samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indeed, I would like to acknowledge in particular today the very substantial contribution that Nigel has made to the business community here in Northern Ireland over the past two decades, in the face of many challenges and over a period of great change and opportunity. The Northern Ireland economy has made great progress since those days in the late 1980s and early 1990s when I came here with my CBI economist hat on. Through the 1990s and in the 2000s prior to the financial crisis, Northern Ireland achieved an average rate of growth of 3% a year – significantly above the growth rate recorded in the UK as a whole. 1 Unemployment fell by two-thirds, from over 12% of the labour force in the early 1990s to just 4% in the mid-2000s. As in the rest of the UK, the unemployment rate here in Northern Ireland has risen in the recession. But it remains below the UK average – in contrast with the 1980s and 1990s when unemployment here was significantly above the national average. There are clearly some particular challenges facing the economy here in Northern Ireland as we move into the recovery phase of the cycle. Compared with the rest of the UK, employment is more dependent on the public sector and the participation rate in the labour force is lower. Ireland’s fiscal and banking problems may well have a bigger impact on the economy here than elsewhere in the UK.

The constellation of a weaker growth dynamic and higher oil prices could, however, delay getting monetary policy back on track. Since central banks are committed to the goal of price stability, a lot will depend on the transmission of oil price increases to inflation expectations. In most industrialised countries, inflation expectations give no cause for concern for the time being. Low inflation expectations and flexible monetary policy concepts allow central bankers to carefully adjust their monetary policy for 2005, provided that it seems appropriate for business cycle reasons. 1/1
And third: I'd like to wish everyone a happy Valentine's Day. As Rihanna sang at the Super Bowl, I hope you all have someone to stand under your umbrella. Inflation Is Still Too High Economic developments over the past three years have been extraordinary. The pandemic contributed to dramatic swings in our economy - and economies around the world-that we are still grappling with today. At the onset, we experienced the deepest but also the shortest-recession in U.S. history, as well as an immediate spike in unemployment, the highest since the Great Depression. Then, along with Russia's war against Ukraine, the pandemic contributed to skyrocketing inflation, which reached 7 percent last June, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index . That's a level we had not seen for four decades, and one that is well above the FOMC's longer-term goal of 2 percent. High inflation hurts everyone, but it's hardest on those who can least afford essentials like food, housing, and transportation. Persistently high inflation also undermines the ability of our economy to reach its full potential. The Federal Reserve has a dual  1/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  mandate, set by Congress, to promote price stability and maximum employment. And price stability is essential for the achievement of maximum employment on a sustained basis. Over the past year, the FOMC has taken strong actions to bring inflation down. Although we have seen some moderation in recent months, the inflation rate remains far too high at 5 percent.

In addition, the severe supply-chain bottlenecks that initially affected this category began to improve last year, which likely contributed to the easing of prices for some durable goods in recent months. However, there are factors that may throw sand in this gear going forward. The economic resiliency of Europe and a rebound in growth in China following the end of COVID restrictions will likely increase global demand for goods. And further improvement in global supply-chain disruptions has stalled over the past few months. For example, the New York Fed's Global Supply Chain Pressure Index remains elevated relative to pre-pandemic levels. The slowest gear to turn is the one that represents non-energy services. It's influenced by the balance of overall supply and demand, and it will take the longest to rotate at the right pace for low and stable inflation. One area where we are seeing signs of this gear turning is in shelter costs. After a sharp rise, we have seen a steep decline in the rate of increase in new lease rents. Assuming this trend continues, we should see a slowing of overall rent inflation during this year. That said, we have yet to see the gears turn for inflation of non-energy services excluding housing, which is still quite elevated, averaging 3-3/4 percent over the most recent six months. Tightening Monetary Policy Taking into account the different speeds the gears are moving, it is clear that overall demand remains well in excess of supply, and inflation is running far above our 2 percent target.
Banks must hold up to 25 percent of the value of operational deposits in high-quality liquid assets, in order to withstand a 30-day stress environment. The liquidity requirement for non-operational deposits is less favorable—up to 100 percent—making it more expensive for banks to hold such deposits. 12 12 The Federal Reserve has also increased its supervisory focus on the liquidity of large banks in particular with  the Comprehensive Liquidity Analysis and Review. 13 See Marco Cipriani, Gabriele La Spada, and Philip Mulder, “Investors’ Appetite for Money-Like Assets: The  Money Market Fund Industry after the 2014 Regulatory Reform,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 816, June 2017. 14 MMFs are open-ended mutual funds that invest in money market instruments. Unlike other mutual funds, MMFs  have traditionally allowed their investors to redeem shares at a fixed net asset value (NAV) of $ per share under most circumstances. This characteristic makes MMF shares very similar to bank deposits (although they are not insured). MMFs are regulated by the Investment Company Act of 1940, which restricts their holdings to shortterm, high-quality debt. The industry can be divided into two main segments: i) government MMFs invest in 8 / 10  BIS central bankers' speeches  Treasuries and agency debt and can only lend to the private sector through repos collateralized by Treasuries or agency debt; ii) prime MMFs can also invest in private unsecured debt. Tax-exempt funds represent an additional, smaller segment, which invest mainly in municipal and local authorities’ debt.

Safe and efficient clearing and settlement have been in demand as banks’ trust in each other has weakened. In Norway, our systems have had to handle major problems in two Icelandic banks operating in our country. These problems have been handled smoothly. Times of crisis can also be a turning point, providing the opportunity for change. During the Norwegian banking crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Norges Bank and other public authorities put pressure on banks to increase their income from bank charges, including payment services. I believe that as banks have to focus even more on running a costefficient business, the incentives for developing the payment system further will be strong in times to come. For this conference we have received a large number of high-quality papers. I know that the selected conference speakers represent some of the best researchers in this field. We are especially pleased to have as keynote speakers two of the leading scholars in the economics of payments systems: David Humphrey from Florida State University and Jean-Charles Rochet from Toulouse School of Economics. Let me also extend my thanks to the three other members of the programme committee: Gabriela Guibourg from Sveriges Riksbank, Eirik Gaard Kristiansen from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and Bent Vale from Norges Bank. As I mentioned earlier, I visit Nice in the South of France quite often. And from my direct observations, I notice that France has developed very fancy methods of processing cheques.
Across firms, it is even less likely that information systems have a common mother tongue. Today, the number of global financial languages very likely exceeds the number of global spoken languages. The economic costs of this linguistic diversity were brutally exposed by the financial crisis. Very few firms, possibly none, had the information systems necessary to aggregate quickly information on exposures and risks.5 This hindered effective consolidated risk management. For some of the world’s biggest banks that proved terminal, as unforeseen risks swamped undermanned risk systems. These problems were even more acute across firms. Many banks lacked adequate information on the risk of their counterparties, much less their counterparties’ counterparties. The whole credit chain was immersed in fog. These information failures contributed importantly to failures in, and seizures of, many of the world’s core financial markets, including the interbank money and securitisation markets. Yet there are grounds for optimism. Spurred by technology, other industries have made enormous strides over recent years towards improving their information systems. Improved visibility of the network chain has transformed their fortunes. It has allowed the management of risks previously unmanageable. And it has allowed the development of business practices and products previously unimaginable. To gauge that, we begin by discussing the progress made by two well-known industrial networks over recent years – product supply chains and the world wide web. For both, a common language was the prime-mover behind a technological transformation. That transformation has delivered huge improvements in system resilience and productivity.

Senior Supervisors Group (2010), “Observations on Developments in Risk Appetite Frameworks and IT Infrastructure”, December. Senior Supervisors Group (2009), “Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008”, October. SIL International (2009), http://www.ethnologue.com. “Ethnologue:  Languages  of  the  World”,  available  at  Tett, G (2012), “Guiding light needed to cut through data fog”, Financial Times, 8 March 2012. Vise, D A and Malseed, M (2005), “The Google Story”, Pan Books. World Trade Organisation www.wto.org/statistics. BIS central bankers’ speeches  (2011),  “International  Trade  Statistics”,  available  at  17
But achieving a forward looking scenario analysis implies bringing together three “bricks”: -  A handful of severe enough but realistic transition path scenarios all the way to 2050. The NGFS is working on those and plan to publish some technical papers soon. -  Macroeconomic assumptions to capture the impact of climate change on macroeconomic variables (productivity, inflation, unemployment, etc.) -  The direct and indirect exposures of the financial system to climate risks. Here of course, disclosure can help. We are not there yet, climate risk analysis needs to rely on new methodological tools in order to deal with challenges related to long-run impacts, accounting for technological change and shifts in political priorities and social behaviour for  instance, non-homogeneity and non-linearity of impacts, and irreversibility of effects. We need to look beyond the standard one-year horizon for default probabilities that does not fit the climate agenda. c. The green economy is still in its infancy and needs to mature As time goes by and our ability to achieve a 1.5 to 2°C scenario is seriously challenged, the amount needed to finance the transition is increasing steadily. The demand for green assets is high, but the supply of green assets fails to keep up. This quantitative challenge to match demand is linked to the massive investment required to promote further development of technologies and to accompany shifts in social behaviour.

The amounts at stake vary, but as an illustration, the last Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, published last October, estimates that until 2050, the energy-related mitigation investments to limit warming to 1.5°C amount to USD 900 billion per year whereas climate-aligned bonds issued in 2018 reached USD 149 billion. Green financing requires an innovation-friendly framework: green loans, green securitisation, green covered bonds, green derivatives, green crowdfunding platforms and green private equity should all be promoted, keeping in sight our heading, which is preserving financial stability. The work of the Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance of the European Commission on green bond labels and sustainable benchmarks should be well understood as a game changer by the financial system: green finance should definitely mature, upgrade its professional standards and be “greenwashing proof”. Green finance has actually the ability to be a powerful transformational force but there will be no transition to a low-carbon future without further engagement from corporates, from large companies to SMEs. Financial institutions can provide a trickle-down effect, thanks to comprehensive CO2 disclosures or divestment strategies. But the real economy must embrace the transition on its own. Once again, appropriate public policies, like a credible carbon price, will set the proper incentives. d. Further developing the climate agenda in an inclusive manner Climate change will trigger strong distributive effects: agriculture in Sweden might benefit from an increase in global mean surface temperature while 145 million  people in China are threatened by sea rise in a +4°C scenario.
There are a number of reasons why this can be economically attractive for firms: the reinsurer benefits from cross-risk diversification; there may be tax advantages; and so on. But there are also potential regulatory drivers: the balance between the treatment of credit risk underpinned by the MA and the treatment of longevity risk underpinned by the risk margin can incentivise this choice. Whilst it is clear that reform is needed, there remains a choice of method to implement this reform. Internationally, market-consistent regimes have used a variety of different approaches to risk margin calculation. The data we gather in the QIS will help form proposals on the best way to implement reform which meets the objectives of the review. Matching Adjustment Turning to the Matching Adjustment. The Matching Adjustment, or MA, has a clear link to the investment incentives for annuity writers. As such, an MA that works will be a key plank of allowing annuity writers to support the recovery and growth, both by innovating, and by investing in long-term productive assets and in assets consistent with the government’s objectives on climate change. The MA lets a firm recognise an immediate benefit today, from future returns above the risk-free rate that have not yet been earned. So getting the MA right is critical for ensuring the right level of policyholder protection in the UK, and getting it wrong could have very severe consequences.

Timescales In preparation for the QIS, we will shortly be releasing an information request to firms which use the MA. We are asking for granular asset data, and asset and liability cashflow data, relating to 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  the relevant firms’ Matching Adjustment Portfolios under the existing regime. I’d strongly encourage firms that use the MA to engage with this at an early stage. We intend to release the QIS over the summer and it will be relevant for a broader set of firms – including both life and non-life. It will cover the MA and risk margin as well as elements of the Transitional Measure on Technical Provisions (TMTP). Whilst at the moment we are not expecting to test changes to the Standard Formula, we still encourage Standard Formula firms to participate as they may be impacted by the other changes. Participation is voluntary, but we will be writing to a variety of firms in each sector strongly encouraging them to participate. In addition we will publish the QIS templates on our website so that any firm is able and indeed welcome to participate. We would like a wide range of participation so that we and the government can understand the impact of reforms not just on the industry as a whole, but importantly on sub-sectors. The PRA will set out plans shortly on overall timelines, and how we intend to engage with firms during the QIS.
And (ii) What are the effects on the monetary transmission channels and central banks’ assessment of their policy space? 1.3. The ECB’s strategy review will be the occasion to foster the integration of climaterelated risks into the monetary policy framework These considerations among central bankers also translate into actions. The ECB, under Christine Lagarde’s presidency, decided to integrate in its Strategy Review how monetary policy can contribute in the fight against climate change. Don’t listen to those who say that this would be mission creeping, or that it would require a change of our mandate: I refuse this “call for inaction”, and climate change will affect and already affects our present price stability mandate. This will be heavy work, both in terms of macro and micro economic research – we should enrich our models to integrate the effects of climate –, and in operational methodology – we should reassess our collateral including climate risks. 2. Progress is needed on climate disclosures to allow for a consistent risk analysis There are many initiatives on disclosure – and let me pay a special tribute to the progress initiated by the TCFD (Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures) –. But the current lack of granular and comparable datasets in the field of climate risks, undermines our ability to operationalise the assessment of financial risks linked to climate change. 2.1.

Let me remind you in conclusion that we central banks cannot be “the only game in town”: to give an obvious example, only an accurate carbon pricing will allow for a full integration of climate risks into any business decision. We cannot do everything, but rest assured we will do our utmost. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and the Leverage Ratio for banks. NSFR will be applicable by 01 January 2018 and the necessary Banking Act Directions on NSFR will be issued in line with the international timeline. By implementing the Leverage Ratio, it is intended to restrict the build-up of excessive leverage in the banking sector. In addition, we intend to strengthen  Accordingly, in 2017, we will begin to  capital positions in line with minimum  monitor the level of compliance under  requirements and Basel III capital  the leverage ratio. standards. Implementing Basel III capital and liquidity standards were identified as key policy measures in the Road Map for  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  It is also our intention to finalise the Crisis Preparedness Plan, and Recovery  20  and Resolution Framework as a  framework of non-bank financial  precondition for effective supervision. institutions. Accordingly, guidelines will be issued on  The capital levels of licensed finance  recovery and resolution frameworks of  companies (LFCs) and specialised leasing  banks and the crisis management  companies (SLCs) are expected to be  frameworks will be strengthened and  strengthened further. Accordingly,  streamlined in order to minimise the  existing LFCs and SLCs will be required  adverse impact, both on the troubled  to maintain a higher minimum core  banks and, on the banking and financial  capital than the prevailing requirement  sectors as a whole. of Rs.

However, as long as the rules of the game prize short-term gain over long-term earnings stability, the temptation to cheat by  4  BIS Review 50/2002  manipulating the market will remain strong. Reforms cannot remove risk from investment, but firms can do more to promote transparency and ensure that their risks are properly disclosed. It is thus vital for firms - not just politicians and the public - to determine if there are weaknesses in legislation or regulation so that they too can correct and begin their part of the process of rebuilding investor confidence. But the present challenges are not only those of better regulation. The global economy is also facing a crisis of confidence, which interferes with investment decisions and dampens activity. Against this international backdrop, we have reacted swiftly to the changing winds that bring new risks to the domestic economy. The latest reductions in the target range are aimed at injecting further monetary stimulus in our economy. These actions are undertaken with an eye on keeping price stability in check. This is the best contribution the Swiss National Bank can make to restore confidence in the economy and promote a strong and sustainable recovery. BIS Review 50/2002  5
Over the last couple of years markets have exhibited a number of features which arguably give us a foretaste of some of the future consequences of climate change, depending on how the climate transition pans out. Here, I am thinking of the disruption to world energy and commodities markets, global supply chain problems and, most recently, the threat of food insecurity. It would be easy to attribute each of these issues to specific triggers, such as Covid or the war in Ukraine, and not think about the bigger picture or what they could tell us about the “new world”. In the “new world”, these are exactly the sort of disruptions we can expect to become more common and more severe as a result of climate change. They should not be considered as one-offs and are unlikely to just go away. It is important that firms take action now to learn the lessons from current events and make sure that they are well prepared for when similar events happen more frequently in future, for example bumpy rides in commodities markets. Thinking back to the example I discussed earlier of making sure that firms consider counterparties’ liquidity profiles as well as their capital adequacy in their credit assessments of commodities clients, investment banks should also think about how those counterparties might be exposed to climate risk.

Today investment bank businesses have bifurcated: on the one hand, you have high-volume, low-latency vanilla flow offerings in liquid markets; whilst on the other hand, you have less liquid or more bespoke businesses (in the form of financing and derivatives-based activities). Both are predicated on facilitating client activity but they present very different challenges. Investment banks tend to think of ‘Good volatility’ as the friend of liquid businesses – client flows increase, bid-offer spreads widen, and firms position themselves to deploy capital and reap the benefits. Traditionally this provides a natural risk offset to less liquid businesses during a market correction. On the other hand, the more illiquid, complex and concentrated risk books often lose revenue in periods of volatility (for example, equities autocallables – a business that has experienced growth over the last ten years – tend to suffer losses during periods of stress, and frequently make headlines). But invariably these losses tend to be masked by greater than normal returns from liquid business lines. But what if this dynamic of liquid markets and supernormal profits during a stress, which people have started to regard as the norm, doesn’t play out next time? The last decade has been an era of global financial asset appreciation. Given the changing macroeconomic backdrop, traders, investment managers, and investors will need to be alive to the financial market environment in which they run their business. They should challenge themselves and whether their assumptions have been complacent in hindsight. What if, next time, “Good volatility” turns into “Bad volatility”?