samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This responsibility rests with the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) at the Bank, specifically its Board. The PRA Board also comprises both Bank insiders and outsiders. 40 So in a nutshell, for the first 300 years of its history the Bank of England operated as an agent of government. In the subsequent 20 years, its degree of policy discretion has been transformed. It now comprises monetary, macro-prudential and micro-prudential policy – a “3M” regime. The Bank’s span of responsibilities may well be unique, at least among advanced economy central banks. Though there are differences in detail, there are also striking elements of institutional similarity in the decision-making architecture for monetary, macro-prudential and microprudential policy, as carried out by the MPC, FPC and PRA respectively. Let me mention four features in particular: (a) Goal dependence: The policy objectives of all three policy committees are set in statute by Parliament, reflecting the attitudes of the electorate at large. In the language of economics, the 3M regime thus exhibits “goal-dependence”. 41 Though different in detail, these objectives share some similarities. For example, the MPC and FPC have a unique primary objective, augmented with a common secondary objective. 42 (b) Instrument independence: The policy instruments of the three policy committees are delegated, through statute, to them. In other words, the settings of these instruments on a day-to-day basis are for the Bank of England’s policy committees, subject to meeting the Parliamentary-set target. The 3M regime thus exhibits “instrument-independence”.

Major UK banks include: Standard Chartered, Santander UK, RBS, Barclays, LBG, HBOS, and HSBC but does not include Northern Rock. BIS central bankers’ speeches  23  Chart 15: One year ahead inflation and GDP forecast errors  Source: Bank calculations. 24  BIS central bankers’ speeches
Insurers are required to hold a buffer of assets above the value of their policyholder liabilities that can absorb unexpected losses due to credit defaults, longevity shocks or other reasons. Solvency II limits what counts as own funds to instruments that can genuinely absorb losses. 3. The capital calculation in Solvency II captures all the risks to which the insurer is exposed, including those in other parts of the group. 4. The incentives of owners and managers are brought back into alignment with those of policyholders in a number of ways including: a. Requiring owners to put their own money at risk through minimum capital requirements that must be maintained at all times. b. If capital levels fall close to these minimum requirements, a supervisory ladder of intervention shifts control increasingly away from owners and managers at a time when their incentives to act in the interests of policyholders are weakest because of the temptation to gamble for resurrection. c. Capital requirements are risk-based, so that owners must put more of their own money on the line as the insurer takes greater risk. d. Taking more risk should also never lead to an apparent improvement in the capital position of an insurer. e. The UK Senior Managers’ Regime puts specific responsibilities for the key aspects of running an insurer on individual managers.

Voting power in the IMF is a balance of creditors’ interests, borrowers’ needs and that all members should be able to exercise influence. Membership of the IMF is open for all countries that meet certain criteria. Today, 182 countries are members, which means that very few countries do not take part in the IMF. This broad membership is one of the organisation’s strengths. The IMF’s head office is in Washington DC in the USA. Around 3,000 people work there. The major part are economists specialising in macroeconomics and international finance. The IMF board which decides on the day-to-day policy in the organisation is also located in Washington DC. The board meets at least three times per week. It has 24 seats, where all countries are represented, most of them in geographical groupings. The IMF’s purpose is to work for financial stability. In simple terms, this means ensuring that the various macroeconomic variables in a country – the exchange rate, inflation, the budget deficit, for instance - are dealt with in such a way that the economy can run smoothly and efficiently. A stable economy allows people to think in a long-term way when they invest and consume. Without stability, it is not possible to create sustainable growth. In Sweden, we have recent experiences of the opposite. The financial crisis here at the beginning of the 1990s increased unemployment and reduced production at the same time as government finances were dramatically weakened and Sweden entered the deepest recession since the 1930s.
(2) How to ensure the necessary coherence of the efforts undertaken by stakeholders of different importance, submitted to different types of regulations, across the different financial centres that compose the financial system of the euro? 2. What roles for the Eurosystem  The Eurosystem has been quite active in the field of payment systems and is likely to develop further its involvement under its three roles of: (1) service provider, (2) facilitator of market and regulatory evolution, and (3) overseer. 2.1. Providing payment services  As a service provider, the Eurosystem has put priority on enhancing the efficiency and safety of its TARGET system, with the launch of the TARGET2 project. TARGET2 will provide harmonised services and prices, efficient liquidity management and settlement mechanisms, while setting a new benchmark in terms of business continuity. The Eurosystems objective is to promote the use of real-time settlement services in central bank money, given their expected social benefits in terms of risk reduction in the payment process. In the field of retail payments, the degree of the Eurosystem’s central banks’ operational involvement varies across countries. Most central banks provide payment services to public institutions. Some central banks also offer processing facilities to commercial banks by participating in private retail payment systems and/or operating an own retail payment system. The completion of the SEPA project calls for a specific effort of those central banks that are significantly involved in retail payment operations.

