samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Chinese authorities conduct an active trade and industry policy to build up the domestic industrial and technological capacity, for instance in the fields of telecommunications, energy, motor vehicles and pharmaceuticals. Their goal is to have 30-50 Chinese countries among the world's 500 largest within 5-10 years. In addition to investments in research and development, China’s human capital has also been reinforced by an increasing return flow of highly-educated Chinese who have now begun to return home after studies abroad. The rapid developments in China have so far mainly occurred in economic free zones along the coasts and in adjoining areas. In rural areas, where the majority still live, poverty is widespread. The uneven distribution of growth has given rise to social tensions, which risk slowing down developments in future. The Chinese authorities are facing major challenges in terms of increasing private consumption and dealing with the growing income gaps. Environmental pollution is another major problem, as is the lack of human rights. The financial system in China is also under-developed. 2  GDP increased on average by around 5 per cent during 2004 and 2005. 3  All of the figures and comparisons here are made in PPP terms, that is, taking into account purchasing power differences and differences in price levels. 4  However, a large part of China’s foreign trade consists of input goods that are imported from neighbouring countries, assembled in China and then exported elsewhere. 5  The Economist 2004-10-02.

Moreover, falling interest rates have lowered house mortgage interest costs. Then there is the Government’s proposed reduction of tobacco tax. However, the price shocks from the supply side are mainly transitory and tend to lower the CPI temporarily but not necessarily inflation’s underlying trend. It follows that these effects probably should not have much influence on monetary policy. This holds even though the CPI change figures are likely to move outside the lower tolerance limit for a time during 1998, mainly on account of the lower tobacco tax. How strong is the upward trend? As I mentioned earlier, the primary concern for monetary policy is inflation’s underlying rate and trend. In that the monetary conditions have been expansionary for some time and both economic activity and resource utilisation are rising, Sweden should be moving BIS Review 35/1998  ˝  -8-  towards a situation with some increase in underlying inflation. This phase may not be imminent or involve anything dramatic but rising resource utilisation will ultimately lead to it. But there are some factors which may defer it. They have to do with the momentum in the Swedish economy and the impact that may come from the crisis in Asia. Another central factor is the exchange rate’s underlying trend. In addition there is the increasingly discussed uncertainty about the sustainability of international share prices. To sum up, most of the evidence suggests that economic growth in Sweden will become stronger in the coming two years.
7    Approve, at the proposal of the Executive Commission, the Banco de España’s Annual Report and, where appropriate, any other reports that it may be required to submit to Parliament, the Government or the Minister for Economy and Finance14.   Approve Monetary Circulars and Banco de España Circulars.   Submit to the Government the proposals for removal from office referred to in Article 25(4)(d) of the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de España.   Approve, at the proposal of the Executive Commission, the Internal Rules of the Banco de España.   Approve the Banco de España’s budget proposal, authorise the annual accounts for issue and approve the proposal for distribution of profit.   Approve the staff policy guidelines and ratify the appointment of Directors General.   Impose penalties the adoption of which falls within the powers of the Banco de España.   Approve penalty proposals to be submitted by the Banco de España to the Minister for Economy and Finance.   Settle appeals or claims against decisions of the Banco de España where it is within its powers to do so.   Adopt any other resolutions necessary to perform the functions entrusted to the Banco de España under the Law of Autonomy that are not the exclusive competence of the Executive Commission.   Designate, at the proposal of the Governor, the two Council members of the Executive Commission and the members of the Audit Committee.

Conclusion As a source as well as a destination for investments, Asia presents compelling prospects for the hedge fund industry. Singapore’s strategic location makes us well-placed to serve as a hub with strong physical connectivity, trade and financial linkages to the rest of Asia. Together with our strong commitment to growing a well-regulated fund management industry, this makes Singapore an ideal vantage point for asset managers to understand Asia and to manage pan-Asian investments. So it leaves me now to congratulate SALT on its inaugural Asian leg of the SALT Conference. I wish all of you a fruitful conference ahead. Thank you. 7  Preqin/Global ARC Study of Asian Institutional Hedge Fund Investments 2012  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
William C Dudley: Comments on "A Skeptical View of the Impact of the Fed's Balance Sheet" Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the 2018 US Monetary Policy Forum, New York City, 23 February 2018. * * * It is a pleasure to be able to comment on this year’s U.S. Monetary Policy Forum paper. As always, what I have to say here today reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System.1 To say that I was interested in this year’s topic is an understatement. The use of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet has been an important element of U.S. monetary policy over the past decade. The start of the reversal of that expansion—the so-called process of balance sheet normalization—has been a key focus of the FOMC’s monetary policy deliberations over the past year. I am pleased that the start of this process—in contrast to the bond market taper tantrum of 2013—has been non-disruptive. The normalization process is now running in the background, essentially on autopilot, with short-term interest rates serving as the primary tool for adjusting the stance of monetary policy. Let me start with my main point: Although I agree with many of the authors’ findings in this year’s paper, I would take a much less skeptical view of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet as a tool of monetary policy.

