samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
5 [6]  References Diewert, W.E and Fox, K.J. (2020), “Measuring real consumption and CPI bias under lockdown conditions”, NBER working paper series, No. 27144. Statistics Sweden (2020), press release (2020), ”Svårare beräkna inflation under coronapandemin”, (More difficult to calculate inflation during the corona pandemic) www,scb,se Statistics Sweden (2020), report to Consumer Price Index Board, ”Hantering av effekter av Corona-pandemin i KPI och HIKP”, (Managing the effects of the corona pandemic on the CPI and HICP) www,scb,se  Appendix Table 1. Products affected by lack of consumption Weight in CPI (per cent) Air package tours  1.2. Foreign air travel  0.6. Tickets to sporting events  0.4. Cinema tickets  0.2  Theatre tickets and entertainment  0.2  Entry tickets to entertainment  0.3  Total weight in CPI  2.9  Source: Statistics Sweden  6 [6]

Furthermore, in 2009, the Government approved the extension to the initial five-years of the FSDP in order to continue the national strategy of strengthening our financial sector and enhancing financial inclusion. The second phase of the FSDP will focus on three main pillars namely: (i) enhancing market infrastructure; (ii) increasing competition; and (iii) increasing access to finance. Overall, the vision is to have a dynamic and inclusive financial sector that supports all aspects of the economy. Therefore, the theme for this workshop and exhibition “Enhancing Financial Access for Women: A Tool for Poverty Reduction” is timely and appropriate. Our aim is to recognise and heighten awareness of women’s issues within this context. More specifically, the main objective of this forum is to showcase a variety of financial services and products available and sensitize the general public on: (i)  how financial institutions are contributing to increasing gender financing in Zambia;  (ii)  bringing awareness to the women on the opportunities that are available for them to access finance and mitigate related challenges;  (iii)  the role of the Bank of Zambia and other financial institutions in meeting the objective of financial inclusion;  (iv)  how the United Nations as the lead international organisation and other local agencies are supporting women in Zambia; and  (v)  sharing experiences in running businesses, and the opportunities and challenges in accessing finance in order to grow the income base.
The moral from all this is one that will be all too familiar to you as accountants, though perhaps one that sometimes gets forgotten by consumers of accounting statements, namely that the appropriate way to frame accounts depends on how they will be used and what questions are being asked. The Asset Purchase Facility accounts may tell us the scale of gains or losses on the Asset Purchase Facility portfolio narrowly considered, but will miss the impact on the public finances from higher activity and lower financing costs and fail to tell us anything about it macroeconomic effectiveness. The rise in asset prices and the recovery in confidence since the start of the Quantitative Easing program have been significant. We cannot identify precisely how much of this is a direct result of Quantitative Easing, and hence the scale of the boost to tax revenues. I have no doubt that this issue will continue to be debated for years to come, and that some sceptics may remain unconvinced. But even a sceptic should acknowledge that the net accounting gain or loss on the Asset Purchase  3  4  Of course that is not true of holdings of corporate assets. BIS Review 126/2009  Facility provides an incomplete measure of the impact of Quantitative Easing on the economy and on the public finances. Thank you.

The company issuing the bond then deposits that money in their own bank. So now it is the corporate’s bank that holds the claim on us. A similar sort of circle occurs if the corporate then uses its deposit to buy a new piece of machinery, because the seller of that machinery will end up putting the proceeds into her bank, so that the claim on the Bank of England is now held by the capital goods producer’s bank. Whatever the type of purchase, it will always end up with someone’s commercial bank having a claim on us. That is even the case if the money is used to buy foreign goods, as the foreign commercial bank will need to exchange the sterling claim with a commercial bank that holds an account with us, if it does not do so itself. The only way that the claim can be eliminated from the system is if a bank chooses to exchange it for cash, which would make little sense since cash pays no interest at all. The reason for going through this in such mind-numbing detail is to make the point that the level of commercial banks’ reserves in aggregate is determined by the way we have funded the asset purchases, not by the commercial banks’ own decisions. The size of banks’ reserves cannot, as is frequently claimed, be a sign that they are “sitting on them”.
For a country that, with one exception, has not had a current account surplus or a balanced budget for at least fifteen years, this attitude betrays a poor understanding of the growth dynamics in a small, open economy and of current world realities. A more balanced assessment of the facts would recognize that the extent and speed of the turnaround demonstrate not only the undoubted resilience of the Maltese economy, but also its vulnerability. More specifically, since the rebound in good part reflects a recovery in the electronics and tourism industries, it underlines our dependence on the state of external demand. We ignore this reality at our peril. Medium-term prospects will be conditioned by slow growth abroad Now, given the pervasiveness of the recession abroad and the considerable uncertainty that still prevails today, we can expect only modest growth in export markets in the near future. According to the IMF, real GDP in the advanced economies will expand by only 2.2% in 2011 compared with 2.7% this year. 1 In Europe, the euro area is forecast to grow by just 1.5%. Given these subdued global prospects, it would be naïve to assume that the current economic upswing in Malta will continue spontaneously without determined efforts to achieve faster growth. There is no other option if we aspire to converge to the higher living standards enjoyed elsewhere in Europe. The key to a better quality of life are rising incomes. In this respect, there is considerable potential for improvement.

