samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To be clear, I am not predicting another LTCM crisis any time in the near future. But I would like to use the case of LTCM to exemplify some key vulnerabilities which played a role in the collapse – acknowledging that LTCM was not an open-ended fund and did not face redemption risk, as most mutual funds do. In particular, let me focus on risks stemming from liquidity mismatches, leverage and interconnectedness across the financial system. The asset management industry keeps reminding us that vulnerabilities in funds cannot be presumed to resemble those of banks. And it is true that investment funds do not issue deposits and that potential losses in a fund are borne by end-investors. But there is a fundamental difference between the equity in banks and the equity in funds. Investors in an open-end fund can run by redeeming their units, whereas equity holders in a bank can only run by selling their shares to other market participants. A run by investment fund unitholders can therefore resemble a run by bank depositors. In both cases, the institution is, in principle, forced to sell assets in a fires sale in order to meet its short-dated liabilities. In general, asset managers are highly aware of their fund’s liquidity position. In the interest of investors, the fund managers have incentives to minimise any impact from their own actions on financial markets, while at the same time accommodating share creations and redemptions. So a bank-like run by unitholders in a fund may not be very likely.

Most importantly, from a macroprudential perspective, the proposed measures would help national authorities in setting binding leverage limits for alternative investment funds to mitigate systemic risk. The recommendations foresee also a role of the authorities in suspending redemptions in a stress scenario. Going beyond the ESRB recommendation, I would argue in favour of complementing the powers that are currently envisaged for authorities with ex ante tools targeting liquidity risks at system level. Existing liquidity management tools may mitigate liquidity risk ex post, but they might not suffice to prevent the build-up of vulnerabilities in exuberant times ex ante. The toolkit available to macroprudential authorities should therefore include additional ex ante requirements such as minimum liquidity buffers and redemption notice periods.12 Mandatory liquidity buffers require funds to hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets for the fund to be able to meet redemptions and margin calls under many foreseeable scenarios. The introduction of minimum notice periods would help align a fund’s liability structure with the liquidity- and riskprofile on the asset side. Overall, such tools could be used to raise the sector’s resilience to potential investor runs or spikes in margin calls. Setting these requirements would greatly limit the sector’s ability to build-up liquidity risk in exuberant times. Finally, given the cross-border nature of the investment fund sector, we need to strengthen the European perspective in the supervision of investment funds while also ensuring a globally consistent approach to monitoring.
But I would caution those who have doubts about the euro, that they underestimate the political commitment to it at their own risk. The euro area is moving towards a more sustainable equilibrium, and comparably fast in international comparison. The ambition to provide long-term foundations for EMU in less than a decade is a historical step of great significance. It is faithful to the objective laid down by the European Treaties to create an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The alternative would be the continuation of the current trend of market fragmentation, leading to protectionism and ultimately to populism. Some of the proposals will imply a greater sharing of sovereignty among Member States. This is unavoidable to guarantee sufficient economic and financial convergence for EMU to function effectively. But it must be ensured that if sovereignty is elevated to the EU level, so is democratic control, and that steps are taken towards the emergence of a true European identity. As central bankers, we all have an interest in global stability. I am confident that, with the measures I have described, the euro area will remain a cornerstone of the international economy. Thank you for your attention. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches

Philipp Hildebrand: Setting the course for the Swiss economy – challenges for the Swiss financial centre and outlook for the future Summary of a speech by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, to the Zürcher Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft, Zurich, 17 May 2010. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  The Swiss banks face two major challenges. First, sooner or later, they will have to carry out their core business – asset management for foreign customers – in a tax-conform environment. Second, the big banks will be required to operate under more stringent regulatory requirements. These challenges are likely to lead to structural changes in the financial centre. How are such changes likely to affect the Swiss economy? An empirical analysis shows that, although the financial centre plays an important role in the Swiss economy, it also entails considerable risks. In the case of cross-border asset management, the relationship between the risk to the economy and the income earned is acceptable. However, this is hardly the case for the banks’ own trading activities. Consequently, current regulatory efforts could not only improve the stability of the financial sector, but also increase both the profitability of banks and the benefit which the Swiss economy derives from the financial sector over the long-term period.
Conversely, tightening is achieved by raising the policy rate above its neutral level. The level of this neutral rate of interest is determined by the supply of savings and the demand for these savings for investment purposes. At the outset of globalisation, the neutral interest rate was initially high owing to the considerable demand for investment in the newly opened economies. However, as prosperity increased and life expectancy rose, the supply of savings also grew markedly, and the neutral rate of interest declined as a result. If central banks wanted to ease their monetary policy, they therefore had to set their policy rate correspondingly low. And because you cannot lower interest rates indefinitely without at some point triggering a flight to cash, after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008 many central banks resorted to unconventional monetary policy measures by buying various assets and expanding their balance sheets. Thanks to this new, broad set of monetary policy instruments, central banks thus also had the necessary room to manoeuvre in helping to stabilise the economy during the coronavirus pandemic. They supplied the economy with additional liquidity and kept interest rates low. Besides the monetary policy measures, the fiscal policy support packages, some of which were 2/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  sizeable, also had an expansionary effect. This made it possible to limit the severe economic downturn caused by the pandemic, and facilitated a rapid recovery.

Thomas Jordan: What are the consequences of the war in Ukraine for the SNB's monetary policy? Speech by Mr Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the 114th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of the Swiss National Bank, Berne, 29 April 2022. * * * Madam President of the Bank Council Dear Shareholders Dear Guests I would like to warmly welcome you all to our Annual General Meeting, and I am delighted that this year we are able to meet in person again. The geopolitical situation has changed fundamentally in the past few months. Russia’s attack on Ukraine has shaken us all. Our thoughts are with the victims of this terrible war. Considerations of the economic consequences pale by comparison with this suffering. Nevertheless, such deliberations are also important for the citizens of Switzerland, and the Swiss National Bank is therefore working intensively on addressing the impact the war will have. On the one hand, we have to properly contextualise the immediate economic effects. On the other hand, we also have to address questions pertaining to the longer term. I will begin my speech by looking at the closely interconnected global economy as we knew it until just recently, the gains in prosperity it brought, and what it meant for monetary policy. I will go on to explain how the consequences of the war that can already be felt are influencing our current monetary policy.
Further turbulence in the oil markets could have a negative impact on economic activity throughout the world and, therefore, on euro area employment as well. These  BIS Review 8/2003  1  concerns could weigh adversely on confidence. In addition, the accumulated macroeconomic imbalances outside the euro area have led to uncertainty surrounding the strength of the recovery in other major economies. By way of conclusion, there are still downside risks to the outlook for euro area economic activity. Turning to prices, HICP inflation has remained slightly above 2% in recent months. On the one hand, there was upward pressure from oil prices and from various increases in indirect taxes and administered prices. On the other hand, the strengthening of the euro, together with base effects, helped to limit year-on-year consumer price increases. Looking ahead, given the outlook for moderate economic growth, the gradual pass-through of the appreciation of the euro should contribute to a dampening of inflationary pressures. Overall, the most likely outcome remains that inflation will fall and eventually stabilise at a level below 2% in the course of 2003. However, the volatility in oil prices makes it very difficult to forecast prospects for inflation movements accurately, especially in the short term. Moderate wage developments are a major prerequisite in order for price stability to prevail in the medium term. This will also help to improve the prospects for economic growth and further employment creation. When looking back we see that wage growth followed an upward trend until recently, despite the economic slowdown.

