samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Over the course of the program, our purchases ran at about the same pace as the total net Treasury supply coming to the market. Moreover, with the completion of the program, the SOMA portfolio holds about 18 percent of the outstanding stock of Treasury securities. Our share of the market is even higher at intermediate maturities, where our purchases were concentrated. Part of the challenge to the Desk was to structure our operations in a manner that would allow the market to absorb such a large volume of purchases. Several features of the program’s design may have helped to promote robust participation by market participants, including the decisions to relax the 35 percent limit on SOMA holdings of individual issues and to include recently issued securities in the range of eligible issues in nearly every operation. These features allowed our counterparties to offer us a wide range of securities at each operation. In the end, dealers participated aggressively, with an average offer-to-cover ratio of over 3.5. Moreover, we managed to execute these purchases at prices that were, on average, at or very near the indicative quotes on these securities that we collect as a pricing reference. In addition to focusing on the performance of our operations, we have also monitored measures of liquidity in the Treasury market. The market seems to be functioning well despite our sizable presence. Measures such as bid-ask spreads, quote depth, and trading volumes have held relatively steady at favorable levels over the life of the program.

With a view to the future, I should note that the current reform will further increase the complexity of the capital adequacy requirements. Although the potential of capital adequacy regulation has not yet been exhausted, other possibilities should also be investigated in the future. Complementing the capital adequacy approach with improved liquidity management of the banks seems to be a particularly promising measure. Shortcomings in liquidity management may give rise to problems that cannot be resolved by adequate capitalisation. It is not surprising that such considerations are made primarily by central banks. After all, liquidity concerns are typical for central banks. On the macro level, maintaining the supply of liquidity is a monetary policy task. On the micro level, however, it is the task of each bank to bring its solvency into line with the risks. This requires that the liquidity risks be correctly assessed and managed, and that assets, which can if necessary be used as collateral, be made available. The central banks and supervisory authorities of the G-10 countries should, therefore, increasingly focus their attention on minimising liquidity risks. This is of particular relevance to banks that are systemically important and internationally active. Integrated financial market oversight: what now? In the meantime, the Federal Council decided on the further procedure regarding the Federal Act on Financial Market Oversight (FINMA Act). The Federal Department of Finance will prepare a statement by the end of next year and submit it to the Federal Council.
On the cross-section dimension, extra capital has been proposed for systemic institutions in order to make them more resilient to financial turbulences. But, the definition of systemic institutions is still blurred, and given the evolution of financial innovation, what today may be a non-systemic institution may eventually become systemic. Indeed, a non-systemic institution on a worldwide basis could be systemic from the point of view of particular economies. Again, these issues are not new in emerging market economies, which in general have more capitalized banks. In Chile, most of the industry already satisfies the requirements that are supposed to be in place by 2019. Moreover, there are larger requirements for banks that have high market share. There are other areas where we have already made significant progress, such as restrictions on currency mismatches, liquidity management and the use of derivatives. In all of these cases, the Central Bank of Chile has authority to set prudential regulation. For banks, these relate with authorizing the use of derivatives, regulation regarding market and liquidity risk, among others. In other areas, the Central Bank also has a say in “systemic” regulation, such as overall limits for Pension Funds. This scheme accommodates recent policy concerns, since it avoids the conflict of interests that arises from mixing the micro supervisor with the monetary authority, while preserving an institution that provides a broad look at the stability of the financial system. This being said, however, there is a need to continue strengthening coordination instances with other regulators.

