samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Going forward the long term viability of BCH will depend on its ability to create a wide range of innovative product offerings that are endorsed by globally renowned Shariah scholars and on the continuous strong support from the key stakeholders. On that note, allow me to congratulate the parties involved in today's signing of Memorandum of Participation – the Commodity Murabahah House, participating Islamic banks and the CPO suppliers – for showing and giving your commitment to making the CMH a reality. Also I wish to take this opportunity to extend my deepest appreciation to the team at Bursa Malaysia, Bank Negara and SC who had conceptualised the idea and all other stakeholders who have worked hard to make this noble initiative come true, insyaAllah. 2  BIS Review 93/2009

It should be noted, that under existing circumstances, this effect will be reinforced by accumulated high consumer debt level of certain households. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Decline in investment activities is driven not only by reduced profits and lower accessibility of other financial resources, but primarily by high uncertainty with regard to future economic development. It is expected to be the highest in industries which have not benefited from the ruble depreciation and which suffer from increased debt burden. For reference: According to forecasts, household final consumption expenditure will fall by 5.5–5,7% and 1,5-2% in 2015 and 2016. Fixed capital investment will decrease by an estimated 10–12% and 0,5-1,5% respectively. As for the labour market situation, we do not expect any considerable increase in the unemployment numbers in comparison with the existing level. This is due to both the demographic factors and the specifics of the Russian labour market which normally adjusts through changes in wages and partial employment, rather than by changes in the number of those employed. For reference: According to our estimates, the unemployment will not exceed 6.0%-6.2% in two coming years. In comparison with December, we revised the balance of payment forecast. The expected fall in imports saw the most considerable change (almost by 30% in 2015 compared with 2014 instead of previous estimate of 10%). Therefore, the current account surplus estimate has been revised upward to 64 billion US dollars in 2015 and to 90 billion US dollars in 2016.
Øystein Olsen: Economic perspectives Annual address by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of the Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank and invited guests, Oslo, 18 February 2016. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can also be found on the Norges Bank’s website. Introduction In late autumn 1857, a steamship left Christiania bound for Hamburg carrying a cargo of silver from Norges Bank to be deposited in one of Hamburg’s finance houses. In only a few months, 20 tonnes of silver worth 800 000 speciedaler were shipped south as collateral for the redemption into silver of bills and notes issued by Norges Bank. There was to be no doubt that the speciedaler was worth its face value in silver. Europe had just been hit by a financial crisis. Norges Bank intervened to maintain confidence in the country’s currency. The Bank remained faithful to the social mission it had been assigned 40 years earlier. This year is Norges Bank’s 200th anniversary. Under the Constitution, control of the monetary system was given to the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The establishment of Norges Bank in 1816 gave the authorities a tool to restore confidence in the country’s means of payment. Norges Bank had a monopoly on the issuance of currency, but the amount of currency in circulation was limited by the stock of silver. The organisation of Norway’s monetary system was inspired by the note-issuing banks that had emerged in Europe since the end of the 1600s.

