samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
3. Of course, CRAs cannot be blamed for every market failure. Let’s turn to the European sovereign debt crisis, the epicenter of which has been Greece. When Greece joined the eurozone in 2001, its sovereign debt rating was a mere A-. The market yield of its sovereign debts denominated in the Greek drachma in 1995 was about 17%. In 2003 after its accession to the eurozone, Greece had its credit rating upgraded slightly to A+, still not a very high rating. Yet, in the ensuing nine years or so, market players were particularly exuberant on the country’s prospect and piled into Greek sovereign bonds without really taking into account its economic fundamentals, fiscal positions and sovereign rating. At one stage in 2005, the Greek sovereign bonds were traded at a spread of as low as eight basis points above the triple-A rated German Bunds. Looking back, this was essentially blind chasing of high risk investments by tens of thousands of market players and investors impervious to objective economic analysis and credit ratings. In the end, they suffered great losses. Furthermore, the capital market failed to price in a reasonable risk premium for the Greek sovereign debts, suppressing Greece’s borrowing costs for a prolonged period of time. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  This effectively encouraged a borrowing binge by Greece that ended up in the plight today.

The specifics of these new measures will need to be negotiated in due course. According to Government estimates, there would be an initial increase in social security contributions of 0.2% of GDP between 2023 and 2032, which could generate accumulated income amounting to 2.3% of GDP in the Reserve Fund by 2032, which includes the possible increase in value of the stock over time. Moreover, it has been established that the  19  Under the baseline scenarios of the National Statistics Institute, the AIReF and Eurostat, this ratio (defined as the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population aged 16 to 64) will rise from 30% at present to between 57% and 61% in 2050. 20  For more details, see P. Hernández de Cos (2021), “The Spanish pension system: an update in the wake of the pandemic”, Occasional Paper No 2106, Banco de España. 20  intergenerational equity mechanism adjustment may not exceed 0.8 pp of GDP per year, including any potential new measures. Therefore, based on the estimated impact of the measures adopted in the first phase of the reform, additional measures will be required to balance the system in the long term. The second part of the pension system reform envisages a series of steps to be spelt out over the course of 2022.
The Greenspan-Blinder definitions of price stability suggest that we know price stability when we see it, or rather, when we stop hearing about inflation. There is nothing mystical about the RPIX measure of inflation, nor the figure of 2.5%. But it is important to have a precise numerical target which is easy to understand in order to provide an anchor for inflation expectations and to which the MPC can be held accountable. 5. Monetary policy over the next decade: what are the challenges? Although inflation targeting has delivered many of the benefits from low inflation that were promised ten years ago, there remain real challenges for monetary policy over the next decade. Two questions have been prominent recently. First, is inflation targeting enough? Second, is deflation, not inflation, the main threat at present? Is inflation targeting enough? Do rapid increases in asset prices pose a threat to stability, even though inflation targeting has delivered steady growth with low inflation? Some commentators have suggested 8 that monetary policy target asset prices in addition to inflation. But which asset prices, and what would that mean for interest rates? House prices have been rising rapidly, and as a ratio to average earnings have reached the previous peak in the late 1980s. That might suggest that interest rates should have been higher. Sterling has for six years now been around 30% higher against the euro (or its predecessors) than before, the trade deficit has grown and the profitability of manufacturing has fallen by two-thirds.

