samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
We have tested numerous tools including overnight reverse repurchase operations, term reverse repurchase operations and term deposit facilities to ensure that, when the time comes, lift-off can be managed smoothly. As the FOMC has communicated, the primary tool will be interest on excess reserves (IOER), with overnight reverse repurchases as a supplemental tool to be used as needed to help ensure a firm floor under short-term interest rates. BIS central bankers’ speeches  3  Once normalization has begun, two important questions will be: How fast will it proceed? And how high will short-term rates ultimately need to go? How fast the normalization process will proceed depends mainly on two factors: how the economy evolves and how financial market conditions respond to movements in the federal funds rate target. If financial market conditions do not tighten much in response to higher short-term interest rates, we might have to move more quickly to achieve the appropriate restraint on financial market conditions. In contrast, if financial conditions tighten unduly, then this will likely prompt us to go much more slowly or even to pause for a while. Our intention will be to move short-term interest rates in a manner to generate the set of financial market conditions that we deem to be most consistent with achieving our employment and inflation objectives. The question of how high short-term rates will ultimately need to go before we approach a neutral monetary stance is a difficult question, which is hard to pre-judge for a couple of reasons.

The pace of improvement in the labor market slowed somewhat in the first quarter of 2015 from that of the second half of last year. Nonfarm payroll employment increased in the first quarter by about 200,000 per month, but a gain of only 126,000 in March. This was well below the pace of the fourth quarter. Growth in hours worked also slowed, but because wage gains picked up somewhat, the growth rate of compensation in the first quarter looks to have been about as strong as it was during the second half of last year. Moreover, the level of slack in the labor market has diminished sufficiently so that one might expect firmer wage gains going forward. The unemployment rate in March of 5.5 percent, for example, is at a level where, historically, we have seen a pickup in the pace of real wage gains. If this happens again and unemployment continues to decline as I expect, then these wage gains will help support continued solid income growth even if the pace of employment growth remains slower than last year. However, it will be important to determine whether the softness in the March labor market report was temporary, or if it foreshadows a more substantial slowing in the labor market than I currently anticipate. The final factor supporting household spending is the decline in energy prices. Recently, the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price has been fluctuating in the neighborhood of $ per barrel, about half the price in June of last year.
Following the intensification of the financial crisis in Autumn 2008 – and against the background of rapidly receding inflationary pressures – we have taken monetary policy measures that are unprecedented in terms of nature, scope and magnitude. These measures fall into two categories: first, standard measures in the form of interest rate changes (Since October 2008, our key policy rate has been cut from 4.25% to 1%); second, what is known as “non-standard” measures, encompassing a policy of fully accommodating banks’ liquidity needs, enlarging the list of eligible assets, lengthening maturities for refinancing operations, the provisioning of liquidity in foreign currencies but also the purchasing of covered bonds and, more recently, government bonds. 8. Let me add that we never ruled out to implement asset purchases, when it appeared necessary to repair dysfunctional markets to ensure a proper transmission of monetary policy impulses. Indeed, in 2009, the ECB embarked into a program of covered bonds purchases, which is now completed. Although modest in size (60 bn euros), this program has been fairly successful in reviving a market segment which in turn supported bank funding at a time where bond issuance were secure. 9. The recent decision to purchase Government securities should be seen in the same light. The objective of this program is to address the malfunctioning of securities markets to restore an appropriate monetary policy transmission mechanism. These interventions are sterilized as liquidity injected is exactly drained, thus fully neutralizing the effect on the banking system. 10.

I expect GDP growth to be around 2-1/4 percent this year, moderately above my estimate of the long-run sustainable growth rate for the economy. In my past speeches, I often mentioned the fact that we’re nearing the longest expansion on record. Well, as of this month, I can finally say that we’ve reached that milestone. The economy has been growing for 121 months—a little over 10 years. 1/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  While this is undoubtedly good news, the headline data mask a more nuanced economic picture. Consumer spending has been an important driver of growth, and the most recent readings have been very positive. However, other signs point to slowing growth. In particular, the latest indicators suggest that business fixed investment has softened and that manufacturing production is in decline. And the outlook for growth outside the United States has dimmed, which will weigh on demand for U.S. products. This mixed picture is mirrored in the employment data. On one hand, the unemployment rate, which stands at 3.7 percent, is near the lowest we’ve seen in 50 years. On the other, job growth has slowed this year relative to last year’s pace. Finally, turning to prices, the latest data show that underlying inflation is 1.6 percent, below our 2 percent goal. The major challenge with inflation that’s persistently lower than 2 percent is that low inflation feeds into inflation expectations.
Bluntly, it is no good assuming that an internationally active bank can be regulated as a single unit if, when distress comes, differences in the insolvency or resolution regimes of the various countries in which it operates effectively split the bank into a series of de facto distinct, local entities. The extra complications are legion, revolving around banking practice as well as resolution regimes. For example, if a group employs central liquidity management, as has been not uncommon, host supervisors and creditors may wake up the morning after a failure to find that all the group’s surplus liquidity is in another jurisdiction, available first to creditors there. This kind of thing can unhelpfully alter the incentives for home regulators to be full and frank in their exchanges with host supervisors. We should not overlook that when extolling the merits of colleges of supervisors. But those problems should, given sufficient will and common commitment, be trackable. Even more difficult are the entanglements and conflicts between home and host insolvency and resolution laws. There is, for example, a first-order difference between single-entity insolvency regimes and separate-entity regimes. 9 The latter, for example in the US for foreign banks, have the effect of de facto ring-fencing local assets for local depositors. And even in countries that basically operate a single-entity regime, some (including the UK) would have the option of putting a branch into liquidation pre-emptively to de facto ring fence it before the home authorities had established a whole-bank insolvency procedure. These issues are not new.

That is a formidable task, and it is striking that, in the US, the FDIC has introduced a requirement that troubled banks must be able to demonstrate that, if necessary, they could report each day the details of so-called Qualifying Financial Contracts, which are essentially derivatives. We may need to contemplate something along those lines in the UK. All of that is needed after buyers for the business have been found. Potential bidders for all or part of an ailing bank will themselves need the kinds of information typically offered to bidders in a “friendly” M&A transaction. So there is a case for banks routinely maintaining such a Data Room as part of their crisis contingency plans. In delivering its resolution responsibilities under the 2009 Banking Act, the Bank is ready to work with banks and the FSA in helping to specify in more detail what is needed in practice. If the information can be ready almost routinely the execution of resolutions would be aided. In summary, as a consequence of its new statutory role, the Bank can have a need for a lot of information about banks getting into distress. That might usefully be seen alongside the information needed before a bank reaches the point of being unviable, when it might apply to draw on the Bank’s public liquidity insurance facilities, notably the Discount Window. And beyond that, a bank might seek Emergency Liquidity Assistance, where the Bank acts under the Tripartite MoU.
Tarisa Watanagase: What determines the future of the Thai economy? Speech by Dr Tarisa Watanagase, Governor of the Bank of Thailand, at the British Chamber of Commerce Luncheon Talk, Bangkok, 17 September 2008. *  *  *  Chairman Bain, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank Chairman Bain for inviting me once again to join this gathering of distinguished members and guests of the British Chamber of Commerce. I look forward to our annual get-together in this warm and friendly atmosphere and especially welcome the opportunity to update and exchange views on the Thai economy and its outlook. My talk today will cover three parts. First, I would like to focus on recent developments and prospects of the Thai economy in the near term. In the second part, I will share with you my perspectives on the important factors that I believe will determine the future of the Thai economy. To close, I will touch on the preparations that we should be making for the future of the Thai economy, focusing particularly on the central bank’s role in achieving price stability to support long-term growth. Ladies and Gentlemen, Notwithstanding news headlines, most of us are aware that the overall economic atmosphere continues to be business-as-usual. Nevertheless, the current tension and ongoing uncertainty on the Thai political scene has posed worries for some investors on the prospects of the Thai economy for the rest of 2008 and 2009. Confidence has already weakened somewhat on both consumer and business ends.

