samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are in a “secular stagnation” world but have not fully woken up to it. There are different hypotheses as to why we might be in such a world. One is that we are stuck in an era of very low demand because there are more savers than opportunities to invest. This is due to fundamental factors such as demographic changes, inequality and preferences for low-risk assets. When the supply of savings exceeds demand for borrowing the price – i.e. the natural real interest rate – goes down. If this natural real interest rate is pushed down below zero and held there by this imbalance between supply of savings and demand for borrowing, central banks can’t push demand back up and economies remain stuck. In this world, neither central banks nor the private sector can easily break the cycle; the government has to step in to borrow massively to invest thus correcting the imbalance of savers and borrowers and pushing the natural interest rate back up. Another, somewhat different take, is that we are stuck in an era not of low demand but of low supply growth. In this view, productivity growth slowed in the 1970s after the benefits of the Second Industrial Revolution had finished working through. And, despite the manifest technological developments, such as ICT, technological change has not since had an equivalent impact on productivity. Or, as Peter Thiel said: “we wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters”.

It is a keystone of the European single market, which will ensure prosperity in Europe for the benefit of the rest of the world. I would like to draw your attention to why the euro and Monetary Union have been successful from the outset, and to the conditions and prospects for building on this success. I. The euro and Monetary union are based on a credible monetary policy and contribute to an appropriate economic and monetary equilibrium in Europe I.1. A credible, stability-oriented monetary policy a/ First of all, let me point out that, from a technical and operational point of view, the launch of the euro on financial markets has been an indisputable success. In this respect, one has to remember all the doubts voiced three years ago. The decentralised organisation of the Eurosystem has achieved the objectives it was assigned in three important respects: •  operational efficiency, as is demonstrated by the timely adjustment of banking liquidity and steering of short-term interest rates;  •  the security provided by the procedures and systems implemented by the Eurosystem, both for the execution of its operations and in the field of large-value payments. At the shortest end of the market, the integration of the interbank market took place in 1999, right from the start of Monetary Union, thanks to the setting up of the Target system for the transfer of large-value payments in real time throughout the euro area and other EU countries.
Potential workers are not counted as unemployed unless they are actively looking for work, so this relatively high rate of unemployment, in part, reflects the relative strength in labor force participation, as the City’s residents remain engaged and looking for work. In contrast, at the national level, the picture is quite different – job growth has been slower and proportionately more people have dropped out of the labor force. Perhaps surprisingly, while historically a key driver of the local economy, the finance sector has not been a leader in terms of job growth recently. Instead, employment in New York City’s finance sector and the securities industry specifically, has been essentially flat over the past two years. The city’s job gains in this expansion have been broad-based across other sectors, indicating a healthy diversification within the economy. Conditions in Brooklyn Now let’s focus on Brooklyn. The borough’s economy has been particularly strong in recent years. Compared with the other boroughs, Brooklyn has seen generally stronger job growth, a stronger housing market, and stronger trends in wage and salary earnings. This strength is exemplified by the transformation of industrial neighborhoods – such as DUMBO, Red Hook, Greenpoint, East Williamsburg, Gowanus and Bushwick – into increasingly diversified residential and commercial neighborhoods; and the recent development of the Atlantic Yards and Brooklyn Navy Yard. This changing landscape has helped spur economic activity which has created many new jobs in the borough.

There are also continued financial challenges for families here as indicated by the New York Fed’s measures of credit conditions. As of the end of 2013, average debt per person was about $ in Brooklyn – little changed over several years. At the same time, the Borough’s delinquency rate on that debt is now 11.6 percent, much higher than the state average and more than double the national average. What’s more, the mortgage crisis continues to take a toll on local homeowners. As of the end of 2013, more than 11 percent of mortgage debt in Brooklyn was 90-plus days delinquent, again significantly higher than the New York State and national delinquency rate. I also want to make a few comments about the impact of Superstorm Sandy. While areas of the New York City metropolitan region were hard hit by the storm, the devastation was particularly severe along the waterfronts of Brooklyn – and in particular in southern Brooklyn and neighborhoods like Red Hook. We saw and heard about the devastation of the storm from many of those affected, including a number of our own employees as well as other residents we met at a series of assistance clinics we organized in response to the storm. Those already living close to the edge financially were particularly vulnerable as were the City’s public housing residents. Still, Brooklyn’s economy showed resilience: while employment did drop in November 2012, it bounced back strongly the next month and accelerated during the spring of 2013, reaching new highs.
But the possibility of a systemic problem of global dimensions involving the world's most important currency was a serious concern at the time. And the events in New York quite naturally prompted us to look at our own contingency plans, especially for crucial operations, such as our payment and settlement systems. These plans had already been greatly expanded and rigorously tested in advance of the Y2K transition. They cannot specifically address every possible disaster whether at home or elsewhere - but we are pretty confident that they are robust and flexible enough to enable us to maintain our core operations in all but the most unmanageable situations. More broadly, the events on 11 September have also prompted us to reflect on the nature and structure of global clearing systems. Last year, as you know, Hong Kong launched its own US dollar clearing system, to provide real-time settlement for the full range of US dollar transactions in the Asian time zone. The aim is to cut down Herstatt risk - that is the foreign exchange settlement risk relating to the delivery of different currencies in different time zones - and to provide a fast, efficient and cheap service for our own region. September 11th brought home to us the risk of serious disruptions to the global settlement system and underlined the importance of our US dollar clearing system as a risk  2  BIS Review 88/2001  management service.

And how far, in any case, would we be able to avoid importing US monetary policy even in the absence of the Link? The experience elsewhere in the region does not give ground for much optimism. The third question is how far the Link is fuelling deflation, and how far this is detrimental to our economy. Internal price deflation is indeed a part - and a necessary part - of the process of adjustment imposed on the economy under the Link when there is a fall off in external demand. It is also, incidentally, a feature of our longer-term economic integration with the Mainland of China. It is the counterpart of currency depreciation under a floating regime, except that the adjustments that it forces to take place tend to involve less overshooting, less instability, and more lasting restructuring. Price deflation brings pain to those who see the value of their assets shrink dramatically, and, as we know, there are many in Hong Kong who are, sadly, in this position. But there are many more who have seen their purchasing power increase, as prices for the whole range of goods and services steadily decline. And the effect, equivalent to that of devaluation, on adding to the attraction of Hong Kong as a regional centre, and as a destination for tourists, can only be positive. The concern comes when price deflation, as part of the adjustment process under the Link, turns into the kind of spiralling deflation that inhibits investment and fuels recession.
All those with a say in price and wage formation must also realise that the Riksbank’s endeavour is to fulfil the inflation target. The repo rate increase in December was therefore important when the overall assessment of future inflation pointed to the target being exceeded. Inflation outlook somewhat more favourable Information of some relevance for the assessment of future inflation has become available since the December report. It concerns the crisis in Asia, the early stages of the wage negotiations, and the rent negotiations. The crisis in Asia has deepened both in terms of its effects on financial markets and as regards its probable consequences for global economic growth and inflation in the coming years. The extent of the effects cannot yet be assessed reliably but there are many indications that they will be greater than most people envisaged at the end of last year. This  BIS Review 5/1998  -7-  suggests that in the coming months the statistics will point to a more subdued growth of Swedish exports and industrial production. Some wage agreements have been concluded, for instance for the paper industry. They still cover just a small segment of the labour market but many observers consider that the existing settlements will serve as a guide elsewhere. It is difficult to arrive at a definite assessment of what these settlements imply for total wage increases but a cautious conclusion could be that the outcome will be somewhat below the Riksbank’s estimate in the main scenario, at least for 1998.

It should be added, however, that agreements are still pending in many cases and the degree of wage drift in various industries also has to be considered. Still, the probability of the report’s alternative scenario with higher inflation should have decreased. Rent costs account for 11 per cent of the CPI and are the largest main item. For 1998 and 1999, final agreements are in place for about 65 and 25 per cent, respectively, of the stock of rented dwellings. They give average increases of just over 2 per cent for 1998 and almost 3 per cent for 1999. The 1998 figure is somewhat lower than expected. There are signs, moreover, that rents for 1998 may be re-negotiated, which has some downward implications for the assessment of inflation this year. No reason at present to alter the repo rate All in all, then, in the period of relevance for monetary policy, global economic development will probably be somewhat weaker than estimated earlier. For this reason the outlook for inflation is somewhat more favourable. To some extent, stronger competition from imports has a similar effect. Somewhat lower inflation in 1998 may also result from a lower increase in rents. For the construction of monetary policy it is equally important at present to consider the altered spectrum of risks. The probability of an outcome for wages that is appreciably above the main scenario has diminished. At the same time, the effects of the Asian crisis are highly uncertain. Much depends on how the crisis is managed.
The GDP deflator would increase by 0.7%, whereby the rise in nominal GDP would be around 2.6% compared with the potentially meagre end-2014 figure of 1%. Overall, these forecasts coincide with those on which analysts concur, although the latter generally involve a somewhat lesser fiscal effort than envisaged in the Draft Budget. The macroeconomic setting accompanying the Draft Budget is subject to downside risks, owing to the uncertainty surrounding international and, in particular, European economic developments. It is against this macroeconomic and financial background that the Draft State and Social Security Budget for 2015 was unveiled in late September. Before continuing, I should point out that, along with the Draft Budget, the Budgetary Plan for 2015 was presented in October. The Banco de España considers that the preparation and publication of this Plan is a most valuable step forward for the control and transparency of our public finances. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The Budgetary Plan for 2015 includes information on the budgetary planning of the regional and local governments, and it thus offers a view of overall general government conduct. The Budgetary Plan is important because it fills a substantial information gap: the lack of integrated information relating to all general government activity at a time at which a new budgetary cycle is beginning. Given that its publication marks the main change since my appearance in Parliament in October, I shall now focus on its content. Budgetary programming foresees, firstly, fulfilment of the budget deficit target for 2014, at 5.5% of GDP.

In the euro area, the corresponding yields on German government bonds also rose by almost 2 percentage points to about 1.7%. The rise in yields was similar in Switzerland, with ten-year Confederation bonds yielding around 1.3%, their highest level in more than ten years (cf. chart 2). In the US, the monetary policy realignment led to a considerable increase in inflation-adjusted bond yields, or real yields. For instance, real yields on ten-year Treasuries have risen by more  Page 1/4  Berne, 16 June 2022 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  than 1.5 percentage points since the beginning of the year and are now back at just above 0% for the first time in more than two years. In historical terms, however, this is still very low. On the stock markets, too, the expectations of a tightening of monetary policy and the heightened uncertainty resulted in price corrections. The leading share indices have recently been trading at well below their levels at the beginning of the year, and the SMI, Switzerland’s leading index, has lost more than 15% over the same period (cf. chart 3). Foreign exchange markets were likewise heavily shaped by the shift in monetary policy: The US dollar, for instance, has appreciated more than 7% on a trade-weighted basis since the beginning of the year. The trade-weighted euro, on the other hand, has lost around 1.5% and the Japanese yen has actually depreciated by more than 10% on a trade-weighted basis over the same period.
This suggests that policymakers, faced with the economic conditions of that period, weighted deviations from their goals in a manner similar to the weights used in these versions of the Taylor Rule. Despite these attractive features, I do not believe that simple policy rules can take the place of in-depth analysis of economic conditions, evaluation of alternative policy plans, and ultimately policy judgment. While simple policy rules provide useful information to policymakers, their very virtue – simplicity – means they cannot capture all information that is relevant for policymaking. For example, such rules cannot easily incorporate asymmetric risks or financial stability issues. Moreover, the usefulness of simple policy rules depends critically on the stability of the relationship between monetary policy and economic outcomes.

In this regard, it gives me much pleasure to officiate at this workshop for the Board of Directors, whose objectives are twofold: i.  to raise the Directors’ awareness about the Bank of Zambia Risk Management Framework; and  ii. by so doing, secure the Directors’ unwavering commitment to embedding risk management culture in the Bank. Going forward, Risk Management Department has lined up similar workshops targeting the various categories of staff ranging from the Executive to unionised staff. The workshops are designed in such a manner that they address both the strategic and practical issues involved in the risk management process. Ladies and Gentlemen It is not my intention to give a long speech, but allow me to urge the Directors to take this workshop seriously, for it is my expectation that at the end of this workshop, Directors will be better placed to not only understand the Bank of Zambia Risk Management Framework fully, but also provide guidance to the Bank on risk management issues. In conclusion, I wish to thank you for finding time from your busy schedules to attend this workshop. I urge you to ask as many questions as you could possibly can, in order to get the best out of it, as well as make the workshop more lively and interactive. With these few remarks, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the workshop officially open. I thank you! BIS Review 119/2006  1
A second observation is that over this nearly twenty five year period, the challenge for monetary policy in many countries has shifted from one of getting inflation down to target, to one of getting it up to target. This has been less marked for the UK, in part because in a more open economy movements in the exchange rate have tended to raise inflation during this period. However we are facing a period of below target inflation today. And this is very different to the challenge of the early days of the MPC. It is important to emphasise that the UK regime of inflation targeting is a symmetrical one, and with very good reason. Both high and low inflation are costly. Put like this, the story is pretty obvious and uncontroversial. An independent central bank with a symmetric inflation target has the same objective either way, whether inflation is above or below target – it cannot throw the towel in. To do so would amount to abandoning our remit and our independence. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  But that is not the end of the story because of late it has been said that central bank independence has been compromised by the actions taken in the face of the pandemic. What this really comes down to is the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, between the economic policy of the Government and the actions of the central bank.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Switzerland – a platform for global business Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Forum de l'Economie vaudoise, Lausanne, 14 September 2007. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Within the past ten years, Switzerland has become a genuine platform for global economic operations. From here, the international markets are being worked systematically, and an ever-growing part of our economic performance is now attributable to investment activity abroad. This is a welcome development since it allows us to keep high value-added jobs in Switzerland. However, it also involves some risk because the international mobility of production has increased. Consequently, the general conditions which help to keep Switzerland attractive as a business location must be maintained. This platform for global economic operations has given us a role outside the European Union and the euro area. Thus we have chosen to face the challenge of globalisation instead of the challenge of European integration. Our path may be demanding, but it is also promising! BIS Review 101/2007  1
So, clusters numbering about 8 to 10 groups were set up by making informal arrangements for them to work together. Separate cluster rules were prepared and the members were trained in keeping cluster accounts and records. This process went on continuously for about 12 to 18 months from the beginning of1999. When the newly formed clusters showed sufficient maturity of being able to operate independently, the next move for the project was planned by the project. In the second stage, it was necessary to give legal status to the clusters. Many options like registering them under the law relating to cooperatives or under the Companies Act were considered, but finally, decision was made to incorporate the clusters under the Societies Ordinance as limited liability societies under the name “Isuru Development Society Ltd”, for the simplicity it provided to the beneficiaries. The societies were registered with the Registrar of Companies in terms of the Ordinance. The societies so registered had the objective of realising a common goal of attaining economic well-being of the members with a mutual  8  BIS Review 22/2008  support. The incorporation of societies as limited liability societies was completed within two years by 2001. The next phase was to further consolidate the limited liability societies into still larger economic organisations. Such a consolidation was essential in order to permit this larger organisation to effectively function as a strong economic entity. This goal was attained by consolidating the common efforts of societies in a particular district into a district-wide limited liability company.

The relatively favorable performance of the U.S. financial system is the result both of the wisdom of past choices made to foster a very open and competitive financial system, but also is the result of good fortune and some of the special advantages that have come from the unique role of the United States and the dollar in the world economy and financial system. Some of these relative advantages are likely to decline over time with the maturation and deregulation of other financial markets around the world. And this healthy evolution prompts us to be even more attentive to the potential risk that the costs we impose on financial institutions in our markets and on companies that want to raise capital in our markets become prohibitively high. Here are a few considerations or principles that I believe should guide us in the official community as we strive to improve the regulatory framework going forward. I want to emphasize that these principles, as in the case of many principles, are easier to state than to achieve. Let me start by acknowledging there are aspects of the exacting standards we have sought to impose on our financial system that have turned out to be expensive in relation to the return against our public policy objective. And provisions that seem optimally designed at any given time are likely to need to evolve as conditions change. That this should occur is a natural aspect of a dynamic financial environment.