samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As I hope you have gathered by now, we do not like surprises, and I suspect firms do not like them either. I hope our draft statement today delivers on our side of that arrangement. 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  7  A safe descent down the mountain I want to turn now to what the Supervisory Statement euphemistically refers to as ‘exit’ – what happens if a bank cannot achieve its business objectives and finds itself on course for a route down the mountain rather than up. Our approach to competition necessarily implies that firms must be able to both enter and exit the banking market. And, whilst our aim is to work constructively with firms to find a path to success, authorising more new banks inevitably means managing more banks’ exits. This is not surprising: such banks tend to operate in highly competitive markets and often have novel (untested) business plans. Indeed we have already seen examples of this – three UK start up banks authorised since the launch of the New Banks Start up Unit in 2016 have decided to give up their banking licence9 before exiting the mobilisation phase. And over the past few years several other firms have chosen to wind themselves down and done so successfully.

BIS Review 36/2004  1  •  credit regulation within limits specified in a separate credit budget  •  channelling of loans through the state banks  •  regulation of capital movements  •  low nominal interest rates stipulated by the government authorities  •  a fixed, though adjustable, krone exchange rate  •  use of price regulation  •  an active business policy through state ownership and state grants and subsidies  The use of price regulation was particular to Norway. The following description is by Petter Jakob Bjerve:4 “A characteristic of postwar Norwegian economic policy, compared with policies in other countries in the west, is that prices have largely been directly set by the authorities, while wages and other income have been determined by the market and by market organisations. With the high level of employment that the government sought to achieve in the 1970s, inflation was probably lower with price regulation than it would have been without it. Nonetheless, there was repeated evidence that freezing prices without freezing wages could not prevent a fairly sharp rise in prices. In 1978-1979, we witnessed a demonstration of the extent to which the rise in prices can be slowed, at least temporarily, when a price freeze is combined with a wage freeze.
BIS Review 36/2004  1  •  credit regulation within limits specified in a separate credit budget  •  channelling of loans through the state banks  •  regulation of capital movements  •  low nominal interest rates stipulated by the government authorities  •  a fixed, though adjustable, krone exchange rate  •  use of price regulation  •  an active business policy through state ownership and state grants and subsidies  The use of price regulation was particular to Norway. The following description is by Petter Jakob Bjerve:4 “A characteristic of postwar Norwegian economic policy, compared with policies in other countries in the west, is that prices have largely been directly set by the authorities, while wages and other income have been determined by the market and by market organisations. With the high level of employment that the government sought to achieve in the 1970s, inflation was probably lower with price regulation than it would have been without it. Nonetheless, there was repeated evidence that freezing prices without freezing wages could not prevent a fairly sharp rise in prices. In 1978-1979, we witnessed a demonstration of the extent to which the rise in prices can be slowed, at least temporarily, when a price freeze is combined with a wage freeze.

The model must be transparent and manageable  Norges Bank’s administration, management and Executive Board must be able to interpret and understand the model. It must not be perceived as a black box. It must have a theoretical structure so that we can easily examine the effects of alternative views of the economy’s functioning. 5. The model must reflect the Bank’s view  As a result of the modelling work, the Bank’s views on relationships in the economy will evolve. At the same time, we are developing a model with relationships that we have confidence in. Models will never provide us with a definitive answer. A model will always represent a simplification of reality. We must be pragmatic and exercise a good measure of judgement in addition. In my view, the most important role of models is to provide a framework and structure for the decision-making process, and to ensure that we do not change our views on the functioning of the economy without thorough reflection. BIS Review 36/2004  7  The use of models must also be seen in connection with the uncertainty associated with the actual state of the economy and the driving forces that dominate at a given point in time. It can be a demanding task in itself to find the balance between incorporating new information on the one hand and making abstraction of pure noise on the other. Allow me to illustrate.
Until August, public spending posted annual growth of 5.2% in annual terms, while revenues slowed down, growing only by 2.2%. Budget deficit was ALL 30.6 billion as at end-August. Foreign demand continues to support Albanians economic growth. Exports’ annual growth was 28.8% in July. On the other hand, imports continued their downturn trend that had  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  started in the second quarter of the year, increasing by 4.6% in annual terms. Export uptrend and import slowdown materialised in narrowed trade deficit in July, contracting by 6.0% yearon-year. However, the economy’s external position remains a structural weakness of the Albanian economy, which reflects the need for higher competitiveness of our products in global markets and conditions the effectiveness of stimulating macroeconomic policies. Indirect indicators analysis of private consumption reveals its moderate performance. Consumption continues to suffer from perceived uncertainty by Albanian families, leading to higher saving although aggregate revenues increased. Private investment slowed down in this period, but it retained positive growth rates. This is supported by good performance of foreign direct investments, up by 38% during the second quarter, and higher import of capital goods, which suggest higher private investment in the economy. Nonetheless, this hike is conditioned by the fact that many businesses are operating below their production capacities, limiting their needs for new investments. Monetary inflationary pressures remain controlled in the medium run. Annual growth of money supply, M3, which resulted 11.2% in July, retained the average rates recorded last year.