At the same time, we introduced as a new element the principle of "representativeness", linked to the desire that at any moment in time the NCB governors exercising the voting right represent a reasonable share of the euro area as a whole. This desire to ensure "representativeness", by way of the differentiation among governors on the basis of the country ranking, should not be misunderstood as an attempt to re-introduce national elements into decision-making. On the contrary, the allocation of governors to groups is a purely auxiliary device, which is used exclusively to determine who votes when. For substantive decision-making – and that is what was crucial to us – the tried-and-tested principles of the Eurosystem constitution have been kept fully intact: the principle of ad personam participation of governors remains valid and the "one member, one vote" principle applies to all members exercising a voting right. All of this will ensure that, also in a future enlarged Governing Council, it is the force of arguments that counts in our deliberations and not which country an NCB governor comes from and whether this is a large or a small country. Finally, given that the sequencing of future euro area expansions is highly uncertain, the new voting system had to be sufficiently robust and able to accommodate up to 27 euro area Member States, so as to avoid having to change the rules every time a new Member State joins the euro area.
2  This certainly requires a strong commitment from us, placing a special emphasis on drawing conclusions based on sound research and analysis. In addition, and also importantly, it calls for our proactive engagement in a practical experimentation phase that can shed light on the nature and scale of the pain points, problems and underlying threats, and also on potential solutions. That is why while the issuance of a digital euro is not foreseen in the immediate future, the Eurosystem has a keen interest to tackle the challenges arising from possible future scenarios. As you may know, many other central banks2 are already analysing this possibility. Along these lines, you may have already heard about the tests that the People’s Bank of China is currently carrying out in a number of provinces, or the extensive work that preceded the well-publicised e-krona pilot in Sweden. You may also be aware of the Fed’s recent announcement of its intention to remain on the frontier of research and policy development regarding CBDCs.3. As ECB President Lagarde mentioned a few weeks ago,4 earlier this year the Eurosystem decided to set up a taskforce to explore the benefits, risks and operational challenges of introducing a digital euro. The results of this work will soon be shared publicly. However, this is only the first step in a more profound reflection that still has to take place.

After all we have heard today, I think it is safe to say that none of us disputes the idea that digital technologies are at the very heart of all serious present-day attempts to achieve any kind of sustainable, cutting-edge innovation. Moreover, in the aftermath of COVID-19, it is fair to expect that the financial services industry will have no choice but to continue to navigate the unchartered waters of digital transformation, on the lookout for a safe harbour that will provide shelter and, hopefully, a gateway to a booming market place. As central bankers with a clear public policy agenda and mandate, we cannot refrain from meeting our obligations in this context. Consequently, as the need for a major makeover becomes more pressing, I believe that financial authorities should take a proactive stance towards digital innovation. We should do so by striking the right balance between responsible parties, assignments and the necessary guardrails whilst ensuring optimal provision of what the BIS General Manager Agustín Carstens likes to call “central bank public goods”. For this reason, central banks must try to stay ahead of the curve and be ready to embrace experimentation and research on these topics as soon as possible, while building bridges with all the relevant stakeholders and closely scrutinising the progress that their initiatives achieve in related fields. Only this strategy will pay dividends in the long run and pave the way for a future that best serves the needs and maximises the welfare of our society.
All this was made possible on account of efforts in recent decades to develop and strengthen the financial system. In the same way, the financial sector will continue to have a central role in providing solutions to the challenges ahead – be it in bringing about an orderly transition to a greener economy, or helping households and businesses become more resilient to financial shocks in an increasingly dynamic and fast changing economic environment. And so, while we have been busy directing our minds and energies dealing with the here and now of the pandemic, we have not stopped thinking about the future. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  Today, we will be launching the Financial Sector Blueprint 2022–2026. It sets out Bank Negara Malaysia’s vision for financial sector development over the next five years, and our broad strategies for getting there. This includes the vision for the financial sector to be agile and resilient to support the transition of our nation to its next stage of development. We have identified five priorities that will anchor our efforts – working together with the government, industry, business and social enterprises and other stakeholders – to promote a financial system that will secure long term growth, planetary health and shared prosperity. The five priorities are: 1. First, funding Malaysia’s economic transformation; 2. Second, elevating the financial well-being of households and businesses; 3. Third, advancing digitalisation of the financial sector; 4. Fourth, positioning the financial system to facilitate and orderly transition to a greener economy; 5.

To this end, the Blueprint seeks to align the financial sector with the national aspiration to not only become a high value-added and high-income economy, but also lay a solid foundation for a more dynamic, inclusive and sustainable development path. Fourth, we continue to be firmly anchored on the Bank’s monetary and financial stability mandates. As we have always emphasised, sustainable economic growth can only happen within a context where monetary and financial stability is preserved, and where the integrity of the financial system is safeguarded. This Blueprint is the fruit of the labour of many, both from within and outside Bank Negara Malaysia. For this, our heartfelt thanks goes out to all who have generously given ideas, insights and time to make this Blueprint possible. I would also like to thank Yang Berhormat Senator Tengku Datuk Seri Utama Zafrul Aziz, Minister of Finance for gracing this event and launching the Blueprint. While producing the Blueprint has been a lot of hard work, the greater task for us is to turn its 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  vision into reality. This requires us to work and think outside the box as the nation enters a new stage of development. It is our desire and belief that the financial sector will continue to serve Malaysia well in the years ahead, doing its part to improve the well-being of people now and for the generations to come. 3/3  BIS central bankers' speeches
We take it seriously: we retain our full optionality on the decisions we will make from March and in the following quarters, informed then by the latest data, forecasts and geopolitical developments. And as we clearly stick to our sequencing – starting with first tapering and second lift off - we will also retain our full optionality about the pace of this sequence, and timing of moving from one stage to the other. Hence, while the direction of the journey is clear, one shouldn’t rush to conclusions about its calendar: it will remain gradual, state dependent, and open in each of its steps. * I. The outstanding success of the euro So – back to the tale of the euro. You students are perhaps too young to remember the politics of the 1990s, but it’s worth reminding ourselves of how far we have come. When we recall that the European Union had only 12 members when the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, we realize how much  Page 2 sur 9 the world has changed. Today the EU counts 27 members and 19 countries have adopted the euro. The addition of Croatia and Bulgaria will soon bring the latter number up to 21. Along with this impressive progress, there was of course a significant loss: the U.K. opted out of the single currency from the start and has more recently exited the EU altogether. We continentals may regret those decisions but we respect them.

And, so that the growth fostered in this way can create many jobs, structural policies will have to assume the principal role, while the role of monetary policy will then dwindle and fade away - alas - to nothing. BIS Review 67/1997
This assessment is also broadly reflected in the March 2019 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area, which foresee annual HICP inflation at 1.2% in 2019, 1.5% in 2020 and 1.6% in 2021. Compared with the December 2018 Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, the outlook for HICP inflation has been revised down across the projection horizon, reflecting in particular the more subdued near-term growth outlook. Turning to the monetary analysis, broad money (M3) growth decreased to 3.8% in January 2019, from 4.1% in December 2018. M3 growth continues to be backed by bank credit creation, notwithstanding a recent moderation in credit dynamics. The narrow monetary aggregate M1 remained the main contributor to broad money growth. The annual growth rate of loans to non-financial corporations declined to 3.3% in January 2019, from 3.9% in December 2018, reflecting a base effect but also, in some countries, the typical lagged reaction to the slowdown in economic activity, while the annual growth rate of loans to households remained at 3.2%. Borrowing conditions for firms and households are still favourable, as the monetary policy measures put in place since June 2014 continue to support access to financing, in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises. The policy measures decided today, and in particular the new series of TLTROs, will help to ensure that bank lending conditions remain favourable going forward.

Michael Gondwe: Skills development as a catalyst for youth employment promotion, income growth, and micro, small and medium enterprises Keynote address by Dr Michael Gondwe, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, at the stakeholder consultative workshop, organised by the Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA) of the Republic of Zambia, Lusaka, 18 October 2012. *  *  *  Chairperson Ladies and gentlemen It is indeed an honour and privilege to make this keynote address on skills development as a catalyst for youth employment promotion, income growth, and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) development. Mr Chairman Over the recent past, macro-economic stability and appreciable economic growth has been achieved in Zambia as reflected in: i. Positive real GDP growth averaging 6.5% per annum in the last 5 years coupled with rising per capita incomes;  ii. Falling inflation, relatively stable exchange rate and downward trend in lending rates;  iii. Favourable external sector performance; and  iv. Stability and growth in the financial sector;  The main challenge that still remains is that of meeting the basic needs of the majority of Zambians, in particular our youth and women, who suffer the brunt of high unemployment. It is for this reason that action is urgently needed to boost skills development in order to enhance productive capacities, investment and decent jobs to sustain the incomes of working families, the poor and the vulnerable.