samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
SNB Working Paper, 2021/17. Maechler, A. M. and Moser, T. (2020), Monetary policy implementation: How to steer interest rates in negative territory. SNB Money Market Event, 5 November 2020. Maechler, A. M. and Moser, T. (2022), Life after Libor: A new era of reference interest rates. SNB Money Market Event, 31 March 2022. Poole, W. (1968), Commercial bank reserve management in a stochastic model: implications for monetary policy. Journal of Finance, 23(5), 769–791. Page 10/10  Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? Andréa M. Maechler  Member of the Governing Board, Swiss National Bank  Thomas Moser  Alternate Member of the Governing Board, Swiss National Bank  Money Market Event Geneva, 17 November 2022  Resurgence of inflation globally since late 2020  2  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  SNB policy rate is back in positive territory  3  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering? | Andréa M. Maechler and Thomas Moser | © Swiss National Bank  Announcing a policy rate change does not, in itself, raise market rates  % Implementation such that money market rates follow Announcement of positive SNB policy rate  SARON  SNB policy rate Time 4  17.11.2022 Return to positive interest rates: Why reserve tiering?

Supervisors both at national and European levels have encouraged and monitored the implementation of contingency plans. Up until now, most major players have taken the necessary steps, but some concerns linger regarding the preparedness level of the smaller players, particularly electronic money and payment institutions. On the other hand, public measures have been taken to deal with the specific risks of a no-deal Brexit that could threaten financial stability or consumer protection. The temporary and conditional recognition of British CCPs should prevent cliff-edge effects, as well as temporary waivers on mandatory clearing and bilateral margin exchange for a limited category of products. Member states have also adapted their domestic regulations or are planning to do so. In France, legislation has been enacted ensuring contract continuity for cross border activities and an extended access to UK settlement systems. II. Building a financial Eurosystem Let me now turn to the heart of my topic. The unfortunate reality is that Brexit leaves us no other choice: we must now reshape the European financial system and develop its autonomy. The euro area can already build on strong assets: an effective monetary Eurosystem, the legal framework for a single financial market and essential components of a Banking Union. However we do not, as yet, have a “financial Eurosystem”, made up of stronger pan-European financial institutions and market infrastructure. Let’s be clear: there will not be a single City for the continent, but rather an integrated polycentric network of financial centres, with specialisations based on areas of expertise.
John C Williams: Attaining and maintaining price stability Remarks by Mr John C Williams, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, at the Money Marketeers of New York University, New York City, 19 April 2023. ***  As prepared for delivery Thank you for that kind introduction. Good evening, everyone. It's great to be here with the Money Marketeers. One of the big issues facing the economy is inflation. Inflation is far too high, and high inflation is hardest on those who can least afford essentials like food, shelter, and transportation. So today, I'm going to talk about the actions the Federal Reserve is taking to restore price stability. I'll also give my views on the economic outlook. But before I go any further, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System. The Dual Mandate For a group like the Money Marketeers, the economic and financial events of the past few months-and even years-have provided a lot to talk about. In fact, the high inflation we see today stems from imbalances between demand and supply that started with the pandemic. A more recent issue has been the stresses that emerged last month in parts of the banking system. Conditions in the banking sector have stabilized, and the banking system is sound and resilient.

I expect real GDP to grow modestly this year as tighter monetary policy continues to take effect, with growth picking up somewhat next year. In addition, we are beginning to see some signs of cooling in the labor market. I expect slow growth will likely lead to some softening, with unemployment gradually rising to about 4 to 4-1/2 percent over the next year. Conclusion In conclusion, inflation is still too high, and we will use our monetary policy tools to restore price stability. I am confident that we will attain and maintain a sufficiently restrictive stance to bring inflation down to our 2 percent longer-run goal. And now, I look forward to our discussion. 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement on Longer-Run Goals  and Monetary Policy Strategy, adopted effective January 24, 2012; as reaffirmed effective January 31, 2023. 2 John C. Williams, A Steady Anchor in a Stormy Sea, remarks at SNB-FRB-BIS High-  Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, Switzerland, November 9, 2022. 3 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Global Supply Chain Pressure Index. 4 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve issues FOMC  statement, March 22, 2023. 3/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  5 Board Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Summary of Economic Projections,  March 22, 2023. 6 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Plans for Reducing the Size of  the Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet, May 4, 2022.
The Federal Council has rejected the initiative without a counterproposal. It maintains that a sovereign money system would be an experiment for which there are no comparable models in other countries, and would carry risks for the Swiss economy. The implementation of the sovereign money idea would entail a complete restructuring of today’s monetary system. This  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  would give rise to great uncertainty, could jeopardise the financial centre and thus damage Switzerland as a whole. The Federal Council also fears that the sovereign money system would harm lending and restrict the SNB’s ability to conduct monetary policy. We share the Federal Council’s concerns. A feeling of disquiet about the existing financial system is not enough reason for a radical overhaul. It is also difficult to predict what impact such an experiment would have on Switzerland as a business location. Moreover, the SNB’s independence would be undermined if we had to distribute new money directly to the state or to private households. The SNB would become a political football and the fulfilment of our mandate would be hampered. Conclusion Let me conclude: the discontinuation of the minimum exchange rate did not plunge Switzerland into recession as many had feared. The economy actually grew slightly in 2015, despite appreciation of the Swiss franc and a hesitant recovery in the international economy. The main reason for this growth is that Swiss companies and employees actively exploited optimisation potential and showed great flexibility.

They are an asset item on our balance sheet and are offset by the increased money supply as a liability item. If we were to make an unrequited transfer of our foreign currency to a sovereign wealth fund, our equity would reduce or even become negative. The sovereign wealth fund or the Confederation would therefore have to buy the foreign currency from us. But where the money would come from for this is not clear. In principle, the Confederation could borrow from the capital markets, though this is unlikely to be feasible due to the debt brake. Or, we could grant the Confederation a loan, but this would be equivalent to state financing via the central bank’s printing press, which is prohibited under the National Bank Act. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  A further problem would arise if, in the future, a reduction in the money supply were to become necessary for monetary policy reasons. The money supply was originally expanded to satisfy the increased demand for francs. However, it is possible that demand may also fall again. If there were to be a sharp decline in demand, the SNB would have to reduce the money supply again in order to keep monetary policy conditions stable. The simplest way would be to buy back Swiss francs, namely by selling foreign exchange reserves. But if the foreign exchange had already been transferred to a sovereign wealth fund, this would no longer be possible.
References Aghion, P., A. Bergeaud, T. Boppart, P. J. Klenow, and H. Li (2019). “A Theory of Falling Growth and Rising Rents  ,” Working Paper Series 2019-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Akcigit, U. and S. T. Ates (2021). “Ten Facts on Declining Business Dynamism and Lessons from Endogenous Growth Theory  ,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 13,  257-98. Auclert, A. and M. Rognlie (2017). "Aggregate Demand and the Top 1 Percent  ," American  Economic Review Papers & Proceedings, 107, 588-92. Auclert, A. and M. Rognlie (2018). “Inequality and Aggregate Demand  ," Working Paper  24280, National Bureau of Economic Research. Autor, D., D. Dorn, L. F. Katz, C. Patterson, and J. Van Reenen (2017). “Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share  ,” American Economic Review, 107, 180–85. Page 18  Bailey, A., A. Cesa-Bianchi, M. Garofalo, R. Harrison, N. McLaren, S. Piton, and R. Sajedi (2022). “Structural Change, Global R* and the Missing-Investment Puzzle,” Supporting paper for a speech by Andrew Bailey, Bank of England, July 2022. Bank of England (2018). “Inflation Report," August 2018. Bank of England (2021). “Monetary Policy Report," November 2021. Bernanke, B.S.,M.T. Kiley and J.M. Roberts (2019). "Monetary Policy Strategies for a LowRate Environment  ," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association,109,  421-426. Blanchard, O. (2022). Fiscal Policy Under Low Interest Rates  . MIT Press, 0 edition. Broadbent, B. (2016). “Uncertain times," Speech by Ben Broadbent at the Wall Street Journal, The News Building, London.

But while risk-free rates have been falling globally in recent decades, measures of the rate of return on productive capital across high-income economies have not. [16] As the return on capital has remained stable, as shown in Chart 4, while the safe rate and cost of funding has declined, a wedge has opened up between the return on firms’ investment and the cost of financing it. [17]  Chart 4: Realised real return on capital has been relatively stable  Note: High-income countries include Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. See Appendix A.2 to Bailey et al. (2022) for data definitions. Source: Authors' calculations using EU KLEMS, the Penn World Table 10.0 and the Jordà et al. (2017) Macrohistory Database. See Appendix A.1 to Bailey et al. (2022) for more details. Chart 5 plots the wedge between the return on capital and risk-free rates for a broad group of high-income economies since 1990. [18] If the return on capital had comoved with the risk-free rate, the wedge would have been stable over time. However, the wedge has increased in most countries, as shown by the blue swathe. The median increase of around 5 percentage points is broadly similar to the rise in the wedge in the United Kingdom (shown in orange). Page 10  Chart 5: Wedge between the return on capital and risk-free rates has risen  Note: High-income countries include Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Bruno Gehrig: Review of the Swiss economy: end-of-year media news conference Introductory remarks by Prof Dr Bruno Gehrig, President of the Swiss National Bank, at the End-of-year Media News Conference, Zurich, 7 December 2001. *  *  *  Financial markets characterised by economic slowdown Development on the financial markets during the current year was characterised by a surprisingly significant weakening of the economy affecting all the major economic regions around the world. The slowdown was most pronounced in the US, but Europe is experiencing a considerable setback in growth as well. Inflationary pressure, already weak, thus eased further. The central banks took advantage of the rapidly increasing flexibility and lowered their key rates, in some cases down to historical lows. Up until the middle of the year, the prevalent opinion in the financial markets was that - buoyed by the Fed's marked interest rate cuts - the US economy, along with the global economy, would stage a fairly swift recovery from the deterioration in the technology sector and the associated weak investment activity. For this reason, the second quarter was characterised by a recovery on most stock markets, increasing bond yields and a US dollar defying gravity. By mid-year it became clear that the cyclical decline was likely to be more serious and to last longer. This reversal of opinion led to investors gradually becoming more risk averse. Equities portfolios were regrouped and invested in the money market and in bonds.

Growing pessimistic sentiment vis-à-vis the economy led to lower capital market yields, declining stock valuations and a weaker US dollar. The general pattern of activities on the financial markets was and still is characterised by a marked parallelism in price fluctuations. On the one hand, this is a reflection of the synchronisation of the current and expected economic development which has been apparent for several quarters and which in turn leads to parallel monetary policy reactions. On the other hand, the widespread globalisation of capital market processes has considerably intensified - at the expense of country-specific differentiations - the impact of the valuation factors effective worldwide. The shock of 11 September The attack of 11 September hit the world economy and the financial markets in a state of instability. It did not trigger any new trends, but magnified developments which were already under way. Business and consumer confidence suffered a severe blow, which further dimmed economic prospects in the US and in Europe. The sudden increase in risk aversion led to drastic corrections on all major stock exchanges and to a veritable flight into the Swiss franc. The record highs the Swiss franc reached on 21 September went in tandem with the stock markets hitting record lows. In response to the rapid and marked appreciation of the Swiss franc, we cut interest rates in an extraordinary move on 24 September. Following this step, and in the course of a broader normalisation of the financial markets, the euro rebounded somewhat vis-à-vis the Swiss franc.
Thus, the current size and composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet actually create strong incentives to adjust policy in a timely way. A far more important threat to central bank independence than the use of unconventional monetary policy is whether the fiscal authorities act in a manner consistent with the central bank’s objectives. As recent history has shown, central banks may not be able to achieve their objectives when an inconsistent fiscal regime is in place. That is, monetary and fiscal authorities need to share the same objectives. When the objectives differ, fiscal dominance  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  can become a major problem for the central bank. For example, if the budget trajectory were clearly unsustainable, then monetary policy may no longer be able to credibly act in a way that keeps inflation expectations in check. But I don’t think the issue of fiscal dominance is linked back to whether the central bank pursues unconventional monetary policies or not. At the end of the day, I think that the best way to maintain independence is for central bankers to use all their available monetary policy tools, including unconventional monetary policy tools when needed, to best achieve their objectives. The historical record is clear: Central bank independence tends to lead to better monetary policy outcomes. But, the causality also runs in reverse: Good monetary policy outcomes help ensure monetary policy independence. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Ravi Menon: Singapore FinTech journey 2.0 Remarks by Mr Ravi Menon, Managing Director of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, at the Singapore FinTech Festival, Singapore, 14 November 2017. * * * Ladies and gentlemen, good morning and welcome to the second edition of the Singapore FinTech Festival. This is the largest gathering of the global FinTech community anywhere in the world. We have more than 25,000 participants from across 100 countries. “The Future is Already Here” The world is becoming more digital. Especially here in Asia. According to Bain & Company, in the past year alone, the number of online-engaged consumers in South East Asia has surged by 50% to 200 million people. And FinTech – or the application of technology to financial services – has been at the forefront of this digital renaissance. According to Ernst & Young, FinTech has already achieved initial mass adoption and is now poised for mainstream adoption. 1 in 3 digitally active users globally already consider themselves regular users of FinTech services. In China that figure is nearly 70%. Singapore’s FinTech journey is set against this emerging digital future. It is also part of Singapore’s broader Smart Nation agenda, to harness the power of technology to support better living, increase productivity, and create new jobs. A Smart Nation needs a Smart Financial Centre. Globally, the financial industry is facing slower economic growth, tighter regulation, and keener competition. It needs to foster innovation and transform itself.
It is thus no exaggeration to say that those present at a similar dinner six years ago felt quite optimistic about the prospects for the European economy, within Monetary Union, although the Union had only just taken its very first steps and euro banknotes and coins had not even begun to circulate. We now have the benefit of the experience built up in the intervening period. The euro has meant tangible benefits in terms of savings on transaction costs for citizens, eliminating exchange rate risks within the area, facilitating market integration and it has provided an environment of economic and monetary stability. The ECB has attained high credibility in a short period of time which is undoubtedly a result of the clarity of its objectives, the effectiveness of its strategy and the soundness of its decisions. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the European economy has not managed to repeat growth figures close to those seen in 2000. It has been prone to bouts of notable sluggishness, highlighting - in addition to the effect of an unusual series of adverse shocks - the structural shortcomings holding back activity and employment. We have therefore seen that, despite the favourable effects a monetary policy unequivocally geared to price stability has on economic prosperity, the full effectiveness of its contribution requires an ambitious reform agenda in other economic policy spheres.

It is not even self-evident that inflation will return to the target level in the long run if monetary policy is too tight. If we are worried that a long period with a low repo rate will give rise to an unjustified upturn in housing prices and indebtedness, we should perhaps ensure we conduct a monetary policy that means we quickly move towards the inflation target, and that still works even if  8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  economic developments are less favourable than forecast in our main scenario. Such a monetary policy could entail cutting the repo rate now to increase inflation and then raising the repo rate slightly faster in the coming period when inflation accelerates (see Figure 7). Admittedly, preliminary assessments within the Riksbank, based on model calculations combined with empirical relationships, indicate that a large repo-rate cut now, followed by faster increases in the future would entail slightly higher risks linked to household indebtedness than if the repo-rate path advocated by the majority is followed. However, the difference in the risk outlook for these two alternatives is almost negligible.
In the EU we have about 5.3 scientists and researchers per 1000 workers, which compares to the US figure of 9 per 1000. 17 In addition, ICT investment, which is an indicator of the diffusion of innovation, represented 6% of GDP in the US over the period 2000-2004 compared to only 3% in the euro area. ICT diffusion appears to be particularly relevant in the services sector given the higher potential for employment creation in that sector combined with the evidence that there is no apparent trade-off in the medium term between labour productivity and employment growth at the level of the sector as a whole. As a result, the key issue for the larger euro area countries is how to increase their future capacity to promote the diffusion of innovation and, in particular, technological changes in the service sectors, a field in which the Nordic EU countries have performed particularly well 18 . The state of structural reforms If euro area countries would now summon up their strength and ambitiously push forward with structural reform, this will support and broaden the improvement in economic activity in the euro area. This is why the ECB has always encouraged the implementation of structural reform within the Lisbon strategy. Five years later, progress has been made in some areas - as also indicated by an increase in the euro area employment rate. Still, all in all the reforms have not been far-reaching enough 19 .

Banking union should now be completed following the finalisation of the 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Comprehensive Assessment and the SSM taking on supervisory responsibility. This means in particular completing the SRM, enhancing the borrowing capacity of the Single Resolution Fund and thereby delivering on the commitment to establish a credible backstop. Moreover, looking forward, a greater integration of financial markets – also referred to as a Capital Markets Union (CMU) – would be warranted to further reduce fragmentation of financial markets, improve funding to SMEs, enhance the transmission of the ECB’s monetary policy, and overall benefit economic growth. We look forward to the detailed elements that the Commission will announce in the course of 2015 and I have no doubt that the European Parliament as co-legislator will again play a decisive role in this regard. The collateral framework of the Eurosystem Let me now say a few words on the second topic you have chosen, our collateral framework. Since the very beginning, the Eurosystem collateral framework had been designed to achieve two goals at the same time: First to protect the Eurosystem from incurring losses, as it is explicitly required by the Statute of the ECB/ESCB; second to ensure that Eurosystem credit operations can be carried out smoothly by making sufficient collateral available. The past and recent experience has shown that such a dual set-up of the Eurosystem collateral framework has been indeed very effective. So far, the Eurosystem has never had to recognise a loss stemming from the Eurosystem credit operations.