samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are the first Asian jurisdiction mandating climate-related disclosure across the financial sector by 2025, in line with the global framework set by the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. We also made an early commitment to adopting new standards promulgated by the International Sustainability Standards Board. Hong Kong adopts the Common Ground Taxonomy jointly developed by China and the EU. We are now exploring the development of a green classification framework on the basis of the China-EU taxonomy, in order to provide the necessary disclosure and guidance to inform capital allocation and encourage market discipline. The HKMA has set clear rules – for example by formulating clear supervisory requirements and integrating climate-risk into the supervisor-driven stress-testing framework. The various regulatory requirements help build climate resilience into our banking and financial sector. In the process, financial intermediaries such as banks also act as facilitators to help the real sector adapt and transition, in line with global consensus and commitment to achieving carbon neutrality. Second, on data. Currently, there is a lack of accessible, standardised data and analytics support in the market. It presents a challenge, not just for climate risk management but for other purposes such as portfolio assessment and business development. We are working with other regulators and the private sector to address these issues, by improving data accessibility and developing a data repository and analytics capability for the industry. We are making good progress.

Eddie Yue: Opening keynote - "Scaling up sustainable finance in Asia" conference Opening keynote by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the ASIFMA "Scaling up Sustainable Finance in Asia" conference, Hong Kong, 17 March 2023. *** Alice, Diana, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, Good Morning, Let me start by thanking ASIFMA for inviting me to this Sustainable Finance Conference. It is my great pleasure to share with you Hong Kong's vision and the concrete steps being taken to strengthen our leading role in green and sustainable finance. As we come into Spring after a colder-than-usual winter, this is a good time to talk about the advances that happen when the right ecosystem is combined with the right opportunities. In the financial world, green and sustainable finance brings extraordinary opportunities. And if we are looking for the best ecosystem for these opportunities to flourish, Hong Kong is the place. The climate challenge to Asia is huge, and urgent. Meeting this challenge will require substantial investment – some $ trillion over the next three decades based on market estimates. China alone will require more than 100 trillion yuan. The multi-trillion-dollar funding need can hardly be met by the public sector alone, and climate finance plays a crucial role here. It helps the public sector raise funding from the market to finance climate projects and initiatives. It also mobilises private capital to directly fund climate actions.
In the wake of the global financial crisis 2008-2009, the NordicBaltic Macroprudential Forum, NBMF, was created in 2011, at the initiative of the Riksbank. This forum has been successful and has reinforced cooperation on macroprudential policy in the region, which has ultimately also strengthened financial stability in both Sweden and the region as a whole. And my assessment is that the integration of the financial markets in the region has made a strong contribution to this success. The Swedish financial market has so far not been as integrated with the rest of Europe as with the Nordic-Baltic region. But this could change. Since the euro was introduced, the financial markets within the euro area in particular have become increasingly integrated, but there has also been greater integration in global terms. The focus in recent years has been on developing and deepening the market for financial services in the EU and speeding up the integration of the member states’ capital markets. 30 I think that this rapid integration of the financial markets in Europe points towards a Swedish membership of the Banking Union. But there are also other factors that speak in favour of membership. One important factor is the risk that we will have less influence in the decision-making processes if we remain on the outside. Developments within the EU have led to an attempt to harmonise the regulatory framework governing the financial markets. This involves capital adequacy requirements and management of banking crises.

I therefore think that Sweden, with its large cross-border banks, should consider membership of the Banking Union. To enable the Riksbank to carry out its tasks and deal with the challenges offered by the changes in the financial system, the monetary policy instruments need to be fit-for-purpose and flexible. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that a combination of several instruments – not just the policy rate – may be needed to stabilise the economy in a crisis situation. The Government has in its proposal for a new Sveriges Riksbank Act suggested several restrictions to practical monetary policy. I think this is unfortunate, as it makes it more difficult for the Riksbank to safeguard an efficient and stable financial system, if the proposals are put into practice. 2 [35]  The Riksbank’s balance sheet is currently very large, and this is mainly due to the extensive purchases of government bonds we began making at the beginning of 2015, and to the measures taken during the pandemic. I believe that our balance sheet will remain large for some time to come. There are several reasons for this. In particular, the generally low interest rates mean that it will become more difficult to use the policy rate in monetary policy, but many of the changes in the financial environment are also important reasons. My assessment is therefore that the bond purchases and holdings of bonds will play a larger role than before.
It is early days for macro-prudential policy. It marks a radical departure from the past because it gives prudential tools an explicit role in managing the risk-taking cycle and activity in the wider economy (Haldane (2014)). To date, the focus of macro-prudential policy has been on the risks arising from leverage on the balance sheet of banks – the quantity of risk. That is why existing macro-prudential tools have tended to focus on bank capital and other bank balance sheet ratios. Yet if risk in the financial system, and activity in the wider economy, are shaped importantly by asset management behaviour and associated pro-cyclical swings in risk premia, then this focus may be too narrow. Macro-prudential action may be justified even when leverage is not present and when banks are not at the scene of the crime. Modulating the price of risk, when this is materially mis-priced, could be every bit as important as controlling its quantity. This is the next frontier for macro-prudential policy – whether, and if so how best, to moderate excessive swings in risk premia across financial markets which risk damaging the financial system or wider economy. This will require new analytical techniques to measure risk premia and their impact. And it will require fresh thinking on new policy tools to moderate movements in these risk premia. This is, in effect, an agenda for the second-generation of macro-prudential policy frameworks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Third, portfolio allocation.

Second, there is the risk of contagion - problems at one bank can spread to others - not just through direct financial linkages but also because, in the absence of timely, transparent information on bank assets, depositors become concerned about other banks which they see as similar. Finally, banks play a central role in payments systems, including payment flows generated by FX trading. The conclusion I draw is that there is enough that is special about banks for their prudential supervision to be retained as a separate activity in any new regulatory structure, and that this argument at present outweighs the case for change. Whether prudential supervision of banks should be a function of the central bank is a separate question. Some argue that other central banking responsibilities (such as the conduct of monetary policy) make for conflicts of interest and therefore that supervision should not be carried out by the central bank. I am not persuaded by these arguments either. Nor am I aware of many examples where the suggested conflicts between a supervisory role for the central bank and its other responsibilities have arisen in practice. Indeed, there are important synergies between the supervisory function and other central bank responsibilities. It makes sense for the ‘micro’ supervision of individual banks in the system to be carried out by the same body that carries out the ‘macro’ function of maintaining the stability of the financial system as a whole, stability which is essential if monetary policy is to be executed effectively and efficiently.
Deviations from the exchange rate’s more fundamental level may also be occasioned by matters to do with credibility. In addition, the exchange rate may be affected by transitory shifts in the currency market’s demand and supply. Such shifts may arise from portfolio adjustments. In certain periods these mechanisms may tend to accentuate exchange rate movements even though economic fundamentals point in a different direction. One example of this is the large movements in the US dollar. Against this background I shall now look at some factors that will probably be important for the development of the euro. I shall take the fundamentals first and then point out some factors that could be of transitory significance for the euro. Fundamental factors Provided economic policies in the euro area focus credibly on price stability accompanied by a corresponding low-inflation policy in the rest of the world - it is probable that the euro’s nominal exchange rates with other countries will display a high degree of stability. However, cyclical disparities between currency blocs and some uncertainty about monetary policy signalling are factors that could generate certain fluctuations. BIS Review 68/1998  -3-  EMU is constructed so that monetary policy will be formulated collectively by the ECB’s Executive Council and the national central banks in the light of the overall picture of inflation in the euro area, while fiscal policies are formulated at the national level.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy in Norway  Opening remarks by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Norges Bank, to Norges Bank workshop on “The Conduct of Monetary Policy in Open Economies”, held in Oslo, on 26-27 October 2000. *  *  *  Introduction I am happy to welcome you to this workshop on “The conduct of monetary policy in open economies”. The workshop brings together researchers and practitioners of monetary policy from a wide variety of countries. The aim is to stimulate exchanges both across countries and between researchers and monetary policymakers on a topic of common interest. Research on monetary policy is an international field. We thus find it tremendously useful to be a part of an international network of researchers and practitioners concerned with monetary policymaking. Contact across central banks does represent an important source of inspiration to the policy discussions in Norges Bank. Norwegian monetary policy The papers presented at this workshop address topics that are highly relevant to monetary policy in general and Norwegian monetary policy in particular. Some of you may be familiar with the Norwegian system. For others it may be unknown that Norway has a monetary policy regime that is unique in an international context: it is a system of neither a fixed exchange rate nor an inflation target. Let me explain in more detail: The political authorities formulate Norges Bank’s mandate for the conduct of monetary policy.
Its importance, however, should not be overstated. Otherwise, rational decision-making is made difficult. It is therefore important to de-emotionalize the discussion and to take decisions based on facts, economic and political common sense rather than on wishful thinking and unrealistic expectations. The introduction of the Euro presents Europe with both opportunities and risks. Let me first dwell on the opportunities. A successful monetary union will contribute to sustainable economic growth in Europe. It will complement the most important part of the EU, which is the single market. The free movement of capital, labor, goods and services will be made easier when only one currency exists. The allocation of resources will reflect expectations BIS Review 102/1997  -2-  about the profitability of investments and will not be distorted by unexpected exchange rate movements. Comparing prices of the same goods in different countries will become much easier as they will all be expressed in the same currency. Competition will thus be enhanced. Monetary union will also most likely contribute to lower interest rates in at least those participating countries which now have interest rates above the average. This should further enhance growth prospects. All of these advantages depend of course on the belief that monetary union will be a success. The likelihood of this happening is relatively high. The new ECB will have as its primary statutory goal price stability. In the performance of its task, it will enjoy a high degree of political independence.

