samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Savings are encouraged by strengthening the financial system and delivering positive real interest rates through appropriate monetary policy measures. The Central Banks’ contribution to promoting investment will be somewhat indirect and will mainly arise from the business confidence that would be generated as a result of maintaining low inflation and minimising the macroeconomic risks. Currently, the Central Bank managed Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) plays a significant role in supplying both equity and debt capital to the private sector as well as the Government, while generating optimum long term returns for members. The Central Bank will continue to fulfill this role and supply equity and debt capital in 2007 by carefully evaluating investment opportunities and a gradual diversification of investments. In addition, the service provided to the presently active two million members will be enhanced through a comprehensive reengineering programme of the EPF by fully automating its operations, using electronic means to update the member accounts in real time. The Central Bank will also actively explore the possibility of introducing a unified voluntary contributory social security scheme for over three million informal sector workers. This will provide a social security to these workers, while generating large scale savings and funds for investment as well. BIS Review8/2007  13  In keeping with the vision of the Central Bank, access to finance by all segments of the population will be improved through continued development of the finance sector.

The key policy instrument used in this endeavour is the establishment of policy interest rates for borrowing (Repurchase Rate) and for lending (Reverse Repurchase Rate) that operates through the Bank’s Open Market Operations. The Central Bank conducts Open Market Operations to keep the level of Reserve money in the system at an appropriate level, while it uses the Statutory Reserve Ratio (SRR) on commercial bank deposit liabilities to further support the monetary policy. Financial System Stability, the other core objective of the Central Bank, is achieved through the regulation and supervision of financial institutions, the overseeing of the financial infrastructure which includes critical payment and settlement systems, as well as keeping a close watch on the financial markets as a whole. To achieve this objective, the Central Bank employs a series of prudential and regulatory measures. In addition to the core objectives, the Central Bank provides policy advice to the Government and vital state sector enterprises to strengthen macroeconomic stability and to enhance growth prospects. The Bank also undertakes several agency and ancillary functions, which include managing the Foreign Reserves of the country, Public Debt and Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF). Further, the Central Bank plays a key role in broadening the financial infrastructure and strengthening the small, medium and microfinance sectors in the country. 2. Outline of today's statement  The policy statement presented today for the year 2007 and beyond focuses on several areas.
However, the national accounts for the United States also contained a review of earlier figures, which shows that the decline in 2009 was greater and the GDP level this year lower than was previously assessed (see Figure 9). The labour market improved in July, but not at a rate that points to a good recovery. CPI inflation in the United States remained high in June and July, 3.6 per cent, which was unchanged from May. Underlying inflation, excluding energy and food, was lower, but rose in both months to a level of 1.8 per cent in July. GDP growth in the euro area was 0.2 per cent in the second quarter of 2011, measured as a seasonally-adjusted quarterly change, which was also slightly lower (0.1 percentage point) than we were expecting in July. Inflation in the euro area fell from 2.7 per cent in June to 2.5 per cent in July, when measured as the HICP. Underlying HICP inflation excluding energy and unprocessed foods also fell in July, to 1.5 per cent. At the monetary policy meeting in July I said that developments in the United States were troublesome. Both monetary policy and fiscal policy must be tightened there in the longer run, which will subdue growth. A strong, self-supporting recovery is therefore needed, a recovery that does not depend on short-term cyclical policy stimulation, to ensure a tangible improvement in the labour market. We cannot see this type of strong growth yet.

As consumers embrace the digital era, insurers will need to rethink their distribution strategies and partner relationships as digital and remote options are rapidly replacing commonplace functions and tasks. Digital technology can be deployed effectively to accommodate customers’ priorities in ways that would promote customer support and loyalty whilst significantly enhancing the consumer experience and satisfaction. In many ways, the human capital and technology imperatives share characteristics that are borderless. We are living in a globalised world, with significantly greater capital and labour mobility than in any other period in history. For multinational organisations, this enables ideas and innovations to transcend borders and be more easily replicated to great positive effect, to grow successful businesses and transform the economies in which they operate. This is where foreign partners of local entities with international presence have enormous potential to make a significant contribution to the development of local economies. As international entities that actively operate in more developed insurance markets, foreign insurers should bring new and proven systems, technology and experiences which can enhance their domestic operations and benefit the wider economy of the host country. This is the fundamental value of foreign direct investments. We know of successful cases in Europe where digitisation has been transformational, where a higher adoption of straight-through  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  processing, paperless documentation, usage of customer analytics and electronic payments have all led to improved efficiency and higher service value for insurers.
But it would be reasonable to say that the lack of fiscal discipline has been a central factor, given the leading role the debt markets have played in the origin and transmission of tensions. As we learned, the fiscal discipline rules of the Stability and Growth Pact were insufficient to ensure the budgetary rigour needed for the normal functioning of a monetary union without fiscal union, and accorded governments an excessive degree of discretionality. Hence, there was a failure during the expansion years to adopt fiscal measures that would have provided greater room for manoeuvre to face the crisis. The crisis also highlighted the interrelatedness which, at times of tension, arises between the three sides of the triangle comprised of sovereign risk, banking risk and the economic fragility stemming from the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances. Once one of these factors is activated, there is a serious danger feedback loops will be set in train that do but exacerbate and deepen the crisis. From this standpoint, the current strains are also attributable to the excessive complacency with which high levels of private debt were run up in several countries during the boom years and which, without the counterweight of sufficiently strict fiscal policies, ultimately led to a series of burgeoning current-account deficits. The source of these imbalances is not unrelated to the asymmetries that prevailed in the opening years of the monetary union.

Developments in the Swiss housing market have been relatively steady, despite the strong demand pressures discernible in certain regions. At present we do not detect any obvious signs of a speculative bubble that might culminate in a sudden fall in prices. The main explanations for the rise in real estate prices in the past few years have been higher expectations and good financing conditions. Around Lake Geneva the pressures on the limited available space and the fast growth in the residential population have acted as special stimulants. Thus there have been no speculative developments as witnessed at the end of the 1980s. Now that the business cycle has peaked in Switzerland, it is very likely that we will move into a phase of more moderate price increases. BIS Review 73/2008  1
As I mentioned earlier, inflation rates may remain above 2% for longer than was expected just a few months ago, owing to unexpected developments in energy prices and the past decline in the euro. In order to maintain price stability over the medium term it is important that economic agents accurately perceive the nature of current price developments. In particular, it needs to be recognised that current upward pressures can be successfully overcome if economic agents see them for what they are - namely, one-off or temporary price increases resulting from external factors - and act accordingly. These factors must not give rise to second-round effects. If oil prices do not rise further, as the markets expect, the effects of past oil price increases will gradually drop out of the annual inflation rate. At the current juncture two main considerations should guide expectations regarding the outlook for the euro area economy. First, the Governing Council is committed to maintaining price stability in the medium term. It will continue to assess thoroughly the outlook for price stability in the euro area. Monetary policy will not accommodate inflationary tendencies in the euro area and in this way will make its best contribution to sustainable growth. Second, euro area countries are now in a much better position to withstand the adverse effects of a sharp oil price increase than they were in the 1970s. The Governing Council remains optimistic with regard to the economic outlook for the euro area.

The Governing Council has today also adopted an ECB Regulation establishing transitional provisions for the integration of Greek credit institutions into the Eurosystem’s minimum reserve system, as a consequence of the introduction of the euro in Greece as from 1 January 2001. BIS Review 97/2000  2
Let me now continue my remarks by focusing on Malaysia’s own experience in managing this pandemic, specifically how we have sought to ensure our banks remain well-positioned to manage potential deterioration in asset quality caused by the pandemic once the raft of policy measures expire. Malaysia’s experience – what, why and how Malaysia, like most countries in this region, relied on a coordinated set of fiscal, monetary, and prudential policies to weather the impact of the pandemic. Our priority at the onset of the pandemic was to provide immediate financial relief to affected borrowers and ensure uninterrupted flow of credit to the economy. With that in mind, we did 3 things; i. First, we implemented a blanket, automatic 6-month loan moratorium for individual and SME borrowers; ii. Second, we introduced and expanded subsidised funds and credit guarantee schemes for businesses, particularly for SMEs; and iii. Third, regulatory and supervisory flexibilities were accorded to banks to facilitate the various support programmes and sustain financing activity. When the economy gradually recovered heading into 2021, these broad-based support measures were refined to be more targeted at borrowers who were still facing acute financial stress. Alas, Malaysia experienced a sharp escalation of COVID-19 infections that led to the reimposition of nationwide lockdowns in the second quarter of 2021. As a result, the continuation and expansion of most of the COVID-19 relief measures became necessary to support distressed borrowers. Managing the build-up of risks We have been very fortunate that the financial sector entered this crisis from a position of strength.

That said, it is equally important for policymakers to ensure that mechanisms for swift NPL resolution remain appropriate, not only to prevent an accumulation of legacy NPLs in the banking sector but also to provide borrowers impacted by this pandemic an opportunity to bounce back once the crisis abates. Such a balanced approach helps to preserve the value and productive capacity of borrowers in turn limiting long-term damage to the economy. For Malaysia, work is underway to strengthen legislation which will expand the coverage of businesses that can benefit from court-sanctioned recovery mechanisms. This will help flatten the insolvency curve and avoid more permanent scarring, if NPL cases were to spike. Admittedly, this is an area where there are opportunities to do more and one where all of us can potentially learn from each other. Concluding remarks Let me conclude. Looking ahead, we are cautiously optimistic that the tide may be finally turning in this crisis. However, we certainly can’t conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic is firmly behind us. We humbly admit that the virus has wrong footed us several times. The hallmark of good policymakers is to, as the saying goes, “hope for the best, but prepare for the worst”.
These new elements in the functioning of the labour market may help the Riksbank to combat inflation and will probably be good for growth and thus employment in the long term. However, they must be weighed against a possible deterioration in security of employment for the individual. How high can the rate of wage increase go without causing inflation to accelerate? In the long term the development of real wages must reflect the labour force's ability to produce goods and services. Thus, real wages can only rise as long as productivity is increasing. If real wages rise faster than productivity, companies are forced to either raise their prices if they can, which means that inflation rises, or to reduce their labour force or curtail their operations. Nominal wages can thus increase by the total of the inflation target of 2 per cent and the growth in productivity. If we assume that the Swedish productivity rate trend is approximately 1 to 2 per cent, a reasonable assessment is that an average increase in payroll expense of around 3.5 per cent should be sustainable in the long term. However, it is important to point out that the arguments regarding wage scope are based on several assumptions. The first concerns an increase in total payroll expense, i.e. both wage increases through collective or local bargaining and other types of increase in payroll expense, such as payroll tax and collective charges.

A temporary phase, which we are in, of low interest rates makes it more likely that we will return to a situation where savers get a better deal. It is a temporary phase, but there is no doubt that there are consequences for those looking to earn income. This is not a situation that is ideal. But we are still in the legacy of the crisis and I think this policy path is correct. We also always say that, in terms of the speed of the recovery, European fiscal policymakers can do more. Those countries which have fiscal space can do more to accelerate the recovery. Some have said that the continued low interest rates and quantitative easing have had benefits for large investment funds, and for the area of property investments in particular these benefits come at the expense of individual prospective house buyers, or indeed people who end up renting. It’s become an issue here as it has in other parts of Europe. How would you respond to that? The low interest rate environment has many benefits. It helps to create jobs. For those with a 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  mortgage, it reduces the cost of maintaining that mortgage. For highly indebted governments there is a saving in terms of debt service payments. But there is no doubt about it: it does mean that it raises the purchase price of homes.
Of course, as I noted in a speech earlier this year, we will have to monitor inflation expectations closely to ensure that they do not become unanchored. We also need to keep a close eye on the degree to which unit labor cost increases in EMEs and real exchange rate appreciation abroad are passed through into U.S. import prices and consumer inflation. Although the historic evidence is that pass-through has been limited in the United States, we cannot be complacent about this. Meanwhile, we have to recognize that monetary policy works somewhat differently in a world in which a large share of global GDP is part of a de facto dollar block. In particular, we must take into account the feedback loops this creates – how U.S. monetary policy influences financial conditions elsewhere and, how these changes, in turn, influence activity and prices in the United States. At the same time, other nations should recognize that we cannot and do not seek to make monetary policy for the world. Responsibility for ensuring that financial conditions in other nations are appropriate for their own circumstances appropriately lies with their national authorities, and they have a wide range of fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and other policy tools available for this purpose. I do not see any fundamental conflict between U.S. domestic economic objectives and the interests of the global system as a whole. But the existing system of global currency and monetary arrangements does render effective pursuit of these objectives more difficult.

But transmission through the exchange rate channel is uncertain and volatile, as the exchange rate is also an asset price that fluctuates with speculative capital flows and can deviate from equilibrium over time, only to correct quite suddenly. Unless the financial system is that much better protected, this process can interact negatively with financial stability, as was the case in Iceland during the financial crisis. This is at the heart of the problem faced by small countries that pursue independent monetary policy and permit unrestricted capital flows simultaneously. The problem can be solved by adapting monetary policy to that prevailing in large countries even though it is not suited to domestic conditions, or by placing restrictions on cross-border capital flows, particularly those related to carry trade. The need for such restrictions is likely to surface earlier and more strongly in countries with shallow financial markets. But capital flow management measures that aim to restrict both carry trade and destabilising capital movements cannot be used as the first line of defence in the fight against inflation and macroeconomic imbalances, except under extraordinary circumstances. Such instruments will have adverse side effects and could push international obligations to their limits. But some sort of tools must be available for use if the need arises. In general, the first line of defence must be conventional management of the monetary-fiscal policy mix, supported by structural reforms and sound economic incentives.
In the new banking package, the concept of “transition plans” is important. Under Article 76 of the proposed amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD VI)[13], a bank’s management board is required to monitor and address environmental risks arising in the short, medium and long term. [14] Banks have to make sure that their business model and strategy are not misaligned with the relevant Union policy objectives towards a sustainable economy and they need to manage potential risks from such misalignments. Article 11 TFEU, the requirement to integrate environmental requirements into the policies and activities of the Union, plays a role in supervision. The ECB has a duty to integrate the Climate Law’s neutrality objectives into its supervisory policies and activities. However, we have some discretion as to how we do this. After all, the climate neutrality objective affects the ECB’s mandate in many respects and Article 11 TFEU does not prescribe how the ECB should integrate the environmental requirements. Do not expect us to act to regulate or enforce environmental policies. We will stick to our mandate. Our mandate is to keep under control the risks that banks and the financial system are facing, and in that capacity we have to look closely at the risks that are building up in the banking sector as a consequence of the climate crisis. Lastly, I would like to draw your attention to the work of the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS).

The emerging Asian economies again provided a particularly vigorous growth hub, and the rise in manufacturing production in China stimulated international trade. Consequently, all of Asia – and especially Japan – benefited from the strength of the Chinese economy. The European economy, meanwhile, lacked vigour in the first part of the year. This was due, in particular, to chronic weakness in domestic demand. In early 2005, Germany, France and Italy even experienced a situation of near-stagnation. Although the economic climate recovered subsequently, this improvement was often hesitant. To a large extent, the Swiss economy escaped the European lethargy due to its relatively diversified export markets. Our foreign trade sagged in the first quarter of 2005 but returned to a strongly expansionary course thereafter. Consumption was relatively firm even if the rate of growth remained extremely modest. Investments failed to show the strength exhibited in 2004 because of the hesitations about the soundness of the recovery. Even construction had a difficult start to the year because of the adverse weather conditions – despite the strong support provided by low interest rates. Although this industry subsequently rallied, it was unable to recover the strength it had enjoyed in 2004. For the year as a whole, the Swiss economy grew 1.9%, which was slightly below the figure reached in 2004. In the uncertain economic environment that prevailed in 2005, the Swiss National Bank did not continue with the normalisation of interest rates which it had embarked on in spring 2004.