samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some progress has also been made in using these models to help design and calibrate postcrisis regulatory policy. As one example, epidemiological models have been used to understand and calibrate regulatory capital standards for the largest, most interconnected banks – the so-called “super-spreaders” (Craig et al (2014)). They have also been used to understand the impact of central clearing of derivatives contracts, instabilities in payments systems and policies which set minimum collateral haircuts on securities financing transactions (Haldane (2009)). Rather less attention so far, however, has been placed on using complexity theory to understand the overall architecture of public policy – how the various pieces of the policy jigsaw fit together as a whole. This is a potentially promising avenue. The financial crisis has led to a fundamental reshaping of the macro-financial policy architecture. In some areas, regulatory foundations have been fortified – for example, in the micro-prudential regulation of individual financial firms. In others, a whole new layer of policy has been added – for example, in macro-prudential regulation to safeguard the financial system as a whole (Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2010)). This new policy architecture is largely untried, untested and unmodelled. This has spawned a whole raft of new, largely untouched, public policy questions. Why do we need both the micro- and macro-prudential policy layers? How do these regulatory layers interact with each other and with monetary policy? And how do these policies interact at a global level? Answering these questions is a research agenda in its own right.

By way of conclusion, let me stress that, if duly harnessed and managed, the new technologies and the growing digitalisation of the financial sector may offer major opportunities for increasing efficiency and improving financial services as a whole. They may also be useful in adapting services to the changes taking place in user demand. 5/6  As regulators and supervisors, we believe we must be an active part of this process, performing the role assigned to us by society by analysing the developments taking place in the market and promoting, within our remit, healthy, orderly and positive innovation in the financial sector. 6/6
Paul Tucker: Money and credit, twelve months on Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Executive Director and Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, at the Money, Macro and Finance Research Group 40th Annual Conference, Birkbeck College, London, 12 September 2008. *  *  *  As many people have said, this is a challenging time for policymakers. But the real challenge is for households and firms in the real world who are having to navigate the fallout from the extraordinary combination of financial and commodity shocks rippling through the world economy. Our job as policymakers is to make that process as smooth as it can be over the medium term. And having our eye on the medium term means we must ensure that the gains of the past ten-to-fifteen years in stabilising inflation are not frittered away. In confronting that task, policymakers are having both to make big picture judgments about the balance of forces buffeting the UK economy; and to apply areas of economic theory that stretch the frontiers of existing research. So, in joining your research conference this morning, I want to sketch, broadly, what the current conjuncture suggests, from the policymaker’s perspective, should feature in the future research agenda of monetary economists. The current conjuncture, and policy By way of establishing the context, I will begin with the Bank of England’s most recent economic forecast. In August, the Monetary Policy Committee published our latest projections for output growth and inflation.

Extending that point, the literature may too easily dismiss the possible effects on prices of the demand and supply of financial assets more generally. But we need testable theories as to why, and the circumstances in which, they might matter. Finally, looking beyond the ex ante compensation for risk, we also need to have better models for exploring what can happen – in the financial system and in the macroeconomy – when nasty forms of risk do actually crystallise. Default comes to mind. 24 Bank default is a special case, given the special role of banks in a monetary economy. And, guess what? Banks don’t really feature in modern macro models. Of course, incorporating those features of the real world is incredibly hard, involving heterogeneous agents, incomplete contracts and markets, and uncertainty. Uncertainty needs to be underlined. It isn’t clear whether existing models could explain the swings we have been experiencing in some asset prices. Is that something to do with market participants having become radically uncertain about the nature of the underlying distributions? And do asset prices become actors in those circumstances? Over many decades now, 25 elegant models have been developed for studying financial market distress in the abstract – whether affecting banks or asset markets. This, of course, involves strategic interaction amongst agents.
Yet the climate risks we face have not subsided, far from it: if the climate transition is put off and carried out in a disorderly manner, the associated costs to our economies will be all the greater. The current context of uncertainty and volatility means that we should increase our vigilance regarding all risks, including those related to the climate, by making progress on the disclosure of climate-related information – which will become compulsory for European banks in 2023 under ESG Pillar 3 – and on how to operationalise transition plans and stress tests. On this latter issue, three European supervisory bodies will carry out an essential stress test in 2024 to assess in particular the transition risks to the entire financial sector linked to the implementation of the "fitfor-55" package. The idea that we could make a short-term trade-off between climate risks and economic and financial risks is misleading: the two are unfortunately increasing in parallel, and, in the longer term, the Russian crisis is yet another reason for us to accelerate our energy diversification and sovereignty through the use of non-fossil sources. What we need then, over the next two to three years, is to chart a "path of compatibility": if we are to be consistent, any measures to support non-fossil fuels, on the supply or demand side – the famous "price shields" – must remain targeted and temporary.

I would like to conclude by coming back to Newton's experiment, where he split white light into the colours of the spectrum using a prism, and then recombined them using a second prism. After breaking the challenges of financial stability down into a spectrum of five questions – which are not exhaustive – I would like now to recombine them into a single certainty: we, as supervisors and regulators, we the ACPR, will do everything within our power to safeguard financial stability in the new macrofinancial landscape. I shall give the floor now to Dominique Laboureix: I would just like to congratulate him on his appointment as Chair of the European Single Resolution Board, and thank him warmly for his powerful work as Secretary General of the ACPR for the past three years. 1 Those subject to Solvency II. 2 The ECB Blog, Bitcoin's last stand, 30 November 2022. 4/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
Important baseline market practices that should apply to every firm – or CG “hygiene” requirements – are hardened by their inclusion in the SGX Listing Rules. Indeed, twelve basic requirements previously couched as guidelines have been shifted from the Code to the Listing Rules. In other aspects, the Code has been streamlined and elaborated in the Practice Guidance. In considering what should be mandatory in the SGX Listing Rules, Council members had carefully considered their effectiveness in supporting long-term business goals, and how the revised Code compares against international practices. There may be some concerns that some of the principles in the Code are subject to interpretation and gaming. I can understand such sentiments. This is why the MAS has also accepted the Council’s recommendation to set up a standing Corporate Governance Advisory Committee to monitor CG developments on a regular basis, and you can expect more details on this Committee once it is set up. There are other views calling on regulators to adopt quicker or harsher actions in response to CG violations. Some felt that directors should be held more accountable for their fiduciary duties, or breaches in their fiduciary duties. Investigations are usually complex and time-consuming affairs especially if there are crossborder elements involved. At the same time, it is important that our financial sector operates with a clear rule of law, as well as fair and transparent legal processes. This is to assure a trusted regime for everyone. We must allow for thorough investigations as a matter of legal and investigation integrity.

24.11.2020  The impact of the pandemic on the Spanish business sector’s financial situation 1st International Management Congress. APD. Purposeful Business Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  *English translation of the original speech in Spanish  Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. First, let me begin by thanking the organisers for kindly inviting me to take part in this Congress. My presentation today will focus on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the Spanish business sector’s financial situation and on the role that economic policy is currently playing and should continue to play to mitigate that impact. Business activity has been particularly affected by the crisis. Many of the economic policy measures adopted have been designed precisely to minimise that effect. These measures are and will continue to be crucial, to prevent the temporary shock caused by the pandemic from resulting in the closure of many businesses and, ultimately, in persistent damage to our productive capacity. However, despite the policy measures taken, many businesses have seen their financial situation deteriorate since the start of the crisis, and how we address this deterioration will have important repercussions for the macroeconomic outlook in the short and medium term. Firms that are most financially vulnerable generally invest less and hire fewer employees than those that are financially sound.1 At the same time, there are now signs that the pandemic may give rise to some structural changes in consumer demand.
First, the Fed's commitment to achieve and sustain 2 percent inflation is a now bedrock principle. This was not always the case. It's only been 10 years since the FOMC defined 2 percent inflation as its longer-run goal. 7 This transparency about our objectives provides a "North Star" for policy decisions and communications. It likewise improves the public's understanding of our goals and actions. It has also served us well in keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored. For example, the most recent Survey of Consumer Expectations shows that consumers expect inflation to decline over the next three years. 8 And market-based measures of inflation expectations have also remained well anchored. This anchoring of longer-term expectations is critical to keeping high inflation from becoming embedded in the psychology of consumers and businesses, which we know from the past is costly to undo. Economic Outlook So, what does tighter monetary policy mean for the economy? We are already seeing some of the effects. Broad measures of financial conditions, including borrowing and  3/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  mortgage rates and equity prices, have become significantly less supportive of spending. This has led to a decline in activity in the housing market and signs of slowing in consumer and business investment spending. As this continues, I expect real GDP to be close to flat this year and to grow modestly in 2023.

