samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Hence, the abovementioned services are becoming more and more decentralized, based on public and private partnership, and privatized. The development of information and communication technologies is another factor that has an impact on the functioning of the state. Firstly, it facilitates the switch from one-way communication channels to interactive two-way communication, which leads to, inter alia, greater activity of citizens and business community and better adjustment of services provided by the public sector to the needs of citizens. Secondly, the growth of the ICT sector contributes to increased innovation demonstrated by the public  2  BIS Review 23/2006  sector worldwide, in other words, altered procedures employed by the public sector gradually cease to be of a reproductive nature, and the public sector becomes one of the leaders of innovation in the services sector. Consequently, the methods of functioning of the state and performance of its functions are irreversibly heading towards the use of technologies and assume the form of estrategy, e-policy, eregulations and e-services. Therefore, we are facing the e-reality in which e-administration has its liabilities towards e-economy. In the past, the public sector used to follow the private sector and apply the best methods of organization management, customer relations maintenance and management or use of technologies, which all lead to increased efficiency of activities. In the contemporary global e-economy the public sector has a much more difficult and demanding role to play.

But in order to achieve this, three cross-cutting levers will be needed: revitalising the single market; providing equal access to training and skills in the southern countries, including France; and pooling our funding. Europe has on the one hand the resources, i.e. a savings surplus of EUR 300 billion per year, and on the other hand huge digital and ecological investment needs: to build the bridge between the two, it is urgent to speed up the Capital Markets Union. The remaining two-thirds of this targeted additional growth could be achieved by addressing two issues specific to France: primarily, inadequate labour supply. To increase potential growth, we do not lack public spending or capital overall, we lack labour. In France, more than 50% of companies are experiencing recruitment difficulties whereas there are still 2.4 million unemployed, including 600,000 young people: this paradox is socially unacceptable. France has almost 3 million fewer people in employment than Germany, and the majority of these are young and elderly people. In this respect, the levers of reform are: for young people, the strengthening of basic education and apprenticeships; for older people, a fair pension reform. And for all working people, professional training more focused on the key issue of skill enhancement; a reform of the unemployment insurance system that provides good incentives for long-term employment and work; and negotiated wage increases for jobs that suffer from a lack of attractiveness.
But I would claim that the major change would instead be if the Riksbank does not issue any money that is used. The payment market is an important part of a country's infrastructure. Just think about how often you pay for something, and how difficult it would be if it didn't work! Would it really be the right thing to allow part of the infrastructure to be completely privatised without any analysis or discussion? What our analysis clearly shows is that the effects of an e-krona on the financial sector as well as monetary policy and the economy as a whole largely depend on how the e-krona is designed. It is therefore appropriate to begin with small steps forward and to learn along the way. The e-krona makes the Swedish payment system more stable and inclusive Cash does not function as a good alternative if we were to have no electricity in a crisis situation, as electricity is required to withdraw cash from an ATM. 14 Sweden may therefore need several alternative means of payment that can function in crisis situations. The more different systems and alternatives that are available, the less vulnerable we will be. An e-krona system would be a parallel, independent system to the card payment systems offered by the private sector, which reduces vulnerability in relation to having only one system.

I think that we need to develop a Swedish stance on the digitalisation of the payment market and that the Sveriges Riksbank Act needs to be adapted to a digital future. The e-krona could mean that we gain a domestic infrastructure for real time payments and at the same time enable all groups in society to continue to make their payments without problems. I hope I have succeeded in providing a picture of how the pilot version of the new e-krona might look and succeeded in convincing you that it will work as a modern form of cash. And I hope that some of you will be involved in helping us develop it! 8 [9]  References Bank for International Settlements (2018), “Central bank digital currencies”. Report submitted by Working Groups chaired by Klaus Löber (European Central Bank) and Aerdt Houben (Netherlands Bank). Camera, G. (2017), “A Perspective on Electronic Alternatives to Traditional Currencies,” Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2017 No. 1. Davoodalhosseini, S. Mohammad R. (2018), “Central Bank Digital Currency and Monetary Policy”, Staff Working Paper 2018-36, Bank of Canada, July 2018. Engert, Walter and Ben S. C. Fung (2017), “Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and Implications”, Staff Discussion Paper 2017-16, Bank of Canada, November 2017. Fung, B., Henry, S. and Weber, W. E. (2018), “Swedish Riksbank Notes and Enskilda Bank Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies”, Staff Working Paper 2018-27, Bank of Canada. Ingves, S. (2018) “Money and payments – where are we heading?”, speech at the Swedish Economics Association, June 2018.
Svante Öberg: The Riksbank's forecasting performance Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Stockholm University, Stockholm, 26 November 2007. *  *  *  Introduction ”When one remembers how foolishly one thought and how wrong one was and how different things have usually been and how the world has been affected by strange metamorphoses, one has less and less respect every year for forecasts.” This is a fairly well-used quotation from Alf Henriksson. And they are wise words. But at the Riksbank we have no choice, as the interest rate affects inflation and the rest of the economy with some time lag. Our decisions must therefore be based on forecasts. The question I wish to discuss today concerns our forecasting performance. Evaluation is important for independent central banks Experiences show that the work on maintaining low and stable inflation is made easier if the central bank can act independently. At the same time, greater independence makes demands on the central bank to be open and to clearly explain its decisions. There are several reasons why this is important. One important aspect is that openness makes it easier to evaluate and to require accountability, which is essential for a central bank’s legitimacy. Openness enables the general public to understand what the central bank is doing. This in turn makes demands on the central bank to be clear in its analysis and message.

GDP outcomes and forecasts Annual percentage change 6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0 mar-00  0 mar-01  mar-02  mar-03  mar-04  mar-05  mar-06  mar-07  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  BIS Review 138/2007  7  Figure 2. Employment outcomes and forecasts Annual percentage change 4,0  4,0  3,0  3,0  2,0  2,0  1,0  1,0  0,0  0,0  -1,0  -1,0  mar-01  mar-02  mar-03  mar-04  mar-05  mar-06  mar-07  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 3. CPIX outcomes and forecasts Annual percentage change 3,5  3,5  3,0  3,0  2,5  2,5  2,0  2,0  1,5  1,5  1,0  1,0  0,5  0,5  0,0  0,0  -0,5 mar-00  -0,5 mar-01  mar-02  mar-03  mar-04  mar-05  mar-06  mar-07  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  8  BIS Review 138/2007  Figure 4. Productivity outcomes and forecasts Annual percentage change 5,0  5,0  4,0  4,0  3,0  3,0  2,0  2,0  1,0  1,0  0,0  0,0  -1,0  -1,0  -2,0 mar-01  mar-02  mar-03  mar-04  mar-05  -2,0 mar-07  mar-06  Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Figure 5.
This evidence is not, however, uncontested (for example, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012)). 5  For example, Beck et al (2000) show evidence that finance has an important impact on growth by fostering productivity growth and resource allocation rather than capital accumulation. 6  For example, Froote et al (1993). 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  co-operation forged between different groups of people over time. It is the sociological glue that binds diverse societies into a cohesive whole. 7 The global financial crisis of the past few years provides a case study of how these capitals, plural, can be decimated by crisis and the toll taken by society. Consider financial capital. At their peak, the world’s 100 largest banks had a market capitalisation of around $ trillion. That was around 8.5% of annual global GDP. At its trough, this had fallen to $ trillion – a destruction of financial capital of $ trillion. Banks have subsequently recovered some of their poise. Nonetheless, the market capitalisation of the world’s 20 largest banks today remains around half its value in 2007. Their market value lies well below the book value of their assets, with the ratio of so-called “price to book” currently around 0.8. Put simply, that means many banks are a valuedestruction machine for investors. Yet these losses pale by comparison with the losses felt by the wider economy as a result of the financial crisis. In the UK, eight years on, GDP is still tracking around 15 percentage points below its pre-crisis trend.

The evidence is that, so purposed, companies create extra value, not just for their staff and customers, but for their shareholders too; it is win-win-win. 58 Indeed, it is win-win-win-win if you throw society into the mix. Other companies, including perhaps some in banking, may need a helping hand in this journey. One option here would be to revisit the UK Companies Act. At the time it was introduced in 2006, the Companies Act envisioned an “enlightened” model of shareholder interest which weighed, albeit secondarily, the claims of a wider set of stakeholders, including employees and customers. The experience since has been rather different. Most academics would put the UK at one end of the spectrum in the primacy it gives to shareholders. The model has, judged at least by public opinion, failed to be sufficiently “enlightened”. That begs the same question begged by the PCBS report back in 2013: would a more plural, less shareholder-centric, statutory definition of companies’ objectives, the like of which exists in a number of other countries, help in better serving investors’, customers’ and ultimately society’s needs? There is no off-the-shelf corporate model that suits all seasons. But there may be value in a plurality of corporate structures. For example, so-called “Benefit Corporations” have recently begun springing up in the US. 59 “B-corporations” redefine the fiduciary responsibilities of a company to embrace a much wider range of stakeholders.
Alexandre A Tombini: Central banking – the next 50 years Introductory remarks by Mr Alexandre A Tombini, Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil, at a panel discussion to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Central Bank of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, 10 June 2015. *  *  *  Today’s panel discussion is part of a series of events to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Banco Central do Brasil. Other events in the series have looked backward. Today we’d like to take advantage of the collective wisdom and experience of our distinguished guests to look forward: what can we expect in the next 50 years of central banking? This is an ambitious question, but an appropriate one as the art and science of central banking is currently in flux, and the outcomes of today’s policy debates and institutional innovations will shape central banking for many years to come. The global financial crisis has had a major impact on how we think about central banking. Before the crisis, there were, naturally, a number of unanswered questions and challenging issues for central banking, but the prevalent view was that the major pillars of the field were largely settled. In a growing number of countries, the operational regime for monetary policy was inflation targeting; monetary and financial stability objectives could be safely addressed separately; and floating exchange rates, coupled with robust international reserves and access to multilateral funding facilities, were often seen as sufficient to protect financial stability from excessive international capital flow volatility.

More importantly, deepening the offshore RMB liquidity pool will enhance market efficiency and underpin the growth of offshore RMB activities, strengthening Hong Kong’s development as a leading offshore RMB hub and its unique role in the internationalisation of the RMB. 7. There have also been significant developments in the internationalisation of the RMB as well: The establishment of an RMB Liquidity Arrangement by the People’s Bank of China and the Bank for International Settlements, announced in June, will provide support to participating central banks in times of market fluctuation. The HKMA is pleased to join the initial group of participating central banks in the Asia-Pacific region. The inclusion of Chinese Government Bonds in FTSE Russell’s World Government Bond Index is testimony to the acceleration in the international use of the RMB. The increased prominence of the RMB in international trade and foreign currency reserves was underlined in May when the International Monetary Fund increased the RMB’s weighting in its Special Drawing Rights basket from 10.92% to 12.28%, the first time the weighting has been reviewed since the RMB was added to the basket in 2016. Opportunities ahead – development strategy 8. The liberalisation of the Mainland capital markets in recent years has resulted in rapid growth in cross-boundary capital flows. Hong Kong’s mutual market access schemes with the Mainland, like Stock Connect, Bond Connect and now ETF Connect, have further catalysed this process by encouraging greater portfolio investment into the Mainland. 9.
This will provide a clear division of responsibility. Could the discussion about new banking sector regulation be a case of the pendulum swinging back towards the regulatory optimism that I described earlier? The picture is probably more nuanced. The banks have shown a striking ability to adapt, a skill which they hardly intend to relinquish. It must be acknowledged that no regulation can prevent financial institutions from encountering difficulties. A new regulatory framework must therefore ensure that banks have the ultimate responsibility for the risk undertaken. Regulatory compliance will then also be in their own interest. Conclusion In my address this evening, I have sought to gather together some historical threads relating to the design of economic policy through our recent history and at the same time provide some glimpses of developments in the field of economics. Views on macroeconomic management have changed in this period – influenced by economic developments and events. Perhaps the policy response during the financial crisis also reflected a swing of the pendulum towards increased regulatory optimism. On the other hand, the financial crisis required full deployment of instruments. Measures were far-going and some were unconventional. In some countries, the bill to be paid is substantial. In their prize-winning work, Kydland and Prescott raised the question of discretion versus policy rules. Today, we have perhaps opted for “both, please”. An economic policy that is conducted blindly according to a rule, or only oriented towards solving day-to-day problems, can have adverse effects.

To this end, it uses a variety of models and empirical approaches, and also conducts its own surveys. In addition, the SNB analyses economic indicators for Switzerland and abroad, and follows the assessments and forecasts of other institutions. KOF Swiss Economic Institute at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zurich (ETH) is without doubt the best-known for economic analysis. It makes a significant contribution towards understanding the Swiss economy with its regular data surveys (for example, the survey of companies it has been systematically conducting since 1955), as well as its economic forecasts and special analyses. In doing so, KOF fulfils an important role for the SNB's monetary policy and, ultimately, for the greater good of our country. For this reason, the SNB has been connected with the KOF Swiss Economic Institute since its beginning in the 1930s. Both institutions maintain a stimulating exchange of information and ideas to this day. With high-quality economic analysis closely linked to scientific research, KOF Swiss Economic Institute will continue to make a valuable contribution in future - to ensure an even better understanding of the Swiss economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
Chart 8: EM foreign currency debt as a share of GDP Per cent of GDP 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  11  13  15  17  (a) Excludes China, non-bank borrowers only. Sources: IIF and BIS. Despite these vulnerabilities, the Bank’s analysis finds that, for EMEs as a whole, reforms to domestic institutional “pull factors” have substantially increased the sustainability of capital flows and so shifted the distribution of capital flows to the right (Chart 9), all else equal. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Chart 9: Pull factors have reduced Capital Flows-at-Risk for EMEs since the Asian Financial Crisis Probabilty density 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.04  B  A  0.02 0.00 -8  -6  -4  -2  0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  Capital flows as a % of GDP 2008-2018 Post-2008 crisis  Asian Financial Crisis  Sources: IMF and Bank staff calcluations. Notes: Chart shows the contribution of pull factors to capital flows to EMEs during the Asian Financial Crisis (purple), and since 2008 (green). In both distributions push factors are held at their sample average, so only pull factors are changing. See chart 5 and annex for further details. Push factors Unfortunately for EMEs, all else has not been equal.