2  BIS Review 33/2010  One indicator of this recovery in confidence is the performance of stock markets, reflecting an improving assessment of business prospects. As Chart 2 shows, equity markets in the UK and US have recovered by around 60% from their troughs about a year ago. Alongside this improvement in financial market confidence, business survey indicators have also been improving across the global economy. Chart 3 shows a composite measure of surveys of purchasing managers from the major world economies. The very negative readings of around a year ago have given way to responses which are consistent with rising activity and the expectation of future growth. BIS Review 33/2010  3  The natural momentum of a recovery is that, as growth continues and memories of the recession fade, both consumer and business confidence will continue to build. Over time, cutbacks in investment by firms and the deferral of major consumer purchases will begin to reverse. As a result, we should expect both consumer and investment demand to gradually strengthen as long as new shocks to confidence do not emerge. Growth in Asia and emerging markets Alongside this general recovery in confidence, a key engine of the world recovery has been a strong rebound in Asia and many other emerging market economies.
In particular, the Central Bank’s review process focuses on adherence to Risk Management Guidelines and the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations as well as Prudential Guidelines that detail minimum, “Know Your Customer” requirements that financial institutions should adhere to. The overarching objective of all this is to ensure that our financial system is safe sound and stable. In a nutshell, there is an existing supervisory framework to ensure the safety of mobile banking solutions. This framework will continue to be reviewed in line with the changes in the mobile banking space. As you may be aware, some of these innovations may require collaboration with the regulators in the telecommunication sector. As such it is our intention to work closely with the Zambia Information and Communication Technology Authority in promoting safe and sound mobile banking services. Mr Chairman, it is also worth noting that since the last Mobile Banking Conference in 2009, a number of positive developments have occurred in the telecommunication sector. For instance the partial privatization of the Zambia Telecommunications Company (ZAMTEL) will result in intensified competition in the sector. This will no doubt lead to better quality service for the consumer. Further, following the liberalization of the International Gateway, we have already seen mobile service companies reducing their rates significantly. This, coupled with the now affordable cell phone handsets, will enhance access to mobile phone services and an opportunity for many of our people to be financially served.

Caleb M Fundanga: Setting new standards for cellphone banking Opening remarks by Mr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the Celpay 2010 Mobile Payments Conference, Lusaka, 27 October 2010. *  *  *  The Chief Executive Officer Celpay International BV The Managing Director – Zain Zambia Limited Managing Director, Celpay Zambia Ltd, Mr Miyanda Mulambo The Conference Chairperson, Mr Maxwell Banda Representatives of Commercial Banks and Financial Institutions present Representatives of International Organizations present Representatives of Zambian business associations Distinguished invited participants Members of the Press Ladies and Gentlemen, It is an honour and privilege for me to officiate at the 2010 Mobile Payments Conference. This year’s conference follows the success of the inaugural 2009 conference and it is therefore my earnest anticipation that as in 2009, you will find the 2010 conference productive and beneficial. The conference provides an excellent opportunity for the exchange of views and sharing of ideas on how to continuously improve the functioning of our financial systems against the backdrop of the global financial turmoil. Mr Chairman, Allow me to begin by commending Celpay Zambia Limited, for making the mobile banking conference an annual event. I hope that the Conference will provide a forum for long-term collaboration in the area of Mobile banking to provide sustainable banking solutions to our people. The Bank of Zambia applauds this initiative which is collaborative and consultative.
How Monetary Policy Affects Your GDP Speech given by  Andrew G Haldane Chief Economist Bank of England  Finch Lecture, University of Melbourne 10 April 2018  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. I would like to thank Phil Bunn, Shiv Chowla, Fergus Cumming, Alice Pugh and Chris Yeates for their help in preparing the text. I would like to thank James Benford, Tom Belsham, Ben Broadbent, David Halpern, Michael Hallsworth, Clare Macallan and Michael Saunders for their comments. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  I am honoured to be here at the University of Melbourne to deliver this year’s Finch Lecture. Colin David Finch built his brilliant academic and professional career on nurturing international co-operation on economic and financial matters: in his studies here at the University of Melbourne and at the London School of Economics; in his long and distinguished time at the International Monetary Fund; and, in later life, at the Institute for International Economics in Washington DC. Citizens of the UK owe Finch a particular debt of gratitude. He led the IMF rescue mission to the UK in 1976. That, in many respects, marked the turning point in the UK’s economic fortunes. It heralded the start of a long period of liberalisation and integration of markets in goods, services, people and money. The world economy broadly mirrored those trends towards increased international liberalisation and integration.

But no conclusive answer is yet on the horizon – and certainly not now, when so much has yet to be revealed – as the contraction is not over and the effects of the currency crisis and banking collapse are still in evidence. It is clear, however, that 2009 and 2010 would have been difficult for the Icelandic economy in any case, whether the international banking operations headquartered in Iceland had developed or not. This is a most necessary reminder that we must not only clean up the financial market regulatory framework and improve supervision, as I will touch on later, but we must also make efforts to ensure that economic policy prevents macroeconomic imbalances from developing once again. The Icelandic authorities are faced with a host of challenges that are rooted in the circumstances I have just described. I would like to focus on three of these. First, it is critical to allow the economy to adjust without allowing inflation or unemployment to become entrenched. The goal is a situation in which economic slack has disappeared, GDP growth is in line with growth in production, inflation is at target levels, and the external position of the economy is sustainable. Second, we must establish a financial system that serves Icelandic households and domestic business activities and is both economical and relatively secure.
Even though, in August and September, there was still frequent talk of an imminent overheating and markets were expecting a further increase in interest rates, we did not become active. It seemed likely to us that the signs of a slowdown would soon become more marked both in Switzerland and abroad. This stance was not without risks. In monetary policy, as elsewhere, one occasionally needs some good luck. In the current environment, we consider the position of the target band to be appropriate. The Libor rate has sufficient leeway in the 3% to 4% bracket to reflect current fluctuations driven by the market. Of course, we will carefully observe and analyse ongoing developments and take action if necessary. Our mission is clearly oriented towards achieving a high degree of price stability in the medium term while taking into account the economic development. Two years of experience with the euro has taught us that living as a dwarf moving among giants is a reasonable strategy. It has allowed us to implement our own policy and at the same time to retain our traditional interest rate bonus, a significant economic advantage. Rather than obstructing our monetary policy during this time, the floating exchange rate has facilitated, even supported it. When we wanted to pursue an expansionary course in 1999, the Swiss franc remained weak. And when, in the first quarter of 2000, we took corrective action by adopting a more restrictive course, it appreciated against the euro without overshooting.

Page 1/3  • In addition, the development of crypto-asset and DeFi comes with significant policy challenges for public authorities, that were highlighted in our discussions today: o First, they raise the question of how to regulate market players, which are not easily captured by existing regulation as they either lack central authority or may require close coordination between several regulatory and supervisory agencies due to the variety of their activities. o Second, the rise of these new assets has led central banks to reflect on the appropriate balance between public money and private assets and the way in which access to public money could be ensured in the digital era through the issuance of Central Bank Digital Currency. The second takeaway is that private players identify substantial benefits associated with distributed ledger technologies and consider that an appropriate regulatory framework would help make the most of these technologies. •  But we know from experience that public authorities need to act quickly, while this ecosystem is still nascent, to guide its development in a way that suits our public policy objectives. We are now at a tipping point. If we do fail to act, there is a risk that inefficient, fragmented, monopolistic solutions could develop in a silo mode, harming financial stability. But if we act early, we can foster the development of an innovative ecosystem, which will improve the efficiency of post-trading processes and infrastructures.
Emerging market economies now make up a much larger share of global trade, the global economy, and global growth. As an illustration, emerging market economies have accounted for 70 percent of global economic growth since the crisis—double their share from two decades ago.3 This growth has provided much-needed support to world economic activity, as advanced economies have recovered slowly from the crisis. Rising economic integration is also evident when we examine the trade relationship between Brazil and the United States. Bilateral trade flows in goods have risen from $ billion in 1994 to nearly $ billion in 2016. The United States is Brazil’s second-largest export market, and an important destination for manufactured goods. In 2016, the stock of U.S. direct investment in Brazil was $ billion, up from $ billion in 1994.4 Recent initiatives announced by the Brazilian authorities—including a large and transparent infrastructure concession program and greater foreign participation in the oil and gas and aviation industries—underscore the potential for further increases in foreign direct investment. The Benefits of Open Trade Increased trade, through its longer-term impact on productivity, has been a key contributor to global growth and prosperity since the Second World War. Openness to trade brings many benefits to the supply side of the economy, including: larger markets, greater specialization opportunities, and the increased ability to exploit economies of scale and scope; faster transmission of technology and innovation; and greater competitive pressure on domestic firms to increase their productivity.

