samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s banking sector Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the end-year reception, organized by the Albanian Association of Banks, Tirana, 23 December 2011. *  *  *  Dear bank executives, Dear participants, This end-year event with the Albanian Association of Banks, turned into a tradition of communication between the banking sector and the Bank of Albania, provides an excellent opportunity to make a short resume of the results achieved by this sector in this year as well as to identify its challenges in the upcoming year. The banking sector managed to finish off 2011 successfully. Its role in supporting Albania’s economic activity was crucial, while prudence was made to guarantee its financial soundness. In this regard, the supervisory role of the Bank of Albania has provided an extraordinary contribution. Banking supervision has been proactive and preventive by creating, at the same time, the necessary space for flexible banking activity management. Amendments to the law “On banks in the Republic of Albania”, a number of amendments to the banking regulatory framework as well as the physical interaction through on-site inspections have contributed to enhanced immunity and dampened negative effects generated by the global crisis. The Bank of Albania has periodically conducted stress tests on specific banks to ensure that the banking sector’s security and functionality is never put in doubt.

* * * These questions aside, one thing is clear in the case of France – and 2016’s too-feeble growth of 1.1%, as published yesterday, confirms it: estimates from national and international institutions all point to low levels of potential growth, at around 1.2%, and relatively high levels of structural unemployment (the equivalent of the NAIRU in English-speaking countries), at around 9%. Clearly, we cannot be content with these levels. All of which brings us back, overwhelmingly, to our four key focuses for reform: Enterprise, Education, Employment and Expenditure reduction (public sector). Our northern European neighbours have shown by example that these reforms 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  are not incompatible with our shared European social model. Studies by the Banque de France show in particular that reforms to the goods and services market could boost the productivity of the French economy by between 3% and 5% in the long-term. Without further ado then, let me pass the floor to Fabrice Lenglart, and I wish you all a fruitful and enjoyable conference. 1 www.banque-france.fr/en/secular-stagnation-and-growth-measurement-conference-organised-banque-de-  france-and-college-de  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Norman Chan: Sound banking Closing remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Conference for Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs), Hong Kong, 16 March 2017. * * *  What is sound banking? Sound banking is not (a) excessive risk taking; (b) irresponsible or unfair treatment of customers and counter-parties; and (c) maximisation of short term profits. Sound banking is: (a) Prudent and profitable; (b) responsible and fair to customers; and (c) sustainable. Trilogy of sound banking (I) Robust Regulation and Supervision – it will provide an externally imposed set of rules and codes that define what is acceptable and what is not. However, no matter how well designed and robust the regulatory regime is, it normally works better in setting minimum standards for compliance and is not so effective in promoting good or best practices. (II) Good Corporate Culture – culture consists of a set of formal and informal values that guide the mindsets and behaviours of management and staff. Unlike externally imposed rules and regulations, which normally entail sanctions if breaches are detected, good corporate culture and values reflect the attitude that “we do things the right way not because we are afraid of being caught but because this is the way it ought to be done”. A simple illustration of the importance of culture and values is the example of combatting littering on the streets.

In 1998, the CBC was ranked 25 among 60 countries, while reaching the first place in the world ranking in 2004, holding this place in the subsequent years (figures 13-14). 4. Conclusions  Macroeconomic conditions have improved significantly in emerging economies since the early 1990s. Emerging economies show major progress in fiscal responsibility and sustainability; adoption of a framework of central bank autonomy, monetary regimes based on IT, and larger exchange-rate flexibility; and achievement of financial system strength. Adoption of more flexible exchange rates and an IT regime has contributed to lower output and inflation volatility, and stronger credibility of central bank policies. Macroeconomic stability is often accomplished gradually. Chile adopted the IT regime in two distinct phases and implemented a solid macroeconomic framework based on central bank autonomy with a clear focus on price stability. This was supported by a solvent, responsible, and predictable fiscal policy and a solid and well-regulated financial system. Chile’s good record of attaining inflation levels close to the target has strengthened private sector confidence in the CBC and raised MP effectiveness and credibility. Low inflation and a credible monetary policy represent an essential macroeconomic achievement. By improving its policy framework, supported by strong transparency, accountability, and communication, the CBC has laid a major foundation to Chile’s macroeconomic stability. Yet the conquest and predictability of inflation are not guaranteed. The CBC will remain vigilant, improving its policy framework as needed to continue delivering high levels of macroeconomic stability.
And how can we ensure that institution-specific insights of the national supervisors are best maintained and incorporated? Allow me to give you a few examples to explain the conclusions we have reached. I will focus on the specific features of the SSM. So do not be surprised if I do not mention things that are self-evident, such as a preventative, forward-looking and risk-oriented supervisory approach. 18 perspectives – one best practice Let us start with 18 perspectives and what is deemed best practice. In developing the SSM’s supervisory culture, we are in a unique starting position. Following the financial market crisis, many countries adjusted their supervisory structures. The reforms generally focused on addressing country-specific experiences of the crisis and on international recommendations. We are in a similar situation in setting up the SSM – but with one major difference: we are not just looking at the experiences of one country; we are incorporating the perspectives of 18 – soon 19 – Member States into a common European supervisory culture. For me personally, this is one of the most exciting aspects of creating the supervisory mechanism. An example of this is the weekly meeting of SSM management. Every Friday, Danièle Nouy and I meet with the heads of the four SSM business areas. Around the table we therefore have representatives of the French, German, Finnish, Spanish and even US supervisory traditions. Another colleague brings to the table many years of experience at a systemically relevant bank.

The kick-off meetings, which have been taking place since early summer between the current supervisors, the ECB and the banks, are simply a first step. In this connection, allow me to stress the inherent dangers in supervision not only of being too far removed, but also of being too close. Other viewpoints and new supervisory approaches and methods may sharpen our perception and mitigate the danger of accepting a bank’s unjustified customs merely because they have long been familiar to us. The comparisons and analyses I referred to earlier will also help to counter this danger. But that is not all. We will also address this issue in terms of our staffing policies. The head of a Joint Supervisory Team (JST) must come from a different country to the country in which the institution it is supervising is established. In concrete terms: the head supervisor for Deutsche Bank will be a French lady; BNP Paribas will be supervised by an Italian man. In addition, there will a rotation of staff members among the JSTs. All in all, this will not only enable us to reach more objective judgements about a bank, but will also foster the development of a common supervisory culture. Banking supervision in a central bank Allow me to say a few words about banking supervision in a central bank. Housing the SSM within the ECB will enable us to benefit from synergy effects.
Figure 5  Output by sector (*) (average index, 2006-2009=100)  130  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  06  07  08  09  10  70  135  IMACEC (*) (index, 2003=100)  135  130  130  125  125  120  120  115  115  07  08  09  10  Retail sales Manufacturing output (*) Seasonally-adjusted series. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau (INE).

Currently, there are enormous business opportunities which still lie unexploited in Zambia in virtually all sectors of the economy. The overall economic growth in the economy would be enhanced underpinned on low and single digit inflation and relative stable exchange rate. With an enabling environment, the private sector would exploit their full potential. Hence, employment would increase and poverty reduction would be achieved. This would contribute to the achievement of MDGs and towards the attainment of the Vision 2030. 6  BIS Review 76/2008
Another distinguishing feature of the countries up on the right of Figure 1 is that they have not yet experienced any major fall in their housing market with an ensuing fall in aggregate demand. This is something that has happened in most of the countries down on the left of the figure. One could say that the countries that have managed well so far have felt the effects of the crisis through weaker development abroad, but have managed to avoid major problems in their own credit and housing markets. However, not surprisingly, the risks linked to developments in household debt and the housing market are currently high up on the policy agenda in several of the countries that have managed well so far, in the same way that they are here in Sweden. Repo rate only marginally higher One thing that is worth emphasising is that when I say that the repo rate has been a little higher than it would otherwise have been, I do mean a little higher. It has not been a case of the Riksbank using high interest rates to stop an upturn in lending and housing prices by depressing the whole economy. In that case, we would have had a much poorer development than is indicated in Figures 1 and 2. When it comes down to it, the repo rate has not been higher than 1 per cent for around one year now. Sometimes it is claimed that even this is a high level.

