samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, we consider important to ensure that macro-prudential policies undertaken in the Euro-area, and banking group solutions originating from the EU, should take into account the relevant impact on non-EU host countries financial stability where systemically important EU bank subsidiaries operate. This could be bridged also by an effective exchange of information in the supervisory colleges, in accordance with the new EU directive for the recovery and resolution of banks, and particularly by working to remove barriers for non-EU host countries to come closer to the European forums and be able to participate and exchange their views. Despite some negative externalities that could be temporary, in the Bank of Albania we do believe that the Banking Union/Single Supervisory Mechanism and the new role provided to ECB, will also serve to improve the supervision of the banking sector in our country. This will come not only by much more consistent approach in supervision practices, but also through improving the coordination framework between home and host supervisors. In this regard, in the Bank of Albania, we are willing and hopeful that we can establish a much stronger working relationship with the ECB. Thank you very much for your attention!

–  banks play the main role in meeting the private and public financing needs, and they rely heavily in local deposits to finance their activity;  Changes in the regulatory superstructure, and enforcement of the regulatory requirements, have had important impact on Albania’s financial sector and economy. More concretely: In the financial sector, we have experienced: –  deleveraging in local financial assets investments, particularly seen at subsidiaries of European banking groups, as they try to meet requirements coming after EBA and ECB stress tests;  –  increasing preference by financial institutions to place local funds in foreign investments (abroad);  In the economy, such behavior by some of the banks has materialized in: –  lower financial intermediation to both private and public sector;  –  negative impact on economic growth;  However, the stability of both, financial system and macroeconomic framework, have been saved and at this point I would like to state that we believe that there can be found ways to further avoid or mitigate any negative externalities. On deleveraging, Bank of Albania has raised the concern on such phenomena directly with the EU counterparts, but also through its role in Vienna II initiative. In this regard, we have highlighted the need to establish effective mechanisms to restore healthy lending to economies of non-EU countries where subsidiaries of EU banking groups operate.
Another important subject relevant to banking supervision is the Basle II Capital Adequacy Accord. SAMA has previously implemented the First Basle Capital Accord in 1992. Accordingly, Saudi banks have maintained high capital adequacy ratios of more than 18% throughout the period from 1992 to 2005. Also it is worth noting that 90% of the capital is of the tier-1 quality. Currently, banks are working closely with SAMA in the implementation of the Basle II Capital Accord. We expect all banks operating in Saudi Arabia to implement the standardized approach for credit risk by 1 January 2008 and then continue to move towards more sophisticated Internal Rating Based approaches. For operational risk all banks are likely to move to standardized approach with one or two banks experimenting with the Advanced Management approaches. SAMA is also encouraging banks to consider a National Data Pooling initiative to help them in credit risk management. All in all Saudi banking system is well on its way to the implementation of Basel II and we expect that banks will remain highly capitalized under the new standard. It is worth mentioning that SAMA's approach in applying Basel (II) Accord is an integrated one aimed at raising the level of risk management in order to maintain the continued strength of the banking system. One of the issues that has preoccupied the supervisors of the banking system and security organs is combating money laundering and financing of terrorism.

Furthermore, looking ahead in monetary policy is hard when the economy is going through major changes that make it difficult to forecast the future path of the economy and inflation. It is quite clear that this demands a great deal of forecasters as well as of those who construct macro models. The forecasts concern inflation one to two years ahead, which calls, for instance, for reasonable precision in the measurement of the output gap and the relationship between the output gap and inflation. It is already evident, for example, that in the 1990s inflation forecasts in many countries were frequently on the high side. I believe that the best we can do, at least at this stage, is to pay close attention to incoming data in the forecasting process, and not mechanically use the results from models that rely too heavily on historical relationships. We have to deal more successfully with the fact that forecasts of economic developments can never be completely accurate and still allow monetary policy to be forward looking. When discussing monetary policy of today, we must remember that we have come a long way. The world economy shows strong growth coupled with low inflation and monetary policy has contributed to this development. However, there are interesting, though somewhat difficult, challenges ahead of us which must be met if we are to preserve this bright picture of the world economy. This conference will contribute to a better understanding of the issues and problems involved. 3  BIS Review 50/2000
But as we move to the next phase of post-crisis regulation, many commentators find it tempting to succumb to world-weary arguments. That any reform will be arbitraged That any insurance will promote risk taking That there is a trade-off between stability and growth  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  And that there will always be financial crises. We were right to reject such fatalism when we embarked on reform and we are right to reject it now. While all recognise that future crises cannot be ruled out, the steps taken in the past six years have certainly reduced the likely frequency and severity of such crises. Where banking systems have raised capital and restored trust in their creditworthiness, access to credit has returned. This central lesson from the US and the UK recoveries could not be clearer. Publicly provided insurance is being removed from the system as the Too Big to Fail problem is addressed and the public subsidy for globally systemic banks is eliminated. Market forces are being restored. The system is more transparent. It is clear who bears risk. And the scope for arbitraging new regulation has been reduced through a global approach to reform that has established common standards and encompassed shadow banking. In short, any serious look at the experience of post-crisis reform shows that reform and regulation support – not damage – long-term prosperity. As I said in Washington three years ago: in no other aspect of human endeavour do men and women not strive to learn and improve.

In some economies, such as the UK, the biggest risks are associated with the housing market, which is why macroprudential actions have been taken. More generally, as the FSB has recently concluded: “there are increased signs of complacency in financial markets, in part reflecting search for yield amidst exceptionally accommodative monetary policies. Volatility has become compressed and asset valuations stretched across a growing number of markets, increasing the risk of a sharp reversal.” Those risks arise against a backdrop in which assets managed by investment funds have reached almost 90% of global GDP – more than two thirds the size of the commercial banking system. The growth of the asset management sector brings welcome diversity to financial intermediation. However, there must also be a focus, as there has been with banks, on the systemic risks it could create. Although the sector is becoming more concentrated, the risks don’t simply arise from the size of asset managers. They arise from the particular activities some in the sector undertake. The biggest risks arise from combining high levels of leverage with holdings of illiquid assets and commitments to provide liquidity at short notice. In the current environment, those types of activities need careful monitoring, and possibly a deliberate policy response. Conclusion There is no doubt that the reforms made thus far, along with a stronger framework for global co-operation mean we are in a better position to face new risks.
The security thread turns into a dark solid line when holding the banknote against the light, and changes colour from green to purple at different angles; the sun symbol with colour-changing image depending on the tilting angle; and on the back, the iridescent stripe at the centre that displays the value 1000 Lekë. The 10000 lek banknote integrates the raised print in the portrait of Asdreni, numerals, lettering and in other areas of the banknote, as well as the element which helps the visually-impaired people to easily identify and recognise the banknote. The watermark image; the hologram accompanied by various optical effects; the security thread which turns into a dark solid against the light and changes colour from green to purple depending on titling angel; and on the back, the iridescent stripe at the centre that displays the value 10000 Lekë. A safe banknote means that we can use cash securely and easily for its identification as a genuine banknote. This is the foundation of a sound financial system: confidence in the core financial operations where currency has its implacable role as an intermediator. From 30 June 2021, the banknotes of the new series 1000 lek and 10000 lek will be legal tender in the Republic of Albania and will be used as means of payment, alongside the existing banknotes. Seeing the beauty and quality of these banknotes, I can absolutely tell you that the work done for their realisation was too valuable.

