samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Perhaps surprisingly given the significant share of ethnic minorities in the workforce, ethnicity pay gaps are larger in London than outside London, for all qualifications (Chart 12). These gaps are larger for those with higher levels of qualification, such as a degree. This presents a second puzzle in the unconditional pay gap data. Recent data do not change this picture. In the latest calendar year (2018), ethnicity pay gaps are positive across all qualifications, averaging 8%. They remain larger in London than elsewhere, with the highest ethnicity pay gaps in degree and A-level qualification categories. Unconditional ethnicity pay gaps are still consistently smaller than unconditional gender pay gaps. 15  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  15  Chart 12: Median ethnicity pay gap by qualification, sample average Ethnicity pay gap, per cent  London  20  Other 15  10  5  0  ‐5 Degree or equivalent  Higher educ  GCE A Level or equiv  GCSE grades A‐C or Other qualifications No qualification equiv  Ethnicminority minority ethnic  White white  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive ethnicity pay gap in this chart indicates that ethnic minorities earn less than their white counterparts, whereas a negative ethnicity pay gap indicates that ethnic minorities earn more than their white counterparts. Ethnicity pay gaps differ significantly by occupation and sector.

Good progress is being made. The share of BAME and female staff below senior management in the Bank currently stands at 19% and 46%, respectively, compared to targets of 20% and 50%. At senior management, BAME and female representation is 5% and 31%, compared to targets of 13% and 35%.14 A wide array of initiatives are underway to ensure the Bank meets these targets. Other central banks have also made a further push towards improving their staff diversity, although few publish pay gaps. The ECB’s Executive Board introduced gender targets in 2013 in order to double the share of women in management by 2019. As of the end of 2018, 29% of management positions were held by women compared with a target of 35% for the end of 2019. For the most senior management roles the share was 22% against a target of 28% for the end of 2019. The ECB announced additional measures last  14  Carney (2019a) discusses diversity and inclusion in the Bank. Carney (2019b) notes that the Bank’s gender pay gap is lower than for most companies in the financial sector. 33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  year. The Fed announced a Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan for 2016-19, aimed at fostering diversity in the organisation. In order to foster transparency and accountability, they report the composition of their employees by diversity statistics annually. Looking beyond central banks, the analysis presented here suggests some clear directions of travel.
Accordingly, the regulator should review and adapt the rules already in place; the aim must be to remove obstacles limiting the advantages to be had and, at the same time, to mitigate any risks that the new environment may generate. From the regulator’s standpoint, it is important, first, to maintain a level playing field, which basically entails putting into practice the well-known maxim: “same risks, same requirements”. However, this has not proved easy, as a great many of the regulations in place have a sectorial approach. In addition, certain activities are subject to special regulations, because of the possible implications, for instance, for financial stability. This is the case of deposittaking, which leads to banks being subject to strict criteria that shape their activity overall, while other intermediaries that offer similar services, but not deposit-taking, are free from such requirements. Turning to the promotion of innovation, in such a global, competitive and dynamic environment some flexibility in the stages at which ideas are tried out is required. Here, the proportionate application of regulations, within the permitted margins, or the creation of controlled test spaces, known as sandboxes, appear to be suitable measures for promoting innovative projects that seek to harness the potential of new technologies in the financial sector. Further, it is worth paying attention to how this transition process unfolds. As I stated earlier, our starting point in Spain – and largely in the rest of Europe – is that of a heavily banked society.