Sheku Sambadeen Sesay: Issues relating to Africa in the context of the global financial and economic crisis Statement by Mr Sheku Sambadeen Sesay, Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, at the dinner in honour of the delegates for the African Caucus Meeting, hosted by the Bank of Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 August 2010. *  *  *  Ministers of Finance Governors of central banks Head of delegations Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen On behalf of the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma and the Board and Directors of the Bank of Sierra Leone, it is my profound pleasure to extend a warm welcome to all distinguished personalities assembled here this evening. I believe that since your arrival here in Freetown you have had a taste of the typical African hospitality which is very true of the people of Freetown. As you are aware this is my first meeting since my appointment as Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone in June this year. Our meeting is taking place at a critical period. Our countries are experiencing the effects of the slow down in the world economy triggered by the global financial crisis. As we are all aware this recent challenge far exceeds the capabilities of any single country. These challenges require international coordinations and inter-governmental collaboration which makes it imperative for us to work together.
Luis M Linde: Brief review of recent developments in the Spanish economy Testimony by Mr Luis M Linde, Governor of the Bank of Spain, before the Senate Budget Committee in connection with the draft State Budget for 2013, Madrid, 21 November 2012. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, This is the first time I am following the tradition of the Governor of the Banco de España in giving testimony to this House as part of the debate on the State Budget. It is a pleasure to do so. The Budget is being debated this year in a national and international economic context beset by difficulties. Consequently, before analysing fundamental aspects of the Budget, I think it is appropriate to briefly review some of the most significant recent developments in the Spanish economy. I will confine my comments to those developments I consider most important for the debate on this draft law. The international setting and the euro area In the current circumstances, marked by the need to complete a series of difficult adjustments, the Spanish economy’s ability to recover is heavily conditioned by the fragile external setting. On the most recent projections of the main international organisations and most private analysts, the euro area’s gross domestic product – and, therefore, the imports of our main economic partners – will hardly grow next year.

Meeting the target will depend on the numerous tax measures taking effect in the last quarter of the year ultimately yielding the expected returns, and on that offsetting the growth of debt service payments, unemployment benefits and pensions. Given the importance of meeting the deficit target in 2012, it should be foreseen that possible slippage in certain items may be offset with possible adjustments to others. The draft State Budget for 2013 sets an overall general government deficit target, in National Accounts terms, of 4.5% of GDP, in line with European commitments. That is down from 6.3% envisaged for 2012, excluding from that figure the impact of the measures to support banks which must be recorded this year (amounting to around 1 pp of GDP). The Budget envisages that the public debt ratio will increase from 85% of GDP in 2012  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  (including € billion of FROB debt due to the drawdown in December of the credit line agreed with the European authorities) to 91% of GDP in 2013. The fiscal effort these targets entail is highly ambitious (around 2 pp in terms of the cyclically adjusted primary deficit), in a setting which will remain difficult. The macroeconomic scenario accompanying the budget envisages that GDP in real terms will contract 0.5%, as a result of the 2.8% fall in national demand which would be partly offset by a 2.3 pp contribution by the external sector.
The Bank of England, which was established in 1694, was controlled by the Crown’s creditors. This limited the Crown’s scope for printing money freely. Acemoglu and Robinson maintain that the Glorious Revolution paved the way for the Industrial Revolution.14 The monetary system A man who makes pins on his own can make between one and 20 pins a day. However, if the work is distributed among several workers such that one produces the wire, another straightens it, someone else cuts it to size, yet another sharpens it, and so on, ten men can produce 48,000 pins per day. This is Adam Smith’s famous example, taken from The Wealth of Nations, of how the division of labour is important for productivity and economic prosperity.15 In Smith’s example, all the operations take place within a single factory. But in a more complex society, one firm’s output is another firm’s input. An important prerequisite for such division of labour is that there are institutions that facilitate simple trading of what is produced. The monetary system is an institution that simplifies trade in goods and thereby promotes the division of labour, productivity and economic prosperity. We must bear in mind that money and the monetary system are not a goal per se. Money is like oil in the machinery. Nevertheless, of all the systems existing within a state, the monetary system is among the more mystical when examined closely. Historically, the King issued money, initially in the form of coins.

It is sometimes hard to explain where this inflow comes from, but it indicates that in the economy there are sources that generate income, that create savings potential, meaning, the savings, although maybe not sufficient, is still substantial in our country and that deposit growth is just below the one in the good years, but it is positive and continuous, which is encouraging. Does this mean that the banks are more focused on collecting capital, than releasing money in the economy in form of credits? We can state that the deposit growth is higher than the one in the last several years, but the deposit growth is also a reflection of lack of enough alternatives for investments. You know  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  that the stock exchange is in standstill, we don't have some other developed financial markets where the citizens can place their savings, so every savings is mainly placed in form of banks deposit. Despite the inflation slows down, in the last several months, according to the NBRM estimations, it seems that the banks restrain over landing. Is this an indicator for the unfavorable conditions in the economy, or on the market, or is it a try for further reduction of the inflation? No, the inflation is not an issue, since it is on quite moderate level, 2.8 percentages is the latest data for August and we expect average inflation of about 2.8 percentages for the entire year, there is no probability for inflationary pressures in the following period.
But I do not consider that there is a single measure that can or should be held up as the only measure that we should adjust monetary policy to. At least as important as the various estimated gap measures are survey-based measures of resource utilisation such as capacity utilisation in the manufacturing industry and labour market shortages, as well as indicators from the traditional labour market statistics. The labour supply holds a central position among these indicators. At this point, I would like to point out that it is important to not just see the labour supply as a homogenous aggregate. Equilibrium unemployment is influenced by how well the match between jobseekers and job vacancies works. And the conditions for this matching are influenced by factors such as the composition of the labour supply, which, in turn, may partly be due to changes in the population structure. I will return to this point later on. The central message of my speech here today can be summarised as follows: to reduce the risk of going seriously wrong with monetary policy, I consider it important not to place any blind faith in the exactness of the gap measures we use, be this the unemployment gap or any other measure. So I have nothing against the fact that we use different measures; rather, I am concerned about how we use them. Let me now discuss the problem of calculating the unemployment gap, which, as I was saying, is produced by comparing actual unemployment with equilibrium unemployment.

The approach must be chosen by each institution under the control of the supervisor, in relation to size and level of sophistication;  –  the supervisory review process (Pillar II), which gives supervisors a key role in assessing the risk profile and the quality of risk management of each institution as well as the corresponding minimum regulatory capital ratios;  –  market discipline (Pillar III), which enhances public disclosure requirements. These three pillars, whose technical aspects I shall not discuss today, constitute an ensemble aiming mainly to: i) improve banks’ risk management, ii) align regulatory capital more closely with the actual risks incurred by banks, iii) enhance the role of  BIS Review 11/2008  1  supervisors, as well as iv) that of market discipline and therefore, ultimately, v) strengthen financial stability. The implementation of such a framework, embracing a broad spectrum of possible approaches for banks and covering a large array of risks, is no simple matter and accounts for the current variety of national situations, including within the G10: Japan for example implemented Basel II in 2007, EU Member States are set to do so in 2008 and the United States in 2009. The magnitude of this task is particularly vast since Basel II, in view of the very nature of its objectives that I have just recalled, will be applied in a very large number of countries.
Ivan Iskrov: Bulgarian National Bank – independence, predictability and transparency Speech by Mr Ivan Iskrov, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, before the 41st National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria on the occasion of his election for a second term of office, Sofia, 26 August 2009. *  *  *  Ms. Speaker, Ladies and Gentlemen MPs, Allow me first and foremost to thank you for the enormous trust and the strong support you just now gave to the Central Bank and its Governor, Ivan Iskrov. I don’t know of any head of any public institution that has so far enjoyed such a vast parliamentary vote of confidence with the support of 195 MPs. This result exceeds the 165 votes in support of my nomination in the previous 40th National Assembly. When a week ago I shared with the person closest to me that I had decided to use the parliamentary case of Mr. Nenovsky to submit myself to a confidence vote by the 41st National Assembly, I heard the following: “Isn't this step rather too risky, besides the Prime Minister publicly announced that he did not approve of the procedure but he respects the BNB as an institution, and highly values you as a governor and wishes you to continue on the post?" I replied that no one could predict the possible deliberations and how the 240 MPs would vote, but that I was nonetheless obliged to ask for their confidence. Or else on 9th October this year I leave!

In 2007, the Kwacha appreciated against the major international currencies with the exception of the euro. Against the US dollar, the Kwacha appreciated by 7.2% compared with a depreciation of 20.7% in 2006. This was attributed largely to higher inflows of foreign exchange on the market due to increased export receipts, which largely reflected high copper prices and the continued participation of foreign portfolio investors in the domestic Government securities market. The depreciation of the Kwacha against the euro can be attributed to significant gains of the euro against the US dollar and other major currencies, supported mainly by relatively buoyant growth prospects in the euro area. 2  BIS Review 76/2008  2.5  Banking sector environment  The overall financial condition and performance of the banking sector has been satisfactory, as reflected in adequate capitalisation and most banks meeting their minimum regulatory capital requirements. With 13 commercial banks in operation comprised of both local and foreign, investment opportunities are immense. The Government through the Bank of Zambia continues to modernise the overall commercial banking environment, by endorsing various legislation to promote safe, sound and efficient operations and development of not only the banking sector but the financial system as a whole. This is evidenced by enhanced financial stability and the emergence of a number of financial institutions offering an array of financial services.
Rather than the classic staircase pattern of disbursements, the Fund should consider, in some cases, providing a larger up front tranche that floats and is available if stress materializes and policy is responding appropriately. •  The Fund should stand ready to support countries in pursuing reasonable restructuring proposals when warranted by the circumstances. Official financial resources in that context can be helpful in meeting some targeted needs. •  And finally, the Fund needs a more credible capacity to withstand arrears, so that it does not face the reality or the perception that is can be induced to accept weak programs only to allow it to refinance its exposure. Conclusion These are modest proposals. They only cover a small piece of the world of the Fund, much less the broader Bretton Woods institutions. They would not fundamentally change the balance established by the Fund’s articles between the rights and obligations of its members. But they would help position the Fund to deal with future financial pressure in emerging markets. And given the scale of the economic costs imposed by recent crises, that is an important goal. Thank you. 6  BIS Review 37/2004

These vulnerabilities increase the sensitivity of the economy and of financial and real estate markets to adverse shocks. I would now like to outline the position of the two globally active banks, Credit Suisse and UBS. I will then present our assessment of the situation at the domestically focused banks. Page 1/3  Berne, 16 June 2022 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  Globally active banks The two globally active banks developed differently in terms of profitability. UBS’s profitability increased and was high by historical comparison. At Credit Suisse, however, profitability was negative. This is on the one hand due to extraordinary items, such as large provisions for litigation, and on the other to relatively low operating performance during the period under review. The differing profitability is also reflected in market indicators such as CDS premia and stock prices. After the Archegos losses, the market drew a stronger distinction between the two banks and it continues to have a more positive assessment of UBS than Credit Suisse. With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the market’s assessment of the globally active Swiss banks and their international peers deteriorated overall. By contrast, the capital position of both banks has improved further since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report. In the case of UBS, this improvement is attributable to a capital build-up due to retained earnings; in the case of Credit Suisse, it is attributable to a reduction in exposure and a capital increase.
For example, measures that exclude energy prices can offer a false impression of the underlying dynamics of inflation if energy prices are trending upwards. Clearly, policy-makers with a mistaken view of the conjunctural situation are liable to make policy mistakes. In a stylised Taylor-rule setting, errors in assessing inflation or the output gap will lead to flawed guidance on interest rate decisions. Such considerations may have led to overly accommodative monetary policy prior to the financial crisis. 20  See: A. Orphanides and S. van Norden (2002), “The unreliability of output gap estimates in real time”, Review of Economics and Statistics 84(4), pp. 569–583; and A. Orphanides and S. van Norden (2005), “The reliability of inflation forecasts based on output gap estimates in real time”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37(3), pp. 583–601. 21  L. Bini Smaghi (2009), “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices”, Freiburg University, 14 October 2009. 22  Such as seasonal movements in food prices. 8  BIS Review 45/2010  Figure 3 Spring vintages (2002–2009) of US output gap estimates by the IMF (WEO)  Source: IMF (WEO) data Note: Output gaps are defined as the percentage deviation of actual output from potential output. To give one example, I have already discussed how the forces of globalisation at the turn of the century weighed on the prices of manufactured goods. This was an important factor underpinning the benign outlook for inflation. Yet the rapid growth of emerging market economies had other implications for global price developments.

Some increase in the transparency both of the strategy and objectives of the funds and of recipient countries’ approach to inward investment should help dispel concerns and ensure they are a force for greater global financial integration rather than a prompt for a new wave of financial protectionism. SWF’s recent investments in global financial institutions have been helpful in easing the current financial market turmoil. And the fact that they, and their central banks, are looking for higher returns and greater asset diversification should be beneficial both to the EMEs and to the recipient countries since it should improve the efficiency of global asset allocation. But that positive story should not conceal that the growth of SWFs is also a result of persistent global imbalances in trade. These imbalances have helped create vulnerabilities in financial markets and in the wider economy. Our current experience is one more illustration of how painful the unwinding of such imbalances can be.