samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In sum, we are at a juncture where achieving the right monetary and fiscal stance and successfully managing economic policy will be pivotal for the future of the Spanish economy. The course the European sovereign debt crisis takes will be a determinant of paramount importance. But whatever the scenario the role of our economic policy will remain fundamental for overcoming the inefficiencies highlighted, for redressing the lack of confidence hampering and raising the cost of external funding, and for keeping the Spanish economy safe from any incident that might occur in the European arena. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Moreover, market participants interpreted the Fed’s revision of its monetary policy strategy as an indication that the Fed will continue pursuing an expansionary monetary policy for an extended period. This, along with expectations of a major fiscal stimulus package, supported investor risk sentiment and caused inflation expectations in the US to rise. What is more, in Europe, the agreement reached in July on the creation of an EU recovery fund led to a further decline in risk premia on sovereign bonds. Page 1/5  Zurich, 17 December 2020 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Overall, risk markets were able to benefit for considerable periods of time, despite the volatile market environment. There was some divergence between the US and Europe, however: While the leading US equity index, the S&P500, hit a new record high as early as the beginning of September driven by technology stocks, price developments on the major European stock markets were more moderate. Thanks to the rally in November, all major indices are up on mid-year. According to the latest reading, Switzerland’s SMI is up around 3% (cf. chart 1). On the interest rate markets, yields on long-term government bonds continued to reflect expectations of an ongoing low interest rate environment. Although yields on US Treasuries did trend upwards slightly overall in the second half of the year, 10-year US Treasuries continued to trade at historically low levels – around 0.9% according to the latest figures – following the marked drop in interest rates at the beginning of the year.
A broad-based transition to more robust overnight risk-free rates can provide the safe descent from Libor we set out to achieve, to a more resilient and transparent financial system. [10] Active and liquid underlying markets underpinning overnight rates have demonstrated resilience and we expect liquidity to move to these markets. [11] But there are also specific and limited use cases where forward-looking term rates may help facilitate this journey. We have seen constructive engagement in the UK. In 2018 the RFRWG surveyed the sterling market – and to be honest, we received a mixed response on the role of term rates, but with a small majority supporting a limited role for them. [12] The UK authorities have been supportive of the development of forward-looking term SONIA rates for limited use in cash markets. These rates have now been available for use in sterling contracts since January. [13] But while a narrow majority of the market made the decision to support the development of those rates, a broader consensus has firmly endorsed the limited use case for such rates. It has done this through the RFRWG but also through the FICC Markets Standards Board (FMSB) that has published a proposed market standard that considers limited use cases where there is a robust rationale for use of forward term SONIA, to meet specific needs, such as in trade finance and Islamic finance products. [14] Let me be clear – forward-looking term rates can support transition.

Conclusion From the very beginning of the crisis, the ECB has acted in a decisive manner. It has taken a number of measures unprecedented in nature, scope and timing. The ECB has provided large amounts of liquidity support to banks. By making changes to its operational framework, the ECB made sure that all solvent banks would have sufficient access to funding. When the crisis intensified in September last year, we introduced a number of new measures. Most importantly, we provided banks with unlimited access to liquidity at fixed rates for up to six months. The ECB also expanded its list of assets eligible for use as collateral in the Eurosystem’s credit operations. Moreover, we recently announced further measures, namely to provide longer term refinancing up to one year and to purchase covered bonds of up to EUR 60 bn. Looking now beyond the turmoil on rules, regulation and infrastructures, the current financial turmoil has taught us one key lesson for the future: self-regulation is not sufficient for systemically important markets, institutions and infrastructures. Maintaining financial stability is in the public interest. Therefore, public authorities must take appropriate measures to regulate, supervise and oversee systemically important markets, institutions and infrastructures in order to prevent systemic risks spreading and safeguard the financial stability of the system. For market infrastructures, one lesson for the future is that, despite their remarkable resilience in the current crisis, there is no room for complacency given their crucial role in financial stability.
When there is a fixed exchange rate target, one might even have to expect an uncontrolled expansion of the balance sheet. This is attached to a number of imponderables. 6 In addition to major financial risks, it should be noted that, as the balance sheet grows, it will become increasingly difficult to reduce excess liquidity during a subsequent normalisation of monetary policy, and to fulfil the monetary policy mandate – of ensuring price stability – sustainably. Second, it is important to bear the following in mind: pegging the franc partially or fully to another currency would mean that the SNB would have to adopt the monetary policy of the  6  4  Cf. also Danthine, J.-P. (2015): Swiss monetary policy facts ... and fiction, speech at the Swiss Finance Institute Evening Seminar, Geneva, 19 May 2015. BIS central bankers’ speeches  currency area concerned. However, it could no longer be guaranteed that this monetary policy would always be optimally tailored to the needs of the Swiss economy. Thus, the benefits of an active exchange rate policy need to be properly weighed against the costs for the economy as a whole. But there is no one-size-fits-all method of determining the need to intervene in the foreign exchange market, or the best way to do so. The points to consider will differ depending on the situation. Current SNB monetary policy In that regard, I would like to briefly describe the SNB’s current thinking.

Competitiveness and macroeconomic stability In international comparisons of competitiveness, Switzerland is regularly among the leaders. For example, it has headed the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index for years (cf. chart 1). So what are the factors behind Switzerland’s high degree of competitiveness? Let me make something clear right at the outset: competitiveness depends first and foremost on companies and their ability to innovate (cf. chart 2). Innovation helps companies to increase productivity, thereby lowering costs and prices. In addition, innovation leads to higher quality and greater exclusivity of products or services, which in many cases bestows price-setting power. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Switzerland is a case in point: its industries are highly competitive, precisely because our country is among the world leaders in innovation, as a number of indicators have shown. If, for example, we look at the number of registered patents relative to population size, Switzerland is by far the most active of the OECD countries (cf. chart 3, left-hand panel). Innovation indices, such as the Global Innovation Index and the Innovation Union Scoreboard, also place it right at the top. 1 A key factor behind this leading position is the level of investment in research and development (cf. chart 3, right-hand panel), which is above average by international standards. Firms that are innovative and willing to invest cannot develop and thrive in a vacuum. The scope for development is largely dependent on a country’s location-specific factors.
Any hasty short-term reactions, like the ones we have been attesting to over the course of the present year and in the early days of this week, bring about individual financial cost to those undertaking them, as well as financial cost to the economy. No economic agent is stronger than the foundations. The high volatility and uncertainty in the foreign exchange market do not have any real base. The euroisation of the economy is a visionary idea, not only for Albania but for the entire region as well, since its final aspiration is the membership into the European Union. It encourages the domestic and the regional market, and the European authorities, to speed up the convergence process. However, convergence in the Euro area is a derivative of continuous structural reforms and strengthening of financial systems, wherein the stability of  BIS Review 119/2009  1  the currency is of prime importance. There can be no European integration without a longterm equilibrium of the national and European currency. In the long run, the exchange rate will inevitably reflect the sound foundations of the Albanian economy, which are to remain so. The past years’ equilibriums remain real indicators of the potentials of the Albanian economy. In the long run, we remain deeply convinced of the benefits the free floating exchange rate regime brings about. It will be the passport to and the best support to the Albanian economy in its path to European integration.

Eurofi – Prague, 9 September 2022 Mobilization of the Eurosystem against inflation Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 sur 3 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be talking to you today at this Eurofi edition, although I very much regret that I cannot be in Prague in person today. I extend my warmest thanks to David Wright and Didier Cahen for organising this event. Let me first express my heartfelt sympathy to our British friends: the Queen brought a sense of duty and a sense of stability which will hopefully remain a powerful lesson in this very volatile period. These are indeed times of extremely high uncertainty and difficulty. The European and French economies will face next year a significant slowdown, and we cannot exclude a limited recession. Let me quote, as I did some days ago in Jackson Hole,i two compatriots to give us some light: first, a philosopher – Voltaire – who said that “uncertainty is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is absurd”ii; second, an economist – Olivier Blanchard – with the following words “monetary policy must be closer to art when it is frequently confronted to new, poorly anticipated and poorly understood, contingencies”iii Well, between art and science, how did we deal yesterday with the present uncertainty? We decided to frontload on our monetary policy normalisation.
A monetary policy framework must be viewed in its entirety, and needs to be clear and enduring. Its success should be judged over the 4  Based on average values of trade in goods over the past five years, Hong Kong had a dependence on Mainland China of some 40% (including re-exports on a value-added basis only); Canada on the USA of 76%; Mexico on the USA of 81%; the UK on the 12 countries of the euro area of 64%; Ireland on the UK of 27%; and Switzerland on Germany of 28%. 4  BIS Review 31/2002  longer term, while we must accept that what delivers long-term stability may not continuously deliver results to everyone's liking in the short term. In the HKMA we do pay attention to the whole spectrum of possible alternatives. The fact that we support the retention of our current framework of the US dollar peg represents a conscious decision; it does not mean that we are deaf to the counterarguments or reluctant to debate them. Conclusion In summary, monetary policy in Hong Kong is set by the Hong Kong government within a broad framework provided by the Basic Law, and with the fundamental objective of providing long-term monetary stability. In our judgement it is unlikely that this aim would be assisted by altering the current arrangements, whether by pinning our currency to that of our neighbour or by any other devices. BIS Review 31/2002  5

