samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
As trade collapsed towards the end of 2008 and into the first few months of this year, Asia’s export-reliant economies were hard-hit. Against this external backdrop, the Singapore economy contracted sharply, as our manufacturing, transport, logistics and wholesale trade industries were closely tied to global and regional trade flows. By the first quarter this year, the economy had posted an output loss of around 10% from its peak a year ago, the steepest decline in its history. The unprecedented global financial crisis has weighed heavily on financial markets worldwide, leading to severe declines in valuation across many asset classes amidst heightened market volatility. MAS’ investments were negatively affected by the crisis. As at the close of the financial year on 31 March 2009, MAS recorded a net loss of $ billion, about 3.5% of MAS’ average total assets. This compares with profits of $ billion in the previous year and $ billion in FY06. This severe crisis has therefore pared back about 80% of the gains in the preceding two years. The extent of loss has been mitigated as we raised the liquidity profile of our portfolio in the early part of 2008, in the face of greater uncertainties. With the broad based upturn in financial markets after the close of the financial year, the valuation of MAS’ foreign assets has improved and more than half of the losses have been recovered. Despite the severe global conditions, Singapore’s financial system has, by and large, weathered the crisis well.

Zeti Akhtar Aziz: The development of Islamic finance Welcoming remarks by Dr Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Royal Award for Islamic Finance gala dinner, Kuala Lumpur, 25 October 2010. *  *  *  It is my very great honour to welcome this distinguished audience to this special gala dinner organised by Bank Negara Malaysia and the Securities Commission to commemorate the presentation of the inaugural Royal Award for Islamic Finance. This gala dinner is also held in conjunction with the Global Islamic Finance Forum 2010 that is taking place this week, and which commenced this morning. Tonight, in commemorating this prestigious Royal Award for Islamic Finance, we are blessed and honoured to have Kebawah Duli Yang Maha Mulia Tuanku Haji Abdul Halim Mu’adzam Shah who will graciously confer the winner with the award. Bank Negara Malaysia and the Securities Commission are proud to jointly sponsor this award under the auspices of the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre initiative (MIFC). Allow me to take this opportunity, as Chairman of the MIFC Executive Council, to record our utmost gratitude to the Rulers’ Council of Malaysia for bestowing the Royal title to the award, giving it the highest distinction and recognition. Earlier this year, Malaysia launched a global search for the winner of this auspicious award which seeks to honour the exceptional individual who has made the most outstanding contribution to Islamic finance.
As the RMB becomes more widely used internationally, other markets that complement Hong Kong’s central role are emerging around the world. Cooperation between these different markets is conducive to growing the whole market, and we are seeing increasing linkages being set up to facilitate the flow of funds between the markets. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  These increasing linkages are the result of several encouraging trends, including the fact that financial institutions in different financial centres have strengthened their business networks in order to serve customers’ RMB needs. For instance, the operating hours of Hong Kong’s RMB Real Time Gross Settlement system have been lengthened, providing the capability to serve the settlement of offshore transactions in the European timezone and early business hours in North America. We at the HKMA are also conducting a range of outreach activities to strengthen Hong Kong’s RMB business links with other parts of the world. These include conducting roadshows to showcase Hong Kong as the offshore RMB business centre, as well as facilitating private sector-led forums and dialogue meetings with authorities in Australia and London. These and other initiatives have encouraged actions to enhance various financial services, including RMB liquidity management and settlement arrangements, between markets in different parts of the world. Concluding remarks As I mentioned at the outset, I had the privilege of delivering the keynote address at last year’s Global Offshore RMB Funding Forum as well.

At the same time, the risks involved in overemphasising the role of central banks in connection with such supervision and regulation also have to be borne in mind. Central banks could find themselves facing increased political pressure that could jeopardise their independence. If their credibility with regard to maintaining price stability were undermined, this could have devastating implications for the effective implementation of monetary policy. Institutional aspects And now, in the final part of my speech, I would like to look at some institutional aspects. To allow a more detailed analysis of systemic risks and how to keep them in check, we need a macroprudential framework in which various instruments can be combined to optimal effect. What is the best way of achieving this? Firstly, it is essential to recognise that ensuring financial stability as a whole is generally dependent on the decisions made by a range of different bodies. These need to act together in order to ensure financial stability. To create the necessary basis for a functioning macroprudential framework, the exact institutional set-up of the regulatory authorities is of the utmost importance. First and foremost, objectives, mandates and responsibilities need to be clearly defined. In Switzerland, for instance, FINMA – the Financial Market Supervisory Authority – is responsible for the regulation and supervision of individual banks. The SNB, on the other hand, is required to contribute to financial stability. With regard to Switzerland’s two big banks, there is a clear overlap between institutional and systemic risks.
To do so it takes as its starting point the banks’ end-year balance sheets from the previous year. It defines a baseline macroeconomic scenario, which coincides with the Banco de España projections available at the time the exercise is performed, and another, stressed scenario, which attempts to reflect the effect of the previously identified risks materialising. The difference between the two scenarios reflects the degree of stress of the exercise, which is slightly greater than last year, in step with the increase in perceived risks. 27/29  The results obtained in the latest stress test performed by the Banco de España – published in the Autumn 2019 Financial Stability Report – are generally positive. However, earnings-generating capacity under the baseline scenario does not reflect the effect of the downward revision in the macroeconomic projections made in the Banco de España’s September forecasting exercise. In the baseline scenario, banks generate modest earnings; these do, however, provide for an increase in solvency ratios of almost 1 pp in three years if the dividend distribution pattern observed in the preceding years holds. This would not be enough to abandon the bottom rung of the European solvency ranking, which is why improving profitability and a prudent shareholder remuneration policy are so important. Under the adverse scenario a portion of capital is consumed, but moderately so at the aggregate level, although there is substantial heterogeneity across banks.

25/29  The evidence available also reveals that households cease to meet their financial obligations when they have to forgo a portion of the regular income they receive or when they lose their jobs. But lending standards and price-setting policies play a key role in mitigating these impacts. Hence, a key factor in the monitoring of bank mortgage lending standards is the extent to which interest rates charged vary in step with the risk borne. Prudent behaviour would advise charging a higher interest rate the greater the risk assumed. In this respect we can see that, set against pre-crisis behaviour, where there was scarcely any relationship between certain risk characteristics of mortgage loans and the interest rate charged, the relationship is now positive and statistically significant. Nonetheless, we should also note that this relationship has gradually diminished in intensity in recent years, in a trend that banks should strive to reverse so as to have prices properly reflect all the costs and risks assumed. Generally, then, the main conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that Spanish banks do not, for the moment, appear to be significantly increasing their risk profile. That said, some factors do require close monitoring. 26/29  3. Resilience of banks to shocks  One way of analysing banks’ resilience to shocks is to subject them to stress tests. The Banco de España conducts stress test exercises annually for all Spanish banks.
These schemes pursue low, stable inflation, healthy public finances, strong and well regulated financial systems and realistic exchange rates. Of course policies vary from one country to another, but their basic principles are shared. In Chile, a fiscal policy that saves during good times, an autonomous central bank that conducts monetary policy under an inflation targeting regime and a floating exchange rate, were key elements to successfully work its way out of the crisis. Furthermore, the country has a solid, well regulated financial system that does not allow for many of the operations that dragged some economies to their  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  troubled present-day situation. A traditional banking model dominates the banking industry, where a strong base of deposits, both personal and institutional, permits to finance mainly credits. Before the crisis, a lot was said about the decoupling of emerging economies’ growth path from that of developed countries. This idea, which gained momentum in 2007 and 2008, was seriously questioned during the disaster because, as I said, no one was spared its effects. In hindsight, however, we can say that there actually was a decoupling. It is true that in a globalized world commercial and financial intertwining does not allow the economies to isolate themselves from the global cycle, but the performance of emerging markets is living proof that mitigating the negative consequences from the external cycle can be done.

