samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Currently, the new life insurance premiums transacted through financial advisers were still insignificant compared to the premiums transacted through agency forces and bancassurance. Any effort to improve the performance of financial advisers must include the takaful sector, which has evolved considerably over the years to become a thriving global business to complement conventional insurance. On that note, Bank Negara Malaysia has recently approved the inclusion of takaful products and services within the scope of business which can be distributed by financial advisers. The inclusion of takaful products is a significant initiative as it will allow financial advisers to capitalise on the potential for growth of the takaful sector given that the market penetration rate for takaful products is low at 7.7% and the large number of untapped Muslim population in Malaysia who are usually more inclined towards Shariah-compliant products. However, to undertake the marketing of takaful products, financial advisers’ representatives must first equip themselves with the necessary knowledge in takaful and understand the Shariah requirements and the differences between takaful and conventional products. In this regard, I commend FPAM and MFPC on their timely effort to formulate and develop Islamic-based professional qualifications in order to satisfy the growing needs among professionals within the financial advisory fraternity. FPAM, together with the Islamic Banking and Finance Institute of Malaysia has jointly developed Islamic Financial Planner module whereas MFPC has recently launched a Shariah Registered Financial Planner module.

Over the period 2000 to 2007, the market penetration rate, measured in terms of the number of life insurance policies in force as a proportion to the total population, increased from 31.5% in 2000 to 40% in 2007. Notwithstanding its wider reach of the market, life insurance coverage remained relatively low compared with the more developed markets in the region such as Japan, Korea and Singapore, which have penetration rates of more than 80%. The relatively low market penetration coupled with rising household incomes and high savings rate suggest a very positive outlook for the Malaysian insurance sector to grow extensively and presents tremendous opportunities for financial advisers to serve the Malaysian consumers. With increased uncertainty prevailing in the global economic outlook and in the financial markets, effective financial planning will assume greater prominence at both the retail and corporate levels. Households, in particular, will benefit from financial planning in order to be  BIS Review 136/2008  1  more self-reliant and resilient against the increased volatility in the financial markets. It is envisaged that the financial advisers would be able to play a role in providing financial solutions to consumers on how best to manage their wealth efficiently and effectively. Financial advisers will help mobilise the country’s financial resources to generate growth and further develop our insurance and takaful sector specifically and the financial system generally.
th  Chart 6: Real wage growth slowest since mid-19 Century 10-year moving average, per cent 4  3  2  1  0 Forecast -1 1850  1865  1880  1895  1910  1925  1940  1955  1970  1985  2000  2015  Source: Thomas, R. and Dimsdale, N. (2016) "Three Centuries of Data - Version 2.3", Bank of England, based on average weekly wages and the CPI; and November Inflation Report. Such high income inequalities are dwarfed by staggering wealth inequalities. The proportion of the wealth v  held by the richest 1% of Americans increased from 25% in 1990 to 40% in 2012. Globally, the share of wealth held by the richest 1% in the world rose from one-third in 2000 to one-half in 2010.  vi  The picture in the UK is complex but in general suggests relatively stable but high levels of overall inequality, with sharper disparities emerging in recent times for the top 1%. When combined with low growth of incomes and entrenched intergenerational inequity, it is no wonder that many question their prospects. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  For example, a common measure of the distribution of income, the Gini coefficient, shows that inequality rose sharply during the 1980s and has more or less plateaued ever since (Chart 7). That suggests a large structural shift during the Thatcher era, followed by a more modest series of adjustments thereafter.

