samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Quite simply, it has become cheaper for the banks to borrow dollars in the market than from the Riksbank, which is a sign that the financial markets are gradually functioning better. These loans have now ceased. For simplicity’s sake I am talking about lending to the banks. But the correct designation for the group of institutions which can borrow from the Riksbank is monetary policy counterparties. Over the past year we have extended the number of counterparties who can act as counterparts in our fine-tuning transactions and introduced a new category of counterparties, known as restricted monetary policy counterparties, who can purchase  BIS Review 160/2009  7  Riksbank Certificates and take part in the Riksbank’s auctions of loans at longer maturities, without being participants in the RIX system. 1 We have also given special liquidity assistance in autumn 2008 to Kaupthing and Carnegie, which they have since repaid. All lending by the Riksbank is against collateral. Over the past year we have extended the eligible assets that can be used as collateral, but this still encompasses securities that are safe assets. The securities accepted are debt securities issued primarily by the Swedish government and by Swedish mortgage institutions. All increased lending by the Riksbank ends up in some form of increased deposit on the Riksbank’s balance sheet. While there can be long transaction chains, as all payment flows in kronor go through the banks' accounts in the RIX payment system, the money never leaves the system.

It is merely moved between the banks’ different deposit accounts with the Riksbank. The Riksbank’s lending in kronor to the banks has thus been entirely funded through deposits from the banks (Figure 8). Figure 8 The Riksbank’s deposits and lending in kronor SEK billion 400  400  300  300  200  200  100  100  lending  0  0 -100  -100  funding  -200  -200 -300 -400 Jul-08  Loans in SEK Fine-tuning Riksbank Certificates  -300 -400  Oct-08  Jan-09  Apr-09  Jul-09  Oct-09  Source: The Riksbank. The interest rates on the banks’ borrowing from the Riksbank, like the previously-discussed interest rates on the Riksbank Certificates and fine-tuning transactions, are related to the repo rate. The banks pay an interest rate that corresponds to the repo rate with a certain premium. The banks thus pay a higher interest rate for their borrowing from the Riksbank than they receive in interest on their deposits with the Riksbank. At the most recent auction of loans in SEK, for instance, the interest rate was 0.40 per cent for both fixed-interest rate loans and variable-interest rate loans. As mentioned earlier, the banks currently receive interest of 0.25 per cent on Riksbank Certificates and for fine-tuning overnight deposits they receive 0.15 per cent. In this way the Riksbank steers market rates by setting the interest rates for the Riksbank’s deposits and lending.
The projected growth in expenditure on contributory pensions in 2017 is rather higher (3.1%), as a result of the projected increase in the number of pensions and the substitution effect arising from the new pensions that replace those that are terminated, so that the weight of expenditure on pensions in total consolidated State and Social Security expenditure increases to 40.7% (as against 38.5% in 2016). Also, the reduction in expenditure on unemployment benefits, of 7%, should be noted. This is explained by the fall in unemployment and in the coverage rate of contributory benefits. On the revenue side, the main measures included in the draft budget are those that were approved on 2 December 2016 in Royal Decree-Law 3/2016. Notable among them is the amendment to corporate income tax in order to widen the tax base. As regards VAT, limits are placed on the conditions for granting deferrals, and a new system is set up for immediate supply of information. As for excise duties, the rates on alcoholic drinks and tobacco products are raised. In the case of Social Security system revenues, an increase in the maximum contribution base of 3% was approved in the above-mentioned Royal DecreeLaw.

