samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The solution centres on a programme of Government guaranteed bond issue that would provide for the full financing of the estimated cost. This programme of bond issuance will run for a maximum period of twenty years, and the financings will be provided for in the Government budget. This incorporation is projected to keep the share of the debt-service ratio to an average of 13.6% of the Government budget in the first decade and 11.5% in the second decade. This means that there will be little crowding-out effects on the Government’s investment expenditure in the period ahead, while the public debt stock-to-GDP is projected to trend down in the long term. With this programme, Thailand’s long-term fiscal sustainability is now assured. With monetary stability in place and fiscal stability enshrined in the Government’s long-term fiscal sustainability framework, I believe the operating environment in Thailand in the period ahead will be more assured and remain conducive to growth. But to really put the growth engine back on its feet, notably the recovery of the domestic demand, more works will have to be done at the micro level to remove the bottlenecks that inhibits the real economy. This leads to our second challenge: to put the banking system back to normal lending. Our banking system is returning to health and profitability with strengthened capital base, and a much lower level of non-performing loans. Yet, the growth in credit has been very minimal with deposit growth rising and liquidity remaining ample.

The investment-saving gap moved to surpluses averaging 10 percent of GDP in the first three years after the crisis, from the pre-crisis deficits average of 7 percent of GDP before 1997. Such magnitude of change is indicative of the depth of the adjustment Thailand had to go through. Although the initial imbalance in the lead up to the crisis was not small, the adjustment was amplified partly by the wave of contagion effect in the early years of the crisis which brought pressure on the capital account, the exchange rate, and growth. Now, while we can look back to the last two years of growth of around 4 percent, signs of fragility still abound, with important issues remaining to be resolved. This includes the continued reform of the banking sector and the resolution of the costs of financial sector restructuring. The main fragility in the recovery process at this time is the weakness in domestic demand. The problem is compounded by the slow growth in bank credit and the weak corporate balance sheets, particularly the non-export sector. Unfortunately, the current external environment does not bode well for the recovery, going forward. The global slowdown is posing strains on Thailand’s export, and is adding pressure to the current account and external stability. Official GDP forecast this year is around 2.0-2.5 percent. Given the change in external environment, this year will be more a time for consolidation than for expansion.
We have urged French banks, in conjunction with the national institute of statutory auditors, the CNCC, to provide detailed disclosures of their subprime exposures. A joint working group made up of staff from the Commission Bancaire, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers and the French Banking Federation has defined best practices in this area. Institutions have started implementing them in a satisfactory manner and practices should be further improved in the financial statements for first-half 2008. In 2009, the Basel Committee is planning to publish recommendations on information to be disseminated under the requirements of Pillar 3 of Basel II. In-depth discussions with banks led to a convergence of practices for asset valuation, including the priority on relying on prices and directly observable market data. Where banks have had to use valuation models because liquid prices disappeared in some markets, the recommendations deal with consideration of all risks – including liquidity risk and counterparty risk – and the rigorousness of the process for determining such prices. With regard to adapting the Basel II requirements, we are also playing a very active role in the various international working groups led by the Basel Committee to give greater consideration, where necessary, to the capital requirements related to some liquidity lines or to the securitisation rules. Finally, the crisis has highlighted the need for banks to improve their analysis, measurement and management of liquidity risk.

Such approaches were used for more than 80 per cent of the relevant banking assets at 1 January 2008. I would also like to point out that the impact of Basel II on credit institutions’ capital goes beyond the capital requirement calculation stipulated in Pillar 1 (even though it provides more comprehensive coverage than Basel I of new risks, such as securitisation activities). Regarding Pillar 2, the new regulations call for major additional arrangements to refine banks’ risk management and planning for capital cushions. This could lead to additional capital requirements, or other appropriate measures to enhance bank stability by considering risks that are not dealt with or are inadequately dealt with under Pillar 1. By the end of the year, this approach should lead to individual ratios for each institution that the Commission Bancaire sets on the basis of structured dialogue with each institution. BIS Review 82/2008  3  We have also undertaken a series of major actions that are directly in line with the general framework of the recommendations made by the Financial Stability Forum. Many spheres of action have been defined, but I would like to speak about three that I think are priorities, starting with transparency and valuation, followed by adapting the capital requirements set by Basel II for certain instruments, and finally, liquidity risk. First of all, enhancing transparency and financial disclosure was quickly identified as one of the key requirements for ending the crisis.
