samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Merrill Lynch agreed to merge with Bank of America. The equity prices of the two remaining independent investment banks – Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley – weakened, their credit default swap spreads widened and this began to undermine their ability to obtain funding. In response, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley jumped over the regulatory wall and became bank holding companies. Hedge funds were forced to liquidate assets as financing terms tightened. As a group, their performance deteriorated sharply beginning in late summer. This provoked investor redemptions – further accelerating the speed and scope of the deleveraging cycle. Although housing and housing finance may have been at the epicenter of the crisis, it is important, however, to recognize that the crisis goes much deeper. In part, it was rooted in the overconfidence of investors and borrowers that paid little attention to liquidity and rollover risk and seemed blind to the risk of a global downturn. It was also rooted in the gaps in supervision and regulation that allowed a whole range of financial intermediaries and businesses to become more leveraged, in many cases funding long-term illiquid assets with short-term borrowing. To some extent, what has happened can be tied to changes in the nature of the business cycle and how those changes influenced expectations. Put simply, when business cycles become more damped and recessions less frequent and less severe, this will cause financial market participants to take on more risk. This will not appear to be problematic during the expansion stage.

Commercial paper rates in the market were high and the issuers wanted to extend the maturity of their obligations. But since that time, purchases have slowed sharply. Following the introduction of the CPFF, commercial paper rates in the marketplace dropped below the rates charged by the CPFF. As a result, issuance into the program has collapsed because many issuers can now raise funds more cheaply in the private market. About half of the maturing paper in the CPFF has not been rolled over. As a result, the amount of CPFF holdings, which peaked at around $ billion in mid-January, has fallen by over $ billion, to below $ billion. To date at least, the CPFF has worked as planned and has been very successful in rehabilitating the commercial paper market. Second, the Term Asset-Backed Security Loan Facility or TALF will provide balance sheet capacity directly to investors beyond the banking and dealer community. This program is designed to restart the securitization markets. The TALF is being rolled out in two stages. In the first stage, which I’ll call TALF Version 1.0, the Federal Reserve will provide non-recourse loans to investors against AAA-rated consumer asset-backed securities collateral. Primary dealers will serve as the contact point with these investors to make it easier for the Fed to interface with potentially hundreds of investors. The AAA-rated securities eligible as collateral for this non-recourse lending program are used to fund a wide variety of consumer and business loans, including student , credit card, auto and small business administration loans.
Another appreciation of the Swiss franc would constitute a very substantial threat to the Swiss economy and the risk of deflationary developments coming about. This is why it is necessary to accept an expansion of the balance sheet arising out of the enforcement of the minimum exchange rate. The SNB is in a position to bear the ensuing risks. Even at a level of CHF 1.20 per euro, the Swiss franc is still high, presenting large parts of our economy with a difficult situation. Consequently, we will continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination and will buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. If necessary, we stand ready to take further measures at any time. Management of foreign currency investments I will conclude today with a few comments about the management of our foreign currency investments. In the recent period, this topic has returned to the spotlight of public discussion. In particular, the possibility of establishing a sovereign wealth fund with the SNB’s foreign currency holdings has given rise to discussion. In this respect, it is important, first of all, to point out that the SNB does not hold its foreign currency in the form of banknotes or bank deposits. The funds are invested in different investment categories and currencies. For a considerable period, the SNB has held not just the traditional instruments – government bonds of countries with high credit ratings – but also bonds issued by private sector borrowers and shares.

The historical fact that, at the time of the introduction of the euro, market interest rates on instruments denominated in euro all along the yield curve were to be aligned with the lowest – and not with the average – rates prevailing prior to the euro was not foreseen by many observers prior to Stage III. The historically low level of short, medium and long-term market interest rates was unthinkable in some countries, which had experienced much higher inflation in the past. In my view, the incorporation of monetary analysis into our monetary policy strategy served, in the eyes of the global market, as an anchor for expectations that in no small way contributed to our success in building and maintaining credibility. The monetary policy strategy of the ECB announced in October 1998 explicitly recognises the monetary nature of inflation by assigning an important role to money in the formulation of monetary policy decisions aimed at the maintenance of price stability. As Prof. Issing explained to us in detail, there were and still are many good reasons to do so. Milton Friedman’s famous dictum that “inflation always and everywhere is a monetary phenomenon” is one of the central tenets of economic theory.
Ardian Fullani: Lending to the economy and the long-term stability of the banking system Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at a forum on “Lending to the economy and the long-term stability of the banking system”, Tirana, 4 March 2013. *  *  *  Dear Guests, Welcoming you to this forum, allow me to say a few words about its importance. The Bank of Albania considers that an open and ongoing communication with the banking industry and business community is a pre-condition to ensuring greater macroeconomic and financial stability of the country. These meetings serve as platforms to present incentives and strategic decisions, with direct impact on the economic and financial activity of both sectors represented in this meeting. Therefore, this is an open forum where the Bank of Albania’s analysis, conclusions and decision making will be confronted by the analyses and conclusions drawn by both other groups. I believe this meeting will lead us to a good understanding and assignment of responsibilities to provide Albania’s economic activity with a new stimulus by reviving lending to economy. Hence, allow me to share with you the main topic of today’s forum: lending to the economy and the banking system’s long-term stability. Besides professional discussions on the topic, this meeting is also aimed at launching the Bank of Albania’s new initiative, which I would call the Bank of Albania’s package to revive lending. Let me elaborate this topic further, dividing my speech into three main sections: 1.

The range of participants and audience at this conference is precisely something I would like to stress, the main goal of the seminar being to promote an exchange of views and flow of ideas and thinking among the various groups having a say on this topic, namely academia, international organisations, policymakers, social agents and the private sector. Only by covering all the different aspects and by sharing the different country experiences on this matter can we expect to make the right diagnosis of the problems and facilitate the acceptance and implementation of the reforms that might be needed. As you may be aware, I myself have repeatedly been suggesting the need for a labour market reform in Spain. But it is not the goal of this conference to act as a platform for announcing or defending the views of the Banco de España. On the contrary, its spirit is to incorporate different views into the discussion and promote mutual learning. I should like particularly to stress the importance of grounding and testing our opinions and proposals in rigorous analytical and empirical economic research.
It was concerns about confidence in the banking system as a whole that explain why the major central banks acted together in December, which in our case meant extending the range of collateral accepted in our regular auctions of 3-month lending. Auctions like this can play a useful role but, as we saw with Bear Stearns, a more continuously available facility may sometimes be needed to avoid an immediate loss of confidence. That is why, in April, when confidence was particularly fragile, we introduced a backstop that is available every day – the Special Liquidity Scheme. As I said in September, in providing such a backstop, we face a balancing act, between avoiding a major shock to the system and encouraging future reliance on the same cheap but risky funding sources. The Special Liquidity Scheme aims to do this by exchanging liquid for illiquid assets that existed only before the end of last year. We intend to learn from the experience of the Scheme to put in place a liquidity facility that works in all seasons – both ‘normal’ and ‘stressed’. It will be part of a set of reforms to our Red Book, to be announced later this year. Any such facility will need to meet two challenges: it will need the right pricing structure and it will need to overcome the ‘stigma’ problem that has affected access to all central banks during the current crisis. BIS Review 75/2008  3  The pricing structure will be key to striking the right balance.

The existing tripartite framework needs to develop so that the authorities are able to reduce systemic risk not just by effective management of crises but by creating incentives for financial institutions to avoid excessive risks. Some of the elements of such a framework I described in my evidence to the Treasury Committee on 20 September last year. In line with international experience, they included a special resolution regime for failing banks, changes to deposit insurance to reduce the incentives for bank runs, and a proper regime for the regulation of bank liquidity. At the heart of the case for a special resolution regime is the need to find a way to allow banks to fail in an orderly manner. As the Treasury Committee said in its report The Run on the Rock, “Banks should be allowed to ‘fail’ so as to preserve market discipline on financial institutions”. It is clear from the responses to the Consultation Document that there is widespread acceptance of the basic case for a resolution regime. But that is tempered by concerns about the details of its design. I want to highlight three key features that will be central to the success of the new regime. First, responsibility for resolving a failing bank should be delegated to a resolution authority which should have a wide range of instruments available to help resolve a failing bank. Which body assumes the role of the resolution authority is less important than the granting of those powers to some body.
Notes The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7

