samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
N. Chatelais, A. D. Gaye and Y. Kalantzis, May 2015: “Low inflation in the euro area: import prices and domestic slack”, Rue de la Banque 6, Banque de France (showing no clear-cut change in the slope of the Phillips curves in the Eurozone and France over the last 10 years). M. Draghi, the Economic Club of New York, Dec. 4, 2015, based on work by a Eurosystem task force, including BDF staff: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/ sp151204.en.html. E. Engen, T. Laubach and D. Reifschneider, 2015: “The Macroeconomic Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Unconventional Monetary Policies”, Finance and Economic Discussion Series 2015-005. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (and references therein). S. Guilloux-Nefussi, March 2015: “Globalization, Market Structure and the Flattening of the Phillips Curve”, Banque de France Working Paper No 539, (proposing a theoretical model explaining a possible flattening of the Phillips curve since the 90s). IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2013 (Chapter I). H. Rey, Nov. 2014: “Monetary Policy and the Global Financial Cycle”, BDF International Symposium on “Central Banking: The Way forward” and Jackson Hole Symposium Proceedings, Sept. 2013. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Germany gained unification in exchange for the euro. The southern countries (Italy, France and Spain) gained the stability of the German mark because they were unable to create such a currency at home. And those who were tied to the German mark long before the euro was created (Austria and the Netherlands) simply remained bound to Frankfurt after the Eurozone was established, only the Bundesbank building was replaced all of a sudden by the ECB building. There’s no basic euro story like this in the Czech Republic. Why should we try to create one artificially? Our story is one of maintaining monetary stability across regimes and governments and of keeping the koruna as the name of our currency continuously since the time of Emperor Franz Joseph (his monetary reform established a new currency – the crown, or koruna – throughout the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in 1892) regardless of totalitarianism and the horrors of the 20th century. Neither the Nazis, nor the Communists had any tendency to rename the currency and kept this old monarchist name despite otherwise changing basically everything, and for the worse. Our country – unlike the rest of the Central Europe – has never experienced hyperinflation in its modern history, and this monetary stability has always served the entrenched mentality of small Czech savers well. Domestic scepticism about the euro – that’s our authentic Czech story. 6.
Digital convergence of telecommunications, computers, and the media is fast conjoining many new products and services to replace the old ones. For these reasons, inflexible and highly prescriptive regulations and rules may be inhibitive to innovation. In addition, with the entrance of more non-bank players in the payments industry, overseeing these players could be more challenging as a different regulatory approach may have to be adopted. Regulators would need to be conversant with the business dynamics and operational arrangements of these new players while, at the same time, these players have to adapt quickly to the regulators’ supervisory approach and requirements. The regulators’ dilemma in achieving a proportionate regulatory framework, in particular to promote the growth of electronic money, remains a challenge. This give rise to the need to balance trade-offs between impacting public confidence and promoting innovation and  BIS Review 69/2010  3  competition. Let’s take the example of the provision of a more lenient regulatory regime. While this would promote the entry of new players in the market, it may also lead to the payment systems being used for illicit purposes. Regulators may as well get the major stakeholders to understand this dilemma. By doing this, hopefully the regulators will be able to apply a more stringent regulatory regime to protect public interest, but at the same time do not unduly affect the viability and growth of electronic payments.

Average annual growth in business investment in the decade before the crisis was 2.4% and in the 15 years before the crisis it was 3.6%. 2  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  One reason for this weak investment since the crisis has been weak demand. Over a run of years, the rate of investment should adjust to maintain the capital stock at a particular level relative to GDP. If GDP grows more slowly, less investment is required to maintain the capital stock at a desired level relative to GDP. This can lead to a vicious circle in which weak demand leads to lower investment that in turn impairs the productive capacity of the economy. This in turn impairs demand as households and businesses revise down their expectations for future income and profits and so on. So what starts as a demand shock can end up as a supply shock. According to the IMF, this effect probably accounts for some of the weakness in investment in advanced economies. 3  But this is unlikely to be the whole story behind the weakness of investment post crisis. One common and repeated candidate explanation is the lack of finance for productive investment. This is not a new issue; it has very deep roots in the UK. The role of banks in providing finance to businesses for investment has been examined many times since Charles Geach’s day.
These forecasts also highlight that much of the financing needed to support investment in infrastructure that supports environmentally sustainable growth is likely to be generated not in advanced economies but in emerging economies such as China. The Bank’s response  So, how, as a central bank, are we responding to the financial risks which climate change presents? Viewed through the prism of our objectives, the Bank’s response has two core elements. The first relates to our micro-prudential objectives to promote the safety and soundness of the financial institutions for which we are responsible – banks and insurance firms - and involves our engaging with these firms on climate-related risks through prudential supervision. Our work initially started by examining the impact of climate change on the UK insurance industry. General insurers in particular are at the front line of managing the physical risks from climate change, such as those from storms and floods. The impact of these physical risks was the focus of the report the PRA published in 2  2015, alongside the Governor’s speech at Lloyd’s of London . We continue to deepen our activities in insurance - including in ensuring that the thinking that underpins the understanding of climate risk on the liability side of insurers’ balance sheets is reflected also in thinking about the transition risks that might arise on the asset side of those balance sheets, something which we expect to share more of over the course of this year.

At this point, I would like to briefly touch another obstacle that hinders access to capital: Fiscal dominance. Due to high level of public sector borrowing requirements in many emerging market countries, fiscal policy ultimately governs price determination in financial markets. Fiscal dominance reduces the amount of loanable funds available to private sector and disrupts effective credit allocation in the economy. Turkey can be seen as a case study. Years of high real interest rates and budget deficits in the 1990s forced the Turkish banking sector to credit rationing. Banks were not able to perform their intermediary function effectively. Instead, they mostly financed public sector deficits. Fiscal dominance has gradually eased following the reform program enacted after the 2001 crisis. The declining public debt burden and the diminishing fiscal dominance in Turkey put an end to the crowding-out of the real sector. That boosted the supply of loanable funds. Banks have returned to their traditional role of financial intermediation instead of financing government expenditures. Share of public securities in Turkish banking sector assets declined by onethird to 28% in the last 5 years; while share of credits to private sector more than doubled and reached to 49% during the same period. The credits extended to the small and medium enterprises by Turkish banking sector have also increased significantly to USD 95 billion as of 2007. This corresponded to almost 20% of the GDP. As a further note, 32% of these credits were in the category of credits extended to micro enterprises.
According to most estimates, it is expected to remain at a historically low level for the foreseeable future. Since it determines what policy rates the central banks can set in the longer term, this means that in a few years’ time, when we have overcome today’s high inflation, we may well be back in a situation where monetary policy once again has to deal with policy rates at the lower bound and inflation that is too low (Figure 3).5 One possible caveat here is linked to the fact that the West has for a long time been dependent on Russian energy and Chinese markets. Not least the pandemic and the war in Ukraine have shown that this dependence has made many companies and business operations vulnerable. It has therefore become increasingly common to think about how the dependence can be reduced and production made more robust. One way of doing this is through so-called reshoring, that is, moving businesses closer to home again. In that case, the globalisation that has contributed to dampening inflation over the last few decades would begin to roll back. This could mean that the ‘headwind’ that inflation has had for a long time is turned into a ‘tailwind’. Although the global real equilibrium rate would remain low in the future, it does not need to become as common as it has been so far that central banks’ policy rates are at the lower bound.

This is an important reason why inflation forecasts still some way into 2022 were that inflation would rapidly return to the target. 4 There are also examples of countries where inflation has risen a lot, even though monetary policy has not been as expansionary for as long as in Sweden. For example, Australia and New Zealand had policy rates of 1.5 and 1.75 per cent respectively in 2017, 2018 and part of 2019, before they were cut. They also began asset purchases relatively late, in November 2020 and at the end of March 2020 respectively. In the third quarter of 2022, inflation was 7.3 per cent in Australia and 7.2 per cent in New Zealand. 2 [15]  to an unexpectedly rapid increase in demand during the recovery after the pandemic. Various measures of underlying inflation, which capture such broader, trend movements, have risen sharply during the year. That price increases are broad-based is also underlined by the fact that they are visible in both goods prices and service prices (Figure 2). Inflation is therefore not transitory, in the sense that it falls back without monetary policy needing to react at all. Sometimes, one adds an argument based on the fact that when the Riksbank raises the interest rate, households’ interest costs increase. This in turn means that the demands for wage increases will be higher, which eventually will lead to an even greater increase in inflation.
Allow me to focus on three particularly important ones in which the Spanish economy is in a worryingly poorer position than our European partners: human capital, technological capital and the financing of innovation. According to the available evidence, the presence of human and technological capital shortfalls is the main reason for the low productivity of Spanish firms.3 And the difficulty in obtaining finance for highly productive business projects has shown itself to be a determinant of the inefficient allocation of resources to firms.4 The need to correct the human and technological capital shortfalls is particularly urgent when viewed in the current context of technological change. The advances in digitalisation, automation and technological development are altering certain crucial aspects of the economy, such as consumption patterns, production processes or the provision of public and private services. Thus, for example, the spread of new technologies has allowed the financial sector to provide services in more flexible ways not requiring customers to be physically present. As an example, the percentage of Internet users in Spain reporting that they use electronic banking services has increased by 30 pp from 2003 to 2018.5 However, all sectors to a greater or lesser extent are caught up in the so-called “digital revolution”. 3  See F. Schivardi and T. Schmitz (2019), “The IT Revolution and Southern Europe’s Two Lost Decades”, Journal of the European Economic Association, forthcoming. 4 See Chapter 4, “Business dynamics in Spain: characteristics, determinants and implications”, Informe Anual 2015, Banco de España.

The disadvantageous levels of human capital compared with those in other developed economies are apparent in both workers and employers. On Eurostat data, in Spain 40.5% of the self-employed, 35.1% of employers and 32.6% of employees have a low educational level, compared with much smaller percentages (24.8%, 20.1% and 19.8%, respectively) in the euro area as a whole. 6  See, for example, D. Acemoglu and P. Restrepo (2018), “The Race between Man and Machine: Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares, and Employment”, American Economic Review, vol. 108, pp. 1488-1542. 12/18  Spain also has a shortfall in terms of the proportion of the population with profiles related in some way to disciplines such as engineering or mathematics. For example, 9% of university graduates in Spain have qualifications in mathematics, science or IT, compared with 14% in Germany or 11% in the European Union as a whole. It is also foreseeable that the massive eruption of new technologies will result in greater importance being afforded to non-cognitive skills (such as a desire to innovate, self-control, ability to concentrate, or adaptability to a changing environment),7 in which Spain also performs poorly in the international comparison. It therefore seems advisable to rethink the institutional design of the educational system, the content of the curriculum and the learning system itself. In this respect, it is crucial to treat this project of improving human capital as a collective task.
The idea that is emerging is that SWFs would adopt such a code on a voluntary basis in an attempt to alleviate concerns in the most important mature market. At the October 2007 IMF/World Bank Annual meetings in Washington, the finance ministers and central bankers of the G7 countries discussed the issue in a private meeting with a number of leading SWFs. They subsequently stated that they “see merit in identifying best practices for sovereign wealth funds in such areas as institutional structure, risk management, transparency and accountability.” 24 Since then, G7 treasury officials have continued to engage with a number of leading SWFs. The US has called on the International Monetary Fund to try to identify possible best practices, noting that these should be modeled on best practices for managing international reserves. 25 So far, Ted Truman has developed  19  For example, Joaquín Almunia, the EU Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs summarised the general position of the European Commission as calling on SWFs operating in EU member countries to increase the transparency of their operations and investments. Interview with the Financial Times on 28 September 2007. 20  In Germany, legislation has been drafted that would enable the German government to veto any foreign investors intending to take a stake of 25% or more in a German company that may threaten national security; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 September 2007.

First, I will outline BNM’s role in fostering an enabling environment for network expansion as well as in promoting competition, innovation and choice in the payment landscape;  ii. Second, I will highlight the key priority areas for stakeholders that could accelerate the displacement of cheques and cash with cost-effective e-payments;  iii. Third, I will outline the importance of a synergistic collaboration between MyClear and the financial institutions to deliver innovative payment solutions and meet user needs; and  iv. Fourth, I will highlight the need for the financial institutions to provide end-to-end and value-adding financial solutions to their customers. 1. Fostering an enabling environment for network expansion whilst promoting competition, innovation and choice  An efficient and well-functioning payment system must not only have the economies of scale to enable lowering of costs, but also the quality of services to serve the needs of an increasingly demanding and sophisticated users. We designed our developmental efforts into two-fold: i. Foster an enabling environment for infrastructure building and network expansion to achieve the economies of scale; and  ii. Promote effective competition among the industry players to spur the development of innovative solutions, provide greater choices and value proposition to the public and in the process, lower costs. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Over the past few years, BNM has played the role of a catalyst by instituting reform measures and introducing market incentive mechanisms to enhance the accessibility and the quality, affordability and security of the e-payment services to the general public.
Labour participation by the white population was, by contrast, on a slightly downward trend prior to the GFC, after which it has flattened off. That leaves participation rates for ethnic minorities today slightly above the levels of the white population. There have been some striking gender-related shifts in the pattern of work. The share of part-time employment among females has been declining, with a corresponding larger share of females working full-time. The opposite is true among males, with the share of men working part-time increasing by 5 percentage points over the sample. For ethnic minorities, part-time employment has steadily increased, with a pronounced pick up following the crisis. Next, we look at three variables which are often used to capture aspects of “human capital”: the highest qualification achieved, the occupation of a person, and the sector in which they are employed. For illustrative purposes, we split the sample into four sub-groups – white men, white women, ethnic minority men, and ethnic minority women – though we also consider more granular sub-sets of these groups. Chart 2 compares the highest qualification attained among the four sub-samples in 1994 and 2019. The main trend is the same across the board: the share of people with degrees or higher education has almost doubled since 1994. The increases are, however, most pronounced among women and ethnic minorities. For example, ethnic minority females have seen a 31 percentage point increase between 1994 and 2019. In 2019, around 60% had a degree or a higher education qualification.

The first one has to do with the defense of the financial customer. It clearly needs strengthening. 1  A household is defined to be in financial risk when debt service amounts to 75 percent of its annual income and its expenditures are 20 percent greater than income. This is estimated at the survey, so it includes households that may be going through temporary difficulties or facing a solvency problem. The data presented here correspond to households in the Metropolitan Region. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Reinforcing the financial area of the Consumer Service Office (SERNAC) and the implementation of standardized credit contracts – with very clear rules for reprogramming and forbidding abusive practices – point in that direction. The second such flaw refers to investor protection; it is necessary to ensure that investors receive reliable information and are spared the deceptions that seem to have occurred in this case. The Bank is readily available to cooperate in these discussions. Another important aspect of the operation of the retail industry is safeguarding the normal functioning of the payment system, in as much as there are stores that will accept credit cards from retail stores as a means of payment. In concrete, what is sought is to ensure that businesses associated the credit card receive what is due them at the right time. This aspect is regulated in the bylaws of the Central Bank.
Commodity price changes with relatively more of a permanent nature may distort the general pricing behavior and initiate a wage-price cycle. This may entail prolonged upward movement in inflation in general and, accordingly, the high costs associated with this. Therefore, to be able to contain the potential second-round effects due rises in commodity prices, it is important for central bankers to pay close attention to core inflation indicators and inflation expectations, and shape their communication policy in this direction. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  We, as the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT), are also in the position to carry out the abovementioned analyses. As a matter of fact, in our Inflation reports as well as the Summary of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meetings, we share with the public, our assessment of the nature of commodity price changes. In the Inflation Report published in January 2012, we made the following assessment on oil prices: “Another risk factor in the forthcoming period is the uncertainty regarding oil prices. Although the weak course of the global economy dampens commodity prices, recent manifesting problems regarding oil supply pose upside risk to energy prices.

Should such a risk materialize, the CBRT will not react to temporary price movements, yet the Bank will not tolerate any deterioration in expectations.” Likewise, at the Monetary Policy Committee meeting held on 27 March; after pointing out that “uncertainties in oil prices pose upside risks to the inflation outlook”, we underscored “[…] we will continue to closely monitor supply-side developments and we will not tolerate any deterioration in inflation expectations”. In view of the current level of inflation, I would like to re-underline on this occasion that it is essential to eliminate upside risks. To this end, last month, we implemented a “strong, effective and temporary” monetary tightening in order to eliminate the impact of recent cost developments on inflation expectations. We will closely monitor factors affecting inflation in the forthcoming period and additional monetary tightening (AMT) will be repeated when deemed necessary. Dear Participants, At this point, I would like to give you a quick overview on the monetary, financial and fiscal policies that Turkey has implemented for economic stability. The global demand shock that came after Lehman crisis brought steep declines in commodity prices with it. In response, expansionary monetary policy as well as supportive fiscal and financial policies were implemented at the same time.