samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is also for this reason that we have tolerated a 'deviation interval' since 1995. While inflation has been low, growth in both Sweden and Finland during the inflation targeting period has been good from a historical perspective, and unemployment has fallen gradually from the high levels during the crisis years. There has been a successful consolidation of public finances in both countries and a fall in the central government debt measured as a percentage of GDP. Additionally, fiscal policy in Sweden has become more predictable with the introduction of a rolling nominal ceiling for public expenditure. Moreover, a number of measures have been taken to improve the functioning of the Swedish economy. These include deregulation and changes in the tax and social insurance systems. This has meant that the conditions for a favourable development have improved and confidence in the Swedish economy has increased. At the end of 1996; however, Finland chose a different direction for its exchange rate policy by taking part in the ERM as a preparation for full participation in the EMU from its start in 1999, while Sweden decided in 1997 that it would 'wait and see'. 2  BIS Review 9/2002  However, an unforeseen obstacle over the past decade has been the large fluctuations in the exchange rate.

At the same time, one should remember that we are still in the same economic playing field, with the same regulations and the same referee, constantly striving to make economic progress to achieve the best possible welfare – a process that actually has no end. Similar experiences Economic developments in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s are very reminiscent of developments in Finland. Like Finland, Sweden underwent an overheating at the end of the 1980s, which was mainly due to an excessively high domestic demand, partly due to insufficiently tight fiscal policy, a rapid credit boom and rising asset prices in the wake of the successive deregulations - all within the framework of a fixed exchange rate regime that set limits as to how far the steering interest rate could be used to govern the level of domestic activity. The fact that Sweden and Finland did not have much to counter with when the currency crisis really got its claws into the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, should be regarded in the light of the imbalances built up within their economies over several years. It was an uneven battle, although Sweden changed its fiscal policy and the Riksbank did all it could to defend the currency, raising its steering interest rate to 500 per cent. However, Sweden was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate as an anchor to achieve price stability in November 1992. Finland had replaced its fixed exchange rate regime earlier in the autumn.
Where TLAC is issued in a group brings me to the final key dimension of TLAC – distribution. One of the big innovations of TLAC is to go beyond previous capital accords to address the distribution of loss absorbency within groups. This was always going to be necessary for resolution which operates at legal entity, not group level. And it is essential to engender trust and time consistency between authorities cross-border. As it is set out in the principles covering the Term Sheet, host authorities must have confidence that there is sufficient loss absorbing and recapitalisation capacity available to subsidiaries in their jurisdictions with legal certainty at the point of entry into resolution. Internal TLAC – prepositioned loss absorbency down-streamed from the resolution entity to material subgroups, equivalent to 75–90% of the subgroup’s needs – is designed to achieve this, without pushing up overall TLAC requirements for the group as a whole. It also provides a mechanism in an SPE strategy through which by converting the internal TLAC via contractual terms, the key operating subsidiaries can be kept outside resolution and the losses can be transmitted to the top of the group for the resolution to take place in one legal entity, be that a holding company or a parent bank, in one jurisdiction. Again this addresses the concerns that some have expressed about making resolution work cross-border in different legal regimes. So if those are the trees, what is the wood?

