samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
They should lead by example, notably by supplying the new European payment instruments to their clients and by ensuring that the retail payment system they operate complies with the interoperability principle enshrined in the SEPA project. 2.2. Acting as a facilitator of market and regulatory evolutions  Turning to the involvement of the Eurosystem in payment systems issues as a facilitator of market and regulatory evolutions, it is fair to say that this mode of action has been mainly used in the field of retail payments to support the SEPA project. The SEPA project was launched in 2002 by the European banking community under the aegis of the Eurosystem and the European Commission. The banking industry has taken on the responsibility of delivering the SEPA products, in particular the specifications of the new European instruments. The European Commission, which grants a great importance to the SEPA project in so far as the latter contributes to the achievement of the common market and the completion of the Lisbon agenda, has elaborated a legal framework for payment services in the European Union. It made public, in December 2005, a directive proposal that should be adopted at the European level before being transposed in national laws by 2008. Since 1999, the Eurosystem’s central banks have been actively promoting, at European and national levels, the establishment of a SEPA.

When completed at the end of next year, we expect that these changes will substantially improve the stability of the market. Indeed, the work completed to date has already reduced the amount of activity being financed on an intraday basis from 100 percent to about 70 percent, and we project that intraday credit usage will decline to no more than 10 percent by the end of next year. By removing the clearing bank from the role of substantial intraday lender, and making tri-party repurchase exposures truly bilateral, we expect that market participants will have better incentives to manage their liquidity and credit risks more prudently. While these changes represent positive developments that will enhance the stability of the triparty repo market, an important challenge remains. Current reforms do not address the risk that a dealer’s loss of access to tri-party repo funding could precipitate destabilizing asset fire sales, whether by the dealer itself, or by the dealer’s creditors following a default. Industry participants have yet to fully embrace the role they must play in finding a solution to this problem. As a result, I would urge industry participants to begin work on this issue without further delay. In fact, this is one of the motivations for convening today’s workshop – to start the dialogue. As several of the speakers will discuss in greater detail today, when fire sales occur they can undermine the stability of other markets beyond the tri-party repo market.
In this period the following had to be done: •  introduce the new Macedonian national currency - Denar;  •  surmount inflation, which at the time of the monetary independence equaled around 1.200 percent on annual level;  •  overcome the accumulated problems in banking, managed primarily by debtors;  •  repay the so-called "frozen" foreign currency deposits to the depositors, as the first precondition for restoring the confidence in banking;  •  build capacity in the Central Bank itself for pursuing an independent monetary policy and efficient banking system supervision;  •  establish a modern payment system. Many of these issues were successfully solved. Manu of them are still being successfully treated. The national currency was successfully introduced, inflation was surmounted, and in the past 12 years it has been on average on the level of only 2.2 percent, annually. The function of prudential supervision has been established, which is continuously being improved and upgraded. Payment operations are conducted smoothly. So is the function of the government's fiscal agent. The capacity for conducting the monetary policy is in constant progress. From April 1992 until December 1995, the National Bank applied a monetary targeting strategy, with the money supply M1 being the intermediate target. At that time, mainly direct instruments were used: selective credits, minimum liquidity, compulsory CB bills, discount rate and reserve requirement.

It turned out to be "everybody's and nobody's" but de facto it belonged to those with the largest political power. In line with those principles of the system, credit plans directed the reserve money issuance, rather than it to be determined by economic fundamentals: economic growth, internal and external balances, supply and demand, real market values. Printing of money was also dictated by the debtors, which did not repay the credits, but issued bills of exchange which at the end were borne by the reserve money issuance, then the extremely soft budget constraints, direct lending to whole economic sectors, and even certain companies, from the reserve money issuance, at interest rates significantly below the inflation rate. Instead of the debtors, often their creditors went bankrupt, with the intention to preserve social rest, or to postpone social unrest. Therefore, the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, followed by the development since then until present day, have been years of Schumpeter's destruction, positive destruction - regardless of our dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the reforms and jeopardized social security, which, I would agree, did not have to erode to such an extent, before the new solutions started to give better results.
This process took painstakingly long and it was not until 1842 that full convertibility at par values against silver was reintroduced after 85 years with a paper money standard. From the time when the strategy was laid in 1822 it took more than 20 years to build enough credibility to sustain full convertibility even after Norges Bank had been successfully established. During the first century of its operations Norges Bank exercised a high degree of independence from the central government and built a reputation of credibility and confidence in defending first silver convertibility and thereafter gold convertibility. During the heydays of the classic gold standard in the four decades preceding WWI, recent research on  1  2  Dylan, Bob (1964), The times they are a-changin, Columbia studios. BIS Review 131/2008  monetary policy (Øksendal, 2008) 2 finds that credibility and confidence allowed Norges Bank more room for discretion than has previously been acknowledged. This room for discretion was used to take domestic considerations into account. This extra room for manoeuvring, however, was only available to the bank as long as its commitment to defend the gold standard was not called into question. Was this a preview of today’s modern inflation targeting regime? As long as inflation expectations are well anchored, more weight can be given to developments in the real economy. The independence of Norges Bank was de facto substantially reduced after WWII. The legitimacy of the bank and confidence in the bank had been seriously undermined during the interwar period and during WWII.

In 2016 we want to see that this project has produced three high quality books on The History of Norges Bank 1816-2016, The Monetary History of Norway 1816-2016 and on selected Topics in Central Banking in an international historical perspective. The aim of the workshop is to bring together international experts from central banks and academia for informal discussions and an exchange on topics related to the writing of central bank and monetary history. We expect discussions to be active and lively and we want this workshop to kick-start research activities in these important areas. I want to thank the Graduate Institute here in Geneva and Professor Marc Flandreau in particular for their hospitality and for allowing us to spend almost two days discussing research in central bank and monetary history. Previous books about the history of Norges Bank have been written in Norwegian, and predominantly by previous central bank governors. But “the times they are a-changin”, to  BIS Review 131/2008  1  phrase Bob Dylan (Dylan, 1964), 1 and today we believe that best practice in writing central bank and monetary history is achieved by contributions from professional academic experts in relevant areas. The research should be brought up to international quality standards through the usual peer review process.
And, even more important, HLIs play no role in traditional financial intermediation, i.e., they are not involved in the savings and loans business. Hence, the failure of one or more important HLIs would not directly encumber the real economy. HLIs do not represent a direct threat to financial stability. The main concern with regard to financial stability is that the failures of one or more large HLIs could have a severe impact on systemically important banks and, as such, constitute an indirect threat to the financial system. We see two channels through which such a shock could be transmitted to the banking sector. 6 First transmission channel: banks as counterparties and creditors By providing leverage, acting as counterparty or serving as prime brokers, large international banks are directly exposed vis-à-vis HLIs. When a HLI incurs losses, this has a direct impact on the bank. Depending on the size of the open position vis-à-vis the HLI, this might threaten the bank's solvency in an extreme case. The effective risk emanating from HLIs depends primarily on the margin and collateral requirements set by the banks. These requirements help not only to constrain losses but also to determine the amount of leverage HLIs are allowed to use. Moreover, banks can partially hedge their risk and diversify their exposures. In general, we do not see a substantial difference between banks’ exposures to HLIs and other risky exposures, such as, for instance, derivatives.

Second, margin calls can force HLIs with a high leverage and a focus on derivatives to liquidate large positions in a very short period of time. In stressful market conditions, both of these phenomena could further depress market prices, reduce market liquidity and increase volatility. This is the second transmission channel through which HLIs may amplify shocks and spread negative effects in the banking sector. 6  See also Hildebrand, 2007. 7  The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, 1999, page 17. BIS Review 74/2007  3  Let us again have a look at the LTCM case in order to assess the disruptive capacity of HLIs through this second transmission channel. The President's Working Group on Financial Markets concluded, «nor were LTCM's exchange positions of such magnitude that a default by it would have caused significant disruptions of the U.S. exchange-traded futures market.» 8 For over-the-counter (OTC) traded products there are no reliable numbers. It is, however, known that the majority of OTC contracts were collateralised. 9 An upper bound for the non-collateralised positions is the abovementioned loss of USD 5 billion, which is presumably too small a number to create a severe crisis in other OTC segments. Moreover, we should not forget that hundreds of hedge funds are liquidated every year without any negative impact. Also, the collapse of a large hedge fund, Amaranth, in autumn 2006 had only a small impact on the financial markets.
Chart 9: Profits in tradable sector boosted by depreciation in early 90s, hit by later appreciation  Chart 10: Unlike early 1990s, there is now limited spare capacity, including in tradable sector  Source: ONS and Bank of England calculations  Source: BCC and Bank of England calculations  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  Chart 11: Investment in tradable sector also sensitive to exchange rate  Chart 12: Business investment growth weak in 2016  Source: ONS and Bank of England calculations  Source: ONS, CBI, BCC and CIPS  These trends then went into reverse after sterling’s re-appreciation later than decade. If subdued domestic consumption had allowed the economy to “rebalance” through the 1992-97 period, the opposite occurred over the following few years. Stronger domestic demand growth “crowded out” the tradable sector by helping to push up sterling’s exchange rate. This led to falls in prices, profits and investment in the tradable sector. What about today? Sadly we don’t have such detailed information on anything like a real-time basis. Indeed we have very little data of any kind, even at an aggregate level, to tell us how profits and investment have behaved since last summer. But here’s my take on what we do know:   First, it’s likely that profitability has improved significantly in the tradable sector of the economy. We know that non-financial corporate profits in aggregate rose 10% in the year to Q3.

That’s true of the most recent period as well: prices of non-oil goods exports rose 12% through the course of last year, in line with those of imports. Admittedly, the behaviour of the sterling price of services exports is rather different. They’re more stable in the face of exchange-rate movements (Chart 8), implying that depreciations do indeed reduce them in foreign currency terms. I think this is understandable. Services are less homogenous than goods and there’s more room for non-price competition. The UK has a larger presence in this area, accounting for 7% of global services trade in total, 12% for business and financial services specifically. Those wholesale services are relatively specialised. Chart 8: Sterling price of services exports more stable  Equally, and for many of the same reasons, the evidence suggests that service export volumes are much less sensitive to any cross-country variations in prices than in goods markets. Indeed it’s only because of this relative insensitivity that such variations can persist for any length of time. At any rate, my main point here is that the positive effects of a currency depreciation depend at least as much on the response of domestic firms as on that of foreign buyers.
For example, we have witnessed how the interconnections between internal and external markets have been changing the way in which different factors affect inflation and how communication has become increasingly important for policy effectiveness. All this in an environment where we have been able to access and process massive amounts of data and a wealth of information. In the next few days, the CBC will publish a new supplement that brings together research on these topics and highlights their relevance to our work. This publication complements those we have already released in previous years on trend growth and the labor market and is part of the Bank’s ongoing research agenda. Back to our central projection scenario: it assumes that, going forward, consumption will continue to be driven by the withdrawal of pension savings, although the second withdrawal is estimated to have a weaker impact than the first, partly because the drop in income caused by the pandemic has already been more than offset by the measures adopted, and the resources that could be withdrawn are concentrated in the higher income quintiles—which are less motivated to use them in consumption (Figure 8). Combining the effects of the recovery in labor income, government transfers and the withdrawal of pension savings, private consumption es forecast to increase by about 11% in 2021, after receding some 7% this year. The increased mobility and sectoral disparity of the economic recovery has also been reflected in the labor market.

The banks’ provision expenses are at their highest in several years, which could suggest expectations of a deterioration in repayment rates. This contrasts with the drop in the system’s delinquency rate, explained by increased write-offs and restructurings, and a portion of the withdrawn pension savings used for debt payment. As for the cost of bank financing, it remains low in historical perspective for the different users of credit, supported by the expansionary nature of the measures implemented by the CBC. To put it briefly, the economy has improved after the sharp contraction of the second quarter, and measures to support households and credit have succeeded in mitigating the threat posed by the pandemic to the welfare of the population and the solvency of businesses. However, the prolonged sanitary restrictions, the lingering recovery of the most affected areas and the scars left by the crisis have held back the dynamism of the recovery, affecting not only aggregate demand but also the response capacity of supply. Consequently, the fall in activity this year will be sharper than we expected in September. Even so, the economy will continue on a gradual path to recovery in the coming quarters and is still projected to return to September 2019 levels only by 2022. This considers that the pandemic situation will permit maintaining higher levels of mobility than those of mid-2020, and that during 2021 progress will be made in the immunization process, as stated by the government.
Discussion of this level has been attributed to Nordhaus (1975). Others, including the UNEP Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gasses (1990) have suggested that two degrees could be a point beyond which the damage caused by climate change may become non-linear. 13  See IPCC (2014). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Climate change and financial stability There are three broad channels through which climate change can affect financial stability: –  First, physical risks: the impacts today on insurance liabilities and the value of financial assets that arise from climate- and weather-related events, such as floods and storms that damage property or disrupt trade;  –  Second, liability risks: the impacts that could arise tomorrow if parties who have suffered loss or damage from the effects of climate change seek compensation from those they hold responsible. Such claims could come decades in the future, but have the potential to hit carbon extractors and emitters – and, if they have liability cover, their insurers – the hardest;  –  Finally, transition risks: the financial risks which could result from the process of adjustment towards a lower-carbon economy. Changes in policy, technology and physical risks could prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of assets as costs and opportunities become apparent. The speed at which such re-pricing occurs is uncertain and could be decisive for financial stability. There have already been a few high profile examples of jump-to-distress pricing because of shifts in environmental policy or performance.