Page 1 sur 7  8th International Insurance Conference: “Towards the insurance of tomorrow” – Paris, 14 October 2016 Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Chairman of the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution and Governor of the Banque de France  Ladies and gentlemen,  I am very happy to be here today for this 8th International Insurance Conference - the first to be organised under the aegis of the French Insurance Federation - and I would particularly like to extend my regards to the federation’s Chairman, Bernard Spitz, as well as to its vice-chairmen. Although I have met you all several times in the past year, this is the first time I have participated in an event in my capacity as Chairman of the ACPR, the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution. Rest assured that at the ACPR, I indeed we - regard the insurance sector as every bit as important as the banking sector. With a total of 826 licensed firms in France in 2015, oversight of the insurance sector is a vital part of our mission to safeguard financial stability – which, alongside monetary strategy and the provision of services to the economy, forms part of my threefold mandate as Governor of the Banque de France. Page 2 sur 7  As supervisors, we are concerned on a daily basis with the theme of this conference: the insurance industry of tomorrow. Indeed, given the speed at which things are evolving, tomorrow’s insurance landscape is already very much present today.
For instance, if the Committee decides the interest rate on one-week maturity repo auctions is to be 16.25 percent, then it will remain as 16.25 percent unless the Committee changes this. b. In the case of liquidity shortage due to unpredicted reasons, thus leading to a decision for an intra-day repo auction, such auctions will be held at the interest rate set by the Committee via the quantity auction method. c.  Each bidder shall make an offer at most for the amount announced for that day and the funding amount to be raised via the auction will be distributed to participants according to the ratios of their bids to the auction amount..  d.  Other guidelines governing the auctions and transactions shall remain unchanged. (iv)  In the case of a temporary liquidity surplus, instead of one-week repo auctions, the Central Bank will hold reverse repo auctions with a one-week maturity subject to the same conditions and with the interest rate announced for the repo auctions. (v)  Fixed rates will be applicable only to repo and reverse repo auctions with a oneweek maturity. Repo and reverse repo auctions or other auctions with maturities longer than one-week that the Central Bank may hold within open market operations will continue to be held under the traditional method and the price/interest will be formed under market conditions.

It is stipulated in Article 42 of the CBT Law that “The Bank shall submit information to the Government in writing and inform the public disclosing the reasons of incapability to achieve the determined targets in due time published or the occurrence of the possibility of not achieving and the measures to be taken thereof”. Implementation details regarding the specification of the extent of the deviation from the target that require explanation are left to  BIS Review 3/2009  5  the discretion of the Central Bank. In this respect, the Central Bank sets an uncertainty band around the target and enforces the accountability mechanism in case figures breach this band. The uncertainty band for 2009 has been maintained at two percentage points around the target. In this context, a path consistent with the end-year target has been established for the end of each quarter. The figures to be used as a reference for accountability throughout 2009 can be found in Table 1.
And we must not lose sight of our collective values regarding individuals’ right to privacy. Before concluding, I would like to add a few words about Brexit. The French authorities are mobilised and committed to making Paris a leading destination for insurance undertakings. The ACPR has taken the lead with an English-language fast-track authorisation. We are holding serious and discrete discussions with various business prospects. The recent announcement by the American group Chubb, the United States’ leading property and casualty insurer, of its intention to transfer its operations to Paris demonstrates that our expertise in supervision in particular is a recognised asset. But mobilising must not mean abandoning our high standards and requirements, and Brexit cannot be an opportunity for British entities to simply set up empty shell corporations in Europe, mere company name plates, while keeping their resources in the United Kingdom. In this respect, I fully agree with the vigilance called for by EIOPA. And lastly, Brexit also brings with it certain risks, and consequently the need for contingency plans: I am thinking particularly of the French policyholders who took out insurance directly with British undertakings, and by way of symmetry, the French undertakings with commitments in the United Kingdom. Beyond what the insurance sector can do for our economy, I would like to conclude by telling you what we can do for you.

This is an essential step towards their possible end later; a step that is justified by our confidence in the gradual convergence of inflation towards our target of 2% over the medium term: we consider the economic recovery in Europe to be “increasingly robust and broad-based". In parallel, we said that we will continue to ensure “ample” monetary support, rather than “very substantial” support as mentioned in our previous statements – thanks to the whole range of our instruments, including the sizeable stock of assets that we will continue to hold in line with our policy of reinvestment, and our forward guidance on interest rates. In this new paragraph, the Governing Council stresses an essential point that I have often referred to over these past few weeks: our non-standard monetary policy is not a solo – it is not simply about net monthly purchases, and we shouldn’t focus too much on them –; it is a group of instruments that we can play, by following a predictable sequence, as part of our gradual normalisation strategy. It is therefore important that insurers continue to adapt their business models to the low interest rate environment. In particular, I welcome the gradual moderation of interest rates paid out on life insurance contracts, which should be pursued in order to maintain, in the long run, insurers’ solvency and their ability to meet all their commitments vis-à-vis policyholders.
Finally, it is worth underlining that the Bank of England has an interest in the evolving structure of financial markets because, as well as being a policy body, it is also a bank. We have a fairly substantial and diverse balance sheet to manage, and that balance sheet is the basis for our financial market operations in support of our policy responsibilities. The Bank is banker to the government, and to the banking system as a whole, and maintains an operational presence in various key financial markets. In the sterling markets, the Bank obviously stands at the centre of the short term money markets, providing liquidity to the banking system and thus maintaining control over short term interest rates. We are also, as managers of the nation’s foreign exchange reserves as well as various currency assets and liabilities on the Bank’s own balance sheet, active in the foreign exchange and some foreign bond markets. Finally, although no longer responsible for debt management, we retain an operational capability in the gilts market, again primarily to manage our balance sheet and provide services to customers. Being close to developments in these markets provides a vital source of information used in the pursuit of our financial stability, as well as monetary policy, objectives. And any operations that were, in a crisis, needed in support of our financial stability objectives could take place in any of these markets. Now I will turn to some of the various forces for change in the financial services industry. First, the euro.

