samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We wish to support your efforts to enhance the adequacy of capital in a manner that conforms with your institutions’ risk profiles, strengthens the management of risk, and fortifies the stability of your financial systems. Concluding thoughts on the New Accord Clearly, all of us have come a long way since 1988, regardless of whether we were the first or simply the most recent supervisors to adopt the original Accord. As we develop new approaches to capital adequacy, none of the milestones we’ve achieved, and none of our success in resolving open issues, would have been possible without the dedication that you, the members of the global supervisory community, have demonstrated. You have been enormously supportive of our work and have undertaken considerable pains to share your views and ideas. The members of the Committee and I are particularly grateful to our friends and colleagues in the rest of the supervisory community for your advice and counsel. We know that none of us will be able to claim individually the success of the New Accord as our own. Instead, it is dependent on all of us to work hard and promote the virtues and benefits of the New Accord in our own countries. Press releases and some encouraging words from supervisors will not suffice. Success will demand our mutual and dogged determination to encourage our banks, to prepare our staff, and to cooperate with each other.

The Bank of Zambia has continued to encourage local banks and other financial institutions to partner with international financial institutions and other banks in Africa, Europe and Asia. In this regard, in December 2007, the Bank organised a forum to exchange information on sources of finance in Lusaka. The forum was well attended and the international institutions showcased their products to their local counterparts. I am happy to note that institutions present here today such as Zambia National Commercial Bank, AFREXIM Bank, PTA Bank, ALS Capital and Loita Capital were all represented at the forum. I imagine that such fora are  2  BIS Review 77/2008  instrumental in structuring tangible financing agreements like the ones we are witnessing today. Finally, I would, like to request all parties involved in the management of these facilities to ensure that the funds reach the intended beneficiaries and that controls are put in place to avoid abuse. The beneficiaries should also ensure that their projects are implemented effectively and expeditiously without any delay. In this regard, may I request the Zambian Mining Services Companies and the Export Fund of Zambia to take necessary measures in a timely manner to fulfill the requirements for declaring these loans effective and for starting implementation. I would like to wish all those involved success in their management of the funds and implementation of the projects so that we can ensure that the development impacts expected from these important initiatives become a reality for the intended beneficiaries and the country at large.
Norman Chan: Hong Kong as an international debt financing centre Remarks by Mr Norman Chan, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the cocktail reception of HKCMA Forum 2005, Hong Kong, 26 January 2005. *  *  *  Mr Yiu, ladies and gentlemen: I am very pleased to be invited to speak at this Cocktail Reception today. Let me first congratulate the Hong Kong Capital Markets Association for successfully organising this Forum. I am glad to note that the Forum has drawn together many market participants to discuss a number of important issues related to the role of Hong Kong as an international debt financing centre. Over the years, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) has been working closely with the HKCMA in developing the debt market of Hong Kong. This co-operation has turned a new page last year with the establishment of the Hong Kong Treasury Markets Forum, or the TMF in short, on which the HKCMA is represented. As the Chairman of the TMF, I would like to take this opportunity to introduce how the TMF intends to work with the industry associations, including the HKCMA, to enhance the competitiveness of the treasury markets in Hong Kong. As some of you may already know, the TMF was set up in March 2004 by restructuring the previous Foreign Exchange and Money Market Practices Committee.

In the past year, the TMF also called on the financial regulatory bodies and financial institutions in Beijing and participated in a Financial Services Expo in Shanghai to promote the treasury markets in Hong Kong. In addition to the Mainland, the TMF maintains close contact with our overseas counterparts in the major financial centres, such as the foreign exchange committees in London and New York. The TMF will continue to arrange regular meetings and visits with our overseas counterparts to keep abreast of global developments and to exchange views on matters of mutual interest. Ladies and gentlemen, in less than a year since its establishment, the TMF, with the support from the industry and market practitioners, has made very impressive progress in its work. Looking ahead, with the numerous and valuable opportunities offered by the gradual opening up of the Mainland markets, it is up to all of us to try our best to seize such opportunities to ensure that Hong Kong will remain the hub for financial services and intermediation for Mainland China and the rest of the region. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 6/2005
As long as the banking system was – or at least appeared to be – sound, as central bankers we did not need to worry too much about what happened elsewhere in the financial system or the condition of the corporate sector or the structure of household balance sheets. But this is no longer true, if it ever was. I have already mentioned the role of the corporate sector in the Asian financial crises of a decade ago. The fact that it was the corporate sector rather than the banking sector that had assumed foreign exchange risk ultimately didn’t matter from the point of financial system stability. The effects were the same – or possibly were greater as the corporate sector was less well able to handle the risks than the banking sector might have been. From a macro prudential policy perspective this means that we must pay attention to conditions in the corporate sector and the soundness of corporate balance sheets. And given that so many banks in Asia have followed those in the rest of the world in looking to develop their consumer credit business, the condition of household finances is also important to understand from a financial system stability perspective. In addition, the experience of the last decade has also taught us that non-bank financial intermediaries matter for the soundness of financial systems. For example, there is plenty of evidence that insurance companies have been major sellers of credit derivatives. This passes credit risk from the banking system to the insurance sector.

In contrast to the balance sheets of the banking sectors in many other countries, Norwegian banks’ total assets are heavily dominated by loans to households and non-financial enterprises. One reason for that might be the lack of securitisation of loans. The work on regulations that will enable securitisation of loans is in progress. Loans to households alone constitute around 50 per cent of banks’ total assets. Loans to households have increased as a percentage of banks’ total assets, reflecting strong credit growth to households. Norwegian banks’ main source of financing is deposits from households and non-financial enterprises. Securities are the second largest source of financing. Assessment of financial stability in Norway In 2005, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prepared a thorough assessment of the financial system in Norway under the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) for Norway. The main conclusions were that the system appeared sound, well managed and competitive, and shorter-term vulnerabilities appeared low overall. Beyond the shorter term, rising household debt levels and associated house price inflation were the most important potential risk factors that needed to be watched. Let me add some observations on this last topic. Unlike many other countries, house purchases in Norway are mostly financed by loans from private banks at variable interest rates. Growth in credit to households has been high for a relatively long period, largely driven by rising house prices.
I will now turn to another aspect that is key to understanding the correct configuration of an independent authority: good governance. This is understood not only in terms of observing certain basic principles of public action (such as efficacy and effectiveness) or of impartiality and due diligence, but also of implementing procedures and collegiate decisions to ensure that the primary institutional course of action is to uphold the public interest. As I have already said, the Banco de España has collegiate bodies, such as the Governing Council and the Executive Board. These, along with the Governor and the Deputy Governor, make up its governing bodies. The fact that these collegiate bodies have broad powers in relation to the functions of the Bank and that a majority (six) of the members of the Governing Council are elected and have recognised competence in the field of economics, the financial system or the legal arena, reinforces the independence of our institution. 17  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52019XB0308(01)&from=EN  12  A further good governance practice is having a structure of committees to support the governing bodies. These are able to appropriately assess and address the various matters that fall within the organisation’s remit, ensuring an overall view and that all the relevant areas of the institution participate in the analysis of the issue concerned.

Mugur Isărescu: Introductory speech - CEPS Ideas Lab: Europe's Choice conference Introductory speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Ideas Lab - Europe's Choice conference, Brussels, 21 February 2019. * * * Chairman Almunia, First Vice President Timmermans, Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great privilege for me to attend the annual meetings of Centre for European Policy Studies, at a momentous time for the Union. Surely, the elections for the European Parliament are on my mind as well, but not exclusively. As the topic of this year’s meeting amply suggests, we, as EU citizens, need to make the right choices so that the future of the Union continues the project that has always fostered peace and economic reconstruction after the Second World War. It is the same project that has helped Central Eastern European countries “return to Europe” after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Centre for European Policy Studies is a great scene for discussing the huge challenges our Union is facing at the moment. It brings together high officials from EU institutions and national governments, academics and representatives of the civil society and business circles. I speak not only on behalf of the central bank of Romania, but also as a representative of a country that holds the rotating presidency of the EU Council. I trust that we will be able to fulfill our mandate and advance projects of substance for the Union.
I am sure that much the same view is held by my colleagues in the small group of countries — consisting of New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom — that formally introduced the regime at much the same time as Sweden in the early 1990s. Since then, more and more countries, including some of the emerging industrialised countries, have changed to a regime with an explicit inflation target. The other week it was announced that two of our Nordic neighbours, Norway and Iceland, are also to focus monetary policy on an inflation target. But we cannot settle down to a quiet life. Our thoughts about both the implementation of monetary policy and its analytical framework must be developed continuously. That is, indeed, an ongoing process at the Riksbank. Early in 1999, for instance, the Executive Board made some formal clarifications. It was noted that monetary policy should aim to fulfil the inflation target, expressed in terms of the consumer price index, one to two years ahead but that under certain specific circumstances there can be grounds for deviating from that aim. In some respects the clarification 1 amounted to a codification of what had been practised for a number of years . Today I shall be discussing how the Riksbank ought to react when the economy is exposed to structural changes of various types. Firstly, how should monetary policy handle price effects of deregulations. In that deregulations can lower the general price level, they may occasion a temporary dip in the rate of inflation.

