samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As Chairman Bernanke noted in his most recent press conference, a strong majority of FOMC participants no longer favor selling agency MBS securities during the monetary policy normalization process. This implies a bigger balance sheet for longer, which provides additional accommodation today and continuing support for mortgage markets going forward. Fourth, even under this scenario, a rise in short-term rates is very likely to be a long way off. Not only will it likely take considerable time to reach the FOMC’s 6.5 percent unemployment rate threshold, but also the FOMC could wait considerably longer before raising short-term rates. The fact that inflation is coming in well below the FOMC’s 2 percent objective is relevant here. Most FOMC participants currently do not expect short-term rates to begin to rise until 2015. To reiterate what I said last week, some commentators have interpreted the recent shift in the market-implied path of short-term interest rates as indicating that market participants now expect the first increases in the federal funds rate target to come much earlier than previously thought. Setting aside whether this is the correct interpretation of recent price moves, let me emphasize that such an expectation would be quite out of sync with both FOMC statements and the expectations of most FOMC participants. Regional economic conditions Turning to the regional economy, my colleagues and I at the New York Fed continually track conditions in our District, and we have a number of tools we use for that purpose.

William C Dudley: The national and regional economy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the Business Council of Fairfield County, Stamford, Connecticut, 2 July 2013. *  *  *  Good afternoon. I am pleased to be here with the Business Council of Fairfield County. I am told that your meetings are very inclusive – that you routinely invite education professionals, executives of local not-for-profit agencies and community leaders as well as business leaders. In doing so, you assemble the type of broad Main Street audience that I most enjoy addressing. So, thank you for inviting me here today. Today I want to talk a bit about the outlook for the nation and the region. As many of you know, I was scheduled to speak at this forum on October 29 of last year but that meeting had to be postponed because of the arrival of Superstorm Sandy which hit on that very day. The region covered by the New York Fed was at the center of the storm, and Fairfield County, as well as parts of the Connecticut shoreline suffered extensive damage. Immediately following the storm, our Regional and Community Outreach function worked with all of the affected areas as part of a needs assessment.
The square-cubed law explains why a flea, even if it were the size of a man, would not be capable of jumping to the moon. It explains why a hippopotamus cannot turn somersaults. And it explains why King Kong and Godzilla were physiological impossibilities – the weight transfer associated with a single step would have shattered their thigh bones. When the world’s biggest banking beasts took a step too far in 2008, they too folded under their own weight. Their physiological structure proved inadequate to make them robust and resilient. That is the essence of the “too-big-to-fail” problem. In the language of Haldane, international policymakers have concluded that many of the world’s largest banks are not the right size given their existing physiological make-up. Over the past few years, initiatives to solve the too-big-to-fail problem have come thick and fast. At root, each has aimed to strengthen the structure of the world’s biggest banks. That is the good news. Claims that they have solved the too-big-to-fail problem appear to me, however, premature, probably over-optimistic. Worse, they risk sending a false sense of crisis comfort. That is the bad news. To see why such a cautious conclusion is warranted, we begin by tracking the structural evolution of the financial system over the past few decades. We then consider the three most prominent policy initiatives aimed at tackling too-big-to-fail – systemic surcharges, resolution regimes and structural reform. In the final section we consider what supplementary policy options might be necessary to ensure banking is right-sized.

The ECB does not vote. Where I do agree is that making the presidency of the Eurogroup a permanent position could strengthen the institutional architecture of the euro area. How would the hypothetical independence of Catalonia affect its relationship with the ECB? At the ECB we act according to regulations, and the treaties. We would adhere firmly to the legal provisions and we would not do anything that is not legal. What conditions would need to be met in order to gain a seat at the ECB? Whether this is political fiction or not, I don’t know. But the ECB only acts on the basis of facts, not hypotheses. If the number of countries in the euro area were to increase then we would respect that, but there would be no shortcuts unless they are provided for by the Treaty. The European Commission has launched an investigation into the use of deferred tax assets (DTA) in the banking sector in Spain and various other countries. The ECB was very critical about DTAs when it had to be evaluated during the banking stress tests. There are four countries that resorted to using these measures widely and the legislation that they adopted varies from one country to the next. I believe that we must look at each case separately and in context. Personally I dislike the idea of resorting to attempts to create the impression that a balance sheet’s loss absorption capacity is greater than it is in reality.
1  “Economic and Financial Regulation in the Era of Big Data” Paris, 24 November 2017  Closing remarks by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  I am very pleased to close this Conference on “Economic and Financial Regulation in the Era of Big Data”. I was in London this morning and I therefore regret having missed your discussions on an issue which I consider of paramount importance. Let me thank warmly all speakers, in particular Benoit Coeuré, member of the Board of the ECB, who opened this Conference and Philip-Hans Franses, Professor at Eramus School of Economics, who I am told gave an outstanding lecture. Big Data indeed deserves a global view, from a number of angles. It was the objective of this Conference and I am grateful to all of you, presenters and participants, to have made this possible. In closing this Conference, I will not come back to the specificities of Big Data and its numerous usages. All presentations have given a fresh look on Big Data and I am sure that on such an excellent basis, discussions will continue beyond this one day Conference on issues which are of key importance for all of us. I would rather like to focus on the consequences of Big Data for the economy in general and for central banks in particular. I will develop this into three parts:  2 I. Big Data will have significant economic effects.

It will in particular change the relationships between the members of the financial community and between this community and the non-financial world  II. Regarding Big Data, central banks will have to switch from an observer status to a user or player position, which implies significant changes in performing part of their activities  III. Big Data raise regulatory issues that cannot be solved within a national context but require a global reflection from public authorities. I. Big data will have significant economic effects. Entry costs for carrying out financial  transactions have already been reduced and will be lowered further in the future. Customer knowledge, in particular regarding the conditions applied by financial institutions, will be enhanced and more generally information asymmetries between clients and providers of financial services will narrow. Big Data can be a powerful card to play by GAFAs or other native non-financial firms to develop new activities. The financial industry has therefore to adapt rapidly to face the data revolution and compete with the new entrants, while protecting privacy against increasing cyber risks in particular. All in all, competition will increase, which is beneficial to the economy. The flip side can be enhanced risks for financial stability, implying a new form of vigilance for central bankers in particular. I will elaborate a bit more on this later on. II. Terabytes of data are available and more will be coming soon. Central banks will  collect more and more granular data. This is a clear opportunity for better forecasting and even nowcasting.
It prevents criminals benefiting from crime proceeds and reduces crime pervasiveness With the negative impact of money laundering and terrorism financing in mind, we all have a strong incentive to ensure that our AML/CFT regime is effective. There is no other option. Financial institutions, being one of our most important partners in combating money laundering and terrorism financing risks, play an important role of deterring and detecting money laundering and terrorism financing activities. As we know that criminals are generally motivated by money, access to legitimate financial services is a key mechanism by which criminals can realise the benefits of their crimes. And if we worked together, we can do a great deal to help make Malaysia to be a hostile place for criminals and terrorist financiers. But we know that this is not easy. Whilst large majority of those who use financial services do so for entirely legitimate purposes, criminals and terrorist financiers also need access to financial services. And the challenge for you, and for all of us, is how we can prevent and detect that abuse. The good news about the industry efforts to comply with AML/CFT law and regulations is that the vast majority of our institutions are doing a good job, with comprehensive compliance programme in place and most importantly, suspicious transactions (or the STRs) are being diligently reported. Financial institutions (particularly banking institutions) are consistently the top contributors for STRs submitted to Bank Negara Malaysia.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Procyclicality in the banking activity Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Conference on Procyclicality and the Role of Financial Regulation, organised by the Bank of Spain and the Financial Stability Institute, Madrid, 4 May 2009. *  *  *  Good morning ladies and gentlemen. First of all I would like to welcome you to the Bank of Spain. Also, let me thank you all for your presence here today to discuss on one of the most difficult and relevant topics affecting financial regulation: procyclicality in banking activity. Let me also thank the BIS Financial Stability Institute, and in particular its Chairman, Mr. Josef Tošovský, for all the support and good advice received during these last few weeks during the preparation of this event that we have co-organized. We are very pleased to have as speakers in this conference a large group of excellent professionals who are directly involved in financial supervision and regulation. A high level meeting like this one is a major opportunity to start building up a common and efficient framework in order to face the procyclicality issue. Cyclicality can be considered an inherent part of economic activity. Banking activity is no exception; it is also affected by the upswings and downturns of the real sector cycles. Not only history proves this, but current events do also. Any doubt about this has been violently resolved after the summer of 2007.
A database of capital flows is also being upgraded. When we are satisfied that the situation has normalized – that is, the one-way speculation has more or less disappeared, and that the exchange rate movement is in line with other regional currencies – then we should be able to remove this measure. I will specifically address this issue again toward the end of my talk today. My third and final point has to do with how we should deal with the challenge of global dynamism in the medium and longer terms. 2  BIS Review 20/2007  Global dynamism in the form of international competition and the unwinding of global imbalances will remain with us for the foreseeable future. During the transition, monetary policy can and must play a vital role in supporting the economy in its adjustment to the impact of global imbalances. As the balance of risk shifts from inflation to growth, the Bank of Thailand will ensure that monetary policy will continue to focus on stability while supporting growth. On the external stability front, should there be a disorderly unwinding of global imbalances, we may see rapid US dollar depreciation, which will put greater pressure on the baht. Adjusting to these rapid exchange rate movements is inevitable. Last year, the Bank of Thailand intervened when necessary in the FX market to smooth the adjustment.

Low levels of production in Iraq have contributed to holding up oil prices. Strikes and production problems in Venezuela and Nigeria have also played a role. These developments may keep oil prices high until growth in the global economy returns to normal. The oil industry will then have come through this period of sluggish growth in the global economy since 2000 without a fall in revenues. This has, in isolation, curbed the effects of the international downturn on Norway. However, the situation, as a whole and with regard to oil prices, is still highly uncertain. Weak external developments have in particular had negative spillover effects on the Norwegian economy through the appreciation of the krone, the fall in equity prices last year and lower demand for Norwegian exports. The krone exchange rate is the price of our currency measured in terms of a foreign currency. Developments in other countries are just as important for the krone as developments in the Norwegian economy. The krone has been strong. As a result, prices for imported goods have fallen. This has contributed to low inflation despite strong wage growth over a period of several years. Our analyses indicate that the most important reason for the appreciation of the krone from May 2000 to the end of 2002 was the positive and widening interest rate differential. Combined with the interest rate differential, the fall in equity prices and reduced fluctuations, or volatility, in foreign exchange markets contributed to the appreciation of the krone last year.
It may also be reasonable to include resource utilisation, as this affects future inflation. The Taylor rule functioned well in connection with the financial crisis 2008–2009. It showed then that we should cut the repo rate at roughly the same speed and by roughly as much as we cut it. If we had instead relied on the Ramses model, we would have cut the repo rate much more slowly. Ramses has an estimated monetary-policy rule that is based on how the Riksbank has reacted earlier, and this has normally involved changing the repo rate in small steps. The starting point for the repo rate therefore has a strong influence as to what level the model will produce for the repo rate in the short term. The model’s estimated rule was therefore far too sluggish in the exceptional situation that arose. It can also be mentioned that Norges Bank, because of the uncertainty of the models it uses, also gives some weight to simple monetary-policy rules such as the Taylor rule.23  21  Op.cit., p 109. 22  J.B. Taylor, “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, North-Holland, 1993. 23  See the article “Criteria for an appropriate interest rate path” in Monetary Policy Report 2/2010, Norges Bank. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  See longer-term forecasts than one year as potential scenarios We should regard the forecasts for longer than one year ahead as potential scenarios rather than unbiased forecasts.

It is hoped that Swedish banks will not have to make use of the opportunity for government guarantees or capital injections, since the terms will probably be rather tough. However, we do not know the details of the proposal at this time. However, what we do know is that the Government has decided to expand the deposit guarantee. This is an important measure to strengthen confidence in the Swedish banking system. At the same time it is important to add that measures of this type must be complemented in the long term with mechanisms that facilitate a sustainable financing of the system; in other words, those institutions that are covered by the guarantee must also carry its costs. In the somewhat longer term In a longer perspective there is reason to consider which structural changes are needed to prevent similar situations from arising again. An intense discussion is currently underway about the need for changed regulations and stricter supervision of the financial markets and institutions. The Riksbank has discussed these issues in various contexts for some time. For example, the rules for management and supervision of liquidity risks need to be developed and improved. The financial sector needs greater transparency so that customers and investors can gain a better overview of the companies' commitments. For Sweden it is also important to create a functioning regulatory framework to handle banks in insolvency.
They have also been the focus of testimony before a number of committees in Congress, including Secretary Geithner and Thomas Baxter’s January 27,  4  BIS Review 73/2010  2010 testimony before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committees. A summary of the salient facts, however, follows. As part of the November 2008 restructuring, Treasury invested $ billion in newly issued Senior Preferred Stock of AIG under its TARP authority. 2 In connection with that investment, the Federal Reserve modified the terms of the Fed Facility to be more sustainable: The maturity of the Fed Facility was extended to five years (due 2013), the maximum amount available was reduced from $ billion to $ billion, and the interest rate and commitment fees were reduced. The Fed Facility remained secured by substantially all of AIG’s assets, and the company continued to be required to apply proceeds of asset sales to permanently repay any outstanding balances under the facility. At the same time, the Board approved the establishment of an additional lending facility that would provide a permanent solution to the AIG securities lending program’s losses and liquidity drains, thus eliminating the need for the Securities Borrowing Facility. Under the new facility, the New York Fed extended approximately $ billion in secured, non-recourse credit to a special purpose limited liability company, Maiden Lane II, in which AIG would hold a $ billion first-loss position. Maiden Lane II then purchased, at market prices, RMBS with a par value of $ billion from certain AIG domestic insurance company subsidiaries.

On the evening of September 16th, we advanced $ billion in credit to AIG through a fully collateralized lending, and announced the term sheet for what would become an $ billion revolving credit facility with AIG (Fed Facility). 1 Some have asked why the Federal Reserve did not see the threat that AIG posed to the financial system before September 16th. The short answer is that AIG had hundreds of regulators, none of which was the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve had no regulatory authority over the firm – no authority over its capital, no authority over its liquidity, and no oversight over its control functions. The Federal Reserve was not engaged in supervision of AIG. It did not have the legal authority to do so. These roles and responsibilities remained with state insurance regulators, and with the comprehensive consolidated supervisor, the Office of Thrift Supervision. Throughout the weekend of September 13th and 14th we were assured by those regulators that a private sector consortium of commercial banks had a solution to AIG’s liquidity problems, and we had no basis to question those assurances. But then Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection and the private sector consortium unequivocally stated that they were no longer prepared to lend to AIG. The AIG situation is both different and similar to that of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund that nearly collapsed in the fall of 1998.
José De Gregorio: Chile’s latest Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Finance Commission of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 4 April 2011. The Monetary Policy Report of March 2011 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl. *  *  *  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, senator Eduardo Frei, senators. I am grateful for the Commission’s invitation to the Board of the Central Bank of Chile to share with you our vision of recent macroeconomic developments, their prospects and implications on monetary policy, as detailed in our Monetary Policy Report of March 2011. The data at hand on the last few months show that our country continues to walk a path of sustained economic recovery. The year 2010 closed with a y-o-y growth rate of 5.2 percent, with very strong consumption and investment. To a large extent, the devastation inflicted on our economy by the world recession of 2008–2009 and the earthquake and tsunami of 27 February 2010 has been left behind. Employment is growing strongly and trend inflation has returned to above zero annual variation rates. The strong impulse of macroeconomic policies has been at the center of these results, and the recovery of the Chilean economy attests to the efficacy of our economic policy framework. However, although the challenges posed by the aforesaid events have been largely overcome, today we face new ones.

Whereas then the exchange rate depreciated continually, amplifying the effect of external price increases, in the past few months the peso-dollar parity has shown large swings, and is now, as of the statistical closing of this Report, at around CLP480 per dollar. After the Bank’s announcement of the reserve accumulation program in early January, the peso depreciated from some CLP465 per dollar to nearly CLP500 per dollar. After that there was an appreciation trend that took it back to pre-intervention levels; however, the effects of this measure have combined with external developments, in particular the sustained weakness of the dollar at the global level and the copper price increasing to all-time highs in nominal terms (figure 15). Thus, since its peak of late 2008, the appreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar has not differed much from that of the currencies of commodity-exporting countries or other economies that have intervened or applied administrative measures in their forex markets (figure 16). The real exchange rate (RER) followed the trend of the multilateral parity, which has depreciated since December. Considering the level of the nominal exchange rate and parities prevailing at the statistical closing of this Report, in March the RER posted figures in line with its long-term fundamentals (figure 17). The baseline scenario of this Report uses as a working assumption that the RER will stay near its recent levels.