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Our task now is to ensure that liberalization and globalization remain productive processes, that our energies are devoted not just to short-term cures, but also to long-term preventive health. There are a number of initiatives that we might pursue, and I mention only a few of them with the aim of stimulating discussion. The first, and most urgent, is the reform of the international financial architecture to better regulate the volatile capital flows that contribute to market instability. This must include improved information and disclosure. The recent experience in this region has shown that problems were allowed to build up because of a lack of information about the full financial picture, both in terms of the destination and the source of the funds. Important steps are being taken in many Asian countries towards greater transparency in the public sector, and I am pleased to report that Hong Kong is playing a leading role in these efforts. But greater transparency among the regulators means that a serious asymmetry of information is emerging between the public and private sectors. We must now consider the need for greater disclosure on the investor side, since the virtual complete lack of information about the activities of huge global institutional investors poses risks to all participants in the markets - to other investors, to lenders, and to borrowers. A second part of this architectural reform must be improved prudential oversight of capital flows, since mere disclosure is no guarantee that behaviour will be prudent.