samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2 The capital requirements and liquidity requirements the state makes of the banks are aimed at making them safe by requiring they hold buffers so they can cope with loan losses and an outflow of liquidity. The capital requirements also set a limit as to how much commercial bank money the banks can create. Commercial bank money the most common The money that is use the most in society is commercial bank money. The banks’ socalled deposits repayable on demand, that is, deposits with a high level of liquidity that can be used for payments, amounts to around SEK 2,200 billion, which is around half of Sweden’s GDP, compared with around SEK 130 billion in central bank money, where cash comprises just over SEK 60 billion. 3 4 In Sweden, we have long had a trend towards a decline in the use of cash. The trend is seen clearly if you relate the value of cash in circulation to GDP. This is the red line in 2 This was what happened to Stockholms Banco around 350 years ago. Their customers wanted to exchange their  commercial bank money for precious metals. Some of Stockholms Banco's assets were, because of the over-issuing of banknotes, in the form of personal loans that could not be quickly cashed in or where the borrower lacked liquid assets. Even if we cannot go the banks now and demand precious metals, the underlying problem remains the same. 3 In addition to cash, there is electronic central bank money.

The Riksbank is one of the central banks that will need to take an active stance on whether or not to issue a digital currency first. We cannot wait any longer, and I shall now tell you what we intend to do in the coming years. We will need to work within three different areas at once. Firstly, we need to identify what technologies can be used. This includes investigating both decentralised and centralised alternatives. It is important not to exclude alternatives in advance and thus limit the room for manoeuvre. Perhaps what we need is a combination of centralisation and decentralisation? We also need to study what technical competence we have, and what we need. We need to investigate in what way payments in e-krona can be initiated: with smartphones, plastic cards or in other ways. The second area is what I call policy issues, where we study the potential effects on the Riksbank, the payment market, monetary policy, financial stability and so on. Here, we ask ourselves what properties an e-krona should have to best meet the needs we see in the economy. I discussed examples of these questions earlier. The third area concerns legal issues. Examples here are what opportunities and what flexibility the Riksbank’s current mandate allows us, how different laws affect the requirements we should make of an e-krona system and so on. Even if we intend to work within these different areas in parallel, there will be interdependencies that we must take into account.
And changes in the competitive structure of labour and product markets can influence the impact of slack on wage and price pressures, causing the Phillips curve to change slope over time. 2  See the Governor’s Open Letter to the Chancellor (Bank of England, 2015b). 3  Bank of England (2015b). 4  Google Scholar lists more than 3000 citations for Phillips’ original article (Phillips (1958)). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Chart 10 plots the historical relationship between wage growth and unemployment in the UK over the period since 1856. Although noisy, it suggests a negative relationship between the two, with an average slope of just under ½. In others words, a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate has, on average in the past, lowered wage growth by around half a percentage point. A somewhat clearer window on this long-run Phillips curve relationship is provided by looking at distinct monetary regimes: exchange rate targeting regimes under the Gold and dollar standards (1856–1970); discretionary monetary policy regimes without central bank independence (1970–1997); and inflation-targeting regimes with independently-set monetary policies (1997 onwards). Chart 11 plots the Phillips curve relationship over these windows. The introduction of discretionary monetary policy regimes, without independence, caused an outward shift in the Phillips curve and a shift up in wage and inflation expectations. That is consistent with a loss of monetary credibility.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  13  Table 1: Estimated wage Phillips curves including measures of expected inflation Nominal wage growth(a) (1) (2) Wage growth (t-1)(a) Productivity growth(a) Unemployment gap Labour share (t-1) 2-year household inflation expectations (t-1)(b)  -0.31*** (0.09) 0.36*** (0.11) -2.22*** (0.36) -0.52*** (0.14) 1.13*** (0.35)  5-year breakeven inflation rate (t-1)(c) Interaction with inflation targeting dummy Constant  Observations R-squared  -0.35*** (0.09) 0.31*** (0.10) -2.23*** (0.36) -0.33** (0.17)  -0.14 (0.29) 0.02 (0.02)  1.02*** (0.28) -0.04 (0.29) 0.03* (0.02)  105 0.50  101 0.50  Sources: Barclays Basix; Bloomberg; Bank calculations. Notes: Estimated using quarterly data between 1987 Q1 and 2014 Q4. (a) Annualised quarter-on-quarter growth. (b) Excludes the period between 2012 Q2 and 2013 Q1 due to effects of the CPAC review on RPI-linked financial instruments. (c) Barclays Basix 2-year head household expectations. It is possible to simulate the effects of lower inflation expectations on the MPC’s February Inflation Report projections using the estimated wage relationships from Table 1, together with the Bank’s general equilibrium forecasting model. Chart 25 shows the effect on wages and inflation. Wage growth ends up around 0.3 percentage points lower at the twoyear horizon, while inflation is around 0.4 percentage points lower, than in the MPC’s central projections. Taking seriously recent falls in inflation expectations would add to the scale and duration of potential downside risks to UK inflation in the period ahead.
In this way, the guidelines reconcile the need for a flexible approach  6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  to macroeconomic management with the gains brought by a commitment to more long-term operational objectives. Lessons from the financial crisis Even though Norway has fared well through the financial crisis, helped by a sound economic policy framework, some concerns related to financial stability remain. In particular, there is one area in which Norway differs from other countries in a manner we perhaps do not like: Norwegian households are among the most heavily indebted in Europe. As activity in the Norwegian economy is gathering momentum, pressures are mounting in the housing market. Consumer confidence has improved and house prices have risen in recent months. Housing starts are moving up, although from moderate levels. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7  So far, the low interest rate level has not led to a pronounced increase in household borrowing. However, the household debt burden is at a historically high level and is expected to increase further. Rising debt and property prices are mutually reinforcing phenomena. Higher asset prices lead to higher collateral values for loans and increased borrowing opportunities for buyers. This increases the overall risk of the financial system. While monetary policy and fiscal policy have been anchored within a long-term, operational framework over the past ten years, there has been no coherent regulatory system for financial markets. Requirements are currently imposed on individual banks, but without adequate regard to overall risk in the financial system.

