samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Looking ahead, the estimates available indicate that GDP in the euro area will grow once more in the third and fourth quarters of the year, albeit at moderate rates, underpinned by the improved international setting and by an accommodative monetary policy, both of which  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  factors are potentially conducive to exports and investment. A pick-up in private consumption is also expected, owing to the rise in household disposable income, but not so in government consumption, which will remain affected by fiscal adjustment processes. It should be stressed that the continuing looseness of monetary policy is fully compatible with the projection that, in the medium term, inflation will hold substantially below the ECB objective of 2%, while in the long run expectations remain anchored at this level. Naturally, the exit by the euro area from this phase of very low interest rates and abundant liquidity, as from the time at which the start of the recovery and the resumption of growth are considered to be entrenched, will pose problems for the ECB’s monetary policy, as they have already begun to do so for the Federal Reserve. But, as matters currently stand, this is not yet our problem. All told, this more favourable baseline scenario for the euro area, if it is to materialise, requires the economic authorities to persevere with the policies that have contributed to stabilisation and to what appears to be the onset of the recovery.

These are the reasons why the EU Innovation Fund and the EU recovery fund’s focus on the green transition are so important. If flanked by national measures that improve the overall business environment, they will be major policy levers for transforming the European economy more fundamentally and overcoming short-termism in investment behaviour that ignores climate-related risks. Greening financial markets The third pillar needed to accelerate the transition towards a low-carbon economy relates to financial markets. The large increase in required bond issuance in response to the pandemic offers the opportunity to deepen the green financial market. Green bond issuance has steadily increased in recent years, with a strong focus on the euro area and on public agencies and financial institutions (see figure 4). Figure 4 Green bond issuance by currency of denomination  Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations. Last observation: 15 July 2020  Green bond outstanding amounts by issuer type  Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations. Last observation: 15 July 2020  But the universe of green bonds remains vanishingly small compared with the total bond universe and in spite of the exponential surge in investor demand for green assets over the past years (see figure 5). Figure 5  Share of IG green bonds in global gross issuance (in %, based on EUR data)  Source: Dealogic. Last observation: 15 July 2020. Global developed market cumulative flows into ESG funds (USD bn)  Source: EPFR. Last observation: 15 July 2020. The lack of market depth is also reflected in prices.
Sir Andrew Large: A framework for financial stability Speech by Sir Andrew Large, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the International Conference on Financial System Stability and Implications of Basel II, Istanbul, 18 May 2005. * 1. Introduction  i)  Vulnerabilities in Financial Stability  *  *  It is clear that rapid growth in size, complexity, and diversity of global financial markets has added new dimensions and challenges to the process of maintaining financial stability. Traditional concerns remain that unwise credit exposure can result in insolvency, and systemic instability. But today there are a new series of hazards. Credit risk transfer has introduced new holders of credit risk, such as hedge funds and insurance companies, at a time when market depth is untested. Systemically significant issues could increasingly arise from market related risks, or from single point of failure risks in the market infrastructure as ever greater volumes of transactions pass through. Equally the growth of derivative instruments and advent of a range of new asset classes, despite added dispersion and better risk management, have added to the risk of instability arising through leverage, volatility and opacity. No wonder that those involved in financial stability work have much to think about! ii)  Introducing a Framework for Financial Stability  The purpose of my remarks today is not to analyse these threats.

One could make a case for a huge empire of threat assessment on the basis that seemingly remote events or threats could crystallise into a financial crisis. For example, what resources would it have taken to foresee that default of the Russian government on its debt in 1998 would, through a complex chain of events, eventually result in the failure of the hedge-fund Long Term Capital Management in New York? A failure which importantly was judged as having wider significance. Equally what resources could it be wise to devote to assess what implications, if any, the downgrades of GM’s and Ford’s debt this month might mean for the financial sector and ultimately for financial stability. Alternatively one might take a hardline view that unless an activity falls fairly and squarely, in the short run, into one of the “must do” categories, it should be discontinued. For example, we could in theory simply ignore risk emanating from overseas – even in an international financial centre like the UK – on the expectation (or hope) that others would take care of these risks on our behalf. Common sense suggests that the answer lies somewhere between the two. But difficult judgements are involved. So we have to devise a rigorous process to scrutinise our actions. A valuable approach is to set out the practical actions we intend to achieve – the “outcomes” or “deliverables” – and then to challenge them. We do this from two points of view.
This behaviour is in sharp contrast to the intense accumulation of financial assets observed previously and reflects the adjustment of banks’ balance sheets in the context of the general deleveraging process. The decline in the annual growth rates of assets has been most visible in short-term loans and deposits as well as in liquid assets, such as equities and mutual fund shares. The sharp contraction in interbank deposits has mainly reflected the freezing of the interbank market following the onset of the financial turmoil, in the context of which euro area monetary financial institutions (MFIs) withdrew their short-term deposits placed at banks. In addition, euro area banks have scaled down their deposits with other counterparts outside the euro area. As well as downsizing their external assets, banks initially scaled down their investment in marketable assets. By contrast, partly related to “relationship banking”, the growth rates of long-term loans have held up. Banks’ investment in long-term debt securities even accelerated in early 2009; indeed, MFIs stepped up their purchases of government debt securities, reflecting the generous liquidity situation in an environment of heightened risk aversion. While the slowdown in the growth rate of assets in principle limits the earning capacity of banks, other factors contributed in the first half of 2009 to a marked improvement in the profitability of large banking groups in the euro area. Net interest income was the main factor behind this improvement, owing to the positive slope of the yield curve and wider operating margins.

Lorenzo Bini Smaghi: Monetary policy, credit flows and small and medium-sized enterprises Speech by Mr Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, San Casciano Val di Pesa, 18 October 2009. *  *  *  I would like first of all to thank the organisers of this event for their invitation, which allows me to speak about monetary policy, credit developments and the situation of small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) in the euro area. I will structure my comments as follows: after briefly outlining the importance of SMEs in the euro area, I will examine the situation in the banking sector and discuss some aspects of the process of bank restructuring in the euro area. I will look at bank lending developments in the euro area, before analysing some of the evidence on SMEs’ access to finance which emerged from a recent survey conducted by the ECB. I will conclude with some observations concerning the economic outlook and the role that monetary policy can play in this context. In brief the main conclusions are as follows: first of all, the situation in the euro area banking sector improved in the first half of 2009. Nevertheless, a number of considerable risks remain, some of which might even have increased. Second, the volume of bank loans to the non-financial private sector has been modest in recent months.
Preet Bharara, Criminal Accountability and Culture, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s  Conference: Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial Services Industry: Expanding the Dialogue, Oct. 20, 2016 (criticizing a “culture of minimalism,” in which firms “do the least amount possible to be in some kind of compliance with rules”). 8 Virtual Markets Integrity Initiative Report, Sept. 18, 2018. 9 2018 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 6. 10 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, a division of the Department of Homeland Security, created its  Trade Transparency Unit in 2004. 11 FinCEN Advisory: Update on U.S. Currency Restrictions in Mexico: Funnel Accounts and TBML, May 28, 2014. 12 Office of Foreign Assets Control, Advisory on the Use of Exchange Houses and Trading Companies to Evade  U.S. Economic Sanctions Against Iran, Jan. 10, 2013. 13 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Money Laundering and Globalization. 14 Debra Cassens Weiss, Group goes undercover at 13 law firms to show how US laws facilitate anonymous  investment, ABA Journal, Feb. 1, 2016. 15 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Bank Secrecy Act Anti-Money Laundering Examination  Manual, App’x F (“Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing ‘Red Flags’”). 16 Section 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act is not codified in the United States Code, but is available as a historical  note to 31 U.S.C. § 5311. The operative rule appears in Department of Treasury regulations. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.540 (“Voluntary information sharing among financial institutions”).

Like all happy marriages, the bonding should foster growth and help the partners to realise their potential during good times; and provide an anchor to help them to face the challenges of the bad times with resilience and confidence. 7. Both partners have certainly done well during the good times in the past decade. (i)  HK’s developments  8. During this period, Hong Kong has continued to consolidate its role as a premier international financial centre and has become a more globalised economy: –  The total assets of the banking system have increased 2.7 times to $ trillion, with foreign currency assets accounting for about 60% of the pool. –  The market capitalization of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has become more than 4 times bigger, advancing from number 8 to number 6 in the global ladder. –  The bond market has also increased by about 3 times, with foreign currency denominated bonds accounting for about 40% for most of the time. 9. Hong Kong has also become a hub for private wealth and asset management. Nearly 80 of the top 100 global money managers are in Hong Kong. The total assets under management hit a record high of $ trillion in 2013, with 72% of the funds sourced from  1  Mr David Puth, CEO of CLS Group Holdings, and CLS Bank International. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  non-Hong Kong investors.
Developing the renminbi market – Preparing for the future That said, with the transformation of RMB to become international reserves currency, coupled with China’s strong FDI presence and push for financing infrastructure in Asian countries as part of One Belt One Road plan, it is timely to enhance the strategies moving forward. I would suggest to look at a few key aspects: 1. The first is to increase the stock of renminbi liquidity onshore. With a stable and larger renminbi liquidity pool, banks will be able to offer renminbi loans and financing. Currently, the RMB deposit balance with the banking system is relatively low, hovering around 3% of total foreign currency deposits. Malaysia is a net receiver of FDI from China and with substantial exports to China – banks should be proactive in approaching clients to facilitate these flows in renminbi. Banks with regional presence should also expand its renminbi business through its branches overseas, using Malaysia as a launch pad and leveraging on the renminbi liquidity infrastructure available in Malaysia. The offshore CNH renminbi market is well developed, and the gap between CNH and CNY markets has narrowed significantly. As such, banks should be able to offer competitive pricing for clients to manage and hedge renminbi exposures. With the various liquidity facilities in place, we can expect the renminbi market here to be able to meet their requirements. 2. Second, is to further develop the renminbi foreign exchange onshore market to increase the depth and liquidity.

Frankly, I understand that the general public is not familiar with concepts like overheating or positive output gap, but I believe that annual growth rates to the tune of 20% for retail sales and in excess of 10% for wages are more than self-explanatory. Still, with all the obvious signs – even for non-economists – that the economy is growing fast, we are criticised for not fighting deflation. The recent experience has made us painfully aware that – despite the large amount of information provided through a wide range of communication vehicles – our messages get through to a much lesser extent than we had thought. Therefore, we should enhance our efforts in escaping the professional jargon and trying to be as accessible as possible when explaining to the public the rationale behind our monetary policy decisions. If I were to conclude on Romania’s experience with inflation targeting, I would say that it worked quite well, even though the concept of inflation targeting has not been immune to criticism, especially in the post-crisis period. I would mention here Axel Weber, who suggested in 2015 that inflation targeting is a simplistic framework that could not stabilise the value of money in a complex and constantly evolving economic environment. However, his opinion is not shared by other well-known economists.
An inclusive culture recognises that work can be done in many ways; and that our best ideas can occur at any time and in any place. xxiv  11% of our staff are employed on a formalised flexible working arrangement,  including remote working. In our most recent survey, two thirds of people agreed that there was a good balance between their work and their personal life. Our broader leadership training programme emphasises unconscious bias training to ensure diversity can flourish and progress. This training is part of our broader focus on values. Values count heavily when assessing performance and reward. All managers - including myself - are assessed by colleagues on their values and behaviours. The Employee Network Groups support colleagues in the Bank to be themselves and connect with different aspects of their lives. They bring issues to the attention of the Bank’s senior team and they hold us to account, raise awareness of different cultures and causes, and educate us to work against any biases. For 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  7  example, the disability network has played a huge part in our efforts to make the building more accessible, the women’s network was heavily involved when we developed our flexible working propositions and the Bank’s ethnic minorities network has launched a reciprocal mentoring scheme to support career development.

At the same time, growth has not been lower than before; rather it has been quite a bit higher (see Figure 3). From this perspective, I think that one must say that inflation targeting has been a great success. CPIF inflation of 1.8 per cent on average is a good result An assessment of monetary policy cannot merely be based on an analysis using hindsight and comparing inflation outcomes with the target. There are a number of reasons why  1  From 1993 to 1995, monetary policy was aimed at preventing the temporary inflationary impulse that arose in connection with the krona being allowed to float becoming entrenched and leading to an increase in the underlying rate of inflation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  inflation may deviate from the target, despite monetary policy being conducted accurately. It is therefore necessary to modulate the analysis and see which factors explain why CPI inflation has on average undershot the target. The prices in the Swedish CPI include a component that reflects households' mortgage interest expenditure. When mortgage rates rise, this component contributes to pushing up CPI inflation and, vice versa, when mortgage rates fall, it pushes down inflation. Normally, the variable mortgage rates follow the development of the repo rate fairly closely. This means that when the Riksbank cuts the repo rate to increase activity in the economy and gradually bring up inflation, the initial result is that CPI inflation falls, that is to say, the direct impact on inflation is "in the wrong direction".
The Monetary Policy Committee set out its latest economic outlook in the February Inflation Report. That Report went to great pains to stress the considerable uncertainty surrounding the prospects for the economy. Nobody can predict with any certainty how the UK economy, or indeed the world economy, is likely to fare over the next year or so. So beware of anyone that suggests otherwise. With that warning in mind, let me outline my central economic outlook, which is broadly similar to that described in the February Report. Near-term prospects are bleak. Output is likely to contract further in the first half of this year, as a weakening labour market and  2  BIS Review 46/2009  concerns about job prospects weigh on consumption, companies run down their stocks and scale back investment spending, and the synchronised slowing in world demand restrains export growth. But as we go through 2009, I believe it is most likely that the pace at which output is contracting will ease and that we will see some signs of recovery by around the turn of this year. This view is based on the substantial stimulus that is already starting to flow through the pipelines of our economy.

Spencer Dale: Tough times, unconventional measures Remarks by Mr Spencer Dale, Executive Director and Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the Association of British Insurers Economics and Research Conference, London, 27 March 2009. I would like to thank Rohan Churm, Alan Mankikar and Tim Taylor for their considerable help in preparing these remarks. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. *  *  *  The UK economy is in a deep recession. Output in the United Kingdom fell at its fastest rate in nearly thirty years in the final quarter of last year, and a similar fall in output in the first quarter of this year appears likely. We are in the throes of a synchronised global downturn, which has spread far and wide. But the darkest hour is just before the dawn. Although immediate prospects appear bleak, the substantial economic stimulus that is underway means that there are grounds for thinking that economic conditions may start to improve later this year. An important part of that stimulus stems from the extraordinary measures taken by the Monetary Policy Committee over the past six months, including our decision to start using unconventional policy measures. Today, I will describe my view of the economic outlook and outline the factors that I believe will spur a gradual turnaround in our economy.
Effective surveillance of the financial market has entailed adoption of appropriate risk management policies and procedures meant to ensure that financial institutions do not undertake excessive risks that may increase the vulnerability of the country to external shocks. V.  Current state of the economy  Mainly due to the policies pursued the Zambian Authorities, the economy has shown appreciable resilience in the wake of the global economic crisis. Positive economic recovery trends have already started to be witnessed within 2009. (i)  According to the Central Statistical Office, GDP growth is now forecast at 6.3% for 2009, up from 5.7% recorded on 2008, primarily driven by increased output in the mining, construction and agriculture sectors: •  Mining growing by 21.4%  •  Construction by 15.5%  •  Agriculture by 7.1%  (ii)  Although inflation rose to 16.6% at end-December 2008 from 8.9% in 2007, much of this increase was driven by the rise in food and energy prices. By October 2009, annual inflation had fallen to 12.3%. (iii)  The exchange rate has also stabilised with the weighted inter-bank rate moving within a range of K4,600 and K4,750 per US dollar in the third quarter of 2009. (iv)  The external sector adjusted strongly with the strong rebound in copper prices, to above US $ per metric tonne, and increased output (primarily through a new mine, Lumwana Copper Mine). The merchandise trade balance recorded a surplus of US $ million (f.o.b.)

The need for this involvement is heightened by the entry into force in 2018 of the new standard (IFRS 9) under which banks will switch from using the concept of incurred loss to that of expected loss in order to calculate the credit portfolio provision. This standard is undoubtedly an improvement on the current situation, since it enhances the measurement of the risks of loans and receivables. At the same time, it significantly increases the complexity of calculating provisions and, thus, increases the risk of heterogeneous application across banks, which is something the supervisor should be aiming to mitigate. The work under way in the Basel Committee on this matter is therefore very timely. My comments so far imply that there are in practice significant obstacles to satisfying the legitimate expectations that a rigorous and granular supervision will help moderate the intensity of the regulatory changes needed to promote financial stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  The regulatory frameworks in force and different supervisory cultures, along with the difficulty of becoming more involved in accounting practices, often place considerable limits on the intensity of supervision attainable. This explains why the actions of the authorities to prevent financial crises largely rest on the definition of clear and demanding prudential standards to underpin the work of supervisors.