samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It allowed shared knowledge and expertise to tap into opportunities to create scale and efficiencies for the development of common infrastructure. Another area that has leveraged effectively on partnerships has been in developing the ecosystem to support start-up businesses. An example of this is the Malaysian Global Innovation & Creativity Centre (MaGIC) ASEAN Startup track which builds a community of startups within ASEAN and accelerates their timeto-market-readiness. There are also various financial technology or ‘fintech’ initiatives by regional financial institutions that foster partnerships to accelerate financial innovators in the region. In 1919, an American biochemist discovered the four basic building blocks that form the DNA’s iconic double helix structure. Similarly, I believe that successful partnerships are also anchored by four strong foundations in its DNA, namely Adaptability and Responsiveness, Complementarity, Trust, and Governance. Let me elaborate on these essential foundations for success for aspiring policymakers and entrepreneurs to reflect on. The first base of a strong partnership is adaptability and responsiveness. In today’s world, challenges will not be easily addressed with conventional and one-dimensional solutions. With greater interconnectedness and intensification of competition, one needs to draw on broader perspectives that can be gained from partnerships, to build the agility to manage in an everchanging environment. In a partnership, it is important to strive for mutual respect and recognition of the differing needs, preferences and interests, and to encourage an open dialogue around them.

This was because the ASEAN economies did not have the preconditions to achieve such a monetary union and that the effort to achieve such preconditions would involve immense costs to the economies. It was therefore concluded that the region would instead be better served by greater regional financial integration to achieve the very same objectives of a greater shared economic prosperity for the region. Additionally, in Europe, the integration process is facilitated by a more centralised governance structure led by supra-national institutions while ASEAN has built on institutional arrangements and mechanisms that would facilitate financial integration that leverages on a network of committees for the governance process. ASEAN has also adopted a more flexible path that allows member countries to participate in the financial integration process based on the state of readiness. Of particular focus is the harmonisation of regulatory standards and supervisory practices, which is reinforced by capacity building initiatives and technical assistance to bring all member states to a similar level. This inclusive approach ensures that all member states mutually benefit from the integration process. Additionally, regional cooperation in the areas of surveillance arrangements, financial safety nets, and crisis management has been intensified to secure financial stability during the integration process. While much remains to be done, significant achievements in regional financial integration have already been met in recent years.
On the workers’ side, they are undoubtedly losing purchasing power. Indeed, the collective bargaining agreements registered in Spain in January and February this year reveal that wage settlements have reacted moderately to the high inflation environment for the time being. Specifically, in February the wage increase agreed for 2022 rose to 2.3% (from the 1.5% wage settlement for 2021), a percentage clearly below the inflation rates observed in recent months and those expected for this year as a whole. When assessing these figures, it should be borne in mind that the collective bargaining system is highly inertial. The above figures basically reflect the outcome of multiyear collective bargaining agreements over the last two years in an inflationary environment that is very different from today’s. Specifically, the figures for 2022 only include 19 agreements signed this year with a negotiated wage increase of 2.6%, affecting less than 15,000 workers. Therefore, they cannot be considered to offer a true picture of the state of collective bargaining in the early stages of this year. As regards businesses, various pieces of information show that in recent months they have not been fully passing the recent increase in their costs (basically the cost of their energy inputs, but also of other inputs) through to the prices of their products. In this respect, whether as a result of competitive pressures or demand weakness, profit margins appear to have declined recently as a consequence of the current inflationary episode.

