samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Let me be crystal-clear: any hypothesis of a reduction of purchases partly for Q3 or the following quarters is purely speculative. As Christine Lagarde has said, we did not even discuss phasing out at our April Governing Council meeting. Our net purchase volumes will be freely determined until at least March 2022 by our commitment to preserve favorable financing conditions for all economic agents. Our monetary policy can be patient, as the euro area inflation is well below other jurisdictions. Page 5 sur 9 III. Is the ECB efficient in its results? Over the period 1999-2007, inflation averaged 2.1%. But the inflation rate has dropped to only 1.0 % between 2013 and 2019. This is a substantial shortfall. Headline inflation in the US (CPI) experienced a similar decline of 1.1%, having dropped from 2.7% to 1.6% between the two periods, although the gap to the target is smaller. In the euro area, according to Banque de France’s analysis, two factors explain most of the gap between the observed level of inflation and our targetiii. The first one is caused by the Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis.This set of crises has durably depressed demand and therefore prices, through the Phillips curve; while the slope of the Phillips curve seems to have decreased in recent decades, it is still positive. The Phillips curve remains well alive: in the bad news of “missing inflation”, this is the good news for monetary policy.

Faced with such swings in sentiment, I want even more to stress today two ideas that are constant and consistent: (A) the ECB has been an innovative and efficient inflation-targeter, including in the Covid-crisis; (B) beyond Covid, the ECB has a powerful “quartet of tools” to keep its monetary policy as accommodative, and for as long as necessary. A. The ECB as an innovative and efficient inflation targeter In the first part of my remarks, let me try to answer three questions: is the ECB clear in its objective? is it consistent in its instruments? and is it efficient in its results? Page 2 sur 9 I. Is the ECB clear in its objective? For the ECB, like all other major central banks, our inflation objective is our lodestar. That means our definition of price stability should be simple, symmetric, and medium-term oriented. However, not everyone may perceive it this way. Hence, in the context of the Strategy Review launched by Christine Lagarde, we are currently reflecting on whether it can be communicated more clearly. To make it even simpler, we should reexamine the overly sophisticated qualifiers attached to the 2 % figure (“close to but below”). There is no benefit in appearing ambiguous about what we are aiming at. “Symmetric” refers to the fact that our objective is a target and cannot be a ceiling. Looking backwards, a central bank that has been successful in achieving its target on average will have had roughly as many episodes of inflation above its target as below.
TRICHET: The quantum leap we are asking for in surveillance of fiscal policy has to be the equivalent, in our own institutional framework, of what a federation could do. And we should not overestimate labor mobility in the U.S. and underestimate it in Europe. If I take the U.S. state with the highest unemployment and the state with the lowest, I am not that far from what we observe in the euro area, for instance in 2009 between 18% and Spain, 3,7 % in Netherlands, and between 13,6 % in Michigan, and 4,3 % in North Dakota, 4.3%. WSJ: Should senior bondholders of bank debt be forced to accept haircuts in the event of a bailout, as proposed by the European Commission? TRICHET: This is not a European concept. This is a global concept, which is discussed in particular at the level of the Financial Stability Board and of the Basel Committee It is particularly important for so-called systemic financial institutions. Very careful analysis is  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  required on the various possible options – additional capital buffers, contingent capital, bailing in financial instruments, etc. I would say for us it is still a work in progress. In any case I don’t imagine we could have a different solution in Europe than in other advanced economies. WSJ: What can be done to improve the euro zone’s growth potential?

I maintain that. WSJ: What do you think the risk is that this wrenching process will cause the breakup of the euro or its membership? TRICHET: Of course the euro is there and will be there in the future. I do not comment on what I consider absurd hypotheses. I am used to such questions from the very beginning of the euro. The paradox is that, years ago, the question was about Germany supposed to be at that time the “sick man of Europe”. I was responding that Germany was doing hard work that its economy was catching up on competitiveness. Now the same hard work has to be done by those that were growing rapidly over the past years but at the same time had lost their competitiveness. One has to accept that within a vast economy that has the size of the euro area, with 331 million people, there are economic differences. For instance when I look on both sides of the Atlantic I see that the differences between the fastest and slowest-growing U.S. states, it is more or less of the same order of magnitude as between countries in the euro area, for instance between Oklahoma and Nevada, 13 % differences in growth in 2009; between Slovakia and Ireland more than 9 % in growth in 2008. WSJ: The U.S. copes with these differences through labor mobility and a federal budget. Does the euro zone ultimately need a big federal budget?
At the same time, the pressures on the productive system appeared to be particularly strong in France. The Banque de France’s surveys indicate that the production capacity utilisation rate of over 87% is almost three points higher than its long-run average. Recruitment has become increasingly difficult: according to the INSEE surveys, 53% of industrial companies reported difficulty in hiring new staff in October 2000, against 39% in January 2000 and 32% in October 1999. This was the information available to me on 20 December 1999 when I commented on monetary policy developments in 1999. It is the highest level ever recorded in these statistics. These pressures on the productive system have been corroborated by the sharp increase in imported capital goods and manufactured products. Price stability: the monetary policy decisions of the Eurosystem The recent decisions should be assessed against the price stability objective assigned to the Eurosystem by the Treaty on European Union. In its pursuit of transparency and accountability, the Governing Council of the European Central Bank decided in October 1998 to give a precise definition of price stability as being a year-on-year increase in the euro-area HICP of below 2%. Its success in meeting this objective, which is the same as that adopted by the Monetary Policy Council for French monetary policy when the Banque de France became independent, should be assessed in the medium term.

This type of forward looking planning by country’s educational institutions is also needed for the development of a vibrant services sector in Sri Lanka. The conclusion to be drawn from the discussion so far is that Sri Lanka has missed opportunities in the past, but it need not continue to suffer in the future. It is still not too late to re-orient the economy towards the establishment of a vibrant services sector catering to the needs of the globalised industry, trade and commerce. The country’s highly literate and easily trainable work-force, investments in ICT infrastructure and conducive economic reforms will pave the way for its entry to the newly emerging globalised services industry. If Sri Lanka does not acquire its position in this newly emerging global trend, as it did during the Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa periods, it cannot be avoided to be relegated to yet another episode of missed opportunities. 8  BIS Review 4/2007
Covered bonds have mortgages as collateral for their funding and according to the regulations governing the handling of these bonds, mortgages with an excessively high loan-to-value ratio may not be used as collateral. As the covered bonds are regarded as more secure by the market, the banks had the incentive to change over to this form of funding. Moreover,  3  See, for instance, Chistelis, Georgarakos and Haliassos (2013), Differences in portfolios across countries: economic environment versus households characteristics. The Review of Economics and Statistics, March 2013, 95 (1), pp. 220–236. 4  Another explanation for the banks’ extensive market funding is that the Swedish occupational pension system means that Swedish households themselves do not save with the banks, which means that the banks must find funding in the markets. The pension funds in their turn invest substantially abroad, which means that the banks must partly fund themselves abroad. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  many banks in Europe had already introduced similar covered bonds. However, mortgage institutions were not allowed to fund the entire stock of mortgages with these bonds. To cover the remaining amount, the mortgage institutions instead began to borrow from their parent banks, which in turn to a great extent obtained funding on the financial markets. This meant that the link between the mortgage institutions, the banks and the financial markets were further reinforced, and this also increased the complexity of the funding of housing. During the 2000s, the banks’ market funding in foreign currencies also increased.

Philipp Hildebrand: The Swiss National Bank’s monetary policy strategy in the financial crisis Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, 23 March 2010. The complete text in German can be found on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  To contain the financial crisis, central banks all over the world have chosen to take advantage of the room for manoeuvre afforded by their monetary policy strategy. The major central banks were only able to act in a flexible way – at least in part – due to their high degree of credibility with regard to their goal of pursuing price stability. The monetary policy strategy of the Swiss National Bank (SNB), too, has made it possible for the Governing Board to take conventional and unconventional measures to counter the crisis. The SNB’s approach has proven viable in the crisis. But this does not mean that we can sit back now. We must first find ways to withdraw smoothly from the measures taken to contain the crisis. In addition, we need to be sure that the Swiss economy is back on a sustainable growth path. After all, the crisis has shown that imbalances in the global financial system can occur even in an environment of price stability and macroeconomic stability. The main way to counter imbalances in the financial system is through better regulation.
Annual overall inflation is projected to remain above 8.0% during the first quarter of 2011, mainly due to the following factors:   Seasonal increase in some food prices: During the first quarter of the year, there is seasonal low supply of selected food items including fish, fresh vegetables and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7    Lagged effects of money supply growth in 2010: During the second half of 2010 there was a rapid increase in broad money by over 15.0%, largely due to lending to government for the purpose of purchasing maize following the bumper harvest. 57. However, the Bank of Zambia will continue to monitor developments and undertake appropriate monetary policy actions to ensure that monetary targets are achieved. To contain growth of money supply within the programmed path, Bank of Zambia will continue to employ open market operations and auctioning of Government securities. This is expected to be complemented by prudent fiscal operations. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Norges Bank has adopted a set of recognised international standards for corporate governance and the exercise of ownership rights and takes an active part in their further development. The GPFG’s expectation documents and voting guidelines clearly express the bank’s priorities as a long-term owner. We exercise our ownership rights by voting at shareholder meetings and engaging in dialogue with companies. On 7 April, we announced the GPFG’s first investment in unlisted renewable energy infrastructure, ie a 50 percent stake in the world’s next largest offshore wind farm off the Dutch coast. Unlisted renewable energy infrastructure is still a relatively new area for Norges Bank. We intend to build up the portfolio gradually, primarily through investments in wind and solar power. We will prioritise investments that contribute to improving the overall risk-return tradeoff in the GPFG. Management of the GPFG is to be cost-efficient, and the Executive Board monitors cost developments closely. Earlier this month, Norges Bank announced a revised strategy describing how we will fulfil the investment mandate ahead. The strategy plan expresses our ambitions and our overall aim of achieving the highest possible return after costs. Our ambitions are high. As they should be. Nonetheless, we still aim to be a small, flexible and cost-efficient organisation. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
That is something that we may review next year in line with the process of deregulation already referred to. In the meantime, this need not be a barrier to setting up virtual banks, either by converting existing local franchises or, in the case of an overseas bank, by setting up a branch in Hong Kong. As proof of this, we are currently considering two applications to set up virtual banks, and assuming that they can meet our authorisation requirements, I hope that these can be in operation quite soon. One of the main tests that these applicants will have to satisfy is that they have adequate security to prevent unauthorised access to their systems and to protect customer information. Weak internet security puts the financial position and the reputation of the bank at risk, and concerns about security are the major barrier to more widespread customer acceptance of e-banking. It is essential therefore that the banks get this right. We have tried to help by issuing guidelines to the banks on various aspects of security, including the need for senior management to commission periodic independent assessments of the security aspects of their e-banking services. We have recently provided further guidance on how such assessments should be conducted and the areas they should cover. However, we also need to be in a position to conduct meaningful on-site examinations of our own.

Jaime Caruana: Perspective on issues relevant to the new international capital framework After-dinner remarks by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the “Accounting, Transparency and Bank Stability Workshop”, Basel, 17 May 2004. *  I. *  *  Introduction  Good evening. I hope that you are enjoying this opportunity to dine and unwind after your deliberations on emerging issues in accounting, transparency, and financial stability. You represent a wide range of views and institutions and, based on the animated conversations taking place during dinner, it seems that you bring great enthusiasm and interest to this workshop. In my view, that mixture enlivens the exchange of ideas and helps us to sharpen our understanding of the questions we face and the options we have to address them. It has been said that “learning is achieved only in company.” In this connection, we are all indebted to the workshop’s coordinators and sponsoring organisations for bringing together such select and highly qualified company in which to learn. Here I’d like to thank in particular Urs Birchler from the Swiss National Bank, along with Reint Gropp from the European Central Bank. On the academic side, I’d like to thank Mark Flannery (University of Florida), Rafael Repullo (CEMFI and CEPR), Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden (Université de Lausanne, CEPR and JFI), and Anjan Thakor (Washington University).
Those risks have the potential to affect the Bank’s core responsibilities both for the safety and soundness of the firms we regulate and for the stability of the financial system if there is a late, abrupt and disorderly transition. In particular, risks to financial stability will be minimised if the transition begins early and follows a predictable path. Once climate change becomes a clear and present danger, it may already be too late. As outlined in the PRA’s 2015 insurance report, and in our 2017 Quarterly Bulletin article on the Bank’s 1  response to climate change , there is evidence to suggest climate change is already having an impact. In looking at physical risks for example, on a global basis, weather related insured losses have increased from an average of around $ billion per annum in the 1980s to an average of around $ billion per annum so far this decade. And for specific weather events, there are indications that climate change is becoming a significant contributing factor. For example, Lloyd’s of London has estimated that the 20cm of sea-level rise that has been seen since the 1950s at the Battery in New York increased Superstorm Sandy’s (2012) losses by 30%. In terms of transition risk, there are already examples of how disruptive changes, linked to policy, technology and other economic factors, cause sharp changes in valuations.

6 Climate Bonds Initiative and UNEP Inquiry into the Design of a Sustainable Financial System (2015) “Scaling up green bond markets for sustainable development”. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  such a shift is in its infancy and is an area where further research and collaboration is needed to support progress. Experts and financiers in the City and China have a role to play here. The work being done by the Taskforce in its pilot is to be commended. Mobilising private capital today is essential. Almost two thirds of required financing will need to be directed at sustainable projects in developing countries. Governments alone will not be able to meet this challenge. Yet it is not obvious that private investors will naturally fill that gap. For instance, debt instruments issued by emerging market firms often do not fall within the mandate of advanced market investors due to a missing, or too low, credit rating. It is in this context that bilateral partnerships such as the UK-China Taskforce are so important in accelerating progress.
Is there a risk to budgetary independence that might emerge if the Federal Reserve did not remit any income to the Treasury for a considerable period of time? My response here is that we should take a long-term perspective when we assess the potential fiscal costs associated with the Federal Reserve’s enlarged balance sheet. The fact is that the Fed’s reimbursements to the U.S. Treasury have been around $ billion per year in recent years, far higher than the $ to 30 billion range that applied before the financial crisis. Under most scenarios, the Federal Reserve’s total remittances to the Treasury will be larger than they would have otherwise been in the absence of the asset purchase and maturity extension programs. More importantly, the Fed’s cumulative earnings understate the fiscal implications of the Federal Reserve’s actions. To the extent that the asset purchases have resulted in easier financial conditions that have promoted stronger economic activity, this in turn has had a positive fiscal consequence for the U.S. government. In addition, the Fed’s asset purchase programs have pushed longer-term interest rates below what they would otherwise have been, reducing the overall funding expenses of the U.S. Treasury. Once we take into account the broader fiscal consequences of the unconventional monetary policies put in place by the Fed, they are quite likely to cumulatively have an overall positive impact on the government budget. As a result, the use of unconventional monetary policy tools should pose no significant threat to the Fed’s independence.

Such collaboration can also be extended to facilitate retail payment card transactions via the domestic debit card schemes of both countries. Eventually, I envision ATMs in Malaysia and Indonesia will be linked seamlessly. This will reduce cost, enhance safety and expand outreach. Conclusion Let me conclude with a quote by Malaysia’s second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak Hussein, who said in 1967 that, “We cannot survive for long as independent but isolated peoples unless we also think and act together and unless we prove by deeds that we belong to a family of SouthEast Asian nations bound together by ties of friendship and goodwill” We have indeed come a long way in our cooperation and journey between Indonesia and Malaysia. The potential of Bank Mandiri as a Qualified ASEAN Bank in Malaysia will be a significant milestone for both our countries and the ASEAN region. It represents the realisation of a vision that was formed more than six years ago with the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, with roots that go even further back. We should expect greater achievements by both our countries. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Thank you. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches