samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We can see that deviations from the normal level of payments vary by industry, fluctuating from week to week, but the overall trend towards normalisation is undeniable. 1/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  For example, in the last week, the total deviation of incoming payments down from the normal level was −7.1% compared to −7.3% the week before. But excluding mining, the production of petroleum products, and government activities, the deviation also decreased to total −1% after −4.4% a week earlier. The Bank of Russia transitioned to a loose monetary policy, cutting its key rate to 4.25% — a historic low. This is necessary to keep inflation on target against the backdrop of disinflationary risks linked with a significant drop in aggregate demand. But this monetary policy focus will also help the economy return to potential more quickly. That said, it is important to take into account that the structural changes in both the Russian and global economy, generated by the pandemic, have most likely affected the potential of the economy. How extensively — it remains to be seen and evaluated. The banking sector is supporting recovery processes: corporate loans have grown by 5.5% since the beginning of the year (growth was only 5.8% last year). Of course, this is also because companies that experienced a sharp drop in revenue experienced a need for debt financing. But the banking sector overall has continued to lend, and we estimate that lending growth will be up to 9% this year.

However, in light of the normalisation of the economic situation, the extension of a number of easing measures and the timetable for additional provisioning, a profit this year of about 1 trillion seems achievable. The fact that most banks maintain profitability (in general, the proportion of unprofitable banks has probably not changed significantly during the pandemic and in general the share of assets of unprofitable banks in the assets of the banking sector is now about 5%, i.e., in general, the share of unprofitable banks is not very large). All of this allows banks to ramp up lending and maintain capital reserves. In general, the overall sector’s capital reserves, measured against key capital ratios, stand at about 5.9 trillion rubles. This is enough to reserve, if necessary, an additional approximately 11% of banking sector lending, which is a very serious safety margin. That is, suppose even if about a third of those restructured loans end up defaulting (which is not a small amount), the capital reverses cover this amount threefold. Let me clarify that this is an overall sector estimate. Capital reserves are unevenly distributed among banks. What general conclusion can be drawn from the response to the pandemic by the banking sector and the implementation of our measures? You cannot predict exactly what the next shock will be, when it will be, what it will be, but reducing financial stability risks, creating safety nets, and consistently eliminating vulnerabilities in the financial sector, will offer protection in any case.
Il est important que le dialogue entre tous les États européens se poursuive, même si le passage à l’euro modifiera l’environnement économique traditionnel de l’Union européenne ; c’est la raison pour laquelle le groupe de l’Euro 11, composé des ministres des Finances de la zone euro, a été constitué et s’est déjà réuni plusieurs fois. Le dialogue entre toutes les parties concernées doit prendre en compte l’indépendance totale de la BCE et l’objectif de la stabilité des prix qui, en vertu du Traité, doit guider la politique monétaire de la zone euro. En particulier, la coordination entre les 15 pays permettra à ceux qui n’ont pas encore rejoint l’Union monétaire de converger vers la zone euro. Le nouveau mécanisme de change qui va lier à l’euro certaines des monnaies concernées (c’est le cas de la drachme grecque et de la couronne danoise er depuis le 1 janvier 1999) apportera sa contribution à ce processus. En favorisant la stabilité des taux de change, le nouveau MCE permettra le bon fonctionnement du marché unique et aidera les pays “ out ” à se qualifier pour la monnaie unique. b) L’Union monétaire aura aussi des relations étroites avec des pays extérieurs à l’Union européenne. 7  BIS Review 22/1999  Premièrement, l’Union monétaire et l’Union européenne constituent un pôle attrayant pour nos voisins de l’Europe centrale. Les résultats atteints par certains d’entre eux au cours de ces dernières années témoignent de progrès remarquables.

Depuis ce jour, l’Eurosystème (c’est-à-dire la BCE et les onze banques centrales nationales des États membres de la zone euro) assume la responsabilité de la conduite de la politique monétaire dans la zone euro en ayant comme objectif principal le maintien de la stabilité des prix. Nous pouvons aujourd’hui exprimer notre satisfaction devant la manière dont s’est réalisée la transition vers un marché monétaire intégré de la zone euro qui s’est mis en place dès les tout premiers jours. S’agissant de l’évaluation fondée sur une large gamme d’indicateurs des perspectives d’évolution des prix, le Conseil des gouverneurs de la BCE a considéré, lors de sa réunion du 7 janvier, que les évolutions sur les marchés de capitaux témoignaient d’un accueil favorable des récentes décisions de politique monétaire de l’Eurosystème, indiquant ainsi que les opérateurs de marché anticipaient le maintien de l’environnement de stabilité des prix. BIS Review 22/1999  4  Pour faciliter l’intégration des marchés de capitaux nationaux, un accord portant sur le calcul et la publication d’un indice de taux d’intérêt des opérations interbancaires a été conclu ; cet indice, l’Euribor, se substitue aux anciens indices nationaux et couvre la gamme des échéances allant de 1 à 12 mois. L’Euribor est rapidement devenu la principale référence de court terme pour les opérations en euro.
Our considerations can and should be altered if the economy develops in a different direction than we had expected. Essentially, this is the same monetary policy strategy as before. The goal for monetary policy still concerns inflation and the ambition remains the same; that is, a desire to ensure that inflation is low and stable a few years ahead, while giving some consideration to the stability of the real economy. This is characteristic of what is known as flexible inflation targeting, which as far as I know, is conducted by all central banks that have inflation targets. In this context I would like to take up a current issue that has recently featured in the monetary policy debate. It has been claimed that the Riksbank places too much focus on asset prices and too little focus on inflationary pressures from the labour market. My response is that the basis for the monetary policy decisions includes analyses of demand and production, as well as the labour market and inflation. It is necessary to analyse asset prices and credit volumes as these affect and are affected by economic activity and inflation. Wage formation also plays a central role in the development of inflation. Over the past ten to fifteen years, fiscal and monetary policy has provided the foundation for good economic growth and wage formation has adjusted to this and functioned well.

Cecilia Skingsley: Experience with macroprudential policies Summary of a speech by Ms Cecilia Skingsley, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a workshop arranged by the Committee on the Global Financial System, BIS, held at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 10 August 2015. *  *  *  Since the global financial crisis, several countries have started implementing macroprudential policies. This workshop has provided us with the opportunity to deepen our knowledge regarding how different countries choose, calibrate and implement different kinds of macroprudential instrument. We have also gained a greater understanding of the efficiency of these instruments, as well as of how different countries incorporate macroprudential settings in the calibration of monetary policy. Although we have come a long way the past few years as regards setting up institutional frameworks and developing tools, macroprudential policy is still a relatively new policy field in many countries and there are many important issues that need to be addressed. I would like to elaborate on three of these issues. The first is the challenge of determining the proper mix of policy instruments and the right balance between them, and deciding how fast and resolute our actions should be when imbalances are building up. For example, on the one hand, we know from international experience that credit growth can be difficult to curb once it starts accelerating. This would speak in favour of prompt and strong measures.
Chart: Distribution of exports – 1835 and 1950 The foundations of a modern shipping nation had been laid. Soon, most of the ships in the fleet were travelling between foreign ports, generating important export revenues. A hundred years after the repeal of the Navigation Act, shipping accounted for almost half of Norwegian export revenues. The era of the sailing ship had passed, but we had been able to utilise new shipping technology, both as shipbuilders and as sailors. Shipping and the maritime sector are still important drivers of the Norwegian economy and a significant source of livelihood for many Norwegians. Norwegian shipping technology still ranks among the best in the world, and a large proportion of Norway’s imports and exports are transported by ship. In Tokyo, Japanese sushi chefs go to the fish market every morning to buy Norwegian salmon. Delicious dishes made from Norwegian dried cod are served in the backstreet restaurants of Barcelona. And in Norway, Bacalhau, a Portuguese dish based on dried cod, has been adopted as a dish for festive occasions. The nature of work at sea has changed. Norwegian sailors are in the minority in the merchant fleet, and large factory ships have taken over from traditional fishing boats. Shipping and fishing generate far fewer jobs now, and for those who still have the sea as their workplace, work is less 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  arduous and less dangerous than it used to be.

Resolution regimes: rolling back the implicit subsidy from the state The most fundamental effects prospectively flow from making orderly resolution credible for the largest and most complex firms. Funding costs for any banks where bailout was STILL confidently expected would be heavily subsidised, as in the past. Where there was uncertainty, there would tend to be somewhat subsidised funding combined with a bias to shorter-term financing which could run at signs of trouble. But such “regimes”, if they merit that description, are unsustainable. Policy is clear: taxpayers should not provide solvency support to banks. Instead, losses exceeding a bank’s equity base should fall on bondholders and other uninsured creditors, in line with the creditor hierarchy that would apply in bankruptcy.1 Other things being equal, exposing the holders of bank bonds to risk will tend to increase the overall cost of finance for banks during normal times compared with the past. Earning a fixed return but exposed to downside risk, investors in, especially, longer-term debt will be a source of market discipline. That is likely to incentivise banks to be better capitalised than in the past – through some combination of less levered balance sheets and less risky business activities. For society at large, the counterpart is that, with a lower probability of failure and credible plans in place to resolve banks without recourse to public funds, government bond yields should be lower than otherwise and the public finances more resilient.
Indeed, the financial crisis of 2008 had far-reaching consequences on the public finances of most countries: tax revenues fell due to declining activity; welfare spending rose due to higher unemployment; stimulus plans had to be implemented and, in many countries with the notable exception of France, the cost of rescuing the financial system was huge. Government deficits in numerous countries increased and their debt exploded. As an indication, the ratio of government debt to GDP of most industrialised countries rose by over 20 points between end-2007 and today, which is very significant. If the fiscal positions of these countries had been sound before 2007, the situation would be very different today. But most countries had large deficits and high debt levels before the crisis. Creditors started to question the ability of some countries to meet their commitments. Doubts emerged as to the “sustainability” of their public debt, despite the fact that, for decades, markets had considered government bonds to be risk-free or the safest type of asset. For the past two years, the epicentre of this second episode of the crisis has been in Europe because the first doubts about the sustainability of an OECD country’s public debt focused on a euro area country: Greece. At end-2009, the newly-elected Greek government announced that the government deficit for that year was twice as high as expected, above 12%, and that public debt exceeded 100%. Creditors suddenly lost all confidence and Greece’s borrowing rates soared, making it impossible for it to access market financing.

Many member countries of the International Monetary Fund have adopted such a code in the form of signing for following the principles of outlined in a general data dissemination system and, at a more stringent level, a special data dissemination system. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka is a signatory to the IMF’s General Data Dissemination System. The final message In summary, if statisticians are desirous of supporting economic development, they should necessarily produce and supply statistics to meet the requirements of the market. It is essential that they produce such statistics as a readily usable product that could be sold in the market at a price. It is now time in Sri Lanka for the private statistics-producers to enter the vast market of information. The universities in this sense are in an advantageous position, because they have the best human talents with them. It is unfortunate that they sit idly on this vast wealth of resources. It is time that universities in Sri Lanka reorient themselves to gain advantage from the market resources and become financially self supporting. In addition, the universities should train their statistics students to become entrepreneurs of statistics rather than becoming employees of agencies that may plan to hire statisticians. BIS Review 36/2009  3
The first year of transformation - 1990 - was practically devoted to the stabilisation goal; further transformation steps taken in 1991 were accompanied by continuing stabilising policy. Measures seeking external stability were an indispensable part of the programme. It was understood that the exchange rate would have to be undervalued in relation to purchasing power parity to sustain the liberalised trade and a partly convertible currency and to function as a stabilisation anchor. Compared to steps such as freeing of prices, freeing of external trade, and introduction of partial convertibility, it was clear that privatisation would be a gradual, more time-consuming process. First, steps were taken to stop state subsidies to firms (as well as to prices), and to let the firms face a hard budget constraint; that included also a stricter credit policy by commercial banks. A shift of property rights to private hands was the only way how to BIS Review 25/1997  -4-  change fundamentally the behaviour of firms, expose them to the pressures of the market, and initiate productivity increase and structural change. In 1989 the private sector was almost non-existent in the former Czechoslovakia, accounting just for 3 per cent of GDP. Domestic capital base was weak and institutions of market economy such as stack exchange and developed financial sector were lacking. Therefore, a combination of standard privatisation methods (that means sales, including sales to foreign investors) with non-standard ones was used to speed up the process.

