samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Faced with such swings in sentiment, I want even more to stress today two ideas that are constant and consistent: (A) the ECB has been an innovative and efficient inflation-targeter, including in the Covid-crisis; (B) beyond Covid, the ECB has a powerful “quartet of tools” to keep its monetary policy as accommodative, and for as long as necessary. A. The ECB as an innovative and efficient inflation targeter In the first part of my remarks, let me try to answer three questions: is the ECB clear in its objective? is it consistent in its instruments? and is it efficient in its results? Page 2 sur 9 I. Is the ECB clear in its objective? For the ECB, like all other major central banks, our inflation objective is our lodestar. That means our definition of price stability should be simple, symmetric, and medium-term oriented. However, not everyone may perceive it this way. Hence, in the context of the Strategy Review launched by Christine Lagarde, we are currently reflecting on whether it can be communicated more clearly. To make it even simpler, we should reexamine the overly sophisticated qualifiers attached to the 2 % figure (“close to but below”). There is no benefit in appearing ambiguous about what we are aiming at. “Symmetric” refers to the fact that our objective is a target and cannot be a ceiling. Looking backwards, a central bank that has been successful in achieving its target on average will have had roughly as many episodes of inflation above its target as below.

It is a remarkable a story of individual imagination and collective action – the self-same ingredients that first enabled humans to break free from their biological chains. One response to the Great Fire was the introduction of new fire laws and regulations. The first-ever building regulations were after soon put in place, specifying the materials to be used when building houses and the minimum spacing between them. This may not sound transformational now, but at the time marked a significant rewriting of the social contract between government, businesses and households. A second response, this time from the private sector, was to create a market previously missing entirely. In response to the devastation, a market for insuring people’s homes was for the first time created. The first fire insurance company, the “Insurance Office for Houses”, was set up in 1681 at the back of Royal Exchange, close to my office. It was the inspiration of (of all things) an economist, Nicholas Barbon. The idea was simple enough. By pooling risks across a number of households, both the insurer and insured were provided with an extra degree of financial protection against fire risk. A problem shared was a problem halved. The newly-installed rules and regulations around house-building reduced this risk further, by protecting individually-insured households, and collectively-at-risk insurance companies, from correlated conflagrations. This risk-pooling idea caught on. The home insurance industry grew rapidly, first in London, then Edinburgh, then across the UK. In 17th century Britain, home insurance was very much a creative industry.
Chart 18: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender pay gap, sample average Years  Occupation  Region  Tenure  Age  Sector  Qualification  Job type  FT/PT  Public  Total explained  Per cent  25  20  Unaccounted for  15  10  5  0  ‐5 Accounted for  Total gap  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Note: A positive gender pay gap in this chart indicates that women earn less than men, whereas a negative gender pay gap indicates that women earn more than men. ‘Years’ refer to time-fixed effects, ‘Job type’ captures if the job is temporary or permanent. 23  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  23  Looked at over time, the halving of the gender pay gap since the mid-90s has been driven roughly equally by accounted and unaccounted for components (Chart 19). The main factor causing the shrinkage in the explained component is qualifications. While at the start of the sample the qualification component was adding to the gender pay gap, by the end it was dragging. This reflects the significant increase in relative educational attainment by females over the period. The unexplained – or “gender pay bias” – component has shrunk somewhat, though remains significant at just under 10% at the end of the period.