Obviously the changes in the Bank’s remit announced in May 1997 by the incoming Labour Government, and largely enshrined in the 1998 Bank of England Act, were profound ones. The arrival of monetary independence meant that the work of the MPC – of which I am one of the nine members – has scarcely been out of the news. Less obtrusively, the departure of banking supervision to the new FSA meant the end of one substantial – though actually comparatively recently acquired – function; and the shift of debt management to the DMO brought to an end another, much older one. So does the “new” Bank have a new relationship with the financial services sector? Let me first say that, though the Bank has been through a period of profound change, its core purposes remain the same. One is obviously to promote monetary stability; and there our role is now much more substantial and overt. But the Bank has two more core purposes, and both relate directly to the financial services sector. 1  BIS Review 43/1999  The first is to promote the overall stability of the UK financial system. This role is not new, though it has recently been set out explicitly in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank, HMT and the FSA. Broadly, promoting systemic stability means working to ensure that the financial system continues to perform its key roles in support of the wider economy – settling transactions, providing liquidity and allocating savings.
We also learnt that we must ensure clear responsibilities and limits to delegation. The fund is a long-term savings plan and capable of riding out large market swings. This is the very foundation of the investment strategy with its high allocation to equities. Our ability to adhere to this strategy in a critical phase – even if this should last some time – is crucial if the Fund is to deliver the returns we expect in the longer term. Norges Bank’s Executive Board has reinforced its oversight of the Bank’s investment management. It has issued a new mandate that delegates investment management responsibility and introduces additional limits in the risk profile for investment management. As with the Fund’s long-term investment strategy based on active management and active ownership, the results of our operational management of the Fund need to be measured over time. To that extent, we need to maintain an incentive structure in order to retain and build long-term competence. We also need to ensure the quality of the investment management. In our view, the search for excess return has had a strong disciplinary effect on the organisation. 6  BIS Review 58/2009  I am confident that the operation we have built up will deliver good results in the long term. Thank you for your attention!

The return generated by Norges Bank’s investment management in 2008 was 3.4 per cent lower than the benchmark portfolio used as performance measure. This is considerably weaker than might have been expected in light of our investment strategy, which relies on a large number of small, independent positions. In the period since 1998, the Fund has recorded a cumulative annual excess return of 0.04 percentage point lower than the return on the benchmark portfolio defined by the Ministry of Finance. Norges Bank’s aim is to generate added value through our investment choices. After many years of high performance, the Fund is now right back where it started. The Fund’s underperformance and the fall in overall return can largely be attributed to the financial crisis. Assessment of the results of our active choices should, in our opinion, also take into account the long-term perspective on which the Fund’s investment strategy is based. Norges Bank’s investment results since 1998 are different for the two asset classes equities and fixed income instruments. Although active equity management generated negative results in 2008, these were well within the limits predicted by our risk models for any one year. However, since the beginning the annual excess return on equities has been close to ½ percentage point. We have established an equity management strategy that seems to be fairly robust to market fluctuations and that has, as we have seen, generated solid returns viewed over a longer period. Developments in the Fund’s fixed income portfolio have followed a different path.
Other components were: •  fiscal policy oriented towards full employment  •  regulation of credit within limits specified in a separate credit budget  •  channelling of loans through the state banks  •  regulation of capital movements  •  low nominal interest rates stipulated by the government authorities  •  a fixed, though adjustable, krone exchange rate  •  use of price regulation  •  an active business policy through state ownership and state grants and subsidies  The proposal to establish an incomes policy council did not receive support. There was just too much control and coordination. Now, only 30 years later, very little of this system remains. The building was not solid enough. We know from experience that fiscal policy alone cannot ensure a high level of employment. The structure of the labour market and of wage formation is probably of greater importance. The direct regulation of credit, interest rates and capital movements broke down and was phased out in the 1980s. The krone is floating. Price regulation no longer plays a role as a macroeconomic instrument. The scope of business policy has become more general. State ownership in the Norwegian business sector remains extensive, but the management of ownership has been totally revised following the negative experience of companies in Kongsberg, Mo i Rana and Syd-Varanger. I would like to highlight two factors that have taken on considerable importance for economic policy.

Since the turning point last autumn, however, we are witnessing a very gradual rise in nominal long-term interest rates and a “steepening” of the yield curve. This is a more favourable development for bank profitability, which could turn into a weakness in the event of a sudden rise in rates: I do not believe this hypothesis is the most likely. But the ACPR remains particularly attentive to the supervision of the interest rate risk management frameworks put in place by banks. The next stress test exercise, currently underway, will look at different scenarios regarding interest rate variations. As regards the insurance sector, the moderation of the rates paid out on life insurance policies is necessary to preserve their solvency. Luckily, we have observed such a trend in 2016 on eurodenominated products, although the average return remains significant at 1.9%. The low interest rate environment has also prompted a shift in savings towards unit-linked products. Here the ACPR is vigilant as to the commercial conditions of this development. The second challenge is the rise of digital finance. Supporting new players is a priority for the ACPR, which we have materialised by the creation of the Fintech Innovation unit and the Fintech Forum with the AMF. Fintechs bring innovative solutions for customers, which are very welcome, but they must also be attentive to data protection, cyber-security and compliance with anti-money laundering measures. But the digital challenge is not limited to Fintechs.
Accounting for 99.2% of the total business establishments in the country, there is vast potential to enhance the SMEs' contribution to the economy. In view of both their significance and potential, the Government has given due recognition and allocated significant amount of funds and resources to further enhance the growth of this sector. Various initiatives undertaken by the financial sector had also led to the SMEs enjoying a high level of financing from the financial system. In 2006, banking institutions approved RM39.6 billion to more than 84,000 SME accounts, an increase of 10.7% from the previous year. Meanwhile, outstanding loans to SMEs expanded by 4.2% on an annual basis to RM104.6 billion at end 2006, accounting for 45% of total outstanding business loans. In spite of these priorities and efforts, certain segments of the SME sector continue to lament the lack of financing access, which is deemed as a major challenge that hinders their growth and development. Interestingly, this is not unique to Malaysian SMEs, but rather a worldwide phenomenon. According to the Asian Banker's 2005 Report, it was estimated that only about 5%3 of the world's 500 million lowincome entrepreneurs have access to financial services. The main reasons for the financial constraints faced by SMEs are quite generic, and high on the list is the perception that SMEs are historically a high risk group lacking in financial discipline and unable to provide trustworthy financial track records.

To bridge this information gap, the SME Credit Bureau would effectively consolidate the fragmented information. This convergence of data from various sources would be enhanced, resulting in a convenient, timely and efficient access to SME information and credit ratings to assist the potential lenders to make a more objective evaluation of loan applications. It is our ardent hope that the SME Credit Bureau will become an integral component towards enabling SMEs to gain access to financing. The SME Credit Bureau also aims at promoting greater transparency, professionalism and sound credit culture among SMEs. SMEs can be assured that their good track records would be captured and evaluated by an independent third party, which in turn, would assist them to increase their financing and business opportunities. The credit reports would serve as a convenient tool for SMEs to carry out a self evaluation in identifying areas that needs improvement. This strategic alliance represents a meeting of the common objective of CGC and D&B to bridge the gaps in the availability and access to SME credit information in the country. The SME Credit Bureau is a big step towards a more sophisticated and transparent financing environment for SMEs in Malaysia. Both CGC, which is in the business of providing credit enhancement to Malaysian SMEs; and D&B, a global operator and provider of credit bureau services, are well equipped to drive this initiative forward. On this note, I would like to congratulate CGC and D&B Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. in making this initiative possible.