samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The fiscal guideline, that is how much of the Fund that should be used every year, is what most closely resembles liabilities. However, since the guideline is formulated as a percentage of the Fund itself, it yields little guidance to the risk characteristics of the allocation. Thus, the process of establishing a strategic allocation is still more similar to that of an endowment than to that of a pension fund – despite the recent change in the name of the Fund. Let me move on to the management of the Fund within Norges Bank. Norges Bank's contribution to the Fund's return has been positive. Total returns have fluctuated considerably since the Fund made its first investments in equity markets in 1998, while excess returns have been relatively stable. As a financial investor, we have three main tasks. Invest incoming cash as efficiently as possible in capital markets (transition), stay invested in markets broadly in accordance with the strategy that is defined by the Ministry of Finance and endorsed by the Norwegian parliament (beta management) and finally to achieve a higher return where markets provide opportunities for this and where we have an advantage in terms of specialist skills (alpha management) by diverging from the benchmark portfolio. 2  BIS Review 45/2007  With respect to the first task we are different from many investors. Simply maintaining the financial exposure is a demanding task with the size of our inflow. We have therefore dedicated substantial resources to this activity.

Our philosophy is to stimulate ownership of decisions and empowerment in the investment process – and that is appreciated by our managers. Moreover, the mere importance of the mission, as formulated by our Board, "... to safeguard and grow financial wealth for future generations through highly professional management coupled with strict integrity", is attracting resources in and of itself. To wed a business culture to a central bank, with its civil service responsibilities, has posed a challenge in terms of adapting the Bank's governance system to the increased importance of professional investment management. Elements in addressing this include a strengthened focus on accountability by a clear division of responsibilities and a system of checks and balances. Maybe the most important element in our governance system is the establishment of a high degree of transparency for the public by providing open information on performance, risks, costs and investments on a timely basis. All in all, we feel the challenge of managing the Fund has enriched the organisation by forcing the central bank to think outside of the box. And perhaps the central bank perspective and values have added to the depth and long-term horizon of the investment organisation. Let me round off this presentation by recapitulating some of the main insights we have gained in the decade the Fund has existed.
And lastly, the strengthening of regional financial safety net through institutional mechanism and arrangement such as the development of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) will increase the region’s ability to respond to a crisis, build confidence and hence lessen possible market turbulence during times of financial stress. As I have outlined here, numerous advantages for member countries and for the region as a whole can be expected from the launch of the AEC in just a few years from now. However, capitalizing on these opportunities will not be automatic. ASEAN leaders will need to step up their efforts in their preparatory works to achieve a credible and meaningful start. For one thing, boosting each member country’s competitiveness and addressing key structural problems should be priorities that lie primarily with respective nations. Furthermore, to ensure sustainable success of regional economic integration, growth must be inclusive both within and between member countries. To this end, the equitable economic development pillar of the AEC blueprint calls on member states to narrow the development gap within ASEAN through mutual assistance and cooperation. Under this pillar, subregional programs such as the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation have been underway to accelerate economic integration of the newer members through various capacity  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  building and infrastructure projects.

