samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Krzysztof Rybiński: Single euro payments area from the point of view of the National Bank of Poland Address by Mr Krzysztof Rybiński, Deputy President of the National Bank of Poland, at the Conference of the Polish Bank Association, Single Euro Payments Area, SEPA Organisational Structure in Poland – SEPA PL, Klub Bankowca (Bankers’ Club), Warsaw, 10 October 2006. *  *  *  Ladies and Gentlemen, Not all of you may know that the first bank that fulfilled many functions of a modern central bank was established in 1609. It was the Bank of Amsterdam. This bank issued its own money, managed its supply through open market operations and operated an RTGS system for large volume payments, although the meaning of the term “system” was slightly different four hundred years ago as compared to its current meaning 1 . Four hundred years ago, the RTGS system of the Bank of Amsterdam completed payments equal to the Netherlands’ GDP within three weeks. Today, many countries need less than a week for the same task. Bankers who managed floren’s agio in the seventeenth century could have never dreamt that four hundred years later we all would not only use a single European currency, but also implement standards of the Single Euro Payments Area, or SEPA. SEPA is to be real. It is part of a vision of united Europe where payment services are part of the single market.

A number of regional and global business processing centres and other regional facilities have been set up including the OHQs, regional offices, international procurement centres and regional distribution centres. Ladies and Gentlemen, As part of the Government policy commitment to improve the delivery system and reduce the cost of doing business, the Central Bank has undertaken a progressive liberalisation of domestic rules and regulations to reduce the cost of doing business. An area of focus has been the rules governing the foreign exchange transactions. Reducing cost of managing risks associated with such transactions include the recent liberalisation of rules on foreign currency accounts, interest rates swaps and hedging. To broaden and deepen our capital markets, the multilateral agencies and multinational  corporations are now allowed to issue bonds in Malaysia. Going forward, Malaysia will continue to undertake further liberalisation while balancing the need to accord flexibility and choices to businesses with the macroeconomic objectives of ensuring stability in financial markets. Ensuring such long-term stability that facilitates planning and investment decisions has been an important part of maintaining our competitive position. In the development of our financial sector, the banking sector continues to be the pillar of the financial system and is now at its strongest position with high level of capitalisation, improving asset quality and stronger profitability. Policy initiatives to strengthen the banking system, including in the areas of regulatory and supervisory frameworks, risk management, corporate governance and best practices in transparency and disclosure have contributed to strengthen the system further.
As you know, stabilisation in Europe takes place through national budgets and, in normal circumstances, they are sufficient to smooth the cycle. A recent study demonstrates that 47% of an unemployment shock is absorbed by the automatic stabilisers in the EU, compared with only 34% in the US.4 They were insufficient in some countries during the crisis only because they faced an exceptional circumstance: a very large shock from the financial sector. With a genuine banking union, however, the risk of this happening again should be lower. First, we expect the SSM to increase the quality of supervision and the assessment of systemic risk. Second, if a financial shock were still to appear, national budgets should be better insulated. The costs of banking sector repair would be shared with the private sector through the Single Resolution Mechanism and a more integrated European financial market. All this suggests that stabilisation at the national level could be more effective in future. Or put differently, the more successful we are in building a genuine banking union, the less we would need a central budget for stabilisation purposes. However, this does not mean I see no role for fiscal union in the stabilisation area. First, we would need the public backstop, namely for the future resolution fund, which would be fiscally neutral over the medium-term. In my view the ESM could play this role like the US Treasury does this for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by providing a credit line.

Not only in terms of the substance but also in terms of building and maintaining support for the regime, the UK has been much better served by an objective expressed in terms of a target for inflation. It is easier to explain. But that leaves open the question of what role money should play in our analysis. Some commentators want money to be important in the transmission mechanism because, after all, inflation is a monetary phenomenon; others feel that it can be placed to one side on the grounds that it is essentially endogenous and, after all, the dual of the quantity of money – interest rates – is in our models (more or less). This is an area where, given our individualistic governance structure, views on the Committee cannot be expected to be monolithic. My own view is that it is useful to recover the concept of shifts in the supply of broad money. 32 But such shifts do not have much in common with the proverbial helicopter drop; households and firms are not forced to hold the extra money, but respond to the terms and conditions on deposits offered by banks. The consequences for the macroeconomic outlook therefore depend on the nature of the underlying shock. For example, if a shock – say to the monetary regime – caused perceptions of macroeconomic risk to decline, there could plausibly be shifts in both the supply of and demand for credit.
This dynamic can expand local economic activity and consequently create new jobs for high-skilled workers in a region. These dynamics are clearly visible in Ithaca, where a large number of local companies – in industries ranging from information technology to medical equipment to agriculture – are closely tied to Cornell. Many of these companies were started by Cornell’s faculty and students and have remained in the local economy to stay connected to the university. Other companies have been attracted to the region because of the access afforded to specific knowledge or new products and processes invented at Cornell. Higher education institutions such as Cornell play a vital role in upstate New York’s economy. The relative stability of the higher education industry has, not surprisingly, contributed to a strong economic performance in recent years. Ithaca’s housing market is among the healthiest in the state, and it has experienced relatively strong employment growth during and since Great Recession. Indeed, unlike most of its Upstate peers, Ithaca has gained population throughout the past decade. What is the Fed doing now? Since the beginning of the downturn, the Fed has actively used monetary and regulatory policy to help support economic activity and improve economic outcomes – here in Ithaca and across the nation – relative to what would have happened in the absence of this support. With regard to monetary policy, the Fed has in place a highly accommodative stance.

Since the global financial crisis (GFC) giant steps have been taken at the G20 to strengthen international policy coordination and cooperation. Overall there are two opposing  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  developments affecting the IMS. On the one hand, the significant reforms since the GFC have strengthened the IMS. But on the other hand, growing interconnectedness especially through increased international investment positions together with unconventional monetary policies pose challenges to the IMS. In these global circumstances, having faced the deterioration in inflation and its outlook reflecting the pass-through from the TL depreciation and domestic factors and elevated volatility in capital flows together with tightening global financial conditions the Central Bank of Turkey has been following a tight monetary policy to fight inflation, taking liquidity stabilizing measures for the foreign currency market and ensuring the stability of the financial system. This policy framework was announced as a “road map” document back in August 2015 outlining monetary policy, foreign currency liquidity and financial stability related measures and aimed at alleviating policy tradeoffs. The key idea is to provide market making facilities to the local banks when they face financial stresses in the global markets. They are then allowed to borrow in foreign currencies from the central bank and use their all liquid assets irrespective of their denominations i.e., local currency and foreign currency denominated assets as collateral when they borrow from the central bank in any currency. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
It is already easy to open an account with another bank and to  9 See, for instance, BIS (2018). 10  See Juks (2018). 11 This is highlighted by among others the BIS (2018) and Camera (2017). 5 [9]  rapidly transfer money there electronically, so this risk does not increase with an e-krona. Another possibility is of course to invest the money in short-term government securities. If people stop trusting the banking system as a whole, it is of course more attractive to invest in an e-krona than in cash, which is the only alternative today in such a situation. However, the Riksbank already has a large toolbox to manage situations with a confidence crisis in the banking system. An e-krona would moreover make it possible to rapidly deal with such a situation by supplying e-kronas to those who want to withdraw money from their bank accounts. This would be more effective than it is with cash today, which could reduce the contagion risk between banks. 12 If people know that it is easy to withdraw their money, the risk of a bank run should decline. It may also be the case that the banks become less likely to take risks if they know that they must take better care of their deposits. 13 Many people react at the very idea of a central bank being able to issue digital money. They are afraid that it would entail a major change, a new role for the Riksbank.

But I would claim that the major change would instead be if the Riksbank does not issue any money that is used. The payment market is an important part of a country's infrastructure. Just think about how often you pay for something, and how difficult it would be if it didn't work! Would it really be the right thing to allow part of the infrastructure to be completely privatised without any analysis or discussion? What our analysis clearly shows is that the effects of an e-krona on the financial sector as well as monetary policy and the economy as a whole largely depend on how the e-krona is designed. It is therefore appropriate to begin with small steps forward and to learn along the way. The e-krona makes the Swedish payment system more stable and inclusive Cash does not function as a good alternative if we were to have no electricity in a crisis situation, as electricity is required to withdraw cash from an ATM. 14 Sweden may therefore need several alternative means of payment that can function in crisis situations. The more different systems and alternatives that are available, the less vulnerable we will be. An e-krona system would be a parallel, independent system to the card payment systems offered by the private sector, which reduces vulnerability in relation to having only one system.
Financing of terrorism has been criminalized in Saudi Arabia in compliance with provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Law issued by a royal decree on 25/6/1424H (23/8/2003). Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, The recent positive developments in our national economy represent a solid brick of the economic and social development bricks that you have continued to consolidate in this country since assuming the reins of government on 26 Jumada II 1426H (corresponding to August 1, 2005). One of the most prominent indicators of development is the rise of total government expenditure during the period from 2006 to 2009 to Rls 2.0 trillion. Total government spending in 2009 reached Rls 596.4 billion, the highest in the history of the Kingdom, and you, may Allah bless you, have been keen to take advantage of financial resources to spend effectively on the completion of infrastructure projects and the development of human resources. You have also urged quick completion of projects in the transport, health, education and water sectors for the service of citizens. You – may Allah bless you – have paid special attention to the human element where you have ordered the establishment of a number of universities, opened the door of welfare and development for future generations through the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques’ Program For Foreign Scholarships, and ordered its extension for other five years. This is in line with your attention paid to invest in the most important elements of development, namely, the human element.

I also wish that our commitment to achieve future success of the industry as reflected in this event by the joint efforts and collaboration of the regulators, the industry, the market participants and the relevant parties will be further enhanced moving forward. In this regard, I would again congratulate AIBIM on its continuous effort undertake the initiatives in promoting Islamic finance, particularly by organizing this event. 2  BIS Review 115/2006  On this note, I wish you a successful and eventful week. Dengan lafaz Bismillahirrahmanirrahim, saya dengan sukacitanya merasmikan pelancaran "Kuala Lumpur International Islamic Financial Expo 2006". Thank you. BIS Review 115/2006  3
Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput: Creating a resilient future with sustainable banking Speech by Dr Sethaput Suthiwartnarueput, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at Sustainable Thailand 2021, organised by the United Nations and the Government Pension Fund, Bangkok, 27 September 2021. * * * Your Excellency the Minister of Finance / distinguished guests, First, let me thank the United Nations and the Government Pension Fund for inviting me to share my remarks on sustainability which is fast becoming the most critical issue of our time. The recent UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Report was less of a wakeup call and more of a fire alarm. And yet, if we look at the latest UN NDC Synthesis Report, emissions, at least measured in terms of pledges, appear to be headed in the wrong direction. This wake-up call and this alarm are particularly relevant for us here in Thailand. Thailand is a country which typically ranks among the top ten in the world in terms of vulnerability and susceptibility to climate change. This is not altogether surprising. We are a country with a large share of the labor force still in agriculture and a lot of our population centers and industrial areas are located in areas near to the sea and therefore vulnerable to rising sea levels. But not only are we vulnerable to climate change, we are also vulnerable to policies that countries are implementing in response to climate change.

A lot of our exports are in sectors which have a large carbon footprint and will be susceptible to policy measures like the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism currently being put in place by the European Union (EU), as part of the EU green deal. So, what role can sustainable banking play in taking Thailand from where it is today to where it needs to be in terms of reducing its vulnerability to climate change? Banks in Thailand can play an important role in getting us to where we need to go. Banks play the predominant role in channeling credit to the private sector. Over 90 percent of private credit comes from the banking sector. So, banks will need to increasingly incorporate sustainability considerations into their lending decisions and increasingly need to improve disclosure on climate-related information. They will also need to improve their risk assessment tools. For all these to work, there needs to be a very clear tone from the top from these institutions. There has been progress to date. The Thai banking sector, including the Thai Bankers’ Association and the Association of International Banks in Thailand, have developed and adopted Sustainable Banking Guidelines in 2019. We have seen concrete steps taken by Thai Banks to incorporate sustainability into their business strategy. We have seen them setting up clear governance structure on sustainability issues such as dedicated sustainability committees, developing risk assessment tools, and disclosing ESG-related information.
This means that, given that we have already reinforced the level and quality of capital for the overall banking industry, the impact on requirements of the current revision should be borne by those parts of the banking system where the major unwarranted low asset densities are located. This objective of reducing the unwarranted variability in risk-weighted assets could be achieved through the implementation of a combined set of measures that ensure risksensitivity and comparability. Internal models are being revised with that objective in mind. First, there are some portfolios which should be defined as non-modelable, due to the scarcity of reliable data (i.e. low default portfolios). Second, among those exposures or risks that are considered as modelable, there are reasons that justify the revision being undertaken on definitions and methodologies. And, third, consideration should be given to the inclusion of restrictions to model parameters as a means to facilitate the supervisory task, so avoiding abnormally low values for individual parameters. In order to limit unwarranted variability in risk-weighted assets, a common backstop that has enough granularity to ensure risk-sensitivity is also needed. In this regard, capital floors based on the standardized approaches and designed as a limit to the output of internal models may be considered. In this regard, the revision of standardized approaches is also relevant. This revision seeks to incorporate the lessons learned in order to increase their risk sensitivity avoiding undue complexity.

