samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The DTI carries out its supervisory responsibilities using its own staff; the Treasury, on the other hand, while setting the legal framework and policy directions for regulation, leaves most of the detailed regulatory functions to others. Under one piece of legislation - the 1987 Banking Act - the Bank of England carries out prudential supervision of banks. Under another, the 1986 Financial Services Act, the Treasury delegates its powers to the Securities and Investments Board, which in turn recognises a number of front-line regulators. These front-line regulators cover different sections of the market. One, the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA), is responsible for securities houses; another, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO), for fund managers. These two regulators undertake both prudential supervision and conduct of business regulation. The third, the Personal Investments Authority (PIA), is responsible for the retail sector, and has principally a conduct of business remit although it is responsible for the prudential supervision of independent financial advisers (IFAs). So, in effect, there is a layered approach to the regulation of financial services in the UK, with different powers held at each level. (To complete the picture, the Building Societies Commission supervises building societies (Savings and Loans) - though the largest of them are now converting to bank status. And the Department of Social Security is responsible for the supervision of occupational pension schemes.)

With the promising economic potentials ahead of us, I would like to reemphasize our shared vision of “What we shall expect to see for the future of the Greater Mekong Subregion” and “How we can achieve such prosperity.” 4. I picture the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) in the next twenty years as a much more connected and integrated region: a region where we are not only connected solely by a river, but by various modes of transportation, where one can travel conveniently, where trade and investment can flow across efficiently, and where prosperity can be widely enjoyed even by those in the rural areas. Although we are not yet there, I strongly believe that this vision can come true. 5. We always hear the saying “Rome was not built in a day”. Thus, we have to start working together towards our shared vision starting today. There is a great deal of preparatory work to be done; but in my view, some of the most crucial tasks are infrastructure development and businesses access to funds. The first task is channelling intraregional funds to infrastructure projects, followed by the second task of promoting economic growth and equality within the region through enhancing financial markets and supporting private financing. Ladies and Gentlemen, 6. Let me highlight key issues on the first preparatory work, which is financing infrastructure development. The ADB has already committed at least 9 billion US dollars1 to fund its GMS development projects in the pipeline.
If, for example, a central bank raises interest rates because inflation is edging upwards, it can expect this to have a dampening effect on the economy. At the same time, monetary policy authorities must always bear in mind that monetary policy can only create favourable conditions for growth temporarily; in the long term, expansionary monetary policy cannot achieve a lasting stimulation of aggregate demand. If it nevertheless attempts this, it will have an inflationary impact in the long term, and destabilise the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  economy. To avoid this, the central bank must focus on a goal which is achievable with the resources at its disposal, namely ensuring price stability. Price stability is not an end in itself. By ensuring price stability, monetary policy creates conditions favourable for companies and households, and thereby makes an important contribution to stable economic development. Fiscal policy is aimed at ensuring that expenditure and receipts are balanced over the long term. At the same time, budgetary policy has to take account of the state of the economy. This is how the Confederation’s primary fiscal policy goal is set out in the Federal Constitution. 1 These clear principles ensure that fiscal policy can fulfil its important function of stabilising the economy without the soundness of public finances being called into question. If fiscal policy focuses exclusively on encouraging growth and pays no attention to budget soundness, it runs the risk of losing its room for manoeuvre.

