samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
I tend to believe that the end of the cycle of heavy capital inflows is followed by a short-term bout of inflation (basically on account of the exchange rate channel), while the subsequent decline in inflation is triggered by the recession and the downbeat expectations that are typical of the periods following capital flow bonanzas. This view may be explained by a relatively large nominal depreciation. However, over the following years, inflation reverts to levels more or less similar to those seen prior to the stop in the heavy capital inflow episode. The stylised profile is depicted in Chart 3, Figure I. Chart 4, Figure I sets out the stylised trajectory of the exchange rate. If massive capital inflows span over several years, the real appreciation on an annual basis tends to be significant, so that the cumulated appreciation is also significant, leading to the downward path in the chart. Nevertheless, the end of the episode of large capital inflows results in a cumulated real depreciation even higher than the cumulated appreciation. The literature shows that in most cases real depreciation becomes manifest via a nominal depreciation of the currency. In the stylised trajectory shown in Chart 4, Figure I, real depreciation is driven by the drop in prices no earlier than the first year after the end of the episode. 4  BIS Review 5/2010  Figure I 2. Real GDP (annual change) percent  percent  1. Current account deficit (% in GDP)  No. of years after LCI  No.

It shows that white men have the highest mean and median hourly earnings, as well as higher earnings across every percentile of the pay distribution. Males also have higher earnings than females across the pay distribution for both ethnic groups. Ethnic minority females have higher earnings than white females across the distribution. All distributions have a strong positive skew, though white males have the longest upper tail. 8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  Table 1: Summary statistics for hourly earnings £ across gender and ethnicity groups  Statistic  White male  White female  Ethnic minority  Ethnic minority  male  female  Mean  13.6  10.4  12.9  11.1  25th percentile  7.6  6.0  6.9  6.4  Median  10.9  8.35  10  9.1  75th percentile  16.4  12.7  15.7  13.6  Standard deviation  14.4  8.6  11.1  8.4  Skewness  46.3  20.4  13.9  16  Source: ONS Labour Force Survey and Bank of England calculations. Charts 5 plots the distribution of hourly pay in £ for males, females and ethnic minorities separately on two dates: 1997 and 2018. It shows that there is a higher peak of low-paid females in 1997 and, to a lesser extent, in 2018. Put differently, more of the distribution of pay among males is skewed towards the upper tail of higher pay rates.
“Financial literacy” or “the set of skills and knowledge that allows an individual to make informed and effective decisions with all of their financial resources” is an important life-skill in our diverse capacities as students, employees, consumers, savers and investors etc. By now you may wonder as to why how you manage your personal finances is of any interest to the Bank? You may wonder as to why the Bank should care on how best you can manage your personal finances? The answer is simply this – We believe that economic development can be fostered by educating individuals on how best to manage their personal finances. We don’t have to rely on the big businesses or other forces for this – each and every one of us has the potential to foster economic development. Therefore we stand before you today not as leaders or dictators of your wallets and purses, but as counterparts on a way to forward our future financial prospects. And so it gives me great pleasure to introduce to you a tool designed to help you take charge of your personal finances and take you closer to realizing your full potential as agents of economic development – the MoneyPACIFIC Money Guide The Guide is simple enough for EVERYONE to understand. It is featured in, Samoan, Tongan and English and with this in mind, Samoa has accepted the privilege to be the imperative starting point for launching this project. This Guide was by you and for you.

It was compiled using your perspective as a school student, as an elder of the village, as a hard working stay at home mother and as a danceloving-father when he gets his paycheck without his wife knowing; or to put simply, as an everyday Samoan citizen. MoneyPACIFIC has produced the Guide and made it easy to understand, and made it accessible to everyone so that you can plan, measure, prioritise or just to be aware of how  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  much you are spending for everyday necessities. Again the intension is not to dictate how much your wallet is crying but to ensure that your wallet is happy to deliver a well sought out purpose for you and your families. To round up my remarks, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the New Zealand and Australian Governments for the support afforded to the MoneyPACIFIC iniative as we have benefitted greatly from the work it carries out for the Pacific communities. I would like to thank each and every one of you for making the time to attend today’s MoneyPACIFIC Money Guide launch.
In that context, both the ECB and the SNB conduct a careful analysis of monetary aggregates partly in an effort to assess the risks of long-term financial imbalances. Moreover, acknowledging the monetary source of long-term inflation helps avoid the build-up of excess liquidity in the first place. In closing, let me therefore repeat that the Fischer et al. paper could benefit from focusing more extensively on the admittedly complex but nonetheless important link between money, asset prices and long-term inflation perspectives. In the  4  For example, Nelson (2003) argues that movements in monetary aggregates provide useful indications regarding different yields usually not incorporated in economic models  5  Baltensperger, Jordan and Savioz (2001), Jordan, Peytrignet and Rich (2001)  6  Reynard (2006)  7  For example, Issing (2002) provides evidence of a close relationship between excess money growth and real asset prices, a relationship that does not appear by looking at a standard Taylor rule as a measure of monetary policy stance. Similarly, Friedman (2005) showed that pre- and post-financial market crash evolutions of stock prices and gross domestic products were strongly related to the pre- and post-market crash evolutions of monetary aggregates. White (2006) pointed to the need of pushing further the frontiers of economic research in the direction of incorporating financial variables to assess longer-term macroeconomic developments.

At times, this new measure differs significantly from the traditional M3 measure. The paper shows that this new variable has valuable information content in inflation forecasting exercises. In many ways, the empirical work presented in the paper speaks for itself. Nonetheless, it seems to me, there are at least two factors which limit the extent to which we can draw far-reaching conclusions from the work presented in the Fischer et al. paper. First, the analysis covers the years from 1999 to 2006. This period is characterized by remarkably low and stable inflation. For a central banker, this is good news. Such prolonged periods of low and stable inflation can, however, give rise to distortions in econometric analyses. An accurate evaluation of the information content of a particular variable for future inflation becomes difficult when the volatility of inflation is low. In such a setting it comes as no surprise that the random walk is a hard to beat benchmark. Therefore, when inflation is low and stable for a protracted period, a low correlation between money and inflation should not automatically lead us to conclude that money no longer matters. BIS Review 107/2006  1  Second, the evaluation of the additional value of money in the paper is undertaken based on a forecast horizon of six quarters. As the authors recognize themselves and as I will point out later on, money appears to be particularly valuable to inflation dynamics of medium and long-term frequencies.
I remember  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the speech our distinguished guest delivered at the end of his ECB tenure and the fact that the closing remarks showed not only a good sense of humour, but also a subtle comprehension of the manner in which physical distances and especially distances in time alter the assessment of individuals and, if I may add, of events. Please allow me to read the final part of the aforementioned speech, which presents the timeline of the news published by Le Moniteur concerning the return of Napoleon from his exile on Elba Island: 10 March – “The Corsican ogre has landed at Cape Juan”; 11 March – “The tiger is in Gap. Troops are on their way and will stop him. He will end his miserable adventure as a homeless refugee in the mountains”; 12 March – “The monster succeeded in proceeding to Grenoble”; 13 March – “The tyrant is now in Lyon. Horror has caught the people”; 18 March – “The usurper is some days’ march distant from Paris”; 19 March – “Bonaparte approaches in a hurry, but he will not succeed in advancing to Paris”; 20 March – “Napoleon will be in Paris tomorrow”; 21 March – “Emperor Napoleon is in Fontainebleau”; 22 March – “Yesterday evening His Majesty celebrated his arrival in Paris. The jubilation cannot be described”.

Mugur Isărescu: The single currency – a central banker’s viewpoint from an EU Member State outside the euro area Opening speech by Mr Mugur Isărescu, Governor of the National Bank of Romania, at the 2015 COFACE Country Risk Conference, Bucharest, 29 April 2015. *  *  *  Dear Professor Issing, Ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to have the honour of opening this conference, the more so as this is an opportunity to meet Professor Issing again – the similarity of our surnames brought us literally side by side at many events over the years. Professor Otmar Issing’s career is stupendous, but it is only natural that the general public has been remembering him as a prominent figure of the European Central Bank, whose inaugural chief economist he was, and as a key contributor to the building of the Economic and Monetary Union. I.  Euro adoption by Romania: between desirable and feasible  My intention today is to speak about the issue of the single currency from the viewpoint of a central banker in an EU Member State still outside the euro area. During my address, it is inevitable to touch upon various opinions which our distinguished guest has expressed over the years. I start by recalling what Otmar Issing said back in 2006, in a dinner speech occasioned by his leaving the ECB: “We were all privileged to participate in a historically unique experiment: the creation of a new currency for Europe.
Then I will turn to four eye-catching initiatives:   first, the establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board or ESRB, a new body that will for the first time become responsible for macro-prudential supervision in the EU;    second, how policy makers are dealing with systemically important institutions;    third, the issue of procyclicality or the dynamic interplay between the financial sector and the real economy;    fourth and last topic to which I will pay some more attention is the mandate of central banks in the area of financial stability. Let us now embark on our architectural walk! II. Causes of the current crisis  Much has been said about the root causes of the current crisis over the past three years. I will not expand on this topic but I will just mention specific factors – some of them of a macroand others of a micro-economic nature – which in my view were key in the run up to the crisis. In the two or three years before the crisis erupted, a constellation of factors, including very favourable macro-financial conditions combined with strong growth, low inflation, ample liquidity, exceptionally low volatility across virtually all financial markets and extraordinarily low risk premia, had the effect of covering up the building up of significant imbalances. Significant financial imbalances were in the making, at various levels of the global economy and financial system.

With each central bank focusing on  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  their own domestic mandates, financial conditions collectively for the world as a whole can be suboptimal. Global credit and monetary expansion seems to be precariously unanchored. Given the complexity of cross border interactions, the expansion of central bank balance sheets the world over has implications for the system as a whole that are by no means clear. This is especially worrying given that existing facilities for international liquidity support is inadequate for absorbing a large international crisis should one occur. In a highly integrated global economy, the need for collective action is inescapable. But progress in achieving this with respect to the international monetary and financial system so far is very limited. As with all common goods, achieving political will to further the collective interest is extremely difficult. Thus while we can hope for greater international coordination, we can certainly not plan on one. Instead, countries are left to fend for themselves. Here, the experience of Asia offers some guiding principles. In many ways, Asian countries have been pioneers in terms of policy responses to dealing with capital flows. This often entailed going against prevailing wisdom and convention. In 1998, facing intense speculative flows from hedge funds, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority purchased stocks to counter the steep fall in equity prices. In the same year, Malaysia introduced capital controls amidst the Asian financial crisis to stem the decline of its currency.
This curbs the impact of oil price fluctuations on domestic demand and production – and on inflation and the exchange rate. A floating krone also has a stabilising effect, as the exchange rate normally appreciates in good times and depreciates in bad. At the same time, the fiscal rule and the inflation target anchor exchange rate and inflation expectations. As a result, the impact on these variables of a terms-of-trade change, stemming from variations in the oil price, becomes less pronounced. Moreover, the fiscal rule slows the pace at which exposed industries are scaled back. According to the fiscal rule, petroleum revenue spending shall be limited to four per cent, i.e. the expected annual real return on the accumulated financial wealth in the petroleum fund. This implies a steady phasing-in of petroleum revenues into the mainland economy. This partly insulates the economy from fluctuations in petroleum prices and extraction rates in the petroleum sector – and when followed it ensures that revenue spending in the Norwegian economy is at a level that can be sustained over time. Nevertheless, as the petroleum fund is becoming very large, the fiscal rule implies that sizeable and increasing revenues will be spent every year, thereby leading to expansionary impulses from fiscal policy. We must also strive for an equitable distribution of our wealth across generations. Although the value of the petroleum fund is considerable, financing the large future pension payments under our universal pay-as-you-go scheme will be very demanding.

High demand for oil combined with limited idle production capacity and uncertain production levels in many oil-producing countries have led to a sharp rise in oil prices and other energy prices. High energy prices are boosting investment in the petroleum and electricity sectors, with considerable impetus to the engineering industry. Increased trade has engendered higher demand for shipping services and favourable freight rates. This has in turn led to a boom in the shipbuilding industry. While oil prices are high, they are still lower than the prices that prevailed after the OPEC II shock in 1979. Norwegian oil production, on the other hand, has increased considerably since then. Price developments have also been favourable for many metals. Prices for fresh farmed salmon have also shown a pronounced rise in recent years. As consumers, we are benefiting from ongoing globalization through falling prices for many imported goods. After a shift towards a higher share of imports from low-cost countries, prices for Norway’s imported consumer goods have fallen virtually every year since the mid-1990s. BIS Review 50/2006  1  The change in clothing prices may serve as an illustration. Prices rose by around 3 per cent annually for a long period, but since 1995 they have been falling by about 6 per cent annually. This kink point coincides with the dismantling of barriers in the textile trade and with a period of rationalisation in retail trade in Norway. The magnitude of the current income shock is best seen in a longer, historical persepective.
These concepts are not all that easy to define but roughly speaking it is a matter of new technology leading to extensive changes in the business community, as well as in society in general. The economy is launched into a process of transformation — a sort of struggle between old and new. New products are introduced as well as new forms of production. Patterns of consumption also change and so does the demand for education. Growth shifts to other parts of the country. The new demand stimulates the growth of capital markets. All these developments influence the public debate and the political system. Bit by bit, the entire economy responds to the new technology. That is what happened in many parts of the world when the steam-engine was successfully developed in the late 18th century. It also occurred after new sources of motive power led to the electric motor and the combustion engine in the late 19th century. 2  See e.g. Myhrman, J. (1994), Hur Sverige blev rikt (How Sweden became prosperous), SNS Förlag, Stockholm. 3  See Magnusson, L. (1996), Sveriges Ekonomiska Historia (Sweden’s economic history), Tiden Athena, Stockholm; Schön, L. (2000), En Modern Svensk Ekonomisk Historia (A modern Swedish economic history), SNS Förlag, Stockholm; Åkerman, G. (1932), Om konjunkturväxlingarnas nödvändighet och grundorsak (On the necessity and basic cause of economic fluctuations), Ekonomisk Tidskrift 1. For a survey of Erik Dahmén’s work and contributions to economic research, see Eklund, K. (1986), Springtime for Dahmén.

But everything suggests that the new technology will also give rise to new lifestyles, affecting culture and perhaps even the political system and economic policy. All this will happen in ways we cannot predict today, although certain historical patterns are perhaps discernible. •  Future economic developments will suffer setbacks, either milder or more troublesome than those in the past, depending not least on the general direction of economic policy in each period. The setbacks will probably mean that the economy moves backwards one step after already taking two steps forwards. •  The forcefulness of the economic advance will probably also depend on the extent to which various institutions in society manage to support rather than obstruct the transformation; in other words, how well the educational system, taxation and various social security systems, for example, are suited to the new era’s inherent requirements. •  To conclude with some words about the role of the central bank in the environment I have just described, I should say that it involves promoting the payment system’s stability and efficiency in the face of fluctuations in expectations and production. One way of doing this is to combat both inflation and deflation. Another is to ensure that banks and other financial enterprises do not take undue risks. In these ways it is hopefully possible to mitigate the effects over time of the setbacks that tend to be associated with a process of rapid transformation. BIS Review 10/2001  5
Those principles have got to be based on best practice in the markets on the one hand, and the public policy needs on the other. Here, I’m including adequate systemic security. My thesis would be that the very effort necessary to define those principles and the necessary engagement between leaders of the industry on the one hand and public authorities on the other will reward us with a system where all parties can operate and contribute with confidence. 4  BIS Review 29/2003

The situation only got worse when the sovereign crisis – that started in Greece in late 2009 – progressively spread to other euro area countries with vulnerable fundamentals. As we have seen in our discussions today, the trigger of the crisis in the euro area shows, to a certain extent, similarities to those that affected Latin America in the past: a stop in  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  foreign capitals inflows, which induced severe financial stress and real adjustment. But also differences, due to the fact that this reduction of capital flows took place in a highly integrated monetary union, with its own peculiar adjustment mechanisms, leading to the segmentation of the euro area capital markets. These peculiarities also contribute to explain the huge magnitude and depth of the crisis. The scale of the imbalances and adjustments surpasses those in Latin American past experience. Correspondingly, the challenges that individual countries and the area as a whole are facing are daunting. Indeed, the policy response to the crisis – both at the national level and at the level of the EU and the euro area authorities – has been substantial, particularly in the structural and institutional dimensions. The euro area authorities have realised that, in parallel to the management of the crisis, a reshuffling of the European governance and a strengthening of the institutional framework are necessary for the long term sustainability of EMU.