samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This reduction in minimum CAR does not necessarily translate into a full 2% lowering of the total CAR requirements because in parallel with this, MAS will amend the rules for computing CAR, which is the second component of the package of CAR revisions. (ii)  Changes in CAR computation rules  One noteworthy revision to the computation rules will be a requirement for banks to set aside more capital for significant investments, commensurate with the risks associated with such investments. We had stated in August last year that this would be done, when we extended by two years the grace period for Singapore banks to divest non-financial businesses.2 Another significant revision is to allow banks to include 45% of the revaluation surpluses from banks’ holdings of property assets as well as portfolio equity investments as Upper Tier 2 capital. This will raise the capital available to banks, but it is unlikely to offset the higher capital that they will have to set aside for significant investments. In line with the policy of setting more transparent requirements, MAS will publish these CAR requirements and computation rules. Local banks will report their CAR based on the revised rules starting from their second quarter financial results. 1  MAS lowered the Tier 1 component from 12% to 10% in November 1998, and again from 10% to 8% in September 2000. 2  “Extension of grace period for banks divestment of non-financial businesses”, MAS Press Release, 22 August 2003.

Jean-Pierre Roth: No frontiers in monetary policy – from the fight to avoid internationalisation of the currency to the internationalisation of monetary policy Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss Institute of International Studies, Zurich, 6 May 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  In view of the challenges with which it has been faced, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) demonstrated its adaptability time and again. Over the past thirty years, for instance, it abandoned its endeavours to prevent the use of the Swiss franc as an international currency. Moreover, it has gradually incorporated international elements into its monetary policy strategy and its monetary policy instruments. The goal when making these adjustments was always to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy in order to protect the country from any inflationary trend. In managing the current crisis, both the internationalised monetary policy strategy and the internationalised policy instruments have served the SNB well thus far. BIS Review 552009  1
To the extent that these platforms operate across geographical borders, appropriate arrangements for cooperation among national supervisors must be in place. The third thrust is to move derivatives trading to platforms where appropriate. This will help to improve price transparency. Singapore is a major centre for exchange-traded derivatives in Asia. We are well placed to move more derivatives trades to organised platforms, but the extent would have to take into account the local context, such as product characteristics and participant profiles. The fourth thrust is to report trades. Mandatory trade reporting enhances supervision of derivatives markets by addressing information gaps. For this to be effective, regulators need timely access to relevant data that can be aggregated. This requires cross-border supervisory cooperation on data access and harmonisation of reporting requirements and standards. But national concerns have led to some jurisdictions setting up their own trade repositories, which could make data aggregation more challenging. MAS is assessing the need for a local repository and the appropriate regulatory regime to avoid duplication. In recent months, there has been a notion in some quarters that as tighter regulations are proposed for OTC derivatives in the US and EU, activity will flow to centres in Asia that are purportedly less tightly regulated. This is mistaken. Leading centres in Asia – like Singapore, Hong Kong, and Australia – are very much part of the G20 initiative and there is no room for regulatory arbitrage.

Trades that give a false or misleading appearance of market activity, actions to rig the prices of securities or futures, are all prohibited under our law and severely dealt with. MAS works closely with the Commercial Affairs Department to take enforcement actions ranging from civil penalties to criminal action. Last year saw the fruition of MAS’ first civil penalty court action. We secured civil penalties against a fund manager who was found by the High Court to have window-dressed his portfolio by creating a false appearance relating to the price of one of the component shares. The fund manager and its CEO were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $ each to MAS, as well as costs of the court action. The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The assistance that we sought, and obtained, from our foreign counterparts was vital to our success in this case. Similarly, MAS stands ready to assist our international counterparts in their enforcement efforts. Earlier this year, the Australian authorities successfully prosecuted a former fund manager of an Australian bank for insider trading. MAS had referred this case to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) and provided ongoing assistance during ASIC’s investigations. Infrastructure – sound and stable The final component of the capital market ecosystem is the infrastructure that supports the trading of securities and futures. Capital market participants trade either on a multilateral basis through organised exchanges, or bilaterally with each other over-the-counter or OTC.
Tharman Shanmugaratnam: Key issues in Asian financial markets Keynote address by Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the ACI (The Financial Markets Association) 52nd World Congress, Singapore, 15 March 2013. *  *  *  Mr. Manfred Wiebogen, ACI Global President Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen 1. I am delighted to be here today with all of you. 2. The last time Singapore hosted the ACI Congress was back in 2001. In fact, it was just before 9/11. The world was in a very different place. Asia too was so different from today. The wounds of the Asian crisis of the late 90s were still fresh. Investor confidence in the various countries in the region was uneven. And Asian capital markets were by and large in their infancy. The new financial landscape 3. We are now in a new phase in global finance. Global finance is deleveraging, after the great credit bubble that began more than a decade ago and came to an end in 2007. But deleveraging still has some way to go, and some years to go, before the overall level of leverage relative to economic activity gets back to a sustainable level. 4. The pace of deleveraging has been moderated so far by central banks, who have taken onto their balance sheets unprecedented levels of both public and private sector debt. Their actions have reduced the risks of catastrophe.

