samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Google Trends indices show the number of searches on a specific topic as a proportion of all searches, normalised to give a maximum value of 100. For instance in my recent speech “Resilience and innovation in post-trade”, available online at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/speech/2019/resilience-and-innovation-in-post-trade-speech-by-dave-ramsden. 2  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  2  improvements in policy, better able to adjust to shocks when they did happen? One way analysts at the OECD and at the UK Treasury tried to answer that question was by looking at graphs like these (Charts 2 and 3).3 These try to quantify the resilience of different countries in specific time periods in terms of shocks to GDP. They show a statistical estimate of the average GDP shock to hit the G7 economies in the first and second half of the available pre-crisis data – roughly, the pre-crisis decade and the previous decade – and how long that average shock persisted for. The scale on the X axis shows the number of years from the point the shock first hit. And the scale on the Y axis shows the deviation from trend output in each year. Broadly speaking, the smaller the average shock, and the faster it goes back to trend, then, as defined, the more resilient the economy. There were a few conclusions that we drew from this analysis back in 2008. First, the scale of economic shocks, measured by the size of the initial impulse, had fallen significantly across all the G7 economies.

Financial institutions must both be innovative in developing relevant and effective financing solutions, and facilitate innovation by supporting green technologies or nature-based solutions that may be the key to unlocking a green future for Malaysia. Adequately addressing the needs of your clients requires addressing the needs of the future industries that your clients will be operating in. The Bank is working actively to enhance the green ecosystem to support the economy's transition. This includes refinements to our regulatory and supervisory approaches, facilitation of products and services, engagement and capacity building as well as efforts to bridge data gaps. We look forward to continuing close collaboration with the financial sector via the Joint Committee on Climate Change (JC3) and other key stakeholders to further the climate agenda. Finally, I would like to thank AICB and ABM for facilitating this important conversation. Thank you. 2/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches
By de-politicising the short run trade-off between inflation and activity, this arrangement has provided the grounds for the most successful monetary policy regime for the UK thus far. The MPC’s flexible inflationtargeting framework was further strengthened by the 2013 Treasury Review and the following Remit update which effectively ‘completed the contract’ by further specifying the relationship between the MPC’s primary objective for price stability, and its secondary objective to support jobs and growth. Though, having overseen the 2013 Review, I must declare an interest in judging its contribution. Since then, the Remit has explicitly acknowledged that, in exceptional circumstances shocks to the economy may be particularly large or the effects of shocks may persist over an extended period. In such a period the  1  Carney M (2017), remarks given at a conference to mark 20 years of the MPC’s operational independence, notes that Governor Eddie George once remarked that in the half century that followed the Bank’s nationalisation in 1946 it “operated under legislation which, remarkably did not attempt to define our objectives or functions.” 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  MPC must balance the trade-off between the speed with which inflation is brought back to the target and the consideration that should be placed on the variability of jobs and economic activity.

I would note this is something the Committee was able to anticipate before the referendum, the minutes of the MPC’s May 2016 meeting stating that “[t]he implications for the direction of monetary policy will depend on the relative magnitudes of the demand, supply and exchange rate effects.” And my colleague Ben Broadbent has recently set out in more detail what this means in the particular context of Brexit. True to this statement, the MPC has set monetary policy since the referendum on the basis of its assessment of how those effects are interacting. This is made difficult by the large, uncertain and sometimes offsetting implications of the decision to leave the EU. So it is not surprising that even though all Committee members sign up to the framework I have laid out, their individual assessment of the economic outlook has differed along the way. Decide Which brings me to the second phase of ‘end to end’ monetary policy: Decide. In the MPC’s meeting at the start of this month, a majority of its members thought that the evolution of supply and demand was such that the margin of slack in the economy now seemed fairly limited, and that underlying inflationary pressures had shown some signs of picking up. As a result, they judged that this reduced the degree to which it was appropriate for the MPC to tolerate an extended period of above-target inflation, and that a small reduction in stimulus was warranted.
This is again to help address the problems that SMEs have, not just during this COVID-19 period, but also to help them restructure their businesses post-COVID. Those are some examples of how we are ending up where we are today which is largely due to measures undertaken by the government to support the recovery as well as cushion the impact from the COVID-19. I would like to turn now for the second part of my talk today which is on what lies ahead given that the recovery is likely to take some time. Again, the contraction from the COVID-19 last year was 6 percent and we expect the economy to grow 3 percent this year. For the next year, we are looking at a GDP growth of about 4.7 percent. Therefore, we are expecting the economy to come back to the pre-COVID level at least in terms of the headline GDP sometime around the third quarter of next year. However, given the uneven nature of the recovery, it does not mean that everything would go back to what it was like before. Recovery in the service sectors will lag quite significantly; notably, sectors related to tourism where the current forecast foresees a period of almost 4-5 years until we are likely to see tourism come back to the pre-COVID level.

