samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
TL Loan Rates  Commercial Loan Standards*  (4-Week Average, Percent)  (Net Change)  Source: BRSA, CBRT. * Banks are requested to state the change in the demand for credit. Net percentage change of indexed responses indicates the direction of the change in credit demand. The index is calculated as [the sum of percentages for (Increased Somewhat + Increased Considerably)] – [the sum of the percentages for (Decreased Somewhat + Decreased Considerably)] +100. Index values greater than 100 signify increase in credit demand. Source: CBRT. As a result of these developments, credit growth gained pace in the last quarter of the year (Chart 12). Accordingly, annual rate of growth in total credit stock materialized around 16 percent at the end of the year, slightly higher than the 15 percent benchmark level for the medium term (Chart 13). Total credit growth proved robust in early 2013, and the uptrend of 13 weeks in credit volume stood close to the past years’ average. 4  Chart 12. Chart 13. Loan Growth Rates  Annual Growth Rate of Loans  (Adjusted for Exchange Rate, 13-Week Average, Annualized, Percent)  (Percent)  Source: CBRT. Source: CBRT. BIS central bankers’ speeches  There is a risk of further acceleration in credit in the forthcoming period. Financial conditions index continued to ease with rapid capital inflows, improving credit supply conditions, and accommodative liquidity policy (Chart 14). This outlook necessitates a cautious stance against macro financial risks.

But a more conservative monetary policy in expansionary phases would not only have favourable effects on tempering the amount of credit, it would also improve credit quality. Monetary policy also affects how banks assume risks. Researchers at the Bank of Spain have shown that a long period of low interest rates contributes to relaxing banks' credit granting standards. The market pressure to maintain high returns in a setting of low interest rates and, therefore, of lending offering very tight income margins, leads some banks to extend credit to individuals and firms with a greater risk profile. Also, the expansionary monetary policy stance means this greater risk takes longer to materialize, which in turn stimulates ever greater increases in this type of risky investment. Banks thus increase their risk profile by financing individuals and companies with a history of default, or by increasing the credit extended to new borrowers who, lacking a credit record, entail a greater level of uncertainty and, therefore, of potential risk to the bank. Finally, in an environment marked by low interest rates and the search by banks for yield, the general conditions of risk acceptance and selection are substantially relaxed, which translates into the riskier granting of credit that will materialise once the cycle turns down.
Not that I want to defend the past economic regime in any way, of course, but let’s not forget that it had elements which can be traced back at least implicitly to the pre-war period. An explicit return to the three traditions I mentioned is the central feature of our post-1989 economic history. Many of us clearly remember that the liberalisation of prices and foreign trade in 1991 was accompanied by effective stabilisation measures. These included an appropriate devaluation of the koruna against a basket of currencies and the maintenance of balanced budgets or even slight surpluses. It is therefore no accident that in 1991 inflation was “only” 56% here, as compared to triple figures in Poland and often quadruple figures in other transforming 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  economies. The Czech National Bank embraced the legacy of price stability right from its establishment in 1993. The maintenance of a fixed exchange rate until 1997 was a condition for attaining singledigit inflation and provided a fixed point in the unstable transformation environment. The switch to inflation targeting in 1998 marked the start of a roughly ten-year transition to price stability according to the definition long applied in advanced market economies. Maintaining price stability is not just our constitutional duty, but a long-standing legacy that we proudly embrace. The second feature of our economic history that I mentioned at the start is an ability to cope with the consequences of the struggle for economic independence.

Jiří Rusnok: Currency, taxes and other institutes of financial law Welcome speech by Mr Jiří Rusnok, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Currency, taxes and other institutes of financial law conference, Faculty of Law, Charles University, Prague, 20 September 2018. * * * Good morning, everyone. It is an honour and a pleasure for me to welcome you to today’s conference on the currency, taxes and other institutes of financial law. The 100th anniversary of the foundation of the independent Czechoslovakia is a good opportunity to look back and identify the main features of our national economic history. As you know, we have been through four periods since 1918 – the period of political and economic emancipation from Austria-Hungary, the wartime economy, the era of central-planning-based totalitarian communism, and finally almost three decades of democracy and a market economy. So, more than enough has happened in our country over the last 100 years. Although these periods could not have been more different, two common features have appeared in various guises. I would characterise them on the one hand as economic moderation, prudence and discipline, and on the other as a struggle for economic independence and a willingness and ability to bear the consequences. Let me give some examples of both. Czechoslovakia’s founding fathers Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Karel Kramář and Alois Rašín were well aware that nurturing a sound financial environment was crucial to the prosperity of the young nation.
The risk here is that when the current external disinflationary pressures subside, domestic cost growth pressures will have built up and will push inflation above target before monetary policy can restrain it. I would not discount this risk. The labour market has clearly become much tighter. And if pay is being held down by cyclical or scarring effects, these could change quickly. And there has been a substantial depreciation in sterling in the past three months which will push up on inflation, possibly more quickly than the usual prolonged lag between changes in the exchange rate and inflation. But with interest rates near the effective lower bound, with powerful disinflationary forces from abroad likely to persist for the next year, with low growth in unit labour costs and with an economy growing at around 2%, I think this is the lesser risk. Second, there is the concern that continued low interest rates lead to the build-up of financial stability risks through an acceleration of credit growth, increase in bank leverage and household indebtedness. The financial system has only recently come back to life with economy-wide credit now growing in the UK at around the rate of GDP. While there are some elements of credit that are growing more strongly, such as buy to let mortgages and unsecured debt, I think we are now emerging from the post-crisis phase and in a more standard stage of the credit cycle and we now have macroprudential tools to manage risks as they build up.

James D Rogers: Inauguration of the Sierra Leone Stock Exchange – a significant milestone Welcome address by Dr James D Rogers, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the inauguration of the Sierra Leone Stock Exchange, Freetown, 27 July 2007. *  *  *  Mr Chairman Your Excellency The President Honourable Vice President Honourable Minister of Finance Honourable Ministers Honourable Members of Parliament Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen I am extremely delighted to welcome all of you, and in particular His Excellency The President and the Honourable Vice President to this inauguration ceremony the Sierra Leone Stock Exchange, a project pioneered by His Excellency The President and into which much time and resources have been invested by the Bank of Sierra Leone over the past several years. In 2002 the first step was taken with the establishment of the Stock Exchange Technical Committee (SETC) under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Governor of the Bank. I wish to note that the present Deputy Governor is the second Chairman of the Committee, and has professionally steered us to this point. I want to particularly thank His Excellency The President for accepting our invitation to launch this project. During his administration, His Excellency has given support, encouragement and advice to the Bank in every sphere of its activities, and I wish on behalf of the Board and Management to express my thanks and appreciation to him.
Among other things, this provides advice on the characteristics of financial transactions that may arouse suspicion, particularly when one or more of the parties is known or suspected to be a terrorist or terrorist organisation. Even if there is no evidence of a direct terrorist connection, a transaction should still be reported to the JFIU if it looks suspicious for other reasons. This obviously applies to remittances as well as the opening of an account. It may subsequently emerge that there is a terrorist link. Thus, success in the fight against terrorist financing depends in large measure on the overall quality of AIs’ controls against money laundering - in particular, their ability to detect suspicious transactions. 2  BIS Review 47/2002  The customer due diligence process This in turn depends on an institution’s knowledge of its customers and what is a normal pattern of account activity for a particular customer. It is crucial therefore for AIs’ to have effective systems for customer due diligence. The main essentials are already there in the HKMA’s guideline, which requires AIs to make reasonable efforts to determine the customer’s true identity. But the process may need to be articulated more clearly so that AIs are in no doubt about what they should be doing.

Overall, East Asian economies have become more resilient. The managed float exchange rate and Inflation Targeting monetary policy frameworks that a number of regional economies have adopted after the Asian crisis have proven to be effective tools in maintaining economic stability and have had a role in helping spur economic growth. They have also had a role in helping dent financial imbalances especially excessive external borrowings and their maturity mismatches. The latest numbers of external debt to GDP in East Asia (except for the case of South Korea) stood below 30 percent in 2007, declining from the range of 62 to 168 percent from the peak during 1998 whereas the ratio of foreign reserves to short-term debt in most regional economies jumped from approximately 1-3 times in 1998 to 4-8 times in 2007. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the direct role of monetary policy in curbing financial imbalances apart from price stability will need to be revisited. It may be very well be the case that some tightening monetary policy is needed along side prudential measures in curbing financial imbalances. On the financial sector side, reforms that have been put in place to foster transparency and governance as well as to strengthen regulation and supervision have also resulted in significantly healthier financial institutions across the region in terms of solvency, liquidity, and profitability.
But this should be compensated to some extent by the banks becoming more secure and thus a fall in risk premiums on loans to banks. Although our calculations show that the costs of the new regulations are limited, it is unavoidably the case that stricter regulation entails various forms of cost. It is in the nature of the regulation. The important thing is that these costs are seen in relation to the gains in the form of a more stable bank system. And there is no doubt that the gains are substantial, after what the world has gone through since the financial crisis began. Here I refer to the severe economic downturn I mentioned at the start. But it is nevertheless important not to tighten the screws too much. This would mean that the banks only wanted to lend money to the most secure customers and investments. A lot of good investments would be missed. A lot of people would be unable to buy homes. Longterm economic growth would be slowed down and our total welfare would decline. We must quite simply ensure we do not put a spanner in the works so the banks reduce their lending too much. When I first worked at the Riksbank, in the 1970s and 1980s, the credit market was severely regulated and this is not a situation we should wish to return to. Nor should we ignore the fact that banks have an ability to circumvent regulations and make use of loopholes in the law.

Bundesbank, Frankfurt – 26 September 2019 Speech in the presence of Jens Weidmann  by François Villeroy de Galhau Governor of the Banque de France  « Household Expectations »  1  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to open - with my colleague Jens Weidmann - this joint Bundesbank - Banque de France conference on households’ expectations. I would like to thank warmly the Bundesbank: this FrenchGerman cooperation testifies that our two institutions can promote and contribute to good research on a very topical policy issue. Over the past year, the decline of market inflation expectations has been pronounced while households’ expectations have been increasing quite steadily. This divergence is a challenge for our assessment on inflation expectations. All the interesting papers presented in the next couple of days will illustrate how much we can learn on inflation expectations when observing them outside financial markets. I. Inflation expectations: a key issue for monetary policy  I.1. Policy relevance for Central Banks  Stable inflation expectations at a level close to our target are - of course - key for our monetary policy: they provide a strong nominal anchor helping us to stabilize inflation when facing large demand or supply shocks. Since the 1990s, management of inflation expectations through central bank communication has become a standard tool for monetary policy. A lot of evidence suggests that this policy has contributed to anchor inflation expectations and to reduce their volatility, while facing strong inflationary or deflationary shocks.
When money available to investors is close to free and is widely available, and there is a presumption that the central bank will keep it that way indefinitely, discount rates applied to assessing the value of future cash flows shift downward, making for lower hurdle rates for valuations. A bull market for stocks and other claims on tradable companies ensues; the financial world looks rather comely. Market operators donning beer goggles and even some sober economists consider analysts like Boockvar party poopers. But I have found myself making arguments similar to his and to those of other skeptics at recent FOMC meetings, pointing to some developments that signal we have made for an intoxicating brew as we have continued pouring liquidity down the economy’s throat. Among them: •  Share buybacks financed by debt issuance that after tax treatment and inflation incur minimal, and in some cases negative, cost; this has a most pleasant effect on earnings per share apart from top-line revenue growth. •  Dividend payouts financed by cheap debt that bolster share prices. •  The “bull/bear spread” for equities now being higher than in October 2007. •  Stock market metrics such as price-to-sales ratios and market capitalization as a percentage of gross domestic product at eye-popping levels not seen since the dot-com boom of the late 1990s.

Under the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke, all 12 Federal Reserve Bank presidents, together with the sitting governors of the Federal Reserve Board, have input into the decision-making process. There is a formal vote – regardless of who is the Fed chair – that includes only five of the 12 regional Bank presidents plus the governors, but all of the principals seated at the table participate fully in the discussion of what to do. And yet, either because we will effect a change in the chairmanship starting in February or because at the last meeting we took the step of tapering back by a small amount our massive purchase of Treasuries and MBS, great attention is being placed on the voters for 2014, of which I am one. Two comments I recently read have been buzzing around my mind as I think about the many issues that will condition my actions as a voter. 1  “It’s Alright”, words and music by Waylon Jennings, copyright Waylon Jennings Music, 1980. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Beer goggles … The first was by Peter Boockvar, who is among the plethora of analysts offering different viewpoints that I regularly read to get a sense of how we are being viewed in the marketplace.
16  There is nonetheless some heterogeneity across banks, owing to differences in factors such as the composition of their private sector credit and debt securities portfolios, their international presence or the extent of their lending under the ICO programme. For instance, the impact of the scenarios on firms’ probability of default varies notably according to their size and sector of activity. These factors and others, such as the relative weight of mortgage credit (relatively safer) and lending to firms, mean that impairment losses are more prevalent at some banks than at others in Spain. Conclusions In short, the Spanish banking industry looks to maintain satisfactory aggregate resilience were the extreme macro-financial risks identified to materialise. While the materialisation of such risks would entail a significant capital charge in the sector, this would not be so substantial as to jeopardise the stability of the financial system under the scenarios analysed. In any event, the current uncertain environment calls for prudent behaviour on the part of the industry and the careful monitoring of risks, which may evolve rapidly and require that new stress scenarios be considered. Moreover, the short and medium-term challenges I refer to above must not allow us to overlook the need to address the structural challenges already facing the banking sector before the onset of the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In particular, the need for capacity adjustment and the growing competition from tech firms, as well as the potential adverse impact of climate-related risks. 17

