samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Looking at the past, we see lax fiscal policies and monetary policies, which had to accommodate them. The latter was accompanied by pegged or foreseeable exchange rate regimes. The outcome of this scenario was high inflation and periods of volatile and unbalanced growth. In such an environment, expectations deteriorated because the public sector led the excessive increase in domestic demand, maturities were shortened and uncertainty increased, the current account deficit widened, and measures continued to fell behind. With the addition of the adverse trigger-effect of domestic or external factors to this environment, an increase in foreign exchange demand and pressure on the foreign exchange reserves of CBRT was inevitable, resulting in crises and devaluation. However, the present circumstances of the Turkish economy are very different from those of the past. To start with, as you all know, unlike the past, a floating exchange rate regime is being implemented. The most apparent feature of the floating exchange rate regime is that it is shock-absorbent. In other words, changes in the demand or supply of foreign exchange are reflected in the level of the exchange rate, and in contrast to pegged or foreseeable exchange rate regimes, the exchange rate goes up or down.

In the area of trade finance for example, recent data shows that European banks are increasing their trade finance activities and have even regained some market share in Singapore. Three dimensions of a successful finance professional The financial industry in Asia and Singapore will continue to grow and generate good jobs. •  In 2013, Singapore’s financial sector grew by 11%, against an overall GDP growth rate of 4.1%. Growth was supported by increased activities in areas such as corporate transaction banking, trade finance, fund management, private banking and re/insurance. •  Last year, a total of 4,500 jobs were created in the financial sector, most of them in higher value-added activities. The demand for highly qualified finance professionals will only grow in the coming years. To take advantage of this opportunity, our finance professionals must acquire three things: •  depth in core competencies  •  cross-functional adaptability  •  Asian knowledge and expertise  First, depth in core competencies. Jobs in the financial industry are becoming more complex, requiring deeper knowledge, expertise, and skill sets. Take for example, a client adviser working in a wealth management function. Ten years ago, maybe he was only expected to offer advice on simple loans and basic investment products. Today, the client is more sophisticated and demanding – he expects more comprehensive  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  and customised wealth management solutions. The banker must be able to offer advice on alternative investments, options for intergenerational wealth transfer, and risk management strategies.
The PRA agrees with longstanding and justified concerns raised by the industry on the sensitivity of the risk margin to interest rates, and its overall quantum when interest rates are low. The Government’s April Consultation Document[9] lays out reform proposals. The potential impact of these reforms can be significant. For general insurers, we believe that a roughly 30% cut in risk margin can be justified, similar to the impact on EU firms of reform proposals made by the European Commission. This outcome would therefore ensure no disadvantage on competitiveness grounds for GI firms. For life insurers, given the longer term nature of the insurance risks and the presence of closely matched assets, we believe that a greater reduction of around 60% is possible – but only if the FS is also reformed to better reflect credit risk retained by life insurers. Simultaneous reform of both risk margin and MA can also correct a potential distortion in the current framework that has become apparent over time. Namely that, broadly speaking, under the Solvency II regulatory regime, some long term insurance risks – in particular, longevity risk – appears to have been highly-capitalised, relative to credit risk. This has created an environment where life insurers have been retaining less and less insurance risk, but acquiring additional credit risk, including counterparty credit risk. This trend has become more evident since Solvency II came into force, and raises questions about the effectiveness of the regime, in terms of both competitiveness and in mitigating risks to our statutory objectives.

