samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Part of this vision is enshrined in the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) for 2006-2010, whose broad macroeconomic objectives are as follows: •  to accelerate pro-poor economic growth;  •  to reduce further and stabilise inflation; and  •  to sustain a viable balance of payments as well as external and domestic debt position. Could you now tell us about the Information Dissemination Programme? As mentioned in my introductory remarks, the Information Dissemination Programme is part of our strategy to inform the general public on the role of Bank of Zambia in the economy. The other channels through which the Bank shares information with the general public are through: •  Regular meetings with players in the financial sector, e.g. banks and other 1non-bank financial institutions;  •  Seminars for the media;  •  Seminars with senior policy makers, such as Members of Parliament;  •  Various publications, such as the Statistics Fortnightly, Quarterly Financial and Statistical report, Monetary Policy Statement and Annual report; and  •  Bank of Zambia website, among others.

Yves Mersch: Post-trade harmonisation and financial market integration in Europe Closing remarks by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the conference “Post-trade harmonisation and the integration of financial markets: a joint effort”, organised by the European Central Bank and the European Commission, Frankfurt am Main, 19 March 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, We have come to the end of today’s very intense programme. I now have the pleasure of sharing with you some thoughts on the main messages that have emerged in the course of today. Financial integration remains at the core of the European agenda. For the future of Europe, it is important that the Single Market project is taken forward with the full determination of all of us, even in times of difficulty. As President Mario Draghi remarked this morning, “in times of severe economic challenges, it is particularly important that our commitment to achieve a truly single European market is reaffirmed”. From the Eurosystem’s perspective, financial integration is of great importance. First, it is vital for the single monetary policy of the euro area: monetary policy is implemented through the financial system, which has to be as efficient as possible in order to guarantee a smooth and effective transmission of monetary policy impulses. A highly integrated financial system ensures that impulses diffuse homogeneously across the whole euro area. Second, financial integration has implications for the stability of markets. Integration results in increasing interconnections and cross-border activity.
In FY22/23, the US Federal Reserve raised the target range for its policy rate by a total of 4.5% points. Singapore Dollar interest rates also increased sharply. The Singapore Overnight Rate Average (SORA) rose by 3% points during this period. MAS could not have avoided this interest expense. Doing so would have undermined exchange rate policy and domestic market functioning. If MAS had not intervened in the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate would have appreciated even more, and this would have severely hurt the export sector and economic growth. If MAS had not mopped up the excess liquidity created by this intervention, the market mechanism for determining interest rates and allocating capital would have broken down. This in turn would have created financial vulnerabilities such as excessive credit growth and inflated asset prices. The negative currency translation effects and interest expenses reflect the consequential cost of carrying out MAS' function as a central bank – which is to conduct monetary policy conducive to sustained non-inflationary economic growth. The relevant measure of MAS' financial performance is not currency translation effects or interest expenses but how well its investments have done. MAS made a small gain of $ billion on its investment portfolio amidst a depressed market environment. Last year was an unusual year for financial markets, with both equity and bond markets performing poorly. The rapid increase in policy rates by global central banks, elevated inflation and slowing economic growth adversely affected both bond and equity prices.

In the 11 FYs since the last recapitalisation, MAS returned a total of $ billion to the Government, more than two times the amount of the latest increase in capital. In sum, the $ billion net loss is not cause for concern though the investment performance bears close watching. The loss does not impair MAS' ability to carry out its functions. More importantly, it does not change how we will conduct monetary policy. The loss does not result in a draw on MAS' past reserves. The OFR position remains healthy even after MAS transferred $ billion of excess OFR to the Government. But the investment performance is likely to remain weak amid a challenging macroeconomic and financial market environment. A return to profitability and ability to contribute again to the Government's Consolidated Fund will take some time. HOW IS MAS HARNESSING THE BENEFITS AND ADDRESSING THE RISKS OF WEALTH INFLOWS? I will now move on to the topic of wealth flows into Singapore. This issue has attracted much media and public interest. MAS has focused on harnessing the benefits of these wealth inflows while addressing their risks. But before explaining how we do this, let  9/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  me try to set the wealth inflows in context. First, as a trusted, vibrant, and well-regulated international financial centre, Singapore has attracted large inflows of wealth to be managed here. Assets under management (AUM) have grown an annual average of 15% during 2017 to 2021.
In this regard, private sector’s improvement in technology and innovations, in tandem with other infrastructure development, can become a tailwind to support the GMS to overcome technology stagnation and provide a competitive edge to the private sector. This should also enhance the intra- regional trade and investment capabilities. 13. Last but not least, financial system can act as a blood-vein that nurtures the economy. We might not realize the necessity of having a healthy blood- vein system in our body. But if there is a blockage, one could experience a detrimental malfunction of the brain, and stroke may occur. The same applies to our economy; efficient and accessible financial system will ensure smooth and solid transformation of the economy. At this juncture, financial institutions are a key in keeping the efficacy and health of the financial system in check. On one hand, financial prudence through enhanced risk supervision and management will provide a strong backdrop for improvement in financial system. On the other hand, the favorable financial system should also be underpinned by financial inclusion, which is analogous to having the blood-vein reaches all organs in our bodies. As I previously pointed out, increasing access to financial services will bolster economic dynamism where vast financial opportunities can be better tapped by private sectors. Ladies and gentlemen, 14. To end my remarks today, allow me to reiterate that these key enablers will be necessary to support the areas of transformation for the GMS.

On the third elements, rapid pace of globalization and change in global trade pattern have raised challenges to our economies and thus, shed lights on the necessity to improve the efficiency of regional production processes. Thus far, many industries in the GMS have stepped up their efforts to move up the value chains of production as well as integrate into regional supply clusters to better utilize the abundant resources. Nowadays, the GMS has shifted its focus from primary products to intermediate and final goods through the employment of advanced technology and high-skilled labour. This allows the GMS to continually expand the production capacity and speed up innovations that would foster the long-term regional economic growth going forward. Ladies and Gentlemen: 10. This journey of transformation is not a bed of roses and it could take some times to bear fruits. Yet, there are opportunities to be seized in pursuit of long-term sustainable development. With promising prospects await, what I expect to see in a very fast-approaching future is the interplay between different facets of development to strengthen the health of the economy and keep it well in balance. These recipes may sound familiar, if not already overheard. The key enablers that I view important to warrant the GMS’s smooth transformation towards strong growth foundation mentioned above include (1) infrastructure (2) in-house technological advancement and (3) sound financial system. 11.
In particular, we support expanding the scope of the resolution framework to ensure that the failure of small and medium-sized banks can be addressed in a more effective and harmonised way. At the same time, ensuring adequate resolution funding is critical to make resolution feasible for smaller banks. This includes using deposit guarantee schemes to help unlock access to the Single Resolution Fund and introducing a single-tier depositor preference. The proposals form a coherent package which must be preserved in its entirety. We call on the co-legislators to adopt it swiftly, preferably during the current institutional cycle. The events of this spring have demonstrated the need for effective and agile crisis management frameworks for banks of all sizes. To complete the crisis management toolkit for large banks in the EU, we also need to make progress in other areas, such as liquidity in resolution and a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. The missing third pillar of banking union The large gap in our institutional framework is still the missing third pillar: the European deposit insurance scheme. As long as deposit insurance remains at the national level, the sovereign-bank nexus will continue to be a source of fragmentation in the banking union, as the level of confidence in the safety of bank deposits may differ across Member States. In a crisis, we run the risk of deposit outflows towards other Member States and non-banks, thereby exacerbating systemic liquidity stress.

