samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is in the interest of the countries which have already introduced the euro, but even more so in the interest of new countries entering the euro area. Without having achieved sustainable convergence, the loss of the exchange rate and interest rate instrument could cause costly tensions in the economy at the expense of growth and employment. The determined efforts of Greece to achieve such convergence have to be commended. However, it is too early to reach a firm conclusion. Next year, the European Central Bank (ECB) will produce a convergence report to analyse what has been accomplished. Let me repeat and underline that achieving convergence is not a process which ends with adopting the euro. On the contrary, being a member of the euro area and being able to benefit from the potentially great opportunities that offers call for ongoing adaptation to the new environment and the new rules of the game. It is like in sports: reaching the top is difficult, but staying there is even harder. 1  BIS Review 113/1999  Integrating one or more of the EU Member States which have not previously introduced the euro will be a challenge for the euro area. However, an even greater challenge for Europe as a whole lies ahead. I am referring to the enlargement of the European Union. First, I shall deal with that process in general. Then, I should like to say a few words about how the Eurosystem (i.e.

The criteria related to each step of the process should be implemented in a strict and effective manner, in order to provide the countries concerned with the external constraints necessary to bring their economies in line with the respective standards, while at the same time avoiding any discrimination. Of course, against a background of different starting points and varying degrees of economic transition, a plurality of approaches should be feasible without compromising equality of treatment. Indeed, we do not expect the candidate countries to join the EU or to adopt the euro in a single wave. However, irrespective of the individual time frames pursued, what is clear is that the accession process requires a significant amount of preparatory work on the part of all involved. Conclusion It is probably unnecessary for me to remind you that, whatever the Eurosystem’s involvement in the enlargement process, our primary objective is and will continue to be the maintenance of price stability in the euro area. Hence, any arrangements or other forms of cooperation with accession countries must be without prejudice to the Eurosystem’s independence and its primary objective. Nonetheless, I hope that I have conveyed the message that we at the ECB and the Eurosystem at large are also aware of how the wider economic and political environment can have implications for the fulfilment of our tasks and objectives. As central bankers we do not operate in a vacuum and this is certainly the case with regard to the Eurosystem and the prospect of EU enlargement.
This proposal is an important step to encourage a strong corporate and market focus on how Islamic financial institutions are generating value, not just for shareholders, but for the communities which they are a part of. On-going collaboration and active engagement with the industry are currently being undertaken under this initiative to ensure proactive behaviours and sustained momentum towards the creation of a sustainable development. Another precondition for long term sustainable value creations is the availability of top-notch talent to drive and execute innovative business strategies that will realise the full potential of Islamic finance. Based on market assessments, a greater pool of quality professionals are required to sustain the growth of global Islamic finance that is estimated to surpass $ trillion total assets size by 2020. The challenge in meeting this demand however goes beyond the numbers. The next phase of growth and development of Islamic finance calls for a deep talent pool that not only has a strong foundation in the application of Islamic finance principles, but also the much broader set of competencies required to use those applications effectively to provide and implement solutions to real world problems. And such talent must be developed not only within Islamic financial institutions, but also the professional ancillary service providers that are part of the Islamic finance ecosystem. In Malaysia, there are close to 40 professional ancillary services entities under the MIFC Community which play an important role in the development of Islamic finance.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated some of these factors, amplifying the challenges that the world economy, and therefore the economic and monetary authorities, will now have to contend with. But beyond the impact on the global economic outlook, the war has struck the largest blow to the international economic order since the Second World War. This dramatic event has thrown into relief the need to reinvigorate and bolster the foundations of multilateralism, which are the set of rules and values that we have established to ensure peace and prosperity. But we should also view this as a chance to give fresh impetus to international cooperation, which has contributed so much to global progress in recent decades. Such impetus means strengthening the international institutions, many of  1  which date back to the mid-20th century, so that they can respond more effectively to the new crises, such as the global financial crisis and the pandemic crisis, which are more global in nature than the typically regional crises of past decades. International institutions should equip themselves, in their respective field of competence, with the appropriate tools to prevent and respond to systemic crises. In addition, the global nature of processes such as the green transition and digitalisation means these institutions must adapt in readiness to deal with these challenges and help attain the goals and fulfil the commitments we have set ourselves in these areas.
I intend to devote today’s speech to describing what the new regulations entail, explaining the effects we can expect them to have in Sweden and presenting my view of the regulations. This means that several parts of the speech will be rather technical, but a thorough review is necessary to clarify what the new regulations actually entail. 2 Before I begin I would like to point out that although there has been a great focus on drawing up regulations that promote a more stable financial sector it is important to remember that the sector must be effective so that it can continue to manage deposits, provide loans and conduct payments. Finding a good balance between stability and effectiveness is always an important task. In my view, we have managed to achieve this balance. Why we must develop Basel II Capital inadequate in terms of quantity and quality A basic problem with the current regulations is that they allow the banks to hold far too little risk-bearing capital, and in many cases capital that is of far too poor quality. According to the Basel II regulations the capital base consists of two parts: Tier 1 (or primary) capital and Tier 2 (or supplementary) capital. Together, these should correspond to at least eight per cent of the banks’ risk-weighted assets, of which Tier 1 capital must constitute at least four per cent.