Good progress is being made. The share of BAME and female staff below senior management in the Bank currently stands at 19% and 46%, respectively, compared to targets of 20% and 50%. At senior management, BAME and female representation is 5% and 31%, compared to targets of 13% and 35%.14 A wide array of initiatives are underway to ensure the Bank meets these targets. Other central banks have also made a further push towards improving their staff diversity, although few publish pay gaps. The ECB’s Executive Board introduced gender targets in 2013 in order to double the share of women in management by 2019. As of the end of 2018, 29% of management positions were held by women compared with a target of 35% for the end of 2019. For the most senior management roles the share was 22% against a target of 28% for the end of 2019. The ECB announced additional measures last  14  Carney (2019a) discusses diversity and inclusion in the Bank. Carney (2019b) notes that the Bank’s gender pay gap is lower than for most companies in the financial sector. 33  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  33  year. The Fed announced a Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan for 2016-19, aimed at fostering diversity in the organisation. In order to foster transparency and accountability, they report the composition of their employees by diversity statistics annually. Looking beyond central banks, the analysis presented here suggests some clear directions of travel.
I would, for example, underline the development of asset-backed securities markets in different countries, among which France, to take advantage of demand from global investors for this type of securities. Let me also mention, as regards the short end of the yield curve, the very rapid development of the market for commercial paper in euro and, in particular, the success of the Paris-based market, which has attracted large foreign issuers, thanks to its security, an appropriate regulatory framework and the efficient functioning of DVP procedures. The euro’s market share as an issuance currency reflects, to a large extent, the ability of intermediaries to promote the deep and liquid markets that issuers and investors need. Hence, as was predicted by observers, since the start of Stage Three the euro has become the second most important currency in all segments of international capital markets. •  At the shortest end of the market, the integration of the interbank market took place last year right from the start of EMU, thanks to the installation of the TARGET system, which enabled large-value payment systems to move money efficiently and safely in real time from one location to another. An important feature to have in mind is that this efficiency has been achieved not through the centralization of payment systems, but through a decentralized network in which national RTGS systems managed by NCBs are linked together. Such a structure is working well.

The euro has experienced a similar episode recently. This situation seems to be about to correct itself, now that more and more signs point to a closing of the growth gap between the United States and continental Europe. Thus, the potential appreciation of the euro is more than ever a topical question. This potential clearly reflects the economic soundness, dynamism and strengths of the euro area, supported by the structural reforms under way. As these winning cards, if I may say so, are now materializing more and more clearly, I am confident that market participants will soon share our analysis. 5  BIS Review 52/2000
Other investment flows have also fallen sharply as global banks reduced the size of their balance sheets after dramatic expansion of their crossborder activities during the pre-crisis boom. On the other hand, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows had actually increased slightly relative to the pre-crisis period. The same notion holds for the region as well. Financial flows from the region have been much weaker since the global financial crisis. In particular, other investment inflows have fallen sharply and turn into small outflows due to the process of deleveraging. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows also experienced slowdown, however the role of the direct investments in some countries is still strong as they were still going through the "expansion phase" when it comes to this type of flows. Portfolio debt flows have increased, reflecting a combination of factors, but mostly as a result of government borrowing abroad by issuing government bonds. 11  Chart 8 Financial flows and their structure  Source: IMF BOP data. Financial integration in emerging market and developing economies has risen substantially over the past two decades, delivering benefits but also posing new challenges. Guarding against a sudden stop or external crisis requires carefully monitoring of different aspects of flow and stock imbalances. Although it seems that flow imbalances narrowed in the region, for completing the picture it is essential to observe the stock positions, as well.

In the last couple of decades, the dynamics of the external balance sheet of the region, examined through the net international investment position, pointed towards a process of significant widening of the negative gap, in the run up to the global financial crisis. Although, this trend to some extent slowed, IIP reached its peak in 2012 and with the beginning of 2013 taper tantrum episode started to reverse. Despite the reversal, on average it is still above the some of the benchmarks, such as the norm of the EC within the macroeconomic imbalances procedure, that equals -35% of GDP. 12  Chart 9 Net International Investment Position  Source: IMF BOP data. In order to have the complete picture, more granular view is important, as it can reveal whether the pre-crisis mode of the rising financial exposure elevated the external vulnerability of the region, and hence whether the adjustment which followed was more abrupt and costly in economic terms. For instance, the larger weight of direct investment (including the intercompany lending) should in principle improve the external risk profile of the country, as the probability for sudden reversal is low, and in general it does not yield future financing requirements for repayment of the obligations due. This is not the case with portfolio investments, or the other investments, as debt creating flows, where the risk is higher, both in terms of sudden reversals and rising future payment burden.
The Central Bank, with the primary goal of achieving and maintaining price stability, as entrusted to it by law, will continue its practices to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy and liquidity management, also in 2009. Accordingly, the Central Bank may change not only its liquidity management strategy, but also the borrowing and lending interest rate margins in cases of unpredictable changes in market conditions and emergence of needs that may arise. BIS Review 3/2009  15  Annex: Calendar for 2009 MPC Meeting Dates 15 January, Thursday  Inflation Report  Financial Stability Report  26 January, Monday  19 February, Thursday 19 March, Thursday 16 April, Thursday  30 April, Thursday  14 May, Thursday  28 May, Thursday  16 June, Tuesday 16 July, Thursday  29 July, Wednesday  18 August, Tuesday 17 September, Thursday 15 October, Thursday 19 November, Thursday  27 October, Tuesday 24 November, Tuesday  17 December, Thursday  16  BIS Review 3/2009

A number of factors have contributed to this outcome, including flight to safety flows, the presence of the Eurosystem on the secondary market, the hunt for yield by investors, and the success of the first European common debt issues. Liquidity indicators also displayed good resilience. For instance, the depth of the secondary market for French government negotiable securities, measured by the average volume of daily transactions (excluding Eurosystem purchases), has remained at a historically high level,albeit at 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  an increased transaction cost, more pronounced for non-core sovereign debt markets, but at levels far below those of previous crises. The ownership structure of European debt securities has also contributed to and reflects this resilience. According to data from the ECB1, non-residents of the euro area were holding a significantand stable 44% of euro area government debt at the end of 2020,willing to invest in EUR, via highly liquid securities. Among residents, long term investors are prominent investors : the central banks were accounting for 21% of total outstanding debt, for the euro area, investment funds, insurance corporations and pension funds were holding about 11%, while other monetary financial institutions or banks for 19%. b) Let me now turn to the repo market and its resiliency during the Covid crisis. Under normal market conditions, the repo market is very liquid since large banks dedicate specific balance sheet capacity for this activity.
In conclusion, in an environment where the resource utilization has yet not reached pre-crisis levels and no demand pressure is observed, we anticipate that core inflation indicators will remain consistent with medium-term targets and economic recovery will be slow and protracted. 2. Turkey’s long-term growth performance and potential growth rate  In the second part of my speech, I would like to share with you my views on the necessary reforms for the establishment of strong and sustainable growth in Turkey as well as those to increase its long-term potential growth rate. The growth rate of a country is determined by three factors. These factors can be summarized as: (1)  Capital deepening  (2)  Employment growth and  (3)  Total factor productivity  When we look at the last fifty years in the Turkish economy, we see that Turkey’s average growth rate has been around 4.5 percent. A study carried by staff members of the Central Bank of Turkey, Dr. Seref SAYGILI and Dr. Cengiz CĐHAN, suggests that capital deepening has a large share, as much as 75 percent, in this growth rate. According to the same study, the contribution of employment growth and the increase in productivity remained very limited, at 20 percent and 5 percent, respectively. There is no doubt that capital accumulation plays a leading role in the development of an emerging economy, as expected. Other country cases also present a similar outlook.

Durmuş Yılmaz: Evaluation of global financial developments and structrual reforms Speech by Mr Durmuş Yılmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the 19th Annual World Business Congress, Konya, Central Anatolia, 21 July 2010. *  *  *  Honorable Rector, Esteemed Academicians, Distinguished Guests, We are gathered here today for the 19th Annual World Business Congress of the International Management Development Association (IMDA), where the lessons learned from past experiences in the global business world, current issues and future tendencies will be discussed. I would like to congratulate everyone, notably Prof. Dr. Mehmet Babaoğlu, Rector of Karatay University, and distinguished members of the University for their Contributions to organizing this esteemed Congress, which is held in a different country each year. I would like to start my speech with a brief evaluation of global financial developments. Then I will address structural reforms, which we deem essential for raising Turkey’s potential growth rate, when considering the Turkish economy on a macro scale and from in a longterm perspective. 1. Global developments:  As is known, problems, which emerged in the global financial markets about two years ago and spread across the corporate sector over time, affected the Turkish economy as well as other economies. We see that the impact of global turmoil on economies mainly emerged through three channels: (1) Foreign Trade, (2) Capital Flows and (3) Expectations. The Turkish economy has been affected by global turmoil through all these three channels due to its structural features.
And that is not just in relation to international trade. Domestic deregulation is increasingly in vogue in many countries; and there is much greater openness around the world to inward investment and foreign ownership. I see the same presumption in favour of competition, for example, in the global trend to privatisation, through which governments have increasingly returned commercial activities, in which they have no necessary comparative advantage, to the market sector. At the same time, against the background of financial globalisation, attention has in the past few years increasingly focused on removing restrictions on the free flow of capital again domestically and internationally - essentially on the grounds that this can further improve the effective allocation of productive resources, increasing the benefits to be derived from competition in markets for goods and services. The IMF is in fact currently working on an amendment to its Articles of Agreement to give it a greater role in promoting the liberalisation of external capital movements. BIS Review 36/1998  -3-  Of course, it remains true that market competition, and the supply capacity of the economy more generally, are inevitably influenced by virtually every other aspect of public policy, and will be affected to varying degrees by the particular social and economic judgements made by national politicians. This is true whether one is talking about direct public sector provision - of education and training, for example, or incentives to saving and investment, or current or prospective welfare provision, or the structure of taxation.

But even a snail can make remarkable progress if it keeps going. I am told that the quick species - I suppose they are the Model T snails - travel at a speed of three inches a minute - say 5 yards an hour. In that case a quick snail could have travelled quite easily from Cranfield to the borders of Scotland since the collapse of the Berlin Wall! And if you look back over a decade rather than at the outcome of just the latest meetings, then there really has been remarkable progress within the developing, emerging and transitional economies as well as the industrial world - towards a broad international consensus on approaches to economic management. That consensus can perhaps be summed up essentially as macro-economic stability and supply-side flexibility - but that needs some elaboration. On the macro-economic side we have learned - and it has taken some countries longer than others - that you cannot achieve what we are all trying to achieve - sustained growth, high levels of employment and rising living standards - simply by pumping up demand in our economies through expansionary monetary and fiscal policies without regard to the underlying supply-side capacity of our economies to meet that demand. Short-term demand management through monetary policy too often led just to accelerating inflation, which had then eventually to be brought under control through recession - an absolute recipe for short-termism in both financial and business BIS Review 36/1998  -2-  behaviour.
The SNB will be allowed to evaluate its gold holdings at their market price, and a revaluation surplus will appear on our balance sheet. Technically, the SNB will also be able to buy or sell gold on the market. 3.2 Second stage: transfer of excess reserves The recently revised Constitution and the new Federal Law on Currency and Payment Instruments are not sufficient as a legal basis for allowing the National Bank to transfer excess reserves for external use. A special constitutional basis must be created for this purpose and then specific legislation will have to allow the realisation of concrete projects (law on the Swiss Foundation for Solidarity, for example). 5  BIS Review 73/1999  Consequently, a second revision of the constitutional article concerning the SNB is now being drafted. Among other things, this new article provides for the possibility to transfer, outside the SNB, excess reserves deriving from the revaluation of the gold stock. Deliberations on this article have just begun in Parliament. If everything goes well, the article could be approved by both houses before this summer. Afterwards, in compliance with Swiss regulations, the draft of the new article of the Constitution will be submitted to the voters and the cantons for approval. In Switzerland, every amendment to the Constitution must reach two majority votes: a majority of the citizens’ vote and a majority of the cantons approving the revision. This vote could take place in spring 2000, i.e.

Mr Roth discusses demonitisation of gold in Switzerland Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Vice–Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 22nd Annual FT World Gold Conference in London on 14 June 1999. I would like to thank you for inviting me to participate in this gold conference and for the opportunity to give you some insight into the present state of the discussions on the demonetisation of gold in Switzerland. I must admit that I have accepted your invitation with mixed feelings: why play the role of trouble shooter here among people worried about the activity of central banks on the gold market? How to communicate the SNB’s intentions when its room for manoeuvre depends on a complicated political process? All this makes me dream of the comfortable situation of my colleagues in Belgium and Holland who were able to implement their strategy without outside interference and could communicate their sales as a fait accompli. I also look with envy at the Bank of England which will be able to proceed with sales shortly after the Treasury has made its intentions public.