samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
If we manage this, we can also try to influence cyclical fluctuations in, for instance, production and employment. As I said, this sounds simple but we now have to manage the fact that the commodity price rises are on the one hand pushing up inflation and on the other hand dampening growth. A tight monetary policy could contribute to dampening inflation. At the same time, it would restrain real activity in the economy in a situation when economic activity is slowing down. The decision is not made easier by the fact that it is difficult to capture and predict all of the effects of an increase in commodity prices on the economy and – not least – how persistent the price impulses will be. If it is a question of temporary effects on inflation, these need not be counteracted by monetary policy. Sometimes one hears the argument that the Riksbank should not try to counteract price increases that are impossible to stop. One such example is the rising world market price for oil. But even prices we have little possibility to affect, other than to the extent that the exchange rate is affected by monetary policy, are included in the basket of goods that measures consumer prices. This is of course because they affect households’ purchasing power. A price impulse can gain a foothold and have long-lasting effects on inflation regardless of where it originates. And the central bank must parry long-lasting effects, whether the impulses come from wages, food prices, oil or something else.

Demand from emerging markets One factor that has definitely been important is that emerging markets with a large population such as China and India have been increasingly integrated into the world economy. This was something that dampened inflation for a long period. Industrial nations were able to import cheap goods from emerging markets. At the same time, the increased international competition held back price rises on many domestic products. In this way the central banks were helped in keeping inflation at bay. For some central banks, including the Riksbank, the  BIS Review 57/2008  1  problem was rather how to get inflation up to target level. But now there appears to have been a turnaround. The emerging markets’ demand for energy and metals, but also food commodities, has grown and global inflation is beginning to be pushed up instead. This development is reinforced by some of these countries having price regulation that prevents the high world market prices from having an impact on the domestic market. Supply effects and alternative use of agricultural products But there are more explanations as to why prices have risen. Supply has not managed to keep up with demand. There were probably few who predicted the very rapid growth in the new economies. In addition there are natural rigidities regarding increasing supply. Quite simply, it takes time to progress from prospecting to mining. It is also possible to point to specific supply shocks. Poor harvests in many areas, such as Australia, have affected food prices.
In fact, infrastructure (b) loans tend to be “unique” rather than “common”, and each can have its own risks and corresponding mitigation structures, which would pose challenges to the 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  structuring, rating and assessment processes; given such unique nature of infrastructure loans, originating and managing an (c) infrastructure loan portfolio require the asset manager to possess highly specialized skillsets and experience, and the track record of the asset manager is a key assessment criterion of rating agencies as well as prospective investors; the risk appetite of many long-term investors may need to adjust over time. Over the past few years, we have seen an increasing interest among conventional long-term investors like pension funds and insurance companies in infrastructure-related (d) assets, possibly because the conventional fixed income instruments have failed to provide a decent return amidst the long-depressed yield environment. However, the appetite of such investors tended to focus on the small set of prime quality, investment grade-tranche of infrastructure loan assets, whereas many infrastructure loans may fall in the sub-investment grade domain. 8. Ladies and gentlemen, the reputation of financial derivatives was badly damaged during the Global Financial Crisis. The mortgage-backed securities, CDO, CDO2 and CDO3, etc. all got a bad name, for good reasons.

News conference  Berne, 13 June 2019 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  In my remarks today, I will present the key findings from this year’s Financial Stability Report, published by the Swiss National Bank this morning. In the first part of my speech, I will talk about the big banks, before going on, in the second part, to outline our assessment of the situation at the domestically focused banks. Big banks  The global economic and financial market conditions that the two Swiss big banks are facing have become slightly more difficult since our assessment this time last year. Nevertheless, further progress has been achieved in implementing the revised ‘too big to fail’ regulations. This holds true for both areas covered by the regulations: resilience and resolution. As regards resilience, the Swiss big banks Credit Suisse and UBS have slightly improved their capital situation overall. As a result, they are now close to full compliance with the lookthrough going-concern capital requirements on a consolidated basis. The current calibration of these regulatory requirements is necessary to ensure adequate resilience at both banks. This is confirmed by both our loss potential analyses and the historical loss experience during the last financial crisis. The market’s assessment of the two big banks’ resilience is generally similar to that of the previous year. Their stand-alone ratings, which evaluate the intrinsic financial strength of the banks, assuming no extraordinary external support, remain unchanged.
Accordingly, our baseline scenario has revised the growth outlook for the world and our trading partners for 2013 and 2014 slightly downward (table 1). The portfolio realignment originating in the transition to a more balanced configuration of the external scenario has not been without volatility, which again was evident in the weeks before the close of this Report. Although the authorities of the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) have pointed out that the unconventional stimulus program will be withdrawn gradually – helping to tone down the reaction of the markets – most recently volatility has been on the rise. Capital flows to emerging economies have retreated and become costlier, especially in the most vulnerable economies. The U.S. dollar depreciated against the currencies of developed economies, but appreciated in the emerging world. As I said at the beginning of this presentation, the latter has complicated macroeconomic management in some countries because of its inflationary and financial effects, and has led to reverse previously adopted exchange rate interventions. In the developed markets, long-term interest rates have risen again, internalizing that the Fed will soon begin reducing its asset purchases. In Chile, since our June Report, domestic output and demand have continued with the gradual normalization process that began this year, growing less than in 2012 for the second consecutive quarter. In the second quarter, GDP expanded 4.1%, confirming the slowdown (figure 2).

It is expected that by 2025, the number of older people in Thailand will account for 20% of the population and exceed the number of children under 15 years old. In an ageing society, banks that are able to cater to the needs of older population and tailor their products to accommodate changing demands would be successful. The next trend, urbanization, happening in many East Asian countries, brings both challenges and opportunities. According to the World Bank Research that just came out early this year, almost twelve million people in Thailand now live in urban areas; about ten million live in Bangkok alone. The number seems low for the area outside Bangkok because of the strict definition of urban areas employed by the World Bank. The same research also says that, cities outside Bangkok are growing at a much faster rate, and some cities such as Surat Thani have more than doubled its population in ten years. Urbanization results in increased purchasing power and fuels domestic demand. More infrastructure investments such as housing, electricity and transportation will be required. This is where the financial sector can contribute and benefit from the development. The trend towards regionalization poses a fourth challenge as well as an opportunity for the banking sector. With the commencement of the AEC in 2015, competition will intensify, benefiting those prepared to pursue opportunities across borders.
The resolution frameworks, in step with the text of the Directive, are structured in three phases: prevention; early intervention; and resolution in the true sense of the term. 1.- In the preventive phase, recovery and resolution plans must be designed. Recovery plans are drawn up by the banks themselves and should include a series of actions relating to the institution’s capital and liquidity in order, should the case arise, to restore its financial equilibrium. Supervisors must revise these plans, identifying potential impediments to their proper application. Resolution plans are agreed by the resolution authorities and seek to establish a catalogue of actions that the authorities might take in situations in which a credit institution is close to non-viability. 2.- For the early intervention phase, supervisors are entitled to take measures before a bank’s financial position deteriorates irremediably. These measures have helped bolster conventional tools, such as limiting dividend pay-outs. These new measures include most notably the possibility of altering a bank’s business strategy or the power to call for legal changes in a bank’s structure. 3.- The third, resolution phase is what leads to the reorganisation of a credit institution, making use of specific mechanisms. Most prominent in this connection has been the socalled bail-in, involving rescuing a bank from the inside, as opposed to the traditional publicsector bail-out. A bail-in entails the possibility of cancelling – or converting into capital – the entitlements of specific shareholders and creditors of credit institutions in a position close to insolvency.

John C Williams: The right tools for our time Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the International Economic Symposium co-hosted by the Deutsche Bundesbank and NABE, Eltville, 10 May 2022. ***  As prepared for delivery Good afternoon. I'm so pleased to be here with you today. We've waited a long time to gather in person. And I think we can all agree that meeting in this charming location was worth the wait. For most visitors, Eltville is renowned for its wine and roses. But for economists, it's a place to convene for weighty discussions on monetary policy. Given the events happening around the world today, there is much to discuss. We are meeting at a time of significant economic challenges and uncertainties. Inflation has reached levels not seen in decades, both in the United States and in many other countries. And recent events-including the war in Ukraine, lockdowns in China, and other supply disruptions related to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic-are exacerbating near-term inflationary pressures and uncertainty about the global economic outlook. The challenge for monetary policy today is clear: to bring inflation down while maintaining a strong economy. This, of course, is at the heart of the Federal Reserve's dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment. Although the task is difficult, it is not insurmountable. We have the tools to return balance to the economy and restore price stability, and we are committed to using them.
Headlines: UK heads for credit crisis. Closed for credit. Credit card sales dive. Facts: bank and building society lending up by 0.7% in the latest month (September) and by 8.8% over the past year. Credit card lending was up by over 26% on a year ago. Headlines: House prices hit as recession clouds gather. Facts: house prices rose by 6.7% over the past year on the Halifax index and by 7.5% according to the Nationwide. Now I say all this, President, not to draw attention to the proclivity of headline writers, and some economic/financial commentators, to sensationalise. My serious point is that, especially at a time of unusual uncertainty as at present, we all need to focus more carefully than ever on the evolving facts, and on the more probable outcomes and not allow ourselves to become preoccupied with extreme, even if possible, outcomes. Against that background, let me offer you my own assessment of where the UK economy has come from and where it is headed. Since the recession of the early 1990s the economy as a whole has, as I say, grown at an average annual rate of just over 3% - well above trend.

This is largely due to the scarcity of the instruments in the market. In Malaysia, the growing ringgit sukuk market has resulted in an active secondary market. This is largely due to the regular and varied issuances throughout the year. This is supported by the investment in research and development and in talent development to ensure the availability of expertise in the structuring of sukuk instruments and in sukuk documentation. Having the potential to innovate new instruments will depend on having the necessary talent. This is an area of focus in Malaysia to develop the skills, expertise and capability. The Islamic financial system in Malaysia now offers a wide range of financial products and services that are competitive and able to meet the changing requirements of the domestic and global economy. Way forward for the global Islamic financial system As we advance forward, we need to recognise the forces of change and the transformation taking place in the international financial system and global economy. Relentless efforts have been initiated to reform the international financial system by the international community to address the weaknesses that have contributed to the recent crisis. In this environment, Islamic finance needs to continue to evolve to remain effective and competitive. The Islamic financial system does not exist in isolation and will continue to develop as an integral part of the global financial system.
Pill, H. (2022a). ‘Monetary policy with a steady hand,’ speech given at the Society of Professional Economists online conference, 9 February. Pill, H. (2022b). ‘What did the monetarists ever do for us?’ speech given at the Walter Eucken Institut / Stifung Geld und Währung conference, Inflation and Debt: Challenges for Monetary Policy after Covid-19, 24 June. Rudebusch, G. D., and J.C. Williams (2008). ‘Revealing the secrets of the temple: The value of publishing central bank interest rate projections’ in J.Y. Campbell (ed. ), Asset prices and monetary policy, University of Chicago Press, pp. 247-284. Tenreyro, S. (2022). ‘The economy and policy trade-offs,’ 2022 Dow Lecture given at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 23 February. 1. The title of my speech is hardly original (see Mann (2022)). Sharing this speech title with one of my MPC colleagues should reassure readers that the Committee is well-aligned in recognising its remit and mandate. 2. See Pill (2022a,b). 3. See the article on the Financial Times, 21 October 2021. 4. See Consumer price inflation, Office for National Statistics  , May 2022. 5. From today’s perspective, it is tempting to reassess policy decisions with the (considerable) benefit of hindsight. This often leads to the conclusion that policy actions should have been earlier and more aggressive. However, such assessments should recognise impossibility of acting ahead of the realisation of an unanticipated (strictly, unanticipatable) shock.

[18]  References Broadbent, B (2021). ‘Lags, trade-offs and the challenges facing monetary policy,’ speech given at Leeds University Business School, 6 December Broadbent, B (2022). ‘Reliable partners,’ speech given at Gresham College, London, 30 March. Cloyne, J. and Hurtgen, P. (2016). ‘The macroeconomic effects of monetary policy: a new measure for the United Kingdom,’ American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics Filardo, A. and B. Hofmann (2014). ‘Forward guidance at the zero lower bound,’ BIS Quarterly Review, March, pp. 37-53. Friedman, M. (1961). ‘The lag in effect of monetary policy,’ Journal of Political Economy 69(5), pp. 447-466. Giannone, D., L. Reichlin and L. Sala (2004). ‘Monetary policy in real time,’ NBER Macroeconomics Annual 19, pp. 161-200. Harrison, R., R. Thomas and I. de Weymarn (2011). ‘The impact of permanent energy price shocks on the UK economy,’ Bank of England staff working paper no. 433. Havranek, T. and M. Rusnak (2013). ‘Transmission lags of monetary policy: A meta-analysis,’ International Journal of Central Banking 9(4), pp. 39-76. Mann, C.L. (2022). ‘On returning inflation back to target,’ speech given at Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum, 21 January. Pill, H. (2019). ‘Monetary policy – ‘Whatever it takes’ within our (new?) mandate,’ chap. 3 in R. Barwell and J. Chadha (eds.) Renewing our monetary vows: Open letters to the Governor of the Bank of England, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, pp. 35–52. Page 12  Pill, H. (2021). ‘UK Monetary Policy – ‘Crossing the river by feeling the stones’,’ speech given at the Confederation of British Industry, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 26 November.
In practice, however, the expectations hypothesis hardly holds water and this is due to the risk premiums that reflect all the other factors also affecting interest rates. There is a notion that average risk premiums should be positive and increase as the period of maturity increases as investors want to be compensated for the price risk associated with holding long-term bonds. 2 In addition, risk premiums are affected by supply and demand on the bond market, which can have either positive or negative effects on risk premiums. In actual fact it is probable that risk premiums can be positive as well as negative and that they fluctuate a great deal over time in a rather irregular way. This makes it difficult to adjust market rates in a way that excludes the effects of risk premiums and reveals expectations concerning future interest rates. Normally, it may be possible to come reasonably close using standard adjustments, but when, as in recent years, the markets are highly uneasy and uncertain at the same time as the central banks are actively influencing price formation using various unconventional measures, it is very difficult to reliably estimate expectations. But is it important for us to be able to distinguish monetary policy expectations from the other factors that affect the interest rate? The answer is that it matters when evaluating the alternative courses of action for monetary policy.

Total investment will amount to just under 13½% of GDP in 2010, while business investment will be about 9%. Over the period 1980-2009, total investment averaged 22% of GDP, while business investment averaged 13% of GDP. This year’s total investment ratio is the lowest since World War II. The ratio of business investment to GDP has been lower than in 2010, however: in 1945, in 1993-1995, and in 2009. Even in 2013, at the end of the forecast horizon, investment will be only about 18% of GDP, which is below the 20% needed to maintain 3% output growth in the long run. This development in the level of investment is not inconsistent with the experience of other countries with a high pre-crisis investment ratio. Nonetheless, it is cause for some concern, and it is important to ensure that these will be “only forecasts”, for nothing is inevitable in such matters. In speeches I have given in the recent past, I have emphasised that, although the interest rate level has certainly affected the investment level, it is probably far from being the most important determinant, particularly with interest rates as low as they are right now. I think other factors are much more influential, such as post-crisis risk aversion, uncertainty about demand and operating environment, reduced access to foreign credit, and impaired corporate balance sheets. These hurdles must be overcome, and they are one of the reasons that it is so important that progress be made in corporate debt restructuring.
Discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate The minimum exchange rate has undoubtedly served Switzerland well during an exceptional period. However, the old adage popular among economists – “there’s no such thing as a free lunch” – holds true for monetary policy as well. The SNB Governing Board was well aware that the introduction of a minimum exchange rate would entail certain risks – and we consistently alluded to these. That the SNB would have to make large foreign currency purchases and expand its currency reserves in order to enforce the minimum exchange rate was thus to be expected. The SNB must be willing to bear these risks if doing so is necessary for the fulfilment of its legal mandate, and if these risks are justified given the chances of success. We enforced the minimum exchange rate consistently for more than three years (6 September 2011 to 15 January 2015). At the peak of the euro crisis in 2012, the SNB had to purchase CHF 188 billion of foreign currency. Adding this to purchases from prior years reveals that the SNB’s currency reserves rose from CHF 50.5 billion in 2007 to  1  In August 2011, the SNB announced that it would very significantly increase the supply of liquidity to the Swiss franc money market by expanding banks’ sight deposits at the SNB from CHF 30 billion to CHF 80 billion within a few days.

Fritz Zurbrügg: After the minimum exchange rate – new monetary policy challenges Speech by Mr Fritz Zurbrügg, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Money Market Event, Zurich, 26 March 2015. *  *  *  The speaker would like to thank Dirk Faltin for his valuable support in preparing this speech. He also thanks Marco Huwiler and Peter Kuster for helpful comments. Accompanying charts can be found at the end of the speech. Ladies and gentlemen A warm welcome to our traditional Money Market Event in Zurich. We are delighted that so many of you accepted our invitation to attend. A year ago at this gathering, I spoke to you about the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) investment policy. At the time, I touched only peripherally on monetary policy and the minimum exchange rate of CHF 1.20 per euro. It will come as no surprise to you that this year I have decided to devote my talk exclusively to monetary policy. On 15 January of this year, the SNB discontinued the minimum exchange rate to the euro. This step attracted a good deal of attention around the globe and triggered dramatic price movements on the financial markets for a short time. It has significant implications for large sections of Switzerland’s economy. For the SNB, too, the decision to discontinue the minimum exchange rate was a momentous one. I would like to take this opportunity to explain our rationale for discontinuing the minimum exchange rate in more detail.