samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Markets need to form a view on the probabilities of different paths of future interest rates in order to price a wide range of financial instruments. So they are interested in what central banks say. In recent months both the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank have found it far from straightforward to convey the likely trajectory of future interest rates. And the Fed announced three weeks ago that Chairman Bernanke had established a subcommittee of the FOMC to examine a number of “communication issues”. There is now a lively debate about how, and to what extent, central banks should try to communicate their intentions with respect to future official interest rates to financial markets and the wider public. At the Bank of England, our approach is to keep it as simple as possible. We don’t say where interest rates will go next for the simple reason that we don’t know. And it would be quite misleading to pretend otherwise. The MPC reaches a new judgment each month, made afresh in the light of all the new information about the prospects for inflation. We don’t decide in advance. So trying to give direct hints on the path of interest rates over the next few months risks deceiving financial markets into believing there are definite plans for the next few months when no such plans exist. But in order to form judgements about the likely path of interest rates over somewhat longer time horizons, markets do require some information from the central bank.

Jean-Pierre Roth: The Swiss economy and financial centre – successes and new challenges Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Handelskammer Schweiz-Österreich und Liechtenstein (Foreign Trade Chamber for Switzerland-Austria and Liechtenstein), Vienna, 25 February 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Mid-2003 saw the start of a remarkable, broad-based economic upswing in Switzerland which is still underway, even if business cycle uncertainty has increased in the recent period. A number of factors indicate that the long-term growth outlook, too, has improved for Switzerland. These factors include the increasing globalisation of our economy and the opening up of the labour market to the EU. The Swiss economy is participating in globalisation through increased direct investment as well as growing foreign trade. At the same time, there is more competition on the domestic goods market, although a fair bit still remains to be done in this area to complement the opening up of the labour market to the EU. Globalisation and market opening present companies and economic policymakers with challenges that become particularly acute when setbacks occur – as in the case of the current international financial market turbulence.
In particular, public investment should be boosted, especially in infrastructure, an area in which various countries that have fiscal space have built up a considerable investment deficit in the past. Those countries could improve their potential growth, given the positive correlation between this type of public expenditure and productivity (at least when investment projects are efficiently selected, designed and implemented) and, at the same time, support the recovery in the euro area as a whole in the short term. All in all, the coordination of fiscal policies should be reinforced, to encourage the countries that have fiscal space to use it, while those that have higher debt levels continue with their fiscal consolidation. In the medium term, as indicated in the Five Presidents’ Report of June 2015, a fiscal capacity for the euro area as a whole needs to be developed, to prevent overburdening monetary policy at times, such as now, of major economic difficulties. In the absence of more ambitious mechanisms, it would be advisable to reinforce the instruments already available, such as the European Investment Plan (the so-called Juncker Plan). Redirecting unused structural funds towards that Plan could help to launch projects that are unable to find funding in the present uncertain environment and to trigger productive investment, which continues to show signs of weakness in the euro area as a whole.

First, I feel that the ECB deserves recognition for having been the European institution that provided the quickest and the most ambitious response to the crisis. It assumed, in exceptional circumstances, a key role in vanquishing doubts as to the continuity of the euro, in underpinning the recovery and, subsequently, in combating the risks derived from the current situation of near-zero or even negative inflation rates. Notably, the ECB’s unique role as the monetary authority of various states and economies did not weaken its resolve as it pressed ahead with its four broad lines of action: First, key policy rates were reduced almost to the bottom of the possible range. Thus the marginal deposit facility rate, which had been negative since 2014, stood at –0.4% in March this year. In the current context of abundant liquidity, this rate is a key reference in monetary policy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Second, the ECB Governing Council strengthened its communication policy through the publication of forward guidance. Third, the liquidity-providing instruments used since 2008 were adapted to the new circumstances. In mid-2014 longer-term refinancing operations were commenced with the specific objective of stimulating credit expansion, i.e. making access by banks to very long-term funding from the ECB conditional on them granting credit to households and nonfinancial corporations. In March it was decided to extend this instrument to 2017.
François Villeroy de Galhau: Special address on the French National Strategy for Financial Education Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the 4th OECD/GFLEC global policy research symposium to advance financial literacy "Addressing the needs of youth", Paris, 24 May 2017. * * * Accompanying slides. Your Highness (Queen Máxima of the Netherlands), Mr. Secretary General, ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be here with you today for this symposium on financial literacy. Indeed, French citizens have high expectations about financial education: [slide 2] 78% believe that financial literacy should be taught at school and 65% believe that access to it would reduce overindebtedness and financial vulnerability.1 Academic research by Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell2 confirms its importance, as does our own research in France3 [slide 3]. If we consider the three "standard" questions used to assess awareness of interest rates, inflation and risk diversification, only 30% of those surveyed answered all three questions correctly, which is lower than in other European countries. Furthermore, in France some of the worst results were obtained by the youngest age group, as well as the oldest. However, there is more at stake: this represents a challenge for democracy. Providing our fellow citizens with the keys to understanding complex economic debates is a matter of respect.

