samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As policymakers, we need to take in how far-reaching those ripples are going to be. Monetary Policy The adjustments to monetary policy we made this year were designed to balance maintaining a strong U.S. economy with slowing global growth, and provide insurance against ongoing and potential future risks. And that’s what they’ve done. The economy is in a good place, and monetary policy is as well. My forecast is for moderate GDP growth, the labor market remaining strong, and inflation moving back to our symmetric 2 percent target. Of course, things can change. Data dependency remains our motto, and if there were a material change to this outlook, we would adjust monetary 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  policy in support of our goals of maximum employment and price stability. Conclusion I’ll conclude with this. John Donne’s words are perhaps more relevant in 2019 than they were in 1624. No man is an island, and no economy can insulate itself—for better or worse—from the fortunes of its neighbors. At the same time, all economies are having a common experience as a result of longer-term structural changes. Shifts in demographics and productivity growth point clearly in the direction of low neutral interest rates and slowing growth. We’re seeing the reality of these changes in the form of sluggish inflation and interest rates much lower than in previous decades. Central banks and policymakers around the world need to prepare for economies that are more connected than ever before. I’ll now take your questions.

The common thread of geopolitical tensions is that while they’re difficult to predict, they’re also impossible to ignore. On a backdrop of low r-star and slowing global growth, they drive businesses to be more cautious, more vigilant, and more conservative in their approach. Data Dependent, Not Data-Point Dependent The long-term factors driving low r-star and slowing global growth, as well as the more near-term geopolitical tensions, are afflictions from which we all suffer. So what’s the solution? Where do we as policymakers, researchers, and regulators go from here? At press conferences I’m often asked: if growth slows by X percent, or unemployment increases by Y percent, will that mean that the FOMC is going to do Z at its next meeting? If the Fed had a motto, it would probably be “data dependent.” When asked about this, it’s important to clarify that while I’m data dependent, I’m not data-point dependent. It’s not about being guided by one single data point—GDP or job growth—but by all of the data and information that tell us where the economy is, and where the economy is heading. Importantly, it’s not about looking at things merely as they are—it’s about trying to read how the economy is likely to evolve over the next couple of years, and what risks lie ahead, based on a broad range of evidence. Monetary policy is a long game. The policy decisions we’ve made this year will continue to have a ripple effect years into the future.
Year 0 = 100 180  180  From 2007 From 1972  160  160  140  140  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  0  Ye  a  r1  Ye  a  r2  Ye  a  r3  Ye  a  r4  Ye  a  r5  Ye  a  r6  Ye  a  r7  Ye  a  r8  9 2 1 0 ar r1 r1 r1 Ye Yea Yea Yea  Sources: DMS database, Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2019), FTSE Russell, St. Louis Fed and Norges Bank  But both the downturn in the wake of the financial crisis and the high returns in recent years should serve as a reminder that the market value of the fund may vary widely in the future. A fall in global equity markets comparable to the decline in 2008 would alone reduce the fund’s value by almost NOK 3 000 billion. 7  Over the past decades, we have converted large portions of our oil wealth into financial wealth (Chart 8). The fund has grown much bigger than expected, partly owing to the increase in securities prices and the krone depreciation. The fund is around twice as large as the present value of remaining government oil revenues. Chart 8 Larger-than-expected fund... Share of mainland GDP.

Though most of our work and recommendations will focus on financial institutions under the supervision of the Bank of Thailand, we expect that the outcome of this process will provide a common framework for policy-making among the supervisory authorities in Thailand and serve as a shared foundation for coordinating our efforts between the private and public sectors in transforming our financial infrastructures towards a deeper, more efficient, balanced and sound system. As we move forward, this plan together with the new Financial Institutions Act currently under consideration by the Joint Committee of the Senate and the Lower House, the Deposit Insurance Act,  2  BIS Review 8/2002  and the supervisory standard as will be specified in the New Basel Accord, will provide a future framework within which our financial institutions will operate. Ladies and Gentlemen I would like to close by saying that our future is in our hand. We ask for your cooperation in positioning our financial system for the future. I am fully confident that together we can contribute to the benefits of our nation. Thank you. BIS Review 8/2002  3
So this is also about the HKMA changing as a regulator; modernising the fight against money laundering requires change and regulatory support, a more flexible approach, and we are committed to further developing the approach that has been started through our various initiatives. 17. So my message is simple. The purpose of engaging every one of you in these two days is to enable and encourage banks, whatever stage you are at in your Regtech evolution, to consider, test and responsibly implement technology-enabled innovations in the fight against financial crime, facilitated by, as well as contributing to, an effective AML/CFT regime in Hong Kong. 18. On our part we are going to be using a number of tools, including continued engagement through forums like this, to follow up and see that positive changes are happening in banks and the wider eco-system. The HKMA and the banking sector will continue to contribute to AML/CFT efforts in Hong Kong, and through our supervisory processes, regulations and guidance, we support banks’ efforts to innovate and fully grasp the benefits of RegTech. We welcome your feedback. 19. Please enjoy today, I know the team have put a lot of thought into making it interesting and thought provoking. 20. Let us seize this opportunity to develop a stronger collective vision of what each of us can contribute towards a more effective response to money laundering. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

