samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Bean, Charles R. (2009), “The Great Moderation, the Great Panic and the Great Contraction”, Schumpeter Lecture, Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, www.bankofengland.co.uk. Borio, Claudio and White, William R. (2003), “Whither Monetary and Financial Stability? The Implications of Evolving Policy Regimes”, in Monetary Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Jackson Hole Symposium, 131212. 11  Walsh (2009) points out that when financial factors cause distortions, these distortions will in general introduce corresponding terms in a loss function for monetary policy that is a second-order approximation to household welfare. Curdia and Woodford (2009) present a model where the second-order welfare approximation is a standard quadratic loss function of inflation and the output gap between output and potential output, but where potential output is affected by financial factors. Then inflation and the output gap remain the target variables, with and without financial factors. The neutral rate in the model, that is, the real rate consistent with output equal to potential output, is then also affected by financial factors. 12  See Svensson (2003b) for further discussion of the important distinction between the response variables in the policy reaction function (the variables that the central bank responds to) and the target variables in the loss function (the variables that the central bank “targets” and wants to stabilize at their target levels).

We are home to: four of the top five global insurance players; a vibrant ecosystem comprising a strong brokers’ cluster where nine out of ten of the top global brokers are based here; the largest captive community in Asia Pacific; a growing concentration of more than thirty specialty players; and the largest grouping of Lloyd’s syndicates outside of London, with 26 syndicates. Reflecting the increasingly important role of non-life insurance in driving overall industry growth: The share of offshore non-life insurance as a proportion of total non-life insurance premiums has increased steadily, rising from 60% in 2010 to close to 70% in 2016. Over one-third of offshore premium flows are attributed to specialist lines of business, such as large and complex property, marine, construction and engineering, energy, financial lines and agriculture. Insurance companies are gradually anchoring more global and regional positions in Singapore, and most Asian risks, including large reinsurance programmes and specialty risks, can now be fully placed in Singapore. Singapore’s share of global Asia-Pacific originated reinsurance premiums has also risen from 3% in 2013, to close to 10% in 2016. 1/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  Vision 2025: Global capital for Asian risk transfer 6 So what next after this? 7 The global reinsurance industry continues to face structural challenges, in a few forms: Alternative capital, which gives rise to excess capacity and softening rates, is expected to persist. Insurance underwriting is not keeping pace with the rate of emergence of new risks, such as cyber, supply chain, and reputation risks.
Turkey has a good record for structural issues. We have liberalized the trade and capital accounts of the balance of payments for about two decades. We have a flexible labor market. High domestic savings is one of the main characteristics of the economy. Market oriented economy is another aspect of the structural component of Turkey. Right now, Turkey has four important structural reforms on its agenda, not only as a part of the disinflation effort but also because they are essential for changing the environment. Thus, these structural reforms are vital for adapting to the changing global environment. They consist of reforming the banking sector, the social security system, agricultural subsidies, and privatization. Some of these reforms have already been approved by parliament, and the others are in the pipeline. The new Banking Act which was approved by parliament in June has the following four general objectives: •  to close the legal loopholes;  •  to implement the international supervisory regulations;  •  to assign the supervision of banking organizations to an independent agency; and  •  to make some adjustments regarding the process of founding and operating banks. In particular, the twenty-five Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision drawn up by the Bank for International Settlements in 1997 have been endorsed in the amendments to the Banking Act. As a result, the amendments are consistent with modern principles of effective banking supervision.

The last but by no means the least point I would like to make is that we now have an occasion for showing, once more, the ability of the Turkish economy to overcome adversity by meeting the challenge to our resilience following a major earthquake. During the last two years, we have survived the South Asian, Russian and Latin American crises, and also an economic slowdown in the EU region that is an extremely vital trading, financial and economic partner for Turkey. We also had the uncertainties preceding the early election held in April 1999, which tested the resistance of the Turkish economy. I truly believe that we have already passed these exams, and also that we have gained enormous experience. I have always said that we are extremely good in bad times, although we don’t like them. This time the situation and prospects are different, and we will show the abilities of the Turkish economy in good times as well as bad. If the program we have begun implementing is successful, that success will affect at least the next 50 years of Turkey’s economic and social life. I believe these messages are clear and will be well understood by our international partners. BIS Review 109/1999  4
The Central Bank does not consider that the depreciation can be justified on economic grounds and, now that uncertainties have been dispelled, conditions are at hand for restoring calm in the foreign exchange market, and possibly even for the recent depreciation to be reversed. Ladies and Gentlemen  BIS Review 27/2001  5  Three major decisions involving implementation of monetary policy have been announced at this meeting. The Government has agreed to present a bill to parliament proposing a new Central Bank Act which entails a modernisation of the legislation on the Bank and will strengthen its position for tackling monetary issues. The Bank welcomes the new bill. The Government and the Central Bank have issued a joint declaration on inflation targets and exchange rate policy reforms. Experience from other countries shows that such a framework has established a firm basis for implementing monetary policy and contributed towards price stability. The Central Bank has also announced its decision to reduce its policy rates by 0.5 percentage points. This is a reflection of the Bank's assessment that the economy will begin to cool this year and that the targets now set for inflation do not require interest rates to be as high as they have been recently. Interest rates will nonetheless remain high and a tight monetary stance is still being maintained. All of these are decisions, which hopefully will consolidate the position of Iceland's financial markets, will contribute towards price stability and bolster the foundations for improved living standards.

This prediction did not materialise in full. During the second half of the year it seemed clear that there would be some lag between the depreciation and its effect on the price level. This prompts questions about the correlation between prices and exchange rate developments. The short-term relationship of these factors appears to have weakened, which is undoubtedly explained in part by market competition. A more flexible exchange rate policy is also unquestionably at work. In earlier times, when devaluations were made amid extensive announcements, the change was in general rapidly reflected in the price level, since it was fairly certain that it would be permanent. After the exchange rate was made more flexible, it can be assumed that uncertainty about the permanence of changes has led buyers and sellers of goods to take more short-term exchange rate risk than before,  2  BIS Review 27/2001  since high costs are involved in making frequent alterations to prices. However, it is imprudent to ignore the eventual impact of a depreciation on prices, since research offers no support for such a view. This is one of the assumptions on which the Bank bases its forecast from this February, where inflation is expected to run at 4.3% between 2000 and 2001 and 4.6% from the beginning to the end of the year. Next year it is forecast to slow down to 2.7% from the beginning to the end of the year.
Svante Öberg: The current economic situation Speech by Mr Svante Öberg, First Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at Swedbank, Stockholm, 20 August 2010. *  *  *  In this presentation I shall begin with an account of the Riksbank’s assessment of the economic situation abroad. I shall then discuss our assessment of economic developments in Sweden. These are the assessments we made at the monetary policy meeting on 30 June and published in our Monetary Policy Report on 1 July this year. I will also comment on new information received during the summer, but I will not make any new overall assessment of economic developments. We members of the Executive Board will not do this until the next monetary policy meeting, which will be held on 1 September. Finally, I shall report how the majority of Executive Board members and I personally viewed monetary policy at the end of June. My presentation of the current economic situation can be briefly summarised in three points:   The Swedish economy is developing strongly after the deep recession we have experienced. Inflationary pressures are currently low, but inflation is expected to rise as resource utilisation increases.   At the most recent monetary policy meeting in June the members of the Executive Board decided to raise the repo rate to 0.50 per cent, and assessed that it would thereafter need to continue to rise towards more normal levels. The earlier extensive lending to the banks is being phased out.

