samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Lars Heikensten: Monetary policy and wage formation in Sweden  Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU), in Stockholm, on 5 May 2000. *  *  *  Let me start by thanking you for inviting me to this seminar. Few things are more important for the Swedish economy today than to ensure that we have a well-functioning wage formation system and labour market. In my introductory speech today I will discuss four issues. First, I will present the argument for adopting price stability as the Riksbank’s chief objective and say some words about the Swedish debate on this matter. Then I will comment on developments during the last decade, when we abandoned the high-inflation policy of the 1970s and 1980s. My third subject will be the current monetary policy situation and the choices that we now have to make. Lastly, I will comment briefly on wage formation and the labour market in the light of this situation. Discussion of the price stability objective In the early 1990s, there was a shift in Sweden’s economic policy towards establishment of a low-inflation regime. A few years later, price stability was established as the objective of monetary policy. This change was the result of a realization among policymakers that the policy of high inflation and recurring devaluations that had been pursued in recent decades had failed.

Jarle Bergo: Cyclical developments and monetary policy Speech by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at Regional network, Region East, Oslo, 10 November 2004. The text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 3 November, Inflation Report 3/04 and on previous speeches. The references and the  Charts in pdf-format can also be found on the website of the Norges Bank. * * * Price stability, in the sense of low and stable inflation, is the objective of monetary policy in a number of countries. Historically, the experience of Norway and other countries is that high inflation has resulted in unstable output and employment. In addition, a fall in the price level will often occur in tandem with a downturn. The first inflation target was introduced in New Zealand in 1990. Canada followed in 1991, the UK in 1992, and Sweden and Australia in 1993. A number of other countries have followed suit. In Norway, the Government issued a regulation introducing an inflation target in 2001. Monetary policy in euro area countries and Switzerland is also aimed at price stability, even though this is not referred to as inflation targeting in these countries. Inflation targeting has proved to be particularly appropriate in very open, small and medium-sized economies.
Bailey, Andrew, Jonathan Bridges, Richard Harrison, Josh Jones and Aakash Mankodi (2020), “The central bank balance sheet as a policy tool: past, present and future”, paper prepared for the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium, August, Bank of England. Bernanke, Ben (2020), “The New Tools of Monetary Policy”, American Economic Association Presidential Address, 4 January. Brunnermeier, Markus and Yann Koby (2018), “The reversal interest rate”, NBER working papers no. 25406, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA. CGFS (2019), “Unconventional monetary policy tools: a cross-country analysis”, report from working group, Committee on the Global Financial System, BIS, October. ECB (2020), “Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 April 2020 on reform of Sveriges Riksbank (CON/2020/13)”. Gertler, Mark and Peter Karadi (2013), “QE1 vs. 2 vs. 3…: A framework for analyzing large-scale asset-purchases as monetary policy toll”, International Journal of Central Banking, January. Hansson, Jesper, Marianne Nessén and Anders Vredin (2018), “The storm after the calm – Lessons for monetary policy analysis”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review no. 4, Sveriges Riksbank. IMF (2020), “Technical assistance report - Proposed amendments to the Riksbank Act”, IMF Country Report no. 20/239, August. Ingves, Stefan (2019), “Long-term trends - important pieces of the monetary policy analysis”, speech, Swedish Economics Association, 7 May. Ingves, Stefan (2020), “The monetary policy toolbox”, speech at the Swedish Economics Association, 10 June. Lundvall, Henrik (2020) “What is driving the global trend towards lower real interest rates?”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review no. 1, Sveriges Riksbank.

