samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Of late, it has been trending down, but the average volatility remains high at 10.1% compared to its 5-year average of 8.2%. On a day-to-day basis, the ringgit was also volatile, particularly prior to the USD/MYR fixing time even though it can be quiet throughout the rest of the day. As trade related FX transactions are done throughout the day, it is highly perplexing as to why trading activities and observed volatility have to be concentrated just prior to the fixing time. The only plausible reason for the above phenomena is that it emanates from the fixing orders from non-resident financial institutions 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  (NRFI), the transactions of which are driven by NDF market activities. As NDF is settled using fixing rate, NRFI have been using fixing orders to square their offshore NDF positions. As a consequence of such speculative activities, the ringgit fixing rate has significantly diverged from the onshore traded ringgit prices. The ringgit fixing rate was clearly out of sync with real trades and investment activities done throughout the day. The impact of NDF market volatility has been clearly pervasive in the onshore market. Several FX traders in the domestic market were observed to be looking towards the NDF market to provide cues in determining the opening market price for ringgit. And this behaviour continues throughout the day in the pricing of the ringgit. Unfortunately, our media and public were also drawn into taking the lead from these offshore rates as well.

The recent litigation in New York involving claims under surety bonds is perhaps a much reported incident of this sort. And uncertainties in a world dependent on expeditious performance of contracts has to be a real issue in financial stability terms. Second, we have seen the emergence of large multifunctional financial groups. So my observation is that whatever thinking might have gone into the Basel II Accord for banks, we would be wise to focus further, on the way in which capital adequacy and other prudential supervisory techniques fit together, for different parts of the financial world, including insurance. The wisdom in earlier days was that systemic risk, in a financial stability sense, was largely confined to banks. Not any more. It has been recognised for some time that the securities arena and the process of securitisation has changed all that. And more recently, growing interlinkages with the insurance sector are giving rise to the need for a further rethink. II  Looking beyond capital adequacy: the importance of liquidity  Secondly a rather different angle. Viewed from the point of view of financial stability, capital adequacy is clearly a vital and valuable policy tool. That is why Basel II is so important. But systemic crises do not always emanate from capital inadequacy. The first indication of trouble ahead may well come from a completely different area. What I am talking about is the question of liquidity.
The air of political insecurity bred all sorts of populist acts, including irrational legislative proposals with regard to both the banks and the BNB. Could it be, however, that in 2015 we would witness a radical change in the thinking and actions of the political representatives and media circles towards more prudence and better awareness of the key role the banking sector has for the financial stability, economic growth and welfare of society? I don’t know. But I do hope very much it would be so. Dear Colleagues, Outside the issues related to the national specifics of the environment the banks operate in, I would take the opportunity to note some forthcoming amendments in the regulatory framework in 2015 relating to the introduction of new uniform European norms and practices with a direct impact on the work of credit institutions in Bulgaria. In 2015 the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive in the EU will come into effect, aiming to introduce EU-wide rules and tools for the Member States to deal with banks in trouble and to take timely and adequate measures to rescue viable institutions. This directive is going to be transposed in the Bulgarian law by means of new legal provisions and amendments to the existing legal framework (e.g. the Law on Credit Institutions, the Law on Bank Bankruptcy, and the Law on the BNB).

Own interest rate forecasts When we expressed our views in February regarding the future development of the interest rate, it was the first time we presented our own assessment of the future repo rate path. By this we mean that we try to calculate what we believe will be a well balanced monetary policy over the coming years. Previously we presented forecasts for the economy on the basis of what the financial market participants believed about the repo rate. Now that we are presenting our own interest rate path it will be clearer both what we believe about the interest rate and what we believe about the economy in general. We consider this to be a major step forward in the Riksbank’s way of explaining how monetary policy functions. For most people I believe it is more important to have an idea of the development of the interest rate over time, rather than to know what an individual interest rate decision will entail. In this context I always try to be as clear as possible. The interest rate path is merely a forecast, not a promise. The economic conditions on which we base our forecasts are constantly changing. Changes are constantly taking place in the economy, which means that we have to reconsider our opinions of future developments. The interest rate path represents nothing more nor less than the best assessment we were able to make at the time it was published. When the world around us changes, we also have to change our forecasts.
