samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Bossoni (2001) provides a useful overview of the literature on narrow banking and comes to a more sceptical conclusion. A longer-term perspective on the debate is provided by Goodhart and Jensen (2015). 11  Tobin (1987); there are echoes of this proposal in the more recent work of Barrdear and Kulmhof (2015). 12  Under his proposal, however, deposit-taking banks would be “ring-fenced” from providing investment-banking services. Even so, commercial bank deposits would have to offer more attractive terms – in particular a higher rate of interest – than the DCAs. One implication is that, if the appropriate spread between the interest rate paid on commercial and central bank deposits were to widen during times of banking stress – and one imagines it would – the central bank would more often run up against the zero lower bound. 13  See, for example, Diamond (1984); a useful summary can also be found in Freixas (2008). 14  Kashyap et al. (2002) point out that there are technological similarities between holding deposits and making advances: both involve expertise in liquidity management. Diamond and Rajan (2001) go further, arguing that, given imperfect information on the part of depositors about the riskiness of individual loans on a bank’s balance sheet, the risk of a run is a necessary discipline on the bank. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  because we’ve partially insured their liabilities.

321–349 Kashyap, A, Rajan, R and Stein, J (2002), “Banks as liquidity providers: An explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit-taking”, The Journal of Finance 57, 33–73. Lainà, P (2015), “Proposals for Full-Reserve Banking: History and Critique from David Ricardo to Martin Wolf”, Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland. Lowe, P (2015), “The transformation in maturity transformation” speech given to Thomson Reuters’ 3rd Australian Regulatory Summit, Sydney, 27 May 2015. National Savings and Investments (2008–09), Annual Report and Accounts available at http://nsandi-corporate.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/13428-Annual-Report-Web.pdf Pennacchi, G (2012), “Narrow banking”, Annual Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 141–159, 2012 Rogoff, K (2014), “Costs and benefits to phasing out paper currency”, NBER Working Paper No. 20126 Shafik, M (2016), A New Heart for a Changing Payments System, speech given at the Bank of England. Simons, H, Cox, G, Director, A, Douglas, P, Hart, A, Knight, F, Mints, L, Schultz, H (1933): “Banking and currency reform”, Manuscript. [Reprinted in Samuels, Warren (ed.) (1990): Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology. Archival Supplement, Volume 4. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.] Tobin, J (1987),”The Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1987, pp. 167–183. Walport, M (2016), “Distributed ledger technology: beyond block chain”, Council for Science and Technology. Wolf, M (2014): “Strip private banks of their power to create money”, Financial Times, 24 April 2014. Yermack, D (2013), “Is Bitcoin a real currency? An economic appraisal”, NBER Working Paper No. 19747.
I want to use these remarks to explain why we are doing this, covering four main topics: -  First, why achieving net zero requires action from everyone, including central banks;  -  Second, how a clarified remit, coupled with market mispricing of climate risk, gives the Bank the green light to adjust the composition of our Corporate Bond Purchase Scheme to support net zero in ways that don’t compromise its monetary policy goals;  -  Third, why those adjustments should aim to improve firms’ incentives for delivering net zero, not simply minimise the current carbon footprint of the Scheme; and  -  Fourth, how we will turn our words into action, starting with the next scheduled reinvestment operations this autumn. The framework we are setting out today is a first for central bank monetary policy operations. But, as a famous frog once sang, it’s not easy being green.1 Some worry central banks will go too far, straying into territory best left to government. Others worry they will be too timid, under-using their influence for change. So we need your help. Do our proposals get that balance right? Have we missed anything? And how do we work with others to amplify our impact, recognising that central banks’ voices and influence are at least as powerful as our buying power? Our draft framework already draws heavily on emerging best practice. But today marks the start of an intensive period of listening and learning, framed by the questions set out in the Discussion Paper.

We welcome input on this question in response to the Discussion Paper, but will need to base our judgments on a combination of robust, broad-based scientific evidence and specific UK government policy. 25  https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/early-phase-out-of-unabated-coal-generation-in-great-britain 16  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  16  Chart 11: Transition consistent production pathways for fossil fuels  Source: SEI, IISD, ODI, E3G, and UNEP. (2020). The Production Gap Report: 2020 Special Report. This discussion leads naturally to our final tool: escalation. In calibrating our framework, we face a trade-off. On the one hand, we want to set challenging incentives to support transition. But jumping straight to the end state today, when data remain partial and firms are still developing credible emissions-reduction plans, is neither feasible nor productive. This is not at all an argument for despair or timidity. Issuers should not be given excessive time to adjust. And emissions data are improving steadily (Chart 12). Chart 12: Evolution of emissions data for CBPS eligible firms  Source: Certain information ©2020 MSCI ESG Research LLC. Reproduced by permission  17  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  17  But it does suggest adopting a progressive approach, in which the debt of firms that fail to develop and execute credible plans moves down the rungs of a ‘ladder’, flipping first to a negative tilt, then – if poor performance continues – to removal from eligibility, and ultimately active divestment (Chart 13).
On the social level, one indicator that captures the considerable advances made in recent years is the inequality of income distribution ratio, which fell from 4.6 in 2000 to 3.8 in 2007, well below the average of 4.8 in the EU and the euro area. 3  A broad treatment of this subject is contained in Duguay, Pierre, Productivity, terms of trade and economic adjustment, remarks by the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada to the Canadian Association for Business Economists, 28 August 2006. 4  Early school leavers are defined as the percentage of the population aged 18 - 24 with at most a lower secondary education and not in further education or training. 5  The education attainment level is defined as the percentage of the population aged 20 - 24 having completed at least upper secondary education. 6  Data obtained from National Commission for Higher Education NCHE Further and Higher Statistics 2008, December 2008. BIS Review 60/2009  3  The challenge ahead Despite this encouraging start to EU membership, much clearly remains to be done. An indication of the challenge ahead is provided by the gap between income levels in Malta and the EU. Measured in terms of real GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS), this gap has not been narrowing of late and in 2008 was still about 21% and 29%, respectively, below the EU and euro area averages. A useful exercise for policy purposes decomposes this income gap in terms of labour productivity and labour utilisation.

For reasons already explained, progress towards the attainment of a balanced budget over the medium term must at the same time also be a priority. Financing  8  Report entitled The 2009 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 Member States (2008-2060), published by the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee. BIS Review 60/2009  5  the necessary investment, therefore, represents a complex task. This is because some 65% of budgetary revenues come from cyclically-sensitive sources, essentially direct and indirect taxes, and current projections show that the recovery in Malta’s export markets, and therefore also in the domestic economy, is likely to be very slow. This means that the tax base will expand only moderately. As a result, the need to allocate more public funds to investment while at the same time reducing the deficit can only be satisfied if a major effort is made on the expenditure side. Here too, however, the task is complicated. This is mainly because about 69% of total budgetary outlays are in the shape of fixed commitments such as wages and salaries, interest on the public debt and welfare payments. Since increased taxation must be ruled out as an option, the solution must be centered on efficiency improvements in the use of budgetary resources and a reordering of spending priorities. In this context it should be noted that beyond 2013 Malta is unlikely to be eligible for EU funds to the same extent as at present.
We also have a contingent term repo facility that we could activate at a higher frequency if needed; and we – like the ECB – can lend to a very broad range of counterparties against a wide range of collateral. Central banks and regulators must also be clear that liquidity facilities and buffers are there to be used. For example, in October, the Bank clarified our supervisory expectations to re-emphasise our commitment to providing liquidity in the ordinary course of business. We do not expect firms to justify any usage, nor is there any presumption they would use their own buffers before our facilities. Next year’s first system-wide liquidity stress test will be another opportunity to demonstrate that liquidity buffers are fully useable. Increased central clearing would be a capital-efficient way to further improve repo market liquidity; this would be most effective if smaller institutions participated directly. And a more holistic approach by firms to internal capital management would make them more agile, including not applying the leverage ratio at the desk level. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  Liquidity concerns also go to the heart of otherwise immensely positive developments in market-based finance. As is the case for banks, the institutions at the heart of market-based finance, particularly open-ended investment funds, must prudently manage their leverage and liquidity. Mismatches between redemption terms and the liquidity of some funds’ assets means there is an advantage to investors who redeem ahead of others, particularly in stress.

This is pushing up hurdle rates on investment, swamping the impact of lower policy rates. Reducing uncertainty would turn a vicious cycle – in which falling equilibrium interest rates eat into policy space, exacerbating downside risks and pushing down equilibrium rates further – into a virtuous one, of rising equilibrium rates, increased policy space, and stronger global growth. “The Growing Challenges for Monetary Policy in the current International Monetary and Financial System”, speech by Mark Carney at the Jackson Hole Symposium 2019. 3  6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  III. Transforming payments During Benoît’s time at the ECB, the public provision of money has faced challenges from Bitcoin to stablecoins. The Bank of England has an open mind but not open door when it comes to such innovations. Unlike social media, for which standards and regulations are only now being developed after the technologies have been adopted by billions of users, the terms of engagement for any new systemic private payments system must be in force well in advance of any launch. And there are a host of issues that still need to be addressed – from maintaining the highest standards of operational resilience and managing financial risks, to addressing privacy and anti-money laundering concerns. Like Benoit, we recognise that these initiatives were not conceived in a vacuum; rather they seek to address long-standing problems in payments.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  Figure 7 Change in the Central Bank of Chile's international reserves (percentage of GDP) 7  7  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2  -3  -3 91  93  95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  (*) Reserves consider purchase of $ billion announced in January this year. For GDP, growth and inflation forecasts contained in March 2011's Monetary Policy Report are used. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 8 Copper price and multilateral dollar (1) $ index, January 2006=100) 5  130  4  120  3  110  2  100  1  90  06  07 Copper price  08  09  10  11  Current and one year ahead copper price forecast (3)  Multilateral USD (2) (1) Gray bars depict forex intervention period. (2) Dollar against currency basket of the U.S.'s main trading partners. An increase shows an appreciation of the dollar. (3) In Monetary Policy Reports of May 2008 and March 2011, respectively. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg and U.S. Federal Reserve.

In fact, it is hard to find another episode where the developed world suffered a severe recession that was not magnified in developing countries. This is especially relevant in Latin America (figure 2). The developed economies face a different scenario. They are having important doubts about whether their fiscal situation will be sustainable. Large expansions of fiscal expenditure before the crisis and the implementation of unprecedented stimulus packages to cope with it threw their debt levels very high. Today they have no further room to continue increasing public spending and, even worse, they need to make substantial adjustments that are difficult to implement in such a weak economic situation. The cases of the United States and Japan are good examples. Add to this what is happening in peripheral European economies, the adjustments that are needed and the financial tensions this creates. What the founders of the euro had in mind early on was that the economies in Europe, particularly in the south, would adopt sound macroeconomic policies following in the steps of Germany. Nonetheless, it seems that some economies, such as Greece, only took advantage of the low risk premiums, over-borrowing and creating a deficit way bigger than set forth in the Stability and Growth Pact. The consequence was extreme financial vulnerability that is proving very difficult to resolve today. For the time being, risks seem to be well contained, but the lack of credibility of the markets has resulted in some agents speculating with the possibility of some member country being discharged from the Eurozone.
Petroleum activities have contributed to technological developments in the shipbuilding industry and the offshore sector. The current cost level in the Norwegian business sector is adapted to an expansion of the petroleum sector and a steady phasing-in of petroleum revenues into the mainland economy. In the long term, the exchange rate tends to adjust so that both the domestic economy and the current account are in balance. After a period, we will be able to cover a smaller share of our imports using current petroleum revenues and by drawing on the Petroleum Fund. Competitiveness will then have to be improved. It may have to be brought back to around the level prevailing at the end of the 1960s prior to Norway’s emergence as an oil nation. Rough estimates3 suggest that the real exchange rate that ensures balance in the external account when petroleum wealth no longer has the same significant role in the economy is more in line with the real exchange rate that we started with. This is shown in the chart, where the real exchange rate in the very long term will revert to the level prevailing before petroleum extraction began. In conclusion, the Petroleum Fund and the fiscal rule shield the economy from fluctuations in oil prices and extraction rates. With an inflation target, inflationary pressures are steered using the interest rate, while the value of the krone fluctuates.

For these reasons alone, the use of petroleum revenues may in periods deviate from the 4 per cent rule. Spending was also increased in response to the economic downturn in 2003. We can therefore safely affirm that the fiscal rule has been normative for fiscal policy. Nevertheless, over the last years more oil money has flowed into the Norwegian economy than earlier. Petroleum investment shows a pronounced increase this year. Moreover, government petroleum revenue spending has increased in recent years. The fiscal rule is part of a set of economic policy guidelines. The various components of economic policy have varying effects. This is why they have different functions: •  Monetary policy steers inflation in the medium and long term and can also contribute to smoothing swings in output and employment. •  The central government budget – growth in public spending – influences the krone and the size of the internationally exposed business sector in the medium term. Government expenditure and revenues must be in balance in the long term. •  Wage formation, the structure of the economy and incentives determine how efficiently we use our labour resources and other economic resources. There is also an interaction. To give you an example: •  In its budget resolutions, the government authorities will attach importance to the effects of the budget on the Norwegian economy and will therefore take account of interest rate effects.
Elvira Nabiullina: Speech - OPORA RUS Governor SIA session Speech by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, at the OPORA RUS Governor SIA session, 3 December 2020. * * * Good afternoon, I am happy to welcome you, whether you are now in the Kaliningrad Region or are video conferencing — this format is becoming quite common now. I hope that this meeting is attended by a large number of participants. Indeed, I was listening very attentively and I think that the approach the Kaliningrad Region is pursuing to develop small and medium-sized businesses is promising and comprehensive. However, we are all very well aware that a lot of projects depend on how accessible funding is — it would be impossible to implement a project when there is no access to funding. Today’s meeting is very important to me: although the Bank of Russia influences the economy through the financial sector, the ultimate goal of our work is to ensure that the financial sector helps the economy and people overcome hardships and develop. Of course, we have always been concerned about the issues related to the financing of small enterprises. We carry out regular meetings with OPORA RUSSIA President Alexander Kalinin several times a year to discuss the most topical problems and advance in both the regulation and other areas associated with the development of multiple projects.

Therefore, we discussed this topic already last year, but we have now progressed to the active phase of the efforts aimed at establishing the centralised information service Know Your Customer, or KYC, as we have got used to saying. This platform will make it possible to reduce the number of banks’ refusals and companies’ expenses for the communication with banks. Clients’ risks will be assessed not by banks, but by the platform developed by the Bank of Russia that will classify companies into three risk groups according to the traffic light principle. Banks will be able to focus only on the group having these risk signs and on the analysis of the operations of clients involving potentially higher risks. We are going to launch this platform into regular operation at the end of 2021 and then scale it up so as to embrace all credit institutions by the end of 2022 Q1. Of course, we believe that it will make life easier for SMEs. We have also discussed how to improve this platform together with you. The second issue is the Faster Payments System (FPS). Initially, we launched it to enable P2P transfers. We can see that it is highly requested. However, right from the beginning, we have built this system considering the needs of retailers and small businesses and comprehending that this system may help SMEs cut costs significantly. The FPS addresses the issue of high acquiring fees and considerably reduces costs for trade and service companies.
William C Dudley: What the euro crisis means for taxpayers and the US economy Testimony by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Subcommittee on TARP, Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives, Washington DC, 15 December 2011. * I. *  *  Introduction  Chairman McHenry, Ranking Member Quigley, other members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you today to discuss the economic and fiscal challenges facing Europe and the potential implications for the United States. My name is Bill Dudley, and I am president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Let me preface these remarks by stating that the views expressed in my written and oral testimony are solely my own and do not represent official views of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or any other part of the Federal Reserve System. Additionally, because I am precluded by law from discussing confidential supervisory information, I will not be able to speak to the financial condition or regulatory treatment or rating of any individual financial institution. The Federal Reserve seeks to promote financial stability in order to enable U.S. businesses and households to maintain their access to credit and to ensure sustained economic growth.

At that time, the global economy was still dealing with the immediate effects of the financial crisis, and the Swiss franc was significantly overvalued against all currencies. The international economic environment is now much more positive. Inflation and economic outlook for Switzerland The change in the exchange rate situation also alters our assessment of the inflation and economic outlook for Switzerland, which I will outline for you now. As a result of the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate, the inflation outlook has again declined significantly. For the current year, we have reduced our inflation forecast from –0.1% to –1.1%. Together with the sharp fall in oil prices, the appreciation of the Swiss franc since the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate temporarily moves inflation further into negative territory. Inflation reaches its low point in the third quarter of 2015, at –1.2%. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Thereafter, forecast inflation rises more rapidly than in the December forecast, due to the interest rate reductions since the last monetary policy assessment. Nevertheless, in 2016, inflation will amount to –0.5%, which is 0.8 percentage points lower than in the December forecast. Not until 2017 will inflation move into positive territory again, at 0.4%. The conditional forecast assumes that the three-month Libor remains at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon, and that the Swiss franc weakens. The inflation forecast shows that the period of negative inflation is temporary. Sustained negative inflation, or even a deflationary spiral, is not to be expected.