Third, we adjusted what has come to be known as our “chained forward guidance”. Indeed, in recent months the Governing Council had been explicitly stating its expectation that net purchases would end shortly before it starts raising policy interest rates. However, in our meeting last week, we agreed that any adjustments to the key ECB interest rates will be take place some time after the end of our net purchases under the APP and will be gradual. The change from “shortly before” to “some time after” maintains the sequential process we intend to follow in adjusting our instruments, but widens the possible time interval between these two events (the end of net purchases and the point at which we start raising our interest rates). This increases the flexibility with which we can implement our decisions in such an uncertain economic and geopolitical context. The gradual adjustment of interest rates is indicative of the Governing Council’s commitment to avoiding abrupt changes to monetary policy instruments. 6  Domestic policies Domestic economic policies must also have a vital role to play at the current juncture. First, it is important for domestic fiscal policy to exploit its ability to act in a very granular and targeted manner and to focus on supporting the households, businesses and sectors most affected by this combination of shocks. This includes particularly lowerincome households, which bear the brunt of the impact of inflation, and more energyintensive firms.
They are estimates which are often revised as new information becomes available. But what is striking about the recent revisions is that the changes do not result from any new information about earnings, but simply from a change in the procedures used to weight together the earnings in different firms and industries. It may be that this change has made it more difficult to make comparisons of earnings over time, and hence to measure underlying earnings growth. Whatever the explanation, there has certainly been a change in the estimated profile of earnings growth over the past two years. The revised data suggest that instead of rising steadily BIS Review 86/1998  -4-  throughout last year, as the economy grew at above-trend rates and the labour market tightened, the rate of growth of earnings actually fell. From a peak of 5.3% in February last year, earnings growth is now estimated to have slowed consistently until March of this year, when it reached a level of 3.9%. This deceleration in earnings growth coincided with a period in which, according to the Labour Force Survey, the labour market tightened considerably: employment rose by 360,000 unemployment fell by 320,000 and the unemployment rate fell from 7.8% to 6.5%. Over the same period wage settlements accelerated. And the revised data imply that since March of this year, as the pace of economic growth has slowed, earnings growth has accelerated, from 3.9% in March to 5.2% in June.

In return, we would be able to adopt similar supervisory policies, thus reducing damaging regulatory arbitrage possibilities and other risks associated with it. One implication of the supervision/regulation heterogeneity across counties in the region is the ineffectiveness of indirect measures to control for credit growth. Therefore finding ways and pushing homogeneity in this regard would at the same time be also important to compensate the lost effectiveness of monetary policy and the eventual demand pressures. There are also a few other ideas that stress the importance of pre-emptive regional cooperation, in bringing us as a region closer to fulfilling our target of European integration. By setting up and pursuing coordinated financial market development policies, we help to integrate our national financial markets into the international financial markets, and pave the way for other economic and social reforms to follow. The modalities of such cooperation vary. Ad-hoc periodical meetings of Governors in the region, supported by more frequent meetings in a technical level to support the discussion agenda, could be one way of approaching the objective for stronger cooperation. In addition, through a more consistent communication, we can try to identify particular issues which are relevant for our regional financial markets, and pose those issues to our counterparties, being common home country authorities, other supervisory authorities where we turn for assistance, or even professional organizations where our supervisory authorities participate. I am sure our concerns can be taken more seriously if raised as a region.
On the one hand, standing back and not intervening would enhance market discipline. This market discipline would provide incentives for better decision-making by the management of financial firms and more vigorous monitoring by their creditors. On the other hand, the risks to financial stability from a failure would have been extraordinarily high, creating pressure for the official sector to intervene in an effort to prevent a disorderly failure. Historically, in most cases when the relevant firms were very large and complex, this dilemma has led to official sector interventions. A consequence is that market discipline was undermined for those firms perceived to be “too big to fail.” To the extent that such actions cause creditors to anticipate future interventions that would shield them from losses, this reduces creditors’ incentive to monitor the management of these firms or respond forcefully in the case of early signs of deterioration. In addition, because the expectation of official sector intervention lowers expected credit losses, this results in cheaper funding costs and provides G-SIFIs with a competitive advantage. It also creates an incentive for such firms to take actions to maintain their too-big-to fail status to preserve this funding advantage. As a consequence, the structure of the financial system has evolved towards larger and more complex firms than can be justified by economies of scale and scope. This is an unacceptable regime and this policy dilemma needs to be resolved.

However, credibility is about the long term, about consistency, and about actions rather than words. We have the second-highest international reserves in Europe after Switzerland. A strong central bank is now a firm anchor in the economy. Over the next six years, monetary policy should be more restrictive, or rather interest rates should be higher, than in the, say, six to ten years before Covid. We need to motivate people, firms and also the government to save. It's the only road towards less debt. This is the first policy for a strong koruna. Second policy for a strong koruna – fiscal policy Inflation was last at the CNB's target in 2018, a period when public finances were in a surplus. In 2017, the public finance surplus in the Czech Republic was 1.5% of GDP. In 2018 it was 0.9% of GDP and in 2019 it was 0.3% of GDP. That is no accident. 2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Defeating inflation is conditional on monetary and fiscal policy coordination.6 The key question is: will the higher inflation observed after Covid be persistent? The answer depends not only on monetary policy, but also on the government's credibility regarding its willingness to stabilise debt. If fiscal policy generates rising deficits, monetary policy alone cannot ensure permanently low inflation. If the central bank increases rates, it will cause a recession. In an entitlement economy, the government will attempt to compensate people for the recession with accommodative fiscal policy. This in turn will fuel inflation.
Some elements of consumer confidence have bounced back too, in particular consumers’ appetite for major purchases. Official data on retail sales have confirmed this recovery in spending, rising 12% in May to leave spending 13% below its pre-Covid level. In part this may reflect the partial opening-up of a larger number of shops. But a larger part appears to have reflected a shift towards online purchases. As a fraction of total retail spending, online sales has risen from around a fifth prior to the Covid crisis to around a third now. Reflecting these trends, many business surveys have also bounced back from their April lows. UK PMIs for May and June rose back to levels only a little below the 50 (no change) mark (Chart 9), as in our major trading partners, although the precise signal to take from these balances at present is unclear. 11  The May MPR discusses what these different categories of household spending represent. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Chart 9: UK PMIs Diffusion Index  70  Services Business Activity 60 50 Manufacturing Output  40  Composite Output  30 20 10 0 2006  2008  2010  2012  2014  2016  2018  2020  Sources: IHS Markit. Notes: Output balances. The UK’s faster recovery might simply reflect an earlier relaxation of lockdown than was assumed in May, as in other countries.

We can use a model to explain GDP across a range of countries using the stringency of their lockdowns in that quarter, as well as a range of other country-specific factors (Chart 7).10 That model suggests world GDP will be 15% lower in Q2 than at the turn of the year, compared to 26% in the May MPR scenario. Chart 7: Lockdown stringency against GDP growth over 2020 H1 GDP change from 19Q4 to 20Q2, %  10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25  UK  -30 -35  0  20  40 60 80 100 Average Oxford stringency index over quarter  120  Sources: Apple, University of Oxford and various national data sources. Notes: See Footnote 10. 10  For a panel of 55 countries, we employ a forecast combination analysis of around 20 different regression models, each of which uses different sets of explanatory variables and the final forecast is a root mean square error weighted average of forecasts from all our specifications. The variables we use are containment, economic and health policy response indices, which are calculated in-house using the Oxford University Covid monitoring database, Apple mobility trends and country characteristics, e.g. share of exports in GDP, dummies for income level and geographic region and average GDP growth between 2014 and 2018. We also include containment policy characteristics such as the maximum containment policy response and the time spent at this maximum response in a quarter.
19 To assist more borrowers, CCS is working on expanding its services. It will offer a centralised repayment solution to those who have accumulated substantial unsecured debts above their annual incomes. Under this new repayment solution, borrowers will not have to approach multiple creditor banks to negotiate how to reduce their debts. Instead, CCS will coordinate across all of a borrower’s creditor banks, and work out a centralised repayment plan. This centralised repayment plan will take holistic account of the borrower’s income, expenditure needs, and loan obligations. All the leading retail banks have agreed to come on-board CCS’ centralised repayment solution by the first quarter of next year. Thrust three: empower individuals to take charge through financial education 20 The third thrust is to reach out to more Singaporeans to empower them with the knowledge and skills to better manage their finances, and especially to avoid excessive borrowing. (a)  2  An integrated consumer education campaign, that explains the problems that result when debts get too high, will be launched by MoneySENSE next year. The  The number of reported unlicensed moneylending and related harassment cases has declined 23% from 10,840 cases in 2012 to 8,306 in 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  campaign will use multiple media channels to reach out to different segments of Singaporeans. (b)  We will reach out to Singaporeans where they work and live.

