samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Prasarn Trairatvorakul: Managing Thailand’s turnaround Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Association of International Banks (AIB) Dinner Speaker Series, Bangkok, 15 May 2014. *  *  *  Introduction It is my great honor and pleasure to be back here in this auspicious occasion, and, first of all I would like to thank the Association of International Banks for inviting me to give a talk this evening. Much has changed, since I gave an address at this event last year. Though it is still warm and sunny in Thailand, the economic condition is not quite the same. The economy continues to slow down after accelerated domestic spending in the past few years, worsened by political uncertainty that continues to this day. On the external front, the recent global economic recovery and monetary policy abroad has evolved with less uncertainty than before. For this exclusive evening, it is timely for me to share with you the recent economic developments and outlook of the Thai economy as well as our roles to support sustainable growth of the Thai economy and safeguard financial stability amid prolonged political uncertainty. Recent and current economic situations Let me first start by describing the economic developments. Thailand’s recent economic circumstances have been unfavorable, but may have reached the trough. Internally, growth has decelerated since the second half last year, owing mainly to diminishing domestic spending.

Looking at variables whose imbalances tended to be associated with crises in the past, we do not see these variables approaching crisis levels but rather staying at low risk levels. What we are observing is a mainly sentiment-led slump in demand and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  subsequently an opportunity for strong domestic rebound when sentiment improves. I would like to explore some key variables in more detail. Financial volatility is well contained amidst economic slowdown. Exchange rate has been relatively stable and international reserves have remained high, reflecting some degree of confidence among foreign investors and appropriate exchange rate management. Inflation expectations are firmly anchored, allowing monetary policy some room to address the downside. We benefit from this stability because consistent macroeconomic policy commands credibility from the public. It is worth mentioning a risk when it comes to volatility: that even with the Fed’s QE tapering already factored into the markets, the monetary policies of advanced economies continue to exhibit likelihood of change. These policy changes could cause Thailand to experience capital outflows or a volatile exchange rate. The Bank of Thailand closely monitors these risks and currently assesses them to be manageable given Thailand’s financial structure. Credit risk is also moderated by the wisdom of the private sector. Private companies have recently kept leverage in check at a cautionary debt-earnings ratio. Financial institutions are carefully managing loan quality, as household debt levels that have been decelerating since last year indicate.
The New York Fed The New York Fed has important and unique responsibilities in supporting liquid and wellfunctioning financial markets. Working alongside our colleagues in the Federal Reserve and other agencies, we are taking rapid and significant actions to supply liquidity and to stabilize critical parts of our financial system. We are conducting large-scale repo operations to assure ample liquidity in money markets.3 In addition, at the direction of the FOMC, we are purchasing sizable quantities of U.S. Treasury securities and agency residential and commercial mortgagebacked securities to improve functioning in these critical markets.4 To put the current situation in context, we are running more open market operations, for greater sums, than at any time in our history.5 The Federal Reserve is also making liquidity available to key intermediaries to support market functioning and to keep credit flowing. These actions include offering term loans to depository institutions through the traditional discount window, and the establishment of the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility.6 These strong and timely actions averted a potential shutdown in the flow of credit and are providing funding and stability at a time of extraordinary volatility in markets. Although stresses in financial markets will not entirely abate until the pandemic is behind us, we have seen material improvements in measures of liquidity and market functioning in key parts of the U.S. financial system. Our work is not done.

Let me turn now to the labour market, which is of course also highly important for this story. Here, too, the story has been far from normal. During the Covid period, employment has fallen much more than the rise in unemployment, albeit by significantly less than would ordinarily be implied by the decline in activity. Two things help to explain this. First, the furlough scheme has worked well to preserve jobs in firms or sectors temporarily hit by the effects of the pandemic and associated restrictions. Second, there has been a rise in inactivity, in other words those who do not have a job and are not currently searching for one. Turning to earnings, measures have been affected by compositional effects related to the changes in the labour market caused by the pandemic. On the one hand, lower pay for those who have been furloughed has dragged on average wages. On the other hand, the fact that job losses have been skewed towards lower-paid and part-time roles has boosted the measure of average wages for those still in employment. Initially the first of those effects dominated, and the level of private sector average weekly earnings fell during the middle of last year, such that for a while the growth rate was, unusually, negative. As the Covid period has gone on, however, the second effect has come to dominate. To illustrate the magnitude, a second little piece of arithmetic.
Libra must also be a pro-competitive, open platform that new users can join on equal terms. In addition, authorities will need to consider carefully the implications of Libra for monetary and financial stability. Our citizens deserve no less. Leveraging our position at the heart of the international financial system and one of the world’s largest fintech hubs, the Bank of England will help lead the way on these issues at the G7, G20, the FSB, BIS and IMF. Whatever the fate of Libra, its creation underscores the imperative of transforming payments. The Bank’s strategy to open access to a wide range of payment solutions combined with appropriate regulatory oversight of them maximises the likelihood that the payments revolution will meet the demands of the new economy and the needs of all our citizens. Supporting more lending to SMEs through an open platform Big data is opening up new opportunities for more competitive, platform-based finance of SMEs. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques are already mining fields of data generated by online activity. This has the potential to yield enormous benefits for households and businesses by opening up new lines of credit, providing greater choice, better-targeted products and keener pricing. Putting data to work is critical to closing one of the biggest funding gaps in the country.

Tarisa Watanagase: Thai financial sector and the challenges ahead Speech by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the conference on Asian Finance & Capital Markets 2004, Bangkok, 8 July 2004. *  *  *  Good morning, Let me first begin by thanking Euro Events for inviting me to address this distinguished audience. I am delighted to be here to share with you some of my thoughts on the Thai financial sector and where it is heading, especially since a lot is happening at this juncture, with the Financial Sector Master Plan being implemented. I trust therefore that we will have much to learn from each other, given the diverse background of participants in this conference, ranging from banking and government officials to investment managers and business leaders. Since you will engage in absorbing debates on practical issues on finance and capital markets, my presentation will deal with the broader issue of prospects and challenges for the financial market in the Thai perspective. While the discussion will be based on the experience of Thailand, some of the challenges will be commonly faced by other emerging economies. Thus, it is my sincere hope that the implication drawn from this presentation will also be applicable and useful for participants from other countries. I will first touch on the structure of the Thai financial sector and the assessment of where the banking sector currently stands.
The euro area has done a lot since the start of the crisis to strengthen fiscal rules. In particular, Member States have sought to move away from the unstable middle ground of the first SGP by anchoring fiscal rules more firmly in national law. The Fiscal Compact – which requires countries to run balanced budgets over the cycle and reduce their debt levels progressively towards 60% of GDP – has to be written into national constitutions or equivalent, and is overseen by national fiscal councils. This comes closer to the model of having decentralised implementation of rules, but with very little discretion. But will this be enough? I see two possible outcomes. The first is a stable equilibrium between centralised banking governance and decentralised fiscal governance. That is, banking union better insulates national budgets from financial shocks, meaning budget deficits are generally milder. And in this context, the Fiscal Compact provides sufficient medium-term credibility to allow fiscal policy to operate counter-cyclically without threatening market access. The second possibility is some form of deeper fiscal union at the euro area level. Economic union Clearly, the political economy of deeper fiscal integration is difficult, especially given the preferences expressed at the recent European Parliament elections in some reform-resistant countries. Thus, we should focus our efforts for now on making the new equilibrium work. But here again we need consistency. If the current fiscal rules are to be credible, we need higher growth, and that means looking deeply at how we coordinate structural policies across Europe.

13 As a central bank, MAS enjoys warm and substantive relations with our counterparts in the People’s Bank of China (PBC). We have been in close coordination with PBC over the past year to enable cooperation in the RMB business and related arrangements. 14 PBC has recently appointed the Singapore branch of ICBC as the RMB clearing bank in Singapore earlier this year. ICBC has been working closely with the industry since then to prepare for the offering of their RMB clearing and settlement services. I am delighted to share that ICBC has officially launched RMB clearing services yesterday. Key banks in Singapore are ready to actively participate in this promising new market. 15 MAS also has growing relations with the key sectoral regulators, namely the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). MAS and CBRC currently hold annual meetings to exchange views on regulatory cooperation and market developments. MAS also plans to step up its engagements with CSRC and CIRC in areas of common interest. 16 These initiatives clearly indicate the increasing importance and connectivity between the financial markets of our two countries. Certainly, we hope for more of such bilateral collaborations as China continues the progressive internationalisation of its financial market and currency. 17 MAS therefore sees great value in establishing a physical presence here to facilitate such future cooperation and regular interactions.
Mr. Bäckström speaks on Swedish monetary policy outside EMU Address by the Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Urban Bäckström, to the Monetary Policy Forum organised by the Centre for Business Policy Studies and the Riksbank in Stockholm on 22/4/98. I am pleased to note that the Centre for Business Policy Studies (SNS) is maintaining the tradition, together with the Riksbank, of arranging the Monetary Policy Forum. This is our sixth annual opportunity of discussing monetary policy issues in the Forum and what could be more natural on this occasion than to consider the monetary policy future in Europe in connection with the launching of what is perhaps history’s most momentous project in this field. Besides the question of how monetary policy will be conducted in the euro area, an equally important issue for us in Sweden is how our monetary policy will be affected when Stage Three of EMU starts and Sweden does not participate initially. The discussion of “Monetary Policy in EMU” is to be opened by my Finnish colleague, Dr. Sirkka Hämäläinen, and I want to take this opportunity of wishing her a hearty welcome to Sweden. In this context I should also like to express my appreciation of the close cooperation between Suomen Pankki and Sveriges Riksbank, which we reckon to continue even though Finland participates in the monetary union. The topic assigned to me is “Swedish Monetary Policy Outside EMU”. First I shall paint my picture of what an outsider position will entail for Sweden’s economic policy.

At that time they considered there was a case for cutting taxes and argued on the basis of estimated resource utilisation that this was feasible without risking capacity restrictions. Our estimations suggested otherwise, though the differences should not be exaggerated. We still do not know who was right. But what we do know is that economic activity has declined far more than any of us foresaw and this has been accompanied by higher inflation. Concluding remarks Now for a brief summary of what I have said. Economic policy as a euro participant is not all that different from economic policy today. When discussing stabilisation policy it should borne in mind that the best way for us to achieve a favourable development – inside or outside the euro area – is to create conditions for a smooth adjustment to various markets, primarily the labour market, and for a good productivity trend. In these respects there are measures we ought to take in any event. But euro participation can help us to move in the right direction. By adopting the euro we would relinquish our national monetary policy. That would make the formation of fiscal policy more crucial. There are risks here, as we know from our own experience in the 1970s and ’80s, when policy was neither consistent nor focused on the long term. As a result, cyclical fluctuations were accentuated and the government finances gradually weakened. That limited the room for action when Sweden entered the 1990s.
7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  For example, micro data studies from the UK, US, Denmark and Norway have all found statistically significant correlations between higher levels of household debt and the size of consumption cuts in a shock.13 And macro studies have also found correlation between rapid credit growth and the severity of downturns.14  But new studies have also sought to deepen the knowledge base. In particular, they have looked at why more highly indebted households cut consumption in response to shocks – the channels through which the observed association is working. For example, there could be debt financed ‘over-consumption’ prior to a downturn that is then cut back when expectations adjust to reality or credit becomes unavailable. This channel might work directly through unsecured consumer borrowing or through mortgage financed borrowing to consume. Alternatively, there are channels through which higher levels of debt constrain household budgets without appealing to ‘over-consumption’: some indebted households may be unable to consume as much as they would like in a downturn because they do not have a sufficient buffer of liquid savings and find themselves unable to access additional credit when they need it the most. This situation is more likely when falls in house prices reduce the value of the borrower’s collateral. The situation is also likely to be exacerbated if the downturn is accompanied by rising uncertainty. The combination of rising uncertainty and credit constraints would tend to lead to further reductions in spending as households build precautionary buffers.

1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  AT THE CROSSROADS 6. Allow me to offer some perspectives to this set of questions. Liveability: Balancing between resilience and growth 7. Just as houses must not only be safe but also functional, so too must the financial system be able to support the activities of its participants. The reforms are set out to strengthen the safety of the system but not regardless of economic cost, or to impede the ability of market participants to function properly. We can always build a house with many more pillars, fences, gates and other defences that would assure that it can never be at risk of collapse, but we also need to consider its liveability. 8. I can assure you that it is not lost on global regulators that the reforms that we have embarked on in the past decade are not ends in themselves. The key is to strengthen the foundations of the global financial system to better assure ongoing resilience and steady development of the sector. Therefore, the new regulatory requirements should take into account the financial sector’s linkages to and support of the broader economy. 9. While most policy-related reviews of the reforms have been done, there are ongoing impact studies to assess how different parts of the world as well as different stakeholders are affected; and whether there are unintended effects. 10. Take central clearing requirements for example.
He steps onto e-scales and it only takes him seconds to get feedback from the e-dietician. Things look good. Besides, he knows that his e-dietician has delivered relevant guidance to the restaurant where Global is going to have lunch with one of his friends. Now it's time for his favourite coffee and online newspapers, that is a special edition of news, commentaries, lists, reports, quotes, similarities, differences etc. related to our Global’s interests. News aggregator turns out to be very helpful in getting access to useful information, filtered from noise and randomness. While at home, Global looks through the newspapers using his TV-set. When he is out, he uses his communicator to do this (the name ‘mobile phone’ fell into disuse in 2015). Sipping his coffee, he starts reading. After a while, his wife joins in. They both use the aggregator, but they have different interests and different news search criteria. John Global's wife comes from Scotland. She is much attached to the Global Scott Network. She believes that the Scottish population is shrinking, so in order to sustain growth in Scotland it is necessary to employ the Scottish intellectual capital spread all around the world. The Global Scott Network is so efficient, that it has been outpacing large competitive consulting companies for more than twenty years, by receiving orders related for example to biotechnological clusters. The Global Scott Network is an example of a diaspora understood as an ethnic or a religious community living in a foreign country or environment (e.g.

The UK is the exception: since the mid-1990s, the country has emerged as the growth model for Europe. For Switzerland, the sluggish development in Europe is especially regrettable, as the Swiss export sector usually serves as the engine for economic recovery. All in all, Switzerland's export industry is well positioned to benefit from higher demand from abroad. Switzerland has been able to reduce its production costs per unit in the past few years, and the Swiss franc even depreciated slightly versus the euro since the launch of the single currency. As regards domestic demand, consumer sentiment remains satisfactory overall, but this should not be expected to stimulate growth decisively. While construction activity is robust, it has lost some of its momentum. Investment in equipment is still brisk, and the recent modest slowdown should not last too long. On the whole, the Swiss economy is still on its growth trajectory, but it lacks stimuli from abroad. This situation is the same as the one underlying the National Bank's interest rate decision of December 2004. Even though Switzerland is particularly affected by the lacklustre performance of the European economy, overall prospects are not gloomy. Growth in the rest of the world remains dynamic, and this is expected to benefit Europe in due course. For Switzerland, a growth rate of 1.5-2% is still realistic. With the Swiss economy thus continuing to grow below its potential, the labour market will not see any sustained improvement. BIS Review 11/2005  1
Financial systems are opened up, for the participation of domestic and foreign financial intermediaries, with a view to obtaining efficiency gains through greater competition and importing financial expertise. This has generally been a success, although specific problems have been encountered. A feature of these problems has been that, at times, the profit motive and the enthusiasm of financial intermediaries, not necessarily just the foreign ones, might prevail to such an extent as to undermine the public interest of ensuring effective financial intermediation. The problems might also have been the result of ineffective regulation of financial markets and supervision of financial intermediaries, and inadequate regard to the basic purpose of the financial system. One example, and it is only appropriate that I should use an example from Hong Kong, is the closure of the Hong Kong stock market in 1987. This was done in the interest of the financial intermediaries who were about to be hit badly by the world-wide crash that occurred overnight because they had taken large and concentrated positions in stock futures. The closure of a secondary market, which provides the liquidity for attracting primary market activity that channels additional savings into investments, was blatantly wrong and seriously damaged the credibility of the stock market as a channel for financial intermediation. The damage was temporary, as it turned out, and confidence was eventually re-established, but not without much soul-searching and many market reform measures. Such problems notwithstanding, it is clear that emerging markets in Asia are enthusiastic in embracing financial openness.

Mr Bäckström reviews some topical monetary policy issues in Sweden  Speech given by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Swedish Bond Promotion, Stockholm, on 4 October 1999. *  *  *  This year’s economic growth in Sweden has been impressively strong. GDP growth in the first half-year, on the first half of 1998, was 3.4%. The number in employment has risen by approximately 100,000 persons. As many people are returning to the labour market now that more jobs are becoming available, the reduction of unemployment has not been as marked. But total as well as registered unemployment is falling from the previously high levels. This has been accompanied by price increases that are moderate. To date this year, inflation’s underlying rate – measured by UNDIX, which excludes interest expenditure, indirect taxes and subsidies – has fluctuated between 1.0 and 1.5%. The picture since the summer seems to point to a continuation of favourable growth and employment, with no immediate threats to price stability. But we have to be on our guard, particularly as the economy is now in an upward phase. Due to the time lag in monetary policy, the Riksbank’s interest rate decisions have to be based on the prospects fairly far ahead. The most relevant period for our deliberations is the outlook for inflation twelve to twenty-four months ahead.