samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This reveals something we pointed out emphatically during 2008: that the origin of our high inflation was mainly foreign, but that it was the duty of monetary policy to control it from propagating excessively into other prices and expectations (Figure 4). Thanks to that determination we have been able to aggressively cut the MPR, without compromising our commitment to price stability. A less credible policy would be incapable of being as expansionary as it is today, because it would not pass through to the interest rate structure or to market rates. In the past, monetary expansion was limited by fears of financial and macroeconomic instability. With the strong fundamentals of today’s Chilean economy, such limitations don’t exist. Although nobody escaped the impact of the financial collapse of the end of last year on the real economy, the ability of each economy to bounce back will be largely determined by its own strengths. That is demonstrated both by recent projections by international organizations and private agencies and by the evidence discussed in this Report. Chile should be one of the first economies to reap the benefits of expansionary policies and take steps forward in a faster, sustained recovery. Therefore, as soon as in the second half of this year our economy should be back to trend growth rates.

As usual, the baseline scenario described above reflects the events that are believed to be most likely to occur with the information available at the closing of this Report. Logically, different events will lead to different macroeconomic conditions and, therefore, an MPR path that will also differ. Currently, the level of uncertainty is definitely higher than normal and, after assessing the probability of alternative scenarios, the Board considers that the balance  BIS Review 65/2009  5  of risks for growth is biased downward, and is unbiased for inflation. The main risks are associated, once again, to the complex global economic outlook. In the past few weeks, some signs of stabilization of the crisis in developed economies have begun to show up, with a marginal recovery of manufacturing output, exports and confidence indicators in different economies, particularly in Asia. It is possible that these signs may be just another stage in the volatility shown by the markets in the past several quarters, and new stressful situations may arise that could worsen the already precarious situation of the world economy. Meanwhile, if the rebound of stock markets and the reduced risk aversion are solid indications that uncertainty is fading out, a more widespread recovery of global output and demand may be seen in the short run at the global level. The materialization of some of these risks could have important implications on the domestic economy, mainly consumers and entrepreneurs’ expectations possibly taking longer than predicted to improve, or the economy quickly recovering from its current state.
It would allow us to acknowledge that market failures may drive a wedge between market prices on the one hand and efficient asset values that internalise externalities on the other. Nevertheless, in line with the provisions of the Treaties, considering climate externalities under the market efficiency principle would need to be consistent with maintaining a functioning price discovery mechanism. Furthermore, monetary policy implementation in line with the market efficiency principle would need to remain without prejudice to our primary mandate of safeguarding price stability. One possible objection to the market efficiency principle is that efforts to mitigate environmental externalities could be counterproductive, as they might simply amplify other types of market failures. However, this objection cannot provide a justification for refraining from action altogether. A classic finding in the economic literature – the theory of second best – illustrates that, in the presence of many market failures, leaving one failure unaddressed is suboptimal. Conversely, addressing a particular market failure has the potential to improve the overall allocation of resources, even if it worsens some other market failure. [35] Nevertheless, transitioning from the market neutrality principle to the market efficiency principle would entail implementation challenges. Implementation considerations The application of the market neutrality principle implies that our corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) currently exhibits an inherent bias towards large firms in carbon-intensive industries.

Two trends are noteworthy for Asian banks: the rise of the Asian middle class and the regionalisation of Asian corporates. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Rising incomes and the agglomeration effects of urbanisation will significantly expand the ranks of the Asian middle class. •  In ASEAN, the middle class is projected to make up two-thirds of the population by 2030, compared to less than a quarter in 2010. This rapid expansion of the middle class will spur demand for a wide range of goods and services. Modern services, such as telecommunication, banking and finance, have higher income elasticities of demand compared to traditional services. This means that as income rises and wealth accumulates, the demand for financial services – be it consumer credit, wealth management, or insurance – will rise more than proportionately. As Asian economies develop and integrate further, Asian corporates will expand and internationalise. They will need more funding – not just traditional bank credit but debt and equity financing. They will need more cash management and transaction services. Asian banks who have been serving these corporates in their home markets will follow them as they regionalise their businesses. Financial regulation The second driving force that will shape banking in Asia is financial regulation. The Global Financial Crisis has spurred far-reaching financial regulatory reforms. The ones impacting banks most will be the new Basel III rules.
  New information supports the Riksbank’s view that the global economy and the Swedish economy are recovering. However, there are some signs of weakness in the United States and Asia, while Europe looks slightly stronger than expected. The unease on the financial markets has waned, but the situation is still not normal. However, I shall begin by discussing international developments. International developments In the Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Report earlier in the summer we painted a picture of international developments over the coming years that can be briefly summarised as follows: GDP growth will be strong in the world as a whole, but in Europe GDP growth will be modest and the upturn will start from a very low level. Inflation abroad will be relatively low. But these are of course just rough outlines. Behind them lie more detailed analyses and reasoning, which I will now go on to develop. Recovery in world economy – strong growth in Asia The recovery in the world economy is continuing. The rate of the recovery varies, of course, from country to country and region to region, but for the world as a whole we were expecting in June an annual GDP growth of just over 4 per cent over the coming three years. (Figure: Global GDP growth) The IMF’s most recent update to the forecasts for the world economy, in July this year, even implies a slightly higher growth rate this year and next year.

Following the monetary policy meeting at the end of June, new inflation figures have been published for June and July. These show that the CPI and the CPIF rose by 1.1 and 1.7 per cent respectively in July, compared with the same month last year. Inflation is so far in line with the assessments in the Monetary Policy Report: in July underlying inflation was only 0.1 of a percentage point lower than the forecast in our Report. Long-term inflation expectations It is important to the Riksbank that long-term inflation expectations in society are anchored securely around the inflation target of 2 per cent. This makes our work easier. If most people expect inflation to be 2 per cent, this affects price-setting and wage-formation, so that we can more easily attain the inflation target in the long term (even if short-term fluctuations cause inflation to deviate from the target level). This is the reason why we carefully follow inflation expectations. According to a survey from Prospera, inflation expectations for the coming five-year period were on average 2.2 per cent in June. This figure represents an average for all respondents. (Figure: Inflation and inflation expectations). Recovery in the Swedish economy To summarise, the new information presented during the summer supports the Riksbank’s view that the Swedish economy is continuing to recover. GDP growth has so far this year been slightly higher than we had expected, and the labour market has shown slightly stronger development. Inflation has largely been in line with our forecasts.
Run risk would be reduced but not eliminated, and it would be more likely that in a stress funds could sell a so-called vertical (representative) slice of their assets. This is important for an agency-form collective investment structure. There may though still be some first mover advantage to exit in this structure, so great care would be needed to design it in a way which doesn’t fall foul of the familiar issues missed by the post financial crisis reforms. Each of the three options I have just outlined may not be mutually exclusive. Properly differentiated, there may be a role for funds of each of these types, to suit the needs of the diverse set of existing MMF investors. We may end up with some MMFs becoming more cashlike and some less cash-like, but we need to avoid the muddy middle. Conclusion In conclusion, we are very much in the world of having a second chance to deal with the issue of how to structure money market funds consistent with their role. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  The FSB will shortly be consulting on what reforms would be most appropriate. The Bank of England remains very supportive of the work being taken forward by the FSB and under the Italian G20 presidency.

I trust that the topics today help us consider the state of play of financial literacy in Malaysia, what works and how to improve our financial education interventions. I also look forward to the debate on the implications of digitalisation on financial literacy and consumer protection – this can sharpen our appreciation for the difficult trade-offs between the benefits and risks of digitalisation to financial consumers, and consider the role of digital financial literacy in promoting financial well-being in the digital age. Distinguished guests, Neil Armstrong once said that "research is creating new knowledge". As policymakers and practitioners, the research of the sort we will be deliberating today is exciting because it introduces valuable insights into designing and evaluating effective interventions, tailored to the needs of those in our population. There are many ideas out there on promoting better education outcomes – be it by refreshing traditional delivery approaches (like competitions, classes or webinars) or deploying new tools such as edutainment games or those driven by artificial intelligence. However, what matters most is not the novelty of new approaches, but whether or not our efforts work well – and yield a high return in terms of financial literacy and financial well-being. Insights from the research are important to develop targeted interventions that address the financial education needs in our population. It can also give answers to what are the challenges faced by consumers to access or obtain financial education.
At the EU or euro area level, it is logical to consider some kind of a banking union, but in my mind, this would involve a two-tier system, wherein domestically oriented banks that are not systemically important for the area as a whole will remain within the domestic system of supervision, deposit insurance, and LOLR. What should happen at the global level is somewhat less clear to me. Some temporary retrenchment is probably not undesirable at this point, as cross-border banking – and perhaps financial globalisation more generally – far outpaced developments in public frameworks. The issue of global liquidity provision to banks needs further exploration. And finally, if countries are increasingly taking unilateral action to protect themselves, someone – probably the IMF – must monitor the process. Going forward, some rules of the game might have to be considered so that we are not faced with unintended consequences for the global system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Niklaus Blattner: The demographic challenge – macroeconomic perspectives Summary of a speech by Mr Niklaus Blattner, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Conference "Die alternde Gesellschaft als sozio-ökonomische Herausforderung" (the aging society: a socio-economic challenge), University of Basel, Basel, 9 February 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Demographic aging, i.e. the growing average age of the population, or the reversal of the age pyramid, is also a matter of concern for a central bank. Without a careful analysis of the long-term developments in the real economy, any monetary policy assessment, and consequently any inflation forecast, will be inadequate. In addition to the activities in the money and capital markets, the longterm growth outlook – and thus also the population perspectives – are factored into the Swiss National Bank's monetary policy assessment. The aging of the population is a fact. It is linked to three main trends, which will greatly influence Switzerland's demographic landscape in the decades to come: first, the economically active population will decrease, second, the old-age ratio, i.e. the ratio of people over 65 to those between 20 and 64 is on the rise, and third, longevity is increasing. In future, Switzerland will have to produce more with fewer resources. "Fewer resources" because the economically active population is declining, "produce more" because the old-age ratio is worsening and longevity increasing.
In fact, the Central Bank had been predicting a recession in 2009 since at least 2006, as can be seen from the graph that shows predictions for 2009 GDP growth at different dates. The predicted recession was supposed to be a mild one, but then we need to bear in mind that recession forecasts tend to be dampened while the times are still good! 4  BIS Review 139/2010  When all three shocks had hit, the mood changed dramatically, as can be seen from Graph 2. The bleakest forecast was made in May 2009, when GDP was predicted to contract by 11% in 2009 and unemployment for 2010 was forecasted to reach 11%. However, the outcome turned out to be much better – a contraction of 6.8% – and the prospects for peak unemployment have also improved markedly. I think this due not to ordinary forecast errors but to various factors that supported domestic demand and export production in 2009, some of which were temporary. These included temporary permission to withdraw a specified maximum amount from third pillar savings, with use amounting to 1½% of GDP in 2009. This measure is akin to a fiscal stimulus of a similar size. But these factors also included other measures to support households, which mitigated the decline in private consumption. Furthermore, the delay in corporate and household restructuring, although detrimental in the medium term, postponed some of the short-term contractionary effects that tend to accompany it.

We engaged with them to discuss these risks and how “de-tiering” could alleviate them. Each of these banks now accesses CHAPS directly. Over the last year, they accounted for 17% of total CHAPS values, demonstrating a clear and measurable reduction in risk, which in turn, benefits the wider payments ecosystem and all of its participants and end users. In April 2012, after consultation with all CHAPS participants, formal tiering criteria were introduced to CHAPS based on a presumption that Indirect Participants that breach the criteria should transition to direct access. The Bank will continue to analyse the financial stability risks presented by indirect access and further refine if we consider there is an unacceptable level of risk. Expanding eligibility to non-banks. Where it can be done safely without compromising our mission to maintain monetary and financial stability, we also seek to promote efficiency, innovation and competition through our operation of RTGS and CHAPS. We have therefore recently widened the access criteria for RTGS and CHAPS to enable non-bank PSPs to join. Key to this was working closely with the FCA, HM Treasury and the PSR to develop a supervisory regime that would allow non-bank PSPs to access settlement in RTGS and participation in the CHAPS payment system without increased risks. In April 2018 Transferwise was the first non-bank PSP to join RTGS and was followed by iPagoo who in August 2018 was 8 i.e.
In this context, it is important that all players involved consider in their investment and funding decisions that the current price and demand trends of the sector might not continue, especially considering the external risks described, the expected increase in supply and the economic slowdown. While total household debt over income has dropped, the available evidence suggests that bank debt remains dynamic, particularly in the middle to upper income homes. To the extent that banks properly evaluate and analyze the credit risks inherent in this segment, it should not be a source of vulnerability. However, there are factors that could contribute to an underestimation of these risks. First, rolling credits have been pretty dynamic in recent years. Second, the absence of a consolidated debtor data base hinders any household credit risk assessment for supervisors and suppliers – a concern we brought up before this Senate last time we presented our Financial Stability Report. Finally, those banks that have recently expanded a lot their consumer loan portfolios have seen a sharper deterioration of their  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  NPLs indicators, consistent with greater risk taking in this segment. So far, this has been accompanied by increased provisions. While in recent years the overall Chilean banking system has tended to reduce its dependence on short-term wholesale funding, some small and midsize banks remain highly dependent on this source.

Senders will have upfront certainty of fees due and an immediate update on transaction status. High security. The central platform leverages on the strong security and risk mitigation protocols built into national faster payment systems. The ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, have a shared vision of a multilateral network of payment linkages across ASEAN by 2025. MAS believes that Project Nexus can be a key enabler towards realising this vision. ASEAN is well placed to be a first-mover on this multilateral solution. In fact, as this network expands, we hope to see more countries coming onboard as we build connectivity from ASEAN to the rest of the world. STRONG LIKE METAL - ATOMIC SETTLEMENT (PROJECT UBIN PLUS) The second desired outcome is atomic settlement. Real-time cross-border payments does not mean real-time settlement. Let me explain. Project Nexus solves the clearing problem. The sender's bank account is debited and the recipient's bank account is credited instantaneously, based on the payment instruction sent through the network; and the recipient can spend the money. But it does not solve the settlement problem. The actual movement of funds between the banks is not instantaneous. It involves many intermediaries, goes through different ledgers, and takes two to three days to complete. This potentially creates multiple points of failure and higher costs. We want a real-time settlement system that is strong and secure like Metal. We want atomic settlement. Atomic settlement is the simultaneous exchange of two linked assets in real-time.
To be successful, these spokes would need to be repositories of knowledge and expertise on technologies and their application to companies. And, ideally, these repositories would have regional and sectoral reach to enable them to touch the long tail. The UK’s existing university network would be one institutional solution to this spoke problem. They have regional and sectoral reach. They also have embodied expertise and knowledge. By working in partnership with local businesses, they could serve as repositories of expertise on good company practices – in management, organisation, logistics, robotics, AI and the like. A new set of business parks attached to these universities could serve, not so much as innovation incubators for new companies, but as diffusion clinics for existing ones. This idea goes with the grain of the earlier proposal; it would broaden the scope and purpose of universities. In future, these would develop a broader set of capitals – beyond human capital (in people) to include physical and intellectual capital (in firms). And they would do so throughout the lifecycle of companies, not just in their early years. As it happens, this would also be consistent with Newman’s original conception of universities as diffusion-engines, every bit as much as innovation-engines. In Germany, a network of applied research institutes, run jointly by universities and industry, has been in place since 1949. The Fraunhofer institutes now total 72. 75  Their extensive project work means they can  apply technological solutions quickly to a wide variety of firms.

They can be divided into two categories: restrictions on the use of the SRR powers; and mechanisms for payment of compensation where property rights are unreasonably affected by the use of the special resolution powers. In the case of the restrictions, there is protection for netting and set-off arrangements, secured obligations and capital market instruments such as covered bonds and securitisations, to ensure that they are not disrupted by the transfer powers. This is an important part of the regime, and I want to emphasise that it is not in the interests of the authorities to disrupt instruments and markets that are of course of great importance to other banks. It would just be counterproductive to take that sort of action. In the case of compensation, the framework established by the Act ensures that the proceeds of the sale of a bank’s business are returned to the failed bank’s creditors and, if any surplus remains, to the shareholders, after meeting the claims of creditors in priority order. Moreover, creditors left behind in an insolvent entity – typically the rump of the business after other parts are transferred – are entitled to receive compensation to the extent that an independent valuer determines that they have received less than they would have done if the bank had gone into insolvency without the SRR being used. This is the “No creditor worse off” safeguard.