They follow current changes in prices, primarily petrol and food prices, and ruble exchange rate fluctuations. The third important factor we took into account is consumer demand. Lending underpins consumption but slowing wage growth constrains a rise in demand. Consumption growth slowed down after a short-term acceleration in November, which was likely associated with preemptive purchases of non-food goods in the run-up to the VAT hike. We can see it from retail sales figures. The rise in consumer activity does not exert pressure on prices. This, among other things, is an important reason of a moderate VAT pass-through to prices. The fourth factor is external conditions. A number of changes which only started to emerge in December, intensified at the beginning of this year. The US Fed and the European Central Bank eased their rhetoric as regards the monetary policy outlook. Improvements were seen in markets’ expectations regarding the negotiations of international trade restrictions. These factors supported emerging market currencies and reduced their risk premiums. We may say that external risks declined in this part. At the same time, geopolitical risks remain in place. Oil prices in the first quarter were higher than projected in the baseline scenario. However, risks are high that oil production will exceed consumption this year. Finally, overall monetary conditions have changed little if at all since the start of the year. Deposit rates have edged higher, while loan rates have stabilised.
This will make possible clearer, more transparent and, consequently, more interesting banking business for new private investors. No less important is the fact that we are creating a system which will help banks chose their development strategy as to how to turn a small banking business into a large one, while avoiding risks to its stability. A few words about the development of a new resolution mechanism. The existing credit resolution mechanism is not only more expensive and time-consuming than that which has been proposed, but it also hampers the competitive environment. Today, a bank operating under this resolution may not comply with the ratios, but nevertheless carry out the same operations as a normally operating bank, meanwhile a turnaround manager obtains access to almost free benefits. Turnaround managers fiercely competed for this credit resource exactly because it gave them a considerable competitive advantage. We do not think that the new mechanism will trigger significant growth in resolutions. Resolution means that the state takes up losses incurred by previous bank owners, thus this mechanism should be applied with caution. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  We call the new instrument the Banking Sector Consolidation Fund, because we expect that banks under resolution will be able to be united into banks with larger capital, which will then attract more investors. We consider it important to encourage growth in the number of banks with large capital to avoid excessive concentration in any one level of the banking system.

