samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
  How has the last global financial and economical crisis impacted the Albanian economy, the regional economy and more priority the convergence process?   Can we afford it? All these are very important issues on which I think we should stop and study in deep. They are subject of research work, whose findings shall light the orientation of economic and structural reforms. Given that, the Bank of Albania has joint the forces with the University of Oxford to carry out a scientific research dedicated to the finding of the answers for the above questions and other similar. Answers to these fundamental issues benefit not only Albania and its regional partners, but also the EU and its political and economical structures. I am confident that the European Commission may exploit the outcomes of these scientific researches to build up new anchors, as economic and political incentives in order to increase the efficiency of all regional sources. These studies shall help us to better see that: What and how should be done to return EU, its Pre-adhering Economic Programs and Fiscal Economic Programs into stronger external anchors for the national and regional policies. However, it is important to realise that international restrictions can not support the long-term sustainable prosperity in absence of internal anchors. BIS Review 117/2010  3  Obligations that may be imposed from Brussels or from other international organisations are indispensable as long the internal anchors are fragile.

Given a small-sized and open economy, the increase and stability of exports is of outmost importance. Therefore, the research work, the reforms and the strategic decisions should be adopted in line with this target. In this respect, the role of banking systems acquires a particular importance, which should carefully identify the primary and profitable sectors and should provide their ongoing financing. Banking credit has been and remains one of the main instruments which shall provide the sustainable performance of the economic and financial activity at home. For this strategy to be successful, it must include as one of its substantial constituents the philosophy and priorities of the Western Balkan regional development. This need does not only derive upon the competition requirements and the achieving of the economy of scale, but also upon our common target for the European integration. During the recent years, I have continuously highlighted that the key of the successful integration in the European Union is the regional cooperation. There are many reasons backing the conclusion that our models of growth must be seen as complementary and not competitive to each-other. It is indispensable that the complete process of structural reforms takes place quickly and in a coordinated way, which precedes the membership to the European Union. Only in this way the whole region will converge naturally, avoiding episodes of misbalances within the bosom of the European family upon the membership. This will be a real contribution to the long-term sustainability of the European developments.
This reflects a number of developments. First, the influx of workers from abroad, including from the European Union accession countries. The precise figures are very uncertain, not least because people come and go a lot, but recent research 4 estimates that 2005 probably saw the largest ever entry of foreign workers to the UK, totalling around 400,000 – equivalent to around 1.5% of total employment (although outflows have probably risen, too). In addition, older workers are increasingly likely to stay in work – people above pensionable age accounted for a quarter of the growth in the work force over the past year; and Government policies are encouraging people on benefit back into work. The result has been that the labour force participation rate, the number of people in work and the number who are unemployed have all been rising at the same time – a fairly unusual combination. A faster growing labour force potentially raises the amount the economy can produce. Rather like raising the economy’s speed limit, it implies that it can grow faster without hitting supply constraints and generating inflationary pressure. That may be the situation right now. In any event, putting all this together with the impact of energy-related price movements, I do not read the fact that inflation is currently above target as convincing evidence that the economy is overheating. 4  “Foreign labour in the United Kingdom: current patterns and trends”, John Salt and Jane Millar, Labour Market Trends, Office for National Statistics, October 2006.

Public finances were hit hard when the banking sector had to be rescued in the wake of a bursting housing bubble, in which housing prices and bank lending had chased each other’s tails to form an unsustainable spiral. This was why these countries quickly encountered major problems in managing the growth of their sovereign debts, despite their relatively good position at the outset. An excessive build-up of debt – irrespective of whether it takes place in the private or the public sector – leads to problems sooner or later. Events in the euro area in recent years provide a frightening illustration of this. It is clear that the euro area is facing major challenges, not only for individual countries but for the EMU as a whole. The ECB, the EU and the IMF have implemented a range of support measures to come to terms with the acute problems. A number of new decisions and measures have also been announced within the EMU over the course of the year. However, it is important to point out that responsibility for managing these problems primarily lies with the politicians in the respective countries. Decisions are required at the national level, not only to resolve the problem of weak public finances but also to improve competitiveness (see Figure 6).
Svein Gjedrem: Ten years of inflation targeting strategy in Poland compared with the experience of other countries Presentation by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the conference "20 years after the collapse of the socialist economy. Transformation, economic growth and convergence in Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries ", National Bank of Poland, Warsaw, 5 June 2009. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to speak at your conference. It is a pleasure for me to be here in Warsaw on this occasion. Norges Bank was given an inflation targeting mandate in 2001. Inflation expectations have been well anchored around the 2.5 per cent target rate in recent years. We practice flexible inflation targeting. The credibility of our inflation target has enabled monetary policy to support a stable economic growth path. However, like other countries, Norway was hit by the international economic downturn that followed the financial crisis. The estimated growth rate for 2009 is minus one percent. Preceding the downturn, we went through a long period of low CPI inflation. Headline CPI in Norway is strongly affected by fluctuating energy prices. An inflation measure that instead includes trend energy prices, CPIXE, illustrates how the inflation rate gradually has been approaching our target of 2.5 per cent. In this – until the fall of 2008 – rather benign macroeconomic environment, rising property prices, high credit growth and a low saving ratio posed a policy challenge – as in many countries.

We still try to have a long-term perspective, and we will carefully consider the effects of measures already taken as we move along. Even with monetary policy able to counteract cyclical fluctuations to some extent, there is a limit to how much the one tool at the central bank’s disposal – the key policy rate – can accomplish. Regulations need to underpin the robustness of the financial system with respect to cyclical fluctuations. Supply side policy needs to support the capacity of the economy to absorb asset price fluctuations. BIS Review 69/2009  1  As for regulatory reform of the financial sector, I believe we both need to reconsider the structural elements and we need some new discretionary features. In order to limit excessive credit growth, the leverage ratio of banks should be contained, with higher capital requirements. The procyclical effects of such capital requirements need to be addressed. Since profits fall during a recession, capital requirements then tend to be more binding, reducing credit availability when it is most needed. The work aimed at changing the procyclical effects of capital requirements is still in its infancy. Banks’ incentives to increase loan provisions during upturns could be strengthened. This would smooth profits and hence make capital requirements less procyclical. Ideally, loan provisions should internalise some of the cyclical risk by being based on longer term risk assessments. In addition, one could reduce the procyclical effects of capital requirements more directly by making the capital requirements themselves more flexible over the cycle.
The Federal Reserve Act limits the types of securities the Federal Reserve may purchase in its OMOs, and under its Authorization for Domestic OMOs the FOMC only authorizes transactions in us government securities, which includes Treasury and agency securities.1 The staffs that have direct responsibility for executing OMOs are known as “the Desk.” Until late 2008, the primary role of the Desk was to influence the daily federal funds rate by adjusting the aggregate level of reserves in the banking system through transactions in Treasury securities arranged with designated primary dealers–counterparties operating in the  1  For the full Domestic Authorization, see the minutes for the first FOMC meeting of each year. The minutes for the January 2012 FOMC meeting are as follows: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/ fomcminutes20120125.htm. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  government securities market. OMOs typically employ an auction format to ensure competitive bidding and are structured in a manner that minimizes disruptions to market functioning. The Markets Group has several other critical transactional responsibilities as well. It is responsible for lender of last resort activities in the New York Federal Reserve District, operating the discount window as a source of short-term loans for banks in sound financial condition but otherwise in need of funding. As fiscal agent of the U.S. Treasury, the Markets Group plays a role in conducting Treasury auctions and facilitates payments and other financial services for the Treasury. The Markets Group also provides important payment, custody and investment services for the dollar holdings of foreign central banks and international institutions.

at the time the Federal Law on Currency and Payment Instruments enters into force. If the revision of the Constitution is approved, it will become effective immediately, which means that the SNB will be able to transfer its excess reserves as soon as the implementing bills will be ready. Should the revision of the Constitution fail to pass, the excess reserves would remain on the SNB’s books, and the Bank would then have the responsibility of managing them with the objective of generating more profit for the government. Nothing fundamental would change as far as the possible selling of gold is concerned : gold sales would remain on the agenda. With regard to the sale of gold, the essential element is thus that the Federal Law on Currency and Payment Instruments be passed. The amendment to the Constitution is only important to the extent that it determines where the excess reserves will be administered. 4. Perspectives for the SNB’s gold policy Ladies and gentlemen, I have been talking to you for twenty minutes now without actually giving you an idea what the SNB will concretely do. Given the political uncertainty which still exists regarding the process of demonetisation of gold and the transfer of excess reserves, you will understand that this is neither the time nor the place to set out a sales programme.
A greater “meeting of the minds” is warranted especially now that the New Basel Accord includes explicit disclosure requirements intended to promote greater insight into a bank’s risk profile. Likewise, the Basel Committee’s treatment of provisions and the valuation of financial instruments must keep pace with changes in the relevant accounting standards. These and other topics constitute areas where supervisors and the accounting profession must continue to work toward convergence. The members of the Committee believe that market discipline, and hence financial stability, is strengthened when accounting and disclosure requirements reflect sound risk management principles and are consistent with the control practices that banks adopt. Consequently, we recognise our responsibility to participate actively in the development of national and international accounting standards. I must confess that, in Spain, part of this  4  BIS Review 42/2003  responsibility is perhaps a bit easier for me than for some of my fellow members of the Committee, since the Bank of Spain is not just a bank regulator, but also the national accounting authority for banks. Where the development of international standards is concerned, the Committee and its member organisations devote considerable resources and our staff’s time to share our perspectives as supervisors with those who make the rules. But the discussions between supervisors and accountants cannot be a one-way street.

Such a basis will also provide legal clarity regarding the necessary access to EUwide macro-prudential information as well as to supervisory data concerning individual institutions, subject to adequate confidentiality arrangements. The next steps towards the implementation of the de Larosière Group proposals will require a number of legal, institutional and organisational issues to be addressed. In this regard, the ECB stands ready to contribute to the necessary preparations in a constructive and timely manner. We look forward to the communication from the European Commission and the decision of the European Council in June that will lay the foundations of a new system of macro-prudential supervision in the EU. Speedy progress towards that goal is of the essence, for the strengthening of macro-prudential supervision in Europe is an important and urgent policy objective – and one which the members of this Committee have strongly supported in a consistent and, indeed, visionary manner. *** Madam Chair, honourable members of the Committee, I would like to thank you on behalf of the Executive Board and the Governing Council for our enriching exchanges of views over the past five years. Owing to the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament, today’s presentation of our Annual Report is the last before your Committee in its current composition. I have always appreciated your cooperation and our fruitful dialogue. Thank you for your attention. I am now at your disposal for questions. BIS Review 49/2009  5
On that basis, it was possible to build a whole architecture of asset prices, whose relative riskiness is determined according to the intrinsic characteristics of assets and investors’ risk appetite. The important word here is “relative”. To price financial assets, markets need a basis – a risk free rate. That basis has now been shaken. Immediate consequences seem benign in the US. Markets have judged, and rightly so, in my view, that there is currently no alternative to US debt as the most liquid market and it remains the ultimate benchmark for assessing risk. So, if anything, the downgrade of US debt was followed by new inflows into Treasuries and a decrease in US interest rates across the yield curve. At the same time, however, a pervasive uncertainty has been created, which might be  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  responsible for the strong decline in confidence and equity prices that has occurred over the last weeks. In Europe, of course, sovereign credit risk has had more immediate and dramatic consequences, with an abrupt increase in sovereign spreads for peripheral countries following the July 21st statement. It remains difficult to foresee how, in the longer run, markets will assess debt sustainability in different countries and jurisdictions. That assessment depends on a complex process, where, together with economic fundamentals, subjective probabilities, self-fulfilling beliefs and other influences play a major role. The certainty that debt would be paid in full strongly anchored market perceptions in the past.

While markets are currently rewarding those countries which liquefy public debt, they seem to be aware of some inflation “tail risks” and hedge themselves through gold and the CHF – whose prices have reached historical highs. At this stage, therefore, the euro area is paying a double price. One for its mistakes and one for its virtues. The mistake, for governments, was to allow the piling up of debt through unsustainable fiscal policies over a decade, and then to create ex nihilo a doubt as to their ability to pay those debts. And we are also paying the price for our virtue and our refusal to liquefy our debt through massive monetization of our fiscal deficits. Will our virtue be rewarded at the end? I believe so and, to explain why, I need to take a longer-term perspective. In the next decade, the world will be divided into two: on the one hand, advanced economies, with high absorption capacity, low savings and high debt with ratios between 85% and 100%; and, on the other, emerging economies, with high savings, low debt (around 30% GDP on average) and less absorption capacity. Our common prosperity will therefore depend on our ability to create stable channels and mechanisms of financial intermediation between those two parts of the world. That, in turn, will crucially depend on the existence of assets that can be considered safe stores of value.
I should emphasise, however, that the Eurosystem projections are built on the assumptions that the sanctions against Russia will remain in place over the full projection horizon, that the intense phase of the war will continue until the end of the year with no further escalation, that disruptions to energy supplies will not lead to rationing in euro area countries, and that supply bottlenecks will gradually be resolved by the end of 2023. 1  The reduction owed to the fall in both the services sector component (down 2.4 points to 50.6, a 15-month low) and the manufacturing PMI (down 3.2 points to 46.1, the second consecutive month in contraction). 1  However, a prolongation of the war in Ukraine remains a significant downside risk for growth, particularly if energy supplies from Russia are suspended and result in rationing for firms and households. Likewise, the war could also further dampen confidence and aggravate supply-side constraints, while energy and food prices could remain persistently higher than expected. A faster deceleration in global growth would also pose a risk to the euro area outlook. Indeed, given the high uncertainty surrounding the outlook, the June projections are complemented by a downside scenario that reflects the possibility of a severe disruption to European energy supplies, leading to further increases in energy prices and production cuts.

At the same time, economic activity continues to benefit from the reopening of the economy (which is underpinning spending on services, in particular in the tourism sector), a strong labour market, the support of the savings built up by households during the pandemic and fiscal policy support both at the national and European level thanks to the implementation of NGEU-funded projects. Against this backdrop, the Eurosystem projections published in June envisaged real GDP growth of 2.8% in 2022 (albeit with 2 percentage points (pp) relating to carry-over from 2021) and 2.1% in both 2023 and 2024. These projections represented a further downward revision. For instance, compared with the December 2021 projections, the GDP growth forecasts for 2022 and 2023 were down by 1.4 pp and 0.8 pp, respectively. Meanwhile, last week saw the publication of the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) for the third quarter of 2022, conducted in early July. The results show a fresh downward revision of real GDP growth expectations from the second quarter, down to 2.8% for 2022 and to 1.5% for 2023 (down 0.8 pp on the previous survey), followed by 1.8% for 2024.
To the extent this reflects improved credibility it implies less of a need for policy to respond to one-off hits to the price level. 17  Data from Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), updated from OECD and IMF sources. 18  The capacity of fixed-exchange rate systems to experience genuinely inflationary shocks – those that move wage and price inflation jointly – is also evident in Chart 2. The correlation between wage and price inflation was +0.6 during the classical Gold Standard; under inflation targeting it’s been -0.2. That may also reflect a more volatile environment for real wages shocks (i.e. to the terms of trade and productivity). Nor are floating exchange rates a guarantee of stable inflation: during the 1970s and 1980s, when there was no stable nominal target at all, this correlation rose to 0.9. But inflationary shocks appear better contained with a domestic inflation target than an exchange rate or commodity peg. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 13 Inflation more persistent under fixed exchange rates  Chart 14 UK inflation persistence fell after introduction of inflation targeting  1.6  Estimated coefficient in regression of UK inflation on lagged inflation, 20 year rolling window Consumption deflator  1.2  GDP deflator  0.8 0.4 0.0 1962  1972  1982  1992  2002  2012  Source: Bordo and Eichengreen (1999), IMF and OECD. Note: Blue shaded area represents +/- 2SD around diamond central estimate of a panel regression; sample 1960-2010. Source: ONS and Hills, Thomas, Dimsdale (2010).

In practice people may take time to react to real income shocks; it’s also possible they expect some of the recent declines in energy prices to be reversed 10. But, in the data, there’s no correlation between household saving rates and changes in real energy prices, either here or elsewhere in the OECD 11. This suggests their effects on income are in general matched by equivalent shifts in real spending. Note that the UK is not the only place where consumer confidence has risen in recent months (Chart 10). 9  This point was made in a recent speech by the Governor (Carney (2015)) and, in an article, by Kristin Forbes (2015). 10  Forward markets discount an oil price of $ at the end of next year, quite a bit higher than the current spot price though still well below where it was in mid-2014 $ and $ respectively). 11  In regressions of changes in saving rates on the contribution to real income growth of energy and food prices, the estimated coefficient is close to zero and statistically insignificant in all 17 OECD countries for which we have data. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  Nor is it unusual to see stronger demand at a time when these survey measures of household inflation expectations are falling. Typically, these near-term expectations surveys track actual inflation 12.