The fact that the bond in this case is linked to STIBOR 3 months is probably due to it being the same frequency as the coupon payments. It would, of course, be impractical to have settlement and coupon payments every day. In this context, backward-looking average rates have roughly the same practical and administrative advantages as forward-looking interbank rates. As the Riksbank is now starting to publish average interest rates and indices for SWESTR, market participants can therefore start using SWESTR instead of STIBOR also at longer maturities. This is, of course, an adjustment for both lenders and borrowers, but the obstacles are hardly insurmountable. In other countries, for example, various adjustments have been introduced which mean that interest payment is delayed for a couple of days. In this way, market participants can see what the final interest was and make the payment a few days later. Market participants need to work together for an orderly transition It is thus clear that there are issues that need to be addressed before a transition to SWESTR can be completed. Since reference rates are used by many participants and in a large number of contracts, it is important that this is done in an orderly manner. It will be a development project running over several years. The Riksbank would like to call on all those concerned to start the transition now. Sweden should not be left behind in the global effort to start using transactionbased reference rates.
Thomas J Jordan: A changing role for central banks? Speech by Mr Thomas J Jordan, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Welcome Event Master of Banking and Finance, St. Gallen, 22 September 2010. *  *  *  I would like to thank Dr. Claudia Strub and Till Ebner for their valuable support in drafting this speech. Introduction The economic cost of financial crises is enormous. The recent crisis highlighted the extent of systemic risk and thus the overriding importance of a stable financial system. It also demonstrated the inadequacy of the instruments and measures used until now to ensure financial stability. More effective measures are needed to check and prevent systemic risk. The key question is how should – or can – this be achieved in the future? In my talk today I would like to address this question by focusing on the role of central banks. Specifically, I will endeavour to answer the following question: To what extent will the lessons learned from this crisis affect or even alter the future role and tasks of central banks? I intend to examine this from three perspectives: In the first part of my talk, I will examine the extent to which central banks need to undertake a fundamental review of their instruments and objectives in the light of recent events. In particular, there is a need to analyse the effectiveness of the monetary policy strategies and instruments used to date, especially in periods of crisis.

Now that I am already way out on a limb, I should emphasize that my remarks reflect my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee or anyone else in the Federal Reserve System. As a starting point, it’s useful to travel back in time to the 1980s and 1990s, when inflation targeting was introduced. The problem at the time was high and variable inflation that contributed to macroeconomic instability and unmoored inflation expectations, which in turn fueled high and variable inflation. To break this vicious cycle, numerous central banks instituted inflation targeting, or variants thereof, with a focus on bringing inflation down to a low level and fostering the establishment of stable, well-anchored inflation expectations. This strategy worked extraordinarily well in the decade preceding the global financial crisis, as central banks were able to achieve remarkably low and stable inflation, leading to a positive feedback loop between low inflation and well-anchored inflation expectations. Today, we face an altogether different set of problems stemming from a very low neutral interest rate—that is, the short-term real interest rate consistent with an economy operating at its potential alongside low and stable inflation. Ironically, the problem we need to solve these days is the risk of inflation that is persistently too low, rather than too high. Today’s low neutral interest rates reflect the culmination of trends extending back 25 years.
However, when it comes to the size of financial markets, there are a couple of caveats that I wish to add. First, a larger and deeper financial system may attract increased capital flows, and consequently, lead to increased volatility of the exchange rate. Such volatility can be mitigated if the foreign exchange markets are also deep enough to absorb the variations in the demand and supply of foreign exchange. Exchange rate flexibility is necessary and having a healthy level of foreign exchange rate reserves is also helpful in times when there is significant volatility of capital flows. During the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98, net portfolio outflows were RM31 billion. During the 2008–09 financial crisis in the AEs, we experienced almost three times that much outflows without any significant disruption of domestic financial intermediation. The second caveat has to do with the question of whether a financial system can become too big whereby it becomes a drag on the economy. Based on research at the BIS and the IMF, this may indeed be the case. In July 2012, Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi of the BIS published a paper, where based on a study of 50 advanced and emerging countries from 1980–2009, they found that beyond a certain point, further growth of the financial system can actually reduce real growth by reducing productivity growth. Furthermore, a fast growing financial sector can also drag down productivity growth by pulling away scarce resources from the rest of the economy.

