samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The central banks in the US, Canada and Switzerland have raised their key rates by 0.25 percentage points since mid-March. Market expectations concerning key rates in other countries have risen slightly. For the next year, market pricing indicates that key rates will be increased in the euro area, the UK, Sweden, Switzerland, the US, Canada, Japan and Australia. In Norway, the key rate was last raised by 0.25 percentage point to 2.5 per cent at the monetary policy meeting on 16 March this year. Financial markets still expect a gradual increase in the sight deposit rate ahead. In line with developments in global markets, the rise in Norwegian long-term interest rates has gathered pace. Markets have factored in that the key rate will be lower in Norway than in the US and the UK at the end of 2009, but higher than in the euro area and Sweden. In the past couple of years, low interest rates and relatively high growth in real wages has contributed to strong growth in household purchasing power and consumption. Increased housing wealth and equity price gains may also have contributed to the high level of consumer demand and will probably continue to make a contribution ahead. With the prospect of an improving labour market and relatively low inflation through the projection period, growth in household real wage income will probably remain fairly high in the years ahead. A gradual normalisation of the interest rate level will curb growth in disposable income as the interest burden increases.

Svein Gjedrem: Business cycles and monetary policy Speech by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), for Norges Bank’s regional network, arranged by the Centre for Economic Research at NTNU – Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, Fosen, 3 May 2006. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 26 April, Inflation Report 1/06 and on previous speeches. The  Charts in pdf-format can be found on the Norges Bank’s website. *  *  *  Introduction Monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards low and stable inflation, with annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 per cent over time. This is also the most important contribution monetary policy can make to sound economic developments in the long term. Low and stable inflation provides the economy with a nominal anchor. This contributes to predictability for agents who make decisions about saving and investment today, although the result depends on economic developments ahead. In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. Flexible inflation targeting builds a bridge between the long-term objective of monetary policy, which is to keep inflation on target and provide an anchor for inflation expectations, and the more short-term objective of stability in the real economy.
However, analysis of Spanish bank capillarity shows that between 2007 and 2017 the increase in the proportion of the population without a bank branch nearby was 0.7%, as the closures were concentrated in areas of high branch density. Also, the emergence of new technologies allows bank services to be offered using more flexible and mobile methods. In any case, we should not forget that the average size of Spanish bank branches remains small, in comparison with other European countries. This drive to correct the excessive size of the Spanish banking system has been accompanied by significant restructuring. As you well know, the financial crisis led to considerable deterioration in the quality of Spanish banks’ assets. In fact, the excessive concentration of Spanish banks on the real estate sector and the intensity of the recession caused the non-performing loan (NPL) ratio to reach, within just five years, unprecedented levels of around 14% by the end of 2013. Moreover, as a consequence of defaults, banks foreclosed a considerable volume of real estate, which formed part of the collateral for many loans. In 2014, their foreclosed assets amounted to more than € billion. The lower return on assets, along with the increase in provisions for NPLs, when a large part of the general provisions built up during the preceding expansion had been used, caused the banking industry as a whole to post a loss in 2012.

This is because the main reasons underlying the outbreak of the current financial crisis are deficiencies and mistakes in the establishment of economic policies along with the fulfillment of regulatory and supervisory activities. Nevertheless, we all know that the reconstruction of economic balances under normal conditions relies on the proper execution of these functions. Another factor leading to uncertainty is the enforcement of global financial and monetary measures of a size, speed and coordination that has never been witnessed before. This raises ambiguity pertaining to the responses to these measures from financial markets and economies in the upcoming period. In the current conjuncture there is a consensus that the recovery in global economic activity will not be anytime soon and what worries the global community is what will follow the crisis. The question about mechanisms to avert any future global financial crisis similar to the current one will completely occupy the agenda of academics and policy-makers in the near future. Moreover, the extent and pace of the reversion for financial measures and nontraditional monetary policy exercises against the financial crisis on the back of stabilization in economies will top agenda very soon. The global financial crisis has led to a significant slowdown in economic activity in Turkey as in other developing countries. A remarkable tightening in lending conditions and a surge in interest on loans were experienced during the worst period of the financial crisis.
Svein Gjedrem: The conduct of monetary policy Introductory statement by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs of the Storting (Norwegian parliament), Oslo, 10 May 2007. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The statement is based on Norges Bank’s Annual Report for 2006, Monetary Policy Report 1/2007 and the Executive Board’s assessments in the period to the monetary policy meeting on 25 April. *  *  *  I would like to thank the Chairman of the Committee and thank you for this opportunity to report and answer questions on monetary policy in connection with the Storting’s deliberations on the Government’s Credit Report. The account is based on the Bank’s Annual Report, but is also updated based on the Executive Board’s assessments in the period to the previous monetary policy meeting. We also consider the report from Norges Bank Watch. In recent years, the Norwegian economy has been influenced by a number of positive supply-side conditions, which have curbed inflation, increased the growth potential of the economy and boosted production. At the hearing in 2006, I indicated that inflation would pick up. Rising capacity utilisation and a tighter labour market were expected to lead to higher wage growth. There were prospects of a gradual increase in the key policy rate to a more normal level.

