samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These balance sheet linkages have altered the risks we face but they are an inevitable consequence of the free movement of capital, which has brought with it new opportunities for us all. Any answer to the question of what role the IMF should nowplay must recognise these balance sheet linkages. The size and composition of balance sheets is crucial for determining how shocks are transmitted across national borders. And surprises about economic policy and news about economic fundamentals can, by generating changes in desired balance sheet positions, have large impacts on capital and expenditure flows. 3  This principle is also illustrated by the United Kingdom. Between 1946 and 1971, the UK had four IMF programmes. The maximum current account deficit at the start of those programs was 1% of GDP. Since 1998, the UK current account deficit has not been less than 1.5% of GDP but has been financed fully through private markets. 4  Greenspan, A (2005), “International Imbalances”, Remarks before the Advancing Enterprise Conference, London. 5  Lane, P. and G. Milesi-Ferretti (2005), “Financial Globalisation and Exchange Rates”, IMF Working paper 05/3. BIS Review 11/2006  3  Is there a need for an international monetary institution? In the post-Bretton Woods world, do we need an international financial institution, and what would be its role? Or has the international capital market replaced the need for such a public institution by providing both finance to, and discipline on, countries?

Pension plans that had placed funds in AIG guaranteed investment contracts, or GICs, which function much like deposits in a bank, would have experienced significant losses, losses that would be passed along to retirees or to others whose aspirations to be retirees would surely have been changed. BIS Review 73/2010  1  And these indirect consequences of an AIG bankruptcy would not have stopped at the U.S. border. AIG was global in scope. It conducted its operations in more than 130 countries, and across various parts of the financial industry, insurance as well as banking. The damage from an AIG filing would have been felt from the farms of Iowa to the streets of San Francisco to the far off corners of the world. The unplanned and chaotic bankruptcy of this trillion dollar financial conglomerate (especially a day after Lehman’s filing) would have been a global catastrophe. That catastrophe did not happen. More than a year and a half later, it is easy to forget the level of panic and fear that gripped the world during the week of September 16, 2008. A bankruptcy of AIG would have fueled the fear, much as gasoline fuels a fire. And let us not forget what Federal Reserve and Treasury officials have said many times in testimony – we did not have the necessary tools, such as legal authority for a special resolution regime, with which to limit the damage of an AIG collapse. We also did not have the luxury of time.
As before, these solid growth rates are a consequence of the growth of the activity of the foreign facilities, the announced new foreign investments, with some of them expected to employ a larger number of people, but also the expected additional fiscal impetus in infrastructure. Their positive secondround effects are expected to continue to be felt in the labor market by increasing the demand and price of labor. Current projections show room for growth in the number of employees and the nominal wages of around 3%. Partial effect on the wage growth is expected from both the realized and the announced increase in the wages of the public administration. Under such assumptions, our projections show that domestic demand will be a source of economic growth, while net exports would have a negative contribution. By the end of the time horizon of the projections, there are assessments for gradual balancing of the growth structure, with a gradual reduction of the negative contribution of net exports. Consumption and investment decisions of the entities are still expected to be financially supported by domestic banks. The performances of the credit market in 2014 are better than our initial expectations, and lending surveys show that these performances are a combined effect of the growth of both the supply and the demand for loans. These performances and the assumptions about the movement of the sources of funding for banks indicate credit growth in 2014, which is assessed at 8.7%, and its acceleration to 9% in 2015 and 10% in 2016.

Financing For Sustainable Development Report 2019) 3 Air pollution was a cause of almost 5 million deaths worldwide in 2017 while 62 million people were affected by  natural hazards in 2018, with 2 million needing to move elsewhere due to climate events (Source: NGFS (2019). A call for action: Climate Change as a source of financial risk). 4 Imam Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfa fi `ilm al-Usul, page 174. 5 Islamic banking assets has grown to 31.4% (RM916.7 billion) of total banking assets (as at end 2018,  compared to only 14.1% in 2008) 6 A blockchain is a digital ledger that holds any kind of information (e.g. transactions, contracts, assets or  identities) that can be stored in a digital format. Entries in the digital ledger are permanent, transparent and searchable. 7 Reference: The Edge Malaysia Weekly (4 – 10 June 2018). Personal Wealth. These challenges include lack of  data (value of the endowment), limited transparency, lack of clarity in accountability, lack of proper auditing and poor planning for waqf assets development  3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
(2) Figure above (below) 50 points indicates optimism (pessimism). Sources: Adimark, car association Asociación Nacional Automotriz de Chile, Central Bank of Chile, chamber of commerce Cámara Nacional de Comercio and ICARE/Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez. 8  BIS Review 61/2010  Figure 3  Lending interest rates (*)  Loans to firms and households  (moving four-week average, percent)  20  40  16  35  12  30  8  25  4  20  0  07  08 Commercial 30-89 days  (*) Weighted average rates. 09 10 Consumer over 3 years  (annualized change in the moving quarter of the nominal seasonally-adjusted series, percent)  30  30  20  20  10  10  0  0 -10 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10  15  Consumer Housing  Commercial  Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Superintendence of Banks & Financial Institutions. Figure 4 Nominal exchange rate (indices, Jan/2/2006=100)  Real exchange rate (indices, 1986=100)  140  140  130  130  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  08 MER  09  10  MER-5  OER  120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  70  88 91 94 97 00 03 06 09 1995-2009 average 1990-2009 average  RER  Source: Central Bank of Chile.

Domestically, financial conditions showed early signs of normalizations, with lending increasing from month to month, low interest rates and credit standards that were more expansionary during the fourth quarter of 2009 than during the preceding quarter (figure 3). The value of the peso has fluctuated significantly since December, partly owing to global phenomena, but largely due to domestic factors. After continuing with the process of  2  BIS Review 61/2010  appreciation that began in early October, the peso peaked at the beginning of January. It then depreciated sharply, driven by increased tensions in world financial markets and by changes in the hedging strategies used by pension funds. The depreciation trend reversed during the course of February due to a decline in external tensions and a change in pension funds’ purchase flows. After the earthquake and tsunami, the peso experienced further fluctuations due to changes in private expectations about how the reconstruction would be financed and how insurance claims would be paid. The importance of idiosyncratic factors is apparent in multilateral indicators that measure the peso’s movements with respect to the dollar and other currencies, which are showing smaller variations than those of the peso/dollar exchange rate (figure 1). Annual CPI inflation returned to positive territory earlier than what had been foreseen in December (figure 2). Core measures, in particular the CPIX1, continued to display low month-on-month variations.
What is the next frontier for diversity and how is it to be reached? From a potentially long list, let me make four points on possible next steps. First, we have barely scratched the surface when it comes to harvesting the fruits of existing diversity initiatives, focussed on the protected characteristics of gender, ethnicity and disability. On gender, where progress has perhaps been fastest and furthest, there are still gaps to fill all the way up the executive chain, especially in financial services, with a persistent pay gap of 20-30% and low levels of representation at executive level. On ethnicity, as John Parker’s report last week made clear, we are scarcely out of the  7  For further details please see Haldane (2014) ‘Central bank psychology’. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  starting blocks. And on disability, physical and mental, much the same could be said. Whatever else we do, we must not let up in continuing to make progress along these dimensions of diversity. Second, notwithstanding that, I do think we need to do a much better job of understanding and measuring the more subtle, cognitive and socio-economic dimensions of diversity. They are harder to identify and measure, as the information exists between our ears rather than on our faces. But that is precisely why unconscious biases may be largest and most in need of redress.

The reason is because a child engages in so-called “divergent” thinking – that is to say, thinking untethered by convention and education. It is too late for anyone in this room to recreate their childhood brain, I’m afraid. But we could all do the next best thing, which is to create “divergent thinking” within and across our organisations. That means building teams rich and diverse in their backgrounds, personalities and thought processes – if you like, creating your very own mini-Medici effect. This is very much the ethos in some of the world’s most innovative companies. The benefits of diversity do not end with innovation and creativity. Diversity has also been shown to make organisations more resilient to stresses and strains, including the frailties of human decision-making. Human decisions are riddled with biases like hubris and groupthink. These impair judgement and make for  6  Haldane (2016), ‘The Sneetches’ sets this out in greater detail. 3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  3  sub-optimal decision-making. And we do not need to look far for examples. Hubris was the reason some banks failed in 2008. But groupthink was the reason most banks (as well as many regulators, central banks 7  and academics) failed in 2008. As lack of diversity was the cause of these failures, greater diversity can be the antidote to them recurring in future. Plato argued that necessity is the mother of all invention. The evidence, accumulated over the centuries since, suggests Plato may have been only half right.
Finally, a fair market is one with open access, in which clients feel they can trade safely and on the basis of merit, with counterparties who hold to clear standards of market practice and integrity. And here, clearly, FX markets have had ground to make up over the past decade. Standards in some parts of the market fell  1  See Section 5.2 of https://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs37.pdf. See the July 2019 Financial Stability Report, at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-report/2019/july2019.pdf. 2  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  4  unacceptably short in the years running up to, and following, the financial crisis – and that led to a concerted push to turn the corner with agreement of the FX Global Code. The overall takeup numbers are impressive: as of 9 September, there were 956 public commitments to the Code on the Global Index.3 And the Code has driven some beneficial changes in market practice – eg on information sharing. But it will take time to see whether it has led to a persistent step-up in behaviour. So, while it may be an ‘A for effort’ on fairness, it’s also a ‘must show consistent improvement’. Technology and FX market fragmentation  In many ways, though, the most profound change in FX markets has been happening elsewhere, in response to hard economics and technological innovation. As a relatively standardised, high volume product, spot FX had embraced widespread electronic trading well before the financial crisis.

Table 1: Key flash episodes over the past decade  Year  Asset class  Markets  Price move  Duration (minutes)*  2010  Equities  S & P 500  -6%  5  2011  FX  USD/JPY  -4%  4  2014  Bonds  US Treasuries  +37bps  5  2015  FX  EUR/CHF  -41%  20  2015  FX  NZD/JPY  -10%  10  2015  FX  USD/EUR  -2%  4  2016  FX  ZAR/USD  -9%  15  2016  FX  GBP/USD  -9%  1  2017  Bond futures  French OAT  -11bps  1  2018  FX  ZAR/USD  -9%  1  2019  FX  USD/JPY  -4%  4  2019  FX  TRY/JPY  -10%  7  Sources: Bank for International Settlements, Bank Underground, Bloomberg Finance L.P., Cielinska,O, Joseph,A, Shreyas,U, Tanner,J and Vasios,M (2017), ‘Gauging market dynamics using trade repository data: the case of the Swiss franc de-pegging’, Bank of England Financial Stability Paper No. 41, Financial Times, International Monetary Fund, MarketFactory, Inc., Nanex, Reserve Bank of Australia, Securities and Exchange Commission and Bank calculations. *Approximate time space in which price moves from prevailing price to a new low (or high) price.
These projections, which do not appear to be overly optimistic given the figures – published on Monday – for the decline in unemployment and the rise in Social Security registrations in March, highlight the need to continue pursuing policies geared to boosting competitiveness, investment and exports, the only foundations suitable for sustainable job creation. Price developments in 2015 and 2016 will be greatly influenced by oil prices. Consumer prices might fall by 0.2% on average in 2015, and rise by slightly more than 1% in 2016. Stripping out the energy component, consumer prices are expected to rise modestly, in line with the scenario of growing household expenditure, the lessening of surplus capacity in the economy and the depreciation of the euro. The risk of deflation appears to have been clearly averted in the Monetary Union and, consequently, in Spain. Recent monetary policy conduct Let me turn now to recent monetary policy conduct. Monetary policy in the euro area has been progressively adapted to medium- and long-term inflation expectations, in a setting marked by the weakness of economic growth in the area. The armoury of instruments used by the ECB includes conventional or standard measures – such as interest rate movements and the provision of liquidity in its ordinary refinancing operations – together with non-standard or extraordinary measures, among which the setting of negative interest rates on the discount facility, and long-term liquidity-provision and assetpurchase programmes. The need to keep the deflationary risk at bay, i.e.

The data available on the Spanish economy suggest that, during the first quarter of 2015, the expansionary trajectory observed in 2014 has stepped up. GDP is estimated to have increased by 0.8% in quarter-on-quarter terms, which would place the year-on-year rate of change for the first quarter at 2.5%, a higher level than expected. The recovery in the Spanish economy this year and in 2016 will be underpinned by the strength of private domestic demand and by stronger exports. Moreover, the decline in the tax burden, following the reform that came into force in January, and the monetary policy measures recently adopted by the ECB – including most notably the asset purchase programmes – will also support growth. The projections published by the Banco de España  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  in its Economic Bulletin two weeks ago point to GDP growth of 2.8% this year, followed by similar growth in 2016, at a rate of 2.7%. As to the labour market, the projections of the Banco de España are for growth in employment of 2.7% this year and 2.6% in 2016. The increase in employment will enable the unemployment rate to continue shrinking at an even greater pace than in 2014, to stand at around 20% of the labour force in the fourth quarter of 2016.
Matching these expectations by working together is the best way to strengthen people’s 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  confidence in the European project, the euro and the ECB. Jean Monnet once said that “everyone is ambitious, the question is if one is ambitious to be or ambitious to do”. I can assure you that the ECB is ambitious to do, and to play its part in accordance with its mandate. Thank you for your attention. I am now available for your questions. 1 See Spring 2013 Standard Eurobarometer survey (EB 79) and Spring 2019 Standard Eurobarometer survey (EB  91). 2 See “The evolution of the ECB’s accountability practices during the crisis”, Economic Bulletin, Issue 5, ECB,  2018. 3 See, for example, the Single Code of Conduct for high-level officials adopted by the ECB in 2019, which includes  the obligation to publish monthly appointment calendars. 4 All the reports are published on the European Parliament’s website. 5 See the ECB’s website. 6 See the ECB’s website. 7 See G7 Working Group on Stablecoins, Investigating the impact of global stablecoins. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches

In time, there may emerge greater differentiation between VBI and non-VBI institutions which will be better understood by shareholders, fund providers and financial markets more generally. Furthermore, the more comprehensive and holistic approach of VBI in advancing the good for society could prove to be a key competitive advantage that will influence and shape the future of the financial industry. The drive for positive changes in the Islamic financial services industry however requires a major paradigm shift in many institutions. It takes a long view to recognise returns beyond financial profits where social and environmental gains are also highly valued. It will also take increasing professionalism and high quality talent that will contribute to this transformation of mind and culture. In Malaysia, we can readily leverage on the available Islamic finance talent development ecosystem, which has a comprehensive and diversified range of offerings, spanning tertiary and professional education, research, training and consultancy services which are globallyrecognised. The implementation of VBI has already galvanised many stakeholders including institutions of higher learning such as the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) and International Shariah Research Academy (ISRA) to undertake impactful applied research that advances the implementation progress of VBI by the financial industry. Indeed, Islamic finance has greatly benefited through these institutions that have contributed towards enlarging the pool of Islamic finance professionals and deepening expertise through various programmes and initiatives. At the same time, these institutions have also grown in recognition.
Table 3: Top 20 UK industries by PCI and share of employment Reinsurance  0.01%  Fund management activities  0.16%  Television programming and broadcasting activities  0.08%  Trusts, funds and similar financial entities  0.03%  Motion picture, video & television programme activities  0.34%  Sound recording and music publishing activities  0.03%  Legal activities  1.09%  Translation and interpretation activities  0.02%  Software publishing  0.04%  Creative, arts and entertainment activities  0.32%  Activities auxiliary to financial services, except insurance and pension funding  0.66%  42  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  42  Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing activities  0.35%  Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy  1.29%  Advertising  0.42%  Computer programming, consultancy and related activities  2.43%  Leasing of intellectual property and similar products, except copyrighted works  0.01%  Market research and public opinion polling  0.14%  Organisation of conventions and trade shows  0.08%  Higher education  1.61%  Sources: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES). Notes: Dates for 2017. Only industries with 1000+ employees included in table. These are partial, though informative, pieces of micro-level evidence, though no substitute for an economy-wide digital twin. This could be used as a general equilibrium test-bed for formulating, and  evaluating the impact, of industrial strategy interventions, nationally and locally.

54  Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) for international comparisons and Mealy, Farmer and Teytelboym (2019) for regional comparisons. 39  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  39  Chart 24: Local authority-level ECIs and hourly earnings Hourly earnings, £ per hour  35  R² = 0.4466 30  25  20  15  -0.1  -0.05  0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2  10 0.25  ECI Sources: ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), ONS Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) and Bank calculations. Notes: Data available for Great Britain only (i.e. excluding Northern Ireland). Mean hourly earnings excluding overtime against economic complexity indices calculated using BRES. Chart 25 plots a cartogram of local authority level ECIs for the UK, at the NUTS 3 level. It shows a remarkable degree of difference across areas of the UK. This matches regional differences in income and pay. These metrics could help when designing the Local Industrial Strategies currently being developed by Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and the devolved nations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Table 1: Top 10 local authorities by ECI City of London  Camden  Tower Hamlets  Hammersmith & Fulham  Southwark  Kensington & Chelsea  Westminster  Hackney  Islington  Cambridge  Sources: ONS Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) and Bank calculations.
BIS Review 3/1998  -2-  In the end we know that demand has to be brought back under control. The choice typically is not whether or not to tighten policy but whether to tighten sooner or later; and there is a strong presumption that by tightening sooner - before excess demand really takes hold - we will need to tighten less - to moderate the pace of growth of demand rather than bring it to a shuddering halt or even send it in reverse. Too often in the past the mistake has been to tighten policy too little and too late, contributing to an exaggerated, boom and bust, economic cycle and thereby encouraging an unduly short-term approach to both financial and physical investment. So in trying to maintain effective price stability, in trying consistently to achieve the Government’s inflation target, of 2½% for underlying retail price inflation, what we are really trying to do is to achieve economic stability in the much wider sense of ensuring that aggregate demand grows in line with our productive potential. If we are successful in that, then the financial and business communities will become more confident of making longer-term decisions, and in that way we can contribute indirectly to improving the underlying supply-side of the economy. This objective is now very widely understood and accepted. But it is, of course, much more easily said than done. Since the recession of the early 1990s we have in fact been reasonably successful in maintaining this broader economic stability in this country.

Whatever they decide more widely, it is clear in my view that, for a number of reasons, including the cyclical differences between our situation and that on the Continent, we cannot now be confident that this country could live reasonably comfortably with a single European interest rate. That is why I welcomed the Government’s decision last October to exercise, for the time being, our opt-out, but to plan the technical preparation for our future participation, when we are more confident that sustainable convergence has indeed been achieved. BIS Review 3/1998