samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
‘No money, no inflation: The role of money in the economy,’ Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Summer, pp. 162-177. Masuch, K., S. Nicoletti-Altimari, M. Rostagno and H. Pill (2004). ‘The role of money in monetary policymaking,’ BIS papers no. 19, pp. 158-191. Poole, W. (1968). ‘Commercial bank reserve management In a stochastic model: Implications for monetary policy,’ Journal of Finance, Vol. 23, no. 5, pp. 769-791. Rotemberg, J.J. and M. Woodford (1997). “An optimisation-based econometric framework for the evaluation of monetary policy” in B. Bernanke and J.J. Rotemberg (eds. ), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, MIT Press. Sargent, T.J. and N. Wallace (1973). ‘Rational expectations and the dynamics of hyperinflation,’ International Economic Review, Vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 328-50. Tobin, J. (1958). ‘Liquidity preference as behaviour towards risk,’ The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 65-86 Woodford, M (2003). Interest and prices: Foundations of a theory of monetary policy, Princeton University Press. Page 18  1. See King (2002). 2. See Friedman (1970), p. 24. 3. See Bernanke (2004). 4. See the discussion of this in Masuch, et al. (2004). 5. See Goodhart (1989). 6. See Poole (1968). 7. That would be in the spirit of the traditional monetarist arguments made by Friedman (1963) and Brunner and Meltzer (1988), as well as reflecting the portfolio models of Tobin (1958) that lie outside the monetarist tradition. 8. See the arguments made in IIMR (2022) and Jessop (2022). 9. See the discussion of these issues in Bernanke (2003). 10.

I expect real GDP to grow modestly this year as tighter monetary policy continues to take effect, with growth picking up somewhat next year. In addition, we are beginning to see some signs of cooling in the labor market. I expect slow growth will likely lead to some softening, with unemployment gradually rising to about 4 to 4-1/2 percent over the next year. Conclusion In conclusion, inflation is still too high, and we will use our monetary policy tools to restore price stability. I am confident that we will attain and maintain a sufficiently restrictive stance to bring inflation down to our 2 percent longer-run goal. And now, I look forward to our discussion. 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement on Longer-Run Goals  and Monetary Policy Strategy, adopted effective January 24, 2012; as reaffirmed effective January 31, 2023. 2 John C. Williams, A Steady Anchor in a Stormy Sea, remarks at SNB-FRB-BIS High-  Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, Switzerland, November 9, 2022. 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Global Supply Chain Pressure Index. 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve issues FOMC  statement, March 22, 2023. 3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  5 Board Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Summary of Economic Projections,  March 22, 2023. 6 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Plans for Reducing the Size of  the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet, May 4, 2022.
It would help avoid lock-in on existing platforms and enable providers of finance to compete for SME lending, helping to broaden the products available to companies and offer more competitive rates, making access to finance quick, easy and cost effective.20 It is not for the Bank of England to build this platform but we can help lay some of groundwork. The messaging standards we are adopting in the new RTGS will also include tagging payments with a unique ID called a Legal Entity Identifier (LEI).21 This will be mandated for financial institutions and as a next step we are considering how to extend this to corporate payments. That could mean that the payment data sent via CHAPS of non-financial firms could be made available for inclusion in a portable credit file. The LEI could  See: Furman, J ‘Unlocking digital competition’ Report of the digital competition expert panel (March 2019). See: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/future-finance. The introduction of Legal Entity Identifiers (LEIs) will enable consistent and accurate identification of legal entities on a global basis. Their introduction was pioneered by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) following the financial crisis as a means of precisely identifying counterparty risks and exposures. The LEI is linked to a publically available database about each registered entity. LEIs are not yet widely used in payments or supply chains. Following a consultation, the Bank is making LEIs mandatory for all payments initiated between financial entities.

9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  Equally important, utilising ML and AI to analyse the data could free up supervisors’ time to add the greatest value where humans excel over machines: judgement. That is why the Bank is today launching a Review to explore a transformation of the hosting and use of regulatory data over the next decade. This review will be conducted in close consultation with banks, insurers and financial market infrastructures. We are also embarking on proofs of concepts, in collaboration with firms and the tech sector, to test how we can automatically extract regulatory firm data. And we will identify and implement near term improvements in how we use data, including greater use of AI and ML to interpret the information. Support the transition to a carbon-neutral economy My final example of how the new finance can serve the new economy is the most fundamental. Indeed, it is existential. This year, the threats from climate change spurred demonstrations across the country and prompted Parliament to declare a ‘climate emergency’. In response, last week, the Prime Minister announced legislation that would make the UK the first G7 country to commit to net zero emissions by 2050. The changes required to achieve this are enormous. Carbon emissions will have to decline by 45% from 2010 levels over the next decade.26 This will require a massive reallocation of capital creating unprecedented risks and opportunities.
By determining the conditions for the banks’ deposits in and borrowing from the RIX system, the Riksbank can affect the overnight rate, that is the interest on overnight loans between the banks. BIS Review 51/2008  3  Deposit and lending rates set the limits for the overnight rate When the payment system closes for the day and trade between the banks in the overnight market has been concluded, the banks’ accounts in RIX must be in balance. This means that the banks must finance their deficits or invest their surpluses. The banks have two alternatives for achieving this. They can either balance their respective deficits and surpluses against one another on the overnight market, or they can use the Riksbank’s deposit and lending facility. The latter means that they can deposit in or borrow from the Riksbank overnight at interest rates published in advance. These are known as the deposit and lending rates, which are 0.75 percentage points below and above the repo rate respectively. This difference creates an incentive for the banks to firstly borrow from and deposit funds with each other at a rate of interest in this so-called interest rate corridor. One could thus say that the deposit and lending rates set the limits for the overnight rate. How does the Riksbank ensure that the overnight rate is stable? But we do not leave it at that. The facilities ensure that the overnight rate remains within the corridor.

Conclusion Beyond the immediate Y2K issue, it is clear that Asian bankers face many serious challenges. They need to keep abreast of changing developments, and anticipate new trends. They must significantly improve their corporate governance. Technological innovations will continue. Policymakers have a full agenda to liberalise prudently, while tightening standards of supervision and enforcement. As financial liberalisation proceeds, new market opportunities will emerge and there will be a demand for more differentiated products and services. Capital markets should grow in Asia, providing an alternative means of intermediation for regional economies. If Asian financial systems can do these things and respond to new opportunities, they will be a source of strength, and not weakness, to their countries as the new millennium dawns. BIS Review 130/1999  5
Over the course of the second half of 2009 and throughout the entire 2010, annual GDP growth will resume positive values, closer to trend, in line with the strong monetary and fiscal impulse and with the Chilean economy’s sound fundamentals. Thus, for 2009 at large, annual GDP growth will be within the range between -0.75 and +0.25 percent, while domestic demand will drop 4.7 percent year-on-year. Consistently, the baseline scenario assumes that the current account deficit will amount to 1.8 percent of GDP in the year, lower than predicted in January (Table 2). The labor market is already feeling the deterioration of the macroeconomic environment. Employment, after the usual seasonal adjustment, has shown a decline in the past few months and the rate of unemployment has begun to rise. Taking into account the typical relationship between the output gap and employment, it is likely that the labor market will continue to deteriorate in the months to come, with higher unemployment, despite early signs of recovery in the economy. Still, the implementation of the National Agreement for Employment recently announced by the Government could mitigate part of the rise in unemployment. The increase in output gaps has affected inflationary pressures and perspectives in the large majority of countries. A big number of economies, Chile included, have seen a rapid decline in inflation since the final months of last year. This obeys to a large extent to commodity prices falling, particularly oil and its derivatives.

We can now benefit from the lessons we learned the hard way from the profound financial and real crisis we suffered in 1982-1983. Chile has steadily built throughout the years solid macroeconomic and financial institutions that, although they do not shield us from world events, do permit us to adjust to external shocks at substantially lower costs than we would have faced in the past. Therefore, as we have also said since the current crisis turned into chaos, Chile has never been better prepared to weather a shock like the one we are now enduring. Proof of this is the enormous countercyclical effort of macroeconomic policies carried out in the context of a solid, stable financial system. In fact, with respect to October of last year, and compared with the rest of the world, ours has been one of the greatest easing efforts of monetary policy, and our monetary policy rate (MPR) is at its historic low (Figure 2). Such an expansionary monetary policy has been implemented within the context of a credible inflation targeting regime, which ensures its effectiveness facing shocks of the magnitude we are seeing now. Chile’s inflation was among the highest between early 2007 and October 2008, a period that saw commodity prices soar. Also, Chile’s inflation has been one of the fastest to drop (Figure 3).
The Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo is now growing and consolidating day after day under the management of an Albanian professional unlike some time ago when the management of the central bank was the task of a foreign central banker. Meetings of this kind are now turning into a tradition. After holding similar meetings in Korça, Gjirokastra, Shkodra and Saranda we are now being introduced with a new reality of the North-East region, and I believe that the town of Kukës plays a key role in this area. Through these regional meetings we aim to be in touch with the economic and financial reality of different regions in Albania. Given the weather, cultural, social, geographical, demographic, objective and subjective characteristics, each region has different economic and social development opportunities and levels. From this viewpoint, we aim to fully be acquainted with these specific characteristics, identify all the financial and natural resources, formulate “recipes” and other advice which would help in making more rational use of them. Beyond what I previously stated, I would like to clarify that the exploration of the potentials that the different regions have to offer and the identification of their level of use is also essential in terms of the banking system’s activity, in particular of the geographic expansion and financial intermediation. Another major reason motivating the Bank of Albania to organize these meetings relates with the establishment of a more effective communication channel between the Bank of Albania and the public.

Ardian Fullani: The banking system – promoter of economic development Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the regional meeting “The banking system – promoter of economic development”, Kukës, 12 September 2008. *  *  *  Dear Governor, Dear Mayor of Kukës Municipality, Dear Mayor of Prizren Municipality, Dear Mr. Uldedaj, Dear Mr. Basha, Dear participants, I am delighted to be here today and there are many good reasons why I was looking forward to this gathering. For the second time within a relatively short period of time I see this gigantic engineering work growing every day and taking its final shape. Every single person visiting the road segment Rëshen – Kalimash understands that what they have in front of them is an extraordinary engineering, civil, useful, far-sighted and patriotic work. Similarly, my return to Kukës after quite a long time has surprised me. There is now a completed airport, cross-border activity has intensified, the climate is extraordinary and soon this town will turn into a city with modern infrastructure. Numerous opportunities are ahead of you. Your cleverness stands in perceiving them and making use of them cleverly in order to enhance the opportunities of the Kukës community and the North-East region. The other reason for making me feel delighted is the presence of my Kosovar counterpart, Mr. Hashim Rexhepi. This meeting is of special significance.
While it is true that the contributions to the monetary policy decision-making process that have been made by economic expertise and econometrics can scarcely be overestimated, the fact remains that to some extent monetary policy is still a matter of trial and error. It is some consolation in this context that we have a continuous supply of new information. If our policy happens to be unduly restrictive, for instance, this will show up in weaker inflation and vice versa. The direction of policy can then be adjusted. This is relevant not least with respect to the new economy. It seems unlikely that the mechanisms I talked about earlier would cause economic relationships to change overnight. Presumably it would be more a matter of gradual changes that we can incorporate in the foundation for decisions. Then it is naturally the case that our decisions invariably involve taking some degree of unavoidable chance as the risks associated with alternative strategies are weighed in the balance. The economy’s cyclical position is important here. It is generally agreed at present that economic prospects for the coming years are unusually bright. Most forecasters count on stable growth of between at least 3 and 4% this year and next, followed it seems by the continuation of a favourable trend. In this situation, when resource utilisation is rising rapidly, a transition from low to more normal interest rates can hardly constitute a sizeable threat to activity. That was how the Federal Reserve reasoned, for example, in a similar situation in 1994.

First, the financial crisis made it obvious that an ability to understand and anticipate what is happening in the household sector is essential to gauging the strength and resiliency of the U.S. economy. Second, our policy actions are intended to change the incentives facing households, so it is important to be able to gauge how our policies are transmitted into household financial decisions. Good information on household borrowing, for example, allows us to see how monetary policy affects outcomes such as auto loan originations. Third, better household finance research helps support our community outreach and development missions. A major challenge to achieving these goals is that household finances have traditionally been poorly documented. We have lots of information about corporate sector debt and equity, but comparable basic facts about the household sector are much harder to come by. For example, the lack of timely, comprehensive data made it more difficult to understand how vulnerable the household sector’s financial position had become by 2007. I’m happy to say that we’ve made progress in beginning to close this data gap. At the New York Fed, we’ve been able to develop products that support a much better understanding of the household sector’s borrowing behavior, ranging from loan-level mortgage information to credit card utilization and borrowing limits. This has greatly improved our knowledge of household debt burdens, new borrowing activity, debt repayment as well as delinquencies.
In order to illustrate the mechanism in operation, I have simulated a small macroeconomic model of the sort used by Woodford and others to study alternative monetary policies (see Annex for details). Real demand depends inversely on the current and expected future path of real interest rates, while the central bank sets the nominal interest rate. Prices in this economy adjust slowly, with a Phillips-curve relationship linking inflation to the current and expected future path of slack in the economy. Private agents understand how the economy works and have rational expectations. The key parameters – the interest elasticity of demand and the responsiveness of inflation to the output gap – are set to be broadly in line with empirical evidence for the United Kingdom, but given the extreme simplicity of the model, the results should be taken as merely illustrative. In this economy, the slow adjustment of prices in the face of shocks to demand or supply leads to efficiency losses, which depend on the square of the deviation of inflation from target and the square of the output gap. The policy maker wishes to minimise the present value of these efficiency losses. Such an objective can be thought of as describing the rationale for flexible inflation targeting, namely seeking to stabilise inflation but in a manner that avoids excessive variability in output. Chart 4 shows what happens in this economy when there is a large and relatively persistent drop in demand, but monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates.

I consider three policy scenarios. In the first scenario (the green line), the central bank can credibly commit to its future policy settings. I do not regard this as attainable in practice over anything other than very short time horizons, as central bankers generally cannot tie the hands of their successors. But it does provide a useful benchmark against which to judge alternative policies. The nominal interest rate is cut straight to its zero lower bound and remains there for over six years, far longer than is necessary to bring output back to potential and enough to generate subsequent overheating and excess inflation. But it is precisely that expectation of temporarily higher future inflation that reduces expected future real interest rates and boosts demand today. In the second scenario (the red line), the central bank cannot commit in this way; the best it can do is simply to set policy on a quarter by quarter basis. Interest rates are again cut to their zero lower bound but now the monetary stimulus is withdrawn earlier, after about four years, and there is no overheating phase. The consequence is that expected real interest rates are higher than under the first scenario, demand is weaker and the output gap larger. From a welfare perspective, the first scenario offers a better outcome, because – at least in the model – the overheating period is a price worth paying to generate higher activity and less deflation in the near term.
It is likely that, as the recovery takes hold, output will grow at rates above its historical trend for a while. But this growth needs to be seen in the context of the sharp fall in the level of output over the past eighteen months and the margin of spare capacity that was opened up as a result. The recovery in the level of economic activity is likely to be relatively slow. CPI inflation looks set to increase sharply in the near term, reflecting higher petrol price inflation and the reversal of last year’s temporary reduction in VAT. Indeed, it is quite possible that the Governor will have to write a letter to the Chancellor early in the New Year explaining why inflation is more than one percentage point above the inflation target. But monetary policy can do very little to affect these short-term movements in inflation. Further out, the downward pressure from the persistent margin of spare capacity is likely to cause inflation to fall back below the 2% inflation target, although this pressure should gradually fade as the economy recovers. Implications for policy What implications does this have for the stance of monetary policy? At our most recent meeting in November, the Monetary Policy Committee voted to maintain Bank Rate at 0.5% and to increase the scale of asset purchases to £ billion.

The retrenchment of companies was also evident in the labour market as firms laid off employees, reduced working hours and bore down on earnings. Wage freezes became commonplace. Similarly, households pulled back sharply on their spending and increased their savings. This retrenchment by households was partially driven by the slowing in earnings growth and the fall in asset prices. But it was amplified by the pronounced rise in fears of unemployment and the increased uncertainty about the economic outlook. BIS Review 159/2009  1  Risk of vicious downward spiral The fall in households’ and firms’ confidence proved mutually reinforcing and, to some extent, self-fulfilling: both households and firms expected conditions to weaken sharply and both cut back on spending. The contraction in consumer expenditure helped to validate firms’ concerns about future demand. Likewise, the falls in employment and squeeze on incomes reinforced households’ fears about future earnings prospects. And the worsening economic environment in turn exacerbated the weakness of the banking system. As the quality of banks’ loan books deteriorated, the supply of bank credit tightened even further. Individually, this pulling back on the part of households, firms and banks made sense. But, collectively, it threatened a vicious downward spiral: the fact that each part of the economy was retrenching at the same time risked a collapse of aggregate spending in the economy. In turn, this raised the spectre of price deflation and all its associated ills. Policy response In such situations, it falls to policy to break the ensuing vicious cycle.