samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The consumer price growth will slow down together with the exhaustion of the effect of the external factors that played a prominent role in the first half and in the middle of this year; exchange rate dynamics is also expected to normalise. With the stabilisation and subsequent reduction in inflation expectations during 2015, the baseline scenario predicts a gradual easing of the monetary policy. The more pronounced the downward trend in inflation and inflation expectations will be, the more accommodative the monetary policy may become. (Slide 3)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In addition to the baseline scenario, built on fairly optimistic assumptions, we have prepared two more alternative scenarios, number II and III. They are based on more negative assumptions. Scenario II predicts that the mutual sanctions and trade restrictions will remain during the whole period under review. This will lead to a certain increase in the capital outflows coupled with corresponding exchange rate dynamics. It should be noted that the ruble volatility, on the one hand, partially offsets the negative impact of external environment by maintaining the competitiveness of Russian producers and accelerating import substitution, however, on the other hand, it leads to enhanced inflationary pressures. Scenario II also assumes a possible increase in the tax burden. Due to the decision taken by the government on this issue, we plan to finalise this scenario. This scenario forecasts lower GDP growth rates compared with the baseline scenario (you can see it on the slide), and a slower decline in inflation.

I would like to say that the draft Guidelines are available on the official website of the Bank of Russia. We are now discussing the document with experts and analysts. It was reviewed at a Russian Government meeting. Based on the discussion outcomes, including the today’s discussion, we will be ready to finalise the document and submit it for consideration to the State Duma. Thank you very much for your attention! 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Spencer Dale: 2010 – a progress report Speech by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the Kent Business School 21st anniversary dinner, Canterbury, 1 December 2010. *  *  *  I would like to thank Ryan Banerjee, Rohan Churm, and Geoff Coppins for their considerable help in preparing this speech. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. Introduction It is an honour to be invited here this evening to help you and the Business School celebrate its 21st anniversary. Birthdays are a natural time to pause and reflect – especially those that mark a coming of age. Reflecting on your first 21 years, much has changed since the Business School was founded. Some of you may remember that 1989 was the year in which Nigel Lawson resigned as Chancellor and the Berlin Wall fell. You may remember less well that it was also the year that Kylie and Jason enjoyed four Number 1 hits and Coronation Street attracted its largest ever audience to watch Alan Bradley meet his grisly end under a Blackpool tram. How time flies. The economy has also had its fair share of ups and downs since then. After the 1990s recession, we enjoyed 63 quarters of consecutive growth, withstanding en route the effects of Black Wednesday and the dotcom bubble.

The fall in output during this recession was larger than that in either the 1980s or 1990s recession. One year of growth does not make a recovery. We need to see a sustained period of robust growth for the economy to function normally again. So what are the prospects for demand and output, and how likely are we to achieve this sustained period of growth? The strength of the recovery over the next few years will depend on the balance of the substantial headwinds and tailwinds buffeting our economy. Economic forecasting at the best of times feels like a triumph of hope over experience. That is especially so in the current environment in which the economy is subject to gale force winds blowing in both directions. But it is at least possible to identify some of the key factors that will determine the future pace of growth. Headwinds and tailwinds Consider first the main headwinds hampering growth. Most obvious is the fiscal consolidation now underway in the UK. Public sector spending, as a share of nominal GDP, is projected to fall by around 8 percentage points over the next 5 years. My central view is that the direct impact of this reduced spending, via the impact of lower government procurement and smaller transfer payments, is unlikely to derail the recovery. The spending cuts will certainly dampen growth. And some households and companies directly affected by the cuts could suffer significant hardships.
So is second-round inflation a risk in our final assessment? The spike in oil and commodity prices adds to already present inflationary pressure. Monetary policy must therefore be pre-emptive, as well as poised. Since last year, domestic demand has been strong. The output gap is projected to close later this year. Capacity utilization has increased and hiring has become more difficult. These indicators point to excess demand that may lead to inflationary pressure. On top of that, a sustained and large supply shock amid strong demand is like adding fuel to the fire. It can unhinge inflation expectations. And price controls can only delay the inevitable price pressure. There is therefore an increase in the risk to second-round inflation which necessitates additional monetary response. A downside risk of high oil prices to global growth, and therefore Thai economic growth, also exists. However, in the central scenario, the balance of risks has clearly shifted to inflation. Our projections point to a significant risk that core inflation may breach the upper end of the band. As such, regaining poise by moving toward the neutral rate will allow us to pre-empt inflation risk. By now, you are probably wondering what the neutral rate is. Let me comment briefly on this mysterious topic. First, on the concept – the monetary policy stance is normal or neutral if aggregate output is at its potential output and the monetary policy is not exerting any pressure on growth and inflation but simply promoting their stability.

The rule is robust to variations in government revenues and provides a stable framework for economic developments. The fiscal rule has been adhered to, which in itself makes a considerable contribution to stability. Monetary policy has been assigned a clear responsibility for stabilising the economy. Inflationary pressures are addressed using a different approach than earlier. Monetary policy keeps inflation under control. This may translate into high interest rates and in periods a strong krone. The alternative could have been higher inflation, with a continued contest for economic resources and persistently high wage growth. This would have resulted in a continued deterioration in business sector competitiveness year after year as a result of higher price and cost inflation in Norway than abroad. The experience of the 1970s and 1980s shows that inflation and wage growth do not have a stable anchor under these conditions. Inflation and wage growth would have continued to move up until monetary policy was tightened. Unleashing inflation is not a viable alternative. Why is unemployment rising? High labour costs, a strong krone and global stagnation are leaving a mark on Norway’s internationally exposed sector. Many enterprises will not be able to sustain activity given current market conditions and cost levels. Labour costs are also squeezing margins in some private service industries. More enterprises are competing on international markets. Moreover, even if allocations are growing, public entities have limited capacity for increasing employment because wage expenses have risen so sharply. Chart 11.
Did you communicate with us at an early stage? Did you set in motion a careful effort to fully understand the issue and its ramifications? Did you learn  4  BIS Review 76/2006  from a specific problem to make broader changes that would allow your organization to be more proactive, rather than reactive, going forward? While the onus is clearly on the firm to carry out these various steps, our awareness of what is taking place often makes the process work much more smoothly and effectively. In turn, the Federal Reserve should aim to become more transparent in our conveyance of supervisory expectations. •  Through the exam process, we provide feedback to specific institutions, including comments directed at areas where we would expect continuing compliance risk management improvements. Most of this communication is, of course, a highly confidential dialogue between the supervisor and each supervised institution. •  As I mentioned when firm-specific problems are severe enough, we may take a public enforcement action. Professionals in the compliance risk management arena will find it valuable to keep track of actions issued by the agencies. Although a public action is levied on a firm-specific basis, it could hold a larger implication for the rest of the industry about issues where supervisors may be particularly focusing their attention. It could also signal an area where other banks may find similar weaknesses. •  When a fundamental change is expected on a widespread basis, we don’t convey our expectations by using public actions against individual firms.

In these cases, the Federal Reserve will disseminate information by issuing written guidance, or by communicating its high-level findings from horizontal reviews of bank operations which may help the industry adjust its practices. I will leave you with two brief final points. •  First, we all need to assume that managing legal and reputational risk will remain a challenge going forward. It is highly unlikely that the rapid pace of innovation and crossborder expansion will slow down, and further legal and regulatory changes are always to be expected. •  But second, and to end on a positive note, I do think that the interests of the private sector in maintaining the long-term integrity of franchises - and the official sector - in ensuring integrity of market practices - significantly coincide. This should encourage continued collaboration and dialogue and a more transparent and effective approach to the setting of expectations and developing of standards. Thank you very much. BIS Review 76/2006  5
It is estimated that 49% of an unemployment shock is absorbed by the automatic stabilisers in the euro area, whereas the figure for the US is 32%.9 And studies have found a gradual convergence in labour mobility between Europe and the US, reflecting both a fall in interstate migration in the US and a rise in the role of migration in Europe.10 Where the euro area and the US differ more is in terms of ex ante risk-sharing – that is, insuring against shocks through financial markets. This was a concept that only appeared later in the literature on Optimal Currency Areas. 11 But it plays a key role in stabilising local economies in a monetary union, in two ways.12 The first is by de-linking consumption and income at the local level, which happens through integrated capital markets. If labour income falls during a recession, but the private sector holds a diversified financial 3/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  portfolio, people can smooth their consumption with the financial returns they receive on assets in better performing parts of the union. The second way is by de-linking the capital of local banks from the volume of local credit supply, which happens through retail banking integration. Because local banks are typically heavily exposed to the local economy, a downturn in their home region will lead to large losses and prompt them to cut lending to all sectors.

8 Beyer, R. and Smets, F. (2015), “Labour market adjustments and migration in Europe and the United States:  how different?”, Economic Policy, Vol. 30, Issue 84. 9 Dolls, M., Fuest, C., Kock, J., Peichl, A., Wehrhöfer, N. and Wittneben, C. (2015), “Automatic Stabilizers in the  Eurozone: Analysis of their Effectiveness at the Member State and Euro Area Level and in International Comparison”, Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim. 10 Beyer, R. and Smets, F. (2015), op. cit. 11 For a review of the development of this literature see Mongelli, F. (2002), “New views on optimum currency area  theory: what is EMU telling us?”, ECB Working Paper No. 138. 12 For a fuller explanation of financial risk-sharing within monetary unions, see ECB (2016), “Special Feature A:  Financial integration and risk sharing in a monetary union”, Financial Integration in Europe, May. 13 Asdrubali et al. find that financial risk-sharing in the United States increased monotonically each decade from  the 1960s to the 1990s. See Asdrubali, P., Sorensen, B. and Yosha, O., “Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: United States 1963–1990”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 111, Issue 4, 1 November 1996. 14 See Hane, G. (1998), “The Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s: Summary and Implications”, in FDIC  Banking Review, Vol. 11, No 1. 15 ECB calculations based on FDIC data. The term “institution” refers to a separately chartered commercial bank  or savings institution.
Honoured guests: As the Chairman of the Supervisory Board mentioned in his speech, the Central Bank was relatively successful in working towards its goals in 2014. In addition, a great deal of work was done to ensure the efficacy of the capital controls, the smooth  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  operation of financial system infrastructure, and the recovery of legacy assets from the crisis, among other things. This would not have been possible without the competent and hardworking people employed by the Bank. I wish to thank you all for your efforts. In this context, I would like to stress how important it is that, whatever amendments may be made to the Central Bank Act, the Bank must remain a strong institution capable of safeguarding monetary and financial stability in Iceland. In order to do so, it must have the independence to apply its policy instruments to this end. It must also be a professionally strong and vigorous workplace where senior management and staff members have a dynamic interactive relationship on matters relating to operations, analysis, and policy formulation. In closing, I would like to thank the Central Bank’s many collaborators for a successful cooperative relationship over the past year, in particular the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs and the Financial Supervisory Authority. I thank the financial institutions with which the Bank interacts for their cooperation. I would also like to thank the Parliament of Iceland, particularly the Economics and Commerce Committee, for their collaboration. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Arthur Yuen: Bank account opening and maintenance Opening remarks by Mr Arthur Yuen, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Briefing cum networking session on "Bank Account Opening and Maintenance", Hong Kong, 21 April 2017. * * * Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, 1. A very warm welcome to all of you to this briefing and networking session. We are going to discuss the important issue of business account opening and maintenance, and this event is jointly organised by the HKMA and Invest Hong Kong. I would like to first of all welcome all the representatives of Chambers of Commerce, who share the same concern as the HKMA that some SMEs and start-up companies from overseas are finding it difficult to open bank accounts in Hong Kong. 2. I am sure you would all appreciate that over the past years, customer due diligence (CDD) requirements have tightened globally, and Hong Kong followed this international trend. Needless to mention is also that a very small number of banks, for a variety of reasons, need to comply with requirements or standards mandated by their head offices or overseas authorities, thus leading to de-risking efforts in some instances. Surely no one would disagree that we are now in a more complex world, and sometimes we indeed have to deal with sub-optimal outcome. But I totally appreciate that knowing it is one thing, and experiencing the effect of it is quite another. 3.
We thus normally approach these two main tasks somewhat differently and we often regard monetary policy and financial stability as two separate parts of the Riksbank's mission. Recently, however, it has become increasingly clear just how interlinked these two tasks are. BIS Review 41/2009  7  When the interbank markets have been ineffective and interest rates have to a certain extent been governed by a lack of confidence, the impact of monetary policy has been weakened. This has meant that we have needed to use tools from both of the toolboxes during the crisis. The situation has required the use of some tools that we otherwise use rarely. We have even had to reinvent some of the tools and refine them as we go along. The measures have primarily aimed to strengthen financial stability and to maintain the functionality of the financial markets so that the payment and credit systems work effectively. This is a prerequisite for the effective functioning of the economy as a whole. Many measures that are taken with the aim of safeguarding financial stability also have indirect monetary policy effects. For instance, measures that lead to greater confidence in the markets contribute to lower interest rates and increased access to credit, thereby increasing the impact of monetary policy. Similarly, the Riksbank's interest rate reductions contribute to financial stability by improving the supply of credit. The measures that are normally taken under the framework of monetary policy or to promote financial stability have thus begun to complement and mutually reinforce each other.

The major question now is how we can restore confidence in the financial markets so that they can manage on their own. This is a task that authorities around the world have been struggling with for some time now. In my opinion, we need a purge of the international banking system. The problems that are weighing down the banks’ balance sheets must be brought to light. It is only when we see the depth of the losses that confidence can be restored. The great complexity in the current financial system means that this is a much more difficult process than in the Swedish bank crisis of the 1990s. It is difficult to say how long it will take before the programmes currently being implemented in Europe and other parts of the world have the intended effect. Meanwhile, the Riksbank is prepared to do whatever it takes to maintain the functioning of the Swedish financial system. Thank you! BIS Review 41/2009  19
In the long run, the industry as a whole has a clear interest in informed, responsible and  2  BIS Review 24/2007  capable consumers. As past experience, whether in Malaysia or abroad, has invariably shown, the irresponsible and unfair treatment of consumers is damaging to the consumer, damaging to the firm, and damaging to the reputation of the industry. The Bank is encouraged by the high level of commitment shown by some insurers towards significantly improving their market conduct practices. Nevertheless, much more can be achieved across the industry to address overly aggressive sales practices that result in unsuitable products being sold to consumers. Bank Negara is investing significantly in raising the level of financial capability among consumers through initiatives under the Consumer Education Programme. Additional focus has been given to this task with the setting up of the Consumer and Market Conduct Department. But this is an extensive task, for which a significant improvement in the level of financial literacy among across a widereaching spectrum of consumers may only be seen in the next generation of consumers. It is, therefore, important now that insurers take their responsibility for the fair treatment of consumers seriously. In particular, we would like to see a far greater interest by the Board and senior management in improving selling practices, as well as the quality of disclosures and advice provided to consumers.

Philipp Hildebrand: Global and Swiss economic outlook – overview for 2011/12 Introductory remarks by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Berne, 15 December 2011. *  *  *  The Swiss National Bank (SNB) reaffirms its commitment to the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. It will continue to enforce this minimum rate with the utmost determination. It is prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities. The target range for the Libor remains at 0.0–0.25%, and the SNB continues to aim for a three-month Libor close to zero. Even at the current rate, the Swiss franc is still high and should continue to weaken over time. The SNB stands ready to take further measures at any time if the economic outlook and the risk of deflation so require. In the third quarter, the global economy picked up again slightly, thanks to positive stimuli from Japan, the US and China. Growth in Europe, however, remained weak and the economic outlook for the euro area deteriorated. In Switzerland, the pace of growth slowed considerably in the third quarter. The substantial appreciation of the Swiss franc over the summer is weighing heavily on the Swiss economy. For 2011 as a whole, real GDP growth of 1.5–2.0% can be expected. This is only because of the favourable economic development in the first half of the year. For 2012, the SNB is expecting economic growth in the order of 0.5%.