samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, efforts to increase regional financial integration have come hand-in-hand with financial sector reforms and fostered regional cooperation, particularly in terms of crisis prevention and management. Regional surveillance through enhanced channels of communications and platforms of information sharing has been a main focus across different fora of economic ministers and central banks in Asia and the Pacific. The main regional crisis management tool, reserves pooling arrangement under the Chiang Mai Initiative, has been enlarged and its activation process has also been streamlined to better serve the needs of its members. Surely, Asian economies cannot decouple from the global economy as we still depend considerably on other economies outside the region. However, I believe that post Asian crisis regional integration and cooperation have helped most of our regional economies to stand by each other amid the turbulent environment. Ladies and Gentlemen, Although the regional economies have become increasingly more resilient and have focused on fostering effective regional crisis prevention and management mechanisms, we still need to be vigilant about the on-going risks. Moreover, there are important lessons from this crisis that we need to take into consideration in choosing the direction and pace of further economic integration in the new environment. First, while innovations and the removal of barriers to cross-border activity have expedited global capital market integration, they could also bring about complexities, less transparency, and therefore greater possibility and magnitude of systemic risks.

In fact, a  BIS Review 88/2006  3  study by the ECB shows that the closer a country comes to an excessive deficit, the more likely it is that the forecast the government presents officially will later turn out to be wrong. There is a strong bias towards unrealistic optimism once a country’s deficit approaches 3% of GDP. The same result was indicated in a study by Lars Jonung and Martin Larch. What challenges does the future hold? Let me say something in this respect about the new member states. It is all too apparent that the collapse of Germany’s leading role in fiscal discipline has also set a bad example for some of the larger new member states. This despite the fact that Germany now appears to be in the process of correcting its deficit. Given that public finances did deteriorate so much in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic during the first years of this century it is fortunate both for themselves and for the euro area that these countries have postponed joining ERM II and the attempt to rapidly adopt the euro. They have made clear that their government finances must be in order before the process of joining the euro area begins. Had they tried and locked their currencies within ERM II they may well have stayed in that position for a long time, becoming in the meantime targets for speculation – as their poor public finances would have lent little credibility to their overall economic policy.
No data for Greece, Slovakia, Estonia or Lithuania. a. The ratio has been calculated dividing NPL by the sum of provisions and capital (including equity instruments eligible as CET1 and reserves). In any event, ensuring a suitable level of provisioning for problem assets is key to properly identifying impairments and correctly measuring the bank’s solvency. Moreover, a rigorous provisioning review policy provides banks with the right incentives for the management of their non-productive assets, since it reduces the book losses that the disposal of such assets may generate. This is only achieved with stringent accounting regulations and strict supervision of asset valuation on the bank’s balance sheet which, as you are aware, has been a key element in the Banco de España’s supervisory strategy. Indeed, we have recently amended the accounting Circular to which banks must conform in order, among other purposes, to fine-tune the accounting criteria in respect of provisioning credit risk losses. Further, for some time we have been actively contributing within the SSM to developing a common methodology in this field encompassing best practices and ensuring their uniform application across all countries. 2.3  Regulatory reform  The ongoing and still incomplete reform of the regulatory framework is another factor of uncertainty that has affected banks’ share prices. With regard to the Basel Committee’s agenda, major headway has been made in reforming prudential standards and, in particular, in the treatment of credit, market and operational risks.

These developments have continued to sustain our external balance with the current account of the balance of payments likely to continue to record large surpluses. Going forward, in the next 12 to 18 months, several external and domestic developments need to be taken into account in the assessment of our economic outlook. First, the slowdown experienced in a number of the major economies is likely to extend into 2009. This more prolonged period of slowdown is likely to have spill over effects on other economies including emerging economies. Global financial markets are also expected to remain volatile as the financial stress experienced by financial institutions in these economies continue to have an impact on credit conditions, the housing market and their overall economy. These developments have resulted in a number of institutions scaling back their global operations. The disruptions in the credit markets have already exerted some restraint in economic  BIS Review 71/2008  1  activity. While the adjustments are still taking place, there remains uncertainty about the full magnitude of the losses and its consequent impact on financial stability and thus on their overall economy. Despite these developments, indications are that growth remains resilient here in the Asian region, benefiting from the strengthened domestic demand and the increased trade activity within the region and with the non-traditional markets.
Insurers are required to hold a buffer of assets above the value of their policyholder liabilities that can absorb unexpected losses due to credit defaults, longevity shocks or other reasons. Solvency II limits what counts as own funds to instruments that can genuinely absorb losses. 3. The capital calculation in Solvency II captures all the risks to which the insurer is exposed, including those in other parts of the group. 4. The incentives of owners and managers are brought back into alignment with those of policyholders in a number of ways including: a. Requiring owners to put their own money at risk through minimum capital requirements that must be maintained at all times. b. If capital levels fall close to these minimum requirements, a supervisory ladder of intervention shifts control increasingly away from owners and managers at a time when their incentives to act in the interests of policyholders are weakest because of the temptation to gamble for resurrection. c. Capital requirements are risk-based, so that owners must put more of their own money on the line as the insurer takes greater risk. d. Taking more risk should also never lead to an apparent improvement in the capital position of an insurer. e. The UK Senior Managers’ Regime puts specific responsibilities for the key aspects of running an insurer on individual managers.

The PRA is well aware of the need to have regard to facilitating long-term productive investment in the economy when pursuing its statutory objectives.5 Insurers active in the bulk purchase annuity market tell us that they intend to continue this diversification into direct investments, targeting on average a c.40-50% share of total assets backing annuity obligations, significantly higher than before Solvency II. Overall, I think the PRA’s implementation of Solvency II works well for annuity business. That is why we recommended adoption of a similar framework for superfunds. Solvency II does though have one significant flaw as a regime for annuities business: the design of the risk margin. Particularly in relation to long-dated insurance risks, such as longevity, the risk margin calculation is too sensitive to interest rates. As a result, the risk margin is too high when interest rates are low and too low when they are high. With interest rates currently low, insurers have responded to a too-high risk margin on annuity business by reinsuring longevity risk on new business offshore. Meanwhile Transitional Measures on Technical Provisions (TMTP) offset the risk margin on the pre-Solvency II back book. The irony is that UK insurers do not hold an especially high level of risk margin (net of TMTP) on their annuity books in practice. This outcome is unwelcome from our perspective because UK insurers are increasingly exposed to offshore reinsurers and TMTP is higher than it otherwise would be, giving the impression that UK insurers are more reliant on transitionals to meet capital requirements.
Moreover, on 23 December 2009 the ECB launched a public consultation on the establishment of loan-by-loan information requirements for ABSs in the Eurosystem collateral framework. 34  BIS Review 10/2010  debate in the United States, where the most independent institution, namely the Federal Reserve, is subject to attacks and pressures from various corners, including legislative initiatives aiming to curtail its powers. A final concern regarding international cooperation is this: there is no doubt that the “Volker rule” represents a new topic for discussion and that there is a risk that not all countries will want to follow this path, out of a wish not to penalise the financial institutions based in their own countries through the new regulations on separation. As has been the case in the past, it can be expected that vast financial resources will be employed in an attempt to influence political decisions and to stand in the way of a proposal of this kind. It would be a shame if the authorities in major countries put the interests of these institutions ahead of those of the taxpayers and ahead of global interests. This brings me to the role that central banks can play in supporting more sustainable credit flows. Recent work shows that price stability is necessary, but not sufficient to ensure a homogenous flow of credit to the economy and avoid financial instability. In particular, if monetary policy concentrates solely on inflation objectives, it might, in some circumstances, end up being too accommodative of credit cycles and fuel speculative bubbles.

