samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
According to data reported from INSTAT, real annual growth of the GDP amounted to 4.9%, that is, higher than figures recorded during the first two quarters of the year. Economic activity improvement relied mostly on trade, tourism and other services. The industry sector maintained the same contribution to the economic growth, while construction sector activities continued to shrink for the fourth consecutive quarter. Developments in demand components follow the tendencies of the beginning of the year and are in line with our previous assessments. Available data suggest that economic growth continued to be stimulated to a large extent by foreign demand; meanwhile fiscal consolidation during the second half of the year predictably yielded a slowing effect to the economic activity. Private consumption and investment remained low during the second half as well, despite improvement of financing conditions for the activity. Private consumption continues to be subject to a hesitating approach by consumers to spend and a low support by banks. Increased salaries, employment and remittances in the economy were not fully factorised in optimising individuals for the future, as proven by low levels of consumer confidence index for the third quarter of 2010. In addition, sluggish consumer demand and non-utilised capacities in the economy did not encourage businesses for new investments. However, with the improvement of financing conditions and further increase of demand, contrary to the first two quarters, private investments are considered to have given a positive contribution during the third quarter.

It goes with the grain of how banks are resolved, reinforcing the continuity of services which are critical to the real economy. It is predictable, with a clear framework of rules. It is proportionate, applying only above a clear size threshold. And it is efficient, allowing wholesale and investment business to prosper at a safe distance from retail and SME customers. Ring-fencing is a very substantial undertaking for the PRA, the FCA and the affected banks – but we are on track for implementation by 1 January 2019. Stability begins at home  Once these reforms are up and running, the core deposit-taking and payments services that must be continuously supplied to UK households and small firms will be protected in ring-fenced banks (RFBs). Groups operating across borders will also include non-ring-fenced banks (NRFBs) and will need to be resilient according to their global footprint. Resilience requires systemic capital buffers both at the domestic and global level. The domestic buffer applies to the RFB whereas any global buffer applies to the whole group. The RFB and NRFB shares of capital should provide sufficient resilience for each. So if the size of the domestic buffer risks leaving the rest of the group with too small a share to be resilient against shocks, we will increase the group’s buffer to 2  prevent this from happening . These complexities do not just flow from ring-fencing but from the international reach of many UK banking groups. We set their consolidated requirements as home supervisor.
This agreement between the Bank of Albania and SECO, the centre of expertise for all core issues relating to economic policy, in Switzerland and not only, helps the Bank of Albania to fulfil the objectives, to carry out its duties and to withstand future challenges. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  I would like to thank once again Mr Maître and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs for the contribution to the Bank of Albania. I look forward to the fruitful and successful cooperation under the new agreement Thank you! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

However, they all agreed that work on a collective option should not preclude parallel efforts by anyone; indeed, that if any firm or group of firms wished to step forward and take Long-Term Capital itself or Long-Term Capital’s positions onto their balance sheets that this would be the most desirable outcome. In the absence of any other solutions, the firms dispatched two working groups to Long-Term Capital’s offices in Connecticut to consider the feasibility of “lifting” the fixed-income and the equity positions out of Long-Term Capital. A third working group met at one of the firm’s offices downtown to develop the idea of a consortium approach. By mutual agreement another firm, UBS, a Swiss bank, was added to this core group and to each of the three working groups. However, no one from the New York Fed participated in any of the working groups. At no point in this early morning meeting, nor at any stage last week, was there discussion of the use of public monies - Federal Reserve or otherwise. No Federal Reserve or government guarantees, actual or implied, were offered, discussed or solicited. Later that afternoon, we participated in a conference call to review the progress of the working groups. Two of the working groups concluded that a “lifting” of the fixed income and equity positions was not feasible. The third group developed a consortium approach, which was deemed feasible. Every one agreed that the consortium approach should be “last ditch”, and that parallel solutions should still be encouraged.
Strategic decisions need to be made on establishing relevant competent authorities tasked with the responsibility of resolving banks and investment firms, on setting up resolution funds, and on the drawing up by the supervised entities of adequate plans for recovery or controlled restoration of their viability by restructuring. In connection with the new EU capital framework CRD4, in 2014 the BNB began to implement the new reporting framework for supervisory purposes (the so-called FINREP and COREP), consisting of over 100 separate reporting forms. The additional supervisory reporting will meet the accumulated information needs of the Banking Supervision Department and will tackle the most sensitive sources of risk in banks’ portfolios. In 2015 it is expected that the EU-wide banking supervision rules will become more and more common in banking practices. Numerous technical standards, developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and adopted by the European Commission, are going to be put in place. In supervising the subsidiaries of euro area banks, the BNB is going to cooperate actively with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which started in November 2014. Last but not least is the BNB’s intention to initiate an asset quality review of the entire banking system, which will cover all banks operating in Bulgaria. This will also be a key requirement if the government should decide, at some point, to start talks with the ECB for joining the SSM.

