samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To give you a few examples, the Bank of Thailand has imposed a cap on loan-to-value ratio on high-end real estate loans since 2003. We also tightened credit card and personal loan regulations in 2004 and 2005, respectively. These pre-emptive measures helped reduce balance sheet vulnerability and ensure Thailand’s resiliency against and fast recovery after the sub-prime crisis. Nevertheless, despite the success so far on the stability front, we cannot afford to be complacent about economic stability as shocks can occur at any time and in any form, thus we must remain vigilant. Ladies and Gentlemen, Economic stability is the means to an end but not an end in itself. This is because we can also have a stable economy that grows at an undesirably low rate, especially when productivity is sluggish. This brings me to the second success factor, namely high potential growth. Thailand, despite its strength in economic sustainability, has a moderate potential growth rate compared to her peers. Over the past decade, our GDP grew on average by 4.4 percent2 annually, and the average growth rate rises to 5.1 percent excluding the sub-prime crisis period. This growth performance has been somewhat lower than the Bank of Thailand’s research result3, which estimated Thailand’s potential growth at up to 6.1 percent for the next decade. Our estimate result is based on the assumption that the country’s investment growth over the next 5 years returns to its normal trend, which is approximately 10 to 12 percent growth per year as seen during 2002–2005.

While these initiatives bode well for inclusiveness, the government must be careful not to excessively gear government spending towards populist policies that eventually add financial burden to the already-tight budget and sovereign debt in the future. In particular, it is important that the government prioritize and balance between public consumption and public investment accordingly. More importantly, efficient management with good governance will be the key ingredients to policy success in this regard. For our part, the Bank of Thailand has also put inclusiveness as one of the main agenda in the Financial Master Plan II, other than efficiency and provision of financial infrastructure. The objective is to provide financial access for all, particularly to the underserved, in an efficient and financially viable manner without compromising financial stability and prudence. This is still an on-going process which we are committed to. Ladies and Gentlemen, Before ending my talk this evening, I would like to address some of the concerns raised by Japanese corporations in Thailand, as reported in a survey from JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization). The key concerns include political stability, development of customs-related system and human resource development. On politics, I have good faith that the upcoming election is another important step towards political stability, while commitment to improving inclusiveness mentioned earlier would bring a long-term solution to the country.
The transition from Libor to SARON  Let me now turn to the SNB policy rate and the transition away from Libor. As Thomas Jordan has explained in his remarks, we are introducing the SNB policy rate as the future of Libor is uncertain. This adjustment does not entail any change in the SNB’s current monetary policy stance. However, the move away from Libor presents the financial markets, and those operating in them, with a very challenging task. I would like to discuss three aspects of this transition in greater detail: first, the choice of the Swiss Average Rate Overnight (SARON) as the alternative reference rate; second, the importance of using SARON in financial products and developing a liquid, SARON-based yield curve; and third, the issue of how interest payments should be calculated over longer periods. As regards the first aspect – the choice of a new reference rate: In Switzerland, the National Working Group on Swiss Franc Reference Rates (NWG) recommended SARON as the alternative as early as 2017. Switzerland, like other currency areas, has thus chosen an overnight rate as its preferred alternative to Libor. SARON has been in existence for ten years and, unlike Libor, is based on trades and binding quotes for overnight transactions on the secured Swiss franc money market. This market segment is broader and more liquid than the unsecured money market on which Libor is based.

The large majority of citizens, who had nothing to do with the errors leading up to the crisis, were made destitute because their small incomes and savings declined in value. Large parts of the growing middle class in the worst hit countries in South East Asia were wiped out. Conditional support was often provided with tough requirements of economic policy restraint. A tight fiscal policy would create scope for financing restructuring in the banking sector. Stringent monetary policy would counteract an overly severe depreciation of the currency. This can be criticised with hindsight, as in South East Asia the countries often did not have problematic deficits in public finances or high inflation rates. The IMF has admitted since that the restraint was too great, as they did not realise the extent of the financial crisis. The task for the BIS, the IMF, the World Bank and other international organisations should be to continue the work on finding rules and methods, both to protect innocent people from ruination and to put the risk for bad investments on those making the investments. Work on this is underway in the organisations I mentioned earlier. It involves capital adequacy rules for banks, but also reporting,  4  BIS Review 9/2002  auditing, financial supervision, bankruptcy legislation and transparency in conducting monetary and fiscal policy.
20132, 2010 and Maddaloni, A. and J.-L. Peydró, “Bank Risk-Taking, Securitization, Supervision and Low Interest Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area and the U.S. Lending Standards”, ECB Working Paper Series No 1248, 2010. 6  One paper that does not focus on banks is Bekaert, G., M. Hoerova and M. Lo Duca, “Risk, Uncertainty and Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper Series No 16397, 2010, which finds that low policy rates lower the risk aversion on the stock market after around five months. BIS Review 164/2010  3  to bear this mechanism in mind. If the policy rate has been low for a long period of time, there may be reason for particular vigilance regarding signs of increased risk propensity. When there are such signs, it may be easier to act. Although not always easy to detect, it is not impossible to identify signs of increasing risk. For example, the Riksbank warned in speeches and reports, a long time before the crisis broke out, that the compensation for risk on the financial markets was too low. 7 Weaker monetary policy effect when agents are consolidating their balance sheets? Something that has characterised the recovery from the recent crisis in many countries, although not in Sweden, is that it has been very slow. One hypothesis is that several economies are currently undergoing what is known as a “balance sheet recession”. This concept was introduced a few years ago as an explanation for developments in Japan and its “lost decade”.

Well, by considering how quickly we should aim to return inflation to target. If, for instance, inflation is below target while growth in the economy is high, as has been the case in Sweden in recent years, a monetary policy that aims to quickly push up inflation through very low interest rates could lead to demand being stronger than the economy can manage further ahead. We would then risk overheating, where prices and wages begin to increase rapidly and where inflation expectations would perhaps also be adjusted upwards. The Riksbank could then be forced to tighten monetary policy substantially. If we instead gradually begin to raise the interest rate earlier, there is a greater chance that we can avoid overheating. We can thereby also avoid the recessions that often follow overheating. This type of policy can thus mean that the fluctuations in the economy are smaller over time. This is where the  BIS Review 101/2006  3  two-year horizon that we work with comes in. It means that we can in normal cases allow up to two years before inflation attains the target. What I have described so far with regard to the principles for monetary policy is currently an accepted view of how monetary policy with an inflation target should be conducted. Central banks around the world have chosen slightly different varieties, where the details of the monetary policy system may differ considerably. However, the overall strategy is still the same. How to take into account house prices?
What this means is that if members of the public do not believe in the central bank’s ability to control inflation, a rise in prices could trigger public expectations that prices will rise even more in the future. Businesses will soon raise prices of goods, and workers, in facing higher prices, will in turn demand for higher wages, leading to a vicious inflationary cycle. Inflationary expectations, if unhinged, would eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy. As such, the interest rate increase reflects the central bank’s strong commitment to control inflation. A central bank that is seen as having a strong commitment and is credible in its actions to fighting inflation would therefore have a higher probability of success in anchoring inflation expectations. This is essentially what we will find in every textbook on monetary policy. In reality, however, there is more to inflation expectations than meets the eye. A case in point is Malaysia’s inflation experience in 2008. At that time, we had the firm conviction that the spike in inflation and inflation expectations during the period would be temporary, as the prospect of weakening demand would dampen price increases in the future. Most importantly, we also saw the sharp spike in commodity prices and increasing risks from the US financial market which posed significant downside risk to future growth. As events began to unfold, this conjecture turned out to be the baseline case.

1  Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems  2 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment  services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC 3 Directive 2009/110/ЕC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking up,  pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amending Directives 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC  2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
With greater readiness, Islamic financial institutions can strategically position themselves to further realise the true value proposition of Islamic finance, particularly as a financial regime that places emphasis on risk-sharing and that further strengthens the link of finance to the real economy. Of importance, industry players will be better positioned to ride the evolutionary waves of financial innovation that is prevalent in Islamic finance in order to enable greater offerings of risk-sharing products to customers and businesses. In Malaysia, Islamic banks now have the potential to be better able to pursue their role as investment intermediaries through the offering of investment accounts in addition to the entrenched deposit products, in which various modes of risk-sharing contracts can be applied. This is supported by the legal recognition of investment accounts in the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 (IFSA). It provides a differentiation between the deposit account and the investment account which offers a new investment avenue that caters for a wider range of investor risk-return preferences. In contrast to the deposit account, these funds are being channelled directly to finance entrepreneurship in productive activities. In promoting entrepreneurship and value-creating activities, it also contributes towards generating growth and enhances the prospects for job creation. Additionally, the Investment Account Platform (IAP) that is currently being developed will provide a centralised multi-bank platform as a new financing option for entrepreneurs with viable projects as well as an opportunity for the investing public to finance these projects.

Indeed, many of the reforms that are now being widely debated to address the weaknesses observed in the global financial system during this crisis have already been implemented in Asia. This includes the adoption of sound liquidity frameworks, substantially strengthened  2  BIS Review 91/2010  governance and risk management practices, comprehensive financial safety nets, and the implementation of counter-cyclical measures such as loan-to-value ratios. While a decade of financial reforms have paid off, increased regional efforts on surveillance, crisis management, liquidity support arrangement, and financial supervision and development of regional financial markets continue to be the focus of attention going forward. Conclusion Let me conclude my remarks. The global economy is experiencing a significant and fundamental shift. Asia is very much at the centre of this shift. As Asia becomes an increasing source of demand and as a more financially integrated Asia becomes more interlinked with the rest of the world and as Asia further strengthens its resilience, the stage is set for Asia to assume a more prominent role in the global economy. In the endeavour to achieve the shared goals of balanced global growth and the common interest of global financial stability, Asia holds the potential and the promise of a platform for meaningful collaborations towards attaining sustainable global solutions and progress in this more inter-connected world. BIS Review 91/2010  3
In that Swedish banks are expanding their operations in the other Nordic countries and the Baltic region, developments in those countries are becoming increasingly important for them. Borrowers abroad now account for approximately half of the banks’ total loan stock. The analysis of borrowers has therefore been extended abroad. The major bank groups are analysed in various respects. Profitability trends illustrate the ability of the banks to build up reserves for unexpected losses. Moreover, there is always the strategic risk that a bank with weak profitability will be tempted to try out new, bold lines of business in order to generate a higher return on equity. The analysis of the banks’ credit portfolios can provide an indication of how loan losses are likely to develop in the coming year or two. Another aspect of the analysis is the banks’ liabilities. Traditional banking involves accepting deposits and using the funds for making loans. People’s growing propensity to save in other instruments than bank accounts has forced the banks to finance the growth of credit by borrowing in the capital market. The structure of bank funding provides an indication of the risks in bank liquidity. Monitoring this is perhaps the most difficult part in that the liquidity situation is liable to change very rapidly. If problems in one bank group spread to other players in the system via the banks’ mutual commitments, the payment system may be affected immediately. The Riksbank therefore keeps an eye on interbank exposures.

Rapid expansion of exports and moderate increase of imports led to improved trade and current account deficits, contributing to foreign currency demand and supply balancing and increased exchange rate stability. Monetary and fiscal policies have conveyed a careful macroeconomic stimulus. Withdrawal of the fiscal stimulus during the second half of the year, led to a more stimulating monetary policy, by reducing the key interest rate in July and a fuller introduction of it into the financial markets during the following period. Financial markets were characterised by an improvement of liquidity indicators and a decline in interest rates in almost all financial instruments. Furthermore, a prudent fiscal policy rendered budget deficit and public debt in line with 2010 forecasts. These developments are expected to be brought forward, in broad terms, in 2011 as well. Economic growth is expected to remain comparable to levels of 2010. However, it is expected to be driven by domestic demand to a large extent. The banking system is in a much better position compared with two previous years in terms of supporting the increase of domestic consumption and investment with funds. Moreover, inflation pressures are forecasted to be under control, budget deficit and public debt are expected to be further consolidated, and external position of the economy is expected to be more stable. Respecting this picture has important implications, which I will address later in more details, for policymakers and economic agents. Latest developments in global economy are characterised by continued economic growth in most developed countries and emerging economies.
Other countries have abandoned the attempt to maintain rigidly fixed exchange rates, and adopted a  BIS Review 71/2001  1  combination of domestic monetary management based on an inflation target and a floating exchange rate. Examples include both developed economies, such as the UK and Canada, and emerging market economies, such as Brazil and South Africa. There are arguments for and against both of these approaches. But what is clear is that both in theory and practice there is now a recognition that pegged (fixed but adjustable) exchange rates do not provide a viable long-term middle course. More interesting, perhaps, is the absence of serious debate on the merits of the third position, namely the willingness to forego freedom of capital movements in order to retain domestic monetary autonomy and stable exchange rates. That is perhaps surprising in the light of the experience of the two major countries in Asia that escaped the financial crisis of 1997-98, namely India and China, which had in common the presence of capital controls. The willingness to impose controls on capital movements, at least temporarily, was certainly evident at the Bretton Woods Conference. Mindful of the weakness of Britain's national balance sheet, Lord Keynes, urged on by the Bank of England, argued that there should be no legally binding obligation to make the sterling balances convertible into dollars.

My perspective in pursuing these questions is not as overseer, or as policy maker, but as practitioner. Recall that following the designation by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) of eight private sector financial market utilities as systemically important in 2012, the Board of Governors, acting in its oversight capacity (and inestimable wisdom! ), committed to hold the wholesale services operated by the Reserve Banks to “as high or higher a standard” as it holds these private sector utilities; I assure you, we are experiencing, appropriately, that “or higher” side of the spectrum. Like our infrastructure peers we are challenged to maintain the integrity of existing operations while contending with a brave new world; constrained by the demands of cost recovery and limited resources; challenged by the multiplicity of risk and compliance frameworks with which to comply and governance and stakeholder bodies to satisfy; conscious that we have to defend across an extended front while our adversary need only find a single point of entry; and keenly aware that we must be perfect every day, our foe successful but once. These are heavy burdens; I speak not to you, but of you. With that context these remarks (I assure) reflect my own views and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
We know that central bank policies do affect financial conditions facing the private sector, not just the public sector. And we know that monetary policy makers can, and do, thereby affect inflation. Indeed, in the longer run, it’s all they can affect and – barring the sorts of restraints necessary for financial repression – the only enduring means by which they can have an impact on the real value of public-sector debt. We’ll now have a look at how that works. What higher inflation does to the public sector’s liabilities: a simple simulation As I said in the introduction, levels of government debt that are ultimately unaffordable – that the government cannot (or will not) finance through conventional fiscal measures – can in extremis present a threat to the stability of inflation. That’s because inflation – above all surprise inflation – can reduce the burden of that debt. What I want to do here is use a simple, stylised simulation to gauge the scale of this effect. I’m interested only in the pure effect of higher inflation. So the simulation assumes that all the real determinants of indebtedness – the path of real GDP, real (ex ante) bond yields and the government’s primary deficit (relative to GDP) – are all fixed. This is unrealistic. In the short term generating the higher inflation would probably require a period of lower real interest rates (if only a brief one, relative to the timescales involved).

International Women’s Day is an occasion to look back on past struggles and accomplishments but even more importantly a time to look ahead to untapped potential and opportunities that await future generations of women. In Zambia today we recognize the strides that have been made by women in national development and we look ahead at the challenges that are before us as we strive to achieve our goal of gender equality. In this regard, Zambia is a signatory to many international instruments and Conventions seeking to empower women. These include the United nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development. This declaration calls for the equal representation of women and men in the decision making structures of member states at all levels, and also for the achievement of at least 30 per cent target of women in political and decision-making structures. I must concede here, Ladies and Gentlemen, that although we have made significant strides as a country in women representation; we are yet to meet the target of 30 per cent. I still believe that this target is not impossible to attain. With concerted effort we can achieve and even exceed it because this country has scores of women with untapped potential. This exhibition gives us an opportunity to identify this potential and encourage our women to stand up, and be counted and contribute to the development of this country.