samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
It is probably also to the euro’s existence that we owe the Swiss franc’s reduced volatility and its rather controlled weakening, whereas the dollar experienced difficulties. This is a reaction to which we were not accustomed; moreover, it is good news for our economy. While it may be justified by the United States’ huge external deficit, the slide of the greenback has nevertheless exerted an asymmetrical impact: it has hit European exporters hard, but has not affected Asian currencies that have been kept artificially low by massive intervention. The Swiss franc's fall against the single currency has sheltered us somewhat from these upheavals. Guarded optimism for 2004 Our economic forecasts for the current year are marked by cautious optimism. The recovery that began in the third quarter of 2003 is set to continue. The production gap, which measures the difference between actual production and its potential level, is expected first to stabilise and then to gradually narrow. However, this will take time. As usual, the first signs of an economic recovery appeared in the industries geared to exports. Next, capital goods investment began to pick up, driven by the high rate of depreciation in new technologies; there is therefore significant pent-up demand. To a large extent, these investments feed on imports, so  BIS Review 25/2004  1  that the immediate impact on our economy is limited. Moreover, as investment is also gaining steam among our neighbours, our own capital goods industry, with its strong export bias, has improved.

Today, while SMEs are growing in significance in most emerging economies, SMEs remain under-represented in international trade, accounting for only one quarter to one third of manufactured exports and a very small share of foreign direct investment. By comparison, SMEs in the developed economies contribute about 50% of total value added. For SMEs that become increasingly knowledge based and technologically advanced, the opportunities exist to participate in international strategic alliances, to connect into global and regional supply chains, and to be part of a production network. These arrangements will require a transformation of existing business models, management and technological capability, and the innovative capacity of the SMEs. It will need to involve increased access to financial resources, collective research efforts, accelerated product development and wider distribution channels. The ability of SMEs to realise this potential depends critically on providing the necessary infrastructure and enabling environment for SMEs to enhance their capacity and capability to effectively participate and expand in the domestic economy and to venture into the international markets. The financial sector and Government support are an essential part of this enabling environment for SME development. Repositioning of the financial industry to meet the new demands of SMEs Banks are the dominant providers of financial services to SMEs. In the recent period, considerable advances have been made among APEC economies towards strengthening the scope and access to financial services to the SMEs.
In emerging Asia, the acceleration of spending and increased inflationary pressures appreciate the real exchange rate. Eventually, the foreign exchange regime affects the real exchange rate’s behavior only temporarily, and the adjustment arrives sooner or later by other ways, some times at a greater cost. Improved terms of trade Another factor influencing the exchange rate’s behavior has been the improvement of our terms of trade. Along the past ten years, the ratio between the price of our exports and imports, i.e., the terms of trade, has almost doubled. As of the third quarter of 2010, the terms of trade exceeded the average for the last two decades by more than 60%. Underlying this increment are the higher prices of copper, iron, wood pulp and other commodities relative to manufactured goods, partly attenuated by the oil price increases (figure 3). Improved of trade lead to an increase in the real national income – the sum of wages, profits and taxes – faster than the expansion of our productive capacity. To the extent that this higher national income is perceived as permanent by policy-makers and private agents, it stimulates expenditure and puts pressure on the installed capacity, the domestic interest rate and, ultimately, the real exchange rate. 2  In the case of fiscal earnings, for over twenty years our country has implemented a responsible, prudential fiscal policy, generating fiscal surpluses for most of the period.

