samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
This figure could be a lot higher if we take into account the mode of payment used by customers to pay agents, which based on anecdotal evidence, are primarily in cash and cheque. On this front, agents should work hand-inhand with insurance companies to encourage and incentivise their customers to adopt epayments. Besides enhancing the customer experience, higher adoption of e-payments could also boost the agents’ efficiency and productivity. In this regard, time and effort saved from less handling of cash and cheques can be directed to more productive tasks such as to increase sales, even by usage of WhatsApp. Second, increasing your digital accessibility to prospective clients. For a long as I am aware, the agency force has always dominated the insurance distribution 2/4  BIS central bankers' speeches  channel. In 2017, there was a total of over 56,000 agents constituting a market share of approximately 63%. Irrespective of whether in general or life insurance, the agency force has traditionally been the physical point of contact and engagements with clients. But, with the Internet and improved access amongst a growing number of the Malaysian population, online insurance solutions will not only become more viable, but also easier to adopt. In this, the agency force cannot afford to stagnate. Other industries with heavily digitalised services, like the air travel, hospitality and retail sectors, have elevated the digital literacy of the Malaysian population and improved their appetite for efficient delivery and transparent pricing of services.

4  UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2019 International Energy Association (IEA) Global Energy Review 2020 IPCC Global Warming of 1.5°C Special Report 7 UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2019 5 6  3  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/speeches  3  Let me be clear, change needs to happen in the real economy. Consumers, governments, corporates all need to act. But, if the real economy does not make that change and we head down a path of increasing climate instability or disorderly transition, the financial sector will bear that risk. It is, in my view, self-evident that the financial system cannot diversify its way out of this risk. As the pandemic has revealed, the interconnections between the real economy and the financial system run deep. And just like Covid-19, climate change is a far-reaching, system-wide risk that affects the whole economy, from which the financial system is not immune. For the same reason, while individual investors can divest, the financial system as a whole cannot. Indeed, seemingly rational individual actions that delay the transition make our collective future problems much bigger. Given the scale of change required, we will simply not be able to divest our way to net-zero. Rather if financial risk is to be reduced, then the underlying climate risks in the real economy must be managed. And fixing this collective action problem is a shared responsibility across financial institutions and regulators. We need to work together to solve it.
1  BIS Review 7/2000  Chart 1: The payment pyramid  The payment pyramid  inte rba nk s y ste m  S e ttle m e n t b an k  C le arin g h o u s e  Ban k  B an k  P a y er  pa ym e nt se rv ice s sy st em (re tail)  P a y ee  This is where the large, time-critical payments occur and obviously where the system risk is greatest. Disruptions in this segment of the payment system can lead to severe consequences, partly through the banks’ exposure to each other and partly through the banks’ processing of payments to and from their customers – i.e. retail payments. At Norges Bank, we have come to focus more on risk in the retail payment system, not least because many small transactions can amount to a fairly large sum, but also because it typically takes some time before final settlement between banks occurs. Internationally, more attention has been paid to risk in retail systems. Moreover, if such systems combine pure retail payments and large payments - as is the case in Norway - it is recommended internationally that the risk-reduction measures be as strict for these systems as for systems for large-value transfers. We have also seen that part of the credit risk between banks arises in connection with (the legal basis related to) the various payment services.

It is under such circumstances that output and employment have tended to suffer severely, leading to actual deflation. That, of course, is what prompted the Swedish political system’s resolute intervention at the time of the bank crisis here about a decade ago. It was a matter, not of protecting the banks as such or their owners from losses, but of safeguarding the banks’ central function in our economy. Maintaining a modern market economy would be virtually impossible/ without an efficient credit supply and payment system. In the present context it is positive that the banking sector is functioning well even though stock markets around the world have fallen steeply in recent years. There are also many signs that the banking sector has learnt a good deal from the financial problems in the last few decades. As regards general economic policy, we know that focusing on low and stable inflation creates a better and securer environment for economic policy decisions on the whole. A credible long-term commitment to low inflation does away with some of the uncertainty about future income streams,  BIS Review 50/2002  3  which are what ultimately determine the fundamental value of various kinds of asset. Such a commitment should also provide better conditions for financial decisions. But there is more to it than that. As representatives of the Austrian School pointed out, business cycles are not exactly alike.
I said that we more often heard the opposite concern from EU officials in the context of Brexit – that having escaped the “shackles” of EU regulation we would embark on a course of weakening financial regulation in a way that makes the financial system less resilient. This, needless to say, would be anathema to the Prudential Regulation Authority and to all of us who have spent the last decade repairing the financial system. So as far as the stringency of financial regulation goes, we at the Bank have a clear view of what would make sense for the UK in a post-Brexit environment: we should keep it calibrated roughly where it is now and have no desire whatsoever to weaken it. And despite inevitable tensions between regulator and regulated, my impression is that at the most senior levels most of the people running banks and insurance companies in the UK today would agree with that position, and that it also has support in the Government and Parliament. We need to keep pace with new developments and continually patch any weak parts of the regulatory system, but overall following 10 years of wrenching reform we should let the new architecture do its job. But what about the style of regulation in a post-Brexit world? Now I am always reluctant to talk about style, for good reason: my oldest child told me the other day how much she admires the persistence with which I prioritise comfort over fashion in my clothing choices.

