samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
18 See for example Gentzkow, M and Shapiro, J M (2010) What drives Media Slant? Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers, Econometrica, Vol 78, No. 1, pp 35-71 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  Chart 1: Main News Sources Split By Age  Source: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism  The digitization of knowledge and the fact that it is usually freely available has been hugely democratizing 19  and empowering of people to get information to shape their views . Individuals can go to the doctor better informed about their illnesses and alternative treatments. The wisdom of crowds can generate restaurant reviews, ratings of products and services, and alternative perspectives on a wide range of issues. And trust can be built based on studying the “likes” and “dislikes” or reading the reviews of thousands of individuals. But there has been a downside – people can be overwhelmed with information that is difficult to verify, algorithms create echo chambers of the like-minded who are never challenged; fake news distorts reality; “post-truth” fosters cynicism; anonymity bestows irresponsible power onto individuals who can abuse it; a world in which more clicks means more revenue rewards the most shrill voices and promotes extreme views. Experts, who sift through all the information and make informed judgments, are just one of many voices in this cacophony. And the inaccessible language they use often renders them the least heard. Experts define themselves through “boundary work” that separates them from non-experts.

Thomas Jordan: Comments on Swiss monetary policy Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 106th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 25 April 2014. *  *  *  Mr President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has a mandate to ensure price stability, while taking due account of the development of the economy. The monetary policy decisions needed to fulfil this mandate have a direct impact on the size and composition of our balance sheet. As a result of the current size of our balance sheet and the nature of our investments, it can be assumed that the annual results will continue to fluctuate significantly in the foreseeable future. Since summer 2007, the global economy has experienced a series of crises. At times, it was on the brink of the abyss, and the threat to the Swiss economy was correspondingly great. In order to fulfil our statutory mandate, we have been obliged to resort to unconventional measures, rather than operating solely with the familiar monetary instruments. The most exceptional measure was certainly the introduction and enforcement of the minimum exchange rate against the euro. However, the creation of the stabilisation fund to take over illiquid assets from UBS was also a special measure. In 2013, this episode was successfully concluded. By contrast, the minimum exchange rate remains the SNB’s key monetary policy instrument.
An important, even ground-breaking characteristic of this service is that it allows clearinghouses and other groups to process and clear transactions on their own, although the clearinghouses will continue to achieve final settlement of the underlying obligations on accounts at the Federal Reserve in central bank funds. By permitting this separation of clearance and settlement, the new service opens opportunities for the private sector to develop clearance solutions while using the most sound and riskfree settlement mechanism available. In addition to these major developments, the securities industry has put the T+1 project in motion for the settlement of equities and privately issued debt instruments. Like the CLS Bank project and the new CHIPS design, the T+1 project is an important effort not only to eliminate significant settlement and pre-settlement risks from the payment and settlement system, but also to raise the system’s operational reliability and efficiency in the area of securities transactions. All of these planned improvements to the functioning of the payment and settlement system demand a high level of cooperation between the private and public sectors. In my view, it is especially important for the financial services sector to support common interests and shared goals. I say this because I am convinced that only through these joint initiatives can the financial services sector adequately address efficiency issues and the potential for systemic risk in the current environment. At the same time, I recognize that industry-wide efforts pose new challenges as they are applied to ever more difficult and complex issues.

2 The rapid growth of hedge funds in the West End is the latest example of the innovation that this cluster of financial skills has produced. You know something must be happening when the Mayor of New York commissions a review of the threat London poses to New York’s position. London’s recent growth certainly has a cyclical element but it also reflects two more structural changes – the removal of barriers to international capital movements and the advances in information technology. These have led to a growing role for international capital markets compared to national banking and to a growing concentration of those markets in a few hubs among which London and New York are dominant. And this finance revolution is still underway. It is far more advanced in the US than in Europe and in Europe than in Asia. In the absence of disasters therefore London, as the preeminent centre outside the US, can look forward to a long period of fast growth and expect its share of the UK economy to increase. This evening I want to discuss the implications of that trend for the UK economy and for economic policy. On the first, is London a goose laying golden eggs for the rest of the country or is it more of a cuckoo in the nest? On the second, how does the growth of London and financial markets generally impact on the Bank’s core functions of setting monetary policy and maintaining financial stability.
Not long afterwards, Foreningsbanken had to petition to be placed under public administration. The bank Centralbanken for Norge followed only a few days later and then Handelsbanken. Michelsen was on to a fundamental problem. Banks have critical functions in a modern economy. First, banks play a key role in the payment system. In one way or another, practically all payments go through banks. Individuals and firms have bank deposits that they depend on for making payments. Banks operate payment systems used by shops and other businesses. They operate interbank and international payment systems and payment systems for securities trading. If payments come to a halt, the economy will seize up. Second, banks extend credit: Short-term trade credit and operating credit; long-term loans for investing in housing, real estate and businesses. Without this credit, businesses and investments come to a standstill. Banks may be regarded as intermediaries. They channel money from depositors and other investors to borrowers. Banks determine who should be given credit and monitor borrowers and their projects. Moreover, they do so with considerable efficiency. Thus, depositors and investors avoid having to do this job themselves. This function makes banks unique: Banks extend long-term credit and raise short-term debt. 6 We call this banks’ maturity transformation. But this transformation also makes banks vulnerable. Banks are dependent on public trust. If any doubt arises as to a bank’s ability to service its debt, a run on the bank may ensue.

In 1996, the Bank Guarantee Schemes Act was passed, which continues to be current Norwegian law. The act makes it possible to write down equity capital and force banks to issue new shares to the government, enabling them to be nationalised. 9  Forhandlinger i Stortinget [Proceedings of the Storting] No. 18, 17 October 1991: Address by the Minister of Finance on the situation at Kreditkassen etc. (in Norwegian). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Subordinated debt – debt instruments with characteristics similar to equity capital – is to be written down in proportion to banks’ losses. In this way, banks can continue operating under government ownership. Should a bank nevertheless be closed, deposits of up to NOK 2 million per depositor are guaranteed by the Norwegian Banks’ Guarantee Fund. For a long time, this was one of the world’s most modern bank resolution laws and Norway weathered the crisis in 2008 better than most countries. Moreover, Norwegian banks have probably also drawn lessons from the banking crisis of the 1990s. Norwegian banks had via that crisis gained greater insight into crisis risk than banks in many other countries had before the global financial crisis erupted in 2007. Managements and boards of Norwegian banks were probably also more conscious of their social responsibility than those in many so called leading financial centres elsewhere in the world. But the Bank Guarantee Schemes Act does not provide for the imposition of losses on creditors who have made ordinary loans to banks, without, in practice, closing the bank.
Financial stability risks arising from developments in commodity markets operate largely through indirect, or macroeconomic, channels as high and volatile oil prices can pose risks to economic activity and inflation and, thereby, contribute to financial sector stress. Speculative activity that has occasionally been blamed for fuelling the momentum in oil prices seems to have played again some role in driving the recent price developments (as shown in the chart on the right on slide 4). A comparison of the relative movements between oil prices and the net futures commitments of non-commercials – that is, entities not engaged in oil producing or refining – on the New York Mercantile exchange suggests the existence of a positive correlation. In the global fixed income markets, it is apparent that the protracted period of low long-term interest rateshas been coming to an end since the spring of 2006 both in the US and in the euro area. Until early May, the increase in long-term interest rates in the major economic areas (shown in the chart on the left on slide 5) has had relatively little impact on global asset prices or on asset allocation. But, there have been some signs that the “search for yield” which began in 2003 could be ending. The recent increase in financial market volatility, after the Review was finalised, and the flight-to-safety into government bonds suggests that a process of re-pricing of risk could be starting in financial markets.

Notable among other factors that distort the efficient allocation of resources are regulation and the public procurement system.17  13  Anghel and Lacuesta (2020). 14  If this misallocation of resources had been avoided, this period would have seen total factor productivity grow by 10% overall, instead of fall by 8%. Gopinath, Kalemli-Özcan, Karabarbounis and Villegas-Sanchez (2017) and García-Santana, Moral-Benito, Pijoan-Mas and Ramos (2020). 15  Albrizio, González and Khametshin (2023). 16  Gopinath, Kalemli-Özcan, Karabarbounis and Villegas-Sanchez (2017). 17  García-Santana, Moral-Benito, Pijoan-Mas and Ramos (2020). 5  As regards the quantity and quality of regulation, an abundance of increasingly complex rules and regulations that vary from one region or municipality to the next can have a negative impact on both economic agents’ decisions and the ability of governments to guarantee market unity, both domestically and at European level. This limits firms’ ability to grow and expand geographically, while stifling their incentive to innovate and specialise. As an example, I need only mention that, in 2022 alone, central and regional governments approved almost 11,000 new pieces of legislation.18 Some of these regulations may in fact directly influence the size of firms, given that firms are subject to stricter regulation above certain headcount thresholds. Regulatory improvement should be implemented by strengthening two important mechanisms already existing in our legal system. First, the Law on Market Unity establishes mechanisms to protect economic operators that allow them to file complaints.19 After ten years in force, 575 decisions have been issued.
It will be necessary to reassess ideas based on clear boundaries between monetary policy and financial stability policy, and consider more deeply the particular risks associated with a small, unstable currency. All of these points will be considered with an open mind, and the Bank intends to examine two options thoroughly: the first is participation in the European Monetary Union. The other focuses on the monetary policy options available to Iceland if it remains outside the EU and the EMU. The latter of these could also be useful during preparation for EU and EMU membership, if it comes to pass. The Bank aims to complete an interim report early this summer, and an in-depth report early in 2011. This re-examination of policy pertaining to financial and monetary stability could require a review of the Central Bank Act, which I think is needed in any case. Consequently, I welcome the Minister of Economic Affairs’ statement, earlier in this meeting, that he intends to push for a comprehensive review of the Central Bank Act. I consider it critical that attempts be made to achieve as much multipartisan consensus as possible about that review. *  *  *  Honoured guests: The affairs of the Central Bank of Iceland were administered by the Prime Minister’s Office until this past fall. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office for successful collaboration during that period.

The clearing spread for the narrow set would remain 10bps (bidder 6, as the cheapest narrow bidder, would be allotted only £ against his bid for £ The clearing spread for wider collateral would be 19bps £ would be allocated to bidder 1). That results in a stop-out spread (the difference between the clearing spreads for wider and narrow collateral) of 9bps. The stop out spread remains at 9bps until the point at which £ is allocated to the wider set. At that point, bidder 6 is no longer filled, and the clearing spread on the narrow set rises to 12bps. Bidder 1 receives £ out of the £ he has bid, and so the clearing spread remains at 19bps on wider. But the stop out spread is then 7bps (Chart 5). At the point where £ is allocated to wider, the clearing spread on narrow is still 12bps (bidder 6 is unfilled, and bidder 5 gets £ against a bid of £ but the clearing spread on wider falls to  16  8  Strictly, the stop-out spread is not defined if the allocation is 100% to one type of collateral. BIS central bankers’ speeches  17bps (bidder 1 is fully allocated and bidder 2 gets £ The stop out spread falls to 5bps (Chart 5). Continuing this process, and tracing out the spectrum of stop out spreads and the associated proportions of the funds allocated to wider collateral, results in the auction demand curve.
Despite last year’s narrowing current deficit, Albania’s external position remains a constant structural weakness. The Albanian banking system is considered to have adapted commendably to this complex situation. I would like to underline that we have done an immense amount of work so far. Therefore, I take this opportunity to congratulate all central and local managing units of banks operating in Albania. During this period, the Albanian banking system has continued to expand its activity and lending to the economy. Financial soundness and profitability indicators have improved and system’s activity capitalization is in a good position. The banking sector remains the main actor of financial intermediation in Albania, whose financing continues to rely mainly on public deposits. The main problem of the banking system has been the growing non-performing loans share, which has also reflected the active policy of the Bank of Albania to enhance the transparency of banks’ balance sheets. Credit risk remains the primary risk to our banking sector. In response, the banking sector has established adequate reserve funds to buffer major shocks on the borrowers repayment capacity and market equilibrium. Stress tests support our conclusion on banking system resilience. The presence in this room of both the business community and the banking system suggests me to refer once again to the need for sincere cooperation of mutual benefit. With a few exceptions, I think this cooperation has been present and operational and has certainly supported in particular the country’s economic activity over the past years.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy in Norway Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), given at Norges Bank’s Conference on Monetary Policy 2006: Evaluating Monetary Policy, Oslo, 30 March 2006. The speech is based on Inflation Report 1/06 and previous speeches. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  1. Introduction The title of this conference is “Evaluating Monetary Policy”. The conference therefore gives me an opportunity to provide a background for the assessment of monetary policy in Norway. 2. Transparency and communication of monetary policy strategy In most industrial countries, monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. Low and stable inflation is the most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments. As a framework for organising and explaining monetary policy, inflation targeting is now common. In our country, inflation targeting was introduced in March 2001. As non-elected bodies, central banks are granted substantial autonomy in the execution of monetary policy. Here, as in many other countries, the political authorities have delegated monetary policy decision-making to the central bank. This means that it has instrument independence, that is, the Bank’s Executive Board sets the short-term interest rate. The Bank is also accountable to the political authorities.
In this vein, the full and timely implementation of the principles and best practice recommendations developed by both the public authorities and the industry, as well as a regular assessment of this implementation process, are of utmost importance. The second issue that I would like mention is that of procyclicality, and in particular the extent to which the current regulatory framework could encourage the procyclical behaviour of financial institutions. This is a complex issue as procyclicality depends on many factors. Although the way in which financial institutions manage their risk is regarded by many as the main determinant of procyclicality, other elements such as capital requirements, accounting standards or banks’ compensation schemes can act as contributing factors. In terms of policy action in this field, in the short term, regulators are determined to avoid measures aimed at tightening capital requirements, as these could impinge on the financial standing of banks and negatively impact the supply of credit and, in turn, the whole economy. At the same time, the contributing factors to procyclicality must be looked at from a longer-term perspective. Finally, I would like to address the importance of cross-border cooperation between central banks, supervisors and regulators in the current context. Indeed, the significant impact of the crisis in the US sub-prime market on other parts of the world highlights the importance of improving cooperation between national authorities, both for preventing and for resolving shocks.

William C Dudley: The national and regional economic outlook Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the University at Albany, Albany, New York, 18 November 2011. *  *  *  Good morning. I am pleased to be at the University at Albany. It is always a pleasure to speak with students and faculty because of the intellectual leadership role you play in your communities. I also welcome the addition of business leaders to this gathering because you shape the economic landscape in the region. So, I thank you all for coming today and helping make this such a rich audience. Over the past 20 months, I have been engaged in a series of outreach meetings all across my Federal Reserve District. I consider these visits just as important as my trips to Washington, D.C., to help formulate monetary policy or to Switzerland to shape international bank regulation. The understanding of issues and concerns that I gain today will help ensure that my policy decisions reflect the public interest in the broadest sense. Each visit within the region helps me deepen relationships with the people I represent. As you may know, the New York Fed’s District includes all of New York State; 12 counties in northern New Jersey; Fairfield County, Connecticut; Puerto Rico; and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In August, I met with community leaders, businesses and elected officials in Newark, Patterson and Jersey City.
That’s too short a time for monetary policy to have much effect. Prices of other, non-energy traded goods aren’t quite as volatile, their direct effects take longer to feed through and therefore affect the overall rate of inflation for longer. But they’re still unlikely to have that much of an impact a couple of years ahead, the sort of timescales it takes monetary policy to have its peak effects. So although the pandemic was clearly much less disinflationary than central banks and other forecasters had predicted – the demand-shifting and supply-impairing effects on goods prices were very significant – it nonetheless seemed likely at the time that these effects would dissipate, along with the virus itself, within that medium-term horizon. I think there are some signs this has begun to happen. One of the higher-profile effects of the pandemic was a dramatic rise in the cost of shipping. Also well reported were the steep rises in prices and delivery times for computer chips and the cars on which they rely. In all three cases rates of inflation have fallen back markedly over the past few months (Charts 6a and 6b).

Given the enormous scale of the rise in import prices it would have been surprising to see no impact whatever on domestic inflation, particularly against the backdrop of a very tight labour market. But it’s unavoidable that we are having to learn about these effects, and to respond to them, as they emerge. Unlike the more volatile movements in tradable goods prices, shifts in domestic inflation tend to persist for longer and it will require a period of below-trend growth in demand to bring inflation back towards target-consistent rates. Because they’ve depressed real incomes, that slowing in demand will to some degree follow from the very same rises in import costs that have pushed up headline inflation. But monetary policy needs to be tightened as well. My third point is that the response to a pure demand shock – say from easier fiscal policy – is rather different in this respect. We can be less uncertain about its effects, there’s less reason to wait till they actually come through and one would therefore expect a more immediate reaction. For as long as it’s in place, the government’s Energy Price Guarantee has the effect of limiting headline inflation and, to that extent, any related strengthening of second-round (and more persistent) effects on domestic inflation. By the same token, however, it mitigates the severity of the hit to household incomes and thereby supports domestic demand.