samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
So far, the results of these questionnaires have been indirectly reflected in the periodical analysis and reports and in other different papers of the central bank. The further consolidation of these indicators, paves the path of their publication for the purpose of being used by the economic agents, as an extra way of communicating with the central bank. A preliminary step in this direction is also the consolidation of the applied methodology for calculating these indices, through a professional expertise as that of IFO. The undertaken steps, in expanding and consolidating the statistical basis of the monetary authority in real time, will enable the management on time of the situations and challenges, which are lead by economic development and the further integration of the regional markets. Coordination of the work between regional central banks for adopting the methodology and the indices enables the maximal use of existing knowledge basis on the specific features of our region, against that of the most developed economies. The use of the same methodology for establishing the indices will make it easier to compare them to each other. In parallel, these indicators will serve as a communication tool with the international institutions, specialized in best presenting and identifying the priorities according to the countries and with the foreign investors interested in our country. BIS Review 118/2006  1  Our purpose is to maximally adapt the indices we are drafting to the best international practices in this field, far from voluntarily solutions.

FEN is focused on shaping healthy financial attitudes from a young age, increasing access to tools and resources to help individuals manage their finances, and working across the spectrum of society to help individuals attain financial security, through sound financial planning and by cultivating sensible financial habits. To date, FEN has undertaken about 700 financial education programmes and initiatives, with more than 60 million interactions through its various outreach programmes. All these initiatives are part of a five-year National Strategy for Financial Literacy plan developed in 2019 which, among its aims, is to empower Malaysians to plan ahead to secure a sustainable future. Looking ahead into the future, it is important for us to be agile and to continuously innovate in facing emerging challenges and the fast changing environment. While the pandemic taught us the importance of economic and financial resilience, it also paved the way for a rapid adoption of digital financial services. This is evidenced by the World Bank's finding in their Global Findex 2021 report which revealed that 79% of Malaysian adults use digital payments, of which 42% did so for the first time after the pandemic. 2/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  While the rising importance of digital financial services is welcomed, the adoption of such services without sufficient understanding and knowledge could pose risks to consumers. Malaysian consumers are vulnerable to the manipulation of online frauds due to low level of digital financial literacy.
Norges Bank built up foreign exchange reserves while banks financed household and corporate saving deficits, partly by raising loans abroad. With the decline in oil prices, confidence in the Norwegian economy faltered, capital flowed out of the country and out of banks’ balance sheets. Norges Bank had to step in as lender to the banks. The developments that followed the decline in oil prices in 1986 will not be repeated. In 1986, confidence in the Norwegian economy faltered while inflation was high and rising. Monetary policy measures had to be applied – through a resolute fixed exchange rate regime from summer 1986 – to restore confidence in the national and international value of the Norwegian krone, i.e. to reduce inflation. The Norwegian economy is on a much stronger footing now than it was in 1986. None the less, fluctuations in household saving and corporate saving and investment could pose challenges for both monetary policy and our banks. The outlook ahead The past 15 years have been a golden era for the Norwegian economy. It must also have been a privilege to be in a position to engage in banking activities in Norway in this period. Selling loans has been easy, there have been virtually no losses, and deposits and borrowing have been stable. Banks have in addition been particularly adept at making use of new technologies and being more cost-effective. The combination has led to favourable results. Lending growth will probably have to be reduced and losses may rise.

The macro prudential pillar takes account of those risks that may affect all, part, or most banks in the system - and not just individual banks. Like most other bank supervisors I’ve spent most of my career looking at banking system soundness mainly from an individual bank perspective. However, as a career central banker, I also have had to spend a good deal of time looking at financial stability from the macro prudential perspective as well. For much of my career we didn’t call it macro surveillance but it was very much in our minds when, for example, in the late 1980’s the U.S. banking system suffered from the collapse of a number of sectors of the economy episodically resulting in a very unhealthy and unstable banking system as a whole. Over 1,500 banks failed and public confidence in the industry was understandably threatened. In fact, on two occasions during that period the system was so close to collapse that major banks were unwilling to settle transactions unless the physical documents were in hand. At that time public policy was being directed toward eliminating weak and unstable banks so that trust and confidence could return – a necessary precursor to turning around a weak economy. That’s why – to use the title of my speech – I wonder whether the trend toward macro prudential surveillance isn’t just a new name for something we, as supervisors, have been doing all along.
Our monetary policy, which is currently geared towards this challenging set of circumstances, consists of two key elements: the negative interest rate and the SNB’s willingness to take an active role in the foreign exchange market. Both of these elements are intended to make Swiss franc investments less attractive, thereby supporting economic activity. Swiss sovereign money initiative (Vollgeldinitiative) In conclusion, let me say a few words about the recently submitted sovereign money initiative. This popular initiative aims to fundamentally remodel Switzerland’s monetary policy and banking system. The initiative aims to remove the banks’ money creation powers. Instead, all new money would be created by the SNB and distributed directly to the Confederation or the citizens. Under the new system, proponents want any income that the SNB derives from note-issuance to be distributed to the public. Moreover, they claim that such a system would enhance financial stability. The sovereign money initiative would entail a radical overhaul of Switzerland’s financial system, creating a regime that does not exist in any other country today. The introduction of sovereign money would be a risky experiment. We must therefore carefully analyse the impact of the proposed constitutional change on the structure and implementation of monetary policy. Equally, we must take a comprehensive look at its implications for financial stability, the exchange rate and the economic cycle. We will comment further on the sovereign money initiative in due course. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention.

