samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Turkish accession today would imply an increase of more than 17 percent in the EU population. Indeed, between 1990-2003, the average population growth rate and the birth rate Turkey have been 1.8 percent and 2.3 percent per annum respectively.15 The Turkish population is expected to stay young in the foreseeable future. Whereas in the 2000 s, the EU-15 has 0.3 percent of population growth rate and 1.1 percent of birth rate on average at highly decreasing trends.16 According to certain estimations, in the year 2020, the average age in the EU-15 will be 43, while it will be 33 in Turkey17. This means that in the future, Europe will probably be experiencing labour shortages rather than the unemployment problems of today18. What this argument implies that Turkey s young and expanding population will reduce the negative impact of the EU s aging and diminishing work force in the coming 15-20 years. Turkey with a young population would be an important asset in the long-term in competing with countries such as China, India and the US. As another variable in the equation, we observe an advantageous position for Turkey regarding the dependency ratio. As a result of a young and growing population, the dependency ratio of the Turkish population is in a decreasing trend. As of the year 2000, the share of the age group of 55 and above in total population is 29 percent in the EU-15 while that of Turkey is a mere 11 percent19.

Flexible job markets are important particularly in a monetary union. Exchange rate adjustments are not possible in response to economic developments and changes in competitiveness. Therefore, wage policy in the individual countries bears a special responsibility. It largely determines labour costs and thus a country’s competitiveness. It must take into account productivity, the employment situation and the competitiveness of the respective country. The relative cost competitiveness of the various economies in the euro area has to be monitored very closely. The present situation should be a catalyst, pushing further forward structural reforms in the euro countries. The EU’s Lisbon strategy – which aims to make Europe’s economy more dynamic and competitive – and the completion of the internal market, for example in the services sector, are very important items on the European agenda which should not be forgotten in the present circumstances. Enlargement of the euro area Many of the challenges confronting the ECB are shared with other central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan. These include overcoming the financial market disruption and the economic downturn. Over the longer term, there is globalisation, with the rise of emerging market economies such as China and India, the rapid advances in science and technology and the ageing of our population. All these phenomena affect the economic environment in which central banks conduct monetary policy.
Therefore, I would like to reiterate my appeal for finding a political consensus that would enable the establishment of a fiscal rule, which serves the maintaining of long-term sustainability of public finances and investors’ confidence in the Albanian economy. Third, the reform of social and health insurance systems is another important aspect that remains problematic for the long-term stability of the country. Deficits resulting from them are upward and may substantially affect fiscal parameters in the future. This reform should open the way to development of relatively backward segments of the financial system, those of private pension and insurance funds. This would really contribute to expanding and deepening the financial market in Albania. Fourth, sticking to financial stability, I would like to bring to your attention the changes in the code of civil procedure relating to easing of collateral execution. Further to the package launched recently by the Bank of Albania and the letter I sent a few days ago to the major parties in the Assembly, I would appeal once more for their approval at an earlier time possible. It is a set of proposals that we and international experts regard indispensable for the stability of the banking system, guarantee of deposits and recovery of credit to economy. Finally, the long-term development of Albania and the policies and strategies supporting it deserve greater attention. The Bank of Albania remains confident in the long-term development prospects of the country.

The labour market should see a gradual decline in the number of jobseekers in the second half of the year as companies gradually use up the resources currently available. A much-debated question is the extent to which monetary policy contributes to long-term growth. It would appear that the growth of an economy depends first and foremost on the development of its resources and then on their productivity. Monetary policy cannot change this situation; it can only be vigilant in maintaining a stable framework that is conducive to the efficient development of productive activities. The National Bank succeeded in doing this in 2004. Moreover, our forecasts suggest that price stability should continue in 2005 and 2006, with inflation averaging around 1%. Completion of the gold sales On 31 March, we completed our sales of the 1,300 tonnes of gold no longer required for monetary policy purposes. These sales had begun on 1 May 2000. The fears expressed in some quarters that our gold sales would destabilise the market have proven to be unfounded. By selling the gold in small instalments and according to a fully transparent schedule, we succeeded in assuaging the market's fears. Moreover, our sales strategy and risk hedging also proved effective in financial terms: the 1,300 tonnes of gold were sold at an average price of CHF 16,241 per kilo. This was CHF 700 more than the average market price during the same sales period. An additional profit of more than CHF 900 million was therefore realised.
Developing those raw ingredients, and mixing them appropriately, has been crucial for social and economic progress over the course of history. And what has been true of the past is likely to become even more important for driving economic and societal improvement in future. Like the GSA, the Bank of England is a public institution whose role is to serve the public good. We have been doing so for 325 years. The issues I will discuss today – stability in our economies and societies, economic and social progress, the impact of innovation and ideas, the role of education and insurance – have remained central to public policy throughout that time. They will remain so in the period ahead. To summarise up front my line of argument:   Imagination and creativity are what set humans apart from other animals. They explain why human evolution has been jet-propelled, while other animals have proceeded on foot. Through their creativity, humans have followed a completely different evolutionary arc – so-called Life Version 2.0.   Innovation and creativity are the wellspring of improvements in economies and societies. They explain the secular, spectacular rises in global living standards and well-being now seen for several centuries. Human imagination and intelligence has been the engine of progress and growth.   Creativity and innovation can come at a cost. The US economist Joseph Schumpeter spoke of “creative destruction”. He was right. With innovation can come a loss of livelihood and a straining of the social fabric.

13 In addition to these topics, we at the Federal Reserve are following closely the potential for the decline in the  balance sheet to affect other aspects of the structure of financial markets or the banking industry. As one example, we are paying attention to the possibility that a decline in the size of the balance sheet puts downward pressure on bank deposits. As discussed earlier, in general, balance sheet normalization removes an asset from the private sector that can be held only by banks (reserves) and replaces it with an asset that can be held by anyone (securities). It is possible that, on net in equilibrium relative to a counterfactual in which the balance sheet does not decline, (a) banks will hold fewer reserves; (b) banks will offset some of this decline by holding securities instead, and some by taking in fewer deposits; and (c) non-banks will replace those deposits with securities. The extent (if any) of any such decline in deposit activity on deposit and loan pricing will likely depend on a variety of factors, including the extent to which the decline comes from wholesale institutional deposit activity motivated by interest rate arbitrage. See Ihrig, Mize, and Weinbach, How does the Fed adjust its Securities Holdings and Who is Affected?, September 22, 2017  7/7  BIS central bankers' speeches
Conclusion What I hope this discussion highlights is that, in practice, the job of monetary policy makers comes down to making difficult and complex decisions in the face of uncertainty. Over the past couple of years the challenge has been dealing with a succession of real changes in relative prices (via negative supply side shocks) which have pushed up on prices whilst depressing demand and output. That is extremely uncomfortable for everybody. But there was, and is, no easy way for monetary policy to deal with the impact of such shocks. In our current projections there are very major risks to either side of the central case. On one side, higher inflation expectations could become entrenched making it very costly for the MPC to subsequently bring inflation back to target. On the other side, the economy could be much weaker than we expect pushing down on inflation and risking deflation. Recovering to the target from that could be even harder (at least in my personal view). MPC members place different weight on these possibilities and reach different judgements accordingly. But it is clear to all of us that both risks exist. I believe the MPC is charting the right course through these difficult times. Despite temporarily higher inflation for a period, and notwithstanding all the uncertainty, I want to assure you that we remain determined to bring inflation back to target in the medium term, consistent with our remit.

But as an academician I was in contact with the central bank already at the beginning of 1990s. At that time, the staff was struggling with very basic issues: a new statistics and data on the newly born market economy, ways how the economy should be analysed and what kind of theory or model should be applied etc. The Czech National Bank was receiving a lot of help from the foreign central banks and international institutions. Today, we are at the level of state-of-art and we do not receive but provide foreign technical assistance. We assist directly to a number of countries as well as our experts are invited to IMF missions around the world. And yet our staff is based primarily on people educated in the Czech Republic. I consider it as a good signal that we have reached significant achievements in economic education and that the problem of missing generation will soon cease to exist. I can only hope that we will continue with this process of catching up and that CMC will keep contributing to it. What can I wish to you personally? Let me recall my recent visit to the Bank of Israel on the occasion of its 50th anniversary. We were having lunch with the Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and we discussed necessary fiscal reforms. Mr. Netanyahu said that for pushing reforms through, one needs three things: the vision, the will and the political power.
In line with our monetary policy strategy, we take the view that the sustained underlying strength of monetary and credit expansion in the euro area over the past few years has created upside risks to price stability. Over recent quarters, these risks appear to have become manifest as inflation has trended upwards. Not least in the face of the ongoing tensions in financial markets, the monetary analysis helps to support the necessary medium-term orientation of monetary policy by focusing attention on the upside risks to price stability prevailing at medium to longer horizons. While the growth of broad money and credit aggregates is now showing some signs of moderation,  2  BIS Review 105/2008  reflecting the policy measures taken since 2005 to address risks to price stability, the strong underlying pace of monetary expansion points to continued upside risks to price stability over the medium term. The currently flat yield curve has given rise to a substitution from longer maturity assets into monetary instruments, which offer similar remuneration but greater liquidity and less risk. This substitution has led the current headline rate of M3 growth to overstate the underlying pace of monetary expansion. At the same time, shifts out of overnight deposits drove the annual growth rate of M1 down further in July. These effects, as well as other temporary factors, must be taken into account when assessing monetary developments and their implications.

Moreover, growth in the world economy is expected to remain relatively resilient, benefiting mainly from sustained growth in emerging economies. This should support external demand for euro area goods and services and thereby investment. This outlook is also reflected in the September 2008 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. The exercise projects average annual real GDP growth in a range between 1.1% and 1.7% in 2008, and between 0.6% and 1.8% in 2009. In comparison with the June Eurosystem staff projections, real GDP growth figures for 2008 and 2009 are lower. In the view of the Governing Council, the uncertainty surrounding this outlook for economic activity is particularly high at the current juncture and, generally, downside risks prevail. Risks stem particularly from renewed increases in energy and food prices, which could dampen consumption and investment. Moreover, downside risks continue to relate to the  BIS Review 105/2008  1  potential for the financial market tensions to affect the real economy more adversely than currently foreseen. The possibility of disorderly developments owing to global imbalances also implies downside risks to the outlook for economic activity, as do concerns about rising protectionist pressures. With regard to price developments, annual HICP inflation has remained considerably above the level consistent with price stability since last autumn, standing at 3.8% in August according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 4.0% in June and July 2008.
As the leading green and sustainable finance hub in Asia and the dominant gateway to China, Hong Kong plays a crucial role in supporting China's climate transition by channelling international capital to green projects. Last year, out of the approximately $ billion green and sustainable bond issuances in Hong Kong, Mainland entities accounted for over 80% of the issuances. Since 2021, we have supported the green, sustainable, and blue bond issuances from the governments of the Shenzhen municipality and Hainan province in Hong Kong. This has created a strong demonstrative effect for both public and private sectors in the Mainland to leverage Hong Kong's green bond platform and enriched the range of RMB financial products available in the Hong Kong market. Hong Kong is already Asia's largest sustainable financing centre, with one-third market share. To facilitate further growth in sustainable investment between China and the rest of the world, we have spearheaded several initiatives. First, we are the first Asian jurisdiction mandating climate-related disclosure across the financial sector by 2025, and the first market working to operationalise the Common Ground Taxonomy jointly developed by China and the EU. This allows international issuers and investors to report and communicate sustainability impacts and meet regulatory and investor needs across global markets. Secondly, we have been collaborating with relevant Mainland authorities to promote Hong Kong's green financing platform.

It was a time when there was an absence of speculators. It was only in 1997-98 when the ringgit and other regional currencies came under speculative attack. The volume of foreign exchange transactions had become massive, far exceeding volume of trade and the normal financial flows. This resulted in exchange rate volatility during the Asian crisis that occurred wave after wave. Regional currencies continued to plummet during this period. After more than a year of this turmoil and uncertainty in the foreign exchange market, Malaysia implemented selective capital controls and de-internationalised the ringgit. This was instrumental in restoring stability in the market. It acted very much like a circuit breaker. Offshore trading of the ringgit, the major source for financing the speculative attacks, was effectively eliminated. Within a year, all the controls that were imposed were removed. More than 10 years later, the ringgit, however, still remains non-internationalised. An important precondition for the internationalisation is the development of a robust foreign exchange market in our financial system. Financial stability The events surrounding the current financial crisis has brought into sharp focus the role of central banks in financial stability. As these events continue to unfold with great uncertainty on the financial markets and broader economy, allow me to reflect on Bank Negara Malaysia's own role in financial stability. In addition to its functions as the lender of last resort, Bank Negara Malaysia has also had the responsibility for the regulation of banking institutions.
Pricing of this insurance is assumed to be based on the distribution of equity returns during  2  For example, Guttentag and Herring (1986a) and Herring (1999). 3  The banks themselves have been anonymised to protect the innocent. 4  BIS Review 18/2009  the Golden Decade. If the “true” distribution of returns were its long-run average, by how much would this insurance have been under-priced in 2007? Chart 10 provides some answers for a selection of strike prices for the option. The degree of under-pricing of risk is large and is larger for options designed to protect against tail risks (lower strike prices). For at-the-money options on UK equities, the insurance premium would have been under-priced by around 45%; for options well out-of-the-money – say, 50% below equity prices at the time – the mis-pricing would have been nearer 90%. This is risk underpricing on a dramatic scale. These examples are no more than illustrative. But they help illustrate that the quantitative consequences of disaster myopia were material ahead of crisis and may have contributed importantly to the price of risk being set too low. And that, in turn, helped sow the seeds of the credit boom. Network externalities Any asset portfolio is, in essence, a financial network. So the balance sheet of a large financial institution is a network, with nodes defined by the assets and links defined by the correlations among those assets.

Chart 11: Common component in asset  Chart 12: VaR vs CoVaR for a selection  prices  (a)  of major UK banks, post crisis Per cent 70 60  VaR Post Crisis 25 Median CoVaR Post Crisis 20  50 15 40 30  10  20  5  10 0 0 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08  Sources: Bloomberg, Merrill Lynch, and Bank calculations. (a) Proportion of variation in global equities, emerging market equities, high-yield spreads and commodities explained by a common component over a three-month rolling window.
The Financial Secretary recognized this by announcing in his Budget speech that he had asked the Secretary for Financial Services with the assistance of the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform to conduct a comprehensive study on corporate governance in Hong Kong this year. The objective will be to plug any gaps in the corporate governance regime and to become a benchmark in the region. Market bodies, professional organizations and regulators will be asked to help in this task. Your own Association may be able to contribute. I do however believe that sound corporate governance is particularly important for banks. The rapid changes brought about by globalization, deregulation and technological advances are increasing the risks in banking systems. Moreover, unlike other companies, most of the funds used by banks to conduct their business belong to their creditors, in particular to their depositors. Linked to this is the fact that the failure of a bank affects not only its own stakeholders, but may have a systemic impact on the stability of other banks. All the more reason therefore to try to ensure that banks are properly managed. It is true to say that banks in Hong Kong are already well managed by international and certainly by regional standards. The fact that they survived the financial crisis in generally good shape is a testament to this. However, during the financial crisis, the HKMA came across a few individual cases where the board of directors did not perform as well as might be expected.

In the face of this exceptional health crisis, financial institutions and supervisors alike are responding rapidly and powerfully 2.1 Rapid, powerful and unprecedented responses to support the real economy during the pandemic Unlike in 2008, banks are at the heart of the solutions this time round, and not at the centre of the crisis. With their staff, whom I would like to commend, they have gathered their forces to put in place strong measures to support the real economy. That includes the rapid implementation of state-guaranteed loans: to date, 559,000 requests have been received for a total of EUR 105 billion, of which EUR 85 billion have already been granted. In France, loans have therefore been rapidly channelled to VSEs and SMEs, in contrast with the difficulties seen in Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. Bernard Delas will come back to the measures taken by insurers, but let me just highlight the ACPR’s work on the conditions for the payment of compensation for loss of earnings, in order to better identify the challenges faced by the industry. 2.2 A responsive monetary policy Since this morning we have been in the silent period, so I shall limit myself to some retrospective remarks on monetary policy. I have often stressed that monetary policy is not made for the banks, but rather for the entire economy. And the banks have often been overly critical of monetary policy, holding it responsible for all their ills.