samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
These ingredients of the single mechanism – a single authority and a common fund – are as essential as the existence of uniform rules and regulations to ensure that holders of bank liabilities in any jurisdiction are treated the same and to severe the link between bank risk and sovereign risk. At the same time, the creation of a genuine single resolution mechanism is essential so that the single supervisory mechanism can operate effectively. Otherwise, it would have to deal with complex interaction arrangements with a constellation of national resolution authorities – each managing its own funds – which would make its task notably more difficult. In this context, the legislative proposal submitted last July by the European Commission is a good starting point. The EC proposes the creation of a single resolution agency or authority, ultimately reporting to the European Commission, which would manage a common fund fed by contributions from the industry. It is common knowledge that the Commission’s proposal is currently subject to intense debate. In particular, apart from the assignment of resolution powers to the European Commission, three matters are prompting most discussion. First, the legal basis of the proposal – anchored in Article 114 of the Treaty – is being questioned by some countries, which even raise the need for a reform of the Treaty. This is despite the favourable opinion on the proposed legal basis of the Council’s legal services, the European Commission and most Member States.

Higher interest rates should help shift priority to the investment projects that are the most profitable and economical. This is the best way to foster increased productivity. The aftereffects of the 1970s - when inflation had finally been subdued - provide a good object lesson as well. Many companies had grown accustomed to negative real rates;  5/8  BIS - Central bankers' speeches  too many investments had been undertaken on the assumption that real rates were negative and would remain so. This led to a painful adjustment when inflation subsided and real rates turned positive, and many firms - even some large ones - folded as a result. All of this points in the same direction: it is of paramount importance to take the reins firmly and bring inflation down before it starts to distort the economy. Honoured guests: The Central Bank's interest rate hikes have caused a marked increase in monthly debt service on non-indexed, variable-rate loans. Furthermore, fixed-rate clauses on many borrowers' loan agreements will expire this coming winter. A decisive response is needed, but first we must diagnose the problem. To start with, it is clear that there are few casualties in the real estate market - as yet. Those who have financed home purchases with nominal-rate loans in the past three years have profited on higher property prices and negative real rates. At the same time, wages have risen significantly overall.
2  BIS Review 13/2003  If we look at the period from 1986 and compare developments in nominal oil prices with the return on a fund managed according to the Petroleum Fund's investment strategy - a global portfolio containing bonds and equities in a 60-40 distribution - we see that the fund would have yielded a far higher annual return. What about the risk? How is it affected by a conversion from oil to financial wealth? History provides us with a clear, if somewhat surprising answer. A conversion from oil to financial wealth increases the return and at the same time reduces the risk. This is because wealth under the seabed (somewhat simplified) only consists of one asset, petroleum, while broadly invested financial wealth is highly diversified in many instruments whose return fluctuates at different rates. Today the distribution between financial wealth (the Petroleum Fund) and petroleum is about 20-80. If we venture to base our assessment on historical relationships, it is fairly clear that we have, relatively speaking, too much oil in our portfolio and that the current conversion to financial wealth is to our advantage. We have no guarantee, of course, that history will repeat itself, but relying on the opposite requires considerable courage. The Petroleum Fund can be invested in two main types of instruments; bonds and equities. The international bond market is about the same size as the equity market. Government bonds are a relatively safe investment, but the return is low.

92 fe b. 93 fe b. 94 fe b. 95 fe b. 96 fe b. 97 fe b. 98 fe b. 99 fe b. 00 fe b. 01 fe b. 02 fe b. 03  0  Annual return Standard deviation  8  Oil 3.3 % 40.5 %  Petroleum Fund 9.9 % 8.9 %  BIS Review 13/2003  7. Return and risk: oil vs Fund - with the Fund’s current equity portion (40 %) Return and risk for combinations of oil and Fund 1 February 1986 – 1 February 2003. Measured in USD. Per cent  Return (geom.annualised)  14 12  Today (80 % oil)  10 100 % oil 0 % Fund  8 100 % Fund 0 % oil  6 4 2 0 0  10  20  30  40  50  Risk (standard deviation, annualised)  8. Annual return in the US Per cent 60  60  40  40  20  20  0  0  -20  Fixed income instruments  Equities  -40  -40  -60  -60 1925  -20  1935  1945  1955  1965  1975  1985  1995  Source: Ibbotson Associates og Datastream  BIS Review 13/2003  9  9. Average return in the US Rolling 10-year periods.
On the contrary, lack of discipline has been inherent in the system. Confidence in monetary policy and general economic policy has been strong in the area and thanks to this confidence – and as free riders – countries have been able to raise loans at low interest rates. A committee headed by Herman Van Rompuey, President of the European Council, is assessing how coordination and monitoring of EU economic policy in the various countries can be improved. The goal is to reduce deficits and at the same time ensure that conditions are favourable for future economic growth. Without stretching the comparison too far, management of public finances in euro area countries can perhaps be compared to the management of Norwegian counties and municipalities. Under the law, they cannot go bankrupt. The government stands behind them. They have access to funding markets and can make use of the Norwegian central government’s creditworthiness. There is an obvious temptation here to borrow too much – to act as free riders – that is reminiscent of the temptation faced by the euro area states. But the Norwegian system is balanced. If local government administrations in Norway borrow too much, the central government intervenes. Municipalities and counties with a budget imbalance must apply to the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development for approval when decisions are made on borrowing or long-term leasing agreements. The county governor, as representative of the state, supervises the municipalities.

