samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There is also the possibility in the euro area to ask for refinancing by the ESM. Those developments are key for providing a comprehensive response. We still have some work to do to finalise the consolidation of public finances and establish them on a stronger footing. But clearly we are well advanced in the process of doing so, and the same is true of the banks’ capital base, although we may have to finish that with the SIFIs’ capital surcharge as from next year or thereafter, and with banking union which is in the process of being negotiated. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  EUROWEEK: You’ve made some very strong comments about London. But what role does Paris see itself playing as a financial centre in the European context? Noyer: First, it’s clear that London is and will remain a major financial hub which brings a lot of advantages to the global economy, given its skills base and the capacity of its infrastructure. The comment I made was not a suggestion that Paris should replace London but simply that I do not believe in the trend of financial services concentrating more and more in London. This is something that should not be acceptable from a financial stability perspective by the euro area authorities. Why? Because, in the event of any problems, the central bank needs to be able to provide liquidity without any time lag where and if it is needed, and in a strictly controlled way.

This is essential if we are to avoid distortions in the convergence of competitiveness and therefore prevent a reemergence of the problem of growth moving towards certain parts of the eurozone to the detriment of others. In structural terms a decisive move in this direction was the agreement on banking union which will break the negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns and will ensure the efficiency of the single monetary policy. Last but not least there was the new concept developed by the ECB saying it was determined to do whatever it took to ensure the stability of the euro. The concept of the OMT has the merit of making it difficult for the market to fight the central bank once it has expressed a determination to do whatever it takes to achieve a certain goal. On the other hand, the OMT is also credible because of the conditionality. It’s not a case of simply endlessly signing cheque after cheque. It is framed within the context policies which are geared towards sustainability. Finally, of course there is the permanent backstop of the ESM. So I think that when we look at all these decisions they amount to a very comprehensive package which addresses all the doubts and questions which have been raised since the start of the sovereign debt crisis. Therefore it is quite natural that 2012 is considered by market participants to have been a landmark in the creation of a new era for the eurozone.
As our knowledge of the size of the threat improves, expectations of how banks should perform this role have also increased. This also means that managing financial crime risk has become a significant compliance undertaking, particularly in the area of transaction monitoring. 17.But the ability for banks to work in a sea of data and fund flows is indeed very challenging. It is not that our systems do not produce results, judging from an average annual growth of 40% in 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  the past five years in suspicious transaction reports. Rather, it is the degree of success by which those results contribute to the objectives of our AML system – to deter, disrupt and detect – that are increasingly under scrutiny 18.To improve our work, Regtech solutions are increasingly being recognised as highly applicable in AML. Data analytics and machine learning are seen as having huge potential to complement banks’ processes in AML/CFT surveillance, and improve efficiency and effectiveness of the process. 19.For example, the generation of huge numbers of alerts by transaction monitoring systems, which can sometimes require armies of analysts to process, is a pain point for banks. We note that some banks use machine learning and artificial intelligence to help detect and recognise suspicious behaviours and patterns, as well as to facilitate the closing of low-risk alerts. This helps free up precious analysts resources to focus on investigating high-risk cases, and in turn enhance the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the transaction monitoring process.

