samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The investment in new technologies in recent years has already had a positive influence on Spanish productivity, although its overall effects have been blurred by the less dynamic behaviour of other types of investment. Looking ahead, a step-up in investment in technological capital will require the complementary promotion of investment in human capital and in capital goods to help spread innovation across the economy as a whole. As regards policies aimed at promoting market flexibility and efficiency, the liberalising momentum of the reforms undertaken must be carried further. The Annual Report underscores the advisability of land market reform, given its consequences for the formation of real estate prices and costs and its influence on labour mobility. It further stresses the need to pursue liberalisation and competition policies in the network industries (telecommunications, electricity, transport and distribution, etc. ), as the benefits of better workings here will spread to all productive activities. In the labour market, the persistently high ratio of temporary to permanent employees alongside a high unemployment level (especially among certain groups), with labour shortages in certain industries and regions, highlights the need to press ahead with reform. In particular, the incentives for effective participation in the labour market must be further improved, as must the decentralisation of collective bargaining, so that it is better suited to the conditions firms face and to workers' characteristics.

This is an effective instrument for increasing the prosperity of European citizens and one suited to playing a leading role in the international monetary system. It is also a magnet for other European countries whose integration into the area will give it greater worldwide influence. A dynamic process is now under way in the area in which those economies that are most flexible and best equipped with physical, technological and human capital will be those that most benefit from participation in the common European venture. To date, the Spanish economy has been able to draw on its progressive economic and monetary integration in Europe to move towards correcting some of its structural imbalances, to further real convergence with the core European countries and to pursue increasing external openness. In parallel, Spain has re-geared its economic policies towards stability and has pushed through the liberalisation of its financial, factor and product markets. This modernisation and openness drive has led to a substantial change in Spain's position in the world economy, which includes strategic ownership interests in certain regions in which it has invested strongly. Undoubtedly, the main challenge now facing the Spanish economy is to consolidate this position against a background of heightened competition, rapid technological change and future European Union enlargement. The Annual Report presented today illustrates the benefits that the Spanish economy has obtained from participation in Economic and Monetary Union, even under the particular circumstances of a generalised slowdown in the world economy, as was the case in 2001.
In addition, managers should have at least three of those five years of experience managing funds of hedge funds if they offer this product. Redemptions of retail hedge funds need only be made once every quarter. This is an accepted international practice. Managers who want to provide for more frequent redemptions are free to do so. Redemption procedures should be prominently disclosed. To facilitate the entry of foreign funds of hedge funds, there will be a flexible diversification rule. The rule will require any fund of hedge funds to be diversified either across 15 hedge fund managers or by having not more than 8% of its assets allocated to a single hedge fund manager. This would enable foreign funds of hedge funds to benefit from an earlier liberalisation introduced by the SFA in July this year, which allowed all recognised foreign funds (including hedge funds) to be offered directly to Singapore investors instead of only through feeder funds previously. For a foreign fund to be recognised by MAS, the foreign offeror needs only to register a foreign company in Singapore and appoint a representative to act as a liaison for investors. The fund and its manager should be from a jurisdiction with acceptable regulatory standards. While providing for direct offers of foreign funds into Singapore, the alternative feeder fund structure is still available. A Singapore fund of hedge funds can therefore feed into a foreign fund of hedge funds.

Such alliances could benefit from the Singapore manager’s access to local investors as well as the foreign manager’s working relationships with other hedge fund managers. Structures that involve a foreign fund of hedge funds feeding into other funds of hedge funds will also be allowed with good reason and disclosure of all relevant fees and charges. Work has also begun on the third pillar – enlightened investors – which is an essential element of a disclosure-based regulatory regime. The Financial Advisers Act (FAA), which will become operational on 1 October, will create a class of financial advisers who can advise and inform investors on a whole range of investment products. These financial advisers would be able to promote public awareness of more sophisticated products such as hedge funds. As part of the regulatory regime under the FAA, a new code of conduct will be issued shortly to provide guidance on the standards of conduct expected of all persons who provide financial advice  4  BIS Review 52/2002  (including exempt financial advisers like banks and insurance companies). The standards will cover specific responsibilities with regard to hedge fund products such as explaining product features and risks, as well as making investment recommendations to clients. The new regulatory framework under the FAA is expected to raise the quality of advice on investment products and, along with that, investor sophistication. Within MAS, a new division has been set up to provide an overview of investor education efforts across the financial sector.
Hence, the group’s credit risk model might be developed in the parent bank, while the group’s liquidity is managed through a foreign subsidiary, and the group’s derivatives trading is done in yet another subsidiary. That is why integration gives rise to a structure that often seems to be in conflict with the present regulatory structure. But the problem is not integration – the problem is that our regulatory framework is not designed for a single market for financial services. Let me give you a concrete example of this. In the Nordic and Baltic countries – excluding Iceland – there are six banking groups with significant cross-border activities. Each one of these cross-border groups has regulatory contacts with seven supervisors and eight central banks.2 It is commonplace to  1  Banking Supervision Committtee (2004), “Cross-border banking and its possible pol-icy implications”, December  2  The Bank of Lithuania also has supervisory responsibility. 2  BIS Review 35/2005  note that Western Europe is over-banked. It would not be outrageous to say that it is also over-crowded with regulatory authorities. Our conclusion is that we, as national authorities in the EU, must solve the issues that integration gives rise to, rather than stopping integration. This might sound very obvious, but some of us authorities still only pay lip service to the idea of the single market. Or we love the idea of the single market as long as it means that our own banks survive as national champions and are able to expand abroad.

Regulation on the EU-level also faces another trade-off that is not present on the national level – that between the value of a level playing field and the cost of an overly detailed or inadequate regulation. A completely level playing field presupposes detailed rules that are applied in the same way in every market. But too detailed rules on the EU level risk being inadequate on the national level since national markets often differ widely. This could give rise to costly overregulation hampering financial development or driving financial institutions to settle elsewhere. Hence, it might be wise to leave some degree of freedom to the member countries. Historically, institutional competition has proved to be very positive for development in the long run. BIS Review 35/2005  3  At the same time, EU directives (as most international rules) tend to leave plenty of room for national discretions, effectively reducing the value of the convergence/harmonisation that probably was the motivation for the directive in the first place. We risk ending up with the worst of two worlds – very detailed rules on the EU level and loads of discretions on the national level. This makes the rules opaque and their implementation difficult to predict for the private sector. The starting point for EU rules should be the least common denominator. Today instead, it often seems like the starting point is the sum of all member states’ national rules.
News of Fed tapering in late spring last year reversed the flow of capital into EME-dedicated equity and bond funds, and emerging market currencies depreciated against the dollar. Sovereign debt yields rose sharply in vulnerable emerging market nations such as Brazil and Turkey. Sovereign debt spreads edged up in Mexico also, but significantly less so than in other EMEs. Much like in the morning after a party the night before, investors woke up sober and more discriminating. Why Mexico stands apart There are concerns that the outsized capital flows to EMEs during the QE era pushed down interest rates and led consumers and businesses to take on too much debt. Mexico seems better positioned than many other countries in terms of this risk exposure. While according to the Banco de Mexico, private lending is up 38 percent since its recession low in 2010, international comparisons based on World Bank figures show the rate of credit expansion in Mexico pales in comparison to other emerging market nations. Between 2009 and 2012, private lending as a share of GDP grew 5 percentage points in Mexico while jumping 20 percentage points in Brazil. The level of debt exposure is also lower in Mexico than in many other emerging market nations. Private lending as a share of GDP was 28 percent in  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Mexico in 2012, compared with 35 percent in Indonesia, 54 percent in Turkey and 68 percent in Brazil.

Foreign direct investment doubled over 2012, although a large portion of the increase was due to the acquisition of Grupo Modelo. Mexico stands apart. As of February, Moody’s boosted its rating on Mexico’s government bonds to A3 – joining Chile as only the second Latin American country with an “A” rating. The structural reforms Mexico has passed played a role, but so did the ability to pass them. A unified political will to work for what’s in the nation’s best interests is a rare find these days and something about which Washington can only dream. Other nations, such as Brazil, may be headed in the opposite direction. Brazil’s economy likely shrank in the second half of 2013 and prospects for 2014 are half of what Mexico’s growth is projected to be next year. The Brazilian slowdown follows years of rapid growth and rising prices. Now, there are fears of a Brazilian house price bubble – homes in Sao Paulo are selling at three times 2008 prices. In contrast, Mexico City house prices are up 35 percent. I am not forecasting a housing bust for the Brazilian economy, mind you. But consumers may have to deleverage, which will detract from growth. The government may have to rein in spending as well. Brazilian government debt has outpaced GDP growth in recent years and currently stands at 57 percent of GDP, nearly twice that of Mexico. Faced with poorer growth prospects and a weakening labor market, Brazilian banks will likely tighten lending after a decade of credit expansion.
When the interest rate appreciates substantially, it prompts a fall in inflation, which will result in a reduction in the interest rate with subsequent pressures to depreciate. However, one must recognize that these are not very significant effects because, in a floating regime, the pass-through coefficient from the exchange rate to inflation is limited. It occurs primarily because of the usual transitory nature of exchange rate fluctuations, due to changes in their fundamentals and their relationship with the stage of the cycle. Emerging economies may feel tempted, after a long history of crises caused by exchange rate lags, to handle it to keep it depreciated, due to fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). Handling the exchange rate is, apart from hardly feasible in the medium to long term, risky. In the first place, in less flexible exchange rate regimes, the transmission coefficient to inflation increases, because the level of the exchange rate may become a coordinator of price expectations, given the policymakers’ commitment to price stability. This, in turn, feeds back to increased pressures to keep the exchange rate stable, thus aggravating the problem. Secondly, a commitment of the authority to exchange rate stability may create perverse  4  BIS Review 68/2009  incentives to take financial risks, by artificially lowering the cost of external borrowing. This reinforces fear of floating, creating a spiral towards exchange rate rigidity, and deriving in the much feared currency mismatches and exchange rate delays that were intended to prevent in the first place.

Given these considerations, the Bank chose instead to set minimum reserve spreads privately for each bond in the auction, drawing on a range of sources of information. One factor is the balance of our portfolio relative to the market as a whole, where the MPC was very clear that purchases should be representative of outstanding issuance. The Bank therefore publishes every month a ‘sector key’, showing the target share of purchases for each sector alongside our current holdings. 8  Since the August 2016 decision, cover in these operations has averaged 3.1, with the second operation in August 2016, which received offers slightly below the target level of purchases, standing out as an anomaly. 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  5  By adjusting our reserve spreads over time to reflect progress against that sector key, we can make ourselves relatively more willing to buy in sectors where we are underweight, tilting purchases towards those sectors. Collectively these choices were designed to encourage participation and competition in the auction, ensure that the Bank does not over-pay for bonds but delivers appropriate value for money, and accommodate the likely variable intensity of participation through time. Impact so far So if that was the theory, what have the results been? Most obviously, and even before purchases began, there was a clear and immediate impact on market pricing from the announcement of the August package. Yields on gilts eligible for purchase in the APF fell by 14-18 basis points on the day (Chart 4).
We hope that the interaction through presentations and panel discussions will provide ample opportunities for participants to share the experiences and challenges in their home markets. To provide a global perspective, we are honoured to have distinguished speakers from the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the UK Financial Services Authority, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The presentations by leading industry practitioners will add an important market dimension. To start off the programme this morning, let me put to you three broad propositions which regulators should reconcile with, in keeping with the demands of global capital markets: (a)  First, the need for cross-jurisdiction regulatory collaboration;  (b)  Second, a growing impetus for international standards; and  (c)  Third, how can regulators and regulations respond and facilitate capital markets’ continued innovation and growth. The need for regulatory collaboration The importance of cross-border regulatory cooperation is evident from the cross-border element in the regulator’s job. Local investors buy financial products overseas while foreign funds own substantial stakes in locally-listed stocks. Capital market intermediaries compete vigorously to add value, servicing global orders. Even markets now seek direct presence, in the form of trading terminals, in different jurisdictions. Increasingly, cross-border operations are no longer conducted predominantly via telephone or fax wires, but by proprietary networks capable of channeling orders and funds across the globe almost instantaneously. Such proprietary systems combined with the reach of the internet has pooled isolated pockets of liquidity into a single global market.

