samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It means, the foreign savings is necessary, and part of it will pour through the foreign direct investments, while part through debiting. Of course, speaking from the viewpoint of the monetary policy, we would like to see the state to borrow also from abroad, not only on the domestic market, because it gives additional security and stabilization to the Macedonian economy. The level of debt is still moderate and causes no other unfavorable implications. So, whether like it or not, we must borrow, better abroad, in order to, if not else, cover also the current expenditures? Well, the state budget is structured in such a manner that it has a deficit, meaning a need of funding, but whether that funding is used for current or capital needs, it is hard to say, because it is one account of the Government from which all those needs are covered. If a problem regarding the repayment emerges, hypothetically, does it mean that the monetary policy can feel the consequences as well? The fiscal and the monetary policy are, of course, interleaving and the monetary policy is always adjusted in order to maintain the balance in the Macedonian economy. If we come to a situation when this balance is disturbed, the monetary policy will adequately react in order to restore the balance. The foreign reserves for a month "melted" by approximately Euro 80 million. Has these reserves been spent for maintaining the stability of the Denar, or for other purposes?

It is sometimes hard to explain where this inflow comes from, but it indicates that in the economy there are sources that generate income, that create savings potential, meaning, the savings, although maybe not sufficient, is still substantial in our country and that deposit growth is just below the one in the good years, but it is positive and continuous, which is encouraging. Does this mean that the banks are more focused on collecting capital, than releasing money in the economy in form of credits? We can state that the deposit growth is higher than the one in the last several years, but the deposit growth is also a reflection of lack of enough alternatives for investments. You know  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  that the stock exchange is in standstill, we don't have some other developed financial markets where the citizens can place their savings, so every savings is mainly placed in form of banks deposit. Despite the inflation slows down, in the last several months, according to the NBRM estimations, it seems that the banks restrain over landing. Is this an indicator for the unfavorable conditions in the economy, or on the market, or is it a try for further reduction of the inflation? No, the inflation is not an issue, since it is on quite moderate level, 2.8 percentages is the latest data for August and we expect average inflation of about 2.8 percentages for the entire year, there is no probability for inflationary pressures in the following period.
The macroeconomic projections accompanying the Budget for 2013 include the stabilising of our unemployment rate at around 25% of the labour force, a rate double the average for the European Union countries. This rate of unemployment is, quite simply, dramatic. Hence the enormous importance of economic recovery and of greater labour market flexibility: these two variables complement one another, and without both operating simultaneously, net job creation will not be possible. Fiscal consolidation I shall now move on to public finances and to the nature of the fiscal drive needed. In 2007 Spain posted a budget surplus of close to 2% of GDP and a public debt/GDP ratio of 37%, then one of the lowest among the euro area members. However, this apparently healthy state of affairs concealed a precarious situation owing to the presence of high tax revenue that had a significant temporary component tied to the major expansion of the construction and real estate sector, and to unsustainable spending dynamics. Indeed, the end of this expansion uncovered the risks latent in that situation. Almost half of the deterioration of more than 13 pp of GDP over only two years from 2007 to 2009 – a turnaround in public finances unprecedented in Spanish economic history – was due to the fall in revenue, largely associated with the disappearance of the aforementioned extraordinary revenue.

But given the nature of the problems at the source and in the development of this sovereign debt crisis, the role that any ECB decision may play in resolving it can hardly go beyond mitigating the risks of serious accidents and of providing more time so that the decisions that must be taken in areas other than the ECB may come to fruition. The Spanish economy Let me now turn to the key features of our current economic situation. The Spanish economy has been greatly affected by the financial tensions in the euro area, which emerged with the outbreak of the international financial crisis in 2007–2008, and the public finances problems of several euro area members, beginning with Greece. In our case, the crisis reached us and, in turn, we contributed to its unfolding as a result of the doubts over the sustainability of our public finances, our poor growth expectations and the scale of our foreign debt, which essentially built up during the real estate boom. Economic policy has striven to overcome various factors of vulnerability in a very adverse macroeconomic setting. The results of the reforms undertaken are still incipient, and we must persevere with this strategy, which is the only realistic way of resuming sustained growth. As recent events in Europe show, there are feedback loops from public finances and their problems to the banking system and its problems, and from the latter to activity and  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  employment.
Taking into account inflation expectations, the pricing behavior and the course of other factors affecting inflation, we will maintain our tight monetary policy stance as long as deemed necessary. Chart 3. Chart 4. (2-Week Moving Average, Billion TL)  (Percent)  CBRT Funding*  *Marginal funding is O/N funding quoted at the upper limit of the corridor. Source: CBRT. CBRT Rates and BIST Interbank O/N Repo Rates  Source: BIST, CBRT. The yield curve, which was nearly flat in the last quarter of 2015 as in the entire year, assumed a positive slope in January 2016 (Chart 5). This was mainly due to long-term rates that rose amid the uncertainty surrounding global markets, geopolitical risks and heightened inflation expectations, which also affected the spread between 5-year market rates and the BIST overnight interbank rates. After remaining negative across the fourth quarter of 2015, the spread turned slightly positive in the first weeks of January as a result of rising 5-year market rates (Chart 6). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5. Chart 6. Yield Curve Between October 28, 2015- January 22, 2016 (Percent)  (Percent, 5-Day MA)  Source: Bloomberg,  Maturity (Year)  Money Market Rates  Source: Bloomberg, BIST. Regarding our Turkish lira liquidity policy, there has been some decline in banks’ FX swap deals with the market for short-term funds owing partly to changes we made to the guidelines for the use of FX deposits as collateral following the announcement of our road map.

