samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, during the periods of export booms particularly in the early 1950s, the fixed exchange rate regime worked well, as foreign exchange earnings, which arose due to external factors rather than domestic export promoting policies, were not only sufficient to meet current expenditure but also helped build up foreign reserves so that currency peg could be maintained without foreign grants or borrowings. The necessary condition for any country to maintain a currency peg with a strong reserve currency like sterling pound on a sustainable basis is the country’s ability to earn sufficient foreign exchange. In other words, such a country would require a strong set of export oriented policies. In technical terminology, a country should run at least a balanced current account in the balance of payments on a long-term basis for it to be 5  able to maintain a peg with a strong foreign currency. Economies like Japan early on, and later Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and even China, given their strong export oriented policies, were able not only to generate current account surpluses on sustainable basis, but as a result, also saw the value of their currencies appreciating against major currencies like the sterling pound and the US dollar. During the period of Sri Lanka’s fixed exchange rate regime, successive governments did not pursue export oriented policies continuously. There were short episodes where policies focused on export promotion, but there were more times of policy reversals towards encouraging import substitution and inward looking polices.

Yet we have also seen a strong and, thus far, persistent contraction in business investment, which may weigh on future productivity growth as such investment tends to raise the technology content of capital. A prolonged period of below-trend investment could also lead to an excess of savings over investment, and therefore a fall in the natural interest rate. Developments in labour supply have also been weak. One positive factor has been the increase in the labour participation rate in the euro area by around 1 pp during the crisis, whereas in the U.S. participation has fallen by more than 3 pp. However, this has to be set against an increase in euro area long-term unemployment from 3% to 6%, which creates a risk of workers’ skills being eroded and skill mismatches emerging. This is particularly  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  relevant because unemployment is concentrated among those with lower skills: around 20% of low skilled workers are unemployed, compared with only about 7% of high skilled workers. Total factor productivity – which principally captures long-term technological progress – has fallen only marginally during the crisis, most likely reflecting the underutilised capacity in the inputs to production. However, this is no cause for comfort as TFP was on a declining trend in the euro area well before the crisis, and has recovered less quickly than in the United States.1 These developments create two interrelated challenges for policymakers. The first is how to prevent the fall in observed growth from feeding back into potential growth.
From the public finance standpoint, it is hardly obvious that the aforesaid situation could have been avoided with a different mix of credit sources for the necessary fiscal impulse. This, because the level and the structure of interest rates are also important when trying to affect gaps and inflation in the medium term. Summing up, the changes we have seen in the macroeconomic scenario since last May lead us to think that, if anything, inflationary pressures are less than were forecast, so the risk of inflation remaining below the 3% target longer than estimated has increased. In this context, it may be necessary to increase the monetary stimulus. Although given the current low level of the MPR there is limited room for maneuvering, an additional cut cannot be ruled out. We must also keep in mind that expectations about the course of monetary policy affect the market interest rate structure and the exchange rate. The Board was clear—both in the May Report and in June’s monetary policy meeting—in that it estimates that, in the baseline scenario, it would be necessary to hold on to the monetary stimulus for a longer period than the one implicit in financial asset prices. Recent information continues to validate this diagnosis (figure 3).

