samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The remittance flows have further increased to $ 1,726.7 mn by end September 2006 and a 20% increase is expected by the year end. Remittances provide income support to families and opportunities for un-skilled workers to travel, improve skills, earn foreign exchange and engage in self-employment afterwards. It is estimated that about 1.3 mn Sri Lankan migrant workers are employed in different countries in various capacities. The banking sector, the government as well as the country as a whole benefit from worker remittances. The country uses remittances for payment of imports, goods and services while the banks invest remittances in foreign currency bonds issued by the government. That helps the government's foreign borrowing programme. More recently, the government resorted to issuing of foreign currency denominated bonds and attracted a significant part of worker remittances through banks. In addition, the banks also use worker remittances for their foreign currency trades and investments. If not for remittance inflows, Sri Lanka would have been severely affected by the increase in oil prices that raised the oil bill by three times in 2006. The enhanced remittance inflows also reduced pressure in the foreign exchange market and hence on the exchange rate.

Cash payments still account for a large proportion of the number of transactions in the Swedish economy. But it comes as no surprise to anyone if I say that they have declined in significance in recent decades. As a per cent of GDP, the share of Swedish banknotes and coins in circulation (M0) has more than halved since the 1950s, from around 10 per cent to just around 3.5 per cent. 2 In the past fifteen years, however, the trend has levelled off. The use of cash has not declined in the same way as before. M0 in nominal terms has actually increased. If we look at the statistics for ATM withdrawals, we find that the total transaction value has remained fairly constant at around SEK 275 billion a year during the entire 2000s. The number of cash withdrawals has been around SEK 320 million. Does this mean that we have reached a lower limit for how much the use of cash can decline? Has the heyday of the account-based payments ended? I do not believe we should be so sure of that. Cash is still expensive to transport and manage and a heightened risk of robbery in recent years has not made cash management cheaper. In the end, it is we consumers who pay the costs in different ways. However, we must probably point out that we Swedes like our cash more than most analysts believed a few years ago. How then have the account-based payment instruments developed?
The Federal Reserve entered this tightening cycle with its overnight policy rate at the zero lower bound and with a large portfolio of long-duration securities. Normalization, therefore, has two parts: increasing the overnight rate, and reducing securities holdings to a smaller size. The FOMC began raising the overnight rate from zero in late 2015, and it began reducing the size of the portfolio late last year. First: overnight rates. Due to the large supply of reserves that has accompanied the Federal Reserve’s expanded balance sheet, we are employing a new and innovative framework to control money market rates. 5 Before the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve followed a wellworn playbook for monetary policy implementation that was based on keeping reserve balances scarce. Nowadays, however, reserves are no longer scarce. Our current framework relies, instead, on providing the market with two overnight investment opportunities to help steer money market rates: interest on reserves (IOR), which is the Federal Reserve’s main tool to control interest rates, and the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) facility, a secondary tool. The current framework is simple and efficient to operate. In contrast, in the pre-crisis regime, hitting the target federal funds rate each day was a technically challenging exercise. 6 We also have now had more than two and a half years to observe the performance of this framework, 4  These remarks focus on dollar money markets, many of which are linked to LIBOR, and do not discuss the reference rate itself.

