samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Given this objective, the monetary policy has been adjusted to avoid persistent deviations from 3% due to the second-round effects of supply shocks or the widening output gap. This is why the Board increased the monetary policy rate in 25 basis points in July, August and September 2007, to a current level of 5.75%. In September, due to the turbulences in global financial markets and their possible consequences on the Chilean GDP growth, the Board decided to change the upward bias in the monetary policy rate to a neutral bias. This was then confirmed in the monetary policy meeting of October, when the Board decided to maintain the monetary policy rate and remarked that future trends would depend on new information and its implications on inflation forecasts. This time the Board added that the future of monetary policy would depend on developments of the World Economy, the eventual propagation of the inflationary shock to other prices, wage trends, medium and long-term expectations of inflation, and the evolution of the output gap. The market has also adjusted its expectations on the future course of the monetary policy, given both the news on the internal inflationary front and the expected evolution of the worldwide GPD growth. As a result, financial prices have internalized the fact that the monetary policy rate will increase another 25 basis points during this year and another equal increase during 2008.

Although different levels of haircuts are applied to the different categories, one might say that the Eurosystem also allows banks to use collateral easily where either the interbank Repo markets are less liquid (such as in category 3+4) or where there is even no interbank Repo market at all (such as for non-marketable assets). Banks have the choice to use more or less liquid assets as collateral, a facility which constitutes a big advantage in critical liquidity conditions such as those currently experienced by market participants. BIS Review 120/2007  7  Some recent figures: The available eligible marketable collateral amounts to EUR 9 trillion. While the amount submitted to the Eurosystem nearly reached 11% of all eligible collateral by 31 August 2007 (nearly EUR 1 trillion), around 6% is effectively used to collateralize outstanding credit operations with the Eurosystem. By the end of 2006, uncovered bank bonds had become the largest single asset class put forward in Eurosystem operations (31%), surpassing government bonds for the first time (21%). ABS have also shown a steady growth, reaching 11.4 % of all collateral submitted by the end of 2006, and 19% by the end of August 2007 (+4% in August 2007). The year 2007 has also shown a steady increase in the use of credit claims, which by end of July 2007 represented roughly 10% of all assets submitted as collateral to the Eurosystem.
To sum up, despite the fact that nearly half of the CPI is composed of energy, food, and administered goods prices, it is evident that monetary policy is still capable of keeping the main inflation trend under control via other items. As stated also in the last two years’ monetary policy statements, the inflation target would be changed only if sharp and long-term deviations from the target occur due to factors beyond the control of the monetary policy such that the medium-term targets no longer make sense. Within this framework, while considering the possibility that inflation might be exceeding the target for a while in the short run, the Central Bank maintains the 4 percent inflation target hinging on the evaluation that the general trend of inflation is downwards. The forecasts presented in the Inflation Reports will continue to refer to two-year periods. In phases when inflation is above the target, the forecasts presented in the Inflation Report become more important. The forecasts inform the public about the path that inflation will follow while moving towards the medium term target. In other words, the reference value established for economic units is the inflation forecast in the short-run and the inflation target in the long-run. Another message that inflation forecasts contain is the monetary policy stance.

The Central Bank continued to withdraw the excess liquidity in the market mainly via New Turkish Lira deposit transactions in the Interbank Money Market within the CBRT and repo transactions in the Repo and Reverse Repo Market of the Istanbul Stock Exchange, on an overnight basis. However, when the excess liquidity withdrawn via overnight operations increased, the Central Bank has started to issue liquidity bills from July onwards in addition to its overnight operations in order to increase the flexibility and efficiency of liquidity management. Overnight interest rates in the market were generally around the borrowing rate of the Central Bank, depending on the withdrawal of the excess liquidity by the Central Bank via overnight operations. Hence, the borrowing rate of the Central Bank has continued to be an indicator for money markets. BIS Review 4/2008  7  Based on the information currently available, i)  The increase in base money,  ii)  Coupon and principle redemption by the Treasury to the Central Bank,  iii)  Treasury’s being net foreign exchange debt payer,  will have a lowering effect, while; iv)  The Central Bank’s net foreign exchange purchases,  v)  Interest payments to be made by the Central Bank for required reserves and excess liquidity absorbing transactions,  vi)  The decline in Treasury cash accounts within the Central Bank  will have an increasing effect on the level of the liquidity in the market in 2008.
This is especially true for low value transactions and cross-border remittances, where fees can be as high as 13% of the value of funds transferred.4 These high costs impede not only remittances but also bilateral trade and investment. We therefore need to work on solutions that will promote competition and innovations, making these services more affordable. While a complete solution for cross-border transfers is yet to emerge, significant progress has been made with respect to payment solutions within each GMS country. In Vietnam, OnePay allows customers to make financial transactions on e-commerce websites, as well as deposit funds into their bank accounts without visiting a physical bank branch. Wing in Cambodia, BCEL in Laos and Wave Money in Myanmar all provide instant money payments and transfers through mobile phones to recipients who do not have bank accounts. In Thailand, PromptPay is a modern, faster payment system that provides free transfer services for transactions up to 5,000 baht (or about 150 US dollars), one of the cheapest rates in the world. PromptPay allows individuals and businesses to transfer money between banks and e-wallets using their mobile phone or citizen ID numbers.

Would it be remunerated or not and how appealing should any remuneration be versus commercial bank money held on deposit accounts? Would we apply limits or restrictions on its use to control demand in normal times or in stress? How and to what extent should data and privacy be protected? And crucially, running though all of these design questions of the question where the public/private boundary lie; which functions and services should be provided by the central bank and which by the private sector? These are profound questions and choices that would inform any decision to launch a CBDC. We certainly do not have the answers today. We should however recognise a couple of realities. First, that the form of money has always been evolving and that technology and consequent changes in the way we want to live and transact with each other are now driving rapid change in money and payments. We cannot hold that back. We need to think about and debate these issues now. And in thinking about CBDC, we should think about the role it could play in the future and how money and payments might evolve in its absence. Second, changes in the form of money have implications that go wider than finance and economics. We should recognise there are questions about privacy, competition, inclusion, the role of the public sector and other broader societal issues. These will require the engagement of the political authorities and will need broader debate.
“The Impact of the Great Recession on School District Finances: Evidence from New York,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 534; Chakrabarti, Rajashri and Sarah Sutherland. 2012. “Precarious Slopes? The Great Recession, Federal Stimulus, and New Jersey Schools,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 538; and watch for two forthcoming Liberty Street Economics Blog posts on January 30 and February 1, 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

The banks’ trust in other banks dropped to a level where interbank lending almost came to a complete halt. Confidence and credibility is the core in money and finance. What good is a 100 dollar note if there is no trust in its worth to buy 100 dollars of goods and service. When confidence and credibility have been destroyed it may take a long time before they are restored. An example from Norwegian monetary history illustrates this. The example is from the time of the birth of Norges Bank. The successful establishment of Norges Bank in 1816 played a key role in stabilizing the external value of the Norwegian currency after the chaos following the Napoleonic wars in Europe. The previous joint currency with Denmark had collapsed and two attempts to restore the currency based on broad guarantees had failed, first from the Danish government in 1813 and second from the hastily called Constitutional Assembly in 1814. The successful restoration of credibility in the Norwegian currency was finally brought about by the establishment of Norges Bank, but it took a long time. Norges Bank was in full operation already in 1818, but since the Parliament postponed the decision to reintroduce silver convertibility, the value of the notes continued to fall until the Parliament changed its strategy in 1822. In this year a course to reintroduce silver convertibility was set. Convertibility was introduced, first at poor (low) rates far from silver parity, but as confidence improved the convertibility rate was gradually moved closer to parity.
Structural measures As a complement to the efforts to date regarding systemic banks, the authorities in several countries have adopted or are considering adopting reforms involving changes to banking business models, with legal restrictions on the size of credit institutions or the activities they may pursue. Examples of this are the Volcker rule, introduced in United States; the measures considered by an independent commission chaired by John Vickers in the United Kingdom; and the proposals of a group of experts chaired by the Governor of the bank of Finland, Erkki Liikaanen, in the European Union. Broadly, these measures seek to restrict the size of banks or to simplify their structure, segregating specific activities which are considered essential, such as taking deposits, from potential losses in other banking business areas, especially those related to trading. These reforms might help reduce the complexity and size of banks, and their interconnectedness with the so-called shadow banking system. They would thus contribute to facilitating bank management and supervision, and, where necessary, to simplifying bank resolution. However, these proposals and the measures considered have so far remained outside the coordination of the Financial Stability Board. As a result, the main jurisdictions have drawn up their proposals in isolation, and there are significant differences between them. For instance, there is no consensus on the boundaries of the activities to be segregated or on the legal procedures to do so.

