samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In light of the information currently available, and against the background of the Bank of Thailand’s long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth, I believe that the risks at present are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future. Such weaknesses could come from further retrenchment of business and consumer confidence, undershooting of fiscal expenditure targets, and slower than expected recovery in the industrialized countries. Whatever risk ultimately materializes, we would make timely and decisive adjustment of our monetary policy. With strong international reserves, at 140% of short-term debt, we can afford to adjust our monetary policy to support growth, if needed. At this juncture, I would like to stress that the Bank of Thailand remains committed to the open and transparent monetary policy framework that has served us well since May 2000. Let me emphasize that inflation targeting is a framework, not a rule. Just as the case of a real-life anchor, inflation targets keep the economy on the desired growth path in the long run, while permitting it to respond in the short run to unpredictable tides and currents. As long as the inflation rate is within the targeted range, I believe monetary policy is allowed sufficient flexibility to address other challenges currently facing our economy. Given the supportive policy mix, the recovery process in Thailand should remain on track for next year.

This is happening particularly in the advanced world, but even in the emerging world there has been a slowdown in potential growth. No one can say for sure if this is a permanent state of affairs. There is some debate among economists as to whether the productivity slowdown is a short term or long term phenomenon. But certainly the demographics will still be with us, societies will get older and labour force growth weaker, and economic growth is going to be significantly slower in the next 10 to 20 years than it has been in the past. Investment is unlikely to pick up very significantly in this context, and it does mean taken together with the savings trend, a lower long term real rate of interest in the global economy. 13. So putting the two together – trends in ageing and in economic growth, I think we have to live with the fact of low real interest rates for many years to come. 14. It will pose a challenge for retirement security, and especially for pension funds and insurance funds. As you know, it hits you on both your assets and your liabilities. It means a lower return on your assets. And it pushes up the value of liabilities because the discount rates has gone down. 15. It is not a temporary challenge but a long term challenge. As life expectancy goes up, liabilities will be pushed out further, and the gap in maturity between your liabilities and your assets is likely to grow.
Most of the economic problems we face will be eased as growth recovers but, in my view, a return to boom conditions is unlikely in the UK anytime soon. If that is the outlook for growth, then what about inflation? That has been above target now for most of the past five years. But it would be hard for anyone to argue that inflation has been high because of excess demand growth in the UK. And because monetary policy works in large part by boosting or restraining nominal demand that would not seem to be the root cause of such high inflation either. Rather we have been subject to a range of cost or supplyside shocks including high energy prices internationally, compounded by the large depreciation of sterling during the financial crisis, and tax changes and other “administered” or regulated price rises reflecting difficult policy choices (such as producing cleaner energy). As a relatively small open economy, overly dependent on financial services, the UK has been more exposed than most countries to externally-driven cost pressures. It may sound perverse, but my concern for much of the past five years has been the risk of eventual deflation: that once the temporary effects of the various price level shocks work off, weak demand growth would leave us with a Japanese-style economic malaise which would have been very difficult to escape from. The asset purchase programme – or QE as it is generally called – has been crucial in avoiding that outcome.

Lower middle-income countries are those with per capita gross national incomes (GNIs) of between US $ and US $ per year; while upper middle-income countries are those with GNIs between US $ and US $ This status reflects the continued economic growth that has been registered in the recent years.   Zambia’s reclassification as a middle income country would enhance investor confidence and further boost the investment climate thereby creating jobs and wealth for the people. In terms of financing, it should be noted that with the new arrangement, the government would be able to access more non concessional financing which remain key for infrastructure development necessary for economic development. This is in contrast with the previous status whereby Zambia could only access limited concessional financing which attracted very low interest rates and payable after a long time.   Despite the positive reclassification, it should be noted that the disparity between the poor and the rich would always be there and do exist even in developed countries. The challenge for the Government is to implement policies that will redistribute wealth so that inequality is reduced.   Nevertheless, with reclassification, it shows that the Government has been working very hard to accelerate economic growth, which is a necessary for economic development.   On average, people have been pulled out from poverty as per capita income has risen from US $ in 2000 to over US $ in 2010.
EMU and the labour market A core issue in the current EMU debate concerns whether changes will be required in the Swedish labour market to prevent the inflation rate from increasing if we join the single currency system and, if so, what these changes might comprise. Unit labour costs, that is to say, wage costs adjusted for growth in productivity, have increased slightly more rapidly in Sweden than in the Euro area recently. The statistics in this diagram are not necessarily the best for studying developments in Sweden alone, but work well for comparisons 3  See Tägtström, Sara (2000): “The wage spread between different sectors in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, 2000:4, Stockholm. BIS Review 40/2002  3  between countries. The diagram shows that unit labour costs have increased on average by 1.6 percentage points more in Sweden than the Euro area during the period 1999 to 2001 (see diagram 4). As the possibility to conduct an independent economic policy declines, the need for functioning adjustment mechanisms increases. In addition, increased flexibility in the labour market is most likely necessary to stabilise variations in production and employment. Generally speaking, the lack of an independent national monetary policy means that any disturbances to the Swedish economy not felt in the same way in other EMU countries, would require greater flexibility in factor and product markets in Sweden.

The requirement for increased flexibility in the labour market could apply both to increased variability in nominal wage increases and to increased geographical and professional mobility of the labour force. Increased adaptation to the rate of wage increase in the Euro area and increased variability in nominal wage costs? The design of the negotiation system probably has significance both for the adaptation of wage increases to that within the Euro area and for the degree of nominal wage flexibility. Wage formation in Sweden can be characterised by a combination of centralised and decentralised agreements. During 2001 trade and industry had a relatively high percentage of agreements with local wage formation. Almost 70 per cent of employees in the private sector had wage agreements that entailed complete or partial local wage formation. The percentage of local wage agreements in the public sector has also increased during the 1990s. A more decentralised wage formation process could entail greater nominal wage flexibility, as wage costs could then be connected to a greater extent to the individual company’s situation. On the other hand, a more co-ordinated wage formation could also entail increased flexibility, as it would make it easier for those determining wages at a central level to take the overall considerations required to enable the economy as a whole to develop favourably. It is unclear to what extent a potential Swedish participation in Stage Three of EMU would entail incentives for a more decentralised or more co-ordinated wage formation process.
First of all, I’d like to underscore that we are well aware of both the power and the limitations of monetary policy instruments. Monetary policy can help bring about a smooth economic adjustment, but this can only be done in order to fulfil the primary objective, to maintain price stability in the euro area. The ECB responds to the price stability symptoms of the crisis, not to its fiscal and structural root causes. Seen from the perspective of the authorities responsible for fiscal and structural policies, monetary policy can buy time for reforms that become effective with some time lag, monetary policy can alleviate the macroeconomic duress that past policy mistakes can inflict on citizens, but it cannot substitute for reforms. The ECB’s response was composed of two types of measures, standard and non-standard. Standard measures activate those instruments we have also used before the crisis to achieve price stability, primarily changes in short-term interest rates. After the intensification of the global financial crisis in September 2008 – the second layer of the iceberg – the ECB reduced its main interest rate from 4.25% in the summer of 2008 to just 1% in May 2009. This was a series of rate cuts that was unprecedented in speed and size over such a short time-span. However, the third and fourth layers of the crisis also posed a threat to the effectiveness of such standard measures.

This correction is painful and requires perseverance of all responsible parties. The reward should be positive results that are now in fact tentatively observable. Third, governance reforms at the level of the euro area and the European Union at large have contributed to an improvement of the foundation for a better performance in future, and this work is still in progress. The multi-layered crisis  When looking at the crisis as it has developed since 2007, it can be helpful to use the metaphor of an iceberg. In each phase of the crisis we have discovered new layers, from the visible tip of the iceberg to the dangerous ice cliffs that linger under the surface – and which, in the economic context, have emerged in the subsequent phases, each time proving to be larger than previously thought. This has challenged policy-makers to acknowledge the real dimensions of the problems, and to adjust their response accordingly. The tip of the iceberg – the liquidity crisis – was revealed in mid-2007 when the US mortgage market, which lay at the basis of a complex, tangled web of globally-held financial derivatives, took a sharp down-turn. This triggered the first case of what we have later come to describe as “frozen” interbank-markets around the world, quite a fitting extension of the iceberg metaphor. The underlying cause was a spike in counterparty risk, due to the obscure distribution of exposures to the risks in the market for subprime mortgages.
A full understanding of economic and financial realities – which stubbornly evade the patterns put forth by researchers – also calls for steady and diligent efforts to monitor and interpret such realities  12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  References  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  14  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  15  16  BIS central bankers’ speeches  BIS central bankers’ speeches  17

This activity is the first in its kind, and I express my highest considerations for the trust that the Bank of England has put to the Bank of Albania. The Centre of Central Banking Studies is internationally recognised as a centre of intellectual excellence in the area of central banking studies. Considering the goal that this centre has set to itself, as an opportunity provider to central banking employees to be endowed with ampler perspectives in the respective areas of expertise, I call for your attention to listen to what the distinguished experts shall say. Their professional achievements and the central banks they represent guarantee this. Thank you and good proceedings! 2/2
The third principle is that the Central Bank does not use the exchange rate to target inflation. There are many examples of financial crises and economic disasters when the exchange rate has been used as an anti-inflationary tool, generating serious exchange setbacks that only brought on substantial, costly adjustments to the real sector and caused long-lasting harm to GDP potential. However – and I must say this not to fail on the second principle I mentioned earlier – the exchange rate does affect inflation and, yes, it is affected by monetary policy in the short term. This is a channel for transmitting monetary policy in open economies that mitigates the cost in terms of increased unemployment of meeting the inflation target. Let me rephrase this. Inflation is controlled via the interest rate: if the outlook is inflation rising, then the  BIS Review 135/2010  1  interest rate is raised. In a closed economy, interest rate hikes slow down demand, which means that they also slow down economic activity and employment, thereby controlling inflationary pressures. This allows medium- and long-term policy to be upheld but obviously inflicts short-term costs. That is what stability is all about. In an open economy, on the other hand, there is an additional channel and that is the temporary exchange rate appreciation that results from raising the interest rate and this diminishes the need to slow down economic activity.

This regime some times involves drastic exchange rate adjustments, which can be costly to many firms. The alternative is a more rigid exchange rate, where fluctuations in foreign currency supply are mirrored by fluctuations in domestic credit cost and availability, which can be very detrimental to the financial system’s soundness and to firms. More rigid systems simply put off real-sector adjustments, but in the meantime capital flows, credit availability for firms and inflation are all affected and eventually the value of the currency is eroded and the higher nominal exchange rate does not lead to a higher real exchange rate. On the other hand, a floating exchange rate allows more rapid adjustments and the next movements of the exchange rate are uncertain, preventing the market from betting on one direction. Thus we avoid repeating past mistakes and returning to the days where prospects of gradual appreciation artificially cheapened foreign borrowing and induced massive capital inflows. Another important factor in determining the exchange rate are pressures from fiscal policy. For more than twenty years, Chile has benefited from a responsible fiscal policy, using it counter- cyclically when the situation warranted. Questions of budget go beyond macroeconomic considerations but the fact is that in the present circumstances our economy has started to take off and does not require an additional boost from fiscal policy. The Finance Minister’s recent statement on the budget aims towards reducing the structural fiscal deficit and is fully coherent with assumptions in our latest Monetary Policy Report.
Between 2011 and 2015, the number of cheques issued had reduced by 27%, from 205 million cheques in 2011 to 148 million cheques in 2015. At the same, the number of IBG transactions had increased by 147% from 60 million transactions in 2011 to 149 million transactions in 2015. This is a key milestone as the number of IBG transactions surpassed the number of cheques cleared for the first time. The IBFT transactions had also increased significantly by almost eight-fold from 5.8 million transactions in 2011 to 47 million transactions in 2015. This signifies greater public confidence in the use of e-payments. Such achievement is also indicative of how effective collaboration and coordinated efforts by the various stakeholders in the payment value chain could produce the intended outcomes. We should put in more effort to sustain the cheque reduction whilst promoting greater adoption of e-payments in areas where the usage of cheques is still relatively high. These areas include interbank card and loan repayment, over-the-counter cheque payments to government agencies and cheques usage in the takaful and insurance industry. Intensified efforts needed in the displacement of cash Our progress in promoting the use of debit cards as an alternative to cash however, has been modest. For the period between 2011 and 2015, there was only a marginal increase from 1 to 3 debit card transactions per capita and from 7 to 9 payment card terminals per 1,000 inhabitants.

First, I will outline BNM’s role in fostering an enabling environment for network expansion as well as in promoting competition, innovation and choice in the payment landscape;  ii. Second, I will highlight the key priority areas for stakeholders that could accelerate the displacement of cheques and cash with cost-effective e-payments;  iii. Third, I will outline the importance of a synergistic collaboration between MyClear and the financial institutions to deliver innovative payment solutions and meet user needs; and  iv. Fourth, I will highlight the need for the financial institutions to provide end-to-end and value-adding financial solutions to their customers. 1. Fostering an enabling environment for network expansion whilst promoting competition, innovation and choice  An efficient and well-functioning payment system must not only have the economies of scale to enable lowering of costs, but also the quality of services to serve the needs of an increasingly demanding and sophisticated users. We designed our developmental efforts into two-fold: i. Foster an enabling environment for infrastructure building and network expansion to achieve the economies of scale; and  ii. Promote effective competition among the industry players to spur the development of innovative solutions, provide greater choices and value proposition to the public and in the process, lower costs. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Over the past few years, BNM has played the role of a catalyst by instituting reform measures and introducing market incentive mechanisms to enhance the accessibility and the quality, affordability and security of the e-payment services to the general public.
While there were no big surprises for the CPIEFE regarding expectations in March, headline inflation figures were below projections, affected by some temporary factors which are expected to reverse in the coming months. On one hand, the decline in international fuel prices, along with an appreciation of the peso in the first four months of the year, reflected in lower energy inflation. The recent depreciation of the peso will help to reverse this situation soon. Electric power has also helped to keep inflation low, but this effect is reversible once the impact of refunds implemented in April and May fades away and the forthcoming entry into force of new price regulation. In addition, the low basis for comparison of June 2012 will mean that CPI inflation will enter the tolerance range in the coming months. With respect to the CPI measurement, and as I pointed out on when I presented the last Monetary Policy Report to this Commission, I want to reiterate that the measurement of this index and other statistics, poses many methodological and practical challenges that must be dealt with in a continuous and transparent fashion. The improvements announced by the National Statistics Institute to the measurement methodology of certain specific products in the basket, as well as other improvements to be made on the occasion of the regular review of the household basket, are most welcome.

household income and long-term interest rates) have been exceptionally favorable in the past few quarters. Meanwhile, the profits of small and medium-sized construction enterprises have deteriorated, which could result in an increase in the sector’s payment delays. Finally, the outlook for the supply of new office space remains high by historical standards. The Chilean economy is well positioned to deal with the changing internal and external conditions ahead. Internationally, conditions facing the Chilean economy have been benign for a long time, with high terms of trade and very favorable external financing conditions. At home, the progression of the investment cycle has led to strong growth in employment and spending in a context of contained inflation and neutral ranges for the MPR. Indicators of recent months suggest that external and internal conditions have started to normalize. The adjustments in relative prices, such as the real exchange rate, have gone in the right direction to help the economy to accommodate the new situation, that is, lower terms of trade, and the normalization of domestic demand and external financing conditions. The Board follows the evolution of external and domestic macroeconomic conditions and their implications on inflation closely, and reiterates its commitment to conduct monetary policy so that projected inflation stands at 3% over the policy horizon. Let me finish with some reflections. Final reflections The economic conjuncture always presents challenges to those of us who are in charge of economic policy making. Now we must face a different configuration than what we’ve seen in recent years.