samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
For the time being the crypto ecosystem is by very far not large enough to threaten the dominant role of mainstream finance. But this may evolve going forward, if we look beyond the current setbacks faced by the sector. So we consider that it is important to keep an eye on it. 2/ The second reason for our interest is the two-sided impact the tokenisation of finance might have on the functioning of our financial system, both in terms of efficiency and stability. From an efficiency perspective, a case in point is the recourse to DLT which underpins the development of tokenised finance. It has actually a largely recognised potential to enhance transparency, with a better tracking of transactions and ownership, but also cost-efficiency and availability around the clock. But it brings also a risk of fragmentation of processes, if the underlying blockchains are not interoperable and cannot also smoothly interact with legacy, centralised, clearing, settlement and payment systems. This interoperability for the time being remains to be ensured. 1/3  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  From a stability perspective it is clear that currently the crypto ecosystem is not large enough and interconnected enough to threaten the stability of the whole financial system, as shown by the modest impact on mainstream finance of the May/June crypto assets market turmoil in the wake of the Terra-Luna collapse and more recently the impact of the collapse of the FTX crypto-conglomerate.

Denis Beau: Opportunities and challenges of the tokenisation of finance Introductory statement by Mr Denis Beau, First Deputy Governor of the Bank of France, at the European and American Chamber of Commerce event, New York City, 17 January 2023. *** Digitalisation is far from being new in the financial sector, but tokenisation based on DLTs may be a new turn. In my initial remarks I would like to explain why, at the Banque de France and the ACPR, from the standpoint of our financial stability mandate, we have a strong interest in the development of tokenised finance, and how it impacts the policy tools we use to fulfil our mandate. I/ The tokenisation of finance is of prime interest for two main reasons: 1/ It is part of the significant transformation drivers of our financial landscape Indeed, digital technologies are profoundly transforming finance, ushering in a wave of new players at the crossroads of IT and finance, digital assets in new, tokenised form-usually referred to as crypto-assets, for investment and settlement, and new exchange and settlement infrastructures. Their combination is translating in activities and services that first swept into the payment sector and are now spreading more broadly. Among them, so-called decentralised finance, DeFi, is emerging as a crypto-based alternative to traditional finance where the provision of services is disintermediated and their governance decentralised, and is enabled notably by permissionless blockchains, smart contracts and decentralised applications (Dapps).
Somewhat startlingly, of the 219 insurers established between 1843-1870, 170 were discontinued by 1870 13 – so over three out of every four new companies failed. 10  Ibid. 11  Alborn (2009). 12  Ibid. 13  Borscheid and Hauter (2012). BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  In 1869, the Albert Life Assurance Company failed, in part due to an over-ambitious takeover strategy 14 but also to having racked up excessive expenses, inadequate premia and an unexpectedly high surrender rate. Despite a suspicion that the Albert had been insolvent for several years, the company only failed when it ran out of liquid assets to pay current claims – thus revealing the limited oversight of insurers more generally and, in this case, the lack of legal means available to prevent the company from trading any earlier. The Albert is therefore often cited as the catalyst 15 for a piece of legislation passed the following year – the Life Assurance Companies Act 1870 – which attempted to address such problems and establish a scheme of regulation specifically tailored to insurers. This in part reflected the view of the insurance industry by Parliament – described by the Select Committee of 1853 as “those useful institutions” – as playing an important role in the economy. It is noteworthy that even back in the 19th century, many were outraged by the introduction of the Act which to them represented ‘the mephitic influence of red-tape regulations’ 16 – a sentiment that has surely been uttered in more recent times too.

To return to my marine analogy, the good ship Solvency II has more up-to-date and useful features than the old one. But it is an evolution, not a revolution, in ship design. It still has cabins, a bow, and propellers. More importantly, we may have tuned up the engine a bit and altered course by a few degrees, but we have clearly not changed our course or our destination. Thank you. References Adams, J. The impact of changing regulation on the insurance regulation on the insurance industry, speech delivered at the Nicholas Barbon Lecture, London, 2012. Alborn, T. Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society 1800-1914, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2009. Andromachi, G. and Goldby, M. (eds), Systemic Risk and the Future of Insurance Regulation, London, Informa Law, 2015. Bailey, A. The evolution of insurance regulation: a shifting scope and new frontiers, speech delivered at the Nicholas Barbon Lecture, London, 2013. Bernstein, Peter. L. Against the Gods: the remarkable story of risk, New York, Wiley, 1996. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Black, M.A., ‘Chronological and Statistical Chart of the Life Associations Established in the United Kingdom from 1706 to 1863 Showing Where They Are, When & How They Disappeared,. Published by Edward Stanford, 1864. Borscheid, P. and Haueter, Niels-Viggo. World Insurance: The Evolution of a Global Risk Network, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012. Clark, G. ‘Insurance as an Instrument of War in the 18th Century’, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 29, No. 2, (April 2004), pp. 247–257.
Information technology has developed rapidly and even if the stock markets reacted too optimistically, the technological development should be favourable for rather more long-term growth. Productivity has also improved in recent years, which may also be a sign that we are on our way into a higher long-term growth track. The approach of economic policy has then been successful. Support and understanding also seems to have been attained for the price stability target taking precedence over other ambitions and demands. By giving central banks independent responsibility for the price stability target, an attempt has been made to avoid suspicions being created that the price stability target would be set aside for short-term employment considerations. In the long-term, a demand-stimulating economic policy would only be expressed in inflation when full utilisation of resources is reached. For central banks that, after a long period with a poor inflation record, are to establish credibility for price stability, independence can facilitate this transition. When credibility and support for price stability has been achieved, there is less risk of monetary policy coming into conflict with short-term employment objectives. I would first like to briefly describe the basis of the monetary policy decisions made by the Riksbank. Simple decision-making rule as a guide The new Riksbank Act has now been in force for almost two years. This act stipulates that the objective of the Riksbank is to maintain price stability and to safeguard a reliable and efficient payment system.

But it must be recognised that these interventions are not to manage the level of exchange rate, as the ringgit remains a floating currency. Demand and supply forces must be allowed to determine the level of the exchange rate. But at the same time, we cannot be oblivious to the aberrations in demand and supply, originating from large speculative positions. Large swings in the exchange rate are detrimental to our country. It is highly risky for an open economy like Malaysia that relies on international trade activities and exchange rate as a price mechanism. Through experience and practice, we have generally accepted that in a floating rate regime, the market should be left to its devices in determining exchange rate levels. However, empirical evidence suggests that markets mechanisms often go through bouts of distortion. This is not at all surprising. It is proven time and again. The latest Nobel Prize recipient for economics, Professor Richard Thaler’s work have centred on the essence that economic agents are humans. And humans are irrational. This is the opposite of conventional economics that rely on the central assumption that all economic agents behave rationally. This irrationality is the main catalyst for speculative activities in the FX market. When speculative activities are large, they can swing towards extremes. Under these situations, and from the central bank’s perspective, intervention is then necessary to rebalance the supply and demand forces, and to manage the volatility caused by violent swings in the exchange rate. Intervention in a floating rate regime is not new.
Mr Carse: The importance of corporate governance in banks  Speech by Mr David Carse, Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, at The Year 2000 Millennium Dinner of The Association of International Accountants - Hong Kong Branch, Hong Kong Bankers Club, Hong Kong, on 17 March 2000. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, I am very pleased to be here this evening to speak to the Association on the subject of corporate governance in banks. I have chosen this as my theme both because it is highly topical for reasons that I will explain later and because it should be of particular interest to this audience. The Association plays an important role in the training and promotion of the accounting profession; and accountants are a vital component in corporate governance not simply in their specific role as auditors but also as a source of highly trained directors and managers. I will begin by giving you a brief situation report on the banking sector because this is relevant to the governance issue. Clearly, the situation is looking a lot better than it has done for the last two years. As the 1999 results released so far have shown, the performance of individual banks is by no means uniform. Some have done a lot better than others, depending on such factors as the mix of their business and where they are in the provisioning cycle.

Thomas Jordan: Monetary policy under the spell of the financial crisis Summary of a speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Member of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the State Street Global Advisors (SSgA) Prima Talk, Zurich, 6 May 2009. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The crisis in global financial markets has led to a sharp downturn in the world economy. Unavoidably, the Swiss economy has been pulled down too. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has reacted by considerably relaxing its monetary policy, moving – in effect – to a zero interest rate policy. The SNB is maintaining its ability to act at times of zero interest rates by making use of three unconventional measures: increasing the number of long-term repo transactions, purchasing Swiss franc bonds issued by private sector borrowers and buying foreign currency on the open market. The initial impact of these measures has been positive. Risk premiums in the money and capital markets have fallen slightly. The tendency of the Swiss franc to appreciate against the euro has been checked and volatility is declining. Curbing the upward pressure on the Swiss franc helps to protect against deflation risks in Switzerland. The Swiss economy is currently experiencing the most severe economic crisis since the midseventies.
Moreover, from 12 at the start, the number of participating countries has risen to 19 today: 7 countries decided democratically to join the euro, and none has wanted to leave it. These are the concrete economic benefits that make the 340 million citizens of the euro area attached to their currency, to our currency. This attachment, which has been measured since the outset, has remained strong throughout the crisis. 70% support the euro today, i.e. the highest level since 2008; a large majority of French citizens support the euro (68%). Support remains strong in Italy, albeit at a lower level (53%). The euro is not a technocratic utopia: it is a political and democratic decision, supported 25 years on – with hindsight – by a clear majority of citizens. II. However, there are four doubts about the euro. I will address them seriously, even though I think that these ideas are erroneous. a) The euro is enemy of growth and employment Some say that the euro acts as a brake on growth, employment, and competitiveness. However, at 1.7% in 2016, growth in the euro area was higher than US growth (1.6%) and above all there are major economic successes among euro area countries.

Globalisation in the Aftermath of the Crisis In more recent periods, major trends have influenced how we perceive and pursue the globalisation process. The first trend is growing anti-globalisation sentiments and rising populism. We can trace this back to rising inequality and deteriorating standards of living in many communities across the globe. 1/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  Between 1988 and 2011, the incomes of the poorest 10% increased by just USD65, while the incomes of the richest 1% increased nearly 200-fold, or USD12,000. In the advanced economies, workers railed against the intense competition from lower cost producers of manufactured goods such as Bangladesh, China and Vietnam. Coupled with higher living costs, many became marginalised. The angst of these communities have fused into anti-establishment movements and pushback against trade agreements. Unfortunately, these circumstances happen at a time when we need to galvanise all our resources to pull away from the setback of what was termed the “New Mediocre”. Second is the growing perception that globalisation erodes national sovereignty. Participation in multilateral institutions and international trade agreements is portrayed as a devolution of national policies. The extensive involvement of multilateral institutions in domestic economic affairs and the onerous obligations in trade agreements have incited strong reactions from domestic constituents. This reality, for some, underscores the imbalances associated with globalisation. Its economic ramifications are immense, with the consequences of Brexit and the retreat of the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement still unfolding as we speak.
First, quantitative easing, through the purchase of public and private debt, seeks to extend the effects of low short-term interest rates to the rest of the yield curve, including to longterm rates, over which monetary policy normally has no direct influence. To do this, the central bank purchases assets with long-term maturities, generating an increase in their price, or, tantamount to this, a reduction in their yields. These lower yields on the assets acquired by the central bank are in turn partly passed through to the yields on assets with a similar duration, such as the interest rates on bank loans, which tend to be the most relevant ones for the saving and investment decisions of households and firms, thus stimulating demand and price rises. Second, forward guidance seeks to transmit to private agents the central bank’s commitment to maintaining an expansionary monetary policy throughout the early stages of the recovery, in order to avoid the deanchoring of inflation expectations. These programmes, whose application has involved major challenges for central banks given the lack of any similar experience in the past, seem to be working acceptably well, assisting the economic recovery and avoiding the emergence of crisis-induced deflationary pressures. According to analysis carried out by the Banco de España, ECB action can explain around half of the nominal GDP growth in the euro area over the period 2015-2017. That said, it is important to stress that central banks cannot take sole responsibility for the recovery.

16.06.2017  Speech by the Governor of the Banco de España at the 2017 CUNEF graduation ceremony Luis M. Linde Governor  It is an honour to be here with you today, to celebrate the CUNEF University 2017 graduation ceremony for graduates and postgraduates. Allow me to congratulate all those who are graduating today, and to express my gratitude for the invitation to preside over this ceremony, which it has been a great pleasure to accept. Since its foundation more than 40 years ago, CUNEF University has played a very important role in the education of banking and finance professionals in Spain. CUNEF graduates occupy important positions not only in the private sector but also in the public sector, including in the institution that I represent. And I am sure that the students graduating today will maintain the tradition of professional excellence built by this university. I would like to focus today on what is, without a doubt, the key function of central banks: monetary policy. I will start with a brief historical outline of how the functions of central banks have changed from when they were first established up until the present day, and I will then describe the current framework for monetary policy implementation, concluding with some reflections on the main challenges we face following the economic and financial crisis that broke ten years ago this year. The evolving role of central banks Central banks are offspring of the Enlightenment.
Among cryptoassets are what are generally known as cryptocurrencies, conceived for use as a means of payment, and those known as digital tokens, conceived for obtaining financing and which confer on the purchaser the right to receive remuneration, or to exercise certain rights. The Bitcoin is an example of the former. The so-called ICOs (Initial Coin Offerings) are an application of the latter. Both have been the subject of growing interest, and there are at present numerous and highly heterogeneous initiatives. While their impact so far on global financial stability is considered to be limited, they pose a series of risks, in areas such as consumer protection and the prevention of moneylaundering and the financing of terrorism, which the authorities monitor closely and on which they have issued warnings and statements. In this connection, it should be stressed that these are assets of a marked speculative nature, without the backing of supervisors and susceptible to fraud or price manipulation. They cannot be considered as money or as deposits, and they do not enjoy the protection of the regulations governing banking and investment products. It is worrying that, in a setting in which less than half the population understands the concept of compound interest rates, there is such demand for complex assets with these characteristics. Lastly, I wish to refer to the risk of authorising – owing to a lack of knowledge or of due care – access to personal information that would preferably have been kept private.

1/2  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  Two years later, we've seen great progress toward a recovery. The most recent data show that well over two-thirds of New York City's job losses have been reversed. Still, areas of the New York City economy, especially those dependent on visitors and office workers, continue to struggle and are lagging the nation in recovery. Despite the challenges, there is palpable energy and momentum propelling us into the future. Now that our focus is on the recovery, we must create an equitable future for all residents of this city. We must make sure that all of the people who live, work, or own a business here have a chance to succeed. It is essential that we build a stronger foundation so that everyone can fulfill their economic potential, both here in New York and around the nation. That's why it's critical that we prioritize tackling some of the city's biggest problems, including poverty and inequality, and issues in areas such as infrastructure and transportation. These issues are not new; they existed long before the pandemic. And there is no simple or single solution to solve them. But as we plan for a better future, we must understand how New York's challenges have evolved since March 2020 and how they are playing out in the current environment. With that knowledge and awareness in mind, we can chart the path forward. The New York Fed's Role This brings me to our conference today.
SPEECH  From market neutrality to market efficiency Welcome address by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the ECB DG-Research Symposium “Climate change, financial markets and green growth” Frankfurt am Main, 14 June 2021 On behalf of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the co-organizers – the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) – I am pleased to welcome you to the Symposium “Climate Change, Finance and Green Growth”. While all of us would certainly have preferred to convene in person, the event’s virtual format does at least have the welcome side effect of lowering our carbon footprint. The programme of the Symposium is highly topical: it features six state-of-the-art academic papers and a moderated discussion focusing on the interaction between climate policies, financial markets and sustainable development. The Symposium underscores the ECB’s commitment to better understand the consequences of climate change for output and inflation, to explore the role that central banks can play in fostering the transition to a low-carbon economy, and to support high-quality academic research on climate change. In view of the Symposium’s agenda, my opening remarks will focus on the scope for the ECB to contribute to the global fight against climate change. While this topic is also an important element of the ECB’s ongoing monetary policy strategy review, my remarks should not be seen as an indication of its eventual outcome.

In addition to the fact that individual shareholders are often small and scattered, they only have limited ways of exerting pressure on management, short of disposing of their share. Importantly, the reality of limited liability seriously biases shareholders’ perspective on risk. While shareholders benefit from the upside of risk-taking, they are not symmetrically penalised on the  3  The focus here is placed on a typical banking institution, but other financial institutions might be similarly affected. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  downside. This asymmetry is particularly acute in the case of highly levered institutions. For these institutions, the return on equity in good times is high, say above 20%. The trade-off between high returns if the risky gamble pays off, and zero, if it does not, is particularly lopsided. Both limited liability and the natural highly leveraged nature of banking thus come with a natural propensity for socially excessive risk-taking on the part of banks’ owners. In this sense, shareholders cannot be relied upon to impose on managers the socially optimal level of risktaking.4 Managers What about the bank’s managers? Here theory tells us that, apart from reputation and other soft considerations, the behaviour of managers will crucially depend on the link between their remuneration and the firm’s performance. What is at issue here is less the level of managerial remuneration. More important is the relationship between the remuneration and the medium to long-run performance of the bank.