samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some near term sources of uncertainty have eased but others remain. Because of the Government’s Energy Price Guarantee there is more certainty about the outlook for energy prices and Government policy more broadly is on a more stable and predictable footing. This has been reflected in pricing in financial markets. The labour market remains tight and services inflation has hit 30-year highs and is contributing more to overall inflation. I am not yet confident that domestically generated inflationary pressures from increased costs and firms’ pricing are starting to ease. Encouragingly survey and market based medium term inflation expectations have fallen back from their peak, though they remain elevated. Assuming that in the near term the economy evolves broadly in line with the latest MPR projections and given my assessment of the balance of risks, then I expect that further increases in Bank rate are going to be required to ensure a sustainable return of inflation to target. Considerable uncertainties remain around the outlook and if the outlook suggests more persistent inflationary pressures then I will continue to vote to respond forcefully. At the same time I am mindful that there are other uncertainties that I haven’t covered today, for example relating to the transmission mechanism for policy. We have increased Bank Rate very rapidly over the last year and on past experience a change in interest rates has its peak impact on inflation only after around 18-24 months.

Spanish banks, for their part, are in a relatively good position compared with their European counterparts, with a relatively high and growing degree of efficiency. In any event, it is also true that office density, despite falling in recent years, remains high, especially when compared with that of other European countries (see Chart 7). In this area, new technological developments should allow further gains in efficiency by providing for proximity to customers and for the marketing of products via means other than face-to-face contact. Chart 6  3.2  Chart 7  New products and services  The second foreseeable response by the industry to the narrowing of financial margins is the search for income supplementing that from the traditional commercial banking business. Net fee income relating to services (management or transactional), as a proportion of total operating income, has been on a slightly rising trend in most countries. In the current setting, it appears this trend is reflecting a lesser propensity of banks to subsidise certain transactional services with a charge to net interest income. That said, fee-generating business is subject to growing competition owing to the emergence of new unlicensed bank competitors, which have demonstrated ample ability to harness the new technologies (the so-called fintech companies). These new competitors specialise in specific segments of the services value chain, services that in the past were exclusively provided by banks, without being subject to banking regulation requirements.
Adopting this culture of assessment in economic policy design should be one of its pillars. Allow me now to give you a brief overview of the impact of the pandemic on economic activity. Subsequently, I shall briefly address the content of the economic policy strategy I have just outlined. Details of this content are, in any event, in a document I forwarded to the Chair of this Committee to be distributed among its members. 2. The economic crisis caused by the coronavirus pandemic The pandemic has had an extraordinarily acute impact. In Q1, China saw the biggest decline in its GDP in history. In the United States, the unemployment rate rose to record highs. And euro area GDP fell by 3.6% in the same period. In Spain, despite the fact the lockdown measures only affected the last fortnight of Q1, GDP slumped by 5.2%, also the biggest quarter-on-quarter decline in our recent history. The fact that virtually all of the restrictions linked to the state of alert have been in force for more than half of Q2 will necessarily mean a significantly sharper decline in activity in this 2  period. On Banco de España estimates, this contraction in GDP might stand at between 16% and 22% relative to its Q1 level. The severity of the crisis has been particularly visible in employment. The adjustment from mid-March to end-May affected more than 26% of total employment. In parallel, the number of firms registered in Social Security records has undergone the biggest fall in its history.

The less good news is that the worrying international imbalances within and between the industrial countries persisted through most of the past year - though just between you and me, my Lord Mayor, and so long as you don’t breath a word to the Chancellor, there is a glimmer of a suggestion - no more than that - that those imbalances may now be becoming somewhat less worrying. In the United States evidence of a sustained improvement in the rate of productivity growth has persisted. We, in this country, must fervently hope that the seeds of this technological modification are blown in our direction and find a receptive environment here. There is no obvious reason why we should be immune from this highly desirable infection - though sadly the symptoms of contamination are still hard to detect. In the meantime its supply-side effects in the United States imply that the US economy can sustain faster growth than seemed possible before, without necessarily overheating - at least for a time and up to a point. But the same developments have also helped to raise the temperature on the demand side of the US economy, and the Federal Reserve has been administering monetary sedatives at intervals throughout the past year. But finding exactly the right dosage, and the right timing, to keep the body temperature near normal in present circumstances really does demand the wisdom of Solomon - or at least the wisdom of Greenspan.
Understanding of risks is key in ensuring that our AML/CFT measures are commensurate with the risks, in order for us to protect the financial institutions and the integrity of our financial system;  iii. Non-compliances will be viewed very seriously and strong regulatory and supervisory actions are to be expected;  iv. Cooperation and collaboration between financial institutions and LEAs are vital for an effective AML/CFT regime; and  v.  Legal, regulatory and operational frameworks alone are not sufficient without effective execution and overall implementation. Results would need to be measured based on the outcome and impact. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  In relations to the Mutual Evaluation that will be undertaken from 13 to 25 November this year, I wish inform that some financial institutions will be called to meet the assessors during the on-site assessment in November. The purpose of the meeting is for the assessors to assess how effective AML/CFT measures are being implemented by the reporting institutions. We have identified several potential institutions as per the criteria given by the assessors. If your institution is being selected, you will receive formal notification from us in due course. Nevertheless, there are also high possibilities that the assessors may request to meet institutions of their choice during the on-site assessment.

The first panel will be moderated by Mr. Liviu Voinea, Deputy Governor and will approach the theme of investments and investment finance in 2018. The second panel will be moderated by Ms. Lara Tassan Zanin, Head of The European Investment Bank Office in Romania and will focus on the support of sustainable growth in Romania, shifting from consumption to investments. Ladies and gentlemen, Romania and the European Investment Bank share a long and fruitful cooperation that started in 1990. It got closer in 2007 when Romania became a member of European Union and implicitly of European Investment Bank. This joint partnership has boosted investments in Romania in areas of significant importance for the national economy, such as the infrastructure, small and medium enterprises, environment and innovation. These coordinates are totaling more than 13 billion EUR allocated to around 130 projects financed by the European Investment Bank, besides other 70 projects financed by the European Fund for Strategic Investments. These figures alone speak about the priorities, however I would like to point out that the financial impact transcends beyond the sum of total loans. There is significant potential for development and improvement. Romania is a net beneficiary of EU funds, the latest data showing a positive aggregate balance with more than 32 billion EUR as net received funds.
3 In other words the massive increase in the stock of lending – an increase of £ trillion in absolute terms – did not lead to very much of an increase in productive investment at all. Of course there are benefits in enabling people to buy their homes. And much of the financing of financial markets almost certainly came back to productive investment in the form of market investments in business. But as we discovered in the crisis much of the lending appears to have financed the increase in house prices and a large part of the market investment was simply misallocated and lost. 4 Nor did this increase in lending drive a commensurate increase in economic growth in this particular credit cycle. Over the period 2000–2007 GDP growth averaged little more than its long-run average of around 2.8%. In fact, business investment over the period averaged just 1.3% a year and it appears that most of this was related to commercial real estate. Conclusion The financial system can be a powerful engine for growth and prosperity. But its ability to generate systemic crises means it can also be a powerful destroyer of those as well. This has been true throughout history but never more so than for today’s highly complex, globalised and digitalised financial system. We should not therefore see economic growth, or productivity as somehow opposed to effective financial regulation.

In addition, the crypto ecosystem inherits and may amplify the vulnerabilities of the mainstream financial system, as it grows and tries to replicate the functions of that system, and it introduces new points of vulnerability like bridges between blockchains or so called oracles that feed data to blockchains. Third, the investigations undertaken by many central banks, for the issuance of a retail and/or a wholesale CBDC, should be seen in my view as part of a broader response by central banks, in line with their monetary and financial stability mandate, to help bring the financial landscape, which will result from those transformations, within a confidence prone regulatory and operational framework, to help reap their benefits and master their risks. At the Banque de France, our response is based on three convictions: First, the traditional pillars to ensure confidence cannot be replaced by any "algorithmic" confidence, namely by rules of the game that would be coded once and for all and for which respect would be entrusted to algorithms. Second, confidence requires a regulatory framework that is clear, fair ("same business, same risk, same rule"), balanced and consistent at international level, if we want to simultaneously encourage innovation, protect adequately customers and investors, and maintain the stability of our financial system. Europe has led the way in this field, with the adoption of MiCA.
Since the various elements of economic policy differ in their effects, they have different tasks:   Monetary policy now steers inflation in the medium and long term and can in addition contribute to smoothing fluctuations in output and employment.   The central government budget – growth in public expenditure, which must be sustainable in the long term – influences the krone and the size of the internationally exposed sector in the medium term.   Wage formation and economic structures and incentives provide the basis for efficient use of our labour resources and other economic resources, and for economic growth. There is also an interaction:   In their budget resolutions, the government authorities will attach importance to the effects of the budget on the Norwegian economy and will therefore take account of the effect on the interest rate. In this way, they avoid a situation where growth in public expenditure and the interest rate push the economy in different directions.   With a known monetary policy response pattern, the parties to the centralised income settlements can take into account interest rate effects when wage increases are agreed.   Moreover, the parties to public sector negotiations can take into account that the higher the pay increases are, the fewer there are who can be remunerated over government budgets. Norges Bank Act of 1985 – a framework for today’s monetary policy The Norges Bank Act, passed in 1985, governs monetary policy.

Another feature of central bank legislation in other countries is legal independence, in the sense that the central bank’s use of instruments, primarily the key interest rate, cannot be overruled, whether by instruction or reversal. If the Norges Bank Act were being written today, it would probably include an objects section. As mentioned, much of the preparatory works is out of date so that the provisions of the Act of 1985 must be interpreted in the light of the current economic system. Moreover, Section 1 reads “[t]he bank may implement any measures customarily or ordinarily taken by a central bank”, and this is something that changes, as we know. The Act is thus flexible enough to provide a suitable framework also for the conduct of monetary policy today. It specifies, moreover, that Norges Banks sets the interest rates on its loans and deposits. Norges Bank’s responsibilities are also now well established through practice. The central bank is accountable Norges Bank has two parallel governing bodies. In addition to an Executive Board, appointed by the Council of State, it has a Supervisory Council appointed by the Storting. This is also shows the peculiar position of the Bank in the government administration. The direct link to the country’s national assembly reflects that the Storting under Article 75 (c) of the Norwegian Constitution “shall supervise the monetary affairs of the Realm”.
Furthermore, central banks should seriously consider the question of whether they need to intervene when risks in the financial system increase as a result of strong credit growth and an easing of lending conditions. Credit aggregates are part of the SNB’s monetary policy strategy, and the National Bank monitors their development closely. However, the SNB’s main aim is and will continue to be the maintenance of price stability. BIS Review 35/2010  1

16 It becomes difficult to attract labour to the major cities when it is impossible to find a home for a reasonable price. 17 I am concerned about this social development, as it is creating problems for economic growth and economic distribution, and is increasing the likelihood of financial crises. It is of great importance that reforms are carried out to slow this development down. Measures affecting all mortgage borrowers are absent Like the Riksbank, Finansinspektionen has drawn attention to households’ high indebtedness and has taken measures to reduce the risks and increase resilience among households. This has also contributed towards slowing down price growth for housing, although this was not the primary purpose of the measures. 18 However, these macroprudential policy measures, such as a loan-to-value limit and amortisation requirements, are only aimed at new borrowers. Consequently, they mainly affect the conditions for the people I refer to as outsiders and, to some extent, could make it more difficult for them to enter the housing market. 19 On the other hand, there are few measures affecting the stock of already existing loans, which means that the new rules affect insiders and outsiders differently. In a study, the Riksbank has demonstrated that an amortisation requirement aimed at all borrowers could reduce household debt over the long run and that this would also mean a redistribution of resources from lenders to borrowers.
The performance of the Albanian financial system was affected by the wavering of confidence in our financial system during the first half of the year and the withdrawal of a portion of deposits. This performance, coupled with another group of factors, yielded less support, and at higher cost, to the Albanian economy with banking loans. BIS Review 78/2010  1  Among the factors worth noting are:   Higher economic agents’ uncertainty and liquidity premiums;    The correction of the business model in particular financial market segments;    Increased exchange rate volatility; and    Contracted demand for loans in the second half of 2009. The wavering of public confidence underscored the prime importance of financial stability in Albania’s economic life. Within its area of responsibility, the Bank of Albania undertook a number of comprehensive and co-ordinated measures, which aimed at maintaining financial stability at a systemic and institutional level. These measures, inter alia, consisted in:   Reviewing the regulatory base in terms of increasing the supervisory prudence;    Strengthening on-site supervision;    Increasing the analysis of banks’ balance sheets at an individual and systemic level; and    Enhancing the co-operation with the national and foreign counterpart institutions. Our endeavours to preserve financial stability were also coordinated with other public, executive and legislative authorities. Worth noting is the improvement of the public deposit insurance scheme and the increase of the deposit insurance level by the Deposit Insurance Agency.

We will continue to carefully monitor – as we always have done – the possible side effects of accommodative monetary conditions. It is crucial to remain vigilant and to use the available micro- and macroprudential policy tools as necessary. I will say more on this during the hearing in my capacity as Chair of the European Systemic Risk Board. The low yield environment needs to be understood in the context of the protracted decline in real yields we have witnessed since the 1980s. And this trend is not unique to the euro area. It largely reflects more structural factors such as a slowdown in productivity growth, which can be reversed through an ambitious structural reforms agenda. In other words, we need a coherent economic strategy in the euro area that complements and enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy. This is why there was unanimous consensus in the Governing Council that fiscal policy must make a more decisive contribution. In view of the weakening economic outlook and the continued prominence of downside risks, governments with fiscal space that are facing a slowdown should act in an effective and timely manner. Where fiscal sustainability is ensured, the potential effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy is reinforced in the current environment, given that 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  fiscal multipliers are higher in a low interest rate environment. At the same time, governments in countries with high public debt should pursue prudent policies and deliver on structural balance targets.
Third, the foundation of growth must be based on good governance and provides economic opportunity for people across all segments of the society. Social stability cannot be sustained with only selected few enjoying the 2  benefits. Having said all this, one necessary foundation in support of achieving these goals is to have a wellfunctioning legal framework that promotes governance, productivity, sustainability and equal opportunity. For Thailand, there is much room to improve on our legal framework. In a fast changing world, specifically with technology and liberalization, laws can quickly become outdated, stalling business progress and creating high costs of compliance, especially for SMEs. At the same time, new risks may not be properly regulated as dynamic technological and social progress has created the needs for regulation in areas once not deemed necessary. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the policymakers to continue to improve the legal framework to support their policies and goals. For these reasons, I want to highlight a set of laws – mainly laws relevant to businesses that will support and shape Thailand’s future business landscape. Some of the laws that I will discuss are already in effect; some are being reviewed at the National Legislative Assembly; and some are being considered at the Council of the State after having been endorsed by the cabinet.

So far, 17 companies have obtained TC licenses, most of which are multinational corporations. Second, ASEAN banks and their branches are expected to gain broader access within the AEC region. Under the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF), ASEAN countries may enter into bilateral agreements to allow Qualified ASEAN Banks (QABs) to establish branches in the partnering country. To attain QAB status, banks must meet governance and several operating standards as well as other criteria agreed on a bilateral basis. For Thailand, this is an ongoing process, and we are now under QAB negotiations with Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar. 7  Third, we promote the use of local currencies for cross-border transactions. This helps reduce transaction costs and mitigates the exchange rate risks amidst the backdrop of high foreign exchange volatility in advanced economies. For liquidity support of regional currencies, Thailand has established several Bilateral Swap Arrangements with neighboring countries including China, Malaysia, Cambodia, and Laos. Further arrangement is expected, especially with Indonesia and other CLMV partners. These aforementioned developments are initial steps that could lead countries in the region into a new regional financial landscape that further integrates trade and financial services. Ladies and gentlemen, I hope my talk today is not overloaded with too many details, but I think it is a good opportunity to share some of the reform efforts in Thailand that may be less frequently discussed. Let me end my talk by providing you a quick summary.