samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, we must emphasize that the Republic of Macedonia is finally back on the right track: back to the main mega-trends of the most developed part of human civilization, to the building and practicing of a functional market economy; to the competition on the open international market; to the dominance of the individualism as opposed to the general and omnipresent collectivization; to the painstaking establishment of institutions responsible to the people; to the difficult road of providing the rule of law. And have we learned the lessons? •  that we should stay away from the revolutionary methods which suddenly stop it all and start building it all over;  BIS Review 100/2006  3  •  that there is no efficient system in which ownership and rights deriving from it are not known;  •  that there is no efficient system which denies the differences in the capabilities, dividing the social wealth on the basis of their harsh negation;  •  that there is no sustainable economic growth by continuously spending more than we earn;  •  that there is no strong economy without developed institutions and judicial system. Ladies and Gentlemen, The Central Bank completely distinguishes between the principles of the previous and of today's system in creation. Therefore, today it is a successful and modern institution, with a satisfactory trend of development of its institutional capacity.

It turned out to be "everybody's and nobody's" but de facto it belonged to those with the largest political power. In line with those principles of the system, credit plans directed the reserve money issuance, rather than it to be determined by economic fundamentals: economic growth, internal and external balances, supply and demand, real market values. Printing of money was also dictated by the debtors, which did not repay the credits, but issued bills of exchange which at the end were borne by the reserve money issuance, then the extremely soft budget constraints, direct lending to whole economic sectors, and even certain companies, from the reserve money issuance, at interest rates significantly below the inflation rate. Instead of the debtors, often their creditors went bankrupt, with the intention to preserve social rest, or to postpone social unrest. Therefore, the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, followed by the development since then until present day, have been years of Schumpeter's destruction, positive destruction - regardless of our dissatisfaction with the slow pace of the reforms and jeopardized social security, which, I would agree, did not have to erode to such an extent, before the new solutions started to give better results.
Norman T L Chan: Symposium on Financial Stability – opening remarks Opening remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA Financial Stability Symposium, Hong Kong, 30 May 2013. *  *  *  Good Morning Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. Welcome to the HKMA Financial Stability Symposium. The Symposium marks the 20th Anniversary of the HKMA, which is a very young central banking institution comparing with its peers. It is very timely and appropriate for the HKMA to convene this Symposium on Financial Stability because Hong Kong, like many of our Asian neighbours, have learnt from our own bitter experience in the few years after 1997 just how painful and devastating financial crisis can become. So it is clearly our common wish to do what we can to reduce the risks of financial crisis recurring or at least mitigate the damage that it can cause to the financial system and the economy when it occurs. 2. In this connection, it may perhaps be useful to look back and observe how the mainstream thinking on financial stability have changed or evolved since the time when the HKMA was set up in 1993. I would list a couple of key issues below: (i)  there was the belief that financial crises would only occur in the developing economies because they had weak financial institutions and poor regulatory regimes. Advanced economies would be immune as they had mature financial institutions and robust regulatory systems.

I am sure there will be very interesting and fruitful exchange of views and ideas on the major financial stability issues, including those that I have mentioned earlier. Once again, thank you all for being with us today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
We need to better understand the degree to which any changes in the nature of liquidity reflect the evolving structure of financial markets, changes in regulatory policy or other factors. With respect to regulatory policy, an important objective should be to achieve the best balance between the benefits of increased safety and soundness versus any costs imposed by these regulatory changes on market function and liquidity. In my remarks today, I will focus on market liquidity rather than funding liquidity, although I recognize that the two are related in important ways. I will examine market liquidity in two important fixed-income markets – the U.S. Treasury market and the U.S. corporate bond market. The Treasury and corporate bond markets provide a useful contrast in evaluating liquidity conditions as they differ with respect to the homogeneity of their securities, how their securities are traded and how regulatory changes may have affected the incentives of dealers to make markets in these securities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Treasury market is much more homogeneous and the average size of each issue is much larger. Trading volume and average trade sizes are much larger, and much of the trading activity for interdealer on-the-run securities is conducted electronically through the use of central limit order books (CLOB). In contrast, the corporate bond market is much more heterogeneous; there are many more distinct bonds available; and bond sizes are much smaller. As a result, corporate bond trading is fragmented across a large number of distinct outstanding bonds.

The contention is that higher liquidity costs and more frequent illiquidity events will, over time, drive up the borrowing costs of households, businesses and the U.S. government; and that this is a substantial, largely unintended cost imposed by tougher regulation. Thus, the argument concludes, the regulatory burden should be rolled back. This is a noteworthy assertion and would have significant implications for regulatory policy if it were correct. However, as I will lay out in my remarks, I don’t think the hypothesis is wellsupported by the available evidence. First, the evidence to date that liquidity has diminished markedly is, at best, mixed. Second, even if one were to interpret the evidence as indicating that liquidity has been reduced, it is not clear whether regulation is the primary driver, as other changes have played important roles as well. Moreover, even if higher capital and new liquidity requirements were found to result in greater transaction costs, these costs would need to be assessed against the benefits of having a more robust and resilient financial system and a reduced risk of financial crises in the future. That said, more work should be undertaken to fully assess this issue. There is much that is still unknown. The available market liquidity data primarily focus on the inter-dealer markets and thus do not shed light on possible liquidity changes between dealers and customers. In addition, the financial system is adjusting in complex ways in reaction to regulatory, technological and other changes.
The Riksbank’s balance sheet SEK billion 900  900  Assets 800  Liabilities Equity  700  800 700  Other Foreign exchange reserve  600 500  600  Foreign exchange loans  400  400  300  Assets 200  100 Gold  500  Foreign exchange reserve  Liabilities Equity Banknotes and coins  0  August 2008  Government bonds  Certificates and fine tuning  300 200  100  Gold  Banknotes and coins  0  September 2016  Source: The Riksbank  The Riksbank purchases government bonds to support the upturn in inflation ... To begin with, I would like to remind you that the aim of the Riksbank’s operations is not to make a profit and deliver dividends to the government. Our task is to maintain price stability, and bond purchases are one component of the expansionary monetary policy we are conducting in order to safeguard the credibility of the inflation target. The Riksbank started purchasing government bonds in February 2015. At that time, inflation had been low for a long time, long-term inflation expectations had fallen to a record-low level and a period of falling oil prices risked pushing down inflation expectations even further (see Chart 2). In this situation, the Riksbank needed to safeguard continued confidence in its ability and willingness to stabilise inflation around the inflation target. As we know, a credible inflation target lays the foundation for efficient price-setting and wage formation and hence promotes good growth in the economy.

This raises the question of the sustainability of this debt, and of the impact of an upward shock to interest rates or a downward shock to activity, especially in an increasingly uncertain macroeconomic context (trade tensions, Italian budget, Brexit, yellow vests). Given the situation, it was essential to avoid an infinite debt spiral. In December 2017, the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière, under the chairmanship of Minister Bruno Le Maire, thus decided to lower to 5% of their equity the ceiling of the main banks’ exposures to the most indebted large companies. It also decided to raise the countercyclical capital buffer of French banks, by 0.25% in June 2018 and again by 0.25% in March 2020. This countercyclical buffer, expressed as a percentage of core equity and applied to French exposures, aims at enabling banks to build up a capital reserve to maintain their supply of credit in the event of a turnaround in the financial cycle, the buffer then being immediately released. However, these binding instruments apply only to banks, while non-bank intermediation is playing an increasing role in financing the economy. According to the ECB, the loans and deposits of investment funds have risen threefold since 2011. Macroprudential policy thus needs to be adjusted to better take account of this new dimension. The HCSF is firmly committed to this goal. Its powers enable it to intervene outside the banking sector and it has started designing stress tests that cover all sectors. B.
These are probably the most important services for the majority of customers. Several banks also offer trading in shares and fund units on the Internet. The product range and user-friendliness can be expected to increase in the period ahead. I’m sure discussions during this conference will give you an indication of future product developments. 9  BIS Review 78/2000  Nordic countries rank at the top globally in terms of access to the Internet. Nordic banks thus have a unique opportunity to serve a substantial share of customers via the Internet. This also has relevance to cross-border integration. Banks that focus on Internet distribution are perhaps particularly interested in markets where there are many Internet users. Although estimates vary, it is safe to say that the Internet will significantly reduce the banks’ variable costs. However, substantial IT investments may be necessary to keep pace with technological and market developments. In isolation, this may contribute to increasing banks’ fixed costs. As a result, the competitive environment may change. There is a danger of over-investment. Sunk costs account for a large share of overall costs. This may lead to marginal pricing as the fight for volume intensifies. This could have a negative effect on bank profitability. Many Nordic banks have a smaller customer base for distributing fixed costs than large foreign competitors. As mentioned, some banks have tried to compensate by entering into cooperation agreements. However, it might be difficult to reduce total costs without a substantial reduction in the costs of more traditional distribution.

