samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The only exceptions were those measures that had already been approved (the tax reductions in Royal Decree-Law 15/2018 of 5 October 2018 on urgent measures for the energy transition and the protection of consumers, and the impact of the Supreme Court ruling of 5 October 2018, which stipulates exemption for maternity benefits for personal income tax purposes), or those that were more clearly defined since they were in response to specific agreements (the inflation-linked rise in pensions, and those relating to publicsector employment and wages). In the fiscal policy arena, moreover, I should like to point out that the latest budgetary outturn figures appear to confirm an exit scenario from the Excessive Deficit Procedure in BANCO DE ESPAÑA  5	 TESTIMONY BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA BEFORE PARLIAMENT IN RELATION TO THE DRAFT STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY BUDGET FOR 2019  FORECASTS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY: MAIN RISKS. A MORE UNFAVOURABLE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT  CHART 5  LONG-TERM IMPACT OF A "NO-DEAL" (a)  GDP GROWTH FOR 2019 %  % deviation from baseline scenario  3.5  0  3.0  -2  2.5  -4  2.0  -6  1.5  -8  1.0  -10  0.5 0.0 Jan-18  -12 Apr-18  Jul-18  UNITED STATES  Oct-18  Jan-19  United Kingdom  EURO AREA  IMF (JUN-2018)  EU-27 BANK OF ENGLAND (NOV-2018)  SOURCES: Consensus Forecasts, IMF and Bank of England.

How Malaysia survived the global financial crisis Let me conclude by outlining why we had not been adversely affected by the recent financial crisis. Banking system maintained strong financial and capital buffers at end 2008 during the peak of the crisis as evidenced by:   Strong capital position with RWCR of 12.6% and core capital ratio of 10.6%.   Ample liquidity with total interbank placements of more than RM150 billion with BNM that can be unwound to release RM liquidity to the system at any time.   Low exposures to foreign currency (FX) denominated assets.   Banks’ leverage position remains manageable and lower than foreign institutions abroad. –  Balance sheet leverage (i.e. total assets / common equity) for the Malaysian banking system of about 15 times (vs. global average of about 20 to 30 times). Banks had strengthened institutional set-up and capacity post Asian Financial Crisis through:   More robust risk management standards and practices.   Stronger corporate governance structure.   Smooth implementation of the Standardised Approach of Basel II’s Capital Adequacy Framework.   Balanced and diversified business portfolios. Enhanced financial infrastructure post Asian Financial Crisis through:   Enhanced depth and size of bond and Sukuk market (about 107 % of GDP).   Strengthened financial safety nets (e.g. establishment of Malaysian Deposit Insurance Scheme)/Danajamin/CDRC/SDRS.   Strengthened regulatory and supervisory approach (e.g. gradual move towards principles based regulations, adopting of risk based supervision).   Legislative reforms (e.g.
Other factors could also have an impact during the course of 2008, for instance, via a decline in the total wage bill paid by the sector. Against this backdrop, Swiss GDP growth is likely to settle at around 2% in 2008. This easing-off should allow for a reduction in the level of capacity utilisation. In a moment I will outline the risks attached to our baseline scenario. BIS Review 150/2007  1  Developments in monetary and financial conditions Since the onset of the sub-prime credit crisis in August, yields on long-term Swiss Confederation bonds have remained almost unchanged. For 10-year maturities, the rate has fluctuated around 3%. For shorter maturity bonds, however, the search for quality investments has resulted in a drop in rates. Yields on two-year maturities, for instance, have fallen from 3.0% to 2.0%. However, this decline has been partly offset or even fully neutralised by an increase in risk premiums, in particular in the case of issuers with poor ratings. Since September, the depreciation in the US dollar has accelerated. The Swiss franc has also strengthened a little against the euro, although the movements were more volatile in nature. Monetary and financial conditions can also be analysed in terms of volumes. Special attention should be given to commercial lending, since a shortage of credit in the current circumstances would be equivalent to a tightening in monetary conditions. However, no effect of this kind can be identified in Switzerland, not even in the most recent statistics.

Paul Tucker: The state of the markets – four issues Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, at the Association of British Insurers 2009 Biennial Conference, London, 9 June 2009. *  *  *  Many thanks for the invitation to be here today. The Bank greatly values its relationship with the insurance industry. We are just immensely grateful for the intelligence you provide, as asset managers and insurers; and for our constructive dialogue on policy issues. I have a few brief remarks on four broadly linked issues. The macroeconomic outlook and bank lending Since the beginning of the year I have felt that it will take until late autumn at least to have any kind of a handle on broadly what type of outlook we face. My view on that hasn’t really changed. Of course, over recent weeks near-term indicators, notably the business surveys, have improved a bit. Confidence seems to have stabilised. And that has been most obvious in the financial markets, where the really good news is that firms on both sides of the Atlantic have been raising funds in the equity and bond markets. But a sense of perspective is needed if those apparently small steps forward are not to be frittered away. Inevitably the medium-term outlook remains highly uncertain, and the path back to anything like normality can only be gradual I’m afraid.
The first step was usually to see whether a healthy bank was able and willing – or at least able and persuadable – to buy the distressed bank’s business. Examples here range from acquisitions of smaller institutions by much larger ones, such as Santander’s acquisition of Alliance and Leicester; to mergers between two large lenders, such as Lloyds TSB’s with Halifax Bank of Scotland and, in the United States, Bank of America’s merger with Merrill Lynch. There were some hasty shotgun weddings. The great attractions of finding a buyer for a failing institution are of course that it both ensures continuity of service provision and avoids triggering deposit guarantees or use of public funds. Depositors find themselves banking with a different bank but access to services  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  is maintained. And there is continuity in the provision of lines of credit, including through overdraft arrangements to households and corporates. There are, however, two big risks. First, mergers can concentrate supply and so damage competition particularly if both the distressed bank and the rescuer are relatively large. In the UK, the largest six banks and building societies now account for 80% of the outstanding household and corporate lending, up from 65% at the start of 2008. And second, the rescue mission can go badly wrong if rather than pull the failing operation up it pulls the purchaser down.

To this end, it uses a variety of models and empirical approaches, and also conducts its own surveys. In addition, the SNB analyses economic indicators for Switzerland and abroad, and follows the assessments and forecasts of other institutions. KOF Swiss Economic Institute at the Swiss Federal Institute for Technology Zurich (ETH) is without doubt the best-known for economic analysis. It makes a significant contribution towards understanding the Swiss economy with its regular data surveys (for example, the survey of companies it has been systematically conducting since 1955), as well as its economic forecasts and special analyses. In doing so, KOF fulfils an important role for the SNB's monetary policy and, ultimately, for the greater good of our country. For this reason, the SNB has been connected with the KOF Swiss Economic Institute since its beginning in the 1930s. Both institutions maintain a stimulating exchange of information and ideas to this day. With high-quality economic analysis closely linked to scientific research, KOF Swiss Economic Institute will continue to make a valuable contribution in future - to ensure an even better understanding of the Swiss economy. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1
In-house training courses tailored to each business unit, commitment by senior management of banks, understanding of benefits of implementing Basel II by all stakeholders and hiring of right skills would help in mitigating skills shortage related risks. Regulators and supervisors have to be at it to assess progress within a reasonable time frame. 2  BIS Review 88/2005  11. Without data, there are no models and without models, the risk management capability is reduced. This does not mean that commonsense approach in handling matters should be discarded altogether. Given the heavy competition and highly leveraged nature of businesses, banks, at minimum, should record historical data for computing the probability of default loss, and operational risk losses. This is a difficult task. The challenge for banks is to build up databases for operational losses, both historical and potential future losses. The challenge for regulators is to ensure that banks start collecting this type of data in a systematic manner. Banks often see regulators as a pain in the neck due to constant nagging. Perhaps, moral suasion and organizing peer pressure might encourage banks. 12. Unbundling risk related capital charges in the new Basel II Capital Accord requires an explicit capital charge for operational risk. Calculating such a capital charge has proved extremely difficult because of a lack of an accepted methodology and credible industry data.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Presentation of the 2011 Annual Report Address by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, to the Governing Council of the Bank of Spain on the presentation of the 2011 Annual Report, Madrid, 8 June 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, The presentation of the Annual Report for 2011 is taking place in an extremely difficult setting for Europe in general, and for Spain in particular, marked by the acute euro area sovereign debt crisis and the double-dip recession in the Spanish economy. The year 2011 was characterised by the worsening of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Initially affecting a small number of countries in a situation of relative vulnerability, it spread to others with sounder economic fundamentals, duly turning systemic. The fresh downturn in the euro zone not only detracted from the area’s recovery but was also one of the main determinants of the halt in the ongoing pick-up in world growth begun a year earlier. Two main factors lay behind the crisis. First, the insufficient adaptation of domestic economic policies to the demands of monetary union membership, which translated into a build-up of major imbalances that placed some economies in a position of vulnerability. And second, the lack of political consensus at the European level to tackle the weaknesses of the euro’s institutional design, which largely explains the spread of the tensions to countries whose misalignments were on a lesser scale.
The unemployment rate fell from 12.2% to 11.5% from the end of one year to the next. Against the backdrop of quickening growth, inflation was brought further under control. The year-onyear rise in consumer prices stood at 0.3% in December 1998, after 1.1% in 1997, and thus met the objective of less than 2% set by the Monetary Policy Council. This was the lowest rate of inflation recorded since 1954. One of the main factors in the slowdown in price rises was the fall in the price of oil and other commodities. “Underlying” inflation, which reflects the fundamental trends in the economy, showed a slightly more sustained progression than the consumer price index. According to France’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies, INSEE, it posted a year-on-year rise of 1.1% in December 1998, the same as in December 1997. According to the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP), which is the measure of inflation in the euro area, France is one of the three best-performing countries in terms of inflation: French inflation stood at 0.7% as an annual average in 1998, compared with 1.1% for the euro area. In the course of 1998, the franc remained constantly above its central rates vis-à-vis the other most credible currencies of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. The goal of a stable external value for the franc—which was the external intermediate objective of French monetary policy over the last five years—was thus achieved. This went hand in hand with the maintenance of the competitiveness of the French economy.

The reason why we emphasize the importance of competitiveness indicators is therefore not only that cost containment is a necessary condition for low inflation. It also, and primarily, lies in the fact that in the European economy of today, which is governed by complete freedom of choice for consumers and complete freedom for businesses to choose where to invest, jobs will be created preferentially in economies that manage to contain their unit production costs and offer an environment that is as favourable as possible to business competitiveness. BIS Review 62/1999  4
Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson: Monetary policy, economic growth and prosperity Opening address by Mr Birgir Ísleifur Gunnarsson, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a conference to mark the 60th anniversary of the University of Iceland Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Reykjavik, 31 October 2001. *  *  *  I would like to congratulate the University of Iceland’s Faculty of Economics and Business Administration on its 60th anniversary, its noteworthy activities and its contributions towards strengthening the Icelandic economy. I also wish the faculty every success for the future. At the same time I thank you for the honour I have been shown with this invitation to deliver the opening address at this anniversary conference. I have chosen to call my talk “Monetary policy, economic growth and prosperity.” I shall therefore focus on the role played by monetary policy in economic policy implementation, and its contribution towards economic growth and prosperity. And there is ample reason as well, because the most notable events in economic organisation this year have involved precisely the monetary policy framework and the Central Bank. Price stability Important changes have been made to central bank legislation around the world in recent years.

This fragmentation was affecting the whole economy of the area, and a banking union has been proposed in order to re-establish a smooth transmission of monetary policy and ensure that the credit supply meets the real economy’s needs. Some evidence on the fragmentation of the banking system First of all, let me give you some evidence on the fragmentation of the banking system. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The ECB has been continuously monitoring the degree of integration in the euro area financial markets. The latest Financial Integration in Europe report, published in April 2012, showed several indicators pointing to rising fragmentation in various market segments as the sovereign debt crisis has escalated. In addition to the price-based indicators highlighted in the report, quantity-based indicators also continue to point to a further and significant renationalisation of euro area banks’ funding markets. Banks located in peripheral countries continued to lose market funding, while those in some other countries retained it and managed to issue bank debt at attractive yield levels. The market for secured bank funding has also been affected by the increased tensions in some euro area government bond markets. Differences between bank lending rates offered to non-financial corporations and households in euro area countries reflect divergences in bank funding conditions that go beyond country-specific economic conditions. Let me give you a few examples. The coefficient of variation across euro area countries of the short-term cost of borrowing for non-financial corporations has been increasing towards all-time highs.
This increase in the supply of credit in the local economy could fuel a credit boom, which in turn could translate into an excessive leveraging in the economy and an increase in banks’ credit risk. Furthermore, screening by external lenders may be more imperfect than local screening, which can lead to over-indebtedness of domestic corporations and to increase the credit risk of the local intermediaries that have already lent to these corporations. To address these risks, prudential regulation is needed. In this regard, overall liquidity requirements, in particular those associated to foreign short-term funding, provision policies to address the credit risk associated with large capital inflows, and currency mismatch restrictions are key areas on which authorities should focus attention. To the extent that banks are the primary source of local financial intermediation, prudential regulation has the virtue that it targets the problem directly – i.e., it targets the financial intermediaries where the credit and funding risks are incubating. However, when designing regulation it must be considered that focusing on prudential regulation to the banking system can foster banking disintermediation in favor of less regulated financial intermediaries, which certainly goes against the spirit of macroprudential measures. Indeed, the global financial crisis has taught us the dangers of generating a parallel unregulated banking system and steps must be taken to limit this risky behavior must be taken, by enlarging the scope of regulation and limiting the extent of banking activities.

The aim is not only to strengthen the institutional  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  architecture but also to advance the implementation of the single market. The ECB’s position in this respect is well-known. Here today I would like to warn against an illusion which seems to be spreading among policy-makers in Europe. The illusion is that the economic governance of the euro area can be strengthened not by increasing the responsibilities of policy-makers, which would mean stronger European institutions and stronger rules, but rather by delegating to financial markets the task of selecting the appropriate policies that authorities must abide by, in particular with respect to budgetary policies. One avenue that has been advocated by some is to make more explicit the conditions under which countries, like companies, would not repay their obligations and would restructure their debts or even default. The proponents argue that such explicit rules would improve the ability of markets to price sovereign risk and, thus, to exert discipline on governments with a view to achieving sounder fiscal policies. This view is predicated on the general principle that investors should bear the consequences of their decisions. Although at first sight this may seem reasonable and fair, it is wrong not only in theory but also in practice. The reasons are simple and include the following: First, as over 50 years of IMF experience have proven, market assessments of the solvency of countries tend to be wrong.
The G20 communiqué backed the calls for a broader international cooperation in several fronts, but let me remind you that the international community of central bankers and financial regulators have already developed strong cooperation ties. Institutions as the BIS with its regular meetings or governors and of senior central bank officials and experts or forums like the Basel Committees and the Financial Stability Forum have been providing for years the necessary dialogue, exchange of ideas and information between us. I understand that other forums of economic authorities can replicate our own model of cooperation. Regarding the IMF, the discussion currently concentrates around its role and legitimacy. Its role should focus on three main topics. The first is surveillance. It is very important that the IMF becomes a key and integral part of the financial early warning system. The IMF is vital not only in terms of forecasting, which is already regularly performed and published, but also  BIS Review 147/2008  1  in terms of surveillance of each country’s policies and specific warning indicators, aimed at detecting its growing unbalances. One of the points that, in my personal opinion, have complicated efforts to deal with the current financial crisis is that the whole focus of the IMF during decades was to prevent crises in emerging markets. There is a different picture now, and is paramount that the surveillance done by the IMF focus on every relevant economy and really works as an early warning system. The second topic, evidently, is international cooperation.

We are in the very preliminary phase of this discussion and many challenges lay ahead in that regard, particularly deciding what should be subject to international supervision and what should be subject to national or regional supervisory entities. Much of the discussion today evolves around crisis prevention. In terms of crisis resolution, the recommendation is for every country to take all the necessary actions to restore the regular working of its financial system, consumer and investor confidence and the level of economic activity. But every country must act according to its needs and resources. Countries were financial institutions faced severe losses require capital injections, while some countries have to boost domestic demand to compensate for too much dependency on exports. The important point here is to draw a clear difference between fiscal stimulus, liquidity management and monetary policy. 2  BIS Review 147/2008  The difference between liquidity management and monetary policy is not clear for many observers nowadays, but it is nonetheless fundamental. In moments of market disfuntionality, for instance, monetary easing sometimes does not work. It is important to mention that in some circumstances liquidity management is the critical issue. Of course, we should not forget the need for price stability in order to have the basis to restore growth.