samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is about establishing an incentive-based approach to risk management and capital adequacy, within a framework of the three mutually-supporting pillars The new comprehensive framework provides at least four transmission channels for influencing financial stability and the overall economy: first, by setting more risk-sensitive minimum regulatory capital requirements, so that regulatory capital is both adequate and closer to economic capital; second, by providing incentives to encourage improvements in banks’ internal risk management processes; third, the enhanced mechanisms to encourage the marketplace to exert external discipline on banks and the banking sector; and fourth, the necessary greater co-operation among supervisors across jurisdictions. The effects of each of these channels will be different in terms of time and in terms of final influence, some of them having the capacity to bring significant long-term positive changes to the financial markets. In my view, perhaps too much attention is placed on the minimum capital rules of Pillar 1 and not enough on the effects of the other three channels. 3. Implications of Basel II for monetary policy  Let me therefore turn to the issue of how the main elements of Basel II may affect the ability of the monetary authority to fulfil its objectives. I believe that the achievement of price stability as a desirable medium to long-term target is, by now, a non-controversial objective of primary importance whose foundations are well known. On one hand, the proposition that labels inflation largely as a pure monetary phenomenon within long time-horizons can hardly be contested either conceptually or empirically.

The first is that Basel II has tried to incorporate in the framework not only micro risks but also the macro perspective to risks. If you like, we have tried to incorporate how micro risks change through the cycle and in stressed economic conditions. We have therefore been very conscious about how micro prudential regulation can influence macro behaviour and also how different macro scenarios can change the risks that bank face. As Jean-Claude Trichet said in June last year, when presenting the new framework: “It will enhance banks’ safety and soundness, strengthen the stability of the financial system as a whole, and improve the financial sector’s ability to serve as a source for sustainable growth for the broader economy” This enhanced financial stability is a significant contribution of Basel II to monetary policy. In general terms, a better functioning of the banking system will tend to improve the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanisms. In addition, one could think of a positive effect on the expectations about better financial stability. Second, Basel II is about much more than just setting better quantitative minimum capital requirements.
Moreover, Thailand’s corporate sector has relatively low external debt financing. External corporate debt amounts to around 13 percent of total corporate debt, with a majority belonging to large corporations for financing overseas investment, and these firms tend to manage exchange rate risks well. On top of these external buffers is the fact that our growth engines in 2017 are firmer and more balanced than last year. Most importantly, both exports and to a lesser extent private investment have shown signs of a more broad-based and sustained pickup in recent 1  Including Bank of Thailand bonds 2  months. Given that the export recovery is now a regional phenomenon, we expect the trend to continue. On exports of services, the tourism sector, which was temporarily affected by the crackdown of illegal tour operators in the fourth quarter of last year, has recovered faster than expected. At the same time, fiscal stimulus remains an important growth driver with the additional mid-year budget and the implementation of the medium-term public infrastructure investment program. Apart from improved government disbursement, the government has proposed the supplementary budget for fiscal year 2017 amounting to 190 billion baht, which is over 1% of GDP on top of the originally planned budget deficit of 2.6% of GDP. In addition, fiscal policy will continue to be expansionary with a budget deficit of 2.9% of GDP proposed for the fiscal year 2018. Despite the continued sizable budget deficit, there are fiscal buffers to cushion against unexpected difficulties ahead.

“The Thai Economy: The Current State and The Way Forward” Speech by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob Governor of the Bank of Thailand Japanese Chamber of Commerce (JCC) Thailand Dinner Talk 13 March 2017 Mr. Shingo Sato, President of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Members of the JCC Board, JCC members, Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, A very good evening to you, First of all, I would like to thank the Japanese Chamber of Commerce for inviting me again to share with you my thoughts on the prospect of the Thai economy. Last year, I truly enjoyed the exchange of views, ideas, and information with all of you and certainly hoped many of you did so too. With more than 5,000 Japanese firms actively operating in Thailand across various industries, Japan is certainly one of Thailand’s most important business partners in both the real and the financial sectors. Indeed, as Thailand is trying to move towards more innovative and high value-added industries, it is encouraging to see Japan continuing to be at the top among countries that applied for privileges under the new BOI investment promotion scheme in 2016. This would not happen if Japanese professionals already on the ground like yourselves did not have strong confidence in the long-term prospect of the Thai economy. Ladies and gentlemen, My talk this evening will consist of two parts. In the former part, I will briefly discuss the current state of the Thai economy, paying special attention to its resilience and growth momentum.
I am, indeed, convinced that each of the six members will aim for as collegiate an attitude as possible. To me, this is already evident from the work to date. But it is also the case that, in making monetary policy, a variety of factors have to be weighted into an overall assessment of inflation’s future path. In weighing up the odds, different people may reach different conclusions, which need not be an entirely bad thing. It might even have the advantage of demonstrating that decisions on the monetary policy stance tend to involve assessments that are complex and tricky. From interviews and comments in the press, it is already evident that members of the Executive Board voice somewhat different shades of opinion in their inflation assessments. This, too, is something that all those who follow monetary policy will have to get used to. It is, moreover, an assurance that our discussions in the Riksbank will be properly informed about aspects of the BIS Review 14/1999  –2–  monetary policy stance. It is also consistent with the transparency that the Riksbank is striving for and which is a basic condition for the new legislation. The monetary policy situation Sweden’s economy in perspective In the years since the crisis in the early 1990s, economic development in Sweden has been rather good. Growth has been relatively high, yet inflation has been kept at a low level. Since summer 1993, annual GDP growth has averaged almost 3%.

The lower share prices and the contagious spread of the crisis to other markets were liable to have consequences via decreased demand for exports from the industrialised countries, as well as via more cautious behaviour among their consumers and firms. BIS Review 14/1999  –3–  The problems in LTCM also aroused fears of a considerably more serious scenario where banks in the industrialised countries became so cautious about granting credit that this would paralyse global economic activity. As the signs of an international slowdown became increasingly clear and were accentuated by the growing turbulence in financial markets, the Riksbank revised its assessment of the Swedish economy and the path of inflation. This warranted some easing of the monetary stance. In November the repo rate was therefore lowered in two steps, from 4.10 to 3.60%. In the December Inflation Report it was still considered that in one to two years’ time, both the change in the CPI and the underlying rate of inflation would be below the Riksbank’s 2% target for price stability. On 16 December the repo rate was therefore lowered another 0.2 percentage points, to 3.40%. After this adjustment, responsibility for the future formulation of monetary policy passed to the Riksbank’s new Executive Board, which would be taking over from the turn of the year. Strong finish to 1998 Most signs suggest that activity in the Swedish economy was fairly strong in the latter part of 1998. GDP figures have still to be published but the available statistics point to a good fourth quarter.
At the level of monetary measures, the Central Bank of Kuwait cut the interest rate several times in March 2020 down to all-time low 1.5% to reduce the borrowing cost and ensure that the temporary liquidity issues at the CBK-regulated units would not turn to permanent issues to their solvency. This step was followed by a series of measures related to financial stability including activation of its emergency plans and those of the banking sector to address the requirements of the pandemic, as well as taking a package of measures within the macroprudential policy to ease the regulatory requirements upon the outbreak of the crisis, the most important of which was releasing the prudential capital buffers of 2.5%, facilitating liquidity requirements to provide a wider lending space for banks, and reducing the risk weights related to exposures to small and medium enterprises, thus supporting the vulnerable sectors. As regards, the financial stability, the measures included payment moratoriums for the affected customers, obligating banks not sell or seize the collateral, and instructing banking sector units to conduct a comprehensive review of their credit and investment portfolios. To mitigate the economic and financial damages, and maximize the benefits from the aforementioned monetary and financial measures, the Central Bank developed and implemented a clear plan to follow up on the situations during the pandemic, in light of the data on the conditions and spreading infection.

The total financial packages provided around the world to various economic sectors (health and non-health) amounted to around USD 10.8 trillion, equivalent to 10.2% of the global GDP, while the amounts allocated to support liquidity injected into the economies reached USD 6.1 trillion, or 6.2% of the global GDP. Like the other countries in the world, the Kuwaiti economy encountered many challenges, as economic activities have been shut down for several months, and global shipping of merchandise goods has been severely disrupted. Proceeding from the importance of discussions and sharing of experiences to pave the way towards making the right decisions and bringing about thorough strategies that strengthen the monetary and financial stability, I would like to briefly present the efforts made by the Central Bank of Kuwait to achieve this goal during the previous period, and the measures it have taken to alleviate those challenges and develop a mechanism for follow-up thereon and a plan for safe exit.   Speech delivered by His Excellency the Governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait, Basel A. Al-Haroon, in the 46th Ordinary Session of the Council of the Governors of the Arab Central Banks and Monetary Authorities, held in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on September 18, 2022. Page 1 of 4  In line with its proactive approach adopted since March 2020, the Central Bank of Kuwait has taken several measures and actions through its various monetary, supervisory and hedging instruments.
Underlying inflation, like the output gap and the neutral interest rate, is an unobservable variable. An ideal indicator of underlying inflation should show the same average rise as the rise in the CPI over time. It should be less volatile than the CPI and should be indicative of future developments in inflation. BIS Review 49/2006  5  The consumer price index adjusted for taxes and excluding energy products, the CPI-ATE, has been widely used as an indicator of underlying inflation. However, the CPI-ATE not only excludes temporary effects of tax changes and fluctuations in energy prices, but also trend changes in these variables. This indicator is therefore not a perfect measure of underlying inflation. In the last 10 years, the CPIATE has underestimated underlying inflation because energy prices have increased more than other consumer prices and the level of excise duties has increased somewhat. In the past ten years, the difference has been roughly 0.3-0.4 percentage point on average per year. Traditionally, Norway has been a net exporter of energy, but at the end of the 1990s the situation reversed. The price of energy is largely determined by supply and demand in the Nordic energy market and to some degree by the energy balance in non-Nordic countries. Energy trading is important for Norway. It reduces the vulnerability to precipitation levels and inflows. However, the majority of Norway’s energy trading partners use coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy. Production costs for thermal power are higher than for hydropower, which is produced in Norway.

Paul Tucker: Competition, the pressure for returns, and stability1 Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, at the British Bankers’ Association Annual Banking Conference, London, 17 October 2012. *  *  *  Introduction Propelled by a deep crisis in the financial system, the international authorities are overhauling the “rules of the game” for global finance. The changes are profound. But it is worth stressing that the goal is not to abolish risk or risk-taking. We need to find broadly the right balance between, on the one hand, safety and, on the other hand, the contribution that sound and honest finance can make to economic prosperity. In striking that balance, international policymakers have maintained three beliefs: •  risk is an intrinsic and unavoidable part of the (monetary) services that banks provide to the economy, just as risk is intrinsic to the businesses that borrow from banks;  •  competition in finance is good, although the authorities need to be mindful that the drive for superior headline returns can contribute to excessive risk in the system as a whole;  •  a global financial system must be maintained, but the authorities need to contain the way that financial problems can be transmitted easily from one part of the globe to others. In short, the things society wants from finance come with risks attached. History contains repeated episodes of herd-like chasing of high headline returns during exuberant phases of the credit cycle.
Caleb M Fundanga: Financial sector challenges and progress in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Information Exchange Forum on Sources of Finance, Lusaka, 10 December 2007. *  *  *  • Mr Chairman • Representatives of International Financial Institutions • Chief Executives and representatives of Financial Institutions • Distinguished ladies and gentlemen I am greatly honoured to be given an opportunity to make some remarks at this forum. I wish to extend a warm welcome to all participants gathered here today, particularly those who have travelled from outside the country. I hope that you will not only have fruitful deliberations but also find time to explore the beautiful scenery and experience the warm hospitality that Zambia has to offer. Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, this forum is more than timely as Zambia is working tirelessly towards financial deepening, wealth creation and reducing the levels of unemployment. In order to achieve this, affordable financial services should be available to the majority of businesses. In fact, the forum has come at an opportune time when the economy has shown signs of macroeconomic stability and growth. The financial sector in Zambia is considered relatively under developed. In spite of this status, post independence governments have always recognised the importance of the financial sector to national economic development. This is the reason why the activities of the sector had up until 1992 been controlled by the state.

Risk measurement It will come as no surprise to you that, as a supervisor, I will begin by talking about the second of these elements, namely risks. The process of transition will entail two types of risks to the financial system:  4/9    On the one hand, the physical risks caused by the direct effects of climate change, for example as a result of the gradual increase in temperature, or more frequent or more severe climate events such as storms, flooding or natural disasters.   On the other, the transition risks. These refer to the potential effect on specific bank borrowers of the regulatory measures aimed at sustainably transforming the  economy, technological changes, and changes in customer behaviour and preferences driven by greater environmental awareness. The two types of risk are related: the more ambitious the regulations combating climate change, the greater the transition risk and the lower the physical risk, and vice versa. Environmental risk is a risk in its own right, although its impact materialises through “traditional” banking risks.
14 I doubt, however, that bankers and investors would share this particular view of the philosopher, especially in the light of developments over the past few years. Let me conclude, however, on a reassuring note and a wish concerning the exit from the current crisis on the basis of the logic of Heraclitus that led him to the conclusion that “out of discord comes the fairest harmony” (έκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην άρμονίαν) – which, in the context of the discussions in this conference and in relation to our policy aims, would be translated into achieving sustainable growth in an environment of price stability and financial stability. Thank you very much for your attention. 14  8  See Kahn (1979). BIS Review 65/2009  References European Commission (2009), Spring Economic Forecast, May. Heider, F., M. Hoerova and C. Holthausen (2008), “Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads: The Role of Counterparty Risk,” available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362113. International Monetary Fund (2009) “Global Financial Stability Report”, April. Kahn, C. (1979) “The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: Fragments with Translation and Commentary”, London: Cambridge University Press. Papademos, L (2009a). “The dual crisis: economic impact, policy response and exit strategy”, speech at the High-Level Panel Debate on “Europe in the Economic and Financial Crisis: How to bring back prosperity for everyone?”, Brussels, 4 May. Papademos, L (2009b). “Monetary policy and the ‘Great Crisis’: Lessons and challenges”, speech at the 37th Economics Conference “Beyond the Crisis: Economic Policy in a New Macroeconomic Environment” organised by the Österreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, 14 May 2009.

As a central banker, I will concentrate in my remarks on the role of central banks – and of the ECB in particular – in dealing with the current financial crisis and establishing conditions that support the economy’s recovery and return to a path of sustainable growth and price stability. In particular, I will address the following issues: •  first, the available central bank policy instruments in managing a financial crisis and the rationale for the measures actually taken;  •  second, the effectiveness of the ECB’s policies in promoting the orderly functioning of money markets, in fostering the provision of credit to firms and households, and, more generally, in countering the effects of the crisis on the financial system and the broader economy;  •  third, the role and effectiveness of other policies – notably the government measures to support the banking system and the fiscal stimulus packages – in mitigating the impact of the crisis and in complementing the actions of central banks; and  •  fourth, and looking forward, the prospects for sustainable growth in an environment of price stability and financial stability; that is, the prospects of escaping from the current state of economic underperformance and financial system stress, and the associated need for an appropriate exit strategy from the extraordinary measures taken by central banks and governments. II.
Much of the credit for this belongs to the European Central Bank (ECB), whose steadfast commitment to price stability has created an environment conducive to investment, reflected in the fact that interest rates are low across the yield curve. The ECB’s credibility in fighting inflation is now so well established, moreover, that long-term inflation expectations are well anchored at around 2%. Price stability clearly yields important welfare benefits. So there are both advantages and opportunities for policy makers and economic agents in the euro area. But in setting out on this new phase of Malta’s economic development, we must be aware that, while the ECB can, and indeed has, delivered low and stable inflation, it cannot use the interest rate to permanently increase growth. From Malta’s perspective, therefore, the adoption of the euro must be viewed as but one in a continuum of challenges to be faced. The purpose of this conference is precisely to focus attention on the policy choices that need to be made in the years ahead. Put simply, the task that Malta faces is to bridge the remaining income gap with the more advanced members of the euro area. The success of this endeavour will depend importantly on how effectively the public and private sectors work together, both in assimilating the lessons learned during these first years of EU membership and in implementing appropriate policies.

For, while the EU has for fifty years brought peace and stability to the peoples of Europe, the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union have created a congenial environment in which economies can grow and people prosper. BIS Review 110/2007  3