samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And, even more important, HLIs play no role in traditional financial intermediation, i.e., they are not involved in the savings and loans business. Hence, the failure of one or more important HLIs would not directly encumber the real economy. HLIs do not represent a direct threat to financial stability. The main concern with regard to financial stability is that the failures of one or more large HLIs could have a severe impact on systemically important banks and, as such, constitute an indirect threat to the financial system. We see two channels through which such a shock could be transmitted to the banking sector. 6 First transmission channel: banks as counterparties and creditors By providing leverage, acting as counterparty or serving as prime brokers, large international banks are directly exposed vis-à-vis HLIs. When a HLI incurs losses, this has a direct impact on the bank. Depending on the size of the open position vis-à-vis the HLI, this might threaten the bank's solvency in an extreme case. The effective risk emanating from HLIs depends primarily on the margin and collateral requirements set by the banks. These requirements help not only to constrain losses but also to determine the amount of leverage HLIs are allowed to use. Moreover, banks can partially hedge their risk and diversify their exposures. In general, we do not see a substantial difference between banks’ exposures to HLIs and other risky exposures, such as, for instance, derivatives.

We are making headway in our strategy to position Singapore as an e-trading hub for FX, facilitating better price discovery during Asian hours and better execution for players in the region. XTX Markets, a global FX liquidity provider, has announced its plans to set up its pricing and trading engine in Singapore. We are working with other key banks and e-trading platforms in the pipeline. JOBS AND SKILLS Let me move on to the second pillar of the ITM—jobs and skills. More finance professionals are going for training and development. Some 27,000 financial industry professionals have benefited from SkillsFuture programmes during 2016-2017. There remains, however, a shortfall of specialised talent in IT—which we are addressing in two ways: MAS, IMDA, the Institute of Banking and Finance and institutes of higher learning are working together to deepen the local IT talent pool at the entry level. IBF is engaging financial institutions on developing local IT talent through company-led training and professional conversion programmes (PCPs). We have ramped up efforts to reskill and redeploy banking professionals into emerging roles. Job roles are changing as banks pivot towards digital banking models over time. We must ensure that our banking professionals can take on these new roles. More than 3,000 consumer banking employees will be reskilled through a PCP over the next two years, acquiring relevant skills in sales, product development, and digital engagement.
I am pleased to inform the public that based on the outcome of the review and stress test, the Governing Council have concluded the following: 1. The Bulgarian banking system is stable. The main indicator of a bank’s financial resilience, the ratio of bank common equity tier one capital to its risk-weighted assets, or the CET 1 ratio, remains significantly above the required minimum regulatory requirements on a system level and is above the EU average as announced in the latest European stress test. The CET1 ratio adjusted for the results of the asset quality review is 18.9% on system-wide level compared to the minimum regulatory requirement of 4.5%. The stress test indicated that if the latest 2018 macroeconomic forecasts materialize, the CET1 ratio would increase to 22.2%. In the case of a severe economic crisis, which is very unlikely, the CET1 ratio would decline to 14.4%. For the European banks, the results are significantly lower – 13.9% and 9.4% respectively. Therefore, banks’ capital adequacy is strong and banks have the capacity to absorb shocks in unfavorable market conditions. 2. The capital adequacy of each bank after potential adjustments from the asset quality review remains above the minimum regulatory requirements. Indeed, the individual results vary across banks. Follow-up plans have been developed in line with individual results and include measures aimed at maintaining existing capital buffers for some banks or increasing capital buffers and decreasing risk-weighted assets for others.