00-05  2006  2007  2008 (e)  2.9 2.4 3.1 2.2 1.5 10.0 5.5 2.7 2.7 3.0  3.8 2.9 2.5 1.9 1.6 9.4 4.8 3.0 3.1 3.1  5.1 3.9 2.8 2.9 2.0 11.6 5.5 5.6 3.0 4.6  5.2 3.8 2.0 2.7 2.4 13.0 5.9 5.7 3.2 5.0  3.2 2.2 1.1 0.9 -0.6 9.0 3.0 4.2 1.0 3.0  2009 (f) Report May'09 -1.2 -2.3 -3.0 -3.5 -7.2 6.5 -1.9 -2.0 -1.7 -1.5  2010 (f)  June IPoM meeting May'09 S S S T S S S T = S  -1.1 -2.2 -2.7 -4.1 -6.8 7.3 -1.8 -2.6 -1.7 -1.4  2.1 1.4 0.5 0.4 0.9 7.5 1.4 1.5 0.9 2.0  June meeting S S S = = S S S S S  2.3 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 7.8 2.1 1.9 1.3 2.3  (*) Regional growth are weighted average by world GPP participation in IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO, April 2009) (e) Estimated; (f) Forecasted. Fuente: Central Bank of Chile base on investment bank data, Consensus Forecast and IMF. Commodity prices have posted substantial increases in the past few weeks. Both copper and oil have seen their prices rise more than 50% since the end of 2008. The copper price hike reflects increased demand, especially from China. In the case of the oil price, the increase began showing in domestic prices, partly offset by the recent appreciation of the peso. Little by little, dislocations in international financial markets are being fixed.
The European Central Bank’s proposed ‘Single List’ will also include certain bank loans; indeed these are already eligible in some member countries. Similarly, the Fed has broadened the range of collateral accepted at the Discount Window. A working group commissioned by the Basel-based CPSS (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems) in 2004 has examined whether existing arrangements would prove adequate in an emergency. It would appear that some of the infrastructure required to facilitate more extensive crossborder use of collateral is already in place: links between securities settlement systems, for example. Nevertheless, central banks may need to put in place more cooperative and coordinated policies, such as the establishment of a framework for information-sharing. When risks do crystallise it is imperative that central banks, along with regulators and ministries of finance, are well prepared so that they are able to respond in an effective manner. The CPSS working group looked at preparations that are needed in order to be able to make effective use of existing infrastructure in a crisis. But it is equally important that central banks and regulators be in a position to make the decisions necessary for resolution of a crisis, both individually and, when needed, collectively. This entails gathering data and intelligence on firms and markets, sharing it appropriately amongst all relevant public authorities, understanding the systemic conjuncture, and setting up national and international frameworks for coordination of decision making. I could give an entire speech about questions in these areas, and current and potential initiatives to address them1.

We did it because inflation is too high, but especially core inflation at 4,3%: there is for sure a significant energy and supply component in the euro area inflation; but it is also becoming broader and more domestic, and this is the field where we have to act. And second, we clearly show our determination to bring inflation back to 2% in the medium term: this is not only our target, it is our commitment towards European citizens; our will and our capacity to deliver on our mandate cannot be subject to any doubt whatsoever. That said, yesterday’s significant move sometimes raises two questions: - what about the next move? Let me be clear: we have our hands completely free. Nobody should speculate that this will be the magnitude of the next step – we did not create a new “jumbo habit” –; nor that we simply must emulate other  Page 2 sur 3 important Central banks. We obviously go in the same direction as them, but not necessarily at the same speed or with the same final level: because the nature of inflation has its differences on both sides of the Atlantic, the monetary answer has its differences too. - and this brings a second frequent question: what about the destination of the journey?
In 1998 a few of the banks launched the so-called Cash card, which was a prepaid cash card designed to replace banknotes and coins for transactions entailing small amounts made at small points of sale. Afterwards, one can say that it was a flop. Consumers never liked it. Maybe there were too few places where one could recharge the card, perhaps the normal debit cards were too similar, maybe one believed that the banks should have paid some interest on the money when it was transferred to the Cash card? Anyway, it was not a success. At most in an individual year the number of transactions amounted to 4.2 million. The Cash card was finally discontinued in the autumn of 2004. However, it is not just in Sweden where developments have been sluggish. Developments have been slower than expected in the rest of Europe also. There are countries where prepaid cash cards – similar to our Cash card – are used to a relatively large extent, and here I am thinking in particular of Belgium and the Netherlands. All in all, however the use of prepaid cash cards is modest. What has grown in recent years is the use of so-called server-based network money. Companies that manage prepaid payments on the Internet, so-called e-payment companies, have become increasingly common. Neither buyers nor sellers need give sensitive information – such as card numbers or account numbers – on the Internet by using these companies.

