samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The really hard question for us is could we - or should we - attempt to protect those businesses most affected by the strong exchange rate even if that meant putting the economy as a whole at significant risk of rising inflation. The reality is that, were we to do so - notwithstanding our specific mandate from the Government - we would not succeed in protecting even the suffering sectors except possibly in the very short term; and in the medium to long term our overall economic performance - in terms of growth and employment would - on all past experience - almost certainly be worse. As it is, Mr President, the recovery in the world economy, and the extraordinary efforts of UK businesses themselves to cope with the hostile international environment, are already resulting in a stronger net external trade performance. That in turn is contributing to the recovery in our own economy, particularly in manufacturing output growth, and to the more encouraging news in recent surveys. To the extent that this improvement in external demand persists, it will help to ease the exceptional pressures on the most internationally-exposed sectors, and contribute to a better balance within the UK economy. But it needs, of course, to be accompanied by corresponding moderation of the growth of domestic demand - after the offsetting stimulus of a year ago - if we are to maintain overall stability. That essentially is why interest rates have had to rise since last autumn.

New legislations, both in the central bank act and financial institution act will empower the central bank to have much more ability to manage the nature of commercial banks and will follow the principle of transparency when we shall BIS Review 111/2000  2  be able to do much more for such an important event as a national election and hopefully then commercial banks would be much less inclined to cooperate in less than virtuous activities. Whilst it is probably true central banks of the modern era spend so much time in trying to stabilise national events, the biggest single cause of untold misery, poverty, death and famine in the modern economy is probably neither disease nor natural events, but it is the ever more frequent financial and currency crises and many central banks in many economies have been helpless in this prevention. There are now many international fora to tackle these problems, but all of them now are bent on making emerging markets behave themselves better with a better system, monitor themselves better and monitor what’s going on in the rest of the world, the latter is actually an impossibility. All financial transaction of significance is now computerised. A central bank with any kind of competence will have good access within the nation and understand and manage their own destiny. Given a reasonable government and even minimal legal system, each nation should be able to keep peace and stability. But international transaction is something else.
For this, a necessary, but not sufficient condition is that standards are comprehensive in coverage and consistent across jurisdictions. I am not sure, for instance, that the leverage ratio, if it was to be implemented as a compulsory instrument, would meet this double test. At the current level of accounting divergences, consistency will be very difficult to achieve. Furthermore, there is a risk that it would encourage migration of credit activities towards other – less regulated – parts of the financial system. It is therefore important that consistency apply across standards and countries. Convergence between accounting standards is a precondition for a consistent implementation of some of the prudential reforms discussed by the Basel Committee. It is also essential that new prudential standards for banks become truly universal. Procyclicality Strictly speaking, procyclicality is a tendency of financial systems to fluctuate around a trend with the economic cycle. By extension, procyclicality can encompass all “amplification mechanisms” through which an initial shock results in wider movements in asset prices, credit flows, market liquidity, and, possibly, the real economy. Our accounting and prudential regimes have increased procyclicality in recent years. In a mark to market environment, asset prices movements quickly translate into changes in the capital base of financial institutions. This, in turn, triggers additional demand for assets and a further increase in their prices. This kind of “inverted demand curve”; where demand increases with prices, may create the conditions for deep and lasting financial instability. Addressing procyclicality caused by the regulation itself is therefore a priority.

And I see it as my responsibility, as the ECB President, to report back to you, and engage in further discussion, once the Governing Council moved forward on the content and timeline of our exercise. The two way street communication principle will apply. Shaping the future of money The other topic you have asked me to discuss today is the future of money. Indeed, as central banks navigate a complex and changing landscape, we should not only aim to anticipate future trends, but also seek to shape them. In doing so, we should be particularly attentive to risks and perform a thorough analysis of their costs and benefits. The financial services environment is evolving as new entrants shake up the market. So are the public’s needs and demands. The ongoing discussion around so-called stablecoins offers a glimpse of the changes that might come. This phenomenon could disrupt the current payments landscape, with spillover effects for monetary policy transmission, financial stability and the international monetary system more 3/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  broadly. But the ECB is not standing still in the face of these challenges. Last year, the ECB launched TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS), an instant payment service that allows money to reach the recipient within seconds, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. TIPS responds to the growing user demand for instant payments and helps ensure that any bank account holder in Europe can be reached.
The Instrument of Government states that the Riksbank is responsible for monetary policy and that no authority has a say in the Riksbank’s decisions on monetary policy. 10 A ban on the Executive Board members seeking or accepting instructions when carrying out their monetary policy tasks was written into the Sveriges Riksbank Act. The composition of the new Executive Board with six members outside of the political system and with long periods of office was also an important part of the increased independence (see Figure 2). Personal independence was strengthened, as “a further step away” from the politicians on the General Council to the deciding body was created. The members of the Executive Board would be appointed by the General Council, which would in its turn be appointed by the Riksdag (see Figure 2). However, the members of the Executive Board would not be politicians and nor could they be dismissed on political grounds. The terms of office exceeded the period of time between elections to parliament. 11 Financial independence was already considered to be strong and was not extended. But the TFEU’s prohibition on monetary financing, which was written into the Sveriges Riksbank Act, contributed to strengthening the Riksbank’s independence in relation to the Government. The prohibition means, for instance, that the Riksbank may not purchase debt instruments directly from the state. 9 The European Commission and ECB have defined in their convergence reports the scope of central bank inde-  pendence, divided into functional, institutional, personal and financial independence.

Our instrument independence – that we ourselves have been able to choose among our tools to attain our objectives and to use them quickly – has been essential in alleviating the effects of the crisis and contributing to good economic developments. I personally think that perhaps the most obvious monetary policy conclusion from the coronavirus crisis is that the repo rate is far from adequate in maintaining our price stability objective. Although I am discussing monetary policy today, I would also like to emphasise that the fiscal policy measures in Sweden and abroad have been a decisive factor in the special type of crisis in which we have found ourselves – some sectors have needed extensive support. 28 For a description of how the Riksbank’s measures have worked during the crisis, see for instance Sveriges Riksbank (2020b). 10 [20]  Proposal for new Sveriges Riksbank Act too limiting with regard to monetary policy toolbox We at the Riksbank consider the proposal for the new Sveriges Riksbank Act presented in December 2019 to be good in several aspects. But when it comes to the monetary policy toolbox, we think the proposal is far too restrictive. I do not believe that it sufficiently reflects the lessons I have just described. 29 There is thus a risk that it will become more difficult, not just for us, but also for future Executive Boards to make a good contribution to socio-economic developments.
On past loss performance, this standard reduces the probability of failure to extremely low levels, and the probability of simultaneous failures that drive crises to even lower levels. And that past performance includes the global financial crisis. In the UK, even the two biggest failures of the crisis – Royal Bank of Scotland and Halifax Bank of Scotland – suffered losses comfortably within these baseline standards. Using Basel III definitions, both suffered losses – even over three years – of around 5% of risk weighted assets. 10 So going further could have a sharply diminishing further effect on the probability of banking failure. And it could run the risk of economic cost. Our standard recognises those risks. By not taking it higher, we are seeking to strike a balance; to be macroprudential. That balance is also served by the make-up of the requirements. Hard floor capital requirements don’t help the real economy. They simply move the point of failure and distress of banks to a higher level of capital. They may make banks more resilient, but they don’t make credit supply and essential service provision more resilient. So a large slice of bank capital should take the form of a useable buffer: a cushion that sits on top of minimum capital requirements that can be run down and built up gradually afterwards. The emphasis is on useable.

