samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
However, it now seems that the disproportion between banking losses, on the one hand, and movements in underlying asset prices, on the other, can (almost) fully be accounted for by the extraordinary degree of leverage which accumulated in the financial system over the last decade. Procylicality was at work, but on a much longer time horizon, and during the upward phase of the credit cycle. The following stylized facts describe what happened 8 : •  overall leverage grew strongly during the last decade  •  there was an upward break in the trend growth around 2003 / 2004  •  "inside" leverage (between financial institutions) grew faster than "outside" leverage (in the real economy)  •  the growth in leverage was closely associated with a dramatic increase in maturity transformation  •  risk measurement methodologies played a role in minimizing the impact of leverage in financial and risk reporting  •  accounting methodologies also played a central role. Instant recognition of profits led to a disconnection in time between measuring the return on an asset and recognizing the risk; this created a powerful incentive to take risk and strongly amplified the credit cycle. 7  At times, CDS indices appeared mispriced with implied probabilities of default clearly inconsistent with any plausible state of the global economy. 8  See CGFS, April 2009. BIS Review 94/2009  3  Policy options Addressing procyclicality clearly involves many policy actions. Those should be part of an integrated framework of macro prudential supervision.

Here in the Federal Reserve’s Second District, many households in both our urban and rural communities are vulnerable financially. And since the onset of the pandemic, access to quality, nutritious food has been greatly impeded. After many businesses were forced to shut down in the spring of 2020, food banks were quickly overwhelmed. In addition to an abrupt increase in need, there was also the challenge of distribution. I’m sure many of you remember the long lines to food pantries that stretched through neighborhoods. And many of our schools shifted from providing free lunches to students to offering grab-and-go meals to entire families. Now, we are facing another economic challenge: higher food prices. Transportation and labor costs—along with supply-chain disruptions—are driving up the price of many staples, such as beef, poultry, eggs, peanut butter, and produce. Food is not only becoming far more expensive for families, but also for food banks—which, at the same time, are reporting fewer donations. The result of all of this is that food insecurity is becoming more widespread—and more difficult to resolve. The ripple effects expand across the economy, as food insecurity drives economic inequality, which in turn is a barrier to cultivating a healthy workforce. And a healthy workforce is what we need to keep our economy strong. At the New York Fed—and across the Federal Reserve System—one of our key areas of focus is to better understand the economic drivers and social determinants of health.
As a matter of fact, the pass-through effect of exchange rate movements on prices has been weakening worldwide, in environments where price stability has been ensured thanks to highly reliable monetary policies, attributable to the facts that pricing in domestic currency is widespread, and owing to low and stable inflation, losses of value in the domestic currency are perceived as temporary and firms resort to price adjustments less frequently. At this point I would like to clarify one issue on the exchange rate policy of the Central Bank. The Central Bank has no policy towards keeping the Turkish lira overvalued. As always mentioned from the beginning of the implementation of the floating exchange rate regime, exchange rates are determined under the supply and demand conditions in the market. In case of excessive volatility in both directions, the Central Bank intervenes or if there is an excess foreign exchange supply Central Bank holds FX buying auctions to increase foreign exchange reserves. So we should keep in mind that in the current design of the monetary policy, with the floating exchange rate regime, level of foreign exchange rates is determined according to the developments in economy, exogenous shocks, expectations and volatility in risk premium as a result of all these. Dear participants, I would like to briefly mention what the economy of our country can gain if the main goal, which is price stability, is accomplished after the disinflation process.

Süreyya Serdengeçti: Falling inflation Opening remarks by Mr Süreyya Serdengeçti, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, for the conference on "Real Sector and Financial Sector in the Environment of Falling Inflation", organised by the Banks Association of Turkey, Ankara, 28 September, 2004, and given at the Monthly Meeting of Ankara Chamber of Commerce, Ankara, 29 September 2004. *  *  *  Dear Guests, In my speech today, I would like to dwell on the “environment of “falling inflation”, its main impacts on economy both in other countries and Turkey and finally, the significance of maintaining price stability for Turkey’s economy. The achievements obtained on the inflation front in the last three years under the current program allow us to speak about falling inflation environment and permanent price stability. Now, let me briefly review the point we have reached in the fight against inflation: CPI inflation, which was 68.5 percent at the end of 2001, remained below the targets set in 2002 and 2003 and fortunately, it realized as 18.4 percent at the end of 2003. In 2001-2003 period, the total decline in inflation exceeded 50 points. In August, CPI inflation fell to 10 percent thanks to the stability program, which was determinedly carried out in 2004, and the tight monetary and fiscal policies implemented within the framework of this program. Looking at the CPI inflation today, I do not see any serious problem that would prevent us from reaching the 12 percent-CPI inflation target for 2004.
It would be bound to fail due to our poor understanding of the process of short-term exchange rate determination. Given this state of ignorance, ongoing Forex dicussions inevitably suffer from a lack of analytical and systematic rigour. Reasons given for exchange rate movements remind us of a self-service shop offering all kinds of goodies that always fit the need of the moment: ice cream when the sun burns and hot coffee when it gets cold. The shopping list includes: -  trade imbalances  -  cyclical leads and lags  -  asset price bubbles  -  events and announcements in politics  -  a broad range of differentials, preferably in interest rates, productivity and inflation  and all this both effective and expected. One chooses the story that best fits a specific situation in the hope that something is better than nothing. This opportunistic selection, reinforced by communicative herding, gives the Forex discussion the character of a sequence of scenes with different key subjects that influence expectations to a varying extent, thus also possibly causing exchange rate distortions. Exchange rate developments between the USD and the euro in the past two years once again are a good example in this respect. I am not cynical, but humble. Day-to-day or month-to-month exchange rate movements seem to be a marvellously complex process, a highly unstable interaction of facts and expectations. The globalisation of capital markets has, if anything, added to this complexity by amplifying the impact of expectations.

Bruno Gehrig: Moving among currency giants – a Swiss perspective Speech by Prof Bruno Gehrig, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce, Zurich, 16 January 2001. *  *  *  First of all, I should like to thank you for the pleasure and delight of being invited to speak to you today. At the same time, I should like to emphasise how much I appreciate the exemplary and highly successful activity of the Swiss American Chamber of Commerce. Your organisation plays an invaluable part in the economic, political and - most important of all - in the personal relations between US and Swiss citizens. In my speech entitled "Moving among currency giants" I should like to outline a few ideas under four different headings. I shall start out with a few remarks on the system of floating exchange rates, which we have more or less learned to live with since 1973, the time of the breakdown of Bretton Woods. This will be followed by some considerations on the always topical subject of short- and medium-term currency movements. After this bird's eye view of general developments, the frog perspective will be highlighted. I will deal with the special features of our small currency, and end by drawing a few conclusions for the SNB's monetary policy.
Page 23 of 27  Figure 19 MPR Corridor (*) (percent) 4.0  Corridor FTS  3.5  Confidence interval: 66% EES  Confidence interval: 33% Forward  3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 Jun/23  Mar/23  Dec/22  Sep/22  Jun/22  Mar/22  Dec/21  Sep/21  Jun/21  Mar/21  Dec/20  Sep/20  Jun/20  Mar/20  0.0  (*) The corridor is built following the methodology of Box V.1 of the March 2020 Report. It includes the FOS of Jun 3, the EES of May 11 and the quarter’s mean smoothed forward curve. The methodology corresponds to the extraction of the implicit MPR considering the forward curve on the interest rate swap curve up to 2 years discounting the fixed rates for each term at the simple accrual of the ICP. Source: Central Bank of Chile. Figure 20 Monetary policy interest rate (*) (percent) 8  Chile  Developed  Emerging  Jan-15  Jan-16  Jan-17  7 6 5 4  3 2 1 0 Jan-11  Jan-12  Jan-13  Jan-14  Jan-18  Jan-19  Jan-20  (*) For both developed and emerging economies, the rates are weighted by respective country's GDP at PPP. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg.

This leads in turn to a rise in redundancies, something we have unfortunately seen in these last few weeks. Banks then become uncertain as to whether companies can pay back their loans. When uncertainty arises about the financial strength of companies, interest rates go up and it becomes more difficult for the financial system to mediate credit from lender to borrower. Investors, those who normally want to invest money to increase their returns, back away. When they do so, the functioning of other markets increasingly deteriorates. The Riksbank acts as a safeguard so that the system does not run out of money It is now a question of trying to shorten the period of risk aversion and credit shortage as it can exacerbate and prolong the downturn in the economy. As the Riksbank functions as the banks’ bank and supplies them with money which they then pass on to others in society, the Riksbank’s task is to supply money to the financial system. This reduces the risk of money shortages and sharply rising interest rates exacerbating the situation. By guaranteeing ample access to Swedish kronor that keeps down interest rates, the Riksbank helps to ensure that consumption and investment do not fall as much as they otherwise would have done. In this perspective, the Riksbank’s task is key in order to mitigate the effects on jobs and companies. And we take this task extremely seriously because “it is no game”, as one business leader put it in our survey.
Norges Bank now devotes considerable resources to improving and developing our model apparatus for such “nowcasting”. We engage in extensive cooperation with researchers in Norway and abroad and with other central banks. Results and documentation of this work will be published in coming monetary policy reports and articles by researchers at Norges Bank. BIS Review 102/2007  5  In order to forecast somewhat further ahead, we must gain more insight into the forces at work and how they are affecting the economy. Statistical forecasting models, or models largely based on previous experiences, will be of limited help. For example, previous experience provides limited guidance in explaining the driving forces behind this cyclical upturn because of the many differences in relation to earlier periods. A solid basis in economic theory is required to shed light on causal relationships. Norges Bank's work on models in recent years has aimed at constructing a theoretical macro model that can enhance our understanding of economic developments. By looking at households' and firms' behaviour, we can analyse the effect of changes of a more structural nature on the economy. In the model that has been given the name NEMO (Norwegian Economy Model), developments in the Norwegian economy can be explained among other things by changes in business technology, market structure in the product and labour market, household preferences with regard to work and leisure and monetary policy.

