samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
With large and, to some extent, varying budget revenues, the basis for determining central government expenditure and taxes from one year to the next may easily be impaired. If budget spending is allowed to vary in step with oil prices, the Norwegian economy may experience abrupt shifts and instability. Changes in oil prices may then quickly influence wage and price expectations, the exchange rate and long-term rates. In addition, short-term rates would have to be changed frequently and sharply. BIS Review 19/2001  9  In recent years, central government real underlying spending growth has accelerated somewhat. In 2000 and 2001, spending growth has been higher than 2 per cent, which is higher than normal growth in the mainland economy. At the same time, direct and indirect taxes have increased. Fiscal policy has thus had a virtually neutral effect on domestic demand for two years while wage growth has been substantially higher than in other countries. A possible interpretation of this development is that it is more demanding to use the government budget to dampen cyclical fluctuations during an upturn than during a downturn. The willingness and ability to pursue a counter-cyclical policy may in itself be cyclical. Another interpretation is that a neutral fiscal stance this year, with a strong increase in government financial wealth, is a balanced approach to using the budget to stabilise the economy while phasing in an increase in financial income in the economy. Conclusion The Norwegian economy is fragile and vulnerable.

We can see from the graph (blue line) that inflation in the third quarter of this year was insignificantly higher than we had forecast in September. The dashed red curve represents the new forecast. It begins in the fourth quarter of 2004 and ends in the third quarter of 2007. The new forecast differs from the previous ones in three points. Firstly, the projected inflation is higher until the third quarter of 2005. Secondly, the inflationary uptrend sets in half a year later. And thirdly, inflationary pressure has decreased in the long term, which is evidenced by the lower-lying curve. There are significant economic facts behind these three deviations, which I would like to comment on. 1. Slightly higher inflation in 2005  The increase in the anticipated inflation until the third quarter of 2005 is predominantly attributable to the rise in oil prices. At the September assessment, the price of Brent in London stood at USD 41. By the end of October, the price had surged to over USD 50 before dropping back to around USD 40. Higher prices of oil products were the main cause for the rise in inflation in the last few months. Annual inflation between May and September hovered around 1%. A fresh spurt in oil product prices in October and November triggered a rise in annual inflation to 1.3% and 1.5% respectively. According to the new inflation forecast, the annual rate of inflation will increase to 1.5% on average in the first quarter of 2005.
And it is warning signal when banks have to run to securities markets to finance growth faster than deposits alone allow them to do. Systemic risk increases when imbalances build up. Macroprudential policy is designed to address the systematic features of financial crises, strengthen bank resilience and curb the probability of a crisis. Policy rules and transparency are aimed at avoiding complacency in good times. For example, the Basel III framework specifies that the ratio of credit to GDP should be a conditioning variable when setting the level of the countercyclical capital buffer for banks. The authorities must explain and justify their actions, or their inaction. If banking regulation is to be effective, not only must we be able to identify imbalances that are building up, but we must also understand the interaction between banks and other economic agents and how systemic risk arises. Lessons from the 1960s and 1970s showed that detailed regulation was not very effective. If we are to intervene in the markets, we must understand how the market functions and why the market cannot be left to its own devices. This provides a basis for regulating markets and insight into regulatory effects. From the textbooks we are well aware of the ingredients of market failure – or the preconditions for regulating markets. Environmental economics is often used as an example. If a polluter does not bear the costs it inflicts on others, a fee should be imposed on the polluter.

Profitable projects no longer receive funding and the real economic costs may prove substantial. Individual borrowers do not take into account how collateral values will affect other economic agents, or in other words do not take into account the increased systemic risk they inflict on others. The parallel with environmental economics fits well here. When pollution has no cost, it becomes excessive. In addition to the contagion effects through loan collateral, costs may arise from the market failure that occurs in a crisis when some economic agents deleverage substantially and the real interest rate cannot be set sufficiently low to underpin aggregate demand for goods and services among other economic agents. This theory seems to fit well with the situation in the US and Europe after the financial crisis, where it has been difficult to set policy rates below zero. The result is amplification of the real economic costs associated with a financial crisis. Individual borrowers do not take into account that more credit during good times increases the risk that the economy ends up in such a situation. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  The theory can be briefly summarised. The financial system left to its own devices creates excessive debt and excessive risk in upturns and insufficient credit in downturns, giving rise to credit cycles that amplify fluctuations in the economy. That is the background for macroprudential policy of banks. Regulation should be tightened during goods times and relaxed during bad times. The mechanisms I have described are not new or unfamiliar.
In this context, the largest retail payment system in the Republic of Macedonia established a Guarantee Scheme in 2017 which is in accordance with the regulation of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia that aims to effect the same-day settlement and thus, minimize the liquidity risk in the important payment system in case of a participant default. Furthermore, we also engaged in facilitating cross-  border payments in euro in 2017 by establishing a link between our RTGS payment system MIPS and TARGET2, which relies on the highly appreciated cooperation with Bank of Italy. And we do not stop here. Our recent efforts have been focused on building a Strategy for reducing the cash usage and thus, increasing the digitalization and cashless payments, which 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  is a joint project of the central bank, the Ministry of Finance and the banking community. During the following three days, the lecturers will address all the above relevant developments in the payment market. The conference agenda includes a variety of interesting topics, including the European payment landscape and legislation with a special focus on PSD2, instant payments, T2 & T2S consolidation project, collateral management system, recent work of CPMI and latest trends in central bank oversight. This year’s agenda also covers themes related to cryptocurrencies, central bank digital currencies and distributed ledger technology and cyber resilience.

Ardian Fullani: Monetary policy, from the past to the present Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the 10th international conference on “Monetary policy, from the past to the present”, Tirana, 26 October 2012. *  *  *  H.E. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies Ambassadors, Honourable Minister of Finance, Honourable Governors, Distinguished Guests and Participants, I am very honoured and privileged to open the proceedings of the Tenth Conference of the Bank of Albania. This conference is particularly important this year as it is organised in the framework of activities for the 100th anniversary of the Declaration of Albania’s Independence and the 20th anniversary of the Bank of Albania. While retaining the scientific approach, the conference pays tribute to the endeavours made over the years in the monetary and finance aspects. In Bank of Albania’s view, the past is an essential element for the analysis and decisionmaking, and a requisite for theoretic or empirical research. At present, this is a necessity, a challenge that the economics world is facing. To scan, diagnose and cure the situation of the economy, a successful scholar would have to be able to read the human thought. Unfortunately, such a doctor does not exist. Therefore, in our days, the economic science is turning its attention to individual characteristics such as: history, ethnography and other national traits, considering them as substantial determinants for the stochastic process that leads the behaviour of economic agents.
If there were a tolerance band, inflation of just over 1 per cent, or below 3 per cent, instead would be “tolerable” if unforeseen events meant that inflation ended up there, but it would not be something to consciously aim for. The idea that many commentators seem to have is that a target range would mean the Riksbank would feel less forced to bring inflation up to 2 per cent, which in turn would mean that monetary policy would not need to be as expansionary and the risks linked to such a policy could be mitigated. Difficult to pursue another policy even with an interval I would like to point out here, without commenting on the pros and cons of a target range in general terms, that this idea appears to be based in part on a misunderstanding of the motives behind the Riksbank’s policy. The reason the Riksbank is eager to get inflation to rise is not that we have a rigid fixation with achieving exactly 2 per cent inflation all the time. It is due to the fact that the period in which inflation has been below the target has gradually become longer, and that long-term inflation expectations have shown a falling trend and still remain below the target.