To address some of these problems, the European Commission has recently published an interesting proposal for amending the European regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms that introduces a differentiated treatment for high quality securitisations that meet stringent standards in terms of simplicity, transparency and standardization. 5. Concluding remarks  Let me now conclude by highlighting what I think are the main lessons drawn from the recent crisis in connection with credit developments. First, it seems clear that given the large financial imbalances that emerged during the expansionary years, a protracted contraction in credit demand seems not only unavoidable but also positive to restore the ability of the economy to grow on a sustainable basis. Yet there is little doubt that frictions on the supply side amplified the contractionary effects of weak demand and that those frictions merit bold policy attention. In any case, policy interventions aimed at revitalising credit during a crisis should be carefully designed and calibrated, duly taking into account that credit flows should not be expected to fully recover until lenders’ and borrowers’ balance sheets are on sufficiently firm ground. In the case of Spain, some of the main constraints affecting credit developments for most of the recent crisis have abated considerably as a result of the improvement in the macroeconomic outlook, the bold banking sector reform and the introduction of various measures at both the national and European level.
Investment was still able to reach record levels because the additional capital could be borrowed from investors abroad who willingly placed their money in U.S. securities in the expectation that the good times would continue. That explains why the U.S. current account has been able to run up a gigantic deficit, currently equivalent to almost 5 per cent of GDP, at the same time as the dollar has appreciated strongly. Even with rapidly rising productivity, the rate of economic growth became incompatible with long-term stability. In order to dampen activity, the Federal Reserve started to apply the brakes in summer 1999, raising the instrumental rate in a series of steps, totalling 1.75 percentage points, to 6.5 per cent. The setbacks were not long in coming. Last year the value of the Nasdaq exchange was virtually halved. Profit warnings have been pouring in, firms are shedding labour, banks have tightened their lending, consumer confidence is weakening and unemployment is tending to rise. Manufacturing output has virtually stopped growing. In the course of a month the Federal Reserve has lowered the interest rate 1 percentage point to 5.5 per cent and market agents are counting on further cuts this spring. We now have to consider what is actually happening. Is this just a temporary correction after a period of undue optimism that has led, for example, to surplus investment and will now be followed by a fairly mild and gradual slowdown?

Lars Heikensten: What is happening in the United States and how will it affect us? Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Swedish Shareholders' Association, Malmö, 9 March 2001. *  *  *  First I want to express my thanks for the invitation to speak to you here. It is always a pleasure to visit Malmö at this time of the year; the signs that spring is approaching are more numerous and clearer down here. The current focus for forecasters — around the world, I would say — is the U.S. economy. As usual when activity is turning, opinions among economists differ greatly. This reminds me of the remark someone made to the effect that if you placed all the economists in the world in a long line, they still would not reach a joint conclusion. That I think catches the mood at present among economists, though assessments do seem to be following a pattern. American economists generally appear to be considerably more optimistic than economists with an outside view of the United States. The United States has unquestionably been acting as an economic engine for global growth for almost a decade. It is equally clear that to a large extent it is the U.S. economy’s future path that will steer international economic activity and thereby the conjunctural situation in Sweden. Against this background I shall be considering a number of questions to do with the American economy and outlining some conceivable outcomes.
This was necessary to lay the foundation for our work and to exploit that we are one of the biggest supervisors of the world. We are exceptionally well placed to look for the best practices and to identify emerging risks by using our unique database. Good benchmarking combines strong analysis and data-driven assessment with expert judgement. It allows taking into account the specificities of individual banks while still fostering consistency of assessments across banks and countries. Good benchmarking looks at risks from multiple perspectives and helps to develop a deep, holistic understanding of each institution’s overall risk profile and viability. Third, we need to further analyse in detail and for each topic individually where we are able to create a harmonized approach within the SSM, where we are able to remove uneven playing fields. We already did so for the options and national discretion. In November we will consult on the legal text we drafted for executing the discretion given to us regarding the 122 OND identified and decided upon by the SB. Apart from the famous ONDs, the current legal environment in which we operate is characterised by many different interpretations and national gold plating. In this  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  context, we face a particular challenge. It goes without saying that the SSM applies national law; consequently, the SSM is not always able to ensure a level playing field when national laws diverge.

Ardian Fullani: Opening, extension and modernisation of the primary and secondary treasury bill market Address by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at a meeting with the Minister of Finance and representatives of all banks in Albania, Tirana, 8 April 2005. *  *  *  Honored ladies and gentlemen! First of all I have the pleasure to thank you for your willingness in finding the time to take part in this work meeting. I would also thank your technical staff for the devotion shown in dealing with this issue, which constitutes one of our priorities at the Bank of Albania. At the Bank of Albania conference on “Central banking in the time of integration” I launched, interalia, the idea of the need for qualitative developments in the banking and financial system and this as closely connected with the need for further increasing the intermediation role of this system in the economy. It is understandable that the implementation of this idea would simultaneously require the giving of more possibilities to the banking system, so that this system carries out its role better and more actively. The topic we are discussing today is in this line. I am strongly convinced that the treatment of this issue did not appear as something unexpected, but it is a logical result of the positive developments taking place so far and the banking system awareness to be more active in its role for raising public confidence in the system.
Measured in these terms, the deficit was three times larger than that of Italy and Spain last year. Policy had to be reversed and tightened. Many Norwegians saw a decline in real incomes. 1  David Landes (1998): The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., N.Y  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Slide 4: Output gap: A boom-bust economy In the early 1980s, the Norwegian economy experienced a new boom, this time fuelled by debt. When oil prices fell in 1986, the Norwegian economy was hit again. We experienced a collapse in house prices, a severe banking crisis, a currency crisis, a fiscal crisis and high inflation. Unemployment soared. Large parts of the banking system were eventually nationalised. In the two years period after summer 1987, GDP fell by almost 5 percent. During the 1980s, Norwegian GDP per capita grew by a mere 1.2 percent annually, less than half of the growth recorded in both the preceding and following decades. By the early 1990s, the Norwegian authorities realised that the old policy framework was unsuitable for a modernised economy, with deregulated credit and capital markets. The low growth performance and volatility of the recent past was to be replaced by stability, predictability and renewed growth.

The capacity to withstand market turmoil was demonstrated during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. For a period of 18 months, Fund losses totalled roughly EUR 90 billion – more than 25 per cent of Norway’s GDP. The losses did not go unnoticed and led to a public  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  debate on the investment strategy. The conclusion was that the strategy is robust and that Norway must accept such fluctuations in the Fund’s capital, given the high equity share. This point was made clear through 2009 and 2010, when those losses were reversed, and additional gains made. The government remained faithful to the strategy, reaffirming its commitment to the Fund’s long-term investment strategy. The large size of the Fund can also be exploited. Last year the Fund started investing in real estate as a new asset class. The first property investments were made in France, Germany and the UK. We are now preparing for property investments in the US. Direct real estate investments will provide a fairly stable, inflation-adjusted cash flow. Over time, in accordance with the mandate, we aim to invest up to 5 percent of the Fund in real estate. The investments will be allocated to more countries as we gain experience. Slide 11: Considerable overweight in Europe The large size and the long investment horizon also entail a need for diversification. From the start, the Fund has been invested with a considerable overweight in Europe.
And finally, before I leave the question of macroprudential risks in the asset management world, there is I think an optimistic message in the work that the FSB and IOSCO have been carrying out in this area. There is now, in my view, a much greater understanding and cooperation between macroprudential authorities and market regulators. This has been a quiet, but significant, development over the last few years. It is perhaps a bit of a caricature, but when I first became involved in this debate four years ago, the macroprudential world was engaged in applying a bank-centred view of macroprudential risk to asset managers and investment funds. And, in the other direction, the market regulator community was in denial that systemic risk could originate in this area of market-based finance. There are of course still major areas where we do not agree – perhaps unsurprisingly given the very different mandates of macroprudential authorities and market regulators. But there is a much greater understanding now that, on the one hand, there are risks in this area that do need to be explored but also, on the other hand, that this assessment and any policy action cannot be a read-across from other very different parts of the financial system. Rather, it must recognize the essential characteristics of the asset management and investment fund universe.

It is against that gloomy – some would say dismal – background that I want to discuss today how I view the growth and development of market-based finance in recent years. 1  Carlyle is thought to have coined the phrase having read the works of Thomas Malthus, who argued that economic stagnation and starvation would be an inevitable result of population growth, although the exact phrase first appears in Carlyle’s tract on his opposition to the emancipation of West Indian slaves. 2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  And, to reassure you that we do not invariably see the glass as half empty, I want to start not with the risks, but with the benefits of the development of market-based finance from a financial stability perspective. And finally, I want to look at some of the issues and the risks to market-based finance arising from Brexit. Growth and development of market-based finance. Market-based finance, measured by the assets of non-bank financial institutions, grew to $ trillion in 2015 – an increase of about 50% since 2008. It now represents nearly half of the assets of the global financial system. The asset management industry – firms like those here today – manages around $ half of which is in investment funds. The growth of market-based finance since the crisis has not been evenly distributed – either geographically or between types of activity. Geographically, the US still dominates with 35% of global non-bank financial assets.
The history of money originates long ago and its developments are closely related to the people that have produced it. Its role is not limited to the economic functions; it is also a historic evidence of the minting or issuing country. It speaks about periods of economic crisis or downturns, of peace and prosperity, of successes and injustices. In this context, we decided to dedicate the First Conference of the Museum of the Bank of Albania to two main topics, which we think are the gist of its exhibitions and educational activities. 1. Findings, researches and discussions in the area of monetary production and circulation, the history of the economy and banking activity in Albania and Albanian historic territories, which contribute to accurate interpretation and updating of information transmitted to the visitors 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  through Museum collections. 2. The educational role of central bank museums in getting to know the history of money, and banking activities and enhancing financial literacy through exhibitions, education and innovation. For this purpose, we aim, therefore, to bring together foreign central bank experts to share their perspective on the management of central bank museums, collections and educational activities. This conference certainly underlines the commitment of the Bank of Albania to earnestly engage in both research and educational activities. We are very interested in enhancing cooperation with researchers, academia, peer museums, and specialised institutions in economic, historic and cultural heritage research.

No banks required financial assistance from the Government during the crisis, in contrast to the situation in some of our Asian neighbours where the cost to the public finances of bank rescues and restructuring could reach as much as $ billion. The rapid recovery in the Hong Kong economy is now helping to improve the banks’ performance and to bring down bad debts. In the first half of this year, the pre-tax operating profits of the local banks BIS Review 65/2000  2  from their Hong Kong operations rose in aggregate by more than 50% over the same period of last year. Admittedly, much of this was due to the reduction of 58% in the bad debt charge, which will be a temporary factor in improving profitability. But even at the pre-provision level, profits grew by about 15% compared with 1999. Surprisingly, after the publicity about declining margins on mortgage lending, the growth in profits was helped by an increase in the overall net interest margin. This reflected the fact that funding costs remained low during the period. The position of the local Hong Kong banks is therefore looking better than at any time since the Asian crisis. However, like the Japanese banks, the banks here are also faced by a number of important challenges, albeit on a smaller scale than those in Japan. Foremost amongst these is increasing competition.