samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
At this point, I would like to emphasize that we closely monitor pricing behavior as inflation hovers around high levels, albeit for a temporary period. I would like to hereby remind you that we will provide public with the updated evaluations and forecasts on medium-term inflation outlook along with possible risks and policy measures, more extensively in the Inflation Report to be published on 29 April. BIS Review 68/2010  13  Distinguished Guests, 37. Throughout 2009, as the Central Bank, we focused on policies oriented towards containing the adverse effects of the crisis on the economic activity and on financial stability while also overseeing price stability. Thanks to the experience gained from domestic crises in the recent past, we were able to make prompt and effective decisions, thus we were able to do our part to minimize the adverse impacts of the global crisis. In this period, the soundness of the financial system in addition to the relatively limited deterioration in the risk premium provided monetary policy with an extra room for maneuver. 38. Accordingly, envisioning that undershooting the inflation target at year-end has been more likely, we continued the rate cut cycle that we initiated in November 2008 by pursuing a front-loaded monetary policy in early 2009.

During  BIS Review 68/2010  9  this period, lower-than-targeted tax revenues due to contraction in domestic demand as well as higher-than-targeted primary expenditures mainly due to increase in current transfers to Social Security Institution due to slowdown in employment growth have been the primary causes of the surge in the budget deficit. An analysis of developments in public finance in the first quarter of 2010 reveals that the central government budget balance had an improved year-on-year performance, this being mainly attributable to the increase in tax revenues with the revival in economic activity. Central Government Budget Deficit and EU-Defined Public Debt Stock Budget Deficit  Public Debt Stock  (Ratio to GDP)  (Ratio to GDP) 80  12  Pu blic Debt St ock  B udge t D efici t M aast rich t Cri teri a: 3%  Maastricht Crit eria: 60 %  60  9  49.0 48.8 47.8 6  40  4.9 4.0  * Medium Term Program (2010-2012) Targets. Source: Ministry of Finance, Medium Term Program (20102012). 2012*  2011*  2010*  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  2004  2003  2001  2 012*  20 11*  201 0*  2 009  20 08  200 7  2 006  20 05  200 4  2 003  0 20 02  0 200 1  20  2002  3 .2 3  * Medium Term Program (2010-2012) Targets.
For instance, the purchasing managers index for the manufacturing sector rose in both the euro area and Japan in October. Recent statistics thus indicate that international economic activity remains strong and that developments are largely in line with the assessment made in the Inflation Report. This also means that there may be less reason for concern over international developments than has sometimes been the case in recent years,” continued Mr Heikensten. ”With regard to the Swedish economy, we observed in October that economic activity had accelerated again after the slowdown at the beginning of the year. Exports were expected to show strong growth. The investment upturn that began last year was expected to continue, but gradually enter a calmer phase. Private consumption was also expected to rise more rapidly given, for example, a good growth in real wages, expansionary fiscal policy and a gradual increase in employment. All in all, we foresaw a fairly good growth rate and a normal economic cycle, where domestic demand would become more of a driving force. Given this background, we were assuming there would be a turnaround for the better in the labour market," said Mr Heikensten. "New data also largely confirm the earlier picture with regard to economic activity in Sweden. The most recent business tendency survey paints a bright picture of the situation in most sectors included in the survey, and foreign trade statistics indicate stronger growth in exports.

However, in my opinion, the changes that have occurred would appear to indicate slightly stronger economic growth and perhaps also the risk of a slightly more rapid rate of price increase, mainly connected with international inflation and a weak krona. Given the information we have now, the financial markets’ expectations of a repo rate increase some time next year appear reasonable. As I see it, this conclusion is supported by the strong growth in the real economy and the increased risks that follow on from a continued rise in house prices,” continued Mr Heikensten. ”Let me conclude with a few more general reflections. It is quite natural given the current situation with extremely low interest rates and stimulation from monetary policy that the time for a repo rate increase is approaching. There have been increases in the repo rate on a number of previous occasions since inflation targeting was introduced, without any dramatic consequences. This is essentially a natural consequence of the strong economic growth and something that could contribute to safeguarding continued stable development in the Swedish economy during coming years,” concluded Mr Heikensten. 2/2
The last few decades saw probably the most rapid industrialization since the industrial revolution occurring in ASEAN. ASEAN became renowned for exports of consumer products of great values. We are now hubs for automobile and electronics production. Another noteworthy development in recent times also includes trade expansion among ASEAN nations. Intra-ASEAN trade used to represent only about 12 percent of its overall trade in 1993, but today, that figure has increased to around 25 percent. Moreover, this trend is set to accelerate, resulting in trade expansion both within ASEAN itself, and between ASEAN and the rest of the world. Ladies and Gentlemen, Today, the importance of ASEAN in the global economy cannot be denied. Size-wise, ASEAN population amounts to 565 million with growing middle class population, which means stronger demand for consumer products and financial services. Looking forward, for ASEAN growth to continue and able to avoid disruptive crises, the economic and financial infrastructure that underpins our economic activities must be strong. This brings me to the role of financial policy and strategy to enhance ASEAN strengths. For ASEAN to be strong, a necessary condition is that its financial system must be deep and wide. And its financial institutions must function as intermediaries to allocate funds effectively and efficiently. In the past, ASEAN relied on external source of funding, mainly from developed countries. At present, however, new polar source of funding has shifted towards Asia as well as ASEAN. Having well-developed financial system would enable ASEAN to better recycle its surplus capital among its members.

As to Antony's question on whether Shanghai is a threat to Hong Kong's status as an international financial centre, I hope my description of our strategy will bring you around to the view implicit in that strategy that we see a complementary, mutually-assisting and interactive relationship, where relative strengths are exploited, relative weaknesses are addressed and synergies maximised; and not a relationship characterised by cut-throat competition, as some may have portrayed it. 2  BIS Review 58/2008
I am also delighted that the new Pacte Bill, which was recently adopted at the first reading by the National Assembly, seeks to promote equity investment as well as long-term investment. Our discussions in the lead-up helped to shape this legislation, with the result that the bill includes measures to reform “eurogrowth” (Eurocroissance) life insurance products at long last, setting an ambitious target – with which you are all familiar – of EUR 20 billion in outstandings, compared with EUR 2 billion at present. Accordingly, France’s lawmakers have expanded the tools put in place to achieve this goal. Now it is time to deliver. We are entitled to expect a fresh start, with a reset for eurogrowth products and innovative and energetic sales and marketing efforts by your industry, once the framework 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  has been simplified. Retirement savings, meanwhile, have been the subject of a lively annuity versus lump sum debate. Like you, I am glad that the ability to receive annuity payments – and above all the principle of an annuity product – has been maintained across the board, not to defend one industry against another, but because a lifetime income is closer to a retirement product and because this timeframe should support more equity investment. Here again, though, it is up to you to take the steps to enable retirement savings to finally take off in France and ensure that your approach to asset/liability management better takes into account the longer durations of these products.

The CBI Industrial Trends Survey shows that in manufacturing industry investment intentions are the strongest recorded since 1997. BIS Review 158/2010  7  making tax payments to ease cash flow constraints. And a further supporting influence has been the relative strength of company cash flows I commented on earlier. The flip side of the fact that more companies have survived the recent recession is that there has been a fall-off in measured productivity. Instead of slack being created in the labour market through company failures and job losses, there is the possibility that more spare capacity has been retained within companies which have survived the recession – particularly in the services sector, which accounts for the bulk of business activity in the UK. However, the extent of this margin of spare capacity and the way it will impact on the performance of the economy going forward is a big uncertainty at present, as I will discuss later. The 1990s recovery A third reason for optimism about the private sector and business activity to drive the UK economy forward in the current recovery is the experience of the previous recovery from the early 1990s recession. Through the mid-90s, the UK economy grew healthily – with annual GDP growth averaging close to 3.5% while the public sector deficit was being brought down in a broadly similar way to the reduction planned by the current government.
Moreover, if banks and fintechs did not both know how to innovate, and often innovate together, bigtechs would ultimately reap the rewards. Furthermore, we take very seriously the commitments we made to you last year: we have therefore worked with you this year on the deadlines and visibility of the stages in the authorisation process of fintechs. In this context, I am pleased to announce that a Fintech Charter will be adopted and published before the end of the year. This charter will clearly explain, in great detail, the stages in this authorisation process, from their first contact with the ACPR to their obtaining the required authorisation or registration. It will contain specific commitments on the part of the ACPR, firstly in terms of the visibility of the process: the appointment of a dedicated analyst, an indication of the additional information to be provided, and an authorisation certificate to facilitate procedures with investors. Secondly, in terms of deadlines: at each stage of the process, acknowledgement of receipt will be provided within two days and a response will be given on the content of the request within two weeks. The charter will also clarify our requirements regarding authorisation applications so that they can be prepared as well as possible. In order to help entrepreneurs navigate the regulations, a set of guides and Q&As will be posted on our website: these Q&As have been devised with representatives of the ecosystem to answer the regulatory questions that fintechs most frequently ask. III.

