samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We also need a pool of knowledgeable analysts and journalists who will shine the spotlight on any obscure fine print that the lay investor fails to notice. A more informed and sophisticated investor base will reinforce market discipline and form the basis for a more vibrant and mature financial sector. In all these respects, we have a long way to go. Market discipline also requires an effective enforcement regime. To preserve investor confidence, penalties for transgressions must be swift and appropriate. MAS now has the power to investigate and bring a court action for market misconduct under the new civil penalty regime. This will complement the existing criminal penalty regime administered by CAD. Liberalising the financial sector We began to open the financial sector to greater competition while the region was reeling from the Asian Crisis. This went against conventional wisdom. Opening up during such a time seemed like throwing away the life-jackets as the flood waters rose. We thought otherwise. We could see the flood approaching – not just the storm we were then in, but the greater climatic challenge posed in the longer-term by the worldwide changes in the financial  BIS Review 62/2002  3  industry. We decided that we had better learn to swim before the deluge overwhelmed us. Furthermore, our actions to liberalise in the midst of the crisis would send a clear signal that Singapore’s financial centre would always be open for business. Banking The two major areas of liberalisation have been in banking and the capital markets.

At the end of the new forecasting horizon in the third quarter of 2007, inflation would stand at 2.6%. The lower long-term inflation forecast suggests that there is currently more room for manoeuvre in maintaining an expansionary monetary policy course. 4. Exchange rate  The dollar has plummeted since October. It has lost 7.9% vis-à-vis the Swiss franc. Notwithstanding the sharp fluctuations of the dollar, the franc has remained virtually unchanged against the euro. The depreciation of the dollar has a direct impact on the Swiss economy in that it undermines the price competitiveness of the export industries. Moreover, a weak dollar also exerts an indirect influence by clouding growth prospects in Europe, our largest sales market. The appreciation of the franc has tightened monetary conditions. At the same time, the weaker dollar has a dampening effect on import prices and, consequently, on inflation prospects. 5. Continuation of expansionary monetary policy  I will now come to my concluding remarks. The inflation forecast shows that the process of normalisation of monetary policy has not yet ended. In light of my comments it should nevertheless not be difficult to understand our decision to leave the three-month Libor rate at 0.75%. Since inflationary pressure is expected to ease in the long term, there is no need to take a further step toward a normalisation of interest rates at this point in time. In addition, the stronger franc has already resulted in more restrictive monetary conditions.
The prospect of Brexit and our future relationship Let me say from the outset that Brexit is and remains bad news, not only for the United Kingdom, but also for Europe. But we respect the British choice, whatever it turns out to be. At this stage, both the British and Europeans are faced with great uncertainty surrounding the outcome. We are still hoping for a deal, but we have to be ready for a no-deal and all the risks it entails. Supervisors both at national and European levels have encouraged and monitored the implementation of contingency plans by the financial industry: on our side, we are ready. Let me add one word on the future relationship between the UK and the European Union. After Brexit, we will obviously no longer belong to the same European club, but we will hopefully remain close partners and friends. The UK will continue to participate in international forums – such as the G7, G20 FSB, BIS, etc. – where cooperation will be much needed to face our common challenges such as financial stability, digitalisation and the regulation of Bigtechs, as well as the challenge of green finance. In a context where the multilateral order is being put at risk, let me express the wish that the UK, together with the EU, may resolutely strive to renew multilateralism.

These reports showed fan charts in which inflation was much more likely to be below the target than above it throughout the two to three year horizon over which the Bank produces its forecasts. The central projection in both Inflation Reports we produced last summer suggested inflation would fall to around 1% or just above in the first half of 2011 and to struggle to return to the target after that. This was the economic backdrop against which I and other members of the MPC took the key decisions to put in place the monetary policy settings which we currently have in place today: sharp falls in demand and rises in unemployment; great uncertainty about recovery prospects; and a general expectation of persistent below target inflation. The Bank was not alone in its prognosis – this was the general view of the forecasting consensus last summer. A year on, however, the economic situation has changed. There are still many uncertainties about future economic prospects. But there are four features of the current position of the economy which are now very different from the situation we faced last summer – the world economy has bounced back, the UK economy is also recovering, the margin of spare capacity does not appear to be as large as we had expected a year ago, and inflation has run above target rather than falling below it. Before moving on to talk about monetary policy, I will briefly discuss these four factors in turn.
We should all be mindful of the very strong need for transition financing, in particular for Asia-Pacific which accounts for nearly half of global greenhouse gas emission and where the social and economic reality is especially complex for achieving carbon neutrality. Hence, green finance is not just about financing green. It’s also about financing transition, meaning supporting the “brown” industries to adopt greener and more sustainable business models. Talent development 26. I have talked about the importance for the financial system to push for technology adoption and green finance with the broader concept of financial inclusion in mind. However, one of the biggest challenges facing banks is shortage of talent. We do need the right talent with necessary skills and know-how to drive the transformation. If we do not even have the requisite people to understand the risks involved and balance the competing objectives, our journey is going to be arduous. So, let me spend a few minutes to talk about capacity building. 27. With useful contributions from HKIB and the industry, the HKMA conducted a “Capacity Building for Future Banking” study last year to take stock of potential talent gaps that the banking industry will face. The study revealed notable skills gaps in fintech and green finance. These are the two key growth areas in the financial world. And their developments are evolving so fast that the skill sets of the existing workforce cannot keep pace with the latest industry needs. 28. This is a global issue, not unique to Hong Kong.

4  Capgemini, RBS and EFMA, World Payments Report 2009, September 2009. 5  ECB, Payments Statistics (formerly known as the Blue Book) (see www.ecb.europa.eu). BIS Review 151/2009  3  Moving forward with an e-payments solution give a flying start to “SEPA for online payments”. Moreover, it could take the wind out of the sails of providers who make use of banks’ infrastructures but are not subject to the same strict security requirements. In my view, security is of crucial importance, especially for the online world. Overall, e-SEPA online services would come to the great benefit of corporate customers and consumers. At the same time, e-SEPA will be an additional revenue source to the banking sector. When can the payments industry expect to reach the full SEPA finishing line? As I have outlined, the key implication of SEPA is that the whole economy – consumers, corporates and banks – will benefit from it. So how can we bring this project closer to success? Let me mention two important ingredients, namely, first, a further improvement in the SEPA governance and, second, the necessity of a SEPA migration end date. On first point: SEPA governance. The EPC clearly plays a pivotal role in organising the stakeholder involvement around the design of the SEPA products, currently the SCT and SDD Rulebooks, and the SEPA Cards Framework. However, the governance of a project like SEPA requires that stakeholder involvement at the European level is made more balanced, bringing together stakeholders from all sides of the SEPA project.
Today, I intend to speak above all about the new results from the analysis of the Riksbank’s data on the debts of individual’s and households and explain how these relate to other studies of household indebtedness. I also want to explain why the results should be viewed in the light of the vulnerabilities in the Swedish financial system. Let me begin, however, by saying a few words about why household debt is a cause of concern to the Riksbank at all. 1  International stakeholders, for example the IMF, the OECD and the EU, have also been concerned. The risks associated with high household indebtedness have also been discussed at other central banks. The Riksbank warned about these risks already prior to the financial crisis (see, for example the speech made by Stefan Ingves on 4 October 2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Household debt can threaten sustainable growth The Riksbank has long pointed out the risks associated with the development of household debt. When household debt is analysed, the debts are usually placed in relation to something else. As most households pay their borrowing costs using their current incomes rather than their assets, the debt ratio, that is debts in relation to disposable incomes, is often used as an illustrative measure of risk. 2 Since 1995, the aggregate household debt ratio, that is total household debt as a percentage of disposable income, has increased from 90 to 174 per cent, and it is expected to continue to increase in the years immediately ahead.