A decade of inflation targeting The Norwegian economy emerged quickly and fairly painlessly from the recent global economic downturn. Since 2001, economic policy in Norway has been guided by a fiscal rule and a flexible inflation target. With solid government finances based partly on petroleum revenues and firmly anchored inflation expectations, there was room for manoeuvre both in monetary and fiscal policy when the financial crises hit. Inflation in Norway is currently low, but it has been close to target over the past decade. During this period, monetary policy has faced demanding trade-offs, and the application of judgment has been put to a test. We have gradually learned more about the functioning of our economy under an inflation targeting regime. Let me touch upon some of these insights. Fairly soon after we had adopted inflation targeting, we learned how demanding it may be to strike a balance between different monetary policy considerations in a small open economy. When the key policy rate is raised to restrain a pronounced rise in domestic inflation, it may strongly impact the exchange rate, as we experienced in the period 2002–2003. Both the real economy and inflation were affected. Midway through the decade, global inflation rapidly declined. China’s entry into the WTO, and increased imports from Asia to the west led to a persistent fall in import prices. The combination of very low inflation and strong economic growth posed new challenges for monetary policy. Interest rates – both in Norway and abroad – were set at low levels.
In order to deal with this problem, it is important that the new exchanges establish clear rules regarding participation and price quotation as soon as possible in the process of starting their operations. Finally, I would like to say a few words about electronic money. E-money is still very much in its infancy but has the potential to develop. In the euro area, various e-money schemes exist. Although the volume of e-money in circulation currently remains very low in the euro area, the number of devices already in circulation suggests that usage could expand rapidly ("Issues arising from the emergence of electronic money", November 2000 edition of the Monthly Bulletin of the ECB, p.49-60.) In this context, it was important that the regulatory framework was clearly set up at an early stage so as to reduce uncertainty. In my view, this will encourage innovation. I am glad to say that the framework adopted in the European Union has the advantage of ensuring a high measure of security for customers, in particular through providing protection against counterfeiting and money laundering. For monetary policy, there are three main issues arising from the emergence of electronic money. First, it is important that electronic money does not jeopardise the unit of account function of money. In other words, electronic euros stored on a payment card must have the same value irrespective of when and by whom the card was issued. This important principle has been safeguarded in European legislation through the imposition of a redeemability requirement for e-money.

For example, on-line brokers often provide clients with detailed information regarding market conditions and the execution of orders. Greater transparency on the part of brokers reduces the information asymmetry between brokers and customers. As a result, customers may be able to obtain better execution prices, not least because they can more easily see the prices quoted by various brokers. 2  BIS Review 27/2001  Although the electronification of financial markets can bring benefits to customers, some risks are also associated with it. The first type of risk is by nature operational. Advances in information and telecommunications technologies have made it easier than ever before to set up exchanges for financial products, for example on the internet. In the early stages of their development, the new trading systems need to be thoroughly tested so as to ensure maximum security. In particular, it is important for them to be able to withstand turbulent market conditions, including periods of exceptionally high trading activity and market volatility. The second kind of risk arises from the possibility of a disorderly segmentation of financial markets. As new trading systems are developed, the possibility exists that trading activity becomes spread over a number of exchanges. Competition between exchanges is generally beneficial. However, customers may, at least over a transitory period, be faced with some difficulties in accessing the new exchanges. Until the changeover is complete, customers may thus be unable to always obtain the best execution prices.
This was not a given as we were heavily reliant on foreign capital and expertise in the first years of oil activities. But decisions were taken early on in favour of substantial government ownership, high taxation of production profits and skills transfer requirements, which were in many ways in keeping with Norwegian traditions. The roots can be traced back to concession policy and hydropower management, and to the post-war focus on collective solutions. It was also broadly recognised that economic gains from the use of natural resources, economic rent, should be returned to society. The value of the fund is now more than three times annual mainland GDP. The fund has grown bigger than total net household wealth, including housing wealth (Chart 9). This means the fund has an interesting distributional aspect. While the richest decile controls half of household wealth, we all benefit from the fund. 8  NORGES BANK  Chart 9 ... and larger than household wealth. Share of mainland GDP. 350 300  1)  Percent 350  Net household wealth  ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 13 FEBRUARY 2020  300  GPFG value  250  250  200  200  150  150  100  100  50  50  0 1998  2001  2004  2007  2010  2013  2016  0 2019  1) At 30 September 2019. Net household wealth is the sum of net value of household assets from the financial accounts and an estimate of the value of their dwellings.

