samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The key principle behind our targeted loan policy is to provide funding in a way that will boost investment, employment, production and exports, and on reasonable terms. Therefore, we attach great importance to making credits available to a broader population and the easy access to loans by our industrialists. Thanks to our efforts to expand the use of rediscount credits, the share of SMEs in total credit utilization has steadily increased since early 2022. The share of SMEs was 6% of rediscount credit utilization at the end of January 2022; this exceeded 20% in July 2022. 4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  In this context, the regulations we have made regarding access to export credits have affected SMEs positively. The share of SMEs saw an increase to 50% of TRY rediscount credit utilization, which reached 90% on the back of our liraization strategy. The net export status and rediscount credit shares of firms with a rediscount credit balance since the beginning of the year indicate that the share of net-exporting firms in rediscount credits has increased to 55% from 40%, and the ratio of net-exporting firms that used credit has gone up to 68% from 59%. Accordingly, the net foreign trade contribution of firms with a rediscount balance, and their net FX contribution in the spot market improved significantly in the same period. In our new economy model, we are focused on achieving the most efficient results for the Turkish economy with our targeted loan policies that will support the current account surplus.

However, some of the new players adopted risky business models, growing very quickly, and to do that they attracted deposits with high interest rates. In addition, they did not adequately assess risks in lending, and sometimes lending was directed to related persons. The number of banks increased considerably, and peaked in 1998 at 60 – the highest number of banks that ever operated in Croatia, twice as much as before Croatia's independence and three times the current number. That is when I joined the central bank. Just before the next crisis was about to happen. In the second case, the trigger of the crisis that started in 1999, and lasted for the next two years, was again macroeconomic – the recession caused by drying-up of global capital flows in the aftermath of the Russian and Asian crises and negative spillovers of the military intervention in Kosovo for the tourist industry. However, this time around none of the large banks were affected. It was a crisis of small and medium-sized banks. Mostly the newcomers. Within a very short period of time the central bank submitted proposals for bankruptcy proceedings for a total of 16 banks and five savings banks. In only one case was the rehabilitation of the bank proposed in order to preserve trust in the banking system and safeguard financial stability, all other banks that operated at too high a risk were removed from the market. This time around, however, the fiscal cost was much smaller, around 1 per cent of the GDP.
That is to say, financial regulation and supervision remained within the domain of so-called “microprudential policies”, decided upon and applied to each individual bank. Monetary policy (pursuing price stability) and fiscal policy (seeking budgetary stability) were, for their part, entrusted with managing the economic cycle. 1  However, the global financial crisis and its high cost in terms of economic activity, employment and public debt prompted the reconsideration of this paradigm. It should be borne in mind that the crisis came about owing to the build-up of previous imbalances, whose correction entailed a considerable loss of well-being for society. There was a macroeconomic dimension to these imbalances, which were concentrated in the financial sector, highlighting how the microprudential approach, bank by bank and market by market, was clearly insufficient to ensure the stability of the system as a whole. This is what is known as the “fallacy of composition”.1 Indeed, on occasions, bank managers’ decisions can be optimal from an individual perspective, but are not so once the effects on the system as a whole through the numerous interconnections between the different intermediaries and financial markets are taken into account. It was thus deemed necessary for economic policymakers to have an additional set of instruments for attaining the goal of (macro-) financial stability enabling them to incorporate this aggregate view.

For example, if banks do not have sufficient solvency levels, they may not be capable of passing changes in money market interest rates through to their customers, or may pass them through excessively. In this respect, financial stability may be said to be a de facto pre-requisite for ensuring price stability. 11  Macroprudential policy can also increase an expansionary monetary policy’s room for manoeuvre if the latter is beginning to induce excessive risk-taking by certain agents or markets. In this case, the activation of macroprudential instruments, which are more selective and can affect certain agents alone, may enable the expansionary monetary policy stance to be maintained, by smothering the increases in risks in specific sectors. This is particularly important in the euro area, where monetary policy is determined at the supranational level by the ECB taking into consideration the area as a whole, whereas macroprudential policy remains under the national remit. But nor must we exclude situations in which the objectives of the two policies may clash. For example, in the expansion prior to the international financial crisis, the relatively expansionary monetary policy stance contributed to the accumulation of macrofinancial disequilibria. Had these macroprudential tools then been in place, they could have been activated to counter some of the monetary policy effects on the risks to the financial system’s stability. In short, we cannot ignore the interaction between these two policies.
However, on the positive side, the share of lending to these sectors has now eased slightly since before the crisis to around 10.5% of total assets as at September 2011, and domestic banks are encouraged to continue on this path to reduce concentration risk. In the same vein, I would also like to stress that the sovereign debt crisis has also highlighted the importance of prudent credit standards and for banks to improve the institutional capacity to appraise risk, not only as it relates to the individual borrower but also from a sectoral and economy-wide perspective. The Central Bank of Malta also continues to urge banks to expand loan loss provisioning levels, especially related to the construction sector, and also to strengthen further the capital buffers through the adoption of prudent dividend policies. Such measures are also needed for banks to eventually implement the stringent Basel III regulatory requirements. I must stress that there is never room for complacency, especially at a time of uncertainty in the global financial system, and also because economic growth in our main trading partners is expected to slow down appreciably during 2012. Conclusion I have touched on a number of areas in this my first speech to you as Governor of the Central Bank of Malta. In concluding, I would like to say that the challenges faced by the Maltese economy today are not so dissimilar from those of the past.

China and Singapore have strong and comprehensive bilateral ties 5 Singapore-China relations too are growing and evolving, in step with the development of our economies and societies. The relations between our two countries began a new era after the first official visit to Singapore by late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in 1978. He and Mr Lee Kuan Yew paved the way for stronger diplomatic and economic ties between Singapore and China. 6 With regard to merchandise trade, China was Singapore’s 3rd largest trading partner last year. In services, China has been also our 5th largest export destination. Singapore was China’s 13th largest trading partner in terms of merchandise trade in 2012. Singapore was also the third largest source of FDI into China last year, after Hong Kong and Japan. 7 Bilateral trade was further boosted with the signing of the China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (CSFTA) in September 2008 in Beijing. This was the first comprehensive bilateral FTA that China signed with another Asian country. It has led to greater cross-border economic links between our two countries. 8 Multiple Sino-Singapore economic projects are also evidence of our deep relationship, including the Suzhou Industrial Park which would be celebrating its 20th Anniversary in 2014 and the Tianjin Eco-City which would be celebrating its  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  5th Anniversary this year.
In the United States, the “Volcker rule” has been introduced. This prohibits US-operating banks from undertaking proprietary trading and restricts private equity activity. The rule was tabled in October 2011 and became law in July 2012. Banks have two years to comply. In the United Kingdom, the proposals of the “Vickers Commission” include placing a ringfence around retail banking activities, supported by higher levels of capital. The final version of these proposals was tabled in September 2011 and legislation to enact them is planned by 2015. Banks will have until 2019 to comply. Most recently in Europe, the “Liikanen plan” was announced in October 2012. It proposes that the investment banking activities of universal banks be placed in a separate entity from the remainder of the banking group. There are at present no plans to legislate these proposals. As with the other reform strands, it is remarkable how quickly radical structural reform proposals are finding their way onto the statute book. And although different in detail, these proposals share a common motivation: separation of certain investment and commercial banking activities. In theory, such a separation delivers financial stability benefits of two distinct types (Boot and Ratnovski (2012)). First, separation reduces the risk of cross-contamination. Riskier investment banking activities, when they go wrong, can pollute and dilute the financial resources of the retail bank. This potentially inflicts losses (or fear of losses) on depositors. It may also constrain banks’ ability to make loans to the real economy when it might most need them.

Firms may then be inclined to tailor their risk-taking to their own assessment of the probability of intervention, while at the same time the incentive for firms to hold adequate buffers of liquid assets is likely to be reduced. The gap between the amount of liquidity that a firm will choose to hold, and the optimal public choice will then widen. It is not surprising, then, that in most jurisdictions firms’ liquidity management is subject to standards imposed by regulation. Intervening in this way requires that the authorities be able to answer some difficult questions. There is the question of calibration: how much liquidity is ‘enough’ for any given firm? In other words, what is the optimal public choice of liquidity buffer? And for how long should a firm be expected to be able to survive without outside help? This is a much more difficult question for liquidity buffers than for capital, as in the case of liquidity it is not sufficient merely to analyse the structure of a firm’s assets and liabilities. The firm also has to take account of the possible ways in which its counterparties and creditors may behave in a crisis. Moreover, in a liquidity crisis, there is feedback from the actions that a firm takes to meet liquidity needs—selling assets for example—to the market’s perception of its solvency and hence to the size of those very liquidity needs.
The “slow correction” of 1962 comes to mind as an example: A stock market correction took place, and yet the economy continued to fare well. Here is the point as to the market’s beer goggles. Were a stock market correction to ensue while I have the vote, I would not flinch from supporting continued reductions in the size of our asset purchases as long as the real economy is growing, cyclical unemployment is declining and demand-driven deflation remains a small tail risk; I would vote for continued reductions in our asset purchases, with an eye toward eliminating them entirely at the earliest practicable date. How large is the camel? Let’s turn to the camel, by which I mean the size of the Fed’s balance sheet. A little history provides some perspective. We began to grow our balance sheet as we approached year-end 2008. On Sept. 10, 2008, the amount of Reserve Bank credit outstanding was $ billion. On Nov. 25, 2008, we announced a program to purchase $ billion of securities issued by the housing-related government-sponsored enterprises, together with our intent to purchase up to $ billion in MBS in order to goose the housing market. I supported these initiatives, recognizing that the economy was in the throes of a financial panic.

I understand that the EU Code on remuneration would already be consistent with this. What I am describing is not a scary prospect. It should, in fact, be liberating to establish a financial system based more firmly on the principles of the market. But it is a prospective world in which our capital markets will be at least as important as they were over recent decades. That underlines the necessity of the work on, for example, standards for central counterparties, on shadow banking, and on transparent and resiliently liquid markets. This is a world in which securities regulators will play a vital role in underpinning stability. In the UK, the new Financial Conduct Authority under Martin Wheatley will be a member of the new macroprudential body, the Financial Policy Committee, for just that reason. Thank you again to AFME for providing a forum through its book for this public policy debate to continue. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
A deep, single capital market will also strengthen the international role of the euro,5 as further developed euro-denominated markets, derivatives and benchmarks will reduce transaction costs, curb spreads and mitigate rollover risks. This will in turn attract foreign investors and widen the possibilities of using the euro in international transactions. Conclusion Let me conclude. Assessing potential vulnerabilities in the light of current challenges is key to making financial markets and infrastructures more resilient. Authorities and market participants are reflecting on the lessons to be learned from the pandemic and this will be a key topic of today’s discussions. Our panellists will provide insights on CCP margin practices and the related funding and operational complexities that emerged last spring and which we need to address. This conference will also provide an opportunity to discuss the direct and indirect implications of climate change for central clearing. Cash and derivatives markets have already developed products to facilitate sustainable investments and help hedge against climate risks. Our panellists will also consider the changing clearing landscape, including some of the regulatory and supervisory cooperation issues I have mentioned and the global dimension of this debate. Given the challenges currently faced by economies and financial markets, finding the right mix of internal capacity building, cooperation and innovation will be crucial to make central clearing even more resilient. I am sure this conference will give rise to a fruitful exchange of views. Thank you for your attention.

Risk-weighted assets were calculated, to put it simply, by first giving the banks’ different assets risk weights of between 0 and 100 per cent, depending on how risky they were assessed to be. For instance, the banks’ mortgages were given a risk weight of 50 per cent. A bank’s risk-weighted assets were then calculated by multiplying the value of the respective type of asset by the respective risk weight. Basel I meant that the banks should have capital exceeding eight per cent of the bank's risk-weighted assets. This requirement still applies, although the content of both the banks’ capital and their risk-weighted assets have changed over time. Basel II and III entailed more risk-sensitive capital requirements and increased model risks At the beginning of the 1980s, several countries deregulated parts of their credit markets. As a result, the banking systems in many countries rapidly became more complex and even more internationally interlinked than before. New types of more complex financial instrument were introduced. Moreover, new and more advanced methods for measuring risk and risk management were developed and refined by most of the banks. Many agents, including the Basel Committee, assessed that Basel I needed to be reworked to become more risk-sensitive and to better reflect developments in the banks and in society. The banks were keen on pushing this question as they wanted to use their own methods for calculating capital requirements. In 2004, the so-called Basel II Accord was published.
Ladies and Gentlemen This workshop is being held at a time when the global economy has come under serious strain caused by the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US. Appetite for profit and poor credit risk underwriting standards led to a surge in sub-prime mortgages. This brought about a real estate price bubble as demand for residential properties grew. The situation culminated into a liquidity and credit crunch in financial markets. The financial crisis has spread to other countries directly through financial market linkages and indirectly through trade. Recent projections indicate that the global financial crisis will lead to global contraction in economic output with a corresponding reduction in incomes, a rise in unemployment and decline in volumes of trade. Ladies and Gentlemen The current state our financial sector calls for a new approach to the supervision of banks and other financial institutions. Risk Based Supervision (RBS) represents a paradigm shift from the traditional rules based, historical, standardised and point-in-time assessments to a process-oriented, forward looking, continuous and risk profile driven approach to supervision and regulation of the financial sector. RBS is a structured and forward looking process designed to identify risk factors to which individual banks and other financial institutions and the entire financial industry are exposed. This approach enables supervisors to critically assess various risks and the risk management systems of banks and other financial institutions in order to assess the risk profile of these institutions.

It is my hope that we will develop the supervisory systems in the region to a level where they will be able to interact effectively. This uniformity in the supervisory systems will prepare us to respond better to regional and global financial challenges. With these few remarks, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my honour and privilege to declare this important regional workshop on Effective Banking Supervision: A Risk Based Approach officially open. I thank you!!! 2  BIS Review 159/2008
In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to Japanese businesses for their contribution to the progress of the Thai economy over the years. Here's hoping that we continue to build and strengthen the foundation of this great relationship. Again, I am deeply grateful for this opportunity, and thank you for your kind attention. BIS Review 27/2007  3

Global investments have suffered from weakening business confidence. In Q1 this year, G3 investment growth moderated to 3.4% on a year-on-year basis, from 3.7% last year. In the ASEAN-4 economies, year-on-year growth in fixed investment spending has pulled back sharply, to 3.1% in Q1 this year. This is half the pace seen in 2018. There are three factors driving the current weakness in manufacturing, trade, and investment. a downturn in the global electronics cycle; the lagged effects of deleveraging in China; and the trade conflict between the US and China. 1 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  Of the three factors, the trade conflict poses the biggest risk to global growth outcomes. Cycles in electronics production are a common feature and structural trends in digitalisation and the Internet-of-Things should support a recovery eventually in chip production in the next few years. As for deleveraging in China, there has clearly been an easing of the policy stance in recent months in response to the slowing economy. If the trade impasse between the US and China drags on and further tariff measures are imposed, growth in the second half of 2019 is likely to be weaker than earlier envisaged. MAS’ estimates suggest that the direct impact of the tariffs that have been introduced to-date would already shave off a cumulative 0.3% points from global GDP growth over 2019– 2020. The indirect effects on business and consumer sentiments and financial markets are difficult to estimate.
There are also a significant number of other Taiwanese banks which have expressed the intention to establish representative offices here. We are processing these applications in an orderly fashion on a “first-come first-served” basis. It has long been our policy not to allow in too many banks from the same region or country too quickly. As in the case of the Japanese regional banks and the Korean banks we therefore operate a queuing system. I know that this can sometimes be frustrating to those who are at the back of the queue. But I would like to made it clear that these is no reluctance on our part to admit banks from Taiwan, as the existing presence here clearly demonstrates. I am sure that Dr. Jeffrey Koo will also testify to this. 6. Hong Kong is currently going through tougher times as a financial centre. Some foreign banks have cut back their lending here and a few banks have actually left. This has reflected problems back home rather than discontent with Hong Kong. However, it is true that Hong Kong must reduce the cost of doing business in order to remain competitive, and that is why the current fall in property prices and rents, while painful, is also necessary. I am confident that Hong Kong will emerge from the current crisis with a better-balanced economy and with even stronger fundamentals. Above all, it can continue to rely on its main strategic advantage as a financial centre - namely, its proximity to the Mainland of China.

In this kind of uncertain economic environment, it is all the more important that we should be trying to maximize the opportunities to develop trade and investment links between neighbouring economies. That is why this Symposium is timely and important. The existing economic links between Fujian, Hong Kong and Taiwan provide a solid platform on which to build for the future. Taiwan and Hong Kong are already major trading partners with Taiwan’s exports to Hong Kong accounting for 23.5% of its total exports in 1997. Visitors from Taiwan also account for a significant proportion of the total number of visitors to the territory and thus make a major contribution to the tourist industry in Hong Kong which, as you will know, currently needs all the help it can get. 4. Trade between Hong Kong and Fujian is also growing rapidly in both directions and both Hong Kong and Taiwan are a major source of overseas investment into the Province. There are over 10,000 Hong Kong enterprises in Fujian. 5. The Hong Kong presence in Fujian includes a number of banks from Hong Kong, including Bank of East Asia. The same bank also maintains a branch in Taiwan which puts it in a good position to take advantage of the triangular trading links between Fujian, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In its role as an international financial centre, Hong Kong is also the host to a number of banks from Taiwan. The Taiwanese presence here consists of 4 licensed banks, 2 restricted licensed banks and 3 representative offices.