samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Such concerns about the short run are indeed analysed carefully each month by the Monetary Policy Committee, and the results of that analysis feed into our monthly interest rate decisions. Visits like this give me the chance to listen to you and learn from you and other businesses about what is happening on the ground - not just in the retail sector but in manufacturing and services more broadly. And my visit is the tip of an iceberg because we have a permanent Agency in the North West - staffed by members of the Bank who live and work here. BIS Review 4/2005  1  But I want to step back from the immediate conjuncture and look further ahead. More relevant for our future prosperity is the question not of whether we might save too much but whether we are saving too little. The level of income that will sustain us in the future depends critically upon how much as a nation we set aside today. In other words, what is happening to the national saving rate - the proportion of the net national product that is not consumed by either the private or public sector? Since the late 1960s the national saving rate has been declining fairly steadily, from over 10% to around 5%. Although saving rates elsewhere in the G7 have also fallen, they were higher than in the UK for most of the post-war period.

Surprisingly, in the light of the fall in G7 saving, UK long-term real interest rates as measured by the forward rates implied by the yields on index-linked gilts - are near their lowest levels for twenty years. US and euro-denominated rates are also low relative to past experience. There may be other factors that have offset the effect of fiscal policy on real interest rates, such as demographic developments and higher saving and more open capital markets outside the G7. But there remains a risk, as discussed in the Bank’s recent Financial Stability Review, of an unwinding of low long-term real interest rates as the stimulus from highly accommodative monetary policies across the G7 economies is gradually withdrawn. What do these arguments mean for monetary policy today? They imply, I believe, three main challenges for central banks. First, the factors that affect the level of real interest rates in capital markets around the world also determine whether a given official interest rate is an expansionary or restraining influence on demand. When driving a car we normally know whether our foot is on the accelerator or the brake. That is less obvious in the case of monetary policy - hence the debate among economists about the level of the so-called neutral interest rate. Uncertainty about the extent to which monetary policy is applying the accelerator or the brake justifies central bankers’ continued interest in the monetary and credit aggregates which contain information about the pace of nominal activity and hence future inflation.
This is in line with the growth in the activities of the two existing cross border PvP links recorded by us. Since 2010, the combined average daily turnover of the links with Malaysia and Indonesia has doubled, reaching a new record of $ billion last month. This is equivalent to an annual growth of about 23%. Other economies in the region, especially those with significant FX transactions, can similarly be benefited from a reduction in settlement risk and increase in efficiency in the settlement of FX transactions by establishing a PvP link with the USD RTGS system in Hong Kong. 9. The HKMA will continue to watch out for opportunities to collaborate with Asian neighbours to develop infrastructural solutions to meet growing regional demand for more efficient and robust settlement solutions. 10. Lastly, I would like to thank BOT again for the Bank’s commitment and professionalism leading to the successful launch of the PvP link. Based on the solid foundation laid through this project, I keenly look forward to working with BOT in other areas of central bank cooperation to contribute further to regional financial stability and prosperity. 11. Thank you. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Intrinsically Linked, One with the Force The FOMC is mandated by Congress to promote maximum employment and price stability. The goals of our dual mandate are intrinsically linked. Specifically, price stability is essential for the economy to reach its full potential and to sustain maximum employment over the long term. Since the pandemic, imbalances between demand and supply have persisted throughout the economy, leading to high inflation and a tight labor market. Although we have seen some signs of a gradual cooling in the demand for labor—as well as for some goods and commodities—overall demand continues to exceed supply. I'll first discuss what this means for employment. At the national level, job growth has been robust, with monthly job gains averaging about 220,000 over the past three months. Other indicators show that labor demand is gradually slowing, yet remains very strong. For example, job openings have come down from their peak level in March of last year. Still, the ratio of job openings to unemployed far exceeds levels prevailing before the pandemic, when the labor market was very strong. Similarly, quit rates have been gradually declining, but are above pre-pandemic levels. In addition, the unemployment rate is at a historically low level of 3.4 percent. And in April, the employment-to-population ratio for those between the ages of 25 and 54 reached the highest level since 2001. The strength of the labor market is evident in parts of the Federal Reserve's Second District. Fairfield County in Connecticut has fully recovered from the pandemic.
1  BIS Review 28/2000  Let me begin by examining the question from the central bank’s stance as guardian of the integrity of the payments system and as banking supervisor. I believe there are perhaps two characteristics of e-banking which may deserve some vigilance here. The first is the technical security of access and messaging. This is a matter of accuracy, safety and secrecy. If we use the internet to move our money, or to hold our money, we expect messages to arrive at their destination without error or interception; we expect the system to be safe from fraudulent or unauthorised access; and we expect to enjoy the same degree of customer confidentiality as with conventional banking arrangements. We want to be assured not only that the execution process is reliable and secure, but also that there are adequate controls on any “read only” access facilities. How can we obtain these assurances? Perhaps some of you mirror my own feeling of personal inadequacy in matters of electronic technology. Inevitably we are dependent on the experts. They have devised sophisticated methods of electronic signatures, encryption, certification, firewalls and the like. One way or another, by obtaining appropriate professional advice, by applying rigorous standards of compliance and computer audit, and so on, those within an organisation should be able to deliver the necessary assurances to customers, and the regulatory or supervisory authorities will need to satisfy themselves as to the dependability of such assurances.

If risks of a new financial crisis were to mount up in some distant future, a central bank could not stand idly by. The type of monetary policy regime with an explicit inflation target that applies in Sweden and other countries does, however, provide ways of coming to terms with problems from fluctuating asset prices. For one thing, the regime means that in the event of asset market instability, the monetary stance is adjusted automatically in a stabilising direction. As asset prices affect aggregate demand and this is an important mechanism for inflation, interest rates will be raised when asset prices move up and vice versa. This can be expected to exert some stabilising effect on asset markets. For another thing, macroeconomic stability as such should have a stabilising influence on financial markets. Focus on the provision of credit While a credible macroeconomic policy is needed to prevent financial crises, it is probably not sufficient by itself. It is also necessary to oversee and supervise the financial system, which includes having appropriate rules for the operations of banks and other credit institutions. In the final analysis, it was the provision of credit that lay at the heart of the events in the 1990s to which I have referred. Extensive credit risks constituted the problem and it seems that banks made similar mistakes time and again.
See, C. Toloba and J. M. del Río (2020) “The outlook for the digitalisation of Spanish banks: risks and opportunities”, Financial Stability Review, Issue 38, Spring. 3  necessary.3 It is precisely for this reason that a few years ago the European Banking Authority came up with a set of Recommendations aimed at cloud outsourcing activities.4 This example proves once again the fundamental role that central banks and financial authorities should play in the current digital context, including developing a proactive stance towards digitalisation with a view to ensuring that the latter can take place in an orderly manner. On the one hand, central banks need to boost their understanding of the changes that the industry is now experiencing and how these are likely to impact its present and future structure, and also to identify potential sources of risk for financial stability. Enhancing stakeholder engagement appears to be a cornerstone for achieving this objective. Furthermore, they must be ready to move ahead in deploying tailored, swift and proportionate responses as needed. A very good example of this is the work that both the BCBS and the FSB are steering in terms of assessing the vulnerabilities of crypto-assets and the potential practical strategies to address them in a cohesive way across borders. In addition, financial authorities may wish to show greater ambition and explore how emerging technology can help enhance the way they fulfil their supervisory, oversight or market conduct tasks, to name just a few.

Even though users do not cover costs directly, the costs involved in using these schemes are high, making these solutions an expensive alternative for banks. Eventually, banks’ customers foot the bill one way or another. Cheaper alternatives are on their way. The new solutions could also result in faster payments. National payment card schemes, such as BankAxept in Norway, might provide an alternative to the international card schemes, including access to the new services. New regulations have been introduced to lower the costs related to international cards. A new EU regulation also provides for direct bank-to-bank payments, bypassing the card schemes entirely. Technological innovation has given us not only new methods of payment, but also new forms of money – so-called e-money. E-money is electronic money issued by non-bank entities, but in existing currencies. Paypal customers can make payments through their Paypal account. Facebook has recently applied for a Europe-wide e-money licence. If large providers offer an attractive, user-friendly solution, this method of payment could become widespread. A key issue related to e-money is the question of consumer trust. E-money is a claim on the issuing company. E-money is not backed by a deposit insurance scheme or any authority. Other companies are offering new forms of money – often in the form of a new currency – on closed platforms such as social networks and online games. Examples of such platform currencies are Amazon Coins, the virtual currency used in the online game World of Warcraft and Chinese Q Coins.
Hitherto, the Central Bank of Iceland has auctioned unlimited amounts at a fixed rate of interest. Initially the ECB decided both the interest rate and total amount of its repo auctions at any time. The result was that the ECB only accepted a fraction of the bids made for its repos. This arrangement was abandoned and more recently the ECB has invited bids for a specific amount, but not at any predetermined rate of interest. Amounts are decided on the basis of the ECB’s assessment of the credit institutions’ liquidity requirement and the money market interest rates which it aims to achieve. One reason for the ECB’s choice of this format is that the various EMU central banks operated different arrangements for liquidity facilities before the ECB was established, and different viewpoints needed to be reconciled. Regarding other aspects of central bank activities and their effect in Iceland, it should perhaps first be pointed out that the Central Bank of Iceland began increasing the transparency of its activities and actions long ago. Among other things, this is reflected in the Bank’s efforts to explain more clearly its policy and assessment of the economic and monetary situation and outlook. One step in this direction was taken towards the end of 1999 with a thorough review of the Bank’s publishing activities.

We do admit that the higher interest rates affected the stock market and property market. But we should also remember that high interest rates are necessary to cool the overheating in the asset markets that prevailed until recently. Given the excess demand situation in Hong Kong as the economy grew by 6.4% in the second quarter, a correction was expected. A moderation in property prices will help bring houses to more affordable levels to homebuyers. 34. Higher interest rates will also bring down inflation, by encouraging savings. Once inflation and the asset markets correct under the free market regime, Hong Kong will become much more competitive. In real effective exchange rate terms, the competitive effect of neighbouring depreciation will be offset somewhat by a rise in domestic inflation. Higher interest rates will also bring the external account more in line with the fundamentals and improve the trade balance. Hong Kong, as a free market economy, is adjusting exactly according to the textbook. 35. Moreover, our banking sector is very robust and strongly capitalized to withstand any shocks. Operating profits of the local banks grew by about 18% in the first half of 1997 and the bad debt charged fell in the first half of 1997 as the level of classified loans was 2.08%, down from 2.91% a year earlier. The capital adequacy ratios of local banks as a whole exceeds 17%. The average loan-to-value ratio is 70%, with the actual measured loan-to-value ratio being 53.3%, according to our survey at end September 1994.
Michael C Bonello: Facing the challenge of today’s economic realities Speech by Mr Michael C Bonello, Governor of the Central Bank of Malta, at the Institute of Financial Services Annual Dinner, St Julians, 14 November 2003. *  *  *  This being my first public statement since my reappointment, I should like to express my appreciation to the Government for the trust that has been placed in me. I am conscious of the magnitude of the task that lies ahead, but I am also comforted by the thought that I shall continue to be supported by a team of competent and dedicated professionals. I am, therefore, able to look forward with confidence to leading an independent Central Bank of Malta into membership of the European System of Central Banks next May, and to cooperating closely with the Government in creating a policy environment which would allow us to guide the Maltese lira smoothly into the euro area. I stress this point because it is only when the economy becomes anchored in the relative safety of the common currency area that the benefits of participation in the European single market can be enjoyed to the full. Early adoption of the euro is, therefore, in the national interest and must become our common objective. Pursuing that goal successfully, however, will require a courageous effort to overcome the obstacles that stand in our way. This much was clear from the beginning.

In a speech I delivered last year, I had shown how Malta’s competitiveness lags behind that of EU member States, mainly because of restrictive practices and other labour market inflexibilities; the maintenance of monopolistic situations in economically strategic areas such as transportation and inland freight; and insufficiencies in our educational system and innovation efforts. These conclusions have been supported by a number of studies since then and remain valid today. Problematic as it is, however, the budget deficit is by no means the only determinant of macroeconomic imbalances. Certain systems and practices which create demand without generating output have equally harmful consequences. A typical example is the welfare system. It has become so entrenched that its benefits are mistakenly considered to be immutable rights; but, as the rapidly growing welfare gap shows, it is a system which carries the seeds of its own destruction. For while the welfare state was born from the noble premise that care for the weak and the needy is the responsibility of society as a whole, in Malta the terms “weak” and “need” are defined very liberally. In so doing, we overlook the fact that generous welfare depends on two details of demography and politics: that there are enough people of working age to fund the claims of those defined as being weak and in need; and that working people are indeed willing to pay the necessary taxes. If these conditions are not met, there can be no other solution but to redesign the welfare system according to the funds available.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  These alternative models of corporate governance offer a different balance of power between capital and labour. Indeed, the distinction between the two is blurred: the owners of, and workers for, the robots are in effect one and the same. These governance structures may allow a more equitable distribution of robotic rents and generate greater value for the companies themselves and for wider society. Turning to the nearer-term, what if any implications do these labour market trends carry for the economy and monetary policy? Last week, the MPC set out its view in the quarterly Inflation Report. This painted a picture of solid UK growth, alongside subdued price pressures. The UK is growing roughly at trend, but inflation is 2 percentage points below target. The picture among other advanced economies is not greatly dissimilar. The UK inflation picture is relatively easy to explain, at least in an accounting sense. The lion’s share of inflation’s weakness is accounted for by external factors – weak world prices and a strong exchange rate. These factors are themselves in part a reflection of weak world demand, pushing down the prices of oil and other commodities. The impact of external disinflationary pressures on UK inflation is thus likely to be persistent. Nonetheless, in time these external pressures should wane. What will then determine UK inflation is the evolution of domestic costs, specifically labour costs. The UK labour market has been hard to read over the past few years.

This workshop will provide an opportunity for all GCC organizations in the statistical community to share national experiences, and lead discussions to identify areas for mutual cooperation for further improvement in data production and presentation. I may emphasize here that timely availability of reliable and mutually consistent national data would be of great help to the GCC Monetary Council in its task of preparing for the achievement of the ultimate goal of GCC Monetary Union. It will also provide the basis for judicious policy formulations even after the establishment of the Monetary Union for the region. I therefore urge you all, to actively engage in workshop discussions to fully understand these matters, come to useful conclusions and make your deliberations fruitful. Dear Participants I hope that by the end of the workshop you will have achieved at least the following two objectives: 1. Sufficient statistical insight to effectively address burgeoning data-related issues and concerns, and be in a position to produce intended statistical forms and table, and;  2. Identification of some future work based on mutual cooperation. I thank you all for your attention and wish all a productive and rewarding workshop. 2  BIS Review 170/2010
Above and beyond this, in taking on the market maker of last resort function, a central bank assumes significant financial and reputation risks. To summarise, the direct and indirect costs of this kind of market intervention need to be weighed up against the overall economic costs of a system-wide implosion of liquidity. At a time of significant stress in the system, we must probably retain a second line of defence of this kind for use when needed, if we are to carry out our task of ensuring sustainable welfare growth in the spirit of our mandate. However, liquidity or market assistance of this kind needs to be examined carefully, case by case. It must be planned as a distinct supplement to the first line of defence and clear principles laid down in connection with its provision. Last but not least, it must only be used to “kick-start” a market that is fundamentally capable of survival. Taking on a permanent market replacement function is something that should, fundamentally, be avoided. 11 Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, I now come to the conclusion of my remarks today. The accumulation of systemic risk represents a serious threat to the stability of financial systems. It is therefore important, on the one hand, to recognise this risk at an early stage and, on the other, to develop measures capable of containing it. I have spoken about four fundamental criteria for evaluating measures of this kind.

If we want central bank control over leverage to be stronger in the future, shadow banks need to be part of what we consider “banks” tout court. In fact, by 2007 the size of the official and shadow banking systems, measured by the total amount of assets, had become essentially the same. 3 But there is also an issue of quality – or, if you prefer, of composition – of finance. Due to the increased risk aversion resulting from the financial crisis, collateralised lending is bound to increase in the future, even in markets where traditionally unsecured lending was the most important source of finance (e.g., the euro area interbank market). As a consequence, the demand for securitised assets – of the type that shadow banks have learned to create in the past – is set to increase further in the future, as institutions demand such types of debt to use as collateral. To put it in a nutshell, we will continue to need the functions, the financial products and the expertise that the shadow banks have been offering. But, we need to make sure that these activities are performed in a non-disruptive way. The new financial landscape can also reinforce the effectiveness of monetary policy. I already mentioned that most of the funding of financial institutions – whether banks, brokerdealers, hedge funds or shadow banks – is short-term. In other words, a key function of the financial system is maturity transformation.