samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The international outlook continues to be highly uncertain. A further escalation of the European sovereign debt crisis cannot be ruled out. This would have grave consequences for the international financial system. Moreover, given our country’s close relations with the euro area, Switzerland’s economic prospects are highly dependent on how the crisis develops. Compared to the previous quarter, the SNB’s conditional inflation forecast has once again been adjusted downwards. In the short term, inflation will dip into negative territory sooner, owing to the effects of the earlier currency appreciation, which have been stronger than expected. In the longer term, the worsening of the growth outlook for the euro area is dampening inflation. The forecast for 2011 shows an inflation rate of 0.2%. For 2012, the SNB is expecting inflation of –0.3% and for 2013, of 0.4%. These forecasts are based on the assumption of a three-month Libor of 0% and a depreciating Swiss franc. In the foreseeable future, there is no risk of inflation in Switzerland. If foreign demand were to fall off more sharply than expected, downside risks to price stability would emerge. Global economic outlook Following a very weak second quarter, the global economy picked up again slightly in the third quarter, benefiting from the resumption of production following the earthquake disaster in Japan. The decline in commodity prices during the third quarter also had a positive effect. In Japan, the US and China in particular, aggregate economic activity strengthened slightly. In the euro area, on the other hand, economic growth was weak.

This can be attributed to the fact that the economy still has substantial momentum to support growth. Exports and private investment, in particular, are expected to grow on the back of continued global recovery, a high level of capacity utilization, and conducive financial conditions supported by a turnaround in credit extension of the banking sector. Moreover, the economy is now in a much better position to weather external shocks, thanks to an improved external position and the strength of domestic demand. In addition, the Government’s much improved fiscal position should allow the economy to adjust to higher oil prices without interrupting the growth momentum. It is, therefore, our view that the risks to growth from the higher oil prices should be manageable. BIS Review 58/2004  1  On the other hand, the impact of the higher oil prices on economic stability is expected to be more pronounced. Latest data on headline inflation continue to show signs of price acceleration. In August, Thailand’s headline inflation therefore rose by 3.1 percent year-on-year, while core inflation rose by 0.7 percent year-on-year. With a narrowing of the output gap and reported tightening in some segments of the labour market, we believe that there is considerable pent-up price pressure building up in the system that could eventually translate into higher consumer prices. Our inflation forecast points to a higher probability of rising domestic inflation going forward.
In countries such as Italy and Germany, supports in the form of capital, credit and other liquidity were employed in addition to the fiscal policy. Meanwhile, in emerging markets, economies were supported by various measures, although these measures were more limited compared to advanced economies. With the rate cut decision we took at the Monetary Policy Committee Meeting on 17 March 2020, we announced our first set of measures geared towards countering the economic effects of the pandemic. These measures aimed to; (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)  enhance predictability by providing banks with flexibility in Turkish lira and foreign exchange liquidity management, offer targeted additional liquidity facilities to banks to secure uninterrupted credit flow to the corporate sector, boost cash flow of exporting firms through arrangements on rediscount credits, and boost the liquidity of the Government Domestic Debt Securities (GDDS) market. The uninterrupted and smooth functioning of financial markets, the credit channel and firms’ cash flows was essential to contain the adverse effects of the coronavirus. The measures taken boosted the financial sector’s liquidity and credit conditions, and the monetary transmission mechanism continued to function effectively. 5  In sum, we aimed to support financial stability and the post-pandemic recovery process by providing much-needed liquidity to the financial system and the real sector under appropriate conditions during the pandemic. Thus, we sought to minimize the long-term damage to production and employment that may be caused by temporary effects arising from the pandemic.

This trend appears to be in stark contrast to the 2008 crisis. As the services sector is a labor-intensive sector, the cost that the pandemic imposed on employment has been much higher than that of the financial crisis of 2008. In this process, central banks all over the world took extraordinary expansionary policy measures such as interest rate cuts, asset purchases, liquidity steps and credit support programs. The experience of policy makers in unconventional monetary policy after the 2008 crisis and the expansion of the toolkit has made a positive contribution to the policy response to the pandemic. Central banks of advanced and emerging economies used the existing policy space without hesitation and promptly, and cut policy rates as a first response to the crisis. Central banks also reintroduced bond purchases that they had included in the post-crisis toolkit. It is noteworthy that emerging market central banks also resorted to bond purchases, unlike in the 2008 crisis. Central banks have provided more funding through repo transactions and extended the maturity of funding to prevent liquidity squeeze in the money market and to facilitate access to liquidity. In this period, when economies came to a standstill, this intervention by central banks was appropriate and vital for the functioning of the financial system. Globally, policy rates have been rapidly lowered and the average interest rate in both advanced and emerging economies has fallen below the levels in the 2008 crisis.
And we will insist that banks' risk  2/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  management practices are fully aligned with all our expectations by the end of 2024 at the latest. It is clear that central banks and supervisors are not primarily responsible for addressing the ongoing climate and environmental crises. They are climate and environment policy-takers, whereas governments and legislators – including the European Parliament – are climate and environment policymakers. The European Union and its co-legislators are clearly committed to the Paris Agreement. The EU is taking concrete steps to implement legislation that puts this commitment into practice. Central banks and supervisors cannot ignore this in the pursuit of their mandate. Similarly, on the path to meeting the Paris Agreement goals, we cannot ignore scenarios which include a greater manifestation of physical risks from climate change and environmental degradation. And we will not ignore all this. To the contrary. We acknowledge that we cannot deliver on our mandate if we assume a status quo in which the world will not transition as the baseline scenario for the future. And by rejecting that status quo as the baseline, we are becoming a force that contributes to the transition. And we will continue to be just that: a force that contributes to the transition. Within our mandate. And in the pursuit of our mandate. Thank you very much for your attention. 3/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches

Lim Hng Kiang: Singapore Exchange Beijing Representative Office Opening speech by Mr Lim Hng Kiang, Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore and Minister for Trade and Industry, at the Launch Ceremony of the Singapore Exchange Beijing Representative Office, Beijing, 21 April 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Congratulatory remarks I am delighted to be here with you this evening to commemorate the opening of the Singapore Exchange Beijing Representative Office. First, I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Chinese Government and the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission for the generous support of the Singapore Exchange’s efforts in China. Establishment of the Singapore Exchange Beijing representative office The setting up of the Singapore Exchange’s first overseas representative office in Beijing underscores the exchange’s commitment to China. This representative office will further strengthen existing links between our two business and finance communities under the broader China-Singapore partnership framework. Chinese listings on the Singapore Exchange The Singapore Exchange started serving the fund-raising needs of Chinese companies since 1997, and it has seen strong interest in the recent years. Encouraged by the Chinese government’s "go out" policy and also boosted by the economic strength of the Chinese economy, Chinese companies have increasingly taken significant steps to regionalise and internationalise their businesses. Many Chinese companies have chosen Singapore as a springboard into the region and the Singapore Exchange as a fund-raising platform.
In Europe, our lack of innovation and agility in crises is probably the most severe: in 2019, among the 100 most innovative firms in the worldvi, 38 were based in the United States, 21 in China and 15 in Europe. And of the large digital corporations – the GAFAM and other bigtechs – whose power equals that of sovereign states, none is European. Europe is clearly losing momentum at a time when this crisis is triggering a further acceleration of digital technology. In the short term, a too persistent provision of public support to firms could have perverse effects on innovation, as it would prevent creative destruction from occurring. This lack of a “cleansing effect” calls for a sufficiently selective approach in assisting the recovery: public support for “building back better” should not be aimed at preserving yesterday’s world. In the longer term, what can we do to put Europe back on the path of innovation? I’m not going to claim to know more than all the research, which is often better qualified than I am. But I firmly believe that innovation is perfectly compatible with the European model and with our choice of the euro. Economic stagnation is not written in our destiny: we can – provided we have the patience and tenacity to remain mobilised over the long term – achieve a great deal by liberating two European energies. First, that of Europe’s talent and its human capital: 448 million men and women, whom few can rival in terms of qualifications.

Yes, a  Page 9 sur 14 big step forward has been made thanks to Next Generation EU. But the real Hamiltonian moment will come when the existence of a permanent common fiscal capacity allows genuine countercyclical action to be taken to counter major asymmetric shocks. Conversely – and not contradictorily –, adequate fiscal discipline is key to cope with economic reversals. Look at Germany, which fixed the roof while the sun was shining, and made appropriate use of its financial leeway during the crisis. There will be a debate, to be concluded most likely next year after the German and French elections, on the Stability and Growth Pact. We should avoid a fruitless confrontation between “illusionists” – who plead for debt cancellation, which is completely out of the question – and “traditionalists” – who want to keep the same old rules as if nothing had changed, including on the level of interest rates. We do still need rules, but revised and simplified ones. Indeed, the current low interest rate environment (with r<g) does not mean that public debt sustainability issues have become irrelevant: it only implies that governments have more time to ensure debt sustainability. These new rules should be based on a medium-term debt trajectory and on a single operational target, namely a ceiling on the growth rate of public expenditure as proposed by the European Fiscal Board (EFB), chaired by the Danish economist Pr. Niels Thygesen. First, we can keep the 60% long-term debt anchor, which is in the Treaty.
Some reforms underway represent efforts to ensure that our rules keep pace with the achievements that the industry has already made. On this note, I would argue that Basel II is just as much about aligning supervisory practices more closely with the industry’s latest advances as it is about promoting improvements in the management of risk within the industry itself. But I sympathise with the sense that the wide range of standards that are evolving in parallel represents a drain on the limited resources that firms have to keep pace with those changes. I agree that we must find a way to balance the dangers we are trying to ward off against the time and resources it takes to adapt to new circumstances and new rules. And I want to work with you to make sure that the labours you undertake are not merely exercises in compliance with new rules, but rather will represent honest efforts to strengthen your practices and your long-term prospects for growth and innovation. From my perspective as chairman of the Basel Committee, I can say that the Committee’s main focus in the near future will be on completing the current work and on implementing Basel II in a sound, consistent, and effective manner. This will allow us all a period to digest the framework we have designed. At the same time, we have always said that Basel II should be an evolutionary approach. This does not mean a moving target.

Artificial intelligence experts are creating virtual environments to speed up the process of learning about system dynamics. “Reinforcement learning” allows algorithms to learn and update by drawing on 55  interactions among virtual players, rather than drawing on limited runs of historical experience. At least in  principle, a virtual economy would allow policymakers to engage in their own reinforcement learning, speeding up their process of discovery about the behaviour of the complex economic and financial system. Conclusion So will Big Data keep its promise? I am optimistic it will. Economics and finance needs to make an on-going investment in Big Data and data analytics if it is to rebalance the methodological scales. And early research, including at the Bank, suggests the returns to such activity could be high, deepening our understanding of the economy and financial system. These returns will best be harvested if there is strong collaboration between statistical authorities, policymakers, the commercial sector, research centres and academia. The Bank of England can play a  52  For example, Lehdonvirta and Castronova (2014). Levitt et al (2016). 54 Yanis Varoufakis has previously been involved with a similar idea: http://uk.businessinsider.com/yanis-varoufakis-valve-gameeconomy-greek-finance-2015-2 55 See https://deepmind.com/blog/deep-reinforcement-learning/ for a discussion. 53  13  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  13  catalytic role in bringing this expertise together. So too can DAFM. I wish DAFM every success and look forward to working in partnership with you.
The social partners would have to go it alone. The experience of some European countries shows that this can be demanding. With a floating exchange rate, the necessary adjustment of the cost level can take place faster, and may prove less painful. The krone exchange rate can function as a stabiliser. The depreciation of the krone through autumn last year indicates that this mechanism is functioning (see Chart 8). The monetary policy credibility built up over the years is now of considerable benefit. Continued confidence that inflation will remain low and stable over time is a necessary precondition for a pronounced weakening of the krone concurrent with a low key policy rate. The benefit associated with a currency of our own disappears if the temporary rise in inflation associated with a krone depreciation is countered by higher wage increases. The result would be a higher key policy rate and a stronger exchange rate than would otherwise be the  4  4  Including reserves that have been approved for development by holders of oil rights and other proven resources in fields and discoveries. Source: The shelf in 2014, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. BIS central bankers’ speeches  case and, not least, higher unemployment. The social partners have a particular responsibility in this regard. In December last year, Norges Bank lowered the key policy rate by 0.25 percentage point to 1.25 percent. Norges Bank gave weight to the weakening of the growth outlook for the Norwegian economy observed through autumn.

In the initial years under the fiscal rule, petroleum revenue spending rose approximately in pace with the GPFG’s capital. The fiscal rule, based on a real return of 4 percent, thereby provided an effective constraint on petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget. In recent years, high oil prices and solid returns have resulted in strong growth in the value of the GPFG. This has provided scope for substantial increases in petroleum revenue spending, although spending has been around 3 percent of the GPFG’s value in recent years. In a period of low unemployment and solid economic growth, it has been appropriate to set aside a greater share of the revenues. Recent years have been characterised by wide fluctuations in returns, with extreme variability during the financial crisis. Volatility on the world’s stock exchanges and in financial markets impacts the market value of the GPFG and thereby the anchor for fiscal policy. Although the depreciation of the krone has increased the GPFG’s current value in krone terms, this veils the fact that its international purchasing power is unaffected by changes in the krone’s value. Such volatility has become more difficult to manage as the GPFG has grown in size. Oil prices have fallen sharply over the past six months. Even if prices edge up again, we have been reminded of the uncertainty associated with future revenues. Lower oil prices imply slower growth in the GPFG than previously estimated.
Nevertheless, the market has been incorporating some moderation into its vision of the US monetary policy and some more intensity in that of the Eurozone, which partly explains the global depreciation of the dollar. Emerging currencies have benefited from the weak dollar, the better prices of commodities and increased risk appetite. Comparing the statistical closures of this and the previous Reports, the peso has appreciated by around 4.5%, which, in real terms, translates into a decrease of approximately 3.5% of the real exchange rate. Thus, at the last cutoff date it was fluctuating around 90 in its 1986 = 100 measurement, lower than its averages of the last 15 or 20 years. Moreover, in the days following the statistical closure, the peso has continued to appreciate in both nominal and real terms. As a working assumption, the baseline scenario of this Report assumes a slight depreciation in real terms over the projection horizon (figure 7). 3  Turning to the performance of the emerging economies, in the first half of the year China grew 6.9% annually, exceeding expectations. These figures raise the baseline scenario estimate, although some moderation in activity is assumed for the second half, in line with the latest data on manufacturing output, retail sales and investment (figure 8). In Latin America, the recovery of activity has been slower, with poor performance of investment and sectors unrelated with natural resources.

On the one hand, it further strengthens the accountability of the decision-makers and increases transparency for the public. On the other, it will also contribute to the study of the country's economic history and a better understanding of the decisions made from a historical perspective. The publication of this material will be made in March of each year. The measure will have retroactive effect, so that the publication of March 2018 will cover the meetings of the years 2000 to 2007. Finally, we will also make changes to the publication periods of both our Monetary Policy Report and our Financial Stability Report. The Monetary Policy Report, which will keep its quarterly frequency, will be released first thing in the morning after the meetings of March, June, September and December, and will be complemented by a press conference of the CBC Governor at the Bank's premises. By publishing this Report the day after the Meeting, the Board will have the chance to reinforce the communication of the grounds that justify the policy decisions. In general, the vast majority of central banks publish their Reports or similar documents on the same day that monetary policy decisions are announced. The Monetary Policy Report will continue to be submitted to the Senate immediately after its publication, in dates that will be agreed upon with the respective instances. The Financial Stability Report, for its part, will continue to be published twice a year, but will now be made separately from the Monetary Policy Report, in May and November (table 4).
However, the CPI also has a well-known disadvantage, which in my opinion makes it less appropriate as a direct, operational target for monetary policy. This disadvantage is that the CPI is directly affected by interest rate changes through their impact on housing costs. This short-term effect also has the reverse sign to the medium-term effect. This means that the Riksbank’s own repo rate increases contribute to an increase in CPI inflation in the short term but reduce it in the slightly longer term. The major interest rate changes during the crisis have led to considerable fluctuations in the CPI. I believe on the whole that it is better to consistently use the CPIF as an operational target for monetary policy and disregard the direct effects of interest rate changes on the CPI when assessing whether monetary policy is well-balanced. By stabilising the CPIF around 2 per cent, the CPI will be stabilised around the target in the slightly longer term. It would then be important to consistently use the CPIF to rank various monetary policy alternatives and not change back and forth between the CPIF and the CPI. If we sometimes refer to the CPIF and sometimes to the CPI, monetary policy will become unclear. The unemployment gap is the most appropriate measure of resource utilisation There are many ways of measuring resource utilisation, for example the output gap, the hours-worked gap, the employment gap, capacity utilisation or the Riksbank’s RU indicator.

Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Figure 10 Nominal exchange rate (1) (index, 2-Jan-2006= 100)  Real exchange rate (2) (index, 1986=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  90  80  80  80  70  70  140  140  130  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  90 80  06  07  08  OER  09  10  MER  88 92 96 00 04 08 RER 1990-2009 average 1995-2009 average  MER-5  (1) Vertical dashed line marks date of publication of the September 2010 IPoM. (2) Information at 16 December 2010. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 11 MPR and expectations (percent) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  07  08  09  10  11  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0  12  Forward September 2010 IPoM  Forward December 2010 IPoM  MPR  FOS first half December 2010  EES December 2010 Source: Central Bank of Chile. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches