samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  In recent years, goods and services exports have been the engine of our economic activity, against a background of marked weakness of domestic private expenditure and contained imports from the rest of the world. During 2014, foreign trade flows have undergone changes of some scale, as a result of the loss of steam in our export markets (in the emerging economies and, since the spring, in the euro area alike) and the acceleration in imports as the recovery progressively took hold. As a result, the contribution of the external sector to GDP has declined appreciably and the pace of adjustment of the external imbalance has been less rapid than expected. Conceivably, some of these developments are temporary and will be reversed, in part, in the coming months. Moreover, the depreciating trend of the euro may help improve the external balance in the near future. However, the weakness of the euro area, along with the high sensitivity of our imports to changes in final demand, highlight the need to further improve the competitiveness of our economy. As regards inflation, the Spanish economy is currently posting very low rates. This partly reflects temporary factors, but also structural factors that account for the subdued tone of core inflation. Inflation rates have been trending downwards for months throughout Europe, and Spain is one of the euro area countries that has moved most markedly in this direction. We can argue about the advantages and disadvantages of a price situation such as that described.

What is clear to me is that there is – at the very least – the potential for misuse of this specific feature, as various ongoing misconduct cases bear testament to. The Code already provides guidance that is designed to minimise the risks of that misconduct occurring. The underlying debate, which our consultative process seeks to resolve, is whether there are ways of reducing those risks even further. If we can identify specific, legitimate, uses of this type of trading activity, as well as the already well-known illegitimate uses, we can then cater for both within the Code. But if the evidence suggests that trading in the last look window is simply inconsistent with good conduct, this section of the Code will need to be updated accordingly. It’s impossible for me at this stage to presuppose the outcome. What I want to emphasise is the GFXC’s commitment to acting on the evidence we receive. We are fully aware that the Committee’s eventual conclusion has the potential impact on some firms’ current business models, and that is why we are committed to establishing the broadest possible evidence base on which to take our decision. There are nine days remaining before the feedback window closes, and I encourage all of you – both price makers and takers – to provide us with your views. While the last look debate is the current centre of attention it is important to recognise that over time the Committee will need to update other areas of the Code.
The new standard was very much a response to the financial crisis, the first reform of the Accord to be backed by a remit from world leaders to effect real change on the global scale. It built on a number of more immediate domestic responses, including in the UK the FSA’s so-called 4–6–8 approach. The new standard requires more and better quality capital, and is a step change in capital adequacy. For the largest UK banks, and taking into account all of the changes brought in by Basel III, there is a seven-fold increase in the amount of Core Tier I capital, the highest quality of capital that must have the characteristics of equity which major banks are expected to hold. Under the Basel II regime, the Pillar I minimum requirement was £ of this highest quality capital for the largest five UK Banks. Compared to this, taking both capital minima and capital buffers together when Basel III is fully implemented the figure will be £ as measured in September 2013 (ie on a like-for-like basis in terms of the point in time). Breaking down this increase of £ in Core Tier I capital, the largest part £ is accounted for by the change in the definition of capital resources, a further £ relates to raising the minimum requirement from 2% to 4.5% of risk weighted assets (and changes to the risk weights), £ to the Basel III Capital Conservation Buffer, and £ to the Basel III Globally Significant Banks Buffer.

In brief: the definition of capital set in Basel I included instruments that did not properly absorb losses; capital requirements were too low in relation to the underlying riskiness of assets, particularly for the trading book; and banks were able to move risk assets increasingly into the trading book. The finger is often pointed at Basel II for enabling all of this to happen, but the timeline suggests that the problems built up under the combined Basel I and Market Risk Amendment regime. That said, Basel II had its own flaws, and was not well implemented, points I will return to later. But, first, I want to look more at the flaws of the pre-crisis regime, starting with the definition of capital. This was flawed from the outset in the late 1980s, both in the definition of eligible capital instruments and the approach taken to the adjustments which should ensure that accounting balance sheet items such as goodwill are not recognised in regulatory capital. A further issue in my view has been the treatment of provisions. Basel I allowed hybrid debt instruments to count as Tier 1 capital even though they had no principal loss absorbency mechanism on a going concern basis. They only absorbed losses after reserves (equity) were exhausted or in insolvency. It was possible to operate with no more than two per cent of risk-weighted assets in the form of equity.
Several considerations need to be made. By adopting a single currency, the country foregoes independent monetary policy and the central bank can not act as a lender of last resort. The loss of monetary policy independence can be problematic if a country has achieved little in the way of real convergence (both structural and cyclical convergence) and is susceptible to asymmetric shocks. On the other hand, the loss of the lender of last resort function by the national central banks implies high and protracted fiscal costs in the case of financial crises. For this reason, a healthy and resilient financial system would be required for participating in the monetary union. It is partly a reflection of these economic challenges that the new EU members appear to be following different trajectories towards EMU. On one hand, Slovenia, the Baltic countries, Malta, Cyprus and Slovakia have proceeded to join the ERM II with a view to enter EMU in the future. The other countries, notably the larger Central European ones, have opted to stay out of the ERM II in order to have more time to do the necessary economic adjustments. (II)  Challenges of the ERM II  Once the economic argument and the political consensus are strong enough to support EMU membership, the acceding country can decide to enter the ERM II mechanism. What could go wrong for accession countries during the ERM II? Some often-cited issues are related to fiscal consolidation, financial stability and the choice of the central parity.

“Sustainable Regimes of Capital Movements in Accession Countries”, CEPR. Buiter, W.H. and Grafe, C. (2002). “Anchor, Float or Abandon Ship: Exchange Rate Regimes for the Accession Countries”, EBRD 10 Year Anniversary Conference. European Central Bank, (2003). “Policy Position of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on Exchange Rate Issues Relating to the Acceding Countries.’  4  BIS Review 1/2007
17 17  Jul.17  1818  Jul.18  19 19  (*) As from January 2019 the line uses the new indexes with 2018=100 annual base, so they are not strictly comparable with past figures. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and National Statistics Institute (INE). 9  Figure 3 Selected CPI prices (indexes, January 2018=100)  Mobile phone services  101  Telecom package services  101 105  105  100  100 100  100  99  99  95  95  98  90  90  98 16  17  18  19  New cars  110  16  105  100  100  95  95 16  17  18  18  19  Air transport services  110 160  105  17  160  120  120  80  80  19  16  17  ----2013 basket  18  19  ----2018 basket  Source: National Statistics Institute (INE).

According to these figures, between 2015 and 2019 around 865 thousand people came to the country, which also has a significant effect on the demographics (figure 4). As we reported to this Commission last December, an immigration phenomenon of this magnitude has a strong effect on the labor force. Moreover, the immigrant population has a participation rate in the labor force of the order of 80% according to the 2017 Census, compared with the native population’s which is somewhat above 60% according to the same source. As we noted in a box in last December’s Report, the effects of immigration manifest through supply and demand channels that together generate an expansionary effect on output and have a limited inflationary impact. On one hand, the increase in population brings with it an increase in aggregate demand for consumer goods and services, pushing inflation upward. But, on the other hand, immigration expands the supply of labor, which moderates wage increases and reduces the marginal costs of companies, putting downward pressure on inflation. While over time the economy adjusts to accommodate the population increase, it is unclear which channel will dominate, that of higher aggregate demand or that of the increased labor force. This will depend on the propensity to save of the immigrant population (considering remittances), the willingness to work at different wage levels and how fast the capital stock will adjust in response to the larger scale of the economy.
2  Supervision, which I have the honour of chairing, decided last October to commence work on the financial risks associated with climate change, while the Single Supervisory Mechanism has decided to include climate risks in its Risk Map for 2020, the basis for defining supervisory priorities.5 Also of note is the work carried out by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) to promote the publication by businesses of consistent and comparable financial information relating to climate change.6 Apart from international coordination, a high degree of coordination between the various economic policies is also fundamental. Allow me to illustrate this with an analogy, particularly relevant to the Banco de España and the Eurosystem. As we all know, the European Central bank (ECB) has in recent years been implementing an expansionary monetary policy to achieve its inflation target, and thus support economic growth in the euro area. We on the Governing Council of the ECB have always insisted that the effectiveness of our measures would be increased if they were complemented by a more expansionary fiscal policy (where the margin exists) or an ambitious structural reform agenda. The situation of climate policy is similar. The necessary investment for the technological transformation required in our economy will hardly take place if financial conditions are not favourable or the regulatory environment penalises competition or innovation. Later on I will refer to the role that can be played by the financial sector and also by supervisors, regulators and central banks.

It is important to have such a tangible point of reference for standards of conduct, but setting the right tone requires more than lofty exhortations for good behaviour. First, lead by example. Management must take time and effort to clearly articulate the firm’s core values and purpose. They have to demonstrate commitment and credibility by “walking the talk” with concrete policies, processes and actions. The firm’s leaders must themselves be seen to be guided by those same qualities they want their staff to emulate. And programmes to build a culture of trust and ethics cannot be a one-off exercise to fend off bad publicity or to placate the regulator. Shaping culture demands a sustained effort. Second, create a safe environment for whistle-blowing. This means providing the necessary mechanisms to challenge, question, and report ethical breaches. •  A number of banks in Singapore have put in place new channels for whistleblowing and enhanced the escalation and investigation processes to facilitate staff reporting. Third, align human resource policies to a culture of trust and ethics. I have already mentioned compensation as being an important way to create incentives for the right behaviour. But the incentives for ethical conduct must go beyond compensation and encompass all HR policies: recruitment, on-boarding, appraisal, training and coaching, promotion, and career development. •  An organisation’s HR policies and practices are the clearest demonstration of its value system, the qualities it regards as important.
It had an impact on the UK through a number of different channels – global financial markets, the financial health of our banks and other financial institutions, world trade and economic activity, and through business and consumer confidence. Because the shock was much bigger than earlier shocks the MPC had faced, the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  policy response was more dramatic, featuring deep cuts in interest rates and direct injections of money into the economy through Quantitative Easing. In my view, this was entirely right and appropriate given the risks of a deepening recession and deflationary pressures. Chart 4 Strong emerging market growth to continue Annual percentage growth rates of real GDP 10  Advanced Economies *  8  Emerging & Developing Economies *  6 4 2 0 -2 -4 1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010  2012  *: 2011 and 2012 growth rates are IMF forecasts. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook  However, the trends in the global economy have now turned around. As Chart 4 shows, global growth in both the advanced economies and emerging and developing market economies – dominated by Asia – has recovered to rates very similar to our experience before the recession. And the upward pressure on global energy and commodity prices we saw before the recession have resumed.

In the debates we have had within the MPC over the past year, there appear to be four key areas where these differences of judgement arise, and which – so far at least – have led me to a different conclusion on monetary policy from the majority on the Committee. These are not new issues in that they have featured throughout my time on the MPC and in many earlier debates on UK monetary policy. But the current economic situation has brought them into sharper focus. Issue 1: The powerful influence of the global economy The first of these key issues I would highlight is the way in which the MPC takes into account the powerful influence of global economic trends and their impact on the UK economy. The way in which the global economy affects the economic outlook for the UK has been a major theme of my speeches and interviews since my very earliest days on the MPC. The UK economy is very open to international trade, with imports and exports combined accounting for over 60% of GDP. We are also the second most important global economy after the US in terms of flows of international direct investment. The UK is home to one of the most important global financial centres in the world – London.
But to develop and manage such an app, a bank has to assemble a highly skilled and diverse technology team: product owners – who create the vision for the app and work with business and tech teams to deliver it; business analysts – who work with customers to understand their requirements; system and security architects – who design the app based on its security, data, and infrastructure requirements; API designers – who develop APIs that provide and pull data from various financial institutions onto the app, taking into consideration data security; UI/UX designers – who design the look and feel of the app to provide a good user experience, such as minimising the number of clicks to perform an action; so ware developers – who write the programmes that underpin the functionalities of the app and seamless integration across its diﬀerent components; testers – who ensure that the app performs according to the requirements; production supporters – who monitor the performance of the app, manage incidents, and ensure timely resolution of issues; and data analysts – who analyse app usage statistics and customer feedback, in order to recommend improvements to the app. Let me catch my breath here. The multitude of technology talent needed to develop and manage just this one single product is staggering. The technology workforce in our financial sector is an estimated 25,000; 30% more than in 2014. Singaporeans make up just over one-third of this workforce.

It reflects the impact of the Job Support Scheme that shored up local employment; and the border control measures during the COVID-19 pandemic that made the employment of foreigners diﬀicult. Job growth in the financial sector has been consistently strong over the past 5 years A total of 21,000 net jobs were created during 2016-2020, with Singaporeans taking up about 16,000 or about 75% of these jobs. With more financial institutions setting up their regional and global hubs in Singapore today, 40% of financial sector jobs here are primarily international-facing. Half of these jobs are filled by Singaporeans. They include good jobs such as: application developers who develop digital products for overseas markets; private bankers who serve regional clients; and risk managers who monitor risk metrics for the regional or even global business. The employment outlook for the financial sector in 2021 remains positive. Late last year, MAS and the Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF) conducted a survey of financial institutions’ projected hiring from January to December 2021. Close to 800 financial institutions responded, representing about two-thirds of the financial services workforce. Financial institutions are oﬀering 6,500 newly created positions in 2021. These are new jobs created and do not take into account gross outflow of jobs. About 6,000 of the newly created positions are permanent jobs. Half of these jobs are in technology and consumer banking, with the remaining jobs spread across other business lines and functions.
With such abundant reserves, even quite large unexpected variations in reserves holdings need not threaten monetary control (‘Zone A’ in Chart 7). That may change as central banks unwind their QE holdings.11 As the aggregate level of reserves falls, the chances of a sudden reserves drain pushing up on market rates increase (‘Zone B’ in Chart 7). Of course no-one knows with any certainty where this inflection point lies. So central banks must either aim to stop asset unwind well before that point is reached (the approach announced by the FOMC), or have tools in place ready to allow banks to replace the reserves depleted by asset sales/redemptions as and when they need to (the approach we expect to take in the UK).12  In the UK, the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted to begin balance sheet unwind in February 2022 – see Monetary Policy Report - February 2022 | Bank of England – and gave further detail on its approach in its May Report: Monetary Policy Report - May 2022 | Bank of England. 12 See Waiting for the exit: QT and the Bank of England’s long-term balance sheet - speech by Andrew Hauser | Bank of England 11  Bank of England  Page 11  None of this fundamentally changes the nature of the challenges facing central banks in maintaining monetary control. But it does underscore the importance of reflecting operational needs in the design of potential future digital currency frameworks.13 5.

Working towards promoting equitable and inclusive growth is necessary for the long-term sustainability of ASEAN. The industry should explore these less penetrated markets through new strategies and strengthened capabilities. Nonetheless, expecting markets to effectively provide for the needs of the underserved may be challenging. Markets, driven by financial motives have a tendency to end up instead widening the disparities in income, equality and socio-economic protection. Intervention or even redistribution becomes a necessary tool to correct this, rebalance societal fortunes to enable the economically worst off to benefit and be co-opted back into the mainstream, as part of an overall social agenda that promotes inclusion and cohesiveness. This goal, of inclusion and cohesiveness, may well be a prerequisite to truly maximising society’s economic potential. Consistent with this is another key initiative in Malaysia that targets the underserved. This is the new insurance scheme for the Bottom 40% households. Supported by pioneering contributions from foreign insurers, a fund will be set up to provide insurance cover for those eligible. They will receive income support if they are diagnosed with critical illnesses or hospitalised. This policy intervention attempts to resolve the market’s inability to provide such protection. Perception out there has been that this segment of the population is uninsurable, or from the perspective of insurers, too risky and likely unprofitable. We are taking a view that this is misplaced, and it will take proof to change this. Currently, we are still finalising the details and targeting the scheme to be fully operational in early 2019.
Zamani Abdul Ghani: Malaysia – seizing the opportunity to evolve Opening remarks by Mr Zamani Abdul Ghani, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia, at the Seminar on Financing for Overseas Project, Kuala Lumpur, 14 January 2010. *  *  *  I am pleased to be invited today to officiate this Seminar on Financing for Overseas Project. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I wish to thank and congratulate the EXIM Bank, the ICD and the CIDB for their efforts in organizing this important and invaluable Seminar. The continuous collaboration among Malaysian private and public related organizations with the IDB and its related organizations demonstrate the solidarity of the Muslim Ummah and the community at large towards achieving a strong and sustainable economic development. This also reflects the growing importance of cross border trade and investment among the OIC member countries. We, at Bank Negara Malaysia, are pleased to note that over 200 participants from more than 100 companies in Malaysia are participating in this Seminar. Today’s Seminar which brings together participants in the related industries, not only provide information on the business opportunities abroad, but also serves as an excellent platform to establish new networking links as well as sharing of innovative ideas and invaluable experiences. Malaysia has always accorded and will continue to accord a high priority on enhancing collaboration with the OIC member countries towards fostering intra-OIC trade and investment. Realizing the large business opportunities in the OIC countries, Malaysia entered into an MoU with the IDB in 2004.

Mr Sudhir Amembal the principal resource person is a renowned authority in leasing, having undertaken various leasing consultancies and training worldwide and being an author of various leasing publications and books. I am very grateful that he has found time to come to Zambia and share his vast experiences with us. I am glad to note that this seminar has brought together key players in the economy and other stakeholders. I thank you for your attention. BIS Review 17/2007  3