samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the European Union, a small-size enterprise has about 50 workers, and the volume of its activity is around 10 million euros. Medium-size enterprises are defined as those which employ about 250 workers and their annual commercial activity is around 50 million euros. In Saudi Arabia, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund adopts the annual sales standard to identify small and medium size enterprises for the purpose of funding by “Kafalah” program. They are defined as enterprises with annual sales not exceeding Rls 30 million. The World Bank has conducted a questionnaire and distributed it to commercial banks to establish a definition for small and medium size enterprises. The result has shown differences between banks in their definitions, but it can be concluded from that survey that small-size enterprises are those whose annual sales range from Rls 100 thousand to Rls 5 million, and employ 2 to 49 workers. The medium-size enterprises are those with a turnover of Rls 5 million to Rls 50 million per annum, and employ from 50 to 200 workers. Ladies and gentlemen, SMEs have various advantages, such as their easy establishment due to low capital required for their establishment and operation, their easy establishment procedures, and low establishment and administrative expenditures due to their simple organizational structures. They are also characterized by management independence by their owners, who seek to achieve the best possible success.

However, the actual reality emphasizes that small and medium size enterprises play an important role in the economic activity in both the developed and developing countries, through their absorptive capacity in employing the workforce of the different levels of training and education. A study by the Riyadh Economic Forum on “the Saudi Business Sector and Meeting the Economic Challenges” showed that the average number of workers in the Saudi private sector stood at 8.4 workers per one single institution, and, consequently, 90 percent of the institutions in the Kingdom is considered within the scope of small and medium size enterprises. Small and medium size enterprises are considered the best efficient and effective tool for accelerating economic and social development, especially in remote areas with the least opportunities for development. They also provide a fertile field for training workers and developing their skills. To this end, governments have paid great attention to such enterprises and established the basic regulatory framework needed for their growth and development, particularly after having proved their ability to reduce pressure on the government sector in providing job opportunities and training. Governments also helped big enterprises in the marketing process and in providing raw materials and primary commodities at the different production phases. It is noted that most regional and international aid donating agencies and organizations have a growing tendency to provide financial resources and technical assistance aimed at assisting such small and medium size enterprises to depend upon themselves and play their anticipated role in the economy.
A reasonable and oft-used benchmark of longer-run inflation expectations is to look at inflation five or more years in the future. Such a forecast horizon is sufficiently long enough for typical business cycle dynamics and the effects of monetary policy on inflation to have played out, although under some circumstances, this may fall short of the “long run” implied by theory. Over the past year and a half, measures of longer-run inflation expectations have been insensitive to the rapid rise in inflation. Figure 1 shows the time series of these measures of longer-run inflation expectations. This includes median expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for inflation measured by the PCE price index 6-10 years in the future; breakeven inflation rates 6-10 years in the future as implied by nominal and inflation-protected U.S. Treasury securities; and the University of Michigan survey of inflation expected over the next 5-10 years.5 Realized 12-month CPI inflation is also shown in the figure for reference. As seen in Figure 1, SPF longer-run inflation expectations have remained remarkably stable over the past year and a half, while the market-based measure and the Michigan survey rose modestly during 2021 before retracing some of those gains this year. Because the Michigan survey asks about inflation over the next 5-10 years, it is a mixture of short-run and longer-run expectations, which may be related to its modest sensitivity to inflation.

