samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Norman T L Chan: A fascinating train journey Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the CUHK (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) Business School Master Degree Graduation Ceremony 2015, Hong Kong, 21 November 2015. *  *  *  Professor Michael Hui, Professor Kalok Chan, parents, graduates, ladies and gentlemen: 1. It is a great honour to be invited to attend today’s graduation ceremony. It is also a great pleasure to be back to CUHK, where I spent the most beautiful part of my life as a student. There were so many fond memories and I cannot tell you how much I have missed my campus life even though I have graduated for nearly 40 years. 2. My fellow graduates, today is a memorable and joyful occasion not only for you, but also for your parents, your family, your loved ones and your friends. You have all worked very hard and gone through many rounds of examinations and challenges before you can be here today on this occasion. You must feel very proud and wish to tell everybody that “I have made it”. My heartfelt congratulations to you all: you have made it. You have received a master degree that provides you with the knowledge and skills that are badly needed and sought after in the modern era of business and finance.

Further, like the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, it has pursued a very expansionary liquidity-provision policy, which can be measured by the sizeable increase of over 50% in its balance sheet since 2008. Among the extraordinary measures, I would highlight the long-term (as long as three years) refinancing operations; the extension of the list of assets accepted as collateral for the loans made to banks; and the launch of asset purchase programmes, such as the Securities Market Programme, the two Covered Bonds Purchase Programmes (including Spain's) and the announcement, in August 2012, of the Outright Monetary Transactions programme. More recently, in July this year, a policy of forward guidance has been adopted, involving the more accurate communication of the projected behaviour of official interest rates in the future. Yet we should remember that the capacity of monetary policy to resolve the problems at the root of this crisis is very limited. What it can do, and is doing, is making time so that other players who do have the proper tools to resolve the problems can adopt the measures needed, and so that such measures may take effect. The other European economic authorities, starting with the Commission, have – in close collaboration with national governments – taken significant steps towards correcting the weaknesses exposed in the euro's institutional arrangements. Thus, a permanent mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism, has been set up, with the capacity to provide funds to the Member States deprived of access to the capital markets.
Of concern has also been lack of adequate information on debt concentrations in the system partly due to the increasingly elaborate ways in which debt is passed on from originating institutions to different investors. The propensity to under-price credit risk, especially under conditions of excess liquidity, has also increased concerns over underwriting standards. The consequent sharp pricing corrections would in turn have the potential to result in broader economic disruptions. Recent developments in the prudential regulatory and supervisory framework have, and will continue to play an important role in promoting sound risk management practices in the light of these changes. These of course, include the modification of capital standards that are more granular in addressing different types of risk. Supervisory approaches globally have also evolved to place a greater emphasis on sound risk management and early interventions to address emerging risks before they become major problems. There is also more emphasis being placed on the expectations of financial institutions to play a greater role in ensuring that financial products offered to customers and investors are suitable given their needs and financial circumstances, and that they have a good understanding of risks assumed with the products.

As needs and roles change, the organisation must be able to customise its information environment and modify its processes in response. This practice forms a good base to pursue new information technology initiatives. Allow me to share with you several prescriptive pointers which I am sure that you have heard several times before and are probably guided by these and similar practices in your respective central banks. Notwithstanding, the familiarity, I believe that it is appropriate for me to repeat them at a forum such as this. During the course of this week, as you deliberate on how to ensure that your organisation’s information technology investments remain appropriate, I encourage you to be guided by the following pointers which are selfexplanatory: •  Understand the value of your organisation’s data and tie information technology investments to the value of that data. •  Tie information technology investments to factors that provide strategic value. •  Understand the business issues that affect the organisations you serve to the point that they become second nature. •  Develop expertise in areas of business so that you can better contribute to the enhancement of the various business functions in your organisation through the application of information technology. •  Remain in a continuous state of dialogue with various areas of the organisation to facilitate shared learning that can eventually translate in the deployment of information technology in a manner that is in line with the organisation’s strategic directions.
25 (1973–74) to the Storting: “Petroleumsvirksomhetens plass i det norske samfunn” [The role of petroleum activity in Norwegian society]. 2  The Paradox of Plenty. Oil Booms and Petro-States by Terry Lynn Karl (1997) provides a good overview of oil nations’ problems. BIS Review 78/2010  1  From time to time, I meet representatives of the diplomatic corps in Norway. They seldom fail to mention the high cost level in Norway and their bewilderment over aspects of our way of life. A 17th century Moroccan ambassador was even more critical in his account of the wealthiest nation at that time: “…the Spanish nation today possesses the greatest wealth and the largest income of all Christians. But the love of luxury and the comforts of civilization have overcome them, and you will rarely find one of this nation who engages in trade or travels abroad for commerce as do the other Christian nations […]. Similarly, the handicrafts practiced by the lower classes and common people are despised by this nation, which regards itself as superior to other Christian nations. Most of those who practice these crafts in Spain are Frenchmen [who] flock to Spain to look for work … [and] in a short time make great fortunes.” See chart “Petroleum production” at the end of the speech. The oil age in Norway has now spanned about 40 years and there are prospects that it will continue for some time ahead.

Rosthom Fadli: IMFC Statement Statement by Mr Rosthom Fadli, Governor of the Bank of Algeria, on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Algeria, Ghana, Islamic Republic of Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan and Tunisia, at the forty-second meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, Virtual IMF Autumn Meetings, Washington DC, 15 October 2020. * * * The global economy is showing tentative signs of recovery, thanks to nimble, proportional, and synchronized global policy responses. The October 2020 W EO’s cautious optimism about the outlook, however, should not overshadow the fact that the Covid-19 pandemic is still evolving and the virus is spreading, with a serious possibility of new infection waves, including in areas where the pandemic was believed to have been contained. While the lockdowns continue to exert a heavy economic and social toll worldwide, containing the pandemic and saving lives are still top priorities. The path of the economic recovery is closely intertwined with the path of the pandemic, which is subject to significant uncertainty. An effective vaccine will be found—hopefully sooner than later—but the vaccine and medical treatments will only be effective if they are available worldwide and at affordable prices, especially for poorer countries. No country or region is safe as long as the virus is spreading somewhere else.
Such a framework would almost certainly entail more focus on unwinding large balance sheet problems (both with respect to the sovereign and the financial system), reducing sovereign debt to more sustainable levels, making debt dynamics less vulnerable to shocks, increasing liquidity buffers, and preserving appropriate exchange rate arrangements. Addressing these issues would help reduce the risk of future capital account crises. It would create better conditions for private sector growth. In virtually every context where public sector debt burdens are high and fiscal deficits large, more ambition in the adjustment path should be positive for growth through the effect on confidence, interest rates, and the exchange rate. Of course the Fund can’t want reform more than its members. The principal burden for running a set of policies more commensurate with the risks emerging markets face in this world rests with their governments. The role of the Fund should be to help guide and encourage them to the point where they build in a more substantial degree of self-insurance. The Fund should not acquiesce in and validate policy frameworks that fall substantially short of the threshold necessary to safely navigate this world of high variability in the external environment and occasional domestic political pressures to weaken policies. Changing the surveillance framework Part of the challenge entails reorienting surveillance, the process through which the Fund’s policy advice is delivered, to make it more effective.

We assess the models banks use to measure risk and the scenarios used to stress test exposures, but the banks have the responsibility for designing and running the risk management infrastructure. By looking across a broad range of world class financial institutions, we have a good sense of the evolving frontier of best practice in risk management which we can then use to help benchmark other institutions and pull common practice closer to that frontier. For a number of reasons, this can’t be the model for the Fund’s relationships with its members. But it provides an interesting prism in thinking about surveillance. The Fund has explored a number of ideas to strengthen the surveillance framework. One of the most promising is to establish a process with more frequent, published staff assessments of performance against a medium-term framework designed by the member country. That assessment could convey a  4  BIS Review 37/2004  clear judgement about the degree of progress being made in reducing vulnerabilities, improving resilience, and strengthening the structural underpinnings of growth. Analysis of public and external debt trends, benchmarked against sustainability and vulnerability thresholds, and stress tests for relevant shocks could play a key role in this process. There are compelling arguments for combining such a framework with contingent access to Fund resources. Surveillance today does not provide a meaningful check on ex ante policies, and resources are only made available when the financial need is acute.
However, despite these uncertainties, 2016 was marked by a certain degree of stability in Europe: euro area growth, which was at first fragile at the beginning of the year, strengthened and financial markets proved resilient in the face of the different shocks. For 2017, of course, none of these uncertainties have been lifted and others will be added to the list: 2017 is an election year in the Netherlands, France, Germany and possibly Italy. Nevertheless, the euro area can count on four points of reference:  economic growth, which promises to be robust; in the Eurosystem, it is expected to stand at 1.7%, as in 2016.  the gradual rise in inflation. This should not be a surprise, for several months the Eurosystem has been repeatedly announcing the crossing of the 1% threshold: at endDecember, inflation rose by 1.1% in the euro area. This is partly due to the rebound in energy prices, but it is also the result of our non-standard monetary policy; we have been able to avoid the deadly danger of deflation that was creeping up on us. On the contrary, there now seems to be concerns about a “return of inflation"; this is very exaggerated ... and we have not yet reached our target of 2%. The other point raised concerns the differences between countries, with the German 1.7%. These differences should gradually diminish over the course of the year, and they are consistent with the underlying economic fundamentals. the monetary policy of the Eurosystem.

Furthermore, after rising in the second half of 2018, credit default swap premia are now back at roughly the same level as in mid-2018. In the area of resolution, the Swiss big banks have improved their gone-concern lossabsorbing capacity since last year’s Financial Stability Report. Credit Suisse and UBS already meet all look-through requirements on a consolidated basis. Page 1/3  Berne, 13 June 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  In addition to those at group level, the Federal Council has drawn up requirements on big banks’ loss-absorbing capacity at the level of individual group entities, and in early April initiated a consultation on a corresponding amendment to the Capital Adequacy Ordinance. These requirements are intended to ensure that not only the group as a whole, but also material group entities have sufficient loss-absorbing capital in the event of a crisis. The SNB supports the proposed amendments to the Capital Adequacy Ordinance. Work is also underway with regard to liquidity in a crisis, known as ‘funding in resolution’. It is aimed at ensuring that the big banks have sufficient liquidity during preparations for and in the phase immediately after resolution. For this purpose, FINMA is drawing up resolution funding plans in line with international standards. In cooperation with the SNB and the two banks concerned, it is currently assessing the big banks’ liquidity needs under possible crisis scenarios.
4  BIS Review 85/2009  We can have the best laws to combat money laundering, the best system to prosecute the offenders but if we lack the human capacity to implement them, then our efforts will be in vain. Hence, building local capacity must therefore be at the forefront of our efforts. The same concern applies to NPOs. That is, building capacities within the structures of our NPOs to be able to identify suspicious transactions and reporting them to the Money Laundering Prevention Authority (MLPA) is an important feature of Samoa’s anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing activities regime. I understand that the MCIL may need to incorporate in its existing legislation some requirements for NPOs to comply with anti-money laundering measures and requirements. Some key requirements would include proper customer identification. That is, the NPOs must have a good understanding of who their customers are and their sources of funds as well as the purpose of conducting financial transactions through or with them. Another important requirement relate to the proper keeping of books and records that would assist any investigation that may involve information or records of NPOs. Conclusion In concluding, I should reiterate that it is everyone’s responsibility to do something about protecting Samoa from the offence of money laundering and terrorist financing activities. And, although one of Government’s principal and ongoing task is to increase public awareness, there is still a lack of common knowledge within the public domain of what constitutes a money laundering offence.

But, in recent years, there appears to have been an increase in the number of operators of dubious financial background who move from country to country taking advantage of gullible governments and private individuals and entities. Their intention is to defraud governments and people by convincing them to accept and/or invest in get-rich-quick projects that are later proven to be just pure scams. I should mention that we have come across a wide range of scams in the past, some of which have been repeated in several countries by different or most probably, the same operators. In the event, sharing of information about such experiences would benefit us all in our efforts to protect our financial system, not to mention our people, from such abuses. The features of scams touted around the Pacific are mostly similar, except a few cosmetic variations in some cases. Usually, substantial benefits are promised by the get-rich-quick operators in return for payments made by the victims or some contingent liabilities accepted by Governments and private individuals up front. Let me state some examples for your reference: i. Letters of Guarantee  ii. A loan for Indigenous Development  iii. A loan to a private company  iv. Sale of Passports  v.  The Nigerian Scam  vi. Lottery winnings  (The last two on the list have come up quite often through the internet and email messages. ) Capacity building Let me end with a word on capacity building.
This is because the bank may be disinclined to abandon its special vehicle if only to protect its name and reputation. Whatever the case, it means that the financing problems that affect the special vehicles can easily lead back into the bank. What one has regarded as true sale may in reality not always have been so. Credit ratings attracted investors but were used wrongly As you realise, the result has been an extremely complicated structure. Many asset classes have arisen, each with their own unique conditions and idiosyncrasies in pricing. This has in turn made it difficult to assess the different products. Then they can instead obtain help from the credit rating agencies. With the aid of the credit rating the agencies have issued, investors have been persuaded to invest in the products. Credit ratings are excellent aids that measure the probability of a failure or an expected loss. But they do not take into account how the risks covary and are otherwise distributed. Unfortunately, many investors appear to have disregarded these limitations. In addition, all of the repackaging, special middlemen and more or less visible guarantees have made it difficult to gain insight into where the risks are. In particular the geographical spread appears to have been greater than in earlier episodes of financial turbulence. 2  BIS Review 30/2008  Uncertainty increased and liquidity disappeared When the problems in the subprime market began to show here and there, this caused great uncertainty.

For instance, the Bank of England granted the building society emergency liquidity assistance. And HM Treasury abandoned the limits of its existing deposit guarantee, extending them to cover all deposits in Northern Rock without limitation. The question that many people are probably asking is why so much effort was made for one individual financial institution. Public measures of this type could hardly be appropriate if it had been a question of an ordinary engineering company or retail chain that was in financial straits. It is due to two factors. Firstly, it concerns the special role played by the banks and the bank system as a whole in the economy. Secondly, it concerns the special contagion risks in the financial system. In a central bank context, these are usually called systemic risks. Banks and other intermediaries in the credit market who receive deposits from the general public play a central role in the financial system. They contribute, for instance, to facilitating the mediation of capital by acting as intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. They also create the conditions for more efficient mediation of payments in the economy. The banks’ deposit accounts are of central importance for the use of payment cards, credit cards and credit transfers. Many banks also participate in the system for the settlement of  BIS Review 30/2008  5  large-value payments supplied by the central bank. The banks and their account systems are therefore a vital part of the payment system.
Bandid Nijathaworn: Post-crisis challenges to emerging markets – what are at stake for central banks? Keynote address by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor for Monetary Stability of the Bank of Thailand, at the South East Asian Central Banks (SEACEN)/Bank of England Seminar on Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy Management, Brunei Darussalam, 22 March 2010. *  *  *  First, I want to thank SEACEN, the Centre for Central Banking Studies of the Bank of England, and Ministry of Finance, Brunei Darussalam for inviting me to deliver this morning’s keynote address. The SEACEN’s advanced course and seminar have always been an important learning forum for central bankers in Asia to discuss common challenges as well as to share practical experience. So, I very much appreciate the opportunity to be speaking to all of you today. On a personal note, it has also been a few years since I last spoke at this forum, as my responsibility at the Bank of Thailand as a deputy governor up to October last year changed from monetary policy to financial regulation and supervision. This brief tenure of overseeing financial stability, especially managing the financial system at the height of the global financial crisis, has been a valuable experience and makes me appreciate even more the responsibility, the complexity, and the challenge to central banking. And it is a reflection of this experience that I want to share with you this morning, on the post-crisis challenge to emerging economies and what are at stake for central banks.

This should be coupled with easier access to credit for productive enterprises - especially micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) – and reforms to foster technological change and productive diversification in line with the changing structure of the global economy. In the above recognition and its continued quest to contribute to unleashing the potential of local MSMEs, the Bank of Zambia hosted a strategic forum on the role of finance in this area, in June this year. As a follow-up, the Government is working closely with stakeholders and the cooperating partners in improving availability of financial resources to MSMEs. Further, some provision has been included in the 2013 Budget. Distinguished participants MSMEs could play an important role in creating employment and spurring growth. However, their competitiveness is undermined by inadequate infrastructure, limited access to financial and business services. Stakeholders can help small firms to integrate in, and reap more benefits from local and international value chains, by facilitating the provision of business services, among which continuous skills development is paramount. An important policy question is how to address the constraints which affect the capacity to grow and generate earnings of MSMEs, very often informal that operate in traditional sectors and account for the bulk of jobs in our country. This feat, ladies and gentlemen, can only be achieved gradually, as the drivers of informality are usually multiple and deeply rooted in long-standing development gaps and weaknesses.