samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Between early July and early August alone, the Swiss franc appreciated by roughly 20%.1 With interest rates close to zero and inflation forecasts signaling deflationary risks, the minimum exchange rate helped us avoid a dangerous tightening of monetary conditions, in a situation where we had exhausted the options available under conventional monetary policy. It also provided the foreign exchange market with clear guidance at a time of enormous uncertainty. The rationale for the introduction of the minimum exchange rate is internationally acknowledged. As I have seen over the last two years, particularly central banks and the IMF understand the difficult situation facing Switzerland in 2011. They also recognize that we set the minimum exchange rate at a level where the Swiss franc remains highly valued even today. Over the last few years, exchange rate tensions between the major economies have flared up. In this context, some observers have criticized central banks for influencing exchange rates, either directly through foreign currency purchases, or indirectly through additional monetary easing measures such as the purchase of securities. It is claimed that these types of asset purchases generate spillover effects or constitute a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.2 In recent weeks, it has been suggested that capital flows have again become highly volatile  1  Based on daily data. 2  There are several event studies which show that asset purchases by the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England weakened their domestic currencies.

By contrast, merchanting – which is less well known but has a long tradition in Switzerland – has grown significantly over the past ten years.8 And since 2010, net income from merchanting has been higher than net income from banks’ financial services in the current account. Merchanting refers to trade, denominated primarily in U.S. dollars, that does not cross the domestic border.9 The dynamics of Swiss merchanting can be partially explained by the relocation of commodity houses to Switzerland and the commodities boom before the financial crisis. Over the past five years, merchanting has accounted for almost one-third of the current account surplus. Allow me to recap the main points regarding the Swiss current account. Switzerland’s large current account surplus is determined by three structural factors: the strong net international  4  Already then, the savings surplus was based on net income from capital investment abroad and net receipts from trade in services with foreigners. See also T. Schlup, “Zahlungsbilanz”, in Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, electronic version (e-HLS). 5  See Figure 1 in Fratzscher, M., A.J. Mehl, and I. Vansteenkiste (2011): “130 years of fiscal vulnerabilities and currency crashes in advanced economies”, IMF Economic Review, Vol. 59, Issue 4, 2011, pp. 683–716. It shows real exchange rates from 1890 to 2009 for Switzerland, and the major economies and emerging markets. Switzerland and the Netherlands are the only countries whose exchange rates have appreciated continuously and uninterruptedly since 1950.
Russia’s unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine has brought supply security back to the top of the agenda for all major economies, most saliently for energy. And over the longer term, it is likely to accelerate the global transition to clean energy production as a way to increase climate and energy security. But such technologies are highly resource-intensive in their installation phase. Getting the global economy on a path to meet the Paris Agreement goals could see total mineral demand from clean energy technologies quadrupling by 2040. [7] This threatens a new era of competition for resources. Challenges for Europe in 2023 As this new global map takes shape, we enter 2023 facing three big challenges. The first challenge is to reconsider how we can best protect Europe’s critical interests in a fast-changing world. As an economy that is very open to trade and deeply integrated into global supply chains, we are vulnerable to geopolitical headwinds. For example, 35% of Europe’s manufacturing output is absorbed outside the EU, much more than for the United States or China. So, as the next chapter in the globalisation story is being written, we need to ensure that Europe is a leader, not just a follower. And as the French President and German Chancellor have recently argued, we have the capacity to do so. [8] Already now, Europe is the top trading partner for 80 countries, compared to just over 20 countries for the United States.

It’s time to talk about money Speech given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee  London School of Economics, London 28 February 2020  I am grateful to Alex Michie for his assistance in drafting these remarks and Ben Dyson, John Jackson, Josh Sadler, Tom Mutton, Alice Carr, Emma Sinclair, Ryland Thomas, Michaela Costello, Chris Ford, Simon Scorer, Justin Jacobs, Wayne Chapman, Samantha Riley and the Bank’s Archivists for their input. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Intro One of the questions that I find hardest to answer simply is “what does the Bank of England do?” I get asked this penetrating question a lot, especially by children when I visit schools as part of the Bank’s outreach and education programme – which incidentally is one of the most rewarding parts of my job. There is a long, comprehensive and accurate answer of course, describing our monetary policy and financial stability objectives, policies and actions and our role in demand management. When I talk to economics classes in schools, I can often feel their teachers willing me to come out with these textbook answers. But I find that the better and simpler answer is that we are responsible for ensuring that the money of the United Kingdom ‘works’. Money, like electricity and water, is crucial to the operation of a modern society.
Furthermore, some national supervisors may set higher capital requirements than implied by Basel I, perhaps even higher than those implied by Basel II, depending on the risk environment. For those banks that do experience reductions in capital as a result of Basel II, some observers have questioned whether the lower requirements might provide certain advantages and make it easier for those banks to acquire other banks that do not share in the same benefits. History suggests that this particular concern may be unfounded. In a paper published this past February by the Federal Reserve, researchers reported that they did not find convincing evidence that past changes in capital requirements have had a substantial impact on mergers between banks. The issue of competition between banks has also come up in the context of competition between countries. Here, we should remember that Basel II is intended to help ensure that international competition in banking markets is driven by the strengths of each bank, rather than by differences in each country’s rules. One way that the Committee has sought to promote a consistent application of the new framework is by providing banks and supervisors with detailed requirements where necessary. As I have already mentioned, these details may add to the appearance of length and complexity in Basel II, but that is a small price to pay for greater consistency and a more level playing field.

Overview of assessment outcomes  Table 1  Assessed member  Publication date of  Number of regulatory changes,  Overall assessment  jurisdiction  assessment  amendments, and clarifications  grade  made by a member jurisdiction during the assessment Japan  October 2012  5  Compliant  Singapore  March 2013  15  Compliant  Switzerland  June 2013  22  Compliant  China  September 2013  90  Compliant  Comparability of bank capital ratios Over time, the consistent national implementation of Basel III standards will help ensure greater “truth in advertising” when comparing bank capital ratios. It is important that, when a bank publishes what purports to be a Basel III capital ratio, investors and counterparties can be reasonably sure that the ratio has been consistently calculated and that, if there are differences, those differences are transparent and some measure of their materiality is available. But there is more to bank capital calculation than just following national regulations. The current framework makes use of internal models – these were introduced in 1996 for market risk, and in 2006 for credit and operational risk. The rationale was clear: to provide incentives for improved risk measurement, and reduce arbitrage via greater risk sensitivity. The Basel I framework, established in 1988, had grown outdated and was increasingly subject to arbitrage. Given its limited risk sensitivity, it provided banks with incentives to accumulate risk, as the build-up of many risks would not be visible in banks’ capital ratios.
Economic forecasting, as I have now learned, is a tricky business, not the least with a highly volatile component like private investment. In assessing future investment trend, we at the Bank of Thailand look at key investment determinants, including the return, cost of capital, and confidence factors. Judging from the recent trend as well as outlook for each of the determinants, we have come to conclude that the prospect of a continued and robust growth of capital spending is good. In terms of return, corporate profitability is up, and marginal return to new investment is likely to be on the rise in line with a steady increase in the capacity utilization rate. The low interest rate environment helps reduce the cost of capital as well as improve firms’ liquidity and leverage position. Progress on corporate debt restructuring and the budding growth of bank credits to the industrial sector are also likely to help relax firms’ financial constraints further. This means easier acquisition of the funding for new projects. Moreover, business sentiment as measured by the Business Sentiment Index is on a general rebound. Therefore, barring no major disruptions to the recovery process coming from abroad, I expect private investment to come into the limelight, replacing private consumption as the main driver of growth in the period to come. That is to say, in terms of growth drivers, we should soon graduate from the combination of export and consumption to the combination of export and investment.

While the debt issue does not look to be serious for now, a build-up of household debt stock could imply that private consumption would likely to become more sensitive to interest rate changes. This would have a direct implication on monetary policy because even a small change in the policy rate could now have a large impact on GDP when households are highly leveraged. It is therefore prudent for us to monitor household debt closely and ensure that the rise in household leverage is manageable. The second challenge is posed by the slow recovery of commercial bank credits. Despite some positive development, it is clear that credit expansion has not kept up with economic growth, and the intermediary process between depositors and investors is still clogged up. While it is true that many companies can now resort to other means of financing such as issuing debentures or drawing from their retained earnings, the banking sector is still by far the largest source of funds for the corporate sector and is likely to remain so for many more years. Thus, a dysfunctional banking sector can surely threaten to undermine the strength of the economic recovery. In the near term, non-performing loans (NPL) as well as non-performing assets (NPA) must be reduced more speedily, and indeed this has been one major focus of my work at the Bank of Thailand.
Mr Nyberg comments on how EMU may affect the Swedish housing loan market and its financing  Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Föreningssparbanken in Warsaw on 14 October 1999. *  *  *  Thank you for giving me the opportunity to come here and give some points of view on how EMU may affect the Swedish housing loan market and its financing. This is undeniably an issue which we have every reason to take an interest in whether we take part in the monetary union or not. One of the ideas with EMU is to create a more efficient market for goods and services where competition is increasing and consumers obtain better products at lower prices. In the housing loan market, this should mean that borrowers expect a greater range of products, more suppliers and lower interest rates. How should the Swedish housing loan institutions handle this challenge? Competition for customers As we know, the national housing loan markets in Europe look rather different, which is illustrated by the following diagram (figure 1). In countries such as Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the total outstanding stock of loans with mortgages in property totalled over 50% of GDP. In other countries, including Greece and Italy, the equivalent figure is under 10%. The differences depend on factors such as the systems of rules, tax legislation and market structure which vary from country to country.

As a Welshman now working in Threadneedle Street, I appreciate that the Bank of England can appear a remote institution, apparently focused on the City of London and far away from the day-to-day concerns of people living elsewhere in the UK. The work of the Agencies provides a bridge between the Bank and the households, businesses and communities it serves. Through my discussions over the past couple of days, I have learnt about how Brexit has affected trading relationships on the island of Ireland and across the Irish Sea. And our Citizens Panel on the cost-of-living emphasised the distinctiveness of the retail energy market in Northern Ireland, which has been in focus of late given the sharp rises in utility bills. I am not going to discuss those issues this evening – although I realise that they are important, as well as politically and economically sensitive. I have been in listening mode, and can now take some of the lessons learnt back to our deliberations at the Bank. I originally hoped to spend the bulk of my time exploring the macroeconomic motivations underlying MPC decisions in the past few months. I hope to return to those issues in a moment. But given recent events and actions, it would be remiss of me not to address market developments. Over the course of the past week, there has be a significant repricing of financial assets. Part of  Page 3  that re-pricing reflects broader global developments.
But its potential has not escaped the notice of central banks or the financial services industry. Both are exploring DLT as a means of reconfiguring financial infrastructures. And some believe this new technology of distributed trust could bring about a genuine transformation of money and finance. One reason to think this possible is because a similar model of distributed trust has already fundamentally reshaped a number of other products, services and businesses. We have seen the rapid emergence of businesses built on peer-to-peer interactions and transactions. These business models are underpinned by trust between buyer and seller, producer and consumer, trust which is distributed and personalised. Take the market for accommodation. This has been transformed by the emergence of AirBnB. This peer-to-peer or distributed model of accommodation among strangers is underpinned by feedback ratings which endow participants with personalised trust. AirBnB is only 9 years old but already has over three million listings. Its estimated valuation is well above the market capitalisation of established, centralised, hotel chains such as the Hilton and Hyatt. Or consider travel. Everyone has heard of Uber – itself a distributed trust model. Fewer people have heard of BlaBlaCar. This is a distributed model of riding-sharing among strangers, also underpinned by feedback ratings and personalised trust. BlaBlaCar is only 11 years old but already transports more than four million people per month, well above Eurostar or JetBlue airlines.

Despite a huge increase in the volume of central bank reporting, neither understanding of, nor trust in, central banks has improved. These trust and understanding problems are not unique to central banks – they are common across banks, business, government, the media. Nonetheless, what explains these trends? The financial crisis and the slow recovery from it are likely to have been one factor, but not the whole story. Let me highlight three other factors to have played a role, for central banks and more broadly. (a) The changing nature of trust  Trust has been studied extensively by philosophers, sociologists and anthropologists over many years. 49  These studies have shown that trust can take a variety of forms and can change shape quite fundamentally over time. Such a mini-metamorphosis appears to have taken place over recent years, in particular among trust in institutions. 50  The traditional model of trust was a fairly simple one. To a significant degree, it was anonymous, centralised and institutional. The actions of institutions, like the Fed and the Bank, were trusted by the general public, even when few of them understood what it is these institutions did and why. And having a trusted third-party, able to exercise a degree of control over monetary and financial affairs, was a source of comfort. This institutional structure, in the main, served society well. Not least, it lasted for several hundreds of years. Some have argued that a good chunk of society’s success over this period can be attributed to these institutional foundations.
Over time, we expect stronger governance within insurers to reinforce associations between financial reporting and fundamental economic factors, as intended by IFRS. In Malaysia, the finalisation of IFRS 17 is indeed timely in the light of current reforms being undertaken by Bank Negara Malaysia to further develop the domestic insurance market. This will see greater competition and complexity in the insurance sector, alongside a renewed impetus for growth through channel diversification and digitalisation. In this environment, the implementation of IFRS 17 will have an important role in improving the quality of information provided to the market on how these developments impact the performance of insurers, and in strengthening foundations for sound governance and risk management. This in turn will promote the effective functioning of insurance markets to serve the economy. Early preparation is key So then, where do we stand today? With less than two and a half years before the implementation date sets in, how prepared are insurers to implement IFRS 17? The answer is not encouraging. A recent survey published in January this year by a software firm covering some 240 insurance companies spread around the world, found that a startling 92% of insurers had yet to start putting solutions in place. Among those that have started, a vast majority are still only in the initial stages of planning.

But the work must start now, and it must start right by taking a broader and integrated approach to implementation. Today’s workshop aims to bring some of the most important issues in implementation to light, and provide you with valuable insights from our distinguished speakers and subject matter experts. With greater clarity and knowledge to inform careful preparations, insurers can be confident of not just achieving a smooth transition to IFRS 17, but of laying strong foundations for long term growth and success. 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  That is the ultimate goal. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Lim Hng Kiang: Singapore’s key role in Asia Opening remarks by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the 8th Annual Citi Asia Pacific Investor Conference 2011, Singapore, 16 February 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, 1. Good morning and a very warm welcome to everyone here today. It is my pleasure to join you here at the 8th Citi Asia Pacific Investor Conference. 2. This conference is taking place at a time when the global economic recovery is picking up pace. Against this backdrop, there will be many opportunities to be explored. I am confident that this conference will provide an excellent platform for participants to share ideas and build networks. 3. The world’s economic landscape has been re-shaped since the recent global financial crisis. The recent crisis was said to be the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Today, the advanced economies which were at the epicenter of the crisis still face headwinds in their recovery. In the United States, economic recovery remains fragile after two rounds of quantitative easing measures. In the Euro-zone, concerns over sovereign debts have yet to subside. There are still uncertainties in the horizon for these advanced economies. 4. This time, Asia is at the forefront of the global recovery. Asia’s resilience, built up over the years since the Asian Financial Crisis, has enabled us to weather this crisis better.

As a regional financial hub, the developments in Singapore’s capital markets reflect the growing vibrancy, diversity, and sophistication of Asia’s capital markets. 16. To conclude, let me reiterate that the outlook for Asia is positive. Although the region’s growth is expected to settle to a more sustainable pace, Asia will remain at the forefront of the global recovery. Despite facing challenges from large capital inflows and inflation, I am confident that Asia’s policy-makers will make appropriate policy adjustments in order to achieve long term sustainable growth. 17. On this note, I wish you a fruitful and successful conference. Thank you. 1  Al Rajhi Group and Keppel T&T announced a joint venture agreement to establish an asset management company to manage the world's first Shariah-compliant data centre fund – Securus Data Property Fund. The fund's initial closing was achieved in June 2010 at $ million with institutional investors from the Middle East and Asia. 2  Khazanah Nasional Berhad issued its inaugural Singapore Dollar sukuk amounting to $ billion in August 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3