samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The balance, up to this point, shows is the economy has managed to contain the pressure of the global crisis generated by the pandemic, achieving sufficient stability to undertake a recovery. The Central Bank has contributed to this, without abandoning its medium-term institutional agenda. All this, however, is far from implying that the crisis has been weathered and the job is done. While the figures for activity in 2020 are beginning to stabilize, revealing that a major catastrophe has been averted, the evolution of the economy in 2021 and 2022 will determine the deeper legacy of this episode. Just to recover the losses of the past year there is a long and difficult road ahead, full of challenges and risks. Measured only in the per capita income dimension, by the end of this year we will have fallen back to the levels 8 The BIS, CEMLA, and World Economic Forum, among others. 10  of 2013 (Figure 17). If the growth trend between 1990 and 2008 had been maintained, by 2025 we would be close to doubling the 2008 per capita income. However, the sum of the years of low growth, the social outbreak and the Covid-19 crisis only allows us to project that by 2025 per capita income will have accumulated an increase of around 25% since 2008. To even consider closing this gap, it will be necessary to create hundreds of thousands of jobs, sustainably recover consumption, reactivate investment, and maintain credit growth.

Andrew Hauser: Building the market infrastructure of tomorrow – CREST, RTGS and the Bank of England, 20 years on Speech by Mr Andrew Hauser, Executive Director for Banking, Payments and Financial Resilience of the Bank of England, at the CREST Twentieth Anniversary Conference, London, 20 September 2016. *  *  *  I am grateful to Sana Siddique for her help in preparing this speech, and to David Bailey, Jo Clennell, Toby Davies, Rachel Greener, Chris Redmond, Iain Saville, Hugh Simpson and Paul Symons for their input and guidance. Introduction July 1996 was an eventful month. Dolly the world’s first cloned sheep was born. Boris Yeltsin was re-elected as President of Russia. The Spice Girls’ first single, “Wannabe”, was riding high in the charts. And the summer Olympics opened in Atlanta. By the time the Games closed in early August, Great Britain had won only 15 medals in total, finishing 36th in the rankings – three places behind North Korea, twelve behind Kazakhstan and 32 behind China. As that song of 1997 had it, “things could only get better”. But there was one rather more upbeat event that month back in the summer of 1996. On 15 July, in a crowded room high up in Trinity Tower, Wapping, Chancellor Ken Clarke picked up a computer mouse – then still a relative novelty – and, waving it towards a large computer screen like a wand, declared the CREST settlement system open for business.
8  projects mean that the main mechanism for financing the public deficit continues to be traditional access to markets. An aspect I would like to underscore regarding the economic policy response to date is the high degree of complementarity of the measures adopted by the different authorities. If the ECB's response and the decisions of the European Council have enabled governments to expand the scope for fiscal action, it is the action taken by the latter and the ECB itself that has been vital for guaranteeing liquidity and reducing risk for non-financial corporations. This, along with the decisions taken by micro and macroprudential authorities and the ECB, has helped sustain the flow of credit to economic agents. It is very important that this degree of complementarity is maintained in the future. Outstanding European architecture reforms This crisis has also shown that, despite the progress of recent years, further improvements are needed in euro area governance. In particular, beyond the importance of having access to a recovery fund with the characteristics described above, we must continue to stress the major limitation for the proper functioning of the euro area of not having a permanent macroeconomic stabilisation mechanism that allows for greater risk-sharing in response to economic shocks.

