samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We see that as we move further down on the list, fewer countries satisfy the criteria. Based on this approach, Norges Bank is among the five most transparent central banks, as we satisfy every criterion on the “natural order”. The point I will make by showing this is not to win transparency competitions, but to illustrate that transparency has many dimensions, and there is no unique way to measure it. As a general guideline, Norges Bank applies Wim Duisenberg’s definition of transparency: The external communication reflects the internal deliberations. 10 When assessing whether we should publish a given piece of information, we do not ask ourselves if there are any good reasons for publishing it. Instead, we ask ourselves if we have any good reasons for not publishing it. Usually, we find no convincing arguments for not publishing what we find useful in the internal deliberations. An argument often heard against publishing certain information is that the public might misinterpret it or put excessive weight on it. However, the danger of misleading the public by providing additional information could also be seen as an advantage: It forces us to be clear and pedagogic in our communication. Transparency is, however, not just a means to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and discipline in the internal decision process. We should not forget that transparency is important for democratic accountability. Central banks have gained considerable independence during the last 20 years, and central bank independence is probably an important commitment mechanism for securing price stability.

If these are not of sufficient quality, we will be criticised. Public scrutiny disciplines the internal process and, I believe, results in better monetary policy. 4  BIS Review 132/2008  Measuring transparency Even if I have focused on certain dimensions of transparency, such as openness about our intentions for future interest rate decisions, transparency has many other dimensions. Petra Geraats 4 distinguishes between five dimensions of transparency: 1. Political transparency refers to openness about policy objectives  2. Economic transparency focuses on the economic information that is used for monetary policy  3. Procedural transparency is about the way monetary policy decisions are taken  4. Policy transparency refers to the announcement and explanation of policy decisions  5. Operational transparency concerns the implementation of the central bank’s policy actions  Due to the many dimensions of transparency, it is not possible to talk about transparency as if it were a one-dimensional concept. One could claim that some central banks are more transparent than others in some particular dimensions, but it is difficult – if not impossible – to measure overall transparency by a single metric in a precise and non-controversial way. However, for some research purposes, for example for cross-country comparisons and for analysing historical developments, it is useful to try to measure overall transparency by a single metric.
Let’s be clear that the business model and the risk are owned by the firm – the PRA’s job is make sure that a firm’s approach to risk management is sound and that their policy holders are adequately protected. I believe Solvency II will help to do this. It will introduce greater risk-sensitivity; co-operation across jurisdictions; and consistency in approach. Being a risk-based regime means that insurers should be able to evolve and adapt to capture all risks they are exposed to and the qualitative risk assessment introduced under Pillar II will further support this move towards a more responsive, reflective and adaptable solvency regime. This in turn will mean that insurers will need to think carefully about the risks they are exposed to and how this is captured and managed. This does not mean that Solvency II should dictate firms’ business models. Rather, market forces and expectations of policy holders will inform insurers’ pricing and strategies. As referred to earlier, there is much we can do to prepare for the future by learning from mistakes of the past. One such area where this should be borne in mind is in the use of risk models which will play a huge role in Solvency II for the larger, more complicated firms. Firms need to be able to understand their models and their limitations, and be able to challenge them. As the Governor said last year: “The dangers of using poorly designed models were made all too clear in the banking sector.

Let me express a clear personal opinion; financial crises of the past were often, in large part, created by the people at the top making poor decisions – people not possessing the right information; not having due regard for risk; not being properly incentivised. Significant failures have often had their roots in poor governance with insufficient checks and balances to the decisions of powerful individuals. Strong, effective systems of oversight and risk management are paramount in meeting the PRA’s objectives for the safety and soundness of firms and insurance policyholder protection. Not surprisingly, governance issues are consistently at, or near the top, of the PRA’s agenda whether for banks or insurers. I can safely predict that this focus is not about to lessen any time soon. Firms in tomorrow’s world need to aim for governance best practice. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The recent banking crises further illustrated that one of the most obvious ways in which financial stability can be undermined is through disorderly firm failure and the consequent disruption of financial services. The PRA’s stance is that unsuccessful business models need to be allowed to fail, but that failure should be in an orderly manner so as not to disrupt the provision of core financial services. And I think we would all agree that the taxpayer should not be asked to bail out a failed firm. One difference from banking is that failing insurers usually do exit in an orderly manner.
The banks borrowed the foreign currencies abroad and on-lent them to customers, avoiding open exchange risk exposures. However, when the krona was attacked and the fixed exchange rate subsequently had to be abandoned, banks were doubly affected. Foreign counterparties, perceiving the banks’ weakened position, reduced or withdrew credit lines. This forced the banks to demand either early repayment from customers or loan conversion into domestic currency. This led, in turn, to sharply increased loan losses because, at short notice, borrowers were unable to raise the larger amounts in krona that were needed to repay the foreign currency loans, which the krona’s depreciation had made much more expensive. Neither had the supervisory authority, the Bank Inspectorate, adjusted. It continued its traditional formal supervision, ensuring that reports, permits et cetera were formally correct, rather than supervising the actual risks. The authority was also somewhat complacent about risks (to be frank, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance should share the blame for this) since BIS Review 65/1998  -3-  Sweden had not experienced a financial crisis since the 1930s. Lacking relevant crisis experience, the authorities did not perceive that the 1980s could pave the way to a new financial crisis. The decade was, after all, characterised by sustained economic growth, rising bank profits and extremely low loan losses. The financial weaknesses I have described so far are quite similar in Sweden and Korea. However, some differences should also be noted: •  In Sweden, banks had built up good capital reserves.

Caleb M Fundanga: The importance of multi-cultural awareness and language learning Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia, Lusaka, 22 December 2010. *  *  *  The Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Zambia, H.E Mr. Li Qiangmin The Chairperson – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr Li Tie The Deputy Governor Administration – Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula The Deputy Governor Operations – Dr Austin Mwape The Principal – Chinese International School in Zambia, Mr. Tan Haitao Distinguished Teachers from the Chinese International School in Zambia Colleagues from the Bank Members of the Press Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen It gives me great delight, on behalf of the Bank of Zambia, to welcome you all to this important signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Bank of Zambia and the Chinese International School in Zambia. The MoU that we are about to sign today provides a framework for the provision of Chinese language lessons to members of staff at the Bank of Zambia. Your Excellency, the Bank of Zambia attaches great importance to the need for staff to learn other international languages. In the process of both economic globalization and diversity of culture, language has become more and more important.
Speech given Nishkam High School, Birmingham. Available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/speech/2017/everyday-economics. ING – Economics Network. 2017. “ING-Economics Network survey of the public understanding of economics”. Available at: https://www.economicsnetwork.ac.uk/research/understandingecon. Laibson, D. 1997. “Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, pp. 443-477. Mullainathan, S. and Shafir, E. 2013. “Scarcity”. Allen Lane. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6

Ranee Jayamaha: Promoting credit culture and expediting the process of debt recovery Speech by Dr Ranee Jayamaha, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, at a workshop on proposed law on restructuring of sick industries and other legal issues at the Centre for Banking Studies, Rajagiriya, 1 February 2005. *  *  *  Honourable Mr K C Kamalasabayson, Attorney General, Mr Sumant Batra the Guest Speaker from India, distinguish guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am happy to be associated with this Workshop aimed at deliberating on vital issues relating to the proposed law on Restructuring of Sick Industries, and other legal and financial system issues on debt recovery by financial institutions. As you are aware, the two core objectives of the Central Bank are: to secure economic and price stability and financial system stability with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of productive resources of the Country. Debt recovery is one of the core elements of financial system stability and it depends on the performance of economic sectors, the industrial sector being one of the important areas. This is why the Central Bank has been interested in promoting credit culture and expediting the process of debt recovery. In recognition of this, in the year 1990, the Central Bank was associated in the enactment of a package of fourteen Debt Recovery Related laws.
But the more important question remains whether the institutional framework for overseeing financial markets, seeking to prevent crises and, when prevention fails, to manage them, is adequate. Open financial markets will always be prone to bouts of irrational exuberance, but do we do enough to contain the collateral damage which excessive volatility can cause? Some academics, notably John Eatwell at Cambridge, argue that we need a fundamental recasting of the international financial institutions. He favours the creation of World Financial Authority charged with setting the regulatory framework for financial markets across the globe, and endowed with powers of intervention when crisis threatens. His arguments are persuasive, but it seems unlikely that countries will be prepared to cede sovereignty to such an authority on a scale which would be necessary to make it work effectively. There have been many other less ambitious proposals, both from within the IMF and the World Bank, and from individual countries. For a time it seemed as though the creative departments of every  BIS Review 25/2003  1  Finance Ministry in the world – if that is not an oxymoron – were engaged in a kind of architectural competition to draw up a new set of relationships between the international financial institutions, their member countries, and the key regulatory organisations in the financial sector. On the face of it, the changes made as a result of this frenzy of creativity have been very modest. No major new institutions have been set up.

The Icelandic banking sector experienced a dramatic expansion in just a few years, funded by cheap foreign financing, which allowed it to boost its assets from 100 to almost 900 percent of GDP between 2004 and end-2007. This expansion made the Icelandic banking system one of the largest in the world in relation to GDP. As global conditions deteriorated in early 2008, banks’ CDS spreads rose to unprecedented levels. In response, banks slowed lending growth, enhanced liquidity buffers, reduced costs, and started a process of downsizing non-core operations and laying off staff. But their ability to deleverage was limited by the global risk aversion. A recent FSAP update and Article IV Consultation conducted in June 2008 pointed to several risks that were mounting throughout 2008: (i) liquidity and funding risks, associated with the banks’ reliance on market funding and their large funding needs over the short run; (ii) credit and market risks, resulting from foreign currency, equity exposures, and high indebtedness of domestic borrowers, as well as collateralized lending, connected lending, and large exposures; (iii) operational risks, associated with the banks’ rapid expansion in recent years; and (iv) quality of capital risks, related to complex ownership structures. In this light, the Staff Report concluded that “if risks were to materialize in full, Iceland could face severe financial strains.” Despite the authorities’ attempts to prepare for contingencies earlier in the year, the crisis brought down the three main banks within a week.
It is one of the most robust interbank clearing systems in the world, and is a very important piece of financial infrastructure contributing greatly to financial stability in Hong Kong. But in running the system, the HKMA cannot avoid lending to the banks at the end of the day to effect what are really residual interbank payments. But in providing such liquidity money is created in the form of a larger overnight balance of the banking system that appears not to be directly matched by an increase in the holding of foreign reserves by the HKMA. BIS Review 19/1998  - 11 40. However, the manner in which this “last resort” liquidity is provided does not involve any real conflict with the discipline of the currency board system. Lending through the LAF is organized largely through a repo arrangement of paper issued by the HKMA22. Such paper, in the form of Exchange Fund Bills and Notes, are liabilities of the HKMA which are fully backed by foreign currency assets. The HKMA runs an Exchange Fund debt programme involving the issue of debt instruments of maturity from three months to ten years. The proceeds of such issues have largely been switched into foreign currency assets. In any case, with a real time payment system, overnight lending in the term of repos through the LAF, though essential, is infrequent and the money is to be repaid the first thing in the following morning.

To banks, we urge you to embrace fintech, and join the CDI platform. To data providers, we invite you to contribute meaningful data, such as logistics data and procurement data between buyers and suppliers, to enrich the types of data available. To SME owners, we encourage you to contact your bank and understand more about CDI. Together, we can take Hong Kong’s data ecosystem to new heights, and ultimately contribute to bridging the global trade financing gap. 15. The benefits of a more digitally integrated trade finance system are plentiful, that much is certain; and the HKMA strives to help bring about an enhanced system in collaboration with different stakeholders. We look forward to working with the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Fung Group in this regard so that the needs of the underserved segments can be better catered for. 16. Before I close, I’d like to take this opportunity to offer you a glimpse of the HKMA’s vision of digitalising cross-border trade. For those of you who have been following our CBDC developments closely, you will know that we are working on a project called mBridge. We have already developed a trial CBDC platform, and it has proven ability to speed up crossborder payments from multiple days to near real-time. 17. We are now exploring the feasibility of connecting eTradeConnect, CDI, and mBridge to strengthen the synergy between the three and further digitalise the cross-border trade process.
Let me share with you another observation from Preet Bharara. A common element in many of the frauds his office has prosecuted is the failure of colleagues to call out bad conduct by raising their hands. This is so telling of a culture that condones or promotes misconduct. People see something, but do not say something. And, it is so shortsighted. It prevents problems from being addressed while they are small. By not raising their hands, these colleagues are “quietly adding risk to your books [and] invisibly enlarging your liabilities.”8 They are also tacitly encouraging bad conduct by skewing incentives. There may be many reasons for choosing silence over raising your hand. You may face a conflict of loyalties. It’s uncomfortable to tell on a colleague. You may think that the problem will just go away, or that calling attention to a problem will harm the firm. Raising your hand is difficult. But, it is also absolutely necessary. As rising leaders in the industry, you need to lead by 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  example. In doing so, you will make it easier for others to follow your lead. My final message is a request that each of you commit to a candid assessment of yourselves, your firms and your industry. For Adam Smith, candid observation was a cornerstone of economic behavior: “We suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behavior, and endeavor to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us.

Research must be designed like an increasing spiral, where the newly gained knowledge in philosophy, economic history, empiric research and application of mathematic and statistical models must return to the starting point to confront the set of all new and old problems, prove the generality of its application, and evaluate the set of potential externalities. As I mentioned at the beginning, this is the 100th jubilee of Albania’s independence and our annual conference this year focused on the development of monetary policy during the last  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  100 years and paid particular attention to the impact that domestic and international political and economic events have had on the nature of the central bank and its monetary policy. Addressing the mixture of historic and economic developments, the large variety of monetary regimes, abrupt swings in economic, politic and philosophy systems, and modern economics was amazingly refreshing, interesting, and thought-provoking. It certainly deserves more attention. Our traditional approach to research has largely contributed to our understanding of monetary and financial stability issues and models with a large set of parameters, forecasts and shock analysis. It has enriched the envelope of models and methodologies that are available in the process of policy design and implementation and has increased our confidence. However, it is time to go deeper in the understanding the fundamental of economic behaviour as an individual and social phenomenon. This understanding requires, among others, proficient research in economic history and economic behaviour and economic welfare.
José De Gregorio: Exchange rate and export development Speech by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the Special Session on Exchange Rate at the Chamber of Deputies and the 23rd National Meeting of Fruit and Vegetable Producers, Santiago de Chile, 6 October 2010. *  *  *  Chile has prospered during recent decades thanks to globalization. Having tried various strategies, we can say we have reached consensus on this matter. For an economy of our size and characteristics, opening up to the rest of the world is essential for creating the competition and efficiency that will stimulate development. Four decades ago, this idea was a voice in the desert in developing economies, but today it is the accepted norm. There is also consensus that monetary and exchange policy should be conducted by an autonomous central bank, and that fiscal policy should be governed by transparent, predictable and sustainable rules. After much trial and error, our country adopted an institutionality that has allowed us to walk through complex international situations with relative stability. Today I would like to discuss how we at the Central Bank of Chile view the challenges facing export development, in particular with regard to monetary and exchange-rate policy. Let me open by explaining the four principles guiding our decisions, so I can clarify some misconceptions with respect to the Central Bank and the exchange rate.

The effects of exchange rate fluctuations on activity are an important factor in our evaluation of the inflation outlook and in our monetary policy decisions. At the present time, interest rate differentials with developed economies are well below historic averages and the interest rate is still below normal levels. The fourth principle I want to discuss is that stronger countries generally have stronger currencies. In other words, the purchasing power of their wage packets is comparatively greater as these economies outpace the rest of the world. We could discuss many more factors, such as ways to mitigate appreciation, what circumstantial factors spur it, etc. At the end of the day, what we need is to transform the cyclical strength of our economy into greater productivity which will increase our potential for growth. But it is important to note that this principle does not work the other way around. In the past we have been obnubilated equating a strong currency with a strong economy, but we soon had to realize that the strength of the currency was not due to a fundamentally sound economy but rather the outcome of policies inducing currency misalignment. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that I have not included a flexible exchange rate as one of the principles, in order to avoid dogmatism. But in our country, experience overwhelmingly shows that exchange rate flexibility, managed pragmatically, is the most adequate system for us.