In 1995 and 1996, however, the growth of real wages, which - if aggregated over all sectors - was faster than the increase in productivity, became one of the potential inflationary dangers. The nominal anchor of the fixed exchange rate played an important role in the relatively good Czech results in fighting inflation. Instead of repeated smaller devaluations as in Poland or Hungary, the Czech Republic used a combination of a large initial devaluation and a subsequently fixed nominal exchange rate. In 1990 - before the start of the full transformation programme - the currency was devalued by more than 50%. That subsequently enabled us to keep the nominal exchange rate stable for five years. After the introduction of a wider 7.5% fluctuation band in 1996, the exchange rate is within the band. Transformation involved so much fundamental change that its start inevitably led to an initial fall of output and GDP. However, part of the former higher output level was simply feeding the enormous waste which went on throughout the command economy. In 1993, GDP stagnated partly due to the split-up of Czechoslovakia. Economic growth was resumed in the Czech Republic in 1994 and continued in 1995 and 1996 as a fast growth period. Unemployment has been kept low during the whole transformation period, thanks mainly to the rapid emergence of new private firms, and a large shift of labour into the previously underdeveloped service sector.
A recent Economist article even asked, “Can central banks talk too much?”15 It essentially argued that forward guidance on interest rates could complicate price dynamics in the bond market as the central bank simultaneously signals its intentions to the markets, while taking its cue from them. As policy decisions are ultimately a judgement call made against an inherently uncertain backdrop, there is naturally a limit to how much transparency can do to make central bank action predictable. Communication is also context-specific, where a standard rules-based approach will not work. Discussions at forums like this are extremely valuable because they provide the opportunity to share experiences from real-life settings, including what has worked and what has not, as well as the pitfalls and the nuances. Hopefully, some general guiding principles can emerge, that will prove useful for practitioners gathered here today. In conclusion, the guidelines for monetary policy communications are probably due for a refresh given the increased complexity facing the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. For 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  sure, central banks must continue to talk, engage, and be accessible and accountable. How we do it could evolve, and this high-level seminar serves to help us do just that and hone our communication skills. I wish you a most productive session. Thank you. References Bernanke, B S (2007), “Federal Reserve Communications”, Speech at the Cato Institute 25th Annual Monetary Conference, Washington, D.C., 14 November.

Ardo Hansson: Availability of banking services in Estonia Answer by Mr Ardo Hansson, Governor of the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank), before the Riigikogu (the unicameral Parliament of Estonia), Tallinn, 22 September 2014. *  *  *  Interpellations raised by members of the Riigikogu concerning the accessibility of banking services 1. Why has Eesti Pank not set minimum requirements for the provision of cash and payment services in a decree alongside the technical requirements, in the context of the Emergency Act? 2. What solutions has Eesti Pank discussed for ensuring the equal accessibility of cash and payment services across Estonia? The principal position of Eesti Pank Banking services are important and they need to be accessible to people and companies across Estonia. It is reasonable for services to be provided efficiently and flexibly. I understand that people are worried about the accessibility of banking services across Estonia. Eesti Pank does not prefer any one means of payment over any other. Cash is an official means of payment and so Eesti Pank believes that it should be available through flexible solutions everywhere in Estonia. Eesti Pank works every day to supply Estonian companies and people with cash. We provide a flexible cash service to the commercial banks, giving cash out and taking it in every working day, and in exceptional circumstances we can be even more flexible.
Meanwhile, room for further policy accommodation was diminishing, and any possible side effects of keeping the interest rate low for a protracted period, needed to be taken into account. 10. I would like to end my remarks by thanking you all again for your contributions to the Thai economy and let me assure you that the Bank of Thailand will continue our works to ensure a stable and resilient financial and economic environment, conducive to economic growth of the country. Thank you very much. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Its consequences are still being felt today and the focus of policymakers has, therefore, shifted to the immediate task of giving the economy a quick resuscitation and lifting it out of the short-term slump. After the crisis, foreign direct investments from the eurozone have dropped significantly. However, despite the weakness back home, the UK’s net FDI to Thailand still managed to register a positive number of approximately 48 million USD for the first three quarters of 2009. It is, therefore, to our mutual benefit for the BCCT to have a good understanding of the outlook and challenges for the Thai economy from a policymaking standpoint. This will be the mission of my speech today and I would like to proceed in the following sequence: First, I would like to start by giving you an update on the current economic development; second, I would attempt to draw an outlook for the Thai economy for the year 2010; and third, I will outline the key challenges that await the Thai economy going forward. Ladies and Gentlemen, As you all know, the Thai economy was hard-hit by a sharp drop in the external demand caused by this global financial crisis. The spillovers from the large decline in exports were far-reaching and affected all sectors of the domestic economy, with the manufacturing sector being hardest hit. Consequently, sentiment turned gloomy as more workers started to lose their jobs. To make matter worse, the escalation of internal political tensions adversely affected private consumption and investment.