samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
  Finally, and most important, many oil and commodity producers face an intertemporal choice between extracting resources and keeping them on or under the ground. According to standard economic reasoning (the Hotelling rule), one important determinant is the return earned on financial assets, to be compared to the expected commodity price increase over the long run. The possibility of large valuation losses on financial assets makes it optimal to reduce the rate of extraction, which would durably lower the supply of oil and other commodities. However, there are also practical and conceptual difficulties:   A choice would have to be made as to the true nature of the “super reserve currency”. Would it be a basket of existing monies or a new “fiat” currency? If the “super reserve” is a basket of existing currencies (such as the SDR today) it would basically serve as an instrument for diversification of foreign exchange reserves (or private portfolios), and such a diversification can easily be achieved by using existing currencies. On the other hand, the “super sovereign” could be issued as such as a fiat currency. Then, the international community would have a basic choice. Either the new currency could be made “strong” and never depreciate against any other major existing currencies, which probably means that its supply would be severely restricted. Or, the “super sovereign” would be issued according to pre-specified rules, and depreciation against existing currencies could not be excluded.

Such equilibrium is stable by virtue of the mutual benefits it brings to both groups. Moreover, the more it lasts, the more it is impossible to change since both group become mutually dependant through the stock of claims and debts they have reciprocally accumulated. Any significant break, for instance, in the allocation of reserves by surplus countries, would both trigger major exchange and interest rate volatility in deficit countries and lead to significant valuation losses in surplus countries. This “financial balance of terror” is supposed to keep the system in place for a long period of time. Implicit behind this doctrine, however, is the assumption that the creditor country can live with the risk of losses on its reserves and accept that possibility as a price to pay for the success of its growth strategy. A more recent explanation is provided by the “asset shortage” theory (Caballero, 2006), which helps and explains why asymmetries in financial developments generate both payment imbalances and asset bubbles. According to the theory, the world has a shortage of liquid  4  BIS Review 76/2010  and riskless assets. Moreover, the supply of those assets is asymmetrically distributed between regions, with the US providing a large chunk of the total. Hence, there is a structural excess demand for dollar denominated securities, which sustains permanent capital inflows in the US.
The investment-saving gap moved to surpluses averaging 10 percent of GDP in the first three years after the crisis, from the pre-crisis deficits average of 7 percent of GDP before 1997. Such magnitude of change is indicative of the depth of the adjustment Thailand had to go through. Although the initial imbalance in the lead up to the crisis was not small, the adjustment was amplified partly by the wave of contagion effect in the early years of the crisis which brought pressure on the capital account, the exchange rate, and growth. Now, while we can look back to the last two years of growth of around 4 percent, signs of fragility still abound, with important issues remaining to be resolved. This includes the continued reform of the banking sector and the resolution of the costs of financial sector restructuring. The main fragility in the recovery process at this time is the weakness in domestic demand. The problem is compounded by the slow growth in bank credit and the weak corporate balance sheets, particularly the non-export sector. Unfortunately, the current external environment does not bode well for the recovery, going forward. The global slowdown is posing strains on Thailand’s export, and is adding pressure to the current account and external stability. Official GDP forecast this year is around 2.0-2.5 percent. Given the change in external environment, this year will be more a time for consolidation than for expansion.

During 1997-1998, we underwent a severe economic contraction, thousands of companies went bust, hundred thousands of people became unemployed, and the amount of nonperforming loans in the financial system skyrocketed. The economy staged a rebound in 1999 and 2000. But the recovery was cut short by the global economic downturn in 2001, when growth that year registered merely 2.2%. Things then started to turn in 2002. Despite the continued global slump, the Thai economy expanded 5.3% that year and has since been on a firm growth path. The resiliency of the economy is evidenced by the fact that during the past two years Thailand has weathered several economic storms – the Tsunami, avian flu, political uncertainty, and the recent oil shock – with only a moderate slowdown in GDP growth. BIS Review 46/2007  1  The key driver behind the current economic expansion has been a combination of domestic demand and exports. The latter, in particular, has always been our main engine of growth. One reason for this is that our export structure has become more diversified, both in terms of product and destination. For example, over the past twelve years, Thailand’s exports to ASEAN + China as percent of total exports has increased from 25 to 30% whereas those to G3 have declined from 51 to 42%. This allows us to reap benefit from the growing intra-regional trade, particularly China-related.
Low interest rates curb the decline in investment and make it easier for households to repay debt. The change in behaviour can nevertheless take time and we cannot expect consumers in the US and Europe to drive a new upturn. The public sector will eventually have to rein in expenditure and increase tax revenues to prevent debt from increasing. If growth in the global economy is to be sustained, public and private investment and consumption in China and other Asian countries will probably have to absorb a greater share of output in these countries. In many industrial countries, export prices have risen relative to import prices. Lower oil and commodity prices are easing the burden. But Norway’s terms of trade are deteriorating. Some of the gains of the past few years have now dissipated, and Norway’s disposable income might fall by close to 10 per cent in 2009. Norway will move down on the list of the world’s richest countries. (And perhaps this is not altogether a bad thing.) Norwegian firms are affected when households the world over buy fewer cars and furniture and fewer ships are built. Lower oil prices will probably also result in a fall in investment on the continental shelf in the years ahead. But let us not forget that petroleum prices are still higher than the industry dared hope just a few years ago. 10  BIS Review 16/2009  The competitiveness of the Norwegian business sector declined during the upturn.

Svein Gjedrem: Economic perspectives Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the meeting of the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank, Oslo, 12 February 2009. *  *  *  Introduction The poet Øyvind Rimbereid from Stavanger – his works already awarded a place in the Norwegian literary canon 1 – has been nominated for this year’s Nordic Council Literature Prize for the collection of poems entitled Herbarium. The poem “Tulip” starts with the tulip bulb market bubble in the 1600s. A futures market for tulip bulbs had emerged in Holland when growers discovered that infecting the tulip with a virus could produce stripes and beautiful colours. In a short time, bulbs were trading at 25 times the normal value before the market collapsed. A hundred years later, a tulip bulb cost less than one per cent of the price before the collapse. 2 In the words of Rimbereid: “ The year 1635 and on pollen-yellow paper flutter tulip bulbs grown in places unknown to most. Or grown only in the signature on the bill of exchange of a seller who himself has bought a signature from a seller with money that itself exists only as a signature.” 3 Downturn in the global economy In September 2008, the turbulence in financial markets erupted into a full-blown global crisis. Just before, it had appeared that the US government rescue of the mortgage corporations Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would calm the markets.
Developing as an invoicing currency, for instance in energy markets or in the context of free trade agreements, would be important steps to gain a global role.viii Indeed, it would create the need to store euros for future trades, and consequently lead to the development of a full range of euro-based financial tools. 3. Safeguarding cross-border payments by technological advances in international financial infrastructures The euro area should remain on the frontier for cross-border payments, including the G20 agenda adopted in October 2021. The G20 roadmap for 2027 has indeed committed to bring profound improvements in this area including in setting ambitious targets on costs, speed, and accessibility of cross-border payments. But the challenge for all the stakeholders, central banks, regulators as well as the private sector, is to deliver and ultimately meet the expectations of end-users. This remains a strategic priority for the Banque de France, which in parallel has paved the way for a more prospective solution: namely a  Page 7 sur 7 wholesale CBDC that could be issued by the Eurosystem, deploying experiments such as the Jura project of cross border wholesale payments in coordination with the BIS and the Swiss National Bank. ** In the 1960s, US Secretary of Treasury Henry Fowler warned that "Providing reserves and exchanges for the whole world is too much for one country and one currency to bear." ix To Fowler, we answer: “We in the euro area are happy to help.” I thank you for your attention and I wish you a good forum.

What we need to do as supervisors is to make sure that global banks have adequate risk management capabilities, sufficient loss-absorbing capital, and are subject to intensive and coordinated supervision, so that we are able to contain the systemic risk they pose without curtailing their contribution to economic growth worldwide. We have nothing to fear from global banks which are well-managed, well-capitalised and well-supervised by home and host authorities. What we should do is prevent the emergence of badly managed, badly-disciplined banks, whatever their geographical dimension, as they can expose our financial systems to important risks. I hope that this humble contribution provides food for thought. As I said at the beginning of my intervention, I do not have all of the answers. But I do think that we can and should learn lessons from all experiences, both positive and negative. My words reflect the experience that we have had with our global banks in the last three years. But of course, past successes are not, per se, a guarantee of future success. Sophocles wrote in one of his tragedies that “we cannot call a mortal being happy until he’s passed beyond life free from pain”. Following the same principle of precaution, neither supervisors nor credit institutions should succumb to the temptation of unfounded optimism about the future. This is the reason why we will continue pushing for a very intense supervisory process for these global institutions and we will ensure that they are complying with the highest standards in any field.
This is one of the HKMA’s key policy objectives, but it is also an area in which HKAB has a keen and constructive interest. In particular, HKAB, together with the HKMA, is joint owner of Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Ltd, which operates one of the key features of Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure, the Real Time Gross Settlement System. One other project on which HKAB can work closely with the HKMA is in the development of a Commercial Credit Reference Agency. Some of your members are already participating in the Working Group that is now engaged in thrashing out the details of how the CCRA would work. An issue which has been raised in the deliberations of the Working Group is whether HKAB should participate in the ownership of the CCRA, as it does in HKICL. This was not an idea that found much favour when we consulted the industry on the CCRA  4  BIS Review 55/2001  scheme last year. But perhaps, now that it seems likely that such a scheme will go ahead, it is an idea which should be revisited at some stage in the future. That is a matter for HKAB and it is one that I leave you to think about. Even if you were to confirm the earlier view not to participate directly in this particular project, it would not undermine the general principle that the HKMA and HKAB should, wherever feasible, work hand in hand in developing important pieces of the financial infrastructure.

A few years later, a group of researchers: Rafael Anes, Carlos Fernández Pulgar, Diego Mateo del Peral, Pedro Tedde and Gabriel Tortella, undertook a far-reaching project on the history of the Spanish banking system. The result was La banca española en la Restauración, published in 1974. Since then, a number of books have been published by the Bank of Spain, sometimes in collaboration with commercial editors. To mention just two of these books: El Servicio de Estudios del Banco de España, 1930-2000; and Un siglo de historia del sistema financiero español (in Spanish and English). Moreover, the early history of the Bank has been covered by three volumes written by Tedde de Lorca: El Banco de San Carlos (1782-1829); El Banco Español de San Fernando, 1829-1856; and El Banco de España y el Estado liberal, 1847-1874. The Banco de España has also shown its interest in Spanish economic history through its annual research grants programme, financing the collection of Estudios de Historia Económica (or, in Banco de España parlance, “the red books”). There are now 72 of these studies, the first ones dating back to 1980. The aim of the Banco de España with this collection is to disseminate economic history papers written by its own staff or by researchers to whom it has awarded grants, in order “to enhance knowledge of Spanish economic history, paying particular attention to quantitative aspects”.
BIS Review 62/2002  5  The change in our conduct of monetary policy has also been cautious and incremental. We have progressively become more explicit in stating our assessments and intentions. We now publish MAS’ assessments of the state of health of the economy in the Macroeconomic Review, and the factors considered in each policy review through the Monetary Policy Statement. We even publish a chart showing the movements in the trade-weighted index, although not our policy band or the trade-weights themselves. Enterprising analysts have tried to divine the trade-weights of MAS’ basket of currencies from the graph, not totally unsuccessfully. This enhanced disclosure has made our monetary policy more effective. Despite the more volatile external environment and the liberalisation of the use of the Singapore dollar, there has been less need for MAS to intervene in the markets to manage the exchange rate within our policy band. Greater market understanding of MAS’ thinking, underpinned by sound and credible policies that are in line with economic fundamentals, have contributed to continued confidence in the Singapore dollar. The best defence against speculative attacks remains Singapore’s sound economic fundamentals and a credible exchange rate policy. MAS works with the other economic agencies to manage and preserve these economic fundamentals. Our role is to provide in-depth assessments of economic developments and short and medium-term economic outlooks.

There is at present a long list of reform agenda items being debated internationally: these include strengthening financial institutions by requiring them to hold more capital and liquidity; changing compensation practices to discourage excessive risk taking by bankers and reforming regulatory structures to ensure more effective supervision, especially of large and complex firms that have systemic implications. 5. It is therefore very timely today that we have five very distinguished speakers joining this Panel to share with us their insights into this complex and important question of how we should go about reforming the international financial architecture and regulatory regimes in different jurisdictions. They are, by order of their appearance in the programme: (i)  Mr Rintaro Tamaki, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs of Japan;  (ii)  Dr Jong-Goo Yi, Standing Commissioner of the Financial Services Commission of Korea;  (iii)  The Honourable Chris Bowen, Minister for Financial Services of Australia;  BIS Review 7/2010  1  (iv)  The Honourable Mr Ahmad Husni Hanadzlah, Minister of Finance Two of Malaysia; and  (v)  Professor KC Chan, Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, HKSAR. I understand from the organiser that we will invite Professor Chan to speak first as he may need to leave earlier for the Legislative Council meeting. The order of other speakers will follow the programme. Professor Chan, please. 2  BIS Review 7/2010
A growing number of these jobs are related to exports of oil extraction equipment. The oil and gas industry has played a decisive role in the strong growth of the Norwegian economy over the past 40 years. The past 15 years stand out in particular. But this dependence on oil has also made the Norwegian economy vulnerable to changes in oil prices or a decline in petroleum revenues. Chart: High wage growth (not incl. the krone depreciation over the past two years) High domestic labour costs have also increased the Norwegian economy’s vulnerability. The cost level in the Norwegian business sector has increased sharply in comparison with our trading partners. A rise is followed by a fall, and oil prices have fallen by more than half since last summer. As activity and earnings from the petroleum sector decline, oil service companies must seek entry into other markets. With a high domestic cost level, that task may prove demanding. Chart: Fall in petroleum investment A decline in activity on the Norwegian continental shelf has long been anticipated. The fall in oil prices has accelerated and amplified an announced decline in activity. Norwegian exports to other oil-producing nations are also in decline. This does not mean that the oil age is now nearing an end. Nearly half of known oil and gas reserves on the Norwegian continental shelf have not yet been extracted2. Large new discoveries have been made over the past few years and the Norwegian oil service industry is still receiving new orders.

