samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Conclusion I think it is quite clear that the banking industry can no longer afford to continue conducting business as usual and ignore the issues that I have highlighted. The banking industry must take stock of the external challenges it faces today, including a very difficult economic environment, the impact of evolving technologies and the shift in customer expectations. It must focus on winning customer loyalty, providing value, operating efficiently and resiliently, and attracting the right talent. In addition, the enabling institutions such as educators and regulators need to provide the necessary support if the industry is to succeed in this transformative journey. The industry is clearly at a crossroads and needs to make proactive decisions now to remain relevant in the future. There are two paths that the industry can take. If the banking industry continues to operate the way it has in the past, ignoring the many challenges that it faces today, it would lose its dominant position. Competition Central Bank of Kuwait - Public ‫ عام‬- ‫بنك الكويت المركزي‬  - 19 -  will increase from different institutions such as telecom operators, technology companies and FinTech firms, and customers will flock to these solutions, as we have already seen in some markets. Banks, as a result, will be pushed to the fringes of the industry, if not removed altogether. But if the industry manages to evolve, then the picture could be different.

Tackling the urgent issues To tackle the urgent issues stemming from the crisis, it was first essential for the three countries that were experiencing major difficulties to be able to continue funding themselves:  BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  the EU and the IFM stepped in to assist them. They did this via bilateral loans in the beginning, and then in the framework of a structure that borrowed on the markets backed by a guarantee from the euro area Member States: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This support was subject to strict conditionality to ensure that the sustainability of public finances was restored and the country in question regained its competitiveness. These countries therefore undertook to meet deficit reduction targets in order, ultimately, to be able to tap the markets directly for their funding needs. This support was always designed to be temporary and encourage sound fiscal policies. Central banks also played a decisive role throughout the crisis. First, they cut their key interest rates sharply after the crisis of 2008 in order to guarantee price stability and boost lending and activity. Furthermore, they provided financial institutions with liquidity to limit credit crunches. Since 2008, the Eurosystem, for example, has conducted fixed-rate tenders with full allotment against an extended range of eligible collateral.
17  Figure 10  Probability of MPR hikes implicit in market assets (*)  Breakeven inflation, 5 in 5 years (percent)  (percent)  2,4  2,4  100  1,8  80  1,2  60  0,6  40  0,0  0,0  20  -0,6 ene.16 16  -0,6  0 16 Aug.16  U.S.  1,8  Germany  1,2  Japan  0,6  jul.16 Jul. ene.17 17  100 Fed (Dec.17)  80 60  Fed (Jun.17)  40 20  ECB(Mar.18) 16 16 Oct.16 Dec.16  0  17 Feb.17  (*) Fed fund future contracts are used for the Fed; OIS for the ECB. In parentheses, the month at which the hike is expected. Source: Bloomberg. Figure 11 Exchange rate (1) (2) (accumulated change since January 2013, percent)  60  60  OER  45  45  30  30  15  15  MER-X RER  0  0  -15  -15 Multilateral dollar  -30 13  14  15  16  -30 17  (1) Increase (decrease) indicates depreciation (appreciation). (2) March 2017 data contain information up to the statistical cutoff date. Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg. 18  Table 2 International scenario 2.015 €  2016 (e) Dec.16 Report  Mar.17 Report  Terms of trade Trading partners' GDP World GDP at PPP World GDP at market exchange rates United States China Eurozone Latin America (excl.

Crucially we now have a credible framework for setting monetary policy to meet the inflation target in the medium term. Monetary policy cannot prevent the short-run ups and downs of economic cycles. In the current climate, the Committee believes that, if Bank Rate were set to bring inflation back to target too quickly, the result would be unnecessary volatility in output and employment. Instead we are focused on returning CPI inflation to the 2% target in around two years, when the present sharp rises in energy and food prices will have dropped out of the CPI inflation rate. We judge that in order for inflation to return to target it will be necessary for economic growth to slow this year, reducing the pressure on supply capacity of the economy and dampening increases in prices and wages. But the risks to both the upside and downside remain large and the MPC will continue to make its judgement about the appropriate level of Bank Rate month by month. The next year is not going to be comfortable for anyone and we already hear calls to change the system, the target, and our focus on inflation. But the new framework and the independence of the Bank was designed for difficult times as well as for plain sailing. I hope we can look to you and other businesses for support in doing what is needed to bring inflation back to target. BIS Review 80/2008  5  6  BIS Review 80/2008  BIS Review 80/2008  7
However, my view is that, in certain situations, it can be appropriate to attempt to counteract financial imbalances with a limited tightening of monetary policy. A tightening of monetary policy would be likely to have a restraining effect on credit growth and asset prices. Even if monetary policy does not succeed in entirely preventing financial imbalances from arising, it can limit their extent. The expected macroeconomic consequences following the correction of imbalances should then be less serious, particularly if the risk of a serious financial crisis is reduced. The clear communication of the reasons for increased interest rates should raise public awareness of the risks of financial imbalances, which, in my opinion, may have a stabilising effect. In this example, monetary policy contributes to more stable inflation and resource utilisation over the slightly longer term, which should be balanced against the short-term costs of conducting a somewhat tighter monetary policy. This form of monetary policy thus does not entail a deviation from flexible inflation targeting, that is to say a monetary policy aimed at stabilising both inflation and the real development. Neither is it an issue of turning house prices or any other asset price into a target variable for monetary policy. On the contrary, it is an illustration of flexible inflation targeting in which the destabilising effect of financial imbalances on inflation and resource utilisation are incorporated into the monetary policy assessment.