Charles Bean: The economic outlook Remarks by Mr Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, at the National Farmers’ Union Conference, Birmingham, 16 February 2009. *  *  *  The weather is at the forefront of farmers’ minds but rarely crosses that of a central banker except when, as two weeks ago, a dump of snow brings London to a standstill. But economists’ lack of interest in the weather was not always the case. William Stanley Jevons, one of the great Victorian economists, thought sunspot activity was the key to understanding economic cycles. Sunspots affected the weather, which in turn determined crop yields, demand and output in what was still a largely rural economy. No one takes this theory of cycles literally. But it is a useful metaphor for the way unforeseen shocks can switch an economy from one path to another. Today, the global and British economies have suffered such a shock, though one that is man-made in origin rather than extra-terrestrial. The origins of the crisis lie in the balmy economic weather prevailing in the decade or so before mid-2007. Growth was steady and inflation low and stable in the United Kingdom and other advanced economies, while rapid development in China, India and other emerging market economies was lifting millions out of poverty. Economic stability boosted confidence and encouraged an expansion of credit. Moreover, high levels of savings in some Asian economies, coupled with loose US monetary policy, drove global real interest rates unusually low.
If this continues it will drag still further on the economy’s already weak productivity trend, over and above the drag from reduced economic openness that I highlighted earlier. I’ve talked so far from a whole UK perspective. And that’s right because the MPC and FPC set policy for the whole country. But regional resilience is also an important aspect of resilience.5  And Scotland, like the UK, has been resilient in a number of ways. The Scottish economy has become increasingly diversified over time. I already mentioned Scotland’s relatively robust performance in the financial crisis. And while the falls in the oil price weighed on growth in 2015-16, more recently GDP growth has broadly kept pace with the UK as a whole – although Brexit uncertainty is having the same negative effects in Scotland as elsewhere. Scottish labour productivity, while slower than pre-crisis as in the rest of the UK, has been better sustained, perhaps because there has been less of an impact from the financial sector. And unemployment is at 3.2%, even lower than the already record-breaking UK rate of 3.8%. In the Highland region it was 3.0% in the most recent data. Andy Haldane’s speech “Is all economics local?”, available online at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk//media/boe/files/speech/2019/is-all-economics-local-speech-by-andy-haldane.pdf, gives a sense of the kind of new ways the Bank is using regional data to get a better understanding of the economy.