The benefits of global financial integration Financial integration brings benefits to the Malaysian economy. Being a part of the global financial system facilitates trade and investment flows between Malaysia and the rest of the world. It has allowed foreign investors to invest in Malaysia with full confidence that the profits from such investments can be easily repatriated back to their home countries. Malaysian exporters and importers can freely trade with the world in full confidence that they could conveniently receive and make payments in any currency they wish in a quick and efficient manner. At one time, the lack of banking relationships made it necessary for BNM to established bilateral payments arrangements with central banks in many other developing economies to facilitate payments for trade between Malaysia and those economies. The expansion of correspondent banking has now made such arrangements largely redundant. The globalisation of finance has allowed Malaysian corporates to tap global sources of funds to support their investments and operations in other parts of the world, hence broadening their economic opportunities. It has allowed Malaysian fund managers to invest in other markets to diversify their investments and increase the yields to their unit holders. It has allowed foreign funds to invest in our financial markets, adding depth and liquidity to these markets. It has allowed foreign financial institutions to operate in our markets and our financial institutions to operate in foreign markets. Therefore, our engagement with the global financial system brings real benefits to the economy.
This may partly reflect market participants’ investment responses to the past reduction in the key ECB interest rates, which has reduced the remuneration of short-term deposits and marketable instruments and fostered corresponding shifts in the allocation of funds not only within M3 but also to instruments outside M3. The outstanding amount of MFI loans to the private sector contracted further in March, reflecting mainly a negative flow of lending to non-financial corporations. The reduced amount of financing is again related mainly to loans with shorter maturities, while the net flow  2  BIS Review 56/2009  of loans with longer maturities remained positive. The decline in short-term lending is likely to reflect to a large extent lower demand in the wake of a sharp deterioration in economic activity and business prospects at the start of the year. Interest rates on short-term and floating rate bank loans to households and non-financial corporations have declined significantly over recent months, indicating that the transmission of monetary policy impulses to the economy continues. Overall, the latest money and credit data support the assessment that both banks and money-holding sectors are reducing their highly leveraged positions built up in past years. To sum up, the Governing Council’s decisions today take into account the expectation that price developments will continue to be dampened by the substantial past fall in commodity prices and the marked weakening of economic activity in the euro area and globally.

In the situation where some forecasts have been extremely pessimistic, one might expect markets to adjust correspondingly in an abrupt fashion. In the event, in the foreign exchange markets the dollar overall has remained rather steady; and the short-term interest rate futures curve implies that rates are expected to bottom out later this year and then begin to rise. Moreover, while the stock market has fallen back over the past year from what many felt were unrealistic levels, and has been volatile again in recent days, the downturn in the mainstream market has so far been relatively limited, with the greatest fall concentrated in more speculative stocks. Equity valuations are always uncertain at times of adjustment, and we could see some continued volatility in that area, but the overall picture is that the markets as a whole are "looking through" the present slowdown, on the basis that they see a reasonable prospect for a recovery in US growth after the present adjustment. A second area of uncertainty lies much closer to home, and happily its ramifications are almost wholly beneficent. This is the question of whether changes in the supply-side of the UK economy mean that we can hope to achieve higher rates of sustainable growth, consistently with our inflation target, than has been possible in the past. One essentially empirical argument that is sometimes made to suggest that we can achieve faster sustainable growth is that inflation has in fact run a little below our target for most of the past two years.
Basis 4: Transition of the burden of financial crises from shareholder to tax payer Ladies and gentlemen, the history of global financial crises taught us that nature of crises have been changing and along with that the burden of such crises have shifted from shareholders to tax payers. The history of systemic financial sector crises dates back to the 18th century, to the banking sector crisis named as the South Sea Crisis in UK in 1720s. After the inception of the formal banking system, USA has reported a series of crises in their banking system from 1792 to the latest, the Subprime Crisis in 2008. During initial periods, the impact of these crises was local and their spillover effects were negligible. With the evolution of the global banking business, banks have gradually started to link with the other banks in tandem with the improvements in global trade and capital market developments. With this interconnectedness, a crisis in one particular bank or banks in a particular country began to spread and create crises in the regional and global financial markets. The first ever global financial crisis erupted in 1857 in the US. However, until the world’s biggest slump, the Great Depression during 1929–33, Governments wanted financial systems to become stable by themselves, while the Governments’ involvement with banks was limited to raising funds from banks for developing infrastructure and other public spending. There was no lender of last resort to look after the crisis-ridden financial institutions.

Boris Vujčić: Croatia's joining the euro area makes it an active participant in defining a common monetary policy Speech by Mr Boris Vujčić, Governor of the Croatian National Bank, at the conference "Croatia, the 20th Member of the Euro Area", Zagreb, 24 January 2023. *** Your Excellencies, esteemed guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is my honour and pleasure to welcome you to the conference that marks an outstanding success of our country, our economy and our society as a whole, to which many of you have directly contributed: the introduction of the euro in Croatia. Allow me to extend my deepest gratitude to you for all your effort, hard work and dedication to this, in all respects, complex and demanding project. Commenced in 2017 with the Eurostrategy, a strategic document outlining significant and lasting economic benefits to be brought to the Croatian economy by the euro and, in contrast, relatively small and mostly one-off costs, the project involved a lot of stakeholders in Croatia and abroad. Exposed to a great many risks, it demanded that quite a few goals be achieved and challenges overcome in the process, which was done successfully and in the shortest possible period, notwithstanding all external shocks and requirements that had to be met along the way. Some of them are widely known, while only a narrow circle of those involved is familiar with the others. Still fresh in our memories are the COVID pandemic and the devastating earthquake that hit Zagreb in March 2020.
They consist of, first, risk-sensitive minimum requirements; second, a more consistent system of supervisory review; and, third, enhanced transparency and market discipline. Each of these three pillars offers unique benefits on its own, but the real strength of the three pillars stems from their ability to complement each other. The first pillar - which specifies the minimum capital requirements - constitutes a very direct approach to supervision. By applying a uniform set of rules to banks, the first pillar adds transparency to the regulatory process. Applying a shared set of rules to all banks makes it easier to compare organisations and get a sense of their relative degrees of solvency. On a technical level, the Committee based the measures of risk on the advanced practices that banks are adopting. The rules reflect the evolution in credit risk management by allowing qualifying banks to rely partly on their own estimates of the drivers of credit risk to determine the amount of capital required against particular exposures. One such driver of credit risk might be the bank’s own estimate of a borrower’s probability of default. Similarly, the new capital rules will reflect the advances in operational risk measurement by incorporating an explicit capital charge for such exposures to loss. BIS Review 34/2004  3  So the minimum rules will align capital charges more closely to better measures of the actual underlying economic risks that the industry is developing.

From this perspective, too many have been quick to judge obsolete the meetings attended only by advanced economies, such as the G7, and to consider that only those which also involve emerging economies, such as the G20, have the legitimacy to discuss global problems. As we have seen, there are important questions on which the interests of advanced economies diverge from those of emerging economies. In some cases, such divergences stem from specific characteristics or distortions in international relations created by emerging economies. It is thus essential that the advanced economies find common points of interest to be discussed subsequently in larger fora. This crisis began and developed at the centre of the advanced economic system, and ultimately originates from an objective difficulty among more developed countries to accept the consequences of the process of international integration, which has accelerated in recent years. Such countries, even the larger ones, have become smaller individually, to a greater  6  BIS Review 66/2009  extent affected by, and vulnerable to, the external environment. It is only by strengthening the cooperation between them that they will be able to maintain global leadership. Thank you for your attention. BIS Review 66/2009  7