samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are also restricting the new licences to players anchored in Singapore for two reasons. First, so that we maintain a strong local core in our banking system, which must remain our objective as I explained earlier. Second, to avoid an unintended unilateral liberalisation of our full bank regime as a result of our WTO commitments. MAS will also issue up to three digital wholesale bank licences, which will be open to both local and foreign players. The digital wholesale banks will be introduced as a pilot, and 34. MAS will review whether to grant more such licences in the future. Safeguards 35. To ensure high-quality applicants, MAS will set prudent baseline requirements on track record and sustainability of business models. MAS will not allow value-destructive competition to the detriment of long-term financial system stability. We will also put in place safeguards to protect depositors, mitigate the risk of untested business models, and minimise costs to the financial system in the event of a failure. We will also ensure that digital banks will compete with incumbents on a level playing field. 36. As digital full banks will have access to retail deposits, MAS will phase in their permissible activities via a two-stage process to minimise risks to retail depositors. It will also be required to be a member of the deposit insurance scheme. A digital full bank will commence as a restricted digital bank to build up its business model and internal processes, and gradually progress to become a full functioning full bank.

Innovation in finance is not an end in itself. And competition in finance has to be more than a zero sum game - it has sometimes looked like that, as trading desks compete against each other to be a fraction of a second faster and to knock the other out. Competition and innovation has to be aimed at serving the needs of society and the economy better, here in Singapore and abroad. So it is worth reminding ourselves of these larger purposes and opportunities. I will highlight five: First, financing the growth of infrastructure in emerging Asia, and increasingly of climate-resilient, low-carbon investments. Both banking and capital markets should seek to meet what is still a huge financing gap in the region for critical and sustainable infrastructure. Second, financing growth enterprises and SMEs. SMEs are the backbone of all our economies. Besides finding new ways to meet their financing needs, banks can also help to raise their productivity by helping them adopt digital services. Third, reducing costs and improving convenience for consumers. We are already seeing major changes here, especially in cheaper, more convenient and seamless payments. Fourth, in helping people to plan early and achieve financial security in their later years. Singapore has recently come up top in the world for life expectancy. It is to be celebrated, but it also increases the need for good financial advice, and for those with savings outside their CPF accounts to be able to invest in products that will help them achieve greater retirement security.
In Chile, domestic demand grew rapidly in the run-up to the crisis. During 2004–2007, the average annual growth of output was 5.3%, while the average growth rate of domestic demand was 8.1%. Private consumption grew 7.2% and investment 12.1%. The faster growth of demand than output is explained by a significant improvement in our terms of trade on the back of higher prices for copper and other commodities. In 2007, Chile, like many other economies in the world, suffered a significant inflationary process, which only worsened during 2008 (figure 2). Perhaps the most remarkable component of this inflationary process was how strongly the increase in international food prices was transmitted domestically. This may have partially been due to Chile’s high degree of commercial openness and little distortions in the price setting mechanism. Another factor underlying inflation pressures, and a deceleration of growth, was the higher cost of energy (especially electricity) that hit the Chilean economy with particular strength (figure 3). Not only thermoelectric power plants had to operate with more costly inputs, but also unfavorable hydrological conditions and a severe shortage of natural gas implied that these more efficient sources of generation had to be replaced by diesel, in the context of rising oil prices. Inflation rose from an annual rate of 2.6% in December 2006 to 9.9% in October 2008, when the rise of food and energy prices had also propagated to the rest of consumer goods. Hence, the risks of inflation remaining above the target beyond the policy horizon grew strongly.

Although copper still accounts for a relevant portion of Chilean exports, an important number of new markets for a variety of products have been opened thanks to both the unilateral efforts of trade liberalization and the significant spread of bilateral trade agreements with the major economic countries and zones. Finally, a sound financial system, with globally integrated, well-capitalized, and adequately-regulated banks. Actually, the regulation of the domestic banking system prevented some of the most notorious credit excesses that happened in advanced economies, or in the past of many emerging markets, including Chile. 1  Banco Central de Chile (2007). 2  See Marcel et al. (2001) for a discussion of the budget rule. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I will continue my presentation speaking about how all the shocks we have seen the last few years have affected the Chilean economy and the policy responses we have put in place. Then I will describe the recovery process and I will finalize presenting some thoughts on the lessons that can be drawn from our recent experience and some challenges I see for the future. The run-up to the financial bust By March 2008, Bear Stearns had already gone bankrupt and the risk of a higher stress episode at the world financial markets had increased greatly. Due to the risks of a potential sudden stop if the financial crisis should worsen, and in a context of a severe appreciation of the Chilean peso, in April, the Central Bank decided to start accumulating reserves through sterilized intervention.
Moreover, all windfalls from the high copper price have been saved in sovereign funds deposited abroad. BIS Review 39/2008  5  International changes in terms of trade (cumulated growth between 2003 and 2007, percent)  Venezuela Russia Chile Peru Norway Australia Colombia Mexico Argentina Canada South Africa New Zealand Thailand Brazil Poland United Kingdom China Malaysia Switzerland Turkey Israel Hungary Sweden United States Singapore South Korea Japan Philippines  -40  -20  0  20  40  60  80  100  Source: Institute of International Finance, International Monetary Fund. The downside of commodity price increases is inflation. The rise in the prices of specific goods leads to an increase in measured inflation. The effects of these external shocks on inflation will depend on a number of factors. First, on the weight each commodity has in total CPI. In general, in poorer countries commodities in general (foodstuff and energy in particular) have more weight, while in richer countries, services are more important. Also important is the level of price protection (tariffs, price bands and other mechanisms to isolate internal prices from international fluctuations), price controls or subsidies. In Chile, the shock to food prices has been further aggravated by weather problems.

José De Gregorio: Monetary policy and commodity prices in turbulent times Keynote address by Mr José De Gregorio, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, at the 2008 Annual Meeting of Latin American Chief Executives of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), hosted by Corpbanca, Santiago, 2 April 2008. I am very grateful to Igal Magendzo for his great contribution during the preparation of these notes. *  *  *  The global economy is in turmoil. In this scenario, monetary policies around the world face strong challenges. Sailing through quiet waters has been pleasant. As we know, the stable and prosperous performance of the world economy in recent years has partly been the result of sound monetary policies. Now, during difficult times, monetary policy should contribute to make the adjustment less costly and lay the foundations for a sound, persistent recovery. Macroeconomic management in emerging market economies have improved significantly in the past several years, owing part of this to the large increase in commodity prices, but also to fiscal consolidation and the commitment to price stability. This has increased the resilience of emerging economies to global economic turbulences. In this presentation I will address three issues. First, the troublesome inflationary effects of the high commodity prices cycle we have experienced. Then, I will argue that, in this juncture, reinforcing the commitment to control inflation and reverse deviations from the target is a first order task.
At home, the effects of the higher external interest rates on local rates and on the valuation of mutual and pension funds, especially fixed-income-intensive ones (e.g., the E pension fund) are worth noting. In the particular case of mutual funds, significant withdrawals have been observed in medium- to long-term funds, which undid part of the increases reported in previous FS reports. Although so far there have been no significant hikes in money market rates, the greater dependence of medium-sized banks on financing coming from these funds is one risk worth keeping an eye on. The financial situation of domestic firms has not changed much from earlier FS reports. Corporate debt has fallen a little, to 119% of GDP at the third quarter, but it is still near peak levels. A large part of the variation owes to the peso appreciation against the dollar during the period (figure 14). The profitability of domestic firms also kept its downward trend at the close of 2015. A similar pattern is seen for a group of companies reporting to the Superintendence of Securities and Insurance (SBIF) which maintain low profits and high indebtedness by historic standards. Meanwhile, various indicators reveal that the exchange rate risk remains bounded. Finally, firms’ bank debt repayment default remains stable and relatively low, although the increase in the substandard commercial portfolio reflects a slight decrease in borrowers’ capacity to keep their repayments up to date.

What then are the risks - the possible arguments against our joining the euro? Essentially the potential downside can be summed up as the risk that the single monetary policy - the “one-size-fits-all” short term interest rate within the Eurozone, which is the inevitable consequence of a single currency - will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic monetary policy needs of all the participating countries. Countries may have divergent cyclical positions. They may face divergent fiscal positions, which would affect their appropriate fiscal/monetary policy mix in different directions - though this should be contained by the Growth and Stability Pact. Or their domestic policy needs may diverge as a result of economic shocks of some sort - a classic, but unique, example was German re-unification, but the more recent global economic disturbance was perhaps another example. The risks of divergent monetary policy needs within a monetary union are certainly real. They were recognised in the Maastricht Treaty, which established the famous “convergence criteria” precisely in order to try to limit the risks before the euro-project went ahead. They are essentially similar to the risks of sectoral or regional divergence within a national currency area - which we in the UK certainly know something about - it is in fact a major monetary policy headache for us at the present time. But in the case of the Eurozone the risks are of divergent monetary policy needs between the different member countries - they apply at the national level.
Through the themes and art embodied in its design, the national currency remains a faithful herald of the development, culture and history of a country. Thanks to these attributes, the currency is in itself a significant element of the national identity. The theme of the current series of Albanian banknotes, created more than 20 years ago, features important historical periods of the Albanian nation, and prominent personalities of Albania. These themes, embodied in each banknote through the portraits of some of the most illustrious national figures, evoke notable episodes in the history of Albania in its endeavours for freedom and prosperity. The themes lead us on a journey through historical eras, starting from Antiquity, moving through the Middle Ages, the National Awakening, the Independence of Albania, and concluding with the symbols of the national flag and anthem on the latest and largest denomination, the 10.000 lek banknote. These symbols have been chosen as representative and unifying elements for every Albanian. While the new series that we are presenting today retains the same themes of the already existing series, its design is reconfigured and restyled, through the application of modern technologies in banknote production. Thanks to cutting-edge technology, the Albanian banknote is now more secure. Its security features – a key priority of the Bank of Albania – are enhanced. In addition, innovative printing techniques and materials have been used to increase durability and the banknotes’ dimensions have been optimised. The design now boasts a fresher look.

Dear ladies and gentlemen, Safe and efficient fulfilment of the economy’s need for money, in terms of value and structure, and guaranteeing the confidence of the public in our currency, which is one of our main responsibilities, have been at the core of our efforts in preparing this new series. Therefore, I am very honoured to unveil today, for the first time, for the eyes of the public, this new series of banknotes. As the Governor of the Bank of Albania, through this symbolic signing, I open the doors for the first two banknotes of the new series to start their journey and circulate in the Albanian economy. In the hope that the new banknotes will be welcomed by the public, let me now present to you their design. I would also like to call on the public to handle banknotes with due care, in order to preserve their durability, quality and integrity. From 30 September 2019, the banknotes of the new series 200 lek and 5000 lek will be legal tender in the Republic of Albania and will be used as means of payment, alongside the existing banknotes. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
“The Riksbank has aggressively, using a high repo rate, tried to prevent household debt from rising” The first part of the criticism can in turn be divided into different parts. For one thing, it claims that the Riksbank has leaned against the wind aggressively, and for another thing that household debt has been the main, if not the only, reason for this policy. I intend to comment on these points one by one. So how much has the Riksbank in practice leaned against the wind in recent years? My view here is clear. The monetary policy conducted after the crisis has for the most part been governed by traditional monetary policy motives, that is, the expected development of economic activity and inflation over the coming years. Giving consideration to the risks associated with the developments in household debt and housing prices has been part of our assessment, but a relatively minor part. The picture painted in the criticism has been quite different. Here the starting point is instead that the Riksbank’s concern over developments in household debt was the main motive for raising the repo rate after the financial crisis. Much of the criticism even seems to assume that household debt was the only motive for raising the repo rate.

Krugman, Paul (2014b), Apologizing to Japan. The Opinion Pages, The New York Times, October 30. Malmqvist, Peter (2014), Låg ränta bäddar för överhettning. (Low repo rate paves the way for overheating) Svenska Dagbladet Opinion, 19 July. Mian, Atif and Sufi, Amir (2014), House of Debt. University of Chicago Press. Mitelman, Henrik (2014), Nu blir Ingves börsens bästis. (Now Ingves is the stock market’s best friend) Dagens industri newspaper, 29 October. Münchau, Wolfgang (2014), What central banks should do to deal with bubbles. Column, Financial Times, July 13. OECD (2011), OECD Economic Outlook, No. 89, May 2011. Schularick, Moritz and Taylor Alan M. (2012), Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008. American Economic Review 102(2). Smets, Frank (2013), Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely interlinked? Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2013:3. Jubilee issue. Stein, Jeremy C. (2013), Overheating in Credit Markets: Origins, Measurement, and Policy Responses. Speech at “Restoring Household Financial Stability after the Great Recession: Why Household Balance Sheets Matter”, research symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Summers, Lawrence (2014), Washington Must Not Settle for Secular Stagnation. Financial Times, 5 January. Svenska Dagbladet (2014a), Krugman har fel om svensk bubbla. (Krugman is wrong about a Swedish bubble) Interview with Lars Svensson, SvD Näringsliv (business section of Svenska Dagbladet newspaper), 14 January. Svenska Dagbladet (2014b), ”Nollränta är som att kasta bensin på en brasa”.
We think that the inflation rate will reach its trough this quarter. For 2016, we expect average inflation of −0.5%. As you can see from the chart, inflation will move back into positive territory in early 2017. These forecasts assume that the three-month Libor remains at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon, that the Brent crude oil price remains at USD 50 per barrel and that the Swiss franc weakens. Again, our forecasts show that the current period of negative inflation is temporary. Nevertheless, even temporarily negative inflation rates are undesirable. Yet they cannot always be avoided – especially during phases of strong exchange rate appreciation. What matters is that inflation expectations remain firmly anchored and that monetary policy is able to ensure medium-term price stability. Medium and long-term inflation expectations are still positive. This can be seen in various surveys of inflation expectations, and is confirmed by discussions between the SNB’s delegates for regional economic relations and company representatives from different sectors of the economy. Thus, we do not expect sustained negative inflation, let alone a deflationary spiral. Concluding remarks This brings me to the end of my speech. Earlier this year, the SNB took some far-reaching decisions: It discontinued the minimum exchange rate against the euro, and lowered the negative interest rate on sight deposits significantly into negative territory. These measures were necessary to promote adequate monetary conditions for the Swiss economy, and to ensure the SNB’s ability to provide medium-term price stability in the future.

It would therefore be impossible for the Eurosystem to conduct a successful policy by mechanistically following a simple rule whereby policy decisions are closely linked to a few indicator variables or to a central inflation projection at a particular point in time. Two key features of the ECB’s communication with the public and the markets are our Monthly Bulletins and the monthly press conferences. The latter usually directly follow the first Governing Council meeting of each month. By these means we publicly conduct a detailed review of current monetary, financial and other economic developments in the euro area against the background of the strategy. This aims at illustrating the application of the strategy in practice, guiding market expectations. Although the strategy is complex, we generally try to end with an overall assessment which summarises the opinion of the Council on the future situation. The press conference provides prompt information in an even-handed way, and it offers the opportunity for immediate two-way communication. As far as I am aware, no other central bank regularly communicates with the public in such a prompt and open manner immediately after its monetary policy meetings. We are convinced that this contributes to reducing uncertainty in the markets and thus gives important and clear guidance, also with regard to short-term policy moves. In this respect, one should recognise that the ECB is facing a completely new environment.
According to surveys by the IET (Institute for Tourism Studies), the Balearic Islands was the second-ranked Spanish region in terms of incoming international tourists and of their expenditure, with almost 10 million visitors from January to September 2015 and with receipts of around € billion. Forecasts Let me move on now to our growth forecasts. The latest Banco de España projections, released in September, place the increase in GDP at 3.1% for 2015 as a whole, and at 2.7% for 2016, in line with those drawn up by the main international agencies and by private analysts. This growth is forecast to be underpinned by national demand, with moderately negative contributions by net external demand. Among the components of national demand, household consumption is expected to continue to be highly dynamic, supported by the favourable labour market performance and driven by the expansionary impact on disposable income of the fall in oil prices, the reduction in direct taxation and the refund of the “extra” December salary payment to public-sector employees. The current recovery in investment in construction is expected to run further, against a backdrop of improved financing conditions, while business investment will continue to post high rates of increase, in line with the strength of final demand. As regards foreign trade, there will be modest increases in exports, in a setting in which the improvement on euro area markets and the achievement of further gains in competitiveness are expected to be partly offset by the slowdown in other foreign markets.

Luis M Linde: The Spanish economy – situation and outlook Speech by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XIV Día de los Economistas 2015, organised by the Colegio de Economistas de las Islas Baleares, Las Palmas, 30 November 2015. *  *  *  Let me first thank Mr Onofre Martorell, the dean-president of the Balearic Islands Association of Economists, and Mr D. Valentí Pich, the president of the General Board of Economists’ Associations, for their invitation to this event, and Professor Guillem López Casasnovas, too, for his kind words of introduction. I shall begin by talking about the international and European economic setting, moving on to the Spanish situation and our growth projections. I shall also briefly refer to developments in the external sector, in general, and to tourism, which is so important for our economy and, naturally, for the Balearic Islands, in particular. I shall conclude with some remarks on the Spanish banking system and the challenges the Spanish economy faces. International setting Recent developments in the international environment have been marked by greater uncertainty over global growth (due largely to the slowdown in the emerging economies), the fall in oil and commodities prices, and the increase in volatility on financial markets, linked to expectations about interest rate rises in United States and to the revision of global growth forecasts.