samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
GFXC signup data from the GFXC global index of public registers, https://www.globalfxc.org/global_index.htm. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  Why not sign up to the Global Code? Four explanations and responses  In this section, I want to respond to four stylised explanations sometimes heard from buy-side firms still uncertain about signing up to the Code. Explanation (1): Lack of awareness – “What is the Global Code? I’ve never heard of it, and don’t know what signing up involves.” Given the breadth of engagement during the drafting of the Code, and the raft of publicity since its launch, it is hard to believe that asset managers of the size listed in Table 2 are unaware of its existence. A wealth of materials on the Code is available on the GFXC2 and national FX Committee3 websites. The UK’s Investment Association has produced a public summary of the Code4 and a guide to signing up,5 explaining the process of making a public commitment for buy-side firms. Similar material is available from the Association of Corporate Treasurers6. And a raft of conferences and training courses have covered the main themes of the Code. Nevertheless, the global buy-side is a diverse community, so a key priority for the GFXC outreach work is to consider what more can be done to ‘push’ targeted material to a wider range of firms, using the contacts of national FX committees and trade associations to help organise a dedicated event in the New Year.

The number of ‘Statements of Commitment’ (SoCs) – which record organisations’ recognition of, and commitment to adopt, the Code – has risen sixfold, from 100 in April 2018 to 605 in November, as recorded on the GFXC’s global index. That index, available on the GFXC website,1 allows market participants to see who signed up, and when. It includes statements from banks, asset managers, corporate treasurers, infrastructures, non-bank liquidity providers – and 41 central banks, including the Bank of England, who have committed to following the principles in the Code in their official operations and investment activities, except where doing so would inhibit the discharge of their legal duties or policy functions. Adoption of the Code is now widespread amongst banks and other sell-side firms. Table 1 shows that all of the largest 30 firms by asset size have signed up to the Code. Progress on the buy-side has been slower, though still quite encouraging: 11 of the largest 30 asset managers, accounting for over $ trillion of assets under management, have so far committed to the Code (Table 2). That number will rise over time, as firms currently working towards adoption reach the end of their internal processes. Nonetheless, it is clear that more remains to be done to secure the same degree of signup to the Code as there has been on the sell-side. What are the remaining obstacles, and how can we address them?
Debate on the difference of behavior between the Eurosystem and the Fed. •  Less aggressive interest rate cuts in the euro area than in the US after 2001 and prolonged period of stable policy rates between 2003 and 2005 raised the question: is the Eurosystem “too passive”? •  Activism and gradualism refer to the number and magnitude of changes in the policy rate over a given period. •  Research recently conducted on the basis of an estimated model for the euro area and the US over the last two decades has yielded three findings: 2 -  the monetary policy strategies pursued by the Eurosystem and the Fed do exhibit some differences;  -  the degree of interest rate smoothing, taken as an indicator of monetary policy gradualism, is quite similar in the euro area and the US;  -  the differences in patterns can be ascribed to differences in size and nature of shocks. Most of the differences are due to demand shocks, which were larger in the United States. 1  A. Blinder (1998)  2  Motto and Rostagno (2005) and Sahuc and Smets (2006)  2  BIS Review 63/2006  Monetary policy and asset prices. •  Caution is also an answer to the following question: should monetary policy systematically react to perceived asset prices misalignments?

