samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
20  “Under such circumstances, any runs on banks for whatever reason became to some extent self-justifying, whatever the quality of assets held by banks. Banks had to dump their assets on the market, which inevitably caused a decline in the market value of those assets and hence of the remaining assets they held. The impairment in the market value of assets held by banks, specifically their bond portfolios, was the most important source of impairment of capital leading to bank suspensions, rather than the default of specific loans or specific bond issues.” (Friedman and Schwartz (1963)). 21  For example, Laux and Leuz (2009). 22  For example, Wallison (2008). 23  For example, Turner (2010). BIS Review 28/2010  9  Underlying both of these debates is a perceived tension between the needs of different stakeholders, in particular investors and regulators. So what broad principles might frame accounting standards if the demands of these stakeholders are to be met? Using the framework outlined earlier, these principles might include:   The importance of a common measuring rod  The G20 have committed FASB and the IASB to convergence of international accounting standards by June 2011. This is an ambitious timetable, for it is not just a meeting of two minds. There are perhaps more than 30 different accounting standards operating worldwide. Many minds need to meet if a truly international standard is to emerge. It could be argued that differences in accounting standards do little harm.

Jiří Rusnok: The changing world of central banking Keynote speech by Mr Jiří Rusnok, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the conference of the Czech Economic Society, Prague, 17 May 2021. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, members of the Czech Economic Society, esteemed guests from the Czech Republic and around the world: Let me start by thanking the organisers for inviting me to this conference. It is an honour and a pleasure to be here today to communicate some thoughts about central banks. I will split my address into two thematic parts. In the first, I will talk about central bank independence, about the central banking paradigm from the historical perspective, and about some of the challenges that central banks face today. In the second, I will try to shed some light on the humdrum reality of our monetary policy decision-making during the Covid crisis. I say that with tongue in cheek, because, as you know, real-life decision-making is fortunately never humdrum. Let’s turn the clock back a few decades and briefly remind ourselves how central banks gained their independence and what consequences it had. This will help us understand the framework in which central banks have long been operating and the it is now facing. How did central banks gain their independence? Central bank independence stands on theoretical and empirical foundations.
They will help economies to reap the full benefits of belonging to the Single Market and to the Economic and Monetary Union. They will help societies to sustain social models which would otherwise be debased by the permanent output loss caused by the crisis, and the related loss of tax revenues.16 I should add that there is a need for reforms in all euro area countries, including the larger ones, albeit to varying degrees and in different areas. Even if a euro area country doesn’t feel the pressure of financial markets and programme conditionality, its government should take seriously the responsibility to carry out necessary reforms that will ultimately support growth elsewhere in the region. And it is the responsibility of all euro area governments, jointly, to advance the reforms outlined last December by the President of the European Council that will give stable foundations to the single currency. The Single Supervisory Mechanism is an important first step, to be complemented as soon as possible by a Single Resolution Authority and Fund; further steps towards an economic, fiscal and political union should follow, completing our Economic and Monetary Union. If there is a lesson to be learnt for all euro area countries, it will be to make sure that in the future they make the necessary changes pro-actively and not in response to a crisis. Thank you for your attention. 15  A coordinated reduction of mark-ups would lead to a similar impact on GDP growth in the adjusting countries.

1323; and Angelini E., A. Dieppe, B. Pierluigi (2013), Learning about wage and price mark-ups in euro area countries, ECB Working Paper No 1512. 14  See Gomes S., P. Jacquinot, M. Pisani (2010), The EAGLE. A model for policy analysis of macroeconomic interdependence in the euro area. ECB Working Paper No 1195. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  studies done for other countries.15 The simulations exclude the reforms that enhance total factor productivity, which I mentioned earlier. These would further add to the impact on GDP and employment. To conclude, Portugal can already count on key achievements in labour and product markets that were thought impossible only a few years ago. The support of its European partners has been and will remain instrumental in this process. Structural reforms always take time to have their full beneficial impact on the economy. Having entered the second half of the adjustment programme, these benefits should increasingly become tangible. I do not underestimate the pain that these changes inflict. But they are necessary in order to lay the foundations for robust and sustainable growth. Growth-oriented policies are no substitutes for fiscal and external adjustment: they are mutually reinforcing. If designed in a way that reduces rents and fights vested interests, they will not only improve the efficiency of the adjustment process but also its equity, to the benefit of the poorest, the youngest, and of future generations. They will support medium to long-term growth and therefore employment and fiscal sustainability.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and the economic situation Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Central Bank of Norway, at a meeting of the Troms Fish Farming Association, Harstad, 13 March 2003. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 5 March and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The Charts in pdf can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2½ per cent over time. Norges Bank sets the interest rate so that future inflation will be equal to the inflation target of 2½ per cent. Interest rates were reduced this winter in response to the change in the inflation outlook. The inflation projections were revised downwards as a result of weaker cyclical developments in the world economy, a sharp drop in interest rates internationally and a strong krone. In addition, the Norwegian business sector is feeling the effects of the high Norwegian cost level. Moreover, growth in domestic demand has slowed. Household purchasing power has been reduced as a result of higher electricity prices. The weak prospects at home and abroad are in turn having an impact on the Norwegian labour market and the outlook for wage growth and inflation in the years ahead.

On that note, I look forward to the discussion and insights that will emerge over the coming days. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Capital flows, net in % of GDP Financial account flows, in % of GDP  15 20.0  10  MK  5  Baltics  5.0 0.0  RS  LV  2017  2016  2015  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  -20  2009  -10.0  2008  BG  2007  -5.0  2006  SI  25  2005  -15  20  2004  -10  15 SEE LT BalticsHR RO AL  2003  CZ CEE  10 CESEE  2002  HU -5  EE  2001  -5  SEE  10.0  EU28 0 PL 5  2000  0  CEE  15.0  Source: Eurostat, IMF and NBRM calculations. With the occurrence of the crisis, investment ratios plunged across the board, and despite the more recent recovery, the level of investment in most of the countries is still below the pre – crisis maximum. The crisis was accompanied by rising uncertainty, increased risk premium, and most importantly, sharp reversal in the external financing. The region has been shielded partially from 2  the sudden stop, given the FDI dominance as a stable financing, and the contained bank deleveraging, amid regional initiatives (Vienna Initiative in particular). Yet, some of the countries were also caught by the crisis in the middle of rising vulnerabilities, excessive leverage in particular, which precluded faster recovery of the investment rates.

Therefore, as infrastructures are becoming increasingly interlinked, more coordination in the implementation of the default rules is vital for further mitigating risks at the systemic level. Finally, the default of Lehman Brothers was a major showcase for the severe implications of “institution-based interdependencies” between two or more infrastructures resulting from the exposures of major financial institutions participating in each of these infrastructures. Therefore, it is crucial for us to continue closely monitoring the interdependencies between individual institutions in order to assess their impact on the stability of the infrastructure. Infrastructures for OTC derivatives Let me now turn to the need to strengthen the infrastructure for OTC derivatives. OTC derivative markets have been very dynamic with a veritable explosion in outstanding contract volumes primarily over the past decade. The basic problem, however, is that this very dynamic evolution of OTC derivatives markets has outstripped development of the underlying clearing and settlement arrangements. Indeed, as the post-trading of OTC derivatives remained predominantly bilateral and non-standardised, the respective arrangements have become increasingly inadequate for coping with the growing volumes and complexity of OTC derivatives trades. This was highlighted in particular during the financial market turmoil, when higher trading activity and market volatility further aggravated the existing tensions. [The resulting processing backlogs and uncertainties about counterparty risk raised strong concerns among policymakers, as highlighted in the Financial Stability Forum’s April 2008 report 1 on the lessons from the financial turmoil.]
12.07.2017  Congressional Hearing of the Governor of the Banco de España before the Commission investigating the financial crisis in Spain and the financial assistance programme  Luis M. Linde Governor  Thank you Madam Chair, Ladies and Gentlemen. I appear before this Commission following the summons received from the President of the Congress of Deputies in connection with the publication drafted and released by the Banco de España on 16 June entitled “Report on the Financial and Banking Crisis in Spain, 20082014”. The plans to draft a report on the economic and financial crisis that first broke in Spain in 2007-2008 were considered some time ago in the Banco de España, justifiably so given that this crisis has been the worst the Spanish economy and financial system has undergone in recent decades. The Parliament’s decision last February to set up this Commission confirmed for us the advisability of drafting the Report, understanding that it could be a suitable contribution by the Banco de España to the Commission’s work. Although some of its effects have continued to the present day, the crisis may be deemed to have ended or been brought under control, in general terms, in 2015.

That hardly characterises the UK in the past five years, where inflation has averaged well above our 2% target and the real interest rate has as a consequence been pretty low. Moreover, it is by no means obvious that the UK’s economic problem is simply one of deficient aggregate demand. The limited disinflationary pressures coupled with consistently weak productivity growth suggest that the financial crisis may have wrought significant damage to the supply side of the economy. Our November Inflation Report discussed a variety of possible explanations for the weakness in productivity, relative to a continuation of its pre-crisis trend. Some of the weakness may unwind naturally as the recovery gathers pace, some may require policy intervention to fix, and some may persist indefinitely. But it seems unwise to assume that all of it will unwind with a recovery. That part of it which is attributable to a supply-side deterioration will instead be absorbed as a higher price level under a nominal income target. Of course, this issue could be addressed by adjusting the target level of nominal income down for the presumed deterioration in supply, but unfortunately we do not presently have a good handle on just how big this is.
2  BIS Review14?/2001  Inflation 1990 - 2001 Per cent 5  5  4  4  Norway 3  3  2  2  1  1  Euro area 0  0 1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  Since 1997, inflation has been higher in Norway than in the euro area. The difference partly reflects a period of strong growth in Norway, while the level of activity in Europe has been low. The higher level of inflation in Norway cannot be sustained, however, as this would undermine the basis for stability in the krone exchange rate and confidence in monetary policy. Short-term capital inflows and outflows are probably the most important factor determining movements in the krone exchange rate from day to day, from week to week and from one quarter to the next. They are governed by expectations concerning future returns. Changes in expectations concerning the future value of the krone can trigger extensive capital movements. As a rule, Norges Bank does not intervene in foreign exchange markets with a view to influencing the krone exchange rate. The krone is floating, and the value of the krone fluctuates in periods by the same magnitude as exchange rates in other open economies. Nevertheless, the prevailing stability of the krone is largely a reflection of confidence that inflation in Norway will be kept at a low level.

The asset purchases that are now part of the ordinary monetary policy toolbox involve various kinds of risk being transferred from society at large to the central bank’s balance sheet. 14 This is why the risks have increased on the Riksbank’s balance sheet. But the risk buffer that the Riksbank has in the form of equity and revaluation accounts has not grown at the same rate. This means that we need to take measures to ensure that the Riksbank has enough of a buffer for the risks that exist on the balance sheet. Generally accepted accounting principles indicate that the Riksbank may make provisions for the risk of losses existing on the balance sheet. The Riksbank has  14 A transfer of risk from the public to the central bank’s balance sheet is actually one of the channels through which asset purchases may have an effect on the economy. See CGFS (2019). 10 [13]  previously had a relatively small balance sheet, associated with small financial risks, and has therefore not needed to make provisions to complement the existing loss-absorbing buffer. However, risks have increased in recent years as new assets have been purchased and the balance sheet has grown. As from this year, the Executive Board is therefore starting to make provisions to strengthen our buffer, so that it can be used if the Riksbank should make losses. The provisions will thus form a complement to the existing equity and revaluation accounts.
On this issue, the draft of the new Bank of Thailand Act has stipulated this condition. Even though there is a need to review the draft in order to make it more effective, the Bank of Thailand strongly endorses the importance of this Act because it will provide for an up to date framework for the development of the Thai monetary system in the future. In data dissemination, the Bank of Thailand has improved the process of data collection and dissemination to ensure that they are complete, correct, and expeditiously published, such as the improvement of the M3 data, the report on buying-selling of foreign currency especially the forms F.T. 3 and F.T. 4, as well as random checks on the correctness of the report. At this point, we would like to note that the purpose of this random check is not to emphasise the use of penalties but to create awareness amongst the financial institutions the importance of data reporting to the Bank of Thailand, so that the Bank of Thailand can have an up to date database for policy decision-making. On the external data, for the first time there has been a survey and announcement of the International Investment Position (IIP), in order to correctly monitor foreign currency exposure of the Thai economic system. Also, Thailand is the 21st country ranking in the world, in compliance with the International Monetary Fund's Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).

Moreover, to ensure that the quality of the assessment of each financial institution is of the same standard and to ensure transparency in the process, the supervision report will be submitted to the Financial Institution Development Committee, which comprises the Heads of all Supervisor Teams. The Bank of Thailand’s management will meet with the Board of Directors of the financial institution to present the findings of the supervision report, and there will be a close monitoring and follow up on the directives given, as well as the points raised in the supervision report. To put in place this new supervision framework, the Court of Directors of the Bank of Thailand has approved the new structure of the Supervision Group due to be effective on the first of January 2001. Under the new organisational structure, there will be a clear separation of the three lines of work, namely supervision, examination, and research and analysis. This will provide for checks and balances within the system as well as serve to develop depth in supervision work. Moreover, a new Department of Risk Supervision and Department of Information Technology Supervision will also be set up, which will help ensure that the supervision process will be more proactive and forward looking, focusing on strategic as well as management risk. It is quite pleasing that the work, which has been undertaken, has begun to bear fruit, and we will have by the end this year a strengthened financial institution system.
From a macro point of view, credit risk derivatives are helping diversify and spread risk, under the assumption that buyers of risk will deliberately alter their own risk-return profile. But the ultimate risk remain and as a result, some sectors, such as insurance companies or pensions funds, which hitherto did not feel the direct pressure of a worsening in credit quality, may now find themselves directly impacted, had they sold such derivatives at an earlier stage. Against this background, and beyond the primary objective of achieving price stability over the medium-term, which part should central banks play to improve the functioning of financial markets and promote financial stability? Apart from their operational tasks - such as the management of money market liquidity and the monitoring of large value payment systems - central banks must endeavour unremittingly to create the conditions for the international economy to minimize misalignments in asset prices, excessive volatility, purely speculative phenomena and dangerous herding behaviour. This is the underlying message in central banks' repeated calls for prudence and caution. I would like now to address my third point, that is, the prospects of the European Union enlargement. 3. European Union enlargement  At first glance, the link between this topic and the two issues I have been dealing with up to now appears quite tenuous. Yet, while the issues arising from market integration and financial stability are of concern for many Central Banks, managing the EU enlargement is a distinctive concern of the Eurosystem.

The effective implementation of the acquis communautaire is not only a  8  BIS Review 2/2003  legal prerequisite for accession to the EU. It also implies the effective transformation of accession countries’ economic framework, which should facilitate their integration into the EU and, later, the euro area. In this context, it should be ensured that there is no discrepancy between the central banks’ formal status in the legislation and the implementation of that legislation. It is of utmost importance that all present and future Member States respect this economic and institutional ground rule of the European framework. –  Sixthly, let us not forget the present and future contribution of Central and Eastern European countries to the economic prosperity of Europe at large. It seems that this contribution might be sometimes underestimated, while the relative influence of the US economy, for instance, might be sometimes overestimated. In fact, transition economies, as a whole, are as important as the US in terms of external demand addressed to the euro area: they both enjoy the same share, i.e. 13% of our exports. And, during the last two years, transition economies contributed for two-thirds to the overall growth of our total external demand, while the US contributed for less than 0.1%. More generally speaking, Central and Eastern Europe countries are already major contributors to the overall growth on the European continent. In 2001, despite the international context, they remained at quite high a level of growth, around 2.8%.