samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Furthermore, within the larger prerogatives scope provided by the 2010 law, encompassing the functioning, surveillance, and security of the payment systems, the Bank of Algeria is currently updating the payment systems infrastructure (real-time gross settlement system for large value payments and urgent payments and clearing system) established in 2006, in line with international standards. The completion in 2014 of the modernization of the existing credit bureau and the establishment of a new infrastructure for the development of a broader credit bureau will provide an important tool to monitor credit risk as of the second half of 2015. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The new risk-based, forward-looking supervision approach will be focusing on the banks’ credit allocation process in order to avoid the reemergence of credit risk concentration. Anchored within a framework of strengthened stability, the deepening of the financial sector reform as of 2014 will form the basis for a better allocation of national savings to foster productive investments and financing of nonhydrocarbon inclusive and job-creating growth, that is less dependent on the budget and is driven by SMEs development. In this regard, a series of recommendations has been formulated at the end of 2012 by a working group chaired by the Bank of Algeria, with a view of improving the financing of SMEs development, especially through better access to credit and banking services. These efforts should be sustained. For their part, banks are expected to diversify their SMEs financing tools, while continuing to improve the assessment, analysis, and management of credit risks.

They created a “Risk Profiler” bot which is not perfect but plays a useful role in directing our enquiries. More recently, our credit union supervisors got in touch with our competition team about working on barriers to growth issues. They observed that the structure of our requirements creates some difficult cliff-edge effects for growing firms. This arises in the following way. For all deposit-takers in the UK (banks, building societies and credit unions) capital requirements go up in tiers as they get larger. This works as a “slab” system. To illustrate this let me take the perilous step of drawing an analogy with tax, perilous in that it is considered a cardinal sin for central bank officials to utter the word “tax”. You can contrast this “slab” system with income tax. When a firm’s size exceeds a certain threshold, it has to carry an extra layer of capital not only for each asset it takes on above that threshold, but for its entire asset base. To make the comparison with income tax, it’s as though if your income exceeded £ the higher tax rate of 40% was then applied not only to your earnings above £ but also to all of your earnings below the threshold. We tend to think – in line with the international consensus in Basel – that this tougher “slab” approach is a good thing for deposit-takers because it should discourage them from becoming too large too quickly.
2  The ABX indices are baskets of 20 credit default swaps that provide insurance against default losses on securities of a given rating and vintage of issuance that are backed by home equity loans.

But the steep rise in implied future yields five years ahead suggests that inflation is expected to be higher in the medium term. That could be associated with expectations of softer macro-economic discipline, perhaps more specifically reflecting market uncertainty about EMU in the light of the ongoing debate about prospective membership and about how far the ECB will in practice be free to pursue its statutory task of maintaining price stability. It may, on the other hand, simply reflect some kind of market imperfection. The same analysis can be applied to Italy and Spain, for example, to try to assess market expectations about their possible membership of EMU as part of the first wave. It shows that notwithstanding the recent falls in short-term interest rates in those countries - which can largely be explained by their improved economic performance - 5 years forward yields remain significantly higher than those in Germany and France suggesting that early EMU membership is not at all certain in the eyes of the markets. BIS Review 22/1997  -4-  What can we conclude from all this, Mr. Chairman? Well, the conclusions that I draw are essentially threefold and hardly very surprising. I conclude, first, that markets at present are reasonably persuaded that the world economy as a whole will remain relatively stable at least by comparison with much of the post war period.
That is less true for groups for which MPE is the preferred resolution strategy. Summing up, from a resolution perspective, the distribution of loss-absorbing capacity (the sum of going-concern and gone-concern loss absorbency) is crucial. Yet, from a regulatory and supervisory perspective, there is as yet no international standard that requires a banking group to ensure a sensible distribution of equity (and debt) within the group. The international standards on banking will need to catch up. The calibration of capital requirements: stress testing But how much capital (equity and gone-concern loss-absorbing capacity) should a bank have, and how should regulators decide? I will conclude by saying something about how stress testing can help. The minimum standard set in the Basel Capital Accord is just that: a minimum standard. There has to be provision for add-ons for individual banks’ particular circumstances; and also for temporary across-the-board increases when the environment has become more threatening than anything envisaged when the Accord was calibrated, ie when the world has become extraordinarily risky. In the United Kingdom, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) has the power to recommend, or direct, the micro-supervisors to vary capital requirements temporarily in order to protect against just such unusual threats to stability. But in order to use those degrees of freedom, policymakers need a good framework for assessing banks’ capital adequacy in different circumstances, both at the level of the system a whole and for individual firms.

Paul Tucker: The reform of international banking – some remaining challenges Speech by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Member of the Financial Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Authority Board, at the Oliver Wyman Institute Conference, London, 1 October 2013. *  *  *  Over the next few years the international regulatory authorities will move towards completing the programme of reforming the global financial system. Domestically, that will mean implementing those reforms, as discussed in the Record of the Financial Policy Committee’s latest meeting published this morning. Today, I plan to sketch a few of the issues in banking regulation that I think will confront policymakers as they take this forward. I should stress at the outset that these are my views and do not necessarily represent the views of any of the domestic or international bodies of which I am a member. Just as a scene setter, let me recap the central components of the international reform programme, led by the “G20” Financial Stability Board. They are essentially as follows.1 To make banks more resilient to stress – the essential steps are, of course, new regulatory requirements for capital and liquidity. Second, to ensure that banks and other financial firms can fail in an orderly way without taxpayer solvency support – that’s the resolution agenda. Third, to simplify the network of counterparty-credit exposures amongst banks and others that arises from derivatives transactions – central counterparties (CCPs).
In 2005 the interest rate had fallen to a historically low level of 1.5 per cent. Although the Riksbank predicted in 2005 that inflation would remain low in 2006, albeit rising slightly, we were counting on strong growth in demand, partly due to the expansionary monetary policy. The low interest rates had also led to a rapid rise in household borrowing and house prices. If we had tried in that situation to push up inflation more quickly by means of further interest rat cuts, I believe there was a risk that the economy would have overheated later on, with excessively high price and wage increases and other imbalances. In that case we would have been forced to tighten monetary policy much more than we now envisage. Ultimately, we would have risked an unstable economic development. Monetary policy’s ability to stabilise the economy Let me also briefly mention in this context the question of monetary policy’s ability to stabilise the economy in general. By considering how quickly we should aim to bring inflation back on target, we try to contribute to the most stable development of production and employment possible. But the fact that we give consideration to the real economy when formulating monetary policy does not mean that we have any targets for employment or production. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, it could probably easily lead to unrealistic expectations of what we can achieve by raising and cutting the interest rate. Monetary policy cannot in the long run affect either production or employment.

Stefan Ingves: Introduction on monetary policy Speech by Mr Stefan Ingves, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at the Riksdag Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 22 February 2007. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here! I came here for the first time one year ago, as newlyappointed Governor of the Riksbank. A year passes quickly, and now it is once again time for me to summarise the past year and at the same time report on how the Executive Board of the Riksbank views the prospects for the economy and inflation. Before I begin, I would like to welcome the fact that the Committee has decided to hold this hearing at a later date in relation to the publication of the Riksbank's report. Of course, this means I risk having to answer even sharper questions than usual, but it’s all in the line of duty. It is also important that these hearings are held under the best possible conditions. My most important message today is: •  We have now begun to publish our own forecast for the repo rate. This means that we have taken a further step towards increased clarity and openness in monetary policy. •  Inflation rose last year, but was still below the target. One of the main reasons is the substantial productivity growth. Understanding which mechanisms lie behind the strong productivity has been, and is, an important task for the Riksbank. •  The economic prospects are bright.
Simon M Potter: Concluding remarks at the Monetary Policy Implementation in the Long Run Conference Concluding remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Monetary Policy Implementation in the Long Run Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 19 October 2016. * * * Thank you for participating in the conference “Monetary Policy Implementation in the Long Run” here at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Over the past two days we have engaged in productive and thought-provoking discussions of the evolution of monetary policy implementation across global central banks. These discussions will help shape the way the Federal Reserve thinks about monetary policy implementation in the future. The Federal Reserve’s implementation of policy has evolved in important ways in recent years, including using the balance sheet as an active policy tool at the zero lower bound (ZLB).

Absent a forceful policy response, the consequences would be lower incomes for working families, higher borrowing costs for housing, education, and the expenses of everyday life, lower value of retirement savings and rising unemployment. Federal Reserve response The Federal Reserve has taken a series of policy actions to help contain the risks to the economy posed by this financial crisis. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has reduced the nominal federal funds rate target by 300 basis points since August of 2007. Alongside these appropriately aggressive monetary actions, the Federal Reserve has taken a series of initiatives aimed at improving market liquidity and overall market functioning. A more detailed description of these liquidity initiatives is included as Annex I. These actions are designed to allow financial intermediaries to finance with the central bank assets they can no longer finance as easily in the market. And in this way these liquidity facilities reduce the need for those institutions to take the types of actions, such as selling other assets into distressed markets or withdrawing credit lines extended to other financial institutions, that would serve to amplify the pressures in markets. In addition to these monetary policy and liquidity actions, the Federal Reserve has been working with community groups and housing advocates across the country to help homeowners navigate the complex challenges of higher resets and falling home prices.
Imported goods become more expensive, and inflation in Norway remains high. Chart 3 Frequent devaluations in Norway Krone exchange rate. Index 8.4 Krone in terms of the currency basket index Currency band for the exchange rate target Devaluations  8 Weaker krone  7.6 7.2 6.8 6.4 6  Stronger krone  5.6 1973  1976  1979  1982  1985  1988  Source: Norges Bank – Historical Monetary and Financial Statistics  Norges Bank  Economic perspectives 2023  4  The devaluations reflect a well-known economic policy problem. The authorities can draw up a long-term plan, such as maintaining a fixed exchange rate. But because it will be tempting to deviate from the plan to reap short-term gains, any promises to stick to it are of little value. In the economics literature, this is called the “time-inconsistency problem”. 3  A new monetary policy framework emerges Over the following decades, economic reforms are implemented in both Norway and other countries. Many of the changes are directly motivated by the experience of the 1970s. It had turned out that it was difficult for the authorities to commit to an objective of price stability. It had also proved impossible to bring about a permanent decrease in unemployment by pursuing an expansionary monetary policy over time. Eventually, such a policy will only cause wages and prices to surge. And if high inflation becomes entrenched, it can be costly to bring it back down.

Given continued high structural unemployment and low potential output growth in the euro area, the ongoing cyclical recovery should be supported by effective structural policies. In particular, actions to improve the business environment, including the provision of an adequate public infrastructure, are vital to increase productive investment, boost job creation and raise productivity. The swift and effective implementation of structural reforms, in an environment of accommodative monetary policy, will not only lead to higher sustainable economic growth in the euro area but will also raise expectations of permanently higher incomes and accelerate the beneficial effects of reforms, thereby making the euro area more resilient to global shocks. Fiscal policies should support the economic recovery, while remaining in compliance with the fiscal rules of the European Union. Full and consistent implementation of the Stability and  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Growth Pact is crucial to maintain confidence in the fiscal framework. At the same time, all countries should strive for a more growth-friendly composition of fiscal policies. We are now at your disposal for questions. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
With sustainability-focused mandates gaining traction in parts of Asia, Singapore is supporting our asset managers to develop relevant solutions and skills in their investment processes to support this growing and strategic segment, such as the IMAS-WWF responsible fund managers masterclass, with the first run this November. In June, MAS launched the Green Bond Grant Scheme to nurture the growth of the green bond market and enlarge the supply of green assets. The grant defrays the costs of 14.  obtaining an external review for green bonds of up to $ per issuance. With asset owners mobilising capital into sustainability-focused products, green bonds is emerging as an asset class here in Asia. a. In April, Singapore witnessed its first green bond issuance by a Singapore company, City Developments Limited (CDL). CDL successfully financed its investments in energy saving and efficient infrastructures through the green bond. In July, DBS also led the way with a USD 500 million green bond issue, the first such issuance by a financial institution in Singapore. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  b. International green bond issuers are also considering Singapore. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA), the non-banking financial arm of India’s Ministry of new and renewable energy, announced plans to raise a USD 300 million Green Masala Bond at the Singapore Stock Exchange. Conclusion 15. In conclusion, Asia’s economic growth is the bright spot in the global economy, and this will create immense opportunities for bonds in Asia.

Jacqueline Loh: Singapore - the gateway to Asia's bond market Opening address by Ms Jacqueline Loh, Deputy Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Global Borrowers &amp; Investors Forum - Asia, Singapore, 21 September 2017. * * * Toby Fildes, Global Managing Editor, GlobalCapital Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. 1. Thank you very much for inviting me to the Global Borrowers & Investors Forum – Asia. I am delighted that Euromoney has chosen Singapore to anchor the Asian edition of your flagship Global Borrowers & Bond Investors Forum. The Forum started over 20 years 2.  ago in London, and consistently attracts over 700 issuers, investors and financial intermediaries from around the world to exchange views on key issues facing global bond markets, to network and importantly, to close deals. Asia is the natural next franchise for the Forum. In 2016, Asia’s debt issuance at USD 1.3 trillion made up about one-fifth of global debt issuance, but at 20% y-o-y, grew twice as quickly. A focused Asian edition will help to make the Forum more accessible to issuers, 3.  investors and intermediaries based in Asia. Today’s programme is very topical, covering the deepening of Asia’s bond markets, financing Asia’s infrastructure and the rise of Asia’s green bond market, and features distinguished speakers like Governor Agus of Bank Indonesia and Sir Robert Stheeman, Chief Executive of the UK Debt Management Office. I will touch on these themes briefly. Asian bonds are a mainstream asset class .
Now none of this means that we have closed our minds to the possibility of a more benign relationship between the demand and supply sides of the economy, which would allow us to sustain for a time stronger growth consistently with meeting our inflation target. But we can’t afford to bet the Bank on that happy state of affairs either. When people approach me with the sound-bite “give growth a chance” what I hear them saying is “take a risk with inflation”. But equally when they say “you must take no risks with inflation” I hear them saying “the world will never change”. The truth is that nobody knows with any great confidence. The important thing is to keep an open mind and to monitor intensively all of the data as it becomes available to us, and draw what inferences we can as to how those data affect the balance of risks around the inflation target looking ahead. What is encouraging, Mr Chairman, is that for all these uncertainties and complications the broad prospect for the UK economy - including the Scottish economy - over the next couple of years is for continuing relatively strong growth, with continuing relatively high employment, and continuing relatively low inflation. The monetary policy debate is a narrow one, it is about just how strong the growth, just how high the employment and just how low the rate of inflation. It’s a very long time since any of us could describe the debate in that way with any degree of confidence.

You are all of course familiar with the global financial shock which hit Asia in 1997 and spread to other emerging market countries and transition economies through 1998 and the early part of last year. This shock impacted the UK economy in two main ways. First, the withdrawal of external finance from the immediately affected countries meant that they had no option but to rein back their domestic economies, resulting in a sudden, sharp, slowdown in world demand - including demand for industrial countries’ exports. That in turn had the effect of dampening aggregate demand in the industrial countries. Had the industrial countries - led by the United States and the United Kingdom and closely followed by the Eurozone and subsequently also by Japan - not acted to stimulate their own domestic demand, we could indeed have seen the serious world downturn which many were anticipating only a year or so ago. In the event, the global slowdown was contained, but at the expense of the build-up of substantial external imbalances within the world economy, and at the expense, too, of substantial imbalance between strong domestic and weak net external demand in a number of industrial countries - most notably in the US and here in the UK. Second, these developments in the world economy had a major impact on the international pattern of exchange rates. In the first place, many of the countries most adversely affected by the interruption of international financial flows saw their currencies fall dramatically in foreign exchange markets.