samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
What is not acceptable is to fall between regimes – for instance to argue that by holding backing assets such as sovereign bonds that are in general much safer than those on a bank’s balance sheet, this is good enough to ensure convertibility into fiat money at par. Low risk is not the same as no risk. This is why the FPC set out in its Financial Stability Report that stablecoins used in systemic payment chains should meet the standards equivalent to those expected of commercial bank money in relation to stability of value, robustness of legal claim and the ability to redeem at par in fiat. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Some major stablecoin proposals do not appear at present to meet this expectation  Some stablecoin proposals do not include a legal claim for coin-holders. And some stablecoins propose backing in instruments that may have material market, credit and liquidity risk, but do not have the money protections I have outlined. While this might be acceptable for speculative investment purposes, it would not be for payments widely relied upon by households and businesses. Stablecoins need to offer coin-holders a robust claim, with supporting mechanisms and protections to ensure they can be redeemed at any time 1-to-1 into fiat currency. Some may ask if this would rule out a multi-currency stablecoin? Such a proposition is the wrong place to start – it raises questions around the value of the coin, and the underlying money it represents.

2 See Draghi (2015), “Monetary Policy: Past, Present and Future”, speech at the Frankfurt European Banking  Congress, 20 November 2015. 3 Using the Phillips curve approach presented in Box 2 of the ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 3 / 2016. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
•  Thirdly, a fund owned by the government must be highly transparent, not only to the Norwegian public but also in an international context. Let me elaborate on these aspects. In the early summer of 2007, the fund’s strategic equity share was raised from 40 to 60 percent. From summer 2007 to 2009, the fund bought equities worth USD 180 billion in international markets, equivalent to 0.5 percent of all globally listed equities. The largest volume of transactions was carried out in the midst of the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The long-term horizon also enables us to invest countercyclically, by rebalancing asset classes: If the equity share increases by more than 4 percentage points from the target weight of 60 percent, we will sell equities and buy bonds. Conversely, if the equity share drops below 56 percent, we will sell bonds and buy equities. The capacity to withstand market turmoil was demonstrated during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. For a period of 18 months, the fund’s losses totalled roughly USD 120 billion – more than 25 percent of Norway’s GDP. The losses did not go unnoticed. They led to lively public debate on the fund’s investment strategy. However, the conclusion drawn was that the strategy was robust, and the government remained committed to it.10 Norway would have to accept that the fund’s capital would fluctuate, sometimes dramatically, given the high equity share. Indeed, through 2009 and 2010, not only were those losses reversed, but additional gains were also made.

Chart: Key policy rate in the baseline scenario The degree of transparency regarding Norges Bank’s interest rate decisions has increased gradually since inflation targeting was introduced. We provide clear guidance about the future path of the key policy rate. Explicit interest rate forecasts were introduced in 2005. A key objective is to convey the contingency and the uncertainty in the forecast. To that end, we seek to be transparent about the considerations underlying each interest rate forecast and what the objectives and trade-offs are. We consider it important to explain why our forecast has changed. In our Monetary Policy Report, the interest rate forecast is accompanied by a separate chart showing the revision since the previous report due to changes in news and new assessments. Monetary policy also seeks to mitigate the risk of a build-up of financial imbalances. Operationally, and as a support to monetary policy decisions, our objectives and trade-offs are described by a monetary policy loss function7 The loss function is minimised subject to our model of the Norwegian economy, and the implied interest rate path is an important aid to the policy decision process8 Since models are simplifications, our projections are based on a combination of model analyses and professional judgement. Transparency allows financial market participants and other interested parties to make their own judgments on the revisions to our interest rate forecast – and the revisions will often be anticipated.
Like the MPC, it has external members, drawn from outside the Bank’s executive team, a published record of its meetings and a regular Financial Stability Report to explain how it is using its powers to achieve its statutory objectives. There is substantial cross-membership between these two Committees to ensure effective policy co-ordination. But though the institutional set up for the Financial Policy Committee mirrors that of the Monetary Policy Committee, the nature of its task is different. The Monetary Policy Committee is, in the main, engaged with guiding the economy towards the best achievable path for output consistent with keeping inflation at target – or with bringing it back to target. In the jargon – which some of you in the logistics field, for example, may be familiar with – the problem is one of “optimal control” or “dynamic programming”. What setting for interest rates is consistent, looking forward, with the best central outlook for the economy? The Financial Policy Committee’s job is really about identifying risks and preventing them from crystallising. This is not just about the most likely and visible risks. What we learned in the financial crisis was that the financial system, has a myriad of connections and actors and a phenomenal ability to change and adapt. It needs to be thought of as a complex “ecosystem”. At times of stress, it can behave in very extreme ways – or break down altogether. In such a world, it is not enough to know that every individual part is managing its own risk.

