samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Such collaboration can also be extended to facilitate retail payment card transactions via the domestic debit card schemes of both countries. Eventually, I envision ATMs in Malaysia and Indonesia will be linked seamlessly. This will reduce cost, enhance safety and expand outreach. Conclusion Let me conclude with a quote by Malaysia’s second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, who said in 1967 that, “We cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of SouthEast Asian nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill” We have indeed come a long way in our cooperation and journey between Indonesia and Malaysia. The potential of Bank Mandiri as a Qualified ASEAN Bank in Malaysia will be a significant milestone for both our countries and the ASEAN region. It represents the realisation of a vision that was formed more than six years ago with the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, with roots that go even further back. We should expect greater achievements by both our countries. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Thank you. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

PRODUCTIVITY AND STABILITY FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH  ADDRESS BY DR MARIO VELLA GOVERNOR, CENTRAL BANK OF MALTA DELIVERED DURING THE IFS ANNUAL DINNER  18 NOVEMBER 2016  Dear President and Members of the Committee of Institute of Financial Services (IFS) Malta, personally and on behalf of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Malta and of its Senior Management, I thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished audience. Dear Minister. Ladies and gentlemen. This annual event brings together key stakeholders in this country’s economic development and growth, and in the development of the social, educational and cultural conditions without which economic development and growth are not possible. It is now an established tradition that the Governor of the Central Bank seizes the opportunity of the Annual Dinner of IFS Malta to make a number of factually grounded remarks about some matters in the remit of the Central Bank. The traditional presence of the Minister of Finance at this event is of vital importance because it provides the stakeholders present with a more dynamic view of the whole, in the light of the statutorily distinct roles of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. Before sharing some thoughts with you, I would like to commend IFS for its ongoing commitment to responding to the changing needs of the marketplace and its pursuit of excellence in the provision of financial services education.
Looking ahead, given that it is hard to explain the relative weakness of the euro, it is reasonable to expect that it may in due course recover to more realistic levels; and there has indeed been some welcome movement in that direction since the spring. Whether that will continue is hard to judge, but it would be enormously helpful both to the balance of the UK economy as a whole and to the individual businesses most directly affected. The other major area of uncertainty we face is the encouraging and exciting, if somewhat tantalising, prospect that the UK may come to enjoy, or indeed may already be beginning to enjoy, some of the benefits evident in the US arising from the “new economy”. The advances we are seeing in information and computer technology, when combined with the greater flexibility and adaptability our economy has shown in recent years and the wider trading opportunities and greater competitiveness flowing from the globalisation of the world economy, are potentially very exciting because they represent scope for improvements in the supply side of the economy: they hold out the possibility that the economy might be able to grow faster than recent historical experience without jeopardising price stability. The dilemma is that, while the benefits these developments can bring are undoubted, if and when they manifest themselves in enhanced economic performance, the evidence of their doing so in the UK is, so far, piecemeal rather than conclusive.

Ian Plenderleith: Current issues in UK monetary policy  Speech by Mr Ian Plenderleith, an Executive Director of the Bank of England, to the Aberdeen Chamber of Commerce on 26 July 2000. *  *  *  If you look at the performance of the UK economy as a whole, there is a great deal from which we can draw encouragement. Since the early 1990s, we have enjoyed what by any standards has been an impressive period of continued growth in output, employment and living standards. The sustained growth in output has been achieved despite the downturn in Asia in 1997-98, which, accentuated by the crisis in Russia, spread to the emerging market economies as a whole and produced a sharp weakening in external demand felt by all the industrialised countries. With the help of the rapid steps we took then to cut interest rates, we have seen a strong recovery in activity in the UK economy last year and continuing growth this year. Equally, we can draw encouragement from the steady rise in employment that has accompanied this sustained growth in output. The improvement has been shared right across the UK: rates of employment vary from region to region, but all regions have shared a rise in employment rates. What is particularly encouraging is that this substantial rise in employment rates has been achieved in the face of considerable changes in the business environment - for example, shifts in demand and in consumer taste, advances in technology and intensified competition.
And the ECB took pains to say that, although the approach might skew the subsequent distribution of possible inflation outcomes to the upside, this would be “accidental not deliberate”. So I don’t think it really qualifies. Anyhow, these episodes aside, most guidance seems to me to be pretty clearly “Delphic” in nature: it’s about the central bank’s view of economic outlook (a forecast) and about policy conditional on it (a “reaction function”). As a general matter, we know that’s the purpose of numerical forecasts for interest rates, because those central banks that publish them tell us so. The Norwegian central bank, for example, describes the rationale like this: “With the aid of the policy rate paths and related communication, Norges Bank provides forward guidance regarding future policy rate developments and information about the central bank’s response pattern.” [13] As for the UK, the few times the MPC has issued formal guidance about policy, it’s very clearly of this type. If ever it’s said something about future policy, it’s always been in the context of, and dependent on, the outlook for the economy and inflation at the time. In August 2013, the Committee said it would not raise interest rates “at least” until unemployment had fallen to below 7% (so passing this threshold was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a hike). It added the proviso that low rates would be maintained only “provided this does not entail material risks to either price stability or to financial stability”.

Christian Noyer: “The Brussels agreement is sound” – interview with Le Télégramme Interview with Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, in Le Télégramme, published on 15 December 2011. *  *  *  Does the Brussels agreement protect the euro area over the long term? I believe it is a sound agreement. It includes rules of governance that had been missing up until now. Of course, we had the Stability and Growth Pact, but it was of an inadequate legal standard, and it was not complied with as it should have been. Setting up clear rules of governance that are sound in substance and that will be integrated into the constitutions and organic laws of Member States is a good solution that should provide us with lasting protection. What would be the consequences of France losing its triple-A rating? I do not know what rating agencies will do. What I see is that these agencies have managed, through their criticisms, to weaken the positive sentiment that prevailed on markets after the Brussels summit. In addition, downgrading France’s credit rating does not seem justified when considering economic fundamentals. Otherwise agencies should start by downgrading the United Kingdom which has larger deficits, the same level of debt, more inflation and a lower growth rate than us as well as slumping credit. What is the legitimacy of these rating agencies? Agencies have become totally incomprehensible and irrational.
Øystein Olsen: Managing Norway’s oil wealth Speech by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at FeBAF, the Italian Banking, Insurance and Finance Federation, Rome, 14 April 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found on Norges Bank’s website: Charts (PDF). Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. Introduction First, let me thank you for the opportunity to speak here at FeBAF – the Italian finance federation. Norwegians love Italy for its food and wine, its architecture, its great cities and breath-taking scenery. Italy is blessed with both natural and cultural assets that have been refined and managed by the Italian people for hundreds of years. Norway is not known for its wine, but I think it is safe to say that we have been more than lucky in terms of natural resources. The management of Norway’s currently most important natural resource – petroleum – is the topic of my speech today. Over the past two decades, Norway has transformed oil and gas resources into financial wealth. Oil revenues are invested abroad through a sovereign wealth fund – the Government Pension Fund Global, or the oil fund for short – which is managed by the central bank of Norway. My speech today is intended to shed some light on how Norway’s petroleum wealth has been managed. I will seek to explain how we see ourselves as a global financial investor.

Richard W Fisher: ¡Ándale Pues! Get on with advancing hispanic prosperity through education Remarks by Mr Richard W Fisher, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, at the Hispanic Economic Experience Conference, Dallas, Texas, 16 June 2011. *  *  *  The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. I am here today not simply to say bienvenido and welcome you to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas with un fuerte abrazo, but to underscore the importance I attach to our achieving a better understanding of the Hispanic economic experience and, very importantly, the potential for greater Hispanic advancement within the U.S. economy. Let me cut to the quick: Hispanics are underachieving in our society, especially in Texas. Here are the data:   There are some 50 million Americans who identify themselves as Hispanics. This number is up 43 percent over the last decade. Roughly 66 percent, or some 32 million, self-identify as Méxicanos.   Texas has the second-largest Hispanic population, after California: 9.5 million Hispanics, the vast majority of whom are of Mexican origin, live here. A majority of them are native born, whereas in the rest of the United States, a majority are foreign born. In other words, the majority of Hispanics who live in Texas are as American as I am; some maybe more so, as I am a first-generation American born of immigrant parents.
Plainly, the sooner the euro is in physical circulation the better, and I personally feel that the plan of a three-year wait was a trifle generous. I should add an associated observation concerning pride in one’s currency. A currency is unlikely to win the widespread confidence of international financiers if nationals of the currency zone themselves lack pride or confidence in it. It is fully understandable, though nevertheless unhelpful, that people whom I meet here in Germany, for example, seem to have moved from pride in the Deutsche mark to nostalgia for the Deutsche mark, rather than from pride in the Deutsche mark to pride in the euro. So much for possible sources of negative perceptions. At the same time there are positive aspects about the emergence of the euro, although not all of them are necessarily clearly visible from Asia. A notable achievement has been the establishment of the euro as a major force in the international foreign exchange and bond markets. High degrees of liquidity are being enjoyed, and in the bond market issuance in euro quickly overtook the combined issuance levels of the former component currencies. In this sense the euro has already proved that it is greater than the sum of its parts, and has succeeded in reaping those economies of scale which were advertised as one of the several benefits of the single currency.