The aim is that the banks must reduce the differences in maturities between their assets and liabilities and their dependence on shortterm market funding. To achieve this, the banks must match their funding and lending to a greater extent than they do today. Assets with short maturities can have short-term funding while long-term illiquid assets, such as mortgages, will need more long-term and stable funding. All funding with a remaining maturity of more than one year will be counted as stable funding. This is a sound and important feature of the new Basel regulations. And it will probably affect the Swedish banks’ business models. Currently, none of the four major Swedish banks meet the structural liquidity measurement requirements (Net Stable Funding Ratio). This is mainly because they largely fund their lending through short-term market funding. The banks will need to think again here. In addition, a number of the Swedish banks do not meet the shortterm measurement (Liquidity Coverage Ratio) either. These banks must, before the LCR is introduced, either strengthen their liquidity buffers, for example by buying government bonds, or reduce their short-term net outflow. A weakness of the new standards is, however, that they do not contain any specific rules for matching maturities per currency. This is something Swedish authorities should look at more closely. Two thirds of Swedish banks’ market funding is in foreign currency. A certain proportion of this is converted via the swap markets to SEK and then lent.
I would like to share views on how the Eurosystem will act to address this concern, while performing their task regarding price and financial stability. Ten countries from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe - comprising 75 million inhabitants - are to join the EU, thus completing European reunification. Although their combined GDP is rather small (equivalent to that of the Netherlands for instance), in terms of population' size they will propel the EU (450 million inhabitants) largely ahead of the combined population of both the US (population: 275 million) and Russia (population: 145 million). This testifies again, if need be, to the attractiveness of the European Union framework, which has provided us with economic prosperity and political stability for almost half a century. Accession countries have accomplished important progress in stabilizing and strengthening their economies and their institutions. Observing the accession countries, recent history shows the major improvements those countries have made, in hardly 10 years, on the road towards convergence with the EU. Let us keep in mind, the sometimes rather slow pace the current Member States took, regarding for example trade openness, price liberalisation, or macro economic discipline. BIS Review 2/2003  7  Nevertheless, there is also general agreement on the fact that the gap, in terms of average GDP per capita, between the accession countries and the euro area, although diminishing, remains still quite significant.

Between 1998 and 2001, the relative share of corporate bonds issued by corporate borrowers in the euro area as a percentage of GDP has more than doubled, while it increased by one third in the United States.2  –  Competition between all issuers, corporate or sovereign, has intensified. For sovereign issuers, the disappearance of currency risk and the convergence process driven by the Maastricht Treaty have transformed government bonds into directly competing risk free assets. As a consequence, sovereign issuers have implemented strategies aimed both at differentiating their issuance profiles - in order to diversify the opportunities offered to investors - and at establishing benchmarks on a selection of maturities. This is reflected by the building up of an outstanding amount of at least 5 bios euros on the internationally important 10 years segment, in each euro area country, while issuance strategies on other segments - 2, 5, 30 years - differ, some countries building up relatively larger outstanding 3 amounts on 30 years maturities (Italy), some on 5 years maturities (Netherlands). Only a few large countries (Germany, France for instance) are able to provide a high level of liquidity on all the spectrum of maturities. This competition has provided market participants with a wider range of products that are also more standardised, which allowed for the development of electronic trading and enhanced the liquidity of the euro bond market. –  Internationalisation and competition between private issuers have been accompanied by an impressive surge in the amounts issued.
First, in a financially integrated world it has been argued that it is global monetary liquidity rather than domestic liquidity which affects domestic interest rates and domestic economic activity, mainly – though not exclusively – through its effects on liquidity premia. Second, it has been claimed that the level of longer-term domestic real interest rates is likely to be determined by global savings and investment rather than its national components. These influences can be expected to be more pronounced for smaller economies. Therefore, a smaller country which cannot affect the global supply of liquidity to any significant degree could then lose effective control of inflation. This reasoning, however, is dubious, and not supported by theory or confirmed by empirical evidence. For example, in a two-country new Keynesian model, it has been shown that, provided exchange rates are flexible, global monetary factors can affect the domestic price level only through their potential short-term effects on global output. 1 Interestingly, the sign of the spill-over effect is the opposite of what would be expected from the global liquidity hypothesis. A comparatively loose foreign monetary policy induces a depreciation of the foreign currency and has a negative impact on domestic demand and prices in the home country. The main conclusion of rigorous theoretical analysis is that monetary policy can affect domestic demand even in a fully financially integrated world and even in a small country, as long as exchange rates are flexible.

We need to learn the lessons on accounting and valuations. We need to learn the lessons on regulation and supervision. We need to learn the lessons on macroeconomic management and the interplay between the macroeconomy and the financial sector. I am still optimistic on all of these points. There is a major international effort under way to reform regulation and supervision, also regarding cross-border banking. In the wake of the Special Investigation Commission report that I mentioned earlier, I hope that Icelanders now turn to the task of facing head-on where they went wrong on top of all the international failures. And finally, I note with pleasure that the pension funds are going to draw their own lessons on where they might have done better; for instance, by being more critical going forward, as indeed we all must be. In closing, let me welcome you to Iceland and wish you an enjoyable stay and fruitful deliberations during your convention. We need to learn from our different countries’ experiences and seek out the common challenges that we face. In spite of the financial crisis, the world will remain full of interconnections and spillovers, as we can see from the spread of cash and ash across borders. Thank you very much. BIS Review 63/2010  5
Adrian, Tobias, Emmanuel Moench, and Hyun Song Shin. 2014. “Dynamic Leverage Asset Pricing.” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 625 (December). Adrian, Tobias, Erkko Etula, and Tyler Muir. 2014. “Financial Intermediaries and the CrossSection of Asset Returns.” Journal of Finance 69, no. 6 (December): 2557–96. Baldwin, Richard, et al. 2015. “Rebooting the Eurozone: Step 1 – Agreeing a Crisis Narrative.” Vox, November 20, http://www.voxeu.org/article/ez-crisis-consensus-narrative. Baldwin, Richard, and Francesco Giavazzi. 2015. “The Eurozone Crisis: A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Solutions.” Vox, September 7, http://www.voxeu.org/content/eurozone-crisis-consensus-view-causes-and-few-possiblesolutions. Bernanke, Ben S. 1983. “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression.” American Economic Review 73, no. 3: 257–76. Borio, Claudio, Mathias Drehmann, and Kostas Tsatsaronis. 2011. “Anchoring Countercyclical Capital Buffers: The Role of Credit Aggregates.” International Journal of Central Banking 7, no. 4 (December): 189–240. Carlson, Mark, et al. 2014. “The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability: Some Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion Series, November. Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmström. “Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises.” Working paper, 2012. Dang, Tri Vi, Gary Gorton, and Bengt Holmström. “Opacity and the Optimality of Debt for Liquidity Provision.” Working paper, 2009. Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity.” Journal of Political Economy 91, no. 3 (June): 401–19. Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni, Deniz Igan, Luc Laeven, and Hui Tong.2015.

The vitality of the manufacturing, financial and construction sectors, which have fuelled economic growth in our country over the past few quarters, is likely to diminish, particularly in view of the expected slowdown in global demand. Growth in Swiss GDP will probably amount to a little over 2.5% in 2006 (this is a cautious forecast), falling back slightly in 2007 yet remaining in the vicinity of 2%. Consumer prices rose 1.4% in July, marginally above our figure for core inflation, which at 1.2% is the highest since April 2002. However, these rates are well below the level of 2% that we consider the upper limit for price stability. For 2006 as a whole, we expect the average rate of inflation to remain below 1.5%, and this is unlikely to change much in 2007. With respect to monetary policy, the healthy economic outlook in both the world and domestic economies, together with the high level of capacity utilisation in manufacturing, require us to further pursue normalisation of the target range for the three-month Libor. This is particularly necessary in view of the significant relaxation in global monetary conditions – due to the depreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro – that has occurred since our last monetary policy assessment in mid-June. BIS Review 78/2006  1
When an economy goes through a period of high productivity growth and high returns on many investment projects, real interest rates will normally increase. Over time, the real interest rate must reflect the economy's longterm growth potential. When real interest rates rise in our country relative to other countries, we have to expect that the real exchange rate will move in line with the same pattern that can be observed when we increase the use of petroleum revenues in the domestic economy. There is symmetry here. A decline in productivity growth will have the opposite effect. Developments in the 1990s may, over a very long time horizon, prove to have been an episode - and the considerable structural changes in the services sector a one-off event. This would imply that the economy will tend to return to its previous path. But it is also possible that we will see a new round of pronounced productivity gains thanks to new technology and new structures. BIS Review 65/2002  5

After more than 40 years in banking, many of them in Hong Kong, he is about to retire from the field. He is thus currently much in demand among his many friends within the financial community, who wish to fete him on his retirement. He is also receiving bookings in his new, risk-taking career as popular singer and entertainer – a field in which we wish him every success. I take this opportunity to pay tribute to David for his outstanding contributions to Hong Kong during difficult and challenging times, not just in the financial sphere, but also in the many community and charitable activities in which he is involved. Ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour to welcome Governor Jaime Caruana as speaker, and Mr David Eldon as discussant. I now have much pleasure in inviting Governor Caruana to deliver the seventh HKMA Distinguished Lecture. 2  BIS Review 9/2005
A sense of self must be accompanied by a sense of the systemic. Consider four financial reforms that are helping to create this sense of the systemic and thereby rebuild trust in the system. First, ending Too-Big-To-Fail Perhaps the most severe blow to public trust was the revelation that there were scores of too-big-to-fail institutions operating at the heart of finance. Bankers made enormous sums in the run-up to the crisis and were often well compensated after it hit. In turn, taxpayers picked up the tab for their failures. That unjust sharing of risk and reward contributed directly to inequality but – more importantly – has had a corrosive effect on the broader social fabric of which finance is part and on which it relies. By replacing such implicit privilege with the full discipline of the market, social capital can be rebuilt and economic dynamism increased. The leaders of the G20 have endorsed measures to restore capitalism to the capitalists by ending too-big-to-fail and, in response, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has identified systemically important institutions; made them subject to higher standards of resilience; and developed a range of tools to ensure that, if they do fail, they can be resolved without severe disruption to the financial system and without exposing the taxpayer to loss. This is the year to complete that job. Governments must introduce legislative reforms to make all systemically important companies, including banks, resolvable. Jurisdictions must also empower supervisors to reach agreements for credible cross‐border resolution plans.

Economic and political philosophers from Adam Smith (1759) to Hayek (1960) have long recognised that beliefs are part of inherited social capital, which provides the social framework for the free market. Social capital refers to the links, shared values and beliefs in a society which encourage individuals not only to take responsibility for themselves and their families but also to trust each other and work collaboratively to support each other. 9 So what values and beliefs are the foundations of inclusive capitalism? 10 Clearly to succeed in the global economy, dynamism is essential. To align incentives across generations, a long-term perspective is required. For markets to sustain their legitimacy, they need to be not only effective but also fair. Nowhere is that need more acute than in financial markets; finance has to be trusted. And to value others demands engaged citizens who recognise their obligations to each other. In short, there needs to be a sense of society. Social capital has been eroded These beliefs and values are not necessarily fixed; they need to be nurtured. My core point is that, just as any revolution eats its children, unchecked market fundamentalism can devour the social capital essential for the long-term dynamism of capitalism itself. To counteract this tendency, individuals and their firms must have a sense of their responsibilities for the broader system. All ideologies are prone to extremes. Capitalism loses its sense of moderation when the belief in the power of the market enters the realm of faith.