samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Figure 2 Swedish exports and the Swedish export market Annual percentage change 20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10  -15  -15  Swedish exports Swedish export market  -20 80  85  -20  90  95  00  05  10  Note. The dots represent the Riksbank’s forecast for the whole year. Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  The composition of Swedish exports is changing The forecast for the growth of the export market is calculated on the basis of current trading patterns (see Figure 2). At present, the predominant component of Swedish exports relates to trade with Germany and our Scandinavian neighbours. Together these countries account for approximately one third of Swedish exports (see Figure 3). Figure 3 Swedish exports per recipient country Percentage of total Swedish exports 30  30  USA UK  25  25  Germany Scandinavia BRIC  20  20  15  15  10  10  5  5  0  0 98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  07  08  09  10  11  Source: Statistics Sweden  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The United Kingdom and the United States are also important export markets for Sweden.

I will mention three sets of policy responses that will inevitably have to figure in our toolkits. First, there is much sense in curtailing volatility in the exchange rate over the short-term. The costs of volatile and uncertain exchange rates are high in small open economies especially – which is what most of our ASEAN economies are. Accordingly, Malaysia, Singapore and several other Asian countries have not felt comfortable leaving their exchange rates entirely to market forces. Their central banks, within each of their monetary policy frameworks, have sought to instil a focus on longer term fundamentals. There is merit in allowing exchange rates in Asia’s emerging economies to appreciate gradually over the long term, reflecting their more rapid growth. If we resist these long term trends, we are likely to see more inflation in our economies. But some stability in the short term is wise. Second, macro-prudential policies are now an important part of the policy tool kit. Many Asian countries have introduced new macro-prudential measures to try and avoid bubbles in  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  their property markets over the last two years. Malaysia brought in stricter limits on loan-to-value ratios on housing loans. Singapore and Hong Kong have done similarly, and have introduced additional stamp duties or transaction taxes to discourage speculative demand for residential properties. These targeted administrative and prudential measures are not conventional macro-economic tools.
Investment, however, will be worse than we expected before. The external scenario continues to present risks and new volatility episodes will probably occur in the financial markets. Now let me turn to our Financial Stability Report (IEF). Financial Stability Report Our Financial Stability Report is released in June and December of each year, containing recent macroeconomic and financial developments that might affect the Chilean economy’s financial stability. This Report’s external scenario includes the same risks I just described when examining the Monetary Policy Report, particularly with respect to the US monetary policy and the evolution of the Chinese economy. In the Financial Stability Report we also present the Brexit-related risks, as well as the difficulties of European banks to resolve their non-performing portfolio problems – legacy of the global financial crisis – in a scenario of weaker world growth estimates and the global banking industry adapting to new regulatory standards. Most 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  recently, this scenario has become more complex because of banks’ profitability being threatened by low interest rates. Another risk we need to monitor in the coming months has to do with the prices of commodities and their possible impact on the countries exporting them. Although lately these prices have tended to stabilize, they are still lower than they were only a few years back and might endanger the fiscal revenues of some economies.

(5) Includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. (6) WEO's April 2016 weights. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Bloomberg and Emerging Portfolio Fund Research. Table 2 International baseline scenario assumptions 2014  2015 (e) Mar'16 Report  Jun'16 Report  2016 (f) Mar'16 Report  Jun'16 Report  2017 (f) Mar'16 Report  Jun'16 Report  Terms of trade Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP World GDP at market exchange rates Developed ec's GDP at PPP Emerging ec's GDP at PPP United States China Eurozone Latin America (excl. Chile) External prices (in $  -1.8 3.4 3.4 2.7 1.7 4.8 2.4 7.3 0.9 1.1 -0.9  -4.5 2.9 3.1 2.4 1.9 4.0 2.4 6.9 1.5 -0.7 -9.7  -4.5 3.0 3.1 2.4 1.9 4.1 2.4 6.9 1.6 -0.5 -9.8  -4.2 2.9 3.1 2.4 1.8 4.0 2.3 6.4 1.5 -0.9 -5.8  -3.9 2.8 3.0 2.3 1.7 4.1 1.9 6.5 1.5 -1.0 -3.8  0.7 3.1 3.3 2.7 1.9 4.5 2.4 6.1 1.6 1.3 1.0  0.1 3.2 3.4 2.7 1.9 4.6 2.3 6.2 1.6 1.5 0.6  LME copper price BML $ cents/lb) WTI oil price $ Brent oil price $ Gasoline parity price $ Libor $ (nominal, 90 days)  311 93 99 731 0.2  249 49 52 467 0.3  249 49 52 467 0.3  220 40 41 398 0.7  215 45 45 401 0.9  230 45 46 420 1.5  225 51 52 420 1.6  (e) Estimate. (f) Forecast. Source: Central Bank of Chile.
The most difficult of these challenges have been in the financial market, where problems from outside can rapidly escalate into crises that threaten the integrity of our whole system. Capital flows, particularly those that are boosted by high leverage, have become large, fast, volatile and sometimes quite destabilising. Large economies with deep markets may have been able to withstand the volatility without their stability being seriously undermined. Yet, even then, government intervention in one form or another has been necessary: witness the LTCM episode in 1998, or the more recent interventions in support of the euro. For small and open economies, such as our own, the challenge is even harder to meet, and the measures necessary to prevent market failure have been even more dramatic. We faced our own episode here in Hong Kong in 1998, when the shock waves from highly mobile and volatile international capital flows threatened our markets with collapse. Our intervention in the stock market in August 1998 to keep our markets working earned us a great deal of vilification at the time, and – for the wrong reason perhaps since we did not go in to make a profit – a great deal of praise since. But let’s leave the last word on this – at least for the time being – to Alan Greenspan. He said, in his post mortem earlier this year on the Asian financial crisis, the following words: Official safety nets and interventions cannot be eliminated entirely.

These novelties will be offered to the public as a modest contribution to the formation of a modern and dignified state for the Albanian nation. At present, fulfilling these obligations has become a more difficult task due to negative effects arising from the global economic crisis. Most evidently, labour markets, capital markets and economic activity remain under the effect of contraction of consumption and investments in the private sector. The anaemic reaction of the markets has placed central banks in a difficult position, a solution without any choice, i.e. intervene in the economy with all the instruments to address current emergencies while the other factors are forced to contract in favour of the long-term stability of public and private balances. In this situation, central banks are obliged to undertake a series of extreme and qualitatively-different measures, which have been never tested before and exceed all imaginary boundaries of the monetary policy. Actually, politicians are obliged to cope with debt crisis through an extreme fiscal policy aiming at short-term balancing and long-term stability of the fiscal policy. The focus and emphasis of the economic policy remains long-term rebalancing by cutting on expenses. An important part of these measures is very focused on the short-term problematic, hence risking to disregard the undesired effects in the long term. Under the pressure from social costs, the philosophy of current policies is to overcome the situation and maintain social peace and macroeconomic stability at the expense of sovereignty.
The crisis, the ensuing economic contraction, and the monetary easing in response to the crisis amplified this tendency still further, and long-term real rates are now at an absolute historical low. In part, this is related to the business cycle position in larger advanced countries and could turn around in coming years. However, it is unlikely that the decline in real rates over the past few decades will reverse to any large degree in the near future. One of the main theories in conventional economics is that monetary policy cannot affect real variables – including long-term real interest rates – except temporarily. Although this is something of a simplification, and it is possible that monetary policy that is either far too tight or far too loose over a long period could have more of an impact than this, particularly in an economy with major imbalances, the theory is nevertheless a close enough approximation under normal circumstances to take account of it here. The period under scrutiny is too long for monetary policy to have had a substantial impact on developments. Furthermore, it is clear that the tendency to cut interest rates is not limited to individual countries; it is an international pattern, although it surfaces to varying degrees in different countries. Therefore,  3  the explanations will most likely be found in factors affecting the propensity to save, the willingness to invest, and weaker growth in potential output globally.

A re-assessment of its implication on price stability indicated this appreciation was not compatible with our price stability target over the medium term. Under these premises, the Bank of Albania was forced to act. We lowered the policy rate to a new historical minimum of 1 percent. We clearly communicated the Bank of Albania did not assess this appreciation to be in line with fundamentals, anymore. Lastly, we announced the initiation of an FX purchase program in the domestic market. This program was aimed at controlling the pace of appreciation, removing the excessive short term FX supply and reversing expectations and one-sided bets in the market. In regard to this last one, I would like to emphasize the main features of it: First, it was undertaken as measure of last resort, when the space for further conventional policy rate cuts was limited. Therefore, any additional monetary policy stimulus would need to make use of unconventional instruments. Second, it was clearly communicated to the market to be of both an exceptional and a temporary nature. Therefore, it does not represent a shift from our commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime, and should not be represented as such. As a result, these measures proved to be efficient and now the exchange rate movements are going back to normality. Thank You! 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
4 On the demand side, the issuer also benefits from the competitively attractive pricing of Sukuk ranging from 10 to 20 basis points lower than mainstream bonds. This has resulted from the continuous over subscription of the sukuk which has ranged from two to thirteen times. The phenomenal demand for sukuk is further reinforced by excess liquidity in the global financial system. This demand comes from a relatively wider investor base that comprises both the conventional and Islamic investors. The strong demand for sukuk has also been spurred by the higher level of surplus savings and reserves in Asia. In the case of Japan , apart from the high savings rate, Japan has the largest percentage of high net worth individuals wealth distribution in the Asia Pacific. From the investors' perspective, besides the intrinsic value of sukuk which is largely assetbacked, convertible to shares and exchangeable with shares, there are benefits of  3  Source: GCC Research , Kuwait Finance House. 4  An estimate amount of investments for Eastern Corridor Economic Region (RM112 billion), Northern Corridor Economic Region (RM100 billion), Iskandar Regional Development (RM382 billion) and Sabah Development Corridor (RM25.8 billion). 4  BIS Review 23/2008  diversification. Sukuk is fast becoming a new asset class. Sukuk has also generated good investment returns for investors arising from its higher pricing in the secondary market due to the "buy and hold" preference and its scarcity. Opportunities in takaful The other opportunities in Islamic finance are in the takaful or Islamic insurance and retakaful.

Lars Nyberg: Is it dangerous to borrow dollars? Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Svenska Handelsbanken, Stockholm, 17 May 2011. *  *  *  The lessons of the financial crisis are many. The world’s banks – and a number of institutions that were not banks – had far too little and far too low-quality capital. They also had too little liquidity. The conviction that the markets would always be at hand with more or less unlimited liquidity turned out to be wrong. Across the world, central banks were forced to intervene and to provide the funding that the banks were unable to obtain elsewhere. Now the new regulations known as Basel III are almost in place, even if it will take a few years to introduce them. The banks will need to hold both more and better capital and their buffers for managing liquidity shortfalls will need to increase. Of course, nobody is claiming that this will save us from all future financial crises, but it can reasonably be expected to strengthen the resilience of the financial system to shocks. The most apparent shortcomings brought to light during the crisis can be said to have been remedied. Even so, there is naturally still much work to be done. One issue that must be addressed is how to take care of banks that nevertheless become insolvent and must be wound down, as this is an area where the crisis revealed major shortcomings in a number of countries’ legislation.
Therefore, in my view, policymakers have to ask themselves constantly the following three questions: a)  whether they have consistently checked progress in transition against what must be the ultimate goal of the transition process;  b)  whether they have done enough to nurture human and social capital, as without those ingredients economies will grow slower than they might; and  c)  whether they have anticipated and tried to overcome the obstacles to transition, since one should expect resistance to change and one should not expect broad understanding for every measure taken. Finally, ladies and gentlemen, in honour of Monsieur Jacques de Larosière, I have chosen to conclude this lecture with a French saying: “Le bonheur, disait M… n’est pas chose aisée. Il est très difficile de le trouver en nous, et impossible de le trouver ailleurs.” (Sebastien Roch Nicolas dit Chamfort - 18th century French Philosopher.) Applied to transition economies Chamfort’s words can mean that we of the transition economies must realize that our happiness lies within us. We must look inside our respective countries and find specific answers to our problems for the better future. Naturally, we should not neglect looking outside as well.

Therefore it seems reasonable to  3  BIS Review 43/2000  argue that transition economies should pay special attention to formal education, and other forms of training and research. As the empirical evidence suggests (Flanagan, 1998), return to schooling began to rise rapidly during the transition. Relatively soon, they approximated those in many market economies. Under central planning, the main distortions in human capital formation were the overvaluation of vocational training and the undervaluing of university education. However, the transition process has quickly started to correct this shortcoming of socialism. Formal schooling need not be the main factor in developing human capital. Let me just mention that according to Lucas (1993), the most central feature of human capital accumulation for growth is learning on the job (learning by doing). For this to happen, we need both managers and workers to be constantly exposed to new challenges, to move up on the “quality ladder”. In the globalized world of today it seems that one of the best ways to be exposed to new challenges is by exporting. An old Latin saying could be paraphrased into: “Exportare necesse est, vivere non necesse est”.2 By opening up the economy, we are promoting human capital, which in turn is essential to growth. A similar approach can be used to argue for more foreign direct investments (FDI) in transition economies. FDIs bring not only physical capital, but: new organization, know-how, etc which then increase “domestic” human capital.
It is also our intention to change the supervision of the banking institutions from “compliance based’’ systems to a “risk focused” systems, whereby a corrective action plan is consistently applied across the industry. This will necessitate banks to develop integrated risk management systems and strengthen internal controls and procedures, in line with more advanced prudential requirements. Banks will also be required to set up integrated risk management mechanisms and begin ‘stress testing’ to assess their resilience to internal and external shocks, in order to facilitate the identification of risks and to initiate corrective measures. The supervision and regulation of non-bank financial institutions will also be strengthened by enhancing the minimum capital requirement of such institutions. This will facilitate the non-bank financial institutions to enhance resilience and expand their business activities. Accordingly, the existing finance companies will have to increase their core capital to Rs. 100 million by 31 January 2007 and to Rs. 200 million by 30 June 2008. Further, the regulatory framework of registered leasing establishments will also be further strengthened by carrying on comprehensive on-site examinations of selected leasing establishments and spot examinations of the others on a regular basis. In addition, in order to enhance the orderliness in the business of money changing, the minimum annual turnover required to be considered for the renewal of the money changing permits will be increased from US dollars 120,000 to US dollars 600,000 with effect from 1st January 2007.

