samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If it is decided that the resources available for resolution lie principally within the existing waterfall, that would further suggest that resolution authorities must have the ability to intervene and to take action before the end of the waterfall. But where does that boundary lie? The UK resolution regime sets the statutory definition for entry to resolution as being the point where the CCP is failing or likely to fail and there is no reasonable prospect of action being taken to restore it to viability. Integral to this test is the principle that this is a forward-looking judgement, capable of being exercised flexibly at different points in a CCP’s distress and dependent on a multitude of factors that drive an eventual decision at the time. That can make it difficult to pin down a single universal trigger point but it is possible to identify some circumstances that could be indicative of this boundary being reached. Those possible scenarios could include an assessment that the default management procedures of the CCP have failed, or are likely to fail, to both absorb losses fully and replenish the CCP’s resources in a sufficiently timely manner to allow the CCP to continue to operate. That failure might arise through legal challenge hindering the default management process or from an assessment that if the losses were allowed to continue they would exceed caps on contributions and could not be credibly absorbed via other means.

It could also similarly arise from a determination that there is no realistic prospect of a successful auction to return to a matched book or that the CCP’s own rules to allocate losses or tear up contracts are either not yet available to it or will undermine financial stability or the objective of continuity through full tear-up and closure of the service. So – in line with the Key Attributes – it needs to be possible to place the CCP into resolution before its loss allocation rules are exhausted. These are all examples of entry into resolution caused by clearing member default. But nondefault losses could also bring a CCP down and it is certainly possible that a breach of a CCP’s regulatory requirements with no reasonable likelihood of replenishing its capital would present a trigger point for intervention. I have mentioned the incompatibility of full-tear up with the objective of continuity. But an intervention by a resolution authority cannot by itself guarantee a successful auction. To do so, may still require partial tear-up and forced allocation and these would seem to be necessary tools in any resolution toolkit for a CCP. How losses are then allocated upon tear-up again  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  goes to the question of the timing of intervention and whether the tear-up takes place before the resources available to a CCP have been exhausted or after it.
At the same time, improvements are also being contemplated to the existing crisis management tools. This entails not only ensuring that relevant and timely information is available, through such mechanisms as the colleges of supervisors and the cross-border stability groups, but also a resolution regime that minimises the costs to the taxpayer and the development of internationally consistent firm-specific recovery and resolution plans. The EC is working on a framework for cross-border crisis management covering aspects such as early intervention, the reorganisation of ailing banks and insolvency procedures for winding up failed banks. The possibility of introducing a levy on the financial sector for the creation of a resolution fund, based on the polluter pays principle, is also being discussed in different fora. Taken together, the numerous proposals currently on the table represent the coming together of an ambitious regulatory reform effort designed to strengthen the resilience of the financial sector that could have far-reaching implications. It has been a commendable example of broad consultation and deep reflection, and consequently deserving support. Going forward, the impact assessment study results, due this summer, should provide useful guidance as to the optimal timing and sequencing of these reforms. In this regard, care must be taken to avoid any risk of undermining the incipient recovery, which is already threatened by the current sovereign debt crisis. It will also be important to aim for a level-playing field and to minimise the potential for arbitrage through harmonization, particularly in the case of the proposed bank levy.

In his words, “There has been a massive breakdown of trust: trust in the financial system, trust in bankers, trust in business, trust in business leaders, trust in politicians, trust in the media, trust in the whole process of globalization – all have been severely damaged, in rich countries and in poor countries alike.” When I had addressed your annual dinner in November of that same year I expressed the view that the crisis would not be over until confidence and trust were restored and the credit channel started to function again. We are not there yet. We are still confronted by the farreaching consequences of the sub-prime episode, which now include a full-blown sovereign debt crisis. It is now clear that risks had been building up over a number of years. Some derived from the fact that corporate governance, risk management, market infrastructures for derivative products as well as supervisory practices and regulatory frameworks had not kept pace with the process of financial innovation. Others have been associated with an overly accommodative monetary policy at the global level, particularly in the United States. There is no doubt, however, that financial regulation and supervision proved inadequate. The initial trigger of the crisis was the securitisation of sub-prime mortgages and the associated originate and distribute model. These products found ready buyers, but there were significant misaligned incentives underlying the model.
Stefan Ingves, Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, in his capacity as Chairman of the ESRB Advisory Technical Committee First ESRB Annual Conference 22-23 September 2016 Keynote Address “It takes all sorts…” - macroprudential oversight in the EU “It takes all sorts to make a world” is a common expression when confronted with something odd, but at the same time recognizing that diversity is essential. I think it also “takes all sorts”, or at least plenty of different sorts, to make a functional macroprudential body. Especially one at an international level like our host – the European Systemic Risk Board, the ESRB. The ESRB’s macroprudential mandate is mirrored by its broad composition, bringing together central bankers and financial supervisors; national and EU-wide perspectives; sectoral experts and academics. Certainly we may look at various issues differently. We may indeed find each other’s perspectives odd at times. But that is also the point. With the right set-up, differences in perspectives and expertise enrich our assessments and become a strength. And the ESRB uses that strength to handle its rather daunting task of overseeing the EU financial system as a whole. So let me elaborate a little on what the ESRB has achieved so far and why I think the EU needs a strong ESRB with a broad membership as we move forward. Designed for oversight of a diverse, interconnected financial system It is quite an impressive journey that the ESRB has undertaken since its launch in 2011.

While these differences are quite likely to generate different risks, the structure of the national financial system may also in itself contribute to either mitigating or further fuelling them. One size will not fit all – national flexibility is needed It is not very long since the CRR/CRD entered into force, but we have already enough practical experience to be thinking about developing it further. In my view, that should include simplifying it. We really had very limited experience of conducting macroprudential policy in practice at the time the CRR/CRD was drafted. In principle, the Commission’s starting point was to transform the Basel III minimum capital regulation into a maximum harmonization framework. And the somewhat cumbersome procedures when using some of the instruments under the CRR/CRD are probably the result of the pretty tough negotiations which took place before the current framework saw the light of day. Today, with some more experience and a fair amount of “learning by doing”, I think most would agree that national flexibility is necessary for efficient policy implementation. Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, the circumstances under which macroprudential policy operates are not static. Therefore, in terms of the macroprudential framework it is unlikely that one size fits all, and fits at all times. Rather, the appropriate macroprudential policy set-up, naturally including the use  |7  of its instruments, will to some extent need to be tailored. The national flexibility, which is already part of the current CRR/CRD framework, is in my view key for efficient macroprudential policies.
All in all, both our standard and non-standard monetary policies have prevented the materialisation of deflation risk. The programme we launched a year ago – Outright Monetary Transactions – succeeded in countering speculation about a euro area break-up. Its basic functioning is as follows: if a given State suffers unwarranted tensions on its debt, we could decide to intervene as far as is necessary, provided that State commits to an agreed recovery programme. Undoubtedly, the announcement of the creation of the OMTs had a very strong impact: banks and firms regained access to capital markets; the spreads between the yields on Spanish and German 10-year bonds fell from more than 6pp in July 2012 to just under 3pp in May 2013, while the premium on Italian 10-year bond halved. This new monetary policy instrument has therefore fostered a considerable improvement in financial conditions in the euro area and represents a solid shield against further speculative attacks. The ECB’s Governing Council has stressed that monetary policy will remain accommodative for as long as necessary. In the period ahead, we will monitor very closely all incoming information on economic and monetary developments and assess any impact on the outlook for price stability. ********* The euro area is getting stronger: it is undergoing major reforms, building new institutions and setting up powerful crisis management instruments. These major and in many respects historical advances will lay the foundations for the future of our monetary union.

Foreign investors have also entered the Icelandic market directly, both in domestic securities and bank deposits. This development kept the exchange rate of the króna relatively high and obviously above its long term equilibrium level. The Central Bank repeatedly stated that the króna would depreciate at some stage. The Bank’s hope was that the economy would have cooled considerably down  2  BIS Review 52/2008  before that happened in order to limit to the extent possible the pass-through of the effects of the depreciation into domestic prices. One aspect of developments during the period of expansion was the abundance of liquidity in the international markets at very favourable rates which I mentioned earlier. It fuelled among other things the rapid expansion of Icelandic banks and business in general to other countries. This expansion was financed partly by own funds but more importantly by relatively cheap credit. Questions have been raised from time to time in other countries about where the money for Icelandic investment abroad came from. They need not to be raised because the answers are provided in the statistics. The gross debt of the Icelandic economy rose rapidly and according to the official statistics, compiled on the basis of internationally accepted standards, the net international investment position of Iceland was negative by 125% of GDP at the end of 2007. In assessing these numbers, one must keep in mind the extremely rapid increase in gross capital flows resulting from the internationalisation of the Icelandic economy, its business and financial system.
Beaucoup de réflexions actuelles  Page 7 sur 14 en France – dont celles récentes de la commission Arthuis – avancent le principe d’une telle norme de dépenses, à juste titre. Mais il faudra en fixer le niveau, ce qui relève du débat démocratique : les exemples chiffrés que je viens de citer peuvent l’éclairer. C’est un objectif exigeant mais accessible : nombre de nos voisins européens y sont parvenus. B. Our macroeconomic policies? The lack of macroeconomic policy coordination has long been the “usual suspect” for the weakness in our economic union. This was true during the euro crisis: monetary stimulus, whether powerful enough or not, was not sufficiently supported by fiscal policy, which was tightened too early. This lesson has not been forgotten in this crisis. Along with my colleagues on the Governing Council, I personally will never forget that night of March 2020 when, locked down in our homes, we took, in less than three hours, some of the strongest measures in the history of the euro, creating our now almost famous PEPP [Pandemic emergency purchase programme]. On the fiscal front, with its Next Generation recovery plan of EUR 750 billion, financed by a shared debt instrument, the European Union demonstrated an unprecedented level of solidarity towards the countries most affected by the Covid crisis. Monetary policy is no longer the only game in town, and Europe has reacted appropriately over the past year.

Inferior European management practicesxii seem to explain 30% to 50% of the Total Factor Productivity gap between European countries and the United States. Along with improvement in education, stronger competition and open labour markets could help Europe close this management gap. Capturing the full potential of our single market  To compete with the American or Chinese economies and their companies, scale is obviously of the essence. We are not that bad at start-ups, but the number of scale-up companies in Europe has to be dramatically increased. And this requires two strategic arrows targeted at size and money. Size: As I said, Europe has the advantage of having a single market, the largest in the world. But we need to be bolder and take full advantage of the size effect. We must revive the single market, above all because we can optimise its power by combining its various components much better: free movement of goods, naturally; but also regulatory power. We must use the power of standardisation, notably to direct innovation, as illustrated by the GDPR and data where Europe is taking the lead. We must have the courage to develop an industrial policy with public-private partnerships, as in the case of artificial intelligence and batteries. To achieve this, the European competition policy could be more strategically orientatedxiii. As such, Europe should (i) rethink what is the relevant market for mergers, (ii) not facilitate the market penetration of foreign firms. In the digital sector, network effects should be assessed to take into account monopoly positions.
Plantin, G, Sapra, H and H S Shin (2008), “Fair Value Accounting and Financial Stability”, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business Research Paper 08–15. Simonson, D G and G H Hempel (1993), “Banking Lessons from the Past: The 1938 Regulatory Agreement Interpreted”, Journal of Financial Services Research, pages 249–267. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

However, the estimated scale seems to be much exaggerated. One problematic issue is related to the  BIS Review 6/2007  1  fact that before the eurozone, we did not have examples of currency unions between developed countries. So the Rose study was based on data on currency unions involving poor and/ or small countries. As noted by Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003), “one does not need to be a eurosceptic to wonder whether such findings are directly applicable to Europe’s single currency”. Follow-up studies (e.g. Rose and Wincoop (2001), Kenen (2002), Persson (2001)) attempted to correct the Rose estimates but arrived, rather inconclusively, at anything between a 50% and 150% growth of bilateral trade. Recently, the first studies based on euro area data emerged. These show that the trade creation effect of the euro was substantial, although (until now) by an order of magnitude smaller that the original Rose estimate (e.g. Micco, Stein and Ordonez (2003)). Our knowledge about trade creation effects of the euro is still far from complete and we will probably have to wait another 10+ years to have enough data to draw firm conclusions about its magnitude in the eurozone. Now let me move to the cost side. As already noted in contrast to the benefits, some costs have a contingent character. They are tail-events – rather unlikely but with a possibly high impact if they happen. Let me concentrate on two issues: -  asymmetric shocks,  -  arising micro- and macroeconomic imbalances.
To build confidence in the Bank over time, the central bank must manage this form of autonomy in a sound manner. I have emphasised the importance of an efficiently run central bank that concentrates on core tasks. Over the past 10–12 years, the number of central banking staff in Norges Bank has been reduced from 1200 to 300 (see Chart 1). This is an adequate staff level. We no longer produce statistics, and we are no longer a manufacturing enterprise. We issue the currency, but we do not print banknotes or mint coins. The distribution of money has been taken over by private business. 1  Lecture at Norwegian Polytechnic Society, Oslo 17 September 1985. Published in Economic Bulletin No. 3, 1985. BIS Review 154/2010  1  As a result, we have been able to reduce the Bank’s operating costs by about NOK 600 million per year, measured at constant prices. At the same time, the Bank’s equity capital has increased more than twofold and now stands at close to NOK 70 billion (see Chart 2). The central bank’s formal independence must be supported by a solid capital base. 2  The objectives pursued by the central bank are for the common good. The objective of monetary policy has always been determined by the government and the Storting (Norwegian parliament) and was for a long period set out in an Act. Norges Bank has issued notes and coin throughout its history, for the first hundred years based on the silver or gold standard.

There is a strong sense at Norges Bank that we are being put to effective use today. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 154/2010  17
Wage-earners and employers expected to be bailed out when competitiveness was weakened by the excessively fast wage rises. Under a floating exchange rate, however, relatively higher increases in nominal wages do not have as much significance for competitiveness, if the exchange rate adjusts. We can have higher price and cost growth than our trading partners without seeing our competitiveness deteriorate, if the krona functions as a shock absorber. So, companies do not bear the direct burden of excessive wage increases, since the exchange rate adjusts over time so that profits are maintained in the sectors exposed to competition. Also, a floating exchange rate often dampens cyclical fluctuations. In 2001, the Swedish IT sector – including Ericsson and Telia – was hit by a deep decline. But the decline was partly compensated for by the weaker krona exchange rate, so that profits were sustained in the paper and pulp industry, the iron and steel industry, and in other parts of the manufacturing sector. Under a floating exchange rate, the inflation target is the nominal anchor for price and wage formation, rather than the rate of wage increases abroad. Wage-earners and employers know that the Riksbank has to immediately intervene with interest rate adjustments if inflation deviates clearly from target. So, excessively high wage increments can lead to tighter monetary policy. For an individual company or industry, developments in wage costs in other countries nonetheless have great significance, since the exchange rate in these cases can be taken as given.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Prospects, challenges and promises New Year wishes to the Paris financial centre New Year wishes to the Paris financial centre by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, 12 January 2017. * * * I would like to welcome you all, our partners throughout the year – public officials, financial and economic players, journalists – to this magnificent Golden Gallery for this happy tradition of extending New Year wishes to the Paris financial centre. I would like to start by extending to you, on behalf of the whole of the Banque de France and the ACPR, our warmest wishes for 2017, for you and your loved ones, as well as for all of your staff. To these personal wishes, I would like to add several collective wishes this evening: first for Europe and its economy, then for our country, and finally for the smooth financing of our economy and for financial institutions. 1. For Europe and its economy A year ago, I had noted with you that 2016 had begun as the year of volatility, with the turbulences in the financial markets. In fact, 2016 was rather the year of uncertainty, with the Brexit victory in June, the American election in November and the Italian referendum in December.