The euro area faces a complex macroeconomic scenario, marked by an outlook of moderate growth and very low inflation, recently compounded by uncertainties such as those arising from the assimilation of migrant flows and the referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the EU. The ECB’s monetary policy is providing considerable stimulus through the easing of financing conditions, but it is necessary for other policies to accompany monetary policy if we wish to anchor the recovery and improve the medium-term outlook. In this respect, the fiscal policy of the member countries and of the EU as a whole should use the room for manoeuvre allowed under the Stability and Growth Pact to promote activity and, in parallel, the structural reforms aimed at improving our economies’ potential should be deepened. Turning to the Spanish economy, it has in the past three years moved back onto a path of economic growth, showing greater dynamism than in most of the EU countries. But it has not managed to overcome the imbalances I talked about earlier to the extent necessary. 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Spain still has an unemployment rate of over 20% and a very high proportion of very longterm employment; we have financing maturities arising from our external debt that each year exceed 45% of our GDP; and our long-term demographic outlook threatens the sustainability of our public pension system.
In one breath they say that we should not adopt the euro – so that we can keep our own currency and hence retain the ability “to weaken the koruna in bad times” – and then criticise the Czech National Bank for doing exactly that in the bad times of 2013. They then happily add that Greece would have benefited from having its own currency and that Germany is profiting from the euro being weaker than the Deutschmark would have been. The same, however, doesn’t go for the Czech Republic after 2013. These endearing 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  inconsistencies are present throughout the population. Here again, however, the Eurozone and its satellites offer parallels. You in Copenhagen have a fixed exchange rate against the euro (and previously had a fixed rate against the mark) and thus in effect “buy in” monetary policy from Frankfurt. You have your own notes and coins but not your own monetary policy. Note this fine “Scandinavian paradox”: you have an opt-out from the euro following the 2000 referendum, yet you do not make your own monetary policy, nor did you before the euro was created, whereas the Swedes do not have an opt-out (although they have been trying not to fulfil the criteria and not to join ever since rejecting the euro in their 2003 referendum), yet they pursue autonomous monetary policy. I sometimes wonder whether the Czech sitting-on-the-fence approach is heading towards the Danish model. It wouldn’t be my choice, but it’s good to be prepared.

And this approach has the full backing of the central bank. Ten years ago, supporting euro adoption in our country was a sign of “good social morals among the better classes”, whereas today only the brave confess to ardently supporting it. That’s how much the mood of the elite and the electorate has changed over the last decade. Why is that so? Here my seven personal comments come into play. The euro and political union A stateless monetary union is inherently unstable. A currency is usually a consequence, not a cause, of the establishment of a state. In Europe, however, we began to build the “currency house” from the roof down, and then in 2008 everyone was very surprised at how the tiles flew off when the first wind appeared. Is there a prospect of a political union – a single European state – in the pipeline? Even if there is, do we want to be part of it? If the question is no, which would seem to be the case, thoughts of introducing the euro in the Czech Republic should, for that reason alone, be left on the back burner. Autonomous monetary policy Autonomous monetary policy is a kind of “absorber” of economic shocks. It is meant to reduce their impact and smooth the economic cycle. It prevents an economic contraction being borne by the unemployed and those on low incomes more than is necessary.
I am glad to see that almost all selected papers, including the ones by academia focus on the practical issues that are important for the policy formulation and decision making in the central bank. These works serve as the foundation for our understanding of economic and financial phenomena and the interaction of our monetary, macro and micro prudential policies with the economy. It is due to this understanding and knowledge that Bank of Albania crafts its policy response and chose its policy instruments to respond to significant negative shocks that have hit our economy. Recent data suggest that the pandemic has had severe impact on the Albanian economy, which experienced the strongest contraction of gross domestic product in the last two decades, at – 10.2% during the second quarter of 2020. Macro data on labour markets show that compared to the end of 2019, the Albanian economy lost about 50 thousand jobs, equal to an annual decline in employment of 3.6%. As a result of this the unemployment rate increased to 11.9%. Responding to such developments, inflation in the third quarter decreased to 1.4%, from 1.9% in the previous quarter. Despite these negative shocks, the measures taken by the Bank of Albania have provided the necessary monetary stimulus to support the normal functioning of the financial markets and to ensure the flow of credit in the economy. Interest rates for households and businesses are low and liquidity pressures are under control, while the exchange rate appears stable.