A core motivation, for the quick actions taken by central banks during this crisis, has been to restore an orderly functioning of money markets. High volatility, high risk premia, impaired interbank and funding markets hurt the normal transmission of monetary impulses. Starting in the summer of 2007, Central Banks were confronted with major and unprecedented tensions. Increasing uncertainty led to liquidity hoarding by financial institutions. Banks severely limited the maturity, the scale and the number of their counterparties, severely affecting the functioning of the interbank market. These interventions were adjusted to the specific structures of the financial system in which central banks operate. In the US, where financial intermediation is heavily dependent on securitized credit markets, this involved significant asset purchases by the Central Bank. By contrast, in the Euro area, where financial intermediation occurs mainly through the banking system, ECB actions were aimed at providing banks with sufficient liquidity through repo operations to secure the flow of credit to the economy. 6. In the Eurosystem, we have entered the crisis with a large set of tools. From the outset, our operational framework was based on a broad list of eligible counterparties and collateral. So, we could adjust rapidly to the shocks in money and credit markets even if the environment in which we had to operate has changed profoundly. 7.
As I mentioned before Parliament scarcely a month ago, these events come at a time when the Spanish economy continues to show considerable buoyancy, with GDP growth in the first half of the year around or slightly above a rate of 4% and employment growth somewhat higher than 3%. This period saw the continuation of the slight moderation in domestic demand first seen in 2006 and of the improvement in the contribution of net external demand to growth, which began that same year, enabling the composition of domestic and external sources of expenditure to be brought more into balance. But the change in composition extended also to domestic demand, where lower relative household spending growth and stronger business investment were observed during the first half of the year. Indeed, the gradual moderation in household consumption initiated some  2  BIS Review 130/2007  quarters ago continued, reflecting a natural adaptation to less generous monetary and financial conditions as a result of the interest rate rise under way since late 2005 and of the weaker wealth effect on consumption due to slower house price rises. However, the buoyancy of employment and its effect on income prospects are helping to smooth the adjustment of consumption to more sustainable levels.

Spain’s net borrowing, although it has continued to increase, is doing so more slowly than in previous years. The changes I have described in GDP composition on the expenditure side have been feeding through to the various productive branches which, as a whole, have remained most robust in the first half of this year. Noteworthy in this respect is the strength of industrial production and the mild slowdown in construction activity. But the most notable feature on the supply side was again the abundance of labour resources, which continue acting to smooth the adjustment of activity to the buoyancy of demand, preventing cost pressures and excessive prices. The growth of consumer prices, spurred by a temporary turnaround in oil prices in the first half of the year, posted a year-onyear rate of 2.2% in August, leaving the differential with the euro area close to its historical low. However, it is very likely that, once the base effect of the energy price falls in the closing months of 2006 has been stripped out, inflation will again rise and that at the end of this year it will reach levels similar to those at end-2006. This is in fact suggested by the HICP growth flash estimate of 2.7% for September. In examining the outlook of the Spanish economy for the coming quarters, it has to be kept in mind that there are still few indicators of the situation since the turbulence erupted on international financial markets.
That requires measures in various areas. In addition to the above-mentioned labour market reforms, human and technological capital improvements must also be made. In this connection, it is essential to improve the quality of the education system, adapting it to the challenges posed by globalisation, technological progress and the automation of tasks. Moreover, the presence of high and persistent profit margins in some sectors advises lowering the potential barriers to competition in such sectors. It would also be worth mitigating the effects of those factors that prevent growth of the most productive firms (chiefly, the regulatory thresholds linked to size). Finally, despite the progress made in recent years, the banking sector continues to face farreaching challenges, largely shared with other European financial systems. Spanish banks must firstly speed up the sale of their non-earning assets. These weigh down not only their profitability, but also their capacity to allocate resources to those economic activities that most contribute to growth. In addition, the reduction in non-earning assets originated before the European single supervisory and resolution mechanisms were established may bring us closer to culminating a Banking Union. Such a Union would then 6/7  allow us to address the need to pool macrofinancial risks within the euro area and to strengthen its governance mechanisms. That would make the European financial system – and therefore the single currency – sounder and more resilient to future financial shocks.