It is also pertinent that teachers obtain quality and professional training to harness and effectively utilise computers. I therefore urge you to consider enhancing computer literacy amongst your staff. In an information age, knowledge and effective use of computers along with sound education will be the cornerstone of a vibrant, modern society. This is why our teachers are absolutely critical to the future of our economy. I have no doubt that supporting our schools in the manner that the Bank of Zambia is doing today will lead to stronger motivation and morale amongst our students and teachers alike. I am certain that we all desire a country where our  BIS Review 14/2010  1  teachers and students are proficient in using computers and extract immense value from them. This should be the vision that we should all aspire. Ladies and Gentlemen, In conclusion, I would like to urge all students present here today take an interest in using computers. Computers will assist you in your studies and make your lessons more effective, easier and enjoyable but they will not automatically make you a genius. The computer will open doors to communication, research and opportunities. Remember that the goal of computer literacy is for the user to become an explorer, and an active seeker of information which I hope you will be, with this donation. Seize what you have been bestowed with today. Guard against vandalism and use the computer facilities to ensure a brighter future for yourselves.
The level of debt, in contrast, seems to matter much less as an indicator of a turn in the financial cycle, though it does seem to matter as an indicator of the extent of the correction and the consequent damage to the economy.24 We also have a wide range of other economic and financial indicators, such as asset prices and credit conditions. We can estimate how far these are above or below an equilibrium value to help us make an assessment of where we are in the financial cycle. And, of course, macroprudential policy makers need to apply their judgment. The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England uses all of these approaches to make its assessment of the level of risk or, to put it another way, where we are in the financial cycle. And we use that assessment to inform our stress test of the core banking system so that the test becomes more severe, with higher losses and greater stress, when we judge the risks in the financial system are getting higher. But we would, in my view, benefit greatly in this area from a better understanding of how the expectations of the future that inform financial sector risk-taking are formed, the ability to use that understanding in modelling the financial cycle and better real-time information on the evolution of expectations.

Clearly, many people would now question the validity of this mindset. But have we learnt our lessons? Unfortunately, I’m not so sure we have. While most people would agree with the view that excessive debt and leveraging was a major factor leading to the crises in the US and Europe, many would still think it is possible to overcome the problems without having to deleverage or somehow avoid the pain arising from the deleveraging process. 8. On the subject of pain, most of us understand what happens when we live beyond our means through borrowings at the individual, household or corporate level. Without any increase in productivity or income, excessive levels of debt can lead to insolvency or bankruptcy, which entails very serious and unpleasant consequences. However, the situation is a lot less clear when it comes to a country incurring excessive debt because the usual bankruptcy rules do not apply. Indeed, when compared to households or corporates, there are two significant problems relating to governments spending beyond their means. First, there is the temptation for governments to continue to incur deficits as the market seems to be quite willing, at least for a while, to finance such deficits. In this context, Greece is a good recent example. Secondly, there is the usual political pressure for governments to spend and borrow now, and worry about repayment later.
So, what could have happened is that market participants, trusting central banks’ forward guidance that policy rates would stay at very low levels for an extended period, were increasingly pricing exchange rates on the basis of information about how policy would evolve in the more distant future. That is, with short-term rates broadly stable, the weight investors attached to the 8 4 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  expected future path mechanically increased – just as theory would predict.8 Term structure models can therefore provide compelling evidence that exchange rates remain deeply connected to monetary policy also when interest rates are at, or close to, the effective lower bound, even if interest rate differentials per se suggest a structural break in the relationship. Asset purchases and exchange rates But the right-hand chart also suggests that this is not the full story. A clear break emerged in late 2013. And that break is likely related to the second policy instrument I mentioned before, namely asset purchases. Although asset purchases, by removing duration risk from the market, act primarily on the term premium, they also entail a strong signalling channel, in particular at, or close to, turning points. For example, the Federal Reserve’s decision to start tapering in December 2013 triggered an appreciable increase in future expected short-term rates. You can see on the right-hand side that the ten-year expectations component differential vis-à-vis the euro area widened by more than 50 basis points in just a few months.

He has cut fuel subsidies, and carried through the unpopular decision to raise fuel prices to keep Indonesia's budget deficit from ballooning. Acceptance of the need for continued economic reforms by the population will build investor confidence. Investors remain concerned about unclear and inconsistent regulations as well as the security situation because of the threat of terrorism. They are also unhappy with the restrictive labour laws in the country. If these areas can be improved, foreign investments will stream in. Indonesia is a huge and sprawling archipelagic country consisting of almost 18,000 islands, making it very difficult for a concerted take-off in one single planeload. So it may be a better strategy to think in terms of building a fleet of smaller jets. Each one will take off when ready. Eventually, the entire fleet will take the whole country airborne. In other words, it may be more practical to focus first on some parts of this huge country. These parts can then demonstrate to the other regions what is needed to attract investors and generate growth. They can also generate the resources to help other parts to grow. Indonesia has now decided to use the strategy of SEZs to spearhead its growth. Singapore is working with Indonesia to develop SEZs in the nearby islands of Batam, Bintan and Karimun. When the SEZs in these islands succeed, they will provide the thrust and momentum for SEZs in other parts of the country to do likewise. 4  BIS Review 86/2006  Conclusion Let me conclude.
If use of the franc were to be crowded out by the euro, the Swiss National Bank would have had little  2  BIS Review 32/2004  leverage left to influence monetary conditions in our own country. It would become a paper tiger! (c)  Third, even short of a “euroization” of the Swiss economy, we feared the loss of our monetary autonomy. Given the importance of the common currency for the Swiss economy, what else could the Swiss National Bank do other than follow the European Central Bank’s monetary policy and de facto integrate the franc into the euro zone? A gradually shrinking interest-rate differential between euro and Swiss franc investments as well as a loss in monetary autonomy would have resulted. How does our recent experience relate to these concerns? 3. Our experience as an independent monetary entity  (a)  The euro/Swiss franc relationship  Our fears of a euro destabilizing the Swiss franc did not materialize. Relative to the euro, and since its introduction, the franc has been fluctuating in a relatively narrow band of plus or minus 5 percent, about four times less than against the dollar during the same period. The Swiss franc appears now to be less affected by exchange rate shocks and more shielded from speculative movements.

Wider exchange rate band The attempt to shift from the mini band to the wider band lasted for 48 hours. We knew that it had limited chances of success. Within four days we had lost almost $ 6 billion in international reserves. And the free floating exchange rate regime, supported by a solid fiscal stance, has become our new objective. The idea of widening the band under the model designed and issued as of January 13th was good, but unfortunately it came too late. Centralisation of Foreign Exchange Transactions Suggestions about centralising exchange market operations shock me. Because centralising exchange market transactions in the central bank amounts to having no foreign exchange regime, it leads the country to the moratorium, with the re-negotiation of debts. Credit lines to Brazil would be cut. It means violating the rules of the game. It would be a completely arbitrary act which would have terrible consequences. Economic Growth The first semester of this year will be hard. But I believe that from next year we will achieve high rates of growth - maybe spectacular rates of growth. Interest rates Interest rates will be kept high at first, but not for a long time. Dollarisation I do not see any case for dollarisation in Brazil. It is a little bit strange for a country to be without its own currency. There will come the day when the adoption of a single currency within the MERCOSUR will be taken into account by its member countries.
So what was the potential role of monetary policy in contributing to the crisis? The main argument blaming monetary policy for the crisis is that policy rates in the U.S. were kept too  6  Kohn (2006, 2008) specifies three conditions that should be fulfilled for central banks to take “extra action” to deal with a possible asset-price bubble: “First, policymakers must be able to identify bubbles in a timely fashion with reasonable confidence. Second, a somewhat tighter monetary policy must have a high probability that it will help to check at least some of the speculative activity. And third, the expected improvement in future economic performance that would result from the curtailment of the bubble must be sufficiently great.” He concludes, also in 2008 and after thorough considerations, that those conditions would rarely be met. 7  See Bean (2009) for an extensive and excellent discussion of the crisis, including the credit expansion and housing boom, the macroeconomic antecedents, the distorted incentives, the information problems, the amplification and propagation of the crisis into the real economy, the policy responses and the lessons for monetary policy and economics generally. 4  BIS Review 112/2009  low during the period 2001-2005, which would have contributed to the build-up of excessive credit growth and a house-price bubble (Taylor 2007). There are two relevant questions in this context about U.S. monetary policy during 2001-2005. First, was the low interest rate reasonable given the information available at the time?

One important lesson from the financial crisis is that financial factors may have a very strong and deteriorating effect on the transmission mechanism, making standard interest-rate policy much less effective. This motivates more research on how to incorporate financial factors in the standard models of the transmission mechanism used by central banks, and a rapidly increasing volume of such research is now being produced by academic and central-bank researchers and presented at an increasing number of conferences on financial factors and monetary policy. Important questions include how potential output and neutral real interest rates are affected by financial factors and financial distortions (Curdia and Woodford 2009, Walsh 2009), and what impact financial factors have on the general equilibrium effects of  6  BIS Review 112/2009  alternative policy-rate paths on inflation and resource utilization forecasts. 11 Before such extensions to the modelling framework are operational, policymakers and staff have to improvise and apply unusual amounts of judgment on the effects of the financial crisis on the transmission mechanism. Even with much better analytical foundations concerning the role of financial factors in the transmission mechanism, there will of course, as always, be considerable scope for the application of good judgment in monetary policy.
Mugur Isărescu: Developments in the Romanian economy since 2008 Speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the “Romania Investors Days” conference, Bucharest, 16 June 2015. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to witness the growing interest the investors’ community is showing towards the Romanian economy. Since this is the first reverse roadshow focused on Romania, I hope it will prove fruitful for all parties involved and that it will be followed by other similar events. In my address today, I intend to briefly touch on the most relevant developments in the Romanian economy and I guess you will agree with me that we have come a long way since the beginning of the crisis. Probably the most synthetic assessment of the transformation is given by the fact that, at the onset of the crisis, Romania fell short of all four Maastricht criteria – inflation, long-term interest rates, public deficit and debt, exchange rate stability –, but now they are all fully met. Up to 2008, Romania was going through a period of fast economic growth (in excess of 7 percent per year, on average), fuelled by large capital inflows and the strongly pro-cyclical stance of the fiscal policy, especially in the last two years before the onset of the crisis.

Integrating sustainability factors into own-portfolio management Central banks must send the right signal and lead by example in their investment and disclosure policies. The DNB has signed up to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment. Norges Bank, which manages the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund, has advocated a diversification of the portfolio and is implementing a divestment strategy dedicated to selling off some oil and gas stocks. We, at the Banque de France, adopted in March last year a Charter on Responsible Investment for the management of our own funds and our pension portfolios: this means allocating them to socially and environmentally responsible investment funds. With respect to disclosure, in March 2019 we were the first central bank to publish our climate-related risks’ exposures. We are also working to further align our reporting with a TCFD-like approach that would fit the specificities of central banks. We trust our experience will be useful to the NGFS membership in defining some best practices as far ESG investment for central banks is concerned. We can be proud of what we have achieved in 16 months, but it is “time to roll up our sleeves”: the merciless perspective of a more than 2°C world requires us to strive to do better and to do it now. Developing practical solutions now tops the agenda of the NGFS “Season 2”. II. The road ahead for central banks/supervisors and other players too a. Disclosures and taxonomies, two faces of the same coin We are currently facing a chicken and egg dilemma.
Those three or four e-wallets may hold smaller amounts of money each, but in sum might add up to more than what he/she would have otherwise held in cash in one physical wallet. He/she needs to topup each e-wallet separately, because each wallet has a different top-up and refund mechanism. b. Merchants may proudly display all the schemes that they accept, whether by card or contactless or QR codes. Underneath all that, the merchant needs to deal with different acquirers that send him settlement files in different formats, at different times, and pay him on different days. 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  c. Between the consumer and merchant, instead of counting cash and change, the payment ordeal could transform into checking which payment instrument is accepted, which card to dip into which terminal, or which QR code to scan. Fortunately, we have not reached that e-payment nightmare. While competition from many payment providers benefits consumers with lower prices, convenience and more innovative solutions, e-payments still need to interoperate in order for the industry to continue growing. Let me share three areas where MAS is enhancing interoperability of e15. payments, namely point-of-sale terminals, QR codes and regulatory powers. 1 6 . First, Unified Points of Sale (UPOS) terminals. Singapore is a highly-carded market, with over 349 payment cards per 100 inhabitants9. Many merchants, if they accept e-payments, have a terminal, usually provided by a bank acquirer. Five years ago, we started noticing that some 15% of merchants had more than one terminal. Why?

Because different banks were acquiring the same merchant so that they could offer the merchant lower on-us rates for their cards dipped in their own terminals. This was good for merchants, and even for the consumer as the merchants passed on some discounts to them. But there were hidden costs: Cashiers had to be trained on different terminals, customers at self-checkout lanes fumbled with which terminal to dip their card into. So we set out to study the market, see which merchants had more than one POS terminal, prioritise them by the volume and value of transactions that they handled, and worked closely with their acquirers one-by-one to on-board onto a single terminal that can accept all schemes that use chip and contactless near-field communication (NFC). Today, the process is still underway, but you can already see these UPOS terminals deployed in supermarkets, convenience stores and petrol stations – these are merchants that we visit daily, if not weekly. Besides addressing the challenges I mentioned above, this has certainly made the self check-out experience a delight. 17. Second, Singapore Quick Response (SGQR) code. Besides chip and contactless NFC payments, many mobile payments are optical via a Quick Response (QR) code. Just as we started to tidy up the POS terminals at merchants, we started to observe a proliferation of payment QR codes as each e-payment company deployed its own QR code sticker at each merchant’s cashier. We identified the problem early and immediately formed an industry task force comprising payment schemes and acquirers.