samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
those not provided by the public sector, began rising soon after the signing of the first wage agreements, which also involved the largest section of the labour force. The effect was a 1.25% rise in the CPI. In combination, rises in housing, petrol and general service prices explain almost seven-tenths of the CPI increase last year. Housing prices have probably reached their peak, and the same may be said about oil prices. These factors are therefore not likely to cause a rise in the CPI this year; if anything, they could bring it down. Iceland's inflation rate moved some way closer to the levels pertaining among its European trading countries in the course of the year, as measured by the Harmonised Consumer Price Index for the European Economic Area. At the beginning of the year, twelve-month inflation in Iceland measured by the HCPI was 4.6%, or 2.7 percentage points higher than among main trading partner countries. By December the twelve-month rate in Iceland was down to 3.7%, which was 2.3 percentage points above the average among main trading partners and lower than in five of the seventeen countries in the European Economic Area that calculate the same monthly index using the same terms. The Central Bank publishes its inflation forecast four times a year. At the beginning of last year it forecast a 5% rise in inflation between the years, which turned out to be the case. When the króna depreciated, the Bank's mid-year inflation forecast assumed that the impact would soon be felt in prices.

Consequently, monetary policy decisions are based on a forecast of future inflation. It is difficult, however, to keep inflation perfectly in check. It may deviate from the inflation target, due, for instance, to unexpected events or political decisions. Likewise there may sometimes be reason, in the event of a sharp deviation, to return inflation slowly to the target so as to avoid substantial real economic costs. But like other forecasters, the Riksbank can of course also make mistakes in its forecasting. For all these reasons inflation may be above target during some periods, and be below target during others. In order to take account of and clearly reflect this reality, the inflation target is set within a tolerance band of ± 1 percentage point. In exceptional cases, this tolerance band can also be exceeded during short periods. Fortunately it seems that the Riksbank’s forecasting ability has at least not been poorer than most other forecasters’, possibly even somewhat better. As you might guess the Riksbank doesn’t receive any congratulatory telegrams for creating thousands of new jobs when we overshoot the inflation target by a few tenths of a percentage point, but when we undershoot to the same extent some economists are quick to put a price on the miss in the shape of lost jobs. We welcome all criticism that is underpinned by solid analysis, since it enables us to enhance our forecasting ability.
For some quarters now, we have indicated that in order to ensure appropriate monetary conditions, we would consider selling foreign currency in addition to policy rate increases. In the fourth quarter of 2022, we sold foreign currency worth around CHF 27 billion. Foreign currency sales, together with the increase in the SNB policy rate, contribute to the tightening of monetary policy. They help to dampen imported inflation. We will also sell foreign currency in the future if this is appropriate from the monetary policy perspective. However, the development of inflation and thus the outlook for monetary policy are currently highly uncertain; therefore, we conversely also remain willing to buy foreign currency if necessary, i.e. if there were to be excessive appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc. Ladies and gentlemen, I now hand over to Martin Schlegel. Liquidity assistance loans  Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to explain how the SNB is providing liquidity to Credit Suisse and UBS. The liquidity is being granted on three levels. First, both banks have unrestricted access to the SNB’s already long-established facilities. The banks can obtain liquidity against high-quality securities under the liquidity-shortage financing facility (LSFF). This serves to bridge unexpected liquidity bottlenecks in the short term. Furthermore, the SNB provides emergency liquidity assistance (ELA). ELA loans are covered by collateral in the form of Swiss mortgages transferred to the SNB or pledged securities. Second, Credit Suisse and UBS have access to additional liquidity assistance (ELA+).

But given the importance of the issue, we have to move ahead because the consensus is building that the status quo cannot be maintained, as it helps neither banks nor supervisors. Hence the title of my speech today: Strengthening bank capital: Basel III and beyond. The Basel III reforms themselves deliver two of the four characteristics that I said were essential – higher quantity and quality of capital. They are important, but not enough on their own. It is the Committee’s current and future work programme on implementation and consistency that will ensure that the full benefits of the regulatory reforms of bank capital can be achieved. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches
And according to a study of Capel and his colleagues in March 2004, bilateral trade between Turkey and EU can increase by around one third once Turkey has become a full member of the single European Market.23 Moreover, thanks to the intensive reform agenda, the investment climate in the Turkish economy would improve for both domestic and foreign investors. 21  Dansk Industry (December 2004). Turkey and the EU - Perspectives and Opportunities. 22  Commission of the European Communities (2004). Issues rising from Turkey’s membership perspective. 23  Capei, C.H., Lejour,A.M. and Mooji de R.A. (March 2004). Assessing the Economic Implications of Turkish Accession to the EU .CPB, No. 56. 7/8  In consequence, it is reasonable to assume that foreign direct investment (FDI) will increase strongly. According to some studies, the EU membership is estimated to result in 2-4 billion Euro24 worth FDI flows per year. This in turn will not only contribute to the strengthening of the economy as a whole, but will also help to deal with current macroeconomic concerns such as the current account deficit. I have to add that economic benefits of FDI are potentially high because FDI not only brings in longterm capital but also technology, management skills and opportunity to reach new export markets.

