samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The ambition is to complete the full introduction of instant payments in the European Union by the end of 2021. The following steps are needed to achieve this goal: - Assess the need for mandatory adherence to the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme in euro (SCT Inst.) by the end of 2021 and determining the criteria according to which payment service providers will be subject by this obligation; - Assess whether to adopt a legislative prohibition on charging instant payments higher than standard credit transfers; - Ensuring cross-border connectivity and interoperability of payment systems for instant payments in euro through the TIPS service of the ECB-operated TARGET 2 payment system. All payment service providers that have joined the SEPA Instant Credit Transfer scheme (SCT Inst.) and are reachable in TARGET 2, should be reachable either as a participant or as an reachable party (i.e., through another payment service provider that is a participant) and in the TARGET 2 instant payment service TIPS by the end of 2021; - Developing cross-currency instant payments in the European Union, which will be ensured by the inclusion of currencies other than the euro in the TARGET 2 service for instant payments - TIPS, as was the case with the Swedish krona in 2020; - Encouraging the establishment of links between payment systems processing instant payments in the European Union and those of third countries offering the same service, provided that the standards for fraud prevention, money laundering, etc. are met. 4.

This presupposes gradual decrease in the use of elements with lower degree of security, such as static passwords, and limiting the use of older technologies and communication channels that are prone to attacks (such as SMS text messages); - Prevention of new types of fraud, particularly in the context of instant payments, as well as strengthening payer’s protection and regulating a chargeback procedure in specific cases (e.g. an error), which would make instant payments come close to card transactions; - Review of the possible exceptions from applying strong customer authentication, such as contactless card payments, also exploring the possibilities for introduction of an individual limit set by the customer, for which no PIN entry is required; - Potential measures to reduce the risk of fraud due to ‘social engineering’ or ‘targeted phishing’, with a possible requirement for a match between the names of the payee to the payment transaction and the account holder, and the implementation of technological solutions for validation of the e-mail correspondence sender; - Possibility for additional standardisation in terms of the information provided to users in their account statements, particularly for card payments. The sophisticated business models using multiple intermediaries result in users’ confusion, e.g.
Re-establishing it may require a prolonged and costly process, which should also be taken into account. It is such fears that largely explain the policy conducted by the Riksbank in recent years. Does a policy that “leans against the wind” require there to be confidence in the inflation target? It is probably possible to construct theoretical and quantified examples in which the recession that is prevented or mitigated by “leaning against the wind” is sufficiently long and deep for it to be worth taking the cost of losing, and having to re-establish, confidence in the inflation target. But in practice, it is very difficult to imagine how a central bank, seeing that confidence in the inflation target is being eroded, could stick to a tighter policy and risk inflation expectations staying permanently low in order to perhaps prevent a financial crisis sometime in the future. I am not saying that this is a reason to never conduct a policy that “leans against the wind”. On the contrary, I am personally in favour of the idea as such, and can well imagine formally integrating such a policy into the monetary policy set-up, in the way it has been done in Norway. But one can argue a policy that “leans against the wind” is in practice a “fair-weather” policy – windy but sunny, in other words. Only as long as confidence in the inflation target is intact, there is scope to use monetary policy to counteract financial imbalances.

Incentives for increased saving were not actually introduced until the crisis was actually upon us and then they only helped reinforce the decline. It may seem something of a paradox that international organisations, such as the Basel Committee, are now implementing a number of new regulations – such as Basel II – despite the fact that the old regulations had negative effects and were therefore abolished. However, these are a completely different type of regulation. The old regulations were aimed at prohibition and other strict controls, while modern regulations give the banks plenty of flexibility to offer their services as long as they meet certain fundamental conditions. For instance, Basel II allows the banks to determine their own risktaking to a great extent, as long as they have adequate risk management and capital reserves. The experiences of regulation and the crisis also show clearly how important it is that the central bank can make independent decisions regarding the interest rate according to objectives set by parliament, for instance, to maintain inflation or the exchange rate at a stable level. If there are no guidelines for the interest rate, or if the parties that determine the interest rate have differing interests, it will often be set too low for the purpose of benefiting borrowers, investment and central government consumption. This was the case in Sweden during the years of regulation. Apart from leading to higher inflation and pressure on the exchange rate, exaggeratedly low interest rates also have a negative effect on the financial sector.
Yves Mersch: Strengthening the European financial industry amid disruptive global challenges Speech by Mr Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the European Institute of Financial Regulation (EIFR), Paris, 3 September 2018. * * * Europe’s financial industry still faces a number of challenges. Its continued weak performance, with low price-to-book ratios and meagre profitability, is ample proof of that. Some of those challenges – such as high levels of legacy assets, the need for deleveraging and the burden of stricter regulation – are a result of the financial crisis. But even before the financial crisis, the industry was facing pressure on various fronts, and those challenges are still there. In particular, fundamental technological change continues to call established business models into question. Today, I will focus on disruptive challenges that are arising in a particular area of business: digital technology. Such technology is becoming ever more important in banking and is opening the door to competition from non-banks in core areas such as payments. Cascades of complementary innovations have already fundamentally altered the payment landscape, and European banks need to act now if they want to avoid losing out to bigger international players. The euro area has been very successful in providing a top-tier foundation for innovative payment services. However, this foundation has not yet been fully utilised by European players to provide true state of-the-art pan-European services.

I particularly express my gratitude to the Bank’s staff, the banks’ managers and shareholders who were the first to experience the effects of our decisions, to the media which facilitated the necessary two-way interaction with the public, to the government authorities with whom we necessarily cooperate, to the international financial organizations, particularly the IMF, the World Bank and the EU Delegation, with whom we have exceptionally useful cooperation, to the business community, which, with some exceptions, showed high positive sensibility and understanding for the National Bank policy, to the diplomatic representatives in the country who, in their distinctive way, often expressed their support and understanding for the work of the National Bank. I also thank all the critics of the decisions we have made all these seven years who, regardless of their opinions, made us more cautious in the decision making process and helped expand the knowledge of the market participants, including the households, on the National Bank activities and on the importance of its decisions for the everyday life. I know well that these special occasions are not suitable for longer speeches on our accomplishments. Actually, we were doing that regularly through the monthly reports, quarterly and annual reports, regular press releases of the sessions, through press conferences and the NBRM website which is becoming richer and better from day to day.
The lesson here is to look at the economic substance, not the legal form. Securities lending Most accounts of the crisis give a headline role to SIVs, money funds, securities dealers and, as I shall come on to, the RMBS market. There has been rather less daylight, especially outside the US, around the somewhat obscure but very significant role played by the securities lending markets. The vanilla securities lending market is straightforward and important: it intermediates the loan of securities (equities, bonds or whatever) by asset managers to short sellers who need to deliver securities to settle their transactions. Securities lending is absolutely vital to effective market making, and thus to efficient capital markets. Asset managers hold their  4  BIS Review 6/2010  securities with custodians and, ultimately, in Central or International Securities’ Depositaries. Many enter into a service agreement under which their securities can be lent out by an agent. That provides the basis of a parallel, financing market. This is big, perhaps $ 6 at its peak. Say a Treasury Bond is lent out not against collateral in the form of securities but against cash, as is normal in the US market and had been growing in Europe before the crisis. The cash collateral can then employed in the market, ie it is lent to counterparties, usually secured. During the boom, risky assets, including ABS and CDOs, were increasingly accepted as collateral via so-called triparty repo arrangements, under which they were sometimes grouped with more innocuous securities with similar ratings.

It has become commonplace that shadow banking somehow exacerbated the boom, and complicated the rescue efforts of the authorities during the bust. 1 That is true. But there has been relatively little discussion about what this means for policy. We do not need to get too bogged down in defining what is meant by “banking” here. I mean it simply to refer to firms that take on-demand or highly liquid deposits, and use those liquid savings to provide term loans to households, firms and other parts of the financial system. Banks are, therefore, absolutely central to the monetary and payment system; and they are also vital to the credit system. They are leveraged; they run maturity mismatches; and their net worth is often uncertain. So they are exposed to runs, with spillovers to the rest of the system and the economy more widely. Reflecting that, they have long functioned within the terms of an established social contract with the authorities. 2 It has involved industry-financed deposit insurance (and now special resolution regimes); prudential regulation and supervision; and liquidity insurance from central banks. That regime reflects the spillovers (“negative externalities”) that flow from bank failure. But precisely because the regime aims to place a higher weight on the safety and soundness of banking than banks and their shareholders would themselves, it sets up incentives for some types of business to be booked outside the banking system.
To bridge this information gap, the SME Credit Bureau would effectively consolidate the fragmented information. This convergence of data from various sources would be enhanced, resulting in a convenient, timely and efficient access to SME information and credit ratings to assist the potential lenders to make a more objective evaluation of loan applications. It is our ardent hope that the SME Credit Bureau will become an integral component towards enabling SMEs to gain access to financing. The SME Credit Bureau also aims at promoting greater transparency, professionalism and sound credit culture among SMEs. SMEs can be assured that their good track records would be captured and evaluated by an independent third party, which in turn, would assist them to increase their financing and business opportunities. The credit reports would serve as a convenient tool for SMEs to carry out a self evaluation in identifying areas that needs improvement. This strategic alliance represents a meeting of the common objective of CGC and D&B to bridge the gaps in the availability and access to SME credit information in the country. The SME Credit Bureau is a big step towards a more sophisticated and transparent financing environment for SMEs in Malaysia. Both CGC, which is in the business of providing credit enhancement to Malaysian SMEs; and D&B, a global operator and provider of credit bureau services, are well equipped to drive this initiative forward. On this note, I would like to congratulate CGC and D&B Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. in making this initiative possible.

Do you think your depositors are going to have the same confidence in you, even if it is somebody else that has failed? Do you think they are going to say, “it’s okay. Only one finance company has failed. The company that we have deposited our money in is okay. Therefore, we can go on without any problem”. Do you remember the finance company crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s? When one finance company failed, what happened? Why is it that Northern Rock had to be supported so strongly by the Bank of England, even though it is not a clearing bank? Isn’t it simply because the Bank of England realized that if one major bank fails, the domino effect, or the contagion effect will take place? So, my dear friends, it must be now clear to you, that as directors, you are not only responsible to your shareholders; you are not only responsible to your own depositors; you are also indirectly responsible to all depositors. Don't forget that if one fails, the resulting effect on the industry and the markets is going to be very very serious. Nobody is going to be spared. That's why we want you all to understand your responsibilities. That's why we take the necessary steps to regulate the industry so diligently. We have a responsibility, to preserve the financial system stability of this country. We take that responsibility seriously.
And his British counterpart, John Maynard Keynes, proposed an International Clearing Union with penalties on large surpluses or deficits (his suggestion of a new currency, the bancor, was included primarily because at the time national currencies were not convertible). His aim was to ensure symmetric obligations. As he wrote in 1941, “[T]he social strain of an adjustment downwards is much greater than that of an adjustment upwards. And besides this, the process of adjustment is compulsory for the debtor and voluntary for the creditor. If the creditor does not choose to make, or allow, his share of the adjustment, he suffers no inconvenience. For  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  whilst a country’s reserve cannot fall below zero, there is no ceiling which sets an upper limit. The same is true if international loans are to be the means of adjustment. The debtor must borrow; the creditor is under no such compulsion”. And ever since then, the absence of an effective symmetric framework of obligations on both debtor and creditor countries has led to periodic crises. The obstacle to the creation of a binding framework is clear. Governments know whether they are debtors or creditors today. So a framework that has economic and indeed moral force when seen from behind the “veil of ignorance”, as suggested by John Rawls, is unlikely to appeal to governments.

None of the underlying causes of the current crisis have been removed. The problem of “too important to fail” banks is still with us. And even more intractable is the challenge of how to reconcile free trade with a stable international monetary and financial system. Today, the most obvious problem at the global level is that the imbalances are growing again. And continuing high debt levels, although in many ways a natural response to low long-term interest rates, leave indebted countries particularly vulnerable to a rapid reversal of high saving rates in surplus countries and a rise in long-term interest rates – surely inevitable in the long run – which would drive down asset prices. It is clear that these vulnerabilities affect us all. So recognising our common interest in moving to a more sustainable pattern of world demand is in our self-interest. The global community showed that it could work together when the world economy was close to the abyss in 2008. The challenge now is to prove that we can also work together when we are no longer in an immediate crisis, but still facing deep-seated problems. Will we create a more stable IMFS? The next few years will provide the answer. And they will, as our Chinese friends say, be interesting. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Thus, in general, our estimated Phillips curves fit better when you use AWE growth adjusted for compositional effects. In the past two to three years in particular, the extent of the skew towards low skilled employment helps to explain some of the weakness of average productivity and pay. That skew might reflect the particular circumstances of today’s recovery. Perhaps easier immigration has made low-skilled labour easier to come by, especially at a time when other European economies haven’t been growing as quickly as the UK. Maybe deterrents to investment in physical capital, and new technologies, have also reduced the relative demand for high-skilled labour. If so, then you might expect the compositional effects to improve further over time: a strengthening of the recovery in the rest of Europe would reduce the relative supply of low-skilled labour and a fall in risk premia on new investment, in human as well as physical capital, would raise the demand for high skills. I guess we shall see. Thank you! References Autor, D., L. Katz and M. Kearney, 2006, “The polarisation of the U.S. labour market”, NBER Working Paper no. 11986. Bean, C., 2006, “Globalisation and Inflation”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 2006 Q4. Bentolila, S., D, Juan J. and J. F. Jimeno, 2008, “Does immigration affect the Phillips curve? Some evidence for Spain“ European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1398-1423, November.

M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: Risk management - Challenge for the Thai financial institutions and regulator Opening remark by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the Market Risk Management Techniques for the BIS Capital Regime Seminar, held in Bangkok, 12 October 2001. *  *  *  Distinguished guests, Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to personally extend a warm welcome and to express our deep appreciation to all of our distinguished speakers and panelists who have agreed to come to Bangkok at this difficult time. I would also like to thank our co-host, the World Bank, in the efforts and interest which they have shown to make this important seminar possible. It is also important to convey my appreciation to the members of the financial industry for your interest and enthusiastic participation in this seminar. As we all know, the New Accord Proposal is scheduled to be finalized early next year, with its implementation scheduled for 2005. Countries that have not yet implemented the consolidated supervision will have until 2008 to comply with the New Accord. Thailand is in this second category since we have yet to be empowered by law to carry out consolidated supervision. The new Banking Act with such a provision is expected to take effect next year. Even with such a relatively long grace period toward compliance, Thai financial institutions have already taken the first step of the journey toward that direction.
To cope with these challenges, Carmen’s ability to take a step back and to provide us with a clear view of the big picture is most welcome. With this, I conclude my remarks, and I look forward to a stimulating talk and discussion. Carmen, the floor is yours. Page 4/4

Exports being our only area of sunshine, we have to make sure that the increasing exports are maintained until such time that investment or consumption is taking place normally and this can only be done with a low interest rate and a competitively priced baht. For this reason, it is our belief that the low short-term interest rate, coupled with the long-term interest rate of the same level as the EU and the US, is a correct strategy that we will try to maintain. Inflation is still low, around 2% headline and less than 1% core. This looks like a good level of economic numbers to nurse and nurture an economy that is still weak and recovering with a capacity utilization of only 54%. Astute investors will I think see all this and invest in the country just as they did two years ago when I lowered interest rate from the very high and unbearable level to the low level of today, against many contradictory advice from people who should know better. Whilst nursing the economy though, let me emphasize that we intend to put in mechanisms to improve the sustainability of growth and stability, some of which occurrence I have outlined in this speech, and others we are working on as we learn more and more about the economy and improve the accuracy and speed of our data collection and dissemination system. Ladies and gentlemen. In ending my statement let me recall that I began by stating that we still have plenty of problems.