samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Some of those funds have been recovered, but Bangladesh Bank is still working to recover most of its loss. We at the New York Fed are still helping them to do so. Simply put, it was not just Bangladesh Bank that was wronged. The New York Fed—my client and employer of more than 20 years—was wronged as well. So I come to you today not as a dispassionate observer. I come to you today bearing the scrapes and bruises and scars of our own experience at the New York Fed. This morning, I will speak about where we are and where I think we should go from here. My message, in brief, is that we are all in this together. The integrity of the payment system is critical to the U.S. and global economy. Financial institutions and the official sector must do their utmost to protect the system from financial crime. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  Where Are We Now? The payment system can be used to facilitate many types of crime. Fraud and theft have accompanied money transfers for as long as there has been money. The Romans considered counterfeiting to be a form of falsum, which was a fraud against the public.2 And, of course, Willie Sutton provided the timeless, common-sense explanation for bank robbery. Money laundering is, by contrast, a more recent development in criminal law. In the United States, anti-money laundering law reflects an evolution in focus from banknote tracking to combatting narco-trafficking to counterterrorism.

When criminals take advantage of your firms and our financial system to make use of their ill-gotten gains, they make every institution involved play the fool. And here I am going to use the “M” word: morals. Now I know that whenever a lawyer starts talking about morals, eye rolling ensues—often justifiably. But I do think that detecting and deterring financial crime is not just a legal obligation. It is a moral one. Thanks for letting me get all of that off of my chest. I’m honored that you wanted me back this morning. Forums like this highlight important issues and choices. Make the right choices, not just the legal ones. I wish you all a good conference. Thank you. 1 Richard Charlton, Meghan McCurdy, Brett Phillips, Thomas Noone, Sean O’Malley, and Edward Silva assisted in  preparing these remarks. 2 See Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 467 (1953). See also Marcus Tullius Cicero, In  Verrem 2.1.108 (tracing the crime of counterfeiting to the Cornelian laws). 3 FinCEN, History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws. 4 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  4 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230. 5 SR 18–10: Joint Statement on Innovative Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Dec. 2,  2018. 6 See Michael Held, Reforming Culture and Conduct in the Financial Services Industry: How Can Lawyers Help?,  Remarks at Yale Law School’s Chirelstein Colloquium, Mar. 8, 2017. 7 Cf.
Pablo Hernández de Cos: Closing ceremony of the academic year 2022-2023 Speech by Mr Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Center for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI) , Santander, 30 June 2023. *** Good afternoon dear colleagues and friends. And good afternoon class of 2023. It is a pleasure for me to participate in this graduation ceremony, together with Rafael Repullo, long-standing Director of CEMFI, and Nezih Guner, who is due to take over from him in September. As such, this graduation ceremony is special. Indeed, very special. Because it will be the last one with Rafael Repullo as Director. After 36 years of service, he is going to step down, to be replaced by Nezih Guner. At the same time, the Deputy Directors Manuel Arellano and Samuel Bentolila will also step down, to be replaced by Mónica Martínez-Bravo. I would like to thank Rafael, Manuel and Samuel for "Making a Miracle" to use the title of a famous paper published in 1993 by the Nobel laureate Robert Lucas. While Lucas was referring to episodes of very rapid income growth in Asian countries, I would like to draw attention to the miracle of their transformation of a small venture at the Banco de España's Training Centre into one of the top European graduate schools for economics and finance. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Nezih and Mónica for accepting the challenge of taking this great institution forward.

This conference series seeks to bring together top  1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  researchers to present their recent work on topics of critical importance for the Spanish economy, and also distinguished policy-makers to discuss their views on these topics. But past successes are simply a good starting point. CEMFI has ambitious plans. It has a plan to implement a strategic vision for the future (underpinned by rigorous external evaluation), it has outstanding leadership (current and incoming) and it has plenty of talent. All these elements have been brought to fruition this year. In fact, the academic year that we are closing today has been full of good news for CEMFI, starting with the successful restructuring of the Master programme, the refurbishing of the new premises in Casado del Alisal 12, and the increase in the size of the faculty from 16 to 19 members, in line with the Board of Trustees' decision to have 25 faculty members by 2025. Even so, we should never forget, that all this – the premises, staff, faculty, strategic plans – are merely instruments. You, the students at CEMFI are the ultimate purpose. Your education and your future. They are at the core of our decisions. Apart from the Master in Economics and Finance, the other major academic programme at CEMFI is the PhD in Economics. In this respect, I would like to mention that 10 students have already defended their PhD theses or will do so in the near future.
