samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In fact to varying degrees, reflecting differing assessments of how far our particular currency areas are expected to be affected by the world slowdown and different starting points, relating both to our assessment of trends in domestic demand, and of how close we were initially to full capacity, both the UK and the Euro-zone, as well as the US, have acted fairly aggressively to reduce interest rates since the autumn; and Japan has moved to more active fiscal stimulus. And if the global economic prospect, and net external demand in the industrial countries, were to deteriorate further, then it would be right to contemplate further moves in the same direction – consistently with our aim of effective price stability. What we all aim to do – as I said earlier – is to keep aggregate demand in line with the supply capacity of our economies. We have no interest in the creation of unnecessary spare capacity in our economies as a whole, nor in a fall in the underlying general price level. But that will still inevitably mean a sharp deterioration in the balance of payments of the industrial countries, collectively and probably individually, reflecting the imbalance between external and domestic demand growth in the industrial economies. And that in turn is bound to mean substantial pressure on the internationally-exposed sectors of the economy, not just in this country but throughout the industrial world, and we are already seeing ample evidence of that.

Ravi Menon: China at an inflection point – what does it mean for Asia? Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) City Lecture, London, 5 May 2016. *  *  *  Mr David Marsh, Managing Director and Co-founder of OMFIF Ms Foo Chi Hsia, Singapore’s High Commissioner to the UK Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen The China syndrome China’s size and promise have long enthralled the world. •  The dream of penetrating China’s market was colourfully captured in the words of a British commentator in the 1840s: “If we could only persuade every person in China to lengthen his shirt-tail by a foot, we could keep the mills of Lancashire working around the clock”  •  Well, war, revolution, and central planning quickly laid to rest that fantasy. Since the closing decades of the last century, the gravity-defying growth and transformation of the Chinese economy have once again stirred global imagination. •  GDP growth averaged 10% per annum during 1980–2010, ahead of virtually all other economies. China’s size, growth, and rapid integration with the rest of the world mean that no evaluation of the global economy can be complete without looking at China. •  In 2000, just 5 countries ranked China as their top export market, compared to 53 countries that ranked the US similarly.
The moving of manufacturing and services to other countries need not mean higher unemployment and lower growth if innovative forces are equally strong in the country from which the jobs are disappearing. In addition, flexibility in the labour market needs to be good. Measures to facilitate for the labour force to move between sectors are crucial, in order to avoid long-term unemployment, for example. Skills development and retraining opportunities must be offered to those losing their jobs in the sectors that are closing down. The adjustment process can be painful for those involved, but structural change is also a positive force. Lower costs and productivity gains enable investment and employment opportunities to move to other, more refined products and services. Old sectors or companies that are pushed out of the market create scope for new employment in areas where the country concerned has a comparative advantage or within domestic services production that does not compete to the same extent as the manufacturing industry. It should also be borne in mind that many rapidly-growing low-cost countries like China will probably increase their imports as much as their exports. What can we offer these countries in the future? The areas where we have comparative advantages contain future export potential and employment opportunities. Monetary policy challenges The fact that prices of imported goods have tended to be lower than we had earlier expected over a period of time raises the question of what measure of inflation we should concentrate on.

Lack of adequate logical security may be prone to technical exposure to unauthorized implementation or modification of data and program at either the network, platform, database or application level. A classic example of this type of controls is the use of user ID and password. Supervisor should be able to analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of both physical and logical access control in accomplishing financial institution's information security objectives. Integrity Supervisory objective An objective of IT supervision in an integrity area is to ensure reliability and completeness of system functionality in order to verify that data is processed in an accurate and timely manner. Supervisory areas Therefore, supervisors need to review and assess whether financial institutions have sound application control in place. In this regard, they should have control built in the procedure and programmed in the system to ensure the integrity of input, process and output. In a large financial institution using various applications, a sample of applications including core banking applications and management information system (MIS) would be examined for control adequacy. Data and system integrity can reflect the effectiveness of system development, acquisition and change control procedure. Therefore, it is necessary to cover those areas in the scope of supervision. Availability Supervisory objective An objective of IT supervision in an availability area is to ensure financial institutions' readiness for being able to run business without interruption during an occurrence of disruption.
Part of this is aversion to appreciation, and part of it aversion to variability in the exchange rate. In this sense, the high level of reserves today could be read less as an indication of fundamental strength than as an indication of the need for more progress toward completing the transition to a modern monetary policy regime. Even though reported inflation in most emerging economies has been moderate, the observed preference for nominal exchange rate stability suggests a monetary policy regime with less independence to sustain price stability over time. Emerging market economies have retained controls on cross-border capital flows, some quite comprehensive, some more selective. These come with a range of different justifications, from insulation against volatility and speculation, to protection of the domestic financial system, to limiting variability in the exchange rate or maintaining a specific objective for the level of the exchange rate. By design, these controls limit the degree of integration with the global economy and they necessarily distort incentives in ways that affect all economic and financial activity. Their appeal as a source of durable stability has diminished over time, and we now have a greater understanding of the effects they can have in lowering long-run growth potential. For policymakers in many emerging economies,  BIS Review 91/2006  3  the question is not whether to remove controls, but when and how to do it without significantly raising short-run vulnerability to financial instability.

