samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Energy prices have dropped sharply over the past month and the prices for many other commodities also have softened. And with the unemployment rate still high and capacity utilization low, resource slack is likely putting downward pressure on prices. In addition, market measures of longer-run inflation expectations are at the low end of the range they have been running since last November. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Putting these factors together, my outlook is for overall inflation over the medium term to fall back towards core and remain below the 2% level I see as consistent with the price stability leg of the Fed’s dual mandate. Monetary policy and the dual mandate In my view, central banks should focus on medium-term inflation. Over shorter periods, measured inflation rates are affected by all sorts of short-term influences, such as fluctuations in food and energy prices that are beyond the control of monetary policy. Furthermore, there are significant lags before policy actions influence inflation. So reacting too strongly to short-run influences simply adds noise to the policy-making process. So, by this appropriate standard I think inflation likely will be below our goal of 2%. And of course, unemployment is much above its natural rate. Thus, at the moment, there is little conflict between our two goals. Both suggest at least some additional monetary policy accommodation would be helpful.

In addition, the crypto ecosystem inherits and may amplify the vulnerabilities of the mainstream financial system, as it grows and tries to replicate the functions of that system, and it introduces new points of vulnerability like bridges between blockchains or so called oracles that feed data to blockchains. Third, the investigations undertaken by many central banks, for the issuance of a retail and/or a wholesale CBDC, should be seen in my view as part of a broader response by central banks, in line with their monetary and financial stability mandate, to help bring the financial landscape, which will result from those transformations, within a confidence prone regulatory and operational framework, to help reap their benefits and master their risks. At the Banque de France, our response is based on three convictions: First, the traditional pillars to ensure confidence cannot be replaced by any "algorithmic" confidence, namely by rules of the game that would be coded once and for all and for which respect would be entrusted to algorithms. Second, confidence requires a regulatory framework that is clear, fair ("same business, same risk, same rule"), balanced and consistent at international level, if we want to simultaneously encourage innovation, protect adequately customers and investors, and maintain the stability of our financial system. Europe has led the way in this field, with the adoption of MiCA.
I am not sure which of these three scenarios will happen or whether a fourth scenario will emerge, as the current situation is something we have never experienced before. However, what I am certain is that since the outlook for macro economic and financial environment is very uncertain, it is highly possible that we will continue to see large fund inflows and outflows as well as sharp fluctuations in the financial markets. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to ask everyone to stay alert to the risks ahead and be aware that the current environment is highly abnormal and uncertain. We should all take precautionary measures and get to the bottom of the problem, learn from others’ experiences and avoid overstretching ourselves. Otherwise, we may find ourselves being trapped in the debt abyss with no way out. Thank you. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5

Nina Stoyanova : Banks and business Speech by Ms Nina Stoyanova, Deputy Governor and Head of the Banking Department of the Bulgarian National Bank, during the video conference "Banks and Business", organized by the Capital newspaper, 2 December 2020. * * * I would like to welcome you to the video conference on Banking and Business, organized by the Capital newspaper. The banking sector is sending off a challenging year. In 2020, we witnessed the unprecedented pandemic caused by COVID-19, the imposition of measures to prevent its spread, which led to an economic downturn, as well as to many difficulties facing business and the people we have to deal with on a daily basis. However, there were also positive events during the year, such as the inclusion of the Bulgarian lev in Monetary Mechanism II and the establishment of close cooperation between the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the European Central Bank (ECB) in the field of banking supervision in July. 2020 Banks in Bulgaria were able to quickly adapt to the new reality resulting from the pandemic and ensure continuity in the provision of financial services to businesses and citizens. This became possible due to the high degree of electronicization and digitalization of the banking sector in the country.
A reminder of the policies implemented by the ECB and their underpinning. You will remember that the first response to the financial turmoil in the summer of 2007 came from the Eurosystem, which injected liquidity of over EUR 90 billion into the European interbank system which was on the verge of seizing up completely. Since then, the Eurosystem has provided concrete and often crucial responses to the different manifestations of the euro area crisis. To do so, it has redesigned its policy measures both from a qualitative point of view – by creating new instruments – and a quantitative point of view (the size of its balance sheet has trebled since the start of the crisis). As regards instruments, we have used both: •  The “standard” instrument par excellence: interest rates. The ECB’s monetary policy has been very accommodative for several years, with key interest rates currently at historically low levels and negative real interest rates in large parts of the euro area. •  A broad range of “non-standard” instruments that can be grouped into two categories: i) liquidity-providing instruments (with the fixed rate full allotment policy, the expansion of eligible collateral, and the extension of maturities up to three years with the VLTROs) and ii) instruments making it possible to intervene directly on the most dysfunctional market segments (the CBPP and SMP). This diversification and broadening of the Eurosystem’s interventions has naturally raised questions about the ultimate goals pursued, the methods used and the possible risks incurred.

The public deficit of the euro area has shrunk from 6.3% in 2009 to 4.1% in 2011. At the current juncture, this is clearly an asset for us and an element of confidence both for the markets and  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  economic agents, and needs to be further enhanced. In addition to these efforts at the national level, a much stronger framework for common discipline has been put in place, which represents a major step forward towards a more integrated economic union. It is crucial that all of the efforts in this area are pursued with determination. Now turning to competitiveness, here too the progress already made in terms of structural reforms and the adjustment of unit production costs in many countries is very encouraging. Never in the recent past have the European economies been reformed so much in such a short space of time. I could cite many examples, in Spain (labour market and financial sector reforms), Italy (pension and services market reforms) and in France, where an important pension reform was made in 2010 and where structural reforms on the labour market and on the goods and services market are in preparation. These structural reforms constitute the necessary foundation for dynamic and sustainable growth in the future and they must be vigorously pursued. Furthermore, at the European level, the new Stability Pact includes a surveillance mechanism for macroeconomic imbalances, which had been missing up till now.
4  BIS Review 42/2003  As we consider the long-term view, we should not lose sight of the fact that we are just at the beginning. The New Accord represents another important milestone in the adoption of more advanced risk measurement and management practices. But to remain robust and relevant to the demands of twenty-first century banking, our capital regulations must keep pace with changes in the market environment and with the state of the art in risk management. On that note, I would like to emphasise the importance of research and debate in promoting the safety and soundness of the financial system. The Basel Committee owes a debt of gratitude to the studies and efforts undertaken by economists, risk management professionals, and researchers in both the public and private sectors as we have sought ways to refine the proposals. We know that your work has helped to inform ours. The future evolution of the Accord will be dependent on input and contribution from the industry, and I look forward to continuing our healthy and fruitful exchange of views. In closing my remarks today, I would like to stress again the Committee’s commitment to having a balanced Accord of the highest quality. Although we are encouraged by the general support for the proposals shown through the CP3 process, we recognise that there are some high-level issues still to be addressed and we are working hard to find the best ways to resolve them.

Nonetheless, sectorial mismatches in banks, non-banks, and households, still need to be monitored. In Chile, as mentioned above, these mismatches are limited due to FX hedging and regulation. The CBC was an early adopter of an inflation-targeting regime, shortly after its independence granted in 1989. A fully floating FX regime was adopted in September 1999 and capital controls where abolished in a necessary step to complete a coherent framework to effectively control inflation. Since then, the Central Bank has kept its commitment of no intervention in the FX market, except when required by extraordinary circumstances. Page 9 of 12  Central Bank of Chile September 2019 High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation? International Capital Flows in the Post-crisis World, September 2019 CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE  Monetary policy framework and its effectiveness  The Chilean experience with capital controls and FX interventions FX rate and capital controls: 1990-2018 (*)  International reserves and FX interventions: 1982-2017  (CLP per USD)  (millions of USD)  800  45000 Capital controls 40000  700  FX interventions  FX bands  35000 600  30000 25000  500  20000 400  15000  Reserves requirements to the foreign loan and later extended it to capital flows not related to debt, the American certificates of deposit of foreign shares, and potentially speculative FDI. Increased the discount rate.
Philipp Hildebrand: Review of the international financial system Introductory remarks by Mr Philipp Hildebrand, Vice-Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the end-of-year media news conference, Zurich, 10 December 2009. * 1. *  *  Introduction  At the news conference in June of this year we spoke of a gradual calming in the general financial market environment, although the outlook remains uncertain. Since then we have seen a majority of banks returning to profitability. The horror stories being reported almost daily just over a year ago have now disappeared. It is very tempting just to go back to business as usual. However, we must not forget that – just over a year ago now – the international financial system was on the brink of collapse. Support packages of an unprecedented size were being put together for the banks. Exceptional monetary and fiscal measures were required to combat the dramatic plunge in the global economy – measures which have had to be kept in place to the current time. Only by a narrow margin was a complete collapse of the financial system avoided and the danger of a major depression averted. This experience has clearly shown us all that the principle of sustainability needs to be a much more dominant element in the development of the international financial system than it was previously.

In December last year, the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Thailand concluded the bilateral local currency swap arrangements during the visit of Vice President Xi Jinping to Thailand. The Agreement provides for the exchange of respective local currency upto 70 billion yuan or 320 billion baht, to facilitate bilateral trade and investment. I believe this is a crucial role that the public sector can provide to give assurance to the private sector on the availability of their access to the yuan and the baht for their trade and investment needs. In addition, the Bank of Thailand received approval from the People’s Bank of China and China Securities Regulatory Commission to participate in the interbank bond market and securities market here in China. Our investment would allow our asset allocation and diversification to better reflect the increasingly important role of the yuan in international monetary system. Last but not least, I hope that the inauguration of our Beijing representative office will be more than just another success story. I truly hope that the spirit and friendship behind this long-standing relations and successes, nurtured earnestly over centuries, will continue to serve as solid foundations that will lead to even greater and closer future cooperation between our two nations. Let me end by thanking everyone for being an important part of this success. And, with Your Royal Highness’ permission, may I propose a toast to future success and cooperation as well as to your Royal Highness’s good health and prosperity. Thank you.
This misperception might lead to inappropriate policy decisions. Unlike in previous crises, one difference on this occasion and in the years ahead is that the euro area countries will not be able to use the exchange rate as a policy instrument. This fact seems to excite many commentators. Some believe it will create further tensions within the euro area, and may lead to a split-up. Other observers, on the opposite, foresee a strengthening of other policy instruments to face up to the challenges. I won’t respond to such speculation, but will make a few points for you to consider. First, one reason for creating the euro was to avoid precisely the kind of turbulence that occurred in Europe when we had a large number of currencies with adjustable exchange rates. There is no doubt that the effects of the crisis would have been greater if the euro area members still had their own currencies. This is the lesson from the upheaval of 1992-93, which is fully understood today. To use Chancellor Merkel’s words: “One of the lessons of this financial crisis is that, if we hadn’t had the euro, we would have had to invent it”. Second, the current crisis is bound to raise again the issue of whether a single market like the one we have among 27 countries in the EU can function smoothly when the exchange rate of some of the members is allowed – or even encouraged – to depreciate sharply, possibly distorting competition.

Given the rapid change in perceptions in a ‘post-truth’ environment, with few impartial media and the increase in populism, most central banks across the world, including the National Bank of Romania, may face a possible delay in recovering the public trust to the pre-crisis levels. Even if they spoke more plainly or loudly, using all the modern communication toolkits, the slow bridging 4/5  BIS central bankers' speeches  of the trust gap should not crush the contribution of independent central banks to the efforts to avert crises, achieve economic progress and be an open and responsible institution in the society. And, in the National Bank of Romania’s case, its legacy is an important pillar of Romania’s modernisation. 5/5  BIS central bankers' speeches
After a first ripple in the first quarter of this year and an increasing number of central banks pointing to the need to reprice certain risks (I gave a warning in that respect at a conference by the European Institute in Washington in April) the market reaction over the last couple of months witnessed what needs to be seen as a basically healthy reaction to mispricing. This reaction however was accompanied by the unpleasant effects of a crisis of confidence among the participants of the global credit markets prompting central bank intervention. Since I agreed to speak about the turbulence in financial markets, many actions have been taken and a policy agenda for drawing the lessons is emerging. Allow me therefore briefly to highlight the main events, before commenting on the experience we acquired inside the Eurosystem during these weeks and months with our elaborate toolbox of instruments and operations. I will conclude with some tentative lessons to be drawn in terms of transparency, valuation, market functioning and supervisory framework adjustment. At this stage of collecting evidence, I will not dwell on the macroeconomic consequences of this turbulence which took place against the background of a strong performance of the global economy. The momentum of past dynamics still outweighs potential downward risks to the baseline scenario. I. What happened in the markets  If many expected turbulence, the specific features and the transmission mechanisms were less clearly anticipated.

The challenge is to enhance efficiency and reduce costs, respond to market and regulatory demands and, most of all, gain competitive advantage through innovative products and services. The overall Islamic financial system, comprising financial institutions, markets and the financial infrastructure, has demonstrated its viability and robustness as a form of financial intermediation. Its growing role in mobilising and channelling funds to productive investment activities across borders brings significant benefits to global economy. Building stronger financial markets and greater intermediation through knowledge sharing especially, forms an important part of this process to facilitate greater international and investment flows. Much in the same way that national strategies are developed to remain competitive in the new, knowledge-based economy in a globalised environment, institutions in the public, private or non-profit sectors, have come to recognise that "knowledge" can play an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of their operations. In addition to investments in human capital and leveraging on the role information technology, considerable attention has been devoted to harnessing the explicit and tacit knowledge they posses. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have previously made two references to the New Silk Road. The first was made at the 2nd World Islamic Economic Forum (WIEF) on "Unleashing the Potential of Emerging Markets" in Islamabad, Pakistan in November 2006, while the second reference was during a special address at the Global Islamic Finance Forum - Investors and Issuers Forum in March 2007.
This money is created by banks, not by Norges Bank. Chart 1 shows the money supply and the supply of banknotes and coins in Norway since 1960. In Norway, the money supply mainly comprises deposit money in banks. 6 In the early 1960s, banknotes and coins accounted for a fifth of the money supply. Current accounts and cheques were already becoming commonplace. Since then, banks’ deposit money has increased dramatically, and today, banknotes and coins make up less than 2.5 percent of the money supply. In other words, virtually all the money we use has been created by banks. 3/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  So how do banks create money? The answer to that question comes as quite a surprise to most people. When you borrow from a bank, the bank credits your bank account. The deposit – the money – is created by the bank the moment it issues the loan. The bank does not transfer the money from someone else’s bank account or from a vault full of money. The money lent to you by the bank has been created by the bank itself – out of nothing: fiat – let it become. The money created by the bank does not disappear when it leaves your account. If you use it to make a payment, it is just transferred to the recipient’s account.

Pillar 2 requires supervisors to carry out their obligations in a transparent and accountable manner, for example making publicly available the criteria they use in the review of banks’ internal capital assessments, and explaining to banks why any remedial actions are considered necessary. So we see transparency as an effective tool and reality check for ourselves too. The three pillars together can thus be seen as a series of checks and balances that seek to promote reasonable and realistic approaches to risk management and to capital management in banking organisations. The efforts that banks take to identify and assess their risks rigorously, and to evaluate and implement measures necessary to protect themselves effectively, represent not just good steps toward maintaining capital adequacy, but also important steps toward improved corporate governance on a broader scale. 3. Basel II will become an effective standard at the macro level  I believe that Basel II will likewise serve as an effective standard at the macro level, which is the second topic I’d like to address today. Supervisors and central bankers are increasingly interested in standards that will strengthen the stability of the banking system and of the financial system more broadly. Indeed, just across the street from us here at Grocers’ Hall, the Bank of England is an example of a central bank that is explicitly charged with promoting financial stability. Another example would be my own institution, Banco de España. In my mind, three factors will drive Basel II’s success as a public policy standard.