samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Portfolios of loans can be easier for the Bank to assess from a risk perspective, as they do not embed the complex structures sometimes present in securitised assets. And securitising loans into asset backed securities – such as RMBS – is both complex and expensive for the firms, and generally only available to those large enough to have an existing securitisation programme. The ability to accept raw loan collateral means that smaller counterparties, without securitisation platforms, are not disadvantaged when positioning collateral at the DWF. Since financial instability can start with smaller banks just as easily as larger ones, expanding the universe of possible Discount Window counterparties could lead to significant financial stability benefits. Alongside the expansion of eligible collateral to loan portfolios, we have been encouraging banks to “pre-position” their collateral. Pre-positioning involves the commercial banks identifying, and the Bank of England assessing, various types of collateral ex ante, so that it need not be assessed at short notice in the event of a sudden and unexpected need to borrow at the Discount Window. Assessing varied pools of illiquid collateral can be extremely complex and time consuming. The Bank may not be able to lend much, if at all, against collateral where it has not had time to conduct sufficient due diligence. As a result, it is vital that such collateral is pre-positioned well ahead of any need to draw. One of the benefits from having a more public and transparent facility is that such due diligence is much easier to carry out.

6 Like the SLS, DWF drawings are typically structured as a liquidity upgrade – exchanging borrowers’ illiquid collateral for UK Government securities (gilts in the case of the DWF). The Bank is willing to accept a very wide range of collateral in the Discount Window – a much wider set than that which is normally eligible in the Bank’s regular open market operations. The Bank’s published documentation sets out four categories of eligible collateral (Level A to Level D). The contents of each are determined by the market liquidity of each eligible asset class. The least liquid collateral set includes own-name securities or pools of loans: that is where a borrowing bank itself has originated, or has some other close financial links to, the assets comprising the collateral. Other features of the DWF are very different from those underpinning the SLS. First, DWF borrowings typically have a term of 30-days. 7 The DWF is intended to act as a bridge in the event of a liquidity shock. For a relatively mild shock that might support a counterparty to the next regular ILTR, 8 or to planned debt issuance. For greater shocks, the solution might require more fundamental changes in the firm’s balance sheet (e.g. asset disposals). In any case, before it will agree to lend in the Discount Window, the Bank of England will need to be convinced that there is a credible path to a point where access is no longer required.
Legislation in 1942 followed the then German model, particularly in making the Bank of Japan subservient to the Ministry of Finance; and after the war, there was American influence. 1 Rosa Maria Lastra, “Central Banking and Banking Regulation”, LSE Financial Markets Group,  1996, page 285. BIS Review 33/1997  -3-  In Figures 1 and 2, I have attempted to capture some of the distinctions between these leading central banks. (Because I am concentrating on distinctions, I have omitted common tasks - such as the issuance of banknotes and acting as banker for government - which are carried out by virtually all central banks.) Figure 1 shows the UK’s “scores” in five areas, while Figure 2 adds in, by way of comparison, the other G5 countries. Mapping the distinctions is not an easy task. For instance, though in Germany a government office is responsible for banking supervision, it is central bank staff who undertake much of the day-to-day work of monitoring individual banks. In France, supervision is the responsibility of the Commission Bancaire, but its secretariat is effectively part of the Banque de France, and the Governor chairs it. And in Japan, the central bank closely monitors the large banks, though the responsibility for supervision formally rests with the finance ministry.

SME Financing and Business Linkages in Zambia – Focus Financial Services. Further, the programme will include panel discussions on policy recommendations and an interactive session. The discussion panel will, among others, cover policy issues and outline some possible recommendations for action. Chairperson As I conclude, allow me to thank the presenters and panelists for accepting to facilitate our deliberations at this Forum. I urge all delegates to engage fully in these discussions so that we can collectively develop pragmatic solutions to the financing challenges facing Zambian businesses. Thank you for listening. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Markets might then react by driving up long-term interest rates. The premature tightening of financial conditions could then trigger increased volatility in financial markets, especially in economies that have yet to emerge from the pandemic and those with higher fiscal or external funding needs. In sum, while the global economy is in a much better place compared to last year, uncertainty remains as elevated. What has changed is the nature of the uncertainty. Last year, we were uncertain how far down the economy will go, in the face of an unprecedented pandemic. This year, the uncertainty is in both directions: a much stronger recovery or a much 2/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  dampened one. SINGAPORE ECONOMY The Singapore economy had recouped in the first quarter of 2021 the aggregate output loss incurred during the pandemic. The recent tightening of domestic restrictions and border controls will cause a near-term setback to segments that make up about 8% of the economy. The consumer-facing industries (retail trade, food & beverage, and land transport services) will be most affected by the tightening measures. The travel-related industries (air transport, accommodation, arts, entertainment & recreation) are likely to see further delay in their recovery. Construction and marine & offshore engineering activity may be hindered by labour shortages from the border restrictions on the entry of foreign workers. But the economic impact of the current restrictions will be significantly less severe than during the circuit-breaker last year. The majority of businesses remain in operation.

On a different yet related note, international cross-border payment arrangements are another compelling case study on how to bring this specific domain into the 21st century. Despite not yet being overwhelmingly disrupted by digital innovations, their flaws have recently come under the spotlight thanks to initiatives such as Libra which have clearly targeted this market segment with the promise to overcome its present weaknesses. Indeed, as attested by the recent Financial Stability Board (FSB)7 and Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI)8 reports to the G20, cross-border payments still suffer from a number of long-standing frictions which hamper global trade, development and economic growth. These include, in particular, legacy technology platforms, limited operating hours and onerous compliance checks, alongside other relevant aspects such as high funding costs, weak competition or an insufficient degree of standardisation. In this light it comes as no surprise that this issue is one of the top priorities on the G20 strategic agenda for 2020. Accordingly, since last December, the FSB and the CPMI, with the support of other international organisations, have been working together on defining the necessary building blocks to deliver a global roadmap that can help achieve the required structural improvements.9 Interestingly, this reform programme, a combination of practical steps and indicative time frames, does not hinge only on technological developments.
This puts pressure on emerging economies’ exchange rates and external accounts. This is one element we have seen in the past year, with parities against the dollar posting the greatest appreciations of the last decade (figure 2). So far, the Chilean economy has been able to withstand this challenge, but the risk of these pressures intensifying is still latent. The real exchange rate has risen after the announced intervention early this year, and now its level is near its average of the past 15 to 20 years (figure 3). Among the policies that emerging economies have used to mitigate the impact on their currencies has been the adoption of foreign exchange measures. These have taken a variety of forms, including foreign currency purchases and the implementation of administrative measures. In Chile, in early January, we announced a program of reserves accumulation of 12 billion dollars, which will be completed over the course of this year. This is the equivalent of 5 GDP points, the largest since the first half of the 1990s (figure 4). To this date, we have already made purchases amounting somewhat more than 8.5 billion U.S. dollars. This program serves two purposes. The first, as we emphasized in the announcement, is to transitorily attenuate the appreciation of the peso. This should allow the productive sector to make the necessary adjustments within a context in which these pressures could remain for a long time. The program did have an effect on the peso. Without the intervention, it would have appreciated further.

This is the key element of our duty, the feature of a good banker. By being active in AML, we are simply doing our job. Any negligence on this means we are not up to the requirements of our job. We need to emphasize that the key element in the process, is the strong commitment to understand and implement it. It is very important for such commitment to come from the highest management structures of the bank. If such commitment is missing, this will be immediately shown at the structures of the bank that are directly involved in the AML process, whose functioning will be negligible and full of formalism. Within the institution, this commitment should be shown: in the preparation and approval of the internal procedures on AML (including those of knowing the client), in setting up the proper entities and appointing the responsible persons (on monitoring the AML implementation process) with the proper professional and hierarchical qualities, in rightly defining their rights and responsibilities, in giving them moral and material support, in providing qualitative and continuous training for the staff, especially for those that have direct contact with the client and analyse its ML risk profile and in keeping up a positive pressure in the institution for such process to be implemented and be continuously functioning. In one word, the climate that should exist within the institution for such issue (but not only) should favour in any instance the responsible actions being taken from the bank staff on AML.
We have already seen some EME countries with idiosyncratic factors such as Argentina and Turkey experiencing these pressures. The second source of risk is headlined almost daily in the news: the escalating trade protectionism and especially trade tension between the US and China. The back-andforth between the two countries and the unpredictability of the outcome have driven much of the macroeconomic as well as financial volatility in the past few months. Up until now, the impact of the announced tariffs between the two countries on global trade has been limited since it takes time for the effect to be fully passed through. Nonetheless, the full impact of the ongoing trade war is expected to come next year, and the series of trade disputes could be far from over. If further tariffs were carried out, supply chain and production networks across the region could be disrupted. While the trade volume would certainly be directly affected, perhaps the more serious casualty is private investment, which—as we have seen in our recent past— decline under uncertainty. To the extent that uncertainty brings about reduced investment, prolonged trade war will reduce the productive capacity for future growth and delay technological upgrading for firms. Along with the growing trade disputes, the escalation of geopolitical risks—the third source of risk that we are facing—is one of the most pronounced trends of the past few years.

We—the central bankers, credit rating agencies, and everyone in this room—must continue to be vigilant. We must maintain good buffers and build immunity. Despite many immediate challenges ahead, we also need to look at our long-term goals. Let me end by talking about something I like to do when I have some free time: hiking. There are two types of hiker. The first likes to admire the scenery, birds, trees, and the majestic mountain range far beyond, while the second only focuses on the path in front. The first inevitably trip on rocks or fallen branches, and the other sometimes looks up to find themselves lost. We cannot complete our journey only looking up or only looking down, and we need to pay as much attention to the short-term risks as we do to our long-term aspiration. I wish you all a fruitful conference this morning. Thank you very much. 6
We have often referred to the benefits of having a floating exchange rate regime in an open economy like Chile, which is regularly subject to shocks in its terms of trade and external financing. Preserving the float during good times provides exchange rate flexibility to address situations like the present one and thus promote a more efficient adjustment of the economy. It also plays a key role in preventing currency mismatches that have been so costly in other countries in the region and in Chile in the past. Thus, the period of favorable financial conditions that we have seen in recent years has not resulted in higher short-term debt or currency mismatches in the banking system or in the non-financial sector. The credibility of the inflation target of the central bank is another important asset, which provides room for monetary policy action, as are compliance with the fiscal rule and the soundness of our banking system, which is well-regulated and supervised. Free trade and diversified target markets for our exports also play a key role in ensuring that the transition to the new macroeconomic configuration is smooth. One example of its usefulness is the way in which non-mining exporters have managed to avoid the appreciation of the local currency in recent years and weather the international crisis. Despite the difficulties they have faced in some markets such as Europe and the United States, they have been able to retain global leadership positions, maintaining or increasing their shares in world trade.

In my view, portfolio flows in the opposite direction – i.e. portfolio outflows from Mainland China – will also present huge  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  opportunities to the asset management industry, especially given the fact that the Mainland economy is the single largest provider of savings in the world. Currently, outward portfolio investment (OPI) from the Mainland is only around 5% of its GDP, still far below 57% for East Asia, 42% for the US and over 100% for the UK. Our inhouse research findings show that an economy’s portfolio investment outflows as a percentage of GDP tend to grow along with the level of economic development measured by per capita GDP. So, given the huge potential outward portfolio investments from Mainland China, how will they be allocated across different financial markets? Our researchers have studied this particular subject in depth and found that the home bias is still very much there, i.e. the closer the potential investment destination to Mainland China, the more OPIs it will receive from Mainland China. As such, Hong Kong is likely to be one of the key destinations of Mainland’s OPIs and the amount of those OPIs Hong Kong will receive will increase as China’s GDP grows. Apart from being the final destination for these investments, Hong Kong can also act as an ideal launch platform for these investment flows to reach other major global markets.
Based on the kind of systematic adjustments indicated above, a tailor-made operational portfolio has been constructed. This reference portfolio serves as a basis for more traditional selections of securities. The fund’s largest holdings in terms of ownership share, both in equity and fixed income, are based on our own analyses of investee companies and countries. Chart: External managers The large majority of the fund’s investment decisions are made within our own organisation. Still, we have always used external management companies in areas where developing inhouse capabilities has not been an efficient option. Most of the external mandates have in recent years been directed to specialists in specific sectors or countries. The fund is a long-term, responsible investor. The objective of our management is to achieve the highest possible return at acceptable risk levels. Norges Bank’s work on responsible investing underpins this objective. As a long-term investor, we are dependent upon healthy and sustainable developments in investee companies and markets. Our work with responsible investment rests on three pillars: We promote international principles and standards, and express our expectations as an investor on certain issues. We exercise active ownership through voting and engagement with companies. And we integrate environmental, social and governance issues into the investment process and risk management. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart: Responsible investment I Promoting good industry standards is an effective way of safeguarding our investments and assets in the long term.

In view of such initiatives, with a worldwide and immediate scope, you will agree with me that international coordination is not an option but an obligation. 3/3
Money demand was affected by a moderate upward private sector demand for funding. Lending to private sector increased by 12.5% in July, triggered by the relatively stable increase of lending to private businesses and resurgence of lending to households. Although the banking system has eased lending standards, the Bank of Albania deems that there is still room for further easing, especially as regards credit for private investments. Developments in financial markets indicate downward risk premiums and liquidity. In the interbank market, trade volume expanded further and interest rates dropped, remaining close to the key rate and displaying low volatility. Moderate government demand for funding is reflected in refrained upward trend of government bill yields in the primary market. Additionally, the yields trend retained its trajectory, showing low inflation expectations by financial market agents. At the end of H1 2011, the situation of the financial system and banking sector was stable. The banking sector, expanded its activity and broadened its share in the country’s economy. Liquidity situation is good while the deposits by the public increased at satisfactory rates; they cover more than once the value of credits and borrowing from non-residents is low. Data indicate that lending growth rate is improving, but the credit portfolio quality continued to drop. The banking sector retains stable growth rates of net interests revenue and gross operational profit. However, tightened capital requirement to cover credit risk, led to lower net financial results of the banking sector compared to a year earlier. However, financial performance continues to be positive and concentrated.

A particular benefit was that we were able to access deeper and private information not available to analysts to run the tests; the resultant reports and briefing sessions are always attended with great interest by the market. Charlotte Gerken Executive Director, Insurance Supervision  Annex  ©2023 Bank of England
On the social level, one indicator that captures the considerable advances made in recent years is the inequality of income distribution ratio, which fell from 4.6 in 2000 to 3.8 in 2007, well below the average of 4.8 in the EU and the euro area. 3  A broad treatment of this subject is contained in Duguay, Pierre, Productivity, terms of trade and economic adjustment, remarks by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada to the Canadian Association for Business Economists, 28 August 2006. 4  Early school leavers are defined as the percentage of the population aged 18 - 24 with at most a lower secondary education and not in further education or training. 5  The education attainment level is defined as the percentage of the population aged 20 - 24 having completed at least upper secondary education. 6  Data obtained from National Commission for Higher Education NCHE Further and Higher Statistics 2008, December 2008. BIS Review 60/2009  3  The challenge ahead Despite this encouraging start to EU membership, much clearly remains to be done. An indication of the challenge ahead is provided by the gap between income levels in Malta and the EU. Measured in terms of real GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS), this gap has not been narrowing of late and in 2008 was still about 21% and 29%, respectively, below the EU and euro area averages. A useful exercise for policy purposes decomposes this income gap in terms of labour productivity and labour utilisation.

Although these imbalances declined slightly in 2016, they are still at levels similar to those in 2014, when the sectoral countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) was set at 2%. 1 Final requirements refer to the requirements that will apply after expiry of all transitional provisions, and in particular to the qualitative requirements for going-concern capital. Page 2/3  Berne, 15 June 2017 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  Second, the average interest rate margin of domestically focused banks decreased in 2016, having stabilised at a low level in the previous year. This renewed reduction in the interest margin highlights the considerable pressure which these banks continue to face in their core business, in an environment of exceptionally low interest rates. At the same time, however, banks’ net interest income and reported profits increased. This is mainly because the growth in mortgage volume more than offset the reduction in the interest rate margin. Third, the resilience of domestically focused banks remains adequate. In terms of both riskweighted assets and leverage ratios, they are well capitalised by historical standards, and their capital surpluses currently exceed the regulatory minimum requirements. SNB stress tests indicate that the surpluses at most of these banks are large enough to absorb losses under adverse scenarios. That is the SNB’s evaluation of the current situation at domestically focused commercial banks; but what about our assessment of the outlook? Here, the predominant feature is again the margin pressure that I have just mentioned.