In the United States there seems to have been a further extension of the upward phase this year and a slowdown may be softer and more cautious than anticipated earlier. Even with stronger international growth, external price pressure is likely to be weak. For one thing, after the Asian crisis there is still some unutilised capacity on the whole in the global economy. Other factors are increased price competition and an expected appreciation of the krona. Economic prospects in Sweden also look brighter. Besides the positive cyclical signals from abroad and their expected effects on the Swedish economy, there is the stronger growth of domestic demand. Firms as well as households are optimistic about the future. There are a number of reasons for this. Real wages and employment are rising rapidly and public sector finances are becoming stronger. Fiscal policy in 2000 and 2001 is now assumed to be somewhat more expansionary. All in all, GDP growth is judged to be 3.6% in 1999, 3.8% in 2000 and 3.0% in 2001. These assessments are based on the technical assumption that the repo rate is kept unchanged. The strong growth trend means that in the coming years the economy’s unutilised resources at present will be utilised more quickly than the Riksbank envisaged earlier. Inflation is accordingly judged to move up somewhat faster than the Riksbank assumed earlier. In the main scenario the underlying rate of inflation, measured as UNDIX, is judged to be 1.8% twelve months ahead and 2.1% after twenty-four months.
It is therefore important that the Riksbank’s equity is of an adequate size to retain the confidence of the financial sector. Does the Riksbank have to make a profit? Well, a profit only becomes important when it affects the balance sheet and thereby the Riksbank’s ability to carry out its tasks. The Riksbank does not need to make a profit every year, but in the long run it is important that the Riksbank does make a profit. We need to be able to build up buffers to cover our costs so that we can carry out our task regardless of the government and the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. It is therefore important that the Riksbank is not financially dependent on them. Moreover, EU legislation requires that a central bank should have adequate financial resources to carry out its tasks independently. The main reason why I have chosen to talk about the Riksbank’s possibilities to make a profit is that it is not self-evident that the Riksbank will always report large profits year after year. The coming five-year period actually looks rather gloomy from this perspective. The low interest rates and expectations of rising interest rates further ahead mean that we share this situation with many other central banks. It is linked to the way the Riksbank has prepared itself to be able to manage its tasks in the future.

Caleb M Fundanga: Fostering entrepreneurship amongst young people in Zambia Remarks by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the VentureComp launch by Intermarket Banking Corporation, Lusaka, 12 January 2010. *  *  *  The Managing Director Intermarket Banking Corporation, Mr Subhrendu Chatterji Mr Joseph Toubi, Executive Vice President, Business Development & International Relationship, Afriland First Group Representatives from the Securities and Exchange Commission Representatives from the Pension and Insurance Authority Representatives from Lusaka Stock Exchange Representatives from Commercial Banks and other Financial Institutions Distinguished Invited Guests Members of the Press Ladies and Gentlemen. I am honoured for the invitation to officiate at this important launch of the business plan competition – VentureComp 2010. Allow me to begin by commending Intermarket Banking Corporation for its commitment to providing innovative products and services on the market. I have noted that the bank has brought an array of products and services that specifically target the small and medium scale enterprises and in some cases business start-ups. This is commendable and should be emulated by other banks. I am reliably informed that VentureComp 2010 is a business plan competition for students in all Universities, Colleges and other Institutions of higher learning. The spirit of the competition is to foster entrepreneurship amongst our young people and highlight the numerous opportunities available in the area of business. It is also interesting to note that the best business plan will be rewarded with start-up capital for immediate realization of the idea behind it.
Ardian Fullani: Economic outlook and important developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at The Economist's Conference – First Business Roundtable with the Government of Albania: Identifying new business opportunities, Tirana, 14 September 2006. *  *  *  Honorable Chairman, Distinguished Participants, I am very pleased to be here today to share and discuss with you our views, future macroeconomic and financial market developments and outline our policy orientation. I was looking forward to converse to this forum. It is a great opportunity that such well known institution, focus their attention toward Albania. I would like to thank The Economist Conferences and express my deepest and highest appreciation for this venture. I am confident that members of all communities, foreign and domestic, gathered here today will leave this forum with a clear image on the economic reality and business opportunities Albania has to offer. Assisted by geopolitical conditions and actual state of affairs, although small at a glance, Albanian economy presents numerous financial and economic advantages and incentives. Recently Albanian economy has reached a commendable macroeconomic equilibrium, sustained by an economic growth of 5-6 percent, low inflation levels well contained within a 2-3 percent band, and continuously shrinking budget deficits. It is my pleasure to emphasize that the Bank of Albania and its policy has been rightfully credited and earned accolades by established foreign and domestic institutions for its notable role in such accomplishments.

Therefore in July 2006 Bank of Albania decided to shift the course of monetary policy by raising the base rate (7 days repo rate) with 25 basis points. We are happy to observe that market is reacting following our decision. However based on our short term inflation forecasts and in presence of several risks, some of which I already explained above, Bank of Albania perceives that inflation pressures for the next 12 months remain elevated. Currently we are cautiously evaluating the extend of market response and assessing whether further action is needed. Simultaneously Bank of Albania is becoming increasingly concerned regarding the quality of loan portfolio. The accelerated pace of credit expansion, is posing challenges to both banks and to supervisory authority. The response to these challenges will aim at achieving macroeconomic stability, by means of a well capitalized banking system. With this goal in mind, the Bank of Albania, as the supervisory authority, has intensified the dialogue with the banks in order to find an adequate consensus for: setting realistic objectives of annual activity growth; containing the credit expansion and maintain good credit portfolio quality; strengthen the internal control and risk monitoring systems; and monitor carefully the capital indicators. I would like to use this floor to emphasize that Bank of Albania will be very firm to follow strictly all requirements that derive from the law and regulatory framework.
Anyway, they cannot offer as good financial services as commercial banks or credit card companies! (c)  Monetary autonomy  The last fear we had was related to the potential loss of monetary autonomy. Could Switzerland, a country completely surrounded by the euro zone, possibly hope to implement an interest rate policy different from the one of the European Central Bank? With the loss of its monetary identity, Switzerland would have seen its interest rates, traditionally below German rates, converge to higher European interest rates causing severe pains to the Swiss economy. Fortunately, we did not experience this outcome. First, in the months following the introduction of the euro, it became apparent that markets were not anticipating a pegging of the franc to the euro. An expected peg would have generated a convergence in interest rates, which simply did not happen. Second, and as could have been expected, the monetary needs of the Swiss economy differed from those of the euro zone: •  As an open economy strongly oriented towards global markets, the Swiss economy felt more deeply the slowdown in global trade than the euro zone. •  Furthermore, the Swiss franc kept playing its role - although to a smaller extent - of safe haven in tense international situations. •  Finally, Swiss inflation was considerably lower than inflation in the euro zone, where adjustments and catch-up phenomena occurred.

BIS Review 32/2004  3  Facing this reality, we decided to act independently and lowered interest rates initially in March 2001, a few months before the European Central Bank. Then, facing a clear economic slowdown and a strengthening of the Swiss franc, we lowered interest rates repeatedly and aggressively. So far, the magnitude of our policy loosening has exceeded that of the European Central Bank. We thus kept our monetary autonomy intact, and the interest rate differential between the euro and the Swiss franc has even slightly increased. 4. Swiss monetary policy in the new monetary order  What have we learned about the effects of the new monetary order on the international monetary system and on the effectiveness of monetary policy? (a)  The stabilizing role of the euro  Developments in currency markets over the past 5 years have taught us that the introduction of the euro has fundamentally modified and stabilized the international monetary system. In the past, this system was dominated by the dollar. Dollar crises were violently affecting economies dependent on international trade and capital mobility. The Swiss franc was particularly vulnerable as Switzerland is a small open economy with a currency playing the role of safe haven. Today, the euro has become the counter-weight of the American currency. When the dollar tumbles, the euro absorbs funds in quest for stability. Third party currencies are thus better shielded from speculative flows. Indeed, the Swiss franc is not the only currency to benefit from this new monetary order.