samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This has not only enhanced the range of business opportunities for the financial institutions but also their potential to expand beyond domestic borders and building further on regional linkages. Increased Asian regional complementarities Post-crisis, ASEAN has further increased intra-regional trade and investment linkages within ASEAN and with the other major economies in the region. Intra-Asian trade now accounts for more than half of the total trade of the region. The emergence of China and India has created new export markets for ASEAN, thus diversifying the ASEAN export market from over-concentration in the traditional markets. ASEAN is among the few regions to have a significant and growing trade surplus with China, reaching about USD 20 billion in 2005. Meanwhile, the total trade between the ASEAN-5 and India has expanded by more than tenfold from only USD 2 billion in 1990 to USD 21 billion in 2005. 2  BIS Review 46/2007  In investment activities, Japanese investors have had an early presence in most of the ASEAN economies. This has generally reflected the diverse comparative advantage of ASEAN economies that range from labour cost advantages to natural resources and the increasingly more deregulated and liberalised regimes. Foreign investors have also leveraged their supply chain networks on the ASEAN platform to take advantage of this diverse comparative advantage. Even within ASEAN, there has been an increasing trend of outward direct investment especially by Malaysia and Singapore, being undertaken to leverage on regional growth opportunities.

While the current global and regional environment has since the last ten years changed dramatically, bringing with it new risks and challenges, the region has emerged strengthened with greater economic and financial resilience. Strong macroeconomic fundamentals have been sustained, and reinforced by enhanced economic flexibility. The financial and corporate sector restructuring and reform that were undertaken during the ten years have also supported these developments. Equally important is the aggressive development of the domestic financial infrastructure and financial markets. The ASEAN economies have also developed complementarities with the major regional economies in the Asian region including China, Japan, South Korea and India that has contributed to deepening of regional economic integration, reinforcing further the strong trade and investment linkages that was already present in the region. The issue before us now, is whether the South East Asian nations can rise to the challenge of sustaining its dynamism and prospects in this more challenging global environment. Allow me to elaborate on the elements that have facilitated the ability of the ASEAN economies previously to successfully adjust to shocks and to take account of the recent developments that have further strengthened their capacity and capability to deal with future shocks and thus sustain their dynamism. Improved macroeconomic fundamentals While the macroeconomic fundamentals were favourable just before the crisis, in the current environment, the external position of the regional economies has strengthened further.
Gorton, G and He, P (2008), “Bank Credit Cycles”, Review of Economic Studies 75(4), pp 1181–1214, Blackwell Publishing. Group of Thirty (2010), Enhancing Financial Stability and Resilience: Macroprudential Policy,Tools, and Systems for the Future. Hamilton, J and Lin, G (1996), “Stock Market Volatility and the Business Cycle”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 573–593. Harvey, A.C., and Jaeger, A. (1993), “Detrending, Stylized Facts and The Business Cycle”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 8, 231–247. Holmstrom, B and Tirole, J (1997), “Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3), pp 663–91, MIT Press. IMF (2009), “Lessons for monetary policy from asset price fluctuations”, World Economic Outlook, Chapter 3, October. IMF (2010), “Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer System”, Global Financial Stability Report, International Monetary Fund, April. Kay, J (2010), Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation. Kashyap, A K, Stein, J C and Hanson, S (2010), “A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation”, Forthcoming in Journal of Economic Perspectives. Keynes, J M (1931), “The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of Money Values”, Essays in Persuasion, Macmillan Publishers. Keynes, J M (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan Cambridge University Press. Kindleberger, C.P. (1978), Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Palgrave Macmillan. King, M (2010), “Banking: From Bagehot to Basel, and back again”, Speech given at the Second Bagehot Lecture Buttonwood Gathering, New York City.

