samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As a consequence, institutional independence should be subject to a functional analysis of the need for those new tasks to benefit  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  from the same broad independence framework. If central bank independence is to be modelled in a functional manner, then its pendant – the central bank’s accountability and disclosure requirements – also need to reflect this modelling. Accountability and transparency The principles of accountability and transparency are essential for independent central banks. Accountability is a political duty and sine qua non for the democratic legitimacy of an independent central bank that is answerable for the exercise of its decision-making powers. [18] Accountability refers to the ex post explanation and justification of autonomous decision-making. [19] Transparency is aimed at increasing the effectiveness of a central bank’s policies by communicating them in real time, or even in advance, thus facilitating the public’s understanding of the central bank’s objectives, behaviour and decisions. [20] The channels through which the ECB is held accountable for the performance of its monetary policy function are laid down at constitutional level, i.e. in the Treaty. The Treaty was concluded by the national governments and ratified by the national parliaments of the EU Member States, and in some cases endorsed by popular referenda, in accordance with national constitutional requirements. This gives the ECB, as an independent institution accountable to the EU institutions as well as to the public at large, a profound degree of democratic legitimacy.

(I'm delighted to note, however, that manufacturing output picked up modestly in February - the first monthly increased since August.) For what it's worth, we were not alone in experiencing the earlier decline. Comparable figures show that manufacturing output fell by over 11% in Japan, and by close to 5% in both the US and Germany, while manufacturing employment fell by 6½% in Japan and 7½% in the US - that's to say by more than in this country although it fell by less than 2% in Germany. The frustrating thing is that, with the best will in the world, there was not much that either we at the Bank, or the UK Government, could have done to ward off the pressures on UK manufacturing, which had their origins abroad. That's fairly obvious where we are talking about the global slowdown - with negative overall growth last year of about 2% in Japan (fourth quarter on a year earlier) and close to zero growth in the US and Germany. This compared with growth of just over 1½% in this country - by some margin the highest in G7. We can go to international meetings and encourage the respective authorities there to stimulate their economies, but there is nothing that we can do about it directly ourselves. What we were able to do - given that inflation was marginally below target - was to try to compensate for that external weakness by stimulating domestic demand here in the UK.
I would like to urge that, in searching for labor market solution, attention must also be paid to the problems of the wage structure, since at the going wage, price mechanism and its signaling function do not work efficiently enough to clear the labor market to eliminate this skill mismatch. Related issue is that of a long stall in labor productivity as well as overall productivity growth. Policy distortions and a lack of clear policy directions can discourage firms from accumulating physical capital and investing in innovation, and prevent workers from moving to higher value-added sector. For example, agricultural price subsidy measures, while serving their redistributive purposes, may inadvertently channel workers away from highly productive manufacturing to agricultural sector, thus contributing to lower overall productivity of the economy. At the same time, low public spending on R&D and insufficient protection of intellectual property rights may deter innovative entrepreneurship and hinder a transformation towards a knowledge-based economy. Good news is, the risk of a sustained growth slowdown could be reduced or even avoided, as success of some mature economies in Asia have shown in the past. This will depend crucially on the quality and the timeliness of public policies across a wide spectrum in tackling these long-term issues. To be sure the task is not going to be easy. Reorienting the country’s growth strategy to focus more on skills development, innovation, and productivity involves deliberate planning over relatively long stretch of time. Three principles are of the essence: visionary leadership, consistency, and continuity.

Making headway towards sustainable growth Ladies and gentlemen, The success of Asian economies in weathering the global financial crisis is certainly commendable. But it would be a mistake to be lulled into complacency by this success of short-term volatility management. In particular, there remain important long-term challenges to the sustainability of growth in Asia. Indeed, latest economic indicators already pointed to a  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  less upbeat growth trajectory of the Asian region including China. The apparent slowdown in Asia, despite gradual improvement of the advanced economies, lends support to the idea that Asia also has its own structural bottleneck issues to deal with. The time is ripe for all parties involved to look beyond short-term fluctuations and give serious consideration to longer-term structural issues that are holding back Asian potential growth. This is the second topic of my talk today: what can Asia do to sustain its high pace of growth in the post-crisis world? Since the onset of the global financial crisis, most policy responses in emerging markets have been focused on demand-side management, through monetary or fiscal policy stimulus. But boosting demand alone could only get us thus far. The real lift of potential growth of the economy must essentially come from supply-side progress. This refers to either the more abundance or the better use of capital and labor inputs in the economy.
Indeed, the initial group of six countries that started this process has now expanded to become a group of 27 countries, with another one, Croatia, joining next year. Others are currently negotiating to become members. Proposals for deeper monetary integration date back to the Werner Report of 1970 and gained political momentum in the second half of the 1980s. At that time, Member States were taking steps towards establishing a single market. This included also the liberalisation of capital movements. As a consequence, Europe became captive to what Robert Mundell and other economists have called the “impossible trinity” – in other words, the impossibility of simultaneously achieving the three goals of financial liberalisation, exchange rate stability, and national monetary policy. One of the three goals had to be abandoned. The choice as to which one became increasingly clear after the failed attempt to secure exchange rate stability through the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 1 Given that a single market, including capital account liberalisation, had been a stated goal since the Treaty of Rome, and given that exchange rate stability was needed to reap the full benefits of the single market, Member States agreed to renounce monetary sovereignty. Moreover, sharing a currency makes sense for countries with close trade ties. This is especially true for the euro area countries which, since the start of EMU, have conducted almost half of their overall trade among themselves.

Short-termism estimates which are statistically significantly below unity (at the 5% confidence level) are shown in red. The simple average of x across the 20-year period is very close to one (0.9935). On the face of it, this does not suggest that short-termism has been a particular problem among this crosssection of firms. Chart 4  Chart 5  Short termism estimates over time  Industry estimates  Source: Bank of England. Source: Bank of England. Notes: Bars show the estimated x parameter for regressions for the UK and US pooled data. Estimates where the 95% confidence interval spans 1 are coloured grey. Notes: Bars show the industry estimates for the sample split into (1) 1985–1994, and (2) 1995–2004 for each industry. S&P and FTSE industry classifications were used. Bars are coloured based on the significance of the estimates at the 5% level. But this masks some important within-period variation. In 13 of the 20 years, x is lower than 1. And in 9 of these years, x is statistically significantly below unity. Moreover, there is evidence of a rising tide of myopia: 8 of these 9 years occur in the final decade of the sample. To illustrate, Table 5 shows point estimates of x over two decadal sub-samples (1985–1994 and 1995–2004) and over the full sample. Estimates are significantly below unity in the second sub-sample, but not the first.
3 While participating in international meetings recently, I have been struck by how much the discussion reminds me of the one we had in Sweden a couple of years ago. Countries that had not fallen below their inflation targets for very long at that point have now increasingly started to ask themselves whether they have not underestimated the difficulties of getting inflation to rise. One example is the United States, where, even though the Federal Reserve's main argument is that inflation will reach the target of 2 per cent in due course, Janet Yellen has also noted that “many uncertainties attend this assessment, and downward pressures on inflation could prove to be unexpectedly persistent”. 4 Her colleague on the Board of Governors, Lael Brainard, has similarly expressed unease that “the recent low readings for inflation may be driven by depressed underlying inflation, which would imply a more persistent shortfall in inflation from our objective”. 5 The European Central Bank (ECB) is grappling with similar problems. The President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, recently stated that, even if inflation is expected to rise gradually in the period ahead, “progress towards a durable and self-sustaining convergence of inflation towards our objective is not yet sufficiently convincing”. 6 Of course, it remains to be seen how justified this unease is.

When we felt that this confidence was in the process of becoming undermined in 2014 and early 2015, we made the assessment that there was no other option than to increase the pace of repo rate cuts to clarify that the focus was entirely on inflation. Accordingly there was no longer any scope to use the repo rate to attempt to influence debts and housing prices. In this respect too, the Riksbank has been a forerunner in the world of central banking, albeit unintentionally. As far as I know, no other central bank applying a policy that uses its interest rate to counteract the build-up of financial imbalances, such as Norges Bank, has had to make such a clear and important choice. Having said this, I now also see more fundamental problems with a monetary policy that leans against the wind, even when there is confidence in the inflation target. I will return to this at the end of this speech. Consequently, my interpretation of Sweden’s experiences so far is that a policy that leans against the wind has its limitations. For example, it seems, at least under certain circumstances, that the policy rate would have to be set quite a lot higher to effectively dampen the increase of debt. But such a policy could slow down the economy as a whole quite seriously and risk leading to inflation falling significantly below target for a long period.
We welcome further development of the breadth and depth of the commodities market and infrastructure in Singapore. To strengthen our position as Asia’s leading commodity derivatives trading centre, we have taken measures to encourage the growth of the futures market which would facilitate the price discovery process. Since February 2008, the regulation of financial and commodity futures has been consolidated under MAS to facilitate Singapore’s growth as a futures trading hub. MAS has also reviewed the capital requirements for brokers trading only in commodity futures contracts to ensure the relevance of our capital requirements in light of developments in the commodity futures market. We would continue to engage the industry as the market evolves to ensure our regulatory framework remains robust, while offering a business friendly environment for commodities trading. Conclusion The surge in commodities prices presents a challenge for the global community. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development sees agricultural commodity prices retreating from peaks but rising up to 50% higher in the next decade. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation says food production must rise by 50% by 2030 to meet demand and has warned that close to one billion people faced the prospect of hunger. Commodities form the heart of a man’s basic needs. World demand and supply of commodities would find a balance in due course. Proper functioning markets, both physical and financial, can help to make this adjustment and transition more efficient and less disruptive. Towards this objective, we welcome a healthy development of the commodities market in Singapore.

This would hold back consumption spending, and hence GDP growth, in the oil importing countries. Not surprisingly, the world economy is expected to slow in 2008, led by the US and other developed economies, amidst falling asset prices and tighter credit conditions as well. The US is weighed down by falling house prices, weak consumer spending and continued credit market distress. Domestic demand in Europe is expected to be subdued while softer external demand and the strong Euro could constrain export growth. Some slowdown is to be expected in Asia, although firmer domestic demand conditions should offset some of the weakness in exports. The region would also be buoyed by continued strong growth expected of China, India and the Middle East, which would help to mitigate the impact of the softer G3 economies. Indeed, inflation has emerged as a bigger concern in Asia, particularly among the faster growing economies I have just mentioned, including Vietnam. Thus, governments and central banks in the region not only have to deal with slower growth prospects, but also guard against rising inflationary pressures arising from strong domestic monetary expansion as well as higher commodity prices. High commodity prices would shape manufacturing decisions and define future trade flows. Higher shipping costs from fuel hikes have eroded the wage advantage of low cost producers such as China and Vietnam especially in inexpensive items that have high freight cost relative to final sale price.
Price-earnings ratio for Sweden and USA Affärsvärlden general index and S&P 500 40 35 30 25 20 15 10  S&P 500 average for 1871-1999  5 0 1950  1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  Note: Exceptionally high P/E ratios for Sweden in 1992 and 1993 are not shown here Sources: Global Financial Data and Statistics Sweden  Although long series for the Stockholm Exchange’s P/E ratio are hard to find, it is hardly controversial to say that the present level is well above the historical average. The deviation of share prices from the fundamental conditions that have applied historically is even clearer after a look at the path of  Real trends in US shares S&P 500, average annual percentage change  15  15  Total real return  11  Real share price 10  Real earnings/share 6  5 1  2  2  0  1940-1981  1982-1999  Note. Averages calculated as geometric mean. Somewhat different results may be obtained with an arithmetic mean, an estimated time trend or another base year, but the results still support the conclusion that the earnings trend in recent years is not markedly higher than for the entire post- World War Two era. Source: Global Financial Data  BIS Review 137/1999  2  earnings.

These measures are necessary to secure long term sustainable prosperity and modernisation of the country as we move forward. Lest we forget, a well-compensated labour force also makes for good consumers as well. Devising policy to be part of the future. We are constantly crafting policies to secure a stronger foothold in the future. Businesses and policymakers need to be proactive and agile. To embrace and facilitate, not to deter or hinder. This is the Bank’s modus operandi in embracing financial technology, or FinTech for short. We were one of the pioneers to implement a Regulatory Sandbox, which allows for the safe experimentation of FinTech innovations. We shall facilitate and make the hard decisions necessary if the innovations benefit the economy, even if it means changing the status quo. In meeting demands of the future economy, Malaysia welcomes innovators to develop the ‘next big thing’. This year, the Government launched the world’s first Digital Free Trade Zone in collaboration with e-commerce giant, Alibaba Group. The hub will be Alibaba’s first e-hub foray out of China. 5/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  The sharing economy is another new source of growth that promises to increase efficiency in an inclusive manner. Unlike the conventional work structure, it is accessible to anyone who has idle or under-utilised assets, skills or time to spare. Recognising its vast potential, the Government has partnered with the industry to promote sharing economy, while safeguarding against its risks. The measures include ensuring adequate worker and consumer protection, and creating a level playing field.
the rudiment of the Central Bank continues to distribute banknotes and coins, attract funds, extend credits to banks, organize international payment operations. As late as in the sixties of the preceding century the competences of the National Bank, i.e. the Head Office in Macedonia started to be distinguished from the competences of the commercial banks. At the same time, however, the dependence of the Head Office in Macedonia on the National Bank of Yugoslavia of that time, increased - a process which was the same for all former Yugoslav republics. In fact, the activities of the Head Office of the Republic of Macedonia were reduced to performing only routine operations of executive and operational character. All policies, decisions and regulations were created and adopted in Belgrade. The second period, period of institutionalization, represents some kind of a turning point in central banking. In 1971, instead of head offices of the former Yugoslav republics, national banks of the republics and provinces were established, including the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. In 1972, the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia adopted for the first time a law on the National Bank of Macedonia on the level of the Republic, while in 1974 it was defined also with the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. The first Governor, appointed in 1972, was Stojan Kjosev, who was until then a member of the Executive Council of the Republic of Macedonia.

The choice made was  2  BIS Review 100/2006  imposed by the circumstances: lack of developed financial instruments and institutional financial structure; absence of the interest rate transmission mechanism, and high interdependence between the aggregate demand and money supply. In October 1995, NBRM made a shift towards monetary strategy of targeting the nominal exchange rate against the German Mark, and later against the Euro, with the Denar exchange rate stability being the intermediate monetary policy objective. Such a strategy, applied in a small and open economy such as ours, has proved to be very successful for maintaining the price stability until present day. All reforms in the monetary policy instruments since the independence have been directed towards introducing indirect, market-oriented instruments for enabling efficient monetary policy conduct. Therefore, in 1993 deposit and credit auctions were introduced, and at the end of 1994 CB bills auctions were introduced. The initial development and strengthening of the financial system of the Republic of Macedonia, especially of the government securities market, enabled us to include new instruments, following the example of the modern central banks. In April 2005, we promoted the overthe-counter market for government securities. In the same year, we launched the general repo agreement and we started with repo operations when concluding lombard credits. In March this year, together with the Ministry of Finance we introduced Treasury bills for monetary policy purposes. The transition of the monetary strategy and of the monetary instruments would not have been successful without adequate banking reforms.
The disclosures required on stress testing together with the publication of individual firm results will provide a transparent independent measure of firm resilience to the markets. This will benefit all stakeholders including both advisors to DB schemes and scheme trustees when  Page 8  seeking to transfer liabilities to the insurance sector. For insurers, greater transparency could contribute to reducing the cost of capital, opening more opportunities for firms with stronger financial positions to benefit from the expanding market. In the banking sector, published stress tests for our largest banking groups have delivered greater transparency, better diagnosis of where weaknesses are, and a much deeper ability to compare the strengths and weaknesses of different business models, allowing counterparties and capital providers to make better informed judgements about counterparty risk when contemplating a transaction[18]. Hence there should be a strong built-in incentive within the system to do disclosure well and for us as regulators this would be a sign of a market functioning efficiently. That’s why I’m keen we engage with current and prospective users of insurers’ disclosures and why we will set up a further subject expert group to provide input on the nature of disclosures that will provide the most meaningful insight, be easy to use, and support pension scheme trustees and their advisors in making business decisions. Please keep an eye on the Solvency UK engagement website for announcements. The Solvency UK package represents a more principles-based approach to regulation and supervision.

Four Rs: Creating the conditions for long-term sustainable growth in the life annuity sector – speech by Charlotte Gerken | Bank of England 2. PPF7800 Index March 2023 update 3. Risk Transfer Report 2023 - Hymans Robertson 4. Pension Trustees: The Planning Puzzle | Charles Stanley (charles-stanley.co.uk) 5. Defined benefit bulk annuity market favours full scheme transactions as funding levels improve (xpsgroup.com) 6. Report of the Member Options Working Party - Actuarial profession 7. Illiquid assets throw UK pensions off balance - Risk.net 8. Asset managers cut debt in pension scheme investing strategies | Financial Times (ft.com) 9. Shifting up a gear – WTW 10. Insurance supervision: 2023 priorities (bankofengland.co.uk) 11. Who’s concentrating? Trends in the life insurance sector and the need for strong reinsurance and investment risk management − speech by Charlotte Gerken | Bank of England 12. Why private equity sees life and annuities as an enticing form of permanent capital | McKinsey  Page 10  13. UK pensions implosion could end with a deals boom | Financial Times (ft.com) 14. Buy-in and buy-out volumes £ in the first half of 2022 - Hymans Robertson 15. bulk annuity provider ESG index - WTW (wtwco.com) 16. Insurance Stress Test 2022 feedback (bankofengland.co.uk) 17. The groups are due to report in early Q2. The inputs from these groups will be a consideration amongst others as we work through potential proposals and their workability. 18.