samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Particularly, the role of media is vital in this campaign, which through the transmission power to the public, has the skill to affect the mentality and communication pattern of the public at large. School, is another key factor for the establishment and cultivation of a new mentality. School may help for disrupting this 55-year chain and not transmitting it to the young generation. On behalf of the Bank of Albania, I invite all the participating institutions, and more broadly, to join us in this meaningful and demanding commitment to educate the Albanian public, with a view to abandoning forever the use of these outdated terms in the economic and financial interactions, and definitely turning it into a linguistic relict. I warmly thank you for the insofar contribution and allow me to recall once again that our currency is neither “old” nor “new”, but simply Lek! 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches

By slicing and dicing the data in different ways, it is possible to assess how different segments, sectors and regions of the UK have performed during the recovery. That means looking at aggregate metrics of economic health, such as income, employment and wealth. But a different lens is provided by looking at these metrics on a disaggregated basis and at non-standard measures of societal well-being. Taken together, these disaggregated data tell a rather more nuanced story about the UK’s recovery: a recovery which for most has been slow and low, for many partial and patchy and for some invisible and incomplete. This uneven economic surface helps reconcile the macro data and the micro stories from my regional visits – the “recovery puzzle”. It also has implications for what happens next to the economy in the light of the referendum, including monetary policy, on which I will conclude. Why it matters Before turning to the data, it is worth spending a moment on why this matters. Why look at the distributional pattern of activity when monitoring the economy as a whole and when setting monetary policy? This might seem like a strange question. Surely the fortunes of different sectors and segments of society are important? Yet, at least viewed from one angle, the distribution of gains and losses across the economy and across society ought not to much matter, at least when it comes to setting monetary policy. Here is why. The tools available to monetary policymakers, like the Bank of England, are small in number.
In addition, frameworks for enhanced regional risk management, crisis management and resolution are also being put in place. With greater financial integration, the region will be able to leverage on the advantages of economies of scale, innovation and more importantly place greater reliance on the cumulative strengths that resides within the region including our financial resources, skills and knowledge. It will also better position the region to collectively address emerging issues and challenges faced by the region taking into consideration the region's socio-economic context. Ladies and Gentlemen: While Islamic finance is gaining global interest and acceptance, the world's most populated Muslim region in the world, the New Nusantara offers opportunities for the accelerated expansion of Islamic finance. The intrinsic nature of Islamic financial structures encourages stability. Islamic principles require that the financial transaction be supported by genuine economic transactions. To further reinforce this, the governing Shariah principles also serve as a built-in self-regulatory mechanism that insulate Islamic instrument issuers from unproductive, speculative and unethical elements and thereby contributes to the stability of the financial system. Historically, capital financing and investment flows into the Nusantara region have generally been sourced from the developed financial markets. While we may see continued growth in short term capital inflows from these traditional sources, the more competitive global environment provides no assurance of the sustainability of such longer term investment flows.

It already provides for an automatic revision of the situation in the event that the National Bank's earnings should permanently exceed the expected level. Inflation Forecast December 2002 with Libor at 0.75%  Annual average inflation in %  BIS Review 73/2002  2002  2003  2004  2005  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.6  3
François Villeroy de Galhau: Monetary policy in uncertain times Speech by Mr François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France, at the London School of Economics, London, 15 February 2022. * * *  Introduction I am very grateful to Iain Begg for the invitation to speak to you today, more than two years after my first intervention at the LSE. So many things have happened since then, and the Ukrainian crisis shows that uncertainty isn’t going away any time soon. The euro area, like many other economies in the world, is entering a crucial phase in the recovery from the covid-19 crisis. There is good news, there is bad news and the two are very much related to each other. Unemployment has fallen to its lowest level in the history of the euro area and real GDP surpassed its pre-crisis level in the final quarter of 2021. On the less positive side, shortages of materials, equipment and labour persist in some sectors whilst others still operate below capacity. This lopsided economy plus sharply higher energy and food prices caused headline inflation in the euro zone to accelerate to 5.1% in January. Core inflation is only at 2.3% but significantly higher than one year ago (1.4%).

