samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Nature’s education website declares: “Ignoring Population Structure Can Lead to Erroneous Predictions of Future Population Size.”[11] The lesson is no different in markets – underlying market structures matter. CCPs – who are in the risk management business – can help with this by understanding and managing the markets in which they operate. This includes client positions and the role of physical delivery. The recent events in the nickel market are a good example. The historic price moves I just spoke about can be the result of things completely outside of the financial system – weather, plagues, and invasions. But they can also be exacerbated or even driven by market structure. In the case of nickel, much of the price move was related to the build-up of a very large position in the form of a tangled and opaque web of derivative exposures involving a single client. We have seen these before: Archegos, Long Term Capital Management. This time, while the bulk of the contracts were bilateral, many were centrally cleared. There will be important lessons learned from the events in nickel – both with respect to the specific incident and more generally,[12] and I am sure I will have more to report following the conclusions of the independent review we have commissioned. Page 6  When it comes to this early lesson, CCPs could form part of the solution.

Page 1  Central clearing: three lessons and a path forward − speech by Christina SegalKnowles Given at the European Association of CCP Clearing Houses (EACH), Brussels  Page 2  Published on 19 May 2022  Christina Segal-Knowles talks about central clearing (a system that helps manage the risks of financial contracts). She says the work to strengthen it is a crucial part of our efforts to enhance the resilience of the UK and global financial system. Christina reflects on recent episodes of extreme market stress, and looks at what could be learnt from them to make central clearing stronger. Speech Thank you for having me – it is a pleasure to be here with you to celebrate the 30th anniversary of EACH. I would have loved to be there in person. But I have another anniversary to celebrate here in London – my son turns 6 today – so I am multitasking! The reality is that Central Counterparties (CCPs) have much to celebrate. A decade ago, incentivising central clearing was a key prong of post-global-financial-crisis reforms. CCPs were central to efforts to move away from the opaque network of insufficiently margined bilateral derivatives contracts that helped to turn a slump in U.S. subprime mortgages into a global financial meltdown. Today, prompt and transparent margining and greater use of central clearing ensures that perceived stress on one major participant does not cause a panic. Greater use of CCPs and the broader reforms to derivative markets have made the financial system more resilient.
We see a slowdown in economic development., We do not see, or do not yet see, a recession to be on our hands. So I will not speculate about what we would do if there really were a recession. We will cross that bridge when we come to it or, as my mother used to say: if the skies fall down, all the birds are dead. Interest rates in the United States are higher, but you have to realise that the United States is in a totally different phase of the cycle than we are and whether that will in any way induce capital flows to move differently from what they are moving today remains to be seen. And the third part of your question was, have we in any way made the conclusion that the banks, when the rate was 3 %, were not giving in enough to the demand for credit. No, on the contrary, as you know, the development of credit to the private sector has been quite buoyant over the past few months, although its bias of increase has come down somewhat. The last time I was here, I reported that credit to the private sector was growing at an annual rate of nearly 10%; the latest figure we have now is that it has come down to a rate of slightly over 9%.

This is important because in future while computer knowledge will perhaps not immediately get you a job, it will ensure that you are one step closer to being employed. Ladies and Gentlemen, I also recognize the efforts of the former Students Association who have been soliciting for donations from various organizations. As former students we all have the responsibility of helping the school that has played a key part to what you are today. Let us continue to support our beloved school. I thank you. BIS Review 14/2010  2
When the ECB Governing Council, in December last year, decided to also accept cash as collateral in our securities lending facility, we effectively increased the supply of bonds available in the repo market, thereby swiftly reducing the share of bonds trading special.7 The price effects of this decision can be seen on the next slide. Before we accepted cash as collateral, there was a strong positive relationship between the level of excess liquidity and repo rates, not only for trades backed by German collateral, but also for those involving French and, to a lesser extent, Italian securities. The moment we amended our securities lending facility in December last year, the relationship broke down, as you can see on the right-hand side. 4 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  Recent ECB analysis confirms the intimate relationship between cash and repo markets and the impact of supply and demand effects.8 The authors estimate that a 1% reduction in the effective supply may increase specialness, on average, by up to five basis points. Studies for the US market come to qualitatively similar conclusions.9 In other words, whether a bond trades special, and by how much, depends crucially on its effective supply, which is itself affected by factors such as the amount of investors that are willing to lend out securities in the repo market. These effects are also found to be persistent. You can see this on the same slide. The “scarcity” premium stabilised in spite of continuously increasing excess liquidity, but did not regress.

