samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But the currency board regime rules out such a choice, and in this sense it cannot escape from being ascribed some significance in the explanation of Hong Kong's price deflation. Does price deflation matter? In addressing this question, some attention tends to focus on the fact that negative inflation may in certain circumstances imply undesirably high real rates, and that, in particular, it rules out negative real interest rates (at least when measured simplistically by adjusting nominal rates for immediate past price movements), which may be deemed appropriate during a period of deflation. But it is not obvious that real rates of themselves have much of an influence on the intertemporal consumption decision for example, there is little evidence of people having abstained from purchasing electronic goods over the past several decades despite fairly certain knowledge that prices would be lower tomorrow, and there is a limit to the extent that one can delay buying food or clothing. And, as regards the investment spending, it is not the real interest rate calculated by reference to the CPI which is relevant, but the user cost - the nominal interest rate relative to the expected future net yield from the asset in question, adjusted for depreciation. Prices of different asset classes adjust according to market forces and the user-cost arithmetic, which may not be particularly sensitive to changes in the broader price level per se. In this light, it is at least questionable whether mild overall deflation would be a material impediment to investment decisions.

Yet Hong Kong now finds itself with a consumer price level that is 12% below the peak of four years ago, and with a GDP deflator some 15% below its peak and 22% lower relative to that of the US than it was four years ago. What is the explanation, and can one live with this? There is general consensus, supported by both recent IMF analysis and research conducted within the HKMA, that Hong Kong's deflation is predominantly cyclical. I shall return to Hong Kong in a minute, but let me first dwell for a moment on the global slowdown in inflation. Over the past four years the rate of consumer price inflation has averaged 2.5% in the USA, only 1.7% in Euroland, minus 0.3% in Japan, and minus 0.3% in Mainland China. In six other economies of east and south-east Asia taken together, the inflation rate fell to 2.7% on average in these four years as 1 against 4.4% in the preceding four. This widespread slowdown in inflation, and in some cases the emergence of deflation, is not just a cyclical phenomenon. There are, I believe, some more fundamental institutional and structural factors which have been contributing. Underlying forces a. Successful central banks  First of these is the commitment of monetary authorities to combatting inflation and their evident success in doing so (or even over-achievement in some instances). With so many of them represented here today, I do not need to elaborate further. b.
Workers aged 25 to 54 have been particularly prone to dropping out, which suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate may overstate the improvement in labor market conditions. Despite some improvements, the economy continues to operate with significant excess slack. Less than 59 percent of the U.S. working-age population has a job. This is unacceptably low – just about the same share as in late 2009 and well below the levels in 2006 and 2007. Once again, this large amount of slack is putting downward pressure on trend inflation. After a brief run-up during the second quarter of 2011 – reflecting the pass-through from higher commodity prices and supply-chain disruptions – inflation has retreated and may be headed down further. As I noted earlier, it is unlikely that the faster growth experienced in the fourth quarter of 2011 will be matched in the first half of 2012. In addition to the temporary nature of some of the recent improvement, there are significant impediments to a robust recovery that I’ll list briefly. First, global financial and economic conditions may impede faster growth. In particular, growth in the euro area is slowing and a recession may be underway with adverse direct and indirect effects on the U.S. economy. Second, fiscal policy has become more contractionary. Despite the extension of the payroll tax cut, the stance of federal fiscal policy has tightened and employment and spending by state and local governments continues to decline.

