samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We will soon discuss, as Mario Draghi said, the technicalities of our 2019 reinvestments to ensure market neutrality. But we should keep our options open about the timing of our reinvestment in the following years. In the face of uncertainty, one often hears reference to the celebrated Brainard 1 ‘conservatism principle’ (as reinterpreted by Alan Blinder 2. This is not, as the impression is sometimes given, a general warning to move cautiously when the world is uncertain. The Brainard ‘conservatism principle’ says only that you should move cautiously if you are uncertain about the effect of your policy instrument on your objective. But we should go beyond a static view of Brainard’s principle [which focuses on one single small step] a dynamic view would include the time dimension and consider how to manage and communicate a sequence of incremental steps. 2. Our collective challenge facing divergence: combining independence and co-operation The global economy continues to expand strongly but we are now seeing a strong divergence in performance. We have used a lot in the latest IMF-WEO forecasts, the nice French word « plateau » to describe global growth. But this “plateau” is not even: a strong acceleration in the US, even if it is temporary and fragile, offset by a moderation in growth in the rest of the G7. Some prominent emerging market economies are either expected to slow down rapidly or record only modest growth. In short we are moving from synchronized growth to economic divergence.

And third, we will retain our stock of assets for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. Moreover, this sequence doesn’t depend on the fiscal uncertainties that can appear in member states. The Governing Council is clear about the fact that there is no fiscal dominance in the euro area and no influence of any national fiscal policy on our common monetary policy. Flexibility – Our sequence is clear but the details of implementation are flexible and state1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  dependent. We have included several options to deal with incoming data. Let me illustrate this on two points: One frequent focus of speculation is the precise timing of the first increase in interest rates and the path of policy rates thereafter. Obviously, we have to consider here the trade-off between more clarity today and flexibility tomorrow. It is true that forward curves beyond the second half of 2019 are somewhat volatile. But for the time being, this volatility is relatively modest, and certainly so for interest rates that matter for the economic decisions of households and corporates. Therefore the trade-off currently favours keeping our options open. I wouldn’t see any value in trading off our flexibility tomorrow against more clarity today but as we approach the summer of 2019, the balance will shift in favour of detailing our forward guidance. We also have flexibility over reinvestment.
4  Other FinTech players are increasing competition in retail and commercial banking by providing new lending and borrowing platforms for retail and corporate customers. In a number of G20 countries, new business models draw on big data and advanced analytics to tailor products and services to customers and discipline credit underwriting. For example, peer-to-peer (“P2P”) 5  lending has grown rapidly in recent years from a small base. In the UK, P2P lending now represents about 14% of the new lending to SMEs. Estimates suggest that more than half of these credits were unlikely to 6  have been provided by existing banks. Other platforms are allowing firms to borrow against invoice receivables, drawing on data gathered directly from software their customers use to manage their accounts payable. Some of the more radical innovations underway are in emerging economies. E-commerce platforms in China, for example, are using algorithms to analyse transaction and search data to improve credit scoring. The result has been a significant expansion of credit availability with low default rates (albeit ones not yet tested by an economic downturn). 7  In wholesale banking and markets, the direction of travel over the past few years has been from intermediated trading (involving ‘dealers’, either via voice or electronically) to non-intermediated, more fully 8  electronic order-driven trading. Where securities, such as equities and futures, are traded electronically, including via exchanges, algorithmic trading has grown rapidly. Technological improvements, and the growth of multilateral trading venues, led to the emergence of high-frequency trading firms.

Overall, I believe that Europe has the ability to meet the challenges that the western world faces, if it is able to make full use of its own experience and institutions. Changes are nevertheless needed. And this brings me to the questions specific to Economic and Monetary Union. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In this regard, I would like to make two main points: first, the global economy is becoming increasingly “multipolar” and the euro will have to stand its ground alongside at least three – and possibly more – other major international currencies. Second, the euro can only be assured of a major role in a multipolar currency world if the architecture underlying the single European currency is sufficiently strong. The task of achieving this cannot be delegated to financial markets and requires appropriate institutional steps. The euro in a multipolar world When the idea of the single currency was first mooted in the 1980s, the global economy was dominated by three countries: the United States, Germany and Japan. Since then, the global economy has seen major changes. With the ongoing integration of global markets, we have witnessed the rise of emerging market economies. China, in particular, has led to a progressive shift in the centre of economic gravity and is expected to overtake the United States in terms of GDP at market exchange rates sometime from 2025 onwards.
Mr George outlines monetary and exchange rate policies for sustainable growth Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr E A J George, at The Central Bank Policies Conference, Macau, 17 May 1999. Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me begin by saying that it is a real pleasure to be here with you today in Macau and to participate with such distinguished central bank colleagues in your conference. One of the very agreeable things about coming to the other side of the world to participate in an event like this is that it enables me to step back from the daily hubbub of my office, the financial markets in the City of London, and the media, and reflect in a broader way on what it is we are all actually trying to do. It is in fact much more agreeable than working! In a broad sense, of course, our ultimate objective as central bankers is clear, and it is reflected in your conference title when you talk about “leading the way to sustainable growth”. I would add high rates of employment and rising living standards to that objective. Very often in the past, certainly in my own country, but not just in my own country, that fundamental objective was seen to be largely a matter of demand management – of pumping up demand by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies – with too little regard to the structural, supply-side, capacity of our economies to meet that demand.

And here I must say that I do not feel comfortable with the recent developments in financial markets. The surge in asset prices in many countries, the absence of volatility in many markets and the low level of credit spreads show that today's investors have an unprecedented confidence in the future and a strong appetite for all types of risks. For sure, economic fundamentals have improved in industrialised and in emerging countries. It is, however, hard to believe that the world economy has now entered a phase of lasting and accelerating prosperity. We must remain alert. No major financial crisis has shaken the world in recent years in spite of the Iraq war, rising oil prices, major natural disasters, various terrorist attacks and permanent rumours of new terrorist attacks. The resilience that financial sectors have shown may cause us to forget that crises are still a possibility. Thus, the major challenge for international business today is, to my mind, to keep a weather eye open even when the waters appear calm. 4  BIS Review 120/2006
Understanding is a necessary but not sufficient condition for trust-building. And trust tends to be earned slowly from repeated experience. Nonetheless, these studies point to an important role for simpler, personalised communications in lowering the twin deficits. There probably further for this agenda to run. For example, there is no reason in principle why the same methods could not be applied to other central bank publications, covering the financial system and banknotes. The Bank has already made some strides in this direction through its Financial Stability Report and Knowledge Bank, aimed at improving public understanding of the economy and finance. Looking ahead, in my view greater personalisation of central bank communications holds promise. Central banks often affect people’s lives in ways which are lagged and indirect and hence difficult for them to observe. Earlier this year, I constructed “personalised” scorecards, which set out the impact of the Bank’s monetary policy easing actions after the global financial crisis on the income, wealth and well-being of citizens across the UK. 49  This recognised that the impact of monetary policy on people’s lives is often quite different depending on their personal circumstances – old versus young, borrower versus saver, home-owner versus renter, North  48 49  Haldane and McMahon (2018) and Bholat et al (2018). Haldane (2018a). 21  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  21  versus South. Casting the impact of monetary policy in terms of averages or aggregates tends not to resonate with people’s personal experience.

The Riksbank discusses a number of possible measures in its latest Financial Stability Report. Firstly, the Riksbank tries to influence developments by communicating our views on what is happening publicly and in the form of a dialogue with the banks. The Financial Stability Report plays a central role in this context. The Riksbank can in certain situations provide a more comprehensive picture of the risks than the individual market players, as the latter attaches greater importance to evaluating developments in their own portfolios. If the Riksbank believes that an unhealthy build-up of risk is occurring and our assessment has not had the intended influence on the individual market players, there are other measures that the Riksbank can take. In extreme cases, quantitative regulations may be introduced, such as raised required capital adequacy ratios or a reserve requirement. Nor can an increase in the repo rate be ruled out if financial stability is threatened. However, these are more far-reaching measures and would only be used if the build-up of risk was assessed to constitute an acute problem. The assessment of the situation made by the Riksbank and other authorities will always be marred by a large measure of uncertainty, as it is extremely difficult to evaluate how serious the build-up of risk actually is. If drastic measures are to be taken, the assessment must be based on a strong foundation. The development we can see today is, as I mentioned earlier, far from requiring any intervention.
One important component of this is the German Fraunhofer institutes. These were first established in 1948 to rebuild the German corporate sector. They have now grown to total 72 in number, covering all sectors and regions across Germany. Collectively, they employ almost 25,000 people and help around 6,000-8,000 companies each year, large and small. 47  They have an annual budget of a little under 0.1% of German GDP. A second piece of infrastructure supporting German business is the so-called Steinbeis system. This was created in 1971. It is a network of technical professionals whose skills, experience and know-how can be drawn on by companies across Germany, operating through around 1,000 Steinbeis Enterprises. It currently has around 6,000 professionals in the network. Over 2,000 businesses have been founded on the back of the Steinbeis platform. A third layer of the institutional cake in Germany is the financing of companies. This itself has three layers: the Sparkassen, operating locally and largely financing local businesses; the Landesbanken, operating regionally and typically serving somewhat larger companies; and KfW, Germany’s national development bank, typically serving large companies. Often, representatives from these organisations will have a role in the governance of German businesses.

You can take a look at our first example of this – the November Inflation Report –online, at www.inflationreport.co.uk. This afternoon’s event will showcase a selection of the materials we are planning to run alongside these changes in our communications to help explain to people about the Bank’s work. To bring that to life, the first session will kick off with three of my colleagues – Ben, Sam and Jon –explaining to you what the Bank is doing on some topical issues, things that are influencing the Bank’s policies and the role we play in the economy right now. The questions they will answer are:   Why did the Bank change interest rates earlier this month?   What we are doing to keep banks safe? ; and    What are we doing in response to the vote to leave the EU to ensure the Brexit process is as smooth as possible? Through our dialogue with you today, we will enrich our understanding of how we can meet our objective more effectively, and we hope you will gain a better understanding of what the Bank does and how it is going about it. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Before handing back to Ranvir, I’d like to thank Speakers for Schools, We Are Futures, Economy.org and Rethinking Economics – the key stakeholders that have helped us with this morning’s events and who have been working with us to develop our educational resources.
The downward trend in market interest rates also reverberated on medium term real interest rates causing real market interest rates to go down compared to the second quarter and to hover around historically low levels (Figure 18). Besides, policy rate cuts and improvements in global risk perceptions have started to have favorable effects on credit markets. In fact, consumer loan rates, which were reacting rather sluggishly to policy rate cuts, have displayed a significant decline in this period (Figure 19). Moreover, the CBRT reduced Turkish lira reserve requirements in October, in order to further alleviate the tightness in credit conditions, and thus enhance the effectiveness of policy rate cuts. Within this framework, the recovery in credit markets is expected to continue gradually throughout the last quarter. However, the effectiveness of the credit channel in supporting economic activity is still partly restrained owing to the ongoing tightness in lending standards for small and medium-sized enterprises. BIS Review 143/2009  7  Figure 18: Medium-Term Real Interest Rates Figure 19: Loan Rates* from the Yield on Government Securities* (Percent) (Percent) 25 2.4 17  20  2.2 15  2.0 13  15 1.8  11  1.6  10  9  1.4 7  1.0  *2-year real interest rates, calculated using 2-year nominal interest rates from the yield curve and inflation expectations from the CBRT’s Expectations Survey.

0109  0108  0107  0105  0909  0509  0109  0908  0508  0108  30  0907  0 0507  70  0107  100  0106  110  200  Source: Bloomberg. Source: Goldman Sachs. The course of food prices is another important assumption for inflation forecasts. Contrary to the upward trend in previous years, the seasonally adjusted food prices displayed a decline in the third quarter (Figure 33). This change was mainly driven by the decline in unprocessed prices fuelled by prices of fruits and vegetables decreasing at a faster pace than seasonal averages. Unprocessed food prices had displayed an upswing in the first half of the year. Deceleration in annual inflation in processed food prices continued as well and prices fell compared to the same period of the previous year for the first time in the history of the index (Figure 34). The July Inflation Report envisaged food inflation to be 7.5 percent at the end of 2009 and 6 percent for the following years. However, better than expected outcomes regarding food prices necessitated a downward revision in food inflation to 5.8 percent for end-2009, while the projection of 6 percent was maintained for the following years. 14  BIS Review 143/2009  Figure 33: Food Prices  Figure 34: Food Prices  (Seasonally Adjusted,  (Annual Percentage Change)  Quarterly Moving Average)  2 1,5 1 0,5 0 -0,5  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT.
Nazrul Hisyam Mohd Noh: Opening #IDAREYOUChallenge2017 Grand Finale  remarks  -  Opening remarks by Mr Nazrul Hisyam Mohd Noh, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the #IDAREYOUChallenge2017 Grand Finale, Kuala Lumpur, 3 September 2018. * * * It is indeed an honour for me to be here today at the grand finale of #IDAREYOUChallenge 2017. Within the theme of today’s event, I would like to take this opportunity to pose three dares for everyone here today: 1. Firstly, to the university undergraduates present here, I dare you to break the myth that the young generation are not financially savvy and do not plan financially for the future. 2. Secondly, again to the millennials and post-millennial Gen-Z present today, I dare all of you to break the myth that you are the “me me me” generation, one that only cares about yourself, and to prove that all of you have a much wider and richer perspective, that you actually care about being financially protected for the sake of your future and your loved ones. 3. Finally, I dare the chiefs and captains of the insurance industry seated here today: I dare the industry to break the myth that insurance is unexciting, but instead, to demonstrate through engagements with the emerging generation of today that insurance is filled with opportunities for meaningful and exciting careers. I cannot emphasize more, especially to the millennials and post-millennials present, that you have much ahead of you.

On the other hand, the market capitalization of the GAFA – Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple – is 25 times higher than that of the whole FinTech universe. The BigTechs already have a material footprint in financial services1 and competitive advantages to expand their activities further in this area. On top of massive financial resources able to support investment at scale and an undeniable digital agility, they benefit from strong brand recognition, worldwide customer base on which they have accumulated proprietary database and privileged access to forefront technologies. In that context, BigTechs more than FinTechs have the potential to fundamentally  redefine financial intermediation beyond the universal banking model toward integrating financial services within a universal ecosystem. Such a move is already gaining considerable traction in China. And it is raising very fundamental questions to which I will come back. To conclude my first point, digital finance may not lead to a more decentralized system as the centripetal forces of network effects may profit most to large conglomerates. Rather than  eliminating intermediation, if left on its own, digital finance will more likely lead to reshuffling the cards with the most digitally agile incumbents and the most financially able challengers becoming the new dominant (and potentially systemic) intermediaries. II. A common challenge: Rethinking old issues, investigating new ones This leads me to my second point. The digitalization of finance forces us to revisit old regulatory and supervisory questions and to face new ones. Among old issues to revisit, I would like to highlight two of them.
This is why interest rates were so high in 2009 and in the first half of 2010. On the other hand, as I have previously explained in speeches and papers, it was appropriate that emphasis should shift back to the inflation outlook and the economic slack as the danger of further currency depreciation dissipated and exchange rate-linked loans became less prominent in the balance sheets of Icelandic households and businesses without foreign-denominated income. When the IMF-supported programme concluded at the end of August, monetary policy shifted back to the inflation targeting regime provided for by law and the March 2001 agreement between the Central Bank and the Government. Second, a considerable body of experience and theoretical study indicates that acceptable monetary policy can roughly be captured with an equation in which the policy rate is determined by the deviation of inflation from target and the output gap. In addition, the nominal interest rate level is determined by the equilibrium real interest rate, which is the real interest rate that is consistent with inflation at target and demand in line with potential output. This is the so-called Taylor rule. But note that I refer to “acceptable” monetary policy. Truly sound monetary policy is always more complex, as it takes account of forecasts of inflation and GDP growth, financial market conditions, and a variety of risk factors.

The inflation target will be fully reached towards the end of 2013, which is broadly in line with last year’s forecast. The difference is that the target will be reached from above, and not below. What caused such a radical change? First of all, there were increases in oil and other commodity prices. Second, the króna depreciated by 6½% in the first half of the year, bottoming out in mid-July before reclaiming about 4% of that loss. Third, house prices rose. Fourth, wages rose far in excess of productivity increases. Early in the year, it was primarily external – and presumably transitory – factors that caused the spurt in inflation. But as the year progressed, domestic cost pressures played a progressively larger role – wage increases in particular. For example, unit labour costs are expected to increase by 5½% this year and core inflation 3 excluding tax effects was up by 4½% in October, as opposed to just over 1% at the beginning of the year. Now let us look at monetary policy year-to-date. At the Monetary Policy Committee’s first meeting of the year, in February, it was decided to cut the Bank’s interest rates by 0.25 percentage points and communicate a neutral bias regarding the future interest rate path. This proved to be the last interest rate cut of the year. What we call the “effective policy rate”, which is where the Bank’s interest rate spectrum has maximum effect on short-term market rates, was then 3.6%.