samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Measures that raise trade barriers typically would protect lower-wage, import-competing jobs, but would also weigh on the prospects for jobs in the more efficient export sector, which tend to be higher-paying. The outcome would be countries producing more where they have a competitive disadvantage, and less where they have a competitive advantage—the exact opposite of what we should be aiming for. For example, in the United States, one of our largest manufacturing exports is aerospace parts (which requires skilled labor) and one of our largest imports is apparel (which requires less skilled labor). These second-round effects would also likely hurt productivity growth. Scarce resources would be used less efficiently and trade protection would likely lessen the level of competitive pressure that helps drive innovation. Moreover, lower productivity growth would likely lead to a slower improvement in a nation’s living standards over time.7  Better Approaches to Deal with Globalization Rather than protectionism, a better policy would be to help domestic workers and companies compete more effectively, rather than compete less. We need additional mechanisms that allow us to more fully capture the benefits from liberalized trade and to more proactively mitigate its costs. Ideally, policy should also better address job losses and income inequality from automation and other technological advances. How we respond should depend on regional and industry circumstances. These include the nature of trade impacts, the skill sets and location of the workers that have been affected, and the amount of resources that can be mobilized to facilitate adjustment.

These higher earnings reflect both higher incomes and greater labor force participation, with returns concentrated in the most disrupted regions, where workers are more likely to switch industries and move to labor markets with better opportunities in response to training. Hyman, Benjamin (2017) “Can Displaced Labor Be Retrained? Evidence from Quasi-Random Assignment to Trade Adjustment Assistance,” University of Pennsylvania. 9 For further discussion, see William C. Dudley, Panel Remarks at Bank for International Settlements’ Annual  General Meeting, June 26, 2017. 10 For further discussion, see recent Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) report, Structural  Changes in Global Banking after the Crisis. 11 Other committees of the BIS, including the CGFS, which I chair, and the Financial Stability Board, which the BIS  hosts, play an important role in analyzing international financial stability issues and developing related policy prescriptions. 12 See William C. Dudley, U.S. Monetary Policy and Emerging Market Economies, March 27, 2014. 8/8  BIS central bankers' speeches
Risk analysis and buffer-raising will also be a challenge for Eesti Pank in the forthcoming periods. The central bank just finished its first year as a member of the euro area, with one of the lowest equity to monetary policy assets ratios among euro area central banks. We must bear in mind that the revenues and expenditures of monetary policy operations are shared within the Eurosystem in proportion to the central bank’s participation in the total capital. The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank thus resolved to raise the central bank’s capital adequacy ratio to the average level of euro area central banks in the long term. In order to bring the ratio into line with Eesti Pank’s participation in the Eurosystem, the capital adequacy ratio must be raised. This means that the central bank’s equity must be raised from 0.37 billion euros to approximately 1.3 billion euros. Eesti Pank’s equity currently stands at 0.07% of the Eurosystem’s total equity, while Eesti Pank’s participation in the Eurosystem stands at 0.26%. [QUO VADIS, EURO AREA?] 1. It is not only the central banks that can contribute to a successful exit from the crisis – the governments of member states must, as soon as possible, implement the measures taken and agreements made by the European Council and the euro area heads of state and government. Closer cooperation in the field of economic policy, along with clear-cut, functional rules, serve the interests of all members. 2.

Unfortunately, it has to be admitted that food and energy prices affect the cost of the consumer basket more than in older euro area Member States. Thus, consumer prices accelerated to 5% in Estonia. 3. Estonia stands strong, compared to the EU average. In the midst of a crisis, we demonstrated our ability to quickly fix the balance in times of trouble. We now need to make plans for regulating our behaviour at times of joy. 4. Our State Budget Strategy has set out a budget policy framework for the medium perspective. Unfortunately, we have yet to see the binding nature of the document in the decision-making process. For example, the budget strategy prepared in the spring of 2011 set its sights on restoring the consolidated budget surplus. As at 2012, the attainment of the objective has been postponed. This is worrying. It shows that the current framework enables to change long-term goals too easily. The current framework also provides no solutions to managing the cost increase at times of growth. It would thus be reasonable to establish rules for restricting expenditure alongside the established rules for ensuring a balance. These rules would reduce the volatility of the cost increase, prevent unjustified expectations and alleviate the pains of cost-cutting. 5. At the beginning of 2012, the euro area heads of state and government resolved to launch the European Stability Mechanism sooner than initially planned. 6.
At the time, there was excitement about the idea that a stable banking system could be a source of liquidity to fund the expansion of the economy. So in addition to being the government’s banker, the Bank also engaged in commercial activities: taking deposits in exchange for which it issued notes – and providing loans by discounting commercial bills. That was 321 years ago. The Bank of England you see today has its roots in a relatively more recent act of Parliament. I refer of course to the 1844 Bank Charter Act, which paved the way for the Bank to become the monopoly supplier of bank notes, and effectively responsible for monetary policy in the UK. The Act also had the effect of limiting the amount of commercial business the Bank could undertake, so it chose to concentrate not on competing with the emerging joint-stock and clearing banks, but instead to focus on its role  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  as banker to the banks, and supplier of liquidity of last resort. It could be argued that this was the point at which the Bank’s financial stability role was born. In subsequent years, as the Bank sought to define this role, it was helped by the advice of Walter Bagehot, a keen student – and sometime critic – of the Bank of England’s reaction to banking crises over history.

Despite this less-than-ideal starting position, the Bank ultimately embraced the provision of liquidity to the system over the course of the crisis, with the expressed aim of reducing the costs of disruption to critical financial services. This came about via an alphabet soup of schemes, including DWF, ECTR, ELTR, FLS, ILTR, and SLS. 3 Common to all was a  2  See Plenderleith (2012) for details of episodes of lender of last resort since 1973. 3  More information about these schemes is available on the Bank’s website: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  recognition that to achieve its aim, the Bank needed to provide liquidity against a wider range of collateral, to a wider range of counterparties, for a longer term. Two other innovations are noteworthy. •  First, in some circumstances the Bank lent in a currency other than sterling – a first for our liquidity insurance operations. 4  •  Second, the Bank acted as a market maker of last resort in the sterling corporate funding markets – making small targeted purchases and sales of commercial paper and corporate bonds. 5  Many of these changes were made in the heat of the crisis. And since the 2012 Winters and Plenderleith Reviews 6 much effort has been exerted in hardwiring them into our operating framework to make it clear to market participants how we would act in future.
Hence, the country would likely turn the table on the ECB, and push for generous liquidity support or supervisory forbearance. From the ECB’s perspective, an effective financial union is a key complement to the single monetary policy. To the extent that it restores the flow of savings between euro area countries, it will support the normalisation of monetary policy transmission and allow us to exit our exceptional measures. But more fundamentally, without integrated capital markets and a well-functioning banking sector, there cannot be a single monetary policy – and this means we cannot fulfil our mandate. Fiscal union The second pillar, fiscal union, is necessary to ensure that fiscal policies are fully commensurate with the requirements of the common currency. The crisis provided prima facie evidence of the sizeable negative spillovers associated with fiscal crises within monetary union. Moreover, it showed the importance of sound fiscal policies for allowing governments to perform their essential functions: countries with weak budgets lose their ability to perform cyclical stabilisation during a crisis. Measures that guarantee solid fiscal policies are therefore a public good – both for individual Member States and for the whole euro area. For domestic citizens, they ensure that the automatic stabilisers will be able to play out in full during a downturn and smooth the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  economic cycle. For citizens elsewhere in the euro area, they provide protection against contagion emanating from budgetary decisions over which they have no democratic control.

In this regard, the involvement of multilateral agencies such as ADB would be very useful in that not only will it foster investors’ confidence if the multilateral agencies put in their own financial resources, but it will also help build the governments’ capacity in structuring projects, strengthening the PPP framework and improving project governance to make their infrastructure projects commercially viable. Secondly, shortfall in educational inputs has been seen as one of the major constraints for some developing economies to enhance productivity and move up the value chain. It has also been a major reason for the remaining pockets of poverty in the region, including in countries where substantial economic progress has been made but a substantial proportion of the population is still living in poverty. We encourage ADB to further strengthen its support for the educational sector and developing human capital, which are essential to enhancing competitiveness, eliminating poverty and addressing the rising inequality in developing Asia. Thirdly, intra-regional trade has been an important source of growth after the global financial crisis as regional economies increased their domestic demand and reduced their reliance on exports to advanced economies. As the global economy continues to rebalance, the prospect of the region to sustain its growth would very much depend on its ability to hold up domestic demand through sustained productivity enhancement as mentioned above, and further trade integration within the region.
We will remain committed and we are making every effort to ensure that this high inflation ceases to be a problem for our country and that it is brought down to 3% within the policy horizon. Thank you. 8  Figure 1  Inflation indicators (1) (2)  Core inflation of goods and services (1) (2)  (annual change, percent)  (annual change, percent)  25  20  CPI Core CPI (w/o volatiles) CPI volatiles  20  Core services (w/o volatiles) Core goods (w/o volatiles)  15  15 10 10 5  5  0  0 18  19  20  21  22  18  23  20  19  21  22  23  (1) Dashed vertical line marks statistical cutoff of March 2023 MP Report. (2) For details on the different groupings and their shares in the total CPI basket, see box IV.1 in December 2019 MP Report, Carlomagno and Sansone (2019) and Economic Glossary. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute.

Goldstein, M., “Managed Floating Plus and the Great Currency Regime Debate”, Institute for International Economics Policy Analyses in International Economics, No. 66, 2002. Linde, Luis M., “The Changing Role of Central Banks”, the 4th Future of Banking Summit, organised by Economist Conferences, Paris, 26 February, 2013. Zurbrügg, F., “Fiscal and Monetary Policy – Interdependence and Possible Sources of Tension”, the University of Lucerne, Lucerne, 21 November, 2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
First, of course, is the fact that one cannot rely on a backup computer site for Y2K contingency if that site also uses the same software that is the cause of the Y2K problem at the main site. In some cases, it is impractical to build a duplicate software system from scratch simply to provide for Y2K contingency. In these cases, as a senior banker explained at one of our New York Y2K forums, contingency planning amounts to, “Testing, testing, and more testing.” Contingency planning can also be separated into components that are firm-specific and those that are market-wide. Each individual firm will need to develop its own contingency plans designed to maintain the integrity of its operations during the changeover to the Year 2000. The FFIEC has recently issued guidance to banks in the United States regarding the core elements of their own contingency planning.5 The Joint Year 2000 Council will also be developing a paper on contingency planning for the benefit of the global financial supervisory community. This paper will seek to address firm-level contingency as well as issues of market-wide contingency. 5  See www.ffiec.gov/y2k/contplan.htm BIS Review 56/1998  - 10 -  Market-wide contingency refers to the planning by participants and supervisors done to ensure that individual disruptions can be managed in ways that will prevent them from causing disruptions to critical market infrastructures.

Federal Reserve Governor Edward W. Kelley, Jr. has recently elaborated on the activities of the Federal Reserve System in connection with the Y2K problem, as well on possible macroeconomic implications.1 I will not attempt to cover those topics again here. Instead, this morning I will begin with some background on the possible implications of the Y2K problem for international banking and finance. Second, I will describe how various supervisory initiatives led to the formation of the Joint Year 2000 Council a little more than two months ago. Third, I will discuss the actions being taken by the Joint Year 2000 Council, particularly in the areas of raising awareness, improving preparedness, and contingency planning. Background on the International Implications of the Y2K Problem The Y2K bug potentially affects all organizations that are dependent on computer software applications or on embedded computer chips. In other words, nearly all financial organizations worldwide are potentially at risk. Even those whose own operations remain strictly paper-based are likely to be dependent on power, water, and telecommunications utilities, which must themselves address possible Y2K problems. Also, many non-financial customers have dependencies on technology. All countries of the world, therefore, need to address the Y2K problem and its potential effects on their domestic financial markets. In some cases, it is said that computer systems in particular countries are not much affected because their national calendars are not based on the conventional Gregorian calendar used in the United States and many other countries.
Our non-standard measures of negative interest rate policy and asset purchases brought down the overall level of the yield curve to a region that is, by definition, unreachable under a zero lower bound and contributed to a considerable flattening of the term structure. The lowering and flattening of the yield curve in turn eased financing conditions for non-financial corporations and households, contributed to spurring economic activity and helped bring inflation closer towards our aim. From an analytical perspective, further study of the impact of innovative monetary policy measures is a necessity for central bankers and an opportunity for academics. While academic researchers have the  privilege of being able to watch new policy measures unfold before scrutinising their impact, central bank researchers and decision-makers have to monitor the impact of policy in real time, and are forced to rely on sparse empirical evidence, especially if the policy measure is unprecedented. There are many open issues regarding the interplay between the yield curve and monetary policy that require further research in my view. So let me finish with a little wish list or research agenda. First on the list should be a better understanding of the role of term premia in macroeconomic models. This includes a more thorough analysis of the transmission of quantitative easing through the duration channel, but also, more generally, a better integration of long-term rates in the transmission mechanism as formalised in DSGE models. [34] Second is an improved modelling of long-term trends.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Rising oil prices – a challenge for monetary policy? Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Déjeuners de la Finance, Geneva, 2 November 2005. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Despite oil prices being at a historically high level, inflation has increased only slightly in recent quarters and growth appears to be robust. Are we to assume, therefore, that oil no longer plays an important role in today’s economic environment? What challenges does the current situation pose for monetary policy? For the first time, the steady rise in energy prices is not the result of a political boycott by oil-producing countries, but of an increase in energy demand, coming in particular from the newly industrialised countries in Asia. In other words, the rise in crude oil prices this time can be attributed to the strong growth in global economic activity. This does not mean, however, that the role of monetary policy has changed. Although core inflation currently appears to be under control in most countries, a persistent and continuous rise in energy costs could have an effect on all prices and wages in the long run, thereby jeopardising monetary stability. Notwithstanding the low level of inflation (excluding energy prices), it is vital that the monetary authorities maintain a forward-looking stance so as not to put their credibility on the line and to ensure long-term price stability. 1/1
•  Our banks also undertake regular stress tests on their own and those coordinated by MAS. •  We have subjected the banks’ balance sheets to a combination of stresses – including a sharp rise in interest rates, a decline in property prices, and a rise in unemployment rate. They have enough capital to see them through. It is the household sector that we are concerned about. •  At the aggregate level, household balance sheets are resilient. Cash and deposits exceed household debt. •  But the health of the balance sheet is not uniform across all households. Many households could have over-extended themselves, fuelled by low interest rates and stretched loan tenures. •  The vast majority of mortgage loans are on floating-rate packages, which means that households will face higher monthly repayments when interest rates normalise. •  An estimated 5 to 10% of borrowers have probably over-leveraged on their property purchases, i.e. they have total debt service payments at more than 60% of their income. •  If mortgage rates were to rise by 3 percentage points, the proportion of borrowers at risk could reach 10 to 15%. •  In particular, lower income households and those with smaller saving pools may find this a strain. Those with longer tenure loans will also be adversely affected. So, when interest rates rise, long before any bank gets into trouble, some households will. Banks must therefore practice responsible lending, and consider the ability of borrowers to service their debt in a sustainable manner.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Switzerland - a platform for global business Keynote address by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Consulate General of Switzerland / Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, New York, 1 June 2006. *  *  *  It is a great pleasure for me to be with you today and I would like to thank my dear friend, Ambassador Loretan, for hosting this lunch of the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce. Swiss people always feel at home, here, in this fascinating city. New York is a unique place, not only because of its size, its beautiful skyline, its location, but foremost because of its openness to the world and its multiculturalism. Compared to New York, is Switzerland anything more than just a small village located in the heart of Europe, a country of watchmakers and chocolate producers? Is there anything to see other than the Matterhorn and the water fountain on Lake Geneva? It is interesting to note that, despite the strong presence of Swiss multinationals abroad and, of course, the very well-known Swiss flag – thanks to the Red Cross flag – Switzerland is largely ignored in international surveys and is almost non-existent in European statistics. “To live happily, live out of sight!” (pour vivre heureux vivons cachés) is a well-known proverb. This may well be true, but it serves to fuel many clichés; and misconceptions are generally counterproductive.