samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Thus, the central bank can use the amounts and modalities of its liquidity provision to the banking sector to influence prices in the money market and other markets for relevant assets. By easing the pressure to abrupt deleveraging, the central bank can reduce the likelihood of a credit crunch and adverse spiralling dynamics, thereby addressing downside risks to price stability. It should be kept in mind however, that monetary policy can exert mitigating effects, but cannot solve the underlying problems, often of a structural nature. In addition, the creation of abundant liquidity can in itself create side effects that need to be carefully monitored. First, there is a risk of distorting the incentives to carry out the necessary adjustment by favouring evergreening of loans and “zombie-bank”-type dynamics. This would represent a continued source of uncertainty about banks’ exposures to non-performing loans, about the possible implicit liabilities faced by governments and ultimately a drag to economic growth. Second, large liquidity-providing repo operations increase asset encumbrance in the banking sector. Banks tie certain types of collateral with the central bank, and these assets are no longer available to the bank for other types of transactions. And this increases banks’ difficulties to issue unsecured bonds and thus can worsen their access to private sources of refinancing. The ECB’s measures during the financial crisis Let me now turn to the concrete measures that the Eurosystem has undertaken during the crisis.

It had to include both monetary and economic analysis – the ECB’s famous two pillar strategy. By explicitly taking into account the development of  Page 2/4  money and credit in its monetary policy strategy, the ECB was unique in the world of central banking. However, the ECB’s monetary policy strategy was questioned by some academics. They favoured inflation targeting. Otmar never shied away from his critics and their arguments. Consequently, he launched the ECB and Its Watchers Conference. Academics, journalists and market participants were invited. There were lively debates about the role of money in the ECB’s strategy. In his last contribution to the ECB and Its Watchers Conference in 2006, Otmar reviewed the active discussion about the role of money in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy over the previous eight years. Otmar reminded the audience how some had argued that the role of money was too large. For others it was too small. Otmar pointed out that his typical response had been that it was ‘just right’. This reminds me of a scene in the film ‘Amadeus’. Mozart, Otmar’s favourite composer, asks the emperor whether he likes his new piece, the Abduction from the Seraglio. The emperor answers, hesitantly, that he does, but adds that occasionally the piece seems to have too many notes. ‘I don't understand’, Mozart replies. ‘There are just as many notes, Majesty, as are required.
Norman T L Chan: Recent economic and financial developments in Hong Kong Remarks by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 22 February 2013. *  *  *  The property market in Hong Kong moderated briefly after the introduction of the fifth round of prudential measures on property mortgages by the HKMA in September 2012 and the new tax measures by the Government in October 2012. However, activities in the property market picked up again recently, with significant increases in transaction volume and prices of residential properties as well as commercial and industrial properties. The risk of overheating in the property market has, once again, risen sharply. Moreover, the recent increase in intensity of the quantitative easing by central banks in Europe, the US and Japan has made it more difficult and uncertain for them to “exit” these measures in the future. It will be particularly so when inflationary pressures emerge again in the advanced economies, and the pace and extent of interest rate hike could be greater than originally expected. In fact, in the last quarter of 2012, the HKMA already started requesting local banks to assume a of 300 bps increase in interest rate above the baseline scenario for its mortgage portfolio when conducting stress testing.

