samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We feel the new technologies should be approached with an open mind so as to broaden our scope of economic activity and derive the best possible productivity gains from these advances, together with the corresponding positive impact on production costs and prices. We are anti-Malthusian as regards labour. It is essential to ease the bottlenecks in all sectors reporting a significant shortage of skilled labour in order to continue to contain production cost increases - and thus ensure price stability - and to allow unfettered growth. In this respect, we all welcomed the objectives of the European Council in Lisbon, which aim at boosting the labour force participation rate in Europe from 61% to 70% and increasing the supply of “new economy” skills. This is a very important decision which represents a conceptual turning point. We are anti-Malthusian as regards investment. We would like it to be as dynamic as possible, in terms of both capacity and productivity, in order to loosen production capacity bottlenecks, preserve production costs, which is good for price stability, and allow unfettered growth. More than ever, the time has come to invest in Europe. We are also anti-Malthusian as regards the liberalisation of trade. An open-minded attitude in this respect has the advantage of consolidating and strengthening price stability, increasing the purchasing power of consumers and encouraging long-term growth.

M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Thailand's emergence from the crisis - new paradigm for sustainable growth Speech by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the International Conference on "Economic Recovery and Reforms", Bangkok, 28 October 2002. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my great pleasure to be here with you tonight. I would like to begin by welcoming you all once again to Bangkok and to this important international conference on Economic Recovery and Reforms. I would also like to express our appreciation to the Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, the main organizer of the conference, in allowing the Bank of Thailand to co-host the event. Our appreciation also goes to the distinguished scholars who came from all over the world to share with us their perspectives on this important topic. To many of us here, especially those in the Asian region, the 1997 financial crisis has completely changed our lives. It was, in a way, a sharp reversal of fortune when suddenly things that were thought to be good before the crisis became no longer good enough. And terms like ‘restructuring’ and ‘reforms’ have then become something of a norm. This long and tiresome journey has now lasted for more than five years, and naturally begs a question, “when are we going to get out of this abyss?” This question is particularly pertinent to Thailand. After all, the Asian crisis started here.
One obvious example is that the properties we want an e-krona to have will affect what technology we can use. The e-krona project will also need to be run in different phases. As a possible e-krona can affect the financial sector and the economy in so many different ways, there are many and complex questions that must be answered, and the answers are often interdependent. It is therefore wise to begin by creating a full list of all of the possible questions and surveying the most important deliberations and interdependencies. 9 [10]  Only after this, in a second phase, will it be possible to begin answering the questions and in this way gradually identifying which answers give the best target-fulfilment as a whole. If we do this work properly, at the end of the second phase we will have a set of answers that provide a good picture of how we want the e-krona system to look. Here of course the Riksbank can decide either to conclude the project or to proceed further. If the Riksbank decides that the e-krona system would promote the safety and efficiency of the payment system, the next step will be to construct such a system. I believe that the Riksbank has never before launched such a complicated project in such an unknown area. The complexity of course gives rise to risks and uncertainties throughout the project, something we will need to compensate for by being flexible.

iZettle, another Swedish company, has a service that converts your smartphone into a card terminal. There are several other innovative payment services on the market and under development. 9 There is a growing interest in this issue in the central bank world. For instance, the Bank of England has begun to study this question, as has the Bank of Canada, see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2016/886.aspx and http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2016/06/fintech-financial-ecosystemevolution-revolution/  7 [10]  In the first case, with accounts in the Riksbank, the e-krona would be fairly similar to the central bank money that we currently have in our payment system. These e-krona would not be lost if, for instance, the consumer lost his or her telephone, if that is where they are stored. The amount of central bank money can also change rapidly and at the pace determined by the demand from the general public. It is possible, although it does not need to be the case, that this would make it more difficult for the Riksbank to carry out the fine-tuning operations that we use to steer the short-term rate, that is, the starting point for interest-rate setting in Sweden. If we instead have a digital unit that can be transferred decentralised between two people, other complications will arise. Could such a solution be compatible with the regulations on counteracting money laundering and terrorist financing? How would we prevent digital units of value being copied, that is, counterfeited? Convey e-krona directly to the general public or through the banks?
Although some key payment systems are probably less vulnerable to generic, non-bespoke attacks2 than most financial firms, given their limited reliance on the internet, the consequences of a successful attack could be  1  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/records/fpc/pdf/2013/record1307.pdf. 2  Such as “distributed-denial-of-service” (DDoS) attacks – which affected some banks earlier this year. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  severe. Addressing this cyber threat will not be just about IT security and system enhancement, but also people, processes and culture, posing challenges to the managers of FMIs as well as their overseers. For systemically important systems, recovery arrangements are particularly important, and this is an area where alternative technology such as MIRS could come to the fore. The next issue relates to the times at which the Bank’s RTGS system can be accessed by settlement banks. Currently it operates for around ten hours each business day, with the most recent change occurring in 1999. Since we made that change, a number of central banks have lengthened their RTGS operating hours quite considerably, most obviously driven by the demands of the internationally-harmonised CLS cash settlement window, and also by a more general desire to operate with a greater overlap with major markets in other time-zones. And in the UK the move to a cash pre-funded model for two of our largest retail systems may create a latent demand to access the RTGS system outside of its current operating hours. Faster Payments, which operates 24/7, often provides confirmation to customers almost instantly.

In the longer run, that increase in productivity would be expected to flow through fully into real wages. By contrast, the peak to trough fall in real wages following the crisis was in the region of 10%. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14
The case for “transparency about transparency” is the case for honesty in economic policy. Some progress has been made. Pilot transparency reports on the UK and Argentina have been produced by IMF staff. Other pilot reports are to come. Australia has published a self-assessment transparency report. The need now is to make the production of Transparency Reports an integral part of the Article IV process. There is no reason for further delay. Transparency Reports should always be published. I very much hope that the IMF will make rapid progress towards the regular production and publication of Transparency Reports on each country. This practical measure could do a great deal to enhance the performance of all economic actors involved in the international capital market. 6. Conclusions  Unrestricted capital mobility and the absence of an ILOLR are not a recipe for a stable international financial system. Short-term interbank flows are the Achilles heel of present arrangements, leading to both currency and maturity mismatches. Throw in a predilection of emerging markets for pegged exchange rates and you have a dangerous cocktail. Purist solutions – whether of an ILOLR or a return to permanent capital controls – are, for good reasons, unlikely to be pursued. What is needed now are some practical steps forward. Central to any such programme is the need to monitor and manage the national balance BIS Review 95/1999  8  sheet. The objective cannot be to eliminate the risk of financial crises. The middle way will not do that.

Let’s not think of how we can reform, but how we can design. Let’s create a system that can better withstand the unforeseeable and the unpredictable. Conclusion These are difficult, complicated issues. But complexity doesn’t need to get in the way of getting back to principles or impede necessary action. Look no further to what we just accomplished with LIBOR. On January 1st, we are taking a giant leap in moving to a post-LIBOR world. That’s a monumental feat for financial market reform—and it was made possible by a significant, prolonged, and coordinated effort by the private and official sectors across the globe. With Treasury market reform, we must take the same approach of bringing together the best ideas from the public and private sectors. Three episodes of market dysfunction over the past decade are too many. Let’s work together to build a system that is truly resilient and can withstand the challenges of our time—and of the future. Thank you. 1 Recent Disruptions and Potential Reforms in the U.S. Treasury Market: A Staff Progress Report, Inter-Agency  Working Group for Treasury Market Surveillance, November 8, 2021. 2 For a history of the Desk statement on repo operations during that period, see Repo and Reverse Repo  Operations: Statements and Operating Policies. Details on the parameters of the repo operations during this 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  period can be found at Historical Repurchase Agreement Operational Details.
Nevertheless, uncertainty over the European economy’s capacity promptly to embark on a path of sustained recovery has not been sufficiently dispelled. In particular, the hesitancy of the US economy, the deterioration in its current-account and budget deficits, continuing imponderables in respect of the international political situation and the current volatility of financial and foreign currency markets may affect the European economy’s growth prospects, given its dependence on the external environment. Along with these, there are other factors more specific to the area (such as the sluggishness of business investment, doubts about the scale of the consequences of the stock market crisis for  BIS Review 31/2003  3  demand, and the persistent weakness of some of the major Member State economies) that might delay the expected acceleration in activity in the euro area which, in all likelihood, will grow in 2003 below potential for the third year running. On the institutional front, highly significant events for the process of European construction have taken place in 2003. The signing of the Treaty of Accession to the EU by ten new countries, which took place in April and will be effective in May 2004, marks the start of a phase of far-reaching changes which will pose sizable challenges for the competitiveness and cohesion of the area and for the strengthening of the effectiveness of the European institutions.

When an economy goes through a period of high productivity growth and high returns on many investment projects, real interest rates will normally increase. Over time, the real interest rate must reflect the economy's longterm growth potential. When real interest rates rise in our country relative to other countries, we have to expect that the real exchange rate will move in line with the same pattern that can be observed when we increase the use of petroleum revenues in the domestic economy. There is symmetry here. A decline in productivity growth will have the opposite effect. Developments in the 1990s may, over a very long time horizon, prove to have been an episode - and the considerable structural changes in the services sector a one-off event. This would imply that the economy will tend to return to its previous path. But it is also possible that we will see a new round of pronounced productivity gains thanks to new technology and new structures. BIS Review 65/2002  5
These institutions in effect aim to promote an environment that is conducive for growth. Equally vital are the institutions to maintain macroeconomic and financial stability stability, as well as to promote inclusion and socio-economic stability. To accelerate the movement of resources from traditional to modern activity in the new industrialised economies in Asia (South Korea, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong and Singapore), industrial policies have been targeted at enhancing efficiency, higher-productivity and competitiveness. Incentives and some domestic protectionism had an important role at the initial stage of the industrialisation process to advance the industrialisation process. These features are exemplified in the experiences of Japan and the newly industrialised Asian economies (South Korea, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong and Singapore), as well as later, in the other Asian economies such as ASEAN and China. 2  BIS Review 130/2009  Although the Asian Governments participate directly in economic development, the emphasis is on the private sector leading growth, particularly after industrial and infrastructure foundations have been laid. The role of the Government has been to support the private sector through developing an environment for the private sector to undertake higher productivity activity, with the actual production of goods and services is ultimately driven by the private sector. Governments, together with the established institutions, draw up industrial plans and set targets to guide the industrialisation process for the private sector to embark to realise these goals.

So the challenges are ahead of us. It is not easy to change mindsets. Remember, that a lot of people in this country, particularly those who work for the government have been used to a war situation. For most of their working lives, they have been living in a war economy. A war economy is very different from an economy at peace. That, in my view, is why you had a change of government this year and you have a new government, who is trying to win the peace. We won the war, but it was very difficult to win the peace. Why? Because our mindsets were stuck in the past. There was that concept of control. You had to control everything in the economy including prices. When I say prices, I mean the exchange rates, the interest rates, other prices which affect the functioning of the economy. That is all justifiable in a war situation. But when you come into a peace situation, where it is a normal functioning market economy, then you have to re-think, you have to get back to first principles, and reassess how the economy should work in a new dispensation.
Historically, the most drastic processes of deleveraging, including the post-war episodes and the recent post-crisis episode in the US, have relied on both mechanisms. But the contribution of nominal growth has always been decisive for success. In the euro area, until recently, real growth and inflation were too low to foster macroeconomic deleveraging, so balance sheet repair had to take place through the more painful channel, conflicting with the objective of macroeconomic stabilisation. Rising nominal growth is now helping to reconcile those two goals. Nevertheless, further efforts are still needed to work through the legacies of the crisis, especially in parts of the euro area banking sector where nonperforming loans remain high. The third important feature of the recovery is its broadness across sectors and countries – which is to say, it has not only strengthened but become more homogenous across the euro area. This reflects above all the effectiveness of our measures in narrowing financing conditions across different economies. If one looks at the percentage of all sectors in all euro area countries that have positive growth, the figure stood above 80% at the end of last year – above its historical average of 73% and the level observed during the 2009–11 recovery. Similarly, the dispersion in growth rates across both sectors and countries has also narrowed significantly and both are now at their lowest level since 1997. The same story is visible for employment. In early 2014 the vast majority of euro area headcount growth was coming from Germany.

However, as a part of this inquiry the Riksbank is organising a workshop tomorrow with the title “Housing markets, monetary policy and financial stability”, where a number of invited international academics will present essays they have written on this topic. We hope that this inquiry will improve our knowledge of a field that is important both to monetary policy and the economy as a whole. I hope that this talk has given you, and in particular the new members of the committee, an insight into how I view the situation in Sweden and abroad. I shall now do my best to provide good answers to any questions you may have. 8  BIS Review 149/2010  BIS Review 149/2010  9  10  BIS Review 149/2010  BIS Review 149/2010  11
5” while the Federal Council, in turn, “is solely responsible for the economic decisions that fall within its area of responsibility.”  8  In 2010, members of the Governing Board appeared 13 times before parliamentary commissions. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, central bank independence has its pitfalls. A latent threat to such independence can, in principle, always be said to exist. This threat is particularly great in times of crisis. Consequently it was right and important, during the recent crisis, for central banks around the world to work closely with governments. However, the risk now is that false expectations have been raised amongst politicians. Central banks need to remain firm and concentrate on their monetary policy mandate. While it was necessary to be close to other government authorities at a time of emergency, now that the crisis has been confined, a little more distance is in order. As I outlined at the beginning, the SNB has also taken exceptional measures in order to fulfil its mandate. In doing so, it has shown that it is prepared to make use of the independence it has been granted. What is essential here is that we are always guided solely by our mandate when making our decisions. At the same time, we are continually analysing developments and constantly drawing conclusions with a view to our future actions.

These considerations can provide a rationale to use public resources to assist firms with a high level of debt produced by an exogenous shock, such as the current pandemic, but which are viable based on their medium-term perspectives in terms of profitability and productivity. However, the design of public support programmes to help viable firms improve their solvency position poses serious design challenges, related to the selection of the firms receiving the aid and the design of a structure of incentives for those firms participating in these programmes. Without adequate selection criteria, there could be a poor redistribution of limited productive resources, keeping low-productivity firms running or providing support to companies that do not need it. Also, an inadequate design could leave aside viable firms that face solvency problems. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  This calls for a careful design of these programmes and a permanent real time evaluation of them, which, in the end, requires close monitoring of the financial situation of both non-financial firms and banks. In this regard, the Banco de España has exerted much effort in recent months in assessing the implications of the COVID-19 shock for the corporate sector. New tools based on micro simulations have been developed, making an extensive use of our micro databases, including our Central Balance Sheet Data Office database, which contains information of the non-financial sector, and the Spanish Central Credit Register, which contains information on all loans provided by Spanish banks to firms.
14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  these would tend, therefore, to reduce the interest elasticity of investment demand, 𝜎. Whether these effects are significant at the macro-economic level is, however, far from clear. Market Power and Monetary Policy  Taking this evidence together, we now summarise the various channels we have discussed through which monetary policy might prospectively be influenced by a rise in market power and mark-ups. First, if shocks to firms’ mark-ups have increased over recent decades, this would tend to shift outwards both output and especially inflation variability. Because these shocks are trade-off inducing, monetary policy is constrained in its capacity to cushion them. In consequence, the path of interest rates (both its level and variability) is affected only modestly by a rise in the incidence of mark-up shocks. Second, a rise in market power also has the potential to alter the slope of the Phillips curve, as discussed above. This, too, may affect the setting of monetary policy. To see that, consider the period loss function for monetary policymakers in the textbook model. This can be derived from the utility function of the representative household (Galí (2008)). It takes the form: 𝐿𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡2 + 𝜆𝑥𝑡2  (10)  where the weight on the output gap is:  𝜆=  𝜅 𝜖  (11)  Under optimal discretionary monetary policy, the policymaker minimises this loss function each period, subject to the Phillips curve, taking expectations as given.

Chart 6: Banks’ net interest margins Per cent 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1996  2000  2004 UK  2008 Euro area  2012 US  Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Notes: Data is sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis as that provides a consistent long-run international comparison of net interest margins. The broad post-financial crisis trend for UK banks in this data is consistent with the series for UK banks’ net interest margins published in the Bank’s Inflation Report in August 2016 (Chart C, Page 10). 27  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  27  Chart 7: Contribution of changing sectoral composition to UK-listed firms’ mark-ups Cumulative change in mark-up since 1987 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 1988  1992  1996  2000  2004  2008  2012  2016  Market share changes (sector)  Mark-up growth (sector)  Net entry (sector)  Total change  Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bank calculations. Chart 8: UK-listed firms’ mark-up distribution over time 90th percentile  70th percentile  50th percentile  30th percentile  Mark-up (e.g. 1.2 = 20%) 3  10th percentile  2.5  2  1.5  1  0.5  0 1987  1990  1993  1996  1999  2002  2005  2008  2011  2014  2017  Sources: Thomson Reuters Worldscope and Bank calculations.