samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This indicates, again, the willingness of the government to undertake additional spending to support the recovery of the economy. On the monetary and financial side, the Bank of Thailand has ensured that monetary conditions remained sufficiently accommodative to support the recovery. We reduced our policy rate down to 0.5 percent which is as low as it has ever been in the history of the Bank of Thailand. In addition, financing conditions were also accommodative and supportive of economic recovery. For example, 10-year government bond yields in Thailand stand at only about 1.7 percent which is almost at a record low. Although we have not reached a zero or negative rate as we see in Japan, but for Thailand, it is a very low interest rate. For the overall liquidity, the loan to deposit ratios in the banks, as well as other measures of liquidity, indicate that overall liquidity is high. Nevertheless, the problem is that not all the liquidity is going where it needs to. In particular, we would like to see more liquidity being distributed to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). If we look at credit growth in Thailand and this is another illustration of my point that overall liquidity in Thailand remains adequate, credit growth to large corporates has been growing at over 10 percent a year. Even for the household sector, credit growth has also been growing at about 4 percent a year. However, the segment where credit growth has been shrinking is the SMEs.

2  Walker, David (July 2009), "A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities", Her Majesty's Treasury; G20 Working Group 1 (March 2009), "Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency", G20; OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance (May 2009), "Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis - Key Findings and Main Messages", OECD. 2  BIS Review 147/2009  complacent. We must not let up in our efforts to improve our regulations and codes, as well as in the actual practices and governance culture. As part of this effort, I am pleased to announce that we will be establishing a Corporate Governance Council, comprising members from the private and public sectors. The objective of the Council will be to promote a high standard of corporate governance in companies listed in Singapore so as to maintain and enhance investors' confidence. In turn, this will enhance Singapore's reputation as a leading and trusted financial centre, and benefit all players involved. In conceptualising the Corporate Governance Council, the CCDG serves as a useful reference. Unlike the CCDG, which also had responsibility for promulgating accounting standards and improving disclosure practices, the Corporate Governance Council's focus will be squarely on corporate governance matters. Among the Council's roles will be the identification of opportunities for continuing professional development of directors and the development of practical guidance for Board committees. By taking into account perspectives of relevant stakeholders, the Council can develop initiatives that are robust and balanced, and achieve broad support and alignment of all parties.
When monetary policy is the only available instrument, the presence of the banking friction leads the monetary authority to set the policy rate at a lower level than it would if the friction were absent, in order to boost output and moderate the decline in bank capital. Subsequently, the policy rate is returned to around its steady-state level and inflation is stabilised by the emerging output gap. The lower path for capital (and therefore investment) is maintained by a lower level of bank capital as the leverage ratio returns to its previous level. The case when both instruments are available is more complex. The ability to use two instruments allows the policy maker to manipulate the capital to labour ratio by boosting credit supply (through a reduction in the bank levy) and constraining labour supply (through a  13  Though note that this implies a countercyclical leverage ratio, which is somewhat at odds with experience. BIS Review 111/2010  21  higher nominal interest rate). The substitution of capital for labour reduces the marginal cost of output, holding down inflation for a given level of output. Moreover, it puts capital and output onto paths with much narrower gaps. But this capital-friendly policy boosts the current return on, and price of, capital. Without an immediate rise in the bank levy, future credit supply would be too high. It is this which gives rise to the rather odd oscillation in the bank levy/subsidy.

The model includes the standard macroeconomic variables appearing in New Keynesian descriptions of monetary policy: real GDP growth, CPI inflation and a short-term nominal interest rate. In addition, the model also includes a set of variables relating to credit and asset prices: total credit growth; the spread of investmentgrade corporate bonds over government bonds, as a general indicator of credit spreads; and house price inflation. To capture the potential impact of the Great Moderation on perceptions of the riskiness of the environment, we also include a measure of macroeconomic volatility. This is generated from an auxiliary factor stochastic-volatility model, which estimates the common time-varying volatility in a set of key macroeconomic variables (GDP, consumption, investment, exports, imports and inflation). The resulting series are shown in Chart 2, together with estimated one standard deviation confidence intervals, and have the characteristics that one would expect: high in the Seventies and early Eighties, then falling back as the period of the Great Moderation wears on, and rising sharply with the onset of the financial crisis and the Great Contraction. We envisage a set of seven underlying fundamental shocks driving these seven variables: an aggregate demand shock; an aggregate supply shock; a monetary policy shock; a macroeconomic volatility shock; a credit demand shock; a credit supply shock; and a house price shock. The first three of these are conventional in nature. The fourth captures changes in the riskiness of the macroeconomic environment.
(2008). 12  The relevant literature tries to integrate standard or workhorse models of financial frictions (such as the Bernanke-Gertler (1989) model of the financial accelerator and the Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) model of credit cycles) into a New Keynesian “sticky” price model. Examples of this literature include Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). The only way the addition of a financial sector “matters” in these models is if we contemplate exogenous shocks to the financial friction itself. That is not very instructive. Several interesting papers presented at a Federal Reserve conference in Washington in March 2012 analysed a wide variety of potential “financial frictions” that might create externalities that would justify a policy intervention. My concern is that there seems no limit to the ingenuity of economists to identify such market failures, but no one of these frictions seems large enough to play a part in a macroeconomic model of financial stability. So it is not surprising that it has proved hard to find examples of frictions that generate quantitatively interesting trade-offs between price and financial stability – the finding in these models is that overwhelmingly the most important objective remains stabilisation of inflation. 13  Focussing on small deviations around the linearization of the steady-state of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model helped to divert attention away from the gradual build up of big risks.

Against this backdrop, I will refer to Max Weber’s distinction between ethics of conviction –  Page 5 sur 10 a driver for a broad mandate but also to a risk of overpromising what central banks can actually deliver – and ethics of responsibility – a driver for realism and a more focused mandate. The Eurosystem’s answer to that question consists of a clearly hierarchical mandate, with one primary objective, price stability; if fulfilled, we can and must contribute to its secondary objectives of economic growth, social cohesion or the environment. In addition to preventing potentially conflicting objectives, achieving price stability is like killing two birds with one stone: monetary policy can mitigate income inequality by affecting the movements in and out of unemployment through its effects on the business cycle.iii And let me clarify that the Eurosystem’s strong commitment to fight climate change is motivated first and foremost by its profound implications for price stability, through impacts on the economy and the financial system. In other words, we are acting in the very name of our existing mandate. Inflation has accelerated significantly over the past year, reaching 9.1% in the euro area in August and 8.3% in the United States. Monetary normalisation is consequently fully warranted in the euro area among others. It’s too early to tell the final interest rates. But the neutral rate R* helps us to give some light on the first part of the journey.
The Federal Reserve used a lender-of-last-resort authority it had been granted in the 1930s under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to facilitate the transaction. Further, on that Sunday, March 16, the Federal Reserve announced the introduction of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), an emergency extension of the standard discount window facilities to primary dealers. Finally two days later on March 18, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cut the fed funds target by 75 basis points, bringing the total decrease in the target since the start of the crisis to 300 basis points. At that time, many saw this point as the peak of the crisis and assumed that the weaknesses in the financial and regulatory system would be fixed as the crisis subsided. 2  The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society. 3  Primary dealers are broker-dealers who trade in government securities directly with the Federal Reserve. BIS Review 81/2010  3  At this point, it is worth spending a moment to explain in a little more detail the basic elements of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, a provision that had only previously been used for relatively small loans in the 1930s. 4 Section 13(3) allows a Federal Reserve Bank to lend to any individual, partnership or corporation under the authority of a supermajority of the Federal Reserve Board in unusual and exigent circumstances, if adequate credit accommodations are not available from other banking institutions and if the Federal Reserve Bank is secured to its satisfaction.

Emissions need to fall at a much faster pace than seen so far if we want to avert irreversible damage. I am hopeful that the lessons we draw from the COVID-19 crisis may end up helping to tackle climate risks, not least by showing us that when faced with global challenges, we need to – and indeed can – respond with joint solutions. To reduce carbon emissions all the way to zero by 2050, joint action at the global level is just as vital. Today I have listed some of the ways in which, through our supervisory action and as part of international networks, the ECB is compelling banks to account for climate change – when managing risks, selecting their board members and devising stress scenarios. Climate-related risks show up in the already existing risk categories – as such, we will treat them with the same rigour, toughness and importance as we treat other material risks. And we expect banks to do the same. Urgent action is not an option; it is an imperative. 1 OECD (2017), Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth, May. 2 International Energy Agency (2021), Global Energy Review, April. 3 See the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society entitled “Explaining Extreme Events from a Climate  Perspective”; and the Climate Signals database. 4 ECB (2020), Financial Stability Review, May. 5 De Guindos, L. (2021), “Shining a light on climate risks: the ECB’s economy-wide climate stress test”, The ECB  Blog, 18 March. 6 Available on the ECB Banking Supervision website.
after an inflation target was set for monetary policy and the króna was floated, the Central Bank has no specific objective as regards defending the exchange rate of the króna, which is determined on a day-to-day basis by supply and demand in the domestic forex market. Various factors affect currency flows, such as interest rates and the interest rate differential with abroad, the merchandise and services balance and, last but not least, expectations about the future. BIS Review 8/2003  3  It may also be noted that, since the autumn, the Central Bank has regularly purchased foreign currency in the domestic interbank market. The purpose of such purchases is to boost the Bank’s foreign reserve, which was significantly depleted during its efforts to control the slide in the króna in 2000 and 2001, and not to influence the exchange rate, although undoubtedly they do so to some extent. The Bank’s experience shows that direct intervention in the forex market with the aim of influencing the exchange rate of the króna only has a short-term effect at best. Regular foreign exchange purchases were stepped up in January and again in February. Now, the Bank purchases 1½ million US dollars daily and has purchased the equivalent of 11 b.kr. since the autumn. In the Central Bank’s view, various factors may have caused the króna to strengthen in recent weeks, not least expectations about the east Iceland construction projects, a possible underestimation of the degree of slack in the economy at the moment, and increased fishing quotas.

There was already some inflation in spring 2001 and a rapid slide in the exchange rate of the króna until the end of November 2001 caused inflation to increase substantially, from around 4% when inflation targeting was adopted to 9½% in the beginning of 2002. Inflation surged following heavy demand pressure in the economy which was driven by large-scale credit expansion and resulted in an enormous current account deficit, peaking in 2000 at 10% of GDP. For most of the period of overheating the Central Bank did not follow a direct inflation target and the backbone of monetary policy was a fixed exchange rate, with a fluctuation band, i.e. a soft exchange rate peg. Nonetheless, the Central Bank sought to counter inflationary pressures as soon as 1999 and began raising interest rates, which caused the króna to strengthen until spring 2000. Expectations changed then, partly under the impact of the wide current account deficit, and the currency inflow diminished. A downward exchange rate trend then began. The Bank raised its policy interest rate in phases until the end of 2000 when it reached 11.4%, where it remained until spring 2001 when a minor cut was made. The interest rate remained unchanged until late 2001 when the Bank felt it could discern clear signs that inflation was beginning to come down again. By then, the exchange rate of the króna had fallen by almost one-third from its highest point in spring 2000.
Monsieur Trichet éclaire les conditions du succès de l’euro Discours de Jean-Claude Trichet, le Gouverneur de la Banque de France, à la conférence de la Banque Centrale de Hesse tenue à Francfort le 22/2/99. Monsieur le Président, Mesdames et Messieurs, c’est un grand plaisir et un honneur pour moi d’intervenir ici, à l’invitation de la Landeszentralbank de Hesse et du Center for Financial Studies de l’Université de Francfort, en compagnie de conférenciers aussi remarquables. Aussi je tiens à vous remercier de me donner l’occasion d’évoquer avec vous l’Union monétaire européenne et l’avénement de l’euro. Il y a un peu plus d’un mois, s’est produit un événement unique dans l’histoire de l’Europe. L’euro est né et le caractère irréversible de ce changement a convaincu un nombre croissant d’acteurs de la scène politique et économique que le succès de l’euro était une nécessité pour l’Europe et le reste du monde. Il représente la clé de voûte du marché unique européen qui assurera la prospérité en Europe. Mais, pour rendre ce succès durable, nous allons devoir affronter, aujourd’hui et demain, un certain nombre de défis. Les banques centrales sont au cœur du passage à l’euro, à la fois au niveau européen et au sein de leurs économies nationales.

(a)  Do we need an IMF? The apparent success of central banks has led some economists to argue that the widespread adoption of inflation targets and floating exchange rates is sufficient to ensure the smooth running of the international monetary system – a regime which Professor Andrew Rose calls the ‘reverse Bretton Woods system’. There is no need for an international institution such as the IMF to watch over the system. It is certainly true that the most important thing any nation state can do to minimise the spillover effects it has on others is to maintain domestic economic stability. And that is exactly what Australia, Britain, and other countries have done during the recent period of economic success, known as the “Great Stability”. But domestic stability is not sufficient to eliminate spillover effects. The impact of national macroeconomic policy decisions is transmitted to other countries through important prices in the world economy: real exchange rates; real interest rates, and prices of important commodities like oil. Changes in spending by US households affect export demand in the rest of the world, both directly and indirectly through movements in the dollar. Changes in saving by governments in Asia affect spending in the rest of the world through movements in real interest rates. Changes in the supply of oil from the Middle East affect incomes and spending elsewhere through movements in oil prices.
More work will have to be done on this as a case study but, at face value, the fact that US Treasury yields could move by over 100bps just on speculation of a small reduction in the rate of purchases, confirms that asset purchases in the US must have been having a very sizable effect on market prices, at least as large as the quantitative estimates that have previously been made.4 And the degree of reaction in UK gilt yields makes it clear that there have been large international spillovers – a point which some previous research has also noted.5 The degree of correlation since May has been striking and for shorter-term rates, it is possible that it has been exacerbated by poor liquidity in money markets and hence over-done. Given how the recoveries have differed in scale and nature – the US economy has grown much more than the UK since the recession, and has not suffered the same collapse in productivity – one would surely expect the prospects for monetary policy to be quite different in the two jurisdictions. A final issue I want to raise is whether market behaviour has been affected by regulatory changes. Over the past year or so many of the reforms being introduced internationally have been implemented or anticipated. In particular the future rules on capital and liquidity have become clearer, and proprietary trading has largely relocated away from the traditional intermediaries as a result of the “Volcker Rule”.

