samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
14  BIS Review 133/2010  Barro (2006), “Rare Disasters and Asset Markets in the Twentieth Century” by Robert Barro, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006, 121, no.3 Bean, C., Paustian, M., Penalver, A., and Taylor, T.(2010), “Monetary Policy after the Fall”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Annual Conference, Jackson Hole, 2010. Diamond DW, Dybvig PH (1983). “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, 91 (3): pp 401–19. He, Z, I Khang and A Krishnamurthy (2010): “Balance Sheet Adjustment during the 2008 Crisis”, IMF Economic Review, pp 1–39. Kashyap ,K., Stein, J. and Hanson, S (2010). “An Analysis of the Impact of ‘Substantially Heightened’ Capital Requirements on Large Financial Institutions”, Working Paper. McGuire, P M. and Tsatsaronis, K (2008), “Estimating Hedge Fund Leverage”, BIS Working Paper No. 260. Miller, M (1995). “Do the M-M Propositions Apply to Banks?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol 19, pp 483–489. Modigliani, F.; Miller, M. (1958). “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment”. American Economic Review 48 (3): 261–297. Reinhart and Reinhart (2010), “After the Fall”, NBER Working Paper 16334. Wadhwani, S (2010) “What Mix of Monetary Policy and Regulation is Best for Stabilising the Economy”, The Future of Finance, London School of Economics. BIS Review 133/2010  15

Thankfully, Marvin, along with others, helped lay the intellectual groundwork and created the vocabulary for us to work through some of the most significant issues facing central banks. His work is a true emblem of how researchers play a vital role in informing and shaping the policy discussion. I look forward to the upcoming conversation. Thank you. 1 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Mark S. Sniderman, Conference Summary, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume  32, Number 4, Part 2, pp. 845–69, November 2000. 2 Marvin Goodfriend, Overcoming the Zero Bound on Interest Rate Policy, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,  Volume 32, Number 4, Part 2, pp. 1007–35, November 2000. 3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Transcript of the Federal Open Market Committee Meeting  and presentation materials, January 29–30, 2002. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
Thirdly, the Federal Republic is a major world competitor in sectors such as machine tools and industrial equipment. Its global competitiveness is a major asset for the euro area given how closely intertwined EMU countries are. Therefore, I would point out to all those who argue in a similar fashion that what looks as a disadvantage for the euro area as a whole from a specific angle is in reality an advantage when seen from the right perspective. Il Sole 24 Ore: But in a more general way Ms Lagarde did point out that the euro area is experiencing large economic imbalances. Is there a Europe-wide agenda to solve this problem? Trichet: The aim must be to elevate significantly growth potential in all countries through the structural reforms that are overdue in Europe. This will remain strategically important in the  2  BIS Review 45/2010  next decade. The 2020 Agenda will have to be implemented in a more effective way than the 2010 Lisbon Agenda, as President Van Rompuy has recommended. More generally let me say that given the nature of monetary union, some countries, because of a rapidly aging population for example, will have to run current account surpluses, while other countries with very significantly fewer pension liabilities will not be called to run such surpluses. Similarly, some countries, to regain competitiveness, will have to keep inflation below the EU average.

But, given lower levels of leverage, it is unlikely that we will see, or want to see again, the returns on equity that we saw before the crisis. In the new world, paybills may well have further to adjust. A major element of the rethinking of business models in global banks has concerned their Fixed Income, Commodities and Currency business – charmingly known as FICC. A consequence of higher risk aversion and tougher capital and liquidity requirements have been a step reduction in FICC-related activity, especially proprietary trading and marketmaking. Inventory levels held in banks’ FICC areas have nearly halved since the boom years. A consequence has been falling income from FICC trading over the past five years. It is not yet clear how this very material element of banks’ business models will evolve. Many banks, reacting to both low profitability and regulatory pressure, are continuing to shrink these operations. And as the data suggest the average pay bill in banking is skewed very heavily towards the top earners, such as principal risk takers in investment banking and trading, this should both restore return-on-equity and reduce the pay bill. To sum up. The landscape has changed with key changes to the way the official sector approaches regulation and supervision. Those changes have generated changes in rules and in supervisory practice that have changed the world for banks. Banks are now wrestling with the changes they need to make to thrive both in the new economic environment and in this new landscape.
In practice, discretionary prudential measures pose difficulty in the form of potential regulatory forbearance, market distortion, timing effectiveness, and the difficulty in modeling early warning system. Rule-based prudential measures, on the other hand, pose difficulty in policy calibration. That is to say, calibrating this type of policy tools has so far proven difficult for emerging markets where data availability is limited and large structural breaks are usually present. Let us now turn to the longer-term challenge in the pursuance of monetary and financial stability in emerging markets, that is, the issue of structural reform and its implementation. From a longer-term perspective, the attainment of monetary and financial stability is determined predominantly by the embedded structural features of the economy. These matter not only with regard to how shocks are propagated through the system but they also influence the effectiveness that policy stabilization efforts can cushion the economy from such shocks. In what follows, I will discuss two key aspects of the structural features that are important for the pursuance of monetary and financial stability. These are the financial development and the policy institutions and framework. First, financial development. One important requirement to ensure that the risk management capacity of the economy evolves with the changing nature of risk is to enhance the risk management ability of economic agents. The key to this would be to strengthen the efficiency and the robustness of the financial system.

Regarding policy implementation, besides monetary policy measures, we have also used non-standard monetary policy measures that are still in place, and additionally in several occasions we have modified some of the prudential measures for further strengthening of financial stability. Managing economic and financial cycle spillovers and putting them on the right track, go beyond monetary policy scope of operation and refer to the overall macroeconomic policy mix. Additionally, international developments and regulation could also affect domestic cyclical movements. Nowadays, we live in a world of ongoing recovery of the advanced economies from the long-lasting crisis, rising vulnerabilities of emerging economies, increasing and unpredictable volatility of the international financial markets and, on top of that, quite persisting geo-political risks. In this complex environment, we need to continue with internal policy coordination and international cooperation. Therefore, we have been discussing here today quite comprehensive economic phenomena that require multiple angles of observation and profound analysis. Although I believe that the research papers that are going to be presented today will shed light on some of the issues that I have mentioned, this will definitely be a challenge for the researchers in the period ahead, too. As policy makers, speaking today, many years after the onset of the global crisis, we can probably say that many policy challenges are already behind us, but still there are more to come.
The scepticism was clearly expressed by Kåre Willoch, who was prime minister when the new Act came into effect in 1985: “[Nicolai Rygg] was held primarily responsible – and  15  In 1926, Minister of Finance Holmboe, of the centrist-liberal party Venstre, said: “It is however a well known fact that wherever governments have assumed authority over the national bank, the outcome has been unfavourable because vested interests have been so considerable and the temptation so strong that it was impossible to resist, and the government has helped itself to the national bank’s cash…”. In Francis Sejersted (1973): Ideal, teori og virkelighet. Nicolai Rygg og pengepolitikken i 1920-årene. [Ideals, theory and reality. Nicolai Rygg and monetary policy in the 1920s]. J. W. Cappelens forlag. 16  In Francis Sejersted (1973). 17  Berge Furre (Norwegian historian, theologian and politician for the Socialist Left Party), (1999): “Norsk historie 1905–2000: Industrisamfunnet – frå vokstervisse til framtidstvil” [History of Norway 1905–2000: from confidence in growth to doubts about the future], Det Norske Samlaget. 18  For a lively description of the personalities governing the large central banks in the 1920s, see Liaquat Ahamed (2009): The Lords of Finance. The bankers who broke the world. Penguin Books.

The current financial turmoil is here to remind us that financial innovation is not a smooth process. An appropriate knowledge of the mechanisms through which monetary policy affects the economy is of crucial importance for central banks. Financial innovation affects these mechanisms by altering the channels through which monetary policy operates. Drawing on some lessons from the current turmoil, I would like to make four points. First, securitisation has created new uncertainties in the transmission channels of monetary policy. It may have weakened some channels and strengthened some others. At least in normal times, financial innovation significantly weakens the bank-lending channel. Securitisation gives firms broader access to capital markets and, as such, makes them less dependent on bank funding. Similarly, banks may be more able to issue debt securities and less dependent on the constraint of funding themselves with secured deposits. At the same time, however, securitisation strengthens the “direct” transmission channel through which interest rates operate, since a great number of financial intermediaries are more dependent on liquidity and on its price. Second, financial innovation – to the extent that it makes it easier to take risks and encourages the “search for yield” – may have increased the impact of monetary policy because, in such an environment, risk premia are highly procyclical and move in tandem with interest rates. Third, this same procyclicality of “risk taking” can lead to booms and busts, when investors’ appetite for risk changes.
This SupTech-Regtech linkage is targeted at driving adoption of technology for compliance and supervision efficiency and effectiveness. 33. A greater use of analytics to support our AML/CFT risk monitoring and supervision work will hence be a key priority in MAS. To illustrate, we expect to tap Hadoop-based Big Data system to build complex network models that are better able to identify and pick up subtle patterns in entity behaviours. In the future, we hope to rely more recent technologies such as Machine Learning, Deep Learning and Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) based computing, to deepen MAS’s financial surveillance and supervisory insights. I know that some of the major FIs are doing the same. Our Data Analytics Group will also look to establish a community of senior data 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  practitioners with the industry to support an exchange of views for mutual learning. 34. Let me conclude by reiterating why we take ML/TF threats so seriously. Singapore is an important global financial hub. Our financial centre is home to many FIs including a number of international firms. Many of them serve the region including in global business lines or in regional corporate functions. Our reputation is one of being a clean, trusted and efficient financial centre supported by a talented workforce and strong rule of law. This reputation has been built over the years and must be protected diligently. 35. With the rise in ML/TF risks globally, Singapore must be proactive in playing our part to combat these threats.

To be effective, we need to forge a strong collective effort with every stakeholder doing its part. In this regard, a good regulator-industry partnership is one essential thrust of our AML/CFT strategy. 36. On this note, I wish you a successful and fruitful conference. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
In recent months, the Riksbank has decided on • • •  A lending programme to the banks of SEK 500 billion to facilitate lending to companies Purchases of covered bonds for SEK 145 billion Purchases of municipal bonds for SEK 30 billion  10 [25]  • • • • • •  Purchases of government bonds, in addition to those decided in 2019, of SEK 25 billion Purchases of commercial paper for SEK 32 billion 9 Lending of USD 60 billion to the banks Easing of collateral requirements so the banks can borrow from the Riksbank more easily Lower interest rate on the lending facility, to 0.2 percentage points above the repo rate (from 0.75 percentage points). Offering the banks unlimited loans against collateral with a three-month maturity in weekly extraordinary market operations  Common to many of these measures is that they lead to significant changes on the Riksbank's balance sheet. It may also be necessary to adjust the repo rate, although there is not very much scope for interest rate cuts at present. However, the major problem at the moment is not that the interest rate is too high, the risk of a credit crunch is more about the major difficulties faced by many Swedish companies and households. When the banks are to decide to give loans, they must of course consider whether the borrower will be able to repay the loan.

Many of these agents had a business model based on lending or investing money in the longer term and regularly obtaining financing through different forms of short-term market funding. When access to short-term funding was strangled, there was an overhanging threat of suspension of payments. To counteract this problem, many central banks established different types of ‘facility, where a number of financial institutions could borrow money against various forms of collateral – even those that could not be sold at a reasonable price on the market. Here we can see that the central bank has an important task to fulfil in a crisis: to take on risk in a time when no one else is willing to do so. In a crisis, there is a risk of a ‘fire sale’ dynamic arising. Institutions that cannot replace their funding are forced to sell off assets, which leads to a fall in prices If the central bank, in this situation, goes in and offers the actors loans with these assets as collateral, and does not fully apply the prevailing market valuation, the market can stabilise. The purpose of the measure is primarily to preserve financial stability by ensuring that the liquidity supply functions. But if the central bank does not support the liquidity supply, there is the threat of a credit crunch and bankruptcies, which will, of course, in turn have macroeconomic effects that impact the monetary policy objectives.
The Hong Kong dollar and the Renminbi continue to circulate as legal tender in Hong Kong and the mainland respectively. The Hong Kong dollar is treated as a foreign currency in the mainland. Likewise, the Renminbi is treated as a foreign currency in Hong Kong. 15. The Basic Law has provided for the legal status of the Hong Kong dollar. The Renminbi is still not yet freely convertible. However, even if it becomes freely convertible, it will only be one of the many foreign currencies traded in Hong Kong’s forex market. As for the cross-border circulation of the banknotes of the Hong Kong dollar and the Renminbi, this is a natural consequences of the close relationship between the two places. This phenomenon was in existence long before the handover. The legal status of the Hong Kong dollar will not be affected and the Hong Kong dollar will not be replaced as a result. 16. The issuance arrangements for the Hong Kong dollar remain independent. Hong Kong dollar bank notes continue to be issued by the three note-issuing banks under the authorisation of the HKSAR government. Under the linked exchange rate system, the note-issuing banks provide 100% backing in US dollar according to the fixed rate of $ to $ In order to ensure that all the Hong Kong dollar notes and coins in circulation comply with the monetary rule of the Currency Board System, we have improved our coins issuance mechanism so that it operates in exactly the same way as the notes issuance mechanism.

John Gieve: Stability and change Speech by Sir John Gieve, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, to the Engineering Employers’ Federation North West, Warrington, 20 July 2006. *  *  *  I am delighted to be here today. The Bank of England has long connections with this region. We first set up offices in Manchester and Liverpool back in 1820s. That was a time when North West of England was a key hub in an emerging international economy, with the Port of Liverpool providing the gateway for industry in Lancashire and Cheshire to trade with the rest of the world, particularly textiles. The structure of the economy in the North West has of course changed markedly since those days and the region is now more associated with the aerospace, defence and pharmaceuticals industries than with textiles. Here as elsewhere, recent years have been a time of rapid change in the structure of industry and the economy. We may have been talking about globalisation for years but that doesn’t mean it is complete; in fact it is still gathering momentum. Macroeconomic stability: a platform for change In the face of that rate of change, it may seem paradoxical that among central banks the last 10 years have been known as the “Great Stability”. The UK is an example of that. Since 1992, when an explicit target for inflation was first introduced here, inflation has been stable and very close to its target.
Domestically focused banks: resilience and lending policies I would now like to turn to the domestically focused banks. In Switzerland, there has been a further increase in risks on the mortgage and real estate markets since the end of 2012. This development poses the greatest challenge to the stability of domestically focused banks over the medium term. Conditions on the mortgage market, in particular, have deteriorated. In Switzerland, growth in mortgages for residential real estate continued to exceed GDP growth in 2013. In the first three quarters of this year, mortgage volumes increased by CHF 27 billion, or an annualised 4.4%. Over the same period, annual economic output, i.e. aggregated economic output over four quarters, rose by CHF 8.4 billion from the end of 2012, or an annualised 1.9%. This means that, for Switzerland as a whole, the already high indebtedness is continuing to grow faster than people’s capacity to offset this debt with income. The situation on the residential real estate market has also deteriorated slightly. Depending on the segment, real estate prices have risen in real terms by between 2.6% and 3.5% on average since the beginning of the year. Despite a slowing of momentum compared to last year, these growth rates are still high in a historical comparison. In addition, overall, prices for residential real estate have increased more strongly than rents or income since the beginning of the year. There is also no sign of a reversal of domestically focused banks’ risk appetite.

The guideline for fiscal policy implies the use of petroleum revenues equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund, ie an estimated increase in the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget of about 0.4 per cent of mainland GDP each year up to 2010. A clear majority in the Storting supported the Government's long-term strategy for using petroleum revenues. BIS Review 47/2001  1  At the same time, the guidelines stipulate that the Government shall use the budget to stabilise economic developments. The annual budget resolutions will provide an indication of the emphasis placed on this consideration. The Norwegian economy and state finances are marked by a high and varying level of petroleum revenues. The basis for determining central government expenditure from one year to the next may thus easily be impaired. If budget outlays are allowed to swing in pace with oil prices, the result may be abrupt shifts and instability in the Norwegian economy. Changes in oil prices will then rapidly influence wage and price expectations, the exchange rate and long-term interest rates. In that case, it would be very demanding to ensure price stability. This would prompt rapid and pronounced changes in short-term interest rates and be accompanied by a higher risk premium on Norwegian kroner, which would lead to a generally higher interest rate level over time.
Housing – The Quiet Decade Speech given by Sir Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor Financial Stability, Member of the Financial Policy Committee, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee and Member of the Prudential Regulation Committee  The Law Society Property Section Convention, London Thursday 20 May 2021  I'm grateful to Kristina Bluwstein, Rand Fakhoury, Lewis Kirkham, Lisa Panigrahi, Sarah Venables and Matt Waldron for their assistance in preparing these remarks. I'd also like to thank Richard Donnell, Robert Gardner, Geoff Meen and Christine Whitehead for sharing some of their insights with me. All view represented here are my own. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  One of the many unusual features of the Covid-driven economic contractions in advanced economies has been the behaviour of housing markets. Housing markets typically slow and house prices fall in severe economic contractions. But despite very adverse economic conditions after the initial Covid lockdown shock last spring, housing markets have been buoyant in many advanced economies and house prices have been rising. House prices grew by 5.7% on average across advanced economies in 2020, the sharpest increase since 20071. Of course, what we have experienced over the past 12 months or so has been very different to a ‘normal’ business cycle contraction or even to the more extreme contractions that follow financial busts.

3  For more information on the special reserve requirement on certain capital inflows in Iceland, see Central Bank of Iceland (2017). 5  References: Central Bank of Iceland (2017). Special reserve requirement on capital inflows. Monetary Bulletin 2017/4. Available at www.cb.is. Gudmundsson, Már (2008). Financial globalisation: key trends and implications for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. BIS Papers No 39. Available at www.bis.org. Gudmundsson, Már (2016). Global financial integration and central bank policies in small, open economies, Singapore Economic Review. Obstfeld, Maurice (2015). Trilemmas and trade-offs: living with financial globalisation. BIS Working Papers 480. Available at www.bis.org. Rey, Helene (2013). Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence. Available at www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2013/2013Rey.pdf. 6