The economic situation in July 2010  70  Purchasing Managers’ Index in the manufacturing industry Index over 50 indicates growth  70  60  60  50  50 USA Euro area Sweden  40 30 00  10  20  30  5  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  4 3  2  2  1  -10  -15  July  -15  -1  -20  -2  10  Inflation Annual percentage change  3  April  08  08  4  -10  06  06  5  -5  04  04  5  -5  02  -10 02  10  0  00  15  Households  10  00  0  -20  20  Companies  15  40  02 04 06 08 10 GDP Quarterly changes in per cent calculated in annualised terms, seasonally-adjusted data  Bank lending to companies and households Annual percentage change  1  CPI  0  12  5  0  CPIF  -1  CPIF excluding energy 00  02  04  06  08  -2 10  12  Sources: The Institute for Supply Management, Markit Economics, Statistics Sweden, Swedbank and the Riksbank  Figure 6.
Background slides  BIS Review 51/2010  9  10  BIS Review 51/2010

It is therefore in the interests of the Riksbank to participate in a dialogue and the development of knowledge that will facilitate this dialogue. I have here today identified a number of areas for future study and research. They have to do with the adaptation of wages in Sweden to the rate of wage increase in the Euro area, increased variability in nominal wage costs in Sweden and increased geographical and professional mobility in the European labour market. Let me to this add the big issue of demographic change and its effects on labour supply. Another interesting question, which is of imminent importance to Sweden, has to do with what 7  See Björklund et al. (2000): Arbetsmarknaden (The Labour Market), SNS Förlag, Kristianstad. 8  Communication, New European Labour Markets, Open to All, with Access for All, COM (2001)116. 6  BIS Review 40/2002  effects wage increases in the public sector will have on inflation. I hope that the trade unions in Europe will take an active part in initiating and carrying out research projects in these fields. Thank you for listening! 1.
To manage those risks, authorities can do more to work with market intermediaries to enhance transparency and understanding around secondary market liquidity. Securities market regulators may have an important role to play in developing globallyconsistent best practices in liquidity risk management and valuations. Liquidity buffers and redemption schemes should be assessed. And greater standardisation of debt securities will also need to be supported. The need to ensure resilience in the non-bank financial sector also raises questions about the nature of central bank operations. The maintenance of an effective monetary transmission mechanism now requires backstops for both banks and markets. Bagehot will need to be updated for the 21st century, with central banks standing ready to operate frequently, against a wide range of collateral and a broader range of counterparties. In short, diversity will reap rewards, but resilient diversity will require a significant programme of reform and alertness to new risks. Trusted The second pillar of the future of reform is to rebuild trust in finance. Trust between institutions, counterparties and investors is central to maintaining the ability of finance to function. Trust between regulators across jurisdictions is needed to maintain an open global system. 18  8  Chart 12 shows the sudden and sharp reversals of flows into US high-yield bond funds and sets those flows in the context of funds’ liquidity buffers. BIS central bankers’ speeches  And most fundamentally, trust between the public and the financial system is needed to maintain the social licence for finance to operate.

When technological change is disruptive and widespread, the productivity effect is generally insufficient to counteract completely the destruction effect, partly because of the time it takes for the full potential of new technologies to be realised, and partly because of the phenomenon of greater job polarisation – to which I will turn to in a moment. As a consequence, over the medium term, technological change tends to reduce labour’s share of income. Historically, however, technological progress has not led to permanent declines in the labour share because 9  of a third effect – the creation of new tasks for labour. When combined with the productivity effect, this ultimately has counterbalanced the displacement effects of technology, boosting productivity and wages while leaving employment unaffected. 7  Partly there is a lag in reorganising enough of the economy to the advantage of the new general purpose technology for aggregate productivity growth to increase. 8 The following is based on Acemoglu, D and Restrepo, P (2018), ‘Artificial Intelligence, Automation and Work’, NBER Working Paper No. 24196. 9 This creation effect need not be fully exogenous to the technological change, for example because the new technologies allow new jobs to emerge that wouldn’t otherwise be possible – though of course factors like education and skills are important in determining how quickly and smoothly these gains come about. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Could this time be different?
Stripping out the effects of the two World Wars, this ratio has declined fairly steadily, from around 15% in 1830 to around 5% at the start of this century. Financial panics over this period did little to interrupt the downward trend. Events of the past two years have dramatically altered that picture. In relation to GDP, base money in the UK has risen by a factor of four – easily the highest financial crisis multiplier ever. 8 It has reached a peak last witnessed almost two centuries ago. Past liquidity crises are foothills by comparison with recent Himalayan heights. Measures of central bank balance sheet expansion under-estimate the scale of liquidity support provided during this crisis. As in Harman’s time, there has been a widening of the collateral taken by most central banks in their operations. 9 The taking of imaginative forms of collateral has a history which predates central banking: in the 12th century, King Baldwin II of Jerusalem secured a loan using his beard as collateral. Nonetheless, recent efforts are probably unprecedented in scope. Collateral swaps, typically not involving beards but often requiring haircuts, have also played a significant role during this crisis. They too do not expand base money, but do liquefy banks’ balance sheets. And guarantees of wholesale liabilities have similarly served as an important liquidity insurance device for a number of countries. Together, these two instruments have totalled between 10% and 40% of GDP across the UK, US and euro-area.

5 Two sets of initiative are discussed here: changes to the regulation of banks’ risk-taking; and changes to the terms of the social safety net to improve its time-consistency. It is too early to know whether these measures will be sufficient. But recent events suggest some mix of these measures is surely necessary. 2. Evolution in the banking safety net  The three longest standing state insurance devices for the banking system are liquidity insurance, deposit insurance and capital insurance. These offer protection to different parts of banks’ capital structure, respectively wholesale deposits, retail deposits and equity. So how have risks to banks’ balance sheets – in effect, the “insurable interests” of the state – evolved over time? And how, in turn, has this evolution shaped the design of the banking safety net? The UK provides a useful historical case study. Chart 1 plots UK banks’ balance sheet against GDP since 1880. The ratio is flat for almost a century, at around 50%. Over this period, banks’ assets grew roughly in line with money spending. But from the early 1970s, this pattern changed dramatically. By the start of this century, bank balance sheets were more than five times annual UK GDP. In the space of a generation, the insurable interests of the state had risen tenfold. By itself, this expansion of balance sheets need not imply that the state was bearing greater implicit risk. For example, banks could have self-insured by holding larger buffers of capital and liquidity.
Participation in the monetary union, however, would deprive us of that possibility and we would then run the risk of landing once more in a situation like that in the late 1980s. This account of the problem has a kernel, to which I shall be returning shortly, that deserves to be taken seriously. But the arguments also suffer from distinct weaknesses. For one thing, they assume that policy will be unsuccessful. The starting point is that the fiscal stance will be unduly expansionary and that Sweden will deviate seriously from the cyclical path in the rest of Europe. So far, however, the empirical foundation for this case is weak. What we know to date about fiscal policy indicates that its direction is now becoming more neutral after a series of years in which its impact on the economy has been restrictive. Thus, as things stand at present, Swedish fiscal policy will come to be more in line with the stance in the euro countries. It should also be noted that many countries in the monetary union are doing relatively well there despite a level of activity that for some time has been or is stronger than in Sweden. It is mainly two countries, Italy and Germany, albeit important for the euro area, that have fallen behind appreciably and even there it now looks as though activity has turned upwards. For another thing, the argument presupposes that any problems with overheating can be tackled successfully by the Riksbank.

An unduly strong krona, on the other hand, would benefit the other countries’ competitive position, but also dampen economic activity in Sweden to the detriment of demand for the other countries’ exports. Assessments of the appropriate exchange rate cannot be based solely on a particular model. Besides comparing various prices and costs, allowance must also be made for other indicators of the state of the economy and their future paths. In earlier negotiations, the rate-setting decisions have rested on the macroeconomic situation in the country in question and the rest of the world, various indexes of competitiveness and, not least, the exchange rate’s average level and its fluctuations in recent years. The agreed rate has often been the prevailing market rate or a rate close to this. How should economic policy be formulated? The room for discretion in monetary policy will be affected if Sweden participates in ERM II. One extreme in that situation would be for policy to focus on a strict exchange rate target, so that the interest rate is set exclusively in relation to the exchange rate tendency. In practice, the Riksbank would then fully follow the ECB’s footsteps. The other extreme, you might say, would be for monetary policy to continue to target inflation, still with the exchange rate as one of the set of indicators of inflationary pressure in the Swedish economy.