samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In large part, that demand follows directly from the increased breadth and scale of central banks’ responsibilities and financial exposures. But in the Bank of England’s case the desire to build a strengthened financial risk framework also reflects an important consequence of taking on responsibility for the micro-prudential regulation of banks, which is that we should be willing to do unto ourselves as we would do unto others: a Golden Rule for central bankers. And it reflects a strong desire to investigate new ways of driving innovative analysis and lean against the risks of groupthink. Strengthening the Bank of England’s financial risk framework  The Bank has had strong first- and third-line financial risk functions for some time. An expert first-line team assesses, prices and haircuts the wide range of collateral pre-positioned with us, monitors the specific risks taken in live operations on a day-to-day basis, and evaluates the financial condition of our counterparties, 6  liaising with our supervisory colleagues in the Bank’s Prudential Regulation Authority arm . And internal and external auditors regularly assess the effectiveness of the Bank’s financial controls. Until recently, however, the Bank has not had a dedicated second-line financial risk function, reflecting a perception that central banking operations did not give rise to tensions of the sort seen between profit making and risk control in private firms. The amount of residual risk to which the Bank was actually exposed, after taking account of large collateral haircuts and government indemnities, was also felt to be relatively small.

Or: With expanded markets and choice available for high net worth customers, will it make it harder for domestic financial institutions to continue supporting inclusion outcomes that are partly cross-subsidised by high net worth business today? Correspondingly, to what extent will this impact the cost of financial services for the poor, potentially making them even more unaffordable than before? Or: Are there opportunities to bring new technologies and emerging practice into domestic markets and simultaneously create an environment for them to take root and spawn original domestic applications that will create additional multiplier effects? Or: How might easier cross-border access encourage new business partnerships that would enable financial institutions to penetrate untapped customer segments more efficiently and reduce associated information asymmetries? Answers to such questions can be important in how we think about and approach financial integration. Ultimately, behaviour matters, and therefore needs to be explicitly addressed in financial integration strategies. Unless we also turn our attention to the behavioural responses of financial actors in a more financially integrated region, we may find that our best efforts to strengthen the pillars for greater financial inclusion ultimately does not deliver as expected. Financial inclusion and financial integration strategies therefore need to come together through deliberate approaches that are mutually reinforcing.
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

But in our own case this effect has been offset by the weakness of the euro – or by sterling's bilateral strength against the euro, if you prefer – which has dampened both external demand and our domestic price level. The result of these external developments – the global economic slowdown and the pattern of exchange rates taken together – for us has been that, notwithstanding only a rather modest slowdown of our overall economy, we have continued to see a growing imbalance between the internationally-exposed (particularly the euro-exposed) sectors, which have been having a rather torrid time, and the more heavily domestically-oriented sectors, which have been doing rather better. The weakness of manufacturing alongside continuing growth in the services sectors is a crude reflection of this imbalance. With inflation running somewhat below the Chancellor's symmetrical 2½% target, and with developing uncertainties about the continuing strength of domestic demand, the MPC was in a position to respond to these developments by reducing interest rates earlier this year. In fact we cut rates by ¾%, while the Federal Reserve cut much more aggressively, by 2½% over much the same period, and the European Central Bank by just ¼% – reflecting the different overall monetary conditions as they saw them in their respective currency areas. You might suppose that these relative interest rate movements would have encouraged the dollar to weaken against sterling and by more against the euro – and given the pattern of international imbalances it would have been helpful if they had.
Principle 7 – reporting and disclosure “The board shall demand integrity both in financial reporting and in timeliness and balance of disclosures on the institution’s affairs.” The guidelines for this principle require that the institution’s financial statements fairly present the state of affairs of the institution as at the end of the financial year and the profit or loss and cash flows for the reporting period. Furthermore, the annual report is expected to state whether the corporate governance guidelines have been adhered to or, if not, where there has not been compliance the institution is expected to give reasons. Mr Chairman, as you will note the four principles highlight the fact that the Bank of Zambia places a great deal of importance on integrity and professionalism in the financial sector. Our expectation is that this should extend to other economic sectors as well. Lessons can thus be drawn from the work that the Bank of Zambia has done and can be applied to the other sectors. Mr. Chairman, the prevalence of fraud in institutions all over the world has culminated with regulatory authorities in several jurisdictions instituting jail terms and fines against the scourge. The famous Sarbanes-Oxley is one such response. Our own corporate governance guidelines have a strong linkage to the Banking and Financial Services Act which when not adhered to may result, upon conviction, to a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to both.

Mr. Chairman, the international work that is being done in respect of money laundering and corruption payments or terrorist financing is such that trade and service companies, like banks, are now being held accountable for what they deal in and whom they trade with – as suppliers as well as buyers. The implications of anti-money laundering (AML) are such that they extend to all forms of finance, industry and business. It is thus critical that the principles of integrity and professionalisms are applied in all spheres of institutional activities. Mr Chairman Ladies and gentlemen I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 129/2007  3
The main role in creating the inflation rate during 2004 has been played by the “Rent, water, fuels, energy” group, unlike the past years when this role was played by the “Foodstuffs and non-alcoholics” group. The price index of the “Rent, water, fuels and energy” group marked high annual growth rates over 2004. Despite the increase of the energy price by 31.2 percent in February of this year, this group recorded a rise even in the price of rent and imputed rent. The annual inflation rate of the “Foodstuffs and non-alcoholics” group has been a negative one during May-November, due to the growth of domestic agricultural production, including the production of greenhouses. The positive inflation performance during the last two years was facilitated by the absence of shocks, the positive developments of productive capacities and the consolidation of macroeconomic and macrofinancial indicators. The concern that oil price rise in the international markets would have caused a consumer price rise even in Albania, has not become a reality. The appreciation of exchange rate in Lek against US dollar during 2004 has eased the effect of oil price rise in the international markets. Also, the inflation value of the two main partner countries, Italy and Greece, has been low, compared to inflation rates in Albania. As a consequence, imported inflationary pressures did not accompany Albania’s trade activity. The favourable macroeconomic developments during 2004 have provided an appropriate environment for the inflation control.

It was then that inflation expectations among the public finally trended down to the target of 2 per cent, and that interest rate spreads against Germany were reduced to fractions of a percentage point. This fiscal tightening could in turn be based on the predictability of the new monetary regime that would eventually allow less severe monetary policies. This interaction is rather well understood, if not always acted upon, at the national level. But on the European level there is a twist, as the single monetary policy is now matched by a multitude of fiscal policies. The risk that is often discussed is that the ECB would in the end have to bail out a single fiscally undisciplined country from unsustainable debt. But as the Stability Pact crisis has shown, the more immediate problem might be more prosaic than a cataclysmic debt crisis: the problem might be a bias towards fiscal laxity that has to be counterbalanced by tighter monetary policy - hence a bad policy mix. With a single monetary policy the effect of fiscal stimulus in one country will be diluted in the whole area and will therefore by definition meet with less of a monetary policy response than it would if monetary policy had been national. Furthermore the nature of the political set-up makes it more difficult for the ECB to comment on individual national budgets. This means there will be a strong temptation to “free ride” by expanding the budget at the expense of fellow European nations.
For example, in the June TLTRO III operation, participating banks received a total of € trillion, a record high for the Eurosystem’s refinancing operations. The evidence available suggests that these operations have fulfilled  1  See Aguilar et al. (2020). 3  the purpose for which they were conceived, since banks have indeed used the funding received to lend to the real economy.2 These measures, along with those adopted complementarily both by national governments (in particular through the public loan-guarantee schemes) and by the prudential authorities, aimed at enabling financial institutions to use some of the capital buffers built up in recent years, have been pivotal in facilitating the flow of financing to the economy during the crisis.3 Near and medium-term challenges for the euro area economy and monetary policy Let me now share some thoughts on the current outlook for the euro area and the role that monetary policy could play in the near and medium term. One year on from the first reported cases of COVID-19 in Europe, the coronavirus pandemic continues to exact a tragic human cost and pose enormous challenges for the economy. Since reaching its weakest level last spring, economic activity in the euro area has been on a recovery path. However, this recovery is subject to a high level of uncertainty and has been partial, uneven and fragile.

I should note that the Review uses data that was available up to 5 May 2006. In my presentation (some of the slides), I will refer to developments since this cut-off date. In presenting the main findings of the analysis, I will broadly follow the structure of the Review (as outlined on slide 2). 2. Overview of the main risks and vulnerabilities  I would like to begin with an overview of some pertinent developments in the euro area financial system and of the main sources of risk and vulnerabilities for euro area financial stability, in comparison to the assessment in the December 2005 Review. Overall, the developments since last December lend support to the view that the euro area financial system is robust and well-capable of withstanding shocks. First, the pace of global economic activity has strengthened and it has become more evenly distributed. Second, the balance sheets of euro area banks and insurance companies have continued to strengthen. At the same time, these positive developments are clouded by the fact that the risks and vulnerabilities we identified in the December 2005 Review remain and some of them have increased. Global imbalances have continued to grow. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that tightening liquidity conditions in the G3 economies could yet expose vulnerabilities in the pricing of assets following a protracted period of hunt for yield in a low interest rate environment. Particularly at risk are leveraged investors, especially hedge funds, and this could accentuate the risks of disorderly market corrections.
This can be achieved by the further harmonisation of national procedures for supervision and crisis management, and by preparing for joint actions in one way or another. This of course requires better and more extensive cooperation across national borders. Because cross-border banking has a strong geographical component, enhancing cooperation on a regional basis can be an effective way of proceeding. We have in fact already taken some steps in this direction. Regarding supervision, EU leaders have been able to agree on an extensive set of reforms that will enhance coordination across member states, including the creation of European supervisory agencies and of a European Systemic Risk Board. In parallel, the EU has set up a number of colleges of supervisors for large cross-border banks, which will ensure that relevant national bank supervisors meet regularly, share information and expose or deal with any cross-border problems. In the field of crisis management, the attempts to enhance cooperation within the EU can be summarised in a set of non-legally binding Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). The latest MoU, which was signed in 2008, aims at improving cross-border cooperation between all the 27 EU Member States. Obviously, signing a non-legally binding document is not a solution to the complex trilemma discussed here. Nevertheless, the fact that representatives from supervisory authorities, central banks and finance ministries across the entire EU have agreed on a common set of principles for crisis management and resolution is an important starting point for more intense cooperation. But obviously more has to be done.

Mr. Carse reviews the progress being made towards global regulation Address by Mr. David T.B. Carse, a Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Aurthority, at the Bankers’ Association for Foreign Trade 75th Anniversary Annual Meeting held in Florida on 6/5/97. I am pleased to be here this morning to talk to you about the Hong Kong perspective on the trends in global regulation. I have been asked particularly to talk about our experience of being a host supervisor - in other words, what it is like to be on the receiving end of consolidated supervision. This is quite appropriate because, although the Hong Kong Monetary Authority is the home supervisor for a number of local banks with overseas operations, the distinguishing characteristic of Hong Kong is that it is the host to almost 500 banks from over 40 different countries. This is in keeping with its role as one of the leading international financial centres in the world with the third largest representation of foreign banks and the fifth largest total of external assets. Hong Kong after 1997 Of course, Hong Kong’s other distinguishing characteristic is that it will experience a reversion of sovereignty to China in less than two months’ time. This has naturally aroused much interest and speculation among the foreign banks based in Hong Kong about the legal and regulatory environment which will apply after the handover on 30 June, and I will therefore try to explain to you briefly the main features of the arrangements that will apply.
There is also a supermarket contest to illustrate the importance of spending within your budget, plus a chef to show you how you can cook up a storm without spending a bomb. 6. There are plans to bring these activities to other parts of Singapore, and several community centres are in discussions with MoneySENSE. Important Role of Media 7. The media is still the most effective channel for financial education. In the national financial literacy survey conducted by MoneySENSE, 54% of the respondents said they were interested to learn about financial education through mass media. 8. I am glad the local newspapers have been very supportive in running MoneySENSE articles on a regular basis. The Straits Times, Lianhe Zaobao and Berita Harian have been doing so regularly for more than two years. Other publications like Today and Smart Investor have also begun to run regular MoneySENSE columns. I would like to thank all of you for partnering us in this important effort, and I would like to see this continue. 9. MoneySENSE will soon launch a TV game show requiring participants to make financial decisions such as on whether to purchase certain items, whether to take on more credit, whether to take up insurance and whether to invest in certain financial products. A preview of this new TV game show will be staged at this Roadshow on Sunday. So look out for this sneak preview. BIS Review 30/2006  1  10. These are all good initiatives.

But our financial education outreach can progress faster, and reach many more people, if we make the most of our collaborations with the unions, community centres and other organisations are here today. I encourage all of you to work with MoneySENSE to bring financial education to residents in your neighbourhoods, to your workplaces, and to your members. In this regard, I am happy to know that NTUC is planning to organise MoneySENSE programmes for its members. MoneySENSE encourages students to be ambassadors of financial education 11. It is also important to begin young. The Ministry of Education (MOE) has promoted financial literacy in schools so that students get a basic sense of money matters and of the need to save and spend wisely, from young. Financial education messages are taught through subjects such as Social Studies and Civics and Moral Education at the primary and secondary levels. Our teachers have also been given resources and training to enable them to deliver financial literacy lessons effectively. (One of the resources well-received by teachers is a CD-ROM entitled 'Promoting Financial Literacy in Schools' which comprises illustrations and case-studies to facilitate class discussions on financial literacy matters and issues. Workshops focusing on hands-on activities are also conducted annually to enhance teachers' competency in financial literacy.) 12. About 30 schools, through MoneySENSE, have enhanced their financial literacy programmes by conducting enrichment activities. These include interactive board games on prudent money management, workshops on financial matters such as debt, insurance and financial planning and inter-school financial literacy competitions.
When it comes to the payment market, I think the ambition should be for the Riksbank to promote harmonisation and competition on equal terms by offering attractive platforms for banks and others to make their final payments. This also increases security in that the liquidity risks in the system decline. One could of course imagine that the banks would have their own system to regulate payments with each other. But if a private player were to run such a system, all participating banks would have large claims on that player, just as they have on the Riksbank at present. And if such a private player were to go bankrupt, this money would be lost if a payment had not gone through. That risk does not exist when the central bank runs the settlement system. Moreover, there could be large volumes of payments so that costs become low, especially if a lot of countries collaborate, as is now the case on the ECB's TIPS platform 12. By ensuring that there is transactional efficiency in Swedish krona, we also reduce the risk of any other type of currency taking over parts of the economy. New payment methods emerging Changes in the payment market are not only about new companies coming in to compete for business. The way that households and companies make their payments is also changing. For instance, they more often make direct payments to other countries, as online trade is increasing. The central banks need to ensure that these flows are also stable and efficient.

It may seem as though competition and efficiency will only increase as digitalisation increases. But the payment market is distinguished by positive network effects. This means that when new users connect to a payment solution, there is increased benefit for all participants. This means that the market could ultimately be dominated by one or a couple of large companies that attain  8 It is of course also important to have a stable fiscal policy to ensure there is confidence in the currency. 5 [35]  monopoly status. It is therefore important that the state takes responsibility and regulates the market, but as new products are positive for consumers, the state also needs to implement measures to benefit competition and innovation. 9 These new types of company that have begun competing on the payment market often have as business concept to gather and analyse data, which means they can offer cheap services. This so-called FinTech sector has grown rapidly and is now challenging the banks. In general, increased competition is positive, as it leads to lower prices for companies and customers. However, it is important that the same rules apply to all players on the market, and that the legislation also stays apace of the emergence of new phenomena, which can be difficult to classify and to scrutinise. Sometimes the changes on the payment market occur very quickly. In China, it didn’t take long before companies like Alipay and WeChat Pay had taken a dominant position. This is where network effects come in.