L. Arrondel, M. Debbich and F. Savignac (2015), “Stockholding in France: the role of financial literacy and information", Applied Economic Letters, Vol. 22, Iss. 16, pp. 1315–1319. L. Arrondel, M. Debbich and F. Savignac (2015), “Does financial literacy influence financial decisions? ", Banque de France, Rue de la banque No 2. www.banque-france.fr/uploads/tx_bdfgrandesdates/RDB_02.pdf. 4 Pete Seeger in “Loose Talk", ed. by Linda Botts, 1980. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Beyond this general judgment about unsustainability, there is little consensus on how this adjustment process will unfold or on its implications for economic activity and financial markets. The plausible outcomes range from the gradual and benign to the more precipitous and damaging. The size of the imbalance and the inevitability of eventual adjustment, however, mean that the world will be living for a considerable period of time with some risk of large movements in relative prices, greater volatility in asset prices, and periods of slower growth in the United States and in the rest of the world. That said, a number of observers have suggested that living with these imbalances for an extended period of time presents very little risk to the U.S. and world economy. These arguments are worth some attention. One view is that the rise in the surplus saving of the rest of the world, the relative ease with which capital now moves across borders, and the increase in the relative attractiveness of claims on the United States together may suggest that the world can sustain larger imbalances, more easily, for a longer period of time than would have been possible in the absence of these conditions. This is true.

That uncertainty necessarily adds to the normally substantial degree of uncertainty we face in making monetary policy judgments. And it reinforces the case for preserving confidence in our commitment to keep underlying inflation low over time, and for retaining the capacity to respond with flexibility to the challenges we face in this uncertain world. Thank you. BIS Review 3/2006  5
Yet Hong Kong now finds itself with a consumer price level that is 12% below the peak of four years ago, and with a GDP deflator some 15% below its peak and 22% lower relative to that of the US than it was four years ago. What is the explanation, and can one live with this? There is general consensus, supported by both recent IMF analysis and research conducted within the HKMA, that Hong Kong's deflation is predominantly cyclical. I shall return to Hong Kong in a minute, but let me first dwell for a moment on the global slowdown in inflation. Over the past four years the rate of consumer price inflation has averaged 2.5% in the USA, only 1.7% in Euroland, minus 0.3% in Japan, and minus 0.3% in Mainland China. In six other economies of east and south-east Asia taken together, the inflation rate fell to 2.7% on average in these four years as 1 against 4.4% in the preceding four. This widespread slowdown in inflation, and in some cases the emergence of deflation, is not just a cyclical phenomenon. There are, I believe, some more fundamental institutional and structural factors which have been contributing. Underlying forces a. Successful central banks  First of these is the commitment of monetary authorities to combatting inflation and their evident success in doing so (or even over-achievement in some instances). With so many of them represented here today, I do not need to elaborate further. b.

