samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This will involve: 1.  enhancing the timeliness, completeness and consistency of the quarterly euro area accounts, so that they become available within 90 days of the end of the reference period;  2.  compiling more accurate, frequent and timely statistics on assets and liabilities of investment funds from early next year (based on an ECB Regulation adopted in July 2007);  3.  compiling frequent, timely and harmonised statistics on insurance corporations and pension funds, which will become increasingly important in our ageing society;  4.  compiling comprehensive statistics on the securitisation of bank loans and the financial vehicle corporations which handle these securitisations, as well as improving the measurement of credit risk transfers, including credit default swaps, in close cooperation with bank supervisors;  5.  enhancing statistics on bank credit lines, bank balance sheets and interest rates on deposits and loans, for instance by gaining more insight into loan collateral; and  6.  looking at user requirements for micro-data, for example for household consumption and finance.

However, the quality management for this database, which is provided by  BIS Review 50/2008  5  Secondly, the ECB could support ongoing market initiatives to improve transparency by offering its expertise in the international standardisation of definitions and classifications (looking, for instance, at how to define a covered bond, a mortgage prepayment rate or the residency of a bond issuer or holder, or considering ways of consistently classifying counterparties). This could include dialogue with the financial industry in the context of the possible enhancement – under consideration by the European Commission – of the supervisory disclosure requirements under the so-called Pillar 3 of the Capital Requirements Directive so that the information to be disclosed is based on clear definitions and reported in a standard format and with sufficient frequency and timeliness. Thirdly, as regards the Short-Term European Paper market, the ECB is also involved in the actual compilation and publication of relevant statistics, and such transparency may come at a premium in the current circumstances. In general, more statistical data may be collected by NCBs on an ad hoc basis, from selected key players, for instance in relation to particular types of financial innovation. I also invite the STC to contribute to the enhancement of the financial literacy of euro area citizens and to further improve the accessibility of its statistics for specific target groups. Conclusions European policy-makers need to have at their disposal a wide array of timely, high-quality statistics on which to base their decisions.
Of course, we could provide even more monetary stimulus through further asset purchases. And we will continue to assess the benefits and costs of further reductions in overnight interest rates. Be in no doubt that we are ready to provide more stimulus if it is needed. Relying on generalised monetary stimulus alone, however, is not a panacea. Monetary policy works, at least in part, by providing incentives to households and businesses to bring forward spending from the future to the present. But that reduces spending plans tomorrow. And when tomorrow arrives, an even larger stimulus is required to bring forward yet more spending from the future. As time passes, larger and larger doses of stimulus are required. We are not in a typical post-war business cycle recession. And, as with many medicines, there are side-effects from the prolonged use of monetary stimulus. With long bond yields at unsustainably low levels, there is a risk to financial stability. Real interest rates (that is, returns adjusted for expected inflation) on government bonds are negative out to a horizon of 25 years. That is not consistent with a sustainable economic recovery and a return to more normal levels of interest rates. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  A long period of exceptionally low interest rates may also encourage excessive risk-taking, leading to vulnerabilities in important financial institutions. So if we cannot rely on monetary stimulus alone, what additional policies should we consider?

That has been responsible for  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  an unusually weak recovery in consumer spending which, after falling initially by some 7%, is still more than 4% below its peak. The result is a large number of vacant retail premises – visible here in Belfast, as elsewhere. The second factor is the extent to which the balance sheets of the major UK banks had grown before the crisis hit, and had been financed primarily by borrowing. So the subsequent reduction in bank lending – the deleveraging – was greater here than in many other countries. That deleveraging has as its counterpart a reduction in the amount of (broad) money in the economy and a reduced willingness on the part of banks to expand lending to finance the recovery. And the third is the crisis in our main trading partner – the euro area – where the near term outlook is weak, and the longer term prospects for tackling the evident fault lines in the monetary union uncertain. The former means that our current account deficit has remained stubbornly high, and the latter is holding back corporate investment With a disappointingly slow recovery, and unemployment one million higher than before the crisis, the main aim of economic policy has been to generate both a recovery and a rebalancing of the economy, and bring unemployment down without putting at risk hard-won medium-term price stability. The Bank of England has played its part by administering a powerful combination of medicines.
In this context, the Board has held the MPR at 5%, but noting that if these trends consolidate adjustments to the policy rate may be required. Let me now describe for you our baseline scenario for the Chilean economy and the main risks examined in our Report. Macroeconomic scenario International trends depicted in June have settled. News coming from the developed economies, particularly the United States, confirms a gradual recovery. The revision of U.S. economic figures lowered the growth forecast for the whole year, but showed that the U.S. economy picked up sooner than expected. In the second quarter it accelerated thanks to increased investments in fixed assets, a steady improvement in the labor market and more  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  optimistic expectations of consumers and enterprises. In addition, the markets foresee that the Fed will anticipate the withdrawal of the monetary stimulus in place. The recovery of the Japanese economy continues, but questions remain regarding its sustainability. After six quarters of contraction, the Eurozone recorded positive growth in the second quarter, driven by Germany and France, and also favored by the economies of the periphery that moderated their contractions. However, it is still premature to conclude a change in trend. The emerging world, on the other hand, has continued to show widespread deceleration. China settled in lower growth figures, despite some signs of stabilizing output and messages from the authorities that they will sustain an economic expansion of 7% annually.

We are entering a consultation period that is absolutely critical and that will lead in June next year to the issuance of an opinion by EIOPA. This opinion, which will be reviewed by the Commission, will form the basis for the negotiations with the Council and Parliament that are scheduled to start in early 2021. Here again, we need to put the challenges posed by Solvency II into perspective. Let me remind you that this is the most ambitious reform ever undertaken in insurance. The new regulatory framework, based on an  Page 5 of 6  approach that takes into account all risks to which insurers are exposed, has undeniably strengthened the resilience of the European insurance market. However, and you yourselves see this every day, the prudential requirements imposed by Solvency II have a number of drawbacks, including being volatile and complex. To remedy this, let’s take advantage of the window of opportunity offered by the directive’s review, and push for four priorities that are essential for financial stability and for the sound financing of the economy: (i)  All things being equal, the revision must not lead to an increase in capital requirements for the European insurance industry. (ii)  It would be counterproductive to artificially lower the capital requirement by stopping equity investments. But despite the advances obtained in 2018, this asset class is still being penalised.
Figure 8 National Figure 9 employment and unemployment rate (percent; millions of(*) persons) rate Real exchange (index, 1986=100) Universidad de Chile (*) 120 2,8 14  12  110 12  2,6  11  100 10  2,4  10  90 8  2,2  9  80 6  2,0  8  1,8 98  7  70 4  88 90 92 94 96 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 RER Average 1990-1999 Unemployment rate  INE  00  (*) The dot shows the real exchange rate as of 6 September 2010. Employment  120  7,5  110  7,0  100  6,5  90  6,0  80  5,5  02  Mar.09  04  Ago.09  06  08  Ene.10  10  Jun.10  70  5,0  Average 1995-2009  Unemployment rate Employment  Source: Central Bank of Chile. (*) Seasonally-adjusted series. Sources: Central Bank of Chile, National Statistics Institute (INE) and Universidad de Chile. 10  BIS Review 126/2010  Figure 9 Real exchange rate (*) (index, 1986=100) 120  120  110  110  100  100  90  90  80  80  70  88  90  RER  92  94  96  98  00  Average 1990-1999  02  04  06  08  70  10  Average 1995-2009  (*) The dot shows the real exchange rate as of 6 September 2010.

As has happened under different circumstances, any movements of the exchange rate away from the trend assumed as a working assumption is possible in a floating regime, and its potential effects on the financial system, output or employment will be considered by the Board as inputs for their future decisions. Summarizing, for the rest of this year, annual CPI inflation is expected to return to figures around 3% to then move to the upper limit of the tolerance range for some months. This short-term trajectory is influenced by one-time effects, which will eventually revert, permitting inflation to hover around 3% throughout 2011 and to the end of the relevant projection horizon, this time the third quarter of 2012. Y-o-y CPIX1 inflation will describe a more gradual convergence to 3%, largely because the shorter-term effects on inflation are concentrated in items outside the CPIX1. Private expectations are not very different from this (figure 10). The Board estimates that it will continue withdrawing the monetary stimulus at a pace that will depend on how domestic and external macroeconomic conditions unfold. This process of MPR normalization was begun in June and continued in the meetings of July and August – with increases of 50 basis points each time – taking the MPR to 2% y-o-y. Going forward, the market has internalized a process of withdrawal of the monetary stimulus in the coming quarters. This is consistent with the progressive normalization of credit conditions, which is visible in various markets and indicators.
The most important of those costs was probably the adverse effects of such interventions on risk-taking incentives – in other words, the moral hazard of government insurance (Alessandri and Haldane (2009)). This is not a new issue. The historical evolution of the financial system has been a game of cat and mouse between the state and the banking system (Haldane (2010)). Because the cat has typically failed to keep pace with the mouse, the result has been a widening and deepening of support mechanisms for banks over time. Elsewhere, I have called this dynamic link between bank and sovereign balance sheets the “doom loop” (Haldane (2012)). One measure of the extent of this problem is found in estimates of the “implicit subsidy” banks earn as a result of the expectation of government support. Chart 9 plots one measure of this “implicit subsidy” to UK banks. This peaked following the bail-outs at a remarkable £ in 2009. Since then, it has fallen substantially – to around £ in 2013 – as regulatory reforms have been put in place to constrain risk-taking and the financial strength of banks has improved. But it remains in positive territory, suggesting an on-going distortion to risk-taking incentives. Public policy responses The modern company harbours a range of micro-economic frictions. In some cases, these seem likely to have generated significant macro-economic costs, in the form of sub-optimally low rates of investment and sub-optimally high degrees of risk-taking.

If he were to summarize this talk he might suggest a title like “Knowing Your Destination is a Good Start in Getting Where You Are Going” or some other derivation of what I believe is his actual quote: “You’ve got to be very careful if you don’t know where you are going because you might not get there.” When setting monetary policy, it is very important to have a clear idea of where you want the economy to go. And fortunately, there is now much more transparency about the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) expected destination, because the FOMC releases its long-term projections for inflation and unemployment. Unfortunately, however, actually reaching our desired destination will prove challenging and involve choices, as I will discuss this evening. At our January meeting, the central tendency of the FOMC members’ long-run projections for unemployment was 5.0 to 5.2 per cent, and for inflation (measured by the personal consumption expenditures price index or PCE) was 1.7 to 2.0 per cent. At present, both unemployment and inflation diverge significantly from these longer-term goals, with the March unemployment rate at 9.7 per cent, and core PCE inflation over the past year at 1.3 per cent. In such circumstances, one might think that the current path of monetary policy would be particularly straightforward. Unfortunately, just knowing your destination doesn’t get you there. To reach your destination you need to know how you want to get there.
The total banking sector assets in all new member states are only 345 USD billions at the end 2002 (thus just 31,5% of Citigroup, or 43,4% of Deutsche bank, or 45,5% of HSBC). Structure of ACs Banking Sector Assets  3%  2% 2% 1%  1% POL CZ  7%  HUN 38%  7%  CYPR SVK SLO LAT LIT  15%  EST MALTA  24%  * As of 31st Dec 2002, recalculated by market exchange rate  BIS Review 53/2003  19  3  A look at financial depth [as measured by banking sector assets to GDP] of individual markets in five accession countries [Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia] shows that there is still significant space for growth of financial intermediation. Financial depth in the CR is the highest among the transition economies, but it is still significantly lower than in the EU [EU average 270%]. Financial Depth (Bank Assets/GDP in %) 130 120 110 100 CR HUN SVK POL SLO  %  90 80 70 60 50 40 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  7  Besides developments in banking, we can observe continuous growth also in non-banking financial intermediation [illustrated by Czech Republic]. In the Czech Republic, the share of non-banking financial intermediation on GDP increased over last two years from 19% to 21,7%. The highest increase was in the share of insurance companies and financial leasing institutions.

The problems and challenges that the new member states will face are not any different from those that are faced by the “old” member states, such as implementing the new Basle Capital Accord, implementing the IAS, increasing cross-border cooperation, monitoring activities of large complex financial groups, evaluating new complicated financial products, understanding risk transfer among different financial institutions. The transition will greatly benefit from the hard work that has been done during the economic transition and during the preparatory stages for the EU accession. It will be smooth and I do not expect any disruption of financial service in the new member states, or in the EU as a whole. It could be said that the financial sector is already in the European Union. Useful links • pavel.racocha@cnb.cz • www.cnb.cz Czech National Bank • www.nbp.pl Polish National Bank • www.nbs.sk Slovak National Bank • www.mnb.hu Hungarian National Bank • www.bis.org links to other national banks  26  10  BIS Review 53/2003
However, as our economy grows and current agreement ends at 2009, we will soon get full ownership of our economic policies with a reduced role of IMF under article 4 of the Agreement. The Bank of Albania has a proven track record of competence, credibility and professionalism in the service of our economy. These three elements provide necessary conditions to support and guarantee achievement of economic goal of stable prices and boost credibility in Albanian economy; but, we can not be hold responsible for the behavior of the other players. I am convinced that we need to find and implement clear domestic and foreign anchors to preserve the credibility of our reforms in the future. For the way ahead we are focusing our efforts in the identification and utilization of key elements of the state, politics, markets, institutions and general public that could efficiently play the role of domestic anchors. As part of this preemptive action, the Bank of Albania is carefully considering the possibility  BIS Review 121/2006  3  to launch a fully fledged inflation targeting regime of monetary policy in the midterm. This will be a conditional decision based upon results of current ongoing research, evaluation of the preconditions and building up of capacities. Other possible anchors such as a memorandum of understanding with ministry of finance and public education are considered as well. On the foreign side we see numerous prestigious partners which understand our concerns and appreciate the value of fiscal discipline.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  This rigour has a purpose. The dangers of using poorly designed models were made all too clear in the banking sector. So the Bank won’t hesitate to withhold approval of inadequate or opaque models. Models must be based on appropriate data and account for all quantifiable risks. Boards have the responsibility to ensure models remain appropriate and to show they are used in practice. Of course, risk-based capital standards are about more than models. Models can never be relied upon in all circumstances or in isolation, nor can they be substitutes for sound judgment. Solvency II recognises this in its three-pillar approach – supplementing a modernisation of the quantitative regime with new supervisory review, governance, risk management and transparency requirements. These requirements, under pillars 2 and 3, build a coherent framework for the future. Tools like scenario testing and the Own Risk Solvency Assessment are therefore fundamentally important. By thinking about the risks that could harm future solvency – and the possible responses to a stress – ORSAs promote the protection of safety and soundness of insurance firms, while providing insights into overall financial stability. Right idea 2: a regime that holds the right people to account The step-change in regulatory standards under Solvency II has several implications for the industry. Risk professionals like yourselves have a central role to play in building models; in using expert judgment to marry quantitative and qualitative assessments of risk; and in making technical subject matter accessible to Boards.
As you know, Spanish credit institutions have based a substantial portion of their business in the recent upturn on the granting of loans for housing development and purchases. And a large number of these loans have ultimately been repackaged as negotiable financial instruments by means of securitisation. These two phenomena are, as you all know, at the root of the problems experienced by certain credit institutions in other regions. But before drawing any insufficiently founded conclusions from this, we must bear in mind the differences between Spanish institutions and those beyond our borders that have been more severely impacted by the effects of the turbulence. As I shall explain, these differences are substantial and place Spanish financial institutions in a sound position to withstand these effects. The first and certainly one of the most significant differences lies in the fact that Spanish banks have kept the risks of the loans they have securitised on their balance sheets. The "originate-to-distribute" model followed elsewhere has not been developed at all in Spain and, consequently, credit institutions' incentives to value loan risks in a cautious and rigorous manner have not been weakened. Under these conditions, it is perfectly understandable why products like the US subprime mortgages, which triggered the current situation, have not emerged.

Miguel Fernández Ordóñez: Situation of the Spanish economy and financial sector Speech by Mr Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the XV Financial Sector Meeting “The way forward for the Spanish banking business model”, Madrid, 15 April 2008. *  *  *  I shall be focusing today on the Spanish economy which, naturally enough, has been affected by the changes in the international environment prompted by the further slowdown in the US economy, the rising course of oil prices and the prolongation of the bout of financial turbulence. To this end, I shall begin with a brief reference to the situation in the United States and in Europe, focusing thereafter on the macroeconomic outlook for Spain in an attempt to define its degree of exposure to the international financial turbulence. Finally, I shall offer some economic policy considerations. It is in the United States that the deterioration in macroeconomic conditions has been most marked. The effects of the sharp adjustment in the US real estate sector have been amplified by the consequences of the instability in international financial markets, severely affecting business and household confidence. The outlook of most analysts for 2008 points to a strong deceleration in the first two quarters of the year, and even to a recession at some point along the line, although any more medium-term projection is shrouded in considerable uncertainty. In the euro area, some of the risks to continued economic dynamism progressively materialised during 2007.