The extent and scale of the actions taken in the euro area since the spring of 2014 to address the risks of too low inflation have been unprecedented, covering four strategic lines: negative remuneration in the deposit facility; communication policy and the use of forward guidance; several programs aimed at restoring the bank lending channel of monetary transmission; and the program of quantitative easing that entails large scale purchases of private and public assets. Since October 2014, the size of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet has increased by 50 % up to € with the implementation of the Extended Asset Purchase Program, whereas the deposit facility rate, which is a key money market reference in the current context of excess liquidity, has remained in negative territory, reaching its lowest record at –0.40 % in March. The ECB has not been alone in the use of unconventional monetary tools once interest rates reached its effective floor. The Federal Reserve engaged in successive rounds of quantitative easing through asset purchase programs. All in all, the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve increased from 870 billion in September 2008 to more than 4.4 trillion, holding now more than 30 percent of the stock of outstanding Mortgage Backed Securities and nearly 25 % of outstanding Treasuries. The Bank of England also embarked in quantitative easing through purchases of public sector assets, and holds now almost 25 % of the total outstanding UK public debt.
Figure 1 Development of public debt ratio Percentage of GDP 180  180 Greece Ireland Portugal Spain  140  140  Italy  100  100  60  60  20  20 00  02  04  06  08  10  12  14  16  Note. Public debt is shown as a percentage of GDP on the vertical axis. Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor. 1  IMF Fiscal Monitor (April 2012), “Balancing Fiscal Policy Risks”. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Given the high level of debt, the need for deleveraging in the euro area has recently become a question that is much discussed in various contexts. Deleveraging – course of events and earlier experiences Experiences of the Swedish and Finnish banking crisis in the 1990s show that the process of deleveraging can take more than a decade. It can generally be divided into two phases. 2 During the first phase, the consolidation phase, households and companies reduce their debts. This means that households reduce their consumption and companies reduce their investment, which entails a weak or negative GDP growth. As a result, public debt increases, as the expenditure for social welfare increases and tax revenue declines. In Sweden, for instance, public debt increased from 46 per cent of GDP to 83 per cent during the period 1990–1994, 3 that is, the period when households, banks and companies reduced their debts.

The second risk is that the United States will not rise to its fiscal policy challenges, which could hamper the continued strengthening of the global economy. Let me discuss these risks in more detail. A third risk that is often discussed concerns the slowdown on the Chinese property market. I shall not go into this in any great depth here; I shall merely note that if property prices were to fall uncontrollably, China has the scope to implement fiscal and monetary policy stimulation, in that they have a low national debt of around 25 per cent of GDP and a high policy rate of almost 7 per cent. 1 The debate on the Chinese economy is otherwise often fairly categorical. It concerns either overheating or an imminent crash. If we look back at earlier developments, we can see that they have successfully managed to avoid both of these extremes. My assessment is that there is good scope for them to do so this time, too. The euro area – prolonged deleveraging In the euro area, it is mainly the Greek debt that has received attention. But, as well all know, other euro area countries have also suffered debt problems; for instance, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Italy also has a high national debt, but this is a problem it has had for a long time. The following figure shows how public debt as a percentage of GDP has developed in these countries and the IMF’s forecast until the end of 2017.