  Finally, and most important, many oil and commodity producers face an intertemporal choice between extracting resources and keeping them on or under  BIS Review 120/2010  7  the ground. According to standard economic reasoning (the Hotelling rule), one important determinant is the return earned on financial assets, to be compared to the expected commodity price increase over the long run. The possibility of large valuation losses on financial assets makes it optimal to reduce the rate of extraction, which would durably lower the supply of oil and other commodities. However, there are also practical and conceptual difficulties:   A choice would have to be made as to the true nature of the “super reserve currency”. Would it be a basket of existing monies or a new “fiat” currency? If the “super reserve” is a basket of existing currencies (such as the SDR today) it would basically serve as an instrument for diversification of foreign exchange reserves (or private portfolios), and such a diversification can easily be achieved by using existing currencies. On the other hand, the “super sovereign” could be issued as such as a fiat currency. Then, the international community would have a basic choice. Either the new currency could be made “strong” and never depreciate against any other major existing currencies, which probably means that its supply would be severely restricted. Or, the “super sovereign” would be issued according to pre-specified rules, and depreciation against existing currencies could not be excluded.

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