The (scant) risk-sharing channels in the Economic and Monetary Union Completing Banking Union and developing the European Capital Markets Union are, moreover, key objectives for securing the appropriate and stable functioning of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Comparing the workings of EMU and of the United States, in terms of the mechanisms each have in place to cushion the impact of shocks affecting a single country or State, illustrates clearly how far we still have to go. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that, in the United States, around 70-80% of the impact of shocks affecting a particular State is distributed among the other States. In this case the main risk-diversification channel is through the workings of the capital markets. Hence, the cross-border ownership of capital allows around 40% of the asymmetric shocks within the United States to be shared. The credit channel, which operates through the granting of credit by non-resident institutions to resident agents, enables around a further 20% of asymmetric shocks in the United States to be shared. Conversely, in the euro area, around 70% of the financing received by households and firms is mediated by the banking sector, while only the remaining 30% is obtained on capital markets. This is practically the opposite of the United States, and reveals how the financing of the economy depends on the banking sector in Europe. As a result, capital markets in the euro area absorb 10% of shocks, and the credit channel around 34%.
The previous regulation from 2001 stated: “In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account.” The formulation “extraordinary temporary disturbances” must be interpreted in its historical context. In inflation targeting’s early phase, exception clauses were normally included in the mandates to clarify that monetary policy should not contribute to unnecessary fluctuations in the real economy. After the change in 2018, the mandate reads: “[i]nflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flexible”. The specification “forward-looking” means that in its conduct of monetary policy Norges Bank shall disregard temporary disturbances that do not affect inflation further out and that an exception clause for extraordinary temporary disturbances was, in the Government’s view, no longer necessary. [5] The question of whether monetary policy should disregard imported inflation is related to the choice of price index for inflation targeting. This topic is also discussed in the economics literature (see literature review in Section 3.1 of Husabø (2017)). However, the literature is not fully unanimous about which price index the central bank should aim to stabilise. [6] Table 3.2 in Husabø (2017) shows the degree of covariance with activity for alternative price indices. [7] One difference is that average domestic inflation has run somewhat higher than CPI inflation, which might suggest that a target for domestic inflation could be set somewhat higher than the target for CPI inflation.

Inflation is high and broadly based When my predecessor Øystein Olsen spoke here a year ago, Norges Bank had just begun to normalise the policy rate. During the pandemic, the policy rate had been lowered to a historically low level. When society reopened, demand picked up quickly, and already last summer, activity  returned to its pre-pandemic level. There was no longer a need for a highly accommodative monetary policy. At the same time, the evolution of the pandemic was still uncertain. We therefore expected to gradually raise the policy rate further. In late spring 2021, the rise in prices for commodities and other globally traded goods accelerated. The pandemic-related lockdowns had led to a shift in consumption, both in Norway and other countries. There was a rotation away from spending on services to goods, and global goods demand increased. High demand, coupled with pandemic-induced delivery delays, led to substantial global supply chain constraints, with long delivery times and high freight rates. Chart: Sharp rise in global prices It took some time for the rise in global prices to feed through to Norwegian consumer prices. This is because at the same time the effect of the pandemic-related krone depreciation was fading out. But since summer, imported inflation has been high. Over the past year, employment in Norway has risen further, and unemployment has come down to a very low level. In the period to summer, labour shortages became a growing concern for firms. Over the past few years, wage growth has edged higher.
42  Philip Coggan (2012): Paper Promises: Debt, Money and the New World Order, Penguin, London. 43  Many attempt to measure whether institutions are fulfilling their societal role, which is a difficult exercise. As a nation, Norway scores high. Individual institutions are also measured. If any of us has preconceived notions, at least mine bear out. The institutions I thought would be at the bottom of such lists are at the bottom, and vice versa – those I thought would be at the top are at the top. But this is not a static situation. Movement is possible – in both directions. 44  The expertise must of the highest standard. A central bank’s competence does not always translate well into performance. There are two reasons, in particular, for this state of affairs: First, the Bank is a monopoly and there is no domestic benchmark. Second, it has a potentially very generous budget, since it prints its own money. Even though Norges Bank ranks high in terms of reputation and confidence, it may quickly slip into a state of complacency and then mediocrity. It is only the Bank itself that can establish the mechanisms that will prevent such a development. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  3. Leaders must be aware that the institution will be held accountable – it must practice transparency as a principle. 4. Leaders must utilise institutional memory and staff experience – they must learn from history and manage their wealth – their cultural heritage.

However, today marks not an end, but a beginning. In just over a week the Single Supervisory Mechanism will become fully operational, and the immediate future poses challenges of the first order both for supervisors, involving the adaptation of our structures and functioning to the needs of the new European mechanism, and for banks. I would not like to conclude without thanking the whole team at the Banco de España, which has been working for months in collaboration with the European Central Bank, the banks and the audit firms to successfully see through this complex exercise. And, naturally, I would also like to extend my thanks to the teams at all of the banks which, for months, have devoted their best technical capabilities to this end. Thank you very much for your interest and for being here today. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Following the next decision to increase interest rates by 0.25 percentage point on 20 September, we indicated that the probability that the next change in interest rates would be a reduction was the same as the probability of an increase. The sight deposit rate has since remained at 7.00 per cent. In the December 2000 Inflation Report, it was estimated that price inflation would decline gradually in the years ahead, but remain higher than 2 per cent in 2003 and 2004. However, the projections were based on the assumption that interest rates move in line with market expectations, as implied by the forward rate curve. The market had factored in a decline in interest rates over the next two years. It thus appeared that market participants had a different perception of the probability of a reduction in interest rates than the one expressed by Norges Bank. The technical assumption of a fall in interest rates influenced the projections. In the report, we also indicated that given an unchanged interest rate, projected price inflation would be below 2 per cent from the end of 2002. Has monetary policy been successful? It is not possible to find a simple performance measure that makes it easy to determine in retrospect whether monetary policy has been successful. As noted earlier, confidence and credibility are important for achieving the objectives of monetary policy. The degree of confidence and credibility will be an indication of how successful monetary policy has been. Confidence and credibility cannot be measured directly.

Low oil prices amplified the fall in investment in the petroleum sector. At the beginning of 1999, the outlook for the Norwegian economy seemed fairly bleak. In this situation, the possibility that Norway would enter a recession of a type that would further reduce confidence in the krone was considered a definite risk. This is why Norges Bank decided at the beginning of 1999 to reduce interest rates. Owing to the uncertainty associated with economic developments and the effects of interest rate changes, Norges Bank adopts a gradual approach to the setting of interest rates. Interest rates were therefore reduced in five steps by a total of 2.50 percentage points in the period from 28 January to 23 September 1999. The lowering of interest rates contributed to strengthening the krone. 6  BIS Review 7/2001  In mid-1999, Norges Bank considered the risk of a recession of a type that would reduce confidence in the krone to be substantially reduced. In addition to the reduction in interest rates, this was partly due to brighter prospects for international growth and higher commodity prices. However, we still envisaged a growth pause in the Norwegian economy. The projections for price and cost inflation in the next few years were then in accord with the corresponding aim for inflation for the ECB.
In fact, the pilot program of Uruguay (“e-Peso”) was not blockchain-based. d. There are different policies being explored and there is no “one size fits all” answer. e. Nevertheless, countries could largely benefit form sharing their experiences. Page 10 of 11  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  ***  Page 11 of 11

2  See also “Comparing the recent financial crisis in the United States and the euro area with the experience of Japan in the 1990s”, Monthly Bulletin, ECB, May 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Both episodes clearly share elements of a “balance sheet recession”, where strong credit expansion ends with a sharp correction in asset prices, thereby triggering the need for significant balance sheet adjustment. Yet, the scope of the required adjustment in the euro area when viewed at the aggregate level differs markedly from that in Japan, even if some euro area countries struggle with excessive leverage. In Japan, the sharp fall in equity prices from the peak of 1989 led to losses of almost 80% in the two decades that followed. Real estate prices also precipitated, with urban land prices declining by about 40%. By comparison, at the euro area aggregate level, equity prices fell by about 50% and have already rebounded from their post-Lehman trough, while residential property prices have fallen by a mere 3% since their peak in 2008. Moreover, the levels of indebtedness across sectors clearly differ. As for fiscal imbalances, the fiscal response in Japan meant an increase in public debt from 67% of GDP at the start of the 1990s to about 240% in 2012. For the euro area as a whole, the increase was much smaller, with aggregate debt increasing from below 70% in 2008 to 92% in 2012.
The Bank has benefitted from capacity building, training, technical assistance, and funding from:   The African Development Bank (AfDB);    The Association of African Central Banks (AACB);    The British Department for International Development (DFID);    The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);    The European Union (EU);    The German Technical Cooperation (GTZ);    The International Monetary Fund (IMF);    The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD);    The Reconstruction Credit Institute (KFW);    The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);    The West African Monetary Agency (WAMA);    The West African Monetary Institute (WAMI);    The West African institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM); and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9    The World Bank  This list is by no means exhaustive. We want to assure these organisations of our cooperation at all times and we know that with their continued support we shall maintain the course despite the challenges of our time.

