samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This will only work if all authorities are confident that global resolutions will deliver domestic financial stability and protect local services. Crossborder cooperative agreements will help, but fine words must also be backed up by harsh economic incentives. Operating structures of banks must be made consistent with resolvability and, above all, banks must have substantial loss-absorbing capacity that cascades through their group structures. At the St Petersburg summit in September, G20 leaders mandated the FSB to develop these proposals. The Bank of England is now working intensively with other authorities and the financial industry. Our aim is to complete the job by the next G20 Summit in Brisbane. By increasing the resilience of banks and tackling too big to fail we can help make London a safe global banking centre. But that is far from sufficient; we must also dramatically improve the resilience of global markets. 3. Creating robust markets  To do so, we need first to consider how measures to increase the resilience of banks affect the functioning of markets. For example, the combination of higher capital held against  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  trading books, the new leverage ratio, and the proposed Volcker restrictions on proprietary trading have already combined to reduce dealer inventories across a range of securities.7 With dealers less willing to deploy capital against large market moves, volatility has increased and liquidity fallen in the face of shocks such as the potential shift in US monetary policy earlier this year.

8  For a more detailed review of the issues considered here see “The future of repo: ‘too much’ or ‘too little’?”, a speech by Andrew Hauser, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2013/speech665.pdf. 9  Estimates reported by the Basel Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) suggest that the combined impact of liquidity regulation and OTC derivatives reforms could generate additional collateral demand to the tune of $ trillion. Depending on the data used, that amounts to at least a third of the high quality collateral in active circulation today. But it is  4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  how to innovate. Investor expectations for liquidity are changing and models for risk intermediation should evolve in ways that reduce balance sheet usage. 4. Central banking in global markets  Central banks need to keep up. In particular, we can catalyse more efficient and effective private collateral management by backstopping private markets. 140 years ago in Lombard Street, Walter Bagehot expounded the duty of the Bank of England to lend freely to stem a panic and to make loans on “everything which in common times is good “banking security”.” Bagehot was particularly scathing on the Bank’s failure at that time to state a “clear and sound policy” on this general topic writing “...until we have on this point a clear understanding with the Bank of England, both our liability to crises and our terror at crises will always be greater than they would otherwise be.”10 140 years on, the Bank has a clear and sound policy.
The economy registered a growth rate of 5 percent in 2006, a respectable number, against the backdrop of external and internal disturbances. The recent slowdown in consumption and investment could be traced to the confidence factor. Political uncertainties and the unwarranted strengthening of the currency that prompted the introduction of reserve requirements on short-term capital inflows, together with the amendment of the Foreign Business Act that, unfortunately, happened successively within such a short period of time, all had a negative effect on consumer and business confidence. However, we believe that the momentum has not been lost, and uncertainties only postponed consumption and investment decisions. Evidently, retained earnings to total assets averaging over Q1-Q3 of 2006 was at 17.6 percent, higher than the average of 13.3 percent in 2005, while capacity utilization rose to 74.2 percent in 2006, indicating that further investment in production capacity should be in the pipeline. To sum up, while challenges abound, we have weathered them relatively well so far. This can be attributed to a fine combination of the economy's resiliency and appropriate policy stance. By appropriate policy stance, we refer to the “right” policy for the “right” reason at the “right” time. BIS Review 27/2007  1  Let's now turn to our monetary policy. Monetary policy's main objective is to maintain monetary stability. By this we mean price stability and confidence in the value of the currency. Thailand has adopted inflation targeting since May 2000.

In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to Japanese businesses for their contribution to the progress of the Thai economy over the years. Here's hoping that we continue to build and strengthen the foundation of this great relationship. Again, I am deeply grateful for this opportunity, and thank you for your kind attention. BIS Review 27/2007  3
Some of the most important recent changes in the payment landscape have been catalysed by regulatory intervention, for example the development of the Faster Payments Scheme (FPS). 5 In the past, regulatory intervention in retail payments has been targeted, addressing specific problems as and when they have emerged. Going forward however, the Payments Systems Regulator (PSR) which launched in 2015 is likely to create a new dynamic by stimulating a greater focus on competition and innovation in payment systems. Alongside this new regulatory focus, the pace of technological change in payments has picked up sharply. Recent years have seen huge growth in demand for payments services that can be accessed in real time, at any time (“24x7x365”), in a wide variety of locations through mobile phones and tablets. The software on these devices also makes growing use of so-called Application Programming Interfaces or “APIs” which allow the seamless integration of payment into websites, and offer new ways to utilise payments data to improve services to customers. The “electronification” of payments and rise of mobile banking has enabled non-banks to deliver services using existing payments infrastructure and made it possible for challenger banks to grow without having to build an extensive branch network. The emergence of various forms of Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) poses much more profound challenges because it enables verification of payments to be decentralised, removing the need for a trusted third party.

Nevertheless, in the last couple of years, most measures of inflation expectations, be they survey-based or market-based, have pointed in the same direction of a prolonged period of too low inflation, well below our target of being close to but below 2% over the medium term. As a consequence, monetary policy has become progressively more accommodative. First, in a context of fixed rate full allotment introduced on the 15th of October in 2008 to offset liquidity risk in the market by ensuring banks’ continued access to liquidity, we have introduced forward guidance to avoid an unwarranted tightening of the effective monetary policy stance. Initially implemented in July 2013, this guidance was “firmly reiterated” in early 2014 and remains in place today. Second, the Eurosystem introduced targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) and the asset purchase programs for covered bonds and asset-backed securities in June 2014, with the goal of improving the transmission of our monetary policy. Third, the main refinancing rate was cut to 5 basis points and the deposit rate entered into negative territory in two steps (–20 basis points). However, by January this year it was clear that economic recovery as well as monetary and credit indicators were too weak to bring medium term inflation close to but below 2%. Marketbased measures of inflation expectations, even if prone to liquidity shocks, had been falling further below the target and at longer term horizons. The Governing Council was determined to act boldly to counteract the risk of a too low for too long inflation.
[23] One way in which the portfolio rebalancing channel may affect bond yields is through a direct impact on demand and supply conditions in the maturity segment in which we purchase. For instance, buying a French eight-year bond decreases the supply of that bond available in the market. For given demand, this drives up the price of the bond and compresses its yield. Securities of similar maturity are close substitutes, so their yield would also be affected, but those with very short and much longer maturities would not be greatly affected. This is why this channel is often referred to as the “local supply channel”. Another way in which the portfolio rebalancing channel is set in motion is through duration extraction. [24] The formalisation of this idea is based on prominent work by Vayanos and Vila (2009). [25] Let me just give you the basic mechanism. Going back to my previous example, under the duration extraction channel, the purchase of a French bond not only affects demand and supply locally but also reduces the aggregate risk to be borne by market participants. This leads price-sensitive investors to re-adjust their bond portfolio across maturities given their overall risk-bearing capacity. In terms of asset pricing terminology, central bank bond purchases decrease the market price of duration risk (the expected excess return on a long-  term bond per unit of risk). As I explained earlier, excess returns constitute the term premium component of long-term bond yields, so term premia and overall bond yields decline.

Eva Srejber: The role of monetary policy for growth in Sweden  Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of Sveriges Riksbank, at the FöreningsSparbanken’s Economics Day, held in Vellinge, on 6 June 2000. *  *  *  I would like to begin by thanking you for the invitation to speak here at FöreningsSparbanken’s Economics Day. In my speech today, I shall try to look beyond the day-to-day monetary policy where the focus on interest rate points and minor differences in assessments of the consumer price index at times entails a risk of a lack of perspective. It can therefore sometimes be justified to remind oneself and others of the role that economic policy can and should play. For me as a decision-maker at the Riksbank, this applies in particular of course to the role of monetary policy and the importance of the stability of the payment system. I would also like to recall the successes achieved in the Swedish economy during the past decade, where fiscal and monetary policy have both made important contributions. The challenge now is to reinforce what has been achieved and at the same time be strong enough to carry out the changes that remain. It is also important to continually evaluate and discuss the design of economic policy as new experiences are obtained. This requires openness, which has been a lodestar for the Riksbank in recent years.
Monetary policy is always adjusted with the aim of achieving the 2 per cent objective. Occasionally the argument has been presented that the Riksbank should accept that inflation has risen to the upper range of the interval around the objective. This argument is difficult to reconcile with the conduct of monetary policy in general. To begin with, it is clear that if the Riksbank did so, inflation would more often be outside the tolerance interval. In the second place the rate of inflation would on average be higher than 2 per cent unless the Riksbank had the same tolerance for inflation staying at the lower edge of the band in an economic downturn. However such a policy would instead reinforce the real swings in the economy, in contrast to a policy that is always focused on the objective. In upswings the Riksbank would allow more growth and inflation and in downturns we would do the opposite. There is not any asymmetry in monetary policy and there should not be any either. One of the purposes of a clearly formulated objective is simply to inform what the policy aims at. In such a way the inflation objective may anchor the price expectations in the economy. The Riksbank should be evaluated in light of this objective. If the Riksbank systematically aimed below the objective or always overestimated the risks of inflation, it would be manifested over time by too low inflation on average.

