samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the one hand, this appreciation put Switzerland’s price competitiveness under severe pressure in the short term, and I’m sure I don’t need to go into detail on the practical repercussions for individual companies in a forum such as this. The impact is still being felt at many of your organisations, although Swiss firms have once again proved impressively flexible and resilient. On the other hand, the decision last January was absolutely necessary, given that the euro lost considerable ground against all major currencies as a result of the changed international environment. Waiting any longer would have put the minimum exchange rate under permanent pressure. The minimum exchange rate had become unsustainable. The costs associated with continuing such a policy would thus no longer have been justified. Moreover, had we discontinued the minimum exchange rate at a later date, the impact on the Swiss economy would have been even greater. I am therefore convinced that the SNB’s decision came at the right time. Without this difficult step, we would have compromised our ability to fulfil our mandate of ensuring price stability in the medium and long term. It is precisely by fulfilling this mandate that the SNB contributes indirectly to Swiss competitiveness in the long term. In my remarks today, I will first go into more detail about this contribution. I will then discuss the difference between the short and long-term effects of a strong currency on competitiveness. Finally, I will examine the role of the Swiss franc exchange rate in our monetary policy deliberations.

However, my remarks today will focus on monetary policy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  from markets in which they are no longer competitive, or relocate part of their production – and thus some jobs – to lower-cost countries, in order to keep pace with their foreign competitors. Individual companies may even have to cease their activities in Switzerland altogether. A study by the KOF research institute shows that, following a Swiss franc appreciation, the segment of lower-skilled workers in particular sees employment numbers fall. 3 However, the same study also points out that, despite pressure on margins, the remaining companies will respond to the franc’s appreciation by stepping up research and development, improving product quality and increasing the number of highly skilled workers they employ. Over time, these measures should lead the industries concerned to become more productive overall. The majority of empirical studies for other countries confirm that, as a general rule, strong competitive pressure increases an industry’s productivity. 4 Moreover, a number of country studies indicate that an appreciation can have a positive impact on productivity. 5 Often, the relationship is reciprocal, with productivity gains themselves leading to a stronger currency. Thus, in contrast to the short term, in the long term one cannot claim a contradiction between an economy’s competitiveness and a strong currency (cf. chart 9). The fact that Switzerland is among the world leaders in competitiveness, despite the strong Swiss franc, confirms this finding.
In a nutshell, independence ensures that the ECB can act in line with its mandate. Accountability ensures that the ECB does act in line with its mandate. Economic benefits of the euro The fact is the euro has already delivered material benefits. Let me mention three of them. First, in line with our mandate, inflation has been kept under control. This directly benefits household purchasing power and helps build confidence in the value of the currency. Let us take a historical perspective. [slide] In the 18 years preceding the introduction of the euro (1981– 1998), inflation gradually declined but remained at 4.6% on average, with major disparities across countries. In the 18 years since the euro (1999–2016), inflation has been much more stable, averaging 1.7%, and the disparities across countries have narrowed. Second [slide], better controlled inflation means a lower cost of financing, because it reduces risk premia. All economic players benefit from lower interest rates: households, when they purchase a property, companies when they invest, but also governments and hence taxpayers. Spreads may temporarily react to political uncertainties, but remaining in the euro continues to be our best protection against such fluctuations. Third, the euro has helped consolidate the European single market, by eliminating currency fluctuations for corporates, simplifying day-to-day life for citizens and promoting capital market integration. Moreover, the economic size of the euro area and the stability of its currency have enabled the euro to play an important international role.