Sound economic fundamentals continue to provide support for favourable growth and collective efforts should be focused on raising the economy’s potential output in order to achieve price stability and sustainable growth in the long run. 2  BIS Review 119/2008  By old book, growth comes from utilization of the country’s resource endowment with available technology. However, with the advent of global economic and financial integration, growth is no longer constrained by endowment. In today’s world economy, outsourcing for inputs abundant in other countries and exchange of technology and skills allow for lower production costs and greater potential to grow. Potential output in this era is thus free from conventional hindrance. From the Bank of Thailand’s latest research, the Thai economy has a potential output growth rate of around 5.5 to 6.0 percent per year from 2008 to 2015. This is based on an assumption that investment can grow at the same rate as the economy, and therefore, the ratio of real gross investment to real GDP needs to increase from 22 percent today to 28 percent within the next 8 years. Prior to 1997, Thai economy grew satisfactorily on the back of high level of investment as well as increasing utilization of labor. During this period, sufficient capital formation allowed for an increase in labor productivity. However, in the post crisis era, potential output gradually declined as real investment did not fully resume its pre-crisis level, which was 31 percent of real GDP.
But the world inflation climate has become much more inflationary now, both through the direct effect of rising energy and commodity prices and through a turnaround in global demand. While the global demand environment remains buoyant, we should not regard energy and commodity price movements as one-off shocks, as the inflationary pressure from the world economy may well persist for quite a while. And persistent above-target inflation carries other risks for price stability in the UK – to the credibility of our policy framework and to expectations of future inflation. Indeed, Chart 11 shows that UK services sector inflation has been running at around 4% for much of the past decade, and has not shifted downwards to offset rising goods prices. This raises the possibility that in the services sector, high inflation expectations have already become engrained. 7  Kemp (2011) argues that if all monetary authorities treat energy and commodity price shocks as exogenous, there is a strong risk of an inflationary bias to global monetary policy.

The first is the pressure that strong growth in Asia and other rapidly growing emerging market economies is placing on the markets for energy and other natural resources. We have already seen this pressure reflected in a strong upward move in global energy and commodity prices since the early 2000s, as Chart 5 shows. After a brief respite during the financial crisis, this upward pressure on energy and commodity prices has resumed as the world economy has bounced back from recession. The oil price is back above $ and while there has been a modest correction in commodity prices over the past month, this seems likely to be a short-term pause in the upward trend rather than a fundamental readjustment. Chart 5 – Real oil and commodity prices since 1980 Deflated by US consumer price index; 2000=100 S&P GSCI Agriculture and Livestock index  350  S&P GSCI Industrial Metals index  300  Brent crude spot price 250 200 150 100 50 0 1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  . Source: IMF and Thompson Datastream It is no coincidence that this upward pressure began to emerge in the early 2000s and has continued for the best part of a decade now. The rapid growth we have seen in Asia and other emerging market and developing economies has been very resource-hungry. The effects of this can be seen in the pattern of global energy consumption, shown in Chart 6.
Supervisory Statement 1/20 Solvency II: Prudent Person Principle, section 2.3 (SS1/20 Solvency II: Prudent Person Principle (bankofengland.co.uk)  )  3. PRA calculations using annual returns data for year-end 2014 and Matching Adjustment (MA) Asset & Liability Data submissions by firms as at year-end 2020. 4. This refers only to assets in Component A of firms’ MA portfolios. See paragraph 4.5 of Supervisory Statement 7/18 for a definition of Component A. (Supervisory Statement 7/18 'Solvency II: Matching adjustment' (bankofengland.co.uk)  Page 15 ) 5. Solvency II Review: Matching Adjustment and reforms to the Fundamental Spread 6. PRA Discussion Paper 2/22 (DP2/22 – Potential Reforms to Risk Margin and Matching Adjustment within Solvency II | Bank of England)

There are two important ingredients: Our explicit inflation objective is 2 percent, and this is to be achieved over the long run. As recently as 2005, many FOMC participants preferred to describe a range of inflation outcomes as being consistent with our inflation mandate instead of stating it as a single number.3 Our current statement narrows our objective to 2 percent. It also sees this as an average that we aim to achieve over the long run, in recognition of the obvious realism that inflation may deviate from this goal from time to time owing to economic challenges, conflicts in achieving the dual mandate objectives and difficulties in the policy transmission channels. The statement also notes that maximum employment is largely determined by nonmonetary factors, which are difficult to measure and may change over time. Hence, we cannot and do not specify a fixed, time-invariant goal for it. But FOMC participants can provide their current assessments of goal variables related to the achievement of maximum employment. We do so using the central tendency of FOMC participants’ projections for the rate that unemployment would converge to in the absence of further shocks to the economy. As of January 2012, this rate is 5-1/4 to 6 percent. The statement also indicates that policy will seek to mitigate deviations in inflation and unemployment from these longer-run goals, and addresses the weighting of relevant costs and benefits when trying to close these gaps.
7  Dependency ratio is described as the ratio of total population to working population i.e. aged between 15 and 64. 8  Gerald, J.F. (23 April 2004). "Lessons from 20 Years of Cohesion". The Economic and Social Institute, paper presented at the Brussels Economic Forum. 7  4/8  use this basic equation as a tool to highlight the areas to be improved in Turkey and Turkey s possible contributions to the EU in terms of productivity, demographic developments and the repercussions of all these in the labour market. First of all, as Ben Bernanke indicated, "Productivity growth is the principal source of improvements in living standards ".9 And then, we observe that during the last decades, the EU has lagged behind in productivity growth compared with other industrialized economies. In particular, labour productivity growth has been weak since the mid-1990 s.10 Thus, while growth in hourly productivity in the 1980s stood at 2.4 percent on average in the Euro area and at 1.3 percent in the US, that trend has been reversed between 1996 and 2004, with an annual average in the Euro area and in the US of 1.3 percent and of 2.5 percent respectively. In the US, productivity growth has even picked up to 4 percent per annum since 2001, despite adverse factors such as September 11 terrorist attacks, the 2001 recession and the recent rise in energy prices.11 Of course, there are several reasons of the EU s lagging behind in the productivity growth.