With the lifting of pandemic-related restrictions in China and lower energy prices, activity among trading partners will likely be higher than we had anticipated earlier. High inflation has prompted central banks in many countries to raise policy rates to the highest levels since the 2008 financial crisis. Over the past year, foreign interest rates have risen more than Norwegian rates. Combined with the turbulence in financial markets, this has probably contributed to the depreciation of the krone. The krone is now considerably weaker than we envisaged in December. A weaker krone means an increase in prices for imported goods and services in krone terms. This will contribute to sustaining inflation in Norway. Figure 5. High employment Activity in the Norwegian economy has been higher than expected. Employment is high and unemployment is low. At the same time, we have seen an increase in labour force participation, which is a welcome development. Growth in the economy will likely be weaker ahead, but the slowdown appears to be less pronounced than projected in December. The enterprises in our regional network report slightly better prospects than before Christmas, but there are wide variations across industries. In the secondary housing market, prices have risen somewhat in recent months, but the number of homes for sale is quite high. New home sales are very low. We expect a modest decline in house prices ahead as a result of higher interest rates.
I have comments in three areas: the political economy genesis of the UK’s system; how it bears on the communication of monetary policy or what Blinder called the ‘cacophony problem’; and a plea for Blinder to widen his enquiries beyond interest-rate setting. Political economy and one-member/one-vote Modern Britain has no tradition of non-elected officials taking major executive decisions affecting the whole of the nation. This is in marked contrast to say the US where, at Federal level, the President is the only member of the executive to have reached office via the ballot box. Nor in the living memory of the UK people have we had any crises of democracy, so we have not developed national institutions, such as Germany’s Bundesbank, whose place in society was not mediated via our democratic processes. In consequence, when debates about the possibility of central bank independence got underway in earnest from the mid1980s, a widely perceived stumbling block was that central bank officials could not account personally for their decisions on the Floor of the House (of Commons). There was a democratic deficit. Resolution came via the political cost of the failure of other approaches to monetary policy, in which Ministers running for re-election decided rates; the happenstance of the development during the 1980s and 1990s of influential committees of Parliament, before which central  1  See http://econ2008.bankofcanada-conference.ca/wp-content/blinder.pdf  BIS Review 96/2008  1  bankers could (and frequently do) appear; and specific design features of the monetary regime itself.

Irma Rosenberg: The objective of monetary policy Speech by Ms Irma Rosenberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a meeting arranged by Öhman Fondkommission, Stockholm, 14 February 2006. *  *  *  A discussion has recently taken place in the media on the objective of monetary policy. Some have argued that we should have more objectives while others considered that we already work with too many objectives and that this has created a lack of clarity. In my opinion this discussion is a bit misleading. We have one objective: keeping inflation low and stable. However, in our efforts to achieve this objective, we have, like many other central banks, opted to be flexible to avoid exposing the economy to strain. Our statutory objective is to maintain price stability. It has been left to the Riksbank to decide on the detailed interpretation of this objective. We have defined it as meaning that inflation should be 2 per cent. However, monetary policy affects the economy with a time lag and is simply not precise enough to maintain inflation at a constant 2 per cent. The inflation target includes a tolerance interval of +/one percentage point to underline that temporary deviations are permitted, provided that these are not too large. For further clarity, we apply the principle that in the event of any deviation, inflation should normally be brought back to the target within a two-year period. When we set the interest rate, we must accordingly base our decision on an inflation forecast.
A BIS Review 78/1998  -5-  few minutes before the start of the scheduled 10:00 a.m. meeting, one of the Core Group firms told me that an investor group would make an offer to acquire the Long-Term portfolio. I called one of the representatives of the investor group to confirm this development. The offer was subsequently conveyed to Long-Term Capital by that investor group and a response was requested by 12:30 p.m. After a brief consultation with the Core Group, I decided that the effort to proceed with the consortium approach needed to be suspended for a short time until the alternative offer could be considered. As noted earlier, the consortium approach was seen as a “last resort”. Consequently, the meeting about the consortium approach was adjourned at about 10:50 a.m., to reconvene at 1:00 p.m. At 12:30 p.m., I learned that the alternative offer had not been accepted and would not be extended. Shortly after 1:00 p.m., the meeting about the consortium approach resumed. This was now the only solution being pursued. During the next five hours, the private sector participants discussed every aspect of the terms and conditions. At the end of that discussion, 14 banks and securities firms agreed to participate in the recapitalization, with three firms contributing smaller amounts than the other eleven. Two firms declined to participate. I want to emphasize a few points. First, this was a private sector solution to a private-sector problem, involving an investment of new equity by Long-Term Capital’s creditors and counterparties.

The Swiss franc temporarily appreciated immediately following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. The trade-weighted Swiss franc exchange rate, however, was recently below its level at the beginning of the year (cf. chart 4). Adjustment of the threshold factor I would now like to discuss the lowering of the threshold factor from 30 to 28 as mentioned earlier by Thomas Jordan. With this technical adjustment, which will take effect from 1 July 2022, we will ensure that sufficient amounts of sight deposits are subject to negative interest, and that the latter is being passed on to the money market as intended. From March 2022, upward pressure built up on the short-term rates on the secured money market. This stemmed from the fact that the exemption thresholds had risen over time due to the dynamic calculation model, which meant that there were no longer sufficient amounts of sight deposits subject to negative interest. To keep the secured short-term money market rates close to the SNB policy rate, the SNB provided additional liquidity to the money market via repo transactions as a temporary measure. However, given that the increase in exemption thresholds is structural in nature, it is appropriate that we lower the threshold factor. This will result in the secured short-term money market rates being close to the SNB policy rate again without the SNB having to regularly provide larger amounts of liquidity. The SNB will continue to regularly review the basis for calculating the exemption threshold and adjust it as necessary.
Cashiers will redenominate payments in the currency used for the institution's system, regardless of which currency the customer has used. Bank branches will provide two versions of their forms, one for kronor and one for euro; new cheques and other forms will therefore be produced. Statements of account will specify the rate at which the currency has been converted. The automatic teller systems (Bankomat and Minuten) will also have to be adapted. Moreover, banks must be prepared for people who want to make giro payments in euro right from the beginning of 1999. Some large companies may also wish to pay out wages in euro before the new currency is available in the form of banknotes and coins. As mentioned earlier, it is difficult to foresee the magnitude of demand for euro services and how soon companies and individuals will switch from kronor to euro. Monetary and exchange rate policy. A single currency implies a single monetary policy, which in EMU will be decided by the ECB. The Riksbank and the other national central banks will have the task of executing this policy. The changes for Swedish banks and other financial institutions will probably not be all that great. The Riksbank is likely to remain the financial sector's counterparty. The main differences from today for Swedish banks are a much larger market for intra-day money and counterparties located all over Europe. The detailed conduct of monetary policy is not yet clear. The final decisions are due when the ECB has been established in 1998.

Retailers have expressed a wish that this should continue to be possible with the euro, in which case an active introduction of the 1 and 2 cent coins would not be called for and we could round to the nearest 5 cents (approximately 43 öre). We appreciate this view and have promoted it at various levels but without gaining much support. So we do not yet know the outcome. It must be realised, however, that if we join the euro area, even the smallest denominations will be legal tender. So there is no way of entirely avoiding the small coins in Sweden. Cash receipts Today's cash registers are capable of recording total sums in two currencies. If each item is to be registered in both currencies, however, it seems that all the existing cash registers would have to be replaced. I agree intuitively with retailers that it would hardly be reasonable to do this throughout Sweden in order to register two currencies for a period that is likely to be shorter than six months. Perhaps we can make do with receipts that give the total in euro as well as kronor together with the conversion rate. That would be much the same information as the banks have agreed to provide on statements of account. Once again, however, this is a matter where retailers and consumers must get together and discuss what is reasonable. As I have said, EMU will affect each one of us.
Europe, with its deep financial interconnectedness and high risk of spillovers, requires a particularly close level of information-sharing and cooperative oversight – the prerequisite for the Eurosystem to provide liquidity to CCPs. The role of the central bank of issue thus needs to be acknowledged appropriately. On this note, I hope that I have been able to whet your appetite for a vigorous and fruitful exchange of views during today’s conference and leave you in the capable hands of the 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  organisers. Thank you. 1 See Cox, R. T. and Steigerwald, R. S. (2017), “A CCP is a CCP is a CCP”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,  Policy Discussion Paper, Vol. PDP, No 2017–01. 2 See BSCB-CPMI-FSB-IOSCO: Analysis of central clearing interdependencies, 9 August 2018 (second analysis)  and 5 July 2017 (first analysis). 3 See FSB work programme for 2019, 12 February 2019. 4 The revision of EMIR as regards the regulatory framework for CCPs was proposed by the European  Commission (Commission proposes more robust supervision of central counterparties (CCPs), 13 June 2017). Significant amendments have been made to the text during the legislative process, including the introduction of different frameworks for the supervision of EU and non-EU CCPs. 5 Committee of Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and Technical Committee of the International  Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO): Principles for financial market infrastructures, April 2012. CPSS was renamed as CPMI as of 1 September 2014.

Investors’ disagreement and uncertainty about the overall stance of monetary policy will reflect their views on the future evolution of both the federal funds rate and the SOMA  5  See, for example, Question 8 in the January 2013 Survey of Primary Dealers. 6  The measures of forecast uncertainty and disagreement discussed here are based on Rich and Tracy (2006) and Wallis (2004, 2005). BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  portfolio. One way to get a sense of the overall level of policy uncertainty is to convert the SOMA portfolio into “fed funds equivalents”.7 With this translation, it is possible to estimate the hypothetical level of the federal funds rate that would provide a similar amount of monetary policy accommodation as both the actual level of the federal funds rate and the size of the SOMA portfolio. Figure 2 shows the disagreement and uncertainty around this measure of policy uncertainty 12 months in the future. Disagreement about current policy is quite low relative to the past few years, which likely reflects the effect of forward guidance on expectations about the federal funds rate and the relatively low disagreement about the size of the portfolio that I mentioned earlier. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is relatively high and larger than the amount of disagreement. Since there is very little uncertainty about the level of the federal funds rate one year from now, most of this effect comes from uncertainty about the size of the portfolio.
Averagesize farms continue to be relatively small, thus restricting the development and growth of average productivity, or differently known as “the economies of scale”. There are many reasons behind this. We can mention the inheritance of the communist system and the separation of land after its collapse. As it was stated above, the lack of a normal land market also due to ownership problems, naturally plays an important role in establishing larger farms and, consequently, more competitive ones. These problems also affect the agricultural sector-bank relationship and the lending activity at home. The recent data show that lending to the agricultural sector accounts for 1.25% of total lending to businesses, on average. It is a considerably low figure, which should raise our concern, considering that this sector contributes by one/fifth to the gross domestic product. I believe that there are two reasons driving the banking system to be reluctant to finance different projects in this sector. First, risk classification and categorisation for credit to agricultural sector is a commitment different from the other activities. The lack of formalisation, even for matters such as regular maintenance of information and statistics  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  about ownership, and financial statistics, damage the farmers’ credibility from the early steps of lending. I find that there is room for prudential intervention by public institutions, not to condemn farmers, but to better prepare them and assist them in formalising their business.

2  If we analyse how lending has evolved compared with income, in the business sector the recovery of turnover and the subdued growth of debt in 2021 appear to have led to an improvement in firms’ financial situation, although on average it is still more vulnerable than before the pandemic. Thus, firms’ average debt and debt burden ratios began to fall in 2021 and the percentage of highly-indebted firms2 decreased across the board, down to almost pre-pandemic levels in the sectors moderately affected and largely unaffected, but still 7 percentage points (pp) higher than in 2019 in those that were severely affected. 2  Firms are understood to be highly indebted when their ratio of net financial debt to (gross operating profit + financial revenue) is higher than 10, or they have positive net financial debt and zero or negative earnings. 3  In the case of households, favourable labour market and income developments are also contributing to the recovery in their economic and financial situation. In 2021, households’ gross disposable income (GDI) grew by 2.2%, although it remained 2.8% down on 2019. From the onset of the health crisis to end-2021, households’ aggregate net wealth rose by 9.8%, assisted by the increase in value of their financial assets and, above all, their real estate assets and by their relatively stable debt levels.
Conclusion  Finally, I would like to make a few concluding remarks. Finland, Sweden and Norway all experienced a severe banking crisis in the early 1990s. That taught us how costly financial crises can be, and how important it is to prevent their recurrence. In the last 20 years three-quarters of IMF member countries have experienced a banking crisis. Not even a perfectly healthy macroeconomic policy and an effective supervisory system constitute a guarantee against crises if participants in the financial sector behave imprudently. The most important preventive measure is thus to promote prudent behaviour. The authorities will contribute to this end. However, I would like to emphasise that responsibility for sound practices primarily rests with market participants themselves. Banks are at the core of the financial system, and will probably remain so in the foreseeable future. However, they face increasing competition from several quarters. Unless banks adapt to this new environment, their profitability and financial strength might suffer and they may be tempted to engage in unhealthy risk taking. The authorities should look at the restructuring of the banking industry with an open mind. Structural changes may be necessary to reap the benefits of factors such as new technology and globalisation. 11  BIS Review 78/2000

Mario Draghi: Interview in Bild Interview with Mr Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank, in Bild, conducted by Mr Kai Diekmann, Mr Nikolaus Blome and Mr Daniel Biskup on 25 April 2016 and published on 28 April 2016. *  *  *  BILD: Mr Draghi, when you became President of the European Central Bank (ECB) just over four years ago, the Germans were scared that, as an Italian, you would create too much inflation. Now, even an Italian is unable to generate sufficient inflation. What is going wrong? Mario Draghi (laughs): Nothing. People in Germany can rest assured that their ECB President is doing everything to restore inflation to the right level. Our mandate is price stability, which means inflation of just below 2%. BILD: In order to achieve that, you have cut interest rates to zero. German savings are melting away like butter in the sun. Don’t you care about that? Draghi: We are well aware of the situation for savers. And it’s not only in Germany that people have to face low interest rates. But interest rates are low because growth is low and inflation is too low. Think about the alternative: if we raised rates now, it would be bad for the economy and it would unleash deflation, unemployment and recession. The interest on savings comes from growth, so it is in the interests of savers that inflation stabilises and growth becomes more robust.