samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Figure 2 CPI monthly inflation (percentage) 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -1.5  Jan.  Feb.  Mar. Apr. 2001-2006 Average  May  Jun. 2007  Jul. Aug. 2008  Sep.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec.  2009  Source: National Statistics Bureau (INE). 6  BIS Review 145/2009  Figure 3  Accumulated CPI variation by country  (percentage)  Japan  0  South Africa Turkey Chile Indonesia  Colombia Hungary Peru Brazil Czech Rep. Malaysia Israel Mexico South Korea Norway USA Thailand Poland UK Sweden Eurozone Switzerland Canada Hong Kong  5  10  USA Eurozone Hong Kong Switzerland Malaysia Chile Japan  15  20  (a) Between January 2007 and October 2008. -4  -2  South Africa Hungary Mexico Brazil Poland Colombia Israel Turkey Indonesia South Korea Sweden UK Norway Peru Thailand Canada Czech Rep.  0  2  4  6  (b) Between October 2008 and September 2009 (*)  (*) For Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and South Africa, data at August 2009. Sources: Statistics bureaus of each country and Bloomberg. Figure 4 World growth forecasts (annual change, percentage) 4  3.0  3  2.5  2  2.0  1  1.5  0  1.0  -1  0.5  -2 -3  0.0 08  May  Sep.  09  May  (a) Forecasts for 2009  Sep.  09  Mar. May  Jul. Sep.  (b) Forecasts for 2010  Source: Consensus Forecasts.

Households and firms reduced their expenditures in preparation for a possible catastrophe,  BIS Review 145/2009  3  causing a much larger drop in demand than would have occurred without the crisis of expectations. In hindsight, you can say that we overreacted, because the catastrophic scenario did not materialize. But the loss of confidence had a real foundation, both because of the deteriorated global macroeconomic and financial conditions and because we were enduring the deepest crisis ever. In this context, there was also the uncertainty about how and how effectively policies would operate, which has faded thanks to the determination of central banks and finance ministries in the larger part of the world. In our case, the quick reaction of macroeconomic policies has been essential in mitigating the impact of the external crisis. Although our GDP will fall this year, the performance of our economy, from a historic perspective, has been remarkable. In 1982 and 1983, the Chilean economy grew nearly 18 percentage points lower than the world’s average. In 1998 and 1999, this difference was around 4 percentage points. In 2009, estimations point at the drop in output in Chile similar to the world’s average (figure 8). Monetary policy can do little to avoid the immediate effects of this kind of confidence crisis. However, policies do play an essential role in preventing these crises from aggravating, and they provide the grounds for the recovery of expectations. To that end it is necessary to act in a timely manner and with conviction.
The experience accumulated over the past several years, both in Chile and in other countries, has brought new challenges and posed new questions on the conduct of monetary policy under inflation targeting. Among these burning questions, let me single out a few: (1)  How uncertainty affects all the dimensions that influence monetary policy decisionmaking  In Chile—as in any other country—monetary policy is subject to several sources of severe uncertainty. To the classical doubts about the timeliness and quality of statistical data necessary to gauge the state of the economy, one must add imperfect knowledge about the nature and persistence of the intense shocks that hit our economy, uncertainty on how appropriate are the models we use to understand economic signals and make projections and, ultimately uncertainty on the value of the models’ parameters. Knowledge is also imperfect on the preferences of the society and of those responsible for the policies applied. Does this generalized uncertainty that permeates central banks around the world justify slower policy reactions to shocks to inflation or GDP? How must dissimilar projections, coming from different models, be weighted in policy decisions? These and other questions raise the need to invest heavily in data, models and economic projections and research, a task to which the Central Bank of Chile devotes great efforts.

The target range and the length of the policy horizon reflects that the Bank will tolerate deviations away from the target range, particularly if caused by temporary supply shocks that raise headline inflation and recognizes that a tradeoff exists between the length of the policy horizon and the volatility of output and employment. This raises several questions, such as: Is the present combination of a 2-4 target range for annual inflation and a 12-24 month policy horizon optimal? How flexible should the extent of the policy horizon to the type of shocks—temporary vs persistent—of supply vs demand? Is it advisable to review the length of the policy horizon as a way to consider asset prices or, in general, financial stability concerns in the conduct of monetary policy? (4)  Measurement and implications of inflation expectations  Of all monetary schemes, the one based on inflation targeting is the most sensitive to private expectations regarding future inflation, because this is the main anchor of inflation and, together with output gaps, is also the main determinant of medium-term inflation. In addition, central banks have no direct control on such expectations. Inflation is the result of pricing decisions of a large number of decentralized agents, whose actions are significantly influenced by their views of what the future aggregate inflation rate will be. Recognizing this, in our Central Bank we assign great weight to direct measures of expected inflation and to inflation compensation derived from the differentials between nominal and inflation-indexed interest rates.
For one thing, the municipality’s credit rating could fall because it takes on another large credit commitment, which would lead to higher loan costs for both the municipality and the housing company. For another thing, there are some credit providers who have already ceased granting loans to municipalities with a poor ability to repay. This situation will probably be accentuated by the advent of the new capital adequacy rules, with more individual assessments of each borrower. Given this, it will be even more important to consider the four points I mentioned earlier. The other important issue is to implement a review of housing policy, as it is important to obtain the construction needed in the regions where jobs are available. This will enable Sweden’s economy to develop well. One example of possible changes is the introduction of market-adapted utility value rents or the complete disappearance of the utility value system. It is possible that more market-adapted rents would contribute to increased production of new properties as a result of increased demand, unlike the current utility value regulated rents where increases in demand do not result in sufficiently large new production of apartment blocks of rental apartments in growth areas. It is often said that a changed, market-adapted system would lead to higher rents, but the question is whether this scenario would not only apply to the more attractive residential areas of the metropolitan regions and university towns.

BIS Review 2/2002  1  The market for apartment blocks, on the other hand, is more complex, as it is affected by a number of different regulations and restrictions. This has led, for instance, to the relationship between rents and prices in this market not being stable. Normally, there should be a connection between the development of prices and rents for apartment blocks, as the future cash flows that constitute the basis for the valuation of the property are primarily governed by rent income. However, the statistics regarding prices and rents for apartment blocks show that the rise in prices of apartment blocks has been clearly higher than the rises in rents since 1995. A similar development took place between 1987 and 1990, although the price rise was much more rapid then. The price increase at the end of the 1980s was driven by expectations of future price rises. Regulations in the form of the utility value system and central rent negotiations provide modest changes in rent every year. The changes in rents do not vary substantially in connection with economic activity and demand. These regulations may have a stabilising effect on the property sector in that they stabilise income flows, given that the vacancy rate for housing is low and does not vary. Stable income flows are a good thing from the lender’s perspective. Do these regulations cause any problems? I can see two main problems, which I shall discuss.
Finally, I would like to mention the necessary action by government, in at least two areas of its competence. The first is fiscal policy. One of the major advantages of the fiscal consolidation drive during the long period of expansion of the Spanish economy is that the government budget mechanisms, known as automatic stabilisers, can now operate fully. These mechanisms act rapidly, promoting confidence and facilitating agents’ formation of expectations. However, the activation of fiscal policy measures of a discretionary nature must be prevented from jeopardising budget stability in the medium and long-term, since this would entail costs far exceeding any potential benefits that might be had in the short-term. The second area of action is that of measures of a structural nature aimed at improving the functioning of certain markets, increasing the flexibility of wage and price formation mechanisms and expediting the reallocation of factors across sectors of the economy. For this task to be successful, the responsible co-operation of the social partners is also crucial. To go into these matters in depth would need a whole conference in itself, so I shall conclude on this point, but not before reiterating once again the main idea I wish to leave with you today. The Spanish financial system has not participated in the causal factors of the current international financial turbulence and this, together with its financial soundness, puts it in a favourable starting position.

Notwithstanding this, and as a natural consequence of credit growth in the past, and of a macroeconomic setting characterised by a cyclical turning point, we should expect continuing rises in bad debts in the coming months. This rise in bad debts should concern us, and indeed it would be alarming if bank regulators and supervisors were unconcerned; but it does so only moderately, bearing in mind the resilience of the banking sector according to the stress tests performed by the Banco de España under assumptions in which extremely adverse scenarios materialise. Nor will I be referring today to the problems that are common to all adjustment processes, the adjustment in the Spanish economy having moreover begun before the turbulence emerged last summer. Rather, I shall be focusing on what for me is the worst effect of this turbulence: the global financial market dysfunctions. So you may better understand my subsequent remarks, I would like to very briefly outline how, starting from a very limited  BIS Review 62/2008  1  segment of the US mortgage market (the subprime mortgage segment), we have reached a generalised situation of international financial market turbulence. The factors behind the current situation are complex. But in my opinion there are two key elements that explain such an intense process of propagation.
Implementing them requires compliance functions to be thoughtful in determining how to identify large long or short positions, given the uncertainty of tradable float. It also challenges staff to consider which trading strategies may have adverse implications for market liquidity and whether they warrant policies around them. Further, the TMPG’s best practices note that responsibility for establishing and maintaining a rigorous internal control environment within an organization rests with its senior management. Neither best practices nor laws nor regulations can guarantee a lack of bad behavior. Recent failures illustrate the adverse consequences that behavioral weaknesses can have for those who rely on financial services. It also underscores the importance of adopting a culture that creates an environment in which laws, regulations, and best practices are valued and upheld. To that end, regulators and supervisors in various jurisdictions have heightened their focus on firms’ corporate governance programs and emphasized the need for instilling values that promote proper behavior and sound decision-making throughout the firms. For example, the New York Fed has been working to advance industry driven culture reform in the financial services industry over the past few years. 19 We are joined by other official institutions and groups across the globe, such as the Group of 30 and the Basel Committee, in pushing for heightened standards of market practice and behavior. 20 Promoting adoption of best practices Ideally, best practice standards should become an integral part of the market, observed consistently and transparently by participants across various segments.

Macroeconomic stability was preserved and performance of the Chilean economy was much better than in previous world recessions (figure 1). Also, the financial system endured the global financial crisis with no setbacks, no systemically important financial institutions experienced major stress, and macroeconomic policies set the stage for the healthy recovery we are witnessing now. The macroeconomic framework of the Chilean economy was very important in attaining these results. This framework rests on four pillars. First, monetary policy management is based on a flexible inflation-targeting regime, conducted by an autonomous central bank and supported by a floating exchange rate system. The inflation targeting scheme considers a 3% annual inflation target, with a two-year horizon to correct deviations and a ±1 percentage point tolerance range. 1 The floating exchange rate regime includes the possibility of intervening in the foreign exchange market under exceptional circumstances, which has happened four times since September 1999. Second, a fiscal policy that is accountable and predictable thanks to a structural balance rule. 2 The significant amount of savings accumulated during the run-up of copper prices was a crucial factor in bolstering the resilience of the Chilean economy and in providing a countercyclical fiscal boost. Third, a high degree of commercial and financial integration with the rest of the world.
Villy Bergström: Is the Riksbank to blame for unemployment? Speech by Mr Villy Bergström, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at Brunnsvik adult education college for trade union officials, Brunnsvik, 4 November 2004. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come to Brunnsvik to speak about the Riksbank and how we work. Over the past ten years, Sweden’s macroeconomic performance has been relatively robust, both in comparison with other OECD countries and with the economic performance of the 1970s and 1980s. But there are problem areas, and I intend today to discuss perhaps the most serious of these - the employment situation. It’s natural in the employment debate that questions are put to the Riksbank, since our conduct of monetary policy affects short-term economic developments. This makes it tempting to criticise the Riksbank and to expect us to be able to solve the employment problems through a looser, more inflation-tolerant monetary policy. However, the experiences of many decades of research and of actual economic developments are unambiguous: inflation is no solution to unemployment problems. To elucidate this it’s important to differentiate between two issues: on the one hand the long-term relationship between a stable, low inflation rate - which is the Riksbank’s statutory objective - and employment. On the other hand the impact of monetary policy on economic activity and employment in the short term.

Over the past decades, LIBOR has been so widely used and deeply ingrained in our global economy that the pricing and return of a broad range 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  of financial products were referencing to this critical benchmark. To help us tackle this complex exercise and further expedite our transition progress, collaborative efforts would be key. This means that – not only banks, sell-side and buy-side institutions should continue to push forward with their preparatory work, but also their corporate and SME clients should step up the transition efforts. 7. To facilitate a smooth transition, tremendous efforts have been put in by various industry associations in the past few years. Alongside their close engagement with industry stakeholders, they have developed useful resources and materials to promote greater awareness and readiness. In this respect, we strongly encourage market participants to draw reference from these industry publication, and make good use of the existing tools available when preparing for the transition. 8. With that, I would like to highlight and draw your attention to a joint information note published by the Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA) and Treasury Markets Association (TMA) last month, which sets out the key options available in the loan market for replacing US dollar LIBOR. We hope that, with this publication, loan borrowers and market participants could develop a better understanding on the characteristics of these options, and make timely action to transition away from LIBOR. 9.
A country that has joined the EU has the obligation to eventually join the euro area. However, it does not adopt the euro immediately upon its accession to the EU. Instead, it becomes what is called in EU-term a “Member State with a derogation”. Countries in the derogation phase have a number of obligations. •  Upon accession of the EU, new Member States are required to treat their exchange rate policy as a matter of common concern and to pursue price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. The Treaty foresees that at some point following accession, new Member States will join the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). •  Moreover, they have to regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern. The economic policies of these Member States become subject to coordination and surveillance at the EU level. This is an essential preparation for the monetary union. Members that once adopted the single currency have to put more emphasis on coordinating economic policies because monetary policy is no longer under national responsibility. III  But policy coordination is not sufficient. To join the euro area, Member States must fulfil a number of legal and economic convergence criteria. The legal convergence criteria oblige the euro area applicant countries to put in place the legal foundations for participation in the monetary union, of which central bank independence is a cornerstone.

Exports to EU and EU’s Final Domestic Demand 15  160 EU's Final Domestic Demand (billion €  14  140  Exports to EU (2010=100, right axis)  13  120  12 100 11 80 10 60  9  2017*  2015  2016*  2014  2013  2012  2011  2010  2009  2008  2007  2006  2005  20 2004  7 2003  40  2002  8  * Forecast. Source: Eurostat, IHS CBRT. 4  Another factor that will lead to an improvement in exports and current account balance is the depreciation of the Turkish lira. As of January, the real effective exchange rate index has fallen to 88.2, which is the historically lowest level in the past 15 years (Figure 7). The most recent data show that export growth has been outpacing import growth and we expect this picture to become more evident during the first half of 2017. Figure 7. Real Effective Exchange Rate (CPI Based, 2003=100) 140  130  120  110  100  90  01.17  01.16  01.15  01.14  01.13  01.12  01.11  01.10  01.09  01.08  01.07  01.06  01.05  01.04  01.03  80  Source: CBRT. Regarding external finance, current account deficit is financed predominantly by FDI flows and long term borrowing (Figure 8).
In particular, we may expect that, after three years of robust growth, investments in residential construction will stagnate at a high level. Overall, we project GDP growth of just over 1.5% this year. Previously, we had expected growth to reach about 1%. To a large extent, this correction to our growth forecast is due to seco’s revision of the figures for the first two quarters. For 2006, we forecast economic growth of a little more than 2%. This would take GDP growth to a level above the potential growth path for the Swiss economy. The output gap – i.e. the gap between normal and actual utilisation of resources – will diminish. Monetary development Alongside the figures for the real economy, movements in monetary and credit aggregates also indicate that economic recovery is underway. Since adopting a resolutely expansionary monetary policy three years ago, mortgage lending has grown at an annual rate of over 5%. We continue to monitor developments in the real estate market closely. Since September, other loans have also recorded positive rates of growth with respect to year-back figures. In the past, a development of this kind usually indicated a strengthening in economic recovery. The economy is well supplied with liquidity as a result of the expansionary monetary policy. Although the growth of the broadly-defined monetary aggregate, M3, had fallen to 1% in October 2004, it has since climbed back to over 6%. However, excess liquidity will be gradually reduced as a result of the interest rate increase announced today.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Creating a sustainable pool of talent for Malaysia Speech by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Kijang Emas Scholarship Award Ceremony, Kuala Lumpur, 30 April 2015. *  *  *  In preparing for the future, a future that is going to be fundamentally different from the current environment, talent development has become more important than ever before. The environment before us is rapidly changing and is continuously becoming more interconnected, more complex and certainly more competitive. It is also becoming more uncertain and unstable. Malaysia has, however over several decades, demonstrated time and again our ability to face the challenges arising from these transformative changes, supported by our resilience and strong foundations. Human capital makes up a critical component of these foundations. Developing the talent that we have and making greater investments in our talent pipeline will contribute to generating the development of our future leaders that will be able to effectively operate in this new environment. Education and capacity building to generate the new talent with the right skills, mindsets and values, as well as effective talent development strategies and their implementation, have now become key priorities of the nation. The Kijang Emas Scholarship Award is an eminent scholarship award that is part of the Bank’s commitment to creating a sustainable talent pool for the nation.