samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And second, there were no people with well-founded experience on how to run and lecture these programs. There was a generation problem - one generation was - and still is - missing. Where we stand today and how we have coped with those drawbacks? There was no magic solution but I dare say that today we have almost overcome the problem of missing generation in economic education and that we have been closing the gap between us and the developed world fast. I see three important factors which contributed to this development. On the first place I would put the new generation of young and strongly motivated people. They created enormous pressure on those who with their limited know-how - started to prepare new economic courses. This is my second point in this respect that there was a learning-by-doing process of creating new courses, mostly designed along the recent trends in economics and business education. Despite the fact we did not have any experience with these courses, we roughly knew which direction to go. Last but not least, the Czech education system received a strong support from abroad, both in terms of visiting lecturers and money. In some cases, these two aspects were interconnected, and completely new programs were gradually built up. Among all, let me name Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education, US Business School Prague and CMC Graduate School of Business. I can offer another illustration of how far we have gone. I have been with the Czech National Bank for six years.

But as an academician I was in contact with the central bank already at the beginning of 1990s. At that time, the staff was struggling with very basic issues: a new statistics and data on the newly born market economy, ways how the economy should be analysed and what kind of theory or model should be applied etc. The Czech National Bank was receiving a lot of help from the foreign central banks and international institutions. Today, we are at the level of state-of-art and we do not receive but provide foreign technical assistance. We assist directly to a number of countries as well as our experts are invited to IMF missions around the world. And yet our staff is based primarily on people educated in the Czech Republic. I consider it as a good signal that we have reached significant achievements in economic education and that the problem of missing generation will soon cease to exist. I can only hope that we will continue with this process of catching up and that CMC will keep contributing to it. What can I wish to you personally? Let me recall my recent visit to the Bank of Israel on the occasion of its 50th anniversary. We were having lunch with the Finance Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and we discussed necessary fiscal reforms. Mr. Netanyahu said that for pushing reforms through, one needs three things: the vision, the will and the political power.
chart 7). Before the onset of the global financial crisis, the euro area was regarded by financial markets as a more or less homogeneous unit. Hardly any distinction was made between country risk within the euro area. This was reflected in the fact that the government bond interest rates of most member countries were practically the same as those of the country with the lowest yields, namely Germany. During the course of the financial crisis, concerns over the stability of the euro area led to increasingly large divergences between the sovereign yields of the large member countries. Yields rose not just on Italian and Spanish bonds, but also on French sovereigns. In this environment, the growth and inflation outlook for the euro area again deteriorated. At the end of 2011, the ECB therefore reversed two of its interest rate hikes, those of April and July 2011. Market uncertainty resulted in renewed inflows to the Swiss franc, causing it to appreciate against a broad range of currencies (cf. chart 8). In 2007, one euro cost CHF 1.65 – by August 2011, the exchange rate had fallen to almost parity. The Swiss franc also gained markedly against the US dollar, which at the time was not regarded as safe haven due to discussions about the debt ceiling. In 2007, a dollar cost CHF 1.25 – in autumn 2011, it temporarily fell to 75 centimes. A rapid and substantial appreciation was also taking place against the other major currencies, with no end in sight.

The Swiss franc was overvalued against a broad range of currencies, resulting in a severe deterioration in the economic and inflation outlook for Switzerland, threatening severe consequences for the real economy. To turn this dramatic tide of events, at first the SNB increased its liquidity – in August 2011 alone, liquidity expansion amounted to CHF 170 billion. This measure, however, did not have a sustained effect. Finally, in September 2011, the SNB introduced a minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro as a temporary, exceptional measure (cf. chart 9). The SNB was thereby prepared to use its balance sheet to purchase foreign currency in order to stop the spread of panic. While this policy measure corrected the exceptional strength of the Swiss franc, the currency remained substantially overvalued. Nevertheless, the stabilisation of the euro/Swiss franc exchange rate allowed the Swiss economy to adjust to the new currency reality. In addition, the inflation outlook, which had worsened due to the strong Swiss franc, brightened again. The euro crisis impacted not just the economy in Switzerland, but also the economies and exchange rates of the other neighbouring countries under review. They, too, eased their 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  monetary policies. In Sweden, from the end of 2011 to the end of 2013, interest rates were lowered in successive steps to 1%; between 2010 and 2011, they had been raised to 2% on the back of robust economic growth.
Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 10 Incidences on annual CPI inflation (1)(2) (percentage points)  CPI inflation (1) (annual change, percent) 10  10  10  10  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  -2  -2  -4  -4  -2  -2  06  08  10  12  IPoM jun. 2010  IPoM sep. 2010  -4  03 04 05 06 07 08 09  4  4  -4  Public utilities (5,43%) Fuels (5.7%) Foodstuffs w/o fresh fruits and vegetables (21.32%) Fresh fruits and vegetables (2.90%) Other (64,65%)  (1) Gray area shows forecasts as from the third quarter of 2010. (2) In parentheses, shares in the CPI basket with annual base 2009. For the period 2003-2008, weights in the basket of December 1998. For 2009, weights in the basket of December 2008. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute.

Some increase in the transparency both of the strategy and objectives of the funds and of recipient countries’ approach to inward investment should help dispel concerns and ensure they are a force for greater global financial integration rather than a prompt for a new wave of financial protectionism. SWF’s recent investments in global financial institutions have been helpful in easing the current financial market turmoil. And the fact that they, and their central banks, are looking for higher returns and greater asset diversification should be beneficial both to the EMEs and to the recipient countries since it should improve the efficiency of global asset allocation. But that positive story should not conceal that the growth of SWFs is also a result of persistent global imbalances in trade. These imbalances have helped create vulnerabilities in financial markets and in the wider economy. Our current experience is one more illustration of how painful the unwinding of such imbalances can be.
I also have a number of specific remarks and views to make on the aspects of East Asian financial markets to be discussed in the next sessions. But for the benefit of time, I think I should leave them for later opportunity. For now, let me close by saying a little bit about the role of policy. Government policies, in my view, have played an important role in the current development of East Asian financial markets. The key policy, of course, has been the implementation of financial sector reform which has resulted in a much improved financial system, especially the banking sector. Policies have been directed at developing the region’s capital markets too, especially the bond market. Policy coordination has also been strengthened to increase regional financial integration and to develop a policy coordination framework that can help the region deal better with the likelihood of a crisis. I am referring here to the CMI or the Chiang Mai Initiative and its surveillance process. But while policies have been important, the process of financial market development in East Asia has essentially been left to the market, in the sense that the process is basically a market-driven one. But on account of what is perceived to be a slow progress, question arises whether policy should do more. My view is that the process should continue to be market-driven and not policy-driven. But there are areas that government policies can do more, especially on issues that involve efforts on a region-wide basis.

The decisions taken on 12 March, which were said to have missed their target, have often been compared unfavourably with the successful “package” of 18 March. However, I want to stress that they are complementary. On 12 March, the ECB decided to make almost EUR 3,000 billion – ¼ of euro area GDP – available to banks through “TLTRO III” operations that provide refinancing at a negative interest rate (that can be as low -0.75% if banks at least maintain their stock of outstanding loans) for an amount of up to 50% of lending to the economy, essentially to ISEs and SMEs. On 18 March, we further decided to launch an exceptional asset purchase envelope of EUR 750 billion for those that obtain their financing through the markets, namely governments and large corporations. This totally unprecedented Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) aims at avoiding a positive shock on long-term interest rates associated with the exceptional expense of the public health crisis. It also comes on top of the EUR 300 billion of asset purchases that had already been planned. Also unprecedented is that the ECB has thus accorded itself flexibility, where necessary, on three fronts: between public and private sector  Page 4 of 8 securities, between countries for public sector securities, and with regard to the issuer holdings limit of 33% on each public sector security. The Eurosystem also decided, quickly and forcefully, to activate its macro- and microprudential levers to help euro area financial institutions optimise their capacities to finance businesses.
Caleb M Fundanga: Third quarter 2010 media briefing Presented by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Lusaka, 8 November 2010. *  *  *  Executive summary This brief examines monetary policy implementation and its outcomes in the third quarter of 2010. The brief also reviews other economic and financial sector developments. In the conclusion, it provides an inflation outlook for the fourth quarter of 2010. Monetary policy The focus of monetary policy during the third quarter of 2010 continued to be the achievement of the end-year annual inflation target of 8.0%. Consistent with this inflation outturn, annual overall inflation was programmed at 7.3% for end-September 2010. To achieve this, the Bank of Zambia utilised largely Open Market Operations and Government securities auctioning to maintain reserve money within the programmed growth path. This was to be complemented by prudent fiscal management. Inflation Quarterly overall inflation increased to 1.6% in September 2010 from the 1.0% recorded in June 2010, but was slightly lower than the 1.7% recorded in the third quarter of 2009. This outturn was mainly attributed to the rise in food inflation to –0.1% from the –1.7% recorded in the previous quarter, as non-food inflation slowed down to 3.2% from 3.7% during the same period. However, the annual overall inflation rate was largely unchanged at 7.7% in September 2010 compared to the 7.8% recorded in June 2010, but was above the projected 7.3% for the period.

This industry process formally began in January 2011, issued its requirements document in May 2011 and recommended a consortium led by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) as its preferred provider in July 2011. DTCC is currently running a private sector entity identification pilot project, starting with over the counter derivatives. Although this market is fairly concentrated, building the database still  24  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010). 25  European Commission (2010). 26  G20 (2009). 27  Financial Stability Board (2010). 28  CPSS-IOSCO (2011). 29  Office of Financial Research (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  poses challenges. DTCC anticipates the database could contain over 1 million entities. This pilot will provide valuable experience when moving to a broader range of products and market participants. The FSB is constructing an LEI roadmap, harnessing the efforts of both official and private sectors. Its destination is a single, global LEI standard. As announced last week, significant progress is being made across five fronts: governance, operational model, scope and access, funding and implementation and phasing.30 The FSB will present its LEI recommendations to the next G20 summit in June 2012. Creating a PI for finance is altogether more complex. Finance is in the pre-barcode era for retail products or the pre-web era of the internet. But enough work has already been done to demonstrate that PIs are feasible.
shocks which are not common to other members, and which would therefore require a monetary policy stance that differs from that which is appropriate to the currency union. The Treaty’s provision for a flexible time-table is grounded in this fundamental economic principle. Now, while most of us are probably familiar with the fact that Malta has an obligation to adopt the euro at some point in the future, the rationale for doing so might be less obvious. Perhaps an appropriate way to put it is that EMU has come to play a central part of what the EU is today and of what it is expected to become in the future. This is because by significantly reducing transaction costs and intra-area exchange rate risk, the euro facilitates progress towards the completion of the Single Market and gives access to a large pool of financial resources. By increasing price transparency, moreover, the euro fosters a more competitive environment, which, in turn, is conducive to higher levels of efficiency. In this sense, the euro also contributes to the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy’s goal of making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. Indeed, the Strategy states explicitly that it is essential to exploit the potential of the euro to promote the integration of EU financial markets and also, therefore, SME growth and job creation.

Once Malta is an EMU member, the foreign currency and local currency rating will be equalised but at what level will depend mostly on the fiscal account.”  BIS Review 61/2004  3  ECB; and that even if the degree of business cycle synchronisation with the euro area is already significant, national economic and financial structures might respond to the ECB’s monetary policy stimuli differently from the average euro area Member State. While this might not matter much when other tools of adjustment such as the exchange rate are available, the argument continues, the use of these tools is thwarted in a single currency area such as EMU. On the one hand, exchange rate flexibility is conditioned by the maximum allowable bands in ERM II, and is given up altogether upon the irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate at the point of euro adoption. Additionally, the Stability and Growth Pact constrains the use of fiscal policy for fine tuning the economy. Consequently, any underlying imbalances in the economy are bound to persist. While based on sound theoretical principles, this argument is largely not applicable to Malta. In particular, the business cycle is already fairly synchronised with that of the euro area, and the degree of trade integration is also quite significant. At the same time, sectoral GDP and employment data both reveal a strong correspondence with euro area economic structures, after allowance is made for the relatively more dominant role of tourism in Malta.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Advancing financial inclusion to its next level Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) 2014 Global Policy Forum – “Advancing financial inclusion to its next level”, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 10 September 2014. *  *  *  It is my very great honour to be invited to speak at this year’s AFI Global Policy Forum in beautiful Trinidad and Tobago. First of all, on behalf of Malaysia, let me express how greatly honoured we are to be given this opportunity to host the headquarters of AFI. Malaysia is strongly committed to the financial inclusion cause and will strive to the fullest and best of our ability to provide the necessary support to AFI towards achieving its objectives. This is an exciting time for advancing the global financial inclusion agenda, as the world economic recovery gains further progress and as there is increasing world attention and priority being accorded to achieving financial inclusion and to an economic progress that is more inclusive. While stability and growth has been restored in many parts of the world, all of us recognise that economic growth, no matter how stellar, will begin to fade when inequality sets in, and as income disparities widen. Additionally, experience has shown that financial crisis and economic recession entrenches the cycle of poverty.

Caleb M Fundanga: Bank of Zambia’s Information Dissemination Programme Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, on the launch of the Bank of Zambia Information Dissemination Programme, Lusaka, 28 May 2007. *  *  *  Governor, kindly give brief introductory remarks On behalf of the Bank of Zambia Board, management and staff, and indeed on my own behalf, I wish to sincerely thank the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) for this opportunity to launch the Bank of Zambia Information Dissemination Programme. This programme is part of our comprehensive strategy to inform the general public and all our stakeholders on the role of Bank of Zambia in the economy. What is the primary role of the Bank of Zambia? Just to remind the listeners, the Bank of Zambia’s primary role is to formulate and implement monetary and supervisory policies that will ensure price and financial system stability. Our vision, in this regard, is to become a World Class central bank. What is your general assessment of the recent performance of the Zambian economy? In the past few years, the Zambian economy has performed relatively well, recording positive real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, with inflation and interest rates coming down. Specifically, what have been the developments in output? During the period 2001-2005, growth in real GDP averaged 5.0% per annum. More recently, in 2006, it is estimated that the economy grew by close to 6%, marking the eighth consecutive year of positive real growth in output.
The third – and almost certainly the most important – factor is the range of furlough schemes put in place this year. These have introduced an even bigger wedge between GDP and household incomes, shielding consumers from the huge drop in national income. This has been done only at the expense of a material rise in public-sector debt, something that will have to be paid for over time. But as far as households are concerned, the schemes have succeeded in smoothing out that cost, helping to sustain both incomes and consumer spending in the meantime. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  Let me now turn to another important contributor to the anomaly in Chart 1, and the main focus today – the extent to which consumers have responded to the pandemic by substituting some forms of spending for others. I’ll begin with what some simple economics has to say about what you might expect to happen, depending on the circumstances, and then look at a bit of evidence. The direct impact of the pandemic on aggregate consumption Imagine the government suddenly slaps a big excise duty on something people buy. Let’s suppose – just for the sake of (wholly unrealistic) argument – it’s restaurant meals. Imagine too, just to make the parallel a little closer, that the government compensates you for the cost of this (it redistributes the proceeds of the tax). So you don’t lose out in terms of income.

Regarding collateral valuation, it cannot be ignored that provisions apply to the uncollateralised part of each loan. Consequently, guarantees pledged to each loan represent a central element in the new approach for measuring credit risk. To fulfill their role, guarantees have to be effective, that is to say, they need to be validated as a mitigant of credit risk. For this to be true they must subject to strict, rigorous and verifiable valuation criteria. To facilitate this last point, banks should have procedures for the valuation of the collateral with updated information based on revised appraisals adapted to changes in the macroeconomic situation and reliable analysis of trends of market prices, particularly for real estate collateral. Finally, estimates of credit losses and provisions should rely on credit risk models developed on a sufficiently quantitative basis where prudence should be reinforced. In any case,  1  See G. Jiménez and J. Saurina: “Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation”, International Journal of Central Banking, 2006. 4/7  estimates should be based on credible assumptions that are sufficiently justified and consistent over time. The methodology used must be readily understandable and the results intuitive. Also, consistency should be an objective. Banks should establish procedures for periodically testing the reliability and consistency of the results obtained. The periodic testing of the calculation of provisions should be done regularly through, for example, back-testing the estimated credit losses with those actually observed in finalised credit operations.