Moreover, from 12 at the start, the number of participating countries has risen to 19 today: 7 countries decided democratically to join the euro, and none has wanted to leave it. These are the concrete economic benefits that make the 340 million citizens of the euro area attached to their currency, to our currency. This attachment, which has been measured since the outset, has remained strong throughout the crisis. 70% support the euro today, i.e. the highest level since 2008; a large majority of French citizens support the euro (68%). Support remains strong in Italy, albeit at a lower level (53%). The euro is not a technocratic utopia: it is a political and democratic decision, supported 25 years on – with hindsight – by a clear majority of citizens. II. However, there are four doubts about the euro. I will address them seriously, even though I think that these ideas are erroneous. a) The euro is enemy of growth and employment Some say that the euro acts as a brake on growth, employment, and competitiveness. However, at 1.7% in 2016, growth in the euro area was higher than US growth (1.6%) and above all there are major economic successes among euro area countries.
12/02/2021  "Riding the Growth Momentum in Asia" – Keynote Speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), …  Speeches  Published Date: 25 January 2021  "Riding the Growth Momentum in Asia" – Keynote Speech by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director (Markets & Development), Monetary Authority of Singapore, at Asian Financial Markets Forum (Prelude) on 22 January 2021 Introduction 1. Good a ernoon. It is my pleasure to join you today at this Prelude event to ACI’s inaugural Asian Financial Markets Forum to be held in October. Asian economies and financial markets have experienced remarkable growth in the last two decades, and will continue to be major contributors to global growth going forward. With this positive outlook, I am glad that the Forum will focus on “The Asian Financial Markets in the Next Decade” – a theme which is highly important and invigorating. Macroeconomic outlook – Bullish for Asia 2. The COVID-19 global health crisis has led to the deepest economic downturn in eight decades. The World Bank estimates that the global economy contracted by 4.3% in 2020. [1] As the world economy began to emerge from the depths of recession in May last year, Asia was at the forefront of the recovery. Indeed, the 2020 recession in Asia was shallower than in the rest of the world. [2] This was due both to positive growth in China and Vietnam, as well as less severe recessions in other Asian countries.

Bundesbank, Frankfurt – 26 September 2019 Speech in the presence of Jens Weidmann  by François Villeroy de Galhau Governor of the Banque de France  « Household Expectations »  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to open - with my colleague Jens Weidmann - this joint Bundesbank - Banque de France conference on households’ expectations. I would like to thank warmly the Bundesbank: this FrenchGerman cooperation testifies that our two institutions can promote and contribute to good research on a very topical policy issue. Over the past year, the decline of market inflation expectations has been pronounced while households’ expectations have been increasing quite steadily. This divergence is a challenge for our assessment on inflation expectations. All the interesting papers presented in the next couple of days will illustrate how much we can learn on inflation expectations when observing them outside financial markets. I. Inflation expectations: a key issue for monetary policy  I.1. Policy relevance for Central Banks  Stable inflation expectations at a level close to our target are - of course - key for our monetary policy: they provide a strong nominal anchor helping us to stabilize inflation when facing large demand or supply shocks. Since the 1990s, management of inflation expectations through central bank communication has become a standard tool for monetary policy. A lot of evidence suggests that this policy has contributed to anchor inflation expectations and to reduce their volatility, while facing strong inflationary or deflationary shocks.