samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition, digitalisation was regarded by firms as replacing low and medium-skilled jobs but not high-skilled jobs. 4  For more information, see European Investment Bank (2019): Investment Report 2018/2019. Retooling Europe´s Economy. 5 For more information, see ECB (2018): “Digitalisation and its impacto n the economy: insights from a survey of large companies”, ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 7/2018 3/6  Intangible assets Today’s conference deals not only with digitalisation but also with intangible assets. Intangible assets are non-monetary assets without physical substance encompassing ICT, research and development (R&D), innovation, design, creativity, image and brand, organisation and human capital formation. The development of the digital economy has certainly contributed to a notable increase in investment in intangible assets, as digital firms tend to both invest and innovate more than non-digital firms. Also digital technologies have increased the demand for high-skill workers, increasing in this way the investment in intangibles. Partly as a result of digitalisation, the relative importance of intangible assets has been increasing in most economies6. But measurement of intangible assets is not straightforward, and their definition in the national accounts has gradually broadened. The current national accounts systems include as intangible assets computerised systems (software and databases), R&D, mineral exploration and entertainment, literary or artistic originals. Nevertheless, some authors7 claim that a broader range of assets should be included in the definition of intangible assets.

People want to be team players.1 Those behavioral traits can be amplified through a firm’s culture, which can weigh on one’s willingness to do the right thing. This is, unfortunately, what seems to have occurred at Wells Fargo, one of the largest retail banks in the United States. Whether to obtain a bonus or simply to keep a job, employees felt they had to keep quiet and meet sales targets despite the cost to customers.2 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  So, how do you change a culture where silence leads to misconduct? I will offer two ideas that might help and one idea that will not. Here is what will not work: Merely telling your employees to speak up. Cultures do not change simply by exhortation. Eloquent speeches, a well-phrased value statement, and an annual requirement to acknowledge the code of conduct are just not sufficient. That’s the easy one. The two ideas that might work are harder. First, managers have to lead by example. Senior executives must be seen within the firm to expect and respect challenges, and in turn must challenge ideas themselves. And, they have to explain difficult decisions to their employees—sharing not only the news of what they have done, but why. More important, mid-level managers have to do the same. Of course, mid-level managers will not generally behave that way unless they see their senior leadership setting the example. Second, if your organization values people when they raise their hand, your incentives have to reflect that.
4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  34 Another field of research work can be around central bank digital currencies, or to use the buzz word, CBDC. Globally, there has been some discussion on the potential implications of CBDCs, but this is still relatively green field thinking. I will not delve more into it as the subject can be a seminar theme in and of itself. Conclusion 35 As you will have realised, I have flagged more questions than answers this evening. I think the post-crisis financial landscape is an exciting time to be an economist, analyst or researcher in support of financial market development, as well as to help shape policy reviews and thinking. Many of the developments I have touched on are rapidly evolving, and are also not mutually exclusive from one another. 36 There is a view that we should accept a more central role incorporating beliefs and expectations to both understand and shape financial market developments. New advances in behavioural economics can provide for tractable and psychologically-founded models of beliefs to be integrated into the standard analytical frameworks in finance and macroeconomics. 37 It is important that policymakers and regulators have a firm grasp of these interactions and develop new techniques to calibrate policies and mitigate risks. 38 The MAS therefore welcomes the opportunity to further engage the research community, hopefully with many of you, so that with your knowledge, expertise and research rigour, we can deepen our collective learning and understanding.

11 Two weeks ago, at a forum of the International Conference of Banking Supervisors, Sir John Vickers (who oversaw the Vickers Report to reform the UK banking market) shared his views that the Basel III capital requirements are not stringent enough, and have not sufficiently reduced the likelihood of crises as intended. I am not saying that this is the view of the MAS. I am sure that many bankers will disagree. But the point is that this is an area which is deserving of greater discourse. 12 Evaluating the effects of the banking reforms will be a key exercise. One set of issues revolve around whether the reforms are having the intended outcomes or, on the other hand, whether there are unforeseen and undesirable effects. This will involve an assessment of banks’ behavioural responses, whether there are new forms of arbitrage strategies, and the spillover effects on the broader economy. Cross-border lending to developing economies 13  One example relates to the impact on cross-border lending to developing economies. 14 There are studies that indicate that some global banks have reduced their presence and activities in developing economies as part of their business review, and some have attributed this to the banking reforms. Establishing a clear, causal link between the declining trend in crossborder bank loans to developing economies and the post-crisis reforms will be helpful, if possible. 15 Such investigations can support the Basel Committee’s work on a full, timely and consistent implementation of the reforms globally.
For example, De Paoli and Paustian (2017) study a non-cooperative game between monetary and macroprudential authorities and find coordination problems to be significant following cost-push shocks in cases where objectives do not overlap. But they also find that a leadership structure in which macroprudential policy moves first – or is varied at a lower frequency than monetary policy given that financial vulnerabilities build slowly – mitigates these coordination problems. Future Research and Policy  Financial regulation has undergone a fundamental rethink and reform since the global financial crisis. By most accounts and on most evidence, that has resulted in a financial system which is more resilient than in the past, better equipped to head-off market frictions and failures of various kinds, better attuned to various adverse incentive effects, and better able to safeguard risks which imperil the financial system as a whole. It 35  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  35  is a regime of “constrained discretion”, comprising a portfolio of regulatory measures calibrated, albeit roughly, to equate societal costs and benefits. That’s the easy bit. The hard bit is what happens next. Not least given the scale of regulatory change over the past decade, this new regulatory framework will plainly need to adapt in the period ahead in the light of the new evidence, experience and incentives associated with operating it. This paper has discussed some of those issues.

Out of this intellectual vacuum, a new framework for regulation has been born – macroprudential regulation. This explicitly recognises the links that might tie together individual nodes in the financial system. These might arise from correlated asset exposures, the type of which has historically emerged during the upswings and downswings of the credit cycle (Aikman et al (2015)). Or they might emerge from financial exposures, on- or off-balance sheet, between intermediaries operating in the global financial web (Haldane and May (2011), Arinaminpathy, Kapadia and May (2012)). Over the past decade, a lot has been written in the area of macroprudential policy (Galati and Moessner (2013), Aikman et al (2013), Freixas et al (2015)). A sizeable number of countries are now undertaking macroprudential policy in some shape or form. Table 5 in the Annex provides a rough summary of current international macroprudential practices (for a more comprehensive overview, see Cerutti et al (2017)). By any historical metric, however, macroprudential policy remains a fledgling framework. Understandably, many of its key facets remain contentious. And the macroprudential policies put in place internationally so far are more notable for their differences than their similarities. This is providing a diverse body of case law. We discuss two key aspects of this framework: its appropriate objectives; and the choice of instruments. Objectives of Macroprudential Policy  The Bank of England entered the debate on the potential role of macroprudential policy in a discussion paper published in 2009 (Bank of England (2009)).
3  See Carney (2016), “Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – climate change and financial stability”, speech given at Lloyd’s of London, September 2015. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  Of course, given the uncertainties around climate, not everyone will agree on the timing or the scale of adjustments required to achieve this goal. But the right information will allow optimists and pessimists, sceptics and evangelists, to back their convictions with their capital. The main obstacle standing in the way of a smooth and timely market-led adjustment has been the absence of quality information on climate-related financial risks and opportunities. As the Task Force has highlighted, a significant number of climate-disclosure regimes – indeed on some 4  counts around 400 – already exist. But existing schemes vary in their status, coverage and ambition. For example, while 80% of Fortune 500 companies participate in one of the existing schemes, it remains the case that only around a third of the top 1,000 US companies produce broadly comparable information on the climate-related financial risks they face. The Task Force’s report – presented to you today – shows the way forward. Let me highlight some of its recommendations that will make a major contribution. The first breakthrough is a disclosure framework that it sufficiently comprehensive for use by all publicly-listed companies, whatever their sector, across the full set of climate-related financial risks they face. The recommendations are designed to leverage, rather than replace, existing disclosure regimes.

A further important feature is the expectation that, where available, asset managers and owners will make disclosures of the aggregate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions embedded in their investment portfolios. Achieving broad coverage will take time and obviously depends on adoption by issuers. Implementation  We are pleased that all Task Force member organisations, companies with market capitalisations of around $ trillion and financial institutions responsible for assets of $ trillion, have today announced their support for the disclosure recommendations. 5  With better disclosure, a market in the transition to a 2-degree world can be built. That market will expose the likely future cost of doing business, of paying for emissions, and of changing processes given both those charges and tighter regulation. And it will help smooth price adjustments as opinions change, rather than concentrating them in a short, dangerous space of time. Early disclosure rules allowed 20th-century financial markets to grow our economies by pricing risks more accurately. The spread of such standards internationally has helped lift more than a billion people out of poverty. Climate-related disclosures could be as transformative for 21st-century markets. 5  Bloomberg data and Bank calculations using market capitalisation as at 12 December 2016 and assets at end-2015. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  6
From a longer-term perspective, currency should be able to move flexibly in line with economic fundamentals. Active foreign exchange interventions can cause potential distortions. First, financial market development would be hindered. A certain level of exchange rate volatility is often a pre-condition for market development. Without sufficient volatility, there would be no incentive for firms to hedge themselves against currency risks and for financial institutions to start offering currency hedging tools. It should also be noted that heavily managed exchange rate may discourage businesses from upgrading their technology, productivity, and competitiveness, so as to command more bargaining power in the global market and better withstand exchange rate volatility. Given limitations and side effects of short-term exchange rate management strategies, exchange rate interventions should only be employed to deal with excessive movements or special circumstances when the market needs anchoring. Interventions should also be two-way, not aiming to resist trend movements but to cushion the impact of extreme movements. For normal times, the exchange rate should move flexibly to serve its role as shock absorber for the economy. Ladies and Gentlemen, Now, policymakers have to strike the right balance between implementing short-term measures and building long-term capacity for the economy to better withstand external shocks. To promote economic resilience in the long run, it is important to press ahead with reforms that deepen local capital markets. Deeper and more liquid markets help absorb higher capital flow volatility and large shocks, preventing large swings in price movements.

After the introduction and the keynote, the conference explores four directions of thought on the topic of monetary unions in history. A panel is devoted to each of them. The first panel will explore the link between monetary unions and economic integration by offering a glimpse in their history. The second session will focus on twentieth century monetary unions following the great and continuous economic stress of the First World War. The third panel will examine monetary unions as facilitating tools for greater customs and economic integration within the Comecon and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Finally, the last session will address the question to what extent the political relations transcend in the monetary unions as well illustrated by the Great Britain and the member-states of the European Union. This program will break for a discussion between leading academics and policy-makers on the issue of the parallel currencies in history. I would not crowd out the precious conference time by dwelling on each piece of research to be presented and discussed today. Let me pause here, to give way to interesting and open exchange of opinion and deliberations which I believe this conference will stimulate. And once again – welcome to Sofia and enjoy your stay in Bulgaria! Thank you. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Then I will discuss the implications for Thailand, before moving on to policy navigation of the Bank of Thailand. Financial volatility has manifested itself throughout 2015. Let me briefly recap some of them: •  Only a few months ago, the Chinese equity market recorded one-day steepest loss of 8.5 per cent and trillions of dollars were wiped off from the global equity market within a day. The fluctuations in the Shanghai stock index perfectly exemplify the market volatility where from the beginning of this year the index rose by 60 per cent up to June, before collapsing to 10 per cent loss by August. •  There have also been sharp capital outflows from Emerging Markets, resulting in large Emerging Market currency depreciations. Indeed, the Institute of International Finance expects that capital flows to Emerging Markets will turn negative for the first time since 1988. •  On the commodity front, Brent Crude Oil price plunged below 50 dollars per barrel this year, having peaked at over 110 dollars just one year ago. Against this backdrop, market participants have been increasingly concerned about investment and business implications. So what brought about heightened volatility in the global markets? I will attempt to answer by highlighting two key sources of volatility. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, unconventional monetary policies – most notably successive rounds of Quantitative Easing – were implemented by major advanced economies. This abundant global liquidity contributed largely to strong asset price gains and higher risk appetites.

We are uncertain as to the functioning of the economy and how long it will take for the resource shortages observed in some sectors of the Norwegian economy to translate into higher inflationary pressures. This may warrant small steps in interest-rate setting. Employment is now rising more rapidly than expected. Corporate earnings are rising sharply, with higher growth in corporate demand for credit. The sharp increase in household debt is persisting. House price inflation remains high. Prices for oil and several other commodities have picked up further. At the same time, the underlying rise in consumer prices remains low. So far, a tighter labour market does not seem to have resulted in higher-than-expected pay increases, but there is a risk that wage growth may subsequently rise faster than projected. The krone is stronger than assumed. Overall, there are not sufficient grounds for changing the outlook for inflation and output or the risk assessment. Thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 35/2006
Let me pay a warm tribute to the Captain of our vessel, Mario Draghi, as his term soon comes to an end. Thanks to Mario Draghi’s leadership, we protected our most valuable asset, the euro, and kept our monetary union together. Thanks to his unswerving determination and readiness to do “whatever it takes”, we are still all on board. Thanks to him, the Eurosystem has deployed a supportive and innovative monetary policy strategy. Over the past five years, the ECB has experimented with a variety of unconventional policy instruments, and it has arguably gone later but further into the toolbox than the Fed or the BoE. And the different instruments can influence different parts of the yield curve. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  This policy has been effective in supporting the recovery in the euro area since 2013. As a recent memorandum of the “old guard” apparently missed some positive outcomes of the last years, let me remind them: estimates of the effectiveness of the unconventional monetary policies implemented since 2013 have a broad range but are in the order of 2½ percentage points on growth and 1-1½ percentage points on inflation over the period 2015–2018. In times of heightened uncertainty, the recent strengthening of our forward guidance – which is now strongly “state based” – demonstrates our determination to reach our inflation target.

Yiu-kwan Choi: The debt market of Hong Kong - what can we offer to investors? Keynote address by Mr Yiu-kwan Choi, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the third Annual Asia Pacific Bond Congress, Hong Kong, 13 June 2006. *  *  *  Mr. Shale, distinguished guest, ladies and gentlemen, It gives me great pleasure to speak at this year’s Asia Pacific Bond Congress. On behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, I would like to extend my warmest welcome to everyone here today, especially those of you who have traveled from afar to visit us. I would like also to thank Euromoney for organizing this excellent event, and for organizing it in Hong Kong for the third time. It is a clear recognition of the important role of Hong Kong - Asia's World City, in the bond markets of the Asia Pacific region. Like many other financial markets, the bond markets in the Asia Pacific region have recently seen plenty of new developments, challenges as well as opportunities. I am glad to see that the Congress has rightly covered many of these latest issues, and I am sure that for those who were here yesterday would have learnt from my colleague, Ms Julia Leung, about the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s efforts in enhancing regional cooperation.
There are also signs that the strong growth in productivity that has been evident in other countries – for example in the US – is moderating somewhat. And we may see a similar trend in Norway. Second, even without a reversal, profits may fall and unemployment rise. The implications of this will depend on how far businesses, in their search for qualified labour, will go in bidding up wages. It will also depend on how wage-earners react and on their ability to adapt to change. Furthermore, it must be expected that the strong krone will shave profits in some enterprises and industries at the moment, even though many have used currency hedging to safeguard their income. Even though demand for labour is strong, there is a risk that outflows from the labour market to various social security schemes will remain high. Sickness absence is high, and the share of the working-age population on rehabilitation schemes or receiving disability pensions is rising. Many workers choose to take early retirement under the AFP scheme (contractual early retirement) when they reach 62 years of age, and – because this age group is expanding sharply – this number will probably increase in the years ahead. In Norway, close to 600 000 persons of working age receive social security benefits or pensions. This is equivalent to 25 per cent of the labour force. This is the Norwegian economy’s Achilles’ heel. A particularly disturbing aspect is that disability is increasing among young people 1 .

Islamic banking in particular, which is a form of financial intermediation that is directly linked to trade and investment flows, has significant potential to facilitate this process. Islamic finance requires all financial transactions to be supported by an underlying economic activity. There is now a renewed focus in the global community on generating real economic activity, generating jobs and generating overall financial stability. Following the developments that have led to the current global financial crisis, there is a greater recognition for the need to reduce the decoupling of the expansion of financial transactions and the growth of the real economy. This is in fact a fundamental requirement in Islamic finance thereby resulting in a close link between financial and real flows. BIS Review 26/2009  1  In Malaysia, the Islamic banking sector continues to progress, recording double digit growth over the recent 8 years with an average annual growth rate of 20% in terms of assets. As at the end of 2008, Islamic banking has increased its share of assets in the banking sector to 17.4%. The assets share of the takaful industry grew at 23% per annum in the recent five years, with family and general takaful capturing 11% and 7% respectively, of the overall insurance sector. The MIFC initiative has focused on promoting Malaysia as an international Islamic financial hub, in particular in sukuk origination, foreign currency business, takaful, research and talent development.