But we should be mindful of the fact that we are at the start of a long process in which the credibility of the policies adopted plays a fundamental role. To ensure that the medium-term budgetary objectives are realistic, economic policymakers must convey to economic agents their resolve to exert rigorous control over the deviations in revenue and spending that may occur. In this connection, and given the high degree of decentralisation of the Spanish State, it is vital that the regional and local governments should be committed to controlling and reducing the deficit through compliance with the principles laid down in the law on budgetary stability. It is particularly important that the regional government budgets that are approved in the coming months should accept the fiscal consolidation strategy as a key objective, that they adopt far-reaching structural reforms on public spending and that they ensure their budget outturns are rigorously in compliance with this objective. Finally, in light of the huge amount accounted for by the public spending component linked to the deterioration of employment, it should be stressed that the viability of any budgetary consolidation strategy for the Spanish economy will depend on this strategy adopting a jobgenerating growth pattern that, as occurs in other countries, provides for a significant reduction in unemployment. To this end, the main instruments available to national economic authorities are supply-side and structural reform policies geared to promoting job creation, smoothing the switchover to new productive activities and increasing the economy's efficiency and productivity.
The Board of Governors’ policy statement said the following: “If the decrease does not reverse, it is clear that inflation will rise sharply, and persistent inflation will be imminent if nothing is done, with the accompanying upward spiral of prices, wages, and exchange rates against foreign currencies. The depreciation of the króna in recent weeks is also harmful to the balance sheets of indebted households and companies and undermines the stability of the financial system over the long term. Thus it is critical that the depreciation of the króna be reversed as soon as possible.” The market’s response to the Board of Governors’ decision was favourable, and that is well, but at this point it is not possible to assert whether this decision will generate the results the Board of Governors intended. The next edition of Monetary Bulletin, the Bank’s principal publication on economic issues, is in the final preparatory stages and will be published on April 10. It will include an appraisal and forecasts by the Bank’s experts as regards the current economic climate and the likely developments in the near future. Because this next issue of Monetary Bulletin is forthcoming in such a short time, I have chosen not to discuss current issues at length today, though it was tempting to do so. The media discourse on the size of Iceland’s foreign reserves and the strength of the Central Bank and the Icelandic government is often misleading.

If a central bank, either the one located in this building or another one, should change its course in mid-stream because of escalating pressure stemming from painful side effects, it is hardly  BIS Review 36/2008  1  likely that such a bank would be taken seriously when it next attempted to mount a campaign against inflation. The independence of the Central Bank exists not least to guarantee that those wishing to take the line of least resistance, hoping that the illness will cure itself, cannot bring undue pressure to bear. The Central Bank’s independence also provides the government a buffer against such pressure. The fact is that the Central Bank neither can nor wants to ignore the figures that tell us that it is far from having achieved its goal of bringing inflation down to targeted levels. There are many explanations for this – or excuses, perhaps – but as has always been the case, many excuses are usually worse than one. And of course, the main explanation is that growth, and demand have been greater and more enduring than economic indicators – and therefore the Bank’s forecasts – suggested. This has required lengthier and more invasive treatment than was previously intended. And while the Central Bank does not consider this a desirable state of affairs, it is convinced that this treatment is inevitable and necessary. Ladies and Gentlemen: The twelve months that have elapsed since the Bank’s last Annual Meeting have been eventful in many ways.
All three of these have contributed to lower real rates over this period, although reduced growth in potential output might be more recent. The aging of the population, increased public saving in emerging countries (including the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves), and increased income inequality within countries are among the factors that have contributed to the increase in the propensity to save. Declining relative prices of investment products and increased uncertainty and risk aversion, particularly during the aftermath of the crisis, have negatively affected the willingness to invest. But how does Iceland fit into this picture? As Chart 1 indicates, developments here have been similar, although interest rates have been – and still are – higher than in larger industrialised countries. This is quite at odds with what could be expected based on some of the discussion taking place in Iceland. The fact is that long-term real rates in Iceland are currently at their lowest for this entire period, apart from a short time in the midst of the economic crisis, when the real policy rate was held very low so as to stimulate the economy and presumably pulled longer-term rates downwards for a while. I have said that monetary policy had little to do with these developments. This does not change the fact that these developments have affected monetary policy, as they reflect in part the decline in short-term equilibrium real interest rates. Monetary policy has therefore responded to this with lower nominal interest rates than would otherwise have been appropriate.