Instead, we should pay close attention to a possible cumulative risks scenario, the likelihood of which has increased recently: an adverse loop of protectionist threats, unfavourable exchange rate movements, and abrupt financial markets corrections. Such a negative loop would tighten financial conditions, and deteriorate the growth outlook in the Eurozone. Our monetary policy stance would then have to be adapted, depending on the ultimate impact on inflation prospects. In any case, this cyclical expansion provides an appropriate timing for reforms, especially for those that may be costly in a downturn, such as reduction in public expenditures and labour market reforms. The growth and employment performances of other European countries [slide 9] in recent years show that implementing deep reforms can have large payoffs. In Spain, for instance, significant reforms were implemented between 2010 and 2012 to reduce the duality of the labour market, to increase labour flexibility for firms and to strengthen active labour market policies. There have been some short-term employment costs, but France would not have to face these costs in the current upturn thanks to the supportive medium prospects, and could enjoy major benefits from structural reforms. 2. This momentum is being harnessed to implement ambitious and consistent reforms. [slide 10] 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  However, to take advantage from these benefits, there is a need for consistent structural reforms.
Given our highly open economy, we may have to accept somewhat wider variations in inflation than some other countries. The last time I was here, almost exactly a year ago, Norges Bank’s Executive Board had just decided to reduce the key rate by 0.25 percentage point to 1.75 per cent. Since then, the key rate has remained at this historically low level. Real interest rates are also low. From December 2002 to March 2004, the key rate was reduced by a total of 5.25 percentage points. The interest rate decline can be ascribed to a number of factors. In late autumn 2002, inflation started to fall. The inflation projections were also revised down. Gradually new information about the outlook for other countries and the Norwegian economy indicated that inflation might be very low. Short-term interest rates fell by close to 4 percentage points. It would seem that it is not only changes in the real interest rate that have an influence, but also the level of real interest rates. Between December 2002 and March 2004, the interest rate has moved from a high to a low level. The real interest rate is now lower than a neutral interest rate. A real interest rate that is lower than the neutral rate will stimulate activity even after the effects of the interest rate fall itself have been exhausted. Calculations seem to indicate that the neutral real interest rate for Norway is between 2½ and 3½ per cent, and it has probably fallen somewhat in recent years.

Besides, we are especially concerned about the collateral adequacy and will take further measures to decrease pressure on market-traded bonds through providing liquidity against other types of assets. Amid the increased volatility of the foreign exchange market, the Bank of Russia will stick to the conservative approach to the assessment of banking sector demand for liquidity. Meanwhile, the volume of ruble liquidity provision will be sufficient for the banking system to function properly and the money market rates to remain within the interest rate corridor bounds. The Bank of Russia will also continue to permanently monitor the situation in all the segments of the financial market and is ready to take the required measures to ensure its stable functioning. It is crucial for normal functioning of the economy and successful implementation of all macroeconomic policy measures. Currently the Russian economy faces both external and internal challenges. The uncertainty over further developments is really high and the sensitivity of the economy and especially the financial markets to various developments increases, at some point the reaction can be excessive. In these conditions the Bank of Russia is ready to be flexible and take unconventional decisions in meeting strategic objectives of ensuring financial and price stability. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
I judge that there are some upside risks to inflation, should confidence about achieving the 2% inflation target in the medium run be lost. But there are also downside risks if growth remains very subdued. As long as medium-term inflation expectations do remain consistent with our objective – in particular as long as wage growth remains so weak – I believe that we can and should continue to support the economy through the supply of money. But there is a case for taking a slightly longer-term approach than previously. Because of the underpinning from regulated and administered prices, and the fact that the economy is currently flat rather than contracting, I think the risk of deflation is considerably reduced. Rather than a very large, rapid programme of asset purchases to avoid an imminent slump – as was needed in 2009 and again in 2011/12 – a slower, more gradually supportive policy might be more appropriate and less risky to nurse the economy through the next phase of recovery. It is sustained momentum that the economy needs now rather than emergency action. Because of that, in February I voted for an additional £ over 3 months thinking that this could be the first instalment of a more prolonged run of purchases at a somewhat slower pace than previously, and with a relatively modest addition to the total by the end. If we were to do that, then it would be straightforward to accelerate or to stop purchases as the economic outlook developed and the risks became clearer.

I should also note that, from April 1st this year, the new Financial Policy Committee (the FPC) of the Bank will also have statutory responsibility and powers to make the financial system more resilient through macroprudential policies,4 and the Prudential Regulation Authority (the PRA) within the Bank of England will take over from the Financial Services Authority the job of micro-prudential supervision of firms. These functions do not depend on the central bank balance sheet and so, in principle, do not need to be undertaken by the central bank. But they are being put in the central bank for very good reasons, which include, for example, exploiting the synergies with central bank operations and skills, and eliminating the underlaps that arise from separate institutional arrangements. Because they do not necessarily involve the Bank in conducting financial operations, I will say no more about macro- or microprudential polices today. (Else I will still be going at midnight!) In summary, the primary operational policy levers available to the Bank of England to influence the macroeconomic outlook are: setting the price or quantity of money; influencing  4  For more on my views about the FPC see: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/ speeches/2012/speech550.pdf  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the price and quantity of credit; and the communication of our actions, analysis and views5. Let me unpack these policy operations a little further.
Such expectations are even greater on Islamic finance given that the professed values of this industry are driven by the principles of Shariah which promote fairness, equality and justice. It is from this perspective that Islamic finance practitioners are duty-bound to observe the norms of high ethical conduct to uphold the values and the sanctity of Shariah. The need is even more now, given the increasing complexities faced by Islamic finance brought about by more competition and evolving regulatory requirements, more offerings of sophisticated products and growing cross-border activities. In Malaysia, it has always been our priority from the beginning to develop talent in Islamic finance as we recognise that quality talent is a crucial prerequisite for the continued success of the industry. There has been significant investment in capacity building, in line with our strategic approach in realising the visions of talent development outlined in the Financial Sector Master Plan and the Financial Sector Blueprint. To elevate the next stage of growth would require talents with different levels of technical competency and capabilities. The knowledge of yesterday might be useful for tomorrow, but more likely, would not be sufficient to meet future challenges. It is with this realisation that we should strategically implement a plan of action to develop true professionals who would lead the industry to the next stage of development, and recognised and respected as authorities in their chosen fields. These professionals should produce results that exceed expectations. They should also possess the highest degree of integrity in personal and business dealings.

It is still not wholly clear - to me at least - quite why the storm struck suddenly when it did. Most crises of this sort have their origins in some evident macro-economic policy failure. At least in hindsight there are usually fairly clear tell-tale signs of expanding fiscal deficits and/or lax monetary policies, classically accompanied by evidence of imbalance in the form of accelerating inflation or a rapidly deteriorating balance of payments. There were such signs, perhaps most notably in Thailand; but they were not for the most part particularly pronounced in Asia. Some of you perhaps understand better than I do why the initial infection proved to be so contagious. It was after all your money! In fact through the first half of the 1990’s, and in some cases for much longer, the countries in question had been remarkably successful. They attracted, by their very success, huge inflows of capital from the rest of the world, where yields had fallen, in the hope of achieving higher returns. There is no question that this capital inflow made a very big contribution to the remarkable economic expansion in Asia and hence to the global economy; but with the benefit of hindsight, the accelerating scale of the inflow, and particularly the forms that it took, became an important part of the problem. It was not all in the end productively employed.