samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The operation of a structural rule and the establishment of a path with annual goals for it helps to provide more certainty to the formulation of monetary policy, while allowing the budget’s automatic stabilizers to operate, letting monetary policy assume the main countercyclical role. In the projections I have just presented, we estimate that the impulse the Chilean economy will receive from abroad will fall somewhat short of our June estimates, particularly because of lower terms of trade. In recent weeks, copper has approached its long-term levels faster than we thought. Therefore, our projections are down from June, to $ per pound this year, 2.85 in 2019 and 2.8 in 2020. For its part, the oil price has moved kind of erratically, but is still above the prices of the beginning of the year. Going forward, in our baseline scenario a downward trajectory is still considered, in line with market price futures. With this, the terms of trade will post a decrease of 1.2% this year, not the slight rise we expected in June. In 2019 and 2020, they will decline further. Regarding financial conditions, in the developed world the divergence of their monetary policies persists, because of dissimilar evaluations of capacity gaps and the inflationary pressures that each face.

The latter in particular is defined as “being a reliable institution because of its technical nature and excellence in achieving the mandated objectives.” This expresses the need for the CBC to be prepared to respond to the opportunities and challenges that are presented to it at the macroeconomic and institutional level, in the understanding that in today’s world and society the citizens’ and markets’ confidence have to be earned day by day, beyond our past achievements. Based on these definitions, the plan identifies five areas of priority:  Maintain intellectual leadership in the areas related to the institutional mandates of the CBC;  Strengthen the understanding and dialogue of the organization with its environment;  Strengthen its corporate governance to balance out risk tolerance and the efficiency of its business processes;  Improve ability to understand and incorporate technological changes into its tasks; and  Consolidate the CBC as an employer of excellence, capable of attracting and engaging the best talent. Accordingly, twenty-one lines of action were defined that will be developed over this fiveyear period, all of them described in the document in your hands. Below I summarize those that may be of greatest interest for you honorable senators, with their corresponding progress status. Intellectual leadership. Since last January, we apply a new monetary policy communication scheme. To date, we have held six monetary policy meeting under this scheme, three of them accompanied by the respective publications of the Monetary Policy Report and subsequent presentation to the Senate.
Meanwhile, aggregate current account deficits of advanced economies rose slightly, underpinned by renewed fiscal easing in the United States. 3 Chart extracted from the IMF External Sector Report, 2019. 4  Chart 3 Current account and fiscal balances in Euro Area and USA USA  Euro Area  Current account and fiscal balance, as % of GDP  Current account and fiscal balance, as % of GDP 4.0  0.0  2.0  -2.0 -4.0  0.0  -6.0  -2.0  -8.0 -10.0  -6.0  -12.0  -8.0  -14.0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019  -4.0  Fiscal balance  Fiscal balance  Current account balance  Current account balance  Source: IMF, WEO October 2019, database  The dynamics of the balances is not always indicative on how appropriate the external position is. The deviation of the current account from its fundamentals and desirable policies provides for additional substantial information on the correction needed. According to the IMF (2019), 35–45 percent of overall current account surpluses and deficits were deemed excessive in 2018.

A more developed market for securitisation may be one way of tackling this problem. It requires, however, assistance from the authorities in the form of a simplified regulatory framework. A well-developed market for gilt-edged bonds may also work in the same direction, but this also requires the approval of the authorities. A general reflection is that the financial innovations in a new market develop best if they are controlled by the wishes of investors and issuers. It is impossible to say what these wishes will be like in future. The role of authorities is to create a body of rules that provides scope for changes and preferably avoids locking the market into special structures or instruments. The Swedish housing loan institutions are well run and should have good opportunities for borrowing competitively in the European market however it develops. However, no one can borrow without systematically building up relations with the funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors which make up the so-called investor base. All the Swedish institutions have a task here in the market for euro. BIS Review 113/1999  6
This occurs not only inside Sweden but also in the form of teleworking from other countries in organisations that are located in Sweden. Teleworking makes it possible to use the labour force more flexibly over the business cycle, so that the work can be part-time when economic activity is low and full-time when activity is high. The third cause has to do with changes of institutions in a broad sense. A concrete Swedish example is that more and more collective agreements contain agreements on working time “banks”. According to these agreements, the number of hours worked for an employee can be redistributed over the business cycle. Another example is the emergence of temporary employment agencies in Sweden. From once upon a time being illegal, the industry is currently about 80,000 strong. In 2017, 250,000 were employed by the temporary employment industry in the areas of temporary staffing, career transition and direct recruitment. In Sweden, we have also seen greater labour supply among older people. According to the LFS for the first quarter of 2018, almost four per cent of those employed were between 65 and 74 years old. One can assume that their labour supply is very flexible. If we add all these explanations together, it is perhaps not so strange that the correlation between resource utilisation and nominal wage increases seems to have weakened in recent years. Other explanations also feasible But there are also other feasible explanations for the observation in Figure 4.

