samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Caleb M Fundanga: Employing African resources for African development Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the 2009 Africa Investment Forum, Istanbul, 5 October 2009. *  *  *  Introduction I feel particularly honoured and grateful to be a discussant at this important forum, whose theme is “Employing African Resources for Africa’s Development”. This forum could not have come at a more opportune time than now when all our economies are faced with the challenges emanating from the impact of the global financial and economic crisis. This seminar is also timely in that the fiscal policy response is going to play a large role in determining how well African economies emerge from the financial crisis. This is because Africa must sustain and enhance investment flows in infrastructure, energy, health and education if it is to accelerate the growth momentum achieved prior to the crisis. The question of resource mobilisation for development, whether this is at a national, regional or international level, is thus something that policy makers in Africa are grappling with. Global financial crisis and Africa’s development For most of the current decade, several African countries have been registering positive economic growth rates averaging 5.3 percent between 1999 and 2008, with growth in SubSahara Africa slightly higher at an average of 5.6 percent over the same period. 1 This growth has contributed to rising income levels in several African countries leading increased investments in education, health, water sanitation and general infrastructure development.

However, despite improvements in growth witnessed since 1999, significant reductions in poverty will not occur without a significant increase in growth rates to above 7% on a sustained basis. One of the ways in which growth can be scaled up is through the employment of the vast African resources for the development of the continent. Prior to the global financial and economic crisis, the African continent experienced a surge in investment flows in many sectors including mining, manufacturing, tourism, transport and construction. This inflow of foreign capital helped to finance the development registered in Africa over the past decade. The inflow of foreign capital coupled with high prices of commodities on the global market led to high international reserve accumulation in most commodity exporting countries, including those in Africa. However, following the global financial and economic crisis the accumulation of international reserves declined as commodity prices plunged and foreign capital inflows, both private and public slowed significantly or were reversed. This has had a negative impact on the availability of resources to finance Africa’s development. The challenge going forward is recovering, maintaining and sustaining the economic gains and macroeconomic stability that African countries experienced before the crisis hit. In view of the anticipated reduction in aid flows and foreign direct investment, African countries need to give domestic savings mobilisation as much attention as the other foreign sources of development finance.
The adoption of specific measures of this new toolkit obviously depends on how each of us assesses its own local credit and asset market potential vulnerabilities. Some EMEs imposed tighter limits on financial institution and household leverage. In East Asia, for example, policies included loanto-value and debt-to-income ceilings on real estate lending. In Brazil, we increased capital requirements on riskier consumer loans and imposed a minimum payment floor on credit card balances. And we also imposed taxes on capital inflows and a reserve requirement on banks’ foreign exchange spot positions. The important outcome was that this pragmatic response worked. Therefore, macroprudential measures, including those that target specific capital flows directly, became an important part of the policy framework to address sudden floods and sudden stops. In complement to traditional macroeconomic policy responses, these measures showed that they can help ensure macro-financial stability. There are many quarters, ranging from academia to the IMF itself2 that are increasingly subscribing to this view. However, there are also reputational costs to implementing these policies, which I will address a little later. But what do we mean by “it worked”? In Brazil’s case, it means the following: (a) macroprudential policies contributed to bringing down the pace of credit expansion to more sustainable levels; (b) they were successful in improving the maturity and composition of international financing; and (c) they also reduced foreign exchange volatility.

