samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
15  Figure 7  Labor market indicators (1) (2) (index, January 2020=100)  Employment levels  Total hours worked (3)  110  125 110  125  100  100 100  100  90  75  90  75  80  50  80  50  25  70  25  70  20 01 Chile  Abr. 04 Colombia Spain  Jul. 07 U.S.  France  01 20 Japan  U.K.  04 07 Abr. Jul. Peru (right axis.) (1) Monthly data for all except Spain and France, which use quarterly data. The latter use base 2020.Q1=100. (2) Seasonally-adjusted series, except for Colombia, Spain and Peru. (3) Four Chile and France, total hours worked are calculated by multiplying average hours and total workers in the period. Sources: Bloomberg and respective statistics bureaus. Figure 8 Q: How have your workers' wages changed with respect to before the crisis? (percent of total answers)  Annual wage correction Welfare benefits Sales commissions Overtime pay Incentives and bonuses Non-monthly payments Other basic and permanent wages Basic wage Significantly reduced  0 20 Slightly reduced  Slightly increased  Significantly increased  Source: Special survey to companies, Central Bank of Chile.

: Quarantines begun in Santiago East  1  5  +116 3 %  Pharmacies  3  0  7  Department stores  Mar. 03  May 05  (*) Percentages show variation between 30 July and 26 August. Source: Central Bank of Chile using Internal Revenue Service data. 17  Jul. 07  1 0  Figure 11  Evolution of local assets v. baskets of comparable countries (1) Tipo de cambio (index, 17/April/2020=100)  102  10-yr sovereign bonds' interest rate (dfiference w/respect to 1/June/2020, percent)  102 0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  98  98  94  94  90  90  86 17-04 17-Apr. 86 -0.2  Jun. 06 17-08 17-06 17-Jun. 17-Aug. Comparable basket (2) Sep.  Jul. 07  Aug. 08  09  -0.2  Chile  (1) Vertical lines from left to right mark the dates of: the June monetary policy meeting (June 16), approval in Congress of the idea of legislating on a bill that would allow the withdrawal of 10% of the AFP funds (July 8), and first announcements by the Central Bank of Chile (July 20). (2) The basket of comparable economies is made up of a combination of Latin American assets and commodity exporters (Australia, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, New Zealand and Peru). Source: Bloomberg.
Pay growth of UK workers moving jobs (“twisters”) has exceeded that of workers remaining in their position (“stickers”) by 4 percentage points since 1994 (Chart 13). When workers exercise the outside option of moving between jobs, this puts upward pressure on pay through two main channels. The direct, or arithmetic, effect arises from moving workers securing a pay rise and boosting the batting average for overall wage growth. More twisters means higher average pay. The indirect, or behavioural, effect arises when companies pay higher wages to existing staff, as well as new staff, to encourage them to stay rather than exercise their outside option. The threat of twisting can also boost pay. This flow-based model suggests a slightly different specification of the Phillips curve. The flow of workers, as well as the stock of unemployed, may matter for pay growth. Sure enough, if we replace the unemployment gap with measures of voluntary job-to-job flows, this provides a (statistically and economically) significant explanation of wage growth (Table 1). As with under-employment, in a statistical horse-race between the two measures the unemployment gap does slightly more of the donkey work. Flows between jobs also provide a useful framework through which to explain recent pay developments. Chart 14 plots voluntary job-to-job flows in the UK recently. The global financial crisis raised unemployment and job insecurity.

