samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But the tightness in the labor market may add inflationary pressure, a point in which I have already mentioned. Fourth, the private sector has shown much resiliency and adaptability. For example, in response to the appreciation of the baht, exporters have made increasing uses of foreign exchange hedging instruments. At the same time, the increasingly diversified export market structure has provided Thai exporters with cushions against the current slowdown in major advanced economies. As another example, many private firms, burned by the crisis experience, no longer over-leverage their balance sheets and turn to equity and retained earnings as major sources of funds. Fifth, the banking sector is now much healthier than even a few years ago. The BIS ratio of the entire banking system remained high at 15.3 per cent in May. Despite the economic slowdown, both ratios of gross NPL and net NPL to total loan declined slightly since the third quarter of last year. In fact, the outstanding amount of NPL declined in the last quarter. In addition, the implementation of IAS39 accounting standard in 2006-2007 and the preparation for the adoption of Basel II at the end of this year have together strengthened the stability of our banking system. With insignificant exposures to collateralized debt obligation (CDO) investments, the Thai banking sector as a whole is also immune to the U.S. sub-prime spillover. Last but not least, Thailand is among the world’s top places when it comes to the ease of starting and operating businesses.

The key to high-performance economy inevitably lies in supply-side policies that raise the economy’s potential growth. BIS Review 98/2008  5  The fact that supply-side policies take time should urge the government to hasten such policies. However much conflict of interest between a fixed-term government and long-term policies may be, it is important to realize that raising productivity, and hence the economy’s potential output, is ultimately the key to raise economic performance without provoking subsequent instability. As mentioned earlier, Thailand needs to be more resilient to oil shocks. For example, it is now a good opportunity to shape up our logistic system. Much integration needs to be done to coordinate the use of rail, road, river, and air transportation. Ladies and Gentlemen, My main message for you this evening is that the key for a successful economy is to preserve competitiveness and to grow at the potential rate as well as raising the potential output. This is to ensure both the performance and the sustainability of an economy. Many central banks are doing this through inflation targeting. At present, the risk of political uncertainty not only lies in terms of consumers and businesses’ confidence, but also in the efficiency of the government to pursue policies that raise productivity. As negative supply shocks persist, the better the job done by the government to enhance productivity, that is, to secure our potential output, the lesser the cost of economic stabilization. Thank you very much for your attention. 6  BIS Review 98/2008
And taking STIR, bond and  BIS Review 11/2001  3  other contracts together, LIFFE is the largest derivatives exchange in Europe by value, although Eurex is the largest by volume. •  London originates over 19% of cross-border international bank lending, compared with 7% for France and 9% for Germany. •  London has a market share of 55% of underwritten euro-denominated Eurobond issuance, and an estimated market share of 70% of secondary trading in the Eurobond market. •  Around 500 foreign companies are currently listed on the London Stock Exchange. This is more than any other exchange. 59% of global foreign equity turnover is reported to the London Stock Exchange by London market firms. And just under 40% of equity trades reported to the London Stock Exchange by market firms are denominated in euro. •  The market capitalisation of the London Stock Exchange, at & 128;2.7 trillion, is nearly double that of either Frankfurt or Paris. •  London is the largest global centre for the fund management of institutional equities, with $ trillion of institutional equities under management. •  And London is the global market leader in aviation and marine insurance, with a combined market share of 22%. Conclusion It is early days. London is not complacent. But our view is that London will continue to thrive in the 21st century, so long as it remains internationally competitive. In particular, the environment which London provides for financial business must remain attractive and consistent with international 'best practice'.

2/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Meanwhile, the high levels of government debt following the pandemic, alongside the tightening of financial conditions, represent a vulnerability and limit the space to adopt fiscal expansion measures. This setting is also subject to an extremely high level of uncertainty, stemming, above all, from the course of the war in Ukraine and its economic repercussions, which are hard to predict. However, inflationary pressures also pose a genuine risk. Whether they increase further depends not only on the course of the war, but also on internal factors, such as a possible persistent rise in inflation expectations, or higher-thanexpected increases in wages or mark-ups. More persistent inflation would require a sharper tightening of monetary policy, which would render those public or private agents in a less sound economic and financial position more vulnerable. This could have a greater-than-expected impact on their spending levels. 1. The economic policy response Against this backdrop, I would like to share my opinion on how economic policy should respond. First, I would like to underscore that the current situation is far different from that triggered by the pandemic. We then faced a temporary but highly adverse shock, in a setting free of inflationary pressures. That environment warranted a forceful monetary policy response, in order to create conditions that were conducive to an equally extraordinary fiscal expansion which would guarantee the income of households and firms and thus minimise the crisis-induced structural damage to employment, productive capacity and growth.
But in a world in which capital flows freely, local attempts to control the pace of credit creation, particularly within the financial system, may not work. All of that will need to be thought through. But first we need to concentrate on the immediate challenges. Summary In a speech four months ago, I stressed that “we must try to avoid a vicious circle in which tighter liquidity conditions, lower asset values, impaired capital resources, reduced credit supply, and slower aggregate demand feed back on each other”. I identified monetary policy, liquidity policy, and regulatory capital policy as being amongst the instruments the authorities would need to use. That remains the case, as the stress in the global financial system has  4  BIS Review 38/2008  continued and, in the US at least, evidence of a feedback loop is apparent. Each of those instruments is constrained in some degree. That underlines the need for close co-operation between the authorities and the industry, and internationally. BIS Review 38/2008  5

We must all be able to pay our bills in a secure manner, preferably also in a simple and speedy manner, i.e. we must know that the  BIS Review 51/2002  1  party to which we are sending money actually receives it. There are many countries in the world where this does not function and this is as much of an obstacle to development as when roads and railways do not function. The banks are the institutions that handle the major part of the payments. It is because they are so important to the financial sector that they are subject to such comprehensive legislation and that they are the companies most closely monitored by Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority). We may have views on how the banks should set charges, handle their customers and so on, but without them our lives would certainly be more complicated. In this context it is worth noting how much IT in a broad sense has helped the banks to develop and simply means of payment. It is not so long ago that one received a weekly wage in the form of a brown envelope containing banknotes, handed out on a Friday afternoon. Nowadays our wages are paid directly into our bank accounts and we receive notice of this in a bank statement. Nor do we have to go very far to pay our bills; we can sit at our desks and fill out giro forms or - even easier - pay through the computer.
In addition, the GFXC hopes to develop a framework that can assist market participants to review or develop their client disclosures, and to identify any challenges to appropriate transparency. 13 Third, to continue to embed and integrate the Code into the FX market. A survey was conducted by the GFXC last year, to assess the industry’s baseline in Code awareness and adoption. We plan to conduct another survey later this year, to see how market participants are embedding the Code and how practices and behaviours have evolved. This survey will be rolled out across the key FX jurisdictions likely through the FXC network. We look forward to your active participation when the survey is rolled out. From the survey findings, we hope to identify ways to deepen adoption and broaden awareness over time and across jurisdictions. 14 These efforts need the support of you as market participants, and we hope that you can do 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  your part in promoting the good practices set out in the Code, from your respective vantage points and positions within the FX market. Singapore’s approach 15 Last year, I shared that the Singapore Foreign Exchange Market Committee (or SFEMC) has taken on the responsibility to promote and encourage adherence to the Code in Singapore. 16 Given Singapore’s position as the preeminent FX centre within the Asian time zone, it is important for us to continue to take a leading role in adopting the Code.

Jacqueline Loh: The FX Global Code – one year on Keynote address by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 14th FX Week Asia Conference, Singapore, 29 August 2018. * * * Ms Eva Szalay, Editor, FX Week, 1 Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. How time flies. It did not seem too long ago when I was invited to speak at last year’s conference and I am very happy to be here again at the 14th FX Week Asia Conference. 2 Last year, I shared the launch of the FX Global Code (or the Code), its unique features and the elements that have been put in place to promote industry adherence. One year has passed, and it is timely to review developments since the launch of the Code and its impact on the global FX industry. More importantly, I would like to share with you, the priorities ahead to further embed the Code within the global FX market. FX Global Code: Overview 3 I am sure that by now, most of you would have heard of the Code. But for the benefit of those who may not have, let me provide a quick overview. 4 The Code was launched in May last year by the Bank for International Settlements (or BIS) as a single, global code of conduct for the wholesale FX market. It was developed over 2 years through a public-private partnership between central banks and key FX market participants.
The volatility of key variables for economic agents such as the interest rate, inflation or the exchange rate has diminished. But growth has continued to be unbalanced in those aspects I have already mentioned, such as household and corporate debt, and continuing price and cost differentials. At issue here are imbalances posing risks to growth sustainability within an area with very high stability requirements by Spanish standards. Yet while such risks are very important for the Spanish economy, the biggest risk of all is complacency. It is vital to maintain the attitude of non-complacency which has driven economic agents, governments and other players who have sustained the Spanish dynamism of recent decades. A change in attitude which were to convert the satisfaction with the current situation into an excuse to detain the drive to innovate and reform would, sooner or later, bring the ongoing process to a halt. We must continue striving to discover how we can improve the performance of our institutions and companies. This is the main idea I wish to share with you today: let us not fall into complacency. However much we have progressed, let us not stop. There are examples of developed countries which, having achieved very favourable income and wealth levels, lost their reforming dynamism and, as a result, entered lasting situations of slackness and sluggishness with serious employment problems and a deterioration in confidence at all levels. It is therefore important to identify the specific policies we should foster in the future.

