samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This was especially so between 2000 and 2016, wherein GDP increased by a compounded annual growth rate of 10.4%, while exports grew only 4%. Page 5 of 17  Sri Lanka’s economic growth during the past decade or so has mainly been generated by the expansion of domestic demand, rather than increased exports. The tradable sector, that is Imports and Exports as a percentage of GDP, declined from nearly 80% to 45% from 2005 to 2015. As a Small Open Economy you simply  cannot do that. The problems were compounded by a heavy recourse to foreign commercial borrowing for projects with low returns. That is what has led to the debt problems and many of the other difficulties we are having. When compared with regional peers and competitors, Sri Lanka’s export performance has lagged behind significantly. The Export Value Index presented by the World Bank shows the extent to which Sri Lanka’s export sector has been lagging in comparison to its regional counterparts, during the period from 2000 to 2015. Sri Lanka has only increased its exports by 1.9 times in that period 2000 to 2015, while Vietnam and Bangladesh have increased by 11.2 times and 5.1 times respectively. Even South Korea and  Thailand which have a much higher base, increased their exports by 3.1 times, whereas we, as I said only recorded a 1.9.

To get them to produce output that they can sell in the domestic market and abroad. So one challenge is really how we link our SMEs into  International Supply Chains, either through larger companies, or directly. We really need to think in terms of linking up our SMEs to supply chains. The Government has already taken some decisive measures to overcome the short-comings of the export sector. With some  improvement in the performance in the export sector, so far, there are signs that the initiatives are favourable. Since March, we have now seen an improvement in export numbers. We’ve got numbers up to May – in March April and May the numbers have shown an up-turn in export revenue. Hopefully that will gather momentum. I think with the GSP-plus kicking in, and hopefully, a more stable macro-environment, export growth will continues. Page 16 of 17  As I said, Sri Lanka cannot attain 6-7% growth on a sustained basis without transformation of its export performance. Nor can we  overcome the constraints associated with our external debt burden without significantly enhanced non-debt creating foreign exchange receipts, generated, inter alia, by increased exports. So, export  transformation is crucial for both boosting growth and employment, as well as to stabilize our vulnerability stemming from our external debt. The performance of the EASL will be a key determinant of the future prosperity of all Sri Lankans. Thank you very much. Page 17 of 17
1.3  The euro project  At the core of this report is a discussion of the euro project. It examines what euro area membership entails and what its strengths and weaknesses have proven to be so far. Chapters 2 and 16 focus on economic developments in the euro area since its  1  See Central Bank of Iceland (2010), Monetary policy after capital controls, Special Publication no. 4, and Central Bank of Iceland (2012), Prudential rules following capital controls, Special Publication no. 6. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  establishment, with particular emphasis on the post-crisis period, and Chapter 17 compares the effects of the financial crisis on countries inside and outside the eurozone, with emphasis on a comparison of Iceland and Ireland. The objective is to inform the reader and report on research findings, with the aim of promoting informed discussion and policy-making on this major issue. Chapter 24 explores the changes that would be needed in Icelandic laws and regulations with respect to the currency and the Central Bank should Iceland join the EU and adopt the euro. Chapters 21-25 describe the Eurosystem and the EMU accession process. According to EU regulations, member countries are to adopt the euro once they have fulfilled the Maastricht criteria for economic convergence.

The Rt Hon Sir Edward George: Shafts of light amidst the general gloom of the global economy Speech by The Rt Hon Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England, at the Bankers Club/Guild Banquet, London, 4 February 2002. *  *  *  President, My Lord Mayor - locum tenens, Excellencies, My Lords, Aldermen, Sheriff, Ladies and Gentlemen I'm sure you've noticed that time passes more quickly as you get older. I explain it with my own pet theory of relativity based on the fact that each year that passes is a smaller proportion of what's gone before. But I must confess I'm beginning to have my doubts. It seems much more than 12 months ago that we last came together for this great annual gathering. The fact is, it's been a very long, hard, year, not just for policy-makers around the world but also for many of you in the financial services industry - particularly the international financial services industry. We've had to cope with the synchronised global economic slowdown; the extension of the fall in equity prices - with dotcoms spreading to telecoms and beyond - even now to Enron; with increasing credit risks; and then with the vicious terrorist attacks of 11th September and their aftermath, and, finally around the turn of the year with the very sad climax to Argentina's long drawn out crisis. I could easily go on. It really has been a long, hard, year.
In 2004, we issued three new licences to foreign Islamic financial institutions. In 2005, Islamic windows of the conventional banks were encouraged to be transformed into Islamic subsidiaries that allowed foreign equity participation of up to 49%. The foreign exchange administration rules were also liberalised to allow foreign corporations and agencies to issue ringgit sukuk in Malaysia. In 2006, foreign tie-ups were encouraged – in the four new licences for takaful business that were issued. Following these developments, the MIFC was launched in 2006 to develop Malaysia as an international hub for Islamic finance. Under this initiative, new international Islamic banking and takaful players could be established in Malaysia to conduct business in foreign currency. In 2007, foreign entities were permitted to issue non-ringgit sukuk from the Malaysian market. Foreign entities could also operate Islamic fund management activities here. Early this year, the announcement was made that up to two mega Islamic banking licences with up to 100% foreign ownership would be issued to conduct international business. These initiatives cumulatively have internationalised our Islamic financial system in terms of the presence of foreign players and in terms of participation in our financial system. The Commodity Murabahah House, or the CMH, that is being established today will be an important platform that will further enhance global interlinkages in the international Islamic financial system. The CMH is designed to be a multi-currency and multi-commodity exchange-traded platform to facilitate the trading and settlement of commodity which acts as the underlying transaction for liquidity management between Islamic financial centres.

Philipp Hildebrand: Principles for sound compensation practices Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Economic Outlook 2009 (Unternehmer NW-Schweiz), Basel, 23 April 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Most financial institutions viewed compensation systems as being largely unrelated to risk management and risk governance prior to the crisis. Short-term profits were rewarded with generous bonuses with little regard to the longer-term risks taken on behalf of the firm to generate those profits. With hindsight, it should therefore be no surprise that these bonuses fueled the excessive risk-taking that has ultimately undermined the global financial system. It is important for the future stability of our financial system that compensation systems be viewed as an integral part of the risk management system in financial firms, and designed and governed with this in mind. The Financial Stability Board (previously the Financial Stability Forum) has drafted a set of sound compensation principles for large financial institutions with exactly this goal in mind. The Principles were endorsed by the G20 leaders at the London summit earlier this month and aim to be widely implemented by the 2009 remuneration round. BIS Review 50/2009  1
The most recent estimate we have for Sweden puts the total cost of executing payments at just below 1 per cent of GDP per year. 17  Account-based payments require a network of intermediaries and technical systems Unlike when we use cash, using the money we have in our accounts as a means of payment requires a relatively advanced technical infrastructure. This is because the purchaser's money or credit needs to be verified, payment instructions need to be sent and so on. A transfer must also be arranged between the banks of the purchaser and the seller. At present, this usually takes time, often a day and sometimes more. This means that risks arise for the parties involved in the transaction. As consumers, however, we do not normally notice that payments take time and that risks arise. 16 See, for example, Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole. (2003) “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets” Journal of the European Economic Association 1(4). 17 The total cost includes both the private and the social cost. See Segendorf, B. L. and Jansson, T. (2012) ”The cost of consumer payments in Sweden”. Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 262. Similar costs have been calculated for other EU countries (see Schmiedel, H, Kostova, G. and Ruttenberg, W. 2012. ”The social and private costs of retail payment instruments”. Occasional Paper Series 137. ECB. 6 [15]  As I mentioned previously, positive network externalities are something that characterises the payment market. This means that there are efficiency gains to be made by using coordination.

Later on, payment instruments issued by the private banks took ever greater market shares and the use of cash has declined steadily since the 1950s as a proportion of GDP. During the 1990s, electronic alternatives such as card payments also gradually started to replace cash for purchases in shops. Money is now electronic and is created by banks When we talk about money, many people probably envisage a banknote in one currency or another. But in today’s digital society, cash forms a very small part of the total amount of money, only about 2 per cent. 11 The overwhelming majority is completely electronic. Neither is it the case that the Riksbank or other central banks are normally the ones who create new money these days. 12 Many of us have been taught that, when banks get new deposits, they can create new loans, but it actually works the other way around. At present, it is the banks that create new money when they issue new loans. If I approach my bank with a request for a new loan for a home and the bank grants me credit, I will receive a liability in my account with the bank. At the same time, the money I have borrowed is transferred to the seller of the property, who deposits the money in his or her bank account. So new loans  10 Eichengreen, B and Temin, P. (1997) ”The gold standard and the great depression”. NBER Working Paper 6060.
As over 80% of customers invested $ and below, FIDReC is the right avenue for them to pursue their claims. FIDReC normally deals with claims not exceeding $ In the case of the structured products, however, the FIs have agreed for FIDReC to hear deserving cases. We have also said that if there are breaches of our regulation, we will take action against the financial institution or individuals involved. MAS has required the independent parties to highlight these breaches and potential cases of mis-selling to MAS. They have already brought a number of possible cases to our attention and we are following up on them. Normally, as you know, MAS does not comment on our dealings with individual institutions. However given public interest in this matter, MAS confirms that we have been conducting formal inquiries into allegations of breaches of the law, inadequate internal controls by the FIs or poor sales practices by their representatives. We will make an announcement on any actions we are taking when our inquiries are completed. MAS urges any affected investor who has a genuine claim that you were mis-sold the product to make sure you lodge your complaint with your FIs. MAS requires FIs to have a  BIS Review 126/2008  1  rigorous process to look into every complaint and resolve them fairly, giving due weight to the views of the independent parties. Clearly, there is a range of investors who bought these products. Some are well-educated professionals. Others are sophisticated investors.

Heng Swee Keat: The sale of structured products to retail investors Opening remarks by Mr Heng Swee Keat, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s Press Conference on the Sale of Structured Products to Retail Investors, Singapore, 17 October 2008. *  *  *  Many individuals who purchased structured products linked to Lehman Brothers are worried about their investments. MAS has been actively working to ensure a fair resolution for these investors. We have also been communicating our actions to the public since the issue first came to light in the middle of September. Our first priority has always been to help affected investors. Let me touch on what we have done and how we have put in place a serious and impartial resolution process to deal with investors’ legitimate concerns. First, we are making sure that HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd, the trustee for the Lehman Minibond Programme, carefully considers all options and acts in the interests of investors. If a new swap counterparty is available, investors would have the opportunity to vote on this option. In order to assist investors make an informed decision, MAS will appoint an independent financial adviser. We expect the trustee to know whether options will be available to noteholders by the end of next week.
It is true that the economy is not overheated, so rate hikes do not have the intention of affecting that. But interest rates do affect inflation even though the current situation does not entail overheating. These effects come through a stronger currency and lower wage drift. Furthermore, it is very common that central banks begin to shift towards a neutral monetary stance by raising nominal interest rates before the slack has disappeared so as to avoid sharper increases later at the tipping point between slack and excess demand. Examples of this are the European Central Bank’s rate hike earlier this year and the Swedish Riksbank’s increases in mid-2010, when unemployment in Sweden topped 8% and the output slack measured almost 4%. Iceland’s output slack is just under 2% this year. I will conclude my remarks now. I know there are a number of questions I have not answered, and a number of aspects of this complex situation that I have not addressed. My answers to the questions you ask me now may fill in some of the gaps. On the other hand, it is important that we discuss these matters calmly and try to promote the best possible understanding of how monetary policy works, as this will make a genuine contribution to the current discussion of Iceland’s future monetary policy regime. It is well to remember, though, that no monetary policy will be successful if the tools it offers are never used to tighten the stance.

Access to foreign credit is a prerequisite for export-driven growth. Moreover, deterioration in the banks’ position would adversely affect terms in the domestic credit market. Lending rates could rise and deposit rates could decline, impeding investment and delaying economic recovery. As soon as confidence in the Treasury and the financial system erodes, Iceland’s currency will suffer as well. In that instance, we would not be able to lift the capital controls as planned, after the Third Review of the IMF programme. Furthermore, the financial system would be poorly equipped to tolerate possible instability associated with capital account liberalisation. Finally, it is appropriate to bear in mind that financial undertakings’ scope to meet the needs of other individuals and firms would be drastically reduced. All of these factors show how vital it is to the public interest that the Central Bank and the Financial Supervisory Authority set forth general guidelines so as to maintain stability while matters of legal uncertainty are being settled. Other authorities and the legislature must also assess whether further measures must be adopted in order to remove all doubt. Ensuring stability is in our hands – all of our hands. We hope and expect that all parties will work together to achieve that goal. 2  BIS Review 91/2010
On the other hand, budget revenues for this period were down by 2.9% on a year earlier, reflecting the weak performance of tax revenues. These developments are materialised in a significantly increased budget deficit, which turned out to be twice higher than a year earlier. The budget deficit dynamics was reflected in a higher public debt over this period. At the end of the first quarter, the public debt as a share of GDP accounted for 63.3%. The public debt constitutes one of the major weaknesses of the Albanian financial system. Therefore, the Bank of Albania suggests that taking immediate measures to control this debt would contribute significantly to reducing uncertainties and risk premia in the economy. Taking advantage of the opportunity, we reiterate the need for putting in place a reliable and transparent fiscal rule. This is the best way to discipline the fiscal policy and preserve the trust of financial markets about the Albanian public debt in the long run. Data on the external sector of the economy show that foreign demand contributed positively to Albania’s economic growth and to trade deficit narrowing during the first half of the year. This behaviour was due to the 17.4% annual growth in exports and the 6.3% annual decline in imports over the same period. Consequently, the trade deficit dropped 22.2% over this period. The insofar adjustment of the trade deficit is a positive development of the Albanian economy. However, this deficit reduction is heavily thanks to transient factors.

Ardian Fullani: Overview of Albania’s recent economic and financial market developments Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Press Conference on the Monetary Policy Decision of Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council, Tirana, 31 July 2013. *  *  *  Today, on 31 July 2013, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania reviewed and approved the Monetary Policy Statement of the Bank of Albania on the first half of 2013. Based on the latest monetary and economic developments in Albania, and following the discussions about their outlook, the Bank of Albania’s Supervisory Council decided to lower the key interest rate by 0.25% percentage points to 3.50%. Lowering the key interest rate would improve the conditions for a higher aggregate demand, hence helping inflation fall back toward the Bank’s 3.0% target. Further easing of monetary policy takes into account expectations for a contractionary fiscal policy over the second half of the year and makes room for a fast and low-cost adjustment of public finances. Let me now proceed with an overview of the economic developments and key issues discussed at today’s meeting. The first months of 2013 confirmed our assessments of Albania’s slow economic growth and weak inflationary pressures. Albania’s economic activity continues to suffer from sluggish aggregate demand reflecting economic agents’ uncertainties about the future, relatively tight lending standards, and economic weaknesses of our main trading partners. However, amid a challenging macroeconomic environment, Albania’s economic and financial stability remains stable.
Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Empowering financial consumers in the digital age Welcoming remarks by Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the BNM-OECD Conference on “Financial Education and Financial Consumer Protection in Asia-Pacific”, Kuala Lumpur, 11 December 2019. * * * As I made my way in to work this morning, I glanced through my smartphone to check on my monthly bills, how much pocket money my sons had spent over the week and on what. I also browsed for money changers offering the best exchange rates for my next trip. Having all this information available to me literally at my fingertips would have been unthinkable years ago. Today, I can organise my financial matters quickly and conveniently over a 20-minute car ride to work! It is my great pleasure to extend a warm welcome to all delegates to Kuala Lumpur and to the Conference on Financial Education and Financial Consumer Protection in Asia-Pacific. We are delighted to co-host this event in collaboration with the OECD. At risk of repeating what many others have already acknowledged, let me say at the outset that financial education and financial consumer protection have never been more important, or more confounding, than in the digital age that is upon us.

Conclusion Let me now summarise what I have said and draw some conclusions. The global capital markets are here to stay. They have contributed to the good economic growth in many countries in recent decades by providing capital efficiently. At the same time it cannot be denied that the global capital markets can generate problems, as we have seen in recent years. There have been marked fluctuations and they have spread from country to  7  BIS Review 52/1999  country. Shortcomings in national economic policy have been the cause in many causes but not in all. Small countries with less liquid markets have been heavily hit when highly leveraged funds have shifted capital between markets. For some countries with a weak political and economic system, the capital movements have been sufficient to elicit political crises and considerable social costs. A part has also been played by problems in financial institutions in the industrialised countries, even in the very centre of the international financial system through the Manhattan-based fund LTCM. Last autumn the US Federal Reserve found it necessary to reduce the instrumental rate and take the initiative in solving the problem of credit. Against this background it is not surprising that an active discussion is now in progress about what is called the new international financial architecture. International meetings are being held in quick succession.