samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
First, completing the banking union comes at the top of the list, in particular, by overcoming the current deadlock on the third main pillar of the Banking Union, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). The commitment to deploy such a scheme would have a strong impact on citizens’ trust and would contribute to increased risk-sharing in the euro area, insofar as it is designed as a fully-fledged mutualised EDIS. 3/8  In addition, it would help align financial responsibility with the pan-European decisionmaking that already exists in the areas of banking supervision and resolution. The current misalignment makes EMU governance more prone to institutional and political frailty. It also remains crucial to eliminate certain regulatory barriers and practices that are hindering the emergence of a truly European banking market. The second priority is linked to the need for well-developed and integrated capital markets within EMU, which requires further deepening of the Capital Markets Union. This is essential to enhance the capacity of the euro area to cushion macro-financial shocks. In particular, the development of a truly cross-border financial sector would allow economic agents to smooth asymmetric, national shocks through a strengthened credit channel. Moreover, an enhanced Capital Markets Union would improve the channelling of the abundant aggregate savings – which currently exceed investment in the area by 3% of GDP – to satisfy investment needs in the areas of infrastructure, energy and innovation.

Third, and connected with the previous condition, they should preserve the incentives to pursue sound fiscal policies. Ultimately, sound public finances are indispensable for the provision of a truly safe asset. Lastly, the sizable current account surplus and the strong overall fiscal position of the European Union, compared to those of other advanced economies, can be seen as a call for greater investment. Among the main areas of necessity, we should prepare our economies and citizens for challenges related to climate change, ageing and digitalisation. More importantly, the EU lags behind the US in terms of productivity growth. These challenges are widespread and common to all our economies, and therefore a common and  8  Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2018), “The search for a Euro Area safe asset”, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper, 18-3. 9 Brunnermeier et al. (2017), ESBies: Safety in the tranches, and ESRB (2018). 10 Zettelmeyer and Leandro (2019), “Beyond ESBies: safety without tranching”, in Risk sharing plus market discipline. A new paradigm for Euro Area reform. 7/8  safe source of financing would be tailor-made for them. It could also provide some stabilisation for the economy, as investment provides a safety net in times of economic distress.
Yet at the same time, London has remained the dominant futures and options market in Europe, and indeed it has strengthened its position in many markets during that time so that, as far as on-exchange business is concerned, London is by far the largest centre in Europe and second only to Chicago. And the central bank survey of OTC derivatives markets in 1995 demonstrated London’s position as the premier centre for the trading and booking of OTC derivatives with 27 per cent of average daily turnover, pushing New York into second place. I do not propose to follow the traditional gambit of Ministerial speakers at trade conferences, reciting figures far better known to the audience than to the speaker, but the growth of LIFFE, the LME, the IPE and OMLX in recent years has been striking, and the most recent development is that LIFFE overtook the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to become the world’s second largest exchange in the first quarter of this year. So if, as I was taught at Stanford Business School, markets are efficient in the sense that they react in advance of events, in the light of an assessment of probabilities, then they appear not to have been particularly distressed by the prospect that EMU may start without the UK in the first wave. Certainly we have not seen an anticipatory flow of business away from London and towards Continental European markets.

