samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The latter, along with the overly high level of savings, helped keep interest rates and volatility at bay. All this translated into a new financial texture, in which the bank intermediation model shifted away from "originate and hold" to "originate and distribute". The new products and institutions that changed the fabric the financial system was made of until three decades ago led to the outbreak of the current financial crisis. The financial crisis was triggered by the  BIS Review 56/2009  1  developments in the US subprime mortgage market, as I have mentioned earlier. In turn, it broke out due to the fact that the Federal Reserve System, given the above-mentioned conditions, had no other option but to increase interest rates with a view to maintaining low inflation. With the new financial texture however, rate hikes brought about the emergence of the financial crisis. In view of the above, my opinion is that ample liquidity changed the financial system to the point where monetary policy found itself trapped. Inaction would have resulted in higher inflation. The actions taken brought about financial instability. If regulation and supervision had prevented the excessive build-up of risks by investors, interest rate hikes could not have prompted financial instability. Such developments point to the need of efficient cooperation between monetary policy, on the one hand, and regulation and supervision, on the other, a fact that failed to materialise over the past years in some of the world's leading economies.

While the leu was strengthening, up until the summer of 2007, the issue of adopting the euro was not on the agenda of economic agents. The crisis highlighted the fact that the leu was overappreciated and the market made the necessary correction. Over a relatively short period – from July 2007 to date – the leu weakened by around 35 percent. Over the same period, the prospects of economic growth changed dramatically: from an almost 9.4 percent growth rate in 2008 Q3 to a most likely significant decline in 2009 Q1. The monetary and fiscal policies will be resorted to with a view to adjusting to the new environment. In face of the crisis, the relatively large stock of private foreign debt and the increased market volatility made some economic agents believe that the early adoption of the euro could supersede the need for economic policy adjustments. Yet this is not a viable option, as adopting the euro prior to having achieved the main stages of convergence with the EU might pose serious threats in the future. The adoption of the euro today would mean to relinquish monetary policy before having ensured convergence sustainability, namely before removing all the imbalances we are facing today. The outcome would consist in monetary policy being designed by the European Central Bank (ECB). But the ECB policy might prove inadequate from the standpoint of the specific problems facing the Romanian economy.
In May and June we purchased about $ million per day, or about one percent of average daily trading volume in the secondary market, and that pace declined to about $ million per day by September, or less than 0.1 percent. Currently, the SMCCF holds about $ billion of overall exposure across corporate bonds and corporate bond ETFs. This is less than 0.2 percent of the outstanding bonds in this $ trillion market.15 As we’ve said previously, if further improvement in market functioning occurs, we could slow SMCCF purchases further and potentially pause daily purchases entirely. Conversely, if market functioning measures indicate deterioration, the SMCCF remains available to ramp up support. Despite the small footprint of the CCFs, we know the signaling effects have been potent—indeed, this is the main channel through which these facilities have had an impact—and we remain watchful for the risk of creating distortions. One possibility could be that companies issue shorter maturities than they would otherwise to benefit from presence of the CCF backstop. So far, we see no evidence of this behavior; if anything, there has been a tendency toward refinancing maturing debt at longer tenors.16 Another distortion could be excessive amounts of corporate debt issuance based on future expectations of an official sector backstop. This “moral hazard” risk will bear watching over the coming years, but there are at least a couple of reasons to believe it’s muted in the current circumstance. For one thing, global pandemics are an extremely infrequent occurrence.

One such law is the Law on Electronic Documents, Electronic Identification and Trusted Services that we believe could have multiple positive effects on our economy.. Another example that should be underlined is the newly established Central Population Register and the guiding regulations for its operations that besides other functionalities, will offer integration of the trusted services (eID) with the register. All these initiatives clearly denote our strong commitment to embrace with financial innovations and reap its benefits. Dear guests, A Fintech ecosystem cannot flourish in a vacuum. It is of vital importance that the regulators and supervisors, but also other stakeholders collaborate to better achieve the fintech goals that will be enshrined in the National Fintech Strategy. Multiple entities and agencies need to collaborate and contribute their knowledge, expertise, and resources. The support and coordination of these various parties is essential for enabling swift operation of all elements of the ecosystem. Their integration and synergies will provide space for innovation to prosper. Sharing experience and best practices would also help provide guidance on the most effective regulatory frameworks considering country circumstances. Thus, through coordinated and inclusive approach of all stakeholders, let us avoid vacuums and create an enabling financial innovations environment, benefits of which can be felt by the society at large. Thank you.
BIS Review 14/2001  7  The government’s asset position and wealth management  Government assets and liabilities Estimates in billions of NOK Assets  Liabilities  Petroleum Fund National Insurance Fund  390  Direct ownership  300  Bonds and Treasury bills  170  50  Minor holdings  100  State banks  165  The table shows in simplified form the central government’s financial assets and liabilities, with estimates for the balance at the end of 2000. The government’s most important assets are the Government Petroleum Fund, assets in the National Insurance Fund, and the state’s direct ownership interests in enterprises. The estimate for the government’s direct ownership in the table includes Statoil, Norsk Hydro, Telenor, Statkraft and DnB. In addition, the state has many smaller stakes and direct loans through the state banks. The government has loan debt. In the table, the figures for the National Insurance Fund are consolidated as the Fund’s claims on the central government and the central government’s debt to the Fund are offset. The table shows that the central government’s loans through the state banks are approximately the same as the central government’s loan debt. The central government raises loans in the bond market and lends through the state banks. The interest rate on the loans and the pricing of risk are market-related. If we exclude this credit intermediation, the management of government wealth is primarily linked to state ownership interests in the Norwegian business sector, the National Insurance Fund and the Government Petroleum Fund.

Employment growth Per cent 6 4  6 4  General government  2  2  0  0 -2  -2 Manufacturing  -4 91  BIS Review 14/2001  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  -4  00  1  Whereas the upturn was balanced for a long period, the public sector has laid claim to a large share of the increase in the labour supply in recent years. Manufacturing employment has fallen markedly since 1998. The mainland economy features some aspects that are associated with a boom period, although growth is low. After several years of mainland GDP growth in the order of 3-4 per cent, activity is now increasing by less than 2 per cent a year. The economy is operating near capacity limits. New working time reforms, increased use of sick pay and disability benefits and a reduced supply of labour from other Nordic countries are restraining growth in many sectors. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that productivity growth in Norway has picked up to the levels in some of our neighbouring countries. Risk premia for private companies in the US Percentage points 6  6  4  4 High risk  2  0  Medium risk  Low risk  2  0  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001  International equity prices declined sharply last autumn. In the US, output and employment are stagnating.
As you know, the UK decided not to participate in Economic and Monetary Union at the outset. But although the UK is 'out', the City of London is effectively 'in' already. And this is because of the City's international role, making markets and providing financial services, regardless of currency. So the City of London needed to be well prepared for the introduction of the euro in January 1999. And it was well prepared. As a result, London remains a competitive market place for euro business. You can trade euro in London, just like dollars. There is a wide variety of euro payment routes available in and from London. And London is playing a key role in pioneering the development of the euro markets and financial services across Europe. This means that London can, and does, provide a gateway to the euro for Japanese financial institutions. The City of London does not depend on the currency used by the UK. Financial activity will be carried on where it can be carried on most conveniently, profitably and efficiently. The City thrives on deep and liquid markets, regardless of currency. Measured in these terms, we have, over the last few years, seen the euro as an opportunity for London, not a threat. And the City has been taking advantage of this opportunity, since the euro's launch, by innovating and setting standards of excellence in the euro markets.

This means: maintaining the right approach in areas like labour flexibility, low taxation and regulation; and continuing to foster open markets and to welcome foreign firms. Among such firms, we hope that many of the largest Japanese financial institutions will continue to see London as their natural European home. London is determined to remain internationally competitive as a centre for innovation and excellence in the 21st century. And we hope that it will also continue to be Japan's gateway to the euro. *  4  *  *  BIS Review 11/2001
Against this background, assuming a limited amount of further easing and constant policy rate until the end of 2010, medium-term forecasts suggest that, with 70 percent probability, inflation will be between 5.0 and 6.0 percent with a mid-point of 5.5 percent at the end of 2009, and between 3.9 and 6.9 percent with a mid-point of 5.4 percent by the end of 2010. Furthermore, inflation is expected to decline to 4.9 percent by the end of 2011 and to 4.8 percent by the third quarter of 2012 (Figure 35).

0109  0108  0107  0105  0909  0509  0109  0908  0508  0108  30  0907  0 0507  70  0107  100  0106  110  200  Source: Bloomberg. Source: Goldman Sachs. The course of food prices is another important assumption for inflation forecasts. Contrary to the upward trend in previous years, the seasonally adjusted food prices displayed a decline in the third quarter (Figure 33). This change was mainly driven by the decline in unprocessed prices fuelled by prices of fruits and vegetables decreasing at a faster pace than seasonal averages. Unprocessed food prices had displayed an upswing in the first half of the year. Deceleration in annual inflation in processed food prices continued as well and prices fell compared to the same period of the previous year for the first time in the history of the index (Figure 34). The July Inflation Report envisaged food inflation to be 7.5 percent at the end of 2009 and 6 percent for the following years. However, better than expected outcomes regarding food prices necessitated a downward revision in food inflation to 5.8 percent for end-2009, while the projection of 6 percent was maintained for the following years. 14  BIS Review 143/2009  Figure 33: Food Prices  Figure 34: Food Prices  (Seasonally Adjusted,  (Annual Percentage Change)  Quarterly Moving Average)  2 1,5 1 0,5 0 -0,5  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT.
Based on the analysis of these channels, the direct effects of the war on Spanish foreign trade are expected to be moderate, as its bilateral trade flows with Russia are relatively limited. Nevertheless, the indirect effects may be significant. Spain’s share of energy products imported from Russia is admittedly relatively small (6% of the total in 2019) and lower than that of countries such as Germany and Italy (17% and 22%, respectively). However, its high dependence on external energy sources and the impact of the war on energy prices on the international markets have already triggered a major negative shock to our international purchasing power. Given the crucial role of these commodities in production processes and the limited capacity in the short term to substitute these energy inputs from Russia, a hypothetical interruption of the supply of energy products from Russia to Europe would have a significant impact on activity and inflation in the euro area. That impact would be more pronounced in the economies that are more dependent on Russian gas, with the consequent indirect effects on the Spanish economy. The war has also adversely affected uncertainty, as shown by the fact that the decline in household confidence in March, after the conflict broke out, was the largest in the time series. 6  Consequently, a delay in the gradual recovery that was under way in the Spanish economy should be expected.

As I pointed out earlier, the costs of avoiding negative interest rates by substituting currency for deposits is probably lower for retail depositors than for larger, business and institutional, depositors. Because retail depositors can avoid negative rates on deposits relatively easily, it makes sense not to impose negative rates on their deposits. In addition, many retail depositors may have a visceral negative reaction to being charged negative rates, and may lack a clear understanding of whether their bank is minimizing the costs of storing their deposits. Recognizing these difficulties, the central banks that have negative policy rates offer zero rates on many of their deposits from banks, imposing negative rates on the “marginal” deposits. In this way, commercial banks can, in general, charge their retail depositors deposit rates of zero and earn zero at the central bank on at least a large portion of their reserve holdings. Observers report that retail depositors in Switzerland, Denmark, and Sweden do not face negative deposit rates. At the same time, many large business and institutional depositors do earn negative rates on their bank deposits. This state of affairs opens up new avenues, at least in theory, by which some can avoid negative rates: large business depositors could attempt to impersonate a host of retail depositors. While generally unrealistic, the possibility of such a ploy requires that some effort be expended to prevent that avoidance activity.
Partially, this is because price changes are intrinsically costly,5 but also because firms often wish to maintain customer goodwill by not immediately passing increased costs along. Furthermore, many firms hedge their foreign trade on the foreign exchange forward market so as not to be affected by short-term exchange rate fluctuations.6 This very time horizon is an important aspect of exchange rate fluctuations. If the change is deemed to be temporary, it is reasonable to assume that many firms will avoid changing their prices and that the pass-through will thus be moderate. If, on the other hand, it is deemed to be permanent, the pass-through should be greater, as otherwise margins will be lower (in the event of a depreciation of the krona). Another important aspect here is the competitive situation on the market. On a market characterised by strong competition, it will be more difficult for a firm to increase prices without losing sales. The general demand situation can also play a part. It will probably be easier to raise prices in a period of high economic activity, when many domestic competitors will also have a tendency to increase their prices, than in periods in which domestic demand is developing weakly. Empirical studies suggest that, for example, a weakening of the exchange rate by 4 per cent will increase import prices by about 2 per cent, which is to say that the pass-through is about  3  See Hansson and Lindberg (1994) for a description.

Peter Praet: Interview in Knack Interview with Mr Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Knack, conducted by Mr Ewald Pironet and published on 6 January 2016. *  *  *  For over a year now, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been printing heaps of money, pumping it into the economy and pushing interest rates down to almost 0%. When may this policy be deemed a success? You may label that ECB policy a success if inflation, the rise in the cost of living, stays below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. That is our mandate. I admit that our policy has not yet been successful enough: inflation rates in Europe have been at the very low level of almost 0% for quite some time now. That is why we are continuing to take the necessary measures to drive inflation up to 2% over the medium term. However, the point at which we think we will reach 2% is constantly postponed, because all kinds of things are happening that are dampening inflation, such as the decline in oil prices or lower economic performances in the emerging countries. We have decided to maintain our policy until March 2017. But we need to be careful not to jeopardise the ECB’s credibility by shifting that horizon. It is up to the ECB to keep inflation at just below 2%, but it is failing to do so.
These developments, besides their positive contribution in enhancing the financial intermediation, speak for a better perception of investing potential from banks in Albania. An outstanding development is mainly related to the client service, which is accompanied through electronic terminals by the increasing number of electronic cards in circulation. Banks offer already debit and credit cards in co-operation with international companies such as Visa and MasterCard. Six banks provide the ATM service and the number of ATMs reached 108 by the end of February 2005. The banking system results to have a profit level, which has been increasing to Lek 5.1 billion. Return on equity (ROE) was estimated at 21 percent while credit quality is only 4.2 percent from 4.6 percent in the previous year. In any case, we must say that credits are still new and do not have adequate history to show their performance. However, problems and challenges, which the system is facing, are still enormous and in this context the role of the association of banks, I think, will be important to overcome them. Credit to the economy and credit register Credit to the economy has recently known a great development. High growth rates impose us to be prudent in the other direction, that is portfolio quality. Enhancing competitiveness and consequently, enhancing the credit level is bringing about a rising trend of weighted risk assets and some banks are already close to the minimum level of 12 percent.

Now the public administration has become a client of the system and I think that there are real opportunities to resolve the utility services payments through the banking system. Also, I hope that the system will be aggressive and will keep promises to the public to put its windows at the service of selling Treasury bills directly to the interested public. We, as Bank of Albania, have kept our promises and very soon we will introduce as a first step a commission that is presumed to cover the transaction cost while we will accompany this move by the ban of cash flows receipt at the windows of Bank of Albania. We shall request the individuals that their participation in the auctions, through windows of Bank of Albania, will become possible only upon presentation of a banking document, which certifies that the client has deposited a certain amount as a guarantee in one of the banks pertaining to the system. Another direction on which banks must further focus relates to an aggressivity of broader propaganda and clarification. I think that still the majority of common people show a certain hesitation to refer to banks. I believe that they have a feeling of non-confidence that the bank shall not resolve their problems. Many individuals, though in an absurd way, are still in search of a “friend” to negotiate with the bank.
But we must be vigilant towards any significant increase in longer-term inflation expectations. If high inflation gains a foothold, it may prove more costly to bring it down again, as experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. When my predecessor stood here last year, Norges Bank embarked on a gradual normalisation of the policy rate (Chart 7). But when inflation accelerated over spring, it became clear that the policy rate was no longer appropriate for the economic situation in Norway. Over summer and autumn, we raised the policy rate faster and in larger steps than had been the norm. As mentioned, the main driver of the jump in inflation has been higher prices for energy and imported inputs. So why does it help to raise the policy rate in Norway, some might ask. We cannot influence energy and commodity prices. But by softening demand, we can help avoid price increases for those prices spilling over to other prices and wages, and ushering in a period of high inflation. Chart 7 The policy rate was raised rapidly Policy rate. Percent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2001  2004  2007  2010  2013  2016  2019  2022  Source: Norges Bank  Norges Bank  Economic perspectives 2023  9  Chart 8 Inflation does not come down on its own Consumer price index subcomponents. Four-quarter change.

This can reduce the supply-side flexibility of the world economy. Combined, these shifts can make the job of keeping inflation low more demanding. How this will play out is highly uncertain. But there is one thing I am certain about. The global economy must make an absolutely necessary transition to a low-carbon economy. There are evermore signals of the urgency to achieve that transition. The number and intensity of heat waves, floods and droughts are on the rise. The transition is fraught with uncertainty and proceeding too slowly. For each year the transition is too slow, the more likely it becomes that stronger and more costly measures will be needed later on. To reach the targets, governments have a range of instruments at their disposal. Carbon pricing is particulary effective in that it sends a clear message as to what we should do less of and what we need more of. The rising costs of emissions is one of the main drivers behind today’s investments in renewable energy and more energy efficiency solutions (Chart 9). We can see that price mechanisms work. Chart 9 Transition to a low-carbon economy Carbon price in the EU Emission Trading System. EUR per tonne of CO2e 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2010  2013  2016  2019  2022  Source: Refinitiv Datastream  Norges Bank  Economic perspectives 2023  11  The transition will not be seamless.