Ladies and Gentlemen, with these few remarks I hereby declare this workshop officially open. I thank you for your attention. 2  BIS Review 51/2010
So, we must heartily embrace the process and take the best opportunities offered by the integration of the global communities while limit the potential adverse consequences that come along with the process. To do this, we must reexamine ourselves to review our weaknesses and our strengths. After all, there was an old Chinese saying: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle." Thailand learned her first-hand lessons the hard way and had opportunities to reexamine herself in detail in the past couple years. Several weaknesses were identified. Prominent in the list is, of course, we do not fully know our enemies. This has already been partially remedied by simply being part of the game, staying competitive in the world market, and actively participating in the new knowledge-based economy. Thai Ministry of Commerce now has 48 representative offices around the world. And in my case, the Bank of Thailand constantly sends our staffs to work at other public and private organizations, both inside and outside the country. But still, at the core of all of these, we need to make sure that our corporate sector gets back on its feet.

On this front, Thailand has done remarkably well, registering a substantial increase in net inflow of foreign direct investment in the four years following the crisis despite the overall net capital outflow due to debt repayment within the banking sector. Foreign direct investment (to the non-bank sector) increased from an average around 1.4 billion US dollars during 1992-1996 to 3.4 billion US dollars during 1997-2000. Though much work is required on the corporate sector in the march toward modernization of the Thai economy, the government and the central bank also have vital roles in maintaining stable economic environment and providing the required infrastructures to allow the private sector to drive forward to create wealth and prosperity. Several long-term plans have been made in the past couple years. On the macroeconomic front, the Bank of Thailand has adopted Inflation Targeting as a framework of our monetary policy since May 2000. It may be a little too early to claim our success, but the results thus far have been encouraging. Long-term interest rates of the interpolated 14-year government bonds were reduced from 8.3 percent at the beginning of 2000 to currently at 6.1 percent. Inflation remained subdued and will stay within the target range during the next two years. The maturity of state enterprise debentures offered in the market increased from a maximum of 7-year in 1998 up to 20 years in 2000, reflecting greater confidence on the long-term economic stability.
They will probably realise that debts borrowed by developed countries are still debts and must be repaid one way or the other in the future. Moreover, excessive debt or leverage would drag down the economy sooner or later, just in the same way it did to the developing economies. It is natural that most people would prefer to get out of the indebtedness trap without the pain that would be inflicted on them when the economy undertakes the necessary fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. So it is not surprising that people would like to think that if they can find someone who is very clever to lead the government or to be in charge of the central bank, then somehow good life can return and business is back to normal once again without the painful adjustments. No one can rule out the possibility of finding a very clever person who can save the world without pain, but I suspect that it would probably not be a bad idea, and hopefully not too late, to start studying and learning from the Hong Kong recovery story after the eruption of the Asian Financial Crisis. Conclusion: Don’t mortgage our children 19. Ladies and Gentlemen, while I have talked a lot about the predicament of the developed world, it is not my intention to suggest that the developing world is all home and dry.

In the US, the federal government still persistently registers fiscal deficits (averaging 3.2% of GDP per annum since 1980s) only except for the second term of the Clinton presidency in 1997–2001. Incurring persistent fiscal deficit means that the governments have to continuously raise additional debt to finance their spending. Quantitative easing: Lessening of pain of excessive debts? 10. This ballooning government debt raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. For now, the situation seems manageable as central banks in these economies are pursuing quantitative easing (QE) policies to artificially suppress government bond yields. The aggressive asset purchases by major central banks have now suppressed bond yields to extremely low levels, where shorter-term government bond yields in some European economies like Germany, Austria, Denmark and Switzerland have already turned negative. 2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Negative government bond yield means that lenders are paying borrowers for the privilege of holding their debt, which is clearly not making any sense. I doubt how long such an unusual phenomenon could last, but in any case, I’m certain that such distortions will definitely come with unintended consequences. At least, one side-effect I can already observe is that QE penalises prudent savers and pensioners very badly. In Japan, for example, QE helps reduce the financing cost of public debt at the expense of eroding the purchasing power of JGB holders, with many of which being retirees and pension funds, by paying them negative real yield. Sovereign debt crisis: Mishaps that belong only to EMEs? 11.
Dozens of banks were affected in this manner. Even more alarming is how long it takes to detect successful cyber penetrations. According to a study8, the median time it takes to discover a cyber attack is 146 days. This means that of all the cyber attacks in the world happening this week (in April), more than half of them will not be detected until after Labour Day in September. It is not inconceivable that a future financial crisis could be precipitated by a cyber attack. The regulatory and supervisory framework for cyber risk management is still evolving. Two areas are likely to figure prominently. First, we need some common risk management standards in cyber defence. Given how inter-connected systems across the global financial industry are, common standards for the swift recovery of critical functions disrupted by a cyber attack will help reduce systemic vulnerabilities. Given how often cyber incidents stem from compromised user IDs and passwords, a global minimum standard for robust authentication for online financial services is worth considering. Second, we need to encourage sharing of cyber intelligence within the financial industry. This will heighten the industry’s collective situational awareness, so that it can respond more quickly and more effectively to impending cyber threats. Regulators can help to establish common infrastructure, processes and protocols to facilitate this. 7/9  BIS central bankers' speeches  A good example is the US Financial Services – Information Sharing & Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC).

Concerning the intensive debate about the Riksbank’s policy, my conclusion was that it can be useful to have a system where the monetary policy remit and policy objective are reviewed at regular intervals, as is currently the case in for example Canada. This would create better understanding and legitimacy for the monetary policy conducted and clarify that the central bank actually only performs the remit it has been given. I also believe it can be a way to counteract the forces that seem to exist in many parts of the world to make central banks less independent. As regards the decline in cash use, there are not so many conclusions to draw as yet. What we can say for certain is that an e-krona would affect the conditions for monetary policy quite substantially, more or less regardless of how it is designed. It is wise that many countries are examining the scope for introducing e-money, as one of the lessons that after all can be learnt from developments in Sweden is that cash use in society can decline very rapidly. These were the experiences and reflections I wanted to share with you. Perhaps the conclusions I draw are not that spectacular. But I would like to believe that the observations and experiences that we practitioners and economic policy decisionmakers make in our day jobs, so to speak, slowly but surely help to enhance the level of our collective knowledge. My hope is that this could at least be a small contribution to this development.
The current account on the other hand, which constitutes a flow that adds to or subtracts from these stocks, is less important. 22 Changes in the valuation of the assets and liabilities are affected to a great extent by changes in the exchange rate. 23 There are, however, considerable shortcomings in the statistics in this area. The values of some types of asset are definitely underestimated, as there is a lack of statistics on the Swedish households’ direct investments abroad. The net position can also be measured in different ways depending on whether direct investments are accounted at market value or at book or nominal value. However, both methods give a net position that is much lower than that given by the accumulated current account surplus (see Figure 8). 21  The nominal external position was –22 per cent of GDP in 2010, while the market-value net position was +4 per cent of GDP according to statistics from Statistics Sweden. 22  This is also found by Lane (2006) in an analysis of the Swedish exchange rate. 23  For a more detailed analysis of the external position see Blomberg and Falk, 2006.

Christian Noyer: After the global crisis, which models of growth? Keynote speech by Mr Christian Noyer, Governor of the Bank of France and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the CIGS (The Canon Institute for Global Studies) – EHESS (Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales) International Symposium “After the global crisis, which models of growth?”, Tokyo, 3 October 2011. *  *  *  Let me begin by saying I am delighted to be here with you today. I am of course conscious that the world is experiencing major economic turbulence and that Japan has suffered this year a series of particularly cruel catastrophes. As you know, I have profound admiration for your country, and we French wish to show our solidarity with you in the face of these ordeals. I would like to warmly thank the organisers of this symposium – which should be fascinating – for giving me this opportunity to speak to you. I thank the Canon Institute for Global Studies and its Chairman, my friend Governor Fukui. I also thank the France-Japan Foundation of the EHESS and its Director, Sebastien Lechevalier. In 2009, the Banque de France was one of the first institutional sponsors of this Foundation, whose objective of promoting greater intellectual and cultural exchange between Japan and France is highly commendable. Our two countries have much to learn from each other and a great deal to gain from deeper collaboration. I do therefore strongly welcome this initiative.