In addition, PBC and MAS together announced an expanded Currency Swap Facility last Friday. This will see a doubling in the size of the swap facility from RMB150 to RMB300 billion. The scope of the Currency Swap Facility will also be expanded to allow MAS to provide RMB liquidity to banks in Singapore, where needed. This backstop facility will further strengthen confidence in Singapore’s offshore RMB market, and encourage more financial institutions, corporates, and investors to step forward and participate in the RMB market via Singapore. 36. Secondly, with a strong RMB pool, Singapore can provide enhanced access to RMB funding for corporates and investors. Singapore is a major source of FDI to China and serves as the Asia-Pacific headquarters for many multinational companies (MNCs) and Asian corporates with operations in China. We also serve as the regional treasury centre for a large base of Chinese corporates. 37. With the new RMB clearing arrangements, we can expect financial institutions based in Singapore to reach out to local and regional corporate and investors and encourage greater participation in the offshore RMB market. 38 Thirdly, Singapore can support the integration of offshore RMB with Asian local currency markets and act as a test-bed for new RMB products. The development of a wider range of RMB products will be healthy. It will create additional ways in which corporates can redeploy their RMB funds in the offshore markets, and provide additional products for investment. 39.
Likewise, we cannot be specific today about the design of the “final” post-crisis operational framework. Before  8  BIS Review 51/2010  deciding on this, we will need to consider thoroughly the lessons to be learnt from the crisis. However, the operational framework that prevailed prior to the turmoil seems to provide a good benchmark. It served us well prior to the crisis, and could be adapted quickly as circumstances worsened. Concluding remarks Let me conclude. There is no doubt that the crisis will leave us a heritage of severe macroeconomic imbalances. Dealing with them will represent one of the most daunting challenges for policymakers in modern history. Against this backdrop, let me emphasise that the Governing Council will continue to deliver on its mandate, which is to maintain price stability over the medium term. All our decisions regarding an exit from supportive measures need to be seen within this context. As regards fiscal policies, it is essential to prevent public finances from running out of control. Clearly, this will require a very ambitious fiscal consolidation effort. In particular, as regards the consolidation strategy, and given that the tax burden is already high in many countries, the fiscal adjustment will have to be primarily expenditure-based. Finally, let me stress that any call to reduce the real value of public debt through higher inflation will be firmly opposed by the ECB. A low and stable level of inflation is a prerequisite for confidence, stability and sustainable growth. Thank you.

The short-term economic policy objective to reinforce aggregate demand by monetary and fiscal policy measures belongs to the first category. The ECB has lowered interest rates and considerably increased money market operations, i.e., the total volume of shortterm loans to banks. In addition, EU countries have agreed to support the economy in 2009 and 2010 by raising fiscal expenditure in the total amount of 1.8% of GDP. However, this is constrained by rapidly expanding deficits and external debts. Therefore it is important that EU Member States make already plans for reducing fiscal deficit in the next years. The European Commission stresses that in the current complicated economic environment the Stability and Growth Pact is still relevant. The longer-term objective in the EU is to achieve fiscal balance or surplus. Second of all, it is extremely important to restore confidence in the financial sector. The minimum rate of guaranteed deposits in the EU was raised to 50,000 euro already in 2008. Thereafter Member States have agreed upon common principles to support the banking system. At the end of 2008 Member States put the main focus on the banks' liabilities side to ensure banks would be able to finance their operations also in a more adverse market situation. To this end many countries have offered collaterals to loans taken by banks, i.e., the state guarantees the repayment of loans taken by banks. In several countries the government has made contributions to banks' capital and acquired holdings in commercial banks.
Norges Bank concurs with this view. Using the fund to attain policy objectives such as environmental, foreign, regional or industrial policy goals may easily come at the expense of high, long-term returns. The other area I would like to address is the division of responsibilities in the governance model. It must be explicit, with a clear division of roles and responsibilities. The current governance model for the GPFG is based on a delegation of responsibilities and powers from one level to another. A control and supervisory line runs in parallel from the manager upward to the Storting. Regardless of whether the fund remains under the aegis of the Bank or is organised in a separate entity, its governing bodies and management must be held to account. This also requires that the parties at the various levels in the governance hierarchy respect the powers and delegated authority actually conferred on them. A lack of clarity in decision-making responsibility may adversely affect investment management in the long term. The third potential pitfall concerns the composition of the board of a new management entity. The Central Bank Law Commission emphasises that such a board must have expertise in finance and investment management, but also expertise beyond the purely financial. In Norges Bank’s experience, a sound understanding of the GPFG’s role in the Norwegian economy and in economic policy is important for the board in discharging its tasks, and not least important in filling the role of key adviser to the Ministry on matters concerning the mandate and investment strategy.

In the current governance model, it is natural to think of the Ministry of Finance as the principal and Norges Bank as the agent. For the Ministry, the formulation of the management mandate, reporting and supervision will be important tools for ensuring that investments are managed in line with objectives. It is my view that the interests of the Ministry and the Bank largely coincide. All employees of the Bank are highly conscious of the Bank’s social mission. But there is no escaping the fact that the Bank has much more information about the investments and their management at its disposal than the Ministry. The Ministry has given Norges Bank a relatively detailed mandate for the management of the fund. The investment strategy is largely determined by this mandate. The mandate sets the benchmark index and tracking error limits. In addition, the mandate imposes constraints on the fund’s investment universe. The permitted deviations between the actual portfolio and the 2/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  benchmark portfolio are subject to defined limits, also known as index-tracking, which means that the GPFG’s return and investment risk are for the most part determined by the benchmark index. Chart: Return on the GPFG and the benchmark index The role of the Bank and the Executive Board in formulating and elaborating the management mandate is to advise the Ministry of Finance. This is an important job.
(Slide 5) The first and perhaps the most fundamental reason explaining why we believe that the reduction of inflation is so important is the following. According to public opinion polls, for about 70% of Russians the inflation not only remains the number one problem, but it is even becoming more acute. On these slides you see that the value of all other parameters and of all other problems that worry the Russians is going down, while the significance of inflation goes up. This is, perhaps, one of the most disturbing factors. High inflation erodes salaries and pensions, depreciates savings. In order to stop people being afraid of saving, to make them confident of their financial future and able of conducting organised savings (organised savings create conditions for long-term investments and, consequently, for economic growth), we believe that it is critically important to pursue a policy aimed at reducing the inflation. Now there are many concerns, and I would say these are justified concerns, about the problem of expensive loans in the Russian economy. It is true that interest rates on loans, especially for investment purposes, are high. But we should understand that, as a rule, it is the inflation that sets the lower limit for interest rates on deposits and loans. Why? Because neither households no businesses are inclined to bring their savings to banks, if the interest rate is not as high as the inflation.

The consumer price growth will slow down together with the exhaustion of the effect of the external factors that played a prominent role in the first half and in the middle of this year; exchange rate dynamics is also expected to normalise. With the stabilisation and subsequent reduction in inflation expectations during 2015, the baseline scenario predicts a gradual easing of the monetary policy. The more pronounced the downward trend in inflation and inflation expectations will be, the more accommodative the monetary policy may become. (Slide 3)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In addition to the baseline scenario, built on fairly optimistic assumptions, we have prepared two more alternative scenarios, number II and III. They are based on more negative assumptions. Scenario II predicts that the mutual sanctions and trade restrictions will remain during the whole period under review. This will lead to a certain increase in the capital outflows coupled with corresponding exchange rate dynamics. It should be noted that the ruble volatility, on the one hand, partially offsets the negative impact of external environment by maintaining the competitiveness of Russian producers and accelerating import substitution, however, on the other hand, it leads to enhanced inflationary pressures. Scenario II also assumes a possible increase in the tax burden. Due to the decision taken by the government on this issue, we plan to finalise this scenario. This scenario forecasts lower GDP growth rates compared with the baseline scenario (you can see it on the slide), and a slower decline in inflation.
In spite of delays in execution, the programme has, on the whole, been very successful. Our collaboration with the IMF according to the current economic programme will conclude in August, but of course, our long-standing co-operative relationship with the Fund will not end then. On behalf of the Central Bank, I would like to use this opportunity to thank the IMF and its staff for their efforts over the past two-and-a-half years. The conclusion of the IMF-supported programme and the implementation of the capital account liberalisation strategy bring the determination of Iceland’s future monetary  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and economic policy framework to the fore. That work has already begun, partly with the Central Bank’s December 2010 report entitled Monetary Policy in Iceland after Capital Controls. Let us think back for a moment to 1961, when the Central Bank of Iceland first opened its doors. As will be described in subsequent speeches, the Icelandic economy was changing rapidly at that time. A number of structural changes were well underway, and some of them are still in effect today. The policy of the time aimed at establishing market-based economic equilibrium in Iceland. Trade in goods and services was liberalised, and multiple exchange rates were supplanted by an exchange rate based on underlying economic conditions. Then, as now, Iceland was pursuing an economic programme in collaboration with the IMF. Then, as now, Iceland’s economic ties to the rest of the world were under review.

These Fintech companies, which possess some advantages over traditional banks such as state-of-the-art technology and no legacy operating infrastructures, have taken advantage of the opportunities offered by payment services regulation and exert additional competitive pressure on banks. Licensed Payment Institutions and Electronic Money Institutions, are smaller (in terms of size and complexity), and have a competitive advantage in terms of cost structure and overheads. Moreover, due to the fact that they are not licensed to hold customer deposits, in other words they are not banks, they are not burdened by red tape. However, they cannot effectively operate without the existence of traditional banks nor can their business model be sustained without banks. Bank accounts and customer deposits are a basic pillar for the functioning of the payments ecosystem. Therefore, the co-existence of these institutions and traditional banks is at the same time competitive and dependent. Competitive because PIs/EMIs have gained market share from traditional banks with respect to payment services and dependent because they rely on traditional banks in order to provide these services. In addition to the provision of payment and e-money services, a number of authorised PIs and EMIs in the EU are offering further (non-regulated) services such as peer-topeer lending, data analytics, information and communication technology related services, consultancy services, in-game payments and other payment-processing products.
What is happening is that people who use the scheme are getting a free ride at the expense of those who do not use it. Had the latter been consulted, they might well have preferred to see their taxes put to a different use. The other example comes from New York. Defending his proposal to introduce a congestion charge for vehicles entering Manhattan, Mayor Bloomberg is reported to have said that the question was not whether people wanted to pay, but how they wanted to pay: whether through a higher incidence of respiratory and other diseases and increased health care costs, or by reducing the number of polluting vehicles in the city and using the money collected through the charge to improve public transport. The Central Bank of Malta raised its central intervention rate twice last year and again in January. Wasn’t this risky for an economy finally showing growth? The primary objective of the Bank’s monetary policy is price stability. As is typical for small, open economies, however, the Bank does not target inflation directly. Instead, the Bank pursues this objective by using the exchange rate as its intermediate target and the level of the external reserves as its operational target. In the absence of capital controls, interest rates on the Maltese lira are inevitably influenced by those offered by the currency to which it is pegged, the euro.

When it comes to mutual insurance against asymmetric shocks, it is clear that fiscal risks do not always stem from fiscal action, but from unsustainable economic and financial policies elsewhere. Therefore, any move in this direction should be accompanied by a new convergence process towards more resilient economic structures. Such a process would allow us to advance together towards a better-equipped EMU, outlining a clear path of reform and a commitment to a fiscal capacity. Political convergence is needed to kick off such a process, as any new convergence process can only be as effective as the legitimacy underpinning it. Conclusion Let me conclude by saying that protection against moral hazard is of course very important. At the same time, it should not be used as a strategy to relegate the move towards a fiscal capacity for the euro area to never-never land. The move towards a fiscal capacity could take the form of a gradual and conditional process that allows us to move in parallel towards restored fiscal buffers at the national level, convergence in the capacity to absorb shocks at the national level and a strengthening of institutions at the euro area level, while moving, equally gradually, towards more central fiscal stabilisation. 3  See Cœuré, B.: “Drawing lessons from the crisis for the future of the euro area” speech at “Ambassadors Week”, Paris, 27 August 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  I think we should be more ambitious in that respect.