samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In my opinion, American analysts who in general have a very optimistic view of a very short downturn underrate these risks. What effect will the American economy have on the Swedish economy? The question is also what effect developments in the American economy will have. If you look just at the effects on trade flows, the effect on Europe and Sweden is not so strong. Exports to the United States only account for a bit more than 2 per cent of our GDP and the American market has about the same importance for the euro area. In addition, we are affected by demand for Swedish goods from other countries reducing when their export to the United States drops. Moreover, some international companies with activities in the United States can affect household wealth in Europe as well through share prices –this applies not least to Sweden. Our “Swedish” companies are very international (Ericsson, Electrolux, Stora-Enso, Volvo, Atlas Copco, Skanska) at the same time as a large part of Swedish households’ shareholding is invested there. What conclusions should we draw then for the Swedish economy? I would like to begin by reminding that the Swedish economy is better equipped than for a very long time as regards the underlying climate for growth. We have sound and stable public finances. We have paid off our foreign debt after a number of years with a current account surplus. Inflation expectations are stable and unemployment has been considerably reduced (see Diagram 2).

There were other economists who would have preferred seeing more economic convergence between and within euro-zone member countries first, and they spoke out too. Both groups of economists did their jobs remarkably well. Today, most economists speak out in favour of labour market reform and other programmes for reform to make the euro zone work. Other economists prefer macroeconomic demand management. All of them want to help politicians to realise their legitimate economic ambitions. The economists’ papers, non-papers, reports and opinions are welcome. Economists in government work hard and their work is useful. Their professional life is fascinating. 4. Economists in business  The Occupational Outlook Handbook of the US Department of Labor contains the following description of what economists in business do: “Economists working for corporations are involved primarily in  BIS Review 62/2004  3  microeconomic issues, such as forecasting consumer demand and sales of the firm’s products. Economists working for corporations might also analyze their competitors’ growth and market share and advise their company on how to handle the competition. Other economists working for corporations monitor legislation passed by Congress, such as environmental and worker safety regulations, and assess its impact on their business. Corporations with many international branches or subsidiaries might employ economists to monitor the economic situations in countries where they do business, or to provide a risk assessment of a country into which the company might expand.”2 - This list is by no means complete but it provides a good first impression.
Re-establishing it may require a prolonged and costly process, which should also be taken into account. It is such fears that largely explain the policy conducted by the Riksbank in recent years. Does a policy that “leans against the wind” require there to be confidence in the inflation target? It is probably possible to construct theoretical and quantified examples in which the recession that is prevented or mitigated by “leaning against the wind” is sufficiently long and deep for it to be worth taking the cost of losing, and having to re-establish, confidence in the inflation target. But in practice, it is very difficult to imagine how a central bank, seeing that confidence in the inflation target is being eroded, could stick to a tighter policy and risk inflation expectations staying permanently low in order to perhaps prevent a financial crisis sometime in the future. I am not saying that this is a reason to never conduct a policy that “leans against the wind”. On the contrary, I am personally in favour of the idea as such, and can well imagine formally integrating such a policy into the monetary policy set-up, in the way it has been done in Norway. But one can argue a policy that “leans against the wind” is in practice a “fair-weather” policy – windy but sunny, in other words. Only as long as confidence in the inflation target is intact, there is scope to use monetary policy to counteract financial imbalances.

Figure 5: Calmer developments on the housing market Index, January 2005 = 100. 300  300  250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  50  Sources: Valueguard and the Riksbank. 20 [21]  Figure 6: Similar developments of currencies in small open economies Index, 5 January 2015 = 100. 120  120  SEK per EUR NOK per EUR AUD per EUR NZD per EUR CAD per EUR  115 110  115 110  105  105  100  100  95  95  90  15  16  17  18  90  19  Source: ECB. Figure 7: Declining use of cash in Sweden Percent of GDP. 12  12 Sweden  Norway  Other advanced economies  Euro area  10  10  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  00  03  06  09  12  15  18  0  Sources: BIS and the Riksbank. 21 [21]
For instance, the harmonised national average interest rates on the deposits and loans of households and  BIS Review 50/2008  1  corporations that are published every month by the ECB and the NCBs provide citizens and firms with very useful preliminary insights. 1 Concerning the key developments in ECB statistics over the last two years, I would like to highlight the following 2 : 1. Since June of last year the ECB and Eurostat have jointly compiled and published quarterly euro area accounts. 3 These accounts can be considered the “national accounts” for the euro area and provide a complete and consistent overview of its economic, financial and monetary developments. A fairly unique feature of the euro area accounts is their almost entirely consistent representation of “real” and financial developments, which greatly facilitates integrated analyses and permits further enhanced cross-checking of the economic and monetary analyses that feed into the overall assessment of the ECB’s monetary policy stance. 2. The euro area accounts record not only the economic and financial transactions, but also the financial balance sheets of all institutional sectors (i.e. households, nonfinancial corporations, financial corporations and general government). They integrate and complement more timely and frequent statistics, for instance by providing a sectoral breakdown of the broad monetary aggregate M3 and by providing hitherto unavailable quarterly data on household and corporate income, expenditure, savings and wealth. 3.

2  BIS Review 94/2008  In addition, regulation can also encourage procyclical risk taking. Basel I, for example, encouraged the growth of securitisation and the “originate to distribute” model of banking because holding the low risk elements of a loan portfolio in the banking book were relatively heavily capital-weighted. Basel II contains more carefully calibrated capital risk-weights and is a considerable improvement over Basel I. But the risk measures are drawn from the market and share some procyclical features. Weights increase as credit risk rises so riskweighted assets will seem relatively low during tranquil economic times and relatively high during periods of stress. While there may be scope within Pillar II to address this, it is too early to know whether that can be used effectively. The combination of these market and regulatory effects have amplified risk taking during the boom and is now constraining risk appetite as financial conditions have deteriorated. Policy responses Since the crisis broke last summer, regulators, governments and central banks have come together in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to analyse what has gone wrong and agree an international response.
To achieve this goal, we have to build on the best assets of our network: its agility; its technical competence as a “knowledge hub”; and, if I may, the relentless efforts of its Chair, my colleague Frank Elderson, and the commitment of the Banque de France to its global Secretariat. A team of 14 people from the Banque de France is the backbone of the Secretariat, strongly backed by our new Climate Change Center chaired by Nathalie Aufauvre. Given the extension of the NGFS and the deepening of its work, secondments from other NGFS members would be most welcome to contribute to the dynamism of the Network, through one year stays, on site, in Paris, or flexible options including remote work. And we intend to  strengthen our efforts to communicate and disseminate the work of the NGFS among our membership and beyond. We have increased means, and still many avenues to explore. If I had to stress only two tasks where our whole global community needs the NGFS: (i) climaterelated economic scenarios. We released a first wave in July 2020, we will update them next week. I read some unfounded doubts on them: NGFS works with the best partner research institutes, publishes a range of plausible and differentiated futures – not intended to be central forecast –, and will regularly incorporate the development of scientific evidence. This provides, as a common public good for COP26, the best reliable framework for financial risk assessment.

Green Swan 2021 Global Virtual Conference – 2 June 2021 Never too much and never too many: how to transform global discussion into global action against climate change  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Ladies and Gentlemen, This “Green Swan 2021 Global Virtual Conference” co-sponsored by the Banque de France, the BIS, the IMF and the NGFS should have taken place in Paris, birthplace of the Climate agreement and of the NGFS, but it is my pleasure to welcome you online. Central banks’ commitment to the climate cause may seem obvious today. But few issues have seen such a rapid and massive change. My generation changed its mind, I changed my mind. Many of us now share the imperative of Hans Jonas: “In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your willi”. In Amsterdam three years ago, for the inaugural Conference of the NGFS, I referred to greening finance as our “new frontier for the 21st century”. Today, the challenge could almost look inverted: we have gone from the risk of “doing too little, too late” to the criticism by some of “too many doing too much”. No: we are not doing too much (I), and we are never too many (II). But before starting, I would like to draw two useful and cautious lessons from the above-mentioned criticisms. First, we, central bankers and supervisors, cannot do everything by ourselves; we are not the only green game in town.
Opening remarks by Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a conference organised by the Bank and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee on The uncertain future of global economic integration, Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre, Reykjavík, 14-15 September 2017. I welcome all of you to this conference and the foreign participants to Iceland. The conference is organised by the Central Bank of Iceland and the Reinventing Bretton Woods Committee. The heading is broad and probably reflects in part the worries that some of us might currently have about the future of global economic integration. The topic encompasses both real economic integration – that is, trade in goods and services and the flow of labour and equipment across borders – and financial integration – that is, cross-border capital flows and stocks and associated activities of banks and other entities. The financial integration part will probably dominate the proceedings, not least because most of the speakers are current or former central bankers. I do not see that as a problem, as in my mind more work remains to be done in assessing the costs and benefits of global financial integration than regarding real side economic integration. After all, the post-war global economic order was initially based on the principles of free trade in goods, current account convertibility, and monetary stability through fixed but adjustable exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Open capital accounts were the exception, however. Real side economic integration was seen to be more important for economic progress than financial integration.

Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour: Practical aspects of dispute resolution in Islamic finance facilities Remarks by Mr Abdul Rasheed Ghaffour, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM) Law Seminar on "Practical Aspects of Dispute Resolution in Islamic Finance Facilities", Kuala Lumpur, 14 November 2017. * * *  “Past, present and future: Legal certainty and Islamic finance in Malaysia” It is my honour to join all of you today in exploring this interesting topic on the practical aspects of dispute resolution in Islamic finance. This seminar marks another significant step in fostering dialogue between Islamic financiers, Shariah scholars and the legal fraternity. Gatherings such as this serve as an important platform for Islamic finance practitioners to develop a better grasp of legal issues, and for lawyers to gain a keener sense of Islamic finance. I am encouraged to see the Association of Islamic Banking Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM) taking the lead in advancing this mission. Disputes in business transactions have been around for as long as commerce itself. It is therefore no surprise that we come across judges and lawyers very early on in human history. Earlier than bankers – and definitely long before we see the first central banker . Disputes are bound to happen. One party may not be able or willing to honour their obligations. The other party may be dissatisfied with how an obligation is performed.
Svein Gjedrem: The economic situation in Norway Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to invited foreign embassy representatives, Norges Bank, 21 March 2002. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen  The economic outlook  The world economy has been experiencing a slowdown. Economic growth stagnated in the US and the euro area in the last three quarters of 2001. Growth remained somewhat firmer in the UK, but was moderate towards the end of the year. GDP has fallen in Japan. In most countries, public and private consumption fuelled growth in demand, while a fall in capital formation and inventories has exerted downward pressure. Growth in the US economy came to a halt last spring. Overinvestment, particularly in IT and telecom equipment led to low returns on capital and reduced corporate earnings. The stock market declined when growth prospects were revised. The unemployment rate rose. Terrorism and war added to the uncertainty. The US economy is flexible and seldom remains in recession for a long period. There are some signs of an early recovery. Monetary policy and fiscal easing have supported continued growth in private consumption. Equity prices, commodity prices and long-term interest rates have picked up since the sharp decline following the events of September 11. Oil prices plunged by around 40 per cent between autumn 2000 and the end of 2001.

48  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  48  Dow, S and Montagnoli, A (2007), ‘The Regional Transmission of UK Monetary Policy’, Regional Studies, Vol. 41, No. 6, pp. 797-808. Easterlin, R (1974), ‘Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence’, in David, P and Reder, M (eds.) (1974), Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in Honor of Moses Abramovitz, Academic Press. Easterlin, R (2013), ‘Happiness and Economic Growth: The Evidence’, IZA Discussion Paper Series, No. 7187. Ellis, C and Pike, T (2005), ‘Introducing the Agents’ scores’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Winter 2005, pp. 424430. Farmer, J D (2019), ‘How complexity can resolve the crisis in economics’, speech at Santa Fe Institute, 5 May 2019. Forrester, J W (1969), Urban Dynamics, MIT Press. Forth, T (2019), ‘”Birmingham isn’t a big city at peak times”: How poor public transport explains the UK’s productivity puzzle’, CityMetric, 31 January 2019. Fratantoni, M and Schuh, S (2003), ‘Monetary Policy, Housing, and Heterogeneous Regional Markets’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 557-589. Galí, J (2015), Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework and Its Applications, Princeton University Press. Ge, J and Polhill (2016), ‘Exploring the Combined Effect of Factors Influencing Commuting Patterns and CO2 Emissions in Aberdeen Using an Agent-Based Model’, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Vol. 19, No.
15.02.2023  Latest monetary policy developments in the euro area Consejo Empresarial Alianza por Iberoamérica (CEAPI) Madrid Pablo Hernández de Cos Go verno r  Ladies and gentlemen, let me begin by thanking Consejo Empresarial Alianza por Iberoamérica for inviting me to address you all. Today I will focus on recent and future monetary policy developments in the euro area. In the first part of my address, I will explain the rationale behind the monetary policy decisions that we adopted in our European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council meeting earlier this month. In the second part, I will lay out a number of factors that will require close monitoring going forward. Our February monetary policy decisions In order to explain the rationale behind our February decisions, it is useful to first go back to our decisions and communication at our December monetary policy meeting. As you may recall, in that meeting we raised our key interest rates by 50 bp. More importantly for the purpose of my address today, we also announced that interest rates would still have to rise significantly at a steady pace to reach levels that are sufficiently restrictive to ensure a timely return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target. The ECB Governing Council’s assessment of the inflation outlook is based on a wealth of information, in which the ECB/Eurosystem staff’s macroeconomic projections – prepared on a quarterly basis – play a prominent role.

Taking these two elements together, I can conclude that, at the time of our February meeting, the risk-free forward curve – together with all the other factors influencing markets’ and experts’ inflation expectations – could be seen as compatible with a return of inflation to the 2% target in the medium term. And we acted and communicated in accordance with this assessment. First, we reiterated our determination to stay the course of raising interest rates significantly at a steady pace and keeping them at levels that are sufficiently restrictive to ensure a timely return of inflation to its 2% medium-term target, in a manner consistent with our December communication. Second, we approved a 50 bp rate hike that had already been discounted by the market. Third, we announced our intention to raise rates by another 1  The fo rward curve is used as an indicato r o f the future expected path o f the sho rt-term risk-free interest rate (as represented in the euro area by the € an index o f banks' o vernight bo rrowing co sts that very clo sely tracks the ECB’s depo sit facility rate). Strictly speaking, the fo rward curve is no t an exact indicato r o f the expected po licy rate path, because fo rward rates also co ntain term premia that fluctuate o ver time.
In the Asian financial crisis, it ran its full course with the rapid price adjustments in most asset markets taking place within a period of just over a year. In Asia , there was limited potential to reduce interest rates in an environment that was vulnerable to capital outflows. The focus of policy in Asia was therefore on the resolution of the banking sector and to restore the functioning of the intermediation process. In most of the crisis affected economies in Asia , this strategy produced positive results and growth resumed within twelve to eighteen months. Financial crisis and Islamic finance In the midst of the unfolding of the global financial crisis, it is useful to review the foundation and structures of the Islamic financial system to assess its resilience in withstanding the impact of the current and future crises. In taking into account the dynamics of the crisis and the potential implications for Islamic finance, two important dimensions are key in undertaking the assessment. The first key dimension highlights the inherent ability of Islamic financial system to deal with the test of such crisis. Islamic finance is well-supported by two essential features which serve as pillars to Islamic financial transactions. Firstly, Islamic finance encourages business and trade activities that generate legitimate profits, subject to an explicit requirement of materiality and validity of the transaction. This requirement ensures that the funds are channelled into real financial business activities, reinforcing a close link between financial  2  BIS Review 145/2008  and productive flows.

In both cases, the crises followed a period of strong growth, rapid credit expansion and sharply rising asset prices. Prior to the Asian crisis, there was indiscriminate lending to the corporate sector. Investment activity was excessive, with the ratio of investment to GDP exceeding  1  L. Laevan and F. Valencia, "Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database", (Sept 2008) International Working Paper of the International Monetary Fund, WP/08/224. BIS Review 145/2008  1  35% for many economies in the region. The sub-prime crisis similarly originated from imprudent lending practices. The low interest rate environment also accentuated the build up of the excesses and rising asset values. In Asia , domestic credit increased to unsustainable levels, reaching 180% of GDP during this period. In the United States , it had increased close to 240% in 2007. The excessive leveraging and increased risk taking reinforced the formation of asset bubbles. In both cases, there was also abundant liquidity. Both Asia and the United States experienced surges of capital inflows. This was reinforced by favourable sovereign ratings in Asia and the strong ratings for the securitized instruments in the US . The eruption of the crisis set off the reversal of these trends. There was also a failure to recognise that in a highly integrated international financial system, it meant that a crisis that originate in one part of the financial system not only would have an impact on other parts of the system but it could have far reaching implications on other jurisdictions.