samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This is almost double the 7 percent job loss on the mainland from the employment peak to its trough. Furthermore, the recession in Puerto Rico has lasted about five years – three times as long as the mainland downturn. The recovery has also lagged that of the mainland. While the mainland’s economy began to recover in mid-2009, Puerto Rico’s economy continued to decline for another year. But, since mid-2010 there have been promising signs: Recently released revisions suggest that job growth on the island, while still very weak, improved modestly since last summer. And most of the weakness since then has not been broad-based, but instead concentrated in construction and manufacturing. The unemployment rate has come down by a full percentage point since its peak. However, at just over 16 percent, it remains unacceptably high. Inflation generally remains subdued on the Commonwealth – although there has been some recent volatility. After a period of falling prices in 2009, inflation picked up in December 2009 with annualized rates of around 4 percent for a few months – with medical care a key driver for these increases. Since June 2010, reported inflation rates have reverted to a range  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  between 1 percent and 2 percent. However, the rise in food and energy prices is likely to push inflation somewhat higher over the next few months.

There are limits to the size and extent of the shocks that the private sector can manage, at least in the short run, without official assistance. 16. Looking ahead, to minimise the need for government intervention aimed at heading off market failures induced by large and volatile capital flows, we need to build bigger markets and to strengthen the markets we already have. The challenge here – in an age when grandiose government schemes are no longer palatable or feasible – is to find ways of doing this without too much government, including regulatory, involvement. Among the more significant developments in the international efforts to deal with this issue are codes of practice, rather than regulatory impositions, and the promotion of transparency. Increasingly, the focus is not so much on architecture – building something grand and visible to replace the now defunct Bretton Woods system – but on infrastructure: laying down the connections and making sure they work properly rather than building walls and barriers. I shall say more about this in a few minutes. 17. A crucial element in the management of international capital flows is, of course, the question of exchange rate systems, which were a special target of large speculators looking for short-term profit opportunities during the Asian financial crisis. Where there is an exchange rate target against which bets can be laid, the pressures that build up can be quite formidable.
The Rt Hon Sir Edward George GBE: Macro-economic management in the UK Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the 2001 Institute of Directors Convention, London, on 25 April 2001. *  *  *  The theme of your convention is change - and as a general observation what's always struck me about change is that it's not simply a one-off event - a discrete step from A to B. Change is a continuing process - and once you've embarked upon that process it's not always clear where it will lead. You either embrace the process, notwithstanding the uncertainty, it seems to me, or you resist it, with the risk then that the world changes around you and begins to pass you by. What is certainly true - in this country but much more widely internationally - is that there has gradually over a long period been a very profound change in the approach to overall economic management. For a long period after World War II the emphasis of macro-economic policy seemed to concentrate on aggregate demand management, with too little attention paid to the constraints imposed by the supply-side capacity of the economy to meet that demand. When growth and employment were judged to be insufficient, monetary and overall fiscal policy were used in combination to provide a stimulus to the economy, often supported by direct controls of one kind or another to suppress the emerging symptoms of increasing pressure on resources.

It is important to understand, however, that the stated aim of consistently low inflation is not simply an end in itself: low inflation is a measure - a barometer if you like - of our success in keeping overall demand in the economy in line with supplyside capacity, so that the underlying aim is economic stability in that much wider sense. BIS Review 33/2001  1  Now it has to be said that this emphasis on low inflation as the objective of monetary policy was not without its critics. Some people argued that "any fool can control inflation simply by holding back growth and employment. It is a recipe" they said "for economic stagnation". Well that has not been our experience since inflation targeting was introduced. In fact we've experienced the longest period of continuous and relatively stable quarter by quarter growth since quarterly records began, with average annual growth at around 3% over the whole period compared with our long term trend rate of 2¼2½%. Employment has steadily increased, and unemployment has fallen to its lowest level for 25 years. While the rate of inflation has been consistently relatively close either side of the Government's 2½% target - the lowest rate that I suspect most of us can remember. This experience demonstrates at least to my mind - that there is no necessary trade-off between growth and stability - certainly in the medium and longer term, rather the reverse.
But under the current shareholder-centric model, these wider stakeholders are not given any control rights over management. This constrains their ability to rein in managerial excesses, even though their incentives to do so may be sharpest. In other words, the standard corporate governance model may be predicated on a misclassification of risk and, as a result, a misalignment between these risks and control rights, with potentially adverse implications for corporate risk-taking. Companies and society (a)  Externalities and systemic risk  At least for some types of firms, their actions can have an impact beyond internal stakeholders – shareholders, creditors, employees, customers and clients. They impose social externalities on the economy and wider society. If companies’ objectives are shareholder-centric, these externalities are unlikely to be internalised fully within firms’ decision-making. In other words, there is a potential disconnect between company and societal incentives. These externalities can be both good and bad. For example, many companies are in the business of creating public or quasi-public goods – for example, health, education, transport and utilities. And that is why, historically, their corporate governance structures have typically tended to weigh broader stakeholder and societal interests. In other cases, these social externalities may be negative – the creation of public “bads”. The classic example is environmental pollution. But these social externalities can also arise in more subtle ways – the mistreatment of customers and clients through delayed payment or mis-selling, exploitation of employees through inadequate working practices, or attempts to avoid paying sufficient tax to government.