Enhancing financial well-being of borrowers 14 We want to help everyone to manage their finances well. The Government, financial industry and CCS are working together on a three-pronged approach. Thrust one: tightening credit standards 15 First, we have to avoid excessive borrowing in the first place, which is why MAS has introduced tighter credit standards. (a)  1  2  In June this year, the data in the consumer credit bureaus was enhanced to include information on the total amount of debts that an individual has across financial institutions. This enables financial institutions to make a more realistic assessment of an individual’s repayment capacity, before they grant a new credit card or unsecured credit facility, and before they increase the credit limits on such facilities. MAS imposes minimum income requirements and also limits the amount of credit that each bank can extend to individuals. BIS central bankers’ speeches  (b)  From June next year, financial institutions will not grant further unsecured credit to a person if his total unsecured debt across all financial institutions exceeds his annual income, for three consecutive months. This cap on further credit is to help individuals avoid accumulating unsustainable debts. MAS had announced this last year and provided for a transition period of 18 months to allow time for borrowers to adjust. However, even when the rule takes effect, financial institutions are encouraged to give borrowers time to repay their existing debts gradually. 16 The Government is also strengthening other social safeguards to protect higher risk borrowers.
It is unlikely that in future decades the West will account for such a large share of the world’s unequivocally systemic firms. In both Asia and Latin America, a number of jurisdictions have made progress with putting the KA regime on to a statutory footing. But it is probably fair to say that not a few emerging-market countries are watching progress in the EU. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that the EU’s Directive is the keystone to breaking the back of the TBTF problem. How? The toolkit for Resolution Authorities established by the KAs obviously includes the workhorse techniques for resolving standard commercial banks. Either: liquidation with prompt payout to insured depositors by the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS), commonly known as Liquidation and Payout (L&P). Or: what the US call Purchase & Assumption (P&A) – selling to a third party the distressed bank’s deposit book together with some cash injected by the DGS and perhaps some other good assets. At its simplest, P&A involves splitting the distressed bank into ‘good’ and, let’s say, ‘not so good’ bits. The deposit book and cash might for a while be held in a Bridge Bank controlled by the Resolution Authority (RA), pending sale to a purchaser. But whether or not a Bridge Bank is employed as a holding position, the services to insured depositors are sustained. Meanwhile, the rump goes into administration, with the administrators selling what they can and winding down the rest.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Pilot platform for cross-border investment and settlement of debt securities Remarks by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the press conference for the launch of the pilot platform for cross-border investment and settlement of debt securities, jointly with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Euroclear Bank, Hong Kong, 13 March 2012. *  *  *  The world as we know is changing. Many aspects of how the global financial landscape will change have been discussed. One key area of focus has been the uneven growth momentum across the world, which is expected to persist for some time, and this development will have an impact on the trends and direction of the flows of trade and capital across the world. In essence, the nature of trade and capital flows will be significantly different from what we have experienced in the past decades; gross capital flows from across the globe between the east and the west, the north and the south, will be larger in size and more robust, going forward. These developments may pose risk in particular, to open economies like Malaysia and Hong Kong. A key safeguard to manage the risks that may arise from this transformation would be by strengthening our financial systems, to further develop the capital markets and to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory frameworks. In the Asian region, accentuating this global transformation are the rapid regional economic and financial integration and the expansion of domestic demand.
The Bank of England and Islamic finance My Deputy Governor responsibilities for the Bank of England's £ trillion balance sheet and all of our market operations gives me a particular perspective of the Bank's role at the heart of the UK's financial sector in pursuit of our remit for monetary and financial stability. When considering how we might best carry out our role my approach is framed by four practical steps that I will refer to as the four Cs. First, assessing whether the Bank might be able to provide a solution to the challenge in line with its remit of monetary and financial stability. If this is the case, then the remaining three Cs, to work to convene, collaborate and create to help find a solution. I want to use my remarks today to apply these four Cs to the subject of this panel and show how a range of institutions and interested parties might contribute, in this case to leveraging sukuk, including for sustainable finance. The Bank of England has worked for many years to create a more equal footing for firms in the UK's Islamic finance sector. Islamic Banks have been established in the UK for 40 years, going back to 1982.

Through a potentially much greater contribution from Islamic finance, progressed by our discussions and learnings today, we can better achieve the G20 Indonesian Presidency aim to "recover together, recover stronger". I would like to thank Zish Jooma, Amy Lee and Rupal Patel for their help in preparing the text and Arshadur Rahman, Timothy Rawlings and Christopher Worthington for their comments and contributions. 4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  1 I am indebted to my colleague Andrew Hauser for this speech reference, which was  included in his December 2020 speech 'Why Islamic finance has an important role to play in supporting the recovery from Covid – and how the Bank of England's new Alternative Liquidity Facility can help', at the launch of the ALF. 2 International Energy Agency (2021), World Energy Outlook 2021 3 Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, GFANZ (2022), Financial Institution Net-zero  Transition Plans 4 Rahman, A. (2018) Chapter 9: The Case for GDP-linked sukuk. In Shiller, R, et al.,  Sovereign GDP-linked bonds: Rationale and design(pp. 79-88), CEPR Press, London. 5 Fitch Ratings (2022), Special Report: Global ESG Sukuk Market 6 Refinitiv (2022), Sukuk Perceptions and Forecast Study 2022: Navigating a New  Environment  5/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches