samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
A rise in aggregate GDP in an economy need not necessarily mean higher welfare for all its citizens or regions, as the lady in the audience made clear. The more uneven the distribution of winners and losers, and the greater the skew in gains, the less likely it is aggregate social welfare will have risen. When it comes to evidence on the distributional impact of monetary policy, there are wide gaps in understanding and even wider gaps in perception. Even among policymakers and academics, work in this area remains embryonic and the results are often ambiguous. 16  If I were summarising this research  evidence, I would say it suggests monetary policy can and has affected inequality, but that these effects have probably been modest quantitatively. There are a number of reasons why existing research may not have been clear-cut in its conclusions. Studies have used different measures of monetary impulse (interest rates versus QE) and different methodologies (macro versus micro). Perhaps most importantly, these studies have tended to focus on different monetary policy transmission channels. Doing so can give quite different perspectives on the impact of monetary policy on overall inequality. The general public probably suffers from a particularly acute version of this problem. When asked to assess the impact of changes in monetary policy, they tend to focus on those channels which have an observable and immediate impact on their finances.

17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Producing something along these lines would be a new departure for macro-economic policy, if not for some of the other arms of policy. Analyses of monetary policy have tended to emphasise the economy-wide effects, measured in terms of macroeconomic outcomes like GDP, unemployment and inflation. This still makes sense as a means of explaining the social good monetary policy is offering. But messages often land most effectively when they are personalised. Monetary policy has an important personalised impact on most people’s lives. Some scorecard-like device could, at times of significant change in the monetary policy stance, help explain, in simple terms, the personal as well as societal benefits monetary policy confers. It would seek better to explain how monetary policy is affecting your job, your cost of living, your GDP. This should help make monetary policy relevant to people’s everyday lives. At a time of diminished trust, and some scepticism, it could potentially make a contribution towards improving public understanding of, and trust in, monetary policy. It would mean the next time someone shouts from the audience “That’s your bloody GDP”, we would have right of reply: “Oh no it’s not; it’s yours too.”  18  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  18  References  Agerström, J, Carlsson, R, Nicklasson, L and Guntell, L (2016), ‘Using descriptive social norms to increase charitable giving: The power of local norms’, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 52, pp. 147-153.
The numerous instruments developed since the crisis should now be put to work in preserving financial stability. This is what is being done in France, for example, with the gradual activation of countercyclical capital buffers or measures limiting the exposures of the main banks to large, highly indebted corporations. 2.2.2. Adapt the framework to new risks In addition to applying the regulatory standards, the supervisor is also, of course, paying close attention to how business models evolve, in order to identify emerging risks, monitor them and 5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  devise possible solutions. Several new areas of risk are coming under particular scrutiny: With regard to cyber risk, the planned solutions, especially to increase cyber resilience, need to be harmonised and coordinated at the international level to maintain a clear and coherent regulatory framework for all financial sector participants. The Banque de France made the rationalisation and harmonisation of current regulatory efforts a key theme of its G7 presidency this year. As part of this, 23 global authorities (finance ministries, central banks, bank supervisors and markets) took part in a cyber resilience exercise in June 2019, with the aim of strengthening their operational resilience to a major cyber incident impacting the global financial system. The exercise, which was by nature highly complex and the first of its kind in the world, marked a huge step forward in terms of global cooperation. Thanks to its success, G7 countries agreed to draw up a programme of exercises for the coming years.

