samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Another particularly relevant case at the present juncture is Brexit, which may have very significant effects on the UK and EU economies. Depending on the future framework for relations between the EU and the United Kingdom, and whether or not the departure from the EU takes place in an orderly manner, the latest estimates, published by the Bank of England just a few days ago, range from long-term GDP losses for the United Kingdom of around 2% of GDP in the case of an orderly exit and favourable future agreement, to declines of around 10% of GDP if there is no agreement and the exit is disruptive and disorderly. The costs for the EU would be lower, although in the event of a hard Brexit the impact could be significant for those countries with closer trade and financial ties with the United Kingdom, such as Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands. At the same time, the evidence suggests that greater protectionism raises the vulnerability of economies to domestic adverse shocks. This is because international trade allows producers to diversify their business and cope with cyclical fluctuations in domestic demand. This diversification mechanism is even more important in crisis periods, as seen in Spain, where businesses facing severe contractions in domestic demand during the most recessionary phases of the last crisis found an escape valve in the form of exports that enabled them to maintain their activity and limit job losses.

The ECB’s asset reinvestment policy, the guiding principles of which were readjusted yesterday, aims to preserve the monetary stimulus provided by the asset purchase programme through full reinvestment of the assets on the programme’s portfolio as they mature. In short, monetary policy will continue to have tools with which to tackle future economic and financial crises, although these tools naturally have their limitations. Therefore, as the Governing Council of the ECB has been saying in recent years, rather than overemphasising the role of these tools, they need to be complemented by the implementation of structural reforms and fiscal policies to foster growth. Spanish economic policy: progress made and challenges The Spanish economy has been on a growth path since late 2013 and GDP overtook its pre-crisis levels in mid-2017. A number of structural reforms implemented during the recession contributed to this dynamism. On the domestic front, these include labour market reform, the balance-sheet clean-up and restructuring of credit institutions, pension reform and fiscal consolidation. These reforms have undoubtedly helped largely correct some of the Spanish economy’s main imbalances in the pre-crisis period: in particular, high levels of private sector debt, low competitiveness, the excessive current account imbalance and the excessive weight of the real-estate sector. Similarly, economic policy measures have enabled progress to be made on correcting the problems faced by the financial sector during the worst of the recent crisis. Nevertheless, the recovery has also benefited from a series of factors exogenous to domestic economic policy with varying degrees of persistence.
This was visible in private and public consumption, and in investment in construction and other works, with the resulting increase in growth in construction, trade and some services. However, March figures and incoming indicators suggest that the recovery of  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  growth in the remainder of the year will be somewhat slower than expected. This is reflected by several indicators, such as retail sales, imports of consumer goods and business and consumer expectations. Particularly worrisome is the possibility of consumer and business confidence remaining in clearly pessimistic territory, a situation that, if not reversed, will hinder the recovery of growth in the second half of the year (figure 3). The evolution of credit also reflects weak private spending. Annual growth of consumer and commercial loans is still bounded, despite the low interest rates. Job creation in the private sector has also been in line with the economic slowdown. Hiring in the most cycle-sensitive sectors, such as manufacturing and construction, post negative y-oy rates of variation, which however have moderated in recent months. Nevertheless, the stronger increase in employment in agriculture and services, especially some linked to the public sector, has led total employment to grow by about 1% annually. The unemployment rate remains low, because the slower employment growth is matched by also slower growth in the labor force (figure 4). Nominal wages continue to grow strongly, slightly more than 7 percent. The empirical evidence suggests that this owes mainly to the indexation to higher past inflation.

And last but not least, on behalf of the Board, I wish to stress that we will conduct our monetary policy to ensure that inflation stands at 3 percent over the policy horizon, and we insist on the need for every participant in the financial system to thoroughly evaluate their borrowing and lending decisions. In addition, we will continue to contribute with what is our task, i.e., safeguarding the stability of the currency and the normal functioning of internal and external payments, to Chile’s development and welfare. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  7
I do not agree with that conclusion. It seems to me that the problems for the emerging-markets concerned to a large extent depend on the decision of these countries to stabilise their dollar exchange rate or even peg to the dollar. Countries that choose to peg to the dollar will tend to import U.S. expansionary monetary policy into to their own country. This monetary policy may in many cases be too expansionary for the countries concerned, creating an overheated economy with risks for bubbles and other negative consequences. A flexible exchange rate would give the countries the option of conducting an independent monetary policy appropriate for the country in question. If countries nevertheless choose a peg to the dollar, with capital inflows, bubbles, and other negative effects, they are themselves responsible for those effects. More expansionary monetary policy, for instance, in the U.S. in the form of lower long rates due to LSAPs, tends to depreciate the dollar, all else equal. This does not mean that the U.S. is conducting a beggar-thy-neighbour policy that hurts other countries. A weaker currency is a normal consequence of more expansionary monetary policy in an open economy. Other countries can adjust their policy in response. All countries cannot depreciate their currency against each other, but all countries can conduct more expansionary policy if they prefer, using conventional or unconventional policy tools. This will increase real activity and both exports and imports, which in a situation with underutilised world resources is to the benefit of all.