Pay Power Speech given by  Andrew G Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England Acas “Future of Work” Conference Congress Centre, London 10 October 2018  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Will Abel, Shiv Chowla, Tomas Key, Brad Speigner and Ben Stokes for their help in preparing the text. I would like to thank Ben Broadbent, Clare Macallan, Becky Maule, Mette Nielsen, Silvana Tenreyro and Jan Vlieghe for their comments and contributions. This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  It is great pleasure to be here at the Acas Annual Conference whose theme this year is the “Future of Work”. It is a particular pleasure to have Brendan Barber as Chair. As a member of the Bank of England’s Court between 2003 and 2012, Brendan’s insights on the labour market and wider economy were crucial in helping the Bank steer a policy course through a period of first macroeconomic calm and then extra-ordinary macroeconomic storm following the global financial crisis. It is the labour market that I want to discuss today.
But I’ll point out a couple of things about the November 2017 measures here. First, they occurred despite the fact that the stock of unsecured lending (conventionally defined) is significantly lower than in the mid-2000s, relative to income. What mattered more were incipient signs of faster growth. Second, what also mattered were signs that the supply of credit, and the associated under-writing standards were loosening. Mortgage debt costs likely to remain below average The consequences of default for households are much greater in the case of mortgage debt. Rates of default are much lower, partly for this reason.5 On the other hand the stock of mortgages is much bigger. And unlike conventional unsecured debt – the blue bit of Chart 5 – mortgage gearing is also significantly higher than it was a generation ago, in the mid-1990s (Chart 6). However, that doesn’t mean it’s unaffordable. You would have to see a marked rise in ratios of mortgage debt to income, and/or in the level of interest rates, even for interest payments on those mortgages to return to their pre-crisis average. The second is not what the bond market predicts. I want to explain here why the first is unlikely and, in doing so, to describe briefly the links between these things.6 The main point to understand is that aggregate mortgage debt is largely a consequence, not a cause, of the level of house prices. That’s certainly true in the data: statistically, mortgage growth follows rather than precedes changes in house prices.

For example, if one of the costs of debt is that it encourages the pursuit of risky ventures by managers, you’d expect to find less of it in fast growing firms and more in mature companies where the opportunities for further growth are more limited. This is what you do find: high-leverage companies tend to be larger, older and have less volatile earnings. They also tend to have more tangible assets, on which debt can be secured, and are less R&D intensive. All this is in line with theory. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  But theory does much less well explaining why debt grows or falls within particular firms, or indeed across the whole economy, over time.9 One possible reason why the economic fundamentals can’t explain these swings is they they’re often less justified by those fundamentals, and instead driven by swings in sentiment among the suppliers of finance. Empirically, periods of rapid growth in corporate debt in the US have tended to coincide with deteriorations in credit quality and other signs of easing supply.10 Protections for lenders tend to decline, debt issuance skews towards riskier borrowers and, despite this, lending spreads often contract. It’s clear that we’ve seen many of the same things in the recent growth of “leveraged loans”. These are loans issued to already-indebted companies, which are often then packaged up and sold (as “Collateralised Loan Obligations” (CLOs)) to institutional investors.
To the degree that the public doubts that we will, current accommodation is reduced because expected future short-term rates, interest rate uncertainty and associated risk premiums all will be higher than they otherwise would be. Premature talk of exit strategies or assertions of inflation targets as ceilings only feed the perception that we are not committed to the low rates. And thus, I think we are seeing such added restraint today. 6  Woodford (2011). 7  Again, see Evans (2011). 8  Rogoff (1985). 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A proposed policy I believe that we can substantially ease the public’s concern that monetary policy will become restrictive in the near to medium term and, hence, reduce the restraint in expanding economic activity. This can be done by clearly spelling out in our policy statements the conditionality of our dual mandate responsibilities. What should such a statement look like? I think we should consider committing to keep short-term rates at zero until either the unemployment rate goes below 7 percent or the outlook for inflation over the medium term goes above 3 percent. Such policies should enable us to make progress toward our mandated goals. But if this progress is too slow, then we should move forward with increased purchases of longer-term securities. We might even consider a regime in which we reevaluate our progress toward our policy goals and the rate of purchase of such assets at every FOMC meeting. Let me note several aspects to this policy conditionality.

