samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Gent Sejko: Financial inclusion, governance, tackling nonperforming loans, and Albania’s milestones for 2020 Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the meeting organised by the Albanian Association of Banks, Tirana, 12 February 2020. * * * Dear ladies and gentlemen, It is always a pleasure for me to attend meetings and round tables with representatives of banks operating in Albania. They are also an excellent opportunity to discuss and harmonise our efforts for a stable deepening and expansion of the financial market, as one of the core pillars of the economy and the main driver for sustaining development and enhancing the public’s welfare. I would like, in my brief address, to bring to your attention some highlights of 2019, regarding the contribution of the banking and financial systems, as well as some milestones for 2020. Let me first focus on the overall state of affairs in the Albanian economy. The devastating earthquake that hit Albania on 26 November 2019 was a major event with a strong impact for 2019, on all the sectors of economy and the whole society. It was an unexpected shock giving rise to economic and psychological consequences in the affected areas and beyond. On the other hand, it was a difficult test, and I may say that all banks passed it successfully, in terms of continuity of financial market’s critical functions.

The Bank of Albania, in the framework of legislation approximation with the EU acquis, has increased the regulatory requirements to ensure more qualitative governance. But, beyond the formal fulfilment of the regulatory requirements, these principles are indispensable to be incorporated into and become part of the culture of the entire organisation. This is a long-term investment, which generates positive and stable outcomes. Second, while adopting better governance, the same expectation should be transmitted also to your clients. The principle not to accept informal data from firms when assessing their repayment capacities has provided absolute positive results in preventing the creation of new non-performing loans. Yet, the issue of informality is still present in our economy. Banks may do more in this regard by offering to your clients and encouraging them to use existing or personalised products, which ensure a higher circulation of funds within the system, enhance the interconnection between firms and clients, and facilitate the establishment of a more complete financial profile and a more precise assessment of the repayment capacity. Third, there is still a relatively high quantity of “intangible assets” in the balance sheet of banks, despite the insofar success. In total, the properties regained from legal processes are a high potential waiting to be transformed into funds. But, it may lose its value very quickly, becoming an unnecessary cost, which harms the reputation and competitiveness of banks.
Joyce, M, Tong, M and Woods, R (2011) “The United Kingdom’s quantitative easing policy: design, operation and impact”, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 51(3). Koo, R (2003) Balance Sheet Recession: Japan’s Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global Implications, John Wiley & Sons. Laeven, L and Valencia, F (2010) “Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly”, IMF Working Paper, 10/146. Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010) “Final Report: Assessing the macroeconomic impact of the transition to stronger capital and liquidity requirements”. Bank for International Settlements. Reinhart, C and Rogoff, K (2009) “The Aftermath of Financial Crises”, NBER Working Paper 14656. Sargent, T and Wallace, N (1981) “Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic”, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 5. White, W R (2006) “Is price stability enough?”, Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 205. Wilson, J S G (1966) Monetary Policy and the Development of Money Markets, Allen & Unwin. 14  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Present: What implications do the lessons of the past twenty years imply for our assessment of the current situation and the challenges facing monetary policy today? We are not without advice on this dimension. Some monetarists expressed concern that the expansion of central bank balance sheets via QE during the financial crisis would trigger inflation. This fear proved mis-founded. More recently, other monetarists have attributed the current strength of inflation to the expansion of bank deposits associated with monetary easing and QE at the onset of the pandemic. Different diagnoses reflect the existence of different sects within the overall monetarist doctrine, often associated with varying focus on either narrow measures of ‘outside’ money (the monetary base, M0) or broad measures of inside money (such as M4 in the UK or M3 in the euro area). Interestingly, having been critical of the failure to tighten UK monetary policy in the face of strength in broad money growth through the pandemic, one stream of British monetarist thinking now advocates a gradual tightening of policy, despite the current elevated level of inflation. This preference for gradualism stems from the view that monetary growth has eased of late and strong policy action now risks tightening too much, inducing unnecessary macroeconomic volatility. [8] This contrasts with the advice of others who advocate stronger immediate policy action in the face of elevated spot inflation.
Better monitoring of the vulnerability of domestic economy to shocks is needed. It requires availability of data and proper understanding of (1) vulnerabilities which can be accessed through the sectoral balance sheets and flow of funds data; (2) screening of markets, where the boom-bust cycle might arise from, such as the real estate markets; (3) proper following of the financial and real sector linkages within an economy and (4) better information on public finances. This list of general recommendations in fact hides a necessity for very large and energy consuming efforts in the area of statistics. Although there are many angles which should be noticed, I would stress those which I think can give us “the large picture” of what should be done. The first lesson of the crisis was that timely, more granular and more inclusive data is needed. And let me note here that probably monetary statistics is one of the most explored examples, where the granularity and inclusiveness of data becomes the next inevitable developmental step. The aggregate monetary data should capture all sub-sectors of the financial sector, including insurance companies, pension funds, investment funds, other financial intermediaries and the shadow banking system. Also, for the purpose of tackling the issue of cross-border financial flows, consolidated data for banking or insurance groups seems inevitable. This requires a serious reshaping of the monetary statistics. I think that the Eurosystem offers a good example of concrete steps being undertaken to translate the need for granular and more comprehensive set of data, into a reality.

The key difference with previous programmes is that purchases are now conducted in a flexible manner and fluctuations in their distribution will be allowed over time, among jurisdictions and across asset classes, with a view to preventing fragmentation in monetary policy transmission. 1  The volume of purchases initially announced under the PEPP was € billion for the whole of 2020. In June the term was extended up to at least June 2021, and the volume by a further € billion, making for a total of € trillion. The PEPP, together with the new purchases under the Asset Purchase Programme (APP), will increase the portfolio of the Eurosystem’s securities purchase programmes to around € trillion in June 2021. In early October 2020, net purchases of public and private sector assets under the PEPP had already reached € billion since its launch at the end of March, i.e. 42% of the current envelope. Today we can safely say that the PEPP has been clearly successful in curbing financial market deterioration in all euro area countries. This is particularly visible in sovereign yields, which are now close to their pre-crisis levels; but it may also be perceived in other market segments such as that for corporate debt. And, of course, this decline in the cost of sovereign debt has provided policy space for fiscal authorities in all euro area countries, enabling them to take unprecedented measures to sustain the income of households and firms.
Calculating equilibrium unemployment after the fact is difficult and requires a number of assumptions. Serious attempts have been made, but as shown, they have had varying results. At the same time, monetary policy is forward-looking and is thus guided by forecasts of economic development. However, assessing the level of equilibrium unemployment in several years is even more complicated. And, as I mentioned earlier, even if we could know what the level of equilibrium unemployment would be further ahead, this would give us no guidance for monetary policy in the here and now. The economy is regularly subjected to structural changes affecting equilibrium unemployment. And we have limited knowledge of how the adjustment from one equilibrium rate to another occurs, or how long it takes. This means that using equilibrium unemployment in practical monetary policy is not uncomplicated. It is therefore important to closely monitor all of the statistics that reflect conditions on the labour market, which we already do. Monetary policy can primarily affect unemployment in the short term, via aggregate demand. Here I can mention that several debaters have previously claimed that an incorrect balance in monetary policy has made a significant contribution to the negative developments in the labour market. Naturally, we should not conduct a monetary policy that leads to demand being unnecessarily low and to unemployment becoming higher than it would have been because we single-mindedly react to the risk of inflation rising.

That went well beyond constructive pressure to improve efficiency to destructive agony. We’ve been only too well aware of that - we could hardly not have been; and we’ve not been insensitive to it either. We have consistently taken account of the unexpectedly persistent strength of the exchange rate in both our forecasts and in our monetary policy judgements. But when you come right down to it, for as long as economic conditions between one country and another diverge, whether for cyclical or structural reasons, there is a choice. Countries can either aim to stabilise their respective domestic economies, accepting that that may mean exchange rate volatility, or they can aim to maintain exchange rate stability, accepting that that may destabilise their respective domestic economies. These are the horns of the uncomfortable dilemma we have been on. I have no doubt, in terms of the macro-economy as a whole, that we have been right to persist in aiming to stabilise our domestic economy - the facts speak for themselves. It is possible - even perhaps likely - that our dilemma may now become less acute, at least for a time as the euro strengthens to a more sustainable level. Our best chance of maintaining that happier position - if indeed it occurs - is to persist in domestic stabilisation and structural reform alongside our European partners, but it is difficult to be confident at this stage that the dilemma will not re-emerge. BIS Review 50/2000  2
We modernised the bank and the financial system during the 1980s, so that is one thing. Here at the ECB, I’ve overseen the creation of a macroprudential policy and financial stability department, which is state of the art. And I am proud of course of having participated actively in all of the policy decisions that happened since I came here in 2010, especially those that put a 7/8  BIS central bankers' speeches  stop to the existential crisis over the future of the euro. Is there any decision that the ECB took that in hindsight you regret? The rate hike in 2008 was an overreaction. There seemed to be some justification at the time for the increase in rates in 2011, though in hindsight it was clearly premature. That’s it, I already said it in the speech. Will you stay in Germany or are you going to go back to Portugal? I’m going back to Portugal. In June, I will be at the ECB conference in Sintra. Normally we invite former members of the Executive Board, so I hope they will continue to invite me. Particularly as I don’t intend to go and work for any private financial institution. I will do some postgraduate teaching in Madrid. I always hoped I would have the opportunity to be a free intellectual. In my career I never had that luxury. I always thought and dreamed about it, and I hope to have a sufficient number of years to satisfy that ambition.

As Jean Monnet said, humans take important decisions only in a state of need. Which means in a state of crisis. I expect, nevertheless, that the fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund will be decided, and that there will be some kind of long-term promises about a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. There is also an absence of a macroeconomic tool to automatically stabilise the economy. On fiscal policy, we need two things to address this gap. First, we need coordination of national fiscal policies to become stricter and discussed more from the perspective of the euro area as a whole. This is a very important thing that should have already happened. The second thing is a type of macro stabilisation fund, along the lines of a rainy-day fund, like the IMF has proposed. Let’s see what happens. France has proposed something along these lines. There are also proposals on the table from others. That would be one of my priorities for reform. What about the other side of the coin? Germany and others are calling for risk reduction? First, I would say there has been a huge amount of risk reduction already. The periphery countries have undertaken huge adjustments; they’ve gone from big deficits, both in the budget and the external current account, to complying with EU rules.
As such, knowledge sharing platforms such as this Workshop are useful to enhance our knowledge on the latest changes and trends in this space. It is also crucial to continuously adopt new approaches and tools such as data analytics and artificial intelligence to elevate our surveillance and enforcement capability in keeping up with the increasingly complex and innovative financial instruments. Remaining reactive and defensive would limit our opportunity to proactively shape the orderly development of the financial landscape while managing any potential ML/TF/PF risks that accompany it. The second observation is on the greater scrutiny by both the domestic stakeholders and global community on AML/CFT/CPF measures and implementation. Revelations of highprofile information such as Panama Papers, FINCEN leaks and more recently, the Pandora Papers, have attracted great interest within the domestic and international communities on the AML/CFT/CPF regime. This has led to higher expectations for authorities to take prompt action against activities involving cross-border flow of illicit funds as well as the broader ML/TF/PF threats. While efforts by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to enhance and provide greater clarity on related Standards, including on transparency of beneficial ownership is underway, authorities and gatekeepers are also expected to ensure that blind spots are effectively addressed. More often than not, the information regarding these illicit activities resides with multiple parties across the public and private sectors. Hence, any suspicion will only surface if we are able to link and integrate that information.