But unlike the market standard agreements addressed in the Protocol, scheme rules and commercial agreements provided by agency banks vary and preserve a good deal of discretion for the FMI or G-SIB acting as a quasi FMI. We are exploring how far that discretion can, or needs to be, constrained. Ultimately, there is a potential collective action problem we need to address. It should be in the interests of FMIs and agency banks to allow the resolution to succeed. After all, in an SPE strategy the legal entity they are dealing with is likely to stay outside resolution. But the temptation must be there, if you can in  4  International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2015) ‘ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol’. 5  Financial Stability Board (2015) ‘Guidance on Arrangements to Support Operational Continuity in Resolution’. 6  In the US these are known as Financial Market Utilities (FMUs). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  resolution, to grab collateral or to increase margin calls on an extraordinary basis. This is the behaviour we saw at various points in the crisis. We need to plan to avoid a repeat of that. This brings me to the other consultation paper 7 issued recently by FSB, related to funding in resolution. If it is clear on Monday morning that a bank in resolution can meet its obligations falling due, then the incentive for counterparties to remove liabilities or seize collateral should be reduced. The funding in resolution principles represent a step toward achieving this.
So it is not right to argue, as some people have done recently, that because inflationary risks and pressures arise from the global economy they should be ignored by the monetary authorities.7 In the UK and in many other countries, monetary policy responds to global shocks and influences all the time. Nor is it correct to argue that inflation generated by import prices is outside the control of monetary policy. Monetary policy affects the exchange rate – which in turn can offset or reinforce our exposure to rising import prices. And the demand climate and the price expectations of firms can affect how much of this imported inflation comes through to the consumer. Yet in the UK, monetary policy has not only accommodated a large part of the recent surge in energy and commodity prices but also allowed a very significant sustained fall in the value of the pound, which has aggravated the rise in UK relative inflation relative to our peer group of other European economies.8 Rather than dismissing the impact of global influences on domestic inflation, monetary authorities need to assess how far they pose a threat to price stability – either in the direction of persistent inflation or persistent deflation. In the UK, we took the view in late 2008 and 2009 that the threat of deflation was the biggest risk in the wake of the global financial crisis, and cut interest rates to historically low levels, supported by direct injections of money into the economy through the policy of Quantitative Easing.

Source: ONS, IMF World Economic Outlook  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  In the UK, the rate of growth which we have seen over the early stages of recovery has not been spectacular, but that is not unusual in the early period of a return to growth after a major economic downturn. It is also not surprising that there have been variations in growth across different sectors of the economy and that confidence still remains fragile in the business community and among consumers. It is normally only 2–3 years into the recovery phase of the economic cycle that perceptions of improving economic conditions begin to catch up with the reality of a return to growth. This strong correspondence between economic growth in the UK and elsewhere in the EU shown in Chart 1 should not be a great surprise. It reflects the close economic links which have grown up over the centuries and which have been reinforced by the development of the European Union and the Single European Market. But this close link between economic growth in the UK and elsewhere in Europe is an example of a much more general phenomenon. We now live in a highly integrated global economy. And economies which are very open to trade and investment – like the United Kingdom, and indeed Jersey – are strongly influenced by international economic trends. During my time on the MPC, the growth and inflation performance of the UK, and hence our monetary policy judgements, have been heavily driven by global developments.
I shall keep my comments mainly therefore to what the new government should do, be it really a new government or just the old one in a new bottle, and I shall refer only to the present or historical developments only in so far as it is necessary to understand future recommendations. As this is an after lunch speech, I shall also keep it short and not try to be comprehensive, but only comment on things that interest me or I think might be useful to the audience. Let’s start with a simple concept, the Credit Bureau. One of the reasons the NPL could become so high, and banks with high NPLs could remain supported by the public, is because in the present law the concept is that financial transactions are secret and banks are secret places, looked after and owned and supervised by responsible people. It would be nice if it were true, but the banking industry is leveraged by a ratio of 12:1 and the temptation is rather great for the owner to take advantage of other people’s money, people who have no right to know what is going on with their money even once a year because they are not shareholders but just depositors. The temptation of the supervisors to evade their responsibilities by not taking the correct action is also great, as rich people are powerful, and bad political systems over a long time do not help to make you brave. This philosophy must be changed.

Under these circumstances, the traditional pro-cyclicality of credit emerged once again, fuelling asset price inflation (particularly real estate prices in certain regions of the US and Europe) rather than consumer price inflation. In the past twelve months the scenario changed radically: a severe financial crisis, stemming from the US real estate sector, hit mature economies in general, whereas demand pressures over the availability of limited production factors led to mounting inflation in a global scale. Thus, central banks currently face a much more complex and challenging environment than during the years of the great moderation. Monetary responses have been initially diverse due to the nature of the problems that surfaced, but the priority on the need to preserve price stability prevails. Due to both increases in raw material prices and demand pressures, inflation accelerated sharply around the globe. In mature economies in general, marked by broader levels of idle capacity, higher commodity prices probably explain the bulk of the inflation upsurge. In emerging countries, including Brazil, domestic demand pressures have had a relatively more important role in stoking mounting inflation pressures. As a matter of fact, strong domestic demand in these economies created conditions that enabled initially isolated price pressures to become more widespread. Not surprisingly, monetary policy is currently more and more focused in moderating the pace of demand expansion and containing inflation pressures in the majority of the emerging world.
First, it requires the active involvement of many different stakeholders, in particular Government agencies and very often a variety of NGOs, as well as financial institutions with specialized skills and knowledge. Second, the state of economic and social development of a society is an  BIS Review 88/2010  1  important determinant on the level and quality of financial inclusion. Third, what constitutes acceptable level of inclusion, in terms of access to finance, protection of personal rights and liberties, or assurance of retirement and healthcare benefits varies from one jurisdiction to another. For the reasons that I mentioned, there is no uniform global benchmark that can be used as a successful model for financial inclusion programs. Success stories and experiences are dispersed and often go unrecorded and to further the cause we need to reveals this situation. The financial inclusion agenda requires a systematic and internationally-recognized set of financial inclusion indicators that is meaningful and capable of assisting us in formulating developmental policies. Furthermore, enormous efficiency gains from the availability of such indicators can both reduce the cost of research and implementation as well as increase the effectiveness of the delivery and execution of the policies. Lessons learned in using financial inclusion data in the Malaysian context Let me to briefly share some of the lessons we have learnt in terms of using data to improve the policy formulation process, and develop a more efficient and inclusive financial sector.

Likewise, a fall in oil prices does not have an impact on the domestic  BIS Review 66/2004  1  economy, but results in a lower accumulation of foreign assets. The Fund thus acts as a buffer against disturbances. By building up the Fund, the aim of ensuring that several generations will enjoy the benefits of our petroleum wealth is also taken into account. In 2001, the Storting adopted new economic policy guidelines in Norway. At the same time as the inflation target was introduced in monetary policy, a strategy was drawn up for the use of petroleum revenues over the government budget, i.e. the fiscal rule. The fiscal rule is designed to prevent swings in the petroleum sector from spreading to the mainland economy. This ensures that petroleum revenues are phased in at a steady pace. The guideline specifying that only the real return on the Petroleum Fund is to be used means that the capital in the Fund is not depleted over time. Norges Bank has no set target for the level of the exchange rate. Nevertheless, developments in the krone are of considerable importance to interest-rate setting because the exchange rate has an impact on inflation and output. An important channel for monetary policy is the foreign exchange market and the krone exchange rate. Although the krone fluctuates, the krone exchange rate is not particularly unstable compared with other countries’ currencies. The krone exchange rate is the price of our currency measured in a foreign currency.
Therefore, high inflation is a major source of concern to the Central Bank as it poses a threat to general economic development. With regard to the real estate sector, high inflation will affect the cost of property. In the case of the low income group, high inflation will make real estate prices unaffordable. Apart from inflation, there are other financial prices which are of great concern to the Bank of Zambia, especially in our efforts to stabilise the macro-economy. One such financial price is the level of interest rates. Interest rates, being the cost of funds, can inhibit borrowing for investment in real estate if they are too high. Inflation also affects the level of interest rates. To this effect, lowering of interest rates requires that all key stakeholders play their respective roles effectively and consistently. The Government, by reducing domestic borrowing, contributes to the lowering of yield rates on Government securities, which are often used as anchors by commercial banks in setting their interest rates. Commercial banks are, on their part, also expected to respond favourably to improving macroeconomic conditions consistent with low interest rates, while borrowers need to improve their credit culture. As for the Bank of Zambia, the greatest contribution we can make to the lowering of interest rates is reduction of inflation to single digit levels. In this regard, the Bank will continue monitoring financial conditions and take appropriate actions to contribute to the lowering of lending interest rates.

In this regard, a stable financial system plays a catalytic role for financial institutions to provide the financial products that will contribute to the development of the real estate business. Therefore, to enhance the capacity of the financial institutions to meet the challenges of financing, among others, the real estate sector, the Bank has undertaken a lot of reforms. For instance, the Bank’s legislative and supervisory powers have been strengthened to conform to a liberalised financial sector. However, the development of a more active secondary financial market to enhance efficiency in the financial system remains a key challenge to us. To address these and other challenges, the Government approved the Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP) in 2004. In coming up with the FSDP, the Government recognised, among other weaknesses, that public financial institutions that were established to facilitate the provision of various financial services to the majority of the people in the country were insolvent, and therefore ineffective, or have closed down. e.g., mortgages (ZNBS); agriculture lending (LIMA Bank, Co-operative Bank and EXIM Bank in the past) and; banking services for the rural populace (NSCB). In addition, long-term project finance has remained difficult to access for many years. In this vein, the FSDP is aimed at enhancing financial intermediation and efficiency of the financial sector, and it is anticipated that problems related to real estate finance would be resolved once the FSDP is fully functional.
The euro/dollar exchange rate is conventionally quoted to four decimal places, so a pip is 0.0001. At the current exchange rate that is approximately equal to one basis point, allowing comparison to spreads in other markets. 11 http://www.haraldhau.com/wp-content/uploads/FX_PriceDiscrimination_in_FX_OTC_markets.pdf. The chart is based on 548, 298 trades in vanilla forward in EUR/USD involving 10,087 clients and 204 dealers between April 1, 2016 and March 31, 2017, as reported on the DTCC, REGIS and UnaVista trade repositories. 10  9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  9  can also be too low as well as too high. Business won at zero or negative spreads – eg to build market share – cannot be sustained in the long run, unless compensated by more remunerative returns elsewhere. Persistently compressed earnings have in the past been one factor cited as a trigger for misconduct. But these results do give some sense of the potential gains that might be available from improved understanding of FX markets, and effective use of execution technologies. How to navigate a fragmented market: disclosures, TCA and the Global Code  How can the buyside make practical progress in this area? I want to highlight three main areas for action: demanding better disclosures; seeking more effective technology; and adopting the Global Code. Effective disclosures are a necessary precondition for ensuring good service.

But Lola’s travails vividly illustrate how, in a complex world, you can get very different outcomes – good, bad or ugly – from an otherwise identical situation. And that’s a powerful metaphor for today’s FX markets. The complexity in FX markets lies not in the products themselves, which for the most part are relatively simple. It lies in the structures that have evolved to deliver them, driven by extraordinary technological innovation. For those with the right access and understanding, the multiple sources of liquidity, trading venues and execution algorithms available in FX markets offer enormous choice, competition and functionality. That’s the ‘good’. But finding your way around such complexity isn’t a cakewalk. Knowledge is power – and even quite sophisticated investors need their wits about them to benefit from everything the market has to offer. Complexity also poses new challenges to system-wide stability and functioning. And, sadly, it can give rise to new ways to behave inappropriately. When any of these go wrong, that gives you the ‘bad’ – sometimes even the ‘ugly’. But my message today is a call to arms, not a cry for despair. As Lola found, actions matter – and even modest ones can have big effects. Working collectively, there is huge scope for the buyside to improve the value they get as individual firms and strengthen the market as a whole. Today, I want to discuss three specific ways to do that.
This can include a variety of measures, such as higher capital and liquidity requirements, more intense supervision, concentration limits, etc. Work is still under way on defining such possible measures. The FSB is expected to provide recommendations to the G20 summit of November in Seoul. An alternative way to make banks internalise the externalities they pose on the financial system is through a bank levy. A levy responds more directly to the need to raise a contribution from the financial sector in order to pay for the cost of past or future financial crises, depending on whether the levy is imposed ex-post or ex-ante. For instance, the proceeds raised by a levy can be destined to finance a dedicated fund to be activated in the future for the orderly winding down of distressed banks. The EU Commission is moving forward in this area, with the aim of establishing a common framework for a levy in the EU member states. The IMF is also finalising a report on this topic for the G20 summit later this  BIS Review 87/2010  5  month in Toronto. In my view the discussion should be properly framed in the overall reform of the prudential framework, including the quantitative impact assessment of the various initiatives I mentioned earlier. Such a careful assessment is warranted, inter alia, to avoid imposing an undue burden on the banking sector and, ultimately, hamper the flow of credit to the real economy.

Our cooperative journey to the SDDS Plus began in 2013, when, after the achieved national consensus on the usefulness of the accession to this standard, we officially informed the IMF of the efforts that we will make in the medium-term period to meet the membership criteria. Then, in the next years, we worked on the production, promotion and publication of the required data.