samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We appreciate your accepting of our request to share with the participants your knowledge and experience in this field of your Ministry’s work, which reflects your regulatory role towards preventing and/or detecting criminals offences, including money laundering. This is the first Workshop of its kind on this important topic, with emphasis on the role of the NPOs to detect and prevent the offences of money laundering or terrorist financing activities. Money laundering and the financing of terrorists are problems that should concern us all. They are not problems for only the Government and the law enforcement agencies to worry about. Rather, the public sector, the business community, the private sector and even ordinary citizens must play a role in combating these illegal activities. This Workshop is therefore opportune, as it covers one of the important sectors, other than financial institutions. I am referring of course to yourselves, the Non-profit Organization Sector. Non-profit organization sector There is a strong belief internationally that the non-profit organizations sector is one of the more vulnerable sectors, which criminals would try and exploit to conduct their illegal activities without attracting much attention. And, some of the reasons for such vulnerability relate to generally weak management structures and the lack of regulatory supervision over NPOs operation. Many jurisdictions  BIS Review 85/2009  1  have relatively low institutional capacity to monitor NPOs and detect their being used for money laundering and by terrorist. Some jurisdictions even indicate their unwillingness to impose a regulatory requirement on this Sector.

The Riksbank cut its repo rate by 0.5 percentage points, to 3.75 per cent. Now, just over six months later, we can conclude that the impact of the attacks on the global economy was less than feared, although certain sectors were hard hit. In addition, there are more and more signs of an imminent improvement in activity in both the USA and Europe. The stocks that had been built up during the downturn in activity appear to have been largely phased out and according to a number of indicators, production has begun to increase. A cautious optimism has begun to spread. There is also the additional impetus that comes from the expansionary economic policy in many countries and strengthens confidence in an impending upturn. However, for the global recovery to really take off and become stronger, it is necessary that it is accompanied by a broad and sustained increase in demand. If production increases because stocks are too small and need to be refilled, there is a risk that the upturn will be short-lived. We have been receiving both positive and negative signals regarding the situation in the US economy. The positive signals come from an unusually strong growth in productivity during the slowdown in activity, which indicates that the US industry has managed to adapt its production structure in an impressive manner. Private consumption, which is important in all countries, but particularly in the USA, has also remained strong during the whole of 2001 and early 2002.
Chart: Marked fall in oil prices 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  On top of this, there has been a substantial fall in oil prices as a result of a sharp fall in global oil consumption. Despite production cuts, total oil production is substantially higher than consumption, with little spare storage capacity. Against this background, oil prices are likely to remain low in the coming period. Futures prices indicate that oil prices will pick up, but to a markedly lower level than the level we have been used to seeing in recent years. There were already prospects at the beginning of the year that petroleum investment would decline. Owing to the fall in oil prices, oil companies have cut their investment plans. Low oil prices affect the outlook for the Norwegian economy. Chart: Substantial krone depreciation The fall in oil prices and general uncertainty in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak have weakened the krone exchange rate. On 19 March, the krone hit record-weak levels against a number of currencies. At that time, uncertainty in the NOK market was particularly high, and limited liquidity contributed to amplifying NOK movements. Against this background, Norges Bank announced that there could be a need to intervene in the NOK market. In order to support a wellfunctioning NOK market, Norges Bank has made extraordinary NOK purchases totalling NOK 3.5 billion in the foreign exchange market. Chart: Money market turbulence Financial market volatility also led to high credit premiums.

