samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As regards the challenge of moving to a more sustainable economy, the financial sector and the wider economy could be hurt by an inadequate or delayed response to the accelerated transition to a carbon-neutral economy. Allow me to illustrate my point with an example: the Banque de France conducted simulations based on macrofinancial scenarios prepared by the NGFS, which found that a delayed and disorderly transition would be far more damaging, costing up to 5.5% of French GDP by 2050. Given their lynchpin role in financing the economy, banks must continue to be resilient amid the twin transition. This is especially necessary in Europe where, unlike in the UK and US economies for example, bank loans are the main source of financing, accounting for approximately 70% of financing for euro area businesses, compared with around 40% in the United States. In saying this, I do not want to give the impression that banks are alone in providing financing to the economy. On the contrary, they need to harness the complementarities offered by market financing. The digital and green transition that lie ahead will require huge investment but also, and most importantly, innovation. On this front, the European Union (EU) lags Asia and the United States. Take the example of research and development (R&D) spending: in 2018, total public and private R&D expenditures in the EU were equivalent to 2.2% of GDP, compared with 4.5% for South Korea and 2.8% in the United States.

Durmuş Yilmaz: Press conference for the presentation of the Inflation Report Press conference by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the presentation of the Inflation Report, Ankara, 29 April 2010. *  *  *  Distinguished Guests and Members of the Press, Welcome to the press conference held to convey the main messages of the April 2010 Inflation Report, one of the most important communication tools of the inflation-targeting regime of the Central Bank. The report typically summarizes the economic framework addressed in monetary policy decisions, elaborates global and domestic macroeconomic developments and presents the medium-term inflation forecasts, which have been revised in view of previous quarter developments, along with the monetary policy stance. Before moving on to the Central Bank’s assessments on the inflation outlook and economic activity, which I will share with you in detail shortly, I would like to summarize the current global conditions. The recovery in global economic activity and the normalization of the international financial system have continued during the first quarter of 2010 (Figure 1). However, distressing levels of government debt, lingering problems across credit markets, and high levels of unemployment rates, all suggest that completely resolving problems across developed economies is not likely over the near term (Figure 2). Although the recovery across developing economies seems to be stronger, ongoing problems across developed economies – with their prominent role in global trade – still create downside risks for developing economies.
A point worth noting is that, if they continue, today’s higher market interest rates will have a direct impact on inflation from household interest expenditure, just as the recent years’ steeply falling interest rates had a sharp downward effect on inflation. In that case, the higher interest expenditure would pull CPI inflation upwards fairly rapidly towards the targeted rate and above inflation’s underlying rate (UNDIX). Monetary policy would then face the same situation, albeit in reverse, as on so many occasions in the recent past. An attempt to counter the tendency by tightening the monetary stance would accentuate the direct impact and add to the increase in CPI inflation. That is why it is inflation excluding transitory factors that is the focal point for monetary policy. Central issues for monetary policy in an upward phase About a fortnight ago the Executive Board of the Riksbank confirmed that the stronger growth can lead to increased price pressure. Monetary policy may accordingly need to be conducted in a less expansionary direction in the future. But the Board also emphasised that the Swedish economy is not yet in such a situation. The trade-off between inflation and growth is uncertain and earlier relationships therefore have to be tested in the light of new information. I consider that this conclusion still holds. When the Riksbank begins to talk of a less expansionary monetary stance, I can imagine it raises a number of questions. I should like to take this opportunity of discussing some of them.

It is not just total output that has exceeded expectations. The same applies to employment. In the first half of 1999 there were approximately 100,000 new jobs compared with the same period last year. Much of the increase occurred in the private sector. This has been accompanied by decreased unemployment, if one disregards the temporary seasonal upturn during the summer. However, the reduction of unemployment is less marked than the increase in employment because many people are returning to the labour market now that jobs are becoming available. Meanwhile, price increases have been moderate. The underlying rate of inflation (UNDIX, which measures inflation excluding interest expenditure, indirect taxes and subsidies) fluctuated during the spring between 12-month figures of 1.0 and 1.5%. Other indexes also point to low inflation, despite an increase in some commodity prices, oil in particular. Altogether, then, the Swedish economy is developing very well. We are now entering the seventh year of favourable economic growth – an average annual rate of about 3% – since the upturn in the summer of 1993. Today, moreover, there is no immediate threat to price stability. Market interest rates rising The better economic situation and expectations that inflationary pressure will be somewhat higher than before have caused a worldwide increase in market rates of interest. Sweden is no exception. During the summer the five-year T-bond rate, for example, has moved up just over 1.0 percentage point. Along with this increase, the spread between T-bond and other interest rates has widened.
This is not a large amount, of course, but a modest beginning can grow into something large, and it will be possible to step up the purchases when foreign currency inflows increase from current levels. The stability and subsequent appreciation of the króna have played a leading role in the recent disinflation episode, with inflation falling from 18% in early 2009 to 3.3% in October 2010. Excluding tax effects, inflation measures only 2.6%, which is very close to the Central Bank’s inflation target. Headline inflation now looks set to reach the inflation target by the end of this year. But the slack in the economy has also played a major role, as has cautious monetary policy relative to the circumstances. It is emphatically not a given that this progress should be made, and spare capacity in the economy does not produce price stability by itself, as innumerable examples illustrate, the most dramatic among them the runaway inflation in Germany’s Weimar Republic and, more recently, Zimbabwe. It was therefore necessary to achieve exchange rate stability and bring inflation expectations down towards the target. This could not have happened if the Central Bank had complied with the wishes of those who went furthest in demanding a sudden, steep, and untimely interest rate cut. But in spite of all  BIS Review 158/2010  1  this, interest rates have fallen significantly.

The court judgments and IMF review were  4  BIS Review 158/2010  in place by the MPC’s September meeting, however, and as a result, the substance of the September statement was different as regards the conditions for liberalisation. But it was conditions that had changed, not the policy. As the chart shows, developments in Government bond yields in August and September have a bubble like pattern that is often described as going down the stairs and coming up on the lift (or vice versa, if one considers price rather than yield). It is likely, then, that factors in addition to the MPC statements were at work here. These could include unusually large leveraged positions, the structure and effectiveness of the market, and a typical bubble phenomenon featuring extreme tension right before the bubble bursts. For its part, the Central Bank will investigate what happened and draw the appropriate lessons from it. But this could be useful for others as well. At all events, if market participants are interested in leveraged speculation on the duration of the capital controls, they are free to engage in it. But if they do, it is their choice and their responsibility. The removal of the capital controls is certainly further off than many observers thought earlier this fall, but a delay of several years is not in line with announced intentions.
With this objective in mind, how, concretely, can we make progress on Economic Union? There is an absolute prerequisite: the implementation of national reforms. Let me say, as an independent central banker, that the new French government, under Mr. Macron’s presidency, has already made decisive steps in that direction [slide]. A substantial labour market reform was approved last summer and has already been implemented. A forthcoming reform of vocational training and apprenticeship is expected next year. Moreover, measures have been taken to keep public deficits below the threshold of 3% of GDP. For the first time in 10 years, the government deficit should be below this threshold in 2017 (2.9%). Needless to say, these efforts have to be pursued in the future. Furthermore, in my view, we should also trigger four accelerators [slide]:  -  A macro accelerator: a collective economic strategy in the euro area. It is premised on one simple fact: economic growth and employment would be stronger in the euro area if we combined more reforms in countries where they are needed, like France or Italy, and more stimulus in countries with leeway for it, like Germany or the Netherlands. To achieve this collective economic strategy, euro area Member States have to seal a deal, which could be prepared and adopted as early as 2018. It could be supplemented by the creation of a Stabilisation Lending Instrument, aimed at supporting, through credits, Member States facing asymmetric shocks.

This could be part of a European Monetary Fund, provided that its scope of action is extended beyond the current European Stability Mechanism. -  A micro accelerator: i.e. a Financing Union for Investment and Innovation. The aim is to mobilise the EUR 350 billion savings surplus of the euro area, notably to shore up equity which is the key to an innovation economy, and also to foster synergies, thanks to an integrated steering mechanism, between the Juncker investment Plan, the Capital Markets Union and Banking Union. -  A fiscal accelerator, once we have increased trust between Member States and made headway towards greater economic convergence: the euro area budget could be used to  Page 6 sur 6 finance, for the benefit of all countries, certain “European common goods” such as digital technology, energy transition, security, and migration controls. -  An institutional accelerator: The fourth is not an accelerator in substance, but rather a “facilitator” for the first three. In terms of institutions, we would need first and foremost a euro area Finance Minister, President of the Eurogroup and member of the Commission, backed by a European Treasury; but also a euro area Parliament group, in order to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the institutions and decisions. But it only makes sense if we make progress on the substance: if not, it would be little more than mere window dressing. The latter two accelerators, fiscal and institutional, would require Treaty changes, unless they were to be very limited.
Øystein Børsum: Ownership and climate risk in the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) – on the tools for addressing climate risk in the fund Speech by Mr Øystein Børsum, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), Oslo, 21 December 2021. * * * Accompanying presentation:www.bis.org/review/r212312d_presentation.pdf Actual presentation may depart from the published text  Introduction Climate change is an issue that matters. Chart: Emissions must come down The global economy as it stands today is not sustainable. But it needs to be, and so emissions must come down. This is an issue for everyone – and not least the fund. With our broadly diversified, global portfolio and long-term horizon, in many ways we stand or fall with the global economy. Norges Bank is a financial investor. Our mission as the manager of the fund is to build and safeguard financial wealth for future generations. But the way we manage the fund can also have an impact beyond the purely financial, such as on the transition to a low-carbon economy. What our role should be – and what our work should involve – is what I will be discussing today. Back in the summer, an expert group delivered its report to the Ministry of Finance with recommendations for how climate risk should be addressed at the fund. Norges Bank has spent the autumn assessing these recommendations and how they might be implemented. This week, the Executive Board submitted its response to the Ministry.

As a result of the work I have been talking about today, Norges Bank expects to build up further detailed information on companies’ climate risk and climate plans. We will share this information with the Council on Ethics. Divestment and exclusion are the final link in our chain of tools, but far from the most important. We plan to be a driver for change, pushing companies to make the transition to net zero emissions. Active ownership is our most important tool. Conclusion Before I finish, I should also mention that we invest in companies that can contribute to climate solutions, both through the environment-related mandates and in the rest of our equity management. We are also now building up a portfolio of high-quality wind and solar power assets. The environment-related mandates were originally introduced in December 2009 and have brought positive learning effects in several parts of our organisation. As we wrote in our letter to the Ministry of Finance, we intend to draw more on the expertise of the managers of the environment-related mandates in other areas of our management. To sum up: Our ambition is to be a leader in responsible investment. Together with other large investors, we will contribute to the development of standards and methods for reporting. We will increase both the breadth and the depth of our dialogue with companies on climate issues, and we will use the full toolbox we have as an investor.
The financial crisis was a searing experience that damaged household and business confidence in a profound way – with a more lasting effect than the typical economic downturn. The housing bust created both a large housing supply overhang and a large number of households that were underwater on their mortgages. Households needed to repair their balance sheets and bring down their debt service burdens to more manageable levels. Higher levels of unemployment further depressed demand. Credit availability contracted. The tightening of credit standards occurred quite broadly – in housing credit, consumer credit cards and business lending. Some of the credit supply restrictions were imposed by banks that needed to repair their balance sheets, deleveraging by building up capital and working down their bad assets. Fiscal outlays were not high enough to compensate for the contractionary impulse from these first three sources. The crisis led to a significant deterioration in the U.S. federal budget deficit and put pressure on state and local budgets. After the federal budget deficit reached around 10 percent of GDP at the peak, fiscal consolidation occurred at the federal level, as well as at state and local levels, restraining economic activity instead of supporting growth. Productivity growth has also been quite low. In the period before the crisis (2003 to 2008), U.S. nonfarm productivity growth averaged 2 percent per year. Since 2010, productivity has been closer to 1 percent. While some of this decline can be explained by lower capital spending, the decline is difficult to fully explain.

The scale, pace and timing of any further increases in Bank Rate will reflect the Committee’s assessment of the economic outlook and inflationary pressures. The Committee will be particularly alert to indications of more persistent inflationary pressures, and will if necessary act forcefully in response. I’ll conclude by offering a few observations on this language from my perspective. First, by focusing on the ‘scale, pace and timing’ of further changes in Bank Rate, the statement clearly widens the discussion beyond the interest rate decision at the next meeting. In my view, this represents the desirable introduction of greater flexibility in our communication of the policy outlook relative to the previous language. It thus reflects the uncertainties we face, and the likelihood that we will have to take finely-balanced decisions over rates not just in August but also beyond that, in the face of two-sided risks to the economic outlook into next year. Second, by referring to ‘any further increases in Bank Rate’, the introduction of greater flexibility does not obscure that the next change in Bank Rate is more likely to be in one direction rather than another. We are talking about rate increases, not rate decreases. At the same time, the reference to ‘any’ increases allows for the possibility of remaining on hold, which helps to capture the potential breadth of opinions on the Committee: after all, we have seen votes to keep Bank Rate unchanged in recent meetings.
We dismantled the import barriers protecting our industries, which forced them to hold their own against global competition. We also had to overhaul our labour relations. We had inherited the adversarial style of labour-management relations from the British. Worse, the communists had infiltrated the unions and used them to foment unrest and chaos. After independence, with the Communists defeated, the government worked with the unions and employers to alter the nature of industrial relations. In 1968, we passed the Employment Act and the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, to vest the power to hire and fire clearly with employers. We replaced the old adversarial approach with a cooperative tripartite relationship based on trust and confidence. This was institutionalised in 1972 with the setting  BIS Review 19/2003  3  up of the National Wages Council. Since then we have enjoyed harmonious labour relations, a precious and unique advantage in attracting foreign investments to Singapore. Unlike other emerging Asian economies like Korea and Taiwan, we also opened the door fully to MNC investments. It was the fastest way for us to create jobs, penetrate overseas markets and bring in Western and Japanese technologies. Other countries in the region eventually followed, making Southeast Asia a major production location, which in turn benefited Singapore. These remaking and growth strategies succeeded, and brought full employment and steadily rising incomes. Over time, we moved into higher value-added activities. After two decades of robust growth, Singapore had transformed itself into a newly industrialised economy.

This led to the displacement of more than 25,000 people, loss of lives and significant economic damage. Last year, 53 weather disasters across the world racked up more than USD1 billion in economic losses 1. In fact, it is estimated that altogether, economic losses from natural disasters were more than a quarter of a trillion US dollars in 2020 2. These events are prompting a renewed determination around the world to achieve a new balance of economic, social and environmental progress. Indeed, the pandemic presents a once-in-ageneration opportunity to place sustainable development firmly at the core of recovery plans. To date, Governments of more than 120 countries have committed to “Net Zero” by mid-century or earlier. Among the countries are some of Malaysia’s major trading partners such as the EU, South Korea, Japan and China. Similarly, more and more companies are also adopting net zero targets. It is noteworthy that in 2020 – during the pandemic - such commitments by regions increased by ninefold, and threefold by corporates. This is significant. A fast growing number of countries have also introduced climate change legislation and carbon management programs. Global climate change laws are reported to have increased twenty-fold since 1997 across 164 countries, up from 99 countries just 6 years ago 3. Climate-related laws and frameworks are also being strengthened in many countries, in ways that could significantly alter the course of economic development going forward.
That’s part of the political discussion; that’s not for us to decide. Very finally, the Eurozone budget – which is an idea wanted by the French President, Emmanuel Macron – seems to face a lot of opposition. Do you think it’s a good idea? Is it necessary and what could overcome this opposition? It is not an easy discussion. It’s a fundamentally political discussion that’s about sharing money, that’s about sharing sovereignty. It’s good the discussion has started. It’s good that ministers and leaders are discussing ways to make the Eurozone more resilient and to make the Eurozone stronger. Given the amount of uncertainty that we see around us in the world, all of us in Europe, in the Eurozone, have a duty to make our system stronger. It’s good that that the discussion has started, finally. 3/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Even if it’s being delayed, even if it might not happen in this mandate of Emmanuel Macron? No one expects that discussion to be easy, so there is lower-hanging fruit such as completing the banking union. We would certainly hope that the capital markets union would feature more prominently on the agenda and also that the rules, the fiscal rules and the macroeconomic rules we’ve been working with, can be improved, can be made more credible. Fiscal union is not lowhanging fruit; it is difficult, it will take time, but it’s good that that discussion has started. 4/4  BIS central bankers' speeches

For instance, the low level of interest rates is still having a stimulating effect on the economy. Domestic demand continues to be supported by high immigration. In addition, the repercussions of the high Swiss franc value are not only negative. For example, imported preliminary products for companies and consumer goods for households have become cheaper. Finally, Swiss firms and their employees have made huge efforts to deal with this difficult situation. Overall, the SNB expects moderate economic growth of close to 1% for the year 2012. This modest economic momentum is likely to be reflected in a moderate increase in unemployment over the course of the next few quarters. The expected economic activity is lower than would be the case for normal capacity utilisation. This means there will be no inflationary pressure from this source. Our conditional inflation forecast of mid-March 2012 shows that there is no risk of inflation in Switzerland in the foreseeable future. The forecast also makes it clear that the threat of a deflationary trend has been kept in check. Inflation rates are only temporarily negative. Nevertheless, the monetary policy challenges for the SNB remain very considerable. I would now like to go into a little more detail on our reflections on monetary policy, particularly with respect to the minimum exchange rate. Reflections on Swiss monetary policy After being announced on 6 September 2011, the minimum exchange rate was rapidly attained. When our press release was issued, at exactly 10 am, the euro was trading at a little over CHF 1.12.