samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In addition to regulators of the country in which the CCP is headquartered, these include foreign regulators. These regulators may be interested parties for many reasons. For example, their currencies may be used in settling the obligations of the CCP, they may have counterparties to the CCP that are headquartered or do significant amounts of business in their country, or they may have FMIs that are linked to the CCP. I want to emphasize that effective cooperative oversight is essential. Otherwise, the risk is that the system will become overly fragmented, with a proliferation of national CCPs. In this case, many of the risk-reducing benefits from CCPs could be lost or severely attenuated. That is because fewer offsetting positions would likely be cleared through any particular CCP and this would reduce the scope for reducing large gross exposures into much smaller net positions. The second safeguard is to ensure fair, open and safe access to global FMIs around the world. It is important, for example, that global CCPs have rules that are not exclusionary or that unnecessarily entrench the position of whatever dealer, firm, or FMI is currently dominant in the market. The third safeguard is to establish rules to ensure that, if a major market participant were to fail, a CCP can liquefy its collateral quickly so that it can meet its obligations in a timely way. But this also needs to be done in a way that would not disrupt financial markets or the CCP’s participants.

Interest rate risk measures the potential for loss which results from a mismatch between the term structure of a bank’s assets (e.g. mortgages) and that of its liabilities (e.g. customer deposits). While the term structure of assets gets increasingly longer, that of liabilities remains very short. The rise in credit risk was due, on the one hand, to the deterioration in the outlook for the Swiss economy. A slowdown in economic growth in Switzerland could have a negative impact on domestic credit quality, with the result that banks would face the prospect of writeoffs on their assets. On the other hand, the continued strong rise in mortgage loans and real estate prices has also caused credit risk to increase further in the past few months. Furthermore, the results of our mortgage lending surveys suggest a high risk appetite on the part of individual banks. In this regard, the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) submitted two important measures for consultation which should counter potential imbalances in the real estate and mortgage markets: more risk-sensitive capital requirements for mortgage lending and a countercyclical capital buffer. With more risk-sensitive capital requirements, incentives for mortgage lending should be structurally improved. The countercyclical buffer is a component of the Basel III framework and represents a variable capital requirement which is only activated in the event of excessive credit growth. As soon as credit growth weakens again, the buffer can be deactivated.
Once the terms of the bail-in are finalised, conversion ratios for the CEs into shares will be established and CE holders will be able to exercise their rights under the CEs resulting in legal title and voting rights being transferred to those bailed in bondholders entitled to compensation. In order to receive legal title and voting rights to the shares, the CE holders are required to provide evidence of their underlying beneficial ownership of the bonds, confirm that they are not acting as a controller and provide instructions for settlement. In this way beneficial ownership of the bank in resolution will stay in the private sector throughout the process. 4  e.g. BRRD article 43. 5  BRRD articles 36 and 74 and associated technical standards. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  •  Reorganisation: Finally, where a firm has been stabilised through a bail-in, this must be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring plan. Bail-in is – explicitly – a prelude to reorganisation and the stability that it creates buys the time to achieve this 6. How much time is required will depend on the options available and how easily and quickly they may be implemented but it is essential to address directly the causes of failure and to restore market confidence so that the firm can access funding and operate normally.

