samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If a pair of jeans becomes cheaper because the dollar has fallen, or the price of plasma TVs has been halved because their production has increased in China, or the price of food goes down because the competition in the retail food trade has toughened, it is something that we essentially should be happy about. But should there be a sharp fall in demand then the situation would be completely different of course. So what risks do we see that could cause inflation to deviate from the path in the main scenario? There are a number of risks in the inflation assessment that have been in focus for some time, e.g. the twin deficits in the US economy, the developments in the Swedish krona, and productivity growth. In addition, new risks have emerged in connection to specific factors, such as the developments in food prices, and these are creating great uncertainty over how inflation will be affected in the period ahead – not least in the short run. Compared with the previous Inflation Report the main scenario on this occasion has taken account of the downside risks to inflation to a greater extent; e.g. increased international, as well as domestic, competition is now forecast to have a somewhat bigger impact on Swedish prices than previously assumed. There are arguments, however, that this could nevertheless entail an underestimation of inflation as much as an overestimation.

Caleb M Fundanga: Fourth quarter 2010 media briefing Presented by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 18 February 2011. *  *  *  Executive summary 1. This brief examines monetary policy implementation and its outcomes in the fourth quarter of 2010. The brief also reviews other economic and financial sector developments, and concludes with an inflation outlook for the first quarter of 2011. Monetary policy 2. The focus of monetary policy during the fourth quarter of 2010 continued to be the achievement of the end-year annual inflation target of 8.0%. In this regard, the Bank of Zambia utilised largely Open Market Operations to maintain reserve money within the programmed growth path. This was supported by the auctioning of Government securities. Inflation 3. Quarterly overall inflation increased to 2.5% in December 2010 from 1.6% in the third quarter, and was above the 2.3% recorded in December 2009. This outturn was mainly attributed to the rise in food inflation to 3.6% from –0.1% in the previous quarter, as non-food inflation slowed down to 1.5% from 3.2% during the same period. 4. Similarly, the annual overall inflation rate rose to 7.9% in December 2010 from 7.7% in September 2010, but was in line with the end-year target of 8.0%. This outturn was largely on account of the rise in annual food inflation to 4.4% from 2.8% in September 2010, as annual non-food Inflation decreased to 11.3% from 12.5% during the same period. 5.
However, if we describe the entire chain, from the Swedish Social Insurance Administration beginning the payment process until Ingrid actually has the money in her hand, there is a fairly substantial amount of infrastructure, infrastructure communications and payment flows required. In addition to the basic infrastructure of electricity, telecommunications and post, the computer systems at the Swedish National Debt Office, the banks, the Riksbank and the Bankgirocentralen are used to implement ordinary, simple pension payments. In order for Ingrid the pensioner to receive her pension, the social insurance office sends a payment order to the Swedish National Debt Office and one to the banks the Swedish Social Insurance Administration uses to execute its payments. It is the Swedish National Debt Office’s job, in its role as bank to the central government, to pay pension money to a number of banks as instructed by the social insurance offices. These banks in turn distribute money to the pensioners’ accounts in their own banks, if the pensioners have bank accounts there. For those pensioners who have accounts in banks other than those with which the Swedish Social Insurance Administration has an agreement, the money is forwarded to these banks through Bankgirocentralen. The pensioners who do not have a bank account at all are instead given a payment slip that can be redeemed at any bank or at Svensk Kassaservice. The Swedish National Debt Office makes the payment of pension funds by temporarily, over the day, using its credit with the Riksbank.

The third discussion forum I would like to mention is the reference group for the payment system called together by the Riksbank and consisting of representatives from VPC AB, Bankgirocentralen, Stockholm Stock Exchange, the major banks and the Swedish Bankers’ Association. Part of the work in these working groups has entailed charting the flows and the infrastructure of the payment system. The charting process began as an internal project at the Riksbank, with a general review of the payment system’s basic conditions, agents and services. This has since functioned as a basis for discussion and as reference material for other working groups to make a more in-depth survey of some representative payment services. One example is the flow chart of the Swedish Social Insurance Administration's pension payments that I have spoken of today. Other payments that have been charted are credit transfers and payments for securities. The general conclusion reached by most participants in these discussions is that each organisation has a responsibility for supplying its services in accordance with the agreements it has with its customers. This responsibility includes solving crises internally and cooperating with those the organisation is dependent on to be able to supply their services. The discussions have also increased awareness that everyone in the chain must have a reasonable level of business continuity and crisis recovery planning and that cooperation may be necessary to safeguard common interests. It has not yet been decided how these discussions will continue.
Before I begin, I would note that the views I share with you this evening are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.1 Principles and objectives Throughout the history of Federal Reserve operations in financial markets, our approach to engaging with counterparties has been designed to serve the effective implementation of monetary policy. The New York Fed, through its Open Market Desk (the Desk), is in the business of implementing policy as directed by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC, or the Committee), and the Desk has demonstrated a willingness to engage with a wide range of counterparties to achieve this objective under the guidance of the Committee. In addition to its role in the implementation of monetary policy, the New York Fed has a number of responsibilities and duties as the fiscal agent for the U.S. Treasury. We have therefore also used our counterparty relationships to assist the activities we undertake in support of the Treasury. Indeed, for decades, the primary dealers have played a critical role not only in open market operations, but also in the underwriting and distribution of newly issued Treasury securities. In addition to carrying out these domestic operations, we stand ready to conduct a number of foreign exchange operations.2 Foreign exchange counterparties are essential to the successful implementation of U.S. foreign exchange policy operations, which are conducted by the Desk but directed and funded generally equally by the Fed and the Treasury.

At the time there was evidence of a breakdown in communication and trust between small firms and their finance providers which threatened the effectiveness of the provision of finance to this sector of the economy. Since that time, the situation has improved, in part against a background of economic growth but also with a change in the structure of small business finance with a move away from overdrafts towards some element of fixed-term  3  BIS Review 19/2000  lending. A particular interest has been financing for high technology companies, focusing attention on the access that technology-based firms have to the equity they need in their early stages. The Bank produced its first report in this area in 1996 and has since held an annual forum with regular meetings with small business groups, venture capitalists and fund managers. Small business investment is especially relevant for Wales given the ongoing need to attract more knowledge-based industries to replace more traditional sources of investment. One final area where the Bank has taken an active role is worth mentioning; and that is in assisting the UK financial sector in its practical preparations for EMU. This was concentrated in the run-up to the introduction of the euro at the end of 1998 but the UK’s readiness at that time has meant that a large part of cross-border business in euro, whether in bonds or equities, is transacted with the UK, particularly in London.
It’s unsurprising, as the IEO noted, that with such a small number of observations there are still open questions about the QE transmission mechanism and impact, and we have welcomed the IEO’s recommendations about how the Bank might continue to advance its understanding. To make matters more complex, we also recognise that the effects of QE are likely to be state contingent, meaning that there is no single “effect of QE” (Figure 5).16 But based on my reading of the academic evidence and my practical experience as a UK policy maker, and consistent with the findings of the IEO report, my central view is that QE achieves its goal of supporting demand and inflation. We have good evidence that it does indeed lower interest rates, through a combination of portfolio balancing, signalling and market liquidity channels. And while the specific contribution of the different channels is still uncertain and much debated, there is increasing evidence that the associated reductions in borrowing costs and accompanying increase in household wealth does feed through to increases in GDP growth and inflation.17  There are, of course, other important considerations regarding the broader impact of QE. For example, as the IEO’s report notes, there has been significant public debate about the possible spillovers associated with QE, with a particular focus on the potential for distributional effects.18 While this topic is not the focus of my remarks today, I would emphasise that the Bank continues to take the analysis and communication of potential side-effects from its policy interventions extremely seriously.

Further details including transcripts of the oral evidence sessions are available on the Committee’s website. As set out most recently by Andrew Bailey in his 2020 Jackson Hole speech and accompanying paper. The supporting paper for Andrew Bailey’s Jackson Hole speech, mentioned above, gives a good overview of the evidence for the UK, as does Box B of the IEO report, while the 2019 BIS Committee on the Global Financial System report on unconventional monetary policy tools summarises the cross country evidence, as does Ben Bernanke’s 2020 AEA Presidential Lecture. 18 The Bank has actively contributed to work on this topic, with a notable contribution, for example, by Bunn, P, Pugh, A and Yeates, C (2018) "The distributional impact of monetary policy easing in the UK between 2008 and 2014." 15 16 17  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  9  Figure 5: Stylised QE transmission mechanism  Taken from the supporting paper for Andrew Bailey’s Jackson Hole speech.
The UK is the largest magnet for tech talent in Europe. This creativity and entrepreneurship is reflected in business start-ups. Over 1,100 new businesses start up in Britain each day – roughly, one every 75 seconds. 12  And when started, a disproportionately large number  succeed, with the UK home to half of the top 10 fastest-growing companies in Europe. 13  Financing them is a  venture capital industry which, in 2017, invested more in the UK than in Germany and France combined. The upper tail of UK companies, then, is large and thriving. It more than holds its own relative to international competitors. Although there is ample scope for improvement, the upper tail is fairly well-spread, sectorally and geographically. Its success is built on world-leading education, innovation and research. The UK is, genuinely, an innovation hub, with companies to match. Let us now reduce altitude and take a closer look at the lower tail. As Chart 7 also illustrates, there is a materially larger lower tail of UK companies, productivity-wise, than there are in Germany and France. 14  The  bottom 25% of UK companies have levels of productivity around 80% or more below the UK median. Their Germany and French counterparts have productivity around 60% or more below the median. If we look more closely at this lower tail, what is striking is both its scale and longevity. Table 1 shows growth in average productivity among the bottom 99% of the productivity distribution.

Finally, I will highlight what is missing and mention a number of important ongoing initiatives that could help to overcoming the key challenges in terms data that we still need to deal with. 2. The macro-prudential oversight function and the role of the ECB  Let me start by reflecting on the macro-prudential oversight function. There are three main components in the macro-prudential oversight process. The first concerns the surveillance needed to identify plausible and (systemically) important sources of risks and vulnerabilities on the basis of an analysis of the individual and collective strength and robustness of the constituent parts of the financial system – institutions, markets and infrastructures. The second involves the assessment of the potential costs and the ability of the financial system to cope with these costs should some combination of the identified risks and vulnerabilities materialise. This requires the ability to measure (and model) the potential costs and to calibrate the plausibility and importance of the various risks. The third component is the possible policy response that needs to be clearly justified and interlinked with systemic risk assessments. In particular, it should inform policy decisions on the appropriate timing of interventions and the selection of tools. The role that the ECB and the national central banks of the EU Member States play in contributing to financial stability is set out in the Treaty on European Union.
He knows market risk. He worked on the trading floor,” Lannoo said. Lannoo and the shadow committee are critics of the accord, saying its overly complex nature may in fact heighten systemic threats by “capturing” regulators who would be required to take a more active role in banks' daily operations. Revolution in the making The new accord, now over five years in the making, represents a revolution for the banks who will adopt it. It leaves the first accord's simple dictates behind and offers a menu ranging from basic to complex. A second Basel Committee member, who also requested anonymity, said he had few doubts that the technocrat Caruana was the right choice for the job due to his expertise in such a complex field. “This is not new territory for Jaime,” he said. Indeed, some critics of the accord say a technocrat like Caruana is just who is needed to make sure that the byzantine draft is moulded into shape before being finalised by the end of this year. Caruana, a 51-year-old Valencian, studied telecommunications engineering and then qualified as a government economist. Those who have worked with him say he is a real technology fan, which given his studies is no surprise. The current controversy over the Basel reform is probably a source of discomfort for Caruana, who keeps himself to himself. “He is very simple and discreet, and shys away from limelight,” says a former colleague.

