samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I would once again like to emphasize that any new data or information on the inflation outlook may lead to a change in the policy stance of the Central Bank. Therefore, the indicated path for the policy rates should not be perceived as a commitment on behalf of the CBT. Distinguished Guests, Revised projections suggest that the contribution of energy, food and services will be close to 5 percent at the end of 2009. In other words, assuming no further hikes in administered prices (except those implied by automatic pricing mechanisms), meeting the 4 percent target at the end of 2009 would be possible only if the prices of goods excluding food, energy and tobacco deflate by 3 percent. However, factors such as rising import prices, potential second round impacts of supply shocks, and the structural inertia in inflation could continue to impose downward stickiness in goods prices. Therefore, converging to the medium term target of 4 percent may extend beyond two years, even when tight monetary policy is maintained for an extended period. Under these circumstances, getting inflation back to the 4 percent by the end of 2009 would require offsetting the first round effects, and thus create undesired fluctuations in economic  BIS Review 62/2008  11  activity and relative prices. That is why we envisage a framework in which inflation remains higher than 4 percent at the end of 2009. The forecasts presented above deserve particular attention, given that inflation is likely to stay above the target in the next two years.

Monetary policy response  The CBRT has been clear about its approach in responding to inflation resulting from factors beyond its control: Monetary policy will tolerate the first round effects, but will promptly respond to any deterioration in overall pricing behavior. I want to emphasize that the policy pursued since September 2007 should be interpreted in this context. In September 2007, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decided to initiate the rate cuts, which had already been signaled earlier in the year. Accordingly, policy rates were lowered by 225 basis points between September 2007 and February 2008 (Table 2). Table 2: Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) Decisions in 2007 and 2008 Dates for MPC Meetings  Decision on Interest Rates  Interest Rate  January 16th, 2007 February 15th, 2007 March 15th, 2007 April 18th, 2007 May 14th, 2007 June 14th, 2007 July 12th, 2007 August 14th, 2007 September 13th, 2007 October 16th, 2007 November 14th, 2007 December 13th, 2007 January 17th, 2008 February 14th, 2008 March 19th, 2008 April 17th, 2008  No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change No Change -0.25 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.25 -0.25 No Change No Change  17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.50 17.25 16.75 16.25 15.75 15.50 15.25 15.25 15.25  Source: CBT. In the January 2008 Inflation Report, we indicated that uncertainties in the global economy, hikes in electricity prices, and risks to price setting behavior had compelled the CBRT to be more responsive to incoming information.
BIS Review 58/2003  1  The oversight of payment and securities settlement systems in practice In future, the National Bank will be taking a risk-oriented approach, i.e. we will deploy our resources in those specific areas in which the risks are particularly high. The National Bank Law stipulates a three-tier oversight process. The first tier is an obligation on the part of operators of payment and securities settlement systems to provide statistical information. The National Bank will use the data it collects to gain an overview of the breadth and importance of the systems and instruments for the clearing and settlement of payments and securities trades that are available in Switzerland. The second tier is a more wide-ranging disclosure obligation that is imposed upon the operators of securities settlement systems and those payment systems which process payments in excess of 25 billion Swiss francs a year. With payment systems of this size and larger, the National Bank will look in greater detail into the extent to which they might jeopardise the stability of the financial system. Finally, the National Bank Law provides for powers on the part of the National Bank to impose minimum requirements on systemically important financial market infrastructures as a third tier of oversight. Detailed implementation provisions for oversight will be laid down in an ordinance to be issued by the National Bank. In early November 2003, the National Bank submitted a consultation draft of this ordinance to interested parties. The draft itself can be found on our website.

1  Relevant documents are published on our website: https://www.snb.ch/en/ifor/finmkt/fnmkt_benchm/id/finmkt_reformrates  Page 3/5  Berne, 13 December 2018 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Charts  Page 4/5  Berne, 13 December 2018 Andréa M. Maechler  News conference  Page 5/5
Our efforts to promote high standards of corporate governance and sustainable business practices build on principles and guidelines developed by organisations such as the UN and the OECD. As a financial investor, the fund is affected by the regulation of financial markets. We engage with regulators and participate in consultations on new regulations. We support the development of harmonised rules across markets. We express our expectations towards the companies in our investment portfolio through published expectation documents and direct engagement. So far, we have established three focus areas: climate change, water management and children’s rights. The documents set out our expectations of how companies should manage risk in these areas. Chart: Responsible investment II The purpose of our interaction with investee companies is to support the companies in their creation of long-term value. One of the most important tools at our disposal for exercising ownership rights is voting. We vote at nearly every annual general meeting of the companies in our portfolio. As mentioned, equal treatment of shareholders, including minority shareholders, is of paramount importance to us. Shareholders should have the right to nominate and dismiss directors, file shareholder proposals at general meetings and approve significant changes to the capital structure of a company. Chart: Responsible investment III We seek to identify, assess and report on different kinds of risks to future returns by analysing environmental, social and governance issues. The aim is to gain greater insight into companies and portfolio risks.

Historically, real assets like equities have yielded more than nominal assets like bonds. Equities have also proved to be more risky. However, the short-term variations in equity prices largely stem from changing discount factors or risk appetite, not from variations in income forecasts for the companies. 1 With the fund’s long-term perspective, such changes in risk premiums are of minor importance. Thus, the fund has ample capacity to bear this risk. Sixty percent of the fund capital is invested in listed equities. Recently, a new asset class was introduced – real estate. This improves the fund’s balance between risk and return. According to the fund’s management mandate, up to five percent of the fund is to be invested in real estate. Real estate investments are currently concentrated on 10 global cities in Europe and the US, but a large chunk is also invested in logistics property in various countries, including Italy. Property in major Asian cities may be included in the fund’s assets this year. The fund’s second-largest asset class is bonds or fixed income. The purpose of the fixed income portfolio is to protect the value of the fund from heavy losses when the stock market falls, and to provide liquidity. The strategic bond weight is currently 35 percent. Seventy percent of the fixed income portfolio is invested in government bonds in developed markets. These investments are distributed across countries on a GDP-weighted basis.
Figure 4 Households’ total financial assets Per cent of disposable income 550  550  Ireland Spain Denmark USA United Kingdom Sweden  500  450  500  450  400  400  350  350  300  300  250  250  200  200 96  98  00  02  04  06  08  10  Source: OECD  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Policy in line with international debate and our mandate The policy conducted by the Riksbank has sometimes been characterised as “difficult to grasp” and “strange” in the debate in Sweden – that we are conducting housing policy” and that we “are not following our mandate”. 8 I hope that this description has put forward two points in particular. The first is that the policy conducted by the Riksbank has been well in line with the international discussion that arose after the crisis and concerns how best to take into account risks linked to household indebtedness and developments in the housing market. If anything, as I noted earlier, the Riksbank was among the first to highlight these problems. The second point that I hope has come across is that the policy the Riksbank has conducted is well in line with the mandate we have been given. The Riksbank has not acted on the basis of any hidden agenda to try to attain some other purpose, whatever that might be.

Heikensten, Lars (2008), More To It than Just “Leaning Against the Wind”. Article in the Financial Times, 5 June 2008. H M Treasury (2013), Review of the monetary policy framework. March 2013. Ingves, Stefan (2007), Housing and Monetary Policy: A View from an Inflation-Targeting Central Bank. In Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, Jackson Hole Symposium Conference Proceedings, 433–443, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Ingves, Stefan (2010), Monetary policy and financial stability – some future challenges. Speech at the Swedish Economics Association, Stockholm, 17 May. Issing, Otmar (2009), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy. Cato Journal 29(1), 45–51. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Jordà, Oscar, Schularick, Moritz and Taylor, Alan M. (2011), When Credit Bites Back: Leverage, Business Cycles, and Crises. Working Paper 2011–12, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Krugman, Paul (2013), What Janet Yellen – And Everyone Else – Got Wrong. Blog in The New York Times, 8 August. Mian, Atif R. and Sufi, Amir (2010), Household Leverage and the Recession of 2007 to 2009. NBER Working Paper No. 15896. Ministry of Finance (2013), Ett förstärkt ramverk för finansiell stabilitet [A stronger framework for financial stability] (only in Swedish), memorandum, 26 August. Mishkin, Frederic S. (2007), Housing and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. In Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, Jackson Hole Symposium Conference Proceedings, 359–413, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Norges Bank (2013), Monetary Policy Report with financial stability assessment. 1/13 March. Nyberg, Lars (2011), Monetary policy and financial crises – some reflections. Speech at Danske Bank, Stockholm, 21 December.
What about the funds earmarked under the second plan to support the Greek banks? That money, € billion, disappears with the stopping of the programme, on Tuesday evening, as does all assistance for Greece which was still available but conditional on the implementation of the programme. The ECB has maintained its emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to the banks. Did the question of its withdrawal come up last weekend? The ECB acts within its regulatory framework. We can offer emergency liquidity assistance to the banks provided that they are solvent, the collateral submitted is of good quality, and that the ELA doesn’t interfere with the ECB’s monetary policy. Until Sunday these conditions were met. It was found at the same time that the creditworthiness of the Greek government was seriously degraded, particularly after the Eurogroup’s decision to withdraw the safety net granted to Greece. That led to us not authorising new drawdowns from the central bank, while maintaining the current level of liquidity. I regard this as a measured decision as it does not create an irreversible situation. Are you going to continue providing support to the banks until Sunday evening? We are going to continue the support until further notice. The situation is being constantly monitored by the Governing Council. What is the ECB’s exposure to Greece? On the one hand, there are the loans extended to Greek banks by the Eurosystem, with a total value of more than € billion.

However, fiscal performance in 2009 was weak, mainly due to the global economic crisis, which reduced domestic revenues. Despite this, Government remained within the programmed domestic financing for the year. 1  December-2009 inflation revised to 12.0% in the Budget Speech for 2010 presented to Parliament on October 9, 2009. BIS Review 53/2010  1  Distinguished Members, the financial sector has remained resilient despite the effects of the recent global financial crisis. Currently, the Zambian financial sector is characterized by high liquidity levels, reflecting tighter lending standards in the wake of the lessons from the global financial crisis leading to marked decline in private sector lending. As a result, the demand for the relatively risk free Government securities has increased causing a decline in yield rates on Government securities. The decline in Government securities yield rates and relatively low inflation experienced since the beginning of the year should contribute to a decline in banks lending rates and thus stimulate borrowing by the private sector. I am aware that the high interest rates in the country pose a very big challenge for our manufacturers to borrow for recapitalisation and expansion of their businesses. Access to finance is essential for the economy to grow and therefore it is necessary that we find ways that could reduce the cost of borrowing to allow key sectors to expand. Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to reiterate that the economic fundamentals point to a reduction in lending rates.
Consistently with this view, we believe that it is essential that payments be able to flow freely throughout the TARGET system. 25. Why do we devote this effort for preparing for the euro? The reason is very straightforward. London’s pre-eminent position as an international financial centre rests on the fact that it provides broad and liquid markets for the full range of internationally-traded currencies and for the vast array of different instruments and facilities denominated in them. The euro will undoubtedly become a major internationally-traded currency, and it is therefore certain that it will be traded extensively in the London markets. The euro thus represents an opportunity, rather than a threat, for the London markets, and it is important that the London markets prepare in good time the systems and infrastructure needed to take advantage of this opportunity. London as a financial centre after EMU 26. The reason why we are convinced that the euro represents a major opportunity for the London markets relates essentially to the strengths that the London markets have displayed over the years:  •  London is a global financial centre rather than just a European centre, with much of its business generated around the world, not just within Europe. BIS Review 110/1997  -5-  •  London has always thrived on financial innovation, and has a strong track record of capitalising on new opportunities. •  The euro may very well bring greater financial activity to the main Continental financial markets.

And following the successful symposium we held early this year, we are planning to hold a further symposium, next January at the Bank, on London as the international financial centre for the euro. 15. This exercise -- to prepare the UK markets for wholesale activity in the euro by January 1999 -- has now gathered substantial momentum. Let me touch on a few of the main priorities being pursued: 16. First, market participants agree on the need to be able to trade in London the full range of euro-denominated instruments. 17. Secondly, they also agree on the need for appropriate payments mechanisms in London to carry out transactions in euro both between parties within the UK and cross-border to and from the UK. 18. Thirdly, efficient, cost-effective mechanisms for settling transactions in euro-denominated securities also need to be made available in London. BIS Review 110/1997  -4-  19. Fourthly, there is agreement on the desirability of harmonised market conventions for the issuing and trading of euro-denominated instruments. 20. Fifthly, there is agreement on the need for as sound a legal basis as possible for euro transactions, to provide legal certainty and to ensure continuity of contract. 21. Sixthly, there are tax and accounting issues to be addressed, related to the introduction of the euro. 22. There is work going on in each of these areas, and good progress on many of them. Let me give you one example -- the payments system, which lies at the heart of the UK’s preparations for the euro.
The sum of the economies of all the new member states does not presently amount to more than the GDP of the Netherlands. Furthermore, historically high inflation rates in the acceding countries have been reduced through reinforced macroeconomic discipline (which in turn owes much to the enlargement process). A simple calculation shows that even if growth in the acceding countries averages some 4 per cent more than the euro area, and this catch-up, according to most estimates, generates Balassa-Samuelson price convergence with 2-3 percentage points higher inflation than euro economies, their inclusion in the euro area would still only add some 0.2 percentage points to area-wide inflation. Instead, it is the perspective of the acceding countries themselves that is crucial. Risks with ERM II The one risk with ERM II that has been discussed at length in recent years is the potential conflict between a pegged exchange rate and an inflation target. Both exchange rate stability and low inflation are necessary to fulfil the conversion criteria, but in some cases it may be difficult for monetary policy alone to meet two targets at the same time. One possible situation is that the central parity has been set too low and that real appreciation pressures, due to catching up, are so strong that the upper band comes into question. This can result  BIS Review 53/2003  1  in large-scale speculative currency flows and unnecessary turbulence, as demonstrated by the attack on the forint at the beginning of this year.

Lars Heikensten: Euro entry before reforms or reforms before euro entry? Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Frankfurt European Banking Congress, Frankfurt, 21 November 2003. *  *  *  The outcome of Sweden’s referendum was an unambiguous “no” to euro adoption. This means business as usual for Swedish monetary policy. Since 1993 we have had an inflation target of 2 per cent, which has gained credibility with the public and the markets. Since the introduction of the inflation target, inflation has averaged 1.7 per cent while average growth has been 3 per cent. This compares well with the Swedish experiences of previous decades. It also compares favourably with the recent performance of the euro area. This relative strength of the Swedish economy was in my opinion an important factor behind the result in the referendum. However, the outcome of the referendum does not mean business as usual in our relations vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. We will not have a seat at some of the negotiating tables in Frankfurt and Brussels that we could have had. Of course, we will try to compensate for this. To some extent, this can be done by keeping our own house in order - by conducting sound economic policies. Also, we will do our utmost to contribute to European policy discussions. Being outside the euro certainly doesn’t mean that we want to be on the margins of the debate on monetary integration in Europe.
In light of recent international experiences of bank failures, the traditional intervention criterion of lending to “solvent but illiquid” banks has been put to the test as it becomes increasingly difficult to determine the necessity for intervention as well as the method and timing of such measures. The extension of such support will therefore be based on a careful balance of various considerations, which include amongst others, its potential systemic implications, the cost of the intervention, the cost of failures, avoiding disruptions in the functioning of markets and finally its potential social implications. In order to avoid long term moral hazard, the lender of last resort is based on the rigorous application of viability tests and the “first loss principle”, where losses are borne by the shareholders of the financial institutions. The operational framework also needs sufficient flexibility, in terms of policy instruments, acceptable collateral and range of counterparties, to deal with exceptional market conditions. Going forward, cooperation arrangements for dealing with crises will continue to be further enhanced. This includes further strengthening current cooperation arrangements among the various regulatory agencies in Malaysia, as well further advancing cross-border cooperation in the region. Indeed, significant strides have already been taken to strengthen the cooperative framework between central banks and supervisory agencies in the region to promote financial stability at the regional level. These have included the establishment of various regional mechanisms for cooperation and coordination in surveillance, information sharing and crisis management.

In June this year, we raised the SNB policy rate by half a percentage point, and in September by another 0.75 percentage points. This was done in order to counter the risk of a further build-up of inflationary pressures and to bring inflation back within the range of 0% to 2% that we equate with price stability. We do not aim to fine-tune inflation within this range. However, when faced with large shocks that increase the risk of persistent movements of inflation away from the range, determined action is necessary, irrespective of whether these movements are below or above the range. Determined action today is consistent with our resolute response to deflationary pressures in the past. Finally, I would like to conclude my remarks with a comment about the importance of humility. Conclusion  3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  The SNB decides its policy using an approach that is simultaneously pragmatic, consistent and determined. This allows us to fulfil our commitment to price stability in the face of economic shocks in a manner that is both flexible and resolute. In and of itself, such an approach provides no guarantee of success. From time to time, we miscalculate and misjudge the situation. It is therefore important that we remain humble and open-minded when reaching our decisions. In order to improve our understanding of a continuously changing economy, we draw on work from researchers both inside and outside the SNB.