Pongpen Ruengvirayudh: Thailand in 2014 – recent developments and challenges ahead Keynote address by Ms Pongpen Ruengvirayudh, Deputy Governor for Monetary Stability of the Bank of Thailand, at the Thomson Reuters FX Community Forum 2014, Bangkok, 18 February 2014. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, 1. It is a distinct pleasure to be back here again and I would like to thank Thomson Reuters for the invitation. To the winners of this year’s FX awards, I would like to congratulate you on your notable achievements. And to the rest of the market participants, I would like to express my thanks for your continuing contribution to the development of the Thai foreign exchange market. 2. Much has changed both at home and aboard since I gave an opening address at this event last year. On the external front, the US Federal Reserve’s planned scaling-down of its QE program has sparked turbulence in the emerging markets as investors continue to speculate on the Fed’s exact tapering timeline. On the domestic front, the absence of political solutions continues to subdue public and private spending, with unavoidable repercussions on overall growth outlook. Certainly, the interplay between these recent developments will have profound implications for the Thai economy to some extent going forward. For this reason, I would like to take this opportunity to share with you my views on these important developments and the potential challenges they pose to the Thai economy. 3. Let me start with the developments on the external front.
It should be pointed out that the reason that a central bank may wish to lean against the wind does not have to be because it only wishes to safeguard financial stability. That may be the case, but it may also be a purely monetary policy decision. The bank may simply wish to attempt to avoid severe fluctuations in the real economy and inflation, even if these are not deemed to be associated with financial stability problems. Leaning against the wind is not a problem-free strategy. Three primary counterarguments have been put forth. 7 Firstly, the imbalance must be identified at a sufficiently early stage. Attempting to rectify the imbalance too late may be problematic as monetary policy acts with a time lag. If property prices fall steeply immediately following an increase of the policy rate by the central bank, the delayed effects of the interest rate increase will reinforce the negative effects on the economy of the falling property prices. Of course, one must also be sufficiently certain that an imbalance really is building up. If the upturn is being caused by fundamental factors, a higher interest rate would hinder growth unnecessarily. Secondly, one has to rely upon being able to deal with the property price increase through reasonable increases of the policy rate. One hypothesis is that the optimistic mood often prevailing during a boom in the property market means that significant increases of the policy rate are required to have an effect.

Instead, one equation for households (H) and one for firms (F) are needed: lending itH  it   tH ( ztH ) ,  itFlending  it   tF ( ztF ) . If we suspect that a bubble is building up in one of the two markets, measures can be aimed at just that market. This is not possible with the policy rate, as there only exists one policy rate in the economy. In other words, both equations have the same “lever”. Regulations or charges can also be adjusted on the basis of the aggregated credit growth and, in this case, the effect would be rather like an interest rate increase. However, with regulations, it is also possible to aim measures in a specific direction and only increase the interest rate margin for the market in which credit growth is deemed to constitute a problem. This strategy allows us to avoid tightening credit growth for the other sector which does not form a risk, which – all other things being equal – reduces the costs of leaning against the wind. One condition for the implementation of such targeted measures is, of course, that the rules governing when action is to be taken are based on developments in the individual sectors. Of course, the time-varied application of such regulation would not be unproblematic. As in the case of leaning with the policy rate, any imbalance must be identified at a sufficiently early stage.
Preliminary document, Central Bank of Chile, March. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 9 Nominal exchange rates in the world (index 01/Jan/00-18/Oct/11=100)  Average  U.S. (2)  U.K.  Mexico  India  Russia  South Korea  Hungary  Philippines  Peru  China  July (3)  South Africa  Range (1)  Poland  40 Israel  40 Eurozone  60 Malaysia  60 Chile  80  Sweden  80  Norway  100  Thailand  100  Colombia  120  Japan  120  Canada  140  Brazil  140  N. Zealand  160  Czech Republic  160  Australia  180  Switzerland  180  Spot October  (1) The range shows highest and lowest levels posted by domestic currency during indicated period. (2) Uses Broad index. (3) At 27 July 2011. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. Figure 10 Real exchange rate (index, 1986=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70 88  92  1991-2010 average  96  00  04  1996-2010 average  08 TCR  Spot (*)  (*) The observed exchange rate of 18 October 2011. Source: Central Bank of Chile.

18.05.2022  Welcoming remarks Pathways to Gender Equality in Central Banks Margarita Delgado Deputy Governor  Dear ladies and gentlemen, I feel very honored to participate in the opening of this conference co-organized with the International Economic Association, Banco de la República and Banco de España. The development of initiatives, such as this one that gives visibility to issues related to gender diversity, are key to finding solutions to the waste of talent that involves not taking this diversity into account, consequently putting economic growth at risk and depriving economies of opportunities to develop. Ensuring diversity and, in particular, gender balance, must be a priority in our organizations and, with this commitment, we work at the Banco de España, where we have made significant progress in recent years. By the end of 2021, 51% of our total staff were females, and it is noteworthy that, in one decade (since 2012), that proportion has increased in nearly 10 percentage points. More than 4 years ago, in April 2018, Banco de España joined Bank Al Maghrib, the central bank of Morocco, to organize the first international meeting between international central banks with the aim of studying and fostering female leadership in central banks.
I want to underline today that you are an important partner in our efforts and when we join forces guaranteeing the welfare of future generations becomes an easier task. Dear guests, We have constantly emphasised that financial education and research are an integral and significant part of the activity of the Bank of Albania. They are a precondition and source for the social-economic development and welfare of the citizens of Albania. In this regard, I would like now to turn your attention to what has now become a tradition, the ceremony for the Governor’s Award for the Best Diploma. 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  This is the 13th year that the Bank of Albania has selected and awarded three diploma theses. Over the years, we have found that the quality of research work has been improving, to the point that it has become actually difficult to distinguish the work presented by a recently graduated student from that of a researcher at the Bank of Albania. The selected topics present great interest, as they focus on critical issues related to the economic and financial reality in Albania and beyond. As in previous years, Albanian students from domestic or foreign universities have applied and presented their best research work. We are happy to note that participation and interest from students and universities has been significantly on the rise, revealing the recognition, reliability and reputation this Award has achieved.