Banking services should be provided in accordance with the clients’ financial literacy, in any case highlighting, the benefits and the risks that customers may incur as they use your bank products. In the context of its role as the supervisory and regulatory authority of banking operations, the Bank of Albania will continue to carefully monitor and address the challenges facing this  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  activity. Our regulatory framework and supervisory and operational activities will be adapted to provide all the necessary support for the banking activity to be safe and have multiple benefits for the banking industry, customers, and the economy in general. The professional and continuous communication with you will be at the basis of our activity, to identify together the best solutions that address your needs and those of other interest groups. Dear bank managers, In conclusion, I would like to bring to your attention one of the biggest lessons learned from the crisis of the latest global financial system, which I think remains applicable for Albania: concentration on short-term time horizons is counterproductive to both individual financial institutions that engage in them, and the overall financial system and economy of a country. In this context, I invite you all to be farsighted in your analyses and decision-making processes with regard to the future of the economy of Albania and its banking industry.
Many of the financial institutions are still being constrained by large nonperforming assets, and despite injection of capital and massive liquidity support, financial intermediation is still not fully functional. On the fiscal front, the continuation of large fiscal deficits and rising public sector debt are increasingly placing a limit on fiscal flexibility while quantitative easing and very low interest rate environment globally are fuelling some asset prices to rise. Given these challenges, it will be a mistake to believe that the world is on the mend. In many ways, the global economic structure and the character and governance of the international financial system will be fundamentally different. First, overall global growth will, for a prolonged period, remain below its past trend, with the growth trajectory in advanced  BIS Review 158/2009  1  economies lower than its average in the decade before the crisis. Several structural weaknesses in the advanced economies will require considerable time and resources to be resolved. While the advanced economies address these issues, the global economy will increasingly be driven by the emerging market economies, particularly China, Brazil, Russia and India. Despite Asia’s large potentials and as a growth leader, it is unlikely that in the immediate term, Asia and other emerging economies would be able to lift global growth in the short-term back to the pre-crisis level. In the short to medium term, the emerging economies will take time to fully compensate for the weak growth in the advanced economies.

The ASEAN Finance Ministers have agreed in 2003 on the Roadmap on Monetary and Financial Integration of ASEAN in the areas of capital market development, capital account liberalisation, financial services liberalisation and ASEAN currency cooperation. In 2007, the ASEAN Central Banks established a task force, chaired by Malaysia, to chart the milestones and timeliness for ASEAN financial integration. To complement the AEC Blueprint, leaders in early 2009 have agreed to an Implementation Plan to promote the development of an integrated capital market within ASEAN. These initiatives along with other regional efforts will effectively transform ASEAN into a single integrated market, and thus strategically position ASEAN as an important economic zone with a role to play in contributing towards global stability and growth. With the broad diversity within Asia, the pace of development will not be equal for all economies. The general agreement is that growth within Asia will be led by China, India and Korea. In a large part, the shape of Asia’s future will be dictated by the dynamic engagement of these prominent growth drivers with other Asian economies and the rest of the world. The prospects for ASEAN to thrive would depend crucially on its ability to engage with these growth drivers and seize on the opportunities that they offer. However, ASEAN must also recognise that at the same time, the level of competition will further intensify within Asia.
Thus although the fiscal imbalance is narrowing and returning back to the levels stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty a strong case can be made for continued caution in Malta’s fiscal policy and for further measures that would help to ensure the achievement of the government’s targets. With a government debt ratio at around 69% in 2010 and 2011, it has become even more important to bring down this ratio at a faster pace (Chart 3). 3  J. C. Trichet, “Remarks at the farewell event”, Frankfurt am Main, 19 October 2011, p. 3. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Moreover, despite the weak external environment the economy continues to grow at a sustained rate and, as I referred to earlier, it is considerably easier to undertake further consolidation at a time of ongoing economic growth. Reductions in the deficit ratio would also leave more room for manoeuvrability on the fiscal side in the event of an economic slowdown without breaching the European rules. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The least painful way to reduce the ratio of the deficit to the GDP is through economic growth. In turn faster growth can be achieved through improvements in productivity. In this respect, consensus needs to be reached on steps that can be taken with minimal social disruption to reduce the threat to, and ultimately enhance, the country’s international competitiveness. Competitiveness depends partly on developments in productivity and wages.

