samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Such an initiative could usefully be extended to include similar simulation exercises at the domestic level, and even across many countries at the same time. This would help to meet the following objectives: (i)  assess the degree of preparation of all stakeholders, namely financial institutions as well as public authorities;  (ii)  be sure of their capacity to implement common and consistent measures in order to restart operations after a cyber-attack;  Page 3 sur 3 (iii)  test dedicated crisis communication tools. 3) Monitoring the degree of cyber security and the progress of cyber resilience programmes. Irrespective of the nature of our organisation (a central bank, a commercial bank, an insurance company, a FMI), we have to not only deal with a large number of cyber security issues, but also to coordinate a large number of stakeholders (boards, senior executives, Chief Information Officers, Chief Risk officers, Chief Information Security Officers, etc.,). Therefore it is of utmost importance, but at the same time difficult to obtain an overview of cyber security. All levels of management (technical, operational and executive) need to have appropriate information to monitor cyber resilience and cyber risks. Above all, monitoring cyber security at the executive level (“tone at the top”) may prove to be challenging. Of course, there is a broad range of different metrics and it is necessary to select a limited number of them.

They are indeed service providers, usually unregulated, vulnerable to cyber risks and, in some cases creators of the most powerful new technologies, which could significantly contribute to spreading risks (application programming interfaces (API), artificial intelligence software, cloud computing structures, etc.). The lack of substitutability of some of these services increases the vulnerability of the financial sector. 2) The second consideration regards the embedding of security in systems from the earliest stages of conceptualisation. The CPMI-IOSCO guidance refers to this principle as “resilience by design”. It makes perfect sense, since it is the most efficient way to ensure the security of IT systems. This principle is however no doubt difficult to implement in the case of urgent and costly IT projects. This is why it requires a more proactive approach from executives and closer attention from regulators and supervisors. The same principle has already been emphasised in the European General Data Protection Regulation which entered into force some months ago. It gives us one more reason to enforce this principle. Page 2 sur 3 3) The third consideration regards speed: the capacities to resume critical activities within two hours after a cyber-attack, the two-hour Recovery Time Objective mentioned by Benoît. In this regard, in today’s environment it would be both unrealistic and unwise to resume activities without ensuring first that IT data have not been corrupted or that recovery of the activity affected does not trigger a higher risk exposure on its own, and for the whole financial ecosystem. II.
Public authorities and central banks have both an interest and an obligation to ensure that market infrastructures have a high level of security and operational performance. The market infrastructures in the euro area are performing well in this respect and, as we have heard, there are a number of initiatives under way to further enhance this (in particular as regards the collateralisation processes). I would, however, urge industry representatives to further pursue the triparty interoperability project, and seek to find ways to address the issues which have recently appeared. In particular, where these issues are not going to be addressed by T2S, I would encourage the industry to find a solution now. It is of great importance that collateral can flow freely, regardless of its location. I am confident that further improvements will be made. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

Other pertinent examples might be the United Kingdom's dependence on the euro area, Ireland's dependence on the United Kingdom, Switzerland's 4 links with Germany, and so on. Moreover, many of these other currency pairs have exhibited considerable fluctuations when compared with the stability of the cross rate between the renminbi and the Hong Kong dollar in recent years, indicating that exchange rate variability may not be an obstacle to the continuing expansion of mutually beneficial economic ties. On this evidence there would be no obvious advantage in a closer link between the Hong Kong dollar and renminbi. In our particular case, there is a further crucial consideration: the renminbi is not convertible. There would be little logic in trying formally to fix a fully convertible currency against a non-convertible one. One might argue that the constancy of the HK dollar against the renminbi for the past several years amounts to de facto fixing, but it does at least allow for variation at such time as might be justified – for example, in the light of major or sudden structural shifts such as WTO entry or eventual convertibility. It would not anyway be possible to operate Hong Kong's currency board system by reference to a nonconvertible currency, since the essence of the system, namely continuous convertibility between the HK dollar and the anchor currency, would be denied.
Therefore I welcome the creation of a G7 group dedicated to cross-border cyber exercises, and I confirm today that the Banque de France will coordinate the G7 test in 2019. Cybersecurity will indeed be one of the priorities of the forthcoming French presidency of the G7 next year. Besides cyber risks, we need to seriously deal with the emergence of crypto-assets. The underlying technology clearly promises sustainable innovation. The Banque de France was the first central bank to offer a service to the market based on blockchain and we intend to carry on experimenting with this technology. But support for blockchain doesn’t mean blind support for bitcoin and the like speculative assets. We were clear in the G20 last month, and let me be clear today. First, the frequent use of the term “digital or virtual currency” misleads the general public on what those assets really are: they are not currencies, with none of a currency’s key functions – store of value, medium of exchange, unit of account. Moreover, crypto-assets carry obvious risks in terms of consumer and investor protection, as well as money laundering and terrorist financing. Therefore they require internationally harmonised answers: the Financial Stability Board, in consultation with other standard-setting bodies and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), should make recommendations by next July. In particular, we should work on exchanges and platforms which provide services at the interface between crypto-assets and the real economy.

Tokenisation allows the assets to be traded securely and seamlessly without the need for intermediaries. There are already interesting applications in Singapore of tokenisation of both financial and real assets. UOB Bank has piloted the issuance of a $ million digital bond on Marketnode’s servicing platform that facilitates a seamless workflow. OCBC Bank has partnered with MetaVerse Green Exchange to develop green financing products using tokenised carbon credits to help companies offset their carbon emissions. MAS itself has launched an initiative – called Project Guardian – to explore the potential of tokenised real economy and financial assets. The first industry pilot, led by DBS Bank, JP Morgan, SBI Group and Marketnode, will explore the institutional trading of tokenised bonds and deposits to improve efficiency and liquidity in wholesale funding markets. ENABLE DIGITAL CURRENCY CONNECTIVITY A digital asset ecosystem needs a medium of exchange to facilitate transactions – three popular candidates are cryptocurrencies, stablecoins, and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). How does MAS view each of them? MAS regards cryptocurrencies as unsuitable for use as money and as highly hazardous for retail investors. Cryptocurrencies lack the three fundamental qualities of money: medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account. As I mentioned earlier, cryptocurrencies serve a useful function within a blockchain network – to reward the participants who help to validate and maintain the record of transactions on the distributed ledger. But outside a blockchain network, cryptocurrencies serve no useful function except as a vehicle for speculation.
As an example, each percentage point in higher capital is calculated to lead to 15 basis points in higher interest cost. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Proposals of time-varying regulation, such as time-varying capital requirements, are particularly interesting. Their more apparent connection with risk build-up may make them less costly than the alternative of introducing a constant higher minimum requirement. Timevarying regulations might also be structured in a way to be more pointed than monetary policy, which also varies with time. For instance, reducing the LTV threshold ratio for maximum lending against real estate can be more effective in mitigating a housing bubble than general interest rate increases. Along the same line of thought, another possibility is to introduce differentiated regulation. After all, the credit market is not entirely homogenous and it is, for example, possible to make a distinction between a household market and a corporate market. Making some regulation sector specific is also a viable way of reducing the regulatory costs. There is also a debate regarding the role that central banks should play in matters of supervision and the application of rules. Various institutional arrangements can be imagined. One possibility would be for the central bank to determine the policy rate and for the supervisory authority to determine regulations. Time-varying regulations also raise the issue of what would be an appropriate form of institutional organisation.

But if we do identify deficiencies, how can we implement the necessary changes? Winston Churchill once pleaded, in a famous World War II speech, to President Roosevelt: "Give us the tools, and we will finish the job!" So far, the Riksbank has lacked specific “hard” tools for financial stability. We have relied on communication and moral suasion, hoping that our arguments will convince financial system actors to change their behaviour. Our experience is mixed. Before the crisis, our banks reduced their credit expansion to the Baltic countries, warned by us, but they did too little and too late. One conclusion is that we must be even clearer and more forceful in our communications. The Riksbank is presently analysing its tool kit with the aim of arriving at a proposal in the near future. I do not think it is necessary that the tools should be vested with the central bank. For instance, there could be a rule implying that if the central bank sends a recommendation to the supervisory authority, they must “act or explain”. The supervisors could then use microprudential tools such as increasing bank capital requirements for certain activities or jurisdictions or reducing the maximum level of loan-to-value ratios. As in my previous discussion on monetary policy versus regulation, I believe that monetary policy and promoting financial stability are mutually interdependent. During the recent financial crisis, we observed the difficulties of conducting monetary policy in a non-stable financial environment.
The simulated policy would probably also have prompted a significant drop in cumulative real GDP growth, estimated at about 3.3 percent. These higher interest rates would, however, only have had a limited impact on credit growth, i.e. they would theoretically have reduced a 30 percent credit growth to around 27 percent. As a result, it is not clear that the simulated policy could have significantly reduced the probability of a real estate bubble developing. Another study of  14  See, for example, Buch, Eickmeier and Prieto (2011). This study of the US market between 1997–2008 suggests that looser monetary policy or unexpected house price decreases prompt small domestic banks to increase their exposure to risk. The same conditions seemingly cause foreign banks to reduce their risk exposure, however, while large domestic banks retain the same levels. 15  Angeloni, Faia and Lo Duca (2010). 16  Bean et al. (2010). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  OECD countries by Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche and Stefan Gerlach,17 estimates that, to obtain a 10% decrease in property prices, central banks would have to sacrifice between 2.3 and 4.0 percentage points of real GDP growth. In turn, Christian Hott and Pierre Monnin18 estimate that house prices were overvalued by some 25 percentage points in the US in 2005 and by approximately 50 percentage points in the UK in 2006.

On a deeper level, this conclusion is based on the recognition that, from a welfare perspective, a “leaning against the wind” policy would clearly be dominated, by instruments which target the root causes of those problems generated by excessive risk-taking in times of low interest rates. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  References Altunbas, Yener, Leonardo Gambacorta and David Marqués-Ibáñez. 2010. Does monetary policy affect risk-taking. European Central Bank Working Paper, No. 1166, 11 March 2010. Angeloni, Ignazio, Ester Faia and Marco Lo Duca. Monetary policy and risk-taking. 2010. Bruegel Working Paper 2010/00, February 2010. Assenmacher-Wesche, Katrin and Stefan Gerlach. 2010. Monetary policy and financial imbalances: facts and fiction. Economic Policy, Volume 25, Issue 63, Pages 437–482, July 2010. Bean, Charles, Matthias Paustian, Adrian Penalver and Tim Taylor. 2010. Monetary policy after the fall. Paper presented by Mr. Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Annual Conference, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 28 August 2010. Bean, Charles. 2006. Impact of globalisation on monetary policy: commentary. Proceedings. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. pp. 307–313. Bernanke, Ben. S. 2010. Monetary policy and the housing bubble. Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia. 3 January 2010. Borio, Claudio. 2011. Anchoring countercyclical buffers: the role of credit aggregates. Bank for International Settlement Working Paper, No.
Negative signals are coming from manufacturing, where companies' profit expectations are subdued in both the USA and Europe. However, the first reports just presented for Q1 look better than the market had expected. Although as private consumption has been relatively strong in the USA, there is no pent-up need to purchase capital goods as is usually the case after an economic downturn. Household consumption may also be negatively affected if households' wealth in property, and not just equity, is undermined. If the US long rates continue to rise as they have done in recent years, this may be one of the consequences. A large part of Sweden's exports go to the euro area, which means that developments in economic activity here are particularly important. There are fewer signs of a recovery in Europe and the upturn in economic activity may be less strong. However, if one examines the leading indicators, companies appear to have become more optimistic. All in all, it can be concluded that growth prospects in the world around us have improved. The effects of the expansionary monetary and fiscal policy conducted on both sides of the Atlantic are becoming more tangible. The slowdown in economic activity therefore looks to be relatively limited. At the same time, there are risks. The structural imbalances in the US economy, which were built up during the end of the 1990s as a result of excessive optimism, are threatening to slow down the recovery.

The Riksbank cut its repo rate by 0.5 percentage points, to 3.75 per cent. Now, just over six months later, we can conclude that the impact of the attacks on the global economy was less than feared, although certain sectors were hard hit. In addition, there are more and more signs of an imminent improvement in activity in both the USA and Europe. The stocks that had been built up during the downturn in activity appear to have been largely phased out and according to a number of indicators, production has begun to increase. A cautious optimism has begun to spread. There is also the additional impetus that comes from the expansionary economic policy in many countries and strengthens confidence in an impending upturn. However, for the global recovery to really take off and become stronger, it is necessary that it is accompanied by a broad and sustained increase in demand. If production increases because stocks are too small and need to be refilled, there is a risk that the upturn will be short-lived. We have been receiving both positive and negative signals regarding the situation in the US economy. The positive signals come from an unusually strong growth in productivity during the slowdown in activity, which indicates that the US industry has managed to adapt its production structure in an impressive manner. Private consumption, which is important in all countries, but particularly in the USA, has also remained strong during the whole of 2001 and early 2002.
Moreover, fair value accounting is consistent with the increasing use of mark-to-market techniques in risk management. Such techniques in part reflect a progressive but fundamental shift from the traditional banking approach of holding assets until maturity to today’s approach of managing on the basis of continually assessing the opportunity cost of maintaining the existing balance sheet. It is clearly beneficial to transparency if publicly-available accounting information as far as possible reflects the basis on which management actually run a business. However, there are a number of complications associated with the wider use of fair values. First, there is a question as to how one can obtain robust fair values for instruments which are not priced, even indirectly, in reasonably deep and liquid markets. Model-based valuation techniques may be used, but they may not be analogous to genuine market clearing prices. The issues here include determining the conceptual basis for valuation (“the model”), obtaining the necessary inputs, and avoiding slavish adherence to a model which may in some circumstances deliver misleading results. In other words how, and to what extent, can human judgement properly be used to modify the model? Second, there is the question of the economic relevance of unrealised gains and losses - particularly if they are not immediately realisable. For example, while information on changes in the fair value of bank loans conveys useful economic insights, it needs to be interpreted carefully.

Starting from 1994, the Treasury’s annual use of short-term advances is to be reduced gradually over five years from 15 to 3 percent of each year’s incremental budget appropriations. By 1998, the Treasury will be entitled to short-term advances totalling not more than 3 percent of that year’s incremental budget appropriations over the previous year. In addition to that, the Treasury and the Central Bank have signed a seven-point protocol to cooperate in fighting inflation. The official aim of this accord is also to give the Central Bank more independence. So, an important development towards the full independence of the Central Bank has been initiated, as required in the Maastricht Treaty. However, we have been in the process of preparing a new Central Bank law in parallel with the same institutions in the EU. The work has already been done and we are ready to submit it to the government if and when the political environment is appropriate. On the other hand, in addition to the already installed electronic payments clearing system, the CB has signed a contract to develop and install a modern national securities settlement system. The new system will allow the Bank to increase the efficiency with which government securities can be traded on the capital markets and ensure that the payments system will match the standards of those in the EU and other western nations. The new system will also be capable of being connected to the BIS Review 105/1997  -3TARGET network.
As housing prices have climbed, the number of homes moving into the foreclosure process and the number of households with mortgages underwater have fallen sharply. Moreover, households have deleveraged their balance sheets. Debt levels have declined and lower interest rates have cut financing costs. As a result, the financial obligation ratio, which measures the debt servicing cost of households, has declined from a peak of 18.1 percent of disposable income in the fourth quarter of 2007 to 15.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2013. This is a level not seen since the early 1980s. On the fiscal side, the amount of restraint has diminished sharply. For 2014, the projected drag is about ½ percent of GDP, roughly half the level of 2013. Moreover, much of this restraint was frontloaded into the beginning of the year, with the cessation of long-term unemployment compensation, the expiration of the bonus depreciation provisions and the higher tax rates that applied to final tax settlements for the 2013 tax year. For the remainder of this year and next, the degree of fiscal restraint should be very modest. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In terms of the outlook abroad, the circumstances are more mixed. Although Europe is doing better, Japan is digesting the large hike in consumption taxes that was implemented on April 1, Chinese growth is slowing and some other emerging market economies are coping with structural imbalances that are anticipated to lead to slower growth this year.

In the 1800s and up  1  Bordo, M.D. and Jonung, L. (1987), "The long-run behaviour of the velocity of circulation". Cambridge University Press and Norges Bank  2  J.D. Sachs, F. Larrain (193), Macroeconomics in the Global Economy  BIS Review 46/2003  3  to the First World War, the gold standard and price fluctuations in the agricultural sector contributed to alternating inflation and deflation. In the interwar period 1918-1940, real interest rates were fairly high, sometimes well above 5 per cent. This was partly due to the policy of gold parity and the reestablishment of the gold standard, which resulted in high nominal interest rates in a number of countries. The post-Second World War era can be divided into two periods. The postwar period up to the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971 was characterised by unusually low real interest rates, ranging from 0 to 2 per cent. Real interest rates were low despite high returns in the stock market, strong growth in output and in stocks of real capital. According to most economic growth theories, this should have been accompanied by a high real interest rate. From a more short-term perspective, however, low real interest rates led to high investment activity and growth. However, this probably contributed to the tensions that led to the marked changes in economic policy in the 1970s and 1980s, internationally and in Norway. To a certain extent, a negative real interest rate characterised the 1970s and most of the 1980s in Norway.