Vittorio Corbo: Monetary policy under inflation targeting in Chile and around the world Speech by Mr Vittorio Corbo, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the ninth annual conference of the Central Bank of Chile, “Monetary policy under inflation targeting”, Santiago, 20 October 2005. *  *  *  Dear First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Dear Central Bank Governors, Dear Central Bank officials, professors and economists visiting from abroad, Dear friends, I am very pleased to welcome you to this Ninth Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile, which has become a traditional event in the discussion of central banking policies and for the economic development of our countries. This Annual Conference focuses on the subject “Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting,” the monetary system that is gradually being adopted in countries around the world. I am not surprised at the great participation of central bankers from inflation targeting economies in this Conference. Thank you so much for coming down. This year, our annual conference coincides with the eightieth anniversary of the creation of the Central Bank of Chile. The occasion calls for a brief retrospective account of our Bank, which will help to better understand its path to the present monetary policy framework in Chile. Next I will review some of the challenges facing monetary policy in Chile today, which motivate several of the topics that will be discussed during this conference, which I will also list shortly later on.
How quickly this reduction will feed through to consumer prices depends among other things on competitive conditions and margin setting. A change in the real interest rate will also influence demand in the economy. •  The real interest rate channel to aggregate demand  •  An increase in the real interest rate reduces demand, both for consumer and investment goods. It becomes relatively more attractive to save, and leads to a reduction in current consumption. Investors in their turn will face higher investment costs and will as a result reduce investment demand. •  The exchange rate channel to aggregate demand Strengthening the exchange rate means that domestically produced goods and services become relatively more expensive than competing foreign products. Demand for domestically produced goods is thus reduced. It is common to assume that the effects through the channels mentioned so far will come about within one year of a change in the interest rate. The direct exchange rate channel to inflation is probably the one that acts quickest. •  The demand channel to inflation The reduction in aggregate demand as a result of the rise in the interest rate will in turn slow the rise in prices. This is mainly due to two factors. First, output is reduced. The decline in output results in lower demand for labour. This reduces wage growth. Second, firms set lower prices as a result of lower demand. The impact on inflation is often assumed to come one to two years after the effect on aggregate demand.

The fact that economic mechanisms function in this way was pointed out in Report 29 (2000-2001) to the Storting from the Stoltenberg Government and in Annex 4 to Report 1(2001-2002)to the Storting from the Bondevik Government A deterioration in competitiveness can be caused by two factors: high wage growth, or a nominal appreciation of the krone. In isolation, an expansionary fiscal policy must lead to a tightening of monetary policy if the inflation target is to be attained. Without such a tightening, the labour market would be tighter, and competitiveness would deteriorate as a result of rising wage and price inflation. BIS Review 49/2002  9  In the debate, it has been stressed that the scaling back of manufacturing has come faster and with greater intensity than expected. But nor was wage growth expected to take the turn it did. Not this year, not last year, and not the year before that. Wage growth that is 15 per cent higher than other countries (from 1998 to 2003) is bound to have repercussions. The krone exchange rate has also appreciated. But the reaction in the foreign exchange market cannot be called an overreaction when wages have increased so much. The same forces that have driven up the krone, could bring it down if they were reversed. Competitiveness is the ability to pay high wages on the basis of high productivity. For a number of years, Norway has had high wage growth that has not been matched by equally high productivity growth.
The last condition points to the restricted use of interest rates for the purpose of bursting a bubble, since the level of interest rates has a bearing not only on decisions taken by entities directly engaged in the process of forming a bubble but in fact on all the entities operating in the economy. To evoke a vivid picture, the use of interest rates to this end may be compared to the use of an atomic weapon in the battlefield – for an atomic bomb makes no distinction between friend and foe. Donald Kohn’s conditions are not easy to meet. Therefore, the opinion now prevails that supervisory authorities must enhance their macroprudentail activities 5 . Consequently, one of the conclusions is to take recourse to supervisory instruments with a view to bearing on decisions of those market participants which are primarily responsible for bubble formation and report to supervisory authorities. By way of illustration, although the supervisory authorities do not interact with financial institutions which extended a large part of subprime loans or with arbitrage funds which purchased instruments backed on those loans, they continue to oversee the process of credit risk management and liquidity at banks. Banks played an important role in the process of spreading the crisis. as investors and providers of liquidity to companies – intermediaries in the sale of assets and companies investing in those assets, as well as by organizing the securitization of those assets. The role of good supervisory policies cannot be underestimated 6 .

£ character selection and Future Forum launch Remarks given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  Science Museum, London Friday 2 November 2018  I am grateful to Clare Macallan and Jennifer Nemeth for their assistance in drafting these remarks and to Lizzie Levett, Emma Sinclair and Toby Davies for providing background information. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  It is always a pleasure to visit the Science Museum. Its galleries and exhibitions showcase the rich history of human ingenuity in the sciences, technology, and medicine. You might think that the Bank of England has little in common with such lofty endeavours, but science spans all aspects of life, extending even to central banking. Within this Mathematics Gallery alone, there are multiple examples of where the worlds of central banking and science converge. Take the Moniac machine, which illustrates the circular flow of income around the economy using an assortment of pipes and coloured water. Or Babbage’s Analytical Engine, developed in collaboration with mathematician Ada Lovelace. This precursor to modern computers helped estimate mortality rates, techniques that are still central to underwriting life insurance policies today. The same life insurers that we regulate at the Bank of England. Among those who are supervising, modelling and policymaking, are the Bank’s very own scientists. Almost 10% of colleagues across the Bank have a science or maths degree and 1 in 10 of our graduates starting this year studied chemistry, biology or physics at university.
But it is also important to maintain the peer pressure that has been used to ensure that the member states observe the common rules. Arguing the case for adhering to these rules in a country’s internal debate is difficult if other member states lower their ambitions. BIS Review 76/1999  4  Policy interaction Economic policy in the euro area is accordingly formed in the interaction of the single monetary policy and what are primarily national fiscal and structural policies. If this interaction is to function properly, much is required of the parties involved in the way of clarity and a dialogue. The available structure for coordinating economic policies in the European Union consists of a network of different bodies and reports, with the ultimate purpose of arriving at a shared picture of the framework for economic policy. The forms for cooperation are being developed all the time and a number of new instruments have been introduced in recent years. A schedule has been established for the continuous exchange of information and views during the year between the member states, the Commission and other Community bodies, including the ECB. Reports on compliance with the guidelines for fiscal policy, employment and structural policy are submitted by each country for discussion and examination by the other member states, the Commission and the ECB.

Even if the development of inflation in one country may conceivably disturb the path for the union, that country cannot be required to tighten its fiscal policy as long as it complies with the Stability and Growth Pact. 5  BIS Review 76/1999  Secondly, at present there is thus no mechanism whereby a fiscal adjustment could be spread over the participating countries. This is also a problem because the implementation of the Pact indicates that there is a risk of this contributing to a procyclical budget policy. To date, the Pact’s surveillance process has focused on countries with a budget deficit close to the limit. There is nothing remarkable about that: this is where the problems are most apparent and the risk of failure — with problems for the credibility of the Pact as a whole — is most acute. But there is also the risk of the Pact having a procyclical effect. Countries that are close to the maximum deficit on account of weak activity are obliged to follow a restrictive line, while those with good activity and a surplus do not need to tighten their policies in this way. This problem has arisen because the Pact was actually constructed so that it only functions properly when all the member states have established the necessary margins. That is still not the case. For the euro area as a whole it would presumably be best in the present situation if the countries with high activity were to tighten their policies even more.