As under the gold standard or the fixed exchange rate regimes, it is again our own choice of nominal anchor that determines the rate of inflation in Norway over time. 2  BIS Review 102/2007  Future studies will probably find that inflation reverts to the inflation target over time. This is an indication that monetary policy is working and not that there is a natural inflation rate or a natural, self-regulating mechanism. Inflation is still influenced by exogenous conditions. Increased globalisation, particularly China’s growing importance in world trade, has in the past ten years for example resulted in low imported inflation measured in a foreign currency. At the same time, productivity growth has been high in many countries. These positive supply-side features have for a period contributed to a favourable development in the short-term trade-off between economic growth and inflation. As a result, many countries where inflation was a little too high at the outset have been able to bring down inflation at virtually no cost. In this respect, we can probably talk about some degree of endogeneity in inflation.1 However, it is still up to the authorities through the orientation of monetary policy to choose whether inflation is to remain low and stable on a more permanent basis. Over time, interest rate setting is aimed at keeping inflation close to target. In the process, interest rates will have short-term direct or indirect effects on a number of other economic variables.
Lars Nyberg: Developments in the property market Speech by Mr Lars Nyberg, Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at Stock market day, Malmö, 18 October 2003. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, At the Lisbon summit in March 2000 the EU’s heads of state and government decided to initiate an ambitious reform agenda that would extend over the entire decade. The goal was for the European economies to become “the most competitive and dynamic knowledgebased economies in the world by 2010”. Today, I intend to reflect upon what has happened with economic reforms in the light of the Lisbon agenda, both in Sweden and in the euro area in general. But first allow me to thank you for your invitation to speak here today. As I’m sure you all know, the Riksbank attaches great importance to participating at various events and speaking on issues of significance for monetary policy and financial stability. This is perhaps most true of issues regarding the current stance of monetary policy, of which we were informed a short time ago in conjunction with the Inflation Report that we published last Thursday and which resulted in the decision to leave the repo rate unchanged at 2.75 per cent. The interest rate decisions in particular usually attract great interest from the public and the media, which the Riksbank of course finds very gratifying.

This raises the question of the sustainability of this debt, and of the impact of an upward shock to interest rates or a downward shock to activity, especially in an increasingly uncertain macroeconomic context (trade tensions, Italian budget, Brexit, yellow vests). Given the situation, it was essential to avoid an infinite debt spiral. In December 2017, the Haut Conseil de Stabilité Financière, under the chairmanship of Minister Bruno Le Maire, thus decided to lower to 5% of their equity the ceiling of the main banks’ exposures to the most indebted large companies. It also decided to raise the countercyclical capital buffer of French banks, by 0.25% in June 2018 and again by 0.25% in March 2020. This countercyclical buffer, expressed as a percentage of core equity and applied to French exposures, aims at enabling banks to build up a capital reserve to maintain their supply of credit in the event of a turnaround in the financial cycle, the buffer then being immediately released. However, these binding instruments apply only to banks, while non-bank intermediation is playing an increasing role in financing the economy. According to the ECB, the loans and deposits of investment funds have risen threefold since 2011. Macroprudential policy thus needs to be adjusted to better take account of this new dimension. The HCSF is firmly committed to this goal. Its powers enable it to intervene outside the banking sector and it has started designing stress tests that cover all sectors. B.
Taylor, John (1993), “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”, Carnegie-Rocheter Series on Public Policy, 39, 195–214. Tenreyro, Silvana (2019), “The elusive supply potential: monetary policy in times of uncertainty”, speech, Glasgow, 7 March 2019. 24 [24]