But their number will depend on the basket of deliverables of the futures contracts and how those baskets are defined. The alternative would be for a group of different countries’ bonds to be traded interchangeably, but that seems an unlikely outcome. On the OTC markets, the last 18 months has seen the proliferation of trades based on changing perceptions of the likelihood of convergence for the traditionally high-yielding countries and trades based on the differential yields of French and German government bonds. If I might embark on a regulatory diversion here, just for one moment, we at the Bank expect those banks involved in convergence trading to undertake rigorous stress testing of their portfolios to assess the market risk they are running on open positions. That testing should also shed light on the potential for changes in their credit risk - for example if an OTC contract is moving further in the money due to a market movement, the bank would become more exposed to its counter-party. We believe that the credit exposure implications of stress testing should be taken seriously too and are encouraging banks as best practice to do that. In our view not enough institutions do so yet. After EMU, one would expect to see the elimination of exchange rate risk narrowing yield differentials in the bond markets. With exchange rate risk removed and a single monetary policy in operation, national bond yields will differ principally because of differential default risks and differences in market liquidity.
SME Financing and Business Linkages in Zambia – Focus Financial Services. Further, the programme will include panel discussions on policy recommendations and an interactive session. The discussion panel will, among others, cover policy issues and outline some possible recommendations for action. Chairperson As I conclude, allow me to thank the presenters and panelists for accepting to facilitate our deliberations at this Forum. I urge all delegates to engage fully in these discussions so that we can collectively develop pragmatic solutions to the financing challenges facing Zambian businesses. Thank you for listening. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Notably, such organisations have also been instrumental in encouraging the development of a vibrant rental market as a viable alternative to home ownership. For example, in Australia and Hong Kong, social enterprises have had an important role in building affordable housing units or revitalising existing properties for sale or rental, typically targeted at lower-income groups. We need to consider how similar models could be developed here and the role of public policy to enable this. In the context of rental properties, a robust legal and institutional framework to safeguard the rights of tenants and landlords, mechanism to protect tenancy deposits, and arrangements for dispute resolution have been key success factors for countries that have a thriving rental market. At the same time, the introduction of “rent-to-own” schemes could also complement this. The Government has recently launched such a programme. We would welcome the private sector, particularly developers, to also explore such a strategy. Sound, innovative and coordinated public policy is central to addressing the affordable housing challenge. We have advocated that this should reside with a central authority that leads, oversees and coordinates affordable housing initiatives for the nation. This would promote greater strategic and operational cohesion at the national level. Regulatory processes that increase the cost of supplying affordable homes should be reviewed and streamlined. The central authority can also spearhead more effective communications and build stronger collaborations with key partners to advance the affordable housing agenda.
Central banks can provide liquidity to the private sector and reduce systemic risk in the economy by providing credit that is secured by less-liquid assets.6 This “lender of last resort” capacity is particularly important when the precautionary demand for liquidity increases substantially, because it is precisely at these times that private provision of liquidity declines. The financial crisis of 2008 provides a striking example of this ability. As shown in Figure 1, the Federal Reserve doubled the size of its balance sheet in a matter of weeks in September 2008 to meet the extraordinary demand for liquidity as private sources of liquidity dried up. 1 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  On the liability side of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, the increase in liquidity was matched by increases in bank reserves and Treasury deposits through this extraordinary period. 7 The Treasury deposits were funded by an increase in bill issuance, hence the amount of officiallyproduced, safe and money-like assets in the financial system increased by around $ trillion in a few weeks.8 Of course, since investors are aware of the central bank’s unique ability to quickly supply safe and money-like assets in non-normal times, their incentives to monitor risks in normal times may be reduced. The moral hazard raised by this awareness may be addressed through regulation and supervision.

In addition, FDIC deposit insurance complements strong capital by reducing depositors’ incentives to run on banks. Following the financial crisis, the regulatory and supervisory framework has been extended to more directly reduce risks from swings in the supply of liquidity within the financial system. In particular, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) reduces the likelihood of runs by forcing banks to hold highly liquid assets against expected future cash outflows.11,12 Example of money fund reform Runs can also occur on nonbanks. One particularly spectacular run during the financial crisis followed Lehman’s bankruptcy and the Reserve Fund’s “breaking the buck” as investors fled prime money market funds. This run was stopped dramatically by a government guarantee. Recent work by some New York Fed colleagues provides a real-world example of how, in normal times, new regulation can induce investors to distinguish between safe and money-like assets.13 They used the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) recent implementation of measures to reform the MMF industry as a quasi-natural experiment to characterize investors’ preferences for money-like assets.14 In 2014, the SEC approved a new set of rules aimed at mitigating the fragility of prime MMFs. As of October 2016, prime funds have been required under certain conditions to impose liquidity fees on redemptions or gates halting the redemption of shares.15 Additionally, prime funds offering shares to institutional investors may no longer price such shares with fixed NAVs; instead, they must price their shares at the market value of the underlying securities, much like standard mutual funds.
Indeed, it’s precisely in the act of extending credit that a commercial bank typically creates “new” (broad) money[2]. So, at least for the private sector as a whole, its interactions with the banking system – deposit claims on the one hand, bank loans on the other – are essentially a wash and do not represent net wealth[3] (Chart 5). Chart 5: Households’ deposits matched by what they owe the banks  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. Financial balance sheet of the household sector, 2022 Q4. Bank deposits are sterling deposits with UK monetary financial institutions (MFIs). Equity & debt assets include other deposits, holdings of debt instruments and equity & investment fund shares/units. Pension assets are insurance and pension schemes. Bank loans include sterling short-term loans from MFIs and loans secured on dwellings. Debt liabilities include other loans to the household sector. The same is true of new deposits at the central bank (reserves, or “narrow money”) created by an open-market purchase of assets (what we now call “QE”). QE has sometimes been described as “printing money”. I think this is a pretty misleading phrase. It seems to suggest that the central bank simply doles out cash to the private sector, with nothing happening in return. (This kind of “helicopter drop”, as the economist Milton Friedman described it, would arguably add to the private sector’s net wealth[4].) Page 10  For one thing, however, the money created by QE is not like cash (i.e. the zero-interest instrument described in some textbooks).

Speech Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey  Prof. Şahap Kavcıoğlu, Governor The Future of Finance Summit 28 September 2021, Istanbul  2  Mr. Minister, Distinguished representatives of the finance sector, Distinguished members of the press, Dear Guests, First, I would like to thank A Para Team for their kind invitation. Today, I will share our views on the Role of Central Banks amid a Pandemic. I think it would be useful to break the issues that economic policy has focused on since the beginning of the pandemic into two periods. The first was a period in which economies came to a standstill with historically unprecedented shutdowns across the globe. In this period, central banks and other policy makers took many measures to prevent job losses and bankruptcies and to make sure financial markets continued to function. The second period is still ongoing with accelerated recovery amid faster vaccination in the face of global output failing to keep pace with increased demand and surging global inflation due to rising commodity prices. In the first period when coronavirus spread around the world, the global economy suffered a much deeper downturn than the financial crisis of 2008. As the pandemic also caused a large-scale supply shock, the negative impact on economies was much bigger and more permanent than in 2008. The economic effects of the pandemic were felt worldwide and more deeply than the global financial crisis while policy responses were diverse and unprecedentedly strong.
One important lesson from the financial crisis is that financial factors may have a very strong and deteriorating effect on the transmission mechanism, making standard interest-rate policy much less effective. This motivates more research on how to incorporate financial factors in the standard models of the transmission mechanism used by central banks, and a rapidly increasing volume of such research is now being produced by academic and central-bank researchers and presented at an increasing number of conferences on financial factors and monetary policy. Important questions include how potential output and neutral real interest rates are affected by financial factors and financial distortions (Curdia and Woodford 2009, Walsh 2009), and what impact financial factors have on the general equilibrium effects of  6  BIS Review 112/2009  alternative policy-rate paths on inflation and resource utilization forecasts. 11 Before such extensions to the modelling framework are operational, policymakers and staff have to improvise and apply unusual amounts of judgment on the effects of the financial crisis on the transmission mechanism. Even with much better analytical foundations concerning the role of financial factors in the transmission mechanism, there will of course, as always, be considerable scope for the application of good judgment in monetary policy.

Flexible inflation targeting  The Riksbank and all the other inflation-targeting central banks conduct flexible inflation targeting rather than strict inflation targeting. Flexible inflation targeting means that monetary policy aims at stabilizing both inflation around the inflation target and the real economy, whereas strict inflation targeting aims at stabilizing inflation only, without regard to the stability of the real economy, what Mervyn King (1997) has described as being an “inflation nutter”. By stabilizing the real economy I mean stabilizing resource utilization around a normal level, keeping in mind that monetary policy cannot affect the long-term level of resource utilization. Because of the time lags between monetary-policy actions and their effect on inflation and the real economy, effective flexible inflation targeting has to rely on forecasts of inflation and the real economy. Flexible inflation targeting can be described as “forecast targeting”: The central bank chooses a policy-rate path so that the forecast of inflation and resource utilization “looks good.” By a forecast that looks good I mean a forecast either in which inflation is already on target and resource utilization is already normal, or in which inflation is approaching the target and resource utilization is approaching a normal level at an appropriate pace. More precisely, it means a forecast for inflation and resource utilization that as effectively as possible stabilizes inflation around the inflation target and resource utilization around its normal level.
The picture given in the monetary policy minutes can easily become a little compressed and I would therefore like to provide a slightly more comprehensive and cohesive account here. After that, I intend to address slightly more fundamental issues. More specifically, I would like to give my view of the advantages of the current framework, with an inflation target and a floating exchange rate. I feel that the debate over the last few years has been biased towards emphasising the disadvantages of this system and that the positive aspects have been overshadowed or perhaps even entirely forgotten. I think it is good to remind people of these now and again. * I would like to thank Mikael Apel for his help in writing this speech and Charlotta Edler, Mattias Erlandsson, Re-  becka Hallerby, Jesper Hansson, Marie Hesselman, Åsa Olli Segendorf, Marianne Sterner, Ulf Söderström, and Emelie Theobald for comments. 1 See, for example, Orphanides and Williams (2003). 1 [17]  Communication is of great importance To describe what has perhaps been my most important basis for the policy I have recently advocated, I would like to start by referring back to a speech I made two years ago. It concerned the international ideological debate on monetary policy and the lessons I thought could be learnt from developments in Sweden. 2 One of the lessons I highlighted then was that it is important not to lose sight of inflation and inflation expectations.

Examples include the extrapolation of past growth rates of incomes or asset prices into the future when in fact they reflect an adjustment of the level of income or asset price to a new equilibrium. At the time, the MPC argued that the rise in the ratio of house prices to incomes in the years leading up to 2007 reflected a fall in long-term real interest rates – in other words, an adjustment to a new equilibrium house price to income ratio. But if households extrapolated past increases in house prices into the future, then they may have mistakenly inferred that future incomes too would be higher, and so spending and borrowing more than could be sustained. Similar arguments could be made about the reaction of businesses and households to the rise in the sterling effective exchange rate in the late 1990s, and I shall return to this later. Since long-term interest rates in financial markets are, if anything, even lower today the question of sustainability has not yet been resolved. Misperceptions mean that unsustainable levels of spending, and associated levels of debt, can build up over many years. When those misperceptions are eventually corrected, they lead to sudden large changes in asset values, a synchronised de-leveraging of balance sheets, a large downward correction to spending and  14  Caballero (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  output, and defaults.
But I am thoroughly convinced that in practice, in the financial sector and in society in general, we must respect the rules and behave ethically – even when we are respecting the rules. A number of cases that have recently made the headlines have also shown that citizens and customers alike are becoming increasingly demanding in this regard. Adopting the same reasoning, Paul Dembinski likes to quote Ricoeur's broader definition of ethics as "a wish for a fulfilled life – with and for others – in just institutions". 1. From this perspective, what is at stake is more than a simple contrast, but the sound balance and dynamic tension between compulsory rules and enduring, freely adopted ethics. There can be no doubt that the financial sector needs rules. This is not just a question of an activity that involves intermediation between different parties – each of which must be convinced that the rules are being properly applied – but it is also a question of managing risks, while protecting the interests of customers and policyholders. Financial instability also has substantial externalities on the economy, and on social cohesion through unemployment. The recent financial crises have brought the failings of the financial system into focus, not forgetting the impact of new technologies, such as high frequency trading, FinTechs, or crypto-assets. But rules have their limitations.

We can all observe around us the growth of the ATM industry, but it is worth considering how influential it has been on the circulation of banknotes. First, the rise of the ATM has fundamentally changed and modernised the distribution of what is sometimes regarded as an old-fashioned means of payment. Second, it is likely that the growth of ATMs may have led to an increase in notes in circulation for another reason. BIS Review 162/2009  5  When we talk to ATM operators about their business model they stress that the least acceptable outcome is for their ATMs to run out of notes. As a consequence, ATMs are restocked well before they run out. This means that the overall ATM estate is holding what could be described as idle inventory stock, but these are defined as notes in circulation. But I should be clear that I don’t have enough evidence to prove to you that the stock:output ratio for banknotes has gone up, which would run counter to the story in almost all other industries. I want to move on now to trends in cash usage (I am using “cash” here to mean banknotes and coin). Chart 8 shows survey evidence for the use of cash in retail transactions in the UK over the last 25 years. In terms of the share of the total volume of transactions, cash has fallen from over 80% in the mid 1980s to 60% currently.