samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, capital might also flow in the opposite direction, as non-European firms and governments tap the euro-denominated capital market as an efficient source of funds, in the same way as European businesses and governments have chosen to borrow dollars in recent decades. While the potential benefits of a more integrated European capital market in the long run are apparent, a number of observers have suggested that the economics of EMU -- as well as its plain mechanics -- may have unwelcome consequences for the dollar and world trade. More specifically, some have argued, EMU may cause a short-run glut of dollars in the international capital markets, leading the dollar to depreciate and the euro to appreciate, with resulting undesirable effects on trade flows. The reason there could be a dollar glut, these observers maintain, is that EMU would eliminate the need for intra-European intervention, reduce the importance of exchange rate management, and allow national central banks to pool reserves for external intervention, thus generally reducing the European central banks’ need for dollar reserves. Moreover, if the euro were BIS Review 109/1997  -4-  to become an attractive reserve currency for non-European central banks, the dollar glut could become even more severe.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Recent developments in the Spanish economy Testimony of Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Parliamentary Budget Committee, Madrid, 6 October 2009. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, I appear before this Committee as part of the parliamentary discussion of the State Budget for 2010. For the first time in the past two years, we are at a juncture where incipient signs are emerging that the global economic and financial crisis is stabilising. This can be deduced from the macroeconomic projections by various international agencies in recent weeks, which indicate that the dynamic of successive downward revisions of GDP growth has come to a halt, and that in some areas there have even been upward revisions. Part of this improvement is in response to the aggregate demand stimulus and financial system support policies which, undoubtedly, have acted to offset the enormous contractionary impulses experienced and to stabilise the financial markets. Notwithstanding, uncertainty over economic and financial developments in the coming quarters remains high. At times like the present, the task of economic policies becomes vitally important to ensure that the recovery has sufficiently sound foundations. In the Spanish economy this task is particularly significant, since although recent data also point to an easing in recessionary trends, both the downturn in employment and the rapid deterioration in public finances shape a situation laden with challenges and difficulties.
A gradual normalisation of the interest rate level and a larger supply of new dwellings are expected to curb the rise in resale home prices in the years ahead. The question of whether financial stability considerations should be explicitly included in monetary policy is a subject of widespread debate, both in academia and within central banks. The answers diverge and international consensus has not yet been reached. A flexible inflation targeting regime provides scope for taking into account the impact of potential financial imbalances on future inflation and output. Asset prices and household credit and debt are inputs for the analysis of future developments in inflation and the output gap. In this way, the assessment of asset prices and debt levels may influence interest rate policy. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the unwinding of financial imbalances may lie many years ahead, well beyond the horizon for the inflation target. It is questionable whether monetary policy today should respond to potential repercussions of possible financial imbalances well beyond the monetary policy horizon. First, it is well documented that asset price bubbles and financial imbalances are very difficult to identify ex ante. Second, the appropriate timing of a proactive monetary response is likely to be difficult to determine, given the lags in the impact of monetary policy.

Over the past few years, we have initiated targeted reviews, aimed at improving the sophistication of stress testing practice, counterparty credit risk management in OTC derivatives, structured credit, and hedge funds, and the post trade processing infrastructure in the OTC derivatives markets. We are also looking carefully at liquidity risk management practice and the management of the bridge exposures institutions run in leverage lending, leveraged buyout and merger and acquisition financing, and credit activities more generally. These initiatives are designed with several important features: first, to bring more evenness to the incentives faced by the major global institutions, through closer cooperation across supervisors within the United States and across countries; second, to foster more agility in the supervisory agenda, and a capacity to adapt to change that more closely matches the rapid evolution in market developments; and third, to try to encourage market-led initiatives, reinforced rather than imposed by supervision. The  BIS Review 49/2007  3  careful work of Counterparty Credit Risk Management Policy Group II led by Jerry Corrigan – with the supervisory initiatives I referred to is an example. Today, 18 global banks outlined another set of commitments to reduce settlement risk in the equity derivatives market. This approach to supervision is designed to look ahead to try to ensure the adequacy of capital and liquidity, and the sophistication of risk management discipline relative to risk, over time and at all points in the cycle.