Andrew Bailey: Meeting varied people Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England, at Diversity in Market Intelligence: Launching our Meeting Varied People Initiative, 21 April 2021. * * * Thank you Andrea for that introduction, and thank you to everyone for joining us today. People often talk about diversity in terms of the makeup of their own workforces – and for a public institution like the Bank, it is vital we reflect the whole society we serve. This includes both identity and cognitive diversity, which are equally important. 1 I often say I don’t want to work in a place that is full of people like me.2 I want the Bank to have an inclusive and open culture where people speak up, ensuring we make better decisions by mitigating the risks of groupthink and myopia. Over recent years, a number of my colleagues at the Bank have also emphasised the importance of diversity and inclusion, both for us as an employer, and as a wider public good for the financial sector. 3 We have made significant progress internally: for example, launched our Out & Proud Action Plan in September 2020, and continue to sponsor the ‘Women in Finance’ Charter. 4 But there is always more to be done, which is why for example we recently initiated a review, led by our Court of Directors, on ethnic diversity and inclusion. I know that many of you are doing similar work within your firms.
It is to encourage banks to lend to corporations, SMEs and households alike; similarly, extending the asset purchase programme to corporate bonds will be of particular benefit to large French corporations. In other words, we are securing the provision of credit to businesses and households, and protecting it from tensions linked to market volatility. c) Now, what about the risks? I talked earlier about the risks of doing nothing: we need to take action in order to bring inflation back up towards 2%. That said, we also need to keep a close eye out for any possible negative side-effects of our monetary policy, notably for financial stability. We are actively monitoring the financial cycle, including in France where the task falls to the High Council for Financial Stability set up in 2013. I took part in its 8th meeting at the Finance Ministry last week. For the time being, there are no signs of bubbles forming in our main financing markets: on the whole, developments in the equity markets appear in line with corporate profit forecasts, while evolutions in bond yields also seem consistent with the outlook for inflation and growth. Nor are there any signs of excessive credit growth in the financial system. Nevertheless, we remain vigilant over all aspects of the current macroeconomic and financial environment.

b) Why have we decided to do more on 10 March? The comprehensive package that has been introduced by the ECB sends out two clear messages: First, our decisions are guided by our mandate which is to bring inflation back towards our target of 2% over the medium term. We are firmly set on this objective, and we have a broad range of instruments with which to achieve it. In addition to interest rates, we are also acting both on: bank credit easing with the new series of targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO 2); and on market financing via the extended QE asset purchase programme, to 80 billion EUR per month including corporate bonds. On top of that, we are guaranteeing that we shall continue to do so for as long as necessary – via forward guidance. So, negative interest rates are only part of a much more comprehensive package. We think that they have been effective, but they naturally have their limits. Furthermore, the Governing Council gave a strong signal of its will towards an internationally cooperative attitude, as it decided not to opt for a tiering system exempting banks from negative rates. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Second message: our priority is to promote the financing of the real economy. The goal of TLTRO 2 is not, as some have claimed, to offset the impact of negative rates on banks.
I have read two papers prepared by Aspen Institute and the German Marshall Fund: the report “Dialogues on the national interest. Recommendations of public policies” and the program “East-West Gateway”. They generate the object of the forthcoming debates. Allow me to make some remarks regarding the national interest and the transformations within the financial sector that are currently taking place in Europe. The national interest goes beyond its economic dimension, although it is also true that the smooth functioning of the economy is not only an objective per se, but also a means to achieve the other objectives subordinated to the national interest. As any other European central bank we are focused on price and financial stability. Obviously, monetary and financial stability is an essential ingredient of economic performance. This is all the more relevant for a catching-up economy, such as Romania. On the one hand, progress towards convergence is impossible to imagine without capital accumulation from local and external sources alike, and it cannot be achieved in the absence of a viable financial system. On the other hand, investments imply a long-term outlook, whereas high and volatile inflation or fragile financial sector hampers long-term planning. Moreover, the recent global crisis has shown that it is far cheaper to prevent financial instability than to rescue financial institutions in distress.

Anita Angelovska Bezhoska: The Republic of Macedonia has accessed the highest statistical data dissemination standard of the IMF - SDDS Plus Address by Ms Anita Angelovska Bezhoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the event marking the adherence of the Republic of Macedonia to the IMF’s Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) Plus, Skopje, 1 February 2019. * * * Dear ladies and gentlemen,  It is my great pleasure that the idea which at the national level was initiated by the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia several years ago, and accepted and actively supported by the State Statistical Office and the Ministry of Finance, today is already a reality. On 28 January this year, the Republic of Macedonia officially became a member of the highest statistical standard of the International Monetary Fund – SDDS Plus. We have jointly succeeded our country to become part of an international data dissemination initiative, which so far included only seventeen countries, including the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Japan... The Republic of Macedonia is the eighteenth country in the world, the second from Southeast Europe, and the first among the countries of the region that are still not members of the European Union. This successful project is a clear confirmation of the commitment of the three institutions for the continuous upgrading of national statistics and their harmonization with the latest, highest international statistical standards. What actually does this standard represent?
In investment, a weak performance is anticipated for the remainder of 2022 and all of 2023, in line with the more persistent rise in the real exchange rate, worse financing conditions, the reduction in the investment outlook contained in the latest survey of the Capital Goods Corporation (CBC) (public works, mining and energy projects) and the weakness of construction sector indicators. In addition, the pessimistic outlook for the sector (IMCE) and the current high uncertainty. It should be noted that the fall in the machinery and equipment component would be lower than expected, given the higher volume of capital imports, mainly associated with energy projects and transportation and telecommunications. 3  Bilateral Meetings  Market forecasts for activity and demand exceed those of the central scenario, especially for 2023, even considering the corrections after the IPoM was published. The differences are especially notable in the case of private consumption. Certainly, the external impulse that the Chilean economy will receive will be lower than in previous years and what we anticipated some months ago, mainly due to less favorable financial conditions and terms of trade, together with lower external demand. In this macroeconomic scenario, inflation will return to the 3% target within two years. Core inflation will decline more slowly, affected by higher persistence. Our closing inflation projections —at the beginning of September— were made with a nominal exchange rate at $ In recent days, it is closer to $ a depreciation of around 5%.

However, this has diminished during 2022 with the recovery of labor supply and lower demand. The peso's depreciation has also played a relevant role in the rise in inflation. The increase in the exchange rate has been caused by a combination of internal and external factors, where the former have a greater weight. In recent years, the Chilean currency has lost value vis-à-vis other comparable currencies, mainly because of greater local uncertainty and some political-legislative decisions taken in previous quarters. More recently, the peso's evolution has been more linked to the dollar's global appreciation. Data for the quarter ending in August shows that job creation is stagnant, the unemployment rate remains at 7.9% and labor participation has stabilized. On the other hand, the Internet Job Postings Index shows a decreasing trend during the year. Nominal salaries present annual increases of around 11%, and real salaries remain at negative values close to 3% annually as of August. 1  Bilateral Meetings  •  Persistence  Inflation expectations have remained above the 3% target for several quarters. Although some measures they have receded somewhat at the margin, the fact that they have remained elevated for so long increases the risk of a mores persistent inflationary process and constitutes a very relevant point of attention for the Board's decisions. In fact, the latest Financial Operators' Survey (FOS) indicates that expected inflation in one-year falls to (previous: 6.3%) 6.0% and in two years to 4.5% (previous: 5.0%).
If cash is needed as a means of payment in a crisis, it must also be possible to use it in normal circumstances. The Riksbank will continue to work to reinforce the position of cash. E-krona can complement cash without major consequences for financial stability and monetary policy In addition, the Riksbank has also been investigating for a few years now whether it would be possible to offer the general public a safe electronic alternative that could function in largely the same way as cash; an e-krona. This could be a means of ensuring that the general public in Sweden, which has had access to central bank money since the 17th century, can continue to do so even in a digital age. 16 The model we have had, where the Riksbank's cash has co-exited with private means of payment, such as deposits in bank accounts, has functioned well. By introducing an e-krona, we can ensure that the function that cash has historically had as anchor for payments can live on in a new technical form. An e-krona can, like cash, contribute to increased competition and robustness on the market by offering an alternative to private sector payment services. If the Riksbank is present in the market with its own supply of money to the general public, it will also be easier for the Riksbank to ensure that basic payment services are made available to all, including the vulnerable groups I mentioned earlier.

Sud Ouest: France has taken over the presidency of the G-20 group of leading nations. And, on this occasion, Nicolas Sarkozy would like to pave the way towards a reform of the international monetary system that would reduce the dollar's role. Do you see this as a possibility? BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Christian Noyer: The aim is not to reduce the role of the dollar. Even though it has already partially lost its sole reserve currency status, the dollar will continue to play a major role in trade. France is approaching this presidency with an open mind, but there is no doubt that the international monetary system is no longer suited to today's world. Designed in the 1940s and reformed in the 1970s, this system bears the hallmark of an era when international trade played a much smaller role, and when emerging countries such as China, India and Brazil were much less significant players in the global economy. This new configuration must be taken into account. Today, we must hold discussions and debates, measure the magnitude of capital flows that could have very destabilising effects on some countries and strive in a united manner to correct the major imbalances that are dampening world growth. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Timothy F Geithner: The Bretton Woods institutions in the 21st century Remarks by Mr Timothy F Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, before the Bretton Woods Committee, New York, 10 June 2004. *  *  *  It is a pleasure to join you for this meeting of the Bretton Woods Committee. This is a great and accomplished organization. Although the international financial institutions are one of the most important legacies of the great statesmen of the last century, the task of supporting them is not always easy. The Committee has been effective in this role, not just by helping to explain the accomplishments of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to an occasionally skeptical public, but also by helping to shape the debate on how these institutions need to change. The Fund, from its inception, was burdened by a mismatch between the aspirations of its architects and the authority and instruments they gave the institution to pursue those ambitions. Its authority over the policies of its members was limited. Its resources were small, and the facilities established to deploy those resources were modest relative to the problems they were designed to address.

In others, the fiscal position is strong enough to stabilize the debt dynamics, but provides little buffer against adverse shocks, and very little room for fiscal policy to help cushion the effects of such a shock. 2  BIS Review 37/2004  •  Important challenges remain in the financial area as well. In many countries, large public sector debt burdens have left banking systems highly exposed to the sovereign, constraining authorities’ room for maneuver. There are also problems in banks’ corporate and consumer loan books, and a number of banking systems also have a large share of foreign currency denominated liabilities, in some cases held by non-residents. •  The durability of recent improvements in external positions, which reflect weak domestic demand in many countries, is also open to question. As domestic demand strengthens, external balances could move into deficit again, which in some cases will reintroduce a greater external risk. •  And in many cases, the financial exposure of the IMF and the multilateral development banks is already high. These balance sheet challenges took a long time to develop, and they will take a long time to reverse. They are the legacy of years of past fiscal decisions, magnified by the impact of crises on growth, the exchange rate, and the financial sector. They leave an exacting set of policy challenges.
Together these factors can more than account for the strength of inflation. The impact of the rise in oil prices and the changes to VAT have been discussed quite extensively elsewhere and so I will not expand on them further this evening. 2 However, it is perhaps worth spending a few minutes considering the effects that the substantial depreciation of sterling has had on companies’ costs and prices. Sterling has depreciated by close to 25% since mid-2007. To get a sense of the potential impact this depreciation may have had on inflation, it is worth recalling that imported goods and services account for around a quarter of the consumer price basket. So a simple thought experiment in which import costs increased in line with the fall in the value of sterling and these increased costs were fully passed-through into retail prices would imply an increase in the price level of around 6 percentage points. Now there are many reasons why this simple thought experiment is likely to be misleading. But it does serve to emphasise the potential size of the effect associated with sterling’s depreciation and how different judgments concerning its impact could have very different implications for inflation. It was difficult to judge in advance the extent to which sterling’s depreciation was likely to feed through into consumer prices. In part, that was because this was the first example of a large exchange rate depreciation since the UK had started inflation targeting.

When foreign market participants assess the situation and risks for Sweden and Swedish financial institutions, they also take into account to a large degree what is happening in the other Nordic countries and in the Baltic countries. The global financial crisis has affected financial stability in Sweden, although financial institutions here have coped better than those in many other countries. At the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 there was considerable international uncertainty and the market was particularly sensitive to consequences for Swedish banks resulting from the crisis in the Baltic. There was thus good reason for the Riksbank to take measures to stabilise the situation among the major Swedish banks in accordance with its task "to promote a safe and efficient payment system”. As the problems of the Swedish banks concerned mainly lay in the Baltic region, there was even greater justification for aiming the measures at strengthening these countries and thereby the banks there. The costs of these measures would probably be much lower if the problem could be dealt with at source rather than waiting until it had spread to the parent banks in Sweden, for instance through a dead stop in the liquidity supply from international markets. When the Riksbank made an assessment of the resources required to manage a widespread Swedish bank crisis, we took into account the fact that the Swedish banks’ balance sheets nowadays amount in total to 3.7 times Sweden’s GDP (which can be compared to 1.2 times GDP during the bank crisis in the 1990s).