Ravi Menon: Future of finance jobs Opening remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Chairman of the Institute of Banking and Finance, at the Launch of the Study on Future of Finance Jobs, Singapore, 23 April 2019. * * * Mrs Josephine Teo, Minister for Manpower, members of the IBF Council, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to IBF. IBF will be turning 45 this year. It is hard to imagine the financial sector today without the IBF. Not all countries have the equivalent of an IBF. Fewer still have as strong a collaboration as we do here in IBF – among financial institutions and between financial institutions and the regulator. And all for a common cause that has been consistent for the last 45 years – to equip the professionals in our financial sector to do their jobs better, and to make the Singapore financial centre more competitive IBF began life in much simpler times. Its primary aim in the 1970s through the 1990s was to provide training for the financial sector professionals. In the 2000s, IBF shifted its focus to setting competency standards and facilitating skills development for the industry. Looking to the future, the jobs and skills landscape in the financial industry is a lot more complex and uncertain. Technology is transforming finance – the way financial services are produced, distributed, and consumed. This means that jobs in financial services will also be transformed.
For example, some banks are marketing synthetic ETFs tracking an index which are not collateralised by the underlying investment in the index but by other assets with the return guaranteed by a swap with a counterparty which involves counterparty risk. Some ETFs are offering a leveraged return up to 3x that on the index. The IMF, among others, has expressed its concerns (in the Financial Stability Report April 2011) and pointed out that the computer-driven trading used by these products could lead to another “flash-crash” like that of April 2010. 8. Conclusion  In conclusion, a supportive macro and regulatory environment is critical to attracting domestic and global sources of capital. Saudi Arabia has been going about this process for many years, backed up by a prudent monetary and fiscal track record. We welcome longterm capital inflows in various sectors of the economy to gain mutual benefits from the economic potential of Saudi Arabia. To promote this, the government has adopted an “open door” policy towards foreign capital which has provided excellent returns to FDI investors. Saudi Arabia has opened up the financial sector to foreign financial institutions by granting licenses to foreign commercial & investment banks as well as asset management & insurance companies to optimize the level of competence and coverage in different financial disciplines. In terms of regulation of financial institutions, we will continue with the prudent policy which has served us well in the past.

On bank capital adequacy, some countries (such as the UK and Switzerland) have indicated that the standards they apply will be tighter than the minimum set out in Basel III. This represents a cross-border challenge to regulators because banks from relatively lightlyregulated countries will have a competitive advantage. It was this sort of problem that led to a “race to the bottom” in regulatory standards in the pre-crisis years, and we must strive to avoid this happening again. Regulatory arbitrage is a serious threat. For financial institutions, which are systemically important to the world economy (and that therefore are practically “too big to fail”), there needs to be additional rules. The FSB will report to the G20 Summit in November on which banks and insurance companies qualify, and what additional capital requirements they need to have. Some banks are resisting this strongly. They argue that tighter regulations will drive financial transactions into the world of “shadow banking” where the activities will be regulated lightly. In my view, international banks need to accept tighter regulation, which will mean lower returns on capital in good years due to lower leverage. In return, this approach should help them avoid the frequent  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  crises and losses of bank capital which have been seen in the last two decades or so. Hence, in the long-term, bank shareholders should be no worse off as a result.
These lie at 75 points above and 75 points below the repo rate respectively. The difference between the lending and deposit rates is sufficiently large for the banks normally to view it as more profitable to balance deficits and surpluses in their payments at the end of the day on the interbank market, rather than utilising the Riksbank's lending and deposit facilities. Both a bank with a surplus and a bank with a deficit win by depositing or borrowing in other banks at rates between the Riksbank's deposit and lending rates. The fact that the interbank rate normally lies at the centre of the corridor, i.e. close to the repo rate is because the Riksbank usually offers the banks the opportunity to borrow or deposit sufficient funds at the repo rate so that no bank will need to utilise the more expensive alternatives offered by the deposit and lending facilities. The condition for this is that the possibilities in the interbank market have been exhausted. Outstanding notes and coins and other items on the Riksbank's balance sheet mean that the banking system currently has to borrow from the Riksbank. To avoid the necessity of converting a large loan stock every day, the Riksbank every week offers the banks the possibility of borrowing via repurchase transactions with a duration of one week at the monetary policy-steered repo rate.

And, more fundamentally, with economic activity still below pre-crisis trends, whether we have gone too far and whether regulation is now preventing the financial system from doing its job to support growth in the real economy? I imagine this debate will be widespread internationally and will last for some time. In the light of how and why macroprudential policy has developed and where we now are, I would make the following observations. First, we should accept that the complex, interlocking set of reforms of recent years will need fine tuning and adjustment as they are implemented. There will be issues we have to revisit. Indeed, this process is already beginning. The Bank of England and the ECB have together launched a review of the treatment of securitisation. The FPC and the international community is looking at the issue of liquidity in financial markets which many argue has been adversely affected by regulation. Following up the Fair and Effective Markets Review, the Bank of England will host an Open Forum to take stock of the reform agenda in financial markets. And the European Commission has just launched its review of the EU regulation on bank capital. Indeed, given the depth and complexity of the financial crisis and the corresponding depth and complexity of the reforms, we should expect rather than be surprised that we will need to refine and adjust some of the regulatory reforms.
The clarification of monetary policy that was published in 1999 can thus be applied to today’s situation: Out of consideration for developments in the real economy, i.e. growth and employment, in the somewhat longer term, we can refrain from lowering the repo rate now, even though a mechanical application of our rule of action could justify such a move. But should economic activity weaken, for example due to the risk scenario that the adjustment of the US deficits could trigger, the situation will be different. Then I can see reason to lower the policy rate further, especially if the weakening is coupled with a stronger krona. In such a situation I believe it would be an advantage that the repo rate is not even lower than it is today. 6  BIS Review 10/2005

The increase was particularly large for issues with a lower rating. For example, issues with a Baa rating increased by 500%, albeit from a very low level. From a global perspective, the growth in the bond market is contributing to the internationalisation of the euro. In 1999, international bond issues denominated in euro amounted to 40% of total worldwide bond issues. This constitutes an amount comparable with bond issues denominated in US dollars. In the same way, the integration of stock markets is progressing, although they will have to overcome barriers of the same kind as those which I have just mentioned in relation to the bond markets. A notable increase in transactions on the new European indices has been observed. Moreover, the “new  BIS Review 58/2000  6  markets”, with growth figures benefiting greatly from the establishment of the large European market, have expanded considerably. Finally, the announcement of stock exchange alliances and mergers over recent months reflects the logic of stock market integration and will accelerate the process. As I have said, the broadening of the capital markets and their greater integration are contributing to a more efficient allocation of savings. First, this development is leading to lower transaction costs and is increasing the liquidity of the traded instruments. This, in turn, will contribute, all other things being equal, to reducing the absolute level of interest rates. Second, it is multiplying investment opportunities, increasing the range on offer and fuelling competition between issuers.
3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  For example, emerging market economies with young populations and bright prospects should be expected 4  to run large deficits, as Canada did for decades at the turn of the last century. In contrast, rapidly ageing countries should run large surpluses, as confirmed by Bank research (Chart 1). 5  Chart 1: Demographics and current accounts  Sources: April 2017 WEO and UN. Notes: The countries labelled in the chart are China (CN), Germany (DE), Japan (JP), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US). The data point for the 2016 current account for the UK has been adjusted to take account of the likely effect of revisions announced by the ONS, to be incorporated in Blue Book 2017, and erratic movements in trade in non-monetary gold. The adjustment is based on the average revision in 2011 and 2012 and is applied to the 2016 data published in the 2016 Q4 Balance of Payments release. These are “good imbalances,” and we need global trade and financial systems that encourage and facilitate them. There are also “bad imbalances” caused by domestic distortions (for example, in the financial or social welfare systems that affect savings and investment decisions); global deficiencies (such as inadequate global safety nets which encourage reserve accumulation); or mercantilist and protectionist policies (which manage trade).

Those costs would ultimately be passed on to European households and businesses. Moreover if the large stock of existing trades of EU firms – tens of trillions of euros in size – was trapped at a CCP which was no longer recognised by the European Commission, those EU firms would face capital charges as much as ten times higher than today unless and until they could move them. 25  Fragmenting liquidity would drive up costs somewhat in the remaining market as well. On current volumes, almost 90% of swaps are traded by non-EU firms and could remain in the main UK-based liquidity pool. Given the size of this market, the impacts could be expected to be much smaller, although not insignificant. Fragmentation is in no one’s economic interest. Nor is it necessary for financial stability. Indeed it can damage it. Fragmenting clearing would lead to smaller liquidity pools in CCPs, reducing the ability to diversify risks and diminishing resilience. And higher costs would reduce the incentives to hedge risks, increasing the amount of risk that the real economy would have to bear. The Bank of England fully recognises European concerns. I know because I shared similar ones as Governor of the Bank of Canada. These were addressed then through common standards and cooperative supervisory oversight, allowing $ clearing to move to a more efficient and resilient hub in London.
Local authorities can establish who in their area has such difficulties and then they can provide help by delivering cash to homes or help with paying electricity bills and so on. The experiences of other countries can’t simply be copied straight across here, but it is worth discussing them to see whether we could use them in some way to provide cash and payment services to people all across Estonia. I am certain that the commercial banks in particular, though also the state, should be able to provide better solutions than has been the case so far, and I would invite the banks, state institutions and local authorities to take an active role in the discussions about access to banking services. Eesti Pank is of course ready to join the discussion and I do not believe that any solution should be ruled out. Thank you for your attention and I am quite happy to answer any questions you may have. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Try the following: •  key elements of model design;  •  significant assumptions and expert judgements;  •  key sensitivities; and  •  significant limitations and uncertainty in the model. To restate, the challenge is to reduce complexity to simplicity, so that Board members feel that they understand: •  where is the model expected to work well;  •  in what circumstances is it likely to break down;  •  is the overall model output credible;  •  what “moves the dial” in terms of key assumptions or judgements; and  •  are those assumptions and judgements reasonable? Non-Executives should be put in a position to possess a general understanding of the model and meet these expectations without detailed technical knowledge. That’s the job of the Executive, to explain complexity, provide good Management Information (to serve up the needle, to continue the saying) and enable challenge and thus accountability. If NonExecutives do not feel that they can meet these expectations, they should demand the time and support to enable them to do so, rather than head off for the haystack. I want to conclude by putting this into a broader context of governance. I am sympathetic to the view that the demands on Non-Executives have risen to the point where it is time to stand back and take stock and find ways to improve the approach.
These include most notably a lack of funds for saving, cost, distance from the nearest branch, a lack of education and the absence of the financial infrastructures needed to improve the availability of financial services. It is indeed here where new technologies can contribute decisively to overcoming or lowering these barriers. Technology can reduce many fixed costs, traditionally associated with the development of financial services, while providing for a greater adaptation of supply on the basis of each society’s idiosyncratic characteristics. Unsurprisingly, then, the technological proposals linked to financial inclusion hail from different areas. We can find them in traditional financial institutions, in the new fintech companies, in telecommunications corporations and in the large technology consortiums known as bigtech. As to scope, one of the activities concentrating the bulk of the initiatives is payments. Thus, in the past decade we have seen so-called mobile money – i.e. transactional services offered mainly by mobile operators – become commonplace. Adding to these, more recently digital wallet solutions have emerged with multiple functionalities and specific proposals for international remittances. Aside from the progress in payment solutions, developments on intermediation markets are providing for improvements in the financing of those groups with a greater degree of financial exclusion, such as microenterprises and small agricultural producers. However, these developments are not spontaneous or uniform from one country to another.

In view of such initiatives, with a worldwide and immediate scope, you will agree with me that international coordination is not an option but an obligation. 3/3
Chart 12:Risky assets have under-performed  Chart 13: Easier monetary policy supports prices of risky as well as risk-free assets  Note: * Equity yields have been adjusted for leverage. Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream  Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream  Concluding remarks  This talk has been all about rational responses to higher uncertainty: how it raises the bar for decisions that are costly to reverse and – particularly when skewed towards downside risks – how it widens the gap between yields on risky and risk-free securities, contributing to the decline in the neutral real rate of interest and worsening the accounting deficits of pension funds. 10  As Charlie explained, QE probably has acted to raise the absolute deficit of schemes that were under-funded to begin with. But the more important problem has been the under-performance of risky assets (see also footnote 9). 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  11  But human instinct in this area isn’t always so rational. We’re prone to over-interpret noisy events, seeing 11  structure and determination when, very often, there isn’t any . If this is a general weakness, it’s no less evident in the wake of the referendum. Every bit of economic data is scrutinised for the impact of the vote to leave the EU. If it’s more positive than expected immediately beforehand, this is said to confirm the wisdom of the decision; a negative surprise and we’re meant to conclude it was a bad idea.

A pedantic approach to monetary policy in much of the developed world has led to near zero and negative interest rates in many of these economies. Yet growth has remained stubbornly weak. Such policies also risk merely creating the transfer of growth across time rather than promoting sustainable growth over time. It is perhaps time to start asking whether the best way to recover from the blow-out of one debt bubble is to create the conditions for another. Central bankers and financial markets seem to be caught in a cycle of brinkmanship and central banks are caught in a trap of their own making. The outcome has been almost a decade of worsening financial repression, the progressive build-up of risks in the global financial markets, accompanied by weak investment and weak growth. It is clear that the lessons of the financial crisis have not been fully learnt in these economies – not by the financial markets and not by the policymakers. Similarly, fiscal policy is supposed to be a tool that should be useful in supporting demand. But that is only if it is used prudently and has been used prudently.