Rajan, Raghuram (2005), “Has financial development made the world riskier?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium at Jackson Hole. Rogoff, Ken (2020), “The case for deeply negative interest rates”, available at https://think.ing.com/opinions/the-case-for-deeply-negative-interest-rates. Sveriges Riksbank (2020), “Consultation response, SOU 2019:46”. 13 [13]
The rate of price increases for services has diminished in recent years and currently stands at roughly 2 per cent. So this does not appear at first sight to be a contributory factor to the low CPI inflation. It is important to remember, though, that productivity growth in the services sector is normally assumed to be somewhat lower than in the goods sector. Given an inflation target of 2 per cent, therefore, services prices should, on average, be increasing slightly more than 2 per cent and goods prices by somewhat less. With the exception of short periods this has also been the case since 1995, as services prices have risen on average by 2.5 per cent and goods prices by 0.6 per cent. So, developments in services prices have also contributed, at least in the most recent period, to the low inflation. The chief remaining explanation for the low CPI inflation appears, however, to be found in the developments in goods prices. Falling goods prices contributing to the low inflation When it comes to goods prices it is natural to distinguish between price developments for domestically produced goods and goods that are imported from other countries. Prices of imported consumer goods have dropped since the middle of 2003. But inflation for domestically produced goods has also been low, with prices even falling during the second half of last year (Chart 3). Consumer prices for both domestically produced and imported goods depend on many factors, e.g.

There has been steady expansion all along, but especially since EU membership. 31 new licences for financial services operators were issued during 2004, 93 in 2005 and a further 61 up to June of this year. Membership of the EU is contributing to this growth also as a result of the adoption of the single passport regulations and the right to provide cross-border services. There are 99 institutions with passporting rights in Malta today, and two Maltese credit institutions have passporting rights in the EU. The banking sector is composed of 18 banks, of which 6 are domestic and 12 foreign controlled. The combined balance sheet of the domestic banks has grown by an average annual rate of 7% in the past two-an-a-half years and their assets to GDP ratio, at 280%, is comparable to the average for the euro area. For the entire banking system, this ratio is closer to 750%. In the area of investment services, there are currently 21 professional investment funds targeting institutional investors and high net worth customers, and 66 sub-funds, with a total net asset value of Lm1.22 billion. The number of local collective investment schemes (CISs) stands at 14, with 52 sub-funds, and shareholders’ funds total over Lm0.5 billion. The insurance sector has also been growing rapidly of late, with four new licences being issued during the first half of 2006. To date, there are 33 insurance principals registered in Malta, 16 of them are foreign companies offering their services through insurance agents.
With respect to communication, in recent years the Federal Reserve has shifted towards much greater transparency. This includes quarterly press conferences by the Fed chair following FOMC meetings; publishing growth, inflation and short-term interest rate forecasts of FOMC participants on a quarterly basis; and a concerted effort to lay out the guideposts that the FOMC will look at in assessing progress towards our dual mandate objectives. On the communication front, although we have come a long way, I would admit that there is still room for further improvement. For example, the focus of the SEP on the each participant’s modal forecast does not convey how much uncertainty there is about the economic outlook. Similarly, language used in FOMC statements can become stale over time. We tend to make relatively few changes to the statement language each meeting because of the acute market sensitivity to such changes. One could argue that this might not be the best practice to follow, but we should recognize that there would also be significant transition costs if we were to make more extensive revisions to the statement at each meeting. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  For monetary policy to be effective, it is important to have clarity about what the FOMC can be clear and consistent about – its manner of responses to mitigate the potential harmful effects of disturbances and the goals of policy. In contrast, our monetary policy projections and the actions we take cannot be static.

2  4  Of course, if the economy were to weaken, we still have plenty of tools. Not only could we cut short-term interest rates, but we also could extend the maturity of our Treasury and agency MBS portfolio, purchase additional Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities and engage in forward guidance with respect to the future path of short-term interest rates. BIS central bankers’ speeches  It’s a two-way street The U.S. economy plays a large role in the global economy. Most significantly, the U.S. economy represents a sizable share of world GDP – roughly 25 percent at current exchange rates – and the U.S. dollar is the most important international reserve currency. More than 60 percent of central bank reserve assets are denominated in dollars, and that share has been stable to rising in recent years. Most foreign trade is denominated in dollars and most of the foreign currency debt issued by corporations abroad is denominated in dollars. Thus, what happens to the U.S. economy, U.S. financial asset prices and the exchange value of the dollar has important implications for the global economy. At the same time, prosperity is very much a two-way street. Developments outside the United States affect our domestic economic outlook through their impact on trade and financial market conditions, and we have to take such developments into consideration in our monetary policy decision-making. In many ways, international linkages have become more important over time.
BIS Review 44/2003  3  demographics and the pressure this will inevitably exert on our social services and programs, such a shortfall in growth can have debilitating longer-term consequences. (see annex for graph 3) With the post-bubble collapse in the equity markets, a heated political debate has emerged in Switzerland as well as in many other countries about the sustainability of our retirement and social welfare programs. Ideas, concepts and frameworks are being discussed by politicians and frequently commented upon by the media. The fact that these difficult long-term problems which lie at the heart of our social contract are being openly debated is a welcome development. However, short of reneging on promises that are deeply embedded in our cultural and social fabric, the most meaningful way to address these problems in the decades to come is to invigorate our economic growth performance. The challenge for our politicians is a formidable one. The political interests that defend the legislative hurdles which distort the domestic sector of our economy and thus undermine our growth potential are deeply entrenched. Never does this become more obvious than during a parliamentary electoral campaign. Admittedly, painful short-term adjustment problems might emerge once the reform process is initiated. Accelerating productivity growth rates can – in the short term – lead to a further reduction in employment as uncompetitive industries are compelled to restructure. In the longer-term, however, a rise in productivity is unquestionably beneficial. Ultimately, it will lead to higher growth rates.