Given abundance of water resources in the country, as earlier alluded to, the potential for development of hydro-power for both domestic and exports is quite high. Current estimates show that the country’s hydropower resource potential stands at 6,000 mega watts (MW) while the installed capacity is somewhere around 1,715.5 MW. These estimates are a testimony to the great potential this sector has. I am aware of several investment plans that ZESCO has put in place and which are aimed at exploiting this potential. Ladies and Gentlemen, the opportunities identified above do not just happen. Zambians must make a conscious effort to exploit the opportunities identified. We must not view Government efforts of promoting investments opportunities as meant for foreigners only. To facilitate long-term planning for the productive sector, the Bank of Zambia will continue with measures that would achieve and maintain low and stable inflation and interest rates as well as a relatively stable exchange rate. This would provide a foundation for value addition in industries such as agro-processing, manufacturing, construction, and tourism, which is key to sustainable development. It is imperative that as a country, we move from being raw materials producers only to value addition in a stable macroeconomic environment. Apart from appropriate monetary policy and prudent fiscal policy, the stability in the foreign exchange market is important in achieving low and stable inflation. The objective of the Bank in this respect would be to achieve a non-volatile but competitive exchange rate.
These relatively stable ratios, however, conceal some differences in the ways individual institutions have lowered their leverage ratios. Most of them have increased their Tier 1 capital, while many have also reduced their assets. Overall, the shock-absorbing capacities of euro area LCBGs improved substantially during 2009 and in the first quarter of 2010. Even those institutions with the lowest capital ratios managed to enhance their buffers to levels well in excess of minimum regulatory requirements. At the same time, the capital buffers in some segments of the euro area banking sector may not have improved as quickly as has been the case for the LCBGs and will require further strengthening. Conditions in euro area LCBG funding markets have also tended to improve for much of the past six months, although the recent rise in sovereign credit risks has led to a setback for longerterm debt financing costs. As shown in the right-side of Chart 5, the most important driver of euro area LCBGs’ net income throughout 2009 and in the first quarter of 2010 continued to be net interest income. By the first quarter of this year, around two-thirds of the total net income of the LCBGs was generated from this source, while, before the crisis, around half of the total came from net interest income.

The turnaround of the profitability of the LCBGs in 2009 is also attributable to a remarkable recovery of net trading revenue in the second quarter of 2009, which was more or less sustained throughout the year and in early 2010, despite a progressive lowering of market volatility, a tightening of bid-ask spreads and a stalling of the recovery in financial markets. Finally, income from fees and commissions has continued to produce a stable revenue flow for euro area LCBGs, and even increasing somewhat in the late 2009 and early 2010, boosted in particular by revenues from underwriting government and non-financial corporate sector debt securities issuances. Looking ahead, although their financial performance has much improved, the challenges facing euro area LCBGs remain considerable. The central scenario is one of subdued banking sector profitability in the short to medium term for a variety of reasons. First, the recovery in the financial markets that has taken place in late 2009 has lowered the ECB estimates of banks’ cumulative mark-to-market losses on holdings of securities throughout the entire period of the financial turmoil. However, the new estimate in the current FSR indicates that the potential cumulative write-downs on securities and loans for the euro area banking sector for the period 2007 to 2010 is EUR 515 billion, which is lower than the estimate published in the December 2009 FSR.
Its average holding in European companies is today around three times as high as in the Americas and Asia. The chosen regional distribution is related to Norway’s import pattern and has been viewed as a form of currency hedging. But the result has been that a large proportion of the Fund is invested in a region that has experienced weak growth over the past decade. Analyses show that exchange rate risk in the Fund is relatively small and less than previously assumed. Based on these findings, the Norwegian Government has decided that the relative share of European investments should be reduced over time, so that the Fund’s geographical diversification is further improved. A more even distribution of the Fund’s ownership will provide us with the opportunity to take part in value creation in regions with strong growth. This implies a reduction in the allocation to European equities and an increase in the allocation to the Americas and emerging economies. High economic growth in Asia may provide sound returns on investments in that region, even though today’s equity prices already reflect expectations of higher growth in eastern than in western regions. A more even distribution will nonetheless improve the trade-off between risk and expected rewards. Petroleum revenue spending Norway as an oil nation stumbled at the start. The current account surplus at the end of the 1960s had reversed to a deficit of 12 percent of GDP by 1977. The deficit was three times as large as that recorded by Italy and Spain last year.

Table 1  The fiscal rule was drawn up in 2001. Today, the situation is different. In 2001, a real return on the Fund of 4 percent, or a little higher, based on the then prevailing distribution between equities and bonds, was a reasonable assumption. Today, calculations yield a lower figure for expected real return. 1 The real return on bonds in the Fund’s portfolio can now be estimated at 1 percent. With a normal risk premium on equities, the real return on the whole Fund can be quantified at 3 percent. There is a possibility that the real return will be higher, but it may also be lower. If we spend more than the annual return on the Fund, we will be eating into the savings portion. The conclusion is that a more robust approach would now be to base fiscal policy on an annual expected real return on the Fund of 3 percent. Such an adjustment would underpin the main principles that were behind the establishment of the fiscal rule – stability and sustainability. 1  8  See Norges Bank Staff Memo 6/2012. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Chart 8  In 2011 the structural non-oil budget deficit was about 3 percent, which is close to such a new path. Adapting petroleum revenue spending to a lower expected return should not therefore be particularly demanding. If we wait, a necessary policy adjustment later could be far more painful.
It is how people react not only to black and white, but to all of the shades of grey. Like a gentle breeze, culture may be hard to see, but you can feel it. Culture relates to what “should” I do, and not to what “can” I do. 1  Stephanie Chaly, James Hennessy, Steven Manzari, Hamid Mehran, Thomas Noone and Joseph Tracy contributed to this speech. 2  Saabira Chaudhuri, “Banks’ Legal Tab Still Running Higher.” Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2014. 3  O’Toole and Bennis, “What’s Needed Next: A Culture of Candor.” Harvard Business Review, June 2009. BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  A number of factors have contributed to the cultural failures that we have seen. An important question is whether the sheer size, complexity and global scope of large financial firms today have left them “too big to manage.” Large problems can originate in small corners of these firms, as illustrated by the Financial Products Group experience at AIG, and the “London Whale” episode at JPMorgan. Differences in attitudes and business practices across countries can also be difficult to reconcile within a firm’s overall compliance function. Recent fines against BNP Paribas for violating U.S. sanctions programs and providing dollar funding to a country engaged in genocide and against Credit Suisse for facilitating tax evasion by U.S. citizens, point to these challenges.

This will ultimately enhance the liquidity of our markets. Recognising the potential benefits of establishing linkages, the ASEAN Finance Ministers have recently agreed to explore ways to forge alliances within the ASEAN securities markets. Forging successful exchange linkages is, however, not without its challenges. But these are not insurmountable. Let me briefly outline three of them. Firstly, exchanges’ technology and infrastructure will have to be updated and enhanced to cater to an increasingly integrated marketplace and a more sophisticated investor base. There is a need to ensure that the various IT infrastructures are interoperable and scalable, so as to allow partner exchanges to share common platforms and reap the benefits of economies of scale. Secondly, greater harmonisation of standards and regulatory requirements is a prerequisite for deeper linkages and alliances amongst the regional exchanges. Some regional exchanges and regulators have made a start by committing to work together under various MOUs. We should take the next step of looking at other initiatives to bring about greater convergence of standards in corporate governance, trading conventions, rules and regulations. Finally, the success of exchange linkages is highly dependent on investors’ interest in cross-border trades via the linkages. To achieve this, the linkages must provide a cost efficient solution for investors’ trading needs. There is also a need to cultivate Asian investors’ interest in cross-border investments. Asian investors’ investment portfolios traditionally reflect a strong home bias.
Historically, those two functions have been in conflict; …Broadly speaking, the money expanders have been debtors and the money restricters have been creditors.” As my last speech here at the OMFIF was motivated by the anniversary of the Bretton Woods collapse, I am particularly fond of this observation: “Over history, creditors have tended to impose systems that control the supply of money – the gold standard, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the euro – that prevent borrowers from repaying their debts in debased currencies. The strain of keeping up this discipline is intense in democracies where more people are debtors. The gold standard broke down in the 1930s, Bretton Woods in the 1970s and the euro is struggling today, as is what might be called the post-Bretton Woods system of independent central banks and inflation targets.” 4. And now a few humble observations of my own:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  a. Beginning with the fiscal solutions story, this crisis is a deep crisis of the market economy and of financial systems as managed, regulated, and supervised in just a minority of market economies, most of which can now be found in the EU. The USA might have contained the source of the fire, but for three years it has not played a major role in the eurozone and its main role has turned out to be a stabilizing one.

We experienced four consecutive quarters of sequential contraction with a cumulative output loss of 9% – our deepest recession since independence. Conversely, with the subsequent recovery in the global economy, Singapore’s GDP rose sharply and now exceeds the level before the crisis. Last year, the economy grew by an estimated 14.7%. 4. Over the course of the crisis in 2008/2009, MAS’ monetary policy responses were deliberately graduated, underpinned by the objective of promoting price stability in the medium term. We did not react to every single development in the economy or the financial markets as this would have introduced unnecessary volatility and uncertainty. Following the significant deterioration in external demand in late 2008, MAS eased policy in October 2008 and April 2009 to provide support to the domestic economy. In early 2010, taking into account the strong recovery path of the economy and rising domestic cost pressures amidst high rates of resource utilisation, MAS shifted to a modest and gradual appreciation of the $ policy band. Subsequently, MAS tightened policy further in October 2010 by increasing slightly the slope of the policy band. 5. Singapore’s financial system experienced some initial strains but otherwise has proven resilient during the crisis. Banks and insurers maintained robust capital and liquidity buffers, and balance sheets were relatively strong. Their prudent risk management allowed them to weather the crisis well. MAS has also remained vigilant through the crisis, with my colleagues working hard to ensure that our regulatory and supervisory efforts remain robust. Challenges ahead 6.
As the core 2  Sources: FSB, Global Monitoring Report on NBFI 2017  5/9  financial functions lift and shift to the cloud, the risk of a single point of failure will emerge, and yet, cloud providers are unregulated and to a large extent out of the reach of supervisors. Second, the question of conduct. Our regulation deems certain practices acceptable and others not. Technological developments are making it possible to use information that was previously out of reach of a financial intermediary. This could potentially allow a more accurate assessment of risk or a more “responsive” pricing of service. But what is possible may not be (socially) acceptable – to take one example, the current development of “social network informed credit scores” raises questions when privacy concerns or discriminatory bias are at stake. Third, the question of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing. Consider, for instance, crypto-assets: the pseudo-anonymity of Bitcoin and altcoin has facilitated the laundering of money stemming from illegal activities such as drug transactions or tax evasion. Not surprisingly, the sharpest decline in Bitcoin prices thus far happened in 2013 when the infamous darknet marketplace, The Silk Road, was shut down by the FBI. (B) Let me now turn to new risks which are non-financial in nature but closely intertwined with the digitalisation of finance. Three in particular merit central banks’ scrutiny. First, the question of strategic independence of incumbent banks.

(e) Payment systems The Governing Council endorsed a list of eligible securities settlement systems following an assessment of such systems against standards that had previously been laid down for their use in the credit operations of the ESCB. The list, which indicates those securities settlement systems that will be used by the ESCB and the conditions for their use, will be set out in the “General Documentation”, to which I have already referred. In addition, the Governing Council approved a report on the “Assessment of EU securities settlement systems against the standards for their use in ESCB credit operations”. It is intended to release this report during the next couple of weeks. BIS Review 72/1998
In any case those ideas can be implementable only if they do not focus on a single sector, but also recognize the close relationship and inter-linkages among various sectors in the economy. Thank you very much! 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Ladies and Gentlemen: A greater understanding of Islamic banking and finance on the international front would contribute towards our efforts to reinforce the on-going international initiatives towards fostering greater global financial stability. In this regard, the participation of other financial supervisory and regulatory authorities, and other international standard setting organizations would facilitate this process to achieve our shared interest of preserving the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial system. Ladies and Gentlemen: It has been said that Islamic banking and finance is a "mirror of the sea" for until and unless we have the courage to explore its depth, we would never be able to uncover the treasures that reside within. Islamic banking as a new sphere of finance promises vast opportunities and benefits for all. Its integration into the global financial system will contribute towards achieving our shared aspirations for financial stability to ensure balanced growth in the global economy. BIS Review 64/2002  3