samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The increase is primarily due to the rise in oil prices combined with continued robust economic activity. However, the forecast shows that the expected slowdown in the economy, the fall in capacity utilisation rates and a baseline effect as regards energy prices will all contribute to a decline in inflation, which should thus, in the medium term, arrive at a level that is fully compatible with price stability. Observed inflation June 2008 2005 Q1  Inflation  4  2006 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2007 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2008 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  1.35 1.06 1.18 1.10 1.23 1.33 1.22 0.46 0.09 0.52 0.63 1.68 2.50  BIS Review 80/2008  Inflation forecast of March 2008 with Libor at 2.75% and of June 2008 with Libor at 2.75% 2008 Q1  Forecast March 2008, Libor at 2.75% Forecast June 2008, Libor at 2.75%  BIS Review 80/2008  2009 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2010 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  2011 Q2  Q3  Q4  Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4  2.41 2.07 2.01 1.53 1.37 1.35 1.36 1.37 1.38 1.40 1.43 1.47  2.75 2.91 2.65 2.12 1.76 1.50 1.40 1.36 1.34 1.31 1.31 1.30  5

Although Sweden has always contributed financially to the IMF when this was needed, we were not allowed to  2  See IEO (2011), “IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis, IMF Surveillance 2004–2007”. 3  Swap lines entail two parties agreeing to exchange currencies with each other. One example from the crisis is the Riksbank’s agreement with the Federal Reserve, through which the Riksbank was able to exchange Swedish krona for USD 10 billion. The aim of this was to increase the Riksbank’s ability to offer dollar loans to borrowers in Sweden. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  participate and influence the decisions this time; they filtered down to us from the G20 through the EU. The decisions were thus made by a small circle even though they affected all of the IMF’s then 186 member countries. In order for decisions that concern the global economy to have an impact and be implemented effectively, the countries affected by the decisions must feel that they can participate and that they are able to influence the decisions. Legitimacy is thus a precondition for effectiveness. The world cannot and should not be governed by only the largest and strongest countries. The cooperation between the countries of the world that is required to safeguard global financial stability should take place in strong and effective global institutions with a broad membership. This is why an institution like the IMF is important to small countries like Sweden.
10  BIS Review 44/2010  Nevertheless international policy cooperation has moved out of statutory bodies and into groups of a select few, bypassing established channels and fora. Other countries are called upon to contribute to efforts agreed by the G20. Policy action and global imbalances The large global imbalances that contributed to the current crisis are likely to widen anew, if they are not addressed effectively. This would again put at risk the stability of the global economy. Global and prompt policy action is therefore warranted yet again. To this end, the G20 has embarked upon an unprecedented exercise in policy collaboration with the IMF. Still, the G20 lacks the legitimacy that historically has been associated with a truly multilateral framework. Its ambitious economic cooperation should be anchored in a multilateral institution. The IMF is the logical choice. With G20 merging its activities with those of the IMF, both will attain wider acceptance and legitimacy. Success in the ambitious tasks of the G20 can only be welcomed by the rest of us. However, it is a weakness that the members of the G20 represent only themselves. Virtually entire groups of countries and regions are left out. They have no voice and no representation in the work of the G20 or in the institutions which it chooses to set up to further its agenda. This is at variance with the principles of multilateralism and international cooperation that have prevailed since the end of the Second World War.

A deep capital market remains critical to economic development and to ease macroeconomic adjustment in the face of global shocks. The shallowing of our domestic capital market over the past few years has deteriorated the access of firms and households to long term finance. This puts into focus the need to reestablish long term savings as well as ease the functioning of our markets. The recent proposed legal changes included in the Resilience Bill, as well as the broad support that the proposed pension reform should promote long term savings are welcomed, and should support financial stability. Thank you. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
William C Dudley: Why financial stability is a necessary prerequisite for an effective monetary policy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the Andrew Crockett Memorial Lecture, Bank for International Settlements 2013 Annual General Meeting, Basel, 23 June 2013. *  *  *  This panel is entitled Monetary Policy and Banking.1 That takes in a lot of territory. Rather than try to cover the waterfront, I am going to start with a single premise: Financial stability is a necessary prerequisite for an effective monetary policy. There is a critical chain of linkages from monetary policy to banking and onwards to the real economy. Financial stability is a necessary condition for those linkages to operate effectively. Thus, it is a necessary condition for monetary policy to be able to achieve its economic objectives. I will then outline briefly what I see as some of the major implications that stem from that premise. These include that the central bank has a major role to play in ensuring financial stability and should evaluate the stance of monetary policy in light of problems in the financial system that may impair the monetary policy transmission mechanism.2 In my mind, the biggest lesson of the financial crisis has been that monetary policy cannot work properly when there is financial instability. When financial instability occurs, it disturbs market functioning and can also impair bank balance sheets.