Clarity and enforceability of the fiscal framework should also be enhanced. 3. The need for structural reforms  Turning to the aim of a higher long-term sustainable growth rate in the euro area more generally which, as I said, should be our major strategic goal, what we need is both higher productivity growth and higher employment creation. What is needed for these objectives to be achieved are economic reforms that ensure that capital, labour and product market rigidities will be substantially lowered. Structural reforms in capital, labour and product markets and in social security systems are needed to allow an allocation of capital and human resources which would be much closer to the optimum, enhancing the euro area’s growth potential and facilitating the adjustment to economic shocks. The reform priorities in the euro area’s capital, labour and product markets are overarching and very broad. In many cases they need to be translated into concrete policy measures at the European and/or the national level. Starting with capital markets, the pace of reform in this field has been impressive over the last years in anticipation and since the introduction of the euro. This includes policy-induced reform, such as the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) or the development of national legal frameworks governing the issuance of mortgage bonds. Reform covers also market-led initiatives, such as the development of electronic trading platforms or consolidation in the clearing and settlement infrastructure. Despite the past achievements the need for continuation and completion of the reforms remains.
It is certainly clear that a minimum capital framework, however sophisticated, cannot on its own capture the full range of risks in a banking organisation. This has been recognised by the Basel Committee; it is the reason why the Consultative paper introduces the supervisory review process for individual banks under Pillar 2 of the framework, as a complement to the minimum capital standard laid down in Pillar 1. It is equally clear that supervisors, even armed with powers to review the individual capital adequacy of banks under Pillar 2, may under some circumstances be less effective than the market at disciplining risk taking, which again is why the Basel Committee is emphasising the importance of enhanced public disclosure under Pillar 3 of the Accord. But to my mind there is very considerable scope for improving the risk-sensitivity of the minimum capital standard before the benefits of this begin to be outweighed by the costs of greater complexity. Indeed, greater risk sensitivity ought in some respects to mean more simplicity in the capital framework, achieved by aligning capital with a common underlying concept of risk, such as internal or external ratings. Internal ratings indeed offer a very significant opportunity to bring regulatory measures of capital more into line with the economic measures established by industry best practice: in the absence of this, arbitrage of the system through securitisation and other means will remain a problem. The current review also offers the opportunity to iron out some of the existing, fairly arbitrary, quirks of the current Accord.

I mean no disrespect to the existing well-known rating agencies - indeed quite the contrary - when I say that the last thing the regulators would want to see is a mushrooming of untried rating agencies all clamouring for “recognition” from supervisors. We have no wish to see the supervisory net extended, 3  BIS Review 132/1999  by way of quasi-regulation, to rating agencies; nor do we wish to substitute regulatory judgements for the very satisfactory investor discipline that currently operates in the ratings arena. I note that the EU Commission’s consultative paper on reforming the EU framework goes further than the Basel Committee’s and talks of designing an internal ratings based approach that could potentially be used by all banks, not just large sophisticated ones. This makes some sound sense, since, to my mind, banks should seriously question what value-added they are bringing to the credit intermediation process if they do not have a reasonably systematic mechanism for assessing and pricing borrower risk. There are indeed various ways that an internal ratings based approach could be designed, with varying degrees of sophistication depending for instance on the number of “buckets” that are used, whether maturity is incorporated as an additional dimension, and whether the bank’s own internal estimates of loss-given-default are recognised, as well as simple default probability. We do not at this stage have a strong view as to where along this spectrum of complexity the internal ratings approach should be pitched.
Cross-border retail payment services in the euro area  You may recall that in September 1999 the ECB published a report presenting the views of the Eurosystem on how to improve cross-border retail payment services and defining the objectives that the industry is expected to achieve by 1 January 2002. In September this year, the ECB published a progress report. This report concludes that, although most objectives have not yet been fulfilled, substantial progress has been made in preparing the ground for a more efficient handling of cross-border retail payments. Allow me to give you some examples: i. The banking sector has agreed on straight-through processing standards, which will allow the automated execution of cross-border payments;  ii. The Euro Banking Association has developed a payment system specifically designed for cross-border low-value payments, which commenced operations on 20 November 2000;  iii. As from 2002, cross-border payments below EUR 12,500 will no longer need to be reported for balance of payments purposes and hence statistical reporting will no longer constitute a justification for high customer fees. Insufficient progress has been made in the field of customer prices. In too many cases, the payee has been charged with some costs even though the payer had agreed to bear all costs. Two initiatives currently being developed by the European Credit Sector Associations are intended to address this situation. First, a multilateral interbank exchange fee is being developed, which, provided that the fee is low, could be acceptable and could indeed contribute to solving the problem of “double-charging”.

The Federal Reserve’s Pandemic Response - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  SPEECH  The Federal Reserve’s Pandemic Response June 25, 2020 Michael Held, Executive Vice President and General Counsel Remarks at Union of Arab Banks Webinar: Global Banking in Light of COVID-19 and Geopolitical Development (delivered via videoconference) As prepared for delivery  Thank you. It's an honor to join you. And, as a central banker, it is a special privilege to speak alongside the Governors of the Central Bank of Egypt and the Central Bank of Tunisia. My topics today are the Federal Reserve's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the challenges that lie ahead. As always, the views I express are my own, not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.1 Pandemic Work of the Federal Reserve The challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic are daunting. On a personal level, we fear for the health and livelihoods of ourselves and our loved ones. On a professional level, our organizations face existential challenges largely beyond our creation or control. On a societal level, we see how injustice and inequality have reduced confidence in public institutions and increased polarization— right when we most need to come together. To do its part, the Federal Reserve has committed to "us[e] its full range of tools to support households, businesses, and the U.S. economy overall in this challenging time.
Therefore I would strongly agree with any initiative that encourages FDI’s in these sectors through attractive laws and other measures. I believe FDI’s are very important for providing long term stability of the foreign sector. Moreover the productivity growth that usually follows FDI’s inflows will play e significant role in reducing current account deficit. Our economy needs more foreign direct investments hence Country Credit Ratings constitute a chief priority for our economy. It is my belief that FDI’s represent a regional rather than an individual challenge for the South East Europe. Countries in the region must coordinate their efforts toward creating a regional market. Regional infrastructure projects will significantly increase attractiveness and competitiveness as well as international financial market awareness toward our region. It will improve confidence and provide necessary economic incentives to enter in the region leading to higher FDI’s inflows for each economy. BIS Review 85/2006  1  Inflation Our economy has experienced a relatively long period of stable prices. Annual inflation figure as measured by the consumer price index, for the last 12 months is reported at 2.4 percent. Both monetary and fiscal policies have been important factors in keeping inflation low. However, recently inflation pressures have accelerated. The fast growth of credit to economy, the steep increase of oil prices, administrative increase of energy prices, as well as other risks have the potential to create inflationary pressures and pose risk to elevate inflation expectations.

Bank of Albania will take all necessary actions to ensure an inflation rate of 3 per cent with a tolerance band of ± 1 percent, in the short and long run. Interest rates During the recent years interest rates have dropped reflecting the ease of monetary policy. This has been a general trend for all financial assets either in Lek or foreign currency. On average banking system applies 9.7 percent for loans in domestic currency. The yield of 12 month Government securities dropped at a minimum of 5.74 percent in June 2006. However, following the last decision of the Bank of Albania and latest trends in global markets, a modest increase in interest rates has been observed during the last three months for both domestic and foreign financial instruments. We expect this trend to persist within the next 6-12 months. Banking system The Albanian banking system continues to expand. It is solid, consolidated and fully capitalized. The system consists of 17 banks, of which only 3 are entirely domestically owned. Banking network has been extended continuously including remote areas. Banking products increased in number and improved in quality. Entrance in the market of important European financial groups created a better competitive environment and further enhanced efficiency. The expansion of lending portfolio and more competitive lending rates has deepened financial intermediation. Latest data show that in June 2006, the assets of the banking sector reached 60 per cent of the Albanian Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
But it does represent a substantial evolution in our collective thinking over the past decade or so towards a much more common approach to economic management, which serves as a valuable framework within which countries' performance can be assessed. The snail may have moved slowly but it has in fact travelled a considerable distance! But broad agreement on the principles, does not make them any easier to apply in practice. This is evident from the imbalances which have built up within and between the major industrial countries in recent years. It is uncertainty as to how those imbalances are likely to be corrected that underlies much of the current concern about the prospects for the global economy. The major uncertainty relates to the situation in the United States which has experienced a period of exceptionally strong economic growth with relatively low inflation until quite recently. Briefly – and no doubt oversimply – this very strong performance is widely seen as driven largely by exceptional productivity gains, as the application of new information and communications technologies spread through the economy. This development promised a higher sustainable rate of growth in the US economy and higher corporate earnings growth. That expectation contributed to a rapid rise in equity prices, especially in the "high tech" sectors, which in turn helped stimulate both business investment in the US and consumer demand causing the private sector to move into financial deficit.

These objectives of macro-economic policy – monetary and overall fiscal policy – will certainly be familiar to you in this country; they are at the heart of the policies being pursued right across Europe;  BIS Review 36/2001  1  and they are the policies endorsed, too, by all the members of the IMF in the Madrid Declaration adopted at the IMF Annual Meeting in 1994 and expanded and updated two years later. Of course on occasion the flesh proves to be weaker than the spirit – and achieving these macro-economic objectives is not easy in practice even as a technical matter. But the intention – the international commitment to macro-economic stability – is clear. Acceptance of the aim of macro-economic stability served to bring into sharper focus the structural, supply side, of the economy – that is the whole raft of influences that can affect the underlying growth rate of capacity and thus the growth rate of aggregate demand that can be sustained. And here, too, there has been a strengthening international presumption in favour of open markets and free competition – both domestically and internationally – with a continuing strong presumption against predatory trade or exchange rate manipulation. The justification is that undistorted competition contributes to potential global economic growth through increased efficiency and the more effective allocation of productive resources. Faster growth in turn provides a more favourable context for addressing social concerns, including the issue of poverty.
Yet we set out on this path only very recently and I must say that the progress made has been surprisingly fast. For all our sakes, we trust that we will be up to the challenge. Thank you. 9/9

Lim Hng Kiang: Challenges, opportunities and getting it right Speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Minister for Trade and Industry and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore Institute of Directors, Directors’ conference 2010, Singapore, 15 November 2010. *  *  *  Mr John Lim, Chairman of the Singapore Institute of Directors Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen Introduction 1. It is my pleasure to join you this morning for the inaugural Directors’ Conference organised by the SID. 2. I would like to compliment SID for its initiative and efforts in bringing together directors and experts from diverse backgrounds for this conference. 3. As you know, the SID was established in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 to raise standards of corporate governance. In the aftermath of yet another financial crisis, it is timely for us to review and consider how Singapore can continue to improve its corporate governance standards. 4. The recently released Asian Corporate Governance Association-CLSA survey on corporate governance ranked Singapore as having the best corporate governance practices in Asia. Despite ranking first in the survey, the report highlighted that there is still much to be done. Getting it right from Singapore’s perspective 5. The theme of today’s event is “Challenges, Opportunities and Getting It Right”. Getting the corporate governance framework and practices right in Singapore is not a luxury but a necessity for our competitiveness. While Singapore has recovered strongly from the global financial crisis, the outlook remains uncertain.
I do not cite the case of the United States to imply that the Riksbank has already decided to make further rapid interest rate increases in the near future. That is not how we work. Those who follow what we do know that the foundation for monetary policy measures is our inflation forecast. At the time of the latest repo rate increase the Riksbank’s Executive Board judged that inflation is rising only moderately and will be approximately in line with the target in one to two years’ time. It must be borne in mind, of course, that new information may alter our assessment and that our time horizon in the upward phase is moving ahead. In the short perspective, however, things look a little different. The rate of inflation may actually tend to slacken this spring, partly due to effects of the deregulation of telecommunications. But as I said, the perspective for monetary policy lies further ahead. Forecasting is difficult The difficulty for the Riksbank lies in constructing forecasts for the period - usually one to two years ahead - that is generally regarded as the time lag before an interest rate adjustment has its full effect. Anyone with some experience of forecasting knows how difficult this can be and is aware that forecasts not infrequently miss the mark.

We could in fact attach more importance to the current as opposed to the forecast future rate of inflation but that would probably call for rather large repo rate adjustments in order to keep inflation stable around the target. Such an approach would result in sharp fluctuations in real economic activity, which would naturally not be desirable. Are there any developments which suggest that the time lag for effects of interest rate adjustments may be becoming shorter? More and more home owners are switching from fixed to variable mortgage rates, which may indeed tend to speed up the impact of monetary measures. But there are other factors which may be working in the opposite direction, towards a longer time lag. One example is the costs involved in altering prices. One of the benefits of low and stable inflation is precisely that it facilitates contracts with a longer duration. Insofar as the establishment of a low-inflation regime has led to price movements being more restrained for this reason, it follows that it will take longer for monetary policy measures to impinge on prices. For monetary policy’s time horizon, there are therefore arguments in both directions. The problem of faulty forecasts is limited, however, in that monetary policy is implemented continuously. Moreover, current information about economic tendencies can be accorded more weight than events that lie further ahead and the forecasts can be revised as time passes.