samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  Chart 9: Hurdle rates for UK businesses remain high Percentage of respondents 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 <5%  5%-10%  10%-15%  15%-20%  20%+  Source: Bank of England Finance and Investment Decisions Survey, as reported in Levina, I., Melolinna, M., Saleheen, J., and Tatomir, S. (2017), ‘The financial system and productive investment: new survey evidence’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 57, No. 1, available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2017/q1/q1pre.pdf. Chart 10: Diffusion of productivity stalling? GVA per worker, £ Total Frontier Firms Laggard Firms  30  25  20  15  10  5  0 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  Sources: ONS Research Database and Bank calculations. See Productivity puzzles - speech by Andy Haldane at the London School of Economics, 20 March 2017, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech968.pdf. 11  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  11  Chart 11: Investment intentions picking up globally Standard deviations from mean (2002-2017) 2 UK  US 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017  Sources: BCC, CBI, CIPS, Business Roundtable CEO Survey and Bank of England.

9  4  Identifying the effect of increased uncertainty is complicated by the fact that it is usually accompanied by a tightening in financial conditions. In this regard, the pickup in uncertainty following the referendum on EU membership in the UK was unusual, as financial conditions eased, helped by a series of monetary and macro-financial policy measures taken by the Bank of England. 5 ‘Uncertainty, the economy and policy’, speech given by Mark Carney, 30 June 2016, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech915.pdf. 6 For individual firms, the standard variation of annual earnings was around 30 percentage points in the period before the crisis. See ‘Uncertain times’, speech by Ben Broadbent at the Wall Street Journal, 5 October 2016, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/speech929.pdf. 7 For example, estimates by the Bank for International Settlements suggest that between 1990 and 2016, the investment rate in fixed assets declined from around 8% to 3½% of total assets, while the investment rate in intangible assets increased from around 7% in 1990 to 10% in 2016. 8 Various papers find evidence that intangibles investment is less responsive to changes in demand than investment in fixed assets. For example, Masayuki (2015) estimates an accelerator-type investment model, where growth of the firm’s sales is included as regressor, together with a measure of cash flow. The estimated “accelerator” coefficient is small and not statistically significant for intangible investment, suggesting this effect might be absent.
Simon M Potter: Interest rate control during normalization Remarks by Mr Simon M Potter, Executive Vice President of the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the SIFMA Conference on Securities Financial Transactions, New York City, 7 October 2014. *  *  *  I would like to thank Josh Frost, Lorie Logan, and Matthew Raskin for their excellent assistance in the preparation of these remarks and colleagues in the Federal Reserve System for numerous insightful comments and suggestions. Thank you, Rob. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this important event. Securities financing markets are essential to the efficient functioning of the global financial system, and to the implementation of monetary policy in the United States and abroad. As you know, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) recently published a statement on its policy normalization principles and plans. Today I would like to talk about these principles, and more specifically, about how the Committee plans to raise and control shortterm interest rates when it becomes appropriate to do so. Obviously, these plans are of interest to the Open Market Trading Desk (the Desk) as we must implement the directives issued by the FOMC after each meeting, and I am responsible for reporting to the FOMC on the transactions made to meet its operating target. I’ll also review the overnight reverse repurchase agreement (ON RRP) operations that the Federal Reserve has been testing for the past year, and explain recent changes the Committee made to these operations.

They also have had to pay more attention to evaluating business opportunities by using more sophisticated risk/return analysis than they previously did, a strategy financial firms have been particularly aggressive in pursuing. What lessons might other countries thus draw from the US experience and what are the implications of the strong economic performance in the United States for other countries? One lesson seems clear. With the advances in technology, all countries that move toward more open and transparent markets stand to benefit from the universally available strides that have been made in information technology. I want to emphasize that the processes I am speaking about do not call for just onetime efforts. Quite the contrary. They demand ongoing attention and adaptation to new circumstances. Second, it is not just that productivity growth is being driven by technological advances. It is also a question of how these technological advances are applied. At the end of the day, I believe, the United States has had such strong economic performance because of the high degree of flexibility and adaptability that has been built into the US labor, product and financial markets over the past decade. BIS Review 29/2000  4  These lessons seem to be gaining a following, as many countries across the globe have begun to record substantial progress in liberalizing and deepening their capital markets, deregulating their state-owned enterprises, and easing existing labor market rigidities. In so doing, these countries position their economies to capture the manifold benefits technological advances allow them to enjoy.
Beyond the banking system relations, transparency is a serious obstacle in the establishment and operation of capital market in Albania. In this regard, I think that the Albanian business should be aware of the fact that transparency enhancement and increased formalization are in its long-term interest. Dear participants, Long-term visions are translated into success achieved through work and short-term sacrifices. The Bank of Albania invites you to foster the cooperation in resolving these problems of mutual interest. Thank you! 6  BIS Review 158/2009

*** The successful introduction of the euro represents one of the greatest achievements in modern European economic history and, in order to understand how it came to be that 11 European countries decided to relinquish their monetary sovereignty and adopt a common currency, one must first look back, at least briefly, over 50 years of European integration. The first concrete step towards achieving this goal was taken when the continent lay in ruin following the Second World War and six countries signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This Treaty not only led to the removal of barriers to trade and the creation of a “common market” in coal and steel products, but also transferred powers previously exercised by the Member States in the coal and steel sectors to a newly established and independent High Authority. This showed how economic integration could serve not only as a means of fostering increased trade and improving economic welfare, but also how it could act as a driving force behind greater political integration by increasing the interdependencies between the participating Member States. When, six years later, the same six countries signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), the same approach was extended to virtually all sectors of the economy with the explicit aim of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and a common market within which goods, capital and labour would circulate freely.
It also means allowing more dynamic structures to evolve within the organisation to support specific strategic business use cases, such as our cloud centre of excellence. In an era of disruption, efforts to reduce the complexity of financial products and services to the average person could become more challenging. A key reason for this is the dramatically increased access to financial solutions for people from every walk of life, whether they are suited for them or not. To reap the promise that such access brings of opportunities to reduce inequality and improve standards of living, it is imperative that individuals are sufficiently confident and capable of making wise financial decisions. This brings me to the fourth strategic priority of the Bank – which is building financial capability among the Malaysian public to navigate opportunities and risks in the changing financial landscape. It has long been our conviction that encouraging a population that is both financially and digitally literate is a necessary and vital condition to harness the full potential of fintech and contain its risks. To that end, the Government recently launched Malaysia’s National Strategy for Financial Literacy which includes a specific focus on helping consumers protect themselves against fraud and exploitation, and embrace innovation more confidently in the digital era. In the area of remittances, our work to improve conditions for the use of formal remittance channels by leveraging on technology, particularly by workers and small businesses across the country, has led to substantial reductions in the cost of remittances.

At the same time, we recognise that our digital goals and aspirations can only be achieved through the values and behaviours of staff that promote inclusivity (between those that have technological skills and those that don’t); accountability (that is, the effective and responsible use of technology); effective collaboration that breaks away from working in silos; and an appropriate level of risk-taking that is compatible with a more agile and responsive organisation. And so we have taken pains to be specific and deliberate in our approach to building a digital culture within the Bank. This starts with being clear across the organisation on our tolerance for higher risks associated with disruptive innovations – through the development and communication of our digital risk appetite. We are shifting conversations on new digital initiatives away from the technical solutions themselves, to a greater focus on the business process transformations that they are intended to serve, and that is what we measure and track. We are also investing heavily in equipping our people with the knowledge, skills and confidence to make sound judgment calls in an environment where the pace of change is occurring at a dizzying speed, and our ability to anticipate risks is likely to be more constrained. At a practical level, this means being more precise about escalation, decision and communication protocols, while allowing more flexibility in internal policies to allow business lines to respond swiftly to emerging situations.
Here the key issue is to avoid that rising long-term unemployment and structurally low investment create hysteresis effects. The second challenge is how to raise potential growth in a durable way. In line with my broad definition of potential growth, recent research has suggested that pre-crisis estimates may have been overstated by effects linked to the financial cycle.2 In other words, after incorporating information on the unsustainable developments in real interest rates, credit growth and property prices that characterised the 2003–08 period, potential output may have been lower than we thought. A return to the status quo ante may not therefore be enough to restore high levels of sustainable employment. These challenges are interrelated because, to the extent that we can achieve an upward shift in the future growth potential, it will affect growth expectations today. This might induce firms and households to frontload consumption and investment decisions, thus helping lower the risk of hysteresis effects. And vice versa, if there is no prospect of higher growth in the future, we could fall victim to self-fulfilling negative expectations. For this reason, I see policy action on both fronts as urgent. And there are three policy areas that I see as relevant: monetary policy; financial sector repair; and, most importantly, structural reforms. How can we raise potential growth? Monetary policy We know that monetary policy can help buy time for necessary structural measures to be implemented. Going beyond that, it may seem strange to include monetary policy in a discussion of potential growth.

We aim to achieve a return on the Fund which exceeds market returns by 25 basis points every year. Since inception, the excess return has been 31 basis points, a satisfactory result in our view. The chart shows our major investments in Spain. We more than doubled our holdings of Spanish public debt during 2010. The reason was partly increasing returns, which made these investments more attractive. By the end of 2010, the Fund owned stocks in 80 companies listed on Bolsa de Madrid. The total value of these investments was EUR 5.6 billion. That is on a par with the benchmark portfolio. That makes our Fund one of the largest financial investors in Spain. The fact that the Fund represents another country’s government makes it important for us to be transparent, regarding both our targets and aims and our modus operandi. The central point is the division between the government and the central bank. The government provides the rules, the central bank makes the concrete investment decision. Another is our mission to be a financial investor. We seek no strategic stakes. We do not sit on the executive boards. Thank you.
Two key pieces of legislation that were recently enacted to support these outcomes are the Credit Reporting Agencies Act 2010 and the Personal Data Protection Act 2010. The Credit Reporting Agencies Act 2010 governs the operations of private credit bureaus and provides for the development of a regulated and structured credit information sharing industry. The Personal Data Protection Act 2010 on the other hand regulates the collection, processing and handling of personal information for commercial purposes by data users and provides safeguards for the data subjects against the abuse of such information for improper or unauthorized purposes. The operationalisation of these laws are currently in progress and we look forward to a productive exchange of experience during the course of this workshop which will benefit our own efforts to build a conducive environment for the orderly development of private credit bureaus. Despite the compelling public benefits provided by credit registries, regulators face considerable challenges in educating consumers to appreciate how credit reports can help enhance their access to credit and improve the terms under which credit is provided. The role of regulators in public outreach is particularly important in the initial stages of building credit reporting systems to promote public confidence and wide participation. A common frustration that has emerged from the more pronounced emphasis on credit reports in lending decisions has been that access to credit increasingly depends on an individual’s credit history, and yet, one can only build a credit history if credit is granted.

I note with interest that the workshop will discuss potential solutions to this dilemma. It is important that as the credit reporting landscape continues to evolve and assume more prominent roles in influencing borrowing and lending behaviours, appropriate attention is paid to consumer education to mitigate consumer anxiety and ensure that consumers understand and can exercise their legitimate rights. As uncertainties continue to cloud the global economic outlook at a time when borrowers have become more financially literate, lenders have become more innovative, and financial products have evolved to become more sophisticated and intricate, the need for an effective and efficient financial infrastructure becomes increasingly more critical to ensure the prudent expansion of credit and risk taking. This workshop addresses a key part of that infrastructure that can contribute towards avoiding damaging effects of a financial crisis induced by credit excesses. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Before I end my remarks, allow me to say a few words about this magnificent building, Sasana Kijang. Designed to be a nexus for thought leadership and collaboration in central banking, “Sasana” is a Sanskrit word that describes a site, centre, building or arena where communities gather for meetings, while the Kijang is a small yet very intelligent animal that is depicted in Bank Negara Malaysia’s logo.
The challenge is to enhance efficiency and reduce costs, respond to market and regulatory demands and, most of all, gain competitive advantage through innovative products and services. Ladies and Gentlemen, The success of this IBBM-University of Nottingham collaboration will depend on the active involvement and support from the financial services industry. I therefore, encourage the industry to play a proactive role in supporting the activities organized by the Financial Services Research Forum. In concluding, I look forward to seeing greater collaborative efforts between the academia and the industry in research and development for the financial services industry. On this note, I am pleased to officially launch the collaboration between IBBM and the University of Nottingham , in the Financial Services Research Forum. Thank you. 2  BIS Review 63/2006

His second goal, however, was an example of the power of expectations in the modern theory of interest rates. Maradona ran 60 yards from inside his own half beating five players before placing the ball in the English goal. The truly remarkable thing, however, is that, Maradona ran virtually in a straight line. How can you beat five players by running in a straight line? The answer is that the English defenders reacted to what they expected Maradona to do. Because they expected Maradona to move either left or right, he was able to go straight on. Monetary policy works in a similar way. Market interest rates react to what the central bank is expected to do. In recent years the Bank of England and other central banks have experienced periods in which they have been able to influence the path of the economy without making large moves in official interest rates. They headed in a straight line for their goals. How was that possible? Because financial markets did not expect interest rates to remain constant. They expected that rates would move either up or down. Those expectations were sufficient – at times – to stabilise private spending while official interest rates in fact moved very little. An example of the Maradona theory of interest rates in action is shown in Chart 1.
Flexible inflation targeting builds a bridge between the long-term objective of monetary policy, which is to keep inflation on target and provide an anchor for inflation expectations, and the more short-term objective of stability in the real economy. Monetary policy influences the economy with long and variable lags. This means we must look ahead when setting interest rates. I would therefore like to comment briefly on some international developments that are important to the Norwegian economy and the assumptions concerning developments in Norway on which Norges Bank’s assessments are based. The developments I will be  BIS Review 79/2005  3  describing are based on the analysis in Inflation Report 3/05 and the Executive Board’s assessments following the monetary policy meeting at the beginning of November. Prospects for global growth are still favourable. Among many of our trading partners, economic policy is oriented towards increasing activity. This will to some extent counteract the dampening effect of high oil prices. Domestic demand among main trading partners such as the euro area and Sweden is expected to edge up somewhat next year. For our trading partners as a whole, economic growth is expected to increase somewhat from 2005 to 2006. In the years ahead GDP for an average of our trading partners is expected to grow by around 2½ per cent. Very high growth in demand for oil contributed to rising oil prices in 2004 and the first half of 2005.

10  BIS Review 44/2010  Nevertheless international policy cooperation has moved out of statutory bodies and into groups of a select few, bypassing established channels and fora. Other countries are called upon to contribute to efforts agreed by the G20. Policy action and global imbalances The large global imbalances that contributed to the current crisis are likely to widen anew, if they are not addressed effectively. This would again put at risk the stability of the global economy. Global and prompt policy action is therefore warranted yet again. To this end, the G20 has embarked upon an unprecedented exercise in policy collaboration with the IMF. Still, the G20 lacks the legitimacy that historically has been associated with a truly multilateral framework. Its ambitious economic cooperation should be anchored in a multilateral institution. The IMF is the logical choice. With G20 merging its activities with those of the IMF, both will attain wider acceptance and legitimacy. Success in the ambitious tasks of the G20 can only be welcomed by the rest of us. However, it is a weakness that the members of the G20 represent only themselves. Virtually entire groups of countries and regions are left out. They have no voice and no representation in the work of the G20 or in the institutions which it chooses to set up to further its agenda. This is at variance with the principles of multilateralism and international cooperation that have prevailed since the end of the Second World War.