•  Early termination: For resolution to work effectively, resolution authorities need to ensure that counterparties do not use entry into resolution of a firm as grounds for closing out derivatives and other contracts. Disorderly close out could generate exactly the adverse impact of failure on the broader system that resolution is intended to avoid. For that reason, powers to apply a stay on contract terminations and cross defaults are part of the Key Attributes. This power is included in the BRRD, along with to apply a stay power in recognition so that resolution actions taken by non-EU resolution authorities can be enforced within the EU. There are also provisions in the BRRD that will give resolution authorities the power to impose requirements that where EU firms are operating outside the EU, in the absence of a recognition power in the host regime, their financial contracts include terms that ensure the actions of the home resolution authority are enforceable 3. 2  BRRD article 32. 3  BRRD article 55. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  •  Bail-in: So to the bail-in where again the KAs and the BRRD are aligned 4. The most important thing to note here is that bail-in must respect the creditor hierarchy. Under BRRD, a small number of liabilities are excluded from bail-in – for example those with an original maturity of less than seven days, and in exceptional circumstances some additional liabilities may be excluded – for example in order to maintain continuity in critical functions.
A Strong Foundation for Shanghai – Singapore Partnership 5 Over the years, China and Singapore have developed a strong bilateral relationship. Trade and economic ties are robust and strong. This is a firm foundation for the Shanghai – Singapore relationship to grow from strength to strength: In 2015, Sino-Singapore bilateral trade rose 1.6% year-on-year to SGD 123.5 billion or about USD 90 billion. For the third consecutive year, China was Singapore’s largest trading partner. Singapore was China’s 3rd largest trading partner in ASEAN 1. During the same period, Shanghai – Singapore bilateral trade saw steady growth to reach almost USD 13 billion. In 2015, Singapore’s investments into China amounted to about USD 7 billion, an increase of 18.5% from 2014. For the third consecutive year, Singapore was China’s largest foreign investor2. Singapore was China’s 5th largest investment destination. Singapore’s actual investments into Shanghai expanded an impressive 160% year-on-year to reach USD 2.2 billion in 2015. 6 In particular, financial cooperation between both countries has thrived. In September this year, President Xi Jinping met PM Lee Hsien Loong at the side-lines of the G20 meetings in Hangzhou. Both leaders noted the positive progress achieved in the latest government-togovernment (G-to-G) project in Chongqing. Financial cooperation was highlighted as an area that has made strong headway. China and Singapore also achieved several new financial cooperation milestones in 2016.

These include (1) closer integration of global economy through stronger trade and financial linkages, (2) increasingly large and mobile capital flows due to lower costs on cross-border investments, (3) rapid spread of information made possible by advancement in technology, and (4) more pronounced reactions on the part of market participants in times of heightened uncertainties ever since the onset of the global financial crisis. The interplay between market players’ expectations, their self-fulfilling nature and spillover effects paves the way for market exuberance in response to a trigger event. As a clear case in point, the recent ups and downs of financial markets upon new information the market perceives from each round of the Fed’s announcements highlight the role of “shifts in beliefs” on market volatility. What made the post-2008 period particularly vulnerable to such self-fulfilling global turmoil is the current stage of the world economy characterized by lingering structural weaknesses of the crisis countries and limited policy space that reduce the potential of macroeconomic stabilization policy. All of these factors reinforce the role of global shocks and contagion through real linkages as well as expectation channel in transmitting volatility around the world. Notwithstanding the turbulence of the global economy, Asian economies had proven to be resilient in the face of negative external developments, with favourable macroeconomic performance and well-maintained stability during the past period, thanks to the region’s flexible policy framework, robust financial system, and improved risk management as lessons had been learned from the crisis of 1997.
It tracks how most markets have continued to improve towards normal levels (on these indicators at least). An interesting exception is markets for bank funding instruments in Europe, which have become subdued as commercial banks have de-levered and central bank operations have provided cheap medium-term funding in large scale. Perhaps the worst functioning is the market for CMBS which has still not really returned in the UK (in contrast to CLOs which have made a comeback this year). Chart 2 Market functioning “heat map” based on issuance and spreads data(a)(b) P R I M A R Y  Corporat e bonds Bank bonds, unsecured  RMBS  CMBS  S E C O N D A R Y  Corporat e bonds Bank bonds, unsecured  RMBS CMBS  United States United Kingdom Euro area United States United Kingdom Euro area United States United Kingdom Euro area United States United Kingdom Euro area United States United Kingdom Euro area United States United Kingdom Euro area United States United Kingdom Euro area United States Euro area  N  2007  08  Very loose  Loose  Normal  NN NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN NN N NN N N NNN N N N NNNNNNNNNNN N N N NN N N N N N NNNNNNNNNNN N N NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN NNN NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN N  09  10 T ight  11 Very t ight  12  13  No Issuance  Sources: Bloomberg, Dealogic, JP Morgan Chase & Co, Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Bank calculations.

Both FIDE Forum and ICLIF are uniquely positioned to advance corporate governance in the financial sector. After all, they bring together those who represent the ultimate governing body of financial institutions, with great responsibilities and accountability. Such an opportunity must be capitalised and not wasted. FIDE Forum and ICLIF should therefore complement each other and avoid duplication. There are significant benefits to be gained from an effective partnership where resources can be channelled to increase the collective impact of programmes and initiatives by the two organisations. In my own engagements with the industry, over the years, coordination and cooperation among financial institutions can become game changers for the industry. In this respect, we should fully appreciate the distinctive purpose of ICLIF and the FIDE Forum and how they coordinate with each other within the space of directors’ development. With close coordination and cooperation we can avoid the redundancies and wastage and realise the synergistic benefits from the alliance between the two organisation. Being a director of a financial institution will demand a lot from the individual. It is a position of trust where integrity is the norm. It should be, given the critical role of financial institutions in any economy. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  As a network of financial institution directors, FIDE Forum provides a valuable resource for directors as they navigate the heavy responsibilities that come with the position.
According to our estimates, annual inflation is expected to be higher than we forecast in April but lower than its current level. Due to the high base effect in the first half of this year annual inflation will return to the target only in the second half next year. Third. Monetary conditions remain accommodative. Interest rates on loans and deposits are low as compared to current and expected inflation. Our decisions to raise the key rate in March and April have not yet been fully reflected in banks’ interest rates. Banks’ lending and deposit rates are closely connected with yields on government bonds, OFZs. OFZs are risk-free ruble assets for banks and the pricing of all other ruble products of banks is pegged to them. OFZ yields with various maturities change together with the key rate, though to a different extent. The key rate impacts to the most extent the yields on short-term OFZs, with maturities of up to two-three years. These yields have increased significantly over the past two months. They will impact the cost of short-term loans and also deposit rates, which have already started rising. Meanwhile, yields on long-term OFZs are largely determined by long-term inflation expectations, the assessment of the macroeconomic policy stability, and external environment. The cost of long-term financing of investment projects as well as mortgage loan rates depend precisely on the yields on long-term OFZs.

External price impulses via consumer goods are then expected to increase in pace with unit labour costs among our trading partners. With a path for the interest rate and the krone exchange rate in line with the baseline scenario in Inflation Report 1/05, inflation may increase gradually from less than 1 per cent today to close to 2 per cent in mid-2006. Under these assumptions, inflation may stabilise at around 2½ per cent at the threeyear horizon. Developments in line with these projections imply that the output gap will increase to about 1¼ per cent in 2006. As the interest rate is gradually increased to a more normal level, growth in private demand will probably ease, and capacity utilisation may be brought down and stabilise. Developments since the March Inflation Report was presented do not provide grounds for changing this perception of the state of the real economy. The results of the wage settlement so far suggest that wage growth this year will be somewhat lower than projected by Norges Bank. Inflation, on the other hand, has been broadly in line with expectations, and there has been virtually no change in the krone exchange rate. The inflation outlook has not changed substantially since the March Inflation Report was published. At its meeting on 20 April, the Executive Board stated the following: “The Norwegian economy is growing at a solid pace, and capacity utilisation is rising.
Shanghai will become a big financial centre, first serving the Chinese market, and later, an international financial centre. Mumbai and Dubai also aspire to be international financial hubs. India will grow its manufacturing sector in a big way and make its presence felt in the export market. All countries, including Singapore, will have to adapt to these realities. Domestically, we have other long-term headaches. We are facing a demographic crunch, with a rapidly-ageing population and a declining birth rate. Our people are increasingly mobile. In a borderless world, ensuring that our best remain rooted to Singapore, physically and emotionally, will be a challenge. Despite these challenges, I am optimistic about our prospects. I base my optimism on our fundamentals. We have two basic strengths – good governance and our ability to nurture and attract talent. Good governance and talent form a virtuous cycle for sustaining economic growth. Let me elaborate. First, good governance. A World Bank Institute report released in September 2006 ranked Singapore among the top 10% of countries around the world with good governance. Good governance is possible only if you have an honest, capable and committed government. In our case, the government must, in fact, be exceptional to overcome the exceptional challenges faced by Singapore, given our land and space constraints and geopolitics. For the next decade at least, I do not see any danger of a drop in the quality of our governance. The new team under Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong is firmly in place.

There are clear needs for developing other channels of financial intermediation in the longer term, in order to promote diversification and ensure financial stability and sustainable growth. However while the capital markets on the Mainland are still in their nascent stage and face some difficulties in development, the banking system will remain the most important channel of financial intermediation in the foreseeable future. Thus, those engaged in the banking sector will continue, for a long period of time, to play an important role in ensuring the effective intermediation of funds. Given the rapidly changing macroeconomic environment, the banking sector professionals face a difficult task in achieving this mission. The changes involved in this broad picture include supervisory policies for the banking sector, relationship between the regulatory authority and banks, and governance arrangements of individual banks. In line with the government’s reform and open policies and under the supervision of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, Mainland banks have become increasingly commercialized. Banking professionals have progressed from their former mode of following the authorities’ policy instructions to a more active role in assessment of loan applications before making credit decisions. This is not an easy change. It involves both time and considerable adjustment in the thinking. Besides, good tools are a must for a good job: bank employees have to increase their knowledge of the banking business in a market economy and enhance their professional standards.
Jon Nicolaisen: Challenges for the payment system Speech by Mr Jon Nicolaisen, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the Finance Norway’s payments conference, Oslo, 12 November 2014. *  *  *  Introduction The modern history of payments in Norway began 200 years ago. A clause was included in the Constitution stipulating that the Storting (Norwegian parliament) should “supervise the monetary affairs of the realm”. Two years later, in 1816, Norges Bank was founded. The Storting delegated “supervisory authority” over monetary affairs to the Bank. Today, private banks perform payment services for the general public. Norges Bank has become the bankers’ bank. According to the Norges Bank Act, Norges Bank shall promote an efficient payment system. The Bank issues cash and ensures efficient settlement between banks’ accounts with Norges Bank. In addition, the Bank has responsibility for overseeing and supervising those parts of the payment system located outside of Norges Bank. Finanstilsynet (Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) has responsibility for supervising the retail payment systems. 1 Payment services play a unique role in the economy. The payment system can be compared to the plumbing system in a house. As long as it functions, we do not give it a second thought. But if it fails, the consequences are immediate and serious. The Norwegian payment system is efficient and up-to-date. Fast, cheap and reliable payments save time and provide security to households and the business sector. It gives the nation a competitive advantage over many other countries.

The result can be that an inexpensive solution – BankAxept – is supplanted in favour of more expensive solutions. In Denmark, merchants charge a fee to customers who use a credit card. A similar practice in Norway could keep down payment costs. The profit banks earn on the use of international payment cards is higher than on BankAxept. It is therefore likely that, in isolation, it is in the interest of many banks for customers to choose international payment cards. New European regulations that will set a cap on the fees issuers of payment cards can charge are in the pipeline. This will likely weaken banks’ incentive to promote international payment cards. Banks continue to lose money on payment services. The cost survey we are presenting today does show that banks’ cost coverage has increased somewhat over time. But income still amounts to only 76 percent of the costs associated with payment services. Banks lose money on all main types of payment instruments, except for international cards. The losses must be covered by income from other banking activities. Pricing that does not cover costs may be a conscious choice by banks. Some customers may believe that they should not have to pay for using their own money. At the same time, mispricing and losses weaken banks’ ability and willingness to promote efficient solutions and invest in new infrastructure. That is not a forward-looking approach. We must invest now to ensure efficient and secure payments also in the future.
It is available on our website along with other data and information useful to policymakers, business people and the general public. We use our website to share what we learn about our diverse District, and you will find detailed information about the region at the site. I invite you to visit newyorkfed.org to explore our highly localized maps and information on small business, credit and housing conditions and even the latest job openings at the New York Fed. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Finally, and crucially, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, we are working with our colleagues in Washington, D.C., and at other agencies to help put the nation’s financial system on a firmer footing. Our supervisors are working hard to ensure that our District’s banks are operating safely and soundly. Although much has been done, we are not finished and are determined to keep at it. I recognize fully that there can be no return to pre-crisis business as usual – whether on the part of the financial sector or on the part of regulators like ourselves. All in all, there is a lot to keep myself and my colleagues busy. National economic conditions Now I’d like to turn to the national and regional economy. The incoming data on the U.S. economy generally has been a bit more upbeat over the past few months, suggesting that the recovery may be finally establishing a somewhat firmer footing.

Mr Noyer discusses “the euro from A to Z”  Speech delivered by Mr Christian Noyer, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the European Union Centre, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Atlanta on 14 January 2000. *  *  *  It gives me great pleasure to speak to such a (young) audience about what is, after all, the world’s youngest and newest currency. As indicated by the title of my speech, I do not intend to enter into complex economic and political considerations concerning the pros and cons of the introduction of the euro under the specific economic and political conditions prevailing in Europe. Rather, I should like to provide you with a concise overview, from A to Z, of the main elements of the new institutional and operational framework under which monetary policy is being conducted in Europe following the introduction of the euro. Nonetheless, I do hope to be able to enhance your understanding of the euro, both in the broader context of European integration and in terms of the practical functioning and implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. In this context, you will see that there are some similarities between the institutional framework and conduct of monetary policy in the United States and in Europe. At the same time, there are also substantial differences, particularly with regard to the political and economic framework in which monetary policy has to operate on your side and our side of the Atlantic.