samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Neither of these models is likely to fit within the regulatory regime for payment stablecoins, though they may fit within other regulatory regimes. In the first case, to be acceptable as a means of payment at systemic scale, stablecoins will be required to meet redemption at par  on demand which is inconsistent with an investment product. In the second case, the issue of liquid liabilities that can be used as money in return for illiquid debt obligations is the banking business model and issuers of tokenised money who wish to pursue credit creation will need to be regulated as banks. This brings me to the second area, the issuance by commercial banks of new forms of digital money to be used on new payment rails – in the form of ‘tokenised’ bank deposits. These might offer some or all of the functionality and efficiency claimed for stablecoins, allowing banks deposits to compete better with non-bank payment coins. Some banks in the UK and in other jurisdictions have been exploring and investing in the development of tokenised deposits as settlement assets on new forms of ledger (eg DLT). The majority of this effort appears to have centred on wholesale as opposed to retail financial transactions[16], though there are signs that attention is now being given to tokenisation of retail deposits[17]. In regulatory terms, the tokenisation of bank deposits is a much simpler proposition than nonbank stablecoins.

Spain is trading between –45 bps and –50 bps. Italy is now trading below –40 bps1. And for Austria, Belgium and The Netherlands, rates have been moving downwards as well. One could say that whereas in the past the repo market was largely characterised by “collateral chasing cash”, today the main dynamic in some markets appears to be “cash chasing collateral”. The evolution of repo rates for different collateral classes over reporting dates suggest that the old pattern still exists in parallel with the new. As I will argue below, this observation provides a key to understanding the roots of these developments. New dynamics in the short term funding markets unsurprisingly lead to debate in the financial industry. There are concerns about short-term borrowing costs swinging sharply at the end of reporting periods, creating volatility and potentially spilling over into government bond markets – an effect we have indeed seen for core general collateral (GC) collateral. And some observers fear collateral scarcity might herald more general disruptions to the “plumbing” of the financial system, which would be especially problematic given ongoing structural changes in financial intermediation. Activity is after all shifting increasingly from banks to non-banks, and marketbased finance is, by and large, organised around collateralised lending. Perhaps inevitably, some point the finger at monetary policy, and in particular at the side-effects of the ECB’s asset purchase programme. The substantial creation of liquidity by the APP is argued to have pushed unsecured lending rates to the deposit floor, causing secured lending rates to fall even lower.
9  See Tucker P M W (2006), “Reflections on Operating Inflation Targeting”, a speech at the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, May 2006. 10  Tucker (2009e), op. cit. BIS Review 21/2010  7  carried away beyond anything warranted by fundamentals. Regulators need to be a bit less disposed to find fundamental explanations for any degree of financial appreciation, and a little more alert to market participants themselves saying, as many did, that risk is underpriced. That does not of itself mean that monetary policy should be more timid in trying to repair deficiencies in nominal demand. But it does underline the need, as I said a few years ago, to take care that the remedy for one set of imbalances does not lead to another. And this is especially important if, as would seem to be the case, monetary policy is capable of generating prolonged periods of stability at an aggregate level that lead financial market participants to believe mistakenly that the world is less risky than is actually the case. It is all very well saying that the cognitive biases of economists and the authorities should change slightly, and that our mindset should at times be a bit more lateral. But do we, in actual fact, have any instruments for doing anything about threats to stability from credit bubbles that are not associated with burgeoning nominal demand and inflationary pressures? That is precisely what the “macroprudential instruments” debate is about. There is increasing interest in these possibilities.

