samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Within three months of its operations, two submissions have been received with 30 more in the pipeline. These applications amount to a credit enhancement to raise RM8.4 billion of bonds. A further initiative in this direction is the resumption in the operations of the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC), to facilitate the restructuring of debts, including private debt securities of the larger viable corporations. Renewed optimism in the financial market It is now more than two years since the onset of the global financial crisis. The effects of the crisis on the Asian economies began to be felt in the second half of 2008. Measures to stabilise the financial systems in the advanced countries and the implementation of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus on a global scale have begun to contribute towards a gradual improvement in economic activity in most countries. Conditions in the domestic economy have also shown signs of improvement in the second quarter, with the decline in the industrial production index and in retrenchments being at a much slower pace. As labour market conditions stabilises and the business and consumer sentiments turn positive, and as this is reinforced by the accelerated implementation of the fiscal stimulus packages, the continued access to financing and the lower rate of inflation will cumulatively improve conditions in the domestic economy in the second half of 2009 and into 2010. Signs of optimism have also started to emerge in the bond market.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The Malaysian bond market Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of AmBank's Malaysia Corporate Bond Handbook Commodity Murabahah House, Kuala Lumpur, 18 August 2009. *  *  *  It is my pleasure to be here today on this occasion of the launch of the Malaysia Corporate Bond Handbook. The handbook, which is the first comprehensive guidebook for bond investors, is an initiative that will contribute towards improving the visibility and the development of the Malaysian bond market. Our bond market continues to be dynamic, with continued new developments that enhance Malaysia's position as a centre of origination for securities. In addition, a deeper and more liquid domestic bond market is also important for the development of a vibrant regional bond market which would in turn allow for a part of the savings in the region to be recycled and re-invested in the region. Growth and development of the Malaysian bond market The Malaysian bond market has experienced significant transformation over the recent decade and is now well positioned to have a more significant role to support the changing requirements of the economy in our next stage of development. Initiatives introduced by Bank Negara Malaysia to spur the development of the domestic bond market started as far back as 1986. The establishment of Cagamas Berhad, the national mortgage corporation was the first institution that the Bank established as part of the efforts to develop the domestic bond market.
Financial markets experienced sharp corrections, with a significant drop of the Pound, but they did not freeze. Cooperation between central banks to cope with the Brexit vote has been effective. We, on the ECB Governing Council, remain fully mobilised and determined. –  Second, by maintaining the proper functioning of the euro area – a collective asset belonging to 340 million people. More than two-thirds of euro area citizens support the single currency, according to the Eurobarometer survey. Of course, Brexit will have an impact on the euro area economy, but this impact will be more modest than in the UK. Brexit does not change our economic projections for this year in France: we still expect growth of at least 1.4%. But it is important to reduce the uncertainty over Britain: the quicker, the better. –  Third, by preparing the new trade deal between the UK and the EU in a swift, orderly and consistent manner. We can’t make any assumptions at this stage as to the outcome of the negotiations. What is clear, however, is that there can be no cherrypicking and no free-riding. For the UK to maintain access to the single financial market, all the usual EU rules should be strictly respected. 2)  Building on our strengths to raise investment and growth  Despite the gradual economic upturn seen in 2015–2016, our main European challenge is still how to increase growth.

More broadly, developing practical ways to model realistic interactions among banks and other financial institutions and between the financial and real sectors of the economy would be important advances. Transparency of Process and Results The next element we identified as contributing to the SCAP’s success as a macroprudential exercise was transparency, both of the process and, especially, of the results. The SCAP was groundbreaking because it disclosed firm-specific supervisory estimates in detail, including loss amounts and rates on different types of loans, projections of net revenues, and the amount of capital each firm would have to raise to meet publicly disclosed supervisory targets ratios. These disclosures formed the template for subsequent DFAST and CCAR stress test results. Current stress test disclosures deliver not just insight into individual banks’ ability to withstand stressful economic outcomes, but also provide a broader perspective about the exposure of different segments of bank lending, securities and other activities to adverse economic and financial market developments. These segment-level results, aggregated across banks, are important because they have the potential to serve as public warning signals about over-heating or a build-up of risk that can supplement other cyclical macroprudential analysis. While the transparency of the supervisory stress test results was a groundbreaking element of the SCAP in 2009, subsequent discussion has focused largely on the transparency of the process of generating the results, in particular, information about supervisory stress test models.
Thus, this step will help to insulate U.S. markets from the pressures in Europe and support the availability of credit to U.S. households and businesses. European banks are particularly active in areas such as trade finance, project finance, energy lending and municipal finance – a sharp contraction of the financing they provide would be harmful for the U.S. economy as a whole including for U.S. exporters, firms working on infrastructure projects, the energy industry and hardpressed state and local governments across the country. U.S. financial institutions currently do not face difficulty obtaining liquidity in short-term funding markets. However, were conditions to deteriorate, the Federal Reserve has a range of tools available to provide an effective liquidity backstop for such institutions and is prepared to use these tools as needed to support financial stability and to promote the extension of credit to U.S. households and businesses. In sum, I am hopeful that Europe can effectively address its current fiscal challenges. The Federal Reserve is actively and carefully assessing this situation and the potential impact on the U.S. economy. At this time, although I do not anticipate further efforts by the Federal Reserve to address the potential spillover effects of Europe on the United States, we will continue to monitor the situation closely. Thank you for your invitation to testify today, and I look forward to your questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

This year’s bicentenary of the Norwegian Constitution is an occasion to remember the importance of good institutions that have clearly defined roles. This is essential for stability and progress. Come what may. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15
And at this point, I would like to stress more on why we cannot afford to be complacent with the situation. Most importantly, there always seems to be an unbridgeable gap between what market anticipates and what governments and central banks can really offer at the end of the day. And if history is any guide, it is precisely this gap that creates ripples of disappointment and risk aversion that propagate throughout the global financial market almost instantly. When we look back, not so far in the past, all of us have just witnessed a panic sell-off in global stock markets starting from late July to September. In addition to stocks, almost every type of risky assets was also under tremendous selling pressure across the board, and some  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  market commentators even went so far as comparing this event with the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis. And when we look forward, the future is not very promising either due to two major reasons. First is the fact that so-called “milestone” developments toward the resolution of the crises in the U.S. and the Eurozone so far do not seem to address problems at their root causes; rather, issues have been dealt with merely temporarily, one after another. A recent example of this would be the eleventh-hour negotiation in the U.S. in raising debt ceiling limits only to meet the August-second deadline, which did nothing but leave the big elephant standing in the room.

We have also seen Germany under tremendous pressure both at home and abroad with regard to its role in solving the crisis. Moreover, the future of Greece, where it all started, also remains unclear. We have seen various attempts in engineering debt restructuring for Greece, even an “orderly default”; and in late October we have seen agreement between Eurozone leaders and banks on Greek debt’s haircut. Personally, I am concerned that many of these steps are merely “technical” solutions that do not address the situation at its root causes, and only time will tell how these “technical” steps would play out as well as what the eventual fate of Greece in the European Union would be. Looking beyond Greece, some contagion of the sovereign debt crisis to the financial sector and the real economy of other European countries and beyond seem to be inevitable at this point, with countries that are “too big to bail” such as Italy also on the list. Private holders of PIIGS bonds face substantially higher risks, which have already led to recent downgrades of several financial institutions. Without decisive actions and unreserved collaboration in solving the debt crisis, the outlook for Eurozone economy is likely to be affected – given the possibility of further fiscal consolidation in countries like Italy, Spain, and even France. Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to restate that what happens on both sides of the Atlantic will likely shape the global economy over the years to come.
Like a commercial bank, collateral bestows post-default recovery value. But unlike commercial banks, we do not use collateral for liquidity management purposes. The Bank does not re-pledge collateral to raise liquidity for example. The emphasis is on the protection that the collateral offers in a default situation. Although the eligibility of collateral depends on a number of factors, in all cases the collateral must be of sufficiently high credit quality so that it presents a low risk to the Bank in the event of a default by a counterparty. The Bank’s operations vary in their policy objectives, and so have different eligible collateral pools which are tailored to match the policy goals. In operations designed solely to implement monetary policy, only a narrow range of collateral is allowed. By design, these operations will normally involve lending at close to Bank Rate. The Bank’s counterparties have a financial incentive to optimise their use of collateral in these operations by selecting the cheapest to deliver. If any relatively illiquid or lower credit securities are allowed in the narrow collateral set, then the commercial banks will have an incentive to exploit that premium. That would mean that the central bank’s monetary policy operation could become a regular source of funding (and profit) for the firm. This can matter if, for example, it creates distortions in demand for those lower quality assets.

The financial crisis, and the associated expansion of the balance sheet to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system, was a true “game changer” for the Bank of England: the Sterling Monetary Framework has been almost completely redesigned over the past few years. The increased demand for liquidity insurance necessitated a large and rapid expansion in the scale of lending and the range of collateral the Bank took in its operations. 3  Further details are available in the Bank’s 2010 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/quarterlybulletin/qb100201.pdf  4  These operations were suspended when large-scale asset purchases commenced in March 2009. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the Autumn of 2007, the Bank extended the range of collateral acceptable in its LTRs (henceforth eLTRs) and increased their size somewhat. In April 2008, in the wake of Bear Stearns’ failure, the Bank introduced the SLS. Through that scheme, the Bank eventually lent £ of 9-month T-bills against a wide range of private-sector collateral – mostly UK RMBS backed by legacy mortgages – for up to 3 years. Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the Bank further extended the collateral allowed in eLTRs and initiated a massive expansion in its lending at the 3 month maturity, eventually peaking at £ in early 2009. In October 2008, the Bank also introduced a permanent Discount Window Facility (DWF), which can provide liquidity to counterparties on a bilateral basis against a wide range of collateral, ranging from US treasuries and German bunds to self-originated ABS.
Distinguished Guests, Once more I would like to underline that extending the horizon within which inflation converges to the target of 4 percent does not mean that monetary policy will be looser in the forthcoming period. On the contrary, the presented inflation forecasts are based on a tighter monetary policy stance compared to the previous period. Monetary policy will be more  BIS Review 62/2008  13  responsive to bad news than good news in the period ahead. This approach reflects our firm commitment to attaining price stability. I would like to stress that prudent monetary policy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition in itself for attaining price stability. The support from fiscal policy and structural reforms are also critical in this respect. Sound fiscal policy has been one of the main factors in driving inflation down to single digits. The role of fiscal policy will continue to be critical on the road to price stability. Preserving the resilience of the economy, especially under current conditions, requires the continuation of fiscal discipline and structural reforms. In this respect, the European Union accession process and the implementation of structural reforms envisaged in the economic program remain to be of the utmost importance. Finally, I would like to conclude my speech by specially emphasizing that advances in structural reforms, which would improve the quality of fiscal discipline and raise productivity, are monitored closely by the CBRT with regard to their implications on macroeconomic and price stability. Thank you. 14  BIS Review 62/2008

I am not sure which of these three scenarios will happen or whether a fourth scenario will emerge, as the current situation is something we have never experienced before. However, what I am certain is that since the outlook for macro economic and financial environment is very uncertain, it is highly possible that we will continue to see large fund inflows and outflows as well as sharp fluctuations in the financial markets. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to ask everyone to stay alert to the risks ahead and be aware that the current environment is highly abnormal and uncertain. We should all take precautionary measures and get to the bottom of the problem, learn from others’ experiences and avoid overstretching ourselves. Otherwise, we may find ourselves being trapped in the debt abyss with no way out. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
An alternative would be to apply these same techniques on a normative and prescriptive basis – how should central banks be communicating to best engage with a wider audience? For some time, this has been as area of active study and policy design by behavioural economists. For example, in the UK the Behavioural Insights Unit (BIU), initially set up by the UK government, has worked on a range of public policy questions, including taxation, regulation and consumer choice. In particular, their work has focussed on how sometimes subtle changes in language can be used to improve understanding by the public and to “nudge” them towards a particular course of action. 74  Understanding the response of the public is often not easy and often calls for the use of randomised control trials familiar from development economics. For example, the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK has recently used these techniques to explore how changes in the language used to describe financial products affects the likelihood of them being understood and purchased by retail investors. In choosing retirement income products, use of the word “annuity” shrunk take-up by 25%. 75  This approach of trialling, eliciting feedback and then adapting is not common in macro-economic public policy. That is, at least in part, for the understandable reason that doing experiments with the general public on a macro scale is a rather daunting task.

While we welcomed greater engagement of emerging economies in the global regulatory reform process, such as in Basel Committee and various working groups, the key success factors are these: First, our inclusiveness at the policy development stage rather than just implementation stage, and secondly, on the inclusiveness in the supervisory colleges of global banks which are systemically important to our domestic financial system. Ladies and gentlemen, In closing, I would like to iterate that, the success in meeting these challenges, rests as much with us, as with the banking sector. Thus far, we are pleased with their efforts in strengthening risk management, not only in the process, but more importantly, the culture. Often, we are asked why our banking system has managed to remain resilient, while those with more sophisticated risk management system have suffered. I believe the key is, first of all, there is no gap between the risk profile of our banks and their risk management system, as well as our risk-based supervision. Our banks business model is less complex, mobilizing local and stable deposit, for on lending to domestic borrowers, with small investment portfolios, mostly in plain vanilla Thai government bond. They have very little exposure to less familiar risk such as overseas assets and complex products. But looking ahead, things will not stay this safe if both banks and the Bank of Thailand do not work closely to continuously strengthen risk management.
2  BIS Review 33/2010  One indicator of this recovery in confidence is the performance of stock markets, reflecting an improving assessment of business prospects. As Chart 2 shows, equity markets in the UK and US have recovered by around 60% from their troughs about a year ago. Alongside this improvement in financial market confidence, business survey indicators have also been improving across the global economy. Chart 3 shows a composite measure of surveys of purchasing managers from the major world economies. The very negative readings of around a year ago have given way to responses which are consistent with rising activity and the expectation of future growth. BIS Review 33/2010  3  The natural momentum of a recovery is that, as growth continues and memories of the recession fade, both consumer and business confidence will continue to build. Over time, cutbacks in investment by firms and the deferral of major consumer purchases will begin to reverse. As a result, we should expect both consumer and investment demand to gradually strengthen as long as new shocks to confidence do not emerge. Growth in Asia and emerging markets Alongside this general recovery in confidence, a key engine of the world recovery has been a strong rebound in Asia and many other emerging market economies.

27.11.2020  Opening address of the 19th Conference – Club de Gestión de Riesgos de España Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Introduction Many thanks to the Risk Management Club for their kind invitation to open this annual conference. We are now into its nineteenth edition that, inevitably, will focus on the new challenges in the aftermath of COVID-19. The title of this conference refers to the “new world” that will be awaiting us after overcoming the crisis caused by the pandemic. Needless to say, we all wish that this happens as soon as possible. It may seem a little excessive to talk of a “new world” after the pandemic, but I believe to some extent it will be. We should remember that crises are periods of change, in which what is established is called into question. Each crisis is certainly different from previous ones. Or rather it should be different, at least if we supervisors, regulators and banks learn from the past and avoid making the same mistakes. In any event, it seems we have now been hearing the word “crisis” more than ever for over a decade. Until relatively recently, when we referred to “the crisis” we had the global financial crisis in mind. Now, sadly, we must clarify which crisis we are talking about. It could be said that the society we live in may be the result of how we have tackled and resolved each of the crises we have faced.