samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Myopia risks coming at the expense of higher inflation tomorrow. It imparts an inflation bias. 49 What is true of monetary policy is equally true of regulatory policy. A desire to bring forward income may result in regulatory policy also becoming too loose. As one former British Prime Minster put it, pre-crisis regulation was “hugely inhibiting of efficient business by perfectly reasonable companies”. 50 Myopia then risks coming at the expense of a higher incidence of crises tomorrow. It imparts a crisis bias. 51 Luckily, these temporal biases also have a potentially straightforward solution. This is to delegate decision-making over monetary and regulatory policy to an agency less prone to myopia bias – an agent whose time horizon stretches beyond the political business cycle. This is where central bank independence comes into the picture. The inflationary experience of the 1970s and early 1980s was taken by many as evidence of myopia-induced inflation biases. Politicians had flunked the marshmallow test. In response,  48  The Bank of England GfK / NOP FPC Survey. Further details available at: http://www.bankofengland. co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/fpcsurvey.xlsx. 49  Barro and Gordon (1983). 50  Blair (2005). 51  Haldane (2013). 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  countries began granting central banks greater degrees of monetary policy independence, as an institutional response to a behavioural bias. 52 This international trend was followed by the UK in 1997, when the Bank of England was granted operational independence. Has this curbed the inflation bias?

This system will have much greater functionality including the potential for such synchronisation which we are now actively exploring with the London centre of the BIS Innovation Hub. At present, given where we are on in the UK on the imminent implementation of a vastly more capable RTGS system these options look to provide a faster route to settlement of tokenised transactions in central bank money and are working with industry on how to best exploit the possibilities of the RTGS system [22]. But we will continue to remain closely engaged with all the options. As with retail payments, it is difficult to forecast now what will prove the more successful approaches. It is most likely that, as is not uncommon with technological development, a range of approaches will eventually be implemented and will co-exist. We have a variety of payment systems, both wholesale and retail, of different vintages operating in the UK today. I would guess that in the future, as new technologies take hold we will see both more innovation and more variety. Changes in how we pay for things and what type of money we use is an exciting area of possibility for the Fintech world. It is also a fundamental issue for the Bank of England – as a regulator, as the provider of the central high value payment rails and the issuer of the highest quality, public money in the UK.
Oil futures prices have fallen and indicate an oil price of around USD 60 per barrel in 2010. Other commodity prices that are important for the Norwegian economy have also fallen sharply. Metal prices are particularly sensitive to cyclical developments. Futures prices for a selection of raw materials indicate unchanged or moderately rising prices in the next few years. Many countries that have been hit by the economic setback will see an improvement in their terms of trade and growth in their disposable income. The current downturn followed a period of very high global and domestic economic growth, supported by favourable trading conditions. Few countries benefited more than Norway from  1  Folketrygdfondet will manage the new Government Bond Fund. 2  The Government has increased the capital of Kommunalbanken Norway (the local government funding agency), it has increased the scope of GIEK (the central government export credit agency) and Innovation Norway, and has offered state loans to Eksportfinans Norway (the credit institution for export financing). 2  BIS Review 42/2009  the economic upturn, which drove up prices for oil, gas and other export commodities. At the same time, an increasing number of cheap consumer goods were imported from new EU countries and from Asia. Norway’s real disposable income increased by more than 40 per cent from 2002 to 2008, more than that of any other western country. But our terms of trade are now deteriorating.

The G20 group is now discussing how to tackle the crisis and prevent it happening again. It will be important to avoid protectionism and trade wars. Moreover, the ambition is to establish a new and more sustainable financial architecture. Markets are integrated and banks are global, while the supervisory authorities are national and the application of rules varies. Supervisory authorities must be strengthened and adopt a uniform approach to banks, and regulations must be improved. There has been some competition between countries to establish national financial centres. This has had an impact on national supervisory authorities, who have therefore tended to be reluctant to impose stringent requirements on the banking sector. It is important to avoid slippage in the rules  BIS Review 42/2009  5  towards an agreed minimum level that is too low. For Norway, it is essential that rules are applied stringently and uniformly in all the Nordic countries since banks based in Sweden and Denmark have large market shares in Norway and Norwegian banks have ambitions in Scandinavia. In recent years, there has been little cooperation across countries in the field of macroeconomic policy. The view has been that all is well as long as each country keeps its own house in order. This is an important point of departure, but we have now presumably learned that imbalances and risk arise when large countries do not sufficiently take into account that their own choices also influence those of others. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) must be given a more important role.
The so-called “permanent income” from petroleum activities can be used to calculate the return both on today’s Petroleum Fund and on future investments. The value of labour input in the petroleum sector comes in addition. With this more accurate picture, the income level in Norway is not particularly high. Norway’s income is approximately on a level with other Western countries such as Australia and Germany, while the level in, for example, Canada and Denmark is considerably higher. Chart 15. Productivity in the private service sector Annual growth. Per cent 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1 0  0 1980  1984  1988  1992  1996  2000  Source: Statistics Norway  Norway’s income is generated through labour. Income growth in the 1990s was unusually strong as a result of substantial productivity gains and a sharp increase in employment. Major technological advances were achieved in the petroleum industry, and productivity growth in private services was especially high - particularly in retail trade, financial services and telecommunications and postal  services. In retail trade, nationwide chains boosted efficiency. New technology and improved services provided new impetus to the financial industry. The telecommunications and postal services started operating on normal commercial terms. A number of conditions were conducive to favourable developments in the 1990s. Wage growth was moderate for a long period and interest rates were low. Banks regained their strength after the banking crisis.

For the Swiss mortgage market, there is currently only a small risk of a credit crunch. On the one hand, there have been no widespread excesses on the Swiss property and mortgage markets recently, which makes it unlikely that banks’ appetite for risk will decline to any great degree. On the other hand, opportunities for loan refinancing in Switzerland remain strong. The structure of mortgage lending in Switzerland is quite varied, and for banks the “Pfandbrief” mortgage bond is a refinancing tool that provides continuing strong opportunities for loan refinancing, and has experienced something of a renaissance since the financial crisis. As such, the already muted outlook for the Swiss economy is unlikely to suffer any additional impact from a credit crunch on the property market. BIS Review 107/2008  1
The establishment of the Central Bank 60 years ago was a major step forward for the country: finally, it would be possible to pursue domestic economic policy in a systematic way. The second of the Triple Crown anniversaries marks four decades since two zeroes were shaved off the króna and a new currency was effectively issued at the beginning of 1981. I remember clearly when the redenomination took place. I was 10 years old and thought it was great sport to have new money in my hands – new krónur, or course, but new aurar, too. Since the redenomination, all of Iceland’s banknotes have been designed by Kristín Þorkelsdóttir, about whom we shall hear more shortly. Kristín’s banknotes alone could have been considered reason enough to issue a new currency. But the real reason, and a far less sentimental one, was the persistent, entrenched inflation that engulfed Iceland, particularly in the 1970s. It stemmed from a number of causes, but the most important one was the fact that the Central Bank of Iceland did not have an independent mandate to apply policy instruments to combat it. And this brings us to the third anniversary we are celebrating in 2021. This year marks the 20th anniversary of Iceland’s inflation target, which is also the 20th anniversary of the 2001 legislation enshrining the Central Bank’s independence in law. In 2001 I was thirty years old, and I remember the Central Bank’s Annual Meeting held on 27 March, and the excitement in the air when the announcement was made.

And from then until last year, we had a central bank that had been deprived of the authority to intervene in the functioning of the financial system. But the Central Bank is not alone on the stage. Sound economic policy is a triumvirate comprising the Central Bank, the Treasury, and the labor market partners, all of which must work together to keep the economy in balance. These three members of the triumvirate must act in concert in order to ensure stable prices, stable purchasing power, and low interest rates for the long term. We can do this just like other countries can. We will do it. And the Central Bank will do its part. Sixty years of Central Bank operations should give us a reliable roadmap to the future. We who work for the reunified Bank are champing at the bit in our excitement to take on the tasks that await us. Now let us watch the video about the design of Iceland’s banknote series, in commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the redenomination of the Icelandic króna. Thank you  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
The intensity and duration of this new phase of recovery will be influenced by conditioning factors that are largely external to the area, such as oil prices, or the sustainability of the US recovery, given the persistence of its financial imbalances. But, above all, a sound recovery will depend on the ability of European economies to underpin their growth with domestic factors supportive of robust investment that increases productive capital. BIS Review 38/2002  3  The monetary policy stance should be tailored to the prospects of maintaining price stability. Particularly important in this respect (besides oil prices, which have already hampered any reduction in inflation in the first half of the year) is continuing wage moderation which, in some countries, is beginning to be questioned. The single market and monetary union provide the European economy with a particularly suitable framework for developing its growth potential and for consolidating it as one of the central pivots of the world economy. Notwithstanding, the area still lacks sufficient flexibility and innovative capacity to compete satisfactorily with other more dynamic areas, mainly in the more technologically advanced industries. The Barcelona Summit has clearly shown the ability of the European authorities to pinpoint key issues and to design a blueprint for reforms (of differing ambition but of equal importance) that will make Europe a more dynamic economy. While greater ambition would conceivably have been desirable, meeting the targets laid down in Barcelona on schedule would entail a qualitative change of enormous importance.

These actions, taken together, should vaccinate the economy and protect it from the more insidious disease of too low inflation. Thank you. 1 John C. Williams, The Research-Policy Nexus: ZLB, JMCB and FOMC, Remarks at the Conference Celebrating  the 50th Anniversary of the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, New York (May 31, 2019). 2 John C. Williams, The Economic Outlook: The ‘New Normal’ is Now, Remarks at The Economic Club of New  York, New York (March 6, 2019). 3 David Reifschneider and John C. Williams, Three Lessons for Monetary Policy in a Low-Inflation Era, Journal of  Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp. 936–66, November 2000. 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC Briefing. January 2002. 5 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  5 This discussion abstracts from balance sheet policies such as quantitative easing, which can make financial  conditions even more favorable to growth. See, for example, Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, and Brian P. Sack, Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, The Brookings Institution, Volume 35, No. 2, pp. 1–100, 2004. 6 Thomas M. Mertens and John C. Williams, What to Expect from the Lower Bound on Interest Rates: Evidence  from Derivatives Prices, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 865, August 2018. 7 John C. Williams, When the Facts Change..., Remarks at the 9th High-Level Conference on the International  Monetary System, Zürich, Switzerland (May 14, 2019).
These include buffers for banks with global or domestic systemic importance; and buffers in the discretionary component of capital requirements, Pillar 2, such as the PRA’s firm-specific buffer. In the liquidity framework, the liquid asset buffer (LAB) is a reserve of high quality liquid assets which banks hold in normal times to manage a 30-day period of liquidity stress. Using its LAB in a stress can thus give a bank breathing space to meet extraordinary demands for cash without taking actions that may be damaging to the wider financial system and real economy. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Chart 2 Illustration of different capital requirements and buffers  Releasability and usability It is important that all of the buffers outlined above play their role, if necessary, in allowing banks to maintain lending whilst absorbing losses. Whether and how that is enabled rests on two key concepts: releasability and usability. A regulatory buffer is releasable when the authorities can reduce it – including down to zero if need be – freeing up additional resources. The CCyB is a good example of this. In the UK, the FPC released it during the early Covid period, increasing the size of firms’ management buffers.

It ties up resources without providing the extra capacity in stress that regulators wanted them to provide, and had assumed they would when determining how to prepare the system to absorb shocks. If a regulatory buffer is instead perceived as similar to a minimum requirement and firms take actions to avoid dipping into it, these actions might be harmful to the real economy and, as last year’s Bank analysis showed, to the banking system. Thus it is essential to have a well-designed regulatory buffer framework which can make fresh resources available when they are most needed. The early Covid stress gives us an opportunity to investigate how the current framework behaves and how practically usable regulatory buffers may be. Given the effectiveness of the fire-fighting I mentioned at the outset, bank capital ratios did not approach their Capital Conservation Buffers, so we cannot probe directly how banks would have behaved had capital ratios fallen inside that regulatory buffer. However, there are at least three approaches we can look at. Approaches to analysing capital buffer usage Approach 1 – What do banks and investors say about buffers? The first approach involves asking banks what constraints they face in practice in dipping into buffers and how they manage their capital positions. In broad terms, they told us that expectations of capital instrument and debt investors and concerns about the actions of credit ratings agencies are a major constraint.
Maja Kadievska-Vojnovik: Drivers of European Payment Integration - Innovations and Cooperation (opening speech) Speech by Mrs Maja Kadievska–Vojnovic, Vice Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia at the opening of the 10th jubilee edition of the NBRM's Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures: Drivers of European Payment Integration - Innovations and Cooperation, Ohrid, 5-7 July 2017. * * * Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear guests from home and abroad, It is a great pleasure to wish you very warm welcome to the annual Conference on Payments and Market Infrastructures. This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Conference and we are very proud to host it here in Ohrid in front of a group of eminent speakers and distinguished audience. Let me first thank you all for coming as you are the ones who bring the success to the Conference. I hope you find the next couple of days interesting, informative and productive and most of all enjoyable as we celebrate the occasion. I would like to take this opportunity and extend my sincerest gratitude and appreciation to De Nederlandsche Bank and Banco de Portugal, as institutions with whom we maintain close and fruitful collaboration on many fronts, and particularly with respect to this conference. Your continued support and cooperation is highly appreciated and I believe it will only grow stronger in the future to come. Ladies and Gentlemen, We named this 10th jubilee Conference – Drivers of European Payment Integration – Innovations and Cooperation.

It encourages introduction of new types of payment services and sophistication of customer 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  protection and security. Also, much attention is paid on evaluation of SEPA-regulation and further integration via implementation of Pan-European instant payments solution. The innovations in the field of financial market infrastructures are expected to bring synergies between TARGET2 and T2S, which is in the scope of the Eurosystem’s Vision 2020. At the national level, we made significant progress towards fulfilling the European standards in the payment area. A new Law on payment services and systems implementing PSD and some articles of PSD2, E-money 2 and Settlement Finality Directive was drafted with the EU support via IPA project. In the field of payment systems oversight, the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures were adopted. Furthermore, we aligned our methodology for collecting payment statistics data with the EU regulation on payment statistics. Last but not least is the recent project to enhance euro cross-border payment infrastructure by establishing an alternative payment channel via the Macedonian Interbank Payment System (MIPS) RTGS system, which was connected with the TARGET2, via Banca d’Italia. I am very glad that all these issues will be discussed by eminent experts from the Bank for International Settlements, European Commission, De Nederlandsche Bank, Banco de Portugal, Commerzbank, Euroclear, ProgressSoft as well as domestic financial institutions.
The steering system has been successful in the sense that overnight loans between the banks are arranged as a rule at the repo rate. A potential drawback of the fine-tuning operations is that the operational risks grow with the volume of these operations. We therefore make a weekly offer of one-week Riksbank certificates at the repo rate. As this withdraws liquidity, the fine-tuning operations do not have to be so large. BIS Review 153/2008  5  The way in which we implement monetary policy means that we are active at two time horizons or, as we usually say, at two points on the yield curve. One is for overnight loans or deposits, where our fine tuning helps to keep the overnight rate at the repo rate; the other is for one-week certificates, likewise at the repo rate. As we are active in the market only once a week, with one-week certificates, we cannot steer the one-week rate as effectively as the overnight rate, which we steer on a daily basis. Neither do we intend to do so. Our operational goal is precisely to steer the overnight rate. Which measures should be said to be connected with the implementation of monetary policy and which should instead be seen as more directed at assisting the performance of markets and promoting financial stability? There is no simple answer. Something that a financial crisis makes clearer is how monetary policy and financial stability interact. Neither of them can evidently function without the other.

In Sweden there is a central counterparty – NASDAQ OMX Derivatives Markets – for derivative instruments that are traded on OMX. There was until recently no central counterparty for spot transactions in Swedish shares and interest-bearing securities. With the creation of new trading facilities in Europe, however, clearance of Swedish shares through a central counterparty is now possible. 3 In October it was announced that a central counterparty service will also be provided in future for spot share transactions on OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm. The tendencies I have just mentioned indicate an explosive development. What will be its consequences for the Swedish financial infrastructure? The Swedish systems will indeed be wholly or partly replaced by or linked up with systems elsewhere. This means that to a growing extent, securities trading, clearance and settlement will be arranged outside Sweden. As integration increases, national securities markets and financial infrastructures will become more and more intertwined. For the Riksbank it is important that the systems in the Swedish infrastructure work safely and efficiently – even if they are in foreign ownership and located abroad. Coping with the increased integration entails new and stronger demands for joint solutions and cross-border cooperation. There is much to be done in all these respects. In order to oversee the foreign systems that affect the Swedish infrastructure, the Riksbank will be cooperating with other central banks. Counterparty risks and insufficient market transparency In the light of what I have just described, it is clear that trading, clearance and settlement are changing rapidly.