And of course the United States, and the rest of the world, has compelling strategic and economic interests in the success of this endeavor. A more complete and successful integration of the emerging economies offers the prospect of a more prosperous and stable global economy. Thank you. 4  BIS Review 91/2006
Jaime Caruana: Presentation of the Annual Report of the Bank of Spain Address by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to the Governing Council of the Bank of Spain on the presentation of the Annual Report, Madrid, 13 June 2003. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, Twelve months ago, on presenting last year’s Annual Report, I highlighted the significance of the year 2002 as the final step in the replacement of the peseta by the euro. Some of the features characterising economic developments last year were also discernible at that point: uncertainty and a crisis of confidence prompted by a wide-ranging set of shocks to which I shall refer during this speech. This conjunction of factors is perhaps not so much the outcome of chance as it is of the fact that, in a globalised economy, shocks that might previously have had local effects now feed through rapidly and sharply to the world economy as a whole. Given this adverse external environment, it is worth reflecting on the conditions our economy should maintain to continue with the process of convergence towards the income levels of the most advanced countries. As on previous occasions, I shall commence with a brief review of the international economic environment. The world economy experienced a modest, hesitant and, in terms of its geographical distribution, uneven recovery in 2002. Against a backdrop of notable uncertainty, the growth of the main economies was lower than expected.

This is obviously the description of the policy-mix at the current juncture. Moreover, in a context of low R*, fiscal policy is more effective and gains policy space thanks to the accommodation provided by the central bank (as r < g). In turn, the effects of monetary policy, which is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB), are reinforced by fiscal policy, which becomes today one of its main “transmission channels”. But in the longer run – and in the years to come –, the greatest risk is of course that monetary policy could become subordinated to fiscal policy. If and when inflation reappears, central banks must be able to normalise their stance and increase the interest rates paid on debt. Acting too late or too little, for short-term or political reasons, can be very costly for long-term interest rates and inflation. The best way to foster the current policy-mix congruence while preventing the risk of future fiscal dominance is to establish clear and credible reaction functions for monetary and fiscal policies: For the central bank, the mandate provides a clear guidepost. Forward guidance will of course be very useful in this process, to ensure a smooth and predictable exit. For governments, policy commitments and forward guidance are perceived as less credible because of the well-known time inconsistency problem.
If the Monetary Union – now bolstered by the Banking Union – is to remain one of the great landmarks on the road to European union, the support for it needs to be renewed and strengthened. And this naturally cannot be achieved by monetary policy, or even, I would say, by economic policy, alone. Governments must press ahead with the reforms needed to make the economies of the European Monetary Union more flexible and productive, thereby spurring innovation and investment. Thank you very much. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In other words, it has become more important to inspect systems, defined in a wide sense, than to scrutinise particular commitments or market risks. Some supervision, moreover, can be carried out with the market’s assistance. By this I mean that authorities can prescribe as well as encourage a more open presentation of the institutions’ risks and profitability in different operations. Such a transparency accentuates the banks’ demands on each other as well as what customers require of their banks. These developments do, of course, call for new forms of competence and resources for the authorities. The transition from an administrative organisation to one that inspects sophisticated risk management systems in a wide sense is something of a cultural revolution. That is what central banks and financial supervisors around the world are working on intensively at present. Some have come a good way, others have more to do. Basic minimum standards for solvency and risk management, more active supervision with a stronger focus on risk, and increased transparency are also the foundations of proposals that have been presented both by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and by the Swedish Committee on Bank Legislation. In this context I want to draw attention in particular to the international work that the Director General of the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, Claes Norgren, is doing as chairman of the Basel Committee’s Capital Task Force, as a part of the cooperation in the Bank for International Settlements, and in the Banking Advisory Committee of the European Commission.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Second, during the financial crisis, especially during the fall of 2008, financial market conditions tightened dramatically even as the FOMC was cutting its federal funds rate target to zero. Monetary accommodation turned out to be insufficient to produce an easing of financial market conditions, and the economy fell into a deep recession. Over time, financial market conditions have become a much more important factor in evaluating the appropriate setting of monetary policy and the level of short-term interest rates. This reflects several factors. First, over the past few decades, as the U.S. capital markets have grown in size and scope, the U.S. financial system has become much less bank-centric. This has loosened the linkage between the federal funds rate and financial market conditions. Second, the U.S. economy and financial markets have become more interconnected globally. Thus, the impact of U.S. monetary policy has become more diffused, and financial market conditions have come to depend increasingly not only on developments in the U.S., but also on developments elsewhere. As an example, the low level of U.S. 10-year Treasury yields presumably is due, in part, to the fact that long-term interest rates in Europe and Japan are much lower. So, if the effect of short-term rate changes on financial market conditions has become less predictable and more variable over time, what implications does this have for U.S. monetary policy? From my perspective, there are three major implications that deserve attention.

No amount of computer capability will enable you to access the computers of the money centers of other countries, and of the off-shore center of the world. These are vast sum that we are talking about, directed at an opportune moment on markets which are not yet sophisticated, deep or varied and for political or financial reasons are at the time vulnerable somehow. In Thailand, for instance in 1997, the amount of non-resident baht moved in that year was 900 billion dollars when our total GNP was only 140 billion dollars. When that kind of money moves against a nation, there is really no way a reasonable defence could be made. Of course, the important powers of the world say that the country should behave itself better, but one has to ask a question why important powers of the world try to make sure that each country behaves itself, yet allows the international monetary system to behave totally as it wishes without due regard to responsibility or the misery and famine that such events could cost. The obvious answer is that all the major important money centers and funds are in the advanced countries and the major countries systems being much more diverse is less liable to collapse when there are large movements of funds in any particular sector. Banking in Thailand for instance provides 77% of all credit available in the country at this moment while in the US it is only 26%.
Perhaps my speech may have sounded somehow provoking; however I believe this is the right time for us to put a halt to some transition phenomena or impairments. Although I am aware of the numerous and complex problems, I can clearly see some light at the end of the tunnel. The chances are right there. Our duty is not to waste them. On behalf of the Bank of Albania I assure each institution, individual, company,  BIS Review 115/2008  5  undertaking or initiative that we are open to collaborate for the best of future progress and prosperity of this community. Thank you once again for your attention and hospitality. 6  BIS Review 115/2008

Aggregate data provided us with the big picture of the euro area economy and its financial markets. But the big picture was too blurry. And, at times, it was downright misleading. Money markets were a good example. After all, money markets are where the transmission of monetary policy starts. Prior to the crisis, the ECB collected microdata on these markets through the Euro Money Market Survey, the EMMS for short. This survey shed light on what was happening in the money markets during the crisis. For example, in unsecured markets, we could see that euro area banks were taking fewer counterparty risks with banks from other euro area countries. But our vision was limited. First, we didn’t collect direct information on market rates, so we didn’t know how much each market participant was paying for liquidity. If we had had a full picture of the dispersion of rates, we would have had less need to read between the lines. Second, we only published the EMMS annually, which seriously limited the potential for research and analysis. Research on a crisis that was developing by the hour could not be based on data published once a year. But we understood the shortcomings of the data and got to work. In 2016, we started to collect money market statistical reporting, or MMSR, data. The MMSR data include trade-by-trade granular data on four market segments. This means we receive full information on each trade – the maturity date, the rate, the counterparty, the collateral and more.
The Federal Reserve has cut its key rate on two occasions this autumn, which has contributed to a further downward revision of interest rate expectations in both the US and the rest of the world, including Norway. The interest rate differential between Norway and other countries can have an impact on the krone exchange rate. In the short term, however, the factors that influence the krone exchange rate vary. In periods, there seems to be a link between high oil prices and a krone appreciation, but there have also been periods when the krone has appreciated while oil prices declined. The krone appreciated when the interest rate differential against other countries was high in 2002, but as interest rates in Norway moved down to the level among our trading partners, the value of the krone fell back. In the past, we have observed that market turbulence has occurred in tandem with a weaker krone. This autumn the krone appreciated during the period of market turbulence, but has weakened somewhat in recent weeks, reflecting shifting themes in foreign exchange markets. However, it appears the krone will be a good 3 per cent stronger on average in the second half of this year than in the first half, and about 1.5 per cent stronger this year than last, which has a dampening impact on inflation. Given our inflation-targeting regime, we will be mindful of the effects of higher interest rates on the krone exchange rate when inflation is low.

Mojmír Hampl: Czechs and Austrians – even closer than they appear Speech by Mr Mojmír Hampl, Vice Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, Vienna, 14 November 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, dear guests, It is a great honour and utmost pleasure for me to speak here today. And believe me, these are not just standard nice opening words. I really mean it. As if there is anywhere I particularly enjoy visiting, it is Vienna and also Austria as a whole. And as the statistics show, the same goes for many Czechs. More than two million of us visit Austria annually, and the number is going up every year, regardless economic circumstances (not the other way around). This is not due solely to the typical and widespread enthusiasm among Czechs for skiing. Many Czechs simply like Austria as a country. It would be hard for me to find a Czech who does not feel good, safe and comfortable here. And it is no accident. So, please forgive me if I do not discuss today macroeconomic trends, the extraordinary synchronisation of economic cycles in our two countries, and factors behind continually rising mutual trade. Much of this will be surely covered in the discussion. There is something else I would like to talk about. I would like to make a personal comment about the closeness of our two countries.
Fourth, the question has been raised whether the agencies rating the securities issued by special purpose vehicles are independent enough. Growth in these agencies’ earnings in recent years has to a large extent derived from rating these securities. Rating is requested and paid for by banks. High ratings result in sales to more investors. Without high ratings, this market would be far less attractive and the agencies would lose some of their earnings. This may have generated incentive problems. In addition, the agencies, which have specialised in the assessment of corporate bonds, may have lacked the expertise to rate asset-backed securities. Fifth, there have been shortcomings in the supervisory system. As mentioned above, some German banks have taken substantial off-balance-sheet risk. In the US, neither agencies nor lending institutions have been subject to federal supervision, and the various lending institutions and brokers have operated under different regulatory and supervisory regimes with varying intensities of enforcement effort. 1 Both supervisory authorities and banks have underestimated liquidity risk. Special purpose vehicles and banks have invested in long-term assets and taken out short-term loans. The problems in the US mortgage market and the contagion effects in other financial market segments have had negative consequences for many financial institutions and banks. One US bank has gone bankrupt so far. Several US mortgage institutions have had to close or have been bought by other institutions.

Just as important as the amount guaranteed under the scheme is how quickly the deposits can be released. This will partly depend on the amount of capital in the guarantee fund. The rapid release of funds also depends on sound procedures for bank data centres and automated systems. 2  On Monday 17 September, HM Treasury issued the following statement: “I can announce today that following discussions with the Governor and the Chairman of the FSA, should it be necessary we, with the Bank of England, would put in place arrangements that would guarantee all the existing deposits in Northern Rock during the current instability in the financial markets”. On Thursday 20 September, HM Treasury specified the accounts that were covered by the guarantee issued on 17 September. The guarantee covers all accounts existing at midnight on Wednesday 19 September and all accounts in Northern Rock re-opened in the future by those who closed them between Thursday 13 September and Wednesday 19 September, inclusive. The guarantee covers future interest payments, movements of funds between existing accounts, and new deposits into existing accounts. HM Treasury also stated that it would cover existing and renewed wholesale deposits and existing and renewed wholesale borrowing which was not collateralised. BIS Review 115/2007  7  Central banks can respond in a number of ways to combat the kind of turbulence that several countries have now experienced. One response is to supply short-term liquidity, as a number of central banks have done, including Norges Bank.