samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We endorse the Managing Director’s focused and streamlined Global Policy Agenda (GPA) which, amid great uncertainty and significant downward risks to the outlook, lays down a holistic policy framework to restore confidence, build up economic resilience, and help the most vulnerable countries and people. We firmly support the GPA’s advice against a premature withdrawal of policy support before the recovery has gained sufficient traction. We also strongly endorse the GPA’s call for close global cooperation in health, economic, technology and trade areas to see us through the crisis and the subsequent recovery phases. Our constituency is a heterogeneous group of countries at different stages of containing the spread of the virus and kick-starting their economies, but are all united in their common goal of safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of their citizens. Policy responses have been swift and comprehensive, including supportive fiscal and monetary packages, and innovative social protection programs. Nevertheless, in the oil importing countries in the constituency, macroeconomic stability has been undermined by increased fiscal and external imbalances and soaring public debt. The oil exporting countries have been additionally hit hard by the sharp drop in international oil prices, that not only has put significant pressure on their public finances and balance of payments, but has also derailed their long term diversification plans; while oil prices have recovered somewhat, economic activity is expected to remain subdued for some time.

We do appreciate that the System is still in a developmental phase and has yet to reach its ideal configuration. The arrival of ten new members, moreover, will not make things any easier for a time. I would nevertheless like to suggest that a collective effort be undertaken to rationalise the work of the ESCB, not least by containing the number of meetings in Frankfurt and elsewhere. The challenges posed by EMU are clearly diverse and vary from country to country as well as across time, depending on a host of factors ranging from the extent of catching-up that needs to be done and the tools available to policymakers, to the degree of cross-sectoral linkages and of consensus on the respective national strategies. In practice, however, the underlying economic causes are probably quite similar across countries, often being manifestations of macroeconomic imbalances and structural inefficiencies. As such they must be addressed sooner rather than later. Only in this way will it be possible for our countries to derive full benefit from EU membership. That probably hardly needs emphasizing in this forum because central bankers understand the importance of coherent policies designed to achieve a more efficient allocation and use of resources. At the same time, however, we are also conscious of the difficulties involved in reconciling what is conceptually desirable with what is feasible in practice.
In a system of flexible exchange rates, gold is no longer required for it to perform this function and the gold initiative is therefore unnecessary. Price stability and the stability of the Swiss franc are not determined by the share of gold in the SNB’s balance sheet, but by its monetary policy. It has achieved these goals more effectively than virtually any other central bank: average inflation has remained below 1% for the last 20 years, and never in the history of the SNB has there been such a sustained period of low and stable inflation. Prescriptions on the share of gold in the balance sheet, coupled with a sales ban, would make it considerably more difficult for the SNB to fulfil its mandate in future. For this reason, the gold initiative is harmful. In order to pursue a stability-oriented monetary policy, the SNB needs to be able to supply the Swiss economy with Swiss franc liquidity quickly in periods of crisis. The SNB’s balance sheet expands when liquidity is increased. In the aftermath of a crisis, it is critical that this newly injected liquidity be reduced again, in order to prevent an undesirable rise in inflation. Scaling back liquidity, on the other hand, reduces the balance sheet total. Given that the initiative is calling for gold to make up at least 20% of the SNB’s assets, a temporary liquidity increase would require gold holdings to be increased, too.

2  BIS Review 80/2001  Central banks have ensured the smooth functioning of markets by supplying liquidity to the banking system. Interest rates have been cut in the US, Canada, the euro area, Switzerland, Sweden, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Denmark, Japan, the UK, New Zealand, Korea and Malaysia. These cuts will contribute to mitigating the negative effects on demand, output and employment. The Norwegian economy is characterised by high capacity utilisation and strong cost inflation. The mainland economy appears to be expanding approximately in line with growth in output potential. At present, we do not have sufficient evidence to assert that international developments will change this situation. The announced increase in spending of petroleum revenues may lead to a more expansionary fiscal stance than in recent years. According to Norges Bank’s assessment, with an unchanged interest rate ahead, the probability that inflation two years ahead will be higher than 2½ per cent is the same as the probability that it will be lower. BIS Review 80/2001  3
A comprehensive assessment of our current policy package should not only look at the intended consequences and side effects that can be observed, but also weigh them up against what would have happened in the absence of our exceptional policy [SLIDE 3]. How profitable would our banking system now be had we not eliminated the 2014–15 deflation risk? The landscape for our banking system would have been somewhat dire. In a deflationary environment – and we have avoided this lethal danger thanks to our monetary policy –, the debt-servicing cost for borrowers is heavier in real terms. Defaults are more frequent, and less sustainable debts result in higher credit spreads. The risk of a debt deflation spiral then increases further. But this has been avoided in the euro area and if the price of this is a temporary reduction in bank interest margins, then it is worth incurring such a secondary side effect. 2. – Let me turn now to the price of assets and the financial cycle At the level of the euro area, we consider the financial stability situation to be overall under control. The solvency ratios of significant euro area institutions have improved continuously since 2014, reaching 15% on average in Q2 2017. Overall private debt in the euro zone diminished as a share of GDP: 128% in 2011, 122% today. Non-performing loan ratios have also declined, especially for small and medium sized enterprises. I support the recent SSM initiative for provision rules for new flows of NPL, despite all the criticisms.