Another benefit of centralisation of portfolio management through delegation is that it allows firms to aggregate the execution of trades across vehicles, thereby achieving better outcomes for the end investor. It enables multi-manager funds that allow investors to diversify exposure to managers while minimising costs. And from an investor protection standpoint, centralised portfolio management allows investment firms to more efficiently address ‘fair allocation’ requirements – fairly allocating purchases or sales across all clients in similar strategies and to aggregate similar strategies when forming the performance ‘composites’ that are presented to prospective clients. Delegation, of course, has to exist within a framework of regulation to ensure investor protection. Fund managers need to delegate responsibly. Delegation must not be allowed to become devolution. Managers should not use delegation to escape their obligations and accountability for managing their investors’ money. They must supervise and track activities that have been delegated. And the entities to which they delegate must be regulated appropriately in their own jurisdictions. Supervisors in the respective jurisdictions need to be able and willing to cooperate. There are of course already global norms covering delegation. In 2000, IOSCO set out broad principles to underpin the regulation of delegated functions. In the EU, these have been already implemented through the likes of UCITS and AIFMD. I do not want to comment here on the detail and motivation of the current EU proposals.
Eva Srejber: Globalisation and the IMF  Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at The Social-Domocratic Student Club, Stockholm, on 19 September 2000. *  *  *  Thank you for the opportunity of coming here to Stockholm University and meeting you from the different social-democratic student clubs in Stockholm and others among you who have seen posters here at the University. In a week’s time, the International Monetary Fund, IMF, will have its annual meetings with the World Bank in Prague. We will probably see demonstrations at these meetings - in the same way as we saw at the World Trade Organisation’s meeting last winter and at the IMF and World Bank meetings in Washington in April. In a short time, the IMF has increasingly become the subject of debate, not least since it is closely associated with the controversial and often hard-to-interpret economic trend called “globalisation”. The Riksbank has a reason for taking part in this debate. Most of you will be aware that one of our tasks is to maintain stable prices. The other main task of the Riksbank is to promote financial stability and an efficient payment system and to issue banknotes and coins. As part of this task, we participate in various international organisations which work for financial stability, among other things we are the contact authority for the IMF in Sweden.

The benefits of integrated supervision rest on the synergies between banking supervision and monetary policy given that banks play the crucial role in monetary policy transmission mechanism. In such a context, the supervisory information regarding the individual banks’ health can be highly beneficial to central banks in enhancing monetary policy effectiveness. On the other hand, expanding the central bank’s mandate with additional tasks may pose challenges with respect to central bank governance. As noted by Georgsson et al. (2015) the broader the mandate a central bank has, the more often it will be forced to find a balance between different objectives, tasks and tools. Studying the implications of financial stability tasks on central bank governance, BIS (2009) underlines the need for effective governance arrangements that should be designed to deliver sustainable conduct of monetary policy functions in combination with the additional mandate to contribute to financial stability. Further, the Report stresses the importance of clarity with respect to financial stability responsibilities, policy transparency as to promote accountability, full autonomy to safeguard against political pressures and undue influence from business and industry and close collaboration with other regulators in the country. Another important aspect is the central bank balance sheet which should be sound enough with strengthened risk-bearing capacity to enable successful implementation of monetary policy and support financial stability in case of emergency. Going back to banking supervision, besides the institutional setup, another important question raised by the crisis relates to the role of transparency and accountability in promoting more effective banking supervision.