samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It has been accompanied by external surpluses that are larger than for many years, making it possible to repay foreign debt. Government finances, moreover, now show a surplus instead of the earlier deficits, which means that government debt is already being reduced in relation to GDP. The latest figures show that prices in Sweden’s economy are virtually stationary. The falling trend in market interest rates in recent years has been a major factor here in that it has reduced house mortgage interest expenditure and thereby temporarily exerted a downward effect on inflation. The underlying price trend is not, in fact, as low as the CPI figures might suggest but that does not alter the conclusion that in the years ahead, inflation will continue to be low. If Sweden sticks to disciplined fiscal and monetary policies, together with other ways of enhancing economic policy’s credibility, we have a real opportunity of reinstating the tradition of price stability that existed in Sweden prior to the 1970s and 80s. Let me give you a short historical background to our current economic policy strategy. Tradition of price stability In the period from 1830 to the late 1960s, the annual rate of inflation in Sweden averaged around 2 per cent. So if one disregards the 1970s and 80s, low inflation has been the norm for almost a century and a half. There are indeed grounds for saying that price stability is a long Swedish tradition. The tradition of price stability did not obstruct the economy’s development.

Mr. Bäckstöm remarks on the Swedish economy Address by the Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Urban Bäckström, at Svenska Handelsbanken’s seminar in New York on 7/10/98. First of all I should like to thank Svenska Handelsbanken for the invitation to meet with you today here in New York. I arrived late yesterday from the 1998 Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington D.C. The discussions in Washington over the weekend focused on the current problems in the world economy. At the centre was of course the crises in emerging markets that began in Thailand last year, which spread to other economies in East Asia and Russia and which most recently have been pressuring economies in Latin America. Lately, we have also seen some contagion effects spreading to the industrial countries. Stockmarkets have been falling and there have also been some problems in connection with the Long-Term Capital hedge fund. However, today I will talk about the Swedish economy. I shall be using a fairly broad brush to paint you a picture of how our economy has developed in recent years and I will conclude by saying a few words about the present situation in my country. Positive trend in recent years The Swedish economy is now entering its sixth consecutive year of favourable growth. The average annual GDP growth rate since the summer of 1993 is almost 3 per cent. This is an improvement compared to the average that has characterised our economy in the past twenty-five years.
We of course aim to be a more sensible and reasonable prudentist, but the question of ease of exit for our patients has nonetheless become more pressing through time. A well-functioning and competitive market is one in which firms can enter and exit easily. Our competition objective leads us to pay particular attention to this, significantly more I would say than prudential regulators without such an objective. I have frequently bored this audience with the very long list of things we have done to encourage entry, particularly into retail and SME banking markets given the competition issues in them. I will resist the urge to do this again but confine myself to making the simple point that in the 8 or so years since its creation the PRA has authorised 61 new banks, of which 28 are really de novo UK banks, because I think these figures speak for themselves. We have, however, said and done less on ease of exit. By “exit” here we mean the point at which a firm becomes unviable and can no longer sustainably meet obligations to customers using its own resources. While this often ultimately ends in winding-up proceedings, outside of fast failures there is much that can be done beforehand to “ease” their passing1. A reliably safe exit process is a vital corollary of ease of entry, as it allows us to be more accommodating to new entrants.

One of those efforts is our plan to bring in a simpler regime for smaller banks and building societies – we call this “strong and simple” just in case anybody thinks we want to have a weak regime for such firms. The prudentist does not believe in letting her younger patients develop cavities, but she does want to make their visits more pleasant. As far as I can work out from the many responses to our discussion paper, pretty much everyone thinks this is a good idea. The question now is how to design the simpler regime. The responses set out a broad range of views, which we are currently analysing. For instance, the discussion paper set out two alternative approaches to designing prudential requirements for the simpler regime – a ‘streamlined’ approach, which takes the existing framework as a starting point and modifies elements that are too complex for smaller firms, and a ‘focused’ approach, which is based on a narrower but more conservatively calibrated set of prudential requirements. There are advantages and disadvantages to each, and these will need to be weighed up when 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  designing the regime. The responses to our discussion paper seem to suggest relatively stronger support for a streamlined approach, but we’ll keep going through the responses in detail and then bring forward proposals for consultation in due course. Our other main early reform effort is less popular, strictly for the prudential enthusiast only. But it may well be more important.
In the initial period after the introduction of an inflation target in 2001, it appeared that the social partners had not yet internalised the response pattern ensuing from the monetary policy mandate. We are now well into a cyclical phase with very high capacity utilisation and low unemployment. In this situation, there may be a risk that wage growth will again accelerate. On the other hand, the experience gained by the social partners that large pay rises push up interest rates may have the effect of curbing pay increases. In local wage negotiations at enterprise level, competition, the supply of foreign labour and the possibility of outsourcing or relocating activities abroad may dampen the impact. The inflation target of 2.5 per cent provides a framework for the social partners. Over time, nominal wage growth above 2.5 per cent will mean higher real wages and higher purchasing power. Real wage growth that exceeds productivity growth can lead to higher inflation and higher interest rates. In government-financed enterprises – often labour-intensive – budgets are adjusted to the wage growth expected by the Government. This is usually in line with assumptions about cost inflation in the economy as a whole and with the inflation target. If wages rise more sharply, efficiency must be increased in order to minimise the adverse impact on service production and customers. Norges Bank's most important instrument is the interest rate on banks' deposits with Norges Bank (the sight deposit rate), also referred to as the key policy rate.

Under the law, the New York Fed does not have the authority to provide what I would characterize as a “naked” guarantee – one that would be unsecured and not limited in amount, and would put the U.S. taxpayers at risk for the entirety of Lehman’s trading obligations. As Chairman Bernanke has observed, “the Federal Reserve has done, and will continue to do, everything possible within the limits of its authority to assist in restoring our nation to financial stability and economic prosperity….” 6 In this case, Lehman had no ability to pledge the amount of collateral required to satisfactorily secure a Fed guarantee, one large enough to credibly withstand a run by Lehman’s creditors and counterparties. As events subsequently played out, several weeks after Lehman weekend, on October 2, 2008, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), which provides the U.S. Treasury Department with legal authority to issue a guarantee. 7 Again, the Federal Reserve did not then, and does not now, have such authority. Even if it had been legally possible, a Government guarantee would have also placed the taxpayer at enormous risk because it would have undermined deal certainty. It is important for the acquirer – and not a third party – to issue the guarantee because it gives the acquirer a strong incentive to close the deal and assume control of the target. For example, J.P. Morgan Chase, which proffered the guarantee needed to merge with Bear Stearns, negotiated a host of provisions from Bear Stearns that assured deal certainty.
Rodrigo Vergara: Chile’s March 2014 Monetary Policy Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, of the Monetary Policy Report before the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 31 March 2014. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, Senator Ricardo Lagos-Weber. Senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen, Thank you for your invitation to share with you the vision of the Central Bank Board about the recent macroeconomic developments, its outlook and implications for monetary policy. The detail of this vision is contained in our March 2014 Monetary Policy Report. A year ago, when the Board gathered with this Commission on a similar occasion, we underscored the importance of investment in the Chilean economy’s strength and its connection with the global cycle of mining investments. We then stated that the implementation of a large number of projects in mining and related sectors, such as energy, had provided a boom in investment. This had resulted in greater domestic spending, putting pressure on installed capacity utilization and the labor market, as well as on imports and the current-account deficit of the balance of payments. The Board also noted that it foresaw at the time a gradual maturation of said investment cycle and expected a normalization of economic growth during 2013, after several years of expanding above trend.

Confidence in the Swedish financial system could have been seriously damaged if a failure like the one at Lehman Brothers had been allowed to occur. The Riksbank’s assessment was that the two banks were experiencing temporary liquidity problems, but that their solvency was not threatened. Finansinspektionen later revoked Carnegie’s licence to conduct banking activities owing to serious deficiencies in the company’s risk management and violation of the law concerning asset management. The decision to revoke the licence thus had nothing to do with Carnegie’s liquidity problems or with the Riksbank’s loan. Carnegie is now owned by the Swedish National Debt Office and the Riksbank’s liquidity assistance has been repaid. The Riksdag (the Swedish parliament) has also introduced a new act concerning support to credit institutions, which will give the government the opportunity to take the necessary measures to strengthen stability in the financial system. For instance, a government guarantee programme has been presented to support the banks’ and mortgage institutions’ medium-term funding, and a stability fund has been established to manage potential future solvency problems in Swedish institutions. The current situation Despite the crisis in the global financial markets and the increasingly gloomy economic prospects, the assessment is that the Swedish banks still have good resilience to facing the situation that has arisen and future developments. 1 The losses arising from the international crisis have so far been limited, not least in an international perspective, and the Swedish banks have good financial strength.
Tarisa Watanagase: Global financial crisis and economic integration in Asia Address by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor, Bank of Thailand, at the TU-JBIC International Conference on “The Future of Economic Integration in Asia”, Bangkok, 21 November 2008. *  *  *  Distinguished Speakers and Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my honor and pleasure to accept the invitation from the Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University and Japan Bank for International Cooperation to speak at this congregation of prominent researchers and policy makers in the International Conference on “The Future of Economic Integration in Asia”. I would also like to congratulate the organizers for putting together a concrete and thorough program covering all core aspects of Asian economic integration that need better understandings and brainstorming efforts from academics, as well as the public and private sectors. I believe that the knowledge and views from this avenue will certainly provide important inputs for shaping the future direction and pace of economic integration in our region. Ladies and Gentlemen, While trade and financial integration in Asia has been gathering significant momentum for the past decade, the current global financial crisis has manifested an extraordinary case and timing for us to reassess and rethink carefully about the future course of further integration among our regional economies and beyond. Therefore, it is very timely to talk about the global financial crisis and its implications for economic integration in Asia.

