samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Calculated through a combination of ‘SOC2KM’, ‘SC102KM’, SC2KMMJ’, ‘SOC10M’ and ‘SOCMAIN’ to create 10 classes of occupations as these change across time  Pay  Log of average gross hourly pay in main job (‘HOURPAY’)  Public sector or private  ‘PUBLICR’ Whether working in the public or  sector  private sector  Region  Region of usual residence ‘URESMC’  Sector  A combination of Sector (SIC2007) ‘IND07’ and industry section (main job) ‘IND07M’ as these change across time  Tenure  Length of time continuously employed ‘EMPLEN’ 36  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  36  UK-born  A combination of varying country of origin and country of birth variables: ‘CRYOX’, ‘CRYOX7’, ‘CRYO’, ‘CRYO7’ and ‘CRY01’  Usual hours worked  Log of total usual hours in main job (including overtime) ‘TTUSHR’  Wave  ‘THISWV’ Wave to which the data refers to  37  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  37  References Alkadry, M G and Tower, L E (2006), 'Unequal Pay: The Role of Gender', Public Administration Review, Vol. 66, No. 6, pp. 888-898. BEIS (2017), 'Race in the workplace: The McGregor-Smith Review', Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. Bjerk, D (2007), 'The Differing Nature of Black-White Wage Inequality across Occupational Sectors', The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 398-434. Black, D, Haviland, A, Sanders, S and Taylor, L (2006), 'Why do Minority Men Earn Less?

The challenge, now, is to calibrate and phase in the new framework in a way that does not impede the recovery and does not contradict our macroeconomic objectives. In the long run, we want stronger balance sheets in the banking system but too high capital requirements could have negative effects, reducing loan supply and, paradoxically, fostering risk-taking in order to keep a high return on equity. In the immediate future, disorderly deleveraging is one of the main downside risks to the recovery process. A macroeconomic assessment of the reforms is underway and will help us strike the optimal balance. The broader point here is that the proposed reforms may have significant macroeconomic consequences and these should be factored in when designing and implementing them. A critical issue put forward relates to the behavior of banks with respect to the capital buffers that they retain on top of the existing minimum. If banks target buffers above the regulatory minimum, which is an endogenous market outcome, they may need to raise even larger amounts of equity than what can be expected by just looking at the current package. We know from empirical studies that weaker capitalized banks typically exhibit weak loan growth compared to other better-capitalized banks. We also know that banks may find it less costly to adjust loan volumes and loan pricing than capital, as frictions in the market for bank capital make the latter option more expensive.
As the responsibility for structural reforms in the EU and in the euro area rests with the individual Member States, a wide variety of institutional solutions and regulatory arrangements across countries and sectors exist. In many areas I consider this decentralised approach to be an opportunity, not a disadvantage. It makes possible healthy competition between differing policy designs of national authorities and enables solutions that are tailored to the particular needs of a country or region. This fact, which is a clear advantage of the euro area economy compared with other more centralised economies, is often not recognised enough. Decentralised policies offer a unique opportunity to explore different solutions in a competitive manner, allowing the testing of various approaches and, if thought useful, selection of best practices with a high degree of confidence. Fiscal policy is a good example of a field where Europe found an efficient solution in the form of common rules which keep the advantages of decentralisation and subsidiarity. As is well-known, budgetary policies remain under national responsibility, but effective common rules have been developed in the form of the excessive deficit procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. These rules are designed to ensure that a high degree of fiscal discipline supports the single monetary policy in its primary objective of maintaining price stability.

 An automated market maker (AMM) platform inspired from the DeFi markets, which could serve as the basis of a multi-CBDC platform where different central banks come together to enable fast, automated and transparent settlement across currencies. Page 6 sur 7 I announce today that we engage the second phase of our experimentations program with 4 or 5 additional ones starting this semester. We want to get closer to a viable prototype, testing it in practice with more private actors and more foreign central banks in the second half of 2022 and in 2023. This work ensures that we stand ready to bring central bank money as a settlement asset as early as 2023, with the implementation of the European pilot regime. This pilot regime will offer a regulatory framework to support the financial asset tokenisation trend. Finally, these experiments conducted by the Banque de France contribute directly to the Eurosystem's existing task force, and future Governing council’s decision, on improving our services to the wholesale market. This leads to the key outstanding issue of the articulation of a CBDC with existing infrastructures, such as Target Services in the EU. Both must be made interoperable: on the one hand, distributed ledger technologies are still not mature enough to handle large volumes of transactions, and therefore will not replace conventional systems from one day to another; they will rather complement them. Centralised and distributed systems will thus have to coexist securely and efficiently.
To join or not to join To join or not to join EMU is a complex and multi-faceted decision for any sovereign nation. By definition, it amounts to a long-term commitment to an uncertain process subject to unpredictable influences. The long-term costs and benefits of such a decision are therefore not easily evaluated. In addition, the cost-benefit analysis must take place at many different levels. Economics constitutes only one layer of analysis and by no means the only relevant one. Switzerland and the United Kingdom are both nations with long-standing traditions of global integration and free trade. Both nations rely fundamentally on multilateral contractual frameworks such as the one offered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our nations and our peoples live in and benefit from a global and open world. Europe is and must remain part of that world. Surely an open multilateral global economy must be our primary long-term commitment. The decision to join a regional agreement such as the European Monetary Union must be evaluated against this global backdrop. I have tried to provide you with a brief sketch of some of the salient macro-economic issues related to such an evaluation. Beyond  4  BIS Review 24/2004  economics, both of our nations have a proud political history. Ultimately, the decision to surrender national sovereignty - be it monetary or otherwise - will always be a political one. Central bankers may have views as private citizens which they would presumably express at the ballot box.

When you know it’s there, it’s obvious. But when, as instructed , people are engrossed in the highs and lows of the basketball game, many fail to notice the bear. The risk of adjustment in the stretched prices (and compressed yields) in corporate debt markets are my moonwalking bear, hidden in plain sight. The icebergs can lurk beneath the surface of the system. They make navigation of markets uncertain and hazardous. Assessment of them requires diving into the cold, murky depths of the financial system. Excessive leverage and liquidity mismatches were the bergs of the financial crisis. They forced investors into firesales of assets, magnifying market adjustments, and sometimes even disrupting market functioning. In other words, they compromised market resilience. Those risks have been addressed. But we must stay alert to any possible new bergs of the future. To spot them emerging we need to dive into the detail of the system, to look at the incentives and constraints facing the participants. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  We’ll don our diving equipment later. Before we do, it’s worth asking who should care about hidden risk? Any manager focussed on risk and return will be interested in these bears and bergs. Failure to acknowledge them can damage performance. But while the risks mean some investors can have a bad day and others a good one, the ups and downs of asset markets don’t necessarily concern policymakers.
The growing importance of Islamic finance Indeed, Islamic Finance has grown most significantly in the last decade, posting double- digit rates since 2007, at close to 20%, compared with growth of 4% in the “conventional” financial sector. It has now reached a volume of $ 2 trillion, which is a very significant figure that represents around 1% of total global bank assets. The surge of Islamic Finance is apparent both in Islamic countries and also, in European markets, with the establishment of Islamic banks and the development of the Sukuk market for private and official issuers under some European jurisdictions. The prospects for Islamic finance are also positive, given the extensive scope for the financial inclusion of a population in a number of countries, with very low rates of bank access and usage. The regulatory challenge of Islamic finance The further development of Islamic finance will nonetheless depend on implementing the necessary financial reforms to ensure its integration into the wider financial system. Here, I think that the challenges are twofold: FIRST, in Islamic jurisdictions the challenge is to continue developing the architecture of Islamic finance in areas such as payment systems and supervisory and resolution regimes. In particular, it would seem vital to advance towards the standardisation of Islamic finance regulation, breaking the existing jurisdictional heterogeneity, in order to take advantage of a wider international market. The SECOND challenge refers to the integration of Islamic finance into the wider financial system.

But fire services do not offer free insurance for people who smoke in bed or set fire to their own house, thereby encouraging them to take risks that endanger others. When it became clear that Northern Rock could not find funding elsewhere, it came to the tripartite authorities (FSA, Treasury and Bank) to seek financial support from the Bank of England. Rather than stabilise the situation, the actions of the authorities seemed, at least initially, to fan the flames. There are lessons for us to learn. And I will come to those in a minute. But let me return to the queues of depositors. Here is an extract from a local newspaper: “By noon on Friday, more than 40 … customers … were waiting in line at the branch … waiting upward of an hour and a half to withdraw money from their accounts.” “Anxious depositors clutching withdrawal slips filled the offices for a second straight day. … The company placed extra chairs in a waiting area and asked customers to write their names on a sign-in sheet.” This wasn’t Newcastle or London. It was Los Angeles on August 17 and 18. The bank experiencing the run was not Northern Rock but Countrywide, a US mortgage bank. It is a Tale of Two Banks – banks of similar sizes and facing similar difficulties with funding – just a few weeks apart. Like Northern Rock, Countrywide took risks and relied on short-term funding from investors. But the similarity ends there. There were two significant differences.
Another change, which is created by the ongoing structural change in our country in growth dynamics, is closely related to the increases in productivity. According to SPO data, the contribution of total factor productivity to growth reached 51.3 percent in the 2002-2004 period, while this rate was 3.3 percent in the 1990-2000 period. In other words, the largest contribution to growth comes from the increases in productivity. In the 2001-2005 period, productivity increases in the private manufacturing industry reached 36 percent, in cumulate terms. Hence, the increase in productivity was the main determinant of growth, during this period. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the increases in productivity not only enhance the quality of growth, but also contribute to the sustainability of growth. I would like to talk about another factor in the scope of the changing growth dynamics in the Turkish economy. That is the fact that our economy is getting more and more integrated with the world. High export rates have made a remarkable contribution to growth in the past four years. In this period, the average annual rate of increase of exports realized as 24 percent. In the 2002-2005 period, our exports increased by 104 percent. Parallel to this development, firms are increasingly shifting to exports and reaching international markets by quitting local production processes and local markets. As our economy opens to the outside world, profit margins narrow, due to increasing internal and external competition in the sectors.

After focusing on the developments in inflation and our policies regarding interest rates and exchange rates, now I would like to talk about the growth of the Turkish economy. As you all know, the Turkish economy has been displaying a high growth performance for the last four years. Since 2001, cumulative real growth has been 35.1 percent, whereas the average annual growth has been 7.8 percent. The point that stands out in the growth figures is that growth is led by the private sector and that the investment-originated base is growing. In the 2001-2005 period, investment expenditures of the private sector increased by 105 percent, while those of the public sector increased by 15.5 percent. On the consumption side, expenditures of the private sector increased by 30.3 percent in the same period, whereas those of the public sector increased by 5.9 percent. These developments indicate that the ongoing strong investment trend enhanced the growth potential and that the dynamics and actors of growth changed parallel to Turkey’s structural change process. Growing with public resources is no longer the case. In this respect, it is clear today that the public sector assumes and should assume, a strong supervisory and regulatory role in the framework of good governance principles. This is emphasized evidently in the Ninth Development Plan Strategy, which comprises the period between 2007 and 2013.
Just as central banks need to gradually unwind monetary accommodation when the crisis has passed, so must fiscal policy return to a more sustainable trajectory. Targeted fiscal policy measures can support monetary policy and macroprudential policy in achieving their objectives. Tax or expenditure measures have the advantage of being able to either alleviate or accentuate the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies on specific groups of people or sectors of the economy. To help cool an overheated property market, fiscal measures such as transaction taxes on property purchases can be a useful complement to macroprudential measures to curb excessive demand. In the current conjuncture of high inflation, fiscal policy has the versatility of being tighter overall to help ease demand pressures while providing targeted support for the most vulnerable groups. INTEGRATED POLICIES AS APPLIED IN SINGAPORE Before I conclude, let me say a few words about the Singapore experience. Singapore does not have a formal integrated policy framework but there has been an intuitive coherence across monetary, fiscal, and macro-financial policies. This has helped to secure both price stability and financial stability through various crises. Close consultations on the state of the economy across the respective policy-making bodies and a common ethos of prudence has helped to achieve this policy coherence without resorting to formal policy co-ordination. Monetary policy is centred on managing the exchange rate to ensure price stability over the medium-term. It is set by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS).

Luis de Guindos: Interview in La Vanguardia Interview with Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, and La Vanguardia, conducted by Mr Manel Pérez and published on 12 April 2020. * * *  What is your assessment of the global economic situation in the midst of this coronavirus crisis? The global economy will enter recession and so will the European economy, albeit an even more severe one. The ultimate fall in GDP will depend on how long the lockdown lasts. International bodies have calculated that the economy will shrink by 2% to 3% for each month of lockdown. So one and a half months would be around 5%. Three months would be double that. Do these calculations also apply to the Spanish economy? Spain had an advantage at the start of this crisis – it was seeing growth that was higher than the average of its euro area peers. But it also had a problem – its economy is more exposed to the crisis as it is more dependent on services like tourism, which are heavily affected by the pandemic. This makes it very likely that Spain will experience a deeper recession. And coming out the other side of the crisis, what do you think the economic recovery will look like? In the euro area, the most likely scenario is that we will see some signs of growth starting in the third quarter, but we will have to wait until 2021 to see a genuine recovery in economic activity.
Many other countries have applied macroprudential measures. The institutional framework and the formulation of the measures vary. Macroprudential policy will by its nature vary across countries. The credit cycle and systemic risk vary over time and across countries. That being the case, neither banks nor other economic agents should be surprised that macroprudential policy in Norway differs from that of surrounding countries. In many countries, the central bank has a prominent role in macroprudential policy. Monetary policy objectives and macroprudential objectives are not the same. Monetary policy is aimed at securing low and stable inflation and is the first line of defence against cyclical fluctuations. Macroprudential policy is aimed at strengthening the resilience of the financial system and curbing financial vulnerabilities that build up in the economy over time. Macroprudential policy and monetary policy nevertheless share many features. In Norges Bank, we can build on the experience of monetary policy when providing advice on the size of the countercyclical capital buffer for banks. Both macroprudential policy and monetary policy must be based on an assessment of the state of the Norwegian economy and developments in credit, inflation, output and employment. The buffer works through banks, as does monetary policy. The analysis of the capital buffer therefore has much in common with the analysis we perform when setting the key policy rate.

The global economic recession paved the way for Keynes’ concept of demand management and active government intervention, and the rewriting of textbooks began. After the war, universities produced a new generation of economists filled with ideas of planned economies and regulation. The interest rate was regulated downwards to promote distributional aims. Other regulations had to be tightened to curb the consequences of distorting market prices. And new  1  Odd Nordstoga, Lykkeliten from the album November, Universal in 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  regulations were then added to alleviate the consequences of the former ones. One regulation came on top of the other and so on. That was the case not only in Norway, but also in many other countries. Detailed regulation – or fine-tuning – prevailed until the 1970s. The scale of regulation was summarised in a speech by Norges Bank Governor Knut Getz Wold at the Norwegian School of Economics in 1972: “Pursuant to the Act relating to access to regulating monetary and credit conditions of 1965, the King can decide to use a wide spectrum of instruments, such as liquidity reserves, foreign exchange reserves, supplementary reserves, investment obligation, direct lending regulation for certain credit institutions, interest rate caps on loans and issuance control in addition to reporting requirements in certain areas.
The fact that around one third of all Swedish covered bonds are owned by foreign investors is both an opportunity and a risk. The opportunity to spread funding has been positive, at the same time as we have previously seen that foreign investors tend to be the first to sell their holdings in times of unease, and that this can start a sales spiral. We saw this type of selling behaviour in 2007, for instance, when unease on the financial markets increased and the Swedish banks’ exposure to the Baltic countries made investors want to sell the Swedish banks’ covered bonds, which were perceived as high risk.5 Investors then sought safer assets, such as government securities. During the second half of 2007, foreign investors reduced their holdings of Swedish covered bonds by as much as a quarter, from SEK 450 billion to SEK 330 billion.6 It was primarily investors with a short-term investment strategy who withdrew, which meant that bond yields rose. With the exception of the acute global financial crisis, however, the market for covered bonds has functioned well. Foreign investors’ interest in Swedish covered bonds is currently high, which is evident in the low yield levels. But the more the banks become dependent on a particular source of funding, the more vulnerable they become if this market were to suffer problems.

Research, including the PRA’s own analysis of survey responses from UK firms, suggests that the fixed costs of implementing new requirements can be proportionally higher for small firms than for large ones when measured as a fraction of a firm’s assets.7 What this tells us is that there are economies of scale when it comes to compliance costs and that some costs fall relatively heavier on small firms than on large firms. At the same time, separate research by Bank staff shows that prudential requirements that are well-matched with the risks that cause large banks to fail are not so well-matched with those that cause small banks to fail.8 Putting this evidence together, we can ask whether there are requirements which are relatively more costly for small firms to implement but which deliver fewer benefits than when they are applied to large firms. And that is what we do in this Discussion Paper. Having identified requirements which do not make a material  6  Amadxarif et al.