samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
To be clear, the question here is not about whether CCP margin is to “blame” for the dash-for-cash. The question is did the system have enough liquidity ready in the right places to respond to derivative market volatility without adverse consequences for financial stability. Whatever we conclude, our policy response will need to take into account the whole story- including the essential role that margin played in preventing panic. We don’t want to return to the pre-Lehman world of a spaghetti bowl of counterparty credit risk. 4. Conclusion  So going back to my original questions. First, what has the experience of March and April told us about the reforms we put in place post-2008 to make the global financial system simpler? A: The headline answer is: It worked. When it comes to the crucial goal of preventing panic fuelled by a spaghetti bowl of bilateral derivatives exposures, the new system held up despite unprecedented stress. Second, where do we go from here? A: I have two recommendations:  First, we need global regulatory cooperation in order to avoid reverting to fragmentation and spaghetti. Trust based on proportionate, informed reliance. Second, if we want the simpler system to keep working, global regulators need to stay ahead of the curve and keep the system under review. We cannot ignore the fire the financial system experienced in March and April last year just because central banks did a good job putting it out. We need to look behind the walls and address any faults in the wiring.

During 2008–09, the Bank of Albania started the revision of the regulatory and operational procedures to make them more comprehensive and solid with a view to tackle extraordinary financial situations. In this context, the FSVC has assisted us with expertise to amend and upgrade the relevant manuals. In 2010, the assistance of FSVC was requested to perfect operational risk supervision and assess IT infrastructure adequacy. In addition, during the same year, assistance was received as regards revising the credit risk manual. In 2011, cooperation between the Bank of Albania and the FSVC focused on boosting banking risk assessment, this time around on liquidity and market risks assessment. Moreover, the assistance of FSVC has proven very useful for the regulatory and operational empowerment of the Albanian Deposit Insurance Agency (ADIA). I would like to underscore the appreciation of the ADIA and the Bank of Albania, as its supervisory authority, for the invaluable contribution of FSVC experts on drafting ADIA’s Strategic Development Plan 2002–05; preparation of payment procedures in the compensation process during 2008; drafting of amendments to the law “On deposit insurance” in 2009, and; identification of further legal and regulatory improvements to enhance ADIA’s capacities on insurance of liquidities. I would also like to point out that the FSVC’s assistance has been evident and effective. It has always been adapted to the Bank of Albania and ADIA’s concrete needs and provided swiftly. The deployed experts were professionals with considerable financial and legal experience in key institutions such as the Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation.
Germany and France did not respect the Pact in 2003–4, while Spain and Ireland respected it more or less fully until 2007. Indeed, Spain was running a budget surplus before the crisis. Neither does it seem that fiscal policies played a primary role in driving the economic cycle before the crisis. There was no uniform rise in government debt ratio in the euro area before the crisis, and in several countries debt-to-GDP ratios actually fell. In Spain, for instance, the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  public debt ratio fell from 62% of GDP to 36% from 1999–2007 and in Ireland from 47% to 25%. The more important factor driving the economic imbalances up to 2007 was the increasing private financial deficits – or put differently, rising private debt levels financed by the banking sectors of both core and peripheral countries. Contrary to public debt ratios to GDP, private debt was increasing much more rapidly in all peripheral countries before the crisis. In Portugal the private debt ratio to GDP increased by 49% from 1999 to 2008, in Spain by 75%, in Ireland by 101% and in Greece by 217%. To fund this expansion of private debt, cross-border lending between euro area banks increased significantly, encouraged by the absence of exchange rate risks after the introduction of the euro. The exposures of banks from core to peripheral countries more than quintupled between 1999 and 2008. These developments largely explain the evolution of fiscal, current account and competitiveness positions before the crisis.

