samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Instead, the value of the notes was set, for instance, by royal decree, that is the king or queen simply decreed what value the notes should have. Such money is sometimes called ”fiat money”. This is money that has no link whatsoever to metals or other material objects. Faith in such money must thus be created in some other way. We can view money as a "good" with special properties. It can be used to pay for things and it has a special information value, it is a measuring stick that makes it possible to compare prices. It also acts as a means of preserving value, it can be stored and saved to be used for future consumption. It is in this context that price stability comes into the picture. If inflation rockets, the money we have saved loses purchasing power. It was therefore quite natural  BIS Review 135/2009  1  that the central banks – when they were eventually given the monopoly for issuing notes – were also given the task of safeguarding price stability. In Sweden, the state, in the form of the Riksbank, first acquired the sole right to issue notes in 1903. One of the reasons the Riksbank was given this sole right was the desire to create a uniform and stable payment system. Previously, the banks had been able to fund their operations by issuing their own notes. However, when a bank went bankrupt its notes became worthless.

We need to see increased dynamism, particularly in those sectors which are not as directly affected by the current slowdown. Other measures are also necessary, such as liberalisation and deregulation policies, to improve competitiveness. Policies aimed at improving the human capital of our workers and increasing labour mobility should also be encouraged. Finally, a comment on fiscal policy. The current fiscal situation in Spain is sound, having ending 2007 with a budget surplus and reduced public debt. Indeed, let me recall that our public debt to GDP ratio, at 35%, is the lowest among the big EU countries. It is important to maintain this stance in the face of the current slowdown. Expansionary demand policies could prove counterproductive. We should avoid a deterioration of the budgetary situation beyond that implied by automatic stabilisers. Let me turn now to the financial sector. So far, the impact of the recent turbulence on financial stability in Spain has been limited. This is largely thanks to the actions of the banks themselves, who have not entered into the kinds of business that have been most directly affected. Spanish banks have demonstrated that you do not need to turn to the originate-todistribute model to become an efficient and profitable banking business. Plain vanilla, traditional business can be compatible with high returns on equity and efficiency. It also has the added value of implying greater stability. But I think that the Bank of Spain’s approach to supervision has also had a positive effect. Let me emphasise two key characteristics in this respect.
While I believe these measures would be welcomed by the private banks and their clients as they offer greater convenience and flexibility, I must remind everybody that the core objective of our regulatory framework continues to be investor protection. So private banks must ensure that they have in place the necessary systems and internal controls to implement the portfolio based approach and other related measures to facilitate the investment process. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In this regard, it is hard to overstate the importance for private banks to have proper documentation. Proper documentation helps bank management monitor staff’s sales practices and detect deficiencies. Proper documentation also provides audit trail and evidence on the sales process. A bank with proper documentation will be in a much better position to demonstrate that it has properly discharged its duties to its clients in the event of a dispute or complaint. Enhancing competency of industry practitioners Let me move to another pillar that is necessary to support the continued success of Hong Kong’s private banking industry: namely the availability of professional talents. Institutions can only be as strong as the people that make them up. How the world perceives the standard of our financial services depends crucially on the quality of the people delivering such services. Private banking clients now demand quality and efficient services that are tailored to their specific investment needs. Meanwhile, the financial markets have become more complex and volatile.

These processes not only help to fight money laundering and the financing of terrorism, but also enable private banks to obtain relevant information to better understand their clients, including their background and, most importantly, their risk appetite and investment needs. By doing so, private banks can agree on an investment strategy with clients and provide suitable products and services that fit their needs. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As we all know, private banking clients cover a wide spectrum of individuals. At one end of the spectrum there are clients who are highly seasoned investors, at the other end there may be unsophisticated clients with only very basic investment knowledge, notwithstanding that they have substantial wealth. While our regulatory framework is aimed at providing appropriate investor protection to all clients, regardless of the size of their wealth, it does not mean all investors have to be treated in exactly the same way in the process of making investments. In other words, the HKMA agrees that private banking and retail banking clients can and should be treated differently in the investment process. This being the case, we need to have a clear and practical definition of “Private Banking Customer”. After consulting the industry and the SFC, the HKMA is minded to agree that a “Private Banking Customer” can be defined as a customer with either (a) at least $ million of assets under the management (AUM) with the bank concerned or (b) total investable assets of at least $ million.
Alongside the somewhat stronger near-term growth we have also seen some improvement in the labor market. Workers are filing fewer initial claims for unemployment insurance. New claims have fallen to levels not seen since mid-2008. Private-sector employees are working more hours. Aggregate hours worked rose at a 3 percent annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2011, up from essentially no growth in the third quarter. Combined with average hourly earnings rising at a 1.8 percent rate, the increase in hours worked suggests an annual rate of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  increase in private wage and salary income of close to 5 percent. This is a respectable rate that might support more spending – if sustained. A firmer labor market has been accompanied by partial recovery in consumer confidence over the past few months. Confidence is rising up from levels that were often – in the third quarter of 2011 – lower than at the depths of the Great Recession. It should be noted that while workers’ hours grew at a healthy pace in the fourth quarter, employers added an average of just 140,000 payroll jobs per month, somewhat less than in the third quarter. Despite this rather tepid increase in jobs, the unemployment rate fell a cumulative 0.5 percentage points from September to December. This apparent discrepancy is due to two factors – faster job growth as measured by the household survey and an outright decline of the labor force.

