Capital inflows, largely through the banking system, helped finance a boom in investment and real estate. Distortions in the financial system led to a misallocation of resources so that high rates of private investment did not generate substantial improvements in productivity. Exchange rate regimes where the domestic currency was fixed to the dollar generated false expectations of stability, and the resulting increase in unhedged borrowing generated large exposures to changes in the exchange rate or interest rates. By 1997, the short-term external debt of the private sector had risen substantially, relative to GDP and to reserves, and this created conditions similar to a classic bank run, when the crises hit. The initial spark for the loss of confidence is still not fully clear, as is often the case in financial crises. And although the particular dynamics differed across the countries in the region, the basic pattern was common, with a rapid and sustained effort by domestic and foreign investors to reduce their exposure to further losses. The initial effects of this behavior made the exchange rate commitments untenable, and when those commitments were broken and currencies fell, the panic became self-reinforcing. Uncertainty and lack of information fed the run. Market participants were unable to judge whether deteriorating developments reflected temporary liquidity problems or deeper solvency issues. They  BIS Review 65/2007  1  reacted by assuming the worst. These shifts in market sentiment risked becoming self-validating, with liquidity problems transformed into solvency problems with broader risk of default.

Inflation expectations remain firmly anchored in line with our aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term. The firm anchoring of inflation expectations is of the essence. Turning to fiscal policies, in view of the ongoing vulnerability to adverse market reactions, countries need to do their utmost to meet their deficit targets and put government debt-toGDP ratios firmly on a downward trajectory. In this regard, the Governing Council takes note of the recently announced measures in some euro area countries to reduce their very large fiscal imbalances. Where necessary, additional corrective measures – preferably on the expenditure side – need to be swiftly defined and implemented. At the same time, all euro area countries should pursue ambitious and credible multi-year consolidation strategies. This will help to strengthen confidence in the sustainability of public finances, reduce risk premia in interest rates and improve the conditions for sound and sustainable growth. Any positive fiscal developments that may emerge, reflecting factors such as a more favourable than expected economic environment, should be exploited to make faster progress with fiscal consolidation. Substantial and far-reaching structural reforms, complementing fiscal adjustment, should be rapidly implemented to enhance the prospects for higher sustainable growth. Major reforms are particularly necessary in those countries that have experienced a loss of competitiveness in the past or that are suffering from high fiscal and external deficits. The removal of labour market rigidities would further support the adjustment process of these economies.