samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Crude oil prices rose to about USD 75 per barrel over the summer, partly owing to the conflict in the Middle East and reduced production in Nigeria and the US. In recent weeks, oil prices have edged back again. Brent Blend futures prices nevertheless indicate that oil prices will remain high several years ahead. Export prices for Norwegian natural gas largely follow developments in oil prices with a lag. Since autumn 2005, prices for Norwegian gas exports have risen substantially according to the quarterly reports of the oil companies Statoil and Hydro. In the next few years, natural gas will account for a steadily larger share of total petroleum production on the Norwegian continental shelf. Petroleum investment has reached a high level after three years of strong growth. In 2005, investment was close to NOK 87 billion, and it is expected to edge up again this year. The large Ormen Lange and Snøhvit projects have contributed to high petroleum investment, and high oil prices have fuelled activity even at oil fields that have been in production for a long period. The development of the Skarv Idun fields will contribute to holding up petroleum investment from 2007. Information from our regional network suggests that petroleum investment provides considerable impulses to activity in Norway’s coastal regions. According to the network, suppliers to the petroleum sector are expecting strong growth to continue in the coming months.

As global capacity utilisation increases to a more normal level, demand for Norwegian exports might remain buoyant. A growing number of export enterprises are facing capacity constraints, particularly in the production of metals and refined petroleum products. Export growth in the years ahead will probably occur in industries such as the engineering and shipbuilding industries. Production growth is now high in these sectors, and employment is rising after declining for several years. High growth in the global economy has also pushed up prices for non-oil commodities. Rising commodity prices and buoyant activity in markets that are important for Norway have generated growth impulses to the Norwegian economy. Since May this year, commodity prices have varied  BIS Review 80/2006  3  widely, but on the whole edged up since end-June. International equity markets have stabilised since the turbulence in May, and have edged up since the previous monetary policy meeting. The benchmark index on the Oslo Stock Exchange is now about 15 per cent higher than at the beginning of the year. Interest rates are still low among many of our trading partners, in spite of the increases in several countries as a result of rising energy prices and higher consumer price inflation. In the US, there are now expectations that the rate tightening cycle is nearing an end, and that the policy rate will be lowered in the course of next summer. A rise in key rates is expected over the next year in the euro area, Sweden, the UK, Australia, Japan and Switzerland.
The first is that the recovery is being propelled by a virtuous circle between rising consumption, employment growth and labour income. As low financing costs and, initially, low oil prices have 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  fed through into household spending, the labour market has strengthened and real disposable incomes have accelerated. Around 50% of the rise in real labour income since mid-2014 can be explained by more people in work, with most of the rest explained by lower inflation boosting real wages. This has in turn fed further consumption growth as households have kept saving rates stable, leading to higher employment, income and spending. And as aggregate demand has strengthened, investment has also begun a cyclical recovery, which we expect to reinforce growth dynamics going forward. However, it still remains 10% below its pre-crisis peak and well below its historical trend. Importantly, domestic demand has firmed against the backdrop of improved private sector balance sheets, which is the second key feature of the recovery. For virtually the first time since the start of monetary union, spending has been rising while indebtedness has been going down. Especially in formerly stressed countries, debt ratios for both firms and households have fallen substantially. And pertinent for the strength of the recovery, the drivers of this deleveraging have been changing. Bear in mind that there are two types of deleveraging: “macroeconomic” deleveraging – reducing debt ratios through nominal growth – and “balance sheet” deleveraging: paying off or writing down debt.

Historically, the most drastic processes of deleveraging, including the post-war episodes and the recent post-crisis episode in the US, have relied on both mechanisms. But the contribution of nominal growth has always been decisive for success. In the euro area, until recently, real growth and inflation were too low to foster macroeconomic deleveraging, so balance sheet repair had to take place through the more painful channel, conflicting with the objective of macroeconomic stabilisation. Rising nominal growth is now helping to reconcile those two goals. Nevertheless, further efforts are still needed to work through the legacies of the crisis, especially in parts of the euro area banking sector where nonperforming loans remain high. The third important feature of the recovery is its broadness across sectors and countries – which is to say, it has not only strengthened but become more homogenous across the euro area. This reflects above all the effectiveness of our measures in narrowing financing conditions across different economies. If one looks at the percentage of all sectors in all euro area countries that have positive growth, the figure stood above 80% at the end of last year – above its historical average of 73% and the level observed during the 2009–11 recovery. Similarly, the dispersion in growth rates across both sectors and countries has also narrowed significantly and both are now at their lowest level since 1997. The same story is visible for employment. In early 2014 the vast majority of euro area headcount growth was coming from Germany.
UK banks, in particular, have sizeable direct investments in the US and large cross-border exposures to US banks and corporates. Cross-border exposures to US non-bank borrowers stand at around $ bn, more than 50% higher than the equivalent exposures to the rest of Europe, while the total exposure of UK banks to the US amounts to $ bn, or 8% of UK GDP. Close ties in financial markets parallel the strong links in other sectors. Whether it is Grand Met seizing the Pilsbury Doughboy or Ford making off with Jaguar and Aston Martin, there has been a significant and increasing flow of direct investment in both directions across the Atlantic. The close correlation between movements in the FTSE and Dow is testament to the links between the US and UK corporate sectors. Given the strength of these ties, UK banks and investors are inevitably vulnerable to a US slowdown. The scale of UK exposures to the US helps to give some dimension to the scale of this risk. An analysis based on the market ratings of borrowers suggests that the statistically expected annual losses on UK bank's exposures to the US are likely to be around $ or about 1% of UK exposure. In principle, banks should have fully anticipated these losses in their loan pricing and general provisioning. But bank capital is there primarily to absorb unexpected losses, for example the consequences of an unexpectedly deep US recession.

I will return to banks' capital adequacy later but  BIS Review 4/2001  1  first I want to say a few words about our perception of the US economy and the implications for the UK. US Economy: Soft or Hard Landing? The dramatic improvement in US economic performance through the 1990s, in terms of growth and productivity, gave rise to a sharp increase in expected returns to investment and, as a result, increased domestic and foreign demand for US assets. Investment has been particularly concentrated in ICT (information, computers and telecommunications), much of it financed by borrowing on the strength of projected future profits. However, growing uncertainty over the size and permanence of these productivity gains, and about the long run growth of GDP and profits, has fuelled the recent increase in market volatility. In addition, there have been more immediate worries about the impact of a cyclical downturn in productivity and earnings. Another area for debate has been the implications of any reversal in capital flows. As I have noted, buoyant earnings expectations drove up equity prices and encouraged high rates of investment. But alongside the rapid rise in the market value of US household wealth in relation to income came a sharp fall in domestic savings. The gap between savings and investment - manifested in an external current account deficit which has risen to an unprecedented rate of 4½% of GDP - has been filled by large capital inflows.
Since there has been no deterioration in their money multipliers, central banks of emerging market economies have not felt the urge – experienced by their counterparts in advanced economies – for an unconventional broadening in their money bases. Esteemed participants, distinguished guests, In emerging market economies, the gradual alleviation of the pressure on financing sources – caused by public sector demand – has provided significant room for the private sector to invest in physical capital. These investments have enabled – via capital markets and the banking system – the use of both domestic as well as foreign savings. These shed light on the importance and prominence of institutional capacity and financial infrastructure for financial stability. Smoothly functioning payment and settlement systems is the first and foremost significant requisite for strengthening financial infrastructure in emerging market economies. The existence of both a stock market backed by a strong capital market and also a bond market in local currency is also essential. Another important structural factor is a sound banking system. An adequate legal infrastructure, strong capital structure and confidence-based management are the prerequisites for such a system. Distinguished guests, A strong infrastructure is a “necessary-but-not sufficient” component of financial stability. Another “sine qua non” for more stable global capital flows is developing and implementing a macroprudential policy framework, and emerging market economies have taken important steps in this direction in the post-2008 period.

If a non-European country wanted to help Europe, there is the question of whether it should send the money to the IMF or use it to purchase EFSF bonds, a senior tranche of the SPV, or the peripheral countries’ debt, i.e. with no intermediation. The many uncertainties associated with the specific operation of the EFSF are giving rise to general doubts about the appropriateness of the current approaches to overcoming the ongoing debt crisis in the euro area. I cannot help feeling that many solutions to the problems have been wrongly chosen in part because the main causes of the financial and debt crisis have not been correctly identified. Greece gets too much attention from decision- and policy-makers. It represents a mere 1/50 of the European economy. I believe that without the political will to provide Greece with massive support from European funds to restore its competitiveness – and I see little such will at the moment – its exit from the euro area will be inevitable, since depreciation of the Greek currency will become part of the measures to restore competitiveness. The provision of loans to Greece has so far primarily bought time. This has enabled wealthier Greeks to transfer their savings out of the country. The costs of such action have been a reduction in Europe’s credibility and harm to the reputation of the International Monetary Fund and its ability to raise funds outside Europe.
A bank intending to serve such conglomerates should have an integrated system across countries and advisory services for alternative funding such as from the capital market. These require more investment in IT and people. On connectedness, financial integration has a key role in supporting business opportunities in ASEAN. If you compare the pace of financial integration to economic integration, there is still a lot of catching up. For example in Thailand, foreign assets in the banking system account for about 10 percent of total assets, still well below intra-ASEAN trade at 24 percent and investment at 17 percent. Currently, financial institutions are already on the journey toward financial integration through outward presence, as well as strategic partnerships and alliances. This will be further enhanced with Qualified ASEAN Banks (QABs) and greater cohesiveness and transparency of regulation in ASEAN. To underpin ASEAN’s promising future and growth potential, infrastructures necessary to facilitate financial integration is also important. Further linkages of financial infrastructures should be encouraged and promote usage of already integrated systems, such as the regional payment systems. I must admit that the regulatory landscape for banking in ASEAN countries are quite diverse and include many legacy regulations which impede integration. This makes financial integration more difficult to achieve. This is one area that ASEAN as a group has recognized and will tackle under its financial integration plan Post-2015 to accommodate AEC 2025 agenda. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Finally, on sustainability, a banking system that is competitive, inclusive, and connected needs to also be sustainable.

At the same time, the SSM will develop its own more detailed supervision manual, which lays down the supervisory approach to be taken by the SSM including on off-site and on-site reviews, risk assessments and model validations. The ECB and the EBA are cooperating closely to ensure that these two projects are fully consistent. Here again, the existence of the SSM will greatly facilitate the work of the EBA, as all SSM members will naturally converge in their supervisory practices. Third, the conduct of stress tests. The Council Regulation requests the SSM to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the banks that the ECB will supervise directly. This will have two main building blocks. First, a balance sheet assessment, which is a point-in-time evaluation of the asset side of banks’ balance sheets. Second, a forward-looking assessment of individual banks’ capital positions and provisioning levels in the form of a stress test. This stress test, and future stress tests undertaken as part of the SSM’s regular supervisory functions, will be conducted in close cooperation with the EBA, in particular regarding the design and timing of the exercises. European Systemic Risk Board As regards interactions with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), the activities of the SSM will have a clear systemic dimension and so cooperation between the SSM and ESRB will be essential.
The Committee has also indicated that it will take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and costs of its purchases when adjusting their size, pace, and composition. While noting that purchase activity will depend on these factors, the  1  The FOMC also directed the Desk to reinstate its previous policy of rolling over maturing Treasury holdings into new issues. See the Desk’s Frequently Asked Questions for more information. In practice, the amount of maturing proceeds will be quite small, since securities maturing within the next three years were sold as part of the MEP  2  This excludes about $ billion of MBS trades scheduled to settle in the future. 3  I would like to thank members of the Markets Group Staff, including Katherine Femia, Lorie Logan, Linsey Molloy, Roman Shimonov, and Nathaniel Wuerffel, who contributed to the preparation of these remarks. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  Committee has not specified the time at which purchases will be complete or the total expected size of the purchases. Instead, under this conditional, outcome-based approach, the Committee has enacted a policy that will adjust to incoming information about labor market conditions and the broader economy, as well as its ongoing assessment of the efficacy and costs of purchases. Retaining the flexibility to adjust purchases is an important feature of the program, given our relatively limited experience with the use of the balance sheet as a monetary policy tool and the uncertainty about the policy’s effects.

One of the potential costs of additional purchases is that they could disrupt functioning in Treasury and MBS markets – a cost that the Desk carefully assesses when it implements the FOMC’s policy directive. As you know, there is a finite supply of Treasury and agency securities available to purchase, in terms of both total amount and amounts available in the market at any given time. If the Federal Reserve were to become too dominant a buyer or holder, it could reduce the tradable supply of these securities and discourage trading among market participants, leading to diminished liquidity and price discovery. A significant deterioration in liquidity could lead investors to demand a premium for transacting in these markets, ultimately raising borrowing costs and undermining the program’s policy goal.4 However, as discussed later, the purchases have gone smoothly so far, and market liquidity seems to be holding up well. Although the current program is different in some respects from prior balance sheet programs, its intended purpose and the ways the Committee anticipates it will impact the economy are similar. The purchases are conducted to achieve the FOMC’s dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability. Asset purchases help achieve this mandate by putting downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, supporting mortgage markets, and helping to make broader financial conditions more accommodative. The current purchases reduce interest rates and ease financial conditions through the same transmission channels as previous balance sheet programs.
In order to achieve this, the board shall have clear, well-defined and understood responsibilities. There shall be a balance of skills, knowledge, experience and perspectives among directors so that the board works effectively to ensure the long-term safety and soundness of the institution.” The guidelines in this respect expect the board of directors to exercise professionalism by having a formal charter that sets out its responsibilities, having a rigorous formal processes for evaluating its performance along with that of board committees and individual directors and, ensuring that the institution complies with all relevant laws, and codes of business practice, and that it communicates with its shareholders and relevant stakeholders openly and promptly Principle 6 – roles of senior management “It is the responsibility of management, under the direction of the chief executive officer, to conduct the institution’s business and affairs in an effective, responsible and ethical manner,  2  BIS Review 129/2007  consistent with the principles and direction established by the board through the strategic plan.” Apart from reflecting integrity in their management of the institution, the guidelines for this principle require that senior management be appropriately qualified to run the affairs of the institution. The expectation is that people of appropriate qualifications will reflect the professionalism that is required of their respective professions.

Mr. Chairman, the international work that is being done in respect of money laundering and corruption payments or terrorist financing is such that trade and service companies, like banks, are now being held accountable for what they deal in and whom they trade with – as suppliers as well as buyers. The implications of anti-money laundering (AML) are such that they extend to all forms of finance, industry and business. It is thus critical that the principles of integrity and professionalisms are applied in all spheres of institutional activities. Mr Chairman Ladies and gentlemen I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 129/2007  3
BIS central bankers’ speeches  depression. 5 And there have been several notable shifts in the nature of employment which may have affected people’s satisfaction with their job. One is in the changing nature of employment. The number of people in self-employment has risen from 3.6 million in 2005 to around 4.7 million today and so, less dramatically, have numbers of workers on temporary contracts. Those on zero-hours contracts have risen from 120,000 to 800,000. Some of this shift in employment practices is likely to have been a voluntary choice by workers to increase their job flexibility – for example, those nearing retirement or returning to work after childcare seeking part-time employment. But this is not the full story. Around 15% of those working part-time would prefer to be in full-time employment. And around a third of those on temporary contracts would prefer to be on permanent contracts. For those individuals, the darkside of labour flexibility – job insecurity – may be being felt. Some measures of job insecurity are consistent with that. For example, job insecurity would tend to lower the likelihood of people moving jobs. 6 As Chart 6 shows, job-to-job flows began rising slowly after 2010 but remain at levels well below their pre-crisis levels. Meanwhile, surveys suggest around a quarter of workers currently are afraid of losing their jobs, the highest level in several decades. 7 Citizens Advice has recently estimated that around 4.5 million workers in England and Wales are in insecure employment.

By slicing and dicing the data in different ways, it is possible to assess how different segments, sectors and regions of the UK have performed during the recovery. That means looking at aggregate metrics of economic health, such as income, employment and wealth. But a different lens is provided by looking at these metrics on a disaggregated basis and at non-standard measures of societal well-being. Taken together, these disaggregated data tell a rather more nuanced story about the UK’s recovery: a recovery which for most has been slow and low, for many partial and patchy and for some invisible and incomplete. This uneven economic surface helps reconcile the macro data and the micro stories from my regional visits – the “recovery puzzle”. It also has implications for what happens next to the economy in the light of the referendum, including monetary policy, on which I will conclude. Why it matters Before turning to the data, it is worth spending a moment on why this matters. Why look at the distributional pattern of activity when monitoring the economy as a whole and when setting monetary policy? This might seem like a strange question. Surely the fortunes of different sectors and segments of society are important? Yet, at least viewed from one angle, the distribution of gains and losses across the economy and across society ought not to much matter, at least when it comes to setting monetary policy. Here is why. The tools available to monetary policymakers, like the Bank of England, are small in number.