samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is hard to overstate the benefits that banking union will bring. It will break the link between sovereigns and their banks. It will stop those negative feedback loops that have such perverse effects in times of stress. It will ensure that credit conditions in the euro area will not depend on where you are but on who you are, which is what should be expected of an efficient financial market. The governance structure we have adopted will guarantee that, while the Governing Council will keep the decision power, there will be no conflict of interest between monetary policy and banking supervision. On the contrary, more consistent supervision across the euro area should allow for the early detection of potential risks and imbalances and, ultimately, improve the transmission of monetary policy. Today the first pillar of the banking union is being constructed: the Single Supervisory Mechanism. This is a fundamental first step and its rapid implementation is a major success for the euro area. But alone it cannot achieve all the objectives of a banking union. That is why we must rapidly construct its two other pillars: a supranational bank resolution authority (the European Commission is due to deliver a draft text on this topic before the summer) and a unified deposit insurance system. Naturally, in the current situation, there are some dark spots. One major concern is the stagnation of bank credit, which especially affects SMEs.

The member countries can decide on an appropriate name and the structure of the apex body. For convenience, I have taken the liberty to name it as the SAARC Payments Council (SPC) which can be chaired by a member central bank or co-chaired by two central banks. The Council should draft vision and mission statements for the SAARC region and prepare a road map for payment reforms for the next 5 – 10 years, taking into consideration the modernization that needs to be attended to by member countries at national and regional levels. Under SPC, there should be several task forces consisting of senior officials of central banks and other financial institutions directly involved in payment and settlement related activities who will attend to the preliminary work, such as stocktaking and identification of gaps in the national payment systems. There should be task forces on (a) policy and operational matters; (b) legal and regulatory aspects; (c) technical and institutional infrastructure; and (d) communication and exchange of information. The task forces should make their recommendations to the SPC, which will take considered decisions. In nominating members to the task forces, where possible, countries should select officers from their respective NPCs, as such councils are expected to have representatives of all stakeholders with the necessary skills and expertise to handle work relating to the above areas. Sri Lanka has already established an NPC with a clear mandate to take forward payment reforms across the nation.
That is a recipe for government debt to rocket if banking sector problems choke off credit supply and economic growth. The 1999 Draghi Report urged authorities’ risk monitoring to identify that kind of vulnerability. 21  My conversation was with Martin Wolf. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  This goes some way towards making the case for the “structural” element of macroprudential policy. We need a resilient financial system partly because governments cannot always take the full burden of supporting spending in the economy in the face of a credit crunch. Monetary policy But what about lessons for cyclical macro policy? As I have discussed, I think we should take seriously the possibility that monetary policy – and, indeed, impulses in the supply of broad money from bank lending – can affect risk premia. And we need to go the further step of not ruling out that this could sometimes exacerbate medium-term imbalances. That does not, however, drive me to a conclusion that monetary policy should be used for broader objectives than targeting inflation over the medium term. As we learn lessons from one terrible crisis, we must not lose sight of the hardship caused by the inflationary boom-and-bust episodes that occurred until the current monetary regime was developed during the 1990s. And we need to place some weight on there not having obviously been a boom in nominal demand in the run up to the crisis, either here or in the USA, although there were building booms in some countries.

4  Represented by, for example, Bernanke (2005), “The Global Savings Glut and the US Current Account Deficit”. 5  See King (2011), “Global imbalances: the perspective of the Bank of England”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  So we need richer stories to make sense of what happened. It is precisely in that spirit that colleagues at the Bank for International Settlements6 have stressed the importance of gross capital flows. As Cecchetti has emphasised, whereas global current account balances (the counterpart of net capital flows) expanded in the twenty years to 2007 from about 1% of world GDP to about 3%, the gross capital outflows of all countries increased from around 3% to over 15% of world GDP (Chart 5). And the aggregate international investment position of all countries7 increased from under 50% to over 150% of annual world GDP. Opening up the possibility that gross capital flows matter transforms the picture. For example, as Borio points out, Europe’s gross capital flows were enormous, accounting for around half of gross inflows into the US in the run up to the crisis. And sufficient of that was invested in US ABS for the US’s mortgage crisis to be transmitted across the Atlantic, including to France and Germany, pretty well instantly in 2007 – and before the solvency of the banking system was in doubt. Even if gross and net flows had been equal, wouldn’t the composition of those flows have made a difference?
The SRM extends to all banks that operate in the SSM participating Member States and has as its objective the application of effective and uniform resolution rules and equal resolution financing conditions within the Banking Union. This function is carried out by a specialised EU agency – the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which performs its tasks and exercises its powers in close cooperation with the national resolution authorities. The SRB is a collegiate body composed of permanent (executive) members and one member designated by each participating Member State, representing its national resolution authorities. Subject to the nature of the issues to be addressed and resolved, SRB holds meetings in plenary session, executive session and extended executive session formats. The plenary session meetings are attended by the permanent members and all representatives of the participant Member States. Decisions in the plenary session are taken by a simple majority vote, each member having one voting right. The extended executive session meetings are attended by the SRB permanent members and the representatives of the participating Member States, where the banks, in respect of which the relevant decision is taken, are established. The decisions of the executive session, attended by the SRB permanent members, are adopted by consensus and where this is not possible – by simple majority of the votes of the SRB permanent members.

As Bulgarian is not a member of the euro area and the ECB’s decisions have no legal force in the country, the BNB will issue individual administrative acts regarding the significant institutions upon a request by the ECB and in full compliance with it. For the purposes of direct supervision over the banks determined as significant, the BNB has appointed sub-coordinators, and representatives of Joint Supervisory 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Teams who are to take part in all stages of the supervisory process. The Joint Supervisory Teams are responsible for the overall assessment of the risk, stability and vulnerability of each of the significant credit institutions. They also determine the relevant supervisory measures, as needed, including additional capital requirements under Pillar 2 of Basel II. The Joint Supervisory Teams assess the adequacy of the internal ratings of capital and liquidity, and the risks to them, the recovery plans, and the adequacy of the business model and corporate governance of each bank. With regard to prudential supervision related policy issues, the BNB’s representatives participate in other committees and structures assisting the ECB’s work in relation to the tasks conferred to it under Regulation (EU) № 1024/2013. The ECB is responsible for monitoring of less significant institutions and for the general procedures applicable to all credit institutions. Direct supervision over institutions classified as less significant is exercised by the BNB, but with full harmonization of the supervisory process with that of the ECB.
Our research indicates that the large growth in student debt, and an associated high level of student debt delinquencies, has been associated with a reduction in mortgage and auto loan borrowing among younger people. While younger individuals were previously much more likely to finance home and car purchases by age thirty, Chart 16 (Proportion of Borrowers with Home-secured Debt at Age 30) shows that those with student debt are now less likely to do so than those with no student debt, as shown by Brown and Caldwell in a Liberty Street Economics blog post in 2013.5 In fact, our research suggests that student debt appears to have replaced or crowded out other types of debt, so that the difference in average total debt held by student-loan and non-student-loan borrowers has remained stable over time. We suspect that this decline in taking on other types of debt by student-loan borrowers partly reflects increased uncertainty about the future. However, in addition to a possibly reduced  5  Meta Brown and Sydnee Caldwell (2013), Young Student Loan Borrowers Retreat from Housing and Auto Markets Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Liberty Street Economics blog, April. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  appetite for borrowing, a reduction in access to credit is also likely to play an important role, despite the comparatively high earning potential of those with a college education.

Cunliffe, J, (2015) “Macroprudential policy: from Tiberius to Crockett and beyond”, Bank of England, speech given at TheCityUK, London. Drehmann, M, Borio, C and Tsatsaronis, K (2012), “Characterising the financial cycle: don’t lose sight of the medium term”, BIS Working Paper No 380, June. Hills, S, Thomas, R and Dimsdale, N (2010) The UK Recession in Context – What Do Three Centuries of Data Tell Us?, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Q4. Jorda, Ò, Schularick, M., and Tayler, A, M., (2015) “Leveraged bubbles”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Fancisco Working Paper Series, 2015–10. Mcleay, M, and Thomas, R, (2016) “UK broad money growth in the long expansion 1992– 2007: what can it tell us about the role of money ?”, forthcoming in: in Chadha, J, Chrystal, A, Pearlman, J, Smith, P, and Wright S (2016) eds., The Long Expansion in the UK: causes and consequences”, Cambridge University Press. Mian, A, R., Sufi, A., and Verner, E., (2015) “Household debt and business cycles worldwide”, NBER Working Paper No.21581. Rachel, L, and Smith, T, D, (2015) “Secular drivers of the global real interest rate”, Bank of England Staff Working Paper No.571, December. Schularick, M and Taylor, A., M. (2012), “Credit booms gone bust: Monetary policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Cycles, 1870–2008”, American Economic Review 102(2): 1029–1061. Waldron, M, and Zampolli, F (2010), “Household debt, house prices and consumption in the United Kingdom: a quantitative theoretical analysis”, Bank of England Working Paper No 379.
In this context, the Governing Council again stressed that the degree of forecast uncertainty tends to increase with the length of the projection horizon. Turning to the monetary analysis, recent data confirm the gradual increase in underlying growth in broad money (M3). The annual growth rate of M3 increased to 4.1% in January 2015, up from 3.8% in December 2014. Annual growth in M3 continues to be supported by its most liquid components, with the narrow monetary aggregate M1 growing at an annual rate of 9.0% in January. The annual rate of change of loans to non-financial corporations (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) was –0.9% in January 2015, after –1.1% in December 2014, continuing its gradual recovery from a trough of –3.2% in February 2014. The three-month cumulated net lending flows were positive in January for the second consecutive month, compared with sizeable net redemptions still recorded a year ago. Despite these improvements, the dynamics of loans to non-financial corporations remain subdued and continue to reflect the lagged relationship with the business cycle, credit risk, credit supply factors and the ongoing adjustment of financial and non-financial sector balance sheets. The annual growth rate of loans to households (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) increased further to 0.9% in January 2015, after 0.8% in December 2014. Our recent monetary policy measures should support a further improvement in credit flows.

Full and consistent implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact is key for confidence in our fiscal framework. In view of the necessity to step up structural reform efforts in a number of countries, it is also important that the macroeconomic imbalance procedure is implemented effectively in order to address the excessive imbalances as identified in individual Member States. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Index above 50 indicates growth, below 50 a decline. 06  07  08  09  Sources: National Institute of Economic Research and Swedbank  14  BIS Review 138/2008  Poorer prospects for world economic activity 8  8 USA  7  7  Euro area  6  6  5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0  -1  -1  -2  -2 00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat and the Riksbank  Lower oil price Brent crude, USD per barrel  140  140 Oil price, outcome Futures, MPU September 2008 Futures, 2008-10-16 Spot price, 2008-11-06  120  120  100  100  80  80  60  60  40  40  20  20 0  0 00  01  02  03  04  Note. Futures are calculated as a 15-day average.

2  BIS Review 132/2008  Within a day, AIG had to be rescued following rumours about the size of its losses on CDS contracts and pressures grew on the remaining securities dealers. Later in the week, Secretary Paulson announced his initial $ billion plan to purchase assets to support the banking sector. It didn’t entirely still the doubts. The pressures were also felt in Europe. At the end of September Dexia, Fortis and Hypo Real Estate all had to receive emergency capital injections, mostly government supplied. In the UK the authorities facilitated a rapid consolidation in the mortgage sector with Abbey Santander buying Alliance and Leicester, some mergers in the building society sector, and the proposed merger of LTSB and HBOS. Finally, in late September the Tripartite authorities intervened to resolve growing difficulties in Bradford and Bingley by transferring the deposits and branch network to Abbey Santander and taking the remaining assets and liabilities into public ownership for orderly wind down. But the loss of confidence went wider than a subset of vulnerable banks. Our report estimates the total US and European marked to market losses on credit assets at nearly $ trillion. While these will not all fall on banks and may exaggerate the losses to those who can hold debt to maturity, investors and counterparties became worried about the extent of the likely losses on banking and trading books in a wider range of institutions and in their ability to continue to finance their businesses.
But the precautionary measure has served us well. We will continue to be vigilant in anticipating issues, and in taking proactive measures to strengthen the resilience of our system. With regards to the flow of credit from banks to corporations, we believe this is best facilitated through government schemes to co-share some of the risks with banks. In February, the Government announced the Special Risk-Sharing Initiative (SRI). Under this Initiative, the Government will absorb 75% of the risk for insurance covering working capital and trade-financing loan facilities. The Government will also absorb 80% of the risk for bridging loans which go towards meeting firms' working-capital needs. We also have schemes for SMEs and micro-loans. Apart from ensuring that the financial system continues to function effectively, the Government has, as in past periods of downturns, used fiscal measures to minimise the impact of the crisis. This involves targeted help for families and companies, while continuing to build capabilities to prepare for the upturn. This time, a creative Jobs Credit Scheme has been added to help companies keep their workers. Conclusion Ladies and Gentlemen, these are very challenging times. The global economy is in recession, and the financial system remains fragile. We need tough, decisive and forwardlooking actions in the core economies that are deeply affected. Asian economies have also been severely affected, and policy adjustments are necessary. However, the medium-term prospects for growth remain strong.

More specifically, the energy component is the largest contributor to the surging trend of domestic headline inflation (with around 45% share of HICP). We expect that our domestic short-term inflation outlook will continue to remain, overall, at very elevated levels, similar to the euro area inflation developments, amid the ongoing significant uncertainty and volatility resulting from the war. More specifically, Cyprus HICP inflation for 2022 has been revised upwards in our most recent projections, now reaching 8,4 percent compared with 7,0 percent in the CBC June 2022 projections. Banking sector n this ever changing and uncertain economic environment, the Cyprus Banking Sector is proving resilient, exhibiting a solid and healthy financial standing. The solvency position, as measured by the Common Equity Tier 1 ratio was edging up to 17,5 percent in the second quarter of 2022, a level higher than the respective European average of 15,2 percent. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio, indicating the availability of liquid funds against deposit outflows over a 30 day stressed period, stood at the level of 320 percent in July 2022 which is more than 3 times higher than the minimum requirement of 100 percent, placing Cyprus amongst the most liquid banking sectors in the Union, where the average LCR amounts to 168 percent.
In any case, the bias and probabilities of external risk scenarios reinforce the need for a small and open economy such as Chile to maintain deep-rooted macroeconomic foundations, particularly a path of fiscal consolidation, sustainable debt levels and adequate capitalization of the country’s banking system. At home, we estimate that the risks to activity are unbiased. The economy has brought positive surprises in good measure because the possibility of a more dynamic behavior of investment identified in previous reports has materialized, short only of a more significant response from large-scale projects and the real estate sector. For its part, although the labor market could take a little longer than expected to recover, the latest data tend to provide greater robustness to the employment, wage bill and consumption projections. As for inflation, we estimate that the risks are unbiased. Although the risks in the international scenario and their negative implications have increased, the economy has shown more dynamism than expected and the short-term outlook for headline inflation has been corrected upwards. In this context, we consider that the current level of monetary stimulus is less necessary and may begin to withdraw it in the coming months. Thus, we reaffirm our commitment to conduct monetary policy with flexibility, so that projected inflation stands at 3% over the two-year horizon. Institutional advances and challenges As I pointed out at the beginning, this presentation to the full Senate has a special connotation.

Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus: Welcoming remarks - BNM Sasana Symposium 2023 Welcoming remarks by Ms Nor Shamsiah Mohd Yunus, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the BNM Sasana Symposium 2023, Kuala Lumpur, 8 June 2023. *** Distinguished guests, central bank officials and payment system operators from Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, ladies and gentlemen. Assalamualaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh and good morning. Welcome to the inaugural BNM Sasana Symposium! Every year, in March, Bank Negara Malaysia publishes our Annual Report, along with the Economic and Monetary Review, and the biannual Financial Stability Review. We also publish our Quarterly Bulletins. These reports describe how we have discharged our mandates over the past year, and provide our thinking, analyses and assessments on the economy and financial system. In the reports, we also discuss important ideas and pressing issues affecting the economy and financial sector in feature articles that help inform and shape long-term initiatives that are necessary to strengthen our economic fundamentals. One of the ways we hold ourselves accountable to the rakyat through our flagship publications is by explaining the key considerations behind the decisions and measures that we take, and the priorities that guide our work. Often, this involves complex policy trade-offs that have to be carefully balanced from many angles. Our reports, as well as any communications from us, such as our Monetary Policy Statements, often generate lively conversations all around the country – in the press, on social media, and at the dinner table.