samchain/econo-pairs-v1 huggingface dataset:
Savers are afraid that Germany could at some point end up being liable for the collapse of, say, an Italian bank. What would you say to that? A European deposit guarantee scheme is not about paying for other countries. It does not mean permanent transfers and it does not mean new taxes. A European scheme would increase confidence in banks and help them to operate on a pan-European basis, supporting the Single Market and hence growth and jobs. At the same time, it is of course important to keep reducing risks in European banks, in particular when it comes to non-performing loans. Savers need to be patient. The ECB has decided that it won’t raise interest rates before the summer of 2019. Why can’t it happen sooner? The euro area economy is growing and unemployment has fallen significantly. Price pressures are gradually picking up. But this doesn’t happen in one day. Ample monetary stimulus will remain needed to support a sustained convergence of euro area inflation towards our aim of 2/3  BIS central bankers' speeches  below, but close to 2%. In other words: monetary normalisation has started, but it is a gradual one. We expect interest rates to stay at the current level at least through the summer of 2019. But we have already started to reduce our net asset purchases and anticipate to end them after the end of December. That is an important step towards normalisation. What role does Brexit play in your planning?

Benoît Cœuré: Interview in Der Tagesspiegel Interview with Mr Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, in Der Tagesspiegel, conducted by Ms Carla Neuhaus on 19 September 2018 and published on 1 October 2018. * * *  Mr Cœuré, the financial crisis erupted 10 years ago. Is the eurozone now better prepared for a crisis? As central bankers we always need to be prepared for the next crisis. It is our job to make the financial system as resilient as possible. And a lot has been done on that front. The financial system is now much safer than it was 10 years ago. We have better regulation and higher capital and liquidity buffers in banks. Good progress has been made, but we are not there yet. Why not? There are still parts of the financial system that are not nearly as well regulated as we would like them to be. I’m thinking of the shadow banking sector, for example, meaning financial institutions that conduct activities similar to those of banks but don’t have a banking licence. Regulators still don’t have proper instruments to adequately monitor and control risks in these institutions. It would be up to politicians to change that. But are they still ready to do so, 10 years after the start of the crisis? There is indeed a risk of complacency. After all, the economy is doing well, memories of the crisis are fading, and bankers have been trying again and again to soften regulation.
The inflation target for monetary policy, the fact that the Riksbank now has statutory independence and the fact that we now have sound public finances, a budget ceiling and balance targets for fiscal policy – all of this has contributed to much greater stability in the economy than we had in the 1970s and 1980s. The current regulations mean that economic policy as a whole can never seriously clash with the monetary policy target in the way it actually sometimes did during the period with a fixed exchange rate regime. Both public authorities and banks also learned a lot about financial stability during the crisis in the 1990s. The Riksbank now has an organisation that continuously analyses the stability of the financial system and maintains a preparedness to act in a potential crisis situation. This gives us the opportunity to detect and counteract at any early stage any changes and vulnerabilities that could lead to a serious crisis. It also makes it easier to manage the problems if a crisis were to occur. The experiences of both the Riksbank and others have definitely given us better resilience to the current global financial crisis than we would otherwise have had. There are several reasons why we now have greater credibility and better conditions to do our job efficiently. One is most probably that openness and clarity have long been, and still are, of central importance.

We have seen an unexpectedly rapid and broad weakening in economic activity and it is clear that this will continue to be weak in the coming period. Despite global and forceful measures to resolve the financial crisis and to alleviate its effects, it is still difficult and expensive to borrow, both for households and companies. The oil price and other commodity prices have continued to fall, which leads to lower cost pressures. Inflation will fall quickly and undershoot the target next year. We considered that a much lower repo rate was necessary to attain the inflation target a couple of years ahead and at the same time contribute to ensuring economic developments are not too weak. Another reason why such a large cut was necessary is that the interest rates paid by the general public recently as a result of the financial crisis have been higher than normal in relation to the level of the repo rate, which in itself has a constraining effect. The financial crisis makes demands on us to be flexible, to act quickly and forcefully. We have tried to work in this way so far, not least by means of new solutions and measures we would not normally use. The fact that we are giving the banks the possibility to borrow in Swedish krona from the Riksbank at longer maturities than normal and that we have supplied loans in US dollars are examples of this.
The main stylized facts revealed by this analysis (Table 3) of Chile’s labor force show an increase in the participation of women and a reduction in that of the youth, which is consistent with the increased coverage of college education for the new generations. Also, human capital has grown significantly, but lags behind developed countries in terms of coverage and especially quality. The return on the  7  working experience of Chilean workers is low by international standards, with marked differences across individuals with different levels of education. About the characteristics of the labor market, we observe that although informal work has decreased in Chile it is still high (around 30% of total employment), well above the standards of developed countries. At the same time, our labor market is very dynamic, with a high turnover relative to other countries and with a significant incidence of fixed-term jobs. Meanwhile, salaried employment is increasingly concentrated in big companies. Real wages have grown strongly for all income levels, but high dispersion persists. The wage differences are correlated with differences in the duration of employment (turnover). Finally, the aggregate unemployment rate shows a downward trend, partly due to the fall in the relative participation of younger workers, and the hours worked have fallen systematically during the last twenty years. Regarding female employment, the data confirm that women receive a lower pay for the work than men, even controlling for such characteristics like education, specific occupation and expertise.

