samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
But this must not stop us from making progress straightway on the first two accelerators, in order to breathe new life into the Economic Union. These accelerators would contribute to the functions of economic policy, as described by Musgrave:iii allocation, stabilisation and distribution. The allocation function would obviously be the role of the micro accelerator, but also of the fiscal one. The stabilisation function could be ensured mainly by the macro accelerator, but also by the micro one, thanks to enhanced private risk sharing, and possibly by the fiscal one. Finally, a distribution function – if any – could possibly fall to the fiscal accelerator provided that its implementation does not result in a “transfer union” which would be a one-way budget. ** I would like to conclude my speech by quoting Kazuo Ishiguro, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature for 2017 and who was born in Japan: “If you are under the impression you have already […] perfected yourself, you will never rise to the heights you are no doubt capable of.” iv These words could apply to our international cooperation since the crisis, as well as to the European Economic and Monetary Union. Both are undeniable successes and it is well worth emphasising it. But this should not prevent us from making progress towards a better functioning of the Economic Union. I strongly believe that we could achieve something that even today may still be considered unbelievable. Thank you for your attention.

It has been estimated that during a financial crisis, poor households lose 10 times more of their income compared with the average household The role of financial inclusion has thus become more magnified as a means to improve the livelihoods and as a means to strengthen the financial resilience of the disadvantaged. It provides the opportunity to save for the future, to invest and generate income and to insure against adverse events. The relative stability and improving global conditions, therefore, provides us with the opportunity to accelerate the financial inclusion agenda as a global imperative. The theme of this year’s Forum, “Global Partnerships, National Goals, Empowering People” highlights that financial inclusion is a shared responsibility. The significant progress that has been achieved in advancing financial inclusion, has also provided us with the opportunity for further advancement that would support and facilitate greater scale and sustainability of inclusive finance. Allow me to touch on five potential areas which I believe would cumulatively contribute towards advancing financial inclusion to its next level, both at the national and international level. Priority 1: Focus on relevant and quality financial services Significant strides have already been made in the area of improving access to financial services. Within a short span of three years, AFI has been instrumental in galvanising commitments from member countries to enhance financial inclusion policies, resulting in 20 million of the unbanked to gain access to financial services. Yet we wish to achieve more than just access.
This may seem to be a modest goal, but is not a trivial one. People of my generation may remember the German Gunter Sachs, one of the heirs to the Opel fortune. He was known for saying that he had not worked a day in his life. 11 Sachs could live off his fortune and his spending was not confined to only useful things. For example, he lavished thousands of red roses on Brigitte Bardot, strewn over her home from a helicopter. There is no shortage of examples of individuals who have spent large portions of their wealth on an opulent lifestyle. But nations do not have the possibility of living off wealth alone. A nation thrives on each other’s labour, as Finance Minister Erik Brofoss stated in his address on the state of economy to the Storting (Norwegian parliament). The economists Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner 12 have shown that countries with abundant natural resources have generally experienced weaker growth than otherwise comparable countries. Perhaps this is not so strange. Sudden wealth in one sector of the economy also results in higher wages and cost levels in other sectors. Such visible wealth can also weaken and crowd out internationally exposed business. Economists refer to this phenomenon as the “Dutch disease” after the Netherlands pursued an expansionary economic policy based on huge revenues from gas sales in the 1960s. When gas production declined, a period of harsh economic restructuring followed. The sheltered sector had to be reduced and the internationally exposed sector increased.

Moreover, it would transpire that the actual pace of oil extraction – and oil-revenue spending – increased much faster than the committee had recommended. In the first 25 years, Skånland’s prediction was right on the mark. All the oil revenues were spent. But in the past 15 years, petroleum revenues have risen at such a fast pace that a portion has been set aside. If we look at the period of oil revenues in its entirety, close to half of the oil-based revenues have been spent. 9 In 1994, the economists Bye, Cappelen, Eika, Gjelsvik and Øystein Olsen of Statistics Norway estimated that government petroleum revenue spending came to about 10 per cent of overall public expenditure at that time. Tax income from the petroleum sector and petroleum sales revenue – current petroleum revenues – were spent over the government budget. The economists at Statistics Norway expressed concern regarding Norway’s oil dependence. 10 These economists can now rest assured knowing that around 10 per cent of public expenditure is still financed by oil money, but with one important difference from 1994: The source of these revenues is now the return earned on the oil fund – not current petroleum revenues. We have thus succeeded in replacing oil revenues with a permanent flow of income. We can draw on a perpetual source rather than from a well that is being depleted. 7  In 1977 the Canadian economist John Hartwick described the principles for the management of a natural resource in order to produce permanent income.
Norman T L Chan: Master’s degree 2009–2010 graduation ceremony Speech by Mr Norman T L Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at The Chinese University of Hong Kong master’s degree 2009–2010 graduation ceremony, Hong Kong, 17 December 2010. *  *  *  Professor Wong, Professor Lee, Faculty Members, Graduates, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great honour to be invited to speak at today’s Graduation Ceremony. I am so happy to see so many fine men and women graduating today. All of you have made well earned accomplishments that make your parents and families feel very proud. On this joyful day, it is clearly a time for celebrations and photograph-taking with families and friends. However, some of you may, when you have a few quiet moments of your own, ask yourselves these questions : What would I become in 10, 20 or 30 years’ time? Have I chosen the right field or career? What does it take to succeed and make a name in the society as so many of my CUHK seniors have done before me? These are very pertinent questions and certainly I did ask myself these questions when I attended my own graduation ceremony in the CUHK some 34 years ago. In talking about successful people, I am sure all of us have our own idols. But very few people will disagree with me if I refer to Bill Gates as a prime example of success.

Since very few of us are geniuses, it is only natural to conclude that we cannot and should not ever aspire to succeed the way they did. However, if you really dig deeper into the stories of great success, you will probably find that even very clever and talented people have to make use of every opportunity they have come across to develop and perfect their talents before they can transform from good to great, and from great to awesome. While one cannot turn himself into a genius if he is not one, he can still decide, on his own, how hard he works to upgrade and excel in whatever profession that he is pursuing. There is of course no guarantee that if we work really hard we will definitely achieve great success, but at least we will have a chance. If we don’t even give it a try, there is no hope. It does not matter which way you may wish to go as long as you are fully aware that you do have a choice. That choice, which will shape your careers and your whole life, is yours and yours alone. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 174/2010
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Figure 4 Real exchange rate (1) (index; 2005=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 06  07 Latin America (2) Emerging Europe (4) United States  08  09  10 11 Emerging Asia (3) Commodity exporters (5)  (1) Correspond a simple average of the real exchange rate for each group of countries. An increase indicates depreciation. (2) Includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. (3) Includes China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia,South Korea, and Thailand. (4) Includes Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, and Russia. (5) Includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Source: BIS. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches

With the changes that are reshaping the financial system, skills requirements in the financial industry will also change. Today new careers are also being created in more diverse areas including in areas of finance that have leveraged on technology such as in internet based services. Further challenges will arise from the intensification of competition for talent in a more borderless workplace. Given the importance of talent to performance greater attention needs to be accorded to talent development. There also continues to be an acute talent shortage of such skilled talent in our financial services industry. If left unresolved it will impede future growth and performance of the industry. This existing significant skills gap is already becoming a constraint on industry growth. Indicators from the AIF Skills Gap Index, which measures skills gaps within the workforce, point to a significant deficit in several skill sets that are considered important in the financial services industry. The creation of ACE represents an important step in efforts to provide a comprehensive and integrated solution for such skills and talent development for the industry. At the executive level, leadership, corporate governance and ethics are issues that have dominated attention in global finance given the need to recognise the importance of sustainable outcomes. There are high expectations of the financial industry to demonstrate responsible leadership that will also embrace a strong moral compass in its operations. Education and professional development have a key role in bringing to the forefront these important issues for the industry.
Unemployment is up, businesses have closed, and the direct and indirect costs to the taxpayer have resulted in fiscal deficits in several countries of over 10% of GDP – the largest peacetime deficits ever. At the heart of this crisis was the expansion and subsequent contraction of the balance sheet of the banking system. Other parts of the financial system in general functioned normally. And we saw in 1987 and again in the early 2000s, that a sharp fall in equity values did not cause the same damage as did the banking crisis. Equity markets provide a natural safety valve, and when they suffer sharp falls, economic policy can respond. But when the banking system failed in September 2008, not even massive injections of both liquidity and capital by the state could prevent a devastating collapse of confidence and output around the world. So it is imperative that we find an answer to the question of how to make our banking system more stable. As Bagehot knew only too well, banking crises are endemic to the market economy that has evolved since the Industrial Revolution. The words “banking” and “crises” are natural bedfellows. If love and marriage go together like a horse and carriage, then banking and crisis go together like Oxford and the Isis, intertwined for as long as anyone can remember. Unfortunately, such crises are occurring more frequently and on an ever larger scale. Why? 2.

But the scale of maturity transformation undertaken today produces private benefits and social costs. We have seen from the experience of first Iceland, and now Ireland, the results that can follow from allowing a banking system to become too large relative to national output without having first solved the “too important to fail” problem. 4. Finding a solution  Many remedies for reducing the riskiness of our financial system have been proposed, ranging from higher capital requirements on banks to functional separation and other more radical ideas. The guiding principle of any change should be to ensure that the costs of maturity transformation – the costs of periodic financial crises – fall on those who enjoy the benefits of maturity transformation – the reduced cost of financial intermediation. All proposals should be evaluated by this simple criterion. The first, and most obvious, response to the divergence between private benefits and social costs is the imposition of a permanent tax on the activity of maturity transformation to “internalise the externalities”. Such a tax, or levy, has been discussed by the G7, and introduced in the UK. The principle that the “polluter pays” for the costs they impose on others is an old one, going back at least to Pigou in the 1920s. The main practical problem is to calibrate the costs to maturity transformation. The loss of world output from the financial crisis is enormous, even though such a crisis might be considered a once in a generation, or even once in a century, event.
In “Fault Lines”, for instance, Raghu Rajan considers that the main reason for the rising inequality in the US over the last 20 years has been the inability of the middle class to adapt to new technologies. The changes in technology required to maintain the advanced economies’ competitive position may be the result of the rise in productivity and the competitiveness of EMEs, especially if this affects low value-added sectors as well as increasingly high-tech sectors and services. The US economy was capable of growing at a fast pace prior to the crisis mainly through borrowing. Such borrowing was rational only if households and firms expected their income to increase in the future, at a faster pace, and if asset prices continued to increase, which ultimately did not happen. In fact, economic growth and asset price increases were the result of overly expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, predicated on measures of output gaps which turned out to be much smaller than estimated in real time, as well as regulatory failures justified by the desire to improve access to borrowing. Another way in which faster growth in EMEs can impact negatively on growth in advanced economies is through changes in the terms of trade (Chart 3). These changes can occur via different channels. One is through commodity prices (Chart 4). For a given supply, the higher and persistent growth in EMEs is pushing up demand for commodities, in particular food and energy, and increasing these prices permanently, in terms of overall levels and rates of change.

Paul Samuelson, however, has pointed out the restrictiveness of assumptions which are required to obtain the above-mentioned result.2 He draws attention to the fact that the long-term impact of innovation abroad in a world of free trade and mobile capital is not  2  P. Samuelson (2004), “Where Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting Globalization”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18, 3, pp. 135–146. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  unconditionally welfare-enhancing. His observations have not given rise to much debate. Maybe it’s time to revive such a debate. There are several ways in which faster growth in EMEs may have a negative impact on advanced economies and dampen their production potential, at least for some time. One way is through the classical side-effect of comparative advantage. If the dislocation phenomenon is long and sizeable enough, the transition to the new steady state is bound to take a long time, during which growth will be subdued.3 There may be reasons for believing that the adjustment process we are currently experiencing, with hundreds of millions of people gaining access in a very short time to the market economy, is not necessarily consistent with the simplified trade models that we used in order to analyse changes in comparative advantage. Some of these issues linked to globalisation have been considered from the perspective of technological change.
Simpler financial eco-systems offer the promise of greater robustness, at some cost in richness. In the light of a costly financial crisis, both eco-systems should be explored in seeking answers to the $ billion question. 42  Washington Mutual, with assets of around $ was resolved by FDIC, but was perceived by many to have caused systemic spillovers. 43  For example, Tucker (2010). BIS Review 40/2010  13  References Aikman, D, Barrett, P, Kapadia, S, King, M, Proudman, J, Taylor, T, de Weymarn, I, and T Yates (2010), Uncertainty in Macroeconomic Policy Making: Art or Science?, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2010/speech432.pdf Amel, D, Barnes, C, Panetta, F and C Salleo (2004), “Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the International Evidence”, Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 28(10). Baker, D and T McArthur (2009), “The Value of the ‘Too Big to Fail’ Big bank Subsidy”, Centre for Economic and Policy Research. Barro, R J (2006), “Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 121(3), p.823–866. Barth, J R, Caprio Jr., and R Levine (2004), “Bank Supervision and Regulation: What Works Best?”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 13(2), p.205–248. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009), Consultative Document: Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector. Beale, N, Rand, D, Arinaminpathy, N and R M May (2009), Conflicts Between Individual and Systemic Risk in Banking and Other Systems, forthcoming.

Peter Pang: Diverging monetary policies, global capital flows and financial stability Opening remarks by Mr Peter Pang, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the conference on “Diverging Monetary Policies, Global Capital Flows and Financial Stability”, jointly organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York/European Central Bank/Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas/Hong Kong Monetary Authority, hosted by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Hong Kong, 15 October 2015. *  *  *  1. It is my great pleasure to welcome all of you to this Conference jointly organised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. 2. Today’s Conference is very timely. With the US Fed contemplating an imminent liftoff in policy rates, while the ECB and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) are still preoccupied with quantitative easing (QE), central banks around the world are carefully weighing the potential impact of the expected divergence in monetary policies on global capital flows and financial stability. Financial markets often move ahead of the real economy. We have seen global financial markets tumbled and emerging market economies (EMEs) experienced quite intense capital outflow pressures during this summer. Many would be interested to know whether such gyrations of capital flows and asset prices have already captured a good part of the adjustment process or are just a curtain raiser for even stronger threats to financial stability of the EMEs. 3.
The third discussion forum I would like to mention is the reference group for the payment system called together by the Riksbank and consisting of representatives from VPC AB, Bankgirocentralen, Stockholm Stock Exchange, the major banks and the Swedish Bankers’ Association. Part of the work in these working groups has entailed charting the flows and the infrastructure of the payment system. The charting process began as an internal project at the Riksbank, with a general review of the payment system’s basic conditions, agents and services. This has since functioned as a basis for discussion and as reference material for other working groups to make a more in-depth survey of some representative payment services. One example is the flow chart of the Swedish Social Insurance Administration's pension payments that I have spoken of today. Other payments that have been charted are credit transfers and payments for securities. The general conclusion reached by most participants in these discussions is that each organisation has a responsibility for supplying its services in accordance with the agreements it has with its customers. This responsibility includes solving crises internally and cooperating with those the organisation is dependent on to be able to supply their services. The discussions have also increased awareness that everyone in the chain must have a reasonable level of business continuity and crisis recovery planning and that cooperation may be necessary to safeguard common interests. It has not yet been decided how these discussions will continue.

One possibility could be to discuss the consequences of part of the infrastructure being temporarily out of order, and how the negative effects of this could be limited. The focus on consequences means that it would be possible for the business continuity and crisis recovery planning to manage a large percentage of possible crisis scenarios. Summary A payment system with effective resilience to shocks is of critical importance to the economy and to society. However, the resilience of the payment system depends on investments from individual agents, which each have their own objectives rather than those of the economy as a whole. This makes it important for the Riksbank to participate and work to ensure that the resilience of the payment system as a whole remains on a reasonable level with regard to the social economy. There is some gain for the commercial organisations to have a good resilience to shocks as recurring disruptions at one agent will lead to customers changing to a different agent. This also means that it is rational to invest in cooperation with those on whom the agent is dependent to supply its service. One can reason in a similar manner with regard to the resilience of the system as a whole. The advantages of an improvement in the resilience of the payment system will benefit everyone, but to achieve a sufficiently strong resilience it is necessary to cooperate. Here the Riksbank and other authorities have an important task in explaining and acting as catalysts for cooperation.