Inflation Expectations of the Players in the Money Market Agents)  In flation Expectation s of th e Players in th e Mon ey Market Agen ts Per cen t 5  5  J an .’95 4  4 3  F eb .’ .’9 96  CP I  No v .’ .’9 97  2  2  F eb .’ .’9 98  1  3  1  F eb .’ .’9 97  0  0  -1  -1 94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  So u r ce cess : St at i s t i cs S wed en an d Pr o s p er a R es ea r ch  BIS Review 14/1998  -9-  Question 7: Is the policy asymmetrical? It takes time before a change in the instrumental rate affects the economy and inflation. Therefore monetary policy always has to be formulated with the aid of forecasts of future inflation. When the Riksbank formulates monetary policy it is done with the aid of a forecast one or two years into the future. A simple rule of thumb should be able to describe monetary policy: if our overall assessment of inflation – assuming that the instrumental rate remains unchanged – indicates that inflation will deviate from the objective for two consecutive years, the instrumental rate must be changed in the corresponding direction.
I have talked about why this is the case many times in recent years and I therefore do not intend to go into it in more detail here today.4 Briefly, however, what is at issue is this: since nominal interest rates include compensation for inflation, these interest rates will be lower, on average, in a low-inflation economy. Moreover, there is an effective lower bound for the policy rate, where the positive effects of further reductions cease and the negative ones begin to dominate.5 This means that there is less scope for lowering the interest rate to stimulate demand in economic downturns. In addition, since expected inflation is lower, it is also more difficult to achieve as low a short-term real interest rate as would be needed to have a sufficient effect. One consequence of this that is worth noting is that, with inflation more persistently below 2 per cent, negative policy rates would become more common. Those who are critical of a policy rate below zero should therefore be strong advocates for maintaining confidence in the inflation target and thus also for a monetary policy that strives to achieve the target. …which is reflected in the strategy reviews of the Federal Reserve and the ECB The problems of persistently too low inflation play a central role in both the ECB’s strategy review from July this year and the US Federal Reserve’s review from August last year. The changes that were made clearly show a wish to avoid these problems.

The prices we can get for the goods we sell have not kept up with the prices we have to pay  Page 4  for the goods we buy. This has made us poorer as a country. The fall in our national real income has manifested itself in a rise in the prices we have to pay for the things we buy as consumers. The developments in energy prices have been particularly stark. The impact of that is very clear in the data so forgive me for spending a bit of time setting that out too. Chart 1: CPI inflation projection with direct energy contribution Based on market interest rate expectations  The purple bars on this chart show that a big part of the rise in consumer price inflation has been caused directly by energy prices. But the chart also shows the almost mechanical flipside of that. In the MPC’s central projection, inflation falls quite sharply over 2023 as last year’s large increases in energy prices drop out of the annual calculation. Page 5  Chart 2a: Typical household energy bill Smaller of Ofgem energy price cap and Energy Price Guarantee  This next chart illustrates what is going on. The blue line on the left-hand chart shows the evolution of the ‘typical’ household energy bill. Nobody actually pays the typical energy price bill, of course, but it has become an industry standard as a measure of what households pay on average.
Marzunisham Omar: Launch of Association of Islamic Banking and Financial Institutions Malaysia's Integrity Year 2023 Speech by Mr Marzunisham Omar, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Launch of Association of Islamic Banking and Financial Institutions Malaysia's (AIBIM) Integrity Year 2023, Kuala Lumpur, 14 February 2023. *** Assalamu'alaikum and a very good morning to distinguished guests. It is with great pleasure and gratitude to AIBIM that I am able to be with you today to speak on a topic that is close to my heart. Integrity, as this audience is aware, is the cornerstone of any well-functioning financial system. Throughout history, we have seen the damaging consequences from bank runs, financial market meltdowns and other financial shocks that occur when the public can no longer count on financial institutions to do the right thing in private. And yet, cases of corruption and financial mismanagement continue to abound. Trust is central to banking. If we already know how badly things can go when trust breaks down, why is integrity – or rather, the lack thereof – still an issue in 2023? Anybody here who has ever had to make a difficult life decision may understand why. Integrity is not a given. It cannot be written or codified into existence. Integrity requires continuous personal and institutional reflection of what our values are. Above all, it demands of us the strongest form of ethical courage to stay true and consistent to these values, especially when it is much easier to do otherwise.

This, in turn, induces pressures for depreciation. However, one must recognize that these are not very significant effects because, in a floating regime, the pass-through coefficient from the exchange rate to inflation is limited. 4 Emerging economies may feel tempted, after a long history of crises caused by exchange rate misalignments, to keep their currencies depreciated. Managing the exchange rate is, apart from hardly feasible in the medium to long term, risky. In the first place, in less flexible  4  For a recent discussion on the Chilean evidence see De Gregorio (2009b). BIS Review 113/2009  3  exchange rate regimes, the pass-through from exchange rates to inflation increases, because the level of the exchange rate may become a coordinator of price expectations, given the policymakers’ commitment to exchange rate stability. This, in turn, feeds back to increased pressures to keep the exchange rate stable, thus aggravating the problem. Secondly, a commitment of the authority with exchange rate stability may create perverse incentives to financial risk taking, by artificially lowering the cost of borrowing abroad. This reinforces fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), creating a spiral towards exchange rate rigidity, and deriving in currency mismatches and exchange rate misalignments that the policies were intended to prevent in the first place. I am not saying that attention must not be paid to the exchange rate beyond its effects on inflation. The exchange rate is an important determinant of resource allocation, and hence, excessive deviations from fundamentals may create distortions.
Governments showed a strong commitment to reduce systemic risk by saving important financial institutions, by providing guarantees for inter-bank lending, by raising the level of deposit guarantees for the public etc. Such measures, most of the times designed as temporary, appear to have been successful in restoring the market confidence and steering the world economy back in the gradual recovery path. Focusing on the financial markets and institutions in the aftermath of the crisis, a number of issues, previously known but many times neglected, have re-appeared forcefully to request a serious and thorough response by the authorities. Many of these issues relate to the financial activity itself, others are connected more with the surrounding economic environment. It can be said now that the supervisory authorities of the financial markets and institutions are partly responsible for what happened. Despite the rhetoric, they failed to properly and timely  BIS Review 139/2009  1  identify and control the risk in the financial industry. Here one can mention the soft-hand on bank wholesale borrowing that financed the foreign currency credit in a certain jurisdiction, the neglect for the special purpose entities that were created to by-pass balance sheet prudential requirements etc. There are many reasons for this weakness and a number of them, in my opinion, go beyond the legal and resource capabilities of the supervisory authorities to act. On their own, the supervisory authorities were wrong in basing their work on the misconception that strong individual financial institutions are sufficient for the entire financial system stability.

It means that we should move beyond the north-south divide which has too often shaped past discussions on EMU. Economic fragmentation is receding on our continent, thanks to a broad cyclical recovery, the ECB’s actions and the bold reforms initiated in several countries. We should be careful not to allow 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  political fragmentation to jeopardise these achievements. Ultimately, what matters is that we strike the right balance between solidarity and responsibility and that we embrace a vision which secures the integrity and resilience of the euro area. We all know that this is not easy. But failure to do so would leave the ECB alone at the forefront of macroeconomic stabilisation in the euro area. This is a risk not worth taking. Thank you. 1 See Cœuré, B. (2018), “The euro area’s three lines of defence”, speech at the conference “Deepening of EMU”,  Ljubljana, 2 February. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches