samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Initiatives are being taken to resolve remaining distressed companies, as per the provisions of the Finance Business Act (FBA), No.42 of 2011. Licenses of two distressed companies were cancelled and the settlement of the liabilities of existing depositors under the Sri Lanka Deposit Insurance and Liquidity Support Scheme (SLDILSS) is currently underway. Amendments are proposed to the FBA to facilitate expeditious resolution actions in respect of distressed finance companies. During 2018, the Central Bank continued its efforts to strengthen the payment and settlement infrastructure of the country, while developing an efficient national payment and settlement system, which is capable of catering to the growing payment needs of the economy. Let me mention some of these initiatives briefly. Approval has been granted to LankaClear (Pvt) Ltd to implement a National Card Scheme (NCS) under the brand name 'LankaPay' in partnership with an international card scheme. This system was launched 2018 with a licensed commercial bank commencing to issue LankaPay cards. As a result of the emergence of new payment technologies across the globe and the interest shown by local institutions to keep abreast of these technologies, the National Payments Council, which is the consultative 28  committee on payment and settlement systems, appointed two committees to study developments in the Financial Technology (FinTech) sector and Blockchain technology.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for the faith you have shown in me and the support and encouragement you have given me, as well as for your excellent cooperation, and that applies to you all irrespective of political affiliation. Thank you! 7/7
For instance, banks and insurance companies are searching for growth through the diversification of their activities in such a way that they can no longer be considered as homogeneous institutions falling within the scope of one economic sector and one supervisory system! These conglomerates aim to exploit the synergies that exist among banking, insurance and investment. This market evolution towards huge financial conglomerates, with integrated product development is slowly blurring the traditional boundaries between banks and non-bank financial institutions, on the one hand, and the supervision of these institutions, on the other. In spite of these trends in the international financial markets, regrettably, supervisory systems, in our sub-region, are mainly structured along the traditional boundaries demarcating banks, insurance companies, investment and micro-finance institutions. These integration changes represent major challenges to the supervisors of the different sectors, especially as the financial institutions become more complex in their structures and operations. BIS Review 12/2005  1  Notwithstanding the foregoing, the sluggish growth of our economies in the sub-region has also created a difficult operating environment for financial institutions, especially banks. As a result, this has contributed to the mushrooming of non-bank financial institutions, such as, micro-finance. It is a fact that the financial sector in our sub-region is dominated by commercial banks, which have continued to service only a small section of the population. The majority of the people are denied access, largely, due to numerous reasons, including perceived risks, high costs involved in dealing in small transactions and the inability to provide marketable collateral for loans.

Employees need dependable transportation to get to training programs-and to their jobs. And broadband is sorely needed in many households. I can't tell you how many people said, "Good luck getting broadband," when I told them I was buying a home in Columbia County. It's a problem that plagues rural communities throughout the Second District.2 Investing in businesses and innovation is also an important piece of our tower. Businesses need resources to innovate so they can grow and prosper-and that, in turn, benefits entire communities. All of you here today-representing employers, schools, nonprofits, funders, and community organizations-are key to our tower's foundation. You are what makes our tower strong. Workforce Development Components How do we reinforce our tower? There have been a number of initiatives-and quite a bit of research-regarding workforce development throughout the Federal Reserve System. This includes a three-volume book called Investing in America's Workforce,3 which highlights the ways investments can overcome systemic barriers to employment. While there is no one-size-fits-all approach, there are many promising efforts to learn from. The role of community colleges cannot be overstated.
That has been responsible for  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  an unusually weak recovery in consumer spending which, after falling initially by some 7%, is still more than 4% below its peak. The result is a large number of vacant retail premises – visible here in Belfast, as elsewhere. The second factor is the extent to which the balance sheets of the major UK banks had grown before the crisis hit, and had been financed primarily by borrowing. So the subsequent reduction in bank lending – the deleveraging – was greater here than in many other countries. That deleveraging has as its counterpart a reduction in the amount of (broad) money in the economy and a reduced willingness on the part of banks to expand lending to finance the recovery. And the third is the crisis in our main trading partner – the euro area – where the near term outlook is weak, and the longer term prospects for tackling the evident fault lines in the monetary union uncertain. The former means that our current account deficit has remained stubbornly high, and the latter is holding back corporate investment With a disappointingly slow recovery, and unemployment one million higher than before the crisis, the main aim of economic policy has been to generate both a recovery and a rebalancing of the economy, and bring unemployment down without putting at risk hard-won medium-term price stability. The Bank of England has played its part by administering a powerful combination of medicines.

The right prescription now is a programme that complements monetary stimulus with measures to promote the necessary long-run rebalancing of the economy, enabling us to return eventually to more normal levels of interest rates. Only then can we return to a sustainable growth path. We must not be inactive, but we must be selective in order to be effective. What are those other policies? They come under three headings: restoring confidence in our banks, reforms to raise the future potential supply of our economy, and changes in the world economy and exchange rates. Much has already been done to fix the banking system in this country. And there has been a real improvement in the position of UK banks. Capital ratios have risen, leverage has fallen, liquidity has improved, and bank funding costs have fallen sharply, especially since the announcement of the Funding for Lending Scheme last summer and an improvement in market sentiment towards the euro area. Banks are now overflowing with liquidity, largely as a result of the enormous increase in central bank reserves held by commercial banks. Yet there remains anxiety in markets about the resilience of UK banks. That is affecting the terms on which banks can obtain funding and so their ability to lend to the rest of the economy. Some argue that UK banks’ capital ratios compare favourably with many of their continental counterparts. They do, and we should welcome that. But there is only one simple test of whether UK banks now have sufficient capital.
In the past few months, domestic activity has evolved as expected. The stronger external impulse has consolidated, with still favorable financial conditions, trading partners that, on average, are somewhat more dynamic and better terms of trade. Nonetheless, inflation has stayed below the forecasts of the September MP Report. Most of the difference is related to the more volatile items in the basket, as core inflation —which we  measure with the so-called CPIEFE1— is near expected levels. The projections that I will present to you in a moment assume that the convergence of inflation will take somewhat longer than we anticipated in the last MP Report. This considers the effect of the recent surprises and the evolution of the exchange rate up to the Report’s statistical cutoff. It also assumes that activity growth will gradually speed up its pace, from its bounded present levels to above potential in the second half of 2018, yielding the way to close the output gap that will help inflation to converge within the projection horizon. In any case, there are still significant risks surrounding the baseline scenario depicted in this MP Report. On the one hand, some sectors still lag behind in the recovery process, especially some relating to investment. On the other hand, a scenario in which the economy does not return to higher growth rates in the coming months, can affect the recovery of growth in the medium term.

Thus, in the adverse scenario described above, the fraction of banks that maintain their capital adequacy ratio (CAR) above 10% would represent 57% of the system's assets. Under the severe scenario, the figure would be 50%. There is a contrast with 2012, when the fraction 9  of banks with CARs over 10% accounted for 85% of the system's assets in the severe scenario (figure 15). All this points to the need to enhance the sector’s resilience via higher capital levels, a situation that has been acknowledged in other jurisdiction. Along these lines, the bill that modernizes banking legislation contributes to the strengthening of domestic banks’ capital requirements. As a matter of fact, one of the main milestones in terms of financial regulation was the sending to Congress of the bill that modernizes banking legislation. This incorporates international standards and expertise. One of its proposed tools is the cushion of countercyclical capital, which seeks to increase the resilience of the banking system to absorb potential losses and reduce the volatility of financial cycles. In this sense, it is essential to identify local financial cycles, taking into account not only external factors but also the idiosyncrasy of the Chilean banking system. These elements are addressed in a special chapter of this FSR. Because the Central Bank of Chile will be in charge of implementing this policy, the Board will continue to focus its efforts on its proper application, taking into account both its benefits and the potential direct and indirect costs of this tool.
Given the monetary policy system we currently have in Sweden, it involves trying to find a path for the policy rate that ensures inflation is reasonably close to the target while the real economy is in balance. This is how one should reason regardless of what shocks affect the economy. In this sense an upswing in commodity prices is nothing special. …but their practical implementation is difficult However, the practical implementation of the principles is far from simple. This is partly because it is no simple task to capture in the forecast all of the effects that rising commodity prices might have on the economy. It is also because monetary policy works with a lag. Rapid price impulses cannot be immediately counteracted. A further complication is that the effects on inflation and the real economy move in different directions. Inflation rises while the real economy, for instance, production and employment, slows down. It is not self-evident how these effects should be weighed against one another, but this is something that must be achieved in monetary policy. The commodity price rises in recent years have caused inflation to rise in many countries. At the same time, growth in production and employment is slowing down. The slowdown is partly due to weaker international economic activity in the wake of the financial market turmoil and the downswing in the United States. But it is probably also partly due to the upturn in commodity prices.

5  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  5  One example is artificial intelligence. Ten years ago, the potential impact of AI and machine learning on financial firms was discussed in niche conferences as one of those things on the horizon. Today, 80% of firms we regulate use machine learning. The increasing use of AI will pose big societal questions – what kind of decisions can AI be allowed to make, how to protect against AI creating and amplifying biases/discrimination. These are debates which go much wider than the international financial regulatory community, but to which we must contribute. And there are also specific financial-regulatory issues that have cross border implications. For example, whether AI systems could contribute to procyclicality and risk amplification, whether and how they should be used in regulatory capital models, and what should be the standards for the appropriate governance and oversight of decisions made by AI. That is just one example. Use of the cloud by financial firms poses similar issues – as does the technology-driven changes that are happening in cross-border payment systems and that present new combinations of risk. The challenges go beyond new technology. Regulators and supervisors are increasingly working together to ensure the financial system is resilient to the risks posed by climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy. The regulatory response to this complex financial stability risk is, rightly, multi-faceted.
In short, the risk that more people take on higher debt relative to their income as they have to stretch further to buy homes. In the UK, household debt as a whole is already equal to 135% of household earnings. It was around 110% in 2000 and was driven up to 165% in the years leading up the crisis. It fell back sharply after the crisis. Not surprisingly, the crisis and recession made households realize that their housing assets were worth less and that their debt made them more vulnerable than they previously expected. So they increased their savings and paid down their debt. And the more indebted they were, the more they were likely to cut back sharply on their consumption. There is good reason to believe that this cut-back in consumption in the face of high debt is one of the main reasons why recessions are more painful when they follow a period in which household debt goes up quickly. At around 135% UK household indebtedness is high. It is at 2004 levels. It is markedly higher than many European countries. It is on par with the US. True, there are a few countries with even higher levels.

Economic hopes pinned on exports and consumption, do not appear to be resilient across Europe. The potential for further stimulus on the fiscal and the monetary front appears to be limited. On the one hand, the stability pact does not allow for further fiscal stimulus. On the other hand, the European Central Bank is unwilling to provide the same amount of monetary stimulus as its U.S. counterpart. The reason is simple. Inflationary pressures in the Eurozone continue to be a stumbling block for lower interest rates. The recent deterioration of the international business sentiment and the prolonged uncertainty witnessed in the financial markets has also influenced negatively the growth prospects in Switzerland. Our view at the beginning of 2002 was that economic growth for the current year would be moderate. Our GDP forecast was 1% growth for 2002. Other institutions were more optimistic. All in all, however, there was considerable agreement among forecasters that Swiss household consumption would register moderate but stable growth and that the economy would experience a recovery in the second half of this year. The recovery was to be underpinned by strong growth in exports. The economic information that stemmed from the first quarter of this year was consistent with the scenario just described. First quarter real GDP came in slightly stronger than expected. Although real GDP growth was only 0.6% in the first quarter, an important consideration was the upward dynamics after gloom had set in the second half of 2002. As anticipated, real growth was supported by private consumption.
BIS Review 149/2010  7  In the pipeline: Assessment of monetary policy and inquiry into the housing market So much for the forecast and the repo rate decision. Before I finish, I would like to mention a couple of things that are in the pipeline. Work has now begun on the external assessment of the Riksbank during 2005–2010, which the Committee has commissioned Professors Charles Goodhart and Jean-Charles Rochet to carry out. The professors have already visited the Riksbank and will be visiting us again soon. We will of course provide them with every possible assistance. Unlike the previous external assessment, which covered the period 1995–2005, this assessment covers not only monetary policy but also our work on financial stability. What is of particular interest this time is that the professors will analyse what lessons can be learned from the financial crisis. The assessment will be complete in autumn 2011. An inquiry with a shorter time span is the one concerning risks in the Swedish housing market, which was decided at the beginning of this year. In more concrete terms, this involves giving external experts as well as our own employees the task of analysing issues that in different ways illustrate the relationship between the housing market and the Riksbank’s objective and aims. The inquiry as a whole should be complete at the beginning of next year.

Much of this credit was used to buy houses and property prices began to soar. …because of overly expansionary monetary policy? There is a debate as to the role of monetary policy in creating this situation. The debate has mainly concerned claims that the US central bank had held interest rates too low for a number of years prior to the crisis. But other central banks, such as the European Central Bank, also held interest rates low during this period. It is not entirely clear what role monetary policy played – and plays in general – for the development of property prices and for risk propensity among economic agents. This is a subject that will probably continue to be discussed. However, on the basis of the information available at the time, there was no obvious reason for conducting another monetary policy than the one that was actually conducted. In the United States, for example, there was justified concern that the country might suffer the same deflation problems as Japan, and many other countries also perceived the threat of deflation as something to be taken very seriously. …as a result of a global savings glut? But there was also another and probably more important factor contributing to the low interest rates. Since the end of the 1990s the emerging economies in Asia, particularly China, and in the Middle East had experienced large current account surpluses, particularly in relation to the United States, but also to other western countries.
24/11/2020  Shifting tides in euro area money markets: from the global financial crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic  SPEECH  Shifting tides in euro area money markets: from the global financial crisis to the COVID-19 pandemic         Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the ECB Conference on Money Markets, 23 November 2020 Frankfurt am Main, 23 November 2020 I would like to welcome you warmly to our virtual ECB Conference on Money Markets. [1] This conference offers an excellent platform to facilitate the exchange between academic experts on money markets and policy makers. The conference papers address some of the most topical research questions with respect to money markets and will thus provide valuable input for the implementation of our monetary policy. Money markets are a cornerstone of the financial system. [2] Banks, non-bank financial institutions[3] and non-financial corporations all rely on money markets for their short-term funding, liquidity management and collateral needs. As a result, dislocations in money markets can severely undermine the stability of our financial system. Due to their central role as a source of short-term funding, money markets are also crucial for the implementation and transmission of our monetary policy. Money market rates serve as operational targets for central banks and also as benchmarks for the pricing of credit, thereby directly affecting financing conditions in the real economy.

2  BIS Review 69/2007  Regional economic integration has increased rapidly in Asia in recent years, but these economies still seem a long way from the point where economic or political conditions would make a compelling case for some kind of regional monetary integration. (In Europe, of course, the political case for monetary integration largely preceded the economic argument.) For Asian economies, as for most emerging economies today, the principal challenge is to establish conditions that will enable them to prosper in a world where their exchange rates adjust more freely to changing fundamentals. Capital-account liberalization A third important conclusion from the crises relates to strategies for capital-account liberalization. Although this was not the conventional wisdom at the time, I think the evidence supports the view that the policy mistakes that contributed to the crises lay not in the decision to become more open to capital flows, but in the how those governments chose to become more open. The supervisory and regulatory regimes over the financial system did not provide a strong enough framework of incentives for risk management and controls over financial intermediaries. But the more consequential mistake was that the crisis economies each in different ways chose to liberalize capital controls selectively. Each had in place other incentives or distortions that led to an excessive reliance on short-term borrowing through the banking system. These weaknesses left the financial system and the economies as a whole with less capacity to manage the greater pressures and risks that came with openness to capital flows.