samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Do this increase in unemployment and the decline in the employment rate have anything to do with monetary policy and the introduction of an inflation target or are there other explanations? Unemployment and the employment rate When a large shock like the 1990s crisis occurs, there are tremendous demands on both policy and flexibility among firms and individuals. If one looks at the developments in employment (or unemployment) since the 1990s crisis, one may wonder whether the labour market has really recovered, despite the fact that 13 years have passed (see Figure 5). There may also have been structural changes in the economy that make it difficult to return to the low unemployment levels we had prior to the crisis, for instance, as a result of the strong competitive pressure that globalisation entails. In the long term, it is the way the labour market functions (structural factors) that determines unemployment and the employment rate. How quickly an unemployed person can return to work depends on several factors. Some people may find that their skills have become obsolete when one technique has been abandoned in favour of a more modern technique, such as typographers being replaced by IT people. In this case, training is one opportunity that can lead to a new job after some time. Hopefully, it will also lead to a job with a real wage that is at least equally as high as the previous wage. The greater this possibility, the more probable it is that the employee will return to work.

On the activity side, a wide range of indicators show a broadening and strengthening of demand by households and production by firms. For example, on the demand side, after an unusually deep retrenchment during the recession, consumer spending has begun to recover, and that recovery strengthened considerably in the final months of 2010. Not surprisingly, businesses’ orders and production are following suit. These factors led to a 3.1 percent growth rate in our most comprehensive measure of national output (real, or inflation-adjusted, gross domestic product or GDP) in the fourth quarter of 2010. Growth for the first quarter looks likely to be similar, near 3 percent. In my view, the revival in demand and production – while not as strong as desired – suggests that we may be much closer to establishing a virtuous circle that will support stronger growth. What I have in mind is a cycle in which rising household and business demand generate more rapid income and employment growth, which in turn bolsters confidence and leads to further increases in spending. This is why we upgraded our assessment of the economy at last month’s FOMC meeting, noting the economy is now on a “firmer footing”. The major missing piece of the puzzle has been the absence of strong payroll job growth. We will need to see sustained strong employment growth in order to be certain that this virtuous circle has become firmly established. With respect to the labor market, we have seen some conflicting signals.
And this is exactly the opposite of what should have been happening if a functioning banking and contingent fiscal union had been emerging. So we are risking creating a half-baked BU which will not necessarily be ready for future bad times. And it is also a partial answer to the question of potential participation of some non-euro countries in the SSM. Simply, it is too premature to judge whether the BU is going to be a good project worth participating, or not. Only after the whole project with all it “legs” is created can one seriously answer this question. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

It would run the big risk of encouraging banks to reduce their loan books – in other words, it would affect the interaction of our two objectives, or incentivise the banks to reduce/”optimise” their risk weights. We are, instead, defining the growth of capital in terms of the increase in the nominal stock of Core Tier One, or equity, capital. This makes it easier to find a transition path that allows more capital and more new lending to co-exist. But, this begs three big questions: by how much do we want to see the nominal capital bases of banks grow in short order; why do we want this to happen; and what form do we want the capital to take? The first two of these questions, how much and why, are best taken together. Here, in my view, we face uncertainty that we have to find a way to resolve adequately. What we have done so far is to ask the major banks to try to maintain the projected growth of nominal Core Tier One capital over the next 18 months, according to the projections for this growth that they provided to us earlier this year. This is, their Basel III transition path. In order to go beyond that path, we have to ask why we want to do so? In my view, there could be at least four reasons why new lending by banks might be restrained by lack of capital as represented by low price to book ratios.
The loans in kronor may be concluded in October 2010 as long as no decision is taken on new loans. The extraordinary measures will thus cease once the economy has recovered, and the situation in the financial sector has stabilised. The Riksbank’s balance sheet will then decline. However, the financial crisis has shown that we should maintain a greater readiness to meet any new problems than we had prior to the crisis. How this might affect the balance sheet is a question the Riksbank will be considering over the coming period. 16  BIS Review 160/2009  Appendix: Figures 17 and 18 The Riksbank’s assets and liabilities  30.09.09  31.12.07  Changes  Gold  28 295  25 827  2 468  Foreign currency reserves  297 335  172 544  124 791  Dollar lending to the banks  25 869  Lending in SEK to monetary policy counterparties  337 501  9 129  328 372  Other assets  7 529  4 394  3 135  Total assets  696 529  211 894  484 635  Liabilities, SEK million  30.09.09  31.12.07  Changes  Banknotes and coins  105 998  114 324  -8 326  Fine-tuning, etc.

109 073  143  108 930  Riksbank Certificates  227 489  Swap agreements with FED and ECB  20 253  Loans through the SNDO  91 186  Repos foreign currency reserve  8 461  12 035  -3 574  Liability to IM F (SDR)  24 912  2 517  22 395  Other liabilities Provisions Revaluation accounts  11 705 257 33 170  4 277 206 20 063  7 428 51 13 107  Capital  64 025  58 247  5 778  Total liabilities  696 529  211 894  484 635  Assets, SEK million  227 489 82  20 171 91 186  Source: The Riksbank. BIS Review 160/2009  17
The U.S. economy is currently expanding at a moderate pace, and strains in global financial markets, although having eased recently, continue to pose significant downside risks to the economic outlook. Because developments in Europe will have an important bearing on the prospects for growth and jobs here in the U.S., the Federal Reserve is monitoring the situation there closely. This is also why we have taken special steps in recent months, together with other central banks, to support the flow of credit to households and businesses. Europe The economic situation in Europe has been unsettled for the better part of two years, with pressure on sovereign debt markets and local banking systems. High debts, large deficits and slow growth in several European countries have called into question the sustainability of the entire euro area. The resulting strains in European markets have affected the U.S. economy. The euro area has the capacity, including the fiscal capacity, to overcome its challenges. However, the politics are very difficult, both because the problem has many dimensions, and because many different countries and institutions in the euro area have to coordinate their actions in order to achieve a coherent and effective policy response. Europe’s leadership has affirmed its commitment to the European Union and its single currency union on numerous occasions. And the leadership is working harder than ever to achieve greater coordination in areas such as fiscal policy. A more robust and resilient European Union would be a welcome development for the United States.

Expectations regarding the United States are that it will continue to recover at a slow pace, and that moderate adjustments to the fiscal policy will take place. The downgraded outlook for Japan needs mention, due to both its relation with the Eurozone and some fiscal adjustment measures foreseen for 2014. In the emerging world, incoming data from China suggest that the slowdown of most of 2012 may be reverting. Thus, again y-o-y growth rates around 8 percent are forecast for the Chinese economy for 2013 and 2014. Growth prospects for Latin America are revised downward for this and the next two years. In this scenario, commodity prices will not change much from forecasts a few months back. In the two-year period 2013–2014, the baseline scenario foresees average prices of $ per pound of copper and $ per Brent oil barrel. Accordingly, terms of trade estimates for Chile continue to be high, but lower than they were this year (table 2). External financial markets have shown some calm these months. However, as I noted at the beginning, there is still a long way ahead before the Eurozone crisis can be resolved. The commitment of various organizations to work out a solution seems to be bearing fruit in the market’s evaluation. Anyway, the baseline scenario again considers the possibility of new stress episodes in the world markets. Such greater calm has also reflected in stock markets and currency parities. In recent months, the U.S. dollar has depreciated slightly against the main currencies.
2  Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Risk Management and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, June 19, 2008. 2  BIS Review 112/2010  supervising Lehman. The SEC continued to be the supervisor of the broker-dealers and their parents, including Lehman’s broker-dealer and its parent, Lehman Holdings. Lehman showed some signs of recovery during this period. It raised capital in June of 2008. But liquidity continued to be a significant disability. As part of its monitoring, the New York Fed, in conjunction with the SEC, conducted liquidity stress analyses of the investment banks, in part to evaluate their creditworthiness. Those analyses suggested that Lehman needed to improve its liquidity should the credit crisis intensify. Again, to Lehman’s credit, and in response to our analyses, Lehman took steps to, and did, improve its liquidity. At no time, however, did anyone at the New York Fed believe that Lehman had sufficient liquidity to withstand what was to come in September, events that Richard Fuld, Lehman’s former chief executive officer, has described as the “perfect storm.” 3 Accordingly, as has been well-documented in the press and in the comprehensive report by Anton Valukas, the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy examiner (the Valukas Report), senior Federal officials, including President Geithner, continually pressed Lehman to find workable solutions for its capital and liquidity problems from March to September 2008. Lehman executives pursued potential merger partners.

As a Welshman now working in Threadneedle Street, I appreciate that the Bank of England can appear a remote institution, apparently focused on the City of London and far away from the day-to-day concerns of people living elsewhere in the UK. The work of the Agencies provides a bridge between the Bank and the households, businesses and communities it serves. Through my discussions over the past couple of days, I have learnt about how Brexit has affected trading relationships on the island of Ireland and across the Irish Sea. And our Citizens Panel on the cost-of-living emphasised the distinctiveness of the retail energy market in Northern Ireland, which has been in focus of late given the sharp rises in utility bills. I am not going to discuss those issues this evening – although I realise that they are important, as well as politically and economically sensitive. I have been in listening mode, and can now take some of the lessons learnt back to our deliberations at the Bank. I originally hoped to spend the bulk of my time exploring the macroeconomic motivations underlying MPC decisions in the past few months. I hope to return to those issues in a moment. But given recent events and actions, it would be remiss of me not to address market developments. Over the course of the past week, there has be a significant repricing of financial assets. Part of  Page 3  that re-pricing reflects broader global developments.
However, independent of specific events, the question arises whether regulatory and oversight control has kept up with this development everywhere. It is indeed rather problematic that custody activities lie in a grey area between banking supervision and system oversight. In some countries where the tasks deriving from banking supervision and system oversight are performed by separate authorities the regulatory and oversight  4  BIS Review 28/2003  framework is very likely to be incomplete or at least sub-optimal unless the two authorities succeed in establishing a strong and effective co-operation. This aspect seems all the more important as large custodians tend to become direct competitors to traditional market utilities like CSDs and ICSDs. This said, I must admit that regulatory and oversight authorities should address this issue with the aim of allowing an acceptable level playing field among large custodians and providers of market utilities. The aim here is not the protection of incumbents against efficient predators - or of Little Red Riding Hood against the big bad wolf - but rather to restrict the use made by large individual suppliers of their powerful market position which eventually could lead to outright dependency of the former customers of CSDs and ICSDs on huge and incontestable financial service suppliers. In view of these challenges, there is good reason to critically reassess rules and regulations related to securities clearing and settlement systems as well as to the way regulatory and oversight responsibilities are implemented in practice. A predominantly national approach no longer serves market needs.

In the field of securities clearing and settlement systems the production of services is based on processes with high fixed costs. There is thus a risk that the free play of market forces is limited and that actual market developments might lead to monopolies that greatly damage efficiency. Regulatory and oversight authorities must therefore also make it their goal to prevent potential abuses of market power. Against this background, I strongly believe that trust-based co-operation between the providers of market utilities and regulatory and oversight authorities remains the key to the continued successful  BIS Review 28/2003  5  development of an efficient and secure financial system that can handle fast-changing needs in the future. Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for your attention. 6  BIS Review 28/2003
Through intensive meetings with industry and users, we co-created the SGQR code. While it is based on the EMVCo’s multi-tenanted QR specifications, Singapore is the first and only jurisdiction in the world to develop a set of arrangements by the industry for the industry such that all QR schemes can reside on a single QR code, instead of each scheme deploying its own code with its own scheme only. With SGQR, making a QR payment will be a breeze for the customer as he just looks for a single QR for any scheme the merchant accepts, rather than having to hunt for the right QR sticker for a particular scheme. For mobile or small merchants, SGQR allows easy acceptance of epayments via a single, streamlined and low-cost sticker. Businesses are also exploring QR payments in bills as the customer can quickly pay his bills through his mobile, while the customer details embedded in the QR in turn enhances business processes. 18. Third, Interoperability Powers. With UPOS and SGQR, MAS has been very fortunate in being able to work with willing industry partners. But in future, just as innovative solutions may grow over time, the number of interoperability issues may multiply, and MAS may need the regulatory powers to effectively address the issue of interoperability with many more parties. Hence, in the consultation on the PSB, MAS has proposed innovative powers to require interoperability among payment institutions. Today, we have existing powers to require payment platforms to open access to participants.

In recent years, digital payment solutions such as e-wallets over mobile devices have emerged, and nowhere is this more obvious than in Asia. From 2015 to 2016, non4 . cash transactions in developed Asia-Pacific grew by 8.8% while that in Emerging Asia experienced 28.6% growth1. Digital payments in Asia are forecasted to grow annually at 16.4% 2 to reach over USD 2.5 trillion per year in 2022. That is almost half of the estimated worldwide total of USD 5.4 trillion. 5. Such services are often offered by non-banks, increasing the number of payments being handled outside the traditional banking system. EY and DBS3 found that payments and remittances were the highest-adopted FinTech services among banking and financial services customers in Asia, reaching 40% in China and 20% in India. In ASEAN, approximately one-third of FinTech companies are in the payments space, and this increases to 54% if you include money-transfer and remittance services4. These innovations did not come about by chance, but rather through a confluence of three factors: 6.  a. Technology has lowered the barrier to entry to run a standalone payments business, without being a bank. b. The high penetration of smart phones running apps has made it easier to acquire customers 1/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  digitally, without physical places of business; and c. The boom of online e-commerce has necessitated the creation of solutions to help customers to pay digitally for services that they in turn purchase digitally.
Indeed, the Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia has experienced robust growth in addition to being reinforced by enhanced market discipline and transparency, and the vibrancy of the Islamic financial market developments in Malaysia. The latest financial indicators show that the Islamic banking industry remains well-capitalised with a risk-weighted capital ratio of 14.8% as at end-August 2006, while the net non-performing financing ratio has declined to 4.2%. Clearly, therefore, the industry is strong, resilient and well-positioned to meet emerging challenges and to capitalise on new opportunities for the mutual return of its stakeholders. Secondly, this partnership comes at a significant juncture when Malaysia is enhancing the international dimension of its Islamic banking and financial market, with the introduction of increased foreign participation. In line with the aspiration to position Malaysia as an international Islamic financial centre (MIFC), new licences and business divisions to conduct international currency Islamic banking business, tax and other incentives have been introduced to attract global Islamic financial institutions to make Malaysia the hub for their regional business operations. These measures and incentives are also expected to attract international investors, including from the Middle East, to leverage on Malaysia as an investment gateway to tap the rapidly growing investment opportunities in the East Asian region. Thirdly, this partnership also serves to enhance Malaysia as a centre of product innovation in Islamic finance. Indeed, conscious efforts have been made to ensure a conducive environment for innovation in Malaysia, including the development of the necessary pool of expertise and talent to drive such innovation.

012234  56789  7   30  *" 8%7   *-8 15"* #*#1 #*#1  4512 8 25 41 4 &  45452 34868 1   252 596 252 24 526 5241 26536  6 2284 5 26536   21452 634 6 256 26852 252 54 32 2 3 6 61262 4 6 6456  24 68 488 412 06 54 252 5452 654 6 4 6 06 6 82 6 62 2 668526 6 32 2 !/# 4 2  95  49  944 .9 94944 94944 ' 0   39 3  $  U2526995 mG 9 9 +oTr0sta
This time the likelihood that the disinflation program will succeed is high for three main reasons. First, there is now political stability and consensus on implementing this inflation-reduction policy. Second, all parts of society are aware that there is no alternative to solving, now, our budget and debt burden problems. Third, the technical 3  BIS Review 109/1999  foundation has already been prepared. These three factors underline the importance of the new program. Accordingly, the inflation targets have been set at 25% for the year 2000 and 10% for 2001. Consistent with these inflation targets for the next two years, fiscal policy will be conducted according to a broad-based approach aimed at improving all aspects of public sector revenues and expenditures. With this effort, monetary policy will continue to be supportive of fiscal policies. Although we should not expect a radical change in the implementation of monetary policy, its efficiency will definitely improve in step with the improvement of the fiscal stance. I would also like to underline once more the importance of Turkey’s recent efforts towards disinflation. As you know, in the 1980s the Turkish economy succeeded in making the transition from a closed economy to a market-oriented one. Turkey aims, through this more recent effort, to build a macroeconomic infrastructure suitable for membership in the global economy, where low inflation and a sustainable growth rate, combined with sound and well functioning financial and real sectors, are the minimum standards.

Mr Erçel reports on developments in the Turkish economy in the light of the recent disinflation efforts  Speech by Mr Gazi Erçel, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the American-Turkish Council, held in Washington on 28 September 1999. *  *  *  Two years ago, in the summer of 1997, the crisis in Asia began to accelerate. One year ago, on 17 August 1998 a crisis erupted in Russia that threatened serious consequences not only for the Russian economy but also for the entire international financial system. By comparison, this year’s summer has been uneventful, except my country, which was struck by an earthquake on 17 August 1999. The earthquake has been devastating both in terms of human life and physical infrastructure. The death toll has risen to over 15,000 with over 25,000 injured. More than 200,000 houses were damaged or destroyed and over half a million people were left homeless. The spontaneous and prompt support from the international community together with domestic resources will cover reconstruction costs and we will recover. I have to emphasize that this tragic event will not derail our macroeconomic strategy, nor shall we allow it to jeopardize the hand-won disinflation achievements realized so far. Since Turkey has a long history of inflation, which is the main cause of macroeconomic imbalances, we have directed our efforts to reducing the inflation for quite some time. A disinflation program was launched at the beginning of 1998.