samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
In keeping with previous examples, it illustrates the extreme non-contractual lengths some of the asset managers were willing to go to in order to protect their reputations. It also shows how the equivalent of a “bank run” can happen in the shadow banking system. And it shows the potential importance of public sector support – another complicating factor that makes the true risks in a tail event difficult to assess. As a final example in this section, we have Deutsche Bank’s decision in December 2008 not to call a lower tier 2 subordinated debt issue (a € 2004/2014 bond with a call date of Jan 16 2009), despite the fact that it was customary for banks to call such bonds at the first possible date. The reason that this is interesting is that it was actually economically rational  13  In Japan, money market funds lost much of their appeal after principal losses due to Enron-related investments, and investors largely returned to bank deposits. 14  See Brewster and Chung, 17 September 2008, “Fear of money market funds ‘breaking the buck’ ”, The Financial Times, and Moody’s Investor Service, August 9.2010, “Sponsor Support Key to Money Market Funds”. 8  BIS central bankers’ speeches  in isolation for Deutsche Bank not to call, and it was fully within its right not to do so, but still, investors became infuriated and the consequent short-term adverse reaction almost certainly cost Deutsche and its shareholders a multiple of the gain it received from not calling the bond.

New market segments can be created if the risk-return trade-off is appropriate. The new issues (Credit Suisse and Rabobank), have so far been very well received and we are aware of plans for funds being created to invest in these instruments. We see every reason to believe that new vehicles for owning contingent capital instruments can be created and existing mandates modified to allow them, as long as the market sees these securities as an asset class that will stay and reach critical scale, and subject to the normal market discipline of risk and return. This plays into a second lesson from the crisis. It is obviously crucial from a financial stability standpoint that contingent capital securities do not end up largely in the hands of other highly leveraged financial institutions, where losses could cause further spill-overs and thus generate financial instability. We believe that regulators could play a constructive role in allowing a broad range of “real money” investors to own sensible amounts of this systemic risk. Conclusion In this paper, we have given a number of examples taken from the financial crisis, where financial contracts undertaken for hedging purposes, or with optional features designed to protect the issuer or the investor, have not had the value expected at precisely the time when they needed to. These now look like classic time inconsistency problems coupled with partial equilibrium analysis. To avoid these pitfalls, a more extensive use of extreme and holistic stress tests could be used to assess individual counterparties as well as systemic risks.
We understand that to build one European wholesale financial market will require a staple diet of solid Bundesbank fare, seasoned with a soupçon of Banque de France, a ración of Banco de España, and so on, as well as a couple of pints of Bank of England pragmatism. There is one important area, I think, in which it has not so far been possible to reach an agreed solution, and one on which I might just conclude with one or two observations. That is the question of TARGET, the inter-linking of real time gross settlement systems across Europe. There are two issues of interest, here. First, pricing policy. We have argued that the pricing of the national element of cross-border payments should relate to national costs, rather than being set uniformly. So far we have not prevailed on that point and, as long as the competition authorities approve, it is likely that there will be a common price within the TARGET system for cross-border transactions. Unfortunately, some of our colleagues do not believe this is an area in which competition should intrude. The second important question relates to the terms on which ‘out’ central banks might link to TARGET in the future. We can see no reason why out central banks should not be able to link to TARGET on the same terms as those which apply to the ins. We accept, of course, the need in both in and out countries for rigorous policing to prevent unintended spillover of intra-day credit into the overnight market.

