samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As part of my revision, I studied the inflation rates since the Second World War for several different measures of inflation. They were all at or very close to 3% a year. No-one in Cambridge at that time – and certainly not the students that were to become part of the inflation generation – heeded the late Richard Kahn’s warning that creeping inflation was about to accelerate. The rest, as they say, is monetary history. I would like those of you revising for your final exams this month to be able to look back in thirty years time and recall that the year in which you graduated was when we finally laid to rest the idea that the UK was an inflation-prone economy. Inflation was the norm for most of my adult life. It should not be in yours. BIS Review 63/1999  8  Why then, you may ask, do we need to build a constituency for low inflation? There are two reasons. First, it is important that support for low inflation not wane as the experience of high and unstable inflation of the past recedes. It would be a counsel of despair to believe that the inflationary excesses of the recent past would have to be repeated in order to retain support for low inflation. Yet, in a recent survey of households in Germany, Robert Shiller2 found that support for stability was much higher among those who had experienced hyperinflation.

Speech by the BNB Governor, Mr. Dimitar Radev at the forum of the Association of Banks in Bulgaria on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of its foundation, 13 June 2022 Dear Ms Chairperson, Dear Mr Deputy Prime Minister, Dear Members of Parliament, Dear colleagues and guests, Thank you for the invitation. Please accept most sincere congratulations by the BNB Governing Council on the 30th anniversary of the Association of Banks in Bulgaria. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for your many years of support and partnership. They were demonstrated not only in our operational work, but also in solving strategic tasks for the sector and the country's economy. The ABB was founded at the beginning of a period of dramatic political, economic and social change in the country. Since then, the banks in Bulgaria and the sector as a whole have gone through various phases and periods, some of which particularly turbulent. Unlike in the beginning, the sector and the Association are now much more consolidated. People like me, contemporaries of the events of 1992, remember that there were over 70 banks in Bulgaria at the time, 47 of which became founders of the association. Today, there are 24 ABB member banks (full and associate), with a total of 25 banks and bank branches in Bulgaria. We do not need to go so far back to assess the huge changes in the sector. It is enough to take the period of the last 5 years.
The architectural concept of Sasana Kijang is inspired from the shape of the Cowrie shell, a popular form of money in the Malay Peninsula during the 3rd century with its building facade derived from the geometric patterns of traditional Malaysian songket motifs, reflecting the hand woven fabric designs. Sasana Kijang hosts a learning centre with state-of-the-art training facilities for local and foreign participants and provides opportunities for the exchange of views and experience towards promoting capacity building in central banking. In addition to training facilities, offices and conference halls, Sasana Kijang also houses the Bank Negara Malaysia Knowledge Management Centre and the Bank Negara Malaysia’s Museum and Art Gallery which is open to the public. I hope all of you will take the opportunity to explore the Bank’s collection displayed at the Museum and Art Gallery and to enjoy the activities in the Knowledge Management Centre. As visitors to Malaysia, your stay here is not complete unless you have treated yourself to the variety of food, traditional and modern, that the country has to offer. On that note, I wish you all a productive engagement and a pleasant stay in Kuala Lumpur. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

José Manuel González-Páramo: Re-starting securitisation Keynote speech by Mr José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe/European Science Foundation (ESF) and Information Management Network Global ABS (AssetBacked Securities) 2010 Conference, London, 16 June 2010. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I. Introduction  I am very pleased to be here in London to participate again at the AFME/ESF and IMN Global ABS Conference. Today, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the restarting of the ABS markets, in the light of the important role that it should play from a macro-financial point of view. More precisely, I shall first outline the role which securitisation should play in the financial system and why this role is important. Then, I shall assess in more detail the current situation of the securitisation markets. Finally, I would like to make some considerations on the way forward for the restarting of the ABS markets. In doing so, I shall assess what has been done and what still needs to be done to reach a sustained rebound of the securitisation markets. II. Current financial market conditions  To set the stage, I shall refer to the ECB’s latest Financial Stability Review, published on 4 June, which analyses in detail the so-called large and complex banking groups (LCBGs), and the findings of which may, with some caution, be extended to the euro area banking sector as a whole.
Figure 1: Financial Services Value Chain  At present, the most significant changes are taking place at the front-end, where innovative payment service providers (PSPs) are providing new user interfaces for domestic retail and cross-border payment services through digital wallets or pre-funded eMoney. 8  Other aspects of the customer relationships are being opened up. For example, aggregators are providing customers with ready access to price comparison and switching services. This will increase further when aggregators gain access to banks’ Application Programme Interfaces (APIs). 9  These new entrants are capturing potentially invaluable customer data which can be used to target non-bank products and services. 10  8  For example, more than 80% of incumbent financial institutions thought their customers were already using FinTech companies to make payments whilst nearly 70% thought they were doing the same for fund transfer and around 60% for personal finance. Only 50% thought their customers were doing so for traditional deposits and savings. See PWC “Global FinTech Report” (2017). 9 The second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) will allow, conditional FCA authorisation and customer authority, non-banks to access customers’ bank account data. In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority has required that the UK’s nine largest banks adopt an open banking standard for APIs by early 2018.

The emerging economies were hardest hit by the previous global crisis in the late 1990s. This time OECD countries were the most severely affected. But Norway seems to have largely escaped the crisis. Overall, output has fallen to a lesser extent in Norway than in other countries and it recovered more quickly. Unemployment has remained low. One might almost believe that Norway was immune to crises and that the country is unique. But this is not the case. It is dangerous to believe that we will be able to manage every crisis as successfully. 2  IMF Country Report No. 10/24, January 2010. Norway: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV Consultation. BIS Review 15/2010  7  Norway is not unique. We cannot expect driving forces to be as beneficial in the future. Real interest rates cannot be expected to fall. Another sharp boost to export prices is not likely. In addition, Norway’s economy is now vulnerable. Norwegian labour has never been as costly as it is today. Norwegian businesses may be at a disadvantage in tenders and competitions given the current high level of spare capacity in other countries. Moreover, it has never been more profitable to relocate activities abroad. During the upturn, Norwegian firms fared well in spite of high costs thanks to efficiency gains, high turnover volumes and price increases. The cost of Norwegian labour has been very high, but there has been full employment. Markets will be more demanding ahead.
This suggests that, at least in this sample, imposing a small number of regulatory constraints can achieve the same hit rate as any singular constraint, but at a materially lower societal and regulatory cost, as measured by levels of capital and liquidity and/or regulatory false alarms. Intuitively, these results broadly accord with the conceptual discussion. A regulatory portfolio can help when insuring against multiple sources of risk and myriad sources of uncertainty. It also accords with what we know from various individual case studies of bank failure during the global financial crisis: some banks failed because they were over-leveraged, others because their assets were excessively risky, others still because they undertook too much maturity transformation. Because these fault-lines were, for some banks, reasonably well-correlated – their risk management was poor across all dimensions – individual regulatory metrics performed fairly well in identifying these banks prior to them failing. But some banks’ risk-management failings were singular, not plural. Their risk blind-spots were idiosyncratic and uncorrelated. By using a portfolio of regulatory stress metrics, it is possible to isolate those banks which were risk-management outliers in one, but not all, dimensions. Consider two very different banks which failed during the global financial crisis. American bank Countrywide had a leverage ratio of 7.7% and a risk-weighted capital ratio of 11.6% at the end of 2006. Even if capital regulation had been much tougher in 2006, it may not have been required to raise capital. But its NSFR was just 0.76, indicative of the structural liquidity risk it was undertaking.

Increased awareness of the risks and early reaction to problems is likely to lead to a smoother adjustment to new conditions or to the correction of mistakes, making decisions less abrupt. Basel II is built on the expectation that a country’s banks should be able to manage their risks today and respond to challenges tomorrow. The second reason I believe Basel II will enhance financial stability is that it promotes more effective corporate governance. A bank can have the most sophisticated measurement tools in the world, but if it is poorly governed, it will be vulnerable to financial and operational weaknesses. While much attention has been paid to some of the more complex quantitative aspects of Basel II, I believe the most important aspects are those that address how the bank’s risk management framework is governed. Banks that adopt Basel II will be expected to have a comprehensive and sound planning and governance system to oversee all aspects of their risk measurement and management process. The board of directors, senior management, and audit and other control functions will be expected to exercise their duties in a rigorous manner. I believe that better managed banks under Basel II will be safer, sounder, and more resilient. I should also add that the Basel Committee last month published a paper on sound corporate governance practices for banks, which I believe will be useful for all countries, whether they are ready or not to adopt Basel II.
Developments in the nominal and real exchange rate over the past year probably reflect an improvement in the terms of trade and an increase in oil cash flows into the Norwegian economy. After several expensive wage settlements - and a short period of a strong krone - had weakened profitability in the Norwegian business sector, a depreciation of the krone and more moderate wage agreements contributed to restraining the decline in activity and employment. However, costs in the business sector remain high and competitiveness remains measured by relative labour costs are still fairly weak. It is now close to 5 per cent weaker than the average for the period 1970-2004 and about  5  See Akram, Q.F (2003) ”Real equilibrium exchange rate for Norway”, Norwegian Journal of Economics, no. 2, p. 89-112, and "Oil wealth and real exchange rates: The FEER for Norway ”. Working Paper No. 2004/16, Norges Bank, by the same author. 6  As measured by the import-weighted index I-44. 4  BIS Review 38/2005  15 per cent weaker than in the mid-1990s. Manufacturing industry is nevertheless faring well at present thanks to favourable prices and market conditions. Low real interest rate The easing of monetary policy has resulted in low real interest rates. Short-term real interest rates have fallen by close to 4 percentage points since the end of 2002. It would seem that it is not only changes in the real interest rate that have an influence, but also its level.

The level of Chinese investment pouring into the country has also significantly increased while the Chinese community in the country has continued to grow following the rising number of Chinese investments in Zambia. The level of interactions between Zambian businesses and those from China has therefore significantly increased. However, the obvious and notable obstacle to the smooth conduct of business transactions and interactions between the people of our two countries has been the language barrier. Many a time, communication between our people has been through the use of interpreters. BIS Review 175/2010  1  Reliance on interpreters can be very inconveniencing, ineffective and costly. This barrier can be overcome by learning the Chinese language. It is against this background that the Bank has taken keen interest in launching this MoU. The principal objectives of the MoU are to: a)  establish a framework in which the Chinese International School can facilitate capacity building in learning the Chinese language among BOZ employees;  b)  promote multi-cultural awareness and appreciation of a diversity of languages necessary for Bank staff to transact effectively and efficiently in social and professional fora which require the usage of Chinese; and  c)  enhance opportunities for bi-and or multilateral co-operation between the Bank and relevant Chinese-speaking authorities and stakeholders.
REASONS FOR HIGH SAVING IN NORWAY The Norwegian fiscal rule implies a more cautious spending path than the permanent income rule. The government spends the expected return on its current financial assets, which is significantly lower than total oil and gas wealth. Graph: Oil and gas revenues and government spending The fiscal rule implies that real spending will increase as long as production continues, i.e. until all oil and gas resources are transformed into financial wealth. As the economy grows, spending as a share of mainland GDP will nevertheless fall slowly. This is illustrated in the graph. The graph also illustrates that we have been able to cut through the very large, but temporary income flows at the beginning of the present century. Since 2016, government spending has exceeded the net cash flow from the oil sector. This means that we are running a primary deficit and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Currently, the transfer from the fund equals 8 percent of mainland GDP. Eventually, as delayed consumption increases accumulated returns, spending according to the fiscal rule will also surpass the current estimate of the permanent income. The real issue is thus a question of timing. Has this spending profile been too conservative, and the increase in consumption delayed for too long, as Bergsten and Gagnon claim? My brief answer is no. My first argument is that the conclusion to spend the permanent income does not take into account the resource movement effects discussed above.

The accumulated wealth in the fund is approaching three times mainland GDP, enabling a lasting annual income contribution to future welfare of 6-8 percent of mainland GDP in the coming decades. The present guidelines allow temporary income flows to be transformed into permanent gains, benefiting all future generations. They are simple and robust. They take account of the effects on the rest of the economy and on the economic policy debate. Norway’s experience serves as an example of why temporary shocks in general, and more specifically discoveries of natural resources, justify deviations from a balanced current account. Deficits used to finance investments that generated high returns have served us well. I guess there is no such thing in the real world as an “optimal spending rule”. In the Norwegian case, there were definitely lessons to be learned during the first two-three decades of resource development. Still, over the years, and in particular with the present fiscal rule, I think we have struck a reasonable balance. Thank you for your attention. 1 Bergsten, C.F. and Gagnon, J. (2017): Currency Conflict and Trade Policy. A New Strategy for the United States,  Peterson Institute for International Economics 2 Gagnon, J. (2018): Can a Country Save Too Much? The Case of Norway, Policy Brief 18–7, Peterson Institute for  International Economics 3 Corden and Neary (1982): Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open Economy. The Economic  Journal (92), pp. 825–848. 4 This is measured as the sum of labour costs, intermediate consumption and fixed capital investment.
Over a period of time there may be marked shifts in relative income levels between different locations – hopefully as the living conditions of the poor advance more rapidly than those of the rich, although sadly there has been less evidence of that than one might have wished for – but there is no reason to expect the great cities of the world to sink out of sight. And if you add Hong Kong to that list, you will see the point I am trying to make. BIS Review 33/2001  1  I'm not sure whether anyone a quarter of a century ago accurately predicted how important a contribution the financial and business services sectors would now be making to the Hong Kong economy. Looking ahead, I am definitely reluctant myself to make any prediction about the mix of activity twenty-five years from now. Ask anyone involved in financial services what path for this particular sector in the years ahead would be best for Hong Kong and he would probably answer that continued expansion would of course be best. Ask the same question to a neutral economist and he would probably decline to commit himself, saying only that the optimal strategy would be to allow the forces of comparative advantage to play out. Whether that favours further development of the financial sector, or of something completely different, who can tell?

I would like to emphasize once more that the whole legal framework of the banking system is a topic largely discussed nowadays, not only in Albania, but in international levels as well. Nowadays, risk management has turned into a primary issue and is in the focus of national and international institutions. In this way, regulatory systems are advised to be reviewed and elaborated to be better adapted to current developments and to financial system’s perspectives. The financial system does not operate in the vacuum. It functions under real conditions and our task is to adapt to best experiences. I think our task is to identify the best practices and to try to adjust them to the real conditions of our economy, because by adjusting them to the whole regulatory framework and banking activity, we come to a motif and motivation: the European Community. I am confident that you will use this seminar to find out joint elements in the activity of your institutions, as well as to identify the distinctions. I think it would be valuable to identify also the cases that represent what is regarded as the “best practice” in deposit insurance area. In this way, it would contribute to the achievement of the objective to standardize the regional insurance practices and to create a clearer vision on the insurance activity performance in the future. The activity of the Albanian Deposit Insurance Agency is new. As such, its capability of operating in extreme cases is not proved yet.
What do you think are the qualities that a central banker needs today? Jean-Claude Trichet: It seems to me that in periods that are marked by turbulence, unexpected events, a high level of uncertainty – and I’m afraid that a large part of the reasons for this are structural – central banks are the institutions that have a mandate for price stability, a sense of direction, a stake in overall stability in a medium and long term perspective. They are independent. They can be precisely those anchors of stability that I would say an economy and society need even more in times that are very demanding and very turbulent. That would perhaps be the best way to sum up the responsibility of central banks. Financial Times: Are you concerned, in the wake of this crisis that there’s been any weakening of support for the concept of central bank independence? Jean-Claude Trichet: If I take a global perspective, it seems to me that one of the lessons that has been drawn from the crisis, or taken into account, is that the concept of independent central banks having a stake in stability, and a medium to long term perspective, has been recognised as the right concept. Financial Times: Very soon, you’re going to be chairing the new European Systemic Risk Board, which will take an EU view, so you will actually be including the United Kingdom in your work, your daily outlook, I suppose. To what extent do you think the UK should fear or embrace this process?

Summing up Back in 1983 when the peg was installed, I recall being asked whether it was the government's intention that the arrangement should be permanent, or in what circumstances a change would be contemplated. I said then simply that the peg was for the time being the most appropriate monetary anchor for Hong Kong. I would give very much the same answer today. Our peg is not a fixed rate that is supported by or dependent on discretionary intervention. It is a rulebased currency board system which imposes a particular discipline of adjustment through interest rate channels and domestic prices. It enjoys widespread support from international observers both in official circles and more widely. This is not just people being nice to us and choosing not to say anything which might rock the boat, although there may be one or two of them. Rather it reflects an appreciation of the unique features of a currency board structure and the benefits which it has brought over 18 years, as well as an appreciation of the distinctive characteristics of the Hong Kong economy. The main distinctive characteristics to which I allude are the following: the flexibility in costs and prices, as discussed earlier; the extreme openness of the economy in terms of both trade and capital flows; the constitutional commitment, through the Basic Law, to support the free movement of capital and not to operate exchange controls; and the soundness of the banking sector.