samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As we all know, this crisis started little over a year ago, with the end of the real estate boom in developed economies, which would end up exposing both the weakness and the excesses of the subprime mortgage loans. However, and as was apparent in the subsequent developments, the problem went far beyond lending to agents with low payment capacity. Overall, an asset price bubble, particularly in the housing sector, fueled by an accelerated credit expansion has proven to be a dreadful combination. Maybe bubbles cannot be made to disappear, but the integrity of the financial system must be preserved and requires continuous monitoring. BIS Review 134/2008  1  The collapse of Lehman Brothers can be considered a landmark event that took the financial markets from a period of turmoil to a major crisis. In fact, after the downfall of this investment bank, commercial banks in developed economies, regardless of size, began fearing that their counterparts might go broke and stopped lending to each other, which nearly dried up an already precarious interbank market. Every fragility indicator in this market, and stock exchanges around the world, reflected the onset of a confidence crisis. Whether or not it was a prudent decision to let Lehman Brothers go bust will be argued over for years to come, an institution whose fragility was common knowledge since early this year. Probably some bet on a Bear-Sterns-type rescue, a clear example of moral hazard. Maybe it should have been intervened months ago.

Here, the role of central banks as liquidity provider is essential to ensure the proper functioning of the financial system, and this is one of the main lessons we learned from the mistakes made during the Great Depression that wrecked havoc in the real sector, which could have been substantially reduced. We have also learned that sound regulations designed for normal times and as crisis preventing mechanisms are not necessarily the best for moments of great stress or turmoil, including mark-to-market practices in some segments of the financial industry. It would be premature to draw definitive lessons from the present crisis that is still in the making and going through the damage-control phase. A new wave of discussions on the international financial architecture will come. And although this happens every time there is a world crisis, progress to date has been rather timid. Nonetheless, the potential liquidity constraints that economies outside the epicenter of the crises may suffer, may add an unnecessary burden to countries that had little or nothing to do with today’s events and at the same time are the basis to sustain growth in the world. In synchrony with this, the new liquidity swap facility that is being offered by the IMF is very appropriate. It should be disbursed quickly as current conditions require. In the present circumstances, countries that have saved their terms-of-trade windfalls and enjoy a solid international liquidity position, as is the case of our country, should not have the need to apply for these facilities.
Internationalisation of Islamic finance and its role in strengthening financial and economic linkages Two important global trends are currently taking place. The first is the significant growth of emerging economies in the world, and the second is, the greater international integration as economies and financial systems become increasingly more connected. However, no longer is international trade solely between the emerging world and the developed world, but trade amongst the emerging world has increased immensely. While world trade has expanded by almost four-fold, trade amongst emerging economies grew by more than ten times. In particular trade between Asia and the Middle East and Latin America is gaining traction and importance. Similarly, cross-border financial flows are no longer concentrating between the emerging world and the developed markets, but increasingly it is between emerging economies. As financial markets and financial systems in emerging economies become more developed, greater financial flows between our economies are taking place. These trends have supported and reinforced the recovery and growth that is currently experienced in the emerging world. The turn of this millennium has seen an acceleration in the internationalisation of Islamic finance. This is manifested by the increased number of Islamic financial institutions that are now operating beyond their own jurisdictions, and the increased international participation in Islamic financial markets. This trend is resulting in increased Shariah-compliant cross-border financial flows.

We have now concluded that there is not normally reason to indicate prior to the monetary policy meetings in speeches and press releases how our views of the repo rate path have changed. Our assessment is that it is enough to signal our intentions clearly in connection with the seven monetary policy meetings held every year. In connection with three of these meetings we will publish our own forecast for the future repo rate, and our Monetary Policy Report will show clearly why we have chosen this particular path. On the other four occasions we will make a qualitative assessment of how the most recently published interest rate forecast relates to the new information received. Even if the interest rate path forecast is only a forecast and not a promise, a central bank can hardly be clearer than this with regard to its views on economic developments and the consequences for the interest rate. There may also in exceptional cases be justification for some signalling between two monetary policy meetings. If, for instance, something occurs to radically alter the economic situation, while there is a long time until the next meeting, it may be necessary to make a comment in order to avoid the risk of unnecessary uncertainty in the financial markets. It should then be clear whether the entire Executive Board supports this view or whether it is the opinion of an individual member.
In addition to these forecasts, alternative scenarios on the inflation outlook and the global economy are discussed in the Risks section of the Inflation Report. You can examine the Report for details. While concluding my remarks, I would like to thank all my colleagues, who contributed to the Report, primarily those at the Research and Monetary Policy Department as well as the members of the Monetary Policy Committee, and thank every one of you for your participation. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Cecilia Skingsley: Reasonable expectations of monetary policy Speech by Ms Cecilia Skingsley, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Danske Bank, Stockholm, 19 September 2013. *  *  *  This is not the first time I will present my view of monetary policy in Sweden. I have done so in many different contexts during my 20 years as a professional economist, for instance as a columnist for “Dagens Industri” or, most recently, as Chief Economist at Swedbank. Now, however, I am here as one of the new members of the Executive Board of the Riksbank. It is of course quite a different thing to be one of the six people responsible for the monetary policy decisions than to be an external analyst. It is of course also the case that the experience I have gained marks my monetary policy stance and colours my view of what it is reasonable to expect of monetary policy in practice. Today I intend to talk about my thinking at the two latest monetary policy meetings and about my thinking on monetary policy in principle. Monetary policy through my eyes It is now two weeks or so since I took part in my second monetary policy meeting as a member of the Executive Board.
These two key features of the British and Australian systems illustrate how the arrangements in Hong Kong do not go as far as, or are less formalised than, those in other jurisdictions. This may have something to do with different philosophical approaches: in Hong Kong the tradition has been a freemarket one, which entails a very low level of government involvement in business relationships. But as the Hong Kong market becomes more sophisticated and more competitive, and as consumer issues are coming more to the fore, it may be useful to consider whether Hong Kong should follow the path of other jurisdictions. At this early stage of discussion, there seem to be three broad options, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The first is some form of self-regulation by the banking industry. The second is to provide a specific mandate to the regulator, that is the HKMA. The third is to place the responsibility in the hands of an Ombudsman. There are a number of issues – some philosophical, some practical – that will need to be taken into account in deciding in the fullness of time where the responsibility would lie. As far as the HKMA is concerned, the arguments for and against are, I suggest, finely balanced. One argument holds that a more formal role for the HKMA in this area might create a conflict of interest between our prudential regulation and consumer protection roles.

It would hardly be consistent for us on the one hand to be promoting greater competition and on the other to seek to determine or influence fees and charges. However, the public concern about the effects of deregulation, coupled with the recognition of the importance of banking services to people’s daily lives, suggest that we should be paying more attention than we have in the past to the question of consumer issues. This is the subject to which I should now like to turn. Consumer protection First, I think it needs to be understood that the changes now going on in banking services, including the restructuring of fees and charges, are not solely the result of interest rate deregulation. There are a number of factors – global as much as local – that are driving banks into refocusing their business. These include: increased competition from both within and outside the banking industry; pressure to increase shareholder value; the need to develop new income streams amid a shortage of conventional lending opportunities; and globalisation, which is inducing banks to specialise in forms of business in which they have a competitive advantage. These various factors are forcing banks to innovate - through new products and new technologies – in order to diversify their income. They are also forcing banks to become more cost-efficient: to scrutinise the profitability of their various services, and to rationalise cost structures.
It may help to reduce that tension to attempt to manage the float to some degree, by supporting appropriate domestic policy action with exchange market intervention, though I agree that such intervention may serve as little more than a signal where a currency is internationally widely traded and held. Similarly there can, I believe, be circumstances in which domestic discipline may be reinforced by an exchange rate peg, but it is vital in that case that the authorities should identify a clear exit strategy before serious tensions are allowed to emerge. That – I know from our own experience – is much easier said than done! Mr Chairman, these dilemmas are certainly not new. But clearly they are liable to be accentuated by the massive increase in global capital flows over recent years, which has not only complicated the choice between alternative possible exchange rate regimes but also made the management of any of those regimes substantially more difficult. So there is a further question we need to address which is whether there is anything we can do to reduce the volatility of these massive capital flows beyond pursuing disciplined macroeconomic policies. That of course is the subject of a whole series of conferences on its own; and there is certainly a good deal that we can do. Let me conclude by mentioning some of the items on my own shopping list in this context.

In the line of this logic, the raising of confidence would bring about its positive effects even on increasing their banking activity, which will be in compliance with their objective to be in the market with as much dignity as possible. In this discussion I will not focus on the technical aspect of cause explanation and process implementation, which I consider as exhausted by discussions made between respective technical staff, but I will focus on what we intend to reach and on the shortest and safest way to complete this process successfully. Also, I would like to clarify that the individuals will continue to participate in the primary market of securities and this market will continue to be organized by the Bank of Albania. What we intend to reach through this process is: 1. The realization of a smooth transition process, at the smallest cost possible, in terms of maintaining the participation of individuals in the primary market. 2. The reduction of the time which is needed for the realization of treasury bill primary market auction. 3. The increasing possibilities to apply into practice the principle “Delivery versus payment” for operations that will be performed in the secondary and retail Treasury bill market. Here I take into account either the facilitating of procedures or the increased safety for using these securities as collateral and for encouraging the interbank and lending market. 4.
In any case, there are several key questions that need answers to properly identify NPOs and their activities in a country. These questions include: i)  What is an NPOs sector ? ii)  How many NPOs are in operation? iii)  What types are they (religious, cultural, educational, sports). iv)  What activities do they perform? v)  Are there registration requirements and record keeping requirements for NPOs? vi)  Are there reporting requirements? vii)  Are there mechanisms to verify funds are spent as advertised and planned? So it is fair to say that there are major challenges and practical issues that need careful consideration when the issue of money laundering and terrorist financing is discussed from the perspective of NPOs. The global concern Let me now briefly highlight some of the concerns that have emerged globally in the area of money laundering and terrorist financing. The goal of a large number of criminal acts is to generate a profit for the individual or group that carry out these acts. Money laundering is the processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their illegal origin. This process is of critical importance, as it enables the criminal to enjoy these profits without jeopardizing their source. Illegal arms sales, smuggling and the activities of organized crime, including, for example, drug trafficking, human trafficking and prostitution rings, can generate huge amounts of cash. Embezzlement, bribery and computer fraud schemes can also produce large profits and create the incentive to “legitimize” the ill-gotten gains through money laundering.

Indeed, such is further complicated by the fact that this invisible crime operates on the fringe of society, acting as a bridge between the underworld and the rest. Hence, we need a collaborative approach to work together to overcome such challenges that could damage the image and reputation of Samoa’s financial system, as well as the good standing of NPOs in the country. I now have the pleasure of officially opening this Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing Activities Workshop. BIS Review 85/2009  5
BIS Review 43/2007  3  reductions in working hours per person employed in the euro area can certainly help explain the widening of the gap in the level of output per capita between the euro area and the United States. Table 2 shows how the rate of change in labour utilisation can be decomposed into the rates of change of the four variables I referred to. The decomposition is useful because it helps to better understand the relative contribution of developments and factors affecting labour utilisation. Some of these factors can be influenced by policies and changes in economic institutions in a way that can contribute to improving the economy’s growth performance. Since the mid-1990s, labour utilisation in the euro area has increased, also relative to the United States. This has contributed positively to euro area growth and to narrowing the growth gap with the United States. However, despite this improvement, the level of labour utilisation – as opposed to its rate of change – in the euro area remains much lower than in the United States. This fact reflects a lower labour force participation rate, a higher unemployment rate, and lower average working hours per person employed in the euro area. The figures in Table 2 show how labour utilisation, and thus GDP growth, in the euro area have been supported by an increase in the share of the working age population that is employed (labour force participation has risen significantly and the unemployment rate has declined somewhat).

Turning to today’s conference theme of “On the Horizon for Community Banking,” I have a few observations that I’d like to share. These observations, in part, preview the day’s agenda and I look forward to the continued conversation on these important issues. First, our country and the banking industry have benefitted from steady economic growth, modest inflation, and low unemployment in recent years. These are all positive and welcome outcome, but not all regions have benefitted equally here in the Second District. Some portions of upstate New York have benefitted from an influx of technology companies and other industries, while other regions remain challenged due to a lack of population growth. Later today we will hear from two of our economists who will share national and regional economic trends. Also in the spirit of looking forward, I can share some views on what community bankers can expect from the supervisory process. Examiners are keenly focused on emerging trends around funding costs and liquidity risks. Bankers consistently share with us the challenge of raising core deposits to fund loan growth. Community banks compete not only with other community banks for deposits, but also with credit unions and larger institutions. And, these larger counterparts are actively courting customers through direct mailers and offering competitive rates. Data in the Second District show cost across most deposit categories have increased with a slight uptick in the higher cost funding sources such as borrowings. Data for the largest banks exhibit a comparable trend, but they control a larger market share.
But despite these differences, a common theme arises: emerging markets dependent on the production and export of raw materials (Russia, Brazil and South Africa serve as good examples) are less resilient than countries dependent on vigorous labour force and innovations (exemplified, within BRICS, by China and India). There are also differences in resilience among the “emerging” countries of Central Europe. During the Great Recession, Poland – a big country (by Central European standards), less open and with greater potential for catch-up growth – proved to be the most resilient. The Czech Republic was also quite resilient (it experienced its own banking crisis in the late 1990s, with banks becoming more conservative and risk-averse in consequence). Hungary and Slovenia proved less resilient, and in these countries the government had to intervene in the financial market. In the case of the Czech Republic, the fact that our host financial sector was more resilient to shocks than its home countries was the reason why we never joined the Vienna Initiative. The resilience of emerging economies is now under the spotlight also because we remember the effects of the 2013 taper tantrum. That year, many emerging countries experienced a huge outflow of capital, while at the same time some other countries like the Czech Republic and Poland were effectively trying to discourage foreign short-term capital from coming in. This discouragement was accompanied by interest rate cuts and other forms of monetary easing in general.

I have no doubt at all that the City has the professional and technical capacity, and the self-confidence, to make a major contribution to this process. Let me touch, finally, Chairman, on financial globalisation more generally. As we have seen, the increasingly free flow of capital internationally has the capacity to contribute massively to the expansion of the world economy; but it can become distorted, with the risk of destructive volatility, which in turn can pose a significant threat to financial stability on a world-wide basis. Since the sudden onset of the Asia crisis some three years ago with its global repercussions there has been a 3  BIS Review 49/2000  huge international effort to reduce the risk of volatility. This has involved drawing up codes of best practice - covering everything from fiscal and monetary prudence, external balance sheet and liquidity management and greater transparency, to increased financial regulation as well as higher legal, accounting and corporate governance standards - which national governments particularly in capital importing countries, are being encouraged to apply. It has involved extensive and ongoing reviews of the financial infrastructure and regulatory practice also in creditor countries. And it has involved a continuing review of the role of the international financial institutions in preventing and managing international debt crises.