In the field of blockchain technology, the world has also considerably changed over the past year, with the rise of decentralised finance, the success of non-fungible tokens (NFT), not to mention the first, sometimes spectacular, "clashes” between these new ecosystems and regulatory authorities, in countries as different as China and the United States. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  2. Faced with this changing world, how should we, as central banks and financial sector supervisors, position ourselves? First of all, to be relevant in a changing world, we need to be able to distinguish what does not change. And fundamentally, what does not change in the financial sector is the need for confidence. Consumers of financial services need to have confidence: in the security of transactions, in the protection of their assets and in their freedom of choice. The players in the sector also need to have confidence: in each other, because they remain interdependent, in the rules of the game, i.e. in the regulatory conditions under which they can carry out their activity. Central banks and supervisors clearly have a role to play in maintaining this confidence, in all the forms I have just mentioned. In this respect, I would like to share with you three convictions: Firstly, the mechanisms of confidence cannot be replaced by “algorithmic” confidence, i.e.

And, I believe the experiment was as instructive for the participants – who were made aware of the supervisory authority’s expectations – as it was for the ACPR itself, which witnessed the emergence of extremely promising methods and avenues for a future “trustworthy AI". In order to conclude my speech, I would like to come back to the value of the French financial centre’s “team spirit", with one assurance and one invitation: 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  1° the assurance is that the openness of the Banque de France and the ACPR to the  innovative ecosystem will continue to guide our action and our strategy in the years to come. Launching experiments on new practices? creating a digital platform for experimentation common to the Banque de France and fintechs? All your suggestions to move forward together in this direction are welcome... 2° the invitation is for private players to think collectively if they want to consolidate the ecosystem in which they are developing. I would like to mention a few areas that seem to me to warrant such a collective investment: data sharing, in accordance with the principles of the GDPR, of course;interoperability issues, for example in the thriving world of blockchains and decentralised finance; the development of standards, or even certification techniques, in the field of security, AI use and, last but not least, the preparation for the energy transition and the development of green finance.
4  The performance of the economy through the recession and in the early phases of the recovery has provided further encouraging evidence of the resilience and strength of British business. There are three particularly positive features which should make us relatively optimistic about the supply-side performance of the UK economy in this recovery. The first is the resilience of employment through the recession and evidence of a pick-up in jobs at a relatively early stage of the recovery. Though the GDP figures currently suggest that the downturn in output in the UK in the 2008/9 recession was relatively severe, the latest labour market data suggest this has been a much milder recession than earlier episodes in terms of employment. 5 At this stage of the economic cycle in the early 1980s and early 1990s, employment was about 5% down on its peak. As Chart 3 shows, the latest data from  4  The index measures the impact of a range of regulations dealing with starting a business, property and construction transactions, contract enforcement, tax payment, etc. For latter details see http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 5  It is possible that this discrepancy between the different view of the recession given by GDP and employment data could be reconciled by future upward revision to the GDP estimates, which also occurred after the early 1990s recession.

Heng Swee Keat: Advances in risk management – theory and practice Opening address by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Symposium to mark the opening of RMI’s new facilities, Singapore, 2 October 2009. *  *  *  Prof Tan Chorh Chuan Prof Tan Eng Chye Prof Duan Jin-Chuan Distinguished speakers, guests, ladies and gentlemen Good morning Introduction It gives me great pleasure to join you today at the symposium which marks the opening of Risk Management Institute’s (RMI) new facilities. RMI is Singapore’s first full-fledged research centre dedicated to risk management. RMI was set up three years ago. The timing could not have been more appropriate. Given the spotlight in the current financial crisis on risk management, the shift of economic weight to Asia, and NUS’ standing as a global university in the heart of Asia, RMI has a major opportunity to play a prominent role in research and education on this critical topic. Emerging from the current crisis In recent weeks, confidence has returned to financial markets. More recent forecasts for global economic growth have been revised upwards, including that for Asia. There is palpable relief that the global economy has avoided the abyss. But some players seem to have forgotten that we have just gone through the worst financial crisis since the post-war period. The clean-up of the wreckages will take time.
