samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Both of these tasks make far-reaching demands on how our assets should be managed. In concrete terms, it means that I and my colleagues on the Executive Board must achieve a balance between the requirements our task place on asset management and the goal of generating earnings. In this balance it is obvious that the possibility to carry out our statutory tasks takes precedence. Earnings are only taken into account if they are attained without jeopardising the Riksbank’s central policy functions. The result of this balance is perhaps most easily described with the aid of the Riksbank’s balance sheet (see Figure 1). The Riksbank’s balance sheet Our financial assets are dominated by foreign government bonds 1 , which can be sold if necessary to intervene in the foreign exchange market. In other words, these assets have a direct link to our task concerning monetary and foreign exchange policy. Historically, the gold holding has been justified for similar reasons. However, nowadays it has become more common to regard gold as a financial asset like any other. This also applies to the Riksbank, whose gold holding partly is adapted according to its contribution to the diversification of the total asset portfolio 2 . This adjustment is made within the framework of an agreement with other central banks 3 . Other important assets are monetary policy repos, which comprise a central part of the steering interest rate system 4 . For earnings reasons, part of the repo transactions has been extended by means of FX swaps 5 .

In addition, the Bank of Albania has supplied and continues to supply the interbank market with the required amount of liquidity. BIS Review 148/2008  1  As I have mentioned in my previous statements: There’s no such thing as a free lunch! Meaning that emphasis should be put on the far-sighted perspective characterizing the Bank of Albania in the recent years. I do not refer here only to price stability, but also to the greatest challenge: banking system stability. The Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania has constantly amended the regulatory basis creating incentives for more qualitative lending, while other decisions have aimed at providing more banking system transparency to the public, more efficient internal control and better management and governing structures. Regardless of what has been stated above, the future is of prime importance. For many reasons that I have also mentioned in my previous statements, end-year 2008 and almost the entire year 2009 will in a global context be hard, full of challenges and we will be walking through unknown paths. Overcoming this economic crisis requires time. Its solution will materialize through the resetting of a number of internal and external economic balances, the re-arrangement of many supervisory institutions and the re-design of the regulatory framework on many financial market segments. Put in this general setting, the idea that our small economy would resist this global economic tsunami with no consequences at all sounds as unrealistic. However, this issue is even more intricate.
To illustrate the problem, let’s begin by examining net debt flows in the private nonfinancial and government sectors over the last 10 years. As can be seen in Chart 1, borrowing by the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  private nonfinancial sector rose rapidly from 2003 to 2006 and remained high until the crisis hit. Then borrowing turned negative as new loans were more than offset by repayments and write-offs. Only recently has borrowing turned weakly positive. Chart 2 illustrates how the stock of net debt in different sectors of the economy evolved throughout this period. It shows that much of the credit boom was concentrated in the household sector. The business sector only experienced a surge from 2006 onward. During the boom, leverage also increased in the financial sector. As the boom proceeded, credit losses were low and earnings strong. But once the bust began, this dynamic reversed. Credit losses at financial institutions surged and the sector was forced to deleverage rapidly and raise new capital. This resulted in a significant contraction in the availability of credit and was a major direct shock to the global economy. Crucially, this tightening of credit standards exacerbated how much many households and firms had to deleverage. It also crimped demand, inhibiting economic, employment and income growth, which in turn made the deleveraging process more challenging.

Broad money  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  M3 growth came close to its historic average during the fourth quarter of the year, marking 11.9% and mainly in time deposits in the banking system. Although banks did not tighten their lending terms and conditions – on the contrary, during the second half of the year there were signs of easing – demand for bank lending by the private sector was low. This remains low due to the existence of negative output gap by businesses and the growing consumer tendency to save under a perceived added insecurity for the future and a more cautious behaviour towards actual consumption. Reduction of risk premia in financial markets, maintaining positive economic growth, employment and salaries, as well as a clearer short-term perspective of the economy are expected to contribute to an increased demand for bank loans in the coming period. The banking system meets the prerequisites, in terms of liquidity, capitalisation and more favourable financing conditions to response to this demand. Our outlook for the future supports keeping a positive progress of the economy for 2011. Growing demand is expected to be subject to the comparatively better progress of the domestic demand during this year. Private consumption and investments are expected to rise further, while, after the slowdown in 2010, the fiscal sector is expected to contribute positively to the economic growth. In spite of this, the growing demand is considered to be below the potential of our economy even for 2011.
Opening Address SEACEN-BIS High-Level Seminar Veerathai Santiprabhob, Governor of the Bank of Thailand Bangkok, Thailand 15 September, 2018 Governor Subbarao, Deputy Governors of SEACEN central banks, Executive Director Genberg, Members of SEACEN Executive Committee, Executives from the BIS, Distinguished participants and speakers, Ladies and gentlemen, Good morning. I am delighted to welcome all of you to the Bank of Thailand for the SEACEN-BIS High-Level Seminar. The theme of this seminar is Digital Technologies, Financial System and Central Bank Policy. These are very important topics, especially for the members of the SEACEN Executive Committee who will play critical roles in shaping strategic direction of the SEACEN and how its programs evolve over the years. The impact of rapid transformation of technology is powerful and farreaching. Advancement in information technology has given rise to various data technologies and network platforms, changing many facets of our lives and helping uplift productivity for firms and individuals. These developments have led to greater connectivity between nations, cultures, and people and break down the barriers of international trades, supply-chains, and capital flows. At the same time, these digital transformations, along with new landscapes they introduced, bring new forms of risks for firms and individuals and pose challenges for central banks. Firms will face greater operational risks from IT transformation and cyber threat while being at risk of increased competition and disrupted business models.

During the period of rapid digital transformations, there is no denying that digital divide can worsen, especially in emerging economies. There will be those with access, are able to take advantage of technological advancement, and prosper; and those who lack access or capability to leverage on modern technology, fall behind, and perish. Finding that right balancing will certainly be a challenge for us, central bankers, but it can be an area where international collaboration and networking platforms, like the SEACEN Centre, can play a role. Refining the knowns, looking ahead for the unknowns, and balancing our actions. These are how we should approach our policy questions. I am glad the SEACEN and its organizers have selected a number of topics that will allow us to think deeply about digital transformations and implications for central banks and encourage that future SEACEN activities put even greater emphasis on how we can balance our policy actions and enhance collaboration among members in this new area. I would also like to thank the group of scholars and practitioners here with us today, who will share their thoughts on many important topics, help broaden our perceptions of the knowns, and shed some lights on the unknowns. 3/4  And on this note, allow me to introduce Governor Duvvuri Subbarao, Former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India and currently a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies of the National University of Singapore.
In 2005 we started a project at the Riksbank that is aimed at increasing our understanding of the strong growth in productivity in Sweden in recent years. More specifically, we are studying the relationship between IT investments, organisational changes, internal training and productivity. At the beginning of May this year we organised a seminar where economists from a number of organisations presented their views on developments in productivity. In December we will also be organising a workshop where external researchers will contribute valuable points of view. Hopefully this will make us wiser with regard to developments in productivity growth. However, at the same time, one must have realistic expectations of what can be achieved here; it will probably always be difficult to assess future productivity growth. What significance would lower interest rates in recent years have had for unemployment? There are thus natural explanations as to why inflation has been so low in recent years. With the picture we ourselves and most other forecasters had of inflation prospects during 2002-2003, it would probably have been difficult to motivate a much lower interest rate than we chose. With hindsight, it can of course be noted that the repo rate could have been cut more quickly. We have pointed this out ourselves in our own assessments. 3 The question is what this could have meant for unemployment. 1  When one measures inflation with the aid of UND1X, one adjusts CPI for the direct effects of changes in indirect taxes and changes in mortgage interest costs.

Monetary policy’s effects on unemployment are minor in relation to those due to structural problems. The current situation in the labour market Let me before I finish briefly comment on how I viewed the current situation in the labour market in connection with the monetary policy meeting in May. A large number of central wage agreements are being renegotiated this year. There are several factors governing how high wage costs can be expected to be in future. One important aspect is to what extent the social partners take into account the labour market situation in their wage bargaining rounds. Another is how well the labour market functions with regard to matching the demand for and supply of labour. The wage bargaining rounds have so far resulted in wage increases that appear to be slightly above what we had estimated in the February Monetary Policy Report. We pointed this out at the monetary policy meeting on 3 May. The labour market situation has strengthened and it is therefore reasonable to assume in future that there will be slightly higher wage increases than we have been used to in recent years. The information that we had access to at our monetary policy meeting in May indicated that resource utilisation in the labour capacity was slightly more strained than we anticipated in the February report. There were signs that the labour shortage in the business sector has continued to increase.
You may recall that in the movie Wall Street, Michael Douglas kept on saying: “Greed is good!” When this kind of mindset, which puts the individuals’ interests above the firm’s and the firm’s interests ahead of the client’s, becomes prevalent, it will inevitably lead to highly undesirable if not disastrous outcomes not just for the users but for the financial system as a whole. So while greed is probably an inherent part of human nature, a successful financial firm or an IFC must ensure that it can develop and cherish a culture and values that will restrain excessive greed in the interests of giving customers a fair deal. Only in doing that will an IFC be able to sustain its position and competitive edge over a long period of time. We all understand that an IFC also represents a brand, a quality that customers trust in terms of efficiency, reliability and integrity. It takes  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  decades or even centuries to build a brand, but only days to destroy it if any of the qualities of competence, control or culture are eroded. Ladies and gentlemen, I have talked about the qualities or power of the 3Cs and I hope you will agree with me that, if Hong Kong wishes to remain competitive as the region’s premier IFC, we will have to do everything we can to strengthen our “soft power”.

Norman T L Chan: The power of 3Cs Address by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Treasury Markets Summit 2012, Hong Kong, 12 October 2012. *  *  *  Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you all to this fifth Treasury Markets Summit co-organised by the Treasury Markets Association and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. In the past four Summits, discussions focused mainly on business opportunities available to financial market participants. This year, I am glad to note that, the Summit will also devote a session to analysing some of the fundamental elements of a first-class financial centre. Being an ardent believer of these fundamental elements, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you some of my thoughts on them. From time to time visitors from overseas come to see me and, during our conversations, the question of how Hong Kong has turned itself into a thriving and dynamic financial centre in Asia is often raised. It is not surprising that Hong Kong’s transformation from a trading port into an IFC within several decades has drawn a great deal of admiration as well as envy from neighbours within the region and beyond. This is because of the fact that an IFC will bring about much-desired economic growth, employment and prestige. So it is also not surprising that many cities in the region harbour ambitions of becoming international financial centres.
Second, the inflation target is quantified. The actual target varies, however, from one country to another. In some countries, such as New Zealand and Israel, the target has been set as a target band for inflation, and not as a single target figure. Other countries like Canada and Sweden have a target figure with a target band around it. Common to all inflation-targeting countries is the existence of symmetry: It is equally important to avoid an inflation rate that is too low as it is to avoid an inflation rate that is too high. Monetary policy in the US and the euro area is not usually considered to be inflation targeting. In the US, low and stable inflation is an important long-term monetary policy objective, but no explicit target has been set. In the euro area, price stability is the most important monetary policy objective. This is stipulated by a treaty. The ECB has defined price stability as a rise in consumer prices that is less than but close to 2 per cent. This means that there is no symmetry. The ECB differs here. It also appears that the ECB has a longer time horizon for its assessments, and the bank emphasises developments in the money supply. For most inflation-targeting countries, the explicit target is linked to a level or a band for the consumer price index. Some of the prices in the consumer price index vary considerably, however, due, for example, to tax changes, weather and wind.

Inflation-targeting central banks usually publish inflation reports or monetary policy reports, but there are major differences in the frequency of publication, horizons and assumptions for projections as well as the contents in general.6 In the UK, economic developments receive broad coverage. The Bank makes projections two years ahead, but only for developments in GDP and prices. Sweden has a two-year horizon for the inflation target. The inflation report does not discuss the monetary policy stance. Instead, this is presented in the published minutes from the monetary policy meetings. The inflation report contains relatively detailed prognoses. In all inflation-targeting countries, with the exception of Iceland, the interest rate is assessed at pre-announced times. The interest rate may also be assessed at extraordinary meetings. In addition, signals about the interest rate may be given in speeches or other statements. Practice varies with regard to the publication of meeting minutes and voting. At Norges Bank, we have become more transparent in recent years about the background for the interest rate decisions. So far, we have only had positive experience with this. In statements following monetary policy meetings, press conferences, inflation reports and speeches, we present an account of aspects of economic developments that influence the Executive Board’s assessments and interest rate decisions. Everything is available on Norges Bank’s website. Interest rate decisions are based on a monetary policy strategy drawn up by the Executive Board every four months. The strategy is published as soon as it is adopted and prior to the relevant strategy period.
The cuts we have already made to the MPR have helped to smooth the business cycle, and, as we have mentioned before and now again in the Report I am presenting, a still stronger monetary impulse will likely be necessary in order to ensure compliance with the inflation target. In particular, given the present conditions, and barring a big change in the economic scenario, we believe that the monetary policy adjustments the market expects, which are implicit in the various expectations indicators at the closing of this Report – end of August – , will suffice to achieve the inflation target and help revive our economy. Monetary policy is an important and significant tool to tone down the cyclical fluctuations of the economy. Its countercyclical use is a privilege that we have earned after years of policy conduct that has strengthened the credibility of the Central Bank. But it is also important to note that powerful does not mean almighty. It allows to mitigate, but not fully offset, the natural fluctuations of a small, open economy like Chile. More importantly, if we wish the Chilean economy to attain higher growth rates in the medium term, it will be necessary to implement measures to encourage investment in both physical and human capital and promote productivity growth, all elements which, incidentally, are beyond the scope of monetary policy. This Monetary Policy Report contains a revision by the Board to its medium-term growth assumption for Chile over the coming years.

(*) Starting in January 2014, the new annual indices with base 2013=100 are used, so they are not strictly comparable to previous data. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 5 GDP and domestic demand (annual change, percent) 18  18  12  12  6  6  0  0  -6  -6  -12  -12 09  10 GDP  11  12  Domestic demand  13  14  Final demand  Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 6 Current account (*) (percent of GDP) 6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -6  -6 08  14  (*) Accumulated in moving year. Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 7 Demand indicators (annual change, percent) 60  21  40  17  20  13  0  9  -20  5  -40  1 11  12 New car sales Capital goods imports  13  14 Retail sales  (*) Quarterly moving average. Sources: National Car Association of Chile (ANAC), Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE).
So, it raises the “signal-to-noise” ratio, which reduces uncertainty faced by private agents and strengthens the pass-through from communication to market expectations. Second, transparency is a mechanism for democratic accountability, in a world of policy discretion and central bank independence. Transparency makes it easier to judge whether a central bank is committed to its announced policy, and acts as a check on possible temptations to base policy on short-run or political considerations. In short, communication demystifies and democratises monetary policy. The empirical literature finds that better information about central bank actions can lead markets to do the central bank’s work for it. Blinder et al. (2001) was an early study which found that the US bond market’s ability to forecast Fed actions improved from around 1996 onwards, a few years after the Fed started announcing policy changes and publishing minutes of its meetings. Relatively small changes in the Fed’s policy rate were amplified by complementary movements in the bond market, which helps to stabilise the 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  macroeconomy.

Giving more information may induce not more, but less, clarity among market participants, as there are limits to how much information can be digested effectively.6 The public may not easily understand the uncertainty and conditionality surrounding central bank forecasts.7 Or worse still, agents might come to realise how uncertain the central bank is about economic conditions.8 Sometimes, it is just not feasible to provide that degree of clarity out in the public. Second, central bankers need to think about the potential interaction of greater transparency with the path of future monetary policy decisions. Policy expectations engendered by communication may unduly constrain policy action. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that there can be too much of a good thing, although anchoring the optimal degree of central bank transparency still proves elusive. A number of studies have found diminishing returns to central bank transparency on market expectations.9 Others also found that disseminating specific and detailed information, such as full meeting transcripts, provides little marginal value over more concise communication, such as policy meeting minutes, in terms of guiding market expectations.10 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  There are a set of papers showing that more information can result in destabilising market expectations.