samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Figure 4 GDP growth in selected regions and countries (1)  Monetary policy rates in the world  (annual change, percent)  (percent)  15  15  10  10  10  10  8  8  5  5  6  6  0  0  4  4  -5  -5  2  2  -10  -10  0  0  07  06  08  09  10  Latin America  Asia exc. Japan  U.S.  Eurozone  Japan  Jan.07  Jan.09  Jan.11  Chile Emerging ec. (2) Developed ec. (3) Survey for emerging ec. (4) Survey for developed ec. (4) Survey for Chile (4)  (1) Regions weighted by PPP as in April 2010's WEO. (2) Simple average of reference rates of Brazil, Chile, China, India, Israel, the Korean Rep. Mexico, Peru, Poland and Turkey. (3) Simple average of reference rates of Canada, the Eurozone, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. (4) Averaged responses of analysts surveyed by Bloomberg during May of 2010, indicating expectations for September and December of 2010, and March and June of 2011. Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on respective country's statistics bureau, Bloomberg and IMF.

Annual inflation figures are somewhat below levels foreseen in March. This is because the immediate effects of the earthquake and tsunami, if any, were bounded and certainly smaller than projected in the last IPoM or by overall market expectations. Despite this difference, the assumptions about changes in some specific prices such as public transport fares, the tobacco excise tax or the unchanged stamp tax will result – in the baseline scenario – in inflation being at the end of 2010 in the upper area of the tolerance range of the inflation target. Towards 2011 and 2012, annual CPI inflation will oscillate around 3% and will stay there through the end of the relevant projection horizon, this time the second quarter of 2012. Core inflation will show a slower convergence to 3%, to hit that figure over the course of 2011. These projections are consistent with June’s Economic Expectations Survey, which foresees y-o-y inflation for December of this and next year at 3.5% and 3.2%, respectively, and at 3% two years ahead (figure 7). Aside from the assumptions just described for domestic and external growth, the baseline scenario considers that in the long run the real exchange rate (RER) will be similar to its current level. This, considering that, with the current level of the nominal exchange rate and the parities prevailing at the statistical closure of this IPoM, the RER is aligned with its longterm fundamentals. The domestic growth scenario foreseen for the coming quarters assumes output gaps closing fully during 2011.
On four of these occasions the Board also adopts an Inflation Report. The meetings are scheduled about six months in advance both for the sake of our internal work and to inform those who follow this, for instance in the financial markets. Additional meetings can, of course, be arranged if necessary and we have said that they will be announced as soon as we have fixed a date. But we have now used this procedure for more than two years and that has not yet happened. The publication of the Riksbank’s quarterly Inflation Report is preceded by at least three discussions in the Executive Board: one or two to consider which general questions to include in the Report and our picture of future inflation, a meeting to finalise the text and a final meeting about a week later to set the  4  BIS Review 24/2001  repo rate. At the intervening Board meetings we simply compare new information with the picture in the most recent Inflation Report and decide the repo rate. Processes in compiling the Inflation Report Executive Board Discussion of synopsis. Assessment of inflation from staff. Discussion of the inflation situation.r  Decision made on inflation situation and text. Decision made on interest rate. Drafting committee Discussion of inflation situation. Discussion of interest rate decision. Material for each Board meeting is prepared by the Monetary Policy Department, where some forty economists are involved in various ways.