As a significant part of the credit growth was being financed from abroad, countries built up large capital account surpluses and corresponding large current account deficits as the mirror image. The mechanism that connected these financial and real trade flows was the loss of competitiveness – that is, an appreciation of the real exchange rate caused by economic over-heating. As this audience knows well, all these developments later implied major problems in the financial sector in peripheral countries when the cycle turned. On the asset side, loan quality deteriorated, while on the liability side, those loans could no longer be funded from abroad. It was only at this point, due to the economic downturn and the need to backstop banks, that sovereign debt began its steep rise and became a driver of the crisis in itself. Drawing the right lessons for the euro area In emphasising this private debt-focused narrative for this crisis, my aim is not to negate the importance of fiscal policies. Fiscal policies certainly should not have been pro-cyclical, and fiscal discipline today is essential to ensure sustainable debt levels in the future. My aim is rather to ensure that we recognise the central role played by the financial sector in the crisis and so draw the right lessons for the future. The most important such lesson is that the euro area needs stronger governance of financial policies – an ability to identify and curb cross-border financial flows and hence prevent debtdriven imbalances.
Much of this work involves international institutions like, for instance, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Bank for International Settlements, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and the OECD, as well as the newly created Financial Stability Forum. 1  Governor Bäckström is also Chairman of the Board and President of the Bank for International Settlements. Before becoming Governor of the Riksbank in 1994 he was State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance with responsibility for Fiscal and Financial Affairs, which included the responsibility, under the minister, for the handling of the Swedish banking crisis in the early 1990s. 1  BIS Review 88/1999  However, the work, often hard, of implementing policies and codes lies with national authorities. These measures will contribute to improved financial stability only if countries actually adopt and implement them. A crucial ingredient in achieving this is of course to involve countries, formally or informally, in the development of the policies, codes and standards. But even if that is achieved, I know from my own experience how difficult the actual implementation sometimes can be, not least for political reasons. I would also like to make the point that today’s favourable trends in the world economy should not lead us to conclude that the danger is over. Instead, policymakers throughout the world must continue to work on forestalling new problems both because some evident threats to international financial and economic stability still remain and because there may well be vulnerabilities that are not so evident.

Between 1990 and 1997, the annual flow to Asia alone was equivalent to around 25% of the affected countries’ aggregate GDP. This was a combination of bank lending and portfolio investments; 60% of the lending from international banks was shortterm. That capital moves from one part of the world to another if the yield is seen to be higher is, of course, positive in itself. The problem lay in the conditions for productive investments being less good than  had been hoped. Later, when the Asian economies ran into problems, the capital flows reversed and serious financial turbulence broke out. A further way of achieving a high return was to take increased risks by debt financing and complex financial instruments. This created a starting point for so-called highly leveraged institutions. Long Term Capital Management was one extreme example. International banks engaged in lending directly to countries where the returns were high. At the same time, they lent capital to hedge funds that invested in the same countries. In some cases, moreover, the banks owned shares directly in these funds. There are grounds for saying that risk-taking was high in many cases. The good profits created a culture of deceptive security and stimulated further risk-taking. To this can be added the false sense of security that the new mathematical models imparted. They were seen to function well under normal circumstances but failed to do so when they were most needed, i.e. in turbulent times.
This growth was mainly driven by expansions in the transport, storage and communications;  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  construction; community, social and personal services; financial institutions and insurance as well as manufacturing sectors. In line with the expansion in real GDP, per capita GDP has increased from 332 US Dollars in 2000, to 655 US Dollars in 2005 and 1,784 US Dollars in 2013. We are, however, alive to the fact that more growth is required in order to have a lasting dent on high poverty levels and even more important, there is need to do more to make growth more inclusive and equitably distributed among the citizens of our country. Distinguished Participants, to ensure sustainable economic growth, the Government has been pursuing appropriate macro-economic policies. To this effect, inflation has declined from the double digits of the early 2000s to single digit levels as recorded in recent years. Annual inflation slowed down to 7.1% in December 2013 from 7.3 in December 2012, although it was 1.1 percentage points above the end-year target of 6%. This outturn reflected higher non-food inflation which was moderated by lower food inflation. Higher non-food inflation was largely due to higher fuel prices, coupled with pass-through effects of the depreciation of the Kwacha against the US dollar. During the first four months of 2014 inflation rose to 7.3%, 7.6%, 7.7%, and 7.8% in January, February, March, and April, respectively.

