samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Before regulators recognise more physical collateral, the banking industry needs to come forward with ideas on how to solve this problem. BIS Review 29/2001  3  Procyclicality of capital requirements I want now to turn to my second question; whether we might in some sense be introducing too much risk sensitivity. Under this heading the issue I want to discuss is the danger of 'procyclicality', that is the possibility that regulatory capital requirements will reinforce cyclical movements in the macroeconomy. There was some element of that in the original Accord - because in a downturn specific provisions and write-offs increase, which reduces banks' capital, and may diminish their appetite to make new loans. However, under the new Accord this will be reinforced by the possibility that, as the condition of borrowers deteriorates during an economic downturn, they will be downgraded by banks with the consequence that extra capital has to be set aside. On some estimates, bank capital requirements could as much as double during a cyclical downturn. This is clearly an issue of major concern to central banks. The risk is not a theoretical one; there is evidence that external ratings to some degree behave procyclically, while banks' internal ratings are liable to be even more so. Clearly here again a balance has to be struck between our desire to have the new framework incorporate and reflect current practice at banks, and ensuring that these current practices do not lead to economic volatility.

Governor Veerathai’s Statement Your Excellency, Fellow Governors, Ladies and Gentlemen, Members of the press,  A very good afternoon to you all,  It is my great pleasure to welcome our distinguished guests to this special event before the year ends. Let me extend a very warm welcome to Governor Agus and Governor Muhammad Ibrahim who have both travelled to Bangkok specifically for this occasion. The year of 2016, which is coming to the end soon will be remembered by economists and financial professionals as a year of the unexpected, beginning from China's circuit breaker in the very first week of the year, to negative policy rates, to Brexit and the US elections. Greater uncertainties now hang over the global economy. Fortunately, our ASEAN region, with its high potential, is a bright spot in the world. This is therefore 1  time for us to navigate today’s uncertainties through our concerted efforts to bring out the potentials of our ASEAN region. What we are witnessing here today is a renewal of the spirit of regional integration by relying more on collaboration to serve as a key driver for sustainable growth to benefit all of us. The MoUs that we are about to sign will provide flexibilities on foreign exchange regulations for the settlement of trade and investment in local currencies, resulting in greater efficiency and convenience for businesses. Another key merit of this framework is that businesses will be able to better manage exchange rate risks.
There was no time or basis for the banks to provide collateral for borrowing from the central bank, and when the banking crisis became full-blown a few years later the central bank was highly exposed. This gave the banks a strong negotiating position in the first crisis resolution rounds. This time, funding support for banks came from the government’s balance sheet, not as loans from Norges Bank. This provided transparency. Norges Bank could to large extent concentrate on restoring the functioning of the money market. Moreover, the government was provided with sound collateral, while the banks were provided with government securities that they could use as collateral for borrowing or sell in the market. The Norwegian measures were designed in such a way that Norges Bank’s balance sheet has not increased to the same extent as that of a number of other central banks. The measures led to a gradual improvement in Norwegian banks’ funding. So far, drawings on the covered bond swap line have amounted to NOK 225 billion. The swap line soothed the panic among banks and led to a moderation in the tightening of bank lending standards. Since spring, risk premiums on fixed-income securities have declined and activity in money and bond markets has picked up. In recent months, many financial institutions have again procured funding in traditional commercial paper and bond markets.

BIS Review 119/2009  3  The winding down of extraordinary measures has started In Norway, it has been appropriate to start winding down the unconventional measures earlier than in other countries. In recent months, liquidity has not been supplied through the currency swap lines or liquidity in foreign currency. Loans at long maturities have not been provided since February – several of the loans have now matured. As the markets are now returning to normal, the supply of liquidity will be adjusted so that the money market rate reflects the key policy rate. We want the banks to redistribute liquidity in the interbank market. The underlying structural liquidity in the banking system, i.e. liquidity excluding Norges Bank’s liquidity provision, has been negative in recent years. Structural liquidity was influenced by ingoing and outgoing payments via the government’s account in Norges Bank and is projected to increase ahead, primarily because the government can partly finance increased lending to state banks, payments from the Government Bond Fund and the State Finance Fund and share subscriptions by drawing on their large deposits in Norges Bank. The banking system’s demand for central bank loans can then decrease considerably. The swap arrangement involving covered bonds in exchange for government securities has made a considerable contribution to securing banks’ long-term funding. This spring we saw that the covered bond market started to reopen. The minimum price in the swap arrangement is thus adjusted to the interest rate forming in the market.
But the reform process in East Asia has proven to be worth the efforts, as you can see from the fast growing intra-regional trade. Many of these reforms remain to be completed, and we need to continue to press on with the reform agenda. But the changes from now on should not be as difficult, as public sentiment is supportive of the benefits of these reforms, in terms of the increased efficiency, predictability, and transparency to businessmen and entrepreneurs, both domestic and foreign. One just needs to cross that threshold. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 7/2006  3

(1935), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Cambridge: Harcourt, Brace and Company. Maddison, A. (2009), Historical Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per capita GDP, 1-2006 AD, updated March 2009 in http://www.ggdc.net/maddison. Mankiw, N.G. (2006), “The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(4): 29-46. BIS Review 112/2009  7  Medina, J.P. and C. Soto (2007), “The Chilean Business Cycles through the Lens of a Stochastic General Equilibrium Model,” Working Paper N°457, Central Bank of Chile. Rajan, R. (2006), “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?,” in The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future, Proceedings of the Jackson Hole Symposium 2005, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Rose, A. and M. Spiegel, (2009), “Cross-Country Causes and Consequences of the 2008 Crisis: Early Warning,” CEPR Discussion Paper N°7354. 8  BIS Review 112/2009
To me, both types of institutional setup may have one important common weakness, that is, there does not seem to be the notion of a lead supervisor in either model. Allow me to elaborate on this point. In the case of separate authorities, it would be normal for each authority to assume that every authority is doing its job according to its mandate. Therefore, one would tend to focus only on its own mandate. This can be a problem if some authorities fail to do a proper job, others may not be able to take note. Worse still, if there are supervisory gaps, the chance of any one authority identifying potential adverse impact from areas outside of one’s own mandate is even smaller. Take the US as an example, the authorities and investors did not  2  BIS Review 32/2009  realize that credit rating agencies were not doing an adequate job in their rating of complex structured products. If there were a lead supervisor, would the whistle have been blown earlier? I believe that there would have been a better chance if there were a lead supervisor with a clear mandate to take the lead responsibility and who is risk focused. There would have been more dialogues through which weaknesses may have been identified and corrected. The idea of a lead supervisor has gained widespread support in the area of cross-border supervision, as it contributes to better coordination, which in turn could help to prevent or identify problems at an early stage.

The linking pin is membership in both policy boards by central bank’s senior management, which makes it possible for information and knowledge in one area to be usefully employed in performing the other, without compromising the mandate of each policy board. For example, detailed supervisory information about banks’ changing risk appetite and exposure to different economic sectors and markets – as well as how these risks are being managed – can provide useful early warnings about the health of the economy and potential systemic problems down the road. This can be a very important input for monetary policy board. On the other hand, central bank’s oversight of monetary policy and economic stability can strengthen and provide context to its supervisory responsibilities, for example, in identifying potential macro factors that may affect the health of financial institutions. Decisions about the stance and timing of prudential and supervisory policies in general can  BIS Review 32/2009  1  also be more appropriately made with the full knowledge of macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy. As can be seen, the two policies are essential to each other and hence it is useful or even desirable, in my opinion, for central banks to supervise at least the core financial sector, whether under a separate or integrated supervision model. This is most evident in times of systemic crisis where central banks’ last-resort lending is likely to be called upon and prompt decision is vital.
A persistent downturn abroad, the likelihood of lower wage growth in Norway and a strong krone have led to reductions in the interest rate of 5 percentage points since December 2002. The sight deposit rate has been 1.75 per cent since March this year. Monetary policy easing has aimed to bring inflation up towards the target of 2.5 per cent and stabilise developments in output and employment. The decline in interest rates since December 2002 have contributed to weakening the krone. Measured by an index of 44 trading partners (I-44), the krone depreciated through 2003 by almost 11 per cent from its strongest level in January of the same year. In 2004, the krone has fluctuated moderately around its current level. High oil prices and low interest rates abroad have curbed the effect on the krone of the fall in Norwegian interest rates. The krone has stabilised - though at a high level from the point of view of the inflation outlook. Unexpected disturbances The Norwegian economy was exposed to substantial, unexpected disturbances from autumn 2002 and into 2003. Global economic developments were an important factor behind the appreciation of the krone. In 2003, growth in the global economy moved on a different path and was substantially weaker than Norges Bank and other observers had expected. Weak developments in the global economy resulted in lower interest rates abroad and a wider interest rate differential between Norway and other countries.

Mugur Isrescu: The most important economic decision Nations have ever faced Lecture by Mr Mugur Isrescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the Bitcoin versus Central Bank Digital Currency conference, Bucharest, 6 April 2023. *** Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon! Thank you for attending this conference on the topical issue of cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies. Today I have the pleasure of welcoming and introducing our distinguished guest speaker, Ms. Sundri Khalsa, Professor at the National Intelligence University - known as "the Harvard of the intelligence field", and a US Marine Corps Veteran. Welcome, Professor Khalsa, to Romania and to the National Bank of Romania! Sundri Khalsa's background also includes being a Professor at the United States Naval Academy, Director and Instructor of the Marine Corps Military Occupational Specialty training school, where she trained and certified Marine Corps Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Officers. She is an expert with field experience in Signal Intelligence and information support for integrated military operations. Let me add that her studies also include degrees from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School, with additional certification in Management, Leadership and Decision Sciences, University of Virginia (with specialization in chemistry and biochemistry) and New Mexico Military Institute (where she was awarded the science scholar awards in physics and chemistry). Her book "Terrorism Forecasting: Indicators and Analytical Techniques" is on the CIA's reading list and used in university courses.
It would also create uncertainty about whether conversion would indeed occur, given the risk of prices bouncing back and the short-seller suffering a loss. Both would act as a speculative disincentive. A second potential firewall against speculative attack could come from imposing restrictions on the ability of short-sellers to cover their positions with the proceeds of conversion. Restrictions on naked short-selling are applied around the time of seasoned equity offerings in some jurisdictions.19 A rule to prevent the covering of short positions with the proceeds of a CoCo conversion could provide a further disincentive to destabilising short-selling of banks’ equity. A related concern is that CoCos alter the seniority structure of banks’ capital, as holders of CoCos potentially suffer a loss ahead of equity-holders. But provided the price at which CoCos convert to equity is close to the market price, conversion does not transfer value between existing equity-holders and CoCo investors. And provided conversion is into equity it need not imply investor loss. If a market move really is unjustified, prices will correct over time towards fundamentals. The holder of a converted CoCo will then garner the upside. So while CoCos are susceptible to market aberrations, these can in my view be managed. In this respect, market errors are fundamentally different to model errors. Market errors are temporary risk, while model errors are permanent uncertainty. Market error can be managed,  17  For example, Kotlikoff (2010). 18  For example, Flannery (2010). 19  Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996), for example.

The economic impact of these two structures would be very similar. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  This contractual automaticity would provide a shot in the arm to incentives and thus market discipline. First, for the incentives of investors. Knowing that a trigger might be close to being pulled, and their claims converted, CoCo investors are likely to sit up and take notice. If conversion takes place below the prevailing market price, the incentives among existing shareholders are similarly sensitised. Early signs of deteriorating profits or sentiment are likely to result in greater investor activism. Such activism was absent in the run-up to the crisis, in part because there was no early morning wake-up call for investors. Second, for the incentives of management. If investors are grumpy about their early morning wake-up call, management of the bank are likely to hear their hoarse protests. And anticipating these protests, management are less likely to sail close to the wind or at least will be quicker to tack when fearing a squall. Management, too, would be provided with incentives to remain shipshape. Third, for the incentives of regulators. In the depths of crisis, as recent experience has shown, the temptation to forbear or bail-out is very strong. It is no surprise that the authorities often opt for the greater certainty of bail-out ex post, whatever their preferences ex ante. This policy time-consistency problem lies at the heart of the current regulatory debate.
The former exchange rate peg policy, as well as our current membership of the euro area, are not ends in themselves, but are a means to ensure the economic well-being of our citizens. 5

From the macroeconomic point of view, the simultaneous action of weak inflationary pressures by the domestic economy, downward imported inflation and anchored inflation expectations led to low inflation rates. The domestic economic and monetary environment has put downward pressures on prices. Owing to the fragile aggregate demand, the negative output gap persisted, despite the growth recovery in the fourth quarter of 2013. Pressures  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  from the labour market were subdued because of the rise in unemployment rate during 2013 and the moderate rise in wages. These developments led to a low increase of production cost and controlled businesses’ profit margins. The weak domestic demand narrowed the room for businesses to pass the increase in excise duty on the final prices. Also, the imported inflation has been downward, reflecting the low inflation in our trading partners and the stability of the exchange rate. Economic and financial agents show anchored inflation expectations, with no considerable deviation from either the objective of the Bank of Albania or the average historical behaviour. Analysing the economic performance, INSTAT data show that the gross domestic product increased by 1.1% during the fourth quarter of 2013, after a decrease by 2.5% in the third quarter of 2013. This increase was broadly determined by positive performance of domestic private demand, while the contribution of the public sector and net exports was negative. From the sectorial point of view, economic growth was generated by the positive performance of production, whereas services declined.
The 8 Qualifying Offshore Banks will be given priority in the upgrading. Existing Offshore Banks as well as banks that do not yet hold a banking licence in Singapore are encouraged to apply. After these 20 licences are granted, we will review the pace of upgrading the remaining Offshore Banks. Enhancing competition in retail banking In retail banking, we will maintain the momentum of liberalisation by improving on the first package of measures. We will take applications for the two outstanding QFB licenses. We will also expand what a QFB is allowed to do: a. With immediate effect, they will be permitted to establish up to 15 locations (previously 10), of which up to 10 (previously 5) can be branches, and the rest off-site ATMs. BIS Review 61/2001  5  b. From 1 July 2002 QFBs will be allowed to provide debit services on an EFTPOS network. QFBs can negotiate with an existing EFTPOS network such as NETS, Visa or Mastercard, for access on fair commercial terms. QFBs will then be able to provide debit services such as debit cards, and cashback at retail outlets. Using the Visa network alone to provide debit services will open up more than 23,000 terminals to the QFBs. With cashback services, each EFTPOS terminal, whether run by NETS or a credit card company, becomes a potential cash withdrawal point.

These forces, which are partly external and partly domestic, have masked the relationship between economic slack and inflation, and have been reinforced by a weakening of inflation expectations. 2 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Forces slowing down inflation in the euro area economy2 The euro area recovery has been characterised by a disconnect between economic activity and inflation – which some have referred to as a “missing inflation puzzle”. This disconnect becomes visible, for instance, when comparing actual growth and inflation outcomes for 2016 with those anticipated in the ECB staff macroeconomic projections of March 2014. The real GDP growth rate, which stood at 1.7% in 2016, essentially confirmed the March 2014 projection. HICP inflation, by contrast, turned out to be more than 1 percentage point below the rate projected in March 2014; and measures of core inflation, which strip out the direct disinflationary impact of the collapse of commodity prices over this period, have remained at 0.9%, about half the rate projected earlier. This picture points to pronounced disinflationary forces that have confounded attempts to forecast the impact of improved economic conditions on inflation. Where do these forces come from? Do they pertain to cyclical influences that monetary policy can offset? Do they reflect broader structural shifts in the economy that the central bank is forced to watch as a bystander?
Second, for those companies that external finance seems to be important caveat, the main causes are related to the inadequate collateral, high costs and complex procedures. Both notions bring to the fore  10  the need to discuss the state of play and the potential for financing with alternative instruments through capital markets. Chart 12: The most important limiting factors for external financing (Average 2015-2017, % of the total number of surveyed companies) Region insufficient collateral or guarantee Baltics  interest rates or price too high reduced control over the enterprise  CEE  financing not available at all SEE  too much paperwork is involved there are no obstacles  EU28  0.0%  20.0%  40.0%  60.0%  80.0%  100.0%  Source: Survey on the access to finance of enterprises (SAFE), EC and ECB. 4. Capital markets in CESEE – potential source for finance Although greatly used, the traditional sources of finance, such as government financing for infrastructure, or financing through domestic banks of SMEs might be either limited in size, or constrained by some structural impediments. Hence, these sources might not be sufficient to close financing gaps. In this context, capital markets can have significant role for bridging the existing gaps. Benefits of developed capital markets are well known.

David Carse: The changing landscape of banking in Hong Kong Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, to the Hong Kong Investment Funds Association, Furama Hotel, Hong Kong, 15 August 2001. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Thank you for inviting me to speak to you at the Association's luncheon. My topic today is the changing landscape of banking in Hong Kong. I shall illustrate this by reference to two of the key recent events that are changing that landscape and are going to go on doing so in the years ahead. I am referring to the deregulation of interest rates, the final phase of which took place on 3 July of this year, and the introduction of the Mandatory Provident Fund scheme. I will try to describe the implications of these for the banking industry and for the regulators. I will also try to place them in the context of the broader trends and developments that are taking place in the banking industry. Current industry trends You are probably already familiar with some of these trends and developments. The most obvious one is the increasing intensity of competition. This is a global phenomenon, whose full effects have only recently hit Hong Kong. It has shown here up in the sharp decline in lending margins, particularly on residential mortgages.