(2) Considers implicit volatility on option from US S&P 500 index. Sources: Bloomberg and JP Morgan Chase. 4  BIS Review 97/2007  However, even if this is a normalization process, the dynamics, deepness and extension of market adjustment are difficult to foresee. As with earlier episodes of sharp increases in risk premiums and market volatility, some market segments and specific agents have found themselves unexpectedly in weaker financial positions, which generate tensions and doubts about particular entities’ risk vis-à-vis their counterparties. In this sense, beyond the slow recovery of the past week, the risk remains being a worsening of the international financial scenario if this correction deepens, with more severe implications on the functioning of the principal markets and global financial intermediaries and, ultimately, on world economic activity. Although this correction was triggered by the deterioration of sub-prime mortgage debtors’ payment capacity in the US, what is surprising is that the exposure to such deterioration has spread to financial entities elsewhere, causing tension in the trade securities market and even in the global interbank market. These mortgages were originated by companies specializing in mortgage loans; then they were sold to institutions that packed them as bonds collateralized by payment flows associated to these mortgages, to higher quality mortgages and to other credits. These bonds are known as ABS. With the increase in sub-prime mortgage delinquency rates, widespread uncertainty arose regarding the value of the ABSs because of lack of clear information on their content of sub-prime mortgage credits and the increase in payment delays.
We have responded in several ways. For example, we have paid greater supervisory attention to corporate governance. We significantly increased the depth and frequency of interaction between senior supervisors from the Federal Reserve and directors and executives at banks. This supplements our ongoing assessment of management’s oversight of risk. Our review entails a critical analysis not only of firm policies, procedures and limits, but also of the quality of the risk reports escalated to senior management, the capabilities of the firm’s risk monitoring program, and the adequacy of control functions. We have also increased our enforcement activity for violations of law or unsafe or unsound conduct. Since 2009 the Federal Reserve has taken 36 public enforcement actions against institutions supervised by the New York Fed, which included $ billion in fines. On top of this, five firms supervised by the New York Fed paid $ billion into a qualified settlement fund for mortgage borrowers, and the same five institutions were required to provide over $ billion in other foreclosure prevention assistance. These statistics do not include nonpublic enforcement actions, including restrictions on the further growth of banks that do not have satisfactory risk management regimes. And, earlier this year, we assisted in consigning the concept of “too big to jail” to history when Credit Suisse and BNP Paribas pleaded guilty to criminal charges.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  regulatory capital and higher risk weights for many classes of assets. And the Federal Reserve mandated a new minimum supplementary leverage ratio that includes off-balance sheet exposures for the largest, most internationally active banking organizations and a leverage surcharge for large U.S. banking organizations. In support of these new regulations, capital assessment has become a focus of supervision since the financial crisis. Examiners monitor capital reserves and put banks through periodic stress tests that are evaluated on a cross-firm basis. This has been one of the great advancements of bank oversight following the crisis. These evaluations enable supervisors to assemble a composite assessment of the nation’s banking sector, which materially assists the Federal Reserve in its statutory mandate to promote financial stability.3 The Dodd-Frank Act mandates supervisory stress tests that assess whether large bank holding companies have a sufficient level of capital to absorb losses during adverse economic conditions.4 The Federal Reserve also conducts a capital planning exercise, called the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review or “CCAR.” This evaluation combines the quantitative results from the Dodd-Frank Act stress tests with a qualitative assessment of whether the largest bank holding companies have vigorous, “forward-looking capital planning processes that account for their unique risks.”5 The criteria for both sets of stress tests are dynamic and change in response to evolving risks. For example, past tests have assumed a sharp, sudden, and widespread drop in markets triggered by, say, a large Eurozone shock.
Peter Praet: Maintaining price stability in the euro area Remarks by Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the 15. Handelsblatt Jahrestagung "Zukunftstrategien für Sparkassen und Landesbanken", Berlin, 2 February 2017. * * *  Introduction The euro area recovery is progressing at a moderate, but firming pace.1 The economy has now posted positive real GDP growth for 14 consecutive quarters. The unemployment rate is back to a single-digit figure. Economic sentiment is at the highest level recorded in almost 6 years. The monetary policy measures the ECB has taken over the past few years have contributed decisively to these positive developments. After having hovered at levels well below 1% for three years, euro area HICP inflation has edged up towards the end of last year and, according to preliminary data, reached 1.8%, in January. The recent upward movement of inflation mainly reflects temporary factors, most notably the increases in energy and food prices. By contrast, underlying inflationary pressures have remained subdued and inflation excluding food and energy has mostly remained below 1% since late 2013. The current environment still falls short of a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation to levels closer to 2% over the medium term. It will take time for inflation to stabilise around levels consistent with our price stability objective. Recent developments show the role monetary policy plays in driving the economic recovery and, further down the road, in ensuring a durable return of inflation to levels close to 2%.

