samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Traditionally, Spain’s trade balance with our European partners has run a deficit. Two years ago, this deficit had already fallen to € billion, but the good news is that at the end of last year it ran a surplus of a similar amount, meaning that, last year alone, there was a favourable turnaround of € billion in terms of Spain’s trade balance with the countries of the Union. At a greater level of detail we can see how the non-energy goods balance improved from a deficit of € billion, i.e. 5% of GDP, in 2008 to a deficit of only € billion, i.e. 0.5% of GDP, at end-2011. And the balance of non-tourist services, which has traditionally run a deficit, moved into a surplus of € billion at end-2011 after posting a deficit of € billion in 2008. A further example of the progress made during these difficult years has been the restructuring of our credit institutions. The Lehman Brothers crisis forced many countries to adopt numerous measures during 2009 to repair their banking systems. As is known, in Spain’s case the direct effect of the international financial crisis – the sudden emergence of toxic assets on bank balance sheets – was minimal, thanks to the soundness of our regulation and supervision and to our banks’ business model. But the indirect effects of the international crisis, such as the decline in GDP and the drying up of bank funding, seriously affected our system.

Several insurers and FA firms recognise the risks of associating with representatives who may be distracted by other commitments and remuneration opportunities outside the realm of financial advisory services. These companies accept only representatives who are fully dedicated and committed to providing quality financial advice to their customers. This is how it should be. But practices vary across financial institutions, and it may not be practical to ban representatives from undertaking other activities that earn an income. MAS will work with the industry to push for a consistent industry-wide approach to representatives who engage in multiple activities. Role of introducers FAIR will also review the current practice of FA firms and their representatives making use of “introducers” to reach out to customers. An introducer may be another representative, but may also be any man-on-the-street. Introducers are typically paid a fee to refer customers to financial advisers, or they get a cut of the commissions generated from sales to the customers. The use of introducers means customers risk dealing with individuals whose credentials have not been vouched for by any financial institution. It also means that customers may not receive proper advice when introducers go beyond introducing and pressure customers to buy products. Financial advisory activities in insurance broking firms Making sure that the financial advisory role is the primary focus of FA representatives is only one side of the coin. The other aspect to ensure, is that firms whose primary activity is not financial advisory services, are fully capable of managing this part of their business.
BIS Review 68/2010  3  Figure 3 Different measures of resource utilisation Per cent 6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2 -4  -4 The Riksbank, April -10 NIER, M arch -10 European Commission, M ay -09 OECD, November -09 IM F, April -10 M inistry of Finance, April -10  -6 -8 -10 00  02  04  06  -6 -8 -10 08  10  12  14  Monetary policy has contributed to increased macroeconomic stability The trend towards inflation targeting, or policies resembling inflation targeting, and increased openness and clarity has had positive results. In Sweden and other countries affected by high and fluctuating inflation during the 1970s and 1980s, inflation has become lower and more stable. Similarly, inflation expectations have been significantly better anchored than before (Figure 4). In these cases, I believe that countries with explicit, quantified inflation targets have had a particular advantage. These days, actual inflation can differ quite considerably from the inflation target, for example due to temporary increases in energy prices, without households and companies finding it particularly alarming. They rely on the Riksbank to return inflation to target within a couple of years.

Making headway towards sustainable growth Ladies and gentlemen, The success of Asian economies in weathering the global financial crisis is certainly commendable. But it would be a mistake to be lulled into complacency by this success of short-term volatility management. In particular, there remain important long-term challenges to the sustainability of growth in Asia. Indeed, latest economic indicators already pointed to a  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  less upbeat growth trajectory of the Asian region including China. The apparent slowdown in Asia, despite gradual improvement of the advanced economies, lends support to the idea that Asia also has its own structural bottleneck issues to deal with. The time is ripe for all parties involved to look beyond short-term fluctuations and give serious consideration to longer-term structural issues that are holding back Asian potential growth. This is the second topic of my talk today: what can Asia do to sustain its high pace of growth in the post-crisis world? Since the onset of the global financial crisis, most policy responses in emerging markets have been focused on demand-side management, through monetary or fiscal policy stimulus. But boosting demand alone could only get us thus far. The real lift of potential growth of the economy must essentially come from supply-side progress. This refers to either the more abundance or the better use of capital and labor inputs in the economy.
As shown by mobility data and business impact surveys, the number of visitors of retail outlets dropped by 75%, with 45% of all companies forced to suspend business or shutdown altogether, and many more to follow suit most probably in the future. Meanwhile, 44% of landlords also reduced rent as a result of the overall situation, while 64% of those polled reported sentiments of fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. In general, forecasts suggest a drop in private sector revenue as high as 42%, causing cashflow and liquidity difficulties for corporate bodies. This could cause an increase in default rates, and companies failing to pay would trigger high loan-related losses in the banking sector. Companies are expected to need a total of KD 2.4-3 billion to cover their working capital requirements (such as salaries and rent payments). It is also expected that the prolonged lockdown would bring about layoffs and increase unemployment in the private sector. Amongst all nationals employed in the private sector, 86% of them (62,000 Kuwaitis) work in economic sectors negatively impacted by the crisis. Furthermore, 79% of non-nationals employed by the private sector (1.3 million workers) also work in affected sectors. Closing these companies would disrupt supply chains and cause shortages in both the supply of basic goods and services. The drop in spending and the prevalent uncertainty will also deter future investments. Any failure to take swift and unwavering action in response to working capital requirements would have grave economic repercussions on companies, particularly on small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

As for companies, the concessional financing term according to the scheme was specified as three years, not four as with SMEs. Part of the cost of financing is subsidized where the State shoulders the entire cost for the first year and 50% of the cost for the second year, while the beneficiary has to cover the whole cost for the third. Part Two: guarantee of financing In addition to subsidizing the cost of financing, the scheme proposes a State guarantee of the financing extended to SMEs to incentivize banks to grant financing. The layout is suited to the local economy where the State guarantees 80% of the principal debt but not the cost of financing. Meanwhile, an annual fee of 0.25% is to be paid to the State to reduce banks’ moral hazard and to generate revenue for the government to partially offset the cost of the scheme. The committee proposed a set of controls and restrictions to guarantee that the financing is spent towards the indicated purposes, most importantly: companies refrain from distributing dividends to shareholders while benefiting from the scheme. They must retain the national staff ratio as of 31 December 2019 and work towards satisfying the target ratio for 31 December 2021, relevant to their respective sector. It is worth noting that this guarantee has several advantages for the economy, for banks and economic entities including the following: -  The actual cost to the government to guarantee financing does not exceed one tenth of the overall financing extended to economic entities.
Monetary policy has played its part and it will continue to do so, by adding momentum, but it cannot be expected to solve every problem of our economy by itself. As I said, the mediumterm growth we see today as the most likely is less than what we thought a while ago. Factors like the reduction in investment projects, the decline in productivity, some demographic issues and the convergence to higher per capita income are behind this change. And there are structural factors that we could potentiate in order to sustain higher medium-term growth in the country. Chile’s advances in the last thirty years are huge. Poverty indexes have dropped dramatically and we have improved our living conditions remarkably. The key to our success has been the solid base that we have built with the combined efforts of each and every Chilean citizen. But there is still a lot to be done. Alongside our development over these three decades stand die-hard inequalities that we have failed to resolve as a society. In a way, this is one of the problems that come with our very success. The society – notably our growing middle class – demands ever more and better services, along with more opportunities. As a rule, these are legitimate demands, which must be met with policies that prevent losing what we have gained and entangling us in a dead end situation. This is called the “middle-income trap” in the literature.

Timothy F Geithner: Systemic risk and financial markets Testimony of Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Committee on Financial Services, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 24 July 2008. *  *  *  Good morning, Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus and other members of the Committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I very much welcome the opportunity to appear before you with Chairman Cox of the Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC). The Federal Reserve and the SEC are working very closely together in navigating through the present challenges, and my colleagues at the Fed and I very much appreciate his, and his colleagues’, support and cooperation. The U.S. and global financial systems are going through a very challenging period of adjustment. The critical imperative today is to help facilitate that adjustment and to cushion its impact on the broader economy. The forces that made the system vulnerable to this crisis took a long time to build up, and the system will need some time to work through their aftermath. Looking forward, the United States will have to undertake substantial reforms to the framework of policy, regulation and oversight of the financial system. There was a case for reform before this crisis. The regulatory framework in the United States was designed in a different time for a very different type of financial system than the one we have today.
Both countries have been doing better than average during the recovery, especially lately and in the forecasts. By this measure, Iceland seems to have levelled with the UK in terms of the level of GDP compared to before the crisis, and Ireland is surpassing both. But developments in employment are significantly more favourable both in Iceland and the UK. The flexible exchange rate probably plays a role here, but the price is weak productivity growth. Iceland has now been recovering for about six years and has now surpassed its pre-crisis peak output level and has more than absorbed the slack in the economy, as can be seen in the unemployment rate, which has fallen to just over 3½% in seasonally adjusted terms. Unlike the pre-crisis peak, however, the current level of output is associated with a relatively wellbalanced economy, both internally and externally, although there concerns about tensions in the labour market and a growing positive output gap. Inflation has now been below the 2½% target for almost two years despite strong wage increases, as international developments and the appreciation of the króna have so far counterbalanced those. The current account surplus has remained sizeable. So is Iceland out of the woods? Not quite. The financial crisis casts a long shadow. Both household and corporate debt levels have declined significantly relative to income, through debt restructuring and income growth. The household debt-to-income ratio is back to around the 2005 level, and the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio is at its lowest since mid-2004.

It was an accident waiting to happen, and happen it did, with a vengeance, at the peak of the international financial crisis in autumn 2008, when there was a wholesale run on the FX financing of internationally active banks. After having done a post mortem on the failed banks, we now know, however, that they also had other ailments that would probably have done them in at a later stage, although the process might have been somewhat less disorderly. The combination of the macroeconomic imbalances, an unsustainable banking system, and the full eruption of the Great Financial Crisis meant that Iceland faced unprecedented challenges in 2008. The financing of the current account deficit became impossible when Iceland experienced a full-scale sudden-stop currency crisis early in the year, when the currency plummeted by 26%. Then, in the first week of October, almost 90% of the banking sector failed. This resulted in a further 26% depreciation of the currency. Although the depreciation would later contribute to the recovery, at that point it exacerbated the crisis through negative balance sheet effects on a private sector that was heavily indebted in foreign currency, both directly and indirectly, through price indexation. The outlook was bleak indeed, and many expected that the sovereign would be forced to default on its obligations. That outcome was avoided, and the economy has performed better than seemed likely that dismal autumn. Part of the reason is the nature of the shocks.
As history tells us, a national currency and an individual monetary policy are both important symbols of an independent, sovereign country. EMU is breaking with this tradition. The reasons for so doing are numerous: First, a single currency is a desirable addition to the European single market. Cross-border transactions will no longer be impeded by the need to exchange one currency for another or by uncertainties about the future development of exchange rates. Second, the current influence on monetary policy in the EU is unevenly shared among the member states. Germany stands at the center of the European Monetary System and is thus able to significantly influence the course of monetary policy in the EU. EMU will decrease Germany’s influence and will increase the influence of other countries, notably France. Third -- as is hoped and expected by officials in the EU -- the advent of the Euro will strengthen Europe’s role in the international monetary arena. It will thus put the continent on a more level playing field with the United States. And fourth, achieving monetary integration is viewed as an important step towards achieving ever closer cooperation in Europe. Given the various reasons for replacing national currencies by a single European currency, it comes as no surprise that EMU is burdened with high expectations. A failure to achieve it according to the time-table laid down in the Maastricht Treaty is often viewed as a serious threat to further integration in Europe. Now, EMU is certainly an important project.

It has a lower level of public debt (86%) and public deficit (-0.5%) [than the US (104% & –5.7%) or Japan (237% & –3.2%) in 2018]. This suggests fiscal policy should be fully engaged to respond to any further slowdown. Countries with fiscal space should use it quickly, even more so when they suffer an asymmetric shock like Germany; those with high public debt should make their public finances more growth friendly – this qualitative component is overlooked – and let the automatic stabilizers work freely. And Europe shouldn’t be shy to possibly use its borrowing capacity at EU level itself. Furthermore, the euro area has a 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  savings surplus over investment of more than 300 billion euros. A top priority on the European growth agenda should be a Union for Savings and Sustainable Investment by adding a stronger Banking Union and a Capital Markets Union. In November, the ECB opened a new chapter of its history when Christine Lagarde became its 4th President. This is a good opportunity to initiate, as she announced, a strategic review. I would like to focus on three issues linked to our objectives. First, about the definition of our primary objective of price stability, we have to clarify in particular our various time horizons as well as our commitment to symmetry. Above all, we should better communicate with economic agents – businesses and households. This is crucial to allow them to better adjust their inflation expectations.
The contrast between this concern and the example and experience of Mr Ali, which we celebrated that evening in Glasgow, could not have been more pronounced. Whatever the difficulties he faced of social disadvantage, and no doubt, too, of some degree of ethnic prejudice in the UK - Mr Ali overcame them. From modest beginnings, he moved on to build a whole series of substantial businesses not simply to his own benefit but to the great benefit, in terms of both the goods and services, and the income and employment which he provided to the community which adopted him. But, beyond this impressive business achievement, he also made a great contribution in terms of community service and charitable involvement both here in the UK and in relation to Pakistan. Now this example of the contribution that ethnic minority business - given the proper opportunity and encouragement - can make to our economy is certainly not unique. The Bank of England's investigation some 18 months ago into the availability of finance to ethnic minority firms suggested that while the ethnic minorities represent some 5% of the UK population, they controlled some 7% of UK businesses and accounted for around 9% of new business start-ups. Those national figures relate to 1997, so they are a little out of date.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The transformation of the international financial system and the role of the Islamic financial system Keynote address by Mrs Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the 6th World Islamic Economic Forum, “The Transformation of the International Financial System and the Role of the Islamic Financial System”, Kuala Lumpur, 20 May 2010. *  *  *  This is a time of extraordinary global economic challenge and uncertainty. The recent unprecedented global financial and economic crisis has resulted in tremendous damage across the world. The meltdown in the global financial system resulted in several setbacks including bank failures, a credit crunch, a collapse of asset markets, massive wealth destruction, a sharp decline in trade and financial flows and widespread unemployment in many parts of the world. To contain the effects of the financial crisis on the economy, extraordinary and exceptional measures were taken by policymakers around the world. With the global economy now on the road to recovery, attention has turned towards securing a more permanent solution in shaping the global economy of tomorrow that would avoid such crisis of such proportions in the future. Significant steps are being taken by the international community to intensify efforts to reform and strengthen the international financial system. The aim is to build the foundations for a stronger and more inclusive global economy – built on the premise of sustainable growth and a greater shared prosperity.
Erdem Başçi: Recent economic and financial developments in Turkey Speech by Mr Erdem Başçi, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the press conference for the presentation of the October 2011 Inflation Report, Ankara, 26 October 2011. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Unlike former press conferences held to present inflation reports, today I would like to start my presentation by explaining a five-point action plan entailing price stability, interest rate policy, foreign exchange reserves policy, required reserves policy and financial stability. We are living through a period marked by global developments that call for taking timely, and if necessary, daily counter-cyclical measures against capital flows. Therefore, with the Monetary Policy Committee’s decision of October 20, 2011 we achieved the flexibility needed to effectively implement the two-objective and three-instrument monetary policy on a daily basis. After briefly mentioning the outlook for our primary objective of price stability, I will summarize how and in which direction the three instruments will be employed from now on. Lastly, I will also briefly talk about the positive impacts of decisions that have already been or will be taken regarding financial stability. Firstly, I will talk about price stability. We expect inflation to rise significantly in the upcoming months due to recent excessive depreciation of the Turkish lira, the base effects from unprocessed food prices and the recent adjustments in administered prices.

This has resulted in the intensification of our supervision on areas or businesses that are more prone to ML/TF risks, or where controls have been found to be lacking from past inspections. 17. We have organised and will organise more industry engagements to share supervisory findings on common lapses and good practices at the end of each series of inspections. This is intended to help level up controls over time. 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  18. Our inspections go beyond rules-based compliance. We focus on whether financial institutions demonstrate a good understanding of risks, and a good risk culture within the organisations. We much prefer that FIs adopt a proactive approach in meeting their regulatory obligations than a passive rule-based attitude. Let me elaborate on this. 19. One area relates to governance. You are all familiar with the common thinking of having three lines of defence. Recently, there are suggestions to augment this with a “four lines of defence” model for better governance in financial institutions. The first line involves frontline and management controls within business units; then compliance and risk management functions as the second line; and the audit function as the third line. A newer fourth line involves interactions of the FI with its external auditors and regulators. An FI’s senior management and board should monitor and be satisfied that these lines are effective. Senior managers should never “look the other way” on suspicious transactions, even if they involve major clients who are significant revenue sources.