samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Provided that the flood situation starts to improve by early December, we should see Thailand staging a respectable comeback on the back of domestic demand revival. We expect private consumption to rebound as early as the first quarter next year, and investment to regain its firm footing by the second. This will be made possible by pushes from reconstruction spending and fiscal stimulus, both through the government’s direct spending and additional measures. And in particular, higher investment on developments of flood warning and prevention systems is also urgently needed, both to prepare Thailand for future flood incidents and to restore foreign investors’ confidence. I would like to stress again that Thailand’s fate will depend upon her success in reviving domestic demand, given that the problems in the U.S. and the Eurozone are still far from resolved and are expected to last well into the next year and beyond. Early resolution of the  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  U.S. and the Eurozone crises will rejuvenate the now-sluggish global growth momentum, and this will benefit Thailand by allowing her exports to work with domestic demand in driving growth. But if the opposite happens, then it is likely that another global economic slowdown, even a global recession, is coming underway. Ladies and Gentlemen, This leads us to our second focus today on developments in the U.S. and the Eurozone, along with their implications on Thailand’s outlook going forward. Serious structural concerns continue to threaten the health of the U.S. economy.

Central Bank of Chile’s Twenty-first Annual Conference “Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: Transmission Mechanisms and Policy Implications” Opening remarks by Governor Mario Marcel  Good morning and welcome to the Twenty-first Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile. It is a pleasure to host this event that every year gives us an opportunity to reflect and discuss about issues that have direct implications on our work as central bankers from a broader perspective. I am looking forward to active discussions through the rest of the week on this year’s conference theme: monetary policy and financial stability. Ten years have passed since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and we are still dealing with its economic consequences. But we have learnt a lot, and a decade of hindsight about the causes and long-lasting effects has led us to rethink the way we conduct monetary policy, how to ensure financial stability, and how these two elements are, or should be, interconnected. One of the most important policy lessons from the crisis concerns the relevance of actively seeking financial stability in a context of ever-increasing financial complexity. And central banks worldwide have been increasingly involved in assuring this, since it has become clear that financial stability is a pre-condition for price stability.
This is not entirely correct because any country with its own currency must hold foreign exchange reserves, and it is easy to demonstrate that the reserves must be larger under a pegged exchange rate than under a floating exchange rate. I could continue to beat the drum on simplifications and magic solutions. The main thing, though, is that selecting a currency and monetary policy regime is not as simple as it is sometimes made out to be. And it is not merely a question of which policy is best if implemented perfectly – because implementation is never perfect. Mistakes are made, and then it matters how robust the systems are in the face of such mistakes, and what scope there is to correct them without overstraining the systems. 2  Monetary Bulletin 2016/4, p. 12-14. http://www.cb.is/publications/publications/publication/2016/11/16/Monetary-Bulletin-2016-4/  10  Conclusion In view of the discussion of monetary policy that has taken place recently – not least during the run-up to the Parliamentary elections – I consider it necessary to engage in continued thoughtful discussion of what type of monetary policy framework will be most appropriate once the capital controls have been lifted, as we are not members of a currency union. Many attempts have been made in this regard, and the Central Bank has published a range of material on the topic.

Conversely, if increased competition and deregulation increase reputational concerns, this increases the propensity of the system to periodic credit booms and subsequent busts. 2.3  Dynamics  This model can generate credit cycles which amplify cycles in the real economy relative to a world without credit cycle frictions. 9 Without frictions, bad loans are liquidated immediately, allowing new assets to be originated next period to unencumbered borrowers. By contrast,  8  These expectation effects are necessarily intra-temporal in our model. The actual operation of macroprudential policy may well have effects through inter-temporal expectations as well. See Section 5 below. 9  The property that global games generate endogenous cycles in dynamic settings has been analysed in, inter alia, Steiner (2006) and Giannitsarou and Toxvaerd (2007). 6  BIS Review 168/2010  extending credit to bad risks eventually results in balance sheet impairment for both borrowers and lenders. We perform a simple simulation to illustrate these dynamics. Suppose the macro state moves stochastically around its trend as a result of a sequence of iid productivity shocks. The macro state is mean-reverting as long as banks set tight policies when they realise low asset returns. This occurs when reputational effects are switched off  . Next suppose reputational concerns are introduced, leading banks to risk up to signal high ability. Because of strategic complementarities, banks do this whenever . This leads to subsequent impairment of the borrowing sector.
The euro recovered, on a trade-weighted basis, after having fallen to an eightyear low in July. It appreciated against the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the pound sterling and – to a lesser extent – the Swiss franc. In the US, the Federal Reserve embarked on a third round of asset purchases, intervening in the market to buy agency mortgage-backed securities. Equity markets initially registered distinct gains. The S&P 500 stock market index, for example, climbed 10% between mid-June and mid-September. This was followed, however, by a consolidation phase from October onwards, which reflected the high levels of uncertainty persisting in the market environment. This uncertainty is largely connected to the emergency policy measures in Greece and Spain, the deterioration in the global economic outlook, and the looming ‘fiscal cliff’ in the US. Government bonds perceived as safe benefited from this, with yields persisting at extremely low levels. Against this backdrop, it is notable that the volatility of risky investments has continued to decline. The VIX index, which measures implied volatility on the US stock market, and which is based on option prices, is virtually back down to the level last seen prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007. A very similar picture emerges from implied volatilities on the foreign currency and bond markets. The low volatilities are due to comparatively low demand for options to hedge price movements.