Michael Gondwe: Women’s access to financial services in Zambia Opening remarks by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the “Women’s Access to Financial Services in Zambia – Dissemination and Consultation Conference”, Lusaka, 24 June 2014. *  *  *  •  Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance;  •  Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Gender and Child Development  •  Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Commerce  •  Bank of Zambia Board Members  •  Your Excellences, High Commissioners and Ambassadors to Zambia present;  •  The United Nations Development Programme Country Director, Ms Viola Morgan;  •  The African Development Bank Country Representatives; Dr Freddie Kwesiga;  •  Representatives from the International labour Organisation (ILO);  •  Deputy Governor Administration, Bank of Zambia Dr. Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula  •  New Faces, New Voices Representative, Ms Nomsa Daniels  •  Chairpersons of the Boards of Commercial Banks,  •  Chief Executive Officers of Banks and Other Organisations;  •  Senior Staff and Colleagues from Bank of Zambia;  •  Members of the Press;  •  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is my honour and privilege to welcome you all to this conference on Women’s Financial Inclusion in Zambia. May I extend a special welcome to delegates that have come from abroad. I wish you a good stay and hope you will have time to visit the various places of interest and sample the food that Lusaka offers.
To this end, continuous engagement will be key – both among regulators as well as between regulators and industry players. With that, I wish you all a fruitful discussion in the week ahead and hope you have a good time in Malaysia. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches

The long stretch of history points to clear episodes or epochs during which there were great leaps forward in innovation and well-being: from Ancient Greece to Ancient Rome, from Elizabethan Britain to post-Revolutionary France. By studying these episodes, historians have been able to pinpoint the source of these transformative episodes. The common denominator was the coming together of different cultures, disciplines, religions and experiences in one place at one time. In short, these great historical leaps forward had diversity at their heart. Historians even have a name for this – the “Medici effect”. From the past to the present. What explains why some cities today are thriving, fast-growing creative hubs: from San Francisco to Seattle to Sydney, from London to Dublin to Edinburgh. On this the economic geographers are also crystal clear. The common denominator is diversity - ethnic, cultural, sexual, educational. And if we turn finally from countries and cities to organisations and ask ourselves what hallmarks the most creative, fast-growing, productive and successful companies, what do you think academics find to be the common denominator? You don’t need an economist to tell you the answer to that; it too is diversity. Here’s a quiz question for you. At what age were you at your creative peak? 40, 30, 20 perhaps? In fact, the psychologists tell us it is around five years old. Next time someone tells you to grow up, just remind them of that.
Mario Draghi: Short address on the occasion of the launch of the Europa series € banknote Speech by Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, at the launch of the Europa series € banknote, Bratislava, 2 May 2013. *  *  *  I mentioned this at the end of today’s press conference, but let me say again that I’m very pleased to be here today to see the launch of the new 5 euro, the first banknote of the Europa series. The new banknote will join 15 billion euro notes already in circulation. They are the most visible and tangible symbol of European integration, used from one end of the continent to the other. With the Europa series, we are giving a face to our currency. A portrait of Europa, a figure from Greek mythology, has been incorporated into some of the security features of the new series. After centuries of division, the European Union was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize last year for its contribution to “the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”. We all know that Europe is experiencing some challenging times. Governments and citizens are making extraordinary efforts to put their economies on a sounder footing and to build a more stable future for the European Union. In times like these, it’s important to remember what the Union and the euro have achieved and what they mean in the longer term, especially for young people.

The resilience of the market in the face of the latest shocks has increased confidence in future financial resilience. In these conditions, market participants face more acutely the classic dilemma of deciding whether to follow the market, or to buy more insurance against the risk of a reversal at the expense of near term returns. This mix of forces operating on financial conditions presents challenges for policymakers and financial markets participants, for it makes it harder to figure out what is fundamental and enduring and what is temporary or transitional, or the result of policy distortions. Confidence exists alongside concerns about sustainability. Although there is much that is positive in the world today, there is little reason to believe we have entered a new era of permanent stability. Financial innovation and global financial integration do not offer the prospect of eliminating the risk of asset price and credit cycles, of manias and panics, or of shocks that could have systemic consequences. Over the past 25 years or so, we have seen a significant number of episodes of financial shocks, in U.S. markets and globally. Although more different than similar in their nature and impact, they had some common features. They were unanticipated. The causes varied, with some associated with a substantial deterioration in the real economy, and others not. And they typically involved the dynamic in which a sharp change in risk perception results in a fall in asset prices and a sharp reduction in market liquidity, and an increase in correlations across asset classes.
Situations remain very diverse among advanced economies: while the balance sheet of the Bank of Canada amounts to 5% of its nation’s GDP, the Swiss National Bank holds assets equivalent to 80% of the Swiss GDP. Discretionary and technical factors both explain those differences and evolutions. The former holds for countries that choose to accumulate foreign exchange reserves. The latter is topical in the case of the euro area: the ECB’s balance sheet performs an intermediation function between National Central Banks through the so-called Target 2 system. So, as a mechanical phenomenon, balances in the system tend to grow in times of market segmentation i.e. an impaired interbank market and strong capital flows inside the euro area. Similarly, conducting monetary operations via open market or via repos makes the size of the balance sheet more or less dependent on the size of the interbank market. However, the recent increase in size mainly results from a shift in the monetary policy regime. Central Banks have taken a proactive – rather than purely passive – approach to their balance sheets. They have, according to the common parlance, “put these balance sheets to work”. And, as a result, in the formulation of monetary policy, “quantities” – the amounts of assets and liabilities – have come to play an increasing role as compared to “prices” – the level of interest rates. This, of course, is a component and a consequence of unconventional monetary policies.

If developments in the Norwegian economy are broadly in line with that projected in the period ahead, there are nevertheless prospects that the key policy rate will be reduced further in the course of the first half of this year. The analysis in the latest Monetary Policy Report suggests that capacity utilisation in the Norwegian economy will decline ahead. Moreover, there are prospects that unemployment may increase somewhat, but reduced labour immigration will likely limit the increase. The krone deprecation since autumn 2014 will contribute to underpinning inflation in the coming period, but inflation is projected to move down further ahead. In the conduct of monetary policy, we seek to mitigate the risk of a build-up of financial balances, but monetary policy cannot assume a primarily responsibility for financial stability. Should financial imbalances build up further, the required countercyclical capital buffer for banks may be increased. Rapid rises in house prices and debt may also require the implementation of other, more targeted measures in order to mitigate the risk associated with the high level of household debt. In March this year, the Ministry of Finance requested Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) to consider whether it would be appropriate to implement measures aimed at limiting growth in credit and house prices. Norges Bank submitted its comments today where we endorse Finanstilsynet’s proposal while underlining the importance that regulation should give the banks flexibility – and responsibility for conducting sound credit assessments.
It is lined with a number of potential worries and difficult considerations, not least for central banks. But the situation in the financial markets is currently much more stable than it was during the crisis and the risk of setbacks has declined. One can say that the ice is safer. BIS Review 25/2010  5  Clearer signs of a recovery in the economic statistics As I have mentioned, there is a further overall reason that we are now on firmer ground. The economic statistics that have been coming in have been mainly positive. Confidence in the future development of the economy has also taken a sharp upturn in Sweden, the United States and the euro area (Figure 4). Our assessment is that the situation in the world economy is continuing to improve. In most countries the economy is growing again and world trade is beginning to pick up after the abrupt slowdown in connection with the acute crisis (Figure 5). New figures have been published by Statistics Sweden since our most recent forecast was published. These show that GDP at the end of last year was lower than we had estimated. At the same time, for instance, confidence indicators have continued to strengthen. However, the Executive Board will weigh up and assess the new information at our next monetary policy meeting on 19 April. Figure 4 Increasing confidence according to purchasing managers index  Note.

Dimitar Bogov: What could SEPA bring for the banking and the real sector in the Republic of Macedonia Speech by Mr Dimitar Bogov, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the event “What could SEPA bring for the banking and the real sector in the Republic of Macedonia”, organized by The Banking Association at the Economic Chamber of Macedonia, in cooperation with the European Banking Federation (EBF), Skopje, 13 May 2014. *  *  *  Honorable Mr. Stavreski, Vice President of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia and Minister of Finance, Honorable Mr. Janchevski, Chairman of the Banking Association of the Macedonian Economic Chamber Distinguished guests from the banking sector in the Czech Republic Dear representatives of the banking and the real sector in Macedonia Ladies and Gentlemen, One of the primary functions of each central bank is to create conditions for stable, reliable and efficient operation of the payment systems. To achieve this function, and according to the best practices of central banks of the EU Member States, the National Bank performs four basic roles in the payment systems: operational, supervisory, development and catalyst role. The successful performing of these functions is closely related to the importance of payment systems for a national economy. The proper functioning of the systems for large payments, which are owned and managed by central banks, is important for the effective monetary policy conduct.