We have a long history of working together and reaching remarkable useful consensus on critical issues when it matters most, this time will be no different. Honourable Ministers and Governors I am sure we have all had a very hectic day on discussing all these issues and look forward to a very relaxed evening. For those that have not had time to look around this beautiful and historic city I implore you to find time to explore our beautiful beaches and various historic sites. BIS Review 115/2010  1  I wish you fruitful deliberations and hope that Freetown would forever be remembered as the venue where key decisions affecting the African continent would be made. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 115/2010
In this regard, the Bank of Thailand meets with external auditors at the beginning of each year, in order to exchange views on common areas of concerns and to gain greater insights on the planned audit scope for the coming year, for example, the quality of risk management, the reliability of assigned collateral and foreclosure values. In addition to ongoing meetings with external auditors, there are periodic discussions at the agency level between the Bank of Thailand and the accountancy bodies. Regularly, the Bank of Thailand seeks comments from the Institute of Certifed Accountants and Auditors of Thailand prior to the issuance of new regulations. Likewise, the Bank of Thailand’s supervisors are regularly invited to be a member of the auditing standard committee whose responsibilities involve the development and improvement of Thai auditing standards. In summary, the Bank of Thailand has signifcantly benefited from the increasing coordination between supervisors and external auditors. Despite these benefts, there are several challenges ahead in our relationship with external auditors that merits careful deliberation. First, supervisors should be sensitive to the independence of the external auditors, particularly when the auditors provide various types of consulting services to the bank, which often times may be far more lucrative than external auditing fees. In Thailand, the Ministry of Commerce released a ministerial regulation in 1991 to prohibit external auditors from providing auditing services to any entities where their independence cannot be maintained. However, this regulation still leaves the assessment of independence to the external auditors themselves.

Philipp Hildebrand: Setting the course for the Swiss economy – challenges for the Swiss financial centre and outlook for the future Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to the Zürcher Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft, Zurich, 17 May 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The Swiss banks face two major challenges. First, sooner or later, they will have to carry out their core business – asset management for foreign customers – in a tax-conform environment. Second, the big banks will be required to operate under more stringent regulatory requirements. These challenges are likely to lead to structural changes in the financial centre. How are such changes likely to affect the Swiss economy? An empirical analysis shows that, although the financial centre plays an important role in the Swiss economy, it also entails considerable risks. In the case of cross-border asset management, the relationship between the risk to the economy and the income earned is acceptable. However, this is hardly the case for the banks’ own trading activities. Consequently, current regulatory efforts could not only improve the stability of the financial sector, but also increase both the profitability of banks and the benefit which the Swiss economy derives from the financial sector over the long-term period.
On this occasion, I would therefore like to announce the following measures which we have instructed financial institutions to take, to further strengthen safeguards against financial scams. First, financial institutions are required to migrate from SMS One Time Passwords (OTP) to more secure forms of authentication for online activities or transactions relating to account opening, fund transfers and payments, as well as changes to personal information and account settings. The major banks have already started this process of migrating to more secure forms of authentication; Second, financial institutions will further tighten fraud detection rules and triggers for blocking suspected scam transactions. Customers will be immediately alerted when any such activity involving their banking accounts is detected. As an additional measure, financial institutions will block such transactions, and customers will be asked to confirm that such transactions are genuine before they are unblocked; Third, a cooling-off period will be observed for the first-time enrolment of online banking services or secure devices. During this time, no online banking activity is allowed to be conducted; Fourth, customers will be restricted to one mobile or secure device for the authentication of online banking transactions; and Fifth, financial institutions will be required to set up dedicated hotlines for customers to report financial scam incidents. Financial institutions have been directed to be more responsive to scam reports lodged by customers. Financial institutions have also been directed to facilitate efforts to recover and protect stolen funds, including to work with relevant agencies to prevent further losses.

Within the ECB Governing Council, around Mario Draghi, we take very seriously the task entrusted to us by the European Treaties of maintaining price stability, meaning medium-term inflation of close to but below 2%. Our monetary policy has safeguarded the euro area against the threat of deflation in recent times, and is achieving tangible progress towards our inflation target: inflation rose to 0.5% in October and should exceed 1% in early 2017. It is supporting demand while narrowing the output gap, which has been reduced from -2.4% in 2014 to -1.0% in 2016 according to European Commission estimatesii. The Eurosystem has already  Page 3 sur 8 provided ample liquidity to the European economy: our holdings under the expanded asset purchase programme amounted to nearly EUR 1,400 bn in October 2016. We can take stock of this progress, while remaining alert to the latest financial developments and their mixed economic effects: the rise in the equity market but also in the long term interest rates; the appreciation of the dollar but quasi-stability of the global euro exchange rate; and the increase in inflation expectations. We should be both confident in our progress, and vigilant with respect to our environment. Until March, we will go on implementing exactly what we said we would: our clear success today in purchasing a volume of EUR 80 bn of assets per month, including corporate bonds, is the best guarantee of our credibility tomorrow.
Meetings held last summer with the banks’ leaders revealed, among other things, that some of them were making vigorous attempts to attract foreign investors, those with retail deposit collection in foreign branches were aiming to transfer the deposits held in those branches to subsidiaries within a few months, and some were even considering moving their headquarters out of Iceland which the Central Bank did not object to. As pressures in the global liquidity markets intensified, much like banks in other parts of the world, the Icelandic banks turned to the Central Bank for funding, as many banks abroad have done. The Central Bank of Iceland expanded its liquidity facilities, as did its foreign counterparts. Iceland’s banks obtained funding both from their own Central Bank and, through their foreign subsidiaries, from the European Central Bank (ECB), from which they sought liquidity in euros. As other banks, they became heavily dependent on ready access to liquidity facilities. However, the Central Bank of Iceland could not provide liquidity in currencies other than the Icelandic króna, and until recently most other central banks only provided loans in their own currency. All over the globe, central banks and other authorities fought to rescue banks and other financial companies, resorting to increasingly unconventional measures in the process. In spite of these attempts, financial companies of all sizes have gone bankrupt, while others have been rescued – at least temporarily – through massive government assistance or guarantees.

It is not the MPC’s job to control house prices, any more than it is our job to control share prices or the exchange rate; but just as we would not ignore the wider economic effects of a high exchange rate or a boom in the stock market, so we cannot, and do not, ignore the influence of soaring house prices on consumer spending and hence on the overall pressure of demand. Much attention has been paid to the historically high level of house prices relative to earnings, and what this might mean for the future path of house prices. A less discussed question - of more interest to you - is how much influence the current strength of the housing market is having on household spending; and what impact a weakening in the housing market might have on consumers. 2  BIS Review 41/2004  Healthy as household spending has been in the last few years, there has not a consumer boom on anything like the scale of the late 80s, when house prices last took off. Since early 1998, house prices have risen sharply relative to incomes; but household spending has only grown broadly in line with incomes. A buoyant housing market may still have had some influence on spending; and spending and house prices may have been influenced by some of the same factors. But spending and house prices do not seem to have moved together as closely as they have done in the past.