samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Economic activity is therefore expected to remain sluggish and uneven in 2010, with GDP expanding by less than 1.0% in both the euro area and the United Kingdom. 4 Mirroring these expected trends abroad, the Central Bank of Malta’s projections point to a modest GDP growth rate of around 1.0% in 2010. Net exports are likely to contribute negatively to growth, so that the main growth impulse is expected to come from domestic demand, driven by higher investment outlays on infrastructure projects and, to a lesser extent, by a moderate expansion in private consumption. Labour market conditions are unlikely to improve this year, with the unemployment rate remaining above 7%. This subdued growth outlook, together with the expectation that inflation will remain more elevated than in the euro area, will exert downward pressure on disposable income. Overall, therefore, the economic environment facing small businesses in the foreseeable future, both domestically and in our main trading partners, will be less favourable than that which prevailed before the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. 4  2  European Commission Interim Forecasts, February 2010. BIS Review 50/2010  Small businesses access to finance Since SMEs and micro enterprises are typically more dependent on bank financing than larger firms, the ongoing deleveraging of bank balance sheets in many EU countries represents a potential threat. The prospect of a prolonged period of restricted access to both working and investment capital at a time of subdued demand could result in the closure of many enterprises.

3 Economic activity in both the euro area and the United Kingdom, Malta’s largest trading  1  Eurostat Statistics in Focus 31/2008. 2  Financial Times “The cogs are clogged ”, 16 February 2010. 3  IMF Update of World Economic Outlook, January 2010. BIS Review 50/2010  1  partners, declined by 4.1% and 4.9%, respectively. This contraction had inevitable consequences for labour markets, with unemployment increasing to levels not seen in decades. The combination of lower tax revenues and higher outlays arising from the operation of automatic stabilizers and fiscal stimulus programmes took their toll on public finances, with deficits in a number of countries rising close to, or even exceeding, double digit levels. The growth rate of these economies over the coming years will be constrained by the inevitable fiscal consolidation required to bring deficit and debt ratios back to sustainable levels. These recessionary headwinds inevitably took their toll on Malta’s open economy. The impact, however, proved less severe than might have been expected. The economy came out of the recession in the fourth quarter of 2009, after contracting for three consecutive quarters. On a seasonally adjusted basis, the peak-to-trough drop in GDP was around 3.0%, compared to 4.7% in the euro area. The relative resilience of the Maltese economy is attributable to four factors. First, membership of the euro area has enhanced its capacity to withstand external shocks.
In 2010 Norges Bank had to maintain high liquidity in the banking system to keep short-term money market rates close to the key policy rate. To dampen demand for central bank liquidity and promote increased activity in the money market, Norges Bank’s Executive Board approved changes in the system for managing liquidity in the banking system in December 2010. Under the new regulation, only a certain amount of banks’ deposits – a quota – will bear interest at the key policy rate. Deposits in excess of this quota will bear a lower interest rate. This will give banks a stronger financial incentive to redistribute liquidity among themselves, making the Norwegian money market function more effectively. The new system is expected to take effect from 3 October of this year. 3. From financial crisis to debt crisis  Chart: General government gross debt The experience of recent years has shown the costs of financial instability in many countries. Global economic growth has recovered, but the effects of the financial crisis are still visible and will be so for some time ahead. Financial crises tend to be followed by debt crises. Fiscal policy was used actively in most countries to dampen the effects of the financial crisis. The mistakes of the 1930s were not to be repeated. But as a result, weak public balances became even weaker. On top of this, some countries provided substantial government funding to banks. Government debt quickly mounted.

Anita Angelovska-Bezoska: Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries Speech by Ms Anita Angelovska-Bezoska, Governor of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, at the Ministerial Dialogue on the Economic Reform Programmes of the Candidate Countries, Brussels, 25 May 2018. * * * Dear Ministers, Dear representatives of the European Commission, European Central Bank and Eurostat, It is my great pleasure to join you on the regular Ministerial Dialogue. At the beginning, let me express our gratitude to the ECB, European Commission and Eurostat for their assessment of our Economic Reform Programme that outlines the ongoing, as well as forthcoming mediumterm reform priorities aimed at more competitive, flexible and resilient economy. Herewith, we appreciate the positive assessment of the monetary policy as well as the recommendation to continue “to conduct monetary policy consistent with the exchange rate peg, using available scope within this framework in line with safeguarding price stability” which is completely in line with central bank views on monetary policy strategic framework. In light of today’s thematic discussion on fiscal sectors reforms, we would like to express our support for the Ministry of Finance’s reforms oriented towards strengthening Public Finance Management system that besides improving the effectiveness of the use of public resources, will also foster the ongoing fiscal consolidation process.
The hard-earned lesson for the authorities as well as for market players - not least the executive managements of financial institutions - has been that, to make them functional, statistical measurements require additional techniques. An important component for risk assessment is provided by analysing sensitivity, using what are often referred to as stress tests. This involves assessing the consequences that a more dramatic course of events would have for a particular exposure. Instead of considering the scenarios that are most probable, these tests refer to the worst possible cases. The information is very valuable for those who ultimately have to decide about the risks that are to be taken. The work of the authorities Developments in the financial system obviously affect the work of the authorities that are responsible for the system’s stability. This applies to rules as well as supervision. Financial legislation and regulation need to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the rapid pace of developments in the financial sector. It tends to take considerably longer to amend rules than it does to create new financial products. But there has to be a foundation of minimum requirements for such matters as capital bases and risk management. In addition, the authorities must be increasingly involved in ensuring that institutions themselves possess a basic competence in and understanding of the risks that have to be managed, as well as adequate systems for their management, rather than issuing detailed risk management instructions.

4  BIS Review 124/2007
In other words, effective stress testing must be viewed not only as a tool for monitoring the risks a firm has taken, but for actually influencing and changing behavior. Supervisors should focus on concentrations of exposure to a range of different risk factors, not just on the concern of the particular moment or the most recent sources of shocks. Just as generals are often accused of preparing to fight the last war, practice tends to chase measures of direct exposure implicated in past crises, or what seem like the plausible candidates for future crises, whether to real estate, to hedge funds, to structured financial products, to emerging markets or to a particular industry. 6  BIS Review 85/2006  This may be necessary and desirable, but it is not the most challenging task in risk management, and we generally don’t put ourselves in the position of trying to substitute our judgment for the markets on what level of direct exposure to a particular company or industry is prudent relative to capital. The better approach is to look at what might happen to the firm’s losses in various alternative, more adverse states of the world, and then assess the direct and indirect effects of distress in different parts of the portfolio and the interactions among them. The major financial institutions, for example, typically take on very little direct current exposure to hedge funds as group. But, as you might expect, the scale of potential future exposure is more substantial.

The recognition of a market failure does not mean, of course, that policymakers have the capacity to design solutions that can effectively mitigate those failures without raising others problems. The fundamental challenge for policy is how to achieve the appropriate balance between efficiency and financial resilience. With too much government intervention, innovation is constrained and the system is stifled. With too little, the probability of systemic crisis may rise to levels that are unacceptably high. We judge the appropriate balance not against the standard of whether it reduces to zero the probability of a major financial crisis, the failure of a large individual financial institution or a major reduction in asset prices. That is not an appropriate objective of policy. Some vulnerability to crisis is a necessary and unavoidable feature of a dynamic and efficient financial system where asset prices need to be able to adjust to changes in fundamentals. The consequences of trying to induce regulated financial institutions to self-insure against all conceivable potential risks would do substantial damage to the level and efficiency of economic activity and cause the same risks to migrate to other institutions. This leaves policymakers with a set of normative questions, the answers to which must be based on knowledge about how markets work, as well as a substantial degree of judgment about what policy actions are likely to be both appropriate and effective. What level of exposure to very low probability, extreme adverse events should we be comfortable living with?
These developments, among others, have intensified the demand for electronic payment. As electronic payment facilitates the automation of payables and receivables, costs associated with paper and labour intensive processes, including potential errors in processing, would be sharply reduced or eliminated. Apart from lowering costs, electronic payment allows for better resource allocation, thus raising productivity and profitability of businesses. Electronic payment also improves cash flow forecasting, thereby resulting in more efficient liquidity management. Furthermore, customer service quality would also be enhanced with the provision of faster and more convenient means of payment. Businesses that respond to these opportunities and are effective in delivering their services will generate greater value for their customers and achieve competitiveness differentiation. The faster electronic payment displaces the use of cash, the less would be the need for the costly printing and supply of currency notes and coins. The same is also true for physical cheques. The strategic management of currency is an increasingly challenging task faced by most central banks. Apart from ensuring cost effective and high quality currency notes and coins, it also requires accurate forecasts of the demand for currency notes and coins, which varies seasonally and with economic activity. The higher acceptance of electronic payment not only improves the economic efficiency of a country, but also allows substantial cost savings to be gained. Studies have shown that widespread utilisation of electronic payment systems has the potential of contributing to at least 1% of a country’s GDP annually.

BIS central bankers’ speeches  5
A balanced approach is needed. Just as market failures cause inefficiencies and instability, regulations too can be a two-edge sword, it could correct market failures and distortions, or it can be the cause itself if not well designed. The task of such design to avoid regulatory gap and arbitrage is all the more difficult, given the shifting financial landscape, shifting regulatory landscape as countries  BIS Review 146/2009  3  embark on their own reform agenda at different speed. This is why a forum such as the BIS is all the more critical. The key lesson that we should learn from this and past crises is that the financial system is always vulnerable to the unobserved and unmeasured. It is not that our tenet of risk-base supervision is flawed, but rather we overestimate our ability to understand and manage such risks. In response to the calls for strengthening of regulation, G20 leaders and finance ministers have committed to strengthening of regulation. The comprehensive regulatory reform package being proposed is aimed to address the key weaknesses such as excessive leverage, under capitalisation and underestimation of risk, weakness in standards of risk management for liquidity risk for complex products and markets, and macro-prudential measures.

I believe these are the key strategic policy agenda facing the leadership of banks and regulators alike, and I  BIS Review 146/2009  1  believe a forum such as SEANZA will become even more important going forward in tackling such challenges together. In this spirit, the key parts of my talk today will look at •  First, the key features of this new paradigm. •  Secondly, strategic agenda of emerging markets, such as Thailand in dealing with these challenges, that is, how to seek a balanced reform agenda. My core message today is that, with a growing role of emerging markets and their interdependence with major financial markets and economies, the agenda for global regulatory reforms should pay adequate attention to economic and financial context of emerging markets. Regulators in emerging markets, such as ourselves, therefore have been and will endeavour to take more proactive role in helping to shape such reform agenda, at key forums such as the BIS, and in regional groupings such as EMEAP, SEACEN, and SEANZA. In this regard, we welcome the BIS’ strengthened initiative in this direction, with greater representation of emerging markets in various working groups. Through such means, we look to putting increased emphasis on ensuring that the policy option and implementation process are strengthened and fit the local context, while adhering to best risk-based supervision principles. This will have implication not only for local banks, but also for global banks’ operations in emerging markets.
012234  56789 98 7  !"# # 3 ;796<967  3 Y6%&'#%: )' >%: #&'#6 6% --'&&:  922 2 68 2 2 68 2 8  2 2 27 2 2 8    5 85  217252 2 3285  9 3297  27 2 8  5385 953859  2 2 2 999 232852 22 2178 9 2 2  8252 9  9523 5 91 13 1645 23   1 1 416 5 91 "46 447 6 9 55 63   5 54 5 !

The relative importance of consumption in the economy has increased from 56% in 1998 to 61% of GDP in 2002. The savings rate has, nevertheless, remained high at 35% of GDP, having declined from a peak of 42.2% in 1998. While household consumption and private investment would continue to remain important in sustaining domestic demand and economic activity, this needs to be balanced against the need to save. While there is potential to increase consumption further, of importance is for households to improve the management and planning of their finances over the different stages of their lives. Indeed, financial planning is essential to sustain living standards and long-term financial security. With the rapid development of the financial system and the broader array of financial products and services available to consumers, there is an increasing need for Malaysians to make wise savings and investment decisions that will have lasting implications for their financial well-being. Such financial planning and management will determine the extent of consumption expenditure, the indebtedness and the savings that is possible at the respective stages of one's life. The strengthening of domestic demand in our economy has also been supported by increased lending by banks, including to households. For a number of advanced economies, this trend has become a source of concern. This is in view of their rising household debt that have exceeded prudent levels in the range of 80-100% of GDP. Household indebtedness in Malaysia has, however, remained within prudent levels at 60% of GDP.
In particular, I will focus on what has already been done in this area and on what remains to be done. I will start by underlining the importance, for the European financial integration, of the development of efficient and safe payment infrastructures. Then, I will assess progress made in this field since the launch of the euro. I should mention immediately that my assessment is mixed. On the one hand, I consider that the situation is favourable for large-value payment systems. On the other hand, I can’t yet make the same positive assessment concerning retail payment systems. As a consequence, I will end my presentation by elaborating on the further developments needed to strengthen the integration of retail payments. 1. Payment infrastructures are a necessary driver for financial integration  Payment infrastructures cover all procedures and systems used by financial intermediaries to exchange payment orders issued by economic agents. Accordingly, they play a fundamental role for the smooth functioning of the economy as a whole. Indeed, provided that they allow financial transfers to take place between economic agents in an efficient and safe way, payment infrastructures are a key support to one of the core functions of money, namely money as a means of exchange. In the EU, infrastructures processing payments in euro consist in a number of arrangements, which are of different nature. For example, the exchange of payment orders in euro between financial intermediaries can be handled within multilateral systems or within the framework of correspondent banking bilateral arrangements.

We would like to request your good office, “Your Worship” to issue mandatory directives to all business houses in the country to complete construction sites within a stipulated period and to ensure that all buildings are properly maintained and where necessary repainted on a regular basis. In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to commend the Bankers Association of Zambia and in particular the Project Committee for the effective and efficient manner in which this initiative has been implemented thus far. My hope is that the initiative will not only be confined to Cairo Road but to all areas of the country. Finally, I would like to urge all of us present here today to extend this initiative to our homes. Let us keep our homes, communities and the country clean as cleanliness is next to godliness. I thank you. 2  BIS Review 112/2009
First, in an open economy setting, higher interest rates will attract even more capital inflows to Singapore, especially given our strong macroeconomic fundamentals and persistently low foreign interest rates. This could fuel further asset price inflation. Second, the hike in interest rates would have to be very aggressive for it to dampen demand for credit, and tame asset prices. This would mean a sharp appreciation in the exchange rate, which would impose significant collateral damage on the broader economy. Indeed, some regional countries with interest rate regimes are facing the dilemma between raising rates to curb credit booms and preventing the spillovers on capital inflows and their exchange rates. On balance, a switch to a regime of managing interest rates will be highly destabilising. There are potentially unpredictable costs associated with a shift in the monetary policy regime, quite apart from its limited impact on the other broader and more predominant sources of underlying price pressures in the economy. MAS’ assessment has been corroborated by Professor Ilian Mihov, Professor of Economics at INSEAD. His pioneering academic work has demonstrated that for an open economy like Singapore, a monetary policy response based on the exchange rate delivers superior economic welfare outcomes compared to an interest rate regime. In particular, the exchange rate is better able than the interest rate to reduce volatility in output and inflation.

Jean-Pierre Roth: Recent Swiss experience in monetary policy strategy Summary of a speech by Mr Jean-Pierre Roth, Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements, at a seminar on monetary theory and policy, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, 28 November 2007. The complete speech can be found in French on the Swiss National Bank’s website (www.snb.ch). *  *  *  One continually recurring element in the history of the Swiss National Bank has been the application of a clear set of rules that we refer to nowadays as ′strategy′. The SNB′s monetary policy strategy consists of three elements: a definition of price stability, an inflation forecast and a fluctuation range assigned to a short-term interest rate. Experiences with this strategy since its introduction in the year 2000 – judged in terms of both price stability and cyclical developments in the economy – have demonstrated its value. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the strategy have been questioned by academics and by central bankers. These include inflation forecasting under the assumption of a fixed Libor, the choice of the reference interest rate, the role of monetary aggregates and exchange rates in the SNB′s models, and the decision not to publish the minutes of Governing Board meetings. However, these deliberately selected elements in fact serve to reinforce the legitimacy of the SNB′s strategy. BIS Review 139/2007  1