samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I will begin with a broad overview of the current international approach to overall economic management, then say something about the present disturbances in Asia, and finally about their implications for the prospects for the rest of the world. Let me begin with just a few words about the process of international economic and monetary management. I have just returned as it happens from the annual Spring Meeting of the IMF in Washington, where the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from all around the world gather to discuss current international developments. We all meet again every autumn. Last week, we debated much the same agenda in a variety of meetings - in the Group of 7 major industrial countries; in the Group of 10 - actually eleven - a somewhat wider range of industrial countries; in the Interim Committee in which all IMF member countries are represented, in constituencies; and this time in a new ad hoc Group of 22 or 23 countries including a broad cross-section of industrial, emerging and transition countries. Invariably the journalists, who also gather in Washington, quite reasonably ask, “What exactly did you decide in all those meetings?” And almost invariably, we have to respond that “We did not actually decide on anything - we agreed we should do some further work and meet again for further discussions!” You could be forgiven for thinking that the whole process of reaching international agreement on anything moves at a snail’s pace!

That would be likely to add to the problem of potentially volatile capital inflows next time around. Not surprisingly, too, there is strong political BIS Review 36/1998  -5-  resistance in many countries, including notably the United States, to the idea that public, i.e., taxpayers’, money should be used to bail out private creditors, especially foreign creditors. External financing need not come solely from the public sector. Private finance would, in principle, serve the same purpose, and in many situations market price adjustments may be sufficient to stem the capital outflow. But, given the extent of the loss of confidence in the Asian case, organising private financial support meant in practice persuading existing creditors that their assets would be better protected if they were prepared to leave them in place, especially if other major creditors agreed to do the same and if official support was made available in parallel. But in this case, too, difficult judgements had to be made. There was a danger that, if private creditors had to be in effect coerced into staying put, they would immediately cut their positions elsewhere, while they still could, adding to the international contagion. In fact, in the critically important case of Korea, the promise of massive official support failed to restore market confidence.
The extraction of oil at great sea depths would require the development of new technologies. This entailed the building up of expertise in our own country, which would secure a full order book for many years ahead – and not only off our own shore. The activities on the Norwegian continental shelf would also provide a boost to other industries in Norway. Chart: A new market for the shipbuilding industry And the timing was perfect: economic stagnation and competition from Asian countries had brought the Norwegian shipping industry to the brink of a crisis. With the discovery of oil, an adaptable shipbuilding industry and the oil companies were soon on good terms. Building up a new industry and spending the revenues generated also brought a new set of challenges, and in 1974 these challenges were the subject of a government white paper, Report no. 25 to the Storting, entitled “The role of the petroleum industry in Norwegian society”. To provide room for the oil sector and higher consumption of goods and services, other industries had to give way. The mechanisms described in the white paper are familiar: “A transfer of production and jobs between firms and industries can occur via increased domestic cost pressures.” So, the nation was prepared for restructuring and for the costs this would involve. But the white paper also made it clear that, in order to reap the benefits of economic growth, restructuring would be necessary. We now know, more than 40 years later, that structural changes were indeed made.

