samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A second reflection is that the presence of and adherence to a legally sound, open and stable institutional framework that is respectful of creditors' and debtors' rights is the only way to generate the confidence and support of international financial markets in such a way that domestic saving shortfalls may be financed. My third reflection considers the need for clear, credible criteria beforehand as to how to distribute the costs of crises. Such criteria should strike a balance between both domestic and foreign private creditors. Coverage of the shocks experienced by the international financial system last year would be incomplete without some reference to the set of shortcomings highlighted in the so-called ENRON case, which goes beyond the particular scope of this company and reveals weaknesses of a more institutional and systemic nature. These events were significant since they showed that, even in economies with more sophisticated institutional arrangements, some types of conduct with great destabilising potential may occur. The ENRON case was important not only in quantitative terms but also, and especially, in qualitative terms, witnessing a series of legally dubious practices which go beyond the strictly financial field: conflicts of interest, serious corporate governance shortcomings,  6  BIS Review 38/2002  excessively ad-hoc accounting practices deviating from prudential principles and from what is a fair view of the real economic situation, manipulation of information, etc. And all this set against the inoperativeness of the internal and external control mechanisms of the company.

At the global level, the BCBS (in the banking sphere) and the FSB (in relation to the financial sector as a whole and its interconnections) play a crucial role as promoters of regulatory standards that the relevant authorities of the main jurisdictions in the G-20 area undertake to adopt so as to have common rules in place for the international financial system. In the macroprudential realm, under the coordination of the FSB, the BCBS developed the countercyclical capital buffer in 2010 and the framework for identifying and setting macroprudential buffers for global and national systemically important institutions (2011 and 2012, respectively). These were included under the Basel III regulatory framework, which is the basis for the banking prudential regulations in force in Spain and in the EU. These tools are currently the backbone of macroprudential policy. The Banco de España participates actively in these institutional arrangements, as a member of the various national and international bodies and fora that I have described. Further, it is 3  The 19 euro area countries, plus Bulgaria and Croatia since 2020. 6  responsible for identifying the risks to the financial stability of the Spanish financial system and deciding how and when to use macroprudential tools at credit institutions. Macroprudential tools and credit institutions As indicated, the multi-dimensional nature of systemic risk calls for various macroprudential tools so as to be able to address each of these dimensions as efficiently as possible.
I want to make every effort to see that Eesti Pank has no need to come to the Riigikogu asking for capital at a time of such crisis. It is to avoid precisely this that the central bank builds up reserves and I am glad that the Eesti Pank Supervisory Board shares this opinion. For the central bank to be financially independent, it needs to maintain and invest its assets. The current situation in the financial markets, where interest rates on sovereign bonds have fallen to very low levels, poses new challenges for the central bank as a long-term conservative investor. Eesti Pank has reacted to changes in the operating environment and has spread its risks by adding further asset classes to the investment portfolio and investing money in the sovereign bond markets of more countries than before. •  Eesti Pank’s return on its investment was several times higher in 2014 than the target set at the start of the year, and reached 22.8 million euros. Falling interest rates throughout the year made investments in bonds profitable and the increasing share portfolio of Eesti Pank meant that we earned significant income from investments in shares. As well as earning income, Eesti Pank is careful to keep control over its spending and to use its money efficiently. For this reason we have put the Maardu manor site up for sale, as we do not need it in carrying out the main functions of a central bank.

