samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
William C Dudley: The outlook for the national and local economy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Chairman of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), at the Staten Island Chamber of Commerce, Staten Island, New York, 16 April 2013. *  *  *  It is always a pleasure to speak with the business community given your important role in the community and in the region. I am particularly pleased to have the opportunity to speak to the Staten Island Chamber of Commerce and to be part of this distinguished panel. Thank you for inviting me today. As you know I have the honor of serving as the president and CEO of the New York Fed, one of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks that together with the Board of Governors in Washington make up the Federal Reserve System, our nation’s central bank. As head of the New York Fed I am vice-chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the body that sets our nation’s monetary policy. The Fed was founded 100 years ago in 1913 to advance economic and financial stability. Over this century our nation’s economic output and standard of living has increased greatly, but the United States also faced many different challenges – ranging from the Great Depression of the 1930s to the Great Inflation of the 1970s and most recently the financial crisis.

The increase in payroll tax rates, the rise in high income tax rates, the increase in taxes associated with the Affordable Care Act, and the sequester will result in fiscal drag of about 1¾ percentage points of GDP in 2013, an unusually large amount of fiscal restraint when the economy doesn’t have strong forward momentum and unemployment is still elevated. In terms of the labor market, we have seen only a moderate improvement in labor market conditions over the past six months or so. After an encouraging pick up in the pace of job creation around the turn of the year, the employment report for March showed a gain of only 88,000 jobs. While I don’t want to read too much into a single month’s data, this underscores the need to wait and see how the economy develops before declaring victory prematurely. I’d note that we saw similar slowdowns in job creation in 2011 and 2012 after pickups in the job creation rate and this, along with the large amount of fiscal restraint hitting the economy now, makes me more cautious. Since September, payroll employment has increased an average of 188,000 per month, compared with an average of 172,000 per month over the previous two years. The unemployment rate has declined from a peak of 10 percent in October 2009 to 7.6 percent in March; however, much of the decrease is due to a fall in the number of people actively looking for a job.
Because the origins of the recent crisis appear to have been closely related to lax credit policies in the personal banking segment, commercial practices that lacked transparency and excessive household borrowing, it has brought the issue of consumer protection to the fore. Although also a broader issue, consumer protection is related to the proper functioning and stability of the financial system, particularly if it is understood to include such important  6  BIS Review 142/2010  matters as financial education, transparency with clients and market behavior, It can, therefore, not be ignored when deciding within which institutional framework and with what policies to address this issue. 4. Final remarks  Concern for financial stability is at the origin of central banks. It can, in fact, be said to be in their DNA. Although this concern had faded over time, the experience of recent years has again brought it very much to the fore. As a result, there is now broad agreement that central banks have an unshirkable role in this field and debate centers rather on the instruments they need to have. The crisis has left important lessons, especially for the developed economies where it had its origins. They have already begun to implement financial reforms in a bid to remedy the weaknesses that were observed.

If we wish to shore up this resilience, we must proceed further with the design and application of reforms that tackle the main longterm challenges: productivity, a reduction in structural unemployment and tackling the consequences of population ageing. These are reforms whose positive effects can only fully crystallise following a lengthy period of time. This is precisely why it is desirable that we should set about them as soon as possible. Among the challenges outstanding, I would highlight that of population ageing, owing to its far-reaching consequences, the effects of which will make themselves felt in numerous areas. These include most notably, and primarily, the compatibility between the sustainability and sufficiency of the public pensions system, against the background of the progressive rise both in life expectancy and in the number of pensioners relative to current employees, but also other potentially adverse effects on productivity and the capacity to develop and adopt technological innovations. As we all know, reversing demographic trends is very difficult owing to various cultural, sociological and economic reasons; and, in any event, any policy along these lines requires  4  time to produce appreciable effects. Accordingly, without abandoning policies in the medium and long term that seek to alter or alleviate such adverse demographic trends, in the short term the means of tackling the situation involves growth in employment and productivity.
20/11/2020  COVID-19 and the liquidity crisis of non-banks: lessons for the future  SPEECH  COVID-19 and the liquidity crisis of non-banks: lessons for the future         Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Financial Stability Conference on “Stress, Contagion, and Transmission” organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the Office of Financial Research Frankfurt am Main, 19 November 2020 The reforms that followed the global financial crisis of 2008 have made our financial system safer and more resilient. Tighter regulation and higher capital ratios have been key factors enabling banks to act as shock absorbers rather than shock amplifiers during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. At the same time, the crisis has been a stark reminder that there are still considerable vulnerabilities in the financial sector. In particular, there has been a divergence between the comparatively lean regulation of the non-bank financial sector and its increasing role in financial intermediation across the globe. This divergence has measurably augmented the risks of perilous macro-financial feedback loops, which may also affect the conduct of monetary policy. In my remarks today, I will discuss how prevailing structural fault lines caused a liquidity crisis in the nonbank financial sector in the spring, which amplified market stress, including through forced asset sales, and how monetary policy had to respond to stabilise markets.

They contain Braille markings as well as tactile symbols to denote each denomination. In 2000, Bank Negara Malaysia presented 13,000 units of Ringgit cash test cards to the visually impaired which measured third series banknotes of all denominations. This year, the Bank will distribute 20,000 units of Ringgit cash test cards to the visually impaired. The Bank has made several improvements to the new cash test card design including to measure the fourth series banknotes and a coin channel to measure third series coins after obtaining feedback from the National Council for the Blind, the Malaysian Association for the Blind and Kementerian Pembangunan Wanita, Keluarga dan Masyarakat. In conjunction with this program, I would like to take this opportunity to launch the new cash test card. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
Svein Gjedrem: Economic perspectives Annual address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of the Norges Bank, at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank, Gausdal, 15 February 2001. *  *  *  Introduction Norway’s economy is today characterised by substantial petroleum revenues, sharp growth in government expenditure, a tight labour market and high cost inflation. High oil prices and sizeable petroleum production are contributing to surpluses on the current account and the central government budget. This has also resulted in a vigorous rise in Norway’s disposable income. The current account surplus in 2000, which was equivalent to about 14 per cent of GDP, is among the highest surpluses recorded by an OECD country in the post-war period. The total general government budget surplus also rose sharply, reaching 14½ per cent of GDP. Surplus as a percentage of GDP and income growth for Norway 16  16  Current account balance Public sector Disposable income (growth rates)  12 8  12 8  4  4  0  0  -4  -4 1998  1999  2000  With the exception of a brief pause in growth from the summer of 1998, the Norwegian economy has been expanding since 1993. Employment has risen and unemployment has fallen to just over 3 per cent. A shortage of labour in many sectors has resulted in a relatively sharp growth in labour costs in Norway.

BIS Review 14/2001  7  The government’s asset position and wealth management  Government assets and liabilities Estimates in billions of NOK Assets  Liabilities  Petroleum Fund National Insurance Fund  390  Direct ownership  300  Bonds and Treasury bills  170  50  Minor holdings  100  State banks  165  The table shows in simplified form the central government’s financial assets and liabilities, with estimates for the balance at the end of 2000. The government’s most important assets are the Government Petroleum Fund, assets in the National Insurance Fund, and the state’s direct ownership interests in enterprises. The estimate for the government’s direct ownership in the table includes Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Telenor, Statkraft and DnB. In addition, the state has many smaller stakes and direct loans through the state banks. The government has loan debt. In the table, the figures for the National Insurance Fund are consolidated as the Fund’s claims on the central government and the central government’s debt to the Fund are offset. The table shows that the central government’s loans through the state banks are approximately the same as the central government’s loan debt. The central government raises loans in the bond market and lends through the state banks. The interest rate on the loans and the pricing of risk are market-related. If we exclude this credit intermediation, the management of government wealth is primarily linked to state ownership interests in the Norwegian business sector, the National Insurance Fund and the Government Petroleum Fund.
This successful launch, to the benefit of 305 million Europeans, represents the crowning achievement of the euro changeover, after the launch of the euro on the financial markets, on 1 January 1999. Both operations were a technical success because they had been meticulously well-prepared by the full body of the Eurosystem, the European Central Bank, and all the euro area national central banks, including Banque de France in France. However, aside from the technical success in itself, the warmth and enthusiasm with which French citizens and other Europeans welcomed the euro, their new currency, was proof that European construction enjoys real popular support that has all too often been underestimated. Let me now turn to the core of my subject today: first, the process for economic reform, second, the perspective of enlargement. *  1. *  *  Economic reforms  Before reviewing the priority topics which require a new impulse, I would like to make a remark on the also often underestimated link between reform and the changeover to the euro : indeed, the introduction of banknotes and coins in euro is a major structural reform in itself, as it constitutes a powerful drive towards restructuring the European economy, and a strong lever to facilitate the comparison of prices, taxes and incomes between the Member states.

10 Asian regulators on the Basel Committee and on the FSB can help to present Asia’s perspectives at these international forums. Central banks as well as international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) should also weigh in to lend insights from their economic surveillance work. This will allow regional concerns to be sufficiently factored into the global rule-making and evaluation process. The craft of supervision 11 Rules and standards cannot replace judgment. Good supervisory instincts and technical competence are required to discover, scrutinize and evaluate key risks. This can only be done if banking supervisors do not see their role as a mere compliance function. An effective banking supervisor must be able to assess a bank’s understanding of its risks, its business practices as well as judge its corporate governance and culture. 12 The need for consistency and rigour also mean that supervisory judgment is not just an operational matter. Having formal supervisory decision-making forums is an important component of a good supervisory process. For example, in the MAS, our Banking Supervision heads come together in regular meetings to guide supervisory reviews and decisions. As an integrated supervisor, I also chair a Management Financial Supervision Meeting as well as a Regulatory Actions Meeting that oversees the broad scope of our supervisory policies and enforcement actions respectively, across banking, insurance and capital markets activities. In other words, supervisory practices require as much thought and policy considerations as the rules and regulations.
I find it helpful to summarise the different mechanisms through which asset purchases may boost nominal spending into three broad channels. 4  BIS Review 46/2009  First, the purchases of gilts will act to increase their prices and reduce their yields. This change in the relative attractiveness of holding gilts is likely to cause investors to reallocate their portfolios into other assets, such as corporate bonds, which in turn will tend to reduce the yields on those assets. In so doing, the borrowing costs faced by firms and households should fall. As of today, the Bank has purchased £ of gilts from investors. Second, purchasing assets with central bank reserves will significantly increase the amount of liquidity in the system. This expansion in the supply of money may in itself encourage greater levels of lending and borrowing. Bank deposits are likely to increase, providing banks with a ready source of funding to finance additional lending. Similarly, as the additional liquidity permeates through the economy, companies may feel less constrained by the need to hoard liquidity and more able to undertake investment projects. Third, purchases of high-quality corporate debt should help to improve the functioning of corporate credit markets. Strains on financial institutions’ balance sheets, combined with heightened levels of uncertainty and risk aversion, have impaired the liquidity of key corporate credit markets. Firms’ access to some of these markets has been restricted and the cost of credit inflated.

The causes of this downturn are very different from those of most recent recessions and, as I have just described, the policy response on this occasion has been much quicker and more decisive. There is also a third factor that needs to be borne in mind when drawing lessons from history. This is the first recession in the UK for nearly 20 years. The structure of our economy has changed significantly since the early 1990s, and even more so since the early 1980s and 1970s. The UK economy has undergone extensive reforms and deregulation, and businesses have been transformed by the implementation of new technology and the effects of globalisation. It is hard to quantify precisely the various ways in which the structure of the economy has changed. The appropriate data are not always available and it may be a long time until the effects are discernible in aggregate economic statistics. Importantly, the significance of some of these structural reforms may not be fully apparent until the economy is subjected to a substantial shock. For example, one consequence of globalisation is that supply chains around the world are far more integrated. This is likely to have played an important role in the speed and synchronisation of the world downturn, as the effects of falling demand in a few countries were translated into lower orders and production in many in a matter of weeks. That increased integration is also likely to affect the speed and nature of the recovery.
Last summer, sparked by the debate about a possible reduction in the US Federal Reserve’s bond purchase programme, long-term interest rates rose across the globe. Switzerland was no exception. The most recent interest rate reduction by the European Central Bank (ECB), by contrast, had little effect on Switzerland. One possible reason for this is that money market rates in the euro area were already at a very low level before the ECB’s decision and did not fall any further. Since October 2011, inflation rates in Switzerland have been predominantly negative. The introduction of the minimum exchange rate in September 2011 prevented a more severe deflationary trend, however. Lower price levels in Switzerland reflect, on the one hand, the impact of the past appreciation of the Swiss franc on import goods prices. On the other hand, price developments show clearly that domestic companies are lowering their costs so as to improve their price competitiveness. More than two years after the introduction of the  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  minimum exchange rate, both effects have weakened considerably; this is also reflected in the current path of inflation. At the same time, inflation abroad is receding, especially in the euro area. The inflation differential between Switzerland and the euro area has thus decreased significantly. Inflation differentials play an important role in the valuation of the Swiss franc. This decreased inflation differential means that the real effective exchange rate will hardly change from now on and will remain considerably above its long-term average.

Thomas Jordan: Global economic outlook and economic developments in Switzerland Introductory remarks by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Media News Conference of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 12 December 2013. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen Welcome to the Swiss National Bank’s news conference. I would like to begin today by explaining the SNB’s monetary policy decision before moving on to present our assessment of the economic situation and monetary conditions. My colleague, Jean-Pierre Danthine, will then talk to you about developments in connection with financial stability and banknotes. Finally, my colleague, Fritz Zurbrügg, will look at the current situation on the financial markets, as well as at the management of our currency reserves and interest rate benchmark reforms. As always, we will conclude with a question and answer session. I will now start with our monetary policy decision. As you will have no doubt expected, the SNB is maintaining its minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. The Swiss franc is still high. With the three-month Libor already practically at zero, the minimum exchange rate continues to be the right tool for ensuring appropriate monetary conditions in Switzerland. If the Swiss franc were to appreciate, this would have significant consequences for the Swiss economy. On the one hand, an appreciation would lead to a further decline in import prices and a renewed threat of deflation.
SPEECH  Quantitative tightening: rationale and market impact Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Money Market Contact Group meeting Frankfurt am Main, 2 March 2023 Eight years ago, we launched the asset purchase programme (APP). It was the first time the ECB employed quantitative easing (QE) to help secure price stability when the space for further policy rate cuts was becoming constrained by the effective lower bound. By now, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that the APP was successful in lowering long-term interest rates, stimulating economic activity and raising inflation at times when price pressures were unusually weak. [1] As risks to medium-term price stability had increased sharply, we decided in June 2022 to end net asset purchases under the APP as of July. In December, we announced that the APP portfolio would decline at a measured and predictable pace as of March 2023. This became effective yesterday when we started limiting reinvestments of maturing securities. Until the end of June 2023, the APP portfolio will decline by € billion per month on average. [2] For our corporate bond portfolio, the remaining reinvestments will be tilted more strongly towards issuers with a better climate performance, in line with the goals of the Paris Agreement and without prejudice to our primary mandate. [3] In the second quarter of this year, the Governing Council will reassess the pace of APP portfolio reduction. I will start my remarks today by presenting the rationale for conducting quantitative tightening (QT).

(2022), “Finding the right sequence”, speech at a virtual policy panel on “Unwinding QE” at the first annual Bank of England Agenda for Research (BEAR) conference, Frankfurt am Main, 24 February. There are attempts to quantify the equivalence between changes in the balance sheet and interest rates, see Wei, B. (2022), “Quantifying “Quantitative Tightening” (QT): How Many Rate Hikes Is QT Equivalent To?”, Working Paper Series, No 2022-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, July. 13. See Krishnamurthy, A. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2011), “The effects of quantitative easing on interest rates: channels and implications for policy”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 42 (2). 14. See Lee Smith, A. and Valcarcel, V. (2023), “The financial market effects of unwinding the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 146, January. 15. There were periods of liquidity stress in late 2019 that can also be attributed to the banks’ desire to match the maturity of assets and liabilities after the QE-implied increase in central bank reserves. However, they did not increase the maturity of their liabilities once QT was underway. See Acharya, V. V. et al. (2022), “Liquidity Dependence: Why Shrinking Central Bank Balance Sheets is an Uphill Task”, paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson Hole Economic Symposium, August. 16. Estimates of the term premium from other models, such as the decomposition provided using the method proposed by Kim and Wright, lead to qualitatively similar conclusions.