Throughout my whole first term of office I followed these principles, and today I would like again to state that my second term of office will be governed by the same principles. I have permitted no political interference in the activities of the Bank, which is a fundamental principle underlying the Law on the BNB and the Treaty on the accession of Bulgaria to the EU. I will not allow any political meddling in the work of the BNB in my next term of office. I highly appreciate the first words of the newly elected Speaker of the 41st National Assembly at our first meeting: „Mr. Iskrov, we are well aware of the Law on the BNB, of BNB’s key role for the financial stability in the country, and in spite of our disagreement with the early timing of your reelection, no one questions the independence of the central bank. This is a question of principle, on which there is no argument”. These were Ms. Tsacheva’s first words, and I am really grateful to her for them. BIS Review 104/2009  1  Independence should certainly not be an excuse for idleness or work not done. I would emphasise once again, just as I have so far worked with two Bulgarian Governments and all legitimate political parties and their representatives regardless of the political spectrum they belong to, so they too can count on BNB’s expert advice and support in the future.
And while other advanced economies have experienced a similar fall in the rate of growth of productivity, the level of productivity in the UK economy is low relative to other advanced economies. The level of output per hour in the UK was nearly 20 percentage points below the G7 average in 2015. 1  Weak productivity growth has almost certainly been one of the main reasons for the weak growth in pay we have seen in the UK since the crisis. Over the last decade real earnings have grown at the slowest rate th  since the mid-19 century. And the weakness in productivity growth over the last decade has been accompanied by a weakness in 2  business investment. In the forty years to 2007, business investment growth averaged 3% a year. In the eight years since the crisis it has averaged 1.5% annually. Or to put it another way, if investment after the crisis had continued to grow at its long-run pre-crisis average rate, all things equal, the UK private sector capital stock would be around 10% higher, or around £ larger in real terms. The level of business investment as a share of GDP is still relatively low, especially looking at nominal levels at 9% of output compared to around 12% at the turn of the century though some of the drop happened pre-crisis. 1  See 'International comparisons of UK productivity (ICP), first estimates: 2015', October 2016, ONS.

Gent Sejko: Global Money Week 2021 in Albania Address by Mr Gent Sejko, Governor of the Bank of Albania, at the opening ceremony of the Global Money Week 2021 in Albania, Tirana, 23 March 2021. * * * Honourable Minister of Education, Youth and Sports, Honourable Chairman of the Albanian Association of Banks, Dear students, teachers, friends and colleagues, I am pleased to welcome you in the opening ceremony of Global Money Week 2021. For more than one decade, the Bank of Albania has been engaged in this world-wide movement, in organising during the last week of March, educational and awareness activities dedicated to children, young people and students. Global Money Week, already turned into a tradition, is organized in collaboration with the Albanian Association of Banks, and with the valuable support of the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports. Due to difficulties arisen by Covid-19 pandemic, the Global Money Week, this year won’t be launched at the premises of the Museum of the Bank of Albania, but virtually, in compliance with the health safety and social distancing measures and regulations. I have already emphasised in my previous comments to this event, that GMW is an world-wide initiative organised by the OECD International Network on Financial Education (OECD/INFE), aimed at raising awareness of the younger generation to become in turn financially responsible citizens in the future. Every year, in March, central banks, public agencies and financial institutions and civil society organisations from around the world organise GMW activities.
Moreover, to ensure that the quality of the assessment of each financial institution is of the same standard and to ensure transparency in the process, the supervision report will be submitted to the Financial Institution Development Committee, which comprises the Heads of all Supervisor Teams. The Bank of Thailand’s management will meet with the Board of Directors of the financial institution to present the findings of the supervision report, and there will be a close monitoring and follow up on the directives given, as well as the points raised in the supervision report. To put in place this new supervision framework, the Court of Directors of the Bank of Thailand has approved the new structure of the Supervision Group due to be effective on the first of January 2001. Under the new organisational structure, there will be a clear separation of the three lines of work, namely supervision, examination, and research and analysis. This will provide for checks and balances within the system as well as serve to develop depth in supervision work. Moreover, a new Department of Risk Supervision and Department of Information Technology Supervision will also be set up, which will help ensure that the supervision process will be more proactive and forward looking, focusing on strategic as well as management risk. It is quite pleasing that the work, which has been undertaken, has begun to bear fruit, and we will have by the end this year a strengthened financial institution system.

The report examines the business conditions and credit environment for Latino-owned businesses, and compares Latino firms to non-Latino firms, as well as how their experiences vary across major metro areas. While I don’t want to get ahead of my colleague, Claire Kramer, and our partners from SLEI and Interise who will present the results of the report shortly, there are a couple of themes that caught my attention. First, Latino small business owners face significant financial barriers even after accounting for performance factors, including a disproportionate reliance on high-interest credit products. Those impediments manifest themselves at all stages of the business growth, from start-up to scale-up and beyond. Second, Latino small businesses are more concentrated in a few industries and significantly underrepresented in the professional, scientific and technical services sectors, which also tend to be the most lucrative. Third, the size of the Latino population in a given metro area does not mean that there is a larger share of Latino-owned businesses in the same—which is, to me, somewhat counterintuitive. Digging into and understanding the causes of these issues and identifying possible paths forward is not only an imperative but an opportunity, and of course the focus of much of today’s agenda. It is clear that there is a pressing need for expanding technical support, diversifying sources of financing, especially at the micro level, and, in the case of the geographic conundrum, further collaborating on policy and community advocacy. I very much look forward to today’s discussion and thank you again for your participation.
International Capital Flows in the Post-crisis World, September 2019 CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE  Monetary policy framework and its effectiveness  Buffers used during the years of slow growth 2014-2017 are being rebuilt A New Banking Law is adopting the Basel III solvency standards and introducing a countercyclical capital buffer  Current Law  New Banking Act  10.5%  0 - 4%  Pillar 2  CBCh favourable opinion  0 - 2.5%  CCyB  CBCh lead  1 - 3.5%  Systemic surcharge  CBCh favourable opinion  Conservation buffer 8%  6%  Subordinated bonds + additional provisions  Subortdinated bonds  4.5% Tier 1 Capital  Tier 1 Capital  Sources: Central Bank of Chile. High-level Policy Seminar on Integration or Fragmentation?

However, if the monetary authority is not independent and focuses on other more short-term goals, it may repeatedly use monetary policy to stimulate demand above the level that would be consistent with its inflation objective, in which case an inflationary bias will be generated. In the short run, higher levels of economic activity and employment could be attained, but costs would emerge later on. The inflationary bias would ultimately be anticipated and incorporated into agents' expectations and, therefore, into price-setting and wage bargaining. The outcome would be higher inflation without any lasting improvement in the economy's level of output and employment. This would detract from monetary policy efficiency and the commitment to price stability would no longer be credible. Taking the long view that price stability requires is more difficult for political authorities, which naturally may be inclined to give priority to shorter-term considerations. In my view, the time-inconsistency argument for an independent monetary authority is also relevant – and thus, may also be applied – to the need for an independent financial supervisor. This is because short-term incentives to relax supervisory policies may have important consequences for financial stability in the long run, which may, in turn, also affect monetary policy-making. Moreover, this argument applies to both micro- and macro-prudential supervision. The importance of independence in this field is actually recognised worldwide and enshrined in the Basel "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision".
At present, there are no research findings on the costs associated with capital controls or how much those costs rise each year, as this is a complex estimation task that may not even be feasible until several years from now. On the other hand, it can be argued that the costs were small to begin with because of the situation represented by a worldwide financial crisis. Furthermore, in implementing the capital controls, the Central Bank has attempted to reduce these costs as much as possible by granting exemptions. A bill of legislation relaxing certain restrictions affecting firms and individuals is expected in the near future. But none of this changes the need to make every effort to abolish the capital controls. I mentioned long-term costs. In addition to this, the controls were imposed as an emergency measure and constitute a deviation from our contractual obligations under the EEA Agreement. That deviation has been approved by our counterparties, but we are still obliged to make our best effort towards lifting the controls without jeopardising financial and economic stability. Does this mean we must revert all the way to the regime we had before the crisis? I think that, as regards corporate and household capital movements, the answer is broadly yes. On the other hand, it will be necessary to limit financial companies’ exchange rate risk more than was done before the crisis, including the maturity mismatches in their balance sheets and overall size of foreign-denominated balance sheets.

Given  4  BIS Review 96/2006  the analysis and forecasting tools we use today, it is difficult to say whether a sudden correction in house prices will occur, or whether we can count on a calmer and more prolonged adjustment. At the same time, the Riksbank must take into account the risks when conducting its monetary policy. If house prices and household indebtedness increase rapidly over a long period of time, there is a risk of imbalances building up. These imbalances may force an adjustment further ahead and in the worst case may have severe consequences for the real economy and inflation. If house prices rebound, this could lead to subdued demand further ahead through both a decline in household consumption and reduced investment in construction. This type of development could in the longer term lead to both inflation being below target and to weaker growth in the economy. It is difficult to manage this type of risk. One possibility is to make changes in the interest rate slightly sooner or later than would otherwise be justified on the sole basis of the forecasts for inflation and the real economy. It is hoped that such a policy will contribute to a smoother adjustment process and help to avoid a more abrupt correction. A two-year horizon is a good decision rule, but it cannot always work in all situations. There are now signs of some slowdown in the housing market.
Ladies and Gentlemen, as we move ahead and look to the next 40 years of central banking in Zambia, the Bank of Zambia will continue to play a catalytic role in facilitating the exchange of ideas among the banking community, the private sector, and all other key stakeholders through such gatherings as this conference. We will continue to carry out our mandate, with the objective of facilitating the work of Government and economic activities of the private sector for the betterment of all Zambians. Mr President, Madam Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would be failing this occasion if I do not recognise that the achievements of the Bank of Zambia over the last 40 years are a result of the hard work by employees, past and present, including the former Governors. Allow me at this point to present the names of the former Governors and also to recognize those that are in our midst. BIS Review 48/2004  3  These are: •  Mr R C H Hallet, 1964-1967;  •  Dr Justin Zulu, 1967-1970;  •  Mr Valentine S Musakanya, 1970-1972;  •  Mr Bitwell R Kuwani 1972-1976 & also 1981-1984;  •  Mr Luke Mwananshiku, 1976-1981;  •  Mr David A R Phiri, 1984-1986;  •  Mr Leonard Chivuno, 1986-1987;  •  Mr Francis X Nkhoma, 1987-1989;  •  Mr Jacques A Bussieres, 1990-1992;  •  Mr Dominic C Mulaisho, 1992-1995; and  •  Dr Jacob Mwanza 1995-2002.

To the contrary, during the current liberalization period, which commenced with vigor in 1992, the Bank, in conformity with market reforms, has steadily moved towards the use of market-based structures and systems as opposed to direct instruments in the conduct of its monetary policy. In this  BIS Review 48/2004  1  regard, and beginning 1993, deregulation of interest rates, removal of capital controls and freeing of the foreign exchange market were implemented as part of the broader financial sector reforms. As a result, through the use of mainly market-based instruments of monetary policy, the Bank has made several notable achievements. Amongst these, has been its contribution to the reduction of annual inflation to 17.2% in December 2003 from 197.0% at the end of December 1992. Further, inflation has remained just under 20% in the first half of 2004 and it is the Bank’s desire to see single digit inflation within the foreseeable future. The benefits of lower inflation in single digits can not be over-emphasized, especially with regard to the fight against poverty. Madam Chairperson, last October the Bank took a bold stand of effecting a down-ward adjustment in the statutory reserve ratio to 14.0% from 17.5 % on both Kwacha and foreign currency deposit liabilities. This was intended to release funds to commercial banks. The outcome of this policy action has been increased loanable funds being available to commercial banks. This in turn has greatly contributed to the downward trend in lending rates in the economy.
In this regard, one of the primary methods the AIG uses to promote cross-border co-operation is to encourage home supervisors of the 50 or 60 largest internationally active banks in Basel Committee member countries to engage in practical outreach to host supervisors and the bank to open clear lines of communication and co-operation. While these outreach efforts were initially considered to be “case studies”, they have since evolved into actual implementation planning. Since one of the most important aspects of this planning is the bank’s own Basel II implementation rollout plan, it is important that internationally active banks not only have such a plan in place, but also that this plan should be communicated within the bank, especially to subsidiaries that are significant in the context of the overall bank or of a particular market. This cross-border work has accelerated over the past year, but the Committee recognises that more must be done in order to foster greater consistency. We will continue to work with groups like the IIB to identify high-priority implementation issues for the industry, and we will also continue to encourage home and host country supervisors to develop detailed, practical implementation plans that are tailored to each bank’s unique circumstances. 2/3  Outreach to non-G10 The third area of implementation that I would like to address is outreach to supervisors outside Basel Committee member countries, especially since the IIB has actively encouraged the Committee to promote consistent standards for cross-border implementation.

Jaime Caruana: Basel II progress Remarks by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain, at the Institute of International Bankers Breakfast Dialogue with Government Officials, Washington DC, 26 September 2005. *  *  *  Thank you very much. It is an honour to be here once again for a productive dialogue with members of the Institute of International Bankers, and it is equally an honour to be on a panel with such distinguished colleagues from the United States and the United Kingdom. I will keep my remarks as brief as possible so that we can have plenty of time for your questions and comments. It will probably come as no surprise that I will focus my remarks this morning on the same topic that I discussed with you last year: the new framework for capital adequacy, or Basel II. As you are probably aware, the Basel Committee published the Basel II Framework in June last year. At that time, the Committee indicated that while the Framework was mostly complete, several important technical matters still needed further work. Specifically, the Committee determined that more work was necessary with regard to (1) elements of the trading book and the treatment of so-called double-default effects for hedged transactions; and (2) the estimation of loss given default during periods of economic downturn.