samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It took 50 years before the interest rate returned to this level, which we now regard as abnormally low. However, prevailing views on monetary policy at that time is probably of more interest. Brofoss said the following: “Increasing the discount rate will probably be widely regarded as the most important monetary policy measure. The interest rate is, however, a controversial instrument, both in Norway and in other countries. Nonetheless, an increasing number of countries use it. Whether the purported good results can be ascribed solely to interest rate policy is another question. The effects in Norway may differ somewhat from the effects in other countries. Countries with major currencies can influence short-term capital movements via the interest rate. This is only possible to a limited extent in Norway. A substantial share of business investment is self-financed and is not affected by the interest rate. The same applies to shipowners that finance new ships built in other countries with their foreign exchange earnings. As a cost factor, the interest rate will probably curb debt-financed investment. The question is whether this will eliminate the lowest priority investments. In the long run, we are dependent on long-term investment. Interest rate changes may therefore have adverse effects in Norway that do not occur in other countries.” This stands in contrast to the current view, as expressed by Norges Bank’s delegating authority, the Ministry of Finance:2 “The new guidelines for economic policy also imply that monetary policy has been given a clear role in stabilising economic developments.

Economic developments were marked by high and variable inflation. Inflation rose gradually and it took a long time before it fell. The absence of a nominal anchor was one of the main reasons behind the pronounced swings in the Norwegian economy. With a policy of low interest rates and devaluations, inflation took root. Nominal interest rates were kept at a low level even though inflation and the value of tax-deductible interest expenses rose. Frequent devaluations from 1976 were unable in the long term to prevent a decline in the manufacturing sector. On the contrary, they proved to be self-reinforcing. The wide fluctuations culminated in a credit boom in the mid-1980s. A pronounced downturn and high unemployment followed at the end of the 1980s. I would like to highlight three factors that have taken on particular importance for economic policy in general, and monetary policy in particular. – First, economic agents look to the future when they make decisions about consumption and investments, wages and prices, and take account of not only current economic policy, but also their  4  Bjerve, Petter Jakob (1981): “Kva hendte i Norge i 1970-åra - konjunkturpolitisk?” (What happened in Norway in the 1970s in terms of counter-cyclical policy? ), Sosialøkonomen No. 5, 1981. 5  Official Norwegian Report (NOU) 1973:36 Om prisproblemene (price problems). 2  BIS Review 36/2004  expecations of future economic policy.
That would replace what to my mind is the fuzzy distinction between what are termed “Common equity tier 1”, “Additional tier 1” and “Tier 2” capital – not all of which is capital in the ordinary sense of the term that it can absorb losses outside of liquidation.2 The other element of this policy – which, again, the FSB will be addressing – is where in a group GCLAC should be issued from, ie whether from the group holding company, from intermediate regional or national holding companies, or from operating banks and dealers. This turns on the type of resolution strategy most appropriate for a particular group; ie topdown or Single Point of Entry (SPE) where a whole-group resolution is executed from the topco, or Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) where a group is split into parts which, as necessary, are resolved separately. Of course, it is in operating companies – banks and dealers – that life-threatening losses are generated. Where those losses exceed the equity base of an operating subsidiary, they need either to be absorbed by debt issued into the external market or to be passed up the group structure via intra-group debt or guarantees. The first – GCLAC, ie term debt, issued to the market – is associated with Multiple-Point-of-Entry resolutions.

