samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
One point of interest is that the railway construction also gave Gothenburgers the decisive influence in determining the time in the 19th century. It was the railways that ensured that the whole of Sweden followed the same time. Prior to the railways, time was determined by the sun. It was 12 noon when the sun stood at its highest point in the sky, regardless of which part of the country one was in. This meant that there was a time difference of 52 minutes between the most eastern and western parts of Sweden. When the western trunk line between Stockholm and Gothenburg was complete, it was necessary to have the same time so that the timetables would work, and Gothenburg time became the standard. This period of liberalisation and internationalisation of the world economy was abruptly broken off by the outbreak of war in 1914 and was replaced by national isolation. Although Sweden was largely an open economy during parts of the interwar period, it was not until after the Second World War that this isolation was broken at a global level. For the past couple of decades we have been in a clear period of internationalisation and financial integration. Same driving forces now as then Today, information technology and communications technology have replaced the railways as symbols for economic progress, but the driving forces are basically the same now as they were then and the interaction between the financial markets and other parts of the economy plays the same important role.

Meanwhile, our decisions have to rely on as much as possible sound basis. Drafting the confidence indices, as indicators of economic expectations, does not substitute the lack of statistical information on the current situation of an economy. These indices enable monetary markets and authorities to rearrange in time the strategies that preserve balances of related goals. Confidence indices enable a central bank adjustment of monetary policy stance in the right time in order to preserve price stability, while the economy grows at a potential pace. The developed countries are in frontward regarding the preparation of confidence indices as indicators of expected performance of the economy. Integration of the markets and the globalizing process increase the necessity of preparing these indices in our region, because the objective of monetary policy, the price stability, reflects stability and economic openness towards regional countries and further. It has already been 4 years that Bank of Albania has started the evaluation of business and consumer confidence indices. These surveys are being run on a quarterly basis, with the help of INSTAT, and involve over 600 businesses of production, construction and services sectors and about 1500 consumers. The information collected covers the performance of prices, consumption, income, production, employment, investments and some other indicators, which support the decision-making on the monetary policy stance. In this important process, the Bank has from the beginning been assisted by the experts of Ifo Institute for Economic Research, witch is internationally renown in the field of business confidence indices.
Lars Heikensten: Swedish banks in an international perspective Speech by Mr Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, Royals Vinterträdgård, Grand Hôtel, Stockholm, 10 November 2005. Diagrams for this speech can be found on the Sveriges Riksbank’s website www.riksbank.com. *  *  *  Swedish banks' competitiveness I would like to begin by thanking the Bankers' Association for inviting me to participate in this panel discussion on Swedish banks' competitiveness. Before I set about giving my view on the matter, I think it is important to stress that there are several different perspectives on competitiveness and competition. So, the conclusion will vary depending on the angle from which you look at the issue. The composition of the panel reflects these different perspectives well, which should guarantee an interesting discussion. I would like to define a bank’s competitiveness as a measure of how efficient the bank is at providing a given quantity of financial services at a certain level of quality. For the Riksbank, the competitiveness of Swedish banks is important both from a stability point of view and an efficiency perspective. Competitive banks have greater resilience to different kinds of pressures regardless of whether they stem from increased competition or poorer economic performance. They also are more efficient and can provide more and better financial services at a low cost. How to measure competitiveness, though, is by no means self-evident.

But this market has grown very weakly and in real terms is smaller today than it was at the start of the 1990s. It is not that the market for company financing has shrunk, but it seems to have scaled back its connections to the major banks. That is partly because large Swedish companies can turn to foreign banks or directly to the capital market for funding. Also, it is probably partly because Swedish banks in the wake of the banking crisis have made a conscious decision to reduce their share of risky lending. However, it does not seem as if the Swedish banks have fully managed to compensate for this lower lending through increased advisory services or other ”intermediary services”. In essence, Swedish banks have strong positions in a number of areas but these markets are either mature or else the banks’ shares are shrinking. If we were to assume that the trend oracle will be right, I envisage two possible ways forward for the major Swedish banks, both of which represent extremes. The first strategy would be based on the banks’ proven proficiency in terms of organisation and distribution, and to refine this strength and also become better at peripheral advisory services. Fewer resources would be invested in product development and risk-taking – products can easily be copied and risks sold on to other, hungrier investors.
As a consequence, conduits and structured investment vehicles (SIVs), which were borrowing in this market to finance their holdings of asset-backed securities, started facing difficulties to refinance themselves. Tensions spread to the interbank markets of most OECD countries, as banks began hoarding liquidity to meet their liquidity support commitments with conduits and to put the underlying assets on their balance sheets. Moreover, banks curtailed interbank lending because of uncertainty surrounding the potential exposures of their counterparties. Since the summer, the global economy and the euro area have entered a period of increased financial market volatility, significant re-appraisal of risks and market nervousness. The Governing Council of the ECB is paying great attention to these market developments and, in particular, has acted swiftly to provide the liquidity that was needed to permit an orderly functioning of the money market, to reduce the volatility of very short-term interest rates around the minimum bid rate of the main refinancing operations, and to contain the risk that tensions in these markets would propagate through the banking system. The Eurosystem will continue to play its part to consolidate a smooth return to a normal functioning of markets. The Governing Council is also monitoring very closely the macroeconomic effects that the recent episodes of financial unrest may have on the prospects for the euro area economy. Sound fundamentals and the expected robust global growth should support a relatively favourable medium-term outlook for economic activity.

The current unusual circumstances are one of the main drivers for the prolonged boom in the local property sector. The risk of over-heating in the property sector to financial stability in Hong Kong is no smaller than that seen in 1997. We should note in particular that while mortgage rates were generally over 10% in 1997, after the burst of the property bubble, US interest rates have fallen, and mortgage rates in Hong Kong have spiralled down reaching about 2% in 2004. The situation we faced now is just the opposite. Mortgage rates are around 2%. And, even if the low interest rate environment were to remain until 2015 as anticipated by the US Federal Reserve, the US interest rates are bound to head back to more normal levels. Will mortgage borrowers in Hong Kong then be able to withstand the impact of interest rate hikes and property price falls? For example, under a 30-year mortgage, even though the borrower will be able to enjoy a low interest rate in the first two years, the repayment burden could become much heavier as a result of interest rate hikes in the years that follow. This could have serious consequences for the well-being of those families in the coming years. Therefore, I hope that the public will be cautious and should not underestimate the risks that rising interest rate could have on repayment ability, asset prices and the overall economy in Hong Kong. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Zeti Akhtar Aziz: Unlocking finance, expanding impact Keynote address by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Responsible Finance Summit “Unlocking Finance, Expanding Impact”, Sasana Kijang, Kuala Lumpur, 30 March 2016. *  *  *  It is my distinct honour and pleasure to welcome you to Malaysia and to this Responsible Finance Summit for 2016, with the theme "Unlocking Finance, Expanding Impact". The theme gives strong recognition to the essential role of finance in driving sustainable development and growth in the world today. It is now almost a decade since the eruption of the global financial crisis. Despite the challenges, much progress has been made to forge a vision for a stronger post-crisis world. Whilst having to strike a balance between pursuing financial stability and the potential increased costs to financial intermediation, efforts have been made through the global financial reforms towards more sustainable financial systems. This includes the recalibration of financial regulations to curb tendencies for excessive leveraging, strengthened regulatory and supervisory systems that are forward looking and responsive to risk, as well as provisioning standards that reduce procyclicality and that restrain the build-up of risks. In addition, advancing consumer protection, furthering financial education and literacy as well as improving access to financial services have remained important long-term items on the agenda. In tandem with these efforts to strengthen financial stability, the role of finance is also being re-examined to enhance its positive impact.

Indeed, the global financial crisis witnessed unprecedented levels of global cooperation as the world came together to pursue a common interest of restoring stability and building more sustainable financial systems. In the same manner today, the future of finance demands strong leadership and cooperation in fostering collective will towards achieving the necessary positive transformation. The Responsible Finance Institute, as a think tank connecting various responsible finance practices and expertise around the world, is in a unique position to contribute towards realising this aspiration. But for responsible finance to gain real traction, this cannot be an undertaking of a single institution. Finance, with its potential to serve society, is capable of so much more. As responsible global financial participants, the opportunity to come together again to rebuild trust and provide the foundations of a more stable and sustainable long-term economic growth can be achieved through our commitments to responsible finance. The call is for greater global cooperation and leadership to unlock the future of finance and expand its positive impact in the global economy. With that, I wish you an engaging and impactful summit. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
François Villeroy de Galhau: Euro area monetary policy and businesses Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Vereinigung der Bayerischen Wirtschaft, Munich, 26 January 2017. * * * I am very pleased to be here with you and wish to thank you for inviting me. It is the second time in recent months that I have had the pleasure of visiting Bavaria. In September, here in Munich, I had the great honour of receiving the Montgelas prize, presented by Minister Erwin Huber, in remembrance of one of your great statesmen. If I may add a personal note, I am here as a committed European and a friend of Germany. I am French but my roots are in Saarland where my family has lived since the end of the 18th century and where its porcelain manufacturing company Villeroy & Boch forms part of the German “Mittelstand”. I feel close to your country and admire its success, particularly that of its business enterprises. Bavaria illustrates this success. It is currently one of Europe’s major economic centres. I will also have the pleasure later of meeting Dr Theo Waigel, who, alongside other German political leaders, has played such a key role in the construction of our solid common currency, the euro. Our growth forecasts for the euro area are for growth of 1.7% in 2017, the same as in 2016. This confirms the economic recovery, which is good news, but the situation is not yet satisfactory.

The other question mark concerns the differences between countries, with inflation of 1.7% in Germany. However, following a temporary peak in the first quarter, German inflation is expected to remain under 2% on average throughout 2017. Moreover the inflation differences between countries are consistent with their different national economic situations: growth and employment are also stronger in Germany; and these differences could even contribute, via their impact on relative wages, to correcting the imbalances, hence achieving greater convergence within the euro area. I can naturally grasp the concern of German savers in the face of low interest rates. It is not our aim to keep interest rates low for too long: low interest rates are not a goal in themselves; they are merely the necessary condition today for gradually returning towards our inflation target, and ensuring lastingly higher interest rates in the future, as Mario Draghi himself has put it. This movement has already started for long-term interest rates, with the 10-year Bund gaining nearly 60 basis points since the end of September. In December, in view of the progress achieved, we decided to reduce the volume of our monthly asset purchases from 80 to 60 billion euro. I also repeat that although I am convinced that negative interest rates have their use, they have clear limitations. But, although QE will obviously not last forever, we clearly did not discuss tapering or any exit strategy.
And many countries, including the UK, now have a range of macro-prudential tools to cut excesses off at source, before they affect wider economic prospects. On the surface, global debt burdens are alarming. The outstanding stock of debt has almost doubled since the crisis. Public debt burdens across advanced economies have risen above 90% of GDP for the first time since WWII. Public sector debt is important for intergenerational equity, and high levels of public indebtedness tend to result in lower growth over the long run.13 But history suggests that high public debt is generally a chronic not an acute problem. Provided fiscal frameworks remain credible, public debt tends to be less informative for predicting recessions. Research at the Bank of England and elsewhere finds that private sector credit growth is amongst the best early warning indicators of a downturn.14 Over half of recessions are preceded by private sector credit booms. And within advanced economies, two-thirds of private credit booms have also ended in recessions.15 As borrowers take on more debt and devote a greater share of cash flows to servicing it, they become more vulnerable to shocks. And there will always be shocks. Debt may not be the proximate cause of the crisis, but it can be the vulnerability that turns shock into slump. At present, aggregate private financial imbalances in advanced economies do not appear large enough, on their own, to tip global activity from slowing to stalling.

Global economic policy uncertainty is at record highs (Chart 3). And protectionist rhetoric is becoming reality, with the United States raising tariffs on a range of imports from its main trading partners, and some retaliating in kind (see Annex Table A1). If all measures contemplated are implemented, average US tariffs will reach rates not seen in half a century. 1 Overall, financial conditions in the US have tightened by around half a standard deviation over the course the current tightening cycle thus far (Chart 2). This is a similar cumulative increase as in the 2004-06 tightening cycle, though somewhat less than in the cycle at the turn of the millennium – a pattern is broadly mirrored across advanced economies more generally. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  3  Chart 3: Indices of global economic policy uncertainty are at record highs  5  Standard deviations from historical average  4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 1997  1999  2001  2003  2005  2007  2009  2011  2013  2015  2017  Sources: Bloom et al (2015)2 and Bank calculations  Given the confluence of the current broad-based slowdown and outstanding downside risks, some are beginning to wonder whether the global expansion, begun in 2010, could be starting to end. Recessions are notoriously difficult to predict. The IMF has anticipated only a sixth of the over 300 recessions in member countries since 1991.
Yes, a  Page 9 sur 14 big step forward has been made thanks to Next Generation EU. But the real Hamiltonian moment will come when the existence of a permanent common fiscal capacity allows genuine countercyclical action to be taken to counter major asymmetric shocks. Conversely – and not contradictorily –, adequate fiscal discipline is key to cope with economic reversals. Look at Germany, which fixed the roof while the sun was shining, and made appropriate use of its financial leeway during the crisis. There will be a debate, to be concluded most likely next year after the German and French elections, on the Stability and Growth Pact. We should avoid a fruitless confrontation between “illusionists” – who plead for debt cancellation, which is completely out of the question – and “traditionalists” – who want to keep the same old rules as if nothing had changed, including on the level of interest rates. We do still need rules, but revised and simplified ones. Indeed, the current low interest rate environment (with r<g) does not mean that public debt sustainability issues have become irrelevant: it only implies that governments have more time to ensure debt sustainability. These new rules should be based on a medium-term debt trajectory and on a single operational target, namely a ceiling on the growth rate of public expenditure as proposed by the European Fiscal Board (EFB), chaired by the Danish economist Pr. Niels Thygesen. First, we can keep the 60% long-term debt anchor, which is in the Treaty.

Beaucoup de réflexions actuelles  Page 7 sur 14 en France – dont celles récentes de la commission Arthuis – avancent le principe d’une telle norme de dépenses, à juste titre. Mais il faudra en fixer le niveau, ce qui relève du débat démocratique : les exemples chiffrés que je viens de citer peuvent l’éclairer. C’est un objectif exigeant mais accessible : nombre de nos voisins européens y sont parvenus. B. Our macroeconomic policies? The lack of macroeconomic policy coordination has long been the “usual suspect” for the weakness in our economic union. This was true during the euro crisis: monetary stimulus, whether powerful enough or not, was not sufficiently supported by fiscal policy, which was tightened too early. This lesson has not been forgotten in this crisis. Along with my colleagues on the Governing Council, I personally will never forget that night of March 2020 when, locked down in our homes, we took, in less than three hours, some of the strongest measures in the history of the euro, creating our now almost famous PEPP [Pandemic emergency purchase programme]. On the fiscal front, with its Next Generation recovery plan of EUR 750 billion, financed by a shared debt instrument, the European Union demonstrated an unprecedented level of solidarity towards the countries most affected by the Covid crisis. Monetary policy is no longer the only game in town, and Europe has reacted appropriately over the past year.
For the first time, the UK’s primary payment systems – CHAPS, Faster Payments and Bacs – will be using the same messaging standard. This will be a major step towards interoperability of the UK payment systems and should facilitate improved contingency arrangements for critical and time sensitive payments as described above. And ISO20022 messages will contain richer data in payments, ensuring that PSPs can easily identify and prioritise the most critical payments for processing during contingency scenarios. In the last few days we have received the industry feedback on our like-for-like schemas for CHAPS, the final version of which will be published in December alongside more information on our transition approach. The schema for the enhanced messages will be published towards the end of 2020, aiming to cut over to the ISO messages in the first half of 2022. Conclusion 15  https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/report/2019/sector-simulation-exercise-simex-2018-report 7  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  7  There is a significant amount of work underway to ensure the continued resilience of the UK’s payments infrastructure. And this work must continue, both practical activities such as testing, and also the development and promotion of standards. Given the network nature of payments, this is not something the Bank of England can undertake in isolation. It is a journey we are on with many of you here today – the financial institutions that use CHAPS and RTGS to provide critical payment services to customers.

The dual objective of PEPP  5/7  BIS central bankers' speeches  To enhance the effectiveness of our asset purchases, the PEPP has to be operationalised in a way that it meets the described dual objective. The PEPP is not an interventionist programme where we stand on the sidelines when conditions are calm and enter the market only in times of market disturbances. It rather resembles a two-staged pyramid. At the basis, there is a constant flow of purchases that reaches out to all eligible market segments. In the sovereign space, these purchases are guided by the ECB’s capital key. This is the “stance” element of PEPP. It seeks to create financial conditions that are consistent with our inflation aim. The upper part of the pyramid is its flexibility. This element responds to the challenges posed by the pandemic to market functioning and the smooth transmission of our policy to all parts of the euro area. The first granular breakdown of our PEPP purchases, published last week, highlights this particular aspect of our reaction function. It stresses the three dimensions of flexibility in the PEPP. First, in the sovereign space, monthly purchases in all jurisdictions will exceed the “basis” flow if we observe a general tightening of financial conditions across countries, unusually high volatility or poor liquidity. In this case, we frontload purchases, following the ECB’s capital key. Second, we raise the share of purchases above the capital key in countries facing severe risks of fragmentation.