samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The same applies to the return on GPFG capital. The three paths illustrate the uncertainty we are facing, but they also illustrate another important point. Spending the return will ultimately lead to a flattening of the GPFG, which will then decline as a percentage of GDP. It has always been clear that this will happen at some point in the  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  future. What is new is that this may be the case here and now. At today’s oil price, the GPFG may have reached the peak. In that case, petroleum revenue spending as a percentage of GDP must be reduced to avoid using more than the return on the GPFG. Even if the oil price and the rate of return follow a path that allows the GPFG to grow for a period ahead, petroleum revenue spending should be restrained. By keeping spending well below the upper bound, the need for fiscal retrenchment further ahead can be reduced. The fiscal rule has functioned as a long-term guideline for fiscal policy for nearly 15 years. It has served its purpose. The time has now come to show restraint. A sensible risk adjustment is now to refrain from increasing petroleum revenue spending further from today’s level. The era of rising petroleum revenue spending may be behind us. Conclusion The more than forty-year-old white paper on the role of the petroleum industry in Norwegian society was far-sighted and proved to be on the mark.

In the longer term, this means less money in the national coffer, with an attendant reduction in Norway’s fiscal space. At an oil price of around USD 60 per barrel, transfers to the GPFG may come to a halt. Rather, it seems that at today’s level of petroleum revenue spending there will soon be a need to make transfers from the GPFG to the fiscal budget. Measured as a share of GDP, the GPFG may have already reached the peak. Calculations in the National Budget for 2015 illustrate this point (see Chart 15). The broken red line shows the trajectory for fiscal space assuming a real return of 4 percent. The estimation is based on the oil price level prevailing late last summer. If the return is closer to 3 percent, there will be little room for increasing petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget. On the contrary, in the course of a few decades, petroleum revenue spending as a share of GDP will have to be reduced, that is to say fiscal policy will have to be tightened. If, in addition, the oil price settles more permanently around the level observed so far this year, fiscal policy must be adjusted earlier. If petroleum revenue spending follows the real return, we will be heading for a period of sizeable fiscal retrenchment each year. In addition, pension obligations will show a pronounced rise further ahead. The fall in oil prices has been a reminder of the uncertainty surrounding future petroleum revenues.
The recent report, “Doing Business 2008,” by the World Bank upgraded Thailand by two places. Despite all the storms we faced, we are now ranked at 15th place out of 178 countries for the most attractive destination to invest. This reflects a better infrastructure for doing businesses in Thailand. The improvement was cited on the back of E-Custom system introduced since October 2006. Cost reduction, lesser time consuming and fewer procedures for imports and exports, all induce efficiency for international trades. Overall, we have strengthened the infrastructure or the micro aspects of doing businesses in Thailand. Ladies and Gentlemen, In all, I believe that quality investors look at both economic performance and policy credibility. It is obvious that short-term performance is not difficult to achieve but a consistent performance across horizon is a challenge. Getting the political will as well as policy mix and actions in the right direction is essential. The BOT has a clear stance and stands ready to secure the overall health of the Thai economy. The MPC has done its action last meeting and I believe we are on the right track. I need not remind you that Thailand is no stranger to difficult challenges. While being patient, we certainly have strong fundamentals for the second wind. It is just a matter of time to come. At this critical juncture, the most the Bank of Thailand can do is to keep the macroeconomic environment conducive to sustainable growth and productivity improvements.