Implications for the exchange rate  In principle, the following applies: the more the single currency proves to be a stable and strong currency, the greater will be its advantages for Switzerland, too. With the launch of the euro, the standard deviation of the trade-weighted exchange rate of the Swiss franc vis-à-vis the currencies of the European trading partners has narrowed considerably. The decrease in exchange rate volatility is due to the fact that the euro - as already mentioned - has to some extent replaced weak and extremely volatile currencies. This is a welcome advantage for the Swiss economy, which is closely interconnected with the EU. The volatility of the exchange rate is one thing; the level of the exchange rate is another. Since the beginning of 1999, the Swiss franc has appreciated by more than 9% against the euro. In the  BIS Review 60/2002  3  beginning, the development of the Swiss franc exchange rate against the euro was relatively stable. However, in the aftermath of 11 September, investors became increasingly risk-averse. This led to a further strengthening of the Swiss franc, which had already appreciated during the year 2000. The strength of the Swiss currency is a considerable challenge for our export-oriented economy. One has to put things in perspective, though. First, rather than on the nominal exchange rate, the competitiveness of the Swiss economy depends on the real exchange rate, which is corrected for inflation.
Internal Audit does not participate in management decisions, and our General Auditor reports to the Chair of the Audit and Risk Subcommittee of the Bank’s Board of Directors. In addition to defining clear and comprehensive risk management roles and responsibilities using the three lines of defense model, the Bank’s risk framework establishes governance, escalation, and reporting processes around risk exposures, risk decisions, and risk events. A  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  strong governance regime provides assurance to stakeholders (Management Committee, the President, and the Board) who delegate risk-taking authority to the business lines. From first-line businesses and support functions, risk information flows to the second line, and then to the Risk Subcommittee of our Bank’s Management Committee. The Risk Subcommittee discusses significant emerging and existing risks, provides perspectives on managing and mitigating risks, and supports Management Committee review and decision making. The Audit and Risk Subcommittee of the Bank’s Board of Directors and the Board of Directors itself are at the top of the governance chain, although there are limitations on their roles with respect to supervisory and monetary policy issues. 3 Operational risk management The Bank’s operational risk approach sits within, and is shaped by the Bank’s overall risk framework. Roles and responsibilities as well as escalation and reporting follow the general structure I previously described. At this point, though, I can drill down into operational risk specifics.

Once the terms of the bail-in are finalised, conversion ratios for the CEs into shares will be established and CE holders will be able to exercise their rights under the CEs resulting in legal title and voting rights being transferred to those bailed in bondholders entitled to compensation. In order to receive legal title and voting rights to the shares, the CE holders are required to provide evidence of their underlying beneficial ownership of the bonds, confirm that they are not acting as a controller and provide instructions for settlement. In this way beneficial ownership of the bank in resolution will stay in the private sector throughout the process. 4  e.g. BRRD article 43. 5  BRRD articles 36 and 74 and associated technical standards. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  •  Reorganisation: Finally, where a firm has been stabilised through a bail-in, this must be accompanied by a comprehensive restructuring plan. Bail-in is – explicitly – a prelude to reorganisation and the stability that it creates buys the time to achieve this 6. How much time is required will depend on the options available and how easily and quickly they may be implemented but it is essential to address directly the causes of failure and to restore market confidence so that the firm can access funding and operate normally.
Japan China Latin America World  Inflación -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -0.8 -0.2 -0.4  Consenso de mercado  PIB 0.6 0.2 0.7 -  Inflación -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -  PIB 0.5 0.5 0.3 -  Inflación -0.35 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.8 -0.27 -0.4  0.5 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.46 -  (*) For comparison purposes, the shocks of the respective studies have been adjusted to equal magnitudes. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, Deutsche Bank, International Monetary Fund and OECD. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Figure 12 International prices of commodity foodstuffs (1)  External price index of foodstuffs relevant to Chile (2)  monthly index, January 2007 and June 2010=100  (índice, enero 2007=100)  170  170  170  170  160  160  160  160  150  150  150  150  140  140  140  140  130  130  130  130  120  120  120  120  110  110  110  110  100  100  100  t  t+5  t+10  t+15  07  08  January 2007-June 2008  09 In pesos  10  11  100  In dollars  June 2010-February 2011  (1) Based on FAO index that uses average prices of monthly transactions in the main markets. (2) Based on weights of international prices of the various foodstuffs according to shares in CPI basket.

Going back to what I said earlier about maintaining high morals, keep away from abusing alcohol, drugs and sex as these are the ingredients that are likely to lead you into high risk behavior  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  such as unprotected sex and cause you to contract the HIV/AIDS. Abstinence is the only 100% effective way to avoid getting infected. WHAT EMPLOYERS WANT Employers want to see in you potential to be a high flyer and willingness to learn new things. Employers want a demonstration of productivity. Employers want to receive a good reference, a transcript that reflects goods results and a qualification from an institution of repute, a qualification that is relevant to their needs. You therefore need to be forward looking even as you select your subject. PLAN YOUR LIVES. Do not have the attitude of FIKAISOLVA. Have a recipe for a successful life. It is never too early. I had decided when I began to study law that I wanted to specialize in commercial law. That path has brought me to where I am today. I must make mention that you are fortunate in that the environment of the college is ideal for learning. I had the opportunity to be taken around the college and I observed that you have modern facilities and equipment that support your learning. Your classrooms have the necessary furniture, the computer laboratory has access to internet and the physical building conditions are solid.