The main goal of monetary policy is to maintain price stability. This is of course not an end in itself, but a means to an end. A non-inflationary climate facilitates the free play of market forces and keeps socially damaging developments at bay. Fiscal policy must, basically, aim in the longer term to balance the public budgets. As with monetary policy, it is a question of steady, ongoing efforts. This should be no surprise, considering that the whole spectrum of public sector activities is reflected in the public budgets. This in turn raises the question of what services the state should perform, who should pay for them and how public-services can most efficiently be provided. Where competition policy is concerned, the aim is to create conditions conducive to the free play of market forces. In recent decades, it has unfortunately not always been possible to gain consensus support for the idea of free competition, which is still regarded with scepticism and suspicion by many people. Provided that free competition is able to develop in a stable environment, there can be little doubt that it is the best means to assure optimal use of available resources. When things go wrong, it is generally due not to the principle of free competition itself but to the lack of a stable environment. I would like to stress once again that the task of creating a stable economic framework is a never-ending one: it is a question of constantly working towards - but never actually reaching - the intended goal.
The level of outstanding debt as a percentage of the Island’s annual GNP, a ratio used by many fiscal analysts, rose from about 60 percent in 2000 to more than 100 percent in 2013. Debt ratios in this range can inhibit economic growth in that they generally lead to higher financing costs, which in turn, can lead to constraints on access to further financing. The recent downgrading of Puerto Rico’s public debt to non-investment grade was a clear signal that the current fiscal situation poses serious risks to the Island’s economic future. Steps toward fiscal sustainability Next, I will discuss the buildup of Puerto Rico’s public debt and then provide some thoughts on ways to improve the Island’s fiscal health. To open this discussion, it is worth noting some key features of Puerto Rico’s fiscal institutional environment. The Commonwealth has a close relationship with the U.S. government which, in many ways, is analogous to that of a mainland state. Puerto Rico shares a common market and a common currency with the U.S. mainland leading to strong economic interdependencies. Federal aid is a major source of revenue for the Commonwealth and Puerto Rican residents participate in large U.S. social insurance programs such as Social Security and Medicare. In addition, Puerto Rican debt trades as a municipal security in the U.S. capital markets, and much of the interest earned on this debt is exempt from local, state and federal income taxes, regardless of where in the U.S. the investor lives.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: Increased availability and use of official statistics in the Republic of North Macedonia Introduction speech by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of North Macedonia, at the marking of the European Statistics Day, Skopje, 19 October 2021. *** Your Excellency Ms. Forsgren Bengtsson, Dear Mr. Simovski and Mr. Stymne, Dear State secretary Ms Gaber, Distinguished speakers, representatives of the non-government sector, colleagues and participantsFor a second year in a row, we are marking the European Statistics Day in specific circumstances, shaped by the global pandemics. The health crisis has infiltrated itself into every single pore of our societies disrupting the world we know. Statistics has not been an exception whatsoever. At the time the crisis hit, statistics area in global terms was already facing many challenges. Producers of statistics were coping with lingering tasks that came as a side effect of the global financial crisis in 2008. Although the lack of statistics was not a cause of this crisis, still it revealed significant data gaps and underlined a need of more frequent, comprehensive and granular data to strengthen policy-making infrastructure. The second challenge rested in unprecedented digitalisation and data proliferation, by both private and public entities. It challenged official statistical producers, which serve as the primary source of data, to innovate their data and data sources, but even more to work intensively on setting proper data governance frameworks.
But, there are also other parallels. This includes in particular the arrangements that made the banks’ real risk-taking more abstruse. The banks’ formal and informal promises of loans to special investment vehicles meant that the problems quickly bounced back into the banks' balance sheets. In the Swedish bank crisis one can say that the finance companies in some respects played a corresponding role to the special vehicle. It was the finance companies that primarily financed the expansion in the construction and property markets. The finance companies largely financed themselves in the short term by issuing so-called commercial papers in the  BIS Review 30/2008  3  fixed income market. When the property market folded, it was a finance company, Nyckeln, which in September 1990 was the first to throw in the towel when it could not renew its financing. Other finance companies then followed suit. Many of the finance companies were owned by the banks. And the banks were tied by both formal and informal commitments. The losses therefore soon returned to the bank system. In 1991 it became apparent that the banks had substantial problem loans through their exposures to the property branch both directly and indirectly through the finance companies they supported. The bank crisis had become a reality. Perhaps you begin to see a pattern now?

Norman T L Chan: Responding to the financial crisis – financial reform impacts and regulatory regime changes Opening remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Asian Financial Forum 2010, Policy dialogue: “Responding to the financial crisis – financial reform impacts and regulatory regime changes”, Hong Kong, 20 January 2010. *  *  *  1. “It has often been said that history, especially financial crisis, tends to repeat itself. Notwithstanding the disturbingly frequent occurrence of seemingly similar financial crises, I am inclined to believe that history does not repeat itself because, upon close scrutiny, no two crises are exactly the same. It may be more correct to say that mistakes will be punished by the market. If people do not learn from their mistakes, then the market will continue to repeat its punishment. The only difference between the major financial crises is that the punishment is getting more and more severe, if not violent.” 2. “Going forward, I can see two possible ways to learn more about the financial markets. One is to learn from past mistakes and do something now. The second is to wait until the next disaster strikes and try to do something there and then.
Also in the fact that external conditions forecast to 2015, while less auspicious than expected in September, point to an improvement from this year. And last but not least, in the strength of our economy and our institutions. The significant monetary impulse that has already been added, the increased fiscal impulse and the effect of the peso depreciation on the performance of tradable sectors will lend support to economic activity. The depreciation of our currency has favored the exporting sectors and the regions where some of these sectors are based. It is worth noting that, as can be inferred from our Business Perceptions Report, certain regions of our country, especially to the south, which have endured difficult moments in the past few years, now largely outperform their peers up north. However, as I already mentioned, inflation remains high and above projections, a sign that for the time being monetary policy actions have reached its limit. Although we are convinced that inflation will return to near 3 percent over the course of 2015, we cannot rule out that this convergence is slower than expected. This is important, because in the end, we must not forget that higher inflation hits hardest those most vulnerable sectors of the population, as they have fewer tools to deal with it. In this sense, absent significant changes in the scenario we estimate to be the most likely, we do not see that, in the short run, we should increase the monetary impulse, which is already strong enough.

With growth at nearly 10% p.a. over the past decade, China’s imports of consumption goods have expanded twice as fast as intermediate goods. Singapore’s economic growth remains sluggish. Real GDP growth came in at 0.8% in the second quarter on a quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted annualised basis. Growth in the first half of 2016 has averaged 2.2% in year-on-year terms. The economy’s performance in the second half of 2016 will not be too different from the first half. But there will be some month-to-month volatility in economic activity and the composition of growth will shift somewhat. The trade-related cluster is showing tentative signs of stabilisation with improvement in certain segments. •  The electronics industry, which recorded positive sequential growth in April and May, shows tentative signs of a patchy recovery. •  The wholesale and sea transport sectors have benefitted from buoyant oil trade. The modern services cluster, which has been a key pillar of growth in the last few years, will see its contribution fall significantly in 2016. •  Financial services, which had grown much faster than the rest of the economy in the last four years, will see growth much closer to the overall economy. •  Professional services – like architectural and engineering services– which are more exposed to the UK and EU, will experience slower growth. •  Info-communication services will see a moderation in growth but will be supported by demand for productivity-enhancing IT solutions in a restructuring economy. The domestic services cluster will continue to see modest growth.
My point is that, in addition to analysing vulnerabilities in individual countries and general macroeconomic linkages between countries, you also need to look in particular at the major cross-border financial groups and financial infrastructure. The good news is that these are not so many, after all. Of the approximately 8,300 credit institutions in the EU, only nine are defined as truly pan-European and less than fifty have cross-border establishments in more than two countries. When assessing preconditions, regulation and supervision you need to look not merely at individual countries but also at whether there are major differences or gaps in the application between countries or between financial sub-sectors and if this might lead to vulnerabilities, in particular in a crisis situation. As we all know, a common European approach to bank problem resolution has so far not been developed. In a potential or actual crisis situation, we may face “the prisoners’ dilemma” in which the optimal solution may not be achieved since each country would tend first to look to its self-interest. Hence, it is important for a regional FSAP to identify vulnerabilities stemming from potential conflicts between home and host countries in the resolution of a failed financial group, which for instance might have systemic importance in the host country but not in the home country. The common thread in all this is that an FSAP should focus on two things: The weak spots as well as the channels for contagion of weakness. This is what the IMF is doing in its single-country FSAPs.

