samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
On the one hand, it further strengthens the accountability of the decision-makers and increases transparency for the public. On the other, it will also contribute to the study of the country's economic history and a better understanding of the decisions made from a historical perspective. The publication of this material will be made in March of each year. The measure will have retroactive effect, so that the publication of March 2018 will cover the meetings of the years 2000 to 2007. Finally, we will also make changes to the publication periods of both our Monetary Policy Report and our Financial Stability Report. The Monetary Policy Report, which will keep its quarterly frequency, will be released first thing in the morning after the meetings of March, June, September and December, and will be complemented by a press conference of the CBC Governor at the Bank's premises. By publishing this Report the day after the Meeting, the Board will have the chance to reinforce the communication of the grounds that justify the policy decisions. In general, the vast majority of central banks publish their Reports or similar documents on the same day that monetary policy decisions are announced. The Monetary Policy Report will continue to be submitted to the Senate immediately after its publication, in dates that will be agreed upon with the respective instances. The Financial Stability Report, for its part, will continue to be published twice a year, but will now be made separately from the Monetary Policy Report, in May and November (table 4).

I am confident that their knowledge and experience would be immensely helpful to the participants in understanding and appreciating the practical implications behind these changes both from a supervisor’s perspective as well as from the standpoint of the supervised institutions. To conclude, let me say that we all face enormous resource and capacity constraints in coping with existing responsibilities, let alone undertaking these new challenges. Hence, the value of coming together to share our experiences and plan regional training programs for our member countries is very important. Through these meetings, we can learn and maintain strong networking relationship which should enhance our efforts in capacity building in this innovative and challenging area of financial supervision. Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me much pleasure to declare this Regional Seminar for Financial Supervisors open and I wish you all an enjoyable and fruitful week of discussions. Thank you for your attention and may God Bless you all. Soifua. BIS Review 142/2007  3
Alongside this, changes to the incapacity benefits regime may well also have had the effect of bringing more workers into the market. The number of people under the age of 65 who are inactive because of incapacity is down by around 200,000 since mid-2008. For much of the post-war period, there has been in the UK a steady decline in the hours people have wanted to work. As income grew, the trend was to reduce hours and maintain income rather than to maintain hours and increase income. Not surprisingly, the largest fall in real pay since records began has reversed that trend; the evidence suggests that, as the economy has recovered, with lower real pay, many have sought to increase hours to maintain – or recover – income. That of course may well be a temporary effect and as and when real pay rises the pre-crisis trend may reassert itself. But it may be that this effect will last for some time yet. Another explanation for the weakness of pay despite the fall in unemployment might be that the pressure to catch up lost income is much weaker post recession than it has been in the past. Based on previous episodes in the UK, we might have expected a reduction in real incomes to result in increased inflationary pressure from the labour market.

The question as always is whether the risk of not waiting until the picture is clearer is outweighed by the risk of not acting in time. To sum up, some of what the MPC, at the point I joined it, thought would happen has happened. We have gone from recovery to expansion. Growth is slowing to something close to its pre-crisis average. Investment has made and is making an increasing contribution to growth. But the behaviour of unemployment, productivity and, most recently, pay continue to surprise and puzzle. More “normal” relationships between these variables may reassert themselves quickly and the pay rounds next year in particular should illuminate some of the picture. But there is also reason to believe that some changes, as in labour supply, may be longer lasting. When I started at the Bank this time last year, the MPC was half way through the process of putting together its latest set of forecasts for inflation and growth. That process is now again in train. The softening in the pay and inflation data, together with the weaker external environment, for me implies that we can afford to maintain the current degree of monetary stimulus for a longer period than previously thought. That of course will be a subject for the MPC to debate in the coming weeks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
The rest – and the much larger part – went into a resolution process. In order to reverse the ongoing run on domestic deposits, a declaration was made that all deposits in Iceland were safe. This did not include deposits in foreign branches, as Iceland did not have the necessary access to FX to make such an implicit guarantee credible. All deposits in Icelandic-headquartered banks were, however, given priority over other unsecured claims, including those in foreign branches. This decision was a key to the outcome that deposit claims from the foreign branches have now been paid in full from recoveries of the old banks’ estates. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In international discussion, a number of myths have developed about this process. There have been claims that Iceland allowed its banking system to collapse, with what now seem reasonable results, and that others should consider doing the same. The fact is that Iceland kept the domestic part of its banking system running throughout, and at significant expense; otherwise, the consequences would have been dire. Some have claimed that the banks were nationalised. They were not. The failed private banks are private companies in winding-up proceedings governed by law. The Government fully recapitalised one of the new banks. The other two have been private banks owned primarily by the estates of the old banks. Others have claimed that Iceland defaulted and got away with it. The opposite is true.

The macroeconomic adjustment and rebalancing was unavoidable and was facilitated over time by the real depreciation of the currency. The shocks disproportionally affected overblown sectors (banking and construction), whereas most of the export base remained intact. Much of the impact of the banking collapse hit countries other than Iceland. Another important reason was the policy responses that mitigated the recession and promoted recovery. Let me now turn to those. The policy responses took two main forms: crisis management during the collapse of the banks and the economic programme developed by the Icelandic authorities in co-operation with the IMF. From at least early 2008, the Icelandic authorities were aware of potential foreign currency liquidity problems at the banks and took action by trying to negotiate swap lines and tap foreign capital markets – in both cases, with limited success. Given the lack of international cooperation, the Icelandic authorities were forced to consider radical solutions when the banks failed. Although they were not necessarily articulated in full at the time, these solutions entailed several goals: to preserve a functioning domestic payment system, ring-fence the state in the case of bank failures, limit the socialisation of private sector losses, and create the conditions for rebuilding a domestic banking system. The adopted solution was embedded in the so-called Emergency Act, which was passed by Parliament on 6 October 2008. The Emergency Act saved the domestic operations of the banking system by creating new banks, which involved carving domestic assets and liabilities out of the old, failing banks.
In this context, it gives cause for concern that the fiscal stance in terms of the cyclically adjusted primary balance has eased over the past two years and appears likely to do so again this year. It is also possible to address the currency appreciation at its source by applying what some representatives of the tourism sector have appropriately referred to as “access restrictions and pricing”. In the recent past, numerous observers have expressed the opinion that the Central Bank’s key interest rate is too high under current conditions. As grounds for their arguments, they cite much lower interest rates in trading partner countries, the fact that inflation in Iceland has been at or below target for three years, and the Central Bank’s overforecast of inflation in recent years. Discussing whether the monetary stance is in line with the Bank’s objectives and current economic developments and prospects is normal and appropriate. Opinion varies, sometimes even within the Monetary Policy Committee itself, because reliable data on current and recent developments become available with a time lag and the future is always uncertain. 5  The Bank’s key nominal interest rate is now 5%, and the corresponding real rate is about 2½%. In view of the business cycle position and the fact that inflation is below target, this implies an equilibrium real rate of 1½%, which must be considered low, given that long-run growth potential is significantly higher. Current nominal and real interest rates are not high in historical terms, although they are high in current international context.

But could the Bank have gone further; for instance, by buying even more foreign currency or by lowering interest rates more than was warranted by economic conditions and the inflation outlook? Certainly it could have done so; it could even have gone as far as to more or less halt the appreciation of the króna. But 4  then large interest rate cuts would probably have been needed alongside the foreign currency purchases, perhaps even bringing real rates into negative territory, which is ill-suited to an economy with a positive output gap and very strong GDP growth. The reason is that in order to lower interest rates enough to materially increase residents’ appetite for investment in foreign securities, an interest rate cut of 0.25 or 0.5 percentage points would not be sufficient because of how wide the interest rate differential currently is. It is not a given, either, that long-term interest rates in the bond market would have followed suit in full, and bond market rates are more important for investments by pension funds and other investors than the Central Bank’s short-term rates are. The reason for this would have been that inflation expectations had risen, and if the reduction in short-term interest rates had not been in line with economic developments and prospects, expected short-term interest rates would have increased. This would not have occurred without severe side effects.
The lessons that can be drawn from a comparison with the French experience may seem limited since, in the 1980s, France was facing capital outflows, whereas emerging economies are now often facing speculative capital inflows. However, I believe that, while the challenge has become more demanding, successful financial liberalisation for EMEs still rests on the same two key conditions that applied to France: •  Building a resilient domestic financial system while or before opening the capital account. •  Shaping appropriate institutions and policies. I will illustrate these two conditions in the reminder of my speech. BIS Review 64/2007  1  1. A successful liberalisation requires to strengthen the domestic financial system while, or sometimes before, opening the capital account  I will briefly remind you why and how this can be done. First, why? This is because an efficient financial sector ensures both a better financing of and a better protection for the economy. On the one hand, it ensures a better financing of the economy by broadening the investor base and enhancing their ability to make use of diversified financial instruments. Not only does competition within the financial sector contribute to limiting the cost of capital but it also fosters innovation and thus allows for more efficient risk management. For example, securitisation provides financial institutions with instruments to manage the composition of their balance sheets and thus contributes to buttressing credit distribution while supporting the development of financial markets.

As a central banker, I will of course argue that the role of the central Bank is crucial. It should be the guardian of the health of the "financial ecosystem" through reinforced surveillance and a continuous improvement of the regulatory and legal framework. Sound supervision must be promoted by an independent body, which may be more or less related to the central bank. In France as in India, banking supervision is indeed implemented by the central bank staff. Sound supervision and a clear legal framework in turn are likely to encourage foreign participation and maximise the associated benefits in terms of best practices. The need for appropriate supervision is indeed not reduced but modified or may even be increased in case of financial liberalisation. For instance, a working group in process at the BIS, in which both the RBI and the BDF are currently participating, shows that the development of local bond markets changes the types of risks faced domestically from currency risks to interest rate risks or maturity mismatches. This requires to enhance and control adequate risk management in the banking sector and in those institutions in which the risk may have been transferred. Indeed financial innovations such as credit risk transfers may well spread risks but risk does not disappear. The central bank is also responsible for producing and disseminating various sets of monetary and financial statistics whose quality is of utmost importance for policy makers and investors.
Structural reforms were also needed to correct earlier structural mistakes and restore our economic vitality. Whether the measures that have been taken up to the present are sufficient is a debatable issue; but the point I want to make is that a change of direction and some political action had already been initiated in the 1980s. The work has continued since then and been undertaken by governments of diverse political hues and personalities. In other words, something happened to Swedish economic policy in a wide sense in the late 1980s. When the immediate crisis had been managed in the early 1990s it was clear that the weak government finances would have to be tackled. Moreover, the independent status of our central bank has been formally confirmed, accompanied by a clear mandate. The floating exchange rate regime and the explicit target for price stability have worked well. Several segments of the Swedish economy have been deregulated, though less has been done in this way in the labour market than in markets for goods and services. But the labour market organisations have been working on their own account to improve the system for wage formation. As a result of all this, the Swedish economy is doing better than we have seen for a long time. The economic upswing has now continued for more than six years, during which annual GDP growth has averaged around 3%. And notwithstanding the strong growth of demand, inflation has been lower than one would expect from earlier relationships.

