samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Consequently, shareholders were not covered by the government guarantee and would lose their equity investments to the same degree as the Government had to provide support for their banks. This provided an incentive to the owners to avoid applying for state support unless it was absolutely necessary, to minimise the amount of support and to reduce the time-period of receiving support. We used a very simple, but clear and easy-to-explain, method of identifying banks which should be given support in order to survive and those which should be liquidated or merged. First you write-down the bank’s bad loans. Then you test the bank in a micro- and macroeconomic model. If the model indicates that the bank will be adequately profitable again in the medium-term future it should be given support to survive. But if the model indicates that the bank will never be profitable again the bank will not be of economic benefit to the society and should thus be closed or merged in an orderly manner. 4. Strict valuation rules were used from the onset of the crisis. This was deemed necessary in order to restore confidence but the policy was not without risks. All bank assets had to be marked-to-market even if the market, such as that for real estate, was exceptionally weak. This led to higher bank losses and a weaker financial position than if a somewhat more flexible valuation rule had been adopted.

In undertaking the research, we have worked closely with external stakeholders from the cash industry and have already engaged with the public through several independently-managed focus groups. And we have consulted other countries that have undertaken research into different banknote materials, of which several have already switched to the use of polymer, including Australia and Canada. Based on this research, we are confident that printing our banknotes on polymer would bring several benefits: First, polymer notes are more secure. Polymer notes are harder to counterfeit and allow for the inclusion of “windows” or clear portions in the design, which considerably enhances counterfeit resilience. Such features also allow users to check whether notes are genuine quickly and easily. Second, polymer notes are more durable and resistant to damage. As a result, polymer banknotes last at least two-and-a-half times longer than notes printed on paper. And because polymer banknotes last longer, they don’t need to be replaced so frequently, meaning they are cheaper to produce. Third, polymer banknotes repel dirt and moisture better than paper banknotes, and so stay cleaner for longer, reducing the incidence of ‘tatty’ notes. Finally, polymer banknotes are more environmentally friendly than paper notes. Given these benefits, we are confident that a switch to printing notes on polymer makes sense. But we also recognise that the public takes pride in their banknotes, and that changes to the design and format of notes are consequently of great interest. Because of this, we have decided to consult with the public before making any final decisions.
The Riksbank’s forecast is that the repo rate will remain at the current level of –0.5 per cent until some time around the end of June/beginning of July 2017. At the end of 2018/beginning of 2019 the forecast is that the repo rate will have risen to 0.5 per cent. The Riksbank assesses that this expansionary monetary policy is necessary to get inflation to rise and stabilise around 2 per cent in 2017. The low interest rates mean that most of those who save or borrow for consumption and investment will receive or pay low interest rates during this period. But there are also financial decisions that have much further reaching consequences. ...but what then? Is it possible to say what nominal interest rates will be in 10, 15 or 20 years’ time? It would be presumptuous to attempt precise forecasts. But it is possible to reason out a scenario for a possible normal state of affairs based on what we know today and the factors I have discussed today. In a “normal state of affairs” necessary debt adjustments in the wake of the financial crisis would be complete. Through higher global growth, we could expect higher global real interest rates. Growth can in principle come from employment or labour productivity beginning to increase at a faster pace. If we have lower global saving, we can expect higher global real interest rates. Saving can decline if the percentage of elderly rises and the retirement age falls.

The conclusion I draw from this is that standard monetary policy might be the right response when the financial cycle is rising across sectors and countries. In these circumstances, even  23  See ECB Monthly Bulletin article on “Asset price bubbles and monetary policy”, April 2005. 24  It should be noted that at the time this article was written, the idea of using monetary policy to prick asset price bubbles was alien to much of the theory and practice of central banking. Indeed, in 2006 former Federal Reserve Governor Don Kohn argued that only if the likelihood and risks of bubbles could be accurately identified would early intervention by central banks be superior to cleaning up after the bust, adding that “for my part, I am dubious that any central banker knows enough about the economy to overcome these hurdles” (see Kohn, D. (2006), “Monetary policy and asset prices”, speech at the European Central Bank Colloquium held in honour of Otmar Issing, 16 March 2006). However, that view has now largely changed across the central banking community. In particular, the importance of financial stability for price stability is now selfevident after the crisis, and most central bankers agree that for certain types of financial imbalances monetary policy may be the only tool that is sufficiently broad-based and powerful. 25  See for example Adrian, T. and H.-S. Shin (2010), “The Changing Nature of Financial Intermediation and the Financial Crisis of 2007–09”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports no. 439, March 2010.
Discounting the flow of future pension liabilities by a corporate bond rate only makes sense if the fund is no longer required to meet those liabilities in the states of the world where the bond defaults. But this is not generally the case: broadly speaking, the fund needs to meet its liabilities whatever happens. In normal times, this does not matter very much as the spread of investment-grade bonds over gilt yields is pretty small and does not vary very much. But during the peak of the crisis, the spread – even for investment-grade bonds – rose significantly (Chart A). Consequently, when standard accounting conventions are followed an additional factor needs to be added to Charts 4 and 5, reflecting the impact of changes in the corporate bond spread. That is shown by the mauve bars in Charts B and C respectively; the profiles of the other components of the deficit are unchanged. The main consequence of this is that the value of liabilities falls markedly during the period up to early 2009, indeed so much so that it counteracts the loss in asset value due to the fall in equity prices and pushes the fund into surplus. But it would be unwise for the sponsors and trustees of a pension fund to take comfort from this, given that the fall in the value of liabilities was merely an artefact of an increased probability of default on corporate bonds!

But the more a scheme is underfunded (overfunded) to begin with, the more it will find its deficit (surplus) increased. This is entirely intuitive. By reducing yields, QE increases the cost of purchasing a given future stream of income. So if a fund starts off relatively “asset poor”, the sponsors will now find it more costly to acquire the assets necessary to match its future obligations. A corollary of this is that the cost of provisioning against additional pension entitlements being accumulated by currently serving staff unambiguously rises. That does mean that the effective cost of employing labour, when their pension costs are also included, also rises.8 This is certainly an unwanted side effect of QE. But it needs to be balanced against the higher activity and business profits resulting from QE, as well as the fact that wage growth has recently been exceptionally weak, which work in the opposite direction. Given that pension funds have for the most part seen deficits widen in recent years, whether it be as a result of the crisis and recession or the result of QE, how should sponsors and trustees respond? It makes little sense to rush to close a deficit that is likely to prove temporary. But if a deficit is likely to persist, then corrective action is required, initially to prevent it continuing to expand and ultimately to close it, though that adjustment could, quite reasonably, be spread out over time. This is all recognised by the Pensions Regulator.
Conclusions  Oil and gas provide substantial wealth for the Norwegian economy, while fluctuations in the price of oil give rise to variations in the value of this wealth. Norwegian economic policy is organised so as to maintain stability in the face of these variations. Fiscal policy carries a responsibility for stabilising the real economy, while monetary policy is aiming at price stability and preventing a deflationary recession with a view to maintaining exchange rate stability over time. Changes in the price of oil may influence expectations about future economic development in Norway independently of how much of the petroleum revenues are absorbed into the economy in the short run. However, successful use of the Petroleum Fund will provide financial leeway for an active stabilisation policy, the redistribution of wealth between generations and to a large extent protect the Norwegian economy from oil price fluctuations. 15  BIS Review 121/1999

There are no guaranties that levels of income in the CESEE countries are going to converge towards those of the developed Western economies. No guarantees that these countries are not going to form one, or more, of the so-called convergence clubs at a lower level of per capita income compared to their developed peers. However, it is our job to dare to introduce reforms even if we are not a 100 percent sure about the timing and the scale of the effects, as these are often not under our direct control. But if history teaches us anything, and if we follow the best practices from around the world, not only the EU, then the path we have to follow becomes much clearer. And the closest thing to a recipe for reducing the probability of being caught in the middle income trap (of low growth and slow or no convergence) would be to dare to reform. Be it the education system with an aim to increase the quality of human capital, be it liberalising product and labour markets controls, be it the reform of justice or public administrations systems, or anything else that is proven to enhance the business environment in the country. It is as simple or as difficult as that. But, and this is my final thought – we have to keep in mind the political economy dimension of the process, and there things do not look encouraging.
I would like to thank Matthew Willison, Hugh Burns, Nicolo Fraccaroli and David Swallow for their assistance in preparing these remarks 5  The fourth model is an independent regulatory body with a clear mandate set out in primary legislation and a clear set of accountability mechanisms to Parliament. This model combines the benefits of an expert regulator that can adjust prudential regulation dynamically, with an objective that incentivises it to maintain prudential standards, while using the mandate and the accountability mechanisms to ensure legitimacy. Table 1 summarises the degree to which these four models possess the three ideal features of an institutional structure of prudential regulation. In theory at least, this fourth model is preferable because, unlike the other models, it possesses all three of the ideal features. Table 1: Comparison of alternative models of the institutional structure of prudential regulation Model  Dynamic? Time-consistent? Legitimate? Primary legislation  X  √  √  Government  √  X  √  Regulator  √  √  x  Regulator + clear mandate  √  √  √  +accountability mechanisms to Parliament  There are plenty of precedents for this institutional structure of prudential regulation, including in the UK. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, better known as FSMA, established a regulator in the form of the FSA and specified the regulator’s objectives and responsibilities. The detailed regulatory rules, however, were set out by the FSA in its handbook, not written into the Act.

By contrast, the financial regulator’s task is solely focussed on delivering and maintaining rules that are fit for purpose for their regulated sector only – there is no competition for other initiatives and the process and timetable provides certainty to industry. In a second model, prudential regulatory-setting powers could lie with government ministers. This model would be dynamic because the government would be able to adjust prudential regulation. It would be legitimate since the government is directly accountable to the parliament and ultimately the electorate. But it may not be time consistent because it creates the possibility that prudential regulation will be influenced unduly by the electoral cycle, as was deemed to have happened to monetary policy prior to central bank independence. Alternatively and in a third model, these powers could be given to an independent regulatory body. This model is likely to ensure that prudential regulation is both dynamic and time-consistent. An expert regulator would be able to identify and implement necessary dynamic adjustments, and, for reputation reasons, it would have an incentive to maintain prudential standards provided that it avoided industry capture. But, absent further accountability mechanisms to enhance it, it would lack legitimacy. In summary, each of these models lacks one of the ideal features for the institutional structure of prudential regulation.
4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Given the importance of the matter, I cannot conclude without referring to our level of educational attainment and, specifically, to secondary education. Unfortunately, the measures that raise educational attainment pose a problem; unlike the reforms we have looked at today, the effects of potential improvements in education are very slow and this explains why the attention the subject requires is continuously put off. But this slowness in bearing fruit is precisely what justifies the need to undertake this task as soon as possible and, while waiting, we should reiterate that education is the most important problem facing our society and our economy in the medium term. Thank you very much. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Már Guðmundsson: The Icelandic pension system and the financial crisis Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at the opening dinner of the European Pension Convention 2010, Reykjavík, 2 May 2010. *  *  *  Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to address you here tonight, and I would like to thank the organisers for inviting me to do so. This is due not least to my past interest in and work on the Icelandic pension system and, more generally, my interest in the optimal design of pension systems. During my tenure as Chief Economist of the Central Bank of Iceland from 1994–2004, I was convinced that the pension system that had developed in Iceland, partly by historical accident, was one of the strengths of Iceland’s economy. This conviction had taken root earlier, when I was involved with pension reform and served for a while as the chairman of the board of a pension fund that has long been among the top ten in Iceland in terms of size. However, this view was reinforced around the turn of the century, when I made an in-depth study of the Icelandic pension system and tried to analyse its effects on the economy and the financial sector. 1 I subsequently tried to propagate the virtues of the system abroad.
During my visits to the Middle East, I sensed their interest in investing in Asia. Many are keen to engage China and India but their businessmen told me that they were not so familiar with doing  2  BIS Review 83/2005  business in China. Singapore can serve as a bridge, given our knowledge and connections. Furthermore, Indian, Chinese and Singaporean financial institutions could tap into Islamic funds from the Middle East for infrastructural and other major projects in India and China. 21. As an international financial centre, Singapore is well placed to intermediate and facilitate investment flows between Asia and the Middle East. Already, funds managed in Singapore from the Middle East have increased by over 70% to $ billion in 2004. But this is still a small figure, given the trillions of dollars of wealth in the Middle East. We should work with credible partners to offer a wider suite of Islamic financial services and products. The role of MAS 22. MAS will continue to support and partner the financial industry to seize the opportunities. Last year, I highlighted three strategic priorities for MAS and our financial sector. They are first, strengthen our position as a leading financial centre in Asia; second, maintain excellence in a riskier environment; and third, leverage and build on our reputation. We have made good progress on all three fronts. Strengthening our position as a leading financial centre in Asia 23. As MAS Chairman, I regularly meet CEOs of global banks and big companies.

We are enhancing synergy with the Thai economy through the Singapore-Thailand Enhanced Economic Relationship (STEER) programme. Last week's second STEER meeting in Bangkok saw the signing of nine business agreements ranging from tourism to logistics. MAS and the Thai Securities Exchange Commission also signed a letter of intent for closer cooperation in capital markets. 14. Next month, Singapore and Vietnam will sign the Framework Agreement on Connectivity, which will help us leverage on each other's strengths and complementarities. Areas of cooperation include finance, ICT (Information and Communications Technologies), investments, trade and services, transport and education. Singapore is the second largest foreign investor in Vietnam, after Taiwan but ahead of Japan. The Connectivity agreement will further open up opportunities for Singapore firms in Vietnam. Seizing the opportunities 15. Governments in Asia see the benefits of economic cooperation and are building closer links, both on a multilateral as well as bilateral basis. This will enable the private sector to take full advantage of the rich array of opportunities. I strongly encourage Singapore-based companies and financial institutions to ride the growth momentum. 16. Let me highlight a few such opportunities. As capital restrictions are gradually liberalised in their countries, Chinese and Indian individuals, financial institutions and corporates will begin to invest overseas. Singapore-based financial institutions could partner them to use Singapore as a base to expand into the region. 17. The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) is a win-win outcome for Singapore and India.
William C Dudley: Is the active use of macroprudential tools institutionally realistic? Panel remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the “Macroprudential Monetary Policy”, 59th Economic Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts, 3 October 2015. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to be here today and to have the opportunity to talk about the potential use of macroprudential tools in the United States. Before I respond to Adam Posen, I’d like to make a few general comments on macroprudential tools. I am interested in such tools both as a U.S. policymaker and in my role as chair of the Committee on the Global Financial System of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a body that has done considerable work in this area in recent years. What I have to say today represents my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System.1 The use of macroprudential tools has gotten considerable attention for several reasons. Some countries have implemented macroprudential measures with respect to the housing market that may have limited the extent of home price appreciation and made their financial systems more resilient when the boom unwound. Other countries have implemented countercyclical capital requirements that have made their banking systems more resilient. Thus, the hope is that U.S. policymakers can learn from these international experiences and incorporate effective macroprudential tools into our toolkit that could be used to limit financial stability risks.

How will the governance work in coordinating across these three realms? In the meantime, while we work to sort all this out, we should take considerable solace from the fact that we have made the financial system more resilient to shocks. We may not be able to anticipate the next area of excess. But with higher capital and liquidity requirements and the use of stress tests to assess emerging vulnerabilities, I think we are much better placed than we have been in the past. Thank you for your kind attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
If we don’t address these concerns, we will not have the consensus that is necessary to achieve the many benefits of technology. What do we need to get right in data governance? Data must be protected – we must safeguard privacy, confidentiality, and security. Data must be used in a responsible, transparent, and ethical manner. We must be able to explain the results of data driven algorithms. We cannot hide behind the black box. Humans, not machines, are accountable for decisions driven by AI or data analytics. We must ensure that outcomes of data or AI driven processes are ethical, free of bias, and socially acceptable. Only then, can we create an ecosystem where data flows seamlessly in a trusted manner. MAS has been actively working with the industry to develop principles to guide the responsible use of data in financial services. We are pleased to release today a set of principles to promote Fairness, Ethics, Accountability & Transparency, or FEAT, in the use of AI and data analytics. I’m told this is the first of its kind in the world – where the regulator and industry have come together to set guidance on the responsible use of AI and data analytics. And I am sure this is a living document that will be continually updated as we learn more. Next, on the international front: we need more data connectivity, and less data localisation. This is a serious risk. Data localisation measures are on the rise around the world.

No more checkouts, no more lines, no more fussing with cash and credit cards. Fantasy? Just visit Amazon Go – it is already happening. Imagine a world where insurance is intuitive. How many of us truly understand our insurance policies … or are fully confident they will pay out when we need them? Imagine a world where the payout is automatically triggered by events and is instantaneous. No more lengthy claims forms, no more waiting time, no more opaque processes. Science fiction? Not quite. MetLife’s Lumenlab here in Singapore is already making this a reality for gestational diabetes insurance. They are testing this out in MAS’ regulatory sandbox. Imagine a world where financial advice is integrated. Imagine our own personal financial dashboard on our mobile devices. giving us a complete view of our finances - pulling in data from banks we have deposits with, insurance companies we have policies with, and broker-dealers we have investments with …. …. not to mention, our pension or social security funds, tax liabilities, and mortgages … all in one place: a personal balance sheet – in real-time! And where financial advice is customised for us, based on an integrated view of our unique situations, at important milestones in our life …. … buying our first home, planning our children’s education, looking for investment opportunity to grow our retirement nest. Many FinTech firms are already developing apps and solutions to do this.