samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
There are prospects of strong growth in the Government Pension Fund - Global. Given our assumption for oil price developments ahead (oil futures), spending in line with the expected real return on the Fund implies that the structural, non-oil deficit may increase by close to NOK 15 billion at 2006 prices in both 2008 and 2009. With a period of strong expansion in the Norwegian economy, somewhat lower petroleum revenue spending may be in line with the fiscal rule. Strong growth in the Norwegian economy is boosting tax revenues and reducing spending on unemployment benefits. Over a three-year period, the economic turnaround has strengthened the budget by about NOK 30 billion. In the structural budget deficit, which is the basis for formulating fiscal  4  BIS Review 108/2006  policy, adjustments are made for such cyclical deviations. Fiscal policy that is expansionary during a downturn and contractionary when the economy is experiencing a boom has a stabilising effect. Our projections are based on the assumption that the central government budget will generate some stimulus to total demand and output in 2008 and 2009, but somewhat less than the expected return on the Fund would imply. The path for domestic and external interest rates does not imply considerable changes in the krone exchange rate. Neither the appreciation of the krone last spring, nor the depreciation this autumn can be explained to any appreciable extent by changes in interest rate expectations. Historically, the relationship between oil prices and the krone exchange rate has been unstable.

The Executive Board described the background for the decision as follows: •  Underlying inflation has been lower than projected in recent months. Nevertheless, several factors point to higher inflation ahead. Capacity utilisation is high and there is little spare capacity in the Norwegian economy. Employment is rapidly rising and unemployment has exhibited a marked decline. There are signs of higher wage growth and expectations of rising inflation. At the same time, the krone exchange rate has depreciated from strong values. •  The interest rate path presented in Inflation Report 3/06 will provide a reasonable balance between the objective of bringing up inflation towards target and the objective of stabilising developments in output and employment, conditional on the information currently available to Norges Bank. •  Monetary policy influences the economy with a lag. Over several years, interest rates have been considerably lower than what Norges Bank considers to be a neutral level. The interest rate may gradually be raised to a more normal level at a somewhat faster pace than envisaged earlier, although it is unlikely that rates will be raised at every monetary policy meeting. Based on Norges Bank’s current assessment, the interest rate will thus continue to be raised in small, not too frequent steps if economic developments are broadly in line with projections.
In such a scenario, the outcomes that the PRA is seeking could be delivered through less onerous governance arrangements than specified precisely by the rules, and the PRA has been willing to consider more proportionate solutions. A bank may apply for a waiver or modification in respect of a PRA rule, so long as it can demonstrate that complying with the rule would be unduly burdensome, or would not achieve the 5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  5  purpose for which the rule was made. What the PRA has sought from a firm applying for a rule modification is that its governance arrangements allow it the means to identify conflicts of interests between the ring-fenced bank and the broader group, and that it has the ability for the former to act independently should such a conflict occur. Flexibility around ring-fenced banks’ governance was envisaged by the ICB. In its final report, the ICB stated that “the appropriate degree of independence depends upon the proportion of the banking group’s assets which are outside the ring-fenced-bank. Specifically, some degree of flexibility might be appropriate where a ring-fenced bank forms a very large part of the overall group.”5 The process of granting or refusing applications for waivers and modifications is now all but complete, and rule waivers and modifications will be published by the PRA in the Financial Services Register when the regime goes live in 2019.

8  McKinsey (2005, 2006)  9  King (2006)  BIS Review 107/2006  3  case of the SNB, the flexible nature of the policy framework and the importance attached to money and credit variables means that in an effort to avoid potential long-term financial distortions from emerging, the Governing Board could conceivably tighten monetary policy even if our inflation forecast signals no imminent inflation threat. 5. References  Baltensperger, Ernst, Thomas J. Jordan and Marcel Savioz, 2001. The Demand for M3 and Inflation Forecasts: an Empirical Analysis for Switzerland. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol.137 n.2, pp.244-272. Fischer B., M. Lenza, H. Pill and L. Reichlin (2006). Money and monetary policy: The ECB experience 1999-2006. Friedman, Milton, 2005. A natural experiment in monetary policy covering three episodes of growth and decline in the economy and the stock market. Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.19 n.4, pp.145-150. Issing, Ottmar, 2002. Monetary Policy in a Changing Environment. Contribution to the Jackson Hole Symposium on "Rethinking Stabilization Policy", Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Jordan, Thomas J., Michel Peytrignet, and Georg Rich, 2001. The role of M3 in the policy analysis of the Swiss National Bank. In: Klöckers, H.-J., and C. Willeke, eds., Monetary Analysis: Tools and Applications, European Central Bank, pp.47-62. Jordan, Thomas, und Marcel Savioz, 2003. Sind Kombinationen von Prognosen aus VAR-Modellen sinnvoll? Eine empirische Analyse mit Inflationsprognosen für die Schweiz. Quartalsheft der SNB, 4, Dezember 2003. King, Mervyn, 2006. Speech at the Dinner for Kent Business Contacts, Ashford, Kent, United Kingdom. McKinsey & Company.
The rationale for this was brutally underlined in the euro crisis. The members of the euro share more than a single market. They share a currency, they share risk of the break up of that currency and they share a lender of last resort. With the creation of the European Stability Mechanism, they have begun to share a common backstop. At that level of integration, it is right to ask to what extent financial stability is ultimately primarily a national responsibility and where the buck should stop. The creation and full implementation of the Banking Union should in my view increase the financial stability of the currency union, thereby improving stability for everyone in the EU. It is, however, impossible to ignore the fact that to do so, the Banking Union must continue to develop the necessary backstops – painful though that may sometimes be. There are agreed plans to move further in this direction. It is important that they are implemented. To return to the history for a moment, one sees the need to find a balance between the single market and financial stability in the way in which Europe ultimately came to free movement of capital, with strong Treaty prohibitions on restrictions but within that – and within constraints – a recognition of the need for member states to be able to take the necessary action to defend stability including in relation to prudential supervision.

The Fed also used coupon swaps to settle some agency MBS purchases under its first purchase program. (A coupon swap is the simultaneous sale of one agency MBS and purchase of another agency MBS, which may have a different coupon, issuer, or both.) 29 See Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, August 10, 2010 and Minutes of the Federal Open Market  Committee, September 20–21, 2011. 30 The FOMC suspended Treasury rollovers from July 2012 through December 2012, when it continued the MEP. At that time, redeeming Treasury securities expanded the Fed’s scope to lengthen the maturity profile of its Treasury securities portfolio. 31 See the paper cited earlier by Ben S. Bernanke, “Monetary Policy in a New Era.” 32 See Eric M. Engen, Thomas Laubach, and David Reifschneider, “The Macroeconomic Effects of the Federal  Reserve’s Unconventional Monetary Policies,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Finance and Economics Discussion Series, no. 2015–005, January 2015. The authors found that the gradual nature of accompanying revisions to the FOMC’s policy expectations may have limited the effectiveness of forward guidance and asset purchases. However, in a future crisis, market participants will have the benefit of the current episode in assessing the FOMC’s likely response, leading to a faster adjustment of expectations. 33 The importance of a credible commitment for maintaining accommodative policy when the zero lower bound is  reached is explored in Gauti Eggertsson and Michael Woodford, “The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no.
Jörg Asmussen: The public and the private banking union Speech by Mr Jörg Asmussen, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, at the joint conference “The Single Resolution Mechanism and the Limits of BankRegulation”, Humboldt Universität/Financial Risk and Stability Net-work in Berlin, Berlin, 8 November 2013. *  *  *  Dear Mr Aehling [Veranstalter], Dear colleagues, Ladies and gentlemen, Intro The timing of today’s conference on “The Single Resolution Mechanism and the Limits of Bank-Regulation” could not have been better chosen as the SRM is the dominating theme in all European fora at the moment. Thank you for inviting me and I am happy to share a view on banking union from the European Central Bank with you. Banking union Looking back with the experience of the crisis, I think that many here today share the assessment that the key problem in the past was that there was too little cooperation and too much diversity – we lacked a coherent European approach to financial sector policies. But there is clearly scope for more cooperation today as, particularly after the experience of the crisis, preferences are more aligned in Europe. We all want banks that are well supervised and that can be resolved at minimum cost to the taxpayer. To achieve this, I think we need not reinvent the wheel. There are elements of the US approach that have worked and that we can usefully borrow in Europe.

It will be good for the euro, because it will help to repair our monetary policy transmission mechanism. In other words, it will ensure that the ECB’s low interest rates will be effectively passed on to those countries that probably need them most. It will be good for the internal market, because it will be of help to reverse the significant financial fragmentation that we have seen so far. And it will be good for the recovery, as banks will be put on a stronger footing, confidence will be improved, and ultimately credit will start to flow again to enterprises on affordable terms. But what are the necessary elements of a banking union? To our mind, two elements are indispensable: a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Furthermore, it is important to have a single rulebook and the implementation of the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation IV is key in this respect. A single European deposit insurance is not top on the regulatory agenda today and it may be tackled in the long term only. In fact, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and its liability cascade makes it clear that deposits will come in only at the very end in bank resolution and thus the need for a single deposit insurance scheme is less urgent and a better harmonisation could suffice at present. Let me start with the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
At the same time, higher asset prices provide scope for raising larger secured loans. When negative news appears and spreads, investments do not match expectations and the sentiment is reversed, asset prices fall. Banks’ security is reduced. Borrowers experience problems in servicing their debt. Demand and income developments are weakened and banks’ losses increase. The sharp rise in house prices and household debt has increased the interest in the interplay between monetary policy and the stability of the financial system. Financial stability and price stability are mutually reinforcing. Financial stability facilitates a stable supply of credit and stable capital flows and underpins the transmission mechanisms for monetary policy. Price stability strengthens financial stability. Low and stable inflation provides households and enterprises with a clear indication of changes in relative prices. This makes it easier for economic agents to make the right decisions and leads to greater price stability in financial and property markets than would otherwise be the case. Developments in credit and asset prices have an influence on inflation. We take this into account in our interest-rate setting. We are also aware of the potential risks to financial stability. The current low interest rates make it easy to service debt. The household interest burden, i.e. interest expenses after tax in relation to the sum of interest expenses and disposable income, is low despite strong growth in debt. The interest burden will increase, however, when the interest rate reaches a more normal level. Only 14 per cent of household loans are fixed-interest loans.

The results of the wage settlement so far may suggest that wage growth this year will be somewhat lower than projected by Norges Bank. Inflation, on the other hand, has been broadly in line with expectations, and the krone exchange rate has developed approximately as projected since the March Inflation Report was published. The inflation outlook has not changed significantly since the March Inflation Report was published. At its monetary policy meeting on 25 May, Norges Bank’s Executive Board decided to leave the sight deposit rate unchanged at 1.75 per cent. The Executive Board stated: “The monetary policy assessments presented in the Inflation Report in March indicated that the interest rate will rise after a period and at a gradual pace. The assessments were based on market participants’ expectations that the interest rate would be increased in the summer. A development where the interest rate rises gradually - in small and not too frequent steps - was considered to provide a good balance between the different objectives. The outlook for inflation and activity has not changed substantially since the March Inflation Report. As an alternative, the Executive Board considered increasing the interest rate already at this meeting.
Speeches  Published Date: 29 April 2021  "Inflation & Expectations" - Opening Remarks by Mr Edward S Robinson, Deputy Managing Director (Economic Policy) & Chief Economist, Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Seminar on Inflation and Cost of Living in Singapore and Asia on 29 April 2021 Introduction 1. Thank you for inviting the MAS to join this virtual webinar and live discussion on “Inflation and Cost of Living”, a joint initiative of the Sim Kee Boon Institute for Financial Economics, the IMF Institute and DBS Bank. It is encouraging that academia, industry and an intergovernmental organisation have come together on an important issue of common concern. 2. I recall launching the Singapore Index of Inflation Expectations or SInDEx, as it was known then at SMU in January 2012, and it is heartening to see it nurtured over the past decade. The MAS is grateful to the SKBI for its commitment to this project and to DBS for its generous sponsorship of the DBS-SKBI-SMU Singapore Index of Inflation Expectations, that counts among the key indicators that MAS looks at in its economic surveillance. 3. My comments are in two parts. First, I will make some broad observations on the somewhat complex inflation dynamics that confront us since the onset of COVID-19. Second, I intend to reiterate the important role that expectations play in driving the behaviour of key macroeconomic phenomena, including inflation.

In conclusion, despite the upward global economic challenges at various indicators, especially the forecasts for growth of the global economy to slow, and the factors that still affect the performance of many global economies, the recent data of the Arab banking sector for 2021 revealed positive results in terms of capitals, liquidity and profitability inducing to adopt a countercyclical policy by rebuilding capital and liquidity margins for the sector units to face any future challenges. Ladies and Gentlemen, Once again, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to your Excellencies, and hope that the outcomes of this meeting help achieve the desired goals in supporting financial and monetary stability and plans of development and prosperity for our countries. Thank you  18/9/2022  Page 4 of 4
03.12.2021  A complete institutional architecture for a stronger policy mix “A stronger policy mix for the euro area?” – European Commission webinar organised by DG ECFIN Directorate for Macroeconomic Policies Pablo Hernández de Cos Governor  The COVID crisis has tested the European project in unprecedented ways. The policy response, a successful monetary and fiscal policy reaction, informed by a euro area (and EU-wide) perspective, has been unprecedented too. Given the exogenous roots of the crisis, the need to respond with a balanced fiscal-monetary policy mix was clear. And its depth facilitated the adoption of far-reaching political agreements that allowed the incomplete institutional nature of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to be temporarily overcome, in particular through the deployment of some significant pan-European fiscal instruments. To mention the most important, let me highlight the NGEU programme, and also the unemployment scheme SURE. The need for a policy reaction from the aggregate angle was quite clear on this occasion. This is a novelty when comparing with the two previous crises, the GFC and the European sovereign debt crisis, when the endogenous roots of the shock showed a fundamental need for reform and action at the national level, that was only subsequently reinforced by some important steps aimed at pushing forward the overall euro area (and EU) architecture. Let me start by reminding us how we got here.

Any attempt to short-cut this process and build up ad hoc measures for purely prudential purposes will not succeed. It runs the risk of adding significant distortions and having unwanted consequences. In particular, if not carefully drafted, the leverage ratio could create incentives for banks to pile up riskier assets in their balance sheets, in order to maintain the same returns on equity with lower leverage. This would only aggravate the problems that regulation is trying to solve and precipitate the next crisis. This is why some scepticism is warranted as to the possibility of using the leverage ratio as a universally binding, or in the language of regulators, a "pillar one" component of the capital framework. Consistency with macroeconomic policy Regulatory reform has today to be implemented in a very uncertain macroeconomic environment. It is therefore important that we strike the right balance: efforts towards long term reform must not create, in the short run, additional downside risks to economic activity. Since Pittsburgh, we have a roadmap and we have deadlines. We must find the optimal sequencing to reconcile our ultimate objectives with the need not to impede the recovery. This is especially relevant for the capital regime. Banks must have a much stronger capital base in the long run. But, in the short run, we expect credit to continue flowing to the economy and we want, therefore, to avoid any abrupt and disorderly deleveraging. We don't want, in short, the introduction of a new capital regime to have a procyclical effect on our economies.
Our central projection was for inflation to continue to rise during the second half of this year to a peak close to 4% and then – assuming that oil prices stabilised – to fall back towards the 2% target as the growing margin of spare capacity in the economy held back pay and price increases. Since May, inflation has turned out higher than expected and oil prices have risen further, notwithstanding some moderation in the past week or so. But the news on activity has not been very good either, with some distinctly downbeat business surveys, including yesterday’s Industrial Trends survey, further weakening in the housing market and continued fragility in the financial sector. All this points to a worse near-term prospect for both growth and inflation. The net impact of this on the outlook for inflation in the medium term is less clear, though for our considered view on that, you will have to wait until our August Inflation Report is published in a couple of weeks time. 6  BIS Review 95/2008  Moreover, there are considerable risks surrounding the central outlook. A particular risk on the upside is that the extended period of elevated inflation leads to an acceleration in pay and causes inflation expectations to rise. That could lead the higher inflation to become embedded. But on the downside, there is a risk that the credit crunch leads to a deeper and more prolonged slowdown, leading to greater slack in the economy and causing inflation to undershoot our target.

By international standards, the Governing Board is a very small decisionmaking body made up of just three people. Also, it traditionally reaches its decisions by a process of consensus. If the minutes of its meetings were to be published, discussions within the body would probably become less candid and open and – ultimately – the quality of decision-making would suffer as a result. Moreover, it is unlikely that publishing the minutes would in fact lead to better public understanding of monetary policy within Switzerland. That is why, in view of these special Swiss features, we have decided not to release the minutes of our meetings. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  An additional way of increasing the transparency of monetary policy, and thus its effectiveness, could be the provision of information on the future path of reference interest rates. “Forward guidance” of this kind may be useful for many central banks. However, there are pitfalls and this could easily lead to confusion in the market, especially if the guidance is attached to too many conditions. However, I would not want you to misunderstand me. It is absolutely right that central banks should explain to the general public how monetary policy would react to certain developments. This is nothing new. In the case of the SNB, for instance, the conditional inflation forecast – our main interest rate indicator and an important element in our communications – already provides certain information about the future path of interest rates.