As in other countries, the outlook for the Spanish economy remains uncertain, although this has abated somewhat recently in light of the brighter figures for the world economy. It is likely that the recovery in the Spanish economy will lag that in the euro area to some extent. This is due above all to the marked weakness of investment, not only in the case of housing, but also in that of business investment, given the very low levels of capacity utilisation. While public investment will continue to account for a high proportion of GDP in 2010, this figure will be lower than in 2009. The outlook for private consumption is more uncertain. The main determinants of consumption will not be favourable, given the foreseeable behaviour of employment and the difficulty of reversing the high unemployment rate. Yet as the decline in households’ consumption has been much more drastic than that of their incomes, the saving rate is climbing to very high and indeed unprecedented levels. Hence, if the factors of uncertainty were to abate, consumption might contribute more significantly to the recovery. Given these constraints, the main support factor of activity in 2010 has to be the external sector. This will be assisted by the earlier recovery of our main trading partners and the relatively favourable course that Spanish exports are following.
In many countries, policy-makers are rightly concerned about the negative consequences for demand of tightening fiscal policy too quickly and abruptly while the recovery is still fragile. But a tightening of fiscal policy which is pursued as part of a longer-term, credible and well worked-out plan is much less likely to have such negative demand-side effects, and may have offsetting benefits for the supply-side performance of the economy. 6  BIS Review 33/2010  Progress in putting public finances on a sounder footing can increase confidence and reduce uncertainty about future economic prospects, providing a much better climate for a recovery in private sector demand. It can also support the supply-side performance of the economy by helping firms and individuals plan for the longer term. The effects of deficit reduction on financial markets should also be positive for private sector demand. Long-term interest rates are likely to be lower in a world in which government deficits are being reined in, and the risk of destabilising financial market movements is also reduced. Again, this is likely to provide a much better climate for private sector investment and long-term spending and planning more generally. An additional mechanism through which the negative demand-side consequences of fiscal tightening can be offset is by maintaining a relatively loose or relaxed monetary policy. So the other arm of withdrawing policy stimulus – a tightening of monetary policy – needs to take into account the potential impact of deficit reductions on demand, activity and inflation.

And that same risk, for example taking deposits and issuing claims, is treated in the same way, regardless of the business model of the firm offering the service. There needs to be a level playing field in all directions. Developments in the way we store and manage our money. The supporting structures of law, institutions and physical technology are also about to change in the way we hold and manage the bank accounts in which most of our money resides. The bulk of money in the UK, as I have noted, takes the form of the £ in the tens of millions current accounts we hold in the banking system. At present, we access and manage this money through direct interactions with our bank. At the beginning of this year, the new EU Payment Services Directive (PSD2) came into force. This has been reinforced by the Open Banking requirements mandated by the Competition and Markets Authority for the major UK banks. PSD2 requires banks to allow a third party provider of financial services to have access to a customer’s online payment accounts if the customer requests it. These third party providers will have access to the account information and, again if the customer so chooses , they will be able to instruct transactions. These firms will have to be authorised in the UK by the FCA. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Open Banking requires the major banks to use a common data interface (the API).
With clear risks of a misplaced if not lost generation, to the extent appropriate under our mandates, the monetary policy response has represented a race against long-term (or hysteretic) unemployment. As Janet Yellen remarked, “the risk that continued high unemployment could eventually lead to more-persistent structural problems underscores the case for maintaining a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy.” 18 In Britain at least, these risks have been sharply reduced. The Bank of England has used a range of policies first to stimulate and then to secure the recovery. These have helped support the strongest job growth on record including record-high transitions back into employment by the longer-term unemployed. Longer-term social mobility will benefit from this track record. Looking ahead, improvements in policy frameworks should help to reduce – but not eliminate – the incidence of financial crises. A core lesson of the recent episode is the need to think of  14  For example, using data on over 30,000 households in 38 countries, Easterly and Fischer (2001) find that the poor are more likely than the rich to mention inflation as a top national concern. Moreover, higher inflation is associated with greater income inequality in cross-country data (Albanesi, 2007). Financial crises in developing countries are associated with an increase in poverty and, in some cases, income inequality – see for example Baldacci, de Mello and Inchauste (2002).

