samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In spring 1984, a crisis package was presented with a price freeze and a rent freeze and a norm of 3 per cent inflation in 1985. The outcome was over 7 per cent. In 1984, the so-called foreign loan norm was launched, namely that the state should not borrow abroad to finance the current trade balance deficit. In 1985 a tax-based income policy was introduced. State income tax was to be reduced by SEK 2 billion if the Swedish Metalworkers Union and the Swedish Engineering Employers Association concluded an agreement with wage rises of at most 5 per cent. In 1982, 1984, 1985 and 1986 negotiations took place after discussions on taxes and collective agreements between the Government and various constellations of labour market organisations. Some of these measures were inspired by the so-called norm debate. This was to establish firm norms in economic policy. In order to stabilise inflation at a low level. The most important norm was naturally the fixed exchange rate although the Government had regularly accommodated to counteract the problems that arose when the fixed exchange rate led to unemployment and falling profits. The industrial sector was very competitive for a long time although public expenditure rose at a rapid rate as well. This led to the labour market overheating. As I mentioned, registered unemployment was down to 1.3 per cent in 1989 and 1.5 per cent in 1990. Unemployment in Mälardalen (the region around Lake Mälare) was 0.5 per cent.

The Riksbank is also studying various measures for changes in the quantity of money as well as bank lending. These quantities also have varying degrees of co-variation with inflation, but with a rather long time-lag. Altogether, it can be said that capacity utilisation, inflation expectations, and the exchange rate are the most important determining factors underlying inflation forecasts. What has been said summarises the main content of the stabilisation policy regime that was established after 1992. On 1 January 1999, the Riksbank was made formally autonomous of political influence and has since then been governed by an executive board of six members. BIS Review 59/1999  6  3. Shall policy control the quantity of money or inflation directly? Some central banks, previously the German Bundesbank and now the European Central Bank, ECB, have an (unclear) quantity of money target for their policy. These banks endeavour to meet the inflation target by trying to control the expansion of the quantity of money. In fact, there are considerable similarities between the methods of aiming at the quantity of money and at inflation. The banks’ means is the repo rate that can be set to affect the quantity of money or inflation. However, as in the case of inflation, the quantity of money cannot either be directly controlled by the repo rate.
The Bank of England also must concern itself with the resilience of CCPs in other European and non-European jurisdictions that are used by firms that we supervise. These CCPs must be subject to robust regulatory standards and deep reciprocal supervisory cooperation. To address such issues, we can and should build on current models to develop a new form of regulatory and supervisory cooperation. The European Commission’s proposals announced last week recognise the importance of effective cooperation arrangements between the relevant EU authorities and their overseas counterparts. They include potential provisions for deference to the rules to which a CCP is subject in its home jurisdiction in line with the intent of the G20. 26  The Bank welcomes this. The Commission’s proposals, driven in part by Brexit, address an increasingly important and more general issue in the regulation of the international financial system. 25  Requiring up to another € of capital. See, for example, the G20 Leaders’ communique, Brisbane Summit, 16 November 2014, available at http://www.g20australia.org/official_resources/g20_leaders_communique_brisbane_summit_november_2014.html. 26  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  Elements of these proposals could therefore provide a foundation on which to build robust cross-border arrangements for the supervision of CCPs. This should be based on deep cooperation between jurisdictions and authorities who defer to each other’s regimes where they meet international standards and deliver similar outcomes.

This resulted in a series of devaluations, a smaller one of 3 per cent in 1976, two of them, 6 per cent and 10 per cent, in 1977, one of 10 per cent in 1981 and a large devaluation of 16 per cent in 1982. Overheating in the 1980s The 1980s thus began with two devaluations in 1981 and 1982. The background to these was that the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s had been very problematic. GDP growth had been poor, and production actually fell a couple of years. Unemployment had risen to 3-4 per cent, which was then regarded as a very high level. Inflation had soared to levels of 15 per cent. The current account and public finances showed a substantial deficit. Sweden found itself in a situation with weak real growth and twin financial deficits. I took part in the preparations for the devaluation in 1982, in connection with the change of government that year. The preparations were led by Kjell-Olof Feldt, Erik Åsbrink and Michael Sohlman. I had the task of making calculations of economic developments over the coming years, based on different economic policy alternatives. Two of the alternatives concerned expansionary fiscal policy to bring down unemployment and a strongly contractionary fiscal and monetary policy to eliminate the twin deficits. In both cases, substantial problems remained in the Swedish economy. The third alternative concerned a devaluation of 20 per cent in autumn 1982, combined with a price stoppage and pegging the krona to the D-mark.
Mugur Isărescu: Recent developments in central bank governance Panel presentation by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the "Central Bank and Supervisory Governance" conference, organized by the National Bank of the Netherlands, Amsterdam, 12 February 2016. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great honour to address the audience during this high-level conference on a subject of special interest to all of us, the recent developments in central bank governance leading to heated debates every time they are brought to the fore. Mr. He has done a wonderful job in structuring the challenges of nowadays’ central banking and in outlining the importance of effective governance arrangements in order to meet these challenges – his presentation is a testimony to IMF’s unique ability to draw upon a vast set of worldwide institutional experiences. I, in turn, will draw mainly upon a narrower, but hopefully no less relevant, set of institutional experiences, gathered during my tenure as Governor of the National Bank of Romania. In my address today I intend to deal with the issue of recent developments in central bank governance by looking at: 1. The central bank objectives as the starting point in designing its governance framework; 2. How the NBR dealt with the financial stability as an objective, from an institutional point of view; integrating or separating monetary policy and supervision; 3. A short history of institutional developments within the NBR for ensuring financial stability; 4. The internal control layers in the NBR; 5.

Of course, no matter how much or how responsibly the central bank would get involved in safeguarding financial stability, this public good can only be delivered through cooperation and coordination with the other institutions tasked with financial market supervision and regulation. Relevant in this respect is that in Romania a National Committee for Financial Stability was established as early as 2007. The Governor of the National Bank of Romania, the Minister of Public Finance, the President of the Financial Supervisory Authority and the Chairman of the Bank Deposit Guarantee Fund are members of this committee, whose key objective is to ensure the exchange of relevant information, as well as to prevent, appraise and manage any issues with a potentially systemic impact. Efforts are currently underway to turn this entity set up based on an agreement among member institutions into a National Committee for Macroprudential Oversight, whose composition, tasks and areas of competence shall be set forth by law. This inter-institutional structure will act as a macroprudential authority, within the meaning of ESRB Recommendation 2011/3. 4. NBR: the internal control layers I imagine we all agree that improving the governance structure is essential for a central bank and I strongly believe the sharing of views and experience made possible by reunions such as the one we are attending is extremely beneficial for the process.
And, in aggregate, their lending has, for the moment, come back into line with the major banks’ deposit bases, implying a substantially reduced wholesale funding requirement. But we need to be sure that lenders have the resilience to withstand a major housing shock, particularly if, as has often proved to be the case in the UK, it is accompanied by a substantial fall in spending as many households pull in their horns. On Tuesday, the Bank announced the details of the stress test of the major banks that will be carried this year in the UK, as part of the EU wide exercise. Its central feature will be a test of banks’ resilience to a severe drop in house prices in the context of pressure on borrowers’ ability to service their debts. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  To be clear, this is a severe stress test, not what we expect to happen. We will test resilience against a so called “tail risk” series of events; a series of events that are very unlikely but could plausibly happen with housing at their center. The aim will be to assess whether the major banks could withstand and recover from such a stress without terminal damage to the critical functions they perform for the UK economy. The self-reinforcing link between property prices, the financial system and the broader economy that operate within the stress test have been key to dynamics in previous UK downturns.

Our report discusses a variety of options beyond the implementation of sound practice standards. One possibility is to require higher capital charges for bank exposures to HLIs. Indeed, a primary objective of our current review of the Basle Capital Accord is to determine how to align regulatory capital charges better with the economic risks of different classes of counterparties. We also recognize the critical need to enhance market transparency for the activities of HLIs and other major market participants. The Committee already is working to enhance accounting and disclosure practices at banking institutions worldwide. Extending these efforts to all global players that have the potential to destabilize the financial system, including HLIs, is of particular importance. An international group of central bankers is now studying various approaches to strengthening disclosure in this area. The Committee also considered the advantages and disadvantages of imposing direct regulation on the HLI industry. There are a number of critical obstacles that would have to be overcome before a direct regulatory approach could be implemented. To be effective, any regulation would have to extend to jurisdictions around the world where HLIs are chartered, some of which have more highly developed and more stringent supervisory structures than others. This would require a high level of coordination involving the political, legislative, and judicial bodies of many countries. There is also the difficulty of establishing a regulatory  BIS Review 27/1999  4  regime for HLIs that is not easily circumvented.
7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  7  Chart 1: Range of GDP forecasts in 2007Q4  Chart 2: Forecasts for World Growth by the IMF since 2007  Latest vintage of GDP data  Year on year growth 4 3  Apr-07 Oct-08 Apr-10 Oct-11 Apr-13  Oct-07 Apr-09 Oct-10 Apr-12 Oct-13  Apr-08 Oct-09 Apr-11 Oct-12 Apr-14  Percent year on year 7 6  2 November 2007 IR  5 1 4 0  3  -1  2  -2  1  -3  0  -4  -1  -5  -2  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  2000 2002  Source: Bank of England November 2007 Inflation Report; Bank of England Survey of Economic Forecasters. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook. 2004 2006  2008  2010  2012 2014  2016  For me, this is not really a defence. Economics is important because of the social costs of extreme events. Economic policy matters precisely because of these events. If our models are silent about these events, this jeopardises the very thing that makes economics interesting and economic policy important. It risks squandering the human capital endowment the financial crisis has bestowed. Even if some of the post-crisis criticism of workhorse macro-economic models is overdone, it still raises the question of whether new modelling approaches might be explored which provide a different lens on the world or which better match real-world dynamics.

30  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  30  Chart 9: Model simulations of the housing market  Chart 10: The distribution of house prices Percent year on year  30 25  Real house price growth  20 15  Simulation  10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -20  30  80  130  180  Number of years Source: Baptista et al (2016). Notes: Blue is the list price index, red the house price index and green the number of years a house is on the market. Please see the speech website for the animation. Source: Baptista et al (2016); Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2016); Bank calculations. Notes: The blue diamonds show the distribution of simulated house price growth for over 160 years from the model. The red diamonds show the distribution of real house price growth between 1847 and 2015. This same approach can also be used to examine the impact of various macro-prudential policy measures, whether hard limits (such as an LTV limit of 80% for all mortgage contracts) or soft limits (such as an LTI cap for some fraction of mortgages). These policies could also be state-contingent (such as an LTV limit if credit growth rises above a certain threshold). As an example, we can simulate the effects of introducing a loan-to-income (LTI) limit of 3.5, where 15% of mortgages are not bound by this limit.
To conclude, I would like once again to point to the need to increase our knowledge of how money, credit and asset prices interact with the real economy. We have said that stable inflation does not always lead automatically to stable asset prices and stable credit expansion. 4  For references to the literature, see Dillén, H. and Sellin, P. “Financial bubbles and monetary policy”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review 2003:3. 6  BIS Review 40/2004  The regulations that have been created in the past ten years are in many ways more robust than before. Their aim has been to reduce costly fluctuations in the economy. A focus on price stability and fixed rules for economic policy enables decisions to be evaluated and lowers the risk of arbitrary decisions. But this must not prevent a discussion of alternative ways to formulate decision-making rules that, without damaging the confidence in the aim of price stability, also take account of the risks associated with excessive credit expansion and elevated asset prices. BIS Review 40/2004  7

In the wake of the sharp fall in oil prices since summer 2014, the key policy rate has been lowered several times. Monetary policy is facilitating restructuring by supporting a weaker krone and thereby speeding up the adjustment to a lower cost level. In addition, lower interest expenses are easing the burden for many households and enterprises. There is still room for manoeuvre in monetary policy. However, in an economy undergoing restructuring, monetary policy cannot fully counteract the effects on output and employment. Internationally, monetary policy has faced substantial challenges in recent years. Inflation and interest rates are both close to zero in many countries. The instruments used have rarely been used before. The effect of this policy is uncertain and the expected increase in policy rates has been repeatedly pushed further into the future. Central banks are in uncharted territory. The experiences of other countries indicate that the lower bound for policy rates is below zero, although precisely how far below is difficult to estimate. Lower interest rates may increase financial system vulnerabilities. Low interest rates also increase the risk of a surge in credit growth and property prices. When the key policy rate approaches a lower bound, the uncertainty surrounding the effects of monetary policy increases. This suggests proceeding with greater caution in interest rate setting. However, should the Norwegian economy be exposed to new major shocks, the possibility cannot be excluded that the key policy rate in Norway may also turn negative.
With more global and regional functions anchored here and as the sector transforms with digitalisation and new growth engines, FIs might need to bring in foreigners with the experience and skills that are not yet available locally. Most do so responsibly, by ensuring that they concurrently build the local talent pipeline in specialist expertise and groom locals into leadership positions, even as they bring in foreigners to plug immediate capability gaps. FIs should commit to good HR practices that consider Singaporeans fairly, and have action plans to grow their pool of Singaporean professionals and leadership. 17. FIs should abide by the Tripartite Advisories on Human Capital Practices, and put in place progressive human capital practices. Where an FI is suspected to have discriminatory hiring practices due to their workforce profiles, the FI will be subject to additional scrutiny in its employment pass applications, as has happened to firms put on the Fair Consideration Framework Watchlist. Building a strong pipeline of local talent, is key to supporting and sustaining an FI’s long-term build-out in Singapore. It will engender rootedness of the FI to Singapore, and 18.  facilitates their deeper appreciation of Singapore and the region’s dynamics to facilitate better business outcomes as well. We must work to ensure that Singaporeans have opportunities to grow and take on bigger roles in their careers. MAS urges all FIs to step up in three ways 19. First, FIs should review their hiring practices to ensure compliance with MOM’s requirements under the Fair Consideration Framework. 20.