Eva Srejber: How do we create stability in financial markets? Speech by Ms Eva Srejber, Second Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Riksbank, at a public hearing in the Riksdag: “Economic policy in a global economy - is the Tobin tax an obstacle or an opportunity?”, Stockholm, 3 April 2001. *  *  *  Thank you for the invitation to come here. This is a subject that I am often asked to discuss in various parts of the country. There is considerable interest in the challenges facing economic policy in an increasingly internationalised world. The credit market is central to a country's economy. Financial institutes are needed to mediate payments for households and companies, such as wage and invoice payments. In addition, the institutes mediate capital from savers to borrowers. This can comprise companies making investments or households buying their own home. All in all, a well functioning financial sector is a necessary condition for a country to achieve prosperity. However, mediating payments and lending money also involves taking risks. The international foreign exchange market in turn links together the national credit and payment markets, so that payments in one currency can be exchanged for payments in another currency. This enables trade, investment and foreign aid between countries. International capital flows enable savings in countries with a capital surplus, after exchange on the foreign exchange market, to finance investments in countries with a capital deficit.
Figure 1 World growth (annualized q-o-q change, percent) 10  10  5  5  0  0  -5  -5  -10  -10  -15  -15  -20  -20  07  II  III  Chile  U.S.A.  IV  08  Eurozone  II Japan  III  IV  09  Trading partners  Sources: Central Bank of Chile based on sample of investment banks, Consensus Forecasts, Bloomberg and IMF. In recent weeks, news from abroad has ceased to be mostly negative. Various agents’ projections for world growth have stabilized, and some have even risen marginally (table 1). Still, this is not enough to be seen as a significant external boost for our economy, because world growth remains at low rates. BIS Review 93/2009  1  Table 1 World growth (*) (annual growth, percentage)  World World at market ER US Euro Area Japan China Rest of Asia Latin America Commodity exporters Trade partners  Prom. 90-99  Prom.

Thirdly, most countries have implemented extensive fiscal policy stimulus measures. The OECD estimates that these measures have accounted for just over half of the reduction in general government net lending in the OECD area. In the United States, where stimulus packages have been introduced on an unprecedented scale, the OECD estimates that these active stimulus measures have accounted for as much as three-quarters of the deterioration in public-sector finances. In the euro area it is instead the automatic effects on tax revenues and cyclical expenditures that have predominated. Consequences of the deterioration Extensive historical studies of financial crises show that they are often followed by a severe weakening of public finances and prolonged periods of subdued GDP growth. 2 The deterioration in public finances that we have seen during this crisis will keep GDP growth and inflation down in many regions for some time to come, as the weak finances will enforce fiscal policy contraction and/or may lead to higher interest rates. A tighter fiscal policy is inevitable to make public finances stable in the long term. Restoring the deficit to the level that prevailed prior to the crisis, and one might ask whether this will be sufficient, is not simply a case of replacing the fiscal policy stimulus measures implemented during the crisis with corresponding tightening measures after the crisis. In addition, expenditures have to be replaced as potential GDP and thus potential tax revenue have fallen due to the crisis.
Therefore, in this exercise, we have simply selected coefficients that achieve what we believe to be an appropriate level of sensitivity between capital adequacy regulation and the output gap and the bank lending gap. 12  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Unfortunately, as I have discussed, it is clear that we do not have the same understanding of the more technical aspects of how macroprudential instruments should be used and of how they interact with other policy areas. I have highlighted a couple of high-level approaches to modelling the interaction of macroprudential policy and monetary policy, but these are not yet sufficiently developed to produce anything that is practically applicable. So there are likely to be a number of open questions / uncertainties when macroprudential policy becomes active. Fortunately that is nothing new for policy-makers. That said, this is an exciting and, I believe, potentially very fruitful area for research in the future. And it is encouraging to see prominent researchers becoming increasingly interested in issues related to financial stability. I am therefore hopeful that there will be mutually beneficial cooperation between academics and policy-makers in the future. BIS central bankers’ speeches  13

I will start with a brief recap of the Asian crisis, drawing some lessons and comparison with the European debt crisis. I would briefly discuss the economic setting and policy reform that brought Asia out of the crisis and end with some thoughts and reflections on the post crisis recovery period. Ladies and gentlemen, As a well-known American author, Mark Twain puts it, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme”. So despite the differences in the context and details of both the Asian and the European crises, the underlying root causes are not dissimilar. First, both crises, like most others in the recent economic history of the world, are often associated with the mispricing of risk and distorted incentives structures. In the case of Asia, our problem was both a currency and a banking crisis. We had to abandon the pegged exchange rate system which led to massive devaluation of our currency. With the corporate sector largely overleveraged and loaded with foreign debt, the sharp depreciation of the currency technically bankrupted firms overnight. Banks NPLs shot up and brought on with it the banking crisis. It was clear that the region’s “original sin” was well beyond redemption. We borrowed in foreign currencies and used it to finance projects that did not generate foreign exchange earning to service such a debt. In the case of Thailand, the amount of private external debt was over three times the level of international reserves.
A detailed review of the collection shows that both Spanish and foreign historians have collaborated in the project, covering an agenda that includes modern and contemporary issues. Although the collection is open to all kinds of quality research, monetary and financial topics predominate. Now, I would like to say a few words about our library, which has played a key role in our economic history studies and research. It was set up in 1931, and from the first half of the 1970s professor Rojo promoted the formation of a highly specialised library, stepping up the acquisition of new collections and the modernisation and expansion of its services. 3/4  The most prized section of the library, the so called Fondo de Especial Valor, comprising more than 16.000 pieces from the 14th to the 19th centuries (now in the process of digitalization), is a testimony to economic thought and practice in Spain and Europe; its content encompasses 16th century merchants’ instructions, writings of the School of Salamanca, the publications of the 17th century arbitristas and the works of 18th century Enlightenment thinkers. The collection of royal decrees and proclamations (around 4,000 documents, including the 1745-1796 compilation ordered by the Count of Campomanes), dealing mainly with fiscal, mercantile and monetary matters, enriches the library’s scope with the perspective of legislation topics. The fact that these collections are complemented by others, such as the Goldsmiths’-Kress Library of Economic Literature and the King’s College collection of the papers of J.M.

Bank of England  Page 16  Chart 9: “Excess deposits” have fallen only slightly but households’ overall financial wealth is down sharply  125 120  Household financial wealth relative to disposable income 410 Household M4 (LHS) 390  115  370  110 350 105 100  330  Net financial wealth (RHS)  95  310  90 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022  290  2022 Q3 data points are estimated. Sources: Bank of England, ONS and Bank calculations. But to varying degrees these cushions have since been eroded. The saving rate has fallen sharply and is now around a percentage point below its long-term, pre-Covid average. Most of the excess deposits remain, it seems. But one might ask why they do – why, at a time of significant reported pressure on household finances (when consumer confidence has been setting new record lows), more of them haven’t been spent – and therefore whether it’s realistic to think that they will be in the near future. As many have pointed out, these deposits are probably skewed towards the upper end of the income distribution (and therefore away from those for whom rises in energy prices are the most burdensome). It’s also worth recognising that other household assets have been weakening sharply this year. Despite higher deposits, households’ overall net financial wealth is quite a bit lower than before the pandemic.
We have gone well beyond what people thought possible and we will do whatever is necessary to deliver on our price stability mandate - no more and no less. Thank you for your attention

In the euro area, core inflation has been above 2% since October 2021 and above 4% since July 2022. Another feature of the inflation shock we are facing is its persistence. This may affect inflation expectations and lead to a de-anchoring. Current inflation levels require that we clearly show our monetary determination. We know, though, that the significant changes in monetary policy we have taken already will take at least a year or more to affect the economy. But it is our clear forecast and will to bring inflation back towards 2% within the next two to three years. I am not convinced either by the trade-off between fighting excessive inflation and avoiding a recession. There are at least three clear reasons to prioritize price stability (i) legal: our mandate is focused on price stability (ii) political: our fellow citizens care first and foremost about inflation and its impact on purchasing power (iii) economic: entrenched inflation would mean less confidence, higher risk premia, and greater price distortion, and hence less long term growth. Furthermore, the euro area economic starting point remains relatively favourable this year. The labour market is very strong with many vacancies and the unemployment rate stood at a historical low of 6.6% in July and August. Annual GDP growth in 2022 is expected to reach 3.0% according to the latest IMF projection – almost twice the US growth -, although a slowdown is forecast in the second half of the year after the robust growth of the first semester.
Not only are bond term premia depressed due to quantitative easing both here and abroad, but the low inflation environment is also likely a contributing factor. If investors perceive that the risk of significantly higher inflation has fallen over time as inflation has persistently undershot 2 percent, they should demand lower bond term premia as compensation for inflation risk. Finally, while inverted yield curves have typically preceded recessions, I am unaware of any causal element in that relationship. For example, I don’t believe that banks become unwilling to lend when the yield curve inverts and that this tightening of credit availability “causes” a recession. I think it is noteworthy that in the current environment, higher short-term interest rates tend to raise—not lower—the banking industry’s profitability. This is demonstrated, in part, by the strong performance of bank stocks in 2017 as the Federal Reserve raised short-term interest rates. As I see it, the Treasury yield curve becomes inverted when investors believe that short-term real interest rates are high and monetary policy is tight. Investors anticipate that such a regime will slow the economy and be followed by a reduction in short-term rates. Because these expectations turn out to be validated eventually, we observe that inverted yield curves precede and signal recessions. But, we are not in this situation currently. Investors expect short-term interest rates to rise, not drop, and to remain higher in the future than they are now. Despite the flatter yield curve, the consensus view continues to be that monetary policy is not yet tight.

However, one welcome outcome from this experience is the consolidation of the banking sector, which is much more aware of the constant need for prudent risk management and good corporate governance. From our end, the Bank has also undergone a significant re-orientation of its supervisory techniques and approaches. These are now largely in line with international best practices and also constitute a platform on which we shall meet the future challenges facing the financial sector in the 21st Century. Ladies and Gentlemen, from time to time developments are associated with setbacks and the Bank of Zambia is no exception. Here I am referring to the issue of polymer notes which were introduced sometime last year. The introduction of these notes as we have explained at several fora was meant and is still meant to have cleaner notes in the economy and more importantly to have notes with a relatively longer life-span before replacement, than the traditional paper notes. With a relatively longer life-span, the nation would save resources because the frequency of replacing the notes would greatly be reduced. However, due to technical problems experienced by the printer, most of the notes have been fading faster than expected. May I re-assure the nation that we have continued to work with the printer and a solution is being worked out in the quickest time possible. Needless to say that this problem has posed a big challenge for all of us at the Bank of Zambia.
Nonetheless, depending on the outcome of events, there could be contractive effects on emerging economies. Scenarios such as this back slacker monetary policies. On the other hand, the domestic scenario poses challenges in the opposite direction, inasmuch as the behavior of domestic demand may bring inflationary risks. Today, prudent monetary policy management has to be prepared for all kinds of scenarios and to adapt the amount of stimulus applied according to needs established on a case by case basis. In fact, in our latest Monetary Policy Meeting we decided to maintain the Monetary Policy Rate at 5% for a second month in a row. The greater caution in policy decisions that these events pose has been reflected in the fact that private expectations currently incorporate a higher probability of MPR to remain at 5% until the end of the year. With the Board we have conditioned future changes in MPR to the implications that domestic and external macroeconomic conditions may have on inflation perspectives. The Board has also reaffirmed its commitment to conduct monetary policy in a flexible fashion, so that projected inflation remains at 3% within the policy horizon. Without a doubt, the best contribution that central bankers can make to prosperity in our countries is to conduct monetary policy aimed at maintaining low and stable inflation. This is perfectly clear for us at the Central Bank of Chile. As emerging economies we are long-time victims of inflation and are well aware of its devastating effects on our more vulnerable population.

As the Chilean peso, emerging market currencies have generally appreciated, and since the beginning of the year have been accompanied by a return of capital inflows to these economies. The continuation of this phenomenon brings back some issues, as the abundance of capital may be difficult to accommodate in a small economy like Chile. Such episodes are not new to us and bring with them discussions as to the convenience of exchange market intervention, which some Latin American economies have undertaken in recent weeks. We are convinced that a floating exchange rate regime is the most appropriate one for Chile, as it facilitates macroeconomic and external accounts adjustments. Nonetheless, there are circumstances that may lead to Central Bank intervention in the exchange market, either to sustain an adequate level of foreign reserve assets, or to respond to overreactions in the exchange rate that are not aligned with medium-and long-term fundamentals. Associated to this type of intervention, there are costs. A first one is that it may create confusion as to the monetary authorities´ objective: inflation or the exchange rate. In our case, we have dealt with this by means of transparent mechanisms whereby we anticipate the amounts and terms of interventions, and by maintaining exchange rate flexibility. A specific exchange rate level has never been a Central Bank objective; at most these interventions are conducted to prevent excess volatility or temporary diversions from its long-term equilibrium. It has always been made clear that the Central Bank of Chile pursues a price stability target.