samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In Malaysia , several steps have been taken. The establishment of the International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) aims to engage in applied research on dynamic Shariah-centric innovation. ISRA can provide a global platform for greater global engagement and research with the focus on innovation. In addition, the Central Bank has also embarked on the initiative to develop the Shariah Parameters to promote more consistent application of Islamic financial contracts. This initiative aims to determine the essential features of Islamic financial products derived from underlying key Shariah contracts. These features will serve as a guide for the application of the Shariah contracts for the Islamic financial products. The second strategy is to raise the bar in the status of the Islamic financial infrastructure that supports the risk management and governance of Islamic financial institutions. To ensure sustainability of the resilience of Islamic finance, it is important to have the comprehensive enabling infrastructure that allows for the management of the risks that are peculiar to Islamic finance. There is a need for Islamic financial system to have the capital requirements, effective risk management and strong governance that are fully equipped to manage the risks that are specific to Islamic financial transactions. It is also important for the institutions to spread the risks by having prudent asset allocation based on different Islamic contracts so as to ensure a sustainable revenue stream and to ensure the institutions are in a position to absorb the extreme circumstances that occur during a crisis.

It is for these reasons that changes in the exchange rate level are only a last resort option for an economy like ours. It should be clear, therefore, that isolationist policies and expansionary fiscal, monetary and exchange rate measures cannot be relied upon to generate sustainable economic growth. There are indeed no easy fixes. The only viable option is to compete successfully in the global market-place. I believe that this objective should be approached by pursuing a virtuous triangle of mutually-reinforcing policies: i)  increasing the amount of resources available in the economy and the efficiency with which they are employed, by cutting costs and raising productivity;  ii)  focusing on the market niches in which we can excel;  iii)  ensuring the best international market access for our products and services. On the last of these points, there is at present a lively debate on the pros and cons of different arrangements with our main trading partner, the EU. While not wishing to enter the debate at this point, I cannot fail to observe that the uncertainty surrounding this issue is causing considerable harm to Malta’s economic prospects. It is in our common interest that the direction the country is to take be clarified as soon as possible. And this within a realisation that with Malta’s main competitors themselves seeking closer trade ties with the EU, we cannot afford to fall behind.
In addition, strong productivity within US industry has contributed to improved profit margins. However, the upturn in the USA is expected to be fairly modest, which is mainly because households are expected to increase their low level of savings. (Diagram 1 - savings in the USA). There is a large  2  BIS Review 37/2002  savings imbalance in the US economy. Sooner or later an adjustment is expected. The weakening of the dollar that we have seen recently may be an indication that the adjustment process has begun. The deficit on the current account amounted to 3.9 per cent last year. On top of this, households’ wealth in the form of shares is expected to continue to develop weakly and the rapid price increases on property are expected to subside. The US labour market does not appear likely to improve before the end of the year, which will give a subdued development in real wages. (Diagram 2 - unemployment in the USA, the euro area, Germany and France). At the same time, there is a risk that imbalances in savings in the USA will be adjusted more rapidly and more forcefully with the result that the US economy may lose speed. If the American household sector were to increase its savings and thereby reduce the debt burden more rapidly than is currently predicted, it could lead to a poorer development in consumption than expected and a stagnating economy.

In March 2001, the fiscal rule and new guidelines for monetary policy were introduced. The fiscal rule implies that the central government budget deficit shall be equivalent over time to the expected real return on the Fund, quantified as 4 per cent. The operational target of monetary policy as defined by the Government is inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. This establishes a clear distribution of responsibilities among the different components of economic policy. Monetary policy steers inflation in the medium and long term and can also contribute to smoothing swings in output and employment. The inflation target provides economic agents with an anchor for their decisions concerning saving, investment, budgets and wages. Fiscal policy – growth in public expenditure – influences the krone and the size of the internationally exposed business sector in the medium term. Government expenditure and revenues must be in balance in the long term. Wage formation, the structure of the economy and incentives determine how well and how efficiently we utilise our labour resources and other economic resources. BIS Review 80/2006  1  The transition to inflation targeting in 2001 may have appeared at that time, and in Norway, to be a transition to a new and unfamiliar monetary policy system. But today’s monetary policy system springs from an historical recognition of what monetary policy can in fact achieve. In collaboration with the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Norges Bank has compiled price data from the mid-1600s onwards.
We believe this new fintech strategy would provide the shot in the arm to elevate the banking industry to new heights. Brief recap of key achievements 6. Before I delve more deeply into the strategy, let us have a look at where we currently stand. 7. Last year, eight virtual banks launched their services to the public, marking a key milestone in Hong Kong’s Fintech Journey. The usage of Faster Payment System (FPS) has witnessed substantial growth since launch. So far, it has recorded over 8 million registrations, and is used by the general public in person-to-person payments, government payments, and payments to merchants. On average, more than 630,000 transactions are conducted daily, over twofold than a year ago. Our Fintech Supervisory Sandbox was also well received and more than 200 initiatives have been tested since launch. 8. These encouraging figures show how the HKMA’s Smart Banking initiatives have significantly driven the digital transformation of banking services. They also demonstrate Hong Kong people’s willingness to embrace fintech; and set us up for further fintech developments. Customers’ digital appetite will outlast the pandemic 9. Unfortunately, the city and the world were subsequently battered by COVID-19. But Hong Kong’s pre-pandemic fintech efforts were sufficient, for the time being at least. So we were able to enjoy largely uninterrupted high-quality digital financial services during the pandemic, allowing a wide range of commercial activities to continue in the city. In fact, COVID-19 demonstrated the sheer power of fintech. Fintech can fulfil gaps when traditional banking services are compromised. 10.

On the other hand, the U.S. is less dependent on oil imports than the European Union, let alone Switzerland. Structural characteristics of an economy can also affect the economic impact of an oil price shock. Rigid labor markets, for instance, can lead to asymmetric effects on output. The output loss in the event of a rise in oil prices can exceed the output gain in the event of a corresponding decline in oil prices. It is generally assumed that the overall impact of an oil shock is somewhat less pronounced in the U.S. than in Europe. Finally, exchange rates can play a role. As a result of the substantial decline  3  See eg M A Adelman (1995): “The Genie out of a Bottle: World Oil since 1970”, MIT Press, Cambridge. BIS Review 69/2004  3  in the U.S. dollar against most non-Asian currencies, the recent increase in the price of oil in local currency has been less pronounced in Europe. For a central bank concerned with maintaining price stability as the bedrock condition for sustained economic development, the crucial question is how a level shift in the equilibrium price range of oil would impact longer-term inflation rates. Oil prices have a direct impact on inflation because the price of crude oil immediately impacts gasoline and heating oil prices. The inflation effect depends on the weight of oil based products in the CPI. In Switzerland, heating oil makes up 1.2% of the CPI. Total oil based products represent 3.8% of the CPI.
William C Dudley: The national and regional economy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at Queens College, Flushing, New York, 18 November 2013. *  *  *  Good afternoon. It is always a pleasure to speak with the different communities that make up our region, and it is especially gratifying to have the opportunity to speak with you, our future leaders. So thank you for inviting me. I am especially pleased to be here at CUNY (City University of New York) Queens College, given the relationship that we have developed with CUNY through our educational and regional outreach. This academic year we are hosting, at the Bank, a Queens College student participating in the CUNY Service Corps which is a program to provide students with work experiences in regional and economic outreach. We also collaborated with CUNY for this year’s College Fed Challenge, our yearly competition where teams of students from area universities take on the roles of the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and debate the appropriate next step for U.S. monetary policy. A number of CUNY schools competed and professors served as judges, including your own Professor Thom Thurston. My meeting with you today is part of our continuing efforts to understand what is going on at the grassroots level of our economy and to share what we are seeing.

Despite last year’s narrowing current deficit, Albania’s external position remains a constant structural weakness. The Albanian banking system is considered to have adapted commendably to this complex situation. I would like to underline that we have done an immense amount of work so far. Therefore, I take this opportunity to congratulate all central and local managing units of banks operating in Albania. During this period, the Albanian banking system has continued to expand its activity and lending to the economy. Financial soundness and profitability indicators have improved and system’s activity capitalization is in a good position. The banking sector remains the main actor of financial intermediation in Albania, whose financing continues to rely mainly on public deposits. The main problem of the banking system has been the growing non-performing loans share, which has also reflected the active policy of the Bank of Albania to enhance the transparency of banks’ balance sheets. Credit risk remains the primary risk to our banking sector. In response, the banking sector has established adequate reserve funds to buffer major shocks on the borrowers repayment capacity and market equilibrium. Stress tests support our conclusion on banking system resilience. The presence in this room of both the business community and the banking system suggests me to refer once again to the need for sincere cooperation of mutual benefit. With a few exceptions, I think this cooperation has been present and operational and has certainly supported in particular the country’s economic activity over the past years.
2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  In part, the deceleration of the global economy reflects the shift from accommodative to tighter financial conditions that occurred initially in emerging economies, then in most advanced economies, and finally and sharply in the United States (Chart 2). Last year, the returns on all major asset classes from equities to credit to sovereign debt were negative. Cash once again was king. Chart 2: Global financial conditions indices tightened over 2018 United Kingdom  Standard deviations from historical average  8  United States  7  Emerging Market Economies  6  Global  5 4 3 2 1 0 -1  -2 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Eikon by Refinitiv and Bank calculations. The tightening of financial conditions globally partly reflected the usual – if somewhat delayed – reaction to the tightening of monetary policy.1 Over the past year, the withdrawal of monetary policy accommodation gathered pace. The Fed raised interest rates four times, and the Bank of England and ten other G20 central banks also tightened policy. In addition, after five years in which there was no new net issuance of G7 government debt, new government borrowing outweighed central bank purchases by more than $ trillion for the first time since 2012. Potentially more seriously, the slowing in global momentum may also be the product of rising trade tensions and growing policy uncertainty.

On the latest Banco de España estimates, GDP growth should be slightly over 3% this year and somewhat below that figure in 2016, meaning that growth in our economy will continue to outpace the euro area average. In terms of composition, national demand has continued to expand strongly. After several years of containment in household spending plans, the favourable course of their disposable income coupled with brighter job prospects and readier access to credit have been conducive to the growth of consumption. Real estate market indicators show a recovery in the sector which, while moderate and uneven across market segments and regions, is also contributing to rekindling household spending. The buoyancy of final demand and the progressive normalisation of financial conditions have continued exerting a positive effect on business investment. The firming of the recovery in the euro area economy has helped compensate for the recent loss of momentum in some non-Community markets, meaning that exports maintain high growth rates. Ongoing contributing factors are the gains in competitiveness in our economy, which reflect the containment of costs in recent years by Spanish firms and, more recently, the depreciation of the euro. Nonetheless, imports have responded forcefully to the pick-up in domestic spending (we should remember that gains and losses in competitiveness are felt abroad but also at home, in respect of imports), which has led, in net terms, to external demand generally not contributing to the increase in activity.
The Emergency Financial Control Board was empowered to review all fiscal decisions of local officials and demand changes to the city’s budgets. Part of the city’s tax base was dedicated to bond repayment—essentially handing it over to the city’s creditors. For 10 years, the city could not access the debt markets without support from the state. The economic pain was also very real. More than 70,000 city government workers were cut from the payrolls in 1975 and 1976. City residents faced dramatic service reductions—fire houses closed, schools and police precincts had fewer resources, and crime continued to rise for many years. It is also important to note that New York isn’t the only U.S. city that has been through a major fiscal crisis. Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C. and, most recently, Detroit have all struggled to manage their budgets, and all ultimately reached a point when they were unable to pay their bills. As a result, these cities lost their fiscal autonomy to one degree or another. In the case of New York City, this turned out relatively well, as the short-run loss of decision-making power led to a strong economic rebound that eventually restored the city’s ability to finance its own choices. So, is New York City’s experience really all that instructive for Puerto Rico? With the advantage of hindsight, it now seems almost obvious that New York City’s fiscal crisis was only going to be a detour. The city’s economy had many fundamental strengths, so it only needed some assistance to get back on track.

Still, it’s worth pointing out that this was by no means clear at the outset the crisis in the mid-1970s. Then, many commentators looked at New York City and other large cities as outmoded forms of economic activity, unlikely ever to recover. While we do not have great measures of economic activity for cities, population change is a good indicator of how attractive a place seems to be. By that measure, New York City at the time was seen to have very poor prospects—the city’s population fell by over 10 percent during the 1970s. So, New York City’s eventual bright future was far from clear as its fiscal crisis was unfolding. Of course, not every city that has faced a fiscal crisis has the same track record. Relative to cities that had similarly grim outlooks, New York City’s rebound has been much stronger. In Detroit, there are hopeful signs, but it’s too soon to tell how things will turn out. Both Washington, D.C. and Philadelphia experienced multiple decades of population declines leading up to their crises. These population declines reversed in the 2000s. Washington, D.C.’s population actually grew over 5 percent between 2000 and 2010, a rate even faster than that of New York City. Cleveland’s fiscal reforms, on the other hand, were less comprehensive, and the city has never really turned itself around. Its population in 2010 was less than half the level of 1960. The different performances across cities reflect the complex interplay of native endowments, economic conditions and fiscal outcomes.
The Riksdag was being asked to authorise the Government in principle unconditional drawing rights from the state budget to consolidate the banking sector. If this measure did not succeed in calming interest rates, we would ultimately need to make use of a loan programme from the IMF. Finally, the situation in Sweden became untenable, and the fixed exchange rate had to be abandoned on 19 November 1992. The nominal anchor had completely collapsed. However, inspired by New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, the Riksbank considered adopting an inflation target as a new anchor. 3 No sooner said than done: As of 1993, we have a floating exchange rate and an inflation target of 2 per cent, which still applies today. 4 The results of academic research indicated that the conditions for attaining low inflation increased if one delegated monetary policy to an independent central bank. This reduced the so-called time inconsistency problem in monetary policy, where the long-term objective of low inflation is not compatible with the shortterm motives for high inflation. 5 Empirical studies showed that countries with more independent central banks had lower inflation, without a deterioration in the real economy. 6 I think that an independent central bank is not merely useful in addressing overly high inflation. Independence is also important to avoid inflation being too low, as it facilitates a more long-term focus in decision-making. 7But I will return to this shortly. In the new act of 1999, the Riksbank was given greater independence from the political system.

A central element of our independent position in monetary policy is our instrument independence, that we ourselves can decide over these instruments. The monetary policy toolbox develops as a result of new experiences. For instance, we implemented many measures within the space of one week during the initial phase of the coronavirus pandemic. I therefore find it difficult to see the value of restricting the tools in advance, as proposed by the inquiry. It wishes, for instance, to divide the Riksbank’s toolbox into different parts and micro regulate which tools should be used when, where and how. I understand that this may seem like a good idea, but having to motivate and classify possible measures will be very complicated and will encourage passivity and delay the monetary policy response in future crises. The developments in connection with the WHP declaring COVID19 to be a pandemic meant that a full-scale financial tornado blew up within the course of a couple of days. Important to facilitate democratic scrutiny of monetary policy As I mentioned initially, our strong independence entails freedom with responsibility. An extended monetary policy toolbox entails further challenges for us. If we return to Figure 6, we have found ourselves in a situation where our objectives and mandate remain unchanged, but our toolbox has grown. This was a situation that was not so easy to foresee, and it makes new demands of the Riksbank. One challenge in the new environment concerns the link between the monetary policy tools and our objectives having become less clear.
Yet they did not spend much time working out how to handle a firm’s failure in the event of prophylactic supervision proving insufficient. That was a major problem in the very conception of prudential regulation and supervision, going back decades. In future in the UK, a core role of supervisors will be to work backwards from what would happen at the point of failure. A bank’s resolvability and the likely consequences for the system if it failed will be incorporated into the Prudential Regulation Authority’s planned risk-assessment framework, which will replace ARROW as Hector Sants has explained. Recovery and Resolution Plans – or “living wills” – will be required to ensure that failure does not lead to avoidable disorder. In pursuing this, the supervisors will need to work closely with the team in the Bank who operate the UK’s Special Resolution Regime. That should be helped enormously by the planned new Proactive Intervention Framework or PIF, a major reform involving each firm being “Staged” for internal purposes by the prudential supervisors. My personal expectation is that it would be an odd world if there weren’t quite a few firms at Stage 2 even in a more benign economic and financial environment. And as a bank’s PIF ranking rises, the Resolution team will progressively become more engaged with it. The details of this need to be worked on by Hector and me with our teams, but it will be a big change from the past.

Henry Ohlsson: Decision today, consequences far into the future Speech by Mr Henry Ohlsson, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a breakfast event, organised by Swedbank, Stockholm, 18 March 2016. *  *  *  I would like to thank Bo Enegren, Hanna Köhler, Gustaf Norrefeldt, Cecilia Roos-Isaksson, Marianne Sterner and Ulf Söderström for their help with this speech. Accompanying figures and the table can be found at the end of the speech. Some of the decisions we make only have significance for the here and now. Others may have consequences for many decades to come, in some cases for the rest of our lives. Our choice of education and purchase of a home are examples of decisions that have considerable significance over a long period of time. For a person who puts themselves in debt through decisions with long-term consequences, it is of course important how high the interest rates on the debt are. And this does not concern the interest rates paid now or in the medium term, but also interest rates several decades ahead. In recent years, interest rates have been at their lowest level in modern times. Several other central banks have done as the Riksbank and cut their policy rates below zero, and government bond yields at longer maturities are now at historically low levels. This is partly due to the prolonged recession following the financial crisis.