samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Given this, the Riksbank focused its measures on ensuring that there was good access to liquidity and that the financial markets continued to function. We did not see it as meaningful to stimulate demand in an economy that was largely closed;  11 [30]  instead, the ambition was to avoid tightening financial conditions and, in the long run, to avoid the great uncertainty causing a financial crisis. Among the measures we decided at a number of ordinary and extraordinary meetings were broader and substantially extended asset purchases.20 At the monetary policy meetings in April and June 2020, these measures were consolidated in a programme where assets worth SEK 500 billion would be purchased by mid2021. The purchases now included not only government bonds, but also covered bonds, municipal bonds and corporate bonds.21 Since many actors at the same time put in place a variety of support measures, it is almost impossible to evaluate the effects of an individual measure. However, I do draw some conclusions. The support measures during the pandemic were important and worked very well First, I think it is clear that the overall measures worked very well. Risk premiums in the financial markets began to fall rapidly in April, and the pandemic did not lead to a financial crisis either in Sweden or abroad.

Earnings capacity is important for central banks’ financial independence However, problems may arise if the central bank loses its long-term earnings capacity. In contrast to most other authorities, central banks are not funded through appropriations. Instead, they have their own balance sheet with substantial assets and liabilities and, to put it simply, they tend to be able to finance their operations through the return on their non-remunerated capital, that is, the sum of equity and the amount of banknotes. A central bank can always continue to finance its activities by 'printing money'. However, if the central bank lacks earning capacity, its interest-bearing debt will increase uncontrollably, which is hardly compatible with price stability in the long run. Alternatively, the central bank can keep interest rates low so that interest payments are small. In both of these cases, monetary policy will thus be affected by the weak financial position of the central bank.39  The Riksbank's earnings capacity is weak The Riksbank's situation here is a little special in an international comparison. Since the demand for cash is very low in Sweden, the so-called seigniorage – the surplus from the monopoly on issuing money – is insignificant. Other central banks with low or negative capital can more easily than the Riksbank continue to finance their operations and at the same time build up new capital with the aid of the seigniorage.
The ensuing reform of the Pact in 2005 thus ushered in a greater degree of tolerance, and political influence was permitted in dealing with EU member states’ fiscal imbalances. It is true that the average deficit ratio in the euro area improved through 2007, aided by the upswing in economic conditions. However, only a few countries earnestly engaged in substantial budgetary consolidation efforts. At the same time, financial market scrutiny was mild, and as a result the less fiscally-responsible governments were able to meet their borrowing requirements at a relatively small spread on the benchmark interest rate. This changed after 2007, when the onset of the financial crisis found several Member States poorly prepared for what lay ahead. It became difficult to undo the accumulated imbalances and vulnerabilities. The debt burden worsens when the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the economy. This is reinforced when the primary balance is in deficit, in which case the dynamics of servicing the debt could easily make the debt burden unsustainable. Fiscal consolidation, which is necessary even in less serious circumstances, carries the risk of downward macroeconomic adjustment. In today’s circumstances, there is the danger of a vicious cycle in the form of a negative macroeconomic spiral. This is because weak economic growth leads to lower government revenue that raises the fiscal deficit ratio, and therefore requires further budgetary tightening. 2  L. Schuknecht, Ph. Moutot, P. Rother and J. Stark “The Stability and Growth Pact, Crisis and Reform” ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 129, September 2011.

5  Central Bank of Malta, Financial Stability Report Update – June 2011, 17 October 2011. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  It also noted a slight deterioration in the corporate non-performing loan ratio as an increase in the ratio for certain sectors, particularly construction and real estate activities, was offset by an improved ratio in other sectors. The Update noted that credit risk is being partly mitigated by tight credit standards and cautious lending behaviour on the part of the banks. However, it also expressed concern that credit and concentration risks remain elevated while provisioning levels remain inadequate. In that light, the Central Bank continues to urge the banks to make higher loan loss provisioning – especially for loans related to construction activity – and to strengthen their capital base. These measures would not only enable the banks to meet potential shocks but would also allow them to prepare themselves better for compliance with stricter Basel III regulatory requirements. On the funding side, the resilience displayed by the banking system in the face of adverse international conditions is attributable to the prudent traditional business model that has been a historic characteristic of domestic banks, one that places a strong reliance on retail deposits. This business model has served Malta well as the traditional sources of funding have proven to be very stable, including at a time of international tension.
Until now, the channels for cross-border flows are only open to current account items such as trade, and to direct investments under the capital account. Portfolio investments under the capital account into and out of China are mainly confined to designated channels and are subject to quotas, for example, the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) scheme with quotas totalling $ billion, and the Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) scheme with quotas of $ billion. It can be reasonably expected that a further opening of the capital account would entail liberalisation of these channels and the addition of new avenues. These would result in an increase in cross-border capital flows. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  7. Although it may not be easy to provide a precise estimate of the magnitude of the flows, given that China’s economy is the second largest in the world, and taking into account the size of both its domestic savings and its capital markets, one can probably say that the size of capital flows resulting from China’s capital account liberalisation would likely be felt in the global financial system. 8. From the perspective of Chinese savers, given their high level of savings and the fact that their investment options are mostly limited to domestic markets at present, there would be a desire on their part for investment diversification into international markets. The resulting investment flows, as they are liberalised, could be substantial for individual markets where these funds flow into. 9.

It is likely to be around these and other aspects that our deliberations at the Riksbank will circle when the Executive Board finally adjusts the coming Inflation Report and next discusses monetary policy on 18 March. That is still almost a fortnight ahead and some more statistics are due to be published. In the meantime, the six of us on the Board will have to form our opinions step by step and decide whether there is to be some increase in the repo rate already in March or whether it is possible to go on waiting. Personally I share the concern about inflation prospects that a number of my colleagues have expressed in speeches recently. BIS Review 15/2002  3
William C Dudley: The national and local economic outlook – an update Remarks by Mr William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the University of Bridgeport, Bridgeport, Connecticut, 8 April 2016. *  *  *  Jaison Abel, Jason Bram, Tony Davis, Richard Deitz, Jonathan McCarthy and Joseph Tracy assisted in preparing these remarks. Good morning. I am very pleased to be in Bridgeport and to speak with you today. I would like to give a special thanks to the University of Bridgeport for their part in making this event possible. My visit today is part of our ongoing efforts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to better understand the regional economy. We plan trips like this so that we can meet with a diverse array of stakeholders in the region to gain insights and perspectives on the local economy. These trips also allow us to hear from Main Street about the major issues and concerns affecting people and businesses in the area. Fairfield County is our first destination in 2016, and this is the second time we have visited the area in the past three years. I am looking forward to meeting with a number of different groups today. After starting our day here at the University of Bridgeport, we will meet with an organization called The WorkPlace to hear about some of the nationally-recognized programs they have successfully developed to help the long-term unemployed find jobs.

Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy and wage growth Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to the general assembly of the Employers’ Organisation NAVO, 11 June 2002. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 22 May and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. *  *  *  Norway’s economic policy is based on the guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy. The guideline for fiscal policy states that the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget shall be equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund. This means that all the capital in the Fund is being utilised. Monetary policy is oriented towards low and stable inflation. Historically, periods of high inflation have always been followed by a downturn. Low and stable inflation therefore fosters stability in the economy. Establishing guidelines for economic policy is not new. Both fiscal and monetary policy have been subject to a rules-based framework throughout the post-war period, with the exception of the last half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Monetary policy has had a clear anchor since 1986. The phasing in of petroleum revenues in the central government budget shall be equivalent to the expected return on the Petroleum Fund. Most of the phasing in of petroleum revenues will take place over the next ten years.
The forecasts were made under each participant’s unspecified views of appropriate policy, which is defined in true Fedspeak as: “the future path of policy that each participant deems most likely to foster outcomes for economic activity and inflation that best satisfy his or her interpretation of the Federal Reserve’s dual objectives of maximum sustainable employment and stable prices.”  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  Being more explicit about appropriate policy can clear up a lot of uncertainty. For example, suppose inflation were running higher than we would like, and the economic projections in the SEP showed it coming down over the next couple of years. In the absence of information on participants’ policy projections, the public would not know whether the FOMC thought inflation would simply come down on its own or whether it thought that a monetary tightening would be required to reduce inflationary pressures. Including policy projections will help clarify such judgments. In my opinion, this is a substantial, first-order improvement in policy communications, and this greater clarity may have significant additional value for improving how the economy operates. Expectations of the future path for policy and the degree of uncertainty surrounding those expectations are key determinants of private borrowing rates and other asset prices. These play an important role in the spending and saving decisions of households and businesses.

After all, we have seen our hopes for a more rapid improvement in the economy dashed several times in this recovery. For instance, early last year most forecasters thought that the recovery was gaining traction and that economic activity would increase at a solid – though not spectacular – pace through 2012. Then, as now, the labor market was beginning to show some long-awaited improvement, and households and businesses seemed to be making good progress in repairing their balance sheets following the huge losses in wealth sustained during the recession. Analysts thought that higher prices for energy and other commodities would weigh on output growth, as would the supply-chain disruptions from the disaster in Japan. But these factors were expected to be transitory, and most forecasters thought growth would improve significantly once these influences had passed. Unfortunately, this forecast proved to be too optimistic. Revised data indicate that annualized real GDP growth was only 1 percent in the first half of 2011 and improved only modestly to 2 percent in the third quarter. Consumer spending was particularly sluggish, weighed down by slow growth in employment, income, and household wealth, as well as some continued limits in access to credit. Furthermore, the weakness in GDP growth began before the bulk of the effects of higher energy prices hit the economy and before the disaster in Japan happened. This timing, along with the continued softness of most economic indicators into the early summer, indicates that the slowing in output growth was not all due to temporary factors.
The perception was that the quality of the underlying assets was so good that the risk of a real loss (as opposed to some shorter-term mark-to-market fluctuations) was negligible, and that the returns accruing to the capital note holders and the asset manager were largely due to the funding arbitrage. Another way of explaining it would be that, because of the difference in liquidity, the “buffers” in the structure, the capital notes and the liquidity back-stop provider were effectively earning a risk premium for absorbing this liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. This view of the world made most of the capital note holders believe that the risk of any loss was very limited. We now know all of that changed when sub-prime mortgage assets had become a significant portion of the assets in a typical SIV. The US housing market had started to slide and the lax underwriting standards started to show their impact on recovery rates. Suddenly, investors in the ABCP market came to realize that the risk of actual loss was very real and that a game of “musical chairs” was unfolding in the roll-over process of the short-term debt. At this juncture, one would think that the optimal economic behaviour for the banks with outstanding SIVs, would be to let the SIVs unwind according to the legal construct in place, rather than accept responsibility. In fact, all the banks except one decided to collapse the structures and repurchase the securities10.

The first set of examples above highlighted the need to critically evaluate contingent exposures: without true stress correlations, tail events will not be captured properly. We believe more emphasis should be put on this by investors, analysts and regulators alike. Inevitably that means severe stress tests involving “jump to default” risk and the need to consider counterparty and market liquidity risks, not just issuer risks in these circumstances. Some banks have told us that they think they should not be required to hold capital and liquidity to deal with such extreme tail events – leaving the public sector to be the capital provider of last resort. But that leads directly to moral hazard and excessive risk-taking. Tail events seem to happen far more often than people assume15 and if the risks were properly acknowledged at the outset, many structures would be avoided or risks re-structured so as to limit losses in the event of tail risks. That has obvious implications for financial stability. A crucial component of this analysis is the proper design of stress tests. Obviously, scenarios have to be rather draconian in order to serve the purpose of challenging the “unthinkable”, but at the same time there are difficult decisions to be made, for example, in deciding how much bank capital (contingent or not) banks should hold – and what the probability is of it being wiped out.
Unfortunately, the international environment is rarely stable: we have lived through many financial and other crises, we have just come through a pandemic and we are all aware of the geopolitical challenges across the world. We will overcome current and future challenges as we have done so in the past – by constantly evolving to meet the needs of the nation and of the world. In recent years, Hong Kong’s role has further evolved to include providing a pathway for the ever-expanding international use of the RMB. That will remain our key task for the foreseeable future. Our unique and irreplaceable role in connecting the Mainland and the rest of the world will continue to provide us with many exciting opportunities that we must be ready to seize. 18. I am sure the TMA and all its members will continue to participate actively in this journey to support Hong Kong’s status as an ever-evolving and highly resilient international financial centre for the mutual benefit of the nation and the international investment community. Thank you. 1 Source: The Global Financial Markets Association (GFMA) and Boston Consulting Group’s  (BCG) report “Climate Finance Markets and the Real Economy” https://www.sifma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Climate-Finance-Markets-and-the-Real-Economy.pdf 2 Source: The PBoC Governor Yi Gang’s speech on 16 April 2021  https://www.bis.org/review/r210416a.htm  Last revision date : 16 September 2022

• For instance, the debut of project bond issuance by PT Paiton, Indonesia’s second-largest independent power producer, reflects growing demand for Asian infrastructure debt. Singapore is well positioned as a gateway to investment opportunities in Asia. •  We offer a world class financial centre, with a sound regulatory framework and business-friendly environment. •  With its pan-Asian reach, Singapore is an ideal location for investors to set up base and tap on opportunities in the region. Let me highlight two things Singapore provides to connect global investors to Asia:  •  first, a compelling asset management ecosystem; and  http://www.imas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Speeches-and-Monetary-Policy-Statem... 21-07-18  Connecting Global Markets Supporting Asias Growth  •  Page 4 of 7  second, a treasury centre with a comprehensive suite of risk management solutions. Singapore is a leading asset management hub for institutional investors and fund managers to access pan-Asian opportunities. •  Assets under management in Singapore have grown by an average 15% each year over the last five years, reaching $ trillion in 2016. • About 80% of funds are sourced from outside Singapore. • Two-thirds are invested in Asia. •  Interestingly, we have seen faster growth in alternative AUM (17%) compared to traditional AUM (3%). •  This points to the growing pool of investors setting up in Singapore to access private market opportunities in Asia. We are taking three major initiatives to further strengthen the asset management ecosystem further.
‘Too large’, and central banks may find themselves accused of usurping the role of financial markets, harming innovation and inducing imprudent behaviour; fuzzying the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy, providing a ‘dangerous temptation for … the political class’1; or giving unmerited financial rewards to reserves holders.2 ‘Too small’, and central banks may be criticised for being asleep at the wheel3 at times of crisis; failing to play their part in ensuring an adequate supply of risk-free assets in the economy to maintain financial stability during peacetime4; or hampering the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission.5  Chart 1: Central bank balance sheets compared  Source: Individual central banks’ published data, IMF  The Bank of England has found itself on both ends of this debate in the past 10-15 years. Before the financial crisis, our balance sheet was modest, at 4% of GDP. Since then, and in direct response to the crisis, that figure has risen to around 30%: a more than seven-fold increase. Other regions have seen similar, or in some cases much larger, expansions (Chart 1). But by the UK’s own standards this is truly exceptional. You have to go back to the end of World War 2 or the early 18th century to find anything even approaching the same highs (Chart 2).

For example the Bank recently announced that it would be consulting on the appropriate level of access for new payments providers.20  Dealing with uncertainty: post-QE frameworks  We can, and will, continue to strengthen our analysis of the demand for reserves, through more structured and frequent dialogue. But if there’s one big message I take from our Discussion Paper exercise, it’s that, no matter how deep we dig, we will still face persistent and material uncertainty about the future demand for reserves. We must ensure our post-QT framework can deal with that uncertainty robustly if we are to be confident that we can continue to use our balance sheet to deliver monetary and financial stability. One response would be to stick with the simple floor, but stop contracting reserves well before we hit the PMRR, leaving an ample buffer to ensure market interest rates are stable (Chart 9).