samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The Riksbank has collected data on thousands of individual households’ finances from Statistics Sweden for several years now. These statistics show that the households with the largest debts also have the highest incomes and the largest wealth. We have also examined what would happen to households’ ability to pay if unemployment or interest rates were to rise. The overall assessment is that households at present cannot cause loan losses to such an extent that the stability of the banking system would be threatened. However, even if the household sector’s ability to pay on the whole is good, there is of course a risk that individual households will borrow too much and may experience payment problems. With regard to financial stability, I see no serious risks in the growing household indebtedness and rising property prices. Are there any risks with regard to the inflation target? This question is slightly more difficult to answer. How developments in the asset markets, such as the housing market, will affect monetary policy for a central bank with an inflation target is a subject debated all over the world by academics and economic decision-makers. The problem can be formulated roughly as follows: The increases we have seen in household indebtedness are not sustainable in the long term; household debts cannot grow twice as fast as incomes over long periods of time.

In 2005 and again in 2009, the key policy rate fell to very low levels. In both cases, our forecasts showed that economic agents would have to expect a higher interest rate level after a period and they illustrated how long it would take for the interest rate to return to its normal level. Moreover, it is our experience that it has become easier to talk about monetary policy when we can speak openly about the future. 3  6  The deviation was measured on 23 June after the publication of Monetary Policy Report 2/10. BIS Review 113/2010  Liquidity instruments Central bank balance sheet – stylised  The key policy rate must have a clear impact on market rates if the key rate and the interest rate forecast are to be effective. Norges Bank provides central bank funding to achieve this. We provide loans to banks so that they have sufficient funding to settle their accounts each day. These loans result, in isolation, in higher central bank reserves, i.e. increased deposits from private banks in the central bank. In addition, the central bank reserves are affected by other movements on our balance sheet, such as government account transactions or changes in demand for notes and coin. Norges Bank takes account of changes in banks’ liquidity due to these factors when determining the size of our loans to banks in order to maintain the intended level of bank liquidity.
Given the economy’s current position and its performance indicators, it is expected to continue its strong and comprehensive growth in the coming years. Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, Inflation, which many countries suffer from, is a global phenomenon and it is also a natural and inevitable result of strong economic growth. In the Kingdom, inflation growth rates accelerated to 4.1 percent in 2007 and to 11.1 percent in July 2008, but then, it decreased to 10.9 percent in August 2008. This has posed a difficult challenge due to the contradiction  BIS Review 124/2008  1  between measures that control inflation, i.e. strict tightening of domestic liquidity and public spending, and the ambitious goals of enhancing economic growth fundamentals that require expansionary fiscal policies to build and complete the various development projects and improve citizens’ standard of living. After having witnessed low levels of inflation, accompanied by moderate and sometimes low economic growth in the past decades, the economy began to grow strongly in response to restructuring reform policies adopted by your wise government since about seven years. Inflationary signs have not shown up until 2006 when the demand side for goods and services began to exceed supply, impacting prices. The wave of high prices worldwide along with high expectations of individuals and institutions have played a role in increasing pressures on available resources and, consequently, higher inflation especially following the considerable improvement in the government income. The phenomenon of inflation has become at the top of your concerns.

Urban Bäckström: The current situation for Swedish monetary policy Speech by Mr Urban Bäckström, Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank and Chairman of the Board of Directors and President of the Bank for International Settlements, before the Swedish Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, Stockholm, 27 March 2001. *  *  *  First a word of thanks to the Committee for the invitation to have a stimulating discussion about the current situation for monetary policy. An open discussion of these matters is important for people’s perception of the Riksbank’s legitimacy. I cannot think of a more suitable forum than you as representatives of our principal, the Riksdag. Risk of a slowdown after a series of years with strong economic growth We can look back on a series of years with strong economic growth in Sweden, accompanied by low inflation. As far as can be judged at present, one explanation for this combination is that the Swedish economy is functioning more efficiently. To some extent, however, it has also been a cyclical phenomenon. After the economic crisis that ravaged Sweden in the early 1990s, there were plenty of unutilised resources to draw on and therefore less risk of rising production hitting the ceiling at an early stage. Sooner or later, however, demand growth that is excessively rapid and persistent will generate imbalances in the economy and that normally pushes the rate of price and wage increases up. Such a course of events is liable to result in a recession, with falling output and rising unemployment.
Turning now to labour markets, also here progress has been rather uneven across areas. A number of countries have lowered marginal tax rates in order to make their tax systems more employment friendly. Some progress has generally also been made with the introduction of more flexibility in working contracts and practices. In many other areas, however, important reforms have not yet got off the ground. For instance, few changes have been made regarding employment protection policies in euro area countries, which remain among the strictest in the industrial countries. Also, reforms aiming to simplify and limit unemployment benefit systems and thereby enhance employment growth have only slowly progressed in almost all euro area countries. The emergence of skill shortages and tight labour markets in several euro area countries shows that structural problems still remain and need to be solved. The euro area could use its potential much better, as is illustrated by its relatively low labour force participation. Whereas, in the euro area, the labour force participation rate was 67% in 1999, it amounted to 77% in the US. BIS Review 61/2001  3  All in all, we see that some traditional hurdles to market flexibility and competition are slowly being removed, but as regards the current state of affairs in the euro area there is certainly still plenty of scope and urgent need for improvement. Structural reforms are of paramount importance not only for raising the growth potential of the economy but, most importantly, for increasing employment prospects in the euro area.

With this confidence and trust, policyholders will continue to be willing to use insurance as a means of managing their risks and investments, with all the attendant benefits this brings to the wider economy. UK insurers can only be internationally competitive, or invest for the long term, if they are financially sound. Policyholders will only buy innovative products if they are comfortable they are adequately protected. This is why we see the second of the Solvency II review objectives as the foundation on which measures to pursue the other objectives can be built. There are a number of ways in which the prudential regulatory regime seeks to ensure policyholders are protected. Firms have to hold capital to meet at least a 1 in 200 event in the bad times. And they have to hold reserves not only to meet their likely commitments, but to allow the business to be transferred to a third party. Ultimately there is also the backstop of FSCS coverage for many policyholders. And these mechanisms are all linked: if the capital and reserves firms hold are not adequate, the FSCS backstop needs to be used, the residual cost of which is paid for by surviving firms who in turn may pass the cost to their policyholders or shareholders. Now, it’s our view that in the round, the current regime provides about the right amount of protection for policyholders.
Christian Noyer: International financial stability and the role of central banks in the crisis Address by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France, at the Plenary session: “The international economy in transition” of the Montreal Conference, Montreal, 9 June 2008. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is a great honour for me to take part in this conference and to set out, before such a distinguished audience, my thoughts on the role of central banks regarding financial stability in the current environment. I should like to organise these thoughts around the following five questions: 1)  Do central banks have a role to play regarding financial stability? 2)  What have they done since the start of the financial turmoil in the summer of 2007? 3)  Were they right to take these steps? 4)  Why have they responded differently as regards their monetary policy stance? 5)  What lessons can we learn for the future? 1)  Do central banks have a role to play regarding financial stability? This question might appear paradoxical when we recall that historically the raison d’être of central banks has been to ensure financial stability, that is, the smooth functioning of financial markets and payment systems. In this context, they play the role of the ultimate liquidity provider, in other words, of lender of last resort. However, some people now regard this role as inconsistent with that which in the meantime has universally become the primary task of central banks, i.e.

As regards the central banks’ response to the crisis, although they converged in their shortterm liquidity management methods, they nonetheless responded differently in terms of monetary policy. The underlying reasons for this divergence are both due to the nature of the shocks that the economies are facing and the mechanisms of their propagation to the real economy and to nominal variables. Over the recent period, the industrialised economies have undergone three common shocks: rocketing real-estate prices at least in a number of countries, soaring commodity prices and finally the financial crisis triggered last summer. They have also experienced specific shocks: the real-estate crisis in the United States in a context of household overindebtedness, for example. In the latter case, the economic slowdown already underway since mid-2006 and the expected consequences of the credit crisis on economic activity over the medium term has led the US monetary authorities to change their monetary policy stance. The very different situation in the euro area, where activity remained favourable, has led the ECB to keep its monetary policy stance unchanged in spite of the uncertainties generated by the financial crisis in a context also characterised by persistent inflationary tensions. 5)  What lessons can we learn for the future? At the current juncture, financial turmoil is still affecting the markets.
The level of investment, ten years after the emergence of the crisis, is below the pre-crisis maximum in the EU as a whole, and in the CESEE region as well. Exception is countries such as Macedonia, Poland, and Estonia recently, where investment pattern was different, and the current level is above the pre-crisis one. Chart 3: GDP and demand components, 2008=100 CEE  160.0  160.0  140.0  120.0  120.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  80.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  20.0  20.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  40.0  180.0  SEE  140.0  Baltics  180.0 160.0  140.0  140.0  120.0  120.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  80.0  60.0  60.0  40.0  40.0  20.0  20.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  160.0  Region  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  180.0  Source: Eurostat and NBRM calculations. At the current juncture, an important question is whether such slow post-crisis investment recovery should be perceived as a natural cyclical adjustment, or are there some structural forces that also play role?

But, as a French and European citizen, I cannot help and feel proud of having one the two main currencies in the world. In sum, benefits of the euro include a high degree of credibility of monetary policy reflected in the level of long-term interest rates; diminished exchange rate volatility; completion of the single market and encouragement to cross-border trade. None of this, of course, can be taken for granted. Benign conditions currently prevailing on financial markets can be reversed. Shocks may be coming, which would impact negatively European economies. Despite some signs of cooling, imbalances are still building up, especially in the housing sector, fuelled by a dynamic expansion of credit, although in no way comparable to those in some other developed economies. But I have the strong conviction that we are fully equipped to deal with any contingency, and, provided the necessary structural reforms are undertaken, keep the economy on a path of growth and stability. BIS Review 51/2007  1  2)  How have those successes been achieved? A lot comes, in my view, from the institutional and operational framework in which monetary policy is developed and implemented. The independence of the ECB and of the 13 participating NCBs is enshrined in the Treaty. They are institutionally, operationally and financially independent from European Community institutions and national governments. We have a clear and transparent definition of price stability: inflation below but close to 2% over the medium-term. The monetary policy framework of the Eurosystem is “medium-term” oriented.
Projections The persistently high external costs and more dynamic consumption than anticipated lead to a significant revision of the inflation trajectory with respect to the previous MP Report. Part of it had already been incorporated in the May policy decision, when the Board decided to raise the MPR to 8.25%. The central scenario assumes that the annual CPI variation will continue to rise to somewhat less than 13% during the third quarter. Then it will begin to decline, ending 2022 around 10%, which exceeds the March estimate significantly. Core inflation is also revised substantially. Our forecast for December is changed by 2.5 percentage points up from March. In this case, the main changes are due to higher food prices included in this index, the effect of the exchange rate hike and logistical bottlenecks in the prices of goods. The greater private consumption that is being observed and the secondround effects of the increase in expected inflation also play a role. Looking ahead to 2023 and 2024, the central scenario continues to assume that headline and core inflation will decline steadily, both to around 3% by mid-2024, i.e., the end of the two-year policy horizon. In this projection, headline inflation will close 2023 at around 3%, while core inflation will be closer to 4% annually. The decline in core inflation will be  4  slower than in headline inflation and will start later than anticipated in March, reflecting the greater persistence of external cost shocks and the importance of second-round effects (figure 10).

On the other hand, the focus of micro-prudential supervision is to safeguard individual financial institutions from idiosyncratic risks and prevent them from taking too much risk, while ensuring the consumer protection of both investors and depositors.  In the past years, many of these issues have been addressed. In terms of macroprudential policy, we have seen in all the European countries measures implemented on the supply side, namely capital buffers, and in some member states even measures on the demand side. This is also the case for Romania which introduced debt service-to-income and loan-to-value requirements. 1/4   Some of the topics, like financial inclusion and inequality are just as important as macro and microprudential policies and I welcome the fact that some presentations addressed these aspects.  Financial inclusion and income inequality are more and more a subject of interest for central banks. It is a topic that was on the agenda of a previous financial stability seminar and today’s also, and in my opinion, it deserves a special attention.  The papers discussed these days lead to the idea that higher financial inclusion will reduce inequality, but what I would like to emphasize is that in low income and developing countries in general, the most important factor in reducing inequalities stays within the national authorities competencies.  Proper economic policies must be implemented in order to ensure inclusive economic growth, which generates the reduction of inequality. As it was very well underlined previously, households in Romania borrow more than the inhabitants of peer countries.
Essentially, it would not result in the marginalisation of anyone target group, in particular women. Such programmes would therefore best serve its purpose as part of the core curriculum. Indeed, the national education system can play a pivotal role in financial literacy within a country. The responsibility of promoting economic and financial literacy needs to be a collaborative effort amongst the authorities, the financial service providers and the community to connect to the different target groups including all social groups. These would include the lower income groups, workers and businesses. Important are programmes directed to families where women have an important role and to engage those we have not been able to participate fully to benefit from the favourable economic environment prevailing in the region. BIS Review 64/2004  3  Among the successful financial education programmes are those with specific objectives that are tailored to meet particular needs. This includes programmes to promote savings for specific objectives; for education; or for retirement. The education programmes can also be linked to other objectives such as good health, house ownership and so on. Financial products can be tailored for such purposes to not only to promote interest but to also meet these objectives. All distribution channels need to be relied on to maximise the effectiveness of financial education programmes. Formal training programmes can be reinforced by web based content via the Internet. The World Wide Web offers dramatic economies of scale in terms of distribution of content at low cost.

The increase in the relative significance of the financial sector in most Asian economies can be seen in terms of the momentum in the financialisation of savings and the increase in the volume of financial transactions being conducted through the formal financial sector. These trends are being reinforced by the shift of activities that is taking place from the traditional sectors to the industrial and services sectors. On average, the industrial and services sector now accounts for 74% of the economy in Asia, compared to 60% in 1980. In contrast, agriculture now accounts for 12%, compared to 26% in 1980. Involved in this transformation, women have demonstrated a high degree of mobility, participating in all segments of economic activity. Most discernable is the increasing participation of women in the services sector. Here in Hong Kong, the percentage of women in the services sector relative to the total population increased from 43% in 1980 to 87% in 1999. Similarly in Indonesia, the rise was from 32% to 42%, and in Malaysia, it was from 33% to 57% and in Thailand, from 18% to 34%. In Asia, the demographic structure also reinforces the economic potential of Asia. The population in Asia continues to grow at a relatively high and stable rate to account for more than half the world’s population. Of significance is the relatively young demographic structure in Asia. More than 50% of women fall in the age group 15 to 49 years, similar to that for men.
The reverse side of that same coin is that as more payments are carried out outside of the banking system, they also start to fall outside of typical central bank oversight like the ACH and RTGS. As it stands today, the portion of digital payments is still a small fraction of 9.  total payments. Even in China, where mobile payments have sky rocketed, the total volume of mobile payment transactions in 2016 stood at CNY 208 trillion7, a fraction of the CNY 3600 trillion8 processed by China’s High-Value Payment System. However, as more payments go through these e-wallets and as more consumer monies are held by non-banks, it is important for us to consider the risks that we typically look out for: a. As individual e-wallets, how do we keep them safe to use? b. Collectively, how do we manage risks that e-wallets may pose to the financial system? 2/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  c. As a market, how do we ensure that e-payments function smoothly with each other and with the financial system? 1 0 . Let me run through these three questions, and share how MAS is addressing these through the proposed Payment Services Bill (PSB) – striking a balance between innovation and sound regulation – as well as industry collaboration. The proposed PSB also follows an activity based framework which calibrates regulation according to the risks that the specific payment activity poses, rather than applying a fixed set of regulations to all payment service providers.

This may well be the true answer or reality, but it is rather disappointing if not frustrating that the wide gap between demand and supply has continued to exist. 3. So the natural question for us would be how we can close that gap and bring about a winwin outcome for project proponents and operators on the one hand and financiers or investors on the other. And in this connection, I should say that Hong Kong is uniquely well positioned to play a pivotal role in facilitating and catalysing investment flows to infrastructure projects in the region. We have well-developed capital markets and a deep pool of professional talents, in addition to Hong Kong being a leading centre in arbitration and dispute resolution, all of which are essential building blocks in support of infrastructure investments and their financing. It was against this background that the HKMA set up the Infrastructure Financing Facilitation Office (IFFO) in July 2016. IFFO has the following mission: (a) provide a platform for the key stakeholders to get to know each other and share experiences; (b) enhance the capacity of the investing and recipient countries in infrastructure financing; and (c) facilitate infrastructure investment and financing flows. 4. IFFO now has 90 stakeholders from Hong Kong, Mainland China and overseas joining as Partners. They include project developers or operators, commercial and investment banks, multilateral development financial institutions, asset owners and managers and professional service firms. In the last two years, IFFO has accomplished a lot.