samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It seems to me that instead of eliminating bank intermediation, the competition exerted on banks by non-bank financial players and by tech companies, as well as banks’ reaction to this new competitive environment, will probably lead to a redistribution of the cards of financial intermediation, around a combination of several models that would include : 1/2  BIS central bankers' speeches  - The traditional bank intermediation model - The non-bank financial intermediation model implemented by the asset management sector A so-called “re-intermediated” model in which Fintechs and Bigtechs play the role of intermediary for banks, in particular vis-à-vis retail clients - A completely disintermediated model based on Blockchain technology I will not venture to forecast the weight that the traditional bank intermediation model will have at the end of this transformation. This will depend in particular on banks’ ability to rise to the challenges they face, notably in terms of profitability and technology, and to adapt the services they offer to the digital era but also on the fight against climate change. Nonetheless, this transformation seems to me to clearly imply adjusting our regulatory framework for all activities that will contribute to financial intermediation in the future. These transformations will have a positive impact on the efficiency and stability of our financial system, provided they are accompanied by better user experiences and more diversified financing of the economy. But they also carry risks, which must be managed.

5 The Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission implemented a Manager in Charge Regime (MICR); the Australian Parliament has recently passed legislation establishing a Bank Executive Accountability Regime (BEAR); and the Monetary Authority of Singapore has published Proposed Guidelines on Individual Accountability and Conduct 6 The FSB Report on Strengthening Governance Frameworks to Mitigate Misconduct Risk can be found here: http://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P200418.pdf  4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  4  That’s why the Bank and the FCA are taking a proactive, forward-looking approach to identifying vulnerabilities in hard and soft market infrastructure. We see this as core to our institutional responsibilities. Indeed, the Bank has made catalysing structural reforms in financial markets, such as the new risk-free benchmarks that I’ll turn to in a moment, one of its core strategic goals. But the authorities cannot future-proof alone. We rely on industry to help us scan the landscape for emerging risks and to help determine ways to mitigate them. We are encouraged by your efforts. In particular, the FMSB is undertaking horizon scanning for future misconduct risks through its innovative behaviour cluster analysis; and the Global Foreign Exchange Committee, which is responsible for keeping the FX Global Code ‘alive’, has already identified areas of further work on spot FX market practices.
Despite this advantage, the Bank of Thailand is not complacent and we will continue to prepare our banking sector for future challenges. In this regard, a SWOT analysis of our current financial institutions system reveals that while there was overall improvement in efficiency and soundness, operating costs remained high and financial access gaps remained. Furthermore, there was still inadequate financial infrastructure to support risk management of financial institutions. Meanwhile, future challenges of the next five years would likely come from more intensified competition – not only among banks, but from capital market, both local and overseas. It would also come from more complex and varied needs for financial services, as a result of globalizations and aging population, the shift in resource allocation with greater role of domestic demand vis-à-vis external demand as engine of growth, and finally, capital inflows and external challenges from the global economic crisis. Taken together, these remaining areas of improvement and the need to tackle future challenges have led to the recent launch of the second phase of financial sector reform. This brings me to the second part of my talk: key strategies in the Financial Sector Master Plan Phase 2. When thinking about characteristics that our future financial system is envisioned to have, several keywords come to mind: efficiency, strength and resiliency, diversification, fairness and transparency.

Although the time profile of the adjustment process is different, as is the degree of short-term pain involved, internal adjustment arguably leaves the economy leaner and fitter than it would if everyone could simply depend on depreciation to see them right. The second flawed perception was that the intervention by the authorities in the stock market in August 1998 represented a fundamental reversal of traditional non-interventionist policy. The mistake here was to fall into the trap of characterising Hong Kong as a place where the authorities never intervened. We have always made clear our preparedness to intervene for such purposes as promoting efficiency in the market economy, providing infrastructure, or providing necessary support for the most needy in society. But our emphasis has always been to keep intervention to the minimum. This may sound uncontroversial today; indeed, it is probably an attitude shared by most governments, including those here in Europe. But you should remember that when Hong Kong was first vigorously espousing this doctrine, perhaps 30 or 40 years ago, the vogue in most western countries was for the  1  BIS Review 23/2000  state to assume an expanding role in the economy. In keeping with Hong Kong’s principles, the stock market intervention in 1998 was specifically directed towards improving the operation of the market economy rather than perverting it: it was designed to frustrate market manipulation that would otherwise have led to serious market dislocation.
The fact that we have been wise enough to keep to our principles also in tougher times, and that we have not succumbed to the temptation ‘to try something better’ when times have been easier has in the end only benefited the Estonian economy. •  Today, the central bank maintains that considering the specific conditions and related changes now that Estonia has become an EU member state, our agenda for the coming years should include an upgrading of our monetary system to be completed with the changeover to the euro. Namely upgrading, not a radical monetary reform: the Estonian kroon will maintain its value, and the central bank will continue to exchange it at a fixed rate for euros without any time or quantity restrictions. This promise is as binding to the central bank as the word given in June 1992 that from that day on it was possible to exchange eight Estonian kroons for one German mark every single day. •  By June at the latest, the central bank will announce a competition for finding the design for the national side of the euro coin. As we all know, there are altogether eight euro coins. The side with figures is identical everywhere while the other side is different in all member states. The look of Estonia's euro coins will become clear this year. To find the best solution, Eesti Pank wants the Estonians to have a say and a right to decide the matter.

For example, of all the bonds issued in foreign currencies by world governments and the private sector, bonds denominated in euros accounted for more than 30% in 2003 (prior to launching the euro the overall amount of the bonds denominated in the national currencies of the current euro zone totalled 20%). The share of the euro in the currency reserves of the world amounted to some 19% in 2003. •  The larger the common currency zone is, the smaller the transaction costs, and the more it will support economic development, increase stability and future security. •  Whether joining the monetary union is useful depends on the ratio of the costs of the lost monetary policy independence to the gains arising from the accession. Since the exchange rate is not an adaptation tool in the monetary union, prices and salaries must be flexible and factors of production (capital and labour) have to move freely. In general terms, open economies (and Estonia is a very open economy) and countries with similar economic cycles gain more from the monetary union. •  Why coordinated economic policy? Coordinated economic policy must contribute to creating a favourable environment for stable and sustainable economic growth. •  The most closely coordinated area between the EMU member states and institutions is the budgetary policy.
In this way, the SNB stabilises price developments and supports economic activity. The new conditional inflation forecast for the coming quarters is slightly lower than in September. The longer-term forecast is virtually unchanged. For 2019 the forecast stands at  Page 1/6  Berne, 12 December 2019 Thomas Jordan  News conference  0.4%, for 2020 at 0.1% and for 2021 at 0.5%. The conditional inflation forecast is based on the assumption that the SNB policy rate remains at –0.75% over the entire forecast horizon. Global economic outlook  International trade tensions and political uncertainty have weighed on the global economy in recent months. Accordingly, economic growth around the world was again slightly below average in the third quarter. The increase in manufacturing output was modest in many countries, this being accompanied by subdued capital spending and lacklustre global trade in goods. Against this backdrop, employment growth in the advanced economies was slower than a few quarters ago, and unemployment fell only slightly. However, it is already very low in many countries, and is thus lending support to consumer demand. Various central banks eased their monetary policy in the autumn in light of modest inflation and the economic risks. Moreover, they signalled that they would probably leave their policy rates at a low level for an extended period of time. The SNB is maintaining its existing baseline scenario for the global economy, and expects momentum to remain modest over the short term.

Unusual though they may be, ladies and gentlemen, negative interest rates are nonetheless necessary in the current situation if we are to fulfil our mandate against the backdrop of low interest rates worldwide. At the same time, low interest rates do give rise to certain challenges. Negative interest therefore also attracts criticism. That said, we are convinced that the benefits clearly hold sway. Our assessment centres on the fact that we take an overall view, and seek to serve the interests of the country as a whole. From the perspective of savers and pension funds, the present situation with low interest income is, of course, difficult. You might think that the SNB could simply remedy this. But let us assume that we were to raise the SNB policy rate to zero in the current situation. The economy would cool down dramatically, inflation would fall well into negative territory, and unemployment would rise. In such an environment, there would be scarcely any increase in longer-term interest rates. Furthermore, we would probably soon have to lower our policy rate again given the economic slowdown and lower inflation. Hence any gains in income for savers and pension funds would not be sustainable. From the banks’ perspective, negative interest rate payments to the SNB are a cost factor. We are aware of the burden this represents. That is why in September we adjusted our calculation of the exemption thresholds in such a way that the payments made by the banking system have nearly halved.
As hoped, they have contributed to reducing upward pressure in the neighbouring countries of the euro area. However, corporate financing conditions have not significantly improved, unlike with a conventional reduction in interest rates, and mortgage rates have even risen in some cases. The cost/benefit ratio of unconventional monetary policy instruments must be continually reassessed. If an instrument is no longer having the desired effect after a change in prevailing conditions, monetary policy should be adjusted accordingly. In this regard, it is of central importance that not only the short-term costs and benefits are analysed, but also the long-term consequences. Overall, those euro area neighbours with an independent monetary policy have thus far emerged from the crisis in reasonably good shape (cf. chart 17). GDP in Switzerland and Sweden is currently about 12% higher than the pre-crisis level at the beginning of 2007, while in the Czech Republic it is more than 9% higher. Having the ability to react to the situation at home with an independent monetary policy appears to have paid off, despite all the challenges. Inflation in the euro area’s neighbouring countries is, however, lower than targeted – as, indeed, it is in the euro area member states themselves. In the case of Switzerland, where inflation has historically been lower than in these countries, inflation is currently even negative. This is part of a short-term adjustment process, since negative inflation contributes to reducing the real appreciation of the Swiss franc.

Partnerships will thrive and add value when they are supported with effective decision-making structures and organisational frameworks to ensure the smooth translation of ideas from conception to implementation. These factors create partnerships with real impact as they are able to fully BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  and sustainably utilise their specialist skills, knowledge and technological capacity in ensuring successful outcomes. Conclusion In conclusion, the road to a promising and sustainable future for ASEAN is not one that can be traversed in isolation, especially in a world that is becoming increasingly borderless. As we see our economies prosper, our society will also mature with our improved growth potential. However, we must bear in mind that having good ‘genes’ does not guarantee successful results until we come together to activate and realise our latent potential. Therefore policymakers, business community and civil society must collaborate effectively for this better future, together. On this note, I wish you an enriching, dynamic and productive Forum. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches
In November of last year the ECOFIN Council recognised that, in general, the timeliness targets set in 2002 had now been achieved for the majority of the PEEIs and invited Eurostat and the ECB to review the scope, timeliness and quality of the PEEIs, also in the light of the evolving needs of users. This brings me to the important issue of the communication of statistics. The importance of the appropriate communication of statistics Communication with the general public and financial markets is crucial for any central bank because it helps to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. Euro area statistics play an important role in the ECB’s communication, and it is therefore of great importance to the ECB that these statistics be highly credible and very accessible. In total, the ECB publishes around 70 statistical press releases per year, including monthly monetary statistics and data on interest rates, securities and the balance of payments; quarterly euro area accounts and statistics on investment funds and the international investment position; and annual payment statistics and general data on monetary financial institutions. Even more detailed and more frequent statistics are made available on the ECB’s website. In other to enhance the accessibility of its statistics, the ECB launched its online Statistical Data Warehouse in 2006. Maintaining the public’s confidence in the ECB statistics requires high quality standards. Such standards were set out in a recently published framework governing the quality of ECB statistics.

The answer is that while the rise in real house prices over that period would have been less than half as large, the impact on overall real credit growth would have been pretty modest, reducing it by only a tenth – hardly enough to have a major bearing on the magnitude of the subsequent bust. Moreover, output would have been some 3 per cent lower. Monetary policy on its own therefore does not seem especially well suited to preventing credit/asset-price booms. So the crisis exposed not only the inadequacy of our understanding of the true nature of the risks that had built up in the financial sector, but also the need for suitable instruments to deal with them. One of the key reforms in the United Kingdom following the crisis has been to establish a body – the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) – with the responsibility for overseeing the stability of the financial system, together with specific powers to achieve that. The FPC will exist on a statutory basis once the Financial Services Act has passed into law, but has been operating on an interim basis since June 2011. The FPC has two objectives. First and foremost, it is charged with identifying, monitoring and taking action to remove or reduce systemic risks with a view to protecting and enhancing the resilience of the UK financial system. But that is accompanied by a secondary goal: subject to protecting resilience, it should support the economic policy of the government, including its objectives for growth and employment.
In the chart, we compare the second-highest decile of wage earners with the lowest decile. Wage differentials are smaller in Norway than in any other OECD country. In the US, the group of  4  From Jon E. Dølvik, T. Fløtten, G. Hernes and J.M. Hippe (2007): “Hamskifte – Den norske modellen i endring (Fundamental shift – the Norwegian model in flux”, p.15, Gyldendal Norsk Forlag A/S. Norwegian only. 5  Richard B. Freeman: “Labor Market Imbalances: Shortages, or Surpluses, or Fish Stories?”, at the Boston Federal Reserve Economic Conference, June 14-16, 2006. 6  BIS Review 18/2008  wage earners in the second highest decile earn almost five times as much as the lowest decile while in Norway that group only earns twice as much. Thus, the fundamental shift in economic policy and sharp income growth in Norway have not resulted in substantial wage disparities. When the EU assesses income distribution, low income is defined as less than 60 per cent of median income. 6 Compared with other European countries, the low-income group is small in Norway and the other Nordic countries. In Norway, 11 per cent of the population is defined as low-income earners, while the average for the EU is a good 15 per cent. In addition, the Nordic countries provide a high level of government-financed welfare services. Analyses of low income do not take into account that income levels in Norway are very high. The threshold for low income in Norway is shown by the line in the chart.

Chart 4  5  In this context, some of the discussion has centred on the extent to which low inflation is a problem if it is paired with robust GDP growth and full capacity utilisation, particularly if these are a result of positive supply shocks. In that case, perhaps the problem lies in how the inflation target is presented and understood. This will call for more flexibility and a longer horizon for the target, which was one of the proposals explored in the Central Bank’s 2010 report on monetary policy in post-capital controls Iceland.1  Monetary policy milestones I mentioned earlier the success we have had with monetary policy – success that was visible a year ago and is even more obvious now. This past September, the Central Bank of Iceland issued a Special Publication entitled Monetary policy based on inflation targeting: experience since 2001 and postcrisis changes.2 In addition to discussing the topics in the title, the report maps out this success with monetary policy. Chart 5 shows what that entails: inflation expectations are at target, unexpected changes in inflation that strongly affected short- and long-term inflation expectations in the past no longer do so, and movements in the exchange rate of the króna function much more as shock absorbers and less as sources of shocks than they used to.
Some segments of the export industry are feeling the effects of lower turnover and a strong krone. At the same time, house prices and household debt are still rising. Investors’ view of the economic outlook has improved since the beginning of the year, and financial market funding has been more accessible. Banks should make use of the opportunity to obtain more long-term funding. This will increase their resilience to any further deepening of the crisis in Europe. The current optimism may be fragile. Should credit markets dry up again, Norges Bank is prepared to implement measures to enable banks to maintain normal credit standards. However, liquidity provision by Norges Bank should not replace sound liquidity management in banks or banks’ long-term market funding. Any decisions regarding the use of the government’s or taxpayers’ creditworthiness to enable banks to obtain more long-term funding are the prerogative of the government and the Storting (Norwegian parliament). (Chart 11: Underlying inflation) The operational target of monetary policy is annual consumer price inflation of close to 2.5 percent over time. Recently, inflation has been low, close to 1 percent. Inflation will be brought back to target, but how long this will take depends on the disturbances to which the economy is exposed and the effects on the prospects for the path for inflation and the real economy ahead.

Yet at the same time, he saw possibilities: “Successfully solving them in a satisfactory manner will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences in the economic and financial spheres, and the year might end better than it began.” While times are difficult abroad in our day too, there are bright spots. Growth in Asia remains robust and some figures for the US economy have been positive recently. Europe is facing the challenge of remedying economic imbalances in the face of weak growth prospects. For many countries, demographic developments will in a few years add to the pressure on fiscal budgets. While austerity measures will improve government finances, in the short term they will stifle activity and delay a recovery. This is a very difficult balancing act. But euro area countries have no choice. There is a need to agree on measures to restore confidence in financial markets. Just like 80 years ago, it is difficult to predict where we are heading. The Norwegian economy should be able to hold a steady course. But we will have to take into account that the return on the Fund’s investments may be lower than expected a decade ago. And wage and price inflation is likely to be low for some time to come. Rygg’s hopes were partly realised. In Europe the crisis bottomed out in 1932. Cycles and confidence may shift rapidly and when we least expect it. After hard times come good times. Come what may.