gradual removal of financial tightness. 10  BIS Review 133/2010  Developments in global economic activity have been of major concern for our forecasts through external channels ever since the global financial crisis erupted. In this respect, I would like to express our views on the effects of global developments on aggregate demand and the inflation outlook in the second quarter of the year. The uncertainty caused by fiscal problems in the euro area in May, and the consequent sharp depreciation of the euro led to a weaker external demand in the second quarter than envisaged in the April Inflation Report. Global growth forecasts remain basically unchanged compared to the April Inflation Report. However, euro area growth forecasts have been revised slightly downwards, reflecting the change in the outlook owing to the problems in Greece, Portugal, and Spain spreading throughout the financial systems of the euro area – our largest export destination. In this respect, the export-weighted global economic activity index constructed by the CBT implies weaker external demand than that envisaged in April (Figure 29).
Indeed, having enough capital and hence being considered robust is – undoubtedly – also in the interest of the banks themselves. Although we dealt with the crisis competently – here, I am referring to the successful bail-out of UBS in autumn 2008 – there is unfortunately no guarantee that our country will come off so lightly in future crises. The Swiss TBTF proposal As the above remarks make clear: big, interconnected financial institutions can destabilise the financial system and an entire economy, with dramatic consequences. How can they be made more secure? And how can the problem of the implicit state guarantee be reduced? The package put together by the Federal Council in Switzerland is precisely targeted at these two questions.2 A central component of the Swiss approach is that systemically important banks should markedly improve their capital base and liquidity positions, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and reduce their risk exposure to other banks.3 This will make systemically important banks more stable in future and reduce the likelihood of them running into difficulties. Furthermore, organisational measures aim to ensure that systemically important functions can continue to be performed during a crisis, while simultaneously liquidating the big bank in an orderly manner. This reduces the need for state intervention. These measures may have different starting points and goals, but they all harmonise with each other.

By providing another avenue for financing with the development of the corporate bond market, firms are able to improve their ability to balance debt and equity to better manage the degree of leverage while reducing the impact of shocks arising from over-dependence on any single form or source of financing. The development of corporate bond markets in the region has also enhanced the efficiency of capital allocation by providing an avenue for investing one of Asia’s hallmarks - its large reserve of savings arising from trade surpluses. By developing the regional bond markets, it would enable firms to tap alternative sources of financing at competitive cost thereby contributing to increased efficiency, higher investment and consequently to overall growth. The launch of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) in June 2003 marks the first significant step in regional financial co-operation and integration, and augurs well for the future development of the Asian regional bond market. The Asian Bond Market will not only serve to facilitate the re-investment of a portion of Asia’s reserves back into the region but what is equally important is that it allows for the efficient allocation of savings for productive investments and at the same time broadens and deepens the regional bond markets. In the process, the level of corporate governance in the region would be enhanced as well. Indeed, developing such an alternative source of financing would serve as a more resilient source of long-term financing with improved matching of the currency and maturity profiles of assets and liabilities.
The higher the  BIS Review 56/2003  1  long-term sustainable rate of growth, the easier it is for us to balance aggregate demand in the economy so that it coincides with what is available for household consumption, business investment and the needs of the public sector. So monetary policy cannot raise the potential growth rate but, in a worst case scenario, as we witnessed during the 1970s and 1980s, it can worsen our chances of attaining a high potential growth rate by affecting demand in the economy in the wrong way. Consequently, on an abstract level, the “formula” for economic growth is very simple. It is the weighted sum of labour force growth and capital growth as well as technological progress. However, when we compare growth between different countries, it is not that interesting to note that a country has high growth because its labour force is growing fast. It is the standard of living that is of interest and this does not have to improve just because the population and labour force are growing. The important issue instead is how quickly a country’s production grows per capita and this leads us into concepts such as productivity in a broad sense. For productivity is just that - production per capita. It can be measured per inhabitant, per employee or per hour worked. The concepts are closely related. One interesting observation is that the United States’ rapid growth in recent years has been attributable mainly to high labour force growth.

Until now, we have mainly been concerned with “quantities", and I would just like to say a word in this respect on the Stability and Growth Pact: in my mind, it would be both dangerous and illusory to want to change the rules – rather, let’s respect them. But at the same time, we should consider the quality of public spending: in order to boost potential growth, in the long term, expenditure on investment and on our future are vital, including on education and training and, of course, new technologies. This is true of national budgets, but we could amplify the effect through a euro area investment budget. This budget could be used to finance, for the benefit of all countries, certain “common goods” such as digital technology, energy transition, security, and external border protection. Finally, my third idea begins with a question: how to deal with stabilisation? In other words, how to deal with the shocks that can have a brutal effect on certain national economies? Private risk 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  sharing through the Capital Markets Union and the Financing Union that I mentioned earlier, is part of the answer. In the United States for example, the stock market is capable of absorbing around 40% of a State-specific shock. But that is not enough and it is absolutely vital that we go further still.
They will build strong foundations, which will support the existing ecosystem (including the correspondent banking model) as well as future initiatives such as Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) and multilateral payment systems. The priority themes are: Payment system interoperability and extension focused on modernising and aligning the payment rails across jurisdictions and improving competition. Cross-border data exchange and message standards focused on developing common payment message and API standards. Legal, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks focused on harmonising regulation in areas such as financial crime controls and oversight of financial institutions. To support delivery of the critical actions, two new industry taskforces[11] (outlined below) have recently been established, with fantastic representation from many different continents and industry sectors. CPMI has established a Community of Practice for central banks (COPS) to exchange best practice and learnings. COPS, chaired by Carlos Conesa from Banco de España, will enable central banks to benchmark national approaches and share insights, for example, from their national reviews of access and operating hours. There are nearly 30 institutions participating from developed and emerging economies: and I would encourage other central banks to join. It is also important to monitor progress against the Roadmap actions: something that we will oversee through the FSB’s new cross-border payments Delivery Group, which I chair. Payment system interoperability and extension Most cross-border payments currently rely on the correspondent banking network. [12] They involve multiple parties, multiple currencies and multiple national payment systems. The capabilities of each payment system determine how firms can process payments.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Fifteen months of financial crisis – a status report Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Associazione Bancaria Ticinese, Centro di Studi Bancari, Vezia, 3 December 2008. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The financial crisis broke out a little over fifteen months ago. The magnitude of the turmoil experienced by the financial industry has been greater than all the forecasts. So far, our entire attention has been focused on the problems of the financial industry, while the real economy appeared to be passing through this difficult period without too many problems. We now realise that this view was deceptive: the situation in the non-financial sector is deteriorating substantially. This could lead to new challenges in 2009. After having benefitted extensively from the international expansion of the past few years, we are currently experiencing the consequences of a widespread recession. This situation is difficult for our country, but we may be better placed than others for coping with it. BIS Review 150/2008  1
Despite the intensification of our repo operations, tensions on the money market increased throughout the year owing to the ongoing deterioration of the economic and financial environment, and reached their peak in autumn. A particular source of difficulties was the  BIS Review 48/2009  1  extremely strong demand for Swiss francs coming from eastern European countries, where banks had granted Swiss-franc-denominated loans on a massive scale, refinancing themselves on the money markets. Since these banks have no access to our loans, they found themselves in a delicate position when the Swiss franc money market dried up. The increased demand for Swiss francs contributed to the rise in our interest rates, which we deemed undesirable from a monetary policy perspective. To satisfy demand from eastern European banks, we sought the support of the European Central Bank (ECB), to which we remitted Swiss francs under a euros against francs swap arrangement. The ECB then transferred these francs to its counterparties. Similar agreements – euros against Swiss francs – were subsequently concluded with the Polish central bank and the Hungarian central bank, enabling them to conduct analogous transactions in their respective countries. Moreover, to ensure a better distribution of francs across the market, the SNB itself engaged in swaps with its counterparties. By the end of 2008, our supply of Swiss francs to three central banks and a certain number of other banking institutions by means of swap transactions had reached a total of CHF 50 billion. Thus, the demand for liquidity was considerable across the board.

The distrust characterising interbank relations encouraged certain institutions to stockpile capital. This trend was reinforced by the fact that numerous banks were unable to make a reliable estimate of their own liquidity requirements, particularly in view of the soaring demand for cash on the part of the public. At the end of last year, the total value of banknotes in circulation had risen by 11% and banks had three times as much money on their SNB sight deposit accounts as at the end of 2007. To satisfy this extraordinary demand, the SNB was obliged to expand its repo operations in terms of volume and maturity, and to inject liquidity into the market through a new channel – that of swap transactions. Over the past few years, repos have become the standard tool with which we implement our monetary policy. They involve loans to banks denominated in Swiss francs and backed by securities. As a rule, these loans are granted for a term of one week. However, in response to the special needs of the market in 2008, we had to lengthen the term of our loans on several occasions, extending maturity to as much as twelve months. Unlike other central banks, however, we saw no need to expand the range of eligible securities, since we already apply a very liberal policy, accepting top-rated securities denominated not only in Swiss francs, but also in euros, pounds sterling, US dollars and other currencies. In 2008, the average amount of our repos rose by 53% against the year before.
LumenLab is an enlightened response to Asia’s healthcare and retirement needs in the next decade, and is well aligned with MAS’ strategy to have innovation-led growth drive our next phase of development as a global insurance market. Conclusion Congratulations to MetLife and LumenLab. I look forward to continued partnership with you in Singapore. Thank you. 7  Transcript of Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at Founders Forum Smart Nation Singapore Reception, Prime Minister’s Office Singapore (2015). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Short-term developments are not key, especially when they are largely determined by energy and food prices. The underlying trend and the firm anchoring of inflation expectations are decisive, as well as the orientation of the euro area as a whole. Low inflation rates in some Member States – even when negative – are not in themselves a breach of the target. They can be necessary to restore lost competitiveness. One could also argue about whether it is really necessary to consider further measures given that the measures already taken have not yet been able to have an effect. Monetary policy does not take effect immediately, but only with a certain time lag. As a rule we should take this time and wait and see. Which measures are we talking about here? The large-scale purchase of securities, including government bonds, is often seen as a panacea. As I said, even for innovative or unconventional measures, the costs and benefits, and the opportunities and risks must be carefully considered. Some central banks have used quantitative easing to quickly and decisively provide monetary policy impetus, adjusted to the specificities of their environment. It is these particular central banks and their measures to which we are compared. For me, these are idle comparisons. The following saying applies here: those who constantly compare themselves with others might become more like them, but they won’t necessarily become any better.
If current account improvements are being driven mainly by lower imports in a weak economy, they are likely to unwind when the economy recovers and imports rise again. But if they are being driven by structural changes – such as competitiveness gains and reallocation of resources towards productive sectors – they are more likely to be sustainable in the steady state, both externally and internally. All four aspects are integral to the rebalancing process. Sustainable rebalancing requires that adjustment is stable, symmetrical and structural. Only under those conditions can all economies achieve full employment in a way that is robust to global developments. So what do we see in the euro area today? Progress with rebalancing The imbalances that built up in the euro area before the crisis were sizeable. Current account deficits in the five (former) programme countries – Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus – had doubled from, on average, around 5% of GDP in 2000 to about 10% of GDP in 2008. Moreover, those imbalances were financed largely by volatile, debt-based cross-border flows. That left several countries vulnerable to a rapid reversal in financing, with little ex-post sharing of risks between private borrowers and lenders – a so-called “sudden stop”. Since then, we have seen considerable flow improvements, especially in the countries that entered the crisis with large current account deficits. Deficits in the (former) programme countries have adjusted dramatically. On average they are in balance today. Only Greece and Cyprus are still recording small deficits, while the other countries have moderate surpluses.

While there have been other un-guaranteed MBS transactions in Hong Kong, today's issue sponsored by the HKMC is the largest un-guaranteed Hong Kong dollar MBS in Hong Kong. Moreover, it is the first-ever un-guaranteed Hong Kong dollar MBS that carries a triple-A rating. I believe that the HKMC's introduction of triple-A-rated MBS through credit tranching will become a benchmark for other MBS issuers in Hong Kong. With today's MBS issue, the HKMC now accounts for about a quarter of the total securitisation transactions in Hong Kong in the past ten years and is the largest issuer of asset-backed securities in Hong Kong. For the future, the Corporation has plans to expand the scope of its business to cover non-mortgage assets and selected overseas markets – as always, in a prudent commercial manner. These new business initiatives will help to further broaden the local debt market, and strengthen Hong Kong's role as an international financial centre and funding hub in the region. We are grateful for the enthusiastic response of the banks joining the management group for this issue and find it very encouraging. We are also very pleased to learn that a diverse group of investors including retirement funds, insurance companies, banks and other institutional investors have shown a keen interest in the issue. BIS Review 116/2006  1  Let me conclude by thanking HSBC, the sole arranger and lead manager, for their highly professional work to make this issue a great success.
This will diversify the use of currencies by importers and exporters. The use of domestic currency for settlement of trade reduces the exposures to currency risk and costs associated with the need to hedge against such risks. Collectively, these initiatives  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  are expected to contribute towards further deepening trade and financial integration in the region. Priorities going forward With the developments described just now, in moving forward, we can expect the financial integration process to continue to gather momentum. To my own mind, an important question for policymakers and financial institutions is where should we focus our attention and efforts to adapt to the changes ahead? While further financial integration process has captured the imagination of many, because of the numerous benefits and opportunities, at the same time, policymakers in the region remain focused on ensuring strong and resilient financial systems which are critical to buffer against greater exposures to contagion in a more open and competitive market environment. Efforts continue to be taken to strengthen financial stability frameworks. This includes continuing to develop arrangements, both formal and informal, for cooperation in monitoring risks and to support the effective supervision and resolution of financial institutions with a significant cross-border presence. Greater consistency in the implementation of minimum regulatory standards will also be as important, to reduce distortions arising from unfettered competition, regulatory arbitrage and transactional compliance costs incurred when operating across borders.

I will talk about where we are in this process and some of the priorities for policy frameworks as well as for the management of risks by financial institutions as we move forward. This, I hope, will provide useful inputs for your deliberation and discussion in this conference. The case for greater financial integration ASEAN is home to more than 600 million people and if considered as a single entity, would represent the sixth largest economy in the world with a combined GDP of USD2.5 trillion. According to the OECD, the region is projected to sustain an average annual growth of 5.6%  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  over the next four years and is expected to be the fourth largest trading bloc by 2050. Concurrently, the standards of living among the general populace will continue to improve. Household purchasing power has risen significantly over the last decade, transforming the region into a thriving hub of consumer demand. The size of ASEAN’s consuming class is expected to double from 81 million to 163 million by 2030. By 2020, Asia is estimated to account for more than half of the total global middle class population, with ASEAN representing more than USD2 trillion of additional consumption within the region. Also, as the sources of economic growth become increasingly domestic-based, this enables many economies to diversify their sources of growth. An important development is the significant increase in intra-regional trade.