Gent Sejko: Launch of new banknotes Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the Launching of the two banknotes, 1000 lek and 10000 lek, of the New Albanian Banknote Series, Tirana, 15 June 2021. * * * Dear Ladies and Gentlemen, Welcome in this special day, when we are introducing to the public the two next denominations of the new Albanian banknote series. One of the main responsibilities and legal obligations of the Bank of Albania is guaranteeing the supply of economy with cash, both in value and structure, and ensuring confidence of the public in the national currency. After 20 years, the Bank of Albania, in 2016, undertook the initiative to start the production project of a new banknote series, which is legal tender, by improving and fully refreshing up its style and shape. In this framework, in September 2019, the Bank of Albania launched the new banknote series, which consists of six denominations: 200 lek, 500 lek, 1000 lek, 2000 lek, 5000 lek and 10000 lek. The theme of the new series of the Albanian banknotes embodies the portraits of the most illustrious national figures, and evokes the most notable moments in the history of our nation in its endeavours for freedom and prosperity. The theme echoes through historical eras, starting from Antiquity, moving through the Middle Ages, the National Awakening, the Independence of Albania, and concluding with the symbols of the national flag and anthem on the largest denomination, the 10.000 lek banknote.
In August 2011, in an attempt to counter the exceptionally strong Swiss franc, the SNB narrowed the target range for the Libor to between 0.0% and 0.25%, aiming to keep it as close to zero as possible. It also took steps to expand banks’ sight deposits significantly. 1 These measures were successful up to a point, however in the light of ongoing uncertainty on the financial markets and more bad news from the euro area, upward pressure on the Swiss franc remained high and became more intense still at the beginning of September 2011. The SNB therefore decided to provide the foreign exchange market with clear guidance in the form of a minimum exchange rate for the franc against the euro. On 6 September 2011, it announced that it would no longer tolerate a EUR/CHF exchange rate below CHF 1.20. This exceptional measure enabled the SNB to take a stand against an acute threat to the Swiss economy and to counter the risk of a deflationary trend emanating from the massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc. The minimum exchange rate was introduced as a temporary, emergency measure in a time of extreme turbulence. The franc remained high in the period that followed, yet deflation risk was held in check. Moreover, the minimum exchange rate bought Swiss companies – especially exporters and industries facing competition from imports – some time in which to plan their next steps in a very difficult operating environment.

Ladies and Gentlemen, The financial sector in our region has now reached a new stage of development. Over the years, the role of the financial system has evolved, facilitating the various stages of development and growth. Increasingly, the financial services industry is also becoming a source of growth, especially as several countries in the region are moving towards a knowledge-based and services-led economy. In the process, the dynamic changes taking place are also being driven by technological advances and an increasingly competitive environment. As financial restructuring and reforms progress to a more advanced stage, financial institutions are also moving on to make the necessary adjustments to become more productive, innovative, and strategically more focused. Efforts are now focused not only on the creation of a sound and resilient financial sector but towards institutional development and capacity building of the financial sector to elevate it to a higher level of performance, efficiency and excellence. This represents an important  BIS Review 46/2003  1  phase in the development of the financial sector as highlighted in our 10-year Financial Sector Master Plan that was released almost three years ago. It represents an important development prior to moving towards a more deregulated and liberalised environment. In this context, we are envisaging forward-looking financial institutions that will be able to face the challenges of financial liberalisation and globalisation as we progress into our next stage of development.
This would make it possible to bring the debt ratio down by about fifteen points over ten years. The point here is not to call for a general cut in spending, but rather a slower increase in spending: this is far from the famous "austerity" that we French people are so keen to criticise without ever having experienced it. This would be fully compatible with the functioning of automatic stabilisers, to take account of the economic situation. Of course,this implies no further tax cuts, which we can hardly afford to finance. Page 4 of 9 The Cour des Comptes stated it loud and clear, and rightly so:ii we must therefore stop indefinitely postponing fiscal consolidation. It is not an arbitrary question of threshold or narrow-minded ideology. Our solidarity with future generations is at stake: we do not have the moral right to leave them, in addition to a climate debt that so rightly worries them, a financial debt whose share of GDP has already almost doubled in 20 years. And our political credibility in Europe is also at stake, as well as our ability to inspire lasting confidence in investors. If any doubts as to the sustainability of the French debt were to arise, we could always borrow, but the financial conditions would be different: take a look around, including at several of our European neighbours. And this brings me to the second illusion, that of cost-free debt. 2.

almost the equivalent of the current defence budget. It would therefore be irresponsible to build our future on the already outdated bet of a zero or very low cost debt. A higher deficit today clearly implies less room for manoeuvre and action tomorrow in favour of ecology, health and education. The increase in the cost of debt  II. How to set a credible debt reduction strategy? 1. Revised European fiscal rules This brings me to the debate that has kept you busy this afternoon: the debate on rules, in particular European rules. It has been put on hold since the start of 2020, due to the Covid-19 crisis, and now perhaps the war in Ukraine. But this debate will have to be wrapped up: I neither believe in traditionalists - those in Europe who simply call for a return to "business as usual" - nor in angelicists those who simply believe in the wisdom of institutional processes, or in enlightened economic debates for steering national fiscal cycles. No, experience tells us, particularly in France, that we need rules and not too much "discretion" in the sense of entirely discretionary choices. But these rules must be revised and simplified, in order to be better respected and more credible. Paolo Gentiloni and the European Commission have the onerous task of taking  Page 6 of 9 forward this discussion which is a matter for political authorities, so I will just make a few remarks.
Sveriges Riksbank (2014a), Perspectives on the low rate of inflation. Article in Monetary Policy Report, February 2014. Sveriges Riksbank (2014b), The effects of monetary policy on household debt. Article in Monetary Policy Report, February 2014. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches

We must use the gravity of the global crisis to provoke a bold response. We acted together in 2009; we can do so again. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Second, there will have to be an additional buffer to meet banks’ underlying demand for reserves. We expect that the demand for reserves will be considerably higher than it was prior to the financial crisis because reserves can be used to satisfy the more stringent liquidity requirements that are in place today, and because the opportunity cost of holding reserves is much lower now since the Fed pays interest on reserves. Together, as a rough starting point, we have suggested that the necessary amount of excess reserves could be in a range of $ billion to $ trillion.6 Coupled with uncertainty about the likely growth in other factors, such as currency outstanding, this implies a normalized balance sheet size of, perhaps, $ trillion to $ trillion in the early 2020s. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  After reaching that level, one should anticipate that the Fed would resume purchases of Treasury securities. These purchases would allow the balance sheet to expand to accommodate the growth in currency outstanding and in banks’ demand for reserves as the economy grows. They also would make up for ongoing paydowns of the agency MBS that remain in our portfolio. Although there is considerable uncertainty about the long-run size of the Fed’s balance sheet, I would stress that the balance sheet is likely to shrink by much less than it grew between 2007 and 2014.

For the New York Fed’s Markets Group surveys, see the July results at www.newyorkfed.org/markets/primarydealer_survey_questions.html and www.newyorkfed.org/markets/survey_market_participants.html. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
*** As part of this report, I would like to highlight an important aspect for guaranteeing good governance at the institution: the internal audit systems. The internal audit is independent from the management, guaranteed through the Inspector General, appointed by the Parliament. 7/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  Fostering internal control and monitoring systems and procedures In 2018, the operational risk management function – a new function at the Bank of Albania – consolidated and matured. It is based on the international risk management standards as well as on the best practices of central banks. In the last assessment, the level of Operational Risk Management has shifted from ‘ad-hoc’ to ‘managed’, thus overcoming the ‘basic’ level. This assessment exceeds the Bank of Albania’s objective. This year, the project for “Drafting and Implementing the Bank of Albania’s Business Continuity Management Program” continued and is currently in the final phase of its completion. The purpose of this project is to ensure the continuity of critical processes and to restore normal business as soon as possible in the event of a crisis or emergency situation. Audit engagements in 2018 focused on: (i) giving an opinion on the adequacy of internal audits set by the Management for the audited functions / processes, including supporting applications for the activities; and (ii) other not planned audit and non-audit engagements upon special request by Administrators or other external institutions.

In addition to the monetary policy decisions and revisions to regulations that govern the activity of the banking sector, other important decisions include: (i) approval of the policy and measures for increasing the use of the national currency in the activity of banks; (ii) approval of the policy for the oversight of payment and settlement systems;(iii) approval of the accounting policy in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards; and, approval of the Medium-term Development Strategy of the Bank of Albania for 2019–2021. The strategy upheld the existing mission, vision, and values and updated the list of duties for fulfilling them. Beyond the realisation of the legal objectives of the Bank, the Supervisory Council has monitored continuously the governance of the institution and has worked towards its improvement. As the body responsible for the financial reporting and internal audit system, the Council has been informed regularly, by internal and external audit functions, on the compliance with the legislation and other acts that govern the activity of the institution. The Council has been informed also about the institution’s management policies and the use of financial assets for the realisation of the operational activity of the Bank of Albania. Information was presented regularly on the financial position and result of the Bank of Albania and the international reserve management. The internal audit has been monitored through the Audit Committee, established in 2015.