To quote Mr David Bailey, “data and Regtech go hand-in-hand and data must be at the heart of any Regtech conversation”. Good quality data means Regtech can be used to build effective models and generate decision-making insights. It is vital to build trust with your customers if you want to acquire sufficient quality data. You then need to store and transform that data according to a solid set of data governance rules, identify data which is relevant, and use it in an intelligent and responsible way. Third, proper risk management remains as important as ever. In Hong Kong, we are proud of our banks with their long histories, but we recognise that their legacy infrastructure can potentially hold back Regtech adoption. One key takeaway from today is the reminder that Rome was not built in a day. Banks can start on a small scale, for example by conducting a Proof of Concept (PoC) in a business unit or implementing Regtech in a Cloud-based environment in a newly established part of their business. As a regulator, I must point out that when navigating technologies and determining how to put Regtech to use, it is essential that banks adopt a robust risk assessment framework to evaluate and manage the associated risks. This resonates with Ms Jane Fraser’s suggestions that banks should be mindful of risks such as data security and third-party operational risks that come with new technologies, and that the sandbox provides a valuable means to test new Regtech solutions.
If economic developments differ from our assumptions, market interest rates can then adjust in a manner consistent with achieving the objectives of monetary policy. By comparison, without predictability, a central bank would have to change the key policy rate more frequently or by larger increments. Monetary policy would be less effective. Norges Bank’s publication of interest rate projections is an important part of achieving predictability in monetary policy in Norway. We also give an account of the criteria on which the interest rate forecast is based and we explain changes in the forecast. Changes in money market rates on the day the Executive Board’s interest rate decision is published are a simple indicator of predictability in monetary policy. Ideally, these changes should be modest. On average, the changes in money market rates in connection with interest rate decisions have been somewhat smaller after we began to publish our interest rate forecast, despite the considerable market unrest we experienced during the financial crisis. One of the main reasons why large central banks in other countries now publish forecasts of future interest rates is that they want to achieve greater clarity in their response pattern. Their objective is to make monetary policy more effective in an environment of very low capacity utilisation and near-zero key rates. To provide extra stimulus to the economy under these conditions, the natural course is to seek to influence longer-term interest rates more directly.

12  See Eggertsson, G. and M. Woodford (2003): The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2003:1, pp. 139–211, and Krugman, P. (1998): It’s Baaack: Japan’s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1998:2, pp 137–205. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  I want to reiterate here that monetary policy in Norway will continue to be oriented towards low and stable inflation. This objective provides the economy with a nominal anchor. With firmly anchored inflation expectations, monetary policy can contribute to stable developments in the real economy. Since the inflation target was introduced in 2001, inflation has varied to some extent, but has, on average, remained close to 2.5 percent. And monetary policy has been able to respond rapidly to changes in the economic situation. The monetary policy mandate provides room for flexibility and discretion.In the light of the international debate on the role of monetary policy, Norges Bank, as the country’s central bank, should also conduct a thorough assessment of the framework for flexible inflation targeting within our current mandate. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches
But to attain a higher yield and reduce the financial risk, the Executive Board has decided that a limited part of the foreign exchange reserves can be invested in other assets. The condition is that these are assets with a high credit rating and good liquidity, issued by central governments, provinces or intergovernmental organisations. 11  9 In addition, the Riksbank owns 125.7 metric tons of gold (worth almost SEK 60 billion). 10 The government has given the Swedish National Debt Office the task of issuing green bonds. See the Swedish Ministry of Finance (2019) and SOU (2017:115). 11 Our regulations also allow investments in US agencies and in bonds issued by local authorities or state-guaranteed organisations. 5 [7]  The Riksbank gives consideration to the climate in its investments Last year we stated in our risk and investment policy that we would also give consideration to sustainability aspects when choosing assets. The Riksbank has not yet fully decided how sustainability aspects should be taken into consideration in the investment decisions. There are two main lines to choose between: either we choose which assets or which issuers we want to have in the foreign exchange reserves. The choice between assets would mean trying to invest some of the foreign exchange reserves in particularly climate-friendly assets, such as green bonds. I have doubts about this type of strategy, primarily as our investments are largely in bonds issued by central and federal governments. It is difficult to earmark money for special projects in government budgets.

8 It is important that the Riksbank understands these changes, both to be able to conduct an effective monetary policy and to be able to identify risks on the financial markets. In other words: the Riksbank must be able to manage the economic consequences of climate change. 6 Some people talk about central banks’ role being not just “lender of last resort” but also “market-maker of last  resort”. See, for example, the Bank for International Settlements (2014). NGFS (2019) talk about physical impacts and transition impacts, respectively. 8 See Cœuré (2018). 7  4 [7]  Should the Riksbank buy green bonds? Another question that is sometimes discussed is whether the central banks themselves should try to affect climate change. This usually involves two different directions. The first is regulating the financial markets to steer investments in a more sustainable direction. In many countries it is the central bank that is responsible for this type of regulation, but in Sweden it is the responsibility of Finansinspektionen (the Swedish financial supervisory authority). The Riksbank does not have any of these tools at its disposal. The second direction concerns the central bank’s own investments. After the financial crisis, many central banks, including the Riksbank, built up large balance sheets through asset purchases. Shouldn't these purchases reward sustainable assets, for instance by focusing on green bonds? This is a question faced by central banks today, and the answer is not evident. I shall try to describe my views on this.
3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

In the U.S., for example, on average about 90, mostly smaller, banks per year have been resolved since 2008 and this had no impact on the solvency of the sovereign. Political union can, and shall, develop hand-in-hand with fiscal, economic and financial union. The sharing of powers and of accountability can move in parallel. We should not forget that 60 years of European integration have already created a significant degree of political union. Decisions are made by an EU Council filled by national ministers and by a directly elected European Parliament. The challenge is to further increase the legitimacy of these bodies commensurate with increasing their responsibilities and to seek ways to better anchor European processes at the national level. A more solid political foundation should allow for agreement on a basic principle: that it is neither sustainable nor legitimate for countries to pursue national policies that can cause economic harm for others. This constraint has to be built into how countries design their economic and social models. The only sustainable model is one that is consistent with the terms of a common currency. Countries have to live within their means. Competition and labour markets have to be reinvigorated. Banks have to conform to the highest regulatory standards and focus on serving the real economy. This is not the end, but the renewal of the European social model. From the ECB’s perspective, a strong economic union is an essential complement to the single monetary policy. Building this will require a structured process with correct sequencing.
To defend the fixed exchange rate, the Riksbank raised the repo rate. During 1990–1991 the major tax reform was implemented, which meant that tax deductions declined significantly. All in all, the real interest rate after tax rose very substantially over a short period of time, which subdued the demand for credit substantially, and property prices took a sharp downturn. The end result of this process was a banking crisis. The banking crisis also led to a dramatic deterioration in public finances. At the same time, there was a currency crisis in Europe. Sweden had abolished currency regulation in 1989 and in 1991 pegged the krona to the ecu, the euro’s predecessor. However, partly as a result of the higher interest rates in Germany, an increasing number of countries in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, ERM, experienced a depreciation pressure on their currencies. The previous history of devaluations also meant that there was even greater pressure for another Swedish devaluation. In an attempt to defend the fixed exchange rate, the Riksbank raised its policy rate to a massive 500 per cent. Finally, the situation became untenable and the fixed exchange rate was abandoned on 19 November 1992. The route to the 500-per cent interest rate was thus part of a longer sequence of events, with several interacting circumstances. It also provides a clear illustration of what can happen when the confidence in the nominal anchor is lost.

The stock market and exchange rate crashed. Unlike other countries, Malaysia did not have excessive external borrowing. However, domestic borrowing was very high as banks had lent large sums, often against share collateral and to large property projects. The crash exposed these weaknesses in the private sector. On 1 September 1998, Malaysia decided to impose capital controls. Indonesia Indonesia was also believed to be fundamentally sound, even well after the initial outbreak of the regional currency turmoil. In late 1997, analysts continued to be upbeat on Indonesia’s economic prospects, expecting, on average, a strong 6-7% GDP growth in 1998. But as regional problems stacked up, Indonesia too could not escape the progressive erosion of confidence. The Indonesian economy had two domestic weaknesses: unsound banks and companies that had borrowed excessively abroad in short-term loans unbeknown to the government. These companies started hedging their exposures, sending the rupiah into a downward spiral. The companies became insolvent, badly affecting the banking system. Policy errors by the Suharto government compounded this. Grave social and political difficulties eventually led to a political crisis and a political transition that is still not completed. Korea Korea’s dynamic economy had certain weaknesses, but these were long-standing and well known: chaebols were very highly leveraged and banks often made lending decisions on government direction instead of commercial viability. Like Indonesia, Korea’s short-term foreign debt was high. When the crisis broke, foreign creditors refused to roll-over credit lines. Korean banks which had borrowed heavily overseas came under severe pressure.
Specifically, the Review identifies: –  Market structures which presented specific opportunities for abuse, such as poor benchmark design, and which more generally were vulnerable to conflicts of interest, collusion, and thin markets;  –  Standards of acceptable market practice that were usually poorly understood, often ignored and always lacked teeth;  –  Firms’ systems of internal governance and control that were incapable of asserting the interests of firms – let alone the wider market – over those of close-knit trading staff;  –  Individual incentives that were skewed, with pay packages stressing short-term returns overlong-term value and good conduct;  –  And personal accountability that was lacking, with a culture of impunity developing in parts of the market. All these factors contributed to an ethical drift. Unethical behaviour went unchecked, proliferated and eventually became the norm. Too many participants neither felt responsible for the system nor recognised the full impact of their actions. For too many, the City stopped at its gates, though its influence extended far beyond. A good start has been made in addressing these deficiencies. The design and regulation of key FICC benchmarks has been overhauled and transparency in FICC markets is being enhanced. Compensation rules have, in the main, been transformed to align better risk and reward. From next year, senior managers of banks and insurers will be held directly accountable for failures in their areas of responsibility. And the best firms are improving the “tone from the top”, launching conduct training and revamping control structures.

In principle, by relating new information to our most recent forecast, market players are in a good position to form a picture of policy’s direction and we can see that when we compare their forecasts of the repo rate with our own. However, one should be aware that there is a risk that an unduly simple rule or decision-making model will oblige the central bank itself to disregard other relevant information. Monetary policy is not mechanics. For this reason we have elaborated our view in various respects. We have underscored that there are also grounds for considering the periods before as well as beyond the 1–2 year horizon on which we focus. Strictly speaking, it is a matter of optimising over all future time, including both inflation and output. For a long time now we have also declared that there are transitory factors we should disregard; more recently we noted that there can be grounds for weighing a prompt return to inflation’s targeted rate against the risk of avoidable fluctuations in output. Finally, we have said that departures from our simple rule may be warranted by problems with financial stability. What is important, however, is our ambition to provide a clear explanation and motivation for such departures. Given our ambitions in this field we would risk severe criticism if we were to do so without good arguments. I should also say that if our application of the rule would continuously be modified and altered, much of its communicative and educational value would be lost.
However, the longer the time that passes without the rate of increase in house prices being subdued, the greater the unease that imbalances will build up in the housing market and in households’ debt/equity ratios. So how should monetary policy take this type of risk into consideration? This is a question that has been much discussed in recent years, both between central banks and within the academic world, as house prices have also risen rapidly in many other countries. However, there is unfortunately no common view that we can lean on. We will probably have reason to return to these issues when our and other peoples’ experiences of the fluctuations in asset prices have increased and when progress is made in the academic research in this field. It will also be interesting to see the independent assessment of monetary policy ordered by the Committee on Finance and which is expected to be ready soon. However, it is not possible for decision-makers to sit back and wait to become wiser and more experienced. At the Riksbank we do not consider it to be reasonable to entirely ignore the risks entailed in the rapid increase in borrowing and the house prices rises, although we cannot easily take these risks into account in our usual forecasts of economic developments over a couple of years. If it proves to be the case that economic imbalances are building up, they will sooner or later need to be corrected.

The continued international price pressure, combined with an expected appreciation in the krona mean that import price increases will remain low throughout the forecast period. The high productivity growth will also contribute to keeping down companies’ labour costs and thereby inflation (Figure 13). However, these inflation-dampening forces are thus expected to lose strength further ahead. All in all, one can say that we see a favourable and not overly dramatic development of the economy before us. Essentially we see an economy where the wheels are turning at a good pace and things are generally going well. It is natural in such an economy for monetary policy to become less expansionary to ensure the good development continues for a long period. It is difficult to say how quickly the interest rate increases should be made. The inflation forecast we publish today shows that inflation is expected to be slightly below target two years ahead. This is partly due to the fact that energy prices are expected to fall slightly and thereby hold down inflation. When the restraining effect of the energy prices abates, inflation will rise. At the same time, the economy is expected to develop strongly during the forecast period. To ensure that inflation is close to the target and to contribute to a balanced development of the real economy, we decided yesterday to raise the repo rate by 0.25 percentage points. It may in conclusion be worth emphasising that forecasts are always uncertain and that many things may occur to change this picture.