samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
https://www.mas.gov.sg/news/speeches/2020/harnessing-the-power-of-finance-for-a-sustainable-future  8/13  14/10/2020  “Harnessing the Power of Finance for a Sustainable Future”- Keynote Speech by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director, MAS, at the Finan…  A study by UBS estimates that close to 40% of family oﬀices plan to allocate most of their portfolios sustainably in five years’ time. [8]  This trend will be bolstered with the transfer of wealth to the millennial generation. An estimated $ trillion is expected to change hands to the next generation by 2030. [9]  Several studies suggest that millennials desire to invest in companies with good ESG track records. [10] According to a survey by Morgan Stanley, 90% of millennial high net worth investors want to tailor their investments to their personal values. [11] As a leading wealth management hub in Asia, Singapore can play a strong role in wealth planning solutions that support sustainable development in Asia. MAS launched last year a Green Investments Programme under which we will place $ billion of our funds with asset managers with a strong green focus. The aim is to grow the pool of asset managers that are committed to deepen green finance activities and capabilities in Singapore. We have short-listed several asset managers with a view to appointing the successful applicants early next year. Singapore has also begun anchoring providers of verification, review and rating services.

The only way to avoid that would have been to offer to lend to all banks at a rate that many others – in addition to  2  BIS Review 114/2007  Northern Rock – found attractive to pay. And to do that without drawing attention to Northern Rock’s take-up would have required a truly massive injection of cash into the banking system. That could happen only if there were no penalty rate or if conditions in money markets generally were difficult enough to make the penalty rate attractive to many banks over a prolonged period. Nothing would have been easier than for the Bank of England to lend freely without a penalty rate. Almost every actor in this drama saw advantage in cheap money and plenty of it. The role of the central bank is to ensure that the appropriate incentives are in place to discourage excessive risk-taking and the under-pricing of risk, and in so doing to avoid sowing the seeds of an even greater crisis in future. That we have done in each action we have taken – by maintaining the principle of the penalty rate. Some commentators have taken issue with these concerns about moral hazard, arguing, by analogy, that fire departments put out fires started by people who smoke in bed. I agree that we have fire services to do precisely that. And if a fire starts in the financial system, the central bank will put it out if it threatens to spread.
But the primary justification deployed then was the need for a money market instrument, targeted at the banks as customers, to facilitate monetary management rather than the development of the bond market. Nevertheless, we adopted a comprehensive approach to the task. We put together an innovative market making system that virtually guaranteed liquidity by allowing a handful of market makers to go short in any issue of our paper for as long as their overall holdings, with suitable haircuts, are long. This has now been replaced by an even more robust arrangement whereby short positions in particular issues are squared at the end of the day through overnight repos against other issues. We also built a paperless clearing, settlement and custodian system operated by our Central MoneyMarkets Unit (CMU), which also provided similar services to the larger volume of private sector debt. And, at the same time as we introduced our Real Time Gross Settlement payment system at the end of 1996, we moved on to DvP, or delivery versus payment, with real time and end of day capabilities. Meanwhile, the supply of debt has steadily been increasing. Corporate bond issuance has increased by 300 per cent in the last decade or so. We also have an increasing variety of products, including mortgage-backed securities and retail products brought to the market by the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. All have been readily absorbed by the latent demand to which I also referred earlier.

Jessica Chew Cheng Lian: Launch of Financial Literacy Month 2022 Opening remarks by Ms Jessica Chew Cheng Lian, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of Financial Literacy Month 2022, Kuala Lumpur, 1 October 2022. *** 1. It is my great pleasure to welcome you to Sasana Kijang for the launch of the Financial Literacy Month 2022. On behalf of the Financial Education Network, I thank you for your presence here to join us in flagging off a month-long roadshow to help people across the country build greater confidence in financial matters. It is especially gratifying for our teams to be able to go on the road again, to meet and talk to people in person after what has been a difficult period for many. 2. This is the third year that the Financial Education Network is holding a financial literacy month. And while we have lined up many activities and programmes over the coming month, I know that no one here believes financial education starts and stops within a month. I was reminded again of this as we are about to share the results of the most recent Financial Capability and Inclusion Demand Side Survey, or the FCI Survey, in short, that was conducted in 2021. This is a survey that we carry out once in every three years to track how the level of financial capability in our society – measured in terms of financial knowledge, behaviour and attitudes – is changing over time. 3.
The slow pace of financial integration relative to trade, in my view, is a reflection of three specific factors. BIS Review 95/2006  1  First, trade integration has a much longer history in East Asia, of which the key turning point was the introduction of the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992. Therefore, trade integration benefits from an established policy structure and a more simplified policy framework of tariff reductions, compared to that of financial integration. Second, financial integration has essentially been a market-driven process, with the policy supports focusing on removing market impediments and developing financial infrastructure. Therefore, there has been less of a deliberate policy push while the different levels of financial market developments in the region also act as a constraint to rapid integration. And the third factor is that, compared to trade integration, financial integration is complicated by a wider set of rules and regulatory framework, especially on cross-border capital flows, that tends to be more difficult to dismantle quickly. At the same time, the policy approach on capital flows liberalization in East Asia has been more cautious following the Asian financial crisis because of the risk of capital outflows and the weakened external financial positions. This, in my view, is one reason that led to a more cautious approach in liberalizing cross-border capital outflows. Let me now come to the second part of my talk, that is, the prospect for financial integration in the region going forward, and what should be the role of policy.

4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  1 BIS’ definition of international claims comprises cross-border claims and local claims of foreign banks’  affiliates in foreign currency. 2 2 Based on a presentation by E Remolona (2017), “Bank flows in EMEAP: Neither a lender nor a borrower be”. See also E Remolona and I Shim (2015), “The rise of regional banking in Asian and the Pacific”, BIS Quarterly Review, September 2015. 3 4 World Bank (2015), “The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial Inclusion around the World”. 4 5 Asian Development Bank (2017), “Accelerating Financial Inclusion in South-East Asia with Digital Finance”. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
Lee Hsien Loong: Prospering in a rising Asia Speech by Mr Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore and Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the opening dinner of the Conference Board Symposium on Asian Economies and Financial Markets, Singapore, 27 May 2004. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Let me first welcome all of you to the Conference Board Symposium on Asian Economies and Financial Markets, held for the first time here in Singapore. Asia’s comeback since the financial crisis Asian economies have come a long way since the financial crisis in 1997. For six years they have had a tumultuous ride, marked by unexpected shocks and painful adjustments. The September 11th attacks were followed by the Bali and Marriot bombings in Indonesia, which shook confidence in the region and brought the harsh realities of Islamist extremist terrorism closer to home. Last year, the Iraq war and the SARS outbreak weakened business sentiments and consumer spending, setting back economic recovery yet again. Prospects for the region have since brightened considerably, on the strength of a synchronised upturn in the G3 economies. The electronics industry, a lynchpin of export-driven Asian economies, is finally picking up robustly after a prolonged slump. Investor confidence has returned, bond spreads have narrowed, and stock markets have outperformed the developed countries, until very recently. The Asian crisis forced governments in the region to tackle weaknesses in their financial and corporate sectors and implement much needed structural reforms.

