samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
107(2), pages 407–437. O’Neill, J (2011), “It is Time to Re-define Emerging Markets”, Goldman Sachs Asset Management Strategy Series. Prasad, E, Rajan, R and Subramanian, A (2007), “The Paradox of Capital”, Finance and Development, Vol. 44(1). Reinhart, C M and Rogoff, K S (2008), “This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises,” NBER Working Paper 13882. Von Peter, G (2007), “International Banking Centres: a Network Perspective”, BIS Quarterly Review, December, pages 33–45. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Annex: Charts and tables Chart 2  Chart 1 (a)  Gross portfolio equity inflows relative to lagged market capitalisation for G20 emerging markets(a)(b)  Gross portfolio equity flows to emerging markets in 2010  Cumulative flows since Jan 2010 $ billions) 90  Index, 31/12/1987 = 100 1,200 1,150  Dedicated EMEs  80  1,100  MSCI EM $ Index (LHS)  70 60  1,050  50 1,000 40 950  30  900  20  850  10 0  800 Jan 2010  Mar  May  Jul  Sep  Nov  Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. Source: Institute of International Finance, Thomson Reuters Datastream and Bank calculations. (a) Flows to equity investment funds. (a) Chinese equity market capitalisation includes A, B and H shares. A-shares are currently available for purchase by domestic residents only but are included since we assume capital market liberalisation occurs in China over our forecast projection.

Some in the private sector complain that there might be a lack of regulatory level playing field. But my own experience leads me to believe that supervisors themselves are just as aware of this. So I would encourage those in the private sector to work with supervisors in different countries to ensure the delivery of fair supervision across frontiers. If we can achieve confidence in that, then the intention of pillar two acting as a mitigant against greater prescription will I believe be realised in practice. That said, I recognise that in some jurisdictions the thinking behind pillar two represents a new departure in the philosophy, and perhaps legal basis, behind banking supervision. And in that way it represents a considerable challenge. BIS Review 14/2003  1  Maintaining the link with market practice Basel II has been a long process. But it is not an end in itself. Indeed if it were we would never achieve it. The markets, and the risks they give rise to, are not static. It is instructive, for instance, to reflect on just how much risk management theory and practice has advanced in the five years since negotiations on the Accord began. I have long felt that you need some mechanism to ensure that prudential standards remain appropriate as the state of the art moves on. That does not mean that the standards should be in a state of continuous flux. There is a good case for stability in the initial period while the Accord is being adopted.
Short-term demand management through monetary policy too often led instead to accelerating inflation, and increasing external deficits, which had then eventually to be brought under control through recession – an absolute recipe for short-termism in both financial and business behaviour. Equally, excessive public expenditure – which had ultimately to be financed through higher taxation – imposed burdens on the private sector which weakened its capacity to generate employment and income and wealth. So the emphasis now, throughout the industrial world but increasingly too in the developing, emerging and transition economies, is on effective price stability as the immediate objective of macro-economic policy – not simply as an end in itself but as a measure of the balance between aggregate demand and underlying supply in the economy as a whole. In effect the aim of monetary policy in particular is to moderate, rather than aggravate, the economic cycle, and so to provide the basis for sustainable growth at around the underlying rate of growth of productive, supply-side, potential. And the emphasis now in relation to fiscal policy is to limit public sector borrowing, and the outstanding level of public sector debt, to levels that can be sustained into the medium and longer term without the need for increasing tax burdens or the imposition of rising real interest rates on the private sector. Of course on occasion the flesh proves to be weaker than the spirit – and achieving these macro-economic objectives is not easy in practice even as a technical matter.

2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  ** Since we are in Berlin, allow me to conclude with a European perspective: Europe has not developed global social networks like some important countries. This raises the stakes for the European authorities, if they want a stronger, more autonomous and more innovative European financial sector, to succeed in developing a coherent strategy. We do not have much time to decide this consistent European payment strategy, including EPI and a possible CBDC: one to two years. This makes our today’s discussion still more welcome. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Allowing firms to use internal models to calculate their solvency requirements is an example of how Solvency II meets the needs of the UK insurance sector. UK insurers are many and varied – from Lloyd’s and the wholesale London market, to motor and household insurers, to large life companies with significant annuity books, to specialist providers and mutuals. The Solvency II standard formula works well for many of these firms. But no standard formula – however well designed – can work for all of them. That is why the PRA has now approved 22 partial or full internal models and several more are in the pipeline. The UK is unusual within the EU in having insurance companies with large annuity books – and insurers are increasingly purchasing the legacy annuity obligations of defined benefit pension schemes that corporate sponsors have closed to new members. Solvency II seeks to balance the need for companies and regulators to take account of all the underlying economic risks of annuity obligations – for example, changes in market prices of assets and long-term interest rates used to discount liabilities – with the need to avoid excessive volatility in capital positions, which would create the potential for procyclical investment behaviour by firms as market prices move. Where insurers have long-term, ‘buy and hold’ investments backing long-term, sticky annuity liabilities, the so-called Matching Adjustment allows them to filter out movements in the market price of risk.

As a broad guide to the scale of this inflation of the risk margin and of TMTPs, the current aggregate level of risk margin for UK life firms of around 50% of SCR (with firms in a range around this average) can be compared to the size of the risk margin at the time of the EIOPA impact study used to calibrate its design (when market interest rates were higher) of around 35% of SCR. The purpose of Solvency II was not to raise capital levels on the stock of existing business across the industry. Therefore, the PRA has complete confidence in TMTPs as a legitimate means of achieving a glide path to the new Solvency II requirements and we give firms the full benefit of TMTPs when considering their capital positions. We encourage firms to provide full disclosure of the risk margin and drivers of TMTPs in their first Solvency and Financial Condition Reports in May. To conclude, Solvency II was too long in the making and expensive to implement for both regulators and industry. But that is the past. Broadly, it is now working well, with only a few notable exceptions such as the excessive sensitivity of the risk margin to interest rates. Some of the most important parts of Solvency II were drawn from the UK ICAS regime that was born out of UK experience, including the near collapse of Equitable Life.
Export demand was expected to rise at a slower pace, while domestic demand was forecast to increase somewhat faster, mainly owing to increased investment but also to a slightly stronger pick-up in private consumption. That was also assumed to contribute to an improvement in the labour market. Against the background of the continued cyclical upswing and expectations of a reduction in spare resources, domestic inflation was forecast to rise. Higher wage costs in line with an increase in employment and lower productivity growth was assumed to imply a faster increase in unit labour costs and a gradual rise in companies’ costs. The factors that had resulted in falling prices for imported goods in the past year were estimated to gradually diminish during the forecast period, even though we anticipated that imported inflation would remain low in the period ahead as well. It is reasonable to expect that a pick-up in resource utilisation in the world economy will lead to higher international price pressures. We also made the assessment that the krona would not appreciate nearly as much during the forecast period as in recent years and that it would therefore not have as large a restraining effect on price increases in Swedish kronor in the period ahead. The shift seen in imports in recent years, which has involved a greater share coming from low-cost countries, is likely to continue, however, and probably depress import prices in the period ahead as well.

The object depicted is linked to each note’s key motif. On the 20-franc note, the object is a butterfly, and on the 200-franc, a particle collision. The key motifs of the six notes are time, light, wind, water, matter and language. As I mentioned earlier, the security features are the same for all denominations. I hope you like the new banknote series as much as I do. Now that all the notes are here, people can choose their own favourite. Before I finish, I would like to take this opportunity to Page 2/3  Berne, 3 September 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference on new banknotes  express our heartfelt thanks to Manuela Pfrunder and her team, and to congratulate them on a tour de force in designing the series. And with that, I will hand you over to our Chairman, Thomas Jordan, who will look back over the project and the challenges it presented, both for the SNB and for our partners. Page 3/3
If drug lords continue to live well on their ill-gotten wealth, corrupt politicians continue to exert influence in the political arena, fraudulent bank executives continue to go unpunished with no loss of status, and stock price manipulators continue to get wealthier at the expense of other shareholders, people would ultimately feel that the society in which they live is unfair and unjust. This places a heavy toll on people's emotional resource and negatively affects their well-being. Thus, when economic or financial crimes are committed, it is imperative that prompt actions be taken against the perpetrators. Otherwise, people in the society would harbour negative feelings towards the government and the system. If left unchecked, their feelings of resentment and unfairness would accumulate and get bottled up. People would feel alienated, hating their own society and resenting the government. The feeling that one lives in a fair and just society is as important as, or even more important than the economic well-being. If the public feel void of this social well-being, they will feel thoroughly disheartened, unwilling to be good law-abiding citizens, unwilling to invest, unwilling to contribute to the society they live in. So, the question is how do we prevent this feeling from deepening such that it erodes the confidence and trust in the democracy and the government. What differentiates a "normal crime" from an "economic crime" is that the harmful consequences of a normal crime, which directly affects people's lives and properties, can be easily felt and observed.

These include crimes such as trafficking in drugs, women and children, as well as trading of illegal weapons. But there are more subtle forms of economic crime where authorities find it difficult to agree on the risks. In such cases, cooperation in combating such crimes would be more difficult. Examples of such cases are when bigger nations exploit the natural resources of smaller nations, which have been a practice for over 100 years since the days of colonization. Modern fortes of such crimes can be seen in cases where influential businessmen from large countries move into smaller countries under the pretext of technological advancement to exploit the latter's natural resources, which often are claimed for the mutual benefits of both parties. But it is clear that the allocation of such benefits is often not balanced. There is also a case of exploitation of consumers in smaller nations when products which are hazardous to health in bigger nations, have been relocated for production and sale in less developed nations. An example of this is tobaccos and cigarettes, which come under stringent restrictions on sales and advertisement in bigger nations but have been sold in other nations with highly persuasive but subtle advertisement campaigns aimed at teenagers and women. There are also cases of certain medicines which have been banned in more developed markets and yet can still be found on the shelves of other less developed markets. There is no way for the authorities of two nations to agree that such dubious practices constitute economic crimes.
I would like to draw your attention to the invitation extended by His Excellency the President to all of us in his Policy Manifesto; “Mahinda Chintana: Vision for the Future”, I quote “Together, let us embark on this new journey to lead our beloved motherland to a brighter future”. I believe we all are with it. Distinguished guests, I need your permission to extend my special thanks on behalf of our team at the Consolidation Unit to major contributors who are our partners in the success story of the consolidation programme. Firstly, I wish to thank the Governor for his exceptional leadership and guidance given to us in planning the programme and its smooth execution from the beginning. Secondly, I extend my sincere thanks to the members of the Monetary Board, Secretary to Ministry of Finance and Planning; Dr. P B Jayasundera and the Deputy Governors of the Central Bank for their continuous support and guidance, and in granting necessary approvals expeditiously. Thirdly, I must thank all the members of the financial institutions including the board of directors, senior officials, all employees, members of trade unions, shareholders, borrowers, depositors and all other related parties for their positive contribution to the programme by understanding very wisely, the importance of this project to drive our future economy.

BIS Review 40/2007  5  instance, the members may disagree as to how quickly inflation should be returned to target after a shock. This type of situation may be complicated. But after all, we have managed to agree earlier on interest rate messages that have contained information on our future intentions. Other arguments have also been put forward against publishing one’s own forecast for the development of the policy rate. One is that it could damage our credibility and make communication with the general public and the financial markets more difficult. Let us assume that the central bank first notifies a particular interest rate path but that new information is received afterwards, which leads to a policy rate decision that differs from the path published earlier. According to this argument, the deviation could be perceived as a failure by the central bank and could impair the bank’s credibility 7 . However, I am fairly convinced that it is the other way around – that communication will now be clearer and more efficient. I believe that there is currently widespread understanding among households, companies and market participants that monetary policy must be adjusted when the prevailing conditions change. A forecast is by nature uncertain and this applies even more the further ahead it stretches. We have also been clear on this point. Our assessment of the development of the repo rate, as presented in the Monetary Policy Report, is a forecast. It is not a promise!
Mr. Yam discusses the political process of monetary management in Hong Kong Text of the Thirteenth Susan Yuen Memorial Lecture delivered by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr. Joseph Yam, JP, at the Hong Kong Management Association on 20/10/98. … 1. I am particularly pleased to be here this evening to deliver the Thirteenth Susan Yuen Memorial Lecture. I never had the privilege of meeting the late Mrs. Susan Yuen. But in reading her brief history in the material published by the Hong Kong Management Association, I found out that she and I both came to Hong Kong from the Mainland in 1949. And we both became the first Chief Executives of HKMAs - the Hong Kong Management Association in her case and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in my case. But I fear that I shall never achieve the distinction of having a Memorial Lecture dedicated in my name. And certainly at the age of fifty I am content not to have to ponder such matters. It is a sufficient honour to have been invited to celebrate with you Susan Yuen’s distinguished record of public service. 2. I would like to talk about the political process of monetary management to fit in with your theme of “Managing Economic Turbulence in Asia”. Controversy 3. I am sure you are aware of the controversy over how we managed the financial turmoil that we have been facing. There have been many complaints about a wide range of issues.

It would be naive to think that we can be right all the time. Nobody can be. We can only be less wrong. But more importantly, public support should not be built merely upon faith in an esoteric and aloof BIS Review 87/1998  -3-  HKMA being professional and acting in the best interest of Hong Kong. Whatever reputation the HKMA has been able to achieve, domestically and internationally, such support could never be sustained for long. We do run a system that, at times, inflicts considerable pain on the community. Many of the decisions taken by the HKMA are unpopular. The pain and the unpopular decisions may become too severe to bear just on the foundation of faith, particularly in the peculiar political setup of Hong Kong. 11. An essential part in the management of the political process concerning monetary issues, therefore, is to promote a better general understanding on those issues. This is not easy. Not only are those issues technical, but they are also changing all the time with the rapid changes in the global financial scene. Financial liberalization and the globalization of financial markets, encouraged by the advance of telecommunications and information technology, have drastically changed the behaviour of money. On top of all this, we have the complication that Hong Kong’s monetary system has really only started to take shape in the past ten years or so, as monetary reform measures were introduced to modernize it so it could cope with the demands and expectations of modern finance.
Second, there is the risk of contagion - problems at one bank can spread to others - not just through direct financial linkages but also because, in the absence of timely, transparent information on bank assets, depositors become concerned about other banks which they see as similar. Finally, banks play a central role in payments systems, including payment flows generated by FX trading. The conclusion I draw is that there is enough that is special about banks for their prudential supervision to be retained as a separate activity in any new regulatory structure, and that this argument at present outweighs the case for change. Whether prudential supervision of banks should be a function of the central bank is a separate question. Some argue that other central banking responsibilities (such as the conduct of monetary policy) make for conflicts of interest and therefore that supervision should not be carried out by the central bank. I am not persuaded by these arguments either. Nor am I aware of many examples where the suggested conflicts between a supervisory role for the central bank and its other responsibilities have arisen in practice. Indeed, there are important synergies between the supervisory function and other central bank responsibilities. It makes sense for the ‘micro’ supervision of individual banks in the system to be carried out by the same body that carries out the ‘macro’ function of maintaining the stability of the financial system as a whole, stability which is essential if monetary policy is to be executed effectively and efficiently.

Against that background, how is this dialogue proceeding in the UK at present? For we too are addressing the questions which preoccupy you in the United States, in our quaint, olde worlde British fashion. But before I review the current debate on regulatory structure in the UK, I should say a little about the way we define the objectives of financial regulation. We think of five: to BIS Review 21/1997  -2-  protect the economy against systemic risk; to protect individual depositors, investors and insurance policy holders against loss from the failure of their intermediary; to protect customers against business misconduct; to assist society at large in the fight against crime (for instance by making sure firms have in place systems to detect and report laundered drug money and other proceeds of organised crime); and, last but not least, to create and sustain fair markets. Described bluntly, these objectives make the job of regulators look impossibly daunting. But of course they are not absolute aims. Regulators cannot, and should not, offer blanket assurances to investors and depositors. They cannot, because the tools and resources to do so are simply not available. And they should not, because it would be quite wrong to remove from investors and firms the responsibility for assessing, taking and monitoring financial risks. This is a very important point, which Alan Greenspan has helpfully underlined on a number of occasions recently.