Chart 3 shows the share of HICP items experiencing price falls, year on year. In terms of expenditure weights, around 20% of the HICP items reported negative annual growth rates in May 2009. This share has increased recently but it remains not so distant from the average of the last decade. Excluding food and energy, the share was lower at 14%. The share of items with negative inflation is subject to significant volatility, partly owing to seasonal factors, such as sales in the shops at certain times of the year. This makes the measure more difficult to interpret. However, it is possible to take account of these factors by comparing the proportion of items with negative inflation rates in any given month with the historical average for the same month. As you can see from chart 4, the share of items with negative inflation rates (excluding energy and food) in the year to May was only a touch higher than the historical average, further confirming that there have been no widespread price cuts so far. Let me dwell on this point. Chart 5 shows the distribution of the annual rates of change in all the items included in the HICP basket, weighted by their expenditure share. This also suggests that price cuts are not generalised, but are concentrated on few items. In May this year the bulk of the distribution – around two- thirds – showed inflation rates above 1%, with some items (heat energy) recording an inflation rate above 10%.
The structural adjustment process should start, in any case, not later than the economic recovery and the consolidation efforts should be stepped up in 2011. Structural consolidation efforts will need to exceed significantly the benchmark of 0.5% of GDP per annum set in the Stability and Growth Pact. In countries with high deficits and/or debt ratios, the annual structural adjustment should reach at least 1% of GDP. The focus of the structural measures should lie on the expenditure side, as in most euro area countries tax and social contribution rates are already high. Turning to structural policies, it is likely that the financial crisis will affect the growth potential in the euro area. This outlook reinforces the need to strengthen reform efforts to support sustainable growth and employment in the euro area. It requires, in particular, appropriate wage-setting, sufficient labour market flexibility and effective incentives to work. BIS Review 102/2009  3  At the same time, policies that enhance competition and innovation are urgently needed to speed up restructuring and investment and to create the business opportunities and productivity gains needed to ensure a sustained recovery. In this respect, an appropriate restructuring and consolidation of the banking sector plays an important role. Sound balance sheets, solid risk management, and transparent and robust business models are key to strengthening the financial soundness of banks and their resilience to shocks, thereby laying the foundations for sustainable economic growth and financial stability. We are now at your disposal for questions. 4  BIS Review 102/2009

Most importantly of all, it confirmed that the Bank had sufficient lending capacity in place to meet an extremely severe liquidity shock,  11  See for instance: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2017/speech960.pdf. 10  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/speeches  10  which allowed the Bank to make reassuring statements about its readiness to act. In the event no such shock occurred. But the Bank’s preparedness played a part in that. Just as we expect firms to be ready for the unexpected, we hold ourselves to the same standard. Indeed this exercise drove home an important broader point: for central banks to be effective watchmen (all the time) and firefighters (occasionally), we first need private sector risk managers to have drawn up (and shared with us) their own fire precaution and exit route plans. Without a good understanding of firms’ potential liquidity needs under stress, their alternative sources of liquidity and available collateral we cannot fully evaluate our own capacity to lend. This sort of liquidity planning under stress is I know an increasing focus for both banks and non-banks alike, and is something we would actively encourage. (iii)  Calibrating the Bank’s own capital  I mentioned at the start of my remarks that central bank capital is different to that of a commercial bank: central banks need to meet a ‘policy solvency’ rather than a ‘financial solvency’ test.
Among these, I can mention the amendments to the Constitutional Organic Law (LOC) of the Central Bank to perfect the regulations applicable to payment systems established in the country and recognize payment infrastructures in foreign jurisdictions involving local financial institutions. Other points include raising the limits for foreign investment of insurance companies, making it easier for international custodians to settle in Chile, expanding investment alternatives for the Pension Funds and the Unemployment Fund, as well as moving towards a risk-based model of supervision for such funds. About financial inclusion, one noteworthy regulatory change has been the Law that allows nonbank entities to issue prepaid cards (Law No. 20,950—2016), aimed at promoting the development and massification of electronic payments and increasing financial inclusion, along with boosting competition in means of payment. Its implementation requires that the Bank (and the SBIF) issue the rules that will regulate this activity. These, besides regulating the implementation of prepaid cards, will incorporate another series of normative improvements on the payment system in general, which should contribute to favor the development, competition and incorporation of new technologies in the field. A final change worth mentioning is the Law that will create the Financial Market Committee, which will bring about a very significant change in our country’s financial regulation and supervision structure, and whose implementation poses a major challenge for public politics. Despite these significant advances, big challenges await us.

[INF*RES*AS]  MONETARY POLICY REPORT FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT PRESENTATION BEFORE THE FINANCE COMMITTEE OF THE HONORABLE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC∗  Mario Marcel Governor Central Bank of Chile 5 June 2017  You may browse the Monetary Policy Report of June 2017 and the Financial Stability Report of the first half of 2017 at http://www.bcentral.cl  ∗  Introduction Mr. President of the Senate’s Finance Committee, senator Carlos Montes, senators members of this Commission, ladies, gentlemen. Thank you for your invitation to present the vision of the Board of the Central Bank of Chile on the recent macroeconomic and financial developments, projections and implications for monetary and financial policy. This vision is detailed in our June Monetary Policy Report and our Financial Stability Report for the first half of this year. In the past few months, the macroeconomic scenario has evolved in line with forecasts depicted in our March Monetary Policy Report. On one hand, inflation has brought no surprises, consistently with an exchange rate that has changed little since mid-2016 and gradually expanding capacity gaps. First-quarter activity growth was virtually flat in annual terms, largely affected by downtime in Escondida mining company, in a context of still very weak performance of sectors linked to construction investment. In contrast, consumption shows a more stable outlook, driven by significant growth in demand for durable goods, which has offset the poorer performance of the other components.
These developments were subsequently expanded with the introduction of Islamic windows by conventional banking institutions where Islamic products and services could be offered by these banking institutions. At the same time, adequate firewalls have been instituted to ensure absolute separation of banking operations to avoid co-mingling between the Islamic and conventional funds so as to ensure the integrity of the Islamic banking operations. 1/5  More recently, this structure has been strengthened. Conventional banking institutions that have achieved a critical mass in their Islamic finance operations have the option to transform their operations into a dedicated Islamic subsidiary. Within this framework, Islamic finance in Malaysia has proven to be resilient and able to function effectively and efficiently alongside the conventional financial system. The ability of the Islamic banking institutions to arrange and offer products with attractive and innovative features at competitive prices has appealed to both Muslim and non-Muslim customers, reflecting the competitiveness of Islamic finance as a form of financial intermediation. Since 2000, the domestic Islamic banking industry has been growing at an average of 18% per annum in terms of assets, while growth in the takaful industry was at an average of 28% per annum, with an increasingly more important role in supporting the growth and development process of the country. Attention has also been given to develop both the Malaysian Islamic money market and capital market. A wide range of instruments has been developed to facilitate the effective management of liquidity and funding by the Islamic financial institutions.

This has facilitated the smooth flow of funds in the Islamic financial system. With the development of the bond market in Malaysia which now accounts for 81% of GDP, the Islamic private debt securities account for about 44% of the total outstanding amount of private debt securities in the market, while the monthly traded volume of the Islamic money market is now about RM30 to RM40 billion. The money market also effectively serves as a channel for the conduct of liquidity operations by Bank Negara Malaysia as part of its monetary policy. The rapid expansion of the Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia is also supported by a conducive legal and Shariah framework. In terms of the legal infrastructure, the Islamic Banking Act 1983 and Takaful Act 1984 governs the conduct of the Islamic banking institutions and takaful operators respectively. There is also the Government Funding Act which governs the issuance of government Islamic instruments. A dedicated High Court judge has also been assigned to preside over cases relating to Islamic banking and finance. An arbitration centre is also available to deal with disputes. The Central Bank Act has also been amended to provide for the establishment of a Shariah Advisory Council at the Central Bank as the sole authority and reference on all Shariah matters. The treatment of tax neutrality has also been accorded to Islamic financial transactions.
For them, one of the major advantages of joining a monetary union is stronger economic growth thanks to lower transaction costs and reduced exchange rate risk. Moreover, for countries that have historically experienced high and volatile inflation and thus high interest rates, adopting the euro brings a fall in nominal and real interest rates, thereby reducing government and private debt burdens. Given these positive effects, why has Switzerland not embraced the euro or, at least, pegged the franc to the euro? To my mind, there are four main reasons for this. •  The first is that retaining our own currency, within the framework of flexible exchange rates, gives us the freedom to choose the level of domestic inflation. •  Secondly, monetary independence allows a better reaction to country-specific shocks. •  Thirdly, monetary integration would lead to higher interest rates in our capital market. •  And finally, any tentative move to peg the franc to the euro, as long as Switzerland is not at least in the process of becoming an EU member, would destabilise rather than stabilise our currency. Let me review these points in detail. 2  BIS Review 46/2006  Choice of monetary policy goal The European Central Bank's main task is to guarantee price stability in the euro area. The ECB achieves this by, in its own wording, "aim[ing] at maintaining [consumer price] inflation below, but close to, 2% over the medium term". The National Bank Act defines the SNB's main task, too, as the achievement of price stability.

15 Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Board issues joint statement encouraging depository institutions to  explore innovative approaches to meet BSA/anti-money laundering compliance obligations and to further strengthen the financial system against illicit financial activity, December 3, 2018. 16 Rob Gruppetta, AI and Financial Crime: Silver Bullet or Red Herring?, November 11, 2018. 6/6  BIS central bankers' speeches
First, one highly favourable aspect of recent developments in the world economy, which I mentioned in the presentation of last year’s Annual Report, is the resilience generally shown by the financial system in the industrialised countries, which has limited the adverse effects of turbulence on the real sector. This resilience continued in 2002, although there are perceptible signs that the succession of shocks and the obstinacy of certain disequilibria might have eroded the solidity of certain segments of the global financial system in some countries. There would have been no such resilience were it not for the improvements in risk management introduced in recent years and for the margin for manoeuvre built up during the boom years. Second, the response by general government, with its three-pronged executive (including here the various supervisors), legislative and legal powers, has proven prompt and effective and has allowed many of the shortcomings in market fundamentals highlighted by the crisis to be corrected. Initiatives such as the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act in the United States; the amendments made in Spain by the Financial System Reform Measures Act; the boost to international accounting convergence between Europe and the United States, based on putting principles ahead of detailed rules; the reinforced supervision of auditors; the fresh momentum to improving corporate governance, etc., have all made for some progress in improving confidence. Against this uncertain backdrop, Spanish deposits institutions likewise offered proof of resilience, along with greater strength in areas such as accounting, own funds and provisions.

Nevertheless, uncertainty over the European economy’s capacity promptly to embark on a path of sustained recovery has not been sufficiently dispelled. In particular, the hesitancy of the US economy, the deterioration in its current-account and budget deficits, continuing imponderables in respect of the international political situation and the current volatility of financial and foreign currency markets may affect the European economy’s growth prospects, given its dependence on the external environment. Along with these, there are other factors more specific to the area (such as the sluggishness of business investment, doubts about the scale of the consequences of the stock market crisis for  BIS Review 31/2003  3  demand, and the persistent weakness of some of the major Member State economies) that might delay the expected acceleration in activity in the euro area which, in all likelihood, will grow in 2003 below potential for the third year running. On the institutional front, highly significant events for the process of European construction have taken place in 2003. The signing of the Treaty of Accession to the EU by ten new countries, which took place in April and will be effective in May 2004, marks the start of a phase of far-reaching changes which will pose sizable challenges for the competitiveness and cohesion of the area and for the strengthening of the effectiveness of the European institutions.