samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For example, precious metals such as gold and silver have high intrinsic value and they have been used as money for thousands of years. In modern times, fiat money has no intrinsic value other than (b) the fact that it is the liability of the issuing central bank. The track record in maintaining the value, or purchasing power, of the fiat money varies considerably over time and in different jurisdictions. Moreover, balances in commercial banks are also widely used as money in modern societies. Unit of account: This is also an important attribute or function of money. Money must (c) be accepted as a standard measure of value or price of goods, services, assets, liabilities, income, expenses, profits and losses, in addition to serving effectively as a store of value and medium of exchange. 3. While these three attributes define what money is, I would like to add the concept of “moneyness” to the formula. This concept is important because over many centuries of evolution, we have witnessed major shifts in the use of different and new instruments as “money”. In the last century or so, there has been explosive improvement in the ease, speed, cost and safety of keeping and transferring money. But there is always a question of relativity. There are many commodities, such as diamonds and gold, that command high value over time and are readily traded in the open market. These commodities meet partially the three functions of money, but they score very poorly in the ease and cost of use.

Investor protection or market integrity: As most of these crypto-assets are traded in unregulated platforms, usually via the internet, there are significant gaps in data collection and investor protection. Crypto-asset markets are therefore prone to (c) market manipulation, such as spoofing or flooding the market with fake orders to trick others into buying or selling. Moreover, the security or integrity of some of the trading platforms is also in doubt given the number of cyber incidents that have led to significant losses of the investors. 7. Having said all the above, I wish to conclude by making the following points: Crypto-assets are not money or currencies. So people wishing to invest or speculate (a) in crypto-assets should do so without harbouring the unrealistic expectation that they would one day become money or currencies that can be used as a means of exchange. Central banks must take extra care in making sure that the issuance of fiat (b) currencies is managed prudently in order not to diminish the purchasing power of the currencies or people’s confidence in them. Overseers of payment systems must take proactive steps to ensure that large value as well as small value retail payment systems, making use of commercial bank or central bank balances, are efficient, convenient and at low cost to the users. This is increasingly important as the public now expects and demands a faster and cheaper means of electronic payment or digital cash, as some would call it, for their day to (c) day transactions.
Notes: The chart shows average current accounts for the 57 largest economies over the decade 2006-2015 against each country’s share of services in total exports (the higher this share the more comparative advantage in services that country has). 22  Miroudot, S., Sauvage, J. and Shepherd, B. (2013), ‘Measuring the cost of international trade in services’, World Trade Review, Vol. 12, Issue 4, pp 719-35. 9  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  9  Chart 6: Goods and services components of current account balances  Source: WEO April 2017. Notes: Averages for 2011-2015. The G20 faces a choice – between levelling down by putting more restrictions on goods trade, or levelling up by liberalising trade in services. Evidence from within countries suggests that there may be substantial scope to increase trade in services if barriers are removed. For example, in Canada – one of the few countries to track trade flows within its borders – services account for around 50% of all inter-provincial trade compared with only 25% of Canada’s international exports. If Canada were able to replicate the pattern of trade within its borders with other countries then services exports would triple. Reducing restrictions on services trade to the same extent as those on goods have been over the past couple of decades could reduce the excess deficits of the US by one third and the UK by one half.

Since the crisis the G20 has agreed a series of new international minimum standards to secure the resilience of the banking sector, transform shadow-banking into resilient market-based finance, make derivatives markets safer and end too-big-to fail. Implementation is now being regularly assessed and transparently reported by the FSB and IMF. The playing field for cross-border activities is being levelled. At the same time, supervisory cooperation has intensified. Information is now readily shared through supervisory colleges. And regular crisis management groups for systemic firms are building confidence in how authorities will behave when things go wrong. In short, platforms are being created for deference to each other’s approaches when they achieve similar outcomes. With robust standards consistently applied, wholesale financial services could be brought more fully into bilateral trade agreements, keeping the global financial system open and resilient, and supporting greater trade, investment and innovation. Let me use a specific example of CCPs in London – although my points apply more generally and reciprocally to all critical cross-border financial market infrastructure in the UK and Europe. Prior to the crisis, derivative transactions created a complex, opaque – and dangerous – web of exposures that helped turn a shock into a panic. With the G20’s encouragement, CCPs are now helping to untangle this web and build resilience. Moreover, by netting exposures across counterparties, currencies and products; CCPs are supporting more liquid markets and are lowering costs to end users. That means more resilient financing and better risk management for business and households.
For the duration of the Guarantee this should reduce the risk that a long period of externally generated inflation leads to more persistent domestic price and wage pressures, although the MPC agreed that risk remained material. At the September MPC we also noted further signs of continuing strength of domestically generated inflation, that the labour market remains tight and domestic costs and price pressures including from businesses are elevated. Against that backdrop our initial assessment of the demand impact of the Energy Price Guarantee was that household spending was likely to be less weak than projected in the August report over the first two years of the forecast, and all else equal, relative to that forecast, it would add to inflationary pressures in the medium term. Since summer 2021, I’ve been highlighting my concerns about the build-up of inflationary risks[7]. A key consideration in my assessment of the risks that above target inflation persists is what happens to inflation expectations. I have already described how short term inflation expectations may be impacting on the immediate outlook for earnings. These could in turn feed through into prices given the high share of wages in costs, particularly in the services sector. And the same could happen if the current inflationary environment companies attempt to protect or increase their margins. Because shorter term measures of inflation expectations tend to move with actual inflation policymakers tend to focus on longer term measures.

In August UK CPI inflation was 9.9%, and a third of the total was directly accounted for by energy (Chart 1). The further indirect effects are likely to be material and have been a factor in the marked pickup in CPI services inflation to 5.9% in August, contributing over 2% to the total. Chart 1: Decompositions of headline inflation rates Contributions to annual consumer price inflation  Sources: ONS for the UK, BEA for the US, Eurostat for the EA and Bank calculations. The second noteworthy development is the trend in UK labour participation. This looks like being one of the most significant economic legacies of the pandemic. Around the turn of the year there were signs that the recovery in the economy was bringing people back in to the labour market; a version of the “encouraged worker” effect which is often seen during cyclical upturns. However these signs petered out, and by July 2022 there were about 500,000 fewer people classed as participating in the labour market than pre-pandemic. In this way the UK stands out compared with most other major economies; the UK participation rate is 0.7 percentage points lower than 2019 levels whereas the median OECD country participation rate is 0.7 percentage points higher[2] (Chart 2). Chart 2: Change in inactivity rate between 2019 and Q1 2022  Sources: OECD and Bank calculations. Notes: UK inactivity rates published by ONS typically use the age band 16-64, but 15-64 are used here for international consistency.
Eddie Yue: Opening remarks on regtech Opening remarks by Mr Eddie Yue, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the HKMA's "Unlocking the Power of Regtech" event, 30 June 2021. * * *  Introduction 1. Good morning, good afternoon and good evening everyone. A very warm welcome to all the participants of today’s event, “Unlocking the Power of Regtech”. 2. Just a few years ago, a virtual conference like this would have been a near impossibility. I am sure you would also remember the days of expensive international travel, but today, advances in technology have transformed our ability to communicate and share with others in every part of the world. Similarly, technology has also fundamentally revolutionised the way banking business is undertaken. HKMA’s banking technology goals 3. One of the HKMA’s key policy goals is to encourage the application of innovative technology in the banking industry. Our recently announced "Hong Kong Fintech 2025" strategy, which goes far beyond our Smart Banking Initiatives which were announced a few years back, is an ambitious plan for getting Hong Kong’s banking sector to embrace and adopt new technology and rise to a high level of sophistication. 4. And within that Fintech journey that we are promoting, Regtech constitutes an integral and important driver within our strategy. On that, we have developed a vision that by 2025, Hong Kong will become a leading hub for developing Regtech solutions and cultivating Regtech talents.

But they are using Regtech much less in their risk management and regulatory compliance activities, despite the many advantages that doing so could bring for them. 8. More generally, banks currently have little engagement with the wider Regtech ecosystem. We found that only 16% of banks are currently taking part in associations and industry 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  groups and only 33% of banks are partnering with Regtech firms. So this is an area that definitely needs more work. 9. Our second action is to raise Regtech awareness among banks – in particular their awareness of the benefits, applications and solutions associated with Regtech. 10. Our Regtech Adoption Index told us that a massive 86% of banks consider one of the top public sector activities in this space should be to enhance the engagement between the banking sector and the Regtech ecosystem. 11. And this is where today’s virtual event comes in! It brings together banks, regulators, Regtech providers, industry associations, and representatives from other parts of the Regtech ecosystem. We see this as a perfect opportunity for banks to learn more about the potential benefits of Regtech for their own operations and also for their customers. 12. As part of the efforts to raise awareness, the HKMA has also been publishing a series of Regtech Watch newsletters since November 2019. This series of articles outlines the benefits of Regtech through providing high-level sample use cases for areas like Cyber Risk, Credit Risk, AML/CFT, and also Conduct Management. 13.
As a representative of the French government, I negotiated the Maastricht Treaty with Horst Köhler, the current German President, who, like me, was then Undersecretary of the Treasury. Those were very important and inspiring negotiations, and we became friends. I am proud that the euro is as trustworthy as the Deutsche Mark used to be. The promise we made to our fellow citizens that the new currency would be as solid and credible as the best national currencies has been kept. FOCUS: What irritates you about Germany? Trichet: I deeply believe that the different European cultures complement each other. I was surprised at the beginning to see that any time a decision is taken in Germany, all the arguments against the decision are meticulously listed, even if that decision has already been agreed in principle. At first I was surprised, because in many other cultures, all the arguments that support your conclusion are given strongly preferential treatment. 4  BIS Review 7/2010  FOCUS: Is that wrong? Trichet: With time, I have seen that this German method is a good way of ruling out the possibility of serious mistakes. FOCUS: Has the fact that you have learnt German helped you? Trichet: It certainly has. At the ECB, we mostly talk in English. But in the corridors you’re just as likely to hear German, French, Italian or Spanish, and many other languages besides. Having some knowledge of the German language has enabled me to better understand the culture of the country.

We succeeded in avoiding deflation at the peak of the crisis. You can be sure that the needle in our compass will always point towards price stability. FOCUS: How quickly have you taken action during the crisis? Trichet: As I have said, alertness is of the essence. On 9 August 2007, for instance, ...  BIS Review 7/2010  1  FOCUS: ... just before the US real estate bubble burst ... Trichet: ... we were the first to diagnose that a major crisis was unfolding and supply additional liquidity to the money market. We did so because we had realised that something exceedingly dangerous was developing. FOCUS: Could the ECB really raise interest rates on its own – i.e. without the US Federal Reserve doing so as well? If the ECB were to take such action, the euro’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar would be sure to shoot upwards, causing European exports to collapse. And that is something nobody in Europe would want ... Trichet: I am convinced that the US authorities – both the central bank and the Treasury – consider that a strong dollar vis-à-vis the other major floating currencies is in the interests of the United States. Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner have made this very clear. FOCUS: Do you believe what those responsible in the United States are saying? The US economy is currently benefiting immensely from the cheap dollar. Trichet: I believe in the sincerity of the people I have just mentioned.
Regarding the first wave of crypto-assets which have been brought to the market, they are not a claim on any natural or legal entity, they do not have a guaranteed fixed exchange rate with the currency issued by the central bank and they rely extensively for their circulation on blockchain, a distributed ledger technology system using cryptographic techniques. A second wave might develop in the form of « stablecoin » with a potentially global reach, some of which sponsored by large technology or financial firms, whose distinctive feature, beyond their potentially large size and reach, is that they seek to stabilize their value by linking it to an asset or a pool of assets. What are the specific benefits of such blockchain-based initiatives? First, the blockchain technology and more broadly the DLT could help answer market’s needs and demands. There is in particular a strong demand for quick and safe cross-border payment solutions, available 24h/24, enabling smooth exchanges. There are a number of local instant payment solutions already in place in a number of countries in particular in Europe, available 24/7, settling retail payment orders up to 15 000 euros in less than 15 seconds. A i ns t 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  certain number of initiatives follow the European Payment Council SCTi ns t scheme. The Eurosystem has even launched its own service, under the name of TIPS to help ensure a panEuropean reach.

30.10.2018  Welcome address Banco de España-SUERF Conference “Financial Disintermediation and the Future of the Banking Sector” Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  Good morning. I would like to welcome you to the conference “Financial disintermediation and the future of the banking sector”, hosted by the Banco de España and co-organised with SUERF. Let me start by thanking our colleagues from SUERF for their participation and involvement in the conference. SUERF is a unique institution that has been very successful in creating an active network of academics, financial practitioners and policymakers for the analysis and discussion of monetary and financial issues. Its outreach is achieved through the organization of international events, such as today´s conference, publications and a very active sponsoring of research. It is well known that capital markets in Europe are less developed than in the United States. This is related to the more significant role played by banks in Europe for the provision of funding to firms than their US peers. To illustrate this, let me give you some figures. In 2017, the ratio of financing through fixed-income securities to total debt financing was 12% in the euro area versus 43% in the United States. Also, the ratio of equity market capitalisation over the domestic credit provided by banks to the private sector was almost four times larger in the United States than in the euro area at the end of 2016 according to the latest data provided by World Bank DataBank.
Additionally, in December 2011, the Eurosystem announced further enhanced credit support in the form of two repo operations with maturity of up to three years. There are indications that especially these three-year longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) have proven effective in preventing an abrupt deleveraging. They significantly helped in restoring confidence in financial markets by providing insurance on the ability for banks to rely on ECB liquidity. This has taken pressure off banks to fire-sell assets or to shrink their loan book. In fact, there is some evidence that banks who bid for liquidity at the three-year operations used this liquidity to address the roll-over risk implied by the issuance of debt securities or other funding instruments that will mature over the next few years. At the same time, there is some first evidence that the provision of long-term liquidity has helped in supporting credit provisions, especially in countries more affected by the sovereign debt crisis, therefore helping to address impairments in the transmission of monetary policy. The ECB has recently announced the details of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in secondary markets for sovereign bonds in the euro area in order to address severe distortions in government bond markets which in particular originate in unfounded fears on the part of investors of the reversibility of the euro. OMT also aims to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism in all countries of the euro area, thereby preserving the singleness of the ECB’s monetary policy.

In a nutshell, during this first phase of the crisis, the Eurosystem (1) more flexibly used its open market operations by changing the time-path of liquidity provision and employing fine-tuning operations, (2) lengthened the maturity structure of its open market operations (for instance, operations with a maturity of six months were introduced, whereas the maximum length had been three months before the crisis), and (3) coordinated with other central banks around the world to provide US Dollar funding.4 The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the subsequent very severe financial market tensions led the Eurosystem to adopt further measures. Official interest rates were cut by 325 basis points in just a few months to the then-historically low level of 1 per cent by March 2009. Open market operations were conducted as tenders with a fixed rate and full allotment. This implied that the ECB no longer controlled the aggregate supply of liquidity to the banking sector, but that the aggregate demand by banks, subject to individual banks’ availability of adequate collateral, determined total liquidity provision. As a consequence, the Eurosystem’s balance sheet increased, and short-term money market interest rates dropped to levels close to the deposit facility rate. Moreover, the ECB further widened the set of eligible collateral. Finally, and importantly, the ECB introduced a limited number of open market operations with maturities of one year (three such operations were conducted in 2009). The objectives behind this second wave of measures differed from the first wave.
This gives the central banks a strong role. Figure 7 Voting rights of the General Board  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Obviously, this requires efficient preparations for meetings. A Steering Committee with 14 members has therefore been established with the purpose of guiding the work to be presented to the General Board. The majority of the Steering Committee members represent the EU institutions and in addition there are four elected members from the national central banks. Two advisory committees have also been set up – the Advisory Technical Committee, chaired by Stefan Ingves of the Riksbank and the Advisory Scientific Committee chaired by Professor Martin Hellwig of the Max Planck Institute. The Advisory Technical Committee (ATC) mirrors the composition of the General Board with 62 members. The Advisory Scientific Committee (ASC) is smaller, consisting of only 15 academics and the chair of the ATC. I have been a member of the ESRB and the ATC at its first meetings Box 1 Steering Committee Members  ESRB Chair (ECB President) and first Vice-Chair  ECB Vice-President  Governors of 4 Central Banks  European Commission representative  Chairpersons of the three ESAs  President of the EFC  ATC Chair  ASC Chair The ESRB General Board held its inaugural meeting in January and has since met three times. It will meet again in December. The meetings were prepared by the Secretariat, the Steering Committee and the Advisory Technical Committee.

Out of this came the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), namely the European Banking Authority (EBA) in London, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in Paris. We discussed whether these three authorities could be merged into one, but that was considered premature. Suggesting such a merger might have delayed the whole political process (Figure 5). Trying to move the three to the same city was considered equally impossible. Figure 5 The EU’s new supervisory structure European Banking Authority (EBA) European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)  European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)  The second pillar was the European Systemic Risk Board, the ESRB. The main idea with the ESRB was to look beyond the supervision of individual institutions and focus on the risks relevant to the financial system as a whole. There was a widespread feeling that supervisors in many countries could not see the wood for the trees – and certainly not any woods in any other countries. So the new body should work with issues systemic to parts or to the whole of Europe. As time has passed, this task has become known as “macro-prudential supervision”. The institutional set-up of the ESRB Legally, the ESRB is an independent EU body located in Frankfurt and with a Secretariat provided by the European Central Bank. The President of the ECB is also the Chair of the ESRB. The ESRB has no binding powers.