samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Under these circumstances, major banks are becoming more active in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, firms continue to reduce debts as part of their balance-sheet restructuring measures. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be basically stagnant, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Issuance of corporate bonds and CP has been steady. The growth in money stock (M2+CDs) continues to slow reflecting the above-mentioned situation. In this financial environment, corporate financing conditions are easing, and the lending attitude of financial institutions is perceived by firms as less severe. It continues to warrant careful monitoring how these favorable developments in corporate financing environment will affect economic activities. This BIS Review is available on the BIS website at www.bis.org. BIS Review 33/20009  6

Thirdly, as concerns over the security of corporate and government bonds grew, the premia investors have had to pay against bond defaults have increased very significantly. The perceived decrease in the creditworthiness of key European companies and Western European sovereign bonds was highlighted by the very sharp rise of several benchmark credit default swap (CDS) indices for these markets.1 The foreign exchange market has been of particular concern to the SNB, as the Swiss franc’s safe haven properties and the growing dearth of alternative “safe” assets led to massive movements in our currency, which required the SNB to act. In early August, the real effective exchange rate of the Swiss franc peaked at an estimated level of almost 40% above its post-1990 long-term average.2 The extent of this deviation was very rare, in historic terms, as the previous high point, at the end of 1995, was only 12% above the same long-term average. Since the introduction of the euro in 1999, the volatility of the EUR/CHF exchange rate has averaged approximately 5%.3 In August it rose to almost 30%. As chart 1 shows, three of the largest ever daily negative movements in the EUR/CHF exchange rate also occurred in this period. Since the introduction of the minimum exchange  1  The Markit iTraxx Europe Index, for example, which is composed of 125 investment grade entities from six sectors (auto, consumer, energy, financial, industrial and TMT), more than doubled between July and September.
For financial institutions, while cyber threats may have been regarded as a cost of doing business at one point, it is not an exaggeration to say that they are now viewed as potential existential threats, not just for individual firms but also for the broader financial system and critical infrastructures that support it. As central banks with broad mandates for financial stability, this is certainly a concern for us all. We recognize the challenges and complexities in strengthening prevention, detection, and incident response regimes around fraudulent payment instructions. Users of financial messaging services such as SWIFT span the full range of IT sophistication and capacity, and remediating deficiencies in prevention and detection may require a substantial re-orientation of priorities and resources for some institutions. Overcoming these obstacles will be no easy task, but so long as there is a weak link in the cybersecurity chain criminals will seek to exploit it. As we face the common challenges of strengthening our cybersecurity defenses and payment controls, the need for cooperation is greater now than ever. The Federal Reserve stands ready to engage in further dialogue and cooperation with both its foreign official accountholders and fellow central bank service providers in addressing these challenges. 5/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  Conclusion In doing so, we as a community can ensure that the provision of account services among central banks continues to bear the hallmarks of safety, confidentiality, and reliability which are essential to the execution of our public mandates.

President Wilson, having won reelection in 1916 on the claim of having kept the U.S. out of the Great War and observing strict neutrality, had directed the Federal Reserve Board in Washington to issue a clear-cut warning to U.S. banks not to invest in a pending large placement of British Treasury bills in the U.S. market. The immediate and worldwide effect of the statement was to give the impression that the U.S. had “broken with Britain,” an impression which officials were soon scrambling for ways to counteract.5 The result was the Federal Reserve Board’s decision, contrary to the terms of the account negotiations and to the consternation of the New York Fed, to unilaterally announce to the public the account agreement with the Bank of England. The whole episode spoke perhaps to the Fed’s inexperience in matters of delicate international financial diplomacy. In any event, the Bank of England magnanimously let the matter slide— noting that mistakes “may arise even in the best regulated families”—and the account agreement was executed on May 3, 1917 and operationalized on June 20, 1917.6,7 Andrew Hauser will provide more insight into this fascinating period in his remarks in a few minutes. As expedient as the accounts were for wartime needs, the historical records show they were also motivated by ambitions of the Fed’s first leaders to establish the dollar as a major international currency and, for Benjamin Strong, to establish New York as a great international financial center to rival London. They had their work cut out for them.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 11 Inflation expectations (*) (annual change, percent) 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 10  10  10  10 Jul. 10  10  11  One year ahead  11  11  11 Jul. 11  Two years ahead  (*) Economic Expectations Survey. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 12 Consensus Forecasts for inflation (*) (percent) 2011 5 5  5  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  Developed economies Emerging Asia  2012  5  Latin America  Emerging Europe  (*) For 2011, uses CF forecasts between September 2010 and September 2011. For 2012, as from January 2011. Geometric averages of y-o-y mean inflation forecast for the economies of each region except for Latin America, which uses December-to-December inflation forecast. Developed economies are the U.S., Japan and the Eurozone; Latin America includes Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru; Emerging Asia includes China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. Emerging Europe includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia. Devloped economies and Emerging Asia consider information through October 2011; Latin America and Emerging Europe, through September 2011. Source: Consensus Forecasts.

Finally, the price hikes began feeding back into inflation expectations. Facing the resurgence of inflation, we sped up the process of raising the monetary policy interest rate (MPR). Between June and September of 2008, we increased it 200 basis points. In September of that year, when we still thought we would continue to raise the interest rate in order to bring inflation back to the target – as we had said in Congress early that month – came the Lehman Brothers debacle, and the rest is history. Uncertainty and fear took over investors, consumers and entrepreneurs. Consumers postponed expenses; firms interrupted their projects and depleted inventories; manufacturing production collapsed; demand plummeted; commodity prices fell sharply and the global recession followed. Chile was not spared. Domestic demand also fell with unprecedented force. Sales came to a halt (figure 5). Although the inflation scenario was still complex – it peaked at 9.9% in October 2008 – , a slowdown was foreseen that suggested changing the orientation of monetary policy. Growth projections plummeted unusually fast in every region of the world, going from a moderation to a recession (figure 6). Chile was no exception. In November 2008 we modified our predictions and pointed out that the economic slowdown would entail a drop in inflation, not only because of the sharp fall in commodity prices, but mainly because of the sudden creation of output gaps. We then observed that most likely we would begin cutting down the MPR in the coming months, which set out the process of financial easing.
This present economic recovery is taking place in a sound economic environment. Inflation level remains under control even though the balance of risks to price stability has recently gone up: some pressures have resulted from recent oil price rises or may result from some capacity constraints that could be encountered in the course of next years. Needless to say that the Governing Council of the Eurosystem has been and will remain vigilant in order to secure our primary objective of price stability. Besides, the current account is slightly in surplus and fiscal deficits are, in the euro zone as a whole, on a downward trend. It is worth stressing that European economies have never been creating so many new jobs so fast. The past two years (1998 and 1999) have seen very rapid job growth (about +1.5% a year) and a very big decrease in unemployment. In France, the rise has been sharper since almost 900,000 new jobs were created by enterprises (excluding Government administration) from December 1996 to December 1999 i.e. +6.6% over three years. With the economic growth speeding up, we can expect a further drop in the unemployment rate which is presently below 10%. Due to this economic recovery, the growth differential between the US and the euro zone is progressively to disappear. This gap between the two economic zones in terms of economic growth has resulted in the past years from the lag between their economic cycles.

1.3  Transparency and enhanced surveillance  The efficiency of international capital markets depends on the availability of reliable and timely information both on debtor countries and market participants. –  As regards the public sector, many efforts have been achieved, such as the IMF codes of good practices on transparency in the field of fiscal policy or monetary and financial policies or the promotion by the IMF of statistical standards (the so-called SDDS). –  International Financial Institutions have also continued to proceed toward greater transparency. Several initiatives have been launched, I will particularly point out the participation of 60 countries on a voluntary basis in the pilot experience for the release of IMF article IV reports. –  As far as the private sector is concerned, parallel efforts need to be pursued. Progress may take the form of improved disclosure on a voluntary basis, more demanding statistical reporting and extended requirements for non-transparent segments of the financial markets. Thanks to improved transparency important progress is being made to strengthen IFI’s surveillance in key areas, including financial sector issues, external debt and capital account developments, exchange rate policies. As Prime Minister Fraser has mentioned, the definition of internationally agreed standards and codes is also strongly impacting the IMF surveillance; the implementation of these standards will reduce emerging market economies’ financial vulnerabilities and together with enhanced transparency, improve market discipline and market participants’ ability to better assess the risks of their investment decisions.
The problem is not the idea of the euro. It is much more about repeatedly reviving citizens’ awareness of the benefits of a united Europe and a single currency. And about creating a solid and sustainable economic basis. I have shared with you some proposals on how monetary union could be designed so that it responds to people’s wishes and durably fulfils its objectives. Are these proposals new? No, these and other proposals for the further development of monetary union have been around  4  4  Asdrubali, P., Sørensen, B.E. Yosha, O (1996), “Channels of Interstate Risk Sharing: US 1963–1990”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(4), 1081–1110. BIS central bankers’ speeches  for quite some time. This shows that we have no problem understanding, but we do have a problem implementing. It’s up to politicians to create a framework that is appropriate for the idea of a single currency – at national as well as at European level. The longer politicians stand still, the more people will lose faith in Europe. One sign of this is that political parties which want to move backwards have recently been gaining support. At the same time, the European Central Bank is being pushed into a role for which it was not created. Monetary policy can neither solve structural problems at national level nor institutional problems at European level. On the contrary, the more that is expected from monetary policy, the more likely it is to be overburdened. The ECB alone cannot create growth and prosperity for all.

Among the households of people employed in industries less affected by the pandemic, saving by that half of households with least saving is higher: up to 40% of their annual income. 3  Taking as an indicator of financial vulnerability of the firm the ratio between its debt and its assets (net of non-interestbearing debt), and for the vulnerability threshold a value for this ratio of 75%. 4  See P. Hernández de Cos (2021): "The challenges to the banking sector a year after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic", Speech at the Observatorio de las Finanzas event organised by El Español/Invertia. 2  With a view to the future, the development of various vaccines and the start of their roll-out to the population has allowed us to discern a horizon in which this crisis is resolved. Yet uncertainty remains high, especially that arising from the course of the pandemic and the vaccination process, and the consequences of the crisis on the productive system and on agents’ behaviour. Against this background, the projections presented last Tuesday by the Banco de España continue to complement the baseline scenario with another two alternatives, with different assumptions about how the main areas of uncertainty will evolve.5 The first point of uncertainty evidently pertains to the epidemiological situation.
Even if the central bank could, through intervention in the foreign exchange market or actions to influence domestic interest rates, fix the nominal exchange rate at some particular level, and even if it succeeded in fixing not simply the bilateral rate but the trade-weighted rate, this would only determine the real rate for the short term. This is because any monetary policy actions, such as exchange market intervention or changes in interest rates, in due course have a feedback effect on domestic inflation. More specifically for example, depreciation tends to raise prices. In a market-based economy the central bank, if it already uses monetary policy to set the nominal exchange rate, cannot separately control inflation. Eventually any initial gain in competitiveness from depreciation is offset by the inflationary feedback, most obviously so in highly import-dependent economies such as Hong Kong. Empirical studies do not reject the hypothesis that this feedback is eventually 100%, although the full offset may occur only after a considerable lapse of time. Meanwhile the real rate is also affected by movements in price levels in other economies, which lie beyond the home central bank's influence. In sum, the central bank cannot, except perhaps for the short term, dictate the real exchange rate. Equilibrium of the real rate The second misconception about the real exchange rate is that a weak rate (if it could somehow be arranged) would necessarily be a good thing, because of the benefit which an improvement in competitiveness, thus measured, would bring to the economy.

Mugur Isărescu: Regional economic outlook - Europe Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the conference "Regional Economic Outlook - Europe", Bucharest, 17 November 2017. * * * Your Excellences, Ambassadors, Members of the diplomatic corps, Ladies and gentlemen, Distinguished guests, It is my pleasure to welcome you to the National Bank of Romania. The Board and I are honored to host the presentation of an important IMF document, one of their flagship reports, namely “2017 Regional Economic Outlook Report”. It is a tradition for the National Bank of Romania to host this event and we are pleased to greet the presence of many foreign diplomats – this is a clear testimony of its importance. Allow me to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Jeffrey Franks, who has been a long-standing friend of Romania. Mr. Franks is a veteran of the Fund, who – over the last 25 years – has managed challenging assignments, including the resident offices in Ukraine and Ecuador, and has led teams in Pakistan, Romania, France, Belgium, and Paraguay. He was the IMF Mission Chief for Romania for almost 3 years, from 2009 till 2012. As many of you may remember, during his mandate as mission chief, Romania overcame a very difficult period, with the support of the IMF, WB and EC.
This policy may provide a direct support to aggregate demand, through fiscal transfers, and an immediate and targeted improvement of liquidity to enterprises, through the postponing of the payment of taxes and through the sovereign guarantees programs. The two introduced fiscal packages, so far, provide for a maximum potential stimulus at around 3% of GDP. Even without considering the negative effect on public income, this stimulus transfers to the balance sheet of public sector a considerable part of the financial costs of the crisis. On its side, the Bank of Albania has increased the dosage of the monetary stimulus. This stimulus has been taken the form of the reduction of policy rate, already in its historical minimum of 0.5%, aiming to boost lending and reduce the servicing cost of existing loans. Also, it has been in the form of removing the quantitative limits of liquidity injection into the system, aiming to a better supply of the banking market and the Albanian economy. The volume of liquidity that we inject every week in the system fluctuates around the level 2%. In addition, the Bank of Albania has undertaken operational measures for guaranteeing the supply of economy with cash, in response to its increased demands. In parallel, the Bank of Albania – in an agreement and good understanding with banking industry – has carried out regulatory amendments which ease the postponing with one quarter of the credit payment for firms and households which face temporary financial difficulties.

A broad-based analysis of the data, taking the appropriate medium-term perspective and allowing for these considerations, confirms the underlying strength of money growth. In particular, the pace, maturity and sectoral composition of borrowing from banks suggest that, at the level of the euro area as a whole, the availability of bank credit has, as yet, not been significantly affected by the ongoing financial tensions. This notwithstanding, growth in loans now shows signs of moderation, as previously anticipated, with corporate demand for credit slowing. At the same time, the growth of loans to households continues to follow the downward trend observed over the past few years, as a result of higher short-term interest rates and housing market weakness in several parts of the euro area. To sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the economic analysis with that of the monetary analysis clearly confirms the assessment of upside risks to price stability over the medium term. The information that has become available since the last meeting of the Governing Council has confirmed that annual inflation rates are likely to remain well above levels consistent with price stability for a protracted period of time. The growth of broad money and credit aggregates is now showing some signs of moderation, but the still strong underlying pace of monetary expansion points to continued risks to price stability over the medium term. The latest economic data also confirm the weakening of real GDP growth in mid-2008.
Second, manufacturing costs have increased sharply since 1998. Up to the summer of 2000, this cost increase was to some extent offset by a weaker krone. The appreciation of the krone has highlighted and exacerbated the deterioration in cost competitiveness. On balance, it appears that cumulative wage growth in Norway will be a good 15 per cent higher than in other countries from 1998 to 2003. The krone is now about 7 per cent stronger than the average for the 1990s. BIS Review 51/2002  3  Third, as a result of the fiscal guideline, the internationally exposed sector is subject to additional pressure. Over time, the phasing in of petroleum revenues will lead to restructuring and the transfer of resources from the exposed to the sheltered sector. Fourth, the response patterns in stabilisation policy function in a different way from previously. Under the “Solidarity Alternative”, the response pattern consisted of countering labour market pressures and strong wage growth by reducing growth in public spending (or, if appropriate, by strengthening government revenues). This had a beneficial impact on manufacturing industry. Today, monetary policy shoulders more of the burden. This may sometimes result in a strong krone exchange rate. Fifth, growth in the global economy is sluggish while, at the same time, oil prices are high. The fall in share prices curbs economic growth among our trading partners. Markets for Norway’s export industries are stagnating, but at the same time high oil prices are providing a stimulus for some sectors of the Norwegian economy.

High-level lecture – College of Europe, 31 March 2021 Europe’s growth gap: reconciling Keynes and Schumpeter  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Press contact: Mark Deen (mark.deen@banque-france.fr), Déborah Guedj (deborah.guedj@banquefrance.fr)  Page 1 sur 14 Dear students, Professors, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you today, and I extend my warmest thanks to Professor Béatrice Dumont for her kind welcome speech. For obvious and unfortunate reasons, I was unable to come physically to the magnificent city of Bruges, this architectural jewel of the Middle Ages. Bruges is also a highly significant place for a central banker, as it was the birthplace of stock markets in Europe, in the 14th century. I also stand before you as a committed European, born and raised at the FrancoGerman border, present in Maastricht 30 years ago, and the College of Europe reflects this fruitful European spirit that I particularly cherish. What I want to do today is to avoid "langue de bois". In these troubled times, we need to speak “truthfully” before acting positively. In this respect, I would like to address the following issue: why is Europe lagging economically behind the United States? In order to find the right cure, we first have to elaborate on the right diagnosis. I. The diagnosis: Europe is an economic heavyweight, but lacks speed I would like to start with our undeniable successes.