samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition to all these developments, global financial conditions tightened, and 2022 was marked by exceptionally high levels of geopolitical, economic and financial uncertainties. In 2022, the Turkish economy continued to grow uninterruptedly despite global supply shocks and unfavorable geopolitical developments stemming from the RussianUkrainian War. Economic activity was particularly strong in the first half of the year and maintained its robust outlook in the second half of the year despite the decrease in external demand. Accordingly, in 2022, the Turkish economy grew by 5.6%, ranking among the top G20 and OECD countries thanks to its growth performance since the last quarter of 2019. In addition, Türkiye ranked ninth in terms of national income calculated according to purchasing power parity and doubled its share in the global economy. In 2022, the Turkish economy reached the highest level of national income in terms of US dollars since 2014. In the first half of last year, annual consumer inflation increased rapidly due to the sharp rise in global energy, commodity and food prices, disruptions in supply processes, and price formations in FX markets detached from economic fundamentals in the last  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  quarter of 2021. As the effects of global supply shocks waned and FX markets stabilized, a gradual normalization process started in the underlying trend of inflation as of the second half of 2022.

We used our main policy tool, the one-week repo auction rate, and macroprudential policy tools in line with the Liraization Strategy. Accordingly, we kept the policy rate (the one-week repo auction rate) unchanged at 14% in the January-July 2022 period. On the other hand, we acted in a proactive manner in the face of intensifying risks of a global recession driven by geopolitical developments and global financial conditions. To limit the effects of these risks on domestic supply, investment and current account surplus capacity and to sustain the structural gains in industrial production and employment, we initiated a rate-cut cycle in August. As of November, we had delivered a rate cut of 500 basis points in total, bringing the policy rate down to 9%. With these decisions, we enabled investments that will strengthen Türkiye's position to continue at suitable financing costs at a time when the global economy was facing supply chain and financing problems. In 2022, we also conducted an effective reserve management to reinforce our international reserves. We created a diversity of sources through deposit accounts converted from foreign exchange, YUVAM accounts that we devised for non-resident citizens, FATSI accounts aimed at bringing physical gold into the financial system, and regulations regarding the selling of a portion of export proceeds to the Central Bank. As a result of all these actions, our international reserves rose by 17% from USD 111 billion at end-2021 to USD 128.8 billion at end-2022. Meanwhile, international reserves of central banks decreased by 6% on a global scale in 2022.
And yet, we have just emerged from a successful experience: let us recall that it was collectively considered that we Europeans were in a very bad position in March 2020 at the onset of the Covid crisis. But together we have managed to weather this crisis very well, thanks for instance to the joint purchase of vaccines and the SURE1 and Next Generation EU programmes, backed primarily by Germany and France. I will therefore venture to outline here, in the field of economics, where we will succeed together, what we differ on today, and - lastly and perhaps most importantly, what both our countries are in danger of forgetting. I. Where we will succeed together: monetary policy This shock further increased inflation, which had already reappeared during the strong post-Covid recovery. Thus, after a decade of too low inflation, and even a risk of deflation during the Covid crisis, inflation now stands at 10.7% in the euro area as a whole (7.1% in France, and 11.6% in Germany). Exogenous factors, especially energy prices (up 42%) and certain food prices, still account for half of total European inflation. Nevertheless, inflation has become more "domestic" and broad-based: core inflation excluding energy and food - has gradually increased and reached 5.0% in October, and this is precisely where monetary policy has a more direct impact. The ECB Governing Council therefore decided at the end of October to raise its key rates by a further 75 basis points, bringing the deposit facility rate to 1.5%.

Philipp Hildebrand: The Swiss National Bank’s view of international financial markets against the background of trends in the United States Introductory remarks by Philipp Hildebrand, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 12 December 2003. *  *  *  The past year was a turbulent one for the international financial markets, which were essentially influenced by trends in the US. During the first half of 2003, market developments were shaped by economic and deflation fears as well as by the war in Iraq. In this environment, equity markets reached an annual low in March. In June, bond market yields fell to their lowest level. The second half of the year saw an economic recovery in the US, which is now spreading to other economic regions as well. Capital markets Long-term yields on Swiss paper rose by approximately 60 basis points from their low in June to roughly 2.7%, approximately tracking yields in the euro area. In both cases, yields followed the US market very closely, albeit with modest fluctuations (see graph 1). Under the present economic conditions, the interest rate environment in Switzerland is still viewed as attractive by consumers. The high level of new fixed-rate mortgages is an indication of this sentiment. The higher Swiss yields reflect the improved economic outlook and not inflation expectations, which are modest given that there is still pronounced underutilisation of capacities. In contrast to capital market yields, money market yields were decidedly stable.
Last year, two fifths of our graduate intake was female, a quarter came from a BAME background and a tenth from lower socio-economic groups. Conclusion One of the things economists like to focus on is return on investment. For the modest investment the Bank has made to develop econoME - £ - we hope to reach over 100,000 young people directly by 2020, with a multiplier effect through word of mouth and social media. And we know that our efforts will complement and reinforce those of TaechFirst, NowTeach, Young Citizens, Speakers for Schools, the Social Mobility Foundation and many other initiatives that are improving mathematical and financial literacy and inspiring students to broaden their horizons. We know our contribution depends on the support of teachers and influencers. That’s why we’re so grateful for your help in informing, educating and inspiring your students. 10  This includes Career Ready, the Stephen Lawrence Scholarship Scheme, Reading Partners, Number Partners and Chess Partners where Bank staff volunteer to help children in local primary schools, as well as assist secondary school pupils with CV writing and interview preparation. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  6