•  First, the Eurosystem takes the uncertainty related to transmission uncertainty into account with the medium-term horizon of the definition of price stability. It introduces flexibility in the decision-making process and avoids focusing on short-term developments. The medium-  BIS Review 63/2006  3  term horizon is also a way to reconcile monetary policy and financial stability-related considerations, enabling the central bank to “look through the bubble”. •  Second, the Eurosystem does not rely on a single model. The two-pillar approach based on economic and monetary analyses contains complementary information on the short to medium-term horizon (economic analysis) and the long-term horizon (monetary analysis). The economic analysis relies on indicators on the one hand (hard data related to the real economy and soft data) and forecasts on the other hand (Eurosystem’s staff macroeconomic projection exercises evaluated together with the forecasts of other institutions). The monetary analysis is based on a comprehensive assessment of liquidity and credit conditions. These two analyses can be cross-checked to give an overall assessment of the risks for price stability. Alternative models of the inflationary process justify the fullinformation approach adopted by the Eurosystem in order to overcome uncertainty. In a way, the two-pillar approach rests on the same principles as the Bayesian model averaging, although it is less formal. •  Third, the higher the uncertainty, the greater the need for transparency and more important the credibility.
In particular, a sharp and persistent decline in copper prices originating in real or financial factors would have significant effects on the current account, domestic demand and inflation. The emerging world is facing big challenges in the conduct of economic policies in a scenario that foresees that the strongly expansionary monetary policy of developed economies will continue for a long period. This, because of the possible effects of interest rate differentials between emerging and developed countries on capital flows, asset prices, credit growth and currency behavior. Currency-related tensions may create frictions that may hamper international trade and world growth. The greatest risks have to do with the persistence of highly dynamic domestic demand. On one hand, the economy is already using its internal resources intensively, so if the current expansion of domestic expenditure continues, it could generate, in the medium term, additional pressures on the labor market, the use of installed capacity and inflation. On the other hand, because of its incidence in the behavior of the current account deficit and its potential impact on the vulnerability of the Chilean economy. Any sudden change in external conditions, say, a reduction in the terms of trade or unfavorable financial conditions, could expose the country to costly adjustments. History provides several episodes of this nature.

The will to pursue a given business activity and succeed is critical if promising ideas are ultimately to evolve into marketable products or processes. Switzerland cannot be truly ambitious without ambitious entrepreneurs, and surveys suggest that the country still has room for improvement here. Against this backdrop, steps should be taken to cultivate innovative drive and entrepreneurial thinking early on, for instance by encouraging high school students to do projects in which they found their own small companies. Various universities already run programmes designed to assist young researchers in bringing innovative products and services to market. Private initiatives also play a significant role in nurturing entrepreneurship in Switzerland, helping young people learn how to transform an idea into an innovation and operate a business. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches
This is thus an example of a situation where raising the policy rate will if anything increase the risks to financial stability. 10 Using policy rate to influence housing prices is costly There are also many references to developments in housing prices in the monetary policy debate. Monetary policy would appear to have very little effect on housing prices. If one nevertheless uses the policy rate to influence housing prices (and thereby mortgage growth) this will lead to large costs to the real economy. A study by Claussen, Jonsson and Lagerwall (2011), which is included in the Riksbank’s inquiry into the risks in the Swedish housing market shows, for instance, that it would have been very costly in terms of both production and inflation to try to prevent the upswing in housing prices from 2004 onwards using monetary policy. Keeping housing prices at a long-run trend level in 2004–2010 would have required repo-rate increases over several years of up to 5 percentage points in both 2006 and 2007. GDP growth would then have been on average almost 2 percentage points lower up to 2010, which corresponds to an accumulated GDP loss of around 12 per cent. CPIF inflation would have been on average 3 percentage points lower during the same period. The study confirms for Sweden what several other international studies have concluded, such as Assenmascher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010).

Sir Andrew Large: Financial stability - maintaining confidence in a complex world Speech by Sir Andrew Large, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the City of London Central Banking Conference, National Liberal Club, London, 17 November 2003. *  *  *  I am often asked what we mean by financial stability and what the Bank, or “the authorities” generally, are doing to maintain it. Let me start with the observation that maintaining financial stability is different in a number of important respects from conducting monetary policy. There is no quantified target; no foolproof way of deciding where to look for potential threats; and no fixed timetable for policy decisions. Financial stability is altogether less tangible and more elusive. But it is nevertheless extremely important - as the substantial costs associated with financial instability demonstrate. The Bank of England has had an interest in financial stability for a very long time. But for most of that time its interest was implicit rather than explicit. In the more formal structure put in place in 1997, after the Bank was granted operational independence on monetary policy, our financial stability role was laid down in a published Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank and the FSA. Today I would like to make a few observations on some of the issues at the top of our current agenda. Financial crises are nothing new. Indeed the Bank has been handling them since the eighteenth century. Some are signalled well in advance.
In particular, the activities and institutions which the Bank and the Authority will be expected to monitor will become more complex as the number of financial intermediaries with a presence both in Malta and in other countries, either directly through the establishment of branches or subsidiaries, or indirectly through the provision of cross-border services via the internet or otherwise, continues to grow in the light of the incorporation of EU passporting rights in Maltese legislation. The coming into effect of Basle II and, at the EU level, CAD III will be significant factors in this regard. At the same time, the tendency of companies to seek multiple listings in different securities markets means that interest rates and stock market valuations in one country will increasingly mirror those in other countries, even though the underlying economic fundamentals of that country might warrant some divergence in such variables. Indeed, as has been the experience of other countries, the trend towards consolidation and merger activity in the various segments of the market, from banking and the selling of insurance and investment funds to the provision of payment services and trading facilities, will lead to a situation where the institutions to be supervised will vastly exceed the financial resources and technical expertise available to supervisors and central banks.

The maintenance of financial stability was accordingly recognized in the legislation setting up the Central Bank of Malta in 1968, but it was only pursuant to the 2002 amendments to this legislation that the Bank’s responsibility was made more explicit.1 These amendments also recognized the Bank’s role in preserving a sound and efficient payment system. The Bank’s efforts to strengthen its capacity in the area of financial stability commenced before its responsibility for banking regulation and supervision was transferred to the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) in January 2002. In fact in 2000, a Financial Stability Office was set up to identify and analyse potential systemic threats not only in banks, but also in other parts of the financial system, such as the insurance and investment sectors, the securities markets and also selected large corporations in the non-financial sector. The Office has since developed a set of financial soundness indicators and a model which detects and assesses the impact of different types of risks. It has also introduced shock scenario techniques to stress-test the resilience of the banking system. This year the Bank has also started to conduct a bi-annual financial stability review whereby developments abroad as well as in the domestic macroeconomic, regulatory and operational environment are assessed in one analytical framework designed to detect potential weaknesses and to devise appropriate remedial measures. These activities are supplemented by the work of the Bank’s Payment Systems Office, which is responsible for the maintenance and oversight of the payment system.
Unfortunately, I do not have the time to elaborate on the first question. Instead I will say a few words about the second. Although the discussion about monetary policy and a productivity shock is taking place mostly in the United States, in the light of the impressive economic performance there and the acceleration in the rate of productivity growth, one could certainly ask: What about Europe? Europe is, on the one hand, now in a strong upward economic phase. In addition, new technology, especially the Internet and telecommunications, is gaining ground in many European countries. On the other hand, Europe also differs from the US. The rapid growth of US investment has not yet been seen in Europe. One could also argue that the existence of quite a few structural obstacles in Europe makes an acceleration of productivity growth less likely in the immediate future. A handful of countries - including the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and, more recently, Sweden and Finland - have achieved strong economic growth and in some cases also low inflation. But with the BIS Review 50/2000  2  exception of Ireland, these countries have not yet enjoyed the same strong productivity growth as the US. Nevertheless, the possibility of a productivity breakthrough also in Europe cannot be ruled out. It will probably depend on how well Europe succeeds in reforming microeconomic policy. Higher - or accelerating - productivity growth does indeed pose new challenges for monetary policy.

Furthermore, looking ahead in monetary policy is hard when the economy is going through major changes that make it difficult to forecast the future path of the economy and inflation. It is quite clear that this demands a great deal of forecasters as well as of those who construct macro models. The forecasts concern inflation one to two years ahead, which calls, for instance, for reasonable precision in the measurement of the output gap and the relationship between the output gap and inflation. It is already evident, for example, that in the 1990s inflation forecasts in many countries were frequently on the high side. I believe that the best we can do, at least at this stage, is to pay close attention to incoming data in the forecasting process, and not mechanically use the results from models that rely too heavily on historical relationships. We have to deal more successfully with the fact that forecasts of economic developments can never be completely accurate and still allow monetary policy to be forward looking. When discussing monetary policy of today, we must remember that we have come a long way. The world economy shows strong growth coupled with low inflation and monetary policy has contributed to this development. However, there are interesting, though somewhat difficult, challenges ahead of us which must be met if we are to preserve this bright picture of the world economy. This conference will contribute to a better understanding of the issues and problems involved. 3  BIS Review 50/2000
It was not surprising that during those times the financial stability was not of a main concern for the central bank. As the central banks learnt during the second half of eighties to deal more properly with inflationary disturbances, the price stability was broadly achieved again. Consequently, the interest in financial  BIS Review 20/2005  1  stability issue has been increasing during the nineties. In my opinion, there are two main reasons for it. First of all, central banks have learnt one important rule: that their role of the lender of last resort is something the central bank should be ready to fulfil, but in fact it is optimal, never to do it in practice. Second of all, the financial system is in the end completely incomparable to the pre-World-War-II system. Nowadays, we live in a global world and, although we are more capable of minimising the impact of inflationary disturbances, there are other types of shocks arising. To sum up, the main message we can learn from the history is that price stability as the ultimate goal of monetary policy is not in contradiction with the effort to achieve the financial stability. Indeed, on one hand, price stability is a necessary condition to achieve financial stability, as the inflationary disturbances have the potential to cause serious damages to the financial system; on the other hand, a sound financial system enables the monetary policy to smooth its actions in order to achieve price stability. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.

Zdeněk Tůma: The interrelationship between monetary policy, price stability and financial stability Speech by Mr Zdeněk Tůma, Governor of the Czech National Bank, at the European banking and financial forum 2005, Prague, 22 March 2005. *  *  *  Mr. President, Excellencies, Governors, distinguished guests, It is an honour to be opening the central bankers' forum. As the main part of the conference program concerns the financial sector challenges and opportunities in the “New Europe”, the central bankers' panel has to necessarily reflect the close, particularly topical, issue of the financial stability and its relationship to a reasonable monetary policy conduct. While my colleagues will discuss mainly the particular issues of financial stability, I, having the privilege to be the chairman of the panel, would like to frame the discussion using a more general and historical context. Bearing this perspective in mind, I would like to point to the interrelation between the ultimate goal of monetary policy, the price stability, and the financial stability. First of all, let me start with the definition of financial stability, simply assuming that price stability does not need any further explanation. To be as brief as possible, financial stability can be defined as the soundness of the financial system, that is, its resilience against various shocks.
House prices and financial stability Households have been increasing their borrowing at a rapid rate for a fairly long time now. The rise in household debt has been accompanied by a fast upswing in prices in the house market. There have been no clear signs to date that this development has begun to moderate in earnest. In all likelihood, there is a limit to how long it can continue. The Riksbank’s assessment is also that the rate of increase will slow down in the coming years as interest rates rise. Developments in the property market, chiefly as regards commercial properties but also housing, play an important part in the Riksbank’s analysis of factors that affect the stability of the financial system. A central question when judging whether house price developments have the potential to pose a threat to financial stability is the extent to which they can be assumed to be driven by exaggerated optimism and speculation. If such driving forces are significant then there is a risk that households could have difficulty meeting their interest payments when interest rates rise; further, the downward adjustment in prices could be very dramatic when the lack of realism in estimates finally becomes evident. The combination of households’ payment difficulties and sharp falls in collateral values could potentially cause problems for the banks. However, this is unlikely to happen in Sweden for several reasons.

Conclusion This Summit is a measure of how far we have come, and an aspiration to how much more we can do together. Let us continue to scale new heights and explore new frontiers of collaboration, for a more connected and prosperous Asia. Thank you. 1  China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong; and Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore. 2 Insurance cover against equipment/goods in transit  5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches