samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The members of the Supervisory Board and the steering committee shall act independently and objectively in the interest of the Union as a whole and shall neither seek nor take instructions from the institutions or bodies of the Union, from any government of a Member State or from any other public or private body.” Article 19(2) adds that “the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and the governments of the Member States and any other bodies shall respect that independence.” The following question arises: what is the difference between the ECB’s independence as a central bank and its independence as a bank supervisor? [39] The first notable difference, as already mentioned, is that Article 130 of the Treaty is part of the Union’s primary or constitutional law, while Article 19 of the SSM Regulation is secondary law. This gives the provision shielding the central http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170330.en.html[03.04.2017 15:53:14]  Central bank independence revisited  bank from influence when performing its monetary policy task in Article 130 of the Treaty a constitutional character and takes it outside the scope of the Union legislator’s legislative powers. By contrast, the provisions shielding the bank supervisor from influence are contained in secondary law, which is of a lower rank than primary law and easier to amend. Second, Article 19 of the SSM Regulation should be read in the light of recital 75 of the SSM Regulation, which refers to the importance of the prevention of private industry interference in the supervisory field, in addition to “undue political influence”.

After an assessment has been thoroughly debated in the Committee, the final assessment becomes public.7 The assessments, and the publication of the results, have proved to be a powerful tool. To date, more than 200 adjustments have been made by member jurisdictions in response to findings raised by the assessment teams. In addition, the process has also generated a positive feedback loop, meaning that the lessons learnt from assessments are used to improve and clarify the standards. So far, the assessments have concentrated on the capital framework, but from 2015 onwards the scope of this work will widen further to include the implementation of the liquidity coverage ratio and the SIB-requirements. However, for the new, stricter requirements to bring the benefits we are aiming for, it is important that they be properly reflected, not only in national legislation, but also at the level of individual banks. To use an analogy of car safety, if we are now providing banks with air bags, in the form of higher capital requirements, it is important that those air bags are actually activated in case of an accident. For this to happen, the sensors need to be functioning and well-calibrated. For banks, this means that risk weights need to signal appropriately the risks that individual banks actually face. This aspect is captured in the Committee’s thematic assessments. To put it simply, in these assessments we examined whether the banks’ risk-weighted assets could be trusted.
But even if it is discovered that the risktaking channel is something worth taking into account, it is not so easy to see how this should be done in practice. I cannot see, for instance, that it is realistic to believe that a central bank would refrain from cutting its policy rate below a certain level on the grounds that this might lead to greater risk taking in the economy. Should developments in the economy as a whole warrant a low policy rate and there are no tangible signs of increased risk taking, it would be very difficult to justify such a policy. However, it is of course important  for instance, Geanakoplos, J., “Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage Cycle”, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, August 2010. 5  See, for instance, Gambacorta, L., “Monetary Policy and the Risk-Taking Channel”, BIS Quarterly Review, December 2009, Ioannidou, V., S. Ongena and J.-L. Peydró, “Monetary Policy, Risk-Taking and Pricing: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment”, European Banking Center Discussion Paper No 2009-04S, 2009, Jiménez, G., S. Ongena, J.-L. Peydró and J. Saurina, “Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk?” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6514, 2009, Altunbas, Y., L. Gambacorta and D. Marques-Ibanez, “Does Monetary Policy Affect Bank Risk-Taking?” BIS Working Papers No 298, 2010, Delis, M. D. and G. Kouretas, “Interest Rates and Bank Risk-Taking”, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, MPRA Paper No.

Apart from upgrading professional competency, consideration will also be given to the technical competency of company directors and other staff involved in the insurance business. We will work with industry to formulate an insurance manpower development strategy. We envisage industry players, training providers and tertiary institutions co-operating to develop programmes that will enhance professionalism in the insurance industry. Conclusion MAS will continue to work together with the insurance industry to achieve international best practices and standards. Over the past two years, MAS has worked hard to build a closer partnership with the financial sector. We will continue to promote an open environment and consult actively with the private sector for its views. The relationship between the regulator and the regulated should be arms length but not adversarial. The regulator has to be firm, but also friendly. Market practitioners can help regulators generate ideas, keep abreast of market developments, anticipate global trends and review  4  BIS Review 44/2002  our financial sector strategies. Candid, thoughtful feedback, including dissenting views, go a long way to ensure that policies are pragmatic and remain relevant. We hope that such a regulatory environment will help to develop well-managed insurers in Singapore, who will take up new challenges, and play a more active and productive role in upgrading our insurance industry, and thus our financial sector as a whole. I wish you fruitful deliberations. BIS Review 44/2002  5
5  Nominal wage flexibility can also be discussed on the basis of other different points of departure. One is the length of the central wage agreement periods. This reflects a balance between, on the one side, keeping down negotiating costs - including the risk of labour market conflicts - and on the other side ensuring that wages are not locked for an excessively long period, so that wage levels can be adjusted in the event of an unexpected shock. If membership of Stage Three of EMU were to give rise to greater fluctuations in economic activity than under a domestic monetary and foreign exchange 4  See, for instance, Calmfors, L. (2000): “EMU och arbetslösheten” (EMU and unemployment), Ekonomisk Debatt, Volume 28, no. 2. 5  See, for instance, Calmfors, L. (2002): “EMU:s effekter på lönebildningen” (The effects of the EMU on wage formation), Appendix 2 to Stabiliseringspolitik i valutaunionen (Stabilisation policy in the monetary union), Kommittén för stabiliseringspolitik för full sysselsättning vid ett svenskt medlemskap i valutaunionen (The Government Commission on Stabilisation Policy for Full Employment in the Event of Swedish Membership of the Monetary Union), SOU 2002:16. 4  BIS Review 40/2002  policy, there may be an increased tendency to choose shorter agreement periods. If membership were to lead to more stable inflation than now, the agreement periods could instead become longer, as it would be considered easier to predict nominal wage increases.

Unit labour cost, 1990-2001 Annual percentage change  12  12 Sweden  10  10  Euro area  8  8  6  6  4  4  2  2  0  0  -2  -2 1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Source: OECD  8  BIS Review 40/2002  5. The Beveridge Curve, 1980-2002 (January-May)  Unfilled job vacancies/labour force 1,4 1980 1,2 1987 2002 (jan-may)  1,0 1990  2000 0,8 1984 0,6  2001  1999 1998 1997  0,4  1991 1995-1996  0,2  1994  1992 1993  0,0 0,0  2,0  4,0  6,0  8,0  10,0  12,0  14,0  Total unemployment  Source: Statistics Sweden (Labour Force Surveys) and Labour Market Board  6.
Capital meeting the broader definitions was largely ignored by investors during the intense phases of the crisis, leading to significant financial runs and liquidity problems at institutions whose capital, using the broader definitions, actually satisfied existing regulatory standards. As conditions deteriorated, market focus  1  These remarks were prepared for delivery at a gathering focused on “The New Framework to Strengthen Financial Stability and Regulatory Priorities”, jointly organized by the Financial Stability Institute and the banking supervisors from Central and Eastern Europe, and hosted by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. 2  Beyond concern over immediate losses, investors may also focus on the possibility of future losses and the capital readily available to offset them. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  shifted from the relative strength implied by regulatory capital ratios to the vulnerabilities associated with deteriorating measures of “pure” capital. This led to greater uncertainty and ultimately to liquidity stresses. The experience in the United States during the crisis is instructive as we think about where we should focus our attention in terms of bank capital, as well as in terms of supervision. On the latter, I would note that stress testing has proved to be an important supervisory tool in the United States for judging the quality and quantity of capital.

The USA's increase in growth in the 1990s was partly due to the US economy being internationalised more rapidly than before, with a larger percentage of GDP exposed to international competition than the EU. If eastern Europe is now integrated more closely with western Europe, this could create a more efficient division of labour and raise productivity in western Europe. The challenge of EU enlargement eastwards could rouse decision-makers in western Europe to a more intensive reform effort so they can fully take advantage of what will, in total, be the world's single largest market. There are parallels here to Japan's success story in the 1970s and 1980s, when Japanese industry, which had not yet subsided into its own structural problems, benefited from the interplay with the dynamic Asian economies that complemented the Japanese companies. Just as the dynamic Asian economies additionally formed a bridge to China, the candidate countries comprise a bridge to Russia (particularly the St Petersburg  2  BIS Review 9/2002  region where Sweden is concerned), the Ukraine and the other CIS countries – areas that should also become a growing part of the EU's trading sphere. Moreover, unlike many dynamic Asian economies, the candidate countries' populations have always had a very high level of education; in science and technology it is fully comparable with the level in the current EU member countries.
I will not take the risk and predict the development of the gold price, but one thing is certain: it will remain volatile. Our possibilities to actively hedge the gold risk are restricted by the agreement of September 1999. In particular, we may conduct hedging transactions only in the amount of the sales quota allocated to us for the current year. We are therefore all the more convinced that our strategy of regular sales remains appropriate. The principles that have guided our operations for the past two years – namely fulfilment of our commitments under the central bank agreement, transparency in communication and situationadapted handling of day-to-day business – remain relevant. Management of the free assets The market value of the free asset portfolio – consisting of the as yet unsold portion of the 1,300 tonnes of gold and the proceeds from the already effected gold sales – amounted to Sfr 21 billion at the end of May. The free asset portfolio is managed separately from our other reserves, which will facilitate its transfer to the future beneficiaries once the legal framework has been put in place. As I mentioned earlier on, our possibilities of actively hedging the gold risk against an unfavourable development of the gold price are restricted by the agreement on gold sales of September 1999. However, we limited the risks of a weak US dollar that might reduce the value of our future sales by hedging 35% of the future proceeds in US dollars against the Swiss franc.

The challenge here is to promote greater roles of Asia’s own financial institutions without compromising the open, competitive, and level playing field that has been the hallmark of the region’s financial markets. The fourth observation is the concern about the attendant risk associated with increased financial flows and integration. With increased flows, the region’s financial markets are susceptible to greater risks and spillovers from the international financial markets. The issue then is whether a better system is needed to help mitigate and manage these risks. And the fifth is the concern about the region-wide benefits of the efforts we are doing on financial market development and integration, given the vast diversity of the economies and markets in the region. Ideally, regional financial development should be a win-win situation. Nonetheless, the uneven pace of development and unbalanced focus could risk hallowing out the region’s financial system. And if this happens, it could sow a seed for future instabilities. I think these observations and concerns are important, and in a way they point to the issues that should be addressed in our next step of financial reform. And it is in this context that I see the World Bank Flagship study on East Asian financial markets to be timely. And from what I heard this morning, significant benefits and insights can probably be gained from this study, and be useful to our future works in the region.
However, it also identifies two circumstances under which the Riksbank can depart from this aim; namely transient effects on inflation  BIS Review 37/2005  1  and large deviations from target. The main idea behind this is that we do not focus solely on inflation in every situation; we should also be able to regard developments in growth and employment when these do not conflict with the inflation target. Transient effects refers to certain determined factors which affect the inflation forecast one to two years ahead, but which will then subside without having any lasting effect on inflation trends. This was the case, for instance, in 2002-2003, when large fluctuations in oil prices had a significant effect on inflation. We made it clear then that monetary policy should disregard these transient effects. Large deviations from target refers to when inflation deviates so far from the target level that there may be justification for bringing it back to the target level over a longer period of time than the usual two-year horizon. A more rapid return to the target could cause undesirable fluctuations in, for instance, production and employment and thereby lead to large costs for the real economy. Since the decision on the clarification was taken in 1999, it has become increasingly evident, in my opinion, that there are a number of good reasons for allowing deviations from the inflation target during short or long periods of time.

The high degree of uncertainty militates against ambitious fine-tuning of the economy but favours focusing on the main task of monetary policy, which is maintaining price stability. Moreover, uncertainty necessitates broad-based and impartial analysis as well as judgment and flexibility in monetary policy decision-making. BIS Review 5/2008  1
The rise in labor productivity is usually seen as the main factor behind the spectacular performance of the US economy, characterized by high growth and low inflation. Will productivity now also start rising in Switzerland and Europe? Where will it rise more? In Switzerland, where the labor market is more flexible and structural reforms are more advanced, or in Europe, where the large common market and the single currency are expected to break up old structures? We have good reasons to believe that there is a potential for non-inflationary economic growth in Switzerland. Investment has been strong in 1998 and in the first part of 1999, deregulation and competition have made spectacular progress, large-scale adjustments have taken place in various economic sectors and more flexibility is now accepted in the labor market. Some adjustments in the interest rate have been made in order to restore a more neutral monetary stance. In one word, the degree of competitiveness of our economy is stronger today than it was 5 or 10 years ago, production capacities have not been fully exhausted and monetary conditions have been adjusted. Switzerland will thus benefit from the recovery in Europe without major risk of inflationary pressures. Indeed, the assessment of the future stability in the exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the euro depends crucially on what will happen in Switzerland and in the surrounding countries. If the convergence in fundamentals goes on, the exchange rate should remain relatively stable; otherwise some adjustment will be needed.

News conference  Berne, 15 June 2017 Fritz Zurbrügg  Introductory remarks by Fritz Zurbrügg  In my remarks today, I will present the key findings from this year’s Financial Stability Report, published by the Swiss National Bank this morning. In the first part of my speech, I will look at the situation of the big banks, focusing on the progress made in implementing the revised ‘too big to fail’ regulations (TBTF2) that came into effect almost a year ago. In the second part of my remarks, I will outline our current assessment of the situation at domestically focused banks. Big banks  Let me start then with the big banks and the TBTF2 regulations. The revised regulations are designed to resolve the ‘too big to fail’ issue in Switzerland, so that systemically important banks no longer have to be bailed out with taxpayers’ money in the event of a crisis. The TBTF2 regulations rest on two complementary pillars. First, they are aimed at strengthening the resilience of systemically important banks in a going-concern perspective. They therefore specify higher requirements for going-concern capital in particular, thereby reducing the likelihood of a systemically important bank getting into financial distress. Second, if a systemically important bank nevertheless gets into financial distress – this is called the gone-concern perspective – the regulations provide a framework for orderly resolution, ensuring the continuation of systemically important functions without the use of public funds.
Of course, times change, and with them the economic and monetary environment. This was certainly the case in the 1970s when, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system and the explosion of oil prices, monetary authorities around the world were faced with new and difficult challenges. In many countries, attempting to meet these challenges was accompanied by a move to flexible exchange rates. However, for the most part, we Europeans attempted and eventually succeeded in treading a different path. This was also the case here, when, in the latter years of Governor Zolotas’ time in charge at the Bank of Greece, exchange rate stability was sought by pegging the drachma to the US dollar. As we all know, at that time Greece was not yet a member of the European Community. But this was also soon to change. Indeed, assisting in the successful preparation for membership of the European Community is yet another notable contribution that Governor Zolotas made to Greece’s economic history. Since that time Greece has continued to face challenges as a member of the European Community, and now of course of the European Union (EU). Greece is one of the four EU Member States which have not yet adopted the euro. It has announced its willingness to do so in 2001. In order to join the euro area, the convergence criteria with respect to inflation, long-term interest rates, public finances and exchange rate stability have to be fulfilled. Sustainable convergence is a prerequisite for adopting the euro.

This is in the interest of the countries which have already introduced the euro, but even more so in the interest of new countries entering the euro area. Without having achieved sustainable convergence, the loss of the exchange rate and interest rate instrument could cause costly tensions in the economy at the expense of growth and employment. The determined efforts of Greece to achieve such convergence have to be commended. However, it is too early to reach a firm conclusion. Next year, the European Central Bank (ECB) will produce a convergence report to analyse what has been accomplished. Let me repeat and underline that achieving convergence is not a process which ends with adopting the euro. On the contrary, being a member of the euro area and being able to benefit from the potentially great opportunities that offers call for ongoing adaptation to the new environment and the new rules of the game. It is like in sports: reaching the top is difficult, but staying there is even harder. 1  BIS Review 113/1999  Integrating one or more of the EU Member States which have not previously introduced the euro will be a challenge for the euro area. However, an even greater challenge for Europe as a whole lies ahead. I am referring to the enlargement of the European Union. First, I shall deal with that process in general. Then, I should like to say a few words about how the Eurosystem (i.e.