samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Regulators are one of the stakeholders in this process. In order to fulfil our objectives and functions, we need information from the entities and markets that we supervise. But financial institutions are faced with requirements from other sources too. They have to produce information for a whole range of other purposes, for example to fulfil mercantile, fiscal and statistical requirements, as well as to run their own business, of course. On top of this, changes in the financial markets themselves are having a major impact on information flows. Increases in the complexity and volume of financial transactions are contributing to an increase in the complexity and volume of information that entities need to produce and manage, even if only for their own internal purposes. And if we add in the ever more prevalent international dimension, the situation becomes even more complicated. In the face of these developments, it seems important to me that we find new ways to manage the information process. So what can we do, as regulators, to promote the most effective and efficient processes for the generation, transmission and use of financial information, and therefore the most efficient markets? I  BIS Review 47/2006  1  believe there are five key elements in this process, and it is on these elements that I will focus in the remainder of my intervention. 1  Convergence of regulatory requirements  The first of these involves starting at the beginning of the value chain of information requirements.

This will not only help banks that operate on an international basis to establish more convergent information bases across the countries in which they are present. It will also facilitate the exchange of information among supervisors, because we will be speaking a more common language. And, more directly, the transparency requirements will, in themselves, lead to the availability of more, and more comparable, data for market participants and users. Both these initiatives are international in nature. However, as I noted earlier in my intervention, information demands also come from a range of sources including at the domestic level, and it is certainly worth looking to see what can be done at this level too. One such initiative could be to look at the possibility of using IFRS data for market, corporate law, prudential and tax purposes. 2  Convergence of reporting requirements  So, having common regulatory standards and approaches on an international basis can provide a natural basis for more efficient information flows. However, without convergence of the reporting requirements that stem from these standards and approaches, entities will still have to produce and transmit different information, in different formats, to the regulators in the countries in which they are  2  BIS Review 47/2006  present. In other words, common regulation does not automatically translate into common reporting requirements - the second element that I want to mention today. This has been highlighted as a particular issue in the European Union context, given the political objective to promote a fully integrated financial market.
There is a view that the euro should in some sense ‘belong’ to the participating countries and to them alone. If that view were to prevail it would point in the direction BIS Review 29/1998  ˝  -5-  of one form of bureaucratic regulation or another - no doubt with a nod in the direction of monetary policy considerations as justification - which would damage the euro at least as much as it would harm the financial markets of the City. At the same time some of these same people argue for a successful, strong and widely-used euro that will take its proper place alongside the dollar and the yen as an international trading and portfolio currency, and in that context they positively welcome the active participation of London. In the end I do not think there is very much choice. In a world of increasingly integrated capital markets and liberalised capital movements it is inconceivable that the international use of the euro could be unnaturally constrained. And that will be in the interest of the users of financial markets - whether as borrowers or lenders - within Europe itself and across the world, including the Mediterranean region. It will be in the interest, too, of the providers of financial services by promoting the volume of financial activity throughout the European Union. Like trade in goods and other services, trade in financial services is very much a positive sum game.

Essentially there is a risk that the single monetary policy - the single, one-size-fits-all, short-term interest rate - within the euro area, which is a necessary corollary of the single currency, will not in the event prove to be appropriate to the domestic needs of each of the euro-member countries. There is no doubt that such risks exists. They may result from cyclical divergence. They may arise from differences in fiscal positions even though these are to be constrained through the Stability Pact. Or they may result from economic shocks of some sort that have a bigger impact on some countries than on others. The rise in oil prices in the early 1970’s or German reunification are classic examples. So the risk of divergent monetary policy needs within the euro area is real. And the damage it could cause if serious tensions between member countries were to emerge is substantial, because alternative adjustment mechanisms, such as labour migration or fiscal redistribution, that exist within individual countries, and which help to alleviate the similar regional tensions that arise at the national level, are simply not well-developed at the pan-European level.
An issue that has been widely discussed in the last two years is whether other parts of the world would be able to avoid a recession despite the weak development of the US economy, that is if so-called decoupling could arise. We can now note that the rest of the world is following in the wake of the United States into an economic downturn and the debate on decoupling has faded. Measures to counter the crisis Sweden has so far been able to manage the problems caused in the financial system by the global financial crisis. The Swedish banks are profitable and have substantial buffers following a number of good years. They have not granted loans as hastily as the banks in the United States and they have not been exposed to any great extent to the type of financial products that have been part of the problem. The TED spreads have not been as large as in the United States and the euro area. The interbank market for overnight loans has functioned well in Sweden throughout the crisis, unlike in many other countries. But the Swedish banks have nevertheless experienced problems with funding and this has required that a number of measures be taken by Swedish authorities. The Riksbank has implemented a large number of measures to safeguard financial stability and mitigate the negative effects of the financial crisis. These measures have largely related to the provision of liquidity.

Rest assured that the ECB Governing Council is fully committed to rein in inflation, and to ensure that it returns towards 2% by end 2024 or end 2025. II. Paris' momentum as financial centre Amidst this geopolitical and economic uncertainty, and despite the recent turmoil in the United States and in Switzerland, financial stability has been preserved in Europe. EU banks are robust, with substantial capital and liquidity buffers: they are in their overwhelming majority subject to stringent Basel requirements – which makes a big difference with the many mid-sized US banks. We have in the euro area no "Sorgenkind" or "problem child", such as Crédit Suisse; and since 2014 we have had a single and strong supervisor thanks to Banking Union. As President of the French prudential authority (the ACPR), I can in particular attest to how solid and diversified French banks are nowadays. Four of them are categorised as global systemically important banks (G-SIBS), and they act as catalysts for Paris as a financial centre. Indeed, Paris stands out as unique in the network of European financial centres: it is the only one to offer such a wide range of financial activities, from global asset management to insurance and banking, and it has further reinforced its position since Brexit.
Second, assessments of global imbalances and implications for currency valuation need to adopt a “broader view” that takes into consideration not only current account imbalances but also capital flows which have become much larger than current account flows; taking a narrow perspective of current account imbalance alone could lead us to a policy misstep. And third, central banks should have a collective voice on how much central banks can do, and to what extent further monetary easing can prop up the economy facing with structural challenges and trade disruptions. When we think about policy space, we must not look at the zero lower bound, effective lower bound, or the optimal size of central bank’s balance sheet. We must also be aware of the “financial stability lower bound”: how much additional financial stability risks we are willing to take. This is so that the financial market would have a realistic view of monetary policy and not expect central banks to engage in excessive easing that might result in long-term financial instability. Preparing for the new macroeconomic thinking in the world of bilateralism This brings me to my third and last issue which is the importance of multilateral framework and international cooperation in a world that is becoming more and more polarized, both geopolitically and economically. Multilateral frameworks that have worked so well for us in the past recently got challenged by gravitation towards inward-  4  looking policies and bilateral economic relationships, and that has sent shockwaves to emerging nations on the periphery.

The large volumes implied by the cut in reserve ratios and the potential impact on the exchange rate call for a gradual approach to this process, possibly spanning one year to one year and a half, which is yet another reason why ERM II entry in 2016 and hence euro adoption in 2019 are highly ambitious goals. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  III. The rationale behind other EU Member States’ wait-and-see approach to euro adoption  In fact, Romania is the only non-euro area EU Member State that has set a target date for the adoption of the single currency. The other countries show a prevailing wait-and-see approach, driven not necessarily by the difficulty to observe the limits provided for by the nominal convergence criteria (generally achieved or within reach), but rather by a fundamental change in the overall approach to euro adoption. This occurred amid the benefits of euro adoption becoming less obvious and the costs more apparent. I have already pointed out at the beginning of my speech the fading benefits that euro area membership provided in terms of financing costs. Additionally, the benefits of trade integration, previously deemed as irrefutable, have been drastically diminished by the weak euro area growth. As for the costs of euro adoption, Central and Eastern European economies with floating currencies went through relatively milder economic contractions than those with fixed exchange rate regimes, which highlighted the relevance of this element of policy flexibility.
Switzerland is a good example of this: thanks to the inclusion of the major political players in government responsibilities, and to the extension of direct democracy processes even to financial matters, a deeply rooted culture of stability has developed. It is this which provides the foundation for the stabilising effect of the well designed and constitutionally anchored debt brake. This has made a decisive contribution to ensuring that federal government finances are in good shape despite the financial and economic crisis. As a general rule, any efforts to establish a sustainable fiscal policy in countries with debt problems can ultimately only bear fruit if they succeed in fostering a broad-based culture of stability. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1

Furthermore, incoming data suggest that it will take longer than expected to recover. This, coupled with recent events that have considerably eroded mining activity, will pull down annual GDP growth in 2017. However, as can be seen in the outlook I will be sharing with you in a few moments, a number of elements will help the economy to regain momentum within the projection horizon. Worth noting among these are that no significant macroeconomic imbalances are observed, that the negative impact of the mining investment adjustment has diminished, that the external scenario has improved, and that monetary policy will remain clearly expansionary. Overall, capacity gaps foreseen for the next two years will be somewhat wider than we thought in December, toning down medium-term inflationary pressures. In this context, the Board lowered the monetary policy interest rate (MPR) by 50 basis points during the early months of the year, speeding up the cuts with respect to provisions made in December. At the same time, we considered that, to ensure the convergence of inflation to the target, it will be necessary to enhance the monetary impulse somewhat, which reflects in an MPR trajectory similar to the one implied by financial asset prices during the ten days prior to the statistical closing of this Report.
Moreover, the situation had worsened as it added to the direct impact of weakened global demand. Although the spillover impacts to individual economies have been uneven, monetary policy in most emerging markets have faced a tradeoff between achieving domestic objectives and managing external spillovers. The limited and, in many cases, stretched monetary policy tools have been designed to mitigate financial imbalance and vulnerability, and to restore economic growth and maintain targeted inflation. Our experiences from various Quantitative Easing (QE) episodes remind us that the traditional monetary policy at hand may not be sufficient to address these multiple objectives. Alongside policy interest rate as a primary tool, central banks in emerging markets have additionally relied more on non-traditional, tools and measures. One is macro-prudential policies, mostly related to real estate and the banking sector, to help address pockets of vulnerability in the short-term. The other is a more market oriented approach by allowing greater exchange rate flexibility to counter large and volatile capital flows. Thus far, it is evident that emerging market economies have weathered such spillovers quite well, but new challenges keep coming our way. Despite signs of recovery in some Advanced Economies, their paths remain uneven. This called for the divergence of policy implementations with substantial uncertainty, especially to financial market participants. Next, the prolonged stagnation in some Advanced Economies has taken more tolls on emerging economies as reflected by softening growth and heightening vulnerabilities.

I do see the enhancement of international cooperation as a seed towards success in policy preparation for our region. I believe that, in the middle of a dark tunnel, with each of us holding a torch focusing in the same direction, we could see better along the way and can be sure that it is the right way out. Thank you. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
As a result, the real exchange rate will remain at a relatively high level. With a reasonable degree of certainty, it can be said that the nominal exchange rate will swing more than that implied by our projections. Given the other assumptions in the Inflation Report, our best projections for the coming years is that the krone will hover around this level. It is not easy to project the nominal exchange rate, but perhaps we can provide an indication of the movement in the real exchange rate in the very long term: An economist at Norges Bank, Farooq Akram, has analysed the fundamental equilibrium real exchange rate for the Norwegian krone 1 . He takes into account that a steadily smaller share of our imports will be covered by current petroleum revenues and the return on the Government Pension Fund - Global. 1  Q, Farooq Akram. Oil wealth and real exchange rates: The FEER for Norway. Working Paper 2004/16  BIS Review 90/2006  5  Rough estimates based on this study indicate that the real exchange rate that maintains the trade balance when petroleum wealth no longer accounts for the same share of the economy will be more in line with the real krone exchange rate prevailing in the 1960s - before oil production started. This depreciation can come about either by lower price and wage inflation in Norway than among trading partners or by a nominal weakening of the krone.

I have just seen that our two main banks are moving in this direction and are also giving preferential treatment to mortgages. You also have to remember that a bank manages two sides of the balance sheets. It collects interest from borrowers but it pays interest to depositors. It is the efficient management of the difference between interest earned and interest paid that earns a bank its profits. Given that both lending and deposit books may differ from one bank to the other, there could be various reasons why the full interest rate cut is not passed on to the customer straight away. Are you optimistic that these interest rate cuts are enough to stave off recession? Monetary policy is just one instrument available for macroeconomic adjustment, so it has a limited capacity. It just tries to achieve price stability, because without price stability you cannot have long-term investment plans plus economic growth and employment. The problem is deeper than that. We need a coordinated effort at the political, central banking and regulatory levels. There is talk of a looming recession in Malta. Do you agree with this argument? I have not seen any economic indicators which at this point in time suggest that this scenario is imminent. I would rather wait to see the figures as they come out. So far we have an average growth rate of over three per cent for the first half of the year.
It is of the utmost importance that the entire euro area and Europe as a whole maintain and consolidate their cost competitiveness position. Since the introduction of the single currency, it is more important than ever that we closely monitor the production cost indicator, as it determines to a large extent the competitiveness of goods and services produced in our economy and, therefore, the current level of employment. It also acts as a “leading indicator” of future employment because it gives a measure of the attractiveness of an inward investment compared with investment outside the euro area or outside Europe. Embarking in bold structural reforms: In this context, we also need to pursue and step up bold structural reforms, aimed at increasing the flexibility of the economy as a whole and fostering the progress of science and technologies. This is crucial if we wish to enhance the potential growth of European economies and to continue to promote sustainable growth and enduring job creation. The European Council meeting held in Luxembourg in 1997 explicitly mentioned structural policies among the items selected for reinforced co-ordination. The Lisbon and Stockholm European Councils, held in 2000 and 2001, further enhanced the medium term strategy necessary for structural reforms in the Union. This strategy aims at raising the potential growth and strengthening the competitiveness of the EU economies.

In this new world, phenomena which had traditionally a local or even a national impact may be amplified and become dangerous at the global level: amplification of financial cycles, herd behaviour, global contagion. Analysing the opportunities and the risks, and understanding the functioning of our system with a view to making it as stable as possible is a very exiting, ambitious and urgent task. And, last but not least, union. I can not avoid mentioning the question of completing monetary union with the entry of the United Kingdom. I would like to stress the following points in this regard: let us never forget that the UK is unanimously warmly welcomed in the euro area. It depends only on the decision of the British people and of the British authorities to join in. You know that the Germans and the French on the continent, as well as all other nations on the continent are very warmly hoping for a positive decision by the UK. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 60/2002  5
In order to underscore its ambitions for public finances, the Government has a long-term objective: as the average level over a business cycle, government finances are to generate a surplus at 2 per cent of GDP. A surplus will make it possible to reduce public debt so that future challenges which the Swedish economy may encounter can be accepted without leading to problems for government finances. Considering the public debt that has accumulated in the 1990s and the fact that government finances in Sweden are relatively sensitive to cyclical factors, I find this objective reasonable. Besides the increased awareness of the importance of stable finances, the conditions for achieving Sweden’s budget target have been improved by institutional changes in the budget process. Sweden now has a budget process that is inherently more disciplined and can thereby contribute to maintaining sound finances. Further steps are being taken to consolidate economic policy’s focus on stability. The independence which the Riksbank already has in practice is to have a formal legal status as of next year. The monetary policy objective of price stability will be enshrined in law and the Riksbank will be accountable for fulfilling it. This new Riksbank legislation has already been approved once by the Riksdag (Sweden’s parliament) and the final decision is due this autumn. The reform is backed by five political parties, whose combined representation in the newly elected Riksdag is over 80 per cent.

Mr. Bäckstöm remarks on the Swedish economy Address by the Governor of the Bank of Sweden, Mr. Urban Bäckström, at Svenska Handelsbanken’s seminar in New York on 7/10/98. First of all I should like to thank Svenska Handelsbanken for the invitation to meet with you today here in New York. I arrived late yesterday from the 1998 Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Washington D.C. The discussions in Washington over the weekend focused on the current problems in the world economy. At the centre was of course the crises in emerging markets that began in Thailand last year, which spread to other economies in East Asia and Russia and which most recently have been pressuring economies in Latin America. Lately, we have also seen some contagion effects spreading to the industrial countries. Stockmarkets have been falling and there have also been some problems in connection with the Long-Term Capital hedge fund. However, today I will talk about the Swedish economy. I shall be using a fairly broad brush to paint you a picture of how our economy has developed in recent years and I will conclude by saying a few words about the present situation in my country. Positive trend in recent years The Swedish economy is now entering its sixth consecutive year of favourable growth. The average annual GDP growth rate since the summer of 1993 is almost 3 per cent. This is an improvement compared to the average that has characterised our economy in the past twenty-five years.