William C Dudley: Impact of the Great Recession on public schools in the region Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing, New York City, 27 January 2012. *  *  *  Good morning and welcome once again to the New York Fed’s Quarterly Regional Economic Press Briefing. I am pleased to have this opportunity to talk with the journalists covering our region – and through you, to the people in our District. This morning I will focus on regional economic conditions, with particular attention to how the recession has affected public school spending in New York and New Jersey – states that dominate the Second Federal Reserve District. Following my remarks, my colleagues will provide more details. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System. National economic conditions I will begin with a review of overall economic conditions. Recent data suggest that the U.S. economy ended 2011 on a somewhat stronger note – the best performance since the first half of 2010. Nonetheless, the amount of slack in the economy remains substantial. Moreover, I think it is unlikely that the pace of growth we saw in the fourth quarter will carry through to the first half of 2012. Growth of consumer spending strengthened in the fourth quarter, adding a needed boost to the economy.
The last three topics are especially relevant in the context of the financial crisis, referring to the consequences of having a majority foreign-owned banking system, the rethinking of central bank objectives with special attention paid to financial stability and, finally, the choice of the optimal inflation target. 1. From monetary anchors to inflation targeting  During the nineties, giving up the intermediate objective as an anti-inflationary anchor in favor of direct inflation targeting marked a major change in the way of thinking the monetary policy framework around the world. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Monetary strategies based on a nominal anchor, be it the exchange rate or a monetary aggregate, still prevailed in the early nineties. While exchange rate pegs are currently still in place in some countries (and I will come back to this later), monetary targeting slid into oblivion. But, at the time when the National Bank of Romania had to choose a strategy for conducting its monetary policy, monetary targeting was not yet out of fashion. Moreover, this strategy was adopted and implemented in the context of the stand-by arrangements signed by the Romanian authorities with the IMF, which stipulated the monitoring of monetary aggregates developments. The same as with fiscal and income policies and with structural reforms, the programs agreed upon with the IMF were a strong anchor for coherent policies in the nineties. Another reason for choosing monetary targeting was that the alternative strategy, i.e.

But none of this changes the fact that we must lift the controls as soon as it is safe to do so, both because of the economic cost of retaining them and because of Iceland’s international obligations. In my speech a year ago, I said that this was one of the most complex tasks facing the Icelandic authorities at the time. That has not changed. A prerequisite for success is that we base our efforts on the best possible analysis of the problem and the potential solutions to it. Until now, the controls have been viewed as providing shelter during the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  resolution of the balance of payments problems caused by the collapse of the financial system. If all non-residents’ potentially volatile claims on residents were paid in a short period of time, Iceland would pay down foreign debt much more rapidly than is desirable. If worse comes to worst, the deleveraging could amount to roughly half Iceland’s GDP in relatively few years. Under such circumstances, the króna would depreciate significantly, at least over a considerable period of time, the banks’ liquidity would be weakened, and public sector finances would do likewise. Domestic and foreign Treasury financing would be much more difficult and expensive to come by. But is this analysis correct? Is Iceland faced with a balance of payments and refinancing problem rather than a debt sustainability problem?
As this work has progressed, it has been hard to ignore the concern that these initiatives and tools might shift the attribution of liability between participant and operator in a manner that could challenge an operator’s ability to take appropriate precautionary measures to protect the network. For example, if an operator becomes aware of security deficiencies at a participant as part of an assurance program, and the participant subsequently experiences a breach, does the operator incur some measure of liability for any loss? In such a circumstance, what degree of latitude does an operator realistically possess to deny a participant access to services that are essential 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  to the participant’s ongoing viability? Moreover, if an operator detects potentially anomalous transactions coming from a participant, and does not intervene to prevent a transfer that is in fact fraudulent, does the operator assume a measure of liability for the resulting loss? One way in which we have endeavored to manage these concerns is to provide tools and services to participants to manage their endpoint security risks locally, and in a manner that does not inappropriately shift liability from participant to operator, but admittedly these are difficult questions that compel novel thinking to ensure that the legal framework supporting the payment system is sufficiently robust and responsive to the escalating threat environment.

Alternatively, could it encourage an FMI to endeavor to return to normal operations prior to assurance of complete confidence in and sanitization of a production environment? To put it plainly: could the 2-Hour RTO unwittingly exacerbate rather than assuage the impact of a severe 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  disruption and/or impede prospects for recovery? Reflecting upon these important questions, allow me to offer the following practitioner’s interpretation, which I hope maximizes the value of the intent of the 2-Hour RTO while minimizing the downside risks of its mis-application. Rather than spending valuable time and industry resources re-litigating established supervisory guidance, we should consider the 2-Hour RTO as a vital organizing objective for planning purposes in peacetime, an aspiration to mobilize our best critical thinking to achieve, rather than an inviolable requirement that must be met in all circumstances recognizing the fog of war. A common understanding of this nuance across policy makers, supervisors, and operators strikes me as an important step forward both to focus our resiliency preparations in advance of an extreme event and to promote sound decision making in its remediation. Provocative Question Number 2: To what extent does the proliferation of risk management and information security frameworks to which FMIs must comply risk creating a “check the box” mentality to security and resilience that diverts resources and management attention from other critical initiatives?
In this regard, any measures that discourage early retirement and allow people to extend their working lives beyond the age of 67 would have a positive bearing on the financial sustainability of the system. Some countries have opted to build in an automatic link between life expectancy and the permitted retirement age in their sustainability mechanisms. Others have undertaken a broader change, adopting a notional definedcontribution accounts system, which has some advantages in terms of increasing the transparency of the system. Moreover, against the background of a significant rise in the dependency ratio and future reductions in pension replacement rates, it might make sense to extend the role of retirement saving to complement the resources of the public contributory system with the accumulation of financial assets supplementing future public pensions. In any event, implementing a funded system is complex and requires detailed prior analysis of issues such as the length of time needed to implement it, whether it is voluntary or compulsory, the returns it can offer in a scenario of demographic stagnation and sluggish productivity growth, and how the costs associated with implementing this change are to be shared out intergenerationally. 2) As regards new sources of funding, the alternative is to raise social contributions or other taxes, or permutations along these lines. Increasing social contributions may have adverse consequences for employment, since their weight in overall taxation is already higher in Spain than in other comparable countries.