These measures proved to be nearly ineffective as they were easily circumvented. Today, in an environment of even more integrated markets, the result would be the same. Introducing such measures to combat an appreciation of the Swiss franc would thus be no solution. Consequently, the SNB would certainly be able to smooth excessive fluctuations in the exchange rate should doubts about the stability of the Euro lead to portfolio shifts into the Swiss franc. However, in the face of extreme capital inflows, we would most likely not be able to entirely insulate the domestic economy from harmful disturbances unless we were willing to jeopardize price stability in the long run. Therefore, Switzerland, like any other country in Europe, has every interest in a successful transition towards EMU and a stability-oriented monetary policy by the new ECB. Let me finish with some thoughts on the consequences of the introduction of the Euro on payments executed in Switzerland. Two cases have to be distinguished: payments related to domestic and payments related to cross-border transactions. As regards domestic transactions, there is no reason to expect that the Euro would to any considerable extent replace the Swiss franc as Switzerland’s main medium of exchange. The costs associated with using the Euro in domestic transactions will be and will remain higher than the ones associated with the Swiss franc. Historically, only in cases of extreme inflation have domestic currencies been replaced by foreign currencies as the main medium of exchange.
Many crises, not least the most recent one, have been preceded by a lack of transparency in the financial system. During the latest crisis, the lack of transparency made it almost impossible to know which participants were exposed to the most serious risks. This impenetrable uncertainty was one of the main factors that contributed to the paralysis of the world’s financial markets in the autumn of 2008. It is often uncertainty about the true state of things that in itself makes people nervous and that sometimes leads to bank runs and panic selling, which in turn can lead to devastating chain reactions in the financial system. Of course, the need to increase transparency primarily falls  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  on the participants in the financial system. But the Riksbank can also contribute by being open about its assessments and analyses of the state of the financial system, for example by publishing stress tests. How open the Riksbank should be about its assessments, its preparedness and its own measures is determined by how this can be expected to affect confidence. In a crisis situation, we may of course be forced to carefully consider what can or cannot be said. However, the fundamental rule is that it is better to be open and clear than to be uncommunicative and ambiguous. A “negative” but reliable announcement can therefore be better for confidence than a “positive” but uncertain announcement. Openness about the problems that underlie a crisis may therefore be the key to regaining confidence.

This proposal will enhance worker remittances into the country and help to finance the widening trade deficit and maintain a positive balance of payment position. The budget reiterates the need for permitting professionals to earn in foreign currency and retain such funds in foreign currency accounts within the country. The budget also allows expenditure incurred on acquiring international accreditation as a deductible expenditure from taxation. These measures are expected to enhance foreign currency earnings and further facilitate the management of foreign reserves. The down-side risks Effective policy coordination is certainly the way forward as set out in the budget 2007 and it is interdependent on action by all policy-making authorities. If one or two policy areas lag behind, then the sustainability of achievements over the long term will become an issue. The monetary policy has to play its part to bring down inflationary expectations, while the investment policy has to attract FDIs and  BIS Review 7/2007  3  other investment flows. The reserve management policy should attempt to enhance foreign reserves through increased worker remittances and other flows. Pushing all these policy fronts to work within the open economic policy framework and keeping pace with each other is critical to the success of the medium term development plan. Very close coordination is essential for it and it is certainly a challenge. At the same time, the fiscal policy should make all attempts to stick to its revenue and expenditure targets.
Increasing scarcity in that segment of the cash 5 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  market then also translated into a persistent rise in the specialness premia of such bonds, even when abstracting from year-end effects. Our decision to accept cash as collateral in securities lending, and to allow purchases below the DFR, contributed to relieving this pressure. Premia across maturity buckets are now broadly similar. The relatively low specialness premia for bonds with shorter maturities, in turn, also suggests that the majority of holders of such bonds – mainly non-euro area investors without access to our deposit facility, as I illustrated in a previous speech – were, and remain, generally willing to provide them in sufficient quantity in the repo market.10 Yet, this chart also reinforces the point I made earlier about the flow and stock effects of our purchases: with the effective supply of bonds gradually shrinking over time as a result of our purchases, specialness premia have been persistently inching upwards.11 While stock effects reinforce one of the key transmission channels of the APP by increasing the “value for money” – the bang for the buck – of new net purchases in terms of their impact on financial conditions, we also need to be mindful that a shortage of government bonds may over time adversely affect the intermediation capacity of repo markets. There are two reasons for this. First, government bonds are the main type of collateral used in repo markets, primarily because of their safety and liquidity.

Eva Srejber: Vulnerabilities in the modern payment system Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Swedish Risk Management Conference, Eskilstuna, 18 October 2006. *  *  *  Introduction An extremely large amount of payments are made in any modern economy. In Sweden, the turnover in our payment system amounts to around SEK 1,290 billion a day (broken down into securities trading SEK 500 billion, card and credit transfers SEK 30 billion, foreign exchange trading SEK 390 billion, interbank payments SEK 350 billion and cash payments SEK 10 billion). Thus, in around two days the turnover corresponds to the value of the entire Swedish GDP in one year. It is therefore no surprise that we consider it important to examine possible vulnerabilities in the system and how we can reduce them. One of the more obvious examples of the vulnerability of the system is the many cash transport robberies in recent years, where large amounts of cash have been stolen. However, cash is only one of many ways that payments can be made and cash transports comprise a small part of the infrastructure required to ensure the payment flows in Sweden run smoothly. While a tiny fraction of the payments is made by cash, the remainder is made electronically. However, as we know, computers also have their weaknesses. This became apparent in 2000, when both the Riksbank’s system for large-value payments, RIX, and Nordbanken’s internal computer system suffered shortterm problems at different points in time.
As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the FOMC or the Federal Reserve System.1 In terms of the economic outlook, the situation does not appear to have changed much since the last FOMC meeting. Some recent activity indicators have been on the softer side, pointing to a relatively weak fourth quarter for real GDP growth. But this needs to be weighed against the strength evident in the U.S. labor market. I continue to expect that the economy will expand at a pace slightly above its long-term trend in 2016. In other words, I anticipate sufficient economic strength to push the unemployment rate down a bit further and to more fully utilize the nation’s labor resources. 1  Antoine Martin, Jamie McAndrews, Jonathan McCarthy, Paolo Pesenti and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Turning to inflation, we continue to fall short of our 2 percent objective for the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator. But I take it as a positive sign that the core PCE inflation rate – that is, excluding food and energy – has been quite stable despite the downward pressure being exerted by lower energy prices on the prices of non-energy goods and services, as well as the drop in non-energy import prices from a firmer dollar. Going into more detail, U.S. economic activity has areas of both strength and weakness. On the stronger side of the ledger, domestic demand is doing reasonably well.

Alberto G Musalem: International spillovers and policies Remarks by Mr Alberto G Musalem, Executive Vice President of the Integrated Policy Analysis Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the People’s Bank of ChinaFederal Reserve Bank of New York Joint Symposium, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China, 15 Mach 2016. *  *  *  Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to speak here in Hangzhou about the important theme of international spillovers. By exchanging perspectives and experiences we can forge relationships and a shared understanding that can lead to better economic outcomes. I will focus mostly on the interaction of international spillovers with policy frameworks within and across countries. I will do this from the vantage point of a domestic economy experiencing foreign spillovers. I will then briefly turn to considerations from a U.S. perspective. As always, my remarks reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), or the Federal Reserve System.1 International spillovers encompass a broad topic with respect to their sources and channels. Before narrowly focusing on monetary sources and associated channels, it seems appropriate to first take a broader view of the various sources. Foreign spillovers can emanate from monetary, fiscal, regulatory, currency or trade policies. Spillovers can also arise from endogenous productivity changes, from financial stability developments, and from a global financial cycle.2 The Mundell-Fleming logic remains relevant for thinking about policy options of open economies.