samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The irony, of course, is that this country itself will not be a part of that first wave. That is a disappointment to some, but a relief to others - a point I’ll come back to - but, whatever view one takes about that, no-one, I think, can fail to recognise the huge achievement of all those who have laboured, with such determination, for so long, and against formidable difficulties, to bring the venture to this point, and I take my hat off to them. In the circumstances, Mr Chairman, I could hardly choose to speak about anything else this morning. The advent of the euro, on this broad basis, will, of course, have profound effects on financial activity, and on both providers and consumers of financial services, all around the world - including in our Mediterranean partner countries. And I should like to take this momentous development, in the broader context of the evolution of the European Union, as my theme. I recognise at the outset that the EU is, fundamentally, about politics, inspired by the need to ensure that Europe is never again devastated by war. I am only too happy to leave the debate about what that implies for the political organisation of Europe - including the relationship between European institutions and the individual member states - to the politicians. My interest is in the economic dimension of Europe - though I realise of course that economics and politics can’t in practice be separated quite as neatly as this distinction suggests.

Jaime Caruana: Basel II - the road ahead Remarks by Mr Jaime Caruana, Governor of the Bank of Spain and Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, at the Institute of International Finance Annual Meeting, Dubai, 21 September 2003. *  *  *  Ladies and gentlemen, It is an honour and a pleasure for me to address the members of the IIF. In the kind invitation to participate in this meeting, two topics were proposed to me, the first being the economic situation and Spain’s experience in the euro area, and the second the new Basel II capital accord. I thought that Basel II would be more appropriate, given the very crucial stage we have now reached. But these two topics, the economic situation and the new accord, have suggested to me two preliminary comments. First, while policymakers have long understood the importance of price stability to the health of an economy, in recent years we have all learned much about the concurrent need to promote broader financial stability as well. A number of different episodes of economic crisis and financial disturbance have plainly illustrated the threats that weak financial systems and poorly managed banks can pose to the macroeconomy. This is why I have always stressed that banking regulation should be analyzed not only from a micro viewpoint but also from the macro perspective.
However, there might be unanticipated shocks, which could be very large, like Covid-19, but unlike Covid-19 may not be accompanied by the same levels of policy support. In such cases, the prevailing level of CCyB may be not be sufficient to absorb losses and support lending, so we need to ask ourselves whether an additional tool might be needed. Moreover, the impediments to usability of non-releasable buffers indicate that it is desirable to have a larger portion of releasable buffers to mitigate the impact of deep recessions. In 2019, BoE staff estimated the appropriate level of CCyB to absorb losses in a systemic crisis to be in the range of 3.5-5 percentage points[7] and noted that a gradualist approach to set the CCyB rates would be likely to make this level difficult to achieve before risks crystallise. To address this limitation of the CCyB framework the Financial Policy Committee of the Bank, along with a number of other regulatory authorities across the world, have introduced a positive cycle-neutral  Page 4  CCyB to the capital framework. But, despite this progress, for unanticipated shocks that occur at a time when the CCyB has not been built up or large shocks that do not originate in the financial system,[8] it is possible that the prevailing levels of CCyB will not be sufficient to absorb losses and support lending. So we must look at other supporting measures in such an event. We have two options.

The figure for Italy was slightly better than the euro area average, while Spanish SMEs were much more negative in their assessment of their access to bank loans. A similar picture emerges when investigating the success of applications for bank loans. While Spanish SMEs reported a lower success rate, French firms reported the highest, followed by Germany and Italy. In sum, comparing the data on bank loans with the results of the survey on SMEs, it is possible to conclude that the modest growth in bank loans granted to the non-financial private sector in recent months is mainly due to the weak macroeconomic conditions. However, it has also been affected to some extent by supply-related factors, which have had a negative impact on bank lending conditions. Some forward-looking considerations Let me finally turn to some forward-looking considerations and the role that monetary policy can play. According to the forecasts of the main international organisations, the economic recovery is likely to proceed gradually and unevenly, in a context of continued high uncertainty and possible further deleveraging on the part of banks. Further ahead, as the economic recovery strengthens, banks should be in a position to enhance their capital ratios, thereby increasing their capacity to provide loans. I would like to refer in this respect to the latest guidelines of the Basel Committee with regard to capital requirements and the implementation of Basel II. Regulatory capital requirements are central to our discussion, as there are clear links between banks’ capital management, the loan-granting process and credit supply.
Már Guðmundsson: Iceland’s crisis and recovery and current challenges Speech by Mr Már Guðmundsson, Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland, at a conference, organised by the French-Icelandic Chamber of Commerce; Paris, 28 February 2013. *  *  *  President of Iceland, Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen Nearly all of you probably know that almost 90% of Iceland’s banking sector failed in the first week of October 2008. This fact is well established in the minds of scholars of the international financial crisis. What is probably less well known is that at that point, Iceland was already on its way into a recession after an unsustainable boom and serious overheating during 2005–2007 and a currency crisis in the first half of 2008. The banking collapse and the associated wealth loss and further currency depreciation made the recession worse, of course, but so did the recession that hit the global economy in the fourth quarter of 2008. That autumn, two separate but interrelated sub-stories of the recent Icelandic saga converged in a tragic grand finale. These are: 1. Iceland’s boom-bust cycle and problems with macroeconomic management in small, open, and financially integrated economies. This is a story that has played out many times around the globe, and many of its elements have been seen before in Iceland. It might have been somewhat more extreme this time around, but it wasn’t fundamentally different. 2. The rise and fall of three cross-border banks operating on the basis of EU legislation (the European “passport”).