A report prepared by Dr. Sushil Wadhwani, a member of the MPC, indicates, however, that the Bank of England’s interest rate changes in the period 3 June 1997 –18 April 2001 have come as more of a surprise to market participants than interest rate changes in continental Europe and the US during the same period. The same study indicates that the element of surprise has waned over time. In Norway, it appears that transparency in Norges Bank’s interpretation of the mandate and in the implementation of monetary policy has contributed to making monetary policy somewhat more predictable. The chart shows that Norges Bank’s changes in the key rate have less impact on money market rates now than earlier. The academic literature on transparency and monetary policy is voluminous and growing. "How Do 7 Central Banks Talk?" , a report prepared by a number of well-known academics and presented recently at the Center for Economic Policy Research, specifies the objectives that central banks should bear in mind when developing their strategy on transparency. The report says the following: "Transparency should allow the public to understand, and possibly anticipate, the central bank’s decisions, to see each of them as the logical conclusion of a chain of past and future decisions aimed at a clear set of targets,…") This view of transparency and predictability contrasts sharply with the earlier practice of playing on the element of surprise. In monetary policy, this was associated especially with control of the exchange rate.

When Norges Bank concludes that the key rate should be changed, the change will in most cases be made gradually. This is because there is normally uncertainty about the situation in the economy, potential disturbances to the economy and how fast an interest rate change will affect price inflation. But we will not always take a gradualist approach. A rapid and pronounced change in the interest rate is appropriate if, for example, heightening turbulence in financial markets or a cost-push shock  2  BIS Review 51/2001  resulting from negotiations indicates that confidence in monetary policy is in jeopardy. And should there be prospects of a deflationary recession, it would be appropriate to apply our instruments more firmly. If special circumstances prompt Norges Bank to apply a different time horizon than two years, the Bank will provide an assessment of this. The same applies if special emphasis is placed on developments in financial markets or property markets. In the long run, inflation is determined by developments in domestic costs, productivity growth and imported inflation. A special feature of wage formation in Norway has been that conditions for exposed industries have received considerable emphasis in the wage negotiations, including the negotiations for industries that do not face international competition. During the last few years, the sheltered sector has had greater influence on overall wage developments. The centralised income settlements in Norway have been an arena of coordination, where macroeconomic considerations have at times received considerable emphasis. This has contributed to maintaining low unemployment.
Overall, there has not been any major change in medium-term forecasts and the monetary policy stance, since economic activity has evolved in line with the outlook presented in the October Inflation Report. However, all the main variables affecting the short-term forecast have been subject to an upward revision. In this respect, while short-term forecasts were revised upwards significantly, there has been no major change regarding medium-term forecasts. The revised forecasts indicate that there will be no significant upside pressures on inflation, even if policy rates remain at low levels for a long period. However, as depicted in the slide, inflation is likely to display a significant increase over the next two months due to tax hikes and strong base effects (Figure 34). Moreover, the annual inflation rate may post a limited increase in the second quarter of 2010, due to the low base effect generated by the Consumer Price Index in the first half of 2009, when the downside effects of the global crisis on prices became more pronounced. Accordingly, even if inflation remains above the target for some time, parallel to the gradual phasing out impact of the tax hikes, inflation is expected to trend downwards, stabilizing at around 5 percent over the medium term. BIS Review 31/2010  15  As you may have noticed, I have frequently referred to the base effect today. The reason for this is that the base effect will influence the course of annual inflation throughout 2010 to a large extent.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Role of the Islamic financial system in supporting green technology Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at The Green Financing: Discover Green Technology Industry in Malaysia “Role of the Islamic financial system in supporting green technology”, Kuala Lumpur, 8 October 2013. *  *  *  The recent haze that caused unhealthy air quality is the direct result of acute deforestation and irresponsible practices, a grim reminder of the unfolding environmental catastrophes confronting us and our future generation. Globally, extreme climate change, resource depletion and environment degradation have increasingly become looming threats to livelihoods. Greenhouse gas emissions are on the rise and atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations are at its highest in three million years. It is reported that the global average temperature has risen by 0.74oC over the past century and is forecasted to rise by 1.8oC to 4oC by year 2100. Severe deforestation issues across the continents and over dependence on non-renewable energy resources pose further challenges to the finite carrying capacity of the earth. Sustainable development has become an imperative. It is a global imperative given the interconnected world we live in. It affects everyone. No one is isolated. A united action is therefore required to solve these major ecological problems before solutions become impossible. I am pleased to be here today to speak at The Green Financing: Discover Green Technology Industry in Malaysia (GF 2013).
While I doubt that we will see de-globalisation, firms are likely to hold higher inventories on a permanent basis and shorten their supply chains to relocate high-value services and R&D centres. This is especially true where strategic considerations come into play. We might also see energyintensive production being relocated owing to the uneven impact of the current energy price shock. Added to this, the speed of the transition and the new energy mix will contribute to material transformations. A recent survey finds that around 60% of firms had increased their inventories of critical products by the end of 2021, and almost 90% were expecting to regionalise their production over the next three years. [9] This is likely to reduce efficiency and increase costs, which could create inflation pressures while supply chains are adjusting. It could also make the economic cycle more volatile. [10] Over time, however, the turning points I have identified could also dampen the impact on prices. The green transition, for example, should ultimately lead to falling electricity prices. And insofar as the inventory cycle returns, it will be a multiplier for lower prices when inventories are liquidated in a downturn. The ECB’s monetary policy response So, to sum up, we are currently facing a situation where lingering supply constraints are an important factor causing above-target inflation to persist for longer – and their effect is being exacerbated by the release of pent-up demand.

This was because, in both cases, the shocks were related to a lasting shift in the geopolitical landscape, and reductions in oil supply could not be fully offset by oil from other sources. [6] Today, although the EU response will cushion the rise in energy costs, fossil fuel prices are likely to be higher for some time. Fully replacing European imports of Russian fossil fuels is a challenge in the short term, even though there are an increasing number of examples of substitution effects taking place. [7] Over the longer term, the war is likely to accelerate the green transition in Europe, including the switch to renewables. This will require considerable green investment but will also weigh on investment in oil and gas production during the transition phase. That could put upward pressure on fossil fuel prices while demand for those fuels remains high. If energy prices are durably higher during the transition, it may have an impact on industrial production in Europe, affecting both supply and prices. This is certainly how firms in the euro area see the situation. In a recent ECB survey, at least 80% of respondents expected the ongoing transition to  make the raw materials and energy they use more expensive, leading to higher prices for their products. [8] Second, globalisation is and will be changing. The disruptions created by the pandemic, the exposure of vulnerabilities, the new geopolitical landscape and the prospect of higher energy and transport costs look set to trigger a reassessment of global value chains.
We are now looking at that question and have an open mind on it. But in a way the more interesting thing the robot brought back to us was not these findings, but simply a clearer picture of what the gradient is for small firms which we are therefore publishing today for the first time. Here it is: Chart 1a: Thresholds in UK prudential regulation, translated onto an assets/deposits basis (deposit-takers)  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  Chart 1b: Thresholds in UK prudential regulation, translated onto an assets/deposits basis up to £ (deposit-takers)  Sources: CRR, BCBS, EBA Technical Standards, PRA Rulebook, Supervisory Statements, and Statements of Policy. Note: Only includes thresholds that are either set using assets/deposits values, or can be translated into assets/deposits values. Assumes average size of transactional accounts of £ The y-axis corresponds to the number of thresholds below the £ value for assets/deposits on the x-axis. I’d like to know what people think about this gradient. To me, the basic gradient looks OK. It feels about right that most of the carve-outs are for firms below £ in assets – once you reach that size, you are a fair-sized bank in a UK context and should expect to meet the great bulk of the rules. And within the £ area the slope does not look particularly troublesome.

In time we hope this will help contain the rate credit union failures, which is currently disproportionately high amongst these smaller firms; and  ∙  simplify the regime by eliminating other capital requirements thresholds linked to non-asset metrics such as membership numbers and variety of business lines. The effect of these changes should be to reduce overall capital requirements for the credit union sector by roughly one quarter, and encourage the growth of successful credit unions by removing several cliff-edges present in our current regime. Conclusion We at the Bank have been clear that we have no appetite to weaken the level of resilience in the financial system. But this does not mean that we should stand still, particularly when we have opportunities to advance safety and soundness and competition at the same time. The changes we are proposing today are an example of what we can do when we bring a bit of fresh thinking, supported by our emerging army of regulatory robots, to the question of barriers to growth. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  11
These are:   a better access for exports to EU Member States and to other countries with whom the EU has negotiated trade agreements;    heightened competition in the domestic market due to the removal of protectionist measures;    the free flow of factors of production, including labour and capital, between Malta and other EU Member States;    a greater availability of external financial resources; and    an enhanced degree of policy co-ordination between Malta and the other EU Member States, especially in the area of macroeconomic stabilisation, the promotion of economic growth and trade policy. Of these, the free flow of goods, services and capital are the factors that are most likely to have an impact in the short term. They have, indeed, already left their mark on the Maltese economy over the past year. The freedom of movement of labour, together with funding programmes and policy co-ordination are more likely to have medium- to long-term impacts. I shall therefore focus initially on the main opportunities and threats attendant upon the first set of factors. The longer-term consequences of EU accession will be dealt with in the context of the proposed policy orientations.

Some export industries were also affected by weak demand in Europe and high cost levels. Growth in household demand was moderate in 2013. Household saving increased further and is now at a historically high level. Unemployment edged up through 2013. Capacity utilisation in the economy is still assessed to be close to a normal a level. Chart7: The krone exchange rate After appreciating over a longer period, the krone showed a pronounced weakening in 2013. Both domestic and international conditions contributed to the depreciation. Signs of weaker growth in the Norwegian economy probably had an impact. An improvement in the economic situation in the euro area may also have contributed. Although the krone has appreciated somewhat thus far in 2014, it is still clearly weaker than at the beginning of 2013. Chart 8: Consumer prices in Norway Inflation has increased. As measured by the CPI-ATE, inflation averaged 2.5 percent in the first quarter of 2014. The krone depreciation has contributed to a faster rise in prices for imported consumer goods. Prices for domestically produced goods and services also rose at a faster pace in 2013, at just below 3 percent in the latter half of the year. The rise in house rents and food prices through 2013 partly reflects a revision of the calculation method for these goods items in the CPI. In the coming months, inflation is projected to edge down, partly reflecting the unwinding of temporary effects.
The rise in whole-economy pay has been held back in recent years by the 1% cap on public sector pay. This, arithmetically, has lowered whole-economy pay growth. To my mind, it is likely also to have had a shadowing effect on pay-setting behaviour in the private sector, by setting a very low norm or floor for wage bargaining among private companies, in what has been a tightening labour market. Either way, that public sector pay cap is now being lifted and decisively so. In excess of 1 million NHS workers will receive an across-the-board pay rise of 3% this year. Some NHS workers, especially those in lower salary ranges, may receive pay rises in excess of 10%. That is a nice way for those workers to be celebrating the NHS’s 70th birthday. The lifting of the public pay cap for the NHS could well have knock-on effects, not only to pay settlements elsewhere in the public sector, but to private sector settlements too given the tightness of the labour market. This will add to the gradual, but now clear, upwards impetus to wage and cost pressures in the UK economy, at a time when headline inflation is already somewhat above the MPC’s 2% target. Earlier this week, I was in Wales on a regional visit. The clear message from a number of employers in a number of industries was that wage pressures had picked-up this year.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution has reached almost all sectors and all regions to some degree, even as the productivity problem in the UK as a whole has perpetuated. So how have these upper tail companies been able to buck the UK trend? The short answer appears to be because the UK is, on many dimensions, a global innovation hub. At a headline level, various indices of countries’ innovation status have been constructed. The UK has appeared in the top 5 of the Global  9  These numbers control for differences in the sectoral composition and sizes of firms between the countries in question. Further detail of the method used here is set out below Chart 7 in the annex. 10 Data refer to non-financial business sector. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  Innovation Index for each of the past five years, ahead of France and Germany. 11  It also ranks ahead of  them on the European Innovation Scorecard; it describes the UK as an “innovation leader”. Digging a little deeper, the UK scores particularly highly on research and development and start-ups. For example, it tops the charts among rankings of the world’s top universities, with 5 of the world’s top 25 universities according to The Times rankings for 2018, including the top two slots. And it also ranks first globally in categories such as citable scientific publications, e-commerce and ICT. It ranks fourth globally for its creative outputs.