As Mundell said in 2012: “The euro is more than just the icing on the cake on the single European market and the European Union (EU), it is the glue that keeps the core of Europe together.” Still, an argument frequently heard against the euro is that a currency cannot exist without a state. True, the government prerogative of coinage came to be accepted as an essential attribute of sovereignty, tying the state to the money supply; but actually the state may manipulate the unit of account to the benefit of its own finances, for instance by monetising the debt, and such manipulations were not always, to say the least, in the interest of the people. As a result, it seems to me that the key ingredient of monetary stability is not the state but the independence and credibility of the issuing institution: the central bank – and this principle is firmly established in the euro area, as well as in French law for the Banque de France. However, safeguarding our independence requires more than a series of legal provisions. As any political construct, the euro will thrive if and only if the citizens of the euro area member states are convinced that the Eurosystem delivers, year after year, on its mandate, which is to preserve price stability. This is also the reason why we are subject to accountability rules, requiring regular testimonies to the representation of EU citizens, namely the European Parliament and the National Parliaments, and the publication of our minutes and our results.
UND1X inflation is expected to be 1.4 per cent one year ahead and 2.0 per cent two years ahead, while the corresponding figures for CPI inflation are forecast to be 1.6 per cent and 2.5 per cent, respectively. This time, both the international and domestic inflation risks are judged to be balanced. On the international front, the main upside risk is that the oil price will develop more unfavourably and have greater contagion effects on other prices than is currently foreseen. The downside risks mainly consist of a number of financial imbalances that could contribute both to lower inflation and weaker economic activity. These include high house prices and an increase in household indebtedness in many countries, as well as the large deficits in the US federal budget and current account. On the domestic front, the risks are mainly related to productivity growth; more specifically to what extent the robust productivity reflects a more permanent structural phenomenon and to what extent it is due to cyclical  6  BIS Review 59/2004  factors. There is considerable uncertainty in this regard and there is a risk both of overestimating and underestimating future productivity growth. The balanced risk outlook means that the probability of inflation being higher than the forecast in the main scenario is judged to be equal to the probability of it being lower. In other words, the risk-adjusted inflation forecast is the same as the forecast in the main scenario.

Inflation will nevertheless be curbed by slower wage growth from 2008 and a gradual rise in productivity growth. Somewhat further ahead higher wage growth will push up the rise in prices. The krone exchange rate has appreciated from weak levels. Combined with the fall in prices for imported consumer goods measured in foreign currency, this will push down the rise in prices for consumer goods in the short term. Consumer price inflation is expected to fall to somewhat below 2 per cent in 2010, and then gradually pick up to around 2.5 per cent towards the end of the projection period. Interest rates are low, resulting in renewed growth in household consumption. At the same time, house prices are rising. Over time, household borrowing may surge again and saving  14  BIS Review 139/2009  may fall. With low productivity, higher corporate costs, growth in household demand and higher capacity utilisation, inflation may gradually become too high. This would indicate that the interest rate should be raised. On the other hand, a marked increase in the interest rate in Norway and a wider interest rate differential between Norway and other countries may entail a risk of a stronger-thanprojected krone, resulting in an inflation level that is too low. This would indicate that the interest rate should not be raised too rapidly. Monetary policy cannot fine-tune developments in the economy, but it can mitigate the most severe effects when the economy is exposed to shocks.
Should the situation change, nothing has been done that would impair our ability to fulfil our primary mandate and preserve price stability. Many tools are available to absorb liquidity, if it proves necessary. Concerns are also expressed in the euro area about purchases of government debt as a form of “monetary financing” of the government. As you know, such purchases are explicitly allowed for in the Treaty. There is no legal issue, here. What about the economics? This question can be broken down into two. First, the market impact. True, these purchases may lead to lower interest rates. This is their purpose. OMTs will only take place if and when the Governing Council has determined that bond markets are no longer functioning properly, hence interest rates are distorted. A last, serious, concern is moral hazard. Lower interest rates triggered by secondary purchases could give rise to bad incentives, impede market discipline and delay necessary fiscal adjustment efforts. This is the very reason why strict and explicit conditionality is attached to OMTs. 4. Central banks have been active; they have been audacious; but they do not have unlimited power. This may be a good time to reflect upon what monetary policy can and cannot do. I will concentrate on one specific question: the so-called “decreasing returns” of non-conventional monetary policy. The argument goes as follows: balance sheet expansion and low interest rates create potential imbalances in the financial sector.

François Villeroy de Galhau: Ultra-low interest rates and challenges for central banks Welcome address by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Farewell Symposium for Honorary Governor Christian Noyer, held by the Bank of France and the Bank for International Settlements, Paris, 12 January 2016. *  *  *  Bienvenue à Paris and to the Banque de France (BDF) … I’ve switched to English so as to welcome you all to this new Conference Center created by you, dear Christian. What better way to wish you farewell after 12 years as Governor of the BDF and six years as President of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)? And what better way for me to welcome for the first time this unique community of actors, academics and observers who are together genuinely contributing to a better understanding of monetary policy and financial stability? To quote a few numbers, some 200 VIPs are gathered here, representing more than 80 central banks (CBs), governments and international organizations, as well as about 50 universities, think tanks and financial institutions. It’s no surprise, as Christian enjoyed meeting all of you at international gatherings and research conferences. The Symposium title, chosen jointly by the BDF and the BIS, relates to the prevalence of very low interest rates for the past 7 years in advanced economies and, by contagion, around the world.
Ladies and Gentlemen, the main purpose of collecting sex-disaggregated data is to determine the levels of access, usage and quality of financial services; identify barriers to women financial inclusion; and assist with modifying the existing policies, strategies and regulatory measures that have been earmarked for increasing women’s financial inclusion in the medium to long term in Zambia. Collection of sex disaggregated data and the use of this data provides an opportunity for countries to develop policies that specifically target women’s financial inclusion and at the same time provides data and information for financial service providers to build the business case for developing products and services for women. Data will help us to know where we are, where we need to be and which areas to focus on. Thus the main objective of the project we embarked on last year is to establish a framework for collection of reliable, quality and comparable sex-disaggregated data that can facilitate the measurement of progress made toward closing the gender gap. Distinguished guests, let me highlight the key findings from the Survey, which will be the subject of detailed discussion in the course of this morning. The survey revealed among others that; 1. While the financial sector was among the sectors that employ a high percentage of women, they make up 45% of those employed in the sector, presenting a five percentage gender gap.

Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula: Dissemination of results of baseline survey – framework for collection of sex-disaggregated data Speech by Dr Tukiya Kankasa-Mabula, Deputy Governor (Administration) of the Bank of Zambia, at the Stakeholders’ Workshop, Lusaka, 2 May 2019. * * *  Salutations: The Chief Executive Officers of Commercial Banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions The Chief Executive Officer – Rural Finance Expansion Programme (RUFEP) The Chief Executive Officer – Financial Sector Deepening Zambia The Chief Executive Officer – United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) The Representative -The World Bank Country Office The Representative – United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) The Representative – African Development Bank (AfDB) The Representative – Bankers Association of Zambia The Representatives of various Government Ministries The Representative – Zambia Institute of Banking and Financial Services The Representative – Pensions and Insurance Authority (PIA) The Representative – Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC Captains of Industry; Distinguished Invited Guests; Members of the Press; and Ladies and Gentlemen. Let me begin by welcoming you all to this workshop on the dissemination of the results of the Baseline Survey on the Supply – Side Sex Disaggregated data conducted in the last quarter of 2018. At the same time, I wish to thank the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, Rural Finance Expansion Programme and the Financial Sector Deepening Zambia for supporting the development and implementation of a framework for collection of supply-side sex-disaggregated data from regulated financial service providers.
But, they do little to reduce investors’ incentives to run at the first sign of trouble. Worthwhile as the steps taken thus far are, we have not come close to fixing all the institutional flaws in our wholesale funding markets. The tri-party repo system and the money fund industry that plays a crucial role financing collateral through it are both still exposed to runs. In fact, in each of these areas, one could argue that the risks have increased compared to prior to the crisis. That is because the Dodd-Frank Act raised the hurdle for the Federal Reserve to exercise its Section 13.3 emergency lending authority and because Congress has explicitly precluded the U.S. Treasury from guaranteeing money market mutual fund assets in the future. With extraordinary interventions ruled out or made much more difficult, this may cause investors to be even more skittish in the future. This is why it is essential to make the system more stable. Turning first to the issue of tri-party repo reform, there is still considerable work to do. In particular, the risk that investors will run at the first sign of trouble persists. That is because the costs of running are very low relative to the potential costs of staying put. The potential costs of staying are elevated in part because investors often don’t have the capacity to take possession of the collateral or liquidate the collateral in an orderly way should a large dealer fail. Both aspects result in run risk, fire sale risk and potential financial instability.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Challenges of financial education in Malaysia Opening remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Launch of the Insurance Consumer Education Programme, Kuala-Lumpur, 29 August 2003. *  *  *  Saya berasa amat berbesar hati mengalu-alukan kehadiran tuan-tuan dan puan-puan ke majlis pelancaran Program Pendidikan Pengguna bagi industri insurans dan takaful pada pagi ini. Pelancaran program ini merupakan satu lagi perkembangan penting dalam pembangunan industri insurans dan takaful. Ladies and Gentlemen, The economic and financial landscape in Malaysia has undergone significant transformation. In the process, the economy has become more diversified with new sources of growth. In tandem with these changes, we have seen the modernisation of the financial sector that has also become increasingly more diversified to meet the new requirements of the economy. There has also emerged new distribution channels and channel convergence within the financial sector. The financial sector has also increasingly leveraged on advances in technology which has significantly changed the way financial business is being conducted. As market advances continue to expand the range of financial products and services, consumers are being faced with increasingly complex choices and options in the management of their personal finances and exposure to risk. In this more complex financial landscape, it becomes important for consumers to have improved access to information. Financial education for Malaysian consumers is central to this process. It is therefore a matter that is accorded high priority by the Central Bank.
Economic policy reaction came promptly. In Chile, and other Latin American countries, we implemented a combination of fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate the economy. More important was the fact that probably for the first time, a crisis of the magnitude that affected – and still affects – developed countries, did not cause Latin American economies to enter into a balance of payments crisis or a profound recession. Suffice it to remember what happened in the early 1980s, when our own weaknesses and the shortcomings of economic policies, coupled with a significant rise in interest rates worldwide, dragged us into a deep recession. This is of utmost importance as it shows that we have matured in economic policy framework and that we face the challenge not only of maintaining but also of improving it. After some quarters, the world economy began to recover gradually. This process took place at two speeds. Emerging economies recovered at a fast pace, while developed countries experienced a slower rebound. The causes and consequences of the Great Recession continue to affect economic performance of the developed world. This is so because the fundamental problem, high indebtedness of households, companies and governments, is still present. The fact that the higher the level of debt the more costly the solutions and greater the side-effects, poses a problem. We have been seeing this clearly during recent quarters.

In response, the Met Office made huge efforts to improve their data capture and computing power as a basis for improving their weather forecasting. The results have been dramatic. Over the past 30 years, the Met Office’s forecasts have improved significantly. Their 4-dayahead forecasts are now as accurate as their 1-day-ahead forecasts were 30 years ago. These are improvements on a scale economic forecasters would give their left arm for (unless, like me, it was their bowling arm). It suggests improved data can pay real dividends. To that end, the Bank is investing in improving its own data architecture and analytics. Perhaps a more timely reading of the economic and financial tea leaves can be found by scraping the web or by semantic search on social media sites? Recent research has  3  Barnett et al (2014)  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  suggested just that.4 These are the sorts of question the Bank’s rocket scientists can help us answer. Uncertainties are no less acute when it comes to modelling the economy. Unlike rocket science, economics has few, if any, physical constants or fixed laws of motion. Like cricket, economics is a game largely played in the head; nine parts psychology to one part physics. Understanding and modelling the brain has so far eluded neuroscientists, but this has not stopped them trying.5 Economists are in the same boat, just with bigger holes.
Conceptually, this can be understood as a supply shock, as it destroys part of the country’s productive capacity and cuts down the level of potential output. All other things being equal, this fact causes output gaps to close and inflationary pressures to increase. These pressures must be contained to prevent inflation from surpassing the 3 percent target over a two-year horizon. The virtue of our monetary policy regime is that it is based on achieving the objective over a medium-term horizon, which gives room for adjusting the monetary stimulus while maintaining sustainable economic growth during the reconstruction. Properly conducting this process is the challenge we face and that provides the framework for the analysis contained in this Monetary Policy Report. In what follows, I will describe the latest economic and financial events, our preliminary assessment of the effects of the earthquake and tsunami on the prospects and risks facing our economy, and the way in which annual inflation will converge to the 3 percent target over the two-year horizon. Macroeconomic scenario As I have said before, Chile’s macroeconomic scenario has suffered major changes since December’s Monetary Policy Report. Among a large number of developments, two elements stand out. There is no doubt that the most significant is the earthquake and tsunami of last February and both their immediate and medium-term implications for growth and inflation.

As discussed in a box in this Report, just adding up the above elements configured a medium-term scenario where inflationary pressures and inflation would exceed December expectations. A counterfactual forecast exercise that considers developments only up to February 26 yields that the foreseen growth range for this year would have been around one percentage point higher. Output gaps, besides starting at a smaller level than had been projected, would also close sooner, with corresponding effects on inflation. In the medium term, all these changes would have shaped a scenario where inflation would have risen to 3 percent or more over the course of this year, and would have approached the 3 percent target from above in a two year horizon. The response of monetary policy in this hypothetical scenario is unambiguous. The pace of monetary policy normalization would have been faster than the one foreseen in December’s Report. Indeed, it is likely that inflation convergence to the target would have been consistent with a higher level of the MPR beginning in midyear and throughout the policy horizon. It was in this context that the earthquake and tsunami hit. Their effects on the macroeconomy are relevant for the conduct of monetary policy. First, they caused a loss in capital stock that affected the economy’s productive capacity and therefore the evaluation of output gaps, inflationary pressures and the monetary policy reaction. Second, they are having an impact on output, demand and inflation in the very short term, mostly due to the disruption of retail and manufacturing activity.