samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Although the size of this particular scheme is limited, one hopes that it can be expanded and emulated by other banks. Such programmes are a prime example of the banking sector fulfilling its role of promoting economic growth by providing the necessary low cost funding, while at the same time contributing to the profits of the bank. It is worth noting also that competitiveness does not depend only on costs; as the crisis has reminded us, financial stability is equally essential. In Ireland for example, it was the poor governance and risky credit practices of commercial banks that drove the country into the crisis, even though the competitiveness indicators were very positive. Generally speaking, Maltese banking is run on a prudential and cautious business model and this is particularly true of the systematically-relevant banks, which manifest for example a low loan-to-deposit ratio. Nevertheless, we have stepped up our efforts, jointly with the MFSA, to ensure that the soundness of the banking system is not only preserved but also enhanced. The Joint Financial Stability Board between the Central Bank and the MFSA has contributed to major initiatives, notably amendments to the Banking Rules 09 and 12. These amendments will improve the overall coverage ratio and strengthen provisioning practices. They also boost bank capital and reserves to mitigate potential risks from lending portfolios. The amendments also address the risks arising from banks’ concentration in the real estate sector.

Reforms in the banking system need to be accompanied by structural reforms in other parts of the economy. However, this can only be possible if the economy is growing sustainably. Within the context of limited fiscal space, there is a need for the appropriate environment to encourage investment and stimulate growth in the private sector. Going forward, we need to enhance Malta’s competitive position in order to attract a higher volume of capital investment in the future. A strong education and skills base, an upgraded infrastructure and a clean and sustainable source of energy are essential elements that would pave the way for future investment. The financial sector provides an important contribution to output and employment growth in Malta. Going forward, the sector also has room for expansion in a range of activities that link it with the domestic economy in the sense that value is added in Malta by engaging the services of financial experts, lawyers, accountants and so on, but catering to demand abroad, such as in the Mediterranean region and beyond. For example, the recently announced initiative to create space for a new commercial activity in the form of facilities for Islamic banking is consistent with this vision for Malta. Enhancing our competiveness requires a constant search for new areas of activity as well as strengthening and refining the currently successful ones. It is the only way that we can ensure that the standard of living can keep increasing and that the value added of the Maltese economy can keep advancing. Thank you.
In the current operating system, Federal Reserve’s non-currency overnight liabilities are substantial and allowed to vary considerably to accommodate supply and demand shocks in the private sector.27  Currently, reserves in the banking system are abundant, with possible benefits for the efficiency and safety of the wholesale payment system.28 The estimates for 2025 indicate an expectation that reserves will decline substantially, but still remain many orders of magnitude above their precrisis level. Market contacts focus on the demand for reserves produced by the LCR as an important driver of this change. Banks that satisfy their LCR requirements with large reserve balances free up other high-quality liquid assets for the rest of the private sector. Overnight reverse repos with foreign central banks—who seek safe and money-like dollar assets to maintain liquid dollar foreign currency reserves—have grown substantially in the last few years. Part of this increase was likely a reflection of latent demand that was relieved as restrictions on these investments were relaxed,29 but part of it also represents new regulations that make it more expensive for the private sector to hold large deposits that are callable at any time. A new category of liability is the ON RRP facility, which is available to nonbanks. 30 In addition to supporting interest rate control, this facility helps the private sector adjust smoothly to various new regulations.

The HKMA has now decided that Participating AIs can include two more types of RMB assets, namely “RMB sovereign bonds issued in Hong Kong by the Ministry of Finance of China” and “RMB bond investment through the Mainland interbank bond market”, in the calculation of this limit. The above two relaxations take effect today. I believe they will help expand the scope of development for offshore RMB business in Hong Kong and provide banks with a greater flexibility in RMB asset management, which will be conducive to further development of the market. Third, the HKMA has imposed some restrictive arrangements on the inclusion of RMB assets as liquid assets in calculating the statutory liquidity ratio of AIs. As the offshore RMB market in Hong Kong becomes more mature, I believe there is room for suitably relaxing these restrictions. Since the adjustments to be made in the calculation are more complicated and technical, we shall announce the details later. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
As in other parts of the world, the recovery has been complicated by the impact of the Russian war against Ukraine, which in many countries has been simultaneously inflationary and contractionary – threatening stagflation. In the case of Iceland, the impact of the war has been mostly inflationary, initially, much less so than in countries which before the war relied on imported gas from Russia and on fossil fuels for heating and electricity generation. As electricity generation and heating in Iceland is based on domestic renewable energy, its economy has not been directly affected by the spike in gas and electricity prices which most European countries have suffered greatly from. The energy crisis mostly bypassed Iceland  Iceland has been spared the most damaging negative consequences of the war in Ukraine on its economy. Firstly, the share of exports to Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, the three countries most affected by either the war or sanctions, is relatively small compared to many European countries. Only 1.7% of Iceland’s goods exports went to these countries in 2020. The weight of imports from these countries in Iceland’s  value chain is most likely insignificant and can easily be replaced by imports from other countries. Because Iceland is a very small economy and price taker in most export markets, the loss of one market can easily be replaced by shifting to other markets.