21  There are currently three countries that use, or plan to use, a leverage ratio, namely the United States, Canada and Switzerland. Switzerland has introduced a leverage ratio for its two large, internationally active banks, which will take effect in 2013. 22  Pressure on banks to reduce leverage has been apparent from discussions in various international fora, such as the G20, which has called for the introduction of leverage ratios, in addition to risk-based capital ratios, in order to prevent banks from arbitraging capital requirements. 36  BIS Review 10/2010  With improving conditions in the economy and financial markets, supportive measures by governments and central banks have progressively less “raison d’être”. The withdrawal of these measures must occur in a timely fashion; being too early or too late could have unwanted implications for the speed at which the new steady state can be reached. In particular, too brisk a phasing-out could lead to a dramatic process of de-leveraging, jeopardising the economic recovery. On the other hand, it is essential to prevent the banking system from relying on support measures for too long, i.e. becoming “addicted” to them. The intermediation role of the central banks during the crisis, if drawn out for too long, may reduce incentives for banks to return to actively operating in the money market. Such a scenario may also weaken incentives to restructure banks’ balance sheets. Credit flows to households and firms represent an indicator of financing conditions and of the prospects of a recovery in economic activity.
10 The market responded rapidly to that development and, towards the end of the £ programme, some contacts were telling us that gilt market liquidity had actually improved relative to March 2009. One small point to clear up in relation to maintaining the programme is whether we should be re-investing the interest receipts earned on the gilts. In the United States, the Federal Open Market Committee recently decided that, to maintain the effectiveness of their asset purchases they needed to re-invest the proceeds from maturing assets and interest receipts. That reflects the fact that in large part they purchased (pass-through) mortgage-backed securities where, in addition to receiving coupon payments, a proportion of the underlying assets are constantly maturing or being pre-paid. Absent a re-investment programme, and making assumptions about pre-payment rates, the stock of assets in the US programme might have declined at a rate of around 17 ½ % pa. In the UK purchase programme we bought nearly all gilts 11 , with at least 3 years to maturity. The earliest gilt redemption won’t occur until the second half of 2012. We are receiving dividend payments and those have currently cumulated to a value around 5% of the total stock of purchases. 12 These receipts were anticipated, are currently held in the Fund and will contribute to repaying the original funding of the programme. A good argument can be made that, to keep the monetary stimulus of asset purchases constant, this cash should be reinvested in more gilts.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me take this opportunity to say a few words about the phenomenon of Corporate Social Responsibility. Corporate social responsibility has become an integral part of conducting business in most internationally acclaimed and world class organizations and institutions, of which the Bank of Zambia is striving to become. The acknowledgement of the importance of corporate social responsibility, in my view, has come about as a result of most corporate bodies realizing that they actually have more than just a little responsibility towards the communities in which they exist and do business. After all, these same communities cannot be distanced from any economic activity, just as one cannot live without the other. Let me, in this regard, take this opportunity to urge all Commercial Banks, Non-Financial Banking Institutions and other corporate bodies that are involved in community work and corporate social responsibility to please continue assisting the needy. There are numerous projects that are in dire need of assistance. And to all those corporate bodies that are actively engaged in corporate social responsibility programmes, allow me to commend you and urge you not to relent in your efforts to bring the communities you serve closer to you. Distinguished Guests I hasten to add that the Bank of Zambia has not been alone in this project to restore the MUKUYU TREE. The Bank has partnered with the Kabwe Municipal Council leadership with whom we have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This MOU outlines the accountabilities of the various parties.
But if this model is right, higher rates would not help either, as rates substantially above equilibrium would mean that demand for loans from banks would decline sharply and the riskiness of future projects would increase, and even currently viable projects might turn into unviable, nonperforming ones. But let’s go back. What is a real problem, and take it as a criticism of our own club, is that we are unable to explain this story, this narrative. I have long pondered why this is the case. Recently, I caught a glimpse of an answer in the work of the young German economist Benjamin Braun. Like him, I feel that people have simply stopped understanding us. After 2008 we started to tell a different “monetary story” – a different narrative about money and central banks – to the one people were used to. Public confidence in the monetary system was and is grounded in the previous narrative, which in turn is based on three building blocks. One, the central bank is the sole creator of money and thus has perfect control over the quantity of money; money is therefore exogenous, to use the language of economics. Two, commercial banks do not create money but merely convert existing deposits passively into loans. And three, the lower the growth in the price level, the better. This narrative, which some would term imprecisely “monetarist”, did a very good job of reconciling public preferences and central bank decisions when bankers were fighting inflation and subsequently working successfully to stabilise it, i.e.

Once central banks in the developed world hit the zero lower bound on nominal statutory interest rates, they tried – and have been trying ever since – to respond to this perceived or detected decline in the natural interest rate by doing other things, such as QE, forward guidance and exchange rate commitments. Some have even tried negative nominal interest rates. 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  If this whole story is realistic, and central bankers tend to believe it is, what they did – or have been doing – is nothing other than keeping their economies in equilibrium by other means. This might have side-effects, of course, and there are trade-offs, but the main story is this. In broader terms, it is still a fight to keep the value of money stable, but this time around not by fighting inflation, but by combating the deflationary tendencies stemming from weak current demand, as demand is tending to move further and further into the future – which is just another way of expressing the decline in the equilibrium natural interest rate. Let me make a small detour to the financial sector. Many are arguing that low nominal interest rates are killing the financial sector and are calling for higher rates as soon as possible.
The CBC is willing to take all the necessary measures to include the CLP into CLS, such as extending the opening hours of its RTGS system. Page 17 of 20  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  Related to Financial Markets Infrastructures, I would like to mention that last June the CBC issued a new regulation framework which will implement the first Trade Repository (TR) of the country. This TR, called Integrated System of Derivatives Information (SIID, in Spanish), will be owned and operated by the central and, after a transition process, will be in full operation by 2021. The SIID will collect, store and disseminate information of OTC derivatives trades, following the Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMIs) and international standards for reporting. This infrastructure should promote transparency and market conduct, improve decision-making of market participants, and contribute to the supervision processes of the Financial Market Commission. It is important to note that the Minister of Finance has just announced that a bill to regulate Trade Repositories will be sent to Congress. The SIID is perfectly compatible with the existence of private-owned trade repositories. Page 18 of 20  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  According to the latest BIS Triennial Review of foreign exchange and OTC derivatives, the Chilean Peso represents 0.2% of the global FX turnover. We strongly believe that this share should increase in the future.

The internationalization of the Chilean peso can enhance financial stability, by alleviating liquidity concerns during stress episodes and reducing counterparty risks, among other effects. All of these changes must be accompanied with more robust and developed financial infrastructures. Also, the wider cross-border usage of the Chilean peso improves our position as a financial center. Regarding concrete measures towards accomplishing these goals, the CBC is reviewing its FX regulation, in order to modernize and simplify it. In addition, a larger and more developed FX market should benefit from having access to more robust financial market infrastructures. Page 12 of 20  Central Bank of Chile September 2019  In order to do so, the CBC issued regulation and is implementing a Trade Repository for OTC derivatives, relying on its current faculties and in coordination with the Financial Market Commission. Additionally, the CBC is working on an initiative that will allow its Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) payment system to settle US dollars large-value interbank transactions. These measures add to the future inclusion of the Chilean Peso as the first CLS-eligible currency in South America. This is a priority for the CBC, therefore we are working closely with the CLS Bank to materialize this in the next three years.
It was in a determined effort to avoid them, having already cut interest rates as far as they could, that central banks then turned to alternative, “unconventional” monetary policies. For the most part this meant QE. Asset purchases are designed to keep a lid on forward rates, thereby supporting demand and activity. In the academic literature, however, many economists argued for an alternative – and potentially more powerful – option, namely a committed form of forward guidance. The economist Michael Woodford has been one prominent advocate[8]. Remember that the name of the game, when faced with this risk, and having run out of room to cut the policy rate any further, is to lower forward real interest rates. In this respect, a credible declaration that you will keep the actual policy rate low, even in the event of a future increase in inflation, does two things. It keeps nominal forward rates low. It also raises expected inflation. In the normal course of events the central bank would tighten policy as inflation rises, choking it off before it turns into a persistent overshoot. If you tell people you’re not going to do this then – as long as they believe you – this will push up inflation expectations and further depress the real rate of interest. In many simple economic models expected real interest rates have almost as big an effect on spending as the current real rate.

Such quality developments come from long-term training, discipline and fear of losing credibility and reputation. In other words, microfinance practitioners should have the long-term sustainability, and not quick profit, as their goal. It is, therefore, necessary to develop microfinance practitioners before they are allowed to develop microfinance beneficiaries. Noble eight-fold path is a guide for everyone The Buddha preached the Noble Eight-fold Path to be followed by both the kings and the subjects alike. It is a complete personal development programme for those who aspire to become successful and be of help to others in the society. It is a moral code that requires people to speak rightly, act rightly, live rightly, make efforts rightly, know rightly, concentrate rightly, think rightly and understand rightly. The Noble Eight-fold Path is not a moral code that should be enforced by means of a moral law. It is simply a voluntary action which everyone should follow for his own benefit and for the benefit of others. In essence, the Noble Eight-fold Path converts the followers to be truthful, honest, respectful and exemplary. When these qualities become essential traits of the personality of those who run organisations, such organisations do not have to worry about governance principles. That is because, in such organisations, right practice and right men become totally inseparable from each other. Above all, such organisations would not attempt to cheat their customers by offering them seemingly attractive, but spurious investment programmes.