ASEAN and its members have overcome many difficult challenges over the past three decades. Despite the crisis, we are much better off today than we were before the economic take off. The road ahead is indeed difficult. But the ingredients which fuelled our rapid growth in the past are all still there. Given the political will and the right policies, I am confident that in time ASEAN will recapture the lost ground, and thrive and prosper into the new century. BIS Review 111/2000  8
On its own, the Icelandic Government was in no position to provide Icelandic banks with the FX liquidity facilities that their foreign counterparts were receiving at the time, and it would have placed itself in real peril had it tried to provide them with enough assistance to prevent them from defaulting on their FX liabilities. In addition, there were a number of other weaknesses in their balance sheets – weaknesses that would probably have posed serious problems for them in any case, albeit later on. But even though the situation developed as it did in Iceland, it is important for us to remember that it was this coordinated international response that prevented the financial crisis on both sides of the Atlantic from mushrooming into a tidal wave of national and international bank failures. And it was this response that kept the economic recession from developing into a full-blown depression like that in the 1930s. Central banks played a key role initially, providing massive liquidity facilities and coordinated monetary easing on the home front and, not least, negotiating FX swaps that actually entailed a global extension of the US Federal Reserve’s role as lender of last resort. In addition to mitigating the imminent contraction, these measures were an attempt to interrupt the vicious cycle of fire sales of illiquid assets, falling asset prices, and evaporating liquidity, thus reducing the risk that banks’ equity would plunge below regulatory minimums and banks around the world would start falling like dominoes.

In this context, we must remember, though, that the peak was utterly unsustainable, combining as it did a wide positive output gap and an enormous current account deficit. Iceland’s economic recovery began in Q2/2010. We are well on our way towards recouping our lost GDP, and forecasts indicate that this year we will have recovered it in full. The difference, though, is that the domestic economy is in much better balance than it was then. We are running a current account surplus, and inflation is on target. One might ask how much of a success this actually is, given that a number of other countries have already recovered their lost output. It has been pointed out that Iceland’s investment level is low, but this has been true of most developed countries recently, apart from major commodity producers such as Australia, Canada, and Norway. If we compare Iceland’s recovery to the experience of other countries that have suffered a twin banking and currency crisis, we see that it is far from anomalous, not least in view of the fact that, among comparison countries, recoveries have often taken place in a much more favourable global economic environment than we are facing today. In assessing the recovery, it must also be borne in mind that the room for manoeuvre for stimulating demand was limited. From 2010 onwards, fiscal policy had to focus on gradually eliminating the fiscal deficit, which was a prerequisite for reinstating the sovereign’s access to foreign capital markets.
However, it is fair to say that financial innovation in the last decade or so contributed in no small part to the breakdown of market discipline. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Coming back to the US, the proliferation of MBS and complex financial derivatives of CDOs had, as we now know, greatly increased the leverage and thus risk of the entire financial system. What was worse was that the structure of these financial products was so complex and so far removed from the underlying assets that it was virtually impossible for anyone, including the rating agencies, to fully understand the risks involved and to price such risks appropriately. We now know that there were thousands and thousands of CDOs sold before the Global Financial Crisis that were given Triple-A ratings simply because seriously flawed assumptions and models were used in assessing the risk of defaults. As I mentioned earlier, these financial derivatives had helped amplify the shocks and transmit these shocks across the global financial system during the latest Global Financial Crisis. An era of awakening? While we have seen many instances where market discipline has broken down, it is hard to believe that market discipline will break down permanently. As Europe has recently found out, the market can suddenly awaken and begin to doubt the fiscal sustainability of some members of the Euro Zone. This belated awakening has so far created considerable dislocation to the banking system and capital markets.

Norman T L Chan: 3Ds – an era of awakening? Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the 4th Santander International Banking Conference: “A Global Financial System for a Global Economy”, Madrid, 18 October 2011. *  *  *  Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, I am honoured to receive the invitation to attend and speak at the 4th Santander International Banking Conference today. It is only a few short years ago that the world economy was shaken to its core by the Global Financial Crisis. That we again face the threat of profound and traumatic disruption so soon is a measure of the urgency that governments must employ to correct the structural imbalances necessary to get the economy back on song for the long term. Today I want to take up a little bit of your time explaining what I see as fundamental to righting the ship so that it can survive in the roughest of seas. Collapse of Bretton Woods System After World War II, the World’s Superpowers tried to maintain a system of semi (or quasi) Gold Standard in which major currencies were fixed to the US dollar, which was in turn fixed to Gold at $ an ounce. This global monetary system was basically a fixed rate regime, which imposed an external discipline to restrain monetary expansion globally.
David Clementi: Technological innovation and e-commerce – the implications for derivatives markets  Speech by David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the opening reception of International Derivatives Week, held in London, on 19 June 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to address you at the start of what, I am sure, will be an informative and thought-provoking International Derivatives Week. Given the recent rapid pace of technological development, it is fitting that this year’s conference focuses on e-commerce and its impact on the derivatives industry. This is certainly a topic of great interest to the Bank of England. Maintaining the stability of the financial system and the effectiveness of the UK’s financial services are key objectives for us and recent developments are highly relevant to both. Nobody doubts that technology has rapidly changed the financial landscape, and will continue to do so. One only needs to spend time online to realise that virtually anything - from commodities, to cars, to Pokemon cards - can be bought and sold by someone with access to a terminal. Electronic trading and communication networks have greatly increased the “reach” of the traditional financial marketplaces, but at the same time allowed a wide range of new trading system providers to enter the markets at relatively low cost. It is a challenge just to stay abreast of the latest developments.

I would like this evening to say something first about the role of exchanges in this new environment, and then touch on the role of technology in changing that environment and the implications for clearing houses in managing the resulting risks. Role of exchanges So far, the established derivatives exchanges retain substantial and often growing volumes although, in recent years, OTC derivatives trading has expanded much faster than on-exchange trading in many areas. On-exchange business continues to be dominated by Chicago in the US and by London, Frankfurt and Paris in Europe. The LME remains the world leader in its field, as do the IPE and Nymex in theirs. But the number of new trading systems emerging in the various markets demonstrates that the winds of change are blowing hard, and today’s market leaders are aware of the need to innovate to survive in a rapidly evolving market place. Exchanges are responding to these challenges in a number of different ways. Some exchanges look to leverage off their involvement within wider groups containing a range of trading, clearing and settlement systems. This is not, however, our preferred structure in London; the different tiers have different characteristics and we believe it is generally in the best interests of users if trading, clearing and settlement are kept apart. Some exchanges have chosen to merge or ally with others to provide a larger, more liquid and more competitive marketplace.
Macroprudential authorities should coordinate their actions in order to mitigate these risks and seek ways to balance the protection of customers' interests and financial institution risks with specific policy objectives, a level-playing field being one of them. The initiatives taken by the European Commission, such as the digital finance package, that captures – among others - the proposal for digital operational resilience act (DORA6), and the revision of the second Payment Services Directive, are steps towards mitigating the identified risks. 3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The increasing number of Cyber-attacks in Europe indicates that a lot more needs to be done. The growth of the Fintech sector has raised the need for regulators to adjust their role within the perimeter of prudential regulation. Extending the perimeter of bank regulation to all financial service providers could possibly constrain financial innovation. But keeping the new entrants completely out of the perimeter will tilt the playing field in their favour and leave consumers unprotected. A balance must be found to allow the regulatory perimeter to cover all activities that have systemic risk potential, while allowing for innovation. Finally, Data protection is important in order to safeguard confidence in the banking sector. As a result, Cyber security should be further enhanced and prioritised and Cyber-risk incidents need to be included in financial institutions' business continuity and disaster recovery plans and be tested frequently. Given the cross-border activities of Fintech and BigTech, authorities across jurisdictions should cooperate in regulating them. THANK YOU.

From 2009 to 2011, euro area countries, on average, reduced the deficit-to-GDP ratio by 2.3 percentage points, and the primary deficit improved by about 2½ percentage points. Fiscal adjustment in the euro area is continuing in 2012, and it is indeed crucial that efforts are maintained to restore sound fiscal positions. At the same time, structural reforms are as essential as fiscal consolidation efforts and the measures to repair the financial sector. Some progress  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  has also been made in this area. For example, unit labour costs and current account developments have started to undergo a correction process in most of the countries strongly affected by the crisis. However, further reform measures need to be implemented swiftly and decisively. Product market reforms to foster competitiveness and the creation of efficient and flexible labour markets are preconditions for the unwinding of existing imbalances and the achievement of robust, sustainable growth. It is now crucial that Member States implement their country-specific recommendations with determination. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
In December 2014 and March 2015, the early provision of additional investment capacity through term RRP operations spanning the quarter-end dates, on top of the $ billion of capacity provided through ON RRPs, provided confidence to money market counterparties that sufficient investment opportunities would be available. 19 Absorbing some investment demand in term operations ahead of those quarter ends likely kept demand for ON RRPs on the quarter-end dates below the cap and helped to keep money market rates above the ON RRP offering rate. Given an apparent high degree of substitutability between overnight and term RRPs, cumulative take-up in these operations helps us to assess variability in potential demand for safe investments around peak times and to evaluate how much capacity the Federal Reserve might need to provide in an ON RRP facility to satisfy demand sufficiently to maintain interest rate control (Figure 6). 20 While our testing suggests that the current parameters of ON RRP operations have worked successfully with IOER to control short-term interest rates, there are limits to what we can learn from testing. Importantly, we will likely not know the level of support that proximity to the zero lower bound has provided to money market rates until we start to move away from it. Demand for ON RRPs following liftoff could remain relatively steady. But it could conceivably be much greater than what we have seen at higher levels of interest rates or as regulatory and structural changes in money markets boost demand for safe assets, which I will discuss momentarily.

This is because either the desired policy rate is sufficiently below the ELB or the central bank has committed to keep 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  interest rates unchanged through forward guidance. However, conflicts of objectives between fiscal and monetary policies may arise in the future. The ongoing accumulation of public debt and the large expansion of central banks’ balance sheets increase the likelihood of such conflicts. On the one hand, large fiscal stimuli for too long may lead to concerns about debt sustainability and, via the expectation of future fiscal tightening, offsetting the favorable effects on output and inflation. On the other hand, central banks should keep the risks taken in their balance sheets under control to avoid threatening their own independence. Indeed, low inflation today is not a guarantee that it will remain low forever. They must keep a sound balance sheet with adequate capital in order to keep full control of their monetary stance all along the road. The key question is then how to reconcile the benefits of a mutual reinforcement of monetary policy and fiscal policy in the short-term with the challenges of keeping inflation under control and public debt to sustainable levels in the long-term. There is no magic answer to this question but I will try to sketch here some basic principles that are in my opinion ingredients of a sound policymix recipe: 1. Each authority should be guided by and stick to its mandate.
In order to contribute to policy coordination and information sharing, and minimizing potential conflict between fiscal and monetary authorities as a consequence of CBC autonomy, the Constitutional Law mandates participation of the Finance Minister at monetary policy meetings, without voting rights but with the temporary right of suspending a Board decision. Furthermore, the Law states that CBC policy decisions must take into account the government’s general economic policy orientation. Overview of the evolution of MP framework The Chilean experience with IT can be split into two periods. The first one – from 1991 to 1999 – falls short in many aspects of a full-fledged inflation targeting framework. This first phase featured more than one anchor (an ER band, in addition to the inflation target) and low levels of MP transparency and communication. The second phase – from 2000 to the present – features a single inflation target and an active communication strategy for MP. In the context of reporting the annual monetary program to the Congress, the CBC announcement of an annual inflation target arose as a natural response to the legal mandate for price-level stability. In 1991, the first official target – at a 15%-20% annual target range – was publicly announced in September 1990 for the Dec. 1990–Dec. 1991 rate of annual CPI inflation. From 1990 to 1996, targets were set annually as target ranges in September for the subsequent calendar year, and from 1997 to 1999 as target points (figure 6).

The disadvantage of a gradual transition for Sweden is that, as euro banknotes and coins already exist in the euro area, it may seem strange to the general public that they cannot count on being able to use them completely in all transactions in Sweden right from the start. The advantages of a gradual transition are that the major technical and practical adaptations to the euro can be made gradually, while Sweden can participate fully in all forums for co-operation and decision-making within the monetary union as soon as Sweden joins, without having to wait until the practical work is complete. With a gradual transition process, the financial and central government sector would require 1-1.5 years to prepare from the time that it is clear that Sweden will apply for membership until the krona exchange rate is irrevocably fixed on membership. After this, the financial sector requires a further year and the public sector requires approximately two years before euro banknotes and coins can replace krona banknotes and coins. This would in total involve a period of between two and three years from a referendum until the introduction of the euro is complete. However, I believe that this period can be shortened somewhat, assuming that the political process openly and clearly chooses a transition process and establishes a timetable for the different stages.