Overall it has, in practice, proved difficult to identify what impact deflation of goods and services prices, of itself, may have had on activity. In general, however, because the degree of downward wage flexibility in Hong Kong is probably greater than elsewhere, the economy is believed to be better able than others to cope with this type of deflationary pressure and to avoid severe distributional disequilibria. Deflation of asset prices is a rather different issue. We have certainly experienced some negative wealth effects, particularly on household expenditure, as a result of the sharp drop in property prices. One factor enabling Hong Kong to live with deflation perhaps better than some other economies is the resilience of the banking system and its ability to cope with debt deflation. A long tradition of fairly conservative prudential oversight of the banks has left them strong enough to weather the recession. Although we have demonstrated that we can live with deflation, a modest positive rate of inflation might nevertheless be preferred to our current modest negative rate. And it would certainly be desirable to avoid gyrations of property prices of the sort which have brought such a sharp deflation there in recent years. However, we do not regard the exchange rate as a viable instrument for trying to dispel deflation. We would not consider it worthwhile sacrificing our long track record of disciplined monetary stability for that purpose.
It is admitted that the Treasury is actually free of foreign debt and virtually debt-free domestically, if one takes into account its deposit balance in the Central Bank. The Bank’s foreign reserves and equity have never been larger than they are today. However, it has been said that Iceland’s banks have grown substantially, which makes the foreign reserves proportionally smaller. It is appropriate to remember that banks in Iceland, as elsewhere, are responsible for their own operations, and they must demonstrate prudence and sound risk management. According to the banks’ own declarations, to which the Financial Supervisory Authority has not commented, their financing status is at least comparable to that of comparable foreign banks. Therefore, they need not rush into disadvantageous credit markets ahead of others. However, it cannot be denied that the Icelandic economy’s total debt is too high, which can be traced to the decisions made by financial institutions and other companies in the market. If the Central Bank’s foreign reserves are compared with those of several countries outside the largest currency zones, it can be seen that, according to information from the International Monetary Fund, Iceland’s reserves as a percentage of per capita income are equal to or greater than those in, for instance, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and New Zealand. In terms of importation of goods, Iceland’s position is also excellent. Only New Zealand is stronger overall. In terms of importation of goods and services, Iceland is well above average.

There has been a marked easing in global monetary and fiscal policies; authorities around the world have also enacted substantial initiatives to revitalise the global banking system; the sharp falls in commodity prices will boost households’ purchasing power; and the marked depreciation in sterling should support demand, both at home and abroad, for domestically produced output. The scale of this stimulus is significantly greater than that seen at comparable stages of the recessions in the 1970s, 80s or 90s. But to repeat, there is huge uncertainty about the precise form and timing of the recovery and so this central path should be treated with a healthy degree of scepticism. In particular, I think the risks around this central path are weighted to the downside, reflecting the possibility that the actions taken by the authorities around the world to improve the availability of credit and to restore business and consumer confidence are slow to take effect. So there may still be more to do. Learning from past recessions When considering the likely scale and duration of this recession, it is natural to examine the experience from past recessions. And simple comparisons with recent recessions are not encouraging. For example, taking account of developments in Q1, output appears likely to have fallen by more in the first few quarters of this recession than in any of the preceding ones. But when making these comparisons, it is important to recognise that the parallels are far from perfect.
While the city has had a number of ups and downs since the early 1990s, in tandem with the United States, the general trend has been upwards. The city withstood a terror attack, financial crisis and natural disaster. Following the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001, there was uncertainty over whether this would be a permanent setback for the city. However, the city rebuilt and recovered and Lower Manhattan has evolved into a vibrant commercial, cultural and residential area. Gateway Plaza is still there, but the Battery Park City neighborhood today is now fully developed and well-established. There are even several grocery stores! The city weathered the recent financial crisis and the Great Recession far better than many would have anticipated. Although employment in the securities industry has stagnated after the decline due to the Great Recession, the city has found new sources of dynamism, including 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  rapid growth in the technology sector and the further development of tourism. The number of technology workers in New York City has doubled to about 125,000 in the past decade. That sector is now is nearly as big as the securities industry. And New York City had 56 million visitors last year, nearly double the total of 25 years earlier. In 2011, an important milestone was reached: payroll employment surpassed its previous alltime peak, from 1969, and it has grown strongly since then. Crime rates have fallen significantly across the city since 1990, and real estate values have surged.

By 1982, the city’s inflation-adjusted wage bill had fallen by almost 30 percent, and real investment in the city’s infrastructure fell by more than three-quarters and didn’t reach its 1974 levels until the early 1990s. The city gave up a significant amount of its autonomy in exchange for the relief it received. Ultimately, however, the reforms that were forced on the city created a responsible and transparent budgeting process that has served the city well to this day. By early 1976, the U.S. economy was recovering from a deep recession, and employment in New York City’s financial sector was once again on the rise. Overall employment in New York City began to recover by 1977, and unemployment began to decline. By the end of the decade, there were signs of hope, but it wasn’t at all clear yet whether the city was back on solid footing. While employment did rebound modestly, the city’s population was still declining, crime was still rising and the city was still having trouble borrowing. It would be 10 years after the initial crisis before the city was able to borrow again on its own in the public markets. By the mid-1980s, the resiliency of the city’s economy was becoming more apparent. City-wide employment barely declined during the wrenching recessions of the early 1980s—the first time in a long while that the city’s economy had out-performed the nation’s.
The Bank’s response to the Commission’s call for evidence is http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/regframework/detailed available at answers010216.pdf  12  The 8.5% minimum is composed of 6% common international standard agreed under Basel III plus the 2.5% pillar 2a requirement that reflects shortcomings in risk measures. See footnote 3. 13  We plan only for only the systemic part of the banking system to have a 5% buffer. In line with Basel standards, smaller banks will be subject to a buffer only half the size. That reflects the difference in economic costs between a big – systemic – bank coming close to or actually failing and a small bank doing so. 14  This will take effect by supplementing baseline capital requirements with the countercyclical capital buffer rate on UK exposures. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  We’ll be looking for the evidence that borrowers might have overstretched; that asset prices could be vulnerable to reversal; and that economic imbalances exist that could correct. Assessing risks isn’t the same as “calling the cycle”. We shouldn’t be asking whether a downturn or a bad event is destined to happen. We are not looking for irrefutable proof. Capital buffers should be based on whether the evidence says there is a threat that could materialise in future, not whether it is going to.

The enhanced and robust competition in the marketplace would lead to greater consumer benefits in terms of improved business efficiency, product development and service quality. It is envisioned that the achievement of these imperatives will ensure that the Malaysian takaful industry is well-positioned to successfully make the transition from being "good-to-great" and, InsyaAllah, will remain as the global leader for takaful and retakaful. Ladies and Gentlemen, The overarching objective of our regulatory policies is to ensure that the financial system is in a position to serve the public with the best range and quality of products and services, that the interest of the consumer is at all times protected, and that best practices are adopted to ensure the soundness and stability of the system. It must be emphasised, however, that the ultimate responsibility for ensuring this rests on the players in the financial system, in particular, the Senior Management and the Board of Directors. This is particularly important to ensure public confidence in the efficiency and performance of the financial system to contribute to the overall development of the economy. The initiative formulated for the takaful industry in strengthening competition through the creation of new takaful players, is aimed at achieving this overarching objective. The presence of players with the right qualities and calibre in the marketplace is part of the process of ensuring product innovation and service excellence.
SPEECH DATE:  16 November 2016  SPEAKER:  Cecilia Skingsley  VENUE:  FinTech Stockholm 2016, Berns  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergst org 11) Tel. +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn @ riks ban k.se www.riksb ank.s e  Should the Riksbank issue e-krona?1 Should the Riksbank issue electronic means of payment in the same way as we now issue cash? This is a natural question for a central bank, as technological advances create new opportunities, as the printing press once upon a time made it possible to print banknotes. Banknotes were a complement to the minted coins, and are so today too. Similarly, an electronic means of payment, say an e-krona, could be a complement to physical cash. This is the question I intend to discuss today. The question is particularly relevant for us in Sweden, as cash is being used to a declining extent and is sometimes difficult to get hold of. The fact that cash is no longer as easily accessible as before means that the general public finds it more difficult to get hold of money issued by the Riksbank and instead often has to use money in bank accounts with the commercial banks. This is a development steered by market forces and not by the authorities. Market forces has worked well for a long time, but developments move fast for some consumers and companies.

Such framework needs to be accompanied by adequate accounting, auditing and disclosure standards, to improve market transparency and enhance supervisory effectiveness. Turning to Mainland China's experience, the liberalisation of capital account has been selective. Inflows of foreign direct investment have long been encouraged, which has contributed significantly to China's robust economic growth. In more recent years, steps have been taken by the authorities to allow greater portfolio flows. In particular, the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) schemes have enabled foreign investors to access the domestic financial market, while under the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investors (QDII) schemes, financial institutions can, upon approval, invest overseas on behalf of domestic investors. Reflecting the limited channels of outward investment and market conditions, however, capital flows have been overwhelmingly inward bound in recent years, and China has experienced a rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. This had fed into pressures on the exchange rate and inflation which were only eased somewhat by the global economic slowdown in more recent months. The People's Bank of China has employed sterilisation through open market operations, reserve requirements and credit quota in order to offset the impact of capital inflows on domestic monetary conditions. Such measures, however, have incurred costs to the central bank and the banking sector. Thus it would be useful to consider ways in which outflows of capital can be liberalised in an orderly and regulated manner to alleviate the BOP pressures in the near term.