The other investment component, that linked to construction, has undergone a most significant adjustment in the past decade. This means that, in 2018, following several years 4/7  of recovery, this GDP component was still at around 16% of its pre-crisis level. The downscaling of investment in housing entailed a decline in its weight in GDP to levels close to 5% in 2018, in line with Spain’s peers, compared with 12% pre-crisis. The reduction in housing investment activity came about in parallel with a decline in house prices which, despite the growth observed in recent years, remain in real terms some 32% below the nationwide levels observed in 2007, albeit with some cross-regional dispersion. All these developments better position this sector to support economic growth, as indeed has been the case in 2018. The weight of non-residential construction, for its part, has also diminished considerably, largely reflecting the impact of the reduction in public-sector investment spending. Beyond these improvements, as I stated in my introduction the Spanish economy remains prone to certain vulnerabilities and faces significant challenges, which I shall now set out. First, despite the notable above-mentioned reduction in private debt in recent years, on the latest available data for 2018 Q3 the negative net International Investment Position (IIP) of the Spanish economy stood at 81% of GDP, and that of gross external debt at 168% of GDP, levels that are high in relation to other advanced economies and which mark a factor of vulnerability for the economy as a whole.
To address this issue, last week, the Bank of Thailand as well as the Ministry of Finance filed a new 2-part measure, which received the cabinet approval. The first component of that 2-part package was a 250-billion-baht facility to encourage lending to SMEs using credit guarantee schemes. The second component was a 100-billion-baht package orienting towards what we called “asset warehousing”. Under this facility, they can park their assets with the bank and not have to worry about paying any interest or principal payments on Page 3 of 11  that debt. Furthermore, they also have the option to repurchase those assets at a later date at a fair price. The reason we undertook these measures is to provide support for firms that are experiencing excessively high debt burdens but are still viable over the long term. These measures would help, not just to alleviate the debt burden, but also to reduce the likelihood that borrowers are forced to undertake fire sales of assets which would have a negative impact on the economy by causing all asset prices to drop. Another aspect is that most of these measures that have been undertaken are of a very long horizon which is to ensure continued economic recovery. For example, in the previous SMEs loan scheme, loans were extended for 2 years with the credit guarantees component extending for 2 years. This time, however, we are extending the measures to be very long; the loan component is 5 years, and the credit guarantees component is 10 years.

With such technology, they tend to increase the opportunity in creating more values from the traditional services that we have been offering; not just in a higher valueadded way but in a more scalable way, using technology to increase the footprint of the medical tourism and wellness services. The fourth area might seem a bit far-fledged but it is something that has been constraining Thailand’s ability to grow in the way that other countries have grown. That is the  Page 9 of 11  link again between digital work-from-anywhere technology and our stalled or delayed urbanization. Thailand, oddly enough, is a country where level of urbanization, the percentage of population lives in large cities, is extremely low given our level of development. We are here in Bangkok so we might not feel that because here in Bangkok and Eastern Seaboard are all very crowded. However, the urbanization is all here in Bangkok and the second- and thirdlargest cities are all close to Bangkok. In contrast, the pattern of other countries, especially those that have grown quite rapidly, is largely due to the substantial growth of the urban middle class. People are coming to the cities as they want to live the middle-class urban lifestyle. This drives domestic consumption growth in a lot of countries in the region like Indonesia or even for the countries that are more developed compared to Thailand like South Korea and Malaysia.
They should tell people whether we are meeting our commitments to regulate in a way that harnesses the UK’s strengths as a global financial centre, that maintains trust, and that is tailored to UK circumstances. They should also be designed in a way that is consistent with how Parliament has  Page 8  ranked our objectives – they should make it easy to see how we have pursued our new objective properly subject to advancing our primary objectives. For example, we know that the operational effectiveness of the PRA is important for the UK’s success as a global financial centre. That is why we have committed to increasing the frequency with which we report on our efficiency handling regulatory transactions, including authorisations. We will also provide more information on the time taken to determine cases and provide new breakdowns of these metrics by type of firm. [25] Amongst other things, this will help people understand how long it takes to set up a new bank or insurer – which clearly matters for the UK’s competitiveness. Conclusion Let me briefly sum up. Be in no doubt that our new objective will lead to big changes in how we make rules. We have already been working hard developing our ideas about what competitiveness means for the financial services industry and how it is connected to growth. We have a plan for pursuing the new objective. That plan recognizes the hierarchy of our objectives and it is focussed on what we can control.

10  In countries where supervisory competences lie with an institution other than the central bank, a representative of the latter can also attend meetings, although only one vote per country is counted. 11  To prevent conflicts of interest between monetary policy and supervisory powers, the ECB ensures a separation of objectives, decision-making, processes and tasks. This includes strict separation of the Governing Council’s meetings. 12  This procedure does not apply to ECB decisions relating to its general framework, which are adopted by the Governing Council in accordance with the ECB’s standard procedures, following a proposal of the Executive Board. Nor does it apply to macroprudential decisions, which are proposed by the Supervisory Board and may be approved, rejected or amended by the Governing Council. 5  draft decision (which has not yet been the case), it is returned to the Supervisory Board, which will examine the Governing Council’s reasons and submit a new draft decision. To resolve any differences of views expressed in this interaction, the SSM Regulation provides for the creation of a Mediation Panel, on which each Member State has a representative chosen from among the members of the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board. This mediation process is activated at the request of one or more NCAs, when they fail to agree with the rationale for the objection raised by the Governing Council.