Chart: Change in market value since January 1998 So far, our nation has earned a solid return on its financial assets. The cumulative return on the GPFG since its inception amounts to over NOK 2 600 billion, equivalent to about a third of total GPFG capital at the end of 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Chart: Lower yields Over a third of the GPFG is invested in bonds. Real yields on high-grade government bonds provide a basis for the rate of return that can be expected ahead. In recent years, those yields have been close to zero. Low bond yields reflect global economic conditions: Governments, businesses and households are seeking to save more, while demand for safe investments has increased. Central banks’ substantial asset purchases are pushing in the same direction. However, low yields may also reflect modest expectations of economic growth further ahead. There is no return without risk. The GPFG features a very long investment horizon and a sizeable capacity to bear short-term risk. This is why the chosen allocation to equities is relatively high. It is also the reason why the GPFG has moved into real estate. The authorities have asked Norges Bank to assess whether the allocation to real assets should be increased. Any increase in the allocation to real assets will probably be at the expense of bonds. Chart: Spending of petroleum revenues almost level with revenues Petroleum revenue spending over the fiscal budget has increased since the turn of the millennium.
But during the crisis, many borrowers were unable to refinance either because their property was worth less than the outstanding mortgage balance, or because they didn’t otherwise fulfill underwriting criteria that had also become much more stringent than during the boom. These features surely limited the transmission of accommodative monetary policy through households’ balance sheets. Furthermore, borrowers that were able to refinance and benefit from lower interest rates were mostly those with high credit scores and relatively lower debt balances. The Administration responded to this limited pass-through by introducing programs such as the Home Affordable Refinance Program, or HARP, to enable refinancing for borrowers with high-LTV loans backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, or facilitating streamline refinances of FHA loans. While these programs eventually reached a large number of borrowers, their implementation was complex. As a simple mortgage design counterfactual, had more borrowers had adjustable-rate mortgages, which are generally indexed to short-term interest rates, the pass-through of lower market interest rates would have been more direct. As the Chart illustrates, the average interest rate on outstanding ARMs declined more rapidly than the rate on FRMs, even though in the U.S. most ARMs only adjust after a rather long fixed-rate period (often 5 or more years) and then only do so infrequently (generally once or twice a year). Crucially, ARM interest rate resets reduced mortgage payments without requiring the borrower to refinance, thereby benefiting a broad range of borrowers, including those with little or no home equity and/or low credit scores.

So “yes, sir”, the euro is there. The euro area faces a lot of challenges, as is the case for all major advanced economies. All their central banks have a lot of challenges today, and this is no time for complacency for any of us, but the success of the euro, measured as I just suggested, is obvious. Financial Times: What would you describe as the main challenges facing the euro today? Jean-Claude Trichet: I would say that we have all the challenges of major central banks in the advanced world. There is the challenge of coping, in terms of our own responsibility, with the “turbulent episode” in which we find ourselves since three years. We have to cope with the challenge of globalisation. We have to cope with the challenges of science and technology, which is developing so rapidly that it creates for the central bankers a lot of additional challenges, in particular in terms of assessing correctly productivity and the impact of IT on the financial sector. Population ageing is also a big challenge for all central banks. We have two other challenges that other major central banks do not have. One is the deepening and overall implementation of the single market with a single currency, which has been Europe’s ambition since the very beginning. We are the only central bank which is transforming, by virtue of its own activity, the economy under its jurisdiction. The second challenge is enlargement. We were 11 countries at the beginning.