One of the main levers for action is to increase the supply of safe eurodenominated assets. The launch in 2021 of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme will raise EUR 800 billion. Above all, the unified approach to  Page 5 sur 6 financing EU borrowing, which was introduced by the Commission in 2023, means that bonds xii can be issued under the single name of "EU bonds", which has the advantage of avoiding fragmentation and boosting the liquidity of issues. But I believe we need to go further, by aiming to bring together the bond issues of the Commission, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and maybe the European Investment Bank: the total pool would then amount to EUR 1,100 billion. We also need to speed up the implementation of the Capital Markets Union (CMU), which is crucial for ensuring a better allocation of capital within the euro area: this internal integration priority also serves the euro's external role. These first, realistic steps are the only advances within our reach at this stage. They should not divert our attention from the "creative frontier" xiii that a truly multilateral financial system would represent. The ultimate goal remains to lead the IMF to become a more universal, accessible and agile lender of last resort. This would require adjusting the IMF's role and financial capacity in the global financial safety net, to better reflect the new global economic balances and prevent some under-represented countries from taking or pursuing more unilateral routes.
Increased competition means that companies have to use their resources more effectively and be more cost-conscious. Growth and productivity will therefore increase. Lasting effects on productivity growth could affect the potential growth rate, i.e. how quickly the economy can grow given the amount of labour and capital available and without a rapid rise in 3 inflation. However, this type of development is not without problems. If there is a series of improvements in productivity, the result will be higher growth and limited pressure on prices. During such periods there may be slightly exaggerated optimism over long-term sustainable growth in profits and income, which will also tend to affect prices of various assets, such as shares, houses and apartments. If the central bank makes the mistake of conducting an overly mild monetary policy during such a period, perhaps because inflation is below the target level for a period of several years, there is a risk that the underlying price pressure will increase and future inflation will soar. The relationship between potential growth and competition is not unambiguous. It may be the case that a new invention gives rise to a temporary monopoly – partly due to legislation regarding patents and partly because it involves technological progress. Some economists, and in particular Joseph Schumpeter, have even claimed that the endeavour to achieve these temporary innovation monopolies is one of the most important driving forces behind technological developments (which together with labour supply comprise the motor for long-term potential growth).

However, first one must remember that changes in the repo rate have an effect one to two years ahead. Secondly, there is no antagonism between growth and price stability in the long term; it is potential growth that sets the limits for how fast the economy can grow. Stable prices actually create the best conditions for sustainable growth. The Riksbank cannot affect potential growth. Other operators can do this - trade and industry primarily through investments and the government and parliament, which decide over the regulatory system, education and the infrastructure, etc. This is probably the most important contribution to both good growth and stable prices. Thank you! 8  BIS Review 25/2002
The SNB is now reaping the benefits of having continuously increased its allocation to provisions in previous years. This gave it the room for manoeuvre it needed for measures in times of crisis. The higher allocation to provisions decided on recently has further strengthened the SNB’s capital base. The SNB has sufficient equity capital to withstand even large losses. In the long term, a large part of the liquidity that has been created is excess liquidity. As my colleague, Jean-Pierre Danthine, will explain, the SNB has the necessary instruments at its disposal to withdraw this liquidity. Inflation forecast chart I would now like to comment on the new, conditional inflation forecast in more detail. The (dashed) red curve on the chart represents the new, conditional inflation forecast. It covers the period from the second quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2013 and shows the future inflation development on the assumption of the three-month Libor remaining constant at 0.25% over the entire forecasting horizon. For purposes of comparison, the (dash-dotted) green curve shows the inflation outlook published in March, which was also based on the assumption of a three-month Libor of 0.25%. The new forecast shows unchanged inflation prospects. However, new data have led to a slight upward revision in the inflation forecast in the short term, so that inflation arrives at nearly 1% in the second quarter of 2010.

In addition to all these developments, global financial conditions tightened, and 2022 was marked by exceptionally high levels of geopolitical, economic and financial uncertainties. In 2022, the Turkish economy continued to grow uninterruptedly despite global supply shocks and unfavorable geopolitical developments stemming from the RussianUkrainian War. Economic activity was particularly strong in the first half of the year and maintained its robust outlook in the second half of the year despite the decrease in external demand. Accordingly, in 2022, the Turkish economy grew by 5.6%, ranking among the top G20 and OECD countries thanks to its growth performance since the last quarter of 2019. In addition, Türkiye ranked ninth in terms of national income calculated according to purchasing power parity and doubled its share in the global economy. In 2022, the Turkish economy reached the highest level of national income in terms of US dollars since 2014. In the first half of last year, annual consumer inflation increased rapidly due to the sharp rise in global energy, commodity and food prices, disruptions in supply processes, and price formations in FX markets detached from economic fundamentals in the last  1/4  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  quarter of 2021. As the effects of global supply shocks waned and FX markets stabilized, a gradual normalization process started in the underlying trend of inflation as of the second half of 2022.
Also, the sectors of activity most affected by this crisis (hospitality, transport and leisure) account for approximately 13% of the Spanish economy, compared with around 9% of the euro area economy. As regards the behaviour of the labour market in the coming years, employment in terms of hours worked is expected to move on a very similar path to that of economic activity, showing declines of over 11% in 2020 and a recovery thereafter. The unemployment rate is expected to increase very significantly both in 2020 and 2021 and, despite falling in 2022, will still remain over 18% under scenario 1 and over 20% under scenario 2. Concerning public finances, the general government deficit is forecast to increase strongly in 2020, to 10.8% of GDP under scenario 1 and 12.1% under scenario 2. Although this ratio is expected to fall gradually in 2021 and 2022, the budget deficit will still be very high at the end of the projection horizon, standing at almost 6% under scenario 1 and at slightly over 8% under scenario 2. The government debt ratio is expected to rise very significantly in 2020, by between 20 pp and 25 pp, standing at the end of the projection horizon at 118% of GDP under scenario 1 and at 128.7% under scenario 2.

Additionally, all intermediaries now have to provide a service guide to help insurance buyers better understand the advice and services to which they are entitled. Instead of viewing these as requirements to be complied with, I would like to encourage financial advisers to take advantage of these disclosure tools to help customers fully understand what they are paying for. This will go a long way in establishing yourselves as trusted advisers. Upholding independence The second feature of a trusted adviser is independence. When consumers seek financial advice, they expect to get an objective point of view that places their best interest above all else. And rightly so – the individual’s hard-earned savings are at stake. Yet, the reality today is that the practice of commission-based compensation for financial advisers may not be fully aligned with the principle of rewarding quality advice to customers. Certainly, commission-based compensation has its advantages. It is effective in ensuring that products are actually bought. It is also appealing to consumers who may not be able to afford to pay for advice. But there is a world of difference between sales and advisory. While sales seeks to maximise transaction volume, advisory seeks to maximise the consumer’s welfare. With the prevalent practice of commission-based compensation, it is not surprising that the industry is still often perceived as one that pushes products, rather than provide solutions. The introduction of the balanced scorecard, which is currently being piloted among financial advisers, is to help address this perception.
f-NExT will assess the training needs of the financial sector holistically, and identify gaps in skills requirements. f-NExT will also strive to attract world-class training providers to set up in Singapore. Reputable training providers will be encouraged to set up more training centres to meet the industry's demands for specialised courses. IBF will gradually phase out training courses which overlap with programmes offered by other training providers. 4  International profile  As a leading financial centre, Singapore has a stake in a sound and stable international financial system. MAS is actively involved in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), and initiatives undertaken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to strengthen national and cross border supervisory standards and capital adequacy of banks, market surveillance, and payments and settlement systems. MAS participates actively at the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), contributing to its work in developing principles and guidelines, which serve as global best practice standards. MAS is also an Executive Committee member of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), which is the global standards-setting body for insurance supervision. Singapore is actively involved in regional financial fora, including ASEAN, APEC, the South East Asia Central Bank (SEACEN) Governors, and the Manila Framework Group. MAS is also engaged in expanded technical assistance to central banks and regulators in the Asia-Pacific over the past year, including training programmes on macroeconomic management and financial supervision.

MAS' corporate priorities for the year have been developed on the basis of these external and internal environment scans. These include programmes to enhance Singapore's position as a world class financial centre and to create flexible and forward-looking organisational practices for a more cohesive and dynamic MAS. 4  BIS Review 63/2001
One possibility could be to discuss the consequences of part of the infrastructure being temporarily out of order, and how the negative effects of this could be limited. The focus on consequences means that it would be possible for the business continuity and crisis recovery planning to manage a large percentage of possible crisis scenarios. Summary A payment system with effective resilience to shocks is of critical importance to the economy and to society. However, the resilience of the payment system depends on investments from individual agents, which each have their own objectives rather than those of the economy as a whole. This makes it important for the Riksbank to participate and work to ensure that the resilience of the payment system as a whole remains on a reasonable level with regard to the social economy. There is some gain for the commercial organisations to have a good resilience to shocks as recurring disruptions at one agent will lead to customers changing to a different agent. This also means that it is rational to invest in cooperation with those on whom the agent is dependent to supply its service. One can reason in a similar manner with regard to the resilience of the system as a whole. The advantages of an improvement in the resilience of the payment system will benefit everyone, but to achieve a sufficiently strong resilience it is necessary to cooperate. Here the Riksbank and other authorities have an important task in explaining and acting as catalysts for cooperation.

These agents, together with VPC AB (the Swedish central securities depository) and the Stockholm Stock Exchange, account for the central parts of the payment system. Payment information is sent between the participants through the SWIFT communications system. The Riksbank’s RIX system is the central point on which most payments and payment methods are dependant. This applies to cash payments, card payments, credit transfers, interbank loans, payments of transactions in securities and foreign exchange, etcetera. What I have just described is part of the central financial infrastructure about which most people know very little and see very little – it just exists and is expected to work. The banks are responsible for a large part of the infrastructure that meets the general public, for instance, through ATMs. In recent years, however, the general public has also become part of the infrastructure in that our own private computers can communicate with the banks' Internet banks. The importance of crisis recovery planning Today it is a matter of course for us to have access to different types of payment services. It is therefore easy for us to forget how complex and time-demanding it would actually be if we were suddenly forced to make cash payments directly to all those we need to pay money. Personally, I have many suppliers that I would need to visit at the end of every month to pay my bills.
If the financial imbalances in the USA are not corrected slowly in the near future, there is a risk that the economic upturn will be more short-lived and the downturn more powerful when the correction is finally made. 4  BIS Review 13/2002  On the other hand, the continued developments in the USA will depend on whether domestic demand picks up and is maintained. If the growth in productivity has really reached a bottom level at around 1.5 per cent in an economic downturn, this could be a sign that the long-term sustainable growth rate in the USA has moved upwards and that a recovery will not merely be temporary. Looking at Sweden, it was assessed in the December Inflation Report that the GDP had shown weak growth during 2001 and that it would then rise during 2002 and 2003. The main features of the picture we pained in the Inflation Report still stand. However, according to the National Accounts for the first three quarters of last year, the development in private consumption was weaker than had been assumed. There are other statistics that indicate that the GDP may have been stronger during 2001 than shown in the National Accounts, for instance, credit growth, money supply, tax payments and developments in employment. Regardless of what is correct, we appear to have had a relatively moderate slowdown during 2001. Industrial activity has been very weak, but this has been balanced by the expansive economic policy contributing to other sectors in the Swedish economy developing well.

When companies’ scope to reduce their prices as a result of, for instance, deregulation and increased competition, begins to be exhausted and demand pressure is finally expressed in rising prices, there is a risk that the price increases will be both greater and introduced more rapidly than expected by us analysts. Monetary policy must be based on forecasts of inflation and resource utilisation. If monetary policy is based on an overly optimistic assessment of the interplay between growth and inflation, it can lead to monetary policy becoming overly expansive. If inflation expectations have become more slow moving, it could mean that there is time for considerable imbalances to build up before policy has an impact in the form of higher inflation. Examples of this are Japan in the 1980s, the USA in 1927-29 and again in the 1990s. The example from Japan indicates that even if inflation does not rise during the forecast period with which monetary works, it is important to take a broader outlook both throughout the entire economy and further forward in time, and to envisage the risks that could exist with regard to financial stability. In Japan the cost of borrowing was very low during a long period of time to borrow money to invest in shares and property. As the productivity of the economy increased, confidence in the future grew and this made both investors and credit institutions more willing to take risks. The result was that asset prices were pushed up.