samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
9  G20 Leaders’ Declaration, St. Petersburg Declaration, 6 September 2013. 6  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  6  Central banks stepped in to restore market stability in a big way, carrying out lending operations and asset purchases to limit wider economic consequences. G10 central bank balance sheets have risen by $ trillion, or 16% of G10 GDP since March 2020.10 The good news is that extraordinary central bank action succeeded in restoring stability. But to conclude “all’s well that ends well” in this case would be the equivalent of someone who had an electrical fire in their home after a power surge deciding not to bother to look at the wiring because the fire department arrived quickly and managed to put the fire out without too much damage. We need to open up the walls. So what does this have to do with central clearing? You’ll recall earlier I spoke about margin - variation margin (the losses and gains of individual participants) and initial margin (pre-paid self-insurance). Well in March, UK CCP margin calls grew significantly in response to high levels of market volatility. At their March peak, daily variation margin calls by UK CCPs were over 5 times higher than their average, at around £ And their initial margin requirements grew by over 30%.11 This is not particularly surprising – as I said earlier, one would expect CCP margin to jump in such a dramatic market stress.

As a supervisor and regulator, I have a duty to households and businesses in the UK to preserve financial stability – to protect the UK economy from disruption. So I need to know on an ongoing basis that large CCPs on which the UK financial system relies are robustly regulated and supervised. But that should not necessarily mean I have to do the supervision of non-UK CCPs myself. Indeed if every host authority supervised every CCP that offers services to its banks and other financial institutions it would be untenable. We cannot have 21 different regulators’ hands on the steering wheel when it comes to critical cross-border infrastructure. That would hardly be a good result for financial stability - especially in a crisis, where clear and quick decision-making is critical. The solution is proportionate and informed reliance.8 Informed reliance means that, with sufficient information and a deep cooperative relationship with the home supervisor, I can defer to them to ensure that a CCP is as safe to operate in UK as those I regulate and supervise directly. Proportionate means that for cross-border CCPs that are very important to the UK financial system, I will need more information and even  7 8  BoE calculations. Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure Responsibility E on Cooperation. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  5  deeper cooperation – and in the event that we are unable to secure this, I may need to resort to supervising the CCP directly.
Ardian Fullani: Recent economic developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the press conference on monetary policy decision-making of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, Tirana, 24 March 2010. *  *  *  The Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, in its meeting of 24 March 2010, analyzed and adopted the Monetary Policy Monthly Report. Given the latest economic and monetary developments at home, their projections in future and after assessing the balance of expected risks, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania, at the conclusion of discussions decided to leave the key interest rate unchanged, at 5.25%. After the heavy shock incurred over 2008 and during the first six months of 2009, the world economy has entered into a recovery stage of the economic activity, stimulated by the expansionist monetary and fiscal policy. The main central banks continued to follow an easing monetary polices with the purpose to sustain lending market and to guarantee the economic stability growth. The end of economic recession is accompanied by the invigoration of inflationary pressures, thus reflecting both statistical impact related to the performance of basic commodity prices, as well the demand growth in the world economy. The performance of financial markets was stable and the main indicators of risk are stabilized at lower rates. Notwithstanding, the attention of financial markets is dominated by the increase of uncertainty in terms of fiscal stability of some euro area countries.

On the other hand, Bank of Albania deems that this sustainability would be assisted by the application of a cautious fiscal policy, which should already factorize the long terms soundness of fiscal parameters in its decision-making process. BIS Review 50/2010  3
A better arbiter of market power may be measures of market contestability, in particular the potential for barriers to entry to and exit from the market. Entry and exit rates from banking have, historically, tended to be very modest by comparison with the non-financial sector and other parts of the financial sector, such as hedge funds. For banks operating in many markets and offering a range of services, aggregate returns may offer a misleading guide to the degree of market contestability. Looking separately at the different activities financial firms undertake provides a potentially clearer indication of the drivers of performance and the structural factors determining them. In this respect, JP Morgan Chase provides an interesting case study. JP Morgan Chase is a large universal bank offering a full package of banking services to customers, retail and wholesale. Its published accounts also provide a fairly detailed decomposition of the returns to these different activities. Chart 36 looks at the returns on equity at JP Morgan Chase, broken down by business line and over time. These estimates are based on the firm’s economic capital model. So provided this model adequately captures risk, these estimates ought to risk-adjust returns across the different business lines, allocating greater amounts of capital to riskier activities. (a)  “Low risk/low return” business activities  Consider first some of the activities generally perceived to be low-risk/low return – asset management and treasury and securities services and retail financial services.

A further amplifying factor is that trading books are marked-to-market and any gains or losses taken through to the profit and loss account. So holding a large trading book is a very good strategy when underlying asset prices in the economy are rising rapidly. This was precisely the set of the circumstances facing banks in the run-up to crisis, with asset prices driven higher by a search for yield among investors. In effect, this rising tide of asset price  4  10  The term “Tier 1 capital” refers to the component of banks’ regulatory capital comprising common equity and capital instruments close to common equity (“hybrid Tier 1 capital”), as defined by rules set out by regulators. For a discussion of the composition of UK banks’ regulatory capital see Bank of England (2009a). BIS Review 95/2010  rises was booked as marked-to-market profits by banks holding assets in their trading book. Everyone, it appeared, was a winner. But because these gains were driven by a mis-pricing of risk in the economy at large, trading book profits were in fact largely illusory. Once asset prices went into reverse during 2008 as risk was re-priced, trading book losses quickly materialised. Write-downs on structured products totalled $ billion among the major global banks in 2008 alone. (c)  Writing deep out-of-the-money options  A third strategy, which boosted returns by silently assuming risk, arises from offering tail risk insurance.
Let me remind you in conclusion that we central banks cannot be “the only game in town”: to give an obvious example, only an accurate carbon pricing will allow for a full integration of climate risks into any business decision. We cannot do everything, but rest assured we will do our utmost. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches

All of these solutions lead to lower cost of financial services, greater financial access, and greater opportunity for the public. Ultimately, “fintech” can help unlock massive potential of our people and businesses and be a powerful tool for Thailand and developing countries to improve on productivity, immunity, and inclusivity of the financial system as well as for the whole economy. Ladies and gentlemen, The theme of our very first Bangkok FinTech Fair focuses on SMEs and consumers, because these two groups face various challenges and can benefit greatly from the adoption of fintech. For Thailand, SMEs represent the majority of firms and make up over 80 percent of total employment. Many SMEs struggle to gain access to finance and payment services, which, on one hand, can be attributed to poor financial health due to loss of competitiveness. On the other hand, many SMEs lack the financial management skills and collateral needed for funding, and their 5-7  cost of finance remains high. Meanwhile, the Thai public is facing big hurdles of low long-term savings and high household debts, with Thailand having household debt to GDP ratio amongst the highest in the region. Many households lack access to efficient and low-cost financial services, be it the deposit, payment, insurance or loan products. These people need to be better served by our financial system to be able to unlock their potential, improve standard of living, and ensure their financial security as they age.
Rodrigo Vergara: The Monetary Policy Report and the Financial Stability Report Presentation by Mr Rodrigo Vergara, Governor of the Central Bank of Chile, before the Finance Commission of the Honorable Senate of the Republic, Santiago de Chile, 16 June 2014. *  *  *  The Monetary Policy Report of June 2014 and the Financial Stability Report of the first half of 2014 can be found at http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/index.asp. Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Commission, Senator Ricardo Lagos, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile on recent financial and macroeconomic developments, their prospects and implications for monetary and financial policy. This vision is detailed in our Monetary Policy Report (IPoM) of June 2014 and in our Financial Stability Report (IEF) of the first half of 2014. Domestic output and demand have been slowing down for some months now. The drop in investment that began a few quarters ago has been compounded with weaker private consumption. As a matter of fact, in the forecast scenario I will be describing briefly we have revised downward our growth estimate for 2014, as a result from this behavior of private consumption and the larger than expected fall in investment. Abroad, the trends we have depicted in our latest Monetary Policy Reports have not varied much. The developed world is showing sustained recovery while at the same time the emerging world is decelerating.

Figure 8 MPR and expectations (percent) 9  9  7  7  8  8 6  6 5  5  4  4  3  3  2  2  1  1  0  0 07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  MPR  First half June 2014 FBS  June 2014 EES  June 2014 MP2014 Report Forward June MPForward Report  Source: Central Bank of Chile. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 9 Real housing prices  (base index: 2008 = 100)  150  150  140  140  130  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80 02  03  04  05  06  07  CBCh (*)  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  CChC  CBCh RM (*)  (*) Preliminary results. Source: Central Bank of Chile (CBCh) based on data from the Internal Revenue Service (SII) and the Chilean Chamber of Construction (CChC).
Among women this is even more stark (47.8%  in Labuan vs 54.3% at the national level). 3 Shanghai financial centre was incepted in 2009. Latest available data shows that the share of employment and  tax revenue collected was 5% and 9.6%, respectively. 4 Refers to the BEPS Action 5 – Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking Into Account  Transparency and Substance  4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

At the international level, the development and expansion of Islamic finance become important in strengthening financial and thus economic linkages between emerging economies. It has allowed emerging economies to participate in its development thus increasing the potential to contribute to the rebalancing of global growth as financial flows not only provides support to domestic demand but also to greater trade and investment flows across borders. Concluding remarks In this challenging international financial environment, Islamic finance has continued to demonstrate its evolution and strong growth. Islamic finance in its advancing journey today is presented with an opportunity to increase the financial linkages with the broader financial system thereby facilitate a more efficient allocation of capital across borders. Indeed, Islamic finance as an integral part of the international financial system has the potential to contribute to global financial stability and to enhance the prospects for global growth. BIS Review 152/2009  3
All this must be attained in a setting in which new developments and circumstances will be emerging – and they are in fact appearing already – to make our analytical and supervisory tasks more demanding. In any event, enjoying society’s trust and recognition will involve being able to respond successfully to this challenge. To be able to accomplish our mission and reach both objectives, the Banco de España is going to have to adapt. But such adaptation must also stand on sound pillars. The first of these pillars is our independence. Independence is a necessary condition for achieving the aforementioned objectives and it is independence alone that can offer us the best guarantees of success. Secondly, the exercise of independence should be underpinned by analysis and decisions based on the utmost intellectual rigour. This is also the best base from which to address the necessary accountability and transparency to society. Thirdly, we can only properly perform our dual role of members of the Eurosystem and public servants by the pursuit of excellence in our work and by promoting the excellence of our staff. Such excellence has been and is, no doubt, one of the hallmarks of this institution. It is my firm commitment to maintain and enhance the Bank’s human capital. To conclude, I shall adhere to the tradition launched by Governor Linde when he took office and end, as he did, with a quote.

But, above all, I feel a great responsibility at having inherited the enormous legacy of an institution with the history, functions and position in the Spanish economy of the Banco de España. I wish to begin this new stage thanking those people who have steered my career over the years. I have learnt from all of them and their teachings have been a source of wealth for me. My sincere thanks to all of them. Thanks, of course, to José Luis Malo de Molina, under whose leadership of the Research Department I have pursued most of my career, and, among others, Eloísa Ortega and José María Bonilla. They were most forthcoming with their trust and have, at different times, been a major source of guidance and support for me. Thanks also to Fernando Restoy, above all for being a point of reference in terms of competence and dedication to public service. Thanks especially to José Manuel González Páramo, who oversaw my Ph.D. and took me to Frankfurt. That experience gave me, early on, a first-hand view of the work of the European Central Bank and of the Banco España’s potential as a member of the Eurosystem. Naturally, my greatest gratitude is to Governor Luis María Linde for naming me Director General for Economics, Statistics and Research almost two and a half years ago. That was, unquestionably, the necessary step for taking me to where I am today. 3/5  Thank you, Governor, for your constant support over this period.
But at 10 percent of GDP, the government-sector deficit must be reduced over time to avoid creating an unsustainably large government debt burden. This decrease in the fiscal deficit has to be offset by some combination of a smaller current-account deficit or reduced private-sector surplus. Over time, the U.S. economy needs to increase net exports. However, a rapid turnaround will be hard to accomplish in a world in which most other nations are also looking to increase net exports to support retrenchment at home. So it appears likely that even as we try to lay the foundation for a more export-oriented economy, securing the recovery will require help from the domestic private sector – a smaller private-sector surplus. But if highly indebted households continue to deleverage, while those households and businesses with low debt remain very cautious about spending and investment, there will be little impetus in this direction. In that case, the U.S. economy will have trouble building forward momentum. The financial sector also plays an important role in this process. If credit availability remains tight, then households and businesses may not be able to increase their borrowing even if they want to. While major financial institutions in the United States have strengthened their capital positions significantly since the peak of the crisis in 2008, and deleveraging has abated, the financial system as a whole is still undergoing a process of repair.

Given that the outstanding balances of lending in the short and medium term are not expected to grow in a similar way to how they did in the expansion prior to the crisis and such that they may offset the reduction in net interest income, the recovery in bank profitability will have to be based on the continuing adjustment of expenses, on the search for alternative sources of income and on improved efficiency. 5/8  In any event, in the search for profitable business, banks cannot ease off in their vigilance regarding lending standards. In the current setting, very high rates of credit expansion, as is occurring in the household bank lending segment for the purchase of consumer durables, might be indicative of an easing of risk acceptance and selection standards which, as past experience shows time and time again, ultimately translates into notable increases in nonperforming loans. Despite the limited weight of this business segment in Spanish banks’ overall credit portfolio, the rise in the volume of non-performing assets in this activity as a result of overly rapid credit growth should strike a note of caution: from being an alternative source of income it should not become a potential source of losses.
Responding to leaps in payments: from unbundling to stablecoins Christina Segal-Knowles1 Executive Director Financial Market Infrastructure Directorate  Westminster Business Forum Thursday 22 January 2020  1  I would like to thank Holly Snaith, Michaela Costello, Rachel James and Josh Sadler for their assistance with preparing this speech. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  Good morning. I would like to thank the Westminster Business Forum for inviting me to speak at today’s seminar on ‘Payments policy and regulation - infrastructure, innovation and end-user priorities’. I’d like to start today by telling two short (and seemingly unrelated) stories. The first is the story of perhaps the first giant leap forward in payments – the introduction of paper money. Paper money was invented in China as early as the tenth century. Merchants seeking to avoid carrying around heavy iron coins began issuing IOUs written on mulberry bark. The state eventually took over – outlawing private IOUs and banning counterfeit – and the first state-backed currency was born. When Marco Polo arrived in the mid thirteenth century, he was so amazed by this invention that he devoted an entire chapter of The Marvels of the World to Kublai Khan’s tree bark money. But, the first big leap forward in payments ultimately ended in a leap backwards. By the mid-fifteenth century, China had eliminated paper money entirely. The state had issued too much money and counterfeit was rife. Ultimately, mismanagement of the new invention resulted in what was perhaps the world’s first hyperinflation.

These protections mean that the coffee shop where I tapped my phone this morning does not need to worry that the value of my payment will change materially vis-à-vis the sterling-denominated price of the coffee by the time it reaches the shop’s bank account. And, when the payment arrives in the coffee shop’s account, the shop has a clear right to withdraw these funds, in sterling, and receive the same amount that was deposited. They also mean that, as a payments regulator, I don’t currently need to worry about large fluctuations in the money flowing through UK payments systems. I can instead rely on my colleagues in the Bank’s monetary policy and prudential regulation areas to do their jobs. Absent additional regulation, stablecoins may not offer these protections. Regulation of stablecoins will therefore need to be broader than the regulation of current payment chains. At minimum, where stablecoins are used in systemic payment chains as money-like instruments they should meet standards of stability and protections of holders’ rights equivalent to those expected of commercial bank money. It is tempting to view questions about the stability of value of the ‘money’ flowing through payment systems as a new issue – but in fact it is one of the oldest issues in economics. Indeed fifteenth century China’s leap backwards in payments was motivated by precisely this issue. Failure to properly ensure the stability of value led to the collapse and elimination of the innovation in payments.