samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Of course, since new forms of shadow banking activities are certain to develop in the future, FSB members will continue to monitor for emerging risks, and share data and analysis in order to support any future regulatory response. 9 The data refer to the UK, the US and the Euro Area, as of June 2009 (see Bank of England Financial Stability Report, June 2009). 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  These include reforms to secure the tools and powers authorities need to deal decisively with failing banks. At the same time, major banks are required to make themselves easier to resolve, including by writing ‘living wills’. Most importantly, global standards now require that banks hold sufficient debt in life such that, in the event one fails, its successor can be recapitalised to support the continued operation of its most important activities. The combination of these initiatives and the determination of authorities to complete the job explains why the too-big-to-fail public subsidy for private systemic banks has fallen by 90% in the UK. Put simply, a decade on, market discipline is coming back. The system is also fairer because we are addressing the root causes of misconduct. In the wake of the crisis, a series of scandals ranging from mis-selling to manipulation undermined trust in banking, the financial system and to a degree markets themselves. The economic consequences have been enormous.

What a Difference a Decade Makes Mark Carney Governor of the Bank of England Chair of the Financial Stability Board  Remarks at the Institute of International Finance’s Washington Policy Summit, the Reagan Centre, Washington DC 20 April 2017  I am grateful to Alice Carr, Wayne Chapman, Carsten Jung and Iain de Weymarn for their assistance in preparing these remarks. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  Introduction It’s a pleasure to be back at the IIF’s Washington Policy Summit. 1  Last time I spoke here (in 2011) it was still early in the international financial reform process. From the IIF’s perspective at the time, there were three major concerns: -  The consistency of implementation across the G20;  -  The possibility of significant regulatory arbitrage in shadow banking; and  -  Whether the FSB/G20’s ambitious agenda would impair the recovery. Today, those debates have largely been settled. First, the new international minimum standards are being, by and large, consistently and promptly implemented in G20 jurisdictions. This progress is regularly assessed and transparently reported by the FSB 2  and the IMF. And in general, when countries have deviated from international standards, it’s because they have chosen to go further. Second, activities which give rise to similar risks are being treated consistently regardless of where they originate. A series of measures have addressed the major regulatory arbitrage opportunities that encouraged shadow banking. Contingent exposures of banks have been brought on balance sheet and appropriately capitalised.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  Table 1 Historic equity home bias for G20 countries (a) (1995–2007)(b)(c) Advanced G20  1995  2000  2005  2007  USA  0.72  0.76  0.61  0.56  UK  0.66  0.68  0.58  0.56  Germany  0.65  0.58  0.45  0.48  France  0.80  0.78  0.59  0.62  Italy  0.71  0.65  0.54  0.54  Japan  0.93  0.92  0.84  0.84  Canada  0.67  0.69  0.67  0.68  Australia  0.81  0.83  0.79  0.74  Weighted average  0.79  0.76  0.64  0.61  Un-weighted average  0.75  0.74  0.63  0.63  Argentina  0.79  0.70  0.58  0.59  China  0.96  0.94  0.98  0.99  South Africa  0.94  0.70  0.72  0.79  Mexico  0.94  0.98  0.86  0.91  South Korea  0.98  0.97  0.90  0.82  Brazil  0.97  0.96  0.96  0.97  Turkey  0.95  0.98  0.97  0.98  Russia  n/a  0.97  0.98  0.99  India  0.99  0.99  1.00  1.00  Indonesia  0.99  0.98  0.99  0.98  Weighted average  0.96  0.93  0.92  0.94  Un-weighted average  0.85  0.92  0.89  0.90  Weighted average  0.80  0.77  0.66  0.66  Un-weighted average  0.80  0.84  0.78  0.78  Emerging G20  Total G20  Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, IMF WEO database October 2010, S&P Global Stock Markets Factbook (2010), updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), Thompson DataStream, UN Census Bureau, Penn World Tables and Bank calculations.

Andrew G Haldane: The big fish small pond problem Speech by Mr Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, at the Institute for New Economic Thinking Annual Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 9 April 2011. *  *  *  The views are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the interim Financial Policy Committee. I am grateful to Shekhar Aiyar, Shaheen Bhikhu, Martin Brooke, Damien Charles, Spencer Dale, Andrew Hauser, Robert Hills, Glenn Hoggarth, John Hooley, Marius Jurgilas, Priya Kothari, Salina Ladha, Lara Lambert, Chris Peacock, Jonathan Rand, Maureen Snow, William Speller, Jo Spencer, Iain de Weymarn and Peter Zimmerman for comments and contributions. 1. Introduction  Global capital markets are engaged in a footrace. On the one foot, capital markets in emerging market countries are widening and deepening in order to improve domestic capital intermediation. On the other, international investors in developed countries are diversifying their portfolios in order to boost returns and spread risk. Both are typically seen as essential ingredients of global financial liberalisation and integration. Yet their implications for global financial stability are potentially quite different. The first determines the absorptive capacity of high-return, capital-recipient countries. The second defines the distributive capacity of lowreturn, capital-providing countries. Any imbalance between the rate at which international capital is distributed and absorbed may spillover to global capital markets. Reducing these spillovers may require a rethink of the rules of the international financial system. Experience during 2010 provides a good illustration.
For example, the foreign investor’s total holding of Government securities reduced from K1,054.7 billion in the third quarter of 2008 to K446.2 billion by the second quarter of 2009. Similarly, the flow of foreign investments at the Lusaka Stock Exchange switched from a net inflow of $ million during the period January to May 2008 to a net outflow of $ million in the similar period this year. Exchange rate volatility and domestic inflation The global financial meltdown caused a contagion effect to our foreign exchange market and led to volatility in the exchange rate of the Kwacha against major currencies. This unfavourable development was partly a consequence of reduced earnings from copper exports arising from the fall in copper prices as reflected in the lower supply of foreign exchange on the market by mining companies. For instance, the supply of foreign exchange to the market by mining companies declined by 35.7% to a monthly average of US $ million in the first half of this year from an average of US $ million in the last half of 2008. In addition, the weakness of the local currency was a consequence of increased risk aversion to emerging and developing economy financial assets, as stated earlier, attributed to the deepening global financial crisis. In this regard, the supply of foreign exchange by foreign portfolio investors for the purchases of Kwacha financial assets, such as Government securities and domestic company equities, declined significantly, with most non-residents preferring to liquidate their investments and externalising the foreign exchange.

For instance, during the fourth quarter of 2008, the overall balance of payments deficit widened to US $ million from US $ million recorded the previous quarter. Merchandise export earnings declined to US $ million from US $ million realised in the third quarter of 2008 following a sharp reduction in metal export earnings. Metal export earnings declined by 23.1% to US $ million in the fourth quarter of 2008 from US $ million the previous quarter. Metal export earnings at US $ million in the first quarter of 2009 were 52.6% lower than the US $ million recorded in the similar period last year. A slide in both copper and cobalt export earnings owing to lower prices accounted for this outturn. Nonetheless, it should be noted that commodity prices on the international markets have since recovered considerably and have thus started to bring improvement in Zambia’s external position. Foreign capital inflow reduced Ladies and Gentlemen, the global financial crisis led to a decline in the foreign portfolio investment inflows as investors generally reduced their exposure to financial instruments from emerging markets. The risk aversion towards emerging markets thus led to a reduction in foreign portfolio inflows and holdings in Zambia’s Government securities. This resulted in a  2  BIS Review 161/2009  net outflow of foreign portfolio investment since funds that matured were not rolled over and new funds coming in were being scaled down.
We are continuously estimating this lag, which is quite small and adheres to the standard accepted in other countries. Therefore, even the reduction of 0.25 pp may drag down rates for the ultimate borrower. Having said that, risk assessment factors for specific borrowers are essential for banks, and we can see that this factor prevails. Question from Bloomberg: Before asking my question, let me congratulate you on behalf of all my colleagues on the Russian President’s decision to launch the procedure for expanding your mandate. It proves that your policy is correct and, as far as I can see, everybody is satisfied with it. My question is as follows. When you participated in the online reading of ‘The Master and Margarita’, you read a passage from Chapter 29 of the novel, in which Matthew asks Woland to let the Master have some peace. Have you asked for some peace from the President? And anticipating your answer, what will be your objectives for the new term? Thank you very much. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: Thank you for your question. Peace is something we can only dream of, I would say. Though I would prefer external factors to display more certainty and structural reforms to progress faster. This would make it easier for us to pursue our monetary policy. As for objectives, our monetary policy goal is, as a I have told you today, to ensure low and stable inflation everybody could rely on and feel the benefits of.