This step was necessary at this time to stop the turmoil in Turkey’s financial markets and calm depositors’ nerves. Now, as we all know, the 100 percent coverage may subject both bankers and depositors to moral hazard in the form of willingness to take greater risks to earn higher returns. Depositors may encounter moral hazard when they ignore greater risks associated with their choice of a depository institution which offers them higher rates for their deposits. But even though all the drawbacks of the present system of deposit protection are well known, current conditions in the world financial environment and their effects on the Turkish financial system have prevented us from making the necessary changes in the existing deposit insurance scheme just now. Once we manage to stabilise the macroeconomic environment, we will be able to reduce the 100 percent coverage to internationally acceptable levels. BIS Review 31/1999  4  How a powerful and effective supervision could be implemented for the Turkish banking system was foreseen many years ago. The system in effect during the 1930s had revealed its inadequacies, but the first step was not taken until 1959 with the establishment of the Board of Sworn Bank Auditors. The system was first applied to the Turkish economy under the direction of the Ministry of Finance. The Board recruited many valuable employees, trained them, and gained the power to supervise the system.
With some exceptions, the principle of personal independence is not applicable to the members of the Supervisory Board. Is the principle of independence under Article 130 of the Treaty applicable to the ECB in its role in EFSF/ESM financial assistance programmes for a number of euro area Member States? Another question to examine is whether the principle of independence under the Treaty is applicable to the ECB in respect of its role in ESM/EFSF financial assistance programmes for certain Member States. With the financial and sovereign debt crisis, the Commission, on behalf of the ESM and the EFSF, and in liaison with the ECB, was given a number of specific tasks relating to the assessment of risks to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or of its Member States, the assessment of whether a Member State’s debt is sustainable, the assessment of the financing needs of the Member State concerned, the  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  negotiation of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) detailing the conditionality attached to financial assistance facilities of the ESM/EFSF for that Member State, and monitoring compliance with such conditionality. Where possible and appropriate, the Commission – in liaison with the ECB – was mandated to conduct these ESM/EFSF activities together with the International Monetary Fund.

In particular, in its supervisory activities, the ECB must apply all relevant Union law and, where the Union law is in the form of directives, the national legislation transposing those directives. [25] The ECB is also subject to binding regulatory and implementing technical standards developed by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and adopted by the Commission[26] and to the EBA’s powers to resolve disputes between competent authorities in a legally binding manner. [27] While the ECB is consulted on draft legislation within its fields of competence, the ECB is not a supervisory policymaker and its supervisory tasks, although entailing discretionary judgement, focus on the implementation and enforcement of supervisory policies and rules established by democratically accountable institutions. Even though operational independence is of importance to the http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  manner in which these tasks are carried out, the fact that a supervisor is required to act in response to decisions made by, or in cooperation with, policymakers and other supervisors means that the high level of protection from external influence that is guaranteed under Article 130 of the Treaty is not appropriate for these tasks. The provisions on independence in the SSM Regulation are similar to Article 130 of the Treaty, but serve a different purpose. The personal and instrument independence are also different.
Two obvious examples: we need to make it much more difficult for institutions with little capital and little supervision to underwrite mortgages, and we need to look more comprehensively how to improve the incentives for institutions that structure and sell assetbacked securities and CDOs of ABS. And supervision will have to focus more attention on the extent of maturity transformation taking place outside the banking system. Second, risk-management practices and supervisory oversight has to focus much more attention on strengthening shock absorbers within institutions and across the infrastructure against very bad macroeconomic and financial outcomes, however implausible they may seem in good times. After we get through this crisis and the process of stabilization and financial repair is complete, we will put in place more exacting expectations on capital, liquidity and risk management for the largest institutions that play a central role in intermediation and market functioning. This is important for reasons that go beyond the implications of excess leverage for the fate of any particular financial institution. As we have seen, the process of de-leveraging by large but relatively strong institutions can cause significant collateral damage for market functioning and for other financial institutions. Inducing institutions to hold stronger cushions of capital and liquidity in periods of calm may be the best way to reduce the amplitude of financial shocks on the way up, and to contain the damage on the way down.

Two key issues remain: how to fund the backstop at a sufficiently high level to be credible, and how to create a swift decision-making process to deal with emergencies – if we need 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  weeks, it is useless. The euro area also needs a system for providing liquidity to financially sound banks after resolution – one that is provided by the Eurosystem and secured by a highquality public guarantee. I’m fully convinced that once we have a credible and efficient mechanism for resolution, it will be much easier to reach a pragmatic compromise on deposit insurance, probably with a focus on liquidity sharing between national guarantee schemes. Let me add two thoughts on substance: First, on anti-money laundering. In this area, I am convinced that we need to enhance our approach by building on a network of national authorities and EBA that should ensure an effective single anti-money laundering supervision. This means that EBA should have the legal and human capacities to foster convergence of practices on the best standards, based on clear European mandates. It should go as far as including effective breach of law reviews and a capacity to directly intervene in some cases with European-wide impact. Second, what we have managed to achieve for banks can serve as an example for financial markets.
The rapid upturn in inflation last autumn was largely due to rising energy and food prices, a reflection of the fact that prices rose rapidly on the world market. At the monetary policy meeting I pointed out that it is not possible to immediately counteract such rapid price impulses from abroad with monetary policy. Quite simply, it must be allowed to take some time. In the Monetary Policy Report the rapid price increases are to some extent assessed to be of a temporary nature. If world market prices do not continue to rise at the same rapid pace in future, inflation will fall back again. This is also what is forecast in the main scenario of the Report. However, to some extent, it also concerns the effects on inflation which risk becoming more permanent and which may need to be counteracted with monetary policy. When inflation rises and is above the target, as CPI inflation now is, it is important that it is not allowed to become entrenched and become permanently high. The risk of this increases if inflation expectations rise, and that is exactly what has occurred. Inflation expectations have risen not just one year ahead, but even two and five years ahead, which is troublesome. The monetary policy decision The upturn in inflation and in inflation expectations in the slightly longer term were also factors that indicated the interest rate should be raised at the monetary policy meeting in February.

In the main scenario the recovery in the United States and the euro area is expected to begin during the second half of this year and next year growth will largely be back at the trend level. Growth in Sweden is expected to be approximately the same this year as last year, but in reality this is a weakening if one takes into account the larger number of working days this year. Inflation in Sweden rose rapidly in the autumn and, measured by both the CPI and the CPIX, is expected to exceed the inflation target during a large part of the forecast period. The uncertainty over future economic developments is still considerable, however, and to highlight this a number of alternative scenarios are described in the Monetary Policy Report. One of these involves greater financial turmoil and that growth abroad will slow down more sharply. In this scenario growth in the US economy will fall more than in the main scenario, at the same time as the borrowing costs for households and companies in the whole world will  BIS Review 30/2008  1  be higher. This leads to a general dampening of demand and to lower GDP growth and inflation both abroad and in Sweden. But, as we have written in previous reports, there is also a risk that inflation will be higher than in the main scenario if wage developments are stronger and productivity weaker than expected.
But preserving the interests of the EU, its citizens, its businesses, its Member States, means that the agreement with the UK should not undermine what we have managed to achieve in Europe in the economic field: one of our strongest assets is our single market; it removes all internal borders and regulatory obstacles to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons in the European Union. For the sake of consistency, there is one principle in particular to which we have to stick in preparing the agreement between the EU and the UK: in the single market, you cannot separate access and rules. For the financial services industry, this means that you can hardly expect to obtain a European passport if you do not accept the single market's rules. London is and will remain in the future a global financial centre, but the architecture of the European financial system may have to evolve in this regard. We cannot foresee the outcome of the negotiations – which I hope will be in the interest of both parties – but all actors should as of now undertake all the necessary preparations to avoid any potential “cliffedge” risk. London will and should probably continue to attract and transform savings from all over the world.

In this respect, on a more personal note, allow me to comment on what I read with surprise in some British newspapers last July: I personally never met with the City’s Special Representative to the EU, Mr Browne, and the Banque de France has never wished for Brexit to be detrimental to the City of London, and we have friendly and frequent contact with the City of London Corporation. But, besides savings from the rest of the world, the savings of the EU-27 Member States will be increasingly handled within the single market, given its significant size and the safety of its  Page 5 sur 5  rules. This means that we will move towards some degree of “Europeanisation” for wholesale banks, insurers and asset managers. It is symmetrically the duty of Europe and its member countries to be business-friendly and attractive to the financial industry. We should not achieve this by lowering the bar for our common regulations: the SSM, EIOPA and ESMA are duly mobilised to prevent certain entities that keep their resources outside the EU from setting up empty shell corporations in the EU, mere company name plates, to benefit from passporting rights. We should rather be attractive by offering a stable and favourable framework for investors, including infrastructures, labour skills and labour laws, and taxes. There is some fair but positive emulation in this regard.
In general, banks still provide loans to profitable enterprises. To sum up: The covered bond market provides investors with a broad set of investment opportunities, banks with cheap funding and house buyers with ample credit. At the same time, extensive regulatory measures safeguard the solvency and liquidity of the banking system as a whole. A well-capitalized banking system with stable and liquid funding options is a prerequisite for markets to develop and thrive. That includes the covered bond market. Thank you for your attention. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

We experienced an economic contraction for five consecutive quarters and property prices plunged by more than 60%. Many families found themselves trapped in “negative equity”, and the unemployment rate was above 8%. Hong Kong began to recover in 2003 after six years’ hard struggle. I am sure that this experience is still fresh in our memory. 4. Japan is another good example. It enjoyed rapid economic development after World War II, quickly becoming a powerful industrial nation. During the late 80’s when its stock and property markets were booming, a huge bubble was created, which we only realised afterwards. Few people spotted the emergence of a bubble at the time, and the extraordinary and irrational exuberance was interpreted as the “Japanese miracle”. We all know now that what a disaster this “Japanese miracle” was for its people. Twenty years on, the Nikkei Index still hovers around the 10,000 level, only a quarter of its peak of 39,000, while the average residential land price in six major cities is equivalent to only a third of its level two decades  BIS Review 167/2009  1  ago. Of course, there are other structural problems that have prevented a Japanese recovery for such a long period. 5. The current global financial crisis was caused by the bursting of the property bubble in the US, which left many financial institutions under stress.
Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s latest monetary and economic developments and outlook Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, on the Monetary Policy Decision of the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 30 April 2014. *  *  *  Today, on April 30, 2014, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania considered and approved the Quarterly Monetary Policy Report. Given Albania’s latest monetary and economic developments and discussions on their outlook, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the main interest rate unchanged, at 2.75%. The Council deems that inflationary pressures on the economy remain subdued. Under these circumstances, the monetary policy will continue to be stimulating in the period ahead, which will provide the necessary monetary conditions for compliance with our inflation target in the medium run. Let me now proceed with an overview of economic developments and key issues discussed at today’s meeting. Data for the first quarter of 2014 are generally in line with our previous assessments of the Albanian economy and financial situation. Weak aggregate demand continues to characterise the economy, further impacting almost all the economic and financial parameters in the country. In response to the weak aggregate demand, economic growth remains low and the Albanian economy continues to operate below its potential. The spare production capacities, both in the labour and capital markets, are reflected in low increase of employment and production costs, followed by weak inflationary pressures.

The poor credit performance, particularly as regards lending in foreign currency and credit to businesses was translated into an annual shrinkage of 2% in the loan portfolio in February. Looking ahead, our baseline projections suggest that, after a weak performance in 2013, the trajectory of the Albanian economy will be upward in the medium-term horizon. Economic growth is expected to be more balanced during 2014, driven by both the domestic and external demand. The improvement of confidence climate will enable the real sector to benefit from the monetary stimulus, hence stimulating consumption and investments at home. Also, sustainable recovery of the world economy will sustain Albanian exports, particularly during the second half of the year. Economic growth will be supported by maintaining the current stimulating direction of economic policies, and will benefit from continuing structural reforms. This trajectory will bring the Albanian economy close to its potential and will establish the conditions for complying with the inflation target in the medium term. In the short term, the cyclical weakness of aggregate demand is expected to keep the economy below its potential and will be accompanied with weak inflationary pressures. With 90% probability of occurrence, four quarters ahead, inflation is expected to range between 0.5% – 3.9%. At the end of discussions, the Supervisory Council decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged, at 2.75%.