Colleagues, Zambia’s external sector has also registered significant improvements over the last ten years, with notable surpluses recorded over the last five years. This was largely on account of higher growth in export earnings relative to import bills. Total merchandise export earnings have more than doubled over the last five years to 10.4 billion US Dollars in 2013 from 4.5 billion US Dollars in 2008. The increase was driven by a rise in earnings from both metal and non-traditional exports. Metal exports rose by 76.1% to 7.0 billion US Dollars in 2013 from 4.0 billion US Dollars in 2008 due to both improved prices and an increase in export volumes. Non-traditional export earnings posted a stronger growth of 283.6 % to 3.4 billion US Dollars from 900 million US Dollars over the same period. However, the current account surplus narrowed in 2013 as imports grew faster than exports. This is a normal trend in a growing economy as most of the imports are machinery and intermediate goods such as industrial boilers and equipment, petroleum products, chemicals and motor vehicles that are expected to enhance productivity and ultimately increase production. In the foreign exchange market, the Kwacha has been relatively stable in the last few years. However in 2013, the Kwacha was characterised by a depreciating trend against most major  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  trade partner currencies, except the rand. The Kwacha depreciated against the US Dollar by 4.9% to an annual average of $ from $ in 2012.
Svein Gjedrem: Monetary policy, securities markets and municipalities Address by Mr Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the anniversary seminar, Kommunalbanken, 30 August 2002. Please note that the text below may differ slightly from the actual presentation  *  *  *  In my address today I will touch on three themes. First, I will discuss monetary policy and its influence on municipalities’ financial position, followed by some remarks on the Norwegian bond market and Kommunalbanken AS. I will then conclude with some reflections on the challenges associated with the pension system and the interplay with securities markets. Municipalities’ financial position and monetary policy  Guidelines for economic policy  • Fiscal policy: - guideline for use of petroleum revenues: • use real return on Petroleum Fund • smooth fluctuations in the economy  • Monetary policy: - inflation target  SG Kommunalbanken, 30.august 2002  Norway’s economic policy is based on the guidelines for fiscal and monetary policy. The guideline for fiscal policy states that the use of petroleum revenues over the central government budget shall be equivalent to the expected real return on the Government Petroleum Fund. Most of the phasing in of petroleum revenues will take place over the next ten years. With a 4 per cent return on the Petroleum Fund, the use of petroleum revenues will rise to almost 5 per cent of mainland GDP in 2010.

The BNB Governor made it clear that the only exit from the current regime would be the replacement of the lev with the euro at the currently fixed exchange rate. The whole process of accession – first to the Banking Union and ERM II, and next to the euro area – could not substitute for the good macroeconomic practices and business projects, Mr. Radev said. A country refusing to comply with this is sure to suffer serious economic and financial difficulties whether inside or outside the euro area. The two proven pillars of good macroeconomic policy in Bulgaria are the fiscal stability and the monetary regime stability. Should these conditions, together with the continuous improvement of institutions, be present, the preparatory process and subsequently the accession to the euro area would be a catalyst for the social and economic prosperity of our country. 2/2  BIS central bankers' speeches
We need to ensure broad support for the reform agenda especially since there might be some short-term costs of certain reforms. However, according to the EBRD data not only is the difference in the percentage of people who support market economy approximately twice lower in our region than in Germany, but it has actually declined in the last ten years, diverged, and the same applies to the support of democracy as a political system. This is where policy transparency and communication will play a tremendously important role. And clearly, not everything we do will always get full support from the broad public, especially in the case of 8  structural reforms with long-term gains and short-term costs, but boldness is often rewarded beyond our expectations. Thank you. 9