In the case of the eurozone, that is the European Central Bank. The pros and cons of such cooperation were outlined in detail in a report published by the Central Bank in autumn 2012, and I do not have time to cover them here. 1 If we continue with our own currency, the question of exchange rate policy arises: should the króna be pegged against one currency or a basket of currencies, should it float freely, or should it be somewhere in between? If the exchange rate is pegged, it is not possible to apply monetary policy to mitigate economic fluctuations by responding to shocks. The adjustment will therefore take place more through fluctuations in employment and output and less through fluctuations in real wages than is the case with independent monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate. What do we want in this context? A good stylised example of how independent monetary policy and a flexible exchange rate could mitigate the impact of shocks on employment and output can be found in the most recent issue of Monetary Bulletin, which describes what would happen if the past few years’ improvement in terms of trade should reverse with  1  http://www.cb.is/publications-news-and-speeches/publications/special-publications/specialpublication-7/  9  a reduction in marine product prices. 2 There are many things to consider in this respect. Experience shows that in small, open economies with unrestricted capital flows and a freefloating currency, the exchange rate has a tendency to fluctuate excessively and irregularly, with possible negative implications for financial stability.
However, the stability aspect of this must be given attention. The operational risk would increase when a greater number become dependent on one big system. With regard to the Riksbank, the direct effects of participation in monetary union on the work with financial stability would not be particularly large. Even if Sweden were to join monetary union, the Riksbank, under present rules, would be responsible for making decisions on providing emergency liquidity assistance to Swedish institutions. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the banks and the payment system would not change overnight but would continue to be largely national in nature, as long as the European banks and payment systems have not become genuinely integrated. The oversight and management of crises would therefore have to be carried out by national authorities. The big difference is that international cooperation would become even more important. In the long term, as banks and securities markets become increasingly more integrated, new and interesting issues would arise on how best to carry out international supervision and oversight. In this discussion, if Sweden were to join monetary union, our voice would carry greater weight as a member of the ECB Governing Council and in the cooperation of finance ministers. This is also important for our ability to influence how integration in general proceeds and thereby also for the financial sector’s conditions in Sweden. The role of the Riksbank If Sweden were to join monetary union, the Riksbank would become part of a bigger whole, the Eurosystem.

The Riksbank also has an internal preparation process with broad participation. Finally, we publish the minutes of Executive Board meetings in which the opinion of each member is evident. The latter issue has a different “charge” at European level since there is a risk that a genuinely single monetary policy would be undermined if individual positions were made public. Monetary union and financial stability in Sweden The Riksbank not only has the task of maintaining price stability but also that of promoting a safe and efficient payment system. In light of this, allow me also to say something about the potential implications of entry into monetary union from this perspective. The financial markets in Europe have developed rapidly over the past decade, partly as a result of the fact that the freedom to trade financial services is fundamental to the cooperation in the EU. Competition for the national banks has hardened. The single currency has contributed to the evolution of a far better capital market outside the banks, which has increased competition further. In several large European countries, a process of structural transformation in the banking systems is underway, much like that experienced in Sweden in connection with the banking crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. When competition grows stiffer, it can of course pose a threat to stability, especially if the banks are not accustomed to competition and are also weakly capitalised.
But in the early 1980s, rapid wage increases outpaced productivity gains, and when the international economy turned down in 1985, we fell into a deep recession. We had lost competitiveness vis-à-vis other regional economies. NIE to First World The 1985 recession forced us to reassess our economic policies. We formed the Economic Committee, whose report refocused our growth strategy. To restore our cost competitiveness, we reduced employer CPF contributions (from 25% to 10%), and implemented two years of wage restraint. We began making wages more flexible, by introducing variable components into remuneration packages and cutting back on seniority-based pay. We cut direct taxes sharply (from 40% to 33%), and laid the ground for introducing the GST a few years later. Competitiveness and flexibility became important yardsticks for economic policy and collective bargaining. In our overall development strategy, we put more emphasis on the services sector as a major growth engine, alongside manufacturing that had long been a key driver. In manufacturing, we made a conscious effort to assimilate and adopt new technology from the advanced economies, moving up the value chain as our incomes and capabilities rose. These policy changes worked better than we had hoped for, aided by favourable external conditions. East Asia was undergoing an economic boom, the global electronics industry was expanding rapidly, and the US economy was experiencing its longest post-war recovery. For a decade until the Asian financial crisis broke in 1997, growth averaged 9.2% a year.

The more we develop such a leadership group, the better our chances will be.”  BIS Review 19/2003  5  Collective response Third, while strong and visionary leadership is necessary, it is not enough. To be effective, the leadership must evoke a response, a resonance from the society as a whole. The society must rise to the challenge of changing itself and establishing a new order. There needs to be broad consensus among the population in support of the changes. In the Meiji Restoration, crucial roles were played by the peasant class that formed the armies and the merchant class that financed the military. In 19th century China, the reformers failed because of infighting within a weak leadership, as well as the advanced state of decay of the entire society. But a century later, Deng Xiaoping's reforms took root as the people experienced the benefits of rapid growth and the widespread improvements in living standards. In post-war Britain, the turning point in the public mood began with a sense of humiliation when the Labour Government had to call in the IMF in 1976, after the Exchequer ran out of money. In Singapore, our previous remakings succeeded because we mounted a strong collective response at independence a determination to beat the odds and survive, in 1985 a sense that if we made sacrifices together, we could make our economy competitive again.