samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It should, as planned under the technical enhancement, prepare a “credit scoring” module which will indicate some sort of ranking of borrowers. This would enable the lending institutions to better assess whether the borrower is a willful defaulter from the beginning or whether he has defaulted only on a few instalments. This is how credit bureaux world over provide both positive and negative information of their borrowers. The CRIB would endeavour to accomplish and provide an equitable service through its business plan which will come into effect from the second half of 2006. Accordingly, it intends to engage in a horizontal expansion in collection of information from multiple sources, i.e. credit granters, utility service providers, insurers, public databases and lenders for SMEs and micro sector borrowers in its new database in a phased manner. I hope that the expansion of customer databases to include their payment schedules for other utility services might help the lending institutions to form a better opinion of the borrower. In addition, using the new technology, the CRIB intends to enable customers to have easy access to their own credit profile and apprise the CRIB of erroneous reporting. With the introduction of the new technology, the reporting institutions as well as the CRIB should work together  2  BIS Review 66/2006  to provide positive information of the borrowing clientele, so that their ability to stay in the formal market is made easier.

As a service provider, the CRIB should look after its clients, but its action should not lead to social injustice and be detrimental to public policy objectives. As we know, the CRIB was set up at a time during which high credit default rates were posing a threat to the stability of the financial system with the failure of several finance companies. Undoubtedly, the CRIB has been able to prevent the wide-spread credit indiscipline by willful defaulters. However, one needs to weigh the costs and benefits of flagging the defaulting borrowers within the CRIB’s network against the resultant denial of access to, or elimination of, certain borrower groups from the formal credit institutions. In this connection, it is important to identify the class, the segment, or the group of defaulting borrowers who have been denied access to the formal credit institutions. According to information available at the CRIB as at 20.06.2006, of the 261,322 loans reported, 67% of borrowers have taken loans less than Rs 1 million. The percentage for those who have borrowed less than Rs 5 million was 95% as at the same date. Loans over Rs 5.0 million was only 5% of the total number of loans reported. However, these figures do not include the regular loans below Rs 500,000/= and irregular loans below Rs 100,000/=. Following the default records forwarded by credit institutions, the CRIB attaches a negative label and that does not allow many of these defaulters to access any credit institution in this country.
Mugur Isărescu: Overcoming economic problems, the experiences of Sweden and Turkey – an inspiration for Romania? Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the conference “Overcoming economic problems, the experiences of Sweden and Turkey – an inspiration for Romania?”, Bucharest, 23 September 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Your Excellences, Distinguished Guests It is a pleasure for me to welcome you to the National Bank of Romania. I salute the presence of such a distinguished audience: Their Excellences, the Ambassadors of Sweden, Turkey, Brazil, Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands, members of the diplomatic corps, economists, bankers, businessmen, journalists. We are honored to host this international conference: “Overcoming economic problems, the experiences of Sweden and Turkey: are these an inspiration for Romania?” The title is, I believe, self-explanatory. In today’s globalized world, learning from other countries’ experience is of utmost importance. And while it might be true that no one really learns but from his own mistakes, one can hope that some other mistakes may be avoided when learning from other people’s experiences. Why Sweden and Turkey? Before answering this question I wish to emphasize that the National Bank of Romania is open and willing to host other conferences with similar topics. And today’s conference might be considered the first of a series, involving clusters of countries with relevant interactions.

With reference to the question above, I can tell you that there have been several reasons to begin with these three countries, but the main reason for which we compare today the present situation in Sweden, Turkey and Romania is due to the diligent and assiduous activity of the Ambassadors of these two countries in Bucharest. Then, I would like to salute their presence here today: His Excellency Mr. Anders Bengtcén, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Sweden, and His Excellency Mr. Ömür Şölendil, Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey and to particularly extend my gratitude to them and to all the persons involved in the materialization of this conference. I also thank Mr. Klas Eklund, Senior Economist at the Swedish Bank SEB and Adjunct Professor of Economics at the Lund University and Mr. Çağri Memişoğlu, Deputy General Manager at Garanti Bank Romania. There are, of course, historical links between the three countries. I do take this opportunity to highlight a few of them. With the Republic of Turkey one could go back to the proclamation of the new state as a republic, last century, and even more, centuries of ties between the Romanian Principalities and the Ottoman Empire. I also like to notice the connection between our two central banks. In the National Bank of Romania’s archives there are letters, exchanged between Governor Mitiță Constantinescu and Governor Salâhattin Çam, regarding the organization of a conference for the governors of the central banks in the Balkanic Coalition, in November 1937, in Ankara.
At the present time, the SNB’s most important task remains the requirement to ensure that our money remains sound, thereby safeguarding its value. In this context, retention of value refers to prices for the goods and services paid by an average consumer in our country. I am firmly convinced that price stability is, first, a fundamental basis for the growth of an economy, thereby contributing to prosperity. Second, it has an important social component and is part of the glue that holds our modern society together. Price stability protects the purchasing power of pensions and enables citizens with lower incomes to accumulate and maintain assets. Retention of value cannot be taken for granted. Over the course of history, our neighbour countries have often experienced the pain of a collapsed currency. Money that retains its value, backed by sound institutions, therefore makes an important contribution to social harmony and material prosperity in our country, particularly in today’s world, with its major insecurities and imponderabilities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  However, sound institutions alone are not enough. Additional prerequisites for sound money are widespread fundamental trust by the general public in both our monetary order and the SNB, as well as understanding and support of our stability policy. It is only because these conditions were and are met in Switzerland – for which I am very grateful – that the SNB has been able, and is able, to fulfil its mandate.

In the “Uster Memorial” document, an interest rate of 4% was considered to be appropriate; 1 well, as you know, Swiss interest rates have been considerably below this level for the past few years – so, in this respect, the SNB has fulfilled the requirements set out in Uster in 1830. A short journey through monetary history I would now like to take you on a short trip through Swiss monetary history. We will start our journey in the year 1830, and will make stop-offs at sixty-year intervals, i.e. in 1890 and 1950, before returning to the present day. Let us assume you wanted to buy a loaf of bread in the year of the Ustertag. What money would you have used to pay for it here in Uster? My question may appear simple, but the answer is anything but easy. That is because the year 1830 falls within the long multiple coinage – or multiple currency – period. In other  1  Carl Dändliker: Der Ustertag und die politische Bewegung der Dreissiger Jahre im Canton Zürich (nebst Abdruck des “Uster-Memorials” als Beilage). Zur 50-jährigen Erinnerung, Zurich 1881, p. 6 of enclosure. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  words, the currencies being used in the canton of Zurich in 1830 included guilders, batzen, shillings, thalers, hellers and angsters, just to name a few. 2 Over 300 different kinds of coins were in circulation in Switzerland, with thousands of different embossed images.
Given my assessment of the data as they stand and recognising the substantial policy tightening already implemented, in my view the MPC’s current priority must be to ensure we see the job through, so as to return inflation to target on a sustainable and lasting basis. It remains premature to declare victory over the unacceptably higher rates of inflation we have seen recently. Continuing to raise rates at the pace and magnitude seen over the past year would eventually – and perhaps soon – imply that monetary policy had cumulatively been tightened too much. Nevertheless, given where we stand, I still choose to emphasise the MPC’s need to be watchful for signs of greater-than-expected persistence in inflationary pressure. And I would flag the need for the Committee to maintain a readiness to act to address any such persistence should it emerge. We have long signalled how we assess the potential for inflation persistence: by looking at the strength of corporate pricing power along supply chains, by evaluating the tightness of the labour market, by weighing up wage developments and their implications for services price inflation. The past few days have yielded some new information along these dimensions. Tuesday’s labour market release pointed to signs that the UK labour market loosened a little in the fourth quarter, in line with the narrative underpinning the MPC’s February Monetary Policy Report.

While we have seen some easing in the past couple of months as the impact of past energy price rises starts to recede, UK CPI inflation is still in double digits. That is unacceptably high. In line with its mandate, the MPC has taken action to bring inflation back to the 2% target on a sustainable basis. Over the past 18 months since I joined the MPC: we have raised Bank Rate by almost 400 basis points; we have halted asset purchases and started to run down the portfolio of assets held as a result of quantitative easing (QE); and we have changed the character of our communication about the economic outlook and its implications for policy. Taken all together, this represents a significant tightening of the monetary policy stance, commensurate to the significant challenges to price stability we have been and are facing. These challenges come from recent rises in European wholesale energy prices; from disruptions to global supply chains; from the strength of corporate pricing power; and from tightness in the UK labour market. All of these challenges continue to threaten or linger. The MPC has done a lot to address these challenges. But has it done enough? Famously, monetary policy works with ‘long and variable lags’. [1] As a result, much of the policy  Page 3  tightening announced by the MPC over the past year still has to work its way through to the economy in general, and to price developments in particular.
Our understanding of digital token money has been heavily influenced by cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin. Cyptocurrencies are privately issued currencies denominated in their own units of account. In our illustration, we refer to money based on cryptocurrencies as ‘crypto tokens’. Digital tokens can be issued in conjunction with a private cryptocurrency denominated in its own unit of account; but they can also use an official currency as their unit of account. On the one hand there are private issuers, who claim that the value of their tokens is stable against official currencies; in our illustration we assign this type of token money to the ‘stable coins’ category. However, state institutions such as central banks can also issue digital token money – the SNB, for example, could issue a Swiss franc token. Ladies and gentlemen, as you see, digital token money can take a number of forms. It is important that we understand the characteristics and implications of these various tokens, as they could influence the SNB’s mandate. I will now set out our thoughts on this topic. Privately issued digital token money Let me start by outlining our view of cryptocurrencies, before moving on to discuss stable coins and state-issued digital tokens. We believe that cryptocurrencies and cryptocurrencybased tokens are of only limited use as payment instruments, stores of value and units of account because they are subject to major fluctuations. Crypto tokens are more like speculative investment instruments than ‘good’ money in terms of their characteristics.

However, excessive reliance on credit cards to finance personal spending leads to problems. We see this internationally, and in Asia too. The credit card crises in Korea in 2003 and Taiwan in 2006, where we saw significant increases in card delinquencies, as well as debt-related crimes and strained family ties, are reminders. 11. We have so far avoided most of these problems in Singapore, despite growing usage of credit cards. We were an early adopter of safeguards to discourage excessive borrowing on credit cards and unsecured credit,1 and cardholders have generally been prudent. •  Credit card outstanding balances are not high by international standards, and the majority of users pay off their credit card bills in full. Compared to 10 years ago, a larger share of total credit card balances is now paid off in full. And bad debts written off from credit cards have remained stable at 4–5% of average rollover balances. 12 Nevertheless, there is a small group of borrowers who have incurred unsustainable credit card and unsecured debts. MAS estimates that about 3% of unsecured credit borrowers have accumulated unsecured debts that exceed their annual incomes. They are mainly not from the lower income group. Close to 65% of these individuals earn incomes above the median, and more than half hold tertiary education qualifications. 13 As CCS has found, people fall into debt problems for various reasons. Over-spending such as on travel and cars, and job-related changes, are the two most common reasons.
In short: such supervisory forbearance distorts the market and weakens the entire banking system. Supervisors would become part of the problem. Obviously, we shouldn’t overdo it either. If justified, banks should always have reasonable time to comply with new rules and standards. Think, for instance, of the transitional phases for the Basel framework. But the standards themselves should not be weakened. All this leads us to an interesting conclusion. Obviously, it was a problem that banks failed during the crisis. But taking a long-term view, I would argue that it was also a problem that many weak and under-capitalised banks that did not have a viable business model did not fail. They did not fail prior to the crisis – even though they probably should have – and they could not fail during the crisis either. But not letting banks fail creates some huge problems further down the road. Let’s discuss why banks should be able to fail, but often were not able to do so. Why banks must be able to fail (but often were not allowed to) Why was it that in the past banks were often not allowed to fail? The answer is simple: the failure of a bank can trigger a financial earthquake. Banks engage in maturity transformation: they accept short-term deposits and make longer-term loans. Banks depend on public trust. If that trust disappears, they may suffer a bank run. And that can affect the stability of the whole system.

Transmissions occur through networks whose structure and architecture is constantly changing through financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage. Also, financial systems are "human" systems. Their behaviour is shaped by the way human beings react to shocks in their environment. Herd behaviour has long been known to be an essential feature of financial markets. More subtly, individual reactions, by themselves rational, can, by the virtue of their mutual interaction, produce strong amplification effects 3 . A broader definition of procyclicality would thus encompass three components, which cannot easily be distinguished in real life: (1) fluctuations around the trend (2) changes in the trend itself and (3) possible cumulative deviations from equilibrium value. This points to the policy challenges regulators face. They have to try and identify when pure cyclical fluctuations morph into something different: either a change in the trend itself or the start of a cumulative process. A good operational approach to procyclicality would look at all amplification mechanisms which provoke (or allow) the financial system to deviate durably or permanently from its predetermined path) so that the trend itself may be affected in the short or medium run. 1  Quote from FRBNY Economic Policy Review Issue on Systemic Risk (November 2007, page 26). 2  See Haldane (2009). 3  This has been luminously shown by Danielsson and Shin in their seminal article on "endogenous risk", based on the now famous parable of the Millennium Bridge. BIS Review 94/2009  1  What are the mechanisms at work?
However, if energy resources and gold are excluded from the equation, raw material prices in dollar terms are at a similar level to the beginning of 2004. While the price of oil receded from its high-water mark in the wake of Hurricane Katrina to back within the region of USD 60 a barrel, the gold price is trading at a 24-year high of over USD 500 an ounce. A number of factors have contributed to this increase in price. The physical demand for gold has intensified significantly, rising by about 40% this year alone in India, which is the largest market. Increased demand at the central banks of emerging countries and in oil-producing countries is also being reported. Moreover, the currently low real interest rates push down the opportunity costs of interestfree investments, such as gold. Given, too, that the gold market is largely illiquid, even small shifts in demand can trigger serious price effects. In view of the fact that implicit inflation expectations are still firmly anchored – according to inflation-protected bonds and surveys – inflation fears can hardly be considered to be the main driver behind this gold price increase. SNB’s performance Taking into consideration the development of the gold price, the SNB yielded an average annual return of just below 1% on its assets between 1980 and 2005 (end of September). While interest-  BIS Review 86/2005  1  bearing assets posted a higher average yield during this period, the SNB had to settle for overall losses in gold.

The annual yield – including the gold price movements – fluctuated very strongly between minus 25% and plus 20%. For the assessment of future developments in earnings, these figures are only of limited significance, however. The level and spread of our earnings are determined by the balance sheet total, the structure of the assets and the achievable financial market yields. Since these measures change over time, it is rather difficult to estimate the long-term earnings potential of the SNB. At the end of 2004, the National Bank’s assets amounted to CHF 118 billion. After distribution of the proceeds from the gold sales in spring 2005, the invested funds contracted by CHF 21 billion. Furthermore, higher profit distributions to the Swiss Confederation and the cantons should deplete the existing distribution reserve by 2012, thus decreasing our assets by a further CHF 10 billion as compared with the end of 2004. From today’s perspective, this leaves the SNB with assets in the region of CHF 85 billion. At present, the National Bank’s assets comprise 25% Swiss franc investments, 45% foreign exchange reserves and 30% gold. Foreign currency investments generate interest and dividend income. Given the globally low inflation rates, the nominal interest income is currently substantially lower than in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, the valuation of bond and equity portfolios, foreign exchange positions and gold holdings at market prices result in valuation gains and losses. Meanwhile, the interest income on Swiss franc assets – primarily repos – is marginal.
The latest Eurosystem projections published in December 2012 indicate a small euro area GDP contraction of 0.3% in 2013. Deleveraging goes on in several member states as banks continue to repair their balance sheets, limiting their lending activity and hence impeding the transmission of monetary policy in those member states. The build-up of these problems took place over a fairly long number of years, and the resolution is proving to be a gradual and hesitant process. In this light, it may be useful to start by taking stock of the general euro area situation and then make a number of related remarks on the domestic economy. Retrospective on the euro area As is well recognized, the origins of the crisis can be traced back to the excessively high public sector debt, slippage in competitiveness, inappropriate banking practices and weak bank regulatory environment on both sides of the Atlantic. The crisis has had various intertwined dimensions, each with implications for the avoidance of similar problems in the future. One observes that in several countries, fiscal problems led to sovereign debt downgrades that in turn damaged the banks’ balance sheets. The consequences of the lack of fiscal discipline were aggravated by the erosion of competitiveness and the failure to implement structural reforms. However, in several instances, banking sector difficulties were the trigger for fiscal problems. Indeed, adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact was not a sufficient condition to keep countries out of difficulties.

Fiscal excesses in several countries camouflaged the erosion of competitiveness, resulting in a wider deficit in the external trade accounts, as shown in Chart 4. Inside a monetary union the alarm bells caused by current account deficits are not as loud as they are when each country has its own currency. Before monetary union, such problems were countered, with questionable effectiveness, by currency depreciation. But inside the monetary union these current account deficits were simply financed by capital inflows, largely flowing from the countries in the north to most countries in the periphery. Chart 4 also highlights the separation within the euro area between selected countries in the north, running a generally current account surplus, and selected countries in the periphery with a negative balance. The upper band depicts the maximum and minimum of the data range for Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Similarly, the lower range depicts the corresponding boundaries for Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It is not surprising that those countries in the lower part of the chart featured prominently in the unfolding crisis. Eventually, when markets reoriented their focus towards economic unsustainability, the flow of capital reversed direction; market discipline now took the form of capital flight. There is also no doubt that financial institutions took on excessive risk, including investments in complex and, as is now well known, mispriced financial instruments. Crucially, the heightened degree of riskiness was not complemented by adequate capital buffers.