Furthermore, the logic of sequencing is closely linked to the use of the APP as a stance measure that reinforces the effect of forward guidance on short-term interest rates; if we wish to withdraw monetary accommodation, we should first release the accelerator pedal by stopping adding stimulus. By the way, if we started to raise rates before the end of net purchases, the risk would be to excessively flatten or even invert the yield curve. The fact that the reduction of the balance sheet occurs only in a third step is intended to avoid a brutal impact of the withdrawal of accommodation: the presence of the ECB in the markets, via reinvestments, allows us to contain these destabilising risks including on fragmentation. Hence, the direction of the navigation is clear. But as I have already said recently, we will retain our full optionality about its pace: its calendar will remain gradual, state-dependent and open in moving from one stage to the other. The second compass is our forward guidance on interest rates, as adopted last July. Before coming to it, let me in the order of our sequencing, starting with some considerations on our APP guidance.
2.2 TO CONSOLIDATE THE RESILIENCE OF THE RESILIENCE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, WE THEREFORE NEED TO COMPLETE THE PROGRAMME OF REFORMS AND ADAPT IT TO THE NEW RISKS 2.2.1. “Finish the job”: complete the programme of reforms and ensure its coordinated implementation at the global level. (a) Finish the implementation of Basel III. On 7 December 2017, the Basel Committee adopted an important accord finalising the Basel III framework. The text completes the overhaul of the international prudential framework begun in 2009, by notably allowing financial institutions to continue using internal models, subject to strict conditions. This accord will gradually be rolled out as of 2022 with full implementation scheduled for 2027. In the EU, the transposition of the Basel accords will result in a modification of the Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRR3/CDR6). The Commission has already begun this legal work by asking the EBA to analyse the impact of the reforms on the European banking industry and economy. The Banque de France and ACPR support the principle of a full and faithful application of the Basel accords within the EU. This implementation has to be reciprocal and must be harmonised at the international level. This is a prerequisite for ensuring the stability of the global banking system, and for guaranteeing a level playing field among banks. The implementation will also need to take account of the specificities of the European economic and financial environment.

The FinTechs and BigTechs (especially the big US and Asian companies that are driving the digitalisation of the economy) offer new opportunities (new cyber security solutions, reduction in the cost of internal management for client entities, increase in financial inclusion, etc. ), but are equally a source of additional vulnerabilities, notably in terms of cyber risk, the weakening of financial ecosystems and the development of questionable practices in the use of data. The Banque de France is working actively on these issues within international and European fora, to promote the sharing of experiences and harmonisation of rules and practices, and encourage efforts to make financial sector agents more resilient. We also need to continue assessing the reforms already put in place, to check that they deliver the expected effects and to identify any unintended consequences. The FSB’s assessment shows that although certain measures have largely been implemented requirements for systemically important institutions, clearing – other aspects still have to be finalised, notably with regard to the monitoring of non-banking financial institutions. Only when these reforms are fully implemented will the financial system be effectively protected. T h e European integration projects are also essential for increasing the EU’s macroeconomic resilience. First we need to finalise Banking Union on an institutional level. One positive contribution would be to work towards a European deposit guarantee scheme. This could be based, at least initially, on covering liquidity requirements, with no permanent transfers between Member States.
Robert Ophèle: Diversity and harmonisation of deposit insurance Closing speech by Mr Robert Ophèle, Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) International ERC Conference, Paris, 26 May 2016. *  *  *  I wish to thank the IADI and the FGDR for inviting me to deliver this closing speech. Bruno Bezard opened the conference for the French Treasury, and a central banker will close it. This is a perfect arrangement. Deposit insurance or deposit guaranty is a fascinating tool. History and geography have demonstrated the variety of schemes and how they are a powerful force for the better, or perhaps for the worse. I can’t indeed refrain from quoting the American Bankers Association, in 1933, i.e. more than 100 years after the introduction in the US of the first deposit insurance scheme, by the State of New York in 1829: “these historical experiences show that the guaranty plan is inherently fallacious and based on erroneous premises and assumptions. It has proved to be one of those plausible, but deceptive, human plans that in actual application only serve to render worse the very evils they seek to cure.” Today 113 Deposit Insurance Funds are in place, but I should stress that the jury is still out as to their effectiveness. Indeed, recent history shows how tricky deposit insurance can be. Just remember a few years ago, when schemes avoiding moral hazard by not providing a 100 percent coverage of even the smallest deposits were favoured.

Practice and model diversity is a challenge, but not an obstacle for implementing efficient resolution strategies We have heard today that DGSs may still be very diverse in terms of their status, functions, design, size, etc. This is also the case for supervisory and resolution regimes even though the international standards-setters have made considerable progress in terms of harmonisation. Let me take the example of banking resolution: one of the (many) remaining challenges is to make sure that the adopted resolution strategies will be recognised and applied cross-border. Under the aegis of the FSB, several initiatives have been taken (e.g. ISDA protocol for financial contracts) but this is not the end of the story and many further discussions will be necessary to remove all the obstacles to implementing, inter alia, a single point of entry resolution of a GSIB. In the EU we have now a common legal resolution regime and even a common resolution authority for the Banking Union but resolution measures continue to be implemented at the national level because insolvency regimes within Europe are not unified. Being optimistic, I would say that these difficulties are not an impediment to resolution, because the most important thing is to be mindful of such a difficulty and to deal with it.
The capital adequacy frameworks also made it cheaper in many areas for the banks to expand off their balance sheets. After the event, we can also note that the regulatory frameworks focused too little on liquidity risks. Many of these gaps in the frameworks are now being closed. However, the eternal problem is of course that the markets are always faster at finding new ways of circumventing the regulations than the authorities are at closing the gaps. Perhaps a more fundamental problem was that there was too weak a link between financial supervision and macro factors and other factors that affect the risk of shocks in the financial system as a whole. There was quite simply too much focus on individual companies and too little focus on broader development trends. Nor did the supervisory arrangements adequately reflect the increased internationalisation of the financial sector. In recent decades, the financial markets have become increasingly interlinked and very large sums change hands around the world every day. Large, complex banks and other financial institutions now conduct extensive operations in several countries. At the same time, supervision was mainly conducted on the basis of national mandates and focused on companies within individual, national jurisdictions. Supervision thus lacked the oversight required. Many factors interacted A number of interacting factors thus lay behind the situation that arose.

At the same time, we have seen the risks in this development in no uncertain terms. The flows in the financial system have increased substantially while the system has become increasingly complex and difficult to survey. The mutual dependence of the various markets has increased. This means that crises can more quickly and more forcefully hit an increasing number of economies at the same time. The important thing now is to find the right tools for managing these new risks; to find instruments for a better-balanced development. We need a better insight into the build-up of global risks. This requires increased cooperation between public authorities around the world. It requires greater harmonisation of regulations and supervision. It requires a better readiness to manage cross-border crises. And to find the means to counteract the build-up of large imbalances we must begin to think along new lines. At present the functioning of the financial system is being maintained with the aid of the measures implemented by public authorities. One sign that the crisis is no longer as acute is that the TED spreads have fallen in Sweden, as well as the United States and the euro area. These spreads are now back to around the same levels that prevailed immediately prior to the worsening of the crisis in autumn 2008. But the financial markets are still functioning much less efficiently than normal. It is also still difficult for companies to finance themselves in the capital market.
By contrast, the outstanding volume in SNB USD Bills – launched in February 2009 to refinance the SNB loan to the StabFund – is already at USD 15 billion. In addition to these short-term financing operations, the SNB concluded long-term deposit transactions amounting to USD 4 billion. We plan to further reduce the use of the swap facility with the Federal Reserve. Risks The risks facing the SNB as a result of its commitment in the StabFund are substantial, yet owing to the bank’s strong balance sheet, these risks can be absorbed. I would particularly like to emphasise that the SNB’s commitment is actually considerably lower than the USD 60 billion which still gets quoted by the public quite often. The SNB does not consider its loan to the stabilisation fund as a hindrance – either to its risk capability or its monetary policy latitude. The unconventional measures also pose additional risks to the SNB’s balance sheet in the form of interest rate, currency and credit risks. However, our analyses show that, in terms of the consolidated balance sheet, these risks are relatively low. BIS Review 77/2009  3  The SNB is well aware of the fact that the unconventional monetary policy measures pose not only balance sheet risks, but also a whole series of other risks, including the difficulties connected with correctly assessing the monetary policy impact and with finding the best way to phase out the unconventional measures.