Benoît Cœuré: What yield curves are telling us Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Financial Times European Financial Forum "Building a New Future for International Financial Services", Dublin, 31 January 2018. * * * Accompanying slides. The US Treasury yield curve flattened considerably last year, reducing the spread between tenyear and two-year US Treasury yields to less than 60 basis points. When Alan Greenspan first referred to a bond market “conundrum” in 2005, the spread was around 80 basis points.1 In the euro area, by contrast, the term spread remained broadly unchanged last year. At face value, a simple reconciling factor of recent international bond price developments is the tightening cycle that has gained traction in the United States. It is well known that a rise in policy rates typically leads to a flattening of the sovereign yield curve as long-term rates tend to increase by less than short-term rates. In my remarks this morning I will try to shed some more light on the potential factors currently affecting long-term rates. I will argue that, in and of itself, policy normalisation in the US cannot fully explain the pronounced flattening of the US Treasury curve.
15  20  25  Weeks  Source: Bank of England  Moment 6: where there’s a Means there a Way  The scale and uncertainty of the economic downturn, combined with the sharp deterioration in financial market conditions in mid-March raised another issue: how to manage the Government’s cashflow needs, but in markets that at the time seemed to be barely functioning? And that’s how, at the height of the crisis, I found myself on another call, this time with the Treasury and its Debt Management Office (DMO), to discuss the ‘Ways & Means (W&M) account’ – in modern language, the Government’s overdraft facility at the Bank of England, funded by reserves creation. W&M sits at the very bottom of the hierarchy of tools used to meet the Government’s borrowing needs. The primary tool is gilt issuance – for many years used by the DMO to ‘fully fund’ those needs over the medium term (usually a fiscal year). Because government cash flows are not perfectly predictable, ‘rough tuning’ is achieved through the issuance of marketable Treasury Bills. And ‘fine-tuning’ is done through the money markets. The W&M exists purely as a back-up to those fine-tuning operations. Given these multiple alternative tools, W&M had seen no material usage in over a decade (Chart 13). But clearly the period of dysfunction in gilt and money markets in March and early April raised the possibility that it might be needed if all of the other alternatives were temporarily rendered ineffective.

This will not only help banks that operate on an international basis to establish more convergent information bases across the countries in which they are present. It will also facilitate the exchange of information among supervisors, because we will be speaking a more common language. And, more directly, the transparency requirements will, in themselves, lead to the availability of more, and more comparable, data for market participants and users. Both these initiatives are international in nature. However, as I noted earlier in my intervention, information demands also come from a range of sources including at the domestic level, and it is certainly worth looking to see what can be done at this level too. One such initiative could be to look at the possibility of using IFRS data for market, corporate law, prudential and tax purposes. 2  Convergence of reporting requirements  So, having common regulatory standards and approaches on an international basis can provide a natural basis for more efficient information flows. However, without convergence of the reporting requirements that stem from these standards and approaches, entities will still have to produce and transmit different information, in different formats, to the regulators in the countries in which they are  2  BIS Review 47/2006  present. In other words, common regulation does not automatically translate into common reporting requirements - the second element that I want to mention today. This has been highlighted as a particular issue in the European Union context, given the political objective to promote a fully integrated financial market.
For the case of fiscal policy, the working assumption is that fiscal expenditure will increase this year less than will output, consistently with the recent announcement of the government on the matter, to subsequently converge to a structural deficit of 1 percent of GDP until the end of the current Administration’s term. In the baseline scenario, the cyclical situation of the Chilean economy plus the withdrawal of the macroeconomic stimulus will result in y-o-y CPIX1 inflation moving from its present level of around 0.5 percent to a little over 3 percent in the early part of 2012 (figure 8). It is expected to then oscillate around the target until the end of the projection horizon, that is, the first quarter of 2013. Headline inflation, meanwhile, will surpass the upper bound of the target range, largely due to the effects of higher prices of oil and oil derivatives. The baseline scenario assumes that the oil price will average somewhat more than 100 dollars per WTI barrel in the two-year period 2011–2012. Accordingly, annual CPI inflation will stand above 4 percent for the entire second half of this year and into 2012. For December 2011, it is forecast at 4.3 percent, which compares with 3.3 percent assumed in December. Inflation projections for the latter part of this year have been revised upward in many economies around the world, even before the oil shock intensified (figure 9).