The Bank of England now has extensive powers as a micro supervisor of individual firms and a macro supervisor of the financial system as a whole. Parliament has set objectives for both – primarily, safety and soundness for the PRA,  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and the resilience of the system for the FPC. But unlike in monetary policy, we do not have a quantified target – and, to be clear, we do not think that that would be possible. To have such power with limited transparency would be uncomfortable. If nothing else, it would leave the Bank in a position where supervision was of interest only when it obviously goes wrong. We need to engage society – public, Parliament – in debates about the resilience of the financial system and how we are supervising it in the good times as well as in bad times. The FPC and PRA have already taken various steps to help with this – the six-monthly Financial Stability Review, the published Record of FPC policy meetings, the Committee’s statement on the use of its directive powers, the PRA’s Approach document and annual report, and so on. But stress testing can provide a quantum leap in transparency and accountability. For example, the FPC will need to be able to defend its choice of stress against questions and criticisms that the scenarios are too extreme or not tough enough. That will implicitly be a healthy debate about objectives.
The analyses in Inflation Report 1/2004 indicate that inflation will remain low for a period, then rise through the summer and autumn. The depreciation of the krone from January 2003 and up to last winter is expected to push up prices for imported consumer goods, while the recent appreciation will have a dampening effect. 2  See Kenneth Rogoff, Aasim M Husain, Ashoka Mody, Robin Brooks and Nienke Oomes (2003): “Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes”, IMF Working Paper, 03/243, Eduardo Levy-Yeyati and Frederico Sturzenegger (2003): “To Float or to Fix: Evidence on the Impact of Exchange Rate Regimes on Growth”, American Economic Review, September 2003, pp 1173-93, and Jeannine Bailliu, Robert Lafrance and Jean-Francois Perrault (2003): “Does Exchange Rate Policy Matter for Growth?”, International Finance, 6:3, pp 381-414. BIS Review 34/2004  5  In both March and April, inflation in Norway was approximately as projected in the Inflation Report. In April, the year-on-year rise in the CPI-ATE was 0.2 per cent. Adjusted for some temporary factors, the year-on-year rise was 0.5 per cent.3 The rate of increase in the last three months was 1.1 per cent annualised.4 TNS Gallup’s expectations survey indicates that expectations concerning inflation ahead are stable at about 2½ per cent. As you know, Norges Bank has established a regional network. In the interview round conducted earlier this spring, our contacts in Region South-West reported that the pick-up in the economy is broadening out and gaining strength, and that it is no longer solely driven by stronger household demand.

In the euro area, inflation has been approximately in line with the objective defined by the European Central Bank. The preliminary estimate for May points towards rising inflation, particularly as a result of higher oil prices. Capacity utilisation in the euro area is low and unemployment remains high. Growth potential is weaker than in the US, although GDP growth picked up in the first quarter. As in the US, private consumption is an important factor driving growth. Increased net exports also contributed to growth in the euro area in the first quarter. Interest rate expectations in the euro area have also been revised upwards somewhat recently. The market now expects the ECB to raise interest rates at the end of 2004 or the beginning of 2005. Interest rate expectations were continuously revised downwards up to March 2004. Interest rates abroad have been unusually low for 2½ years. This has been the greatest challenge for our monetary policy. Even though a somewhat swifter rise is now expected, it appears that interest rates among our most important trading partners will remain low for a period ahead. In Norway, output growth has picked up after a growth pause. The interest rate reductions since 2002 have contributed to the turnaround and a soft landing for the economy. Private consumption is showing fairly strong growth. Household demand will probably be the most important driving force in the Norwegian economy in the period ahead.
This is evident in the individual customer group, with almost 60 percent having no access to formal channels of credit, 37 percent of which are low-income consumers with annual income less than 100,000 baht. Access to deposit for the individual customer group is not as grave a problem as access to credit, although about one-eighth of this group still has no access to deposit. Quantitative gap: corporate customer group In terms of quantitative gap, it displays a similar pattern of deficiency in the corporate customer group to that of the previous group, but to a much lesser extent, with less than a quarter of corporate customers lacking access to credit and a mere half percent to deposit. Qualitative gap: the urban low income group and the rural low income group The survey reveals qualitative gaps among low-income customers that bear the brunt of inadequate financial services. Low-income customers in urban and rural areas face common problem of limited access to distribution channels of formal financial service providers, forcing some urban low-income customers to resort to loan sharks as the main source of financing. The rural low-income group in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors also encounters the problem of limited choices of financial services, while the low-income customers in agricultural sector face additional problem of high funding cost.

This calls for bank management to establish adequate security measures, contingent plans and auditing standards within their system of internal control that should serve to monitor reputational risk, strategic risk and other risks. Balanced objective of financial institution stability and the needs for development, competition and level playing field Recognizing the needs for a salient financial system with sound and strong financial institutions on the one hand, and the benefits of competition unleashed by innovation and evolving development on the other, regulators are faced with the challenge to achieve the latter without stifling the former. It is therefore our duties to create a regulatory environment that offers a level playing field in which innovation is nurtured and financial institutions are encouraged to operate their businesses in a safe and sound manner. To foster innovation: Mindful of the needs to keep up with the development of the market, we regularly communicate with market participants and practitioners - this Conference is an example. In addition, at the Bank of Thailand, we develop a policy issuance process that is methodological and is a product of consultation with all stakeholders. We often seek the view of our fellow regulators to ensure that our policies are in line with market and international best practices - in addition to helping us anticipate problems that we might face during implementation phase. In addition, the Bank of Thailand’s senior and middle management regularly exchange views with those from other central banks and regulatory bodies in both regional and international forums.
The statement shall comprise the first two parts of the report by the Zimmerli Expert Commission (on the creation of integrated financial market oversight and sanctions). The third part of the project (examination of expanded prudential oversight) will be dealt with at a later point in time. The Federal Council has taken various concerns of the National Bank into account. As regards the division of tasks between the supervisory board and the management board in particular, the Federal Council has moved closer to the view held by the National Bank, which believes it important that the power of disposition remains with the management board. As a non-professional body, the supervisory board is inevitably faced with conflicts of interest, which could prove an obstacle to individual dispositions. However, the experience and know-how of the supervisory board can be fully exploited with regard to the deliberation of questions of principle, budget and important staff issues. Furthermore, we support increased budgetary autonomy of the Federal Financial Market Oversight Authority (FINMA), as we are convinced that a financial centre that is as complex and significant as the Swiss financial centre requires an authority with a supervisory and management board whose powers are equal to those of the corresponding bodies of banks and insurance companies. The National Bank backs the project regarding the FINMA Act. We continue to view the integration of financial market oversight as a means to improve oversight rather than as an end in itself.

During this period, the Albanian banking sector continued to increase its lending to the economy, albeit at lower paces. Difficulties added to the real sector of the economy and the exchange rate depreciation by about 12% in 2009 were followed by decreased credit quality and increased bank provisions to face the credit risk. Distinguished participants, The pre-crisis phenomena and those that occurred in 2008–2010, offer a valuable experience to economic actors and public authorities of each country in our region. Not to mention all, I would like to dwell only on some of them, which I consider important for enhancing the sustainability of our economy and of the financial system in the future. First, the region needs a better balance in the factors supporting the sustainable economic growth. I think that the public authorities should assign priority to increase in investments and implementation of stimulus policies for developing the competitive sectors. In this way, the country’s export capacity would grow by creating better conditions for a sustainable improvement of the external balance of our economy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second, closely related to the first issue, I would highlight the need for undertaking and deepening the structural reforms. This strategic objective remains a constant priority for each of our economy.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in October 2008, the turmoil mutated into a full-blown financial “crisis” and many market segments seized up. The “Great Moderation” gave way to the “Great Recession”, characterised by a massive fall in industrial output and trade. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Policy interventions were made by central banks and other public authorities to restore and secure the orderly functioning of markets and economies. I like to think of the interventions by public authorities as “lines of defence” against the crisis. They proved successful in guaranteeing those authorities’ ability to continue delivering macroeconomic and financial stability against the crisis. Let me recall briefly the three main lines of defence: central banks increased their provision of liquidity and financial intermediation services; monetary and fiscal authorities adjusted their policies in order to mitigate the macroeconomic impact of the crisis; and governments implemented a variety of measures in support of the financial sector. The government measures adopted in response to the economic crisis – both those related to fiscal policy and those in support of the banking sector – did not come cheap. This is true not only in the euro area, but – more generally – in all advanced economies. Together with the impact on government budgets of the massive economic contraction recorded during the crisis, they led to a significant deterioration in the public finances of a number of economies in the euro area.

Indeed, after inflation had moved on a markedly rising trend in the first half of 2008, prices slowed sharply in the closing months of the year as a result of the abrupt turnaround in oil and food prices and of the marked sluggishness of demand. This deceleration has become more pronounced in 2009 to date, with the annual rate of change of the CPI falling in March, April and May (-0.9% in this latter month). While the CPI trajectory reflects the correction of some price rises in the most volatile components in the opening months of 2008, the ongoing recession, which is severely affecting consumption, is prompting an adjustment in prices and margins that is beginning to impact services and the other less volatile components. And this means that the price growth differential with the euro area has turned negative, and will foreseeably remain so in the coming months. The CPI is expected to continue to temporarily post negative rates of change in the coming months and, once the statistical effect linked to higher oil prices in the first half of 2008 is stripped out, inflation should resume positive although very moderate rates of change. This price behaviour is in line with the improvements in competitiveness required to lessen the scope and costs of the recession, to prompt the necessary adjustments and to embark on a sound recovery.
Mervyn King: A Governor looks back – and forward Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London, London, 19 June 2013. *  *  *  My Lord Mayor, Ladies and Gentlemen: Chancellor: thank you for those generous words. It has been a privilege to work with you over the past three years, a period of great change both at home and abroad. Your support for the Bank has been much appreciated at this end of town, and you have changed for the better the regulatory framework that oversees the City. But we both know that the past few years would have been much more difficult without the continual support of two people. And I am so pleased that both Frances and Barbara are with us tonight. And I’m particularly happy, George, that neither you nor I have to speak after either of them because experience suggests that we would suffer from the comparison. Lord Mayor: let me thank you too for presiding over my final Mansion House Dinner. We have enjoyed many musical evenings together, and Barbara and I look forward to sharing many more with you and Clare after you shed the chains of office later this year. The City has been extremely fortunate to benefit from your energy, drive and can-do attitude as Lord Mayor. I shall not detain you this evening with a retrospective examination of my time as Governor.