4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  History tells us that recoveries from financial crisis are weak, with a typical hit of around 1 percentage point iii  off per capita GDP growth each year for a decade. Globally, we are tracking that pattern, with overall activity 9% below its pre-crisis trend nine years on. Even by these standards, however, advanced economy recoveries have been unusually tepid, with their current level of activity around 13% lower than the pre-crisis trend. In the UK the shortfall, at 16%, is even worse. Over the past decade real earnings have grown at the slowest rate since the mid-19th Century (Chart 6). Weak income growth has focused growing attention on its distribution. Inequalities which might have been tolerated during generalised prosperity are felt more acutely when economies stagnate. In recent decades, as global inequality has fallen markedly, it has edged ever higher in most advanced economies. In Anglo-Saxon countries, the income share of the top 1% has risen notably since 1980. Today, iv  in the US, the richest 1% of households receive 20% of all income.
The euro area In an international setting, as described, of a moderately expanding world economy and heightened geopolitical tension, the pace of growth in the euro area in 2002 was markedly weak. At 0.8%, it was far lower than had been expected at the end of the previous year. This performance has highlighted  2  BIS Review 31/2003  the considerable exposure of the euro area to global shocks and the burden the structural deficiencies still beleaguering the area entail for it. However, although economic buoyancy has diminished across the board, there have been considerable differences in the growth of the different Member States. In particular, among the four major countries in the area, only Spain has remained moderately dynamic in this unfavourable setting, while the biggest economy, Germany, has deteriorated markedly. Thus, while high and growing synchrony has been observed over the past decade, this still remains below what should be the case for a fully integrated economic area. Persisting divergences underscore the need to refine the single market and reaffirm the role to be played by national policies when it comes to ensuring the proper functioning of each of the member economies. It is also significant that the scant growth in the euro area in 2002 was mostly based on the contribution of the external sector. As a result, the shocks buffeting the European economy had a particular influence on internal demand, which was considerably slack throughout the year.

Despite the fact that we left interest rates on hold again last week, we have certainly not gone to sleep!
These firms – the big techs – possess an enormous amount of customer data, and they make highly effective use of those data for their own ends. Recent experience shows that these firms have caused disruption in the sectors they have entered, taking over the most profitable business segments and supplanting existing firms. These developments have major implications for supervisors and regulators. First, proactive supervision must be the primary response to these changes, as the traditional regulatory framework may not be sufficient. Second, we should give consideration to the regulatory perimeter to ensure that the oft-cited mantra of ‘same activities, same risks, same rules” actually applies. And third, cooperation among different authorities will be essential, given the diversity of the sectors and issues potentially affected by these technological innovations. In this regard, customer data governance is a fundamental issue which we will need to reflect upon at great length. If it is deemed necessary for such data to be made available to all operators, then it seems reasonable that there should be no exceptions to the obligation to make it available and that the precise extent of this obligation should be clear. That said,  2  In particular, the impact of the SME and infrastructure supporting factors is reflected in the recent behaviour of solvency ratios. The effect of the exemption of software-related intangible investments from capital deductions will become evident at a later date. 6  individual incentives to collect and manage such information must not be undermined and customers’ rights must be respected.

In any event, the evidence available in the coming months on the effective use of these capital buffers, once the losses stemming from the COVID-19 crisis materialise, will be essential to allow conclusions to be drawn on the effective use of these buffers and to assess whether any additional measures may be needed. Based on the experience obtained during this crisis, and on a medium-term horizon, the balance between structural and countercyclical capital buffers could also be analysed as a way of avoiding the difficulties I have mentioned, should they arise. Thirdly, I also wish to refer to the treatment of dividends during the crisis. As you are all well aware, one of the recommendations of the European prudential supervisors, which has also been made in many other countries, is that banks should refrain from distributing dividends and be highly prudent when paying bonuses to their staff. This measure seeks to ensure that, in this highly uncertain setting, banks are able to build up sufficient funds to absorb losses. In general, all Spanish banks that were legally able to suspend or defer dividends to be distributed out of 2019 income complied with these recommendations. This enabled them to increase in 2020 the capital buffers they had already built up before the onset of the pandemic.
For many years, we were afraid of a possible "internationalisation" of our currency. Until the early 1980s, we had a general feeling that our monetary policy was more likely to be successful if the Swiss franc were only traded domestically. We were overestimating our capacity to control markets with administrative measures. With time and experience, we came to realise that, in the long run, an internationalisation of financial markets was inevitable and that it was overall beneficial, since it would help reduce exchange rate volatility. Today, we are convinced that central banks should accept the markets' strength rather than spend time and energy trying to curb it. In sum, Switzerland, with an independent central bank and efficient financial markets, meets the conditions for successful monetary autonomy. Let us now consider whether the SNB has made good use of it. Evidence of the SNB's monetary independence Whether the SNB's monetary independence has been effective can be judged in two ways. First, by studying how monetary policy has reacted to shocks that were specific to Switzerland, and second, by assessing differences in monetary policy between Switzerland and the euro area in times of calm. Let me first discuss our reactions to asymmetric shocks. Monetary policy under special circumstances Since the introduction of the euro, there have been three major shocks that I think affected Switzerland more than the euro area. These were the stock market crisis of 2000, the September 11 events, and the war in Iraq.

On the nominal side, our two countries' links with the euro area differ markedly. Swiss and euro area inflation have a correlation of 39%, which, although low, corresponds to the average correlation of inflation rates within the euro area itself. Israel's inflation shows a weaker link here, displaying a correlation with euro area inflation of only 19%. Comparing again the levels instead of the correlations, Switzerland has a long tradition of monetary stability with an inflation rate that has been clearly lower than those in Israel and the euro area. Over the last five years, the average inflation rates were 0.8% in Switzerland, 2% in Israel and 2.2% in the euro area. While for Switzerland, low and stable inflation is not particularly noteworthy, it is important to remember that price stability in Israel is a recent achievement and that inflation remains relatively volatile here. Overall, this quick look at the data suggests that Israel and Switzerland have different records in terms of stability, that both countries are highly integrated into the euro area, but that, for obvious reasons, Switzerland seems to be more "European" than Israel. If Switzerland is indeed as integrated as any regular euro area member, what advantages do we see in maintaining our monetary independence, while our neighbours have abandoned their national currencies in favour of the euro? Reasons for monetary independence As you well know, the large majority of European countries have come to the conclusion that adopting the euro is beneficial.
Decisions have to be made and it would not be reasonable to go on acting as though nothing had changed until sufficiently long time series are available for econometric analyses. Recently I had the pleasure of chairing a central bank seminar that the BIS arranged on just these issues. My impression was that it has proved difficult to produce definite evidence of any structural shift in the relationships that govern inflation, such as various versions of the Phillips curve. In many countries, including Sweden, appraisals of resource utilisation, for example, are now more optimistic. As you are no doubt aware, in the past five years our output gap estimates have in fact been revised a number of times. One explanation I find fairly plausible is that after the profound crisis in the early 1990s we simply misjudged the size of the gap. There is also some support for the possibility that productivity has followed a more favourable trend than expected, thereby reducing the risk of bottlenecks. Total factor productivity, for instance, has been on a rising trend since 1993. Another possibility is that, for various reasons, the labour market is functioning more efficiently. One indication of this is that rapidly falling unemployment in recent years has not been accompanied by acute labour shortages. Perhaps I should mention that we have also detected certain changes in inflation relationships.

The forecasts in our main scenario are always based on a combination of model analyses and judgements that take into account factors which the models either cannot capture at all or are unable to capture in a way we consider reasonable. These “hands-on” adjustments become particularly important when the historical correlations on which the models are based appear to have changed. The judgements may be of different types and opinion may be divided as to which factors are most important to take into consideration at any given meeting. My view is that the judgements should as far as possible be reflected in the forecast figures for inflation, the real economy and the repo rate that a monetary policy decision is based on. But I believe that we must learn to live with the fact that it is impossible to quantify all of the factors we monetary policy decision-makers consider should be taken into account in the monetary policy decisions. As I see it, there is no point in trying to produce, at any cost, a quantified adjustment of the forecast just to make a judgement one considers relevant fit into the monetary policy discussion. There must be scope to put forward arguments that appear reasonable, without necessarily having to translate them into exact probabilities or quantifying their effects on inflation and the real economy. As I see it, there is nothing wrong with having “misgivings” about a particular development and allowing this to affect the decision, without being able to exactly quantify the risks it entails.
Better monetary policy and inflation outcomes played a central role in laying the foundation for the increased investment that made the productivity surge possible and in bringing about the reduction in the depth and length of recessions that are a feature of the more even U.S. economic performance. Better fiscal policy in the 1990s helped too, by reducing long-term interest rates and improving confidence in future U.S. economic performance. More of the savings the United States borrowed from the world went to finance private investment rather than government consumption. This list of factors - technology, openness and flexibility, the more innovative U.S. financial system, and good monetary and fiscal policy - is not a comprehensive list. It’s hard to know how important each element was to the overall record and whether we would have seen as much improvement without all four of these elements. We were fortunate in the sense that the size of the shocks we experienced were smaller than in the past. The strategic environment of the 1990s seemed at the time more peaceful and secure, and so our security needs claimed a smaller share of resources than is true now and may be true for some time. But it wasn’t just luck. Much of what was exceptional in the U.S. was the result of conscious choices by policy makers. This is encouraging in the sense that it suggests that with good policy choices we have the capacity to sustain quite strong rates of income growth in the future.

Article 9 of the new NBL defines a wider scope of possible transactions. This allows the National Bank to further optimise the structure of its investments with a view to specific central bank needs. As part of this process, we are also evaluating the possibility of enlarging the investment universe. However, such an extension would raise a number of fundamental questions that will first need to be examined. Before the new law enters into force, we will establish and publish investment policy directives setting out how the Governing Board plans to make use of the extended investment policy scope. While our assets have already been managed largely in conformity with the principles of modern asset management, improvements were nevertheless called for. It was essential to bring our internal investment and risk control processes into line with the new legal framework. The opportunities for diversification brought about by additional investment instruments would, in principle, reduce the market risk of the investments. At the same time, though, the SNB would incur new risks, e.g. additional credit risks. In addition, corporate governance is to be enhanced. The primary goal is to segregate powers as far as possible: firstly between monetary policy and investment policy operations, secondly between investment strategy and its implementation through asset management, and thirdly between risk taking and risk controlling. There are limits to the principle of segregation of powers insofar as the Governing Board is responsible both for monetary policy and investment policy.
BIS Review 5/2004  1  Money and monetary policy can be traced back to the dawn of civilisation itself. In contrast, central banks are a recent development. The first central bank was the Riksbank in Sweden, set up in 1668.2 To celebrate its tercentenary it endowed the Nobel Prize in Economics. The Bank of England, the oldest continuing central bank, opened for business in 1694. Our tercentenary was a more low-key event: we published a book of conference proceedings. By 1900 there were still only 18 countries with a central bank. Today the number is 174. The Federal Reserve has yet to reach its centenary. As institutions go, most central banks are youthful. Indeed, the reputation of central banks as wise and disciplined institutions, in contrast with the wild excesses of finance ministries, belies their respective ages. So the history of monetary policy cannot be equated with the history of central banks. But it is a story about institutions. I.  Externalities in the theory of money  In the history of money, the two key events are the emergence of a medium of exchange and the rise of institutions governing its management. Those events raise two basic questions which are central to understanding the nature of monetary institutions. First, why did money evolve as a social or public rather than a private institution? Second, how can societies reduce the costs of being unable to make commitments about future collective decisions? The answers to these two questions determine the nature of modern central banks.

Thanks to this cooperation, our staff capacities were enhanced as regards the handling of responsibilities arising from the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, approximation to the ESCB standards, and the challenges that we may encounter when Albania receives the status of a candidate country and starts negotiations of EU accession. Last but not least, financial literacy is of key importance to the Bank of Albania. Thanks to support from and cooperation with the project team, an action plan was designed to promote financial literacy and enhance awareness of market-economy principles across various groups of the society. Also, a system for monitoring financial literacy in schools was set up. Further on, due to complexity of our work and new developments in the banking and financial area, it is clear that the project has strengthened our institution and has helped us cope with new situations. Moreover, the cooperation and communication between our institutions intensified from both viewpoints, professionally and personally. We do live in a global society, where financial developments take place at a rapid pace. Therefore, central banks should possess strong and reliable mechanisms of coordination and communication, which may prepare our institutions to cope with such situations.