We revised the year-end inflation forecasts for 2016 and 2017 upwards by 1 point and 0.5 points, respectively, compared to the October Inflation Report forecasts. As I have just mentioned, driven mostly by oil prices, USD-denominated import prices have registered a considerable decline since October 2015. When analyzed jointly with exchange rate developments, the downward revision in the assumption for oil and import prices is expected to pull down the end-2016 inflation forecast by 0.6 points compared to the October Report forecast. On the other hand, the portion of January 2015 public price adjustments which exceeds the inflation target, is likely to push the end-2016 inflation forecast up by 0.4 points. Another influential factor on forecasts in this period proved to be the rise in net minimum wages. Given the announced support by the government and the effects of this minimum wage rise on demand and costs to the employer, we revised the end-2016 inflation forecast upwards by 1 point. Considering the effect of the minimum-wage-rise, we attribute 0.3 points of this to the food inflation, which we raised from 8 to 9 percent for 2016. Lastly, we estimate that a higher-than-projected actual inflation rate at end-2015 compared to the October Inflation Report forecast coupled with the rise in core inflation indicators will push the end2016 inflation by 0.2 points.
It gathers all publicly announced cases of restructuring of companies in EU Member States, Bulgaria and Romania if these fulfil on of the following conditions: reduction of employment by at least 100 people within a year, they apply to companies that employ at least 250 people and the redundancy applies to at least 10 per cent of employment, or if as a result of restructuring at least 100 jobs are to be created. 9  McKinsey Global Institute “The Emerging Global Labour Market”, June 2005. 4  BIS Review 32/2006  global employment in services estimated at 1.46 billion, may theoretically be performed at a distance from the customer. From the monetary policy perspective, it is important to properly understand the impact of offshoring on the functioning of local labour markets, which — as a result of ever greater opening of the economies — have merged into one global labour market. Before the fall of socialism in European countries, the then global market amounted to ca. one billion people. Nowadays, i.e. after China and India have joined the global economy, the market comprises ca. four billion people. This brings about a situation where jobs are being transferred to new, more attractive locations and people increasingly move in search for better-paid jobs. The largest migration known as “the great migration” is taking place in China 10 . According to estimates, over the next 10 years ca.

For example, CXA Group, a health technology start-up established in Singapore, is expanding its services to China and is planning to partner Shanghai Zhongheng Insurance Brokers for its China expansion. There is scope for collaboration to enhance our mutual understanding of new business models and assist in negotiating regulatory hurdles for these companies. 16 One important aspect of enhancing the eco-system is the enrichment of the range of financing opportunities for FinTech companies. Venture capital (VC) managers are an essential component of the start-up eco-system, providing capital as well as expertise to start-ups and early growth businesses. China already has the largest concentration of VC funding globally2. Singapore also hopes to create a conducive environment for VCs by simplifying the approval process and regulatory regime for VC managers. At the same time, we hope to expand the range of funding options to cater to the varied needs of companies at different stages of development. Finally, there is also room to deepen information and knowledge exchange between Shanghai and Singapore industry participants. To this end, MAS and the Shanghai Financial 17  Services Office are discussing a customised training programme to encourage mutual exchange between financial sector players. Through such exchanges, industry participants can get a better understanding of each other’s markets and enhance their knowledge of specialized topics. 18 And this marks only the beginning of our long-term relationship.
16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  16  Saunders, M (2017), ‘The labour market’, speech available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/the-labour-market Taylor, M (2017), ‘Good work: the Taylor review of modern working practices’, Department of Business, Energy, & Industrial Strategy, 11 July 2017. Tuckett, A (2018), ‘What can regional data tell us about the UK Phillips curve?’, Bank Underground, 13 April 2018. Vlieghe, J (2018), ‘From asymmetry to symmetry: changing risks to the economic outlook’, speech available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/gertjan-vlieghe-speech-at-birmingham-chamber-of-commerce  17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  17  Annex Chart 1: Long-run real pay Index, 1900 = 100  700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0  1700  1750  1800  1850  1900  1950  2000  Real wage  Source: Bank of England “A Millennium of Macroeconomic Data for the UK” Notes: Data shows an estimate for real consumption earnings for Great Britain. Figure 1: Change in real pay by region in the UK since 2008  Sources: ONS and Bank calculations. Notes: Nominal regional pay divided by CPI with a four-quarter moving average.

The underlying picture now appears to be one of gently rising household spending. This is being supported by highly accommodative credit conditions and now-positive growth in inflation-adjusted wages. And then, of course, there is the World Cup. Without wishing to tempt fate, England’s recent sporting success on the football field (and cricket pitch) has probably added to that feel-good factor among Englandsupporting consumers. The “smile count” on my recent visits to Wales and Scotland was also as high as I can remember, although I suspect that may have been the weather rather than the football. Of course, there are always some data – and, indeed, some football teams – which disappoint to the downside. That is what data does. But waiting for something to turn up is not a prudent strategy in life. And 19  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  19  waiting for everything to turn up is certainly not a prudent strategy for monetary policy. That is why the MPC has signalled, and I have voted for, a modest reduction in monetary stimulus provided the economy evolves as expected. Monetary policy guidance like this is not unconditional; it depends, as it should, on how the economy performs. From my conversations with household and businesses, such guidance is both understood and helpful to them when planning their spending and borrowing.
That is shown by the blue line which is shooting up quite nicely. But crucially a recovery in the TFR will not have any perceptible impact on labour force and GDP growth until nearly 2040. This is shown by the yellow line. It will take time for the extra babies born in the next 15 years to start entering the labour force. So while it’s the most lasting solution to our challenges, TFR effects will only impact the economy in the long run. 6 / 17  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second way to soften the trilemma is to increase our resident Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR). This will have more immediate payoffs. But even at plausible stretch targets, its effects on resident labour force growth will be quite limited. Singapore’s LFPR – defined as share of the resident population aged 15-64 who are in the labour force – is currently 76.1. It is not bad by OECD standards but there is scope to improve it. Japan is at 76.8; Germany is at 77.9; the Netherlands is at 79.9; Sweden is at 82.1. Our LFPR for older workers is not bad; it is female LFPR where we are lagging behind. There is currently still a fairly large gender LFPR gap between male and females in their 40s and 50s. This gap in Singapore is higher than that in leading OECD countries. In many advanced economies, women tend to return to the work force after their prime child-bearing years.

Unless we are convinced, as I say, in general or in any particular case, that Beauty will in fact end up with Prince Charming, and not be condemned to long-term cohabitation with the Beast, then it would be better for Europe as a whole to delay until we were more confident of a happy ending. Investment will continue to flow to this country so long as we succeed in maintaining an environment offering attractive returns, and our macro-economic and supply-side policies are a much bigger factor in that than the exchange rate. Similarly the City will continue to flourish as Europe’s international financial capital so long as the strongest financial firms from all around the world continue to find it attractive to conduct their business here. I see no signs of that changing: indeed the international business of the City continues to increase; and that has very little to do with our national currency, or with an expectation that we will be among the first to merge it into the Euro. So long as we are properly prepared, as we will be, and so long as we have in place efficient infra-structure, including for payments and settlements, as I assure you we will have - in or out, then the Euro, if it comes, will be more of an opportunity than a threat to the City.
And a large number could fail simultaneously if they take on correlated risks, as was the case in the US Savings and Loans crisis in the 1980s. Something else might be lost: banking relies on information. Large, multinational banks can use their existing customer knowledge to offer a customer services across the globe and across different business lines. This allows information to flow freely across borders and products and supports international trade and investment. I think it is possible to have a world in which large banks can fail in an orderly way – without the contagion and damage to the economy that in the past has forced the taxpayer to come in and absorb losses. But there is no single, silver bullet to achieve that; rather it requires the application of a comprehensive set of policy and powers. It requires a major change in the regulatory landscape and the transition will be difficult. Progress on resolution The good news is that there has been very substantial progress towards this new world. In the UK certainly we are now in a much stronger position in terms of dealing with bank failures  5  See Morgan and Stiroh (2005). 6  The FDIC had injected a total of $ as subordinated debt and equity into Continental Illinois (around $ in 2009 money). This compares to at least $ (contingent) capital injections into RBS (using 2009 exchange rates). 7  See Independent Commission on Banking (2011).

Perhaps, even more important, one of the key benefits of ensuring that certain creditors know they can be bailed in is that those creditors have a much stronger incentive to monitor and, if necessary, constrain the risks banks are taking.13  Transition to new resolution regime Moving to an effective resolution regime, including for the largest cross-border banks, will require a major transition. Many larger banks will need to make changes to their structure and financing. There will inevitably be higher costs as the implicit public subsidy is removed. There is no free lunch. This transition needs to be carefully managed. So in conclusion, I want to set out the principles that the Bank of England is following to guide the implementation of the new regime. Proportionality First and perhaps most important is proportionality. The resolution requirements for a bank should be what is necessary to deliver the resolution strategy for that bank – no more and no less. 12  See Bank of England (2015). 13  The Financial Stability Board has calculated that a withdrawal of government guarantees could reduce banks’ probability of failure by a third. This draws on evidence in IMF and Fed NY working papers that evaluate the relationship between the ‘government support assumptions’ that rating agencies express and measures of bank risk-taking. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Large banks cannot be allowed abruptly to cease operating. They have to be stabilised and resolved. Resolution is not resurrection. It takes time.
Markets might then react by driving up long-term interest rates. The premature tightening of financial conditions could then trigger increased volatility in financial markets, especially in economies that have yet to emerge from the pandemic and those with higher fiscal or external funding needs. In sum, while the global economy is in a much better place compared to last year, uncertainty remains as elevated. What has changed is the nature of the uncertainty. Last year, we were uncertain how far down the economy will go, in the face of an unprecedented pandemic. This year, the uncertainty is in both directions: a much stronger recovery or a much 2/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  dampened one. SINGAPORE ECONOMY The Singapore economy had recouped in the first quarter of 2021 the aggregate output loss incurred during the pandemic. The recent tightening of domestic restrictions and border controls will cause a near-term setback to segments that make up about 8% of the economy. The consumer-facing industries (retail trade, food & beverage, and land transport services) will be most affected by the tightening measures. The travel-related industries (air transport, accommodation, arts, entertainment & recreation) are likely to see further delay in their recovery. Construction and marine & offshore engineering activity may be hindered by labour shortages from the border restrictions on the entry of foreign workers. But the economic impact of the current restrictions will be significantly less severe than during the circuit-breaker last year. The majority of businesses remain in operation.

The near-term impact on resident employment should be mitigated by targeted policy support such as enhanced wage support and rental waivers and rebates. Core inflation should continue on its gradual recovery path, with the 2021 forecast unchanged at 0 to 1%. 3/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  While some increase in import prices is expected, this should be confined to certain noncooked food items. But domestic cost pressures will be muted given the lingering slack in the labour market. The CPI-All Items inflation forecast is revised to 1.0 to 2.0% from 0.5 to 1.5%. The revision takes into account higher-than-expected car prices in Q2, due to the sharp rise in COE premiums. CPI-All Items inflation, which rose by 2.2% in April and May, is expected to ease in the second half of this year as base effects fade. The property market has been remarkably resilient in the face of the pandemic and recession last year and continued uncertainty over COVID-19 risks this year. While nominal GDP contracted 8.2% in 2020, the residential property price index rose by 1.6% during the year. As at Q1 2021, the PPI was 5.6% above its pre-pandemic levels, while nominal GDP was about 4% below. MAS, together with MND and URA, remain highly vigilant to the risk of a sustained increase in prices relative to income trends. A prolonged divergence between prices and incomes is unsustainable from a market stability perspective and undesirable from a housing affordability perspective.
The MPC is aware that our operational independence would mean little in the absence of public trust. We are determined to continue exercising prudence, impartiality, and balanced judgements in deliberating monetary policy. That is ultimately the very source of our credibility. To close my remarks this evening, I hope the FCCT will continue to promote the professional interests of foreign correspondents working in Thailand, and initiate lively and insightful discussion as it has done for the past sixty years. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

In particular, I would like to mention: •  The historical links with the public sector, such as in India where public banks still dominate the banking sector and  •  Banking sector expertise both in a rural environment, especially relevant for India, and in large industrial groups, as indeed Indian industrial groups are active internationally. In this respect, I am very pleased to participate with the RBI in the launching of the first French-Indian Financial Forum on May 16, in Mumbai. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS Review 64/2007