samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We are conducting industry engagement to inform our decision and would welcome input from interested parties. And the most significant moment is when we replace the core RTGS service, planned for 2023. Additional functionality will be delivered in 2024, to further drive innovation and change. For example we will introduce read/write APIs and are exploring the ability to synchronise the settlement of a payment in sterling central bank money to be coordinated with the transfer of one or more assets. The Programme is expected to close in 2025. It will be an exciting few years! ISO 20022  One way in which RTGS Renewal can promote resilience and efficiency is through greater interoperability across payment systems. Could, for example, CHAPS be used as a contingency mechanism in the event of a retail payment system outage? Key to this is the introduction of a new payment messaging standard for UK payments, ISO 20022: the emerging global standard. Following a consultation in 2018,8 the Bank and Pay.UK will introduce a Common Credit Message across CHAPS, Bacs and FPS which will bring greater message harmonisation for the UK’s main interbank payment systems. The Bank is also engaging with other High Value Payment System operators to ensure the standard is compatible with the emerging international consensus. This is an exciting and important initiative which will bring significant and long term benefits for a wide range of firms.

In this context, early next year the Governing Council will reassess the monetary stimulus achieved, the expansion of the balance sheet and the outlook for price developments. We will also evaluate the broader impact of recent oil price developments on medium-term inflation trends in the euro area. Should it become necessary to further address risks of too prolonged a period of low inflation, the Governing Council remains unanimous in its commitment to using additional unconventional instruments within its mandate. This would imply altering early next year the size, pace and composition of our measures. In response to the request of the Governing Council, ECB staff and the relevant Eurosystem committees have stepped up the technical preparations for further measures, which could, if needed, be implemented in a timely manner. All of our monetary policy measures are geared towards underpinning the firm anchoring of medium to long-term inflation expectations, in line with our aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2%, and contribute to a return of inflation rates towards that level. Let me now explain our assessment in greater detail, starting with the economic analysis. Real GDP in the euro area rose by 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the third quarter of this year. This was in line with earlier indications of a weakening in the euro area’s growth momentum, leading to a downward revision of the outlook for euro area real GDP growth in the most recent forecasts.
But the longer this process of accommodation goes on, the greater the risk that it becomes ingrained in expectations of relatively high future inflation and then credibility needs to be re-established with more abrupt interest rate changes and tighter policies in the future. It may be that indicators of an upward drift in inflation expectations are only flashing amber at present. But if the MPC waits until they are flashing red, and if other pressures continue to push up UK inflation in the meantime, the Committee could face a very difficult situation later this year or next. A well-conducted monetary policy should aim to move policy in anticipation of events and in a smooth and orderly way if possible. And as I prepare to leave the Committee at the end of next month, I do worry that the MPC’s credibility and commitment to the inflation target may already have been eroded by not adjusting policy settings soon enough – as the challenge for monetary policy has shifted from preventing deflation to curbing inflation and from halting recession to managing the recovery. Concluding remarks I started studying economics in the mid-1970s and my career as a working economist began in the mid-1980s. Throughout this time as a student and practitioner of economic analysis, we have seen UK monetary frameworks come and go, generally in the midst of an economic crisis. Since the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates collapsed about 40 years ago, the UK struggled to sustain a stable monetary policy framework for any substantial period.

Chart 7 Manufacturing output in UK, Euro-Area and Sweden Rebased to 100 in 2007 105 100 95 90 85  UK Euro-Area  80  Sweden 75 70 2007  2008  2009  2010  Source: Eurostat and Thompson Datastream  Chart 8 Goods exports from UK, Euro-Area and Sweden Rebased to 100 in 2007 115 110 105 100 95 90 UK 85  Euro-Area  80  Sweden  75 70 2007  2008  2009  2010  Source: Eurostat and Thompson Datastream  BIS central bankers’ speeches  9  The performance of UK manufacturing output and exports relative to other regions and countries which have maintained stronger currencies – such as the euro area and Sweden – supports this view. Chart 7 shows that there is very little difference in the current level of output relative to its pre-recession level in the UK, Sweden and the euro area – though the depreciation in the pound may have helped shield manufacturers from a bigger decline in output during the recession. Chart 8 shows broadly the same picture for the exports of goods, which are dominated by trade in manufactured products. This picture is perhaps not that surprising when we think about the characteristics of the modern UK manufacturing base. Many UK manufacturers are niche producers linked into highly integrated global supply chains.
2  Normally, the reserve rate acts as a floor and the overnight lending rate as a ceiling for the overnight interbank rate, as banks will not normally lend reserves at an interest rate that is lower than the rate they receive from the central bank or borrow reserves at an interest rate that is higher than the rate they have to pay the central bank. There may be a stigma attached to using this lending facility. When this stigma cost is high, the market rate may exceed Norges Bank’s overnight lending rate. If one or more banks do not have access to the central bank’s deposit facility, the market rate may fall below the reserve rate. 3  Competition among banks keeps the overnight interbank rate close to the key policy rate. A bank holding reserves in excess of its quota towards the end of the day can avoid having to deposit these excess reserves at the reserve rate by lending in the interbank market to a bank with room on its quota. This bank will be able to deposit the borrowed reserves at the key policy rate and earn an interest rate margin as long as the borrowing rate is lower than the key policy rate. Competition among banks with room on their quotas pushes up borrowing rates and pushes down interest rate margins. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  the level of short-term money market rates. This also applies when the reserve rate is negative.

