samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
When the property market crashed, Svenska Kredit was unable to meet all of its obligations and consequently went bankrupt. This in turn fuelled the problems for the banks. There are parallels between the Swedish credit insurance companies of that time and the current so-called monolines. These are large insurance companies which are specialised in insuring various types of bond loan. Those who have bought the companies’ insurances have traditionally been municipalities, federal states and other bond issuers with poorer credit ratings. The insurance has meant that the bond loans have received better credit ratings and it has been possible to sell them at better rates. In July 2007 the outstanding volume of bonds insured by monolines amounted to a value of USD 3,300 billion. In recent years these monolines have increasingly been used to insure securities issues with a subprime content. This has meant that they have also begun to experience problems. This risks in turn having repercussions for the securities they have insured and ultimately for those who have invested in them. Of course, there are also some essential differences between the most recent financial turbulence and the Swedish bank crisis. This applies to both the nature and the scope of the crisis. But, as you will note, there are many and striking similarities in the way people have acted.

By this time next year, I should be able to report progress made in Hong Kong as well as in the international arena. 14. Let me conclude my speech with the big picture: Hong Kong, as the premier IFC in Asia, is uniquely well positioned under the One Country, Two Systems arrangements to benefit from the internationalisation of RMB and the Belt and Road Initiative. Whatever you have seen or witnessed in the past few years is merely the very beginning of a multi-decade long process. China has been on average contributing more than one third of global growth in the past 10 years and is clearly the most powerful engine for growth in the years to come. China has reached a stage that it has the necessary technology and surplus capital for its corporates to “go out”. Hong Kong, which has been the major hub and springboard for foreign corporates to “go into” China since the beginning of China’s reform and opening programme, has now taken up the extremely crucial role of serving as the hub and springboard for China’s new “going out” era. 15. Ladies and gentlemen, it’s a great pleasure to be able to talk to you today. As a treasury market practitioner, you are in the right place at the right time. Hong Kong is a place that will offer enormous headroom for growth.
We expect to implement the risk-based capital frameworks for life and general insurance companies in the third quarter of 2004. BIS Review 43/2004  1  III  Enhancing market discipline  On enhancing market discipline, we began inspection for compliance with the Financial Advisers Act (FAA) last year. We noted a number of best practices during these inspections and have published them in a paper. To alert investors here, we intend to publish a list of unlicensed entities based outside Singapore who are suspected of conducting activities regulated under the Securities and Futures Act and/or FAA. Details will be released by the end of the week. To help consumers become more self-reliant in their financial affairs, MAS has worked with other public sector agencies to launch MoneySENSE, a national financial education programme, in October 2003. In the next few months, MoneySENSE will conduct a national financial literacy survey to benchmark the current level of financial literacy among Singaporeans. We are also facilitating the development of an integrated dispute resolution scheme for the financial sector. IV  Developing the financial sector  On the developmental front, the wealth management industry grew considerably, both in institutional asset management and private banking. Financial institutions enjoyed fresh inflows of funds as well as substantial appreciation in the value of their assets under management. The alternative asset management industry also saw good growth, with the entry of hedge fund managers.

In practice it is not always so easy to distinguish between what is important for credibility and various factors can interact in a complicated manner. Two cases can, however, be discerned:  BIS Review 56/1997  -6-  - In the first case, the problem of credibility is primarily based on a lack of confidence in the central bank as such and in monetary policy. In the long-term perspective, the task is then the establishment of a trackrecord. Laws that guarantee independence can be an important support in this process. In the short term, there is probably most often not much that can be done other than to show by action--increases in interest rates--that one is sticking to one’s objectives. - More difficult to assess and manage are situations in which the currency’s depreciation is a consequence of weakening credibility in the general direction of economic policy. Investors in the financial market may, for example, think that the risk has increased for a change of regimes in the future, when the target for price stability may be abandoned at least temporarily as a result, for example, of government financial problems. In Sweden this was probably the most common explanation for the recurrent periods of exchange rate turbulence during the 1990s. In situations of this type, monetary policy itself cannot do the job, and what is worse, in the short term the costs of monetary policy measures may be considerable.
2% capital buffer for systemically-important institutions (July 16) and systemic risk buffer of 3% (June 14). LTV cap (2002), differentiated by property type, adjusted counter-cyclically. DTI cap (2005), differentiated by  Korea  property type, adjusted counter-cyclically. Macroprudential Stability Levy (MSL) (2011), price-based tax on banks’ non-core foreign currency liabilities. Croatia  Hong Kong  Singapore  A wide range of instruments including changes to reserve requirements, higher risk weights and liquidity requirements on foreign currency exposures. LTV cap (1990s), differentiated by property and borrower type, adjusted counter-cyclically, in conjunction with mortgage insurance. DTI cap. LTV cap for 1st (80%), 2nd (50%), subsequent (40%), and non-individual (20%) mortgages and mortgages with a long term (from 2013). Mortgage servicing requirement of 30% (2013). Switzerland  Counter-Cyclical Capital buffer on real estate exposures (Feb 2013)  Finland  90% LTV cap; 95% for FTBs, based on fair value of all collateral. Ireland  Higher RW for higher LTV residential mortgages and on CRE lending (2006/7). Netherlands Spain  LTV cap of 100% by 2018 (Aug 2011). Systemic risk buffer for large banking groups Rules-based dynamic provisioning introduced in 2000.

That is: yt = y̅t − δk − γ(k)Δ(k) This captures the view that higher bank capital could reduce credit supply, and hence economic activity, in the near term. But by making the financial system more resilient to future shocks, it may also reduce the tail risk of bad macroeconomic outcomes. Both probability and severity of crises are influenced negatively by the level of bank capital, with the relationship likely to be convex (γ′ (k) < 0, γ′′ (k) > 0, ∆′ (k) < 0, ∆′′ (k) > 0) – that is to say, one would expect a one percentage point increase in the capital ratio to have a larger dampening impact on the probability and severity of crisis when banks are close to their regulatory minima than when capital buffers are plentiful. In this stylised set-up, the marginal condition that defines optimal bank capital is:  δ = −Δ  ∂γ ∂Δ −γ ∂k ∂k  Optimal capital is higher the lower is δ, the economic cost of a marginal increase in capital requirements; the greater are γ and Δ, the likelihood and severity of crises; and the greater are  ∂γ ∂k  and  ∂Δ ∂k  , the marginal effects  of capital on the likelihood and severity of crises. So what have we learned over the past decade about the likely magnitude of these parameters?
Geopolitical risks could also have a bearing on the EU’s foreign direct investment and portfolio exposures . The EU’s main investment partners are other advanced economies. However, certain factors make it difficult to identify the ultimate investors in the EU, given that a sizeable portion of incoming foreign direct investment comes from offshore centres or is intermediated by special purpose entities. Thus, the empirical analyses 6 that have sought to shed light on the origins of foreign direct investment into the EU on an ultimate investor basis find that exposures with respect to the US and China can be significantly understated. Regarding portfolio flows, research7 aiming at restating holdings from a residency-based approach to a nationality-based approach found that in 2017 the euro area holdings of Russian and Chinese debt tripled when issuance via tax havens was accounted for. 5  Euro pean Co mmission (2020). “Critical Raw Materials Resi lience: Charting a Path to wards greater Security and Sustainability”. COM (2020) 474. 6  Alcidi, C., Po stica, D. and Shamsfakhr, F. (2021). “Analysis o f Develo pments in EU Capital Flo ws in the Glo bal Co ntext”. Centre fo r Euro pean Po licy Studies. 7  Co ppo la, A., Maggio ri, M., Neiman, B. and Schreger, J. (2021). “Redrawing the Map o f Glo bal Capital Flo ws: The Role o f Cro ss-Bo rder Financing and Tax Havens”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vo l. 136(3), pp 1499-1556.

Given this, we decided at the monetary policy meeting last Tuesday to hold the repo rate unchanged at 4.25 per cent. The repo rate path remains the same as in February. A repo rate of around 4.25 per cent over the coming year will contribute to bringing inflation back towards the target of 2 per cent a couple of years ahead and contribute to a balanced development in production and employment. However, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the economic outlook and inflation prospects. Conditions for the Riksbank’s monetary policy steering system How is an interest rate decision put into practice? What actually happens when the Executive Board decides that the repo rate should be raised, cut or held unchanged? This can best be answered with a description of how our system works. Like many other central banks, the Riksbank aims its monetary policy at steering the shortest market rate, the overnight rate. This can be done in many different ways. We have a system where we decide the conditions for the banks’ deposits and loans with the Riksbank. The Riksbank supplies a payment system, RIX, which manages payments in Swedish krona. A payment system is an infrastructure that makes it possible to forward payments from one bank to another, and thus payments from households’ and companies’ accounts in one bank to the recipient’s account in another bank. RIX consists of an account system where each of the participating banks has its own account in which payments between the banks are booked.
The exchange rate therefore serves as a buffer against changes in the terms of trade. Norway’s terms of trade also fluctuate considerably, primarily reflecting changes in oil prices. However, a substantial portion of petroleum revenues is invested in foreign equities and bonds through the Government Petroleum Fund. Changes in oil prices influence the size of the Fund, but have little effect on the use of petroleum revenues at home. The Government Petroleum Fund thus serves as a buffer against swings in the oil price, and thereby stabilises the krone exchange rate. The Norwegian economy may nevertheless be exposed to disturbances of a type that cannot be absorbed by the Petroleum Fund. We have to be prepared for fluctuations in the value of our currency that are more in line with the fluctuations observed in other countries. The exchange rate will vary. This means that economic agents cannot assume that the krone will be stable against the euro, the US dollar or a weighted average of foreign currencies. It is the inflation target that is the economy’s nominal anchor. The increase in labour costs is important when Norges Bank’s assesses the outlook for price inflation and sets interest rates. High wage growth, both in manufacturing and other sectors, will affect the internationally exposed sector through two channels. First, high wage growth will weaken earnings and employment. Second, the interest rate will be increased. Normally, this will lead to an appreciation of the krone, with a further weakening of earnings and employment.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Thailand’s economic conditions and prospects - a mid-year update Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at a luncheon organised by the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok, 27 August 2004. *  *  *  Let me begin first by thanking the Australian-Thai Chamber of Commerce for the invitation to speak to you today. For the Australian-Thai Chamber, this is the first for me and I am very pleased to be here. Today, I plan to cover the evolving economic pictures both at home and abroad. For the global economy, a number of interesting new themes are now emerging and I will try to put these developments into the perspective as we understand it at the Bank of Thailand. As for the domestic economy, despite a number of risks and challenges, this year the economy has managed well under the circumstances. Growth momentum remains firm and economic stability remains intact. Today, I will not open up any new kind of inquiry on the Thai economy, but will simply update you on the recent economic outturn and explain the rationale behind this week's decision by the Monetary Policy Committee to increase the policy interest rate. This decision, which is the first increase in three years, has been expected by the market following signs of increased pressure on domestic prices and following our own assessment and communication to the market that low interest rates have become less necessary given the changed outlook on inflation.
However, the official forecast is that, overall, these territorial governments will still post a deficit in 2007 despite the benign economic circumstances over the last few years. Second, budgetary stability should be accompanied by an improvement in the quality of public finances to secure advances in the allocation of factors of production, particularly human and technological factors, and in the efficiency of the economy. The spending policies included in the draft Budget give priority to areas of key importance for improving productivity, such as increased resources for research and development, education and infrastructure, although other priority items entail increases in current primary spending. It is important that the envisaged increase in resource allocation be managed efficiently through the use of better suited mechanisms to assess and select public policies so as to enable real increases in productivity. The budget is not, however, the only instrument, nor often the most appropriate one, to achieve the aim of raising the efficiency of the economy. Structural policies designed to make  BIS Review 130/2007  5  factor and product markets more flexible will be called on to make an essential contribution to this aim and, for this purpose, it is necessary to persevere with and extend the processes of liberalisation undertaken in recent years. Policies of this type, which enable growth potential to be raised and make for the efficient allocation of resources in the economy, are pivotal in the present conjuncture, which, as stated earlier, requires a rebalancing of the sources of growth of the Spanish economy.

As I mentioned before Parliament scarcely a month ago, these events come at a time when the Spanish economy continues to show considerable buoyancy, with GDP growth in the first half of the year around or slightly above a rate of 4% and employment growth somewhat higher than 3%. This period saw the continuation of the slight moderation in domestic demand first seen in 2006 and of the improvement in the contribution of net external demand to growth, which began that same year, enabling the composition of domestic and external sources of expenditure to be brought more into balance. But the change in composition extended also to domestic demand, where lower relative household spending growth and stronger business investment were observed during the first half of the year. Indeed, the gradual moderation in household consumption initiated some  2  BIS Review 130/2007  quarters ago continued, reflecting a natural adaptation to less generous monetary and financial conditions as a result of the interest rate rise under way since late 2005 and of the weaker wealth effect on consumption due to slower house price rises. However, the buoyancy of employment and its effect on income prospects are helping to smooth the adjustment of consumption to more sustainable levels.
One factor that helps determine the surcharge level is based on a bank’s systemic footprint. 19 Suppose a securities dealer borrows $ and lends $ in repo. If a 5 percent leverage ratio requirement  were binding on this dealer, and that dealer planned its business around a 10 percent return on equity, it would require a 50 basis point interest rate spread to cover its capital cost. Such a cost would be quite substantial relative to typical money market spreads. Of course, this is a stylized example, and banks could well choose to 11 / 13  BIS central bankers' speeches  apply a lower cost of capital than used here for low-risk activities like money market intermediation. The mechanism by which banks determine their cost of capital for individual activities remains a topic of active research without a strong consensus. See Stiroh, “A Perspective on Supervisory Objectives and Trade-offs,” February 23, 2017. 20 See also Duffie, “Why the leverage ratio distorts market-making.” Risk, January 3, 2017. 21 There are likely other disincentives to dealers’ acting as intermediaries in money markets. For example, the  Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition on proprietary trading may limit banks’ ability or willingness to engage in activity that is classified for regulatory purposes as arbitrage, such as in the foreign exchange swaps market. 22 This discussion is intended as a high-level summary, and omits a number of other technical requirements for  transactions to be eligible for netting.

While these period-end approaches may be less administratively burdensome to implement than daily or weekly averages, they can incentivize firms to temporarily adjust their balance sheets around quarterend to report higher ratios: balance sheet growth incurs no cost on most days, but incurs a significant capital cost on one or three days a quarter. Much activity in unsecured markets is lowmargin intermediation in which banks borrow funds from non-banks and deposit them at the Federal Reserve to earn IOR; this activity can be less economic for leverage-ratio-constrained foreign banks on the few days when the ratio is calculated. Third, since liftoff in December 2015, I see a modest and gradual uptick in dispersion in the index that combines both secured and unsecured markets. This increase seems to have occurred in two stages: once at liftoff, and again in autumn 2016. In contrast, there was nearly no change in dispersion following the FOMC’s two additional policy rate increases in December 2016 and March 2017. This rise in dispersion in the combined measure reflects the fact that the spread between unsecured and secured overnight rates rose around those times. Much of the fairly modest pick-up in that rate spread seems tied to individual, one-off factors. To begin with, the dispersion in money market rates was compressed to some extent by the zero lower bound, and as rates moved into positive territory, they were able to “unpack” to an extent.
Entering the EU, for the NBRM would automatically mean participation in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In this manner, we are getting much closer to Europe in the field of central banking. The staff of the central bank becomes part of many committees, subcommittees and working groups of the ESCB, which is crucial ingredient for strengthening the institutional capacity for policy making. And this is vital for the future steps, as the EU membership, for small and open economy, with high level of euroization and fixed exchange rates would inevitable imply need for very serious preparations for the Euro adoption. It requires passing the so-called test period, staying in the ERM 2 mechanism for at least two years and delivering stable currency, inflation and long term interest rates comparable with those in the EU, and disciplined and prudent public finance. All of these are Euro convergence criteria that at the end boil down to having safe and sound economy and disciplined monetary and fiscal policy, as a precondition for smooth monetary integration. Hence, entering the EU not only will facilitate trade and finance, and make movement of people much easier, but it will also open the doors to gradually move towards a single currency. The benefits of adopting the Euro are well known, in particular for a country that already has the exchange rate as a target, which means smoother transition. The single currency eliminates the currency risk and transaction costs, and thus facilities trade of good and services.

Second, some EU bodies are obsessed with the “all EU countries must be same” approach. While there may be some point to this, why insist on it in the case of the single resolution system, for instance, if it has been negotiated that the SSM only applies to euro-area countries plus volunteers? One can hardly expect non-euro area countries not participating in the SSM to jump at the single resolution system if it means sharing the burden with those inside the banking union without the same treatment in the area of a fiscal back-stop. At the same time, would you join the SSM if you did not have a clue how the single resolution rules were going to work? The CNB’s position was: let’s discuss the whole thing (BU) in one shot as a one compact and coherent package where the balance between powers, duties, responsibilities and money always remains assured. And negotiate everything as a single animal, so that illogical inconsistencies are not being produced all along. Sure, that would take much more time, but the final outcome might look better and we would not build up the house from the roof down. We are debating the supervisory part first, while burden-sharing (money) is being left for the future. The sequence of steps should ideally be exactly the opposite one. Why? My observation is that the way the various bail-outs and the SSM have been negotiated so far shows that the readiness and willingness even among euro-area countries to share money is declining over time.