samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
25  Macroprudential instruments are, for example, a component of Basel III, the post-financial crisis amendment to the global minimum standards in bank regulation issued by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements, cf. BCBS (2010). Page 13/16  Along with the CCyB, these measures have helped to reduce momentum on the credit and real estate markets in the last three years (cf. slide 26). 26 But it is still too early to give the allclear. It remains to be seen how sustainable the cooling of price momentum in the real estate market is overall. Imbalances remain in the real estate and mortgage markets. Price momentum in the residential investment property segment remains high. There are also signs of renewed price rises in the owner-occupied segment. At the same time, lending rates are still extremely favourable. As a result, the incentives for households, banks and investors to take excessively high risks in the mortgage and real estate markets remain strong. The following conclusion can therefore be drawn: Macroprudential instruments have become a key instrument in the toolbox of central banks and regulators – and rightly so, in my opinion. They facilitate the targeting of specific risks in the financial system. At the same time, however, it would be presumptuous to assume that these macroprudential instruments might be able to curb all risks to financial stability. Conclusion Ladies and gentlemen, let me now wrap up. Credit is good, debt is bad – how can we explain this widespread public ambivalence to lending?

This may sound pretty obvious, but I know that there are many of our managers who have no idea how some of our core departments function and cannot intelligently explain our role in the economy. This reflects badly on the Bank with regard to the calibre of its staff. The third point is that your understanding of core and other departments operations for that matter will facilitate staff rotation, a policy to which the Bank is commited. Finally, and most importantly, an understanding of core functions enables you to better understand and appreciate the mission of the Bank. This in turn facilitates a better understanding of the strategic plan. In closing, I wish to say that I know that the Bank has come a long way and has demonstrated marked improvements in the way that it conducts its operations and in the quality of its management. Director – Human Resources will show in his presentation on the change process in the Bank. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 125/2006
28  See in particular the recently launched Task Force on Scaling Voluntary Carbon Markets: https://www.iif.com/tsvcm/MainPage/Publications/ID/4061/Private-Sector-Voluntary-Carbon-Markets-Taskforce-Established-to-Help-Meet-Climate-Goals 29 See discussion in the CFTC’s report on Managing Climate Risks in the U.S. Financial System: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8234-20 30 Fannie Mae is currently the world’s largest issuer of green MBS: https://multifamily.fanniemae.com/media/8616/display 12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  12  Green bonds come in different flavours, illustrated in Chart 7. The dominant model is the ‘use of proceeds’ bond, designed to raise funds for specific earmarked investment projects that the issuer sees as climate-positive. This earmarking, coupled with regular reporting on project progress, provides debt investors with targeted transparency on the credentials of the projects their funds are supporting. The first such bond, issued in 2007 by the European Investment Bank, coupled the use of proceeds structure with a number of other innovative features, and other supranationals and government agencies helped develop the market further in subsequent years. But the concept only really took off after the agreement of the Green Bond Principles in 2014, which established market-wide standards of transparency, disclosure and reporting.31 There are now approaching $ trillion of such bonds across a wide range of issuers (Chart 8) – and, while that stock is so far just a tiny fraction of the $ trillion global corporate bond market,32 green issuance is growing several times more rapidly than conventional bonds. UK companies currently lie well down the issuance league table (Chart 9), and have primarily issued in euros (Chart 10).

The level of investment, ten years after the emergence of the crisis, is below the pre-crisis maximum in the EU as a whole, and in the CESEE region as well. Exception is countries such as Macedonia, Poland, and Estonia recently, where investment pattern was different, and the current level is above the pre-crisis one. Chart 3: GDP and demand components, 2008=100 CEE  160.0  160.0  140.0  120.0  120.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  80.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  20.0  20.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  40.0  180.0  SEE  140.0  Baltics  180.0 160.0  140.0  140.0  120.0  120.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  80.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  40.0  20.0  20.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  160.0  Region  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  180.0  Source: Eurostat and NBRM calculations. At the current juncture, an important question is whether such slow post-crisis investment recovery should be perceived as a natural cyclical adjustment, or are there some structural forces that also play role?
In this context, real growth in lending to companies fell to 4.3% annually in November, from a peak of 13.4% in June. Several other economies around the world have also shown a slowdown in commercial credit, consistent with the increase in income flows that has come with the increased mobility (Figure 12). The corporate sector increased their indebtedness in order to cope with an unexpected and steep drop in cash flows and avoid solvency problems. Leverage has grown across firms of different sizes and sectors, although it has been most intense in the medium-sized ones and in trade, business and personal services lines, which have been among the hardest hit throughout the course of the pandemic. This upward trend in borrowing has also been seen in the rest of the world, amid the favorable financial conditions that came with the onset of the sanitary emergency. As for households, consumer credit continued to decline, mirroring previous recessions, while for mortgage credit the slowdown has been much more moderate. In the former, annual contraction was around 16% in real terms in the past few months, reflecting a still partial upturn in employment, as well as the increase in the households’ available resources as they withdrew their pension savings. The growth in mortgage loans is still positive, averaging around 6% annually in real terms since the statistical closing of our September 2020 Monetary Policy Report. Page 4 of 19  In this context, the higher risk associated with the different portfolios persists.

Page 16 of 19  Figure 15 Sovereign rates' volatility, EM (1)  Exchange rate volatility, EM (1)  (basis points)  (annualized percent)  P25 - P75  25  Chile  Commodity exporters (2)  25  25  20  20  20  15  15  15  10  10  10  5  5  5  0  0  0  16  17  18  19  20 Nov.  16  17  18  19  20 Nov.  (1) EM includes Brazil, China, Colombia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Russia, and Turkey. (2) Includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway. Source: Central Bank of Chile based on Bloomberg data. Figure 16 Uncertainty (*) (Dec.2018=100)  300  300 Chile  250 200  250 200  150  Global  150  100  100  50  50  0 18 Dec.18  0 19 Apr.19  19 Aug.19  19 Dec.19  (*) In both cases the Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index is used. Sources: Bloomberg and CLAPES UC.
The more flexible labour, product and financial markets are, the lower the employment and income losses in response to adverse domestic and global economic developments will be. Moreover, given that demographics in the euro area are less dynamic than in other economies, including the US, we need even more improvements in terms of higher productivity growth, rising labour force participation and declining structural unemployment. The case for decisive structural reforms is therefore pressing. Structural reforms are generally associated with changes in the long-term equilibrium demand and supply conditions of an economy and changes in the relative prices of goods and services. The transition from the pre-reform to the new post-reform equilibrium conditions normally takes time and within this period some resistance and uncertainty may occur. For this reason the implementation of structural reforms requires a strong leadership, a great deal of courage and a tireless explanation activity. It is very important to make it clear to the public that, if governments, Parliaments and social partners deliver those reforms, the benefits will be significant. In capital markets, structural reforms should aim at allowing a more effective allocation of savings toward the most rewarding investment opportunities. Since the introduction of the euro, the pace of capital market reform has been impressive. This includes policy-induced reform, such as the Financial Services Action Plan initiated by the European Commission in the spring of 1999 or the development of national legal frameworks governing the issuance of mortgage bonds.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Renminbi and China’s global future Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the HSBC Reminbi Forum “Renminbi and China’s Global Future”, Kuala Lumpur, 17 August 2015. *  *  *  The increasing role of the renminbi in the global financial system from a trade currency to an investment currency and now its potential role as a global reserve currency will have significant global implications. I am delighted to be here this morning to speak at this Renminbi Forum. The renminbi sphere has indeed extended beyond the Asian region, extending to other continents, to Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. The renminbi is no longer an Asian story, but it has now become a global story. It reflects China’s importance and influence in the changing contour of the global economic and financial landscape, and the steps that have been taken to enhance its international role. My remarks today will focus on the increasing trend of the internationalisation of the renminbi despite the recent challenges faced in the Chinese economy; the implications of this trend to the region and finally on the steps that Malaysia has taken as the region transitions into this environment. Long-term prospects for the Chinese economy and the renminbi After decades of rapid growth, the Chinese economy is now transitioning to a growth path that is more sustainable.
These go by the name econoME. As the name suggests, and like our recent public communications efforts, these materials describe the economy and finance in terms which are personal and relatable to young people’s lives. Why does the economy and finance matter to me? And how do my decisions in turn affect the economy? We set ourselves a target of reaching 400 state schools with econoME during the course of this year. So far since launch in April, over 1,000 schools have downloaded the materials, conceivably covering around 90,000 pupils. 52  This demonstrates the potential pent-up demand for school materials on economic and  financial issues. The Bank’s aim is to reach close to 1,500 schools by mid-2020. We are currently considering where next to take our education initiatives. A promising avenue would be a younger age range, say 7-11 year olds. This will require different materials and possibly a different approach. A more challenging market still would be adults, perhaps linked to existing initiatives to boost  50 51 52  Haldane (2018a) and Barnes et al (2017). ING-Economics Network Survey of the Public’s Understanding of Economics (2017). Assuming 30 students per class and 3 classes per school. 22  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  22  economic and financial literacy in the public at large. The scale of the public understanding deficit means central bank efforts can only be part of the solution but, as public institutions, an important part.

Speeches  Published Date: 19 May 2022  "A Future Ready Workforce for an International Financial Centre" - Opening Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at Singapore Financial Forum 2022 on 19 May 2022 Good morning from Singapore. I am pleased to join all of you, including our overseas Singaporeans and their friends, as well as leaders and professionals from Singapore’s financial centre at today’s forum. Singapore’s financial centre is doing exceedingly well, and prospects remain bright for the years ahead. The financial sector performed strongly throughout the Covid-19 pandemic. The sector [1] grew by an annual average of 7.2% during 2020-21, four times faster than the overall economy. The last two years also saw 5,800 net jobs created in financial services. Growth has been broad-based – across banking, insurance, asset management, and payment services. We have grown steadily as a leading fund management and domiciliation hub, with 500 variable capital companies incorporated in Singapore since we introduced this new investment fund structure just two years ago. We are now Asia’s leading foreign exchange centre, with FX trading volume growing an average 13% every year from 2017 to 2021, with a modern e-FX trading ecosystem taking deep root. We are powering Asia’s development, with infrastructure investment growing five-fold and project finance by 80%, from 2016 to 2020. The Singapore economy remains on track to grow by 3–5% in 2022 barring a further worsening in the external environment. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has generated both growth and inflation risks globally.
If use of the franc were to be crowded out by the euro, the Swiss National Bank would have had little  2  BIS Review 32/2004  leverage left to influence monetary conditions in our own country. It would become a paper tiger! (c)  Third, even short of a “euroization” of the Swiss economy, we feared the loss of our monetary autonomy. Given the importance of the common currency for the Swiss economy, what else could the Swiss National Bank do other than follow the European Central Bank’s monetary policy and de facto integrate the franc into the euro zone? A gradually shrinking interest-rate differential between euro and Swiss franc investments as well as a loss in monetary autonomy would have resulted. How does our recent experience relate to these concerns? 3. Our experience as an independent monetary entity  (a)  The euro/Swiss franc relationship  Our fears of a euro destabilizing the Swiss franc did not materialize. Relative to the euro, and since its introduction, the franc has been fluctuating in a relatively narrow band of plus or minus 5 percent, about four times less than against the dollar during the same period. The Swiss franc appears now to be less affected by exchange rate shocks and more shielded from speculative movements.

Let us not forget that the Greek Drachma was launched after Capodistria’s assassination and Greece’s switch to a monarchy, the French franc was the “franc Germinal”, the Italian lira was created with the Italian unification, and the Reichsmark appeared in 1873 at the foundation of the German empire. These are very strong symbols indeed. For Switzerland too, the introduction of the euro was a kind of revolution. For the first time in our history, our country was completely surrounded by a single currency area. In terms of population, Switzerland, with its 7 million inhabitants, could be compared to Missouri in the middle of the United States. Just try to imagine Missouri with its own currency! Although perhaps my good friends and central bank colleagues from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis would not mind all that much! Until 1999, we had been living amidst very diverse European currencies. In fact, our country had always lamented about this situation. Indeed, given our large export sector, we could only dream of a stable monetary environment without exchange rate fluctuations, which interfere with economic decisions and price comparisons. Among our earlier efforts, I should mention here, not only our participation with Greece in the Latin Monetary Union, but also steps towards close cooperation between Switzerland and the European Monetary System in the mid-1970s, steps which remained, however, without concrete results. A common misrepresentation should be corrected here, that of Switzerland somehow benefiting from external monetary disorders.
It could be due to complacency and a false sense of security that misfortune would not befall the individual. Or it could also be a general lack of awareness of how much coverage would be considered adequate. But the more likely reason is the perception that getting the recommended amount of insurance protection is costly and beyond their means. Hence, it is given lower priority amidst other more pressing financial commitments like housing, children’s education and other day-to-day needs. 2  BIS Review 163/2010  13. What can we do to keep insurance protection affordable? I urge the insurance industry to make a more concerted effort to address this. Part of the problem lies in the conventional practice of insurers in bundling the savings and protection elements into what is known as Whole Life Plans. Since the savings element in such Whole Life Plans can be very significant, the insurance premiums could be 3–5 times that of pure protection Term Assurance plans, for the same level of protection. I faced the same problem when I first started work. I could not afford a Whole Life Plan but had the good sense to choose a Term Assurance policy. Protecting my young family then was more important than leaving them my Whole Life insurance payout after they are all grown up when they need the sum of money the least. 14. The insurance industry should not always push for a Whole Life Plan as it may result in under insurance.

