samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
And from next month, as previously announced, the Bank of England will begin publication of a freely available compounded SONIA index to support use of the rate across a wide range of sterling products. Avoiding the problem won’t make it smaller or change the need to transition. The answer is for us collectively to confront the challenge and make the necessary progress over the next 18 months. In September, the Working Group on Sterling Risk-Free Reference Rates will begin a further program of public communications to help those with Libor linked exposures navigate onto more robust alternatives. But well done is better than well said, and from October UK banks should all be offering alternatives to Libor. Indeed, a number of the largest UK lenders are already doing this. I’d suggest if you are borrowing past the end of 2021 you consider seriously the greater certainty that those alternatives offer. If you do decide to borrow linked to Libor then your bank should discuss how that contract will change from Libor to an alternative rate ahead of the end of 2021. We would not expect to see any further sterling Libor linked lending after the end of March 2021. Regulated firms in the UK should expect their supervisors to monitor and discuss their progress with these important milestones.

Level 3 is ‘expert judgement’ — where a panel bank has insufficient Level 1 or 2 transactions, it estimates the rate at which it could fund itself in the unsecured wholesale funding market, based on an approved procedure. Further details are available at: www.theice.com/publicdocs/ICE_LIBOR_Methodology.pdf 3 Interim Financial Stability Report, May 2020 – Box 1 The continued importance of the transition away from Libor, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2020/may-2020.pdf 2  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  benchmark. Libor rates – and hence costs for borrowers – rose as central bank policy rates fell to support the economy.4  It is logical that credit spreads on bank debt (a measure of perceived risks in lending to banks) should increase during periods of stress. It is also unsurprising for banks to be attracted to the idea of being able to pass that cost directly onto their customers, but it does raise an important question:  Given this cost is passed directly onto borrowers through the interest rates they pay, how well does that rate actually reflect the cost of bank funding? There have been significant changes to the way banks fund themselves since the global financial crisis, making them more robust. Regulatory changes have significantly reduced dependence on the fickle shortterm unsecured markets that Libor measures.5 We have seen the benefits of those reforms through the first half of this year as banks have continued to lend and markets have remained open.
Therefore, while the focus of my comments will be on the current situation and looking forward to the future, I hope you will allow me also to reflect on some of the things I have learned over the past years. In the first part of my intervention today, I will discuss the current state of the new framework for bank capital adequacy, or Basel II, as well as how supervisors are carrying out work related to Basel II and sound risk management practices. Second, I would like to discuss some of the key lessons that I’ve learned in the development of Basel II, which are factors that I believe will contribute not only to its successful implementation and longevity, but also more generally to financial stability and effective banking supervision. And I will close with some more detailed comments on a lesson we have learned during this process that I think has broader implications for risk management in general – that is, the importance of taking account of the macroeconomic perspective and the effects of the cycle. Basel II update One of Barcelona’s greatest claims to fame is its modernista architecture, exemplified by the work of Antoni Gaudí. The modernistas looked to the past for inspiration, but applied modern tools and techniques to create something new with a focus on intricate details. Of course, the Basel II Framework does not have the beauty of Gaudí’s Sagrada Família, but I nevertheless think that both supervisors and the industry have accomplished something similar.

In the end, the most risky behaviour is one characterised by over-optimism, and lack of consideration of all the relevant risks. This means that when shocks occur, entities are unprepared and tend to react abruptly, causing problems for their institution and, sometimes, for the whole system. On the contrary, adopting a forward-looking approach, which takes account of the possible impact of broader changes in the cycle, should help institutions to avoid mistakes and bad decisions, and to detect and respond to problems in a smoother fashion and at an earlier stage. Conclusion In closing, I would like to thank you as risk professionals for your inputs to the various Basel Committee initiatives during my Chairmanship, especially Basel II. A unique element of Basel II is that rather than imposing a purely regulatory approach, it incorporates what the Basel Committee views as leading practices in bank risk management. In developing the revised Framework, the Committee sought to incorporate rigorous and comprehensive risk management approaches into the regulatory structure. We could not have come as far as we have without the advances in risk management that you in the industry have developed. Moreover, as industry practices continue to evolve, I believe the Framework is flexible enough that these advances can be incorporated on an ongoing basis. These past several years have been among the most interesting and challenging in my career, and I will always look back on the accomplishments of the Basel Committee over this period with a mixture of pride and humility.
According to a 2021 study of seven European cities, individuals who switched one trip per day from driving to cycling reduced their carbon footprint by about 0.5 tonnes over a year. CONCLUSION Let me conclude. This is a gathering in the name of the dismal science. I hope I did not give too dismal a speech. But it is important that as economists and as Singaporeans, we appreciate the gravity of the net zero challenge. The climate crisis demands collective action: nothing short of a whole-of-society effort across countries will suffice. And the time for action is now, not tomorrow. Yes, we wish we can postpone carbon taxes, costly investments in energy efficiency, restructuring of business processes, mandatory reporting of climate risks, until economic conditions are better. But the planet cannot wait, it is continuing to warm up. The cost of delay is having to make sharper and more painful adjustments later amid a worsening climate. The road to net zero is not easy. But we have seen time and again that when confronted with grave challenges, humankind has risen to the challenge. The recent COVID-19 pandemic is a good example. Yes, the world’s response was not optimal, and not everyone played their part.

On the one hand, global trade may continue to grow more rapidly than expected, thereby supporting euro area exports. Moreover, strong business confidence could provide more support to domestic economic activity in the euro area than is currently expected. On the other hand, downside risks relate to the tensions in some segments of the financial markets and their potential spillover to the euro area real economy. Further downside risks relate to renewed increases in oil and other commodity prices, protectionist pressures and the possibility of a disorderly correction of global imbalances. With regard to price developments, euro area annual HICP inflation was 2.4% in January 2011, according to Eurostat’s flash estimate, after 2.2% in December. This further increase was broadly anticipated and largely reflects higher energy prices. Looking ahead to the next  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  few months, inflation rates could temporarily increase further and are likely to stay slightly above 2% for most of 2011, before moderating again around the turn of the year. Overall, we continue to see evidence of short-term upward pressure on overall inflation, mainly owing to energy and commodity prices. Such pressure is also discernible in the earlier stages of the production process. These developments have not so far affected our assessment that price developments will remain in line with price stability over the policy-relevant horizon. At the same time, very close monitoring is warranted.
Bandid Nijathaworn: The role of Early Warning Systems in economic policy formulation Speech by Mr Bandid Nijathaworn, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the panel discussion on “The Role of Early Warning Systems in Economic Policy Formulation”, IMF High-level seminar “Early Warning Systems and Their Role in Surveillance”, Singapore, 9 February 2010. *  *  *  First, let me thank the IMF for the invitation. At first, when I was asked to speak on this panel, I was not sure why the Fund is organizing a high-level seminar in Asia on Early Warning Systems, as interest on the topic seems to have faded completely with the recovery of the Asian economies from the crisis in early 2000’s. Then, it becomes clear that the resurgence of interest on EWS, now called EWE or Early Warning Exercises, is very much the mandate of the G20 that requires the IMF and the FSB to lead the conduct of such exercises in response to the current crisis. Given the severity of the current crisis, I think this initiative is important and needs to be supported. For this afternoon, I want to make three observations on how the new Early Warning Exercises can be made most useful to help sustain global growth and maintain financial stability, especially in light of the lessons learned from the current and past crises.

The global dimension must be the responsibilities of the IMF and the FSB given their comparative advantage as international organization. And as I already noted, EWE by the IMF and the FSB should focus on monitoring the development of risk in the key global financial markets, risk linked to activities of the internationally-important financial institutions, and the economic conditions and policies of the systemically-important economies. These are the areas of risk that have global-wide implications but are not being monitored sufficiently relative to their importance. Third, the focus of the EWE at the country-level also needs to expand beyond detecting and avoiding local macro-misalignments, and to include assessment of the resiliency and robustness of the domestic economy and financial system to withstand large external shocks. The key point here is that, even with good policies, crisis can happen to an economy if the externally-induced factors overwhelm the abilities and the robustness of the domestic economy to cope with. 2  BIS Review 19/2010  And forth, the value of early warning is that warning leads to the needed actions being taken in advance. This means the EWE process should serve to facilitate actions to deal with the important risk and issues by the relevant parties. To serve this end, credibility and effectiveness of the EWE depends on appropriate degree of transparency of the structural models and its appropriateness to the context, whether national or markets, as much as its track record.
Private commercial banks issue predominantly digital money in the form of electronic transfers between bank deposit accounts[3]. Page 4  We have seen major changes in recent years in the form of use of money to make payments. In the mid-1960s, most workers were paid weekly in cash, and around 70% of the population did not have a bank account. [4] Very few had access to credit or debit cards. Consequently, for every £ of funds that people held to make payments, over a third would be held as cash. Nowadays, less than 5% is held as cash. Even 15 years ago, 60% of transactions in the UK used physical cash; pretty much everyone in this room would have carried enough for everyday transactions. In 2021 only 15% of transactions involved physical money. Technology and the increasing digitalisation of everyday life has transformed the way we use money. Private commercial bank money accounted for 85% of the payments made by the public. Within that, debit and credit card transactions accounted for 69% of transactions. Contactless payment has made such transactions much easier for everyday life. And the growth of internet commerce has required the use of digital money. It is always challenging to forecast how technological advances and social trends will play out. Few at the turn of this century would have predicted the development and growth of a massive and dominant market and social platforms.

We intend that the digital pound would have the same (or stronger) privacy protections as bank accounts, debit cards or cheques which are now used for 85% of transactions in the economy. Individuals’ personal details and transaction records would be known only to their private sector wallet provider in the same way they are for bank account providers today (and subject to the same privacy protections). But individuals’ details and records would not be known by the Government or the Bank of England. In this way, the digital pound would provide privacy while also protecting against fraud and financial crime. The digital pound would not be an anonymous bearer instrument like cash, but physical cash would remain available to those who wanted to use it. Neither the Government nor the Bank would program a digital pound or restrict how it was spent. Instead, the Bank would provide the infrastructure and minimum functionality for the private sector to provide programmability features for users. Those features would require user consent. As with banknotes and many current accounts, no interest would be paid on a digital pound. Its purpose would be as a means of transaction - to make and receive payments - rather than as a savings product. Nor do we see the digital pound as a monetary policy instrument and as such it would, like cash, have neither positive nor negative remuneration.
The EU has started on this journey by making payment and data interconnectivity between banks and non-banks mandatory, through the Payment Services Directive 2. Australia has also announced that it will legislate a national Consumer Data Right in 2018, allowing consumers open access to all their data including banking-related ones. While these hold a lot of promise by promoting consumer interests and welfare, there are other details to consider. For example, what primary data rightfully belongs to the customer, and what about secondary data about the customer that a bank had made sense of? How should a customer’s data be packaged for onward sharing? How do we develop technical standards to share this information efficiently and securely? Who should pay for these? In Singapore, we subscribe to the notion of banks sharing their data openly as a larger good. Some of the operational details have to be worked out. In MAS’ engagement with the banking industry, there is broad consensus as to the benefits of open banking. What we see is an opening up of customer data as a ground-up process led by the banks themselves. We believe this is a constructive development, that industry players themselves see the value in doing so. Role of financial regulators In my remarks so far, it should be obvious that financial regulators will have active roles in the business and technology transformation in the banking industry. Regulators need to have a sharp understanding of emerging technologies and new business models, and to be alert to potential risks.

My view has been that the further appreciation of the Swedish krona has risked leading to impaired target fulfilment, and this has been the motivation behind my stance in favour of a lower repo rate path than that decided upon. Am I not concerned that a lower repo rate path would lead to excessive inflation, considering how inflation has increased recently due to higher energy and commodity prices? It remains to be seen how permanent these increases will be. In our most recent forecast, which assumed the stabilisation of these prices, underlying inflation, even in the main scenario, was estimated at less than 2 per cent for most of the forecast period (see Figure 2). On the basis of this forecast, there is thus scope for a more expansionary monetary policy. One matter that I intend to address at the next monetary policy decision is the wide gap between CPI inflation and CPIF inflation that we saw in January and February. This gap is partly due to a detail, related to mortgage costs, in the calculation method used, which also results in higher CPI inflation over the rest of the year than was forecast in the monetary policy report in February. However, in my opinion, the underlying inflationary pressure in the economy is still low, which, for example, is reflected by the low outcome for CPIF inflation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Monetary policy has to be forward-looking, as its influence on the economy is subject to a time-lag.
For example, the Governing Council has recommended that owner-occupied housing will in due course be included in the Harmonised Index for Consumer Prices. The ECB also understands the importance of factoring in the impact of climate change. There is 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  now an action plan on how the ECB will more systematically reflect climate change considerations in its monetary policy operations. This is not only about the moral imperative. Bear in mind that the physical and transition risks related to climate change affect not only price stability but also financial stability, having an impact on the value as well as the risk profile of assets held on the Eurosystem’s balance sheet. This is why the ECB will enhance its analytical and macroeconomic modelling capacities, while developing appropriate statistical indicators. Another aspect to emerge from the review was the importance of communication. Monetary policy communication has become a tool in its own right – and the communication needs to be understood not only by experts but also by the public if the ECB wants it to be effective. A number of changes will be made to the statements issued following monetary policy decisions, which should achieve this aim. And last but not least, the extensive feedback received from the review process has highlighted the importance of the exercise given the rapid changes in the global economy. The new review should not wait another 18 years.

Indeed, the increase in annual consumer price inflation in the euro area from 2.0% in December 2001 to 2.7% in January 2002 has unfortunately been associated, in many people’s minds, with the cash changeover. In reality, other factors contributed to this increase, such as the rise in vegetable prices related to adverse weather conditions and higher tobacco taxes in several euro area countries. But it has to be recognised that, in particular in some sectors with a low level of competition, some upward price adjustments might have occurred in connection with the cash changeover. However, there were also price reductions in the euro area associated with the cash changeover and statistical evidence has so far confirmed that the effect on the overall price level has been contained. Turning now to the current economic situation, over the past few months the economic conditions have gradually changed. The impact of the terrorist attacks on economic confidence has gradually faded away and economic activity has stabilised. While the strength of the ongoing recovery is still subject to uncertainty, the most likely scenario is for economic activity to gradually accelerate and reach levels in line with trend potential growth later this year. Regarding monetary developments, we saw a high demand for liquid and safe assets in the autumn of last year, particularly associated with financial market uncertainty following the terrorist attacks. We saw some moderation in early 2002 but recent data indicate a new increase in the demand for liquid assets.
According to their mission statement, it aims to improve the quality of economic policy with open and fact-based research, analysis and debate, targeted at improving the quality of economic policy. At the same time, we are proud that the National Bank of Romania has been a member of Bruegel think tank since 2016. Returning to our guest speaker: André Sapir is a Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), he also teaches “International Economics and European Integration” at the Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management. Prof. Sapir has a PhD from Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where he studied with the famous trade economist Bela Balassa. He was elected Member of the Academia Europaea and of the Royal Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts. He was a Visiting Fellow at the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. Prof. André Sapir has written extensively on international economics including European integration, monetary union, international trade, international policy coordination and globalization. He worked for the European Commission as Economic Advisor to the Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (1990–2001), then he was Economic Advisor to President Romano Prodi and also headed his Economic Advisory Group (2001–2004). From 2005 to 2009 he was External Advisor to President José Manuel Barroso. From 2011 to 2015 he was successively Vice-Chair and Chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee and Member of the 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  General Board of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), Europe’s financial stability oversight body.

I have mentioned his work outside the academic work to emphasize his extended experience and wholesome view on Europe and the Euro Area. And now, a few considerations about the Euro Area and Romania in the European context: The European financial environment has faced the need for thorough reforms. The financial crisis and the difficulties within the Euro zone have led to rethinking the assumptions behind the Euro zone governance and the links between the European Union’s euro and non-euro member countries. The National Bank of Romania maintains a deep interest in reforms of the EU governance that enhance its strength and resilience, in regional cohesion, nominal and real economic convergence, for the larger objective of Euro currency adoption and Euro Area accession. Euro area accession represents a strategic target for Romania, which needs a healthy economy in order to join it on favorable terms. However, we are facing great challenges with respect to the functioning of the Euro Area and the European Union in general. The euro area is an evolving target, one that changes and transforms overtime and, therefore, we are all asking ourselves what the Euro Area’s future will look like and what we are heading to. Romania can and should play a role in the ongoing debate on the future of the EU and even of the euro area. In this context, I am grateful to André for the opportunity to facilitate this exchange of ideas.