Now I am pleased to inform that the JC3 is one of the collaborators with CGM, together with the Institute of Corporate Directors Malaysia (ICDM) and Islamic Markets in organising today’s forum. The Bank envisions that financial industry players and others from the private sector will play more proactive roles in increasing funding pathways for green and sustainability related projects. By stepping up such efforts, there would be more innovative financial instruments or alternative financing, sustainable or green bonds or sukuk that would support the Government’s climate change agenda. Ladies and gentlemen, The severity and abruptness of the current health crisis do not make climate crisis any less pressing. The resilience of our future economy and financial system will depend on the actions we take now in building climate and societal resilience. This is a sobering reality, one we must take full accountability of, and pledge strong commitment to. This pandemic has not only provided valuable lessons to us on the grave consequences of being ill-prepared when facing a crisis. It is also a strong reminder that sustainability must play a crucial role in our economic recovery and reset. As a central banker, it is not often that I talk about global health – but the current pandemic has challenged me to be more conversant of such issues. The same applies to the topic of climate change which was not in the central banks’ dictionary until recently.
The normative Ramsey model of 1928, devised for a central social planner to decide about the optimal intertemporal path of saving and investment was surprisingly put at the centre of macroeconomics, with the assumption that it could serve as a good descriptive model of the way a capitalist market economy really works. Considered a general equilibrium model of representative agents, the model initially had no money. Money was later inserted back in via the unkeynesian assumption of rigid prices and wages but finance remained completely excluded as if it didn´t matter to explain real economy fluctuations. The crisis has put into question these standard models as good and useful representations of how the economy works. Several researchers, followers of the paradigm, are now working hard to incorporate as many financial frictions as possible into their models. However, other academics belonging to the core paradigm have been raising more fundamental doubts. For instance, Ricardo Caballero wrote: “Rational expectations is a central ingredient of the current core; however, this assumption becomes increasingly untenable as we continue to add the realism of the periphery into the core”. 1 Willem Buiter, questioned the paradigm more acidly: “Most mainstream macroeconomic theoretical innovations since the 1970s ( the New Classical rational expectations revolution ...and the New Keynesian theorizing ...) have turned out to be self-referential, inward-looking distractions at best. Research tended to be motivated by the internal logic, intellectual sunk capital and aesthetic puzzles of established research programmes rather than by a powerful desire to understand how the economy works”.

The sharing of sovereignty is also the pre-condition for any risk-sharing mechanisms at the euro area level. The recent Report by the Four Presidents mentioned the gradually development of a fiscal capacity for the EMU – that is, a common budget for the euro area distinct from the EU budget. It identified two possible functions of such fiscal capacity: first, facilitating the adjustment to country-specific shocks; and, second, providing financial incentives for structural reforms. Reflections on this are at a very early stage and the pros and cons need to be carefully weighed but it is a very important component of a fiscal union. There is a long debate going back to the Werner Report in 1971 or to the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty on the degree of fiscal integration that is necessary to sustain a monetary union. In my view the key question on taking detailed decisions remains that of efficiency, being necessary to assess whether there are economic benefits in excess of costs in moving some expenditure to the euro area level. Economic union The third pillar, economic union, is necessary to ensure the conditions for prosperity within a monetary union and thereby prevent countries from becoming a burden on others. Without the possibility for exchange rate adjustment, countries have to remain sufficiently flexible to adjust through other channels as underlined by the theory of Optimal Currency Areas.