samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This has led our export shares in international markets to stabilise somewhat, following the losses recorded in the two previous years. However, no substantial changes to the gradual deterioration in the pricecompetitiveness indicators seen in recent years are discernible yet. Combined with the buoyancy of final demand, this has meant that purchases abroad have retained strong momentum, whereby import penetration has continued to increase. Despite the better export performance and the slowdown in expenditure, the external deficit has continued to increase both in nominal terms and as a percentage of GDP during the first half of 2006, albeit at lower rates than in the two previous years. The rise in the external deficit reflects, first, the impact of some temporary or one-off factors such as more expensive energy and the cyclical discrepancy between our economy and that of the euro area. We may also include here the import intensity of investment in capital goods, although this component may have a more permanent underpinning. Foreseeably, the recent course of energy prices and the recovery in the euro area will contribute to alleviating the tendency towards deterioration. However, we must not lose sight of losses in competitiveness. Reversing these losses may prove much more complex since that will ultimately depend on the economy’s efficiency and flexibility. The labour market has continued to be governed by the patterns of previous years, with strong job creation that has provided for the incorporation of a growing number of workers into the market and a reduction in the unemployment rate.

Goh Chok Tong: Challenges and opportunities for Singapore’s insurance industry Speech by Mr Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) INCOME 40th anniversary gala dinner, Singapore, 22 October 2010. *  *  *  1. In 1990 and 2000, I had the pleasure of celebrating with you INCOME’s 20th and 30th anniversaries. I am very happy to see that INCOME has grown from strength to strength as it celebrates its 40th anniversary. Naturally, I am anxiously looking forward to your 50th anniversary. Formation of INCOME and adhering to sound principles 2. INCOME was another of the many initiatives of the late Dr Goh Keng Swee. At the “Modernisation of the Labour Movement” seminar in 1969, he mooted the idea of setting up a life insurance co-operative (“co-op”). A year after, INCOME was formed. 3. Dr Goh believed that a life insurance co-op would advance the cause of the labour movement. Such a co-op would be fulfilling a genuine social need. By getting members of the working class to take out life insurance policies at a cost they can afford, the co-op will help them alleviate hardship at times of unexpected events and build up valuable savings for old age. Besides, the labour movement is an inclusive one, bridging different communities, languages and even to some extent, status.
We all know our NBFI sector is highly fragmented. Therefore, the usual question posed to us is “What is the ideal size and type that fits best for the industry to face future challenges”. To answer that, we carried out an assessment of the sector and accordingly all NBFIs were divided into two groups based on two quantitative criteria, i.e., the level of assets and capital base, and one qualitative criterion, i.e., compliance with the regulatory framework of the Central Bank. These two groups were named, “Category A” and “Category B”. Accordingly, NBFIs with an asset base above Rs. 8 billion and a core capital above Rs. 1 billion, and are well-compliant with the regulatory framework are grouped into Category A, while, the rest of the NBFIs are grouped into Category B. Considering the criterion thresholds, Category A companies are believed to be NBFIs fit to continue in the industry. At the beginning of 2014 when such grouping was done, there were 19 NBFIs under Category A while Category B consisted of 39 NBFIs. Further, considering the groups of companies, as some groups were running with more than 1 NBFI, there were 13 groups of companies falling into Category A, while 36 groups were in Category B.

We have also been able to note that productivity growth has shown an increase trend over the past decade. This has confirmed our opinion that structural factors in the economy lie behind the strong productivity growth. It is one thing to observe structural changes in the economy and have an opinion on the direction in which they will have an effect. It is another thing entirely to be able to predict with any accuracy how large and how lasting the impact will be. One of the conditions that must be taken into account is that  2  BIS Review 17/2007  productivity growth usually varies over the business cycle. At the beginning of the business cycle, for instance, productivity growth is usually quite high. Part of the strong productivity in recent years has probably therefore been cyclical. But exactly how much is difficult to say. At the same time, the assessment of productivity growth is an important building block in the Riksbank’s inflation forecasts. Gaining a deeper knowledge of the driving forces behind productivity growth will therefore remain a high priority area for the Riksbank. The Bank already has a project aimed at improving understanding of the correlation between, among other things, IT investments and productivity growth. We also intend to invite various researchers to an in-depth discussion on the driving forces behind productivity in Sweden and abroad. Hopefully, this will give us some new insights into productivity development.
This package has delivered a broad-based easing of euro area financial conditions since June 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  2014: money market conditions have improved substantially; long-term government bond yields, corporate and bank bond yields, as well as bank lending rates to firms and households, have declined markedly; and positive credit growth has returned to the euro area.8 The exceptionally favourable financial conditions have helped the economy recover from the shock waves of the financial and sovereign debt crises. They have insulated the recovery from global headwinds that have engulfed the euro area over the last two years, such as the tensions in global financial markets in August 2015 and the slowdown of global demand since the first half of 2015. More recently, the firming recovery has also broadened across countries and sectors. As regards inflation dynamics, our determined policy actions have been material in warding off deflation. They have also contributed to a re-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations. Market-based measures of inflation expectations, however, have not yet returned to their precrisis levels. Underlying inflation dynamics remain subdued, and risks and uncertainties still prevail, especially those related to the geopolitical environment. To sum up, the ongoing economic recovery is still predicated to a large extent on very favourable financing conditions that, in turn, depend on continued monetary policy support. The firming recovery is not yet sufficiently robust to ensure a self-sustained convergence of inflation rates to levels closer to 2%.

In the summer of 2014, the persistence of disinflationary forces could be clearly identified: first, measures of underlying inflation had been drifting down in synch with headline inflation for more than a year, and had reached historical lows.7 Second, for the first time since the inception of Monetary Union, longerterm inflation expectations had started to fall as well. Such fundamental risks to price stability required a forceful monetary policy response. Accordingly, the ECB deployed a series of unconventional monetary policy measures to ensure price stability. The comprehensive package of June 2014 comprised targeted long-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) and a cut of the deposit facility rate, moving it into negative territory. This package was combined with a, to start with, small asset purchase programme initially involving only private sector securities, which was later expanded to include public sector securities (becoming known as the public sector purchase programme – PSPP) and then scaled up over time. These measures were accompanied by further cuts in the deposit facility rate and further TLTROs; moreover, they have been complemented by our forward guidance.
Various investment activity and business sentiment indicators show mixed dynamics. In particular, new (especially, export) order expectations in industry remain low. This reflects a slowdown in global economic growth, continuing global trade tensions and geopolitical risks. These are all restraining factors for our economy. Regarding the three-year forecast horizon, our expectations here have not changed overall since October. We expect that the GDP growth rate will gradually increase to 1.5–2.0% in 2020 and to 2–3% in 2022. Successful implementation of national projects should provide the largest contribution to the increase in growth rates. This will support internal demand while external conditions remain a factor of uncertainty in the forecast. As regards oil prices. Last week, the OPEC+ countries reached a deal to extend oil production cuts until the end of March 2020.As of now, we stick to a conservative assumption for oil prices in our forecast: their reduction to 55 US dollars per barrel in 2020 and to 50 US dollars per barrel in 2021 and further on. We will adjust this opinion depending on, among other factors, future changes in the OPEC+ agreements and global demand for energy commodities. As to the balance of payments, we have slightly adjusted some indicators for this year, taking into account the actual data available. Let me remind you that the current account balance will 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  gradually decrease over the forecast horizon remaining sustainably positive: approximately to 3% of GDP in 2020 and to 1–2% of GDP in 2021.

We will then have detailed data on GDP for the third quarter, preliminary data on the balance of payments for the entire 2019, as well as current economic statistics for December and first data on inflation in January. We will adjust our mid-term forecast based on this information. Winding up, I would like to get back to the signal of our future actions. We have said today that we will consider the necessity of a further key rate reduction in the first half of 2020. Noting that, after similar signals in the past, it was twice that we cut the key rate already at the next meeting, namely in October and today, and anticipating your clarifying questions, I would like to point out the following. This wording means that we still see room for a slight decrease in the key rate. But both in February and at the next meetings we will comprehensively assess the reasonableness and relevance of such a decision taking into account the entire range of new data that will be available by that time. Our signal does not imply that we will necessarily lower the key rate in February or in the first half of 2020. A further key rate cut will become possible only if our analysis confirms that this is needed to bring inflation back to the Bank of Russia’s 4% target. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Page 16 of 27  Figure 5 Participation rate by gender (*)  Employment by gender (*)  (percent)  (index February 2020=100) Women  60  Men (right axis)  80  105  Women  Men  100 55  75 95  50  70  90  85  45  65 80  40 Mar-10  60 Mar-12  Mar-14  Mar-16  Mar-18  Mar-20  75 Jan-19  Jul-19  Jan-20  Jul-20  Jan-21  Jan-21  Apr-21  (*) Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). Figure 6 IMACEC by sectors (*) (seasonally-adjusted series, index February 2020 = 100) Mining  Manufacturing  Other goods  Trade  Services  120  110  100  90  80  70 Jan-19  Apr-19  Jul-19  Oct-19  Jan-20  Apr-20  (*) Source: Central Bank of Chile. Page 17 of 27  Jul-20  Oct-20  Figure 7 Perception and uncertainty – EPU (*) (index) Chile  United States  United Kingdom  500  400  300  200  100  0 Jan-18  Jul-18  Jan-19  Jul-19  Jan-20  Jul-20  Jan-21  (*) Moving 30-day average. Data up to 4 June 2021. Sources: Becerra and Sagner (2020) and www.policyuncertainty.com.

Indeed my first meeting on getting back from summer leave was to review, with Andrew Bailey and other colleagues, our security team’s preparations for an Extinction Rebellion action in the City around the Bank. Some of the protesters seem to believe we are doing nothing much at all, which I do not accept . At the other end of the spectrum, some have argued that central banks have no real role in responding to climate change. This also I disagree with. I think it would be completely non-credible for the PRA, charged with the safety and soundness of banks and insurance companies, to say that climate change and the financial risks it brings should be ignored in its work. I do of course agree that everything we do on climate must be directly rooted in our statutory objectives. But it is essential to acknowledge that banks and insurance companies are exposed to financial risks from climate change. As the prudential regulator, we must understand these risks and ensure they are being well-managed. Moreover, banks and the broader financial sector will play a pivotal role in financing the transition to a 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  greener world, helping to mitigate the climate-related risks to the UK financial system and economy. Diversity and inclusion The same applies to our work on diversity and inclusion. It is not the job of the PRA or the wider Bank of England to pursue social policy – that is a matter for politicians. But we should do two things.
Banks were ailing, some governments were struggling to obtain the funding they needed, markets were in turmoil, and there were fears that the euro area might eventually break apart. Well, it didn’t break apart. In fact, the crisis triggered a chain of reforms, and these reforms have made the euro area more stable. One of the boldest steps was taken at the peak of the crisis. On 28 June 2012, EU leaders decided to move towards a European banking union. And move they did. Two years, four months and six days later, they had turned their political pledge into reality. On a rainy day in November 2014, banking supervision was taken to the European level. Another year later, the same was done for bank resolution. And there is an ongoing debate about whether and how all this should be supplemented with a European deposit insurance scheme. In my view, it should be, and I am certain that, at some point, it will be. From the start, the banking union has covered the entire euro area. But its boundaries are not set in stone. The banking union is not an exclusive club; it is not limited to those countries that share the euro as their common currency. In fact, any EU country can join the banking union through an arrangement known as “close cooperation”. I know that many in Denmark are very much aware of this. But, as I said, I’m not here to talk about Denmark. I am here to talk about the banking union.

Well, we do aim to achieve a level playing field. But we do not seek to flatten the landscape. We do take into account country-specific circumstances that warrant specific supervisory treatment. And this is the case not only when we act as macroprudential overseers, but also when we act as microprudential supervisors, in particular when we assess the business models of banks. Here, we are even bound by law to “have full regard to the different types, business models and sizes of credit institutions”.1 We understand the value of diversity, and for good reason. Imagine that all banks had the same uniform business model. What would that do to innovation? What would happen to progress? And, equally importantly, what would it mean for financial stability? If all banks had the same business model they would all be exposed to similar risks. If that model was faulty, or were to be hit by an external shock, all banks would suffer. So, as any risk manager will tell you: diversification pays off. For that reason, we value diversity and account for it. We follow the principle of “same risks, same rules, same supervision” – which also means that different risks have to be treated differently – and we take a proportionate approach to supervising banks. So, the banking union is not at all about centralising power or doing away with diversity.
2 Unemployment peaked at nearly 12% in the eighties and over 10% in the early nineties – after smaller falls in output. 2  Labour force data were published after the date of this talk: unemployment has dropped to 7.9% in the three months to April. 2  BIS Review 91/2010  Throughout the recession we have heard many reports from firms about how they and their workforces have responded to recessionary pressures. Those reports are from our Agents or MPC members talking directly to business contacts across the regions and in all sectors – a truly invaluable source of information for the Committee. It has been clear that there has been an unusual response from companies and their employees. Many firms have sought to retain staff wherever possible, rather than shed them as in previous downturns – hours have been shortened and wages frozen or even cut where possible, rather than making people redundant. Large firms with smaller suppliers have tried to work with suppliers to keep their supply chains intact, which has helped smaller firms to survive. Many employees – at least in the private sector – have been willing to forgo income in order to retain their jobs. Tax officials have worked very hard with firms to give them the time for tax bills to be paid.

But I believe there are tools better suited to make the financial system more robust and I want to consider one of them – capital requirements – and how they might in future interact with monetary policy. More immediately, problems and fragilities in the banking sector remain and pose risks that the recovery in demand and activity we have seen across Europe – including in the UK – falters. But in the UK we have also seen CPI inflation rise to a level that is significantly above the inflation target. In recent months CPI inflation has begun to fall, but remains well above the 2% target level and that makes setting monetary policy difficult. We continue to face the problem of balancing risks: risks that inflation of 1.0pp–1.5pp above target lasts long enough to become ingrained in expectations and affect behaviour so that it is hard to bring down, versus risks that the recovery in output becomes weaker and then disappears, leaving inflation pressures lower than is consistent with the target further ahead. Since the financial crisis towards the end of 2008 economic policy has been unusually hard to manage. Both monetary and fiscal policy have been exceptionally expansionary. There has been an extremely large fiscal deficit. Fiscal policy is now being tightened. I look forward to the day when it will be appropriate to tighten monetary policy since a return to more normal levels of interest rates would be a welcome sign that economic conditions were also more normal.
Today I would like us to look at globalisation from the perspective of a central bank, taking into consideration the objective of the central bank, its ability to contribute to the shape of the economy and the instruments that a central bank has at its disposal. To start with, let us consider what channels there are through which globalisation may impact the monetary policy and the central bank. 1  “Economic globalization is a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across international borders.” According to: “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity?” IMF Staff, April 12, 2000 (Corrected January 2002). 2  See e.g. Mussa M. “Factors Driving Global Economic Integration” presented in Jackson Hole, Wyoming at a symposium on “Global Opportunities and Challenges,” August 25, 2000. 3  Economic Policy Committee “Responding to the Challenges of Globalisation”, November 2005. 4  Roach S. “The New Macro of Globalization”, Morgan Stanley Global Economic Forum, 6 June 2005. BIS Review 32/2006  1  Firstly, globalisation — through shaping real economic processes abroad, its influence on the global business cycle and commodity prices on global markets — influences the external environment of the national economy, which is monitored by the central bank and in which the central bank operates.

Let us have a step-by-step look at these channels of influence of globalisation on the monetary policy. Re 1) The growing share of international trade in the global output as well as the increasing international capital flows cause a situation, where the growth rate of a national economy depends increasingly on the developments of the global economy. To illustrate the impact of globalisation on the economic prospects, attention should be drawn to the hot topic in the macroeconomic policy, namely the problem of global imbalances. To give you some facts, the US current account deficit had been growing gradually over the past years to exceed USD 800 billion, i.e. 6.5% of the U.S. GDP, last year. This deficit, which represents import of savings from the rest of the world to the USA, is financed by the Asian central banks, for example the Peoples Bank of China, and by oil-exporting countries. The available forecasts show that the deficit will continue to grow. An animated debate is currently underway to determine whether this is a steady situation that simply reflects the new principles in the global economy 5 , or whether this trend is bound to stop and reverse sooner or later, which may entail a significant increase in the US long-term interest rates, a strong depreciation of the US dollar and a serious slowdown in the global economic growth. The majority of empirical and theoretical studies indicates a growing probability of the latter scenario, especially if no due steps are taken in many countries.