samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I am sure you will quickly get to know him just as well – and I am equally sure that he will represent your various views on the business conditions here in the region to the Monetary Policy Committee just as objectively and forcefully as John Beverly has done. I’d like to thank John publicly this evening for all his work, on both your and our behalf, over the past three years. I thought that in my opening remarks I would talk about the state of the economy as a whole, about the substantial imbalance between the domestic and the internationally – exposed sectors of the economy and the regional impact of that imbalance, and about the difficult dilemma which that poses for monetary policy. I will then happily try to answer your questions. Let me start then with the overall economy. The economy as a whole has grown consistently quarter by quarter now for over seven years – at an average annual rate of 3.2% which is well above its long-term trend rate. Consumer price inflation has averaged some 2.7% over this period. Employment has risen to a record level; and the rate of unemployment has fallen to a near 30 year low. All of that is very encouraging. But since the summer of 1996 our effective exchange rate has appreciated by about 12% and we have been affected by a global economic slowdown resulting largely from the financial crisis that began in Asia two years ago.

Thus, we would need rules not only like the Stability Pact, for a maximum deficit in a downturn, but equally some forceful rule for fiscal rectitude in good times. Those rules are difficult to state as clearly as the 3 per cent limit, but one way ahead could be to define annual targets for actual net lending based on the predicted output gap. But why didn’t we see these problems from the beginning? Perhaps because we were fortunate to have something that can work as a temporary replacement for rules: clear objectives, strong leadership and the market as a quickly reacting judge. This existed not so long ago in Europe. The objective was to join the euro zone and achieve the convergence criteria. The leadership was provided  BIS Review 66/2004  1  by Germany both in terms of its economic size and its example of fiscal discipline. Now the objective of joining the euro has been achieved, and, in addition, Germany has lost its leading role and the markets react less to fiscal laxity. Instead of leadership towards clear objectives we have recently seen the opposite - the political exploitation of the gap between the national and European level. The requirements of the Pact are blamed on heartless “accountants in Brussels”, and when a majority puts narrow national political interests first the agreed rules become moot - “peer pressure” becomes “peer protection”. Incorrect facts are more or less deliberately sent to the Commission ahead of sensitive elections.
But if inflation moves away from the target by more than 1 percentage point in either direction I shall expect you to send an open letter to me setting out the reasons why inflation has moved away from target …and the period in which you expect inflation to return to target’ In 1998 Charlie Bean, now (but not then) the Bank’s chief economist, calculated that open letters might be triggered at least 40% of the time, on the basis of past experience 3 . This did not seem unreasonable at the time. But after 114 monthly decisions, inflation has always been within 1 percentage point of the target. And I take the fact that no Governor has yet sent an open letter as further evidence that there has indeed been an unexpected increase in stability. 2  Mais lecture, June 1997. 3  “The new UK monetary arrangements: a view from the literature”, Charles Bean, Economic Journal 1998. 4  BIS Review 116/2006  Where are we now? Are we now entering choppier waters? The world economy continues to grow at an impressive rate, with few signs of sustained inflationary pressure. Globalisation continues apace. But it is not difficult to think of things that could go wrong, ranging from an outbreak of protectionism, to another sharp surge in oil prices in response to geopolitical events, to a sharp correction in housing markets, which in a number of countries are very richly valued.