Jean-Pierre Roth: International monetary order – or disorder? Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Research Institute for Empirical Economics and Economic Policy, University of St Gallen, St Gallen, 14 November 2006. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The term 'international monetary order' is misleading. Although international monetary systems may have appeared orderly in the past, they were actually dependent upon rigid compliance on the part of the industrial countries, first with respect to the gold standard and later with respect to fixed exchange rates. However, since compliance was in fact anything but rigid, the world experienced a series of currency crises and devaluations. Order existed on paper only. The reality was disorder. Nowadays we have an overwhelming impression of disorder, and yet our national monetary systems are based on sounder foundations than in the past. The risk of currency crises has been lessened by the transition to flexible exchange rates and the move towards monetary integration. In addition, the expansion in the free movement of capital is – to an ever increasing extent – subjecting national economies to the discipline of international competition. Inevitably, this has impacted on the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Since 1993, China’s role in the region has reversed from that of a net exporter to a net importer. The share of East Asian exports to China has doubled in the recent decade. Previously, the high economic performance in Asia was driven by the export orientation and investment driven growth. In the recent decade, greater focus has been accorded to domestic sources of growth. Increased emphasis has been accorded to promoting the role of consumption demand in the growth process. Traditionally, the countries in the region have high savings, relative to other regions. ASEAN’s saving rate of 35% is nearly double that of NAFTA and one and a half times higher than the EU’s. There, therefore, remains significant potential for high rates of consumption without resulting in risks to our system. The increased consumption demand has been a factor that has reinforced the trend toward greater intra-regional trade in Asia. There has also been a trend towards greater intra-Asian investment flows in the region. This includes increased reinvestment of the surplus funds back into the region, both in the form of foreign direct investment and portfolio capital flows. The recent establishment of the Asian Bond Fund is a step in this direction. Initiatives are in progress to promote the development of regional capital markets. The  BIS Review 40/2003  1  initiative to develop an Asian Bond Market will contribute towards recycling part of the high savings to finance productive activity within the region.

Our experience in Malaysia shows that a more diversified and sound financial sector, a more efficient and competitive financial industry and all the structural enhancements made, have evolved a more effective and resilient financial system. This has enhanced the tolerance level to withstand the more difficult and challenging environment. Such fundamental changes, however, cannot be expected to be achieved within a short period of time. Enhancing the tolerance level in the financial sector of the East Asian economies is one of the important elements in strengthening the growth prospects for the region. The overall economic and financial transformation that has occurred has resulted in an Asia that is a mutually reinforcing region of growth; an Asia that has an increasing role in the creation of wealth; and an Asia that will be an important region in promoting and supporting global stability and global growth. BIS Review 40/2003  7
The difference in outcome between the two repo rate paths is partially due to the different development of the exchange rate, but it is, of course, also largely due to the divergence of the interest rates influencing investments and saving. 14  In the figure, foreign policy rates are obtained from adjusted implied forward rates at the date of the Monetary Policy Report. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The exchange rate effects of choosing another repo rate path are naturally uncertain. However, the fact that the exchange rate in general is associated with great uncertainty does not mean that it can be disregarded when decisions are taken on the repo rate path. And, in my opinion, neither does the fact that market interest rates do not fully incorporate the repo rate path – possibly because they are influenced by foreign interest rates to a large degree – form a strong argument for disregarding the potential exchange rate effects of increased interest rate differentials. As a matter of principle, I consider that monetary policy should be a matter of choosing the repo rate path that gives the forecast for inflation and resource utilisation with the best target fulfilment when fully incorporated into expectations. Another principle is that high uncertainty is not an argument for refraining from using the best forecast as a basis for decisions.

Eddie Yue: Global Loan Market Summit Keynote speech by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) Global Loan Market Summit, Hong Kong, 1 March 2023. *** Pedro, Andrew, distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen, Good afternoon. It is a great pleasure to be here. 1. First, I'd like to congratulate the Association on its 25thanniversary this year. A quarter century of valuable work in promoting growth, liquidity and best practice in syndicated loan markets in the Asia Pacific region is truly a significant milestone. We are all grateful for your invaluable contribution. 2. I am glad to see this event returning to Hong Kong in physical format after three years of virtual meetings. Alongside other recent large-scale events such as the Global Financial Leaders' Investment Summit and the many more that are planned, it is a strong vote of confidence in Hong Kong as an international finance centre. In recent months, as travel has largely returned normal, I have been meeting lots of overseas and mainland friends, and from my face-to-face interaction with them, I sensed great excitement and faith in Hong Kong's comeback. 3. 2022 was a difficult year for the global and local loan markets. Geopolitical conflicts, rising inflation and interest rates have put pressure on the performance of almost all asset classes. Bond and equity markets both fell sharply, and new bond issuance collapsed. Notwithstanding all these challenges, we saw continued strength in the loans market.
François Villeroy de Galhau: The tale of the three stabilities: price stability, financial stability and economic stability Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Financial Stability Review Conference, 3 March 2021. * * * It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you to the publication today of the 24th edition of the Banque de France Financial Stability Review. We have a set of very distinguished speakers. I would like to thank them and all the contributors to the review, as well as the Banque de France’s teams who helped prepare this issue, which focuses on macroprudential policy in the midst of the Covid crisis. The past twelve months have seen some of the most dramatic events since World War II, with this unprecedented pandemic. For this reason, and given that today is about the Financial Stability Review, I will focus on the concept of stability itself. Other sources of instability have affected the world economy in the past decade or so: the Global Financial Crisis and ensuing recession, the European Debt Crisis, or more recently rising trade tensions. It seems that the world has become more unstable. Against this backdrop, stability is all the more important for our fellow citizens, and it has different dimensions, but I will focus mainly on three key aspects. I will start (and it will be a surprise to no one) with price stability.

In addition, financial stability, unlike price stability, is not easily summarised by one statistic (inflation in the case of price stability), so we therefore need in any case to look at a range of indicators. What I suggest instead is a slight evolution of the ECB strategy, to achieve a more “integrated” framework. To formalise this approach, one option worth considering could be to renovate and extend the present second pillar into a “financial and monetary” pillar, alongside the economic one. More specifically, let me mention a few examples of variables that could be monitored under this new pillar: Indebtedness of firms and households; Bank balance sheet information, which is useful for assessing the functioning of the bank lending channel (including in a forward-looking way); Indicators of excess risk tolerance and excess credit, which provide information on the risktaking channel; Stock and house prices, which provide information on the asset price channel. This list could be of course modified and completed. In fact, we already monitor many of these variables. The point of having a structured pillar is to formalise this analysis – including on proportionality of our measures – and ensure we have no blind spots. Such considerations would help us optimise the monetary policy toolkit and fine tune it with the numerous tools that central banks have now at their disposal. To some extent, we have already crossed that bridge in adapting existing instruments in order to take financial stability considerations into account.
Despite the rise in oil prices, the Norwegian krone has been fairly weak since 2014. A weak krone has a positive influence on exporting companies. At the same time, prices for imported goods and services increase. A weaker krone therefore leads to higher inflation. Measured by the import-weighted exchange rate index (I-44), the krone appreciated somewhat in the period to autumn 2018, but depreciated again towards year-end. The depreciation coincided with a fall in oil prices and heightened uncertainty in global financial markets. Chart: Growth mainland Norway Growth in the Norwegian economy has been solid since autumn 2016. At the same time, labour market conditions have improved considerably. The number of employed has increased by more than 100 000, and unemployment has declined. Solid global growth, higher oil prices and low interest rates have contributed to lifting growth. The enterprises in Norges Bank’s Regional Network reported rising output growth through 2018, particularly for oil service providers thanks to the rebound in petroleum investment on the Norwegian shelf following several years of decline. There was also a pick-up in exports from oil service companies. Chart: Employment as a share of the population After some years of solid growth, spare capacity has gradually diminished. At the end of 2018, capacity utilisation appeared to be close to what we regard as a normal level. Employment also appears to have returned to a more normal level.

For instance, would we use cash less and cards more, or vice versa? Perhaps we are using methods of payment that require an unnecessarily large use of resources? This could mean higher costs than necessary and thereby higher price increases in the retail trade or less favourable interest from the bank. We at the Riksbank have devoted considerable time and effort to analysing what different forms of payment cost and how we as consumers affect the efficiency of the Swedish payment system when we choose our method of payment. BIS Review 68/2008  1  Today I intend to describe some interesting results from this research. Firstly, what are the social costs of using cash and cards respectively? Secondly, what is in our estimation the better choice between card and cash payments, from a welfare perspective? Thirdly, how does the general public choose between cash and cards in practice? One result of our analysis is that we as consumers probably use more cash and fewer card payments than we would do if we realised what cash management costs – and if we had to pay for it. Why is cash used more in Sweden than in other Nordic countries? In Sweden, card payments have increased substantially since the mid-1990s. But seven years ago Swedes still appeared to be using card payments less than other Nordic residents. At the beginning of the 2000s the number of card payments per capita in Sweden was only half as high as in the other Nordic countries.
We noted in a statement to the press that we expect to take account of the remaining issues and complete the text of the New Accord in the coming months and no later than mid-2004. This period of time will also allow us to take careful note of domestic consultations under way in some jurisdictions, including the process for the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the United States. Most of the comment letters that the Committee received focused on credit risk and the minimum standards in the first pillar. Respondents identified as one of the most important issues the proposed treatment of credit-related losses. As you know, with respect to the internal ratings-based treatment of credit losses, the CP3 calibrated regulatory capital on the basis of both unexpected and expected credit losses – or “UL” and “EL” in Basel terminology. This was intended as a practical compromise to account for differences in national accounting practices and supervisory authority regarding provisioning. Many respondents – including quite a few here in the U.S. – cautioned against this approach, as they believed that it departed from the traditional view that unexpected losses should be absorbed by capital, while expected losses are best managed through provisioning. Based on those comments, and following additional research, the Committee now intends to align regulatory capital more closely to economic capital by calibrating it on the basis of unexpected credit losses alone. A supplementary mechanism will help to encourage banks to provide sufficiently for expected credit losses.

But there is a clear difference between the path of adjustment desired by the surplus countries, which are faced with the need for a longer-term structural shift away from reliance on exports, and the path of adjustment preferred by the deficit countries, which are under greater near-term pressure to reduce the burden of debt in both private and public sectors. Tensions between the two groups were evident at last week’s IMF meetings in Washington where all the talk was of currency conflicts. Such conflicts are, however, symptoms of a deeper disagreement on the appropriate time path of real adjustment. Since surpluses and deficits must add to zero for the world as a whole, differences between these desired ex ante adjustment paths are reconciled ex post by changes in the level of world output. And the risk is that unless agreement on a common path of adjustment is reached, conflicting policies will result in an undesirably low level of world output, with all countries worse off as a result. The international monetary system today has become distorted. The major surplus and deficit countries are pursuing economic strategies that are in direct conflict. And there are  2  BIS Review 136/2010  some innocent victims. Those emerging market economies which have adopted floating currencies are now suffering from the attempts of other countries to hold down their exchange rates, and are experiencing uncomfortable rates of capital inflows and currency appreciation. So there is more to this issue than a bilateral conflict between China and the United States.
This was followed with the establishment of other institutions, which included the Securities Commission and the domestic rating agencies. The Bank also put in place a comprehensive and modern depository, delivery and settlement system to facilitate the issuance, trading and settlement of debt securities in the market. Mechanisms to increase liquidity in the market to enhance the overall price discovery process were also introduced through the provision of updated market information. In addition, measures were also introduced to release the captive holdings and to facilitate the efficient borrowing and lending of securities. More flexible foreign exchange policies was also implemented to facilitate capital raising and investment by non-residents to further accelerate the development of our domestic bond market. Today, the Malaysian bond market is the largest in the ASEAN region, accounting for nearly 90 percent of our gross domestic product. Corporations now have access to more innovative and sophisticated financing solutions through the bond market to meet their diverse funding requirements. Financing through the bond market by the corporate sector now accounts for 58 percent of their total financing compared to 33 percent prior to the Asian financial crisis, when there was greater reliance on the banking system for financing. With the advent of new financing instruments and supporting infrastructure, trading activity in the secondary market have also increased by more than three fold, with the trading volume now amounting to RM516 billion. A key development of the Malaysian financial market is the enormous growth of the sukuk market.

In any event, and in line with the current recovery phase, wage settlements under collective bargaining agreements have risen from 0.6% in 2014 to the current level of 1.7%, on cumulative data to September. This improvement will foreseeably continue in the future, in line with the recommendations of the Employment and Collective Bargaining Agreement, signed by the social agents on 25 June and in force over the next three years, which promotes wage increases of 2%, plus a variable amount of 1% conditional upon different sector-based macroeconomic concepts. The variable elements in collective bargaining should be viewed favourably, insofar as their application caters for firms’ specific circumstances, such that wage developments are adjusted as much as possible to labour productivity. Main factors of risk in the short and medium term The outline I have offered on the foreseeable course of the Spanish economy is not free from risks. And should such risks materialise, they might adversely affect economic growth. On the external front, as earlier stated, are the uncertainties associated with the effects of monetary policy normalisation (in particular in the United States) on global financial conditions. Other factors of concern are the possible resurgence of geopolitical tensions or a potential escalation in the adoption of protectionist measures. Specifically, the outcome of Brexit and the situation in Italy are of particular significance for the Spanish economy.