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This approach alone could also raise competitive equality problems, making it more difficult to ensure a level playing field, one of the key objectives of the Basel Accord. The third option would be a market-driven solution. As I have already said, the Committee has recognised the importance of market discipline in the third pillar of the New Accord. It draws on the power of markets to create strong incentives for banks, incentives to help ensure that banks manage their risks properly and do not hold unrealistically low amounts of capital for their risk. There is a lot of merit in this approach, yet all of us know that markets sometimes behave inefficiently. They can overreact to certain minor events yet still overlook significant indicators of risk in the short run. Likewise, markets are not always able to capture some externalities on their own, such as the interests of the broader public. They sometimes focus on the immediate needs of direct participants rather than those of depositors or customers or they can be too short-sighted in their time horizon. I think the thoughtful comments made by Malcolm D. Knight yesterday about gaps and limitations of market discipline clarify these kinds of issues most constructively. So it is clear that no single one of these three options provides all of the benefits that supervisors seek. We want rules to provide clarity and strong incentives. We want the ability to use discretion to manage diversity, to tailor requirements to the specific businesses of each bank.