Furthermore, these institutions played a very important role in resolving the crisis, since they were able to take over other institutions in a weaker position. It is not surprising, therefore, that the international presence of Spanish banks has increased since the crisis, in contrast to that of the banks of most European countries, which have tended to reduce their international operations. Over the last decade, Spanish banks have increased their international exposure by 45%, while the banks of countries such as Germany, France and Italy have reduced theirs by 38%, 16% and 15%, respectively. 5/17  On the other hand, the effort to adjust business in Spain has been highly significant. Specifically, over the last 10 years, the total assets of business in Spain have been reduced by 20% and employment in the industry by 32%. Also, the number of institutions has fallen by 34%, with a decrease in the number of domestic banks1 from 122 at the beginning of the crisis to 61 in 2018. As a result, concentration has increased significantly. Most of the mergers and takeovers have given rise to healthier banks, with significant cost savings. 1  Grupos consolidados y entidades sin grupo, de propiedad nacional. 6/17  One effect of this consolidation process has been the disappearance of 43% of the bank branches existing in Spain.
In the operational aspect, a change of form of our objective in June served to a better orientation of banking system refinancing with liquidity, resulting in a liquidity premium reduction in the system and a better orientation of interest rates in the inter-bank market. Financial markets were more relaxed with their risk premium gradually falling. Interest rate in the primary market continued its dropping tendency since a year ago, as a reflection to the moderate demand of the fiscal sector for funding and the good liquidity situation of the banking system. Moreover, the reduction of the key rate was followed, to a satisfactory degree, by [falling] interest rates in deposits and loans in Lekë, hence enabling a good introduction of monetary policy decisions into the economy. Beyond a better transmission of monetary policy decisions on interest rates of financial markets during the second half, the Bank of Albania deems that their introduction into the real economy remains incomplete. Referring to developments in lending to the economy during the second half, loans to the private sector, on average, increased with same pace as during the first half. Annual lending growth in November amounted to 10.1% almost commensurate with the level at the end of the first half. Slower increase of loans to the private sector gave a low contribution to money supply expansion in the economy, reconfirming controlled inflation pressures by the domestic economy.

Malaysia’s journey will not track exactly the same path as others, nor should we expect it to. But we can all learn something from the footsteps left by others as we move forward. I hope that our collective journeys, as shared in this forum and others like it, will help us harness the full potential of microfinance to build stronger, fairer and more resilient communities. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches
Regarding monetary policy issues, the sharp rate cuts carried out by the Fed, including two 75bp cuts, contrast at first sight with the policy stance of the ECB. Why such a difference? Does this point to a lack of reactivity on the part of the ECB during downturns? This claim, though often heard, is not supported by scientific analyses of past actions. For instance, recent simulations conducted by Prof. Larry Christiano and co-authors suggest that the ECB’s actions were indeed more effective in stabilizing output in the aftermath of the 2001 crash (Christiano, Rostagno and Motto, 2007), while different shocks and different degrees of nominal rigidities in both economies accounted for apparent different reaction functions. Looking at the present situation, I think that it is possible to reconcile both views if one takes account of the nature and extent of macroeconomic uncertainty that currently affects the US economy as compared with the euro area. Economic uncertainty facing policymakers has always been a first-order problem, but it is obviously particularly acute in periods of stress. Taking into account some non-benign  2  Recent research at the Banque de France highlights moral hazard issues associated with the choice of any of these instruments by the LLR, cf. Ewerhart and Valla (2007), when the strategic behaviour of money market participants is explicitly modelled. 2  BIS Review 37/2008  dimensions of this uncertainty may be an incentive for central bankers to implement a “riskmanagement” approach to monetary policy. This is at least the view that Fed Gov.

Many other central banks have since followed the Bank of England’s lead, and in the HKMA we have published our own Monetary and Financial Stability Report for several years now. More recently we began an internal Banking Stability Report which aims to provide a macro prudential perspective on trends in the banking system that we can then use to target our on-site bank examinations more effectively. The eventual goal is to try to draw these two reports more closely together and to bring a more forward-looking perspective to our banking supervision work. When central banks make their financial stability analysis public it provides financial system participants with an insight into the central bank’s perception of the vulnerabilities of the system. It enables policymakers to be transparent in their views of where they perceive the risks and vulnerabilities to be. Hopefully, by raising warning flags at a sufficiently early stage – for example if we  BIS Review 106/2006  3  perceive risks in a build up of credit to a particular sector – we can encourage banks to review the risks that they are running and, if necessary, to take action to mitigate those risks. But it is important to be careful how the risks and vulnerabilities are presented. The last thing we want to happen is for the predicted problems to surface because everyone has rushed for the exit at the same time.
That shared vision has been the platform that has helped the two institutions to achieve “goal congruence” in the recent past, and there is also no doubt that the resulting harmonization has been the powerful driving force behind our steady progress. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In the meantime, we must also appreciate that a large segment of our economic activities are carried out by the private sector, to which many of you belong. Your contribution then, has also been a vital factor in maintaining the momentum and thrust of our economy. Therefore, let me acknowledge today that, no amount of harmonization of Monetary and Fiscal policies could ever be a substitute for the commitment and dedication of a vast number of entrepreneurs who take risks, as well as burn the mid-night oil, to deliver value in our economy. A future role for the accountancy profession Where do we go from here? In my view, Sri Lanka has only just begun an exciting and adventurous journey, and we are steadily moving towards a $ 100 billion economy that would be more diversified and more stable. Needless to say, the success of our journey would depend to a great extent on harmonized policies, clarity of communication, quick implementation, and the maintenance of a vibrant momentum on a continuous basis. In that context, I see the accounting profession playing an increasingly significant role.

Specific codes for professionals in markets will complement broader efforts to raise standards in banking by the new Banking Standards Review Council. For those in markets we need a simple approach that recognises a fundamental principle of the City: namely that true markets are the source of dynamism, prosperity and progress. Seeking to manipulate, game or profit from unfair access transgresses that principle. It weakens the effectiveness of markets for all. It holds back prosperity. It should thus have clear consequences, including professional ostracism. We must work together to ensure that everyone on every trading floor understands that dealing in a market means serving the needs of clients, investors and customers fairly and effectively. I am delighted that one of the City’s most experienced professionals and proven leaders, Elizabeth Corley, has agreed to chair a panel of market practitioners that will inform the Review. Now, recognising the centrality of markets doesn’t mean the Bank has a naïve faith that all markets always function smoothly. The City’s markets are not those of a textbook. We all know that real markets can seize up in crises of confidence, threatening financial stability and the wider economy. Just as there will be times when central banks must backstop the banking system, there are also times when they should backstop core markets in a way that supports their contribution to the real economy but doesn’t encourage excessive risk taking.
By the way, with EUR 1.7 trillion settled every day, TARGET is already one of the two largest wholesale payment systems in the world, alongside Fedwire in the United States. With the functionalities that will be introduced in TARGET2, we also expect it to be one of the most, if not the most, sophisticated. TARGET2 will further improve financial integration in several respects. Not only will it increase cost effectiveness, but it will also allow for the provision of a harmonised service level ensuring a level playing field for banks across Europe. This will be supported by the implementation of a single price structure for domestic and cross-border payments. Moreover, TARGET2 will offer new functionalities enabling banks to better integrate their euro liquidity management. For example, participants will be able to group some of their accounts and pool the available intraday liquidity for the benefit of all of the members of the group of accounts. In addition, TARGET2 will benefit its users in terms of consolidated information. Whereas in the past an institution’s head office has not been able to see the information being held across its various branches, TARGET2 will enable it to monitor and process automatically all of its data from a single location. The level of integration that TARGET had already achieved in 1999 can be considered higher than that of the securities infrastructure today. Owing to the single currency, a significant process of consolidation has also taken place in the securities infrastructure in the euro area.

Jean-Claude Trichet: European financial integration - the view of the ECB Speech by Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the Eurofi conference entitled “Europe’s single capital market: time to tackle the toughest challenges”, Luxembourg, 10 March 2005. *  *  *  Introduction Ladies and gentlemen, It gave me great pleasure to accept the invitation to this conference, which addresses an issue of the highest importance to the ECB and the Eurosystem. With this in mind, I would like to express the ECB’s views on European financial integration. Let me start by reminding you that financial integration is achieved through an effective interplay of market forces in an environment of free competition, coordinated action by private actors and specific measures taken by public authorities. The ECB both supports and complements such steps. Our support for financial integration is not something we see as optional. On the contrary, we see it as an issue that is of great importance in the conduct of our own activities. Let me give the underlying reasons behind this stance. First, a well integrated financial system is pivotal to the smooth and effective implementation of monetary policy throughout the euro area. In this regard, I would also like to mention the ECB’s task of promoting the effective operation of payment systems, as well as its interest in the smooth running of securities settlement systems.
Securitization markets developed where loans could be funded through the market by investors. In addition, money market mutual funds, securities lenders, institutional investors and businesses needed a safe way to deposit funds where they would earn interest but retain ready access to their funds. Repurchase agreements or “repos” developed to serve this need. A repo is a short-term collateralized loan that shares many characteristics with a demand deposit except that repos are not guaranteed. At the same time, large firms increasingly raised funds by issuing commercial paper in the market rather than relying on bank loans – with the money market mutual funds being large investors in this paper. Large banks, as well, came to rely at the margin on non-deposit funding through the interbank funding market. The Fed acted as the lender of last resort for this market. This system of market-based credit intermediation has been called the “shadow banking system”. The shadow banking system grew at a very fast rate over the past several decades. Chart 1 shows that by 1990, mortgage originations in the shadow banking system equaled originations in the banking system, and grew to more than double the level in the banking system by 2008. Chart 2 highlights the growth in securitization across many different asset categories besides residential mortgages, such as commercial real estate loans, auto loans, credit card loans and student loans.

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