Overall, East Asian economies have become more resilient. The managed float exchange rate and Inflation Targeting monetary policy frameworks that a number of regional economies have adopted after the Asian crisis have proven to be effective tools in maintaining economic stability and have had a role in helping spur economic growth. They have also had a role in helping dent financial imbalances especially excessive external borrowings and their maturity mismatches. The latest numbers of external debt to GDP in East Asia (except for the case of South Korea) stood below 30 percent in 2007, declining from the range of 62 to 168 percent from the peak during 1998 whereas the ratio of foreign reserves to short-term debt in most regional economies jumped from approximately 1-3 times in 1998 to 4-8 times in 2007. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the direct role of monetary policy in curbing financial imbalances apart from price stability will need to be revisited. It may be very well be the case that some tightening monetary policy is needed along side prudential measures in curbing financial imbalances. On the financial sector side, reforms that have been put in place to foster transparency and governance as well as to strengthen regulation and supervision have also resulted in significantly healthier financial institutions across the region in terms of solvency, liquidity, and profitability.
This reflects the strong increase in overnight deposits made by banks with national central banks as a consequence of the switch to the full allotment fixed rate tenders in the ECB’s open market operations, following the intensification of the crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Second, not surprisingly from September 2008 onwards, we see a remarkable increase in the number of sender limits along with a decrease in their value (see Chart 2). Nonetheless, these changes had a marginal impact on the smooth flow of transactions and did not cause delays to the timely submission of payments. Third, the level of non-settled payments remained fairly stable in the second half of 2008, amounting to just 1% or so of the total daily average value settled in the system (see Chart 3), indicating the overall resilience of the TARGET system in the face of the financial turmoil. Crucially, market infrastructures continued to function robustly. In particular, by providing stable networks despite the highly disruptive conditions in financial markets, market infrastructures played an important shock-absorbing role and helped to maintain overall public confidence in the financial system. Since central banking overseers and financial regulators recognised long ago the critical importance of the reliable functioning of market infrastructures for overall financial stability and efficiency, they took action together with the service providers. Stringent requirements ensure that EU infrastructures are adequately designed, effectively manage their risks, and operate efficiently and reliably, both under normal circumstances and at times of crisis.

The investment-saving gap moved to surpluses averaging 10 percent of GDP in the first three years after the crisis, from the pre-crisis deficits average of 7 percent of GDP before 1997. Such magnitude of change is indicative of the depth of the adjustment Thailand had to go through. Although the initial imbalance in the lead up to the crisis was not small, the adjustment was amplified partly by the wave of contagion effect in the early years of the crisis which brought pressure on the capital account, the exchange rate, and growth. Now, while we can look back to the last two years of growth of around 4 percent, signs of fragility still abound, with important issues remaining to be resolved. This includes the continued reform of the banking sector and the resolution of the costs of financial sector restructuring. The main fragility in the recovery process at this time is the weakness in domestic demand. The problem is compounded by the slow growth in bank credit and the weak corporate balance sheets, particularly the non-export sector. Unfortunately, the current external environment does not bode well for the recovery, going forward. The global slowdown is posing strains on Thailand’s export, and is adding pressure to the current account and external stability. Official GDP forecast this year is around 2.0-2.5 percent. Given the change in external environment, this year will be more a time for consolidation than for expansion.
In addition, there has been an important shift from the traditional high net worth clients investing in individual hedge funds to funds being invested in hedge funds via diversified pools and formal fund of funds structures. These pooled assets, coupled with liberalizing regulatory developments have opened up hedge funds to a more diverse universe of investors, including a wide range of institutional and retail investors. Currently, the total size of funds invested in hedge funds via pooled structures is estimated to be approximately USD 300 billion or nearly a third of the underlying hedge fund industry. Remarkably, annual growth rate estimates of the pooled funds suggest that their expansion has proceeded at a more rapid pace than the underlying hedge fund industry. This implies that a significant portion of new assets flowing into hedge funds does so via collective asset management pools. In a competitive environment, the Swiss financial sector has succeeded in leveraging its position as one of the world’s leading asset manager to secure an dominant position amongst collective asset management pool operators in the hedge fund industry. Though many of the early formal funds of funds were registered under Luxembourg, Cayman Island or Bermuda law, Swiss financial firms today manage a significant part of the world’s alternative asset management pools.

In other words, we aren’t hoping for the best, we’re preparing for the worst in several ways. First, we’re ensuring that our banks are ready for Brexit. In recent years we have subjected major UK banks to severe but plausible stress tests. In our 2017 stress test, UK GDP fell by 4.5%, commercial real estate prices by 40%. UK house prices dropped by a third, Bank Rate increased by 4 percentage points and unemployment rose to 9½%. In addition, there was a major emerging market shock and substantial additional misconduct costs. The FPC found that UK banks would have been able to withstand that stress and still have more than adequate capital to maintain lending to households and businesses (Chart 7). In the FPC’s judgment, our stress test last year also encompassed an appropriately wide range of UK macroeconomic risks and associated losses that could be associated with Brexit. Moreover, we judge that the UK banking system has the capacity to absorb not only the consequences of a “no deal no transition” Brexit, but also the losses that could be associated with intensifying trade tensions, a further sharp tightening of financing conditions for emerging markets, and substantial additional misconduct costs. Second, liquidity is an important part of our contingency planning for Brexit. UK-based banks (and CCPs) currently have around £ billion of borrowing capacity at the Bank through collateral pre-positioned in our facilities. That broadly matches the Bank’s peak lending to the financial system during the crisis, and liquidity positions have improved significantly since then.
Is Germany imposing its conditions on the rest of Europe? The ECB has a range of tools to ensure price stability and the proper functioning of the market. It can remedy market disruptions. It has done so several times in recent years to avoid a “credit crunch” by greatly increasing its provision of liquidity to the banking system and by lengthening the maturity of refinancing operations. Still within our mandate, we are able to take quite significant non-standard measures and we have done this on several occasions. The mandate of the ECB is also to ensure the solidity of the euro. But the ECB cannot replace governments, nor spare them from making the necessary efforts to control their debt and restore the competitiveness of their economy. The credibility of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  governments cannot rest on the central bank. And yet, the former must demonstrate their determination to improve their fiscal position. But under Germany’s pressure, the ECB is not using all the instruments at its disposal. How is this justifiable when huge efforts are required of Spain and Italy? The ECB is being unfairly accused. No central bank in the world – neither the Fed nor the Bank of England – directly funds governments or purchases sovereign debt on the primary market to finance their deficits. However, it is possible on the secondary market. We have done so in the past. There are no differences of opinion between the French, the Germans and the European Commission.

All say the same thing: we are not against ECB intervention to correct market anomalies. But it only makes sense if the economic and fiscal policies pursued aim at correcting imbalances and restoring balanced public finances. Some people are now expecting Greece and Spain to leave the euro. Are you preparing for such a scenario? We are not contemplating a Greek departure from the euro area. Moreover, such a scenario is not provided for by the Treaty. There is therefore no plan to prepare a country’s exit from the euro. Besides, comparing Spain to Greece makes little sense. The two situations are completely dissimilar. Spain is competitive. Paradoxically, with the crisis, it is even more competitive than a year ago as the growth of its exports shows. It has serious problems to manage such as the situation of its banks, of its property developers and the indebtedness of its autonomous regions. But Spain is taking the necessary measures: it is pushing through impressive reforms and reinventing its growth model. In your opinion, how did the euro area get into this situation? The euro area is not simply confronted with a financial crisis. It is facing a challenge: it must complete its construction. During the setting up of the euro area and subsequently during its first years of existence, governments acted with an inadequate sense of responsibility. Its construction was incomplete. Fiscal rules were not sufficiently strict and, moreover, they were often ignored. There was a form of cowardliness.