As we noted in the presentations we made before this Commission and the Senate in full last December, the world economy is undergoing a process of recovery in two speeds, generating significant foreign exchange tensions. In early January the Board announced a program of foreign-currency purchases to alleviate these tensions and increase Chile’s international reserves to match those of other emerging economies. Such program involves the purchase of 12 billion US dollars over a period that ends in December this year. Three months into the process, the Bank has bought a little over 3 billion dollars. The peso/dollar parity is now around 3 percent above the level that prevailed before the purchase announcement, fluctuating in the range of 465 to 500 pesos per dollar. The overall trends that have determined an appreciation of the currencies of most emerging economies – including the Chilean peso – are still present. We believe that without the intervention the peso would have appreciated even more. The resolution of growth imbalances around the world will probably take some time, but sooner or later the differences between emerging and developed economies will narrow, mitigating pressures on our currency. Beyond these fluctuations, the gains in competitiveness that our country needs in order to remain on the path to development will be achieved not with actions that artificially increase the level of the nominal exchange rate, but rather with structural reforms that will improve productivity and, therefore, the competitive stance of our exports.
The World Bank’s investment arm, the IFC, will be setting up in Singapore its first Asset Management Company office outside Washington DC, to co-invest in regional infrastructure projects. •  Last year, Temasek Holdings partnered Singapore-based banks to establish Clifford Capital, which aims to plug financing gaps faced by Singapore-based companies involved in long-tenor, cross-border infrastructure projects. •  MAS is exploring with industry players how capital market solutions can encourage investor interest through project bonds, infrastructure debt funds, and project loan securitisation. Pan-Asian focus A third pillar of Singapore’s value proposition as a financial centre is its pan-Asian focus. With strong links to all the key Asian economies, Singapore is a natural gateway for international firms looking to access Asia, and for Asian businesses to access the world. There are three new areas of opportunity that play to Singapore’s pan-Asian focus: ASEAN connectivity, OTC derivatives infrastructure, and offshore RMB business. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  ASEAN connectivity First, ASEAN connectivity. Singapore, in partnership with our ASEAN neighbours, is actively pursuing greater harmonisation and integration across the region’s financial markets. •  We are trying to harmonise rules and regulations and develop integrated trading, clearing and settlement infrastructure. •  For example, ASEAN regulators are currently working on a framework to facilitate cross-border offerings of collective investment schemes. This initiative aims to promote greater flow of capital across the region and enhance investor choice.

At the same time, the balance of inflationary pressures generated by supply-side factors is assessed as contained, given the reduced imported inflation and anchored inflation expectations. Taking into account the insofar developments and expectations for the future, Bank of Albania projections show that, with 90% probability, consumer price inflation for 2012 will range within the 0.7%–2.8% band. Materialisation of this baseline scenario will be reflected in retaining the stimulating nature of the monetary policy in the course of the year. Moreover, the Bank of Albania remains heedful to future developments and ready to respond in the appropriate time and extent in order to comply with its target on inflation. Based on the analysis of the information set out above, the Supervisory Council holds that pressures on consumer prices at home remain low over the monetary policy relevant horizon; they have been, however, on the down side over the recent months. On the demand side, below-potential economic growth will continue to generate low inflationary pressures, while shocks from the supply side are expected to be moderate. At the conclusion of discussions, the Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 4.25%. This decision aims to establish the appropriate monetary conditions to comply with the inflation target in the medium run. Given these conditions, we deem that the monetary policy provides the necessary support to stimulate the aggregate demand. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3