After the introduction of the euro the issue of potentially new co-operation modes has been raised repeatedly, This is also discussed at the Convention on the Future of Europe. Figuratively speaking, the question means which policy measures foster the best utilisation of the possibilities offered by the single currency. C.  Challenges facing Estonian economy on its way to the European Union - the EU perspective  The first priority issue is naturally the further improvement of the EU internal market. The on-going convergence and improved operational efficiency of the internal market will make prices more flexible and allow better use of resources. It is extremely important to develop the common market for all goods and services, including telecommunication services and other utilities - also financial services in order to ensure free competition and price formation based on the demand and supply on the Pan-European market. A well-functioning common market should help to reduce transaction costs, by offering more and more services via the internet, for example. A common innovation policy, system of business support measures and dissemination of experience of different businesses, availability of start-up capital - all this is deemed to promote productivity and further convergence. BIS Review 51/2002  5  Flexibility and mobility of production factors Another set of critical issues is related to flexibility and mobility of production factors. Here I must stress the importance of capital and labour market flexibility. Both need all possible support in order to increase the efficient use of resources in the common market economies.
The disadvantages of not having a developed bond market were brought home to us during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. An efficient and mature bond market can play an important role during times when the other channels of financial intermediation - the banks and the equity markets - falter or fail. In particular, through developing an alternative source of funding, the corporate sector can reduce its over-reliance on short-term foreign currency loans. A sound and healthy corporate sector contributes directly to macroeconomic and financial stability. Improved financial intermediation also brings such microeconomic benefits as efficiency gains and diversification of tools for both borrowers and savers. The absence of a developed bond market in the region was one of the main factors behind the extreme volatility that precipitated the Asian financial crisis. The crisis itself spurred governments in the region to focus on bond market development. This has been one of the positive, constructive outcomes of the crisis, and this is the area in which most progress has been made. It is heartening that the lasting response to the crisis has been to develop rather than to restrict markets. Since the crisis, other important reasons for a stronger, deeper and broader debt market in the region have come to the fore. The strong current account performance of economies in the region has led to a very sizeable accumulation of reserves by the public sector.

Chile) External prices (in $  1.9 2.9 3.1 2.5 1.5 6.7 1.8 -1.5 -2.7  4.7 3.3 3.4 2.8 2.2 6.5 1.7 1.1 2.4  LME copper price $ WTI oil price $ Brent oil price $ Gasoline parity price $ Libor $ (nominal, 90 days)  221 43 44 389 0.7  255 50 53 453 1.5  Sep.17 Report  2018 (f) Jun.17 Report  2019 (f) Sep.17 Report  Sep.17 Report  (annual change, percent) 8.5 -0.5 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.5 2.9 2.9 2.1 2.3 6.7 6.3 1.9 1.7 1.1 2.2 3.2 1.4 (levels) 275 250 49 51 52 53 450 447 1.4 2.5  0.0 3.5 3.6 3.0 2.3 6.4 1.7 2.1 1.6  -1.8 3.4 3.6 2.9 2.2 6.1 1.7 2.4 2.3  275 49 52 440 2.3  270 49 52 435 3.0  (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 9 Activity gap (*) (percentage points)  4  4  2  2 Sep.17 Report  0  0  -2  -2 Jun.17 Report  -4  -4  -6  -6 02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  18  20  (*) Gray area shows lowest and highest gap estimates using different estimation methods for potential GDP (HP, SVAR, MEP, FMV, trivariate filter and SSA). See Fornero and Zúñiga (2017). Source: Central Bank of Chile.