Aggregate cumulative UK impairment charges over the five years of the (a) stress Impairments in the stress (left-hand scale) Impairment rates in the stress (right-hand scale) Per cent 25  £ billions 20  20  15  15 10 10 5  5  0  0 UK mortgages  Sources: PRA regulatory returns, published accounts and Bank calculations. (a) Major UK banks’ core Tier 1 capital as a percentage of their risk-weighted assets. Major UK banks are Banco Santander, Bank of Ireland, Barclays, Co-operative Banking Group, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, National Australia Bank, Nationwide, RBS and Virgin Money. Data exclude Northern Rock/Virgin Money from 2008. (b) Between 2008 and 2011, the chart shows core Tier 1 ratios as published by banks, excluding hybrid capital instruments and making deductions from capital based on FSA definitions. Prior to 2008 that measure was not typically disclosed; the chart shows Bank calculations approximating it as previously published in the Report. (c) Weighted by risk-weighted assets. (d) From 2012, the ‘Basel III common equity Tier 1 capital ratio’ is calculated as common equity Tier 1 capital over riskweighted assets, according to the CRD IV definition as implemented in the United Kingdom. The Basel III peer group includes Barclays, Co-operative Banking Group, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Nationwide, RBS and Santander UK. (e) CET1 ratio less the aggregate percentage point fall projected under the Bank of England’s 2016 annual cyclical stress scenario for the six largest UK banks.
With consent, third parties can use MyInfo APIs to access data that is government-verified to authenticate their customers and make business decisions relating to that customer. Last year, MAS and the Government Technology Agency of Singapore (GovTech) started a pilot with four banks to enable individuals to open a bank account online using MyInfo. Today, we can open a bank account or apply for a credit card - online and instantly – when we give consent to the bank to access our data through MyInfo. More than 20 FIs are now using MyInfo to provide more than 110 digital financial services. We have substantially solved the personal KYC problem. But corporate KYC is far more complex. Last year, I shared with you that MAS is working with local and foreign banks to explore a shared services utility for doing corporate KYC. This is potentially a transformative project. And we made good progress in harmonising various banks’ KYC systems and integrating the proposed KYC utility with the banks’ infrastructure. This is no mean feat given the diversity of banks’ KYC processes and internal IT systems But the economics did not work out: our proposed solution was going to cost more than the savings that banks will get out of it. So we have decided to take a pause on the project. The banks participating in the KYC project will publish a report this week on their learning experience.

Yet, cautiousness is needed, as once the profitability breakeven is crossed, prices can respond stronger to the overall cycle and wage pressures. Hence, central banks have to be cautious in accommodating, as not always this is warranted by low inflation. Low prices might be a reflection of a more structural features (competition for instance), or cyclical ones (such as profitability). In the first case, the impact of the central bank is constrained, while in the second case – once the impact of the profitability cushion wanes – the monetary accommodation can add to stronger inflation pressures than acceptable. Chart 20: CESEE GDP deflator, unit labor costs and mark-ups (percent change) 15.0  Mark-up, change in % Unit labour cost, change in %  10.0  GDP deflartor, change in %  5.0  0.0  -5.0  -10.0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Source: Eurostat, SEE Jobs Gateway Database, National Statistics and Authors’ calculation. Conclusion In the last couple of years we have dealt with the issue of the impact of the monetary policy normalisation, of the ECB in particular, on the region. At the current stance, not only that normalisation is distant, but rather stronger accommodative approach is being employed. The prolonged monetary expansion has called for greater vigilance in the context of excessive risk –taking and debt build-up. At the same time, more scrutiny has been put on the causes of the low inflation that might possible disclose a need for cautiousness in providing monetary stimulus.
Paul Tucker: The repertoire of official sector interventions in the financial system – last resort lending, market-making, and capital Remarks by Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor, Financial Stability, of the Bank of England, at the Bank of Japan 2009 International Conference “Financial System and Monetary Policy: Implementation”, Bank of Japan, Tokyo, 27-28 May 2009. *  *  *  Everything – and I mean everything – about central banking stems from our liabilities being the base money of the economy. From this flow our roles in monetary policy and financial stability. And, in consequence, the manner in which central banks supply our money – overnight, intra-day, and for term maturities; in routine and in various stressed circumstances – just could not matter more, even if much of the time it seems like an obscure corner of the financial system’s plumbing. About half a decade ago, I set out the thinking that underpins the Bank of England’s management of our balance sheet, focusing principally on the implementation of monetary policy. 1 Today I want to explain how, over the past eighteen months, we have developed our system for providing liquidity insurance to banks in the interests of preserving financial stability; and how that bears on the prudential regulation of banks’ liquidity.

Let me summarise the three main points: •  The Eurosystem is exploring synergies between TARGET2 and T2S, with the ultimate goal of achieving a consolidated Eurosystem market infrastructure. •  We are assessing new service opportunities arising from bringing the two infrastructures closer together. In particular, we are considering enhancements to the TARGET2 services in the field of instant payments. •  The Eurosystem will increase harmonisation of its own collateralisation techniques and procedures. We will also consider the business case for a common Eurosystem collateral management system. As part of this morning’s panel, we will delve a little deeper into this vision and will discuss some of the challenges we can expect the future to bring. I would like to welcome the panel members and Marc Bayle who will moderate this session. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches