samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Significant findings from the survey were that 66.3% of the Zambian adult population did not have access to financial services and that only 33.7% used banks, other formal and informal financial services and products (such as those offered by microfinance and savings clubs). Above all, only 15% of the adult population had access to commercial banking services. This low level of financial access therefore constitutes one of Zambia’s main challenges in facilitating economic empowerment of every citizen. Arising from these findings, the Government has since set targets or performance monitoring indicators. One such target is to increase the level of access to financial services to 48% by 2008 and 50% by the end of 2009. Following the earlier survey, a subsequent study called the “Finscope Supply – Side Survey” was conducted in 2007. Some of the key findings were that: a.  bank charges are unaffordable for 90% of the rural adult population in Zambia;  b.  Zambian banks generally have high operating costs and interest rate spreads; and  c.  the physical coverage of financial outlets may not increase at current cost levels. It is therefore, my hope that this Forum will address these and other challenges that slow the pace of financial inclusion in our countries.

Changes in, for example, property prices are routinely taken into account in such a framework since the trajectory of the policy rate for the forecast horizon is set by the outlook for inflation and output, and these outlooks are affected by changes in property prices among other things. However, it is close to impossible to properly quantify, or capture the risks, of overly sharp corrections of property prices some time in the future. We therefore have to take risks of that kind into account in a different way than in the normal approach, where the forecasts for inflation and the real economy serve as the foundation. This is done by adjusting the timing of the policy rates changes, for example by raising the policy rate somewhat earlier than would be justified by the forecasts for inflation and the real economy. By doing so, we hope to minimize the probability of a hard landing scenario. Concluding remarks If I were to sum up my experiences from the last few years, I think three conclusions can be drawn. First of all, as long as asset price inflation only is deemed to be a macroeconomic risk, it can be addressed within the framework of a flexible inflation target. If it is deemed to be a threat to the stability of the financial system, the brunt of the policy response would not be on monetary policy, but rather on the regulatory side.
However, they also presented some interesting suggestions for improvements. Several of their recommendations concerned how we motivate and explain our role in the stability work. They thought we should be clearer when describing our objectives, and also with regard to the  4  BIS Review 68/2004  boundary between our work and that of Finansinspektionen (the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority) as well as to why we write a report twice a year. Most of what I have tried to describe now, in other words. These are good suggestions that we are taking into account in the report to be published in two weeks’ time. The authors had other suggestions that I think are good, but probably require more time for discussion within the Riksbank and for possible implementation. The possibility of including a standing chapter that describes our view of a number of current stability issues of a more political nature is interesting. One advantage is that it would give us a reason to jointly develop an overall view on issues of this nature a couple of times a year. Today this is done on an ad hoc basis, in connection with responses to submissions or in connection with some form of reasoning in the Financial Stability Reports. However, a change of this type requires considerable additional work for those working on the analyses and would also take up more of the Executive Board’s time than at present. It therefore needs to be considered in the light of other commitments.

Indeed, at last year’s presentation of the Annual Report to the Council, I referred to budgetary policy as one of the main underpinnings of the Spanish economy in this phase of the cycle and I pointed out that the favourable fiscal position would allow the automatic stabilisers to operate to their full extent without jeopardising budgetary stability. One year on, the fiscal results for 2008 and the projections available – which point to a budget deficit approaching 10% of GDP in 2010 and to a public debt ratio that might exceed the threshold of 60% of GDP – augur a drastic change in outlook, with the possibilities of fiscal policy boosting spending having been exhausted. Fiscal measures that call into question the commitment to budgetary stability in the medium term should be categorically avoided, since that would adversely affect the cost of raising funds and confidence in the Spanish economy, and it could also generate expectations of future tax rises that might ultimately sterilise the expansionary effects of the measures adopted. Public-sector debt must be prevented from becoming an obstacle once the Spanish economy is better placed to grow. Accordingly, priority must be given to promptly defining a credible strategy to reduce the deficit to levels compatible with budgetary stability, once the exceptional circumstances that led to the rise in the deficit have disappeared. The demand-side expansionary fiscal and monetary impulses are proving very powerful and are contributing to the alleviation of the contractionary forces at play.
Unfortunately, there are individuals who try to take advantage of owners of new businesses by providing them with poor advice or overcharging them for credit. Researching the backgrounds of these service providers and lenders is difficult and time intensive, leaving small business owners too often uncertain as to who to deal with. In some cases, this uncertainty can discourage a business owner from seeking assistance. I believe that we need a better system of certification for organizations that work with small businesses. The certification will assure a business owner that the organization has been properly vetted and has the requisite skills to assist the owner. This not only provides assurances to business owners, but saves them the time and resources required to do this due diligence on their own. Finally, in addition to certification, it would be helpful to have consistent standards and transparency requirements for organizations that lend to small businesses. Such standards and requirements exist for lending to households, and I believe the same justification exists to extend these requirements to small businesses. As a result, small business owners would have greater confidence that they fully understand the terms and conditions of their loan. This, in conjunction with the access to more financial information and education, will help small business owners make better decisions about their use of credit. Conclusion In summary, economic conditions in the Bronx are improving but more progress is necessary.

The fit is much better, particularly in data prior to 2008. Chart 4 then plots any residual correlation between forecasts and subsequent votes, controlling for the economic data. There is none. Admittedly, it’s become harder to uncover simple reduced form relationships, such as the one in Chart 3, since the financial crisis. For much of that period interest rates have been pressed up against the effective lower bound: there hasn’t been any variation to work with. In addition, the pre-crisis relationship in Chart 3 exists because the MPC was generally confident about the stability of the underlying rate of supply growth; that hasn’t been the case in recent years 1. Comparing Chart 2 and 3 is in any case slightly unfair as it measures forecasts at one date against data on growth, which are released slightly later, over the following three months. But it does at least bear out an important point about our inflation forecasts, not to say all forecasts: while they do carry some information about the future, they are ultimately superseded by events. This is a point that I – and countless other central bankers – have made before, of course. However, it does seem to bear repeating. Too often, it seems to me, what we communicate about the path of future policy, whether that’s direct or something backed out from forecasts, is treated as something close to an unconditional promise. But it can’t be.
In difficult times, banks will be allowed to fall significantly below the target levels defined for good times. Allowing banks to draw down capital without violating any minimum requirements helps to mitigate the harmful effects of deleveraging. Overall, regulators must no longer allow banks, especially systemically important ones, to operate at such worryingly low capital levels as have been observed in the buildup of the current crisis. At the beginning of this month, the finance ministers and central bank governors of the G20 were very explicit on this. More robust liquidity requirements The crisis has also provided a number of important lessons regarding liquidity. In short, banks’ liquidity holdings were insufficient. This holds true for the quantity but also for the quality of liquidity. One of the explanations for these insufficient holdings of liquidity was that the stress scenarios considered by banks were far too optimistic. While secured funding remained the most stable source of refinancing, it was much less stable than what banks and  BIS Review 115/2009  3  regulators had assumed. Moreover, it quickly became apparent that liquidity problems at single banks imposed considerable stress on the entire international system. As in the area of capital, the FSB and the Basel Committee are working at full throttle towards an internationally coordinated liquidity standard for banks.

The figures in Table 1 have been updated with details for 2017. 11 These calculations only show interest payments and ignore effects on interest income. 9  9 [13]  Table 1. Households more affected more by interest rate adjustments than previously Interest payments for a typical housing purchase, SEK per month Sweden Greater Stockholm Housing price (SEK million) Debt (SEK million) Interest rate (%) Interest payments Increase in interest payments (+1%)  2004 1.3 0.8 3.7 1793 485  2017 3.0 2.0 1.6 1814 1161  2004 2.6 1.6 3.7 3452 934  2017 6.0 4.0 1.6 3643 2351  Note. The amounts have been adjusted for tax relief on interest payments. The table does not include amortisations. Sources: Finansinspektionen, Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  Rate increases in line with the Riksbank’s forecast are expected to have minor cashflow effects on households as a whole ... In the Monetary Policy Report in December, our assessment was that total disposable household income would slow by about 1.3 per cent in a three-year perspective as a result of rising interest rates. 12 This must be considered a minor effect, especially bearing in mind that rising wages, among other factors, will contribute about 4 percentage points a year to the growth in disposable household income in the coming years. Total disposable income, according to our forecast, will continue to grow at a healthy rate in the years to come, despite rising interest rates.
This familiarity can facilitate crossborder cooperation and coordination in the event of a failure of a systemically important institution, and stem competing insolvency proceedings in multiple jurisdictions and the ringfencing of assets. This last point shouldn’t be discounted. It’s worth remembering that after Lehman Brothers’ parent company initially filed for bankruptcy in the US, many foreign proceedings were initiated for Lehman affiliates around the world. It took over six months to establish a cross-border protocol among the representatives of the more significant Lehman Brothers affiliates. The protocol was meant to improve communication and cooperation among the representatives as well as minimize costs and maximize recoveries for creditors. In the case of one of the most significant Lehman Brothers affiliates, Lehman Brothers International Europe located in the UK, no agreement was ever reached. OLA also provides for backstop liquidity through the OLF, a feature not available in the ordinary bankruptcy process. During the financial crisis, lender of last resort liquidity from the Fed was critical to promoting faith in the financial sector. So, too, will backstop liquidity be important for restoring faith in a recapitalized institution in resolution under OLA and preventing a run. The bankruptcy process also offers many positives. The US Bankruptcy Code is admired around the world and has been the model for similar regimes in other countries. The court-administered nature of bankruptcy provides transparency and predictability to parties and provides stakeholders with a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

Kristina Persson: Globalisation, structural changes and monetary policy Speech by Ms Kristina Persson, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at at seminar arranged by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, Stockholm, 14 April 2004. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to take part in this important conversation on the consequences of globalisation for Swedish economic policy. I shall primarily highlight the significance for inflation and monetary policy, although I shall also briefly discuss the increased demands for structural changes and political management entailed by globalisation. Globalisation - or “the increasing interdependence of countries around the world as a result of growing cross-border trade in goods and services, investment and financial flows” (the IMF’s definition) - is not a new phenomenon. It has been going on for some time and has given rise to rapid structural changes with considerable demands for adaptation of people and businesses. It has led to a change in the division of labour and to specialisation, as well as access to new markets, which in turn has formed a base for increased real wages and growing welfare. How well Sweden can manage these requirements for change in the future will be decisive for our economic development. In recent years, both the scope and rate of change of the globalisation process appear to have increased.
Some of this deficit was covered by direct foreign investment, but the greater part of it was financed by borrowing, as a result of which by the end of 1994 the net external debt had reached 46% of GDP and the exceptionally high level of more than 160% of exports of goods and services and unrequited transfers. 2. I have not yet seen the full 1996 figures, but estimates based on the first eleven months suggest a current account deficit of around (or even less than) $ billion. This looks much more reasonable, not only because it was more than covered by foreign direct investment but also because of what lies behind this improvement. The $ billion drop in the current BIS Review 16/1997  -2-  account deficit between 1994 and 1996 was made possible (a) by a 35% increase in exports, accompanied by a modest increase in imports of about 14%, and (b) by the steady and rapid increase in services income, mainly (but not exclusively) derived from tourism. 3. Since there was also a sizable inflow of foreign direct investment in 1995 and 1996, the country’s net external debt dropped from $ billion at end-1994 to about $ billion at end-1996. Net external debt declined to 31.2 expressed as a percentage of GDP, and to 71.6 as a percentage of exports of goods, services and unrequited transfers.

I am informed that one of the objectives of the Association is to utilise the acquired scholarly knowledge and experience to add value to society through leadership in various projects and initiatives. I know that alumni associations world over have existed for centuries and most of them have one basic principle, that of benefiting members wherever they may be and for free. However I am told that your association other than just carryout activities for the benefit of members will go a step further to do benevolent activities for the benefit of society at large. This is commendable and I am looking forward to see what initiatives you have outlined to advance welfare in our society. Mr President, the theme for this launch this evening “Innovation for Leadership Excellency” is indeed very timely and appropriate to the norms and beliefs that I am told your association espouses. It is innovations such as yours that gives us the comfort that you are indeed giving back to society following the huge resources that were invested in making it possible for you to acquire this very important qualification the Masters in Business Administration from ESAMI. You have been schooled as business managers and therefore it is inevitable that what is expected of you is nothing short of leadership excellence. We shall all be looking up to you to offer solutions to the business and economic challenges that your institutions and the economy as a whole are faced with.
Unlike Norway and Denmark, Sweden has no card network of its own. At the same time, new technology is leading to new, convenient ways of paying becoming available, such as the mobile application Swish, for example. In Sweden, 6.5 million of 10 million inhabitants are connected to Swish. As the rest of society becomes digitalised, demand is increasing for digital payments and, above all, for rapid payments that can be made in real time. For the Riksbank, this means adjusting or complementing the RIX system so that it is able to manage instant payments in a secure and efficient manner. It is important to ensure that all participants involved in payments act under equal and equitable rules. At the moment, we are busy analysing whether we can take advantage of our European cooperation by joining the European Central Bank’s system for instant payments. 4 We are aware, however, that this would mean that part of our infrastructure for payments would thereby end up outside Sweden’s borders and are thus mulling over whether some kind of domestic back-up would be needed and over how the ekrona could be paired with this as a complementary means of payment. This is particularly important as we expect instant payments to become increasingly important in the future. The trend towards a cashless society has also continued – a trend that risks leaving Sweden without functioning cash in the near future. My speech two years ago was part of a proactive strategy to create different alternative courses of action from this trend.

It is possible that the e-krona could play a role for Sweden's crisis preparedness. But in any case, the Riksbank needs to clarify its role as provider of money in appropriate forms in a crisis situation. In the same way as the Riksbank is ‘lender of last resort’ for the banking system, we have a responsibility to enable payments in a crisis, to be a ‘money provider of last resort’. Personal reflections Two years of intensive work on the e-krona have now passed and I will be leaving the chairmanship of the steering group as the project enters the next phase. It has been two incredibly educational years, but I think it is still too early for me to decide whether or not I shall support an e-krona for the general public in the future. As has hopefully been clear from my earlier reasoning, this depends on whether it emerges that there are better alternatives to guarantee both the security and efficiency of the payment market. And to answer this, the analysis needs to continue. At the Riksbank, we will work in two parallel tracks: partly, we will develop the pilot version of a simpler form of the e-krona and learn the lessons that may be needed if it turns out that an e-krona is to be issued. And partly we will deepen our analysis of the consequences for Sweden if the payment market should become entirely privatised.
The scope of our consultation is potentially huge. So I want to say a few words about how we will give focus to our work, and to give a sense of the questions we are asking in our consultation document. The framework we will be using is shown in Figure 3. It divides up areas where the fairness and effectiveness of FICC markets may be deficient into six categories. Three of these relate to the structure of those markets: so-called market microstructure; competition and market discipline; and benchmarks. And three relate to conduct: standards of market practice; firmlevel responsibilities, governance and incentives; and surveillance and penalties. Let me say a little more about each in turn. 1. Microstructure  The first category relates to the microstructure of FICC markets – covering such things as the arrangements for trading, price transparency, market access and the range of asset types. As I noted earlier, many of the products in these markets are tailored to the specific needs of individual borrowers or investors. Although that may be good news for them, it does  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  mean that quite a number of FICC markets are relatively thin and lack widespread transparency and are hence intrinsically more vulnerable to manipulation. So there may be a tradeoff between the benefits of customisation, and the costs in terms of weaker liquidity and potentially greater vulnerability to abuse. Regulatory and technological change is already leading to greater standardisation and transparency across many FICC markets.

Looking forward, it seems to me that the most likely next move in monetary policy will be a gradual and limited increase in interest rates. The current weakness in headline inflation largely reflects transitory – albeit sizeable – factors such a close to 50% decline in the price of oil, and the appreciation of sterling over the past two years. The underlying picture is one in which domestic demand is expected to continue growing robustly, facilitating a pick-up in wage growth, which we are starting to see, and a return of inflation to target. But we don’t have a crystal ball, and should circumstances turn out differently, the MPC has the means, the will and the responsibility to return inflation to 2%. On the upside, should the remaining slack in the economy be absorbed more quickly than expected, the MPC can increase rates more quickly than currently implied by market yields. On the downside, should we perceive that low inflation is beginning to have a self-reinforcing effect through inflation expectations, we will have several tools at our disposal. One would be to increase rates more slowly than currently implied by market yields. Another would be to expand the Asset Purchase Facility and with it the Bank’s balance sheet. Another would be to cut Bank Rate further: the banking system is now operating with substantially more capital than it did in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.