samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Global results in 2006 were once again surprising. World growth was around 5%, greater than expected at the start of the year, and inflation was contained, despite the persistence of a notable rise in oil prices. The country that most improved in the euro area was Germany, where growth rose from 0.9% in 2005 to 2.5% in 2006. The fact that Germany should have moved onto a growth path after so many years of sluggishness is undoubtedly of great importance for the prospects of the Spanish economy. The optimism emanating from the booming international climate needs to be qualified, however. The world economy evidences certain problems and there are question marks about how hard or soft the landing of the US economy will be and whether the absorption of the balance of payments imbalances will be orderly or not. Furthermore, and above all, uncertainty looms over the level of asset prices following their high growth in recent years, in a situation of historically low long-term interest rates and exceptionally buoyant corporate earnings. In the case of the Spanish economy, the ongoing expansion has been accompanied by the emergence of certain imbalances that pose potential risks to continuing economic dynamism. The Banco de España has reiterated that Spanish growth is being driven by resident spending that has not always been met with sufficient responsiveness in domestic productive activity; consequently, cost and price pressures have ensued. These have contributed to certain imbalances whose presence means that any potentially excessive optimism must be tempered.

On the one hand we have the strong  BIS Review 32/2007  1  growth of household debt, linked to intense house purchases in a property boom, and which is the other side of the coin of the high external deficit I referred to earlier. And on the other is the persistence of an inflation differential with our European partners, which raises doubts about the future behaviour of our competitiveness. The Banco de España has issued warnings about these risk factors and will continue to monitor them closely and analyse the attendant developments in depth. Today, however, as initially stated, I should like to take advantage of the opportunity the Círculo de Economía has given me to take a longer-term perspective in examining recent developments in the Spanish economy and its future possibilities, moving beyond the usual short-dated horizon of economic forecasting exercises. Looking back, we can see how favourably the Spanish economy has fared over the past 20 years, which is an incontrovertible fact. With the exception of the 1993 recession, which was fairly widespread in Europe, our country has been growing since 1986 systematically at or above the level of growth in other European countries. And since 1994 we have had 13 uninterrupted years of growth, with mild oscillations around a generally high average rate. Spain's higher relative growth has many causes.
This is especially important just now as there is very considerable uncertainty about the future and the Riksbank’s toolbox is perceived to be limited or even exhausted. Third, because it is important to analyse and discuss whether and if so what central banks, including the Riksbank, can and should do to combat climate change. I will argue that the Riksbank can act with strength and security in an economic crisis, and I will exemplify this in the form of a financial crisis triggered by climaterelated events. The Riksbank’s toolbox has changed but it is not empty. But in order for our measures to have a profound impact, we need to work together with other authorities. Good cooperation with other authorities and in international networks is also key when it comes to the Riksbank’s scope for contributing to climate adaptation. The Riksbank can contribute to a more sustainable future, but only as a complement to other effective climate policy. The Riksbank and other central banks will not be able to replace the need for an effective climate policy that should be focused on setting a price on carbon emissions. Let me begin by focusing on the issue of how the Swedish economy is affected by climate change. The climate and its effect on the economy and the financial system The climate is a particularly complicated system. This means that the economic consequences of climate change are difficult to predict.

And last but not least, the European Payments Initiative (EPI). Some major decisions on the effective launch of EPI are due to be taken in the next few weeks. But I would just like to remind you here that the Banque de France fully supports this initiative, as do the other Eurosystem national central banks and the European Commission, and currently seven EU Member States, including France, that publicly announced their support for the initiative in a statement published on 9 November. 2.The introduction of a CBDC raises complex issues that need to be resolved without penalising banks in order to produce the desired effects. The second reason why we should take a cautious but confident approach to the role of banks in a world of stablecoins and CBDCs relates tothe challenges that need to be met to ensure the digital euro contributes positively to the European financial system and payments landscape. a- Avoiding disruptive effects for financial intermediaries This implies making complex economic, financial, technical and organisational choices, to avoid generating disruptive effects for financial intermediaries that would conflict with our mandate to safeguard monetary and financial stability. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  These disruptive effects could materialise in two ways:  First, if the introduction of a CBDC were to lead, in normal periods and in periods of stress, to the conversion of a large share of bank deposits into assets held in CBDC.A reduction of this size in deposits would have serious consequences.
The measures needed to respond to these issues can only be effective at the European level. Not everything is working well in Europe and it begs a discussion. Italy, as a founding member of the EU and as the third economy of the euro area, needs to be part of it. What do you think of the proposals for reform made by Macron? I don’t want to comment on what the French President says. He has sparked a debate on the future of Europe, and every country should get involved. If European leaders focus only on domestic politics, this inward-looking attitude can only make Europe weaker. A return to the previous era of globalisation without barriers is unlikely, isn’t it? This is indeed unlikely. And that’s good news, since the reason we are experiencing problems today is that globalisation didn’t deliver on its promises. As Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa once said: “Those people who complain that we won’t get back to the pre-crisis path forget that it was the very path that led to that crisis”. We are currently undergoing a very disorderly transition and there is a temptation to turn to nationalist ideas, when one of the great successes to emerge in the aftermath of the Second World War was the creation of an international order based on trust. Change is needed; for instance, we were naive about opening up international financial flows.

Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Corriere della Sera Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Corriere della Sera, conducted by Mr Danilo Taino on 7 March 2019 and published on 11 March 2019. * * *  At its meeting on Thursday, 7 March, the ECB decided to add to the monetary stimulus already in place. What happened? Did the extent of the economic slowdown in the euro area take you by surprise? The slowdown didn’t come as a surprise. Economic activity was exceptionally strong in 2017, thanks to global economic conditions. We knew that euro area growth would adjust towards its potential rate. The slowdown has been stronger than expected and started sooner, which motivated the decisions we took. But those decisions don’t represent a turnaround in our policy; they have been carefully calibrated to this diagnosis. We are adjusting to the new reality rather than reversing our course; we don’t see signs of a recession at present. The ECB staff projections have been revised. They previously envisaged that growth would be consistently above potential, which would have pushed inflation towards our objective of lower but close to 2%, whereas they now foresee that actual output will be initially equal to or below potential output, which means it will take longer for inflation to reach 2%. In the event of external shocks, could the ECB go back to buying bonds on the market? We don’t see the need.
The follow-up could also comprise recommendations on macroprudential policy, which would also help to achieve the aim of global financial stability. Third, moral suasion is the only tool that the IMF can use to influence things. It is perhaps also logical that this is the case. International organisations seldom have any other mechanisms for exerting pressure. It is therefore important that the Fund is able to “speak truth to power” even when speaking to large and powerful countries if it is to have any chance at all to influence things.5 The notion that the global financial system was largely invulnerable was, as I have said, firmly refuted by the outbreak of the financial crisis. The crisis clearly demonstrated that the surveillance of the global financial system was inadequate and one of the reasons for this was an unclear division of roles between various international bodies. This led to the G20 assuming a leading role and many important and necessary decisions were taken, but this was done on an ad hoc basis by a limited number of countries. This is a problem; such decisions should be taken in a legitimate way for their impact to be effective. All of this has led to the idea of setting up some form of predetermined structure for how to act when a potential crisis is identified. The IMF staff recently attempted to concretise the possible form of such a structure.

Petar Goshev: Macedonia – the crisis, its impact and future challenges Opening speech by Mr Petar Goshev, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the XIV Annual Meeting of ACI Macedonia – The Financial Market Association, Ohrid, 26 September 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Honorable members of ACI – the Financial Markets Association It is an honor to open the fourteenth annual meeting of ACI – the Financial Markets Association held in a year of exceptional challenges for both the global financial markets and the financial markets in the Republic of Macedonia. I would like to address three issues, not for a moment forgetting the key word for a successful functioning of the financial markets – the trust. 1)  What are the reasons behind the current financial and economic crisis? 2)  How and to what extent has the financial crisis spilled over the Republic of Macedonia? and  3)  What are the challenges in the future period? At the beginning, let me address briefly the reasons behind the current financial and economic crisis. The financial crisis could also be compared with an illness of a human organism. In both cases, the finding of a cure first requires identification, and then remedy of the reasons that caused the illness, i.e. the crisis. Observing the events over the several recent years, the reasons behind the current crisis could be divided into two broad categories: macroeconomic and microeconomic.
This is thanks to unprecedented international cooperation on financial reforms under the aegis of the Financial Stability Board and the coordination of the Basel Committee in the banking sector, and thanks to the remarkable efforts made by the banking industry. Thankfully, the world of finance in 2017 is not what it was in 2007. That is particularly true for banks in Europe and in France. It is important to stress this achievement, as the European banking sector is often criticised, particularly from the other side of the Atlantic, solely in the light of its difficult cases or institutions that are trailing at the rear, whereas on the whole, it is clearly far more robust than before the crisis. Banks in France for example, have doubled their levels of capital since the crisis and generate a return on equity (RoE) of 7%, and even up to 9% or 10% when adjusted for one-off items. As regards this return, it is clearly lower than the pre-crisis levels, but in certain respects, this can be expected and is reasonable. We cannot ask banks to generate a double-digit return on equity when interest rates and the risk-free rate are so low and banks are indeed more resilient than they were. Moreover, this improvement does not only concern the banks: it can also be seen in the non-banking sector and the financial markets, with particular progress made with regard to over-the-counter derivatives and the shadow banking system.

In addition, there is now a broad consensus on risk measurement approaches. The main point that is still undecided and which continues to occupy the Committee members is the setting of the so-called “output floor” for banks that apply internal models. Let’s be clear: I read and hear the banking industry, and French banks in particular, giving its advice for negotiations on this point. A little restraint would not go amiss, and it is not our intention to defend corporate interests. If an output floor of 75% is not acceptable, it is because this floor – and consequently the standardised approach – would become the constraint for half of the international banks. I must stress that our goal is to  finalise Basel III, based on improved models that remain risk sensitive, and not to move onto Basel IV, which would use the standardised approach. Therefore, an agreement must be reached on a lower output floor along with a tightening of controls over the banks’ internal models, much like the targeted review of internal models (TRIM) that was approved for the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the results of which we are more than willing to submit to peerreview. This stance is shared at the very least by other European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, and by the European Commission. International cooperation on financial reforms is a common good that has been extremely precious during these past eight years and is crucial to our future.
In fact, during the stage when structural imbalances were building up on bank balance sheets, institutions never failed to comply with the solvency requirements. A significant part of the response to the crisis has been based on regulatory changes to correct the design of the capital framework. However, apart from this traditional micro response, the introduction of the macroprudential viewpoint in supervision has been a notable development. The purpose of this perspective is to contribute to the correction of macrofinancial imbalances and improve control over the credit cycle, which should result in more stable and sustainable economic growth. A necessary condition to be able to develop this function is the early identification of macroeconomic imbalances and analysis of the interconnections between individual institutions and markets. As we all know, the Banco de España has been performing these tasks of identifying and monitoring financial system vulnerabilities since 2014 and, moreover, has the option of introducing countercyclical capital buffers. Consequently, one might ask what changes have recently been made to Spanish law and why they are relevant. First, a royal decree setting up a macroprudential authority in Spain was finally approved on 1 March. This needed to be done as Spain was the only EU country, apart from Italy, that had still not established such an authority.

Which is why central banks and monetary authorities spend considerable resources and efforts in designing their banknotes not only, to be as aesthetically pleasing and attractive as possible, but more importantly, to appropriately portray the unique identity of their respective countries. Throughout history, banknotes incorporated significant natural and cultural aspects of the country, encompassing nature, history, society, economy and technology. Bank Negara first issued currency in 1967. And since then, uniquely, our banknotes have always featured the first Yang di-Pertuan Agong, Tuanku Abdul Rahman ibni Almarhum Tuanku Muhammad on the obverse to signify the stability and reflect the unity of our country under the system of Constitutional Monarchy. On the reverse, however, our banknotes have had different icons over the last five decades, with the most recent banknotes series aptly themed “Uniquely Malaysia”, due to the icons that can be found exclusively or largely in Malaysia. It has been a practice for most countries to change banknotes icons from time to time, and to include new theme and incorporate the latest security features. The earliest banknotes might have been first issued in China during the Han Dynasty in 118 BC. Throughout history, banknotes have always signified pride, prestige, authority and sovereignty of the country. And as such, it is not surprising the authorities would always use the best technology available in the production of banknotes. Modern banknotes are extremely sophisticated with so many security features embedded, some of which are invisible and only visible using machines.
Since the monetary policy meeting in August, the government and its collaboration parties have announced proposals, intended to be presented in more detail in the budget bill, which may entail a more expansionary fiscal stance in the period ahead. These proposals include cutting income tax for households, abolishing inheritance and gift tax, lowering wealth tax and increasing support to local governments. In total, this is estimated to provide a stimulus of just over SEK 20 billion in 2005 and 2006. How large the impact of this will be on economic growth and inflation is not so easy to forecast. This is partly dependent on the extent to which households save their increased incomes. Using traditional rules of thumb it could entail a few tenths of one per cent higher GDP growth in both 2005  BIS Review 51/2004  3  and 2006. As things stand, therefore, there is reason to expect growth to average above 3 per cent in the coming two years. In spite of the fact that the economy has performed fairly well for almost two years, developments in the labour market so far have been weak. Even though the demand for labour is still low, the situation is nonetheless judged to have stabilised somewhat. The historical pattern is for employment to lag behind a change in output somewhat. It is common for economic upswings to begin in manufacturing, which then results in a rise in manufacturing employment.

This confidence is still – looking back in a long-term historical perspective – a relatively new element of the Swedish economy. The fact that shocks have been so common in the supply side of the economy in recent years has also made it more important to clarify our view of how monetary policy should deal with the trade offs that then arise. Events have included price effects from mad cows and shocks on energy markets as well as unexpected shifts in productivity. I do not wish to comment on whether supply shocks have in general been more frequent in recent years, but developments have nevertheless made it clear that changes in inflation that are not primarily due to traditional cyclical fluctuations are something that monetary policy has to face regularly, not merely in exceptional cases. The clarification from 1999 can be regarded as one step on the path towards more nuanced inflation targeting. At that time there was a fairly indirect discussion of the need to consider real economic developments. The argument was that monetary policy did not need to try to parry temporary price shocks. The fact that the Riksbank worked with a two-year perspective was then justified by the fact that monetary policy’s impact comes after a time lag. In the description of our method of working I have just given, I emphasised that monetary policy in the short run often concerns trade offs between stabilising inflation and the real economy.
This will involve curriculum design towards the attainment of professional qualifications and the provision of high quality learning solutions that fulfils the AICB’s CPD requirement for its members. A key focus area for ABS in the near to medium term is in acquiring the necessary capabilities and resources to enable it to carry out its objectives effectively. Central to this would be in developing strong in-house faculty and resources which may include visiting professors and industry subject matter experts. ABS is also expected to anticipate and spearhead cutting edge programs tailored to the evolving needs of the banking industry. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We have high hopes that in the next 5 years, ABS will distinguish itself in the quality of its programs, developing a particular strength in delivering integrative and practice-oriented education and learning in banking and business that combine intellectual know-how with practical applications. In an increasingly interconnected world, our workforce must be empowered with the right knowledge, the tools, the skills and the mind-set to deliver worldclass performance. The value proposition of ABS in adopting contemporary approach to business and banking education that equip students for the real world will be demanded as any expertise in a particular discipline. Ultimately, the aim is to integrate the multidisciplinary nature of the banking industry with modern management and professionalism, in turn developing talents with abilities to combine traditional disciplines as they tackle the challenges of uncertainty and complexity. A monumental task is upon ABS. Its challenging and exciting.

That said, in the second quarter of 2007 the euro area's GDP grew less than expected, although it held at levels in line with potential growth. The fundamentals underlying this growth pattern remain firm, so conditions are generally favourable for the continuation of the current economic boom. Significant in this respect is, firstly, the favourable trend of employment, which is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for the increased buoyancy of private consumption in the area. Secondly, European firms on the whole enjoy a healthy financial position and are posting substantial profits, a situation which is conducive to the growth of private productive investment. In the external sector, however, most of the available forecasts point to a loss of steam in the US economy in the coming quarters. But this will be countered by the continued thrust of the  BIS Review 130/2007  1  emerging economies which, as stated, are showing notable resilience to the type of financial tensions currently at large. The sound economic performance of the area has, moreover, been compatible with continued low inflation rates. The rise evidenced by the September figure – which will probably continue in the closing months of this year and in the opening months of 2008 – is largely attributable to the more volatile components of the HICP.