By contrast, the origin of the Federal Reserve Banks in the USA lay in the provision of a reliable nation-wide payment and depository system, and that remains a central activity. While some banking supervision is conducted by the Fed, that is largely the remit of (myriad) other institutions (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, banking regulators in each separate state and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). The Bundesbank was set up against a background of the need to restore and maintain a stable currency, and this, together with the concomitant political independence, remain at the heart of its rôle. An early strong belief in the “real bills” doctrine still influences the Bundesbank’s views on appropriate collateral for central bank operations with the market, and justifies its large branch network and staff. The Banque de France has retained more retail banking than most other modern central banks, maintaining branches in every French département (a network it has found difficult to slim down in face of local and trades union opposition). It also makes use of its branches in compiling a centrale des risques, a register of commercial bank lending, and in keeping track of the million or so individuals who have drawn bad cheques! The Bank of Japan is more of a medley. Its rôle model when it was established in 1882 was, you may be surprised to hear, the Banque Nationale de Belgique, though some aspects of English banking practice were also adopted.
Chart 19: UK government bond yields (10-year gilt yield) Per cent  18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P, TradeWeb and Bank calculations. 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  Chart 20: UK real rates Per cent 26/06/2020  06/01/2020  0 -0.5  08/01/2018  -1 -1.5 -2 -2.5 -3 -3.5  0  2  4  6  8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 Maturity (Years)  Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., TradeWeb and Bank calculations. Notes: Chart shows UK instantaneous implied real forward curve. At its June meeting, the MPC weighed the upside news on demand against the downside news from employment when deciding to expand asset purchases by a further £ billion. My judgement on the balance of these risks led me to vote to maintain the monetary stance rather than loosen it further. I judged the upside news in demand since our previous meeting in May to have outweighed the negative news to the UK’s economic outlook. Let me illustrate my thinking with a simple thought-experiment. In the May MPR scenario, inflation and output fell sharply in the first year before recovering, with the output gap closed by year 2 and inflation back to target by year 3.

And it proves that the concept of Europe is popular as long as it stops being abstract and takes the form of concrete projects. 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  However, during the past 20 years, the euro area has essentially forged ahead through crises, with the creation of the European Stability Mechanism – located in Luxembourg – to help Member States following the Greek crisis in 2012 or the Banking Union in 2014 in response to the Spanish or Irish crises. As it appears that a financial crisis is increasingly distant, general European interest has now waned. This is a serious problem: until now, we have not been able to properly take advantage of the more favourable economic climate in order to prevent a new crisis. And this takes me to our challenges for 2019. II. Our challenges in the face of 2019’s uncertainties A - A slowdown rather than a downturn, in a more fragile environment A word first on the economic environment. At both the global and European level, activity is decelerating, but we are still a long way from experiencing a downturn. In 2019, global growth should at best be in line with 2018’s level – 3.7% according to the IMF – subject to a downside risk. In the euro area,5 according to our latest projections, growth should come out at 1.7% compared with 1.9% in 2018. Although revised downwards, our baseline scenario remains relatively favourable. That said, at the start of 2019, we face three challenges: uncertainty, impatience and isolationism.
The crisis also showed how important it is that the two departments handling financial stability and monetary policy work closely together. The prevention and management of systemic risks requires both macroeconomic competence and knowledge of the financial system. Stress tests will continue to form a central part of our work. In the autumn of 2010, we carried out tests of the Swedish banks’ liquidity for the first time. These showed that the Swedish banks were exposed to greater liquidity risks than the European banks against which we compared them. The greatest problem for the Swedish banks during the financial crisis was not loan losses, of course, but a shortage of liquidity. The crisis has also shown that the Riksbank’s fundamental task as lender of last resort can no longer be limited to lending in kronor. Consequently, stress tests of liquidity need to be developed so that they also show what may happen if the banks are unable to obtain funding in foreign currency. We also need to think through how the Riksbank could achieve greater impact for its analyses and assessments. So far, we have primarily relied on what we usually call moral suasion, which is to say making an impact through careful analyses and strong arguments. But, despite the risks concerning developments in the Baltic that we drew attention to before the crisis, too little was done to prevent the Swedish banks’ rapid credit expansion in these countries.

It may also be difficult for a supervisory authority to build up and maintain a level of macroeconomic expertise sufficient to make a difference in financial crises that only occur every ten or twenty years. But such expertise always has to exist at the Riksbank. Fourthly, there is the matter of resources. For many years, Finansinspektionen has had too few resources to carry out its tasks. This has been pointed out by the IMF most recently. A merger would probably mean that more resources would be allocated for Finansinspektionen’s tasks. Merging the authorities would also allow us to avoid duplicating work and to achieve synergies such as a joint macroeconomic analysis and shared support functions and databases. It should also be noted that increased resources for this activity would not have to burden the taxpayers, as the financial sector would fund the activity via charges. The role played by the state in financial stability is currently being strengthened in several areas of the world. In the United States, which frequently has a large number of authorities acting within one area, a council with overall responsibility for financial stability has been set up. In the United Kingdom, responsibility has been assumed by the Bank of England. The new EU authority, the ESRB, has been moved to the ECB. It has its own board and its own secretariat, but it will also have the ECB’s resources at its disposal.
The reasons are large year-classes approaching retirement age, increased longevity and a lower birth rate. Conditions are quite different in Iceland, where age distribution is changing more slowly than in most countries with similar economies. Iceland’s retirement pension system is based on all working persons saving a proportion of their wages in a fund which is then used to pay their pension. Taxes therefore does not need to be raised even if there is a proportional rise in the number of pensioners. In addition to pension funds, some pensions are paid through the national insurance benefit system and there are also voluntary supplementary pension savings schemes. Iceland’s pension system thereby fulfils what has been considered international best practice in this field [the three-pillar system]. Total assets of Icelandic pension funds were equivalent to 120% of GDP at the end of 2005. No other pension system in the world is on such a strong footing. At the end of 2004, when total assets of Icelandic pension funds corresponded to more than 100% of GDP, the figure for the Netherlands was just over 100% and for the US 80-90%. In the overwhelming number of industrial countries, total assets of pension funds were equivalent to less than 20% of GDP, and the ratio was even lower than 10% in many countries, including Germany, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Sweden and Finland. By comparison, assets of Norway’s Government Pension Fund (Petroleum Fund) last year were equivalent to 60% of GDP.

Those who legislate, regulate and oversee the markets will not be able to prevent this. So what can we do? To begin with, of course, we need to obtain the best possible overview and knowledge of events. We at the Riksbank consider the work in the Bank of International Settlements within the G10 to be invaluable in this context. There is also other work, for instance under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund, from which we can learn. One consequence of this development is that we must take international conditions into account to a greater extent in our own work on stability analysis. We must also oversee developments in the financial markets more than we have done and not only concentrate on the major banks. We must try to be aware of when prices depart from reasonable levels and become a risk. With regard to risk management in individual institutions, it is becoming increasingly difficult to gain insight into what is happening. It is therefore necessary to spend more time on evaluating the systems and person involved. This is the view that has coloured the new oversight system for the banks, what is known as Basel II, which is about to be implemented. It is also our task to equip the systems and infrastructure so well that the effects of any future crises will be minimised.
Few innovations played such a central part in Sweden’s industrialisation around the turn of the nineteenth century as electricity and techniques for using it for propulsion. Swedish technicians and companies played a pioneering role here. In the early 1890s electricity was relatively expensive. Its cost per energy equivalent was considerably higher than power generated from coal. Little more than a decade later, however, the relative price had fallen 50 per cent. This paved the way for the electrification and related expansion of such industries as pulp, paper, mining and basic chemicals. The explosive growth of pulp manufacturing was intimately bond up with the harnessing of Norrland’s rivers for hydroelectric power, which pushed the price of electricity down still further. In connection with electrification, trend GDP growth accelerated from approximately 2 per cent a year to between 3 and 4 per cent. Economic growth in Sweden reached one of the highest rates in the world. The leap forward that may result from the new computer and telecom technology cannot, of course, be compared directly with Sweden’s electrification and its economic effect. Many obstacles lie ahead. But an emerging technology clearly possesses an enormous potential. In the first decade of the twentieth century, however, the optimism over all that the new technology could achieve became rather excessive. The euphoria about the huge profits that could be reaped by using hydroelectric power and other forms of electricity to exploit such natural resources as ore and timber became more and more exalted between 1905 and 1907.

For their part, inflation rates in April 2022 stood at 8.3% and 7.4%, respectively, that is, 6.9 pp and 6.5 pp higher than in early 2021. According to the earliest leading preliminary data available for the euro area, corresponding to May, inflation has risen once again, to 8.1%. Although the Spanish economy saw a gradual recovery over 2021, which extended to early 2022, this recovery is still incomplete and uneven by sector. In early 2021, the primary 1  conditioning factor was the epidemiological developments, as they required maintaining measures to contain the disease. The swift headway made in the vaccination campaign allowed a more buoyant phase to begin in Q2, but this was tempered from mid-2021 by the bottlenecks and higher energy prices, which were compounded towards the end of the year by the spread of the Omicron variant. In the opening weeks of 2022, with this wave of the pandemic subsiding and the first timid signs of relief in the bottlenecks, it appeared that the path to recovery was beginning to clear once and for all. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February has provided a further negative shock, which I shall refer to later in detail. GDP growth stood at 5.1% in 2021 as a whole, which slowed to 0.3% quarter-on-quarter in 2022 Q1. During this period there was an intense shift in the strength of activity, with the hospitality and leisure sectors becoming more dynamic as headway was made in vaccination.
There will be significant deregulation of the economy – in key sectors like financial services, healthcare, and energy – unleashing animal spirits and new investment. The disinflationary drags from oil and commodity prices will fade and lift producer prices while a tightening labour market will feed faster wage increases. In response to higher growth and higher inflation, the US Fed will hike interest rates faster than previously forecast. The US Dollar will strengthen against most major currencies. The most recent data give some support to the reflation story. The OECD’s monthly leading indicators for October show signs of rising growth momentum – not just in the US but in other advanced economies as well. We are seeing an incipient upswing in the global manufacturing cycle. Inventories have been drawn down significantly. Purchasing managers’ indices have recorded sharp improvements in many countries. But how realistic or sustainable is the growth resurgence scenario? The broad elements appear probable – there are indeed grounds for some optimism. But there is considerable uncertainty over the details, and there are several risks on the horizon. The market’s exuberance in recent months does not seem to have accounted for these uncertainties and risks. Perhaps realising this, the market has begun to retrace some of its steps in more recent weeks.

If the economy is close to its underlying potential, a fiscal stimulus will end up mostly in inflation rather than growth. This brings us to the next broad theme of 2017: the return of inflation and the tightening of financial conditions globally. The normalisation of US monetary policy Global inflation, which was weighed down by the fall oil prices during the past two years, has started to gradually pick up again. Energy prices have rebounded off their lows and commodity prices appear to have bottomed out. On a global basis, producer prices have started to rise since early 2016, in tandem with the recovery of commodity and industrial input prices. 3/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  Even in China, producer prices have turned positive, following 4 years of deflation. Globally, we could see a stronger pass-through from producer prices to inflation in 2017. In the US, to the extent that fiscal stimulus boosts demand and lifts inflation towards the Fed’s target, it could precipitate a faster pace of interest rate normalisation than currently priced in. The normalisation of monetary policy is a good thing and is to be welcomed. It would be in line with stronger economic growth and waning deflation risks. Faster growth in the US will be good for emerging Asia. A gradual rise in interest rates away from the zero lower bound will also be good for financial stability, helping to stem the build-up in debt and cool inflated asset prices.