samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Employer’s bank  Employer  Other financial market participants – in and outside Sweden  The financial crisis of 2007-2009 impacted borrowers in other countries hard  Source: Federal Reserve Boston  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Problems in the housing sector could have severe consequences for households Distribution of new mortgage loans by amortisation period, per cent 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 - 10  10 - 30  30 - 40  40 - 50  > 50  None  Amortisation period, years Source: Finansinspektionen  The European Commission is concerned about developments in Sweden From Alert Mechanism Report 2011/2012  ”Despite overall good macroeconomic performance some countries display developments in assets markets, including in particular housing, and a continuous build-up of indebtedness in the private sector, which also warrant further analysis”   The European Commission would like a closer examination of Swedish households’ indebtedness    Sweden’s mandate to handle the situation depends on how the Basel III regulations are implemented in the EU  Source: European Commission  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The Riksbank has an important role to play in the prevention of financial crises The Riksbank is responsible for means of payment and can provide liquidity  The Riksbank monitors the financial sector with a systemic perspective  But the Riksbank lacks sharp preventive tools  The Riksbank represents Sweden in International regulatory cooperation  Preventing financial crises is of great importance for Swedish households Swedish households need functioning financial services and protection from financial crises and their effects  Citizens have the right to expect that authorities will prevent and manage financial crises to the best of their ability  Authorities need the right tools to prevent and manage crises  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  References European Commission (2012): Alert Mechanism Report Finansinspektionen (2012): Den svenska bolånemarknaden (the Swedish mortgage market) Modestino, A. S., & Dennett, J.

I also pay tribute to my predecessors in office in the independent Macedonia, governors Borko Stanoevski, Ljube Trpeski and Petar Goshev and to all management structures of the Bank, both current and former, largely present here tonight. I extend special thanks and recognition to all generations of employees of the National Bank, that dedicated their work life to the institution, and have contributed with maximum commitment and professionalism to the continuous growth and development of the National Bank. This order is your merit, but also a responsibility to continue delivering great results. To continue investing in constant upgrade and to protect the reputation of the institution, thus helping it to come closer to the family of the central banks of the Member States of the European Union. I am convinced that in the next period the National Bank will continue to build and develop itself, and will successfully accomplish its mandate! May we celebrate this great event for many years! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
However, there may be reason for some upward revision to the inflation forecast made in May, and perhaps even to the one made in August. One factor which could indicate a higher inflation rate, at least in the short term, is the high oil prices. Resource utilisation may also be slightly higher than anticipated in the coming years. One reason is the strong figures for Swedish growth that we have seen over the summer. Another is that fiscal policy will probably become more expansionary  BIS Review 51/2004  5  now. Inflation can nevertheless be expected to be in line with the Riksbank's target two years from now. This is also the picture painted in a speech by Riksbank Governor Lars Heikensten in London today. Conclusion Let me summarise what I have said this evening. Despite stock market fluctuations and a periodically weak economic climate, both household indebtedness and house prices have increased substantially, on a national level, in recent years. There have been similar developments in many countries, and households’ debts and interest payments as a percentage of disposable income are not remarkably high in Sweden. Although the debt ratio is approaching the high level prior to the financial crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, the low interest rates have meant at the same time that households' interest expenditure as a percentage of income has largely been halved since then.

Savers want to hold their funds in highly liquid, short-term assets. But borrowers want to lock up their funding over long time periods. Banks help bridge that gap. Pushing banks hard on the liquidity side runs up against this constraint. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  clearing counterparties by the end of 2012. Similarly, I have my doubts whether the next set of industry recommendations to reduce risk in the triparty repo market will be sufficient to eliminate all the major potential sources of instability – including inadequate risk management practices and lack of resiliency to a dealer default. Experience suggests that it is not easy for market participants to agree on measures that enhance financial stability when this goal conflicts with the commercial and business interests. If the private sector falls short in this instance, public authorities may need to intervene and impose more forceful regulatory solutions. I also think that the scorecard is mixed with respect to making financial institutions, in their practices and structure, less prone to amplifying and propagating shocks. On one hand, the capital rules and the CCAR process should cause banks to husband their capital better during times of stress than was the case during the financial crisis. Also, compensation practices are improving in that more pay is deferred and over longer time periods. Similarly, risk management practices have improved.
Macroeconomic studies argued that this was due to monetary policy’s focus on price stability which caused prices to adjust more slowly (Devereux and Engel (2001), Taylor (2000, 2007), Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004)). Empirical studies such as Ihrig et al (2006), found that the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices in the U.K. had fallen from 0.20 before the 1990s to almost zero thereafter; similar effects were found in other G7 countries with the exception of Germany. 5  The February 2011 Inflation Report (Section 4 and the box on pages 34–35) describe estimates which suggest that import price increases since 2007 have added 4% to 6% to the overall price level. This equates to pass-through of between 66% and 100%. I discussed some reasons for why the degree of pass-through may have been larger or at least faster than predicted by earlier studies in a speech last year (Dale 2010). 6  The analysis presented here is based on the forecast made in February 2009. The extent of the surprise stemming from the degree of exchange rate pass-through in subsequent forecasts reduced more quickly than suggested by this analysis since the MPC learnt from this high pass-through and adjusted subsequent projections accordingly. 7  There are of course many other elements of the MPC’s forecasts which have differed from what was projected. For example, previous Bank analysis (see the box on pages 48–49 of the August 2010 Inflation Report) has highlighted the smaller than expected impact from the weakness of demand.

TerraForm Labs and Luna Foundation Guard are not licensed or regulated by MAS, nor have they applied for any licence or sought exemption from holding any licence. Three Arrows Capital was not regulated under the Payment Services Act. It had operated under the registered fund management regime to carry out limited fund management business, but had ceased to manage funds in Singapore prior to the problems leading to its insolvency. Vauld is currently not licensed by MAS nor has it sought any exemption from holding a licence under the Payment Services Act. It has submitted a licence application, which is pending review. MAS and relevant government agencies will take firm enforcement action if any entity is found to be conducting illegal activities or performing regulated activities without a licence. The crypto industry globally is still evolving and regulation is still catching up with industry trends. Singapore is often seen as being at the forefront, with a clear licensing and regulatory framework. But the focus of crypto regulation to-date in Singapore, as well as in most major jurisdictions, has been on containing money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Most regulatory regimes today do not cover areas such as consumer protection, market conduct, and reserve backing for stablecoins. This is changing. Reviews and public consultations are underway, among international standard-setting bodies and regulators, to strengthen regulation in these areas. MAS is targeting to consult on proposed measures in the next few months.
But these opportunities can only be realised if new forms of digital money are safe – which means recognising and properly regulating the elements that are age-old. I am grateful to Morgane Fouche, Matthew Osborne, Stephanie Haffner, Robert Page and James Pople-Hoskins for their help in preparing these remarks. I am also grateful to Antoine Lallour, Nicholas Butt, David Copple, Shiv Chowla, Andrew Hauser and Victoria Cleland for their helpful comments. 1 Private money mainly takes the form of deposits held in bank accounts. The only form of public money  accessible to the general public is cash, in the form of coins and notes. 2 This is based on the amount of cash held by the public as a share of total cash and sight deposits. See Part V  of ‘A millennium of macroeconomic data’, Research dataset, Bank of England. 3 See LINK News and media contact, 'Coronavirus Crisis means cash use down but UK still withdrawing  £ from ATMs each week’Opens in a new window; See LINK, 'Statistics and trends’Opens in a new window; See chart A in ‘New forms of Digital money’ DP, June 2021. Moreover, in practice, the UK authorities remain committed to ensuring access to cash to those that need it. The Bank, HMT, FCA and the PSR have been working together on the Joint Authorities Cash Strategy group to monitor the use of cash, ATM availability, and ensure cash remains available despite the impacts of Covid. 4 See the example of the Corralito in Argentina.

Jean Claude Trichet: Welcome Malta! Speech by Mr Jean Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, at the event for launching the joint communication campaign for the euro changeover at the Central Bank of Malta, Valletta, 30 September 2007. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour and pleasure for me to be here at this festive moment. This is to mark the launching of the joint communication campaign for the euro changeover in close co-operation with the Central Bank of Malta and with our friend, Michael Bonello, just 92 days before Malta adopts the euro on 1 January 2008. This will signify a great milestone in Malta’s history, especially since Malta only joined the European Union (EU) almost four years ago, on 1 May 2004. Let me first offer my warm congratulations to all of those who have helped bring Malta to this point. In 2002 for the countries that were in the euro area at the time, as well as for Slovenia this year, it was a memorable moment and a positive step. So I can well imagine how the Maltese feel at the moment. You can be proud of Malta’s successful convergence process. In fact, we are very pleased about the fruitful cooperation between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Central Bank of Malta in the preparations for the changeover, be it at the technical level or through the participation of Governor Bonello as observer in the Governing Council since last July.
This is targeted for completion by the second half of this year. This initiative will significantly improve transparency in the corporate bond market and provide reliable mark-to-market prices for the industry and asset managers alike. Conclusion 43. Let me conclude. There are fundamental structural forces shaping the global economic outlook for the next few years. The effects of deleveraging and monetary expansion will be with us for some time. They pose twin risks: lower economic growth and higher inflation. 44. But the Asian growth story remains intact, and Asia’s rise as both a source and destination for investment augurs well for the asset management industry. All of you gathered here belong to an industry that has been and will remain one of the star performers of Singapore’s financial sector. 45. 6  I wish you fruitful discussions. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches

Caleb M Fundanga: The role of insurance brokers in the growth of the Zambian economy Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, on the occasion of the annual dinner of the Insurance Brokers Association of Zambia, Lusaka, 24 May 2006. * •  The Chairperson  •  Distinguished Guests  •  Ladies and Gentlemen  *  *  It gives me great pleasure to officiate at this annual dinner and to talk to you on the subject “The Role of Insurance Brokers in the Growth of the Economy”. It is my hope that our interaction this evening will give us a better understanding and appreciation of the important contributions that insurance brokers have made to the economic growth of this country. The insurance world will continue to have a vital role to play as we continue to move the economy towards further stability and growth. Mr Chairman, before I talk about your role in the growth of the economy, I would like to begin by giving you a brief account of the macroeconomic developments in Zambia in the recent past. I know that many of you have been following the economic developments in the country. The economy has performed relatively well in recent years, with inflation and interest rates coming down. The exchange rate has relatively stabilized, following a steep appreciation in 2005. The growth in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 4.7 percent per annum during 20012005.
26 See the article “Rapidly rising housing prices despite the coronavirus crisis” in the Monetary Policy Report in April 2021(Sveriges Riksbank (2021b) 27 See Figures 5 and 34 in the Riksbank (2020b). 28 Based on arguments such as these, I entered a reservation against the decision in November 2020 to extend and extend the asset purchase programme, see Appendix and my comments at the monetary policy meeting (Riksbank 2020c, p. 21-24). 15 [30]  I want to use my (long!) review of the experience of asset purchases since 2015 to try to evaluate whether financial losses are offset by other gains for the national economy. I shall also discuss whether the losses will weaken the Riksbank's financial independence and, in that case, make monetary policy less effective. But let me first focus a little more on the financial losses. How has the Riksbank's balance sheet been affected by the purchase of assets, and how has the value of the assets we have purchased developed? The Riksbank's financial results are now deteriorating Prior to the global financial crisis, the Riksbank's balance sheet was relatively small and uncomplicated. The size of the balance sheet, corresponding to approximately 6 per cent of GDP, was determined mainly by the liabilities side, which was dominated by banknotes and coins in circulation and the Riksbank's equity. On the assets side, these liabilities were matched by the foreign exchange reserve, which consisted mainly of US and European government bonds.

I see several reasons why this is the right thing to do. I do not believe that the Swedish asset purchases will significantly affect how expansionary monetary policy is when the financial markets are functioning well. In that case, selling bonds does not entail any significant tightening of monetary policy. I do not mean that sales would go unnoticed. On the contrary, I believe that sales would lead to price movements and some disturbance in the market. But that is exactly what we should avoid. The Riksbank should as far as possible avoid interfering in market pricing. The arguments against active sales are strengthened by the fact that the maturities of many of our assets are relatively short. In principle, it would be good if we  45 I have highlighted the risk to the Riksbank's finances (Flodén 2016 and 2018, as well as my contributions at the  monetary policy meetings in December 2017, April 2019 and November 2020) and risks to the functioning of the government bond market (April 2019). I have also pointed out that it is desirable that pricing of risk should normally be left to the market (November 2020 and November 2021). 24 [30]  could rapidly reduce our holdings of private securities, that is, mortgage and corporate bonds. However, these assets have the shortest maturity and almost the entire holding will mature within five years (see Figure 14).46 The strongest argument for active sales concerns government bonds.
In some jurisdictions, such as the UK, the securities regulator is the listing authority. In others, such as the US, listing documentation is approved by exchanges, with minimum disclosure requirements set by the securities regulator. This is tied up with whether regimes retain an element of Self-Regulatory Organisations. 9  In the UK, although the FSA was given a “financial stability” objective in 2010, it did not apply to its functions as UK Listing Authority. The proposed objectives of the planned new securities and conduct regulator, the FCA, are intended to apply to the UKLA. 10  IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (2010). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  whole in ways that are opaque to everyone. For example, in the USA, as the SEC has commented, a lot of structured-finance products, including pretty well all CDOs and AssetBacked CP, were issued privately and so were exempt from a panoply of disclosure requirements that apply to “registered” offerings.11 Reducing that opacity, and ensuring the integrity of these market mechanisms, could well be in the interests of investors in private placements themselves. This issue is not easy. On the one hand, it is reasonable for the regulatory regime to make allowance for private transactions amongst “consenting adults”. And the issuance of small amounts of any type of security cannot possibly jeopardise stability.

I believe that central banks can play a special role in this area. Important “intra-financial system markets” are not restricted to banking. The reinsurance markets, and the mechanisms for sharing risks in Lloyd’s of London, are other examples. As are the inter-dealer markets in derivatives, which have traditionally employed different protocols (notably collateralisation, under Credit-Support Annexes) than get used in transactions with end users. Away from banks, these Over the Counter derivative markets have been the principal focus of policy. They are being rethought, under a mandate from the G20 Leaders7. The third category of markets is those that matter directly in their own right to end users. Notably the primary markets in equity and debt. These markets and the associated secondary markets often rely on “market makers” for liquidity, but they are not the marginal source of financing or risk management for banks and dealers. In the past, they have often  4  Drysdale, Lombard Wall, and so on. 5  See Tucker P M W (2010), “Shadow Banking, Financing Markets and Financial Stability”, January 2010. 6  See Gary Gorton “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo”. 7  In September 2009, G-20 Leaders agreed in Pittsburgh that: “All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.
News conference  Berne, 15 December 2016 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  In my remarks today, I will start by presenting our current assessment in the area of financial stability, looking first at the big banks before turning to the domestically focused banks. I will end my remarks with a few words on the new banknote series. Big banks  Since the Financial Stability Report was published in June, the Swiss big banks have improved their capital situation slightly; at the same time, they have substantially increased their holdings of bail-in bonds. Bail-in bonds are debt instruments that can be written off or converted into equity in the event of restructuring or resolution. They form the basis for a crisis-hit bank to be resolved or restructured in an orderly way. Alongside capital requirements, the qualitative and quantitative requirements on such debt instruments are a key component of the revised ‘too big to fail’ regulations which came into force at the beginning of July. These revised regulations envisage that the requirements will gradually be increased to the specified level over a phase-in period ending at the beginning of 2020. As regards core capital (Common Equity Tier 1, CET1), both big banks already largely meet the targets that will apply after the end of the phase-in period. There is still a need for action before the transition deadlines expire, as regards bail-in instruments and high-trigger contingent convertible capital instruments – or high-trigger CoCos.

As expected, today – a good six months after the new note was issued – around two-thirds of the eighthseries 50-franc notes originally in circulation have been exchanged. The next denomination to be released will be the 20-franc note. It will be presented at a press conference on Wednesday, 10 May 2017, and the first notes will be issued one week later, on 17 May 2017. The new 20-franc notes will be put into circulation continuously from that date onwards. Issuance of the third denomination, the 10-franc note, is planned for autumn 2017. We will announce the exact date in due course. Page 3/3