We have been hosting a series of events that bring together experts on economic inequality and the needs of low- and moderate-income communities in our District. Today’s event on food insecurity is part of that larger effort. But we recognize it’s not enough to merely study the issue. The role of our Community Development team is to champion promising solutions by connecting people, programs, and proposals with funding. Up to 40 percent of food produced in the United States goes to waste 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  each year, so there is a huge opportunity to distribute that unused food to those who need it. You’ll be hearing more about that later today. But first, we’ll start off with a presentation from Professor Tashara Leak. She’ll frame the discussion by talking about how food insecurity affects the health of children—and how that, in turn, shapes their economic prospects as they grow older. Then, we’ll convene a panel of business and government leaders, along with impact investors, who will spotlight some of the innovative work being done to make healthy and affordable food more accessible. Thank you all for joining us. And with that, I’ll turn it over to Professor Leak. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is consistent with superstar firms gaining a greater degree of 25  monopolistic power over customers. There is also evidence linking superstar firms to rising degrees of  concentration in the labour market, consistent with a greater degree of monopsonistic power over workers. 26  These shifts in industry concentration appear to have influenced pay growth. Rising concentration across different sectors of the US economy has been found to have had a significantly negative effect on their labour share. 27  Monopsony power among US industries has been found to have had a negative effect on  wage growth in that sector, the more so when unionisation rates are low. 28  And larger firms have also been 29  found to differentiate to a greater degree in the wages they pay their workers. Colleagues at the Bank, Will Abel, Silvana Tenreyro and Greg Thwaites, have recently found similar effects in the UK. 30  Higher industry concentration is associated with lower pay, the more so the less of a sector is  covered by collective bargaining. One important difference from the US is, however, that labour market concentration has not increased anything like as much in the UK as in the US. This, too, might help explain the relative flatness of the UK’s labour share. 23  For example, Autor et al (2017a). Concentration in the labour market is only one means by which an employer might enjoy greater bargaining power over workers.

This makes intuitive sense. In the end, workers are interested in the purchasing power of their pay, not its money amount. They bargain over real wages. So inflation, or its expectation, affects pay with a coefficient close to one. Put differently, in the course of wage bargaining, employers insure workers against inflationary shocks, at least on average. Movements in inflation have been a key driver of pay growth historically. They are the main reason why the Phillips curve shifted downwards significantly as the Great Inflation of the 1970s gave way to the Great Moderation of the late 1990s. That period saw inflation expectations ratchet down to target levels where they have remained anchored since (Chart 8). Pay growth has, in response, fallen pretty much one-for-one. This explains the first downwards shift in the Phillips curves shown in Charts 6 and 7. 1  For example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015), Gordon (2013), Vlieghe (2018), Saunders (2017) and Tuckett (2018). In statistical terms, you cannot reject the null that their slopes are the same. Both measures have a statistically significant impact on wage growth. The regressions in Table 1 use inflation expectations as they give a slightly better empirical fit. 2 3  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  A second key determinant of wage growth is unemployment or, more precisely, the gap between unemployment and its longer-run trend (sometimes called the NAIRU or Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 4  Unemployment).
M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: A brief comment on credit risk analysis Opening address by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the APEC Financial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Program - Credit Risk Analysis, Bangkok, 26 August 2002. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure for me to be here at the opening of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Financial Regulators Training Initiative Regional Program on Credit Risk Analysis. The Bank of Thailand is indeed privileged to have the opportunity to host this distinctive event initiated by APEC. I also wish to personally extend a warm welcome to all the participants and to express our deepest appreciation to the distinguished speakers who have kindly agreed to come to share with us their knowledge and wisdom on various aspects of credit risk analysis. Needless to say, amongst other risks, credit risk or the possibility that a borrower will default, represents a key risk in the banking business. The example of the Thai financial system where roughly 400 billion baht of non-performing loans, commonly known as NPLs still remains since the 1997 financial crisis shows the painstaking effect of credit risks at the national level. Global trends along with advance technology and financial innovations have further added complications to the matter by enabling financial institutions to change their activities and risk profiles at a speed and scale which could not be imagined a few years ago.

One related to fear on the part of the chief ethics and compliance officer to engage in action to resolve a conflict with a key business person – a fear of losing one’s job or her place in the corporate hierarchy. The other problem concerned access to the board of directors. It is one thing to go before the board of directors annually to have the compliance program approved. It is quite another to go before the board of directors to do battle with a senior executive who is probably before the board of directors on a regular basis. One possible solution as we move to the next level is to embed ethics and compliance issues in the disciplines that are more typical of governance issues involving the board of directors. These would be issues like strategy, business goals, and risk management, all of which touch ethics and compliance. Another solution would be to create escalation pathways to the board of directors for resolving conflicts between the chief ethics and compliance officer and a senior business leader. Conclusion As I said at the outset, ethics and compliance have come a long way in a very short time. We have learned a great deal during the journey. As I look out over the road ahead, I believe we will continue to make significant progress in business organizations that deliver on their value proposition, not only to shareholders, but to the other constituents that these organizations serve, their customers, employees, and communities.
A case in point is that a bank needs to have assets of at least $ billion to be eligible to establish a branch in Mainland China, which is at present beyond the reach of most local banks in Hong Kong. Future profits may also benefit from cost reductions arising from economies of scale – that is, the ability to spread fixed costs, including particularly those which are technology-related, over a larger scale of operations. Cost economies can also be achieved by eliminating duplications in branch networks, functions and staff. There may also be a reduction in risk, and therefore saving in costs, due to geographic or product diversification and the ability of larger institutions to invest in more sophisticated risk management systems. To the extent that risk reduction boosts a bank's credit rating, or increased size attracts the attention of investors, its cost of capital may be reduced, thus providing another means to increase shareholder value. Of course, merger is not the only way to maximise value. Nor, must it be said, is M&A always pursued for this reason. Management may have its own motives for chasing size - personal ambition or herd 1  "Consolidation in the Financial Sector": Group of Ten, January 2001, available at www.bis.org. BIS Review 49/2001  1  instinct may also be part of the story. This may help to explain one of the paradoxes of the consolidation boom.

Norman T L Chan: Removal of RMB conversion limit for Hong Kong residents Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 12 November 2014. *  *  *  I am glad to announce that the RMB conversion limit for Hong Kong residents of RMB20,000 per day will no longer be applicable with effect from 17 November 2014. Under the new arrangement, banks will square their positions arising from RMB conversions conducted with Hong Kong residents in the offshore market instead of the onshore market. As a result, the prevailing conversion and other relevant restrictions for onshore conversion will hence be no longer applicable. The HKMA has just issued a circular to banks setting out the detailed arrangements. The HKMA has had many rounds of discussions with the banking industry and Mainland authorities on relaxing the restrictions on RMB currency conversions by Hong Kong residents. We consider that the best option is for RMB conversions by Hong Kong residents to be done in the offshore market instead of the onshore market. With the size of the offshore RMB liquidity pool in Hong Kong exceeding RMB 1 trillion, and considering the scale and depth of the RMB foreign exchange market, we do not foresee any problem for banks to square their positions for Hong Kong residents’ RMB conversions in the offshore market.
Those minority votes, however, were the expression of modest differences in the timing of interest rate changes. The MPC was tightening policy over that period – from the summer of 2006 to the summer of 2007 – and I was in support of the broad strategy of gradual tightening that was being pursued. And I continued to support the broad strategy of the majority of the Committee as we relaxed policy – gradually at first, and then more dramatically from October 2008 onwards. So until I started to express my dissenting votes to raise rates last summer, I felt that my views were relatively close to the majority on the Committee and differences of view were mainly tactical – relating to the timing of Bank Rate changes. I now feel somewhat differently about my position relative to the policy which the majority of the MPC has supported over the past year. Even though my position on interest rates has gathered support in recent months, it is nearly a year since I started to vote for a gradual rise in the UK Bank Rate, in response to a recovering economy and rising inflation. I don’t think such a persistent difference of view with the majority on the Committee can be described as tactical. It reflects significantly different views on the outlook for inflation and growth in the UK and how we should respond as a monetary authority.

And we have a very international business community, reflecting the UK’s position as a major trading and commercial centre dating back to the late 17th century, when the Bank of England was founded, and the leading role that Britain played as the pre-eminent industrial power in the 18th and 19th centuries. When I joined the Committee in 2006, it struck me that most of the shocks and disturbances that the MPC had had to deal with – even in the less turbulent times of its first decade – had emanated from the global economy. The MPC came into being in 1997 just as the Asian crisis was unfolding, and the response to that period of global turbulence was a key issue dominating the first two years’ of the Committee’s life. Then followed the dotcom boom and bust centred on the US economy and the global political turbulence following the 9/11 attacks, including the effects of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Then, as the global economy recovered in 2003/4, the emerging issue was the upward pressure on oil and commodity prices and these global inflationary forces were a major preoccupation until the middle of 2008 and have re-emerged as a serious concern as the world economy has recovered from recession. The global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 was the most extreme of these international economic shocks affecting the UK economy.
The subprime problem was primarily a US problem, but since the loans had been sold to others outside the United States the turmoil had a global effect right from the start. Since no one really knew where the losses would turn up, a situation quickly arose in which banks and other financial institutions became cautious about lending money to each other. They began to hoard liquidity to meet their own obligations and to deal with any speculations that they were affected by the subprime problems. As a result the conditions for interbank lending deteriorated, causing market interest rates to soar. In this situation several central banks chose to act by injecting liquidity into the interbank market. This intervention achieved the desired effect in part, but did not eliminate the mutual distrust among banks. Northern Rock, one of the first casualties of the crisis, became well aware of this situation in September last year when it could no longer find private financing. It turned instead to the Bank of England – and as we all know, the story ended when, following a complicated process, the British government nationalised Northern Rock. The turbulence deepens Now the turmoil was not just related to the US subprime market. More and more assets and markets became affected when even borrowers with better credit ratings were hit. Nor were the problems just a matter of inadequate creditworthiness of US borrowers any more, as the ability of European borrowers to pay now came into question.

Mr President, no company can sustainably grow if it does not provide mechanisms by which employees can influence their working lives. Labour is more than a commodity. Unlike non-living factors of production, such as, machinery and raw materials, the work of human beings raises questions about the impact of work and work relations. As you review your collective agreement frameworks, I wish to remind you that there are a lot of common interests and important interdependencies between employers and employees despite the apparent conflicting interests. For instance firms need workers and workers need jobs. Ladies and gentlemen, there can be no true bargaining without prudent and effective leadership on either side of the table. This kind of leadership is required for us to achieve our collective objectives. We are desirous of seeing a Union leadership, which is well-informed and constantly upgrading their leadership skills for the attainment of organisational goals and workers welfare. In conclusion, I wish to once again implore you to actively participate and take a keen interest in the deliberations of this Forum. It is my expectation that you will have an opportunity to carry out an appraisal of your individual and collective skills and how they impact upon the job market and workers welfare in the financial sector. With these remarks, Ladies and Gentleman, I declare this Forum officially open. I Thank You  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
And the ZLB often comes hand in hand with undesirably low inflation or even a falling price level, carrying with it the associated costs of debt deflation on the real economy. The risk of too-high inflation What about the other risk to our policy goals that I mentioned – the risk that the U.S. economy could face pricing pressures that accelerate rapidly and ultimately leave inflation far above our 2 percent target for an unacceptably long period? At some point when the economy has clearly overcome the remaining impediments from the largest economic and financial downturn since the Great Depression, the odds of inflation  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  rising noticeably above target could become palpable. But such a breakout is just not at all very likely today. Indeed, many Fed critics have been voicing this concern since 2009, and it hasn’t even come close to happening. What if inflation just ran moderately above target for some time? Well, I see the costs of this outcome as clearly being much smaller than the costs of falling back into the ZLB. First, I believe the U.S. economy could weather the modest increases in interest rates that would be needed to keep inflation in check. Such rate increases would be manageable for the real economy; this is particularly true if industry and labor markets have already made the most difficult reallocations of jobs and overcome other factors so that productive resources are more efficiently and fully employed.

The existence of more banks with a pan-European outlook would amount to a private national risk pooling mechanism that would help weaken the link between the macroeconomic risks existing in each country and the stability of its banking system, adding robustness to the monetary and banking union. It is therefore important to identify and attempt to eliminate those obstacles that continue to hinder such banking consolidation in Europe, in spite of the establishment of the banking union. In particular, we must consider whether regulation and supervisory practices tend to unduly penalise geographical diversification of a bank’s business. It would also be desirable to ascertain whether the current structure of the industry in various countries, characterised by the existence of numerous banks that are not listed public companies and that maintain strong links with national business sectors, hampers the participation of foreign competitors, whether directly or through acquisitions. All told, in the short or medium term it is likely that the need to continue reducing costs will encourage bank mergers and acquisitions within each country in order to harness potential economies of scale. In the largest European countries, there would seem to be room for more consolidation. In fact, in many countries the level of concentration in the industry, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, is below that which might be considered to pose a possible threat to competition (see Chart 8).