Eurofi High Level Seminar – Lisbon, 16 April 2021 What fiscal policies beyond monetary policy support? Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very happy to join you today. I would like to extend my warmest thanks to Didier Cahen and David Wright for fostering the fruitful European spirit that we all cherish, despite the difficulties of the moment. As you know, the ECB silent period has already started, so I won’t say a word on monetary policy. However, this will give me the opportunity to tackle a core issue of our incomplete Economic Union besides our successful Monetary Union: fiscal policy. Monetary policy cannot be – and fortunately no longer is – the only countercyclical tool available in the euro area. There are two other links between monetary and fiscal policy to which I would like to draw attention: an accommodative monetary policy, as we have today, supports an active fiscal policy. The second is the risk of a bank-sovereign loop, which as supervisors we are keen to avoid. Let me nevertheless stress that I have no such fear for the country I know best: French banks since 2014 have decreased their exposures vis-à-vis public debt in absolute terms and have done so dramatically as a proportion of their balance sheet. I will first talk about the “fiscal” lessons we can draw from the Covid crisis for Europe (I).
They have no voice and no representation in the work of the G20 or in the institutions which it chooses to set up to further its agenda. This is at variance with the principles of multilateralism and international cooperation that have prevailed since the end of the Second World War. Over time, this could easily weaken not  8  Mervyn King: Speech at the University of Exeter, January 19, 2010. 9  The Financial Stability Board has been established to address vulnerabilities and to develop and implement strong regulatory, supervisory and other policies in the interest of financial stability. It comprises the G20, five other countries and international institutions and standard-setting bodies. 10  International Monetary and Financial Committee – the policy steering committee of the International Monetary Fund. BIS Review 22/2010  5  only the G20 process, but also the IMF as it will be perceived as increasingly guided and controlled by the G20. I referred earlier to a recent speech by the Governor of the Bank of England and I wish to do so again where he states: “Looking further ahead, the legitimacy and leadership of the G20 would be enhanced if it were seen as representing views of other countries too. That could be achieved if the G20 were to metamorphose into a Governing Council for the IMF, and at the same time acquire a procedure for voting on decisions.” Needless to say, I agree with him, as did the Managing Director of the IMF in a recent interview.

It engages the membership of the IMF directly and indirectly. It would lend legitimacy and integrity to the process of international economic and financial cooperation. The Articles of Agreement of the IMF confer upon it to “oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation.” 13 During the crisis, the IMF proved its ability to respond promptly and effectively to very challenging developments. I therefore submit that a statutory-based and representative global order should be one of the main objectives of the discussions on changes in the international financial architecture. Conclusion To conclude, I have presented my view on the prevailing international economic order which I find deficient in important respects. The G20 played a vital role in the response to the global crisis and the rest of the world depends on its successful cooperation. With the world recovering from crisis, the G20 should merge its activities with those of the IMF. That will give them both wider acceptance and legitimacy. At the outset, I described some characteristics of Norway and emphasised our history of active support of multilateral institutions and collaboration. Currently, we do not participate where decisive discussions take place on international economic and financial issues and cooperation, including changes in the governance of the IMF. Yet we are called upon to make relatively large contributions to efforts agreed by a non-statutory body. 11  IMF chief warns of reliance on exports; interview with the Financial Times January 30–31, 2010, p. 5.
And by the end of this year, we will have assessed and approved more than 50 applications for senior management positions within these groups, and considered the suitability of their proposed prudential sub-groups, containing hundreds of entities between them. Ring-fencing also resulted in the Bank helping ring-fenced banks undertake around 20 on-boarding operations to payment systems settling across the books of the Bank, and admitting six banks to the Sterling Monetary Framework. Most of the banks have also needed to undertake a complex legal process – called a ring-fencing transfer scheme – to transfer assets and liabilities between legal entities in their group.4 Each transfer required Court approval. Independent ‘skilled persons’ were required to review the banks’ plans, the PRA and FCA were called to provide their opinions, and objections from the public were invited before the judges could make their decisions. In each case, the Courts were able to approve the transfers going ahead. These transfers took place between April and August this year. Over £ billion of assets were moved between legal entities over a series of implementation weekends. Operational changes, in particular involving IT systems, can be complex, and the impacts when things go wrong can be wide-ranging and difficult to remedy. But in each case the ring-fencing transfer took place smoothly. A knock-on impact of these transfers was that the sort codes of over 1.3 million retail and corporate account holders needed to be changed.