It is possible for a month’s activity data to show a steep drop that does not necessarily respond to economic factors and that are later offset in subsequent months, without either being construed as a change in the mediumterm trajectory of the economy. On the domestic expenditure side, a development of the third quarter most worth noting was the strengthening of investment which made up for a mild slowdown in consumption. By investment components, special mention deserves gross formation of fixed capital in machinery and equipment, as its rates of change in annual terms have remained high throughout the year (Figure 3). Our 2018-2020 growth forecast Turning to our projections, after growing 2.8% in the third quarter, we estimate growth for the full year at 4%. This projection—which considers October data up to the statistical closing of the Monteray Policy Report—is in the lower bound of the range estimated in September (4%-4.5%), mainly due to the deterioration of mining activity. However, compared with what we foresaw before September, the growth in 2018 is in the upper bound of the range (Figure 4). For the next two years, we still estimate that the economy will grow around potential, gradually approaching trend growth. 2  Thus, the projection ranges considered in September are maintained: 3.25% to 4.25% in 2019; 2.75% to 3.75% in 2020. For spending, we anticipate a change in composition, to higher growth in investment and some slowdown in consumption.
But there has been increasing recognition, too, that the private sector has its role to play, alongside governments, and it was to encourage and promote the engagement of private sector firms with disadvantaged, excluded, sectors of our society, through charitable and community involvement, that the Heart of the City campaign was launched, very successfully under Andrew Buxton's leadership, last year. I'm encouraged, too, by the evidence of clear community of interest between the financial authorities and the private sector in its commercial activity. Their co-operation enabled the system to cope remarkably well with the potential dislocation following the 11th September attacks - and I congratulate the Federal Reserve in particular and all of you who played a part in that achievement. The same co-operation is contributing now to the international financial war against terrorism, and to the strengthening of our disaster contingency plans. It contributed, too, to the flawless introduction of Euro notes and coin into the Eurozone - so well managed by the ECB and in which many of you, again, played your part. Another example is the intensive consultation and co-operation on the development of the Basel 2 regime for banking supervision. I'm encouraged finally by the continuing sense of community among financial professionals here in London. This was movingly evident in their spontaneous demonstration of solidarity with their counterparts in New York following 11th September.

But there have been shafts of light amidst the general gloom - and I prefer to focus on those this evening. In terms of the global economy there are now tentative signs that the worst may soon be over, with the prospect of gradual recovery as we move through this year. That should provide some support for global equity markets. With inflationary pressures subdued, monetary policy generally can, for the time being at least, afford to remain reasonably supportive - though I make no predictions as to what that may mean for interest rates. And crucially, for all of us, the international financial system has so far and I recognise that problems are often slow to surface but it has so far - stood up well to the successive shocks. Much more broadly, I am encouraged that - as with the Asia crisis a few years ago - the recent pressures have not generally called into question the real benefits of the market economy, in terms of growth, and employment, and rising living standards, but have rather contributed to a growing recognition that those benefits can by-pass poor countries, and poor communities within countries, and that it is in our collective interest that those who are excluded, one way or another, should be helped to help themselves to participate in those benefits. In the context of globalisation, that was reflected in the Doha agreement on a new round of world trade negotiations; and development financing will be the theme of the Monterrey Summit next month.
A feature of the current stage of the development of the euro money market, which is particularly worthy of note, is that differences in overnight interest rate spreads mainly reflect differences in the credit standing of banks rather than that of the country in which the transaction takes place. 1  BIS Review 63/1999  These structural developments are, of course, positive. For the Eurosystem (i.e. the ECB and the national central banks of the 11 countries participating in the euro area) the existence of a deep and liquid money market enhances the efficiency of monetary policy operations. In this respect, I should like to draw your attention to the “market friendliness” of the framework applied by the Eurosystem to the conduct of monetary policy operations. By this I mean that the framework is based on tenders in which markets decide who receives the liquidity. The standing facilities are open and recourse to the marginal lending facility is not subject to scrutiny. In addition, the list of eligible collateral is extensive. Prospects for the development of financial markets in the euro area Looking now at the financial markets from a broader perspective, it is important to remember that the financial markets of the euro area began the process of integration before the start of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union. An indication of the pace of integration before January 1999 is provided in particular by the evolution of spreads between yields on the bonds issued by the various central governments of the euro area.

Replacing missing prices in this way is usually referred to as imputation. The total weight in the CPI for the products where prices are imputed in this way is not particularly large; it amounts to just under 3 per cent of the total weight of the CPI, see Figure 2. The percentage of imputed prices is at present much higher in other parts of Europe. Figure 2 shows the aggregate weight for the product groups where imputation has been necessary in total for the euro area and the larger euro-area countries. The statistics refer to the harmonised index for consumer prices, the HICP.3  2  See the press release and the material presented at an extraordinary meeting in the Consumer Price Index Board on 1 April. 3 The HICP was developed by Eurostat, which is the EU’s statistical body. The measure was designed to facilitate international comparisons of inflation. 3 [6]  Figure 2. Percentage of imputations in the HICP 4 Per cent  Source: Eurostat  What do the many imputations abroad entail for the quality of the statistics? The conclusion in a current working report written by two world-leading researchers in this field is that the principles recommended by international organisations lead to underestimation of the rate of inflation and overestimation of the real increase in consumption.5 However, this is probably no major problem for Sweden, as the percentage of prices imputed is relatively low. The problems could be much greater for other countries, and therefore for international comparisons.
By reducing the need for using the Hong Kong dollar as a vehicle currency for conducting non-domestic financial business, the US Dollar Clearing System will reduce the impact on local monetary conditions of movements in portfolio capital unrelated to economic developments intrinsic to Hong Kong. This is an excellent illustration of how a piece of robust and efficient financial infrastructure can be conducive to other important policy objectives, in this case monetary stability. Let me turn now to the mechanics of the system. The arrangement adopted here is a private sector solution, in which the Settlement Institution is a commercial bank. This is not only consistent with the tradition in Hong Kong, but is also in line with international practice and with the recommendations of the Bank for International Settlements. At the end of a rigorous selection process, a Selection Panel made up of disinterested members of the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee (EFAC) and senior executives from the HKMA recommended to EFAC that HSBC be appointed the Settlement Institution for a franchise period of five years. Under the arrangements agreed between the HKMA and HSBC, the Settlement Institution will in turn appoint Hong Kong Interbank Clearing Ltd, the current operator of the Hong Kong dollar payment system, to develop and operate the US dollar clearing system. The role of the HKMA will be to oversee the design and implementation of the system and to ensure that it meets the highest international standards. The conceptual design of the system is firmly in place.

The intention is that it should encompass not only the best, internationally agreed, principles of payment system design but also state-of-the-art technology. Leveraging on the technology used for the existing Hong Kong dollar RTGS system, this US Dollar Clearing System will offer a range of advanced and sophisticated clearing functions. These will include linkage with the Hong Kong dollar payment system to provide real time PvP settlement for US dollar-Hong Kong dollar transactions, as well as linkages with the stock and debt securities clearing houses to provide DvP settlement. For the general public, the System will enable banks to offer US dollar cheque deposit accounts, which means that US dollar payments can be discharged through the writing of a cheque in US dollars drawn upon a bank in Hong Kong. The various features of the system will be introduced in phases. All being well, we hope to see real-time interbank payments and PvP for US dollar-Hong Kong dollar foreign exchange transactions introduced by the third quarter of this year and US dollar paper cheque clearing and a linkage with the HKMA’s Central Moneymarkets Unit completed by the end of the year. People have asked whether we propose to introduce clearing in other foreign currencies once the US dollar system is established. In principle this would be possible. In practice there needs to be a business case. The HKMA is certainly ready to respond if there appears to be market demand for similar clearing systems for other major currencies.
BIS central bankers’ speeches  5  The National Institute of Economic Research’s Economic Tendency Surveys, which summarise companies’ and households’ views of the Swedish economy, rose in July, see Figure 11. This is the third month in a row that the indicator exceeds the historical average and thus points to a somewhat stronger growth than normal in the Swedish economy. Households’ confidence in the economy as a whole slowed down further in July, although the view of their own economy is still more positive than normal. Inflation expectations according to money market participants in Prospera’s survey 1, 2, and 5 years ahead have remained broadly unchanged during the summer. Long-run inflation expectations 5 years ahead remain at around 1.8 per cent. CPIF inflation was measured at 0.6 per cent in June and at 0.9 per cent in July, see Figure 12. The outcome in June was lower than our forecast. It is difficult to point to any individual component that contributed to the forecasting error – goods prices services prices and food prices all increased somewhat slower than expected. The outcome in July, on the other hand, was higher than our forecast. It was in particular the volatile air travel and package holidays that were higher than anticipated, although food and clothing prices were higher than expected. All in all, the outcomes over the summer have been in line with our forecasts.