Charles L Evans: Monetary goals and strategy Speech by Mr Charles L Evans, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, at the Annual Hyman P Minsky Conference on the State of the US and World Economies, Washington, DC, 9 April 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can also be found on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s website. Introduction Thank you Dimitri. Before proceeding with my comments today, I need to remind you that the views I express are my own and are not necessarily shared by my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or within the Federal Reserve System. The U.S. Congress created the Federal Reserve System 100 years ago, largely as a way to provide an elastic currency that could mitigate the banking panics and other disruptions that impaired economic activity and contributed to deflations in the late 1800s and early 1900s. That mission has evolved into what is now known as our dual mandate – the Federal Reserve’s directive to help foster conditions that achieve both stable prices and maximum employment. Over the Fed’s 100 year history, three major historical episodes continue to provide lessons for today (chart 1). First, in the 1930s, the U.S. economy experienced a severe credit contraction and deflation during the Great Depression. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued persuasively that inept monetary policy failed to combat these destructive deflationary forces.
Tarisa Watanagase: Combating the global financial crisis – role of international cooperation Remarks by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the HKMA Distinguished Lecture, Hong Kong, 16 December 2008. *  *  *  Governor Draghi, Governor Yam, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honored and delighted to be here among this gathering of distinguished policymakers, financial experts and academia, at this year’s HKMA Distinguished Lecture and would like to thank Governor Yam for the kind invitation. This lecture truly provides an excellent opportunity for us to share our views on the topical issues that are at the center of international financial community. Ten years ago, we had the Asian financial crisis. In Thailand, there were plenty of discussions about the causes and remedies of the crisis, some of which still continued until these days. To me, the Thai crisis had 4 main causes, namely, we had weaknesses in the macroeconomic management leading up to bubbles, lax supervision, excessive risk taking of both the financial sector and the private sector in general, and the inadequate legal and information infrastructure. The crisis we are facing now has many surprises as pointed out by Governor Draghi, but I also see plenty of similarities in the underlying root causes. Because of the crisis’s global scale and its severity, this time around we have seen unprecedented efforts taking at both the national, regional and international levels. Today, one decade after the Asian financial crisis, emerging markets look less vulnerable to financial disturbances.

Its roots in the olden leeuwendaalder or the Dutch lion-thaler show not only its descent from the former Dutch coin (and therefore its being related to the US dollar), but also its European dimension as ever since its birth, shortly after the creation of the modern Romanian state, our leu currency was French. This means that the 1867 Monetary Law was designed in terms of the Latin Union, most of all France. The law stipulated that metal coins should be minted in French style. But our bonds with Europe were broader as the law set forth that the gold and silver coins issued by France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland (all members of the Latin Union) should be accepted by all exchange houses, along with the Romanian ones. Thus, Romania’s European aspirations were strongly asserted, while spreading to Germany through King Carol I of Hohenzollern, whose effigy was placed on the first Romanian gold and silver coins, and to Spain, Mr. González-Páramo, via its Latin spirit. Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to restate here with you what I have often underlined throughout 2010 when we celebrated the NBR’s 130th anniversary since its establishment which made it the 16th central bank in the world in chronological order. The fact is that the history of the Romanian monetary system is closely linked to the history of the modern Romanian state. Feel free to discover this reality by visiting the space dedicated to the leu in the lobby of the Euro Exhibition.
Our reliance on London also stems from the fact that, in some cases, the City represents a gateway to global financial markets for euro area financial and non-financial firms, allowing them to tap into global capital and liquidity pools. In other areas, however, reliance on London is quite limited. For instance, UK-domiciled banks play a marginal role in direct lending to euro area households and non-financial companies. Had it not been for Brexit, certain global and regional trends might even have led to an increase in the EU’s reliance on the City of London as a centre for market-based finance. Indeed, the 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  balance between banks and non-bank financial institutions in the EU has been evolving in recent years: although still very much bank-based, our economy is increasingly financed by non-bank institutions. In the euro area, total assets held by non-banks have almost doubled over the last ten years, growing from € trillion in 2008 to € trillion in June 2019. Non-banks currently account for around 55% of the euro area financial sector. Their fast growth reflects their expanding role in financing the euro area real economy. Whereas in 2008 non-banks accounted for 14% of the euro area financial sector’s loans to non-financial corporations, that share roughly doubled in a decade. Non-banks provide a steady net flow of financing to non-financial corporations through the purchase of debt securities.