In the medium term, the most important challenge for the Thai economy is how to cope with a slowdown in the world economy and a volatile global financial market. Thailand, like many emerging market economies with a small and shallow financial market, is particularly vulnerable to fast-moving international capital. Such rapid movements of capital flows can cause exchange rate to be vastly out of line with the underlying economic fundamentals and have negative impacts on the export or the import sectors depending on the direction of exchange rate movement. In our case, the recent surge in capital inflows has caused a one-way appreciation of the baht relative to regional currencies to the point that it may have become detrimental to both competitiveness and the ability to adjust of the real sector. Sustaining the growth momentum in such an adverse external environment is not an easy task. The key is to ensure that the baht does not move further ahead of other regional currencies. But this alone will not be enough. We also need help from domestic demand which has been somewhat soft due to a number of domestic and external factors during the past year. Whether we shall see a turnaround in domestic demand will depend on a number of factors. Some of these are fortunately on our side. First of all, oil prices, which hit the economy very hard this past couple years, appear to have settled down around 55 USD.
Given scarce labor and increasing wages, productions in Thailand need to shift from labor intensive to a more capital intensive industries and thus more import of capital goods and machinery are made cheaper during this investment up-cycle. Third, on capital flows management. In October 2012, the Bank of Thailand launched the Capital Account Liberalisation Master Plan. This Master Plan aims to facilitate Thai companies to diversify their investments abroad, especially in neighboring countries. This would encourage private companies to operate their businesses more efficiently by expanding their markets and production bases, which in turn will help strengthen their competitiveness. Facilitating outflows also helps capital flows to be more balanced. The Bank of Thailand, for instance, has removed the limit for Thai individuals’ outward direct investment, raised the limit per investor, and eased regulations for transfers of foreign currencies to facilitate investment in foreign securities. Recent surge of capital inflows to the region is likely to continue as long as advanced countries continue their extra-loose monetary policies and as long as the prospect of this region remains much more positive than advanced economies. There is no one-size-fits-all measure to deal with impact of short term capital inflows on the economy. The Bank of Thailand thus utilizes policy combinations, namely: allowing exchange rate adjustment as a first buffer; liberalising outward investments by residents; exercising exchange rate intervention to deal with excessive movements; and should circumstances deem necessary, the Bank of Thailand is prepared to consider appropriate measures in order to prevent serious impact on the economy.

Therefore, it is important for us to take care of financial system stability as well when we conduct  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  monetary policy. The Bank of Thailand has been closely monitoring the expansion of private sector’s loans and assessing ability of debt repayment of the private sectors, especially the middle and the low income groups. Second, on exchange rate policy, the main challenge is that the Thai baht has been on an appreciating trend due to various factors, including capital inflows surge into the region, structural change in the world economy, growth differential between advanced and emerging economies as well as accommodative monetary policy in advanced economies. Generally, allowing the exchange rate to be determined by the market can serve as an automatic stabilizer in the short-term and as an important price signal and catalyst for structural change in the long term. So, as the first line of defense, the exchange rate should be determined by market mechanism and from both the market and our own assessment, the Thai baht still remains broadly in line with economic fundamentals. However, the BOT stands ready to use policy instruments at our disposal to prevent and manage dysfunctional market conditions, excessive speculation or exchange rate overshooting. It should be noted also that, the baht appreciation at this juncture provides an opportunity for businesses to upgrade their technology and productivity.