12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Central banks in new and uncharted territory Major shifts in export prices have not been alone in posing challenges to the Norwegian economy through history. Financial turbulence and banking crises created their own set of challenges. Central banks play a particular role in the event of financial turbulence. As the bankers’ bank, the central bank acts as lender of last resort. The first time Norges Bank undertook this role was during the Christiania Crash in 1899 – Norway’s first debt-driven real estate bubble. When the most recent financial crisis hit Norway in 2008, our role as lender of last resort was again put to the test. Access to short-term funding dried up. This also affected Norwegian banks. Norges Bank had to provide liquidity support, and the government implemented extraordinary measures to safeguard the financial system. For Norway, the real economy effects of the financial crisis were short-lived. Other countries have had a more difficult time. Since the financial crisis, monetary policy in many countries has been stretched close to the limit with the aim of putting economies back on their feet and keeping inflation above zero. Many countries are still experiencing weak growth. This is not unusual in the wake of a financial crisis. A post-crisis economic downturn may prove to be deep, and it may take a long time to reverse the negative trend. In a number of countries, little support from other policy areas has made the job particularly demanding.
Absent the flow of variation margin, CCPs non-defaulting members would face very substantial losses if a counterparty defaults. Variation margin is therefore vital, despite the liquidity demands it necessarily entails; and it is not that case that the post-crisis growth in central clearing has increased these demands – especially now that variation margin is routinely exchanged on non-cleared derivatives too. Indeed the vast multilateral netting sets created by CCPs substantially reduce the volume of variation margin compared to the alternative where the same trades are cleared bilaterally. CCPs also collect ‘initial margin’ to protect their members from potential losses arising from a member default. In an historically large stress event, the distribution of potential of losses changes, with larger losses becoming more likely, and therefore initial margin calls increased as well. The increase in initial margin requirements at UK CCPs during the crisis was substantial [add stat] but also relatively gradual – the peak one-day increase in initial margin was considerably smaller than peak one-day variation margin flows through the crisis. This was in part due to prudent measures taken by CCPs before the crisis to prevent initial margin from falling too far in good times and prevent large or unexpected step changes in initial margin requirements when market volatility starts to rise. 9 FSB (2017) Report on effectiveness of derivatives reforms. 10 Daily variation margin payments to and from UK CCPs peaked at more than £ roughly five times the daily average in January and February.

Again, a simple thought experiment is illustrative: counterparty credit risk, unanticipated margin call and the scale of margin related liquidity flows around the system would have been greater and destabilising had the pandemic struck ten years ago. So if the banking and derivatives markets reforms operated broadly as intended can we conclude that the financial system as whole has – so far – functioned well and proved resilient in the current crisis? Here the judgement is more difficult. We have not seen systemic bank failures, credit crunches or ballooning counterparty credit risks. But we have seen a massive liquidity shock and incipient dysfunction in core financial markets that required central bank intervention on an unprecedented scale. 11  Ben Bernanke has pointed out that panics can be a major cause of credit crunches. Reforms that avoid such panic reduce the likelihood that financial stress transmits to real economy stress. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  It is arguable, as I noted at the outset, that the extreme liquidity shock was simply a function of the scale of the economic impact of the COVID crisis, and the central bank response a necessary and unavoidable consequence of a tail event. Supported by central bank intervention, markets have certainly stabilised.12 Indeed, some seem to have fully recovered their pre-crisis levels. I would reiterate, however, that the crisis is far from over and further negative COVID19 developments could cause financial instability to return.
Your personal commitment Nick to support these causes in times of great financial difficulty is a tribute to you and also to the charitable instincts of the City of London. We thank you for that work, and I am sure that everyone here tonight thanks both you and the Lady Mayoress for the splendid hospitality which you have extended to us all this evening. So I invite you all to rise and join me in the traditional toast of good health and prosperity to “The Lord Mayor and the Lady Mayoress”, Nick and Claire Anstee. 4  BIS Review 84/2010

The recovery in financial markets that we have seen in the past 6 months or so, is in part driven by the statement that the ECB will do “whatever it takes” to keep the euro area together and the perceived commitment that the Fed will do whatever it takes to restore growth in the US. The belief in these policy approaches has been immensely powerful. But it must be backed not only by perceived intent but also by capability and delivery if needed – and economies always generate some surprises. If the actions don’t follow the words when necessary, then similar policy statements in future will be less effective. In the UK, market expectations are already consistent with monetary policy remaining very supportive for some time to come, indicating no change in Bank Rate until well into 2015. Yet there is still a debate about whether the MPC should give more “forward guidance”. In practice we have being doing this through the Inflation Report. The most recent edition makes it clear that we do not see much pressure arising from domestically generated inflation. Rather, we continue to see inflation being driven by factors such as tax changes, higher commodity and energy prices, and other external influences. These and similar adverse relative price changes have made us all financially worse off and contributed to keeping inflation higher than target over the past few years. In response, the Bank could have chosen to tighten monetary policy to keep measured inflation rates down.
14 [30]  One lesson to be learned from the post-financial crisis period is that an expansionary monetary policy over a long period of time can entail a conflict between price stability and financial stability. The conflict was exacerbated by the signs that new problems could manifest themselves in the financial markets if the large asset purchases were concluded prematurely. This was called “taper tantrum”.23 There was also a risk that the private sector had become so dependent on central bank liquidity that the effect of reducing the balance sheets could be greater than the stimulus provided by the asset purchases.24  Risk of new conflict between price stability and financial stability after the pandemic When the pandemic broke out at the beginning of 2020, central banks introduced further expansionary monetary policy measures to facilitate access to credit and liquidity, thereby reducing the risk of interest rates rising so strongly that the economic situation worsened. This time, too, there was no conflict between price stability and financial stability. The expansionary monetary policy increased demand – which helped to sustain inflation – while supporting financial markets. A central task for central banks in acute phases of economic crisis is to be the lender of last resort. Recently, the central banks’ task of ensuring that the markets function (market maker of last resort) has also come into focus. If viable and systemically important banks in distress experience temporary liquidity problems, they can apply to the central bank for emergency loans.

5 [30]  offers liquidity to households and firms by providing liquid deposits and illiquid loans. This creates a liquidity mismatch for the bank. A further problem here is that the bank's assets can be difficult for an outsider to evaluate. As a result, a bank's financial situation depends to a very large extent on the trust its customers have in it. A bank builds trust by having plenty of equity, good earnings, low loan losses and good liquidity. And not least important: a sound culture where risk management is central. Confidence is essential for a bank, but it can also disappear quickly. If this happens, there is a great risk that depositors and other financiers will want to withdraw their money quickly. The risk is that the depositors who arrive first can withdraw their money while those who arrive later are left without, as the bank's liquid assets are then exhausted. This is precisely the reason why bank runs can occur. It can also lead to other financiers quickly withdrawing their funding. If the bank is bad, it should obviously be wound up. The problem is that it is difficult to tell whether or not a bank is bad, so there can be a run on good banks as well. Experience also shows that even bad banks should be wound up in an orderly fashion. There are several reasons for this. One reason is what I just mentioned: banks are highly dependent on trust and are difficult to evaluate.
But the IEO also raises some deeper questions about how much protection the PRA should seek to deliver, for which sorts of policyholders, and with what confidence. And it is those deeper questions that I intend to consider briefly in the remainder of my comments today. Insurers are subject to what is known as “twin peaks” regulation in the UK. In addition to supervision from us in the PRA, the Financial Conduct Authority also supervises insurers. And the IEO report makes it clear that, in the context of securing policyholder protection, the FCA has the primary role. The key word of the PRA’s objective is “contribute”. We should only act when there are prudential concerns, whereas the FCA acts on wider matters of fairness. To give an example: the PRA might intervene to prevent an insurer from selling new policies if it had inadequate financial resources, but it would be for the FCA to consider whether those policies contained unfair terms and conditions. In most circumstances the split of responsibilities is clear, but we need to be sure we are sufficiently explicit about the limits of the PRA’s role in respect of areas such as with-profits business, corporate restructurings and firms that close to new business and go into run-off. Another important consideration for us is whether the PRA should seek to protect all policyholders equally. The insurers we supervise received £ of gross written premium in 2016.

This increase comes on the back of a decline in lending by Euro-area banks – over the same period, their share decreased from around a third to less than 15% as they pulled back from the region. Second, Asian banks have been acquiring the Asian business lines from global banks, especially in wealth management. In 2013, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation bought over SocGen’s Japanese private banking arm. And just late last year, OCBC Bank acquired Barclays’ wealth and investment management business in Singapore and Hong Kong. Even as Asian banks push for growth, they continue to maintain high prudential standards. The average Tier 1 capital ratio of Asian banks was 13.4% as of last year, up from 10.6% in 2008 and comfortably above the Basel minimum requirement of 6%. Key Asian jurisdictions who are members of the Financial Stability Board – including China, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore – have been assessed to be compliant or largely compliant with the Basel Committee’s capital and liquidity standards. Several other Asian countries – Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand – have also implemented the Basel III rules. Asian banks are dealing with cyclical headwinds The major Asian banks’ sound prudential standards position them well to face the challenges in the current environment – ranging from geopolitical risks to heightened policy uncertainty in the advanced economies. The post-crisis operating environment has been difficult for banks around the world. European bank profitability remains depressed seven years after the global financial crisis, with return on equity or RoE averaging below 3%.
The ECB’s asset reinvestment policy, the guiding principles of which were readjusted yesterday, aims to preserve the monetary stimulus provided by the asset purchase programme through full reinvestment of the assets on the programme’s portfolio as they mature. In short, monetary policy will continue to have tools with which to tackle future economic and financial crises, although these tools naturally have their limitations. Therefore, as the Governing Council of the ECB has been saying in recent years, rather than overemphasising the role of these tools, they need to be complemented by the implementation of structural reforms and fiscal policies to foster growth. Spanish economic policy: progress made and challenges The Spanish economy has been on a growth path since late 2013 and GDP overtook its pre-crisis levels in mid-2017. A number of structural reforms implemented during the recession contributed to this dynamism. On the domestic front, these include labour market reform, the balance-sheet clean-up and restructuring of credit institutions, pension reform and fiscal consolidation. These reforms have undoubtedly helped largely correct some of the Spanish economy’s main imbalances in the pre-crisis period: in particular, high levels of private sector debt, low competitiveness, the excessive current account imbalance and the excessive weight of the real-estate sector. Similarly, economic policy measures have enabled progress to be made on correcting the problems faced by the financial sector during the worst of the recent crisis. Nevertheless, the recovery has also benefited from a series of factors exogenous to domestic economic policy with varying degrees of persistence.

The knowledge you have acquired through your training here is only part of the cherished objective. The more important requirement is to conduct yourselves in a sound professional manner, comply with regulations, and invest your capabilities and knowledge to attain real professionalism. May Allah render your knowledge useful to you and your country. I wish you all success, and may God bless you. BIS Review 14/2007  1
At the end of 2015, in Bulgaria the share of SEPA credit transfers in the total number of customers’ credit transfer orders in euro was 59%, and the migration to the EMV standard for bank payment cards and POS terminals is over 90% and is nearly complete. • With effect from 1 February 2016, Member States must remove settlement-based national reporting obligations on payment service providers for balance of payments statistics relating to payment transactions of their customers. Soon the National Assembly is going to pass amendments to the Currency Law, introduced with the Law on consumers’ real estate loans, and the related changes are going to be made to Ordinance No.27 on the balance of payment statistics. Therefore, payment service providers will no longer be required, for the needs of the balance of payments statistics, to keep registers and provide the BNB with information on transactions and payments between residents and non-residents and on  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  cross-border transfers of over BGN 100 000. We expect that these changes would be passed by the end of July this year. • In relation to the agreement reached between the MoF, BNB and market participants, the BNB as the fiscal agent of the government works on a project for the technical implementation of direct connection of the Government Securities Depository with the EBOND system to the BLOOMBERG PROFESSIONAL platform and the system of the Bulgarian Stock Exchange.

Thus, additional development and modernization of the Bulgarian government securities market is expected to be achieved and its further integration into the European Union’s single market to be encouraged. This will allow by the end of next year financial institutions to freely select the place where they trade in government securities issued in Bulgaria, in compliance with the requirements under Regulation 2015/61 concerning the assessment of liquid assets in the form of government securities. This would possibly provide the prerequisites for additional diversification of the investors in Bulgarian government debt instruments. These changes are conceived in line with the debt management and financial markets security policy in the context of our future euro area membership and are necessitated by regulatory reforms at EU level. Finally, I would like to mention a project successfully completed recently. On 31 May 2016 Bulgaria subscribed to the Special Data Dissemination Standard Plus of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bulgaria is the 11th country worldwide to adhere to this highest tier international data dissemination standard. Adhering to this standard is the result of the joint efforts of the Bulgarian National Bank as coordinator for Bulgaria, the National Statistical Institute, and the Ministry of Finance. The BNB oversaw the adherence efforts and was responsible for developing the so-called National Summary Data Page, which is already available on the BNB website. The greater part of the new statistical indicators included in the standard are compiled by the BNB.