samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Yeo Lian Sim: Hedge funds - a mainstream alternative Keynote address by Ms Yeo Lian Sim, Deputy Managing Director (Market Conduct) of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Hedge Funds World Singapore 2002, Singapore, 19 September 2002. *  *  *  Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen  A decade of controversy and rapid growth Ten years ago this month, speculation that Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) would be realigned gained momentum and the British pound came under intense pressure in the foreign exchange markets. The rest, as they say, is history. Hedge funds have come a long way since the Sterling attack. They have been linked to other instances of market turmoil, like the Mexican Peso meltdown in 1994-95 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Studies have revealed little evidence that hedge funds were mainly responsible for those episodes. But their participation is not in dispute. Also in 1998, we saw the near collapse of Long Term Capital Management and its subsequent recapitalisation by a consortium of banks brought together with the help of the New York Fed. The incident raised questions about the risks that large and highly leveraged hedge funds pose to systemic stability. It was to address these concerns that the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), of which Singapore is a member, set up a working group on Highly Leveraged Institutions (HLIs).

Parliament has enacted legislation to ensure there will be no doubt about the separation of retail activity in the major UK banking groups at the point of failure. The PRA now has the task of implementing that legislation to complete the work of making ring-fenced banks separable ex ante. Similar developments in the restructuring space are underway in other jurisdictions. The splitting off of domestic retail banks in Swiss G-SIBs and the requirement for large foreign banks in the United States to form Intermediary Holding Companies (IHCs) are examples. Another aspect being explored in resolution plans is the scope for orderly, solvent wind-down of trading books in investment banks in recovery or resolution. This goes to the general principle that it is important for us as resolution authorities to understand the options  7  6  Financial Stability Board (2015) ‘Guiding principles on the temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution of a global systemically important bank (“G-SIB”)’. BIS central bankers’ speeches  we have to restructure critical functions if we need to in resolution. I can imagine that in time via planning in CMGs we will see more convergence in approaches in this area across jurisdictions. In conclusion, much has been done to achieve what is necessary to make G-SIB resolution work. TLAC is symptomatic of the distance travelled and represents a true game-changer.
In the short term monetary policy can influence developments in the real economy. Norges Bank can do this through two channels. First, Norges Bank will proceed gradually when the krone’s value moves outside the initial range and instruments are oriented to returning it to this range. We seek to avoid a situation whereby monetary policy contributes to abrupt shifts in the economy. Second,  13  BIS Review 20/1999  developments in the labour market and product markets influence wage growth and inflation, and thereby the krone exchange rate. Norges Bank takes this into account when evaluating economic developments and when setting interest rates. However, monetary policy is not a suitable instrument for influencing production and employment in the long term. Nor can it be used to influence the size of the internationally exposed sector over time. It is primarily wage and income determination, the use of oil revenues over the government budget, and the adaptability and efficiency of the economy that determines this. Nor is monetary policy an effective tool of incomes policy. Interest rates cannot be used to influence the negotiating climate of the income settlements. This could act as a highly negative constraint on the freedom of manoeuvre. Long-term fiscal policy challenges The fall in oil prices has obvious and immediate implications for monetary policy. But what about long-term balance in the Norwegian economy? What if oil revenues remain low in the longer term as well? Norway’s government finances are sound thanks to the large surpluses of recent years.

The oil companies have therefore enjoyed stable operating parameters over the last 15 years, although this sector is also faced with the challenge of finding new solutions in response to the sharp shifts in market conditions that we have witnessed recently. This will once again require forward-looking strategies and willingness to compromise. 5  BIS Review 20/1999  The government’s supervisory tasks are substantial. Confidence in the banking system in critical situations may also be contingent on the government’s willingness to provide financial backing. There is a fundamental conflict between these two roles and the government’s role as bank owner. People must be confident that the government does not conceal its own mistakes when intervening in the face of a crisis in the banking system should this again prove necessary. It is virtually impossible to establish such confidence if the government is also responsible for the crisis through its ownership. State ownership in the banking industry has been maintained with a view to ensuring stable national ownership. It seems that, in practice, most comparable countries attach importance to having large financial institutions with a national anchor, but most of them avoid state ownership and the associated conflicts of interest. We should also be able to do this. However, I would like to stress that a greater number of foreign financial institutions could also be advantageous. Foreign institutions will normally be larger and more diversified than Norwegian institutions. This could generate better and cheaper services in the Norwegian market.
As always, we are monitoring developments carefully and in connection with the Monetary Policy Update in April will make a renewed assessment of the international outlook in which we will also take into account how events in Japan may affect the development of the global economy in the slightly longer term. Sweden At the latest monetary policy meeting in February, we decided to raise the repo rate from 1.25 per cent to 1.50 per cent and our assessment was that the repo rate would need to be increased to 3.6 per cent by the end of the forecast period, that is in three years’ time. My assessment was that we will need to raise the repo rate by 0.25 per cent at every meeting in 2011 to 2.75 per cent at the end of the year. This entails a somewhat steeper upward path in the second half of 2011 than the repo-rate path presented in the main scenario of the Monetary Policy Report. However, in light of the uncertainty about the development of interest rates, I did not enter a reservation against the repo-rate path but confined myself to commenting on this at the meeting (see Figure 17). I will now discuss my view of monetary policy in the years ahead in a little more detail and take the picture of the economic outlook presented in the latest Monetary Policy Report as my starting point.

Svante Öberg: My view of monetary policy 2006–2011 Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Handelsbanken, Stockholm, 18 March 2011. *  *  *  I have now been at the Riksbank for over five years and my appointment as Deputy Governor of the Riksbank expires at the turn of the year. I will have celebrated my 65th birthday by then and I have informed the General Council of the Riksbank that I will not be seeking reappointment. This makes it natural for me to look back at the conduct of monetary policy over the last five years and, in the light of this experience, discuss the direction of monetary policy in the years ahead. The three theses that I will argue for in this speech are:   Monetary policy was too expansionary before the financial crisis    Monetary policy worked well during the crisis    The repo rate needs to be raised at every meeting this year (and perhaps next year too)  Monetary policy was too expansionary in the years before the financial crisis My first thesis is thus that monetary policy was too expansionary in the years before the full force of the financial crisis hit the world in September 2008. This applies both in Sweden and abroad. I will present arguments to support this thesis in this section. Abroad Monetary policy was expansionary in the years before the financial crisis in both the United States and the euro area.
The level of prices rose more than twentyfold in the period from 1806 to 18132, and in 1813 the currency was devalued by almost 90 percent. The first national assembly at Eidsvoll was attended by representatives of a nation in deprivation. For the 112 sworn representatives, popularly known as the men of Eidsvoll, who took their places as the Constituent Assembly in spring 1814, the atmosphere was nonetheless full of hope for freedom and a better future. Several of them had spent time abroad and had been influenced by the Enlightenment philosophers and by the American and French revolutions. The Norwegian Constitution was inspired by the thoughts and ideas they brought home with them. Absolute monarchy under the Danish king was to be replaced by the sovereignty of the people and the separation of powers. Institutions with clearly distinguished roles would prevent the arbitrary use of power and foster confidence. This evening we are gathered in one such institution. In the discussion at Eidsvoll, Christian Magnus Falsen, a key member of the Constituent Assembly, said that no state can exist without a well functioning monetary system. Another prominent member of the Assembly, Count Wedel Jarlsberg, insisted that the nation must have its own bank. The people’s elected representatives took responsibility for the monetary system, as stated in Article 75 of the Constitution: «It devolves upon the Storting to supervise the monetary affairs of the Realm».

Conclusion During the Napoleonic Wars, the British naval blockade of Norwegian ports led to shortages of essential foods over several years. Many people risked their lives to sneak past the blockade. Count Wedel Jarlsberg organised the transport of grain from Denmark and sailed several times across Skagerrak himself. The chances of succeeding were greatest when weather conditions were adverse and visibility low. Today, trade with other countries is less perilous. Our prosperity is built on extensive trade in goods with other countries. People from other countries seek to enter Norway to find work and new opportunities. The enormous economic progress in Norway has not been linear. Rapid population growth and food crises in the latter half of the 1800s led to the massive emigration of close to 1 million Norwegians to America. Norway gradually became an industrialised country, and trade and shipping provided our new nation with much needed income. Moreover, an  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  abundance of natural resources has been essential for our country’s prosperity. Norway never did become a true manufacturing nation. We cannot expect the strong growth in national income we have seen in recent years to continue. Norway is not immune to shifting circumstances and external shocks. Steering the course through stormy weather will be testing, but we have an optimal starting point. The beneficial tailwinds have been put to good use and Norway is in a solid position to tackle challenges when the winds shift. The Constitution is the foundation of modern Norway.
This is particularly true of international payment schemes in the area of card payments (Visa, Mastercard), through which nearly two-thirds of card payments made in the European Union, especially cross-border transactions, are routed. Eighteen countries depend entirely on international schemes for the processing of their domestic transactions. Mobile payments, whose share is increasing, depend largely on mobile operating system developers such as Apple or Samsung. In addition, private systems entering in the instant payment sector are multiplying – Paypal, Lydia, and also Alipay, which will soon be launched in France, for example – at the risk of undermining bank interoperability and competition. Restrictions on the use of certain proprietary technical solutions such as NFC sensors, or payment card acceptance software for example, may also constitute an obstacle to free competition. Hence, the importance, in this context, of including collective interest projects in the European strategy for retail payments, which has reiterated the need for the EU to ensure the independence of its range of payment solutions. A key example of this is the project conducted by a group of banks to propose a solution, known as the European Payment Initiative (EPI). This is why the Banque de France and the Eurosystem as a whole are encouraging and supporting this market initiative, which would represent a further major milestone in the creation of an integrated European payment area since the creation of the SEPA area. B- Central banks may also contribute as providers of settlement services in central bank money, particularly with regard to financial intermediaries.

Yet a growing share of data storage services is being outsourced to cloud providers, most of which are foreign. In addition, the use of public cloud services, where data from multiple customers are aggregated on a single server, raises issues of data security and auditability. Several recent episodes such as the US sanctions in Crimea (2014) or the Amazon Web Services failure (2017) have illustrated the real risks to and impacts on the economy of a destabilisation of payment activities. They thus stressed the need for the community to maintain end-to-end control over an activity that is essential to industry, commerce and public services. 2. Faced with these challenges, what roles should central banks play? In this perspective, the public authorities responsible for the development of the regulatory framework applicable to financial services and European private players obviously have a major role to play. The future of Europe’s sovereignty over its payments system will be all the  more secure if it can rely in particular on the ability of its private and industrial players, FinTechs and financial intermediaries to adapt and innovate continuously in order to reap the benefits for themselves and their customers of an open, competitive and highly integrated payments market at European and international level.
So we hired outside webpage experts to upgrade it, who have been working for the last year, and will be ready to go forward with our easy-to-read, easy-to-use, user-friendly format in the next couple of months. The information available on our webpage, whilst extensive does not go back very far in history, and to do real economic analysis, you may have to contact with the team responsible for these issues. Though this is easily done automatically by just clicking into the information item, it is still much better to have the information readily available on the internet rather than having to contact people. In the more major task of restructuring the organisation, the work system and the vision of the Bank of Thailand which we have been doing in the past two years, we have established a new department called the Data Warehouse Department. This department will store all the information of the Bank, sourcing the raw information totally by EDI, thereby dispensing with the more than 900 paper reports that the financial institutions are having to fill every month and make the information available to  1  BIS Review 29/2000  every user inside the Bank of Thailand and outside the Bank according as to their needs and access clearance. Upon completion of the data warehouse, we have a plan to make economic information available on our webpage over a 20-year historical time-span, and this will be done in the next two years.

People compete according to known and clear rules and do not have to talk to civil servants just in order to do business. Those rules were written 70 years ago in the change of the absolute to constitutional monarchy and tended, therefore, to be protective of the public and the consumer and to protect them against sharp practices or practices that might be deemed sharp of the business people. Those rules have had to be changed over time, one by one, but they have not all been changed such for instance that a business company can not buy its own capital back to enhance its returns because it might be deemed financial engineering for its own sake, which the ignorant public might not understand. One day soon there might come a time when the country would be fully competitive and it would be good for the general public, but at the moment the sentiment that the public must be protected is still quite noticeable. And now the TPI decision seems to be no exception. In terms of legal framework, TPI has been put into rehabilitation process and that should satisfy investors for both foreigners and Thais who wish the due process of the law to be administered.
(2015), shows that EMEs countries exposed to the original sin (unable to borrow internationally in local currency) appear as tightening CBMs on banks’ liabilities during the 2013-2015 period. Our understanding is that the databases used in cross-country analysis still contain a high degree of self-judgement by reporting countries that sometimes affect the quality and consistency of the information provided. At least this is our experience regarding answering the IMF’s survey on exchange rate Page 3 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  arrangements and exchange restrictions (AREAER), which is used in the majority of cross-country comparison of CBM and capital controls usage. High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation? International Capital Flows in the Post-crisis World, September 2019 CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE  Currency-based measures  With the exception of China, only countries suffering from original sin used and tightened CBMs on banks’ FX liabilities  Tightening  No tightening  No Original Sin  Original Sin  Source: De Crescenzio, Golini, and Ott (2015), “Currency-based Measures Targeting Banks - Balancing National Regulation of Risk and Financial Openness,” OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2015/03. Recent evidence on the evolution of capital controls shows that Chile has taken more liberalization actions than tightening actions on both inflows and outflows (Pasricha et al., 2018). The following Figure shows the cumulated weighted net inflow easing actions and weighted net outflow easing measures in Chile and in a group of EMEs (excluding Chile).

While the impact of some of the factors underpinning household spending may moderate in the coming quarters, most of the factors operating in the recent past will continue to boost domestic demand and, in particular, productive investment. Likewise, insofar as European markets recover and the effects of the euro appreciation in 2004 ease and are absorbed, the contractionary influence of external demand might be checked. Under this scenario, the outlook for the economy in the short run points to a prolongation of the expansionary phase, with sustained GDP growth rates similar to those observed in 2004. These forecasts are subject, however, to some risk. This poses significant challenges for economic policy, especially when it comes to promoting the sustainability of economic dynamism over a longer  BIS Review 45/2005  5  term, under the constraints stemming from euro area membership. There are certain external risks whose potential influence on Spain is significant, but which economic policy action can do little to counter. This is the case with the dangers arising from the weakness of the euro area, from higher oil prices and from the appreciation of the euro. What economic policy can do here is in line with what policymakers can do to counter domestic risks, these undoubtedly being the most relevant ones for policy design. Accordingly, I shall focus on analysing the nature of the latter and their possible repercussions.
First, in the area of monitoring and assessing risks to financial stability, central banks can benefit from extended access to supervisory information and intelligence to better understand risks and vulnerabilities for the financial system as a whole. At the same, there is clearly the issue, of how to translate the outcome of the financial stability assessment into supervisory action. In principle one cannot but agree that there should be a way through which, if the central bank identifies serious risks to financial stability, the competent supervisor should be able to act. Therefore, communication needs to go both ways: from the central bank to supervisors and vice versa within the respective legal framework. Second, in the area of liquidity, there is clearly room for a closer interplay between the two authorities. Central banks would benefit from enhanced access to supervisory information and intelligence for its role of maintaining stable money markets. To that end for instance access to information on banks’ liquidity contingency planning funds would be useful. At the same time, supervisors would benefit from information available at central banks stemming from their role in the money markets. Third, in the area of crisis management and resolution, depending on the nature and feature of the crisis, there is a need for close interaction between the two authorities. Provision of Emergency Liquidity Assistance is a clear point in case where central banks need supervisory information for decision-making.

Inflation in services is also increasing but here it is interesting to point out that whereas supply side factors were the main driver of services inflation until the end of 2021, demand factors have been making an increasing contribution to services inflation throughout 2022, and ended up surpassing supply driven factors in the third quarter. A similar increasing contribution of demand drivers versus supply drivers is observed in Non-Energy Industrial Goods inflation in 2022. So, Headline HICP inflation is projected to rise further from the already very high levels, averaging to 8.1% in 2022, then decreasing to 5.5% next year and to 2.3% in 2024. But these are annual averages of inflation. This is also important because in order to reach the 5.5% average inflation next year, since inflation starts in the coming year at a high level, it means that inflation is expected to be at 3.3% in the fourth quarter of 2023, assuming, of course, there are no new external shocks. The aim of monetary policy, through higher interest rates, is to support disinflationary pressures through downward pressure on demand. So Monetary Policy has a "more" difficult job than when dealing only with "typical" demand driven inflation. 1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Given the above considerations and the current highly uncertain environment, the inherent flexibility of the meeting by meeting approach we decided at the Governing Council is well suited to calibrating monetary policy, in line with the incoming data and the evolving outlook. Thank you.