samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With a few taps on the keyboard, people can make home equity withdrawals that are deposited in an online bank and are used to finance new purchases and current consumption. During a downturn bank earnings fall, losses rise and banks tighten lending. This can trigger several rounds of decline. This is the mechanism whereby fluctuations in the economy are amplified. The global banking crisis shows that credit cycles and property market bubbles that burst represent one of the greatest challenges to economic policy. They can build up over a long period. They are difficult to identify in real time and even after they burst there is doubt as to the causes. The fall in prices is abrupt and costly. It is particularly important to develop structures and mechanisms that better enable the economy to regulate itself. New equity capital and liquidity requirements for banks can promote financial stability. The requirements should probably be tighter in Norway than the minimum requirements that are likely to be agreed internationally. Norway’s economy is small, with concentrated risk for the banks. It is also important to cooperate with the other Nordic countries to avoid a situation where more lightly regulated banks aggressively market loans in Norway. Owing to flaws and major shortcomings, the tax treatment of capital and property in Norway amplifies credit cycles and house price fluctuations. The 1992 reform resulted in a tax system for Norway that is based on sound principles.

Petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget had increased, but employment in traditional industries was still high. Despite Norway’s high cost level, merchandise exports and supplies of goods and services to the oil industry held up due to high demand. Instead of a gradual slowdown, economic growth came to an abrupt halt in autumn 2008 when the global financial crisis came to a head. Demand for Norway’s export goods fell markedly. Norwegian banks proved to be highly vulnerable to the credit freeze in global money markets and stopped providing new loans. 2 However, Norwegian banks were not as exposed to loan losses – at home and abroad – as banks in other countries. The downturn proved to be milder in Norway, but the banking industry may also have performed its craft fairly well. Government and central bank liquidity provision measures were effective. The liquidity crisis passed quickly and did not turn into a solvency crisis in Norway’s banking system. The rapid rebound in oil prices and a weaker krone provided a boost to the economy. The interest rate was lowered and public spending markedly increased. The downturn turned out to be milder than we had expected when the interest rate was reduced to a low level – partly because oil prices proved to be higher than expected and partly because the measures implemented were more effective than we had dared to assume. We therefore now expect to be able to raise the interest rate again at a gradual pace to more normal levels.
Sterling has fallen a further 3% since the May Inflation Report, largely the result of political events. Mechanically, that fall would add around 0.2% to the level of GDP and around 0.2 percentage points to inflation at the two and three year horizon. Inflation was already expected to lie above the Bank’s target, and to be rising, at the year three horizon in the May Inflation Report. Fifth, despite all of these positives, the sterling yield curve has overall tended to be fairly unresponsive, both to data news and to MPC communications. Estimates of the responsiveness of the UK yield curve to macro-economic news have been below their longer-term averages throughout much of the past 18 months  24  See Evans (2011), for example. 14  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  14  (Chart 18). Perhaps the lesson from US experience, where interest rates have been more responsive to data news and FOMC communications, is that it is policy actions, rather than words, that matter. Sixth and finally, any tightening in policy needs to be put in context. The first 25 basis point rise in UK interest rates for 10 years seems like a momentous step. But it would still leave monetary policy highly accommodative by any historical metric. A 25 basis point rise would do no more than remove a proportion – according to our GDP ready-reckoners, around a quarter – of the incremental stimulus the MPC provided last August.

BIS Review 97/2008  3
First, in every national market there is the question of the dependence of the banking and financial sectors on core infrastructure such as telecommunications, power, water, sewer, and transportation. In all cases, it seems that it is not an everyday occurrence for representatives of these differing sectors to get together with financial sector representatives and discuss their mutual concerns. Yet, this must be made a priority if financial firms and their counterparties are to achieve comfort that their own efforts to prepare for Year 2000 will not be compromised by the failures of systems beyond their control. A representative of the International Telecommunications Union is a member of our External Consultative Committee. At our meeting earlier this month, he provided useful factual information on the preparations being undertaken by telecommunications firms and indicated that a further global survey and report on this topic is due to be completed soon. This is the type of information sharing that helps all parties understand the scope of the problem, as well as the efforts that others are undertaking. We intend to encourage further information sharing between the financial sector and core infrastructure providers at future meetings of the Joint Year 2000 Council and the External Consultative Committee. I would also strongly encourage such mutual cooperation on Y2K preparations within each national jurisdiction. Another issue that some participants in our Joint Year 2000 Council are concerned about in regard to preparations in their countries relates to the availability of human resources.

Correspondent banks are also heavily dependent on the use of cross-border payments messaging through the network maintained by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (“S.W.I.F.T.”) to advise and confirm payments. To provide some sense of the magnitudes involved here, consider that the Fedwire and CHIPS systems process a combined $ trillion in funds transfers on an average day (split roughly evenly between the two systems). While S.W.I.F.T. itself does not transfer funds, its messaging network carries over three million messages per day relating to financial transactions worldwide. The many interconnections of the global financial market infrastructure imply that financial market participants in the United States could be affected by Y2K-related disruptions in other financial markets. In assessing the scope of any such potential problems, we should be realistic in accepting that some disruptions are inevitable, while also recognizing that not all countries confront Y2K problems of similar magnitudes. The problem simply affects too many organizations and too many systems to expect that 100 percent readiness will be achieved throughout the world. Nor are the best efforts of supervisors and regulators capable of completely eradicating the risk of disruption. Ultimately, the work of fixing the Y2K problem rests with firms themselves, and even some of the most determined and well-funded Year 2000 efforts may miss something.
This strategy has delivered considerable results. The króna has been relatively stable since mid-2009 and has actually appreciated a bit in recent weeks, although it has slid somewhat in the past few days. At the same time, the Central Bank stepped down its sales of foreign currency in support of the króna and has not intervened in the FX market since early November. In part, this is due to the fact that the króna was already very weak, and the underlying trade surplus has since provided the króna with a stronger foundation. But one cannot ignore the most important explanation: with the changes to the capital controls that were announced in end-October/early November 2009, and the expansion of the Capital Controls Surveillance Unit staff, the controls are finally working as originally planned. Most important here is the fact that the link between the onshore and offshore markets for krónur has been largely disconnected. This also appears in a significant drop in inflation. In the first quarter of 2009, price levels excluding tax effects had risen by nearly 17% year-on-year. The corresponding figure for the first quarter of 2010, however, is just over 6%. In the absence of further shocks that weaken the króna once more, there is a very good chance that inflation excluding tax effects will be close to target by the end of the year. The Central Bank has cut interest rates substantially.

Durmuş Yılmaz: Food prices and inflation Speech by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the Central Bank of Argentina 2008 Money and Banking Conference “Financial turbulence – impact on developed and emerging economies”, Buenos Aires, 1 September 2008. *  *  *  Dear Guests, It is a great pleasure and honor for me to address such a distinguished audience on the issue of “Food Prices and Inflation”. The current level of food prices constitutes a major risk to households, in particular those living in developing countries. I’d like to thank the Central Bank of Argentina to organize this conference and dedicate a special session on this issue at this juncture. Dear Guests, The second half of 2007 was not an easy period for central bankers – and so far 2008 has been even more challenging. We are currently facing significant inflationary pressures on a global scale due to record high increases in commodity prices. The surge in inflation rates has become a major challenge that threatens price stability in many countries. Average inflation throughout the world has been rising rapidly. Inflation in developed countries has reached its highest level of the last eighteen years. For the first time in many years, inflation figures of the developing countries are in two digit levels. Moreover, the financial turbulence that has started in the second half of 2007 and the subsequent credit crunch are adversely affecting economic activities. Growth rates have been slowed in many countries.
In particular, if current drought conditions prevail, there could be adverse implications on price levels, while impacting on economic activities,  Central Bank of Sri Lanka – ROAD MAP 2017  Accordingly, it is anticipated that inflation expectations would broadly remain anchored in the medium-term with appropriate demand management policies, supported by timely supply side measures. 17  4. Financial Sector Policies for 2017 and Beyond The financial system remains important  from various internal and external  for efficient allocation of resources and  developments. hence in facilitating strong economic performance of the country. In particular, a broader, deeper and a liquid financial system is vital as economies grow more sophisticated. The Central Bank has sought to preserve the soundness, efficiency and stability of the financial system primarily through the regulation and supervision of all major categories of financial institutions,  A stable financial system creates a  ensuring sound and safe payment and  trusted, enabling environment  settlement systems as well as  favourable to savers and investors; helps  establishing risk management systems  the transmission of monetary policy;  and instilling good corporate  encourages efficient financial  governance standards and practices in  intermediation, which eventually  the financial sector while promoting  promotes investment and growth; and  financial inclusion. encourages effective and efficient operation of markets while improving the allocation of resources in the economy.

The baseline assessment would include the environmental risk of a bank’s lending and other businesses. In this Phase, the HKMA will need to work with the industry to develop a ___ (a) common framework, drawing on the latest international standards and best practices. The HKMA will also, in collaboration with the relevant international bodies, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), provide capacity building and training programmes to banks in Hong Kong for better understanding of the green principles and methodology in undertaking the baseline assessment. Phase II – once we have completed the baseline assessment of banks in Hong Kong in Phase I, the HKMA will engage the industry and other relevant stakeholders in a 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  (b) consultation on the supervisory expectation or requirement on Green and Sustainable Banking going forward. The key objective of this Phase is to set tangible deliverables for Hong Kong’s banking industry to become “greener” and “more sustainable”. Phase III – once the deliverables have been set, the next Phase is Implementation, (c) Monitoring and Evaluation. The success of this Phase depends crucially on appropriate measurement of the “greenness” of the banks and the timely disclosure of progress or the lack of it. 4. With the support of the banking industry, I expect Phase I could be completed within around 12 months’ time from now. Responsible Investment 5. In the past few years, there has been a significant shift in mind-set amongst asset owners on Green and ESG investments.
But the operational risk regime in Basel III 1 is designed to address another potential cause of financial failure in firms and to ensure that banks are adequately capitalised against these risks. It does not target the continued availability of services and resilience directly. c)  The third observation is that at the level of the sector our risk appetite has targeted limited disruption in firms that are critical for system functioning. For example FMIs supervised by the Bank as systemically important, set their standard of availability above 99%. And where firms suffer outage we expect them to have business continuity arrangements that allow them to recover immediately or within hours. Firms as a result have established primary and secondary sites, at a suitable  1  This refers to the capital regime only. Additional guidance on operational resilience can be found in the Basel core principles (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs195.pdf). BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  distance from each other, with data mirrored between the two. At the sector level as authorities we have concentrated on ensuring that in the event of a significant disruption to one or more firms we can share information and coordinate actions across firms in the UK market to minimise the impact of system stability and to speed full recovery.

Second, the economy is already highly integrated with that of the EU. This is borne out by trade flows, as well as by a comparison of Malta’s economic structure in terms of the sectoral distribution of value added and employment with that of the Union. In addition, differences in productivity levels between Malta and the EU in the traded goods sector have been found to be small, which suggests that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is unlikely to be strong. Moreover, economic integration will deepen as barriers to the movement of goods, services and factors of production are removed as part of the accession process. These factors, which attest to a significant degree of real convergence, support an exchange rate regime based on a peg to the euro. Empirical evidence indeed shows that the exchange rate peg has been a valuable nominal anchor, restraining price and wage increases. In fact, inflation has averaged just 2.6% in the past five years, indicating a considerable measure of nominal convergence with our major trading partners, and with the euro area in particular. By reducing the costs associated with international trade and investment, the peg has also contributed to Malta’s orientation as an open economy. Price stability and openness have been key factors contributing to the country’s economic growth record, which averaged 3.3% in real terms during the same period. Between now and the adoption of the euro, therefore, Malta intends to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime based on a currency basket centred on the euro.
Many of you here will remember the run on rice and toilet paper at the supermarkets and the real sense of anxiety about our currency. Those days are as clear in my own memory as if they were last week. The policy announced on Saturday 15 October 1983 and formally introduced on Monday 17 October 1983 was to link the Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar at the fixed rate of 7.8 Hong Kong dollars to the US dollar under a currency board system. This policy has become known as the Linked Exchange Rate system, and it is now such an established and familiar part of Hong Kong life that it is difficult to imagine quite what Hong Kong would have been like these last two decades without it. It is certainly, as far as I am aware, one of the longest lasting of the handful of currency board systems now in existence. More recently, events have shown that monetary affairs are never predictable, even with a system as simple and transparent as the Link. For many months, market sentiment towards the Hong Kong dollar had been quite bearish. The general view was that deflation, unemployment, the budget deficit, and general economic difficulty were all prompting serious questions about the long-term viability of the Link. And, from time to time, suggestions were made that the Hong Kong dollar should be allowed to float - or at least be re-pegged - so that monetary policy could contribute more effectively to the resolution of current economic difficulties.

For this purpose, I would appeal to start thinking from this moment on of future projects in the payment infrastructure. I personally will insist that even in this direction we should focus as a banking system on the European Union directives, so that to orient every step in the future towards the country’s integration in the European Union. Short time ago I was informed about a new initiative of EU, which requires establishing within a certain period of time, a unified payment system within the euro area, including payments with cards. For this purpose, I would suggest that respective specialists from the Association and Bank of Albania be informed as soon as possible about this project and they should come out with their relevant suggestions. Also, I remain persistent in my position that we have to adopt in Albania the most advanced solutions for all the infrastructure projects we are going to implement. I believe that we don’t need to examine and consider old-fashioned models, which besides the initial cost would require all the time new funds for their maintenance and modification. In addition, now when the public administration became a client of the system, I think that there are real opportunities to solve the payments of utility services through the banking system. Returning to the financial markets, I think that in spite of the above-mentioned restrictions there is room for improving competitiveness among banks even under the current conditions.
As always, the views presented here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.1  Money-like assets versus safe assets Money-likeness and safety, although closely related, are not completely overlapping concepts.2 Safety refers to an asset’s lack of actual and perceived exposure to risk, including credit risk, counterparty risk, interest-rate risk, and market risk.3 Money-likeness refers to an asset’s lack of information sensitivity, such that, when it is used in transactions, economic agents need not worry about its future value, at least in the short term and in most states of the world.4 Because of this, money-like assets are usually short-term, liquid assets with no credit or counterparty risk, promising a fixed payment in nominal terms.5 In normal states of the world, investors tend not to distinguish too carefully between and among money-like and safe assets. However, in non-normal states of the world, where investors have heightened perceptions of risk—partly because of underlying credit or counterparty issues, but also critically because of uncertainty about the actions of other investors—investors tend to view directly-held liabilities of the official sector as substantially safer than those of the private sector. In these non-normal states of the world, central banks have the unique ability to quickly produce large quantities of assets that are both safe and money-like.

Although during the 2008 MMF run, investors also fled from prime to government MMFs, the characteristics of the run differed substantially: outflows were large but quickly reverted following the guarantee; they largely occurred across—and not within—fund families as investors became wary of particular counterparties; and investors moved to the safest sub-segment of the government MMF industry, that is, funds investing only in Treasuries and Treasury-backed repos. 19 These contrasts further illustrate a difference between investors’ demand for money-like assets in normal times, when regulation changes, and their demand for safety in non-normal times. Public sector provision of money-like assets There is a view that regulation and supervision alone are not sufficient to fully mitigate the financial stability risks associated with private maturity and liquidity transformation, and thus, the official sector should consider providing more money-like assets.20 The argument is that when the official sector increases its supply of money-like assets, it reduces the convenience yield on very short-term securities, thereby weakening the private sector’s incentives to create short-term runnable securities.21 Some recent market pricing helps to illustrate this characteristic.