The Asian financial crisis in 1997 taught us a number of painful lessons from volatile capital flows associated with such weak institutions. Since then, we have seen a large number of developing countries moving towards flexible exchange rate regime, adopting inflationtargeting framework, and improving the resilience of financial system. Yet, the challenges from volatile capital flows have become more intensified and we still see the implications of volatile capital flows on our economies. We are, therefore, very fortunate to have with us Mr. Rodrigo de Rato, Managing Director of the IMF, and Mr. Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager of the BIS, to share their views and insight on this issue. I believe that we can greatly benefit from the IMF’s new surveillance framework, which put greater emphasis on the volatile financial market, as well as from the BIS expertise on analysis of capital flows during the morning session. I am certain that their perspectives will be useful in setting the tone for our further discussions on how to better prepare ourselves for the more intensified volatility of capital flows, which, I believe, have been rooted to our current economic environment. Ladies and Gentlemen, Following our discussions on the theme, we will have Dr. Perry Warjiyo and Mr. Richard Murray, our Executive Directors from the IMF to lead our discussions this afternoon on recent developments in global and regional economies with a view to identifying challenges ahead of us.
Public opinion shifts rapidly from criticising banks for their mistakes – frequently, for the mistakes “inherited” from banks that disappeared some time back – to criticising them for not sufficiently easing the way for  4/13  credit to reach economic agents; indeed, for the risk of financial exclusion stemming from potential branch closures. Like the song, it would seem we can’t live with or without them. But the truth is, with or without criticism, the role of banks remains as essential today for our economy as it was 20 or 30 years ago. However, debate has arisen over the future role of banks, set against the emergence on the scene of the so-called Fintech. This can be seen as a threat or as an opportunity. I believe it entails both. But in any event, banks must evidently adapt their business model to technological change, as Gonzalo so rightly said. If instead of looking at the small, innovative and nimble Fintech, we assess the potential effect that the irruption of one of the so-called Big Tech may have on the system as a whole, the debate takes on a systemic dimension. In this connection, the recent announcement of the launch of the “Libra” project, the virtual currency sponsored by Facebook, has potentially systemic implications. These are so serious that supervisors, central banks and credit institutions must all evaluate the possible consequences. Evidently, we must be sure that the project will not compromise the integrity of payment systems and the stability of the system as a whole.

Thank you. 13/13
Although controversial at the time, these rate hikes have proven their value in containing inflation without derailing the economic recovery. Second, the Monetary Policy Committee’s warning – that the same would happen this year if wage increases should prove excessive – appears to have been credible, which probably would not have happened without the previous rate increases. Third, the foreign exchange market intervention policy introduced by the Bank in mid-May has proven effective. The outlook is for inflation to stay close to target this year if the króna holds relatively stable. This positive outlook is due to a number of factors: favourable inflation developments during the first two months of the year, signs that wage cost increases have been smaller in the recent term than previously thought, the fact that the recent wage settlements – which provided for pay increases consistent with the inflation target – appear to have set the tone for subsequent wage negotiations, and the fact that global inflation looks set to be somewhat lower than previously forecast. Looking beyond this year, however, inflation could rise again when the slack in the economy disappears and the effects of increased investment and the Government’s debt relief measures on domestic demand come to the fore. The impact this has on inflation will depend on how inflation and inflation expectations develop this year, and on other factors that could affect demand in the near term.

Because they are so closely linked to monetary policy, they had shown signs of almost full integration right after the introduction of the euro. But with the crisis, a degree of re-segmentation took place again along national borders; and the Eurosystem had to step in to take on the intermediation role that these markets play in normal times. Another set of issues relate to banking. Banks expanded both across borders and financial sectors, often combing commercial banking, investment banking and insurance business in one and the same group. The two groups whose CEOs are in the panel are clear examples of this evolution. But cross-border integration of rules and prudentials, including the institutional framework, has not proceeded with the same speed and there continue to be clear differences according to the activity type. Banking consolidation also raises sensitive moral hazard and crisis management questions, as painfully illustrated by the crisis. The securities markets showed strong growth in the years before the crisis and clear signs of integration, though not to the same extent as observed in the euro money markets. With the crisis, bond price indictors showed signs of more dispersion across countries in Europe, but the question is whether this points to more segmented markets or rather increased risk awareness on the part of investors. Very topical in this respect is also the CDS market and its interaction with the underlying (sovereign) bond market. Finally, the integration of a securities market depends to a large extent on the integration of the supporting market infrastructure.
Since, in a cross-border resolution of a G-SIB, it is in the interests of both home and host resolution authorities that key subsidiaries that are not themselves resolution entities do not formally enter resolution, and instead resolution tools are applied only to resolution entities, this will incentivise cooperation between home and host and reduce incentives to ringfence assets locally in an uncooperative manner. So, if there is sufficient GLAC of adequate quality that is distributed appropriately within G-SIB groups, we will have made a further, major step in making G-SIBs resolvable and ending TBTF. Again, let me emphasise the importance of disclosure at the legal entity level. It is important that investors in GLAC, and creditors of G-SIBs generally, can identify their place in the creditor hierarchy and therefore better estimate their expected losses should resolution become necessary. This will reduce moral hazard, improve certainty of outcomes in the event of failure, and so incentivise investors to ensure the firms they are investing in are run in a prudent manner. Conclusion I want to emphasise just how much progress has been made in last three years: resolution regimes and authorities are now in place where there were none previously in many countries. Resolution planning for systemic banks is taking place in Crisis Management Groups and will soon be taking place in EU resolution colleges too. We look forward to the guidance and technical standards from the European Banking Authority on how resolutions will be transacted.

Why do I say this, when we have other resolution tools available? I say this because of the importance of protecting critical  1  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.173.01.0190.01.ENG  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  functions. It is simply not credible to think that a G-SIB could be dismantled over a resolution weekend without a destabilising disruption to critical functions. Finding a private sector purchaser capable of taking on the business – in whole or in parts – is likely to be even more difficult. Bail-in enables us to stabilise a firm. It buys the time that will allow for an orderly reorganisation or wind down of all or part of a failing firm, in order to address the underlying cause of the failure. There is more than one way to effect a bail-in: either through the use of write-down and conversion powers directly, or via a bridge institution. In a bridge, liabilities are exposed to loss by leaving them behind in an insolvency process with the activity that is to continue transferred to a new legal entity. In contrast, where the bail-in tool is applied directly, liabilities are written down or converted into equity within the existing legal entity. Applying the bail-in tool directly has a number of advantages over the bridge approach, at least in the context of a resolution at the level of an operating company.
12  Figure 1 Inflation indicators (*) (annual change, percent)  7  7  6  6  Services  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  CPI  CPIEFE  0  1 0  -1  Goods  -2  -3  -1 -2  -3 13  14  15  16  17  (*) As from January 2014 the new indexes with annual base 2013=100 are used, so they are not strictly comparable with previous figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute. Figure 2 CPI inflation (*)  CPIEFE inflation (*)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  6  6  6  6  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  0 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19  Dec.17 Report  Sep.17 Report  (*) Gray area shows forecast as from the fourth quarter of 2017. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).

This led to a wider loss of confidence in banks, the hoarding of cash and illiquidity in many financial markets which is still not over. As financial institutions all around the world have struggled to shrink their balance sheets in the face of this storm, there has been a pronounced tightening in the supply of credit. The number of loan approvals for house purchases fell to a new low in April to – on some indicators – its lowest level in over thirty years (Chart 3). In the past, the swings in the UK economy have been home grown. Credit squeezes have typically resulted from rising domestic arrears and defaults, driven by economic downturns at home. This time the sequence has been reversed. The broadest measures of economic activity have continued to grow: quarterly GDP growth in the latest data for 2008Q1 was 0.4% and employment has continued to rise. The level of defaults on corporate and personal loans has been low. So the squeeze on new lending has preceded rather than followed the slowdown in the UK. The judgement we have to make is how far that tightening will restrain the domestic economy in future. There is no doubt it is having a material effect already (Chart 4). This is most obvious in the housing market, where prices have fallen by around 7% since their peak, and have further to fall. The drop in transactions and turnover is rippling through the housebuilding industry,  BIS Review 80/2008  3  estate agencies and mortgage brokers.
Chart 22: Firm level productivity distributions  a) Region  b) Industry  32  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  32  c) Export status  d) Foreign ownership  e) Innovation  f)  Size  g) Leverage  Source: ONS, ONS Research Database, BvD and Bank calculations. Notes: These charts plot the kernel density distribution of labour productivity (real GVA per employee) across Great Britain. Chart (e) uses unweighted firm data. Chart (g) shows data BvD rather than VML firm-level data and is not directly comparable to the other charts. 33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  Chart 23 – Firm exports and productivity  Source: BvD and Bahaj, Foulis, Gal and Pinter (2016). Notes: Results from a Pooled Regression (slope=0.34; t-value=12.2), data for 2013. Table 3 – Median productivity growth by firm size*  Number of employees 6-10 11-20 21-50 >50  2.8 2.5 1.8 1.2  Source: BvD Notes: Data for 1998 -2013; Three-year cumulative growth. Chart 24: Monetary policy counterfactual experiment based on company accounts data a) Interest Cover Ratio  b) Leverage Density  0.15  Before intervention 0.10  After intervention  0.05  ICR = 1 0.00 -5 0 Interest cover ratio  5  10  15  34  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  34  c) Productivity – scenario 1  d) Productivity – scenario 2  Source: BvD and Bank calculations.

As one illustration, Chart 2 plots successive forecasts by the Bank of England of UK productivity growth since 2008, while Chart 3 shows IMF forecasts of productivity across advanced economies over the same period. These charts point to a string of material and serially-correlated forecast errors over recent years. Productivity growth has consistently underperformed relative to expectations, since at least the global financial crisis. This tale of productivity disappointment, in forecasting and in performance, has been extensively debated and analysed over recent years. Some have called it the “productivity puzzle”. 1  With each year that passes, and as each new turning point in productivity has failed to materialise, this mystery has deepened. This has led some to conjecture that the world may have entered a new epoch of 2  sub-par productivity growth, an era of secular stagnation. Various possible causes of this stagnation have 3  been posited, including adverse demographic trends and diminished rates of innovation. The secular stagnation hypothesis is striking in its gloomy implications for future growth in living standards. 1 2 3  For example, Barnett et al (2014), Bryson et al (2014) and Weale (2014) For example, Gordon (2014) and Summers (2013). Gordon (2014). 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  It is striking, too, because of the starkness with which it contrasts with a second topical hypothesis. This posits that we may be on the cusp of a Second Machine Age or Fourth Industrial Revolution, an era of 4  secular innovation.
The funds obtained through the issuance of supranational debt will be used to tackle the effects of the COVID-19 crisis and to prepare the European economy for future challenges. More than half the funds are expected to be used in two priority areas: digitalisation and the environmental challenge. To access these funds, countries must design recovery and resilience plans containing specific proposals for projects aligned with the particular country recommendations made in the context of the European Semester.7 To assess the impact of these funds, we must turn our attention to some of the aspects that are yet to be clearly defined. Specifically, there are four sources of uncertainty, the response to which will be crucial to determine the fund’s capacity to boost economic activity: the amount to be disbursed, the schedule for implementation of the projects, the type of projects to which the resources will be allocated and, lastly, how the loans envisaged in the agreement will be used. Regarding the amount to be disbursed, it is important to set in context the sheer scale of the resources that the NGEU programme could potentially make available to a number of European countries, including Spain. Specifically, the portion taking the form of grants would alone approximately triple the entire general government's investment expenditure in 2019. Since countries risk facing difficulties when it comes to absorbing such a huge volume of funds, it is vital that bottlenecks are reduced at all levels of government, and that effective and swift public tender processes are designed.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of Russia's economic and financial developments in 2016 Speech by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the plenary session of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 June 2017. * * * Dear Vyacheslav Volodin, and deputies of the State Duma! The Central Bank is guided in its actions by strategic objectives. I want to note that across the country, every employee of the Bank of Russia knows what these are. They are the basis on which key performance indicators for employees are formulated. These objectives are: price stability; financial market sustainability; availability of financial products and services for households and businesses; development of the national payment system; development of technologies and support of innovations in the financial market. These objectives follow directly from the functions of the Central Bank, as defined by the Constitution and by the law. Yesterday, I took another look at the speech I gave to the Duma four years ago. Yes, of course, life has made adjustments. No one back in 2013 expected such negative external factors, the sanctions, and the drop in oil prices. So the task of ensuring financial stability has come to the forefront of our activities. But in dealing with this problem, we have tried not to lose sight of strategically important activities that we assigned ourselves four years ago, and we must continue to work towards the completion of these.