samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Whatever happens, we have to achieve our primary mandate: price stability. DIE ZEIT: "Not all Germans believe in God, but all in the Bundesbank", Jacques Delors once said. The Mark was extremely popular. The euro isn't yet. What went wrong? Trichet: The euro is as stable, as credible, as a good store of value as the Mark was. And look at the figures: More than 12 million jobs have been created in the euro area since 1999 many more than in the eight years before. And around 2 million more than the US have created in the same period. Certainly, that has also a lot to do with the structural reforms that we have to continue implementing actively. But stable prices are a necessary condition for sustainable growth and job creation. DIE ZEIT: Beyond all political differences there was always an economic consensus in Europe: freedom for goods, services, labour and capital. Now the French President Nicolas Sarkozy attacks the European principle of free competition, and also European institutions, especially the ECB. What holds Europe together? 2  BIS Review 85/2007  Trichet: We live in a world of very rapid changes, thanks to science and technology, thanks to globalization. There are major changes in the division of labour. And there is a temptation in particular nations to turn the EU and the ECB into scapegoats. This is not fair. The European construction has helped us to create a level of prosperity, which has played an important role in reuniting Europe. Our values are clear.

The diverse professional training and experience of our staff are among the New York Fed’s strengths. Bank supervisors, risk managers, economists, traders and lawyers contribute insights from their respective professions that lead to better outcomes. In the spirit of learning from other disciplines, I am delighted to introduce today’s keynote speaker. Some of you may recall that, two years ago, Sir David Walker opened our first culture conference with the words, “I am grateful to the philosopher Onora O’Neill for reference to very relevant advice. "8Today we have gone to the source. Baroness O’Neill is professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Cambridge, former president of the British Academy, and former chair of the United Kingdom’s Equality and Human Rights Commission. She was appointed a life peer and member of the House of Lords in 1999, and, in 2007, was elected an Honorary Fellow of the Royal Society. Today, Baroness O’Neill serves as a member of the Banking Standards Board. Her 2002 lectures on trustworthiness—reprinted in the book A Question of Trust —have been tremendously influential among New York Fed staff working on culture. Baroness O’Neill, the floor is yours. 1 Stephanie Chaly, James Hennessy, Jacqueline McCormack, Thomas Noone and Joseph Tracy assisted in  preparing these remarks. 2 William C. Dudley, Ending Too Big to Fail, Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum, November 7, 2013. 3 Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., The Rewards of an Ethical Culture, Remarks at the Bank of England, January 20, 2015.
However, as was the case before, the Central Bank may, with prior notice, suspend the auctions temporarily for short or longer periods when the depth of the foreign exchange market is lost due to exogenous shocks or unforeseen extraordinary developments, and when the resulting excessive volatility and unhealthy price formation are observed in foreign exchange rates. On the other hand, the Central Bank will continue to closely monitor the volatility in exchange rates also in 2007 and will directly intervene in the market in the event of actual and potential excessive volatilities. Banks will be able to borrow foreign exchange in terms of USD and euro from the Central Bank within the predetermined limits with a one-week maturity in the Foreign Exchange and Banknotes MarketForeign Exchange Deposit Market in the upcoming period too. Moreover, the purchase/sale transactions of “foreign exchange against foreign exchange”, “foreign exchange against foreign banknotes” and “foreign banknotes against foreign banknotes” conducted between the Central Bank and institutions authorized to operate in the Foreign Exchange and Banknotes Markets will continue. In conclusion, as can be understood from the general framework and our exchange rate policy implementations described above, exchange rates are established by supply and demand conditions in the foreign exchange markets under the implementation of the floating foreign exchange regime. The key determinants of foreign exchange supply and demand are the monetary and fiscal policies and the economic fundamentals determined by the structural reform process and expectations.

The answers to this question as provided in the Inflation Reports published in 2006 were as follows: •  JANUARY 2006: “... a short-term interest rate path remaining constant for the first couple of months in 2006 and displaying a gradual decline thereafter...”  •  APRIL 2006: “...where the Central Bank continues to cut policy rates gradually...”  •  JULY 2006: “... in addition to the measures of June, the Central Bank will implement measured monetary tightening in the rest of 2006 and cut policy rates gradually in 2007...”  •  OCTOBER 2006: “under the scenario that the Central Bank maintains its tight stance until the last quarter of 2007 and cuts policy interest rates afterwards...”  As it is clearly seen above, as long as there was not a significant shock in the economy, the Central Bank acted in parallel to its earlier statements. However it had to revise its monetary policy stance after important shocks such as the market volatilities of May and June. It is more evident in light of these this example that, as it is frequently emphasized in our announcements, the interest rate path, which is used by the Central Bank in producing forecasts, should not be perceived as a commitment to be followed in every case. Hence, the interest rate risk should be assessed by considering the fact that the outlook presented in the Inflation Report is subject to change depending on the data flow, and thus, the policy perspective can be updated whenever necessary.
And it serves to deflate some of the excesses that have built up in the system, such as the rapid rise in margin financing. The 2.5% depreciation of the RMB against the US Dollar since August is consistent with the divergence in growth momentum between China and the US. It must also be seen in the context of the 15% appreciation of the RMB in real effective terms during the year to July. The move towards a more market-determined exchange rate is in line with the broader liberalisation and internationalisation of the currency. The gradual tightening of financial conditions in Emerging Asia as interest rates normalise in the US will serve to rein in the excessive credit expansion seen in some of the regional economies in recent years. It is not a bad thing to break the psychology of monetary overdependence on the part of markets and even some policymakers. Talk of currency wars is over-blown and comparisons with the Asian Financial Crisis are over-done. To be sure, some of the gyrations in financial markets have reflected concerns among investors about the moderation of growth in Asia. •  The sluggish recovery in the G3 economies has taken the wind from many tradeoriented Asian economies. •  At the same time, the transition to domestic-led growth has been bumpy. Structural reforms to raise human capital, spur new investments and reduce impediments to growth have not proceeded quickly enough in many countries. So, downside risks remain, and there may be further bumps along Asia’s growth trajectory.

Caleb M Fundanga: Catering for the un-banked population in Zambia Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of Stanbic Bank Limited’s Mazabuka branch, Mazabuka Town, 10 October 2006. *  *  *  •  The incoming Member of Parliament for Mazabuka, Honourable Gary Nkombo,  •  The Regional Managing Director of Stanbic Africa, Mr. Clive Tasker  •  The Town Clerk, Mr. Chingangu  •  The District Commissioner, Mr. Chinda  •  Traditional leaders here present; Chief Mwanachingwala, Chief Mwenda, Chief Hanjalika, Chief Nalwama, Chief Monze  •  The Chairman of Stanbic Bank (Zambia) and all Board members present  •  The Managing Director of Zambia Sugar Plc, and Managing Director of Stanbic Bank (Zambia) Ltd  •  Stanbic Bank Management and staff present  •  Distinguished invited guests, ladies and gentlemen  It is an honour and privilege to be invited to officiate at this important occasion. Today I join the Bank’s Board Chairman in thanking the people of Mazabuka for the effort and support that has been extended in establishing this Stanbic Branch, which I believe is the first in Southern Province. Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen, I have keenly followed the progress and growth of Stanbic Bank in the last few years and I must say that as Governor of the Central Bank, it has been very gratifying to witness the progressive strategies of a privately owned commercial bank.
Moreover, the fact that the borrowing rate of the Thai government compares to other countries in the region is much lower reflects that our fiscal risks are much lower. Thus, the risks of having the fiscal-type economic crisis are low as well. The third type of crisis that countries go through is the banking crisis. For us, if you look at our banking sector, it is still quite solid. The BIS capital ratio is about 18-19 percent which is among the highest in the region. The banking sector both in terms of liquidity and capital positions is quite strong. The one area where we are weak in terms of balance sheets is in the household sector where household debt to GDP remains quite elevated and has increased as a result of the COVID-19 crisis since people have less income to pay off their debt. All in all, the Thai economy is an economy where the downside risks are quite limited so we are able to handle various types of shocks whether it is COVID-19, political unrest, social unrest. With all these different kinds of shocks, the economy is still quite resilient. Another factor that contributes to our resiliency is the fact that our labor markets are quite flexible and that there is a strong and extensive informal social safety net. People who lost their jobs, they are able to return to their family, to the rural sector, and still able to survive.

There are actually structural reasons why Thailand is a safe place to do business and a place where risks of economic shock, economic downturn, or significant economic crisis are  Page 5 of 11  very low relative to almost any other countries in the region. If you look at the causes where a country typically experiences an economic crisis, what are those? A country sometimes might have the foreign exchange or balance of payments crisis as they run out of reserves and have too much external debt. Yet, Thailand, unlike other countries in the region, our vulnerability on this front is extremely low. We have a very low level of external debt relative to our foreign reserves which exceeds 200 billion dollars while our short-term external debt is significantly below that. Our current account has been traditionally in very large surpluses. Therefore, the risk of having a baht crisis, like what we had in 1997, remains extremely low. What are other kinds of crises? Another kind of crisis that people experience is the fiscal crisis. If you look at the Thai governments’ balance sheet, it is relatively strong, the public debtto-GDP ratio is just over 50 percent and the fact that the government is able to borrow 10-year money at only 1.7 percent indicates that people are still willing and happy to finance the government. They do not see the government as having a very high risk.
To be sure, Asian economies will continue to be subject to the political, economic and social 3/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  uncertainties that characterise emerging markets. But the region’s fundamentals are sound. Growth inherently enlarges the size of the asset pool, and asset markets in Asia provide a compelling case for global investors. The region is seeing a growing diversity of institutional investors – not just from Asia but also from Europe and the Americas. There is also an expanding breadth of investible assets, driven by Asian companies raising capital to grow and internationalise their business. Alternative opportunities in Asia Recent trends in the asset management landscape favour investment opportunities in Asia. A key trend is the shift in asset allocation from traditional public markets to private market alternatives like private equity (PE), real estate and infrastructure. This is largely driven by investors’ search for yield and portfolio diversification benefits. Preqin reports that allocations towards alternative assets hit a record $ trillion assets under management in 2016. And perhaps as an indication of more to come, global institutional investors are still below their long-term target allocations to such alternative asset classes. In the steer towards alternative assets, there are two themes that stand out for investors looking towards Asia. First, companies, including those in Asia, are choosing to stay private for longer, and are increasingly comfortable with the PE value proposition. Second, Asia’s immense real estate and infrastructure needs are an opportunity for investors to monetise its demographic and structural transformations.

As with bank deposits prior to deposit insurance, this created an incentive for investors to be the first to get out whenever there was any uncertainty over the underlying value of the assets in the fund. By being first in line, they could exit while the fund could still repay at par, leaving others to bear any losses. The longer the investor waited, the greater the risk that the fund would be forced into the fire sale of assets to meet redemptions and end up breaking the buck. As the crisis unfolded, the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury and others took a series of actions to contain the spiral of funding runs and asset fire sales. First, the traditional lender of last resort function was strengthened through the introduction of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and foreign exchange swaps with foreign central banks. Then, as the crisis intensified, the lender of last resort liquidity provision was extended to directly backstop key wholesale funding markets and made available to certain nonbank firms. The Federal Reserve created a direct backstop to the tri-party repo system through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). When the Reserve Fund broke the buck after the failure of Lehman Brothers, precipitating a run on money market mutual funds, the Treasury guaranteed money market fund assets and the Fed introduced the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidation Facility (AMLF).
This intervention served to shore up savers’ confidence in the viability of the financial sector. Our enhanced credit support measures were taken to preserve the integrity of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy at a time when banks showed a tendency to withdraw in a disorderly way from their intermediation function. A functioning transmission mechanism is the pre-condition for the central bank to be able to accomplish its mandate of maintaining price stability in the medium term. The same policy intention underlies our Securities Markets Programme, which we started on 10 May this year. We intervene in euro area public and private debt securities markets in order to ensure depth and liquidity in those market segments which have proved dysfunctional. As government securities are the basis for pricing all private debt instruments, our action in the sovereign bond markets aims to create the orderly conditions necessary for lenders to provide a steady flow of credit to the private economy. Overall, through its enhanced credit support measures, the ECB has replaced ill-functioning segments of the financial market and acted as an “intermediary” between banks with a liquidity deficit and banks with a liquidity surplus. At the same time, and with a slightly longerterm perspective, the measures have contributed to a more stable situation in various segments of the financial markets during the crisis. For example, easier access to central  BIS Review 83/2010  3  bank refinancing meant that banks could refinance their money market activities more easily if needed.

For example, Adrian and Shin (2008) demonstrate that the balance sheets of US broker/dealers expand when monetary policy is accommodative. 6 Similar evidence is provided for the US repo market by Gorton and Metrick (2009), who found that activity started to increase significantly from 2001 – that is, at a time when monetary policy in the US was relatively loose following the bursting of the dot-com bubble. 7 Acharya and Schnabl (2010) provide similar evidence related to the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market. 8 In summary, if the process that has been set in motion under the aegis of the G20 has the potential to place a whole new segment of finance under regulatory scrutiny and oversight, the new collateral-based finance can give a central bank stronger influence over financial and macroeconomic conditions more broadly. 5. Monetary policy in a high-debt environment  I mentioned earlier that collateral is likely to play a growing role in the functioning of capital markets. Demand for collateral is thus likely to increase. But, given the collapse of securitisation activity during the crisis, we could imagine that the current decline in the creation of securitised assets might become a permanent feature of the new landscape. There will be fewer ABSs created out of bank books. Sovereign debt will certainly be widespread. It will probably replace ABSs in the collateralisation of secured lending. Unlike in the past, the risk characteristics of this type of debt instrument will be more graduated than was considered possible only few years ago.
Emerging markets, in particular in Asia, are learning to live with heightened uncertainty in the world where the extent and the whereabouts of benefits from financial globalization to promote growth and development while ensuring our economic and financial stability. This, of course, necessitates that we have to be very focused on risk management. Ladies and Gentlemen, Asian economies have come a long way since 1997 in promoting economic and financial resiliency. We see a region-wide move toward a more flexible exchange rate regime, with a disciplined framework in the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. As for the financial sector, the framework of policy has moved toward risk-based supervision, to an adherence to international standards, and to the undertakings of formal financial sector assessments under Financial Sector Assessment Program of FSAP. The macroeconomic policies also become more flexible, yet proactive, in dealing with changes in the market conditions and practices. When necessary, a tradition fiscal-monetary policy mix has been augmented by appropriate prudential measures of financial institutions. More importantly, legal and information infrastructure, including credit bureaus, has also been put in place to strengthen the foundation for financial system capacity for crisis prevention and resolution. These intensive reforms and institution building during the past decade may make it less likely that financial turbulence will trigger a sharp and broad-based dent to real economic outcomes, especially, since there is no significant build-up of sectoral imbalances in the region.

Competition both on and between platforms has generated an extraordinary array of FX execution choices for market participants to choose between. Whether to seek opportunities to net offsetting trades with others before transacting in the market. Whether to trade by voice or electronically. Whether to prioritise speed or diversity of execution. Whether to use algorithmic or trade-by-trade price selection – on firm or indicative prices; with wider or narrower groups of counterparties; in full view (‘lit’) or anonymously (‘dark’); or with more or less sophisticated ‘Transaction Cost Analysis’ (TCA) tools. Shifting patterns of demand for different bundles of these services, coupled with aggressive price and non-price incentives, have driven dramatic swings in market share between platforms (Chart 4). 4  Electronic Broking Systems line measures trades executed via automated matching systems for dealers. Electronic Trading Systems lines measure trades executed (predominantly by or for customers) via single-dealer proprietary platforms or a multi-dealer systems. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  6  Chart 4: Multi-dealer FX platforms – buyside market share  Source: Euromoney FX surveys. Some implications of fragmentation: the good, the bad and the ugly  Is fragmentation here for good? Some suspect it will eventually hit the buffers, as the declining marginal benefits of ever-greater product diversity, and the growing cost of navigating it, become more evident.
Public finances were hit hard when the banking sector had to be rescued in the wake of a bursting housing bubble, in which housing prices and bank lending had chased each other’s tails to form an unsustainable spiral. This was why these countries quickly encountered major problems in managing the growth of their sovereign debts, despite their relatively good position at the outset. An excessive build-up of debt – irrespective of whether it takes place in the private or the public sector – leads to problems sooner or later. Events in the euro area in recent years provide a frightening illustration of this. It is clear that the euro area is facing major challenges, not only for individual countries but for the EMU as a whole. The ECB, the EU and the IMF have implemented a range of support measures to come to terms with the acute problems. A number of new decisions and measures have also been announced within the EMU over the course of the year. However, it is important to point out that responsibility for managing these problems primarily lies with the politicians in the respective countries. Decisions are required at the national level, not only to resolve the problem of weak public finances but also to improve competitiveness (see Figure 6).

In this sense, the recent creation of a Financial Stability Committee in Chile should improve coordination among regulators and have a view on financial stability and risks. Over time, and as learning takes place, some legislation should be introduced in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee. In the Central Bank, evaluation of financial vulnerabilities and strengths is performed bi-annually in our Financial Stability Report. Finally, regarding the interactions between macroprudential policies and monetary policy, I would like to make some comments.4 The traditional view has been influenced by the Tinbergen principle, by which there should exist as many instruments as policy targets. This view is reinforced by the fact that, as I argued above, the interest rate is too blunt of an instrument to deal with asset price bubbles and financial dislocations. Therefore, we can think of a separation between the interest rate – the monetary policy instrument to achieve the inflation target – and macroprudential tools to deal with financial stability. 4  See also Bernanke (2011) for discussion on these issues. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  However, and perhaps unfortunately, the separation is not that clear. As I discussed before, actions of monetary policy, such as the Greenspan put, may create financial instability. The financial crisis also showed that it has effects on the business cycle and, hence, it has implications on monetary policy. Moreover, the transmission channels of monetary policy could be broken down during a crisis.