samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
8  I remember this period very vividly, because I was fortunate to have the opportunity to discuss and debate the problems of current monetary policy, deflation and liquidity traps in a group of great economists at Princeton University that included Ben Bernanke (before he left to be a Governor at the Federal Reserve Board), Alan Blinder, Paul Krugman, Chris Sims and Michael Woodford. 9  See Svensson (2003a) for a discussion of policy options before and in a liquidity trap. 10  Kohn (2008), after extensive discussion, concludes that there is insufficient evidence that low interest rates would have contributed much to the house-price boom and that higher interest rates would have had much dampening effect on it. Del Negro, Marco, and Christopher Otrok (2007) find small effects of Fed monetary policy on house prices during 2001-2005, whereas Iacoviello, Matteo, and Stefano Neri (2008) find larger effects, although their including the Regulation-Q period in their sample may increase the apparent monetary policy effect on housing. BIS Review 112/2009  5  One obvious conclusion is that price stability is not enough to achieve financial stability (Carney 2009, White 2006). Good flexible inflation targeting by itself does not achieve financial stability, if anyone ever believed that. Specific policies and instruments are needed to ensure financial stability. Another conclusion is that interest-rate policy is not enough to achieve financial stability.

So what was the potential role of monetary policy in contributing to the crisis? The main argument blaming monetary policy for the crisis is that policy rates in the U.S. were kept too  6  Kohn (2006, 2008) specifies three conditions that should be fulfilled for central banks to take “extra action” to deal with a possible asset-price bubble: “First, policymakers must be able to identify bubbles in a timely fashion with reasonable confidence. Second, a somewhat tighter monetary policy must have a high probability that it will help to check at least some of the speculative activity. And third, the expected improvement in future economic performance that would result from the curtailment of the bubble must be sufficiently great.” He concludes, also in 2008 and after thorough considerations, that those conditions would rarely be met. 7  See Bean (2009) for an extensive and excellent discussion of the crisis, including the credit expansion and housing boom, the macroeconomic antecedents, the distorted incentives, the information problems, the amplification and propagation of the crisis into the real economy, the policy responses and the lessons for monetary policy and economics generally. 4  BIS Review 112/2009  low during the period 2001-2005, which would have contributed to the build-up of excessive credit growth and a house-price bubble (Taylor 2007). There are two relevant questions in this context about U.S. monetary policy during 2001-2005. First, was the low interest rate reasonable given the information available at the time?
In periods of wars and conflicts – history shows that, albeit relatively small, Albania has experienced many wars and conflicts – people have turned to the currency and precious metals. Hence, about 100 years ago, at the beginning of the World War I, Europe dived into one of the worst financial crises of the past century and many people and businesses rushed to convert their bank accounts and assets into cash and gold coins. Meanwhile, in Albania, these events triggered a chaotic monetary circulation. In the absence of a national currency and due to the political-military and economic developments during the War, diverse foreign currencies circulated across the country, mainly those of European and neighbouring countries, as well as American and Turkish ones. You may see this conglomerate of denominations in the showcases of the Museum dedicated to the period of Independence and the World War I. Also, the showcases on the monetary circulation in Albania during World War II, in addition to the ones of Antiquity and Medieval periods, exhibit denominations that speak of the important and complicated relationships between money and war. I am sure these important moments to the economic and monetary history of Albania, and beyond, will be discussed at length during the Conference. Dear participants, The Conference is not the only activity the Museum has organised about numismatics, economic, monetary and financial history. We have also organised for the general public a cycle of lectures called “Museum nights”, with lectures delivered by experts in the field of numismatics, history and economy.

Also, in cooperation with the Institute of Archaeology, a one-week seminar was organised on Ancient coins, attended by the students of history, archaeology and cultural heritage. This year commemorates the pan-national Year of Skanderbeg, our National Hero. The Museum 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  has organised temporary exhibitions, displayed both inside and outside the Museum, on the figure of Skanderbeg, featured in the Albanian currency. Financial education has been given an important focus in the work of the Museum. Throughout the year, many students and young people have been involved in educational activities and projects, actively participating during the Money Week events, attending the lectures held at the Museum, and using our educational publications and products. The Museum will continue to work in these two aspects by supporting: i) the scientific, economic, and monetary history of the country; and ii) the financial education of the new generations, with the support and cooperation with the most distinguished actors in these fields. As an institution that keeps and promotes an important part of the cultural heritage of the country, such as the currency, we are privileged and obliged to collaborate in order for the Museum of the Bank of Albania not to be just an exposition of the rare collections, but a place where the public may find adequate and specialised literature and expertise to learn about the economic and monetary history, and become more financially educated.
Our banking sector has reached its historically highest profitability levels. The ratios of capital adequacy and liquidity are above the average for the EU. Consequently, I would propose two brief topics to ponder on:  2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Just think of it, where would Bulgaria have been if the other economic, and not only economic, sectors had similar results? Also, remember where the BNB and the banking sector were not very long ago, in 2014 and 2015. The turbulences that we went through in those years spread well beyond the boundaries of the banking sector. How did this transformation happen, from the state in which this sector was in 2015 to the state in which it is today. The answer is – extensive and determined reforms leading up to full integration into the nucleus of the EU, what essentially the euro area is. I think this is a completely valid response to the challenges facing the country today. Let me finish on a more prosaic note. What is the BNB doing on this matter now? As you are probably well aware, no formal criteria and requirements apply to the BNB. And how so? Because the BNB and the banking sector have succeeded in fulfilling all these criteria and requirements by 2020. It is precisely the compliance with these formal criteria and requirements that allowed Bulgaria to join the European banking union in 2020, one of the key euro area institutions, and the Exchange Rate Mechanism.

We also use a number of other, simpler models as economic indicators. But although developments in this field have made huge advances, the models cannot entirely capture the complex reality we live in. They have their limitations and deficiencies and it is important to be aware of these. And of course we do not base our forecasts and decisions solely on what the models show. Their results are supplemented to a large degree with expert analyses. This applies in particular to situations like the current one, when certain mechanisms in the economy are not functioning entirely as normal. But despite model-based analysis having certain deficiencies, the developments in this field mean we have obtained a much more useful aid in our work. We can act work in a more systematic manner when making our forecasts than was possible before and I would also claim that we have a better base for making our decisions. This has also made it possible to become even more open and clear with regard to our view of the future. There is a positive interaction here. As I mentioned earlier, the openness acts as an extra incentive with regard to developing our working methods. It is not only with regard to monetary policy that we have made progress in our working methods. The tools for analysing the stability of the financial system have also been improved. This increases the chances of detecting at an early stage changes and vulnerabilities that could lead to a serious crisis.
While some of this year’s shortfall can be explained by one-off factors—such as the sharp fall in prices for cellular phone service—its persistence suggests that more fundamental structural changes may also be playing a role. These include the increased ability of prospective buyers to compare prices across different sellers quickly and easily, the shift in retail sales to online channels of distribution from traditional brick-and-mortar stores, and the consequences of these changes on brand loyalty and business pricing power. Over the coming months, I hope that we will be better able to differentiate between these competing explanations. If it turns out that structural changes have played a significant role, I would generally view this as a positive, rather than negative, development. It would imply that the U.S. economy could operate at a higher level of labor resource utilization without generating a troublesome large rise in inflation. More people could be put to work on a sustainable basis, enabling them to gain opportunities not just to earn greater income, but also to develop their skills and grow their human capital. Slightly above-trend growth is gradually tightening the U.S. labor market, which should support a rise in wage growth over time. When combined with a firmer import price trend—partly reflecting recent depreciation of the dollar—and the fading of effects from a number of temporary, idiosyncratic factors, I expect inflation will rise and stabilize around the FOMC’s 2 percent objective over the medium term.

Natural disasters tend to depress economic activity initially, but once the recovery and reconstruction efforts get underway in earnest, such disasters actually serve to lift economic activity. Looking beyond the storm effects—which will make interpreting near-term economic data releases more difficult—the economy remains on a trajectory of slightly above-trend growth at 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  about 2 percent, and the fundamentals supporting continued expansion are generally quite favorable. Low unemployment, sturdy job gains (recognizing the near-term negative impact of the storms), and rising wages (even at a pace below previous expansions) are lifting personal income. Household wealth has been boosted by rising home and equity prices, and household debt has been growing relatively slowly, contributing to a healthy household balance sheet. Thus, consumer spending should continue to advance in coming quarters. Business fixed investment outlays are also likely to continue to rise. With the supply of labor tightening, there are greater incentives for businesses to invest in labor-saving technologies. Investment spending should also benefit from a better international outlook and the improvement in U.S. trade competitiveness caused by the dollar’s recent weakness. The softer dollar and solid growth abroad also suggest that the trade sector will no longer be a significant drag on economic growth. Turning to the outlook for inflation, I have been surprised by the persistence of the shortfall from the FOMC’s 2 percent long-run objective.
The focus of discussion to-date has been on whether and how monetary policy can be used alongside regulatory policy to address financial stability risks. •  An interesting question is: can regulatory policy be used alongside monetary policy to help achieve macroeconomic stability? Macroprudential tools aimed at stabilising asset markets could have positive spillovers in moderating inflation. •  In fact, in Singapore, we employed macroprudential measures quite deliberately to help address inflation concerns as well, not just financial stability. During 2010–2012, Singapore’s inflation rate averaged about 4%, more than twice as high as our historical average. About half of this inflation was attributable to rapidly rising housing costs and car prices. •  Housing costs, represented by actual rentals and imputed rentals on owneroccupied housing, makes up a significant share of Singapore’s consumer price index. •  Car prices, while making for a much smaller share of the CPI, rose by double digits as exuberant buyers auctioned for the fixed number of permits that the government issues for buying cars. •  Low interest rates and abundant liquidity – reflecting easy monetary conditions globally – helped to fuel strong demand for both houses and cars. Monetary policy – in the form of an appreciating exchange rate – reduced imported inflation to close to zero but was not as effective in curbing price pressures in the two asset markets: houses and cars.

We will also provide a detailed picture of access to digital banking services in Spain and recent developments in this area. Lastly, we will conduct a review of the action taken to combat financial exclusion nationally and internationally, which may prove a good platform for future actions in our country. To conclude, I would simply like to thank again the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministry for their efforts to address this problem. And the banking associations for their agile and swift response in drafting and signing this protocol. And, of course, I would like to thank the individuals who have made us more aware of the problem and whose actions have prompted this rapid response. I believe that we should all aim to ensure that Spain continues to take the lead on financial inclusion in the digital era, as it has always done. And I would like to add that the Banco de España is firmly committed to this goal and that we will do everything within our power to attain it. Thank you very much. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Accordingly, we should conduct this process carefully and gradually if we wish to minimise any undesirable economic and social consequences. The goal is to achieve what has been dubbed “a fair transition”, affording due attention and support to those groups and geographical areas most severely affected by this process. Naturally, we should stress that the change of production model will also entail opportunities for economic agents. In any event, we should consider how banks may contribute to bringing about a decarbonised economy; ultimately, when we think about climate change we see particularly pollutant activities, from which banking is naturally missing. I shall try to explain today why, despite being a “low emissions” sector, banks have a major role to play as facilitators of change. If I manage to do this I hope that I will also, at the same time, dispel another doubt that many of you will have entertained: what is the Deputy Governor of the Banco de España doing opening a forum on the decarbonisation of the economy? 3/9  Combating climate change internationally As you know, combating climate change has been a recurrent goal of international institutions, at least since the United Nations Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Traditionally, the companies dependent on oil products have been those most affected by the environmental regulations resulting from these international agreements. Conversely, we should admit that the financial sector’s involvement in this battle has been rather limited. When referring to the financial sector I include both credit institutions and central banks and supervisors.

Real disposable income in the United States, for example, has risen roughly 4% a year over the past two years. In addition, there has been considerable vigor in household demand. Indeed, the question is whether household demand is growing too quickly. In constant dollar terms, consumer spending grew more than 5% in 1999, the fastest rate since the mid-1980s. Housing has also been surprisingly strong, due to the best affordability conditions in a generation. In fact, the home ownership rate reached a record 67% in the second half of 1999. A number of commentators have expressed concerns that the United States cannot sustain these current measures of prosperity. To support their view, they point to the declines in recent years in personal saving rates. 1  BIS Review 29/2000  However, these declines in personal saving rates may be misleading in that they may be due in some respects to technical measurement issues, such as the exclusion of realized capital gains from the income and saving data. More relevant is the fact that household credit quality has not deteriorated over the past several years. On the contrary, it appears to be improving. Delinquency rates on mortgages and consumer installment debt have been falling, as have the number of new bankruptcies reported. Driving these positive trends, to be sure, has been strong growth in employment and income. At the same time, I cannot suggest that the Phillips curve - which holds that there is a predictable trade-off between achieving price stability and employment gains - is dead.
BIS Review 139/2009  3  On the other hand, OECD oil inventories are still ample and OPEC spare production capacity is higher than in the preceding years, while oil demand remains weak. Key rates are close to zero in many countries. Several central banks have signalled that key rates will be kept low for a long period, and key rate expectations abroad have fallen. Pricing in the market indicates an expected rise in key rates in a number of countries after the turn of the year. 4  BIS Review 139/2009  The krone depreciated considerably in the second half of 2008, but has since appreciated again. Stronger risk appetite and market expectations of a somewhat earlier rise in interest rates in Norway have probably contributed to the krone appreciation. Lower capital outflows from the Government Pension Fund – Global have probably also made a contribution. Trading in NOK has picked up since summer and foreign exchange market liquidity has improved. The projections are based on the assumption that the krone will depreciate somewhat from the current level. It is for example assumed that the real krone exchange rate will gradually revert to its historical average. The krone is floating and fluctuates somewhat. It has shown a tendency to appreciate in favourable times and fall in value in response to negative shocks in the Norwegian economy.

We have limited experience to indicate how the interest rate at the current low level will affect output and prices over time. If growth in household demand proves to be stronger than expected, the interest rate may be raised to a higher level and more rapidly than currently envisaged. BIS Review 139/2009  11  Fiscal policy is expansionary this year, and according to the National Budget for 2010, fiscal policy will provide further, albeit milder expansionary impulses to the economy next year. Under the fiscal rule, the government budget deficit should be reduced to about 4 per cent of the capital in the Government Pension Fund – Global when activity in the economy has resumed a normal level. Norges Bank’s projections are based on the technical assumption that the structural, non-oil budget deficit in 2011 and 2012 will remain unchanged from the level in 2010. If growth in the Government Pension Fund – Global is lower than in previous years, the deficit will still be more than 4 per cent of the Fund’s capital, even after capacity utilisation has risen to a normal level. If economic developments are broadly in line with projections, fiscal policy conducted in accordance with the fiscal rule could result in a lower interest rate and a weaker krone than projected. Unemployment is high in many countries. Unemployment in Norway has not risen as sharply as previously projected. The number of registered unemployed was 2.8 per cent of the labour force in October, unchanged from September.
It is because any responsible central banking institution must have an idea of what conditions might be like under an alternative system - if only to clarify its understanding of, and justify its adherence to, the present system. And any organisation must have contingency plans to deal with the unexpected and the unintended. We do not, of course, make public our contingency plans, though we do, as I have mentioned earlier, make public a great deal of research carried out within the HKMA or under our auspices on issues surrounding the Link. What, then, might happen if Hong Kong were to depeg? The answers would, of course, depend on what monetary policy was adopted in its place. It would also depend on domestic, and particularly external, conditions at the time. The outcome could, I think, even with the most benign conditions and the best-judged strategy, be summarised in two words, "uncertainty" and "instability". Uncertainty, because the Hong Kong dollar would become a magnet to speculators eager to test the limits and the weaknesses of the new regime, with all the instability that would bring. Uncertainty in the effects on  BIS Review 88/2001  5  business and on daily life, if, as a result of that instability or of a general fall in confidence, the value of the Hong Kong dollar depreciated dramatically and, in consequence, the price of our imports increased sharply.

Yet the race to achieve net-zero emissions (‘net zero’) by 2050 is a multi-decade marathon, where the starting gun has already fired, and getting to the finish line will require a sprint start, with a reduction in global emissions of a half by 2030 [figure 1 in the Appendix].1 What I would like to talk about today is how we get there – both what we know and what we don’t know - and the important role of climate scenario analysis in helping us plot the best course. Governments will of course play a central role in laying the track, removing hurdles and setting the pace as we move to net zero. Over 110 countries, including the UK, have now moved to enshrine net zero emission targets in policy or law and are working on detailed plans of what these look like in practice.2  But climate change and climate policy will affect everyone - businesses from all sectors of the economy, public bodies like the Bank of England, households and individuals. And so we all have a stretch of the race to run. Some will perform strongly, others may struggle, and some, particularly in less developed countries, might need a helping hand. But let’s be in no doubt. We need everyone to finish. Role of the financial sector  Let me first say a few words about financial institutions given the unique role they play in this race. As corporates, these firms have some direct emissions but they are not significant.