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23 For example, Crowe (2010), Eusepi and Preston (2010) and Hubert (2015). 24 Briault et al (1997), among others, make this point. 25 See the survey by Geraats (2002). 26 Morris and Shin (2002) argue that noisy central bank communication can worsen the understanding of monetary policy, if they cause expectations to coordinate away from fundamentals. Kool et al (2011) show how even precise communication could worsen outcomes, if it leads the private sector to reduce investment in information. 22  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  assess some – but only some – of these benefits. Let me set out some of the key lessons from that literature, before identifying places where the existing evidence base is sparse. The richest seam of research has focussed on whether and how central bank communications have affected financial markets, often using event-studies around the time of key announcements. This has concluded, perhaps unsurprisingly, that central bank announcements cause significant movements in asset prices. 27  For example, they cause adjustments along the yield curve, in equity and corporate bond prices, in the exchange rate and in the volatility of these asset prices. This suggests central bank announcements are a significant source of information to financial markets, either about the course of the economy or the course of policy or both. That is despite often sharp differences in communication strategies across central banks.