samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This was due in part to excessively lax supervisory standards, which led to insufficient monitoring of institutions under inspection and to the underutilisation of the information available to supervisors, and which allowed the excessive growth of the “shadow banking system”. Work is now in progress to define and standardise ways in which material information on transnational institutions can be exchanged through so-called colleges of supervisors, which group together the supervisors of the countries where these institutions have a significant volume of activity. Substantial headway has been made in a short time and improved supervisory cooperation at international level and at European level (with the creation of new European supervisory authorities) will unquestionably enable more effective action. BIS Review 51/2010  3  I would like to emphasise here another dimension which the Banco de España considers crucial, namely the improvement of national supervision. The first step in achieving effective international supervision is to ensure high quality national supervision, not only of large institutions, but of the whole system, since systemic risk may flare up due to a mere contagion effect. The second step is to foster the convergence of a majority of countries towards uniform and higher-quality supervisory standards. In this respect, work is commencing on a review of the various national supervisory models with a view to developing principles based on sound supervisory practices.

There is a need to understand our competitive position, amplify our strengths and double our efforts in areas that we need to catch up. 16. For this purpose, the Financial Secretary tasked the HKMA in 2014, with the assistance of consultants, to conduct a reality check on Hong Kong’s competitiveness vis-avis our competitors and to devise a strategy to promote Hong Kong as the CTC hub in the region. 17. The reality check shows Hong Kong excels in many of the key factors that determine the competitiveness of CTCs. In terms of strengths as a business location, Hong Kong ranks third in the World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” ranking and third in the 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Global Financial Centres Index after only London and New York. We are also a leader in terms of access to capital markets. Hong Kong is a major international banking centre, with the presence of over 70 of the world’s top 100 banks. Our equity market is one of the most active in initial public offers. Benefited from the recent launch of the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, the market capitalization of the Hong Kong Exchange has reached almost $ trillion as of two days ago. As of March 2015, it was the third largest exchange in Asia and the sixth largest in the world.
The second conclusion to emerge from this analysis, therefore, is that if Malta seeks to negotiate a more advantageous form of association agreement, our exporters will only be able to secure improved access to the EU and its partners if the Maltese Government makes commitments in areas other than those covered by the present agreement, including a commitment to achieve legal equivalence with the EU Acquis. Pressures to liberalise, the costs of restructuring and the obligation of legal equivalence will arise irrespective of EU membership It could be argued that as a non-member the pace with which this legal equivalence would have to be achieved would be slower than that implied by the current enlargement calendar. In practice, however, the difference in timing is subtle. It must not be forgotten that nine other countries are also about to  10  In addition, a recent study by the World Trade Organisation shows that this is one of the regions with the lowest concentration of regional trade arrangements, a situation which is not expected to change much in the medium-term. See footnote 7 for source. 11  NSO, News Release 103/2002.

Third, the opportunity cost of staying 21 out of the EU will increase for export-oriented firms. And finally, since the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries that are parties to the Cotonou Agreement are an important source of raw materials for the EU itself, the duty-free access of their raw materials should actually benefit Malta which imports all its raw material needs. In the process local firms would, of course, also become subject to competition from countries covered by reciprocal trade agreements with the EU, and inefficient and high-cost producers in Malta could well be driven out of the market. To a great extent, however, this adjustment is already taking place, not least because the removal of import levies is well underway. Thus, while there could be some increased costs, the effects on unemployment should be limited. In any case, both the Government and the EU have mechanisms designed to assist uncompetitive firms. It could also be argued that some job losses are inevitable if we really want to give consumers a better deal while promoting the competitiveness of domestic firms. A short-term increase in unemployment, moreover, could well be reversed. This is not an unrealistic expectation. Investors from non-EU countries will find that they would be in a better position to tap the enlarged EU market by consolidating their activities in the new members than by accessing these markets separately.
The solution for improving the functioning of housing provision cannot be to force young households deep into debt with all the risks this entails. There are numerous historical examples of how such a development has created problems for both individual households and society as a whole. At an aggregated level, households have relatively high savings and substantial assets. However, since 2007, there is no information on how assets and savings are distributed among households, and consequently neither on how much savings the most indebted households have. Nevertheless, there are signs that the most highly indebted households have significantly fewer liquid assets in relation to their income than households who are less indebted. 27 Better information on household wealth is something that the Riksbank has been requesting for a long time. Structural reforms are needed to manage the challenges on the housing market I am well aware that it is not part of the Riksbank's mandate to manage problems on the housing market and that many of these issues are of a political nature. However, it cannot be disregarded that the housing market is part of Sweden’s economy and thereby affects how the economy functions. The economy becomes more sensitive to shocks if households (and companies) are highly indebted and, consequently, the housing market is of interest to the Riksbank. A poorly functioning housing market affects us all in the long term.

The circumstance that some households are willing to put off the payment of capital gains tax until the future could be a sign that the ongoing level of taxation is too low in comparison to the level of taxation from a sale. All of this makes it important to make structural reforms in housing and tax policy. Our politicians urgently need to address the problems that have arisen and take a long-term socio-economic view of the housing market. 21  0.75 per cent of the tax value with a ceiling of 7,812 kronor. 22 22 per cent. 7 [13]  The macroprudential policy measures have had the intended effect I support the measures taken by Finansinspektionen to manage the risks inherent in household indebtedness. Amortising mortgages is not unusual internationally. After all, a mortgage is a loan and should therefore be repaid. Sweden has previously stood out in international comparisons concerning amortisation culture and the high proportion of interest-only loans. 23 It is therefore reasonable that Finansinspektionen has introduced amortisation requirements. The amortisation requirements have, however, come in for some criticism. One of the arguments is that first-time buyers without high incomes and wealth are excluded from the market, which ultimately also affects new construction and the construction sector. Naturally, it is correct that the macroprudential policy measures affect the borrowing potential of mortgage borrowers. But this is also part of the actual point of the measures. All other factors being equal, amortisation requirements must also have a restraining effect on the development of prices.
Mark Carney: Crossing the threshold to recovery Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at a business lunch hosted by the CBI East Midlands, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of Directors, Nottingham, 28 August 2013. *  *  *  Introduction I’m delighted to be in the East Midlands today to deliver my first speech as Governor of the Bank of England. With leaders in retail, manufacturing, engineering, logistics, information services, biosciences and education, Nottingham and the East Midlands are integral to the success of the UK economy. The businesses here will make good on the promise of recovery in our economy. So I’m very pleased to have the opportunity to listen to business people in this region. In my years in central banking, I have found that there is no substitute for hearing directly from those who deliver economic growth. What I hear from businesses here and elsewhere is that a renewed recovery is taking hold amid a rising tide of optimism. The signs are that this recovery is broad based and set to continue. This is welcome and should be encouraged. Over the past five years, a pervasive sense of uncertainty has held the economy back. The British people have been through the virtual collapse of the financial system, the worst recession in living memory, large job losses, falls in real wages and a, at times harrowing, crisis in the euro area, our most important trading partner.

On the other hand, we can take risk onto our balance sheet should we regard this as absolutely necessary in order to fulfil our mandate. In this respect, the lesson learned from the crisis is that, in good times, we need to ensure that our balance sheet is as robust as possible, so that we can burden it in bad times. Finally, in terms of staff, our independence is expressed by the fact that the members of the SNB executive bodies – the Governing Board members and their deputies – are appointed by the Federal Council for a fixed and comparatively long term of six years.5 Ladies and Gentlemen, our independence is not unlimited, however. First, it is not absolute but related only to our mandate. It is not we ourselves but the Swiss legislators who charge us with maintaining price stability. Incidentally, that also applies to mandates other than the monetary policy core mandate, which I will not be talking about today. The SNB has specified its monetary policy mandate and rendered it measurable. A situation of price stability prevails when the consumer price index (which is calculated by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics, and not by us) shows an average annual rate of below 2%. Deflation is also regarded as a failure to attain the objective of price stability. Where we are independent is in our choice of the means by which we fulfil this mandate. Under article 9 of the National Bank Act, we may use a great many instruments, as needed.
Second, as I’ve noted many times in the past, a symmetric inflation target means we should be averaging 2 percent inflation over time. We’ve averaged well under that 2 percent mark for the past six and a half years. With a symmetric inflation target, one could imagine moderately-above-target inflation for a limited period of time as simply the flip side of our recent inflation experience – and hardly an event that would impose great costs on the economy. The murky state of inflation expectations is another factor that enters my risk-management considerations. For inflation to take off rapidly, we would have to see a jump in inflationary expectations. But inflationary expectations have been quite stable. Indeed, we may be facing a quite different problem. Many forecasters – myself included – assume that stable 2 percent inflation expectations will be an important factor helping to pull actual inflation up. Over the past five years, professional forecasters’ projections for long-run inflation have been at the 2 percent target and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) break-evens have been flat. Yet actual inflation has only just recently made it back up to 1-1/2 percent. Moreover, we still have not seen much at all in the way of higher inflation compensation being built into interest rates or wages. So there is cause for concern that expectations might not produce as strong a pull on inflation as we hope. We can turn to the Japanese experience again to highlight this risk.

Bandid Nijathaworn: The current financial crisis, lessons learned, and future implications Keynote address by Dr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the 11th SEACEN Conference of Directors of Supervision of Asia-Pacific Economies, Bangkok, 29 July 2009. *  *  *  Distinguished Speakers, Participants, Colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to be giving this morning’s keynote address for the opening of the eleventh SEACEN Conference of Directors of Supervision of Asia-Pacific Economies under the theme: “The Current Financial Crisis, Lessons Learned, and Future Implications.” This forum gives us an excellent opportunity, at this crucial juncture, to discuss the recent global financial crisis and to share amongst ourselves the experience as well as the lessons learned, so that we can further strengthen and improve our financial systems and supervision. Looking at the agenda, it is certain that the discussion in the next two days will be a most valuable one. So far, the SEACEN economies, one way or another, have all been affected by the current global financial turmoil. As central bankers and regulators, we are faced with the important task of putting in place future regulation, and the obvious place to start is to ask the questions whether the crisis could have been prevented or mitigated in the first place, and how the lessons learned from the current crisis can be used to prevent the next crisis. These are not easy questions to answer.
William C Dudley: The economic and fiscal challenges facing Europe Testimony by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology, Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, Washington DC, 27 March 2012. *  *  *  Introduction Chairman Paul, Ranking Member Clay, and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Bill Dudley, and I am President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It is an honor to testify today about the economic and fiscal challenges facing Europe, and the Federal Reserve’s efforts to support financial stability in the United States. Financial stability enables U.S. businesses and households to maintain their access to credit and ensures sustained economic growth. This is why promoting financial stability is an important objective of the Federal Reserve, and other central banks around the world. Let me preface these remarks by stating that the views expressed in my written and oral testimony are solely my own and do not represent official views of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or any other part of the Federal Reserve System. Additionally, because I am precluded by law from discussing confidential supervisory information, I will not be able to speak about the financial condition or regulatory treatment or rating of any individual financial institution.

It would definitely be an important reference for the SMEs. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Monetary neutrality: why we can’t escape the hit to real incomes If you open an A-level economics textbook one of the first things you’ll see is something like Chart 4. The “AS” (aggregate supply) lines trace out the response of output and prices to a change in aggregate demand (represented by a shift in the “AD” line), for example from a change in the stance of monetary policy. Bank of England  Page 8  Chart 4: Monetary policy only affects real variables for a while  In the short run the supply curve is upward sloping (“SRAS”), so stronger demand can raise output as well as prices. This is more or less the relationship that A.W. Phillips had uncovered, using pre-WWI British data, in his 1958 paper2. But students are also taught that, over time, once prices adjust in full, there is no effect of monetary expansions on real output. The long-run Phillips curve – here labelled an aggregate supply (“LRAS”) relationship – is vertical. The idea that money is “neutral” – that it has no enduring impact on real output or incomes – goes all the way back to David Hume, in the mid-18th century. It also makes intuitive sense, I think. Most people would instinctively understand that one cannot permanently enrich a country simply by dolling out more banknotes. In the end, all that would do is to raise all prices and wages equiproportionately and nothing real would be affected.

Perhaps this deterred employees from seeking compensating rises in nominal pay (perhaps, in other words, the response to a given hit to real incomes depends on the degree of slack in the labour market and the wider economy). Those post-crisis years aside, there simply wasn’t much evidence on which to draw from the inflation-targeting era. That’s why the estimates in Chart 7 are relatively unstable. The fact is that we’ve never really seen anything like the hits to real income the economy has had to endure over the past couple of years. And absence of evidence isn’t evidence of absence. This uncertainty about the potential scale of second-round effects has some bearing on how monetary authorities, including the MPC, have responded to this surge in inflation. There’s long been a debate about how quickly policy should react to news about the economy. Should interest rates be adjusted immediately to a level that’s likely to be appropriate for some time? If so, one wouldn’t expect to have to make any further changes at the following few meetings (in the absence of any incoming news that alters the outlook). Or should they respond to inflationary news only by degrees, in which case there’s a natural upward slope to the near-term path of interest rates? Even having tightened policy at one meeting, there would need to be negative news about the outlook not to do so again at the following one.
We are in the process of reviewing the Microfinance Act to suggest amendments for more effective regulation of the sector, including regulation of non-deposit taking micro-credit institutions through an appropriate regulatory framework, and a unified customer protection framework for microfinance customers. We plan to issue further directions, in the period ahead, to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory mechanism for microfinance. Further, we have identified that regulation of the microfinance sector in a holistic manner is difficult because the microfinance institutions (MFIs) are regulated by a number of regulators which are exempted from the purview of the Microfinance Act. Therefore, we will convene an inter-regulatory council comprising of all regulators of MFIs during this year. 24  While we make every possible effort to put other financial institutions in order, we have to put our own house in order. In line with this, implementing an Enterprise-wide Risk Management Framework (ERM) and strengthening compliance in the bank have been identified as one of our strategic priorities. In line with new trends in central banking in the area of risk management, implementation of an ERM framework helps to move away from a ‘silo based’ approach to a ‘whole of business’ approach to risk management. ERM enables the integrated oversight of all risks across all levels, locations and departments using a uniform approach with consistent foundations and organisational arrangements for designing, implementing, monitoring, reviewing and continuously improving risk management throughout the Central Bank.

The Riksbank’s picture of what this could mean for inflation is partly based on empirical studies that have been presented in earlier Inflation Reports. These results likewise suggest that the economy is somewhat less inflation prone, though the picture should not be over-interpreted. In a world with low and stable inflation, it is conceivable that wage demands may be formulated differently. A given level of real wages can be attained with considerably smaller nominal wage increases and perhaps with greater precision. Another factor that is often mentioned in the discussion is the concept of a new economy, that is to say, how the trade-off between growth and inflation may have been modified by increased global competition and information technology. This theme has been stimulated not least by the example of the United States, where high growth has been achieved year after year without boosting inflation; but that is a topic for a separate address. Today I shall simply make two points. One is that effects of this type can enable the economy to cope with higher resource utilisation without an acceleration of inflation, that they can raise potential growth or they can lower the inflation propensity. Thus, the so-called new economy can conceivably affect the inflation assessment in the ways I discussed earlier. The other point is that demonstrating effects of this type on inflation empirically is presumably even more difficult in Sweden than it is in the United States.