Jobs will take a different form too, as financial institutions (FIs) speed up on their digitalisation to cater to the extensive shift in customers’ preferences. We therefore need to keep workers employed as much as possible. We are heartened that some FIs, including large employers like Bank of China, Bank of Singapore, DBS, Great Eastern Life, Maybank, NTUC Income and OCBC are committed to avoid any redundancy exercises where they can. MAS urges more FIs to do their part to support their workers and take a longer-term view in investing in their capabilities. MAS will support workers to reskill in functions which are becoming more digitalised to harness the potential of technology in new and expanded roles. 7. The nature of jobs has evolved rapidly as the use of technology becomes more pervasive in the Financial Services sector, from the design, development to delivery of products and services. Therefore, jobs will need to be redesigned and transformed too, and employees will need to acquire new skills and adapt to new work requirements. MAS and IBF, with the support of Workforce Singapore, have worked closely with our tripartite partners over the years, to reskill and redeploy workers into new or expanded jobs. 8. Thus far, 25 local and foreign FIs have committed to support close to 5,000 employees, of whom 3,000 have embarked on this journey. Of these, 900 have completed their training and are in their new roles.
Banks with better measures of their economic risks will be able to allocate capital more efficiently and more closely in line with their actual sensitivity to the underlying risks. By doing so, the Basel II framework encourages developments in the management of a wide range of risks on a firm-wide basis and developing a more comprehensive approach to managing those risks together. Second, to achieve those capital benefits, the more advanced approaches to credit and operational risk require banks to meet strong process control requirements. Again, the increasing focus on a bank’s control environment gives greater weight to the management disciplines of measuring, monitoring and controlling risk. As an example, by relying on banks’ own internal credit assessments, the IRB approach builds on the risk management practices that most internationally active banks are already in the process of adopting for their internal purposes. To qualify for the IRB approaches, banks will need to adhere to various specific parameters and standards that may not be fully in place as yet. Our pilot reviews of U.S. bank readiness do indicate that there are a number of areas that both banks and supervisors will need to work on to be ready for full IRB implementation. These include addressing concerns about independence of the rating process, and accumulating necessary internal default and loss data to be able to produce more reliable quantitative estimates. Enhancements in these areas will be important, not just to ensure readiness for IRB, but for further improvement in credit risk management more generally.

Let me now turn to some of the thinking that has already begun surrounding implementation of the New Accord. To ensure that our new rules have gotten it right, the Basel Committee has just completed collecting data for its third Quantitative Impact Study - or “QIS 3” - in conjunction with supervisors around the world. The industry demonstrated tremendous support for this survey, and 265 banks from nearly 50 countries performed concrete and comprehensive assessments of how the Committee’s proposals will affect them. At this early stage, the results suggest that the incentives built into the New Accord are functioning as we had hoped. We are completing a detailed study of the results and will ascertain the need for any adjustments prior to the release of an updated proposal for public comment during the spring. The Committee intends to finalize the New Capital Accord in the fourth quarter of 2003 such that it can be implemented in each member country at year-end 2006. During this three-year period, banks and supervisors are expected to adapt and develop the systems and processes necessary to conform to the standards of the New Accord. In that regard, the supervisory agencies represented on the Basel Committee are making good progress in their preparation for the new framework. To ensure that the New Accord is implemented in a consistent manner across various jurisdictions, such that market competition is driven by each bank’s strengths, rather than by differences in each country’s rules, the Basel Committee established the Accord Implementation Group.