samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the past year, the TMF also called on the financial regulatory bodies and financial institutions in Beijing and participated in a Financial Services Expo in Shanghai to promote the treasury markets in Hong Kong. In addition to the Mainland, the TMF maintains close contact with our overseas counterparts in the major financial centres, such as the foreign exchange committees in London and New York. The TMF will continue to arrange regular meetings and visits with our overseas counterparts to keep abreast of global developments and to exchange views on matters of mutual interest. Ladies and gentlemen, in less than a year since its establishment, the TMF, with the support from the industry and market practitioners, has made very impressive progress in its work. Looking ahead, with the numerous and valuable opportunities offered by the gradual opening up of the Mainland markets, it is up to all of us to try our best to seize such opportunities to ensure that Hong Kong will remain the hub for financial services and intermediation for Mainland China and the rest of the region. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 6/2005

These actions enabled families to rebuild their financial reserves – precautionary funds that could be used in the event of a job loss or illness – to maintain their consumption and keep up with their mortgage payments. But to save more, it also means that they had to consume less, which dampened economic activity further. Interestingly, student loans are the only part of household debt that continued to rise throughout the crisis. More families and students may have needed to rely on loans to fund education during the difficult times. And going to school was more attractive for some, given the deterioration in labor market conditions. Just as households began deleveraging during the crisis, banks needed to respond in light of the large loan losses that they were taking. As defaults rose, banks tightened their underwriting standards and raised the margins that they charged on loans. As a consequence, they made fewer loans. This tightening of credit availability exacerbated the decline in real activity. It created an “adverse feedback loop” between the financial and real sectors of the economy that deepened the recession. Where are we now? There are several signs that we are now convalescing; this damaging dynamic – the adverse feedback loop – now appears to be reversing. From historical experience with financial crises we know that this phase is a gradual transition process – not a quick event – as households and banks slowly complete their painful adjustments.
And the Treasury, relieved of its responsibility for setting interest rates, can now focus on fiscal policy and measures to raise the long-run growth rate of the UK economy, as well as ensure that the fruits of that growth are distributed fairly. Each body now has clearer responsibilities. Of course, not all of our present monetary framework dates from 1997. It was following our exit from the ERM in September 1992 that monetary policy was first directed to achieving an explicit inflation target, initially a range of 1–4% and, subsequently 2½% or less. With a floating exchange rate, any anchor for the price level had to be based on a domestic nominal target. The move from secrecy to transparency in the conduct of policy also dates back to 1992 when the then Chancellor asked the Bank to produce a regular independent Inflation Report in order “to make the formation of policy more transparent and our decisions more accountable”. The first Inflation Report appeared in February 1993. Those changes led to a significant improvement in our macroeconomic performance. But many, especially elsewhere in Europe, doubted the UK’s commitment to monetary stability in the absence of a willingness to remove operational decisions on interest rates from the political arena. Long-term interest rates contained a risk premium to reflect the possibility that the timing and magnitude of interest rate changes might reflect political considerations. The “Ken and Eddie show” was probably nearing the end of its run. And both principals needed their own show.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Islamic finance – constant evolution and emerging opportunities Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Nikkei Islamic Finance Symposium 2008: "Islamic Finance: Constant Evolution and Emerging Opportunities", Tokyo, 23 February 2008. *  *  *  It is my great honour and pleasure to be here in Tokyo to speak at this Islamic Finance Symposium organised by the NIKKEI. This is an important forum that provides the opportunity to foster a greater understanding and appreciation of Islamic finance and its increasing role in the international financial system. We are also very honoured by the presence and participation of Governor Fukui from the Bank of Japan at this Symposium. My remarks today will focus on the evolution and new emerging opportunities in Islamic finance as its growth and development in the global financial system gains further momentum. My presentation will also touch on our experience in the development of an Islamic financial system in Malaysia which operates side by side with the conventional financial system and in which the international dimension has now become increasingly significant. Evolution of Islamic finance Modern Islamic finance was initially developed as an intermediation channel for Muslims to conduct their savings and investment activities in accordance with the Islamic principles. As recent as five years ago, however, Islamic finance has experienced major transformations. Its rapid evolution is particularly evident in five dimensions of its development.
Figure 2: Annual CPI Inflation and Target Path  14 12 10 8 6 4  Annual CPI Inflation I*  2  Outer Band Target Path  1109  0909  0709  0509  0309  0109  1108  0908  0708  0508  0308  0108  1107  0907  0707  0507  0307  0107  0  * Temporary tax adjustments corrected I Index Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Figure 3: Contribution to Annual CPI Figure 4: CPI Sub-groups Inflation (Third Quarter Percentage Change) (Annual Percentage Change) Food and Energy Services  Tobacco and Gold Core Goods  12  2006-2007 Av erage  10  2008  10  8 6  2009  8  4  6  2  14 12  0  4  -2  0909  0609  0309  1208  0908  0608  0308  -6 1207  0 0907  -4 0607  2  * Food and Energy: Food, non-alcoholic beverages and energy. ** Tobacco and Gold: Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and gold. Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Foo d  Energy  Tobacco Co re and Gold* Goods**  servic es  *Core Goods: Goods excluding food and nonalcoholic beverages, energy, alcoholic beverages and tobacco and gold. Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Although processed food and energy were instrumental in the downward trend of inflation, core goods and services inflation also hovers around historic lows (Figure 3).

0609  0209  1008  0608  0208  1007  0607  0207  1006  0606  0206  -1  Processed Unprocessed 16,70  -0,43 0608 0708 0808 0908 1008 1108 1208 0109 0209 0309 0409 0509 0609 0709 0809 0909  27 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 -3  2,5  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. Given the current economic climate, assumptions on foreign economic activity remain increasingly important in building medium-term forecasts. Therefore, as I have mentioned earlier in my speech, better-than-expected growth figures regarding the second quarter and continued recovery in leading indicators pertaining to economic activity in the third quarter together has bolstered perceptions that the worst part of the crisis is over. Accordingly, while producing medium-term forecasts, assumptions pertaining to global economic activity have been revised slightly upwards compared to those in the July Inflation Report and the forecasts were made on the assumption that external demand would remain weak for an extended period (Table 1). Furthermore, revised forecasts envisage world interest rates to remain low for an extended period of time. Regarding fiscal policy, it is assumed that the consistent framework outlined in the Medium Term Program (MTP) will be implemented and further enhanced by structural measures that would strengthen fiscal discipline. In this respect, it is assumed that the fiscal stance will remain expansionary – but less so than the one in 2009throughout 2010, and fiscal tightening will gradually be adopted starting from 2011.
Christian Noyer: Thoughts on the zero lower bound in relation with monetary and financial stability Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Honorary Governor of the Bank of France and Former Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Farewell Symposium in his honour, held by the Bank of France and the Bank for International Settlements, Paris, 12 January 2016. *  *  *  I find myself in a strange situation today. Memories of recent policy debates are still vivid in my mind and it is difficult to distance myself from very recent discussions. However, the circumstances require that I take a step back and summon the wisdom supposedly derived from sixteen years in central banking. I will try to do a little bit of each, knowing that I might be better at the former than the latter. When I started at the ECB in 1998, the zero lower bound was a mere theoretical curiosity, which deserved at most a brief mention of one page in economic textbooks (except, maybe in the case of Japanese textbooks). It turned out that nearly half of my time as Governor was spent in a near zero interest rate environment. Japanese official interest rates have been there for over 20 years. Official interest rates have stood at zero for more than six years in the US – until very recently – and in the euro area and the UK.

Increasingly, it is taking place through vehicles – such as open funds and ETFs – that issue very short-term (often intraday) liabilities and invest in long-term instruments. It may be a matter of priority to develop a conceptual and operational approach to macroprudential policy that allows regulators to monitor those parts of the financial system that are currently out of reach. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  *** When central banks entered into non-conventional territory, most observers saw that as a temporary incursion. For some of us, this temporary situation has lasted seven years. For the euro area, the current horizon extends, at least, until 2017. This is quite a long period. For many young people today – say, for instance, current PHDs students -, conventional monetary policies are a prehistoric curiosity. Non-conventional is the only “normal” that they have experienced in their lifetime as adults. Will the future look like the past or be different? This question cannot be avoided for three reasons. First, over the past 30 years, long-term real interest rates worldwide have been steadily declining. If low equilibrium rates are a permanent phenomenon, which is rooted in structural shifts in the world economy, then current difficulties and challenges will persist. The chances that we will sooner or later hit the ZLB again are non-negligible.
And as the crisis progressed, our sense is that securities-lending-based financing of leverage was withdrawn, exacerbating the deleveraging in the system, the erosion of market liquidity, and falls in asset values. There are a number of possible lessons here. One is that there needs to be greater transparency and integrity around key financing markets. In the particular case of securities lending, we should consider whether it might lend itself to central counterparty clearing; and if not, as may well be the case for some types of security, we should explore whether transactions could, nevertheless, usefully be registered with a trade repository, with aggregate data published – along the lines now provided for the CDS market. Second, regulators should consider putting restrictions around what regulated firms can take as collateral against securities lending or, alternatively, should ensure that leverage, counterparty-credit and investment risks are properly disclosed to the market. Third, insurance regulators internationally should be sensitive to business lines that can leave an insurer leveraged and exposed to liquidity runs. 8 Fourth, the custodians and ICSDs should review the basis on which they group different kinds of assets for use as collateral in various of their triparty facilities. It should be obvious to a lender when it is taking risky assets as collateral. And conduct-of-business regulators should probably take a look at how custodians market and explain their services to their clients. In the UK, the Securities Lending and  6  Source: Data Explorers.

A uniform set of criteria for STC securitisation can play an essential role in de-stigmatising European securitisation, helping the market to develop on a sustainable track and attracting a broader investor base. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
My co-authors and I have started with the observation that in the face of truly systemic housing shocks, governments always intervene. It is not hard to imagine why: given the importance of housing to Americans and our economy, at some level of housing market stress, the government faces intense pressure to take action. We cannot eliminate the risk that the government may have to intervene. So we need to acknowledge that risk and establish a system to reduce and manage it, or we will recreate an implicit guarantee that puts the taxpayer at unacceptable risk. In my view, the private sector (and the borrower) must absorb all losses up to an agreed point, with the government absorbing all further losses. The level at which the government steps in must be well known in advance and credible to the market, meaning that there should be no speculation as to when and how the government would intervene. When should the government intervene? If markets believe that the government will intervene sooner than it claims, then this will generate uncertainty, and financial markets will speculate on the timing and nature of the intervention. This uncertainty could have a destabilizing effect, leading to higher losses that the government would ultimately have to absorb. A government guarantee that is unclear or not credible, even if it is explicit and priced, will result in greater costs to the government and, ultimately, the taxpayer. What should parties pay the government for its willingness to intervene?

Ensuring an easy, predictable path to securitization of standardized mortgage products is essential to making mortgage credit available throughout our country – in traditionally underserved rural areas and urban areas, and to all sorts of current and potential homeowners, provided by financial institutions of different sizes in different locations. A strong regulator whose primary focus is the housing finance system can also help ensure fair access to smaller institutions. In summary, it is my personal belief that housing finance reform must incorporate an explicit government backstop accompanied by significant sources of high-quality first-loss private capital. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Comparing Charts 2 and 15, there is little correlation between levels of wages and the change in them over recent years. In other words, the regional distribution of incomes does not appear to have changed materially during the period of monetary loosening. The same is true of unemployment rates (Charts 9 and 12a). There is some evidence of the higher-wealth regions benefitting more than the lower-wealth regions over the period since the crisis (Chart 3 and 13a). (c) Recent Monetary Policy In August this year, in the light of the EU referendum result, the Bank’s MPC undertook a further round of monetary policy easing. Interest rates were lowered further, to 0.25%. And the MPC agreed to undertake a further £ billion of asset purchases, of which gilts comprised £ billion and corporate bonds £ billion. The Bank also introduced a Term Funding Scheme (TFS) to facilitate the pass-through of lower official interest rates to the retail interest rates facing households and companies. It is too early to assess what impact this further monetary policy loosening will have on activity and unemployment. Estimates from the Bank’s model suggest it could increase activity by around 0.5% over a three year horizon and support around an extra 100,000 jobs. In an environment of heightened uncertainty about future growth and jobs, these gains are not to be sniffed at. In the period since the MPC’s easing in August, there have been two pieces of material news about the performance of the economy.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 3 Market functioning “heat map” based on issuance and spreads data(a)(b) Corporate bonds P R I M A R Y  S E C O N D A R Y  US UK Euro area Bank bonds, unsecured US UK Euro area RMBS US UK Euro area CMBS US UK Euro area Corporate bonds US UK Euro area Bank bonds, unsecured US UK Euro area RMBS US UK Euro area CMBS (b) US Euro area  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N NN NN NN N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N NNNNNNN  07  08  09  10  11  12  Funding conditions compared with historical averages Very loose Lack of spreads data  Loose  Normal  Tight  Very tight  No issuance  Sources: Bloomberg, Dealogic, JP Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Bank calculations. (a) Shading is based on a score that reflects gross issuance (relative to GDP) and spreads in primary markets, and spreads in secondary markets, expressed as a number of deviations from historical averages, using as much data as available from January 1998.
Figure 8 a) Employment (moving quarter/moving quarter change, thousands)  b) Compensation index (IR) (percent, annualized quarterly velocity, moving  150  12  100 50 0  Real IR  Nominal IR  160  8  140  6  120  4  100  60 40  -2  20  -4 21  22  Source: Central Bank of Chile based on INE data. IALI  80  0  -100  Sence (*)  180  10  2  -50  c) Labor demand (index, January 2021 = 100, moving 3-month average  0 02  07  12  17  Source: Central Bank of Chile based on INE data. 13  22  20  21  22  (*) Information from System of Employment Board Analysis and Sence Labor Observatory. The indexes were built with information downloaded from trabajando.com and laborum.cl with nationwide coverage. The number of ads corresponds to ads uploaded by firms. Latest data available is from 31 October. Sources: System of Employment Agency analysis, Sence Labor Observatory, and Central Bank of Chile.