4  Yet it is clear that the unprecedented crisis caused by the pandemic has increased the credit, market and operational risks the banking sector faces.3 Precisely with the aim of mitigating and managing these risks, the European authorities have adopted various measures which, once more, have complemented those taken by the national fiscal and monetary policy authorities. First, supervisory processes have been adapted to release banks’ operational resources, gearing them to ensure business continuity. And, in turn, all those regulatory changes entailing increased requirements for banks have been postponed. In this connection, the BCBS has decided to delay the implementation of Basel III by a year. In any event, the BCBS has confirmed all jurisdictions’ commitment to full, consistent and timely transposition of Basel III under the new calendar. Second, aspects of the accounting regulations in force for the calculation of credit risk have been clarified, with the aim of preventing excessive procyclicality. As a counterpoint to this, it is necessary to prevent (particularly against the background of the prolongation of the crisis) a misuse of this flexibility from leading to inappropriate accounting practices that translate into a delay in the recognition of the effective impairment of certain credit exposures. Here, supervisory guidelines should be followed; these establish that the measures adopted in this area should not hamper the measurement of effective impairments and reasonable provisioning for credit risk, and they should afford banks the necessary incentives for maintaining adequate standards.
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Big shift – traversing the complexities of a new world Luncheon address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Khazanah Megatrends Forum 2012: “Big shift – traversing the complexities of a new world”, Kuala Lumpur, 2 October 2012. *  *  *  The global economy has now entered into a period of slower economic growth despite the significant and wide ranging pro-growth policies that have been implemented across the world. Why then has the world not been able to achieve a sustained long-lasting recovery? What has been holding back this prospect? In addition, the rapid and significant changes in the global environment have also brought with them new demands and new challenges. Our understanding of the factors that are containing the global growth prospects and the consequence of the new environment will better position us to face the fundamentally new landscape and to manage its consequent challenges. Let me first thank Khazanah for the invitation to speak at this Khazanah Megatrends Forum. The topic on the Big Shift that is being experienced in the world today is indeed highly relevant. While the international and national attention is currently focused on the immediate challenges of the global environment, equally important, however, is to recognise the long-term changes that will reshape our future. The first part of my remarks today will focus on the immediate challenges of the global economy, taking into account the fundamental factors that are likely to affect the growth outlook.

The second part of my remarks will touch on the key imperatives to best prepare us for the new global landscape, so as to be better positioned to succeed and survive in this new environment. Policy-makers in the world economy have continued to be confronted with policy challenges since the onset of the global financial crisis. While the policy responses have focused on addressing the origins of the crisis – on the extensive build-up of excesses, the over-leverage and over-indebtedness of the private and public sectors, the breakdown in the functioning of financial markets, the loss of competitiveness, and the loss in confidence in the financial system and the economy, the concern now is on achieving a sustained economic recovery that is accompanied by job creation. Half a decade into the crisis, and this has yet to be achieved. In the recent months, the global economy has again experienced a broad-based moderation in growth from an already modest pace. This has stemmed largely from the renewed weakness of the economic recovery in several of the major advanced economies. In the United States, the significant monetary accommodation, reinforced by the large scale financial market interventions and the significant fiscal stimulus during the early stage of the crisis, has averted an economic depression, but it has not, however, brought about a sustained recovery. In Europe, an economic contraction is being experienced, resulting from the combination of fiscal austerity, tight credit conditions, and the continued uncertainty and volatility in the financial markets.
The exercise considered minimum capital thresholds which had to be exceeded in each of its parts: the asset quality assessment and the baseline and adverse scenarios of stress tests. Banks not exceeding any of these thresholds had to submit within two weeks a capital plan for remedying their capital shortfall within a period of six to nine months. With the methodology used, 25 of the 130 banks assessed had a capital shortfall, which for the whole of Europe amounted to € billion. It should however be noted that, in anticipation of the exercise, many European credit institutions strengthened their solvency over the past year. Of the aforementioned 25 banks, 12 increased their capital sufficiently in 2014, so only 13 of them, with a capital shortfall of € billion, will have to take additional action to reinforce their solvency. We consider the results of the Spanish banks to be positive. Only one bank was below the threshold in one of the parts of the exercise, specifically in the asset quality review. In this case the estimated shortfall was very small and, during 2014, the bank took measures to strengthen its capital by an amount well in excess of that needed to cover its shortfall. Taking  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  into account these actions, at present all Spanish banks amply exceed the thresholds set in the exercise.

Moreover, it is necessary to use uniform accounting and auditing standards to ensure safety and stability of Islamic banking. It is also encouraged that Islamic financial institutions merge to increase their capital and have more liquidity to finance their investments. Finally, Islamic financial institutions need to steer efforts towards good corporate governance, good risk management, transparency, and financial disclosure. I hope that the Islamic banking industry will achieve further prosperity and success in the future. Thanks again to the Central Bank of Syria for hosting this conference and for the interest in Islamic banking, and I think it is timely and wise to choose this topic for the conference. I wish all success for this conference and the participants and I thank you all for your kind attention. Wassalmu Alikum Warahmatu Allah Wabarakatuhu. BIS Review 53/2010  3
If that was so, the additional base effects from last year would mean that reported consumer price inflation would still reach towards 3%, before falling back to 2% next May. That’s the base effects at work. Second, and beyond that, additional price pressures can arise from the various shortages caused by imbalances in the recovery of supply and demand, as the latter recovers more rapidly than the former. But these imbalances should not last. Let me take an example from the US to illustrate. The continuous lumber contract – highly relevant for house building there – rose from around $ pre-Covid to around $ in early May, as the price rose in the face of inelastic short term supply. However it is now down to below $ as more lumber supply comes onto the market, and there is a shift to satisfy the higher demand at a lower price. Third, we expect to see a switch from demand for goods towards services as restrictions are lifted, which should rebalance the composition of demand. Over time, this should lead to an easing of inflation as spending is redirected towards sectors with more spare capacity. But, initially, that rebalancing may be uneven. Here in the UK, over recent weeks we saw an initial very strong pick-up in retail sales and restaurant table bookings, the growth of which has already eased off. Where supply returns more slowly than the initial surge in demand, we may see a temporary rise in prices.

Mugur Isrescu: nvestments in challenging times - how can Romanian firms thrive in the new context? Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isrescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the conference "Investments in challenging times: How can Romanian firms thrive in the new context? ", Bucharest, 16 March 2023. *** Vice-President Pavlova, Chief Economist Revoltella, Distinguished audience, Ladies and gentlemen, Welcome to this year's conference organized by the European Investment Bank in partnership with the National Bank of Romania, titled "Investments in challenging times: How can Romanian firms thrive in the new context?". I am glad that we are able to meet again at the National Bank of Romania, after 2 years in which we had to host this event exclusively on-line. Please allow me to extend a warm welcome to the EIB representatives that are joining us: Vice-President Pavlova, Chief Economist Revoltella and Ms. Tasan Zanin, Head of the EIB office in Bucharest, and to all our colleagues and guests that are with us today, in person or online. I commend EIB's continuous involvement and support in engaging with stakeholders in Romania through these valuable series of events. There is already a tradition, today's conference being the sixth we have co-organized and hosted. Romania and the European Investment Bank share a long and fruitful partnership that has resulted in projects in important sectors of our economy. I am certain we will be able to continue to build on this important partnership, tackling variable challenges and opportunities.
10  For example Australia, Canada, New Zealand. 2  BIS Review 46/2006  markets about the steady-state rate of inflation being targeted. In other words, a point target makes communication somewhat more straightforward. Of course, that is not the same as saying that we can guarantee to deliver inflation outturns consistently in line with the target over an economic cycle. Shocks, and even policy mistakes, will cause inflation to deviate from target. Explaining such deviations matters. Especially when being reappointed for a further term, MPC members are typically asked by the House of Commons’ Treasury Select Committee whether the MPC has made any big mistakes 11 . In response, we often talk about luck, diligence etc. But I think that the best test – perhaps the only important test – is whether medium-to-long-term inflation expectations have been dislodged from the target. In the UK, expectations have generally been in line with our target since the Bank was given operational independence. But as the recent slight tick up in some measures illustrates, we have to be constantly vigilant. By contrast, an uncomfortable amount of commentary – academic and in the media – proceeds as if that particular battle is won for all time; the ‘death of inflation’ school of thought. Indeed, seductively, these days ‘victory’ tends to be inscribed in to the economic models used by central banks as an input to their forecasts.

With price-level targeting, the de facto near-term target would regularly vary according to (recent) inflation outturns and the time horizon for offsetting them. That might confuse households and firms about the long-term objective, making it more difficult for the central bank to maintain credibility. By repeating an unchanging and simple message about the inflation rate we are aiming at (2%), we may make it easier for households to learn about our aims. (d)  How should central banks respond to asset prices? Others argue that whether the central bank targets consumer price inflation or the price level, they should also target asset prices. On this question, I subscribe to much of the current orthodoxy 27 . Of course, changes in asset prices feed into policy making as they are an important influence on demand conditions, through households’ wealth, firms’ cost of capital, and the price (exchange rate) at which we trade with other economies. But I do not believe we should use interest rates to target asset prices alongside consumer price inflation. In the first place, we just do not know enough about the determination of asset prices – especially of risk premia – to have much of an idea about what price to target. Big moves in asset prices do occasionally occur because of changes in the underlying economic fundamentals. We could not be relied upon to distinguish between those benign changes and bubbles.
In this framework, the expected short-term interest rate path is calculated via the yield curve, expectations survey and other sources and inflation forecasts are published under the assumption that this path will materialize. (iii)  Countries in which central banks assume that interest rate will remain fixed over the forecast horizon: England, Brazil, Peru, and Australia. 2  In recent years, both academic literature and current central banking implementations increasingly support the approach adopted by the first group, including Turkey for sharing the own expectations of the central banks about future monetary policy with the public corresponds to the transparency and  1  In the survey, the farthest period of time given for inflation expectations is 2 years. 2  Some central banks follow more than one method while producing forecasts about interest rates. For instance, Bank of England is in both the second group (expectations for market interest rates) and third group (fixed interest rate). BIS Review 1/2007  3  predictability principles of inflation targeting. In this context, it is observed that more countries from second and third groups join the first group each year. Monetary policy and interest rate risk As mentioned above, the Central Bank shares its forecasts about monetary policy verbally with the public. When evaluating the inflation and monetary policy outlook, a particular question to be answered is raised: How should the policy perspective that will keep inflation close to the target in the medium-term (in a period of one and a half years to two years) be?

8  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms within the industry, where the market shares are expressed as fractions. As a general rule, an HHI below 1,000 signals low concentration, while an index above 1,800 signals high concentration. For values between 1,000 and 1,800, an industry is considered to be moderately concentrated. See ECB Banking Structures Report, October 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  during the crisis, with negative spillovers to credit. Thus, there would be macroeconomic benefits not only to within-country consolidation, but also to cross-border consolidation. In a single market, we would expect the private sector to drive such a rationalisation process, especially given the efficiency gains that can be reaped from cross-border M&A in terms of, among of things, information technology and corporate overhead costs. 9 There are several explanations for why this has not happened, but part of the reason seems to be the effect of a fragmented supervisory and resolution regime, which raises the costs of entry for crossborder banks and reduces the economic synergies of integration. For example, industry surveys suggest that an important factor in low cross-border M&A before the crisis was opaque supervisory approval procedures. The high compliance costs created by different sets of national rules and interacting with several different authorities also affected the deal economics.
For the global banks, the subsidy is worth at least hundreds of billions of dollars per year, on occasions four figures. These numbers are eye-popping. To give some context, they are a large chunk, and sometimes exceed, the measured valued-added of the financial sector to annual GDP. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Recent revisions to support ratings do little to make a dent in them. Because they measure risk mispricing by bank debtors, they capture the extent of dilution in debtor discipline arising from time-inconsistency. The scale of subsidy suggests there is a considerable distance to travel before debtor discipline could be fully effective in checking risk-taking. Short-termism and performance targets The story so far. Ownership and control rights for banks are vested in agents comprising less than 5% of the balance sheet. To boost equity returns, there are strong incentives for owners to increase volatility. Those risk-taking flames have been fanned by tax and state aid. As stories go, this one sounds grim. But this story also contains a puzzle. Long-term shareholders in banks have not obviously reaped the benefits of these distortions. The purchaser of a portfolio of global banking stocks in the early 1990s is today sitting on a real loss. So who exactly is it extracting value from these incentive distortions? The answer is twofold: shorter-term investors and bank management. It is not difficult to see why shorter-term investors in bank equities stand to gain from volatility. Institutional investors in equities are typically structurally long.

Or will protectionism rear its head? Although these may be slow burn, gradual issues, they could over time have a significant effect on labour supply. I would expect that those involved with monetary policy will have this area on their radar screens for many years to come. Such a new way of thinking about the labour market alters how we need to think about capacity in the economy in general and indeed the output gap in so many areas of the economy. Pensions and longevity The last of my four areas today is longevity and pensions. I hesitate to mention it, because for many this is an area more for social policy than for monetary policy. But for me there is a clear monetary policy dimension. I will not attempt a long commentary on the underlying issues. We are all familiar with the facts, both as they relate to the need to anticipate working longer; and to the policy of governments in many countries of transferring risk in pension provision from the state towards the individual. In addition we are increasingly aware that returns on many asset categories that are suitable for inclusion in pension funds have been more modest in recent years. For monetary policy the key issue is how and over what timeframe will these changes impact on savings, which at a domestic level are likely to have to increase to provide adequate income in retirement.