It is difficult to judge to what extent the recovery abroad can be attributed to the monetary policy that has been conducted. There is, however, little doubt that it has had a positive effect. Lower interest rates have given firms and households access to cheaper funding. It has also eased the interest burden for heavily indebted borrowers and contributed to growth in disposable income. In addition, the value of households’ financial wealth has increased. This may also have provided a basis for higher demand. Studies conducted so far also suggest that the unconventional measures have had an effect. 13 A study by the Federal Reserve suggests that the Fed’s asset purchase program has reduced unemployment by 1¼ percentage points and increased inflation by ½ percentage point. 14 The Bank of England estimates that the Bank’s purchases of government  12  Jordà, O., M. Schularick and A. M. Taylor (2013): “When Credit Bites Back”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (45), 3–28. 13  IMF (2013): “Global impact and challenges of unconventional monetary policies”. IMF Policy Paper, October 2013. 14  Engen, E. M., T. T. Laubach and D. Reifschneider (2015): “The macroeconomic effects of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policies”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, Washington D.C.  BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  bonds from 2011 to 2012 boosted GDP by just over ½ percent. The effect on inflation was also found to be positive.
And if the advanced countries’ consumption stops growing, what will happen to global economic growth and particularly that of emerging countries with entirely export-oriented economies? Which brings me to my third remark: we need the emerging countries to continue investing their savings in advanced countries. We therefore need properly functioning international financial markets. In a world where the savings and financing needs are so geographically dislocated, properly functioning financial markets are a prerequisite for economic growth. But, today the capital markets appear very unsettled and full of anomalies, and not just in Europe. •  For example, certain sovereigns (the USA and UK for example) borrow today at historically very low nominal interest rates and at negative real interest rates despite the fact that their deficits are around 10% of GNP and that doubts exist regarding the future evolution of their debt levels. •  Another anomaly: large corporations have accumulated unprecedented cash reserves (several trillions of dollars) despite numerous highly profitable and unexploited investment opportunities around the world, unsatisfied infrastructure needs and investment bottlenecks in commodities production. Fourth remark. We can identify two reasons for this situation: •  The first is the general and exceptional uncertainty weighing on the global economy. Uncertainty makes liquid and safe assets more attractive. It makes investment less attractive. It can therefore partly explain the phenomena that I have mentioned. •  The second reason is more structural: a malfunctioning of our financial intermediation mechanisms. There are doubts about the solidity of banks in numerous countries.

Christian Noyer: Public and private debt – imbalances of global savings Introductory speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at Session 3 “Public and private debt – imbalances of global savings”, Aix-en-Provence Economic Forum, Aix-en-Provence, 6 July 2012. *  *  *  In introduction to this session, I would like to make seven remarks. My first remark is inspired by the very title of this session. In advanced countries, the average public debt to GNP ratio is 100%. In emerging countries, the figure is 30%. This is a very wide gap, and it represents one of the global economy’s largest imbalances. And one of the least mentioned. It also represents a complete reversal of the situation compared with just over twenty years ago. At that time, I remember well, I was chairman of the Paris Club, and emerging countries came to ask for the rescheduling of their debt. Second remark, global demand is still fairly concentrated on the advanced countries. Not only is their debt higher, but their savings (as a ratio of GNP) are lower. The G7 countries alone still account for 56% of global consumption. The problem is clear. How can we hope to raise our level of consumption if we need to reduce our level of debt and increase our savings?
At the same, we are seeing signs of a cooling housing market. House prices fell more than we had expected in September, and the number of unsold homes has increased. According to Statistics Norway's business sentiment survey, the prospects for manufacturing have weakened. The labour market is tight, and the employment ratio is high. The number of employed appears to be slightly higher than expected, while the number of unemployed has been a little lower. The number of job vacancies is high, but the number of new vacancies has decreased slightly. Chart 4: Inflation is high Inflation has continued to edge higher and is markedly above our target of 2 percent. In the year to September 2022, consumer prices rose by almost 7 percent. Energy prices were a main driver, but prices are also rising rapidly for a range of other goods and services, both for domestically produced and imported goods and services. In September inflation was higher than we had expected, with a surprisingly sharp rise in transport prices, which tend to vary widely. The Committee judges that a higher policy rate is needed to bring inflation down towards the target. Inflation has increased more than projected, and the labour market appears to be a little tighter than previously anticipated. These developments could suggest raising the policy rate by more than 0.25 percentage point at this meeting. On the other hand, there are signs that some areas of the economy are cooling down, and prospects for lower-than-expected freight and energy prices may curb inflation ahead.

Ida Wolden Bache: Norges Bank is raising the policy rate to bring down inflation Introductory statement by Ms Ida Wolden Bache, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at a press conference following the announcement of the policy rate, Oslo, 3 November 2022. *** Accompanying charts of the speech. Introduction Chart 1: Policy rate raised from 2.25 to 2.5 percent Norges Bank's Monetary Policy and Financial Stability Committee decided unanimously to raise the policy rate by 0.25 percentage point to 2.5 percent. Norges Bank's task is to keep inflation low and stable. The operational target is inflation of close to 2 per cent over time. We are also mandated to help keep employment as high as possible and to promote economic stability over time. Economic activity is high in Norway, and unemployment is at a historically low level. At the same time, we are seeing that some areas of the economy are cooling down. Inflation is very high. Many people are experiencing how demanding it can be to cope with rapid and unexpected price increases. High inflation is weakening households' purchasing power and hampering economic decision making for both firms and households. We believe that a higher policy rate is needed to curb inflation. In its deliberations, the Committee was concerned with balancing the risk of tightening too much against the risk of tightening too little.
Their focus should be comprehensive, meaning further adaptation of legislation, improvement of infrastructure, full privatization of public assets, improvement of the business climate, deepening and broadening of the financial market, comprehensive reform in pensions, as well as a number of other actions which I can not mention here because of objective reasons. I think that the inflow of foreign direct investments remains our major target. Without them the region would remain small, fragmented, with a low development, social and economic potential, with sporadic exports, with premature markets and high costs, or in other words, with a low productivity. Personally, I am of the opinion that each foreign investment means faster convergence to Europe. Third, the financial market should develop to create other alternatives for savings, financing and risk management of economic entities, as well as for improving the conditions of these activities. Besides the banking sector, the share of non-bank financial institutions should also be rapidly developed, to enable a greater involvement and access to financial services for entities that can not benefit enough from banking services. Furthermore, I think that it is important to pay more attention to development of capital markets, particularly those issuing and trading debt securities and equities by private entities. Fourth, the regulatory framework and supervisory practices should be completed with some important elements in terms of prudential measures and emergency financial situation management. The prudential measures framework should cautiously treat capital and liquidity requests from banks, especially in the case of foreign currency.

2023 International Symposium, National Association for Business Economics – Paris, 22 May 2023  Monetary policy transmission: where do we stand? Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 1 sur 14 In the Euro Area, inflation has begun to fall back, from 10.6% in October 2022 to 7% in April, after 6.9% in March, and is expected to recede by the end of the year. But it will still be too high. And while headline inflation has been declining, underlying price pressures show persistence. The Governing Council has already taken prompt and forceful actions to tighten the stance of monetary policy. The primary question today is not so much how much further we need to go with interest rate hikes, but how large is the pass-through of what is already in the pipe. Today I’d like to elaborate on this and review the two steps of the transmission of our monetary policy (i) first to the financing and monetary conditions, and (ii) ultimately to real economy and inflation. I will then draw some conclusions for monetary policy (iii). I. The transmission of monetary policy to financing conditions has proven relatively rapid and overall in line with past tightening cycles The increase in policy rates since 2022 has been exceptionally rapid by any historical standards: 7 hikes in less than ten months, amounting to +375 basis points, in addition to our progressive exit from unconventional policies which began even earlier.
I would like to offer a few thoughts to launch our discussion today. I will start with the risks and vulnerabilities caused by excessive volatility and procyclicality of capital flows; I will then turn to the policy responses, including means to address the volatility of capital flows directly and issues related to the GFSN (or Global Financial Safety Net). I. Regarding international capital flows, it is fair to acknowledge that we do not have a good benchmark on what would constitute an appropriate level of these flows. There is a trade-off between the costs and the benefits that they bring, and this trade-off varies across countries and over time. Yet, the fluctuations in gross global capital flows do seem to be very procyclical and volatile. If we look at gross inflows in advanced economies for instance, we see that they rose considerably in the years preceding the Global Financial Crisis, from less than 10% in the early 2000s to more than 20% in 2007. Subsequently, they plunged to virtually 0% in 2008 and 2009 and have remained low ever since. Not all types of flows show the same dynamics over time: FDI and portfolio equity flows have been fairly resilient, while bank flows and debt portfolio flows have been very significantly affected, resulting in a marked changed in the composition of gross flows. These sharp fluctuations are clearly not optimal.

Joseph Yam: Current issues for monetary and financial stability in Hong Kong Speech by Mr Joseph Yam, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at the Hong Kong Management Association Annual Fellowship Dinner, Hong Kong, 27 November 2007. *  *  *  Introduction I feel especially honoured to have been asked to speak at this HKMA Fellowship Dinner, one particular reason being that the Hong Kong Management Association and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority share the same initials. I have, ever since the establishment of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority in April 1993, felt some what indebted to the Hong Kong Management Association in its acquiescence to our use of that symbol of excellence, the HKMA, no doubt in the hope that we too would in time mature to deserve the respect that those initials command. About fifteen years on, I hope we have not disappointed you. This evening I would like to talk about the monetary and financial issues currently confronting Hong Kong. I have chosen to do so because what is going on around us on the monetary and financial fronts appears, to me at least, to be unusually complex, presenting risks to monetary and financial stability that are perhaps less well understood and possibly less benign than those that we have been experiencing since the economic recovery from the second quarter of 2003.
Financial services growth was very weak in 2016, at just 1.8%, reflecting slower regional growth and trade. Growth rebounded strongly to 4.9% last year, driven by the strong performance of the fund management segment and steady growth in financial intermediation. The growth momentum has been sustained in the first half of this year and we are looking at another good year for financial services. We remain confident of meeting the 5-year average growth target of 4.3%. We saw a net increase of 7,800 jobs in financial services and FinTech over 2016 and 2017, close to our ITM target of 8,000 jobs. Job growth was mainly driven by the insurance and fund management industries, and to a lesser extent by the banking industry. IT has emerged as a key functional area driving hiring demand across financial services— some of the fastest growing job roles are in software development, cyber security, data analytics, artificial intelligence, and business process engineering. FinTech alone is estimated to have contributed close to 2,000 of the net jobs created during these two years. MAS expects job growth in financial services this year to exceed the ITM target. Let me now take stock of progress in each of the three pillars of the ITM: business strategies 6 / 11  BIS central bankers' speeches  jobs and skills; and innovation and technology. BUSINESS STRATEGIES I will start with our business strategies. Singapore continued to do well in asset management, with assets under management (AUM) increasing by an average 12.7% p.a. over 2016 and 2017.

The distrust characterising interbank relations encouraged certain institutions to stockpile capital. This trend was reinforced by the fact that numerous banks were unable to make a reliable estimate of their own liquidity requirements, particularly in view of the soaring demand for cash on the part of the public. At the end of last year, the total value of banknotes in circulation had risen by 11% and banks had three times as much money on their SNB sight deposit accounts as at the end of 2007. To satisfy this extraordinary demand, the SNB was obliged to expand its repo operations in terms of volume and maturity, and to inject liquidity into the market through a new channel – that of swap transactions. Over the past few years, repos have become the standard tool with which we implement our monetary policy. They involve loans to banks denominated in Swiss francs and backed by securities. As a rule, these loans are granted for a term of one week. However, in response to the special needs of the market in 2008, we had to lengthen the term of our loans on several occasions, extending maturity to as much as twelve months. Unlike other central banks, however, we saw no need to expand the range of eligible securities, since we already apply a very liberal policy, accepting top-rated securities denominated not only in Swiss francs, but also in euros, pounds sterling, US dollars and other currencies. In 2008, the average amount of our repos rose by 53% against the year before.