samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I dwell at some length on this issue because the state of public finances is currently the only significant impediment to Malta’s membership of the euro area. While it is encouraging to know that we have been able to reduce the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio from 11% in 1998 to its current level of around 6%, getting to the Maastricht reference value of 3% by 2006, as the Government plans to do, will require unrelenting efforts and a greater emphasis on expenditure-cutting. This is not only because taxation levels are already relatively high for an economic downturn, but also because of the tradeoffs involved in pursuing further fiscal consolidation. Indeed, the Government’s resolve to trim the deficit will be a key determinant of the degree of exchange rate stability that it will be possible to achieve during ERM II. This, in turn, will depend on how much economic operators, taxpayers and recipients of social benefits and other transfer payments are prepared to give up today in exchange for sustainable public finances tomorrow. In the final analysis, therefore, the success of the euro strategy will hinge on consensus being reached on the implementation of the necessary reforms. In this context, discussions are underway in the Malta Council for Economic and Social Development with a view to reforming the pension and health systems, currently two major sources of pressure on public finances. If the social partners do indeed take ownership of the reforms, the credibility of the country’s overall economic strategy will be considerably enhanced.

As a result, tradeoff situations will inevitably arise, and this will complicate the simultaneous pursuit of nominal and real convergence. One such case is that of public finances. Here the task is to achieve further convergence in economic structures and income levels without endangering fiscal sustainability. The recent experience of some existing Member States suggests an inherent incompatibility between these two objectives. On the one hand, the acceding countries must undertake the structural reforms necessary to create a congenial business environment and achieve an efficient allocation of resources, which would facilitate the implementation of the single monetary policy. On the other hand, they have to ensure that the expenditure associated with such reforms does not drive up fiscal imbalances beyond a level which is sustainable, or which in any case is considered excessive in terms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). In Malta’s case another factor to be considered is the persistent weakness in our major export markets and its impact on the growth rate. Subdued growth does not only constrain the tax base, but through its negative effect on employment could generate opposition to the necessary structural reforms. The pursuit of fiscal balance is further burdened by the co-financing requirement built into most of the EU’s  2  BIS Review 16/2004  funding programmes; by demographic trends which are beyond the control of policy makers, especially population ageing; and by the implementation of acquis-related obligations.
And these are the reasons why the recovery of the Spanish economy and employment will depend, more so than on past occasions, on a suitable budgetary policy mix and on its interplay with other economic policy tools, most particularly with supply-side and structural reform policies geared to improving employment-generation capacity, smoothing the switch to other productive activities and increasing the economy’s effectiveness and productivity. The cyclical juncture at which the Budget for 2011 has been drawn up is marked by the muted start of a phase of recovery which became discernible in the opening months of 2010 and which will foreseeably continue over the coming year. Nonetheless, exceptional domestic and external factors of uncertainty are clouding the outlook. So far, the recovery is proving very subdued and dependent on temporary stimuli linked to the government plans supporting spending and to the possible bringing forward of consumption and residential investment decisions by households and firms in the face of the rise in indirect taxes on 1 July. Moreover, funding conditions remain restrictive and both the public and private sectors have a pressing need to restore health to their financial position. In these circumstances it will be difficult for domestic demand to post the same figures it did in the first half of the year.

This experience is another example of the advantages to be had from abandoning indexation clauses, which are no more than a legacy of inflationary habits from a past firmly behind us, but whose continuing use has been a source of problems, as the Banco de España has reiterated. Improving our economy’s productivity in the medium and long run will require seeing through other, deeper structural reforms, including most notably sectoral liberalisation, the rationalisation of the public sector’s role in economic activity and improvements to the education system. These are reforms whose introduction needs time and whose effects will be deployed over a lengthy period; but the resolve to adopt them also has positive effects in the short run by improving expectations about our economy’s economic growth, which is particularly welcome in these testing times. Thank you. 6  BIS Review 129/2010
In addition, this operation would be financially neutral at the national level, since the recipients of helicopter money would simply be the country’s citizens – a bit like in the case of dividend payments with all households receiving the same amount. Critics might say that it is not the role of central banks to decide on the distribution of funds and that any helicopter money drop should be executed by the government with mere central bank backing. But in fact, any change in the interest rate, just like any other change in the monetary policy stance, inevitably redistributes funds, and indeed does so in a much less transparent way. A helicopter money drop is probably possible even without a digital currency – for example, using central registries of personal bank accounts, often operated by central banks on behalf of the government. But the benefit of using a digital currency is that the central bank would not theoretically need to work with the government, so its independence would not be put in danger. Moreover, the digital currency could be designed specifically to smooth the transmission of helicopter money to consumption. Again, I stress that I only consider this a realistic scenario in a deep recession. The central bank could also limit the possibility of transferring these funds to bank accounts (and vice versa, in order to eliminate any risk of digital bank runs).

True, it is far from clear that anytime soon a full-fledged digital currency (be it blockchain based or not) will be created by a central bank (some of you may be following the debate in the Riksbank in Sweden), but the last three years have seen an explosion of research on this idea in many central banks. Bitcoin must be credited for this powerful intellectual stimulus. When so many professors at the most esteemed universities of the developed world are not thinking about potential reforms of the current monetary order, we have received a stimulus from the libertarian IT guys instead. Fine. To be sure, a hypothetical digital currency issued by a central bank may have very little in common with the cryptocurrencies that currently exist. These two things are mixed up quite often in the public space. Cryptocurrency is in fact a different concept than a digital currency of a central bank and yet a different concept than electronic money such as pre-paid cards. They are all digital in one way or another, but they are conceptually separate. Central bank digital money does not have to be based ultimately on a blockchain at all, but, to enable price stability, it will certainly be linked to the value of conventional elastic currency. To keep the current system of elastic money working, even the concept of central bank digital currency will have to allow the amount of money to change, not to be fixed or constant over time.
At the back we can clearly see the whole field and choose a path to support the team’s offense, especially now that the government has gotten back to its position as the play maker to assist the private sector to reach the goal of achieving growth potential. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

13  Figure 3 Consumption  Gross fixed capital formation  (real annual change, percent)  (real annual change, percent)  8  16 20 Durable (right axis)  6  Private  4 2  12 15 8  Non-durable  40 30  GFCF  5  Machinery & 20 equipment (right axis) 10  0  0  -5  -10  10  4  0  0  -2  -4 -10  -4  Construction & works  -8 -15 12  13  14  15  16  17  12  13  14  15  16  -20 -30  17  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 4 Employment by category  Salaries (*)  (annual change, percent)  14  (annual change, percent)  Self employed  Salaried  7  14  9  7  6  0  3  9  Nominal Labor cost  6  Nominal IREM+  Total 0  Real Labor cost  3  Real IREM+ -7  -7 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  0  0 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  (*) Series spliced with base year 2016=100. + Compensations index. Source: National Statistics Institute.
Looking ahead to the open waters, firms must ensure that they are prepared  Page 8  and well-equipped to face the challenges that lurk therein. Have banks fully considered their changing role in this new world defined by changing macroeconomic conditions, increasing digitalisation and climate change? The better they are able to understand that environment, the better they will be able to adapt. And do not get me wrong, there are some remarkable opportunities for investment banks in that new world. But seizing those will require honest introspection, hard work, and at times completely rethinking their future role in society. I also want to use this opportunity to emphasise that it is the role of the independent boards to kick those tyres and ask those tough (and sometimes existential) questions. How nimble and flexible is the current business model and cost base of the firm? What is the firm’s raison d’être and franchise in the new environment? Is the firm sufficiently prepared to react to different scenarios that might play out? The future won't accept excuses – now is the time to take action. Because although you might feel you have been doing well in the swimming pool, once you are in open waters you’d better truly be a good swimmer. I would like to thank Orfhlaith Sheehy, John Mears, Fatima Abukar, Chris Forster, Simon Stockwell, David Brighton and Kate Jewkes for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1. Global Banks’ $ Billion Haul Marks Most Profitable Year Ever - Bloomberg 2.

That would, in turn, fuel the negative effects on the capacity for recovery and medium-term economic growth. Thus, March 2021 saw the approval of an aid package for the corporate sector and the self-employed that could be a useful tool. Indeed, this instrument could specifically reduce the risk of the pandemic triggering the closure of those firms and businesses that are particularly stressed as a result of its effects, but which remain viable. In this connection, it is particularly important that the package be implemented swiftly and consistently, and that the allocation mechanisms allow this aid to be targeted specifically at viable firms experiencing solvency problems. Flexibility is also required as regards the volume of earmarked funds. These ought to be adapted in line with how the pandemic unfolds and whether or not the risks materialise. In the case of non-viable firms, winding-up processes would have to be expedited in order to prevent them from consuming resources that could be more beneficial in other activities. As I mentioned earlier, these economic policy measures would help prevent the crisis from taking on a financial crisis complexion that may make it a lot more persistent. Thus, the banking sector could continue to be part of the solution to the crisis, as it has to date, by lending to households and firms and helping reactivate the economy when the pandemic is over. For this, a smoothly functioning credit channel — of such importance in European economies and, of course, in the Spanish economy — will surely be required.
There has been much, and in my view justified, criticism of their availability and condition. Over the past ten years, the value of Bank of England notes in circulation has doubled, from around £ billion to around £ billion. But none of that is accounted for by the £ note for which the value in circulation has remained constant for fifteen years at some £ billion. And the average lifetime of the note has doubled. As a result, many more notes are noticeably soiled and scruffy. ATMs account for over 60% of all cash obtained by the public. Few issue £ notes. It is more economical for banks to stock ATMs with £ and £ notes. The problem is not at the production end – we have an ample supply of new £ notes waiting to be used. We want to see them in circulation. There is a need for an adequate supply of low denomination notes that can be used for small transactions where cash is the predominant means of payment. Such mutual convenience is a public good, and may not correspond to the private interest of commercial banks. That is why we must not let this situation continue any longer. The public need £ notes. The solution may involve some alteration in the incentives for banks to obtain different denomination notes from the Bank of England, new arrangements to increase the availability of notes to retailers, and an improvement in the durability of the notes that we print.

And I will continue to speak on this topic to convince more people of its importance. I hope that this persistence will one day show results, whereby our country’s leaders and administrators truly understand the need to change their way of thinking. I firmly believe that this dream is truly within our reach. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 43/2006  5
As the level of innovation increases in a more liberalised and deregulated environment, a governance framework that is more principle-based rather than rule-based becomes relevant. The approach would thus need to develop the broad but clear guidance, standards and core principles rather than prescriptive rules and regulations. The process would involve identifying the risks and ensuring that the institutions have the capacity and mechanisms of internal controls and the systems to undertake and manage the recognized risks. While good governance is indispensable, the relevant principles needs to be applied in a manner that is in harmony with the nature of the different transactions peculiar to Islamic finance. In particular, the framework should endeavour to engender the support of all the stakeholders of the Islamic financial institutions. This entails having in place the systems that will ensure that the obligations to all the major stakeholders - the customers, depositors, investors, entrepreneurs, owners and the community at large - are met with integrity and with adherence to the rules and regulations. Indeed, in an environment where businesses needs to balance between the interests of the various stakeholders which at times could be conflicting, an appropriate governance framework for active checks and  BIS Review 39/2005  1  balances becomes particularly important. While the roles of shareholders and board of directors are certainly critical, it should not diminish the roles of the other stakeholders. Secondly, there must be robust corporate governance framework at the institution level with the shareholders and the board as key players.

Ravi Menon: Harnessing capital for Asia’s growth Opening address by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Deutsche Bank Access Asia Conference “Harnessing Capital for Asia’s Growth”, Singapore, 25 May 2011. *  *  *  The Asian Century: what can go wrong? Mr Rob Rankin, distinguished speakers, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. 1. According to Deutsche Bank’s forecasts, China’s economy will become the largest in the world in 2022. India is projected to become the world’s third largest economy by 2015. Pundits have dubbed the 21st century the “Asian Century”, much as the 20th century has been described as the “American Century”, and the 19th century the “British Century”. 2. But Asia’s rise is not a pre-ordained outcome. History has shown that straight-line extrapolations of growth do not always hold; more recent history suggests that they are the exception rather than the norm. 3. Two thousand years ago, at the height of the Roman Empire, Asia ex Japan accounted for more than half of global GDP, while Western Europe accounted for less than 10 per cent. The picture was not very different for the next 1500 years or so: Asia ex Japan was typically three times larger than Western Europe. 4. Then came the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution in Europe. By the start of the First World War, it was the turn of America and Europe to account for more than half of global GDP. Asia less Japan was less than 15 per cent.
Egil Matsen: The equity share in the Government Pension Fund Global Introductory statement by Mr Egil Matsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), Oslo, 1 December 2016. * * * Accompanying slides  INTRODUCTION The discovery of oil off the Norwegian coast has shaped the economy for almost two generations. Norway’s industry structure has undergone a fundamental change. Oil has lifted the level of prosperity and generated substantial government revenues. Chart: The Government Pension Fund Global Twenty years have passed since the government made the first capital transfer to the Government Petroleum Fund, which has since been renamed the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). Since then, Norway’s subsea oil wealth has to a large extent been transformed into foreign financial assets. The GPFG serves two main purposes: to insulate the central government budget from the effects of large annual fluctuations in petroleum revenues and to preserve a substantial share of the oil wealth and increase it for future generations. A milestone in the management of the nation’s oil wealth was the fiscal rule, adopted in 2001. The fiscal rule permits the government to spend the expected real return on the GPFG, then estimated at 4 percent. The rule was introduced to phase in oil revenues gradually into the economy in pace with the increase in the fund’s capital. The GPFG has grown rapidly over the past ten years. In line with the fiscal rule, the fund’s contribution to the central government budget has increased.

When equities were included in the investment portfolio in 1998, the strategic equity share was set at 40 percent, and the equity share in the actual portfolio had reached this level by June of the same year. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  In June 2007, it was decided to increase the strategic equity share further to 60 percent. The implementation of this strategic change took place during a demanding period. Financial market uncertainty was elevated. Although equity markets declined sharply in autumn 2008 and winter 2009, the new strategic equity share was maintained. The increase in the equity share was been completed by June 2009, and Norges Bank had purchased NOK 1000 billion in equities for the fund over this two-year period. The fund’s average ownership stake in global listed companies had increased from 0.4 percent to 1 percent. A large share of the equities held by the fund today was purchased during these two years. In 2010, the GPFG’s investment universe was expanded to include unlisted real estate. Since then, the fund’s strategic benchmark index has been composed of 60 percent equities and up to 5 percent real estate, with the remainder in bonds. As real estate investments involve some equity risk, the equity share in the strategic benchmark index, in an index composed solely of equities and bonds, is now slightly higher than the allocation defined in 2007. The question of the fund’s strategic equity share is once again on the agenda.
In 2012, the legal and regulatory framework of the banking system underwent important changes. The Bank of Albania and the Deposit Insurance Agency, taking into consideration the European Union regulatory alterations, prepared relevant amendments to the Law “On Deposit Insurance”. In line with EU directives, the base of contributors to insurance scheme expanded, including the savings and loan associations. Also, the formulas for calculating compensation were clarified and simplified. The Assembly of the Republic of Albania approved the related amendments on 26 July 2012. The adoption of the new Regulation “On the establishment, licensing and functioning of the bridge bank” improved significantly the regulatory framework on bank management in the event of bankruptcy. Other important regulatory amendments and improvements took place on bank management, risk management and related structures, supervision decisions, as well as insurance and re-insurance activity. *** Besides the main directions of the Bank of Albania’s work described above, I would like to dwell on some other activities of our work. These activities not only help us fulfil our legal responsibilities, but also serve the development of the financial system and market economy in Albania. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3. Other activities of the Bank of Albania  Money issuance The Bank of Albania has the exclusive right to issue and circulate our national currency and to oversee and ensure banknote and coin quality.

We experienced a collapse in house prices, as well as a severe banking crisis, a foreign exchange crisis, fiscal deficits and high inflation. Hermod Skånland, the Norwegian central bank governor at that time, summarised the causes of the crisis as “bad banking, bad policy and bad luck.” Efforts were now focused on bringing public spending under control, while large parts of the banking system were nationalised. Unemployment soared. Monetary policy aimed at a stable krone exchange rate, resulting in high real interest rates. But with a binding commitment to a fixed exchange rate, inflation was brought under control. The banking crisis and the downturn in the early 1990s made clear how vulnerable our small open economy was to terms-of-trade shocks and that our banks needed to be properly regulated. Furthermore, it became evident to policymakers how hard it is to conduct countercyclical economic policy, or even to avoid being procyclical. In the following years, structural reforms were implemented in order to increase growth capacity, including a major general tax reform. The tax code had already been tailored to capture the economic rent in the petroleum sector – the petroleum company tax rate is about 80 percent. Confidence in monetary policy gradually gained a firmer footing, after a succession of devaluations had come to a halt. Inflation and the real interest rate declined, and cost competitiveness improved considerably. Norway has not experienced a really pronounced economic downturn since the crisis around 1990.