Panel Remarks: The Fed and Main Street during the Coronavirus Pandemic - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  SPEECH  Panel Remarks: The Fed and Main Street during the Coronavirus Pandemic "Supervisory and Regulatory Action to Support the Economy and Protect Consumers" April 23, 2020 Posted April 24, 2020 Kevin Stiroh, Executive Vice President As prepared for delivery  Good afternoon. Thank you for your critical work and for participating in this important forum on "The Fed and Main Street during the Coronavirus Pandemic." The COVID-19 pandemic is impacting all of us – first and foremost from a health perspective, but clearly in terms of social and economic impacts. As has been discussed extensively today, this impact has fallen heavily on low- and moderate-income and minority communities across all three dimensions. I'll speak about what the Federal Reserve is doing to support the economy and to protect consumers and small businesses through supervisory and regulatory actions. I'll note that these action are focused on supervised banks and do not address the significant challenges faced by those households and businesses outside of the traditional banking sector and served by socially responsible capital providers such as community development financial institutions (CDFIs), non-profits, foundations, and impact investors. Before proceeding, let me emphasize that I am speaking for myself and that these view do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
In my recent appearance before the Lower House Budget Committee, I referred to the growing debt of companies and, in particular, of households as one of the sources of medium-term risk to the scenario of sustained growth and the tendency towards the re-balancing of the Spanish economy that I have set out today. Given the importance of the issue, I believe it would be useful to reiterate what I consider is a balanced analysis of this phenomenon. The Banco de España has been on a vigilant footing regarding the rate at which corporate and, especially, household debt has been growing in recent years, particularly given that most of such debt is floating-rate. This tends to increase households' exposure to potentially unfavourable changes in their income or in the cost of borrowing. Such exposure may particularly affect those segments of the population whose room for manoeuvre in these situations is more limited. There is thus no reason for complacency. 4  BIS Review 117/2006  A balanced analysis requires the joint assessment of all factors making up the household financial position. In this connection, it should be remembered that the payments associated with the debt incurred have grown at a substantially lesser extent than the volume of the debt and, at present, they account for a proportion of household income which, at the aggregate level, is still fairly moderate. The value of household financial and non-financial assets has also risen considerably in recent years.

That is due in particular to the property market boom, on which the recent structural changes in the economy, including immigration, have had a bearing. Consequently, the financial position of the sector as a whole is fairly sound. The trend of indebtedness in the past ten years has been sufficiently significant as to identify it as one of the risks to consider in the essentially favourable scenario of the Spanish economy. The Banco de España should signal this fact, particularly in a setting in which credit continues to show signs of being very buoyant. But, at the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that the financial position of households and firms is healthy and provides a sound basis for adaptation to the interest rate levels in keeping with the recovery in economic growth in the euro area. The solvency of the Spanish financial system is a further guarantee for the maintenance of stability in the economy as a whole. In sum, the outlook for growth in the Spanish economy in the coming quarters is, in my view, relatively healthy. And economic policies can contribute to providing continuity to this expansion in the medium term, defusing some of the risks highlighted. In that connection, it will be essential to restrain demand impulses and improve supply-side functioning.
This could refer, for instance, to households who now borrow money to buy a home. In the future the interest rates on these loans can be three or four times higher than the current mortgage rates. I began by discussing the major differences in time horizons in the financial decisions we all need to make. Some decisions apply only here and now. If we make the wrong decision it is not too difficult to put it right. In other cases, we make decisions today that have consequences far into the future. It is then important not to assume that the conditions applying today will apply for decades into the future. References Armelius, Bonomolo, Lindskog, Rådahl, Strid and Walentin (2014) “Lower neutral interest rate in Sweden?”, Economic Commentaries no. 8, Sveriges Riksbank. Ball, L. (2014) “The Case for a Long-Run Inflation Target of Four Percent”. IMF Working Paper WP/14/92, June. Bengtsson E & Waldenström D (2015) “Capital shares and income inequality: Evidence from the long run” CEPR Discussion Paper DP11022, December. IMF (2014) “Perspectives on Global Real Interest Rates”, World Economic Outlook, April. Karabarbounis, L & Neiman, B (2014) “The Global Decline of the Labor Share”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1), 61–103. King, M, Low, D, (2014) “Measuring the ‘world’ real interest rate”, NBER Working Paper No. 19887. Kryvtsov, O, Mendes, R (2015) “The Optimal Level of the Inflation Target: A Selective Review of the Literature and Outstanding Issues”, Bank of Canada, Discussion Paper 2015–8.

In other words, we can say that the long-term nominal interest rate is determined by two factors: •  the long-term real interest rate, which in turn is determined by structural factors and is global, and  •  the inflation target, which monetary policy can make credible. I shall discuss these two factors today and speculate how they may develop in the really long term. Firstly, I intend to take up the fact that real interest rates have shown a falling trend over a long period of time at a global level. What factors lie behind this? Will the trend prevail and, if so, what consequences will it have for monetary policy? And what will it mean for households and companies? BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Secondly, I will discuss the inflation target. Here in Sweden the target has been 2 per cent since it was introduced in the mid-1990s. Most other countries with inflation targets also have their targets at around 2 per cent. What are their experiences of having a target at this level? Should the level be lower or higher? Interest rates have thus been very low for a long time now, but it is reasonable to expect that in the long run they will be 3–4 times higher than they are now. This must be taken into account; otherwise decisions taken today will have major consequences much further ahead. It is thus important to remember that the conditions applying today will not apply for decades into the future.
Jon Cunliffe: The role of the leverage ratio and the need to monitor risks outside the regulated banking sector Speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability of the Bank of England, at the Financial Reporting Council annual conference, London, 17 July 2014. *  *  *  In early 2009, around the height of the financial crisis, the market valued the combined equity of the major UK banks at less than 2% of their total assets. In other words, the market thought these banks were, on average, over 50 times levered. Measured by their regulatory returns, average leverage was “only” 30 times or so. And on a risk weighted basis, the banks had 6.7% common equity capital – well above the 2% minimum. Tier 1 capital ratios were almost 9%. This was of course the time when fear in the market was at its peak. The message was crystal clear. When it mattered most, the market did not at all believe the published numbers for bank capital adequacy. And the market reacted accordingly bringing funding markets to a halt. This episode tells us two things. The first is that financial reporting matters. It matters at all times. But it matters most in times of stress. As an illustration here, I can recall heated discussions between European leaders about mark to market rules and about the transfer of assets from banks’ trading to their banking books in 2008 and 2009.

I do think the reforms already made to the capital adequacy and liquidity frameworks have improved markedly the robustness of the system. A leverage ratio, if and when it is introduced in the UK alongside the risk-weighted approach, would in my view make the capital adequacy regime for the banking sector appreciably stronger by guarding against model risk. And, as regards the non-bank financial sector, what some would classify as “shadow banking” – I also think we are starting to see some positive momentum towards the development of diversified credit channels in the UK and the EU – though there is a great way still to go. At the same time, the financial regulatory community is keeping a pretty close watch as to whether risks are migrating from the bank to non-bank sector and building up elsewhere. The FPC recently made its first analysis and assessment of risks in the UK outside the regulated banking system. That assessment was made difficult by generally incomplete data in this area, which we are starting to correct. But it concluded that, based on its current risk assessment and policy initiatives underway internationally – including through the FSB work on shadow banking that is coming to completion this year – it did not currently see a case for recommending changes to the UK regulatory framework. I am afraid, for financial stability, that is as good as it gets. The financial sector evolves at a phenomenal speed. Risks can change and build very quickly.
Bank Negara Malaysia 25 May 2017  1 Regional average prime office vacancy rate is based on 2015 data 2 Attributed to William McChesney Martin Jr., the ninth Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Bank 3 Return on investment: measured as FDI profit over FDI stock  6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

17 Second, as part of our broader SkillsFuture national initiative, MAS is partnering various other players to enhance continuous learning. We must in particular equip financial professionals with stronger digital skillsets: The Financial IT Academy (FITA) is delivering a digital transformation programme for midcareers that includes topics such as data analytics and agile development, to deliver software faster and with high quality. The Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF) will be offering new learning modules on a set of core capabilities covering data science, human-centric design, agile thinking, and cyber-risk awareness. To develop the cyber security talent pool in Singapore, the Info-comm & Media Development Authority (IMDA) and the Cyber Security Agency (CSA) have introduced the Cyber Security Associates and Technologists (CSAT) Programme1. The University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School will also be launching a new executive education programme in Singapore focused on financial innovation. i) Called the Wharton FinTech Innovation Program for Financial Institutions, it is expected to launch in the second quarter of next year. ii) The Program aims to expose senior managers in incumbent financial institutions to current topics in FinTech. iii) Participants will learn to how to grapple with disruptive trends, and drive change and innovation across their organisations to compete in the FinTech space. We also want to ensure that professionals trained in ICT skills have good placement outcomes in the financial sector. We are doing this through the recently-formed Finance Committee of the Technology Skills Accelerator, or TeSA, programme.
I consider that both the ongoing review of monetary policy strategy and the strategy to address the challenges arising from the growing digitalisation of the financial system are two sound exponents of this way of working. They will allow us to continue adding the maximum value to the European economy and, by extension, to Spanish society. Thank you. 14  References Aguilar, P., Ó. Arce, S. Hurtado, J. Martínez-Martín, G. Nuño, and C. Thomas (2020). “The ECB monetary policy response to the COVID-19 crisis”, Occasional Papers, No 2026, Banco de España. Arce, Ó., M. García-Posada, S. Mayordomo and S. Ongena (2018). “Adapting lending policies in a “negative-for-long” scenario”, Working Papers, No 1832, Banco de España. Arce, Ó., R. Gimeno and S. Mayordomo (2017). “Making room for the needy: the creditreallocation effects of the ECB’s corporate QE”, Working Papers, No 1743, Banco de España, forthcoming in Review of Finance. Arce, Ó., I. Kataryniuk, P. Marín and J. J. Pérez (2020). “Thoughts on the design of a European Recovery Fund”, Occasional Papers, No 2014, Banco de España. Bernanke, B.S., M.T. Kiley and J.M. Roberts (2019). “Monetary Policy Strategies for a LowRate Environment”, AEA Papers and Proceedings, No 109, pp. 421-426. Brunnermeier, M. K., and Y. Koby (2018). “The Reversal Interest Rate”, NBER Working Paper Series, No 25406. Fiorentini, G., A. Galesi, G. Pérez-Quirós and E. Sentana (2018). “The rise and fall of the natural interest rate”, Working Papers, No 1822, Banco de España. Galesi, A., G. Nuño and C. Thomas (2017).