For instance, in the mining sector, the supply of goods and services has been taken up by private companies including those that can be classified as SMEs. Similarly, the transport sector, which was dominated by Government through the United Bus Company of Zambia (UBZ), Zambia Railways and Zambia Airways, etc, is now largely run by the private sector, consisting mostly of small and medium entrepreneurs. One can go on to mention the tourism, manufacturing, real estate, construction and others. This development is of great benefit to the economy in general and individual entrepreneurs in particular. Therefore, small- and medium-scale enterprises have the potential to make a significant contribution to the growth of the economy, thereby improving the economic welfare of the population. As you may know, SMEs in Zambia often have a direct impact on community development. Since they are usually based in places where the owners live, they draw upon the community for their workforce and rely on it to do business. They provide employment, particularly for low-skilled workers, as well as women and the youth, who usually make up the greatest proportion of the unemployed. However, this sector has faced difficulties in accessing credit for working capital and expansion of their investments. Mr Chairman, even if more SMEs wished to modernise their plant and equipment, they would find it hard to do so because of the difficulty of obtaining financing. Many banks choose not to provide credit to SMEs as they are perceived to be more risky and yet less profitable.
Paper presented at the BIS annual conference on “Financial Systems and Macroeconomic Resilience: Revisited”. BIS Review 119/2009  7  is ample and provides room for brisk growth in lending. In a downturn, earnings decline, losses increase and banks tighten lending. Banking sector behaviour is thus procyclical. This first implies that a higher level of equity capital must be required for a given risk assessment. Second, capital requirements must reflect risk through the entire business cycle. Third, banks must build up solid buffers above the minimum requirement in normal periods. Today the capital requirements for mortgage loans are very low. NOK 1 in equity capital can actually be behind as much as NOK 250 in mortgage loans. House price fluctuations are amplified as a result because access to mortgage finance becomes almost unlimited in favourable periods. The requirements imposing an upper limit on banks’ capital-to-loan ratio can remedy this to some extent. Tax rules Improved tax rules can also counteract credit cycles and promote housing market stability. The household debt-equity ratio and house prices are influenced by the tax system. A sound principle is that the net return on capital, after deduction of capital costs, should be taxed. Net return is indicative of the capacity to pay tax. But households are not taxed on the net return on their housing capital. Deductions are allowed for capital costs without taxation of a rise in the value of the property or the imputed value of owner-occupied housing.

The size of the Chinese market is undoubtedly a key factor: central government has outstanding bonds worth approximately USD 1,000 billion.5 This makes the onshore Chinese government bond market the fifth-largest in the world after the US, the euro area, Japan and the UK (left-hand side of slide 5). Over and above the consideration of market size, investments in China are also attractive from the point of view of our security criterion, as they offer additional diversification of market, credit and concentration risks. As regards the diversification of foreign exchange risks, however, China offers only very limited potential for us, as the renminbi is pegged to the US dollar. Nonetheless, the renminbi has been allowed to appreciate relatively constantly against the US dollar since 2005 and this incremental appreciation has had a positive effect on onshore Chinese bond yields in francs. In Swiss franc terms, investments in three to five-year Chinese government bonds have, on average, yielded more than 5% per year since 2005; this is substantially higher than the yield available on other major government bond markets (right-hand side of slide 5). In addition to these financial market advantages, China has strong economic fundamentals. At 40%, China’s government debt ratio is much lower than that of many advanced economies.6 Furthermore, the credit quality of Chinese central government bonds is high compared to that of other emerging economies, as is reflected in the ratings.