For instance, while a fixed-exchange rate regime in certain circumstances tends to support financial stability in a country (or group of countries – to refer to the European context) there might be situations in which such a system could have the opposite effect. To underpin financial stability, economic developments should be sustainable, transparent and predictable. This also applies to political decisions, which affect the financial system directly or indirectly. Completing the circle and reverting to my first observations on the increased global linkages, most countries’ financial systems are influenced by developments outside the domestic economy. Linkages come through different channels: macro economic events having international repercussions, for instance through international markets, or “micro events” such as via banks’ cross-border affiliates. BIS Review 52/2006  1  The FSAP – an attempt to tie together the loose ends Given the various pieces needed to shape and maintain a stable and efficient financial system we need a bird’s-eye view to see that they are all in place and that they do not counteract one another. The approach should also identify weak spots from which the financial system potentially might be destabilised. This need for a bird’s-eye view resulted in the creation of the FSAP. The FSAP is intended to cover the pieces I just mentioned – standards, preconditions and institutional setting and the interplay of these factors in the context of the domestic economy.
5  Although the Federal Reserve only recently introduced these instruments, versions of interest on reserves and term deposits are standard components of some other central banks’ implementation toolkits. 6  For example, there is much to learn from the experience of the central banks that have implemented negative rates recently. It is important to note that, with the exception of the Swiss National Bank, the implementation of  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  For example, “quantitative easing,” known shorthand as QE, originates with the Bank of Japan’s (BoJ) efforts to stimulate inflation in the early 2000s at the zero bound. In this effort, they targeted the money base and conducted temporary operations and short-term securities purchases to accomplish that liability-driven operating objective. Because the maturity structure of the BoJ’s assets remained relatively short, the bank was able to run down the size of its balance sheet to a more normal level relatively rapidly when it came time to do so and then raise rates using standard implementation tools. In contrast, in the United States and other countries, including Japan, QE is now associated with targets for longer-term asset purchases and extending portfolio duration, to put downward pressure on long-term interest rates. Policy normalization will need to proceed in a different way than it did in Japan in the mid-2000s if most of the additional assets, and the reserve balance liabilities created as a byproduct of their acquisition, remain on the central bank’s balance sheet until they mature in the far future.

But before I go on, let me remind you that the views I express are my own and may not reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. The topic of this conference may not appear particularly glamorous. It is natural to view monetary policy implementation as a technical and humble exercise next to the flashiness of policy formulation, which has policymakers determining the appropriate level of interest rates. However, for those of us charged with carrying out policymakers’ decisions, there is keen interest in the mechanics. We have the task of designing and executing operations that ensure that policymakers’ instructions are implemented effectively and efficiently, so that their intentions can affect inflation and the real economy. But while monetary policy implementation is just a means to an end, there is no obvious single “right” way to do it, and every central bank’s operating framework reflects history, unique institutional constraints and the market environment, which may change over time. So even though the topic of today’s conference may seem to lack glamour, it is significant, particularly now, since monetary policy implementation and the market landscape have undergone profound changes in recent years. Many advanced economy central banks have adopted a number of new tools to implement monetary policy or used traditional tools in new ways or in unprecedented size, in part because economic conditions have necessitated historically low interest rates that have bumped up against the zero bound for almost seven years.