What was considered here was a very simple economy for ease of clarity. But, the broad results derived are equally valid to a modern economy with billions of transactions. These results can be summarized as follows: First, if the money supply increases, while the output remains unchanged, then, the general price level will tend to increase. Second, if the money supply increases at the same rate as the increase in the output, then the general price level remains unchanged. Third, if the money supply does not increase, when the output has increased, then, the general price level will fall. Fourth, if the money supply has remained unchanged or even raised when the output has fallen (a negative supply shock), then the prices would rise to a still higher level. In the above example, coconut constituting real output represented the aggregate supply of goods and services, measured in real terms. The total amount of money in the hands of the people represented the demand for coconuts. Since the money value of coconuts is an imaginary concept, that demand could be described as the nominal aggregate demand for goods and services. What would happen to the general price level will depend on the interplay of these two demand and supply forces. The rest of the analysis follows the normal microeconomic theory. If the aggregate demand is higher than the aggregate supply, there will be an excess demand in the economy. That excess demand will generate pressure for the general price level to rise.
Luis M Linde: Overview of Spain’s economy in 2012 – reflection and outlook Testimony by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Parliamentary Committee on Economic Affairs and Competitiveness, Madrid, 20 June 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I appear before this Committee on the occasion of the presentation of the Banco de España Annual Report for 2012, one of the most difficult years for the Spanish economy of the last decades. I shall begin with a review of the general economic situation, and then focus on the progress achieved in restoring the major balances of our economy, developments in credit and in household and corporate debt, the headway in balance sheet clean-up and restructuring of our banking system, financial regulation reforms and progress in the European Banking Union project. I shall conclude with a reflection on the outlook for our economy. Situation of and outlook for the Spanish economy Throughout 2012 the Spanish economy held on the contractionary course that first became discernible in late 2011. GDP fell by 1.4% during the year, far above the 0.5% decline recorded in the euro area as a whole. This double-dip recession, the second dip of which is less acute in terms of the decline in output but more persistent than its 2008–2009 forerunner, has had particularly serious consequences for employment, which shrank for the fifth year running in 2012.

Our focus should now move to a consistent and rigorous implementation of the Basel III framework across the globe. Concluding remarks Ladies and Gentlemen, I have discussed the challenges Switzerland faces as a financial centre. While I consider these challenges to be high hurdles, they are not insurmountable. The Swiss financial industry has constantly adapted throughout its history; it will continue to adapt to the current challenges and continue to be successful. What can the SNB contribute to the success of the financial industry? I am convinced that an independent, stability-driven central bank with a clear mandate, willing and able to act forcefully if appropriate, is a necessary condition for a competitive and vibrant financial centre. However, this condition is far from being sufficient. In that spirit, allow me now to throw the ball into your court. The future of the Swiss financial industry is in your hands. It is your integrity, your power of innovation and your service to the customer that is pivotal for the Swiss financial industry. It is up to you to shape the future of this industry. While I certainly do not pretend to know the business decisions you will have to take in the years to come, I am pretty sure that jumping out of the window is not the best option. In this regard, it may be worthwhile remembering that Voltaire himself made a fortune, and went on to be celebrated as an old wise man – without, to my knowledge, ever following his own advice.
As these shocks were met with expansionary fiscal policy, inflation in Sweden became higher and higher (see Figure 1). With a fixed exchange rate and an inflation rate higher than that in other countries, Swedish competitiveness deteriorated, which was dealt with by devaluation of the krona. Between 1976 and 1982 the krona was devalued five times. In this way, competitiveness was temporarily restored, but inflationary impulses were boosted further. It became clear that the  3  2  Another important element of the regulations was the restrictions to international capital flows through the currency regulation. BIS central bankers’ speeches  fixed exchange rate was beginning to function poorly as nominal anchor. Credibility was gradually undermined. During the 1980s, the credit regulations were increasingly questioned and the large capital flows meant that the effectiveness of the regulations was in doubt. As Englund (1999) writes: “The stage was set for deregulation”. 4 For this reason, the deregulation of the credit markets began in the first half of the 1980s, with an important stage being the phasing out of the loan cap in 1985. This had the consequence that lending to companies and households increased rapidly. However, this development was not met with tighter fiscal policy. In that monetary policy was aimed at maintaining the fixed exchange rate, economic policy became on the whole too expansionary. We are now at the beginning of the 1990s. Following reunification in 1990, the German economy grew strongly, which pushed up interest rates there.

For an in-depth description of the Scandinavian currency union, see Jonung, L., “Den skandinaviska myntunionen – vad säger den om EMU?” (The Scandinavian currency union – what does it say about the EMU?) Ekonomisk Debatt, no. 4, 2003. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The Bretton Woods regime, which came into force in 1951, saw the introduction of a stabilisation policy regime where monetary policy, in addition to focusing on a fixed exchange rate, was also marked by detailed regulation of both the volume and allocation of credits: Liquidity ratios, loan caps and ceilings for lending rates were all weapons in the Riksbank’s arsenal, at the same time as there was an aim to allocate loans towards the housing sector. 3 During the Bretton Woods era 1951–1973, the Swedish economy developed strongly at the same time as inflation was also relatively low (see Figure 1). But when the Bretton Woods regime collapsed in 1973, a period of more unstable economic development began. Sweden entered a number of fixed exchange rate regimes (see Figure 1). One condition for these arrangements to work was that economic policy would largely be conducted in a way that was in harmony with international developments. The oil price shocks of the 1970s were met with the so-called bridging policy, which involved using expansionary fiscal policy to try to bridge over economic downturns. However, the oil price shocks entailed what are usually known as negative supply shocks, which generate a combination of low growth and high inflation.
Others (super seniors) had a low average default but proved extremely sensitive to tail risk. In that specific case, financial innovation produced extreme events inside the system, far beyond what the fundamentals would normally imply. Policy responses The standard prescription for preventing extreme events is to develop stress tests. This is certainly a prerequisite. But success will ultimately depend on our ability (1) to define the proper set of assumptions according to the whole range of possible extreme events; and (2) to act upon the results of those tests when there are very little incentives to do so. Typically this may involve keeping buffers for capital and/or liquidity well in excess of what appears necessary 95% of the time. Except in times of crisis, this approach is likely to be strongly challenged when it appears that its cost/benefit ratio is extremely high. It is not clear which institutional system could deliver such a result over the long run. One should ask, therefore, whether insurance against extreme events has to be taken and organized at the level of each individual financial entity (with the costs associated); or should it be spread over the whole economy, which raises well known issues of moral hazard? Implicitly the second approach has prevailed over the last decade: the financial system was allowed to take a huge amount of tail risk and, when those risks materialized, significant infusions of public money took place. Looking forward, in trying to find the right balance, policy makers will face a number of tradeoffs.

The first, and most obvious one, is between the robustness and resilience of the financial system, on the one hand, and its profitability, on the other. With hindsight, it may be that parts of the returns achieved by the financial industry in the last decade have resulted from too big a tolerance of tail risk. Conversely, one can theoretically increase, almost to a maximum, the resilience of the financial system to extreme events by piling up strong liquidity and capital cushions in all its components. Of course, since capital and liquidity are costly, the economic viability of such a system would be open to question. BIS Review 151/2008  3  A second trade-off appears between risk sensitiveness and financial volatility. We are increasingly expecting our prudential and accounting regimes to reflect precisely, at any moment in time, the level of risk embedded in every financial instrument. This does make sense: prudential requirements, in particular, should be tailored to the risk attached to specific activities. But financial systems are naturally procyclical. Risk – and risk appetite – move up and down with the economic cycle. It is an open question then, whether financial regulation does or not contribute to creating additional feedback loops in an already complex system, thus reinforcing the probability of extreme events. Finally a trade-off appears between financial innovation and product standardization. Many economic activities are exposed to extreme risk, which (almost) never materialise.