Norman T L Chan: A new era of smart banking Opening keynote speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at HKIB (The Hong Kong Institute of Bankers) Annual Banking Conference 2017, Hong Kong, 29 September 2017. * * * Dr Patrick Fung, Ms Carrie Leung, Vice President Pan Guangwei, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning to all of you! The theme of my speech is “A New Era of Smart Banking”, “智慧銀行新紀元 ” in Chinese. In the last few years, we have frequently come across two comments amongst the fintech community. The first comment is that Hong Kong is very backward in fintech, quoting mobile payment developments in Mainland China as the evidence. The second is that fintech will disrupt or displace traditional banking. I must say I don’t agree with these two comments for two main reasons. First, Hong Kong has not been slow in developing and adopting fintech. It is not entirely appropriate to use mobile payment as the only benchmark for measuring the state of development in fintech. There are many other important aspects of developments that define the maturity of fintech developments, such as the use of digital or internet banking and the robustness of cybersecurity. Even in the field of mobile payments, we should appreciate that Hong Kong already has a well-developed electronic payment ecosystem. In 2015, each Hong Kong citizen had on average 2.6 credit cards, compared to 0.3 credit cards per person in Mainland China.
So how can the experience of this region contribute to a better understanding of the interplay between finance and growth and the various policy choices? The countries of emerging Europe gained experience from their own deep crises over a decade ago. In most of them, output collapsed at the start of transition. Then almost everywhere there was a banking crisis, leading to heavy private and public losses. But  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  valuable lessons were learned during the economic transformation. Some of the pressing issues were bank insolvencies, debt restructuring and privatisation. The key lesson was that everyone, including not only the general public but also the elected politicians themselves, pays a higher price when reforms are delayed. This is true even if such reforms seem painful and unpopular in the short run. Ten of the former transition economies are today members of the European Union (three of them – Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia – already joined the euro area). But EU accession was not granted automatically. Membership was not a gift. Many criteria had to be complied with, including the assessment of whether the country had a “functioning market economy” and its “capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union”. That necessitated radical legal and institutional reforms in the candidate countries. Transition Europe had no choice but to learn by experience, well before the recent global crisis, what policies were ultimately beneficial for sustainable economic growth and for the stability of the banking system.

The consistent countercyclical policies of the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Bulgarian National Bank played a key role for the good performance of the banking sector, both before and during the crisis. In the booming years before the crisis, the BNB insisted on a build-up of capital and liquidity buffers, discouraging banks from excessive asset growth and risk-taking. Some of the measures then included:   broadening the deposit base for the calculation of MRRs; gradually excluding the recognition of cash balances as reserve assets;    raising the MRR rate to 12%;    imposing additional tough MRRs on banks with excessive lending growth;    keeping the capital adequacy ratio at 12% even after our EU accession (that rate is 50% higher than the existing minimum Basel 2 rule);    keeping risk-weightings higher than what was required under the EU’s Capital Requirements Directive;    excluding the interim profits when calculating banks’ capital;    discouraging foreign currency lending (except in euro for obvious reasons);    imposing a conservative LTV threshold for mortgage loans, etc. However, when the business cycle turned down, our focus shifted towards providing capital relief, supporting liquidity, and easing lending for temporarily constrained, but solvent clients.
All these are challenges currently being shared by many countries and which Chile cannot ignore, nor can it ignore the need to gradually recover the buffers used up in the course of the current crisis. Addressing these challenges calls for measures other than those adopted to contain the crisis. Page 8 of 19  IV. To conclude  Having weathered the worst times of the crisis cannot lead us to overlook or postpone the challenges that recovery imposes on a day-to-day basis. The liquidity that the withdrawal of pension savings will cause should not create an artificial feeling of abundance because, as we know, this is only dealing with savings that will be in high need later on. These are no times for self-indulgence. No panacea has been discovered for the economy’s recovery, nor will it adjust automatically. There is no easy way to meet the challenges ahead, and there is no room for bad decisions. On the contrary, well-planned and coordinated work is imperative to confront these challenges in an economy that will emerge from this episode with long-lasting scars. The CBC has been attentive, active, and willing to cooperate throughout the last 15 months in the face of unprecedented difficulties and will continue to be so for as long as necessary. This Commission has been receptive to our contributions and has supported us in our work when we have requested it.

The withdrawal of pension savings will have a significant effect on consumption and trade-related activities next year. The fiscal stimulus will continue to be positive, in accordance with the approved budget. The Chilean economy will receive a slightly greater external boost than previously considered, with our trading partners growing by an average of 4.9% in the years 2021 and 2022, with an average copper price of USD 3.15 per pound in the same years. With this, we project that after falling between 6.25% and 5.75% this year, the Chilean economy will grow between 5.5% and 6.5% in 2021 and between 3% and 4% in 2022 (Table 1). With respect to monetary policy, our assessment of the macroeconomic scenario and its outlook leads us to anticipate that the monetary stimulus will remain high for an extended period of time, so as to ensure the consolidation of the economic recovery and the achievement of the Bank’s objectives. In particular, we foresee the Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) remaining at its minimum level for much of the 24-month monetary policy horizon. As for the unconventional measures, they will remain in place. This considers that the total stock of bank bonds acquired by the CBC under different programs—around USD 8 billion—will be maintained for the next six months, reinvesting the coupons as they mature. This excludes the purchases made under the Cash Purchase and Term Sale (CC-VP) program, which have a different objective. With respect to the FCIC, the Board has made no changes to the total amount of resources available.
Lars E O Svensson: Assessment of monetary policy in Sweden in 2009 Speech by Prof Lars E O Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS), Stockholm, 18 March 2010. *  *  *  Carl Andreas Claussen and Gabriela Guibourg have contributed to this speech. Assessments of monetary policy are important for several reasons. First, because the Riksbank has had an independent position in relation to the Riksdag and the government since 1999. This means, for instance, that the Executive Board makes the monetary policy decisions without seeking or taking instructions. The Riksbank’s independence gives its governors a great deal of power. It is therefore also important that the activities of the Riksbank can be monitored and assessed and that the governors can be called to account. A high level of transparency and regular assessments are also necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the Riksbank’s activities. Second, regular assessments also help to ensure that the Riksbank can develop its monetary policy analysis in the best possible way. Every year, the Riksdag Committee on Finance examines and assesses the monetary policy conducted by the Riksbank during the preceding years. The Riksbank compiles and publishes material for this assessment. We published such material just a few days ago. The main message in this material is that the Riksbank responded to the crisis by taking forceful measures.

The opposite  3  Alternative forecasts for the repo rate are published in the Monetary Policy Reports, three times per year. Alternative forecasts for the repo rate are also discussed ahead of the remaining monetary policy meetings, but these are not published in the Monetary Policy Updates. 4  The trend is estimated using a so-called Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter). This is a statistical method for dividing the movements of a variable into trend and cyclical components. The method can be described as a weighted double-sided moving average where greater weight is placed on observations close at hand and gradually decreasing weight on more distant observations. The output gap according to the HP method should not necessarily be interpreted as the Riksbank’s overall assessment of resource utilisation. 4  BIS Review 32/2010  applies when the gap is negative. Figure 2.d illustrates the output gap based on the two repo rate paths. Both paths resulted in negative output gaps during the forecast period, that is to say resource utilisation below the normal level. However, using the repo rate path in the main scenario gave a less negative output gap, using this measurement method, than using the repo rate path from December 2008. The lower repo-rate path thus stabilised both CPIF inflation and resource utilisation better than the higher repo rate path.
2  Faust, J and Leeper, E (2015), “The myth of normal: the bumpy story of inflation and monetary policy”, mimeo at this Symposium. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  II. Developments in global inflation  The different balance of domestic and global forces across economies can be seen in the dispersion in underlying inflation outcomes since the Great Moderation. The Bretton Woods system collapsed with the onset of the Great Inflation. Cross-country inflation correlations rose sharply from close to zero for much of the 1960s to about ½ in the early 1970s as fiscal shocks were reinforced by the global oil price shock in the absence of nominal anchors. The eventual discovery of these anchors culminating in the widespread adoption of inflation targeting heralded disinflation, with a high degree of co-movement of inflation throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly at lower frequencies (Chart 3 – top two panels). 3 By the early 2000s, inflation resembled random variations around countries’ targets, and cross-country inflation correlations fell – especially for core inflation. While the deflationary shock of the financial crisis and the rise and fall of the commodity super-cycle have boosted correlations of headline CPI, core inflation rates have actually become more dispersed. This evidence of domestic monetary sovereignty is remarkable given the ever stronger crosscountry links via commodity markets, goods and services trade, and financial channels.

The need to move the goal from merely access to well-informed usage is increasingly recognised in the development community. • The World Bank’s Global Findex Database reports that 20% of bank account owners have not used their accounts in the past 12 months. As any entrepreneur joining us at the Festival would know, user acquisition is easy. It is simply a matter of good price and good marketing. User retention is the true test of the utility that a product provides. This is where the focus needs to shift. In other words, policy, infrastructure, and services aimed at improving financial inclusion need to genuinely make a difference in people’s lives so that inclusion is meaningful and sustained. • Products need to be designed with the end-user in mind, to delight rather than to perplex with technology. What is the role of central banks and regulators in ensuring that financial inclusion initiatives stick, while safeguarding that innovation delivers responsible, stable and inclusive outcomes for those most in need? Let me make two major points in this context. •  First, FinTech must offer interoperable solutions. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  • Second, the solutions must be embedded in the broader context of people’s lives and the daily operations of businesses. Financial products need interoperable rails to reach customers effectively. Let me cite two quick examples: identity and payments. Identity is the starting point in any digital transaction.
I should first clarify that many of the aspects to which I will refer, especially those relating to the budget balance and revenue and expenditure aggregates, are based on the information provided in the Draft Budgetary Plan for 2021 which the Government published a few weeks ago. This Plan is based on the same macroeconomic forecast that underpins the Draft Budget and includes almost all the revenue and expenditure measures. There are two advantages to incorporating this information. 18  First, not only does the Draft Budgetary Plan include the budgetary outlook for the State and Social Security for 2021, but it also includes the general government outlook, and in addition, in National Accounts terms. In a country as highly decentralised as Spain, to analyse budgetary policy correctly it is essential to take account of general government. Second, the Draft Budgetary Plan does not include the increase in general government revenue in 2021 resulting from the European funds linked to the NGEU programme, nor the expenditure that these monies will fund. Accordingly, in comparison with the information contained in the Draft Budget, it provides for a more exhaustive analysis of the composition of public finances in 2021. 2.1  Main public spending measures  Overall, the Draft Budget envisages a highly significant increase of 24% in total expenditure and of 26% in primary expenditure compared with the 2020 budget outturn projection.

High uncertainty persists over the intensity of the recovery in the closing months of the year, given how the pandemic has recently evolved in Europe. The across-the-board roll-out of new containment measures to counter the health crisis might lead to a significant slowdown in the rate of growth of activity, and even to a contraction, at least in some countries or sectors. For the year as a whole, the baseline scenario of the ECB’s latest forecasts points to an 8% reduction in euro area GDP in 2020, followed by a 5% increase in 2021. The estimated contraction for this year widens to 10% in the harshest scenario (based on a greater impact of the pandemic, with more severe restrictions and a delay in any possible health-related solution), which would moreover entail a very slight recovery, of 0.5%, in 2021. As to the inflation outlook for the area, the ECB augurs a very weak increase this year, of only 0.3%, rising in 2021 to 1%, a figure nevertheless some distance off the medium-term price stability objective. 2  1.2  Recent developments in the Spanish economy  In Spain, the impact of the pandemic on economic activity has been particularly marked, and much more acute than in past recessions. GDP duly posted historical quarter-onquarter contractions in the first half of this year (5.2% in Q1 and 17.8% in Q2), essentially as a result of the rapid spread of the virus and of the measures of confinement and restriction of activity adopted to contain the pandemic.