Union Pay International (“UPI”), headquartered here in Shanghai, signed a MOU with  NETS, a leading payment services group in Singapore, in November this year to support cross-border connection of their mobile wallets. As UPI’s first cross-border tie-up with another nation’s mobile wallet – NETS’ NETSPay platform – this will allow Chinese customers to pay at NETS merchants in Singapore while Singapore’s NETSPay users can make mobile payments at over 8 million merchants in China. The MOU will also support collaboration on technology know-how between UnionPay and NETS, and facilitate the joint setting up of a research and development centre in Singapore, initially focusing on mobile services technology. 2nd MAS – SFRB Training and Exchange Programme  Lastly, deepening information and knowledge exchange between Shanghai and Singapore industry participants and officials. 10  The 2nd MAS-Shanghai Municipal Financial Regulatory Bureau Training and Exchange Programme will be held from 28 to 30 November 2018. Such training a . programmes will encourage mutual exchange and deepen ties between financial regulators, promote better understanding of each other’s markets and enhance their knowledge in specialised topics. Conclusion 11 Asia remains strongly committed to maintain an open global trading system and to  preserve multilateralism. There is therefore great potential for Asian countries to ride on each other’s growth, and for cities like Shanghai and Singapore to strengthen our bonds.
Since coupon rates on  7  Fed funds equivalents are calculated by comparing the change in the 10-year Treasury yield due to asset purchases to the change that historically occurred following movements in the target federal funds rate. This is a simple framework, so the uncertainty around this measure is likely large. 8  For more information on the TBA market, see Vickery and Wright (2013). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  agency MBS are offered in 50 basis point increments, the originator might choose to sell the remaining cash flows to investors in the TBA market in the form of an agency MBS with a coupon rate of 3 percent and retain the remaining 25 basis points.9,10 In this case, the 3 percent TBA contract would be the production coupon.11 The Desk focuses its purchases in production coupons because these securities are the most liquid segment of the TBA market and their yields are closely tied to the primary mortgage rate through the dynamics I just described. Purchases are distributed across different agencies, maturities, and coupons in amounts that are roughly proportional to anticipated gross issuance of those securities. Purchases lower the yield on these securities relative to where they would otherwise be, which should enable originators to offer lower mortgage rates to borrowers.12 Lower borrowing rates should in turn help stimulate demand in the housing market, support home prices, and increase mortgage borrowers’ purchasing power. As I mentioned before, asset purchases affect interest rates in part by removing risk from investors’ portfolios.

operational inefficiency, poorly designed accounting practices, legal uncertainty and inadequate supervision, can degrade the performance of national as well as regional financial markets, frustrate exporters, importers and businesses. Further, these conditions can lead to dramatic manifestations of inefficiency and abuse, and challenge the credibility of the central banks in our countries. When the SAARC region trade and investment flows increase, we will not be able to reform the clearing mechanism urgently to accommodate cross border flows. The ACU has reached crossroads, requiring urgent reforms, if member countries are still interested in maintaining the long-established goodwill and regional cooperation through it. 4  BIS Review 79/2007  6. Outline of a policy framework  It is hard to come up with a blue print or reference framework for establishing a regional payments group without deliberating the topic with the SAARC member central banks. Nevertheless, I wish to outline the key elements of such a framework and a road map which can be developed further by task forces or a working group appointed for the purpose. First and foremost, it is necessary to get the commitment and consent of central banks in forming the regional payment initiative. Second, it is necessary to engage in a stocktaking exercise to gauge the effectiveness and appropriateness of the existing payment instruments, payment systems, clearing mechanisms, settlement systems and infrastructure in the region to identify their weaknesses, inefficiencies, safety levels and risks.
Figure 2 Global imbalances, current account balances (Billions of dollars) 1,200 800 400 0 -400 -800 -1,200  96  97  98  99  00  01  US Japan Emerging Asia Oil exporters Other prima and goods exporters  02  03  04 05  06 07(e)  Euro area Latin America  (f) Forecast. Source: International Monetary Fund. BIS Review 124/2008  9  Figure 3 Real price of housing (*) (IT01=100, index) 200  200  180  180  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80 01 02  03 04  05 06 07  Australia US (2) New Zealand  08  80 01 02  03 04  05 06  Spain Germany Denmark  US (1) UK (3)  07 08  Ireland France Austria  (*) Nominal index deflated by CP1. (1) OFHEO. (2) S&P/Case-Shiller. (3) Nationwide. Sources: BIS y CEIC Data.

Is that a good outcome? Responding to this, the Riksbank has decided to analyse a “possible do”. Should we issue an electronic currency? An e-krona? We have given ourselves about two years to come up with an initial answer to this question. One possible outcome is that we as central bank in some sense will ourselves become an innovator. Moreover, what we eventually decide to do is likely to affect the possibilities and business cases for different financial innovations in more general terms and have possible repercussions on many other aspects of central banking, such as monetary policy and financial stability. To conclude, I believe that a central bank has an important role to play. What we do, and what we do not do, will affect the pace and the substance of innovation in the financial system. I believe this to also apply to the regulatory community in general. We can talk about the promise of innovation, but we also need to walk the talk – that is to make decisions that balance innovation, stability and growth. That will by necessity involve deciding upon a suitable degree of public and regulatory intervention. There will be winners and losers from these decisions. Making the decisions, and finding that balance, is a major challenge, but it is also an unavoidable challenge. 4 [4]
In a context of persistent recession, this strategy would have important benefits, in the form of an increase in the economy’s potential growth, generated by the reforms, and an improvement in the credibility of the sustainability of public finances in the medium term, which would in turn expand the fiscal headroom available and boost the expansionary effects of the current fiscal actions. In short, to have the fiscal space necessary to be able to expand the support measures for the economy should the course of the pandemic make this necessary, the reform agenda needs to be implemented decisively, fiscal consolidation  5  See R. Blanco, S. Mayordomo, A. Menéndez and M. Mulino (2020), Spanish non-financial corporations liquidity needs and solvency after the COVID-19 shock, Occasional Paper No 2020, Banco de España. 17  needs to be planned and support instruments need to be reformed to make them more flexible and focused. In the case of structural reforms, the Annual Report, which I am presenting to you today is a veritable catalogue of the main challenges that, in the opinion of the Banco de España, the Spanish economy faces in order to raise aggregate well-being. These challenges are wide-ranging in type and require the following issues to be addressed: low productivity growth, labour market duality, high unemployment, population ageing, inequality, climate change action, changes in the globalisation model and the speed of digitalisation of the economy.

In annual average terms, the unemployment rate is expected to rise significantly this year (to 17.1% of the labour force under the first scenario and to 18.6% under the second) and also in 2021, before starting to descend in 2022 (when, in annual average terms, it would stand at 18.2% and 20.2% under the respective scenarios). Both scenarios forecast inflation to hold at a moderate pace over the projection horizon. Core inflation has slowed notably in recent months as a result of the weakness of demand stemming from the pandemic. Looking ahead, the persistence of a high degree of cyclical slack will mean inflation in non-energy industrial goods and in services will continue to run at relatively low - though growing - rates until end-2022. The risks underlying the scenarios for economic activity published by the Bank remain tilted to the downside. And more unfavourable developments than those contained in the second scenario, i.e. the harsher of the two considered, cannot be ruled out. In particular, in light of the recent course of the pandemic, we cannot preclude the resort to more severe lockdown measures than those envisaged in the scenarios. Moreover, there is much uncertainty over how long will be needed before we have an effective medical treatment, and there are some risks that it will be delayed beyond mid-2021. Lastly, uncertainty remains on the external front, especially concerning the possibility of the Brexit negotiations concluding without an agreement at the end of the transition period or of US-China trade tensions worsening.