Weak banks have been recapitalised, bad loans reduced, and prudential regulations strengthened. Government finances have been put on a firmer footing, while balances of payments have moved into surplus. The result is a stronger and leaner Asia, more prepared for storms and more ready to seize opportunities. A major development in recent years is the emergence of China as an economic powerhouse. China’s growth and transformation have been phenomenal. Its buoyant exports, supported by low-cost manufacturing capabilities, and its huge domestic market, have created strong competition as well as immense opportunities for the rest of the world. China’s growth has driven the rapid increase in intra-regional trade, and fuelled economic expansion in the region, if not worldwide. China’s economy is showing signs of overheating, but its government is mindful of the danger and determined to act decisively to rein in credit and investment. This gives them a good chance of achieving a soft landing. Beyond this cyclical issue, China is set to continue growing strongly for the next decade or two. The other Asian giant, India, is becoming a dynamic and prosperous economy. Liberalisation policies and market reforms are freeing up the long moribund Indian economy. State-owned enterprises are being privatised. Ports, airports, telecommunications and financial services have been opened up to competition and foreign participation. As the dead hand of bureaucracy is withdrawn, growth is taking off, especially in the services sector.
BIS Review 36/2010  7  depositors would ask themselves why it had been used: if they attached even a small probability to the possibility that the bank was in trouble, it would be rational for them to withdraw their deposits – triggering a run on the bank. Anticipating this reaction, there is a risk that banks would choose not to use the facilities. Further, some market participants might use the information that the facilities were being used to spread malicious rumours in the hope of profiting from the market reaction. Such rumour-spreading would be privately beneficial for the rumour-spreaders, but socially harmful. That is why when designing its discount window lending facilities, the Bank decided only to disclose average usage over a quarter, and then only with a lag. 17 Communication of forecasts is not easy. Probabilities are hard to understand. Yet a forecast is not a number but an estimated probability distribution. 18 And we cannot assume that people obtain information in a neutral form. Indeed for most people information is conveyed to them via the media which may filter out or reinterpret information. This leads to an incentive problem. Instead of simply reporting the information about future prospects made available in the forecasts, there is an incentive to summarise the prospects in a single number or to describe one part of the probability distribution in a way that makes for a good story. That suggests there is merit in trying to communicate directly to the public.

Inflation, as measured by the change in the Consumer Price Index, should be 2% at all times. But because interest rates take time to affect inflation, forecasts of inflation are integral to setting monetary policy. And because the MPC’s forecast is a probability distribution, rather than a single number, it is communicated in a fan chart. That depicts the MPC’s view of the probability of a range of different outcomes. Each forecast covers a three year forecast period, because that is the horizon over which we expect the current stance of monetary policy to have the majority of its effect. Here is an example fan chart (see http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech432.pps). It shows the inflation projection published in the February 2010 Inflation Report. Each fan chart is conditioned on a particular path for the Bank’s policy instruments. This one assumes that Bank Rate will follow the path expected by financial markets. The MPC also publishes another fan chart conditional on a different policy assumption, namely that Bank Rate remains at its current level throughout the forecast. We believe these charts have been helpful in communicating the big picture that the MPC needs to get across. The fan chart works by showing what the Committee believes would happen to inflation if today’s economic circumstances were repeated on 100 occasions. In any given quarter in the future, CPI should lie somewhere in the red shaded area on 90 out of 100 occasions: 10 times in the darkest red band, and 10 times in each pair of lighter red bands.
On the other hand, the realization of such projects enables strengthening of the cooperation between the central banks of the region and the central banks of the EU, which is inevitable in the process of integrating the entire region in the EU. Let me finally thank the ECB and the EU for enabling the NBRM to participate in this project. I wish success for all the institutions involved in the project in anticipation of even greater cooperation and I thank our hosts for organizing this event. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

Dear participants The productivity and the quality of work are major determinants of life quality, affecting nutrition, health and education, social protection, and fair treatment. Jobs are particularly important for the poor, whose labour is often their only asset and a primary route to poverty eradication. It is for this reason, that we at the central bank recognise skills development as an economic imperative. This is because it increases productivity of economic agents. Chairperson In the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis of 2008, employment has re-emerged as a top priority area across the world. A large and growing young population can be a driver for economic growth and social progress provided they access quality education and health, and are engaged in decent employment, without which, many young people will not be able to escape negative social vices and poverty. In recognition, of the foregoing, the National Budget for 2013 whose theme is; “Delivering Inclusive Development and Social Justice” has for the first time put job creation at the centre of its development agenda by explicitly targeting the creation of 200,000 jobs in 2013. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Sectors targeted for these jobs are agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and construction (including infrastructure). Ladies and gentlemen Sustained efforts to bring in private investment coupled with supportive public policies and investment, would contribute to enhancing productive capacities and generating the much needed jobs in our country.
Spain seemed to be in a different position with a positive fiscal balance, though this was mainly due to unsustainable high growth in the construction sector. This illustrates the first question, which is how to solve time inconsistency in fiscal policy. It is easier to follow the prescriptions of Keynes in bad times than in good times. This asymmetry may lead to an increase in budget deficits and sovereign debt over time, also referred to as the fiscal bias. As a result, many countries are forced to tighten policy in a period when the real economy would certainly benefit from further stimulus. The crisis caused fiscal balances to deteriorate by 8–10 percentage points of GDP. There is an immense difference between encountering a shock of this magnitude from a positive fiscal balance of 4 per cent and encountering it from a negative fiscal balance of 4 per cent. A similar time inconsistency problem, the inflation bias, has been a much debated issue in monetary policy. The solution has been central bank independence. The results have been fairly good. The question remains, is there a lesson to be learnt in the fields of fiscal policy and banking regulation? This crisis has been very benign to the Norwegian economy. One of the reasons, I believe, is that we had a national banking crisis only 20 years ago. Many of the executives in banks, corporations and government this time, had experienced the previous crisis. Hopefully, they had learned some useful lessons.

