samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Within this framework, compared to the previous report, the revised forecasts are based on a deeper contraction in 2009, and a global recovery that will be visible by mid-2010, rather than at the beginning of 2010. I would like to clarify that the word “recovery” in this Report refers to “a significantly positive growth in economic activity in year-on-year terms”. 14  BIS Review 67/2009  Table 3: Forecasts for Annual Growth 2009  2010  Previous Forecast New Forecast Previous Forecast New Forecast IMF World  0,5  -1,3  3,0  1,9  Developed Countries  -2,0  -3,8  1,1  0,0  USA  -1,6  -2,8  1,6  0,0  Eurozone  -2,0  -4,2  0,2  -0,4  Developing Countries  3,3  1,6  5,0  4,0  Total OECD  -0,4  -4,3  1,5  -0,1  USA  -0,9  -4,0  1,6  0,0  Eurozone  -0,6  -4,1  1,2  -0,3  World  -0,2  -2,1  2,0  1,9  USA  -1,8  -2,7  2,3  1,8  Eurozone  -1,4  -3,4  0,8  0,3  OECD  Consensus Forecasts  Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, January and IMF World Economic Outlook, April. OECD Economic Outlook, 2008/II, December and OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report, March. Consensus Forecasts, January and Consensus Forecasts, April.

4  BIS Review 67/2009  Figure 6: Domestic Sales of Automobiles (Seasonally Adjusted, Quantity) 45000 40000 35000 30000 25000 20000  0309  0109  1108  0908  0708  0508  0308  0108  1107  0907  0707  0507  0307  15000  Source: TURKSTAT, CBT. Core inflation indicators displayed a continual and accelerating downward trend in the first quarter of 2009. The CPI index excluding energy, unprocessed food, alcoholic beverages, tobacco products and gold fell by 2.66 percentage points year-on-year, while, with a further exclusion of processed food, the index dropped by 1.41 percentage points year-on-year. Even though the SCT cut in the second half of March was also influential in this development, the ongoing decline in the seasonally adjusted rates of change in both indices points to a continuing downward trend in inflation (Figure 7). Figure 7: Special CPI Aggregates H* and I* (Seasonally Adjusted, Monthly Increases, 2-Month Average) 1.4 H*  1.2  I*  1.0 0.8 0.6 0.32  0.4 0.2  0.21 0309  1208  0908  0608  0308  1207  0907  0607  0307  1206  0906  0606  0306  1205  0905  0605  0305  0.0  * SCT adjusted H and I series Source: TURKSTAT, CBT.
2  Refers to households with mortgage debt to income ratios in excess of five. 3  The FPC is monitoring closely the impact that the recently announced tax changes have on activity. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3. Objectives, strategy and outlook for monetary policy  The obvious question is, if the turn of the year heralded the normalisation of bank regulation and macroprudential policy, why not the start of normalisation of monetary policy? After all, the Federal Reserve raised rates in December. Might the ‘special relationship’ extend to monetary matters? Of course there is nothing particularly special about foreign central banks’ policy rates. What is most important is whether the shocks to which others are responding are similar to those with which the MPC must contend. To my mind, there are some important differences in this regard:   First, cost pressures are stronger in the US. American unit costs have increased by 3% in the past year and are growing above historical averages, while unit costs in the UK are currently rising by around half that rate or at a speed notably below that consistent with the inflation target.4    Second, the UK economy is twice as open as the US and is therefore more exposed to global weakness, dragging on exports.5    Third, this also means that pass-through of weak global inflation, compounded by exchange rate appreciation, is likely to exert a greater and more persistent drag on UK inflation.

This means: sustained momentum relative to trend; domestic cost growth resuming a path consistent with headline inflation at 2%; and core inflation measures moving notably towards the target. It is clear to me that, since last summer, progress has been insufficient along these dimensions to warrant a tightening of monetary policy. The world is weaker and UK growth has slowed. Due to the oil price collapse, inflation has fallen further and will likely remain very low for longer. This may mean modestly weaker cost growth through this year, with the likely path for inflation, both headline and core, softer as a result. In short, recent developments suggest that the firming in inflationary pressure we had expected will take longer to materialise. 23  In economic parlance, they are elements of a reaction function. One can think of a reaction function as akin to guide or policy rule relating the policy instrument to a set of macroeconomic variables. These are usually evaluated with respect to an “objective function” containing the policymaker’s target variables. For example, a flexible inflation targeting regime would be consistent with an objective function containing the deviation of inflation from its target and the deviation of a measure or measures of real activity from their equilibrium levels, weighted according to the policymaker’s preferences for stabilising one at the cost of another.
EMU and the labour market A core issue in the current EMU debate concerns whether changes will be required in the Swedish labour market to prevent the inflation rate from increasing if we join the single currency system and, if so, what these changes might comprise. Unit labour costs, that is to say, wage costs adjusted for growth in productivity, have increased slightly more rapidly in Sweden than in the Euro area recently. The statistics in this diagram are not necessarily the best for studying developments in Sweden alone, but work well for comparisons 3  See Tägtström, Sara (2000): “The wage spread between different sectors in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2000:4, Stockholm. BIS Review 40/2002  3  between countries. The diagram shows that unit labour costs have increased on average by 1.6 percentage points more in Sweden than the Euro area during the period 1999 to 2001 (see diagram 4). As the possibility to conduct an independent economic policy declines, the need for functioning adjustment mechanisms increases. In addition, increased flexibility in the labour market is most likely necessary to stabilise variations in production and employment. Generally speaking, the lack of an independent national monetary policy means that any disturbances to the Swedish economy not felt in the same way in other EMU countries, would require greater flexibility in factor and product markets in Sweden.

Mugur Isrescu: The most important economic decision Nations have ever faced Lecture by Mr Mugur Isrescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Bitcoin versus Central Bank Digital Currency conference, Bucharest, 6 April 2023. *** Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon! Thank you for attending this conference on the topical issue of cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies. Today I have the pleasure of welcoming and introducing our distinguished guest speaker, Ms. Sundri Khalsa, Professor at the National Intelligence University - known as "the Harvard of the intelligence field", and a US Marine Corps Veteran. Welcome, Professor Khalsa, to Romania and to the National Bank of Romania! Sundri Khalsa's background also includes being a Professor at the United States Naval Academy, Director and Instructor of the Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialty training school, where she trained and certified Marine Corps Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officers. She is an expert with field experience in Signal Intelligence and information support for integrated military operations. Let me add that her studies also include degrees from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School, with additional certification in Management, Leadership and Decision Sciences, University of Virginia (with specialization in chemistry and biochemistry) and New Mexico Military Institute (where she was awarded the science scholar awards in physics and chemistry). Her book "Terrorism Forecasting: Indicators and Analytical Techniques" is on the CIA's reading list and used in university courses.
Roughly a tenth of banks’ current drawing capacity 10 is collateralised by assets referencing sterling LIBOR. Those assets include: securities paying a LIBOR-linked coupon, securitisations with embedded LIBOR-linked swaps; and LIBOR-linked loans, in either raw or securitised form. The Bank must be able to value and risk manage any collateral taken in its operations in case it has to take that collateral on to its own balance sheet in a default. As 2021 approaches, that will be increasingly difficult to do for some classes of collateral referencing LIBOR. In many cases, firms may choose to re-reference LIBOR-linked collateral to SONIA, either by amending its terms or by issuing new instruments. We can already accept SONIA-linked collateral, subject to meeting appropriate eligibility requirements. An alternative would be to ensure LIBOR-linked collateral includes adequate fallback language specifying an alternative rate in the event that LIBOR ceases to exist. The main 10  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/sterling-monetary-framework/annual-report-201819.pdf?la=en&hash=E4B7FDB6E9048DBD71F5C8CE4E00D3BE9F6A96A2 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  challenge arises with any remaining LIBOR-linked collateral that matures after 2021 but lacks adequate fallback provisions – and we are today publishing a discussion paper seeking views on how best to respond in this situation, through some combination of rising haircuts and future eligibility restrictions. No immediate changes are planned. But we are seeking input on these questions from market participants, by 27 September, to help the Bank formulate clear and well-signposted guidance on its future approach.

Figure 4: Basis between index tenors for a three year £ swap  Source: Bloomberg data and Bank calculations  LIBOR transition, if executed effectively, offers the prospect of concentrating the liquidity currently split across these multiple curves into a single SONIA curve, providing a materially deeper, more transparent and less complex single market in which to hedge interest rate risk. Unlike some other currencies involved in LIBOR transition, sterling starts with the distinct advantage of already having a liquid, well-traded SONIA curve at shorter maturities based on OIS swaps, supplemented by three futures contracts which also settle on realised compounded SONIA. Rolling the liquidity currently in term LIBOR curves into this curve would further improve price formation at the short end and, importantly, improve the definition of the curve at longer maturities too.
More generally, as I have already mentioned, we also have to ensure that our approach keeps up with market developments and takes account of new types of risk that may emerge. For this reason, we have recently commissioned a firm of consultants to carry out a study of the banking sector in Hong Kong over the next five years. 23 The study has two objectives. The first is to examine the strategic outlook for the banking sector in Hong Kong during the five-year period. This will include an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the banking sector and the opportunities and threats with which it is faced, taking into account the impact of global and local trends and issues. Among the issues to be examined will be the costs and benefits of certain features of the current regulatory system (such as the remaining interest rate rules and the one branch policy) and the potential impact of changes to these features. I should add however there is no presumption that changes to the current regulatory system should, or will, be made. We are going into this with an open mind. 24. The second objective of the study is to consider the adequacy and effectiveness of the HKMA’s current approach to banking supervision and to make recommendations for any changes that seem required in the light of the strategic outlook for the banking sector.

Mr. Carse speaks on banking supervision in Hong Kong and the lessons learned from the financial crisis in Asia Speech by the Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr. David Carse, at the Asian Investment Conference “Asia: Meeting the Challenge” held in Hong Kong on 27/3/98. 1. I am pleased to be here this morning to speak to you on the topic of the supervisory lessons which Hong Kong can learn from the region and specifically from the crisis which has engulfed Asia since July of last year. This is a drama that is still being played out and we have not yet reached the final act. But I do not think that it is too early to make some kind of judgment about what went wrong and the lessons that can be drawn for the future. The Asian Crisis 2. I think that it is fair to say that the Asian crisis has surprised almost everyone by its speed and intensity and the ease with which it spread from country to country. Even those who were sceptical about the Asian miracle did not really expect anything like this. Of course, there were warning signs such as the current account deficits in a number of countries such as Thailand. But these could be regarded as the natural consequence of the heavy demand for investment in growing economies.
What about the longer-term risks facing the banks in Hong Kong? Or, to put the question in a larger context, what are the longer-term processes shaping the banking sector that carry risks as well as opportunities? We in the HKMA have identified a few of these in an internal exercise that is still ongoing but I would like to share with you today our preliminary views on five of them. They are: •  structural shift in the banking sector  •  China risk  •  technology risk  •  diversification risk  •  changing international standards. In the remainder of this talk, I shall deal with each of these areas in turn, focusing more on how we think banks in Hong Kong should tackle these processes and risks, and less on our corresponding supervisory responses or strategies, which in any case are still being developed. My main message is that, while banks need to focus clearly on the short-term risks I have already outlined, we should not lose sight of the more fundamental forces that will shape the landscape of the banking sector in the years to come. If they do not take these forces into account, individual banks not only face growing risks, but they could be in danger of losing their competitiveness. Structural shift in the banking sector First, the structural shift in the banking sector.

In contrast, there are also concerns about the effects of continuing easy monetary conditions within Hong Kong. During the past few months, economic recovery has resulted in inflows of funds into the Hong Kong dollar to the extent that the Aggregate Balance of the banking system has become  BIS Review 37/2004  1  extraordinarily high (despite some outflows recently associated with the corrections in the financial markets). As you know, under the Currency Board system there is not much that we can do to dampen easy monetary conditions: this is a question that the Sub-Committee on Currency Board Operations of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee has given a great deal of thought to. If there continue to be capital inflows on the back of sustained growth and confidence in Hong Kong’s prospects, the current account surplus and continuing talks about a possible revaluation of the renminbi, the risk of overheating in the economy and in asset markets will increase. I am not suggesting that this will happen soon, or making a warning. But banks in particular will need to keep the situation under close watch and adopt appropriate risk mitigation measures if the market situation warrants it. Overheating is, after all, something of an unfamiliar risk after such a long period of economic difficulty, and we do not wish to be caught off our guard. Longer-term risks So much for the more immediate risks and potential risks, which both you as banks and we as supervisor must pay attention to.
Regional and international journals have portrayed ASEAN as drifting apart. Analysts doubt whether ASEAN countries can get together to pursue economic cooperation, lower trade barriers and restore prosperity and confidence. As one analyst said on BBC TV: “A lot of these issues are more or less on hold. … there’s very little impetus for really substantial change in the past few years and ASEAN hasn’t coped well with the various political and economic crises that the region has seen. If you look at investment, it’s really shifted to Korea, to China and it’s going to probably get much more competitive when China joins the WTO. In many ways, a lot of Southeast Asia has lost its competitive edge. The political problems, economic problems have really hurt the region. So, what you are seeing now is a lot of investors really reassessing their view of this region and moving much more towards the north east of Asia.”1 Falling behind The figures confirm this. Since 1996, Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) to the North have continued to rise, whereas FDIs to the South have fallen to about half pre-crisis levels. As a result, Southeast Asia’s share of total FDIs to East Asia (excluding Japan) halved, from 33% in 1996 to just 15% in 1999. In equity markets, Southeast Asia’s weight has declined, while Northeast Asia’s has increased.

Unless mergers are accompanied by other measures to improve corporate governance, we will merely create one large weak bank out of several small weak ones. Financial sector reforms also have to include strengthening of the supervisory system and institutions. Had supervision been adequate in the first place, the problems would not have become so grave. Professional and independent supervisory authorities will tighten standards of acceptable banking practices, and over time instil rigour and rectitude among all participants in the system. The supervisors have to set standards, penalise errant lenders, and remove implicit guarantees. Credit discipline will foster the emergence of stronger companies, and provide the basis for sustained growth. Political and social preconditions All these policies - accepting globalisation, fostering ASEAN economic cooperation, restructuring the corporate sector, and reforming the banking sector - are essential for countries to recover. But to be in a position to implement and make such economic policies work, countries must first create the right political and social preconditions. Investors, both domestic and foreign, will adopt a wait-and-see attitude until they know how political uncertainties are resolved. Their views are coloured by past experiences, and they will look for evidence of a clear break with the past. A stable political climate is essential to foster confidence, investment and growth. Governments must put their houses in order, bring corruption under control, and install men and women of integrity and competence to key positions within the top leadership.
Here at Riksbanken, we have made it possible for the payment service to work even when the RIX system is closed by allowing a small amount of central bank money, in the form of a loan, to be outstanding during the night. 2  Other central banks are also considering these questions. See Broadbent (2016). 3  Fi 2015:02. Access to payment accounts with basic functions,” Interim report 2 from the 2015 Payment Services Inquiry. 4  For a description of the RIX system, see http://www.riksbank.se/sv/Finansiell-stabilitet/BetalningssystemetRIX. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Which financial institutions are participants in RIX is affected by developments on the financial markets. In a Nordic comparison, Sweden has so far had relatively few participants as members in the system and a situation where four participants are responsible for 80 per cent of the turnover. This is now changing and the Riksbank will have to consider smaller and perhaps entirely new participants who also wish to manage their payments to and from the banks, and between themselves, via RIX. For example, Forex Bank and JAK Medlemsbank will soon participate in RIX. To maintain healthy competition and efficiency in the financial system, it is important that the Riksbank treats everyone equally, although it is also important to have a safe and secure payment system. As a result of the Riksbank’s responsibility for RIX, a government enquiry from 2011 proposed that the Riksbank should be given the responsibility for coordinating crisis preparedness in the payment system via a new law.

I know the Bank will continue to do just that under Mark’s leadership. Mark inherits a wealth of young talent in the Bank, led by three outstanding Deputy Governors: Charlie Bean, Andrew  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Bailey and, of course, Paul Tucker, who has made an enormous contribution to the Bank over three decades. The Bank of England is in safe hands, and the country will be the better for it. Lord Mayor, the wheel may have come off your carriage at last year’s installation, but then we saw your characteristic ability to turn every situation to advantage as you returned in triumph to Mansion House in a Land Rover. As the City too faces the challenge of turning disaster into triumph, it would do well to follow your example of how to “treat those two imposters just the same”. Roger, your commitment to the promotion of the creative industries – crucial to this, the most exciting city in the world – as well as opportunities for children, aspiring musicians, even trees and bicycles, is well known. And all of us here tonight would like to pay tribute to you Lord Mayor, and to thank the Lady Mayoress, Clare, and yourself, Roger, for the splendid hospitality which you’ve extended to us all this evening. So I invite you all to rise and join me in the traditional toast of good health and prosperity to “The Lord Mayor and the Lady Mayoress, Roger and Clare Gifford”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5