Going forward, activity will grow above potential over the next two years and inflation will converge to 3% during 2020. The beginning of the MPR normalization will depend on our conviction that inflation is in a clear process of convergence to 3%. Especially important for this evaluation will be the way the labor market absorbs the strong immigration flow, the response of investment and external developments. At the same time, there are important risks around these projections. Let me now describe this scenario and associated risks. II. Macroeconomic scenario  II.1. Recent evolution of activity and inflation In the first quarter this year, activity grew 1.6% annually, which combined a 3.6% fall in the mining sector and a 2.2% increase in the non-mining sectors (Figure 1). The high basis for comparison of the same period in 2018 anticipated that first-quarter growth this year would underperform that of 2018, but the result was lower than expected. This combined the negative performance of mining—affected by climatic factors, downtime at some mines and the lower ore—and several of the more volatile sectors—linked to natural resources—of non-mining GDP. In particular, the worse-than-expected performance of agriculture, fishing, and electricity, gas and water stood out. Most of the non-mining sectors whose activity is more related to demand behaved in line with expectations, particularly construction and services. One exception was the export industry, which combined high bases for comparison, weak demand from its target markets—mainly Latin America—and stronger competition abroad.
The other view was that higher interest rates would not have altered the expected long-run equilibrium value of sterling, but would have led to an immediate upwards jump in the exchange rate, as the greater interest rate differential with other countries would have shifted up the uncovered interest rate parity path from OA to QA in Chart 8. That would have meant even weaker external demand, and a more depressed domestic economy. 30 Higher interest rates would have moderated domestic credit growth and asset prices, but only at the expense of slower output growth, rising unemployment and a prolonged undershoot of the inflation target. 31 Everything would have hinged on the success of the strategy in bringing down the expected equilibrium level of sterling in the long run to avoid a further rise in sterling in the short run and a damaging recession. At best, persistently higher interest rates would have implied an initial slowing of growth, a deliberate attempt to weaken sterling, and an under-shooting of the inflation for a period. At worst, we would have seen the exchange rate appreciate further. The decade would have been characterised by rising unemployment and very low inflation. To have deviated from our statutory remit in a direction that would have imposed real costs to output and employment would have been a big gamble. But the costs of the ensuing crisis have been so great that we cannot stop there and say that nothing could have been done. 29  Broadbent (2012).

15 Keynesian policies to smooth the path of adjustment by supporting aggregate demand can help in the short run, but their effectiveness is limited by the fact that a significant adjustment to spending – from consumption to investment – is required. If policymakers can, first, identify misperceptions, and, second, correct them by changes in monetary policy – both highly uncertain empirically – then there is indeed a trade-off between hitting the inflation target and reducing the chance of a financial crisis down the road. But are central banks less prone to misperceptions than others? My second example concerns what Masaaki Shirakawa, Governor of the Bank of Japan calls the “cycle of confidence”. He argues that success breeds confidence, and eventually over-confidence and complacency, leading to collapse. Such ideas are closely associated with the work of Hyman Minsky and others. Minsky set out a “financial instability hypothesis” in which a period of stability encourages exuberance in credit markets and subsequent instability. 16 Perhaps the experience of unprecedented stability in the UK and world economies before the crisis dulled the senses and bred complacency about future risks. I talked about this when I christened the period leading up to 2003 the nice (non-inflationary consistently expansionary) decade. 17 The point of that speech was that the following decade was unlikely to be as nice. And, of course, it wasn’t. But the point didn’t get home, and the financial system became more and more fragile as the leverage of our banking system rose to unprecedented levels.
“Working Together for Sustainable Growth” Special Address by Dr. Veerathai Santiprabhob Governor of the Bank of Thailand WFE General Assembly & Annual Meeting Programme 6 September 2017 | Grand Hyatt Erawan Bangkok, Thailand Khun Kesara Manchusree, President of the Stock Exchange of Thailand, Ms. Nandini Sukumar, Chief Executive Officer of World Federation of Exchanges, Chairpersons, Presidents, Chief Executive Officers and top management of leading global exchanges, Ladies and gentlemen, A very good evening to you all. First of all, I would like to thank the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) for inviting me to be a part of this annual event. I must admit that while I was at the SET, I looked forward to participating in this forum every year, as it often generated good new ideas and reaffirmed our commitments to enhance capital market for the benefit of the global economy. I am delighted to be back at the WFE General Assembly and Annual Meeting. But this year, I join the meeting in another capacity - wearing a different hat. It is my great honour and pleasure to be among distinguished guests and former colleagues. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me start by saying that it is an exciting time for the Thai economy and our region. The Thai economy continues to expand at a faster-than-expected pace. We are witnessing strong growth in exports and tourism. Government large-scale infrastructure investments are making good progress.

Our export to Austria was 1.1 billion USD and import from Austria was 1.6 billion USD at the end of 2012. These numbers are quite small compared to the potential. On the financing side, however, there is good news. Austria is the leading country in foreign direct investment flows to Turkey for the period after 2008 with 7 billion USD in total. Direct investments are mainly focused on the energy sector. There are currently 643 Austrian firms operating in Turkey. Distinguished Guests, The European Union is a success story regarding peace and cooperation among nations with rather bitter historical memories. No wonder the European Union obtained the Nobel Peace Prize in year 2012. Despite all the debates and a high degree of uncertainty regarding the new economic governance structure in the EU, I sincerely believe Turkey’s closer cooperation with Austria will bring invaluable outcomes in line with the European spirit. To conclude, I would like to express my view that the future of the commercial, financial and economic relations between Austria and Turkey looks more promising than ever. Today’s joint meeting and the opening ceremony of the Exhibition “Contemporary Turkish Painting and Printmaking in the Republican Era” are small, symbolic, yet quite significant steps to mark the start of this new and healthy trend. Thank you very much for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3
Risk mitigation is not new to bankers all over the world and same is true for Sri Lanka. Most of you who are sitting here this evening are professional bankers of high calibre. Banking is like swimming across waters. Bankers know how to swim. Regulators need not teach you how to do it. We can warn you of bad weathers, choppy waters, high-tides and currents that can pull you down, but we cannot swim for you. That’s why the regulators expect the shareholders, boards of directors, CEOs, senior management and all employees of banks to understand potential risks of their own operations and be ready to deal with them if such risks were to occur. Therefore, all bank officials individually and collectively are responsible for risk mitigation. Basel II seeks to balance leveraging internal risk systems with supervisory prudence. It is also a reflection of the rapid change in financial market innovations, advances in risk management and enhanced supervisory approaches. In essence, we expect from the banking profession to objectively and reliably identify risks, evaluate them and come up with appropriate risk mitigation measures. Many enterprises fail due to unforeseen risks because they have not paid attention to risk mitigation. When it comes to banking and financial institutions, we need to be much more careful, because they are the custodians of other people’s money.

This would be a natural extension of the risk-based approach to supervision that is already applied and it should be viewed as a means of fostering closer interaction between the industry and the regulator, rather than an imposition of regulations. To enable the process, CBSL has begun to examine the legal requirements in this regard. The internal capital adequacy assessment processes (ICAAP) of banks should cover the identification and measuring of the risks and assessing how much capital is needed to support such risks. After implementation, the CBSL will review banks’ ICAAP as part of the risk-based supervisory process. In addition, there will be an ongoing evaluation of the capital adequacy of banks, including stress tests. In the process of evaluation, CBSL will review and evaluate the risk profile of the banks, the adequacy and reliability of the ICAAP, and identify any weaknesses or inadequacies and necessary prudential measures. Pillar III – market discipline The purpose of this Pillar is to complement Pillars I and II by encouraging market discipline through the public disclosure of key information on risk exposures and capital adequacy. Disclosures are applicable at the bank level as well as supervisory level. The level and content of Pillar III disclosures will vary according to the measurement and calculation approaches adopted by a relevant bank. In terms of Basel II, the disclosures would have to be made on an annual and semi-annual basis. The implementation process will be developed in 2007 along with the Sub-committee appointed for the purpose.
A current example are bad loans, or to use a more technical term, non-performing loans, NPLs for short. Banks in the euro area carry a total of € billion in such loans on their balance sheets. And this is an issue. Having large stocks of NPLs on their balance sheets prevents banks from doing their job. They have a hard time financing our economy. ECB internal research has shown that banks with high stocks of NPLs indeed lend less than others. It is thus important that banks resolve their NPLs quickly and decisively. And this is not just for the sake of the economy and the greater good. Failing to deal with NPLs also hurts the banks themselves. High levels of NPLs require constant attention. And this takes time and energy. So getting rid of NPLs would enable managers and staff to use their time more productively. They could improve business models, shore up profits and make their bank more resilient. So, failing to deal with NPLs hurts the economy and of course it hurts the banks. That’s why we consider NPLs a top priority. Getting rid of NPLs by restructuring, working out or selling them requires a joint effort by banks, politicians and supervisors. Banks have to put in place the right strategies and execute them. Politicians have to improve the judicial and legal systems to allow a swift resolution of NPLs. And we supervisors? Well, last year we published guidance on how to deal with NPLs.

Luis de Guindos: Euro area and Spain - current status and challenges ahead Remarks by Mr Luis de Guindos, Vice-President of the European Central Bank, at the 1st Edition of the Prize José Echegaray of elEconomista, Madrid, 15 October 2018. * * *  Despite the recent slow-down, economic growth in the euro area remains solid and broad-based, as confirmed by the latest data. Real GDP has expanded for 21 consecutive quarters, growing 0.4% quarter-on-quarter during the second quarter of 2018. In the first half of 2018, growth weakened from the very high rates of last year, reflecting lower exports. In the coming period, however, we expect the economy to continue to grow at a pace above its potential. In fact, the duration and amplitude of the current expansion is still below historical averages, having lasted no more than five years and with real GDP now 10% above the trough in the first quarter of 2013.1 By comparison, on average, growth phases in the past lasted seven and a half years from trough to peak, with GDP increasing by 21% over the same period. While risks to growth have remained broadly balanced, those related to global factors, including the threat of increased global protectionism, rising oil prices and emerging market vulnerabilities, have become more prominent. Volatility in sovereign debt markets and the rise in populism add to overall uncertainty. The ongoing expansion has led to strong employment gains.
Today I will talk about how we at the Riksbank work to achieve our price stability target and to ensure we have a safe and efficient payment system. I will for instance claim: •  That monetary policy is not conducted automatically without any consideration for other parts of the economy. Legislation and our methods of working give us the scope to conduct flexible inflation targeting. At the same time, we cannot, of course, accept too much deviation from the target if it is to remain credible. •  That we will continue the work on developing our methods of forecasting. One possible step in this could be to publish our own interest rate forecast instead of assuming that the repo rate will develop in line with market expectations. •  That it is important to follow up the legislatory work in Sweden on how banks in distress should be managed. This is a project that began a long time ago and needs to be completed. •  That my ambition is for the Riksbank to remain at the forefront as regards both of our areas of responsibility. We shall be a small, efficient central bank that is respected both at home and abroad. Before I return to these issues, I believe that the current monetary policy regime can be best understood in the light of the historical experiences of conducting monetary policy. I will therefore  BIS Review 8/2006  1  begin with a look back at the experiences from various monetary policy regimes.

Because I am certain all of you have committed to memory everything I said then, I’ll keep my remarks on LIBOR today short and to the point: We have only 459 days until the availability of LIBOR can no longer be assured, and everyone needs to put their nose to the grindstone in their efforts to prepare for the move off LIBOR. In the immortal words of Captain Jean Luc Picard—make it so! Before I continue on to today’s topic or quote other favorite Star Trek characters, I need to give the standard Fed disclaimer that the views I express today are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee or others in the Federal Reserve System. The Heart of the Economy The markets that are the center of attention today—the Treasury market, the repo market, and the mortgage-backed securities market—represent the heart of the circulatory system of our financial system and our economy, and indeed the global economy. When they are working smoothly, all the other parts of the system can perform as they should. But, the opposite is true as well. If these critical markets break down, credit stops flowing, and people can’t finance the purchase of a car or a home, businesses can’t invest, and the economy suffers, resulting in lost jobs and income.1 Financial markets aren’t static—they evolve over time in response to changes in technology, regulation, and business models. The Treasury market is not immune to this process of change.