Since China has been an important economic partner of Thailand and the region. To further strengthen these flows of trades and investments, close financial cooperation is the key. The Renminbi / Baht Bilateral Swap Agreement (or BSA in short) and the establishment of the Renminbi Clearing Bank here in Bangkok are the great examples. 6. The BSA is designed to be a backstop liquidity facility, which will help boost confidence of the private sector in using the local currency in trade and investment settlement. After the first signing of the BSA in 2010, the use of the Chinese Renminbi in trade and investment settlement between Thailand and China has grown remarkably. The share of trade settlement in Renminbi quadruples between 2010 and 2014. As for investment  BIS central bankers’ speeches  1  settlement, the share climbs up dramatically from a mere 1% in 2010 to 14% in 2014. In spite of the rapid increases, the volumes are still small compared to other major currencies. 7. The Renminbi Clearing bank is the next important step from the BSA. Its Renminbi settlement mechanism is the sequencing plan of the Renminbi scalability. I could see its merit which fundamentally paves the way for further Renminbi internationalization as well as the role of Renminbi in global financial markets that will become increasingly prominent in the near future. 8. There is, however, some room for improvement in order to realize the full economic benefits between Thailand and China.
Inflationary pressures mounted and, to make a long story short, the Central Bank raised its policy rate in successive steps up to the present level of 15.5%. Since 2001, the framework for monetary policy is an inflation targeting one, the target being a 2½% 12-month rise in the CPI. The regime was introduced under trying conditions and inflation rose rapidly immediately after its adoption but fell subsequently and was close to or below the target for about a year and a half before picking up in 2004. It has remained above target since 2004 and the most recent measure of the 12-month increase in the CPI was 8.7%. The reasons for inflation significantly exceeding the target are manifold. I have mentioned the shocks to the economy, the construction of aluminium and power plants, the radical change in the mortgage finance market, the reductions in direct and indirect taxes and ample and cheap foreign credit. Moreover, there was during this period a systematic failure to correctly assess in real time the underlying strength of the economy. This means, that when the Central Bank tightened policy in the early phase of the expansion, official statistics and indicators available at the time significantly underestimated the underlying strength of domestic demand. Thus, in retrospect, the Central Bank responded too slowly and modestly to the inflationary pressures that were building up. A second factor was that the transmission of monetary policy measures was insufficiently effective.

1  Daníel Svavarsson: International investment position: market valuation and the effects of external changes. Central Bank of Iceland: Monetary Bulletin 2008/1. BIS Review 52/2008  3  Focusing again on developments this year, the attention of the outside observer is easily arrested by the depreciation of the króna. I mentioned earlier that it was overvalued for a rather extended period to the extent that the Central Bank warned that it would at some stage have to depreciate. The depreciation came earlier and faster than we would have hoped, partly and perhaps most importantly because of the radical changes in global financial markets after the middle of last year and the associated reassessment of risk. These changes meant that the access of Icelandic banks to foreign financing was seriously curtailed. Additionally, questions were raised about the viability of the Icelandic economy in light of the large imbalances and all of this led to an erosion of confidence. Subsequently, the exchange rate depreciated significantly. By the end of March it had fallen to a historically low level in real terms, a level that was clearly below its long-term equilibrium value. The Central Bank responded to the developments in March by raising its policy rate by 125 basis points on Tuesday morning after Easter, followed by a further 50 basis points increase on April 10, bringing the policy rate to the 15.5% which I have already mentioned.