Doing this makes the bad scenario less likely to materialize and the improvement in credit supply helps to engineer a stronger recovery than would otherwise materialize.4 The third implication is that the stance of monetary policy needs to be assessed based on the state of the financial system and the real economy. How the monetary policy impulse is transmitted to the real economy is not immutable but changes depending on how monetary policy affects financial conditions and how financial conditions affect economic activity. During and following financial crises, problems in the financial system can impair the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy. When this happens, policy may need to be more accommodative than otherwise in order to achieve its objectives. The experiences of both Japan and United States are cases in point.5 In retrospect, we know that following the collapse of the property bubble and the investment boom in Japan in the 1990s, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) did not follow a sufficiently accommodative monetary policy  4  Ideally, as was the case in the U.S. in 2009, the authorities should require banks to meet their stress scenario capital ratio standards by adding equity capital, with no credit given for reducing assets. This leans against the incentive to deleverage to meet higher capital ratio requirements. 5  See my recent speech “Lessons at the Zero Bound: The Japanese and U.S. Experience”, Japan Society, May 21, 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  to prevent deflation.
Notes: The chart shows the difference between the percentage of enterprises reporting an increase for a given factor and the percentage reporting a decrease in response to the following questions: (i) for each of the following types of financing, would you say that their availability has improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated for your enterprise over the past six months? ; (ii) looking ahead, for each of the following types of financing available to your enterprise, please indicate whether you think their availability will improve, deteriorate or remain unchanged over the next six months. The base is the SMEs for which the respective instrument is relevant. The figure refers to rounds 1 (April-September 2009) to 22 (October-March 2020) of the survey. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200519~e5203d3520.en.html  11/14  5/19/2020  Pandemic central banking: the monetary stance, market stabilisation and liquidity  These survey results underscore the importance of our recent monetary policy measures, including the recalibrations of the TLTROs. Nevertheless, it appears that the financing conditions for firms have held up relatively well compared to the depth of the crisis. Although credit standards for loans to enterprises tightened in the first quarter of 2020 (net percentage of reporting banks at 4 percent), the degree of tightening was very mild compared to the credit squeeze that amplified the financial and sovereign debt crises between 2008 and 2012 (Chart 16). Chart 16 Credit standards for loans to NFCs and contributing factors (net percentage of banks reporting a tightening)  Source: ECB (April 2020 bank lending survey).

Early evidence from monetary aggregates shows a very large increase in money growth in March: the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3 stood at 7.5 percent, 2 percentage points higher than in February (Chart 13). This is by far the largest monthly increase since the creation of the euro. In absolute terms, the monthly flow was € billion. For comparison, the largest monthly flows until now were recorded in March 2007 and October 2008 at around € billion. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200519~e5203d3520.en.html  9/14  5/19/2020  Pandemic central banking: the monetary stance, market stabilisation and liquidity  Similar developments were observed in the narrow monetary aggregate M1. This aggregate continues to drive money developments, reflecting the persistently low remuneration environment and the current high level of economic uncertainty. The annual growth rate of M1 increased to 10.3 percent, up from 8.1 percent in February (Chart 13). Chart 13 Developments in M1 and M3 (annual percentage changes)  Source: ECB. Notes: Monthly data. The latest observations are for March 2020. Lending to the private sector was the single largest source of money creation in March, driven by loans to firms. The annual growth rate of loans to firms increased to 5.4 percent in March, up from 3.0 percent in February (Chart 14). By contrast, the annual growth rate of loans to households moderated somewhat: it declined to 3.4 percent, down from 3.7 percent in February.
As a result the build-up in EME foreign assets have been held mainly as central bank reserves especially in Asian countries (Chart 3). In total the foreign assets now held by EME central banks and governments is about $ trillion dollars, which compares with only $ billion gross foreign assets held by the UK government. Many emerging economies concluded after the Asian crisis a decade ago that they needed bigger liquid reserves in traditional government debt to defend themselves against volatility in financial markets even when that carried the likelihood of a negative return (taking account of expected exchange  2  The Kuwait Investment Office is the in-house investment arm of the Kuwait Investment Authority (formerly known as the Kuwait Investment Board) and was established by Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah on 23 February 1953. Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay reached the summit on 29 May 1953. 3  These figures include the NICs. Excluding NICs the estimated surplus is $ billion (1.1%). 4  Latest data show that current account deficits were 5% of GDP or above not only in the United States but also in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand, UK and Iceland. 2  BIS Review 31/2008  rate movements). But when the reserves outstripped the levels needed for that purpose, it was natural to look to increase the returns on investment by widening the range of investments.

Imagine the developments following the World War II, when central banks widely accepted their transition from private to public ownership and when they realised that it was not only necessary but also imperative to cooperate, regardless of physical barriers. Imagine, for example, the president of the Federal Reserve, who wasted three months to travel to Europe and two weeks to receive a letter from his homologues overseas. Actually, central banks have increased their efforts for a better and more fruitful cooperation. This is an undeniable truth. It has been a distinct feature of our work in recent years. Since my first public appearance as Governor of the Bank of Albania, I have pronounced my ambition for Bank of Albania’s legal and institutional transformation in line with the model of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). I am fully confident that the successful conclusion of the Twinning Project with the Banca d’Italia and Banque de France is another determinant step forward in the joint efforts to strengthen cooperation and elevate our work standards to European levels. Today, we see that, in a few months, a brilliant idea has turned into reality and the project has been crowned with success. The project objective was to improve our work practices in the field of banking supervision, statistics, payment systems, interbank market, coordination of EU integration process and financial literacy. More specifically, cooperation in banking supervision focused on implementing major reforms in areas such as consolidated supervision, approval of new regulations and staff training.
11  In the decade ahead, members of the G20 will be increasingly well-positioned to defer to each other’s comparable regulatory outcomes, supported by commitments to common minimum standards and open supervisory co-operation. These commitments could be reinforced by reliance on independent peer reviews and a new, independent dispute resolution mechanism. Brexit will be a litmus test of the future of international cooperation. The UK and the rest of the EU have exactly the same rules and the most highly developed frameworks of supervisory cooperation. Their capital and banking markets are already highly integrated. They have the potential to create the template for trade in financial services. Conclusion A decade on from the start of the crisis, the G20 is building an efficient and resilient financial system which serves our domestic economies and supports sustainable cross-border investment and economic activity. As the global recovery strengthens and broadens, now is the time to take full advantage of these hard won gains. That means completing the journey from fragility to resilience by ensuring that: -  shadow banking is fully transformed into resilient market-based finance,  -  durable market infrastructure is in place,  -  we complete the job of ending too big to fail, and  -  emerging vulnerabilities are addressed in a timely and consistent manner. That means adjusting the reform measures dynamically to maximise efficient resilience and avoid unintended consequences. 11  The UK was an early adopter.

This means that we replicate a combination of representative market indices to determine the size of each holding of securities in our portfolio. Index-linked management ensures that the SNB acts as neutrally as possible in the markets without engaging in ‘stock picking’. It also prevents some sectors and companies  12  For more details on the characteristics of the SNB’s investment policy, cf. Maechler, A.M. (2017), ‘The SNB’s investment policy and its distinctive features’, ‘Money Market Event’, 23 March. Page 9/12  from being over or under-represented. Besides these advantages, the choice of the passive management approach is based on political considerations. A more active management of our equity investments would be tantamount to indirectly pursuing a structural policy. The SNB could quickly acquire significant stakes in select companies – and these could be construed as strategic participations. Clearly, it is not part of the SNB’s mandate to promote or disadvantage certain companies or sectors. The aim is to avoid such conflicts of interest at all costs, not least in order to preserve the SNB’s independence and credibility. The SNB only departs from the principle of neutrality in certain, very specific cases. This is illustrated in chart 5. On the one hand, the SNB refrains from investing in shares of systemically important banks and medium and large-cap banks in the advanced economies in order to avoid any real or perceived conflict of interest. For the same reason, it does not hold shares in Swiss companies.
The policy rate action after Easter halted the slide of the króna and it has remained in a range above the low level it touched in late March. The sudden depreciation in the early part of the year greatly worsened inflation prospects. The rate of inflation is set to rise to above 10% in the near term before subsiding again. Given the policy rate path that the Central Bank published on April 10, the inflation target of 2½% will be achieved in the second half of 2010. The policy rate path also shows that given present prospects the Bank can begin to reduce its policy rate before the end of this year. All of this is covered in detail in the latest issue of the Central Bank’s Monetary Bulletin 2 . Just as in other equity markets, stocks on the Iceland stock exchange have fallen in price from their peak in mid 2007. The decline in the Icelandic index is more pronounced than in many other countries largely because the relatively heavy weight of financial companies in the Icelandic index. Financial companies have declined more in price on the world stock markets than other companies on average. The stocks of Icelandic banks have not fallen more over the past year than those of many banks in neighbouring countries and big international banks, in some cases by less or even much less.

The infrastructure of business laws, accounting rules and public disclosure requirements must also be conducive to prudent management and market transparency. Payments systems must be enhanced to reduce the risk of systemic instability. 29. These are all areas where progress is being made throughout the region. I detect few signs of complacency among my fellow regulators or of a tendency to rest on past successes. We all recognize that banking stability is something that requires constant attention to keep up with changes in the economic environment and with market developments. There is also, I believe, a strong appreciation of the need to work together to promote stability. This is shown by the regional initiatives, through groupings such as EMEAP, to promote cooperation in supervision and in other financial sector issues. International institutions such as the Asian Development Bank also have an important role to play in encouraging financial market development. I am sure that this Forum will be helpful in addressing some of the issues involved, and I am grateful to the ADB and the IIF for organizing the event and for giving me the opportunity to speak. BIS Review 55/1997
I want to build on that track record to do the same for our new tasks because in everything the Bank does, I and my colleagues are conscious that we are accountable to you. The Bank of England has changed radically since that Bank Holiday Monday in 1997 when Eddie George and I sat in the Bank contemplating our new role, unaware of the roller coaster ride on which we were about to embark. The Bank will change again next year with its new responsibilities. But some things don’t change. Here again is Mr. Montagu Norman: AUDIO INSERT: “I would sum up the vital characteristics of the Bank as experience in affairs, cooperation on all sides, independence of judgement. But you know these three things – experience, cooperation, independence – are no good unless people have confidence in you. I like to believe that the Bank, with its long history and tradition, stands high in public esteem. But only by service to the community can that esteem be maintained through times good and bad.” That’s true not just for Montagu Norman’s day, but for today too. The present crisis is far from over, as events in the euro area illustrate weekly. Our own economy is still not back to health. Although inflation has fallen back in recent months, it is still too high. And despite efforts to stimulate the economy, the recovery is proving slower than we had hoped. It will come.

Strikingly, most of that increase in lending wasn’t to families or businesses, but to other parts of the financial system. To finance this, banks were borrowing large amounts themselves. And this was their Achilles’ heel. By the end of 2006, some banks had borrowed as much as £ for every pound provided by their own shareholders. So even a small piece of bad news about the value of its assets would wipe out much of a bank’s capital, and leave depositors scurrying for the door. What made the situation worse was that the fortunes of banks had become closely tied together through transactions in complex and obscure financial instruments. So it was difficult to know which banks were safe and which weren’t. The result was an increasingly fragile banking system. So how did banks find themselves in such a precarious position? Banks are a vital part of our economy. They run the payment system, allowing us to pay our bills and receive our wages. They finance businesses investing in new ventures and families buying a new home. Without a banking system our economy would grind to a halt. Because of that, markets correctly believed that no government could let a bank fail since that would cause immense disruption to the economy. This meant that large banks in particular benefited from an implicit taxpayer guarantee, enabling them to borrow cheaply to finance their lending. In good times, banks took the benefits for their employees and shareholders, while in bad times the taxpayer bore the costs.