What implications does this have for the competitive environment? There are banks on the market which operate fairly, comply with regulations, do not accumulate risks, act prudently, and develop business with the target of long-term sustainability. This is the principle governing what they offer to their customers. At the same time, nothing restricts a fraudulent bank unconcerned about risk management, instead simply ‘hoovering up’ depositors’ money. Certainly, to customers looking in from the outside it will seem like the bank with the most appealing offer. If we fail to expose such banks and withdraw them from the market promptly, decent and fair banks will continue to lose in terms of competitiveness. Therefore, I find it strange that the ARB consistently urges the Bank of Russia not to revoke licences. We believe it to be totally against the interests of responsible banks, which - I am convinced - constitute the majority in the Association and in this room. We are very much concerned that the ARB, though emphasising the importance of competition, nevertheless tolerates misreporting, fraud and the violation of laws. The Association neither condemns dubious operations nor seeks to develop good standards of practice. Furthermore, they demand that we turn a blind eye to problems arising in banks. This is exactly what the ARB means when it insists that we ‘not revoke so many licences’. However, we abide by the law and take measures stipulated by the law. Managers of those banks from whom licences were revoked used to be members of the ARB Board, i.e.
The financial regulator relaxed a set of regulations and allowed 1.6 million loan restructuring operations and postponed by one year the entry into force of the capital requirements established in the New General Banking Law. Finally, the CBC has applied some 20 measures aimed at expanding the monetary stimulus, deepening it through non-conventional instruments to encourage credit and liquidity, stabilizing financial markets, and gaining space to address additional stressful scenarios. These measures have pledged resources equivalent to more than 20% of GDP, doubling the size of the Bank’s balance sheet. These efforts have paid off. The decline in activity stopped in June and in the four months since then it has recovered more than half of the losses of the previous four months. As a result, almost a third of the workers who lost their jobs have obtained new ones and a large number of those who benefited from the Employment Protection Law have returned to their occupations. In the third quarter, fiscal transfers were able to compensate for all the fall in labor income of the poorest 20% of the population, and the remaining 80% will have obtained liquidity that far exceeds the loss of income through the withdrawal of pension savings. There is evidence that the FOGAPE-guaranteed loans reached preferentially the companies most affected by the drop in sales, which helped them to resume their activity.

In this context, real growth in lending to companies fell to 4.3% annually in November, from a peak of 13.4% in June. Several other economies around the world have also shown a slowdown in commercial credit, consistent with the increase in income flows that has come with the increased mobility (Figure 12). The corporate sector increased their indebtedness in order to cope with an unexpected and steep drop in cash flows and avoid solvency problems. Leverage has grown across firms of different sizes and sectors, although it has been most intense in the medium-sized ones and in trade, business and personal services lines, which have been among the hardest hit throughout the course of the pandemic. This upward trend in borrowing has also been seen in the rest of the world, amid the favorable financial conditions that came with the onset of the sanitary emergency. As for households, consumer credit continued to decline, mirroring previous recessions, while for mortgage credit the slowdown has been much more moderate. In the former, annual contraction was around 16% in real terms in the past few months, reflecting a still partial upturn in employment, as well as the increase in the households’ available resources as they withdrew their pension savings. The growth in mortgage loans is still positive, averaging around 6% annually in real terms since the statistical closing of our September 2020 Monetary Policy Report. Page 4 of 19  In this context, the higher risk associated with the different portfolios persists.
The US central bank, the Federal Reserve (the Fed), and the European Central Bank (ECB) took action in this situation by lending large volumes of money to the banks when they could not borrow from one another. The degree of financial unease then varied during the course of a whole year. The TED spreads peaked when the banks wanted to secure their liquidity ahead of the turn of the year 2007-2008. A further peak was reached in March 2008 when US investment bank Bear Sterns suffered acute liquidity problems and suspended payments, but things calmed down again after the Fed mediated the takeover of the bank by JP Morgan. BIS Review 25/2009  1  In mid-September 2008, when the US investment bank Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the financial turmoil became an acute financial crisis. The TED spreads were driven up to very high levels. Many banks, institutions and funds were highly exposed to Lehman Brothers. Few had expected such an important financial agent to be allowed to fall. There was a great deal of concern that more players would end up in a similar situation. The remaining large investment banks as such quickly disappeared. The financial crisis also spread to other countries and developed into a global financial crisis. Access to credit declined on the financial markets around the world and some markets more or less ceased functioning.

