samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is well known that the cause of Turkey’s inflation is fiscal in nature. The last year in which Turkey had a budget surplus was 1970. The budget deficit increased steadily throughout the last decade, finally reaching double-digits in 1999. The fiscal imbalances have also caused difficulties in financing the deficit. Over the last couple of years the amount of external financing available for the budget deficit has declined, causing increased pressure on the domestic financial sector and an increase in the domestic debt. The ratio of cash domestic debt to GNP grew rapidly during the 1990s, finally reaching 24% of GNP in 1999. The increases in the deficit and in the level of domestic debt during recent years are mirrored in the levels of domestic interest rates. The increasing pressure on domestic borrowing has kept real interest rates at high levels, hovering around the mid-20s during the 1990s and rising to over 50% at frequent intervals. I think this brief recital of facts should be more than sufficient to explain why it is high time to face the predicament of the Turkish economy. A radical program is urgently needed to address Turkey’s deep-rooted problems, and it is my wish today to convince you that the program we have delivered to deal with them is well prepared and comprehensive. Let me summarise our goals and the overall strategy by which this program aims to achieve them.

BIS Review 9/2000  2  Here is how exchange rate policy will be conducted during the program period. We are already announcing to the public the daily value of an exchange rate basket consisting of $ 1 and Euro 0.77 for the coming 12 months. The monthly depreciation rate of the basket adds up to a 12-month depreciation rate of 20%, in line with the WPI target for the period. At the end of each quarter, we will pre-announce a depreciation rate for the quarter beginning nine months later, and leaving the pre-announced rates for the intermediate quarters unchanged. This means that at the end of every three-month period, the rate of increase in the exchange rate basket for the next 12 months will be publicly known. The system will function in this manner for the first 18 months of the program. Then, starting in July 2001, a gradually widening symmetrical band will be introduced for the pre-announce exchange basket. From this point on, the total width of the band will be 7.5% by end-2001, 15% by end-June 2002, and 22.5% by end-December 2002. It will be noted that while we are making strong commitment to a pre-announced exchange rate path, we are simultaneously announcing our exit strategy, which should allay concerns about the difficulty of making a smooth exit from such systems. Of course, there are also some risks created by pre-announcing the path of the exchange rate.
All the users of this information should be aware that this information does not substitute or duplicate the official macroeconomic statistics. These qualitative indicators are compiled on the basis of opinions and expectations of the interviewed economic agents. I would like to be more concrete relate to this point. The Bank of Albania, having the awareness, independence and a certain degree of institutional transparency, and aiming at achieving high professionalism, plays an active and proactive role in the country’s economic development. Economic analysis is under direct function of the monetary policy decision-making process. In essence, the decision-making precedes the medium-term developments, sustaining the maintaining of price stability as the primary policy target drafted and implemented by the Bank of Albania. Profound analysis of the past, present and future developments of the economy contribute to appropriate decision-making. I assure you that building a complete “picture” of the present and the future of an economy is a rather difficult process, not only for an emerging economy, such as that of Albania, but also for the most advanced economies of the world. Economic and financial developments are accompanied by elements of insecurity, which have become, as you already know, dominant in last two years. Making decisions on the future of this already globalised world of economic links, requires professional maturity. Assessing and selecting appropriate and reliable statistical information requires profound intuitive abilities. Making the selected data bank beneficial to the decisionmaking, requires analytical foresight.

As a matter of fact forward-looking decisions should be made on the basis of an ever larger and timely information; They should be constantly consulted with specialized economic and financial market agents. The Bank of Albania, likewise other central banks, endeavors to increase the qualitative and quantitative data base, in order to improve analyses and the decision-making process in making new steps. The finalization of the several-year project of the Bank of Albania, along which the Business and Consumer Confidence Indicator was consolidated, is an accomplishment of one of the medium-term development strategy objectives of our institution. The decision to publish these indicators passed through a prudent process and matured only after experts and decision-makers of the Bank of Albania were convinced that the confidence indicators, together with other indicators, revealed valuable additional  BIS Review 36/2009  1  information about the recent and future developments in the country’s real sector of the economy. Allow me to briefly summarize some of the basic concepts on confidence, tendency and the foregoing indicators. They have been widely used in many advanced countries of the world, particularly over the last two decades. These indicators are constructed on the basis of information collected from surveys, which are technically referred to as Business and Consumer Confidence/Tendency Surveys. The Bank of Albania conducts these surveys in cooperation with INSTAT.
Further, under this Act the CNB has at its disposal practically all the tools known to advanced market economies. BIS Review 25/1997  -6-  At the beginning of the transformation process, the main tools of monetary policy were, quite naturally, direct ones. Credit limits, interest rate ceilings expressed as maximum deviations from the discount rate and refinancing loans (in 1991 represented for small, new banks on the average 60 per cent of total sources but for big banks 5-10 per cent only) were used. Credit and interest rate ceilings were abolished in 1992 which can be regarded as a transition year towards indirect control of monetary developments. After credit ceilings on the minor banks were removed in April 1992 and on the major banks in October, central bank control of monetary developments was effected through discount rates, minimum reserve requirements, auction refinancing credits and central bank bills. My predecessors behind this chair, the governors of the central banks from Germany and Switzerland, underlined the role of money supply targets in the kit of tools. In this respect the Czechoslovak and the Czech practice can enrich the experience. Since 1990 the intermediate targets have been set in the form of planned changes in credits or money. For 1990 the target was “to keep the development of credits in total within the scope of -2 per cent to +1 per cent related to the level at the end of 1989”.

On the other hand, there were some disadvantages, especially if compared with Poland or Hungary. The system of a command economy was very pervasive in Czechoslovakia. There was practically no private sector; prices were centrally controlled; enterprise managers were operating within the limits of a rigid system of central planning, having little autonomy in decision-making. Market institutions were mostly lacking, particularly in the case of money, capital and labour markets. Czechoslovakia distinguished itself also as a country with an unfavourably biased size pattern of enterprises: big units, mostly administratively created, prevailed, while small enterprises were almost lacking. External economic ties were biased as well, being monopolised by the state: exports were predominantly aimed at Soviet and other communist countries’ markets. Especially high was the share of foreign trade with the Soviet Union (more than 40%). Connected with this was the fact that Czechoslovakia maintained a rather large proportion of heavy industries, an extensive but mostly obsolete stock of productive capital, along with underdeveloped services, neglected infrastructure and inadequate environmental protection. In coping with the challenge of a system substitution the contraints and even the counterproductiveness of the partial reform approach seemed to be recognised and accounted for in the Czechoslovak case. This was perhaps a lesson learned from the failures of reform attempts in the past. There appeared to be a widely shared consensus that a system replacement could hardly be achieved without a sufficient initial “shock”.
We intend to maintain our policy of reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities for an extended period of time after the end of our net asset purchases, and in any case for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation. Our policy of reinvesting is another instrument at our disposal. Regarding a change in interest rates, the ECB guaranteed that it will not take place until “through the summer of 2019". Does it mean until the end of next summer? At our last Governing Council meeting we said that we expect our key ECB interest rates to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019. In any case, they will stay at their present levels for as long as necessary to ensure that the evolution of inflation remains aligned with our current expectations of a sustained adjustment path. Our enhanced forward guidance signals that we will remain patient in determining the timing of the first rate rise. The path of very short-term interest rates that is implicit in the term structure of money market interest rates is compatible with our intention of being patient. 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Negative interest rates are one of the most controversial points within the ECB’s current monetary policy framework. Particularly for the banks. What do you have to say to them? You have to look at the whole package of measures that we have implemented.

Some remarks about distributional effects As long as assets are unevenly spread across the population, shifts in their prices will have redistributive effects. Let me now say something about what those might have been. I’ll make only a few, and very broad points. First, as regards the distribution of wealth, one of the main sources of unevenness is age. There is certainly considerable variation within age groups. In Chart 7, a snapshot taken from the ONS’s first Wealth and Asset Survey (2006), the vertical lines are interquartile ranges for each 10-year age bracket. Among households headed by 45–54 year olds, for example, those 25% from the top had over £ more in net wealth than those 25% from the bottom of the distribution. But there is also significant variation across age groups. Even relatively wealthy 25-year-olds have significantly less in the way of net assets than the average 50-year-old. This means that, during the first phase of the decline in real rates, when all asset prices were rising, it was generally older people who benefited the most. Anyone who, in the mid-1990s, happened already to own a house, or whose pension was already well funded, would have benefited materially from these trends. Chart 8 plots the age profile of net wealth in 1995 versus that a decade later.11 It steepened considerably. 8  Eggertson and Krugman (2012) develop a model where deleveraging pressure has very protracted effects on (ex ante) saving and on equilibrium real interest rates.
Financial Stability Report August 2020 | Bank of England 7. DP2/22 – Potential Reforms to Risk Margin and Matching Adjustment within Solvency II | Bank of England 8. Review of Solvency II: 2022 Data Collection Exercise (DCE) | Bank of England 9. Review of Solvency II: Consultation | HM Treasury 10. SS20/16 - Solvency II: reinsurance - counterparty credit risk | Bank of England

The increases in official interest rates scarcely fed through in 2005 to longterm interest rates, which led to the forceful flattening of the yield curve, an unusual occurrence at this  BIS Review 60/2006  1  stage of the cycle, although the rise in long-term yields in the opening months of 2006 is contributing to lessening the scale of this discrepancy. Finally, the increase in household wealth, stemming from the rise in the value of financial and real-estate assets, eased the drag on real income arising from dearer energy products in the oil-importing countries. Yet there has been a significant contrast between this optimism on financial markets and the wariness of companies, mirrored by slack investment in the real sector which is particularly striking if regard is had to the favourable trend of corporate profits. Several explanations have been offered for the muted performance of business investment in recent years, such as the difficulties in valuing investment in intangible assets appropriately, over-investment in the second half of the nineties (which caused surplus capacity in recent years), the ongoing reduction in corporations' financial leverage, the uncertainty generated by globalisation and companies' caution following the recent changes in the legislative and accounting framework in the wake of the corporate scandals in some countries. Insofar as some of these factors are probably transitory, greater investment momentum may be expected in the coming years.
It goes without saying, however, that as a result of the rapid development of technology, especially in the ICT area, which drastically lowered the cost of the said exchange, the international integration of trade, investment, financial and other services is now more advanced than it has ever been before. The Economic Policy Committee of the European Union 3 points out four factors that have lead to the rapid development of globalisation over the past years: •  multilateral trade liberalisation; the average customs duty has been lowered by ca. 30%  •  successful economic reforms in many developing countries, especially in China and India  •  the technological advancement, especially in the ICT sector and transportation, which has significantly lowered the cost of trade. To give you and example, fees for sea, land and air transportation, telephone calls and satellite calls went down by 21%, 30%, 95% and 88%, respectively. •  the technological advancement has blurred the borderline between what can and what cannot become subject to international trade. Globalisation may create new macroeconomic interdependences to replace the traditional ones that we know from the books on economics. The majority of economists, politicians and investors may still not quite keep at pace with the “seismic changes” that take place in the economy 4 . However, if we really are witnesses to “seismic changes” in the economy, it may be worthwhile to have a closer look and think about their meaning. Globalisation and its impact on the economy may be viewed from different perspectives.

Because, Ladies and Gentlemen, as I have repeatedly shared with my colleagues at the Bank, when requiring the tasks to be performed with 100% precision, rather than in a slapdash manner, we in the central bank have an asset even more valuable than its international reserves. This key asset is the reputation of the BNB and of each of its employees. I promised to your colleagues of the 39th National Assembly that I would never take part in fruitless discussions, neither would I refute any possible silly allegations of dishonourable people or of unqualified “know-it-all” experts. The people around me, however, know how painful it was for me to bear any stupidity or slander, not for my own credibility but for the confidence the Bulgarian society should have in our National Bank. The BNB is de jure and de facto the most independent public institution; it owes its independence to you – the elected representatives of the people, and reports only and solely to you, to the Bulgarian National Assembly. Therefore I felt I needed to have again assurance of your confidence after such a long and fierce pre-election competition. Dear Ladies and Gentlemen MPs, Only two months ago in this hall I reiterated, and I would like now to reconfirm, the three key principles I have abided by since 2003, for which I will try hard to be remembered as characterizing my work at the central bank – independence, predictability and transparency.
Turning to the data, indeed a sluggishness in households’ time deposit rates has been observed in some countries.22 This can be explained by banks’ specific characteristics, by the structure of the banking sector and the competitive environment. Specifically, banks with larger liquidity buffers react to a lesser extent to increases in market interest rates.23 And we have seen a significant shift of funds from overnight deposits to other less liquid but better remunerated instruments (mainly time deposits), thus reducing the liquidity available for economic transactions. In fact, M1 annual growth turned negative in January 2023 for the first time since the creation of the monetary union. In addition, the increase in bank lending rates in the euro area has been very significant, mainly reflecting the faster pace of policy rate hikes, and has been accompanied by a tightening of credit supply standards. In particular, in the ECB’s latest euro area bank lending survey (BLS), banks reported a substantial further tightening of credit standards 20  Total debt is defined as the sum of the outstanding amount of credit from euro area banks and fixed income securities. 21  See the ESRB report "Vulnerabilities in the residential real estate sectors of the EEA countries”. 22  The smallest increases in households’ time deposit rates are observed in Spain, Ireland and Portugal, while Germany, Italy and France have recorded the largest increases.

However, that rate is now heading upwards, rising from around 1.5% in mid-2022 to 3.6%12 in February this year. At some point, however, the fall in energy prices, the improvement in supply chains and the moderating demand, owing to tighter financial conditions should begin to gradually produce reverse effects on inflation. Thus, at the current juncture, we could well be nearing some sort of crossroads, where the lagged effects of the past increases in commodity prices and exchange rate depreciation are still present, but diminishing, while the first effects of the most recent decreases and appreciation may be emerging and on the rise. However, when this crossroads is reached, and how strongly it will support a decline in inflation, will depend on the extent of the symmetry between the impact of higher and lower costs on prices. In this regard, the impact of cost decreases on inflation may not be fully symmetrical to the impact of cost  10  These items were more directly affected by the increase in the cost of energy, food prices or supply bottlenecks, together with the strong demand for specific goods during the pandemic (especially in the case of durable goods) and the reopening phase (notably in the case of services). 11  A breakdown of core inflation by destination of expenditure shows that the components related to transport recorded an annual price increase at 7,1% in February, 7,3% in December. Prices in the housing equipment and maintenance sub-index increased 9% February, down from 9,3% in December.
Private sector credit is oriented towards funding the working capital and consumption, illustrating the private agents’ reluctant behaviour to make investments and banks’ high prudence to lend. Furthermore, deposits in the system have shifted towards longer maturity terms, thus illustrating the Albanian consumers’ disposition to save. Latest developments in financial markets have reflected contained liquidity and inflation premiums. In the interbank market, short-term interest rates were downward, following successive cuts of the key interest rates. Furthermore, government security yields in the primary market were slightly up. This increase is mostly due to the interaction of demand and supply factors in this market and does not signal for risk premiums increase in the economy. Interest rates in the deposit and credit markets followed the Bank of Albania’s easing monetary policy over the last six months, while its transmission is expected to be more complete in the future, conform to the time lag that characterises the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Projections for the expected economic outlook in the future sustain our earlier assessments for positive, but below potential, growth of the Albanian economy in the period ahead. However, risks about this scenario have increased, mainly as a result of unfavourable developments in the global economy and financial markets. Overall, the economy in our trade partner countries is expected to be sluggish and lending terms in the euro area are expected to be tight for the period ahead.

Monetary policy has little to contribute in this regard, whereas fiscal policy and other economic policy instruments are decisive. Rapid wage growth over many years has led to a high domestic cost level. Measured in a common currency, the cost level in Norway relative to our trading partners is 20 percent higher than the historic average for Norway’s oil age. As a result of the high cost level, internationally exposed industries are vulnerable to weaker international growth, a fall in export prices and a stronger krone. The real value of the krone has increased in recent years, reflecting solid domestic economic growth, high oil prices and relatively weak growth among our trading partners. As long as there are no available resources in the Norwegian economy, increased petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget will push up the real value of the krone or undermine competitiveness. This is likely to continue as long as we plough more oil money into the economy. The petroleum fund mechanism and moderate and predictable petroleum revenue spending over the central government budget will nevertheless make a considerable contribution to stabilising economic developments ahead. By limiting petroleum revenue spending to the real return on the Fund, we can also ensure that future generations share the benefits provided by our petroleum wealth. House prices are at a historically high level. The rapid growth in household income has been a key factor behind the rise in house prices for some time.