Purchase of foreign currency The aim of our buying foreign currency is to prevent an appreciation of the Swiss franc against the euro. This is the key component of our unconventional monetary policy. It is important to emphasise that we do not engage in foreign exchange interventions in order to  BIS Review 77/2009  1  bring about a depreciation of the Swiss franc, but to prevent any further appreciation of the franc in its role as a safe haven currency. Therefore, the reproach we occasionally hear that the SNB’s policy is encouraging an international depreciation race is unjustified. A look at exchange rate movements shows a clear appreciation of the Swiss franc during the course of the financial market crisis (cf. chart 1). So there can be no question of the SNB conducting a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. We give ourselves a great deal of latitude with regard to our foreign exchange interventions. There is no fixed threshold beyond which we become active; we simply decide in accordance with the situation at hand. And markets should not become used to a certain level of intervention. We feel that this approach promises the highest possible impact, which in turn will allow us to phase out the strategy more easily when the time comes. Furthermore, we do not comment on the volume of our foreign currency purchases. The purchases of foreign currency have fulfilled their purpose – and with these I am referring to our first unilateral interventions in the foreign exchange market since 1992.
9 The ARRC Selects a Broad Repo Rate as its Preferred Alternative Reference Rate 10 Information about SOFR can be found at apps.newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/sofr. 11 In addition to the London Interbank Offered Rates, the other major interbank offered rates (IBORs) are the Euro  Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) and the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate (TIBOR).

In my view, these last two factors have probably pushed up the NAIRU by 0.5 to 1 percentage point on top of the about 1 percentage point effect of extended unemployment benefits, which is likely to be a temporary effect. Taken together, this suggests that the current NAIRU might be between 6 percent and 7 percent. Although undesirable, this rise should not create concern about the medium-term inflation outlook. First, even the higher estimate of NAIRU is still far below the current unemployment rate of 9 percent. Second, as discussed above, much of this rise is likely to be temporary rather than permanent. As the labor market improves, the extension of unemployment claims benefits will almost certainly be allowed to lapse. When this occurs, the NAIRU is likely to drop back to somewhere in the region of 5 percent to 6 percent. Third, some of the evidence that the NAIRU has increased is not particularly compelling. For example, the loop in the Beveridge curve that is evident now has been seen in past business  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  cycles – cycles in which there was no persistent rise in the NAIRU. This strongly suggests that the rise in job mismatch has a cyclical component. Fourth, the 9 percent unemployment rate may understate the amount of labor market slack. That is because the labor participation rate has fallen sharply.
As a central bank and regulator, MAS has been focused on two broad areas: enhancing environmental risk management in our financial institutions; and promoting high-quality sustainability-related disclosures. MAS has issued guidelines on environmental risk management to all financial institutions. The guidelines set out MAS’ expectations for financial institutions to assess, monitor, mitigate and disclose environmental risks. They apply to all financial institutions across banking, insurance, and asset management. They cover environmental risks besides climate change – such as pollution, loss of biodiversity, and changes in land use. An industry task force on green finance, convened by MAS, has issued an implementation handbook, providing guidance on best practices in environmental risk management. MAS will conduct later this year a review of financial institutions’ progress in implementing the guidelines, with a view to publish an information paper to share best practices and areas for improvement. MAS plays an active role in international efforts to align supervisory frameworks for environmental risks. MAS is leading the workstream on micro-prudential supervision under the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which provides guidance for supervisors in incorporating environmental risk management. MAS is supporting the Climate Training Alliance, a portal for training on climate risks for central banks and supervisors, established by COP 26. Financial supervisors need to better understand how climate risks can potentially impact financial systems. MAS is leading an effort under the NGFS to study potential financial risk differentials between green and other assets and reviewing methodologies for climate and environmental risk analysis.

BIS Review 128/2009  5  Chairperson, Distinguished Participants, In conclusion, let me simply state that I believe that we in Africa have an opportunity and an obligation to consolidate reform and ensure that we can return to and surpass the high growth rates, of above 5%, witnessed in the new millennium. This is important not just for Africa and the challenge of reducing poverty, but also the world, as demographic changes shift the burden of production onto the younger generation – which is concentrated in the developing economies, including Africa. I am happy to note that my invitation for colleagues to visit Zambia and see the wonderful opportunities for investment and progress that exist have been heeded as I did receive a delegation from Italy early this year. I cannot therefore end without encouraging all of you to visit Zambia when you have the opportunity – I can assure you that you will not be disappointed. I thank you for your kind attention. 6  BIS Review 128/2009