Encik Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid: Welcoming remarks - Islamic Finance Rendezvous Series Welcoming remarks by Mr Encik Adnan Zaylani Mohamad Zahid, Assistant Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia), at the Islamic Finance Rendezvous Series, Bayan Lepas, 14 January 2019. * * * It is a pleasure to be here this morning. On behalf of Bank Negara Malaysia, I would like to express our appreciation to the state government of Penang for hosting this inaugural Islamic Finance Rendezvous Series; and to the Chief Minister of Penang, YAB Tuan Chow Kon Yeow and YB Dato’ Haji Abdul Halim bin Haji Hussain for gracing this event. I would also like to welcome the businessmen and entrepreneurs joining us this morning. A recent survey we did revealed that almost 60% of SMEs were not aware of the availability of Islamic business financing facilities. Indeed, most SMEs adopted conventional financing. Some may still have the misconception that Islamic finance is only for Muslims. Today, we hope to dispel this and create more awareness about what Islamic finance is and has to offer. We have assembled a number of industry experts and leaders for this, and I would like to extend our thanks to the Association of Islamic Banking and Financial Institutions Malaysia (AIBIM), the Malaysian Takaful Association (MTA) and other partners for your support and commitment to organise this programme. Islamic finance has evolved from a niche market into the mainstream Allow me to give an overview of where we are in Islamic finance.
History has shown that inflation measured in terms of consumer prices has not always signalled when imbalances in the economy have been building up. Many of the countries that were hit by depression and banking crises during the 1930s had beforehand witnessed steep rises in asset prices and a sharp credit expansion without any increase in inflation. In Japan, the recession that followed in the wake of a strong credit expansion and rising asset prices during the second half of the 1980s proved, as we know, very severe and protracted. Neither in Japan had inflation provided signals in time that large imbalances were building up. Also during the latter part of the 1990s we have seen examples of crises with a similar course of events, for example in Thailand and other parts of Asia. Banking crises are not a necessary condition for countries to be hit hard after such a development. This is shown by what happened in the United States and England at the beginning of the 1990s. Focus on price stability and financial stability During the 1990s, confidence in an economic policy aimed at achieving price stability seems to have strengthened in earnest in large parts of the world. World inflation is now back to the levels reached before the 1970s, and monetary policy is again playing the leading role in stabilisation policy. Modern neo-Keynesian1 research based on theories of nominal rigidities has shown that not only real shocks but also monetary shocks can temporarily affect the real economy.

So, it could be said that the Riksbank conducts a flexible policy of inflation targeting.2 In addition, the Riksbank’s remit includes promoting financial stability. Low inflation but sharp fluctuations in asset prices and credit At the same time as inflation in the world economy has now stabilised at low levels, fluctuations in asset prices have increased. Furthermore, debt levels among households and firms have continued to display large cyclical variations. Rising asset prices and the increase in debt that occurred in many countries at the end of the 1990s, and which has continued as regards house prices and households, has given rise to concerns in many countries over the stability of the economy and inflation in the slightly longer term. That asset prices and debt levels appear to vary more now than ten or fifteen years ago should, at least in part, be due to the deregulation and evolution of the financial markets. Here, credit and liquid secondary markets can quickly create money that can be transferred around the world to investments with the highest expected return. However, so far the low-inflation economy appears to have lessened cyclical fluctuations and changed the cycles’ shape. It seems as though the cycles have been longer and flatter than before, particularly during expansionary phases. Can a build-up of imbalances be prevented through a different monetary policy?
Although the depreciation of the krone since September 2008 will redress the balance somewhat, we must nevertheless expect job losses in manufacturing. Indeed, recent years’ growth in this industry was an unexpected break in the long-term trend. Norwegian households have built up debt over many years. In the mid-1990s, debt was one fifth higher than income. In 2008, debt was twice as high as income. We have no clear basis for determining what constitutes sustainable debt. People today spend less of their income on basic necessities and have more to spend on their homes and mortgages. Changes in credit markets have provided greater opportunities to spread consumption over a lifetime. The public safety net is also gradually being expanded, which may lead to lower saving. BIS Review 16/2009  11  The experience of recent years nevertheless indicates that the level of debt is on the high side. Growth in private consumption slowed sharply when interest rates rose to more normal levels through 2007. Household debt is largely secured on residential property. When residential property falls in value – and we are probably not at the end of this road yet – consumers have less leeway. A larger number will want to reduce their debt, and banks will curtail lending. All in all, it must be expected that households will deleverage and be more cautious in their consumption and investment in the years ahead. It is easy to bury one’s head in the sand when the economic situation deteriorates.

In the end, the most risky behaviour is one characterised by over-optimism, and lack of consideration of all the relevant risks. This means that when shocks occur, entities are unprepared and tend to react abruptly, causing problems for their institution and, sometimes, for the whole system. On the contrary, adopting a forward-looking approach, which takes account of the possible impact of broader changes in the cycle, should help institutions to avoid mistakes and bad decisions, and to detect and respond to problems in a smoother fashion and at an earlier stage. Conclusion In closing, I would like to thank you as risk professionals for your inputs to the various Basel Committee initiatives during my Chairmanship, especially Basel II. A unique element of Basel II is that rather than imposing a purely regulatory approach, it incorporates what the Basel Committee views as leading practices in bank risk management. In developing the revised Framework, the Committee sought to incorporate rigorous and comprehensive risk management approaches into the regulatory structure. We could not have come as far as we have without the advances in risk management that you in the industry have developed. Moreover, as industry practices continue to evolve, I believe the Framework is flexible enough that these advances can be incorporated on an ongoing basis. These past several years have been among the most interesting and challenging in my career, and I will always look back on the accomplishments of the Basel Committee over this period with a mixture of pride and humility.
The inflation forecast is not only an important internal decision-making tool, but also a crucial communication device. Monetary policy has become considerably more transparent over recent decades. It is now commonly believed that open communication of monetary policy is beneficial to the stability and predictability of its transmission into the economy, and is also crucial for the accountability of an independent central bank. As a result, the inflation forecast, including its underlying assumptions and policy implications, is openly explained to the public. Nonetheless, we must always bear in mind that even highly developed, technically advanced and wellorganised forecasting procedures are not an automatic pilot for inflation-targeting central banks. They are no more – but also no less – than an important input into the monetary policy process. Eventually, the decision is always based not only on the central forecast itself, but also on the decision-makers’ discussions about all the associated risks. Good analytical tools, however, can be helpful even in this respect, by enabling the simulation of different alternative scenarios in a consistent manner. Let me now turn to the progress we have achieved so far in building our forecasting system at the Czech National Bank, where we now have nine years of experience with inflation targeting. The new regime was introduced in a challenging situation, after a period of currency turmoil in May 1997, which ended the fixed exchange rate period and resulted in higher inflation and rising inflation expectations. The economy needed a new nominal anchor in order to return to a disinflation path.

On the implications of DCP for optimal monetary policy, see Egorov, Konstantin and Dmitry Mukhin, “Optimal Monetary Policy under Dollar Pricing,” March 2019. mimeo Yale University; and Casas, C, Diez, FJ, Gopinath, G and Gourinchas, PO (2017), ‘Dominant Currency Paradigm: A New Model for Small Open Economies’, IMF Working Papers 17/264. 27 For more detail, see ‘Lambda’, speech by Mark Carney, 16 January 2017. 26  10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  10  The growing risk of a global liquidity trap puts a high premium on getting more than just monetary policy right. Limited space for monetary policy to respond to adverse shocks means more of the burden for supporting jobs and activity will fall to fiscal policy. Though some may be tempted to resort to protectionism, such policies would merely serve to make the problem worse. Those at the core of the IMFS need to incorporate spillovers and spill backs, as the Fed has been doing. More broadly, central banks need to develop a better shared understanding of the scale of global risks and a recognition that concerted, cooperative action may sometimes be necessary. That doesn’t mean that monetary policy makers in advanced economies must internalise fully spillovers from their actions on emerging market economies, given their mandates are to achieve domestic objectives.
Despite this, Government bonds accounted for the largest proportion of the outstanding total stock of marketable securities, contributing K5,439.4 billion (54.7%) to the entire portfolio. Total Treasury bills in circulation amounted to K4,501.5 billion, representing 45.3% of the total marketable securities outstanding. 13. Investment in Treasury bills held by non-residents increased to K497.0 billion from K8.8 billion in the third quarter. The increase reflected renewed confidence in short-term Government paper. Conversely, foreign Investment in Government bonds decreased to K127.9 billion from K150.5 billion recorded in the third quarter, due to net maturities. Collectively, total holdings of Government securities by non-resident was K625.4 billion, representing 7% of total securities outstanding. 14. Developments in commercial banks’ nominal interest rates continued to be mixed during the reviewed quarter, with the weighted average lending base rate (WALBR) trending downwards to 19.4% from 19.8% in September 2010. Similarly, the average lending rate (ALR) fell to 26.4% in December 2010 from 26.8% in September 2010. However, the 30-day deposit rate for amounts exceeding K20 million and the average savings rate (ASR) for amounts above K100,000 remained unchanged at 5.6% and 4.7%, respectively. Real sector 15. Developments in the real sector were satisfactory during the reviewed quarter. This was reflected by higher output of most monitored commodities, and an increase in investment pledges. 1  2  Figures in square brackets are for September 2010. BIS central bankers’ speeches  Food reserve agency stocks 16.

Egil Matsen: US Senate Democrats’ Special Committee on the climate crisis Opening remarks by Mr Egil Matsen, Deputy Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), at the meeting, Washington DC, 17 October 2019. * * * Chairman Schatz, I thank you for inviting Norges Bank, together with other NGFS-member central banks, to the U.S. Senate Democrats’ Special Committee on the Climate Crisis. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss climate-related economic and financial risks and relevant central bank strategies to address those risks. Norges Bank’s mission is to promote economic stability by conducting monetary policy and monitoring the financial system. Our central bank also has the responsibility for managing Norway’s SWF, the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), in accordance with a mandate issued by the Ministry of Finance. A feature common to both of these mandated responsibilities is the identification and management of risk. In addressing these risks, we should always work within our mandates. For central banks that means taking a comprehensive view of factors impacting the economy and the risks we face, while upholding market neutrality and preserving our independence. Climate risk, the economy and financial stability The scientific basis for climate change is widely accepted. The physical impacts of climate change and measures to mitigate its impact, will affect all parts of the economy and have consequences for the financial system. Consequently, climate risk is a relevant consideration for central banks.
We have put that portfolio under the management of a separate company at arms length from the HKMA to ensure that there is no conflict of interest between our shareholdings and our daily operations as a regulator. Our intention is to sell off these shares very gradually in a way that will have no impact on the markets. This may well mean holding on to them for some time. Meanwhile, the markets have stabilized, and the Hang Seng Index has, like other markets, been enjoying something of a resurgence over the last few weeks. Hong Kong’s Economic Strengths  I believe that in the future we shall be able to look back on our actions in August and September as a resounding reaffirmation of our resolve to maintain our fifteen-year record of currency stability through the linked exchange rate. The link was introduced in October 1983 at a time of uncertainty over Hong Kong’s future and declining confidence in the Hong Kong dollar. The link has survived successive political and economic shocks, both global and regional. It is not only weathering the current crisis, the greatest test so far: it will, I believe, come out of the crisis more resilient than ever, fortified by the technical refinements to our currency board system and, more important, be strengthened by the clear message that we have given about our determination to maintain it. The link is the lynchpin of our monetary system and a vital factor in our prosperity.

So BIS Review 29/1998 ˝  -2-  that although we know that in principle at the macro-economic level free trade and competition are a powerful positive sum game - and although we have seen it clearly enough in practice - there are always likely to be visible - and vocal - losers. And that is bound to provoke outbursts of popular resistance. Against that background establishing and maintaining free trade to the extent that that has been achieved in the EU is in itself a remarkable achievement. But the EU has already in many areas gone well beyond just free trade, in establishing the single market. That involves more than the free movement of goods and services within Europe. It involves also the free movement of both labour and capital, as well as supporting European legislation to avoid market distortions from, for example, state aids, or government procurement, or restrictive practices within the private sector. This further pooling of sovereignty has essentially the same purpose - it is designed to reinforce the macro-economic benefits from free trade and competition and act as a stimulus to growth and employment by allocating resources still more effectively based on comparative advantage, enabling savings to flow to where they can be most productively invested and production to be located where it can be most effectively carried on to satisfy consumer demand. The advent of the euro represents a massive new step in the same direction.