samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Its main elements now include: The Financial Stability Advisory Council (FSAC): a consultative body comprising the minister of finance, the governor of the Central Bank, and the chairman of the Financial Supervision Commission; The Central Bank as the designated resolution authority for banks; the resolution function of the BNB is outlined in the Law on Recovery and Resolution of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, adopted in mid-2015, which transposed the BRRD in the Bulgarian legislation; A mechanism to fund resolution measures by the newly established Bank Resolution Fund (BRF) which is funded by contributions from the banks; the target level of the resources collected in the BRF is 2% of the amount of covered deposits of all banks licensed in Bulgaria and must be achieved by end-2024; A comprehensive resolution toolkit directly transposed from the BRRD comprising: (1) the resolution tools (sale of business; bridge institution, asset separation, and bail-in), and (2) the government stabilization tools (public equity support and temporary public ownership). Progress has been already made in operationalizing the crisis management framework in Bulgaria.

The key actions so far include: Regular meetings of the FSAC to assist in developing common policies, better coordination and exchange of information with a view to maintaining stability and further developing the financial markets; Launching a new department within the Central Bank with operational tasks and responsibilities in the area of bank resolution; Collection of the first contributions from the banks into the BRF, which will amount to nearly 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  BGN 300 million, including the upcoming 2017 installments; Approving the resolution plans for the foreign subsidiaries belonging to banking groups operating in Bulgaria. We have already planned the next steps, which will further build on recent progress. Our efforts are focused on the following groups of measures: Expanding the FSAC mandate, including for better coordination of agencies’ contingency planning in response to situations threatening financial stability; Creating capacity for the practical application of resolution tools, more specifically the sale of business, the bridge institution and the bail-in tools, if needed; Prioritising the resolution planning for domestic systemically important banks; this process is presently underway but their resolution plans are not yet adopted; Addressing financial and legal restrictions on liquidity support by the central bank, taking into consideration both the existing currency board regime and the EU state-aid rules and procedures for public support to banks. We plan to apply the above measures along with further strengthening banking supervision, reducing bank nonperforming loans (NPLs), and further developing the overall financial sector safety net.
But the worst time to introduce them is at the peak of a financial crisis, after the capital has already bolted. And capital controls are not a solution for all economies. For an open economy like Hong Kong they are unthinkable, as well as illegal, since our Basic Law prohibits them. Given that one of the themes of this talk is the dangerous state to which the world financial system has been brought by volatile cross-border fund flows, it is perhaps appropriate for me to restate here Hong Kong’s commitment to economic liberalization and globalization. This is, in my view, the only long-term viable way forward towards a more productive use of resources and more even economic growth throughout the world. The problems that we now face should not cause us to overlook the many advantages that globalization has brought to our region. The current crisis has not demonstrated that this is the wrong path to follow - merely that BIS Review 2/1999  –7–  that there are dangers and instabilities that have to be tackled. And if the imposition of temporary exchange controls is the only alternative available, responsible commentators should at least have the courtesy of giving a little respect to those in the most unenviable position of having to take difficult decisions that they consider to be in the best interests of their people.

The third segment is better detection of economy sensitivity to shocks, which is achieved by establishing sector accounts, and in their frames financial accounts, which will disclose the links between all sectors in an economy, and therefore, the possibilities for shock spillover from one sector to another. In 2017, for the first time, the National Bank prepared financial accounts for all sectors of the economy, which were submitted to Eurostat in an experimental format. The fourth segment is the improvement of the statistical communication process. In this context, on a regular basis, we are making efforts to improve communication with the public, also by conducting surveys for the satisfaction of the reporters and users, creating the possibility for direct electronic communication on all issues related to statistics and undertaking financial education activities. In 2016, we started with a regular publication of press releases on statistics, as well as a project, which is in the final phase, for establishing a statistical internet portal for external data users. In doing so, in the basis of all these new statistical requirements, lies the need for providing granular, rather than aggregate data. The crisis has not called into question the traditional aggregate economic statistics, but has shown that it is not enough.
Chart 9 Corporate debt, % of GDP  Chart 10 Corporate debt growth versus nominal GDP growth  Non CRE Corporate debt  CRE  Corporate debt growth  % of GDP 80  growth rate  GDP growth  20%  70 15%  60 50  10%  40 5% 30 0%  20 90  95  00  05  10  15  10  -5%  0 1998 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18  -10%  Sources: Association of British Insurers, Bank of England, Cass Commercial Real Estate Lending survey, Datastream from Refinitiv, Deals Business Intelligence from Refinitiv, Deloitte, LCD, an offering of S&P Global Market Intelligence, London Stock Exchange, ONS, Preqin and Bank calculations. Adding it all up  The challenge for us is to put developments across the heatmap into a common currency; to prioritise them; ask whether one outweighs another; and consider what they mean all together for how damaging any future economic earthquake could be. In this we are drawing on cutting edge research in the Bank.6 That work, sometimes referred to as calculating ‘GDP at risk’, seeks to translate developments in each metric into its typical effect on the depth of recessions.7  Without unusual developments in debt, the distribution of GDP growth over the next three years is shown by the blue distribution in Chart 11.

First, a growing share of new mortgage loans in this segment was used in 2018 to finance properties in regions with high vacancy rates. Second, the affordability risks of new mortgages financing residential investment property are high and have continued to rise. Since many of these loans also carry considerable loan-to-value (LTV) risk, they are  1  Cf. FINMA, Annual Report 2018, 4 April 2019. Page 2/3  Berne, 13 June 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  particularly vulnerable in a scenario involving a correction in real estate prices and a sharp increase in interest rates. Given the risks I have just described, the SNB continues to take the view that targeted mortgage loan-related measures are necessary in the residential investment property segment. The SNB supports the Federal Council’s proposal to raise the capital requirements for highLTV loans in this segment. Specifically, this would involve increasing the risk weights for loan tranches exceeding two-thirds of the residential investment property’s value. The SNB welcomes the Swiss Bankers Association’s readiness to consider a revision to the selfregulation guidelines as an alternative to the Federal Council’s proposal. Such a revision would reduce the LTV ratio and shorten the amortisation period for new loans financing residential investment property. In the SNB’s assessment, the domestically focused banks hold sufficient capital to cover their risk exposure. Despite a fall in profitability in 2018 as a result of a further reduction in interest margins, they have been able to maintain their capital situation.
Problems in the financial sector are contagious. Precisely because we need the financial system so much, reducing the risk of financial crises must be an important priority. Financial crises cause great damage to society. In addition, we know that financial crises have permanent effects on growth. It takes a long time to recover from the major fall in GDP following on from a deep financial crisis. Normally, we see a downwards shift in GDP level even if good times may then mean a return to the same rate of growth. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  The modern Swedish example of a financial crisis was a frightening experience for many of us. The social costs of the crisis at the start of the 1990s can be illustrated in several ways. One way would be to compare actual growth with the trend development. The difference in Sweden’s GDP towards the end of the 1990s corresponds to 20 per cent of GDP each year, or SEK 50 000 per person in 1998 prices. The financial crisis of a few years ago, which was milder for Sweden, has cost the people of Sweden thousands of kronor more per year. The real effects have a high social and economic price One of the more tangible effects of the crisis of the 1990s was its impact on the labour market. Having gotten used to a level of unemployment of a few per cent, we then saw unemployment increase to double figures over only a couple of years.

Stefan Ingves: Financial stability is important for us all Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, to the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 15 March 2012. *  *  *  Today, I would like to give you a few examples from Sweden and abroad to illustrate why financial stability affects us all, not least in our role as consumers. It can easily happen that discussions of bank regulations, not least at the EU level, can be considered difficult to understand. This is partly because the discussions are often technical, and partly because they can seem abstract. I would like to demonstrate how the political framework for financial stability very strongly affects Swedish banking customers – in other words, almost all households. Crises cost society enormous amounts As financial crises are very costly for the citizens of a society, we should try to avoid them at almost any price. The financial system forms the cornerstone of a modern economy. Its basic functions are converting savings to investments, managing risks and mediating payments, functions that we all constantly come into contact with every day, in one way or another. A functioning financial system is also necessary for the repo rate, which is to say monetary policy, to have an impact. A modern society cannot do without the functions of the financial system. Without the financial sector, Sweden would grind to a halt. But the system also entails risks. Banks are dependent on confidence, are highly leveraged and are thus vulnerable.
Other major central banks such as the Fed and the Bank of Japan followed the example of the ECB, in 2012 and 2013 respectively, and also adopted the same 2% inflation target. This “conceptual convergence”2 is remarkable. Incidentally, even though exchange rates are not a monetary policy target, we should note that the euro traded at USD 1.17 on 1 January 1999 and at USD 1.14 at the end of December 2018, with an average rate of USD 1.21 between 1999 and 2018. 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  With regard to our mandate, the results are tangible [slide 1]. During the 20 year period prior to the introduction of the euro (1979-98), average inflation in the euro area was at 4.9%, compared with only 1.7% during the 20 years that have followed. What’s more, better controlled inflation means lower financing costs as risk premiums are reduced. Interest rate differentials and sovereign spreads have consequently narrowed significantly [slide 2]. The France-Germany spread fell from an average of 1.9% between 1986 and 1992 – the period of the single market without a single currency, between the Single European Act and Maastricht – to 0.4% in 2017-18. The Italy-Germany spread has narrowed by 3 percentage points. If, theoretically, one of these countries wished to leave the euro, it would in all likelihood experience an immediate at-leastequivalent increase in its public financing costs as well as its private financing costs to households and businesses.

Independence is not only secured in legislation, but also by the people that have embodied it for the past 20 years: Wim Duisenberg, Jean-Claude Trichet, and today, Mario Draghi. I would go so far as to talk of a threefold independence: from national governments of course, but also from pre-existing camps (the hawks and the doves) or schools of thought, even if all three of them have their own well-established economic background. Consequently, they have been able to take a pragmatic approach to innovation: for example, when Jean Claude Trichet addressed bank liquidity risk through the Fixed Rate Full Allotment in 2008 or introduced the first security purchases with the SMP in 2010; and of course when Mario Draghi gave his “whatever it takes” speech in July 2012 or began expanding non-standard instruments in 2014. And finally, independence from trends in the media and short-termism, which I shall come back to later. C - The spirit: general European interest These three men have also upheld the European spirit, through their culture and their convictions. Far from being a technocratic arrangement, initially the euro was actually a political aspiration advocated by Helmut Kohl, Jacques Delors and François Mitterrand in parallel with German reunification. And it is now supported by 75% of euro area citizens, the highest approval rating since 2003, and as much as 85% of Luxembourgers and 81% of Germans [slide 4]. This popular support is our greatest success and our greatest asset.
Earlier this year, most forecasters thought that the recovery was gaining traction and that economic activity would increase at a solid – though not spectacular – pace through 2012. The labor market was beginning to show some long-awaited improvement, and the financial repair process seemed to be making progress. Analysts thought that higher prices for energy and other commodities would weigh on output growth, as would supply-chain disruptions from the disaster in Japan. But these factors were expected to be transitory, and most forecasters thought growth would improve significantly once these influences had passed. Unfortunately, the news over the past several months has proved this forecast to be too optimistic. To use an automotive analogy, employment and growth are stuck in neutral. Job growth has been disappointing, and the unemployment rate just last month dipped below 9 percent. Revised data indicate that annualized real GDP growth in the first half of 2011 was only 1 percent and improved only modestly to a 2 percent pace in the third quarter. Consumer spending has been particularly sluggish. Furthermore, the weakness in GDP growth began before the bulk of the effects of higher energy prices hit the economy and before the disaster in Japan happened. This timing, along with the continued softness of most economic indicators into the early summer, indicates that the slowing in output growth was not all due to temporary factors. Even with slightly firmer economic data that have come out recently, the sense of building momentum seems absent.

But they did not portend a permanent ratcheting up of inflation. Core PCE inflation – which excludes the volatile food and energy components and is a better predictor of future overall inflation – has been just 1.7 percent over the past year. Furthermore, prices for energy and many other commodities have softened of late. And with the unemployment rate still high and capacity utilization low, resource slack continues to exert downward pressure on prices. In addition, measures of longer-run inflation expectations are at the low end of the range they have been running since last November. Putting these factors together, I would argue that inflation is likely to remain moderate over the foreseeable future. The FOMC forecasts for core inflation were concentrated near 1.8 percent this year, and its forecasts for total inflation were in the range of 1.5 percent to 2.0 percent for 2012, 2013 and 2014. My own assessment is that inflation will be at the lower end of these ranges. Fed performance These disappointing forecasts pose a challenge for monetary policy. The Fed is charged by Congress in the Federal Reserve Act to encourage conditions that foster both maximum employment and price stability. This is what you hear us refer to as the Fed’s “dual mandate”. Given the high unemployment rate and low job growth, I think it is clear that the Fed has fallen short in achieving its goal of maximum employment. I will return to this point shortly.
Hence the need to have a policy domain, such as macroprudential policy, which seeks to mitigate the insurgence of systemic risk, i.e. the risk that the whole financial system is disrupted and becomes unable to provide services to the real economy. Of course, the targets and instruments of macroprudential policy and microprudential supervision exhibit a certain degree of overlap. However, while macroprudential policy instruments are used to counteract risks of a systemic nature, microprudential supervision applies its instruments to individual institutions or limited groups of institutions to strengthen their resilience. [58] Moreover, some macroprudential policies may require the use of fiscal instruments. This explains why, at national level, fiscal authorities are sometimes involved in systemic risk boards. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  However, at EU level, no fiscal authority exists. Therefore, macroprudential policy should remain at national level. Concluding remarks To conclude, the rationale of the principle of central bank independence, as set out in the Treaty and interpreted by the CJEU, is to protect the ECB from political influence primarily when defining and implementing the Eurosystem’s monetary policy. The additional mandates and functions conferred on the ECB after the financial crisis with regard to micro- and macroprudential supervision and crisis management are not covered by the very high level of independence provided to the ECB under Article 130 of the Treaty.

2  BIS Review 175/2010  We are pleased that also with this Library, we enable a lot of people, either younger or elderly, to give one of the most beautiful gifts – the book, for which the writer Garrison Keillor says that “it is the only gift you can constantly open, again and again”. We are glad that we are opening another such possibility. I sincerely hope that the opening of this Library will be welcomed by the scholars and wider public in the Republic of Macedonia. Thank you! BIS Review 175/2010  3
Also on the derivatives front, clearinghouses LCH and CME will change over discounting and price alignment interest on listed derivatives to SOFR in two weeks’ time, and will incorporate the ISDA transition terms into their standard contracts. That should help increase activity in SOFR derivatives, which, as we’ll see next, should help lay further groundwork for new SOFR-based alternatives. Coming to Terms with SOFR Apart from the overnight and average SOFR rates that are being used right now, there are two other types of rates that some market participants seem to be awaiting. One is the forward-looking term SOFR rate that the ARRC is working on. Earlier this month the ARRC released a request for https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  3/6  30/09/2020  The LIBOR Countdown Has Not Stopped - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK  proposals for the design and production of term SOFR.14 But that doesn’t mean you should wait for it. No one can guarantee that the ARRC will end up recommending a term rate, or when that will happen if it does. Designing a robust new rate is not a quick process, and the ARRC’s first priority will be ensuring that whatever term rate it recommends is robust and durable. The likeliest basis for such a rate is forward derivative contracts on SOFR, which have not yet reached the volume and liquidity that are sufficient to support a widely used term rate.

24 Supervisory issues associated with benchmark transition: Report to the G20, July 9, 2020. 25 BCBS, Basel Framework frequently asked questions, June 2020. 26 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Joint Statement on Managing the LIBOR Transition. 27 OCIE, Risk Alert: Examination Initiative: LIBOR Transition Preparedness, June 18, 2020.  https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2020/hel200929  6/6
While today’s announcement is significant, it does not mark the end of history for the Bank of England’s market operations. We will continue to evolve our approach as the financial sector changes. In particular, we need to respond to two big questions. First, should the Bank of England allow non-banks to have access to our regular facilities? After all, our responsibilities for financial stability run much wider than the banking sector. Institutions that play a central role in markets, like broker-dealers, are obvious first candidates. We will also consider the case for opening them to other participants including financial market infrastructures. If the scope of access to central bank facilities increases, the scope of regulation can be expected to expand in a proportionate manner.13 Backstopping the collateral management of a range of institutions should reduce the need for the Bank to act as a Market Maker of Last Resort.14 Second, given that we host an international banking system and global markets, to what extent should the Bank of England provide liquidity in currencies other than sterling? As markets evolve, banks and markets here may need backstops in other currencies in our time zone before business opens for the Federal Reserve and after it has closed for the Bank of Japan. Although the Bank of England can supply limitless quantities of sterling, we rely on other central banks for access to their currencies.

The UK’s financial sector can be both a global good and a national asset – if it is resilient. It is not for the Bank of England to decide how big the financial sector should be. Our job is to ensure that it is safe. The UK can host a large and expanding financial sector safely, if we implement a reform agenda that extends well beyond domestic banking. That is not to suggest that the focus on reforming domestic banks has been misplaced. Following the crisis, it was imperative to fix first the fault lines at the core of our system, with initiatives ranging from rebuilding the capital of major UK banks and building societies, to changing the structure of compensation and the responsibilities of senior officers. In tandem, some major banks are working to change their cultures.6 But reforms of domestic banking are far from sufficient for a global hub like London. Now is the time for a greater focus on what’s needed for resilient international banking and robust global markets. This will require sustained international engagement. Unlike in the early days of the FT, the UK can no longer dictate standards. Rather than ruling the waves, we must spur collective action through a demonstrated commitment to openness and the promotion of better ideas in Europe and at the G20 via the Financial Stability Board (FSB).