In Spain, the restructuring process of the banking sector has required close coordination between the Government, the Banco de España and the Resolution Fund (FROB). The Managing Board of this latter agency is composed of representatives of the Banco de España and of the respective Economy and Finance Ministries. The institutional arrangements aim at combining the knowledge and technical expertise of the supervisor with the necessary involvement of government representatives, given the substantial amount of public resources employed in the resolution and restructuring processes. At the technical level, it was essential to ensure good communication between the staff of the Banco de España and of the FROB, because both agencies were directly and intensely involved in the resolution policies. Indeed, under national legislation the Banco de España is entrusted with the tasks of initiating resolution and approving resolution plans. The FROB’s role is to prepare resolution plans, monitor compliance with those plans once approved by the Supervisor and implement all resolution actions, including the bail-in tools. Furthermore, the FROB has the power to run institutions under resolution on a temporary basis if so 4  BIS central bankers’ speeches  decided by the Banco de España and to manage the government’s stakes in financial institutions that have received public support, including the definition and implementation of divestment strategies. I think that all the parties involved and most external observers agree that these arrangements have worked very effectively so far.
That is, data on particular markets and institutions should be collected whenever possible by the regulators who ultimately are responsible for the safety and soundness of the institutions or for the functioning of those markets. Regulators with supervisory responsibilities for particular financial firms and markets are more likely to understand the relevance of particular forms of standardized data for risk management and supervisory oversight. For example, supervisors regularly evaluate the ability of individual firms’ own risk measures, such as internal ratings for loans, and of liquidity and counterparty credit risks, to signal potential problems. As a result, these supervisors have the expertise needed to develop new reporting requirements that would be standardized across firms and could be aggregated. Third, greater standardization of data than exists today is required. Standardized reporting to regulators in a way that allows aggregation for effective monitoring and analysis is imperative. In addition, the data collection effort itself should encourage the use of common reporting systems across institutions, markets, and investors, which would generally enhance efficiency and transparency. Even seemingly simple changes, such as requiring the use of a standardized unique identifier for institutions (or instruments), would make surveillance and reporting substantially more efficient. Fourth, the data collected and the associated reporting standards and protocols should enable better risk management by the institutions themselves and foster greater market discipline by investors.

By continuing to usethe our site, agree to our Terms and You can learn moreour about how we use cookies by reviewing our Privacy Statement. of Use"A Privacy Statement. 1 Outside of New York City, however, New York State has faced sluggish job growth as well as ongoing labor shortages. Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and  Jonathan Hastings "The Tri-State Region's Recovery from the Pandemic Recession Three Years On," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, April 13, 2023; Jason Bram, "How Did New York City's Economy Weather the Pandemic?" Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, April 13, 2023. 2 Mary Amiti, Sebastian Heise, Giorgio Topa, and Julia Wu, "What Has Driven the Labor Force Participation Gap since February 2020?" Federal Reserve Bank of New York  Liberty Street Economics, March 30, 2023. 3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, adopted effective January 24, 2012; as reaffirmed  effective January 31, 2023. 4 John C. Williams, A Steady Anchor in a Stormy Sea, remarks at SNB-FRB-BIS High-Level Conference on Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility, Zurich, Switzerland,  November 9, 2022. 5 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Short-Term Inflation Expectations Decline; Perceived and Expected Credit Conditions Mostly Unchanged, May 8, 2023. 6 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Global Supply Chain Pressure Index. 7 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement, May 3, 2023.