samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is clear that in order for the young population to be an advantage for us, a very well designed and planned education strategy is a must. Indeed, the education level of the overall population in Turkey is getting better and Turkey is catching up with several of the new EU members. In the 25-34 age group, 11 percent of population has high level of education, which corresponds to the same level with Slovakia and nearly the same level with the Czech Republic.21 Hence, as the older generation leaves the market for the younger generation and the educational reforms are put into practice during the accession process, the education level of the Turkish labour force will increase and both the EU and the Turkish economy will benefit from it. Ladies and Gentlemen, Having touched briefly on the advantages of the EU from Turkey s membership, what I d like to talk about next is the other side of the coin; that is the advantages of Turkey from the accession process and the ultimate membership. As I mentioned in the early part of my speech, the performance of the Turkish economy for the last four years clearly indicates that Turkey successfully continues the process of economic restructuring. However, in our view, all the achievements so far now belong to the past. Nowadays, we have to start viewing developments with a longer-term and broader perspective in the context of the adjustment process for the EU membership.

Thus, enlargement has become an important aspect of the EU policy. Distinguished guests, Almost in every meeting on the EU and the Turkish economy, I am faced with questions such as "What can Turkey contribute to the EU, in other words, what will be the advantages of the EU from Turkey's membership?" or "What does Turkey expect from being a full member of the Union?". But, there are no easy and quick answers to these questions. Therefore, my answer will rather be a long one. Apparently, there are very strong arguments in favour of Turkish membership such that Turkey will bring the Islamic world and the Western world together or a larger EU with Turkey will certainly be a much bigger power playing an important role in the world. Apart from political aspects, it is clear that the debate on the Turkish membership is very much related to the economic structure of Turkey. Hence, I want to make one thing clear: although membership is a political decision in essence, my answers to the questions I mentioned will focus mainly on economic aspects. Having this in mind, now I’d like to start with the notion of competitiveness on a global level and its implications for both Turkey and the EU. The 20th century has been a new era in terms of diminishing borders in trade and means of production and led to increasing competition all around the world.
Respondents placed the highest probability on a U.S. recession first occurring in 2020 or 2021, assigning a roughly 25 percent probability to each, on average. At about 17 percent, the distribution's average probability of a recession starting in 2019 or earlier suggests a good match with the shorter-horizon question. Interestingly, our respondents demonstrated an ability to calibrate their probability assessments over a longer horizon, something some of Tetlock's superforecasters struggled with. However, historical perspective may offer a cautionary tale. Figure 3 shows the evolution of results from our survey's recurring questions on the probability that the U.S. economy is currently in an NBER recession and that it will be in an NBER recession in six months, taken over the mid2007 to late-2008 time period. This period, of course, encompasses the start of the Great Recession, which the NBER dated as beginning in December 2007. Although the probabilities in our survey responses were starting to trend upward in the second half of 2007, they remained well below 50 percent.10 You might wonder why we ask these two questions. We ask these two questions so that when the current probability of a recession is high, the probability of a recession in six months' time allows us to calculate a probability of switching to an expansion.

6 See Donald Kohn and Brian Sack, Monetary Policy during the Financial Crisis, preliminary discussion draft  presented at the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings and Yale School of Management Program on Financial Stability event, Responding to the Global Financial Crisis: What We Did and Why We Did It, Washington, D.C., September 11–12, 2018. 7 Possible sources to which this lament has been attributed are catalogued here, although its actual provenance  is not known. 8 As part of our analysis of what went wrong in our forecasting before the Great Recession, researchers at the  Federal Reserve and European Central Bank jointly looked at various methods of more directly including highfrequency fluctuations in our forecasting models. The results from this research are reported in Luci Alessi, Eric Ghysels, Luca Onorante, Richard Peach, and Simon Potter, Central Bank Macroeconomic Forecasting during the Global Financial Crisis: The European Central Bank and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Experiences, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, number 680, July 2014. 9 See survey questions and results to the Survey of Primary Dealers and Survey of Markets Participants, Federal  Reserve Bank of New York. 10 Of course, the NBER didn’t actually declare the start of the recession until late November 2008, nearly a year  after it officially began. 11 Estrella and Mishkin’s original paper, updates, related research, and current recession probabilities implied by  the term spread are available on the New York Fed’s Research website.
For example, there is currently substantial agreement, both among academics and monetary authorities, on the need to provide central banks with sufficient formal and effective institutional independence, the superiority of interest-rate operational targets over quantitative instruments, and the pursuit of low inflation as the main objective for monetary policy. Both trends - towards deeper and more integrated financial markets, at one end, and towards monetary policies clearly determined to deliver price stability, at the other - are important factors behind the sound macroeconomic performance recorded practically worldwide over the last decade. Notwithstanding this positive view on the recent past, central banks must deploy their best efforts improving their monetary policy and regulatory and supervisory arrangements - to preserve and consolidate the attainments I mentioned, since various significant risks and challenges lie ahead. As stressed by Frederic Mishkin, the final success of the processes of financial liberalisation and globalisation in developing economies hinges crucially on the ability of both policymakers and the private sector to properly respond to a rapidly changing environment. No doubt, the spirit of this proposition applies likewise to developed countries. BIS Review 53/2006  1  An increasingly liberalised and globalised financial system necessitates a reconsideration of some key inputs in our current monetary strategies. The greater relevance of markets and their evolving nature requires an ongoing assessment of the different monetary policy transmission mechanisms. This area, while critical to successful monetary policy decision-making, still remains shrouded in considerable uncertainty.

Both of these examples result in an increased in measured deposits at banks, but neither presages more nominal spending. 9  G Ryle “The Concept of Mind” London (1949) Hutchinson. Ryle was criticising as incoherent a dualist view of mind and body in which the mind is instrumental in determining action but is wholly distinct from the physical realm. BIS Review 73/2007  5  We need to start as the Governor has said by trying to distinguish supply shocks from demand shocks. 10 Where growth in money is driven by the wish of consumers or companies to increase their holdings of money for a given level of spending, there need be no effect on nominal GDP or inflation. As I have discussed there is clear evidence of changes in demand of that sort in the financial sector. But that is not the whole story. So have there been increases in supply of money and if so how will they feed through into the economy? What does a supply shock look like? It is easiest to visualise in a closed economy in which the money supply is mainly notes issued by the monetary authorities. One can imagine then a direct increase in supply – a helicopter drop of extra notes. In that world people would really find themselves with extra cash in their pockets and would be expected to go out and spend some or all of it.
Communication with public, the Bank of Albania is already a more transparent institution and in turns more accessible to the public at large. The regular communication of our decisions and views, the organisation and participation in academic conferences, and the rigorous accomplishment in a timely manner of requests for information, are assessed by our international partners. In more concrete terms, the National Bank of Austria in the last report, ranked the Bank of Albania first among all the banks of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern countries, for the level and quality of public communication. Dear members of the Committee, Notwithstanding the successful results that I listed above, I still do not consider my mission as complete so far. Looking forward, I see that the Bank of Albania has a lot to achieve in all aspects. Allow me to briefly list the priorities in my agenda for the second term. First priority is related to monetary policy and price stability. In capacity of the Governor of the Bank of Albania, I have been heedful and I will make sure that the quantity and cost of money in economy enables: the stability of prices; the sustainable economic growth and the improvement of welfare. In the medium term, addressing inflationary pressures stemming by the upsurge of prices in international market will be the main challenge. In my view, commitment to the legal mandate of price stability is a non-negotiable objective. The drafting of a prudential and forward-guidance monetary is required from the successful accomplishment of this term.

These certifications will reduce costs and increase efficiency of our banking system operation. Complete re-scanning of our financial system – in collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF – (financial Sector Assessment Program) – to enable the identification and correction of its weak points in a timely manner. I consider that special attention will be paid on: the activity of non-bank financial institutions and convergence of their practices and regulations with those of the banking system. This will boost the effectiveness of financial system and fair competition within and among various segments of this system; fully efficient operation of the supervisory architecture of our financial system, starting from the Financial Stability Advisory Group (FSAG) and continuing with the practices on information share and collaboration amid its regulatory institutions; continuing the work for the reduction of foreign currency use in Albania, aiming at increasing awareness of both public and private actors on the risk it bears, thus by strengthening the response of the Albanian institutions. Third priority relates to encouraging formalisation, and increasing both financial education and inclusion. The relatively high level of informality in the Albanian economy stems serious negative consequences, through putting in threat competition, increasing uncertainty in commercial and financial relationships, and reducing public revenues. In this view, the Bank of Albania will continue to work to strengthen formalisation of the economy.
As an illustration, the Pension Protection Fund’s PPF 7800  index suggests that, between end-2021 and end-  September 2022 – a period in which interest rates rose substantially – the liabilities of UK DB schemes fell by 36% (from £ to £ whereas their assets fell by only 20% (from £ to £ leaving their net assets nearly three times higher. 2. See Thirteen days in October: how central bank balance sheets can support monetary and financial stability – speech by Andrew Hauser 3. See The impact of leveraged investors on market liquidity and financial stability – speech by Jon Cunliffe 4. See Taking our second chance to make MMFs more resilient - speech by Andrew Bailey 5. See ‘The role of non-bank financial intermediaries in the ‘dash for cash’ in sterling markets’, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper, number 47. 6. See ‘Seven Moments in Spring: Covid-19, financial markets and the Bank of England’s balance sheet operations’ – speech by Andrew Hauser 7. See ‘Sizing hedge funds' Treasury market activities and holdings’  ,  8. See ‘Hedge Funds and the Treasury Cash-Futures Disconnect’ 9. See ‘Leverage and margin spirals in fixed income markets during the Covid-19 crisis’  10.

For example, we amended the liquidity coverage ratio to take into account unintended consequences under stress on core markets such as commercial paper and to clarify that liquid asset buffers are there to be used in times of stress. We changed the leverage exposure measure, for example by recognising that cash variation margins are effectively pre-settlement payment of the fair value of the derivative. In doing so, we reinforced banks’ incentives to centrally clear their clients’ derivative trades. In other words, we simultaneously reduced bank leverage while increasing the robustness of derivative markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  And we’ve learned about the unintended consequences of prudential capital and retention requirements on the securitisation market. Regulatory changes arguably treat asset-backed securities in ways that appear to be unduly conservative, particularly relative to other forms of long-term funding. Efforts to rebalance these incentives are now a priority. As the Bank of England the ECB have argued, there is a strong case for differentiating between securitisations that are simple, transparent and consistent, and those that are not. The regulatory treatment of those securitisations should reflect their lower risk profile. By making changes, policymakers are applying a mature approach. We’re learning and adjusting. We will continue to do so, in a thoughtful, open, and deliberative fashion. The third element of the new approach is turning our attention to new and emerging vulnerabilities. Work to assess new market developments and co-ordinate responses will become increasingly important as macroprudential risks arise from outside the traditional banking sector.
We begin in Michigan in 1837, when the state legislature passed the first “free” banking law in the United States.2 Upon commencing business, free banks could issue banknotes—that is, private currencies—that were redeemable in specie—gold or silver.3 These banknotes were transferable debt backed by the general creditworthiness of the bank that issued them, plus assets like bonds and mortgages on real estate, and for a brief time, personal guarantees.4 The statute permitted bank organizers to establish a bank by filing an application with the local county treasurer and county clerk. They did not need approval from the state banking commissioner. (At the time, the United States had no federal banking supervisor.5 Indeed, the “free banking” era generally begins with Congress’s failure to recommission the Second Bank of the United States before its charter expired in 1836, and ends with the passage of the National Bank Act in 1863.) The result, predictably, was chaotic. The state banking commissioner was unsure of how many banks had even been established. 6 Some banks in Michigan were established with the intent to issue banknotes but without the intent to ever redeem them.7 By 1839 almost the entire system had collapsed. After closing down one bank in Michigan, the commissioner found shards of window glass, lead, and nails where he should have found gold and silver coin. 8 Some of these free banks became known as “wildcat” banks.

It was a push towards harmony in private currency, a pressing need for a wartime government in the throes of a civil war. Unlike wildcat banknotes, national bank notes were backed universally by federal government bonds and deposits of other money, such as U.S. government issued “greenback,” in each case held by the United States Treasury, and they circulated at parity with other forms of money.15 The National Bank Act also introduced the division between banking and commerce in the United States, which may have erased some of the more-speculative bank activities of the wildcat era.16 Federal intervention and tighter regulation meant that national banks and their notes were both safer and more fungible than their wildcat predecessors, and the United States’ transition into national bank notes, coupled with new, unfavorable tax treatment for state bank notes, meant the demise of wildcat banknotes.17 Decades later, the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, a central bank currency, and a push for banks to engage in deposittaking activities meant the overall demise of private currency in the United States for decades.18 The Child Is Father to the Man This is, admittedly, a fairly crude history of money and banking in the United States, but you see where I’m going with this. It is hard not to see certain parallels between today’s digital currencies and the bank notes issued during the wildcat era.
I would expect, for example, that package to incentivise banks and their investors to issue and buy securities with conversion features that helped them through recovery or resurrection without the intervention of, respectively, the regulators or the statutory resolution authority. Alternatively, a richer Accord might go further, mandating so-called high-trigger CoCos, so as to encode recovery measures into a bank’s capital structure. And it might even include lowtrigger instruments to aid resurrection when a bank had seriously impaired equity but was not on the brink of bankruptcy. Taken together, that would be a robust Accord for normal times (equity); for recovery (high-trigger CoCos); for resurrection (low-trigger CoCos, or PONV instruments); and for resolution (term bonded-debt issued from the top of the group).13 Macroprudential regimes and the cost of finance Are reforms to resolution regimes and capital requirements – even a more complete Capital Accord along the lines I have sketched for almost the entire capital structure – sufficient to preserve systemic stability? The clear answer of the authorities to that is they are not sufficient, which is revealed by our creation of macroprudential regimes. That is for two reasons. First, any realistic regulatory capital regime, however rich, will sooner or later be found wanting due to regulatory arbitrage or an economic environment that is more risky than anything contemplated when it was calibrated. The authorities need to be able to respond to  11  I have argued before that the minimum for gone-concern LAC should not be less than a banks’ equity requirement.

That would provide gone-concern loss-absorbency for new improved resolution regimes to draw on. A still richer Accord might include instruments that aid recovery by converting into equity in the face of meaningful but not life-threatening losses. This approach moves away from seeing runnable short-term wholesale debt as a source of discipline on banks, to instead seeing longer-term bonds as providing a mass de manoeuvre for recapitalising distressed banks. Not all forms of leverage are the same. But no static regime can ever be enough. If they were, crises would not recur. That is why the new macroprudential authorities, such as the Bank of England’s FPC, will be able temporarily to adjust capital requirements when circumstances warrant. I have stressed that it is oversimplistic to think of macroprudential interventions to improve capital adequacy as always inevitably leading to higher funding costs and tighter credit conditions. It will depend upon the prevailing circumstances: whether the banks started out with solid balance sheets, what the market knows and thinks. The FPC will need to be transparent in order to build understanding of its actions. 15  I worry about the withering away of a market for bankers’ acceptances; claims by one company on another, but guaranteed by one or more banks, and historically eligible for discount at central banks. As I have said before, corporate treasurers, bankers and central banks could usefully work together on this.
Figure 7 plots the volatility of four price indices over time. The standard deviations here are calculated over a moving 36-month period 25. The figure shows that volatility has different levels during different periods. The prices of Swedish-produced fruit and vegetables varied more in 1995-2019 than between 2005 and 2019. The volatility of prices of coffee and cocoa has increased again after being quite low over a 15-year period. The price movements on books have become much more volatile in recent years. 26 The same applies to prices for foreign travel. 27 The changed volatility can often depend on changes in measuring methods. A new way of measuring prices of foreign air travel, for instance, has contributed to a new seasonal pattern with a higher volatility in recent years. Figure 7. Rolling standard deviation for different price indices  Annual percentage change 35  35  30  30  25  25  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  95  97  99  01  03  05  07  09  11  13  15  17  19  0  Fruits and vegetables, Swedish Coffee and cocoa Books Air travel Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  25 The calculations are based on annual percentage changes. 26 The price measurement for books was changed in 2007.

But, more than this, the digital consumer also demands choice and personalisation, transacts with a swipe of their fingers at any time of the day 24/7, and judges products based on peer reviews. Digital consumers are set to grow in significance, especially in Asia. In China, the online insurance market doubled in 2014 to $ billion, representing over 4% of total insurance premiums.1 The Boston Consulting Group estimates that the online insurance market in India will grow by more than 20 times to hit $ billion by 2020.2 Second, data analytics. Advancements in technology have allowed insurers to unlock new data and greatly improve their ability to assess and price risks. Motor insurance is a case-inpoint. In the past, insurers have traditionally relied on historical accidents and claims data to establish premiums and policy conditions. Today, telematics3 technology has allowed insurers to use real-time data to differentiate between drivers’ behaviours and better price risks. However, even as we shift from using historical data to using real-time data today,  1  China: Regulator says online insurance mart lacks variety, Asia Insurance Review eDaily (2015). 2  Insurance @ Digital-20x by 2020, The Boston Consulting Group (2014). 3  Telematics is the technology integrated with computers and mobile communications technology in automotive navigation systems, which allows efficient real-time transmission of information over networks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  driverless vehicles are already under trial in Singapore4 and elsewhere, with the help of environmental sensors and navigation systems.