The network of trade unions and branches would provide the life insurance co-op with a clear advantage over private enterprise. 4. To ensure that the co-op would succeed, the realist in Dr Goh laid down a few principles for its operation. First, the co-op must be fully competitive with private enterprises and cannot expect privileged treatment from the Government. Second, the co-op must have effective management. Third, all levels of staff should be recruited based on merit and not affiliations with the labour movement or government. It was the steadfast adherence to these sound principles that has kept INCOME successful over the past 40 years. The growth of Singapore’s insurance industry 5. At INCOME’s 30th anniversary celebration, I had sketched out the changes in the global financial landscape, and how MAS had to liberalise the domestic insurance industry. Reputable foreign insurers were allowed to set up in Singapore or enter into strategic alliances with existing local insurers. The hope was for the entry of new players to engender competition, which would in turn promote greater innovation and raise the efficiency of the incumbent insurers. MAS also worked on deepening the local talent pool and fine-tuned the already prudent regulatory framework. 6. Ten years on, these efforts have yielded significant results. The Singapore insurance industry, which saw a number of acquisitions, consolidations and new entrants, experienced strong growth, with total assets tripling to $ over the past decade. The industry has also matured in terms of the breadth and depth of products and services offered.
The scenario of slower economic growth in the short term, together with recent price trends (likewise worse than expected), increase the risk of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations. 3  Against this backdrop, at our October meeting, the ECB Governing Council underscored its readiness to adjust all monetary policy instruments to contend with the pandemic’s impact on price stability. In my opinion, the recalibration of monetary policy instruments in response to the second wave of the pandemic should, at least, include further recourse to our pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) and our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs). The PEPP was launched in March to counter the adverse consequences of the first wave of the pandemic. Its flexibility is what sets it apart from the asset purchase programme (APP) in place before the COVID-19 outbreak. Thus, whereas the APP is relatively rigid in terms of how the asset purchases are distributed both over time and across jurisdictions, the PEPP has allowed us to concentrate purchases on those countries whose financing conditions, at any given time, have been subject to a greater degree of tightening. Thanks to this flexibility, together with its large initial envelope, the announcement of the creation of the PEPP on 18 March served to substantially reduce interest rates on sovereign debt, especially that of the countries hardest hit by the health crisis at that moment, such as Italy and Spain.

This would not be problematic if nominal rates could fall as far as necessary; for example, with expected inflation of 1%, to achieve a real interest rate of, let’s say, -2%, the nominal rate would have to be lowered to -1%. The problem is that nominal interest rates cannot drop as far into negative territory as sometimes would be necessary. Were central banks to set interest rates of -5%, for example, commercial banks would endure negative yields on a large part of their assets, which would adversely affect their profitability and, ultimately, their financial intermediation  2  The concept, determinants and implications for monetary policy of the natural rate of interest are discussed in Galesi et al. (2017). Holston et al. (2017), for example, estimate that in 2016 the natural rate was positive, but very close to zero, in the United States. 4 See, for example, Fiorentini et al. (2018). 3  7  capacity. This would have an attendant negative impact on credit supply, economic activity and inflation. There is therefore a lower bound on nominal interest rates. Should central banks lower interest rates below this bound, the effect on the economy may be contractionary rather than expansionary, owing to the adverse effects on the financial system as a whole.5 The level of this lower bound on interest rates is not directly observable and varies over time based on the financial sector’s situation. In any event, it represents the floor for central bank interest rate cuts.