samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another initiative ongoing is to work with other agencies to enhance supervision of saving cooperatives as well as other non-bank entities, which do bank-like businesses, to mitigate shadow banking risks. Ladies and gentlemen, Amidst the structural challenges facing the Thai economy, the Bank of Thailand has stepped up our “stewardship” role by providing policy directions and ensuring that the financial system develops with the sustainable well-being of the Thai people as the main goal. Taking advantage of the rapid advancement in technology, which has become increasingly more powerful and affordable, we have focused on three key imperatives of productivity, immunity, and inclusivity to guide the development of our financial system for the future. First, uplifting productivity is a critical requirement for long term economic growth. One of the main challenges Thailand is facing is structural change due to an aging workforce. Moreover, our labor productivity growth has been on a decline, with growth rate of labor productivity averaging 2.9 percent during 2002 to 2017 compared with an average of 5 percent during 1986 to 2001. A shrinking workforce and low labor productivity growth will pose a challenge to Thailand’s long term growth prospect. To ensure sustainable growth for our economy, we must become more productive. Undoubtedly, proactive adoption of modern technology will be the key to achieve this goal. Second, immunity must be emphasized given the VUCA nature of the future global economic landscape. We are living in a time of disruptions, where outcomes can be unpredictable 1 Estimated for 2018.

But normal interest rates appear to be lower than previously thought. It is therefore more likely that we touch the lower bound for the repo rate in times of economic recessions, and we may then again need to use bond purchases as a complement in monetary policy. References Alsterlind Jan, Henrik Erikson, Maria Sandström and David Vestin (2015), “How can government bond purchases make monetary policy more expansionary?”, Economic Commentaries No. 12, Sveriges Riksbank Altavilla, Carlo, Giacomo Carboni and Roberto Motto (2015), “Asset purchase programmes and financial markets: lessons from the euro area”, ECB Working Paper Series No 1864, European Central Bank 9 [16]  Archer, David and Paul Moser-Boehm (2013), “Central bank finances”, BIS Papers No 71, Bank for International Settlement Bernanke, Ben (2016), “Should the Fed keep its balance sheet large?”, Brookings, 2 september Blinder, Alan, Michael Ehrmann, Jakob de Haan and David-Jan Jansen (2017), “Necessity as the mother of invention: monetary policy after the crisis”, Economic Policy 32, 707-755 Costancio, Vitor (2017), “The future of monetary policy frameworks”, speech, 25 May, European Central Bank De Rezende, Rafael B., David Kjellberg and Oskar Tysklind (2015), “Effects of the Riksbank's government bond purchases on financial prices”, Economic Commentaries No. 13, Sveriges Riksbank.
They have clearly demonstrated their will to take action when necessary. But governments are also intervening to bolster banks’ solvency and soundness. In this context and in order to ensure that national measures for dealing with the crisis are consistent, the international community is taking a collective stand. The G7 plan of action is a major step forward. It sets out clear principles to be applied by the whole international community – in particular the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee – with a view to giving structure to national actions. It expounds the following principles: •  taking decisive action to prevent the failure of financial institutions;  •  taking all necessary steps to unfreeze credit and money markets;  •  ensuring that banks and other major financial intermediaries can raise capital as needed;  •  ensuring that national deposit insurance and guarantee programmes are robust;  •  ensuring accurate valuation and transparent disclosure of assets, as well as consistent implementation of high quality accounting standards. Thanks, in particular, to France’s leading role in discussions, Europe is organising itself.