It is essential that this cooperative approach should be maintained in the future. Otherwise, we would run the risk of seeing the degree of integration of financial systems slip backwards, and that, along with the trade protectionism we have so far managed to avoid, would be a most negative consequence of the crisis. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
The quest for efficiency in statistical reporting and compilation As we have seen, data - whether micro data or aggregate variables - are an essential ingredient for analysing and designing economic policies. But at the same time, reporting data are not free. This always means a burden on reporting agents. And I think that the responsibility of all of us as authorities is to minimise that burden and establish the mechanisms which ensure data collection is as efficient as possible and smooth the ensuing interactions with agents to check data quality. In a sense, collecting micro data may help reduce the reporting burden on economic agents (such as banks, investment funds, non-financial companies, etc.) if they are able to replace other aggregate requirements imposed by the authorities. Moreover, these requirements may sometimes change over time, thus demanding a continuous and costly adaptation of the agents’ reporting schemes, including complex IT developments. But, in any case, data collection imposes short-term costs on agents. Public institutions should be sensitive to their demands to establish an efficient system to collect information, avoiding overlaps and harnessing synergies. In order to tackle this issue there are already some data-sharing mechanisms in place across statistical institutions. Indeed, the special relationship between INE and the Banco de España in the national accounts and balance of payments fields is a good example. Yet more can probably be done both at the national and international level. On the international front there are good practices we can explore.

The goal here is to have a better knowledge of the overall datasets available at the institution (which may point to some synergies, overlapping and gaps), and to establish good data governance procedures and a technically sound platform to host and exploit all that information. At the European level, several initiatives are in motion as well. First, the European Commission has asked the European Banking Authority (EBA) to conduct a feasibility study to explore the possibilities for statistical, supervisory and resolution reporting to converge, thus reducing the reporting costs of financial institutions. The ESCB proposal to the EBA feasibility report –published last September- is based on three main avenues of work: a) a common standard data dictionary; b) the harmonisation of reporting formats, the removal of duplications and improved data-sharing; and c) increased cooperation between authorities and reporting agents. Linked to this project, the ESCB is developing an Integrated Reporting Framework whose aim is to reduce the reporting burden for banks and to ensure the effort made by any credit institution does not depend on the particular euro area country in which a bank is resident. To this end, the purpose is to integrate the existing ESCB statistical data requirements for banks into a single, standardised reporting framework, making it homogeneous across the EU. There are also initiatives to explore the role played by national central banks as producers of statistics at the euro area level.
At the same time, I believe this would presuppose a reasonably balanced economic situation in Sweden, with strong confidence in economic policy, as well as broad political support for ERM2 membership. While there may be some cause for concern about conflicts between an exchange rate target in ERM2 and the direct inflation target, this risk should not be exaggerated. The broad bands for the exchange rate mechanism, together with experience in other countries in the run-up to the monetary union, show that no serious conflicts need arise. If market players are confident that the central rate in ERM2 will be chosen as the conversion rate for participation in the euro area—as they have every reason to be in that this was the case for each of the 5  BIS Review 48/1999  eleven countries that currently make up the monetary union—then the krona’s market rate is unlikely to deviate all that much from its central rate. This was clearly the case for the currencies that have already been converted into euro. Once it was clear, for example, that Finland would be joining the euro area, the markka remained stable and very close to its central rate. In practice this would mean that during ERM membership, Swedish interest rates with relatively long maturities would converge on the levels that apply in the euro area. As the date for joining the union approaches, the very short market rates would be increasingly affected.

Additionally, in the second half of 2012 they were subject under the Assistance Programme for Spain’s financial system agreed with the European Union to an exhaustive accounting review and a stress test, the result of which led to the recapitalisation and restructuring of certain banks. Moreover, during 2013 several measures were taken to ensure that adequate provisioning levels were maintained, which included, most notably, the review of refinanced and restructured loans. –  As a result of the criteria issued by the Banco de España in 2013 for the proper classification of these operations, Spanish banks reclassified under an inferior category operations amounting to € billion, which required approximately € billion of additional provisions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  –  To sum up, between 1 January 2008 and 30 June 2014 the provisioning drive by Spanish banks amounted to € billion, that is to say, provisions amounting to the equivalent of 25% of Spain’s GDP in 2013. Given all these measures, the starting point for Spanish banks was expected to be generally better than that of those in the other European countries as a whole regarding the more demanding criteria for recording assets. And, the outcome of the Comprehensive Assessment which has just been published confirms these expectations. 9. Conclusions  The disclosure of the results today marks the end of a period of just under one year in which all the parties involved – the ECB, the national authorities, the auditors and the banks themselves – have made a sterling effort.
In this context, the Stability and Growth Pact is a crucial element. Its aim is to foster the pursuit of disciplined and sustainable fiscal policies in the euro area. In so doing, it can make a significant contribution to the establishment of favourable conditions for sustained economic growth and high employment in the medium to long term. It would be counterproductive if national fiscal policies started to discontinue their efforts in the light of the achievement of Monetary Union and the currently positive price outlook. I am not fully convinced that consolidation efforts are currently being undertaken with sufficient determination in all participating Member States. Monetary policy alone - however well designed and implemented - cannot solve Europe’s economic problems. Appropriate structural reforms implemented by national governments are of the utmost importance. Much progress is required in this broad area. Moreover, continued wage BIS Review 9/1999  –2–  moderation in both the public and private sectors would contribute to the reduction of the unacceptably high level of unemployment in many parts of the euro area. Unemployment in the euro area is largely structural in origin. Implementing too lax a monetary policy will not solve this problem, but rather exacerbate it over the medium term, as inflation distorts investment and savings decisions, raises the risk premium in long-term interest rates and undermines the allocative efficiency of the price mechanism. Only effective structural policies that improve the flexibility and efficiency of labour and goods markets can reduce unemployment in a successful and lasting manner.

Discussions continue, as part of the review initiated by the Financial Secretary, and I look forward to more of the technical scrutiny of ideas which can be quite enjoyable and revealing. 19. Meanwhile, elsewhere in the region, the full doses of the medicine prescribed by the IMF for a number of the Asian economies are being dutifully and courageously taken. If they persevere, they stand a good chance of coming out of this financial turmoil quickly and the damaging contagion that has spread across the world would be effectively contained. And for the longer term, I am hopeful that the new framework for enhanced Asian regional cooperation to promote financial stability, agreed upon at the Manila meeting of Asian finance and central bank deputies, and subsequently endorsed by APEC economic leaders at the Vancouver meeting, would play an effective role. 20. The framework, which recognizes the central role of the IMF in the international monetary system, includes important initiatives: first, there will be established a mechanism for regional surveillance to complement global surveillance by the IMF; second, there will be enhanced economic and technical cooperation particularly in strengthening domestic financial systems and regulatory capacities; third, there will be measures to strengthen the IMF’s capacity to respond to financial crisis; and BIS Review 115/1997  -5-  fourth, there will be a cooperative financial arrangement that would supplement IMF resources on a case by case, contingent basis. 21.