See for example Richild Moessner and William R. Nelson (2008): “Central bank policy rate guidance and financial market functioning”, in International Journal of Central Banking, 4, no. 4, pp. 193-226, and Amund Holmsen, Jan F. Qvigstad, Øistein Røisland and Kristin Solberg-Johansen (2008): “Communicating monetary policy intentions: The case of Norges Bank”, Norges Bank Working Paper, 2008/20. 6  BIS Review 140/2009  places demands on our communication skills. I am certain that many teachers and lecturers would agree that teaching is not only a means of conveying knowledge to students, but also provides the lecturer with a deeper understanding of the subject. The same applies to central bankers. External communication of our analyses has certainly not reduced our competence as economists. How transparent should the central bank be? How open should we be? Maximum transparency about Norges Bank’s decisions would imply filming the Executive Board’s meetings and webcasting them live. In addition, we could perhaps have installed cameras and microphones in some of the offices and meeting rooms in Norges Bank where the analyses are conducted that form the background for the Executive Board’s decisions. Perhaps I am old-fashioned, but I think that a “reality series” about Norges Bank would not be particularly entertaining and would not foster particularly good decision-making. Maximum transparency is probably not optimal, but how far should we go? There is no absolute answer to this. In the following, I will discuss several considerations that must be taken into account.

Within six decades, our economy moved from being a commodity-dependent nation to one that is successfully transformed. We subsequently elevated ourselves to where we are today, an economy that is open, diversified and competitive. This is only possible because of continuous investments in infrastructure over many decades. Rationalising tax incentives to be in line with international practices On the global regulatory front, as we had witnessed, the unfolding of the global financial crisis revealed the significant vulnerability of international financial markets to market dislocations. Calls for greater regulatory harmonisation and the adoption of international best practices have gathered speed, blurring the distinction between onshore and offshore regulatory requirements. Offshore financial centres which remain mired in the old model and thinking are set to become part of a sunset industry. There have also been significant advancements with respect to international taxation practices. Authorities are now more proactive in seeking to mitigate the distortionary effects of harmful tax competition on the allocation of resources and its negative implications on national tax bases. Malaysia, until early this year, has been an observer of the OECD’s Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS). Since January 2017, we have agreed to become a participating member in the Inclusive Framework. This will allow Malaysia to participate in the BEPS related work on equal footing with other OECD and G20 countries. We will also be able to provide direct inputs to shape the content of the BEPS related standards.