18  Ulrich Bindseil, Monetary Policy Operations and the Financial System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 19  Central bank assets include securities held outright or under repurchase agreements, as well as credit extensions and foreign currency-denominated assets. Central bank liabilities include currency, reserve balances, term deposits held by depository institutions, and reverse repos. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  sheet policies away from very low interest rates in supporting the macroeconomic and macroprudential objectives of central banks.20 That said, a large central bank balance sheet relative to currency in circulation raises a number of questions about the monetary authority’s footprint in money markets, which some policymakers say presents potential risks to central bank independence.21 A large footprint may also increase the central bank’s role in money markets in ways that are difficult to anticipate and that may prove to be undesirable.22 One simple principle for monetary policy implementation regimes is to avoid structures where central bank intermediation crowds out activity that private participants can do more effectively and efficiently. Applying this principle is not simple, since expectations of central bank interventions affect private incentives and can produce changes in the structure of markets.23 So central banks need to be mindful of potential unintended consequences of their implementation regimes.
Norges Bank has not set a specific target for the level of the krone exchange rate. With open trade with other countries and free capital movements, we do not have the instruments to fine-tune the krone exchange rate. The task of monetary policy is to provide a nominal anchor. The inflation target is such an anchor. Stable inflation expectations can contribute to more stable expectations concerning the krone, but the rise in public expenditure and in prices for internationally traded goods also affect economic agents’ expectations as to the krone exchange rate. Our interpretation of the mandate is included in the Inflation Report. An account is also given of how different developments, including movements in the exchange rate, will affect the monetary policy outlook. Over time, the real exchange rate will be determined by conditions other than monetary policy. The real exchange rate may be measured in a number of ways: for example, by relative consumer prices and relative labour costs between Norway and its trading partners, measured in a common currency. The real exchange rate has fluctuated considerably and has at times deviated substantially from the  BIS Review 17/2006  1  average level since 1970. Nevertheless, there has been a tendency for the real exchange rate to revert to this level. The cost level in the Norwegian economy compared with our trading partners rose sharply when the oil age began. Since then, the level has fluctuated to a certain extent without showing a clear upward or downward tendency.

Household saving is negative and over time households must be expected to seek to redress their financial imbalances. Interest rate developments and a weaker housing market will probably have a dampening impact on demand for goods and services and push up saving. On the upside, we expect sharp growth in government spending, with a marked increase in government purchases of goods and services. Petroleum investment is projected to remain high. Current information nonetheless points towards somewhat slower growth further into 2008. In the monetary policy reports, the results of this assessment are presented in the form of this chart, which shows the baseline scenarios for the interest rate, inflation and capacity utilisation in the economy. Monetary Policy Report 1/08 noted that the outlook and the balance of risks suggest that in the near term the interest rate should be set somewhat higher than projected in Monetary Policy Report 3/07. The prospect of higher price and cost inflation will in the short term more than outweigh the effects of weaker growth in the world economy. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the projections. The projections for inflation, output, the interest rate and other variables are based on our assessment of the current economic situation and our perception of the functioning of the economy. The uncertainty surrounding the projections for the interest rate, inflation and capacity utilisation is illustrated by fan charts. The wider the fan charts are, the more uncertain the projections are.
Further repo-rate cuts in April and July GDP continued to fall dramatically during the first quarter of the year, in Sweden as well as abroad, and the GDP forecast for 2009 was revised further downwards compared to the Riksbank’s assessment in February. The Riksbank also assessed that CPI inflation would fall very rapidly during 2009, which was largely due to the rapid interest rate cuts implemented at the end of 2008 and start of 2009. At the monetary policy meeting on 20 April, the repo rate was cut by 0.5 percentage points to 0.5 per cent. The repo rate was expected to remain at a low level until the beginning of 2011 (see Figure 1). In July, the assessment was that the decline in economic activity during 2009 would be slightly deeper than the assessment made by the Riksbank in April. The Riksbank’s assessment was that the repo rate and the repo-rate path needed to be even lower. The repo rate was cut by 0.25 percentage points to 0.25 per cent at the monetary policy meeting on 1 July. The repo rate was expected to remain at this low level until the autumn of 2010 (see Figure 1). The Riksbank also assessed that the cut did not represent a threat to the functioning of the financial markets. Furthermore, the Riksbank deemed that, following the cut to 0.25 per cent, the repo rate had in practice reached its lower bound.

Euro area FDI also exhibits a strong correlation between gross assets and liabilities, especially in financial centres, which points to the importance of the pass-through of financial flows for the evolution of FDI data. [7] The challenge in interpreting headline FDI data is further compounded by the large presence of SPEs in a number of euro area countries. SPEs account for sizeable shares of cross-border financial transactions and positions in FDI. Statistics on SPEs, however, remain underdeveloped, since these do not follow a harmonised international definition and data are systematically collected only for a limited set of countries. The limitations of cross-border statistics also make it difficult to analyse properly international financial exposures. [8] Although data on international financial transactions and positions have improved significantly over the past decade (in terms of coverage and details available on instruments, sectors and geographic breakdowns), visibility on the links between ultimate investors and ultimate issuers of financial instruments remains limited. [9] The identification of ultimate exposures has been further complicated in recent years by the expansion of international financial intermediation chains, which often involve nonbank entities located in international financial centres. [10] A good example of this is the difficulty in measuring foreign currency exposures in international balance sheets – for which official statistics remain sparse – although research-based datasets have recently made some inroads in this area (Chart 5). [11]  Chart 5 Cumulative distribution of net foreign currency exposures  Source: Bénétrix, A., Gautam, D., Juvenal, L. and Schmitz, M. (2020), op. cit.
We will not be able to do that without working constructively with the securities markets regulator and with infrastructure providers. Resilience, risks, and financial firm behaviour So far, I have spoken as if the external threats to the financial system from the business cycle and its capacity to withstand the crystallisation of those risks are essentially separate. That is not remotely true, of course. The behaviour of the financial system affects the weather. This is due to the particular features of the credit system. A credit boom leads both to borrowers becoming overindebted and, unless they have shed the risk, to lenders finding themselves overextended as well. As the probability of default rises, the capacity of lenders to absorb default typically becomes impaired. A double whammy. And a credit boom can fuel asset price rises, giving a boost to banks’ net worth and back into lending conditions, in an apparently virtuous circle, until it proves vicious.5 It matters enormously, therefore, that the system is prone to periods of exuberance in which credit conditions become loose, borrowers overextended and asset prices inflated. That owes a lot to myopia about tail risks.6 But incentives matter too. Whether the diluted incentives of bondholders to price risk in banks prudently, given a belief that they would be bailed out.

2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  At the regional level, the ASEAN Natural Disasters Research Works Sharing (“ANDREWS”) Committee has been formed to facilitate dialogue and information exchange between academia and insurance industry professionals on latest research and market developments relating to natural catastrophes. In Singapore, industry players have ramped up catastrophe analytics and modeling efforts rapidly in recent years. This is supported by scientific and state-of-the-art catastrophe risk research undertaken by research institutes such as the ICRM, the NUS Centre of Hazards Research and the Earth Observatory of Singapore. (iii)  Thirdly, a shortage of expertise to properly understand and assess catastrophe risks. Even where catastrophe models are employed, it is essential to overlay deep expertise and good judgment to challenge assumptions in modeling outputs, in order to have a more robust assessment and interpretation of the risks. The Thailand floods in 2011, for example, offered useful learning lessons about how there can be blind spots, without a deep understanding of the underlying risks: (a)  Thailand was not even designated by insurers as a catastrophe-prone prior to the floods, despite the potential risks and exposures;  (b)  Secondary losses arising from the business interruption claims were heavily underestimated; and  (c)  The accumulation of risks arising from Japanese cedants relocating their supply and production chains to Thailand from Japan, which had been hit with an earthquake and tsunami just months before, was generally overlooked.
I visited a commune and listened to an old woman singing praises of Chairman Mao and the Liberation. I have visited China regularly since then. I have seen China's transformation through the decades - not just the physical transformation but also the change in mindset and values of the people. Pop songs have replaced revolutionary songs. Gucci, Armani and other luxury brands are worn instead of Mao jackets. The communes have given way to industrial parks, like the Suzhou Industrial Park, an integrated township which Singapore helped build. And golf has become popular in China. Most analysts project China to continue to grow by 8% per year over the next 10 years. I share this optimism. However, we should not underestimate the immense challenges before China. The Chinese leaders certainly do not. Premier Wen Jiabao once explained to me the magnitude of China's problems through the concept of "division and multiplication". He said that China's resources become very small when divided by 1.3 billion people, while a small problem becomes huge when multiplied by 1.3 billion. Despite the tremendous changes, China is still underdeveloped and suffers from great imbalances in its development. Beijing's top priority now is to spread the fruits of development more widely. The government recognises the risks for the country if growth in the coastal provinces is not spread to the inland provinces. I believe that Chinese leaders have the capability and the will to do what is necessary to sustain China's growth and ensure political and social stability.

Goh Chok Tong: Opportunities in a New Asia – China, India and ASEAN in-between Speech Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Institute of International Finance (IIF) Opening Dinner, Singapore, 16 September 2006. *  *  *  Let me bid you a warm welcome to Singapore. I hope that your stay here will not only be intellectually stimulating and professionally beneficial but also enjoyable and memorable. The IMF and World Bank meetings were last held in Asia in September 1997. A few months before the meetings in Hong Kong, the Asian Financial Crisis had started to erupt. The crisis swept across the region, causing immeasurable damage. Pundits declared the end of the East Asian growth miracle. But Asia has bounced back. Looking at East Asia through post-Crisis lens, a 2001 World Bank report "Rethinking the East Asian Miracle" noted that Asia was still: "...the most exciting development experience available to us...the Crisis has tarnished that record only slightly and, if anything, together with the strong recovery in several of the countries, may have reinforced the conclusion that there is something very special about these countries." Indeed, there is something special about Asia. Asia had problems, and will face big challenges ahead. But never in human history has the world seen such large-scale reduction in poverty and the rise in living standards for billions in so short a time. I am therefore confident about Asia's prospects.
Chart 7: Average risk weights for major UK banks by counterparty(a)(b)  Chart 8: Average risk weights for major UK banks under different approaches (a)  Per cent 100  Per cent 120  80  100  Basel II IRB Approach Basel II Standardised Approach Basel I  80  60  60 40 40 20 0  20 (c)  Financial Households Other institutions corporates  SMEs  Sources: Bank of England, FSA regulatory returns and Bank calculations. (a) Based on June 2011 data for Barclays, HSBC, LBG, Nationwide, RBS and Santander UK. (b) Cover credit and counterparty credit exposures. (c) Financial firms other than regulated banks and investment firms are included within ‘Other corporates’. (d) Only includes data on SME credit exposures from internal ratings based portfolios. 12  (d)  0 Sovereigns  Banks  Corporates  Retail Other retail mortgage  Source: Pillar 3 disclosures, Bank calculations (a) As of end-2011. Weighted average. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 9: Survey responses to “How much do you trust risk weights?”(a)  Chart 10: Survey responses to “Has your confidence in risk-weighted assets gone up or down?”(a) Per cent 70  45% 40%  60  35% 50  30%  40  25% 20%  30  15% 20  10%  10  5% 1 - not trustworthy at all Source: Barclays Capital.

As elsewhere, a regulatory regime of constrained discretion has given way to one with too much unconstrained indiscretion. This calls for regulatory repair. Without change, the current regulatory system risks suffering, like the Chicago teachers and the LIBOR fixers, reputational damage. Fortunately, there are early signs that regulatory change is afoot to place tighter constraints on this (in)discretion. The emergence of self-regulation To understand how we ended up here, it is useful to explore the historical contours of the regulatory debate. This is a history in roughly four chapters. Chapter 1 covers the period prior to the agreement of the first Basel Accord in 1988. Until then, a patchwork of national regulatory frameworks for capital adequacy operated. Some countries set capital adequacy standards based on simple measures of bank equity to assets – a leverage ratio. Others, including in the US, used risk-based standards with risk weights set by regulators for a small set of asset categories. Chapter 2 begins with the introduction of the Basel Accord. This was a landmark agreement: the first-ever genuinely international banking accord, based around an 8% bank capital ratio, with internationally-set risk-weights applied to a small set of banks’ assets. The Accord was explicitly designed to lean against an international “race to the bottom” in capital adequacy standards (Goodhart (2011)). It also helped ensure a level international playing field. Chapter 3 commences with the Market Risk Amendment to Basel I in 1996 and continues through to the Basel II agreement of 2004.