First, the high level of cross-border capital flows—and their potentially volatile nature—further underlines the importance of solid domestic fundamentals, including exchange rate flexibility, a credible monetary policy framework, sustainable fiscal policy, sufficient foreign exchange reserves, and a strong financial system. The United States has a special responsibility to keep its own house in order, given the large size of its financial markets and the U.S. dollar’s status as a reserve currency. Indeed, the U.S. financial system was the epicenter of the global financial crisis. I believe that promoting economic growth and financial stability at home is the most important contribution the United States can make to promoting growth and stability worldwide. With that in mind, U.S. monetary policy can have a significant impact on global financial conditions, including exchange rates, and shifts in U.S. monetary policy can lead to consequential shifts in global capital flows. Therefore, good communication and transparency from the Federal Reserve is needed. In this respect, I believe we have made a number of improvements in recent years that have facilitated smoother market adjustments to policy changes. One example is the process by which the Federal Reserve began the normalization of its balance sheet last year. We foreshadowed our intentions and initiated a program that was transparent in its design and ramped up only slowly.
In the UK, moves have recently been made to improve the competitiveness of SME finance; I believe that the new Basel framework could in turn be a positive contribution to banking stability but we stand ready to monitor developments. Although this conference is essentially about the issue of banking capital, I would like to end by emphasising that capital is only one component of banking stability; many other factors also come into play. In the field of prudential regulation, I would like to highlight two: valuation and provisioning frameworks, and liquidity management and regulation. There will be little point to all the Committee's work on risk sensitive capital measures if this is not underpinned by adequate loan valuation and provisioning practices - preferably ones which incorporate a forward-looking view of risk and deterioration in loans. A lot of valuable work has been done on loan provisioning by the Basel Committee and other bodies, and I welcome the debate that is currently being sponsored by the IASC on valuation frameworks. 4  BIS Review 29/2001  Secondly, adequate liquidity is a vital counterpoint to capital for banks; the regulation of capital adequacy and liquidity are interrelated. Rationally, solvency ought to be a guarantee against funding problems, with customers happy to roll over deposits where they are confident that a bank is soundly capitalised. But reason does not always prevail, in part because solvency is sometimes hard to ascertain, more often because, swept along by animal spirits, markets can behave emotionally and perversely.

David Clementi: Risk sensitivity and the New Basel Accord Speech by David Clementi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at a Financial Services Authority Conference: “Reforming Capital Adequacy for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Banks”, London, 10 April 2001. *  *  *  Introduction It is a great pleasure for me to be adding my remarks today to those of Bill McDonough and Howard Davies. I would first like to congratulate Bill, as chairman of the Basel Committee, on the very real achievement that this new capital framework represents. Products that are 'designed by committee' normally come in for some fairly trenchant criticism, but this one represents a new milestone in financial regulation, one which I believe will strongly influence how all financial firms, not just banks, come to be regulated in the future. I know it has been a lot of hard work, and I don't just mean the shoulder-strain involved in carrying the document onto airplanes! Unfortunately the hard work is not over yet, both for the authorities and for the banking community - even looking beyond finalisation of these proposals, supervisors and banks will of course have to see through a long and complex implementation process. But this is not to underestimate the progress that has been made and it is certainly a good moment to take stock of the proposals as they stand.