Any exposures to the rest of the group must be limited and on commercial terms. All large UK banking groups – defined as those with ‘core’ retail deposits greater than £ billion – are required to implement ring-fencing by 2019. Currently, seven banking groups cross this threshold. Between them, these groups have around £ trillion of assets, both in the UK and overseas. The ring-fencing regime is designed to be consistent with the other parts of the post-crisis regulatory framework. The most systemically-important ring-fenced banks will be held to higher capital requirements. The Systemic Risk Buffer will be applied to ring-fenced banks to ensure they are adequately capitalised and resilient to shocks. We expect ring-fenced banks to have, on average, around 1.5 percentage points more high-quality ‘Tier 1’ capital than non-systematically important banks.2 And a ring-fenced bank will not be able to be capitalised by debt raised externally by its group, which would give rise to so-called ‘double leverage’. Overall, the Bank estimates that ring-fenced banks’ total loss absorbency will be, on average, around 27% of their risk-weighted assets, higher than the 17% recommended by the ICB.3 Ring-fencing also helps improve the resolvability of the big UK banking groups. The resolution strategy for groups including ring-fenced banks will typically involve a bail-in at the level of the holding company. Bail-in would recapitalise the relevant entity by passing losses up to the holding company to be borne by shareholders and debt-holders. This should stabilise the group.
For example, the $ proceeds must be swapped into foreign currency if they are to be used outside Singapore. Our approach was a cautious one, for although we wanted to promote the bond market, we maintained our basic stance of discouraging the internationalisation of $ But we stated that so long as the stability of the exchange rate was not compromised, the actual implementation of the non-internationalisation policy would continue to evolve as we gained experience with the new rules, and as our financial sector and capital markets grew and developed. We also committed to review the restrictions after a year. We have now completed the review. The response to our new policy has been encouraging. Since the new Notice was introduced, there have been 19 $ bond issues by 16 foreign entities, raising a total of almost $ billion. The issuers were a good mix of supranationals, financial institutions and corporates of good credit standing from around the world. The financial institutions have given MAS feedback, proposing changes to the Notice to give the players more flexibility and generate more liquidity and depth in the market. We have adopted many, but not all, of their suggestions. We will liberalise guidelines in four key areas. Repo consultation limit The development of a liquid repo market is critical to the Singapore government securities (SGS) and $ debt market. An active repo market enables investors and primary dealers to finance their bond inventories and hedge their $ debt positions.

This would facilitate more active trading of SGS and $ bonds and deepen bond market liquidity. Repo transactions with non-residents are presently subject to a $ million consultation limit. Banks have told us that this requirement to consult is a psychological hurdle, even though MAS has assured them that the decisions will be liberal and quick. A non-resident borrowing $ through a repo must first obtain the equivalent amount in SGS, which is a $ asset. Given that MAS Notice 757 already limits a non-resident to no more than $ million of Singapore dollar credit for such investments, allowing banks to transact $ repos freely with non-residents will not lead to a significant net increase in $ credit facilities to non-residents. MAS has therefore decided to lift the $ million consultation limit. Banks in Singapore may now, without prior consultation with MAS, enter into repo transactions in Singapore government securities  BIS Review 130/1999  3  and $ denominated bonds listed on SES with any party, and for any amount, on condition that there is full delivery of collateral. OTC interest rate derivatives OTC interest rate products would open more avenues for non-resident investors to manage their $ interest rate risks arising from investing in the $ debt market. But hitherto MAS has restricted OTC interest rate derivatives, because they could facilitate speculative volatility in the $ In September this year, SIMEX introduced the $ three-month interest rate futures contract.
Gent Sejko: Welcome remarks -15th SEE Economic Research Workshop Welcome remarks by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 15th SEE Economic Research Workshop, virtual, 6 December 2021. * * * Dear professors and researchers from academia, Dear fellow central bank colleagues and researchers, Dear participants, It is a great pleasure to open the proceedings of the 15th SEE Economic Research Workshop, which is being organised virtually this year as well, due to the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions that are still in place. I take this opportunity to express my wish that we would all stay safe and healthy and for the negative effects of the pandemic to come to an end as soon as possible. I hope that the vaccination process, progress in knowledge, cures against COVID-19, and an improvement in the overall situation caused by the pandemic, would enable us to welcome you in Tirana next year. I am glad to note that we have again a full house and a rich agenda this year, with two days in which colleagues and researchers from central banks as well as distinguished universities in Albanian and worldwide will present their works. We really appreciate your interest in participating in this workshop and in the research carried out by the Bank of Albania throughout 2021. I am confident that discussions across this workshop’s panels will be very interesting.

So one may ask whether monetary policy will be as successful in the post crisis era as it has been during the crisis; and whether it will manage to avoid the perils of persistently low inflation. I will concentrate my remarks on the euro area, taking advantage of being in Tokyo to draw some lessons from the Japanese experience, and, I should say in the presence of Deputy Governor Nakaso, from the deep expertise of the Bank of Japan. One may harbor doubts about the power of monetary policy for two reasons. The transmission mechanism may be impaired; and the equilibrium interest rate may be so low (or even negative) that it becomes impossible to reach. The first point speaks for itself. The Eurozone has suffered from acute segmentation and severe impairment in its money and credit markets. Those failures have been addressed aggressively through a set of measures I will detail in a moment. Results have been significant. The so-called Target 2 balances have been reduced by half, which means that banks across the Euro area do not rely, to the same extent, on the network of central banks to intermediate their operations. We have now completed with success and credibility the first Asset Quality Review in our banking system, and the new Single Supervisory Mechanism has been made operational last week. Those measures will be essential in restoring a well functioning credit channel and eliminating the remaining differences in financial conditions across the Eurozone.
In the case of personal income tax and VAT receipts, increases of 1.7% and 2.7% are projected. As to social security contributions, the main regulatory change consists of a 5% increase in the maximum contribution bases. Progress in the reform of the banking system Before concluding, I shall briefly mention the progress in the reform and strengthening of our banking system. This task is at the heart of the responsibilities and concerns of the Banco de España, and, as we all know, it has required a most considerable contribution of public funds. At present we are at a most advanced phase in the ongoing recapitalisation and restructuring of our banking sector. As you know, the starting point was in 2009, when the FROB (the Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector) was created, and the process moved up a gear in 2011 further to Royal Decree-Law 2/2011 on the strengthening of the financial system, which raised capital requirements. But the decisive steps were taken in 2012, with Royal Decree Laws 2/2012 and 18/2012 on the clean-up of the financial system, the Memorandum of Understanding agreed in July with the European Commission, and the financial support facility of up to € billion annexed to this agreement; and, finally, Law 9/2012 on the restructuring and resolution of credit institutions.

We will continue to make Singapore an attractive city where foreign talent will want to come to work and live and where they will feel at home. Conclusion Let me conclude. ASEAN is entering a new and exciting phase. Individually, each ASEAN country possesses unique strengths and offers unique opportunities. Together, an integrated and revitalised ASEAN holds great promise to become the third engine of growth in Asia. Singapore will contribute to the power of this engine. I wish you a pleasant evening and hope that you will have a fruitful stay in Singapore. Thank you. BIS Review 47/2007  3
Our goal is to promote a safe, sound, and stable banking and financial system that supports the growth and stability of the U.S. economy, and we will continue to strive to meet these responsibilities. Thank you very much for your attention this afternoon. I’d be happy to take some questions. 4  6  Forming the Next Generation of Bankers: The Future of Business Education and Ethics, Michael Strine, March 22, 2016. BIS central bankers’ speeches

The disturbances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic will inevitably delay many streamlining and integration measures, however. Nevertheless, merging the tasks of the Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority into a single institution better enables us to face shocks like the current one and rise quickly and decisively from the downturn that lies ahead. I am convinced that, under these circumstances, the incontrovertible mathematical formula – that 1+1=2 – does not apply. The strength of the two institutions unified will be much greater than the sum of its parts. The new Central Bank is an institution that dares to act, can act, and will act. Although a number of policy actions have been taken in recent weeks, we have not emptied our toolbox – far from it. We have a number of other economic policy measures available and will use them if and when the need arises. We will do what is needed to face down the deep but brief economic shock currently threatening our country. Honoured guests: We thank you for listening. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches