samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As regulators, we obviously have a part to play in helping the finance industry adapt. We should strive to reduce uncertainties as much as possible. One source of uncertainty today is the regulatory framework. Nearly ten years after the crisis, our priority must be to stabilise the rules. The main elements of the Basel III package have already been approved in 2010–11 and have largely entered into force. But there are still ongoing discussions regarding the measurement of risk on bank balance sheets. The objective, as you know, is to reduce the unwarranted variability of results between banks and across jurisdictions. And as the German G20 reiterated last week, the completion of reforms must not result in a “significant increase in overall capital requirements”. We have not yet reached an agreement. Thanks to our mobilisation and that of our European partners, we have avoided a bad agreement. For the coming months then, our objective is to reach a good one. Another source of uncertainty is Brexit. With article 50 about to be triggered, we obviously cannot prejudge the outcome of the future negotiations. But it is essential to bear one principle in mind: in the single market, you cannot separate access and rules. In financial services in particular, you can hardly expect to have a European passport if you don’t accept the single market’s rules. Let us be clear: we are saddened by Brexit, and we are not the ones who have decided to have a so-called “clean Brexit".

François Villeroy de Galhau: The future of the finance industry between austerity and innovation Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Süddeutsche Zeitung Finance Day 2017, Frankfurt am Main, 22 March 2017. * * * I am grateful to Marine Dujardin and Banque de France and ACPR staff for their assistance in preparing these remarks. It is a great pleasure to be with you today and I’d like to thank you sincerely for inviting me. I am here in Frankfurt as a committed European and as a friend of Germany; and not just because I travel here at least once a fortnight for the meetings of the ECB Governing Council! On a more personal level, I am French but my roots are in Saarland. My family has lived there since the end of the 18th century and its porcelain manufacturing company Villeroy & Boch is part of the German “Mittelstand”. But today, to discuss the future of the finance industry, I’m going to be talking in my capacity as a member of the Governing Council and President of the French supervisory authority (the ACPR, which I’m sure some of you know). First I would first to say a few words on the Eurosystem’s monetary policy and our latest decisions. Then I’ll share with you my thoughts on how to respond to the current challenges facing the finance industry.
In short, a recovery that will be both weak and protracted by historical standards, and characterised by credit constraints and reduced levels of consumption and investment, as both consumers and firms seek to repair balance sheets. In the process, export markets will become more competitive. 1  The IMF’s forecasts, published in the World Economic Outlook (October 2009), cover 2009 and 2010. The forecasts in the European Commission’s Autumn 2009 Economic Forecasts extend to 2011. BIS Review 154/2009  1  … could benefit the Maltese economy Although euro area membership cushioned the domestic impact of the global crisis, the economy’s resilience has come under strain. As expected in an open economy, the shock was transmitted primarily through the trade channel as external demand shrank. Following average annual growth of almost 4 per cent in 2005-2007, the pace slowed to 2.1 per cent last year. The contraction was particularly pronounced in the manufacturing and tourism sectors, though ongoing expansion in the services sector mitigated the overall decline. The government measures targeted to support affected companies, moreover, served to contain job losses, such that the unemployment rate has remained below that of the euro area. Until very recently, inflation, however, has failed to drop as fast as in the euro area, acting as a drag on purchasing power. These trends produced a sharp drop in output in the first half of the year and the Bank expects annual real GDP to shrink by about 2.2 per cent.

These are key drivers that will accelerate the transformation of Malaysia into a high-income economy in a sustainable and inclusive way. Last but not least, as part of the holistic review, we should be prepared that some DFIs may have to “graduate” into the mainstream legal and regulatory landscape of the Malaysian financial system. This would mean that they may no longer be placed under the Development Financial Institutions Act. This is a positive development as it reflects the maturity and success of the institution in delivering on its developmental mandates. In conclusion, the progress of the nation is a collective responsibility. All of us have our own part to play. Our roles may be different but we share a common vision towards a shared, inclusive and sustainable prosperity for all. For all of us gathered here today, this outcome is crystallised in the vision for DFIs to lift the growth and development of Malaysia. For this to happen, DFIs need to ensure that they are financially sustainable, possess the agility to support the existing and new economic drivers, and constantly measure their performance and contribution in an appropriate performance management framework. As DFIs will continue to be at the forefront of efforts to meet the SDG goals, I hope that the next two days will sow the seeds for individual and collective actions that will both transform DFIs and increase their development impact. With this, I wish all of you a productive forum. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is, above all else, a matter of human health and welfare. The front line of combatting the challenges of Covid-19 comprises the extraordinary efforts of NHS health professionals, Public Health Officials and volunteers across the country, as well as the exceptional support by the FCO to UK citizens abroad. We are fortunate in this country to have the infrastructure, expertise and dedication in public health that we do. The Bank of England’s role is to help UK businesses and households manage through an economic shock that could prove large but will ultimately be temporary. The Bank will take all necessary steps to support the UK economy and financial system, consistent with our statutory responsibilities. Our policy arsenal includes monetary policy instruments, special liquidity facilities, and macroprudential tools. We are also coordinating with HM Treasury to ensure that any initiatives are complementary and that they will collectively have maximum impact, consistent with our independent responsibilities. And lines of communication are wide open with our international colleagues at the G7, G20 and the IMF. While there will be differences in the exact timing and form, the collective impact of our efforts will be both powerful and timely. The Bank are monitoring the situation closely across all our functions and ensuring all necessary contingency plans are in place in the private financial sector and at the Bank of England itself.

In my remarks of a year ago, I mentioned that we are at a period of historic transition with regard to the development of the offshore RMB market. Looking at the development of the Eurodollar and offshore RMB markets side-by-side, as we just did, gives us a unique perspective on how things might play out in the long run. Indeed, as the offshore RMB market reaches maturity, there will no doubt be volumes of literature written by financial historians that compare the birth and development of these two markets. While developments so far have been encouraging, we are still at the initial phase of RMB offshore market development. The policy headroom to develop RMB business is already present, and we at the HKMA will continue to provide a safe and efficient financial infrastructure for the conduct of RMB offshore activities. But the most important of all, I would encourage businesses and financial institutions to make full use of such opportunities already available and promote the development of a wide range of RMB services and financial products. Forums like this one help us prepare for the future by examining what has transpired, making comparisons and exploring business opportunities and collaborative initiatives. I am eager to work together with all of you in shaping what is to come. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
BIS Review 68/2006  3  The first one of these risks is the continuance of the increase in oil and commodity prices. Moreover, continuance of the controlled course of the increase in total demand provided by tight fiscal and monetary policies is a must for preventing a demand-based inflationary pressure. Prices of public goods and services, indirect taxes and the incomes policy should be consistent with inflation targets. Developments in the risk premium, which result from monetary policies of developed countries and are likely to cause fluctuations in global liquidity conditions, also pose risks to the disinflation process. As I have mentioned before, attempts and statements that may damage expectations can also lead to unfavorable effects on the disinflation process. In this framework, relations with the IMF and the European Union are two critical anchors in terms of medium and long-term expectations. Support from international institutions is a significant factor bringing about additional confidence. European Union negotiations for full membership provide support to the national program in the framework of the improvement of the Turkish economy’s investment environment and increase the predictability of the economy in the medium and long term. Uninterrupted implementation of structural reforms is of critical importance. The continuance of the reform process is the only way to sustain and build on the achievements made up to now. Social Security Reform is a significant step in this respect.

Since the authorities had decided on how much each bank could increase its credit book every single month, there was really no need to appraise credit applications in a particularly serious manner. Mortgage credits took most of the available credit volume and the remainder was allocated to safe projects. Credit losses in the banking system were only a fraction of a percentage point of the credit stock each year. As a consequence, the ability to appraise credit risk had slowly dwindled out of the banks. So, unfortunately, was the case for the supervisors. When credit controls were finally removed the volume of credit virtually exploded. All banks wanted to increase their market shares and there was plenty of pent-up demand. Many loans were given to customers who, as it appeared later, were far from creditworthy and should not have passed a proper credit appraisal. The regulations had been abolished at the wrong time and without realising what an extended period of regulation had done to the ability of banks and supervisors to handle credit risk. What can be learnt from this? Quite obviously, deregulating does not mean the abolishing of all rules according to which banks should behave. There are good and well documented reasons for regulating banks. Deregulation means the adoption of a new legal structure that is consistent with a competitive market economy. The dilemma of regulation is to balance between having too little and too much. Too much will stifle the banks, too little will lead to unsound risk taking.
The world is changing quickly and it is only a couple of years since several of the big emerging markets, which now according to a GDP criterion should be given greater influence, were in need of support from the very countries that today by the same criterion would have to scale back their role. We do not know what the situation will be in five or ten years. Maybe, there are reasons to aim for more regional representation? A very difficult question – which I do not think can be ignored – is if the level of “democracy” or “governance” in individual countries’ should be a factor when determining countries influence in the IMF. Whatever the answer to this question is, it will have potential consequences for the legitimacy of the organisation. Finally, we should not be led to believe that a changed representation per se, resolves the problems of the IMF. There are a number of other things that could, and should, be done that may even play a more important role. Allow me to indicate a number of areas where more could be done, and where the prospect of progress is probably higher than in the QVR-field. I myself have positive experiences of a similar gradual process of reform within the framework of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 1. Much has been done to increase transparency in various ways at the IMF. Greater openness is probably the most important way to develop the organisation’s analysis and surveillance activities.

Second, on the cyclical front, the sustained momentum in the Swiss mortgage and real estate market over several years has already led to imbalances that pose a risk to financial stability and, ultimately, the Swiss economy. So, what have we done to address systemic risk in Switzerland up to now? With respect to the structural dimension of systemic risk – the TBTF issue – Switzerland already adopted a package of measures back in 2011. This package aims at reducing both the likelihood of crisis at a systemically important bank and the costs to the economy in the event of such a crisis. The package consists of four complementary measures: (1) significantly more capital, and capital of better quality, (2) larger liquidity buffers, (3) rules imposing sufficient diversification to reduce counterparty risk, and (4) organisational measures. Let me briefly outline some key elements of this package. The new capital adequacy regulations for systemically important banks apply to the riskweighted capital ratio and the leverage ratio. Furthermore, they are designed to be progressive. Put simply, the bigger the bank, and the greater its systemic importance for the domestic financial system, the higher the requirement.
Paul Tucker: Inflation, growth and stability – balancing the Bank of England’s economic priorities Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at The Institute of Economic Affairs’ 27th Annual Conference ”The State of the Economy”, London, 23 February 2010. *  *  *  Many thanks for input to Peter Andrews, Roger Clews, Iain de Weymarn, James Proudman, Gareth Ramsay and Victoria Saporta. For background work to Michael Grady and for secretarial support to Sandra Bannister and Cheryl Feeney. It is an understatement that the current macroeconomic conjuncture poses major challenges for policy. There are also major lessons for the overall framework for preserving stability in our economy. I shall talk about both. Both the challenges and the lessons stem from the source of the crisis: a crash in the credit system affecting a domestic and global economy which had become severely imbalanced. Broadly, from the autumn of 2008 onwards, the sharp falls in economic activity were most pronounced in areas heavily dependent on credit and optimism (Chart 1). There was a vicious spiral down in world trade, where supply chains had become longer, with more counterparty risk and so more dependence on credit. Likewise in industrial production (Chart 2). Business investment collapsed (Chart 3). There was sharp destocking, helping to alleviate firms’ financial pressures. Things are better than they were. Capital markets have mostly reopened, but spreads are still higher than before funding markets deteriorated during 2007 and bank lending has been very weak.

There is a great deal of slack in the economy. Around three-quarters of a million jobs (net) have been lost. And most surveys have firms working well within capacity (Chart 8). The MPC believes that that will tend to bear down on wages and consumer price inflation over the next few years, warranting our substantial monetary stimulus. But the recession will obviously impair the economy’s productive potential. Investment plans have been shelved and some discouraged people are likely to leave the workforce. Those effects are likely to accumulate over time. But there are important temporary factors too. Typically when monetary policymakers talk about the potential supply of the economy, we have in mind the slow-moving accretion in productive capacity determined by growth in underlying productivity, the workforce and firms’ net investment in the capital stock. Right now, that mindset would not quite capture what is going on. There are a number of reasons for thinking that the “effective supply” capacity of the economy has been depleted temporarily due to the shock to credit supply and confidence (Chart 9). How much, and how temporary, are major uncertainties. In the months immediately after the Lehman crisis, the cutbacks in lending and in trade credit insurance were so severe that some firms were probably unable to maintain production at previous levels. Working capital is, after all, an intermediate input. 2 Those constraints have probably reduced over the months.
As a result, my individual views on policy have mostly been wrapped up with those of others in the MPC Minutes and the Inflation Report. So today, I want to offer some more personal thoughts on how I see the economic outlook developing; how I interpret the balance of risks to output and inflation in the medium term; and why I have been voting for no change in Bank Rate or the scale of asset purchases at recent meetings. The outlook for growth The financial crisis brought with it the deepest recession the UK has experienced since at least the Great Depression of the 1930s. The MPC responded by cutting Bank Rate as low as it could reasonably go and injecting £ of extra money into the economy (14% of annual nominal GDP). Since the trough in output in the autumn of 2009, the UK economy has been on a gradual, if bumpy, path of recovery. That was to be expected. Historically, and internationally, we know that economic recovery after a major financial crisis is usually slow and seldom smooth – the MPC (and I personally) have been aware of this and flagging it for some time. Even though we have been predicting a rough ride, the output data at the end of last year and the beginning of this still came as an unwelcome surprise. Analysis of past data suggests that the most likely explanation is that we are currently going through a temporary soft patch.

Chart 1  Chart 2  GDP projection based on market interest rate expectations and £ billion asset purchases  Projection of the level of GDP based on market interest rate expectations and £ billion asset purchases  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Chart 3 CPI inflation projection based on market interest rate expectations and £ billion asset purchases  The recent data has not been particularly encouraging. Official figures for 2010 Q4 and 2011 Q1 suggest that there was no underlying growth (allowing for the unusual impact of snow in December). And the unemployment rate remains at just under 8%. The data may not be totally reliable – they never are – but the message we get from our business contacts in all parts of the United Kingdom is not inconsistent with this broad picture painted by the official statistics. Meanwhile, CPI inflation is likely to go yet higher if (as the MPC expects) rises in the price of energy get reflected in utility bills in due course. The largely unanticipated path of CPI inflation over the past couple of years can be explained by three factors: changes in the standard rate of VAT, unforeseen changes in wholesale oil and gas prices and higher-than-expected import prices following the 25% depreciation of sterling since mid-2007. Given our target of 2%, the recent path of CPI inflation is uncomfortable to say the least.
14  Figure 5 Lending interest rates (1)  Credit growth (3)  (index, 2002-2017=100)  (real annual change, percent)  180  210  25  25  150  180  20  20  150  15  15  120  10  10  90  5  5  60  0  0  30  -5  120 90 60 30 02  05  08  11  14  17  Consumer  -5 02  Commercial  05  08  11  14  17  Housing (2)  (1) Weighted averaged rates of all operations performed in each month. (2) Loans denominated in UFs. (3) Dotted horizontal lines show average of the last 10 years of each series. Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF data. Figure 6 Consumer expectations : IPEC (*) (original series)  80  80 Country's economic situation in 12 mo. 70  Household's perceived situation one year ahead  70  60  60  50  50  40  40 Current personal economic situation  30 20 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  Current economic situation of the country 14 15 16  30 20 17  (*) Value above (below) 50 indicates optimism (pessimism). Source: Adimark.

12  Figure 1 Inflation indicators (*) (annual change, percent)  7  7  6  6  Services  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  CPI  CPIEFE  0  1 0  -1  Goods  -2  -3  -1 -2  -3 13  14  15  16  17  (*) As from January 2014 the new indexes with annual base 2013=100 are used, so they are not strictly comparable with previous figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 2 CPI inflation (*)  CPIEFE inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  Dec.17 Report  Sep.17 Report  (*) Gray area shows forecast as from the fourth quarter of 2017. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).