The SNB reacted swiftly to the deteriorating economic situation, and many people hoped that the monetary policy adopted could shield our country from the turmoil experienced elsewhere. However, it was not in our power to meet these expectations. We did all we could within the framework of our legal mandate. 2009 will be a difficult year for our economy, and the signs are that 2010 will be so too because, even if the downward trend is halted, the under-utilisation of our production resources will still be considerable. Dear Shareholders Dear Guests In such a challenging environment, we shall once again need the support of everyone, in particular our shareholders. We thank you for the unfailing trust you placed in us throughout the year and the interest you have shown in the SNB’s activities. BIS Review 48/2009  5
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  However, it is important to underline that the financial mechanisms created by the EU to assist Member States in distress come with strict conditions that are designed to ensure that needed changes are implemented in economic policies and in national institutional capacity building. The European System of Central Banks has also responded to the crisis. Apart from the conventional interest rate tool, which is currently almost at a historical low, the Eurosystem introduced a number of so called non-standard measures to ensure that the transmission channel of monetary policy is not impaired. These measures include the provision of the necessary liquidity to eligible counterparties, against adequate collateral, on the basis of a fixed rate and full allotment procedure. When tensions emerged in the financial markets after Greece requested financial aid in April 2010, the Eurosystem also activated a Securities Market Programme which is intended to facilitate the monetary transmission mechanism. This involves secondary market purchase of government bonds of a number of euro area countries, and the programme was broadened in the summer of this year to cover purchases of securities of other countries facing funding difficulties. Apart from instituting financial mechanisms, European authorities responded to the sovereign debt crisis by also focusing on reform in economic governance. Clearly, the macroeconomic imbalances that developed in a number of Member States, together with the ineffective implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, signalled a need to strengthen the surveillance framework.

The export share of the Swiss gross national product (GNP) amounts to approximately 42%, while the corresponding share is 29% in Germany and only 12% in the United States. Switzerland's major trading partners are the EU countries, which absorb 59% of Swiss exports. With regard to imports, the interdependence is even greater: 75% of Swiss imports come from the EU. Via foreign trade, the exchange rate exerts an influence on aggregate demand and, therefore, also on the price level in Switzerland. In addition, the exchange rate directly affects import prices. Therefore, exchange rate movements have been, and will be, closely monitored by the SNB. The rapid succession of interest rate cuts by the National Bank since 11 September 2001 was also an expression of concern about an exchange rate-triggered threat to the economy. Since price stability was not jeopardised, it was possible to considerably relax monetary policy. 4.3. Steering the exchange rate? Although the SNB takes account of the exchange rates when determining its monetary policy, it is sometimes called upon to do more than that. It is even requested to concentrate – at least temporarily – exclusively on the exchange rate. The underlying notion is that the National Bank could aim at a lower Swiss franc exchange rate and that exports would consequently pick up to the desired degree. Theoretically, it is possible to weaken the franc in nominal terms by conducting a highly expansionary monetary policy.
Of  8  6  The implied pace of tightening in the current yield curve between 75 and 125 basis points (bps) is 4 bps per quarter compared to 7 and 5 bps in the November and February Inflation Reports respectively. The average pace of tightening in the cycles since the start of inflation targeting in 1992 is around 50 bps per quarter. BIS central bankers’ speeches  course, even after paying down debt following the crisis, UK households’ indebtedness is high by historical and international measures so there may not be a great deal of room for growth in this area if we want to avoid vulnerabilities building up in the economy generally. The growth in credit since the crisis, however, has been in emerging markets rather than in advanced economies which brings me to the last risk – an unfortunate event from some form of a hard landing in major emerging markets. These are now a large part of the world economy and debt stocks in many emerging economies have grown sharply over the last eight years. This could amplify the stresses many of these economies already face from the inter-related effects of slower emerging market economy growth, much lower commodity prices and a stronger dollar. A more severe slowdown and debt-related financial stress in key emerging markets could well have an impact on advanced economies, including the UK, through a number of channels.

Elvira Nabiullina: Speech - OPORA RUS Governor SIA session Speech by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the OPORA RUS Governor SIA session, 3 December 2020. * * * Good afternoon, I am happy to welcome you, whether you are now in the Kaliningrad Region or are video conferencing — this format is becoming quite common now. I hope that this meeting is attended by a large number of participants. Indeed, I was listening very attentively and I think that the approach the Kaliningrad Region is pursuing to develop small and medium-sized businesses is promising and comprehensive. However, we are all very well aware that a lot of projects depend on how accessible funding is — it would be impossible to implement a project when there is no access to funding. Today’s meeting is very important to me: although the Bank of Russia influences the economy through the financial sector, the ultimate goal of our work is to ensure that the financial sector helps the economy and people overcome hardships and develop. Of course, we have always been concerned about the issues related to the financing of small enterprises. We carry out regular meetings with OPORA RUSSIA President Alexander Kalinin several times a year to discuss the most topical problems and advance in both the regulation and other areas associated with the development of multiple projects.
These measures were efficient, at least to some extent. Although sometimes circumvented by banks, they have managed to slow down forex credit growth, providing a wise solution to the problems faced at that time by our economy. Back then, we referred to them as unorthodox monetary policy measures, but after the crisis, the IMF mentioned the National Bank of Romania as being among “the pioneers” of what later became “macroprudential instruments”. After the EU entry, the actual membership in this “convergence club” has fueled and enhanced 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  the catching-up process. Being in the EU meant free exchange of goods and services, along with the free movement of capital and labor, which increased trade, foreign direct investment, and migration flows, for the benefit of economic growth in our country. Moreover, in the long run, EU membership fostered convergence through investments from European funds. Romania has certainly come a long way in terms of economic convergence, with growth resuming and gaining momentum after the global economic crisis: its GDP per capita as a share in the EU average (based on PPS) more than doubled from 30.6 percent in 2003 to 62.7 percent in 2017. The advance was the fastest within the group of peer countries that recorded similar trends: for instance, Bulgaria went from 32.4 to 49.3 percent, while Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, which started from a more advanced level, added between 7 and 22 percentage points to the same indicator during 2003–2017.

Compared with the ECB’s projections for the euro area, which expect growth of around 4% both in 2021 and in 2022, growth in the Spanish economy would be higher. That said, the euro area would attain its pre-crisis level of GDP in 2022 whereas this would be delayed until 2023 in Spain’s case, reflecting the bigger decline in our economy last year. After slowing significantly last year, inflation has rebounded in early 2021. This rise is due to dearer commodities, associated with the improved global economic outlook and, in the case of crude oil, with some supply-side factors. Certain temporary factors have also affected services and non-industrial energy goods prices. These factors will give rise to high inflation volatility in the coming months. There has been much discussion in recent weeks on whether these developments might be a prelude to a period of higher inflation. In my opinion this is unlikely, given the weakness of demand and the high degree of cyclical slack. In the ECB projections, euro area inflation would, at end-2023, still be some distance off the medium-term monetary policy objective of 2%. In Spain’s case, inflation would average 1.2% for 2023 under the baseline scenario. The risks surrounding these projections remain tilted to the downside in the short term under the baseline scenario. Such risks would be essentially linked to more acute episodes of contagion or slower progress in immunisation. Beyond the short term, uncertainty has tended to abate as the effectiveness of the vaccines has been confirmed.