samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
The central bank of the Netherlands – De Nederlandsche Bank – has developed new approaches for the supervision of corporate culture and decisionmaking. 21  The MPG is working with the BIS FXWG to develop market-based adherence mechanisms for the FX Global Code. 6  BIS central bankers’ speeches  of market participants as we develop best practices. This is to ensure that the practices reflect all relevant segments of the market and to promote buy-in and thus foster their adoption. As I mentioned before, both the TMPG and the FXC are expanding their membership such that a range of market participants feels vested in their missions. In addition, we engage with other sectors of the marketplace, such as trade associations and infrastructure providers, to educate them about best practices that have been developed and facilitate their potential adoption of aspects of them. When central banks operate in the markets ourselves, we expect the best practices to apply. This has two aspects. First, we align our own practices to the best practices, except where it would inhibit our policy functions. As a corollary, we expect those institutions that choose to become our counterparties to comply with the best practices as well, so that when we transact, we do so with the confidence that our counterparties are adhering to these standards of behavior. Finally, we keep supervisors, regulators and other official sector bodies, inside and outside our four walls, abreast of the work of our committees.

However, ICAP, the FFO publisher, did not consider it to be a financial benchmark and did not calculate it as such, which raised questions about the FFO’s suitability to be used in such a manner. The TMPG identified this issue during its work on financial benchmarks and encouraged industry groups to examine possible alternatives to the FFO. This led the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and the Risk Management Association (RMA) to jointly recommend that market participants use the overnight bank funding rate, a rate more consistent with international best practice recommendations. See SIFMA’s and RMA’s joint announcement here and the TMPG’s statement of support here. 17  The following year the TMPG was established and issued its first set of best practices, with several recommendations to improve the clearing and settlement processes to alleviate fails. See here. BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  $ billion per day. About a year following implementation of the fails charge, fails declined to only $ billion per day. 18 Best practices can serve as a tool by which control functions, such as compliance, audit, and legal, can test their firms’ procedures and activities against affirmed standards of best practice. The standards can act as a measuring stick that, along with applicable law, regulations, and supervisory expectations, encourages continuous improvement of front, middle, and back offices. For example, the TMPG has a series of practices directed at managing large positions with care.
To close, let me thank the Swiss-American Chamber of Commerce for providing me with the opportunity to honor this extraordinary Genevan-American. Albert Gallatin would find much to enjoy in present day Geneva. He would be particularly pleased to discover an international city with excellent Swiss-American relations. Thank you for your attention. Fig 1. 33  33  8  Graph borrowed from Masson and Mussa, op.cit. BIS Review 106/2008  Gross debt as a percentage of GDP, OECD, 1970-2007. Source: IMF  80.0 70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0  19 70 19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06  0.0  BIS Review 106/2008  9

At the outset of the financial crisis, the private balance, which was negative, swung sharply into surplus, and this was largely accommodated by a decrease in the public balance–in other words, an increase in the government deficit. Recently, 3 this accounting identity looked roughly like this: 6.5% of GDP private balance + (–9.5% of GDP) public balance = –3% of GDP current account balance Realistically, the public balance 4 needs to be reduced to about –3 percent of GDP over the next five years or so for the ratio of federal debt held by the public-to-GDP to stabilize around 75 percent to 80 percent of GDP. One might reasonably do more, but this just strikes me as the minimum adjustment that would be prudent and sustainable. This requires a large change from where we are today. For the accounting identity to continue to hold, which it must, there needs to be sizable shifts in the private balance and/or the current account balance. This is not a policy choice – it is basic math – but policy choices can help ensure that the adjustments take place in a way that is supportive of economic activity. The private balance can be further divided into two pieces–the household balance and the business balance. Currently, for the United States, the household balance is about 2.5 percent of GDP and the business balance is about 4 percent of GDP.
The world has entered an era of far greater volatility in the so-called new normal environment. I want to stress that we must not fear volatility, but always be mindful and well-prepared for any unforeseen events. In the short run, the Bank of Thailand stays firmly committed to maintaining our robust buffers. To build market resilience in the longer run, we embrace on financial market developments, as deep and liquid markets would better absorb large swings in capital flows. We continue to encourage the use of risk management instruments, particularly foreign currency hedging, which would mitigate the negative repercussions of financial market volatility on businesses. We also plan to further relax capital flow regulations to allow more balanced flows in and out of the country which would enhance stability against speculative flows. Ladies and gentlemen, Let me now turn to the Bank of Thailand’s assessment of the Thai economy in 2016. The Thai economy shows signs of gradual, though uneven, recovery. Based on our  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  assessment in December of last year, GDP in 2016 was projected to grow at 3.5 percent which is higher than the 2.8 percent growth last year. I must admit, however, that since last December, the global economy has continued to face stronger headwinds ranging from increased financial market volatility, slowing emerging market growth, continued oil price slumps, and diverging monetary policy paths.

In circumstances of permanent changes in the infrastructure of financial markets, the supervisory role of the central bank regarding the payment system contributes to the maintenance of financial stability. Additionally, the systems for large payments contribute to the coordination of the direct participants in the national payment system, such as the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance, banks and clearing institutions, ensuring finality of all payments in the national economy. In this way, the National Bank maintains the vitality of the payment systems as one of the most important components of the financial and economic infrastructure. In terms of achieving the development and catalyst role, allow me to affirm the strategic approach of the National Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the Banking Association in the development of the national payment system of the Republic of Macedonia through the adoption and implementation of the Strategy for the development of the payment system of the Republic of Macedonia for the period 2013–2017. Our shared vision for the development of the payment systems of the Republic of Macedonia until 2017 is the modernization and improvement of the operations of payment systems through the application of high-tech achievements and gradual harmonization with the standards and rules of operation of payment systems in the European Union. In this way, we expect to increase the reliability and efficiency of payments and the acceptance of non-cash payment instruments, simultaneously ensuring gradual compliance with the requirements for integration into the Single European Payment Area – SEPA.
Therefore, in all of these instances, specific arrangements had to be devised in order to provide for the representation of the Eurosystem and the ECB. We have now reached formal and informal agreements with the IMF, the OECD and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as well as in the G7 and G10 context. Let me briefly comment on two of these arrangements: •  In December last year, the ECB was granted permanent observer status in the IMF. This was a particularly important step. The IMF, as the cornerstone of the international monetary system, plays a key role in the process of multilateral surveillance of economic policies. The ECB Observer attends all meetings of the IMF Executive Board that are of relevance to the Eurosystem, such as discussions on multilateral surveillance or the Fund’s surveillance of euro area monetary and exchange rate policies. As far as the Interim Committee of the IMF is concerned, which has recently been given the new name of the “International Monetary  5  BIS Review 116/1999  and Financial Committee”, the President of the ECB participates in its meetings as an observer. •  Regarding meetings of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, it was agreed that the President of the ECB will be the sole representative of the Eurosystem in discussions on multilateral surveillance and exchange rate issues. This part of the G7 meetings will also be attended by the Presidency of the Euro-11 Group.

2/3  Financial services policy I would now like to say a few words about the European Commission’s Green Paper on Financial Services Policy for the period 2005-2010. As already expressed in its contribution to the Commission’s public consultation, the Eurosystem supports the key policy orientation of the Green Paper, which highlights the need to focus on the consolidation and consistent implementation of the legislative framework for financial services. To this end, the potential of the Lamfalussy framework should be exploited to the extent possible. As regards the area of financial regulation, the Eurosystem concurs with the emphasis placed by the Commission on the objective of rationalising the existing framework. The proposal for “better regulation” based on open, transparent and evidence-based policy-making is fully supported. The Eurosystem also supports the suggestion by the Commission to launch a feasibility study on the development of one body of consistent law. We regard such a “financial services rulebook” as a tool to rationalise the existing set of EU rules for financial institutions and, in particular, to reduce complexity and legal uncertainties and to eliminate possible inconsistencies. Still in the context of financial regulation, the completion of the current FSAP legislative work is also important. In that connection, I would like to mention in particular the Capital Requirements Directive, on which, I am informed, work is proceeding smoothly. Also, I would like to make a specific reference to the issue of securities clearing and settlement, to which the Eurosystem attributes great importance.
Our instrument independence – that we ourselves have been able to choose among our tools to attain our objectives and to use them quickly – has been essential in alleviating the effects of the crisis and contributing to good economic developments. I personally think that perhaps the most obvious monetary policy conclusion from the coronavirus crisis is that the repo rate is far from adequate in maintaining our price stability objective. Although I am discussing monetary policy today, I would also like to emphasise that the fiscal policy measures in Sweden and abroad have been a decisive factor in the special type of crisis in which we have found ourselves – some sectors have needed extensive support. 28 For a description of how the Riksbank’s measures have worked during the crisis, see for instance Sveriges Riksbank (2020b). 10 [20]  Proposal for new Sveriges Riksbank Act too limiting with regard to monetary policy toolbox We at the Riksbank consider the proposal for the new Sveriges Riksbank Act presented in December 2019 to be good in several aspects. But when it comes to the monetary policy toolbox, we think the proposal is far too restrictive. I do not believe that it sufficiently reflects the lessons I have just described. 29 There is thus a risk that it will become more difficult, not just for us, but also for future Executive Boards to make a good contribution to socio-economic developments.

But in Sweden, the political majority chose in 2013 to give responsibility for macroprudential policy to Finansinspektionen, which meant that the Riksbank’s mandate remained unchanged. After the financial crisis a discussion arose regarding central bank independence and what tasks they are best suited for. 22 Had the central banks been overloaded with new tasks in some cases, causing a threat to their independence? 23 Immediately prior to the appointment of the inquiry into the Sveriges Riksbank Act in 2016, I gave a presentation which discussed these issues, among others. 24 The discussion started from Figure 6, which shows how the mandate of the central bank is related to the degree of independence. As I mentioned earlier, one motive for making central banks independent was the desire to attain low and stable inflation. In this way, independence was linked to a clear and limited mandate. The broader the mandate a central bank has, the greater the number of general policy issues that tend to crop up on the agenda, which could be a reason to limit central bank independence. Although my focus today is on monetary policy, I would like to take up an interesting question that Andy Haldane at the Bank of England has brought up. 25 The Bank of England has been given a very broad mandate through its responsibility for both microprudential supervision and macroprudential policy.
Page 1  Some lessons from the Crypto Winter − speech by Sir Jon Cunliffe Given at British High Commission, Singapore  Page 2  Published on 12 July 2022  Jon Cunliffe sets out what he thinks are the lessons from the recent instability and losses in crypto markets – also called the ‘crypto winter’. He discusses how: • technology cannot remove all financial risks • regulators should continue and speed up their work • future regulation should be designed on the principle of ‘same risk, same regulation’ • appropriate regulation will support innovation  Speech In recent months we have seen a dramatic bout of instability and losses in crypto markets – dubbed by some commentators as the ‘crypto-winter’. A widespread collapse of crypto-asset valuations has cascaded through the crypto ecosystem and generated a number of high-profile firm failures. The totemic indicator of the crypto winter is that Bitcoin, the signature crypto asset, has lost 70% of its value since November. Regulators, of course, have not been slow to comment. And, true to type, I want today to pull out four lessons I think we can draw from this episode: Technology does not change the underlying risks in economics and finance; Regulators should continue and accelerate their work to put in place effective regulation of the use of crypto technologies in finance; This regulation should be constructed on the iron principle of ‘same risk, same regulatory outcome’ ; Crypto – technologies offer the prospect of substantive innovation and improvement in finance.

History is littered with examples of similar speculative assets that have made a very large amount of money for those that got out in time -- and that have cost those who did not an equally large amount. Technology does not make assets with no intrinsic value a safe or a one-way bet. A second example is the need for a commonly accepted settlement asset or means of transaction – aka “money” – to have a stable value under stress. If confidence breaks down in the “money“ used as a means of transaction, stress can be transmitted extremely quickly through any system using that form of money. The settlement asset used in the majority of crypto transactions is a so called ‘stablecoin’, digitally native crypto-assets that purport to peg their value to a fiat currency, almost always the US dollar. They are used to buy and sell crypto assets on platforms as they avoid the costly ‘off-ramps’ and ‘on- ramps’ from fiat to crypto, can be integrated into smart contract protocols and can be held as a store of value within the crypto eco-system. The purported peg can be effected in a variety of way – by backing with real economy assets, by backing with crypto assets or by an algorithm intended to guarantee stable value. Last year, 75% of all trades on crypto-asset trading platforms involved a stablecoin[2]. They are integral to the functioning of crypto-markets. In recent months we have seen two of the three largest stablecoins break away from their dollar pegs.
In the current phase of gradual economic recovery not only are restrictions still in force in some areas of activity, but also, as we are seeing, it is proving necessary to reintroduce others as a consequence of the fresh outbreaks of the disease. It therefore seems appropriate to maintain support measures of this kind, to prevent the temporary suspension of activity from turning into a permanent loss of productive capacity. The damage caused by their premature withdrawal would exceed the possible cost of maintaining them until the recovery shows signs of sufficient strength. However, given the significant heterogeneity of the effects of this crisis, in particular in this recovery phase, support measures should be much more focused now and their timing adjusted to the duration of the crisis. At the same time, there are already signs that the pandemic may give rise to certain structural changes, although the full extent of these is, for the time being, difficult to know. On one hand, the pandemic has led to significant changes both in the behaviour of economic agents and in the extent of teleworking and, generally, in the application of new technologies in different areas. These changes, in so far as they are confirmed to be structural, will give rise to changes in consumption and production patterns which it will be necessary to adapt to. Likewise, this crisis has revealed certain vulnerabilities associated with, for example, the global fragmentation of production, which had remained relatively unnoticed in recent years.

Jean-Pierre Roth: The Swiss economy and financial centre – successes and new challenges Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at the Handelskammer Schweiz-Österreich und Liechtenstein (Foreign Trade Chamber for Switzerland-Austria and Liechtenstein), Vienna, 25 February 2008. The complete speech can be found in German on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  Mid-2003 saw the start of a remarkable, broad-based economic upswing in Switzerland which is still underway, even if business cycle uncertainty has increased in the recent period. A number of factors indicate that the long-term growth outlook, too, has improved for Switzerland. These factors include the increasing globalisation of our economy and the opening up of the labour market to the EU. The Swiss economy is participating in globalisation through increased direct investment as well as growing foreign trade. At the same time, there is more competition on the domestic goods market, although a fair bit still remains to be done in this area to complement the opening up of the labour market to the EU. Globalisation and market opening present companies and economic policymakers with challenges that become particularly acute when setbacks occur – as in the case of the current international financial market turbulence.
But his view, which I share, is that there would be a “a strong, though not irrebuttable, presumption of denial [of a merger or acquisition] by any firm that falls in the higher end of the list of global systemically important banks…”5,6 Another step for dealing with the firms that might be viewed by some as already TBTF is to understand better the interconnections and pathways through which the distress or failure of one firm impairs the larger system and causes harm to society. We have made progress through the supervisory process in mapping out critical activities performed by firms. Also, we have identified a number of areas, such as collateral management, where better practices could both improve the safety and soundness of the individual firm and reduce the negative externalities generated by a firm’s failure. Work is also underway to evaluate what changes would be required to make the future bankruptcy of large complex firms less disruptive, while also developing an alternative means for the orderly resolution of such firms outside the normal bankruptcy process. The costs to society of large complex financial firms failing can be reduced at least to some degree by having firms, working in conjunction with their regulators, “pre-plan” their own failure through the so-called “living will” process. The largest and most systemically important  5  See Governor Daniel K. Tarullo, “Financial Stability Regulation”, October 10, 2012.

At this Summit, MAS issued a consolidated set of guidelines to provide greater clarity and certainty on how our banking regulations apply to Islamic banking. Islamic finance was also featured when the Paris EUROPLACE International Financial Forum was held in Singapore in October. We will continue to work with fellow regulators and the private sector to fine-tune our regulatory approach and to develop the infrastructure and talent to facilitate the growth of Islamic Finance in Singapore. 17. As I mentioned earlier, bringing leaders in finance and business together to understand the developments in each region provides a valuable platform for collaboration. I am therefore pleased that MEGA Events has decided to bring the first Annual WIBC Asian Summit (Asia WIBC 2010) to Singapore. Islamic finance will provide an increasingly important bridge in the growing connectivity between the Middle East and Asia. Singapore is pleased to help catalyse deeper relations between these two high-growth regions. Asia WIBC will provide a unique platform for industry players from more established centres of Islamic finance to share their experiences. I look forward to welcoming all of you to the inaugural Asia WIBC in Singapore next June. Conclusion 18. In conclusion, the global economy is recovering gradually, though there remain many risks ahead. Emerging economies are expected to grow well, but we need to tackle the many structural challenges. Governments need to undertake structural reforms. The financial sector needs to facilitate the flow of funds into growth areas, and Islamic Finance will play an important role.