15 This means developments in the US have disproportionate influence on global economic and financial conditions. Indeed, our research suggests that the influence of US financial conditions on foreign GDP has increased by a third relative to its average from 1990 to 2005, despite the US’s rapidly declining share of global GDP. Capital Flows as a % of GDP 2 0 -2 -4 Average Capital Flows-at-Risk Contribution of pull factors Contribution of push factors Total Capital Flows-at-Risk 1996  1999  2002  2005  Gross Gross outflow inflows s  Chart 10: Capital-Flows-at-Risks in emerging market economies are growing again  -6 -8 2008  2011  2014  2017  Sources: IMF and Bank staff calculations. Notes: See chart 7 for notes. Push factors are proxied by the Bank of England’s global financial conditions index. 15  Ilzetzki, Ethan, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2019), Exchange Arrangements Entering the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold? Quarterly Journal of Economics 134 (2): 599-646. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  When the Fed responds to domestic developments (such as a loosening in fiscal policy) global financial conditions and activity react strongly. This was the case during both the 2013 ‘taper tantrum’ and over the past year, as Fed communications significantly shifted expectations for US monetary policy. During both periods, Capital Flows-at-Risk in EMEs spiked (Chart 10). Financial (in)stability in advanced economies has also influenced the sustainability of capital flows to EMEs.
Private banks in Singapore, for instance, hire more than 15,000 professionals, of which about 85% are locals. They also generate business for other firms such as fund management companies when their clients invest in funds managed by those companies. Similarly, family offices create demand for external service providers such as legal, custody, fund administration, and tax firms. MAS has been providing tax incentives to the SFO sector to help create jobs, generate demand for domestic service providers, and channel capital to enterprises in Singapore. 11/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Our incentive schemes exempt from tax qualifying SFOs' income derived from investments managed in Singapore. In return, the SFOs commit to manage assets, hire employees here and incur business spending. Specifically, SFOs applying for our tax incentives are required to: employ a minimum of 2 to 3 investment professionals; incur business spending of $ to $ million, depending on the size of the SFO's funds; and invest at least $ million or 10% of their AUM, whichever is lower, in Singapore equities, bonds, funds, or Singapore operating companies. As outlined by MAS Chairman Tharman Shanmugaratnam two weeks ago, MAS will be adjusting the tax incentives for SFOs to encourage them to: deploy their capital more purposefully to benefit Singapore and the region; and increase contributions towards environmental and social causes. We will make enhancements in five areas. First, we will encourage SFOs to participate in blended finance structures, including those which support the region's transition to net zero. We will introduce three new features.

The decline in global energy and food prices should weigh on the costs of intermediate and final consumer goods. The strengthening Singapore Dollar will further dampen imported inflation. 2/16  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Two, the domestic labour market is showing early signs of cooling off. A recovery in the non-resident workforce is helping to alleviate labour shortages in sectors such as health & social services and transport & storage. Labour demand is easing, especially in sectors most exposed to slower global demand such as manufacturing and ICT services. Easing in labour market tightness should mitigate wage pressures. Three, the pace of cost pass-through into prices should moderate as the strength of domestic demand wanes. Core inflation is expected to end the year significantly lower, at 2.5 – 3.0% yearon-year. In MAS' April Monetary Policy Statement, we had said that core inflation would end the year at around 2.5% year-on-year. We have applied a small range above this, to reflect the potential impact of stronger than expected outturns in some travel-related CPI components, such as airfares and holiday expenses. Excluding the impact of the GST hike, year-end core inflation would be closer to 2%. For the year as a whole, core inflation is forecast at 3.5 – 4.5% but this reflects mostly higher inflation in the first half that is behind us. MAS is lowering the forecast range for CPI-All Items inflation to 4.5 – 5.5% for 2023, down from 5.5 – 6.5% previously.