At the presentation of the last report on financial stability, we expressed our conviction that the financial system needs to be made more resilient to possible shocks. This is all the more valid if we consider the hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ money that had to be spent worldwide on stabilising the financial system over the past few months. The focus is on the need for improvement in the “shock absorbers”: capital and liquidity. The crisis has shown that the current regulation in these areas is no longer sufficient in the case of the big banks. Their level of capital is inadequate when set in relation to their risks. In the area of liquidity, events have occurred that were not taken into account in any of the big banks’ scenarios. The reform of the capital adequacy regulation for big banks, drawn up by the SFBC with the support of the SNB, represents an important step in the right direction – for the area of capital. It specifies an increase in risk-weighted capital together with the introduction of a leverage ratio. The leverage ratio is a supplementary instrument and does not call into question the principle of risk-sensitivity with regard to the capital regulation. An essential constituent of the reform are countercyclical mechanisms whereby, in good times, banks are required to considerably exceed the minimum requirements for capital and the leverage ratio. This ensures that a buffer is created to absorb losses during crises.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Some thoughts on IMF reform on crisis prevention and crisis resolution Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, presented to the G-20 Workshop on Reform of Bretton Woods Institutions, Tokyo, 28 February 2006. *  *  *  Thank you Chairman, First, let me thank the Ministry of Finance of Japan for inviting me to this workshop on the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions. This workshop is another reminder that the work on IMF reform is still ongoing. Next year will be a full ten years since the height of the Asian financial crisis. Over the past decade, many important ideas on the reform of the IMF have been advanced, but still there is no consensus on how the reform should move forward. I see today’s workshop as another opportunity to contribute to this ongoing debate. And whatever the outcome may be, the reform will certainly mark a critical turning point for the global economy, as the Bretton Woods Institutions attempt to adapt their roles and responsibilities to the forces of globalization. Today, I have been asked to speak on IMF crisis prevention and crisis resolution. Given the limitation of time, and the fact that the recommendations on these two issues have been many and are well-known, I thought the best way for me to add value to today’s discussion is to share with you our thoughts on the subject, as well as to make three specific points.
8 For example, the central banks in Chile, the Czech Republic, Israel and Mexico have been able to fulfil their tasks despite having worked with negative equity for long periods of time (Archer and Moser-Boehm, 2013). 4 [12]  Both the Riksbank’s own interest rate forecasts and the statistical methods suggest that the term premiums are now very low, and maybe even negative. Chart 3 shows the Riksbank’s and the Swedish National Debt Office's estimations of the term premium on ten-year government bonds based on similar statistical methods. These statistical methods, as I have said, produce fairly uncertain results, but they clearly indicate that premiums have fallen sharply in the last decade. 9 Both the Debt Office's and the Riksbank’s estimates indicate that the term premium is negative. If the premium really is negative, the Riksbank is expected to lose money on purchasing bonds and funding them at the repo rate. The Riksbank’s estimate points to the term premium currently being around -0.7 per cent on bonds with long maturities. 10 This would mean that the loss is expected to be around 0.7 per cent of the purchase price for each year of maturity. Since the average maturity on the bonds is about five years, this would mean that the losses are expected to be 3.5 per cent of the purchase price. Chart 3.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Given the importance of addressing the risks stemming from systemically important financial institutions, it is necessary for regulators to reduce and if possible eliminate the prospect that a systemically important financial institution would find itself in difficulties in the first place. This consideration also brings up the need of supervising better shadow banking,5 which consists of those parts of the financial system that are not visible to regulators and hence not under their direct control and supervision.6 Basle III goes a significant way in narrowing the gaps in regulation that result from recourse to shadow banking.7 It does so by incorporating off-balance sheet exposures in the leverage ratio and by including in the liquidity, regulatory and supervisory standards a range of risks stemming from shadow banking. Thus, stronger banking regulation and supervision will go a long way towards containing the risks of the shadow banking sector. The situation in Malta I will now take a closer look at some key issues relating to the domestic economy and financial system, particularly the fiscal situation, international competitiveness and financial stability. The outlook for the fiscal situation calls for continued vigilance and caution. Official projections of the deficit ratio for 2012 and 2013 have been revised downward, remaining below the Maastricht threshold of 3%. However debt forecasts have been generally revised moderately upward, to levels projected above the 70% level in 2012 and 2013.
In the current crisis the National Debt Office has also helped to improve liquidity conditions in the financial system by auctioning extra treasury bills. Ultimately, the Government and the Riksdag also have a responsibility for financial stability if it becomes apparent that the initiatives of the authorities are unable to bring a crisis under control. These days the Riksbank is working very closely with other authorities to monitor developments and discuss how to handle the situation. Like other Swedish authorities, we are also in frequent contact with our foreign colleagues and with market participants. As I mentioned previously, the Riksbank has helped where we could to improve liquidity and market conditions. But what have we actually done? What has the Riksbank done? First of all, we have taken several general measures aimed at all of the Riksbank's counterparties. The purpose of the measures is to solve two problems with the Swedish banks: inadequate access to long-term financing in Swedish krona and a limited ability to gain access to US dollars. The lack of long-term financing is due to the lack of mutual trust among the banks during the crisis, which have had a negative impact on the interbank lending markets. One consequence is that the banks have been forced to borrow for shorter terms. Even if it has been possible to get financing, liquidity management have become much more difficult for the banks and risks also have increased.

Together with the measures that the National Debt Office have taken, the Riksbank's lending of both Swedish krona and US dollars contribute to a general strengthening of liquidity primarily in the Swedish credit markets, thereby also creating conditions for the markets to return to more normal conditions and allowing financial stability to be maintained. Second of all the Riksbank has – as I just mentioned – also provided special liquidity assistance to Kaupthing Bank Sweden. This loan is against collateral and with an interest rate that is above normal lending costs. Even if this measure is aimed at an individual bank, it should also be viewed as an initiative to safeguard financial stability and to maintain confidence in Sweden's entire credit and payment system. The decision is based on the assessment that although the bank is solvent, it is unable to perform its obligations without  4  BIS Review 125/2008  liquidity assistance. What happens next with Kaupthing Sweden is mainly a question for the bank's owner, the Icelandic state. The liquidity support to Kaupthing differs in many regards from the Riksbank's other measures. In this case the support is aimed at an individual institution and not at money market participants in general. In Kaupthing's case the point was to enable the bank to obtain any funding whatsoever and thereby continue to exist.
The only periods in which persistence was lower than in the 1990s was in the early 1930s and early 1960s. 2  If index-linked contracts were widely used the relevant real rate would be the index-linked rate. And if the risk premium were determined largely in an integrated world capital market without frictions then again the real rate would be the riskless indexlinked rate. 2  BIS Review 68/2002  Table 1 Inflation in the UK Mean  St. dev  1950-1959  4.14  1.06  1960-1969  3.65  0.72  1970-1979  13.07  1.81  1980-1992  6.40  1.14  1993-2002  2.49  0.24  1950-2002  5.93  1.41  Note: Mean inflation is the total increase in the quarterly price level (RPI until 1974, RPIX after 1974) over the period indicated, expressed as a four-quarter growth rate. Standard deviation is calculated on quarterly inflation rates (not annualised) over the period indicated. Data up to 2002 Q3. Source: Bank of England calculations based on ONS data.

The same menu, consisting of exactly the same brand products, would cost £ today. The food basket has increased in price by a factor of 48. A vacuum cleaner, if you wanted one in 1910, cost £ That is more than 6 years worth of food based on the menu used in the previous example. A vacuum cleaner was an item of such luxury that owners would invite their friends round to ‘Hoover parties’ to show off their prized possession. Over the years, the price of food increased in nominal terms by a factor of 48, but the price of vacuum cleaners stayed roughly the same. Today you can still buy a vacuum cleaner for £ But that is only 47 days of food shopping, rather than 6 years. As vacuum cleaners became cheaper relative to food, people bought more of them - ignoring such change would introduce a substitution bias. If there is any degree of substitutability between products, then rational consumers would have taken account of such changes in relative prices, and the weight of this particular good in the consumption bundle may  BIS Review 68/2002  13  have changed. The overall result of the substitution is that the expenditure share of electrical 6 appliances has not changed much, at least not in the past 50 years.
But I will also caution that we will forfeit these gains if we once again fall under the spell of the three lies of finance that helped cause the global financial crisis. To resist their siren calls, we must maintain the new institutional frameworks created in its wake. Globally, the most important of these is the Financial Stability Board (FSB). Having agreed all the major international reforms to address the causes of the crisis, the FSB is now pivoting to focus on their timely, effective and consistent implementation. Mindful of history, the FSB is also scanning the horizon to identify and address new vulnerabilities that emerge as the structure of our economies and financial systems change. We know we cannot rest on our laurels. Financial history rhymes all too frequently, with enormous costs to our citizens. We must remain vigilant, resist the three lies of finance, and reinforce some core financial truths. II. THE THREE LIES OF FINANCE “This Time Is Different” The first lie of finance is the four most expensive words in the English language: “This Time Is Different.”1 This misconception is usually the product of an initial success, with early progress gradually building into a blind faith in a new era of effortless prosperity. It took a revolution in macroeconomic policy to help win the battles against the high and unstable inflation, rising unemployment and volatile growth of the 1970s and 1980s.

16 Carney (2014), Inclusive capitalism: creating a sense of the systemic. 17 They have also, over the centuries, been beset by poor behaviour, as shown by the FMSB’s comprehensive review of misconduct over the past two centuries. The history of financial fraud has rhymed all too frequently. See FMSB Annual Report (2017). 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  Repeated episodes of misconduct – such as the Libor and FX scandals – called into question the social licence that markets need to innovate and grow.18 Rather than being professional and open, markets became informal and clubby. Rather than competing on merit, participants colluded online. Rather than everyone taking responsibility for their actions, few were held to account. The crisis reminded us that real markets don’t just happen; they depend on the quality of market infrastructure for their effectiveness, resilience and fairness. Robust market infrastructure is a public good in constant danger of under-provision, not least because the best markets innovate continually. This risk can only be overcome if all market actors, public and private, recognise their responsibilities for the system as a whole. III. TRUE FINANCE So this time is no different. Markets don’t always clear. And we can suffer from their amorality. What to do with such knowledge? And how to retain it? To resist the siren calls of the three lies of finance, policymakers and market participants must bind themselves to the mast.
Thus, our banknotes promote the historical and cultural heritage of our country and highlight the most powerful achievements of many prominent historical figures through centuries. I feel good when I see that the two first denominations of this series, 200 lek and 5000 lek, put in circulation since September 2019, are welcomed by the public, have met the expectations of the Bank, and already are gradually becoming a sustainable part of currency in circulation, by supporting the continuous strengthening the quality of banknotes in circulation, aimed at preserving their integrity, in relation with the public, and upholding a dignified image of both the Bank of Albania and the Albanian state. Today, nearly two years later following the launching and the successful issuance in circulation of the first two denominations, the Bank of Albania is launching the two other banknotes, part of the new series of the Albanian banknotes, the denominations: 1000 lek and 10000 lek. The latter is a completely new denomination in the series of the Albanian banknotes. The printing and issue into circulation for the first time of the new banknote with the largest value, 10000 lekë, represents in itself, the adoption of the banknotes’ structure to the evolution of the structure of prices and wages, the development the electronic payments, and of the other indicators related to the management of currency.

The North-West and Sogn og Fjordane: In the North-West, there are still only a few contacts that report an increase in employment. Most companies can increase activity by 10-15 per cent without altering their workforce. Retail trade and construction are the only sectors that report an increase in employment. Construction companies  4  BIS Review 61/2004  report some signs of labour market tightness, due in part to the start-up of work on the Ormen Lange project. The use of foreign contract labour in connection with seasonal work in the fish processing industry, the hotel sector, tourism and the engineering industry is increasing. Growth in household demand, petroleum investment and increased activity in the business sector are paving the way for a rise in employment in the period ahead. On the other hand, intensified competition and continued rationalisation in the business sector may have a dampening impact on labour demand. Developments in real economic variables are mirrored in credit markets. In recent years, household income has shown solid growth, and household confidence has been high. Corporate earnings, however, have been low, and until recently companies have primarily focused on enhancing efficiency. Total credit growth is rising approximately on a par with GDP growth. The composition of credit growth in the past year, however, has given ambiguous signals to our interest-rate setting. Growth in household borrowing is high, while growth in corporate borrowing is low. Developments in corporate borrowing shadow developments in corporate investment. Household debt has increased sharply since 1994.