samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Clarity and enforceability of the fiscal framework should also be enhanced. 3. The need for structural reforms  Turning to the aim of a higher long-term sustainable growth rate in the euro area more generally which, as I said, should be our major strategic goal, what we need is both higher productivity growth and higher employment creation. What is needed for these objectives to be achieved are economic reforms that ensure that capital, labour and product market rigidities will be substantially lowered. Structural reforms in capital, labour and product markets and in social security systems are needed to allow an allocation of capital and human resources which would be much closer to the optimum, enhancing the euro area’s growth potential and facilitating the adjustment to economic shocks. The reform priorities in the euro area’s capital, labour and product markets are overarching and very broad. In many cases they need to be translated into concrete policy measures at the European and/or the national level. Starting with capital markets, the pace of reform in this field has been impressive over the last years in anticipation and since the introduction of the euro. This includes policy-induced reform, such as the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) or the development of national legal frameworks governing the issuance of mortgage bonds. Reform covers also market-led initiatives, such as the development of electronic trading platforms or consolidation in the clearing and settlement infrastructure. Despite the past achievements the need for continuation and completion of the reforms remains.

To conclude I would like to stress more particularly five points. First, on the economic underpinnings, the main strategic goal of the Eurozone as well as of the European Union as a whole should be to increase substantially our growth potential. This is crucial and calls upon increasing very significantly in particular our rate of employment, our labour productivity progress and our technological and scientific basis. Second, as regards methodology, it is clear that we have to work out an appropriate concept for the actual, precise, to the point implementation of the reforms. The Lisbon agenda is excellent in terms of diagnosis. It is not associated with a precise and efficient decision making process, with a powerful delivery concept, which is absolutely indispensable. I was very encouraged to hear clearly Mr Mc Creevy stressing to the Governing Council of the ECB that the Irish Presidency will put the Lisbon agenda implementation on top of its priorities. The ECB will very warmly back initiatives of the Presidency in that domain. It is urgent. Third, as regards prioritization of structural reforms, I would personally particularly mention four points which seem to me of utmost importance in the Eurozone: Youth unemployment which is attaining unacceptable levels in some economies; unsatisfactory functioning of the Single Market in the service sector; insufficient labour productivity progress in the economy as a whole; and, lastly, consequences to be drawn from ageing in the management of the social protection schemes.
It is important to focus on the nature of capital flows not the nationality of investors concerned. Hence the resolution of crises involves more than simply restructuring liabilities to foreign banks or overseas investors. The problems created by the volatility of short-term debt flows require a structural solution. 3. Purist solutions  How can we design an appropriate infrastructure for the international capital market to prevent, or at least limit the frequency of, crises? To return to our transport analogy, there is clearly a case for eliminating blind spots on the road or lengthening the runway. But this is not enough. We also need to think about how the emergency services should respond to a crash. The purist is led naturally to consider solutions of two opposite kinds. One, which maintains open and free capital movements, is to create an international lender of last resort (ILOLR). The second, at the opposite end of the spectrum, is to reinstate permanent capital controls. Consider first the merits of an ILOLR. The obvious institution to play that role would be the IMF, and its First Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, provided a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of an ILOLR earlier this year.4 Although not new, the concept of an ILOLR has, in polite official circles, become the facility that dare not speak its name. The principle of a lender of last resort was described by Thornton and Bagehot in the nineteenth century as a willingness to lend freely against good collateral at a penal rate.

And we also need to identify the needs in the areas of monetary and prudential policies, where the CEF’s member countries have urged it to continue expanding its activities. This is a full agenda, and I am sure it will not be the last time we get together to exchange views on these issues. I believe strongly that we stand to gain immeasurably from considering these challenges on a regional basis. We can learn from each other’s experience; we can engage at times in a joint dialogue with the external actors in the region; and perhaps our political leaders can find some opportunities to launch reform initiatives in parallel – for example, in developing structural reforms to help promote a flow of new capital to, and within, this region. In this spirit, I look forward to very fruitful discussions – now in Tirana and in the future! 2  BIS Review 162/2009
These four characteristics are critical to the long-run credibility and success of the international capital adequacy framework. In Basel III itself, the Committee has made substantial enhancements to the quantity and quality of capital. By agreeing to be part of the Committee’s RCAP initiative, and by responding to it, national authorities have made clear their commitment to fulfilling the G20’s call for consistency in implementing the reforms. And we are now, for the first time, delving into the capital calculation practices of individual banks from an international perspective, to see what needs to be done so that the results are sufficiently comparable and reliable. The Committee is well aware that any changes to bank and supervisory practices will have costs. The potential side effects of materially narrowing down modelling choices could include a reduction in risk-sensitivity and a corresponding increase in the potential for arbitrage. If not done well, it could also reduce banks’ incentives to invest in risk management models, especially their attempts to continuously broaden and deepen their understanding of risk. As always in regulation, we need to find the right balance: we need to reduce material practice-based differences in RWA variation, while limiting the adverse effects from doing so. Resolving this issue will also take time: there is no quick fix. It will be a significant undertaking, and we need to carefully study the right mix of regulatory and supervisory responses.

8 And yet, the G20 lacks the legitimacy that historically has been associated with a truly multilateral framework. Its ambitious economic cooperation should be anchored in a multilateral institution. The IMF is the logical choice. The G20 includes only the countries that established it. Membership seems to have been somewhat arbitrarily determined and not solely on the basis of relative size or importance in the global economy. The G20 formally founded the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 9 and sets its agenda. Membership is at the discretion of the G20. The G20 agrees on the activities of and changes in the IMF and more or less dictates decisions to the rest of the membership. The FSB agrees on standards for financial sector activity, which the rest of the world is expected to adopt, without having been consulted or given the opportunity to voice an opinion in the preparatory phase. A strong institution like the IMF must be at the center of multilateral economic and financial cooperation. Virtually all the countries of the world participate and are represented in the IMF. To be able to continue to play an effective role, the IMF needs to enjoy confidence and trust, and to be seen as having a legitimate structure of governance. Last but not least, the IMF needs to be financially strong, to have at its disposal financial resources commensurate with its tasks, including the ability to provide prompt and significant financial support when needed.
William C Dudley: The US economic outlook and the implications for monetary policy Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City, 7 September 2017. * * * Good evening. It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak at this Money Marketeers event. In my remarks, I will focus on two topics: 1) The economic outlook and the implications for monetary policy, and 2) the Fed’s balance sheet normalization process, which is likely to begin relatively soon. As always, what I have to say reflects my own views and not necessarily those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or the Federal Reserve System.1 Overall, the economy remains on a trajectory of slightly above-trend growth, which is gradually tightening the U.S. labor market. Over time, this should support a rise in wage growth. When combined with a firmer import price trend—partly reflecting recent depreciation of the dollar—and the fading of effects from a number of temporary, idiosyncratic factors, that causes me to expect inflation will rise and stabilize around the FOMC’s 2 percent objective over the medium term. In response, the Fed will likely continue to remove monetary policy accommodation gradually.

For Treasury securities, when the caps are fully phased in, they will generally only be binding during the middle month of each quarter, when there is typically a spike in maturing Treasuries in the Fed’s portfolio. For agency MBS, as long as long-term interest rates are steady or rising, we expect that the fully-phased-in caps will not be binding. However, if long-term interest rates were to fall sharply—provoking a surge in refinancing and mortgage repayments—the caps would likely bind, limiting the amount of agency MBS that would have to be absorbed by the private market. As currently anticipated, once we start the balance sheet normalization program, we expect it to continue in the background until the FOMC judges that the Fed’s securities holdings are no larger than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively. Adjustments to the target range of the federal funds rate will remain the primary tool of monetary policy. However, if economic circumstances were to change during the normalization process in a way that would warrant a sizable reduction in the target range for the federal funds rate, the FOMC would be prepared to resume reinvestment. The program has been designed to be implemented gradually and predictably so that market participants and the U.S. Treasury can anticipate when and at what pace the portfolio is likely to run off over the course of normalization. This should keep expectations more stable and reduce the risk that a sharp shift in expectations could generate undesirably large movements in interest rates and asset prices.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The political background is one of nearly constant conflict both within the dysfunctional “English” monarchical family, as well as with France over control of Normandy and the rest of Henry II’s continental empire. 1 The England of the 1200s was far from a unitary state. Most matters were administered by local barons, with the King acting as an arbiter in the event of a dispute. The relationship between local (baronial) and central (monarchical) authority was much less deferential, and much more arms-length, than it is today. Indeed, the early Plantagenet Kings of England spent most of their time living at home in Normandy or Anjou, allowing the English barons a considerable degree of autonomy. It was only after King John lost Normandy to the French in 1204 that the King resided full-time in England, breathing down the necks of the barons, who did not much like the closer observation of their activities, and the eyeing of their stockpiles of silver that this proximity entailed. The relationship between the barons and King John broke down in part because of unsustainable public finances, with John imposing an intolerably heavy and arbitrary tax burden in order to pay for royal extravagance, infighting, and wars with the French. The royal judicial system, whose tendrils extended ever deeper into the barons’ lives, was used to extort cash and as an instrument of royal control, rather than to ensure “justice”. What lay behind such unsustainable public finances?

This is not something we will do for one or two years. We will have to continue this work as our children become young adults and eventually retire, giving rise to a whole new cycle. Hence the work on financial education has to be done continuously, as it is a very important area to help Singaporeans. 1  Financial Literacy Survey of over 1,800 Singaporeans and PRs conducted by The Nielsen Company on behalf of MAS between August and October 2013. Respondents answered questions and participated in focus groups on their knowledge of, attitudes and behaviour towards financial products and management. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Towards better financial wellbeing Financial protection 7. What will MAS do? We have a two-pronged approach to help Singaporeans to enhance their financial well-being. The first is to regulate the conduct of our banks and financial institutions. For banking, the key issue is to discourage the imprudent use of unsecured credit facilities. Consumer research has shown the immediate pleasure of purchasing a designer accessory or purchasing the latest gadget using a credit card. If you have a credit card, the immediate pleasure of using it to purchase the latest good that you’re interested in can lead people to spending more than they otherwise would. There was an experiment with a group of students in the US who were asked to bid for a pair of tickets to a basketball match.
In some instances, we have found it possible to adopt standards and practices of international bodies and foreign regulators wholesale. For instance, the Committee on Disclosure and Accounting Standards, a private sector led body formed to review disclosure and accounting standards in Singapore, has recommended that Singapore should adopt International Accounting Standards (IAS) as the accounting standards for Singapore. In terms of mutual recognition, we are currently exploring with Australia an agreement for the mutual recognition of our regulatory regimes in certain activities of the securities market. We are ready to conclude similar arrangements with other like-minded regulators. BIS Review 45/2001  3  Consolidation of financial centres The third dimension is consolidation of financial activities in fewer locations. Before the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, financial institutions had predominantly domestic clienteles and tended to locate in their respective financial capitals, for easy access to clients. So the largest centres tended to be financial capitals of countries with the largest economic bases. But as the structure of the financial industry evolved post-Bretton Woods, there has been a decoupling between the size of a financial centre and the size of its economic base. Institutions now need to service customers from many countries. It is not feasible for international players to maintain a major presence in every jurisdiction where they operate. So the financial centres that are able to enhance the competitiveness of their constituent firms are the ones that thrive. Proximity to clients has become less critical.

We also have doubts about the existing deposit insurance system of full cover up to EUR 100,000 adopted at the start of the financial crisis. At the time, this measure certainly helped calm the public and prevent runs on banks. However, we feel that the time has come to consider a return to normal, to reintroduce the system where depositors are not fully covered, at least with respect to non-SIFI banks. I think the question that forms the title of this conference is very topical and relevant. We believe that the time has come to pause and try to discuss these issues seriously. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  As to costs, supervisory authorities are also incurring high costs. On the European scale, we are recruiting hundreds of new employees to be able to meet the challenges of applying the new regulations. Mandatory impact assessments have been introduced, but these often sound like unconvincing or formal justifications for a result known in advance: “There will be costs, but the benefits will outweigh them in the long run”. As to complexity, we have plenty of evidence that the current sectoral approach to regulation does not make our life as supervisory authorities any easier. We are often creating three parallel but materially identical sets of basic requirements for banks, insurers and investment firms.
In short, we need FinTech to do in the sustainability space what it is doing today in the inclusion space. We need Green FinTech. To spur the growth of the Green FinTech ecosystem, MAS has launched an ESG Impact Hub. The Hub provides a physical locality to facilitate discovery, scaling and deployment of technology solutions that support the financial sector's ESG needs, notably on the data front. MAS will engage banks, think tanks, NGOs and other knowledge partners to run a series of ESG-focused accelerators out of the Hub, aimed at bringing together tech solutions to address specific sectoral challenges in ESG data and financing. To harness Green FinTech to build a credible ESG data landscape MAS has launched a collaborative effort with the financial industry called Project Greenprint. Project Greenprint seeks to build digital utilities that streamline the collection, access, and use of climate and sustainability data The aim is to help mobilise capital to sustainable projects, monitor the climate commitments made, and measure the impact associated with their investments. The initial phase of Project Greenprint focuses on four digital utilities ESG Disclosure Portal; ESG Registry; Data Orchestrator; and Digital Marketplace. The ESG Disclosure Portal enables SGX-listed companies to carry out baseline sustainability reporting based on a set of 27 core metrics. Titled ESGenome, the ESG Disclosure Portal was developed by SGX in consultation with its user base and launched just last month.

Short-term developments are not key, especially when they are largely determined by energy and food prices. The underlying trend and the firm anchoring of inflation expectations are decisive, as well as the orientation of the euro area as a whole. Low inflation rates in some Member States – even when negative – are not in themselves a breach of the target. They can be necessary to restore lost competitiveness. One could also argue about whether it is really necessary to consider further measures given that the measures already taken have not yet been able to have an effect. Monetary policy does not take effect immediately, but only with a certain time lag. As a rule we should take this time and wait and see. Which measures are we talking about here? The large-scale purchase of securities, including government bonds, is often seen as a panacea. As I said, even for innovative or unconventional measures, the costs and benefits, and the opportunities and risks must be carefully considered. Some central banks have used quantitative easing to quickly and decisively provide monetary policy impetus, adjusted to the specificities of their environment. It is these particular central banks and their measures to which we are compared. For me, these are idle comparisons. The following saying applies here: those who constantly compare themselves with others might become more like them, but they won’t necessarily become any better.
Overall, the evidence that trade has depressed the 10  wages of unskilled workers in the developed world is mixed at best . Instead, most economists have argued that the more important factor behind rising wage inequality in the United States has been the “skill-biased” nature of technical progress – the fact that computer technology seems to have added more to the productivity of high-skilled than lower skilled employees. One recent and well-publicised IMF study made the same point (Chapter 3, World Economic Outlook, April 2017) but this is only the latest in a very extensive and long-lived literature that has reached broadly similar conclusions. 8  Note that this could reflect the effect of a period of unemployment – so-called “scarring” – and needn’t say anything about the impact of trade on wages. 9 Krugman (1995). 10 Harrison et al. (2011) provide a useful survey; Haskell and Slaughter (2003) provide a careful anaylsis designed to distinguish the effects on wage inequality of both technology and trade and find only weak effects of the latter; Stone and Cavazos Capeda (2012) find some effect of imports on wage differentials but, allowing for their impact on productivity, positive effects across the distribution. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  I can’t possibly do any real justice to this work. Nor should I over-state its results. None of it attributes everything to the nature of recent technical progress or dismisses entirely the impact of trade on inequality.

MFIs – SEEDS (SKS)  Male  % Received by Women  NA – refers to the non-availability of disaggregated data Source: Regional Development Dept., Central Bank of Sri Lanka  As shown in the table, the Small Farmers and Landless Credit Project (SFLCP), Poverty Alleviation Micro Finance Project (PAMP) and SANASA Thrift and Credit Societies have been successful in providing loan facilities at 93%, 76% and 70%, respectively, for women. Approximately 8,681 women have obtained financial and credit facilities under the SFLCP revolving funds loan scheme, while 39,388 women have benefited under PAMP as at the end of 2007. Again, due to lack of statistics and information, it is difficult to assess the ratio of loans granted exclusively for women by commercial banks. Among others, the Sarvodaya  6  BIS Review 40/2008  46.00  (SEEDS) has been in the forefront, reporting a total loan value of Rs 1.9 billion at the end of 2007, of which 67% has been for women borrowers. As shown in Table IV, exclusivity conditions are not necessarily applicable to Sri Lanka given the large-scale membership of women in the widespread banking arm of the Cooperative Societies, i.e. about 1,500 cooperative rural banks and 7,400 Sanasa Societies, both providing banking and financial services. In effect, in the micro finance delivery chain, Sri Lanka’s Cooperative Societies and Sanasa Societies appear to be very significant.