samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Phase three will see the information sharing between participating banks when there is an update of customers' data for AML/Know Your Customer compliance purposes or when a new customer is onboarded and such person is already a customer of a participating bank. Finally, Phase four will deal with information sharing between participating banks for the purpose of account switching. The CBC is committed to make the project work as the benefits to all stakeholders and especially bank customers will be tangible in terms of cost and time savings. This will benefit the entire Cypriot economy including the banks themselves. Having said this, I wish to emphasise that digitisation on its own does not bring full efficiencies or solve the issues I mentioned earlier. The Association of Cyprus Banks and the CEOs and Chairmen of banks must make the necessary internal changes and training to make servicing of clients more efficient. Let me be clear, European banking regulations are the same across Europe. That's why they are called European. Hence differences on banking practices and efficiencies are because of banks' management and their practices. The Cyprus banking sector practice is less efficient than European counterparties. As I mentioned before, it's time for banks and stakeholders to act. In conclusion,  4/5  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The world's economic system has been through a lot in recent years, from the challenge of the pandemic to the impact of the war in Ukraine.

What to expect from the Fed’s Monetary Policy Normalization?1 Sebastián Claro Vice‐Governor, Central Bank of Chile              I would like to start thanking the organizers for this invitation. Let me start with a disclaimer. Next Monday, April 3rd, the board of the Central Bank of Chile will present its inflation report to the Senate. Therefore, I will not be able in this occasion to offer a detailed discussion on the macroeconomic situation and perspectives in Chile, which will be described in detailed in the report. Rather, I have decided to focus on a broader issue that is relevant for Chile and the region in the current scenario. During 2017, we will finally witness the process of monetary policy normalization in the United States. After almost 8 years keeping the Federal Funds rates essentially at zero, the Federal Reserve has started a gradual process of interest rate hikes. This is good news. Fundamentally, the normalization of monetary policy is the natural consequence of a normalization of the US economy after the Global Financial Crises. A normal US economy is a positive phenomenon for the world economy. However, this transition period may become bumpy. Indeed, previous episodes of rate hikes by the Federal Reserve have not been smooth at all for emerging economies. The most obvious of these examples is the debt crisis in the early 1980s.
John C Williams: The longer-run framework - a look ahead Remarks (via videoconference) by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Hoover Institution Monetary Policy Virtual Series: The Road Ahead for Central Banks, 7 October 2020. * * * It’s great to be back in California participating once again in a Hoover Institution monetary policy event, even if only virtually. These conferences have provided an excellent opportunity for academic experts, policymakers, and practitioners to share research and perspectives on critically important issues. John Taylor is both a friend and a mentor, so it’s a particular pleasure to be sharing this online platform with him today. This summer, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) completed its review of the Fed’s monetary policy framework. This culminated in August with the issuance of a new Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy.1 The FOMC put this strategy into practice in its September policy statement, explicitly tying its policy actions and intentions to the new framework.2 The new policy framework represents a substantial evolution of the FOMC’s thinking and approach since the Committee published its first framework statement in 2012. Today, I’m going to talk about what these changes mean for policy as the economy recovers from the effects of the pandemic. But what I’m really looking forward to is our conversation around these important issues, so I’ll keep my opening remarks brief.

Based on the examinations and assessments it undertakes, the NBR ascertains to what extent the management framework, the strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by a credit institution ensure the proper management of risks given the particular risk profile of the credit institution. Thus, the supervision carried out follows the risk-based approach rather than the compliance-based one. In exercising its supervisory task, the NBR issues recommendations, adopts measures and imposes sanctions on the credit institutions themselves or on their executive and governing bodies in order to ensure that the proper remedial measures are adopted and compliance with the regulations in force is restored. D.  Implementation of recommendations of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on lending in foreign currencies  At EU level, the first recommendations on lending in foreign currencies were issued by the ESRB in 2011 (with implementation deadline in December 2012). The recommendations were not aimed at banning foreign currency-denominated loans by way of administrative measures, but at setting forth measures that would ensure borrowers have the capacity to service their debt even in the context of adverse developments. With some of these recommendations already regulated, the NBR supplemented the national legislation with the required provisions. Following up on the action steps of the Romanian authorities, the ESRB concluded that the aforementioned recommendation had been fully implemented by Romania.
For example, UK life insurers have increased their holdings of higher-yielding assets such as long-term, non-traded real economy exposures like property to back annuities.16  This increased risk taking may continue as insurance companies and pension funds adjust further to low returns. From a financial stability perspective, a key risk is that insurance companies and pension funds encounter higher losses in stressed markets and become forced sellers or bystanders rather than buyers, so amplifying market vulnerabilities. Other non-bank financial firms such as investment funds have also turned increasingly to less liquid and riskier investments. Investment fund flows now account for one third of total portfolio flows to emerging market economies (compared to one tenth before the crisis). 17 Bank analysis suggests that non-banks now hold around 40% of the rapidly growing global leveraged loan market. More than $ 30 trillion of global assets are now held in open-ended funds that offer short-term redemptions while investing in longer-dated and potentially illiquid assets, such as corporate bonds. This liquidity mismatch may lead to more frequent fire-sales of assets if funds are required to meet large investor redemptions. Fund leverage could further exacerbate this, for example due to margin calls on funds’ derivative exposures. In short, the adjustment to a low for long world is likely to lead to upward pressure on financial sector risk taking and downward pressure on resilience. We have started to see evidence of these effects in some sectors. One would expect such pressures to continue.

So had you told me then that 40 years later inflation would be around 1% having hovered around ½% for two years, that Bank Rate would be ¼%, having been stuck at ½% for eight years, I might well have replied that this was as likely as my being invited back here in 2016, to give a speech on economics. (I might also have looked to see what you had been drinking or perhaps smoking.) There are perhaps two lessons in this. The first is that life and the economy never quite turn out as you forecast – in the longer term at least. The second is that in life and in economics you should never stop learning. I want to talk today about some of the possible reasons why Bank Rate is at ¼% and has been stuck at what appears, by reference to history, to be exceptionally low levels in the UK and in other advanced economies. And why long-term interest rates are similarly low. In 1976, you would have had to pay 11% to borrow for a year whereas the long-term rate was 16%. Today, the equivalent figures are ¼% and 2½%. 1  Some of the difference, of course, is inflation and the inflation expectations I and everyone else had back in 1976. Bringing inflation under control in the UK in the 1990s and anchoring inflation expectations at around 2% clearly led to a material drop in nominal interest rates and a drop in the entire nominal yield curve.
15 Moreover, if reforms are not perceived to be sustainable under a wide variety of conditions Moreover, if reforms are not perceived to be sustainable under a wide variety of conditions – for example, if a pension reform is unrealistic over the longer-term – agents will anticipate a reversal in the future and refrain from adjusting their behaviour today.– for example, if a pension reform is unrealistic over the longer-term – agents will anticipate a reversal in the future and refrain from adjusting their behaviour today. We have used our Euro Area and Global Economy (EAGLE) 16 model to analyse for a medium-sized euro area country the effect of credibility and timely implementation 17 – in this  13  Andrews, D., A. Caldera Sanchez, and A. Johansson (2011), “Housing Markets and Structural Policies in OECD Countries.” OECD Working Papers, No. 836, January 2011. 14  Gnocchi, S., A. Lagerborg, and E. Pappa (2014), “Do labor market institutions matter for business cycles?”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 51, February 2015. 15  Giavazzi, F., and M. McMahon (2008), “Policy Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings.” NBER Working Papers 13911, National Bureau of Economic Research. 16  Gomes, S., P. Jacquinot, and M. Pisani (2010), “The EAGLE. A model for policy analysis of macroeconomic interdependence in the euro area.” ECB Working Paper Series No. 1195, May 2010.

Article 173 requires institutional investors to include environmental objectives in their annual reports, in particular the exposure to climate risks, by measuring the carbon footprint of the assets that they finance and the "green” share of these assets relative to a set of targets. The implementing decree of the act, which is currently being drafted, will specify the information concerned and its presentation. From a broader perspective, we should aim at greater clarity: there are about 400 climaterelated information disclosure schemes. Imposing requirements or formulating recommendations in terms of information disclosure can be a powerful instrument for ensuring market discipline, as long as the information is targeted and pertinent, as evidenced by a number of successful examples. At the international level, under the aegis of the Financial Stability Board, a first task force known as the "Enhanced Disclosure Task Force" and composed of sector representatives had already issued recommendations in 2012 to improve, simplify and focus the communication of systemically important banks on the nature of their risks. At the national level, the guide on the relevance, consistency and readability of financial statements published by the French financial markets Authority in July 2015 is another positive example. Clarification is a challenge to be taken seriously. We have therefore decided, within the Financial Stability Board and with the support of the recent G20 in Antalya, to set up very shortly – by the beginning of 2016 – another dedicated task force (EDTF).
But on many occasions, and compared with this simple representation, experiments suggest that people focus excessively on the present. It’s not just that they generally place higher value on getting something sooner rather than later: people seem to put a particularly high weight on current outcomes. They seem to discount the importance of what comes tomorrow, relative to today, more heavily than they do any two successive days further into the future. This is referred to in the economic jargon as “hyperbolic discounting” and by psychologists as “present bias”. It helps to explain why we often put things off right until the last minute, even if the cost of doing it is much higher by that time. It means it can be advantageous to commit to things that are good for you over the longer term – regular saving, or signing up to a gym programme – but that, when the time comes, you might be tempted to avoid.2 And it can also explain why people borrow money, and roll over those debts, even at very high interest rates. This borrowing can take many forms, including foregoing opportunities to reduce the longer-term cost of something. In their recent book “Scarcity”, economist Sendhil Mullainathan and psychologist Eldar Shafir give the example of rag collectors in India – people who rely on collecting discarded clothes and selling them on. It is an ardous job with very little reward.