•  Financing new investment through state bonds could well prove inefficient and harmful for the Estonian economy as a whole, even if the investments are in good projects. The low unemployment and rapid wage rises that we see at the moment  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  would cause a large part of the extra money gained from the emission of state bonds to be lost, as infrastructure projects would cost much more than before. Large state construction projects that can only be temporary in nature would also cause economic and social problems in Estonia, because once the large projects finish, a great number of those working on them would find themselves unemployed, having left jobs in other sectors. •  It must be understood that Estonia already profits from the purchases of bonds by the central banks of the euro area. Financial markets act as a series of communicating vessels, so that when interest rates in one area fall, the effect is passed on to other areas. The lower interest rates in the euro area mean that Estonian companies and households can borrow more cheaply, and were it necessary the Estonian state could also borrow more cheaply. If easier financing conditions spur on the European economy, Estonian exporters will be among the winners, and this is the goal towards which the bond purchase programme is striving.
8  Chart 9: The importance of SMEs  99.8  99.8  99.8  99.8  80  99.8  99.8  99.8 99.7  79.4  75.9 67.6  69.8  68.3  73.7 65.5  66.3  74.8  69.5  74.4  60  99.7  50  99.7  99.7  99.7  78.2  70  Macedonia  99.8  Share of number of employees in total in 2015, enterprises employing less than 250 persons (in %)  90  Croatia  Share of number of enterprises in total in 2015, enterprises employing less than 250 persons (in %)  99.9  40  99.6  30 99.6  20 10  EU28  Bulgaria  Slovenia  Romania  Poland  Hungary  Czech Republic  Lithuania  Estonia  European Union EU28  SEE  Share of value added at factor cost in total in 2015, enterprises employing less than 250 persons (in %) 68.3  60  64.5  64.4 55.1  53.0  51.1  52.2  Romania  70.0  70  CEE  Source: Eurostat and SSO of RM. Poland  75.6  Baltics  SEE  Hungary  80  Macedonia  Croatia  Bulgaria  European Union  Slovenia  Romania  Hungary  Czech Republic  Poland CEE  Czech Republic  Baltics  Lithuania  Latvia  Estonia Source: Eurostat.

Even in Japan, where the direct impact of the turmoil has been relatively contained, the economy remains fragile and prospects have deteriorated. The emerging market economies stand in sharp contrast with this gloomy outlook, as their growth forecasts have been revised down only marginally. In fact, one of the most surprising features of the recent developments in the world economy has been the resilience of most emerging market economies to the unravelling of the global turbulence. This feature is even more remarkable taking into account their recent history of financial and economic instability. If we look at basic financial market indicators of risk – such as the sovereign spreads, exchange rates or equity markets – what we observe is that, overall, they have behaved significantly better than comparative asset classes in the industrial economies over the past  BIS Review 56/2008  1  nine months. In addition, credit has generally continued to be available in these economies – albeit, admittedly, at a somewhat higher cost – and creditworthy emerging market borrowers have not been shut out from international markets, contrary to what used to happen in the past. It is true that issuance abroad has been reduced notably since the beginning of the turbulence, and that those borrowers with relatively low credit ratings may have been shut out completely from international markets.
In particular, because no new entity is required, it will not be necessary over a resolution weekend to authorise a new entity, or to change the contract documentation to which the firm is a party, and memberships of Financial Market Infrastructures can remain intact. But, whichever approach is pursued, the essential elements of the transaction are the same. These are set out in the KAs and are included in some detail in the BRRD: •  Entry into resolution: The trigger for entry into resolution is twofold 2: first, a firm must be failing, or likely to fail to meet its conditions for authorisation; second, it must be reasonably likely that no action is available to remedy this situation within a reasonable timeframe. This is intentionally forward looking; it is designed to allow recovery actions to be taken to remedy a breach, or likely breach, of threshold conditions, when the existing owners and management of the firm can take actions that might be successful in rectifying the breach. But, when recovery is not reasonably likely, resolution authorities have the option to put the firm into resolution and deploy their toolkit. And the BRRD goes beyond this – it includes the obligation that, when these two triggers are met, capital instruments are written down or converted to the extent necessary to meet resolution objectives, putting in statute the Basel Committee’s requirement that capital must be fully loss-absorbing when firms meet the point of non-viability.

Financial institutions, together with their staff, were at the frontline of this mobilisation: banks by distributing EUR 130 billion of state-guaranteed loans – a record in Europe, and keep up the commitment – but also insurers – and this has been less frequently mentioned – with numerous payouts on claims not covered in policies. Your teams have demonstrated remarkable operational agility. This resilience also stems from the efforts of banks and insurers who went into the crisis on a firm financial footing, with large French banking groups having almost doubled their own funds since 2008 to 15%, and insurers’ capital requirement coverage averaging 239% at end-September 2020. But although we don’t currently need to worry about their financial soundness, we still need to remain vigilant: there is still a high degree of uncertainty, which calls for the maintenance of our fiscal support measures and an accommodative monetary policy. I won’t talk about the latter today as we are in the “quiet period” before the meeting of the Governing Council on 20 and 21 January. Page 2 of 4  II. The challenges for 2021 After a few more difficult months at the start of the year, 2021 should see the end of the pandemic and the beginning of the reconstruction. And in the financial industry itself, we will need to capitalise on 2020’s resilience to meet four challenges that I shall sum up using the four cardinal points of the compass. 1/ The first, of course, is Brexit, so in the North.
The large majority of citizens, who had nothing to do with the errors leading up to the crisis, were made destitute because their small incomes and savings declined in value. Large parts of the growing middle class in the worst hit countries in South East Asia were wiped out. Conditional support was often provided with tough requirements of economic policy restraint. A tight fiscal policy would create scope for financing restructuring in the banking sector. Stringent monetary policy would counteract an overly severe depreciation of the currency. This can be criticised with hindsight, as in South East Asia the countries often did not have problematic deficits in public finances or high inflation rates. The IMF has admitted since that the restraint was too great, as they did not realise the extent of the financial crisis. The task for the BIS, the IMF, the World Bank and other international organisations should be to continue the work on finding rules and methods, both to protect innocent people from ruination and to put the risk for bad investments on those making the investments. Work on this is underway in the organisations I mentioned earlier. It involves capital adequacy rules for banks, but also reporting,  4  BIS Review 9/2002  auditing, financial supervision, bankruptcy legislation and transparency in conducting monetary and fiscal policy.

Taken to extremes, the  3  BIS Review 98/1999  system as a whole could be brought into disrepute. This is why we promoted the Code of Banking Practice issued jointly in 1997 by the two industry associations. The Code is intended to be observed by authorised institutions in dealing with their personal customers, and it provides an extremely useful mechanism for the promotion of fair and transparent banking services in Hong Kong. What tools can banks use to manage ethics in their own organisations? No doubt you will have been discussing this during the course of the seminar and I will not go into a lot of detail in this speech. Clearly, the first essential is for the bank itself to be clear about the key ethical values to which it subscribes. It then needs to ensure that the organisation and the employees act in accordance with these values. This can be done through the adoption of codes of conduct. The former Commissioner of Banking issued a guideline in 1986 which requires all authorised institutions in Hong Kong to prepare a code of conduct for their staff setting out the standards to which they are expected to adhere. It is also necessary to have policies and procedures designed to ensure compliance with the standards specified in the code of conduct. For example, many companies now employ “ethics officers” and give their staff specific training and advice on ethical issues.
Furthermore, the ESRB adopted three public recommendations on: i)  the macro-prudential mandate of national authorities;  ii)  lending in foreign currencies;  iii)  US dollar-denominated funding of credit institutions. It is important to note that the voting members of the General Board of the ESRB include the Governors of National Central Banks. Indeed, ESRB activities are based on strong cooperation between its members. A key part of the ESRB’s work is to combine the analysis produced by the micro-supervisors and central banks. Clearly, the central bank’s role of ensuring financial stability has extended to the international level, implying further responsibility in decision-making. In Malta, the cooperation between micro- and macro-supervision is embodied in the setting up of the Joint Financial Stability Board. The Central Bank of Malta, in its capacity as the macro-prudential authority, has agreed with the MFSA to set up a Joint Financial Stability Board which will be formally constituted in a few weeks. The objective is to enhance the cooperation between the two bodies for the assurance of the stability of the financial system. The intention is to strengthen the resilience of the financial system and to mitigate the buildup of systemic risks. To these ends, the Board’s mandate includes the development of mechanisms that would identify risks to financial stability, and the establishment of the necessary macro-prudential policy tools. The Joint Financial Stability Board will also be able to make recommendations to the CBM or MFSA boards on macro or micro prudential issues, as the case may be.

In major advanced economies, stimuli from fiscal policies diminished. Moreover, in the second quarter in particular, international economic growth suffered from the effects of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami. The destruction of production plants for important intermediate goods for the electronics industry led to substantial supply problems worldwide, which resulted in production losses. Finally, the concerns about fiscal problems in many advanced economies increased. In particular, the risk that the European sovereign debt crisis might escalate hung like a sword of Damocles over the outlook for the entire international economy. The debt crisis did indeed escalate in the second half of the year. While, initially, it was only the small peripheral states of the euro area that encountered problems because of their high levels of debt, the loss of confidence increasingly affected the larger economies of Europe as well. At the same time, there was growing concern about the stability of European banks. Given these developments, uncertainty in financial markets increased sharply in the second half of the year. At the same time, the demand for safe-haven investments soared. As we all know, these investments include those in the Swiss franc. The Swiss currency had already gained in value in the second quarter. However, between July and the beginning of August, it appreciated very substantially within a very short period. In August 2011, the Swiss franc reached an all-time high against both the euro and the US dollar, in both nominal and real terms.
Mr. Ingves discusses retail trade, EMU and the Euro with respect to Sweden Text of a speech by Mr. Stefan Ingves, a Deputy Governor of the Bank of Sweden, held on 14/4/97. First a word of thanks for the invitation to speak about EMU. Less than twelve months have passed since the Riksbank last attended a meeting of the Swedish Retail Federation with information about EMU. Perhaps some of you were present on that occasion. Whereas the issue of EMU was still fairly new a year ago and not much discussed by most people, the situation today is different. In the interval we have experienced a marked increase both in what people know about EMU and in their interest in the matter. This naturally has to do with the rapid approach of the starting date. Today the move to Stage Three lies fewer than 500 working days ahead. Moreover, there is no mistaking the strength of the political determination in Europe to start on time. This was evident not least at the recent Ecofin meeting in the Netherlands when the EU finance ministers agreed on several important matters such as the stability and growth pact and ERM2. Today I shall be outlining the process leading up to Stage Three of EMU and the changes that we already know will occur. I will also say something about EMU's consequences for retail trade. Before considering practical aspects of EMU, permit me to begin with a look at some general economic features.

Cashiers will redenominate payments in the currency used for the institution's system, regardless of which currency the customer has used. Bank branches will provide two versions of their forms, one for kronor and one for euro; new cheques and other forms will therefore be produced. Statements of account will specify the rate at which the currency has been converted. The automatic teller systems (Bankomat and Minuten) will also have to be adapted. Moreover, banks must be prepared for people who want to make giro payments in euro right from the beginning of 1999. Some large companies may also wish to pay out wages in euro before the new currency is available in the form of banknotes and coins. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to foresee the magnitude of demand for euro services and how soon companies and individuals will switch from kronor to euro. Monetary and exchange rate policy. A single currency implies a single monetary policy, which in EMU will be decided by the ECB. The Riksbank and the other national central banks will have the task of executing this policy. The changes for Swedish banks and other financial institutions will probably not be all that great. The Riksbank is likely to remain the financial sector's counterparty. The main differences from today for Swedish banks are a much larger market for intra-day money and counterparties located all over Europe. The detailed conduct of monetary policy is not yet clear. The final decisions are due when the ECB has been established in 1998.
In addition, however, the multi-currency payment system Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), which is used to settle foreign exchange transactions, may also be classified as systemically important. Closer investigation will reveal whether or not this group will be expanded to include yet more systems, such as that operated by Postfinance. The National Bank’s main points of reference in respect of the minimum requirements that the operators of these systems must fulfil are two internationally recognised standards: the “Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems” and the “Recommendations for Securities Settlement Systems”. Like the two standards just mentioned, the National Bank’s minimum requirements are target-oriented i.e. the system operator in question is largely free to determine how it will achieve the required state of affairs. The minimum requirements are aimed at two aspects of the reliability of payment and securities settlement systems in particular. The first of these relates to the technical and operational security of a system. The system itself may not be the cause of a crisis. Specific emphasis is placed on a lasting guarantee of virtually uninterrupted system availability. The regular review and testing of emergency plans and procedures is part of this. However, the minimum standards also call for measures to protect the integrity and confidentiality of data as well as the traceability of transactions. The second aspect of the minimum requirements concerns risk management and the architecture of payment and securities settlement systems, i.e. the rules and procedures by which transactions are cleared or settled.

Our remit from the Chancellor of the Exchequer tells us that our target is 2% inflation “at all times”, but also recognises “that the actual inflation rate will on occasions depart from its target as a result of shocks and disturbances. Attempts to keep inflation at the inflation target in these circumstances may cause undesirable volatility in output.” Economists and monetary policy makers have long understood that there is generally no conflict between stabilising inflation and stabilising output when the economy is subject to adverse demand shocks. But that there is a real choice to be made when there are adverse cost shocks: inflation can be stabilised, but only at the cost of volatility in output. From a monetary policy perspective, the rise in commodity prices and VAT are both essentially adverse cost shocks. And so, in my view, is the rise in import prices associated with the depreciation in sterling, given that it was not primarily a consequence of monetary policy actions (though the subsequent stance of monetary policy will surely have affected the extent to which that rise in import prices has passed through into consumer prices). The exercise above suggests that together they account for a rise in the level of consumer prices of 9 to 13 percentage points. Since the “excess” inflation relative to the 2% target is a little over 5 percentage points, that suggests that, in practice, we have ended up accommodating around half the impact of the shocks on inflation.