samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Indsutry  Construction  Services  Net Tax  GDP  Private Consumption  Private Public Public Stock Investment Consumption Investment Change  Net Export  Source: TURKSTAT. Turkey’s export performance has become more vulnerable to global cyclical changes in recent years as the share of durables and capital goods in our exports has increased over time. In fact, the significant slowdown in our major trading partners and the consequent contraction in exports were among the determinants of the sharp downturn in aggregate demand. Therefore, the assumptions on the global economy with respect to the inflation and monetary policy outlook presented in the Inflation Report that will be posted on our Website shortly are very important. The impact of the global financial turmoil in the corporate sector has become more evident and global growth has significantly contracted. The credit crunch in international credit markets still persists and there is yet to be a notable improvement in global economic indicators. Our baseline scenario in the January Inflation Report envisaged a gradual recovery in the global economy as of early 2010. On the back of the deepening global financial turmoil in the past period, many international institutions revised their growth forecasts for 2009 and 2010 downwards by a significant margin (Table 3). The forecasts for global economic activity, which were revised in the last three months, indicate a sharper contraction for 2009 compared to our forecasts presented in the January Inflation Report and a slower and more gradual recovery throughout 2010.

Figures for the first nine months of 2014 confirm that the sector has left behind the losses recorded in 2012. This better performance is underpinned by both the reduction in operating expenses and the lower provisioning needs derived from asset value adjustments. Net interest income, under downward pressure from limited business activity and low interest rates, increased moderately in 2014 compared with the same period in 2013. That said, this recovery is as yet modest and the downside pressures on the statement of income persist, meaning banks must persevere in containing their operating costs. iv. Solvency  Attesting to Spanish banks’ solvency were the results of the stress test conducted before the start-up of the SSM, in 2014. As you will recall, no Spanish bank had to submit a capitalisation plan at the end of the year, even under the worst scenario considered. That is to say, under a hypothetical highly adverse macroeconomic scenario, all the participating Spanish banks evidenced solvency levels above the thresholds demanded by the European Central Bank and the European Banking Authority, the two institutions responsible for conducting the test. The latest available figures, for December 2014, confirm that the Spanish banking sector as a whole is operating with solvency levels that comfortably exceed the minimum regulatory levels required. Indeed, the top-quality common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio stands at 11.8% for the sector as a whole, well above the minimum regulatory level of 4.5%. The total capital ratio was 13.6%, also above the regulatory level of 8%.
Productivity during different economic expansions in the US USA: Non-farm productivity growth 5  4,5  annual increase in percent  4  3,5  3  2,5  2  1,5  1  0,5  0  1961-69 first 2 years  1982-90 year 3-4  year 5-6  1991-99 year 7 and thereafter  Source: Federal Reserve, Board of Governors. The background to this scepticism regarding the effects of IT on the rest of the economy lies in the “Solow paradox”. Nobel prizewinner Robert Solow stated in 1987 that “we see computers everywhere but not in the productivity statistics”. This was true until the mid-1990s. 3. Productivity by factor, USA 1980-99 3  average annual increase in percent  2 ,5  2  1 ,5  1  0 ,5  0  C a p ita l d e e p e nin g  La b o u r q ua lity  TF P  Source: Federal Reserve, Board of Governors. Now, however, the effects of computers are beginning to show in the statistics and this paradox could be dismissed. Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel at the Federal Reserve in Washington3 have made an in-depth analysis. This is based on the fact that the productivity trend has increased by just over 1 percentage point during the latter part of the 1990s and they conclude that IT actually accounts for most of the growth in productivity. Just under half of the total increase results from investments in IT.

Kerstin Hessius: The new economy seen from a central bank perspective  Speech by Ms Kerstin Hessius, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a seminar on the IT revolution and the new economy, organised by Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Institutionell Förvaltning, at Moderna Museet Stockholm, on 12 October 2000. *  *  *  I would like to begin by thanking the organisers for choosing such a stimulating and appropriate environment for this seminar as Moderna Museet. If there is one place where you can see the effect of structural change, it is in art. A country’s economy is constantly subjected to changes, which lead to new structures. However, this is nothing new. Every time an economy has undergone significant structural changes, it has been regarded as a new economy. In many ways today’s “new economy” can be seen as one of many such major structural changes. Nor is there any accepted definition of the “new economy” concept; what I am referring to is primarily an increase in the growth potential of the economy. “Multiplied intellectual capacity” The new information technology and the internet have revolutionised the methods in which we work, shop and communicate today. As someone once said, it is as though IT multiplies intellectual capacity in the same way that the industrial revolution multiplied physical capacity. In addition, the costs of using the new intellectual capacity have fallen drastically over a short period of time, which facilitates a rapid dissemination.
These developments were reflected in the widening of the trade deficit in the first two months of the year by the annualised rate of 21.9%. This deficit is determined mostly by electrical energy trade exchanges. Excluding this effect, imports of goods would be lower from a year earlier and the trade deficit would be down by about 9.2% in annual terms. The monetary analysis reveals the existence of contained monetary pressures on the economy. The underlying pace of monetary expansion is assessed as being in line with the demand of economic agents for real money. The annual growth of M3 was 9.1% in February, unchanged from the end of the previous year. Money expansion in the economy was supported more by the foreign currency component, whereas domestic demand for money slowed down. The public sector showed lower demand for funding, in line with fiscal developments in the first quarter of the year. Furthermore, private sector demand for money increased at moderate rates, as evidenced by the slow growth rates of loans to the private sector, 9.2% as at end-February. Crediting slowdown has also reflected a low demand by households and businesses for bank loans and higher prudence by banks in lending, which was materialised in tightened credit conditions. Notwithstanding this performance, supply-side determining factors on lending performance provide the appropriate conditions for further credit growth. The Albanian  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  banking system remains well capitalised and liquid, capable to satisfy the credit demand by the private sector.

Ardian Fullani: Recent economic and monetary developments in Albania Speech by Mr Ardian Fullani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the press conference on the Monetary Policy Decision of the Bank of Albania Supervisory Council, Tirana, 25 April 2012. *  *  *  In its meeting of 25 April 2012, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania reviewed and approved the quarterly Monetary Policy Report. Based on the analysis of Albania’s latest economic and monetary developments and following discussions on their performance outlook, the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania decided to keep the key interest rate unchanged at 4.25%. This decision reflects the balance of inflationary pressures and the need to maintain the macroeconomic stimulus to the economy, under the conditions of a more prudent fiscal policy during the in the course of the year. (Let me now proceed with an overview of economic developments and main issues discussed at today’s meeting.) During the first quarter of 2012, the Albanian economy continued to maintain the parameters of macroeconomic stability even in the context of the ongoing global crisis. International financial markets are characterised by high risk premiums and, despite measures taken to solve the public debt crisis in the euro area, signals for a normal progress of in the short run are absent. These developments, as expected, have provided a reining impact on our economy, which is mainly expressed in the continuation of below-potential economic growth. Annual inflation slowed down significantly in the first quarter of the year.
A dramatic scene in the book is the following: When the clock struck 1, Taraldsen hurried in - the old messenger from Norges Bank; he always trotted with arms flailing. He stopped at Marcussen’s desk and greeted him; an uncertain smile quivering on his old face as he asked: "It is - hmm - of course an oversight?" "What!" responded Marcussen drily. The smile disappeared rather quickly and in breathless surprise Taraldsen asked again: "Aren’t your bills of exchange to be redeemed today?" "No." "Mr. Marcussen! People say that you are a jocular man; but this -" "I’m not joking - damn it!" Old Taraldsen straightened up; everyone was hunched over their work; only young Rasmus’ eyes met his. The boy was white as a sheet; he began to understand. It also started to become clear for old Taraldsen; but immediately afterwards, he became very confused again; because he understood the entire scope of this; he had the entire town's bills of exchange in his head; and of course he had seen a lot of this kind of thing during his long life but all of those were trifles compared to what would happen now. His voice shook as he almost ceremoniously asked: "Will Carsten Løvdahl’s papers be protested?" "Yes," replied Marcussen without looking up. Old Taraldsen trotted out of the offices; but on the steps he met the messenger from Aktiebanken: "Is it true? - Taraldsen!" "Now the entire town is collapsing," answered the old man, throwing up his arms in despair."

Some observers have therefore posed the following question: has the functioning of the economy changed so that higher demand does not necessarily translate into higher inflation, but instead results in growing financial imbalances? If so, a conflict may arise between achieving the inflation target in the short term and financial stability. There are several reasons why financial bubbles can develop in periods of low inflation. First, a highly credible monetary policy results in low inflation expectations. Explicit or implicit long-term price and wage contracts will become more common. It will take longer for higher demand to translate into higher inflation. Cyclical changes will have less impact on inflation. Moreover, periods of higher productivity growth may lay the basis for high corporate earnings, heightened optimism and reduced risk awareness. At the same time, with strong productivity growth, inflation remains low. Banks that record low losses and solid results can increase lending without eroding their capital adequacy level. Debt-financed investments may lead to a faster rise in house and property prices. A third factor is that strong international competition may contribute to curbing inflation during a period of strong economic expansion. China, because of its access to an abundance of cheap labour and its substantial production capacity, has contributed to a fall in prices for many manufactured goods. In Norway, we have not experienced situations where there has been a conflict between the objectives of financial stability and price stability.
Overall leverage seems lower relative to 1998, and may not look that high relative to banks and investment banks, but leverage is hard to measure and the quality of the data is not very good. While hedge funds are large enough to provide meaningful efficiency and liquidity benefits to some key markets, they are also large enough that the failure of a major hedge fund or  2  BIS Review 55/2004  number of funds could have a significant impact directly and indirectly on the major banks and investment banks in the United States. Within the clearance and settlement infrastructure, economies of scale have led to high levels of concentration in some areas. Two institutions together now handle the vast majority of clearing business for U.S. government securities and the associated triparty repo market in which over $ trillion turns over twice each day. The dramatic increase in the volume of transactions handled by the core parts of the payments infrastructure places substantially greater demands on the operations of those institutions. Moreover, many of the major payment and settlement utilities operate across national boundaries, raising complicated questions for the appropriate allocation of oversight responsibility. Alongside these changes in the relative size of institutions and in market structure, financial innovation has led to a dramatic increase in the complexity of the risk management challenge. The frontier of financial innovation inevitably advances somewhat ahead of improvements in the risk management and clearing infrastructure.

This translates into a more competitive and more innovative financial system, one that is more flexible and resilient, with weakness in one part of the system more likely to be offset by a capacity for expansion elsewhere. And, because their overall risk profiles are likely to differ from banks, the greater importance of non-bank financial intermediaries, and of the capital markets more generally, offsets some of the potential concern associated with consolidation in the banking system. Within the universe of non-bank financial intermediaries, there are other material changes worth noting. Let me highlight three. First, the role of the major investment banks in the United States as market makers and providers of liquidity in a broad range of foreign exchange, securities, and derivatives markets has continued to grow over the past decade, as has the international importance of these firms. These institutions are now key participants in the domestic and international clearance and settlement processes associated with these activities. Second, a sustained period of rapid growth in the major mortgage GSEs has left us with two very large financial institutions, whose balance sheets and associated off-balance sheet positions today account for a much larger share of the U.S. mortgage market than was the case a decade ago. This means that the credit and market risks associated with the home mortgage business in the U.S. are now in some respects more concentrated. It means that the actions taken by the GSEs to manage interest rate risk can have a substantial impact on interest rate volatility.
Before the introduction of SIC, payments in Switzerland were first offset against each other through a system of eight clearing houses. The net positions were then settled through the banks’ sight deposits at the SNB. This system was extremely cumbersome, costly and fraught with large credit and systemic risks. In SIC by contrast, all payments are settled individually and directly via sight deposits at the SNB. Thus, the payments are final and irrevocable – just like cash payments. SIC is extremely efficient and has drastically reduced credit and systemic risks. It is one of the most secure and cost-effective systems in the world. Nowadays, SIC forms the backbone of Switzerland’s payment system. Not only interbank payment transactions, but also payment transactions between PostFinance and banks as well as cashless retail payment transactions are essentially carried out via SIC. In addition, the international foreign currency settlement system, Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS), is linked to SIC. SIC, together with the trading platforms of SWX/Eurex and the securities settlement system SECOM of SIS, forms the Swiss Value Chain, Switzerland’s integrated financial market infrastructure. The SIC payment system is of utmost importance for financial stability and the implementation of the SNB’s monetary policy. Our  BIS Review 67/2007  1  monetary policy instruments are tailored to the palette of integrated SIC functions within the framework of the Swiss Value Chain. Initially, the SIC turnover in terms of value amounted to CHF 100 billion per working day; it currently stands at CHF 180 billion.

For the gold sales it was planning, the SNB was allocated a quota not claimed by other central banks that were party to the agreement of 2004. The SNB has chosen an approach for its gold sales that will avoid market unrest, with regular sales transactions. The Swiss National Bank holds currency reserves in the form of foreign currency and gold, thereby ensuring that it has room for manoeuvre in its monetary policy at all times. As a result of the sharp rise in the price of gold, the proportion of the currency reserves held as gold has increased by about a quarter since mid 2005, from 33% to the current level of 42%. The purpose of the SNB's gold sales is to rebalance the composition of currency reserves with respect to its monetary policy requirements. Moreover, by reducing its gold reserves and increasing its foreign exchange reserves, the overall risk on SNB assets will decline. Once the sales have been completed, the Swiss National Bank's gold holdings will amount to some 1,040 tonnes. 2. Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) to celebrate its 20th anniversary  Over the next few days, the Swiss Interbank Clearing System SIC will celebrate its 20th anniversary. In 1987, the introduction of the SIC payment system represented a revolution for Swiss payment transactions. SIC was one of the first payment systems in the world of the type known as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS).
Success in this endeavour is not just a question of thinking things through in a consistent way but, above all, of adopting a persevering and workmanlike approach. Economic stability in the sense of a balanced development of the economy as a whole is the sine qua non for a financial centre. It is essential if investors are to gain sufficient confidence in the prospect of sustainable business success. Stable prices, low interest rates, modest rates of taxation and a solid currency are the crucial factors. To what extent - if at all - is a financial centre reliant on its economic hinterland? This question is less easy to answer. Although a well-balanced interdependency might seem to be desirable here as well, this is not necessarily confirmed by experience. In fact, there never seems to have been any close correlation, and with modern technology enhancing the mobility of people, goods and services, the links have become even looser. Our two countries at least are proof of the fact that there need not be any close correlation between the importance of a country’s economy and that of its financial sector. Talking about economic stability, I referred to the need for perseverance. This is precisely where I see the link with social and political stability. The central task of any community is to provide its members with the greatest possible degree of security, freedom and general welfare.

Mr. Meyer addresses the competitiveness of financial centres from a Swiss perspective Address by the Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, Mr. Hans Meyer, at the International Bankers Club Luxembourg, held in Luxembourg on 23/3/98. Both Luxembourg and Switzerland are major financial centres in Europe. The performance and competitiveness of the financial services industry are thus of key economic and social importance to both countries. I should like to use this opportunity to say a few words on the subject from what may be a somewhat unusual perspective. The factors which determine the competitiveness of an industry are basically the same as those determining the success of the entire economy. In both cases, we are looking at a multitude of quite diverse factors with varying degrees of importance. Today, I would like to single out just three of them which I believe are of particular significance: economic stability, social equilibrium (i.e. political stability), and the human factor. Although each of these elements could be dealt with separately, they should ultimately be viewed in a broader context. Let’s start with economic stability. I define this as a state of balanced development across the economy as a whole, characterised by steady growth, a modest inflation rate and low unemployment. One of the main prerequisites for achieving such a state is the ability not only to create but to sustain an appropriate economic framework. This is primarily an objective for monetary policy, fiscal policy and competition policy.
The third step is the resolution of banks, applied by the Bank of Albania in view of the new mandate. Similar to recovery plans, the resolution plans drafted by the Bank of Albania aim to identify the legal and structural obstacles and difficulties with financial resources that banks face, toward resolvability. In this regard, the resolution plans are one of the key instruments to facilitate the Bank of Albania’s resolution implementation. This year in April, the Bank of Albania approved a bylaw that defines the content of resolution plans. Then banks were required to report a broad set of data for drafting these plans, based on the model of the European Banking Authority and we are currently in the process of drafting them. The drafting of the banks resolution plans is complicated, which includes complex and cross-border issues that must be implemented and coordinated within a short period of time. Hence, the resolution planning is an on-going process and a long-term mission to remove obstacles against the possibility for resolution action in banks. This planning does not mean drafting an annual plan that is stored somewhere in some shelf and it is dusted off only when its implementation is necessary; instead, it is the beginning of a long process of restructuring all aspects of the banking business that may hinder this process.

In the wake of the crisis, experts have reached the conclusion that there is no bank model that would perform well or poorly in times of crisis. Different models of failing banks showed that the issue stemmed from undertaking high risk, financing with short-term instruments and insufficient protection offered by capital, even where minimum requirements were met. This conclusion has been reflected in higher supervisory requirements for quantity and quality of capital and liquidity, limits on the leverage ratio and maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. The banking sector needs to comply with these requirements within a defined medium-term framework. Regulatory measures are also accompanied by the consensus on the need for structural reforms in the financial system, namely, separation of risk-bearing financial speculation activities from deposit collection activities, and issues related with too big to fail banks, by discouraging their excessive growth. The biggest lesson of the financial crisis was that micro-prudential supervision of banks was not sufficient to safeguard financial stability because the system as a whole behaves differently from individual parts. In an effort to make themselves safer, financial institutions may undertake such behaviours that collectively damage financial stability. The banking activity takes place through its own cycles, known as financial cycles, which may deteriorate the business cycle of the real economy. Banks are exposed to collective macroeconomic shocks, which weaken them, at the same time, thus affecting financial stability. The understanding of this lesson dictated the need for macro-prudential supervision in addition to the micro-prudential one.