Øystein Olsen: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 19 May 2020. * * * Accompanying slides of the speech. Please note that the text below may differ from the actual presentation. When I appeared at the hearing before this Committee this time last year, the Norwegian economy was growing at a solid pace and the policy rate was on the rise. The policy rate was raised three times in 2019, from 0.75 percent to 1.50 percent. There was no longer any need for low interest rates to support economic activity. After several years of solid economic growth and falling unemployment, capacity utilisation was assessed to be somewhat above a normal level in 2019. Inflation was close to the 2 percent target. GDP growth slowed through autumn, and towards the end of 2019 the Norwegian economy was assessed to be close to the peak of the business cycle. There were prospects that the policy rate would remain close to 1.50 percent ahead, inflation would continue to be close to the inflation target and unemployment would remain low. We envisaged that growth would slow in the years ahead, partly as a result of weaker prospects for petroleum investment.
BIS Review 99/2008  1  In line with this mission statement, the BoZ is responsible for regulating and supervising banks and the following types of NBFIs: •  Leasing and finance companies;  •  Housing financial institutions (building societies);  •  Savings and credit institutions;  •  Development finance institutions;  •  Microfinance institutions; and  •  Bureaux de change. As at June 30, 2008 there were 14 commercial banks and 71 NBFIs (see Appendix I). Currently, commercial banks dominate Zambia’s financial system with total assets and liabilities amounting to K14,465,045 million as at June 30, 2008 (about 31.8% of GDP). The reference NBFIs, notably, the leasing and finance companies (11, two of which are under statutory management of the Bank of Zambia 2 ), building societies (3), microfinance institutions licensed under the BFSA (15), development finance institutions (1) and savings and credit institutions (2). The combined balance sheet of these institutions, as at June 30, 2008 amounted to about 7.9% of the aggregated balance sheet of the commercial banks (see Table 1). 4.0  Access to financial services  In May 2007, here in Livingstone, the World Bank organized a Southern Africa roundtable discussion on the launch of their new report entitled, “Making Finance Work for Africa”. A common understanding arising from this debate was that financial exclusion has negative economic and social effects on society. These include the following: i.

The Board of directors shall consist of not less than 5 members (Section 30(2);  iii. Every financial service provider must have a Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer who shall not qualify to hold office unless it is shown that they are fit and proper persons, above 21 years old, have not been convicted of a felony or offence involving dishonesty, are not mentally incompetent, have never been removed from office under the BFSA, have not managed a company that has gone into liquidation or entered into a composition with creditors (Section 31);  iv. The majority of directors must be from outside the bank (Section 32(1);  v.  Directors, Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers are expected to act honestly, in good faith and in the interest of the company whilst exercising due care, diligence and skill (Section 33);  vi. A director is required to declare in writing to the board annually, the names and addresses of the director’s associates and full particulars of every material interest (Section 35);  vii.
As regards public finances, euro area fiscal deficits exceeded 6% at the peak of the crisis in 2009 and 2010, but are expected to fall below 3% this year, while primary budgets are even expected to post a surplus of 0.2%.4 This adjustment strategy has brought with it painful cuts in our social models and has not been without controversy. In fact, some commentators and academics suggest that governments should continue increasing deficits to support aggregate demand while the private sector is deleveraging. They argue that parts of the private sector are debt-constraint and need to reduce their leverage, while parts that are unconstrained are not increasing their leverage sufficiently.5 In such an environment the role for government spending is to expand demand for funds, and especially so when the nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound.6 I would agree to this approach if the fiscal budget allowed for room for manoeuvre. But the recent sovereign debt crisis has shown that fiscal space is very limited for many European countries. In Japan, the strategy of fiscal expansion has led to a situation in which gross government debt levels now exceed 200% of GDP. The continued favourable financing conditions appear to also be owed to the fact that more than 90% of Japanese government bonds are held domestically. This situation can be seen as a special privilege for the government.

Factors such as indirect taxes have effects on consumer prices that are transitory; they normally disappear after a time unless long-term inflation expectations have been affected. Conclusion The CPI is the target variable for monetary policy. Measured with the CPI, inflation is to be 2 per cent in a longer, annual perspective. There are grounds, however, for sometimes departing from this target. Short-run deviations from the target should not be attributed automatically to a faulty formulation of monetary policy. This presupposes, however, that clearly identifiable, transitory price movements are involved that monetary policy neither can nor should aim to counter. It is therefore important to look at the factors behind the CPI figures when appraising monetary policy. 7KHUHDVRQIRUOHWWLQJGHYLDWLRQVRFFXULVWKDWRWKHUZLVHWKHHFRQRP\ZRXOGEHGHVWDELOLVHG OHDGLQJVRRQHURUODWHUWRXQQHFHVVDU\HFRQRPLFFRVWVWKDWLVWRVD\H[DJJHUDWHGIOXFWXDWLRQV LQERWKWKHUHDOHFRQRP\DQGWKHILQDQFLDOPDUNHWV  11  BIS Review 61/1999
The problems concerning how measures of resource utilisation relate to the normal level are, however, greater. It is difficult enough to measure resource utilisation, but it is even more difficult to measure what its normal level is. Instead we have to weigh together different measures and indicators in a reasonable way. This of course provides greater scope for a wider range of assessments. The financial crisis has, not least, also raised the question of to what extent monetary policy should take financial stability into account. This is an important question that should be analysed further. Let me conclude by saying that it appears that the fiscal policy and monetary policy stimulation measures that are being implemented throughout the world are beginning to have the desired effects. The situation in the financial sector has improved and an economic recovery is now discernable. But it is still uncertain whether the recovery is stable or whether there is a risk that it will come to a halt as soon as the fiscal policy and monetary policy stimulation measures are phased out. Deciding the appropriate time to begin the phase-out of the now very extensive monetary policy stimulation measures is a major challenge. If the phase-out begins too early there is a risk that the recovery will come to a halt. If we wait too long, there is a risk that we will need to increase the repo rate very quickly in order to meet the inflation target.

This task has, for example, been the reason for the crisis measures that the Riksbank has taken since the autumn. However, we need to discuss whether situations can arise in which flexible inflation targeting conflicts with the aim of promoting financial stability. If so, should interest-rate policy be modified or is it more appropriate to use other instruments to, for example, counteract the development of financial bubbles? I have no ready answers to these questions today. They partly relate to the question of the causes of the current financial crisis. Has monetary policy contributed to the crisis through low interest rates or do the causes lie in entirely different factors, such as global imbalances and/or inadequate regulation and supervision of the financial markets? The analysis of the causes of the crisis has begun, but it is still far too soon to draw any clear conclusions about the contribution of different factors. The current economic situation But what are the prospects for the economy in the period ahead and what challenges are we facing now? The financial crisis reinforced the international economic downturn. It is therefore natural to expect that a recovery will only come when the situation on the international financial markets has normalised. Stabilisation of the financial sector The situation on the financial markets has continued to improve during the summer.
Six years later, Michael Kremer, an economist at Harvard University, formulated the O-ring theory of economic development 1. According to him, if strategic complementarity is sufficiently strong within a system, O-ring effects can create low-production traps. Financial Times columnist Tim Hartford relates Kremer’s theory to the concept of weak links 2. When systems have a strong element of interdependence, weak links begin to have a more multiplicative effect, rather than an additive effect, on the overall outcomes of the system. A musical band is only as good as its least experienced player. A dance troupe is only as synchronised as its worst dancer. Today’s economies and financial systems have undoubtedly become more intricately interlinked across agents, markets and nations. This progression brings benefits as it unlocks new synergies and uncovers diverse sources of growth. However, the increased interdependence also increases the potential for O-ring type effects. Any single component within this complex web of economic and financial relationships can become the weak link of the system, with highly detrimental effects on the system’s stability and on economic growth. The financial crisis of 2008–2009 in the advanced economies was a good illustration of an O-ring weak link, whereby a seemingly small segment of the US financial system – the subprime mortgage market – triggered an economic crisis that reverberated around the world and the effects of which are still being felt today.

Meanwhile, AIG Financial Products compensated its employees, including risk officers, on the basis of revenues brought in rather than profits. At Lloyds, incentive schemes which pressured sales staff to meet targets or face demotion also encouraged misselling of payment protection insurance. In all these instances, executives were inclined to focus on immediate outcomes such as revenues and sales targets in order to deliver visible results quickly, without much regard for the risks assumed. Major efforts have since been undertaken internationally to address these issues. The essence of these reforms is twopronged: the first is a greater emphasis on the governance of the compensation framework by the board and senior management; the second is a greater alignment of compensation practices with prudent risk-taking. As risks undertaken today may materialise much later in the future, the latter entails deferring portions of compensation and subjecting them to adjustments, such as bonus-malus and clawbacks. Finally, a strengthened role of market discipline can also shape the governance of finance for the better by reducing information asymmetries between the market and financial institutions. Again, regulations can play a part by enhancing the scope and quality of mandatory disclosures, such as in respect of key information relating to risk exposures, risk management policies and capital ratios. A relevant emerging trend among investors and consumers has been an increasing focus on more sustainable approaches to finance, including those which consider environmental, social and governance concerns.
The recovery has been broad-based. The easing of monetary policy contributed to a sharp rise in private consumption and housing investment. Activity has picked up considerably in service industries and the construction sector. High petroleum investment, the global economic recovery, a weaker krone and lower wage growth contributed to boosting activity in manufacturing industry. Profitability has improved for mainland enterprises. Mainland fixed investment has also gradually increased. Thus, it may appear that growth in the Norwegian economy has become more self-driven. Even with a pronounced upswing in output, the increase in the number employed has been limited so far in this cyclical upturn. Measured in terms of the number of person-hours worked, however, employment growth was high last year. Registered unemployment has shown a small decline over the past year. Productivity probably increased more than normally in some industries in the early phase of the recovery. A marked fall in sickness absence may have reduced the need for new employees. Capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy has increased, notwithstanding the decline in sickness absence and efficiency gains in the business sector. The output gap is a measure of capacity utilisation in the economy. We interpret a positive output gap to mean that output and capacity utilisation are higher than the level consistent with stable inflation over time. High domestic interest rates in 2002 and fiscal policy management contributed to substantially lower cost inflation in the private and public sectors over the past two years.

Profitability will be depressed both by increased competition and by rising wage costs. Investment will be held back and the transformation will proceed too slowly or not at all. There will then be no quick renewal of capital stocks. Firms will not make good use of the new information technology. I have cited wage formation as a conceivable factor that may hamper a transformation, but of course there are other factors as well, for example the tax system, the educational system, etc. It is not a function of the Riksbank to point out specific factors that can affect the pace of structural change. But perhaps we can contribute to a broader discussion of the new economy. Various factors that hamper or check an adjustment could thus result in the Swedish economy following a lower, not a higher, path for long-term growth, with a stronger, not a weaker, inflation propensity and a continuation of high unemployment instead of a reduction to the low level that most people want. These risks seldom feature in the general discussion about the new economy. The changes that many people refer to as the new economy unquestionably present a number of challenges to the Swedish economy in the present situation. My comments have indicated, moreover, that the notion of a new economy is not correct; that is not what it is all about.
Standard economic theory dictates that, in such circumstances, exogenous changes in money demand should indeed be accommodated. In a seminal article going back to 1970 1 , William Poole showed that, when there is uncertainty about money demand, the optimal response is to stabilize the interest rate, thus letting money supply adjust. Since short-term interest rates are, for all Central Banks, the main policy tool, an increase in interbank rates over and above the official rate would indeed be tantamount to a shift in monetary policy. In contrast, liquidity provision by Central Banks has ensured that the overall policy stance has remained unchanged. A clear distinction has been – and will be – maintained between temporary liquidity provision, on the one hand, and medium term oriented monetary policy, on the other. Should liquidity be provided at a penalty rate, as some have argued, to avoid moral hazard? The answer is clearly positive if and when liquidity assistance is targeted at specific institutions. But there is no reason, for Central Banks, to significantly depart from prevailing policy rates if their main objective is to respond to an exogenous and general increase in demand for central bank balances. In the future, monetary policy may have to be adjusted, not for the purpose of easing financial tensions, but according to its own objective and in view of the state of the economy.

But as the Chinese saying goes, "A thousand miles begins with a single step" (). We are grateful that you have all chosen to join us to take important first step in this meaningful e-HKD journey. I know you're all eagerly waiting to hear about the potential use cases, so I'll give the floor to each pilot group to share their creative ideas. Thank you. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches