samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  BIS Review 46/2003  Nominal interest rates were relatively stable from the 1800s and up to the 1950s.1 Periodically strong fluctuations in inflation resulted in substantial variations in the real interest rate from one year to the next, as we measure it in retrospect. The gold standard set the framework for monetary policy at the end of the 1800s and up to 1929.2 During the gold standard era, the central bank determined the price of the national currency relative to the price of gold. Central banks had to keep stocks of gold that could be used to stabilise the gold price by actively buying and selling gold in the market. The money supply and inflation in a country are then determined by the supply of gold on the world market. When two or more currencies are pegged to gold at a fixed price, these currencies will also have a fixed price in relation to each other. As in other systems with fixed exchange rates, this restricted the individual country’s scope for using the interest rate as an instrument to stabilise the real economy. In the interwar years, nominal interest rates were relatively high. This may primarily be ascribed to the policy of gold parity that was pursued in many countries. The aim of a number of countries, including Norway, was to strengthen the value of the national currency against gold, so as to reestablish the gold parity of the pre-First World War period.

The interest rate reductions since December 2002 reflected a change in the inflation outlook. The cuts were made in response to a weaker global economy and a sharp reduction in interest rates in other countries. In addition, Norway’s business sector has clearly felt the effects of the high level of costs and the strong krone exchange rate. The public sector has also had to scale back its activities following last year’s wage settlement. The sluggish prospects both abroad and at home have in turn influenced the Norwegian labour market and the outlook for wage and price inflation in the years ahead. The interest rate reductions this summer were carried out in larger steps than what has been customary. They were important in order to prevent inflation expectations from taking hold at too low a level. The interest rate cuts, which have also brought real interest rates down to a historically low level, will also contribute to a pick-up in growth in the economy. Relationship between short-term and long-term interest rates Interest rates with a long maturity may be viewed as a sequence of expected short-term interest rates at different future dates. Changes in expectations concerning Norges Bank’s future monetary policy may therefore influence interest rates with a maturity in excess of 1-2 months. Norges Bank’s mandate for monetary policy is well known in the market.
For some years now, monetary policy decision taking has benefited from having a clear framework and from the Bank being transparent about its analysis of the economic outlook. Yesterday, by modernising the sterling money markets, the Bank provided a similarly clear framework for how we implement those interest rate decisions. I hope it makes your jobs a little easier.

Swiss Re reported that in Asia3: (a) more than half of non-buyers dropped out of insurance purchase after conducting initial research or after making their first enquiry; and (b) another one-third dropped out after receiving specific pricing and product details. (4) There is also the view that insurance processes and services, say medical underwriting and claims processing, are non-transparent, onerous and time-consuming. FinTech and InsurTech This brings me to the potential for FinTech, or more specifically InsurTech, to help reduce the protection gap. Technology solutions offer exciting possibilities to alleviate many pain-points associated with the understanding, buying and servicing of life insurance products. To be sure, the insurance sector has always employed technology tools and is a large user of data. This is also part of the problem. A recent McKinsey report stated that 90% of insurers identified complex legacy systems as the key barrier to digitisation. It is only in the more recent one to two years that InsurTech has been recognised as a change driver. Let me cite a few examples of transformations. The move to automation can potentially replace a number of repetitive human processes in the insurance sector. Robotic process automation (or RPA) will enable quick, automatic and 24/7 gathering and processing of data. There will be other technologies that both collude and collide with how things are currently done. Consider the pricing of life insurance premiums.
44  In September 2014, money market rates were soft for several days going into quarter-end, as market participants anticipated that the ON RRP would reach its aggregate capacity on that day. According to market participants, money market lenders lent overnight funds well in advance of quarter-end at rates below the ON RRP rate to informally secure balance sheet capacity for the quarter-end date. 45  The foreign repo pool is authorized each year by the FOMC. For more background information about the foreign repo pool, see “Services for Central Banks and International Institutions.”  46  Other major central banks provide analogous services. In managing the foreign reserves of the United States, the Federal Reserve avails itself of these services when appropriate. 47  As a result, the rate paid on the pool closely tracked the interest rate achieved on temporary open market operations. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  48  We are also monitoring developments in money fund net yields versus retail bank deposit rates. Money fund management fees declined considerably as interest rates fell to near-zero levels, apparently as fund managers worked to preserve a non-negative yield for their investors. Net interest margins at banks were also compressed. It is natural to expect that this compression in margins, both at money funds and at banks, will reverse as rates move away from zero, but the magnitude and timing of this reversal in margin compression may vary among these two investment types.

Philipp Hildebrand: (The) productivity (imperative) Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at Avenir suisse, Zurich, 24 September 2007. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Just a few years ago, the weak growth of the Swiss economy was a dominant topic in public debate. For four years now, the economy has been advancing strongly. Is this merely a cyclical boom? Or has structural change taken place, affecting both productivity and the associated potential growth path? This would have far-reaching implications, not least for monetary policy. A number of factors indicate that structural change is indeed occurring and that this could ultimately result in an increase in the underlying productivity trend. However, time lags and cyclical distortions make it difficult to identify such changes. BIS Review 104/2007  1
That is one reason the Committee is placing so much importance on an effective Basel II implementation process, which brings me to my next point. Implementation issues From the outset, one of the key objectives of both Basel II and, indeed, the current Accord, has been to maintain a level playing field across jurisdictions. Since experience has shown that this was difficult to achieve even under the fairly rigid Basel I rules, the challenge will be even greater in the more flexible Basel II regime. One of the key lessons we have learned in this whole process is that having similar national rules, which are based on common international agreements, does not of itself create a level playing field. What is essential is how the rules will be applied. The success of Basel II will depend to a large extent on our ability to achieve greater convergence in our supervisory practices in implementing these rules. This will require a much higher level of cooperation among supervisors than hitherto. Home country and host country supervisors will need to work closely with each other and with banks to provide effective supervision while minimising burden and duplication of effort. Although changes in financial markets mean that these efforts would in any case be necessary, Basel II has raised the stakes. To promote convergence, the Committee has established an Accord Implementation Group, or AIG, which is chaired by Nick Le Pan, Superintendent of Financial Institutions in Canada and ViceChairman of the Basel Committee.

The industry has therefore undertaken a number of valuable initiatives aimed at responding to financial risks in the marketplace. One key example is the Report of the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II, better known as the “Corrigan report.” There is no question that the global financial system has become more interlinked, which, when combined with the introduction of new and complex products, raises the question of how well market participants could absorb a potential major financial shock in the future. In response, a group of the largest players in the global financial markets developed a series of recommendations and guiding principles to strengthen the resiliency of the financial system. Given the complexity of the subject, it is not surprising that the Corrigan report is a long and complex document. We found the same challenge in developing Basel II, I might add. But I think that this is a very valuable piece of work, and that the supervisory community can very much welcome its recommendations and guiding principles. We are certainly taking it into account in our work on the issues that I have mentioned. In reflecting on the various strands of work that are underway in both the industry and in the supervisory community, I am encouraged by the fact that many of the findings of industry projects  BIS Review 46/2006  3  such as the Corrigan report are consistent with the lessons we have learned from the Basel II process and from other strands of the Committee’s work.
Put crudely, if the KAs set out what legal powers resolution authorities needed, they did not describe the resolution transaction – how the resolution powers should be applied to G-SIBs. Work since in CMGs has confirmed the transaction is a bail-in. And, in a way, this is what the TLAC standard really represents – agreement among authorities that it is not feasible or credible to take a G-SIB apart at the operating company level during a resolution weekend. Rather the key operating companies need to be recapitalised by bail-in to support continuity in critical economic functions (CEFs), and to buy time for the subsequent reorganisation of the firm (to the degree that is required). The precise tool used, and the point in the group at which resolution powers are applied, may vary. But at the heart of all the resolution plans drawn up in the CMGs is a bail-in transaction. If TLAC implies a bail-in transaction, what is required to make this transaction work? I want to cover three dimensions: the quantity, quality and distribution of instruments to be bailed in. The principles that cover the Term Sheet provide the best guide to the policy intent. As regards quantity, the principles provide a robust minimum global standard so that G-SIBs can fail without placing the rest of the financial system or public funds at risk of loss. The principles require resolution authorities to make a prudent assumption about losses incurred on the way into resolution and the need for prudent valuation at that point.

The UK went even further in April 2018, with the Bank of England allowing a non-bank to access both clearing and settlement facilities in the RTGS system. Enhanced transparency expectations can also play an important role in ensuring that infrastructure suppliers and payment service providers continue to maintain high service levels and deliver services that create value for endusers. Slowly but surely, initiatives like these are rewriting the rules of the game in the payments industry towards heightened competition through lower barriers to entry. This is further reinforced by a gradual move towards greater sharing of customer data, such as through the EU’s Payment Services Directive (PSD2), the UK and Australia’s respective open banking initiatives. Malaysia too welcomes greater openness in its payments ecosystem and the broader financial services sector. Conclusion To conclude, allow me to reiterate that regulators should uphold a commitment to support payments innovation. The focus would be to lay the foundations for market-led innovation, by focusing on the elements of trust, connectivity, efficiency and innovation of the payment system. This will ensure that the power of digital payments is harnessed towards value creation for the real economy, while navigating the emerging risks and challenges on the horizon. Looking ahead, the pace of change in payments is only set to intensify. Payment system regulators will have to be agile in considering new ideas, while remaining steadfast in 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  safeguarding the public interest.
The terms of trade will be somewhat lower than expected in March. This is explained by the weak global growth outlook, in a context where commodity prices have already declined since the beginning of the year. In the case of copper prices, averages of $ $ and $ per pound are forecast for 2023, 2024 and 2025, respectively. For oil, the projection points to average Brent-WTI prices of $ in 2023, gradually declining to $ in 2025. Food prices have behaved in line with expectations, and a downward trajectory similar to the March Report is maintained for the near future (figure 19). Monetary policy The conduct of monetary policy has played an important part in the decline of inflation. This has called for a contractionary monetary policy, with the MPR being held constant for several quarters. Although risks to inflation persist, they have been balancing out. The Board believes that the most recent developments in the economy point in the required direction. If these trends continue, the MPR will begin a downward process in the near term. The magnitude and timing of this process will be reviewed on a meeting-to-meeting basis, taking into account the evolution of the macroeconomic scenario and its implications for the trajectory of inflation. As always, the most likely MPR trajectory is plotted through a corridor whose boundaries reflect sensitivity scenarios where the pace of inflationary convergence leads to rate adjustments different from those in the central scenario.

All this shows that there is enormous potential for the expansion of bilateral economic relations between our two countries. BIS Review 45/2005  1  Many politicians in Europe seem to forget that China, like all the other emerging economies in Asia and South America, has become one of the dynamic poles in the global economy in recent years. By contrast, Europe has trailed behind in terms of growth. This is precisely why globalisation makes sense for an economy open to international markets such as ours. For both historical and geographical reasons, our country is exposed to a considerable commercial risk in Europe: 60% of our exports are destined for European countries; accounting for 25%, Germany ranks first among our export markets. These European markets are no longer the most dynamic today, nor will they be in the future. It is essential that we step up the diversification process so as to ensure the expansion of our export sector. It is therefore in our own best interests to strengthen economic relations with Asia, in particular with China. Business relations between industrialised countries and China currently take centre stage in political discussions. In particular, harsh criticism has been levelled at China because of its exchange rate policy of pegging its currency to the US dollar despite the fact that it has made considerable progress in terms of efficiency.
The 5yr5yr inflation swap, which was previously the reference measure, currently does not provide a good signal for inflation expectations as it incorporates both RPI and CPIH components. Bank of England  Page 9  while this latest trend is encouraging it remains well above its long run average, and further above its average than the equivalent measure for the Euro area (Chart 6). Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Bank calculations. Notes: Five-year inflation, five years ahead and two-year inflation, five years ahead, derived from swaps. The instruments are linked to the UK RPI, US CPI and euro-area HICP measures of inflation respectively. UK RPI is due to be aligned with CPIH from February 2030, which will affect the pricing of the UK five-year, five-year measure. Since 2000, annual CPIH inflation has averaged 90 basis points lower than RPI inflation. In a higher inflation environment, some research has found that the distribution of inflation expectations can also matter. Views differ about the salience of this kind of historical research for the UK’s current situation but it does suggest that during periods of high inflation, such as those experienced in the US in the 1970s, the change in the standard deviation and skew of expectations in survey results might signal risks to a de-anchoring of inflation expectations, even if the median doesn’t change9.

Energy  12  See https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30347/documents/175455/default/ and https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/30347/documents/175455/default/  Bank of England  Page 11  prices would otherwise have been significantly higher and more volatile given expected wholesale gas prices, as embodied in the futures curve. The Autumn Statement extension of the EPG looks broadly consistent with the working assumption that the MPC made in the November MPR forecast. Overall as set out in the November MPC, the EPG provides much more certainty about the near term path for inflation, reducing the peak in CPI inflation by more than 2 per cent and bringing it forward to Q4. The EPG and the accompanying more targeted measures also provide more support for household incomes and demand and therefore more upwards pressure on inflation in the medium-term. The Autumn Statement also included a number of measures that will significantly tighten the fiscal position in the medium-term pushing down on activity and inflation. However, the vast majority of these measures do not come into effect until April 2025 so will have very little effect over the MPC’s three-year forecast horizon, relative to what was assumed in the November MPC. The MPC will be able to take full account of the Autumn Statement in its December policy round, and its February forecast. However, given the ongoing uncertainties, global and UK markets remain febrile and sensitive to economic and financial developments. Those putting a forecast together recently have faced the challenge of what to assume about the market implied path of interest rates.
Svensson, L (2002), “The Inflation Forecast and the Loss Function”, CEPR Discussion Paper 3365. Svensson, L and Williams, N (2005), “Monetary Policy with Model Uncertainty: Distribution Forecast Targeting”, NBER Working Paper No. 11733. Weale, M (2014), “Slack and the labour market”, speech at the Thames Valley Chamber of Commerce, 20 March 2014, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech716.pdf. Weale, M (2015), “Inflation: finely balanced risks”, speech at City and Islington Sixth Form College, 11 March 2015, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech805.pdf. Yellen, J (2014), “Labor Market Dynamics and Monetary Policy”, speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole. 20  BIS central bankers’ speeches

First, particularly where OTC markets predominate, a central bank can bring together market participants to discuss and address issues collectively. There is a rich history of collaboration between the official sector, the academic community, and industry participants to analyze existing issues, identify emerging risks, and develop guidance for financial markets. Over time, the New York Fed has led a number of such efforts. For example, the OTC Derivatives Supervisors Group addressed emerging risks of inadequate infrastructure for the growing credit derivatives markets. The New York Fed and the Board of Governors convened the Alternative Reference Rates Committee, which is currently working to identify a set of alternate reference interest rates for financial products and contracts that are more firmly based on transactions from a robust underlying market and that comply with international standards. 6, 7 Similarly, the U.K. official sector worked with a panel of market participants in developing the recommendations in the Fair and Effective Markets Review. The New York Fed also sponsors two industry groups that have long-term missions focused on best practices. The TMPG is, as you know, a group of market professionals committed to supporting the integrity and efficiency of the U.S. Treasury, agency debt, and agency MBS markets. To that end, the Group develops guidance to promote market liquidity and transparency, robust control environments, efficient market clearing, and managing large positions with care. 8 The New York FXC examines similar issues in the FX market.
The world has coped relatively well with the numerous shockwaves that have rocked the global economy in the wake of the financial crisis. Now that we are advancing on the road to recovery, policy-makers must lay the ground for a return to normalcy. We would do well to recall the words of Winston Churchill, “Success is not final, failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts”. Thank you, and I wish you a successful conference. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Our evidence suggests short-termism is both statistically and economically significant in capital markets. It appears also to be rising. In the UK and US, cash-flows 5 years ahead are discounted at rates more appropriate 8 or more years hence; 10 year ahead cash-flows are valued as if 16 or more years ahead; and cash-flows more than 30 years ahead are scarcely valued at all. The long is short. Investment choice, like other life choices, is being re-tuned to a shorter wave-length. Public policy intervention might be needed to correct this capital market myopia. 2. The short-termism debate  The short-termism debate is not new. Excess discounting of future outcomes was a familiar theme among Classical economists. For Jevons, “the untutored savage, like the child, is wholly occupied with the pleasures and troubles of the moment; the morrow is dimly felt; the limit of his horizon is but a few days off”.5 For Marshall, people acted like “children who pick the plums out of their pudding to eat them at once”.6 For Pigou, it demonstrated a “defective telescopic faculty” such that “we see future pleasures on a diminished scale”.7 And nowhere were these problems more acute than in financial markets. Keynes, himself part-time speculator, was well-aware of the perils of short-termism in investment choice, both moral and financial: “It is from time to time the duty of a serious investor to accept the depreciation of his holdings with equanimity without reproaching himself.