Øystein Olsen: The economic outlook Address by Mr Øystein Olsen, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to invited foreign embassy representatives, Oslo, 29 March 2011. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 16 March, Monetary Policy Report 1/11 and previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am happy to continue the tradition of my predecessor by inviting you to Norges Bank to discuss economic developments in Norway. Economic trends During the past few weeks, the world’s attention has been focused on the sufferings caused by the earthquake in Japan, as well as escalating political unrest in Middle East countries. The economic impact of these events is still uncertain. Apart from these, the economic and financial news of the past year has, on balance, been positive. The global recovery has gained strength, even though uncertainties persist. A common feature of the countries that fared well through the financial crisis was that they had kept their house in order. Norway falls into this group, although our abundant natural resource wealth puts us in a unique and favourable position. Against this backdrop, I would like to comment on our experience with implementing the prevailing frameworks for monetary and fiscal policy. Today we can look back at ten years of inflation targeting and the fiscal rule.
In 2022, when the oil price exceeds the cut-off level, the current account balance will return to positive territory and the accumulation of reserves will be resumed via fiscal rule-based foreign currency purchases. We do not expect a noticeable change in the private sector financial account balance over the forecast horizon. According to our estimates, the private sector financial account deficit will reduce from USD 18 billion in 2019 to USD 15 billion this year. This is linked to decline in GDP, decrease in economic revenues, as well as less possibilities for borrowing in foreign markets at the end of the first quarter — the start of the second quarter amid intensified volatility and uncertainty. Further ahead, as global markets stabilise, the potential for external bollowings will recover and this will pass through to a reduction in the private sector financial account deficit to USD 10 billion in 2021–2022. This baseline scenario, without doubt, has many uncertainty factors. They concern both the duration of the restrictions in Russia and worldwide, and the pace of recovery of the global and Russian economies. Besides, new spikes of volatility may occur in global financial and commodity markets. Therefore, in our discussions of the key rate decision and its path, we have a proper regard to the objective of sustaining financial stability. As I noted, the baseline forecast incorporates only the fiscal decisions already made by the Government. We assume that further on the situation may require additional decisions to support the economy.