Modest public debt gave the government significant fiscal space, and the outbreak and restrictive measures were moderate. The structure of the economy, on the other hand, with tourism-related services being the largest sector, created a large potential demand for fiscal accommodation to compensate affected firms and households, as discussed above. As in other countries, both fiscal and monetary policy were applied to respond to the pandemic with substantial easing, and the size of the fiscal measures taken were close to the average in OECD countries. Fiscal measures in response to the pandemic  Iceland’s monetary space was also substantial, with domestic interest rates being significantly above zero at the outset of the pandemic. However, the size of Iceland’s monetary space should not be overestimated. The combination of relatively illiquid currency markets, fairly strong exchange rate pass-through to prices and a long history of monetary instability limit how much the interest rate differential visà-vis abroad can narrow without a risk to inflation. Nevertheless, the Central Bank of Iceland’s policy rate was reduced to a historical low, greatly softening the blow to the domestic economy, especially the construction sector. As it turned out, the economy recovered very strongly as COVID restrictions were lifted and the Central Bank needed to withdraw the monetary stimulus and start raising interest rates earlier and at a faster pace than most advanced countries. From accommodative to tightening policy  Reversing the stance of fiscal policy has been a more gradual process.
With strong financial positions and more trade liberalization, an increasing number of firms have gone overseas, as indicated by a marked increase in Thai Direct Investment from $ Billion in 2007 to $ Billion in 2011. Second, supportive fiscal and monetary policy has helped enhance growth while continuously strengthened stability in the Thai economy. This achievement has been attributable to responsive fiscal and monetary policy, together with market-friendly regulations aimed at keeping the economy operating close to its potential. The rapid recovery from the great floods last year amid global economic uncertainty has revealed the importance of fiscal stimulus and government efforts in restoring public confidence. At the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  same time, the expansionary monetary policy stance has helped accommodate business restoration process. Third, Thailand has a strategically well placed- location for international investors to benefit from rising Asian integration. The rise of China and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) evidently provide enormous opportunities for businesses operating in Thailand to expand and prosper from enlarging market size and integrated regional supply chain. Automotive and electronics industries are prominent examples that have long gained competitiveness after establishing complex supply chain-hub in Thailand and obtaining a critical foothold in the region. Finally, the Thai financial system has been resilient to the global financial crisis. And the key reason for the banking sector’s resiliency is that our financial system remains relatively non-complex.

Prasarn Trairatvorakul: The strength of the Thai economy and future development in Thailand’s financial system Speech by Dr Prasarn Trairatvorakul, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the British Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 4 September 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, First of all, I would like to thank the British Chamber of Commerce for inviting me to give a keynote speech at this prestigious gathering. The Great Britain and Thailand have built strong economic relationship and business ties over the decades. Within Europe, the Great Britain is by far the second biggest trading partner of Thailand, accounting for 13.9 percent of total trade volume between Europe and Thailand. In terms of foreign direct investment, Britain is also the second most important investors among European nations, particularly in banking, real estate, and retail sales sectors. I, therefore, hope that Thailand and Britain will continue this strong tie both in terms of trade and investment, and to prosper together in the future. The past few years have brought us many economic surprises and challenges. After severe floods took a toll last year, Thailand is currently facing much challenge from the global economic downturn, particularly from the continued Euro debt crisis and more intensified global competition. Despite this backdrop of strong headwinds from abroad, I believe that the Thai economy will be able to sail through. I am pleased to say that during the first half of this year, post-flood recovery has been robust.
7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  In that regard, the growth of open-ended investment funds, many offering investors the chance to redeem their share in the fund at a day’s notice, is notable. They have more than doubled in size since the crisis. As they’ve grown, these funds have invested increasingly in illiquid assets. Open-ended mainstream equity funds have been joined by corporate bond, leveraged loan, commercial property and emerging market debt funds. That growth has been an important source of finance for our economy. For example, these funds hold at least a quarter of the additional corporate bonds issued by UK businesses since 2008. So their stability has economic significance. It has the potential to become a systemic issue. While there is a role for these funds in our system, they do have a structural flaw when they start holding less liquid and truly illiquid assets. Despite offering investors the chance to redeem their share at a day’s notice, they typically offer a price for the share based on the quoted market prices of the funds’ assets. But when you hold anything other than the most liquid assets, it can be difficult to realise those quoted prices in one day, especially if a fund is forced to sell in scale. It can take weeks or sometimes months. This isn’t a problem when some investors are buying in as others are selling out. None of a fund’s assets actually need to be sold to pay redeeming investors.

The purpose of this data collection is to secure and improve the information available to the Bank on conditions in money markets, benefiting our analysis of both monetary policy and financial stability. We have written to around 30 banks who we will ask to participate in this data collection exercise. The Bank and the Financial Conduct Authority are in discussion with the Wholesale Market Brokers Association, the administrator of SONIA, regarding the future evolution of that benchmark. We believe that the data we plan to collect should, in time, play an important part in providing firmer foundations for this existing benchmark. Clearly a stronger overnight unsecured benchmark will be a more attractive candidate RFR than is SONIA in its current form. However I want to be clear that the Bank will pursue this data-collection initiative regardless of the outcome of your discussions on RFRs, since we believe it to be necessary for our own monetary policy purposes, and because it is in the interests of sterling markets more broadly to have robust benchmark interest rates in sterling markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
As I have just mentioned, we encouraged banks to use their existing capital buffers, to avoid the severe tightening of credit standards that has characterised the response to shocks in the past. Recommendation on dividends Naturally, as supervisors, we cannot ignore the need to preserve capital in this situation of profound uncertainty. For this reason, we recommend that banks refrain from distributing dividends or repurchasing shares. 6  I am sure I do not need to convince you that this measure has been more controversial, and less popular in the sector, than others. The restriction on dividends has generated much debate; analysts and banks argue that this limitation may generate additional downward pressure on already depressed share prices, putting European banks at a disadvantage in comparison with their peers in the United States. I understand the controversy and the arguments made by banks, but I must again emphasise that, at times of uncertainty, it is clearly preferable to err on the side of caution than on the side of risk. In any case, the evolution of the pandemic, and its effect on the macroeconomic outlook, will be taken into account when the recommendation is reviewed, before the end of the year. Lending developments Following this initial phase, the SSM switched its focus to the assessment of risks and vulnerabilities, analysing the potential impact of the pandemic on bank balance sheets, for which purpose, the vulnerability analysis I have referred to was performed. Certainly, the economic situation caused by the pandemic is entering a second phase.

I have already mentioned on another occasion that, with the prudence due, I consider that the set of measures to support lending, in the form of guarantees and moratoria, along with the regulatory and supervisory actions I have referred to, have achieved the objective of cushioning the enormous initial impact of the crisis, preventing the situation of business illiquidity from leading necessarily to a solvency crisis. In fact, according to preliminary data gathered by the SSM, following the expiry of moratoria in various euro area countries, most borrowers resume payments and only a small fraction were unable to do so. The situation is evolving and thus the response required of the sector is also evolving. Unfortunately, the disease remains with us, and this justifies maintaining many of the exceptional measures to support the economy, in particular for certain sectors. Accordingly, the Government’s decision to extend the grace period by a year and the maturity of financing with an ICO guarantee by up to three years seems appropriate to us. In any case, although the consequences of the pandemic have yet to appear on bank balance sheets, the crisis will inevitably lead to structural changes. Not all economic activity will return to its previous levels. Banks need to be preparing now for this impact. More resources need to be allocated to risk analysis and management, including the active management of rollovers and renegotiations with those customers that will almost certainly not be able to comply with their original contractual conditions.
The public’s recognition of this incentive may help hold down inflation expectations and cause inflation expectations to be more firmly anchored. In addition, TIPS may give the Treasury access to a broader investor base, which also may reduce the Treasury’s overall borrowing costs. The comparison between the prevailing interest rates on TIPS versus nominal Treasuries provides insight into the relative costs associated with issuing a marginal dollar of debt. But just as important is whether TIPS issuance, by displacing nominal Treasury issuance, reduces the level of interest rates that the Treasury pays on its nominal issuances. This would occur if TIPS were not perfect substitutes for nominal Treasury securities and if the demand for nominal Treasuries were downward sloping – that is, not completely elastic. The first condition almost certainly holds given the different attributes of TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. If they were perfect substitutes, then there would not be a liquidity premium for nominal Treasuries relative to TIPS. The second condition seems likely to hold since numerous studies have found that an increase in the net amount of Treasury borrowing leads to higher expected borrowing costs for the Treasury. How big might this effect be? That’s difficult to estimate. A few studies 6 have found that an increase in supply in a particular segment of the Treasury yield curve has contributed to a rise in yields.

In these matters, however, most decisions have to be made at the national level. But the connection with conditions for monetary policy is evident: the better the economy can be made to work, the higher the growth that can be achieved without this generating increased inflation. Monetary union is likely to accelerate the process towards increased integration in Europe. In this way it will also contribute to new demands for structural adjustment. One of monetary union’s primary purposes is, in fact, to stimulate competition and structural changes, primarily to the benefit of consumers in the EU area. At the same time, such a development will probably entail a greater degree of joint action and harmonisation in the Union. 3. Interaction As I have outlined, monetary union involves a central direction of monetary policy and a broadly national direction of budget policy, though discretion in budget policy is demarcated by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact, for instance, and is being further curtailed by the gradual extension of international integration. At the same time, structural policy is to varying degrees a common EU concern. This raises the question of how a balanced policy can be constructed in such an environment. Bodies for decision-making and cooperation One approach to this question involves describing the EU institutions that have been set up for economic policy decision-making and cooperation. •  Ecofin, as the decision-making body for the ministers of finance and economy, is the principal forum in the field of economic policy.
Mervyn King: Do we need an international monetary system? Speech by Mr Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, at the 2011 Economic Summit, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford, California, 11 March 2011. *  *  *  I am indebted to Charlie Bean, Martin Brooke, Oliver Bush, Ed Dew, Katie Farrant, Andrew Hauser, Jenny Scott, Misa Tanaka and Iain de Weymarn who have worked closely with me in preparing this speech, and to Michelle Wright and Rumman Khan for their excellent assistance in preparing the empirical and historical research. No country, however large or small, is an economic island. Trade has always been the key to faster economic growth and higher living standards. Some of the most successful examples of economic development have followed the path of export-led growth, and some of the most unsuccessful have not. South Korea, for example, exports the same amount of manufactures in a day as Egypt exports in a month, and its GDP per head is now five times higher. And trade is not restricted to goods. The days when trade was measured by weight or volume of cargo through our ports have, by and large, gone. Services account for around a fifth of world trade, a proportion that is growing. The expansion of trade in services is related to the rise of technologies that make it easier to transmit services around the world.

These are some of our unique strengths, and it is not easy for others to replicate them, at least in the short term. With all these developments, where should we go next? At the policy level, I believe it would be important to build an effective two-way channel to increase interaction between the RMB onshore and offshore markets. A potential area that can be explored is to promote the use of RMB for conducting crossborder real economic activities such as FDI and ODI. Given the significant share of Hong Kong in Mainland’s FDI and ODI, building such a two-way channel will also be conducive to the sustainable development of the offshore RMB market in Hong Kong. On this, I am glad to see that the People’s Bank of China has, as I briefly mentioned a few minutes ago, recently launched a pilot scheme, under which ODIs by Mainland Chinese enterprises are allowed to be settled in RMB upon approval of relevant Mainland authorities. As for FDI in RMB, there have already been some pilot cases (such as McDonald’s) and it is hoped that the relevant arrangement can be formalised in due course. Apart from FDI and ODI, we have been in close communication with the Mainland authorities to explore other possible channels. In particular, we welcome the announcement of the People’s Bank of China in August last year regarding the introduction of a pilot scheme allowing eligible entities in Hong Kong to make use of their RMB funds to invest in the Mainland’s interbank bond market.