And as far as I am aware, neither France nor Italy has become a champion of growth in Europe. France and Italy are lagging behind today because of a lack of national reforms. The euro cannot and will never be able to replace them. And this is good news since it means that there remains much room for our domestic policies, our collective debates, and our creative efforts. c) European monetary policy fosters inequality For some, the ECB’s current low rates are generating social inequalities: savers who have put their money in fixed-rate products are being penalised by lower returns, while those who own shares or property are benefiting from the rise in asset prices. The reality is very different. First, because savers and asset holders are generally one and the same. Second, and most importantly, because this very piecemeal analysis ignores the macroeconomic impact of monetary policy, which benefits us all. Our measures create very favourable financing conditions, which are stimulating demand via consumption and investment, and speeding up the decline in unemployment. All this helps to reduce inequality, as unemployment tends to hit the poor and less-qualified the hardest. According to estimates, as a result of our actions, euro area economic growth was boosted by 1.5 percentage points between 2015 and 2018. With regard to inequality, now is precisely the time for us Europeans to talk about our experiences.
They have other issues that frustrate them, such as why average wages are still two to three times lower than those in Germany and many other countries after 25 years of transition, when at the same time many products carrying the “Made in Germany” label are assembled on our territory. Or why so many companies pay such large dividends to owners abroad and we are unable to be attractive enough for foreign capital to be reinvested on our soil. And this is us – we have a tendency not to accept that there are always trade-offs, there are no free lunches, that for every plus there is a minus. We want everything at the same time, sometimes even mutually inconsistent things. But that is another matter. There is one area, however, where the Czech population has been very conservative over a very long period of time, and that is the area of euro adoption. In the Eurobarometer – a poll you all know – the Czech Republic remains the country where by far the largest share of the population has a negative view towards adopting the euro out of all the non-Eurozone countries. Roughly two thirds of Czechs are against the euro. This is a higher figure than in Sweden, which rejected the euro in a referendum in 2003. Well, public opinion is not as anti-euro as in the UK, where at some point the euro was only “slightly more popular than ebola”, as I read in one British newspaper.

But still, being for the euro is simply a total political non seller. If I were to summarise the arguments against joining, be it on the side of the general public or professionals, they would be roughly threefold: A. The first one is sentimental rather than economic. We have been living with our Czech koruna, or crown, for quite some time and our country has a long history of monetary stability and stabilisation. By the way, we have had the same name for our currency ever since 1892, from the times of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (the crown is a monarchist name – what a paradox in our republic) and there has never been any reason to rename it. The old adage says: If it ain’t broke, why fix it? If you have low and stable inflation on your own, you don’t need any credibility for your currency from abroad. B. The second argument is more economic. Money matters. And monetary stabilisation matters. If you have shocks in the economy, something has to move to offset the shock. Something has to be flexible. It is easier to accommodate shocks through flexible interest rates or a flexible exchange rate than through wages, unemployment or budget expenditure. We discussed yesterday how hard it can be if you don’t have monetary policy to adjust to shocks. This is a classical argument of monetary economics for the active role of elastic money when you don’t have flexible prices or wages. Simple as that.
In terms of foreign exchange market efficiency, Hong Kong is the fifth FX activity centre supported by a unique network of real time gross settlement systems in USD, Euro, RMB and the HKD. Hong Kong has a high standard of market transparency, disclosure, prudent supervision and without exchange controls which is crucial for centralized treasury functions. 18. A unique advantage of Hong Kong, which is difficult for other centres to match, is its proximity to Mainland China and status as the premier offshore RMB centre. For managing treasury activities denominated in the RMB, we have the largest offshore RMB liquidity pool exceeding RMB 1.1 trillion, a vibrant CNH market with daily settlement exceeding RMB 800 billion, the deepest offshore RMB (or Dim Sum) bond market, the unique access to the A share market through the Shanghai Hong Kong Stock Connect (which will soon be extended to include the Shenzhen Stock Exchange), and critical market infrastructure such as the CNH HIBOR fixing benchmark for pricing RMB financial products and the development of related risk hedging instruments. 19. We, of course, cannot afford to be complacent. Our study has also identified room for improvement in particular in the tax regime for corporate treasury activities. Hong Kong’s tax system has many strengths: tax rates are low and the tax regime is simple with no tax imposed on dividends and capital gain. Hong Kong is also probably the only major jurisdiction in Asia without an interest withholding tax.

To stay ahead of the game, corporate treasurers need to ensure that the treasury function can be transformed to better support international growth in order to capture the immense opportunities in Asia, and at the same time sharpen the management of capital, liquidity, funding and treasury related risks in order to navigate safely in the post crisis intricate market environment. 11. So, as the agenda of this Summit suggests, corporate treasury management can no longer afford to remain in a passive maintenance mode, but need to adopt a proactive and strategic mode. To use a soccer analogy, an effective corporate treasurer needs to be like a good mid-fielder who is able to make lethal passes to the strikers to score goals, and at the same time organise and support the defence to consolidate the victory for the team. 12. Like the mid-fielder in the soccer team, the corporate treasury function needs to be strategically located to support the front line business team in spots where they can strike business deals and where defence can be efficiently organise to handle the risks that may be encountered by the team. In the context of Asia, there is a compelling case for MNCs to set up corporate treasury centres in a financial centre where they can easily capture the China opportunities and where the key treasury functions can be organised efficiently. 13.
Some stylised experiments affecting the natural interest rate So if it’s not monetary policy, what might have caused the long decline in the real risk-free rate of interest in the past twenty years or so, both before and since the financial crisis? Chart 3 provides a basic visual framework for thinking about these things. What follows, based on a simple asset-pricing model, gives a slightly more quantitative flavour. Any such model will generally allow for three sorts of influences on asset prices: the underlying discount rate (the extent to which people care less about the future than the present), expected economic growth and the degree of uncertainty about that growth. The particular model I’m using here allows for two sorts of uncertainty – a generalised, two-sided risk and, on top of that, the possibility of a large downside hit to growth.6 The first of these terms is connected with saving. All else equal, a lower discount rate means people want to save more – at the margin, they’re prepared to tolerate a lower rate of return on any asset. In terms of Chart 3 you can think of this as a rightwards shift in the saving schedule. In the simple model, the effect of a 1%-point drop in the discount rate on the risk-free interest rate and the value of equities is shown in Chart 6(a). Interest rates fall and, at least on impact, equity prices jump. This is because the present value of future profits increases, not because the profits themselves do so.

Bandid Nijathaworn: Regional financial integration and development of local markets Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the JP Morgan Investor Seminar during the IMF/WB Annual Meetings, Singapore, 17 September 2006. *  *  *  First, let me start by thanking JP Morgan for inviting me to speak this morning. The topic today is “Regional Financial Integration and Development of Local Markets”. Given the limitations of time, I want to focus my talk this morning on just two issues. The first is on what has been achieved so far in East Asia in regional financial integration. And the second is the prospect for regional financial integration as we move forward, and what role should policy play. To begin, I think one important defining phenomenon that has been a key driver of East Asia’s recent rapid growth is the increased interdependency amongst economies in the region, especially in trade, and especially in the trade between China and the rest of the region. Intra-regional trade is now the largest component of total trade in most East Asian economies. For example, total trade share of Asia10 with Asia-10 has risen to 41 percent this year, compared to a share of about 21 percent fifteen years ago. And Asia-10 now trade among themselves more than with the G3 economies.
We, at the Banque de France are very attentive to those issues because our institution has been entrusted by law to support financial inclusion. Our contributions in that area are today quite diverse and are a major part of our mission to provide services to the public, in the line with three major objectives: improving fair access, preventing inequalities of treatment and improving financial literacy. As regards fair access, one good example is the Banque de France’s involvement in the “right to an account” procedure set up by French law. If banks refuse to open a bank account for a client, he or she can make a request to us and we will designate a bank within 24 hours. This specific bank account will provide basic services free of charge. In 2019, 51,000 people made use of that right. As regards the second objective to help preventing inequalities of treatment, the Banque de France is involved in preventing and addressing households’ overindebtedness issues. Along with other stakeholders, we help them find solutions to their financial difficulties. In 2019, more than 150,000 such situations were examined. The Banque de France also chairs the observatory for banking inclusion, which is in charge of promoting financial inclusion and especially of monitoring the banking industry’s commitment to cap payment incident fees for all financially vulnerable customers. Lastly, the Banque de France promotes financial literacy, through its role of national coordinator of involved stakeholders, by providing specific tools, resources and training for social workers. II.

For instance, some recent figures for the euro area, and Germany in particular, as well as China seem to show that over time the contribution of the external sector may be decreasing. The ability of global trade to sustain growth and contribute to global recovery also seems to have been stronger than expected. The implications for global finance Let me now turn to the second issue, namely the implications of rising public indebtedness in advanced economies. Although deficits are expected to start narrowing gradually next year, the fiscal burden remains huge. Government debt levels among advanced economies are expected to increase further and approach 100% of GDP. The International Monetary Fund estimates that by 2015 the general government gross debt will reach 110% of GDP in the United States and 95% of GDP in the euro area. This amounts to an almost doubling in the United States and an increase of around 40% in the euro area. Looking forward, the issue of the sustainability of the debt in several industrial countries is looming. This raises several analytical problems, which in my view have not been fully examined in the literature, but which are very important for policy-makers and financial market participants. Here I will consider two of them. The first analytical problem relates to the assessment of a country’s solvency. This task is not as simple as assessing the solvency of a company, a household or a financial institution.