samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Similarly, a comprehensive review of the Spanish tax system is needed to ensure that the different taxes meet their goals in the most efficient and effective manner possible. A comparison between the Spanish tax structure and the European average reveals a smaller proportion of indirect tax revenue in Spain, with lower effective taxation on consumption  18  On average, in the period 2015-2019, public expenditure on education and public investment in Spain stood at 4% and 2.9% of GDP, respectively, 0.9 pp and 1.5 pp less than in the EU. 19  and a significant revenue gap in terms of green taxation. The White Paper for the Reform of the Tax System, published in March, presents a diagnosis of the Spanish tax system. The demographic trends that are expected over the coming years, particularly the spike in the dependency ratio,19 will place the pension system under considerable pressure. The reforms approved in 2011 and 2013 significantly enhanced the financial sustainability of the pension system in the medium term. However, should the pension system’s revenue not increase, the adjustment would be made chiefly by reducing the benefit rate.20 The first part of a new pension system reform was approved towards the end of last year. Among other measures, this reform indexed pensions to inflation and removed the sustainability factor. According to AIReF projections and the European Commission’s Ageing Report, the two measures mean that pension expenditure will grow by between 4.1 pp and 4.3 pp of GDP in the period 2019 to 2050.

There is also a very high degree of complementarity between the financing of investment projects, such as those envisaged in the NGEU programme, and the implementation of structural reforms. In particular, according to Banco de España estimates, if a careful 18  selection of NGEU projects were accompanied by various structural reforms to ease the rigidities in the product and labour markets, the potential growth rate of the Spanish economy could reach around 2% by the end of that decade, nearly 1 pp higher than at present. (vi) The fiscal consolidation challenge Maintaining high levels of government debt over time is a source of vulnerability and leaves less fiscal space in the event of adverse macro-financial shocks. In the coming years, public indebtedness will remain very close to or even exceed current levels, unless an ambitious fiscal adjustment plan is implemented. Specifically, various simulations indicate that if no fiscal adjustment is made in Spain in the coming years, the pressure exerted by population ageing on public expenditure will drive up the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Conversely, under an alternative scenario in which a consolidation effort is made – one consistent with maintaining the structural primary balance envisaged in the Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic projections for 2024 –, the government debt ratio will stand at levels close to 120% of GDP in the coming decades.
By early 2016 mortgage debt to income ratio had dropped to 97%. It remained around that level until Covid, due in large part to house prices growing more in line with earnings. I should make clear here that London – and to a lesser extent the South and East – was very much an outlier during this period (Chart 1). For example, in London, house prices increased by 35% and the house price-toearnings ratio rose by 200 percentage points. The market in London was probably driven by the sheer weight of demand given employment patterns. But investor flows – including from abroad – and migration may have also played a role. Nationally, however, the picture over this period is of a less active market more in line with economic growth and with households staying longer between house moves. A simple thought experiment illustrates the unusual and quiet nature of the market for the UK as a whole over this period. In Chart 2, the blue line shows the flow of new mortgage borrowing since 2000. After rising through the first half of the decade, new lending drops of dramatically during the financial crisis. The red line shows what the flow of borrowing would have looked like, if, taking house prices at their outturn levels, mortgage transactions had levelled off at their financial crisis peak rather than falling back.

Chart 1: House price: earnings  Chart 2: Flow of new mortgage borrowing  House price to earnings ratio Whole UK South and East London  Quarterly mortgage lending £  14  80000  12  70000  10 8  60000  Value of new lending if transactions remained at pre-crisis levels  50000 40000  6 4  97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17 19  30000 20000  2  10000  0  0  Value of new mortgage lending  99 00 01 03 04 05 07 08 09 11 12 13 15 16 17 19 Quarterly value of new mortgage transactions, excluding pure remortgaging. Counterfactual assumes that the number of mortgage approvals remains at its pre-crisis peak, while house prices and LTVs follow the realised out-turn. This exercise therefore doesn’t take into account potential feedback from transactions to house prices. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches and @BoE_PressOffice  4  What lay behind this relatively “quiet” decade for the UK housing market? Housing is a very complex market with multiple drivers on both the supply and the demand side. There is a great deal of debate in the academic literature about the drivers of house prices and the role played by credit conditions. These provide a number of lenses through which to look at the UK housing market over this period. Housing supply is for obvious reasons an in-elastic market in most countries.
In embracing new leading edge technology, the potential for the Islamic financial industry to provide new products and services will be enhanced. It also represents the potential to increase access through a wider range of new delivery channels, including enhancing efficiency while reducing costs for consumers and businesses. IT needs to be leveraged on in making strategic decisions in the alignment of the business, in elevating the institutional capacity and operational efficiency and strengthening risk management capabilities. Despite the more challenging and dynamic environment we have seen, Islamic finance has continued to emerge as a vibrant and resilient form of financial intermediation that is increasingly being embraced on a global scale to become an integral part of the international financial system. In the process of its development, it has further expanded the set of opportunities for the participation by the international financial community and thus increases the inter-linkages both within and between economic regions of the world. In enhancing these new linkages and greater integration, Islamic finance is envisaged to contribute towards unlocking new potentials that would bring mutual benefits, and in doing so, enhance our overall prospects. Thank you. BIS Review 121/2007  5

It is therefore very welcome that labour market reforms have recently been implemented in several countries where rigidities were considered to be particularly onerous, such as Spain[20], Italy, Portugal and Greece, and here in Germany too, some years ago. France is still lagging behind and although a labour market reform is now being discussed, whether it is sufficiently ambitious to significantly lower the equilibrium unemployment rate remains to be seen. Although increased flexibility in labour markets will produce a better outcome in the medium term, some reforms may create losers in the short term[21]. It is only natural that such reforms are opposed by those fearing short-term personal losses, even when the reforms are eventually beneficial for society as a whole. We should take such concerns seriously. There are policies, however, that can help to mitigate or compensate for the negative short-term effects. First, labour market reforms should be sequenced carefully, in such a way that a negative short-term effect on employment is ideally felt only when the recovery is gaining momentum. This could in practice mean that employment protection is liberalised only when reforms to increase nominal wage flexibility have been carried out. This can have a quick effect on reducing unemployment even shortly after its implementation[22]. Second, active labour market policies can help to reallocate workers across sectors of the economy while an adjustment is taking place. Third, expansionary fiscal and monetary policy can also dampen the negative short-term impact of labour market reforms.
Jarle Bergo: The economic outlook Address by Mr Jarle Bergo, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), to invited foreign embassy representatives, Norges Bank, Oslo, 31 March 2005. The address is based on the assessments presented at Norges Bank’s press conference following the Executive Board’s monetary policy meeting on 16 March and on previous speeches. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation. The references and the Charts in pdf-format  can also be found on the website of the Norges Bank. *  *  *  Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to thank you for taking the time to attend this event. It provides me with an opportunity to present Norges Bank’s view of the economic outlook. This year marks the centennial of the dissolution of the union between Norway and Sweden. Historically, an important part of nation-building has been the establishment of a monetary system and a central bank. In Norway, the stage was set for the introduction of a national currency in autumn 1814. With the prospect of a union with Sweden, a clause was included in the Constitution saying that Norway would maintain its own bank and its own monetary system. The monetary unit was the specie daler. In 1875, the Storting (Norwegian parliament) decided to join the currency union that Denmark and Sweden had established two years earlier. The specie daler was then replaced by the krone.

For these reasons alone,  BIS Review 21/2005  3  the use of petroleum revenues may in periods deviate from the 4 per cent rule. Spending was also increased in response to the economic downturn. We can therefore safely affirm that the fiscal rule has been normative for fiscal policy. At the time of the introduction of the fiscal rule in 2001 projections pointed to a continued increase in the use of petroleum revenues. We had to expect this growth in spending to lead to weaker competitiveness in Norwegian manufacturing, either through higher wages or an appreciation of the krone. With wage growth in Norway higher than abroad, the competitive position of Norway’s manufacturing industry has weakened by about 15 per cent since the mid-1990s. Competitiveness is about 4 per cent weaker than the average for the past 30 years. The krone has been influenced by high oil and gas prices and prices for other Norwegian export goods. Monetary policy has also influenced the path for Norway’s relative costs, but the nominal value of the krone is about the same as 10 years ago. Strong growth in public spending and expectations of moderately higher growth in the use of petroleum revenues now seem to have been factored into the cost level. Over the past 30 years manufacturing has been scaled back in waves. The last wave occurred around the turn of the millennium, but a substantial decline also occurred in the period 1977 to 1984 and from 1987 to 1992.
Meanwhile, the positive contribution of the increased net exports as a result of the reduced demand for imports partially limited the slowdown of growth in 2009. BIS Review 68/2010  GDP Growth Rates GDP Growth Rates  Gross Domestic Product  (Annual Percentage Change)  (Seasonally Adjusted)  10  27  5  24 0  -5  21 -10  18  -15 1  2  3  4  1  2  2006  3  4  1  2  2007  3  4  1  2008  2  3  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 12 3 4 1 2 3 4  4  2009  2003  Source: TURKSTAT. 2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Source: TURKSTAT, CBRT. 17. The transformation that the Turkish economy has undergone in the post-2001 period has caused major changes in the employment structure. The share of the agricultural sector in employment was 35 percent in 2002, while, this ratio fell to around 23 percent in 2007. However, with the recent economic slowdown, this trend reversed temporarily and the share of agricultural sector in employment increased to approximately 25 percent in 2009. 18. While global turmoil took a heavy toll on industrial employment, it had a scant impact on employment in construction and services sectors.

Durmuş Yilmaz: Recent economic and financial developments in Turkey Opening speech by Mr Durmuş Yilmaz, Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, at the 78th Ordinary Meeting of the General Assembly, Ankara, 20 April 2010. *  *  *  I. Introduction  1. Esteemed Shareholders, Distinguished Guests and Members of the Press, Welcome to the 78th Ordinary Meeting of the General Assembly of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. 2. I would like to start my speech with a brief evaluation of the global financial crisis that deepened to spread over the whole world in the final quarter of 2008 and took its toll throughout 2009. Later on, I will summarize the key macroeconomic developments that took place in Turkey in 2009. Finally, I will share my evaluations pertaining to inflation developments and monetary policy implementations. II. Global economic developments  Distinguished Guests, 3. The effects of the financial crisis, which first started in advanced countries and deepened mainly due to the bankruptcy of some major financial firms in the USA in September 2008, continued to dominate financial markets throughout 2009. Accordingly, growth rates slumped globally but particularly in advanced countries. Owing to extensive liquidity operations led by central banks and large-scale government interventions, the effects of the crisis started to subside as of the second half of 2009 and the global economy exhibited signs of a slow and gradual recovery. 4.
This will make it possible to make instant payments 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and is expected to be ready at the end of 2018. It will also be prepared to be able to handle other currencies than the euro. One alternative could therefore be for 21 See “Payment patterns in Sweden” at www.riksbank.se/sv/statistik/betalningar-sedlar-och-mynt/betalningsstatistik/. 22 Swedish Retail and Wholesale Council (2018). “När slutar svenska handlare ta emot kontanter?” (When will Swedish traders stop accepting cash?) Research report 2018:1 http://handelsradet.se/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Sammanfattning-2018_12.pdf. 23 Cash payments are instant: When the seller has received the payment in the form of cash, the payment is settled. If cash is unavailable, a need arises for the rapid transfer of money between different participants in other ways. Swish is an example of such a solution. 24 Companies combining financial services with software technology. 25 Retail payments are payments of lower value and between private individuals, companies and authorities. A distinction is made in retail payments between cash payments and payments in the form of account transfers. 26 Sveriges Riksbank “The Swedish retail payment market”. Riksbank Studies, June 2013. 9 [15]  the Riksbank to open a central bank account in Swedish kronor in the European system for instant payments. The ECB’s menu of systems for creating a single market for payments will mean that economies of scale can be utilised even more and is thus basically a positive development. There are also plans among some Nordic banks to create a pan-Nordic payment infrastructure with joint products.

But interest in this market at the retail level has been slow to develop. The paper is predominantly held by banks for liquidity purposes and a small part is held by institutional investors. There are a number of reasons behind this lack of retailer interest. First, at least until recently, the real interest rate has been low and sometimes negative, and so the yield of Exchange Fund paper has not been attractive. Second, as issuer, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority does not have the capacity to market the paper at the retail level. And, quite understandably, the banks who are recognised dealers and market makers are not keen to market the product for us in view of the possible impact on their deposit base. Third, there is no convenient market infrastructure, in terms of both market information and mechanisms for participation, through which retail investors can access that market. 1  BIS Review 84/1999  They may be other reasons. But to the extent that these three reasons are significant, our plan here to list the longer term paper, what we call the Exchange Fund Notes, on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and have trades settled through the established securities clearing system of CCASS, at a time when there is a significant positive real interest rate, should effectively address them. According to this plan, Exchange Fund Notes will be listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 16 August 1999.
Future demand growth has been judged to exceed what the economy can cope with in the long term without generating higher inflation. To date, however, price trends - not least in the domestic economy - have been lower than we had expected, even though our forecasts were below those of most other observers. One recent event is the notable fall in share prices. To date, however, this seems to be more of a desirable normalisation than a fall that endangers economic activity. There are also more and more indications that the recent strong growth of production and employment is tending to slacken. To date, however, that has been broadly in line with our earlier assessment. Finally, there is the rather mixed information about the ongoing wage negotiations. This year’s wage outcome is, if anything, somewhat lower than expected. At the same time, it looks as though several of the demands that have been presented are a little bit high in relation to the inflation target, particularly considering the risk of future wage drift in an increasingly strong labour market. These are matters we will be deliberating in the Riksbank in the run up to the next Inflation Report and monetary policy meeting in December.

As both a user and a partner, we can affirm that the quality of the Office’s statistical output has increased immensely over the transformation period. Examples include the publication of national accounts according to international standards and the compilation of data on the government debt and deficit. The Czech National Bank focuses mainly on monetary and banking statistics and balance of payments statistics. The harmonisation of the monetary statistics with European standards was recently completed in both main components balance sheet statistics and interest rate statistics. Monetary and credit aggregates and interest rates are now methodologically comparable with the data of other EU Member States. Speaking of harmonisation, I must mention the calculation of another convergence criterion - long-term interest rates. This calculation is based on long-term government bond yields on the secondary market. The Czech National Bank thus provides the statistical foundation for assessing this criterion. International standards such as the IMF’s 5th Balance of Payments Manual are also observed when compiling the balance of payments. The balance of payments is now published every month and the required items are also broken down geographically. In recent years, much attention has been devoted to the category of foreign direct investment, where the data are published in very detailed geographical and sectoral breakdowns. The balance of payments is perhaps the best example of co-operation between the Czech Statistical Office and the Czech National Bank.
And third, globalisation leads to imbalances of democracy and sovereignty, leading many to lament a loss of control and to lose trust in the system. As Dani Rodrik has argued, there is a trilemma between economic integration, democracy and sovereignty. 26 Common rules and standards are required for trade in goods, services and capital, but those rules cede or, at best pool, sovereignty. To maintain legitimacy, the process of agreeing those standards needs to be rooted in democratic accountability. Much will be required to create a more inclusive, sustainable globalisation but part of the solution is a more flexible and open trading system for services and for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Freer trade in services can help to resolve external imbalances.27 With barriers to services trade currently up to three times higher than those for goods, the Bank estimates that eliminating this differential could reduce the excess deficits of the US by up to one third and of the UK by up to one half. Freer trade for SMEs and services would spread the benefits of global markets much more widely than traditional, more multinational-based free trade in goods. SMEs employ 60% of workers. More women work in services than men. The digital revolution28 could help to ensure trade is available to the smallest companies as well as the largest. And freer trade in services could help rebalance the trilemma from prescriptive supranational rules to more differentiated, national approaches to achieve common outcomes. The post-crisis reforms of financial services offer a model.

Ongoing financial sector reform will also build financial sector resiliency. Thailand’s financial master plan, now in its second phase, continues, and focuses on liberalization through increased competition, raising efficiency, and strengthening the financial infrastructure. On the third issue, global current account imbalances remain problematic, as they did before the global crisis. As long as structural problems remain in the US and Euro economies and China retains its present economic policies, it is likely global imbalances will persist into the medium term with the risk of a disruptive correction down the road. Such a correction may be particularly painful for small open economies. Firmer policy coordination between large economies is needed to ensure a smooth resolution of global imbalances. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am close to the conclusion of my talk today. I have given you my assessment of the global economy, my thoughts on our policy options going forward, and how monetary policy should be poised, pre-emptive and perceptive. One theme I emphasized today was the global environment of fluid capital and its attendant risks. As a point of departure, let me address how you, as the investor, can thrive in such a world of risk while investing in Thailand. There is no easy answer. Different investment strategies face different risks. Investors themselves are the most qualified for evaluating and managing their own risk exposures given their investment opportunities.