samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Such fundamental changes in investor risk assessment influence not just the prices of the affected bonds. They also impact on other investment categories and, therefore, as I will explain later, on the financial markets in general. Allow me to begin by addressing the most serious developments. The European sovereign debt crisis is far from over. In comparison to last year, it has again worsened. Thus the credit risk premia of euro countries with large debt burdens continued to rise; compared to the previous year’s average value, the risk premia have approximately doubled. That the debt problem in the euro area has worsened is apparent not just on the bond markets. On the foreign exchange market, the CHF/EUR exchange rate, in particular, reacted strongly, attaining new all-time high levels. Since, at the same time, the US dollar was still tending lower, the CHF/USD exchange rate also climbed to extreme levels. The weak dollar has to do with doubts about the robustness of the US economy in the wake of diminishing fiscal and monetary policy stimuli, as well as worries about US public debt. Since the Swiss franc also recorded historical exchange rates against other currencies, its value, on a real and trade-weighted basis, is now well above its long-term level. Investor appetite for bonds considered to be secure helped to push down capital market yields on US, German and Swiss ten-year government bonds to the level last recorded in December 2010 of around 3% (US and Germany) and 1.7% (Switzerland).

The Swiss franc money market is still in a position of structural liquidity surplus vis-à-vis the Swiss National Bank (SNB). Consequently, our focus is on liquidity-absorbing open market operations. Currently, a large proportion of the surplus Swiss franc liquidity is being absorbed through SNB Bills amounting to around CHF 110 billion and daily repo auctions (reverse repos) of around CHF 25 billion. The volume being absorbed has not been increased over recent months. Consequently, the total sight deposits of domestic banks have, at approximately CHF 25 billion, remained almost unchanged. This is a significantly higher level than before the financial crisis. It exceeds the minimum reserve requirements many times over. As a consequence, interest rates on the Swiss franc money market are still close to zero. Despite the fact that interest rates are still very low, the volume of activity on the secured Swiss franc money market remains at a relatively high level. By contrast, the volumes traded on the unsecured Swiss franc money market are still markedly lower than their pre-crisis level. The management of the three-month Libor is, however, not affected by this, and can still be guaranteed. The management of the foreign exchange reserves Allow me to conclude with a few words on the management of our foreign exchange reserves. First, let me stress that the increase in the foreign exchange reserves in 2009 and 2010 was a direct consequence of monetary policy measures. It had nothing to do with the pursuit of investment goals.
Inflation is under 2% and inflation expectations close to target. What is unique in the present economic situation is that almost all economic indicators point in the right direction; we have high growth on a broad front at the same time as inflation expectations are stably low and central government finances in order. An important factor underlying this favourable situation is that economic policy in recent years has been carried out in a consistent and competent way. Monetary policy with the focus on price stability has played an important role although the favourable development would not have come about without a responsible fiscal policy. While households and wage earners have borne a large share of the burden by income-reducing cuts in central government finances, this seems to have taken place on the basis of a general insight that sacrifices were necessary for the time being. However, unemployment is still high and the frequency of employment low compared with previous successful epochs in Sweden, although there are statistical indications that the situation is improving. Unemployment is falling and approximately 100,000 more are in work than last year. The employment ratio has risen from 72% to 74% of the working-age population. The great challenge for economic policy and for the social partners on the labour market is to continue to act responsibly so that the period of good growth that our country is experiencing is not interrupted prematurely.

In two additional steps, on 10 and 17 August this quantitative easing policy was further expanded with an ultimate target of overall sight deposits in excess of CHF 200 billion. This significant increase in the supply of liquidity to the Swiss franc money market was achieved by discontinuing reverse repo operations and repurchasing outstanding SNB Bills, in a first step, and entering into foreign exchange swaps and reinstating liquidity-providing repos afterwards. These operations exerted massive downward pressure on money market rates and expectations of future interest rates. They also caused the Swiss franc to weaken considerably. However, the increasing torrent of bad news about the global economic situation made their impact only temporary in nature. The massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc continued anew, posing an acute threat to the Swiss economy. On 6 September, the SNB hence announced that it would no longer tolerate a EUR/CHF exchange rate below a minimum rate of CHF 1.20. It also indicated that it would enforce this minimum rate with the utmost determination and was prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities, if necessary. Even at a rate of CHF 1.20 per euro, the Swiss franc remains high. It should continue to weaken over time. If the economic outlook and deflationary risks so require, further measures will be taken. The decision to impose a minimum exchange rate was not taken lightly. It was a major step and has naturally elicited a wide variety of reactions. Today, I would only like to address one of them.
7  orientation of future monetary policy, (ii) The publication of the document The Financial Policy of the Central Bank of Chile, the first of its kind in the country, which presents the conceptual framework and institutional context in which financial policy is carried out to achieve the objective of safeguarding the normal functioning of internal and external payments. The first of these initiatives takes on special relevance in light of the similar exercise carried out by the US Federal Reserve, announced by its Governor last week. Meanwhile, the financial policy framework has been especially relevant in framing the Bank’s decisions in light of the various volatility episodes experienced in Chile since last November. From the agenda emanating from the Evaluation Panel’s report, I would also like to highlight the Constitutional and LOC Reform that entitles the Bank to acquire fiscal instruments in the secondary market to contain risks to financial stability, especially because of the broad understanding and support we received from this Senate during their discussion. As it was then pointed out, this power will allow the Bank to prepare itself to address future episodes of volatility in the markets that may jeopardize financial stability and, thus, the welfare of the population. As for the recommendations that are nearing completion, preparing a framework agreement with the Financial Market Commission (CMF) stands out, which includes specific areas and objectives of coordination, exchange, information utilization and confidentiality, and reciprocal technical assistance.

The Monetary Policy Report  The evolution of the macroeconomic scenario, in Chile and around the world, continues to be driven by the spread of the Covid-19 and the containment measures needed to protect the health of the population. The information at hand shows that, after a sharp fall at the beginning of the second quarter, in recent months the Chilean economy has shown signs of stabilization, combining an incipient improvement in some sectors and deterioration at the margin in others. This stabilization has responded to the evolution of sanitary restrictions, the adaptation of various sectors to new operating conditions and the boost from economic policies. The economic impact of the pandemic, however, is very significant and recovery will pose major challenges for public policies, institutions, and economic agents. The magnitude of this challenge is especially evident in the high number of people and businesses whose source of income has been disrupted. Reversing the loss of jobs, the fall in household income and the deterioration in consumption, together with responding to the financing needs of businesses, avoiding bankruptcies and enabling them to recover, are the greatest challenges for economic policy at this stage. As I will show later, based on known activity data and short-term perspectives, we estimate that GDP will end 2020 with a fall of between -4.5 and -5.5%, which compares to the -5.5 to -7.5% range estimated in the June MP Report and which implies a significant recovery in the second half of the year.
Assessments under the RCAP are currently underway for Singapore and Switzerland. Later this year will follow China, Australia, Brazil and Canada. As with all of the RCAP work, transparency is critical to success – all of these reports will, of course, be published in full when complete. It is important to note that, in undertaking this work, the Basel Committee has no enforcement power, so it would be meaningless to think we can force jurisdictions to change their local regulations if we find gaps. Our goal is therefore framed more positively: to deepen the implementation process and to help jurisdictions identify the gaps and address them. Ideally, the assessments provide a roadmap by which identified gaps can be closed. They also provide stakeholders and markets with a much higher degree of transparency about the extent of any local divergence from agreed international standards, and the importance of these. In this way, we believe we will establish the appropriate incentives for local rulemakers to apply the global standards, and for markets and others to apply appropriate pressure where banks may be subject to weaker-then-expected prudential requirements. More consistent domestic regulations will be an improvement. But beyond looking at how local regulators have transposed Basel agreements into domestic regulations, the Committee has also begun examining whether the framework(s) are producing consistent outcomes. Ultimately, what counts is that the capital ratio calculated and reported by individual banks provides a meaningful and comparable representation of their capital strength.

Differences in regulation, or their application, can undermine the regulatory framework by making it more difficult for bank depositors, counterparties, investors, shareholders and supervisors to have confidence that reported capital ratios serve their intended purpose. In this context, some concerns have been recently voiced that banks are not calculating risk weighted assets consistently. The Committee has, in fact, been investigating this issue for much of the past year. This work has examined the calculation of risk weights in both the banking and the trading books. As with our country assessments, we will publish the results of both studies. The preliminary results of the trading book are most advanced, and will be published very shortly. The analysis is based on two sources of data: public disclosures by banks and a hypothetical test portfolio exercise in which 15 large, internationally active banks have participated from nine Basel Committee jurisdictions. I will not pre-release the detailed results today, but the headline messages are that:  1  At least, fascinating for regulatory aficionados. 2  See C Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, A History of the Early Years 1974–1997, Cambridge University Press, 2011  3  The Level 2 reports on the European Union, Japan and the United States can be found at the website of the Basel Committee (www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm).
Fiscal consolidation Significant steps were taken last year to reduce the budget deficit and strengthen the budgetary discipline and management framework. In the first of these areas, and although both expenditure- and revenue-side measures were applied, it should be stressed that the bulk of the effort consisted of spending cuts, allowing  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  net overall general government borrowing to be reduced to 7% of GDP, or 10.6% when the assistance (a non-recurring expense) to financial institutions is included. Last month the European Commission announced a new fiscal consolidation path, setting new deficit targets of 6.5% and 5.8% for the current year, 2013, and 2014, and of around 4% for 2015, and requiring that the 3% threshold laid down by the Stability and Growth Pact be met in 2016. The additional margin provided will help soften the short-term contractionary impact of the fiscal adjustment on activity. As to public spending discipline and management, I should first mention the April 2012 Organic Law on Budgetary Stability. This legislation implements the principles of limiting the structural deficit and volume of debt that were enshrined in our Constitution in 2011. The Law makes key improvements in terms of the transparency of public finances. Many of these improvements were set in train in 2012 and early 2013. In terms of the availability of data on general government financial and budgetary conduct, Spain now probably stands at the head of the European Union countries.

It is to use Singapore as a launch-pad to do business in Southeast Asia. In recent years, Chinese corporates and financial institutions have been rapidly growing their operations and investments in Southeast Asia. Singapore offers an effective gateway for their expansion into the region. •  There are some 6,500 Chinese companies in Singapore. •  Many of them, such as Lenovo, have set up regional finance and treasury centres here to take advantage of Singapore’s banking and capital markets to finance their regional expansion. •  The seven Chinese banks in Singapore are also expanding their presence here to provide funding support for the activities of Chinese and regional corporates. Singapore-based financial institutions have extensive networks in the individual ASEAN countries and, have proven to be trusted partners for Chinese entities venturing abroad. •  A recent example is China Minsheng Investment Corporation, one of the largest private investment firms in China, which set up an office in Singapore with the mandate to invest in companies in South-east Asia and North America. One of its first projects is the construction of an industrial park in Indonesia. •  Other Chinese companies, such as Baosteel, New Hope and Huaneng, have invested in Vietnam and the region through their Singapore subsidiaries, with financing support from local banks like DBS. China-Singapore financial connectivity: the next chapter The next chapter in China-Singapore financial partnership will go beyond co-operation on RMB business and the use of Singapore as an Asian gateway.
A specific target for monetary policy was thus a necessary supplement to the fiscal rule to ensure reasonable macroeconomic stability. The operational target states that monetary policy in Norway is oriented towards low and stable inflation, with annual consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5 per cent over time. In its conduct of monetary policy, Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. 2  BIS Review 106/2006  Current economic situation Since the summer of 2003, there has been a clear upturn in the Norwegian economy. Low domestic interest rates, increased petroleum investment, favourable prices in important export markets, and a strong upturn in the world economy have contributed to solid growth in the Norwegian economy. So far in the upturn, the mainland economy has grown by an average of close to 4 per cent annually. Current information on economic developments indicates that the upswing is continuing. Corporate sector profitability is good. There is strong growth in employment, unemployment has fallen markedly, and household demand continues to rise. Unemployment is now at a historically low level. Seasonally adjusted, registered unemployment stood at 2.3 per cent of the labour force in October. Nevertheless, wage moderation has generally prevailed so far. The opportunities provided by an international labour market may have prompted participants in local and centralised wage negotiations to place greater emphasis on the considerably higher wage level in Norway relative to our trading partners, and potential job vulnerability.

Very often leaders are ahead because they are supported, respected and loved by their followers or, in this case, passengers, who actually want them to take the front seats and lead. 7. On the question of what constitutes good and long lasting leadership, there exists tremendous amount of academic research and literature, which I do not propose to talk about. What I would like to say today is to draw on the teaching by one of our great ancient teachers, Confucius. More than two thousand years ago, Confucius taught his students how to become a “Gentleman” or “Jun Zi (君子)”. What strikes me most as the qualities of a successful “Jun Zi” or “Leader” are the three words used by Confucius: “Wisdom”, “Morality” and “Courage” ( 智、仁、勇). I strongly believe that Confucius’ teaching was right not only in ancient times but also in the modern world. As a master degree graduate in the specialised fields of business and finance, you clearly are knowledgeable, but you may not be wise. So you need wisdom, a quality that can only be acquired with a sense of modesty and humility, understanding fully there are more things that you don’t know than you know. Treat learning as a life long process that won’t stop even after you have graduated from the university. Success is your desired destination but you must not seek to achieve your goal with immoral means.
Notes: The chart shows the difference between the percentage of enterprises reporting an increase for a given factor and the percentage reporting a decrease in response to the following questions: (i) for each of the following types of financing, would you say that their availability has improved, remained unchanged or deteriorated for your enterprise over the past six months? ; (ii) looking ahead, for each of the following types of financing available to your enterprise, please indicate whether you think their availability will improve, deteriorate or remain unchanged over the next six months. The base is the SMEs for which the respective instrument is relevant. The figure refers to rounds 1 (April-September 2009) to 22 (October-March 2020) of the survey. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2020/html/ecb.sp200519~e5203d3520.en.html  11/14  5/19/2020  Pandemic central banking: the monetary stance, market stabilisation and liquidity  These survey results underscore the importance of our recent monetary policy measures, including the recalibrations of the TLTROs. Nevertheless, it appears that the financing conditions for firms have held up relatively well compared to the depth of the crisis. Although credit standards for loans to enterprises tightened in the first quarter of 2020 (net percentage of reporting banks at 4 percent), the degree of tightening was very mild compared to the credit squeeze that amplified the financial and sovereign debt crises between 2008 and 2012 (Chart 16). Chart 16 Credit standards for loans to NFCs and contributing factors (net percentage of banks reporting a tightening)  Source: ECB (April 2020 bank lending survey).

1  Nout Wellink, ‘The Role of National Central Banks within the Europeans System of Central Banks: The Example of De Nederlandsche Bank’, 30th Economics Conference, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, June 13 – 14, 2002. 2  BIS Review 46/2002  This would not, however, represent much of a change because already today the Bank has only limited autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy. As far as the transition to the euro is concerned, therefore, the path that Malta should follow seems fairly straightforward, given the starting point of the existing exchange rate regime. Today, the basket consists of the euro, the US dollar and sterling, with weights of around 52%, 26% and 22%, respectively. There is no fluctuation band. The peg is backed by official external reserves, which have comfortably exceeded the monetary base over the years and are equivalent to a fifth of broad money. The first step would be to increase the weight of the euro in the currency basket at the expense of either or both of the other component currencies. If the United Kingdom were to join EMU, this would automatically raise the proportion of the euro in the currency basket, making Maltese entry into ERM II that much easier. On accession, the timing for joining ERM II, as well as technical questions relating to the entry level and the fluctuation band will be up for discussion. If the Maltese lira were to join ERM II with the normal fluctuation band of ±15%, this would inject more flexibility into the system.