We estimate the full, net present value, economic costs of typical past financial crises to have been catastrophic – around 75% of GDP and in some cases much more. So nobody should deny the economic case for well capitalised banks. And it was obvious in the aftermath of the crisis where bank capital needed to go. Up. A lot. 2  Available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/2015/fsrsupp.pdf. 3  Major UK banks are required to hold, on average, additional tier 1 capital of 2.5% of risk weighted assets under “pillar 2a” requirements. These compensate for existing shortcomings in risk measures and lift average capital requirements from 11% to 13.5%. Should the shortcomings in risk measures be corrected, measures of risk weighted assets would increase.But at the same time, our expectation for capital as a share of risk weighted assets would fall back. The two effects can be expected to offset so that no extra capital would be required. Ongoing work in the Basel Committee addressing excessive variability in risk weights should not materially affect overall capital requirements. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In fact, with market confidence so low at the time, more capital not only boosted resilience, it was also needed for lending to resume. Capital was good for resilience and good for growth. That’s why countries that recapitalised their banking systems quickly secured earlier and stronger recoveries, with the US leading the way. However, after a point, another unit of capital buys a much smaller fall in the probability of bank failure.
The decline in Government securities yield rates and relatively low inflation experienced since the beginning of the year should contribute to a decline in banks lending rates and thus stimulate borrowing by the private sector. Ladies and Gentlemen, the critical role the accounting profession plays in enhancing economic development cannot be over-emphasized. One of the most important role the profession plays in any organization is to provide accurate, reliable and high quality financial information which communicates an organization’s operating results, its overall health, as well as raise the transparency of its various operating activities. The other role is the audit function, both internal and external, which provides independent assurance of the information produced by accountants and also reviews the control environment in which this information is produced. In a growing economy like ours, the need for high quality financial information is very critical. Financial information provides the basis for all financial decision making at all levels of economic activity, from households to large international organizations. Remember, there is no high quality information without the work of accountants and that is one reason why accountants play such a critical role in today’s global financial system and the global economy. You provide financial information that helps businesses and governments run properly. You provide investors and creditors with reliable information for decision making. You also provide assurance services founded on integrity and independence. Distinguished Members, the vision of this country is to become a prosperous middle income country by the year 2030.

Underscoring this more positive sentiment, the data on new orders and shipments of machinery and other capital goods have been increasing at a good clip and surveys of business purchasing managers point to growth in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. However, there are still some sectors – such as single-family housing markets – that continue to struggle. Starts of new single family houses are only about half of the way back to where they were even before the housing boom. In part, the weakness here reflects continued fallout from the financial crisis, as it is still the case that mortgage credit is hard to come by for those without the most pristine credit ratings. So what does this economic outlook mean for the achievement of the Fed’s dual mandate objectives? Underutilization in the labor market Let’s consider labor markets first. Output growth is key for producing healthier labor market conditions. Although the economic recovery generally has been weak, there has been enough cumulative progress to generate considerable improvement in the labor market. So where do we stand today? How much further do we have to go to fulfill our employment mandate? We can point to several measures to mark the progress we have made to date. Employment has been growing over 200,000 per month for quite some time. With expanding employment, the unemployment rate has fallen relatively rapidly.
After September, on the basis of its current assessment, the Governing Council expects that a gradual but sustained series of additional interest rate rises will be appropriate. Lastly, the reduction in the size of the Eurosystem's balance sheet will only be achieved at a later stage, probably when the need not only for normalisation but also for a tightening of monetary policy becomes apparent. As part of this gradual normalisation process, the ECB Governing Council has made it clear that it will not rule out any options, including acting against fragmentation within the euro area, and will maintain a gradual and flexible approach to conducting monetary policy. 2. Macro financial risks and outlook In this context marked by the rise in external shocks, strong uncertainty about the extent of their impact and their duration, and a change in the interest rate environment with the prospect of very low or even negative rates over a long period coming to an end, we can collectively rejoice in the fact that for more than two years the banking sector has been resilient; it has contributed to 2  mitigating shocks and not to amplifying them. This shock absorption capacity is an asset that must be maintained and even strengthened. This can be done through two channels: supervision and regulation. The macroeconomic risks and outlook in particular confirm the need to keep the monitoring of banks' credit and market risks high on the supervisory agenda of the ACPR and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).

Jean-Pierre Roth: The role of the International Monetary Fund in promoting financial stability - a Swiss perspective Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at a meeting with directors of the most important Swiss firms in Argentina, Buenos Aires, 16 November 2004. * 1. *  *  Introduction  I am delighted to be here in Buenos Aires to address such a distinguished audience, and I thank Ambassador von Muralt for organizing this event. For the next 20 minutes or so I would like to speak about the International Monetary Fund’s role in promoting international financial stability, and this from a Swiss perspective. I know that talking about IMF policy can be difficult here in Argentina. However, the Argentine case should not hamper our discussions. It should invite us to reflect on what the Fund has achieved so far in promoting international financial stability and what its present challenges are. Promoting and safeguarding international financial stability was part of the mandate of the IMF in 1944, when the institution was established. It is still, in my mind, the core mandate of the IMF today. There should be no doubt that a strong and resilient international financial system is crucial for global growth and prosperity. This is even more so the case after the structural changes of the last decade, in particular the worldwide information technology revolution that led to a strong increase in the size and sophistication of international capital markets.
Thus, our banknotes promote the historical and cultural heritage of our country and highlight the most powerful achievements of many prominent historical figures through centuries. I feel good when I see that the two first denominations of this series, 200 lek and 5000 lek, put in circulation since September 2019, are welcomed by the public, have met the expectations of the Bank, and already are gradually becoming a sustainable part of currency in circulation, by supporting the continuous strengthening the quality of banknotes in circulation, aimed at preserving their integrity, in relation with the public, and upholding a dignified image of both the Bank of Albania and the Albanian state. Today, nearly two years later following the launching and the successful issuance in circulation of the first two denominations, the Bank of Albania is launching the two other banknotes, part of the new series of the Albanian banknotes, the denominations: 1000 lek and 10000 lek. The latter is a completely new denomination in the series of the Albanian banknotes. The printing and issue into circulation for the first time of the new banknote with the largest value, 10000 lekë, represents in itself, the adoption of the banknotes’ structure to the evolution of the structure of prices and wages, the development the electronic payments, and of the other indicators related to the management of currency.

Hence, on behalf of the Bank of Albania, I would like to thank all the experts that have helped and have been actively engaged for their successful realisation. In addition to the precious work of the Bank of Albania's staff, I would like to highlight the rather 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  precious contribution of many renowned academics, historians, Albanologists, numismatists and experts from the most experienced companies in the field of banknote production. Meanwhile, the Bank of Albania is working on the completion of the new series with two other banknotes, 500 lek and 2000 lek, which are in production process. Concluding, I like to call on the users to handle each banknote with due care, in order to preserve their durability, quality and integrity in circulation. Banknotes are more than a valuable paper. They boost and sustain the economic activity of Albania and similarly tie with visible threads our national identity. I wish the public will welcome both new banknotes we are presenting today, like the previous ones. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
Japan and the euro area have faced similar challenges in terms of sustaining inflation at their goals. One reason it’s been hard to sustain inflation at the target rate is that persistently low inflation due to policy being constrained by the ZLB can feed into inflation expectations. If inflation gets stuck too low—below the 2 percent goal—people may start to expect it to stay that way, creating a feedback loop, pushing inflation further down over the longer term. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  The lower average level of inflation translates into a lower level of interest rates cuts available during a downturn, making it even harder for policymakers to achieve their goals.6 In 1980, when core PCE inflation reached a peak of 10 percent, it was hard to conceive of a world where inflation that’s too low would be the preoccupation of central banks. But the 10 years since the Great Recession demonstrate just how much low r-star has changed the economic environment. Unprecedented monetary stimulus in advanced economies supported economic recoveries and significant declines in unemployment, with unemployment rates today near, or in many cases well below, those seen before the crisis. 7 Bold monetary policy actions surely played an important role in averting far greater catastrophes and aided economic recovery. Despite these actions and this success at bringing unemployment to low levels, inflation rates have persistently been below central banks’ goals.

The fact that inflation has been running below target in most advanced countries suggests that this challenge is not due to factors specific to a single country. Instead, there are more systemic factors at play, with the root cause being a combination of low neutral interest rates and the lower bound on interest rates. Investors are increasingly viewing these low inflation readings not as an aberration, but rather a new normal. This is evidenced by a broad-based decline in market-based measures of longerrun inflation expectations since the mid-2000s, with the UK providing the exception, as shown in Table 1. This downward slippage of longer-run inflation expectations, if it persists, implies that in the future central banks start further from their inflation goals and have even less room to maneuver, making the problem of low r-star and the ZLB even more difficult. Conclusion The ZLB has been a topic of study for nearly two decades. But recent history and the outlook for the longer-term future, make it more relevant than ever. Low inflation expectations, very low r-star, and slower growth all point to a challenging world where policymakers need to make the best use of the tools at their disposal to achieve their goals of strong economies and price stability. The key lessons from this research hold today and in the future. First, take swift action when faced with adverse economic conditions. Second, keep interest rates lower for longer. And third, adapt monetary policy strategies to succeed in the context of low r-star and the ZLB.