Regulatory decisions and economic drivers will affect the status quo These examples give a sense of the level of integration between UK and continental financial markets, in particular for certain complex and sophisticated financial services linked to derivatives markets and investment banking activities. However, Brexit will change this status quo and a degree of decoupling is likely. It is difficult to make firm predictions about the extent to which our two financial systems may drift apart or remain integrated. The contours of the future EU-UK relationship in financial services are still uncertain, and the economic drivers and regulatory choices which could reshape this relationship will probably only be felt over time. The EU will need to balance the benefits of continued integration with the UK financial system against potential risks to financial stability, consumer and investor protection, the level playing field and the integrity of the Single Market. As I have said in the past, this path will not be easy for either side of the Channel, and the risks linked to regulatory divergence and a potential race to the bottom should not be taken lightly. Allow me to briefly discuss the regulatory dimension of this question. A possible scenario is that the United Kingdom will not seek to remain a member of the EU Single Market once it leaves the EU. This means moving away from a fully-integrated relationship underpinned by the EU’s single rulebook and single passport for financial services, and relying instead on the EU’s equivalence framework for third countries.
Money market mutual funds and other providers of short-term financing could rapidly shift funds into the facility away from assets such as commercial paper that support the private sector. In contrast, in the current regime, when financial crises lead to flows into less risky assets, their interest rates fall, limiting the appetite for these less risky assets. Consequently, under a full allotment setup, runs could be larger and these runs could  2  6  The floor has been more solid since the testing was extended in January for a full year. In part, this is likely because the extension allowed market participants to plan ahead knowing that they could rely on the facility. Raising the caps has also been a factor in solidifying the floor. BIS central bankers’ speeches  exacerbate the fall in the prices of riskier assets. Note that the risk here is how quickly financial flows could reverse from one day to the next, not the average level of take-up of the facility over time. Fortunately, this risk seems relatively easy to address. One could design the facility to prevent rapid inflows during times of financial stress. This could be done by building in circuit breakers such as caps on overall usage of the facility. The circuit breakers would not affect the amount of take-up during normal times or prevent take-up from rising at moderate rates. Instead, they would be in place to limit the pace and magnitude of inflows during times of stress.

The subject of growth and development is complex and fascinating. There is no "one-size-fits-all" magic formula. But a country must have the necessary conditions of effective political leadership, sound institutions and social consensus on reforms, and the sharing of fruits. A country must also have the capacity to adapt as the world changes; otherwise, it will soon fall behind. I hope that your stay in Singapore over the next few days will be fruitful, enjoyable and memorable. Thank you for visiting us. BIS Review 86/2006  5
Institutions are again central to explaining the difference. While the US operates in a consolidated union – with a federal Treasury acting as the counterpart of the central bank – the euro area comprises 19 sovereign governments with separate national budget constraints, making sovereigns more vulnerable to a loss of market confidence. This is particularly valid amid a nobail-out clause for member states without any debt-restructuring mechanism below the federal level. Accordingly, national fiscal policies have to be sound ex ante to build fiscal buffers, as is the case for states in the US. Yet fiscal rules were only weakly enforced before the crisis, permitting public debt levels at the national level that were too high for a monetary union that is not complemented by a fiscal union. That said, even countries with low starting debt levels – such as Ireland and Spain – ended up embroiled in the bank-sovereign loop, showing that the institutional framework was incomplete in other ways, too. In terms of sovereign risk, there was no fiscal backstop of sufficient capacity for sovereigns until the European Stability Mechanism was established in late 2011, leaving the euro area vulnerable to contagion. Likewise, there remains no mechanism for sovereign debt restructuring. And in terms of bank risk, there was no backstop on the European level as one might expect for a European banking sector. Still, it would be too simple to lay the challenges faced by monetary policy solely on the European supranational institutional framework; national characteristics were in many ways inadequate too.

Yves Mersch: The European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve – an ocean apart? Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts, 12 October 2016. * * * Interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic seem to be trapped near zero. At first glance, looking only at the short term policy rates, one might think that both the Federal Reserve (Fed) and European Central Bank (ECB) are facing very similar circumstances and challenges. Below the surface, however, the differences are pronounced. In the euro area monetary policy continues to be highly accommodative, aiming to steer inflation back to levels in line with our definition of price stability. In the US, which is at a different stage of the business cycle, interest rate normalisation has so far been slower than expected. It is worth taking a closer look at the details to understand the unprecedented actions of central bank on either sides of the ocean in recent years. To do so, it is useful to divide the crisis into three separate phases. The first phase was the global financial crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers just over eight years ago. Central banks worldwide faced a largely common challenge to avert a collapse in aggregate demand. The second phase centred on sovereign debt, a problem which only affected the euro area. In the third phase, which is still in place today, stubbornly low global inflation and anaemic growth are compounding domestic challenges.
Malaysia 's own experience in managing the financial crisis in our part of the world over 1997-1998 was that a decisive and comprehensive response at an early stage of the crisis not only produced an early recovery but it also reduced the cost of the crisis on the financial system and the economy. The crisis was a defining moment for Bank Negara Malaysia . The Bank's efforts to sustain stability did not end when the Asian financial crisis abated, and when economic recovery was firmly in place. The key lesson was that foundations for resilience are built during the good times. Once stability was restored, the Bank therefore embarked on a comprehensive restructuring and reform of the financial sector. This included the aggressive development of the domestic financial markets and the strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory oversight. This has been reinforced by a higher level of regional cooperation and collaboration. Therefore, it is not what we are currently doing to cope with this international financial crisis but the efforts that have been undertaken over several years that have ensured the resilience of our financial system during these most challenging of times. Over the course of these recent months, we have witnessed the introduction of massive fiscal stimulus packages, sweeping proposals for regulatory reforms and various unorthodox policy measures being introduced to stabilise and restore market confidence in the financial system. Whilst these measures were necessary and have contributed towards some stabilisation in global financial markets, more importantly is the long-term sustainability of this trend.

The subject of this lecture is important as a greater understanding of the origins, the dynamics of financial crisis and the options for resolution is essential not only for its effective management but also for the lessons that can be drawn to prevent such future crisis. Given the severity and far reaching consequences of the current crisis, there has been a greater sense of urgency for the international community to come together to work towards a new international financial architecture that would allow for the more efficient functioning of not only financial intermediation within national economies but also across borders. History has shown that there have been more than 100 distinct banking crises within the span of the recent two decades. While the trigger factors for such financial crisis may be different, for most it involved disruptions in the financial intermediation process, the downward spiral of asset prices and a general loss in confidence. Varying responses at different stages of the crisis have shown wide ranging degrees of success. The objective to be achieved is the restoration of stability in the financial markets, the resumption of credit  BIS Review 87/2009  1  flows and the return of confidence. This would provide the beginning of the recovery of economic activity.
In this way, experimentation allows us to send the right signals for the ecosystem to realise the potential of new technologies without fearing a delayed and unexpected “backlash” from the Supervisory Authority. The experiments underway at the Banque de France on a central bank digital currency (CBDC) are an illustration of the same experimental approach in the field of work specific to central banks. They present with issues directly related to the need for the Eurosystem, should circumstances require it, to be ready to issue a CBDC in order to ensure that central bank money is accessible to the general public and to preserve their freedom of choice of means of payment and their confidence in our currency. By testing the possible uses of a CBDC, we investigate not only the potential of blockchain technologies but we also question the players in the ecosystem on what tomorrow’s landscape could look like, on subjects as fundamental as the methods of exchanging financial instruments for CBDCs, the improvement of the conditions for executing cross-border payments or new ways of making CBDCs available to financial sector players. *  * 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second thrust of our work is to promote a regulatory framework and appropriate supervisory practices. In this respect, our immersion, as a player, in the innovative FinTech ecosystem is a valuable asset that we intend to build on in order to contribute to the impending and necessary changes in regulations and supervision.

However, today I would like to return instead to the subject of liquidity regulation. 1  One important pre-requisite is that the authorities have access to up-to-date and accurate information about financial firms, on which they can base shared assessments of the position of individual firms and the likelihood of a crisis affecting the financial system as a whole. The information needed includes, inter alia, a firm’s group structure, capital, liquidity asset holdings, large exposures, and its involvement in markets and in payment, clearing and settlement systems. This information can be collectively thought of as a ‘Fact Book’ on a firm. In some countries much of this information is already available. The FSA recently published a paper outlining the information that the UK authorities collectively deem it necessary to have in a financial crisis, and asking for firms’ cooperation in making available a limited amount of additional information that is not already collected on a routine basis. 4  BIS Review 79/2005  The potential willingness of the authorities to supply discretionary—as opposed to routine—liquidity in a crisis is likely to give rise to moral hazard, because in the real world, faced with incomplete information, it is difficult or impossible to identify ex ante a ‘pure’ liquidity crisis. By, for example, relaxing normal criteria on collateral quality authorities may move from the injection of liquidity to what is effectively the provision of risk capital.