To achieve the 2% inflation target over the medium term but at the cost of an avoidable depletion of the economy’s supply capacity would not be congruent with the MPC’s Remit, which includes supporting growth and employment in so far as that is consistent with the overriding goal of price stability. I was glad that the “effective supply” way of thinking about this was reflected in our latest Inflation Report. But I would readily concede that we must not lose sight of the potential “speed limit” effects that featured in our November Report. Given the need for some rebalancing in the pattern of demand and activity, and the likely lags in firms bringing even suspended capacity back on-line, bottlenecks are a distinct possibility. We will need to be especially alert to messages from the Bank’s Agents, to survey evidence, and to data on productivity, wages and prices for any sign of inflationary pressures. Volatility of inflation, and inflation expectations The Committee’s strategy has warranted maintaining the very substantial monetary stimulus notwithstanding the marked pick-up in inflation over recent months. As the Governor explained at our press conference a fortnight ago, we think that the recent rise in inflation is accounted for mainly by the increase in petrol prices, the restoration of VAT to 17.5%, and lagged effects of sterling’s substantial depreciation. But we can’t be, and aren’t, comfortable about it. Not least because the country has to trust us that these will be temporary disturbances.
This can lead to many unemployed people losing work-related competence, which can further limit their opportunities on the labour market. Figure 1. Labour force participation and matching efficiency, before and after the financial crisis (a) Labour force participation (b) Matching efficiency 74  74  0.3  0.3  73  73  0.15  0.15  72  72  0  0  71  71 -0.15  70  70  Average 2000-2007 and 2010-2018  -0.15 Average 2000-2007 and 2010-2018  00  04  08  12  16  -0.3  00  04  08  12  16  -0.3  Note: Annual percentage change and deviation from the mean value respectively, matching efficiency refers to deviation from a historical mean value. A negative value refers to a lower matching efficiency than the average. Sources: Statistics Sweden and own calculations  Taxation and compensation systems determine to a large extent how the labour market functions. This affects the employees’ incentives to take part in the labour force and accept new job offers. One important factor in this context is the employees’ compensation rate – unemployment benefit in relation to wages. This determines how much of his or her income an individual can retain if he or she becomes unemployed. The compensation rate has declined steadily since the beginning of the 2000s, with the exception of the years 2015-2016, see Figure 2a.

21 In other words, monetary policy decision-making is surrounded by various different types of uncertainty. At the Riksbank we grapple with issues such as: Which shocks are currently the driving force behind the business cycle? Which forecasting model gives the best forecasts? How large is the effect of a change in the interest rate on inflation? What characterises well-balanced monetary policy? How should the risk of low inflation be balanced against increased risks for financial instability? Is the data correct? Should special attention be given to really negative scenarios? Figure 13. The Riksbank's forecasts on labour force participation and GDP growth (a) Labour force participation  (B) GDP growth  Note. Thousands of persons, aged 15-74 and annual percentage change. The figure shows the Riksbank’s forecasts for labour force participation and GDP growth 2013–2019 (February). Sources: Statistics Sweden and the Riksbank  There has been greater interest in how to take into account uncertainty in the monetary policy decision-making process since the financial crisis. This has often been about finding a structured way to take into account the uncertainty in the monetary policy decision. Unfortunately, I must say that the answer to this question is not exactly easy and that it can probably be best summarised as “it depends”. In practice, there are three approaches a policymaker can take with regard to uncertainty. He or she can act more forcefully, more cautiously or as if the uncertainty did not exist.
If however action were needed on financial stability, this would be effected chiefly through temporary liquidity instruments, which would not conflict with the increase in interest rates needed to ensure price stability. II. A plea for more focused multilateral cooperation Be they energy price pressures or financial spill-overs, the challenges currently faced by central banks require more than individual actions – they call for strong and effective multilateral impetus. I say it here in Washington, during the IMF Spring Meetings. However, the tide has been turning the other way since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As geopolitical rifts deepen and trust fades, it is becoming more and more difficult for the G20 to deliver on its mandate, despite remarkable efforts from the Indonesian and now the Indian presidency. We need to find pragmatic ways forward to overcome deadlocks in global action and adapt to the new realities. Alternatives to multilateral cooperation, such as regionalism, “minilateralism”, ii or “polylateralism” iii can usefully supplement it. Working on smaller scales, or relying on non-state actors could help achieve breakthroughs. Yet they cannot replace it. They lack the global reach of international state cooperation.iv Hence my call for a focused or pragmatic multilateralism. v The principle is simple: rather than pursuing an exaggerated ambition, focus at present multilateral efforts on a few selected global issues, where there are clear common interests.

In my view, without pretending to be exhaustive, these global issues on which  Page 6 sur 7 interests and deliverables could converge encompass the following three “Cs”: climate, crypto-assets, cross-border payments. 1. Of course, addressing climate change comes to mind first. In the wake of the IPCC’s January Synthesis Report, it is estimated that if emissions continue at current levels, the carbon budget to have a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C with limited overshoot would run out in around six years. The latest IPCC report is the final warning from the scientific climate community to all of us policy makers. From a financial standpoint, the collective priority is to make green finance more mature. The path is clear: better data and better standards will allow us to shift from voluntary to mandatory climate-related disclosures, and still more developed climate stress-tests and transition plans for all financial institutions. At the international level, we must ensure the convergence, or at least the interoperability of the various disclosure standards currently under development. ISSB should be the international standard, and be assured the European standard – EFRAG – will be somewhat more demanding but fully compatible. 2. Second, crypto-assets. In light of last year’s debacle, there is a broad consensus in international fora on the need to regulate them. But this consensus must now be leveraged and translated into concrete action.
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14  0  Source: Emerging Portfolio Fund Research Global and Bank calculations. (a) Changes in assets under management may partly reflect changes in sample coverage. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11  Chart 5 UK life insurance liabilities by type(a)  Chart 6 Change in equity allocation of US and French life insurers over time(a) 40  £ billion  Non-profit non-linked  1400  With-profit  1200  Unit-linked  91  94  97  00  03  06  09  12  6 4  800  10  2  600  0  200 88  30  8  20  1000  400  85  8Q cumulative change to equity allocation, percentage points  Smoothed annual growth, per cent  0  96  99  02  05  -10 -20 -30  08  11  0 -2  US (right-hand scale) France (right-hand scale) S&P 500 (left-hand scale)  -4 -6  (a) Technical reserves net of reinsurance  Source: National flow of funds  Source: S&P SynThesys (regulatory returns) and Bank calculations. (a) The 8Q cumulative change to equity allocation is calculated using an 8 quarter moving-sum. Reallocation into equities is calculated as the difference between the allocation in equities at time t and allocation into equities at time t-1, measured in percentage points.

The strongest pension funds reduced significantly their allocation, effectively cutting it in half, while weak funds maintained or increased their allocation. By the end of the period, the strongest funds had half the equity allocation of the weakest. At one level, these portfolio reallocations made sense – the strongest protecting their surpluses by de-risking, the weakest trying to close their deficits by re-risking. Yet, from a longer-term or societal perspective, these reallocations are troubling. To cushion the risk cycle, we would wish to see stronger long-term investors purchasing risk when it was cheap. That would benefit both investors and the economy. Capital that can afford to be patient should be patient. But those funds with the strongest shoulders appear instead to have ducked for cover, while the weakest appear to have engaged in a gamble for resurrection. In the longer-term, this type of behaviour is likely to worsen returns to investors. It will also amplify cycles in the financial system and economy by draining risk-taking when it is already weak. Patient capital ought to part of the solution to the long-term financing puzzle. In practice, it may have been part of the problem. Regulatory policy That naturally begs the question of what, if any, policy response might best deal with the risks and opportunities asset management poses. From a potentially long list, I will focus on three areas. First, Too-Big-to-Fail. Here, the jury is still sitting.
Compare, for instance, the IT bubble at the beginning of the 2000s with the current crisis, where a bubble in the US housing market played a key role. Although the IT bubble resulted in heavy stock market falls and hit many investors hard, the crash did not have major effects on the real economy, which stands in sharp contrast to the effects of today’s crisis. The same applies in a comparison with the Swedish financial crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. A decisive difference between a stock market bubble and a property market bubble is that the latter is almost always linked to an untenable credit boom. When house prices rise, the value  2  BIS Review 70/2010  of the underlying assets increases, which gives scope to borrow even more with this asset as collateral. At the same time, increased lending provides more purchasing power, and this contributes to prices rising even more. It becomes a self-reinforcing spiral that can be very powerful – both in the upward phase and the downward phase. When the upward spiral is broken, there is a turnaround and a rapid downward spiral, which is probably much quicker than the upturn. Prices fall, the mood becomes increasingly negative and lenders and borrowers become increasingly unwilling to take on risk. The banks’ loan losses increase. The result may be a long period when households and companies hold onto their money more firmly to reinforce and balance their finances. Consumption and investment are weak and lending is restricted.

I usually mention an example from the 1990s crisis when talking about this phenomenon; in 1989 the requirement for direct return on the commercial property market was around 4 per cent. A risk-free five-year government bond provided up to 12 per cent interest. But the  4  BIS Review 70/2010  market preferred to invest in an unsecured property asset to a covered bond with a return of 8 per cent more! It takes a lot to defeat that kind of optimism. But the exact size of the increases in the policy rate that are necessary would probably vary from situation to situation. Under certain circumstances it may even be enough to make very small increases. In the world of theory, everyone tries to stay well-informed with regard to for example the most probable development of the interest rate. But this does not mean that things always work out this way in reality. Smaller interest rate increases combined with successful communication can function as a clear signal that the central bank regards the current situation to be untenable. It can contribute to correcting or at least dampening irrational behaviour. If a central bank were to judge that developments in property prices and lending were beginning to give cause for concern, it would also be rather strange, in my opinion, if the governor or governors were to just sit there and not do anything on the grounds that the policy rate would probably need to be raised a lot.
The New York Fed has maintained a gold vault used to store the gold reserves of foreign central banks since 1924 when construction of its main building was completed. Prior to 1924, the New York Fed held gold in custody for foreign central banks in other nearby vaults, such as the one maintained by the New York Clearing House. 12 Defined in general terms as “an arrangement under which one bank (correspondent) holds deposits owned  by other banks (respondents) and provides payment and other services to those respondent banks.” See the glossary of terms used in payments and settlements, published by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures of the Bank for International Settlements. 13 Perhaps the most vivid historical example of this involved large-scale flight-to-safety flows of European central  bank gold reserves to the vaults of the New York Fed during the Second World War. In addition to safeguarding their gold reserves from the Axis powers, inflows of gold were used by Allied nations to finance their purchases of war supplies from the U.S. 14 The Federal Reserve’s Bretton Woods swap lines with foreign central banks were first established in 1962 and  used extensively until the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in the early 1970s. 15 The mechanics of currency swap operations among central banks is a case in point.

President Wilson, having won reelection in 1916 on the claim of having kept the U.S. out of the Great War and observing strict neutrality, had directed the Federal Reserve Board in Washington to issue a clear-cut warning to U.S. banks not to invest in a pending large placement of British Treasury bills in the U.S. market. The immediate and worldwide effect of the statement was to give the impression that the U.S. had “broken with Britain,” an impression which officials were soon scrambling for ways to counteract.5 The result was the Federal Reserve Board’s decision, contrary to the terms of the account negotiations and to the consternation of the New York Fed, to unilaterally announce to the public the account agreement with the Bank of England. The whole episode spoke perhaps to the Fed’s inexperience in matters of delicate international financial diplomacy. In any event, the Bank of England magnanimously let the matter slide— noting that mistakes “may arise even in the best regulated families”—and the account agreement was executed on May 3, 1917 and operationalized on June 20, 1917.6,7 Andrew Hauser will provide more insight into this fascinating period in his remarks in a few minutes. As expedient as the accounts were for wartime needs, the historical records show they were also motivated by ambitions of the Fed’s first leaders to establish the dollar as a major international currency and, for Benjamin Strong, to establish New York as a great international financial center to rival London. They had their work cut out for them.
Its average holding in European companies is today around three times as high as in the Americas and Asia. The chosen regional distribution is related to Norway’s import pattern and has been viewed as a form of currency hedging. But the result has been that a large proportion of the Fund is invested in a region that has experienced weak growth over the past decade. Analyses show that exchange rate risk in the Fund is relatively small and less than previously assumed. Based on these findings, the Norwegian Government has decided that the relative share of European investments should be reduced over time, so that the Fund’s geographical diversification is further improved. A more even distribution of the Fund’s ownership will provide us with the opportunity to take part in value creation in regions with strong growth. This implies a reduction in the allocation to European equities and an increase in the allocation to the Americas and emerging economies. High economic growth in Asia may provide sound returns on investments in that region, even though today’s equity prices already reflect expectations of higher growth in eastern than in western regions. A more even distribution will nonetheless improve the trade-off between risk and expected rewards. Petroleum revenue spending Norway as an oil nation stumbled at the start. The current account surplus at the end of the 1960s had reversed to a deficit of 12 percent of GDP by 1977. The deficit was three times as large as that recorded by Italy and Spain last year.

Caleb M Fundanga: Media relations and the Bank of Zambia – a healthy interaction Speech by Dr Caleb M Fundanga, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the official opening of the Bank of Zambia 12th Media Seminar, Ndola, 5 October 2007. *  *  *  • The Chairperson • Distinguished Journalists • Invited Participants • Ladies and Gentlemen On behalf of Bank of Zambia and indeed my own behalf, I am pleased to welcome you all, to this Bank of Zambia sponsored annual seminar, which is the 13th in the series. Further, it is also my great pleasure to welcome you to the City of Ndola. Ladies and gentlemen, as it is normally the case, some of you are participating for the first time. For those of you that are participating for the first time, let me inform you that this is your seminar and I urge you to participate freely and effectively. I know that your friends who have participated in the seminars before, will agree with me that, every year that we meet at such a forum, we meet as “partners” and it is certainly in the interest, of not only us gathered here but the nation at large that this spirit is exhibited through out this seminar, and beyond. In fact, let me thank the media for having embraced this partnership and worked towards maintaining it. The Bank of Zambia-Media relations have been quite healthy, partly due to annual interaction through Media Seminars.