samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This has led to a considerable expansion of its balance sheet. The chart shows the wide swings in central bank balance sheets since the 2008 financial crisis. Expansion of central bank balance sheets has been particularly rapid in the UK, the US and Switzerland and somewhat more moderate in the euro area. As I mentioned earlier, the purpose of balance sheet policy is to stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates and funding costs in a situation where the key rate is close to zero. Central banks themselves emphasise that the positive effects of balance sheet policy are uncertain – and the effects must be weighed against possible problems. 6 There are four factors that can be highlighted here: First, it may be difficult for central banks to exit the markets once they have built up large bond holdings, and this would require considerable portfolio adjustments for households, firms and banks. Postponing a reversal of the measures could generate expectations that interest rates will remain very low for too long a period after the economy has recovered. This could in turn generate expectations of high inflation further ahead. Indeed, the connection between inflation and the money supply constitutes the second challenge. When a central bank purchases securities or provides longer-term loans to banks, the monetary base, i.e. banks’ deposits at the central bank, increases. There is no direct relationship between the monetary base and inflation.

The Greek central bank’s debt to the ECB increases in turn, while the Bundesbank’s claims on the ECB  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  increase accordingly. Such changes in claims and liabilities are expressed in the TARGET2 balances. Chart: TARGET2 balances In a well functioning market, the bank that had drained its central bank reserves would borrow to replace them in the interbank market, balancing the transfer described above. Imbalances in TARGET2 are a symptom of an interbank market that is not functioning efficiently between all countries in the euro area. If banks in the north are no longer willing to lend to banks in the south, the southern banks must meet their need for reserves by borrowing directly from the central bank. The northern banks increase their reserves at the central bank accordingly. In addition to increasing the claims in the TARGET2 system, this inflates the Eurosystem balance sheet. The central banks are the hub of the system and are required to receive deposits from areas where banks have a surplus of reserves and extend loans to areas where banks as a whole need more funding. Imbalances between countries in the TARGET2 system give no indication of who will bear the losses if a bank defaults and the value of the collateral posted is not sufficient. Any losses are allocated among the participating national central banks according to their relative shares in the ECB’s paid-up capital.
The reason is the combination of a higher risk premia and lower interest rates in industrial countries, as a result of flight to quality and expectations of lower monetary policy rates than previously expected so much for the US as for the Euro Zone. In this external setting, commodity prices have remained high and, particularly, crude oil prices are reaching record nominal levels in dollars. Besides, international prices of food are showing a rising trend. Accordingly, emerging economies have been more dynamic than previously expected, contributing to worldwide GDP growth. Thus, China, India and Russia as a group explain more than a half of the world GDP growth during the first semester of this year. The Chilean economy Chile’s current framework of macroeconomic and financial policies and institutions has insulated the economy from the turbulences in international financial markets. In particular, the fiscal solvency and the conduction of an inflation-targeting monetary policy under a floating exchange rate regime have increased the economy’s resilience to external shocks. Between July 19 and August 16 – the day before the Fed reduced its discounted rate in 50 basis points and authorized the use of bonds supported by mortgages and collaterals – the Chilean peso depreciated slightly, the 10-year bond rates decreased and the stock exchange experienced one of the lowest falls among industrial and emerging economies. The Chilean economy started a period of above-trend-growth in the third quarter of 2006. This growth has been supported by expansive domestic macroeconomic policies and favorable external conditions.