“The important thing is that economic capital will be close to regulatory capital.” But Caruana did acknowledge the need for further study, especially on how diversification of banks' activities across business lines and economic zones. “We do not recognise properly all the diversification that a bank has when it has exposure to several markets,” he said. “We need to know what the best practice is so it can be incorporated.” Potential future risks posed by credit derivatives exposure would also require more work, Nouy said. “There are many different practices in the industry and we simply do not yet know which is the best one going forward,” she said. Consolidation not a goal Caruana distanced himself from speculation that the new accord could drive sweeping strategic changes in the financial sector, including mergers and acquisitions, saying it was not the committee's goal to drive consolidation among banks. Some banks, however, may conclude on their own that the new accord will increase pressure on them to join forces with other players in order to improve their business models under the new accord, he said. BIS Review 39/2003  3  “I think this will be more based on decisions taken by the industry,” Caruana said. “We don't have this as an objective.” Caruana also rejected criticisms that the accord could punish banks in some developing nation markets because they lack the sophisticated risk-measurement techniques used by the world's biggest banks.
And the kind of asset purchased is a third variable. UK QE purchases have mostly been concentrated on the gilt market, as well as much smaller quantities of sterling corporate bond purchases. But during the financial crisis the APF also purchased  Perhaps the closest thing to a policy makers’ manual is the CGFS report referenced in footnote 2. On the operational side a detailed guide to the Bank of England’s own facilities is available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/bank-of-england-marketoperations-guide. 6 I have not covered funding or lending schemes in detail today. But it is worth noting that the TFSME, which was designed to help reinforce the transmission of the reduction in Bank Rate as well as incentivise banks to provide credit particularly to SMEs, continues to expand in size; current usage at £ and is expected to exceed £ 7 See for instance “QE: the story so far”, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/working-paper/2016/qe-the-story-so-far. 8 Buying index linked gilts could potentially create the wrong incentives for the MPC in delivering on our remit. It could also crowd out a key tool for managing inflation risk which is already subject to significant private sector demand, and is often highly illiquid as a result. 9 This number is greater than the approximately £ of gilts purchased to date because some of the gilts in the portfolio have increased in market value since being purchased. 10 Buying short maturity gilts would have a reduced duration impact and would require more frequent reinvestment; it could potentially also distort market expectations of policy rates.

At an international level the Financial Stability Board has commenced a holistic review of resilience in the non-bank financial intermediation sector in light of the Covid-19 shock, due to be delivered to the G20 summit in November. The Bank and FCA are actively participating in the FSB’s review. 11  7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  will remain low for some time (Figure 9). But for me, the key point to emphasise is that our current guidance reflects the ongoing uncertainties and means that the burden of proof for any future tightening is high. One other point I want to make on forward guidance is that I see it as particularly valuable in reinforcing the effects of other tools. In general I think it makes sense to think of different monetary policy tools as complements rather than substitutes. And that is particularly true of forward guidance. It can serve to enhance the impact of individual policy actions by clarifying policy maker intentions, and can link separate policy actions together into a coherent package – in the words of the BIS Committee on the Global Financial System, providing “connecting material” and “giving meaning”. That is consistent with how the MPC have used it in the past and in its current incarnation. c. Negative rates – in the toolbox The final tool that I want to cover today is Bank Rate, and specifically the question of whether Bank Rate could go negative.
Otherwise, a large part of the framework is already in place. We will probably never entirely solve time inconsistency. There may still be creditors who count on being bailed out. Owners with little at stake may take on excessive risk. One of the most important things we do, therefore, is to ensure that banks are solid. This has two important effects. First, the obvious one: Higher capital ratios reduce the probability that banks will experience a crisis. Banks will be able to absorb larger losses before encountering problems. But as I touched on earlier, higher capital ratios also have long-term effects on owners and bank behaviour: The more equity a bank has, the more capital owners stand to lose. They will have a stronger motivation to ensure that the bank operates prudently. Capital ratios at Norwegian banks are generally somewhat higher than at banks in other European countries, which is a good thing. The plan to gradually increase Norwegian banks’  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  capital requirements as laid down in 2013 will continue until July 2016. The minimum riskweighted equity ratio for systemically important banks in Norway will then be 13 percent. What should be done? So what are the lessons we have drawn? Banks should not be bailed out, but banks’ functions must be bailed out. If not, all economic activity will be affected. We will bail out the small depositors – that is both profitable and fair. We should not bail out all creditors.

Jon Nicolaisen: Should banks be bailed out? Speech by Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Oslo, 14 April 2015. *  *  *  Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. On Sunday, 29 September 2008, two weeks after the bankruptcy of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers, the Irish government faced a dilemma: On the following morning, Monday, 30 September, the debt of a number of Irish banks was falling due, and many of these banks could not meet their obligations. Unable to issue new debt in the market, they were in danger of failing. If the banks were to close, economic activity in Ireland would be crippled. The authorities had to act. It was not a matter of a trifling amount. At the time, the debt of Irish-owned banks was over two times Ireland’s GDP. 1 Over half of the banks’ debt had been funded in the market. That evening, the Irish government decided to guarantee most of the debt of Irish-owned banks for two years. The government and the Irish people thereby assumed a considerable risk. Eventually, the losses at Irish banks also proved to be enormous. Since then, the Irish authorities have made capital injections into banks equivalent to around 40 percent of GDP to keep the banks running. 2 This is money the Irish government has had to borrow.