In return, the p2p lenders will refer borrowers who have completed two successful rounds of fund raising to DBS for larger commercial loans and other financial solutions such as cash management. The road to financial inclusion is neither short nor easy. But it is an important one. Broadening access to financial services will offer Asian banks – and FinTechs – the opportunity to grow their business while serving a social purpose. Financial inclusion will be a key priority in the economic co-operation agenda when Singapore assumes the chairmanship of ASEAN next year. Conclusion You will be discussing many of these issues in the days ahead. I look forward to hearing your insights. It leaves me now to hand over to John Williams for his keynote address. He will speak on US monetary policy – a subject of evergreen interest to the financial industry and central banks around the world. I look out for John’s speeches not so much for clues to what the Fed might do next – though that is of course of great interest too – but for the original insights John provides on some of the deep, conceptual issues in monetary policy. John has made thought-provoking contributions in areas such as the natural rate of interest, or r*, and nominal GDP or price level targeting for monetary policy. It is my pleasure now to invite John to share with us his insights on how we should view monetary policy in a changing world.
Such measures would enhance our risk awareness, thus enhancing the monetary policy effectiveness of asset purchases, and it will be an effective way of addressing climate change by greening the financial system. As long as central banks lead by example and become early adopters of what we are also asking the rest of the financial sector to do in terms of disclosing, measuring and managing climate risks, this course of action may lead to changes in the composition of our monetary policy portfolios and, eventually, to deviations from current market benchmarks. But if central banks and financial regulators succeed in our endeavour to spread this climate-risk management culture we are embracing, then any deviation should be temporary in nature as the whole market should follow suit. To conclude, we, central bankers and financial regulatory and supervisory authorities, within our mandates of guaranteeing price and/or financial stability, can and should actively contribute to global action to fight against climate change. Thank you and I am ready to answer your questions. 6

I would only like to mention, as an example of fruitful co-operation, that the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), set up last year as a follow-up to the Lamfalussy report, recently embarked with the European System of Central Banks on considering standards to be applied to the European securities settlement and clearing systems. In the field of financial regulation and supervision, the Council of Economic and Finance ministers (ECOFIN) had mandated, last May, the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) to make proposals concerning the structures for financial regulation supervision and stability at the European level. The framework currently under consideration has the objective of extending the arrangements that are already in place for securities regulation to the other financial sectors, based on existing interinstitutional agreements. Of course, the sectoral specificities are recognized, and especially those of the banking sector, through the appropriate participation of all national central banks in the arrangements concerning the banking supervision. Indeed, one of the statutory tasks of the Eurosystem is to contribute to the smooth conduct of prudential supervision policies and the stability of the financial system. I am therefore convinced that the involvement of central banks in this issue is absolutely crucial. Economic reform is an ongoing process in Europe, in view of the considerable efforts that still have to be made in order to promote sustainable growth and enduring job creation. At the same time, the European Union has to face another important challenge in the near future : the enlargement process. 2.
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Beyond borders – bridging new horizons in Asia Pacific Speech by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 5th Malaysia Insurance Summit “Beyond Borders: Bridging New Horizons in Asia Pacific”, Kuala Lumpur, 7 October 2015. *  *  *  I am delighted to join you today at the 2015 Malaysia Insurance Summit themed “Beyond Borders: Bridging New Horizons in Asia Pacific”. I understand that this is the fifth year the Malaysian Insurance Institute has organised this event which brings together insurance and takaful professionals from around the region and beyond to discuss key developments in the industry. Prospects of the Asia Pacific region The world is undergoing rapid structural changes amidst a rapidly evolving Asia Pacific as an important centre of growth. The International Monetary Fund has projected a growth of 5.6 per cent for the Asia and Pacific region in 2015 and 5.5 per cent in 2016, with the region expected to remain the global growth leader over the medium term. Growth is primarily driven by domestic demand of Asia’s 4.3 billion inhabitants who account for 60 per cent of the world’s population. The region is also expected to be the strong driver of world insurance growth, with its share of the global insurance market likely to rise to 40 per cent in the next five years.

In the medium term, the region is expected to benefit from the deeper regional financial integration agreed by the leaders of ASEAN and recently reported concluding of TPP negotiation. These agreements would result in a more efficient allocation of regional savings to meet the region’s large investment needs which will support growth and consequently financial well-being and soundness. The improved income arising from the economic developments will spur greater demand for insurance services in the region and present immense growth opportunities for the insurance and takaful industry. The Asia Pacific region offers high growth prospects over the long term underpinned by potential demand arising from structural changes and evolving risk exposure. This will have the implication of increasing wealth and shifting preferences, but challenged by a rapidly ageing population and frequent incidences of catastrophic events. First, increasing wealth and shifting preferences in Asia Pacific Rising incomes have increased the spending power and affluence of consumers in Asia Pacific. GDP per capita for the region reached 15,242 US dollars as at end-2013, well above the world average of 10,613 US dollars for the same period. Reflecting higher standards of living and enhanced purchasing power, demand for insurance products in the region has evolved to encompass a broader range of protection and investment solutions that are more responsive to differing risk and return preferences. This has also been Malaysia’s experience, with the significant growth of investment-linked insurance premiums over the last decade alone.
It is not yet possible to tell to what extent the U.S. economy will experience a lengthy, more difficult process of adjustment. That is probably the background to how the Federal Reserve has acted in recent years. A series of interest rate hikes during 1999 and 2000 were presumably intended to restrain the euphoria and excessive expansion. When a downturn then became evident, it seemed  2  BIS Review 26/2001  desirable to try to limit the mood swing by means of the marked interest rate cuts we have seen this year. It is precisely the Federal Reserve’s vigorous action that underlies certain analysts’ view that the current economic slowdown will be fairly mild and brief. If international activity were to move into a recovery, most things suggest that demand in the Swedish economy would start rising rapidly again. The earlier capacity restrictions would then return to the agenda, with the attendant risk of an accelerating rate of inflation. So the situation is difficult to assess and I grant that the judgements our Executive Board has had to make in connection with the present Inflation Report have been more difficult than usual. While the difficulty in predicting the future is admittedly a truism, the present international economic situation is perhaps the trickiest for a decade. Growth with a balanced picture of inflation The main scenario we have adopted in the Inflation Report envisages weaker real economic activity in the rest of the world, with the slowdown in the United States in the foreground.

This picture of the real economy in the main scenario gives a relatively stable development of inflation around the 2 per cent target in the years ahead, both in terms of the consumer price index and of indexes of underlying inflation. The risks surrounding the main scenario are chiefly concentrated to two alternative scenarios that point in different directions. One alternative scenario has to do, of course, with the risk of a deeper global economic slowdown with further stock-market falls. The Swedish economy would be affected via lower export market growth and more subdued demand from households and firms. That would keep inflationary pressure in Sweden down compared with the main scenario. However, the downside risk for inflation in Sweden would be somewhat limited in that the exchange rate would remain weak as a consequence of the lower international activity and concern about its effects on the Swedish economy. The other alternative scenario concerns a risk of higher domestic inflation. The current round of wage negotiations is still in progress and several of the signals in this respect are not encouraging. If the remaining settlements were to be above the levels that have been agreed to date, inflationary pressure may grow, both as a direct result of the high outcomes and indirectly through a greater risk of compensatory wage drift. It is also conceivable that productivity growth will be lower than assumed in the main scenario, leading to rising pressure from costs.