Very recently we informally polled ten leading financial institutions in London. Their forecasts for the dollar/euro exchange rate by the end of this year ranged from $ down to 90c. This is a considerably wider spread than the trading range already experienced and suggests a huge measure of uncertainty, to a horizon of only ten months. Of course, one might argue that this represents uncertainty over the dollar as much as the euro. Yes indeed, and I apologise for analysing things very much from a dollar base. Over time, all currencies have experienced considerable volatility - the dollar, the yen, the euro and its ancestors, sterling and so on. Yet in all of these, investors have been able to enjoy significant positive real rates of return over the long term. That may not be good enough for everyone: some seek short-term gains; others may be worried by mark-to-market volatility in the short term even if they are there for the long haul. But long-term investors will give considerable weight to the overall economic and monetary management of the economy. As I mentioned earlier, there are a number of aspects of the management of the Euroland economy about which perceptions from Asia may be somewhat sceptical. As for monetary policy, I would suggest that it is perhaps natural for outsiders to be rather hesitant in their assessments, in view of the new infrastructure for monetary policy, but as the ECB beds down one would expect confidence to grow.
We have witnessed a process, with no practical solution in sight, involving nationalisations, bankruptcies, bank interventions, the creation of new investor guarantee schemes and considerable curbs on market practices, such as those affecting the short-selling of equities. The list of institutions affected includes most notably: the major investment banks, whose business model has succumbed to the turmoil; the US government-sponsored mortgage agencies; one of the biggest worldwide insurers; and major US credit institutions. In Europe, UK, Danish and Icelandic banks have been involved, as have more recently those from euro area countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany. Moreover, several European governments have announced their readiness to guarantee their banks’ deposits. The foregoing developments pale into insignificance in the face of the importance of the US Treasury’s decision to propose a far-reaching programme whose stated aim is to tackle globally the serious problems besetting the American financial system. The initial appropriation of $ billion for this programme, and its dramatic presentation by the US Treasury Secretary, illustrate the scale of the problem. As you are aware, the plan was finally approved following heated debate in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. Clearly, beyond its effects on specific banks, this unprecedented crisis is profoundly shifting some of the key coordinates that have framed global financial developments in recent decades. An economy such as Spain’s, which has been financing a substantial proportion of its expenditure abroad, can hardly isolate itself from the consequences of such deep-seated changes.

The first challenge is posed by data. As any statistician knows, the output of a model is only as good as the quality of data fed into it – the so-called “rubbish in, rubbish out” problem. Of course, there are various techniques for dealing with this problem, but fundamentally, if there are problems with the data used – be they incomplete, inaccurate or mislabelled – there will almost certainly be problems with the outcomes of the model. AI/ML is underpinned by the huge expansion in the availability and sources of data: as the amount of data used grows, so the scale of managing this problem will increase. Further, there are complex ethical, legal, conduct and reputational issues associated with the use of personal data. For example, are data being used unfairly to exclude individuals or groups, or to promote unjustifiably privileged access for others? Recent examples amongst retailers suggest that overly-personalised marketing can seem plain ‘creepy’. These questions require complex answers that are beyond my philosophical pay-grade. From a regulatory perspective, they are perhaps more directly a primary concern to the FCA given its statutory objectives of consumer protection, but are also potentially relevant to safety and soundness, not least through their impact on reputation and, in turn, confidence. The data challenge is not limited simply to its selection and processing – but also to its analysis, and how inferences are drawn.
Speaking at the Waldorf Hotel in London, he said: “In finance, everything that is agreeable is unsound and everything that is sound is disagreeable.” 5 I worry that the predictability of calendar-based commitments can quite possibly be unsound in two key dimensions. First, the quantitative moorings may be misplaced – especially given shifts in economic relationships following the worst downturn since the Great Depression. Second, I question if it is sound policy to remove all uncertainty or volatility from the market. I wonder whether being totally predictable may, at best, lead to a false complacency that can too easily be upset should we need to change course. At its worst, I fear calendar-based commitments can lead, perversely, to market instability by encouraging markets to overshoot, as they appear to be doing in some quarters at present. I say “calendar-based commitments,” even though the FOMC has tried to couch its calendar-based guidance in Delphic language. The problem is that guidance intended to be Delphic is, in practice, often given an Odyssean interpretation. Whether because of wishful thinking by market operators or because of policymaker inertia (it’s easier to stick with the previously announced plan than to explain a departure from that plan), the Delphic undergoes metamorphosis and becomes Odyssean. Thus, I wonder if anything beyond the Delphic is practicable, as much as I might like to set our compass on autopilot. But even expressing meaningful forward guidance along more amorphous lines is challenging.

10  Too little capacity to absorb losses and the real economy pays when the system amplifies bad times. Too much capacity and the real economy pays because the system can’t perform as efficiently in the good times. So in determining bank capital and more generally, macroprudential policy is a balancing act. To support the real economy it must be both prudent and make economic sense. But make no mistake: the consequences of the financial system’s defences being overwhelmed are typically so great that it should be able to absorb very severe economic shocks. Tales of such shocks should be passed down through generations. 2) “What could, not what will” Central to assessing that the system can absorb severe shocks – is stress testing. And my second  principle is the one that guides the calibration of the economic scenarios that we test the system against. It is to always make sure those scenarios are the answer to “what could happen?”, not to “what will happen?”. In this principle, we embody a central lesson of the financial crisis. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Our shared profession is easily criticised for its failure to foresee the crisis. But clairvoyance is not a reasonable standard to be held to.
SPEECH DATE:  08/12/2020  SPEAKER:  Governor Stefan Ingves  VENUE:  Business Arena  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  Monetary policy in a changing world∗ We have had a dramatic year in 2020, when a lot has changed in our lives. For members of staff and for us in the Riksbank’s Executive Board, the year has brought intensive work to manage the effects the coronavirus pandemic has had on the Swedish economy. Our focus has been on ensuring that there is good access to liquidity and keeping interest rates low. We have wanted to provide the economy with the best conditions possible to recover after the coronavirus pandemic and, as usual, to get inflation to develop in line with the inflation target. In many ways, our measures have resembled those of other central banks. However, compared with the period before the financial crisis, just over ten years ago, monetary policy has changed radically, above all because the monetary policy toolbox today looks very different. Back then, adjustments of the policy rate were seen as the only monetary policy tool. These days, most central banks work with several tools, some of them modern iterations of older approaches, both in times of crisis and in more normal times. Monetary policy and the way we ‘do’ monetary policy has changed, but the objective of attaining the inflation target still remains.

There is an international debate on the importance of being able to make large cuts, down to –5 per cent or more, for instance. 12 Would this be possible in Sweden? Purely technically, it is probably possible. But if such a measure were seriously to be considered – perhaps in a situation where the pandemic was having much greater negative effects on growth and unemployment – we would have to carefully consider a number of questions, not all of which would be strictly economic. The economic questions include the effects of negative interest rates on the functioning of the banks and on their profitability, something that is perhaps more important in countries other than Sweden. The idea is that there is a boundary beyond which interest rate cuts de facto become counterproductive in that lending becomes impeded. 13 Another economic question concerns the well-known reasoning that there is a point at which the general public decides to withdraw all its savings and convert them to cash or go over to using some other currency so as to avoid a negative interest rate. A question of public confidence The classic objection to negative interest rates may need to be complemented by other, less macroeconomic reasoning that concerns public confidence in the central bank and the country’s currency. The central bank is an important institution in most countries and its remit means that it takes responsibility for confidence in the means of payment, the country’s own currency.