samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
8/18  There thus seems to be a need to improve the employability of this more vulnerable group notable for the presence of very young and very old workers, as well as individuals with fewer skills. To do this, it would be desirable to increase the human capital of these workers, a task which, in particular, would need training tailored to employers’ requirements. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the higher inequality in household income emerging in the crisis was, above all, a consequence of job destruction, which underscores the need to ensure that these people can get a job as soon as possible. In addition, the incidence of temporary employment remains very high (nearly 27% in the third quarter of 2019), which, among other things, makes for high employment volatility and reduces worker productivity. Main vulnerabilities of the Spanish economy  A second source of vulnerability originating as a legacy of the crisis is the high government debt, which in the second quarter of 2019 stood at around 99% of GDP, more than 60 pp above that in 2007. It is in this terrain where headway has been less satisfactory in the last few years, as evidenced by the fact that the budget deficit continues to have a high structural component, estimated by the European Commission at above 2.5 pp of GDP.

Monetary policy measures have contributed to the increase in activity and in inflation  Economic research shows that these measures have been effective in the recent past, in terms of easing financial conditions and encouraging lending. Bearing this in mind, the new package of measures will boost economic activity in the euro area against a background of high uncertainty and will help to bring about the convergence of inflation to levels in line with the ECB's mandate. As regards negative interest rates, although there is no conclusive evidence to date that they have adversely affected the supply of bank credit, we cannot rule out that maintaining 5/18  rates at very low levels for an additional, potentially extended, period of time, could ultimately have some negative consequences for the bank-based transmission of monetary policy. In this regard, the mitigating measures adopted by the ECB, consisting of a tiered system for remunerating excess liquidity holdings, are intended to soften the negative impact on bank profitability of the new reduction in reserve remuneration, and thus ensure the expansionary effect on activity and inflation of the interest rate cuts in the current setting. Prolongation of the current expansionary cycle, albeit at a more moderate rate than in previous years  In relation to the Spanish economy, the latest economic data point to a gradual weakening of activity. First, the indicators that measure agents’ confidence have tended to gradually deteriorate since the beginning of 2018, albeit less so than in the euro area as a whole.
In particular, the energy situation in Europe, the loss of purchasing power due to inflation, and tighter financing conditions are having a dampening effect. Inflation will remain elevated for the time being. However, the importance of temporary factors such as supply bottlenecks is likely to diminish over the medium term. The increasingly tighter monetary policy in many countries should also help inflation gradually return to more moderate levels. Our scenario for the global economy is subject to significant risks. For example, the energy situation could worsen again. At the same time, high inflation could become embedded and require stronger monetary policy responses abroad. Finally, the coronavirus pandemic continues to pose important downside risks to growth. Swiss economic outlook  In Switzerland, GDP growth in the second quarter was lower than expected, at 1.1%. This was mainly due to weaker performance in manufacturing. The short-term outlook has deteriorated. By contrast, the situation on the labour market has remained positive. The further development of the economy is likely to be shaped by the economic slowdown abroad and the availability of energy in Switzerland. To date, the prices of natural gas and electricity in particular have risen sharply. For this year, we anticipate GDP growth of around 2%. This is roughly half a percentage point lower than at the last monetary policy assessment. The level of uncertainty associated with the forecast remains high.

Opening Ceremony of Asian Financial Cooperation Association (AFCA) Keynote Speech by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand Beijing, July 24, 2017 Vice President Mr. Ma Kai, Vice Premier of China Mr. Guo Shuqing, Chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) Mr. Chen Yuan, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Mr. Jin Liqun, President of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) Mr. Norman Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) Mr. Tian Guoli, Chairman of AFCA Excellencies, Executives of financial institutions, Ladies and Gentlemen. A very good afternoon to you all, Today’s opening ceremony of the Asian Financial Cooperation Association (AFCA) is a very auspicious occasion, and I am honoured to be a part of this historical event. I would like to congratulate the Chinese government for successfully establishing AFCA – a new forum, which I am certain, will play a significant role in enhancing financial connectivity and cooperation within Asia. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to share with you my thoughts on how we can further enhance financial connectivity to ensure sustained shared benefits – as stated in AFCA’s mission1. Ladies and gentlemen, People have long been connected by trade along the ancient Silk Road dating back more than 2,000 years ago. Today in modern times, many trade and investment agreements between China and other Asian countries have promoted close economic ties in the region.
Chart 9: Emerging market economies could be running to stand still in the future Average 2009-18 Probability density Average 1996-06 Impact of push factors 0.12 Impact of push factors with 2030 amplification due to shifting composition (col 3, chart 10) 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 -8 -6 -4 -2 Capital flows as a % of GDP  0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  Sources: IMF, EPFR, IIF and Bank staff calculations. Notes: This chart shows conditional distributions of capital flows to EMEs post-the 2008 crisis (green), and conditioning on a one standard deviation negative “push shock” (red), as proxied by our global financial conditions index. The diamonds highlight the fifth percentile, which is our preferred measure of Capital Flows-at-Risk The dotted grey distribution results from increasing the sensitivity of the distribution to push shocks in line with the scalar in the third column of chart 10, assuming they apply through the distribution (rather than only to 5th percentile). Estimating the impact of these vulnerabilities on the full distribution is a rich area for future work. The teal distribution conditions on average push and pull factors 1996-06.

Bank research suggests that the spillover from tightening in US monetary policy to foreign GDP is now twice its 1990-2004 average, despite the US’s rapidly declining share of global GDP. Financial instability in advanced economies also causes capital to retrench from EMEs to ‘safe havens’, as it did during the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 euro-area crisis (Chart 6). Connally’s dictum “our dollar, your problem” has broadened to “any of our problems is your problem”. Moreover, the structure of the global financial system – or the “pipes” – is increasingly amplifying capital outflows from EMEs when these push shocks occur. For EMEs, market-based finance has accounted for all the increase in foreign lending since the crisis, as bank lending has declined and FDI has stayed fairly constant (Chart 7).21 While this shift has brought welcome diversity to the financial system, it also reduces the sustainability of capital flows, as market-based flows are particularly sensitive to changes in global risk appetite and financial conditions. Investment fund flows are particularly flighty (Chart 8), especially under stress. The increasing role of “push” factors and the “pipes” of the system means fast-reforming EMEs could soon be running to stand still in their quest for more sustainable capital flows (Chart 9). Bank researchers estimate that the growing shares of FX-denominated debt and market-based finance have increased the sensitivity of “Capital Flows-at-Risk” to push factors by 50% since the crisis, largely using up the selfinsurance purchased by EMEs.
Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -5-  International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that achieving Paris Agreement target on climate change would require, by 2050, about 80% decrease in the CO2 intensity of the building sector, 95% of world energy supply to be of low carbon and 70% of new cars to be electric. This will cause significant, even if slower, shift in the structure of our economies with strong bearing on the financial sector. That is why the NGFS, the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System, has argued that ‘climate related risks are a source of financial risk and therefore fall squarely within the mandate of central banks and supervisors to ensure that financial system is resilient to these risks’. Regulators need to determine how best to incorporate and operationalize climate related risks in their prudential policy settings. It would require expanding the risk matrix to formally include climate related risks and enhancing the analytical tools to assess financial sector exposures to extreme weather events. Bank of England has announced that in 2021, it will start stress-testing banks on different climate pathways. Ultimately, the key is to retool the regulatory regime to factor in risks to climate change in a holistic fashion, instead of adding on an additional item in the risk matrix. Conclusion Let me conclude. While we have managed to fix the fault lines exposed by the GFC, our understanding and ability to respond to some of the emerging risks remain limited.

Even the impact of oil price shock of 2014 on GCC banks have been muted at most, though degree of resilience certainly varies from one country to another. Still, there is broader agreement that our banks entered the low oil price environment from a position of strength which was built through prudent regulatory reforms. Now, as the rule book is mostly in place, it is time for supervision to step up. After all, regulation can only go that far; without effective supervision, it is hard to ensure timely and consistent implementation and achieve financial stability at large. Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  -3-  The role of effective supervision is also critical because not every risk can be pre-defined in a rulebook. While overseeing the dynamic world of finance, supervisors must be agile enough to suitably correct course in line with the constantly changing nature of the banking industry or the emergence of new risks. In the second part of my speech, I would like to touch upon two such emerging concerns; cyber threats and climate change. Addressing Emerging Concerns Ensuring resilience against Cyber threats First, consider the issue of cyber threats. Growing footprint of technology is influencing every facet of the banking business, transforming banks’ internal processes as well as their engagements with customers. As the role of technology deepens from a mere support function to a platform central to everything that banks do, the likelihood of new risks emanating from ubiquitous and connected technologies loom large.
This has functioned as an important tool, particularly in analysing and illustrating the effects on inflation of our own interest rate changes. The CPIX has also held a special status in comparison with other measures of inflation. For various reasons this will not be the case in future; the CPIX will be phased out. We will instead introduce another measure that can better capture the effects of our policy. But the intention is not for this measure to hold a special position in the way that the CPIX has done. I will return to this soon. The change we are now making means that the forecasts, analyses and comments in our reports will focus more directly on CPI inflation. This probably gives rise to a number of questions; not least among you here today. The most obvious one is probably whether this will have consequences for future monetary policy. To answer this question I would first like to say a few words about the need for alternative measures of inflation in general. I shall also describe how the role played by the CPIX in our analysis has changed over time. Then we will come to what the phasing out of the CPIX means for monetary policy. Different measures of inflation are needed The Riksbank has a target defined in terms of the change in the CPI. However, the development in the CPI cannot always guide monetary policy on its own – there is no such universal measure.

If we were to be in exactly the same position as in April, but with the difference that we had already decided to phase out the CPIX – would we have made different forecasts for the repo rate and for the CPI? No, we would not. Our target has not changed. We considered the  BIS Review 73/2008  5  rate at which the CPI approached the target according to our April forecast to be reasonable on the basis of our task. It is also important to put the phasing out of the CPIX in a broader context. The Riksbank conducts a policy of flexible inflation targeting. This means, for instance, that we can let it take a couple of years before the CPI reaches 2 per cent in our forecast if we consider this to be justified by, for instance, temporary shocks. The long-term difference between the CPI and the CPIX is calculated, as I have mentioned earlier, at roughly 0.3 percentage points. The flexibility of our monetary policy means that this type of deviation does not need to have any immediate consequences. But it is of course important that deviations from the inflation target are not too large and that it is clear that the CPI will reach 2 per cent. Otherwise we jeopardise the credibility of the inflation target. The current situation involves factors that have much greater significance for which future interest rate developments we believe to be reasonable than the difference between the CPI and the CPIX.
In a similar vein, on the whole, research does better at identifying these “credit channel” mechanisms in the context of particular stressed episodes than in longer-run averages. 11 Be that as it may, it is beyond doubt that there has recently been an adverse shock to bank balance sheets – involving capital, liquidity, and a potent “asymmetric” information mechanism affecting a wide range of banks. I will pick out four elements in the story, involving liquidity, counterparty-credit risk and capital. First, near closure of the capital markets for leveraged loans, conduit and SIV commercial paper, and RMBS has left banks whose business model is “originate and distribute” unexpectedly holding on to loans and, in addition, facing the prospect of having to take assets back on to their balance sheets. The consequent reintermediation is a hit to both capital ratios and liquidity, as the banks have bigger books to fund. For these reasons alone, big picture, banks responded from August onwards by tightening loan terms and hoarding liquidity. But the story does not end there. The second element is that access to resources (uninsured deposits) from outside the banking sector has become more restricted since the summer. While the new risk-transfer instruments have plainly dispersed risks, lack of ex ante disclosure left market participants highly uncertain about the scale and distribution of losses across the banking sector itself. On top of that, open-ended investment vehicles that have (or may have) themselves invested in structured-finance paper have felt compelled to preserve liquidity, to guard against redemption risk.

I cannot really comment on Italy at that current stage where we are in a political flux and that's clearly not our role to step into that. Apart from trade and your desire to see greater productivity reform, structural reforms, 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  fiscal buffers as well, what are the other issues that you have greatest concern about at the moment in global markets, global economy? Trade – as we just discussed – is clearly top of the agenda. That's the biggest concern we have today. And Brexit? Brexit is a concern but there is a political negotiation and the ECB is not part of this political negotiation. We very much hope that this can be settled in a way that makes it smooth, that does not harm confidence. But we also trust that it can be settled in a way that preserves the integrity of the European project in terms of the four freedoms, in terms of the single market, in terms of having effective ways to regulate our financial industry and to supervise our financial industry to achieve stability in Europe. A huge part of the EU financial industry is based in the United Kingdom, the fundraising for the broader EU is based in many ways in the United Kingdom. The clearing, the forex, the bond trading as well.
Specifically, the 10year OIS rate, which proxies the euro area risk-free interest rate, has risen by 170 bp since the beginning of the year. Domestic fiscal policy Domestic economic policies also have a key role to play in the current climate. But fiscal policy headroom is constrained by high government debt and structural budget deficits. It is therefore important for domestic fiscal policy to exploit its capacity for highly granular action focused on the households, firms and sectors most vulnerable to this combination of shocks, many of which had not yet fully recovered from the adverse effects of the pandemic. In particular, fiscal policy action should target lower-income households, which bear the brunt of inflation, and more energy-intensive firms. Moreover, again with the aim of minimising their impact on budgetary imbalances, it is important that the fiscal policy measures be temporary so as not to further increase the structural deficit, and that the instruments used do not skew price signals, which would hinder the adjustment in demand. Likewise, averting any feedback into the current inflationary process is further reason to avoid an across-the-board fiscal impulse and the widespread use of automatic indexation clauses in expenditure items. This deindexation must be part of the incomes agreement to which I will return later. It is against this background that the measures adopted to soften the economic and social consequences of the war must be assessed.

And the threat posed by climate change means we need to give serious consideration to the resilience of our physical and digital infrastructure. The New York Fed has the appearance of an historic institution, but behind the stone façade 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  we’re grappling with these issues in the same way that you are. In our economic research, our supervision of financial institutions, the payments systems we operate, in short – in all that we do. Talent, technology, and innovation challenge us every day. They create incredible opportunity, but they also test us by exposing new vulnerabilities. I know that over the next couple of days there will be lots of valuable insights shared by experts about how to handle the challenges posed by big data, cryptocurrency, and climate change. But first, to kick off the conference, it’s my pleasure to introduce John Dugan, Chair of Citigroup. Citigroup has operations in over 150 countries, with about 200 million customer accounts worldwide.2 As head of a global employer with complex, international operations, John is no stranger to the changing nature of risk. John became Chair of Citigroup at the start of this year. Prior to that he was chair of the Financial Institutions Group at the law firm Covington & Burling LLP, where he spent much of his career. He has also held a number of public sector roles, including Comptroller of the Currency during a critical time for our financial system and economy, from 2005–2010.
Growth in Sweden will gradually recover… In the wake of the financial crisis there were dramatic fluctuations in production in 2009 and 2010, with a fall in GDP of over 5 per cent followed by an increase of over 5 per cent (see Figure 17). The National Accounts indicate that growth continued to be strong in the first half of this year, but not as strong as in 2010. As I have mentioned already, “soft data” in the form of confidence levels and so on looks much weaker as a result of the global unease. Our assessment is therefore that there will be a substantial slowdown in growth next year (see Figure 17). Thereafter we expect growth to increase towards 2.5 per cent, which historically speaking is a rather normal level (see Figure 17). An important driving force for an increase in growth in the period ahead is that the households have a high level of saving to start with (see Figure 18). Saving is expected to remain high in the immediate future due to the unease around the world, but as unease subsides it is likely that the households will reduce their saving. Consumption may then increase at a relatively good rate. The labour market has improved and unemployment has fallen rather rapidly since the end of 2009. Our assessment is that this improvement will now slow down. Unemployment will continue to fall, but at a slower rate.

This is primarily attributable to a rise in the prices of imported goods. The longer-term inflation forecast is virtually unchanged. For 2019 it stands at 0.6%, up from the figure of 0.3% last quarter. For 2020, we anticipate an inflation rate of 0.7%, compared to 0.6% last quarter. The forecast for 2021 is 1.1%, 0.1 of a percentage point lower than last quarter. The conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate remains at – 0.75% over the entire forecast horizon. Global economic outlook  Our inflation forecast is based on assumptions regarding the development of the global economy. The signs from the global economy remain mixed. GDP growth picked up in the first quarter, with all large economies recording above-average expansion. However, manufacturing output again tended to weaken in a number of countries. This has been accompanied by subdued capital spending and a decline in the global trade in goods. The weakening in industrial activity is attributable to various factors, including difficulties faced by specific sectors – in particular the automotive industry – as well as the impact of protectionist measures and increased uncertainty. On the labour markets, the signals have remained positive overall. Employment figures have risen again in the advanced economies. Unemployment has continued to decline, and is now  Page 3/5  Berne, 13 June 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  at or close to historic lows. This favourable situation on the labour market is supporting consumer demand.