samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The specifics of these new measures will need to be negotiated in due course. According to Government estimates, there would be an initial increase in social security contributions of 0.2% of GDP between 2023 and 2032, which could generate accumulated income amounting to 2.3% of GDP in the Reserve Fund by 2032, which includes the possible increase in value of the stock over time. Moreover, it has been established that the  19  Under the baseline scenarios of the National Statistics Institute, the AIReF and Eurostat, this ratio (defined as the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population aged 16 to 64) will rise from 30% at present to between 57% and 61% in 2050. 20  For more details, see P. Hernández de Cos (2021), “The Spanish pension system: an update in the wake of the pandemic”, Occasional Paper No 2106, Banco de España. 20  intergenerational equity mechanism adjustment may not exceed 0.8 pp of GDP per year, including any potential new measures. Therefore, based on the estimated impact of the measures adopted in the first phase of the reform, additional measures will be required to balance the system in the long term. The second part of the pension system reform envisages a series of steps to be spelt out over the course of 2022.

Freer flows of funds and closer financial ties within the region, after all, will provide much-needed support for investment activities and business dealings over the years to come. D.  Concluding remark  Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to conclude my talk today by restating my firm belief in the promising future of the Thai economy, and stressing again the pressing need for the country to move forward to the long-term agenda of competitiveness and sustainable growth. In these days, once we get so used to reacting to new information in the marketplace, it does not take long before we get so involved in the battle scene that we might lose the long-term perspective. It also does not take long before we forget that meaningful upgrading takes a careful, deliberate planning to truly succeed and a considerable amount of time to unfold. Given many challenges at home and abroad, moving Thailand forward is sure to be an arduous task. As a non-crisis country this time, it is wise to stay vigilant since “good” time is still the time when bad loans are made and imbalances accumulate. It is much wiser, however, to also use this time to make a head start toward the brighter future. The world is moving toward greater speed and greater interconnectedness every second, and to thrive in such environment, a balanced mix of demand management and structural reforms is a prerequisite. They are entrance tickets to a safe, undisrupted trip on the road to prosperity over the years to come.
In Sweden, hedge funds are obliged to register with Finansinspektionen, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, and to regularly report any measures that describe the risks in the fund, such as value-at-risk measures or measures of liquidity risk and indebtedness. The main rule is that the fund’s resources, as in the case of securities funds, should be invested according to the principle regarding risk diversification. Given this, it has not been considered necessary to set a minimum requirement for investment. Previously, Swedish hedge funds were obliged to report all of their holdings to Finansinspektionen, but this was not considered particularly meaningful. There are two main arguments for regulating hedge funds’ operations. The first is based on protecting the consumers from funds that take excessive risks. Amaranth’s gigantic losses affected several pension funds, for instance. However, in my opinion, this type of argument is rather strange. If one wants to protect pension savers’ investments, one should limit the pension funds’ investment opportunities, not the hedge funds’ operations. The second argument is linked to financial stability and the increasing role played by hedge funds. If a large number of funds were to fail and at the same time be highly indebted, there is a risk that the financial markets would be affected. However, this scarcely constitutes a reason for limiting the hedge funds’ investment freedom or for introducing some form of capital adequacy requirement.

In short, what is now needed is a new decision which will provide a comprehensive framework for surveillance; which will approach members’ obligations explicitly from the perspective of external stability; and which will do so in terms which can readily be made operational. And it must be written in clear and unambiguous language. This is a tall order I know – so here are some suggestions. One very simple way of keeping surveillance focused would be to include a ‘selectivity principle’ in a new Decision. This would say that the scope of all surveillance activities should be based on their relevance to external stability: and that what matters is how a member’s policies could affect the rest of the world. The most difficult challenge will be to state members’ commitments in terms that are both general enough to take account of their very different economic circumstances, and specific enough to provide a clear focus for IMF surveillance. Striking the right balance is essential if a new framework is to provide a useful basis for assessing industrialised countries, emerging markets, and developing countries alike in a way that will be accepted as even handed. A good way of meeting this challenge would be to ground surveillance in a more structured analysis of the policy frameworks which countries themselves choose to adopt. The Fund could then focus on identifying areas where a member’s policy frameworks might be unsustainable or inconsistent with external stability, and then offer policy recommendations tailored to the circumstances of the country or countries concerned.
This has the potential to facilitate exactly the wrong type of culture, conduct and risk-taking.9  Challenges Related to Complexity While I have spoken so far about work by the official sector, progress has also been made over the past few years by the industry in terms of senior management focus and commitment to culture reform. Some firms have created Board-level committees looking at culture, others have 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  introduced behavioral risk into their audit programs, and still others have developed dashboards with a range of quantitative and qualitative factors to track their efforts and outcomes. Progress has been uneven, however, and there is still more to do. Let me identify several areas where I think additional work is needed—assessment, technology, and influence. Assessment Given the complexity of the problem, measuring and assessing progress is not straightforward. Assessment of culture and the factors needed to change it are difficult, but this should not deter us. Managers, investors, and the official sector all want to know what is changing and whether misconduct risk has been mitigated. The question then is, how will we really know whether change is happening and whether progress is sustainable? I don’t believe that there is a “silver bullet” for assessing culture change—no single solution, approach, or template will work for every firm in every circumstance. That said, standardized metrics will help in assessing changes over time and across firms.

5 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  5 John C. Williams, Now is the Time for Banking Culture Reform, June 18, 2018. 6 Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Progress, Challenges, and the Next  Generation of Leaders 7 Stephanie Chaly, James Hennessy, Lev Menand, Kevin Stiroh and Joseph Tracy, Misconduct Risk, Culture, and  Supervision, December 2017. 8 John Sterman, “Learning from Evidence in a Complex World,” Public Health Matters, 96(3), 2006. For example,  the overuse of antibiotics that spread resistant pathogens. 9 Michael Held, Reforming Culture and Conduct in the Financial Services Industry: How Can Lawyers Help?,  Remarks at Yale Law School’s Chirelstein Colloquium, Mar. 8, 2017. 10 Banking Standards Board 11 Richard H. Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness,  2009. 12 Kurtz and Snowden, “The new dynamics of strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated world,” IBM  Systems Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2003; and, David Snowden and Mary Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” November 2007, Harvard Business Review. 13 See Misconduct Risk, Culture, and Supervision for more on the concept of “cultural capital.”  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
10  This monetary policy regime has performed well through several rounds of shocks to the Norwegian economy. Both during the financial crisis in 2008 and after the oil price fall in 2014, monetary policy was able to respond quickly. Moreover, the krone exchange rate has functioned as an important shock absorber. When Norway’s terms of trade weakened owing to the oil price fall, a weaker krone helped to support business sector competitiveness. Chart 9 Historically low policy rate Percent 12  12  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  1991  1996  2001  2006  2011  2016  NORGES BANK ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 18 FEBRUARY 2021  2021  Source: Norges Bank  With a policy rate of 1.5 percent, monetary policy could again make a contribution when Norway and much of the global economy locked down nearly a year ago. In the space of a short time, the policy rate was lowered to zero (Chart 9). The policy rate cuts had a broad impact and freed up funds for indebted businesses and households. As containment measures are scaled back, continued low interest rates will underpin consumption and investment, paving the way for a resumption of business activity. The room for manoeuvre in monetary policy is nearly exhausted. We do not envisage making further policy rate cuts from today’s level.

Persistently low interest rates mean that government borrowing appears to be on favourable terms. But at some point further ahead, interest rates will rise again. Central banks will have to consolidate their balance sheets. Some countries will then find themselves in vulnerable position. NORWAY WAS WELL POSITIONED Norway clearly stands out in this regard. We were well positioned to face the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic. Unlike many other countries, we have been able to pursue a very active fiscal policy without having to borrow. We also had room for manoeuvre in monetary policy. In a little over a month, it will be 20 years since the current framework for the division of responsibility in economic policy was established. Fiscal policy would be guided by the fiscal rule, while monetary policy would target inflation. Up until 2001, fiscal policy was responsible for stabilising employment and output. After the switch to inflation targeting, monetary policy has functioned as the first line of defence in stabilisation policy. The primary task of monetary policy is to ensure monetary stability. It must not pursue its primary objective to the exclusion of other relevant considerations. Monetary policy must also take into account the real economy. A monetary policy regime that ends up amplifying fluctuations in the real economy will fail the test of time. As long as confidence in low and stable inflation is well anchored, monetary policy can contribute to high and stable output and employment.
On its part, the Bank will continue to support transition activities through the RM1 billion Low Carbon Transition Facility and other funds for SMEs which will complement funds extended by financial institutions to help SMEs implement sustainable low carbon practices. By 2024, we have also required all FIs to make disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Disclosures (TCFD). Given that such disclosures by FIs will ultimately depend on disclosures provided by their customers and counterparties, this will have implications on demands for climate-related information from businesses. Significant efforts are also being pursued to support climate risk management and transition through the Joint Committee on Climate Change, or JC3, which is co-chaired by the Bank and the Securities Commission. The JC3 serves as an industry-regulator collaborative platform to drive and coordinate the financial sector’s response to climate change. As part of efforts to scale up transition finance, JC3 is actively exploring pilot programmes to test new green solutions and instruments. In identifying suitable pilot projects, priority will be given to climate-friendly projects that can help develop the broader ecosystem for green finance, such as carbon accounting and measurement frameworks, climate data aggregators, or green credentialing standards. Another key deliverable of JC3 this year is the upcoming publication of a data catalogue that will point users to credible sources of critical climate data needed to support identified use cases.

All of this is to say that climate strategies are set to be a key focal point of financial institutions’ business and risk decisions going forward. Within the property sector, it is encouraging to see major banks in Malaysia already offering targeted financing solutions for green residential homes in what used to be a niche market for a handful of smaller institutions. Also important are solutions that can help reduce GHG emissions from existing homes on the books of financial institutions, and increase their resilience to climate hazards. Such products are putting sustainability at the forefront of consumers’ minds not only when they decide to purchase a property, but also in making future decisions regarding renovations, or energy and water supply systems. The introduction of such products is also an important start to collecting critical data for the assessment of risk differentials between green and other mortgages by financial institutions. While these developments are encouraging, experience in other markets would suggest that there is much more that financial institutions in Malaysia can do to unlock the potential to scale up green housing finance. For example, current financing activities are largely focused on the end consumer, which is just one part of the housing value chain. The incorporation of green considerations in funding extended to developers and those involved in construction activities such as engineers and raw material suppliers remains largely untapped, and can help offset or spread over time the generally high upfront costs associated with green buildings.
Our challenge is to embed processes that will be relevant for crises into our everyday interactions: co-ordination is likely to be much easier amongst colleagues who are already familiar with each other and with each other’s views and approach, than with someone who is simply a name on a contact list. This is one positive feature of discussing these issues, just as some of the value of MoUs lies in the process of negotiation and the relationships that fosters. Second: information-sharing in a crisis. Interest groups would be a good forum to discuss in advance what information it might be appropriate to share on specific firms, and to ensure that it would in practice be readily available. And in doing so, we will better understand the information and therefore be able to assess it more quickly and more confidently in-crisis. Third: in-crisis systemic impact assessment. A key first step in deciding how to handle a crisis is in understanding the likely cost of not intervening in it – the likely systemic impact of it. The impact of a particular problem or failure of a particular firm will of course depend on the characteristics of that specific problem – and importantly on the resilience of the financial system, and the interlinkages amongst different elements of it at the time. However, there are common channels through which shocks propagate. And some of those channels will be more relevant for particular firms than others.

John Gieve: Practical issues in preparing for cross-border financial crises Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the Financial Stability Forum Workshop: Planning and Communication for Financial Crises and Business Continuity Incidents, London, 13 November 2006. *  *  *  Introduction My subject this evening is the challenge that globalisation poses for handling and resolving financial crises. If that seems a typically gloomy subject for a meeting of central banks, regulators and finance ministries, I would like to start by emphasising two points. First, I do not believe that globalisation is a source of instability; indeed in financial as in other markets, the opening up of international competition has been a huge force for good; by spreading and diversifying risk, it has in many ways made financial markets more efficient and stable. However, the fact is that governments, regulators and central banks remain largely national and our machinery for cooperation has not kept pace with the internationalisation of markets. Second, I have not chosen the subject because I believe a crisis is imminent. Indeed, in the UK and elsewhere economic and financial conditions currently are mostly benign and are forecast to remain so. Of course concerns about global imbalances and the search for yield in financial markets remain but our central projections like those of the IMF and most other international forecasters show the ‘Great Stability’ of the last 10 years continuing at least in the near term.
 However, the report and the subsequent analysis are restricted in the definition of structural features, in particular on the demand-side. 1   Financial stability is seen in the narrow sense of households being able to repay loans, and banks being exposed to the risk of non-performing loans, mainly because of sharp changes in the house prices. Much emphasis is put on the flow and on trends, and little attention is being paid to the stock.  I would like to focus on these structural features at households’ level, which eventually influence not only the RRE markets but also pose risks to financial stability in a broader sense. The discussion is particularly timely, as residential real estate prices have resumed an upward cycle in the last three years in all EU countries except Greece and Cyprus.  Ex-communist countries in CEE have high ownership rates (mostly as a result of a policy in the early 90’s to sell the state’s houses at affordable prices in the urban areas, as well as due to their large share of rural population). (Figure 1).  They also have low households debt to GDP ratios and low household mortgage debt to income ratio (Figure 2 and 3). However, these countries started from a very low debt level (practically zero), and they witnessed only one major boom and bust cycle of RRE prices in recent history.  These combined features seem to spare them of RRE vulnerabilities. But the devil is in details...meaning the structural features of households in CEE.

Property taxes 100 RO  95  home ownership %  LT  HR  90  SK  85  BG  80  EE  PL  LV  MT CZ  75  HU  SI PT  LU  70  IE  65  ES CY  FI SE  EL  BE  IT  NL  UK FR  DK  60  AT  55  DE  50 45 40 0.0  0.3  0.5 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 taxes on immovable property % of GDP  2.8  3.0  3.3  3.5  Source: Eurostat, ESRB Report  Figure 9. Gini coefficient and GDP per capita, 2015 GDP (current prices, PPS per capita) 35000 Euro area 19  30000  Czech Republic  25000 20000  Poland Hungary  Romania  15000  Bulgaria  10000 5000 0 25  27  29  31  33  35  37  39  GINI coefficient Source: Eurostat  8  Figure 10.
Lim Hng Kiang: Assessing the global megatrends that will impact Singapore’s future Speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Credit Suisse Global Megatrends Conference, Sentosa Cove, 17 January 2013. *  *  *  Ambassador David Adelman, US Ambassador to Singapore Lito Camacho, Vice Chairman Asia Pacific and Country CEO, Singapore Francesco de Ferrari, Head of Private Banking, Asia Pacific Distinguished guests Ladies and gentlemen Good morning. It is my pleasure to join you at Credit Suisse’s first Global Megatrends Conference. It is fitting to hold this conference in Singapore. As a small, open economy in the heart of Asia, we have always been acutely conscious of global trends and developments. Our attitude has always been that we are too small to influence global developments and events. We are a price taker. What we can do is align Singapore’s position in anticipation of the major trends and be nimble enough to ride through short term volatility. So I am happy to share with you our assessments of the global megatrends that will impact our future; and how Singapore is positioning itself to take advantage of these trends. Let me highlight a few. Asia’s growing importance and economic integration Asia will continue to thrive, driven by Asian consumption, to become a key pillar of global demand. China already accounts for a quarter of the world’s demand for luxury goods.

Domestic demand for equipment goods could even turn out to be the most severely affected component of final demand. Developments have been slightly different for the construction sector and its most important component, residential investment. Housing construction has been in decline for the past few years, although the cut in interest rates could now halt this trend. All these factors have brought about a sharp deterioration in business confidence, which should put a damper on job creation in our country. Unemployment will start to rise again. Consumption should continue to grow, but at a considerably slower pace. The household sentiment indicator was sharply down at the beginning of the fourth quarter, reflecting expectations of greater job insecurity. In contrast, the unexpected fall in inflation will contribute to an increase in real income, which will support consumption. For 2009 as a whole, the SNB is forecasting a decline in real GDP. This decline is likely to lie between 0.5% and 1%. Changes in monetary and financial conditions As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the target range for the three-month Libor has already been cut by 175 basis points in three steps since our September assessment. These successive cuts were rendered necessary by a number of factors that contributed to a tightening of monetary conditions, whereas the deteriorating general economic environment  2  BIS Review 157/2008  called for relaxation.