samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Since the onset of the crisis last summer, the way in which the tripartite arrangements work in practice has evolved considerably. The concept of a golden age in the relationship between the Bank and the banks is also far from the truth. Our relationship was described by David Kynaston, in his magisterial history of the City, as “surprisingly prickly”. In the 1920s the Chairman of the Midland Bank, Reginald McKenna, derided the Governor, Montagu Norman, as “an intellectual without an intellect”, and in turn Norman said about McKenna, “some people cannot avoid the limelight”. Since the crisis broke last August we too have had our differences, although more recently the close cooperation between the Bank of England and six of the largest banks in working through the details of our Special Liquidity Scheme was a model of effective collaboration. But perhaps we should not be surprised that sometimes our relationship is “prickly” because our interests do not always coincide. Banks are, entirely legitimately, concerned primarily with their commercial interest. The Bank of England is concerned with the interests of the UK economy as a whole. The two sets of interests are not always the same. BIS Review 75/2008  1  Where they may clash is over the use of our balance sheet. Companies which have misjudged risks or their business model should generally be allowed to fail to encourage prudent behaviour by others.

In the third quarter, the U.S. exceeded market consensus expectations  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  and, although inventory accumulation played a part, the improved performance of the housing and labor markets, combined with better entrepreneurial and consumer expectations, the behavior of stock and other asset prices and, in particular, the lower intensity of the fiscal adjustment suggest that next year the country will outperform its 2013 figures. The recovery of the Japanese economy is still ongoing, but the tax increases announced for 2014 will taper economic growth. The Eurozone posted positive growth for the second consecutive quarter, although less than expected by the consensus. Worth noting were the slower growth of Germany and the contraction of the French economy and, on a positive note, that some of the peripheral economies grew again. Emerging economies have slowed down further and consensus forecasts have seen new downward revisions. In China, after a substantial correction to its growth projections in the first half of the year, recent data show growth stabilizing around 7.5 percent, quite less than in recent years, however. The baseline scenario assumes that the Chinese economy will slow further to reach 7.2 percent annually in 2015, which points to the need to continue to restructure its sources of growth and resolve some of the vulnerabilities of its financial system. In the rest of the emerging world, economic activity continues to moderate, leading some economies to lower their benchmark rates.
4 June 2021  Remarks for the panel discussion at the BIS-BdF-IMF-NGFS Green Swan 2021 Global Virtual Conference  Many thanks, Morgan, and thank you also to the BIS, Banque de France, IMF and NGFS for the invitation to take part in this panel. As you perfectly know in both my capacity as Governor of the Bank of Spain and member of the Governing Council of the ECB, and as Chair of the Basel Committee I can say that the topic of climate-related financial risks is one of the top priorities over the coming years. In both cases, I think the right way to frame the issue is to take our mandates as the starting point. In the case of the Basel Committee, as the primary global standard setter for banks, our mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. If we combine this mandate with the fact that, as has been discussed in various sessions during this conference, climate change poses risks to the financial sector (physical and transition risks) that can be significant in magnitude and therefore can impact financial stability at the global level, one should conclude there is a need for supervisors, regulators and, of course, the Basel Committee to act. In particular, we need to guarantee that individual banks and the banking system as a whole are adequately prepared to identify, measure and mitigate climate-related financial risks. This is the approach we are following at the Basel Committee level.

But, as we mentioned before, the cycle for climate risks is much longer, and there is a lack of comparable historical data, so we should not overstate the precision of stress testing tools as of today, and be ready to examine multiple scenarios and assumptions and learn progressively. This would help to properly complement our regulatory and supervisory framework. 6/6
Ten years after Lehman Brothers, the financial system is now safer The crisis that followed the Lehman collapse demonstrated the importance of a sound financial system that could withstand shocks without hampering the financing of the economy. The economies that, after a macroeconomic shock, suffer a financial shock because their banking sector is too fragile, experience more serious and protracted crises. This lesson led to a vast reform programme of financial system regulation and supervision in order to address the many shortcomings that led to the development of significant vulnerabilities. 1.1 MANY OF THE SHORTCOMINGS IN THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK HAVE BEEN REDUCED A comprehensive reform was thus carried out, covering practically all the areas of the financial system, focusing on four main areas:  (a) Shoring up the resilience of financial institutions For banks, under the impetus of the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), the Basel Committee has established new prudential rules, “Basel III", whose main features aim to enhance the level and quality of capital, limit the use of financial leverage and introduce new liquidity requirements. These rules must ensure that banks are able to cope with short-term pressures on their refinancing and regulate their transformation activity. Lastly, the framework introduces for the first time a “macroprudential” component, consisting of a countercyclical capital buffer and a surcharge for global systemically important banks (additional capital and leverage ratio). Most G20 jurisdictions have adopted this framework.

In addition, if issuers of stable coins also want to offer banking services such as deposits, financial investments and loans, then they will have to obtain a banking license in all countries where they operate. Otherwise these activities would be illegal. Stable coin projects reveal gaps in existing cross-border payment systems. Hence, at the European level, we should aim at promoting a genuine European strategy for retail payments. Payments are no longer a mere boring back-office technicality. They are innovative, and they provide two strategic assets: data, and daily customer relations. The raw truth however is that the European payments market is already dominated by non-European stakeholders. Furthermore, the growing role of non-European digital firms – be they American or Chinese – offering payments solutions should be taken seriously. Despite the creativity of the European ecosystem of payments, our market remains too fragmented. We don’t have much time left. We – the Eurosystem and the Banque de France – call for the creation of pan-European payment solutions, building on a common brand and on a state-of-the-art instant payment such as the Target Instant Payment Settlement infrastructure (TIPS) managed by the Eurosystem, and contributing to much more efficient international payments including for remittances. Some also suggest that the right answer to Libra is accelerating the creation of a Central Bank digital currency (CDBC). This is a scintillating subject, but a separate one.
For 68 out of the 79 months, inflation was within 0.5 percent of the target - below it for 42 months, above it for 30, and on target for the remaining seven. Notwithstanding the stock market crash and the slowdown in world activity, the UK economy has continued to grow steadily and employment has remained strong. On a longer term view, the decade of inflation targeting since 1992 looks remarkably stable by post-war standards.4 The recent slowdown has been exceptionally mild compared with all previous slowdowns since the beginning of the 1970s, and since 1992 growth in both real GDP and consumer spending has also been significantly less volatile, with 46 quarters of positive growth, and no significant downturn in consumption since mid 1994. Prior to the 1970s, recessions were virtually absent, but real GDP was much more volatile than it has been in the past decade. Of course, better monetary policy and low inflation are only part of this story. It matters that monetary policy has been supported by fiscal discipline. Just as important are the many labour and product market reforms that, over a long period of time, have given us a more flexible and competitive economy, which is capable of adapting quickly to sudden change without prolonged periods of unemployment and under-utilised capacity. Attitudes towards inflation American economist Alan Blinder once said: “Price stability is when ordinary people stop talking and worrying about inflation”. Has low inflation entered our bloodstream yet? This is a hard one but there are some clues.

On the one hand, the Bank of England is required set interest rates so as ‘to maintain price stability and subject to that to support the economic policy of HM Government, including its objectives for growth and employment’. On the other, the Government is required to specify what its economic objectives are, including what is meant by price stability. The remit of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) must be set out in writing at least annually and it must be published. The remit has always had important elements of flexibility. For example, while the MPC is directed to aim for the target ‘at all times’ and to treat deviations from target symmetrically, it is not expected to react mechanically. Instead, if inflation deviates from target by more than 1%, the Governor is required to write to the Chancellor explaining the circumstances and setting out what action the MPC considers necessary to return to target. No letter has been written so far, but only because circumstances have not warranted it. There is an explicit understanding that operational independence must be accompanied by transparency and clear accountability to Parliament and the general public as well as to Government. The Bank’s forecasts are published in the quarterly Inflation Report, the minutes of MPC meetings are published within two weeks, and the nine members of the MPC appear regularly in front of Parliamentary committees as well undertaking between them some 50-60 regional visits a year to different parts of the UK.
Instead, major innovations and economic growth became the norm. If we are to understand why advances were made so rapidly, we have to look at areas that economists probably do not explore often enough. In England, a parliament had emerged as a counterweight to the crown and the landed nobility. There was also the introduction of patents, private property rights and – by the standards of the day – a stable tax regime. These were important, growth-friendly institutions which remain central pillars of modern economies. Growth in per capita GDP in England accelerated gradually during the 19th century. More countries eventually came on board and joined the technology race. The groundwork for two of the most important breakthroughs of the late 19th century – electricity and the combustion engine – was laid mainly in the US and Germany. These innovations remained key growth drivers well into the 20th century. At the same time, the US took over from the UK as the most important base for new advances. With the US in the driving seat, economic growth hit new heights, peaking in the middle of the 20th century. Since 1970, growth has slowed. Growth has moved on a new downward trend since 2000. Growth in Norway has shown a similar pattern. Immediately after the war, our per capita GDP was only around half that of the US. There was considerable potential for catching up, and growth was higher than abroad for a long period.

Better health, less heavy work and in many countries a social safety net are also among the gains. Chart: Global warming Nor does it capture all of the costs. Our economic progress has taken its toll on our most important public good: the natural environment. The greatest environmental challenge is of a global nature. With ever higher concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the planet’s average temperature has risen. This has serious, long-term implications both for meteorological conditions and for society. The research field the “Bergen School” helped pave the way for has now gained fresh relevance. Greenhouse gas emissions have increased primarily due to human activity. Irrespective of their source, emissions all have an equal weight in global carbon accounting. Action and innovation to combat climate change are therefore necessary in multiple sectors and across countries. The pricing of emissions is crucial for achieving future emissions targets. The polluter must pay. Firms and consumers will then find it profitable to choose more eco-friendly production methods and products. If everyone also faces the same emissions costs, the reductions that cost the least will be made first. Departing from this principle will increase the costs of mitigating global warming. The pricing of emissions also boosts demand for new and more eco-friendly technology, making it more profitable to invest in research and development of new solutions and products. These must stem from choices made by the individual firm and the individual consumer. The development of new technology to combat global warming is advancing too slowly.
Moreover, the basic goal of any Government regulation should be to ensure competition, protect intellectual property and privacy, prevent fraud, foster transparency, support commercial transactions, and facilitate dispute resolution. The fourth principle directs the Government to recognize the unique qualities of the Internet in relation to existing regulatory models. We should not assume, for example, that the regulatory frameworks established over the past sixty years for telecommunications, radio, and television apply to the Internet. The Framework specifically directs the Government to review, and revise or eliminate existing laws and regulations that may hinder electronic commerce to reflect the needs of the new electronic age. Finally, in the fifth principle, the Framework announces what, to many, is the most important principle in connection with electronic commerce and the Internet, namely that electronic commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a global basis. In this regard, the United States Government has identified nine areas where international agreements are needed to preserve the Internet as a non-regulatory medium, one in which competition and consumer choice will largely shape the market-place. The nine areas are: (1) customs and taxation; (2) electronic payments; (3) a Uniform Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce; (4) intellectual property protection; (5) privacy; (6) security; (7) telecommunications infrastructure and information technology; (8) content; and (9) technical standards. These nine areas are discussed in some detail in the Framework.

Mr. Patrikis discusses global electronic commerce Speech by the First Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mr. Ernest T. Patrikis, at the 1998 International ACH Conference in Seattle on 9/3/98. I am very pleased to be here today to discuss global electronic commerce. At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, we have a tradition of embracing emerging technologies as a means of fostering the growth of commerce. As early as 1914 the Federal Reserve System was using the telegraph to wire funds across the nation. By 1918, the Federal Reserve Banks had introduced their first dedicated funds transfer network. Today, over 350,000 funds transfers are sent over Fedwire every day with a total value of more than $ trillion. So, electronic commerce itself is not new. What is new is the emerging global network environment and its electronic access capabilities. The promise of this global network has brought electronic commerce to the forefront of public-policy making. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and other international organizations have expressed their belief that “the exponential growth and diffusion of the Internet is quickly making the promise of widespread electronic commerce a reality.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Central banking in the 21st century – implications of economic and financial globalisation Opening remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at Central Bank of Malaysia’s High Level Conference 2009 “Central Banking in the 21st Century: Implications of Economic and Financial Globalisation”, Kuala Lumpur, 10 February 2009. *  *  *  Honourable Governors, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is my pleasure to welcome you to the Bank Negara Malaysia Conference on "Central Banking in the 21st Century: Implications of Economic and Financial Globalisation" that is being held in conjunction with the 50th Anniversary of Bank Negara Malaysia. Indeed, the conference takes place at a time when we need to reflect on the many issues that are emerging from the current global financial and economic crisis and the new challenges and lessons it brings to central banks. We are most honoured by the presence of central banks from more than 50 countries who have come to be with us on the occasion of our 50th Anniversary. This gathering has also brought together distinguished speakers not only from the central banking community but also outstanding scholars and senior practitioners from the financial services industry. It is hoped that this conference will contribute to a greater understanding to the issues confronting central banks in the 21st century.

Indeed, we are now in a world that is fundamentally different, a world that calls for a greater appreciation of the changes that need to be made to the systems and structures, to the institutional arrangements and mechanisms, and to the manner in which we operate in this new environment. The international dimension of these changes calls for an outcome in which the international financial system is less prone to disruptions and failures and in which economic progress is a shared prosperity among nations. Globalisation has had a deep impact on the way modern economies function. The benefits of globalisation have accrued to diverse communities and regions but it has also brought with it significant risks. While the Asian Crisis showed the effects of globalisation, it also showed that Asia was able to rapidly rebound and continue to benefit from increased international trade and financial flows. The rapid restoration of stability and resumption of growth had confined the crisis to Asia. As the current financial crisis is translated into an economic crisis, its repercussions are now being felt on a global scale. While the turmoil had its origins in the developed economies, its continued escalation has extended the effects of the crisis to the rest of the world. Economic and financial globalisation thus not only calls for policy responses at the national level but also at the international level.
For ASEAN, avoiding capital account crises will become increasingly more important because the more ASEAN trade with each other, the more closely linked our economies are. Hence, the more contagion there will be, and the faster and wider will crises spread. Fortunately, we have already seen a region-wide move toward a more flexible exchange rate regime, with a disciplined framework in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. Financial policy becomes more flexible, yet proactive, in dealing with changes in the market conditions and practices. When necessary, a traditional fiscal-monetary policy mix has been augmented by appropriate prudential measures of financial institutions, especially to preempt pockets of asset price bubbles developing in the economy. Ladies and Gentlemen, I turn now to the second part of my talk on the potential scope of regional cooperation as ASEAN faces yet another common challenge on how to manage the global contagion of the US financial crisis. Today’s global financial crisis is the world’s worst since the Great Depression in 1930s with an estimated credit loss of 1.4 trillion US dollars. Trillions of US dollars have been used to provide liquidity and to recapitalize distressed financial institutions. Deposit guarantee has been introduced in a large number of countries to restore investors’ confidence. At this juncture, I doubt if any one can predict with any good accuracy when this episode of financial market turbulence would come to an end. The current global financial crisis reminds us of the lessons we learnt from the Asian financial crisis just one decade back.

These three most important elements are dependent on developments abroad, international financial markets, and global demand for commodities. The Swiss franc exchange rate, by comparison, does not play a decisive role. There is thus no contradiction between having a strong Swiss franc and a large current account surplus. Nor is the surplus a suitable measure for assessing Switzerland's share in global imbalances. It is much more the case that Switzerland and its extensive level of direct investment abroad contributes significantly to balanced global economic growth. SNB monetary policy is focused on ensuring price stability. In so doing, it takes due account of economic developments. To fulfil this mandate, the SNB must secure appropriate monetary conditions. The current account surplus does not play a role in monetary policy. In an open economy like Switzerland, however, sizeable exchange rate fluctuations have a strong impact on production and prices. In the current environment, and with interest rates close to zero, the minimum exchange rate is therefore the correct monetary policy instrument. The SNB will continue to enforce it with the utmost determination. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1