Were the initiative to be accepted, the SNB would – in the current environment – have to make large-scale gold purchases to meet the required 20% minimum share of gold. It would not be allowed to sell this gold at a later point, even if it had to reduce its balance sheet again in order to maintain price stability. In a worst-case scenario, the assets side of the SNB’s balance sheet would, over time, be largely comprised of unsellable gold. Managing the interest rate level and the money supply would only be possible via the liabilities side of the balance sheet; in practice by issuing the SNB’s own interest-bearing debt certificates (SNB Bills). This would have serious financial consequences: On the assets side, the SNB would neither have any interest income nor could it realise any profits on gold due to the ban on sales. On the liabilities side, it might have to pay high interest on debt certificates. The SNB  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  could therefore find itself in a situation in which it could only finance its current expenses by means of money creation. The far-reaching demands of the gold initiative would inevitably have repercussions for our monetary policy. In making its monetary policy decisions, the SNB would have to consider the long-term consequences the necessary gold purchases would have on its capacity to act and on the structure of its balance sheet.

The purchase programme alone cannot solve the crisis. However, it has significantly reduced tail risks, such as the exit of one or several countries from the monetary union, and it buys governments more time to implement fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. The affected countries have already made some concrete progress in this regard. However, it is clearly too early to relax our guard. The global economic situation is still fragile and the way out of the crisis in Europe is long and arduous. In many countries – not just in Europe – there are still a number of unanswered questions with regard to the medium-term growth outlook and the sustainability of public finances. And while we expect the global economy to recover gradually this year and the Swiss economy to grow by 1–1.5%, considerable uncertainties remain. The Swiss franc is still high, even at today’s level. In view of the fragile international environment, the downside risks for the Swiss economy remain substantial. In particular, the threat that the franc could suddenly come under upward pressure again has not been averted. The minimum exchange rate is an important instrument in helping to prevent an undesirable tightening in monetary conditions. The SNB will therefore continue to enforce the minimum exchange rate with the utmost determination and, if required, is  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities for this purpose. It stands ready to take further measures at any time.
15  16  17  Figure 14 90-day delinquency rate (percent of loans)  10  4 Clearing houses and family subsidies  8  4  6  Chain stores  Banks (right axis)  4  3  3  2  2 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF, SUSESO and SVS information. 20  Figure 15 Household indebtedness (percent of disposable income)  70  Housing  70  Consumer  60  60  50  50  40  40  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  Source: Central Bank of Chile using SBIF, SUSESO and SVS information. Figure 16 Real housing prices and mortgage debt (*) (real annual change, percent)  16  CChC  House price index IPV in Metropolitan Region  12 House price index IPV  8  15 Mortgage debt (right axis)  12 9  4  6  0  3  -4  0 11  12  13  14  15  16  17  (*) IPV stratified method. CChC hedonic model for new homes in Metropolitan Region (RM). Source: Central Bank of Chile using SII, CChC and SBIF information. 21

One of the more pronounced differences with earlier periods is that Sweden has broken the pattern of high inflation, recurrent cost crises and devaluations that characterised the 1970s and 1980s. Surveys and other information indicate that for some time now, households and firms have adapted their inflation expectations to the Riksbank’s target. In that it influences the behaviour of those who set prices and wages, this in itself assists our endeavours to keep inflation down. Estimates by the Riksbank suggest, moreover, that the long-term component of inflation decreased appreciably in the 1990s, in which case there is a more permanent restraining force that is not directly dependent on how the real economy is functioning. But as I mentioned earlier, there are good grounds for supposing that a low, stable path for inflation can generate positive indirect effects on the real economy. There are also certain signs that the cyclical fluctuations in inflation - and not just its average level - have been smoothed in recent years. 5  BIS Review 18/2000  Thus, there are some indications that the present cyclical upswing will not generate the same acceleration of inflation as its predecessors. But as output in the Swedish economy has been below the sustainable trend ever since the beginning of the 1990s - so that what we have experienced, strictly speaking, is a long period of low activity - it is difficult to tell whether the behaviour of inflation over a complete cycle has in fact changed.
On the first one, our revision to core inflation – I've started answering already in the previous question–, a lot of it is attributable to the unit labour cost. That's a large chunk of the revision. The rest is what you have in the monetary policy statement, which is past upward surprises. So, it's a different starting point, which is informed by data that came in after the last projection that we made in March. The latest data that we had in terms of inflation was from January. Now, things obviously changed between those January data and the May data that we have incorporated because we cut off on the 23 May1. I think that's a small part of it. The large part of it is the unit labour cost. You asked me about the decision and the atmosphere. I have to tell you that it was quite a harmonious discussion and a very good and thorough economic discussion. As I said, we went really deep into the analysis of the labour market and tried to really understand the forces behind inflation to better fight it. It was a very, very broad consensus. By the way, I just want to remind that it was a twofold decision. It was, number one, the 25 basis points but it was also the decision, or the confirmation, that we would stop any reinvestment under the APP. What does the ECB know about lag effects? What takes longer to transmit into the economy? What are you looking at more closely?

I have already applauded the debate in Basel, and at the FSA, on developing a regime for supplementary capital requirements for firms that are especially interwoven into the system. I would add only two points this evening. First, just as top-down stress testing could be a useful input to utilising the “time series” instruments I have been outlining, so the “cross-sectional” add-ons would need to draw upon judgments about how distress at a particular firm would ripple through the system. Stress testing could be one useful part of that. But it would also require a deep knowledge of the plumbing of the financial system – the way payments, settlements and collateral transfers operate. And so my second point is that the debate about how best to regulate the banking system must not distract policymakers or practitioners from improving the plumbing, the infrastructure of our markets. This crisis would have been unimaginably worse without effectively collateralised payment systems, many over-the-counter derivative contracts and central-counterparty clearing houses. Although progress in those areas proceed below the radar of many, we must renew our emphasis on effective financial market infrastructure. Conclusions The current crisis has reminded everyone that our primary interest in regulating the banking sector is the preservation of systemic stability and so of the vital services banks perform in our economy and financial markets. There are two great lessons from the crisis. One is that important banks can fail and so we would be wise to have robust resolution regimes and plans.
In this way they try to immunise the market risk by allowing assets and liabilities to have the same sensitivity to interest rates. This means that a change in interest rates that leads to the debts increasing in value will be neutralised by a corresponding increase in the value of the assets. An investor that lacks this type of natural investment horizon must seek alternative points of departure when choosing duration. The relationship between risk and earnings then becomes a reasonable point of departure. This applies to the Riksbank, as we do not have any fixed-income liabilities. My colleagues and I must therefore consider how to achieve a balance between risk and earnings. If the purpose is to avoid negative effects on the results in all situations, it would be logical to base the duration on the accounting period, which in our case is one year. Then the actual result would be close to the forecast result. However, this type of short-term investment strategy is at the cost of both increased reinvestment risk 16 and lower expected earnings. As a public authority under parliament, we have instead assumed that the general government prefers long-term good earnings at the cost of larger, short-term fluctuations in the annual result. This type of long-term perspective in our assets enables us to avoid paying the extra liquidity premiums that market agent appear willing to pay for fixed-income securities with a shorter duration.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We all agree that the Black Sea Region is increasingly becoming a priority on the international agenda. In fact, a regional approach is emerging as actors completely understand that common problems need to be addressed jointly. Over the past five years the region and the world have faced many troubled moments; fast changes have influenced the way peoples choose to look to the future. The idea of strengthening cooperation in the Black Sea Region is not new. It sprang from a paradox: although the countries in the area shared geographical proximity, they came from different historical and political backgrounds and, as a consequence, had poor or quasiinexistent economic relations. As a veteran in this field, I can give you a simple example: in the ‘90s, to reach either Baku or Tbilisi one had to fly through Vienna. In effect, in the autumn of 1997, the Governor of the Central Bank of Turkey contacted me and suggested the founding of a Governors' Club of Central Asia and Black Sea Region, with the Bank for International Settlements serving as a model. It was officially instituted on May 1st, 1998, in Istanbul, when nine countries signed the founding protocol. During the following years, thirteen more countries gradually joined our Club, now spreading from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean, from Central Asia to the centre of Europe.
With respect to individual countries, we should continue working to strengthen the bilateral surveillance process. While focused on the country at hand, it would be important that bilateral surveillance be fully-informed by regional and global perspectives as well. Systemically important countries will clearly continue to deserve special attention. Operationally, our respective country teams will remain the focal points for our activities in individual members. At the same time, country teams will continue to draw upon specialized expertise where necessary, from both inside and outside of the Fund. To maintain overall coherence, it would be important for efforts to continue in the integration and sharing of information among country teams and specialized experts. Second, our work in financial sectors and capital markets. The IMF is the one international organization capable of carrying out financial sector surveillance universally and comprehensively. Further efforts will be needed to realize this potential, not least by deepening the IMF’s role in anticipating sources of instability in national and global financial markets, and in generating timely action to address them. The IMF will continue to help countries strengthen their financial sectors, including in following up on the findings of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) exercises. One important aspect of this will be to help members adapt their prudential and administrative frameworks to benefit more from private capital flows.

It is a “currency without a state”, in which a group of fiscally sovereign countries shares a single currency and a single central bank issuing fiat paper money, yet evidently lacks a clear monetary hegemon. So the euro is not just a different version of the gold standard, as Balczerowicz, de Soto and many others argue. Not least because of the fact that unlike any commodity standard, the euro lacks anything resembling an ultimate numéraire. And more importantly, within the eurozone Germany is not a monetary hegemon anymore. Yes, the German mark and the Bundesbank were clear monetary hegemons in Western Europe in the pre-euro era. And remember, it was argued that the euro would become “the German mark for the whole of Europe” in the many public debates that went on in Germany prior to its introduction. Yet it is evident that it could not and cannot function in this way. Yes, monetary unification in Europe does not make much sense without Germany. This is still true. But my definition of a clear hegemon is: it should have the right to set the rules and to force others to behave accordingly, the right to enforce the rules. And it has to have the right even to breach the rules itself and still not allow the others to breach the very same rules. But this is not true for Germany after the introduction of the euro.
Today, there are several serious projects being explored by central banks and international organizations on the subject. We believe that, in spite of both global and idiosyncratic contingencies, it is opportune to deepen our understanding and exploration of this type of instruments and related technologies. The Bank has also developed proofs of concept for technology use in its own processes. In particular, we can mention the technical feasibility study for the Bank’s primary debt issuance in blockchain, which we developed jointly with the Central Securities Depository (DCV). The main conclusion is that this technology is technically applicable and that it helps to reduce risks and improve the processes of issuing instruments, pending some technical, legal and inter-institutional coordination aspects to be resolved for its full implementation. On the other hand, the Bank is reviewing the implementation of its financial policy decisions, seeking to take into account the technological advances that are being introduced in the financial industry. In this context, the Bank is developing a new regulatory framework to allow digital payments (other than checks and ATM transactions) to be incorporated into the regulatory perimeter, irrespective of the operating model to which they correspond. IV. Final thoughts  In this presentation I have reviewed the performance of the Chilean economy in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, the policy responses articulated by the Bank to the various challenges of the past year, and the progress that we have been making in our agenda at the same time.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  Monetary policy The task of evolving our liquidity insurance framework will not end, but given the substantial reforms made to it over recent years, it is likely that the focus will shift to monetary policy implementation, as and when the MPC decides to move policy away from its current settings. As the head of the Markets Directorate it is not my role to speculate when the policy setting might change, but it is my job to ensure that decisions of the MPC are implemented effectively. That involves, in particular, ensuring that we have the tools needed for effective monetary control; that is, keeping overnight market interest rates in line with Bank Rate. The Bank’s current approach is to pay Bank Rate on the full balances held in reserves accounts. This is known as the “floor” system. As set out in the SMF Annual Report, this approach remained successful at keeping sterling overnight market rates close to Bank Rate during 2014–15, with the “wedge” between policy rates and market rates relatively small over the past year. But over the year, activity in the sterling money markets remained low as the floor system, alongside a large-scale injection of reserves through QE, reduced the need for banks to transact in money markets. In the near-term, I expect that this system will remain effective at moving market rates in line with any change made to policy rates by the MPC.