A full blown banking crisis started in 1990, peaking with the nationalisation of the three main Norwegian banks in 1992. Unemployment in Norway rose rapidly and reached unprecedented levels. The last two decades have been a golden era in the Norwegian economy. Partly thanks to sound macroeconomic policy and growth-stimulating structural reforms, we have experienced a strong growth record, after many years of meager performance. Due to good luck, we have also experienced very positive terms of trade developments. Increasing prices for our exports, such as petroleum, fish and aluminium, and decreasing prices for important import products like clothing and consumer electronics have made the average Norwegian much better off than he or she was twenty years ago. Norway’s income has nearly tripled over the past 20 years. It is often politically easier to introduce structural reforms during crises. When bad news fills newspapers and television programmes, the electorate is more likely to accept necessary measures. In the long run, reforms prove to be very profitable even though they are painful in the short run. Among the changes in the Norwegian economy from the 1990s on were the removal of subsidies, closing down of government-owned enterprises, deregulation in important markets like housing and electricity, tax reform which increased incentives to work and closed tax evasion loopholes, and the reform of parliamentary budget procedures. Finally, a fiscal rule was put in place, providing a sustainable relationship between the Government Pension Fund and the government budget.
I will say something first about the trigger, and then about different resolution tools and strategies. The trigger for resolution Not a few people worry about the trigger for putting a firm into resolution – not too early, not too late. It is obviously important to get that trigger right. To my mind, the best way of thinking about it is that a firm should go into resolution when its time is up – when Recovery strategies are exhausted, and the firm just will not be able to  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  reverse its decline into insolvency or lack of viability. How to frame that thought more precisely? Every country has criteria for authorising/licensing a bank. A sensible trigger for resolution would be when a bank no longer meets the criteria for being authorised and, crucially, when there is no reasonable prospect of its doing so again. That does not give a damaging degree of flexibility to the authorities; it is a demanding test. Some resolution strategies In the banking field, many resolution tools entail separating out a distressed firm into different parts. Separating bad from good assets; and separating essential from non-essential functions. The good and critical functions are sold and transferred to another bank (often known as “Purchase & Assumption”); or to a bridge bank pending such a transfer. The rump goes into administration, run down and disposal.

But I must stress that in no way does any of this dilute the protection assured to insured deposits. It does transfer losses to the surviving parts of the local banking system. But so do other resolution techniques, and liquidation would entail much bigger losses for the Deposit Insurer and thus for other banks. There is much work to be done on planning how to operationalise that kind of resolution strategy, but it is worth doing. The FSB work programme This brings me, briefly, to the FSB work programme for 2012 and into 2013. There will be a preliminary peer review of the extent to which jurisdictions’ resolution regimes comply with the FSB Standard. That will be followed by more exacting examinations, led by the IMF and World Bank, once an Assessment Methodology for the Resolution Key Attributes is complete. Meanwhile, authorities are enjoined to produce assessments of resolvability of Global SIFIs and the obstacles in their way; firm-specific agreements for co-operation amongst home and host resolution agencies and supervisors; and resolution plans by the end of this year. Each of those requires a conception of a high-level resolution strategy for individual firms agreed amongst top officials of home and key host authorities. And the development of those strategies will inform the information that the authorities need from firms. I have sketched in very general terms two broad kinds of resolution strategy, potentially appropriate for different types of global SIFI.