samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The doctor suggested that she should marry a CPA. “Will that make me live longer?” the lady asks hopefully. “No,” the doctor replies. “But it will seem longer”. Well, I promise to keep my remarks short, although since this is an accounting workshop, you will forgive me if they might seem long. As you know, IFRS 17 was finalised and issued in 2017. Today, the 17th of May, also marks 17 years since the International Accounting Standards Board took on the job to develop a globally accepted accounting standard for insurance contracts. What a remarkable coincidence indeed! The final IFRS 17 standards represent a historic milestone – for the first time, insurers in over 120 countries, with assets worth at least USD13 trillion, will be reporting financial statements based on a common set of standards when IFRS 17 comes into effect in January 2021. Almost two decades ago, standard setters embarked on a Herculean mission to develop a globally accepted accounting standard for the measurement of insurance contracts which did not exist before. In the time that it took to finalise IFRS 17, we have witnessed significant developments in the accounting world, including the transformation of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) into today’s IASB, the formation of the Monitoring Board to enhance public accountability of the IFRS Foundation, and sweeping reforms to key accounting standards to address the deficiencies which were believed to have amplified the 2008 global financial crisis.

Inflation in services is also increasing but here it is interesting to point out that whereas supply side factors were the main driver of services inflation until the end of 2021, demand factors have been making an increasing contribution to services inflation throughout 2022, and ended up surpassing supply driven factors in the third quarter. A similar increasing contribution of demand drivers versus supply drivers is observed in Non-Energy Industrial Goods inflation in 2022. So, Headline HICP inflation is projected to rise further from the already very high levels, averaging to 8.1% in 2022, then decreasing to 5.5% next year and to 2.3% in 2024. But these are annual averages of inflation. This is also important because in order to reach the 5.5% average inflation next year, since inflation starts in the coming year at a high level, it means that inflation is expected to be at 3.3% in the fourth quarter of 2023, assuming, of course, there are no new external shocks. The aim of monetary policy, through higher interest rates, is to support disinflationary pressures through downward pressure on demand. So Monetary Policy has a "more" difficult job than when dealing only with "typical" demand driven inflation. 1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Given the above considerations and the current highly uncertain environment, the inherent flexibility of the meeting by meeting approach we decided at the Governing Council is well suited to calibrating monetary policy, in line with the incoming data and the evolving outlook. Thank you.
The extensively revised official US data now show that productivity began accelerating in 1995. However, that was not visible until the vintages released in 1998. But as Alan Blinder and Ricardo Reiss have reminded us at this conference, Chairman Greenspan did not wait until 1998 to conclude that the underlying rate of productivity growth might be increasing. The key reason was that he talked with and listened to people who work in business. Already in May 1996, when the Fed’s model was forecasting increasing inflationary pressures going forward, Alan said “it is very difficult to take the existing structure of the NAIRUs, capacity limits, and the usual potential analysis that we do and square it in any measurable way with what we sense from anecdotal reports”.1 In the UK, there does not seem to have been a productivity miracle. But we have had many examples of the importance of qualitative data in making judgements. For instance, there have been significant flows of migration that have expanded the potential labour force. By their nature, such flows are not accurately reflected in official data. But the Bank of England’s business contacts were able to tell us that the ability to recruit new migrant workers was a growing and significant response to a tight labour market. The third lesson that Alan has taught us is that it is the consistency over time of a policy framework that sustains a market economy, as the achievements of the United States over the last 200 years show very clearly.

To use a tennis analogy, I see Alan as the central banking equivalent of the non-playing captain of a Davis Cup team, encouraging the younger and less talented members, and stressing the importance of footwork, timing and getting into position early. Alan, thank you for raising the respect which others give to our discipline of economics and our profession of central banking. 2  Transparency in monetary policy. At the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Policy Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, October 11, 2001. This definition was set out much earlier, in similar terms, in Alan Greenspan’s statement before the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, January 25, 1990. 2  BIS Review 56/2005
23.05.2018  “Strengthening the economic governance of the euro: short-term priorities and the long-term view” High Level Seminar. Banco de España Luis M. Linde Governor  Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me first extend a warm welcome to you all to the Banco de España. Thank you for joining us today in this seminar that addresses the pressing and very important topic of the Economic Governance of the Euro: Short-term Priorities and the Long-term View. I would like to thank the panelists who have been so kind to accept our invitation; we are very pleased to have among us a long list of distinguished participants that would certainly throw much welcomed light on the discussion. The timing of this conference is particularly relevant. After years of low growth, Europe is now experiencing a robust recovery which opens up a window of opportunity to make progress in the governance reform agenda before the next economic downturn unfolds. Supported by expansionary monetary policy, real GDP in the Euro Area has expanded for 19 quarters in a row. Stronger price dynamics are yet to materialize, but we are confident that if we are prudent, patient and persistent, our monetary policy measures will be effective in achieving the medium-term goals. Price stability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for achieving sustained and balanced growth. In fact, one important lesson we can draw from the first twenty years of the EMU is the need to improve the area’s resilience to large macroeconomic shocks and to increase its stabilization capacity.

To incorporate fiscal stability through the highest act in the country, the constitution. V. As usual, the establishment of a new action framework is one thing, while whether this framework will become operational, functional, and to what extent, is another thing. It is obvious that the bunch of new ideas, new tools we talk about forced by the crisis, are focused on establishing a concept for managing systemic risk. Therefore, the questions whether it will function, on what the result depends most, are logical. 1) First, the systemic risk is not too hard to define. It is harder to provide operative contents, because of its different dimensions: procyclicality; contagion risk; the spillover effects of a single institution’s distress to the rest of the financial system; correlation risk; concentration risk; then, due to the fact that the risk can originate from several sources, etc. 2) Even when the source is identified, the history shows that there is no action at all, or the action is delayed, or the seriousness of the threat is underestimated. For example, the false reports of the Greek government for the real fiscal deficits were not unknown. And not only for theirs. It is not untrue that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have proposed to the Congress a gradual reduction or possible extinction of the GSEs portfolio (Fannie Mac и Freddy Mac), quite before 2004 when their assets were several times smaller than US Dollar 3.2 trillion at the end of 2007.
On the other hand, it is true that the hedge funds are very quick to take advantage of mispricing and imbalances in companies’ finances or countries’ economies, such as an unsustainable exchange rate – but this is of course difficult to be critical of. When we discuss the effects of hedge funds on the financial markets, I believe it may be useful to compare the crisis at Amaranth, which I described in the beginning, with the crisis at LTCM. The effects on the financial markets were very different. Despite the fact that Amaranth’s losses were much greater than those of LTCM, no authority needed to intervene; Amaranth was able to close its positions of its own accord and in a smooth manner. The large positions were sold (at a substantial discount, one assumes) to JP Morgan and Citadel, another large hedge fund. The situation with LTCM was quite different. A number of events during 1998 (including the Russian debt crisis) had created considerable unease in the financial markets and LTCM had entirely the wrong positions for such a development. When the investors’ assets had fallen from USD 5 billion to USD 1.5 billion in the space of six months, the US central bank intervened. The size of the fund, combined with the fact that so many financial agents were involved, meant that the Federal Reserve saw a threat to financial stability. To avoid an uncontrolled collapse, the Fed called together a group of LTCM’s largest creditors, who took over the fund’s positions.

For this year, it is forecast that GDP growth will remain well above long-term growth in potential output and demand pressures will still increase, but that inflation is projected to remain below target for most of the year. This is uncertain, however, and various changes have taken place and others may lie ahead, which could affect future developments. The tradable sector is now experiencing stronger crowding-out effects from tourism, after the rapid growth of the latter in recent years. Sizeable pay increases in the recent term and last year’s strong appreciation of the króna cut into profits, and companies now have less scope to absorb pay rises. The recent appreciation of the króna is a result of growth in tourism and other favourable developments, and it tends to shift demand outside the domestic economy, thereby reducing the positive output gap. Although forecasts based on given assumptions and available models indicate that the exchange rate will continue to rise, it should be noted that this is highly uncertain. Capital account liberalisation could contribute to either a higher exchange rate or a lower one in the short run, depending on how expectations develop. The special reserve requirements imposed last June on capital inflows to the bond market and high-interest deposits have contained the rise in the exchange rate and will reduce the likelihood of a steep carry trade-related appreciation in the near term. From 12 March, when capital account liberalisation was announced, through yesterday’s official listing, the exchange rate of the króna had fallen by 3.8%.
Similarly, in pricing TIPS, a trader with a nonconformist view faces costs in taking that view, so even if ultimately proven correct, the costs of establishing such a position may deter the nonconformist view’s from being reflected in market prices. Second, professional forecasters may be overly exposed to similar “world views,” sharing similar data, reports, and analyses. This may lead to an information aggregation bias of sorts, in which forecasters share the same information set, which is an aggregate of finer information, and which may result in the loss of some important information. The next charts describe the median four-quarter-ahead CPI forecast and the dispersion around that median for the Blue Chip survey and the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters. While there is significant overlap in the two sets of respondents, there is an important difference between the two surveys: respondents are anonymous in the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters, whereas they are identified by name in the Blue Chip survey. The asymmetric payoffs described earlier may therefore have more of an impact in the Blue Chip survey than in the U.S. Survey of Professional Forecasters, leading to less dispersion in the former than in the latter. Chart 9 shows that the median forecast is substantially the same across the two surveys. However, as seen in Chart 10, there is some evidence of lower heterogeneity among forecasters in the Blue Chip survey compared with the Survey of Professional Forecasters, especially in recent periods, which, in retrospect, were periods of high fundamental uncertainty in the economy.

Third, the estimates of the natural level of output at the end of 2022 are much lower than predicted before the pandemic. The current HLW estimates of r-star in the United States are shown in Figure 3. For comparison, the figure also shows estimates using a version of the model that is not adjusted to take into account COVID or outliers and holds the parameter values fixed at estimates using data through the end of 2019. The two sets of estimates are very similar through 2019. They differ sharply during the acute period of the pandemic, however, when the estimates from the unmodified model exhibit large swings due to the presence of sizeable outliers. Interestingly, the two estimates are very close to each other at the end of the sample. That is, the modifications to the model do not interfere with "letting the data speak." A Modest Imprint Based on the new r-star estimates for Canada, the Euro Area, and the United States, we see no signs of a significant reversal of the decline in r-star estimates evident in prior decades.13 In fact, in all three economies, the r-star estimates in 2022 are within twotenths of a percentage point of the corresponding estimate in 2019. The largest differences between model estimates pre- and post-pandemic relate to the level of each economy's potential output. Figure 4 compares the model's measure of the natural level of output based on estimates using data through the fourth quarter of 2019 (the blue line) to current estimates.
This explains the vigorous response of fiscal and monetary authorities around the world and in Chile, which has focused on protecting employment and access to credit for the most affected companies. At the local level, this projection is also contingent upon the larger investment projects resuming their normal operation and the institutional channeling of the social crisis reducing uncertainty and avoiding new episodes of violence. Furthermore, the scenario considers the additional impulse implicit in the Ministry of Finance’s announcements published in March. It is worth noting that the projections contained in the baseline scenario were made in an even more uncertain environment than in the December Report. It is worthwhile highlight the difficulties in estimating how the pandemic will evolve in Chile and the world, and how the control measures will be adjusted. The unprecedented nature of these elements means that the forecast ranges for growth contain less than the usual information input. All in all, the CBC Board estimates that this year Chile’s GDP will contract between 1.5% and 2.5%. In 2021, it will increase between 3.75% and 4.75%, and in 2022 it will grow between 3% and 4%. On the domestic demand side, higher cash needs to cover business operations will be reflected in a contraction of investment, with the baseline scenario estimating that gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) will contract by 8.2% in 2020. By sectors, both mining and non-mining investment are revised downwards, the latter more so.

What is more, the Swiss franc has only seen a moderate rise against the euro. As Swiss households and companies are on a solid financial footing, they are shielded – so to speak – against a tightening in credit conditions. Lastly, the stronger Swiss franc vis-à-vis the US dollar has limited the impact of higher commodity prices. Several other factors, like a robust labour market and a competitive industrial sector, could cushion the negative repercussions of the financial crisis in Switzerland. Against this backdrop, the SNB is expecting real GDP to grow between 1.5% and 2% this year. Inflation should be below the 2% mark again in the course of 2008. These forecasts still involve substantial uncertainties. Given the present state of the economy, the current interest level seems to be appropriate. However, the SNB will keep a close eye on further economic developments and inflation so that it is able to identify when action needs to be taken and react in a quick and flexible manner. BIS Review 51/2008  1
And a recent study by IMF economists finds that risk-based capital ratios in the range 15-23% would have been sufficient to absorb losses in the vast majority of past advanced economy banking crises (Dagher et al (2016)).13 At the time of the Basel Committee’s study, there was little evidence on the impact of bank capital on the ∂∆ severity of crises (∂k ), which is why this channel was ignored in the quantitative calibration. That has since  changed. Jordà et al (2017) find that, while bank capital does not prevent a crisis from occurring, it matters for the pain suffered in its aftermath. They find that real GDP per head is 5 per cent higher 5 years after the onset of a crisis-related recession if bank capital is above its historical average when the crisis hits. The benefits of capital in reducing the severity of crisis are also borne out by experience since the crisis. Chart 15 plots international banks’ capital ratios prior to the crisis against their subsequent lending growth. The relationship has a statistically significant upward slope. Banks that entered the crisis with higher capital have, on average, been better able to continue their lending. On average, each extra 1 percentage point of pre-crisis capital boosted banks’ cumulative lending over the subsequent decade by over 20%. This finding is corroborated by micro-econometric evidence. Carlson et al (2013) find that US banks with higher pre-crisis capital ratios had stronger loan growth in its aftermath, with the effect particularly pronounced at lower capital ratios.

Norman T L Chan: Remarks at the Hong Kong Academy of Finance Inauguration Ceremony and fellowship conferment Welcome remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Academy of Finance Inauguration Ceremony cum Fellowship Conferment, Hong Kong, 26 June 2019. * * * The Honourable Paul Chan, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, 1. A very warm welcome to all of you for joining us today to witness the Inauguration Ceremony cum Fellowship Conferment of the Hong Kong Academy of Finance (AoF). 2. I strongly believe that the most crucial factor that differentiates an international financial centre (IFC) from the other aspiring financial centres is its superior “soft infrastructure” or “soft power”. I am sure you will agree with me that the quality and professionalism of the people in the financial services industry are the building blocks for the “soft infrastructure” that determines the competitiveness of an IFC. The mission of the Academy is to serve as a centre of excellence for developing financial leadership as well as a repository of knowledge in monetary and financial research, including applied research. 3. The AoF will develop and run a Leadership Development Programme to nurture financial leaders in Hong Kong. The Academy will invite senior management and promising talents from financial institutions, regulators, professional firms and academia in the field of finance to join as Members.
This is because private organisations operating under competitive market conditions should review the existing strategies and adopt new ones for survival and success. Central banks being organisations created and powered by statutes did not consider it necessary to adopt such strategies in their medium to long term planning. However, changes in the world and especially, the changes in the complexities in financial systems, have forced central banks to be mindful of the need for moving into strategic planning as a major management device. In this sense, the theme of the seminar is topical, opportune and timely. As we all central bankers know, the conduct of monetary policy and attaining financial system stability are the primary tasks of a central bank. Hence, the strategic plan of a central bank should be formulated in such a way that it strategically links its goals, objectives and action plans to these primary tasks. Like any other corporate entity, the central bank also has a mission of achieving a long term objective, that is, macro economic development through maintaining price stability and ensuring the financial system stability. In this context, strategic planning plays a very important role in assisting the central banks to effectively and efficiently utilise the limited resources at their disposal to achieve such objectives and accomplish the given tasks. However, the successful implementation of strategic plan will mainly depend on the legal framework governing a central bank, which provides for its  1/2  independence, accountability and transparency.

Ardian Fullani: Bank-business relationship in Albania Greeting speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the meeting “Business Bank Communication Day”, Tirana, 20 October 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Recently, the promising paces in the increase of crediting to the economy from the banking sector make us realize that the numerous meetings organized with the scope of approaching banks to businesses are finally producing their results. Nonetheless, it is yet, too soon to describe it as a victory. Without diminishing the significance of these meetings, I think that the expansion of business crediting is not an effortless issue to be solved, especially when considered that our economy is still in transition. Frequently, the solution to the arousing issues goes beyond the good will of both, the business and banking community. Thus, avoiding the rhetoric of the previous meetings which habitually sets one’s party claims against the other, I would like to emphasize the need of a better coordination of efforts by the two communities to the solution of various issues. A few days ago, on the privatisation anniversary of one of the participant banks present in this meeting, I stressed the necessity of intensifying the institutional relationship between the banking system and the different business associations. Therefore, this meeting is an outstanding example of putting this initiative into practice and I trust it will serve as a good start of the regular contacts between the banking association and the business one.