samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a separate agency, FAA’s role extends beyond the program offerings of IBBM, MII, IBFIM and SIDC which are the affiliated institutes of AIF. I understand that FAA has already attracted both global and regional interests in its accreditation services, including from the UK, Asia and Middle East regions. FAA’s current work to develop a qualifications structure that will link the various qualifications relevant to financial practitioners under a cohesive framework is also strategically significant. Such a structure will allow for the mutual recognition of qualifications and provide clear and systematic learning pathways for financial professionals. This is important to meet the increasing demand for talent in the financial services industry – not just in terms of numbers, but also in the quality. I would also like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the critical role of the industry in enabling the FAA to meet its objectives. Ultimately, the value of the accreditation process lies in its ability to ensure that the educational foundations for professionals employed in the industry are preparing them adequately for their roles. The involvement of industry practitioners on the various accreditation committees and panels of the FAA provides that essential link to close the gaps between what the industry needs, and the training programs being offered. It also provides a platform for practitioners and training providers to engage on the future needs of the industry and the ways in which these needs can be met through professional education and training.

As such we found ourselves pursuing austere macroeconomic policy, which worked to curtail excessive spending and restrain aggregate demand, thereby improving Thailand’s external accounts and stemming capital outflows. At the same time, we had to adopt stricter prudential standards to raise confidence in our financial institutions. Banks inevitably had to scramble to raise capital in order to meet the provisioning requirements under our new and stricter definition of “non-performing loan”. In addition to the adoption of international best practice with regard to asset classification and provisioning, other banking practices had to be upgraded. For example the industry has had to get used to a new way of doing business, pursuing good corporate governance, improved disclosure, stronger accountability and better risk management and control. These are indeed significant changes from the traditional way business had been conducted in the past, and in turn will need commitment of management and staff, inputs and resources to bring the industry to full compliance with international best practices, not to mention a new supervision framework for the authorities. The new financial institution law, pending consideration by Parliament, will provide the BOT with a clear mandate and accountability to regulate and supervise financial institutions under a new framework, including such procedures as prompt corrective action, and reduced scope for use of judgment, among other things. On our part, the central bank has also gone through a process of self-examination.
This evolutionary approach requires two things: first, a stable framework which provides certainty for the industry so that the accord is not a moving target; second, enough structured flexibility to be able to adapt to relevant changes in best practices. Schedule With the release of the three papers on unexpected losses, securitisation, and the recognition of operational risk capital across home and host jurisdictions, the Committee has come a long way toward resolving many of the most complicated issues raised in consultations. These revisions to the framework will, moreover, help to ensure that the New Accord is more sensitive to the actual degree of risk that banks face and even more supportive of future improvements in the measurement and management of risk. The Committee’s working groups are refining these and other technical matters in the New Accord and will report their solutions to the Committee by May 2004. That will allow the Committee to meet its goal of resolving outstanding issues by the middle of this year and agreeing on the text of the Accord that will provide a solid basis for national rule-making processes and for the industry’s preparations to continue. Concluding thoughts Over the next two days, you will have an opportunity to discuss and share ideas on the latest risk management practices in the areas of market, credit, operational, and insurance risk. A great deal of what you will discuss has direct relevance to developing and implementing advanced risk management techniques.

It would destroy the financial infrastructure and, through it, the entire social and economic infrastructure. Rebuilding a nation after this massive destruction would be a very painful and tedious challenge for everyone. What is meant by inflation tax? Modern governments have been given monopoly power by their respective societies to produce and supply currency with a single objective: maintaining its value to facilitate its use for transactions, use as a store of value and a unit of account. Governments are required to attain this objective by responsibly regulating its supply. Governments, when performing this task and as a cost-effective measure, have resorted to the habit of issuing paper currency notes and debased metallic coins thereby gaining a unique advantage. That advantage is the ability to produce it at a cost which is simply a fraction of its face value. For instance, a currency note may have a face value of 1000 units of money, but a government does not spend 1000 units of money to produce that note. The total printing cost of that note may be just a fraction, say, 5 units of money. So, in this case, by issuing a note to a value of 1000, the government makes a profit of 995 units of money. Such profits accrued to the government are known as “seigniorage”. Now suppose that the government uses this 1000 note to pay salaries to a teacher. The teacher is required to sacrifice eight hours of her time a day to get that 1000 note as her salary.
Ravi Menon: Net zero - act now, act fast, act together Keynote speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the COP27 Singapore Pavilion Finance Day, Sharm El-Sheikh, 9 November 2022. *** Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to the Singapore Pavilion's Finance Day, hosted by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). Climate change is no longer a prediction, it is becoming a reality. The frequency and intensity of today's extreme weather events have exceeded early climate models. We are in a race for our lives, to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Unless we act now, act fast, and act together, we will lose that race. We need to act now to start reducing emissions. The world is currently far from a net-zero emissions trajectory. Global greenhouse gas emissions are still rising, not falling. If we do not act now to start decarbonising, we risk breaching tipping points that will lead to catastrophic and irreversible climate change, with unimaginable risks to lives and livelihoods. We need to act fast to finance the transition to net-zero. Decarbonisation is a costly affair. We must also balance decarbonisation and development. The world requires significant financing for sustainable development and new technologies to reach net zero by 2050 - by some estimates, $ trillion annually. This is $ trillion more than the annual investment today. And we need to act together. The climate challenge is too big for governments or any one country to solve.

The Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) has established a Blended Finance Initiative, that will identify best practices and lessons from past case studies and provide practical guidance on modalities to scale up blended finance. MAS and the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) will lead this Initiative.I will share more details in my remarks this afternoon before the NGFS discussion panels at this Pavilion. 2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero Asia-Pacific Network will launch an initiative to develop guidance for financial institutions on how they can facilitate the managed phase-out of coal power generation in the Asia Pacific. MAS and the Asian Development Bank will participate in this initiative. Second strategy - carbon markets to channel financing towards carbon abatement and removal projects. Many entities find it difficult to eliminate their emissions or to even reduce them as quickly as they would like. High quality carbon credits generated by emission reduction and removal projects allow such entities to offset the emissions they cannot get rid of while providing financing for these projects that would otherwise not get off the ground. A well-functioning carbon trading ecosystem is particularly relevant to Asia's transition effort. The market for voluntary carbon credits is huge. Unfortunately, differences in carbon accounting and credit recognition practices across jurisdictions have led to carbon credits being treated with a degree of skepticism.
Given the depth of the recession, there is likely to be a greater than usual degree of history-dependence, or hysteresis, in this path. The deeper and longer the recession, the greater the scarring effects on physical and human capital and hence the economy’s productive potential. The May MPR scenario captured some of these scarring effects. In particular, it assumed that lower investment as a result of the Covid crisis was not recovered, leaving the capital stock 4% lower. Combined with some drag on total factor productivity (TFP) growth, the level of output ended 1½% lower. That scenario assumed no scarring effect on human capital, however, with unemployment returning to pre-Covid levels and the long-run rate of unemployment unchanged at around 4¼%. At the same time, it was recognised that this was just one of many possible paths for the economy. Other paths would give rise to differing degrees of scarring to physical and human capital and losses to the long-run productive potential of the economy. On 14 July, the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) will publish three possible scenarios for the economy involving different degrees of depth and length of the downturn. Perhaps the key uncertainty, from a scarring perspective, concerns the labour market. As Chart 2 illustrates, the Covid crisis has had markedly different effects on different sectors and, most likely, will continue to do so. Chart 14 compares different sectors’ contribution to the pre-Covid employment boom and its subsequent output contraction.

However, substantial cross-country differences persist in this area, with unemployment levels ranging from below 4% in Germany to 20% in Greece. The favourable financing conditions associated with the extraordinary monetary policy measures implemented by the Eurosystem have no doubt been one of the essential determinants behind the economic recovery transforming into a vigorous expansion. To illustrate this, the estimates made by the Banco de España suggest that the monetary policy measures contribute to accounting for practically half the euro area economy’s observed nominal growth since mid-2014. Adding to this is the greater buoyancy of world trade, which recouped growth rates not observed in the five previous years. This result reflects the favourable cyclical juncture at which many advanced and emerging economies now stand, but also a true recovery in the sensitivity of trade to global growth, despite the protectionist threats that have emerged and that may put a brake on this fundamental engine for economies as open as the European ones are. The strength of exports has contributed notably to sustaining the greater buoyancy of the aforementioned investment. Another factor contributing to the expansion has been the headway in the ongoing deleveraging that households and firms have had to undertake. Currently, in the area as a whole, household and corporate debt is drawing closer to observed pre-crisis levels, with a greater correction in the more vulnerable countries being discernible. Fiscal policy, too, retains at present a more neutral stance, following the public finances consolidation process pursued.
A mild economic downturn There are many indications now that the Swedish and international economies have embarked on a stable upswing. This means that the recent economic downturn has been mild in an historical perspective. In 2001 the Swedish economy grew by 0.9 per cent, and in 2002 by 2.1 per cent. Last year the recovery was derailed slightly and the economy grew by 1.6 per cent. During these three years production fell in only one quarter. For a downturn the rate of growth from 2001 to 2003 was high. This was also reflected in the labour market, where employment held up throughout the period 2001 to 2003. Macroeconomic changes The mild economic slowdown is likely a result of institutional changes that have helped increase the stability of the economy. Unlike the situation at the beginning of the 1990s the government finances are sound and monetary policy is transparent and predictable. This does not only apply to Sweden but  BIS Review 28/2004  1  also to large parts of the rest of the world. Stability has become a guiding principle in the economic policies of OECD countries, among others, and has entailed an increased focus on healthy government finances and stable prices.1 The process has been helped by the absence of external cost shocks during the 1990s and beginning of the current decade such as the oil crises during the 1970s and 1980s.

The advantage of such an approach, given that the central banks should succeed, would be stabler real developments thanks to the fact that household consumption and business investment would be stabler if bubbles in the equity and property markets could be avoided. As stability is an important objective for all central banks it is an attractive idea to try to limit the emergence of prices in these markets that deviate substantially from those warranted by fundamental economic factors. As in so many other situations the problem is that this is easier said than done. Firstly, the central banks have to identify when a bubble arises. In other words they have to be able to distinguish between what is warranted by fundamentals and what represents unreasonable expectations of continued price increases. Secondly, once a bubble has been identified, the central banks have to be able to “burst” it. Asset markets are indeed sensitive to the interest rate situation, but it is possible that it would take such large rate adjustments from the central banks to neutralise a bubble that the negative effects on the rest of the economy would be far too high. For example the force of the most recent equity market bubble gives the impression that monetary policy would have to have been tightened considerably in order to slow the increase of almost 150 per cent that was seen on the Stockholm exchange between 1998 and March 2000. Few central banks today say that they counter bubbles actively.
And I know that this is how the vast majority of people do behave, because I observe it. The senior managers and certified persons regime is also not purely, or in my view even primarily, a tool of enforcement. Our job is always to apply forward-looking judgement to prevent problems occurring; and the new regime will ensure that the incentives on senior managers in the roles that they perform align with that approach. But, just as Parliament has recognised that it is not the PRA’s role to ensure that no firm fails, likewise we should not expect the Regulators to prevent all failures, or misconduct, by individuals. The PRA’s enforcement powers are a necessary part of its toolkit, and we will use those tools when the circumstances warrant it. But they are not our primary mode of operating. Also, the Government announced last week that – subject to agreement by Parliament – it plans to extend the Senior Managers regime to other firms across the industry. This is a further step in the right direction. There is no doubt that one regime will be better than many. Lastly on the senior managers regime, there is one other very important broad reason for putting it into place. On and off I have been involved in regulation for over twenty five years. During that time a few regimes have come and gone, and there have been debates about selfregulation versus a regime more purely in the hands of public authorities. This debate strikes me as a gross over-simplification.

But despite the extraordinary policies in major economies, despite reassuring words of global authorities, despite considerable reform efforts, the healthy state of full recovery seems to be constantly pushed away from us. At this point in time, the world is still struggling in what I would like to describe as the state of “indecisiveness”. First is the indecisiveness that we have about growth prospects. Mixed signals and counteracting forces abound, and it has become less obvious how global economic forces will -equilibrate. The talk of the two-speed or three-speed world, which was heard frequently earlier this year, proves to be an oversimplication of a much more complicated reality. Among advanced economies, the U.S. and Japan seem to have gathered some tangible traction as of late. But one should be reminded that the impact of sequestration in the U.S. is still yet to be felt fully. And one should also be reminded that for Japan, contradicting policy objectives could lead to considerable trade-offs, coupled with the fact that the public debt situation there could become more sensitive to possible rises in bond yields given that we are already in the later stage of the global easing cycle. On the other hand, emerging Asia continues to post relatively high growth compared to the rest of the world. But in the absolute term, economic momentum seems to be losing some steam, and it is also possible that the extent of the shadow banking problems in China could be underestimated.
A forecast rate of inflation above the target normally leads to interest rate increases, just as an expected rate below the target prompts the Riksbank to lower the repo rate. Inflation is assessed on a continuous basis. New information—fresh economic statistics, for instance, or signs of a change in some economic relationships—leads the Riksbank to review its current forecast and make the necessary changes. If a new forecast indicates that future inflation will deviate from the target, then the Riksbank has to adjust the repo rate in accordance with the new assessment. However, assessments of future inflation—like any other forecast—are bound to include an element of uncertainty. Moreover, observers are liable to differ on which future path is most probable. So it is hardly surprising—rather a healthy sign—that our inflation assessments and monetary policy are sometimes a subject of lively debate. But while inflation assessments may vary, in Swedish society today there is broad support for focusing monetary policy on price stability. BIS Review 66/1998  -22. Recent years The Swedish economy, as we all know, went through a profound crisis in the early 1990s. This is not an occasion for discussing the causes of the crisis in depth. It will suffice to note that the origins lay in structural weaknesses in Sweden’s economy. But the crisis also had to do with shortcomings in stabilisation policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since production stopped falling and growth restarted in the course of 1993, economic developments in Sweden have exceeded expectations in several respects.

What Do We Do to Get to a “Good” Culture? 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  The second thing is we need to understand what contributes to a good culture, and what allows a bad one to flourish. What fosters an organizational culture where people feel empowered to speak up? And what leads to a work environment where employees feel emboldened to commit fraud? That’s one of the things I’m most looking forward to in today’s conference. I can’t wait to hear the insights from such a variety of voices. Looking beyond our own narrow frame of reference to other fields of study, like organizational psychology, will help us understand how to achieve the progress that’s so desperately needed. Behavioral science really gets to the root of how human nature interacts with an organization’s processes. Everything from how we set goals to how we motivate our staff to achieve those goals has an effect on culture, for better or for worse. This is where the rubber hits the road for most organizations, in the financial services industry, and beyond. We’re also going to hear from experts on the role technology plays, including the ethics of data handling, and what artificial intelligence means for relationships with customers. And I’m particularly looking forward to hearing about how diversity, something that’s a strategic priority for me and this Bank, affects cultural norms. This includes diversity not only in terms of race and gender, but diversity of thought and experience, which also affects an organization’s culture and decision-making.
Globally coordinated efforts and strong international cooperation in some areas, as well as local efforts that are context-specific will both be needed to achieve the desired regulatory outcomes. 11. In short, there are many challenges ahead in navigating the global economic and financial landscape. Singapore, as a small, open economy, will be subject to many of these challenges. We will have to remain vigilant and nimble. I hope that we will continue to make our small contribution to the global discussion on these challenges. We will play our part in strengthening the global financial infrastructure to facilitate the efficient channelling of savings for sustainable development in the region and beyond. 12. I would like to thank The Banker for this award which I accept on behalf of my MAS colleagues. I also thank members of the industry for working together with MAS. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

The correction with respect to March responds to the negative developments in the external scenario in recent weeks, particularly as the escalation of the trade conflict has led to greater risk aversion, causing, among other effects, a global appreciation of the dollar and a reduction in most commodity prices, including copper. The latter is especially relevant due to its effect on the terms of trade (ToT). Thus, for the period 2019-2021 we assume that the ToT will accumulate an increase of 0.6%, which compares with the increase of 1% expected in March (Figure 10). This projection considers a copper price whose annual averages will be closer to 280 cents per pound between 2019 and 2021, and not around 290 cents per pound, as we estimated in March. As for global growth, the baseline scenario adjusts slightly the expected expansion of our trading partners during this year, to 3.2% (3.3% in March). In this correction, a much lower performance of Latin America becomes important. We still estimate that China will grow around 6% and the US somewhat above 2% (table 4). Although our trading partners’ growth is adjusted only slightly, there has been a marked deterioration in world trade growth, which is captured in the less favorable evolution that is expected for Chilean exports (Figure 11). In the baseline scenario, we project that these will lose dynamism, particularly in 2019, due to the difficulties encountered by some exporting sectors. Also because of the lower copper output, which will impact metal shipments.