samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
First of all, the ECB’s accountability practices have evolved over time.3 With the launch of European banking supervision in 2014, specific accountability arrangements were established for the ECB’s supervisory arm. We also strengthened our relationship to reflect the greater complexity of the ECB’s monetary policy measures. For example, when the ECB was taking unprecedented action during the exceptional circumstances caused by the pandemic, I held an ad hoc exchange of views with the political group coordinators of this Committee. Moreover, we have agreed to interact more closely in the context of the ECB’s strategy review and ensure that our regular dialogues play a key role in how we inform about the exercise. The outcome of the review will also provide an opportunity for us to consider the ECB’s accountability practices. The ECB’s accountability has also been enhanced by a better flow of information between our 4 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  two institutions. As we discussed last February4, this requires us to continuously aspire to communicate as clearly and as openly as possible. As part of this endeavour and also in response to parliamentary and public demands, the ECB has already started providing more detailed information about its asset purchases and current holdings on its website. Today I can announce an additional transparency measure.

The latest ECB staff projections foresee annual real GDP growth at –8.0% in 2020, 5.0% in 2021 and 3.2% in 2022. Euro area real GDP is only expected to recover to pre-crisis levels in late 2022.2 The strength of the recovery remains, however, highly dependent on the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic and the success of containment policies. The public health crisis will continue to weigh on economic activity and poses downside risks to the economic outlook. The sharp drop in economic activity earlier this year has weakened price pressures. Annual headline inflation in the euro area stood at –0.2% in August and is expected to remain negative over the coming months, reflecting the effects of earlier declines in energy prices, a stronger euro, and a temporary reduction in the value-added tax rate in Germany. ECB staff project annual inflation to gradually increase, from an average of 0.3% in 2020, to an average of 1.0% in 2021 and 1.3% in 2022. The ECB’s monetary policy The monetary policy measures that we have taken since early March are providing crucial support to the economic recovery and are helping to safeguard medium-term price stability. Without our measures, we would be facing a deeper economic contraction and more severe 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  disinflation. Our policy support during the crisis has been structured along two main axes: liquidity operations and asset purchases.
And financial regulation must have a less pro-cyclical effect. The objective must be to enable the banks to curb the impact of shocks on the economy, rather than to amplify them, as is the case now, where negative spirals are generated between the financial system and the real economy. Because of the global character of today’s financial crisis, the authorities must work in concert to find solutions, both in terms of recapitalisation of the banks and regulation of the financial sector. 2  BIS Review 12/2009

This observation shows that inflation target, to a significant extent, continue to serve as an anchor and that economic agents expect the disinflation process to continue in the medium term. Nevertheless, the fact that currently medium-term inflation expectations are significantly above our medium term target of 4 percent necessitates a cautious policy stance 1 . Figure 10: Medium-Term Inflation Expectations* 9 12-Month  24-Month  8  7  6  5  0108  1107  0907  0707  0507  0307  0107  1106  0906  0706  0506  0306  0106  1105  0905  0705  0505  0305  0105  4  Expectations regarding the period after 24 months have been published since May 2006. Source: CBRT. 1  As of January, one-year and two-year ahead inflation expectations are 6.01 percent and 5.17 percent, respectively. BIS Review 20/2008  7  3. Inflation and monetary policy outlook  Distinguished Guests and Press Members, After summarizing inflation and monetary policy developments in 2007, in this part of my speech, I would like to share our evaluations on inflation and the monetary policy outlook. First of all, I would like to summarize several factors that might enable the disinflation process to continue in the upcoming period: Annual percentage change in CPI excluding food, energy and tobacco imply an inflation trend of 4.8 percent (Figure 11) 2 . In other words, underlying inflation in the past year was not far away from the medium-term targets.
Timothy F Geithner: Liquidity risk and the global economy Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta's 2007 Financial Markets Conference – Credit Derivatives, Sea Island, Georgia, 15 May 2007. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me the chance to join you today. Although this is a conference primarily about credit derivatives, I am going to talk about some of the broader changes we are seeing in financial and credit markets, and their implications for policy. You are meeting during a period of remarkable change and exceptional conditions in financial markets. Financial markets over the past several years have been characterized by an unusual constellation of low forward interest rates, ample liquidity, low risk premia and low expectations of future volatility. In some markets, asset prices have risen substantially, and credit growth has expanded rapidly. In credit markets more generally, spreads have declined to levels that reflect very low expectations of near term losses and credit standards have weakened. It would not be accurate to say this is a world without volatility, for we have had a series of episodes of sharp declines in asset prices and increases in volatility. But these episodes have been contained and short lived, with markets recovering relatively quickly and with little appreciable effect on global economic activity. These conditions are global in nature, though they take somewhat different forms in different markets.

When rumours about some European banks’ exposure to the US subprime market in August 2007 strongly affected money market interest rates and trading volumes within just a few hours, the ECB reacted by providing liquidity to the banking sector on a short-term basis – first overnight, then for slightly longer maturities. This served to ensure that solvent banks would obtain the liquidity that was disappearing from other sources. The first overnight provision of liquidity by the ECB of almost € 100 billion was demand-driven and revealed the  3  See Allen, F, Chui, M., and A. Maddaloni, A., 2004. “Financial Systems in Europe, the U.S.A. and Asia.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20(4):490–508. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  high uncertainty within the banking sector on the ability to obtain funding from private sources. In general, during the first year of the crisis, there was a high degree of uncertainty on individual exposures, but not yet a very strong perception of more severe problems in the banking sector as a whole. Central bank liquidity provision thus aimed at stabilising interest rates, and ensured that temporary liquidity problems of banks would not create problems for bank solvency. The Eurosystem was able to deal with these tensions by only slightly altering its operations under the standard operational framework. This was due to the fact that the number of counterparties to monetary policy operations has historically been very large in the euro area, and because the standard framework offers quite some flexibility.
One thing I would say if you do do it, you better have a mechanism in place to make sure that those large securities firms that are left actually are well-regulated, well-capitalized, have enough liquidity, and have access to a lender of last-resort. One of the problems that we had in the financial crisis is there wasn’t a good method to lend to securities firms. By law, the Federal Reserve discount window – this is the facility that we have open to commercial banks – were not allowed to have that discount window open to securities firms. So, in the crisis, we had to do extraordinary lending activities to securities firms. We need a better lender of last resort backstop for securities firms. If you decide to repeal Glass-Steagall and separate commercial banks from securities firms, that’s not something that I would recommend, but if you were to do that, make sure you have a way of backstopping the securities industry, too, so if a big securities firm gets in trouble it doesn’t threaten the entire financial system. Dr. Olajide Oladipo: Thank you. I’ll be expecting questions from students, too. Audience Member: Not a student. President Dudley:  9 / 15  BIS central bankers' speeches  But you’re a student of something, right? Audience Member: My concern is MWBEs. I feel that the racist element within our capitalization has not allowed us to participate in the economy on an equal level by having access to capital. The government’s asking for 30% on major projects.

As we speak, the Parliament of Romania is holding a solemn plenary meeting dedicated to the before mentioned event. The National Bank of Romania had an important contribution during the First World War. Therefore it chose to acknowledge the historical moment by issuing a set of numismatic coins in gold, silver, coppered tombac and brass dedicated to this Union. On the obverse, in the foreground, there is an image of the building of the National Council in Kishinev where, on the 27th of March 1918, the union of Bessarabia with Romania was voted, while in the background, there is an excerpt from the Union Act; the inscription “ROMANIA” in an arch, the face value “100Lei, 10LEI, 1LEU, 50 BANI”, the coat of arms of Romania and the year of issue “2018”. On the reverse there are the portraits and the names of the three cosigners of the Union Act, i.e. Ion Inculeţ, Chairman of the National Council, Vice-Chairman Pantelimon Halippa and Secretary Ion Buzdugan; the inscriptions “100 ANI DE LA UNIREA BASARABIEI CU ROMANIA” and “27 Martie 1918”. Ladies and gentlemen, Allow me to say a few words about/ introduce Ms. Rachel Lomax. She is back to Romania after a decade or so and ready to share her valuable 40 years’ experience and expertise in policy making and financial markets. After obtaining a Master’s degree from London School of Economics in 1968, she joined HM Treasury.
30  In spite of the cold war, proxy wars and several wars of independence of colonies, the period after the Second World War remains one of relative peace in the developed world, compared with any other period in history. 31  Most of the sub-periods during which debt grew fastest have coincided with periods of economic slowdown. But what is remarkable is that we have not generally seen a reduction in debt levels in good times that would match the increases in debt in downturns. 32  What the graph hides is the fact that most of the increase in the average OECD public debt-to-GDP ratio in the late 1990s has been driven by the steep debt increases of Japan in the 1990s. Taking out Japan from the sample shows a slight drop in the average debt ratio during this period. BIS Review 106/2008  7  Gallatin’s debt reduction efforts look even more remarkable when viewed through the prism of current fiscal developments throughout the developed world. If Albert Gallatin had been in charge of OECD public finances during the decade prior to the onset of the current financial turmoil, we might be in a more comfortable fiscal situation today. As it stands, our longerterm fiscal challenges are formidable and will demand courageous political and fiscal leadership. Albert Gallatin’s adopted home country is no exception. Regardless of who moves into the White House in January 2009, the new President’s longer-term fiscal policy options will be constrained by the legacy of the past.

However, this does not have a great deal to do with the liquidity problems in US dollars and my thoughts on this subject will thus have to wait for a later occasion. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  So, to summarise: not all borrowing in foreign currency is linked to a direct liquidity risk. This primarily affects short-term borrowing, which largely takes place in US dollars. And not all dollar borrowing gives rise to a liquidity risk, but primarily that used for lending to customers. A rough estimate suggests a volume of around SEK 450 billion in the four major banks, but the level of uncertainty is high. Two questions It is apparent that the banks faced problems in their dollar funding during the crisis. Why else would they have borrowed as much as USD 30 billion via the Riksbank? However, one question that is always asked in this connection is why the banks necessarily had to borrow dollars. Couldn’t they instead have borrowed in kronor and then exchanged this into dollars on the foreign exchange market? This would have removed the problem of the shortage of dollars. There is no lack of kronor, as the Riksbank can create these in the quantities needed. For ordinary people like us and for most companies, the foreign exchange market worked faultlessly during the entire crisis. If you had kronor, you could exchange them for dollars. It was the Swedish banks that provided this service – they were the counterparties in these transactions.
Hong Kong is the first and so far the only place outside the Mainland that has developed a RMB bond market. So far, 19 RMB bonds have been launched in Hong Kong with a total issuance size of over 50 billion yuan. The issuer base was expanded from only Mainland Chinese banks at the start, to Mainland subsidiaries of Hong Kong banks and China’s Ministry of Finance in 2009, and further to Hong Kong corporations and international institutions like McDonald’s and the Asian Development Bank this year following an important elucidation regarding the operation of RMB business in Hong Kong in February. 20. The net effect is that any issuers, including foreign corporations and multilateral organisations, are now free to issue RMB bonds in Hong Kong, just as they can issue bonds in any other currencies. Of course, if the proceeds are to be used on the Mainland, the moving of funds into Mainland China will have to meet the requirements there. By the same token, banks can now also offer RMB trade finance, corporate loans, syndicated loans and project finance to their clients in accordance with Hong Kong’s existing banking practices. 21. The latest developments have provided more flexibility and larger scope for the further development of RMB financing activities in Hong Kong. As the pool of offshore RMB funds in Hong Kong continues to grow, there will be huge opportunities for financial institutions to take part in RMB financing as well as in the origination, distribution, investment and trading of RMB bonds. 22.

A precondition for maintaining a stable exchange rate against the euro is that price and wage inflation is on a par with that of euro countries over time. When the krone exchange rate is weak, Norges Bank therefore sets the interest rate with a view to low price inflation. At the same time, we must avoid a situation whereby interest rates are so high that monetary policy contributes to a downturn that undermines confidence in the krone. Interest rates are set based on these considerations. This is not a new policy. In an address to the annual general meeting of Forex Norge in August last year, Kjell Storvik stated: BIS Review 10/1999  –9–  “I would point to the well-known fact that a lower krone exchange rate may contribute to fuelling inflation expectations and that such expectations may in turn generate expectations of a weakening of the krone exchange rate, thereby reinforcing depreciation pressures. Price expectations may thus prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The interest rate level which has now been established should, in addition to directly contributing to stabilising the krone exchange rate, also limit price expectations...” I should also like to quote the following from the Revised National Budget for 1994: “A stable exchange rate can generate expectations of continued low inflation, which in turn influence both price and wage determination.
This is also emphasised in the preparations to the law, where it states that ... the processing of licence applications does not mean that the authorities are responsible for the properties of the system’s operation, etc. It terms of the licensing process itself, Norges Bank has initiated preparations and we will be ready to receive licence applications when the law enters into force. At the same time, we are aware that the formulation of these applications will take some time, not to mention that any changes in agreements or routines (which become necessary based on legal requirements) may take even more time. However, we will endeavour to facilitate this process. We have already had informal contact with the banking associations concerning this matter and we are prepared to provide counsel and guidance in the further progress of this process. 4.3. The responsibility of the banks  The primary responsibility for the development of the payment system must, as mentioned, lie with the banks. This is in line with the approach of self-regulation. Further development of the common infrastructure, agreements and new payment services must come from the industry itself. In this process, it is important that banks provide more information on risk in the systems, so that an explicit division of responsibilities can be established - both for the individual systems operator and for the participants in the payment systems. However, the banks’ ability to develop efficient and stable payment services is influenced by the regulatory framework established by the authorities.

NOK 1735 billion)  (NOK 479 5 billion)  28%  29%  3%  66%  69%  Cards (both c redit a nd de bit card)  Electron ic giro services  5%  Cheques an d other p aper-ba sed payment services  Source: Norges Bank, Annual Report on Payment Systems 1998  We see that the share in value of payments made with payment cards - in spite of a sharp increase in the number of transactions - has not advanced much (still accounting for a mere 3-5% of the total transaction amount in the payment system). The average amount per transaction remains fairly low – i.e. approximately NOK 400. In general, we can nevertheless say that with the exception of cash, payment cards have become Norway’s most important payment instrument for small transactions. On the other hand, the electronic giro is the instrument which has increased the most in terms of value. The increase in direct transfers by business terminals has been particularly sharp, while the growth rate has been highest for “new” services - such telebanking and home banking. These developments are important for the further improvement of payment system efficiency. The emergence of home banking is a natural progression from telebanking, an area which is already highly developed in Norway. At the beginning of 1999, the vast majority of banks in Norway were able to offer giro services over the Internet, and turnover in 1998 already amounted to a good NOK 7bn.
And I would like to share with you that some banks have launched what we may call a “pre-vetting” process for account opening. This means an applicant may request to first submit the documentation and information required for opening an account to the bank by mail, fax or email, and the bank will “pre-screen” or “pre-vet” them before arranging the applicant to have a face-to-face meeting in Hong Kong. I trust this change in process flow would be welcome by customers based overseas. 8. We are also working closely with the industry to explore the use of technology to enhance the efficiency of account opening processes, such as KYC Utilities (“KYCU”) and technology to allow remote account opening. You may have heard about KYCU, which are third-party platforms that aim to manage data as a strategic asset across banks to reduce duplication and cost and assist banks in making decisions, on all types of risks, including but not limited to AML, and as a result to make smarter business decisions. For example, a single source of customer data or documents would remove the need of a customer to provide KYC documentation to every bank, and may shorten the turnaround time for new account opening. We have had a number of discussions with major banks and relevant technology providers and steps have already been taken by both the HKMA and some major banks to take this work forward.

Arthur Yuen: Bank account opening and maintenance Opening remarks by Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Briefing cum networking session on "Bank Account Opening and Maintenance", Hong Kong, 21 April 2017. * * * Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, 1. A very warm welcome to all of you to this briefing and networking session. We are going to discuss the important issue of business account opening and maintenance, and this event is jointly organised by the HKMA and Invest Hong Kong. I would like to first of all welcome all the representatives of Chambers of Commerce, who share the same concern as the HKMA that some SMEs and start-up companies from overseas are finding it difficult to open bank accounts in Hong Kong. 2. I am sure you would all appreciate that over the past years, customer due diligence (CDD) requirements have tightened globally, and Hong Kong followed this international trend. Needless to mention is also that a very small number of banks, for a variety of reasons, need to comply with requirements or standards mandated by their head offices or overseas authorities, thus leading to de-risking efforts in some instances. Surely no one would disagree that we are now in a more complex world, and sometimes we indeed have to deal with sub-optimal outcome. But I totally appreciate that knowing it is one thing, and experiencing the effect of it is quite another. 3.