samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I am acutely aware of the fact that the HKMA is only one of eleven central banks and monetary authorities in the EMEAP group and that the ABF project is an EMEAP project, and not an HKMA project. As I said earlier, I cannot speak for EMEAP, although ABF1 and ABF2 were developed while the HKMA had the honour of chairing the relevant Working Group. Indeed, we are scheduled to hand over chairmanship in May next year, having exceptionally provided the chair for two consecutive two-year terms. But allow me to tell you, nevertheless, what we in the HKMA think could be possible directions to be explored. 20. There are two such directions, which hopefully could lead to an ABF3. First is to enlarge the scope of credit acceptable to the central banks as investors, but address the problem of inadequate credit quality through credit enhancement or guarantee arrangements. Second is the securitisation of bank assets. Both are familiar concepts to the financial markets, and so there is no need for me to elaborate, other than to say perhaps that we favour simple products that can be readily understood not just by simple-minded central bankers but also by the not-so-sophisticated investors in the region. We  BIS Review 79/2005  3  support the EMEAP and other regional fora to further look into these ideas. And we look to the private sector to participate fully in this continuing effort. 21.

With this somewhat inadequate analytical framework in mind, then it is clear, at least to me, that ABF, by increasing the diversity of financial intermediation channels, reduces the probability of disruption in the all-important process of financial intermediation and the occurrence of financial instability, thus contributing to financial stability. 18. There is another dimension of financial stability that we have considered in our deliberations on ABF. Although the empirical evidence is probably difficult to establish, given the increasing degree of intra-regional dependence in Asia, we feel that regional savings are probably less volatile than savings from the developed markets. This is partly also because the management of savings from the developed economies is more sophisticated than that of regional savings, with a much greater involvement of financial institutions, including hedge funds, which are a lot more nimble and probably also have a different perception of risks in the region. By contrast, those mobilising regional savings within the region probably have a better understanding of regional issues, although we should not expect them always to take account of the wider public interest in their purely commercial activity of fund management. Thus if ABF acts as a catalyst for a greater proportion of regional savings being recycled within the region, instead of through the developed markets of Europe and America, there is likely to be some benefit to financial stability. What next in ABF 19. Let me turn to the question of "what next" in the ABF initiative.
The company suffers an escalation of legal and advisory costs and can hardly operate normally while its survival is being negotiated. 3  BIS Review 45/1999  Let me turn to what the HKMA can do to assist in easing some of these difficulties. I should stress first of all that the HKMA is a strong supporter of the workout concept and of the HKAB Guidelines. As set out in the Guidelines, we have indicated that we are prepared to help to resolve differences of views that would threaten a workout and to achieve an acceptable compromise. To this end, we are ready to listen to any involved party, irrespective of size or national affiliation. In taking on this role, we are following the example of the Bank of England in offering to act as an “honest broker” or impartial mediator to help to bring negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion. I should emphasize however that we do not get involved in the detailed negotiations on the workout. That is the job of the lead bank, the steering committee and the company and its advisers. Similarly, it should be the task of these parties to make every effort to resolve disagreements before they are brought to the attention of the HKMA. In other words, the HKMA should only become involved as a last resort. Some people have suggested that the HKMA should become involved earlier and play a more visible role in workouts.

You must continue to organize and support the necessary training and mentoring of supervisors so that a pool of capable and technically sound personnel is always available and that greater reliability may be placed on their output. During today and tomorrow several papers will be presented on a variety of sub themes and I anticipate that at the end of this conference some critical imperatives would have been identified to steer us through the current challenges and others looming on the horizon. Our confidence in the role of the CGBS has never been misplaced. I wish you all successful deliberations and trust that your stay here will afford you the opportunity to discover for yourself the beauty of our country and the warmth of the Guyanese people. Welcome once again to all. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Moreover, the ratio of total credit to nonhydrocarbon GDP remained stable, whereas credit to the private sector/nonhydrocarbon GDP increased somewhat in 2013 to reach 23.45% (21.35% in 2011). In 2013, while pursuing their provisioning efforts, banks consolidated their financial soundness indicators. Solvency ratios remain high, much higher than required under the prevailing regulation and in line with the recommended level under Basel III. The banking sector soundness is anchored to high capital adequacy ratios and high profitability and liquidity. The solvency ratios are in line with those of comparable emerging market economies. In 2013, an assessment of the banking sector carried out by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank has helped define further directions in deepening banking sector reforms and strengthening banking system stability in Algeria. Effective implementation has started in the first quarter of 2014 with the enactment by the Council on Money and Credit of three regulations related to the solvency ratios, large exposures and participations, and loans classification and provisioning. The minimum Tier 1 capital ratio has now been set at 9.5%, higher than recommended by the Basel Committee, and the regulatory capital ratio has been set at 12%. Moreover, as regards the strengthening of the capacity in assessing the banking sector risk, Bank of Algeria will rely, as of the beginning of 2015, on the effective use of the new stress test model, and on the generalization of the bank rating system.

A smooth functioning of the banking sector is therefore clearly an essential element in the resolution of Europe’s problems. As a central banker and supervisor, I see three major tools which can help to ensure appropriate financing of the economy and financial stability – both of which are essential financial conditions for sustainable growth. 1. Financial regulation and supervision must be tailored to the two objectives of strengthening the financial sector while ensuring an appropriate financing of the economy. Of course, after the 2008 financial crisis, the most urgent priority was to re-establish financial stability and bolster resilience to financial shocks. But in the implementation process of the new Basel 3 rules, we need to pay the utmost attention to their potential consequences for the financing of the economy, especially in view of the much shorter agenda. In particular, the new liquidity rules need to be adjusted. In addition, much more progress is now needed in the area of “shadow banking”. 2. Since the beginning of the crisis, the Eurosystem has constantly provided all possible support within the scope of its mandate to help the banking system overcome its difficulties. For instance, the idea of the two LTROs was to remove funding pressures in order to allow a smoother adaptation to the new rules and difficult environment. Simultaneously, this aimed to prevent a major credit crunch that would compromise both the financing of the economy and the maintenance of price stability in the area.
Such coverage is the norm for exports towards countries with appreciable risk and in transactions which, frequently, have the sovereign guarantee of the importing country. CESCE also provides underwriting on the State’s behalf for the political risks associated with exports (the main such risk being default by the sovereign or by the institutions backed by the sovereign), except in operations at less than two years in EU and OECD countries, where it is considered that there is a sufficiently developed private underwriting market; it also extends guarantees and bonds for participating in international tender procedures and projects. From 1998 to 2007 there was a strong expansion in international banking activity in financing for Spanish companies’ international activity. Banks took on a relevant role in the financing of trade flows to emerging countries and in the opening-up of new markets. Against the backdrop of this boom, the use of instruments offered by export credit agencies for exports became less necessary and less frequent. The international financial crisis The financial instability as from mid-2007 and the outbreak of the crisis in autumn 2008 radically altered this financial landscape, giving way to an across-the-board decline in financing by international banks. The contraction in credit had a particularly severe effect on international trade, which fell by between 20% and 30% in the main economies. The central banks responded to this situation through coordinated action that stabilised bank financing conditions.

We have to take all the necessary measures to ensure that our economic fabric is not destroyed, to ensure that businesses that are solvent can survive and that once this urgent health crisis is over, they can return to normal. You have talked about a temporary crisis, a sort of pause. The Spanish government has talked about the same thing. But do you think this is how things will turn out or do you think the economic consequences for Europe could be more severe for longer? This will depend on how long the health crisis lasts and, to be honest, I wouldn’t dare to guess how long it might last. What happened in China is a leading indicator. What’s happening to us now happened two months ago in China and now they are starting to get back to normal. Obviously this is something that gives us hope: we can get through this. From an economic perspective, we have to look for instruments to get us through this period at the lowest economic cost and, of course, with no financial cost from a debt market perspective. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Future responsibility and response-ability  proofing  compliance  -  Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the 9th International Conference on Financial Crime and Terrorism Financing (IFCTF) "Future proofing Compliance: Responsibility and Response-ability", Kuala Lumpur, 4 October 2017. * * *  "Compliance, Past and Future" This is an important and serious gathering. I am encouraged to see many leaders and key compliance officers of the financial industry here at the International Conference on Financial Crimes and Terrorism Financing, signifying the industry’s commitment to a safer and more secured financial system. It is worth repeating that public trust and confidence in the financial system cannot be compromised. The cost of financial crimes and terrorism financing are staggering. Based on the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), money laundering transactions are estimated to cost economies between 2% to 5% of global GDP. This equals to USD1 to 2 trillion annually. It is a humongous amount. Beyond monetary terms, these activities have destructive consequences for the lives of many, especially the poor and underprivileged. We must do better on this if we really want to ‘future-proof’ our financial system.

An efficient, productive and resilient financial system supports and contributes to economic growth and the overall well-being of the people. In contrast, financial busts can have a destructive impact on the broader economy, impacting the livelihood of ordinary people. This is the painful lesson from the history of financial crises. Despite the huge amount of resources being invested in compliance, we still uncover many banking, market manipulation and rigging scandals. These cases illustrate again that rules, although necessary, are not sufficient to maintain the integrity of the financial system. These cases have damaged the confidence and trust of society in the system. One solution for this is a stronger focus on ethics and professional standards to take into account how actions impact the wider society. In other words, financial institutions must recognise and embrace their role as responsible corporate citizens. This means: Establishing a framework that promotes ethical behaviour and decisions; Going beyond what the letter of the law permits, to understanding and complying with its ‘spirit’; and Seeking opportunities to add value and contribute to the well-being of society. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Viewed from this perspective, the values of a responsible citizen are antithetical to money laundering, terrorism financing and illegal behavior. Anyone who is a responsible citizen will not engage in these activities and will actively seek to eradicate them.
The design and calibration of the ECB’s monetary policy response to the crisis has taken into account not only the short term deflationary risks but also the longer-term inflation risks that could eventually result from the policy measures implemented with a view to counteract the former risks. Since the financial crisis escalated in September 2008, the ECB has reacted to emerging downside risks to price stability with both conventional and unconventional actions. Conventional policy action has led to reduce the ECB’s key policy interest rates to a level that is unprecedented. In parallel, a wide range of non-standard measures has been put in place, mainly to stabilise the money market. With policy rates at record lows and additional liquidity-providing measures adopted in so many countries, we are all well aware of the possibility of inflation risks ahead and the need for a credible and well-designed exit strategy. Retaining such exceptional policy measures  BIS Review 81/2009  7  for too long might aggravate the upside risks to price stability and sow the seeds of future imbalances in financial markets. Getting the timing right in withdrawing excess liquidity will be key to a non-inflationary recovery. Generally speaking, the more difficult it is to reverse nonstandard operations, the greater the risk is of being behind the curve when the macroeconomic and financial market situation improves.

At the ECB, many measures of monetary liquidity are investigated and assessed for the implied risks to price stability. It is worth mentioning in this context that the various measures should not be regarded as mutually exclusive but rather as providing an encompassing view. An obvious measure characterising the rate of monetary expansion consists of the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate M3, a measure that tends to attract most attention in the public debate. 11  IMF (2003) “Deflation: Determinants, Risks, and Policy Options – Findings of an Interdepartmental Task Force”, p 15. 12  The steep drop in the growth rate in compensation per employee in 2009Q1 is mainly driven by strong downward developments in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium. Note that, combined with the recent release of productivity growth (-3.6%), unit labour costs growth increased further, from 4.5% in 2008Q4 to 5.7% in 2009Q1, marking a new record high since the start of EMU. 13  See, for instance, McCandless, G. T. and W. E. Weber (1995), Some Monetary Facts, Federal Reserve of Minneapolis Review, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 2–11 or, for an alternative approach, Benati, L. (2009), Long Run Evidence on Money Growth and Inflation, ECB Working Paper, No 1027. 6  BIS Review 81/2009  As we can see in Chart 17, annual M3 growth decelerated further in the first quarter of 2009 compared with previous quarters.
We do not concentrate on inflation to the exclusion  BIS Review 93/2006  1  of all else; we also give consideration to real economic and financial developments. We conduct what is known as flexible inflation targeting. It is made fairly clear in the preparatory works to the Sveriges Riksbank Act that the idea is that we shall also give consideration to developments in the real economy as long as the inflation target is not threatened. A long-term perspective I will now move on to talk about the development of the Swedish economy in a long-term perspective. Let me begin by observing that I personally consider monetary policy to have been very successful since the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. There is a substantial difference between the economic developments over the past 14 years and during the decades prior to this period. Sweden had an inflation rate much higher than that in Germany every year of the 1980s (see Figure 1). The 1980s began with two devaluations of 10 per cent and 16 per cent. For a devaluation to be successful, inflation must be kept down afterwards so the country does not lose competitiveness again. However, this was not successful in the 1980s. After the devaluations, Sweden’s competitiveness declined by around 30 per cent up to the crisis breaking out in 1992 (see Figure 2).

Therefore, I would say that this risk is less acute than at the moment of our previous key rate meeting. Furthermore, investment from the National Wealth Fund and geopolitical risks are still in the focus of our attention. Disinflationary factors are much weaker. A rich harvest might result in a more significant seasonal decrease in food prices. The pandemic situation is still uncertain. The spread of new coronavirus strains worldwide might force countries to introduce new restrictions and disrupt production and supply chains, which in turn might slow down global economic recovery. For Russia, this would involve a decrease in external demand and intensify disinflationary risks, on the one hand. On the other hand, if borders are closed, domestic demand will remain elevated longer, which might become a proinflationary factor. In conclusion, I would like to comment on monetary policy prospects. Beginning from March, we have raised the key rate by a total of 2.25 percentage points. We will assess how our earlier decisions have been influencing monetary conditions, aggregate demand, and inflation. We will also consider how quickly supply-side constraints have been weakening and, accordingly, what level of the key rate is needed to bring inflation back to the target. According to our revised forecast, the average key rate next year will equal 6.0–7.0% per annum. Further on, as inflation expectations go down and inflation decelerates, the key rate will return to its long-term neutral range.
Kristina Persson: Monetary policy yesterday, today and tomorrow Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, Aktiespararna Lindingö, Stockholm, 9 November 2005. The diagrams for this speech can be found on the Sveriges Riksbank website www.riksbank.com. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come to Aktiespararna Lidingö this evening to talk about monetary policy, which is for me a job and – I assume – for you an interest, as you save in shares. It is of course important for those investing in companies to obtain a good (risk-adjusted) return on their investment. Monetary policy that contributes to low and stable inflation leads to less uncertainty, clearer game rules and better conditions for growth. I intend to begin with a look back over monetary policy during the past decade and a description of the sequence of events when we changed over to inflation targeting after the economic crisis in the early 1990s. After that I shall briefly discuss the current economic situation, mention the changed conditions I envisage and what they may entail for monetary policy in the future. From economic crisis to 10 years of inflation targeting Many of you will remember and will have been affected in some way by the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. That was when the foundations of the current monetary policy were laid; when the fixed exchange rate was abandoned as a monetary policy objective and replaced by an explicit inflation target.

We are working with a ‘toy model’ to make a few illustrative high level points around which to frame the QT discussion. I leave the details of the model to the Annex and discuss the intuition here. The starting point is a money demand equation for an NBFI. This relates the NBFI’s money holdings to the overall size of its portfolio and the relative return on money and risky assets. The implementation of QT implies that the NBFI will hold less money and more risky assets (the mirror image of the thought experiment that I discussed to describe the portfolio balance channel of QE transmission in the previous section). In order to persuade the NBFI to accept this shift, the return on the risky asset must rise relative to that on money. If a QT sale is announced and implemented simultaneously, the price of bonds must fall immediately in order to generate expectations of a holding period return in the future that will justify holding onto a greater share of risky assets in the portfolio following QT. The subtlety in the model is to observe that the holding period return on this risky asset will reflect (at least in part) an expected capital gain as the price of the asset changes. This matters particularly for the asset price impact of pre-announced sales.