samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The success of the SNB cannot be measured in terms of our annual results but by whether we fulfil our mandate, which is to ensure price stability while taking account of the development of the economy. In order to fulfil this task, the minimum exchange rate remains necessary for the foreseeable future. And so we return to the starting point of my presentation. I will repeat what I said before, that only the minimum exchange rate can prevent an undesired tightening of monetary conditions, should the upward pressure on the Swiss franc increase once again. Should it become necessary, we will therefore enforce the minimum exchange rate by buying foreign currency in unlimited quantities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Firstly, it enhances the potential for higher global growth, while also contributing towards some rebalancing of the global growth. Secondly, the strengthened international financial linkages allows for greater potential for the diversification of risks. The increase in the Islamic financial products, the growing number of assets classes being offered, the increased cross ownership of assets all have expanded the possibilities for greater diversification of risks and the potential for return. Today, Islamic finance represents a multi-billion dollar industry which has a presence in many countries and more recently, there has been widening participation by established financial centres. There are now more than 200 Islamic financial institutions, some of which are global players, offering an extensive range of Shariah compliant products and services to a broad spectrum of consumers and businesses that transcends beyond the Muslim world. This global forum has aimed to bring together the industry practitioners, issuers and investors, the regulators, scholars as well as those in related services, including the IT services, legal, accounting and auditing professionals and those in human resource development. It is our hope that the deliberations today will play a catalytic role in building greater collective efforts through multistakeholder dialogues and network-building activities whilst discovering opportunities and also improving our understanding on important areas in Islamic finance. Ladies and Gentlemen, As we know today, there are already clusters of cross-border collaborative activities taking place on several fronts that serve to contribute towards increasing the international integration process of Islamic finance.
Financial liberalization is now leading to banking internationalization where surplus funds flow crossborder to finance deficit units, i.e., international intermediation. In this background, it is now realized by Regulations that the high mobility of capital flows creates enormous risks to internationalized banks and to international systems, if the individual fund management systems of such banks are not sound. This requires Regulators to place even greater weight upon the efficacy of the governance systems since the failure of such institutions could be catastrophic to the well being of the entire global financial systems. In addition, the ill effects of money laundering, financing of illegal activities, and the financing of terrorism through the banking system are further risks that are faced by banks due to this growing internationalization. These too, need to be addressed by stakeholders who are involved in the development of the evolving systems. To deal with these challenges, Regulators now have to close ranks internationally as well, and attempt to harmonize prudential requirements to monitor risks of international financial conglomerates, and in this regard, we all must be somewhat relieved that the Basel capital accord has provided a clear framework for us to apply on the subject. As we all know, the Basel code of Corporate Governance for banks and financial institutions covers 8 principles. These are: •  Principle 1: Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear understanding of their role in Corporate Governance and be able to exercise sound judgment about the affairs of the bank.

Nevertheless, in our collective endeavour to pump the patient with as many drugs and tests  BIS Review 24/2007  1  we could possibly administer (may be because we could avoid law suits relating to professional negligence by doing so! ), a plethora of new rules and regulations have been churned out and these keep being churned out at regular intervals. But, with all that frenzied activity, the vexed question that keeps on haunting stakeholders is: Will today’s regulations suffice to inoculate companies from crises in the future and keep them healthy? Will these rules help to maintain and sustain investors’ trust in companies? Will these laws and regulations help to stimulate institutions instead of stifling them? Will these efforts actually build trust and confidence in the overall system? Of course, we have to readily admit that if not for the quick responses in the aftermath of Enron and others, the damage could have been too much to bear. The repercussions and loss of confidence could have been too serious to contemplate. But, at the same time, a painful truth has also emerged. i.e., that laws, rules, regulations and Codes, by themselves do not ensure good corporate behavior. However powerful and strong the new vaccines appear to be, however effective the treatment seems to be, however professional and keen the doctor tries to be, new diseases will emerge. Some may be minor. But, ever so often, new strains will occur, that will place the system under severe threat.
Benoît Cœuré: Monetary policy, exchange rates and capital flows Speech by Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the 18th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, hosted by the International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 3 November 2017. * * * I would like to thank T. Kostka, A. Mehl, I. Van Robays and J. Gräb for their contributions to this speech. I remain solely responsible for the opinions contained herein. Central bank asset purchase programmes are often catalysts for significant cross-border capital flows. By compressing the (excess) return on domestic bonds, they encourage investors to rebalance their portfolios towards foreign, higher yielding assets.1 Such capital flows have reached historical dimensions in the case of the ECB’s asset purchase programme (APP), with both resident and non-resident investors moving out of euro-denominated securities and into bonds issued predominantly by the safest non-euro area sovereigns. I examined these flows in detail in a recent speech at the ECB’s Foreign Exchange Contact Group meeting.2 One intriguing observation I made in this speech was that there was no evidence of a causal link between such capital flows and exchange rate movements. Findings based on event studies instead suggest that, around the time of central bank asset purchase announcements, investors price the exchange rate mainly on the basis of the information these programmes provide to markets about the expected future path of short-term interest rates.

Option-adjusted spread on index of high-yield bonds issued in the US and spread to maturity on index of leveraged loans issued in the US measured relative to the spot Treasury curve. 9  Graham and Leary (2011), Harris and Raviv (1991). Atkinson (1967), Bernanke et al. (1996), Greenwood and Hanson (2013). 11 The characteristic feature of cov-lite loans is not that they have fewer covenants, but that the requirements bind less often, and in particular only in response to particular events (such as additional financing). More traditional, “cov-heavy” contracts require firms to meet such requirements continually (Becker and Ivashina (2016)). 10  15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  If you think there are parallels here with the subprime mortgage boom in the U.S., ahead of the last crisis, then you’d be right. Those too were grouped together and sold to investors as packages of loans, diluting the ability and incentive to monitor individual risks; they grew extremely rapidly, particularly in the last year or two of the boom – and, as it happens, they accounted at the peak for a similar share of their underlying market (13% of total U.S mortgage debt). We should recognise that, in aggregate, corporate leverage in the UK has fallen since the crisis (Chart 17, which includes bonds as well as bank loans).12 As with mortgages, interest payments on those debts remain well below average and, if bond markets are anything to go by, will remain so for quite a while yet.
Thus, any surprises in the evolution of the US monetary policy could affect  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  financial conditions – like they did in May of 2013 –, raising credit costs in world markets, reversing portfolio flows and depreciating emerging-country currencies against the US dollar. The beginning of a new cycle of quantitative expansion by the European Central Bank, plus similar announcements by the Bank of Japan, might reduce the likelihood and impact of these volatility episodes, depending on how these unconventional policies ultimately reflect in global lending conditions. A different risk has to do with the slowdown of emerging economies resulting in reduced capital flows. This because their assets become less attractive, all the more so in Latin America. A scenario in which the recent drop in commodity prices is prolonged or intensified, or where doubts about China’s performance resurge strongly, might trigger this kind of event. The scene may become more complex if at the same time long-term rates go up in the US, increasing the cost of external funding. It should also be considered that an increase in the cost of external financing could put upward pressure on local long-term interest rates. The decline in external and domestic long-term interest rates has motivated bond issues in both markets and local demand for type-3 mutual funds.

Nor Shamsiah perseverance  Mohd  Yunus:  Mastery,  adaptability  and  Remarks by Ms Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 2018 Kijang Emas Scholarship Award “Mastery, adaptability and perseverance”, Kuala Lumpur, 21 September 2018. * * * When I entered university in Australia many years ago, the Times named the Computer the ‘Man (or in this case, Machine) of the Year’. It was a significant signal in public consciousness on the importance of the computer. The byline was, “The Computer moves in”. The world then, as is now, was a world in a state of constant change. Today, we see that technology is at the forefront in transforming almost every aspect of our lives. It is doing so at an unprecedented and relentless pace. This is exciting, but also for many, it brings about the feeling of trepidation, discomfort and uncertainty. Therefore, as both of you begin your next chapter of your life, I encourage you to make the most of your years in university, to not only excel in your chosen discipline, but also to absorb lessons that will serve you well in life. Let me just mention three today: mastery, adaptability and perseverance. First, on mastery. Even in a world where knowledge decays quickly, mastering a field of knowledge is the foundation in building one’s expertise and credibility. Mastery is not mere information accumulation. It is the ability to understand the inter-linkages between complex and evolving situations.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Some thoughts on IMF reform on crisis prevention and crisis resolution Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, presented to the G-20 Workshop on Reform of Bretton Woods Institutions, Tokyo, 28 February 2006. *  *  *  Thank you Chairman, First, let me thank the Ministry of Finance of Japan for inviting me to this workshop on the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions. This workshop is another reminder that the work on IMF reform is still ongoing. Next year will be a full ten years since the height of the Asian financial crisis. Over the past decade, many important ideas on the reform of the IMF have been advanced, but still there is no consensus on how the reform should move forward. I see today’s workshop as another opportunity to contribute to this ongoing debate. And whatever the outcome may be, the reform will certainly mark a critical turning point for the global economy, as the Bretton Woods Institutions attempt to adapt their roles and responsibilities to the forces of globalization. Today, I have been asked to speak on IMF crisis prevention and crisis resolution. Given the limitation of time, and the fact that the recommendations on these two issues have been many and are well-known, I thought the best way for me to add value to today’s discussion is to share with you our thoughts on the subject, as well as to make three specific points.

The first point is how the Fund can improve its surveillance by focusing on how best to reduce the likelihood of crises in emerging markets, in particular, how to help emerging markets better cope with the challenge of the next crisis. The second is our view that the Fund’s surveillance and its works on crisis resolution should recognize the usefulness of national and regional self-insurance efforts that are being pursued by a growing number of countries. And the third is our suggestion that the Fund’s works on crisis prevention and crisis resolution can benefit from a clear separation of these two functions in terms of duties, responsibilities, and decisionmaking, so as to achieve greater effectiveness and accountability. To begin, the consensus seems to be that the Fund has not been doing a good-enough job on crisis prevention and crisis resolution. This is evidenced by a string of financial crises in emerging markets that had happened, which does not reflect well on the Fund’s surveillance mechanism. In addition, dissatisfactions were expressed in the Fund’s perceived lack of consistency and coherence in its approach to crisis resolution, in the shortcomings of its program design and conditionality, and most importantly, in the way political pressure from the major economies were allowed to influence the program content and decisions. In the Thai case, our own experience with IMF involvement was not dissimilar.
- by discouraging the repetitive and unjustified recourse to short-term contracts, including by some employees themselves, the recent unemployment insurance reform provides better incentives to work and to manage companies' human resources in a long term perspective. It will be necessary to assess whether it is both sufficiently effective and sufficiently fair. - of course, there remains the issue of wage increases when it comes to enhancing job attractiveness. These are currently highly expected by our fellow citizens in the face of the inflationary hump; but we must prevent the return of a general price-wage spiral, which would be a loss for all. Nevertheless, for certain jobs where there is a deficit not in skills but in attractiveness, wage increases and negotiated improvements in working conditions are the key. Page 12 sur 15 All these levers for influencing labour supply must be combined, instead of being too often opposed to one another in our public debate. They must be used with perseverance, rather than remain fleeting announcements. Only then can we find the other two missing thirds to gain the half point of potential growth in five years. Only then can we hope to achieve a 5% unemployment rate in ten years. And only then, and I'm coming to this point, will we finally be able keep our public spending under control. 2) Public finances and debt The figures on public debt are well known.

I am passionately convinced of the need for a public service, and affected by its current crisis: its necessary modernisation, its re-legitimisation, recognition for civil servants, is not incompatible with its capacity to perform and innovate, on the contrary. The transformation of the Banque de France is a modest but real example. The idea is not to reduce public spending overall, but to stabilise it. Bringing spending growth down to 0.5% per year from 2023 onwards would lower the debt ratio to 100% of GDP in ten years, assuming the rate of tax and social security contributions remains constant - I insist on this condition; stabilising our spending in volume terms would enable us to reduce our debt even further, to 90% of GDP. The target to be set is obviously a matter for democratic debate. But the most important thing is that the targets set for this "overall spending limit" actually be respected, which unfortunately our country has never been able to do in the long term. The choice of priorities or savings to be made also legitimately belong to the political debate. I would just like to point out that the key issue of the quality of spending is the blind spot in our budgetary debate, whereas it can guide us here. Economic analysis shows that spending for the future – most investment, education, research – has a much better "multiplier" effect on growth over time than simple current spending.
For discussions of how the crisis has affected views on monetary policy and the work of the central banks, see for instance Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2013). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  I began by noting how easy it is to get caught in what I called the prevailing paradigm. But if we had fastened in a monetary policy paradigm prior to the crisis, where we believed that we had found the right solutions, I think that we are now in a situation where there is an unusually large sense of caution when looking ahead. We have all been thoroughly shaken up. The crisis had not been predicted, and inflation targeting alone could not prevent it. We now need to learn lessons from this and to analyse in-depth the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability and how it can best be taken into account in monetary policy. At the same time, it is of course important to ensure that we don’t, as they say, throw the baby out with the bathwater, and that inflation targeting and all the good it has done are abandoned. It is without doubt a rather revolutionary period we are in and it will be very interesting to follow how central banks and their activities develop over the next ten years – even if I myself will be watching from the side-lines. Figure 1.

Following in their footsteps, domestic conglomerates like Samsung and Daewoo started investing in film financing and video production. Korea’s experience above illustrates an important lesson for economic development. Properly structured development institutions can be a potent agent of change for private sector investment, drive growth, and forge inclusive societies. It can do a lot of good. But in reality, the real challenge is how to replicate the key factors that contribute to the success, and to achieve this more consistently across different political, economic and social contexts. With this in mind, let me outline the crucial factors that might help us understand this phenomena: a. First, a mindset shift to contribute more broadly to catalyse new growth areas; b. Second, the need to strengthen accountability frameworks; c. Third, the continuous cultivation of a strong culture of innovation; and d. Fourth, a robust corporate governance. Stepping up to the plate by further developing the non-lending roles More than ever, development financial institutions need to step up to promote new growth areas. They should perform a broader role to stimulate economic activity that would not otherwise take place. They could also improve the quality and scale of such activities. They can provide unique value propositions in terms of advisory and nurturing new growth sectors to become profitable and thus, attractive for private investors. I will highlight two successful examples. Firstly, in the Korean Wave example, they were the first to spearhead investments in the film and music industry.
Australia is one example. Fluctuations in commodity prices entail changes in countries’ terms of trade, which measures the ratio of export to import prices. Changes in the terms of trade have an impact on the exchange rate, which in turn dampens the impact on profitability. The exchange rate acts as a buffer. In the 1990s, the  BIS Review 20/2002  1  fluctuations in Norway’s terms of trade were especially wide. Changes in oil prices were an important reason for this. The krone exchange rate has not fluctuated much compared with other countries. The Petroleum Fund acts as a buffer against fluctuations in the oil price, because the Fund’s capital is invested abroad. This contributes to stabilising the krone exchange rate. We must, nevertheless, be prepared for fluctuations in the krone that are more in line with the fluctuations observed in other countries. Changes in the global economy can affect the krone exchange rate. The exchange rate may also react to and contribute to curbing the effects of domestic disturbances. The floating exchange rate is by and large a well-suited instrument for absorbing unforeseen disturbances to the economy. A stronger krone may, for example, prevent demand pressures from translating into higher price inflation. As history and the experience of other countries have taught us, the real economic losses associated with eliminating high inflation and curbing inflation expectations are considerably higher than those associated with a variable nominal exchange rate.

Caleb M Fundanga: The new K10,000 banknote in Zambia Opening remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official launch of the new K10,000 banknote, Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 16 June 2008. *  *  *  • Members of the Press • Official from commercial banks present • Ladies and Gentlemen I wish to welcome you all to the Bank of Zambia. The objective of this Press Briefing is to announce the introduction of the new K10,000 banknote in our economy. The new K10,000 banknote will be put into circulation as early as this week. By showing you the new K10,000 banknote first, we expect that you will, in turn, help us to inform the public about this new banknote. In order for us to help you understand the new K10,000 banknote, we have produced posters and will make a short power point presentation. The posters are showing the main public recognition and security features of the new K10,000 banknote. Let me from the outset inform you that although we are calling it a new K10,000 banknote, most of the features on the banknote are still the same as those on the current K10,000 banknotes. The differences can best be detected by comparing this new K10,000 banknote with the current K10,000 banknotes in circulation.