samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Banks, their managers and owners, which are affected by supervisory measures must be able to appeal the decisions, although in some circumstances the measure must remain in force while the judicial process is underway. We should not forget the importance of the so called preconditions, the major external factors which fundamentally affect the supervisors’ ability to conduct efficient supervision. The preconditions are, for example, a stable and sustainable macro economic environment; adequate laws and a good judicial system; good accounting and auditing rules; and an adequate system to deal with problem banks and other institutions. In the Swedish pre-crisis situation there was macro-economic instability with excessive price volatility. Inflation had been high and fluctuating, and current account and fiscal deficits had remained high for many years. This made it difficult for the authorities to assess the underlying financial stability of banks and other institutions. Recent important regulatory issues for the financial institutions As you are aware, countries around the world are presently preparing their banks and authorities for the implementation of the Basel II capital requirements. It implies huge financial costs and workloads, but is expected to provide benefits in the form of better managed banks, lower losses and more precise capital requirements. Swedish banks will start implementing the Basel II from 1 January 2007 so their preparations are now at full steam.

Conversely, at the height of the crisis, financial conditions tightened sharply even as the Federal Reserve aggressively pushed its federal funds rate target down toward zero. As a result, monetary policymakers need to take the evolution of financial conditions into consideration. For example, when financial conditions tighten sharply, this may mean that monetary policy may need to be tightened by less or even loosened. On the other hand, when financial conditions ease—as has been the case recently—this can provide additional impetus for the decision to continue to remove monetary policy accommodation. While I agree with Hélène in most respects, there are a few points where I am less convinced. While the global financial cycle complicates policymakers’ ability to guide financial conditions in their own economies, I’m not persuaded that the trilemma has been replaced by a dilemma—that is, essentially an “either/or” choice between an independent monetary policy versus an open capital account. While there is no panacea to insulate countries from financial spillovers—particularly when policy in some areas is constrained by the effective lower bound on interest rates—I think a combination of exchange rate flexibility, a credible monetary policy framework, sufficient foreign exchange reserves, and a strong financial system can help mitigate the effects of such spillovers. Moreover, it strikes me that market participants have become more discriminating over time about the circumstances of different countries, rather than painting all EMEs with a similar broad brush.
Interbank GIRO (IBG) grew at a higher rate of 36% in 2014 and this strong growth rate was sustained at 36% in the first 9 months of this year compared to an average rate of 19% between 2011 and 2013. Instant Transfer (IBFT), the real-time fund transfer service on the other hand, has consistently maintained its high growth rate of over 60% since 2011. This contributed to an increase in Malaysia’s e-payments per capita which is projected to increase from 43 per capita in 2010 to an estimated 80 per capita in 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  To reduce the country’s dependency on cash usage, Bank Negara Malaysia has implemented the Payment Card Reform Framework this year with the objective to create an enabling environment for the expansion of payment card terminals and higher usage of debit cards at affordable and reduced costs. In this regard, encouraging progress is seen in the area of deployment of payment card terminals. Payment card terminal growth which had slowed from 14.6% in 2011 to 4.5% in 2014, is likely to rebound to an estimated growth rate of 12.0% for 2015. This would increase the number of payment card terminals from 8 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2014 to 9 per 1,000 inhabitants in 2015. We envisage that with the implementation of a Market Development Fund by the payment card industry, about RM455 million funds would be used to deploy additional terminals and spur the expansion of the terminal network.

The successful implementation of postpandemic measures, when the priority will be a return to economic and social normality as fast as possible, hinges on the extent to which macroeconomic stability is preserved. When I speak of independence I do not see the central bank secluded in an ivory tower, but working actively, and combatively, under the law, with the fiscal authority, with the government. Based on my experience, I do not think there is a better alternative to a balanced, coherent fiscal and monetary policy mix. And central bank independence implies accountability vis-à-vis the law, the mandate, the society. Or, in the words of 19th-century Romanian writer and politician Costache Negruzzi, the central bank needs to ‘stand accountant’ for what it does. By encroaching upon central bank independence, in favour of political decisions seeking shortterm electoral gains, the real costs will be borne from an economic and social perspective, in the long run, by the entire country. A recent study published by the European Central Bank, titled The Case for Central Bank Independence, shows that – while the de jure independence has largely remained intact – the de facto independence has deteriorated in almost half of the sample of central banks under review. This is a fact and, for me, it is a matter of concern. I shall not comment on it. Looking at central banking history that spans more than three centuries, I hope this is part of the long cycle of ups and downs in terms of central bank independence.
(a) Net percentage balances for the cost (availability) of credit are calculated as the percentage of respondents reporting that bank credit is ‘cheap’ (available) in the Deloitte CFO Survey for large corporates or is ‘good’ in the Federation of Small Businesses’ (FSB) Voice of Small Business Index for small businesses less the percentage reporting that it is ‘costly’ (‘hard to get’) in the Deloitte CFO Survey for large corporates or ‘poor’ in the FSB Voice of Small Business Index for small businesses. (b) A positive balance indicates that a net balance of respondents report that credit is cheaper or credit is more available. Credit surveys, however, only give a broad picture of whether credit is available and being extended to firms. They do not answer the question of whether credit is available for particular purposes like investment. The Bank’s survey specifically addresses this question. It supports the overall picture that external finance is, in the main, available for investment. Two thirds of the firms surveyed said they had invested ‘appropriately’ over the past five years. And these firms seem to have experienced few external financial constraints on investment. The vast majority of those who said they had invested appropriately also said they had received the full amount of funds they had applied for over the past year (Chart 2). Few of them reported other external financing constraints such as cost or shortage of collateral – although within this group the picture was less positive for smaller firms.

Chart 4: Rates of return on capital and cost of capital compared to survey measures Net rate of return for PNFCs (ONS) (a) Net rate of return for PNFCs - 2000-2016 Average cost of loans for private non-financial corporations (b) Weighted average cost of capital (c) Bank Rate Average rate of return (survey) (d) Average hurdle rate (survey) (e) Average cost of bank loans (survey) (f)  Per cent 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: Bank of England, ONS Profitability of UK companies and Bank of England Finance and Investment Decisions Survey. (a) UK non-financial corporations' net operating surplus/net capital stock (per annum). (b) Weighted average interest rate of sterling loans made to private non-financial corporations by UK resident monetary financial institutions (excl. the central bank). 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  (c) (d) (e)  This is partly based on estimates of the equity risk premium as described in Inkinen, Stringa, and Voutsinou (2010). There is considerable uncertainty surrounding these estimates. Question 12: 'If you set an investment hurdle rate, what is it?'. Question 5: 'On average, what is the total rate of return realised on investment projects completed in the past 5 years?' . One might still, however, have expected firms' hurdle rates to come down to reflect lower financing costs and lower yields on other investments such as financial assets.
That would be an argument for keeping the programme in place while recognising that it may not be employed unless unusual circumstances appear. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Q. How would you evaluate the programme. Has it been a success? The programme has been a success. One has to ask what is the counterfactual for what would have happened in the euro area had the programme not been in place. In the dramatic situation that we were facing in May 2010, the damage that could have resulted from the absence of this programme could have been quite severe. Q. Is the transmission mechanism working now? Speaking for myself, I have less concern for the transmission of monetary policy today than in May 2010 when it was introduced. Q. Could Portugal government bonds be extended similar treatment as Greece and Ireland regarding collateral use in ECB operations? Regarding the eligibility of collateral, as a rule we rely on the rating agencies, but in those circumstances when we can make an independent evaluation of the country we don’t need to rely on the rating agencies. This has happened in the case of Greece, this is what has happened in the case of Ireland and I trust that if it becomes necessary to have an independent evaluation in order to assess the eligibility of collateral of any other sovereign in the euro area, then this will be done as well. Q.

On the contrary, they need to contribute to the design of the measures to make them robust and effective across countries. Similar holds for regulatory objectives, as what is considered a priority for regulators in advanced countries, like the G20 countries, might not be considered as urgent in emerging market countries. In this regard, I welcome and strongly support the effort of the Basel Consultative Group (BSG) as a forum for deepening the engagement of the BCBS with non-member authorities, international institutions, and regional groups of banking supervisors on the regulatory reform and banking supervisory issues. I see cooperation between the BCBS and the BCG as a key component helping to design robust regulation and supervision, taking into account financial sector aspects in both advanced and emerging markets and developing countries. As a member of the BCG, the CNB has actively participated in the work of the group. We contributed to the work agenda evaluating major intended and unintended consequences of Basel III implementation for emerging and smaller economies in the past. We also hosted a workshop on this topic in 2013. As I see your workshop agenda, I appreciate that you are going to discuss the timely issue of sovereign exposures in emerging markets. The reasons for the high share of government bonds in commercial bank assets in emerging markets are clear and straightforward. Financial markets in these countries are still under development and shallow, which is limiting their ability to diversify assets.
That’s why the Bank, the Government and the FCA have put in place measures – Temporary Permissions Regimes - to ensure that UK households and businesses can continue to use these services and these contracts after Brexit. 8  See ‘Resilience of the UK financial system to Brexit’ in the July 2019 Financial Stability Report. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  And it’s why we’ve worked with European authorities to ensure UK-based clearing houses continue to be allowed to serve their EU clients after Brexit, avoiding unnecessary disruption to financial markets. All this work will not, on its own, guarantee either market stability or economic stability as we leave the EU. But it does mean that companies planning for Brexit don’t need to add ‘prepare for financial instability’ to their to-do lists, freeing up their capacity to promote the smoothest possible exit from the EU. Climate risks We’re also looking beyond Brexit, to prepare the financial system for the challenges of climate change. The physical risks of climate change are already affecting financial companies. Since the 1980s, the number of registered weather-related insurance loss events – events resulting in property, infrastructure and/or structural damage in the affected regions – has tripled.9  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has warned that global temperatures are likely to rise further.10 Our financial system needs to be able to manage the risks that come with that.

Such an approach would be a recipe for a regulatory framework that’s well-crafted, detailed and intricate... …but ultimately, irrelevant. Regulation of finance is a means, not an end. So it makes much more sense to define the outcome that regulation should achieve and to give regulators the tools to achieve it. Then they can be held to account for doing whatever it takes to deliver that outcome, even as circumstances change. The EU has, however, taken the first approach, putting a large body of rules in the equivalent of primary legislation. Those rules are inflexible and slow to respond as times change. As my colleague Sam Woods has argued, this approach follows from a goal of harmonising regulation across 28 countries.7 Given that, it would be an odd approach to follow outside the EU. And few non-EU countries have. Indeed, even as a member of the EU, the UK has taken the second, very different, approach. By tasking us with promoting a financial system that serves households and businesses in bad times as well as good, it overlaid EU rules with an outcome to be pursued. 7  See speech by Sam Woods (May 2019): ‘Stylish regulation‘. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  And that outcome is what the UK Parliament holds us to account for delivering, even as times change. That has given us the freedom and responsibility to move regulation with the times; to be agile. It’s a responsibility we take seriously.
There are three key initiatives under FAIR of particular relevance to the life insurance industry. These are the web aggregator, direct purchase insurance products and the balanced scorecard framework. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Web aggregator 8. First, the web aggregator. Life insurers offer a wide range of life insurance products to cater to the varied financial needs of consumers. However, it can often be a daunting task for consumers to be sufficiently informed of what’s available to meet his needs and to have some easy way to compare life insurance products. 9. I am pleased to note that a web aggregator will be launched in early April as a collaborative effort between MAS, CASE and the life insurance industry. This will provide a single information portal that will enable consumers to easily look up available life insurance products and compare indicative quotes based on specified parameters in a user-friendly and interactive manner. Direct Purchase Insurance 10. Second, direct purchase insurance products, or DPI. This is a new class of life insurance products for basic needs that is “retail-access friendly”. •  It will be simpler as the features of DPI are broadly standardised. This allows a consumer to make straightforward product comparisons when deciding which DPI to purchase. •  It will be easier to buy as consumers who know what they want and do not need financial advice will be able to buy DPI directly from life insurers. •  It will be cheaper as no commissions will be charged. 11.

Overall, tax revenues, before the transfer to local and regional government, are projected to increase by 7.8% in 2017, while social contributions are projected to increase by 6.3%, which, given the macroeconomic forecasts and the impact of the tax reforms mentioned above, would entail a greater response by revenues to growth in activity than in the past, especially in the case of social contributions, which are projected to grow by more than their bases (employment and wages), even taking into account the effect on revenues of the legal changes mentioned above. If the uncertainties surrounding the estimates of the impact of the legislative changes on taxation are also taken into account, it is clear that revenue growth needs to be monitored constantly over the course of the year, so that a timely adjustment can be made to spending or revenue in the event that the risks to the deficit target materialise. Moreover, in such a decentralised country as Spain, where more than 40% of public spending is made at the local and regional level, the State and Social Security budgets give merely a partial view of the budgetary policy of the public sector as a whole for next year. From this perspective, the Updated Stability Programme to be published in the next few days is particularly important, since it consolidates the budgets of central government agencies with those of regional government and local government.
The National Plan to respond to the economic and social fallout of the war in Ukraine, approved by the Spanish Cabinet on 29 March,5 includes measures that will come at a direct cost of € billion in 2022, according to Government estimates.67 One area of fiscal policy where more resolute action would be desirable is the formulation of a credible commitment to budgetary stability over the medium term. This would help limit the risks of financial market tensions that could be fuelled by the current climate of high uncertainty. This commitment should take the form of a gradual fiscal consolidation programme, to be implemented once the recovery takes hold. A gradual adjustment process minimises the possibility of any abrupt changes in the budgetary policy stance that might hamper the recovery under way. Increasing the economy’s potential output would also help reduce the high level of government debt. This would require reforms that address the economy’s structural shortcomings. NGEU funds could also be particularly useful in implementing these reforms and the investments required to support the changes. 5  See Real Decreto-ley 6/2022 (available in Spanish only). 6  In addition to this amount, there is a contingent liability of € billion linked to the new ICO guarantee facility approved as part of the raft of measures to support business liquidity needs stemming from the temporary increase in energy and fuel costs.

In many parts of the world, and not least in the euro area, low inflation over a long period of time has come as a surprise to central banks and others. The European Central Bank (ECB) has expressed concern over falling inflation expectations and recently cut its policy rate to 0.05 per cent, at the same time as declaring that this is the lowest possible policy rate for them. Moreover, they have announced several measures aimed at stimulating lending to households and companies. But it is still uncertain exactly what the measures will be and how extensive they will be. Moreover, there is little or no previous experience of these interest rate levels and measures in the euro area. It is therefore difficult to assess what effects the ECB’s measures will have on GDP and inflation in the euro area and thus, ultimately, what they will mean for inflationary pressures here in Sweden. One complicating factor is that the central banks in the United Kingdom and the United States appear to be taking a different direction with their monetary policy than the ECB. Their monetary policies are diverging. One reason why we are interested in expectations of policy rates and supplementary measures in other countries is that they influence interest in assets denominated in Swedish krona and therefore ultimately the development of the krona exchange rate.
The main driving forces behind the low inflation are supply factors that in themselves are favourable for Sweden’s economic performance and that by and large are not affected by monetary policy. Interest rates are already record-low and this has resulted in a fast increase in household borrowing and house prices. Monetary policy is stimulating demand at a time when the economy is growing at a rate that is not judged to be sustainable in the long term. We therefore expect resource utilisation to rise in the coming years and, as a result, cost pressures and inflation too. Our most recent forecast points to an inflation rate in line with the target at the end of the forecast period. Our conclusion at the last monetary policy meeting was that the repo rate should be left unchanged at present, but that there was not any hurry to raise it either. The new data that has been received since the publication of the Inflation Report gives us no reason at present to revise that assessment. Finally, I would also like to remind you that we regularly assess the new information that we receive and its effects on future inflation. For example, we could end up in a situation where we see that economic activity is either being notably dampened or is speeding up unexpectedly; in such a case there may of course be reason to revise our assessment. 1a.

The Riksbank has defined this in terms of a target for inflation: to keep inflation at 2 per cent, with a tolerance for deviations of ± 1 percentage point. In practice the Riksbank’s conduct of monetary policy normally involves adjusting the repo rate with a view to influencing demand in the economy. By influencing borrowing costs, the incentives to save, exchange rate developments and thus exports and imports, etc. the repo rate has an effect on aggregate demand in the economy and gradually also on inflation. It is generally held that a rate adjustment normally takes roughly 1-2 years before it has its greatest impact on inflation through these different "channels". That means that our interest rate decisions must be based on a forecast of economic and inflation developments in the years ahead. Even though the current inflation rate is not the decisive factor for our interest rate decisions it is, of course, important nonetheless since it constitutes the starting point for our inflation forecast, which is the key element underpinning our decisions. To make the Riksbank’s monetary policy strategy clear it has been described in terms of a simple policy rule: if the forecast points to an inflation rate above 2 per cent 1-2 years ahead the repo rate should normally be raised, whereas it should normally be lowered if inflation is forecast to be below 2 per cent. BIS Review 25/2005  1  But this policy rule cannot be applied mechanically. That is why “normally” is included in the wording.