samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Developments in other countries are just as important for the krone as developments in the Norwegian economy. Capital flows freely and flows can change rapidly. This can spill over to exchange rates and interest rates as well as output and employment. There is a cost involved for businesses in hedging against fluctuations in the krone. A krone that is stable - but too strong - also entails social costs in the form of low activity. Likewise, a krone that is stable - but too weak - is a source of high inflation. Norway is running a current account surplus as a result of sizeable oil and gas exports. Owing to high oil prices, the current account surplus is rising this year. An increase in the current account surplus will normally result in higher net demand for the domestic currency. In Norway, however, the additional foreign exchange revenues that accrue to the Norwegian state as a result of high oil prices will be invested in foreign securities through the Government Petroleum Fund. As a result, they will not have a direct impact on the balance in the Norwegian foreign exchange market. Oil companies hold a large share of their financial capital in foreign currency, and higher revenues in these companies therefore results in an increase in capital outflows. The effects of changes in the current account on net demand for the Norwegian krone can be illustrated by adjusting the basic balance for transfers to the Petroleum Fund and oil companies’ estimated cash surplus.

Higher demand leads to higher output and employment. Wage growth may pick up. Higher wage growth combined with higher profit margins will result in higher inflation. Lower interest rates normally lead to a depreciation of the krone. Imported goods then become more expensive and inflation accelerates. Expectations play a key role in price and wage formation, and they are influenced by the interest rate. Expectations concerning inflation and economic stability have considerable impact, not least in the foreign exchange market. Petroleum activity constitutes an important part of the Norwegian economy. Oil gives us an economic base that is not available to many other countries. At the same time, the extent of, and fluctuations in, petroleum activity pose a challenge to economic policy in Norway. In a long-term perspective, Norway’s petroleum wealth is to be distributed across generations. The authorities must therefore exercise fiscal discipline, taking into account long-term considerations. In the short term, the substantial capital revenues from the petroleum sector must be managed in such a way that they do not amplify cyclical fluctuations. The Government Petroleum Fund was established in 1990 with a view to safeguarding long-term considerations in the use of petroleum revenues. The idea behind the Petroleum Fund is that the cash flow from an increase in oil prices should accrue to the Fund and be invested abroad and that the increase in oil prices should not affect the wider budget. As a result, the increase in the cash flow does not affect the domestic economy.
And indeed one of the benefits of low inflation is that price signals carry more information, making price comparisons worthwhile. Understanding what is happening is relevant to monetary policy. To the extent that a fierce competitive struggle is squeezing retail margins, it is likely to affect the shortrun outlook for inflation. While such a squeeze won’t have an effect on inflation in the longer term, it could herald a lasting improvement in productivity across the sector as a whole. This brings me to my final issue: whether productivity in the UK will accelerate as it seemingly has in the US.6 Since 1995 the growth of US productivity has doubled and the improvement has been sustained through the stock market crash. This is directly relevant to current thinking about US monetary policy. If faster productivity has indeed helped to create a high level of spare capacity and contributed to a higher growth in underlying supply, holding interest rates at historically low levels for some time should not add to inflationary pressures, even if demand grows rapidly. This is a key reason why the Fed believes it can be ‘patient’ in raising interest rates. The US evidence does seem to suggest that productivity has accelerated and that ICT has played a substantial role in raising productivity in non ICT sectors. This answers one puzzle, neatly posed by US economist Robert Solow when he commented that ‘You can see computers everywhere but in the productivity statistics’.

MPC members have always voiced their different views in public, and while this  6  Basu, S, Fernald, J G, Oulton, N, and Srinivasan, S (2003), ‘The case of missing productivity growth: Or, does information technology explain why productivity accelerated in the United States but not the United Kingdom?’, forthcoming in Gertler, M and Rogoff, K (eds) NBER Macroeconomic Annual 2003, MIT Press. Available from the NBER website: www.nber.org. 6  BIS Review 11/2004  is not without risk to the clarity of the message, and has occasionally led to an uncomfortable personalising of decisions, I see it as an inherent part of system not a quirk of particular personalities. The big prize is long term credibility, and nowadays there is no credibility without openness. This is what gives the present framework the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, and allows members of the MPC to change their minds in the light of experience. And in an uncertain world this openness to learning is a precondition for success under any policy regime. BIS Review 11/2004  7
Least of all should the impression be given that it is somehow possible to have all the gain without any of the pain. We all know, for instance, that virtually all public sector expenditures are in the nature of fixed charges to revenue in the form of wages, social benefits and other handouts, subsidies and debt-servicing costs, leaving relatively few discretionary items of expenditure. This probably explains why we hear many calls for cuts in Government spending, but no specific proposals on where and how much to cut. Likewise, the rigidities which pervade the labour market and work practices have become so fundamentally ingrained in the behavioural patterns of society that they have assumed the status of acquired rights. A number of institutions remain characterised by outdated cultures and practices, while a sizeable part of the population remains stubbornly dependent on subsidies and artificial protection. Under such circumstances it is clear – and recent electoral experience has underscored the fact – that the quest for competitiveness cannot, and indeed should not, be attempted by the Government alone. The change in culture and behaviour that this requires can only be successfully undertaken through the joint efforts of all the interested parties. Faced with similar circumstances, other countries have successfully injected a new dynamism into their economies on the strength of a broad consensus on reform measures among the political and social forces.

The launch that we are witnessing today is a major initiative, the development of a Shariah standard that is integrated with details on operational requirements. This approach ensures a transparent basis of Shariah rulings by the SAC, and provides a convergent in understanding between Shariah scholars and industry practitioners. In judiciary matters, where the SAC serves as a reference point in analysing muamalat cases, the court can also draw on these comprehensive and transparent Shariah standards as basis in arriving at a court ruling. The adoption of the standards by learning institutions will pave the way for greater understanding and acceptance of these standards as a global starting point of reference for the Islamic finance community. As we launch the Educator’s Manual, which is the first of 14 series of manuals, I would like to share my thoughts on our approach in developing the Shariah standards, and would also like to emphasise the importance of embracing diversity and mutual respect in Shariah interpretations. I shall deliberate on two additional areas that stakeholders need to consider to maximise the benefits of having the Manual; reconfiguration of academic programmes and strategising talent deployment. The future growth of Islamic finance, especially cross border, is very much dependent on the harmonisation and mutual recognition of Shariah views and rulings across the globe. It is critical if cross border trades are to be strengthened. Numerous efforts are being pursued to narrow the opinion gaps between scholars through symposiums, roundtables as well as bilateral dialogues.
Last year I pointed out that sterling’s exchange rate was at a 15 year low against the dollar, but close to its peak against the euro. In overall terms sterling’s effective Exchange Rate Index against currencies generally had been relatively stable - at around 105 plus or minus 5% - for most of the past 2-3 years. That pattern of  BIS Review 40/2002  1  exchange rates made life particularly difficult for the euro-exposed sectors or our economy, and, given that the eurozone represents over 50% of our external trade, contributed significantly to the imbalance within our economy. Happily, from our point of view, and indeed in the context of the global external imbalance, we have recently seen a significant strengthening of the euro against the dollar, and to a lesser extent against sterling, which will help to ease some of the earlier tensions. Sterling’s exchange rate has recently moved to two year high against the dollar and nearly a three year low against the euro. Sterling has consequently also weakened in overall, effective, terms, from some 107 some months ago to currently around 103 - which is still within the earlier range. It is frankly anyone’s guess whether the recent pattern of exchange rate movements will be extended, but what has happened so far, taken together with the improved prospect for global demand, suggests that the adverse external factors weighing down the UK economy over the past two years or so should now diminish.

Regarding the International Capital Standard, which aims to develop an international capital standard in order to be able to establish a comparable basis in terms of prudential requirements for all international groups, recent progress was made in Kuala Lumpur in November 2017 which should lead to, by the end of 2019, a version called “ICS 2.0” that will be used as a reference in international supervision Colleges, for a transitory period of five years. During this timeframe, each internationally active insurance group will have to ensure a compulsory and confidential five-year monitoring period based on the ICS, after which this standard is expected to become effective. Now, I will turn to IFRS17: it would be unreasonable to apply the new IFRS17 accounting framework right now. Given the obvious issue of timing, it is quite welcome that the IASB reopened the discussion and that the application of this standard has now been postponed by one year. This will primarily give us time to reach an agreement on identifying groups of loss-making contracts. We also want to bring the discussion on the 4  treatment of reinsurance contracts held to a satisfactory conclusion. At this point, there is too much room for interpretation in the standard, which could interfere with the comparability and consistent application across countries. In Europe, the current “hot topic” is the forthcoming Solvency 2 review. This review must include a full and objective assessment of the framework that has now been in place for three years.
This is a reflection of the exceptional nature of the commodity price shock in terms of its magnitude, its persistence and its broad-based character, affecting commodities across the board, including notably energy but also food commodities.4 It has to be taken into account that, although the shock has been global, Europe has been particularly exposed due to its high dependency on the supply of essential inputs – notably gas – from Russia.5 Indeed, given the magnitude and persistence of the shock, indirect effects have penetrated more deeply into the economy, firms have tended to adjust final prices more often6 and this has triggered a more extensive spread of price rises across the different categories of goods and services.7 In addition, the upward effects of energy and food commodity prices could still be significant in 2023. In the case of food commodities, the transmission of increasing costs along the supply chain could take up to a year8. In the case of gas prices, the pass-through from wholesale prices to final retail prices for consumers varies significantly across countries depending on the regulations in place, the types of contracts used in each national retail electricity market and profit margin developments in the face of rising energy input costs.

Direct financing via capital markets is growing in importance, even though banks are still the most important source of financing in the euro area. Such changes in the financial landscape make the allocation of funds more efficient and are hence most welcome. At the same time, however, they alter the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and insofar as this alteration is difficult to measure, add uncertainty to monetary policy decisions. Apart from the financial environment, the real economy in the euro area is also currently subject to significant change. Monetary Union has enhanced competition between economic agents in the participating countries. Price transparency between the countries has increased. Both consumers and companies are becoming increasingly more aware of price differences and are reacting accordingly. Greater price differences will be harder to justify and maintain, even though differences in the tax systems and in product specifications will continue to exert an influence on price setting. Fiscal policy may be affected, both by increased competition between countries and by the general need to foster employment and growth in order to comply with the challenges of ageing populations. These realities have triggered tax cuts and the start of more fundamental benefit reforms. However, these efforts must be accompanied by a structural reduction in expenditure in order to support price stability, make further progress in fiscal consolidation and boost economic growth. Overall, the increase in competition, less rigidity and a more flexible structure of the economy should lead to an increase in the sustainable rate of economic growth.
Nonetheless, I am not  entirely convinced the Bank of England press release which announces “This is Andy deep hanging out in Stoke” will scan. So I am open to crowd-sourced alternative suggestions. Let me give one or two concrete examples of how this regional engagement has helped my own understanding of the economy, its hidden corners, its quiet voices. When UK GDP returned to its pre-crisis peak in 2014 economists told the world the economy had “recovered”. 16  Around 30 seconds into a talk about the “recovery” with charities in Nottingham in 2016, I was  put straight. The language of recovery resonated with no-one in the room. This experience was repeated on TV, some months later during the referendum debate, when a questioner in Newcastle put straight one of the participants on tonight’s panel with the memorable line “That’s your bloody GDP, not ours”. 14  http://www.visualscribing.com/ Geertz (1998), with thanks to Grace Blakeley at the Institute for Public Policy Research. The date that real GDP returned to its pre-crisis peak has changed between different vintages of ONS data and was originally thought to have occurred in 2014. In the latest vintage of ONS data, it was in 2013. 15 16  8  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  8  When I returned to my desk from Nottingham and plotted GDP regionally as well as nationally, something surprising emerged from the numbers.

Behind the veil lies the ultimate owner – citizens, whether as workers, customers, shareholders, stakeholders or voters. Institutions are executive gatekeepers of these citizen democracies. Ultimately, it is citizens to whom policymakers, economic and otherwise, are accountable. Those of us in the policy game need never to lose sight of that. Despite those ownership rights, it is nonetheless the RSA’s contention that citizens are not at present engaged in the economy, and in economic policy, as fully as would be desirable. They make the case for moving to a deliberative democracy, one in which citizens have a greater say on matters economic and financial. This is a big contention. Nonetheless it is one that I – as a citizen and as someone who works for one of those institutional veils, the Bank of England – fully accept. More than that, the Bank is making strides towards increasing citizen engagement in the economy and understanding of economic policy. In what follows, let me first say a word about the aims and objectives of a programme of citizen engagement, the like of which the RSA are proposing – the “ends”. I will then turn to the “means” – what practically could be done, and indeed is being done, to improve citizen engagement with the economy and economic policy. For reasons of familiarity, I will focus on Bank of England initiatives as one example of such public engagement, although the RSA’s recommendations cover a range of other policymaking functions.
I nevertheless think that one can draw some conclusions from these exercises: Firstly: Whatever the authorities do in terms of macroprudential policy measures, changes in fiscal policy or in monetary policy, it will affect the price of money in the economy, that is, loan costs, and thereby the incentives for indebtedness. This means that measures taken in one area must take into account what is being done in other areas. The one hand must be aware of what the other is doing, even if they are not completely coordinated. 10  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Secondly: It is clear that of the measures now being discussed, some have much greater potential than others for influencing the incentives for households to borrow. Here the challenge will be to find measures that are sufficiently forceful, but will not be the actual straw that breaks the camel’s back. What one wants to achieve is a controlled adjustment. Thirdly: If we are to deal with the excessively high indebtedness, it is unavoidable that this will have an effect on individual households and entail costs for the economy as a whole – although of course the benefits will ultimately weigh heavier, if we can avoid a really poor outcome. Let me be clear that I do not believe it is enough to solely implement measures that affect the supply and demand for credit through increased loan costs for households. Other measures are also needed.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Steps to strengthen the Swiss financial system Introductory remarks by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the news conference, Bern, 16 October 2008. *  *  *  Pursuant to art. 5 of the Swiss National Bank Act (NBA), the SNB shall contribute to the development of our economy and the proper functioning of our monetary system. This is why the SNB has decided to extend a loan not exceeding USD 54 billion to the special purpose vehicle (SPV) set up to take over illiquid assets currently held by UBS. A similar offer has also been extended to the CS Group, which has refrained from making use of such a possibility. For the SNB, this operation is highly unusual, both with regard to its scope and the reasons for it. Scope of operation As to the scope of the operation, USD 54 billion is clearly a substantial amount for the National Bank. I would like to emphasise, however, that the loan amount is entirely guaranteed by the portfolio assigned by UBS, i.e. securities valued at USD 60 billion in the UBS balance sheet. Given the fact that in the past twelve months, UBS has made aggressive write-downs on its risky positions and that its portfolio is fairly diversified (it does not only consist of toxic assets), we feel that the risk of further losses on this portfolio is limited.
Migration path, five years after In 2011 Bank Negara Malaysia had developed a comprehensive roadmap in its Financial Sector Blueprint to drive the migration to e-payments with measurable targets to be achieved by 2020. Over the last 5 years, Bank Negara has worked with the payments industry to put in place conducive regulatory frameworks, agree on market incentive structures and build enhancements to e-payment infrastructure and services. Our aim is to provide an enabling environment for individuals and businesses to migrate away from paper based payment methods and adopt e-payments instruments. The results have been encouraging. Since the implementation of the Pricing Reform Framework in May 2013 and the e-Payment Incentive Fund (ePIF) Framework in January 2015, cheques which had only declined at a marginal rate of 2% on average from 2011 to 2013, had declined at a higher rate of 10% in 2014. The decline in cheque usage had accelerated to 16% for the first 9 months of this year. Consequently, the number of cheques cleared is projected to fall from about 207 million in 2010 to 149 million by the end of 2015. If such decline rate is sustained, the target of reducing cheques to 100 million per year by 2020 would be achieved. The reduction of about 100 million cheques above saves a minimum of RM300m not taking into account other savings in terms of efficiency and security. Similar trend was observed in the number of electronic fund transfer transactions.

Muhammad bin Ibrahim: Developing Malaysia’s payment system landscape Keynote address by Mr Muhammad bin Ibrahim, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Payment System Forum and Exhibition 2015 “Moving Forward with e-Payments”, Kuala Lumpur, 3 November 2015. *  *  *  Welcome to the 2015 Payment System Forum and Exhibition 2015, with the theme “Moving Forward with e-Payments”. This year is another important step in our effort to develop our country’s payment system landscape. It marks the mid-way point of our journey to transform our country’s payments infrastructure into one that is highly efficient, secure and competitive as outlined in the 10-year Financial Sector Blueprint from 2011 to 2020. I will focus on 3 areas in my remarks today. •  First, I will provide you with an update of where we are in our migration path five years since we launched the Financial Sector Blueprint, and what we have done and achieved so far. •  Second, I will share with you some thoughts on how collaborative efforts among various stakeholders in the payment value chain can leverage and thrive on epayments as a strategic tool in today’s increasingly dynamic and competitive environment, and  •  Third, I will outline the opportunities that can be realised in relation to the Financial Sector Blueprint targets with specific emphasis on key priorities for 2016.