samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Additional benefits would result from making data public to the degree consistent with protecting firm-specific proprietary and supervisory information. Investors and analysts would have a more complete picture of individual firms’ strengths and vulnerabilities, thereby contributing to better market discipline. Other government agencies, academics, and additional interested parties would be able to conduct their own analyses of financial system developments and identify possible emerging stresses and risks in financial markets. One area in which better information is particularly important is the web of connections among financial institutions though channels such as interbank lending, securities lending, repurchase agreements, and derivatives contracts. Regulators also need more and better data on the links among institutions through third-party sponsors, liquidity providers, creditsupport providers, and market makers. Knowledge of such network linkages is a necessary first step to improve analysis of how shocks to institutions and markets can propagate through the financial system. Principles for developing a system of effective data and analytical tools Moving from the recognition of the need for more data to an efficient data system is not an easy task. Data collection entails costs in collection, organization, and utilization for government agencies, reporting market participants, and other interested parties. Tradeoffs may need to be faced where, for example, a particular type of information would be very costly to collect and would have only limited benefits.

Woodford, Michael (2007b), “Forecast Targeting as a Monetary Policy Strategy: Policy Rules in Practice”, in Koenig, Evan, and Robert Leeson, eds., From the Great Moderation to the Great Deviation: A Round-Trip Journey Based on the Work of John B. Taylor, forthcoming. Daniel K Tarullo: Equipping financial regulators with the tools necessary to monitor systemic risk Testimony by Mr Daniel K Tarullo, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, US Senate, Washington DC, 12 February 2010. *  *  *  Chairman Bayh, Ranking Member Corker, and other members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. I also want to thank all of you for taking the time to explore a subject that is easily overlooked in the public debate around financial reform, but that will be central to ensuring a more stable financial system in the future. The recent financial crisis revealed important gaps in data collection and systematic analysis of institutions and markets. Remedies to fill those gaps are critical for monitoring systemic risk and for enhanced supervision of systemically important financial institutions, which are in turn necessary to decrease the chances of such a serious crisis occurring in the future.
2  Examples include the contribution of the private sector to: the development of revised ISDA protocols as part of efforts to tackle Too Big To Fail; improvements in disclosure under the aegis of the Enhanced Disclosure Taskforce; consultation over TLAC proposals; the establishment of the Banking Standards Council; and ongoing work to develop the appropriate near-risk free reference rate for sterling markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  It is frustrating for us all that such major progress risks being overshadowed by misconduct problems. The fair and effective markets review We must break the back of these issues, and the Fair and Effective Markets Review shows the way forward. With its publication today, all the main building blocks are now in place for the real markets we need. I want to pay tribute to my colleagues Charles Roxburgh, Minouche Shafik and Martin Wheatley, who so ably led the Review. And to salute Elizabeth Corley, who so expertly chaired the Review’s independent Market Practitioner panel, canvassing and coalescing views from across the industry. The importance and complexity of their task is illustrated by the multiple root causes of the misconduct in FICC markets.

Mark Carney: Building real markets for the good of the people Speech by Mr Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet for Bankers and Merchants of the City of London at the Mansion House, London, 10 June 2015. *  *  *  I am grateful to Ben Nelson, Iain de Weymarn, Nicola Anderson, Alex Brazier, Andrew Hauser, Chris Salmon and Tim Taylor for their assistance in preparing this speech and accompanying Open Forum document. My Lord Mayor, Lady Mayoress, Chancellor, Ladies and Gentlemen. Almost 350 years ago, the Great Fire destroyed the City of London and rendered 100,000 people homeless. It took half a century to rebuild. The legacy of the Great Fire endures, including such Wren masterpieces as St Paul’s and his twenty-five other steeples that survive today within the City’s precincts. But the Fire’s legacy is not limited to how the City looks, it extends to what the City does. The blaze led Nicholas Barbon to establish the first insurance company, an innovation to fulfil a social need: the sharing of risk. Public authorities complemented private initiative. There was a Royal Proclamation that set standards for wider roads and houses built from brick and stone instead of timber. And Parliament passed the Parish Pump Act to prevent “mischiefs that may happen by fire” by establishing fire brigades and improving water supply.
The economic climate in the 1950s and 1960s, with low inflation, high and stable growth and low unemployment makes a sharp contrast with the 1970s and 1980s, when attempts to keep the price rise on a par with the rest of the world failed and a series of devaluations had negative effects on wage formation, productivity and economic growth. There is reason to believe that the high and fluctuating inflation in the 1970s and 1980s contributed to the weak state of investment and productivity. The recurrent crises over wage costs generated uncertainty about business profits and thereby about the conditions for investment. And although the devaluations did lead to a temporary improvement of profitability in the sector exposed to foreign competition, they also eased the pressure for structural adjustments. By concealing important economic signals, high and fluctuating inflation impairs the workings of the economy. Households and firms are less able to make rational consumption and investment decisions and planning for the longer term is more difficult. The risks are greater and the required return, including compensation for the risks, rises. Decision-making therefore becomes more short term and speculative. A good example is Sweden’s real estate boom in the 1980s. The combination of high inflation and the tax system at that time meant that speculative capital was attracted to the property market. Financing more productive investment became comparatively difficult.

When inflation fell back in the early 1990s it became apparent that the investments in real estate had been founded on unrealistic expectations that prices would continue to rise. The property market collapsed and credit institutions were hit by massive loan losses. The bank crisis accordingly accentuated the economic downturn in Sweden. BIS Review 68/1997  -2-  Inflation is also associated with an arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth, often contrary to the ambitions of distribution policy. Referring again to the 1980s, the chief losers from the inflationary economy at that time, with the resultant price fall, were probably not the property speculators but households whose bank savings were eroded by two-digit inflation and whose wages were only subsequently adjusted for inflation. Price stability is the Riksbank’s objective The reason why monetary policy is assigned the task of safeguarding the value of money is basically simple: by adopting an appropriate monetary stance the central bank can choose, or at least strongly influence, the rate of inflation. In the short run price increases are of course affected by many other factors such as the state of economic activity, the direction of fiscal policy, wage formation, etc. But in the long run inflation is a monetary phenomenon. By controlling the supply of money in a wide sense, in the long term the Riksbank can also govern movements in the value of money and in inflation. Interest rate management by the Riksbank cannot, on the other hand, generate economic growth and employment in the longer run.
Stress tests show that the banking system’s capital levels are still sufficient to absorb the materialization of a severe stress scenario, although if such conditions occur it would affect profits somewhat more than was assessed in previous IEFs. The less favorable stage of the cycle could imply higher credit risks. On one hand, those households more exposed to the cycle would take a turn for the worse in their repayment behavior should the labor weaken significantly. On the other hand, the deterioration in the past year of some economic sectors in the commercial portfolios could intensify if the slowdown becomes sharper. Thus, the level of provisions set aside in each case is one important element that could cushion the impact of such risks. As I said, funding costs are low, with near record-low long-term real interest rates. However, one cannot rule out a reversal or new episodes of volatility. Thus, it is still important to diversify by sources and maturities of external and internal credit. A large segment of the banking industry has advanced in that direction, but some smaller banks continue to depend heavily on local wholesale suppliers. Some reflections to wrap up. Final remarks We have been seeing a rise in inflation for some months that has taken y-o-y figures up past 4 percent. The forecasts in this Monetary Policy Report indicate that this is a temporary development associated with the depreciation of our currency, and private expectations corroborate this, as a normalization of inflation over the coming months is foreseen.

This may involve a degree of reliance on head office compliance or the bringing in of outside support - both of which may be necessary, but both require care in how they are used. What are the implications for ongoing monitoring, when technical experts fly in and fly out? If certain compliance tasks are outsourced, is bank management providing effective oversight? Vendors must be scrutinized and, very simply, outsourcing cannot diminish, in any way, the firm’s accountability. These objectives may be met through a variety of organizational models, depending on factors such as the size and nature of each bank’s businesses, its geographical scope, its culture and existing reporting lines, and the legal and regulatory framework in which it operates. There is no “one-size-fitsall” organizational model that we require or even expect. Implications for supervisory authorities Let me now offer a few key principles for the way in which supervisors should be carrying out their responsibilities. First, supervisory authorities have a responsibility to establish clear regulatory requirements, supported by industry and examiner guidance. The goal is to have well-structured rules that implement legal requirements, supplemented by guidance outlining where and how discretion may be exercised. Second, supervisors should employ judgment in how they deal with problems that are found.
The Bank of Albania, in the framework of legislation approximation with the EU acquis, has increased the regulatory requirements to ensure more qualitative governance. But, beyond the formal fulfilment of the regulatory requirements, these principles are indispensable to be incorporated into and become part of the culture of the entire organisation. This is a long-term investment, which generates positive and stable outcomes. Second, while adopting better governance, the same expectation should be transmitted also to your clients. The principle not to accept informal data from firms when assessing their repayment capacities has provided absolute positive results in preventing the creation of new non-performing loans. Yet, the issue of informality is still present in our economy. Banks may do more in this regard by offering to your clients and encouraging them to use existing or personalised products, which ensure a higher circulation of funds within the system, enhance the interconnection between firms and clients, and facilitate the establishment of a more complete financial profile and a more precise assessment of the repayment capacity. Third, there is still a relatively high quantity of “intangible assets” in the balance sheet of banks, despite the insofar success. In total, the properties regained from legal processes are a high potential waiting to be transformed into funds. But, it may lose its value very quickly, becoming an unnecessary cost, which harms the reputation and competitiveness of banks.

For a relatively 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  small market, such as Albania, it is proved that the costs of non-performing clients are borne by the whole system, and individual strategies have no effective results. To provide an effective restructuring for clients in distress, it is indispensable to have an honest collaboration between banks, which ensures not only a more fair assessment of the client’s repayment capacity, but also optimises the time and cost of assessment for both the bank and the client. The Bank of Albania remains committed in supporting energetically such collaborative projects, by guaranteeing impartiality; meanwhile banks should show a good will in this regard. Last, in these days of daily technology advancement, banking business would not be able to survive without investing in technology, in the right time. All banks are fully aware of this, but the pace of development in each of them has been different. Thanks to the strong relations and exchanges with our European neighbours, and the firm aspiration to be part of the EU, a postponing of the necessary investments in this regard would be at the cost of competitiveness. But, investments in technology only, without the support of internal human resources, may expose banks to high operational risks and irreparable consequences.
Through these Lecture Series, which have successfully ended today, it has been highlighted that the central bank, like the rest of the economy, adapts to changes in the market environment. In the case of the Bank of Zambia, prior to 1991, the Bank had numerous roles, including the promotion of economic growth through the provision of credit to critical sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining, etc, as well as issuance of export guarantees to exporters. As expected, the multiplicity of functions led to conflict of interest. For instance, on one hand, the Bank was expected to control the growth of money supply while, on the other hand, it was required to inject money into the system through the provision of credit to the selected sectors. The introduction of economic reforms by the Government beginning the end of 1991 therefore brought about enormous challenges for the Bank of Zambia. To meet the new challenges, the Bank’s operations needed to be more focused. In this respect, the Bank of Zambia Act was amended in 1996 to reflect the changed nature of the operating environment. By amending the Act, the Bank’s primary role was solely “to formulate and implement monetary and supervisory policies that will ensure the maintenance of price and financial system stability”. This was deliberate, as experience world-over has shown that you can only achieve sustained and high economic growth in an economic environment characterised by low and stable inflation.

A particularity of the Chilean macroeconomic policy is the fact that the Central Bank uses a real interest rate as its policy instrument, but this is a subject that require more time for discussion than is available today. Pending tasks: further flexibility in factor markets and further integration with the world economy. My conclusion: the new economy will eventually bring with it a new cycle, more synchronic all over the world. Preparations for such an environment include additional flexibility in all markets. 6  Implied Currency Volatilities. Source: Bloomberg, JPMorgan. Mexican $  10.6  Chilean $  9.0  $  5.6  $  9.2  $  9.7  $  11.2  BIS Review 53/2001  3
Proportion of open unemployed members in different unemployment benefit funds Per cent of members  Hotel and restaurant workers  Building workers  Commercial employees  Industrial workers  Transport workers  SEKO  HTF  SIF  M unicipal workers  Local government officers  Graduates  Teachers  2002 2003  Government officers  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  Note. HTF = The Salaried Employees’ Union. SIF = The Swedish Union of Clerical and Technical Employees in Industry. SEKO = The Union of Service and Communication Employees. The building workers’ funds consist of The Building Union’s and the Swedish Painters’ Union’s unemployment benefit funds. The industrial workers’ funds consist of the unemployment benefit funds of the Swedish Metal Workers’ Union, the Swedish Forest and Wood Trade Union, the Swedish Food Workers’ Union, the Swedish Paper Workers’ Union, the Swedish Graphic Workers’ Union and the Industrial Workers’ Union. The number of members in the unemployment benefit funds included in the chart comprised in 2003 around 88 per cent of the total number of unemployment benefit fund members in Sweden. Source: National Labour Market Board. 8  BIS Review 59/2004  3.

Economic policy should be designed so as to minimise uncertainty and so that the regulatory framework and tax system do not distort the allocation of resources in the economy. If fiscal policy is carried out so that the central government debt is stabilised at a reasonable long-term level, certainty is established in the design of the transfer systems and coming tax burdens and investment and consumption decisions are facilitated. Structural policy also has an important role with regard to creating good conditions for growth. Structural policy is such a broad concept that I can only point to some important components. The tax and transfer systems, for instance, should be designed so that they do not create motives for citizens to act in a way that is harmful to long-term growth and welfare. The task of the educational system is to provide access to relevant, high-quality education and that of labour market policy to ensure that demand and supply of labour power match. 1  BIS Review 48/2000  The tasks of the Riksbank A monetary policy aiming at price stability reduces uncertainty about future real incomes. Agreements on future payments and assessments of future income are thereby facilitated. Demands for compensation for risk are reduced which, among other things, stimulates real investments. Price stability also improves the ability of the price system to spread information about how resources are to be distributed to areas where they most benefit citizens.
The settlements in 2004 and 2005 resulted in moderate wage growth. There are now signs of higher local pay increases in some industries. Pay increments are probably rising in occupations where pay is directly linked to performance. Municipalities and public entities have recorded a sharp increase in revenues, and this may easily translate into higher labour costs. Nevertheless, the labour market is not so tight that there is a pronounced risk of a marked increase in wage growth in connection with the spring income settlement. Moreover, employee organisations have  6  4  Information from Norges Bank’s regional network, January-February 2006. BIS Review 10/2006  gained acceptance for important changes in labour legislation and regulations. This probably reduces the near-term risk of pay increases that weaken production. A characteristic of the wage formation process in Norway has been that fairly long periods of moderate nominal pay increases and rising employment have culminated in a sharp rise in cost inflation – often as a result of working hour reforms – and a decline in employment. Developments in labour costs and the wage settlements in 1974 and 1975, 1986 and 1987 and in the period between 1998 and 2002 laid the basis for a subsequent decline in output and employment. In our interest-rate setting, we must continuously assess how we should take account of the risk of another sharp rise in cost inflation when the labour market tightens.

In the more recent period, with the enhanced international dimension of Islamic finance, it has become an increasing form of intermediation that has facilitated economic linkages between emerging economies. In addition, it has also drawn the participation by the more established financial centers to forge stronger financial linkages with the dynamic growth regions of Asia and the Middle East. Indeed, this would contribute towards more efficient mobilisation of funds across regions, reinforcing the significance of Islamic finance as an increasingly important channel for a globally more inclusive economic development. In the aftermath of the crisis, Islamic finance will continue to spur new connectivity among nations as its role and relevance gains more significance, thereby contributing to a more balanced global growth. Conclusion In conclusion, it is the very premise on which Islamic finance performs its intermediation function that strengthens its potential role and relevance in advancing the growth and development agenda towards preserving financial stability and towards strengthening economic and financial linkages between nations. By operating in accordance with the rules of Shariah, Islamic finance draws its strengths from its direct link to economic activity and its inherent requirement for prudent risk management and explicit disclosure and transparency thereby ensuring the viability of the activities in generating sufficient wealth to compensate  BIS Review 70/2010  3  for the risks involved. These inherent strengths will continue to be the catalysts driving its transition into a new era of growth and development in this post-crisis world.