Page 1  The digital pound − speech by Jon Cunliffe Given at UK Finance  Page 2  Published on 07 February 2023  Jon Cunliffe says it is likely that a retail, general purpose digital central bank currency - a digital pound - will be needed by the end of this decade. He discusses why this is the case, what the model could look like and how the digital pound may sit within the digital payments landscape. Speech As some of you may have seen, the Bank of England and the Treasury have today published, as a Consultation Paper, the report of the Bank of England – HM Treasury Taskforce on the introduction in the UK of a central bank digital currency – a ‘digital pound’. So I am grateful for the opportunity today to set out some of the thinking behind the report and the next steps we propose. First, however, I should set out the headline conclusions of the Taskforce. Our assessment is that on current trends it is likely that a retail, general purpose digital central bank currency - a digital pound - will be needed in the UK. This would be a new, digital form of money, issued by the Bank of England for use by households and businesses for everyday payments. A digital pound would be a very substantial financial infrastructure project that would take several years to complete.
A stable financial system is also one that is able to manage risks that may harm its performance, and consequently that of the economy, and that should be able to absorb shocks without impairing its operations. The Bank carries out this task through the regular monitoring of the financial system, as well as of the domestic payment and securities settlement systems. The Bank’s findings are shared with the Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) and with the Ministry of Finance. The Authority is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervision of all financial institutions in Malta, while the Bank remains the lender of last resort. It is, therefore, the only domestic institution with the capacity to inject liquidity into a troubled institution against collateral. The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, is involved with respect to the possible use of public funds. As the international financial crisis unfolded, the Bank was in continuous contact, at the highest levels, with both the MFSA and with the Ministry of Finance. It also took steps to obtain more frequent balance sheet data from credit institutions. The Government on its part gave a commitment to protect financial institutions and depositors in Malta should the need ever arise. Meanwhile, and in the light of similar steps taken elsewhere, it decided to raise the guarantee provided on bank deposits to EUR100,000. Here I would like to remind this audience that the relevant EU Directive emphasises that the cost of financing such guarantee schemes must be borne by the credit institutions themselves.

Strengthening the Singapore Core In supporting the continued growth of Singapore as a leading global financial centre in Asia, we place a high priority on ensuring that financial sector growth is achieved in a way that is supportive of local employment outcomes. 15. Singapore serves as a key financial hub for the region and is well placed to benefit from Asia’s growth and economic transformation as it emerges from COVID-19. One of the key prongs of our developmental strategy is to attract more global and regional headquarter functions of the FIs here to serve the broader Asian region. When that happens, it will involve FIs bringing in a diversity of talent from their global workforce to build up these new functions here, and this may cause the proportion of Singaporeans in these FIs to come under pressure. However, anchoring more global and regional functions here also brings along more growth, good jobs and opportunities for Singaporeans. Further, it opens up possibilities for Singaporeans to tap on the international footprint of these global financial institutions to gain overseas exposure, with some taking leadership positions overseas. We have to remain open and will continue to welcome global talent that complement our workforce. Employers must, however, hire in a responsible manner and 16. 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  commit to growing the local talent pool.
Your new Commissioner of Housing – whom I note, formerly worked at the New York Fed – attended that conference. We also conduct a periodic poll about the credit needs of small businesses, which are an important source of new jobs in the District. If you represent a small business and would like to participate in our next poll, please pass your business card to my colleagues, who are in the audience, or see me after the speech. And if your business is somewhat larger, I urge you to consider becoming one of our business contacts – just indicate your interest to us on your business card. So how is the region doing? I want to begin by pointing out that Fairfield County has a number of strengths, beginning with a highly-educated workforce: Two in five adults in the county hold a college degree, nearly twice the nationwide average. It also has an array of fine educational institutions, including Fairfield University, UConn Stamford, the University of Bridgeport, Sacred Heart University, Western Connecticut State University, Housatonic Community College and Norwalk Community College. The industry mix here is quite diverse, with a good representation of jobs in the high-paying finance sector. In fact, roughly 35,000 jobs in the county, about 9 percent of total employment, are in the finance and insurance industry, a share almost twice as large as in the nation and even slightly higher than in New York City.

While the overall growth had moderated during the year, the overall balance of payments turned around to a surplus position of RM3.7 billion in 2001. While the current account surplus narrowed in 2001, the surplus remained large at RM27.4 billion or equivalent to 8.9% of GNP. This reflected a moderate decline in the trade account and an improvement in the income and services accounts. As at end-2001, BNM's international reserves was higher at $ billion. Subsequently, reserves have increased further to $ billion as at 14 March 2002, sufficient to cover 5.5 months of retained imports and cover 5.3 times the short-term external debt. While the external debt increased during the year, the outstanding amount has remained low at 55.4% of GNP. The debt profile also remained sound with short-term debt accounting for only 13.7% of total debt. In 2001, Malaysia's macroeconomic fundamentals continued to strengthen. Inflation moderated to 1.4%; international reserves continued its increasing trend, driven by sustained inflows of trade surplus and long-term capital flows; the overall fiscal position of the Federal Government improved; domestic savings remained high and the financial system strengthened significantly. These stronger fundamentals have increased the economy's resilience in the face of a more difficult external environment. The pegged exchange rate regime continued to be well supported by the fundamentals and facilitate international trade and investments during the year. The stability in the exchange rate  BIS Review 21/2002  1  also allowed for the effective implementation of pro-growth policies and the accelerated pace of banking and corporate restructuring.