The Governing Council therefore supports the implementation of the ambitious objectives described in the evaluation report.” In terms of the broader service to Spanish society we have just mentioned, let me remind you that three CEMFI faculty members currently participate in the Council of Economic Advisors of the Spanish Ministry of Economic Affairs, two have recently been appointed members of the Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration, one is a member of the Advisory Board of the Spanish Independent Agency for Fiscal Responsibility, and another one is chair of the Scientific Committee of the Spanish State Research Agency. In addition, last December, CEMFI signed an agreement with the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration to collaborate in the evaluation of 34 pilot projects to improve the design of poverty reduction policies. CEMFI will participate both in the design and the evaluation of the projects, and researchers will be able to use the data generated by these evaluations for the production of papers publishable in scientific journals. Carrying out these evaluations will allow CEMFI to take a qualitative leap forward, positioning itself as an academic institution of reference in the evaluation of public policies in Spain. I would like to thank Samuel Bentolila and Mónica Martínez-Bravo for leading this important initiative.
A new body could be created with a wide range of stakeholders represented in order to discuss and resolve issues that are hindering the realisation of SEPA. Such a governance body is not intended to replace the European Payments Council, which is delivering useful work from the supply side. The main objective is to involve also the demand side and the relevant authorities as well. The European Commission is elaborating the possible modalities of such a “SEPA Council” and envisages the creation of a SEPA Council before the end of 2009. On SEPA migration, challenges still lie ahead. The use of SCTs has been increasing steadily since their launch in January 2008. By September 2009, they had reached 4.6% of the overall credit transfer volume.6 We also see some positive signs ahead: public administrations in several countries are planning to migrate to the SEPA products either in the remainder of this year or in the first half of 2010. And now that SEPA Direct Debit has been launched, companies with crossborder activities are expected to migrate. Still, the current figures show: Further action is needed to fully migrate to the SEPA instruments. An end-date for SEPA migration; has the self-regulatory process reached its limits? This brings me to my second important ingredient for a successful migration to SEPA: An end date for SEPA migration. It is clear that maintaining dual systems is costly for all, not only for banks, but also for the SEPA users.

Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell: The progress of migration to SEPA Keynote address by Mrs Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the British Bankers’ Association, 7th Annual Payments Conference, London, 23 November 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for inviting me to speak at the British Bankers' Association on the occasion of the 7th Annual Payments Conference. 140 years ago, on Monday 22 November 1869, one of the world’s fastest, most technically advanced and also most beautiful merchant sailing ships was launched. Designed to be the first ship to bring home the new season’s tea from China to London, the “Cutty Sark” plied the oceans for decades. The ship is still preserved today, and you can marvel at her in Greenwich, just 20 minutes from here. On Monday 2 November 2009, just three weeks ago, the SEPA Direct Debit (SDD) was launched. I will not dare to speculate as to whether it is the world’s fastest, most technically advanced and most beautiful Direct Debit scheme, but the advent of a European direct debit scheme provides a truly new payment service at the European level. We would like to congratulate all those who have taken part in its development, particularly the EPC for their valuable contribution to this success. The SDD complements the SEPA Credit Transfer, which was launched in January 2008. With these two payment products launched, and with the Payment Services Directive (PSD) now in force, SEPA is well in place. However, not yet completed.
In order to address this situation, one of the objectives in the Sixth  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  National Development Plan is to enhance the capacity of women to participate in national development”. 1 The Report further states that “due to weak economic position such as lack of collateral required by most financial institutions, most women, especially the rural women, are unable to access investment capital to engage in business and other economic activities as individuals”. Access to affordable financial services – especially credit and insurance – enhances livelihood opportunities and empowers women and other marginalized groups to take charge of their lives as well as improve their social and economic equity. This is why financial inclusion is considered to be critical for achieving inclusive growth and poverty reduction. What do we mean by financial inclusion Women’s financial inclusion has been described as “a state in which women as individual, members of households and entrepreneurs, have access to the full range of financial products and services from convenient responsible formal service providers, offered effectively, responsibly and sustainably and at a reasonable cost to clients” These products include payments, savings, credit, insurance and pensions. The Finscope survey of 2005 and 2009 showed that access to financial services in Zambia has been low with results indicating only a marginal increase from 33.7% in 2005 to 37.3% in 2009. This signifies that further efforts are required.

The simplified procedure or relaxed „KYC‟ note allows banks to use various forms of reference documentation such as community leaders other than the traditional approach used in the past. In addition, over the years, there have been a number of positive developments in the economy. Some of these include easier access to banking services through lower bank account opening balances; relaxed KYC procedures for opening and operating accounts; improved payments systems through mobile banking, e-money, increased numbers of ATMs and point of sale terminals, and improved access to foreign exchange through various bureau de change across the country. We have also seen a broader range of financial services, including products tailored for women. Under the second phase of the FSDP, Government is implementing a number of programmes, and building capacity for key stakeholders. Specific milestones include:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  (i)  Development of a rural finance policy – a draft report has been developed and among others, focuses on proposals for developing warehouse certificate systems, supporting financial services providers towards rural banking as well as agency banking and initiatives for rural branch expansions (e.g. Natsave). (ii)  Establishment of development fund – DBZ is now the appointed apex body for wholesale funds and is also expected to launch an enterprise development fund co-financed with the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA).
To achieve this, we must develop synergies between the existing initiatives: Capital Markets Union, the Juncker Plan and Banking Union. But we must also go still further, with two clear goals. Firstly, diversification of financing to meet businesses’ needs. Equity financing, rather than debt financing, is better adapted to risk taking and therefore to innovation. But Europe currently lags very far behind in this area: equity financing of businesses is less than half that in the United States (67% of GDP in the euro area compared with 125% in the United States). Secondly: increased resilience of the euro area thanks to integrated capital markets. As Jens Weidmann and I wrote last year, this manner of sharing private risks is the best way to counter asymmetric shocks within a monetary union. In the United States for example, private equity is capable of absorbing around 40% of an economic shock specific to a State. 3. The new international environment makes action more urgent. Some of those around us seem to no longer believe in the benefits of the European Union. The new US president has stated this very clearly, and the British chose to leave the union. These changes bring us face to face with our responsibilities: we can no longer afford to wait and see. But how should we respond? Not by less Europe. That would be a mistake if we wish to have collective control over our destiny in this new world.

The other question mark concerns the differences between countries, with inflation of 1.7% in Germany. However, following a temporary peak in the first quarter, German inflation is expected to remain under 2% on average throughout 2017. Moreover the inflation differences between countries are consistent with their different national economic situations: growth and employment are also stronger in Germany; and these differences could even contribute, via their impact on relative wages, to correcting the imbalances, hence achieving greater convergence within the euro area. I can naturally grasp the concern of German savers in the face of low interest rates. It is not our aim to keep interest rates low for too long: low interest rates are not a goal in themselves; they are merely the necessary condition today for gradually returning towards our inflation target, and ensuring lastingly higher interest rates in the future, as Mario Draghi himself has put it. This movement has already started for long-term interest rates, with the 10-year Bund gaining nearly 60 basis points since the end of September. In December, in view of the progress achieved, we decided to reduce the volume of our monthly asset purchases from 80 to 60 billion euro. I also repeat that although I am convinced that negative interest rates have their use, they have clear limitations. But, although QE will obviously not last forever, we clearly did not discuss tapering or any exit strategy.
For instance, in order to bring the debt-to-GDP ratio back to 60% in 20 years while maintaining a primary deficit in line with the historical evidence, real growth in the euro area would have to be twice its historical value (1.3% on average over 1995-2021), or alternatively the implicit rate on government debt would have to be half the current one (see right-hand side figures in slide 5). Although simplistic, these exercises illustrate the significant 4  effort needed for the transition to the medium-term fiscal targets, and, indirectly, how it would limit fiscal policy’s capacity as a stabiliser for the duration of the adjustment process. These are just some of the arguments behind the broad consensus on the need to reform the fiscal governance framework in the European Union. However, while everyone appears to agree that reform is needed, views differ on the necessary steps forward and their sequencing. I personally believe we need a coordinated effort aimed at reinforcing the euro area and making it more resilient to shocks. And, in my view, this would involve reforming several areas of economic governance: fiscal and structural policies, the banking sector and capital markets. Allow me to offer a number of reflections on the desirable elements of such a reform, with a view to improving the operation of the policy mix in the euro area.

Completing the banking union should be seen as a priority, in particular by overcoming the current deadlock over its third main pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) with a mutualized component. The commitment to deploy such a scheme would have a strong impact on citizens’ trust and would contribute to increased risk-sharing in the euro area. In addition, it would help align financial responsibility with the pan-European decision-making that already exists in the areas of banking supervision and resolution. The current misalignment makes EMU governance more prone to institutional and political frailty. As a complement, it is also crucial to eliminate certain regulatory barriers and practices that are hindering the emergence of a fully fledged European banking market. In addition, completing the capital markets union is essential to enhancing the euro area’s capacity to cushion macro-financial shocks and to providing a better environment to channel private investment. Currently, the limited development of equity markets and the sizeable home bias in portfolios have significant negative consequences for the smooth functioning of the monetary union. Indeed, they set a limit on the capacity of risk-sharing mechanisms in the euro area. Moreover, an enhanced capital markets union could improve the channelling of the abundant aggregate savings to satisfy investment needs in the areas of infrastructure, energy and innovation, in which private investment is crucial. For example, according to European Commission estimates, the energy transition will require additional investment of over € billion each year over the next decade.
And perhaps as many as 8 million employees are working fewer hours for a variety of reasons.8 Taken together, this means that perhaps as much as half the UK workforce is currently either unemployed or underemployed. This, too, has no historical precedent. 5  ILO (2020a). ILO (2020b). 7 The total number of jobs furloughed may not equate to the number of employees still under furlough. For example, some workers may have more than one job. And some jobs may only have been furloughed temporarily. 8 May MPR: “Those that remain in work may be working fewer hours than normal. This could be because of reduced demand for their services, in which case they will have spare capacity. But they may also work fewer hours because they fall ill, are required to self-isolate, or have extra non-work responsibilities, such as caring for relatives or home-schooling children.” The Ipsos Mori survey in the May MPR suggested around 25% of employees are working fewer hours. 6  5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  In its May Monetary Policy Report (MPR), the MPC produced an illustrative but plausible scenario for the UK and global economies. In this scenario, UK-weighted global GDP was expected to contract by 26% between the fourth quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 and by 13% over the course of 2020. For the UK, the equivalent numbers were a peak-to-trough contraction of 27% and an annual contraction of 14%.

Last but not least, there is a need to build a healthy rental market. Policymakers need to be clear that the drive for affordable housing is not necessarily equivalent to the drive for “home ownership” alone. Adequate housing is about access, which can be achieved not only through outright ownership, but also through the ability to rent a decent home at affordable prices. The overriding policy priority should not be ownership at all costs. We need to learn from the Global Financial Crisis on the importance of a sustainable housing market. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Policymakers need to protect the interests of the public and the stability of the economic and financial system. It is also in the interest of the public that they do not buy homes that they cannot afford and fall into financial hardship, which will have detrimental consequences to socioeconomic stability. More broadly, we need to remember that one of the best ways to achieve the affordable homes objective is to promote employment opportunities and income growth for the people. This will strengthen their economic capability and financial position for home ownership. To some extent, we have observed some encouraging trends, including the fact that house prices are now growing more in line with income growth. Another important avenue for policymakers is the exchange of information and ideas. Through the sharing of experiences, especially with policymakers from other countries, we are able to learn and explore new frontiers.
A one standard deviation rise in a country’s “economic complexity” has been found to increase its long-term growth rate by a remarkable 1.6% per year. If these numbers are even roughly right, this product atlas is a fantastic navigation device. It could help guide countries towards investing in their most profitable industries. Because it also shows how closely product types are linked, both within and across countries, product and country complexity maps might also be used to help chart a course for industrial policy and international trade. The web is a higher-dimension network than the global supply chain. Navigating it is more complex still. Early in its life, that seemed likely to retard its progress. In the early 1990s, web  16  Chandran (2003). 17  Hausmann et al (2011). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  search engines relied on the content of each page to determine its relevance. As the web grew, simple keyword search was being overwhelmed by the web’s size and complexity. By the mid-1990s, search engines were lost in navigation. In 1996, two Stanford students, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, devised a solution.18 You are all now familiar with its name. It was called “BackRub”. Page and Brin saw the links between websites, rather than the content within them, as the key to navigating the web. Using that basic intuition, they created a search algorithm which calculated a ranking of the relative importance of every web page in the global network. This ranking is known as PageRank.

34  Senior Supervisors Group (2010). 35  Jenner and Block (2011). BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  common tongue. That is one of the key messages of the 2010 Senior Supervisors Group report. The experience of global supply chains and the web tell us there is no technological constraint on real-time measurement and management of financial inventories by even the largest firms. Where Wal-Mart has led, Wall Street could follow. Common data standards could similarly transform consolidated risk management. There is no technological reason why slicing and dicing of the aggregate balance sheet could not be done with the same simplicity as searching the web. Determining aggregate exposures to a given counterparty or a risk factor is a single cut of the financial web. It ought to be as straightforward as Googling Aung San Suu Kyi or Britney Spears. (b)  Improving risk management across firms  Measuring and managing risks across firms was perhaps the single most important cause of the seizure of financial markets during the crisis. Counterparty risk reigned supreme. In as densely-connected a web as global finance had become, this was hardly surprising. Network risk, the risk of cascading dominos, was several orders of magnitude larger than at any time in human history. To see that, compare the failure of two financial leviathans only a decade apart. When LTCM collapsed in 1998, it had exposures of $ billion in OTC derivatives with a handful of Wall Street’s finest.