Hence, it is clear that not only are the present day poor nations struggling in the emerging, highly complex and controlled economic environment, they are also facing reduced resource transfers, and not being accorded special treatment they should be afforded in order to propel them out of poverty. Some may however argue that the tremendous benefits of globalization has levelled the playing field and that advantages are available to any and all who care to access, and it is just unfortunate if some persons are unable to take advantage of these conditions. Nevertheless, I believe we are all aware that weaker communities have lesser chances of access and that situation leads to widening even further, the ever-widening gap. Therefore, it is timely and appropriate that this forum addresses the need to impress upon the more wealthy nations to increase aid flows, open out greater trading opportunities, and move towards higher investment and resource build-up in the lower income countries. Lest I be misunderstood, let me add that, not for a moment am I suggesting that the progressive steps the world and the international community have taken over the past few decades in developing new standards and norms are in any way, inappropriate or unwelcome. Those initiatives were certainly necessary and have been beneficial for the overall advancement of society.
The ability to offer different types of products to suit the local needs of Mpongwe district will go a long way in enhancing access to financial services in this area. The Bank of Zambia is determined to facilitate viable branch expansion, and the introduction of new and innovative financial products, to tap savings and channel these savings to investment. The Bank will therefore continue to work in close collaboration with the financial sector to cultivate partnerships in order to establish the frameworks and pursue policies that will drive financial innovation, build strong financial institutions and partnerships to ensure a stable financial sector in the country. As I conclude, let me once again again commend the Board and Management of NATSAVE for this enviable initiative of spreading the branch network throughout the country and having presence in economically viable areas such as Mpongwe. I wish to assure you that the opening of this branch will soon result in increased investment, creation of jobs and a growth in profits for the bank. Honourable Ministers, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentleman, it is now my singular honour and pleasure to declare the National Savings and Credit Bank, Mpongwe branch, officially opened. I THANK YOU  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3

Another important aspect is the identification and division of the population according to their demographic, geographic and cultural characteristics. For us, financial education is a public  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  good intended for all. In compliance with the best international experiences, we identified financial education for young people as highly important, targeting not only students but also their educators. Its practical realisation has been a complex process requiring adequate human and financial resources. For that purpose, the slogan adopted by us is very meaningful: “Education may be costly, but it is priceless”. The implementation methodology is widely known: meeting face-to-face, interactive games that intrigue children’s imagination, a series of publication with a flexible level of difficulties, training of teachers of economy, and a tour in various schools of the country. In this regard, I would like to point out to the recent contribution of the Bank of Albania to high-school students for the book on: “Personal finance in your hands”, which is conceptualised as an elective subject for high schools. Honourable participants, Education is a never-ending process. Learning is lifelong. It is deep, immense, and comprehensive. Therefore, I have to say that in spite of what we have done so far, we still have a long way to go. The Bank of Albania deems as imperative the drafting and implementation of a national strategy on contemporary financial education. The Bank of Albania stands ready to join any initiative at national level, which aims at promoting literacy across the country. Thank you!
And when it became apparent that the official bilateral financing was in practise available only as the very last resort we had to turn to the commercial bank lenders in the major creditor countries and persuade them to extend the maturity of their loans. It was a dangerous moment. But their constructive response went a long way to resolving the immediate crisis and helped to restore greater financial stability to the region as a whole. The creditor banks are also now in negotiation with Indonesia’s commercial debtors. The discussion in Washington turned to preventative measures for the future. It would have been understandable in the light of the Asian experience if there had been some turning back from the path towards greater freedom of international capital movements, and there was some suggestion of this. But on the whole the long term benefits of free capital flows were upheld, and the mood was to continue cautiously down that path, but to emphasise the need, not only for sound macro-economic policies which everyone accepts as a sine qua non, but also for steps to accompany capital account liberalisation designed to reduce the risks of volatility. These related in part to the process of capital account liberalisation, where there was a good deal of stress on ‘sequencing’ - that is on liberalising potentially more stable, longer-term, capital inflows initially, rather than short-term borrowing. But they related particularly to three key conditions for living with freedom of capital movements. The first was “transparency”.

Naturally, we cannot anticipate the results of the forthcoming negotiations, but one principle of consistency must be observed: access to the single market must continue to be contingent on the strict observance of all of its rules. There can be no cherry picking or free-riding. And we must obviously maintain our common European trade policy if we wish to retain our clout in future trade negotiations at the global level. Third asset: our common social model in Europe. It is less widely discussed, but it is what fundamentally defines continental Europe, and it is what German and French society and public opinion share. Our social model combines a high level of public service, relatively low levels of inequality – much lower than in the United States – and a good intensity of social dialogue. And this has been achieved in a market economy. I would like to stress the extent to which this social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft) is a response to the questions raised in the AngloSaxon world, rather than protectionism: Germany, like many other European countries, proves that economic success can go hand in hand with social welfare, and less inequality. We can be proud of these three assets that we have built together. But for the future, while some no longer seem to believe in the benefits of the European project, we can no longer afford to be complacent; we cannot simply rest on our laurels. II. In order to control our common destiny we need to build a better Europe.