But this does not say very much about the future, of course. And as I mentioned at the beginning, I shall not make any overall assessment of economic developments here today; I shall wait until the Executive Board’s next monetary policy meeting at the beginning of September. I will now go on to describe how the Riksbank, and I personally, viewed monetary policy at the most recent monetary policy meeting at the end of June. Swedish monetary policy Following the financial crisis, monetary policy in Sweden has been aimed mainly at moderating the depth of the economic recession that came in the wake of the crisis. The repo rate has been held at an all-time low of 0.25 per cent for a whole year. The Riksbank has also provided the banks with more liquidity than normal, through a number of extraordinary measures. However, for some time now the situation has been such that we could begin to normalise monetary policy, and now in the final part of my presentation I shall describe in more detail our reasoning at the most recent monetary policy meeting. Normalisation of the repo rate In July we raised the repo rate from 0.25 to 0.50 per cent. I agreed with the picture of economic developments painted in the most recent Monetary Policy Report and supported both the proposal to raise the repo rate by 0.25 percentage points and the repo rate path described in the Report.
A key part of this is to make certain that banks and financial markets perform their functions efficiently, and that their business poses no systemic threat to the financial sector and the economy. Hence, for a long time now, the main focus of bank regulation and supervision have been to ensure that banks manage their exposure to risk effectively. These include exposure to credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk. Much progress has been made in honing the approach for a more accurate assessment and a more effective management of risk, culminating in the Basle II, which is a global standard for bank’s risk management. BIS Review 18/2008  1  But, in spite of what has been achieved, mishaps can and do happen. From time to time, we still read about banks suffering large losses that originate from the under-management of these risks. More often than not, the losses are linked to a breach of internal controls or systems that have been put in place to rein in excessive risk-taking in the first place. Ladies and gentlemen. On the security risk aspect, the growth of electronic banking and real-time funds transfer have made the challenge of risk management even greater, as the nature of security risk to banks has shifted considerably. Clearly, the main concern now is not so much about ensuring property security or preventing theft of physical assets, but about ensuring information security and preventing identity theft.

The newly formed TMF takes on a much broader mandate in that it focuses not only on the foreign exchange and money markets, but also the debt, derivatives and other treasury markets. With rapid financial innovations and rising demand from customers for a one-stop service, the dividing line between the traditional treasury and trading functions of a bank with other types of financial market services has become rather blurred. In other words, the treasury departments now encompass a wider variety of functions that cut across different markets, notably forex, money, debt and derivative markets. The formation of the TMF, with representatives from the HKCMA and other industry associations, offers great synergy in helping enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong’s treasury markets, thereby contributing to Hong Kong’s position as the premier international financial centre in the region. In carrying out its work, the TMF focuses on the “3 P’s”. That is: “People”, “Product” and “Profile”. Let me explain further. Firstly, “people”. As with other service industries, financial services are a “people business”. The competitive edge of a financial centre depends largely on the availability of a large pool of highly professional market practitioners. A priority area for the TMF is therefore to work with the industry to enhance the professionalism of practitioners in the treasury markets. As you may be aware, with the support of the TMF, the Financial Markets Association of Hong Kong (ACIHK) has recently launched a new membership regime, together with a revamped professional training and accreditation programme.
Is Tsipras the good cop and Varoufakis the bad cop? What do you make of the changes in the negotiating team? I only know that both were elected on the same electoral platform. It’s a matter of forms and substance, and sometimes the substance is more readily accepted if the forms are improved. Would it be a good idea, as being mooted by Tsipras, to hold a referendum on the bailout measures? As a central banker, it’s not for me to give advice to a prime minister on how to manage his democracy. Papandreou tried and was prevented … Looking back, would it have helped in 2011? There are also those who say that, had we looked closer at the statistics a number of years back, we would have saved ourselves all these discussions … How far back in time do you go? The best way of sharing sovereignty among European countries is by sticking to the rules. In 2011, when asked about the consequences of a “Grexit”, you said it would be “chaos”. Do you still believe this to be the case? At this moment I don’t wish to engage in speculations. The clock has ticked forward but perhaps we can still achieve a positive outcome. Many people believe that the euro area could now withstand such a shock. My main working hypothesis is not the worst outcome.

In some countries there are tax claims, in others there are assets… these are two different “animals”. There are things that may have been good in certain situations, but when that situation passes the question is whether or not the instrument should become permanent. It is similar with our unconventional monetary policy measures: when the crisis is over, there will be those that say why not carry on with the measures because buying government bonds is a really good thing… And they would like it to become a permanent instrument, but this would go against our initial intention. The same applies to these instruments that were devised during the crisis and thought of as part of the programme, but were not, in my understanding, designed to be permanent. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Indeed, regardless of whether decisions are taken by a general Bank Board or a specialized Policy Committee, the ‘ideal’ system for decision-making should encompass the following basic properties: a)  diversity of opinions  b)  regularity  c)  separateness  d)  staff independence  e)  openness  f)  dealing with uncertainty  Diversity of opinions is a consequence of the basic lesson we have learnt from the history of monetary policy. Milton Friedman said in 1968: ‘The first and most important lesson that history teaches about what monetary policy can do – and it is a lesson of the most profound importance – is that monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source of economic disturbance’. This implies that relative smoothness in practical decision making seems to be desirable for any monetary policy practice. In this regard, international experience and experimental research1 have shown that decisions taken by a ‘decision-making body’ seem to be superior ex post to decisions taken by an individual, as the latter are more vulnerable to sudden changes in monetary policy stance. It is argued that a significant improvement in policy conduct can be associated with policy makers learning from each other’s decisions. Regularity means not only that the decision-making body should meet on a regular basis, but in particular that the decision-making process should be taken in a standard framework and should be based on a standard set of policy documents.

Moving the role of ‘Chief Economist’ towards the director of the ‘Economic Department’, and letting him be more independent of any particular body member (making him responsible to the decision-making body as a whole), can help to solve this problem of information filtering. Openness is a consequence of ‘staff independence’. Allowing staff to be more independent at the same time requires the decision-making body members to take an active approach towards the analysis produced by the staff. Since a perfect understanding of the message contained in the ‘policy documents’ is a prerequisite for proper policy conduct, interaction between the decision-making body members and the staff should be assured at different levels. And finally, a need to deal with uncertainty properly arises as a consequence of the uncertainty surrounding monetary policy practice. Therefore, it is highly desirable to discuss the implied risks at different levels: (i)  First, the risks should be discussed by the staff. (ii)  Second, an evaluation of the risks should be performed interactively by the decision-making body members and the staff (alternative scenarios can be produced on the basis of these discussions). (iii)  Third, the risk and the alternative scenarios should be discussed by the decision-making body members during the policy meeting. It is clear that all the above-mentioned properties can be satisfied when either a Bank Board or a Policy Committee are making the decisions. Over the years it has been proven that both systems can work well.
The model incorporates relationships for the demand and supply side of the economy. In addition, a relationship for interestrate setting is included. Within the framework of the model, we have sought to quantify uncertainty in key variables such as inflation, output, the interest rate and the exchange rate, based on the disturbances in the Norwegian economy in the period 1993-2005. Within the structure of the model, we have exposed the economy to similar disturbances ahead through Monte Carlo simulations of add factors. This gives an indication of uncertainty surrounding the different variables based on historical disturbances. Monetary policy responds to disturbances to the other variables. This increases uncertainty about the future interest rate, but at the same time reduces uncertainty in the other variables. In other words, there are strict, model-based technical assumptions behind the fan charts we use to illustrate uncertainty in our forecasts. It goes without saying that it is difficult to be very precise as to exactly how great the uncertainty will be. Nevertheless – in spite of these strict model-based technical assumptions – the fan charts illustrate an important point: that the forecasts are very uncertain. Norges Bank seeks to achieve an interest rate path that provides a reasonable balance between the objective of stabilising inflation at target and the objective of stabilising developments in output and employment. Monetary policy influences the economy with a lag; when the interest rate has been set, a period of time elapses before the effects on inflation and the real economy can be observed.

The interest rate should normally be changed gradually so that we can assess the effects of interest rate changes and other new information about economic developments. Interest-rate setting must also be assessed in the light of developments in property prices and credit. It may also be useful to assess interest-rate setting in the light of some simple monetary policy rules. If the interest rate deviates systematically and substantially from simple rules, it should be possible to explain the reasons for this. These criteria are important guidelines in forecasting an interest rate that provides a reasonable balance in monetary policy. Of course, the criteria cannot provide a precise instruction as to how the interest rate should be set, but points to factors we should have taken into account and assessed. In some contexts, the various criteria may be in conflict. In these situations, it is particularly important to exercise judgment in the trade-off between the different objectives of monetary policy. Uncertainty surrounding future interest rate developments What I have said so far about interest rate forecasts have perhaps left the impression of an exaggerated belief in control. This was not my intention. Our recent history underscores that economic developments involve a great deal of uncertainty. Even if the Bank publishes a forecast for the interest rate, this does not mean that the interest rate will follow the forecast throughout the projection period.