samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Alternatively, a solution would consist in requiring banks to form pools of liquidity and to sign multilateral credit lines commitments, specifying the conditions under which an illiquid bank would be allowed to draw on its credit line. However, the risk of coordination failures is substantial and a purely private solution, by shifting inside liquidity around the system, does not address the aggregate liquidity need that arises in the case of systemic shocks.22 In such a situation, the public sector should intervene and provide outside liquidity ex-post. 20  See Bindseil (2013, op. cit.). 21  Rochet and Vives (2001) provide a theoretical foundation for rescuing Bagehot’s view; see J.-C. Rochet and X. Vives “Coordination failures and the lender of last resort: Was Bagehot right after all?”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 2, 6, 1116–1147, 2004. 22  See B. Holmström and J. Tirole “Private and public supply of liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, No. 1,1998. Tirole (2011) emphasises the role of macro-prudential policies to deal with shortages of aggregate liquidity; see J. Tirole “Illiquidity and all its friends”, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Conclusion Let me conclude. In my remarks today, I have focused on new liquidity regulations and have argued that the interaction with monetary policy implementation is expected to be significant and complex. I would therefore conclude that liquidity regulation and central bank operations cannot be looked at in isolation.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  fixed-rate, full allotment regime in its refinancing operations, offering unlimited liquidity to banks at a predictable cost against an expanded set of eligible collateral. The widening of collateral might be seen as a way to mitigate the adverse and destabilizing effects of shortterm funding “runs” relating to a deterioration of asset liquidity, but it can also be seen as a way to prevent large recourse to central bank liquidity by banks, who would otherwise be subject to funding outflows at a later stage of the crisis. Such a widening has to be accompanied by proper risk management measures, such as haircuts, to mitigate the increase of the risk profile of the central bank. The challenge for the central bank is to “buildin” the possibility to expand the set of eligible collateral while mitigating the incentives for banks to abuse it.20 Similarly, the LOLR’s function of providing emergency liquidity assistance has been criticised for provoking moral hazard by banks. Indeed, support that is considered as appropriate during the crisis might have perverse effects on the incentives of banks at a later stage. Banks may ex ante decide to take an excessive exposure to risk, knowing that the central bank will intervene if that risk materialises. Moreover, there is a fine line between liquidity and solvency needs, which in a crisis is often blurred. Central banks should therefore be particularly wary not to substitute for capital support that should be provided by shareholders, investors, or in last resort by governments.
Compared with the countries that passed the entrance examination at that time, Sweden’s economy is doing well. We have managed to achieve stable government finances and combine this with persistently low inflation, with the result that long-term interest rates have fallen towards the European level. In the present situation, Sweden would have little difficulty with the criteria for inflation, the long-term interest rate and government finances. The budget surplus of around 2% of GDP is clearly better than the criterion of a deficit of not more than 3%. Government debt is still above the convergence criterion of 60% but should not constitute an obstacle; the debt is being rapidly reduced – according to the Spring Bill by almost 10 percentage points from 1988 to 1999 – and countries with a weaker position in this respect were admitted in the initial round. Moreover, economic forecasts for Sweden point to the continuation of strong government finances, making more debt repayment feasible and thereby a further improvement in this position. The criteria for low inflation and interest rates are formulated in relative terms. Comparisons with the level of inflation and interest rates in the three euro countries where inflation is lowest show that Sweden would fulfil these criteria today and current forecasts suggest that the same holds for the coming years. The criterion for exchange rate stability is more complicated.

That is certainly true in the sense that we are able to raise the interest rate and ensure that inflation comes into line with our target. But the picture as presented is too rosy. If wage formation were to fail or budget policy became excessively expansionary, the restoration of a balanced economy would be costly: growth would be depressed and employment would presumably fall when interest rates are raised, accompanied perhaps by an appreciation of the krona. In this sense, access to a national monetary policy is not a patent remedy. At the same time, it is clear that we – as a member of the monetary union – would lose the option of guaranteeing low inflation even by having recourse to this costly cure. For example, if the labour market organisations were to make unduly high wage settlements or if fiscal policy were to get out of hand, the Riksbank would no longer be in a position to secure low inflation. To me, however, it is by no means clear that the natural conclusion today is to begin arguing that Sweden ought not to aim for euro area participation as soon as there is political support. Compared with a couple of years ago, the economic situation is now more stable in almost every respect. It is not only that the economy has adjusted in various ways to lower inflation; government finances have also improved and during the past year employment has risen rapidly.
Henrique Meirelles: Ten years of floating exchange rates in Brazil Speech by Mr Henrique Meirelles, Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil, to celebrate 10 years of floating exchange rates in Brazil, Central Bank of Brazil, Brasília, 19 January 2009. *  *  *  It is an honor for me to speak to you today, which marks a special date in Brazilian economic history. That is because ten years ago yesterday, January 18, Brazil floated the Real (BRL), breaking with decades of exchange rate manipulation and repression by the government. I will start with some facts and then offer an assessment of the regime so far. First, let me address the global context. Since its inception the floating exchange rate regime has weathered many storms, starting with the bursting of the high tech bubble in 2000, the Argentine crisis in 2001, the September 11th attacks and, recently, the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis. On the other hand, the global environment was on the whole favorable between 2003 and 2007. So, it is fair to say that in its first ten years the floating BRL has faced a pretty diverse external environment, neither persistently challenging nor consistently favorable. Now, let us consider the behavior of the exchange rate itself. The floating BRL has averaged $ against the USD, within a range of $ on the outset, to $ on 22 October 2002. It is nothing but a sheer coincidence that the nominal exchange rate currently stands very close to its 10-year average.

On the contrary, trends that have been observed over a period of several years continue to hold. The gradual slowdown in the growth of mortgage loans, whose rate of increase is now below 4%, is persisting. The growth in other lending is still picking up pace, confirming the momentum of the business cycle. These loans are now growing at a rate of 16%, which is faster than in the boom period of 1999 and 2000. At this rate, the level attained during that previous boom will soon be reached again. The behaviour of the monetary aggregates might appear to contradict movements in lending. However, we should not forget that money is a long-term indicator, while the other credits are an indicator that moves in line with the business cycle. In response to past increases in interest rates, a transfer from sight deposits and savings deposits to higher-yield term deposits is underway. Consequently, the M1 and M2 monetary aggregates, which do not include term deposits, are declining. M3, which incorporates all types of deposits, is registering very moderate growth compatible with more stable inflation in the medium and long term. Risks associated with the inflation outlook As usual, our assessment of the inflation outlook is embedded in the baseline scenario that we consider the most probable future development. However, the uncertainties associated with the scenario are greater than usual. This is due to a convergence of various trends with differing effects on the economy.
It has built a macro-econometric model with all these channels that transmit monetary policy in the Albanian economy. The main purpose of the model is to analyze the reaction of prices, private consumption and business investment and so on, in reaction to changes that may take place. We call these changes in analytical terms “shocks” to the economy. Our macro-econometric model is promising. Very promising. But for building econometric models we need statistics. Albania has statistics, but we need better statistics. For the year to come, the Bank of Albania wants to improve the statistical framework. The Bank of Albania needs better statistics, I said. With “better” statistics I mean here “more” statistics, “reliable” statistics and “user-friendly” statistics. We need to measure all macro-economic developments in the economy better. And we need to keep track of these developments. Our Albanian history is still short. We only have time series for about 15 years. In time we will logically have longer time series. Our time series need to become timely available and they should be fully understandable. Inside the Bank of Albania we can work more on statistics. In the year 2007 the Bank of Albania will improve its own database on monetary and financial statistics, and on the balance of payment  BIS Review 121/2006  1  statistics. But, for other statistics we depend upon our national statistical office, INSTAT. We also depend on other institutions for providing us with relevant information.

We will re-assess all preconditions regularly through these types of meetings with foreign professionals. In the meantime we are establishing a professional dialog among central bank, INSTAT, Ministry of Finance and other government institutions. Once more, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you very much for your contributions. I wish you a safe return back to your home countries. BIS Review 121/2006  3
The exchange rate may  11 Since February 2015, the Riksbank has purchased nominal and real government bonds. At the end of 2017,  total purchases were calculated to amount to SEK 290 billion. 12 If tenant-owner associations’ debts are also included in household indebtedness, households’ debt-to-income ratio is today around 200 per cent. 13 This calculation can be found in Finocchiaro et al. (2016). 12 [23]  start to weaken due to decreased confidence among foreign investors, which, in turn, could push inflation up. In such a scenario, the Riksbank may be forced to raise the policy rate to restrain inflation. These rising interest rates would primarily impact households with large mortgages. They would face higher mortgage costs and would thus find it more difficult to manage their loans, which could lead to reduced consumption and demand. The calculation assumes that the policy rate is raised by one percentage point. At the current level of indebtedness, mortgage borrowers would have to reduce consumption by almost two per cent. If indebtedness had instead been the same as when inflation targeting was introduced 20 years ago, their consumption would only have decreased by a few tenths of one per cent. Mortgage borrowers’ consumption would thus decrease by a significantly greater degree today, compared with 20 years ago. The calculation probably also underestimates the effect on consumption, as variable interest rates are much more common today, something the example calculation does not consider.

11 [23]  Greater dependence on other monetary policy tools For monetary policy, continued low real interest rates mean that it may become more difficult to stimulate the economy only with the use of the policy rate when economic activity is weakening and inflation is below target. If, for example, the long-term real interest rate is around zero, at the same time as the inflation target is 2 per cent, the policy rate will also be around 2 per cent, on average. This does not provide much scope for interest rate cuts in the event of an economic slowdown, as the policy rate cannot be cut too far below zero. If the economic slowdown is large enough, households and companies may also start to believe that monetary policy’s scope is limited and accordingly set their expectations to a rate of inflation below the inflation target. Consequently, the monetary policy toolkit, both in Sweden and in other countries, may also continue to need to include more tools. This may include large -scale asset purchases, a measure impacting long-term interest rates, expectations of future short-term interest rates and the amount of money in the economy. 11 Another measure that could be used is the publication of forecasts of the interest rate path, so-called forward guidance, which the Riksbank also does. This year, it is actually ten years since we started to publish three-year paths for the policy rate.
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, the lower economic growth rate also attributes to the sluggish activity in some industries, which, until two years ago, generated a considerable portion of the economic growth. These industries operate in the non-tradable sector, implying that the created product remains in the domestic economy, that is, it cannot be traded in the global markets. To be clearer, I refer to the construction sector and the entire chain of economic activities fuelling it. The sluggish economic activity, or the presence of the negative output gap, leads to the conclusion that there are spare production capacities in the economy. According to the latest analyses, these spare capacities have led to lower inflationary pressures in the economy. Against this background, the Bank of Albania has pursued an accommodative policy, trying to lower the financial intermediation costs (and affecting the cost of credit indirectly), in order to boost investment and consumption and, subsequently, economic activity. We have also supplied the banking system and the Albanian economy with the necessary monetary liquidity, in view of meeting the needs of commercial and economic activity. In addition, through our successful monetary policy, we have accomplished our low inflation objective and have guaranteed a stable macroeconomic and financial environment. This stability, which is the core mission of a modern central bank, allows households, businesses and financial institutions to make financial decisions and take business initiatives amid higher future certainty.

Due to the unprecedented financial crisis facing the global economy in general, and the euro area economy in particular, the economic growth in Albania remains below its long-term equilibrium. I refer here to the potential economic growth, or put into more simple words, to the level our economy would grow if it used all its production capacities. We have made attempts in our analyses to find the reasons behind this performance, the consequences and some of the measures that would help smooth out this concern. In the following, I would like to elaborate on some of our conclusions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  I will begin the analysis of the economic and financial situation in Albania dwelling on what we have considered as the major cause and source of risks for the future: the severe global crisis. The situation in our trading partners is a product of the developments in global economy, which is facing a hard period in terms of the macroeconomic and financial stability. The high debt levels of governments and the individuals have curbed the capacity of many advanced economies to spend and make investments, thus affecting the economic activity and their capacity to pay off debt adversely. Many reputable representatives from the academia and the business attribute the cause of the crisis (debt-burdened balance sheets of the governments and individuals) to globalization and the competition it generates.
For instance, while an unexpected and strong monetary tightening was implemented in the face of capital outflows in the May-June 2006 period, an expansionary monetary policy was adopted following capital outflows in the last quarter of 2008 (Chart 4). The contradiction between these two responses can be explained mainly by the significant differences between the said two periods in terms of both economic conjuncture and the sources of the shocks. As both domestic demand and external demand were strong in 2006, the exchange rate movements triggered by capital outflows had the potential to rapidly damage disinflation and inflation expectations. However, in 2008, it is observed that the downward pressure of the global recession and weak domestic demand conditions on the inflation has come to the forefront. 4  BIS Review 3/2009  Chart 4. Policy rates and market interest rates in the 2006-2008 period  26  Policy Rate (Compound)  June 2006 24  Secondary Market Benchmark Interest Rate (Compound)  22 20 18 16 14  November 2008 06.11.2008  18.09.2008  06.08.2008  24.06.2008  09.05.2008  26.03.2008  12.02.2008  28.12.2007  13.11.2007  27.09.2007  14.08.2007  02.07.2007  18.05.2007  05.04.2007  21.02.2007  09.01.2007  22.11.2006  05.10.2006  22.08.2006  10.07.2006  26.05.2006  12.04.2006  28.02.2006  16.01.2006  12  Source: CBT and ISE. In sum, it is seen that the inflation-targeting regime has provided a significant amount of flexibility to take the necessary measures in the face of high-level shocks.

Policy Panel: Investment and growth in advanced economies Remarks given by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England  2017 ECB Forum on Central Banking, Sintra 28 June 2017  1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  The experience of business investment in the UK since the onset of the financial crisis broadly matches that elsewhere in the advanced world – a sharp fall followed by a feeble recovery (Chart 1). Peak to trough, the level of UK business investment fell by 20%, and it was six years before it surpassed its pre-crisis level, putting the recent experience at the bottom of the swathe of past UK cycles (Chart 2). In my brief remarks today, I will offer some possible explanations for this performance before concluding with comments on the outlooks for UK investment and monetary policy. I. Investment since the crisis In part, weak investment reflects a weak economy, with the recovery following the crash being the slowest since the Great Depression. Weakness in demand is not, however, the whole explanation. Business investment has underperformed relative to output since the crisis, with the ratio of the two falling in the UK by around 2 percentage points in the immediate aftermath (Chart 3), similar to the experience in other advanced economies. 1  Falls in investment tend to be more persistent for recessions associated with financial crises (Chart 4). This partly reflects restrictions in credit supply constraining investment, as well as productivity, wages and economic performance more generally.
Major attractions include the Victoria Falls (one of the seven natural wonders of the world) and the Kariba Lake (one of the largest man-made lake). Specific areas of investment in this sector include: •  Game ranching;  •  Provision of accommodation (i.e. high quality five and four star hotels, Lodges and Camp sites near the popular tourist areas);  •  Transport service – Investment potential exists in air charters in form of helicopters and/or small planes to service game areas;  •  Adventure holiday packages;  •  Organised tours;  •  Out door sports facilities (golf courses and stadia); and  •  Zambia’s cultural heritage. 3.6  Construction and real estate  The construction sector is yet another area of investment as the economy expands. A lot has been done in the recent past in construction with housing schemes coming up in various parts of the country. However, there is still a large deficit in terms of housing in Zambia. This deficit in housing provides an opportunity for further investment in the construction of more houses. 4.0  Conclusion  Looking ahead, the achievement and maintenance of a low and stable inflation rate, remains key to enhancement of investment, business planning, confidence in the economy, maintaining external competitiveness and stabilising people’s incomes. In the medium-term, Government continues to pursue market and structural reforms in partnership with the private sector with the view of consolidating the gains so far attained for sustained economic growth and development.

The potential benefits of a well integrated ICT in agriculture are diverse and include: •  transparent dissemination of information such as weather patterns, seed and fertilizer use, availability and distribution;  •  easy accessibility to suppliers of inputs;  •  common distribution of information on market prices of crops; and  •  generally bringing together of suppliers and buyers of crops. Government has put agriculture at the core of rural development and poverty reduction as well as employment creation. It is therefore important to note that the expansion of ICTs in rural communities is more required now than ever before, as most information is now  4  BIS Review 76/2008  disseminated through internet and cellular phones. These facilities will help uplift the living standards of rural communities. 3.2  Agriculture  Zambia’s agriculture sector has enormous potential to become a major grower and exporter of agricultural and horticultural produce. The country has an abundance of quality land, water (over 40% of fresh water resources in Southern Africa) and ideal climate all suited to a wide range of agricultural products. Only 15% of Zambia’s 60 million hectares of arable land is under cultivation. The recent surge in food prices in the world presents an enormous opportunity for Zambia to become the food basket of the sub region. This can be achieved by re-doubling efforts to boost agricultural productivity coupled with substantial increase in infrastructure investment to ease supply bottlenecks that are pushing up prices.