samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This means that every two weeks of lockdown “costs” us approximately 1.5% of lost annual GDP and at least 1% of additional government deficit. II. Building the appropriate economic policy responses  2.1 The emergency: rapid, strong and convergent responses during the crisis Confronted with this unprecedented, and totally unforeseeable crisis, rapid, strong and convergent responses were implemented across the board in fifteen days to stem the effects of a severe economic shock. The lessons of 2008 have not been forgotten. Seldom has there been such a solid consensus on the direction and the scope of the measures to be taken, including among economists, which is quite rare. In France, we have put in place a shield to protect businesses of all sizes and to help them get through this shock, which in turn protects their employees. This “cash shield” is fashioned from both unprecedented fiscal and monetary measures. The fiscal measures put in place by the government primarily revolve around deferring payments of taxes and social security contributions, a solidarity fund for the self-employed and above all initiatives for those in partial employment – formerly referred to as “technical unemployment”, but we have fortunately inverted that description. France has thus learned from the success of Germany and its Kurzarbeit in 2009.

While  Page 8 of 8 monetary financing is prohibited by the European treaties, it would, for example, according to these theories, be possible to imagine the central bank creating money on a lasting basis to directly finance companies. In principle, nothing is excluded in intellectual debate. However, steps such as these could only be envisaged if there was a major “downside” risk for price stability. It would therefore be imperative to ensure that any such measures guide inflation towards its target. Indeed, the two pillars that must remain in place come what may during these exceptional circumstances are the central bank’s mandate – ensuring price stability – and its independence – particularly from fiscal authorities. Because these two pillars are set down in the Treaty, and, above all, because they are the foundation of our most precious asset: the confidence of European citizens in their currency. ** I would like to conclude by saying a few words about the Banque de France. We have mobilised our activities on five key fronts: our network’s support for VSEs and SMEs and households in difficulty; needs with regard to paper money; economic analysis and monetary policy; close monitoring of the markets; and the supervision of the financial resilience of banks and insurers. In this period of extraordinary uncertainty, you can count on the commitment of the women and men that make up the Banque de France.
By making it safer and fairer we can put in place the conditions for it to thrive. But whether or not it thrives will rest on the efforts of individuals and organisations to re-establish the system’s reputation for integrity. While regulators will fix the mechanics of benchmarks in markets ranging from LIBOR to FX, only private individuals and institutions can reform the behaviour that has made such changes necessary. Changes to the structure of compensation will better align the incentives of bank staff and their shareholders, but not every risk can be anticipated. Even if such a package could be devised it would not internalise the impact of individual actions on systemic risks, including on trust in the banking system. For the system to operate with integrity, penalties for misconduct cannot be seen as a cost of doing business. Rather, banks must recognise that only exemplary behaviour can confer social licence to global financial capitalism. More fundamentally, integrity cannot be legislated, and it certainly cannot be bought. Only a perspective which takes into account the wider implications of actions can guide proper behaviour. And while regulators can promote competition, end the subsidy enjoyed by institutions that are too big to fail, and determine the appropriate split of remuneration between fixed and variable elements to limit risks to financial stability, only society, not regulators, can determine whether the absolute and relative levels of compensation are acceptable. 3.

“Since the medium-term equilibrium unemployment rate depends on the composition of unemployment, it will change over time…That medium-term equilibrium unemployment rate is a different concept from the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate: the latter is the rate to which unemployment will trend towards in the long run once all of the short and medium-term effects have dissipated. That long-run equilibrium rate will reflect the institutional features of the labour market, such as the degree of labour market flexibility, and the extent to which potential employees are aligned with vacancies in terms of skills, location and occupation. Over time, the medium-term equilibrium unemployment rate should converge towards the long-run rate. Current estimates of the long-run equilibrium rate are significantly below estimates of the medium-term equilibrium rate.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  This suggests that, even though unemployment is falling faster than expected, the recovery has some way to run before it would be appropriate to consider moving away from the emergency setting of monetary policy. It is widely recognised that our 7% threshold is not a trigger for raising Bank Rate. Last August, the MPC said that when the 7% unemployment threshold was reached, there should be no assumption of an immediate, automatic change to its policy stance. It would assess the prevailing economic conditions, including wider measures of slack and inflationary pressures, before deciding the appropriate stance for monetary policy.
In a country with a limited number of banks it is less clear that a separate supervisor is needed and the central bank may well be able to take this responsibility on without risk to its reputation or of other contagion to its primary monetary policy responsibilities. In contrast to monetary policy, where the appropriate institutional framework is common to all countries, there is unlikely to be uniformity in the roles played by central banks in the supervision of the financial system. Regardless of where responsibility for regulation lies, it is hard to imagine taking steps either to prevent, or to deal with, the consequences of a financial crisis without the active involvement of the central bank. Central banks are currently at the heart of efforts to restore confidence in the banking system by the provision of liquidity against assets which have proved to be highly illiquid. But the recent challenges presented by the latest episode of financial turmoil suggest that much hard thought will need to be given to the structure and nature of banking regulation in the future. In the longer-term, it seems extremely likely that banks and other “near” banks, especially those that have been regarded as similar to banks  2  BIS Review 36/2008  in terms of their eligibility for financial assistance, will be called upon to hold more capital and a greater quantity of liquid assets than hitherto. It is too early to foresee clearly where the long-term direction will go.

Christian Noyer: Central bankers’ dilemmas under uncertainty Speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at a seminar in Buenos Aires, 5 June 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, •  Thank you for inviting me to this seminar. It is a great pleasure to address such a challenging theme, namely “Central Bankers’ dilemmas under uncertainty”. •  In the first part of my address, I will recall the nature of uncertainty and its importance for the central banker; in the second part, I will sum up proposals for addressing uncertainty. I  The nature of uncertainty  Uncertainty arises in many forms. It is crucial to central bankers in general (I/1) and maybe even more to the Eurosystem (I/2). 1)  The importance of uncertainty for the central banker  The relevance of risks and uncertainty for economic analysis was suggested in 1921, by Frank Knight (Risk, Uncertainty and Profit). “Risk” refers to situations where the decision-maker can assign probabilities to the randomness that he is faced with; “uncertainty” to situations where this randomness cannot be expressed in terms of probabilities. Uncertainty is crucial to central bankers: according to Alan Greenspan, “Uncertainty is not just an important feature of monetary policy; it is the defining characteristic of that landscape”. Thus, I will focus on monetary policy, although the topic is also relevant for financial stability, which is another important issue for central banks.
These banks provide sophisticated risk management and hedging services to the regional corporates. 11. Let me now turn to how to enhance transparency. Sound corporate governance is fundamental to a successful disclosure-based regime. The financial crisis has highlighted the importance of risk management oversight at the Board level and sparked increased global discussions on the need for better corporate governance practices. In December last year, MAS published its response to the consultation feedback on corporate governance regulations and guidelines. The enhanced rules and guidelines underscore the important role played by the Board in overseeing the soundness of the financial institutions. 12. MAS has also been promoting improvements in the disclosure and quality of information available to investors. Since the third quarter of last year, financial institutions are required to provide Product Highlight Sheets when offering investment products to retail investors. This will provide brief highlights, including an overview of product features and risks, and applies to products that are accompanied by prospectuses, including exchange traded funds, asset-backed securities and structured notes. Since January 2010, real estate investment trusts (REITS) have also been required to hold annual general meetings (AGMs). These mandatory AGMs provide an important channel for communication between REIT managers and investors. This will also increase transparency and raise the accountability of REIT managers to investors. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  13. Last but not least, we remain committed to building diversity in Singapore’s financial markets. We will continue to provide a conducive business environment that encourages innovation.

There are now 14 Asian economies at investment grades, of which, nine are at or above the single A rating. At the same time, the supply side factors are also highly favourable. The huge financing needs of Asia will support a continuous expansion in bond issuance. According to the Asian Development Bank, Asia’ s infrastructure financing needs alone amounted to USD 8 trillion from 2010 to 2020. Equally important is the emergence of new and attractive bond asset classes. The two products that have caught most attention of global investors are the sukuks in Malaysia and the RMB dim sum bonds in Hong Kong. This is rightly so as these products connect the global market with the vast and increasingly prominent financial systems in the Islamic world and China. We have seen very encouraging development of the sukuk market in Malaysia, the symbol of Islamic financing. The amount of outstanding sukuks in Malaysia increased substantially from MYR 146 billion (USD 41.3 billion equivalent) at the end of 2006 to MYR 361 billion (USD 113.9 billion equivalent) at the end of 2011. Meanwhile, the growth of the RMB debt securities market has been phenomenal. In a short space of 5 years, the annual issuance amount lodged with the Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) in Hong Kong increased by 16 times from a modest amount of RMB 10 billion (USD 1.4 billion equivalent) in 2007 to RMB 172 billion (USD 27.3 billion equivalent) in 2011.
Bwalya K E Ng’andu: Workshop on Zambian banknotes Opening remarks by Dr Bwalya K E Ng’andu, Deputy Governor (Operations) of the Bank of Zambia, at the G&D Workshop on Zambian banknotes, Lusaka, 22 November 2011. *  *  *    Mr. Werner Reisch and all resource persons from Giesecke and Devrient GmbH    Acting Director – Banking, Currency and Payment Systems    Ladies and Gentlemen  I wish to welcome you all to this workshop on Zambian banknotes and in particular allow me to welcome Mr. Werner Reisch and his team from Germany. As Bank of Zambia, we appreciate your efforts to organise this workshop and would like to assure you that by the end of the workshop all participants will have been enriched with new information on cash management. I am reliably informed that this workshop will be divided into two sessions, with this session targeting employees from Bank of Zambia and the next session that will take place tomorrow targeting commercial bank employees. Ladies and Gentlemen, As you may be aware G&D is a reputable printing company based in Germany which has been in existence since 1852. The Bank has a long standing business relationship with G&D going as far back as 1996 when the company first installed the ISS 300 money counting machines in our Currency office and subsequently the BDS 400 banknote destruction system in 2000.

The enhanced disclosure rules in turn aim to encourage the effective exercise of market discipline through increased provision of information. Our approach to third country branches will aim to ensure that they are operating to standards that give branch policyholders an equivalent level of protection to policyholders of an EEA-headquartered undertaking. The three pillars of Solvency II not only provide a robust foundation to support the safety, soundness and resilience of individual insurers, but also in turn support stability in the system. The financial services sector is more interconnected than ever before. Risks to the financial system can affect all firms; we therefore need to ensure that our analysis is rigorous not just within sectors but at a cross-sectoral level. With a number of mixed financial groups undertaking insurance, banking, asset management and any number of other activities in BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  multiple locations across continents, it is vital for firms and regulators alike to understand the interconnections and dependencies not only between different firms but within them as well. This is just one reason why it is so crucial to get the new regime right. The introduction of consolidated group supervision under Solvency II will ensure supervisors and firms have greater clarity in their overall view of group business, and are able to recognise and therefore manage risks that would not otherwise be visible.
So even once a design is set and an administrator is lined up, it may well be some time before the term rate is ready for prime time. The important point here is that you shouldn’t delay your move off of LIBOR in the hope that a forward-looking term version of SOFR will come along. SOFR is available right now, including 30-, 90- and 180-day compound averages published daily by the New York Fed that are less variable than overnight rates and can be used in all types of cash products. And to make it easier and promote consistency, the ARRC has prepared an extensive set of detailed, product-specific recommendations and conventions for how to do exactly that. Spread the Credit Around The second type of potential rate that has gotten a lot of attention lately is one that incorporates a measure of credit risk, since SOFR is a secured rate. Some banks have expressed concerns about using SOFR in commercial loans without an additional credit component. As part of its work to understand and address any obstacles to the transition away from LIBOR, the New York Fed has hosted a series of four workshops to explore and understand these concerns from both banks’ and borrowers’ points of view.15 The aim of these discussions has been to understand the issues at play. We do not yet know the end result of these workshops, and it would be premature for me to comment on any next steps at this point.

The strong trend is mainly due to the expansion of domestic sectors, not least in retailing. The development is not dramatic but Statistics Sweden does report a 12-month increase in retail sales of 3.3% in November. According to the Wholesale & Retail Research Institute, this was followed by a good Christmas season. The contribution to growth from investment also seems to have been favourable. As a result of all this, employment is rising more markedly than in recent years and this in turn led to a drop in unemployment during 1998. Current inflationary pressure is still low. The rate of CPI inflation remains negative and the December out-turn was lower than expected: the level of consumer prices dropped 0.6% from December 1997, as against the fall of 0.3% that had been foreseen in the Riksbank’s latest Inflation Report. However, this is partly a consequence of the Riksbank’s repo rate cuts, which have brought house mortgage rates down. So while we lowered the repo rate in the light of favourable inflation prospects, the cuts have had the initial effect of depressing CPI inflation even more. This has been accompanied by a further decline in commodity prices. But underlying domestic inflation (UNDINHX) in December was unchanged from the preceding month at 1.6%, though this was still somewhat below our forecast. US equity prices a possible risk The global financial unrest subsided towards the end of 1998. Interest rate differentials between different market segments narrowed again and stock markets stopped falling.
A green paper on the practical arrangements for a changeover to a single currency was presented by the Commission in May 1995 and the European Council, meeting in Madrid in December, adopted a changeover scenario which fixed the timetable for the main decisions. It was agreed that Stage Three of EMU is to start on 1st January 1999 and that, in the light of which member states fulfil the convergence criteria on the basis of statistics for 1997, as early as possible in 1998 the Council is to confirm which countries will participate in the European currency area. On 1st January 1999 exchange rates are to be locked and responsibility for monetary policy is to be transferred to the ECB. The euro is to be introduced as an independent currency and all -BIS Review 41/1997  -2-  monetary policy transactions are to be in euro. For a time the national currencies will continue to circulate alongside the euro but legally they will be one and the same currency. If this seems odd, remember that Sweden's currency, for example, can be expressed in kronor as well as öre. Euro, however, will not be available for our wallets from 1st January 1999; euro banknotes and coins are to come into circulation on 1 January 2002 at the latest. That will initiate a massive exchange of existing national banknotes and coins. By 1st July 2002 at the latest the krona will cease to be legal tender, though of course the Riksbank will continue to exchange kronor for euro.

Physical risks can damage property and other infrastructure6, disrupt business supply chains and food systems, influence productivity and health, and, more broadly, can lead to potentially wide displacement and even conflict. This can reduce asset values, result in lower profitability for companies, damage public finances, and increase the cost of settling underwriting losses for insurers. Transition risks, arising through changes in climate policy, technology and shifting consumer preferences could prompt a reassessment of the value of a large range of carbon-intensive assets – leaving some ‘stranded’. In turn, this will give rise to credit risk for lenders and market risk for insurers and investors. Yet these physical and transition risks are not reflected in the market prices of most financial assets.7 Structural barriers such as the lack of climate disclosure, the lack of clear sector-level climate policies, firms not internalising the cost of emissions, and the short time horizon of some investors, all contribute to what Nick Stern has described as the greatest market failure the world has ever seen.8 A sharp shift towards a new equilibrium as a result of recognising the full extent of this market failure could create significant financial losses in a ‘climate Minsky moment’. Maintaining monetary and financial stability in light of these risks therefore demands a timely, coherent and coordinated policy response from the authorities.
30 See a speech by Stefan Ingves, ‘Basel III: Are we done now?’, https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp180129.pdf. 29  12  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  12  work in more detail and sets out some thoughts on how one might approach the financial stability case of making an adjustment in this area, in line with the principles I outlined earlier. This evaluation exercise highlights that interactions between different types of policy are likely to be a fertile area for research going forward. Summary  The finalisation of Basel III late last year represented a final step towards completing the reforms to banking regulation that followed the crisis. I hope I have been able to convey today the reasons for those reforms and the financial stability benefits both here in the UK and internationally. The focus of regulators has now shifted towards completing the implementation of the post-crisis reforms, but also towards monitoring for any unintended effects the reforms are having, as well as being alert to new risks that emerge. We will consider making adjustments to regulations in response to unintended consequences and new risks to ensure that the resilience we injected into the banking system post-crisis stands the test of time. Or put in the words of the young Tancredi in the novel The Leopard by Giuseppe di Lampedusa, “if we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change”. 31  Thank you. 31  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Leopard.

The Fed’s changed operating framework In recent years, like many other central banks around the world in the face of the Great Recession and the prolonged economic recovery that has followed, the Fed adopted unconventional measures to provide monetary policy accommodation in pursuit of its macroeconomic policy objectives. This is reflected in changes in the Fed’s operating framework and the FOMC’s operating objective for OMOs. For many decades prior to the crisis, the operating objective for OMOs was expressed as a target for the federal funds rate – an overnight, unsecured rate in the market for reserve balances. The target rate was achieved through permanent and temporary OMOs that sought to adjust the supply of reserve balances in the banking system to a level that was expected to equal the estimated level of demand for reserve balances at the FOMC’s target rate. The Desk’s permanent additions to the supply of reserve balances were designed to fall somewhat short of the total demand, creating a “structural deficiency” in the supply of reserves. The Desk then conducted daily fine-tuning operations to temporarily add reserve balances to get to the desired level. These daily operations represented a marginal adjustment to the aggregate supply of reserves, largely in response to the exogenous impact of transitory changes in other Fed liabilities such as currency in circulation and the level of the U.S. Treasury’s account balance at the Fed.