This underlines the importance of policy coordination at international level for effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and to reduce the magnitude of the transition costs. Obviously a world with differing sensibilities and environmental policies poses significant challenges. In particular, there is a risk of a significant “carbon leakage” towards countries that decide to adopt a more gradual transition path. Also, in the absence of sufficient coordination, there is a risk that unilateral measures may hamper trade and the functioning of the world economy, with the consequent loss of global welfare. In this respect, in the sphere of central banks and bank supervisors, I wish to highlight the coordination carried out by the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which the Banco de España joined in 2018. Meanwhile, the Basel Committee on Banking  4  This is precisely the essence of the proposed Carbon Dividend Act promoted by the Climate Leadership Council, which states that “a carbon tax offers the most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions at the scale and speed that is necessary”.
However, there is a risk that African countries could become the biggest casualties of a crisis they did not create. The impact is already severe and has dealt a huge shock to our continent while posing a great threat of reversal to the hard earned social and economic gains that most of our economies had achieved in the recent past. Ladies and Gentlemen, for more than a decade, most African countries had continued to register unprecedented economic growth rates averaging 5% and above. We saw a rise in income levels and a reduction in poverty among our peoples with improved education,  BIS Review 44/2009  1  health, water and infrastructure development. The continent also experienced a surge in investment flows in many sectors including mining, manufacturing, tourism, transport and construction. Progress in governance and accountability had also been noted in most African countries. Mr Chairman, allow me without pre-empting the deliberations to mention some problems the global financial crisis has created for most African economies. Commodity exporting countries have experienced a decline in their export receipts. This has been due to the decline in commodity prices reflecting the weak demand of such commodities arising from the scaled down output in industrialised and emerging market countries. The declining export earnings as well as changing investor sentiment toward investing in emerging markets, which has been reflected in the reversal of investment flows, have been exerting pressure on the exchange rates.

In a nutshell: “few, well, till the end”, or in Spanish if I may, “poco, bién, hasta el final”. There are of course non-economic areas: to name a few, defence and border protection; climate change; or youth education and training – an Erasmus Pro programme should be a priority for the unskilled and unemployed youth, which is our common tragedy in France, Spain and Italy. But in the economic field, much remains to be done as well. Although we have succeeded with monetary union, we must make progress towards economic union – so that monetary policy does not remain the only game in town. Page 5 sur 8 1. The first economic priority is to address the root causes of Europe’s continuing subdued growth; and a major one is what I call the “investment crunch”. (Slide 4) Many, following Ben Bernanke’s speech of March 2005, have rightly talked about the “global saving glut” that was putting pressure on the world’s economies. At present, saving remains high, due to the combination of emerging market economies’ surplus and advanced countries’ aging populations. However, (slide 5) what has dramatically changed since the 200708 crisis is investment, which has dropped sharply as a share of GDP in advanced economies. In the euro area, the total investment to GDP ratio has dropped by around 3 points since the 2007 peak and has only slightly recovered since.
Fixed income investment should primarily contribute to reducing the fluctuations in the Fund’s value. In addition, the Fund should be exposed to credit premiums. The financial crisis taught us that different types of fixed income investments have very similar qualities when market liquidity declines. There are limited gains from holding a large number of diverse securities. Norges Bank therefore recommends simplifying the indices by substantially reducing the number of fixed income instruments. The most commonly used benchmark indices for bonds are market-weighted. Borrowers are assigned weights according to the level of debt they hold. Increased debt can reduce debt-servicing capacity. A market-weighted index is probably not the best approach for diversifying the risk of loss given default. Norges Bank has therefore proposed the use of GDP weights instead of market weights for government debt in the Fund. Under the fiscal rule, central government spending is to correspond to the expected real return on the Fund, estimated at an annual average of 4 per cent. As manager, Norge Bank must invest with a view to achieving a return in line with this objective. Estimating the expected return over the Fund’s long-term horizon is challenging. Some models now suggest that return requirements in equity markets are fairly normal, in spite of low yields7. This may imply a real return of 5–6 per cent in equity markets. With positive contributions in active management, property investment and fixed income management, a total return of 4 per cent is not unreasonable.

Cecilia Skingsley: Inflation-targeting after the financial crisis Speech by Ms Cecilia Skingsley, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Almega (employer and trade organisation for the Swedish service sector), Stockholm, 22 May 2015. *  *  *  Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. I would like to thank Björn Andersson and Mikael Apel for their help with this speech. This coming Sunday is Pentecost, “the day of rejoicing”, to quote Esaias Tegnér. And it is certainly easy to rejoice at the season and see green shoots springing up, the result as Tegnér writes, of “the friendly flames of the Spring-sun”, even in the economic statistics. For a long period of time now we have had a development where production and the labour market have been improving, but inflation has been too low. This has also affected expectations of inflation in the longer run. The Riksbank has cut the repo rate and its forecast for the future repo rate to very low levels to bring up inflation, as well as purchasing government bonds to make monetary policy even more expansionary. It appears as though this policy has had an effect. But we are not home and dry yet, which is shown, for instance in the unexpectedly low inflation outcomes in April. It takes time until inflation is back at a level around the inflation target and there is still spare capacity in the economy and scope to increase activity further.