It also enables us to follow how debts develop over time and thus also provides some information on the households’ amortisation behaviour. The Riksbank’s credit data is therefore an important piece of the household-debt puzzle. The Riksbank’s credit data confirms our concern Let me now say something about what our data shows and also in some cases place the data in relation to other results that have been presented to us in various contexts. It is of course not my intention to give the impression that other results are incorrect in some way. It is rather the case that data is used in different ways depending on one’s perspective and focus, and this is reflected in the results. The Riksbank’s particular focus is on the risks that household indebtedness may pose to the real economy and financial stability. The aggregate debt ratio underestimates debts among borrowers As I mentioned earlier, the aggregate debt ratio is 174 per cent. However, as this figure is based on the entire Swedish household sector it also includes individuals who have no debts but have an income. Now that it is possible, it therefore seems more relevant to examine the debt ratio for those who actually have debts, that is almost four million Swedes over the age of 17. If the debt ratio is calculated only for indebted households, the figure arrived at is 263 per cent.
In addition, integration in the stock markets is progressing, although they have to overcome barriers of the same kind as those I have just mentioned. In addition to the closer links between stock market firms, a notable increase in transactions on the new European indexes has been observed. Moreover, the “new markets”, with growth figures benefiting greatly from the establishment of the large European market, have expanded considerably. The broadening of the capital markets and their greater integration are contributing to a more efficient allocation of savings. First, this development is also leading to lower transaction costs and increasing the liquidity of the traded instruments (which in turn contributes, ceteris paribus, to reducing the absolute level of interest rates). Second, it is multiplying investment opportunities and increasing the range on offer. At the same time, it is fuelling competition between issuers, investors, and even, to some extent, regulatory systems (as shown, for example, by the adoption in several countries, including France, of a legal framework for real estate bonds, modelled on the German Pfandbriefe). Meanwhile, the deeper market calls for restructuring and rationalisation of the finance industry, the effect of which would be to strengthen the management of savings in Europe.

The quarterly assessment in mid-March 2008 will provide the opportunity to assess the inflation and economic outlook on the basis of new data. BIS Review 13/2008  1
Sweden would perhaps need an even more formal external fiscal evaluation. What are the conclusions? This leads to an important conclusion for the implementation of the “reformed” Stability and Growth Pact of the EU. Perhaps the solution to regain credibility is to build from below – to complement the European level with national frameworks in the respective European nations so that they come to internalise the need to balance their budget over the cycle and to ensure that the same transparency exists on the fiscal side as on the monetary side. While pressure from fellow finance ministers has apparently not worked well enough, the present attempts at national processes with transparent targets have a better track record. BIS Review 88/2006  5  Why not have all EU countries commit themselves to establishing independent bodies with the responsibility of enhancing transparency by conducting independent forecasts of the countries’ deficits and providing recommendations on a regular basis? They would have only an advisory role and their authority would stem from impartiality and expertise. The subject of their recommendations would be the overall fiscal stance – neither the specifics nor indeed the political orientation of fiscal policy. The protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) attached to the Treaty states that member states shall ensure that national procedures in the budgetary area enable them to meet their obligations. It would therefore be in the spirit of the Treaty to have EU countries commit themselves to establishing these kinds of bodies.

Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Corriere della Sera Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Corriere della Sera, conducted by Mr Danilo Taino on 7 March 2019 and published on 11 March 2019. * * *  At its meeting on Thursday, 7 March, the ECB decided to add to the monetary stimulus already in place. What happened? Did the extent of the economic slowdown in the euro area take you by surprise? The slowdown didn’t come as a surprise. Economic activity was exceptionally strong in 2017, thanks to global economic conditions. We knew that euro area growth would adjust towards its potential rate. The slowdown has been stronger than expected and started sooner, which motivated the decisions we took. But those decisions don’t represent a turnaround in our policy; they have been carefully calibrated to this diagnosis. We are adjusting to the new reality rather than reversing our course; we don’t see signs of a recession at present. The ECB staff projections have been revised. They previously envisaged that growth would be consistently above potential, which would have pushed inflation towards our objective of lower but close to 2%, whereas they now foresee that actual output will be initially equal to or below potential output, which means it will take longer for inflation to reach 2%. In the event of external shocks, could the ECB go back to buying bonds on the market? We don’t see the need.
The total number of listed companies in the euro zone has increased steadily during the 1990s. This development also applied to the 'growth' stock exchanges. For instance, the number of companies listed on the pan-European stock exchange alliance EURO.NM increased by almost 100 per cent in 1999. It is not so strange that Europe cannot measure up to the USA on the financial markets, as the integration process has not come as far here. Whereas the USA has a large, integrated market, Europe has many small ones, which are also covered by different regulations. On the other hand, this means that there is great potential within Europe's financial sector. Intensive work is currently in progress to realise this potential. This includes the EU countries adopting a plan of action for financial services, that should be fully implemented by 2005. During the Stockholm European Council last weekend, the Heads of State and Government adopted the Lamfalussy Committee's proposals for a more effective legislation process in the field of finance in the EU. This was a very important decision. Today it takes an average of three years for the EU to make decisions on new regulations. Such a slow process is evidently a problem in the financial field, where development is otherwise very rapid. A regulatory system that does not correspond to reality can lead to both increased risks in the financial system and lower economic growth, as the finance markets' contribution to the rest of the economy will be lower than it could be.

On the bond market, there are some corporate and bank bonds issued in euro. However, trade is modest, which is probably due to the fact that it has not been as cheap to borrow on the euro market as was expected. The fact that Swedish companies still choose to seek financing there may be due to the fact that it is the only way for some of them to borrow really large volumes. Nor has there been any major change in the spot trading in krona on the foreign exchange market, compared with the period prior to the introduction of the euro. The average daily turnover in SEK against DEM during the period 1995-1999 was SEK 19.2 billion. The corresponding figure for 1999 and 2000 was SEK 19.5 billion. BIS Review 26/2001  3  Developments on the Swedish stock market have been similarly modest. Since the introduction of the euro, it has been possible to list shares parallel or exclusively in euro on the OM Stockholm Exchange. During 1999, three companies made use of this possibility. They were Electrolux, Nordea and Stora Enso. Since then, no new companies have registered an interest in being listed in euro and trading in the three already listed companies has been very modest. The talk of the death of the krona has thus been greatly exaggerated. It is hardly surprising that there was no spontaneous changeover to the euro. This is in fact what we at the Riksbank said when the debate reached its peak a few years ago.
For example, the IEA estimates that the transition could require $ in energy sector investments a year for decades – twice the rate at present.11 By 2050 we will need nearly 95% of electricity supply to be low carbon, 70% of new cars electric, retrofitting of the entire building stock, and an 80% fall in the CO2 intensity of the building sector.12 With an estimated $ trillion of infrastructure investment expected between 2015 and 2030, smart decisions now can make sure that investment is both financially sound and environmentally sustainable.13 Investing in more sustainable agriculture could deliver an estimated $ trillion in economic benefits per year and generate millions of jobs, while also improving food security and reducing GHG emissions.14 Reducing air pollution could not only prevent millions of premature deaths per year, but avoid over  11  See IEA (2017), ’Perspectives for the Energy Transition - Investment Needs for a Low-Carbon Energy System.’ Ibid. 13 New Climate Economy (2018), ‘The 2018 Report of the Global Commission on the Economy and Climate.’ 12  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7  $ billion in lost productivity and health impacts.15 Getting climate disclosure right will mean that investment flows to firms which are managing the risks and seizing the opportunities. Ensuring our banks and insurers are resilient to climate-related risks will reinforce this process while keeping the financial system open for UK households and businesses in all types of weather.

Some reporting and disclosure requirements were extended, reducing the operational burden on banks; and some market risk-based capital requirements that were deemed to have moved excessively during the episode were offset.1 At the same time, fiscal authorities began to provide support to economies entering lockdown. In the UK, that included government guarantees for lending to the corporate sector as well as income support schemes for employees furloughed as businesses shut or scaled back their activities. The size of the policy response was huge. Across the US, Euro Area, UK and Japan, central bank assets increased by around $ trillion in 2020, more than twice their increase in the year following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. And, according to the IMF, by mid-March 2021, global pandemic-related fiscal support measures totalled $ trillion (around 19% of world GDP).2 This is at least twice as large as the fiscal response observed during the Global Financial Crisis. In 2020 alone, average overall fiscal deficits reached 11.7% of GDP for advanced economies, the largest measure the IMF has recorded since they began gathering data. As a result of all of these interventions, conditions stabilised. There was no credit crunch: credit provision to businesses increased by more than 10% during 2020.