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Surveys of market participants’ expectations of systemic risk – the closest analogue to inflation expectations on the financial stability side – have subsided over recent years (Chart 7). How much of that is attributable to the new regulatory regime, rather than external factors, is at present unclear. Looking internationally, unlike with monetary policy, consensus has yet to be reached on whether regulatory policy should also be set independently from government. A recent IMF  52  Hammond (2012). 53  Hayek (1979). 54  Calomiris (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  study found only half of macro-prudential regimes internationally were operated by central banks, though a number of others were in the hands of independent regulators. 55 Perhaps with the passage of time that will change, as with monetary policy independence. Psychology suggests it should. Because the risk cycle is even longer than the business cycle, myopia biases are even more likely when tackling crises than inflation. The case for independence is at least as strong for regulatory policy as it is for monetary policy. 56 Hubris biases Under the UK’s new framework, decisions on monetary, macro-prudential and microprudential policy are made by Committee, rather than by an individual. Committee members are individually accountable and drawn from inside and outside the Bank. This structure provides some safeguard against over-confidence bias – for example, by diluting the influence of any one individual’s views on policy decision-making. There is evidence to support this in monetary policy decision-making.