samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Elvira Nabiullina: Recent Russian economic developments and Bank of Russia’s forecast Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in follow-up of Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 13 March 2015. *  *  *  Good afternoon! Today the Bank of Russia Board of Directors decided to reduce the key rate from 15.00% to 14% per annum. This decision takes into account the following main factors. First, the latest data on the economic situation show that the balance of risks remains shifted towards the weakening of the economy rather than acceleration of inflation. January data and February leading indicators, primarily business sentiment indices, indicate that the economic situation continues to deteriorate and this trend may persist until 2016 Q1. Seasonally adjusted unemployment fell to 5.0%. It should be taken into consideration that the Russian labour market traditionally adjusts, at least at the first stage, through wage rates and part-time employment, whose dynamics is indicative of lower demand for labour. At the same time, shrinkage of consumer demand will have a downward pressure on inflation. Second, monthly inflation slowed down considerably in February following the surge in late December-January. And weekly March data indicate that this process continues. The current high level of annual price growth is explained by the supply-side factors – decline in the ruble exchange rate and imposed trade restrictions. These are one-time factors, and in case there are no new considerable shocks their impact on monthly and quarterly inflation will decrease over the next months.

The restraining influence of low economic activity will begin to fully impact inflation dynamics in the second half of 2015. By this time, the effect of temporary factors, such as the depreciation of the ruble and foreign trade restrictions that have led to acceleration in consumer prices growth, will be exhausted. As we have already noted, inflation will reach its peak in 2015 Q2, and afterwards it is forecast to fall. In March 2016, inflation will approximate to 9% before falling down to 4% in the medium run. Such inflation dynamics will be accompanied by economic recovery. The bottom of economic recession is expected in 2016 Q1, later on the economy will start growing on a quarterly basis. By that time the initial adjustment of the economy to the new environment will be over. Higher global oil prices, the economic recovery of trade partner countries, and the formation  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  of new sources of financing will also contribute to this growth. In 2017, economic recovery is expected to exceed 6%. We shall continue to regularly update our forecast by monitoring movements of a wide range of indicators taking into account not only annual inflation dynamics, but also quarterly, monthly and weekly ones. If new pro-inflationary factors do not appear and inflation decelerates according to our forecast, we shall continue cutting the key rate.
The core issues from the United States perspective have been whether agreement can be obtained on rules that are open to all systems, that is rules that recognize leading technologies such as Public Key Infrastructure, or PKI, but also provide legal support for other systems. Moreover, variable PKI formats have been developed, and differing levels of PKI certification will be in commercial use, including CA generated high and low level certs, and probably non-CA issued certs. The United States position has been that the different user paradigms may require different legal standards and presumptions, which should not be limited to existing PKI-based systems. In addition, the United States has advocated that any UN or other international legal text on signature rules should incorporate both regulated licensed systems and private sector non-regulated systems. Furthermore, such rules should be open to non-digital technologies. From the standpoint of BIS Review 26/1998  -9commercial law, delineation of fall-back rules on obligations, assurances, and reliance would be necessary to achieve the necessary risk allocation and commercial usage. This will probably require sliding standards for attribution, commercial reliance, liability and security depending on the types of transactions and the imperatives of market cost and pricing. Carveouts may be appropriate for closed or controlled access systems. So far, there has been a significant amount of debate, but little agreement, on these and a host of other issues.

Over the years, the risk areas and thus the scope of regulations to prevent the use of the financial system as a conduit for illegal and other undesirable activities that can pose threats to global security have also increased. From money laundering to terrorist financing, the regulations and standards are being extended to comprehensively address new and emerging threats. This is evident in the ongoing review of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40+9 Recommendations, where among others, several policy goals and initiatives for combating corruption, and addressing proliferation financing more effectively, are being thoroughly discussed and deliberated. A major development in the review of the standards, that is relevant to the industry, is the higher emphasis that will be placed on assessing the effectiveness of measures implemented to counter the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, rather than merely looking at technical compliance. This is indeed very relevant to the theme of this year’s conference “Raising the Bar in Compliance and Enforcement”. As Malaysia’s AML/CFT regime grows in maturity, the benchmark for compliance by financial institutions will be measured more in terms of its effectiveness in deterring and preventing financial crimes before they occur, and in effectively supporting the relevant law enforcement agencies to bring the perpetrators to justice when such crimes happen, despite our best efforts.
Malaysia’s journey will not track exactly the same path as others, nor should we expect it to. But we can all learn something from the footsteps left by others as we move forward. I hope that our collective journeys, as shared in this forum and others like it, will help us harness the full potential of microfinance to build stronger, fairer and more resilient communities. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

Like when we Executive Board members take a decision on what interest rate path is needed for inflation to be close to the target of 2 per cent a couple of years ahead. How much do we need to change it and how quickly? Decisions in times of uncertainty and how we manage this is a recurring theme today. You members of the Committee on Finance will later be asking questions on the basis of the material for assessing monetary policy published by the Riksbank on 16 February.2 Your views on our interest rate decisions of recent years – whether you consider they were wellbalanced given the information at the disposal of the Executive Board at the time the  1  This calculation is based on the SEK/USD exchange rate on the respective auction date. 2  See “Material for assessing monetary policy 2006-2008”. BIS Review 23/2009  1  decision was made – comprise important information for us. I am therefore looking forward to discussing the assessment later, during the actual hearing. But first I would like to talk about how the financial crisis affects the conditions for our policy. I shall also discuss the most recent interest rate decision and our readiness for dealing with unexpected economic developments. The financial crisis affects the conditions for monetary policy For a long time, the global financial crisis only had a fairly limited effect on the Swedish economy.
2  BIS Review 17/2006  Important components in the assessment of what constitutes a good interest rate path – and which stress the element of judgment in this assessment – are expressed in a set of criteria that should be met. The criteria are included in the Inflation Report. Criteria have been set for robustness and financial stability. It is also appropriate to assess interest-rate setting against cross-checks such as simple monetary policy rules. The central balance is nevertheless between the inflation outlook and the outlook for capacity utilisation in the economy, expressed in the chart as the output gap. The projections are from Inflation Report 3/05. If monetary policy is to anchor inflation at the target, the interest rate must be set so that inflation moves towards the target. Inflation should be stabilised close to the target within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1-3 years. Provided inflation expectations are on target, the inflation gap and the output gap should be in reasonable proportion to each other until they close. Looking ahead, the inflation gap and the output gap should normally not be positive or negative at the same time. Several of the recommendations from Norges Bank Watch can be translated into how we should weigh the outlook for these two variables against each other. According to the report, Norges Bank’s inflation projections through 2005 were fairly accurate. Inflation has risen somewhat but is still very low, even 2½ years after the cyclical change.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will agree with me that automation of processes brings in some efficiency which should translate into effective utilisation of resources. Instead of spending time processing bulk payments, employees will have time to concentrate on other more important assignments, such as deposit mobilisation, credit portfolio growth and administration, all of which are important for the wellbeing of an institution in terms of profits, enhanced shareholder value and growth of the economy at large. The world is changing in terms of technological advancement and new methods of doing business are being developed every day. As a country and through innovations like the product we are launching today, we need to constantly keep up with these developments. Ladies and gentlemen, as you are aware the government continues to give tax and other incentives for institutions and individuals importing computers and computer parts. This is deliberate. It is aimed at stimulating economic growth and as such we all have no excuse for not taking advantage of this development. We expect all commercial banks in Zambia to take full advantage of this for the benefit of the Zambian people through improved service delivery. In this connection, I would like to take this opportunity to call on Zambia National Commercial Bank Plc, as a national bank, to take the lead in responding to our call and indeed government’s call to reduce lending interest rates further.
In particular, we cannot rule out the possibility of further waves of the epidemic making it necessary to re-introduce or discretely reinforce the limitations on various types of productive activity. Ultimately, this source of uncertainty will not be fully dispelled until an effective vaccine or anti-viral treatment is available. The second factor concerns the effectiveness of the measures, both in Spain and in the rest of the world, that the economic authorities have pursued in an attempt to prevent the shutdown in activity at the height of the pandemic from leading to permanent job losses and company closures. Evidently, the second of these factors (the effectiveness of the economic measures in minimising the damages of the lockdown) depends, in turn, on the first (how the pandemic evolves). It should in any case be stressed that certain characteristics of our economy make it more vulnerable than others to the shock we face. These include the sectoral specialisation of our  1  In the two reference scenarios published by the Banco de España on 20 April and referred to in this testimony, the expected declines in GDP in Q2 stand at around 15% and 20%, respectively, although the information from indicators for this period remains very scant at present to estimate with any accuracy whatsoever the potential scale of the decline in the quarter. 8  productive system, the small average size of companies and the high proportion of temporary as opposed to permanent employment.

Lars Nyberg: Monetary and financial stability from a central bank perspective Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the conference on the 10th Anniversary of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, 13 September 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, What is the interaction of monetary and financial stability? This is one of the most discussed issues in central banks and academia today, and is likely to remain high on the agenda for the foreseeable future. Many central banks, including the Swedish Riksbank, now have dual tasks: maintaining price stability and promoting financial stability. I will begin by discussing these tasks separately, and then turn to the questions the success in bringing down inflation has raised with regard to financial stability, and how this has influenced the conduct of monetary policy in Sweden. Before proceeding, I should stress that the views I am about to express are my own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the other members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that my remarks primarily are based on my own experiences from an inflation targeting central bank, operating in a small open economy. Price stability The taming of inflation, after the destructive price-wage spirals of the 1970s and 1980s, is one of the major success stories in modern economic policy making. Economic theory tells us that high inflation is bad for a number of reasons. These theories now appear to have been vindicated.
And according to Svensson (2013c), 60,000 more people are now unemployed than if the repo rate had not been raised since 2010. It hardly needs to be pointed out that such calculations are very uncertain. I have previously criticised Svensson (2013b) for focusing on a specific measure of inflation expectations. If one instead uses a different, more accurate, measure of expectations, almost all of the unemployment effect Svensson has calculated disappears (Flodén, 2012). And Söderström and Vredin (2013) point to problems with interpreting causal relationships behind Svensson’s estimated Phillips curve. The claim that unemployment would have been lower if a more expansionary monetary policy had been conducted since 2010 appears more plausible, however. But one can find objections to this conclusion. First, the reasoning presumes that a more expansionary monetary policy would not have caused the crisis scenario that a majority of Executive Board members have expressed as a risk that justifies a higher repo rate (see the article in Monetary Policy Report February 2014). Second, higher unemployment now can be counterbalanced by lower unemployment in the future, as monetary policy can become more expansionary in the future when inflation and inflation expectations today are low. The question is thus whether the low inflation affects the average level of unemployment or merely the volatility of unemployment over the business cycle. 13  Examples are the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank (ECB).

This theory, which Rey formulated with emerging markets in mind, could very well also be correct and relevant for more developed economies, like Sweden. My interpretation of such arguments is that monetary policy in Sweden then cannot deviate too far from monetary policy in the United States and the euro area without giving rise to an unjustified appreciation of the krona.23 Misinterpreted: Inflation is also low in countries with more expansionary monetary policy Inflation is also falling now in countries and currency areas where the central banks have conducted a more, sometimes much more, expansionary monetary policy than the Riksbank. I have sometimes heard these observations put forward as arguments proving that a more expansionary monetary policy would not have much impact. This is not a very convincing conclusion. To begin with, it is only a year or so ago that there was much international discussion as to why inflation was so surprisingly high.24 The background to this discussion was that the weak economic developments in many parts of the world did not appear to have any great effect on inflation. Despite the low demand in the economy and high unemployment, inflation remained at levels that did not appear compatible with historical patterns. 25 To some extent, one can probably say that monetary policy abroad was more successful in stabilising inflation than economic activity, at least for a period of time. Without the powerful monetary policy stimulus, inflation would probably have been much lower.
So it is relatively early days to pass judgement on how the current recovery is proceeding. However, the performance of the British economy over the first year of this recovery does provide some grounds for encouragement. The recovery has been somewhat uneven. As Chart 1 shows, after a couple of quarters of rather subdued growth at the end of last year and early this year, GDP picked up strongly in the second quarter – producing the largest quarterly rise in GDP for nearly a decade. BIS Review 134/2010  1  We do not yet have an official estimate of growth for the third quarter, but the National Institute of Economic and Social Research estimates that GDP rose by 0.5% in this period. That would produce an annual growth rate of 2.5% for the first year of the economic recovery – in line with the historical average growth trend and somewhat stronger than the rebound we saw in the early stages of the previous two economic recoveries, in the early 1980s and early 1990s. 1 The fact that growth has been uneven from quarter to quarter should not be a great surprise as uneven growth is not unusual as an economy begins to recover from recession. This return to economic growth must be seen against the background of a sharper fall in output than we experienced in previous post-war recessions. But two more positive aspects of the early stages of this recovery are worth highlighting.

There are three elements which appear to be underpinning these concerns about the sustainability of growth in the current economic climate: the prospects for the global economy; the prospective impact of the government’s fiscal tightening; and the legacy of the financial crisis. I will discuss these three issues in turn before coming back to the crucial issue of how the Bank of England’s monetary policy can best support the recovery. The global economic outlook A serious setback for the global economy would have major repercussions for the growth of the UK economy. Our economy has a very international focus, and exports, international business activity and the financial sector all play a part in creating strong linkages from the UK to other major economies elsewhere in the world. The sharp drop in business and financial sentiment across international markets in late 2008 and early 2009 – and the ensuing downturn in the global economy – played a major part in tipping the UK into recession two years ago. Similarly, the rebound in the global economy has helped to support our recovery over the last year or so. However, a serious downturn in global growth does not seem very likely at the moment. According to the IMF, global growth this year is now projected to be nearly 5%, compared to a projected growth rate of less than 2% just eighteen months ago.
The comparison of the public debt levels with the Maastricht Criterion as a benchmark reveals shift towards less vulnerable zone in most of the countries. In 2015, when the average government debt level reached its peak, it was below the accepted benchmark by close to 8 p.p. of GDP, while in 2019, the distance was widened to 14 p.p. and by 2024, it is expected to reach around 20 p.p. (according to the WEO, October 2019 forecast). This clearly indicates that in the last couple of years, despite the low interest rate environment, fiscal space in CESEE region was rebuilt thus reducing public sector exposure to sudden shifts in the sentiment at the global financial markets or reversal in the interest rate cycle. Still it has to be noted that the public debt level is still above the pre-crisis pone, and few of the countries, despite the adjustment, did not succeed in bringing the debt level below 60% of GDP (Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Montenegro, and Slovenia). Even more, in Montenegro the debt level has still been increasing, reaching above 80% of GDP in 2019, raising concerns related to sustainability issues. Private leverage in the region has been rising since early 2000s, albeit mostly from lower levels compared to advanced economies. After reaching the peak at the onset of the global crisis, gradual deleveraging occurred, but debt level remained elevated in comparison to the pre-crisis in many countries.

In its latest report on Croatia6, the Commission has released the assessment showing that both household and corporate debt are within prudential levels, though still above the levels suggested by the economic fundamentals. The risks are moderating, but remain relevant mainly related to high concentration of corporate debt, exposure to currency risk and potential solvency risk for companies due to the high debt burden relative to corporate financial assets and equity. 5  European Commission Country Report Bulgaria 2019 Including an In-Depth Review on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 6 European Commission Country Report Croatia 2019 Including an In-Depth Review on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 10  Chart 12. Private debt to GDP by countries  Source: IMF Global debt database. Overall, private debt appears sustainable in most CESEE countries, though risks still remain. External environment remains challenging, making the region vulnerable to economic downturn, capital flows reversals and sharp tightening of financial conditions globally. In the event that monetary and financial conditions remain easy for too long, it may stimulate excessive risk-taking and build-up of financial stability risks. This calls for authorities in the region to maintain and further strengthen macro-prudential frameworks, if needed, to reduce vulnerabilities and enhance resilience to shocks. 11  *** The second issue that we tackle in this note is the phenomenon of “missing inflation” and the “wage–price puzzle”.