The intention was to gradually withdraw from the multiple policy rate setup in order to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy and enhance policy predictability. We were able to stick to our plan until the end of the year, even after the currency pressures increased after the US elections. In fact, our interest rate hike in November was the first conventional interest rate response since 2008. However, the situation in early January necessitated an alternative approach. We have witnessed price movements in the FX market which could not be justified by economic fundamentals. The volatility increased sharply, which could be detrimental for both price and financial stability. The response to this unprecedented episode had to be swift, strong, and targeted. Given the significant downside risks to the economic activity and the credit supply, we decided to implement a monetary tightening which would strongly address the direct cause of the problem, with less significant implications on the real side of the economy. To this end, we have tightened the liquidity supply and induced a sharp increase in the short term interest rates at the interbank market. Moreover, to further strengthen our control on the short-end of the yield curve, we have devised a new tool which is practically equivalent to a currency swap. This facility not only sets a benchmark for the price formation in the FX market but also supplies temporary FX liquidity to the market when needed.
(2015), suggest that the average cost of a financial crisis has been 73% of GDP, which translates to a cost of roughly £ 20,000 per capita if a financial crisis had taken place in 2016. 2 For example, Bunn and Rostom (2015) find that, during the financial crisis, highly indebted UK households, with loans four times larger than their income, reduced their consumption relative to income around three times more than UK households with loans between one or two times their income. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  So today I want to consider one of these next frontiers for macroprudential policy: market-based finance of companies. The nature of corporate finance has shifted decisively in the past decade. Since the crisis, nearly all net finance raised by private companies in the United Kingdom has been through the issuance of equity and bonds. Market-based finance has been the spare tyre to what was, after the crisis, a punctured banking system, unable to lend. The scale of businesses borrowing through issuing bonds is now on a par with their borrowing from UK banks. The shift in the balance of corporate finance should be a positive for stability. A more diverse system can be a safer system. The challenge for macroprudential policy is to ensure this source of finance develops sustainably and safely, so that its users can have confidence in the service they get from it, and the wider economy need not fear it. That challenge is not a distant one.

In conclusion, allow me to reiterate the Bank of Zambia’s concerns with regard to high lending rates being charged by financial institutions, especially Microfinance Institutions, which are inhibiting the expansion of credit. I acknowledge that some financial institutions have begun to lower their interest rates but I am certain that there is room to do more. The continued lowering of lending rates by Microfinance Institutions will not only stimulate our economy but also reduce non-performing loans in the industry as low lending rates reduce the risk of default. I am informed that CETZAM’s interest rates range from 48% to 72% per annum. I have also been informed that CETZAM introduced an agricultural loan product for rural areas and last year lowered the interest rate from 60% to 48% per annum. It is my sincere hope that CETZAM will further reduce lending interest rates to these clients that they are targeting for savings deposits. The Bank of Zambia undertakes to continue pursuing policies that will drive financial innovation, build strong financial institutions and partnerships to ensure a stable financial sector in the country. It goes without saying that strong financial institutions can weather shocks more easily and thus contribute to Zambia’s economic growth. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Finally, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to take this opportunity to once again congratulate and commend the Management of CETZAM for introducing this new savings product, which is expected to improve the savings culture of the ordinary Zambians in the community.
This situation therefore, suggests that there must be now some innovative rethinking, about this process of reserve management. It should also prompt the reserve managers of the reserve accumulating countries to look beyond their  BIS Review 99/2008  1  traditional methods, and intensely search for new avenues for performance enhancement. 1. The philosophy in reserve management in our region has been historically based upon a very conservative approach which focuses on managing foreign exchange reserves, by limiting investment decisions to very low risk, very low return, highgrade instruments. Perhaps, as a result, there has been no significant cross investments of foreign exchange reserves within the countries in the South Asian Region. Of course, there is evidence of mostly concessional loans or similar types of direct investments, but not in the case of traditional financial investments, issued by our respective countries. It may therefore, be useful for those of us in the South Asian Region, particularly in the context of SAARC, to explore the possibilities of cross investment in financing instruments within our own Region. In that way, we would be able to shift and retain capital in this Region, which can then be applied in the development of our own Region. My dear friends, we speak of regional cooperation in lofty terms. We speak of our historical ties. We speak of our shared destinies. We speak of our common culture.

The structured development of the insurance industry over the years in particular, spurred on by various capacity building initiatives, had yielded positive outcomes contributing to continued growth. The performance of the insurance industry is expected to improve in 2010 on the back of the economic recovery and increasing awareness on the role of insurance as a protection and financial planning tool. Improvements in the employment market, rising disposable income and revival in economic activities will generate spins-off to the insurance sector and create greater demand for insurance products. Nevertheless, the operating environment for the insurance industry in 2010 is expected to remain challenging. Despite the optimism on the economic and financial conditions as the financial markets continue to stabilize in early 2010, the low-yield investment environment will continue to pose near-term challenges for insurers. In the past, investment earnings had predominantly been relied upon to offset any setback in insurers’ underwriting performance but such expectations may be altered in the near-term. The financial crisis is a clear reminder for insurers to return to basics and focus on its core function of sound business underwriting. The increasing intensity of climate change has heightened the vulnerability of the world at large to natural disasters and extreme weather conditions. Tsunamis, volcanic ash and earthquakes, not previously known to strike in generally thought “safe” zones have actually occurred. Similarly, earthquakes and hurricanes have become more intense causing multibillion dollar losses to the affected economies.
31  PSR indirect access market review, https://www.psr.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/PDF/MR1512-indirect-access-market-reviewinterim-report.pdf 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  Finally, at the wholesale payments end, we’ve already explored whether the core of the new RTGS system could run on distributed ledger to discover that the technology is not yet sufficiently mature or reliable to run a system that settles the equivalent of a third of the UK’s annual GDP each day and requires 5-sigma performance. Nonetheless, the Bank believes that distributed ledger technology could over time significantly improve the accuracy, efficiency and security of processes across payments, clearing and settlement. Securities settlement in particular is ripe for innovation. Transactions that take nanoseconds to execute, currently take days to settle along a chain involving many intermediaries. At stake, are the tens of billions of pounds of capital that are tied up while settlement completes. 32  The best in the private sector are working  hard unlocking this value. That’s why the Bank is building the new RTGS so that new forms of securities settlement that meet our standards of resilience (including those using distributed ledger) will be able to plug in directly. Ultimately this combination of new technology and direct access to RTGS could be applied to other assets such as helping make the payment, registration and Stamp Duty processes involved in house purchases quicker and more efficient.

The Advent of Cryptocurrencies In the depths of the global financial crisis, the coincidence of technological developments and collapsing confidence in some banking systems sparked the cryptocurrency revolution. Its advocates claim that a decentralised cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin, is more trustworthy than centralised fiat money because:  -  Its supply is fixed and therefore immune from the age-old temptations of debasement;  -  Its use is free from risky private banks; and  -  Those who hold it can remain anonymous and therefore free from the ravenous eyes of tax authorities or worse still law enforcement. Some also argue that cryptocurrencies could be more efficient than centralised fiat money because the underlying distributed ledger technology cuts out intermediaries like central banks and financial institutions and allows payments to be made directly between payer and payee. 14,15  13  The Bank operates the Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) service and infrastructure that holds accounts for banks, building societies and other institutions. The balances in these accounts can be used to move money in real time between these account holders. This delivers final and risk-free settlement. 14 Whereas banks hold records of most fiat money and are entrusted to ensure its validity, with digital currencies, the ledger containing all transactions by all users is publicly available.
Rapid credit growth, emerging external imbalances with growing current account deficit (reaching at one point 10% of GDP), and consequently rising external debt. Price bubbles in the real estate and equity markets coupled with the expansion of the construction sector all provided red flashing lights far ahead of the 2008 global market mayhem. In order to preserve stability of the banking system throughout the crisis, resolute action had to be taken years ahead of the global financial crisis. In the period of large capital inflows, raising interest rates to tame the cycle was not a policy option due to the risk of exacerbating capital inflows even further. Therefore, already in 2003, in the early phase of the cycle, the CNB started to implement a range of measures to limit excessive lending and the increase in foreign debt, which were gradually adjusted and tightened until 2007. Stringent capital and liquidity requirements, way above and beyond anything we have available in the current macroprudential setup, were necessary in order to stem excessive risk-taking and instil resilience into the system to cope with a potential fallout. Such measures were at that time labelled (by banks and some of the colleagues) "administrative" tools, but would later be classified under macroprudential policy instruments. For example, implicit tax on credit growth (when we asked banks to subscribe zero yielding CB bonds for any  euro of credit growth over 12% per annum), and high marginal reserve requirement on foreign borrowing by banks, together with high capital requirements.

Episodes of global financial crises are an excellent illustration of how macroprudential policy measures can be activated in a counter-cyclical manner. In the upward phase of the financial cycle, they were undertaken in a timely manner, with the aim of limiting banking system's exposure to risks and strengthening its resilience by building additional reserves. After 2008, in the downward phase of the cycle, this extra liquidity was released to provide support to the financial sector and the economy. The banking system remained highly capitalized and profitable at the aggregate level. Only a few smaller banks left the market, and there was no need for bank resolution, apart from one regionally significant bank. A different scenario from that in a number of European countries, which went on to bail out banks at a very high fiscal cost. Still, a deep recession took place during the GFC, demonstrating the need for a macro-prudential policy to work hand-in-hand with other policies. Even a very tight financial regulation may fall short of fully curtailing the buildup of macro imbalances and their eventual unwinding. Capital inflows came to a halt and borrowing costs surged as risk premia increased due to worries about growth and fiscal position. As that happened, as you would expect, asset price overvaluations unravelled. However, all systemic banks were doing fine, thanks to a massive use of macroprudential policies in the run up to the GFC. Smaller banks continued to exit either by being closed down or acquired.