Most importantly, this Act also addresses financial stability issues that have surfaced in this current international financial crisis. It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the 2009 Tun Ismail Ali Public Lecture. This Public Lecture is now organised in conjunction with the Tun Ismail Ali Chair in Monetary and Financial Economics at the University of Malaya that was established by Bank Negara Malaysia in August of 2000 in honour of the late Tun Ismail Mohamed Ali. It is our hope that this Chair will contribute towards the advancement of knowledge in the area of monetary and financial economics. This Public Lecture takes place at a time of a financial crisis that is continues to unfold in the advanced economies and that now is having unprecedented consequences on the global economy. For some parts of the world, such as Asia , the financial sector has largely not been affected, but the impact has been on the real sector, following the massive contraction in world trade. While this crisis started in early 2007, Malaysia has seen the full impact of this crisis on our economy in the first half of this year. Today, we are very privileged to have with us Professor Dr. Takatoshi Ito, professor at the University of Tokyo and this year's holder of the Tun Ismail Ali Chair, to speak to us on the "Comparison of the Financial Crises: Japan and Asia in 1997-1998 vs. US 2008-2009".
Although restructuring will be a gradual process and may lie some years ahead, Norway may find that sustaining growth and keeping unemployment low in the coming years might become a challenge more on a par with that facing other economies today. The economic policy framework matters. Fiscal policy follows the fiscal rule, which aims to ensure a sustainable level of petroleum revenue spending over the long term. In the event of major aggregate demand shocks, fiscal policy, in line with the fiscal rule, can be used to alleviate the situation in the short term, as evidenced during the financial crisis. But an imbalance arising from a cost level that is too high and weak competitiveness cannot in the long term be addressed by means of an expansionary fiscal policy. This approach could, quite to the contrary, amplify the problem by crowding out businesses. The fiscal policy stance can affect the growth capacity of the economy. Government regulation and various features of the tax system can influence corporate decisions with regard to localisation, investment and technology. Other measures can affect the labour force and the functioning of the labour market. Supply-side mechanisms are complex and interlinked in ways that we do not fully understand. Nonetheless, an effective supply-side policy is probably the most important contribution we can make to strengthening the growth capacity of the economy.

Thomas Jordan: Financial crisis dispersing? Economy changing direction? Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the general assembly of the Handels- und Industrieverein des Kantons Schwyz, Schwyz, 25 August 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The situation on the international financial markets has recently brightened again. This is mainly due to the positive keynote in company earnings reports and a series of unexpectedly favourable economic data. The relaxation of monetary policy was pursued further through the implementation of unconventional measures in March 2009, and this is also likely to have had a calming effect. Price advances since March should, however, be partly seen as corrections to excessive downward movements in the previous period. Considerable uncertainties still prevail and the danger of setbacks should not be carelessly underestimated. The recessionary developments in the world economy weakened significantly in the second quarter of 2009. Expansionary monetary policy around the world, together with fiscal support programmes, have probably played an important role in this respect. Economic indicators are also showing a turn for the better in the Swiss economy. Nevertheless, in view of the exceedingly low level of utilisation of production capacity, industrial investment will probably continue falling. Given the increasingly gloomy outlook for employment, private consumption is also likely to put a damper on the resumption of cyclical activity.
16 We must continue to safeguard the inflation target, and learn the major lesson from developments in the 1970s and 1980s, namely to ensure to retain the credibility of the nominal anchor. And we must also learn the major lesson from the financial crisis, namely that financial stability is a condition for low and stable inflation and good economic developments in general. The global dimensions of the financial and debt crises affect the conditions for Swedish monetary policy As I mentioned earlier, the Swedish economy, despite good conditions, has been greatly affected by the financial and debt crises. One question that has arisen once again is how much monetary policy in a small, open economy like Sweden’s can deviate from that conducted in other countries. 17 The correlations between Swedish and international (KIX-weighted) GDP growth and inflation since the 1980s are both above 0.8, which indicates that a very large part of the variation in economic activity in Sweden stems from  14  See, for instance, Aiyar, S. Calomiris, C. W. and Wieladek, T. “Does Macro-Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment”, NBER Working Paper no. 17822, 2012. 15  In my speech here last year I gave a detailed description of my thoughts on monetary policy and macroprudential policy. 16  See also Billi, R. and Vredin, A., “Monetary policy and financial stability – a simple story”, Economic Review 2014:2, for a description of monetary policy and financial stability that reflects this opinion.

Peter Pang: Developing critical financial infrastructure between Hong Kong and Thailand Opening remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA-BOT Joint Press Conference on the Launch of US Dollar – Thai Baht PvP Link, Hong Kong, 28 July 2014. *  *  *  Deputy Governor, ladies and gentlemen, 1. Good afternoon. It is my great pleasure to welcome you all to this press conference jointly organised by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and Bank of Thailand (BOT). I would like to thank Deputy Governor Mr. Krirk Vanikkul for joining me here to announce the launch of the payment-versus-payment (PvP) link between BAHTNET, the Thai Baht Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system in Thailand, and the US dollar RTGS system in Hong Kong. 2. Time flies. About a year ago the HKMA and BOT announced in Bangkok to build this PvP link. With the concerted effort of colleagues on both sides, the link went live today as scheduled, after completion of the system development and meticulous testing with the users. The banks in both jurisdictions have been fully engaged to ensure maximum readiness, on both technical and business fronts, for the launch of the link. 3. This PvP link is an iconic project that symbolises the determination of the HKMA and BOT to work together to promote financial integration and financial stability in the region through the linkage of critical financial infrastructure. It will bring significant benefits in three areas. 4.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The starting point for the 2016 fiscal consolidation strategy is, firstly, the assumption that the government deficit target for 2015 will be met, which requires a reduction of 1.6 pp of GDP with respect to the deficit observed in 2014. The available information on the budget outturn to date in National Accounts terms shows that, on data to May, the consolidated aggregate of central government, regional government and Social Security recorded a deficit of 2.2% of GDP, close to 0.2 pp of GDP lower than the figure recorded in the same period of the previous year. In relation to this information, it should be noted that the Social Security surplus decreased by 0.2 pp of GDP, compared with the required improvement of 0.5 pp, and the regional government deficit narrowed by 0.1 pp of GDP, compared with the reduction of 1 pp envisaged for the whole year. In consequence, in order to meet the general government deficit target for the year, the increase in revenue and/or the containment of spending in the remainder of the year will need to be greater than that observed in the early months of the year.

This experience, unfortunately, did not only affect us here, but the whole continent and beyond, touching lives far and wide. I am referring to the infamous Slave Trade Era. Historians, time and again, narrate to us tales of how this wonderful tree was used as the resting place for our forefathers, who were captured into slavery as they were marched across this land, being traded as commodities from Africa to far away lands. It is now common knowledge, rather than myth, that our fore-fathers were being traded under this same spot on which we stand today, proud and free. After the abolition of the Slave Trade, the TREE attained a new significance as a “rendevous” or meeting place. It was from under this very tree that some of our fore-fathers were recruited and taken to fight in the First and Second World Wars. As mentioned earlier, later came the happy times of celebrations at Christmas, Independence Day and Labour Day. In the year 2002, the Bank decided to recognize the historical significance of the Mukuyu Tree and depicted it on the highest denomination of Zambian currency, the K50,000 banknote. It was therefore a matter of concern for us when the Tree and its surroundings fell into a deplorable state due to the Municipal Council’s inability to meet the financial obligations attendant to its maintenance as a historical monument and national heritage site. The Bank therefore decided to adopt the Tree as part of its corporate social responsibility.