samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As cumulative inflation during the first half of 2009 has been historically low at 1.83 percent, it is estimated that inflation will rise in the first half of 2010 due to base effects (Figure 26). As the impact of adjustments in taxes and administered prices made for the sake of budget balance will ease, we forecast that inflation will display a downward trend starting from the second half of 2010 and stabilize slightly below the end2011 target of 5.5 percent. It is critical to note that inflation would be less persistent and thus  BIS Review 103/2009  17  the economic recovery would be smoother if economic agents adopt these forecasts as a benchmark in their pricing decisions. I would like to underline that any new data or information regarding the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the monetary policy stance. Therefore, assumptions on future policy rates underlying the inflation forecast should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBRT. Risks Distinguished Members of the Press, In the last part of my presentation, I would like to mention the risks with respect to the inflation outlook in the upcoming period and give some information pertaining to the probable monetary policy strategy should these risks materialize. As I have mentioned earlier in my speech, despite having partially receded, the risks regarding the global economy are still important for the inflation and monetary policy outlook. In particular, ongoing problems in credit and labor markets pose downside risks on global activity.

Figure 24: Composition Unemployment  of  the  Change  in  Non-Agricultural  (Seasonally adjusted, Quarterly Difference, Thousand People) Participation to Labor Market Change in Employment Net Change in Unemployment  500 400 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 -300 1  2  3 2007  4  1  2  3 2008  4  1 2009  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Recent data include signs of partial recovery in domestic demand conditions and economic activity in line with the policy rate cut cycle, accompanied by the financial measures (Figure 25). However, the negative effects of uncertainties in aggregate demand and low capacity utilization rates on investments and employment are expected to last in the upcoming period as well. Besides, high levels of unemployment are expected to restrict private consumption expenditures. In addition to these, considering the ongoing partial tightness in financial conditions, the Central Bank considers that the uncertainties pertaining to the strength and endurance of the recent partial revival in demand may not yet have come to an end.
In principle, a “simple” alternative would be to set a large fund to guarantee the European sovereign debt and help recapitalize the banks. Its sole existence would reinstate confidence, reduce risk premiums and restore the viability to sovereigns and financial institutions. The trouble is that the European legislation does not have the institutions to implement these solutions. And they must define the fiscal support that such measures would require and how to allocate the burden among the participants. It is precisely on these fronts that the authorities are working and hopefully a solution can be arrived at in the short term. Otherwise, the European situation will continue to hold the world under a lot of pressure still for some months. Moreover, some countries in the Eurozone are facing serious competitiveness problems, thus depressing growth and, since they have no foreign exchange mechanism, solving them will take time because it requires flexibility and structural reforms to boost productivity. Monetary policy implications Today, in Chile, the expected course of the economy and monetary policy has changed from the beginning of the year. The focus is now on the effects that the weak global economy will have on the Chilean economy, especially on growth and inflation. About the former, we said in our last Monetary Policy Report that Chile’s growth would be in the 6.25%–6.75% range this year, to decline in 2012 to 4.25%– 5.25%.

Figure 4 Price of electricity (annual change, percent) 60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  -10  -10  -20  -20  -30  -30 05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 Output growth (quarterly change, percent) Chile (*)  World  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6 05  07  09  11  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 05  07  09  11  GDP Domestic demand Domestic demand w/o inventory change  Figure 6 Growth forecasts for the year 2009 (1) (annual change, percent) 8  8  5.9  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -1.7  -4  -2  -1.7  -4  -4.7  -6 Chile  Dev. economies (2)  Latin  America  Emerging Asia  Emerging  -5.2  -6  Europe  (1) Consensus forecasts from January 2008 to December 2009. For emerging Asia, forecasts are available as from March 2008. Black bars show actual growth in 2009.
If an institution engages in types of business that we regard as being at the higher end of the risk scale, such as share margin financing or lending for property development, this will also attract our attention. Other things that will attract our attention include major changes in the operating environment, including new technology; areas or activities which are experiencing rapid growth; the introduction of new lines of business, products or activities; and domestic and foreign acquisitions. In each case we would want to be assured that any necessary enhancements to the control environment have been made so as to reduce the chance of adverse and unforeseen effects on the institution. Different risk areas require different approaches, but essentially our approach is to start by reviewing the written policies and procedures setting down the controls over a particular area, and then to look at how the controls work in practice. This may involve a combination of reviews of documentation, discussions with staff, and some testing of transactions. The end-result will be a judgement as to whether we believe the controls are effective or need improvement. If improvement is needed we will discuss our recommendations with the management and agree an action plan and time-scale for the remedial action. This may sound to you quite similar in some respects to the work of an institution’s internal audit department and external auditors.

François Villeroy de Galhau: From a couple under pressure to a Europe in transition Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the French German Business Forum, Paris, 16 November 2022. *** I am delighted to be with you today, to bring to a close this forum on "Europe in Transition". While this transition had already got underway, it is now being dramatically accelerated by an unprecedented succession of shocks. These shocks are identical for both Germany and France, but they put our Franco-German unity, and more broadly European unity, to the test. It is not that surprising: our energy policies are separate, and our democratic lives are primarily domestic, and they are under pressure in both our countries. However, today I would like to express a conviction shared with my friend and colleague Joachim Nagel, President of the Bundesbank: to divide us would be to condemn us. Allow me to give you my personal view: I believe that I am one of the French officials who knows Germany best; because of my family roots in Lorraine and Saarland, I am a "frontier man". But it is also my professional conviction. In Washington last month, we have heard too many doubts voiced by international investors about Europe and its reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Structural reforms are needed to unleash the productive potential of the euro area economy. Such reforms fall beyond the remit of the ECB and are the responsibility of other national and European policymakers. Now is the perfect time for such reforms, since the current accommodative policy of the ECB can help offset any short-term adjustment costs of their implementation. This is a window of opportunity that needs to be seized. Doing so will raise future income in the euro area, supporting an increase in the natural rate and boosting the returns to saving. 1 See Orphanides, A and J. Williams, (2002), “Robust Monetary Policy Rules with Unknown Natural  Rates”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol.2, 63–145, Laubach, T and J. Williams (2003), “Measuring the Natural Rate of Interest”, Review of Economics and Statistics 85, No4, pp 1063–70, Laubach, T and J. Williams, (2015), “Measuring the real natural interest rate redux”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper, No. 2015–16 and Taylor, J.B, and V. Wieland, (2016), “Finding the Equilibrium Real Interest Rate in a Fog of Policy Deviations”, Economics Working Papers 16109, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 2 Notwithstanding the uncertainty over estimates of the natural rate, key drivers of long-term interest rate in a  standard Solow growth model such as productivity and population growth have been slowing for decades in advanced economies, suggesting that the natural interest rate may have indeed declined.

But while net financial income has fallen for the wealthiest households, the same is not true for wealth. Wealthier households tend to have a greater amount of housing wealth and house prices have risen since the introduction of negative interest rates. Extrapolating the HFCS forward using changes in equity, bond and house price data shows increases in the net wealth for every wealth quintile. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  The ECB’s policy measures have been unambiguously positive for euro-area governments. Germany alone saved approximately 28 billion euro in 2015 in lower than expected interest payments. Such payments would ultimately have been financed from lower spending or higher taxes. Broadly speaking, the lower income the household sector has received from income payments from government bonds, either directly or intermediated through the banking sector needs to be offset against lower tax liabilities now or in the future. Indeed, research by Deutsche Bank4 shows that the impact of low and negative interest rates on the returns of German household financial assets has been limited so far. This was in part due to revaluation gains on the back of the ECB’s asset purchase programme as well as interest income from investment funds and insurance and pension products. It is still possible for savers to gain positive real returns by holding a diversified portfolio of assets.
This will become increasingly important when it involves strategies and positioning of the “ummah” in the economic sector. Shariah assessments that include input and findings of multiple disciplines as well as variations of insights will provide more added values to a particular Shariah research. This effort can be implemented through active involvement of professionals in the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  process of researching Shariah issues. I am confident that through this approach, we will be able to formulate a collective ijtihad that is comprehensive, in comparison to ijtihad that is peripheral and exclusive. In the Malaysian context, we have decided to encourage the combined expertise and experience between Shariah members and professionals through the Shariah committees of Islamic financial institutions. In fact, we also encourage qualified Shariah scholars to be appointed as members of Board of Directors at Islamic financial institutions, specifically to form a “bridge” or point of connection between the Board and the Shariah Committee members, and to allow them to gain greater exposure to the operational situation in the management of Islamic financial institutions. The process of knowledge sharing and discussions on Shariah as well as on other realms of Islamic knowledge among the Board members of a particular financial institution will enrich the justifications of a particular deliberation before a decision is made. Another key aspect is the importance of Shariah scholars to thoroughly understand the impact of ijtihad on the growth of the Islamic finance industry and society at large.

This change requires the readiness of Shariah scholars to play a greater role and to interact with others from various disciplines to enrich and enhance ijtihad with new perspectives, against the backdrop of a contemporary  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  landscape. This innovation will only be generated through the openness of minds and a paradigm shift, based on sound understanding of the Shariah objectives. As the vanguard of Islamic finance, it is the responsibility of Shariah scholars to promote best practices in the Shariah fraternity through an inclusive and contemporary ijtihad, in line with the rapidly evolving operating environment. Finally, I pray that the discussions will run smoothly and will achieve the intended objectives. On this note, I end my speech with the words of Imam Ibn Taymiyyah,: “Surely among the main thrusts in a religion is the union of hearts, the unison of views and easing of disputes conducted in a good way.” Wabillahi taufik wal hidayah. Assalamu’alaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Let me comment briefly on these two points. As regards the lack of structural reforms, I hope that my previous remarks have underlined that the euro countries have clearly embarked on major structural reforms - triggered by the single market and the single currency - that will bear lasting effects on the functioning of their economies. The central banks of Europe call for the pursuit and reinforcement of these reforms. At the same time, in order to serve these economies in the most efficient way, the euro financial markets are experiencing the deep and rapid integration process that I described previously. On the second point, one has to keep in mind that the American and European economies are not positioned identically in the economic cycle, as the latter are probably at the beginning of a more robust phase of expansion. According to IMF forecasts, growth should reach 3% in the euro area in 2001, compared with 3.2% in the US. From a central banking perspective, the present situation is clearly characterized by a misalignment of the euro if one refers to the euro area fundamentals: robust domestic growth, inflation under control, strong domestic savings, healthy external accounts. We are, to a certain extent, in a situation symmetric to that which prevailed in 1995 when the weakness of the dollar was clearly out of line with the fundamentals of the US economy. At that time, it took a few months before a correction appeared that aligned the dollar with its economic underlying fundamentals.

As for economic outcomes, inflation has been well below our 2% target for the past year, while measures of inflation expectations such as those from financial markets have been stable and consistent with the target – not what you would expect to see if QE was being used for purposes other than our monetary stability objective. In fact it is true that there are links, as I’ll set out, between QE and the Government’s finances – as there are for any of our other balance sheet tools. But these are very different from the charge of “monetary financing” that I have been responding to so far. Instead of reflecting deliberate deviations from our monetary policy objectives, they come down to more prosaic and technical, though very important, and hence understandably a focus of the IEO report, issues of risk management and accounting. Ben’s recent speech “Government debt and inflation” addresses this question comprehensively, as does Andrew Bailey’s recent speech “Modern challenges for the modern central bank”. 21  11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  11  I’ll start, once again, with the Bank’s own balance sheet. Like any financial institution the Bank holds lossabsorbing capital to insulate it against unexpected losses.
We are six different individuals on the Executive Board. We have different backgrounds and different perspectives. Sometimes this leads to our assessments differing, even if we work towards the same objective. It applies in particular to very uncertain situations like the present one. But the whole idea of having an Executive Board is that disagreement is permitted. Different approaches and opinions enrich the discussions and hopefully lead to better decisions. BIS Review 115/2008  5  My own assessment So how did I reason at the most recent meeting, when I voted for another increase of a quarter percentage point? Well, to begin with it is important to put an individual decision in the right perspective. Monetary policy acts with a time lag and what affects inflation a couple of years ahead is a series of interest rate decisions rather than an individual interest rate increase, or cut, for that matter. My decision in September was therefore closely connected to both the interest rate policy we have conducted over the past few years and the interest rate path I expected to see in the future. A new phase We have experienced a long period of low inflation and high growth from a global perspective, but we have now entered a new phase. In developed economies like the United States and the euro area growth is falling, while it remains high in emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil.

We have  BIS Review 115/2008  3  experienced many years of extremely good economic growth and low inflation. Now we must be prepared for high inflation, higher interest rates and lower employment possibly leading to a deterioration of the finances of many Swedish households over a couple of years. Monetary policy often comes into focus in this type of situation. The recent debate – is the Riksbank chasing inflation spectres? The Riksbank’s interest rate increases have been much discussed recently. It has been said that the Bank is chasing a non-existent inflation spectre, that the inflation target should be scrapped or reformulated, and that the Riksbank should take more notice of economic activity than inflation. To begin with, inflation is a real problem for many households. Inflation means that everyone gets less for their money. Oil, electricity and food prices have risen substantially. These goods are an important part of household consumption. Together food and energy comprise approximately one quarter of the CPI. The fact that, for instance, oil and food prices have risen so much here in Sweden is largely because these goods have become more expensive in the world market. Should the inflation target be reformulated? Some of the recent criticism has concerned whether the inflation target should apply to some other measure than the CPI. The idea is that monetary policy should stabilise around a measure of inflation that excludes import prices. The Riksbank is in any case unable to affect prices in the world market.
Our contacts with investors and financial institutions in the Gulf region have also reinforced our belief in promoting the development of Islamic finance in Hong Kong. This has in fact been articulated as a key policy initiative set out by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region in his 2007 Policy Address. In other words, it is now official Government policy to develop Islamic finance in Hong Kong and our commitment to this is beyond doubt. Being a major international financial centre in Asia, Hong Kong should seek to become an important player in the booming Islamic finance arena by providing a platform for Middle East  BIS Review 59/2008  1  investors to access investment opportunities in the Asia Pacific region. Hong Kong can also leverage on its experience, innovation and market diversification to serve as a capital-raising centre for Middle Eastern issuers to tap the funds made available by the high savings rate in Mainland China. Some people have expressed scepticism about how Hong Kong could play a role in these segments of the market. But market players in Hong Kong have answered this scepticism by quickly introducing our first Shariah-compliant product. In late 2007, we witnessed the first Islamic fund introduced by a local bank in Hong Kong. The fund is an index-tracking fund which tracks the performance of the Dow Jones Islamic Market China/Hong Kong Titans Index.

I shall follow your work and the results closely, and I hope you enjoy this excellent event. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Timothy F Geithner: Some perspectives on U.S. monetary policy Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the New York Association for Business Economics, New York City, 11 January 2006. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today. The craft and the discipline of the business economist have long had a special place in the Federal Reserve System. And I am pleased to have the chance to meet with this distinguished group in the profession. My remarks are my personal views and do not attempt to represent the views of the FOMC. The U.S. economy has entered its 17th quarter of economic expansion. As has been the case throughout history, this expansion has features that distinguish it from past expansions, and I’ll begin my talk today with a review of some of these features. Growth in real GDP has been remarkably stable over the past two years, even when compared with the moderation in growth that has occurred over the previous two decades relative to the earlier part of the post-war period. These steady growth rates have hovered in the vicinity of 3.5 percent, which is close to most estimates of the rate of potential growth in the U.S. The robustness of growth is a testament to the resiliency and flexibility of the U.S. economy in responding to adverse shocks. A key feature of this expansion is the continued strength in productivity growth.

If it turns out that the anticipated fall in asset prices does not materialize, the policy constructed under the assumption of a decline will likely have been too easy, and that might itself contribute to further rises in asset prices. This might sound like a more or less generic statement about the perils of having to make policy based on forecasts, but there is a sense in which the forecasting of asset prices, or indeed even understanding the driving forces behind movements in asset price after they have occurred, is particularly challenging. This is why there is a vast literature focusing on these challenges and characterizing the many "puzzles" of the behavior of asset prices. More generally, despite the fact that policymakers can’t be completely confident in their assessment of the future path of asset prices, it seems unavoidable that these assessments will factor into policy decisions. This is not to say that central banks should lean against bubbles or against asset price movements themselves. Nor should the appropriate response to a given change in asset prices be to change policy by more than what would be appropriate to address the effects on the central objectives of the central bank. But policy, in some circumstances, will need to respond to asset price movements when those movements alter the central bank’s assessment of the risks to its outlook, and that change in the assessment of the risks to the forecast should be part of the central bank’s communication with the public.