16.11.2020  Annual Financial Convention 2020 Asociación de Mercados Financieros Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. It is my pleasure to take part in this annual conference of the Asociación de Mercados Financieros. First, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some reflections on the current economic situation in the euro area and the role that the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy could play over the coming months in staving off some of the more serious consequences, at least from the economic standpoint, of the second wave of COVID-19 in Europe. In the second part of my speech, I would also like to discuss some of the challenges for monetary policy in advanced economies, which have prompted the main central banks, among them the ECB, to launch a review of their monetary policy strategy. Lastly, I would like to conclude with a few thoughts on the studies that will allow us to assess whether introducing a digital euro would be warranted. Monetary policy in response to the second wave of COVID-19  The health crisis and the containment measures deployed triggered a deep global recession in the first half of the year. Since the height of the crisis last spring, economic activity has been on a recovery path. However, this recovery is subject to a high level of uncertainty and has been partial, uneven and fragile. Euro area GDP in the third quarter was still 4.3% below that of the fourth quarter of 2019.
As virtual banks are not allowed to operate physical branches, they will have to come up with innovative ways to offer attractive and competitive banking services. This is likely to force existing banks to consider how to further upgrade their services, and better make use of technology in their offerings. The result, I hope, will be a more innovative and globally competitive banking sector in Hong Kong, offering customers more diversified and efficient services. Technology use is a means to an end 20. Last but not least, we should bear in mind that the use of technology is a means to an 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  end, and not an end by itself. Most people appreciate new technology for what it can do to improve their lives. They don’t really care whether the algorithms or the chips are amazingly innovative. To achieve wide adoption, any innovation has to offer users a “unique value proposition”. In plain language, the consumer wants to know “what can it do for me?” 21. Take mobile payment as an example. This has rapidly taken off for retail payment in Mainland China and some other places. In Hong Kong and other markets, people already use credit cards and e-payment systems like Octopus, so mobile payments will grow more slowly. The point is that mobile payment technology is only the means to an end. The Hong Kong consumer will ask: “what can it do for me?”.

For example, we have started a joint research project with the Bank of Thailand on implementing central bank digital currency in cross-border payments. We have also completed a proof-of-concept test with the we.trade platform to connect the digital trade finance platforms of Hong Kong and Europe. So far, it looks quite promising, and we have engaged Mainland China and Singapore on similar connections. 39. A lot of future Fintech development will involve cross-border collaboration. In recognition of this, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) decided to establish an Innovation Hub to explore macro issues that cut across jurisdictions. And I am delighted to say that the first Innovation Hub Centre of the BIS has recently commenced its operation here in Hong Kong, and we look forward to close collaboration with the hub. Concluding Remarks 40. Fintech in Hong Kong has come a long way since we first held this event in 2016. Many of you here have contributed to this progress. We now all look forward to building on our experience with exciting new initiatives and trends. The Government, the financial regulators and the industry bodies all recognise that we need a holistic “Hong Kong Inc.” approach in developing Fintech. This will be about making the most of synergy and collaboration to drive the Hong Kong platform forward. 41. As we continue this journey, we need your participation.