samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The foundation is the development in Hong Kong of multi-currency clearing and settlement systems operated on a real-time gross-settlement basis: so far we have systems for the US dollar, the euro, and the renminbi, in addition to the Hong Kong dollar; there is the possibility of replicating this for any number of currencies, should the demand arise. To make these systems available in Asian time to the rest of the region, we are progressively linking them to other cities in China and with other countries in the region: we established a link with Malaysia in 2006 and have agreed with Bank Indonesia to establish a similar link with Indonesia in 2010. I have no doubt that other links will follow. In addition, through our Regional CHATS service launched in July 2007, we have made available Hong Kong’s own clearing and settlement services throughout the region and beyond for cross-border payments. By June this year, 30 banks in Hong Kong had registered as service providers for services covering over 2,000 payment beneficiary points in 42 economies. BIS Review 93/2009  1  These are examples of how we are helping to build the hardware, or – to use the transport comparison – laying down the roads, tracks, junctions and interchanges, for regional financial markets. For the software and the actual traffic, it is of course the case that in a free-market economy such as Hong Kong's there is a limit to how much the government should take the lead.

Joseph Yam: Financial market developments in Hong Kong Remarks by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Euromoney 40th Anniversary Gala Dinner, Hong Kong, 16 July 2009. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure to be able to share the honour at this evening's Euromoney awards dinner with so many excellent recipients. And it is a particular honour to receive the award for "Outstanding Contribution to Financial Markets". This is a threefold honour. First, because it is awarded by Euromoney, a publication – or rather an institution – with a particularly strong relationship with central banks and markets in this region. Secondly, because the award is presented to the HKMA as a whole, as a recognition of the hard work of staff from all parts of the organisation who have helped develop financial markets. And thirdly, because the award highlights an area of our work that usually receives less acknowledgement than it should: the development of financial markets not just through encouraging product innovation, but also through laying down the infrastructure to enable markets to function and grow. It is, I think, entirely appropriate that this evening's event is being held in a restaurant on top of the Star Ferry Pier – as we are from time to time reminded by the swaying of the structure and the occasional battering from the ferries themselves. Transport links are a good analogy for financial infrastructural links. They involve both local and international networks.
3 But the current level is still relatively high by historical and international standards and is something that, in my view, the FPC needs to keep carefully in mind when thinking of financial stability. Hotspots Within this current overall picture of the UK being at the beginning of a period of standard risks, credit growing gently at a similar rate to nominal GDP, and asset prices supported by low long-term interest rates, there are some hotter spots in property markets and elsewhere, such as consumer lending. 4 I will focus on property markets. Buy-to-let First and foremost, within the residential property market, lending for buy-to-let has been growing strongly for a number of years. The stock of buy-to-let mortgage lending has grown at an annual average rate of 6% since 2008. It rose by 11.5% in the year to 2015 Q4, while the stock of lending to owner occupiers was unchanged. Buy-to-let mortgages now account for 17%, by value, of the total stock of secured lending. Lending for buy-to-let has clearly been profitable. At around the start of 2016, lenders were planning to grow their gross buy-to-let lending by, on average, almost 20% per annum over the next two years, with some challenger banks and smaller building societies planning to grow their buy-to-let books at a much faster rate.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  forward, banks will destroy value. This is not the sign of a vibrant banking system ably supporting the real economy. The last time price to book ratios were this low was in the euro-area crisis in 2011/12 and before that in the global financial crisis in 2008. In those cases, particularly the latter, the fall in banks’ price to book ratios reflected concerns about their resilience and indeed their solvency – that is, whether they had sufficient capital to back the riskiness of their assets. Low price to book ratios were accompanied by very high debt spreads on bank debt for the same reason. This time round, banks’ low price to book ratios are accompanied by relatively low debt spreads. 12 In the main, they probably do not reflect concerns about banks’ resilience, which has improved significantly since the crisis. The FPC and PRA Board, in 2014 and 2015, subjected the UK banking system to severe but plausible hypothetical stress tests. The 2014 test was centered on a sharp contraction in UK economic activity – in the test house prices fell by 35% and CRE prices fell by 30%. The 2015 test featured a global slowdown emanating from weak growth in emerging-market economies. The results of both tests showed that, on the whole, UK banks would be able to withstand these scenarios and continue lending to the real economy. Therefore, the current low price to book ratios probably reflect concerns about banks’ future prospects.
We do not think, act or communicate in the same way today as we did when the inflation targeting regime was new. The driving force behind the changes has come partly from practical experiences, both in Sweden and other countries conducting an inflation-targeting policy. Academic research has also played an important role. Before I go into greater detail on how the Riksbank’s way of conducting monetary policy has developed, I intend to begin by describing the background to the establishment of an inflation target in Sweden. The background to Sweden introducing an explicit inflation target Today the Swedish krona has been floating for fourteen years and two months. 19 November 1992 will always have a special significance for the Riksbank. This was the day when we were forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate, under very dramatic circumstances and after a stubborn defence of the Swedish krona. At that time we were in the middle of the most serious economic crisis in Sweden since the 1930s – a tragic end to almost 20 years of stabilization policy problems. The idea behind the fixed exchange rate policy was to ensure that inflation in Sweden would be in line with that in the countries that were our most important trading partners, and that the fixed exchange rate would function as a nominal anchor. But for various reasons the economic policy conducted in the 1970s and 1980s tended to be too expansionary.

the net borrowings, lie almost entirely with the US, the surpluses or the net lenders are identified with Japan, China, East Asia, the oil exporting economies, and other emerging markets including Latin America. And the third is the financing of the deficits, as well as the reinvestment of official reserves, which are now a major component of global capital lows. The key issues therefore are whether this process can go on? Is it a permanent or a temporary phenomenon? And what would be the implications for the global economy and financial markets. Today, I want to comment on these issues. Specifically, I will discuss the major forces underlying external surplus and reserves accumulation from an Asian perspective. Next, I will comment on policies that are needed globally to address this problem. To begin, reserves accumulation is essentially the mirror image of the evolution of the US external deficits. Two popular views explaining this phenomenon have been put forward. The first is the export-led development model, i.e. the new Bretton Woods, which sees reserves accumulation as a consequence of an attempt to maintain export-led development, especially in Asia. The second explanation is the global-saving glut hypothesis, of which the glut is driven by the transformation of emerging markets from net borrowers to net lenders in the international capital market. Both interpretations I think have merits, and reserves accumulation is probably a reflection of both.
According to Banque de France simulationsv for our country, a disorderly transition would lead to a loss in GDP of up to 5.5% by 2050 compared to an orderly transition scenario. To achieve these two transformations, we Europeans must more than ever unite our forces. And in this respect there are three "cross-cutting" levers that should guide our economic agenda: combining our clients, our talents, and our funding. Our clients are the single market, one of the largest in the world with 450 million people. This is not just the legacy of Jacques Delors. Thirty years on from 1992, we must have the courage to revitalise the single market and optimise its power by combining its different components in a much better way: freedom of movement, of course, but also regulatory power. We could use the power of regulation, in particular to steer innovation, as illustrated by the regulation of data, where Europe is at the forefront. Our talents and "human capital" reflect the strong correlation between growth and education. We have some of the best education and professional training systems in Europe - and you are the best proof of that! But there are significant differences: in the southern EU countries, including our own, there are more low-skilled workers - Spain and Italy have twice as many as Sweden, as a share of the adult population - and fewer highskilled workers vi – France has half as many as the Netherlands or Finland.

They are a difficult challenge, of course, involving the restructuring of part of our productive apparatus, but also a source of opportunities and growth. First, on the digital revolution: technologies have been slow to show their full potential in terms of productivity, which has remained sluggish for two decades in the euro area. However, it is potentially at a turning point, with the latest advances in AI, biotechnologies or telework-related reorganisations - after a lag which corresponds to the process of appropriating these technologies by the economic fabric (investment, training, etc.). Page 5 sur 15  Europe will have to seize the opportunity of this productivity growth pool. However, it is still hampered by a lack of innovation and slowness in adopting these new technologies, particularly compared to the United States. We spend less on R&D (2% of GDP compared to 2.8% between 2015 and 2019), have fewer researchers and have filed fewer patents, particularly in biotechnology (2,400 compared to 5,500 over the 2015-2019 period) or information and communication technologies (7,900 compared to 17,100). The climate transition, for its part, is an absolute necessity at the global level. Its macroeconomic impact will largely depend on the transition strategy chosen: the faster and more orderly its implementation, the less it will cost in GDP percentage points. For instance, according to the Commission, the EU plan would have an overall neutral effect on real GDP  Page 6 sur 15 by 2030iii, a forecast deemed too "techno-optimistic" by Jean Pisani-Ferryiv.
Estimates of return on equity on SME and corporate lending are around 8% to 9%, which is roughly around the cost of equity for these activities, though it’s hard to say with absolute precision. Investment banking, however, is a different story; return on equity in the investment banking parts of UK banks is around 5%. It was 20% in 2010. Returns at European and US investment banks have followed a similar trend although the decline has not been as steep as for UK banks. Overcapacity, excess costs, removal of the implicit Too-Big-To-Fail government subsidy, tighter capital regulations and restructuring costs are all contributing to reduced returns on equity in investment banking. Large parts of investment banking are not meeting required returns which are estimated to be in the region of 11% overall for a sample of UK and international banks. Parts of investment banking are therefore not economically profitable. Banks have made good progress on restructuring their overall balance sheet – they have cut funded assets by nearly £ trillion since the end of 2010 – but they will probably need to shrink parts of their investment banking businesses or boost returns, for example, by increasing prices or cutting costs. Variable remuneration has fallen in absolute terms in investment banking and other parts of banks but that has been offset by an increase in fixed remuneration. Staff cost to income ratios for banks as a whole are similar to precrisis levels or if anything a little higher.

3 But the current level is still relatively high by historical and international standards and is something that, in my view, the FPC needs to keep carefully in mind when thinking of financial stability. Hotspots Within this current overall picture of the UK being at the beginning of a period of standard risks, credit growing gently at a similar rate to nominal GDP, and asset prices supported by low long-term interest rates, there are some hotter spots in property markets and elsewhere, such as consumer lending. 4 I will focus on property markets. Buy-to-let First and foremost, within the residential property market, lending for buy-to-let has been growing strongly for a number of years. The stock of buy-to-let mortgage lending has grown at an annual average rate of 6% since 2008. It rose by 11.5% in the year to 2015 Q4, while the stock of lending to owner occupiers was unchanged. Buy-to-let mortgages now account for 17%, by value, of the total stock of secured lending. Lending for buy-to-let has clearly been profitable. At around the start of 2016, lenders were planning to grow their gross buy-to-let lending by, on average, almost 20% per annum over the next two years, with some challenger banks and smaller building societies planning to grow their buy-to-let books at a much faster rate.
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Macro-prudential supervision Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the CEPR/ESI 13th Annual Conference on “Financial Supervision in an Uncertain World”, European Banking Center at Venice International University, Venice, 25-26 September 2009. *  *  *  Introduction 1 The recent financial crisis has produced a broad consensus on analysis and policy action in at least three areas, namely the need: i) to gain a better understanding of systemic risk; ii) to strengthen the macro-prudential aspects of financial supervision; and iii) to deepen central banks’ involvement in it. The establishment of a new body to conduct macro-prudential supervision at EU level – the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – is one element in a comprehensive set of initiatives and responses in this field. My remarks today focus on the future work of this body and consist of four parts. I’ll first consider the origins, purpose and structure of the ESRB. In second place, I’ll discuss the concept of systemic risk, and how it can be monitored and assessed effectively. I’ll examine some analytical tools for systemic risk analysis in the EU and look at how these tasks could be organised in the context of the ESRB. In the third part, I’ll cover the ECB’s experience in conducting financial stability surveillance in the euro area and reflect on the vulnerabilities that we (and other authorities) identified before the crisis.

I will approach the question from the point of view of central banks and ask: what influenced their ability to raise market awareness with respect to building vulnerabilities within the financial system? And can we rely on the ESRB to repair this problem in the future? The information at the disposal of central banks and other bodies with financial stability competencies enabled them to point to growing risks and vulnerabilities, but it did not allow a deeper understanding of the interconnections in the financial system and of the potential magnitude of the detected risks. As a result, the discussion of the risks in their public communications or publications tended to be mostly of a qualitative nature, and generally did not involve a clear risk prioritisation exercise, and therefore had a potentially smaller impact on market behaviour. Another important element was that risk assessments were generally not made with the specific aim of suggesting appropriate remedial policy actions in terms of prudential policies or regulation. Recommendations, mostly formulated in broad terms, tended to target market participants’ behaviour (e.g. proposing mitigating actions), but they were more muted regarding policy measures that could be taken in the prudential and regulatory area. One reason for this is, again, the information base. The formulation of concrete policy recommendations (e.g. with respect to capital buffers or funding-related issues) would need to be backed by rigorous quantitative assessments, for which publicly available information is generally not sufficient.
Assessment of the Norwegian financial infrastructure The financial crisis was a reminder that increasingly complex financial instruments and demanding technological solutions have increased risk in the financial infrastructure. In the  4  Within certain amounts. Customers must still enter their PIN code in connection with large payments. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  aftermath of the crisis, the international recommendations for the financial infrastructure have been tightened. 5 The new principles provide a comprehensive standard for the financial infrastructure across borders and across various systems. The purpose is to promote a robust and efficient financial infrastructure 6 that supports the stability of the global financial system. The new principles devote considerable attention to such areas as operational risk, derivate exposure and the use of central counterparties. Norges Bank oversees financial infrastructure and supervises interbank clearing and settlement systems. There are two systems that are licensed by Norges Bank to provide clearing or settlement: NICS and DNB as a private settlement bank. For these systems, Norges Bank, as supervisory authority, may require that owners take corrective action for noncompliance with licence terms or the Payment Systems Act. In collaboration with Finanstilsynet, Norges Bank has recently conducted an assessment of important parts of the financial infrastructure in Norway in accordance with the international principles. 7 The main conclusion is that the financial infrastructure in Norway is robust and efficient. Nevertheless there is a need for some improvements.

The time may have come to evaluate the utility of the central credit registers that have long existed in some continental European and Asian countries. None of that, however, can alter banks’ core comparative advantage as monetary institutions: the provision of liquidity through overdrafts, lines of credit and other working capital facilities. That role might be aided by a revival of a market in trade credit.15 Banks will always be levered because their core monetary service revolves around transaction-account deposits, which are debt liabilities. And, on the other side of the balance sheet, they will always have somewhat risky asset portfolios because being a monetary institution makes them an efficient supplier of short-term finance to households, firms and the rest of the financial system. But they can do all that only if they are healthy and prosperous: only sound banks can make a credible promise to repay or lend money on demand. The fragility in banks’ balance sheets is why they are regulated. Today, I have sketched the outline of a Capital Accord for the future. An Accord that would go beyond reducing the probability of failure, by also addressing the need to cope with distressed banks, ensuring that resolution can be orderly. Taking the tax-deductibility of debt interest as a given, the banking authorities can make it beneficial to society as a whole, not just to private interests, by requiring that a minimum level of term bond finance be part of the capital structure.
Between May 2000 and March 2001, the BIS sold 220 tonnes on behalf of the SNB. For the first 120 tonnes, the SNB paid the BIS a fixed commission while the performance risk resided with the SNB. For the next 100 tonnes, the BIS agreed to pay the average price of the AM and PM London gold fixing plus a small fixed premium. In April 2001, the Governing Board decided that there was no reason to continue to sell through the BIS. The SNB now had the necessary professionals, know-how, trading resources and contacts to the international gold market to trade directly. Two types of selling operations were subsequently pursued: spot sales in the market and sales programs with price caps. Over the next three and a half years, 730 tonnes were sold directly in the spot market. For these sales, the SNB used 25 counterparties in four different continents. In an effort to receive consistently competitive pricing, the Governing Board allowed the SNB traders to become two-way participants in the market. In other words, traders were allowed to buy gold on an intra-day basis up to two thirds of the daily allocated sales volume. Overall, the sales had to be conducted within a clearly defined corridor which was structured around daily sales volumes of approximately one tonne (Figure 5). Typically, the Bank of England was used for the physical settlement of these operations. Apart from spot operations, 350 tonnes were sold through option programs.

Nonetheless, the SNB’s unilateral announcement in June 1999 of its intention to sell 1300 tonnes of its gold reserves certainly contributed to setting in motion the process that led to the September 1999 joint statement issued by the fifteen European central banks. III. Selling strategy  The Washington Agreement now set the parameters for the SNB’s selling program. The practical details were negotiated in the months following the signature of the agreement. Annual quotas were assigned for each period going from October to the following September. As you can see in Figure 4, the SNB was allowed to sell 120 tonnes of gold between October 1999 and September 2000, 200 tonnes for the next 12 months, 283 tonnes between October 2001 and September 2002, 283 tonnes again between October 2002 and September 2003, 284 tonnes between October 2003 and September 2004 and 130 tonnes after September 2004. The participating central banks agreed to eliminate the possibility of hedging the gold price risk for the entire five year period. However, flexibility was maintained in hedging the gold price risk for the selling quota within each current 12-month subperiod. In other words, forward sales or option programs were possible for the annual allocations only. On the other hand, there were no limitations on hedging currency risk. The SNB was therefore free to hedge the expected USD proceeds from the sales against the Swiss franc. At the outset, the SNB decided to use the BIS as its selling agent.