The ensuing reform of the Pact in 2005 thus ushered in a greater degree of tolerance, and political influence was permitted in dealing with EU member states’ fiscal imbalances. It is true that the average deficit ratio in the euro area improved through 2007, aided by the upswing in economic conditions. However, only a few countries earnestly engaged in substantial budgetary consolidation efforts. At the same time, financial market scrutiny was mild, and as a result the less fiscally-responsible governments were able to meet their borrowing requirements at a relatively small spread on the benchmark interest rate. This changed after 2007, when the onset of the financial crisis found several Member States poorly prepared for what lay ahead. It became difficult to undo the accumulated imbalances and vulnerabilities. The debt burden worsens when the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy. This is reinforced when the primary balance is in deficit, in which case the dynamics of servicing the debt could easily make the debt burden unsustainable. Fiscal consolidation, which is necessary even in less serious circumstances, carries the risk of downward macroeconomic adjustment. In today’s circumstances, there is the danger of a vicious cycle in the form of a negative macroeconomic spiral. This is because weak economic growth leads to lower government revenue that raises the fiscal deficit ratio, and therefore requires further budgetary tightening. 2  L. Schuknecht, Ph. Moutot, P. Rother and J. Stark “The Stability and Growth Pact, Crisis and Reform” ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 129, September 2011.
François Villeroy de Galhau: Monetary policy transmission Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Annual General Meeting of the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), Paris, 25 May 2023. *** Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a pleasure to deliver this address at this ICMA's Conference in Paris, and I would like to pay tribute to your collective contribution to Capital Markets. Let me thank among others Bryan Pascoe, René Karsenti, Mandy DeFilippo and the ICMA French Regional Committee. In particular, ICMA's emphasis on sustainable finance perfectly echoes our call alongside Christine Lagarde for a "Green Capital Markets Union". It is an important way forward for Europe in the coming years. In the short and medium term, let me focus today on the transmission of monetary policy. In the Euro Area, inflation has begun to fall back, from 10.6% in October 2022 to 7% in April, after 6.9% in March, and is expected to recede by the end of the year. But it will still be too high. And while headline inflation has been declining, underlying price pressures are showing persistence. The Governing Council has already taken prompt and forceful actions to tighten the stance of monetary policy. The increase in policy rates since 2022 has been exceptionally rapid by any historical standards: 7 hikes in less than ten months, amounting to +375 basis points.

Financial inclusion facilitates productive financing and investments which generates income for the underserved, improves equality and contributes to sustainable growth. Having an inclusive financial system is also important to ensure economic and social progress on the development agenda is achieved. Therefore, CGC’s goal of ensuring access to financial services for SMEs via a fair and transparent marketplace for financial products and services, including extending credit that provides a pathway towards balanced economic growth and prosperity for all Malaysians should be lauded. Based on the Economic Census 2016: Profile of Small and Medium Enterprises by the Department of Statistics, Malaysia (DOSM), SMEs in Malaysia constituted 98.5% of the total business establishments. Majority of the businesses were in services sector, mainly in wholesale & retail trade, followed by manufacturing, construction, agriculture and mining & quarrying. Financial institutions are the major source of financing for SMEs. As at end-2017, growth in financing to SMEs continues to be sustained above 5%, outstripping financing growth to households and large corporates. The approval rate for financing applications by SMEs of 75%, has also been consistently higher than that for all customers. The share of SME financing over total business financing has steadily trended upwards to more than 50% from 38% in 2010. This reflects an increased focus on SMEs as a strategic growth driver for financial institutions. According to the latest bi-annual survey by SME Corporation Malaysia (SME Corp), 97% of SMEs which applied for financing from FIs affirmed that they were able to obtain financing.
Jean-Paul Redouin: Liquidity and transformation Speech by Mr Jean-Paul Redouin, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the General Meeting of the French Association of Bank Treasurers (AFTB), Paris, 30 May 2011. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great pleasure for me to speak at this General Meeting of the AFTB. I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the successful cooperation that has been established between your association and the Banque de France. It is extremely beneficial for us and I believe that you and your institutions also find it valuable. In many respects, bank and market liquidity is a fascinating area because few phenomena have been perceived in such different ways over such a short period of time. Indeed, market liquidity became abundant and cheap in the 1980s: financial markets deepened and transaction costs fell. In the 1990s, the growth of derivatives products facilitated the management and transfer of risk. In the following decade and up to 2006, many studies had already focused on excess liquidity. Then, during the financial crisis of 2007–2008, sources of bank funding suddenly dried up.

Properly designed and implemented, such an overshoot can offset the inflation undershoot during “bad” times so that the longer-run average inflation rate and inflation expectations are in 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  line with the target. The third option is price-level targeting, including its various offshoots, such as nominal GDP targeting and temporary price-level targeting. In such a regime, the central bank commits to keep the price level near a steadily growing target path. Like average-inflation targeting, this strategy promises to overshoot the target inflation rate in “good” times to make up for the inflation undershoot when policy is constrained. In theory, both average-inflation and price-level targeting can solve the problem of anchoring inflation expectations at the target rate while maintaining a low inflation target rate amid low neutral rates. Although price-level targeting is a bigger leap from inflation targeting than averageinflation targeting, each can be implemented in ways that are very similar to standard inflation targeting, either in terms of forecast-targeting or a policy rule.6 Importantly, neither will likely be effective in practice unless communicated clearly and carried out consistently over time. More broadly, all of these proposed strategies face potential costs and benefits—in terms of macroeconomic performance, communication, and robustness to uncertainty—which require careful study. In considering alternative monetary policy strategies, academic experts, policymakers, and others from around the world have an important part to play, sharing and discussing ideas and comparing experiences to help all of us to think through these issues.
Domestic inflationary pressures, including wage pressures, have so far remained reasonably subdued and it is crucially important that that should continue. But it does explain our caution in moving interest rates down. Somewhat similar concerns explain my reaction to recent speculation that the Government would now make a strong push for early entry to the euro. I take no position on the five economic tests which are a matter for the Chancellor. But I do see the present external environment – and in particular, as I said elsewhere last week, the euro's present weakness – as a potentially serious obstacle to early entry. So I very much welcome the considered and cautious approach to making the assessment of the five tests, which the Chancellor set out this evening. Most people agree that sterling's exchange rate on entry to the euro would need to be substantially lower than our present rate, which few would regard as sustainable in the medium and longer term. Given the euro's present general weakness, that could come about in either of two ways. If, achieving what was considered to be an appropriate entry rate against the euro – whatever that was precisely – involved a substantial depreciation of sterling's overall, effective, exchange rate (that's to say sterling's rate against other currencies generally), that would be bound to put strong upward pressure on our domestic rate of inflation.

Determining which tool is appropriate has been a matter of careful judgement, depending on policymakers’ objectives, country circumstances, available policy space, and the nature of the shock. Policymakers have typically assigned interest rates as an instrument for price stability, MPMs for financial stability, FXIs for exchange rate stability, and CFMs for directly curbing capital inflows and outflows. However, the reality is more complex as policies interact and have overlapping eﬀects. For instance, MPMs working through the credit channel can have a dampening eﬀect on aggregate demand and influence the attainment of monetary policy objectives. Some countries use CFMs to mitigate capital outflows to stabilise exchange rates, if FXIs prove insuﬀicient. An integrated policy framework needs to provide greater clarity on these interactions. We need a deeper understanding of how these instruments can complement, substitute or conflict with one another. For example, we need to better understand the interactions between monetary policy and macroprudential regulation in achieving both price and financial stability. One view is that monetary and macroprudential policies are largely complementary and hence should be used together for better results. For instance, an IMF study found that tighter MPMs to address financial stability risks are associated with more countercyclical monetary policy responses to macroeconomic shocks. [9] An alternative perspective is that monetary policy can be used to achieve both price and financial stability. By setting the price of leverage and influencing risk taking, monetary policy can lean against the build-up of excessive credit and financial imbalances, thus mitigating financial stability risks.