Martin, and S. Pruitt (2012): “The effects of official bond market intervention in Europe”, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, mimeo; Eser, F., and B. Schwaab (2013): “The yield impact of central bank asset purchases: The case of the ECB’s Securities Markets Programme”, ECB Working Paper Series No. 1587 and Ghysels, E., J. Idier, S. Manganelli, and O. Vergote (2014): “A high frequency assessment of the ECB Securities Markets Programme”, ECB Working Paper Series No. 1642; Altavilla, C., D. Giannone, and M. Lenza (2014): “The financial and macroeconomic effects of the OMT announcements”, CSEF Working Paper No. 352. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Inflation developments since the Great Recession Euro area inflation developments over the past six years have been remarkably volatile. From the 4.1% peak of July 2008, HICP inflation fell markedly at the trough of the recession and reached negative levels in the short period between June and October 2009. However, in the second half of 2009, prices started increasing again, also due to a rise in energy prices. In spite of a persisting level of economic slack, the HICP inflation climbed rapidly and steadily up to a peak of 3% from September to November 2011. Similar developments could be observed in the U.S., where inflation remained stable after a decline in the first months of 2009 and gave rise to a debate on the “missing disinflation”.4 If those developments were somewhat surprising for their swiftness, more recent inflation dynamics have displayed a remarkably high degree of persistence.
10 By 1889, all bar two British banks had limited their shareholders’ liability and nearly two-thirds had opted for reserve liability. 11 But even reserve liability was felt to be precarious, stoking rather than abating banking crises. As Bank of England Deputy Governor Catterns stated in a secret memo of 1937 “today a bank could not in a crisis make a call on shareholders without aggravating the crisis”. 12 In the 1950s, the major British banks eliminated their remaining uncalled capital (Turner (2009)). Entrenching shareholder rights Yet, even once firmly rooted, limited liability quickly gave rise to a new set of questions. If managers were no longer personally liable for failure, what incentivised them to protect investors’ money? And what provided the incentives for shareholders, increasingly dispersed and with their claims protected from downside risk, to remain engaged? In the 19th century, maximising shareholder return was not the centrepiece of companies’ objectives or directors’ duties. To be sure, paying a regular dividend was important and shareholders could – and often did – challenge directors regarding its size. But wider considerations played as important a role. Introducing his reflections in 1885 on “the rights and duties of shareholders”, George Rae observed that “when a man becomes a shareholder in a bank he becomes to all intents and  7  Rae (1885). 8  Acheson, Hickson & Turner (2010). 9  Button et al (2015). 10  Esty (1998). 11  Acheson et al (2010). 12  Turner (2014).

Ardian Fullani: Agreement between the Bank of Albania and the Competition Authority Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, Tirana, 17 July 2007. *  *  *  Dear participants, I am pleased to have concluded this co-operation agreement between the Bank of Albania and the Competition Authority. In observance of the legal responsibilities of the institutions we represent, this agreement concludes the formal basis for cooperative efforts, in terms of achieving the objective of enhancing the competition conditions, in which the banking and financial activity is being conducted. Fair competition promotes the efficiency in the banking business and refines the composition and the functioning of the banking market, by providing significant services to clients and the public at large, being users of banking and financial services. It has been for some years now that the Albanian economy and the financial system are in an intensive process of integration into the regional economies and markets. This process requires the improvement of the legal and regulative framework for developing the business and the enhancement of the human and institutional capacities to cope with the challenges deriving from the economic openness and the enhancement of competition.
Criterion 2, which states that for given inflation developments, the loss Lt will increase with fluctuations in economic activity, is covered by the first and second segments. Criterion 3, which states that monetary policy shall be robust, is covered by the second, third and fourth segments. The adjustments made in March were expressed by slightly increasing the weight given to the output gap, , because financial imbalances can often build up in periods of high capacity utilisation. At the same time, weight was given to avoiding substantial deviations in the interest rate from a normal level. This consideration is expressed in the final segment in the loss function. This can help to mitigate the risk of a buildup of financial imbalances, even in periods when capacity utilisation is not particularly high. Chart: Key policy rate Normally, the key policy rate cannot achieve several objectives simultaneously. In the case of conflicting objectives, the choice of interest rate path will involve a trade-off between different considerations. If monetary policy only took into account the low level of inflation, the key policy rate would be rapidly reduced and kept close to zero for a good while. Inflation might then pick up faster, partly as a result of a weaker krone. In the light of the trade-off against other considerations, however, the Bank does not want to accelerate the pace of inflation. The result would be a pronounced impact on output and employment.

Ravi Menon: Monetary Authority of Singapore's Annual Report 2018/19 Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at MAS' Annual Report 2018/19 Media Conference, Singapore, 27 June 2019. * * * Good morning. Welcome to MAS’ Annual Report media conference. GLOBAL ECONOMY The outlook for the global economy has deteriorated in recent months. In April, the IMF revised downwards its forecast for global GDP growth to 3.3%, from 3.7% last October. Last year at this time, at our annual report conference, I said that if the trade conflict between the US and China escalates into a trade war, all three engines of global growth – manufacturing, trade, and investment – will stall. We are now in the throes of a trade (and technology) war, and all three engines have indeed stalled. Global manufacturing is in a synchronised downturn. Last month, the global Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) for manufacturing fell to 49.8, its lowest level in more than six years. In the US, new orders are near their weakest levels in three years. In the Eurozone, the downturn in manufacturing is even more severe. In China, the manufacturing PMI is in negative territory. In Asia, manufacturing output is contracting in about half of the economies, including Singapore. Global trade volumes have declined for two quarters in a row – in Q4 2018 and Q1 2019. This consecutive two quarters of contraction in world trade is rare. The last time this occurred was ten years ago.
At the margin, it might have led to a little more caution among financial institutions, but unless policymakers had been prepared to shock the economy into a period of slow growth it seems unlikely that the financial crisis would have been wholly averted. However, modestly higher Bank Rate might have had the merit of discouraging households and firms from increasing their own debt levels, and therefore left the economy somewhat more resilient in the face of the crisis. Thirdly, action only in the UK might have had limited effect on what has proved to be an internationally widespread crisis whose roots lie to a significant extent in the excess of savings in Asian countries and consequent excess of capital inflows into the US and Europe. The conventional answer to the question about the pre-crisis period therefore has become that policymakers did not have the right tools available. In the UK there was no provision for macroprudential instruments to be used to deal directly with the problems building up within financial institutions, and to a lesser extent in the indebtedness of households and firms. A more targeted approach to these issues seems highly preferable to using the blunt instrument of Bank Rate. But despite these cautions, it is possible that it would have been preferable to have taken a more long-term view of the risks to inflation from economic instability.

Kate Barker: Monetary policy – from stability to financial crisis and back? Speech by Ms Kate Barker, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England, at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, 8 March 2010. *  *  *  I would like to thank Matthew Corder and Jake Horwood for research assistance and I am also grateful for helpful comments from other colleagues. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England or other members of the Monetary Policy Committee. It is a particular pleasure for me to have the opportunity to return to NIESR, where I worked in the early 1980s in the aftermath of a previous recession, to talk in my present role as a policy-maker. At that time, one of my responsibilities was to monitor and project world trade – I am very thankful that I didn’t have to deal with the analysis of a fall in trade of the magnitude seen in this recession, when world trade 1 fell by a cumulative 18% over the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, before starting to recover – up 11% on the low point by the end of 2009.
Allow me to highlight some of our resilient features: •  We continue to have a strong current account position with the current account last year registering a surplus of 9 percent of GDP, or around 35 billion US dollars, thanks largely to a substantial saving on energy imports. •  Our international reserves have been at a healthy level, standing at three times of the short-term external debt we hold. •  Our capital markets are relatively less exposed to the risk of capital flight, with foreign holdings at less than 9 percent of the Thai government and Bank of Thailand bond outstanding, compared with more than 30 percent in some other emerging markets in the region. •  External debt of the Thai corporate sector has been relatively low, hovering around 13 percent of total corporate debt. And, most of the external debt belongs to large corporations which have used the proceeds to finance their investment aboard and are able to manage their exchange rate risks sufficiently well. As a result, the currency mismatch does not pose a threat to the Thai corporate sector, unlike what they experienced during the 1997 economic crisis. Taken together, the strength of Thailand’s external position on many fronts has helped the Thai economy withstand the recent global financial turmoil, and would continue to provide cushions against possible external shocks in the future. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to be complacent with where we stand and fail to anticipate greater challenges ahead.

There has over the last 30 years been a shift in the pensions industry towards defined contribution schemes – away from defined benefit schemes, because of the latter’s unsustainability. But this shift towards defined contribution schemes has also led to a fragmented market place in many countries, and one where responsibility is placed on the individual to manage his or her funds and take on the risks. It is also by and large a landscape of funds that actively manage investments, rather than passively. So it’s a fragmented marketplace, people have to choose between different funds to invest in and take their own risks, and the funds are largely actively managed. It’s the case in the US, several countries in Europe, and in the UK and Australia, for example. That combination of factors, particularly the fragmentation of the pensions market and active management, has meant higher costs than are sustainable in the long term. 27. The solution has to be greater pooling of funds and a greater reliance on passive investment management. Active management is not all it has been cracked up to be: it has not proven its worth for most ordinary savers preparing for their retirement. We do have to move towards a system, in a whole range of countries, of helping people save for the long term through passive investment funds, and pool savings to avoid fragmentation and excessive marketing costs.
Many elements of requirements for the risk management framework contribute to risk governance. For instance, the requirement for effective board audit and risk committee, regular reviews of the effectiveness of the framework and its implementation and so on. The Board plays a critical role in risk governance. The Board sets standards and expectations that would influence the culture and management of the business, and ultimately, the quality of risk governance. Common shortcoming occurs when Board fails to serve as a sufficient “check and balance” on the activities of the senior management, causing the business to focus excessively on short-term growth at the expense of long term stakeholders’ interest. For this reason, Bank Negara Malaysia places greater expectation on the roles and responsibility of Board and senior management. This expectation can be found in many policy documents issued by Bank Negara Malaysia since the past several years and specifically provided for in the Financial Services Act (FSA) and the Islamic Financial Services Act (AFSA). For an institution’s risk governance to be effective, there must be a strong risk culture which is consistent with the institution’s espoused values and risk appetite. You may asked, how does Board assess risk culture? There isn’t simple and straightforward answer to this question. Some institutions undertake “climate review” among its management and staff to gauge the culture whilst another approach could involve focus group. Ultimately, audit, compliance and risk management functions would have opportunities in the course of their work to observe the risk culture throughout the business.

Or does it represent more of an opportunity? Europe must show that it is a prosperous and secure area. In the short term migration will have an economic impact in the form of a fiscal expansion with some positive impact on growth. Germany’s fiscal situation is likely to deteriorate by around 0.3% to 0.4% of GDP in 2016 and 2017. This deterioration will be weaker in other countries. In the long term we will also have to look at the impact of the refugee crisis. This population is different, and care will have to be taken in integrating the migrants into the labour market, especially in Germany. In the medium term, from a demographic point of view, it can be a positive factor. The key issue is that of integrating migrants into the labour market in line with their profiles. All of these economic aspects are known and straightforward. From an economic perspective, this situation is not insurmountable; it is above all a political issue. The more integration we achieve at the economic level, the more it will be accepted politically. But all of this cannot be done in a day. Europe needs a young and well-trained workforce. We can create an opportunity out of a tragic situation, but it is not going to be easy. It is possible for a country to organise migration, and we have already done so in the past. The issue of security to combat the threat of terrorism will become a major challenge for governments in the months to come.
More specifically, proponents of a “new economy” contend that advances in computer power and software - combined with deregulation in the telecommunications, transportation and financial industries - have produced many new profitable business opportunities. Using advances in technology and tapping into highly liquid world capital markets, many new and existing firms have been able to exploit these opportunities quickly. Furthermore, the proponents of a “new economy” argue, information technology has produced numerous cost savings for business operations. The growing role of the internet as the medium to exchange large volumes of information and conduct efficient transactions - among businesses as well as between businesses and consumers - will lead to a further acceleration of productivity growth. Thus, this view concludes, the increase in the output of the computer/software industry is both a cause and an effect of these deeper trends. We are just at the early stages of understanding the surge in productivity growth. But recent empirical work is beginning to grapple with some of these issues. It appears that a significant part of the increase 3  BIS Review 29/2000  in productivity relates to increased quantities of capital per worker, primarily computers and software. However, the largest part of the improvement in productivity growth has yet to be fully understood. We can not yet resolve the “new economy” debate. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the longer productivity improvement continues, the harder it becomes to view this improvement merely as a cyclical phenomenon.

Notably, it is true that as the unemployment rate has come down, the pace of wage gains has increased. But what is different in the current environment is that productivity growth has increased roughly in tandem with the rate of compensation growth, thereby negating the inflationary impulses of these wage gains. Thus, probably the most notable feature of the remarkable expansion in the US economy over this past decade has been a rebound in the growth rate of productivity. Whereas the productivity growth rate had languished at the 1½% level throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s, it rose steadily over the decade of the 1990s, reaching an astonishing 5.7% annual growth rate in the second half of 1999. The question that remains unanswered - and troublesome - is whether this significant improvement in productivity growth, which has made the US economy one of the most competitive in the world today, is temporary or permanent. What is less often taken into account is that the US productivity boom of the 1990s has taken place against a background of very low inflation in the United States and rapidly decelerating inflation in almost every region of the world. Through much of the 1990s, weak economic performance elsewhere in the world has held down commodity price inflation and strengthened the dollar.