The infrastructure must be constructed so that it does not exacerbate any problems that may arise. It needs to be capable of handling external shocks without any danger of collapsing. However, the severe strains that arise from time to time in the payment system tend to be generated not so much by hang-ups in technical and administrative systems as by problems for one or several of the participating banks. Problems for one bank quickly spread to the rest of the payment system and may generate a systemic risk. This risk arises if problems with credit or liquidity prevent bank A from completing its payments to bank B, which thereby has difficulties in paying bank C. Banks B and C are then liable to fail solely because bank A cannot fulfil its commitments. The risk obviously varies with the size of the payments in question; the larger these are, the greater is the potential systemic risk. The occurrence of systemic crisis threatens the whole or parts of the payment system, and if this ceases to function the entire financial system as well as the real economy will be affected. The crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s was associated with large systemic risks. Last autumn the U.S. Federal Reserve perceived considerable systemic risks in the domestic financial market. In neither of these cases, however, was there a full-blown systemic crisis. In the event of a systemic crisis, the payment system needs a large supply of credit.
Table 3 Main international baseline scenario assumptions (annual averages) 2008  2009 (e)  2010 (f)  2011 (f)  Dec.09  Mar.10  Dec.09  Mar.10  Dec.09  Mar.10  World GDP at PPP (annual change, %)  3.0  -0.8  -0.6  3.8  4.3  4.2  4.4  World GDP at mkt exchange rate (annual change, %)  1.9  -1.8  -1.7  3.1  3.5  3.4  3.5  Trading partners’ GDP (annual change, %)  3.0  -0.8  -0.8  3.6  4.0  3.8  3.8  WTI oil price $  100  62  62  80  82  86  85  LME copper price $  316  230  234  270  310  270  290  Terms of trade (annual change, %)  -16.1  0.3  4.1  4.7  12.5  -2.3  -5.6  External prices, in $ (annual change, %)  12.2  -6.0  -6.1  9.6  3.7  1.0  3.0  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile. 12  BIS Review 61/2010  Figure 8 Expected Monetary Policy Rate (percent)  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 07  Jul. 08  Jul. 09  MPR EES March 2010 Last week of February 2010  Jul. 10  Jul. 11  Jul.

And we will consider how to maintain focus as memories fade and the temptation to turn inwards returns. We are doing so because we know that everyone has a shared interest in real markets. Real markets are professional and open. They are resilient, fair and effective, and they maintain their social license. Real markets are not ends in themselves but serve the interests of end-users. Real markets don’t just happen. They depend on private actors and public initiatives to ensure the quality of market infrastructure. That includes ‘hard’ infrastructure, the plumbing of markets that determines the mechanics of markets; and ‘soft’ infrastructure, like standards and codes that define how market participants should behave. Since the crisis, the UK has played a leading role in addressing misconduct in domestic and global markets. 1  See Fair and Effective Markets Review Final Report, HM Treasury, Bank of England and FCA (June 2015). At: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/report/2015/fair-and-effective-markets-review---final-report  2  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  2  We know that the City has a particular responsibility given London’s position as the pre-eminent global financial centre. 2  What has been achieved? So what has been done to re-build the necessary market infrastructures for real markets to thrive? 3  In the UK, laws and regulations have been strengthened by, for example, introducing a criminal regime for manipulating benchmarks. Public authorities know they cannot and should not try to legislate for every circumstance, monitor every transaction, or anticipate every market innovation.
However, this recovery process has been slower than we expected a few months ago. In particular, because mobility has not increased as quickly as we had hoped and the social distancing, both compulsory and voluntary, has had more long-lasting effects on some areas of the economy, such as construction and services. The withdrawal of pension savings has triggered temporary increases in consumption, especially of imported goods, which have had a positive impact on sectors such as retail but have also put pressure on the prices of the most demanded products. In fact, inflation data for September and October showed significant upward surprises, mostly concentrated in the categories of durable consumer products, such as home equipment and electronics. The significant depletion, and in some cases exhaustion, of inventories of these products has contributed to this result. Investment, beyond the reactivation of public and private projects, is being affected by the restrictions on mobility that have taken a toll on construction, the financial situation of companies, and the persistent uncertainty, so it is lagging further behind than consumption. The labor market, meanwhile, has shown some recovery, with an increase in employment compared to mid-year, but mostly concentrated in non-salaried jobs. Very recently we learned of the Metropolitan Region’s rollback to Phase 2 of the “Step-by-step” plan, which could take some of the impulse off activity at the margin. However, it could also help to avoid more drastic measures in the future by articulating a more orderly transition towards a vaccine.

Payment service providers will have to apply these requirements as of 19 April 2020. 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  With regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/518, Regulation (EU) 2018/389 and the Corrigendum of Directive (EU) 2015/2366, amendments to the Law on Payment Services and Payment Systems have been prepared which are due to be adopted by the end of 2019. 1 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European  Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong customer authentication and common and secure open standards of communication 2 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council on payment services in the internal  market 3 Regulation (EU) 2019/518 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 amending  Regulation (EC) No 924/2009 as regards certain charges on cross-border payments in the Union and currency conversion charges  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches