samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In this sense, I am convinced that in order to deliver a successful roadmap for the potential issuance of a digital euro, we must establish a certain set of priorities upfront. Allow me to be a bit more precise in this respect. To start with, I believe we should deepen the current standing of our work. This means not just promoting a wide-ranging exchange of views within the Eurosystem and with other European authorities and institutions, but also engaging other relevant stakeholders in our discussions, including the private sector and academia. In my view, it is this active dialogue that will help us understand the full range of implications of a CBDC and the minimum requirements that a euro-denominated CBDC should meet. Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, I believe we need to place a strong emphasis on developing a rigorous experimentation agenda that will help us make informed policy decisions about the different design options. This entails identifying the key questions that remain open and need to be further analysed by means of hands-on experience, and formulating the corresponding concrete testing proposals. And we must bear in mind that private agents could be instrumental for the ultimate success of this exercise, so it is important that we make sure to count them in early on. Lastly, international cooperation with other central banks needs to remain high on the agenda, to identify best practice, avoid unnecessary fragmentation and help achieve  2  According to Boar et al.

2  This certainly requires a strong commitment from us, placing a special emphasis on drawing conclusions based on sound research and analysis. In addition, and also importantly, it calls for our proactive engagement in a practical experimentation phase that can shed light on the nature and scale of the pain points, problems and underlying threats, and also on potential solutions. That is why while the issuance of a digital euro is not foreseen in the immediate future, the Eurosystem has a keen interest to tackle the challenges arising from possible future scenarios. As you may know, many other central banks2 are already analysing this possibility. Along these lines, you may have already heard about the tests that the People’s Bank of China is currently carrying out in a number of provinces, or the extensive work that preceded the well-publicised e-krona pilot in Sweden. You may also be aware of the Fed’s recent announcement of its intention to remain on the frontier of research and policy development regarding CBDCs.3. As ECB President Lagarde mentioned a few weeks ago,4 earlier this year the Eurosystem decided to set up a taskforce to explore the benefits, risks and operational challenges of introducing a digital euro. The results of this work will soon be shared publicly. However, this is only the first step in a more profound reflection that still has to take place.
It is because the play raises questions of a more enduring nature. Perhaps we have to recognise that the closest we can get to eternal truths is, precisely, eternal questions? 26  The quotation continues: But truths as aged as that are always worn frightfully thin, and nevertheless it is only then that the majority recognises them and recommends them to the community as wholesome moral nourishment. There is no great nutritive value in that sort of fare, I can assure you; and, as a doctor, I ought to know. These “majority truths” are like last year’s cured meat – like rancid, tainted ham; and they are the origin of the moral scurvy that is rampant in our communities. BIS central bankers’ speeches  11

No liquidity indicator was specified, but the introduction of such a minimum standard as of 2015 was agreed upon. Regardless, the Chilean regulatory framework for bank liquidity considers quantitative limits on maturity mismatches over 30- and 90-day periods in local and foreign currencies, which should provide a reasonable starting point for the application of further BIS requirements in the medium term. Despite a promising start, it is clear that there are still many aspects in which reform is still needed. Addressing the risks posed by systemically important institutions is one such area. It seems clear at this stage that systemic institutions should be subject to stricter supervision and regulation. Moreover, there is a lot of recent work on determining which institutions are truly “systemic.” 5 What I miss, however, is more discussion on regulation that directly limits the size of institutions. In Chile, for example, after a severe financial crisis in 1983 with close to 15% fall in output, a strong banking law was enacted, which has been improved over the years. There are several legal regulations designed to prevent or reduce the impact of financial distress in large financial institutions. In this field, one of the most important measures considered relates to operations and transactions that may lead a bank to obtain a significant market share. These operations require authorization by the SBIF which may also impose conditions to such authorizations.
M R Pridiyathorn Devakula: FSAP from the Thai banking perspective Statement by Mr M R Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the United Nations Conference Center, Bangkok, 15 October 2004. *  *  *  Distinguished guests and participants, Ladies and Gentlemen, Good morning. It is a great pleasure for me to open this important workshop and give a keynote speech. The objective of today’s event is to introduce the joint IMF-World Bank initiative called the Financial Sector Assessment Programme, otherwise known as FSAP, so that at the end of today we will all have a common and thorough understanding of what FSAP is about, how much work it would require of whom, and what benefits there would be for Thailand to participate in. This is a tall order to be achieved in one short day, but I am sure we can do it because we are fortunate enough to have with us two senior and highly experienced staff from the IMF: Mr Stefan Ingves and Mr. Udaibir Saran Das. On behalf of the Bank of Thailand and all the participants, I would like to thank both of you very much for making the time to be here despite your busy schedule. We are indeed grateful for your assistance. By way of introduction, let me very briefly give you an overview of the FSAP and how it might complement and enhance our ongoing efforts to improve corporate governance and promote safety and soundness of the financial system in Thailand.

We must also remember that our external environment may not always and necessarily be ideal. But we would do well to remember that ours has been and is a resilient economy. We have shown that we can grow even in the face of highly adverse circumstances and scenarios. In that context, we would be wise, if we do not develop our economic plans on the overriding assumption of a totally terrorism free environment. Of course, if the peace process is successful and a early political solution is found to the on-going conflict, it would be highly desirable. But at the same time, if we consciously develop our plans and frameworks on less than perfect conditions, we could still find ways and means to succeed and deliver the planned results. We owe that to our people, who cannot and should not have to wait until everything falls in to place. Therefore, our future strategies should be aimed at moving ahead even in the face of threats of terrorism and other adversities without setting out as a pre-condition, the achievement of a permanent peace or ideal conditions to embark on our development projects and programmes. We are also working today on the basis that all our strategies would be of no avail, if we are not sufficiently committed to achieving those plans. We know we are serious in our efforts. We also have to show we are serious.
Add to this the concerns about the soundness of part of European banks, particularly in Italy and Portugal. And let’s not forget several open electoral processes around the world, whose results could cause a shift towards more protectionist policies. In the emerging world, the overall risk outlook has tended to moderate in the past few months. Accordingly, concerns about China have eased, while the Chinese impulse policies have stabilized the pace of growth. Significant risks remain, however, namely the doubts surrounding the sustainability of these measures over time, as well as about the Chinese financial system and real estate sector, among other factors. Moreover, a scenario in which the Fed’s monetary policy becomes more aggressive may have important negative implications on China. In Latin America, beyond very recent improvements, adjustments to both public and private spending are still needed. Domestically, short-term inflationary risks remain tied to the evolution of the exchange rate and, therefore, to the risks coming from abroad. In any case, inflation expectations two years out have remained near 3%. On the output side, the improved external financial conditions could affect growth more than previously estimated. Meanwhile, business and consumer expectations are still in pessimistic territory, which could hold back the recovery of consumption and investment, triggering a sharper deterioration of the labor market. Having assessed these risks, we estimate that the risk balance is unbiased for both inflation and activity. In a nutshell, inflation has declined as expected, and our forecasts point at a faster convergence to 3% than we thought in June.

Andrew Bailey: The outlook for financial regulation in the UK Speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Executive Director for Banking Services and Chief Cashier of the Bank of England, on a regional visit to Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 10 January 2011. *  *  *  Andrew Bailey will become the deputy chief executive of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) on its creation. Thank you to Linda Urquart for inviting me to speak today and Morton Fraser for allowing us to use your venue. I would also like to thank Will Dowson, the Bank’s Agent for Scotland for the assistance that he has given me, and for the work that he does to ensure that the Bank is well connected to the UK’s most important financial centre after London. Will worked for me when he first joined the Bank as a graduate entrant, and I can assure you, drawing on that experience, Will is an excellent person to ensure that the Bank and you as our contacts in Scotland are well informed and understand the relevant developments that affect each of us, and of course that we in the Bank understand the state of the economy in Scotland and the financial sector here. It is quite right that first and foremost our Agents support the needs of monetary policy and the MPC. The information that they gather from you, their contacts, makes a real difference to the monetary policy process. There is a parallel in our responsibilities for ensuring financial stability.
The ECB does not vote. Where I do agree is that making the presidency of the Eurogroup a permanent position could strengthen the institutional architecture of the euro area. How would the hypothetical independence of Catalonia affect its relationship with the ECB? At the ECB we act according to regulations, and the treaties. We would adhere firmly to the legal provisions and we would not do anything that is not legal. What conditions would need to be met in order to gain a seat at the ECB? Whether this is political fiction or not, I don’t know. But the ECB only acts on the basis of facts, not hypotheses. If the number of countries in the euro area were to increase then we would respect that, but there would be no shortcuts unless they are provided for by the Treaty. The European Commission has launched an investigation into the use of deferred tax assets (DTA) in the banking sector in Spain and various other countries. The ECB was very critical about DTAs when it had to be evaluated during the banking stress tests. There are four countries that resorted to using these measures widely and the legislation that they adopted varies from one country to the next. I believe that we must look at each case separately and in context. Personally I dislike the idea of resorting to attempts to create the impression that a balance sheet’s loss absorption capacity is greater than it is in reality.

Its growth forecasts are among the highest in the EU, but does it serve as an example when levels of unemployment and indebtedness are so high? There are many models: Ireland is one, and Spain too… Employment is a lagging indicator. Moreover, unemployment figures, especially youth unemployment, have already fallen to levels below those at the time that the bank bailout was requested. Indeed, they are above 2008 levels, but I can still recall the levels of 20 years ago, so it’s all relative. They have always been higher than in the rest of the EU, even during the boom years. But I believe the mentality in Spain has changed. The ability to acknowledge the reality and to adapt to it shows that it is a mature democracy. That is the type of mortar we need for a monetary union. Spain feels particularly underrepresented in the EU since you took, in 2012, the rotating seat on the ECB’s Executive Board, which it had occupied since the institution’s creation. Do you think that, given its demographic and economic weight, the situation should be corrected? Passports should play a minor role in European representation, especially in supranational institutions like the ECB. Quotas are inappropriate. When we enter the ECB’s Governing Council meeting room, we leave our passports in the cloakroom. The only conditions laid down by the Treaty are competence and reputation. That’s quite different however in intergovernmental institutions where appointments are the result of allocation. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  De Guindos in the Eurogroup?
However, even if liquidity worked,  4  BIS Review 22/2005  their impact on interest rates and the exchange rate would be broadly the same as raising the policy rate, although the transmission mechanism might be different, and they would affect individual segments of the credit system unevenly. In addition, changing the minimum reserve requirement is not a transparent measure and its impact on expectations is unpredictable. The Central Bank firmly advocates that housing costs should remain part of the reference index for the inflation target, and believes that by and large the best available methodology is being used by Statistics Iceland to evaluate them. This is because housing costs are a major item in household consumption in Iceland, where the level of owneroccupancy is 80%. Excluding changes in housing prices would ignore a large proportion of household expenditures. Experience also shows that housing inflation has the advantage, from the perspective of central banks on an inflation target, of being a leading indicator of general inflation later on. Presumably this is because the housing market is independent from foreign markets. Increased housing demand cannot be channelled out of the economy, unlike various other goods and services, nor is foreign competition present to any significant extent. When demand surges, housing prices often rise sooner and by more than prices of goods and services in general.

We are also monitoring consumers' needs regarding access to funds, including stimulus payments, through traditional deposit accounts, as well as for individuals without a traditional banking relationship who utilize pre-paid cards. Conclusions Taken together, these steps demonstrate the Fed's strong commitment to help the U.S. banking system support the U.S. economy and protect consumers during the COVID-19 pandemic. We are aware, however, that many low- and moderate-income and minority communities remain severely impacted. The regional partnership between the New York Fed and socially responsible providers of capital continues to inform our understanding of the needs for access to credit for these critical small businesses. We will continue to work with you to ensure that the financial system acts as a source of strength to support all segments of the U.S. economy. Thank you. 1Agencies issue revised interagency statement on loan modifications by financial institutions working with customers affected by the coronavirus 2Federal Reserve provides additional information to financial institutions on how its supervisory approach is adjusting in light of the coronavirus 3Agencies announce changes to the community bank leverage ratio 4The Fed has also taken action to support the provision of credit by larger institutions.
In fact, such an EU fund would be better diversified than the national funds are today, which all else equal would enable it to charge lower fees or hold a bigger risk-adjusted buffer. In the event of really large banks or several large banks failing, there could be an established system of committed drawing rights, where the EU fund has the right to raise funds through national governments’ ability to raise tax. Regarding liquidity support, the ECB would be given the role as lender of last resort. To convince national governments to commit such guarantees would of course demand very strict and well thought-out rules governing what actions the EU fund should be allowed to take in the case of a bank failure. These rules could be inspired by the US FDIC’s very strict mandate to always choose the least cost solution. Among other things, this would in some cases mean allowing shareholders as well as uninsured depositors and debt holders to lose their money. Since to my knowledge most EU countries lack the rules on how to handle large bank failures, it would also be very positive from a contingency planning and moral hazard point of view. With a strong legal framework, the EU would be able to let investors in even the biggest banks take full financial responsibility.

According to a study by the ECB, 43 banks and banking groups are active in more than three EU countries.1 Only some years ago, cross-border banking M&A in the EU was only taking place between small countries or vis-à-vis the new member states – Austrian banks’ expansion into some Central European countries is a good example of this phenomenon. Now this is changing. Today French, Spanish, German and UK banks are all trying to build European platforms. For instance, as you all know, Spanish Grupo Santander now owns the fifth biggest UK bank, and Barclays of UK owns the sixth largest private sector bank in Spain. And this spring, we are all witnessing the takeover battles, started by foreign bids, for two Italian banks. …is good news for the economy but raises challenges to supervisors and central banks At the Riksbank, we welcome this development. We believe financial market integration is strongly positive for economic efficiency and hence for growth and welfare in the EU. But we admit that integration presents some complex and multifaceted challenges to us as authorities. At the outset, integration is obviously hindered by differences in language, business culture and national laws and regulations. But once it happens, integration tends to follow the logic of business, not the “logic” of country border or national law. For instance, for financial groups which are expanding cross-border a part of the synergies is derived from centralising functions.
Employment in the services sector, which managed the crisis better, is also expected to continue increasing. Resource utilisation is rising gradually Swedish GDP growth is expected to amount to almost 5 per cent in 2010, before gradually falling back to around 2.5 per cent at the end of the forecast period. But as the fall in 2008 and 2009 was so great, GDP will not return to its pre-crisis level until the beginning of next year (Figure 5). The overall assessment of resource utilisation is that it is still lower than normal, but that it will successively rise towards normal levels during the forecast period. It is natural to assume that the higher resource utilisation will gradually have an impact on inflation. Although CPIF (underlying) inflation will continue to fall slightly over the coming year, partly due to a stronger krona, it will then increase, reaching 2 per cent at the end of 2013 (Figure 6). CPI inflation will be slightly higher, as it is affected more directly by the Riksbank’s interest rate increases via households’ mortgage rates. The assessment we made a couple of weeks ago was that an increase in the repo rate of 0.25 percentage points was justified. We also assumed that we will need to continue raising the repo rate over the coming years to stabilise inflation close to the target and to attain normal resource utilisation. However, we do not believe that the repo rate will need to be raised quite as quickly as we had previously assumed.

In fact, more than 75% of Malaysians find it difficult to raise even RM1,000 of immediate cash for emergencies. The ability to plan for the future and exercise self-control is a crucial life skill that needs to be cultivated and nurtured. In fact, a key predictor of success in life, is to be able to take the longer term perspective. Let’s move on to the issue of debt. Not all debt is bad as any economist would tell you, for borrowing to invest in productive assets or purposes will make one better off in the future. However, when the level of one’s borrowings is too high, it is a cause of concern. Let me illustrate, a significant proportion of youth today are surviving on high borrowings. The statistics are telling, 38% of youths take up personal loans, 47% have expensive credit card borrowings 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  and more than 3,400 borrowers between the ages of 20–30 years have sought out AKPK’s financial assistance in 2017, which would likely mean that the actual numbers facing financial difficulties are higher. To those of you today who are making early forays in the working world, it is our collective hope that you will take all active measures to not be part of those statistics. The future ahead of you is bright and the burden of being weighed down by excessive debt is a hindrance to your development and success.