samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The result has been an improved acknowledgment and provisioning for NPLs, while bank capitalisation has also increased – the banks participating in the Comprehensive Assessment had built up additional capital of over € billion between the onset of the crisis and the Assessment. In terms of repairing the banking sector, the new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive provides a harmonised EU framework for resolution with a requirement of bail-in. And the new Single Resolution Mechanism ensures that decisions on resolution are made consistently across the euro area, with resolution financing given at the union level and then recouped from the banking sector. This is a vital step to make resolution more effective, while it should also go some way towards severing the link between banks and their sovereigns by shifting the financial burden onto the private sector, or in the interim, onto the union. But there is more still to be done. For the bank-sovereign nexus to be truly broken it is clear that Banking Union needs to be completed. That means moving towards genuine risk-sharing over deposit guarantee schemes, coupled with genuine risk reduction on banks’ balance sheets. European institutions need to be strengthened in other areas, too, notably those governing fiscal policies. To my mind this must entail moving from a framework of decentralised rules to more effective central institutions; it hardly helps credibility when we take years drafting new rules only to break them at the first test.

And at the Bank of England, we had recently created a directorate dedicated to ensuring financial market infrastructure, including payment systems, meet the necessary standards of robustness and resilience. Overall the pace of technical, structural and regulatory change in payments was poised to pick up. And I have not been disappointed with the level of ambition and innovation we have seen in the past three years. Collectively, we have been on a journey; inching and in some cases taking great strides towards a payments landscape that is competitive, resilient and ready for the future. But, while considerable progress has been made, the journey to best in class payments is far from complete. Whilst important milestones have been reached, many more lie ahead. For example, one catalyst for change in UK retail payments was the creation of the Payments Strategy Forum (PSF) in March of 2015. And, with the formal consolidation of the Bacs and Faster Payments systems into the New Payment System Operator (NPSO) just last month, we can say that a key recommendation of the PSF has been delivered. But the NPSO now needs to turn its attention to developing and implementing the remaining critical recommendations which I will come on to discuss. We now need, collectively, to refocus our energies for the next leg of this journey towards best in class payments.
For example, big data, riskoriented decision-making systems, credit decisions, the use of complex mathematical models in the risk management system, and working with open interfaces and cloud computing. All this suggests that soon there will be high proportion of risks that are technological in nature rather than financial. We need to be ready to face these risks. Our objective is to elaborate uniform standards for working with databases, data quality, and develop the requirements on models applied in data outsourcing, and requirements on information security. This is a great deal of work. We will develop approaches while engaged in dialogue with the industry. The revolution in the use of data has had an impact on both financial institutions as well as regulators like us, the central bank. We need more data about deals and transactions. Then, we need to use modern data analysis methods. For this, we will optimise the reports that are submitted and introduce formats that are convenient for the market such as XBRL. I would like to highlight the fact that we will be working to improve quality control and data management systems and you will benefit from lower regulatory costs. The last area of work I would like to mention is one of the most important: protecting consumer rights. Our objective in this area is absolutely clear – financial decisions should not lead to misfortune in consumers’ lives.

Our main objective is to entrust several strategic credit bureaus with the imperative to aggregate information on aggregate debt payments. These offices will be subject to greater regulation, primarily concerning data protection. If the market cannot come to an agreement, we will have to take an alternative route and create a single integrator. Furthermore, we plan to eliminate certain issues with regulation. These include the collection of credit histories in cases of securitisation, license revocation or bank resolution. Furthermore, in recent years financial regulation has been advanced by adding further objectives that are completed using this regulation. Therefore, alongside the main objective of ensuring the stability of individual banks and financial institutions, ensuring financial stability now falls within the remit. In our opinion, there is currently room for one more addition. Let me explain. The aim of financial regulation has conventionally been seen solely as risk limitation. Attempts to put in place differentiated regulation that would curtail one area of business but stimulate other, higher-priority ones, have always been met with outcry. But proportional regulation, for example, which we started to develop, stimulates small business lending. This was one of the goals for its introduction. Another example: the discouragement of unsecured consumer lending forced banks to cultivate mortgage lending, among other things. For example, a large share of bank lending is currently used for mergers and acquisitions. This creates risks for banks, is unlikely to significantly benefit the country, does not create additional gross product or new jobs, and simply facilitates the redistribution of property.
Overall, lending capacity recovered, to 1.9% of GDP in 2021, although the net debtor position vis-à-vis the rest of the world remains high (70% of GDP at end-2021). As regards the labour market, the recovery in employment was particularly vigorous. Thus, in March 2022 effective social security registrations stood 2.1% above their pre-pandemic  1  Thus, the level in 2022 Q1 was still 9.7% off the 2019 Q4 level. 2  In December 2020, tourist arrivals and expenditure were down to 15.1% and 13.9%, respectively, of their December 2019 levels. However, by March 2022 those figures had climbed to 71.4% and 84%, respectively. In April, the number of overnight hotel stays by foreign tourists reached 89.4% of their pre-pandemic levels. 3  Only exporters with sales abroad exceeding € are considered, given the particularities of firms whose exports fall below this threshold. In any event, the latter account for a negligible share of total exports. 2  level, albeit with notable cross-sector differences.4 In the public sector, employment was around 10 pp higher than the pre-pandemic level, while in the private sector the difference stands at approximately 1.5 pp.5 Nevertheless, total hours worked performed somewhat less favourably, leading to a 4 pp gap at end-2021, although this gap narrowed significantly in 2022 Q1, to 0.5 pp. One discernible characteristic since the crisis began has been employment, measured in numbers of persons, performing markedly better than GDP.6 Various explanations for this have been offered, none of which are easily verifiable. These include the pandemic restrictions (e.g.

Conclusion  Finally, I would like to make a few concluding remarks. Finland, Sweden and Norway all experienced a severe banking crisis in the early 1990s. That taught us how costly financial crises can be, and how important it is to prevent their recurrence. In the last 20 years three-quarters of IMF member countries have experienced a banking crisis. Not even a perfectly healthy macroeconomic policy and an effective supervisory system constitute a guarantee against crises if participants in the financial sector behave imprudently. The most important preventive measure is thus to promote prudent behaviour. The authorities will contribute to this end. However, I would like to emphasise that responsibility for sound practices primarily rests with market participants themselves. Banks are at the core of the financial system, and will probably remain so in the foreseeable future. However, they face increasing competition from several quarters. Unless banks adapt to this new environment, their profitability and financial strength might suffer and they may be tempted to engage in unhealthy risk taking. The authorities should look at the restructuring of the banking industry with an open mind. Structural changes may be necessary to reap the benefits of factors such as new technology and globalisation. 11  BIS Review 78/2000
This applies along corporate value chains in transactions between intermediate good producers (sellers) and final good producers (buyers), just as it does in the labour market between employees (sellers) and employers (buyers). And the underlying distributional competition exists among workers – say between private and public sector employees, or between employees and the self-employed – just as much as much as within the corporate sector or between firms and workers. Monetary policy has neither the mandate nor the capacity to make fine distributional choices across these different groups. That is something better left to the market and/or the decisions of fiscal and regulatory authorities. Monetary policy is potentially a very powerful tool. But it is also a blunt tool – able to steer the aggregate level of spending in the economy over time in pursuit of price stability, but not to micro-manage a broad raft other economic challenges. The danger of over-burdening monetary policy with other objectives and thereby distracting it from its core task was recognised in the design of the MPC’s remit, with clear primacy attached to the achievement of the inflation target. Page 10  What monetary policy can, should and must do is steer the economy in a direction whereby these distributional bargaining processes are resolved in a way consistent with the 2% inflation target. An understanding of how monetary policy actions and their implications for aggregate demand influence the power and position of participants in the bargaining process is needed.

As the digital asset ecosystem grows, it will be natural for linkages between the traditional banking system and digital assets to grow. There is risk of contagion to financial markets through exposures of financial institutions to digital assets. MAS is working closely with other regulators to design a prudential framework for banks’ exposures to digital assets. This framework will provide banks with clarity on how to measure the risks of their digital asset exposures, and maintain adequate capital to address these risks. This will reduce risks of spillovers into the traditional banking system. INNOVATION AND REGULATION HAND-IN-HAND Singapore wants to be a hub for innovative and responsible digital asset activities that enhance efficiency and create economic value. The development strategy and regulatory approach for digital assets that I have described go hand-in-hand towards achieving this. Innovation and regulation are not incapable of co-existing. We do not split the difference by being less stringent in our regulation or being less facilitative of innovation. MAS’ development strategy makes Singapore one of the most conducive and facilitative jurisdictions for digital assets. At the same time, MAS’ evolving regulatory approach makes Singapore one of the most comprehensive in managing the risks of digital assets, and among the strictest in areas like discouraging retail investments in cryptocurrencies. I hope this presentation has made clear that MAS’ facilitative posture on digital asset activities and restrictive stance on cryptocurrency speculation are not contradictory.
This explains the vigorous response of fiscal and monetary authorities around the world and in Chile, which has focused on protecting employment and access to credit for the most affected companies. At the local level, this projection is also contingent upon the larger investment projects resuming their normal operation and the institutional channeling of the social crisis reducing uncertainty and avoiding new episodes of violence. Furthermore, the scenario considers the additional impulse implicit in the Ministry of Finance’s announcements published in March. It is worth noting that the projections contained in the baseline scenario were made in an even more uncertain environment than in the December Report. It is worthwhile highlight the difficulties in estimating how the pandemic will evolve in Chile and the world, and how the control measures will be adjusted. The unprecedented nature of these elements means that the forecast ranges for growth contain less than the usual information input. All in all, the CBC Board estimates that this year Chile’s GDP will contract between 1.5% and 2.5%. In 2021, it will increase between 3.75% and 4.75%, and in 2022 it will grow between 3% and 4%. On the domestic demand side, higher cash needs to cover business operations will be reflected in a contraction of investment, with the baseline scenario estimating that gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) will contract by 8.2% in 2020. By sectors, both mining and non-mining investment are revised downwards, the latter more so.

The sanitary emergency triggered by the fast spread of COVID-19 has forced to take drastic containment measures across the world, which directly affect the functioning of the economy and cause global uncertainty to soar. Unlike other episodes that respond to the business cycle or financial turmoil, this shock brings activity to a sudden halt that shakes both demand and supply in countries both rich and poor, from within and from abroad. Because of these differences in its origin, this crisis may behave very differently from its predecessors. One factor determining its duration will be the extension of the sanitary emergency and containment measures and how the restrictions will be lifted as the spread of the virus is controlled. In the abscense of other shocks to the economy, this could mean that economic activity could recover faster than from previous crises. A second determinant is how deep the productive system will be damaged. The dramatically reduced or even dried-up revenues of businesses creates great pressures on their cash flows which, if not controlled and/or mitigated, in many cases may threaten their survival, the proper operation of payment chains, employment and financial stability. In such circumstances, all means must be sought to avoid the ripple effects of abrupt activity interruption. This calls for resolute policy interventions and the involvement of financial institutions. Although certainly not the source of the problem, banks and other financial institutions must be part of the solution. 7  Chile meets this situation with important strengths.
A broad range of investors have contributed to this growth: global and regional institutional investors as well as individual investors. Family offices are one particular category of individual investment. The number of Single Family Offices (SFOs) awarded tax incentives by MAS increased to 1,100 as of end-2022, up from 700 in 2021. Second, contrary to popular perception, the bulk of the wealth flows into Singapore come from institutional investors and not family offices or high net worth individuals. Non-retail individual clients – which includes family offices, clients of external asset managers, private trusts, and high net worth individuals – made up only 20% of the increase in total assets managed in Singapore from 2017 to 2021. SFOs that apply for and are granted tax incentives by MAS managed about $ billion of assets as at 2021, less than 2% of the $ trillion total assets managed in Singapore. Third, wealth inflows into Singapore have little effect on the exchange rate, domestic inflation, property prices or car prices. The reason for this is simple: while the wealth is managed here, most of it is invested outside Singapore. This means that the wealth inflows typically remain in foreign currencies and have little or no effect on the Singapore Dollar exchange rate. Singapore is just an intermediary for these flows. As for inflation, it has little to do with wealth inflows into Singapore, let alone the portion due to SFOs.

Monetary policy was tightened five times within the space of a year - between October 2021 and October 2022 – even in the face of increasing growth uncertainties. The trade-weighted exchange rate of the Singapore Dollar has appreciated by 8.3% since the beginning of October 2021, helping to dampen imported inflation and domestic cost pressures. But the fight against inflation is not over and the monetary policy stance remains tight relative to the business cycle. The most recent monetary policy decision to maintain the prevailing rate of appreciation of the trade-weighted Singapore Dollar means that the exchange rate will continue to exert a dampening effect on inflation. The continuous tightening of monetary policy imparted by the upward slope of the exchange rate policy band is unique to Singapore's exchange-rate centred monetary policy framework. In countries whose monetary policy is centered on interest rates, the policy rate is set at a specific value and will not tighten further unless the central bank makes a fresh policy decision. The impact of this appreciating path as well as our previous policy moves will therefore continue to flow through the economy and dampen inflation. About one-third of the cumulative restraining effects of the previous five moves remains in the pipeline. MAS is not switching from "inflation-fighting mode" to "growth-supporting mode". We are closely monitoring the evolving growth-inflation dynamics and remain vigilant to risks on either side. We stand ready to adjust monetary policy as needed, especially if inflation momentum were to re-accelerate.
However, should there be signs of a strengthening and spread in inflationary pressure, we will not hesitate to take the necessary measures to ensure price stability in Switzerland in the medium term. Possible longer-term consequences of the war for monetary policy So much for monetary policy today. However, what could be the longer-term consequences of the war? One key issue in my view is how we are going to deal going forward with the dependencies that have arisen as a result of globalisation. Specifically, which countries will still trade with each other in which goods and services and to what extent? We do not yet have definitive answers to these new questions. From the current perspective, however, it appears possible that in the medium term we will be living in a world that is less integrated than it is today. I would like to focus here on this question: What would a less globalised world mean for monetary policy? There would initially be the impact on inflation and the economy, in other words on the two variables at the core of monetary policy. With a reduction in the division of labour owing to a fragmentation of the global economy, production costs for many goods would rise again. As long as this disintegration persisted, it would be likely to trigger more protracted inflationary pressure.

The closer a country’s trade relations were with Ukraine and Russia, the stronger are the direct adverse effects now on growth, of course. However, owing to global interconnectedness, the war is also throwing sand in the gears of countries with few trade links in the region. All of this slows the economy, also here in Switzerland. For the current year, we anticipate that Swiss GDP will grow by 2.5%. This is half a percentage point lower than we expected before the war broke out. Inflationary pressure has risen in Switzerland, too, albeit comparatively moderately thus far. Annual average inflation for 2021 was still at 0.6%; in March 2022 it stood at 2.4%. We define price stability as a situation in which inflation lies between 0% and 2% over the medium term. At our most recent monetary policy assessment in March, we decided to leave our policy rate unchanged at −0.75%, and to maintain our willingness to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary. However, we had already stressed in December that we would allow the Swiss franc to appreciate to a certain extent. So how do we put our current monetary policy in context? We intervene in the foreign exchange market when strong upward pressure on the Swiss franc would lead to persistently negative inflation and weigh heavily on the economy. However, we do not react mechanically to every instance of upward pressure.
And the characteristic reluctance of savers to invest outside their home market may be diminishing. Alongside these longer terms trends, financial markets today also show the effects of other forces. The extraordinary growth in earnings of energy and commodity exporters, the substantial rise in wealth that has come with rapid growth in China, India, and other emerging markets, together with efforts by many of those governments to stem the appreciation of their currencies, has led to a rise in capital flows, official and private, into the United States and other major economies. These flows seem large enough to have had a material effect on global interest rates and asset prices. These changes in economic conditions reinforce each other. The long period of relative economic and financial stability has reinforced expectations of future stability, reducing implied volatility and risk premia, increasing comfort with higher leverage, and encouraging flows of capital into riskier assets. BIS Review 49/2007  1  The low level of real interest rates that has prevailed in much of the world through this expansion has contributed to relatively accommodative financial conditions. The high levels of reserve accumulation by governments with heavily managed exchange rate regimes put downward pressure on forward interest rates, potentially distorting asset prices. The increase in size of sovereign wealth funds, the shift in assets to hedge fund and private equity managers, and the possible reduction in home bias among private savers have increased the amount of mobile capital in search of higher returns.

As part of the Financial Market Committee's (FMC) effort to further develop the onshore financial markets, the Islamic Financial Market Subcommittee has been tasked to formulate specific market development initiatives to take us forward. The committee has already started work in 2022 with an assessment on the current state of the Islamic financial market in Malaysia and identifying gaps on potential growth areas. Key areas with gaps that need to be addressed are the general market liquidity, the extent of foreign participation in the domestic market and the vibrancy of the interbank market for derivatives. The Islamic repurchase market registered RM39.4 billion in volume in 2021 or around 1% of the total Islamic money market volume for the year while the derivatives market witnessed a mere fraction of 0.1% of Islamic instruments with the rest being conventional instruments. If we consider that Islamic financing comprises more than 40% of the total, we have a lot of opportunity here. Meanwhile, foreign participation in the sukuk market was less than a third of the conventional bond market and hence, further efforts can be undertaken to boost this. The assessment also observed that the outlook for the Malaysian Islamic financial market in the next 5-10 years is generally positive, pointing towards continued growth and development as well as Malaysia remaining as a major global Islamic financial centre6.