The evolution of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations in response to the crisis featured all these activities. Our risk management framework has evolved accordingly, guided by our stable principles. First, the “gusty winds”: during the early stages of the financial crisis, we increased the amount of liquidity we provided to the banking system without tightening the risk control framework, despite the onset of stress in the system. In this respect, our risk management framework followed a through-the-cycle approach – thereby avoiding further distress to the banking system. It also stood in stark contrast to the more pro-cyclical nature of the commercial banking sector’s risk management approach – and was thus part of the central bank’s duty to lean against such potentially self-reinforcing winds. It was possible to avoid tightening the framework without exposing the Eurosystem to undue risks because the pre-crisis framework had been calibrated in a sufficiently prudent manner. In fact, the framework proved to be robust enough to protect the Eurosystem from losses resulting from counterparties defaulting, such as Lehman Brothers or the Icelandic banks – although the complexity of the collateral in some of these cases led to lengthy liquidation processes. This experience certainly merited a careful review of the collateral rules for complex securities and financial innovations. More broadly, it justified taking steps towards reducing the reliance on external credit ratings, in line with the G20 agenda.
10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  10  For what it’s worth, as a matter of terminology, I think this would more accurately be described as “financial repression” than “monetary finance”. Either way, I don’t really see how it’s possible to do this, not least because of the open, global capital markets in which all borrowers, public and private alike, now operate. If the claim is that even variations in the financial conditions facing the private sector have no bearing on inflation, one wonders how monetary authorities (including the MPC) are able to control it to begin with. It’s surely not a coincidence that inflation has been stable only when there’s been a stable regime for monetary policy. That wouldn’t be possible unless policy routinely had an effect on it. Chart 4 is informative in this respect. Financial repression might be more feasible if it were possible to depress the yield on government debt alone (i.e. to raise its price), leaving untouched financial conditions facing the private sector. But if that artificial gap were to endure for any length of time it would require quantitative restrictions of some kind, to prevent people selling domestic government debt for some other (relatively under-priced) asset. And because holders of UK assets live abroad as well as at home, those restrictions would have to cover international capital markets as well11. Yet we know such restrictions don’t exist.

Replenishing their inventories, companies substantially increased their demand for commodities worldwide. Russia is a major producer of key commodities. High demand for Russian exports spurs economic growth this year. As companies complete their inventories, the effect of this factor will be tapering off gradually. The growth of oil export quantities will also be supported by the easing of the OPEC+ oil production cuts in response to the recovery of demand. Taking this into consideration, we have raised the oil price path in our forecast by 5 US dollars per barrel in the next three years. According to our preliminary estimates, the expansion of oil output under the new OPEC+ agreements will add about 0.1 pp to GDP growth this year and 0.2–0.3 pp next year. Another important growth driver is domestic demand, including both consumer and investment demand. Considering these trends, we have revised our economic growth forecast for this year upwards from 3–4% to 4–4.5%. After the recovery, the economy will expand at a pace close to its potential. We forecast that GDP will equal 2–3% in the next two years. The possibility to achieve higher economic growth rates will depend both on the expansion of production and logistics capacities and on labour resources, their expertise and performance. T hird. Monetary conditions have been progressively adjusting to the earlier increases in the key rate, but are still accommodative.
Chart 4: Relationship between stock price and number of TCFD disclosures made  And TCFD disclosure is increasingly a responsibility, as suggested by research from the Commonwealth Climate and Law Initiative that concludes that non-disclosure is a bigger liability risk than disclosure.11 That is just one reason why jurisdictions like the UK and EU have signalled their intentions to make TCFD disclosure mandatory. Second, the TCFD disclosure recommendations should be refined to those that investors consider most decision-useful. The TCFD needs to reach a definitive view of what counts as a high quality disclosure before they become mandatory. In my view the next two reporting periods should balance the urgency of the task and the imperative of getting it right. This is best delivered by the current process of disclosure by the users of capital, reaction by the suppliers of capital, and adjustment of these standards to ensure that the TCFD metrics are as comparable, efficient and as decision-useful as possible. “Laggard companies that fail to disclose climate risk in line with the TCFD recommendations may be less attractive to investors and struggle to secure loans or insurance. [F]ailure to disclose may suggest that a company has not considered climate risk, or that it has something to hide in relation to its exposure – either way, silence can send a warning signal to the market.

The loss of revenue means government setting higher tax rates than would normally be the case. •  Sixth, money laundering could lead to risks to privatisation programmes. Money laundering poses a threat to governments’ economic reform efforts, especially privatization of state owned enterprises. Money launderers have the financial power to out-bid legitimate investors. In addition, while privatisation initiatives are often economically beneficial, they can also serve as a vehicle to launder funds. Criminals have been known to purchase privatised banks, resorts, etc to hide their illicit proceeds and farther their criminal activities. Unfortunately, developing countries like Zambia risk being exposed to the threat of money laundering because in the process of attracting investments, they become more vulnerable to accepting laundered money. •  Seven, money laundering could expose any recipient country to reputation risk. In today’s global economy, nations cannot afford to have their reputations eroded by associating  themselves with money laundering activities. Money laundering and other crimes erode confidence in financial markets, and the negative reputation resulting from these activities diminishes legitimate global opportunities available to any country and this could slow sustainable economic growth. Ladies and Gentlemen, what I have just elaborated are the adverse effects of money laundering on any economy in the world. Allow me now to look at the effects of money laundering on the banking sector. As you may be aware, due to banks’ confidentiality principle and their capability to handle huge cashless transactions, and transmit funds efficiently, they are normally the targets of money laundering activities.
development, because for years now, the Central Bank has had to cope with  We should access the international  the conflict of interest of trying to  capital market when market conditions  conduct an independent monetary  are favourable to Sri Lanka to build a  policy while at the same time, raising  buffer to avoid unwarranted domestic  funds for the government as cheaply as  market pressure due to limited resource  possible. This conflict of interest poses  availability. This would broaden and  challenges to the monetary policy  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  29  conduct of the Central Bank. Therefore,  Sri Lanka, implements a number of  taking away the debt management  concessionary development credit  function would enable the Central Bank  schemes through Participating Financial  to have a greater room to manoeuvre to  Institutions (PFIs), with a view to uplift  conduct an independent monetary  living standards to enhance financial  policy. literacy as well as financial inclusion, and  Foreign Exchange Management: With a view to further relaxing foreign exchange transactions, the Central Bank  to ensure balanced regional growth and equitable development.  A New Loan Scheme for the Micro,  has implemented several new policy  Small and Medium Scale Enterprises  measures in the recent past with the  (MSMEs): A new loan scheme for the  support of the government.

Due to the appreciation of the Swiss franc, export-geared companies are exposed to strong price competition. In manufacturing, in particular, margins are under very strong pressure in some cases. However, survey results still suggest that robust foreign demand allows for good utilisation of capacities and supports exports. The short-term outlook also remains good for domestic demand. Construction investment is benefiting from favourable financing conditions, while higher capacity utilisation should stimulate equipment investment. Demand for labour is likely to firm further. For 2011, the SNB is maintaining its forecast of real GDP growth amounting to around 2%. Monetary and financial conditions Monetary conditions were again characterised by the divergence between low interest rates and the Swiss franc, which appreciated significantly in the second quarter. Since the last monetary policy assessment, the three-month Libor has persisted in the lower part of the target range. With inflation expectations rising slightly, real interest rates have remained low and even, in the short-term range, negative. In general, although long-term interest rates have risen since their low point in August 2010, they are still at a low level. By contrast, the real export-weighted Swiss franc appreciated further in the second quarter and has reached an all-time high. By the beginning of May, the US dollar – mainly – had weakened significantly against the Swiss franc. Thereafter, renewed concerns about stability in the euro area also led to a depreciation of the euro. My colleague, Jean-Pierre Danthine, will speak about the situation on the international financial markets in more detail later on.
5  Within the EU a discussion has come up as to which type of authority is best suited to exercise supervision of the financial system: the central banks with their overall responsibility for the safe and efficient functioning of the payment system, or independent financial supervisory authorities, which are not involved in monetary policy decisions that can have consequences for individual institutions. In Sweden we apply the latter model, which I consider to work well in our environment. On the one hand, the risk of a conflict of interests between monetary policy decisions and supervisory decisions will thereby be avoided, and on the other hand it provides scope for a co-ordinated supervision between financial operations pursued in different institutional forms, e.g. banking and insurance, within financial conglomerates. Other EU countries have other models and there are also ambitions from some quarters to change the division of responsibilities. In my opinion, there is no reason to settle for a particular institutional solution for the supervisory work; it is more important to ensure the good functioning of the arrangements that apply. A larger issue that might have institutional consequences is whether it is sufficient in a more integrated EU to rely on co-operation and co-ordination between national authorities or whether a controlling authority is needed that can take on a leader role as required to ensure that the co-operation functions well.

Regulations should ideally be worked out in consultation between the legislators and the supervisory authorities and the central banks in order to facilitate the different roles played by the authorities in promoting financial stability. I would like to emphasise that there is no contradiction between an increased significance for financial transactions and stable financial systems, provided that there are good opportunities to assess the realism and risks in financial commitments. The review of the capital adequacy rules for banks now being prepared is a good example of how the overall purposes or rules to maintain financial stability can be combined with good scope for individual banks to apply the regulations in a way that is effective for them. As the banks are enjoined to better monitor their own risks, a capital requirement that is adapted to their risk exposure is achieved de facto, without a need for detailed provisions in individual cases. This also builds into the system an assurance that fundamental stability can be maintained within the system without unnecessary encroachment on the efficiency of the financial sector. An efficient monitoring of institutions and markets is central to being able to assess the risk of tensions that can nevertheless arise if over-investment financed by loans leads to financial bubbles and if regulations are abused. In particular, when the regulatory framework is made more general in character, great demands will be put on having sufficient resources and good competence at the authorities concerned in order to carry out the monitoring in a well-informed way.
Christine M Cumming: Enhancing payment system speed, efficiency and security Keynote remarks by Ms Christine M Cumming, First Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the TCH Annual Payments Symposium and Business Meeting, New York City, 5 July 2013. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be here today to speak to you about the evolution of the U.S. payments system and the Federal Reserve Banks’ role in that evolution. The views I express will be mine and not those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, although I will draw on the considerable work being done in the Federal Reserve on the future payments direction. Without question, we are living in an once-in-a-lifetime period of change in the U.S. payments system. Payments providers are seeking ways to bring mobile technology to payments, an integration widely seen as a game-changer by payments industry participants. Person-to-person payments mechanisms have grown rapidly, and the potential for those funds to be immediately credited to the receiver could be another game-changer. Commerce increasingly integrates with a payments mechanism, especially as information about spending patterns are a source of value to firms and loyalty discounts and points become an important part of the business value proposition to customers. Indeed, rather than talk about a payments industry, we find ourselves talking about a payments ecosystem, a web of banks, service companies, alternative payments providers and commercial firms. Some have called these developments a second internet revolution.

And I welcome the changes that you announced last week to make appointments to the Monetary Policy Committee subject to a more transparent process with a more systematic timetable. Behind the design of our monetary institutions is a simple principle. I described it last October in a lecture at Kirkcaldy. It is that the value of paper money depends on trust. Trust that it will hold its value. Trust that others will accept it as a means of payment. In particular, our banknotes must be trusted by the public – cash still accounts for over 60% of the number of transactions. In March the Bank launched a new series of bank notes with enhanced security features. As an economist, I was pleased that a pioneer of the dismal science should appear on our bank notes. Adam Smith, who appears on new £ notes, was a thinker who recognised the importance of institutions. Imagine my concern, therefore, when, after 3 ½ years as Governor, I read the following report from the Wolverhampton Crown Court. “A judge demanded to know why police failed for three and a half years to arrest a wanted Birmingham man – when all the time he was living at home. Adam Smith, suspected of passing forged £ notes, had a fixed address in Edgbaston and was picking up benefits”. So I hope the introduction of one Adam Smith will hinder the activities of the other. I am proud of the new £ notes, but I cannot say the same of our £ notes.