samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have introduced major reforms carefully, to minimise the disruption and side-effects, as we have done with the tax and CPF changes. We are providing social support to those adversely affected by the changes, to ensure that no one is left behind, without undermining the incentive to work. Our concern is not just social cohesion, but racial and religious harmony. If remaking our economy splits our society along racial or religious lines, we will be in deep trouble. 6  BIS Review 19/2003  This will be one of our most difficult challenges for a long time to come. Our future depends on Singaporeans being resilient and self-reliant, yet we must make sure that those who are truly unable to cope get the help they need. We will continually need to balance these two objectives, to ensure that we do not have any free riders on our ship, and yet that all of us will reach the destination together. Conclusion This will not be the last time that we have to remake the Singapore economy. Companies find it difficult to successfully ride even one wave of changes. For countries, the challenge is even greater as they have to be ready to transform themselves repeatedly. If a company fails to remake itself it goes under. The creative destruction of the market economy then recycles the freed-up resources to other more productive purposes. But if a country fails to remake itself, the consequences for its people are dire.

The more we develop such a leadership group, the better our chances will be.”  BIS Review 19/2003  5  Collective response Third, while strong and visionary leadership is necessary, it is not enough. To be effective, the leadership must evoke a response, a resonance from the society as a whole. The society must rise to the challenge of changing itself and establishing a new order. There needs to be broad consensus among the population in support of the changes. In the Meiji Restoration, crucial roles were played by the peasant class that formed the armies and the merchant class that financed the military. In 19th century China, the reformers failed because of infighting within a weak leadership, as well as the advanced state of decay of the entire society. But a century later, Deng Xiaoping's reforms took root as the people experienced the benefits of rapid growth and the widespread improvements in living standards. In post-war Britain, the turning point in the public mood began with a sense of humiliation when the Labour Government had to call in the IMF in 1976, after the Exchequer ran out of money. In Singapore, our previous remakings succeeded because we mounted a strong collective response at independence a determination to beat the odds and survive, in 1985 a sense that if we made sacrifices together, we could make our economy competitive again.
And now there are a number of important things that need to be done, which we, once I’ve spoken to the senior management – it is only forty eight hours since I knew about this appointment which was a bit of surprise as well – so I am not as well-prepared as would like to have been before I came before you, but I certainly will be talking to the Deputy Governors, the senior management and eventually to the Monetary Board to work out what we need to do. And then maybe at that point I will speak to you again, to share with you what we have to do in, say, the next three months, next year, the next three – five years, we need to think through, because as I said, the Central Bank has to really set the tone, to set the framework for everything else to happen. I don’t want to go on for too long and I just really want to leave three thoughts with you as to what the Central Bank, in my view, should be imbued with, what its culture should be. One is clearly, integrity. Two is technical excellence and three is professionalism. I would like those three concepts to be the guiding principles for all of us as we go forward.

Dimitar Radev: Spillovers from the ECB’s monetary policy decisions are fast and strong Statement by Mr Dimitar Radev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, for the IFLR Yearbook: Global Banking & Financial Policy Review 2019/2020, published on 24 September 2019. * * * There is much discussion these days about the course of monetary policy in the euro area. What global headlines rarely catch, however, is how such policy affects the European economies outside the euro area. Bulgaria is an example where, due to the high openness of our economy and the strong financial links with the euro area, spillovers from the ECB’s monetary policy decisions are fast and strong. Around 50% of Bulgaria’s exports go to the euro area. Investors from the euro area account for 67% of our FDI stock. Our banking system is dominated by the presence of euro area owned banks, which hold around 55% of the sector’s assets. The monetary policy regime in Bulgaria (a currency board with the national currency fixed to the euro) is another factor enhancing the direct transmission of ECB’s monetary policy. Therefore, even though Bulgaria is not a member of the euro area yet, it is important to consider how our economy is affected by the ECB’s continued accommodative stance. Financial stability and its implications are issues to be potentially concerned about. The ECB’s monetary policy in recent years has succeeded in sustaining the economic recovery in the EU following the great financial crisis.
‘The role of non-bank financial intermediaries in the ‘dash for cash’ in sterling markets,’ Bank of England financial stability paper no. 47. Friedman, M and Schwartz, A (1963), ‘Money and business cycles,’ Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 312-324. Friedman, M (1970). ‘A theoretical framework for monetary analysis,’ Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 78, no. 2, pp. 193-238. Giese, J., M. Joyce, J. Meaning and J. Worlidge (2021). ‘Preferred habitat investors in the UK government bond market,’ Bank of England staff working paper no. 939. Page 17  Goodfriend, M. and R.G. King (1997). “The new neo-classical synthesis and the role of monetary policy” in B. Bernanke and J.J. Rotemberg (eds. ), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1997, MIT Press. Goodhart, C.A.E. (1989). “The conduct of monetary policy”, Economic Journal, Vol. 99, pp. 293– 346. Haldane, A.G., M. Roberts-Sklar, T. Wieladek and C. Young (2016). ‘QE – The story so far,’ Bank of England staff working paper no. 624. Hatzius, J., P. Hooper, F. Mishkin, K.L. Schoenholtz and M.W. Watson (2010). ‘Financial Conditions Indexes: A fresh look after the financial crisis,’ Proceedings of the US monetary policy forum. Institute of International Monetary Research (2022). ‘Fifth increase in the Bank Rate  ,’ June. Jessop, J. (2022). ‘Inflation has peaked – prepare for a soft landing,’ Daily Telegraph 3 June. Joyce, M.A.S., A. Lasaosa, I. Stevens and M. Tong (2011). ‘The financial market impact of Quantitative Easing in the United Kingdom,’ International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 113-161, King, M.A.K. (2002).

This should include “an IMF standing liquidity facility.’’ The global financial safety net is the best insurance we can get against the risks created by economic divergence and it comes at a limited cost. ** So, in conclusion, we as central bankers should be predictable without being pre-committed. In other words, we should give clarity without pretending to certainty. Voltaire summed this up nicely in 1770: “Doubt is an uncomfortable condition, but certainty is a ridiculous one.”4 In these times of doubt, the Governing Council of the ECB is committed to give as much clarity as possible; clarity, not certainty, which is neither possible nor desirable. Thank you for your attention. 1 Brainard, W. (1967), « Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy » the American Economic Review, Vol. 57, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May, pp. 411–425. 2 Blinder, A. (1999), Central Banking in Theory and Practice, the Lionel Robbins lectures, MIT Press, Cambridge  Massachusetts. 3 Rey, H. (2013) “Dilemma not Trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence”, Jackson  Hole conference proceedings, Kansas City Fed. 4 Letter to Frederick William, Prince of Prussia (28 November 1770). 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Our task is confined to ensuring that structural changes do not undermine the soundness and “supervisability” of banking institutions, and that bank shareholders are suitable. So, with this in mind, let me turn to the main topic that I would like to discuss, which is the Basel II initiative. When the IIF met in Madrid last July, the Basel Committee had just released the text of the revised capital framework. The publication of Basel II marked a critical milestone in our efforts to improve the risk-sensitivity of bank capital requirements while providing incentives to strengthen the quality of risk management. I think that on this occasion the meeting of the IIF has been preceded by another milestone in our work in relation to the new capital framework. A successful meeting of the Basel Committee concluded yesterday. Among other things, we dealt with the double default and trading book issues, on the basis of the work undertaken in close collaboration with the International Organization of Securities Commissions. I think this teamwork between IOSCO and BCBS can also be perceived as a landmark in the area of cooperation among supervisors. Let me therefore start by talking about this work strand. Then I will try to clarify some aspects of the calibration exercise and, finally, I will address implementation issues of Basel II. When we were in Madrid last summer, I mentioned that supervisors were very interested in finding practical and prudent solutions to the treatment of certain exposures under Basel II.

I’d like to mention one other area of preparations that will affect banks directly: the recalibration exercise. In order to establish a common data set on which to base this review, the Committee has decided to begin the recalibration exercise in autumn this year. We recognise that the recalibration exercise will demand resources from both banks and supervisors. The IIF expressed clearly to us this concern. In this regard I would like to make two comments. First, we discussed this issue yesterday in our meeting and decided to publish a newsletter clarifying some elements of the proposed work that I hope will address these concerns. In this newsletter, available on the BIS website, we underline several ideas. The Committee thinks that this early recalibration, in the spring of 2006, will give banks and supervisors more time to reflect and will facilitate implementation. In order to ensure that the envisaged review is based on recent and high-quality data, the Committee will undertake a so-called fifth impact study between October and December 2005, three months earlier than previously envisaged. The calibration of the revised Framework will be discussed in spring 2006 on the basis of QIS 5 data. As we are conscious of the workload of this exercise, the Committee does not intend to set data requirements or timeframes for the parallel calculation that will be conducted in 2006. So there is no duplication of work.
When these corrections occur, the result could be weak development of the economy over a long period of time. We have therefore acted to reduce the risk of this scenario to some extent and to contribute to a calmer adjustment in house prices. We have done this by highlighting the risks entailed in the rapid credit expansion and by beginning the interest rate increases that were already on the table slightly earlier than would otherwise have been justified. I would at the same time like to emphasise that this does not mean we have downgraded our inflation target. On the contrary! We believe that monetary policy that is active and forward-looking, but at the same time cautious, is the best means of safeguarding low inflation and a stable economy in the long term. The current situation and future prospects How do we regard future developments? Before I answer this question it may be worth a reminder that the forecasts we have made are based on the assumption that the repo rate will develop in line with  4  BIS Review 101/2006  market expectations (Figure 9). This means that the repo rate is expected to rise slightly further in future. International economic activity has been good in recent years. There are numerous indications that international growth will be relatively strong in future, although it is expected to slow down slightly (Figure 10). Despite the good international economic activity, prices are expected to rise at a fairly moderate rate.

Stefan Ingves: Introduction to monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 26 October 2006. Diagrams for the speech can be found on the Sveriges Riksbank’s website http://www.riksbank.com. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here! This is my second hearing at the Riksdag Committee on Finance to discuss monetary policy. I thus cannot claim that I have very much experience of these hearings. However, this also applies to some of you who are here for the first time, and I am convinced that it will not present any obstacles to an interesting and rewarding discussion. It is often a good idea to begin with a backward glance to gain some perspective for the current situation, and this time, with so many new members, it may be particularly useful. After the look back, I shall look forward and describe the Riksbank’s views regarding the economic outlook and monetary policy. During the backward glance I shall assert that the new regime introduced around a decade and a half ago has worked well. We have had an entirely different stability in the development of the economy than before, and at the same time growth has been relatively high. My most important message when looking ahead is that the prospects for the Swedish economy are also bright. We see ahead of us continued good growth in the economy over the coming years and a continued improvement in the labour market.
Moving forward, greater investment by the private sector in human capital development and innovation is critical for us to maintain the current momentum. The return on investment on these two areas will be visible in the reduction of the development gap among ASEAN countries. Public-private partnerships to address this gap is essential to foster sustainable economic growth and achieve a globally competitive ASEAN. ASEAN has come a long way in fostering cooperation and collaboration to achieve current levels of development and integration. The principle of ‘prosper-thy-neighbour’ is the defining mantra of the ASEAN movement and has been integral to our achievements so far. Therefore, let us 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  develop mutual understanding on the varying degrees of economic development and strategically address the needs of each member country. Let me conclude with a quote, by the author Virginia Burden: “Cooperation is the thorough conviction that nobody can get there, unless everybody gets there”. I believe the spirit of cooperation and dynamism will accompany us on our journey towards building a more vibrant ASEAN Economic Community by the year 2025. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman once remarked, “productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything”. Turning lastly to the external position, the United Kingdom has run a persistent trade deficit of the order of 2–3% of GDP since the beginning of the century (Chart 5). In spite of that deficit, our net external asset position has remained stable and roughly in balance. We managed to achieve this feat by earning more on our holdings of foreign assets than we paid out to foreigners on their holdings of assets here. In part this is because much of our assets are equity-like, while foreigners’ holdings here are more debt-like. Over the past two years, however, our net asset income from abroad has deteriorated sharply, so that our current account deficit – which comprises not only the trade deficit but also net asset income – averaged almost 4% of GDP last year. That deterioration appears to be primarily down to a fall in earnings on European assets, reflecting in particular the cyclical weakness of the euro-area economy. In that case it might be expected to unwind as the euro area recovers. Even so, it would be unwise to expect that we will again be able to run the sort of investment income surplus we saw in the years before the crisis. So the trade deficit in due course needs to decline too.
After rising to an expected 3.5 percent this year, global growth could finally re-attain its pre-crisis trend of 4 percent in 2015. Three quarters of this acceleration is expected to be driven by advanced economies, with the US and the UK leading the pack. And this isn’t the best case scenario. Even in the euro area, risks have become two-sided, albeit around a modest growth rate of about 1%. None of this is to suggest that current levels of economic activity are acceptable or that the world economy is no longer under strain. After the Great Moderation and the Great Recession, there are several reasons why it will be years before any superlatives are attached to this recovery. First, for all the talk of austerity and deleveraging, the aggregate debt burdens of advanced economies have actually increased; with their total non-financial sector debt rising by 25% relative to GDP since 2007. Balance sheet repair in the public and private sectors will exert a persistent drag on major economies for some time. Second, the need to rebalance demand from deficit to surplus countries endures. Given the adjustment pressures on the former, without progress on rebalancing, robust and sustainable global growth will remain an aspiration. Third, confidence, while improved, remains subdued. Recognising that the end isn’t nigh is far from marking the normalisation of business and consumer sentiment. Given past shocks and modest prospects, business investment in particular remains hesitant across the advanced world. On balance, corporations remain more focused on reducing operating expenditures than increasing capital expenditures.

As the global economy gains momentum, staying the course on these policies will be decisive to achieving escape velocity. The United Kingdom is at the centre of these decisions. Let me expand. 2. Financial reform  In recent years, protectionism has been the dog that didn’t bark. Although gently mocked, the G20 pledge to resist protectionism has been largely respected. In contrast, some major trade deals have been signed (such as between Canada and Europe), and other even more significant ones are in train. The UK can help spur on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership discussions on wide ranging free trade between the EU and the US. In tandem with keeping the global trading system working is the re-founding of an integrated, open global financial system. As the leading global financial centre, the UK will be central to completing the job of financial reform. The UK financial system is both a global good – it supports an open global system – and a national asset. To realise its potential, we need our system to be safe, fair and to act 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  with integrity. Without those foundations, the innovation for which finance in the UK is renowned will be meaningless. A safe system means resilient banks and markets that together can absorb rather than amplify shocks. Much has been achieved in recent years to repair the core of the banking system. Minimum capital requirements for the world’s largest banks have been increased seven-fold.
The potential for money to play a role as ‘nominal anchor’ to the economy, outside the standard forecasting framework – as it often has in the face of elevated levels of inflation, such as during the experiments with monetary targetry from the late 1970s – remains an open and challenging question. Monetarism revisited Before addressing these questions, it is worth recalling the central tenets of the monetarist approach to monetary policy. Foremost among these are: First, a focus on price stability as the objective of monetary policy, reflecting the ‘classical dichotomy’ at the heart of most macroeconomic models. In the long run, money and monetary policy are neutral: they have no influence over real variables, such as output and employment, but pin down the evolution of the price level. Second, a preference for using rules rather than discretion to direct monetary policy. Policy decisions need to be credible and consistent if they are to be effective. Assigning responsibility for monetary policy to an independent central bank, largely insulated from short-term political pressures and given the freedom to employ judgment flexibly as necessary, supports this systematic approach to policymaking. Third, a medium-term orientation of monetary policy, recognising the famous long, variable and less-than-fully predictable lags in the transmission of monetary policy to price developments. Owing to these lags, monetary policy cannot control high frequency inflation developments on (say) a month-to-month basis.

He seemed to suggest that, were the role of money to be neglected and monetary policy become focused on shorter-term stabilisation of real economic variables, then the longer-term stability of inflation could be put at risks. With inflation already at undesirably elevated levels, the stakes are high. There is still much to do in thinking about whether and, if so, how monetary variables can help pin down the wider nominal dynamics of the economy and keep inflation at target sustainably and credibly over the medium term. So, to conclude, I return to the question asked at the outset: ‘What did the monetarists ever do for us?’ I doubt that monetarism will be (re) embraced by either the academic or central bank communities in the coming years. But – just like the Romans in the famous Monty Python sketch – maybe our understanding of how the monetary policy transmission mechanism has, does and will work owes more to them than we typically care to admit. The views expressed in this speech are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would particularly like to thank Ryland Thomas for his considerable help with the analytical work presented in the Annex and Saba Alam, Rich Harrison, Jack Meaning, Martin Seneca, Rashmi Harimohan, Bob Hills and  Page 16  Gavin Wallis for helpful discussions in the preparation of this speech.