samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The framework seeks to reduce poverty through three core areas of sustainable economic growth, inclusive social development and good governance. The strategy is a sound one as it does not focus solely on physical infrastructure, i.e. the building of roads, bridges and other “hardware”, but also on the “software” of policy and institutional reform in the public and the private sectors. The Strategic Framework also attaches importance to private sector development, particularly in the fields of finance, banking and corporate governance. The quality of the “software” of a developing economy is precisely what international investors are looking for as they return to Asia. At a time when Asian economies are showing incipient signs of recovery against an improved external environment, international capital flows are triggering back to the region but in a more cautious and discriminate manner than before. Investors are now a lot more selective about who may lend to and where they put their money. International capital flows from OECD markets to Asia, in the form of bank credits, foreign direct investment and portfolio flows, have dropped significantly in the last few years. In the case of bank credits, total flows declined by about $ billion during the 1997-1998 period, although the decline has been at a more moderate pace in the last two years. In the light of this, it is important that the Bank plays a catalytic role in mobilising resources within and outside of the region.

One approach to this challenge would be for the Bank to return to basics and improve the three channels of financial intermediation, namely, banking, equity and debt, through a number of measures. First, the Bank could increase investment in the financial infrastructure in Asia. Just as physical infrastructure, such as airports and highways, facilitates the movement of people and goods, financial infrastructure, such as the payment and settlement systems for the banking and securities sectors, facilitates the safe and efficient movement of money. The importance of a robust payment and settlement system in this region is underscored by the events of 11 September. Secondly, the Bank could expand the technical assistance programme to assist economies in restructuring the banking sector. Small and medium-sized enterprises employ the most workers in Asia and they are mostly dependent on bank financing. The banking sector in Asia, devastated by the Asian financial crisis, has not fully recovered. Banks understandably are adopting a very conservative lending strategy towards companies with a lower credit rating, such as Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. The Bank’s assistance in speeding up the banking sector reform would help SMEs to get back on their own feet, thereby reducing unemployment and poverty. Thirdly, the Bank could expand assistance in building up the institutional capacity of individual economies to improve corporate governance in the private sector. Emphasis should also be made to improve the auditing, disclosure and transparency standards of publicly-listed companies.
Isărescu, Mugur: “Financing and Adjustment in the Economy of Romania”, dissertation on the occasion of being awarded degree of Doctor Honoris Causa by Alexandru Ioan Cuza University in Iaşi, May 2009. Milesi, Ferreti, Gian, Maria, and Assaf, Razin: “Current Account Reversals and Currency Crises: Empirical Regularities”, in Paul Krugman (editor), Currency Crises, University of Chicago Press, 2000. Rato, Rodrigo: “Keeping the Train on the Rails: How Countries in the Americas and Around the World Can Meet the Challenges of Globalization”, speech delivered at the “International Economic Forum of the Americas Conference of Montreal”, Canada, 18 June 2007b. Reinhart, M. Carmen, and Reinhart, R. Vincent: “Capital Flow Bonanzas: An Encompassing View of the Past and Present”, NBER Working Papers, No. 14321, September 2008. Sebastian, Weber, and Wyplosz, Charles: “Exchange Rates during the Crises”, World Bank, Policy Research Working Papers, No. 5059, September 2009. Solans, Eugenio Domingo: “How should Monetary Policy Makers Respond to the New Challenges of Global Economic Integration?”, speech delivered at the “Global Economic Integration: Opportunities and Challenges” Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 2000. Stiglitz, E. Joseph: “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability”, World Development, No. 98, 2000. 18  BIS Review 5/2010

We have seen that the links to the central banks work best when the staff at the Swedish embassies in the respective countries are actively involved and regularly follow up what is happening in the respective banks. At the beginning of this year, Sida commissioned an evaluation of the Riksbank’s cooperation so far with Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The evaluation showed that the Riksbank’s efforts in these central banks had been both successful and appreciated by the recipients. The very fact that we are colleagues, that we do the same things, have the same responsibility, was one of the key factors. There are many  BIS Review 123/2006  1  consultants; colleagues are harder to find. The long-term thinking behind the cooperation is also an important factor. We do not merely make an analysis, write a report and disappear. We are still here and can continue the discussion whenever necessary. The problems that were indicated in the evaluation were more of an administrative nature. For instance, it is difficult to find a place in a foreign aid context for low-cost projects like this, as they do not really follow the set patterns for other aid efforts. Finally, I can mention that the Riksbank has allocated resources in our internal business plan for next year to extend our cooperation with some of the central banks in Sida’s cooperating countries.
The OLF is not prefunded, and the FDIC’s capacity to borrow to fund the OLF is capped at 90 percent of the fair value of the assets of the institution that are available for repayment. The provision of OLF liquidity does not fall ultimately on the American taxpayer. Shareholders may not recover until the OLF is repaid. The FDIC is authorized to assess financial sector participants if necessary to repay the funds advanced by the Treasury to fund the OLF. Reevaluate, but don’t forget the disorder of the crisis The breadth of changes that have been made to the regulatory landscape since the onset of the financial crisis is huge. Given the scale of the changes, it is entirely appropriate to take stock of these changes and reevaluate their effectiveness. It is not surprising to think that some recalibration might be necessary. It is also worth considering what additional reforms are needed to make the financial system more resilient and resistant to future, unanticipated shocks. Sometimes I get asked the question of whether the financial sector is where it needs to be in terms of resilience. My answer is usually that things are better, but they can get even better still. And I suspect that, in even the best case scenario, that will always be my answer. Because threats and risks evolve. Financial institutions, and regulators for that matter, must recognize changing risks and ensure that their approaches evolve in kind.

Many commentators and policy makers have been deeply critical of the Fed’s actions during the crisis. I am not here to suggest that leaders during the crisis were infallible or that decisions 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  made during the crisis were always the right ones. What I believe is difficult to dispute, however, is the importance of having the ability to be agile in times of severe economic stress. Policy makers were both able and willing to try new things, to make adjustments as circumstances evolved, and to attack the crisis from different angles. Many aspects of the crisis were unprecedented. Room to innovate allowed the staffs of public sector institutions to craft targeted responses. It also allowed them to adjust those responses on the fly—through cooperation domestically and internationally, knowledge of the financial sector and familiarity with its participants, and the ability to instill confidence through the provision of liquidity. As a lawyer, I am perhaps a bit of a pessimist. But I’m not a cynic. If there’s one lesson I take from the crisis, it is the importance of having room to maneuver during a crisis. And, there will be future shocks to the system. When the next shock comes, regulators need to have both the legal authority to take risks and the will to act. From disorder to order (hopefully) In the years after the crisis, attention has been focused on mitigating the risk of another one.
Source: Bloomberg and Norges Bank  Monetary policy had to play a substantial role in the wake of the financial crisis. Fiscal space was already limited in many countries and narrowed further through the crisis. Fiscal policy is still constrained. The public sector has done little to deleverage. At the same time, the interest rate level is low and there is very little margin for further cuts. There is less latitude to counter another downturn in the near future. Monetary policy – lessons from the financial crisis Ten years of historically low interest rates and large-scale asset purchases give cause for reflection. An important question is what responsibilities should rest with a central bank. A related theme is what is meant by the objective of low and stable inflation. Let me take a closer look at these questions. The primary objective of monetary policy is to maintain monetary stability, which ensues from the central bank’s responsibility for the monetary system. Behind traditional currencies stands a central bank assigned with the mission of maintaining confidence in the value of money. This is in stark contrast to the so-called cryptocurrencies. They fail the crucial test that a means of payment must pass. 10 Rachel, L. and T. D. Smith (2015) “Secular drivers of the global real interest rate”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No. 571. 11  Both too high and too low inflation have undesired consequences, such as arbitrary wealth redistribution, underinvestment and resource misallocation that may leave resources idle.

For the next year, we are more optimistic, and in our projections we expect credit growth of up to 9 percent. In July, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia made changes in the reserve requirement and also reduced the key interest rate to 3.25 percent, which is the historically lowest level. When do you expect the effects? We made some changes, so that we reduced the reserve requirement ratio for denar deposits and we increased that for the foreign currency deposits. Our goal is to stimulate denar saving at the expense of the saving in foreign currency, which in this way will become more expensive, while saving in denars will become cheaper. Shortly after that, we reduced the key interest rate to 3.25 percent, thus sending a signal to the banks that there is room for greater lending activity. Even that small amount of loans does not go to the companies, but mainly to the citizens. Why is that so and when will it change? In 2009, soon after the outbreak of the global economic crisis, banks here immediately stopped lending to households, while they continued to lend to companies. It allowed banks to clean the loan portfolio of the households, i.e. to eliminate the bad loans in the meantime. Therefore, now they have room to re-start lending to the households, and they are doing it. The process of cleaning the credit portfolios of the companies, however, was left out at that point, so it began more intensively last year, and continued this year.
Action 2: Making available the IM, DD and valuation reports to prospective buyers To facilitate making investment decisions, the IMs, DDs and valuation reports that were prepared by the Panel of Auditors for Category B NBFIs were made available to prospective buyers, after signing the Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA). Based on the company valuations carried out by the Panel of Auditors, the Consolidation Unit prepared a methodology to arrive at a realistic and reflective average price multiple, which was informed to the potential investors. We also advised them that a premium or a discount may be applied to this multiple depending on the strengths and weaknesses of the selling NBFI. Further, we informed the Panel of Auditors to continue their service for transaction management and finalisation of deals. In addition, the Panel of Auditors was requested to arrange data room facility for prospective buyers to get more information and clarifications on the DDs and to assist them in their decision making process. Action 3: Preparation of guidelines on the proposed tax benefits His Excellency the President in his Budget Speech 2014 granted special tax concessions for financial institutions involved in the consolidation process. Accordingly, the Inland Revenue (Amendment) Act, No. 8 of 2014 and Value Added Tax (Amendment) Act, No. 7 of 2014 have been enacted by the Parliament giving effect to the budget proposal on financial sector consolidation. In terms of these amendments, the Central Bank has been empowered to issue guidelines to provide tax concessions on cost of acquisitions.

As the Head of the Financial Sector Consolidation Unit of the Central Bank, I must thank the Governor and the Organising Committee for selecting “Financial Sector Consolidation: Why and How?” as the topic for today because it gives due recognition not only to the current key policy reform in the financial sector that is being implemented in 2014, but also to all stakeholders who are committed to working with the Central Bank to make this major reform a success. Ladies and gentlemen, the major components of our financial sector are banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), which together account for 65 per cent of the financial sector of the country. The financial sector consolidation programme is designed for the reforming of the institutions belonging to these two sectors. As the topic suggests, I will share with you why we wanted to consolidate the banking and NBFI sectors and how we are implementing the consolidation process. Accordingly, my oration is divided into two parts; in the first part, I will discuss the rationale for consolidation and in the second part explain the way we planned and executed the process. With that introduction, let me now begin my oration. Part I: Financial sector consolidation: why? The financial sector of Sri Lanka has shown a high level of overall stability in the past, even during the post subprime global financial crisis period. This has been endorsed by the international and local rating agencies in their annual independent reviews.
And it isn’t just the UK: the most high profile enforcement cases to date, involving the manipulation of short-term interest rate benchmarks, have affected every major financial centre, including London, Singapore, Frankfurt and Tokyo, and have already resulted in global fines totalling nearly £ by authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe. Good progress has also been made on the design and regulation of benchmarks. In the United Kingdom, the design and administration of Libor has been overhauled, and a new regulatory regime was introduced in 2013, following the Wheatley Report. In August this year, as its first act, the Fair and Effective Markets Review recommended to HM Treasury that this regime should be extended to cover a further seven major UK-based benchmarks: SONIA, RONIA, the WM/Reuters 4pm London Fix, ISDAFix, the London Gold Fixing, the LMBA Silver Price and the ICE Brent futures contract. The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has introduced a new set of standards for benchmarks, and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) has produced detailed reports on the priorities for further reform of interest rate and foreign exchange benchmarks. A number of broader regulatory, market and firm level initiatives are also under way in this area. The second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2) is expected to have a major impact on the structure of FICC markets across Europe, with new transparency measures expected to transform the way that they function.

Minouche Shafik: Making markets fair and effective Speech by Ms Minouche Shafik, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking of the Bank of England, at the London School of Economics, London, 27 October 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying figures can be found at the end of the speech. Making markets fair and effective It is a real pleasure to be giving my first speech as Deputy Governor of the Bank of England at the London School of Economics (LSE). It resonates on so many fronts. The LSE has produced many members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Deputy Governors and indeed Governors of the Bank of England as well as vast numbers of its staff over the years. I was taught macroeconomics at the LSE by Charlie Bean, one of my predecessors at the Bank as well as by my host this evening, Nick Stern, when I did the MSc in economics. And the topic of my speech tonight resonates with the origins of the LSE as an institution that always sought to bring the best of academic thinking to the pressing problems of the day. As you will no doubt realise by the frequency of misconduct stories in the papers, Fixed Income, Currency and Commodity (or FICC) markets are certainly dealing with pressing problems.
So the real exchange rate will continue to fluctuate and from time to time the rate of inflation in Sweden will deviate from the EMU average. There is nothing odd about that. The ECB's inflation target, a rate below 2 per cent, refers to the average rate in the monetary union as a whole, not the rate in a particular region or country. In another major monetary union, the United States, the regional differences in rates of inflation have at times been large. Studies show that differences in annual rates of inflation between American cities have exceeded one percentage point for as much as a decade.1 For economic policy in Europe the challenge ahead lies in ensuring that such regional differences in inflation do in fact mirror necessary changes in the real exchange rate, rather than representing unmotivated wage and price increases, for example. But that is another matter that I shall not be considering today. So the significance of the central rate's level should not be exaggerated. If we were to somehow land at a level that, if it were to be permanent, would not be sustainable in the longer run, an adjustment would subsequently occur. But as that would be painful, it is important to do what we can to arrive at a suitable rate from the start. 1  Cecchetti, S, Nelson, M and Sonora, R (2000): "Price level convergence among United States cities: Lessons for the European Central Bank", Working Paper, Ohio State University.

It is not easy to grasp the concept of operational risk, although the Basel Committee’s definition is a good start: “risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems, or external events”. Although public opinion associates operational risk with dire consequences for specific institutions, you and I know that it is present in all banks’ daily operations, and in all their areas, from the most traditional to the most complex. Given the relevance of operational risk, it is not surprising that both supervisors and the leading banks are making an increasing effort to measure its impact. Only if progress is made in such measurement will it be possible first, to conduct analyses of the impact that strategic decisions (expansion in new areas or regions, rationalisation of expenses, outsourcing, etc.) may have on the operational risk profile and, therefore, on the possibility of introducing corrective measures aimed at improving this risk profile. As things stand we are still far from achieving - in technical terms- a satisfactorily broad and deep measurement of operational risk. This is why the Basel Committee, by setting for the first time an explicit capital charge for operational risk at banks, has done so avoiding, in the most advanced alternatives, mechanistic formulas that may curb operational risk management developments in the coming years.
The Federal Reserve has a more explicit focus on reducing spreads on those markets that are considered to be important to the financial system, but has recently also begun to buy government securities on a large scale. Both quantitative easing and credit easing are examples of a type of policy that is only used in special and unusual circumstances and whose effects we therefore do not really know very much about as yet. I think it is important to be clear about this: the situation that has arisen is new for practically all central banks in countries with well-developed financial markets. It would be wise to address the question of how to best handle the situation with a great deal of humility. So what is the situation here in Sweden – will we need to implement as extensive measures as those now being implemented by, for example, the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve? The answer to this question is that we simply do not know yet. What we can say is that we are prepared to do what is required, when it is required, within the existing frameworks. We also have the advantage of being in a situation where we can get an indication of how well the unconventional measures taken by other central banks have worked, even though the differences between countries of course mean that we cannot draw too far-reaching conclusions.

J D Rogers: Debt reporting in Sierra Leone Keynote address by Dr J D Rogers, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the opening ceremony of the WAIFEM Regional Course on Debt Reporting and the IMF/World Bank Debt Compilers Guide, at the Bank of Sierra Leone recreational complex, Kingtom, 7 August 2006. *  *  *  Director General, West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM), Officials of the Commonwealth Secretariat & The International Monetary Fund (IMF), Distinguished Guests, Course Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen. 1.0  Introduction  On behalf of the President, His Excellency, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabba, the Government and people of the Republic of Sierra Leone, I am pleased to bid you all a warm welcome to Freetown. Let me start by expressing our sincere thanks and appreciation to the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM), the Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for choosing Sierra Leone as the venue for this Regional Course on Debt Reporting and the IMF/World Bank Debt Compilers Guide. The theme of the course is relevant and timely. Let me thank the organizers of the course for this initiative which would go a long way to strengthening overall debt management capacity in the sub-region. Ladies and Gentlemen, 2.0  Principles for compilation of gross external debt position  The need for comprehensive, comparable, and reliable data on external debt for informed decisions by policymakers, financial markets and other users of economic statistics cannot be over stressed.