But – thankfully for all of us – we live in a democracy, and so a system of independent regulation can only work if the regulators are properly accountable, in particular to Parliament. So much for principles. In practice, where might these lead to for a post-Brexit system of financial regulation in the UK? One possibility is: nowhere! This could arise in several ways, but one comes immediately to mind – a scenario in which our future relationship with the EU takes a form that means we stick with a system which looks exactly like what we have today. There is no reason to be very alarmed by this prospect – it is not ideal but we have largely shaped that system through our membership of the EU and we make it work well currently. However, this would be undesirable if it came with the prospect of becoming a rule-taker in financial services with all the risks – both prudential, and as a matter of industrial policy – that entails. 4  All speeches are available online at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/default.aspx  4  But let us toy briefly with the idea that the Government and Parliament decide to adopt a style of financial services regulation built on the six principles set out above, or something like them. What, in practice, would this style look like? To step back one pace, you can consider the style of different bits of financial regulation in the UK as being at different points along a spectrum1.
This doubling in China’s share in the world’s external trade will be complemented by an opening to the world of large sectors of the economy that have hitherto been closed to external investors: the telecommunications, financial services and distribution industries, for example, and a variety of technical and professional services. These are all areas with enormous potential in China. They have already, over the past decade, seen dramatic change and expansion through the - still raging revolution in information technology. WTO entry will give them a further boost by breaking down restrictive barriers and opening the channels for direct investment and technology transfer from outside. Increased foreign competition in these areas will force Chinese enterprises to speed up their reforms to meet the challenges. From a larger and longer perspective, further economic liberalisation and integration into the global economy will undoubtedly be a stimulus to regulatory, institutional and cultural change within China: I note that this is an important theme in today’s conference, although it seems to be a matter of some considerable debate what path, or paths, that change will follow. The general view, nevertheless, is that WTO entry will mean growth, integration and globalisation for the mainland’s economy. 1  BIS Review 68/2000  The implications for Hong Kong The view on the implications for Hong Kong are, on the other hand, somewhat divided.

Bank of Japan balance sheet data: end-year. Japan GDP: annual data (nominal). Between 1914–51 National Income is used as a proxy for Japan’s GDP. The National Income data point for 1945 is unavailable and estimated by the average of the 1944 and 1946 data points. BIS Review 21/2010  Source: Bank of England. (a) Wider measure of UK broad money is M4 plus: resident foreign currency deposits; cross-border sterling and foreign currency deposits by non-banks; and local government deposits. 13  Chart 14: World money growth(a)  Chart 15: Lending to UK PNFCs by domestic and foreign lenders(a)(b)  Percentage changes on a year earlier 12 Broad money (a)  Foreign resident foreign-ow ned banks (b) UK resident foreign-ow ned banks UK-ow ned banks and building societies Total  10  £ 70 60 50  8  40 30  6  20  Wider measure of broad money (b)  4  10  2  -10  0 -20 0  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  Sources: Bank of England, Bank of Japan, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and ECB. (a) Global broad money comprises: UK (M4), US (M2), euro area (M3) and Japan (M2). (b) Wider measure of global broad money also includes (if not already in the standard measure): resident foreign currency deposits; cross-border local and foreign currency deposits by non-banks; and local government deposits.
The Asset Management unit then implements this strategy, monitored by the Risk Management unit. Risk Management is also tasked with reporting regularly to the Governing Board and the Bank  2  BIS central bankers’ speeches  Council, which oversees the entire process. This multiplicity of players involved in foreign exchange reserve management, as well as the division of responsibilities, enable conflicts of interest to be reduced as far as possible, and allow effective control of the actual management of reserves. How do these guidelines translate into foreign exchange reserve allocation in practice? Last week, we published the data on the allocation of our foreign exchange reserves for the third quarter of 2012. I would like to take you through those data, and highlight the main areas which may have given rise to discussion. This is the breakdown of foreign exchange reserves by currency (cf. slide 3). As you can see, the euro is our principal investment currency, and its share in our investments has remained largely unchanged for the past number of years. If we take quarterly data as a basis, we can see that this share has fluctuated between 45% and 65%. These fluctuations come about because of the time it takes us to reallocate our portfolio following large inflows of new foreign exchange reserves. These amounts are then gradually diversified across other currencies in order to restore the original allocation.

The main principles of foreign exchange reserve management at the SNB Currently, the management of foreign exchange reserves is enshrined in the National Bank Act (arts. 5, 30, 42 and 46), and defined in detail in the internal instructions drawn up in 2004 and revised in 2008. These instructions are available on our website. Contrary to received wisdom, the SNB is as transparent as possible about the principles surrounding the management of its foreign exchange reserves. Thus, in contrast to other central banks, it publishes quarterly data on its foreign exchange reserves, broken down according to currency and asset class. The basic principles of foreign exchange reserve management are very clear; let me just quickly run through them. First principle: Primacy of monetary policy over foreign exchange reserve management. Concretely, changes in foreign exchange reserves result from monetary policy decisions. The level of these reserves is a variable upon which reserve management policy has no influence. Once this framework has been established, the management of foreign exchange reserves takes place independently from monetary policy. However, the SNB does need to make sure that its investments do not give rise to any conflict of interest with the objectives of monetary policy, or indeed of the SNB as regards financial stability. So, for example, we do not invest in Swiss financials, so as to avoid a conflict between the management of foreign exchange reserves and the SNB’s mandate to contribute to financial stability in Switzerland. As a general rule, the SNB does not invest in Swiss corporate equities.
The New York Fed is the managing member of Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III, and, as set forth above, has control rights over the RMBS and CDOs that were acquired by these LLCs. BlackRock Financial Management Inc., an investment manager, has been retained to serve as the New York Fed’s agent in managing the RMBS and the CDOs. The management objective for both is maximization of long-term cash flows to pay the New York Fed’s Senior Loans to the LLCs (subject to certain fees, costs, and reserves that are senior to the Senior Loans), and refraining from investment actions that would disturb general financial market conditions. Distribution of all cash flows realized by the Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III occurs on a monthly basis. Cash proceeds from the assets may be invested solely in U.S. Treasury or agency securities that have a remaining maturity of one year or less, U.S. 2a-7 government money market  2  In April 2009, Treasury restructured this investment and provided an additional preferred stock facility of $ billion, of which only $ billion has been drawn. BIS Review 73/2010  5  funds, reverse repurchase agreements collateralized by U.S. Treasury and agency securities, and dollar denominated deposits. However, in the case of Maiden Lane III, a broader range of assets may be acquired as part of a portfolio liquidation of one or more CDOs held in the Maiden Lane III portfolio.

Combining macroprudential measures with inflation-targeting is one area that flexibility can be added. The Bank of Thailand is one central bank that has pursued this line of flexibility since 2004. Another approach is to have greater flexibility in the setting of the inflation targets, in terms of the choice between core and headline inflation, as well as the level of the inflation targets itself, so that monetary policy will have greater room to maneuver in responding to shocks. If done carefully, the room for flexibility can be added without undermining the credibility of the inflation-targeting framework. But whatever flexibility we add, it is most important that the long-term objective of monetary policy in sustaining a low and stable inflation environment and in anchoring inflation expectations over the cycle is maintained and not compromised. BIS Review 8/2010  3
xi Alan Krueger documented that countries with greater inequality at one point in time also tend to experience less earnings mobility across generations, and labelled this the “Great Gatsby Curve”. See Krueger, A. (2012), “The rise and consequences of inequality”, speech at the Center for American Progress, January. See also Corak, M (2013), “Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3). In addition, across a wide span of countries and time, Gregory Clark has found a striking uniformity in rates of social mobility. See Clark, G. (2014), The Son Also Rises, Princeton University PRess. xii All of this matters. As formal studies of people’s happiness find, subjective well-being is significantly affected by perceptions of inequality and the sense of community. Moreover, psychologists have shown that the quest for higher wealth only provides short-term satisfaction and draws people into a pattern of consumption that never satiates. Individuals who put a higher premium on income have been shown to have lower subjective well-being and to be more prone to mental illness. And research suggests that only those in the bottom quintile of the wealth distribution are notably happier when their wealth increases. Even that effect only holds for the time it takes for people to adjust their expectations to their new circumstances. At the same time, those in the lowest quintile of wealth are found to be significantly more likely to report psychological distress compared to those in the highest quintile.

*** Speaking hard truths is part of how central banks can reinforce the foundations of more inclusive growth. The paradox is that one of our jobs is to reduce uncertainty by identifying risks. This requires coming straight with the public as the Bank of England did around the EU referendum. And it requires being clear about what we cannot do. Long-run prosperity is not in the gift of central bankers. It depends on a much wider set of initiatives of our elected representatives, and ultimately, on the actions of the private sector. (b) Monetary Policy, Distribution and Equity The second way central banks can promote inclusive growth is as part of a balanced mix of monetary, fiscal and structural policies. Globally, this balance has been absent since the crisis, with disproportionate weight falling on monetary policy. What has that meant for growth and inequality? Before answering, it is important to recognise two facts. First, by law, monetary policy must target the national rate of consumer price inflation, while taking into account as a secondary consideration its impact on other important macroeconomic variables, such as growth, employment and financial stability. Monetary policy cannot target a particular region, industry or segment of the population. Second, all monetary policy has distributional effects, but it is rightly the role of elected governments to take measures to offset them if they so choose. In that context, has monetary policy worsened income distributions, made savers poorer, inflated asset prices, or exacerbated wealth inequalities?
There are many signs that the Central Bank's interest rate rises are producing results in the form of less activity in the areas of the economy which are most sensitive to interest rates. Had the Central Bank not reacted in this way, it is quite certain that overheating of the economy would have produced a much higher rate of inflation than Iceland has known in recent years, with corresponding consequences for the economy. The Central Bank's tight monetary stance has been quite widely discussed in Iceland. Questions raised have included its impact on the current account deficit and whether monetary policy was actually achieving its set aims, given unrestricted access to foreign capital and the insensitivity of households and businesses to interest rate changes. The Central Bank has made special studies of the impact that interest rate rises have on the real exchange rate and current account deficit. Research suggests that, since 1996, the tighter monetary stance has led to a 2-3.5% appreciation of the real exchange rate. At the same, the real exchange rate appreciated by 10.5%. Studies also indicate that this appreciation in the real exchange rate caused the current account deficit to widen by 0.5-2% of GDP, but that it will shrink again in the course of time. Bearing in mind that last year's current account deficit was equivalent to 10% of GDP, rises in interest rates have clearly not had much impact on it. A wide range of other obvious factors are at work there.

In weighing up this decision, interest rate reductions among some of Iceland's trading countries in recent months have also been taken into account. Exchange rate To reiterate, the main objective of monetary policy is price stability. Since the exchange rate is an important determinant of prices, exchange rate stability has been an intermediate objective of monetary policy. During the first four months of last year the króna appreciated somewhat, but this trend was reversed in the middle of June and the currency was under pressure for most of the time until the end of the year. It depreciated by almost 9% from the end of 1999 to the end of 2000. To some extent the depreciation was triggered by fishing quota cutbacks and the resulting deterioration in the economic outlook. Demand for foreign exchange also outstripped supply because of last year's current account deficit, which is estimated at ISK 68.9 billion, as well as heavy investment by Icelanders in foreign securities amounting to almost ISK 40 billion net. Pension funds play the leading role in these investments. By the end of 2000, the real exchange rate of the króna had fallen below its average for the past twenty years. Actions in the foreign exchange market Under the prevailing circumstances, the Central Bank considered it necessary to take action to counter the depreciation of the króna. Besides raising its interest rates, the Bank intervened in foreign exchange markets thirteen times after the middle of 2000 in order to cushion against sharp fluctuations.