samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In the years 2002 - 2003 the largest job destruction was reported in the UK, as a result of transferring manufacturing and services to India, and to a lesser degree to China and other Asian countries (a total of 44% of all jobs shifted in the period 2002 - 2003). However, at the same time, in 1/3 of all instances, companies from the old EU countries generally mentioned the Eastern Europe as the destination of off-shoring. In the years 2002 - 2003 a total of over 33,000 workplaces were shifted from the old EU countries to other countries, i.e. 16,500 on average in each of those two years. Among the present new EU Member States, Hungary and the Czech Republic enjoyed the greatest popularity, whereas Poland was mentioned only occasionally. In 2005 the process of off-shoring in Europe accelerated in the period from January to November, with 32,000 jobs shifted, i.e. nearly twice the average in the period 2002 - 2003. The leader among the  13  Eng. Business Process Outsourcing. 14  Eng. Knowledge Process Outsourcing. 15  European Restructuring Monitor is the European Commission information service. All publicly announced instances of company restructuring in the EU, Bulgaria and Romania, are collected if these fulfil the following requirements: employment reduction by at least 100 people per annum, must concern companies with at least 250 employees and the reduction applies to at least 10% of employment, or at least 100 jobs are created as a result of restructuring, as the case may be.

The previous regulation from 2001 stated: “In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account.” The formulation “extraordinary temporary disturbances” must be interpreted in its historical context. In inflation targeting’s early phase, exception clauses were normally included in the mandates to clarify that monetary policy should not contribute to unnecessary fluctuations in the real economy. After the change in 2018, the mandate reads: “[i]nflation targeting shall be forward-looking and flexible”. The specification “forward-looking” means that in its conduct of monetary policy Norges Bank shall disregard temporary disturbances that do not affect inflation further out and that an exception clause for extraordinary temporary disturbances was, in the Government’s view, no longer necessary. [5] The question of whether monetary policy should disregard imported inflation is related to the choice of price index for inflation targeting. This topic is also discussed in the economics literature (see literature review in Section 3.1 of Husabø (2017)). However, the literature is not fully unanimous about which price index the central bank should aim to stabilise. [6] Table 3.2 in Husabø (2017) shows the degree of covariance with activity for alternative price indices. [7] One difference is that average domestic inflation has run somewhat higher than CPI inflation, which might suggest that a target for domestic inflation could be set somewhat higher than the target for CPI inflation.
Moreover, there must be additional efforts to induce the entities in charge of clearing and settlement services to become more effective, as well as to popularize the use of electronic payment instruments, which will gradually reduce the use of paper instruments. The area of financial system regulation and organization will increasingly be focused on the following aspects: •  improvement of prudential rules and practices, aiming at maintaining the soundness of the financial system as a whole;  •  improvement of the analysis of several authorization processes related to financial institutions and alike;  •  creation and improvement of financial instruments and activities, including those intended to broaden and cheapen credit;  •  adoption of international standards and practices. Additionally, it is a priority to improve the regulation of mechanisms that broaden the population's access to the financial system, as in the case of “banking correspondents,” credit cooperatives, and credit concessions to small and micro firms. I would also like to acknowledge the employees of the Central Bank for their competence, “esprit de corps” and qualification. I have a human resources goal of qualifying and offering even more opportunities for this outstanding group of public servants. I thank President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and Minister Palocci for their confidence in myself.

At this juncture, the transparency of the process is fundamental through the detailed explanations of the actions and of the context in which the decisions were taken. Following the purposes of the inflation-targeting regime, the timely release of the Monetary Policy Committee minutes provides the public with the Committee’s view on the economy and its prospects, providing the rationale for the policy adopted by the Copom. (At the same time, contact with analysts from several segments of the public was enhanced by the creation, especially for this purpose, of an Institutional Communications Group, which allows a more efficient two-way communication through the use of surveys of expectations and other specific research.) The production of reports and the release of studies and research is also fundamental aiming at increasing the transparency of the Bank's activities to the public. In addition to the monthly bulletins and annual reports, other key reports are the Inflation Report, which deals with the inflation-targeting framework, the Financial Stability Report, which deals with the stability of the Brazilian Financial System, the Banking Economics and Credit Report, development of the Interest Rates and Banking Spread Project, the Working Papers Series and the Technical Notes Series of the Central Bank. Thus, the Central Bank will emphasize not only the improvement of statistics and models, but also its transparency and communication. For instance, the increase of information and data available to the public on the Central Bank website has been outstanding. More than eight thousand statistical series are already available, with increasingly easy access.
The average annual inflation marked 2.2 percent, equal to the value of the previous year, revealing the full elimination of the first round effects of the previous year increases in terms of raw material and electric prices. Fiscal policy persisted to be also expansionary during July, notwithstanding at more moderated paces. Budget revenues stood at the same rates of projection fulfilment with the previous months – accounting for 94 percent – while expenditure were met by 98 percent of the projected target, maintaining the same level with the three previous months. This effect provided advantage to the expansion of budget deficit in this period. As we have underscored even previously, the increase of both budget deficit and public expenditure does support the economic activity in terms of a low demand of the economy, but it also is accompanied by the increasing tendency of the public debt interest rates. The increasing review of public expenditures and budget deficit rate is forecasted to preserve this effect  BIS Review 122/2009  1  even during the remaining part of 2009, while a more balanced fiscal position for 2010 would reduce the pressures on monetary markets, by establishing more spaces for the rise of monetary stimulus. The external sector data regarding second quarter 2009 reveal a further reduction of the Albania trade exchanges with the rest of the world in annual terms. According to preliminary data, these development tendencies have persisted even during July 2009. Exports decreased by 17 percent relative to the same month of previous year.

In the same report, we assessed the capacity of the seven largest banking groups to absorb losses by measuring how large the losses would have to be over a three-year period before their capital base fell below the minimum requirement of 8 per cent. We based our assessment on the accounts for 2003 and assumed that banks do not raise new equity or supplementary capital, that the size and composition of the balance sheet does not change, and that the banks do not pay a dividend. In the first example, we assumed that banks have the same results as in 2003 in each of the three subsequent years. In the second example, we assumed a result before losses of zero for these three years. With the same result before losses as in 2003, the most solid of the seven largest bank conglomerates will have the capacity to absorb an average loss per year over a three-year period of 3.1 per cent of gross lending before the capital falls below the minimum requirement of 8 per cent. If the result before losses is zero in the three years, this group will have the capacity to absorb an average loss of 1.4 per cent of gross lending. The least solid of the seven banks will have the capacity to absorb average  BIS Review 39/2005  5  losses per year over a three-year period of 1.7 per cent and 0.8 per cent of gross lending, respectively, given these two assumptions concerning results.
Against this background, it should be stressed that notable headway has been made in recent years in correcting some of the imbalances that had built up in the Spanish economy during the expansion prior to the crisis. Contributing factors here, in addition to the more temporary factors I have just mentioned, were certain structural reforms introduced during the crisis. Of note, first, is the intense deleveraging, carried out by households and non-financial corporations. Specifically, the corporate debt/GDP ratio has fallen by 42 percentage points (pp) from mid-2010, when it peaked, to 2018 Q3, meaning that this indicator now stands some 2 pp below the related figure for the euro area. In the case of households, the process has been slower (partly on account of the greater average life of the debt incurred), but also very significant. Over the same period, households’ debt ratio fell by 25 pp and its level is but 3 pp above the related euro area figure. Accordingly, in both cases, the deleveraging 3/7  process is at a very advanced stage, although some heterogeneity is evident. In particular, in the two sectors, certain agents continue to face situations of high financial pressure as a result of debt incurred. In parallel, the banking sector has been subject to an intense process of clean-up, recapitalisation and restructuring. And in the past four and a half years its basic parameters – such as asset quality and profitability and solvency levels – have improved notably.

The reduction in the IIP to less vulnerable levels will require running current account surpluses for a prolonged period. The continuation and deepening of the gains in the economy’s competitiveness posted in recent years should, along with healthier public finances, contribute to entrenching a sustained path of external surpluses. Closely related to the foregoing point, the second factor of vulnerability of the Spanish economy is that arising from the imbalance in public finances. The sectoral breakdown of the net IIP shows how, since the onset of the crisis, the general government’s net liability position has increased notably, with the liabilities position of the monetary financial institutions and the rest of the resident sectors declining. Despite the considerable reduction in the budget deficit relative to GDP from its peak of 11% in 2009 to 23.1% in 2017, Spanish public finances continued to evidence a high level of structural deficit (estimated by the European Commission to be 3% of GDP, the highest in the euro area) and of public debt, which currently stands at around 98% of GDP. Against this backdrop, it is worth bearing in mind that maintaining a very high level of public debt over a prolonged period may not only hamper economic growth but also lessen the stabilising capacity of fiscal policy in the face of future recessions. Spain must therefore harness the current, favourable economic setting by launching a medium-term programme to reduce the vulnerabilities of its public finances and thus generate budgetary room for manoeuvre, enabling it to face future crises.
Looking ahead, the transition to a greener economy will entail a sharp reduction in aggregate energy dependence, from around 60% today to 10% in 2050 in a zero-emissions scenario. However, this same policy, as well as the digitalisation of the economy, will increase the EU's need to import so-called “critical raw materials”. These materials (such as rare earths, palladium or cobalt) are considered critical by the European Commission due to their economic importance, the difficulty in replacing them with other materials, the high import concentration and other supply-related risks. 5 For example, China controls about half of global rare earths mining capacity and 85% of the refining capacity. Russia is the EU’s main supplier of these raw materials (accounting for 18% of the total value of such imports in 2019). According to the European Commission, the demand for some of these critical raw materials could increase more than fivefold by 2030, which will cause the EU's external dependencies in this field to increase dramatically in the near future. A second vulnerability concerns export concentration. This is a key aspect for the European economy, which has historically maintained a strong trade surplus, and whose exports have compensated some of the recent large terms of trade loss stemming from high energy prices. In this regard, EU exports of various pharmaceutical and chemical products and some high-tech manufacturing goods are highly concentrated in the US and the UK, and are also characterised by relatively low domestic demand.

These vulnerabilities increase the sensitivity of the economy and of financial and real estate markets to adverse shocks. I would now like to outline the position of the two globally active banks, Credit Suisse and UBS. I will then present our assessment of the situation at the domestically focused banks. Page 1/3  Berne, 16 June 2022 Fritz Zurbrügg  News conference  Globally active banks The two globally active banks developed differently in terms of profitability. UBS’s profitability increased and was high by historical comparison. At Credit Suisse, however, profitability was negative. This is on the one hand due to extraordinary items, such as large provisions for litigation, and on the other to relatively low operating performance during the period under review. The differing profitability is also reflected in market indicators such as CDS premia and stock prices. After the Archegos losses, the market drew a stronger distinction between the two banks and it continues to have a more positive assessment of UBS than Credit Suisse. With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the market’s assessment of the globally active Swiss banks and their international peers deteriorated overall. By contrast, the capital position of both banks has improved further since the publication of the last Financial Stability Report. In the case of UBS, this improvement is attributable to a capital build-up due to retained earnings; in the case of Credit Suisse, it is attributable to a reduction in exposure and a capital increase.
Fiscal policy and the Government Petroleum Fund have proved to be effective in terms of sheltering the mainland economy from more normal variations in oil revenues. A permanent change in the krone exchange rate will occur only if there is an increase in the use of oil revenues through a shift in expenditure growth. In this context, instruments other than those available to Norges Bank must be used to return the krone to its initial range. BIS Review 14/2000  8  Interest rates influence the exchange rate through two channels. The interest rate differential against other currencies has some effect on the exchange rate. The exchange rate is further influenced via the impact of interest rates on domestic price and cost trends. The isolated effect of the interest rate differential on the exchange rate may be of little consequence compared with other factors. According to Norges Bank’s calculations, the current interest rate differential against the euro area impacts the krone exhange rate in the order of 20 øre against the euro in the short term. On the other hand, the effect of the interest rate on the exchange rate through the channel of domestic demand and price and wage inflation may in many situations be considerable. The Norwegian economy may be exposed to shocks or disturbances that both reduce domestic activity and weaken the Norwegian krone. In response, interest rates should not be increased. An increase in interest rates will result in higher unemployment and mounting instability in the domestic economy and the exchange rate.

This can also weigh on productivity as older workers may have a harder time adapting to new technologies. Another important demographic factor is increasing longevity which would also, for a given retirement age, increase savings. Lastly, inequalities – both on a global level and within countries – can also affect demand [slide 6]. Growing income inequality within countries – even if it remains significantly lower in 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  continental Europe – implies reduced relative spending power for low-income households, which have a high propensity to consume. More inclusive societies with fewer unemployed and more even income distribution would most likely result in more dynamic demand. 3. Are we witnessing a permanent slowdown in the pace of technological progress? The debate between techno-pessimists and techno-optimists over the future pace of innovation is well-known. It resulted from the slowdown in productivity and in the contribution of ICT to growth in the mid-2000s, even before the Great Recession. For the United States, there was a downward break in the productivity trend as early as 2006. In fact, the diffusion of technology can suffer from two types of lag: a time-lag, but also a spacelag. Time-lags refer to the delay in incorporating innovations efficiently into the production process, as the required structural adaptation of the economy and learning processes can take decades. What stage of diffusion are we at for ICTs? Have structures in individual firms evolved sufficiently to allow them to reap the full benefits of ICTs?
At such a time, it would be possible for established market access channels, via electronic trading platforms or phone links to the trading desks of the main currency trading firms, to be widely used – although there were some bottlenecks immediately after the announcement. By contrast, if we had announced the move at the weekend, for instance, this would have caused uncertainty about the trading conditions when the foreign exchange market opened on Sunday evening (Swiss time). Australia, which normally accounts for only around 1% of daily turnover in Swiss franc forex operations, would have been overwhelmed by the volume of trades during its business hours. You can easily imagine that the turbulence on the Australian market would have been far greater than that observed on the morning of 15 January, with contagion potentially spreading to the entire financial market. We wanted to avoid this. Monetary policy after the minimum exchange rate So what will the minimum exchange rate discontinuation mean for monetary policy in Switzerland? First, let me emphasise that the exit from the minimum exchange rate does not mean that we will simply be a passive observer of the foreign exchange market in future. The SNB will continue to take account of the exchange rate situation in formulating its monetary policy and will intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary in order to influence monetary conditions. Nonetheless, the end of the minimum exchange rate does mean that interest rate steering will once again take on a more prominent role.

On the other hand, reabsorbing this huge volume of liquidity once monetary policy began to normalise would have been very difficult and extremely costly. Communication and timing of the discontinuation The discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate took the financial markets by surprise and the price reactions on the foreign exchange and equity markets were correspondingly strong. In an age when transparency and openness in monetary policy matters are riding high, the decision to exit the minimum exchange rate policy so abruptly bewildered many observers. However, transparency is not an end in itself; it is part of monetary policy. Traditionally, monetary policy has been steered via short-term interest rates. These then feed through to exchange rates and long-term interest rates, thereby influencing – albeit with a time lag – the demand for goods and services and, ultimately, wages and prices in the economy. By communicating its intentions transparently and credibly, the SNB can influence expectations (e.g. on the financial markets), thereby rendering its monetary policy more effective. Fundamentally, we are keen to avoid surprising the economy and triggering major price movements on the financial markets with our monetary policy measures. In the context of conventional interest rate policy, it is thus advantageous to keep the gap between financial market participants’ expectations and the SNB’s actual interest rate adjustments within reasonable limits. Normally, therefore, there is no contradiction between the notion of transparent communication and our monetary policy intentions.