I then want to say something about the importance of personal financial education. There are two distinct parts to the strategy. One involves visits to secondary schools. Below director level, more than 400 people working at the Bank have volunteered as “Ambassadors”, who explain to school pupils what we do and why. People on our policy Committees do the same. It’s now rare that, on one of my regular trips around the country to hear from businesses about what’s going on in the economy, I don’t also make a visit to a local school. In all, we reckon we’ve talked to 12% of the UK’s state secondary schools in the past 18 months alone. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  For our part, we very much enjoy these visits. And the feedback has also been good. Central banks are not often associated with the words “positive”, “appreciated” and “inspiring” so you can imagine how invigorated our Ambassadors are when they hear them. The second strand is a package of online materials – something we’ve named “EconoME” – to help non-specialist teachers of students aged between 11-16 years deliver quality financial education. EconoME comprises three one-hour lessons focussing on financial decision-making and the implications of these decisions on students and the world around them. The resource draws on real-world examples, provided by the Bank of England, which shows how the Bank makes decisions and the practical skills we employ to understand the likely outcomes of those decisions.
It is therefore, imperative that all institutions provide the price of their loans in terms of the Annual Percentage Rate rather than a monthly percentage. In this way, transparency is enhanced and consumers would have a clear  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  picture of precisely how much they need to borrow relative to their income levels. This would result in responsible lending and a more competitive and transparent microfinance industry. It is in this regard that the initiative on transparent pricing for the microfinance sector in Zambia could not have come at a more opportune time. I am informed that the Transparent Pricing initiative will offer training on transparent pricing and collect and publish data on the prices of microloans offered in Zambia. This initiative will complement the Bank of Zambia’s effort of enhancing transparency through the quarterly publication of financial charges, fees and commissions for accounts and other general services and transactions applied by financial service providers. In addition, the workshop has come at a time when the Bank of Zambia is conducting a study on “How Microfinance Institutions Determine Lending Interest Rates in Zambia”. The deliberations from this workshop will be of great benefit to the Bank and will provide valuable insights into the factors affecting interest rates in Zambia. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, one of the reasons advanced by microfinance institutions to explain the high interest rates charged for their services in the past has been the high risk of default and lack of credit information on the borrowers.

I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
But the Bill, taken together with the MOU which I have described, sets out those wider functions much more clearly than ever before, defining our responsibilities, our powers to exercise those responsibilities, and our lines of accountability to the Government, to Parliament and to the public at large. This is a much more precise framework for the Bank’s operations, but one which I am convinced is more appropriate to our modern times. I was delighted to learn last week that I am to be allowed to continue, for the next five years, to walk out with this attractive New Lady of Threadneedle Street, and I look forward to the challenge of carrying through the very positive changes now being made to the role and structure of the Bank. BIS Review 18/1998

Before 1960, the Beatles was still a struggling high school band. However, through some strange connections, Beatles got invited to play at some night clubs in Hamburg in 1960–1962. Within a year and a half’s time, the Beatles played in these Hamburg clubs for 270 nights. These Hamburg clubs were not the kind of music halls in which proper concerts are conducted. They were more like drinking clubs where lots of people came in and went out constantly as live entertainment on stage was performed. The Beatles had to perform 4, 6 or even 8 hours each night. Because of so many live performances of very long hours, the Beatles had greatly improved their stamina and team work. Moreover, they had to try out different varieties of music and songs in order to satisfy the customers. So, by the time the Beatles made their celebrated US tour in February 1964, they had already done an amazing 1,200 live performances. This is an astonishing and unusual number. In those days and even now, very few rock and roll bands are able to do that many live performances in their entire careers. Again the question that I have is: Would the Beatles be just as good and as talented without Hamburg? There was an enlightening study conducted by Ericsson in the 1990s.
This gives the central banks a strong role. Figure 7 Voting rights of the General Board  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Obviously, this requires efficient preparations for meetings. A Steering Committee with 14 members has therefore been established with the purpose of guiding the work to be presented to the General Board. The majority of the Steering Committee members represent the EU institutions and in addition there are four elected members from the national central banks. Two advisory committees have also been set up – the Advisory Technical Committee, chaired by Stefan Ingves of the Riksbank and the Advisory Scientific Committee chaired by Professor Martin Hellwig of the Max Planck Institute. The Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) mirrors the composition of the General Board with 62 members. The Advisory Scientific Committee (ASC) is smaller, consisting of only 15 academics and the chair of the ATC. I have been a member of the ESRB and the ATC at its first meetings Box 1 Steering Committee Members  ESRB Chair (ECB President) and first Vice-Chair  ECB Vice-President  Governors of 4 Central Banks  European Commission representative  Chairpersons of the three ESAs  President of the EFC  ATC Chair  ASC Chair The ESRB General Board held its inaugural meeting in January and has since met three times. It will meet again in December. The meetings were prepared by the Secretariat, the Steering Committee and the Advisory Technical Committee.

Such an approach should generate the productivity gains that are essential for credit, investment and productivity to fuel each other and place the economy onto a sustainable uptrend. Let me now turn to monetary policy. The countercyclical stance during the boom years allowed monetary policy to turn stimulative after the outbreak of the global crisis: the policy rate has been gradually cut from 10.25 percent at the beginning of 2009 to 1.75 percent currently, while the reserve requirement ratios have been lowered to 8 and 14 percent for leiand forex-denominated liabilities respectively. While it is obvious that the NBR did not have to navigate in the uncharted waters of quantitative easing and negative nominal interest rates, there are still challenges to cope with. I would list first the difficulty in designing monetary policy in a context of rapidly improving cyclical position of the economy, while a perfect storm of favourable supply-side shocks – namely oil and food price drops and indirect tax cuts – has been generating low inflation readings for quite a while now, with the potential to alter inflation expectations in the medium term. Furthermore, the already mentioned constraints on credit supply and demand still impair the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy. Specifically, even though the interest rates on new loans in domestic currency have declined further in response to the policy rate cuts, the annual growth of credit to the private sector has leveled off in recent months.
From that date until today another 200 decisions or so were made in the context of Bulgaria's participation in the EU's Banking Union, backed up by serious analytical work. Therefore, as far as the BNB is concerned, no stone has been left unturned on this topic. What I would like to stress is that there are enough representative, thorough and up-todate analyses on the implications of Bulgaria's accession to the euro area. The addition of more analyses at this moment would only further delay the process and would hardly enhance the quality. What we need now is not new analyses on this subject, but concrete actions. How prepared is the BNB to join the euro area? The BNB is in a unique situation. It is the first, and until now the only, Bulgarian institution which, since 1 October 2020, has been a full member of a key institution of the euro area, as is the EU's Banking Union with its two operating mechanisms: the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. Therefore, the BNB is the institution which, not based on theoretical analyses but from first-hand experience, can tell the difference between being outside and being inside the euro area, i.e. we are speaking not about anticipated but about real implications. Most recently, it's been two years since Bulgaria became a full member, and our assessments are unequivocally positive. Now we have information and a database which would have been inaccessible to us before our membership, even if we had invested huge resources.

Central banks have an additional stake in this game. Cash is one of our main products and an increased supply of services from non-banks is likely to reduce its usage. On the one hand, central bank should embrace the development from an efficiency point of view. On the other, a rapid decrease in the use of cash is not without problems. This is only a few of the aspects that may be debated in the second session. The third topic is the future and we all want to know what it will look like. Will the banks be reduced to mere suppliers of infrastructure and account holding services while other actors, the non-banks, have most of the end-user relation-ship? Or will the banks win by knock-out? Will the non-banks become banks over time as their activity expands? Will payment services be delivered to us by Apple? Google? Facebook? Alibaba? What about Bitcoin and its peers? Will we simply have payment services provided by an anonymous network? In addition to having all these kinds of issue debated among representatives for market actors and authorities, we will also have the pleasure of listening to the academic perspective of Professor Charles M. Kahn from the University of Illinois. I’m really looking forward to learning more about all these topics today. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3