samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The global economy has experienced multiple shocks in recent years, with its effects reverberating across the globe. Global growth has continuously underperformed expectations and is expected to remain moderate going forward. The divergence in monetary policy in advanced and emerging economies as well as the unexpected policy adjustments in several economies have also culminated in a global environment of heightened volatility and uncertainties. One of the most significant developments we have experienced thus far is the sharp volatility in commodity prices which has created destabilising implications on commodity-driven countries. Amid a confluence of shocks, ranging from weaker-than-expected growth prospects to geopolitical uncertainty and moderation in China’s economic growth, oil prices declined by more than 50% in a span of 6 months in 2014. The volatility in oil prices has also been heightened by unanticipated economic and geo-political developments. The events unfolding in the United Kingdom and consequent effect to the European region have also contributed to the increased volatility in oil prices. Oil prices rallied to above USD50 per barrel from an average of USD33 per barrel in the first quarter of the year, and today, oil prices have settled back to around USD48 per barrel. The oil price is likely to remain volatile over the next few years due to oversupply and recordhigh oil inventories against slow demand especially in China. LNG prices are also expected to remain low for a protracted period of time.

Strategic decisions need to be made on establishing relevant competent authorities tasked with the responsibility of resolving banks and investment firms, on setting up resolution funds, and on the drawing up by the supervised entities of adequate plans for recovery or controlled restoration of their viability by restructuring. In connection with the new EU capital framework CRD4, in 2014 the BNB began to implement the new reporting framework for supervisory purposes (the so-called FINREP and COREP), consisting of over 100 separate reporting forms. The additional supervisory reporting will meet the accumulated information needs of the Banking Supervision Department and will tackle the most sensitive sources of risk in banks’ portfolios. In 2015 it is expected that the EU-wide banking supervision rules will become more and more common in banking practices. Numerous technical standards, developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and adopted by the European Commission, are going to be put in place. In supervising the subsidiaries of euro area banks, the BNB is going to cooperate actively with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which started in November 2014. Last but not least is the BNB’s intention to initiate an asset quality review of the entire banking system, which will cover all banks operating in Bulgaria. This will also be a key requirement if the government should decide, at some point, to start talks with the ECB for joining the SSM.
As a central bank with a mandate to promote financial stability, it is our duty to ensure the safety of funds when they are most vulnerable, in particular once funds have left the bank. In response to these modern threats, central banks have strengthened risk management frameworks and implemented awareness programmes both internally and for the public. However, some of the risks we are addressing, while familiar, are beyond conventional central bank expertise. The complexity of the challenge requires public-private cooperation to strengthen mutual expertise and build solutions. Some of the risks, such as cyber threats, also transcends national borders. Solutions must involve international collaboration, such as the ASEAN initiative on Cybersecurity Resilience and Information Sharing Platform (CRISP). This platform allows central banks within the region to share cyber-related information and encourage capacity building. It is a testament to the interconnected nature of financial services that national financial stability requires international cooperation. Closing The pace of innovation in payment services combined with the economic effects of the pandemic are putting pressure on authorities to make progress on cross-border payment issues. In addressing these issues, we have to be mindful of the fact that not all central banks are progressing at the same pace. What is important is the common direction that central banks adapt to change to build a stronger and more robust financial system for all. With this in mind, there are questions that I hope the Forum can attempt to answer. First, how can central banks create a safer environment to facilitate cross-border payments?

1 “Poland’s wild ride out of communism remains election faultline”, James Shotter, Financial Times, 2 October  2019. 2 “The legacy of 1989 has been complacency”, Tony Barber, Financial Times, 2 October 2019. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
In striving for clarity, the merged groups should place particular emphasis on explaining clearly and transparently how they have treated potentially impaired assets in the mergers. They should offer not only quantitative information but also explanations so that this information is interpreted correctly. –  Second, banks should continue resorting to international markets to roll over their wholesale funding. As stated, the loan from the Eurosystem has progressively declined and institutions should persevere along these lines. It is vital to remain active in euro interbank markets, to participate in the central counterparty clearing houses and to resort to the primary markets and, insofar as the latter allow them, to extend the average maturities on their funding. BIS Review 161/2010  5  But they must also report to investors that business is as normal. The regular supplementary information I referred to in the previous point should include a section that reports on the status of wholesale funding, with a breakdown of instruments, the corresponding collateral and their duration. –  Third, perseverance in the mergers under way, particularly in the savings bank sector, is vital. The progress to date has been most significant and institutions are meeting the deadlines. But further progress in this connection is needed, and there must be no wavering in the integration plans agreed upon. This phase foresees creating the new institutions and setting out the terms of their governance.

Javier Aríztegui: Reform of the banking system Speech by Mr Javier Aríztegui, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the 5th Conference for financial professionals, Barcelona, 26 November 2010. *  *  *  Good morning. Firstly, I would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to participate in this forum. In view of the programme and the participants, I am sure that this is a good opportunity to debate the challenges facing the Spanish banking system and what the future holds for it. I shall broach the subject of the transformations currently taking place at banks in two parts. The first part will describe developments in our banking sector since summer 2007 and the second will look in greater depth at the aspects I consider essential for assuring the progress which has already been achieved. At times like the present, when international financial markets are showing their aversion to risk and their discomfort with banking systems that are highly reliant on external financing, it is vital to consolidate this progress and to continue using transparency as the main means of showing investors the soundness of our banking system. From summer 2007 to date The crisis which erupted in summer 2007 has gone through various phases. At the risk of over-simplifying matters, I shall split it into three stages. The first phase was characterised by a widespread loss of confidence: the complex structured products created in previous years came to be considered “toxic”.
EUROWEEK: You have often expressed frustration that markets aren’t ready enough to acknowledge the longer term sustainability of monetary union. Are views changing, especially beyond the eurozone itself? Noyer: Although it is of course clearly understood in Europe, it is starting to become relatively well understood in the US and in Asia. It is taking more time outside Europe to develop this comprehensive view, because markets in the US and Asia don’t have as much information at their disposal about Europe. But given how globalised markets now are, the fact that they have been so positive in recent weeks is to me a clear sign that it has started to be understood relatively well all around the globe. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  EUROWEEK: You’ve been speaking with your eurozone hat on, rather than specifically about France. Some of the data that has come out recently about European growth in general and French growth in particular have been very depressing, haven’t they? Is there a concern that the so-called modèle Français is defunct? Noyer: It is absolutely true that the figures have been disappointing in 2012. But what has to be taken into account is that France has been facing the same very strong headwinds that have been blowing across certain parts of Europe. Apart from Germany, the major markets for French exports are the southern European countries and the UK, all of which have been in recession in 2012. The consequence was that the French economy was more or less stagnant.

Tarisa Watanagase: Inflation targeting – a reflection on Thailand’s experience Opening remarks by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Bank of Thailand’s International Symposium on “Challenges to Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Countries,” Bangkok, 13 November 2006. *  *  *  Honorable Guests, Distinguished Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, First, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all of you here today. This is the second time that the Bank of Thailand organizes a symposium at an international level. Our first international symposium, “Practical Experiences on Inflation Targeting,” was held in October 2000, a few months after we had adopted inflation targeting as a new monetary policy framework for Thailand. But this symposium today is the first one that brings together central bank governors, senior central bank executives, world-renowned academics and policy experts from leading international organizations. Many of you have extremely tight schedules and some have to travel a very long distance. I would like to express our great appreciation for your presence and very much hope that what we will learn together in this symposium is beneficial to all of us. Ladies and Gentlemen, Thailand formally adopted inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework on May 23, 2000. The change in policy regime was a result of our search for an appropriate nominal anchor after the floating of the Thai baht in July 1997. In the interim period, we used monetary aggregates as our policy target.
An ideal scenario would be if decisions on the asset portfolio could be converted into policy rate changes and added to the existing repo-rate path. However, while we are still learning more about the effects of changes in the asset holding on interest ratesetting, my aim is to ensure that the public continues to have confidence in our monetary policy. One of the main elements of our monetary policy throughout the period of inflation targeting has been our desire for transparency and clarity: What we are doing and what we achieve with our measures. By continuing along this path, the public should be able to rely on us at the Riksbank doing our job and maintaining price stability, that is, keeping inflation so stable that you do not really have to think about it. Thank you for listening! 27 See, for example, Di Casola (2021), Melander (2021) and Gustafsson (2022). 28 At that time, a few countries had introduced an inflation target: New Zealand was the first in 1990, followed by  Canada in 1991 and the United Kingdom in 1992. See also Jonung (2003). 29 See Skingsley (2021). 10 [19]  References Bailey, Andrew (2020), “The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past, present and future”, speech at Jackson Hole, published on 28 August, available at The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past, present and future - speech by Andrew Bailey | Bank of England.

An example of a recent early prudential action occurred in June 2007, well before the recent financial turmoil aggravated: the Central Bank established a foreign exposure capital requirement for cross-border positions within international banking groups. In a nutshell, the Brazilian approach insulated its financial institutions from the sort of problems that is affecting counterparties abroad. In fact, it is no coincidence that our financial system has shown resilience and has been largely unaffected during the current financial turmoil. BIS Review 44/2009  1  The overall assessment on the Brazilian regulation framework, which was sometimes criticized on the grounds of excessive carefulness, is currently praised in international forums. For instance, the fact that Brazilian regulators have access to information from the clearing systems of all operations in the financial market is a factor of admiration and reference worldwide. Before closing, let me mention that I strongly welcome the recent enlargement towards emerging economies – including of course Brazil – of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). Emerging economies rapidly increasing weight in the global economy and global finances makes them an integral part of any viable solution to the current problems, as we are witnessing today in regard to their role in the G-20. The enlargement of forums in the area of regulation and financial sector supervision give more legitimacy to the discussion being held, with a view to design a new and more robust regulatory framework.
As you know, the UK decided not to participate in Economic and Monetary Union at the outset. But although the UK is 'out', the City of London is effectively 'in' already. And this is because of the City's international role, making markets and providing financial services, regardless of currency. So the City of London needed to be well prepared for the introduction of the euro in January 1999. And it was well prepared. As a result, London remains a competitive market place for euro business. You can trade euro in London, just like dollars. There is a wide variety of euro payment routes available in and from London. And London is playing a key role in pioneering the development of the euro markets and financial services across Europe. This means that London can, and does, provide a gateway to the euro for Japanese financial institutions. The City of London does not depend on the currency used by the UK. Financial activity will be carried on where it can be carried on most conveniently, profitably and efficiently. The City thrives on deep and liquid markets, regardless of currency. Measured in these terms, we have, over the last few years, seen the euro as an opportunity for London, not a threat. And the City has been taking advantage of this opportunity, since the euro's launch, by innovating and setting standards of excellence in the euro markets.

Let me now consider the implementation of monetary policy in the course of 1999. 1  As an indicator of inflation, UNDINHX has merits as well as drawbacks, as I have pointed out on many occasions. Besides excluding imported goods, the index has a tendency to eliminate prices for domestic goods and thereby disregard inflation effects from important structural factors. But it does serve to illustrate the extent to which domestic demand pressure contributes to inflation’s path. BIS Review 28/2000  2  Monetary policy in the past year The early months of 1999 were marked by continued effects of the Asian crisis on the world economy, with weaker international demand. In order to prevent this from leading to a weaker economic trend in Sweden and thereby a lower path for inflation, the Riksbank reduced the repo rate twice, in February and March, bringing it down to 2.90%. The situation stabilised during the late spring and summer. The relatively relaxed monetary policy that had been implemented for a number of years - both in Sweden and in many other parts of the world economy - played an important part in the improvement that occurred during 1999 and contributed to more positive economic forecasts. It was then important for the Riksbank to take timely action so as not to have to implement a more pronounced monetary tightening and economic retardation to cope with rising inflationary pressure at a later stage.
In the pre-crisis period the growth of securitization was accompanied by a growing reliance on short-term funds raised in wholesale markets to finance securities and activities essential  1  I note that the set of issues relating to wholesale funding are closely related to the challenge of ending “too big to fail” I discussed in a November 15, 2012, speech (see www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/ 2012/dud121115.html). The more stable the sources of funding, the more resilient each firm would be, and the less the failure of any one firm would disrupt the provision of credit to the economy. 2  Banking groups retained a prominent role in credit supply via nonbank affiliates outside the commercial bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  to securitization. This ranged from the use of repo3 funding to finance inventories of securities held for market-making4 purposes to the issuance of asset-backed commercial paper by conduits5 created to acquire and hold securities. The increased use of short-term wholesale finance was driven both by demand and supply factors. On the demand side, it was more profitable to use shorter-term funds to finance longer-term assets. On the supply side, such funding was plentiful because it was viewed as safe and because of the growing institutionalization of savings with corporations and institutional investors in need of deposit-like products in which to place their cash balances. After all, the funds were only exposed for a short period of time, and in the case of repo, secured by collateral.

This is important because, even though we might think that our rules and regulations are now in much better shape, history tells us that the commercial incentives of firms will create pressures to find ways to minimise the impact of those rules. I am especially mindful that financial institutions will always be able to innovate faster than we are able to modify the prudential rulebook. In order to remain fit for purpose, the prudential regulatory framework must be responsive to changes in the behaviour and structure of the financial system and identify any gaps, faults or incoherence that can lead to perverse behaviour. This is why we need well-informed rule-makers and alert supervisors, who together can smell when something is off and decide what to do about it. And this is one reason, in my view, why supervision will be particularly important in the coming phase. The financial services industry that we regulate is highly developed, highly innovative and highly sophisticated. But, stripped bare of this complexity, it remains a business in which individuals need to exercise judgement, skill and care. The role of the supervisor is to observe this behaviour and form judgements about the extent to which the firm – and the individuals running it – meet the intention, as well as the letter of, the regulation. Some innovation by financial institutions in response to regulation will be intended by regulators, or, if not intended, at least benign.
(2) Considers long-term interest rates on corporate and bank bonds with over 9-year duration, except for BBB bonds, which considers more than 8-year duration. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and LVA Índices. Figure 4 Stock-index volatility (*) (annualized percentage) 60 Hungary  July-December 2011  50  France Germany Spain Russia Brazil S. Korea Chile Turkey Mexico Australia Hong Kong U.K. U.S.A. Taiwan India Colombia N. Zealand Philippines China  40 30 20  Peru  10 0 0  10  20  30  January-June 2011  40  50  60  (*) Calculated with daily return of stock indexes, base 100=2010. Data at 16 December. Fuentes: Banco Central de Chile a base de información de Bloomberg. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 Retail sales and new car sales Emploment and unemployment rate (index, centered on mean of period (1)(2) (index, 2003=100) 1990-2010) 40 225 375 30 200 300 20 10  175  225  150  150 -10  125  75  100  0  0  -20 -30 -40 90 93 96 99 02 05 08 11  06 07 08 09 10 11 Non-durables  New cars  Employment  Unemployment  Durables (1) Sold in moving quarter. (2) Seasonally-adjusted series. Sources: Chile's National Automobile Association, Central Bank of Chile, Chile's National Chamber of Commerce, and Ricaurte, M (2011), “Indicadores de Mercado Laboral para la Comparación de las Crisis Asiática y Financiera Internacional,” preliminary document, Central Bank of Chile, June.

Also, as discussed in depth in our Financial Stability Report, our financial system is well prepared to deal with more adverse conditions abroad without becoming an additional source of unrest. But as I said before, there are important risks. We are attentive to the evolution of the external scenario and its effects on our economy. We have the tools necessary to deal with adverse situations, and, most importantly, we have the firm determination to act to mitigate the impact of external environment on the Chilean economy. Now let me describe in detail the current macroeconomic scenario, our projections, the risks that remain and where our economy – particularly its financial system – stands, to address them. Macroeconomic scenario As I just said, economic and financial developments of the past few months have been dominated by events from abroad. The crisis of the Eurozone has widened and deepened as distrust builds up with respect to the region’s fiscal, banking and economic situation. All this has reflected in high volatility in global financial markets, increases in risk premiums and liquidity, falling prices of financial assets and commodities, an appreciation of the dollar and a downward revision of global growth projections (figure 1). The transmission of the global crisis to the emerging world has proceeded through the financial channel – via higher debt premiums and net capital outflows –, falling commodity prices – especially for metals and agricultural products –, and a reduction in manufacturing exports.