These forces, which are partly external and partly domestic, have masked the relationship between economic slack and inflation, and have been reinforced by a weakening of inflation expectations. 2 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Forces slowing down inflation in the euro area economy2 The euro area recovery has been characterised by a disconnect between economic activity and inflation – which some have referred to as a “missing inflation puzzle”. This disconnect becomes visible, for instance, when comparing actual growth and inflation outcomes for 2016 with those anticipated in the ECB staff macroeconomic projections of March 2014. The real GDP growth rate, which stood at 1.7% in 2016, essentially confirmed the March 2014 projection. HICP inflation, by contrast, turned out to be more than 1 percentage point below the rate projected in March 2014; and measures of core inflation, which strip out the direct disinflationary impact of the collapse of commodity prices over this period, have remained at 0.9%, about half the rate projected earlier. This picture points to pronounced disinflationary forces that have confounded attempts to forecast the impact of improved economic conditions on inflation. Where do these forces come from? Do they pertain to cyclical influences that monetary policy can offset? Do they reflect broader structural shifts in the economy that the central bank is forced to watch as a bystander?
There must be a much greater focus than in the past on return on capital and on the generation of shareholder value rather than on pursuit of size and market share for its own sake. This is something in which we all have an interest. It is important for the stability of the world financial system and for the economic development of the Asian region that the banks of the world’s second largest economy are fully restored to health and can resume their major role in financial intermediation at home and abroad. I wish you therefore all the best in your efforts. As I mentioned earlier, the Japanese banks have been and will remain an important part of the financial system in Hong Kong. They also of course have a similar role to play in relation to Mainland China. I am aware that the Japanese banks felt particularly disappointed and aggrieved at the collapse of Gitic and the subsequent debt problems that afflicted other Mainland window companies. I do not intend to go over the past history of this episode that is hopefully now coming to an end. But it is possible to see some good coming out of it if it helps, as I hope it will, to restore financial discipline within China. It has also served as a useful reminder to both domestic and foreign banks in Hong Kong not to engage in name lending and not to rely on implicit guarantees.

What we are doing is in full conformity with the spirit of the Treaty. HB: Why are you now being criticised by the banks? Trichet: Are we? If so, it is probably because we are doing things that we have not been asked to do by them. That would be proof of our independence vis-à-vis interest groups. That refutes the argument that we have acted as a result of pressure from the banks. I am therefore very pleased to be being criticised by the banks. HB: You don’t see any threat to the ECB’s credibility? Trichet: After the first 12 years of the euro, despite all difficulties - oil and commodities shocks and financial crisis – we will have delivered price stability fully in line with our definition, less than 2% close to 2%. That is the proof. The Executive Board and the Governing Council are inflexibly attached to price stability. And our credibility does not rely on words but on deeds and on our own track record. HB: And is this also valid for the decision taken during the weekend? Trichet: As regards our Sunday decisions they were of the same nature as those taken earlier in the crisis when we adopted non-standard measures. Where necessary we take our decisions swiftly, like in 2007 and 2008, but without ever losing our sense of direction: medium- and long-term price stability. HB: The Governing Council’s most recent decision was not unanimous. Was there an argument?
Better monitoring the general public's inflation expectations is not an easy task since inflation expectations of firms or consumers are not directly observable. For the moment, reliable data on consumers or firms’ inflation expectations are quite scarce in the euro area whereas in other jurisdictions expectation surveys have been developed quite extensively – famous and recent examples include the New York Fed Survey, the Tankan survey in Japan or the different surveys developed by the Bank of England. In this respect, the new Bundesbank household survey contributes to fill the gap and it is also an excellent example of the recent efforts made by central banks to collect new and better information on expectations of economic agents. II. Communication of central banks should also target households  For the moment, our most reliable information on the general public’s inflation expectations in the euro area comes from the consumer survey conducted by the European Commission. When comparing the different sources of inflation expectations with consumer survey expectations, we can see that they deliver a very different message on the level of inflation expectations, compared to financial markets. European households perceive an inflation rate close to 10% whereas their inflation expectations are closer to 5%. One implication of such a result is that we need to improve a lot our communication to a more general audience. Another conclusion we can draw is that, if households are not well aware of the level of inflation, they perceive quite well the overall evolution of inflation over time (Figure 2).

As already pointed out by Benoît Coeuré 1, while households are not professional forecasters, their inflation expectations usually correlate very well with the ones anticipated by professional forecasters for the same forecast horizon (one year) (Figure 3). However, we can see over the recent period, a divergence between consumer expectations and financial markets indicators. 1  B. Coeuré (2019). Inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy, Speech at an event organised by the SAFE Policy center, 11 july 2019  3  Since it could strongly affect the future path of inflation, such a pattern raises several important questions: will this divergence persist over time or is it very temporary? What are the sources of the divergence in inflation expectations between financial markets and households? III. Firms’ inflation expectations are also of primary interest for Central Banks  While this conference is mostly about households’ expectations, I would like to stress that monitoring firms’ inflation expectation is also of primary interest from a monetary policy perspective. Compared to households, information on inflation expectations within firms is even scarcer. This scarcity of information is in sharp contrast with the relevance of such information for the conduct of monetary policy: at the end, firms are the price setters in the economy and also take part in the wage setting process. Besides, there is evidence that their expectations affect their economic decisions like employment or investment.
Behind the physiological shift from the ridge brows of Neanderthal man to the flat foreheads of modern man may have been a more important neurological one. Flat foreheads allowed growth in the pre-frontal cortex region of the brain. Modern-day MRI scans tell us this region is responsible, among other things, for patience. What we may have seen, tens of thousands of years ago, was Darwinian natural selection of patient homo sapiens over impatient Neanderthals. 42 And with that came rising living standards. The secular struggle – innovation or stagnation? From the distant past, then, to the present and future. Today’s great debate is where next for growth. The sunny uplands of innovation-led growth, as after the Industrial Revolution? Or the foggy lowlands of stagnant growth, as before it? Which of the secular forces – innovation versus stagnation – will dominate? And if growth is going back to the future, on which side of the Industrial Revolution will it land? The balance of these arguments matters greatly for future well-being and public policy. Indeed, it is hard to think of anything that matters much more. More parochially, for central banks setting monetary policy one of the key judgements is the appropriate “neutral” level of interest rates. You can think of this as the interest rate that would align desired saving and investment over the medium term. But what is the “neutral” level of interest rates today? Secular innovation might imply a level at or above its historical average of 2–3%, in line with historical growth rates.

20  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 5: Capital accumulation in the UK since 1850 Capital per head, 2006 prices £  50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000  0  5,000  10,000  15,000  0 25,000  20,000  GDP per head, 2006 prices £ Source: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2010). Chart 6: Capital accumulation across countries since 1980 Capital per head, 2005 prices $ 140,000 Japan 120,000 Germany 100,000  Italy  80,000 South Korea 60,000 India  US  China  40,000  UK  Urban China  0  5,000  20,000  10,000  15,000  20,000  25,000  30,000  35,000  40,000  0 45,000  GDP per head, 2005 prices $ Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010). BIS central bankers’ speeches  21  Chart 7: Literacy rates in Western Europe Netherlands  Great Britain  Sweden  Germany  France  Italy  Literacy rate, percent 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10  1400  1500  1600  1700  1800  1900  0  2000  Source: OurWorldinData.org, based on Buringh and Van Zanden (2009) and Broadberry and O’Rourke (2010). Chart 8: Average years of schooling of the population aged 15+ Percent  Developing economies  12  World  10  Advanced economies 8 6 4 2  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  0  Source: Barro and Lee (2013).
Rachel Lomax: UK monetary policy – the international context Speech by Ms Rachel Lomax, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the APCIMS Annual Conference, London, 17 October 2005. *  *  *  Those of you who have logged on to the Bank of England’s website recently will have noticed that it has turned a cheerful shade of orange. It is a lovely website and we are very proud of it. But perhaps now was not the best time to major on pictures of happy shoppers clutching bulging carrier bags! The fact is that website design – like monetary policy - is beset by information problems and lengthy lags. These make it very hard to get the timing of changes just right. When the organisers of this conference pressed me for a title some weeks ago, I decided to talk about the international context for UK monetary policy for two reasons. First, I was fresh from a summer spent reading this year’s top business books, whose key theme is the dizzying pace of change in the global economy. But second, I wanted look beyond the shopping story that – understandably – tends to dominate the press, to some of the other factors that have to be weighed when the MPC sets interest rates. But let me start with the recent weakness in retail spending. Judging by the latest indicators, this looks like persisting, at least in the near term.

20 Bank of England (a)  15  15  10  10  5  5  5  0  0 1830  0  1860  1890  1920  1950  1980  2010  Sources: Bank of England, Federal Reserve, U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, ONS and Samuel H. Williamson (2017), 'What Was the U.S. GDP Then?'. (a) Data as at February. Final data point shows the latest published balance sheet data, at 29 February 2016, plus the increase in the loan to the Asset Purchase Facility since this time. Excludes TARGET balances held at the Bank by European central banks in 1999-2001. (b) Consolidated assets of all Federal Reserve banks. Data as at end December. Three key developments disturbed that calm, and led to the introduction of our new financial risk framework. The first was the huge increase in the size of the Bank’s balance sheet following the start of the financial crisis. Today the Bank of England holds assets worth about a quarter of UK annual GDP: a five-fold increase on a decade earlier (Chart 2). In the early part of the financial crisis, much of that increase reflected large scale liquidity assistance to the banking sector. For example the Bank lent £ to RBS 3  4  and HBOS in 2008-9 , and its market-wide Special Liquidity Scheme peaked at £ in 2009 .