Elvira Nabiullina: Review of recent inflation developments in Russia and economic outlook Statement by Ms Elvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Bank of Russia, in the follow-up to the Board of Directors meeting, Moscow, 24 April 2020. * * *  Today, the Board of Directors has decided to cut the key rate by 50 bp to 5.50% per annum. This implies that we have switched to accommodative monetary policy. Moreover, we hold open the prospect of further key rate reduction if the situation develops in line with the updated baseline forecast of the Bank of Russia. Our today’s decision is based on the profound revision of our view of economic development and inflation trends in the next three years. Since the last Board of Directors’ revision of the key rate, three events have happened which have defined our view of the situation. They are primarily associated with the spread of the coronavirus pandemic. Firstly, this is a drastic decline in the global economy. Secondly, there has been another round of a slump in oil prices, despite the new OPEC+ deal. Thirdly, the Government has introduced nation-wide restrictions. As a result, a large number of businesses have suspended their operations or switched to the remote work mode. A lot of citizens are currently in self-isolation. As to positive factors, I would focus on a slight stabilisation in global financial markets as compared to March, which was largely driven by measures being implemented by the central banks of reserve-currency countries.
As regards the Federal Reserve, although it is true to say that under the present regime chosen for our monetary policy – namely a currency board with the US dollar as anchor currency – the Fed's monetary policy has a major and direct influence on monetary conditions in Hong Kong, it was certainly not the Fed which determined that Hong Kong should operate a monetary policy of this nature. It was Hong Kong's choice, and we do not require any permission from Washington or New York to continue or discontinue it. With regard to the Legislative Council, while members of LegCo take a keen interest in monetary policy and related issues, and although the HKMA maintains a dialogue with LegCo, more particularly with its Financial Affairs Panel, over matters of common interest, LegCo has no locus under existing laws to determine monetary policy. With regard to the three note-issuing banks, that particular status confers no ability to affect monetary policy. The banks issue notes in response to the public's wishes to exchange deposits into currency, and are required to pay over backing to the Exchange Fund in such manner as the Financial Secretary specifies - which has since 1983 been the equivalent value in US dollars calculated at the fixed rate of 7.80. Within this framework the volume of note issuance itself is neutral in terms of monetary policy.

Although the Hong Kong arrangement, and in particular the status of our Monetary Authority, is unusual internationally and may possibly be unique when compared to the more typical set-up of a central bank established as a distinct corporate entity, the process of monetary policy may not in practice be greatly different from that in other jurisdictions – with the broad framework being set by the government and with the central bank executing the policy in a transparent and accountable fashion. However, we do not have such a precisely defined framework of autonomy for the central bank as exists in some other jurisdictions, which is sometimes regarded as a necessary formal safeguard to monetary stability. The distinction may be less important under our firmly rule-based currency board system than it might be in other circumstances. Legal parameters Let's turn now to the "what" question. Although, as noted already, the Basic Law clearly states that the Hong Kong government shall determine its own monetary policy, it also sets some very important parameters within which that freedom can be exercised. Thus:"The Hong Kong dollar, as the legal tender in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, shall continue to circulate." (Article 111) "No foreign exchange control policies shall be applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Hong Kong dollar shall be freely convertible. …….The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall safeguard the free flow of capital within, into and out of the Region."
Our special focus is currently on information coming in from regions using our network. Leaders of the Bank of Russia’s regional branches are invited to each of our rate-setting meetings. They update us on the situation in their regions; ultimately, our estimates and outlooks are not solely based on the data provided by Rosstat. Rosstat data should indeed be treated as a reliable source of information, considering that alongside authorities virtually all market participants also use them. So, the more trust in Rosstat’s professionalism and independence the better. There are a variety of options on how we may address this. At the end of the day I believe this is up to the Government. I would rather reserve my judgement here. Thank you. QUESTION from Bloomberg: Two questions, again, please. One, following up on the question from my colleague, we heard both the economic development minister and the finance minister mention that the ruble is stronger than its fundamental values. In this connection, what does the Bank of Russia make of this; is the ruble close to its fundamental values, or is it actually stronger? And my second question, which is in some way related to the first. You mentioned that purchases of foreign currency are a possible means to replenish reserves, provided these purchases do not do damage to inflation targets. All indications are, we are on track to meet the 4% inflation target by mid-year. Can the Central Bank launch foreign currency purchases to replenish its reserves? Thank you. ELVIRA NABIULLINA: Thank you.

Yes, we met on the sidelines of the G20 meeting for finance ministers and central bankers. In our talks we discussed, among other things, prospects for yuan-denominated OFZ to be issued on the Russian market. We not support for this idea in principle, with details to be discussed subsequently. Lenta.ru’s QUESTION: There are concerns in business circles and in the expert community that the ruble is too volatile. What is the Bank of Russia’s view on this matter? What could lead to the Central Bank giving up the floating exchange rate? ELVIRA NABIULLINA: In the foreseeable future, I do not anticipate any factors which would force us to abandon a floating exchange rate regime. I am convinced that the negative repercussions cited by enterprises in the real sector of the economy, namely, volatility, are outweighed by the benefits of this policy. Thus we are saved from any drastic corrections in the exchange rate, which would then hurt the economy overall, including social expenditures, etc. Allow me to stress this point again. We are confident that the arrival of the floating rate regime has in many ways helped the economy adjust to external shocks more quickly than it did in 2008–2009. This is also suggested by the depth of recession. It was the floating regime arrangement that enabled the real sector of the economy, together with the financial sector, to adjust to a drastically different environment. This really is an inbuilt stabiliser, and we see that it does work.
Had Continental Illinois been allowed to fail without any intervention, the comptroller of the currency later testified, “we could very well have seen a national, if not an international, financial crisis the dimensions of which were difficult to imagine”.2 The comptroller went on to declare that the largest 11 national, commercial banks were too big to fail. But the problem has become more significant since that time for several reasons. First, the biggest financial institutions have become much larger, both in absolute terms and relative to the overall size of the banking system. This reflects many factors including the end of prohibitions on interstate banking, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act restrictions separating investment from commercial banking, the rapid growth of the capital markets, and the globalization of the economy – all of which created intense competitive pressures to expand in order to gain economies of scale and scope. In commercial banking, consolidation occurred at a rapid pace. For example, Bank of America was the outgrowth of over 160 different mergers, which pushed up the size of the original acquirer from $ billion of assets in 1980 to $ trillion today. In the securities  2  Conover, C.T. 1984. “Testimony: Inquiry Into the Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank”. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation, and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2nd Session, September 18, 19 and October 4: 172–391. P. 288.

Columbia University, New York, 11 October 2022 « What monetary policy narrative after Forward Guidance? »  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de France  Page 2 sur 14  Ladies and gentlemen, dear students and professors, I am very grateful to Dr. Patricia Mosser for the invitation to speak at Columbia University. I already had the honour of delivering a speech here in April 2017, and it is great to be back. The current context is obviously quite different from five years ago: today we face too high inflation – compared with too low inflation in 2017 –, and we are navigating through a geopolitical environment that looks unprecedented in its uncertainty. Due to this uncertainty, binding forward guidance from Central Banks appears less relevant, and has rightly been put aside in the recent past. But this is not an argument for returning to the secrecy that characterised central banking until the 1990s. One of the most topical questions for central banks is therefore how to ensure a “new predictability”. i Indeed, not having forward guidance does not mean, cannot mean, not having a narrative and a monetary strategy. Let me elaborate on this today, first laying out the reasons why we have to act in a determined way to deliver our 2% inflation target (I), then proposing some milestones on our normalisation path (II) and finally shedding light on one sensitive coordination issue (III). I.
We hope that the next three days will give you an opportunity to enjoy Sri Lanka, as well as to learn more about money laundering and terror financing. I wish you a pleasant stay and a very useful and successful conference. Thank you very much. BIS Review 133/2008  3

The probability of realization of credit risk would grow particularly in an economic slowdown or a situation less favourable than the one observed in the recent years. Presently, we see growing indications of possible problems and increased uncertainty – globally and in the euro area – which could, through certain channels, bring negative effects domestically. From the perspective of the sector, 2019 will also be dominated by the asset review and stress test in several banks. We are at the stage of finalising the preparations for the practical implementation of these processes. They are under the lead of the European Central Bank, but with the active cooperation of the BNB. The asset review, stress test and synchronization of our supervisory practices with the European Central Bank are a very important, though not the only, element of the efforts associated with Bulgaria’s plans for entry of the Bulgarian Lev in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) and Bulgaria’s accession to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. These strategic steps should be made simultaneously, according to the plan and the agreements reached with our European partners. In 2019 we expect the positive trends in the banking sector to continue altogether, however with possible increased challenges associated with the general economic environment banks operate in. Concurrently, in the coming months we will evidence processes of potentially long-term consequences directly impacting the sector, aimed at achieving a qualitatively higher degree of integration of Bulgaria into the European financial and institutional infrastructure. 1/1  BIS central bankers' speeches