I think it is most important, in these times of uncertainty, for the Bank of Thailand to act as the linchpin to the public policy. We have to set the anchor that stabilizes the economy. It is fortunate that certain elements of our inflation targeting policy has been modified, allowing increased degree of management of the foreign exchange rate which facilitates trade and improves capital flows. The practice which was intended to take care of official reserves while the global economy is slowing down now happens to be the correct policy practice to be further enhanced to cope with addition weaknesses and uncertainties. More careful management of our international reserves is required so that we can fulfil our debt obligations under the IMF program, and still be left with a strong and healthy level of reserves. This will be achieved through a vigilant watch on the markets, keeping close dialogue with market participants, gathering intelligence and acting in a timely manner. Ladies and Gentlemen, I am here today not to give you a false promise that the BOT could provide policy measures that could lead to the recovery of the Thai economy, but to assure you that our existing policy measures are suitable with the situation and we would do our best not to allow Thailand another crisis of similar cause and magnitude as that of 1997.
Over the next several months, the industry's focus needs to be on the remediation of legacy contracts well before the cessation of LIBOR, so we don't have a last-minute rush. Once we complete this final stretch of the transition, we can say good riddance to LIBOR. Even when the transition from LIBOR is complete, the ARRC's work will continue to shape the future. The ARRC has laid out best practices for the use of reference rates grounded in overnight SOFR.1 Importantly, this envisages only limited use of term SOFR, which doesn't share overnight SOFR's foundation in the deep and robust Treasury financing markets. It's incredibly important that financial institutions consistently act in ways that are aligned with these best practices so that we don't have to come back and clean up another mess. Unlike with Star Trek, the last thing anyone wants to watch is the sequel, "LIBOR: The Next Generation." The LIBOR transition is tangible proof of what can be accomplished when all stakeholders-public and private-work together and persevere, against all odds. That sense of purpose, collaboration, and accomplishment gives me hope for the main topic of the conference today: Treasury market resilience. And yes, there is much work to be done.

And heightened uncertainty can add to market volatility, resulting in diminished market liquidity. But these debates about trade-offs expose a basic problem. Everyone is familiar with the idea of a "jack of all trades." Using monetary policy to mitigate financial stability vulnerabilities can lead to unfavorable outcomes for the economy. Monetary policy should not try to be a jack of all trades and a master of none. There must be a better way. Fortunately, there is. Instead of looking at this as a problem of choosing the point on an unfavorable trade-off curve, we must look for ways to shift the curve by enhancing the resilience of the financial system. The value of this approach to building resilience was demonstrated by the global efforts to strengthen the banking system following the global financial crisis. Despite the economic disruptions caused by COVID-19 and Russia's war on Ukraine, the banking system has functioned well, serving as a source of strength for the economy, not a weak link. Alternative Solutions, Prudent Results As monetary policymakers, we need to count on well-functioning markets that promote financial stability as we pursue our price stability and maximum employment goals. So, what can be done to enhance financial stability? At the Federal Reserve, we have instituted changes over the past few years that support market functioning in times of stress.
The UK’s productivity growth challenge Speech given by Dave Ramsden, Deputy Governor for Markets and Banking, Bank of England  Babraham Hall, Cambridge Friday 23 February 2018  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Bank of England or the Monetary Policy Committee. 1  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  Relevance of productivity for monetary policy  It is businesses that are vital for driving productivity, and it is crucial for the Bank and MPC to engage with and hear from all sorts of business, which is why we have a national network of agencies spread across the UK. It is a pleasure to be back in the region covered by the Bank’s South East and East Anglia Agency. It happens to be the region I was born and grew up in, and one I visit regularly on my bicycle at weekends, so I know what a diverse and vibrant region it is, economically and more generally. The monetary policymaker’s perspective on productivity is naturally a particular one. As MPC members, past and present, have noted, the future potential of the UK economy is not within the gift of monetary 1  policymakers. And monetary policy cannot offset the economic impacts of a large structural shock like Brexit.

(2017) ‘The Bank of England’s FinTech Accelerator: what have we done and what have we learned?’, Remarks given at a meeting for FinTech contacts of the Bank of England’s Agency for the South East and East Anglia at the offices of Mills & Reeve, Cambridge, available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/the-boes-fintech-accelerator-what-have-we-done-and-whathave-we-learned HM Treasury (2009), ‘Pre-Budget Report: Securing the Recovery: Growth and Opportunity’, Cm 7747, December 2009, available at:  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/238510/7747.pdf  OECD (2017), Economic Surveys: United Kingdom, October 2017, available at: http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/United-Kingdom-2017-OECD-economic-survey-overview.pdf Ramsden, D. (2017) ‘Monetary policy from end to end: define, decide, deliver’, Speech given at King’s College London, available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2017/dave-ramsden-speech-atkings-college-london Tenreyro, S. (2018) ‘The fall in productivity growth: causes and implications’, Speech given at Queen Mary University of London, available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2018/silvana-tenreyro-2018peston-lecture  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8
Jean-Pierre Danthine: Causes and consequences of low interest rates Speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Danthine, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Swisscanto Market Outlook 2014, Lausanne, 14 November 2013. *  *  *  I would like to thank Till Ebner, Fabian Gunzinger and Patrick Saner for their very valuable support in drafting this speech. Introduction In the wake of the financial crisis, long-term and short-term interest rates have been at historically low levels for several years already. This holds for advanced economies, in general, and for Switzerland, in particular. Central banks have certainly been important actors in this play, as the financial crisis and its economic consequences called for decisive action: central banks around the world lowered their policy rates sharply; they then adopted unconventional measures, often to exert direct downward pressure on long-term rates and risk premia. But interest rates developments are not just about monetary policy; they reflect the economic and financial circumstances that prevail in a given situation, circumstances to which monetary authorities have to adapt. With this in mind, I will, in the first part of my speech, review the facts behind the currently low interest rates. In doing so, I will focus on the two phenomena highlighted in chart 1: a secular decline in long-term interest rates since the 1980s, which had already brought interest rates to low levels before the financial crisis began, and a cyclical component that led to the extreme lows we have seen over the last few years.

This has led to the built-up of imbalances which increase the risk of a substantial price corrections and of loan losses (charts 13 and 14).6 A second, related, danger is that low rates may induce excessive risk-taking in financial markets – as opposed to reviving productive risk-taking, which is one of the objectives of low policy rates. Here, the economic literature stresses two channels: investors who are unable or unwilling to accept low returns are liable to take higher risks and increase leverage to reach their return objective, a phenomenon known as “search for yield” (chart 15).7 In addition, by pushing up asset prices and dampening price volatility, low interest rates reduce  5  This view is also reflected in market expectations. For instance, 10 year inflation expectations for the US, derived from the yield differential of inflation-linked government bonds and nominal government bonds, stood slightly below 2.25% in August 2013. 6  Empirical evidence suggest that a simultaneous built-up of imbalances in real estate and credit markets is a key leading indicator of subsequent financial instability. Cf., for instance, Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Borio (2012). 7  Cf. Borio and Zhu (2008) and Gambacorta (2009). 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  measured risk and may lead investors to misjudge the true risk of a given investment.8 A long period of low rates, for example, may lead borrowers and lenders to overestimate debt affordability and underestimate the risk of higher debt servicing costs in the future.
Legislators and other policymakers made substantial changes to the financial system to hold firms, and their managers and shareholders, more accountable. A great many of those changes have put both firms and the public sector in a better place. Today, regulators and supervisors expect systemically important financial institutions to be more resilient. They must be prepared for unanticipated losses and shocks to the financial system, including through rigorous (if not always popular) capital and liquidity standards. Supervised firms are also required to have a much greater understanding of the governance and controls supporting their critical operations. This includes, for example, governance frameworks, management information systems, and IT resiliency. This last point is particularly notable because, as many of you are now painfully aware from the data breaches at Equifax and Yahoo (and those are just the most recent ones), cybersecurity risk has increased dramatically in the last several years. Resilience goes a long way. It prepares firms to be ready to fight not only the last war, but also the unanticipated stresses of the next one. It prepares them not to rely on past performance as a guaranty of future performance. But, increased preparedness should not be cause for overconfidence. Supervision and regulation should not and cannot drive all risk from the financial system, and the probability of a systemically important institution’s failure will never be zero.

It bears repeating that Congress did so after facing the terrifying realization that the lack of a credible 4/6  BIS central bankers' speeches  resolution mechanism for dealing with failing systemic firms left only bad choices, such as lending into a run, bailout, or the collapse of the financial system. Over the past several years, there have been efforts in Congress to repeal OLA and create a new, bespoke process for systemically important firms under the Bankruptcy Code. That process would largely mimic many of the features of the FDIC’s single point of entry strategy intended for use in an OLA proceeding. Those efforts have picked up steam this year with the passing of two different bills in the House of Representatives.13 From my perspective, there are attractive aspects to both OLA and the Bankruptcy Code. OLA is largely an administrative process that has the benefit of agility. It is administered by the FDIC, which will already have insight into the institution though the living will process. The FDIC also communicates with foreign regulators regarding systemically important firms. OLA has particular advantages in the context of a cross-border resolution, which means in this day and age the resolution of pretty much any systemically important institution. US regulators have established relationships with their foreign counterparts, and resolution processes similar to OLA now exist in many globally important financial centers.