such as to roughly offset the disinflationary pressures produced by the recession.5 The recent fall in inflation could equivalently be ascribed to unwarranted fears of a possible tightening of the monetary policy stance not too far into the future. Such fears could clearly be observed one year ago, when the Federal Reserve announced the tapering of its large-scale asset purchases. In spite of clear Fed communication on the disconnect between this decision and the timing of “lift-off” of policy interest rates, the tapering announcement quickly led to a rise in forward interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic. The ECB’s adoption of forward guidance in July 2013 was largely the result of these unwarranted developments. Recent studies confirm that our forward guidance was successful in reversing the previous increase in forward-rates and in clarifying the persistently accommodative intonation of the ECB policy stance.6 The same market logic that led to the interpretation of the Fed’s tapering announcement as a signal of a forthcoming tightening of policy interest rates may also have been applied to interpret the implications of the reduction in the size of the ECB balance sheet that occurred  4  See, for example, Coibion, O. and Y. Gorodnichenko (2013), “Is The Phillips Curve Alive and Well After All? Inflation Expectations and the Missing Disinflation,” NBER Working Paper 19598; see also Hall, R.E. (2011), “The Long Slump,” American Economic Review 101, pp. 431–469; and Ball, L. and S. Mazumder (2011), “Inflation Dynamics and the Great Recession,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring, 337–402.

Luis M Linde: Central bank monetary policy, regulatory and supervisory measures Closing remarks by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the V International Banking Conference/Grupo Santander, Madrid, 14 November 2012. *  *  *  Let me first thank Banco Santander, its Chairman Emilio Botín and its Chief Executive Officer, Alfredo Sáez, for inviting me to the closure of this fifth International Banking Conference. The first of these annual conferences was held in 2008. A review of the matters addressed that year, which now seems distant, and those on the agenda today, reveals a high degree of coincidence. We are still in the management of the post-crisis and the economic situation is, in some respects, worse than it was five years ago. It is worse in terms of growth or, at least, growth prospects, and worse in terms of unemployment or stock market capitalisation. The financial crisis, which began in 2007 in the United States and took on a systemic dimension in 2008, following the Lehman Brothers debacle, has confronted the developed countries’ central banks with great challenges. I wish to refer to the central banks’ response in two specific areas. Firstly, in respect of monetary policy. And secondly, in the area of banking regulation and supervision.
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We have gained an increasing understanding that how we finance postsecondary education has significant effects on a variety of critical economic outcomes, including economic growth and inequality. For example, our research suggests that higher student debt and delinquencies reduce household formation and depress homeownership. But there are many important questions still left unanswered. What is the relationship between the amount and type of educational investment that people make and their outcomes? What attributes are associated with borrowers who are more successful at  1  2  Payback Time? Measuring Progress on Student Debt Repayment. BIS central bankers’ speeches  repaying their student loans? Are there particular types of degrees that are associated with better performance with respect to student debt repayment or with better living standards earlier in life? What are the best interventions to help borrowers avoid the consequences of delinquency and default, and to limit any default costs to taxpayers? Do borrowers who use programs like income-based repayment eventually succeed in paying off their debts? How do income-based repayment programs affect important decisions such as labor supply, consumption and household formation? These are important questions for the nation, as the human capital of our citizens is far and away our most important asset, and student loans are an important mechanism for financing needed investments in that asset. But it is very hard to answer these questions with existing data.
The growth of productivity was surprisingly strong; certainly much stronger than many of us expected when the agreements were negotiated. Productivity has now fallen in seven consecutive quarters (see Figure 6). My impression is that the recent development of productivity is in all essentials a result of weaker economic activity. Growth has declined rapidly while the number of people in employment has continued to increase. If we study how GDP and employment vary over the economic cycle it becomes clear that there is a time lag in the cyclical fluctuation in employment in relation to production. It also appears that this time lag has increased since the beginning of the 1990s (see Figure 7). The Riksbank's assessment is that a recovery in the growth of productivity is probable over the next few years. This is indicated, for example, by the historical links that I have just mentioned. However, we do not expect the rate of growth to be as high as between 2002 and 2006. In the latest Monetary Policy Update, the assessment is that the growth of productivity in 2010 and 2011 will average over 2.5 per cent. It is more difficult to assess the growth of productivity in the longer term. A number of explanations have been put forward for the rapid development of productivity up to and  BIS Review 154/2008  5  including 2006.

On the contrary, countries that have in the past undertaken consolidation measures as part of a comprehensive reform agenda have fared best both in terms of boosting growth and sound public finances. These countries (e.g. Ireland in the late 1980s and Spain and some others in the mid-1990s) have benefited from strong supply-side effects on growth and – rather quickly – from the confidence effects of reform, which mitigated the adverse demand effects of fiscal consolidation. 15 So, given this evidence, if euro area countries are to benefit fully from the globalisation process, attaining sound public finances is a prerequisite. Concluding remarks Let me now conclude, in what is going to be my last public speech as a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank. By coincidence, – on 8 May 1998 –, just before the beginning of my mandate at the ECB , I gave a speech in Vienna at that year conference organised by the OeNB (title of the speech: Welche geldpolitische Strategie für die EZB?). I am again back in Vienna at the end of my mandate. Distinguished economists have often criticised the very concept of European Monetary Union, mainly because the Member States in question did not fulfil optimum currency area criteria, having for example a low degree of labour mobility, inflexible real wages as well as sharp differences in commodity prices and segmented financial markets.
The state’s cost for the part of the debt the Riksbank has purchased is thus the policy rate. Economists usually say that the Riksbank’s purchases of government bonds are actually a maturity transformation of the state’s debts from 51 Central bank reserves are electronic central bank money that the banks hold in their accounts with the Riksbank. Central bank reserves are the money the banks have in accounts with the Riksbank overnight, but also the money the banks have invested in Riksbank Certificates with a particular maturity. The total of these investments comprises the banking system’s so-called liquidity surplus towards the Riksbank, which can also be called the banking system’s reserves with the Riksbank or just central bank reserves. 52 See also Vlieghe (2020). 21 [35]  long-term to very short term, as central bank reserves are a state debt with a very short maturity. In other words, the state pays a very short-term interest on the government bonds the Riksbank purchases, and a more long-term interest on the government bonds that private agents hold. In the cases where people are concerned about monetary financing, it is almost always a fear that government bond purchases will lead to rapidly rising inflation, or so called hyperinflation, as was the case in Zimbabwe and Venezuela not so long ago. But the Riksbank's and many other central banks’ government bond purchases have not led to this type of situation. Why is this? One explanation could be that the size of the purchases is important.

This unusual situation has precedent, for example, in Japan, where inflation expectations have remained stable, while inflation itself has lagged for a prolonged period. Of course, there is a risk, too, that inflation expectations themselves could fall–indeed, I would note that longer-dated TIPS break-evens have recently dropped to the lower end of their post-crisis range. Conclusion As I think about the process of normalizing policy, I conclude that today’s risk-management calculus says we should err on the side of patience in removing highly accommodative policy. We need to solidify our confidence that our ultimate exit from the ZLB will occur smoothly – and that our escape can be sustained. A corollary to this conclusion is that we should not shy away from policy prescriptions that imply forecasts of inflation that moderately overshoot our 2 percent target for a limited time. Such a policy strategy more properly balances expected costs and benefits. And it would leave me with much more confidence that inflation will not stall out below target once we start raising rates. I agree with Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart in thinking that we ought to be “whites of their eyes” inflation fighters. 3 The last thing we want to do is regress back into the ZLB. Indeed, such a relapse would be a sign there was something else going on that was preventing the economy from being as vibrant as we thought possible. To summarize, I am very uncomfortable with calls to raise our policy rate sooner than later.