samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
GDP Quarterly percentage changes translated to annual rate, seasonally-adjusted data 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Note: Broken line is the Riksbank’s forecast. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  12  BIS Review 154/2008  Figure 9. Employed 1000s, seasonally-adjusted data 4700  4700 Sysselsatta 16-64 år  4600  4600  Sysselsatta 15-74 år  4500  4500  4400  4400  4300  4300  4200  4200  4100  4100 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Note: The squares are the Riksbank’s forecasts, 15-74 age group. The outcomes are quarterly data and the forecasts are annual averages. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 10.

In the USA it has fallen in three consecutive months and in the euro area it fell to 2.1 per cent in November. In Sweden, inflation fell to 4.0 per cent in October, but our assessment is that it has fallen significantly in November here too (see Figure 11). Inflation is high but is declining rapidly One of the issues that we have had to take note of during the year has been the considerable fluctuation in the prices of food and energy. One of the reasons that we increased the interest rate in the period up to the autumn was to prevent the price increases that started on the world market spreading to other areas via price-setting and wage formation. During the year, I have argued that it did not appear to be especially likely that short-term increases in the prices of food and energy would push up wages by leading to demands for compensation for the price increases. The slowdown in growth and the weakening of the labour market are factors that weighed against such a scenario. There are also three-year agreements on large sections of the labour market that regulate agreed pay increases and these do not contain, as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s and is still the case in some other countries, price development guarantees that provide automatic compensation for price increases.
Consistently, monetary policy had a strong reaction. The Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) was increased by 200 basis points in just four months, starting in June. By September 2008, before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Central Bank estimated that it would be necessary to increase the MPR further, even above market expectations. Monetary and fiscal policy during the crisis As in most of the world economies, financial tensions in Chile were severe after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Interest rates in both peso and dollar markets posted substantial increases in the most stressful times from mid-September to mid-October 2008 (Figure 4). The Central Bank acted quickly, providing peso and dollar liquidity facilities to the financial system to mitigate liquidity tensions, but also to ensure financing in foreign currency should foreign loans become scarce. Also, the foreign exchange reserves accumulation process was cancelled. Local money market conditions normalized rapidly, over a period of weeks. The additional liquidity facilities put in place were not used extensively by financial institutions, reflecting their sustained access to external markets. Beyond the stressful episodes in local money markets, the global confidence crisis that swept around the world was very important in Chile. The events of developed financial markets prompted a deep and widespread revision of investment and spending plans of businesses and households, bringing expenditure to a halt. Domestic demand and economic activity dropped significantly and lending standards tightened (figure 5). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The inflation outlook changed radically, and monetary policy reacted forcefully.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 1 World growth (*) (anual change, percent) 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15  80  84  88  92  96  00  04  15 12 9 6 3 0 -3 -6 -9 -12 -15  08  World at market exchange rate  Chile  (*) Gray area denotes forecast published in the December's Monetary Policy Report. For Chile, considers the midpoint of the projected growth range in 2011. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and IMF. Figure 2 Inflation indicators (annual change, percent) 12  12  9  9  6  6  3  3  0  0  -3  -3  06 CPI  07  08  CPIX  CPIX1  09  10  CPI excluding foodstuffs and energy  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 3 Inflation by components (annual change, percent) 60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0  -10  -10  -20  -20  -30  -30  -40  -40 05  06  Electricity  07 Fuels  08  09  Foodstuffs  10 CPI  CPIX1  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Bureau.
In contrast, reserve expansion associated with LSAPs has a more enduring effect as long as the assets remain in the SOMA portfolio, subject to offsetting influences on reserves from changes in other balance sheet items. 5  The authority for the Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserve balances held by depository institutions was granted by Congress prior to the crisis, in the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, with a planned effective date of October 2011. However, implementation was accelerated as part of the response to the financial crisis. The statute authorizes Federal Reserve Banks to pay interest on balances maintained to satisfy reserve balance requirements (required reserves) and on excess balances (excess reserves). 6  As noted earlier, the Board of Governors is responsible for setting the rate of interest on reserves. Since December 16, 2008, the interest rates on required reserve balances and excess reserve balances have both been ¼ percent, but the rates need not be the same. Although the interest rate on reserves represents an overnight rate, it is calculated and paid out on a lagged basis according to two-week reserves management maintenance periods. The payment is based on daily account balances and a weighted average of applicable overnight rates over the maintenance period. More information can be found in Regulation D.  7  The MEP provided additional monetary policy accommodation by increasing the duration of the SOMA portfolio, but unlike LSAP programs, on net it had a neutral effect on the level of reserves.

I will then discuss the implications of these changes for the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and for the eventual “normalization” of monetary policy when the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) believes it is appropriate to remove the extraordinary levels of monetary policy accommodation that it has provided. Finally, I will discuss some of the considerations that must be taken into account in normalizing monetary policy. As always, these are my views and do not necessarily reflect those of the New York Fed or the Federal Reserve System. The desk’s role in implementing monetary policy The Federal Reserve (the Fed) has a somewhat more complex organizational and governance structure than most other central banks around the world, so before discussing recent developments in the implementation of monetary policy, I’d like to take a moment to describe roles and responsibilities within the Federal Reserve System and where the Desk fits in. The statutory basis for U.S. monetary policy is found in the Federal Reserve Act, which was enacted just over 100 years ago.
Pay growth of UK workers moving jobs (“twisters”) has exceeded that of workers remaining in their position (“stickers”) by 4 percentage points since 1994 (Chart 13). When workers exercise the outside option of moving between jobs, this puts upward pressure on pay through two main channels. The direct, or arithmetic, effect arises from moving workers securing a pay rise and boosting the batting average for overall wage growth. More twisters means higher average pay. The indirect, or behavioural, effect arises when companies pay higher wages to existing staff, as well as new staff, to encourage them to stay rather than exercise their outside option. The threat of twisting can also boost pay. This flow-based model suggests a slightly different specification of the Phillips curve. The flow of workers, as well as the stock of unemployed, may matter for pay growth. Sure enough, if we replace the unemployment gap with measures of voluntary job-to-job flows, this provides a (statistically and economically) significant explanation of wage growth (Table 1). As with under-employment, in a statistical horse-race between the two measures the unemployment gap does slightly more of the donkey work. Flows between jobs also provide a useful framework through which to explain recent pay developments. Chart 14 plots voluntary job-to-job flows in the UK recently. The global financial crisis raised unemployment and job insecurity.

Mr Chairman, I am informed that one of the notable projects being undertaken collaboratively is on ICT Governance implementation within the central banks using the Control Objectives for Information and related Technologies (COBIT) framework. BIS Review 42/2008  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, you will be delighted to learn that just last week a number of board members from central banks in Africa and across the world converged here in Livingstone to discuss the subject “Trends in Central Bank Governance”. Indeed good corporate governance is generally acknowledged as important in economic management and therefore, the role that ICT Governance plays, in this regard, can not be over emphasized. I am also informed that this conference will discuss some of the solutions available for implementing Business Continuity Planning (BCP) and the progress so far made in this regard. Indeed business continuity planning and management for ICT resources is critical to the operations of our Central Banks. The level of investment and dependence on ICT services is significant and few organizations could operate for long today without these resources. I therefore urge you to critically review this area that is equally important to the implementation of good corporate governance. Mr Chairman, allow me also to talk about financial inclusion or access to finance for all. Ladies and Gentlemen, as you are aware most of our rural areas are mostly unbanked due to infrastructural obstacles.
It has been used, for example, to explain and sometimes justify rapidly rising share prices for companies in the domain of information technology, known for short as IT companies. It has also featured, however, in the view that the economic laws under which we live have ceased to apply, leaving our economies in a state of bliss. Constantly accelerating productivity growth should lead to an unending boom, so that we central bank governors can sit back and stop worrying about the tensions that strong growth usually generates between supply and demand, with the risk of rising inflation. Reality, however, does not seem to have kept pace with these notions. Share prices for IT companies have fallen steeply. In the course of last year the average value of the Nasdaq exchange, perhaps the prime indicator of the aggregate value of international IT companies, was almost halved. IT shares have also fallen markedly on the Stockholm exchange as well as elsewhere. Moreover, a number of new companies in this sector have collapsed. Developments in the U.S. economy are a reminder that time-honoured relationships do still apply, even in a phase of rapid transformation with major technical innovations. An economy that is expanding rapidly will ultimately generate imbalances and rising prices. That was why the Federal Reserve had to tighten the monetary stance so that the high growth in the United States would be subdued. My attitude to talk about a ‘new economy’ or a ‘new economic era’ has been sceptical for a number of reasons.

It is key for this framework to be rigorously applied, including in terms of the indicators used, in order to consolidate the effectiveness of this new procedure to assess in particular euro area Member States experiencing sustained losses of competitiveness and large current account deficits. The focus needs to be on the prevention of situations creating risks to economic, budgetary and financial stability in the euro area. In addition, this macroeconomic surveillance procedure should rely on transparent and effective trigger mechanisms. Conclusions Let me conclude with three key messages to policy makers – in advanced and emerging market economies alike – who all have a role to play to address the challenges that are ahead of us. First, what has already been decided has to be implemented expeditiously, comprehensively and fully. This requires resolve and fortitude on the part of the public authorities, but also lucidity on the part of the private sector. Second, there can be no complacency as regards the unfinished part of our reform agenda for a stronger international financial architecture. And I cannot help saying that on top of what is clearly identified by the international community as the urgent issues under discussion in the Financial Stability Board and the G20, we are far from understanding the potential global systemic instability that is associated today with the sheer size of the non-banking sector which experienced an exponential growth over the last 20 years.
19 Đ Đ To support technological adoption and innovation in the financial sector, MAS introduced the FinTech Regulatory Sandbox.Đ The sandbox is also a regulatory innovation for MAS, where we support financial institutions and fintech players to experiment with innovative financial products or services in a live environment, within well-defined boundaries.Đ Upon successful experimentation and exit of the sandbox, entities will then have to comply fully with the relevant regulatory requirements. 20 Đ Đ The sandbox has been well received.Đ Since its launch three years ago, MAS has provided guidance to more than 250 firms, and received more than 60 applications to experiment in the sandbox. iSTOX, a private market platform  leveraging on DLT and owering the trading of tokenised private securities, is the first market operator to enter MAS’ sandbox. 21 Đ Đ The approach that we have adopted requires an extensive review of each application. This is necessary as each sandbox is customised to facilitate meaningful experiments, with appropriate safeguards to contain the consequences of failure. We have learnt along the way that for certain types of activities regulated by MAS, risks can be well managed within certain specific boundaries. Hence, we launched an enhanced version of the regulatory sandbox, Sandbox Express, to complement the current sandbox approach, in August this year. For a start, we have owered three activities under Sandbox Express, including the activity of establishing or operating an organised market, which may be of interest to WFE members.

Likewise, cheques declined at a faster pace of 9.8% or 10 million cheques for the first half of 2014 compared to 2% or 2 million cheques for the same period last year. While the data suggests some improvements, more need to be done. A particular area that requires huge efforts is the distortions in the debit card usage in Malaysia. Despite a seemingly high debit card penetration of about 19.2 million “active” debit cards in contrast with 5.5 million “active” credit cards, the per capita debit card transaction is only 1.7 compared to 11.3 for credit card in 2013, indicating a ratio of 1 debit card transaction to about 6 credit card transactions. Acquirers charge merchants the same merchant discount rate (MDR) for the acceptance of debit and credit cards despite their differing cost structure, which makes debit cards just as expensive as credit cards. It is difficult to comprehend the charges imposed on debit cards, which have ready cash in them, is similar to the charges on credit cards. There has also been a slowdown in the growth rate of POS terminals in Malaysia since 2012, which indicates a potential saturation of POS terminals at those merchants who can afford the MDR. This is further compounded by increases in interchange fees which are likely to cause the MDR to be raised to even higher levels on a system-wide basis, thus hindering the wider expansion of the POS network and depriving society from the convenience of using costeffective payment cards.
And this is an important element to keep the Code relevant over time. Over the past year, the GFXC has also consulted on a particular aspect of Principle 17 on “last look”. Through that consultation process, the Code has been updated. Feedback from market participants has indicated that the consultation process in place is an appropriate one to update the Code going forward. It has also been heartening to hear feedback from many FXCs at the recent GFXC meeting that the Code is “fit for purpose”. There is also general acknowledgement that the Code provides a credible platform to further strengthen good practices and market behaviour. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  9 Having looked back on our achievements over the past year, the GFXC is committed to build on the momentum to further promote the Code. 10 I will share briefly on the GFXC’s key priorities in the year ahead. FX Global Code: Looking Forward 11 First, to step up outreach efforts to the buy side. To those in the audience from the buy-side, you are important participants in the global FX market whom we will engage further. The Code is intended to promote a more transparent, liquid, fair and sustainable FX market for all FX market participants. It is not a Code for the sell-side only, nor is it for only select groups of the market. It is single Code that has relevance to all who have a stake in the global FX market.

While we have seen about 420 Statements on the Global Index, only a small number are from buy-side market participants. At the global level, there is acknowledgement that more can be done to demonstrate to the buy-side community the benefits of the Code, and to articulate more clearly the benefits of adherence. For example, the Code helps the buy-side understand the practices that your counterparties abide by, and helps to inform what you should expect from the relationship, and in turn, who you may want to transact with. The Code also provides a useful opportunity for the buy-side to benchmark your internal processes against global standards of best practices. The GFXC has launched a group that will focus on buy-side outreach to create greater awareness and adoption of the Code. This will not be an effort bound by time, but will be a journey and one which we are committed to. In Singapore, we have seen strong support from buy-side associations and we will continue to encourage Singapore-based buy-side market participants to issue Statements to demonstrate adherence. 12 Second, to continue the existing work on cover and deal which arose in response to the feedback received from the consultation on “last look” practices, and to strengthen FX disclosures. On this front, further work will be done to understand the role that disclosures play in informing market participants how their trade requests are handled in ‘cover and deal’ arrangements.
Central banks consider it important to understand why the Phillips curve has become flatter as this has implications for monetary policy and its impact. If the flatter Phillips curve is due to exogenous changes in, for instance, productivity, this need not reflect a change in the behaviour of households and companies. The possibilities to steer inflation thus need not have deteriorated. Monetary policy affects demand and resource utilisation through many different channels. Unemployment is one channel, but labour force participation, employment, and job vacancies are some examples of other channels through which monetary policy can have an impact. However, if it were the case that the flatter Phillips curve is based on a change in the behaviour of households or companies, for instance, that companies set prices in a different way than before, this could mean that the impact of monetary policy also changes. 17 It is thus not sufficient to observe that the slope of the Phillips curve has changed to draw any conclusions for monetary policy, one must also have an idea of why the slope has changed. A lot of things work well in the labour market – but not everything Economic prospects in Sweden are currently bright. Growth is good, at the same time as employment and labour market participation are rising. The labour market appears to be functioning fairly well, with declining unemployment. Compared with the rest of Europe, things are looking good in several respects.

Employment rate and unemployment in Sweden and Europe (a) Employment rate  70  65  65  60  60  55  55  50  Euro area Sweden 05  07  09  11  13  15  (b) Unemployment  70 15  50  17  15  12  12  9  9  6  6  3 0  Nordic countries Germany Sweden 05  07  09  3  United Kingdom Euro area 11  13  15  0  17  Note. Per cent of population and labour force respectively, aged 15-74 years. Source: Eurostat  Figure 8. Unemployment in Sweden among those born in Sweden and those born abroad and unemployment among those born abroad in Sweden and Europe  20  (a) Unemployment in Sweden among Sweden born and those born abroad  (b) Unemployment among those born abroad in Sweden and in Europe  20 20  20  16  16 16  16  12  12 12  12  8  8  8  8  4  4  4  0  0  0  Swedish born Foreign born  05  07  09  11  13  15  17  Nordic countries Germany Sweden 05  07  09  4  United Kingdom Euro area 11  13  15  17  0  Note.