An incomplete banking union is a key vulnerability for the EU banking sector and hampers progress towards greater financial system integration. Furthermore, as firms broaden their funding sources and diversify away from bank loans, there needs to be a greater focus on financing through marketable debt securities and equity instruments. This lies at the heart of the capital markets union (CMU) project. Implications for the capital markets union Completing the CMU is essential for three reasons. First, the CMU strengthens the resilience of the euro area economy through private risk-sharing. Deep and integrated capital markets provide opportunities for effective risk-sharing. This is essential for financing the real economy and limiting fluctuations in economic activity. However, recent ECB analysis  shows that, while euro area capital market integration has improved over the last 20 years, it remains rather modest. [4] We must also consider the challenges posed by climate change in the coming years. Enhancing the risksharing potential of capital markets will help to further improve the ability of the EU financial system to sustain investment flows during climate-related shocks. This will bolster the EU’s overall resilience to increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, which typically hit regions asymmetrically. Second, further developing EU capital markets boosts innovation, supports long-term growth and enables continued financing of the green transition. This is of paramount importance as the EU navigates rapid technological change and is faced with an increasingly challenging geopolitical environment.
The third aspect of surveillance work - crisis management - has to do with the possibility that the state needs to act to prevent a crisis from jeopardising system stability. In order to manage a crisis, the state  2  BIS Review 53/2003  must be able to judge what the consequences will be if a distressed institution were to fail and, if these consequences are likely to be serious, what measures can be taken to mitigate them. The solution in some cases may be to contribute to an orderly closure, while in others it may be to provide financial support. An example of the latter is the general bank guarantee the state provided during Sweden’s bank crisis. In certain cases it may be up to the Riksbank to provide assistance with liquidity. If a bank’s problems were to be so serious that stability is threatened - and the bank is considered to be viable in the longer run - the Riksbank can grant credit on special terms and act as what is usually known as the lender of last resort. The continuous surveillance and crisis management are closely connected with each other. Oversight is essential for the Riksbank’s ability to judge whether or not a crisis constitutes a threat to financial stability. Without a continuous analysis of the banks, it would be difficult to determine whether and how any support should be provided in a crisis.

It discusses the principles that determine the situations in which the Riksbank can consider providing support for distressed banks and the terms for the support. Many other countries are reluctant to talk about these matters openly for fear that banks will be tempted to take greater risks. The Riksbank, on the other hand, sees openness as a means of deterring greater risk-taking. Clear game rules mean that the banks know more about what to expect. Future stability work Much has been done with the Riksbank’s work on stability in the past seven years but it is not hard to pick out fields where there is room for improvement. The analysis of borrowers abroad will be enhanced. The Riksbank needs to acquire a better understanding of how the banks manage their liquidity, select sources of funding and the effects of this on their durability. The analysis of stability also needs to be supplemented with methods for stress tests, that is, ways of analysing the sensitivity of bank durability. To obtain further inspiration for the work of improving the analysis, the Riksbank has commissioned an external evaluation of the work on financial stability. This evaluation is in the hands of a trio representing the international research frontier, the central bank world and the Swedish bank sector. They will be bringing their individual perspectives to bear in a joint effort to evaluate the quality and focus of the work we have built up.
This linkage is a prerequisite for the efficient conduct of monetary and foreign exchange operations in the euro area. As far as the domestic payment system is concerned, the new Malta Real-time Inter-Bank Settlement System (MaRIS) already provides for the immediate delivery and settlement of wholesale financial payments in line with principles governing the EU’s TARGET system. This is an innovation whose advantages the business community in particular will come to appreciate in time. Meanwhile, discussions between the Central Bank and the Malta Stock Exchange are underway on the changes that need to be made to the securities settlement system. Of course, having in place the right systems which permit funds and security titles to be transferred between Malta and the euro area is not enough. A key task of every central bank is that of safeguarding the stability of such systems. Whereas for the Central Bank of Malta this holds true irrespective of EU membership, one cannot overlook the fact that the ECB has a direct interest in the stability of payment systems throughout the EU. Appropriate oversight mechanisms are accordingly being put in place  Information - another important element in the ESCB’s strategy In this regard, both the Central Bank of Malta and the ECB would require continuous access to the necessary information to enable them to gauge whether the payment and settlement systems are performing well.

Issues raised by Malta’s prospective participation in ERM II During the ERM II phase, which for most new members would start soon after EU accession, the Maltese lira will be fully pegged to the euro and the exchange rate would be allowed to fluctuate by up to ±15% around a central rate to be agreed with the European Central Bank (ECB). A major issue, therefore, concerns the level of the central rate and the size of the fluctuation bands. Although the central rate could be re-aligned if it cannot be sustained within the chosen bands, the initial determination of this rate is crucial because it signals to the market what the authorities consider to be the appropriate level of the exchange rate. Determining the appropriate central rate, however, is not an easy task. While the available evidence suggests that in the current economic environment the Maltese lira exchange rate is sustainable at prevailing levels, the Central Bank is nevertheless undertaking the necessary econometric work in order to estimate an equilibrium rate. The choice of the fluctuation bands is equally important. A narrow band has the advantage of limiting exchange rate risk and contributing to the Bank’s credibility in the area of monetary policy. A wider band, on the other hand, would ease pressures on the monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to maintain the exchange rate within the agreed bands.
I think these goals are broadly shared by supervisors and banks alike, which suggests to me that the relationship between supervisors and banks does not always need to be adversarial. Indeed, a healthy dialogue helps this supervisory process to work well. For example, it is important that firms are proactive in revealing problems to their supervisors. And, individual institutions can certainly benefit from the horizontal perspective that supervisors bring to examinations. This perspective can highlight where the firm stands vis-à-vis best practices, or where there may be important vulnerabilities in its operations. Of course, there is an irreducible amount of tension built into this relationship, given that each party’s roles, interests, and responsibilities will not always coincide. Banks are naturally more sensitive to constraints on their profit opportunities or dividend policies and to the costs of regulation. They may also question how much protection is necessary—for example, how stringent the capital requirements or how severe stress testing assumptions should be. These are areas where I would expect perspectives to differ. Supervisors are principally focused on compliance with laws and regulations as well as issues of safety and soundness. They also bring to their work a perspective on financial stability that may not match the more narrow interests of the firm. For example, supervisors seek to address the externalities created by the failure of a systemically important firm by imposing higher capital and other requirements than the firm would likely select if left to its own devices.

If the monetary authority were to commit to a program 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  of asset purchases until some economic objective is reached and, at the same time, were to make it clear that the policy rate would not begin to rise until the asset purchase program were completed, these steps might help anchor expectations about the likely path of short-term rates more effectively. The Federal Reserve’s third round of LSAPs, which was open-ended, was an important innovation of policy that the paper might have discussed in greater detail. I also don’t agree with the paper’s conclusions about agency MBS purchases. Such purchases do not represent “credit easing” as argued in the paper. The government’s interventions to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have made it clear that there is no credit risk in the Federal Reserve’s purchase of such obligations. Also, the authors don’t acknowledge that the ability to purchase agency MBS has two benefits. First, it enables the Federal Reserve to purchase longer-duration assets at a faster pace without disrupting market functioning. This facilitates larger LSAP programs, when a larger program is viewed as necessary. Second, it opens up another channel by which asset purchases can provide stimulus—by narrowing the spread between agency MBS and Treasuries, the Federal Reserve can drive down long-term mortgage rates and provide support to the housing sector and to home prices.
Combine this with the strength of some key sectors of our economy; the result is that Paris now stands as the first stock market capitalisation in Europe, ahead of London.2 And as the Bloomberg article points out, despite some political unrest earlier this year, Paris is true to its motto: fluctuat nec mergitur, it is rocked by the waves but does not sink. This motto also perfectly suits French institutions – we have a very strong Constitution – and the French economy, which has proved remarkably resilient. Our growth performed better than most expected in the first quarter, at 0.2%3. The likelihood of a recession in 2023 can now be excluded, and prospects have been revised upwards: this confirms our forecast for 2023 of 0.6%, thanks to stronger than anticipated external demand and a quicker than expected  1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  slowdown in energy prices, before rebounding to 1.2% and 1.7% respectively in 2024 and 2025. Furthermore, despite the recent turmoil in the United States and in Switzerland, from which we can already draw out some first lessons,4 financial stability has been preserved in the EU. Our banks are robust, with substantial capital and liquidity buffers: they are all subject to stringent Basel requirements – and to single and strong supervision within the Banking Union, which makes a big difference with many US banks.

The ECB Governing Council has increased its policy rates by 200 basis points since July: we have moved closer to the neutral rate which we estimate to be around 2%, and which we should reach at our next meeting on 15 December. Let us be clear: this rate rise is good news for banks and insurers, who have long been critical of low rates. Financial institutions want the rise to be orderly: it is, very much so; but this does not mean it should be too slow, or predetermined. It is still too soon to talk about a "terminal rate": we will decide what is necessary following a meeting-by-meeting approach; and we do not steer market rates, which are sometimes excessively volatile. The return of volatility in the markets, starting with commodity markets where margin calls reached historic highs this summer. In equity markets, after the corrections observed since the start of 2022, valuations remain relatively high. Fixed income markets are also showing strong volatility, with one extreme example being the September UK sovereign debt crisis: aside from a few specific factors, this was a reminder to everybody of the crucial importance of credible fiscal policies. In light of this market volatility, it is more important than ever that we protect customers. I would just like to say a word here on the increased transparency and justification of life insurance fees: in a speech to you alongside Jean-Paul Faugère, I called for progress to be made this year, with a particular focus on dialogue with insurers.