This exceptional intervention was necessary because AIG had engaged in the highly risky business of selling credit protection over the past few years, which left it vulnerable and very exposed to a turnaround in the US housing market. The uncertainty stemming from this situation gave rise to the risk of a domino effect, affecting one financial institution after the next. Fears that this effect could be fuelled by price manipulations and speculation resulted in a restriction of short selling, first in the United States and then in many other countries including France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Austria and Australia. It was against this backdrop that the idea of an "overall solution" emerged, marking a change in strategy compared to the case-by-case approach that had prevailed until then. This was the underlying rationale for the Paulson Plan adopted on 3 October. Three remarks on the latter: •  The general idea behind the Plan is for the Treasury to purchase currently illiquid assets. It aims to rid banks of the bad assets weighing on their balance sheets, and to eliminate uncertainty about their real value and, in turn, about that of the banks themselves. Indeed, under the current accounting framework, these assets are marked to market, which means that any uncertainty about their value affects that of the financial institutions themselves. •  The way in which the Plan is to be implemented still remains vague. One essential aspect is the price at which assets are to be purchased.
When I was out ice skating at Norrviken not far from here a couple of weeks ago a metaphor came to mind for the way the Riksbank has to adapt to different conditions as they occur. It should be appropriate in this winter holiday period. Say that the ice you are skating on is good, but seems to become gradually worse the further you go. Then there is no harm in going a bit further – waiting and seeing what happens – as long as you are observant. Perhaps you will change course slightly to be on the safe side. More than that is not necessary. But let us say instead that the ice is suddenly really thin. Then it is no longer a good idea to keep on going and wait and see what happens further ahead. A minor change of course is not enough. If the conditions become really bad you will have to do even more – turn around immediately – to get back onto safe ice. What I am trying to say is not that we are skating on thin ice. What I mean is that decisions are linked to, and must also be assessed on the basis of the situation in which they are taken – what information is available and what one believes lies ahead. Like when you are wondering whether you should carry on skating on ice that may be uncertain. How much do you need to change course for everything to go well?

Like when we Executive Board members take a decision on what interest rate path is needed for inflation to be close to the target of 2 per cent a couple of years ahead. How much do we need to change it and how quickly? Decisions in times of uncertainty and how we manage this is a recurring theme today. You members of the Committee on Finance will later be asking questions on the basis of the material for assessing monetary policy published by the Riksbank on 16 February.2 Your views on our interest rate decisions of recent years – whether you consider they were wellbalanced given the information at the disposal of the Executive Board at the time the  1  This calculation is based on the SEK/USD exchange rate on the respective auction date. 2  See “Material for assessing monetary policy 2006-2008”. BIS Review 23/2009  1  decision was made – comprise important information for us. I am therefore looking forward to discussing the assessment later, during the actual hearing. But first I would like to talk about how the financial crisis affects the conditions for our policy. I shall also discuss the most recent interest rate decision and our readiness for dealing with unexpected economic developments. The financial crisis affects the conditions for monetary policy For a long time, the global financial crisis only had a fairly limited effect on the Swedish economy.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Challenges of financial education in Malaysia Opening remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of the Insurance Consumer Education Programme, Kuala-Lumpur, 29 August 2003. *  *  *  Saya berasa amat berbesar hati mengalu-alukan kehadiran tuan-tuan dan puan-puan ke majlis pelancaran Program Pendidikan Pengguna bagi industri insurans dan takaful pada pagi ini. Pelancaran program ini merupakan satu lagi perkembangan penting dalam pembangunan industri insurans dan takaful. Ladies and Gentlemen, The economic and financial landscape in Malaysia has undergone significant transformation. In the process, the economy has become more diversified with new sources of growth. In tandem with these changes, we have seen the modernisation of the financial sector that has also become increasingly more diversified to meet the new requirements of the economy. There has also emerged new distribution channels and channel convergence within the financial sector. The financial sector has also increasingly leveraged on advances in technology which has significantly changed the way financial business is being conducted. As market advances continue to expand the range of financial products and services, consumers are being faced with increasingly complex choices and options in the management of their personal finances and exposure to risk. In this more complex financial landscape, it becomes important for consumers to have improved access to information. Financial education for Malaysian consumers is central to this process. It is therefore a matter that is accorded high priority by the Central Bank.

(X) Essentially, the year 2010 is supposed to be some kind of “the day after”, or the year of “coming to our senses”, which will show that we became smarter after the crisis, that we learned enough from it, and that we are prepared to act differently. The question is, however, whether this comes true, not only due to defending particular interests, but also because not even others know exactly what to do. There is not much use in repeating generally known facts. The general pattern has lately been to inject liquidity and strengthen regulations. We, too, injected liquidity (over EUR 5 billion, in a very short term), but we had to relax regulations in order to activate it. So, the stereotype that in the period of expansion we implemented restrictive monetary policy and in recession we should adhere to expansive policy – does not apply. Our monetary policy has never been really restrictive, but was even hyper-expansive in 2009, although this was not reflected in the monetary statistics. The problem is evidently not in the quantity of money but in its allocation, i.e. the purpose for which it is spent, and the effects produced by such spending. This was not so obvious in the period of expansion (when there was enough money for everyone). At the time of recession  2  BIS Review 2/2010  and stagnation, the change in allocation has a key role. However, no significant changes are possible without the government playing its part.
This was previously necessary because expectations regarding future monetary policy could strongly influence the three-month rate. The SNB policy rate also sets the terms for monetary policy-related transactions with the SNB. The conditions on the money market are currently determined by the interest rate banks pay on their sight deposits at the SNB. We have decided that the interest on these deposits will at present correspond to the SNB policy rate, and will thus remain at −0.75%. I will now summarise the importance of the SNB policy rate. From this point onwards, we will use the SNB policy rate in taking and communicating our interest rate decisions. Our conditional inflation forecast will now be based on the assumption of an unchanged SNB policy rate over the relevant horizon. The SNB policy rate signals the interest rate level we will seek to maintain on the short-term money market. In assessing the actual conditions on the money market, we are focusing on SARON. The terms for monetary policy-related transactions will be based on the SNB policy rate. Page 2/5  Berne, 13 June 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  This adjustment does not entail any change in our current monetary policy, and in particular our expansionary stance. The inflation forecast of March 2019 and the new forecast can be directly compared with one another.

In the current environment, the assumption of a given interest rate remaining unchanged results in an identical forecast, irrespective of whether it is the SNB policy rate or the three-month Libor that is being kept constant. This also applies to the conditions on the money market. The three-month Libor and SARON are virtually on a par at present. Setting the SNB policy rate at −0.75% therefore means that conditions on the money market remain unchanged. In my remarks, I have looked at the changeover to the SNB policy rate from the perspective of monetary policy. My colleague Andréa Maechler will talk about the market’s transitioning from the Libor to SARON in more detail. We are supporting the work on this transition since representative and reliable reference rates are of pivotal importance for monetary policy and the financial markets alike. I would now like to return to my explanation of our monetary policy. An expansionary monetary policy remains necessary against the backdrop of the current price and economic developments. On a trade-weighted basis, the Swiss franc is somewhat stronger than in March and is still highly valued. The situation on the foreign exchange market continues to be fragile. The negative interest rate and our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary remain essential in order to keep the attractiveness of Swiss franc investments low and thus ease pressure on the currency. Looking at the short term, the new conditional inflation forecast is slightly higher than in March.
Monetary policy could obviously have been given a more expansionary turn than was the case at the end of 1996 and during 1997, in which case UND1X inflation might have been higher and more in line with the 2 per cent target, quite apart from the interest expenditure effect on the CPI. In this context one can, of course, discuss the Riksbank’s basic forecasts of inflation excluding the transitory effects from interest expenditure and taxes. The Riksbank made a forecasting error in failing to foresee the economic slowdown inherent in the Asian crisis and the ensuing fall in commodity prices. Unfortunately, you might say, we shared this error with a clear majority of observers. With the long time lag that applies to monetary policy, measures should really have been taken before the end of 1996 or early 1997, which was before the crisis had even arisen. If the commodity price fall does not leave any traces in inflation expectations, it should not affect policy either. CPI and underlying inflation in a longer perspective4  10. CPI and underlying inflation The estimated indicator of underlying inflation broadly corresponds to UNDINHX (see Inflation Report 1999:1) Determinants of inflation: Underlying inflation  1. Expected inflation trend 2. Economic situation 3. Supply shocks, e.g.

If the Riksbank had left the repo rate at 8.91 per cent – its level before the cuts were initiated early in 1996 – then the direct interest expenditure effect could have been avoided. Economic activity would have gradually weakened, however, and this would have pushed down the CPI excluding the interest expenditure effect. But that would have taken time and to begin with the macroeconomic effect would have been rather small. Sooner or later, however, the macroeconomic effect would have begun to surpass the interest effect on the CPI. In theory, that could have been prevented by raising the interest rate and thereby increasing the interest expenditure effect. Such a strategy could have been implemented for a time but in the end the economy would have become so sluggish that the macroeconomic effect would still have gained the upper hand. The situation would probably have caused the exchange rate to collapse. The marked depreciation would have led to rising import prices and perhaps CPI inflation would then have moved back up to the targeted rate. That is what could have happened, though I want to stress that the scenario is theoretical and hypothetical. The Riksbank would have fulfilled the CPI target but at the cost of marked instability in interest rates and the exchange rate as well as in the real economy. I find it hard to believe that such a strategy would have been supported for any length of time by either the political system or people in general.
A renewed focus on the digital economy, for example, can help break the negative feedback loop we see in Europe between fragmented markets, low economies of scale and weak investment in digital capacities, which has at times resulted in the knowledge economy in the euro area contributing only about half as much to productivity growth as in the United States.3 Greater digitalisation would in turn help accelerate the shift in Europe towards what the economist Carlota Perez has termed “smart green growth”, which is not only about renewables and sustainable goods, but also about innovation in the productivity of resources and the shift from tangibles to intangibles.4 Europe already hosts the largest eco-innovation and circular economy industry in the world5 and the euro is the currency of choice for global green bond issuance.6 In the twentieth century, Europe was also at the forefront of the creation of the welfare state. The crisis today offers a possibility to consolidate and expand our global leadership on the environmental front and to make it converge with more digital lifestyles – producing a new, more sustainable economic model. Finally, the drive to build more resilient supply chains could be the catalyst we need to definitively complete the Single Market. If we are to “de-globalise” while also achieving allocative efficiency and strategic autonomy, we will have no choice but to make full use of the size and diversity of our continent-wide economy. So the potential to frame a positive European vision should, I hope, be compelling.

If such changes happen too rapidly, they can lead to temporary disruptions in the labour market.1 So it is natural for people to wonder what the economy will look like in the future and how we will ensure sustainable growth. Our task today – if we want to prevent a persistent increase in precautionary saving and instead to direct such saving towards needed investment – is to provide them with credible answers. Transitioning to the post-crisis economy Dealing with uncertainty about the outlook is the task of stabilisation policies, and here the ECB will continue to take all necessary steps within our mandate of price stability – for all euro area citizens in all parts of the euro area. Already our policies have dispelled tail risks in financial markets that could have led to selfreinforcing vicious circles. We are now orienting our measures to ensure that the right financial conditions are in place to support a recovery from the crisis. This was the motivation behind our recent decision to expand our pandemic emergency purchase programme to € trillion, coupled with the up to € trillion we are making available to banks that lend to the real economy. But monetary policy cannot address the more profound questions about how the economy will look in the future. Historical experience suggests that major economic shifts like the one we are going through today require government action to foster change and smooth the transition to the new normal.
The SRR gives four tools to the three Tripartite Authorities to cope with failing institutions: •  First, the transfer of all or part of a bank’s business to a private sector purchaser; something we have already seen used in the resolution of Bradford and Bingley and Kaupthing under the Special Provisions Act. •  Second, the transfer of the viable part of a bank’s business to a temporary bridge bank owned by the Bank of England. This would allow continuity of banking services  4  BIS Review 132/2008  for its customers whilst enabling due diligence by potential private sector purchasers and providing for the orderly wind down of the rump. •  Third, temporary public ownership which would give the treasury the power to transfer the shares of a failing bank to a nominee of the Treasury. This power would be used in cases where significant amounts of public sector funds are required to stabilise the failing bank or where long term restructuring of the bank is necessary. •  Fourth bank insolvency procedures – a last resort. This would look much like a standard company insolvency but with the important difference that the liquidator’s primary objective would be to assist the FSCS in protecting depositors. I can understand why there has been some nervousness among banks and investors about this regime and particularly about the powers to split failing banks into “good” and “bad” parts.

The medium term agenda We all have lessons to learn from the turmoil of the last fifteen months. I would like to pick out three in particular, two of which are international and one UK specific: •  the need to develop new “macro prudential” policies to bridge the gap between monetary policy and the regulation of particular institutions and markets;  •  the need to establish a more effective regime in the UK for handling failing banks; and  •  the need to improve the handling of cross border crises and bank failures. Central Banks have always paid close attention to asset prices and credit growth in deciding monetary policy but they are setting interest rates for the whole economy and there is no guarantee that the rate or the rapid changes in rates that could be needed to dampen asset price growth will be appropriate more widely. On the other side, regulation and supervision are focused on the resilience and conduct of individual institutions: their management, risks controls, capital and liquidity and so on. What we have found in the last few years is that the sum of what makes sense at the level of individual institutions does not necessarily add up to what is needed for the system as a whole. We need to develop what are called “macro prudential” policies to bridge that gap.