The breadth and engagement of the membership gives its standards credibility and creates peer pressure within the industry to promote adherence. 8  Canute, King of Denmark, England and Norway, 995-1035, reputedly set his throne by the sea shore and commanded the incoming tide to halt and not wet his feet and robes. Yet "continuing to rise as usual [the tide] dashed over his feet and legs without respect to his royal person. Then the king leapt backwards, saying: 'Let all men know how empty and worthless is the power of kings, for there is none worthy of the name, but He whom heaven, earth, and sea obey by eternal laws.' 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  Second, peer pressure within firms should reinforce standards and, more generally, the commitment to real markets. Most banks have codes of ethics or business principles. These are necessary but not sufficient not least because it isn’t reasonable to expect every trader to absorb their meaning or to translate them readily into live situations. But it is reasonable to expect them to use FMSB guidance to help recognise the differences between a real market and a rigged one. And it is essential that business cultures encourage everyone to call out market abuse when it occurs. Third, buyside pressure for proper behaviour is made easier by clear, practical standards.
But both the rating agencies and markets got the sign of the second event completely wrong, with further downgrades and the CDS peaking at 1473 on 10 October. It  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  took them a while to correct this, and the CDS was down to around 180 by the end of 2012. To be sure, there were other things going on at the time, but still! Let me conclude by saying that the Icelandic case seems to support the conclusion that it is premature to state that we are in or heading towards a world without risk-free assets in the narrow sense. It will take policy mistakes of gigantic proportions in several parts of the world to get there. But the risk is not and never has been zero. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Strengthening countries’ resilience through advice on better financial sector reforms or ways to reduce excessive debt would also help. Though, I should note that the IMF’s job of assessing sovereigns’ fundamentals is made more difficult by the fact that they have no formal supervisory role in relation to sovereigns. Stress testing The Bank of England carries out an annual stress test 12 for major UK banks to assess their ability to withstand shocks in a range of scenarios and takes pre-emptive measures to enhance resilience if necessary. This not only reduces the likelihood that banks will require liquidity support from the Bank of England, but also provides an ongoing assessment of their solvency. This informs the difficult judgement of insolvency vs illiquidity in the event that a bank does require access to the Bank of England’s liquidity facilities. There is scope for the IMF to strengthen its surveillance toolkit to include stress testing. The 2014 Triennial Surveillance Review 13 highlighted the importance of national balance sheet analysis in detecting risks and identifying spillover channels. The IMF could extend debt sustainability assessments to cover external liquidity risks and analysis of how balance of payments flows are likely to respond in crisis scenarios. This ex ante analysis would provide greater assurance on the economic fundamentals of countries seeking liquidity support from the IMF and enable countries to take pre-emptive measures to increase their resilience.
The aim of such tightening is to dampen demand. Competition with the HFF doubtless made the commercial banks reluctant to raise their mortgage lending rates, in spite of having full grounds for doing so. This situation has changed recently and a sizeable spread has developed between mortgage lending rates of the banks and the HFF. In other words, the tighter stance is beginning to be felt in the banks’ mortgage rates. Competition with the HFF has undoubtedly prompted the banks to be more aggressive in marketing their mortgage loans denominated in foreign currencies, which in the present climate can be expected to offer them better returns than indexed lending in domestic currency. It is a different matter whether borrowers in foreign currencies have been fully aware of both the exchange rate and interest rate risks entailed by doing so, which the Central Bank has repeatedly cautioned against. It has also been claimed that the Central Bank has raised its policy rate excessively and that it is now far too high. The only possible inference is that critics of these measures would have preferred a much higher rate of inflation. Had the Central Bank not made these policy rate hikes, the outcome would have been much higher inflation, falling living standards and a heavier debt burden for households, the majority of which have a high level of indexed debt. Another consequence would have been to drive up inflation expectations, which experience shows are difficult to unwind. Inflation cannot be switched on and off at will.

Also, if we were to sell assets in a rising rate environment, we could also experience some capital losses on these sales. In combination, depending on the future trajectory of short and long rates, remittances could even fall to zero for a period.13 There are several important points to make here. First, the potential impact of the purchase program on future Fed remittances was known at the onset of the program – we have no new information here. The outcome depends on how the economy evolves, how we respond, and whether we decide to sell long-dated assets in the portfolio or not. Second, it is important not to put excessive weight on the possibility of a period of zero remittances. Our mandate is economic not fiscal – our job is to return the economy to full employment and price stability. Moreover, in considering the fiscal consequences of our actions, what matters is not what happens to our remittances – that is far too narrow a perspective – but how our actions affect the federal debt-to-GDP ratio over time. This is the metric we should be focusing on in assessing the potential fiscal consequences of our actions. In this respect, it is important to note that the narrow impact of Fed remittances on the federal debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the cumulative amount, not the timing of remittances. Cumulative remittances to date have been hundreds of billions of dollars higher, all else equal, compared to if the Federal Reserve had not expanded its balance sheet.
SPEECH DATE:  29/05/2018  SPEAKER:  Deputy Governor Henry Ohlsson  VENUE:  Örebro University  SVERIGES RIKSBANK SE-103 37 Stockholm (Brunkebergstorg 11) Tel +46 8 787 00 00 Fax +46 8 21 05 31 registratorn@riksbank.se www.riksbank.se  Data, correlations and economic policy challenges∗ At the beginning of the Riksbank’s monetary policy reports, there is a page describing the monetary policy strategy. The basis of the strategy is that the Riksbank shall strive towards an annual change of 2 per cent in the consumer price index with a fixed interest rate (CPIF). Given that there is confidence in the inflation target, monetary policy shall also support good growth in output and employment. The Riksbank therefore conducts what is generally referred to as flexible inflation targeting. This is the basic framework for monetary policy. Within this framework, the Riksbank must cope with the fact that the economy and the way it works change over time. My intention here today is to discuss some of the challenges facing monetary policy and economic policy in general as a result of changes that have occurred over the last decade. In brief, it is a question of surprisingly subdued wage increases, the apparent difficulty in reducing unemployment further via expansionary policy alone, and the apparent deterioration in matching on the labour market. I intend to discuss this with the help of a simple survey, in which I look at how five key variables covary. The time period I’m studying is 2007–2018 and I’m using monthly data.

I will begin by highlighting the challenges raised by the accelerated digital transition of our payment system, seen from the perspective of an authority tasked with safeguarding monetary and financial stability (1), before going on to discuss how we at the Banque de France are playing our part in tackling these challenges (2). I/ Challenges Major innovation in the field of payments has clearly accompanied the increasing digitalisation of the ways in which we consume and behave, fuelling the emergence of a dynamic and enhanced new ecosystem. As I see it, this raises three types of challenges for the safety and efficiency of our payment system. A. Ensure that the rise of “decentralised finance” contributes positively to the safety and efficiency of our payment system When I say decentralised finance, I am talking about the new trend towards the tokenisation of financial assets, such as the creation of new tradable assets associated with new rights, for instance utility tokens, and the development of crypto-assets. These offer opportunities to improve our payment systems and solutions, particularly for cross-border payments, but also for securities issuance and settlement systems. They could also help to expand the array of financing tools available to businesses. But they also pose risks that could undermine the efficiency and safety of these systems. These risks must be mitigated and controlled.
Christian Noyer: The contribution of payment infrastructures to the European financial integration and to the establishment of the SEPA (Single Euro Payments Area) Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the 20th Anniversary of the European Banking Association (EBA), Paris, 23 June 2005. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to join you today to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the European Banking Association (EBA), here in Paris at Palais Brongniart. First of all, I would like to give credit to the EBA for its strong commitment in favour of the European financial integration. This commitment has led the EBA to set up the large value payment system EURO 1 and the retail payment systems STEP 1 and STEP 2. Central banks of the Eurosystem, like any central bank, have a keen interest in securing that the financial system falling under their monetary competence is unified, competitive and stable. This is essential for the European economy, considering that a high degree of financial integration enables an efficient transmission of the monetary policy, a better allocation of financial resources, a minimisation of cost of capital, as well as a fast and safe execution of payments across the so called SEPA, that is to say the Single Euro Payments Area. Different factors support the development of a fully integrated financial system at the European level. Today, I will emphasise a key driver of this process - payment infrastructures.

Industry and commerce has proved extremely effective in creating new jobs to offset, and more than offset, jobs lost as the business environment has changed. What is particularly notable about this impressive growth in output and employment is that it has been sustained over a period of years and, importantly, there is every prospect that we can continue to sustain it looking ahead. This element of sustainability is, above all, what translates periods of strong output and rising employment into permanent improvements in living standards. Sustainability means having in place a framework to provide a basis of stability on which the economy can continue to grow. Alongside the stable framework the government has put in place for fiscal policy, the Bank of England’s contribution to stability is to deliver price stability - specifically, to meet the low inflation target the government has set of 2½% on the RPIX. Perhaps the most encouraging feature of the strong economic performance I have described is that it has been achieved consistently with low inflation, and it is through maintaining that commitment to low inflation that we can best ensure that the economy continues to grow over time in line with its potential. Against the background of this encouraging overall picture, we face two main areas of uncertainty at present. The first is the impact of the strong exchange rate for sterling. The strength of sterling in recent years has impacted on virtually all areas of the economy - agriculture and some service industries as much as manufacturing.
19  The service evaluation methodology used in the research conducted by the European Commission consists in the creation of a five-grade scale used to define the level of services provided: LEVEL 0 — no website available to the public or inability to assign an existing website to any of the levels 1–4 (0%-24% on the chart); LEVEL 1 — INFORMATION — the information necessary to launch the use of a given public service is available online (25%-49% on the chart); LEVEL 2 — ONE-WAY INTERACTION — a website available to the public offers the ability to download a form that, after it has been completed on paper, can be used to launch the use of a given public service (50%-74% on the chart); LEVEL 3 — TWO-WAY INTERACTION — a website available to the public offers the ability to launch the use of a given public service by completing and sending an electronic form. Therefore, authorization of the person intending to use the service is necessary (75%-99% on the chart); LEVEL 4 — FULL ELECTRONIC CASE SETTLEMENT — a website available to the public offers an entire public service online, including the stage of decision-making and the delivery thereof. No other paper procedures are necessary (100% on the chart). More information is available in Online Availability of Public Services: How is Europe Progressing?. Web Based Survey on Electronic Public Services. Report of the Fifth Measurement,” Capgemini for European Commission, October 2004.

Mr Yam’s statement on the listing of Exchange Fund Notes on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange Speech by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Mr Joseph Yam, JP, at the listing of Exchange Fund Notes on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 19 July 1999. Mr Lee, Mr Chan, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Today’s signing ceremony paves the way for the listing of Exchange Fund Notes on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange next month. In addition to offering retail investors an attractive and reliable investment opportunity, this listing will mark an important milestone in the development of Hong Kong’s debt market. Hong Kong, and indeed Asia as a whole, lacks an active debt market. What should in theory serve as an important pipeline of financial intermediation, through which the savings of the community flow into productive investment, has, in this region, always been constricted. At times, it has been quite clogged up. By the standards of developed market economies, our reliance on the banking and equity markets, the two other channels of financial intermediation, has been, and still is, disproportionately heavy. As a result, we cannot really say that financial intermediation in Hong Kong is entirely efficient. One consequence is that, in the event of a failure in one of those channels of systemic proportions, the pressure built up in the other channels could become unbearably great, and even explosive.
Industrial production has declined markedly in all major regions of the world economy. In Norway, manufacturing output has been more stable. Norges Bank presented its last Inflation Report on 27 February. We expect price inflation to be about 2½ per cent in two years, if growth in the global economy picks up as assumed. The tight labour market will probably continue to result in fairly strong growth in labour costs and rather sharply rising prices for domestically produced goods and services. Annual wage growth is projected at 5 per cent in the period ahead. A subdued rise in prices for imported goods is pushing down overall price inflation. The projections are based on the technical assumption that the krone exchange rate will remain stable. On the whole, the risk associated with the inflation projection is regarded as balanced. Exchange rates between the major currencies fluctuate widely. The effective exchange rate on the US dollar has risen by more than 30 per cent since 1995. The German mark (later euro) has depreciated by about the same amount. The effective exchange rate for the Japanese yen has fluctuated sharply. Small countries have also experienced wide exchange rate fluctuations. The Swedish krona has changed considerable in the last 10 years and is now 10 per cent weaker than in the summer of 2000. The Australian dollar has depreciated by more than 30 per cent since the spring of 1997. Countries whose exports include a large component of raw materials tend to experience considerable volatility in their exchange rate.

In the long 1 run, this will be offset by a corresponding depreciation of the krone. The international rise in prices for manufactured goods is lower than for services – around 1 per cent. The inflation target of 2½ per cent implies a depreciation of the Norwegian krone of around ½ per cent in the long term, because the target has been set somewhat higher than our trading partners’ inflation target. This means that goods prices measured in Norwegian krone must be expected to rise by about 1½ per cent in the long term. With wage growth of 4 - 4½ per cent, productivity growth in manufacturing must be about 2½ - 3 per cent to maintain profitability. For services, price inflation can be somewhat higher, about 3 – 3½ per cent, and productivity gains correspondingly lower. The size of the exposed sector will be affected by the portion of petroleum revenues that is absorbed into the Norwegian economy. In the long run, monetary policy cannot influence overall employment or its distribution across industries. Historically, employment in the internationally exposed sector has declined in waves. The sharpest declines in manufacturing employment were observed in the years between 1977 and 1984 and from 1987 to 1992. Both periods were preceded by a considerable deterioration in cost competitiveness in manufacturing. There is a risk of a new period of decline in manufacturing. The restructuring in manufacturing may take place rapidly. Competitiveness has deteriorated by about 10 per cent since 1996.