samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Further, the long-term nature of much life insurance business should reduce some of the risks associated with resolving financial institutions, and therefore elements of a going concern regime can be phased in more slowly than would otherwise be the case. At the same time, an orderly transition will promote financial stability. Recent changes in the microstructure of some financial markets have reduced liquidity and made them more susceptible to disorderly trading even in response to small shocks. It is not yet clear how much impact Solvency II will have on the asset side of insurers’ balance sheets, but given that UK insurance firms manage in the region of £ trillion in assets, it would seem wise to implement the new regime carefully. In my view there is only one serious argument which could push us in the other direction. If the sector was undercapitalised under the current regime, then allowing a gradual transition to the new standard would present a risk. This was exactly the position we found ourselves in with the banking sector when implementing CRDIV, the European vehicle for Basel III. The financial crisis had made it abundantly clear that our capital regime for banks was wholly inadequate. So we decided to move quickly, to promote safety and soundness and financial stability.

There is consensus that this model has given rise to substantial results, not least an infrastructure which safeguards important social considerations, while also providing for active competition between participants. The challenge for Norges Bank will be to fulfil its licensing and supervisory responsibility in such a way that self-regulation may be maintained, but which also allows us to move in the right direction in terms of both risk (reduction) and efficiency in the interbank systems. 4.2. Norges Bank’s responsibility  That Norges Bank has responsibility in connection with the payment system is not new to this bill. Under the Norges Bank Act, Norges Bank shall promote an efficient payment system domestically as well as vis-à-vis other countries. This formulation requires us to balance risk against efficiency. Norges Bank also serves as settlement bank for the banks. Norges Bank has, as a result of this function, set requirements on the banks and their clearing systems, with particular emphasis on risk-reducing measures. As a future licensing authority for the interbank systems, we will have to strike a balance between risk and efficiency in our assessment of the systems. In the following, I will provide a few observations on our new responsibility before commenting on the licensing process itself and the requirements which must be placed on the systems. Given that the law has not yet been adopted, this is of course somewhat speculative. We are highly aware that the law is to be supplementary to the approach of self-regulation.
While the key motif ensures coherence within a given denomination, core design elements which appear in all denominations – a hand, a globe, a location and the security features – create continuity across all the notes and lend the series a sense of overall cohesion. The design thus sets new standards when it comes to combining security, functionality and aesthetics. Issuance successfully concluded Thanks to the close cooperation of all those involved, we were able to clear the numerous hurdles we encountered. We would like to take this opportunity to thank all of our partners sincerely for their contribution. Special thanks go to Manuela Pfrunder and her team for their designs. Their work has been consistently impressive – from the earliest drafts right through to the issuance of the final denomination. I would also like to thank our suppliers: Orell Füssli, Landqart, Sicpa and Kurz. Furthermore, allow me to thank our cash distribution partners, the banks and Swiss Post for their valuable cooperation and support in enabling a smooth issuance process. And finally, let me thank the many SNB staff who have managed this project so diligently over the years and have seen it through to a successful conclusion. In issuing modern and secure banknotes, the SNB is fulfilling its statutory task of ensuring the supply and distribution of cash in Switzerland.

Overly stringent regulation normally leads to more expensive financial services, which affects resource utilisation. The stringent regulation of financial markets in the 1960s and 1970s gave us a relatively stable financial system, but at the expense of efficiency. On the other hand, deregulation brought about developments on financial markets which created a “seemingly efficient” system, but which gave rise to major risks to stability. The development over recent years has shown just how closely interlinked the tasks of the central banks are. For example, the emergence of a situation of financial instability also has  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  repercussions for both inflation and resource utilisation. This illustrates that it is not possible to conduct monetary policy and financial stability policy completely separately. Differences in time horizons give rise to trade-offs We can also describe the central banks’ conflicting objectives in terms of different time horizons. For monetary policy, the time horizon is usually two to three years, which is reasonable in light of how the business cycle usually varies. However, we know from experience that financial imbalances and risks in the financial system are built up over a much longer period of time, which can include several business cycles. These longer periods are usually described in terms of so-called financial cycles. There is no established method of measuring the financial cycle, but lending rates, credit terms and asset prices are common indicators.1 So, the financial cycle has its up- and downturns just like the regular business cycle, but is often more protracted.
Had this policy been implemented, I believe that the situation today would have been much more worrying than it is – and as we know, the situation today is hardly without problems. Two relevant questions Before I continue I would like to take up two questions it is natural to ask in this context. As I have noted, the repo-rate decisions have mainly been governed by traditional monetary policy motives, and consideration to risks associated with the development of household debt and housing prices has played a fairly subordinate role. But what exactly do I mean by “a fairly subordinate role”? That is the first question. 11  Summers (2014) writes, for instance: “[A] strategy that relies on interest rates significantly below growth rates for long periods of time virtually guarantees the emergence of substantial bubbles and dangerous build-ups in leverage.” For a review of the links between monetary policy and financial imbalances, as well as further references to the literature, see Adrian and Lang (2014). 12  This is discussed, for instance, in Blanchard (2014). One problem with counterfactual estimates where economic policy changes a lot is that they are sensitive to what is known as the Lucas critique. This states that it is very difficult to quantify the effects of a completely different policy (for instance, a much lower interest rate over a long period of time) in a reliable manner. The reason for this is precisely that the expectations of the economic agents change.

How can we answer this important question? Firstly, monetary union does not necessarily imply that, at any given point in time, all participating countries will have the same rate of inflation or growth, even though the creation of the euro was based on the successful completion of a convergence process. Let us take inflation for example. Inflation divergences across countries or regions are quite natural in a monetary union. In the euro area, long-term convergence to a common level of prices naturally gives rise to different inflation rates across countries. The convergence of productivity and living standards creates a trend towards price convergence. Now, present differentials in the Euro area are not very large, in comparison with those sometimes observed in the United States, which is a long established monetary union of comparable size. My intimate conviction is that we will witness further European integration and, in the medium term, an increasing correlation of economic developments in the area. Several academic studies show that business cycles are becoming more synchronous across Europe. Secondly, the question has often been raised as to whether EMU can be a success without some form of enhanced political union. Indeed, to achieve this, the correct mix is required between fiscal, economic and monetary policies. In the European Union, Member States are responsible for conducting economic and fiscal policies. We therefore believe that these policies should be closely co-ordinated.
The international regulatory community consciously has  2  BIS Review 131/2010  been willing to trade off a relatively slow phase-in period for the new standards in order to reach a much higher level of standards. The new capital rules are intended to provide strong incentives for banks to change their business models in ways that make the system more stable and reduce the negative impact their actions have on others – for instance, by providing incentives to standardize OTC derivatives contracts and clear such standardized trades through central counterparties. To understand what these new requirements mean for the amount of capital banks will ultimately have to hold, it is important to note that one of the intended consequences of these changes is for banks to adjust their business models in ways that reduce the risks their activities generate. This adjustment will likely reduce the amount of extra capital that banks would need relative to a world in which they kept their business models unchanged even as the new rules were phased in. In other words, the impact on banks must be evaluated dynamically, not by taking a snapshot of the banks’ activities and balance sheets today. That said, the new capital standards are much tougher than the existing regime. The requirements have been strengthened in several different dimensions. First, the standards emphasize common equity by creating an explicit quantitative capital standard for this highest form of capital, as compared with an implicit qualitative standard under the previous rules.

But I think there is much more to be said for "one country, two systems" beyond politics and governance, for the simple reason that there are many differences between the two systems within our country, on whatever dimension one chooses to examine the situation, and differences present opportunities for relative strengths to be exploited and relative weaknesses to be addressed, and synergies maximised to the benefit of all concerned. The economic system on the Mainland, described as a socialist market economy, is very different from the economic system of Hong Kong, a capitalist free market economy. The medical system on the Mainland is different from that in Hong Kong, in terms of the manner in which medical services are delivered and funded, and in terms of the types of medicine used. The tax systems are also very different, so are the labour systems, the educational systems and the transport systems (we drive on different sides of the road); and, of primary interest to me as Monetary Authority, so are the monetary and financial systems. China is therefore probably unique in having two different systems, including two different financial systems, in one country. I believe that, beyond politics and governance – the arrangements for which have been quite well bedded down – there is perhaps a need for all concerned to pay greater attention to the opportunities presented by the differences between the two financial systems and to developing a beneficial working relationship between them.
Public lecture at the Oesterreichische Nationalbank Vienna, 6 October 2017  The euro area’s monetary policy in the context of economic recovery  Speech by François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Banque de Francei  Press contact: Clara Martin (+33 1 42 92 98 75; +33 6 74 83 32 38; clara.martin@banque-france.fr). Page 1 sur 8  Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to thank the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and my friend Governor Ewald Nowotny for having invited me today. A little more than one year ago, the full Governing Council of the ECB celebrated in this very place the 200th anniversary of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB). Today, your country is on the eve of important national elections. Throughout history, Vienna has been one of the centres of Europe, and Austria a country that we love: on a more personal note, I am indebted to Austria for enabling me to improve my German during a lengthy stay in Graz, Styria, over 40 years ago. And the Austrian economy has been a strong performer in the euro area: a low unemployment rate of just 5.6% in August 2017, against 9.1% for the euro area as a whole. You are the proof, along with other countries, that our common European social model is compatible with economic success. Today, you have invited me to speak about euro area monetary policy in the context of economic recovery. The prospect of a possible normalisation of our monetary policy gives rise to expectations and somewhat unduly to concerns.

But I have to confess that they will not be exciting to those who advocate quick fixes - and in particular to the small minority who believe that something more spectacular, such as depegging or repegging the Hong Kong dollar, is the panacea for all our problems. In the last part of this talk I shall devote some time to this question, which has received some attention in the past few weeks, with the aim of explaining why, in my view, tinkering with the Link is not a solution. Unstable times Let me first, however, offer some comments on the environment that we now find ourselves in. Internationally, prior to the tragic events of September 11th, there were already signs that a global slowdown was either imminent or already in progress, although it was not clear quite how long or how severe the slowdown would be. September 11th, and its aftermath, has not made the answers to these questions any clearer, but it has left no doubt that the deterioration will be sharper, or that the subsequent recovery will take longer. A number of factors in connection with September 11th are at play. Some have immediate effects that are to a certain extent quantifiable: the physical damage caused by the atrocity; the cost - in additional security and insurance, lost revenue, lost jobs - to the airline and tourist industries; the blow to markets worldwide.
From an economic viewpoint, the dissolution of the union in 1905 was a painless process. Former Central Bank Governor Nicolai Rygg1 wrote: “For 1905, (Norges Bank) points to the bright aspects of developments over the year, i.e. rising exports,…, but it takes time for confidence and the enterprising spirit to grow sufficiently to generate greater vitality and activity”. Norges Bank’s role was primarily to secure confidence in the monetary system. There were fairly large cash withdrawals from banks. Many sought to safeguard their wealth by investing in foreign bonds. Banks had to resort to loans from Norges Bank. The Board of Norges Bank nevertheless chose to leave the interest rate unchanged at 5 per cent. In Rygg’s words, this would not contribute to undermining the confidence-inspiring calm that marked major historical events. Economic developments were favourable up to World War I. International real interest rates have fallen The interest rate level is lower today than in 1905. In fact, Norges Bank has not allowed the key rate to be this low since the Bank was established in 1816. This partly reflects international conditions. In many countries interest rates were reduced considerably when the economic situation deteriorated early in 2000. Interest rates adjusted for inflation, i.e. real interest rates, are now also low. The first decades following World War II were marked by stable nominal interest rates, moderate inflation and low, but positive real interest rates. In subsequent periods, real interest rates have fluctuated. In the 1970s inflation surged.

Prior to the health crisis, the risks of financial instability associated with the large-scale use, as a means of payment, of crypto-assets with unstable value, uncertain convertibility into central bank money, and without a responsible issuer and credible lender of last resort in the event of a destabilising shock, had been clearly identified. With the crisis and the acceleration of the digital transformation, IT risk, and in particular cyber risk, has taken on a new dimension and added an operational dimension of systemic importance to the risk of financial instability, which also concerns cryptoassets. c- Levers for action For a central bank such as the Banque de France, which is responsible for ensuring the smooth functioning of our payment system, the objective is thus to make sure that innovations deliver the expected benefits for users in terms of speed, cost savings and ease of use, but without undermining the efficiency and stability of our overall payment system. As a result, at the Banque de France, we are not ruling out that we might need to issue a digital form of our currency, to preserve the anchoring role of central bank money by providing it in a form that is better suited to the new, highly digitalised payments landscape.
With all these measures in place, we expect further progress in the resolution of the NPL problem next year. With regard to the intervened banks, two have been sold to new investors. The remaining two are in the process of identifying new potential partners which are most likely to be finalised next year. As for the existing Thai banks, the policy framework emphasised by the government is to encourage mergers, such as in the case of Bank Thai, which will help to preserve Thai-owned financial institutions. In this regard, in the case of those banks which have already been sold, the authorities have imposed the condition that they remain listed in the local stock market. And even in the case of the financial institutions which have switched to foreign investors, and for which permission for exiting the local stock market has been granted, the move to exit the stock market has been halted. As for the financial obligation of the FIDF, there is now a clear solution to the problem. The Ministry of Finance will provide a guarantee for the FIDF bonds to the amount equivalent to the loss incurred by FIDF in the first year and for the estimated losses in the following years. The preliminary amount of the  2  BIS Review 6/2001  losses is currently estimated at B880 billion, with the first lot of government guaranteed FIDF bonds expected to be issued in the first quarter of next year.

We only need to think of robotics, artificial intelligence, blockchains, and smart phones with 5G Wi-Fi to realize the extent of the changes that lie ahead for financial services. New technologies also bring opportunities. The Austrian economist, Finance Minister, and banker Joseph Schumpeter demonstrated in the 1920s that successive waves of technological change raise productivity, income, and living standards. However, we know from long experience that technological change often results in costs involving new risks that must be addressed in order to optimise the net benefit. So while FinTech  will broaden consumers’ range of choices in financial intermediation, it also brings new risks, both to the security of transactions and to privacy. To maintain financial stability and real economic activity, we need payment and settlement systems that are secure. As a result, cybersecurity has moved from being a technical issue to a central bank issue. That is why the Nordic central banks have set up this forum for discussion and cooperation so as to foster closer cooperation on cyber resilience and cybersecurity. Today the focus is on financial market infrastructure. One of the questions being asked in this section of the conference is, “What challenges are likely to emerge with new operating models and new actors in the financial sector?” As I said before, the FinTech snowstorm is already here. The newest challenge with respect to cybersecurity is the emergence of new players offering financial services, some of whom have not provided financial services before. The question therefore becomes: What technology are they using?
NGFS Occasional Paper. vii See NGFS and INSPIRE (2021), Ibid, p13, citing University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership [CISL] (2022), Nature-related financial risk: use case. How soil degradation amplifies the financial vulnerability of listed companies in the agricultural value chain. viii IPCC (2022), Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report, Summary for Policymakers ix van Toor et al. (2020), Indebted to Nature. De Nederlandsche Bank andPlanbureau voor de Leefomgeving; x Calice, P., Diaz Kalan, F., and Miguel, F. (2021), Nature-related financial risks in Brazil. Policy Research Working Paper 9759, World Bank Group; Martínez-Jaramillo, S. and Montañez-Enríquez, R. (2021), Dependencies and impact of the Mexican banking sector on ecosystem services. Unpublished NGFS-INSPIRE Study Group Input Paper; World Bank and Bank Negara Malaysia. (2022). An exploration of nature-related financial risks. Kuala Lumpur: World Bank. xi See Svartzman et al. (2021), Ibid. xii DNB (2019), Values at risk ? Sustainability risks and goals in the Dutch financial sector. xiii Banque de France (2022), Responsible investment report 2021.

Why has the outlook deteriorated so quickly? The banking crisis dealt a severe blow to the availability of credit. Growth in secured lending to households fell to an annualised rate of 1.9% in the three months to August, its lowest level in more than a decade. The Bank of England’s survey of credit conditions suggests that the terms on which banks provide credit to companies have tightened even further. And, on some estimates, the supply of finance to the UK corporate sector has ground to a halt. This credit shock has come on top of a fall in real disposable incomes resulting from the rise in energy and food prices earlier in the year. So, taken together, the combination of a squeeze on real take-home pay and a decline in the availability of credit poses the risk of a sharp and prolonged slowdown in domestic demand. Indeed, it now seems likely that the UK economy is entering a recession. At the same time, consumer price inflation, our target measure, has risen from around the 2% target at the beginning of the year to a worryingly high rate of 5.2% in September. Oil and other commodity and food prices have all been rising very rapidly. In those circumstances, it was sensible to allow those price changes to be absorbed by movements in consumer prices. The alternative would have been an even sharper slowdown in the economy. Central banks in other countries also find themselves in a similar position.