Thomas Jordan also referred to this phenomenon in his remarks on exchange rates. Replacing Libor with SARON  I would now like to update you on the work that is under way to replace Libor with SARON as a reference interest rate. Since the UK Financial Conduct Authority announced nearly a year ago that it would not guarantee the continuation of Libor beyond 2021, this topic has attracted significant public interest. Alternative reference interest rates have now been identified for all currencies in which Libor is used as a reference rate. In Switzerland, the National Working Group on Swiss franc Reference Interest Rates (NWG) is drawing up  Page 2/5  Berne, 13 December 2018 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  recommendations to ensure a smooth transition. Many of the leading market participants sit on the NWG, which is co-chaired by the SNB and a representative from the private sector. The SNB principally acts as a facilitator and is responsible for running the secretariat. 1 It also maintains links with international bodies charged with preparing recommendations for reference interest rate reforms and ensuring a well-coordinated transition. In October 2017, the NWG recommended that the Swiss franc Libor be replaced by the Swiss Average Rate Overnight (SARON) used for overnight transactions in the secured segment. SARON has already gained in importance as a reference interest rate. In the course of 2017, an interest rate curve developed based on swap transactions referencing SARON.
Andrew Bailey: Regulating international banks Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Deputy Governor of Prudential Regulation and Chief Executive Officer of the Prudential Regulation Authority at the Bank of England, at the British Bankers Association Annual International Banking Conference, London, 17 October 2013. *  *  *  Today is the BBA’s annual international banking conference, and I therefore want to stick to that theme and explain the PRA’s thinking on issues concerning the pressures on international banking business and the establishment and supervision of foreign bank branches in London. Let me start with the luxury of a wider reflection. Before I joined the Bank of England over 28 years ago, I was an economic historian, with a specialism in nineteenth century economic history. All a bit esoteric you might say. Well, it is the case that the late nineteenth century world economy was more open – and, to use a phrase I don’t much like, “more globalised” – than at any time in at least the first fifty years of the twentieth century. Moreover, the rate of openness in the world economy probably only truly approached late nineteenth century levels in the last twenty or thirty years. The backlash to greater openness that came in the first half of the twentieth century is quite often attributed to the actual or perceived distributional effects of greater cross-border trade, flows of capital and flows of people. The world economy in many ways went backwards in the first half of the last century.

But I would like to point out that the Thai economy has not just slowed down recently. In fact, it has been growing slower for more than a decade, both in terms of quantity and quality of growth. Without enough quantity and quality of growth, we will not be able to grow sustainably and it will be a long way until Thailand can get out of the middle-income trap. The problem is that we are now caught in the middle- unable to compete with either low- or high-income countries. If this trend continues, it will prevent us from reaping the full benefits of future economic integration. Part of this may stem from structural changes in Thailand’s endowment. Labor is now scarce, increasingly mismatched and becoming more expensive. So, labor-intensive driven growth strategy is no longer applicable to Thailand. It is important that we create new sources of growth. To achieve this goal, an improvement in technology, education and labor productivity via higher investment in physical and human capital are needed. Another thing I would like to note is that, as in most developing economies, economic development is often associated with rising income inequality and social exclusion. Thailand is no exemption. In fact, the economy has been growing unevenly. But growth without inclusiveness is not sustainable, because it can lead to deterioration of social solidarity, political uncertainty and finally affect economic growth. Thailand’s economic development should, therefore, properly address the issue of equitable growth going forward.