samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
(2) Korean Rep. and Iceland with last available data for 2014. (3) Maximum means 90th percentile. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF and IMF data. Figure 17 Banks with CAR equal to or higher than 10% under stress scenario (*) (percent of system's assets)  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  20  20  0  0 11  12  13  14  15  16  (*) Six-month figures. Results of stress tests presented in Financial Stability Reports. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on SBIF data. BIS central bankers’ speeches  17

In this view, the Bank of Albania, as the supervisory and promoter institution of the Albanian banking system, in addition to the immediate response to the difficulties created by COVID-19, through a complete package of monetary, supervisory, macro-prudential and operational measures, finds also important the drafting and organisation of educational initiatives, like Global Money Week. Through these educational and awareness-raising activities, we aim at approaching the young generation to the complicated world of finance and banking; to introduce and pass through knowledge on possibilities; the risks that both financial and banking products have; as well as introduce the young public to the necessary information on borrowing and savings. This communication and awareness of young people, in turn help both financial and banking markets become more resilient, comprehensive and efficient. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  The Bank of Albania, has not limited its educational activities only with the Global Money Week. Financial literacy of public is an important part of our daily work. Thus, through virtual educational tools available at our webpage, students and teachers may learn throughout the year on financial issues, by watching videos and reading the literature dedicated to both the pre-university education and students. Our webpage contains simplified information on themes of everyday life, as: the opening of a bank account; personal budget management, drafting a saving plan; applying for a bank credit, etc.
11  See Tucker, P. M. W. (2012), The role of deposit insurance in building a safer financial system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Finally, whatever types of deposit end up being preferred, there should be no discrimination on grounds of location or nationality. The chosen creditor hierarchy should apply the same way to all branches of a bank throughout the world. The Financial Stability Board Key Attributes are clear about that.12 I do not need to remind this audience that depositor preference would not be a guarantee against the relevant uninsured deposits (or the DGS) ever taking losses. But they would be exposed to loss only after bonds, as well as equity, had been wiped out. The greater the gone-concern LAC requirement for bond issuance, the lower the probability of any preferred deposits incurring loss. Group structure: having LAC in the right place, and operational dependencies It will have been apparent from my earlier description of high-level resolution strategies that where and how a group maintains its LAC will vary somewhat according to whether the preferred resolution strategy is SPE or MPE. For SPE resolutions, sufficient loss-absorbing capacity must be at the topco. But more than that, there has to be a mechanism for transferring losses from operating subsidiaries, wherever they are in the world, to the topco. One way of doing that would be for Topco to guarantee the performance of the obligations of its systemically significant and other key operating subsidiaries.

It is hoped that the discussions during the forum will assist in gathering a consensus on the viability of such an initiative where efforts and resources involved may be substantial. Indeed, it should be noted that there is certainly potential in the development of this shared platform, where combined resources and expertise would foster greater efficiency and provide fresh impetus for a more meaningful and far-reaching development of Islamic finance in the international stage. The prospects of such pioneering works with the possibility of international appeal, if successful, would certainly be exciting. Ladies and gentlemen, SSO, at first sight, seems very much the domain of large global players – where opportunities for significant cost arbitrage involved in, say, the relocation of call centres from the UK to Malaysia seem to be very compelling and obvious options. Understandably, the issue of SSO is tread very cautiously by the smaller and boutique players in the industry. Where bottom lines are concerned, an institution's Board may find little appeal in the proposition of outsourcing where the cost-savings involved may seem minimal. However, there are many rewards to be reaped by an institution's successful execution and maintenance of SSO arrangements and a reduction in operating costs may only form part of the picture. The outsourcing of back office operations, say, allows institutions to accord greater focus on their core competencies and core businesses such as the execution of growth strategies or capturing market share.
This would include not just decisions to purchase products, but also in their day-to-day actions such as in their spending and saving habits. It should also include understanding how we can help consumers avoid making mistakes, such as to fall into scams – not just investment scams and get-rich-  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  quick-schemes, but also scams that use social engineering to trick customers into divulging their banking and payment security credentials. As all of us here would know too well, scams have been gaining significant momentum since the pandemic, and continues to be a sinister threat not just in Malaysia but also in other countries. Recognising this threat, BNM has instructed banks to step up security measures to protect their customers, and is working closely with law enforcement agencies to ensure swift action against perpetrators. But while these measures are necessary, they will not be sufficient without the first line of defence – that is, for consumers to remain vigilant, knowing how to avoid getting duped. This is ultimately a matter of financial and digital literacy. For this, the evidence-backed approach that today's Symposium is committed to in educating financial consumers will be a crucial part of the whole-of-nation approach needed to combat scams. Before I end my speech, I would like to reiterate that financial education is more relevant than ever in the post-pandemic era.

This means that over the next 10 years, every month one to two million Chinese on average will give up their low-paid, low-productivity jobs in agriculture and take up better-paid and more productive work in other sectors. The monetary policy must take into account the impact that this process is going to have on the Chinese economy and on economies of other countries. As opposed to trade and capital, the flow of people within EU Member States was stable. The annual net migration to EU-15 remained at a level of less than 5 people per 1000 inhabitants over the past 40 years. Approximately 9% of EU population was born in other countries, whilst in the USA this figure was 12% and ca. 20% in Canada and Australia. However, following the EU enlargement, where 10 new members joined the structures, our part of the world has also seen an increase in migration, which is shown in Table 3 below. In some cases, a significant part of the domestic work force took up employment in other countries. The estimates show that, for example, ca. 5% of Lithuanians took up employment in countries that opened their labour markets for the new EU Member States following 1 May 2004. A conclusion may be drawn that opening of the low cost economies, especially of the Chinese economy, and the increasing international competition on the market of goods and services related thereto, changes the methods of setting prices by enterprises and determining wages on the labour market.
We have seen an exceptionally long period of strong growth in the world economy, but that growth was based on large and unsustainable global imbalances. For growth to be sustained, it must be more broadly balanced, both geographically and across economic sectors. •  Second, the current crisis may dampen economic growth in the future, reduce growth in the capital stock and thereby lead to a prolonged reduction in the level of output. The composition of output might change as well. I would not be surprised if the financial sector, the car industry and the construction sector were to shrink regionally. The economies that will be affected the most are those where the financial sector has expanded significantly in the last 20 years. Especially in those countries the financial sector will obviously have to become smaller, because it has decoupled too much from the real economy and because experience suggests that banks may have become too big to fail, too complex to be managed and even too big to be rescued. •  Third, the simple statement that “if banks are too big to fail, they are probably too big to exist” is a reasonable rule. In any case, for large banks the capital should increase more than they increase in size. The post-crisis financial system should be more riskaverse, less leveraged, less complex. The prevailing business model will probably place greater emphasis on traditional banking activities, which tend to produce lower margins, but are also more robust, less risky and less volatile.

We therefore consider risks to price stability broadly balanced and mainly relating to the outlook for economic activity, higher than expected oil prices, as well as higher than expected indirect taxation and administered prices. •  Since the beginning of the year, financial conditions have continued to improve gradually with corporate bond spreads, stock market volatility, money market term spreads and government bond spreads declining. Is this improvement genuine or is it due to policy measures by governments and central banks? If the latter was true this would be a classical case of moral hazard. These measures cannot be sustained for ever. In this sense, there is no room for complacency. There is rather the risk of a reemergence of moral hazard once temporary measures by governments and central banks are perceived by financial market participants as permanent. •  Where do we stand with financial sector adjustment? Several estimates have been made, both by private and public sector institutions, of the potential losses to be absorbed by the financial system as a consequence of the crisis. Let me illustrate the situation with some key figures: for euro area financial institutions, we estimate the total losses over the period 2007-2010 to be around USD 650 bn. Write-downs on securities have so far amounted to over USD 200 billion. Banks have provisioned and written off over USD 150 bn of their loan exposure. Therefore we estimate further potential losses to be a little below USD 300 bn.
Turning to fiscal policies, the latest available information suggests that the pace of fiscal consolidation in many euro area countries remains unsatisfactory. It is of particular concern that targets for correcting excessive deficits are at risk in some cases. Moreover, countries that have recently breached the 3% deficit limit are being granted relatively long periods to correct the situation in what constitutes a very generous application of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact. Against this background, it is important to recall that the best contribution that fiscal policies can make to stability, growth and cohesion in the euro area is to effectively tackle existing fiscal imbalances as part of a determined and well-designed economic reform programme. In this context, a rigorous implementation of the new rules is needed. This would reinforce the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact, boost expectations of sound fiscal policies and thereby help to increase confidence in economic growth prospects. As regards structural reforms, the European Commission has recently presented the “Community Lisbon Programme”, which contains a list of measures at the EU level to relaunch the Lisbon strategy. The ECB fully backs this initiative, in particular the measures to further open EU markets and to simplify the regulatory framework within which business operates. Progress at both the Community and the Member State level is crucial to addressing the economic challenges facing the EU.

Another aspect of EMU governance is strengthening the economic part of EMU. This requires structural reforms aimed at enhancing potential growth, reducing structural unemployment and increasing national economies’ resistance to shocks. While many euro area countries undertook a wave of reforms during the crisis, today, across much of the area reforms have stalled. This is not a uniform picture. Malta is enjoying robust economic growth despite regional headwinds, largely as a result of reforms implemented in recent years that stimulated the development of new areas of economic activity and increased labour participation. Malta has also taken full advantage of its membership of the EU and its adoption of the single currency. Resilience to shocks can also be built up through deeper economic integration. Indeed, as the Five Presidents’ report argues, financial integration helps to share risk across EMU member countries. The completion of a Banking Union, which will strengthen the European banking sector, is a key objective in this regard. In this area, success so far has been partial. The Single Supervisory Mechanism involving the ECB via the Supervisory Board and the national supervisory authorities is up and running, following a comprehensive health check of the euro area banks. The Single Resolution Mechanism is also operational and is being funded according to plan. As regards the third pillar of Banking Union, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), negotiations are still under way. We believe that EDIS is will increase confidence in banks across the euro area.
The top-decile of German and French companies have, by comparison, levels of productivity 80% and 60%, respectively, above the median. If we look more closely at companies in the top 1% or 0.1% of the productivity distribution, the scale of this success story becomes clearer still (Table 1). On average over the ten years to 2014, 1%-er companies experienced annual productivity growth of 8%. 0.1%-er companies have seen annual productivity growth of 12%. There is no evidence of a lost decade among these high-fliers. For them, the Fourth Industrial Revolution has already arrived. It is tempting to think these frontier companies are a tightly-knit bunch, geographically and sectorally. By and large, you should resist that temptation. Table 1 shows productivity growth over the past decade among the top 1% and 0.1% of companies, broken down by region and by sector. 10  There are some important  differences in productivity performance. Even among the 0.1%-ers, there are some wide regional variations in performance, with the East Midlands at the top (30% per year) and Wales at the bottom (0%). Differences across sectors are larger still. The upper tail of sectors such as transportation and storage and information has seen annual rates of productivity growth of 30 or even 40%. Among virtually all sectors, and across virtually all regions, however, upper tail companies have seen positive and healthy rates of productivity growth.

Chart 18 plots the distribution of management skills from the survey in the UK, Germany and the United States. The UK distribution has a notably larger lower tail. The UK has around twice as many companies with a  36 37  For example, Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) and Bjelland et al (2011). Bloom and van Reenen (2007), Haldane (2017). 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  management score below 2 than in Germany and the US, consistent with the UK’s longer tail being sourced, at least in part, in weaker management skills. Recent research by Bank colleagues, Saleem Bahaj, Angus Foulis, and Gabor Pinter, suggests this tail may also be explained by skills in corporate board rooms. Using company account data, they are able to assess the degree of “connectivity” of board members to other companies. This connectivity proxies a company’s ability, through its board, to draw on the experience of other companies when learning about and adopting new practices, products and processes. Chart 19 and Table 2 plots this measure of board connectivity across UK companies. It exhibits the same “power-law” distribution as other measures of connectivity, with a small set of companies whose directors are hyper-connected and a large set of firms whose directors are loosely or unconnected. 38  As with Facebook  friends and Twitter followers, there is a very small “in-crowd” of well-connected companies and a large disconnected “out-crowd”.
Chile)  1.8 1.5 -0.7 9.3 6.5 4.2 4.4  External prices (in $ LME copper price $ WTI oil price $ Brent oil price $  10.1 400 95 111  Terms of trade  0.5  -7.4  2.2 -0.4 2.7 7.8 5.8 3.5 3.0  2.3 -0.5 1.6 7.7 5.6 3.5 2.8  2.0 1.9 0.3 -0.3 1.3 0.5 8.1 8.0 7.1 6.6 4.5 4.3 3.4 3.3 (levels)  2.4 1.7 1.4 8.3 7.3 4.8 3.9  2.3 1.2 0.9 8.2 6.4 4.7 3.7  355  361  340  350  350  113  112 109 105 103 (annual change, percentage) -5.0 -2.6 -0.8 1.3  100  340  1.3  (f) Forecast. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on a sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, the IMF and statistics bureaus of respective countries. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 3 Real exchange rate (*) (index, 1986=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 88  90 RER  92  94  96  98  00  02  1997-2011 average  04  06  08  10  12  1992-2011 average  (*) December figure includes information up to 13 December 2012. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

This is because, on one hand, acute uncertainty and instability continue to plague international financial markets, while the freeze persists in what were the key funding markets until 2007; and, on the other, the real economy has entered a sharp downturn manifest in a widespread synchronised recession affecting both developed and emerging countries. The global dimension of this crisis and the interaction of the difficulties assailing the financial system with those of the real economy are shaping an outlook of unprecedented complexity. Accordingly, there is the risk of entering a vicious circle in which the difficulties of one sector feed back into those of another, aggravating problems and making them harder to resolve. The seriousness of the situation has compelled economic and monetary authorities in many countries to adopt some extraordinary measures, including bailing out what are often very large financial institutions. International difficulties remain in this field and the disclosure of further losses related to complex structured products cannot be ruled out. This is forestalling any end to the climate of uncertainty and lack of confidence. In recent months, central banks have adopted a wide range of measures, some of which are unconventional. Particular emphasis was placed on supplying the system with the necessary liquidity for it to continue to function.
I intend to briefly discuss both perspectives in turn and first explain why we made the decisions we made one to two years ago and how they have affected economic developments today – and then I will discuss how we use the monetary policy we conduct now to try to achieve the inflation target over the coming years. Reasons for the current low inflation rate The reasons why we misjudged inflation trends earlier are fairly easy to pinpoint now. Although some forecasters were more successful than others in their assessments, almost all made the same two mistakes; we underestimated productivity growth (and thereby overestimated resource utilisation in the economy) and we overestimated import prices. We, like many other analysts, assumed that the rate of productivity growth had increased in a number of sectors, partly due to IT investments combined with restructuring. Similarly, we knew that globalisation was pushing down import prices for many products. What we and many others misjudged was the magnitude of the changes. Productivity growth was even stronger than we had anticipated, with strong growth in the service sector, for instance, where IT use has increased. Import prices were slightly lower than we had expected, partly due to an unexpectedly high increase in the percentage of total imports from low-wage countries such as China and Poland. Consumer prices of imported goods have fallen since mid-2003. It is perhaps all too common that forecasters are reluctant to stick their necks out with regard to large underlying changes.

With the implementation of TARGET2 and BISERA7, banks and their customers have at their disposal a reliable and secure infrastructure for processing small and large payments in euro. This is a proper opportunity to invite any of you who, for one reason or another, have not yet availed of the advantages entailed in joining these two systems to do so. The most direct and broadest everyday contact of the general public with the banking system is through the banknote and coin related services provided to individuals and businesses. This year’s great event in this area was the commencement of operations of the BNB Cash Centre in Sofia. Our Cash Centre is one of the state-of-the-art facilities for storage and processing of banknotes and coins within the European System of Central Banks, meeting the highest requirements to security and convenience of the serviced banks and CIT companies. Through it the BNB has also met its obligations with regard to currency distribution and destruction of unfit currency. In its newly opened cash centre the BNB continues to provide to its customers standard currency-related services. However, this is the proper time to share with you that more and more often we receive at the BNB complaints by citizens that banks have refused to exchange damaged Bulgarian banknotes or that customers have received such banknotes in ATM cash withdrawal transactions. This necessitates the conclusion that banks do not strictly observe the BNB requirements to the quality of banknotes and coins.