Third, we need to strengthen the resiliency of our financial system so that the stresses associated with the failure of a major financial firm are not amplified across the system. Fourth, we need to build up our data capabilities so we can better monitor the global financial system as a whole. For the full benefit from this multifaceted approach to be realized, public authorities must continue to work together in a coordinated manner. Global, systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs) pose a significant challenge to financial stability on two fronts. First, due to their size, complexity and central role in financial markets, a disorderly failure of a G-SIFI would directly cause major disruptions in markets, adversely affecting credit flows and real economic activity. Second, such a disorderly failure  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  would also indirectly place significant negative strains on other financial firms due not only to direct credit exposures to the failed institution, but also due to the fire sale dynamics that would ensue. The lack of transparency in markets as to which firms would be most affected could result in a general pull-back by investors, which, in turn, could lead to additional deleveraging and further downward pressure on asset prices. As we saw during the financial crisis, this amplification mechanism could quickly spread the strains throughout the global financial system. Prior to the financial crisis, the risk to financial stability posed by G-SIFIs created a dilemma for policymakers when one or more of these firms found itself in danger of failing.
For insurance companies, the PRA will have the second objective of contributing to securing an appropriate degree of protection for policyholders. Why do we need a second objective for insurance? One reason is that in taking out some forms of insurance policies, the public can become locked into very long-term contracts, much longer often than is the case in banking with deposit contracts. Bearing this in mind, the public interest I think justifies a second objective for insurance, which is more directly targeted at the situation of individual policyholders. There are a number of important points in this description of the PRA’s objectives. First, the emphasis on economic well-being as an ultimate goal aligns the supervision of banks and insurers more closely to the field of macroeconomic policy. This is in line with the definition of financial stability in terms of the continuity of supply of critical financial services which are important to the functioning of the economy. Four services stand out here: the protection of savings; the provision of payment services including access to funds; credit extension; and risk transfer. This definition is critical to clarifying the public interest-objective in a stable financial system, and that this public interest can diverge from the private interest of a firm in profit maximisation without reference to the public interest. One of the biggest lessons I take from the financial crisis is the need to ensure that the boards and management of firms appreciate and act consistent with the public interest.

The crisis has been a searing experience for banks and regulators, precisely because at times they have both failed to fulfil this central objective of maintaining safety and soundness and hence the continuous supply of critical services to the public. For what is now not far short of three years we have been working to change the approach to financial regulation in the UK. We are still working to do that of course, but the difference is that for the last four and half weeks we have been doing so within the new regulatory framework of regulation – we are doing it now as the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. The prompt for this change of approach has been the severity of the financial crisis, a crisis that has been through a searing phase of prudential problems – failing banks – and more recently a conduct phase as the misdeeds and unacceptable behaviours of the past have been revealed. On a personal note, recently when my appointment was announced, I was described a number of times as a veteran of the Bank of England. It was for me a moment of home truth; 28 years is quite a long time in one place, even if the term veteran sits uncomfortably. But it reminded me that the UK is on its fourth system of financial regulation during that time.
Now that the interest rate has moved up to a fairly normal level, the rise in house prices has come to a halt, and prices are now falling. We have seen that when the interest rate is raised to curb the rise in prices for goods and services, interest-rate setting also contributes to stabilising asset prices. Moreover, we believe that our communication, where we emphasise that the interest rate is set with view to stabilising inflation, and with forecasts for the interest rate ahead, has contributed to dampening fluctuations. It is nevertheless important to be aware that in a small open economy like Norway there is little room for setting the interest rate at a level that diverges from that of other countries with the aim of influencing property prices and credit growth. The task of steering inflation is in itself demanding. With Norway’s balance-of-payments position, the effects on capital movements and the krone exchange rate may be considerable. Pursuing a very firm approach to steering property prices and credit will easily lead to a krone out of balance and result in adverse effects on inflation and inflation expectations. Monetary policy contributes to stabilising developments in the economy. Nonetheless, in some areas, the framework may lead to a situation where business cycles may be selfamplifying. In the following, I will focus on aspects of the functioning and regulation of the housing market and banking activities. The interplay between developments in the housing market and the credit market is important for stability in our economy.

The shift towards imports from low-cost countries has moderated. After falling for several years, prices for imported goods are now beginning to rise. Looking back, inflation has varied somewhat. The three supply-side shocks reduced inflation while boosting production capacity. Low interest rates, favourable economic conditions internationally and substantial investment in the petroleum sector increased demand for goods and services. High capacity utilisation gradually pushed up inflation. Now that interest rates have risen to a more normal level and the global economic situation is deteriorating, growth is slowing and capacity utilisation may again seem to be approaching levels that are more sustainable. The impact of the downturn abroad on the Norwegian economy is uncertain, but on balance it now seems that inflation will gradually stabilise near 2.5 per cent without unnecessary wide fluctuations in output and employment. By and large, we must then be able to assert that inflation targeting has served us well during these years. There have been surprises. The growth potential of the Norwegian economy has been very high. It took a long time for employment to rise after the recovery started, and in 2006 – well into the upturn – inflation fell markedly. Over the past year, import prices and food prices have increased, and against this background the monetary stance may have to be on the tight side for a period.