•  Indeed, these investigations must be undertaken hand in hand with private intermediaries. The tokenisation of finance creates a new ecosystem which is also a challenge for them, especially as their role could be transformed by decentralised technologies. •  And we need to ensure that this ecosystem is fully interoperable with legacy securities and payment systems, which are likely to remain an important element of the landscape. •  In that context, our goal at the Banque de France is to facilitate responsible innovation from the market, while safeguarding the use of central bank money and thus financial stability. •  My final point is to say that today’s discussion showed that central banks need to further their exploration of new technologies to prepare for the future of finance. This is the goal that Banque de France has been pursuing since the launch of its first experiments on wholesale CBDC in 2020. We are now taking this endeavour a step further with a second round of experiments. Let me stress that it is a collective work, whose conclusions will feed the Eurosystem’s reflection on CBDC. •  The entry into force of the European "pilot regime" next year offers an invaluable opportunity for private players but also for public players. In this sense, offering settlement solutions in central bank money - for the cash leg of transactions involving tokenised securities - could allow tokenised finance to benefit from the most secure and liquid asset. •  Thank you again for your participation. Page 3/3
Several years ago, Rich Lyons, Dean at Berkeley’s Haas School of Business, spoke at the San Francisco Fed and talked about culture in a way that has stuck with me ever since. Transforming a culture is a five- to ten-year project; keeping it that way is an ongoing mission that requires strong leadership and consistent action. As a leader of a large organization, I’ve taken that message to heart. I’ve found that a culture based on the principle of open and authentic dialogue, that embraces our diverse backgrounds and perspectives delivers better results. I’ve found that well-defined collective values and direction lead to greater collaboration and innovation. Finally, I’ve found that this work is never a finished project, but an ongoing one that constantly evolves. I started by saying that I feel a sense of urgency in addressing banking culture. So where do I see the priorities for supervision? As supervisors, we need to ensure that bank management and boards are exerting strong and effective leadership with robust governance. That means holding management and boards of directors to high standards in terms of culture and conduct, even when the numbers look rosy. It means ensuring corporate values are clearly articulated and incentives are squarely align with a bank’s strategic goals. It means identifying, communicating, and mitigating risks in a timely and 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  effective manner. It means that employees feel empowered to raise their hands if they see wrongdoing, and that comprehensive fixes are implemented when something goes wrong.

Rosthom Fadli: IMFC Statement Statement by Mr Rosthom Fadli, Governor of the Bank of Algeria, on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan and Tunisia, at the forty-third meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Virtual IMF Spring Meetings, Washington DC, 8 April 2021. * * * The COVID-19 crisis has taken a heavy economic toll and caused tragic loss of lives and immense human suffering. No country has been spared. The synchronized, forceful, and timely global policy response prevented a worse outcome, but the damage has been still very significant and widespread. The recovery is gaining momentum, though its course and pace are highly dependent on the dynamics of the pandemic. The pandemic’s long term scarring effects are also still uncertain. The crisis has exacted a heavy toll on the low-income countries (LICs), in many cases reversing, in a matter of few short months, their hard-earned gains achieved over decades in alleviating poverty and improving social conditions. The vulnerable groups—youth, women, low skill labor and workers in the informal sector—have been hardest hit. The crisis has pushed millions of people into extreme poverty and severe food insecurity in addition to millions already suffering. Saving lives is still the highest priority. Multiple waves of the virus and its still uncontrolled spread in some regions pose serious threats to the global fight against the pandemic and further loss of lives.
The lessons learned from the Great Depression and the commitment on the part of policymakers around the world to ensure that the misery that it caused will not replicate itself this time have prevented the current situation from causing even more severe disruptions. One particular aspect of the current crisis has been the synchrony among different countries. The financial earthquake that devastated developed markets last September and October and its aftershocks that swept over the financial systems of every economy, over output prospects in the world, over income and wealth, just to name a few, propagated to expectations which deteriorated across the entire world. The Chilean economy has not been absent to this phenomenon. As we said in the very beginning, our economy is not and cannot be immune. You can see it in the latest figures and projections contained in this Monetary Policy Report. The channels and mechanisms through which the crisis is transmitted to our economy are varied, and the severe international shock that hit us during the fourth quarter of last year has had damaging repercussions locally, even more so than we foresaw in January. A question that arises naturally is, why the big impact on our economy? Unfortunately, no single answer exists and only time and the gathering of information will allow us more certainty.

Growth in compensation per employee fell slightly in the last quarter of 2018 from 2.5% to 2.2%, but remains just above its long-term average. Unit labour cost growth rose to 2.4% in the same period, partly driven by a fall in productivity growth reflecting the resilience of employment growth to the economic slowdown. The key question – and one currently being asked in many advanced economies – is why these labour cost pressures are not already being reflected in rising prices. Underlying inflation has moved broadly sideways over the last year, repeatedly falling short of expectations and staying below the levels recorded before 2008. Academic literature based on US data has responded by casting doubt on the link between labour costs and inflation, in particular at shorter horizons. Studies find no conclusive results on whether, empirically, labour costs tend to precede or follow prices. 10 This has led to a debate as to whether “cost-push” models from wages to prices can still accurately describe the inflation process. There are certainly a number of forces at work today that make forecasting inflation more complex, not least the effects of globalisation and digitalisation. Yet research by ECB staff finds that, unlike in the United States, the structural conditions for pass-through from wages to prices remain in place in the euro area.
These balance sheet linkages have altered the risks we face but they are an inevitable consequence of the free movement of capital, which has brought with it new opportunities for us all. Any answer to the question of what role the IMF should nowplay must recognise these balance sheet linkages. The size and composition of balance sheets is crucial for determining how shocks are transmitted across national borders. And surprises about economic policy and news about economic fundamentals can, by generating changes in desired balance sheet positions, have large impacts on capital and expenditure flows. 3  This principle is also illustrated by the United Kingdom. Between 1946 and 1971, the UK had four IMF programmes. The maximum current account deficit at the start of those programs was 1% of GDP. Since 1998, the UK current account deficit has not been less than 1.5% of GDP but has been financed fully through private markets. 4  Greenspan, A (2005), “International Imbalances”, Remarks before the Advancing Enterprise Conference, London. 5  Lane, P. and G. Milesi-Ferretti (2005), “Financial Globalisation and Exchange Rates”, IMF Working paper 05/3. BIS Review 11/2006  3  Is there a need for an international monetary institution? In the post-Bretton Woods world, do we need an international financial institution, and what would be its role? Or has the international capital market replaced the need for such a public institution by providing both finance to, and discipline on, countries?

He hoped that the Bretton Woods twins, Master Fund and Miss Bank, would receive three gifts from their fairy-godmothers: first, a many-coloured coat “as a perpetual reminder that they belong to the whole world”; second, a box of vitamins to encourage “energy and a fearless spirit, which does not shelve and avoid difficult issues, but welcomes them and is determined to solve them”; third, “a spirit of wisdom … so that their approach to every problem is absolutely objective”. Keynes warned the delegates that this was asking a great deal: “there is scarcely any enduringly successful experience yet of an international body which has fulfilled the hopes of its progenitors”. So he hoped that the malicious fairy would not bring its curse upon the twins: “you two brats shall grow up politicians; your every thought and act shall have an arrière-pensée; everything you determine shall not be for its own sake or on its own merits but because of something else". And if the IMF were to become politicised then, Keynes said, it would be best for the twins "to fall into an 2 eternal slumber, never to waken or be heard of again in the courts and markets of Mankind". Sixty years on, the wisdom of Keynes's position at Savannah is clear. In recent years, the critics have charged that all three of the virtues of universalism, energy and wisdom have been lacking in the IMF. And if not in a deep slumber, then the Fund has appeared drowsy.
As part of ongoing measures to further strengthen the resilience of Islamic finance, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in collaboration with the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has formed a Task Force on Islamic Finance and Global Financial Stability in 2008 to analyse and propose specific recommendations on the role and contribution of Islamic finance in promoting global financial stability and to outline the areas for strengthening the Islamic financial infrastructure including for putting in place the building blocks for liquidity and crisis management in the Islamic financial system. In this recent decade, the increasing internationalisation of Islamic finance is being accompanied by new emerging global patterns of financial and economic interlinkages. This can be observed in the strengthening of ties in recent years between Asia and the Middle East in trade and investments in a wide range areas. Both Asia and the Middle East are increasingly recognised as dynamic growth regions in the global economy. The two regions have a history of strong trade ties that flourished on the old Silk Road, which served as a major global conduit between the ancient civilisations in the East and West until about the 14th century. Islamic finance today has revitalised these economic ties with the strengthening of the financial linkages between Asia and the Middle East, a trend that will generate mutually reinforcing growth prospects. The emergence of these new financial centres in Asia and the Middle East and their increased integration has paved the foundations for a New Silk Road.

Among Iceland’s major trading partners, weighted output growth measured 0.8% in 2012, as opposed to 1.7% in 2011. To a degree, the capital controls have shielded the Icelandic financial system from the euro area crisis. The effects felt through external trade were unavoidable, however, and Iceland’s terms of trade deteriorated over the course of the year, while the import purchasing power of export revenues stagnated. This played a part in slowing down output growth, even though Iceland’s growth rate was much faster than in trading partner countries. According to preliminary figures from Statistics Iceland for 2012 as a whole, output growth measured 1.6% during the year, which is somewhat below the Central Bank’s February forecast of 2.2%. On the other hand, year-2011 growth figures have been revised upwards, from 2.6% to 2.9%. This is well in line with the Central Bank’s first forecast of GDP growth in 2011. It is not uncommon that output growth figures are revised upwards during upward cycles, when more detailed investment figures become available. It will be interesting to see how estimates of 2012 develop. Output growth in 2012 was driven by growth in private consumption and business investment, while other items, such as net trade and public consumption, made a slightly negative contribution. This is similar to the whole recovery phase in 2010–2012, where business investment and private consumption contributed to output growth more or less equally, with business investment holding a slight advantage.
First, incumbent banks have had their possible strategic responses to greater competition reviewed in our first exploratory stress exercise. 11  Second, existing bank liquidity regulation may need to adjust. Regulations currently treat customer deposits as ‘stable funding’, requiring banks to hold few liquid assets against them. As Open Banking develops, the stability of deposits connected via a central service provider will need to be monitored carefully. And third, frameworks for operational resilience, particularly cyber risk, will need to evolve too. 10  The combination of the revised European Payment Services Directive (PSD2) and the Competition and Markets Authority’s Open Banking reforms will require banks which provide online payment services to allow – at a customer’s request – third parties to access account information and/or to initiate payments via a single common Application Programming Interface (API). This was covered in a recent speech by Karina McTeague, Director of Retail Banking Supervision at the FCA. See https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/payments-after-psd2-evolution-or-revolution 11 See ‘Stress testing the UK banking system: 2017 results’, section 2 ‘The 2017 biennial exploratory scenario’, pp 12-22. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Such resilience is vital. That’s why we’re establishing clear expectations for the system’s ability to recover critical services after an attack. As customers access services increasingly through third party aggregators or payment service providers, that should not compromise the degree of resilience they can expect. The FCA has set out its initial expectations for these new entities.

It also has the ability to make Recommendations within the Bank, to HMT and to any other person, with a view to achieving its statutory objectives. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  The post-crisis reforms embody the lesson of that: keep up… …with the risks the system faces. And with the shape of the system as it shifts. To keep the system capable of serving in the bad times as well as the good. Today – declaring my obvious conflict of interest – I want to look back to consider how, over five years, we’ve got the system to a place where it can serve the economy in bad times as well as good. And then I want to look ahead, to the macro trends of Brexit, borrowing and the unbundling of banking and the challenges they present to keeping up. Looking back, we have largely corrected the fault lines that underlay the crisis. In particular, the banking system has been strengthened. Not everyone agreed it should be strengthened so much. But it was obvious that it needed to happen. The economic costs of major banks getting into distress are vast. So they must be able to withstand – and keep lending through – even very severe and rare economic events. That’s why we stress test them to economic scenarios more severe than the financial crisis. It’s why the largest banks must fund themselves with 10 times more capital than they did before the crisis.